Opinion ID: 786207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Challenges to Felon-in-Possession Charge

Text: 26 In addition to the unanimity argument dealt with above, DeJohn makes two additional arguments attacking his felon-in-possession charge. He asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on this count and that he was entitled to an instruction on innocent possession of firearms. Both claims fail. 27 This court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Avery, 128 F.3d at 971 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under § 922(g). Both actual and constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 560 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 973, 124 S.Ct. 448, 157 L.Ed.2d 323 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The firearms were found in DeJohn's residence, which he shared only with his wife, and he knew precisely where they were when asked by a law-enforcement agent. There is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that DeJohn had constructive possession of the guns, even without disregarding the testimony he presented as to their ownership by third parties. See United States v. Clemis, 11 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1094, 114 S.Ct. 1858, 128 L.Ed.2d 481 (1994). 28 DeJohn next argues that the district court erred in not giving an innocent-possession instruction to the jury. Since he failed to object, this omission is reviewed for plain error. See Sims, 975 F.2d at 1240. Innocent possession is a very narrow defense to § 922(g), requiring the defendant to show that he or another was under an unlawful and imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, that he had not placed himself recklessly in that situation, that he had no reasonable alternative to violating the law, that a direct causal relationship existed between possessing the firearm and avoiding the threat, and that he did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than necessary. See United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1134-36 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472-73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 872, 111 S.Ct. 196, 112 L.Ed.2d 158 (1990). DeJohn has not alleged that any of these factors exists in this case in any of the evidence he has presented; the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on innocent possession.