Opinion ID: 2600024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Continuance of Sentencing for New Counsel

Text: ¶ 26 Aguirre next argues that the trial court violated his right to counsel by denying his request for an eight week continuance, thereby preventing him from being represented by his new preferred counsel at sentencing. ¶ 27 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Additionally, a criminal defendant who pays for his own attorney generally has a right to counsel of his choice. State v. Roth, 75 Wash.App. 808, 824, 881 P.2d 268 (1994). That said, `the right to retain counsel of one's own choice has limits.' Id. (quoting State v. Chase, 59 Wash.App. 501, 506, 799 P.2d 272 (1990)); see also State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 733, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (A defendant does not have an absolute, Sixth Amendment right to choose any particular advocate.). The right to choose one's counsel does not, for example, permit a defendant to unduly delay the proceedings. Roth, 75 Wash.App. at 824, 881 P.2d 268. Nor may a defendant insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford or who declines to represent him. State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471, 516, 14 P.3d 713 (2000). ¶ 28 Although the right to counsel is limited, a defendant may, under some circumstances, be unlawfully deprived of it by denial of a motion for continuance. Chase, 59 Wash.App. at 506, 799 P.2d 272. In considering such motions, the trial court must weigh the defendant's right to choose his counsel against the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. Roth, 75 Wash.App. at 824-25, 881 P.2d 268. The resolution of this balancing exercise falls squarely within the discretion of the trial court. State v. DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d 369, 376, 816 P.2d 1 (1991). ¶ 29 Aguirre argues that an eight week continuance would not have unduly delayed sentencing, noting that it was his first request for a continuance and that his new counsel needed more time to prepare. However, Aguirre and his trial counsel had already spent almost two months preparing for sentencing; the resulting work product presumably would have been available to his new counsel. Even more importantly, the victim had a constitutional right to be present at Aguirre's sentencing. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (codifying, pursuant to the victims' rights amendment, the right of felony victims to attend sentencing). She had flown across the country to exercise that right and likely would not have been able to repeat the trip in the future. VRP (Apr. 10, 2007) at 19-20. Given these facts, the trial court acted well within its discretion when it resolved the balance between the victim's rights, Aguirre's right to new counsel, and the public's interest in the timely administration of justice in favor of denying the requested continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals opinion rejecting Aguirre's claim that the trial court violated his right to counsel by denying his request for a lengthy continuance on the eve of sentencing.