Opinion ID: 4176095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury instruction on flight

Text: Petitioner’s first assignment of error is that the circuit court should not have given a flight instruction to the jury. Petitioner argues that the instruction was not warranted because the State introduced insufficient evidence that she fled. We have held that “[w]hether facts are sufficient to justify the delivery of a particular instruction is reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. In criminal cases where a conviction results, the evidence and any reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Syl. Pt. 12, State v. Derr, 192 W. Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994). Additionally, “[a]n instruction to the jury is proper if it is a correct statement of the law and if sufficient evidence has been offered at trial to support it.” Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Hall, 171 W. Va. 212, 298 S.E.2d 246 (1982). Our law governing the admission of flight evidence is well-settled. This Court has held as follows: In certain circumstances evidence of the flight of the defendant will be admissible in a criminal trial as evidence of the defendant’s guilty conscience or knowledge. Prior to admitting such evidence, however, the trial judge, upon request by either the State or the defendant, should hold an in camera hearing to determine whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs its possible prejudicial effect. Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Payne, 167 W. Va. 252, 280 S.E.2d 72 (1981). We further stated that [i]n considering whether the facts and circumstances of the case indicate a guilty conscience or knowledge, the trial judge should consider whether the defendant was aware of the charges pending against him at the time he fled; was aware that he was a suspect at the time he fled; or fled the scene of a crime under circumstances that would indicate a guilty conscience or knowledge; or otherwise fled under circumstances such that would indicate a desire to escape or avoid prosecution due to a guilty conscience or knowledge. Id. at 267, 280 S.E.2d at 81. In the present case, consistent with Payne, the circuit court held an in camera hearing regarding the flight evidence at issue. At the hearing, Mr. Swope testified consistent with his trial testimony that he and his wife encountered petitioner and the co-defendant stopped in the roadway; that petitioner stated she accidentally hit a person who was lying on the road; that he called 911 after petitioner claimed she did not have a cell phone; that petitioner claimed the victim was still alive in an attempt to make Mr. Swope approach her; that, when he refused to approach petitioner, she sped off; that petitioner returned shortly thereafter and stopped behind his vehicle; that petitioner sped off a second time; that he followed her, but ended the pursuit when his wife begged him to do so; and, that after ending his pursuit, he saw petitioner return to the location of the victim’s body. Petitioner did not testify at the in camera hearing. The circuit court found that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a flight instruction. In its final charge to the jury, the circuit court instructed the jury as follows: 4 Evidence of flight by the Defendant is competent, along with other facts and circumstances of the Defendant’s guilt, but the jury should consider any evidence of flight with caution since such evidence has only a slight tendency to prove guilt. The farther away the flight is from the time of the alleged commission of the offense the less weight it will be entitled to, and the circumstances should be cautiously considered since flight may be attributed to a number of reasons other than consciousness of guilt. Petitioner does not challenge the admission of Mr. Swope’s trial testimony, which mirrors his testimony at the in camera hearing. Instead, she contends that the evidence does not demonstrate that she fled the scene of a crime. Petitioner contends the instruction was not warranted because, each time she left the scene where she encountered Mr. Swope and where the victim’s body lay, she returned. However, we do not find that the circuit court abused its discretion in giving the instruction because the crucial and undisputed fact is that petitioner fled the location in the first place; it matters not to the analysis that she ultimately returned. As the circuit court properly noted, petitioner’s leaving of the scene “shows guilty conscience and knowledge that [she] had done something wrong,” i.e., she murdered her estranged husband. As the State argues, the murder and the concealment of the victim’s body are “inextricably connected to one another.” Therefore, because the record shows that petitioner left the scene in an effort to avoid capture, and that she returned to the scene to continue her efforts to conceal the body, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in giving a flight instruction to the jury.