Opinion ID: 2592762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: utah law has been interpreted as establishing a de facto presumption against the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification

Text: ¶ 8 When we decided State v. Long in 1986, it was already apparent that [a]lthough research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems. 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986). Thus we confronted a troubling quandary: while eyewitness identifications are frequently crucial to the State's case against a criminal defendant, the human ability to perceive and remember accurately is subject to numerous limitations. See id. at 488. In addition, it appears that jury members are frequently unaware of these limitations and thus give eyewitness identifications a disproportionate weight. Id. at 490. ¶ 9 In Long, we considered the appropriateness of jury instructions as a way of familiarizing the fact-finder with these issues. Id. at 492. There, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault based on an identification made by the victim, who had been wounded by a shotgun blast and acknowledged that his vision was glossy when he saw the shooter. Id. at 484. Counsel for the defendant requested a cautionary instruction regarding the accuracy of the identification, which the trial court declined to give. Id. at 487. ¶ 10 Prior to Long, the decision to issue a cautionary instruction regarding the infirmities of eyewitness testimony was left entirely to the trial court's discretion. State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1984); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1984). Although this court cautioned that refusing to provide a requested instruction could constitute an abuse of discretion, see e.g., Reedy, 681 P.2d at 1252-53, until Long we had never reversed a single conviction on the grounds of such a refusal. Long, 721 P.2d at 487. As a result, trial judges in Utah rarely used the instruction, even in cases where there was serious doubt as to the reliability of the identification. Id. We therefore faced a choice between abandoning any pretext of requiring a cautionary instruction or giving the requirement teeth. We chose the latter course, reversed Long's conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 495. In addition, we directed trial courts to provide instructions whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense. Id. at 492. ¶ 11 We also acknowledged that, because of doubts regarding its effectiveness in educating the jury, [a] cautionary instruction plainly is not a panacea. Id. at 492 n. 5. Despite that warning, Long left undisturbed previous holdings that discouraged the use of expert testimony as an alternative to jury instructions. These disincentives first appeared in State v. Griffin, which dismissed eyewitness expert testimony as a mere lecture that could invade the jury's role as sole evaluator of witness credibility. 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981); accord State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982). The Malmrose decision provoked a dissent by Justice Stewart, who argued that because the inherent dangers of good faith error in eyewitness identification are widely recognized, it was error for the trial judge to neither admit expert testimony nor issue a cautionary instruction. Id. at 62, 65-66 (Stewart, J., dissenting). These misgivings later became the core of the majority opinion in Long. ¶ 12 It was never the intent of this court to establish cautionary instructions as the sole means for educating juries about eyewitness fallibility. Indeed, we carefully acknowledged that [f]ull evaluation of the efficacy of cautionary instructions must await further experience. Long, 721 P.2d at 492, n. 5. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is clear that Long actually discouraged the inclusion of eyewitness expert testimony by failing to dispel earlier notions that such testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury about how they should perform their duties. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 61. As a result, trial judges reached two logical conclusions: (1) when in doubt, issuing cautionary instructions was a safe option; and (2) allowing expert testimony was hazardous if the expert lectured the jury about the credibility of a witness. ¶ 13 Subsequent decisions reinforced this bias. In State v. Hubbard, we held that the substance of expert testimony can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a jury instruction. 2002 UT 45, ¶ 17, 48 P.3d 953. Further, we affirmed trial court rulings that such evidence could cause confusion of the issues and could cause undue delay. State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶ 44, 27 P.3d 1133. Proponents of eyewitness expert testimony also found themselves in a dilemma regarding the specificity of the proffered testimony. On one hand, eyewitness expert testimony that was too specific was excluded as having a significant tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role as fact finder. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 20, 48 P.3d 953. If, on the other hand, the eyewitness expert only gave general testimony about memory phenomena, then it could be excluded because it did not deal with the specific facts from this case but rather would constitute a lecture to the jury about how it should judge the evidence. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶ 44, 27 P.3d 1133. In addition, we held that a Long instruction is enough to render an erroneous exclusion harmless, even if the instruction failed to mention significant portions of the proffered expert testimony. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 20, 48 P.3d 953. Finally, in a continuation of our history prior to Long, neither this court nor the court of appeals has ever reversed a conviction for failure to admit eyewitness expert testimony. Given this history, it is not surprising that there is a de facto presumption against eyewitness expert testimony in Utah's trial courts. ¶ 14 This trend, acknowledged by both parties, is troubling in light of strong empirical research suggesting that cautionary instructions are a poor substitute for expert testimony. We turn now to a review of that research.