Opinion ID: 2976265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: In denying Petitioners’ application for asylum, the BIA specifically confined its decision to the changed country conditions in Albania. Because the BIA did not summarily affirm the IJ’s decision, but added its own analysis, we review both the IJ’s decision and the BIA’s analysis to 4 determine whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion that because of the changed country conditions in Albania, Hyzoti does not have a well-founded fear of persecution.
The Attorney General has delegated authority to the BIA and to IJs to determine if an alien qualifies as a refugee. Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) & (b)). That determination requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the applicant qualifies as a refugee as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); and (2) if so, whether the applicant merits the BIA’s exercising discretion on his or her behalf. Id. (citing Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003)). A refugee is defined as “an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 558 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). As an applicant for asylum, Hyzoti must prove that he has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution should he return to Albania. Yu, 364 F.3d at 703; Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 1994). If he satisfies his burden of establishing past persecution, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he has a wellfounded fear of future persecution. See Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389. The government may overcome that presumption “by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that there is ‘a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality.’” Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)). In deciding to deny Petitioners’ application, the BIA stated: 5 [E]ven if we were to assume that the [Petitioners] provided credible testimony and have established past persecution, we find that there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances” such that [Petitioners] no longer have a well-founded fear of persecution, or that their life or freedom would be threatened in Albania. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A). Thus, in effect, the BIA simply assumed that Hyzoti suffered past persecution and afforded him the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. We will likewise assume that Hyzoti did suffer past persecution, and determine whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that changed country conditions in Albania rebut the presumption that Hyzoti has a well-founded fear of future persecution. “It is the purview of the BIA . . . to determine the current conditions prevailing in a particular country.” Weng v. Mukasey, No. 07-0866, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29635 at  (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2007) (unpublished) (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002)). Both the IJ and the BIA cited the United States Department of State’s Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions for Albania (March 2004), to establish the following facts: Albania’s human rights record has noticeably improved; individuals are able to exercise their political rights, generally free from violence and government interference; and recent elections were “the most transparent in Albania’s short democratic history, with no police interference.” Both the IJ and the BIA also cited the Department of State’s Albania: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (February 28, 2005), which states that “[u]nlike in previous years, physical violence was not used against journalists.” Although not conclusive, State Department reports “are generally the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.” Mullai, 385 F.3d at 639 (quoting Kokaj v. Ashcroft, 100 Fed. App’x 506, 508 (6th Cir. 2004)). In fact, “State Department reports on other countries are entitled to significant deference when assessing conditions there.” Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 6 487 (6th Cir. 2001). Moreover, we have determined that country conditions have changed in Albania and that political persecutions are no longer a significant problem. See Prifti v. Gonzales, No. 050918, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 25144 at -6 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2005) (unpublished) (“[D]espite the prevalence of crime and police corruption, ‘there is virtually no evidence that individuals are targeted for mistreatment on political grounds.’”); Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 288 (“There is documentation in the record that suggests that conditions in Albania have changed in recent years.”); see also Lumaj v. Ashcroft, 115 Fed. App’x 595, 598 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that, after the fall of the communist regime, there is little evidence of religious or political persecution in Albania.). Petitioners present virtually no facts or evidence to rebut the information in the State Department reports or to attack our precedents finding that country conditions have changed in Albania. Therefore, we find that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions that country conditions have changed in Albania such that Hyzoti does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioners do not qualify as refugees under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) and are not eligible for asylum.
An applicant seeking withholding of removal must satisfy a more stringent burden of proof than must an applicant for asylum. Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 391 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1987)). In order to qualify for withholding of removal, Hyzoti must establish that there is a clear probability that he would be subjected to persecution if he were to return to Albania. Id. (internal citations omitted); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1987). We have concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision that because of changed country 7 conditions in Albania, Petitioners are ineligible for asylum. Therefore, a fortiori, they “cannot satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of” removal. Id.
In order to establish entitlement for relief on his CAT claim, Hyzoti must prove “that it is more likely than not that [he] would be tortured if” removed to Albania. Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 404 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Pilica, 388 F.3d at 951 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2))). We have already decided that Hyzoti is not eligible for asylum because changed country conditions rebut the presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Petitioners have put nothing in the record to persuade us that — more likely than not — Hyzoti will be tortured upon returning to Albania. Consequently, Petitioners are not entitled to relief under the CAT.