Opinion ID: 55889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gharbi's Sixth Amendment Claim

Text: Gharbi contends the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel by denying Reynolds's request to associate Brittain. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. amend VI; United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). Part of this guarantee is a criminal defendant's right to retain the attorney of his choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). The right to counsel of choice, however, is not absolute. Rather, the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Thus, there is a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome by an actual conflict of interest, or by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. Id. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692. This is true even when a defendant expresses a desire to waive the potential conflict. Id.; United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 791 (5th Cir.1996). A valid waiver does not end the inquiry because the district court has an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692. If a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver. Id. at 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Because the likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, we afford the district court substantial latitude in refusing a waiver where a potential conflict may or may not develop into an actual conflict at trial. Id. at 162-63, 108 S.Ct. 1692. We will not reverse a district court's disqualification of counsel for conflict unless the defendant can show the district court abused its substantial discretion in this area. Sotelo, 97 F.3d at 791. Here we find no abuse of discretion. The district court began with the presumption that Gharbi was entitled to counsel of his choice. Nonetheless, the court found, for a number of reasons, that the presumption was overruled by an irreconcilable conflict of interest. The court noted that Maryam might well be called to testify against her father. If she were called, the court found it impossible to guess whether [Gharbi's combined] defense team would pull punches on cross-examination, thereby providing ineffective assistance to Gharbi. The district court also recognized the opposite risk, that Gharbi's counsel could attack Maryam Gharbi with great detail and thereby jeopardize her plea agreement. Compounding these difficulties was the close family relationship between Gharbi and his daughter, which the court found could create pressure either real or perceived on the direction of Maryam's testimony. These factors presented a serious potential for conflict that, in the district court's judgment, could not be resolved by Reynolds's proposed arrangements. In order to protect the rights of all parties and preserve the appearance of fairness, the district court held that Gharbi and Maryam needed separate and independent counsel. This decision was well within the bounds established by Wheat and is consistent with our precedent. In United States v. Izydore, this court affirmed that a court may deny a request to associate co-counsel based on the serious potential for a conflict of interest. 167 F.3d 213, 221 (5th Cir. 1999). Likewise, in United States v. Millsaps, we affirmed the district court's decision to disqualify a defense attorney who had previously served as counsel for a government witness, citing the potential for divided loyalties. 157 F.3d 989, 996 (5th Cir.1998). The authorities Gharbi cites are distinguishable, [1] and, in any event, show only that other district courts might have reached differing or opposite conclusions if faced with somewhat similar facts. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692. This is insufficient to show an abuse of discretion.