Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel with Regard to Allocution

Text: Shelton argues that the Superior Court violated his right to a fair penalty hearing by prohibiting him from discussing the events of January 11 and 12, 1992 during allocution. According to Shelton, this limiting instruction had a chilling effect . . . and prevented him from fully expressing his feelings to the jury, including any statements regarding relevant matters such as the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and relative culpability, if any. [96] Shelton contends the court infringed upon his constitutional right to present mitigating evidence by limiting his right to speak freely in allocution. Namely, he argues that the limiting instruction violated his right to allocution under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32, as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. This issue was not presented to the trial court at the penalty hearing, no objection was raised at that time to the court's limiting instruction, no proffer was made of the substance of what Shelton would have said to the jury absent the limitation and no showing has been made that Shelton was prejudiced by the limitation. It is clear from the record of the penalty hearing and the trial court's findings on the postconviction proceedings that a fully-informed Shelton and his counsel acquiesced in the limitation. Indeed, the record unequivocally shows that it was part of Shelton's strategy at that time not to go into those events in his allocution to the jury. This issue was not raised on direct appeal. It arises for the first time in this postconviction proceeding under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Shelton now couches this argument in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the court's limitation on allocution and that appellate counsel likewise was ineffective in failing to raise the issue on appeal. We are not persuaded by Shelton's argument that counsel acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in failing to object to the court's limiting instruction. Shelton was not prejudiced by the limitation on allocution because, in any event, his strategy was consistent with the limitation  he did not want to present mitigating circumstances that involved going into the facts of the murder before the jury in the penalty phase. Thus, the trial judge's limitation was a moot point. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) and the particular circumstances under which the allocution issue arose in this case, Shelton has failed to show plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. [97]