Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Racist Statements

Text: Defendant argues that two statements made by Bennett in her testimony unduly prejudiced him. Bennett testified regarding conversations with defendant and Bryant in which they confessed to stabbing Eck. On direct examination, Bennett testified that defendant boasted, in reference to the Eck stabbing, that there was one less cracker that he would have to worry about. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to this comment as prejudicial. The court overruled the objection. On cross-examination, Bennett testified that Bryant told her that Eck had called him nigger while being stabbed. On redirect, Bennett testified that defendant and Bryant had killed Eck because they did not like white people. Defense counsel made no objection to this statement. In overruling defendant's objection to Bennett's first statement, the trial court held that the comment related to motive, was probative, and was not unduly inflammatory. See N.J.R.E. 403. Traditional rules of appellate review require substantial deference to a trial court's evidentiary rulings. See Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 505, 691 A. 2d 293; McDougald, supra, 120 N.J. at 577-78, 577 A. 2d 419; State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106, 449 A. 2d 1280 (1982). Defendant's statement suggests his knowledge that Eck would die from his wounds and tends to prove that defendant intended to kill Eck. Although the statement carried racist undertones, we cannot say that the trial court erred in ruling that the possibility of prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Carter, supra, 91 N.J. at 106, 449 A. 2d 1280 (The party seeking to preclude the admission of evidence must convince the court that the factors favoring exclusion substantially outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence.); Biunno, supra, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403. The mere possibility that evidence could be prejudicial does not justify its exclusion. State v. Bowens, 219 N.J. Super. 290, 296-97, 530 A. 2d 338 (App.Div. 1987) (Damaging evidence usually is very prejudicial but the question here is whether the risk of undue prejudice was too high.). We find that the trial court's decision to allow the statement in evidence was not a clear error of judgment and did not result in a manifest denial of justice. See Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 313, 548 A. 2d 939; Carter, supra, 91 N.J. at 106, 449 A. 2d 1280. Nor do we find plain error in the admission of Bennett's statement that defendant and Bryant said they killed Eck because they did not like white people. R. 2:10-2. The prosecutor elicited this testimony in response to other testimony elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination of Bennett suggesting that Eck called Bryant nigger while being stabbed. Defense counsel thus opened the door for the prosecutor's line of questioning. Moreover, the prosecutor never referred to Eck's or defendant's comments during either the guilt-phase or penalty-phase summation. In fact, the prosecutor, in his guilt-phase summation, specifically told the jury that the case was not about race, [but was] about taking a long, hard, dispassionate look at the evidence. Furthermore, evidence of defendant's negative opinions toward white people was placed before the jury by defense counsel in the penalty phase through the mitigation book, which contained three sections that discussed his animosity. In light of these factors, we find that the admission of Bennett's statements did not possess the clear capacity to produce an unjust result.