Opinion ID: 865310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether there was sufficient proof as to the

Text: REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES ¶36. On July 14, 2005, Judge Hines entered an Order on the issue of attorneys’ fees, which stated in its entirety: THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the issue of attorney fees. The Court has reviewed the attorney fees sought and finds that they meet the reasonableness requirement of the rules. The Court further finds that due to the complexity of the subject matter and the lengthy duration of the litigation that the employment of two (2) attorneys was justified. Accordingly the Court finds that the amount of attorney fees to be awarded in this cause shall be $240,980.40. Triconex argues that Judge Hines failed to make substantive findings of fact in accordance with the McKee factors established by this Court in McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764 (Miss 1982). Instead, Triconex argues, Judge Hines simply gave an impermissible “blanket endorsement” of Greenwood’s attorneys’ claimed fees and expenses, which this Court forbade in BellSouth v. Board of Supervisors, 912 So. 2d 436, 447 (Miss. 2005). The McKee factors are adopted from Rule 1.5(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, which states: A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor 23 required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the location for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Miss. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.5(a). ¶37. Triconex further argues that the Court of Appeals has held that an amount to compensate for one competent attorney is the criteria upon which an award should be made. Evans v. Evans, 912 So. 2d 184 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). ¶38. Greenwood argues that it submitted itemized attorney records for time and expenses for the trial court to consider. Furthermore, Greenwood cites Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-41 and argues that the trial judge makes the determination of reasonableness from experience and observation. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-41 (Rev. 2002) states: In any action in which a court is authorized to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, the court shall not require the party seeking such fees to put on proof as to the reasonableness of the amount sought, but shall make the award based on the information already before it and the court’s own opinion based on experience and observation; provided however, a party may, in its discretion, place before the court other evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount of the award, and the court may consider such evidence in making the award. Id. Greenwood further argues that McKee predates the passage of Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-41, and thus McKee is no longer applicable.8 Greenwood also argues that the McKee factors, 8 Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-41 was approved by the Legislature on March 13, 1990, while this Court decided McKee on July 28, 1982. 24 since they are adopted from Miss. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.5(a), should be applicable only to determine reasonableness in a dispute between an attorney and a client. However, we note that in BellSouth (a “business dispute”), even though this Court reversed the trial court’s findings on attorneys fees, we discussed and applied McKee and the Miss. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.5(a) factors. See BellSouth, 912 So. 2d at 445-48. ¶39. This Court stated in Mabus v. Mabus, 910 So. 2d 486, 489 (Miss. 2005) that, where a trial judge relies “on substantial credible evidence in the record regarding attorney’s fees,” the trial judge has not abused his discretion. It is clear from the language of the trial judge’s order that the judge did in fact apply the McKee factors even though he did not detail his reasoning. Thus, we find that Judge Hines did not abuse his discretion, and we deem it unnecessary to enter into a discussion of whether Section 9-1-41 supercedes McKee. ¶40. Further, this Court finds Evans wholly irrelevant even though, as this Court stated in Mabus, “the general rule is that appropriate attorney fees should be awarded in the amount to secure one competent attorney.” Mabus, 910 So. 2d at 490. Evans and Mabus are clearly distinguishable from this case as those cases concerned divorce, where the trial judge may take into account the parties’ ability to pay. This case involves a business dispute, where ability to pay is not a consideration. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding fees and expenses for two attorneys in this case, which contains complex legal issues and has been ongoing for more than a decade. Accordingly, we find that this issue is without merit. 25