Opinion ID: 750688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Jury Instructions.

Text: 14 The appellant next asserts that the district court erred in two related instances by refusing to incorporate specific language into its jury instructions. The appellant requested that, on the issue of Warren's control over the construction site, the judge (1) recount for the jury a detailed twelve-point checklist itemizing those elements that he contended various courts around the country have found to support a finding of control; and (2) tell the jury that, if it concluded that Warren had retained control over the job site, then Warren had a nondelegable duty to furnish Allegheny's employees with a safe and suitable workplace. The district court declined to give either instruction in haec verba, but instead advised the jury: 15 A contract between an owner and an independent contractor allocating responsibility between themselves for maintaining safe premises ... does not relieve the owner of liability to invitees for injuries sustained as a result of any dangerous conditions known or discoverable by the owner of the property. 16 The defendant in this case contracted with Rust Engineering to construct its No. 3 paper machine building. This fact does not absolve the defendant for injuries sustained by its invitees on its premises while the construction project was in progress if the defendant retained control of any part of the work. One who entrusts work to a contractor, but retains control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others that is caused by his failure or its failure to exercise control with reasonable care. If you find that the defendant retained control of the construction site, then it is the duty of the defendant to furnish the employees of plaintiff's employer with a safe and suitable site. 17 We reject the appellant's claims of error on both procedural and substantive grounds. From a procedural standpoint, the appellant did not object in the prescribed manner and at the appointed time either to the district court's refusal to give his requested instructions or to the charge actually given. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. 3 Although he did make a general reference to what we discussed earlier today--presumably referring to a chambers conference--when the district court called counsel to sidebar near the end of the charge, we have held with echolalic regularity that strict compliance with Rule 51 is mandatory and that a failure of compliance will not be excused merely because the defaulting party brought the same matter to the trial judge's attention more specifically at some other time. See, e.g., Poulin v. Greer, 18 F.3d 979, 982 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 160-61 (1st Cir.1993); McGrath v. Spirito, 733 F.2d 967, 968-69 (1st Cir.1984). As these cases illustrate, an objection raised emphatically in chambers before delivery of the charge does not, without more, preserve for review issues relating to the charge. 18 To be sure, even a forfeited error is amenable to plain-error review. See Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 809 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 100 (1st Cir.1987). But that step is unnecessary where, as here, no substantive error occurred. See United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.1997). Leaving aside the procedural default, the standard of review is familiar: 19 The trial court's refusal to give a particular instruction constitutes reversible error only if the requested instruction was (1) correct as a matter of substantive law, (2) not substantially incorporated into the charge as rendered, and (3) integral to an important point in the case. 20 United States v. DeStefano, 59 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1995). 21 The appellant easily satisfies the third prong of this test. After all, the intertwined issues of Warren's control over the premises and the duty it owed to Elliott while he was working at the construction site are integral to the appellant's theory of the case. See Hanson v. Madison Paper Co., 564 A.2d 1178, 1179 (Me.1989) (discussing a property owner's duty under Maine law to make business premises safe for invitees); Baker v. Mid Maine Med. Ctr., 499 A.2d 464, 467 (Me.1985) (similar). Even if we assume, however, that the first prong of the test also was satisfied, 4 the appellant nonetheless stumbles over the second prong. 22 A trial court is obliged to inform the jury about the applicable law, but, within wide limits, the method and manner in which the judge carries out this obligation is left to his or her discretion. Consequently, though both sides have a perfect right--indeed, a duty--to advise the judge what type of instructions they believe are fitting, neither is entitled to dictate the turn of phrase the judge should use to acquaint lay jurors with the applicable law. See United States v. McGill, 953 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1992) (warning that no litigant has a license to put words in the judge's mouth). So long as the charge sufficiently conveys the [party's] theory, it need not parrot the exact language that the [party] prefers. Id. 23 When, as now, a disappointed suitor asks an appellate court to scrutinize a trial judge's word choices, the central inquiry reduces to whether, taking the charge as a whole, the instructions adequately illuminate the law applicable to the controlling issues in the case without unduly complicating matters or misleading the jury. DeStefano, 59 F.3d at 3 (citations omitted). In this instance, we answer that inquiry affirmatively. Although the district court declined either to define legal concepts with great exactitude or to adopt the appellant's suggested twelve-point checklist, its charge made clear that Warren owed Elliott a duty of care if, and to the extent that, Warren retained control over any part of the workplace. No more was exigible. See, e.g., Kelliher v. General Transp. Servs., Inc., 29 F.3d 750, 753 (1st Cir.1994) (explaining that further instructions are unnecessary when the judge had already sufficiently covered the same ground); United States v. De La Cruz, 902 F.2d 121, 122-23 (1st Cir.1990) (discussing a trial court's discretion in establishing an appropriate level of generality in jury instructions). By like token, even though the court refrained from using the term nondelegable, as the appellant obviously would have preferred, it adequately instructed the jurors anent Warren's independent duty of care. 24 Of course, a trial judge's discretion in framing the issues for the jury is not unbridled, and an arbitrary refusal to amplify a hard-to-grasp concept might well invite reproof. Here, however, the district court had plausible reasons for refusing to augment its instructions. For example, Judge Brody saw the proffered checklist as a source of potential confusion and thus determined that, rather than run this risk, it would be preferable to present a more general statement of the law. This sort of judgment call is uniquely within the trial judge's discretion, and we are reluctant to second-guess it. Similarly, Judge Brody eschewed the term nondelegable because he reasonably feared such an allusion might mislead jurors into thinking that strict liability applied or that Warren was liable vicariously for the independent negligence of Allegheny. This decision, too, was well within the realm of his discretion. See Kelliher, 29 F.3d at 752 (explicating the trial judge's role in determining whether proposed jury instructions tend to confuse or mislead the jury on the controlling issues); Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 353 (1st Cir.1989) (same). 25 The appellant makes a last-ditch argument that the jurors' submission of a mid-deliberation question proved the need for additional clarification on the nondelegability of Warren's duty. 5 We do not agree. The judge's original instructions accurately envisioned that the jury would wrestle with the issue of Warren's independent duty of care to invitees on its premises during the currency of the construction project. Rather than elaborate on these initial, entirely correct instructions (which, along with the rest of the charge, had been typed and furnished for use in the jury room during deliberations), Judge Brody elected to refer the jury to the original formulation. As a general rule, the necessity for giving a supplementary instruction to the jury is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. See United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605, 611-12 (7th Cir.1977) (explaining that a judge, in responding to a jury request for reinstruction, may either supplement or simply reaffirm the original instruction). Of course, the situation would be different if the jurors' question clearly indicated confusion with respect to an important legal concept, see, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946), but that is not this case. Here, given the particular question and the clarity of the original charge, we descry no valid basis for questioning the judge's decision to abjure a supplementary instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 104 F.3d 1465, 1473-74 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Smith, 104 F.3d 145, 148-49 (8th Cir.1997). 26 We have said enough on this score. The challenged instructions accurately stated the law, sufficiently informed the jury of the appellant's theory of the case, and worked no unfair prejudice to either party. As long as a jury charge satisfies these criteria, the court's choice of language is largely a matter of discretion. DeStefano, 59 F.3d at 2. So it is here. 27