Opinion ID: 2057254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Judge's Explanation of Standard of Proof

Text: North Western argues that the trial judge improperly advised the jurors on the standard of proof applicable in civil actions in Illinois. Illustrating the difference in proof required in civil and criminal proceedings, the judge explained that the plaintiff in a civil action will prevail if his evidence is ever so slightly stronger than that of the defendant. North Western argues that the trial judge's statement was a violation of the stricture in our Rule 234 prohibiting questions during voir dire that directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions. 107 Ill.2d. R. 234. The remarks complained of occurred during the voir dire of the first panel of prospective jurors. Responding to a question from the court regarding previous jury experience, a venireman said that he had once been summoned for jury duty at one of the criminal facilities in Cook County but had not sat on a jury during the prior service. The trial judge took that opportunity to explain the difference in the standards of proof governing civil and criminal proceedings. The judge stated: Okay. I'm glad you brought that up. I'm glad you brought that up about 26th and California, because I was meaning to explain the measure of proof or the burden of proof, because we're going to be talking about that; and I'm glad you brought that up. Now, 26th and California is one of our facilities in the Circuit Court of Cook County which devotes itself to the trial of criminal cases. Okay. In criminal cases, I could tell you, that the measure of proof is, quote, `beyond a reasonable doubt,' unquote. That is not the measure of proof in this case. I want you to put the concept of beyond a reasonable doubt out of your mind. It has no place in this courtroom. This is a civil courtroom. The measure of proof in this courtroom is by, quote, `preponderance of the evidence,' end quote. Now, there'[ve] been many definitions of preponderance of the evidence. It means that a proposition, if it's more probably true than not, can be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. I'd like to give you an image. I use it because it's the best image I have ever thought of and I'm going to give it to you. Now, each of you, I think, can recall seeing the statue of justice or the image of the lady of justice. That lady who is    blindfolded, who holds the scales of justice; and if you will recall, those scales are absolutely equal as she holds them. That's the way we are now. Both sides absolutely equal. Okay. Preponderance of the evidence means that the plaintiff, the person who has the duty or burden of proof, must tilt that scale in favor of his clients, his clients; that is Daniel Schaffner's mother and father as co-guardians of the disabled person, Daniel Schaffner. If at the conclusion of the evidence the scales remain equal, the plaintiff loses. If the scales tilt in favor of the defendants, of course, the plaintiff loses. However, if the scales tilt in favor of the plaintiff ever so slightly, then the plaintiff wins. Clear? The panel of veniremen responded affirmatively to the court's question. The trial judge referred to his explanation on several later occasions while reminding the prospective jurors of the difference between civil and criminal standards of proof. At the next recess in the proceedings, counsel for North Western objected to the trial judge's statement regarding the plaintiff's burden of proof and moved for dismissal of the entire venire. The trial judge denied the motion. It appears that all the veniremen who were selected to serve as jurors in the case heard the judge's explanation, and we shall assume, for purposes of review here, that that is what happened. North Western argues that the court's statement to the venire, However, if the scales tilt in favor of the plaintiff ever so slightly, then the plaintiff wins, was a misleading description of the standard of proof in civil cases. North Western believes that the trial judge's reference to the slight tilting of the scales of evidence could only have served to minimize, in the minds of the jurors, the plaintiff's evidentiary burden. North Western correctly observes that this court has previously found error in the use of instructions advising the jury to find for the plaintiff if the evidence preponderates although but slightly in his favor. (See Wolczek v. Public Service Co. (1930), 342 Ill. 482, 495; Molloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co. (1929), 335 Ill. 164, 172; Teter v. Spooner (1922), 305 Ill. 198, 210-11.) North Western ignores, however, the trial judge's statement to the prospective jurors regarding the proper verdict if the evidence was evenly balanced. The judge explained, If at the conclusion of the evidence the scales remain equal, the plaintiff loses. When used as a jury instruction, the evenly balanced evidence description has been disapproved as favoring the defense. ( Goertz v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1958), 19 Ill. App.2d 261, 271.) Both types of instructions have been criticized not because they are inaccurate or untrue, but because they are argumentative and slanted. (See IPI Civil 2d No. 21.06, Comment, at 124-25.) Because the trial judge in the present case, in explaining to the prospective jurors the distinction between civil and criminal standards of proof, gave both an account that has been disapproved as favoring plaintiffs, and an account that has been disapproved as favoring defendants, we do not believe that the jurors would have construed the judge's remarks in a manner prejudicial to the defense in this case. Moreover, the jury was correctly instructed on the plaintiff's burden of proof, for it received an instruction in the form of IPI Civil 2d No. 21.01, on the meaning of burden of proof. At the conclusion of the evidence the trial judge instructed the jury, When I say that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof on any proposition or use the expression, quote, `if you find,' end quote, or, quote `if you decide,' end quote, I mean you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which the plaintiffs have the burden of proof is more probably true than not. Thus, unlike the juries in Wolczek, Molloy, and Teter, the jury in the present case began its deliberations only after having been correctly instructed on the plaintiff's burden of proof. Finally, we note that by agreement of the parties the verdict forms that were used in this case required that at least one of the defendants be found liable for the accident. Because North Western and Schwinn would have been equally disadvantaged by whatever error was produced by the trial judge's statements, we do not believe that North Western can now claim that it alone suffered prejudice in this regard. For these reasons, we conclude that any error in the trial judge's remarks was harmless. North Western makes the related argument that the trial judge's statements concerning the differences in proof required in criminal and civil proceedings was inconsistent with our Rule 234, concerning the voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Rule 234 provides, Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions. (107 Ill.2d R. 234.) North Western asserts that the trial judge's statements to the jurors regarding the differing standards of proof violated that provision. We do not interpret Rule 234 as narrowly as North Western does. The rule also provides, The court may acquaint prospective jurors with the general duties and responsibilities of jurors. (107 Ill.2d R. 234.) The trial judge's comments to the venire were intended to serve that purpose. As we have already indicated, any error arising from those comments was not prejudicial to North Western.