Opinion ID: 1119472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mrs. Moore's statement to Officer Daniels

Text: As previously indicated, Officer Daniels testified that, while waiting for the ambulance, Mrs. Moore stated that [h]e [(referring to Moore)] shot me, [h]e's a good man. I told him I was leaving him. He's distraught[,] and [k]eep him away from me... get him away from me. The jury was given a limiting instruction that Daniels's testimony regarding Mrs. Moore's statement is limited solely for the purposes of explaining and describing Lani Moore's then existing physical, mental, or emotional condition. Moore argues that the circuit court erroneously admitted the statements made by Mrs. Moore to Officer Daniels under HRE Rule 803(b)(3), which excepts from the hearsay rule statement[s] of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. Moore contends that, as statements of memory or belief, Mrs. Moore's statements were expressly excluded by the language of HRE Rule 803(b)(3). [19] However, we need not decide whether the statements were erroneously admitted under the 803(b)(3) exception because, despite the court's ruling, if there was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the circuit court was wrong in concluding that the statements were inadmissible under the excited utterance exception. The prosecution argued that Mrs. Moore's hearsay statements to Officer Daniels were admissible under both the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions. HRE Rule 803 (1993) provides in relevant part that: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness: ... (b) Other exceptions. (1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. (2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Rules 803(b)(1) and 803(b)(2) are identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rules 803(1) and 803(2), and codify part of the res gestae exception to hearsay recognized by the common law. See Commentary to HRE Rules 803(b)(1) and 803(b)(2). Although the two rules have some overlap, the Advisory Committee's Note to FRE Rules 803(1) and 803(2) explains the differing rationales and applications: The underlying theory of Exception (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.... The theory of Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication. 6 Wigmore § 1747. p. 135. Spontaneity is the key factor in each instance, though arrived at by somewhat different routes. . . . . With respect to the time element, Exception (1) recognizes that in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not possible, and hence a slight lapse is allowable. Under Exception (2) the standard of measurement is the duration of the state of excitement. Mrs. Moore's statements to Officer Daniels were not contemporaneous with the event she was describing and, thus, do not fall within the present sense impression exception. The statements, however, were admissible as excited utterances, if they were made under the stress of excitement. The assumption underlying [the excited utterance] exception is that a person under the sway of excitement precipitated by an external startling event will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication and that, consequently, any utterance will be spontaneous and trustworthy. 4 J.B. Weinstein & M.A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 803(2)[01], at 803-101 (1994). [L]ack of capacity to fabricate, rather than lack of time to fabricate is the justification for this rule. Id. at 803-105. The basis for the excited utterance exception,... is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (citations omitted). Three foundational requirements are imposed by HRE Rule 803(b)(2) and recognized by courts applying identical rules. The proponent of the statement must establish that: (1) a startling event or condition occurred; (2) the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; and (3) the statement relates to the startling event or condition. See, e.g., United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 452-53 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.1986); State v. Whalen, 520 N.W.2d 830, 831-32 (N.D.1994); State v. McLaughlin, 642 A.2d 173, 175 (Me.1994); see also 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 at 215-16 (4th ed. 1992); M.H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6753 at 571 (interim ed. 1992). In this case, the circuit court ruled that the first foundational requirement was not satisfied, that is, that there was a lack of foundation in establishing, initially, whether the event occurred. And then the chain of events, at that point in time, were not established. So, as such, the Court will sustain the objection. In this case, I do have a lack of foundation as to whether the events actually occurred. We disagree. Before the hearsay statements were offered, Officer Daniels had testified that on January 7, 1992, she and Officer Tong were preparing to depart from an alarm call when a white car pulled up with its horn honking and headlights flashing. Moore got out and approached Officer Tong, yelling something that Officer Daniels could not make out. After Officer Daniels approached the two men, [Moore] spoke with Officer Tong and myself and said someone had shot his wife. When Officer Daniels approached the white car, she saw Mrs. Moore in the passenger seat and a large hole in the windshield on the passenger side of the vehicle. Officer Daniels recounted that when she got closer, she observed that [t]here was blood on the front of [Mrs. Moore's] white-colored shirt from the upper chest area down to the waistline. The circuit court's ruling that this was insufficient to establish the foundational fact that a startling event or condition had occurred is inexplicable and wrong. Cf. State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 359-60, 845 P.2d 547, 555 (1993) (extrinsic evidence that declarant was crying and holding her face established existence of startling event). Officer Daniels's testimony regarding Moore's statement that someone shot my wife, and the fact that Mrs. Moore was bleeding extensively established, beyond dispute, a startling event or condition. There is also no question that Mrs. Moore's statements to Officer Daniels related to the startling event or condition. We therefore focus on the second and most crucial requirementwhether the statement was made under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event or condition. In all cases, the ultimate question is whether the statement was the result of reflective thought or whether it was rather a spontaneous reaction to the exciting event. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 at 218. The temporal relationship between the event and the statement is certainly a factor to consider when determining whether the declarant is still influenced by the stress of the event. Our recent case law, however, insofar as it suggests that the time interval between the event and the statement is a foundational precondition to admissibility, is inconsistent with the rule itself, earlier precedent, and the overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions considering the identical rule. It is therefore worth examining how our interpretation of the excited utterance exception has evolved to the point where, rather than looking to a short time interval between event and statement as an indicator that the declarant was still excited by the event, the ICA, in State v. Dunn, 8 Haw.App. 238, 246, 798 P.2d 908, 912 (1990), pointed to the fact that the declarant was crying and visibly upset to establish that the event had occurred only a short time before the statement was made. In Territory v. Kinoshita, 38 Haw. 335 (1949), the appellant asserted that the trial court erred in allowing a child's statements to her mother to be admitted as a spontaneous declaration because, inter alia, they were made as much as two and a half hours after the event. Notwithstanding that the time of the startling event had not been established at trial prior to the admission of the statement, the court held that the statements were admissible as spontaneous declarations, explaining that: the element relating to the time when such statements were made is but one of the factors entering into the determination as to whether declarations were spontaneous, natural, impulsive, instinctive, generated by an excited feeling which extends without let or breakdown from the moment of the event they illustrate. Id. at 342 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). In Territory v. Lewis, 39 Haw. 635 (1953), the court again explained the role of the time interval between the event and the spontaneous declaration where, again, the duration of time between the event and the statement was not established: ... We have examined a large number of authorities upon the abstract propositions involved in the rules on which testimony is received or not received as part of the res gestae. These authorities satisfy us that the close connection in time between the statements or declaration and the act of which it is said to be a part is an element for consideration; that being close in point of time is not, however, all of the basis for receiving such evidence, and that the ultimate test is spontaneity or instinctiveness and logical relation to the main event; that the tendency of the modern cases is to be liberal in the reception of such testimony. [quoting Solice v. State, 21 Ariz. 592, 193 Pac. 19, 20 (1920).] Fundamentally, the sound rule is that, in order for statements to be admitted as part of the res gestae, the statements must be reasonably contemporaneous with the event to which they relate, i.e., they must be such as to have been proximately caused by the exciting influence of the event without opportunity for deliberation or influence. ( Territory v. Kinoshita, 38 Haw. 335 (1949)). Id. at 640. The rule formulated in Lewis requires that the event and the statement be reasonably contemporaneous and defines that term not as a bright-line time limit, but in terms of the causative link between the event and the statement. In other words, the statement is reasonably contemporaneous with the event if it was a spontaneous reaction to the exciting event rather than by deliberation or other influence. This rule, however, has apparently been misunderstood. In State v. Messamore, 2 Haw.App. 643, 639 P.2d 413 (1982), the ICA quoted the Lewis rule as authority for the proposition that the authorities and the case law are concerned that the time span between the event and the making of the statement is shortvery short. Id. at 649, 639 P.2d at 418. This ill-supported observation was transformed into a foundational requirement for the applicability of the excited utterance exception in Shea v. City & County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499, 692 P.2d 1158 (1985), wherein this court stated: Because the `element that buttresses the reliability of [an `excited utterance'] is ... spontaneity[,]... the time span between the event and the making of the statement [must be] short very short.' Id. at 506, 692 P.2d at 1164 (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (quoting Messamore, 2 Haw.App. at 649, 639 P.2d at 418). The court, in In the Interest of John Doe, born on November 23, 1970, 70 Haw. 32, 761 P.2d 299 (1988), recited the original rule from Lewis, adding the Shea requirement, and stated: `To be admitted[, statements] must be reasonably contemporaneous with the event to which they relate, i.e., they must be such as to have been proximately caused by the exciting influence of the event without opportunity for deliberation or [other] influence.' Shea v. City & County, 67 Haw. 499, 506, 692 P.2d 1158, 1164 (1985) (quoting Territory v. Lewis, 39 Haw. 635, 640 (1953)) (citations omitted). Essentially, the time span between the event and the declaration must be short. State v. Messamore, 2 Haw.App. at 649, 639 P.2d at 418. Id. at 38-39, 761 P.2d at 303. Then, in State v. Beyer, 72 Haw. 469, 822 P.2d 519 (1991), the court relied on a commentator's interpretation of In the Interest of John Doe to establish the foundational requirements of the excited utterance exception: In A. Bowman, Hawaii Rules of Evidence Manual § 803-2B(2), at 341 (The Michie Co.1990), the author states, with respect to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule: Foundation requirements, according to the court in [ In the Interest of John Doe, 70 Haw. 32, 38, 761 P.2d 299, 303 (1988)], are (1) that the statement be reasonably contemporaneous with the event, (2) that the statement have been proximately caused by the excitement generated by the event; and (3) that the statement have been made without opportunity for deliberation or [other] influence. The court added: Essentially, the time span between the event and the declaration must be short. [Citation omitted.] Id. at 472, 822 P.2d at 521 (brackets in original). Most recently, in State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 845 P.2d 547 (1993), we stated that, [i]n evaluating whether a statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by an event, the time span must be very short. Id. at 358, 845 P.2d at 554 (citing Shea and Messamore ). The overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions holds that a short time interval between the startling event and the excited utterance is not an independent foundational requirement that must be satisfied to come within the excited utterance exception. See e.g., Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (time element important but not controlling; statement twenty minutes after event admissible); State v. Patino, 177 Wis.2d 348, 502 N.W.2d 601, 608 (App.1993) (time lapse measured by duration of excited condition rather than time lapse from event described; statement made one hour after event admissible); Ross v. State, 879 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex.App. 1994) (time between event and statement is not the critical factor, where declarant under stress of event thirty to forty-five minutes later; statement admissible); People v. Knade, 252 Ill.App.3d 682, 192 Ill.Dec. 212, 216, 625 N.E.2d 172, 176 (1993) (time factor is elusive and variable element dependent on facts of case; statement one hour after event admissible); United States v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir.1995) (time lapse not dispositive in application of [Federal Rules of Evidence] Rule 803(2); statement more than one-half hour after event admissible); Moore, 791 F.2d at 572 (lapse of time between statement and event not dispositive; statement admissible even where time element not established but where declarant very excited); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir.1991) (well established law in circuit that amount of time between event and statement is not dispositive; statement must be made contemporaneously with excitement, not contemporaneously with event; statement one to two hours after event admissible); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 85 (8th Cir.1980) (lapse of time between startling event and statement is relevant but not dispositive; statement made between forty-five minutes and one hour fifteen minutes after the event admissible); People in Interest of O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312, 318 (Colo.1982) (temporal interval not conclusive on question of admissibility; statement made by child almost twenty-four hours after event admissible). The elapsed time is certainly a relevant consideration in the determination; a statement made within minutes of a startling event can often fairly be characterized as the product of excitement rather than of deliberation. Because the converse is not necessarily true, however, most courts look at factors other than the mere passage of time to determine whether a statement was made while the declarant was still under the influence of the startling event. Among the factors frequently recited are the nature of the event, the age of the declarant, the mental and physical condition of the declarant, the influences of intervening occurrences, and the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 642 A.2d at 175; Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86; Rivera, 43 F.3d at 1296; People v. Fomond, 273 Ill. App.3d 1053, 210 Ill.Dec. 346, 351, 652 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (1995); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 at 219; Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, at 573. In light of the above discussion, we hold that a very short time interval between a startling event and an excited utterance, although a factor in the determination, is not a foundational prerequisite to the admissibility of the statement under HRE Rule 803(b)(2). Therefore, the fact that the time interval between the shooting and Mrs. Moore's statements to Officer Daniels was not established at the time the statements were offered is not dispositive of whether the statement was made while Mrs. Moore was still under the stress of excitement caused by the shooting. Consequently, we look to other factors, such as the nature of the event and the physical condition of Mrs. Moore. In Webb, the court considered statements made in the emergency room by a shooting victim between one and two hours after the shooting. Id. at 393-95. The court held that the statements were properly admitted where they followed an extremely violent experience, being shot six times, and the victim appeared to be in pain. Id. at 394 (citing Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1207 (1st Cir.1987) (`[t]he remark followed ... a shootinglikely to produce the utmost in excitement and shock ... ensur[ing] the utterance's spontaneity....')). Physical factors such as pain may serve to prolong the period in which the risk of fabrication is reduced to an acceptable minimum. Id. (quoting Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630, 636 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1008, 109 S.Ct. 1645, 104 L.Ed.2d 160 (1989)). In People v. House, 141 Ill.2d 323, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259 (1990), the court employed similar reasoning when considering the statement of a woman that had been given two and one-half hours after she had witnessed two murders and had herself been set ablaze, sustaining severe burns over forty percent of her body. Even though the only testimony as to her condition at the time of her hospital statement was ... that she appeared to be in pain, and even though ... she was alert and responsive, we believe it is inconceivable that [the declarant] spent the intervening time ... fabricating a story to tell police. The very nature of her injuries was such that the injuries undoubtedly commanded her full attention. Id. 152 Ill.Dec. at 599-600, 566 N.E.2d at 286-87; see also Ross, 879 S.W.2d at 249 (where victim had been shot in chest and hip four times, her statement thirty to forty-five minutes later was admissible because, [g]iven the severity of her injuries, we believe that [declarant] was dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, and pain of the event at the time she made both statements); Knade, 192 Ill.Dec. 212, 625 N.E.2d at 176 (We find it inconceivable that the victim, suffering from such serious injuries and associated blood loss, would concoct a fabrication during the span of approximately [one] hour such that the spontaneity of his statements would be destroyed.). Officer Daniels testified that Mrs. Moore was covered with blood from her upper chest to her waistline, was holding her hand flat to her chest, and was perspiring. Her voice was barely audible. It was later established that the shooting had occurred within the previous half hour, that Officer Daniels was the first person, other than Moore, to whom Mrs. Moore had spoken after the shooting, and that Mrs. Moore had a collapsed lung and had lost approximately fifty percent of her blood volume by the time she had arrived at the hospital a short time later. Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, particularly the violent nature of the startling event and the severity of her injuries, we conclude that Mrs. Moore's statements to Officer Daniels were made while Mrs. Moore was under the stress of excitement caused by the shooting and that the statements were not the product of reflective thought. Because the three foundational requirements of HRE 803(b)(2) were established, we hold that the statements were substantively admissible under the hearsay exception for excited utterances. The fact that the statements may have been erroneously admitted for a limited purpose was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.