Opinion ID: 2441435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: OCF v. Wasiak

Text: Initially, OCF again complains about the exclusion of Frank's testimony at trial. Here, OCF sought to read into evidence a transcript of Frank's former testimony with accompanying exhibits as its enough is enough evidence. In response to the plaintiffs' objection that OCF had not shown Frank's unavailability, OCF's attorneys argued that Frank, a California resident, was not subject to the trial court's subpoena power, and added that Frank was on a European vacation. We agree with the court of appeals when it held that the trial court properly excluded OCF's enough is enough evidence because OCF did not establish Frank's unavailability under Texas Rule of Evidence 804 for transcribed testimony from another proceeding. See TEX.R. EVID. 804; Hall v. White, 525 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex.1975); Cf. Tex.R. Evid. 801(e)(3)(about use of depositions from same proceeding); see also Evans, 774 S.W.2d at 658 n. 5. Also, for the reasons we explained in Malone, the trial court's error, if any, in excluding Frank's prior testimony was not harmful. After the trial, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on OCF's motion to set aside or reduce the punitive damage awards. At the posttrial hearing, the trial court heard OCF's evidence, including Frank's live testimony, about its financial condition, including evidence about previous asbestos-related punitive damage awards. That record also shows that, at the time, OCF had only paid $3 million in past punitive damage awards. And again, counsel for OCF conceded this fact at oral argument before this Court. OCF's posttrial evidence shows that it has not paid any punitive damages in Texas or Alabama. OCF first argues that the punitive damage award in this case is unconstitutionally excessive under BMW of North America v. Gore . [4] As a threshold matter, Wasiak argues that punitive damages are the functional equivalent of compensatory damages in wrongful death cases governed by Alabama law, and, consequently, this Court should not grant OCF constitutional immunity from punitive damages in such cases. While it is true that punitive damage awards in wrongful death cases are accorded special treatment under Alabama law, the damages recoverable are intended to serve a punitive purpose and are in no sense compensatory. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 Ala. 516, 38 So.2d 334, 336 (1949); see also Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134, 144 (Ala.1976) (Damages [in wrongful death cases] are to be awarded that will punish the tortfeasor for the act and deter him and others from similar future conduct.). Because punitive damage awards in Alabama wrongful death cases are meant to punish and deter, we conclude that the BMW constitutional analysis should apply in this case.
The Due Process Clause prohibits a State from imposing a `grossly excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor. BMW, 517 U.S. at 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589. BMW marks the first time that the Supreme Court found a punitive damages award so excessive that it violated a party's substantive due process rights. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Under BMW, even if an assessment of punitive damages is not deemed excessive under governing state law, it may violate a party's substantive due process right to protection from grossly excessive punitive damages awards. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 n. 12, 116 S.Ct. 2211 (1996)(noting that BMW provides an ultimate federal constitutional check for exorbitancy of punitive damages). Similarly, we have recognized that, like criminal punishment, punitive damages require appropriate substantive and procedural safeguards to minimize the risk of unjust punishment. See Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 16-17. BMW establishes three guideposts for determining whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between actual and punitive damages; and (3) a comparison of the punitive damages awarded and other civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for similar misconduct. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-21, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). We now apply these guideposts to determine whether the punitive damage judgment here is grossly excessive to the extent it violates OCF's substantive due process rights. In doing so, we are aware that whether the amount of punitive damages is excessive as a pure factual inquiry [5] is beyond this Court's jurisdiction. See Kraus, 616 S.W.2d at 910. However, this Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the courts of appeals properly review such factual inquiries. See Keever, 915 S.W.2d at 479; Kraus, 616 S.W.2d at 910. Moreover, this Court has jurisdiction to decide questions of law like the constitutional substantive due process claims presented here. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3; TEX. GOV'T CODE 22.001.
First, the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct is [p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damage award. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Conduct that endangers a person's health or safety merits more punishment than purely economic harm. BMW, 517 U.S. at 576, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 639 (10 th Cir.1996)(The appropriate penalty is no doubt below what would be justified if OXY's conduct caused loss of life, widespread health hazards, or major environmental injury.). Here, the evidence about OCF's conduct justifies punishment. In the early 1950's, OCF began distributing Kaylo. A few years later, OCF bought the Kaylo line and became both manufacturer and distributor. There is evidence that OCF knew about the dangers of asbestos even before it began selling or manufacturing Kaylo, but nevertheless consciously engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to warn Kaylo users of such dangers. Thus, there is evidence that OCF's conduct over the years displayed an indifference to or reckless disregard for the health and safety of others, including the plaintiffs here. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 576, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1374-76. Consequently, the trial court's judgment does not offend constitutional due process guarantees under BMW's first guidepost. Second, we must examine the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also Kraus, 616 S.W.2d at 910 (Exemplary damages must be reasonably proportioned to actual damages.). This is the second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award.... BMW, 517 U.S. at 580, 116 S.Ct. 1589. In BMW, the punitive damage award (even after reduction by the Alabama Supreme Court) was 500 times the amount of the actual damage award. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Alabama law does not authorize recovery of compensatory damages for wrongful death claims. See Cherokee Elec. Coop. v. Cochran, 706 So.2d 1188, 1193 (Ala.1997)(citing ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 and holding that Alabama law does not allow recovery of compensatory damages in wrongful death cases). However, Alabama law does permit a decedent's spouse to recover for the loss of consortium that the surviving spouse suffered between the decedent's injury and death. Zimmerman v. Lloyd Noland Found., 582 So.2d 548, 551 (Ala.1991). Alabama law also permits survival damages for the decedent's estate if the decedent had a suit pending at the time of death. See King v. National Spa and Pool Inst., 607 So.2d 1241, 1246 (Ala.1992). Here, the jury awarded compensatory damages to both decedents' (Wasiak and Barnes) spouses for loss of consortium and to the estates for their survival claims. [6] The jury also awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the personal injury plaintiffs (Brownlee and Wingate). The ratios between compensatory and punitive damages for each plaintiff under the jury's verdict were as follows: Plaintiff Compensatory award Punitive award Ratio (Including spouse's Loss of consortium) Wasiak $700,000 $2,000,000 2.85 to 1 Barnes 700,000 1,500,000 2 to 1 Brownlee 500,000 750,000 1.5 to 1 Wingate 125,000 100,000 .8 to 1 The trial court reduced the jury's punitive damage awards to the decedents' survivors because under Alabama law, in wrongful death cases (but not personal injury cases), the defendant is entitled to credit settlements from settling defendants against its liability for punitive damages. See Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Ala. 1988). The trial court also reduced all the compensatory awards to reflect the settlement credits. Under the trial court's judgment, the plaintiffs received about $1.6 million in total compensatory damages and about $3.7 million in total punitive damages, yielding a combined ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of slightly more than 2 to 1. The individual ratios under the judgment are: 2.85 to 1 for the Wasiak plaintiffs; 2.14 to 1 for the Barnes plaintiffs; 1.77 to 1 for the Brownlee plaintiffs; and 1.15 to 1 for the Wingate plaintiffs. Even though the constitutional due process line cannot be marked by a simple mathematical formula, BMW, 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589, we conclude that the ratios between compensatory and punitive damages in this case are well within constitutional limits. See also TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 462, 113 S.Ct. 2711 (indicating that a 10 to 1 ratio would not be unconstitutional); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (holding that ratio of 4 to 1 did not cross the line into constitutional impropriety). Third, comparing the punitive damage award with other civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct provides a final indicium of excessiveness. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589. However, unlike BMW, which involved deceptive trade practices and slight economic harm, the nature of this personal injury and wrongful death case does not lend itself to a comparison with statutory penalties. See Continental Trend Resources, Inc., 101 F.3d at 640-41 (holding that violation of common law tort duties are not comparable to statutory penalties). Importantly though, judicial decisions at the time of the misconduct are also relevant under BMW 's third prong to ascertain whether a defendant had notice that its misconduct could subject it to a large punitive damages award. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Continental Trend Resources, Inc., 101 F.3d at 641. Thus, the question under BMW is whether OCF had reasonable notice that its failure to provide warnings about the dangers of Kaylo could result in substantial punishment in the form of punitive damages. See Continental Trend Resources, 101 F.3d at 641 (applying BMW guideposts on remand after BMW decision). Although the notice analysis is difficult to apply because OCF's misconduct during the 1950's and 1960's occurred before product liability law was mature and before punitive damages as a remedy in product cases was fully assimilated into our jurisprudence, the law has recognized for decades that a supplier has a duty to adequately warn of its product's hidden dangers. See Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 264-67 (1969); see also Owen I, supra, at 1258; Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Chic. L.Rev. 1, 2-3 (1982)(Owen III). Indeed, the original Restatement articulated a supplier's duty to warn about a product's dangers. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 388 (1934). The evidence here shows that OCF knew about the dangers of asbestos even before it began selling or manufacturing Kaylo. Moreover, reported cases involving damages caused by defective products gave a manufacturer like OCF notice that its misconducthere OCF's manufacture of asbestos-containing Kaylo for about 14 years and the distribution of it for almost 20 years without warning of Kaylo's dangerscould subject it to punitive damages. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937)(affirming punitive damage award for sale of adulterated motor oil); Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Murphy, 2 Ala. App. 588, 56 So. 817 (1911)(upholding punitive damage award for faulty wiring on street car); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 (1967)(upholding $250,000 punitive damage award for drug manufacturer's failure to warn consumers about known hazards of its product); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969)(affirming punitive damage award against auto dealer for misrepresentations about auto); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill.App.2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), affd., 46 Ill.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970)(affirming punitive damage award against manufacturer because it did not warn consumers of known risk of explosion of can of Drano drain-cleaner); see also Owen I, supra, at 1269 (discussing Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 219 (1852)(involving the sale of an adulterated drug where court upheld punitive damage award)); Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 Ala. L.Rev. 919 (1989)(discussing history of punitive damage awards in product liability litigation). And [i]t has long been established ... that tortious behavior that is particularly egregious will warrant punitive damages. Continental Trend Resources, Inc., 101 F.3d at 638. Despite the dearth of judicial decisions about punitive damages in products liability cases during the relevant time period, the award in this case is still constitutionally sound given OCF's knowledge about Kaylo and its continuing failure to warn about Kaylo's hidden dangers. Although the court of appeals did not have the benefit of BMW when it reviewed the punitive damage awards against OCF, applying the BMW guideposts reveals that we should not alter the court of appeals' conclusion. We hold that the punitive damage awards here do not, by themselves, violate due process under BMW 's standards.
We next consider OCF's claim that any further punitive damage awards levied against it for manufacturing and distributing Kaylo, beginning with the punitive damage awards here, are excessive as a matter of law in violation of the Due Process Clause. OCF argues that continued punitive damage awards for the same course of conduct violate substantive due process because the punishment and deterrence objectives underlying punitive damages have already been achieved by previous punitive damage awards for that course of conduct. OCF contends that because no legitimate purpose is served by additional punitive damage awards against it for manufacturing and distributing Kaylo, continued punitive damage awards, including the ones here, are irrational and arbitrary in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Answering this constitutional argument is no easy task. Professor David Owen, who has studied and written about this issue for the last two decades, has observed that the issue is a problem of enormous complexity which requires much analysis and ingenuity. Owen II, supra, at 394. Courts have also expressed concern and frustration about this issue. See, e.g., Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., 911 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir.1990) (If no change occurs in our tort law or constitutional law, the time will arrive when Celotex's [asbestos] liability for punitive damages imperils its ability to pay compensatory claims and its corporate existence.). Of the many courts that have faced this challenge, only one has expressly held that multiple awards of punitive damages for the same conduct violate a defendant's due process rights. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F.Supp. 1053, 1064 (D.N.J.1989) (Juzwin I), vacated, 718 F.Supp. 1233, 1234 (D.N.J.1989) (Juzwin II) (vacated but abiding by previous ruling that repetitive awards of punitive damages for the same conduct violate a defendant's due process rights). Other courts faced with this argument have rejected it for five principal reasons. First, courts have rejected due process challenges to multiple punitive damage awards by holding that procedural safeguards provide all the protection that is necessary. See, e.g., Scheufler v. General Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261, 1272 (10 th Cir.1997); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir.1985); Fibreboard Corp. v. Williams, 813 S.W.2d 658, 686 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1991, writ denied). However, we believe that courts must consider multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct against a party's substantive due process rights. Whether to punish a tortfeasor by means of an exaction of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434-35, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994). While a punitive damage award in an individual case may be fair and reasonable, the cumulative effect of such awards may not be. Juzwin I, 705 F.Supp. at 1055. At some point, punitive damages for the same conduct no longer serve to punish and deter, but instead become grossly excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Accordingly, we decline to follow these cases. Second, some courts have rejected substantive due process challenges out of parochial concerns. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir.1986). These courts reason that a court-imposed limit on punitive damage awards will only affect claimants within their own jurisdiction, prejudicing those claimants and only providing minimal or arbitrary relief to defendants. See, e.g., Jackson, 781 F.2d at 405 (We believe that the Mississippi Supreme Court would not deny to its own citizens the right to recover that which citizens of dozens of other states are already entitled to recover.); W.R. Grace & Co.Conn., 638 So.2d at 505 (Were we to adopt the position advocated by Grace, our holding would not be binding on other state courts or federal courts. This would place Floridians injured by asbestos on an unequal footing with the citizens of other states with regard to the right to recover damages from companies who engage in extreme misconduct.); Wangen, 294 N.W.2d at 461 ([W]e do not believe this court [Supreme Court of Wisconsin] should abandon the concept of punitive damages in products liability suits and ask the citizens of this state to wait for a national law or legislative reform in all fifty states ....); see also Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 Va. L.Rev. 139, 146 (1986)(noting that when a court denies a litigant punitive damages because its opponent has been sufficiently punished by previous judgments for the same course of conduct, there is no guarantee that other courts will follow suit thereby disadvantaging its own citizens relative to claimants in other jurisdictions). Third, courts have rejected OCF's argument to avoid what those courts perceive as inequitable results. As Judge Friendly pointed out over thirty years ago, it does not seem either fair or practicable to limit punitive recoveries to an indeterminate number of first-comers, leaving it to some unascertained court to cry, `Hold, enough,' in the hope that others will follow. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839-40; see also Fischer, 512 A.2d at 478 (reasoning that the fact that a defendant injured a large number of people should not relieve it from multiple punitive damage awards); Davis v. Celotex Corp., 187 W.Va. 566, 420 S.E.2d 557, 565 (1992)([I]t seems highly illogical and unfair for courts to determine at what point punitive damage awards should cease.); Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive Damages: An Analysis of Constitutional and Other Challenges to Punitive Damages, Post-Haslip and Moriel, 26 Tex. Tech. L.Rev. 1, 68 (1994)(noting that limiting multiple punitive damage awards unfairly advantages the first plaintiff or first few plaintiffs to obtain judgments for punitive damages to the detriment of all others). But c.f. Owen I, supra, at 1325 (questioning the supposed unfairness of rewarding the initial plaintiffs to a greater extent than subsequent plaintiffs). While we sympathize with the second and third reasons for rejecting OCF's constitutional challenge, these concerns should not stand in the way of protecting a defendant's due process rights. Due process mandates at all times, in all circumstances, and for all defendants, `fundamental fairness' at the hands of the law. Jeffries, supra, at 152. As we recognized in Moriel, our duty is to ensure that defendants who deserve to be punished in fact receive an appropriate level of punishment, while at the same time preventing punishment that is excessive or otherwise erroneous. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 17. [A]t some point, some jurisdiction must face up to the realities of the asbestos crisis and take a step that might ... lead others to adopt a broader view. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1399 (Weiss, J., dissenting). Erecting a constitutional barrier to additional punitive damages awards against a particular defendant for the same course of conduct may, to some extent, allow only those plaintiffs who win the race to the courthouse to recover punitive damages. However, punitive damages are not designed to compensate individuals, but are only intended to punish tortious conduct and to deter its repetition. See Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 16; see also BMW, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 Va. L.Rev. 269, 292 (1983)(As courts have uniformly held, no plaintiff has a right to punitive damages ... the purpose of punitive damages is to vindicate the public interest, not that of a particular plaintiff.). Therefore, when engaging in a substantive due process analysis of multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct, courts should focus on the defendant's due process rights and whether the twin aims of punishment and deterrence have been adequately served rather than on plaintiffs' remedies. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1402 (Weiss, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Dukona Corp., N.V., 547 So.2d 70, 73 (Ala.1989) ([T]he focus is on the plaintiff with regard to the propriety of the compensatory damages award, and on the defendant with respect to the propriety of any assessment of punitive damages.). Fourth, some courts have decided that no single court is capable of crafting an acceptable solution to the national problem of multiple punitive damages in mass tort litigation, and have suggested that legislative action is the answer. See, e.g., Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386 (collecting state cases and noting that both state and federal courts have recognized that no single court can fashion an effective response to the national problem flowing from mass exposure to asbestos products.); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1017 (6th Cir.1993)(expressing view that relief from multiple punitive damage awards should not be sought from a federal court sitting in a diversity action but, rather, from the legislature under whose law the action is decided); Jackson, 781 F.2d at 406 (The relief sought by [the asbestos defendant] may be more properly granted by the state or federal legislature than by this Court.); Keene Corp. v. Kirk, 870 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tex.App.Dallas 1993, no writ)(We too conclude that the higher courts and the appropriate legislative bodies should resolve such policy considerations.)(citing Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1096 (5 th Cir.1991)); W.R. Grace & Co., 638 So.2d at 505 (Any realistic solution to the problems caused by the asbestos litigation in the United States must be applicable to all fifty states. It is our belief that such a uniform solution can only be effected by federal legislation.); Fischer, 512 A.2d at 480 (At the state court level we are powerless to implement solutions to the nationwide problems created by asbestos exposure and litigation arising from that exposure.). It may be that a truly uniform solution can only be fashioned by either the Supreme Court or Congress. Nevertheless, the difficulty or enormity of the task does not grant us leave to avoid OCF's properly preserved due process challenge under applicable constitutional principles and to ensure that its due process rights are not violated. See Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 16-17. Indeed, a state court's interpretation of federal law about such a challenge is no less important than that of the federal court of appeals in its circuit. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). Courts should not wait for congressional or legislative action to correct errors made by the courts themselves. Mistakes created by courts can be corrected by courts without engaging in judicial activism. It is judicial paralysis, not activism, that is the problem in [mass tort cases involving successive punitive damages awards]. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1399 (Weiss, J., dissenting); see also Owen III, supra, 60 n. 227. Finally, courts have rejected due process challenges to multiple punitive damage awards not because such challenges are necessarily unsound as a matter of constitutional law, but because the defendant failed to preserve error on the issue, there was not an adequate record to show a due process violation, or, whatever limits due process may impose on multiple punitive damage awards, that limit clearly was not surpassed on the facts presented. See, e.g., Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir.1989)(error not preserved); Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d at 281-82 (no due process violation on record presented); Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389 (same); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F.Supp. 272, 285 (D.N.J.1989)(same); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 216 (Co.1984)(same). Here, OCF preserved its arguments, and as a result of the posttrial evidentiary hearing, the record is adequate for our review. Although we recognize that other courts have struggled with the issue and have discussed valid reasons for rejecting OCF's due process challenge, we join the courts and commentators that have acknowledged that repeatedly imposing punitive damages on the same defendant for the same course of wrongful conduct may implicate substantive due process constraints. See, e.g., Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385 (The principal issue impelling us to take this otherwise routine product liability case in banc is the effect of successive punitive damages awards in mass tort cases arising from the same course of conduct: We, as well as other courts, have expressed concerns in that regard.); King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1033 (5th Cir.1990) (With some misgivings, the panel holds that it is bound [by previous Fifth Circuit decisions] to reject defendant's argument that multiple punitive damage awards for the same misconduct violated constitutional protections.); Racich, 887 F.2d at 398 (We agree that the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the same course of conduct may raise serious constitutional concerns, in the absence of a limiting principle.); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1005 ([P]owerful arguments have been made that, as a matter of constitutional law or of substantive tort law, the courts shoulder some responsibility for preventing repeated awards of punitive damages for the same acts or series of acts.); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (There must ... be some limit, either as a matter of policy or as a matter of due process, to the amount of times a defendant may be punished for a single transaction.); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.Supp. 887, 899-900 (N.D.Cal.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.1982) (A defendant has a due process right to be protected against unlimited multiple punishment for the same act.); Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1244 (The concerns expressed in Roginsky of multiple punitive damage awards in mass accident or products liability cases may require consideration by this court at some future time.); Owen III, supra, at 60 n. 227 (As the total punitive damages assessed against the company in different actions mount, there should come a point when the aggregate of such punishment will be deemed sufficient as a matter of law.); Seltzer, supra, at 55 (The aggregate amount of multiple awards ... can reach a level so fundamentally unfair and destructive that any additional awards above that level should not be permitted.); Koenig, Punitive Damage Overkill After TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources: The Need for a Congressional Solution, 36 WM & MARY L.REV. 751, 763 (1995) (The Supreme Court ... could rule that multiple awards trigger `a general concern of reasonableness' and violate substantive due process because they go beyond what is necessary to deter and punish.). The Supreme Court has not considered at what point multiple punitive damages awards arising from the same course of conduct are unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process. However, if a single punitive damages award becomes unconstitutional when it can fairly be categorized as grossly excessive in relation to a state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence, it follows that the aggregate amount of multiple awards may also surpass a constitutional threshold. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1404 (Weiss, J., dissenting). Even before BMW held that an individual punitive damage award could exceed constitutional boundaries, many courts and commentators (as we have cited) agreed or expressed concerns, that at some point, the aggregate amount of multiple punitive damage awards becomes fundamentally unfair in violation of due process guarantees. BMW simply lends additional support to the view that multiple punitive damage awards against a party for the same course of conduct can surpass constitutional limits under the Fourteenth Amendment. The aggregate effect of such awards may reach far beyond their purpose to punish and deter, becoming what has been coined `overkill.' Jones et al., Multiple Punitive Damage Awards for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 Ala. L.Rev. 1, 1 (1991). In deciding whether multiple punitive damage awards against OCF for the same course of conducthere Kaylo-related claimsoffend OCF's due process rights, courts cannot draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18, 111 S.Ct. 1032. However, we believe the following criteria, derived from BMW and from the Green Oil factors the Supreme Court endorsed in Haslip, are proper for posttrial constitutional review of whether the purposes of punishment and deterrence have been adequately served by previously paid punitive damage awards for the same course of conduct: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the profit earned by the defendant from its misconduct; (3) the defendant's financial position; and (4) criminal sanctions, if any, imposed for the same conduct. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22, 111 S.Ct. 1032; Green Oil, 539 So.2d at 223-24; see also Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897, 908-10 (1991). Like a single punitive damage award, aggregate awards enter the zone of arbitrariness under the Due Process Clause [o]nly when [the aggregate] award[s] can fairly be characterized as `grossly excessive' in relation to the legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589. We agree with the Second and Third Circuits, neither of which has foreclosed the possibility of a successful substantive due process challenge under an aggregate punitive damages award theory, that such a challenge can properly be evaluated only if the defendant develops a sufficient record. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389; Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d at 281. `Only with [sufficient] factual information can the judge determine that the aggregate of prior awards punishes the entirety of the wrongful conduct to the limit of due process.' Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1389 (quoting Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d at 281). In a posttrial review to decide whether a punitive damages award, when aggregated with previously paid punitive damage awards for the same course of conduct, is unconstitutionally excessive, trial courts may consider evidence beyond what is admissible during the trial. After the trial, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury no longer exists. Moreover, the issue is then one of lawat what point do multiple punitive damage awards arising from the same course of conduct violate due process. Here, the trial court properly allowed OCF to present its enough is enough evidence when Frank testified at the posttrial hearing. The court of appeals also considered Frank's posttrial testimony. Using the criteria we have gleaned from BMW and Green Oil, we now examine the record, including the evidence from the posttrial hearing, to determine whether due process requires an end to further Kaylo-related punitive damage awards against OCF in Texas.
First, and most important, a court should give considerable weight to the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. [T]he duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct, are all relevant in gauging reprehensibility. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (discussing Green Oil factors). As we discussed when examining the individual punitive damage award in this case, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's judgment finding that OCF's conduct demonstrated indifference to the health and safety of others for many years. This finding weighs in favor of allowing additional punitive damages awards against OCF. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 576, 116 S.Ct. 1589. The punitive damages paid by OCF thus far are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22, 111 S.Ct. 1032. Second, a court should examine the profitability of the wrongful conduct. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (discussing Green Oil factors). The $3 million in punitive damage awards previously paid by OCF [7] is double the amount of profits OCF claims it earned from its Kaylo sales. Punitive damages, however, are not necessarily confined to the amount of profits. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1391; Stevens, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d at 534. Where evidence shows that product sales resulted in widespread and devastating injuries and little profit in relation to the seller's overall financial condition, merely taking away that profit may or may not impose much punishment on the seller. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L.Rev. 1173, 1191 (1931)([A] penalty which would be sufficient to reform a poor man is likely to make little impression on a rich one....). As other courts considering OCF's same arguments have observed, because Kaylo sales approximated only 2 percent of OCF's total sales, and an even smaller percentage of its total profits, Kaylo profits do not provide an accurate indication of the likely punitive impact of a punitive damage award against OCF. Stevens, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d at 535. Thus, the evidence about the profits, or lack thereof, from OCF's Kaylo sales does not support OCF's due process argument. Third, because courts should ensure that punitive damage awards do not exceed an amount necessary to accomplish society's goals of punishment and deterrence, a court should examine the defendant's financial position. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (discussing Green Oil factors). Here, the trial court and the court of appeals considered OCF's enough is enough evidence from the posttrial hearing and determined that OCF's financial position is not so precarious that further punitive damages awards against it should be disallowed. We agree. The evidence reveals that OCF is a solvent, healthy company. In 1993, shortly before this case was tried, OCF reported to its shareholders that [a]t the end of 1991, our company was valued by the market at $932 million; 12 months later, the market value of the company was in excess of $1.5 billion, an increase of 60%! Moreover, in March 1993, OCF reported to the SEC that the additional uninsured and unreserved costs which may arise out of pending personal injury and property damages asbestos claims and additional similar asbestos claims filed in the future will not have a materially adverse effect on the Company's financial position. [8] Thus, we cannot say that the prior paid punitive damage awards against OCF, combined with the punitive damage awards here, have exceeded the goals of punishment and deterrence. Fourth, previously imposed criminal sanctions for the same conduct are relevant in determining whether a defendant has been sufficiently punished and deterred. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (discussing Green Oil factors). However, there is no evidence about any such sanctions in this case. OCF has not shown that the aggregate punitive damage awards against it have exceeded the twin goals of punishment and deterrence underlying such awards to constitute a violation of its substantive due process rights. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1390. Given the nature of OCF's conduct and the concomitant injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, OCF's relatively stable financial position, and the fact that OCF has actually paid only $3 million in punitive damages for the same conduct, we cannot say that the punitive damage awards here, when aggregated with other paid punitive damage awards against OCF, can be characterized as grossly excessive and beyond the legitimate interests of punishment and deterrence. We therefore conclude, as have other courts when considering OCF's same arguments under similar facts, that the evidence produced by OCF falls short of demonstrating a due process violation. Spaur, 510 N.W.2d at 867 (record reflected that OCF had paid $3 million in punitive damages); see also Stevens, 57 Cal. Rptr.2d at 539-40 (Without any showing of punitive damages actually assessed and paid [by OCF], the evidence fell far short of demonstrating `overkill.'). We affirm the court of appeals' judgment in Wasiak.