Opinion ID: 2507905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exclusion of Proposed Expert Testimony on Spillover Rage.

Text: The trial court excluded some of defendant's proposed expert testimony from Dr. William Vicary, a forensic psychiatrist, on brain physiology, neurotransmitters, spillover rage, and defendant's mental condition during his interviews. The court concluded that the evidence was for the purpose of establishing a diminished capacity defense which had been abolished by sections 28 and 29. Defendant contends that exclusion of this evidence was error in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in his defense and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. We disagree. A criminal defendant has the due process right to the assistance of expert witnesses, including the right to consult with a psychiatrist or psychologist, if necessary, to prepare his defense. ( Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53.) The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution also guarantee a defendant's right to present the testimony of these expert witnesses at trial. ( Doe v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 538, 543, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 888.) Nonetheless, expert psychiatric testimony may be limited by statute. ( People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1111, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) Section 28, subdivision (a) provides that evidence of mental illness shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state. Subdivision (b) of section 28 states that as a matter of public policy there shall be no defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse in a criminal action.... Section 29 prohibits expert witnesses from directly stating their conclusions regarding whether a defendant possessed a required mental state. It provides, [i]n the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defendant's mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states.... The question as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact. Dr. Vicary was allowed to testify about the spillover concept in the abstract and how it might relate to defendant's conduct on the day of the murders. Vicary testified, I think he exploded. I mean, he was in a rage and a frenzy that lasted several minutes. The provocation with the argument [with Mary].... The little girl came afterwards, when he was in the bathroom, still in the frenzy, still in a rage and she was an innocent bystander, just happened on the scene. Defense counsel highlighted this testimony in his closing statement, pointing to Dr. Vicary's testimony on spillover and how it was defendant's blind rage that led him to kill April. The court also allowed Vicary's expert opinion testimony on defendant's personality characteristics, whether defendant formed or acquired the relevant mental states, and his review of all available information on defendant. This testimony included the effects of alcohol on the central nervous system, defendant's general personality and makeup, defendant's mental condition on the date of the killings, and evidence from psychological tests that were administered to defendant. But the trial court excluded Dr. Vicary's testimony on spillover rage that related to whether defendant actually had the requisite mental state, testimony on general brain physiology that dealt with capacity to form a mental state, and testimony on neurotransmitters and those elements of spillover that amounted to capacity evidence. The court concluded that such testimony fell within the direct purview of section 28's prohibition of a defense of diminished capacity and section 29's prohibition of expert testimony on whether the defendant had the required mental state. The trial court also excluded Dr. Vicary's observations regarding defendant's mental condition during their interviews together. Under a claim of state statutory error, we review a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony using an abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563.) We conclude the trial court's decision to limit expert testimony was not an abuse of its discretion. Considerable expert testimony was admitted regarding spillover rage and defendant's mental condition. ( People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 304, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) Those portions of the testimony that were excluded were narrow and fell directly within the prohibitions of sections 28 and 29. Even if the trial court did commit error in excluding the expert testimony on brain physiology, neurotransmitters, spillover rage, or Dr. Vicary's observations of defendant's mental condition during his interviews, we conclude that it was not prejudicial. ( McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 376, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709.) In light of the fact that the substance of Dr. Vicary's testimony was presented to the jury, it is not reasonably probable that the error affected the outcome. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) For the same reasons, with regard to defendant's federal constitutional claims, we concluded that if there was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 313, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121; see also Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.)