Opinion ID: 900591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: [¶ 10.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to modify or set aside Sjomeling's protection order? [¶ 11.] This Court has not previously set forth its standards for reviewing the issuance of protection orders or restraining orders pursuant to SDCL ch 22-19A. It has, however, recognized that such orders are a form of injunction. See State v. Pollman, 1997 SD 36, ¶ 15, 562 N.W.2d 105, 108 (temporary restraining order a form of injunction prohibiting action temporarily pending hearing on merits of permanent injunction). See also 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 327 (1969) (temporary restraining order is in effect an injunction). Granting or denying an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. We will not disturb a ruling on injunctive relief unless we find an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion can simply be an error of law or it might denote a discretion exercised to an unjustified purpose, against reason and evidence. Hendrickson v. Wagners, Inc., 1999 SD 74, ¶ 14, 598 N.W.2d 507, 511 (citations omitted) (quoting Knodel v. Kassel Township, 1998 SD 73, ¶ 6, 581 N.W.2d 504, 506). [¶ 12.] Generally, an injunction may be modified only on a showing of changed conditions. See 42 AmJur2d Injunctions § 334 (1969)(court which rendered decree has power to dissolve or modify injunction where the grounds and reasons for which the injunction was granted no longer exist by reason of changed conditions). Jurisdiction to modify protection orders issued pursuant to SDCL ch 22-19A is explicitly granted by SDCL 22-19A-14: Upon application, notice to all parties, and hearing, the court may modify the terms of an existing order for protection. [¶ 13.] The courts' power to modify injunctions and protection orders is also recognized in the Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which has also been adopted in several states [including South Dakota [1] ]) provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding on various grounds, including the ones that it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application, or that there is any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. This rule makes it clear that the appropriate court may modify or revoke a permanent injunction as changed circumstances may dictate. 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 324 (1969)(footnote added). [¶ 14.] In a discussion of the power to modify judgments and injunctions under Rule 60(b), it has been written that: The fact that the rule allows relief if it is no longer equitable for the judgment to have prospective application is not a substitute for an appeal. It does not allow relitigation of issues that have been resolved by the judgment. Instead it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable. As the Court said in [ United States v. Swift & Company, 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932)]: We are not framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether anything has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting. It is clear that a strong showing is required before an injunction or other prospective judgment will be modified. Mere passage of time is not enough. Again the rule is laid down in the Swift case: Life is never static, and the passing of a decade has brought changes to the grocery business as it has to every other. The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression. Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned. Because the standard is an exacting one, many applications for relief on this ground are denied. But on an adequate showing the courts will provide relief if it no longer is equitable that the judgment be enforced, whether because of subsequent legislation, a change in the decisional law, or a change in the operative facts. 11 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863 (2d ed. 1995). [¶ 15.] Applying these principles in the instant case yields no basis for finding an abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to modify or set aside the protection order. As grounds for the motion, Stuber simply argued the statutory requirements for issuance of the protection order never existed. This was quite clearly an attempt to relitigate issues resolved with the entry of the protection order. In view of the above principles, the trial court quite properly rejected this attempt. [¶ 16.] The only change of circumstances alluded to by Stuber during the motion hearing was the fact that he moved back to Watertown after issuance of the protection order. However Stuber's past actions indicate his adeptness at making quick moves to be near or far away from Sjomeling. In view of this demonstrated mobility and in view of his bizarre actions, his propensity toward alcoholism and violent acts and his admitted suicidal tendencies, Stuber's move back to Watertown fails to constitute a substantial basis for modification of the protection order. As the trial court concluded, Stuber's actions have demonstrated a stubborn non-acceptance of the end of his relationship with Sjomeling. This non-acceptance is not necessarily quelled by Stuber's return to Watertown. Accordingly, the trial court was well placed in rejecting his motion to modify or set aside Sjomeling's protection order and did not abuse its discretion. [¶ 17.] Affirmed. [¶ 18.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and SABERS, AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON, Justices, participating.