Opinion ID: 4217606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: [2,3] Before proceeding to the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.13 FCID claims that the district court, acting as an intermediate appellate court, erred when it considered and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte.14 [4] In this case, the State has raised two issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction: whether FCID has standing to challenge the IMP’s15 and whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under § 46-750 or § 84-911(1). Because we conclude that FCID lacks standing to challenge the IMP’s, we do not reach the second issue. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.16 [5,6] To have standing, a litigant first must clearly demonstrate that it has suffered an injury in fact.17 That injury must 12 Zapata v. McHugh, 296 Neb. 216, 893 N.W.2d 720 (2017). 13 Steven S. v. Mary S., 277 Neb. 124, 760 N.W.2d 28 (2009). 14 Davis v. Choctaw Constr., 280 Neb. 714, 789 N.W.2d 698 (2010). 15 See In re Invol. Dissolution of Wiles Bros., 285 Neb. 920, 924, 830 N.W.2d 474, 478 (2013) (“[t]he defect of standing is a defect of subject matter jurisdiction”). 16 Selma Development v. Great Western Bank, 285 Neb. 37, 825 N.W.2d 215 (2013). 17 Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, 280 Neb. 533, 788 N.W.2d 252 (2010). - 1004 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports FRENCHMAN-CAMBRIDGE IRR. DIST. v. DEPT. OF NAT. RES. Cite as 297 Neb. 999 be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense.18 A complainant must allege an injury to itself that is distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.19 FCID claims it has standing because the IMP’s, which allow for increased ground water pumping, will deprive it of waters that would otherwise be available for its operations. In its petition for review, FCID alleges in part that increased ground water pumping will “interfere with stream recharge and flow . . . and [will] diminish surface waters otherwise subject to capture and diversion for use by FCID to fill its priority flow permits.” FCID further alleges that the reduced streamflow will cause it to have to modify its budget and operations and to “attempt to negotiate for relief [for defaulting] from its obligations to [the Department of the Interior] and [the Bureau of Reclamation].” We have previously considered the issue of standing in the water dispute case of Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD.20 In that case, we held that an irrigation district did not adequately allege how its particular water use interest had been injured by an order of an NRD when it merely alleged that the order would cause a reduced water supply. In other words, the irrigation district failed to state how a reduced water supply would cause it harm. Here, however, FCID has additionally alleged that the reduced water supply would cause it to have to modify its budget and operations and to negotiate for relief for breaching its contracts. Thus, FCID argues that this case is distinguishable from Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist., because its petition contains more specific allegations of harm than those in that case. However, although FCID alleges more specific allegations of harm than those alleged in Central Neb. Pub. Power 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. - 1005 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports FRENCHMAN-CAMBRIDGE IRR. DIST. v. DEPT. OF NAT. RES. Cite as 297 Neb. 999 Dist., that additional alleged harm does not occur unless the IMP’s actually decrease the water supply. And, as the defend­ ants point out, the IMP’s do not by themselves cause more ground water to be pumped. Instead, IMP’s are simply jointly developed plans for how water will be managed.21 Although the IMP’s set forth the water controls that may be employed in times of water shortage, the IMP’s themselves do not actually implement the controls. Instead, for those controls to be implemented, the NRD’s must determine that such controls are necessary and issue subsequent orders pursuant to § 46-715 and Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-718(2) and 46-739 (Reissue 2010). This conclusion can be drawn not only from the three statutory sections above, but from the IMP’s themselves. For example, within the IMP developed by the Department and the Middle Republican NRD, it states, “In accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-715, one or more of the ground water controls authorized by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-739 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-740 shall be adopted for the purpose of implementing this plan.” In the IMP developed by the Department and the Upper Republican NRD, as well as the IMP developed by the Department and the Lower Republican NRD, it states that “[t]he [NRD] will utilize the ground water controls as provided by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-715, 46-739, and 46-740 to form the Ground Water Controls component of this IMP.” Section 46-739 authorizes the NRD to issue the actual order that would limit the water usage by appropriators. Before orders are issued pursuant to § 46-739, the IMP’s contemplate that reviews of the water usage must be necessary. All of the IMP’s at issue state that the “ground water depletions are maintained within their portion of Nebraska’s Allowable Ground Water Depletions as computed through use of the Republican River Compact Administration Ground Water Model” and that “voluntary reductions in baseline 21 See § 46-715. - 1006 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports FRENCHMAN-CAMBRIDGE IRR. DIST. v. DEPT. OF NAT. RES. Cite as 297 Neb. 999 pumping volumes will continue to be pursued by the [NRD] with the incentive of limiting the level of long-term management actions that are necessary during Compact Call Years.” Finally, under the “Compliance Standards” section of each IMP, it states that “[o]n an annual basis the [Department] and [NRD] shall reexamine the sufficiency and effectiveness of the Compliance Standards to determine if amendments or modifications are necessary to ensure the State’s compliance with the [Final Settlement Stipulation] and Compact.” These examples reflect that the IMP’s call for an annual review and that based upon the review, additional orders could be issued as needed. If and when such orders are issued, FCID would then have the right to seek judicial review depending upon the issue in question and the nature of the order. Our conclusion that FCID has failed to show that the IMP’s have caused an injury-in-fact is also supported by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club v. Robertson.22 That case involved a challenge to a land and resource management plan under the National Forest Management Act of 1976. In Sierra Club, the plaintiffs challenged the plan, alleging that the amount and method of timber harvesting permitted by the plan caused environmental or aesthetic harm, in violation of the National Forest Management Act of 1976 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. But because the latter act required an additional stage of site-specific analysis before any timber could actually be cleared, the Eighth Circuit held that the asserted injury was not sufficiently imminent at the initial forest planning stage to create an injury in fact and that thus, the plaintiffs failed to establish standing.23 Similarly, here, FCID’s asserted injury is not sufficiently imminent because in order for the water controls set forth in the IMP’s to be implemented, the NRD would have to determine that such controls were necessary and issue subsequent orders. 22 Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994). 23 Id. - 1007 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports FRENCHMAN-CAMBRIDGE IRR. DIST. v. DEPT. OF NAT. RES. Cite as 297 Neb. 999 Accordingly, we conclude that FCID has failed to establish standing and that as a result, this court lacks jurisdiction.24 Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. Because we conclude that FCID lacks standing to challenge the IMP’s, we need not reach the second jurisdictional question.25