Opinion ID: 1739694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exclusion of juror with scruples about death penalty

Text: Irving raises two possible errors under this heading: first, that the trial court improperly prevented defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors as to whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty  the reverse  Witherspoon question; and second, that the questioning of the jurors who were excused for scruples against the death penalty did not sufficiently establish their inability to follow the law. The State argues that these claims are procedurally barred by Irving's failure to raise them on direct appeal. However, as stated earlier, this may not absolutely preclude consideration of any issues. Irving cites several cases in support of his reverse- Witherspoon argument  none of which are binding on this Court. Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.1968); Thomas v. State, 403 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1981); Poole v. State, 194 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1967); State v. Henry, 198 So. 910 (La. 1940); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 212 (Va. 1981). While this issue may have arisen in this Court in briefs, there is no case in which it has appeared in the opinion. In Sims v. United States, 405 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir.1968), the Court held that the defendant's right to so question jurors existed, stating: [I]f the Government is allowed to ask the question permitted in Witherspoon  whether a juror under no circumstances would consider bringing in a death penalty verdict  then the defendant should be allowed to ask the reverse question  whether under all circumstances a juror feels compelled to return a death penalty verdict when he finds a defendant guilty of first degree murder. 405 F.2d at 1384, n. 5. A different result was reached in King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.1983), where the defendant attempted to ask prospective jurors whether they favored a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes. Id. at 1495. The court of appeals upheld the Florida Supreme Court's decision that the refusal to permit such questioning was not error. The subject question, however, did not address the juror[s]'s impartial application of existing law, but rather it concerned [their] conception of what laws should exist. Id. (quoting King v. State, 390 So.2d 315, 319 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 989, 101 S.Ct. 1529, 67 L.Ed.2d 825). The specific question objected to in King was Would anybody here be in favor of having a mandatory death penalty  [for certain crimes] King, 390 So.2d at 319. Thus, it was not a question addressed to the jury's exercise of discretion in administering the death penalty, but to their agreement with legislatively enacted punishment. The question complained of here was, How many of you agree that for every murder committed that the State ought to kill the person that committed it? And, later, defense counsel asked, How many of you feel that a life sentence is a severe punishment? It appears that the questions come closer to that allowed in Sims than to that prohibited by King, and that the trial court may have allowed the questioning. However, to reverse on this issue would risk running afoul of the Fifth Circuit's holding in Wheat that this Court will circumvent procedural bars arbitrarily. Thus, we find that the issue was procedurally barred; but that there existed cause for the failure to raise the issue earlier. In Smith v. Murray, the United States Supreme Court reviewed its criteria for finding cause, which may be summarized as follows: [A] deliberate, tactical decision not to pursue a particular claim is the very antithesis of the kind of circumstance that would warrant excusing a defendant's failure to adhere to state's legitimate rules for the fair and orderly disposition of its criminal cases. ... . [A] state's subsequent acceptance of an argument deliberatly abandoned on direct appeal is irrelevant to the question whether the default should be excused on federal habeas. ... . [T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default. `quoting Carrier. ... . It will often be the case that even the most informed counsel will fail to anticipate a state appellate court's willingness to reconsider a prior holding or will underestimate the likelihood that a federal habeas court will repudiate an established state rule. ... . [W]here a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures. `quoting Reed v. Ross [468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1]... . But ... the question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel's task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was `available' at all. ... . [However] `where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default. `quoting Carrier. ___ U.S. at ___-___, 106 S.Ct. at 2666-68, 91 L.Ed.2d at 444-46. This language suggests that an alleged error should be reviewed, in spite of any procedural bar, only where the claim is so novel that it has not previously been litigated, or, perhaps, where an appellate court has suddenly reversed itself on an issue previously thought settled. Of course, Smith also recognized the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for procedural default. The question here, then is whether the reverse Witherspoon issue is so novel that recent developments have provided a right that was heretofore unavailable. We think not, and hold that he is procedurally barred. As to the second part of the argument under this heading, Irving asserts that questioning of the jurors did not go far enough to establish that they could, under no circumstances, vote for the death penalty. As the United States Supreme Court has recently held, [D]eterminations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 852 (1985). Because of the inherent difficulty in formulating an exact set of questions and answers that would disqualify a juror, the Court also held that deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853. This holding has been reaffirmed in Darden v. Wainwright, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), and adopted by this Court in Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985) and Stringer v. State, ___ So.2d ___ No. 55,607, decided September 3, 1986 (not yet reported).