Opinion ID: 1418276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Plaintiff's failure to plead collateral estoppel by reason of defendant's prior conviction.

Text: It is not entirely clear from the comments by the trial judge at the time of trial whether the first reason stated by him was that plaintiff was required to plead the prior conviction in order to rely upon it as a collateral estoppel of the defendant. Defendant apparently made no such contention at that time, insofar as is shown by the record, and in its brief as respondent on this appeal defendant has cited no authorities in support of such a contention. In plaintiff's reply brief, however, it is contended that where collateral estoppel is not relied upon in bar of an action, but is introduced in evidence merely as conclusive of some particular fact formerly adjudicated, collateral estoppel need not be pleaded, citing Furlong v. Tish, 189 Or. 86, 218 P.2d 476 (1950), and In re Patton's Estate, 170 Or. 186, 132 P.2d 402 (1943). To the same effect, see Farmers & Fruit Growers' Bank v. Davis, 93 Or. 655, 665, 184 P. 275 (1919). [6] Those cases have never been overruled. They were decided, however, long before our decision in Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970), in which this court extended the application of the rule of collateral estoppel to cases in which there is no mutuality of parties, as required by our prior decisions. In Bahler (at 19) we also held that collateral estoppel will not be applied in such cases when unfairness would result. One of the basic requirements of the rule of fairness is that the opposing party have fair notice. It may be contended that this is of particular importance in a case in which one party contends that collateral estoppel should be applied in a case in which there is no mutuality of parties and that, as a result, this court should overrule those earlier cases and hold that notice must be given by a pleading of collateral estoppel in all cases in which a party intends to rely upon it, whether as a complete bar or as conclusive evidence of a particular fact in issue. Cf. Holmgren v. Westport Towboat Co., 260 Or. 445, 451, 490 P.2d 739 (1971). It is of interest to note, however, that no such requirement was imposed by this court in Meyers v. Burwell, 271 Or. 84, 530 P.2d 833 (1975), also involving an action for personal injuries, in which plaintiff offered in evidence the judgment of defendant's conviction for driving on the wrong side of the road to collaterally estop defendant from denying such conduct, alleged as a specification of negligence in plaintiff's complaint. We held that offer to be proper even though collateral estoppel was not pleaded by the plaintiff. The decision in Meyers was announced two days following the ruling by the trial judge in this case. Because this issue has not been directly raised by the defendant on this appeal and because, for reasons next stated, the conviction of defendant for that traffic offense cannot be used on the retrial of this case as a basis for a claim of collateral estoppel, we do not decide that question in this case.