Opinion ID: 584536
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MJP's Consent

Text: 28 Finally, First City, Texas--Tyler, N.A., a creditor of HSP and P & P who sides with HSP in this appeal, argues that HSP's authority to wind up P & P derives from the Final Judgment, and because MJP did not challenge this aspect of the Final Judgment, HSP's authority to wind up P & P is legitimated by consent. But if MJP consented to anything, she consented to having HSP wind up P & P within 90 days by conveying to her an undivided one-half interest in all of P & P's real estate and mineral interests. She has consistently contested HSP's authority to manage P & P's assets beyond the Final Judgment's directives, and she sought a receiver for P & P as a result of HSP's disregard for the Final Judgment. 29 Moreover, HSP was not bankrupt when he received authority to wind up P & P under the Final Judgment. The Texas court that issued the Final Judgment did not sanction a conflict-of-interest on HSP's part because none existed at that time. The court could appropriately depend on section 35(3)(b) to protect MJP and HSP's creditors from any conflict that would arise if HSP sought bankruptcy protection after the Final Judgment, and nothing in the Final Judgment is inconsistent with this understanding. 30 We conclude that, under Texas law, HSP lacked authority to file a voluntary Chapter 11 petition on P & P's behalf.