Opinion ID: 2639711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court of Appeals Correctly Reviewed the Commission's Decision Under an Abuse of Discretion Standard

Text: ¶ 23 Because the legislature did not intend to confine the meaning of the phrase other work reasonably available to the five statutory factors, we now consider whether the legislature implicitly granted discretion to the Commission to interpret it. We conclude that it did. ¶ 24 As the court of appeals noted, `reasonableness' is a broad, general, and subjective concept; its meaning depends on the context in which it is applied. LPI Servs. v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT App 375, ¶ 15, 173 P.3d 858. Similarly, [o]ther work reasonably available is a broad and generalized phrase that, under Morton, bespeaks a legislative intent to delegate its interpretation to the responsible agency. Because the precise meaning of this phrase cannot be ascertained through traditional means of statutory interpretation, choosing one permissible meaning over another reflects a value judgment that the legislature has entrusted to the discretion of the agency empowered to administer the statute. Moreover, the legislative history indicates that the legislature intended the Commission to take into account more than just the five enumerated factors when determining whether other work was reasonably available. Thus, the court of appeals correctly reviewed rule 612-1-10.D.1 under an abuse of discretion standard.