Opinion ID: 1476693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hicks-Bey Testimony

Text: Williams presents several arguments in relation to the court's decision to allow H.T. to testify via closed circuit television pursuant to Hicks-Bey, supra . The Supreme Court of the United States has outlined three requirements the trial court must find in order to allow a witness to testify outside the presence of a criminal defendant: (1) that the use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify; (2) that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant; and (3) that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., `more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.' Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855-56, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (citations omitted); accord Hicks-Bey, supra, 649 A.2d at 574. We note that the trial court has inherent authority... to control the conduct of the proceedings before it, in order to ensure that the proper decorum and appropriate atmosphere are established, that all parties are treated fairly, and that justice is done. Hicks-Bey, supra, at 575 (citing Guaranty Dev. Co. v. Liberstein, 83 A.2d 669, 671 (D.C.1951)).
Williams argues that the second Craig requirement was not met because H.T. demonstrated no fear of testifying in his presence. As evidence to support this contention, Williams directs our attention to the first day of H.T.'s testimony, when she pointed to him and waved and smiled at him when she entered the courtroom. The record shows, however, that once the prosecutor began to question H.T. about appellant's conduct toward her, H.T. would not respond. Shortly afterward, during a recess in the proceedings, H.T. broke down and cried in the witness room. Ms. Staunch testified that H.T. told her she refused to answer because she was so scared of Williams. The prosecutor relayed that H.T. would testify if the Defendant was not present. She can say the words. She just doesn't want to say it in front of [Williams]. Staunch also testified that the courtroom ... is stressful, but the presence of the Defendant makes the environment unmanageable. Staunch noted that H.T. experienced Williams' presence as a threat to her. Although the trial judge failed to make specific factual findings as to the three requirements, the record amply supports an implicit determination by the trial judge that H.T. feared Williams, so that an attempt to take her testimony by way of closed circuit television was warranted. We note that this matter had been briefed for the trial court. It is apparent on the record that the trial judge wished to proceed with a limited voir dire with H.T. in the jury room in order to determine whether testifying in that manner was even feasible for the child. Once the court realized it was not, it decided to accommodate the prosecutor's strategy to proceed by impeaching H.T., the validity of which we discuss below. Thus, Williams fails to show that the trial court abused its prerogative to govern the conduct of the trial by proceeding with testimony taken via closed circuit television. The judge did note that [t]he testimony I thought was pretty clear that testifying in the presence of the Defendant was traumatic and did add to her difficulty. Thus, the second Craig requirement is satisfied.
Williams argues that the trial court erred when it instituted the Hicks-Bey proceedings during the trial and after H.T. had already begun her testimony. Williams argues that the prosecutor was aware that her witness would shut down when asked about the charged conduct because she had done so during the grand jury proceedings. According to Williams, the prosecutor proceeded with voir dire of H.T. knowing that she would be incapable of going forward and thereby invoking to the jury the specter of H.T.'s fear of Williams before impeaching her with the CAC videotape. The question of whether a trial court may begin Hicks-Bey proceedings after first attempting to get testimony in the courtroom is one that has received scant attention in this court. While it is true, as Williams notes, that Hicks-Bey involved use of closed-circuit television testimony prior to trial, nothing in that decision, nor in Craig, upon which Hicks-Bey relied, turned on the timing of the proceeding. To be sure, a Hicks-Bey proceeding is extraordinary, as the criteria for its use reveal. But the unsuccessful attempt to get courtroom testimony is added assurance that the welfare of the child permitted, if not compelled, the remote testimony. Moreover, by beginning the testimony in the courtroom in Williams' presence, the trial court at least attempted to afford usual trial confrontation before deciding to see whether the Hicks-Bey criteria were met. Finally, the conduct of a trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, Hicks-Bey, supra, and that exercise of that discretion was not in error.
Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing H.T.'s testimony to be videotaped and then played to the jury, rather than showing the jury the live closed circuit testimony. H.T.'s testimony was replayed because the trial court took the testimony directly after conducting a limited voir dire in the jury room. The court proceeded in this manner in order to accommodate H.T.'s limited energy and attention span. By using the taped testimony, the court ensured that H.T.'s actual testimony could be taken in as compressed an amount of time as possible, without having to delay her while the jury were brought in after voir dire was completed and her substantive testimony began. Williams cites no precedent, nor are we aware of any, that forbids this procedure, nor does he argue with any specificity that he was prejudiced. [2] Indeed, we agree with the trial court that there was no meaningful difference between the jury watching the video and the watching the testimony live, particularly under these circumstances.