Opinion ID: 2349482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: M.R.Evid. 606(b) provides:

Text: Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received. Rule 606(b) codifies the settled doctrine of this State, articulated in Patterson v. Rossignol, 245 A.2d 852, 856 (Me.1968), that evidence of statements by jurors may not be used to demonstrate any impropriety in the conduct of the jury in the jury room, but may be offered only to show external misconduct of individual jurors or the exertion of outside influence upon the jury. Cyr v. Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376, 1383 n. 3 (Me.1983); see M.R.Evid. 606 advisers' note; Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 606.2, at 133 (1976). In the case at bar, the plaintiffs sought to introduce affidavits based upon statements made by two jurors to show that a fellow juror disclosed to the jury during deliberations his personal knowledge concerning Raymond Marr's health insurance coverage. In other words, the plaintiffs wanted to prove what a juror said during deliberations to support their allegation of juror misconduct. The plaintiffs' goal is contrary to our settled rule that [e]vidence of what is said by jurors while deliberating upon a case will not be considered by the court to set aside the verdict. Patterson, 245 A.2d at 856 (citing Trafton v. Pitts, 73 Me. 408, 409-10 (1882)). The plaintiffs nevertheless insist that the presiding justice should have considered their affidavits. According to the plaintiffs, the affidavits are admissible under Rule 606(b) because they demonstrate that extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention. The plaintiffs apparently construe extraneous merely to refer to information outside that which the jury may properly consider in reaching a verdict. The plaintiffs' position is unpersuasive. As we observed above, Rule 606(b) reflects Maine law as enunciated in Patterson v. Rossignol . In light of that law, we can interpret extraneous only to refer to information introduced to the jury from outside the normal deliberative process. Thus, as we stated in Patterson, 245 A.2d at 856, juror testimony can be received to show that the jury has been improperly exposed to an external source of information such as a book or a pamphlet, Dongo v. Banks, 448 A.2d 885, 888-89 (Me.1982) (dictionary brought into jury room); Simmons v. State, 222 A.2d 366, 367 (Me.1966) (real estate appraisal book brought into jury room); Heffron v. Gallupe, 55 Me. 563, 565-66 (1868) (pamphlet containing evidence from former trial brought into jury room), or to show an independent investigation of a fact bearing upon the dispute by a juror during trial, Driscoll v. Gatcomb, 112 Me. 289, 290, 92 A. 39, 39 (1914) (private, unauthorized view by juror of subject of litigation); Winslow v. Morrill, 68 Me. 362, 362-63 (1878) (private, unauthorized investigation by juror of pollution caused by party's shop); Bowler v. Inhabitants of Washington, 62 Me. 302, 303-04 (1873) (private, unauthorized investigation by juror of road defect), but not to show that a juror who brought with him into the trial personal knowledge of a particular fact that could influence the jury's verdict discussed that personal knowledge with his fellow jurors during deliberations, Shepherd v. Inhabitants of Camden, 82 Me. 535, 535-36, 537, 20 A. 91, 91-92 (1890) (juror discussed during deliberations his personal knowledge acquired before the trial regarding the plaintiff's realty). The mere communication of personal knowledge by a juror to his fellow jurors during deliberations, however improper that communication may be, is part of the deliberative process itself, and therefore not extraneous. See J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2354, at 712 (McNaughton ed. 1961) (The communication of a juror's personal knowledge during retirement is of course improper.... Nevertheless, his use and his fellows' use of that information during their deliberations is rather to be regarded as affecting the grounds of their verdict, and thus [may not be proved through the statement of a juror].). We repeat the policy considerations that support the rule prohibiting the use of juror testimony concerning what transpired during deliberations to impeach the verdict: (1) the need for stability of verdicts; (2) the need to conclude litigation; (3) the need to protect jurors in their communications to fellow jurors made in the confidence of secrecy of the jury room; (4) the need to save jurors harmless from tampering and harassment by disappointed litigants; (5) the need to foreclose jurors from abetting the setting aside of verdicts to which they may have agreed reluctantly in the first place or about which they may in the light of subsequent developments have doubts or a change of attitude. Cyr, 454 A.2d at 1383 (quoting Patterson, 245 A.2d at 857). To allow the use of evidence of a juror's statement to show the communication by a juror to the rest of the jury during deliberations of personal knowledge that the juror brought into the trial with him, however improper that communication might be, would open virtually every verdict to subsequent attack by disappointed litigants and defeat the policy goals listed above. See Cyr, 454 A.2d at 1383-84. The appropriate time to explore the personal knowledge of the individual jurors is during voir dire. The presiding justice did not err by refusing to consider the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs. Because there was no other evidence of juror misconduct, the motion for a new trial on that ground was properly denied.