Opinion ID: 726119
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application of Miller v. Colortyme

Text: 34 Two elements are necessary for a statute to be ex post facto in violation of the Constitution 4 : it must apply to events that occurred before its enactment; and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). The CCSA, the RPAA, and the general usury statute existed in their present form when the parties entered into the rental purchase contracts at issue in this case. Accordingly, the statutes themselves are not subject to ex post facto analysis. 35 A judicial decision which meets both elements also violates the ex post facto clause and cannot be applied retroactively. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1702-1703, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). This occurs when a judicial decision unforeseeably enlarges a statute to cover conduct that was not offensive before the judicial pronouncement. Id. If the judicial construction is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue it violates the ex post facto clause and must not be given retroactive effect. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S.Ct. at 1703. 36 RAC contends the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Colortyme changed the substantive elements of a usury claim by making it unnecessary for plaintiffs to prove the first two elements, the extension of credit and the absolute obligation to repay it. In RAC's view, the Miller decision acts as an ex post facto law and must not be applied retroactively. 37 The Miller decision did not change the elements of a usury claim. It is a judicial interpretation of the statutory scheme that existed long before the present contracts were made. The judicial construction in Miller is not unexpected or indefensible by reference to the statutory framework already in place. On the contrary, the judicial construction of those statutes is reasonable and foreseeable, gives full meaning to the statutory language, operates in the manner clearly intended by the legislature, and furthers the consumer protection objectives of the statutes. In addition, Miller does not overrule any prior contrary ruling of the Minnesota Supreme Court upon which RAC might justifiably have relied. 38 In short, Miller did not change existing law--it simply stated a reasonable and correct interpretation of the law which differs from the erroneous view RAC had chosen to follow. 39 For the reasons stated above, RAC's constitutional challenges to the Miller v. Colortyme decision must be rejected. The district court was correct in ruling in accordance with Miller, that the first two elements of the usury claim in this case are established by operation of the CCSA and the usury statute.