Opinion ID: 3062086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Confirmation of the Joint Plan

Text: Section 1129(a)(3) provides that a Chapter 11 plan can only be confirmed if it was “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.” The Code does not explain what “good faith” means in this context. See 6 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. § 112:10 (3d ed. 2012). “Case law under the Code, however, has tended to define the good-faith requirement as requiring only that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result consistent with the standards prescribed under the Code.” Id. In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pikes Peak Water Co. (In re Pikes Peak Water Co.), 779 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1985), we quoted the bankruptcy court’s articulation of the standard: The test of good faith is met if there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve its intended results which are consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, that is, is the plan feasible, practical, and would it enable the 32 company to continue its business and pay its debts in accordance with the plan provisions. Id. at 1459. We noted that “[i]n finding a lack of good faith, courts have looked to whether the debtor intended to abuse the judicial process and the purposes of the reorganization provisions.” Id. at 1460. “Not confirming the plan for lack of good faith is appropriate particularly when there is no realistic possibility of an effective reorganization and it is evident that the debtor seeks merely to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of secured creditors to enforce their rights.” Id. We reaffirm today that the test of good faith under § 1129(a)(3) focuses on whether a plan is likely to achieve its goals and whether those goals are consistent with the Code’s purposes. ConsumerInfo argues, and we agree, that a plan proponent’s selfinterested motive does not necessarily indicate a lack of good faith. But SMDI does not take issue with ConsumerInfo’s motivations in proposing the Joint Plan. Indeed, it is surely beyond dispute that both parties proposed their plans in pursuit of their own selfinterested goal. Rather, we understand SMDI’s arguments to be that the Joint Plan was not proposed in good faith because ConsumerInfo’s co-proponent, the Trustee, was corrupted by a conflict of interest of ConsumerInfo’s creation, and because ConsumerInfo had taken unethical steps to prevent SMDI from jointly proposing a competing plan with the debtor. Applying Pikes Peak, the bankruptcy court concluded that the Joint Plan was proposed in good faith because it was both feasible and workable and sought to achieve results consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. Paige, 2007 WL 4143212, 33 at . The bankruptcy court did not err. A plan may, in light of its proponent’s actions or relationships, be incapable of achieving goals consistent with the Code. The bankruptcy court in In re Fiesta Homes of Ga., Inc., 125 B.R. 321, 325 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1990), for instance, recognized that the proponent’s conflicts of interest made diligent pursuit of certain preference actions unlikely and made an appearance of impropriety inevitable. Accordingly, the proposed plan was not likely to achieve a result consistent with the Code—namely, “maximum recovery by and fair distribution to creditors.” Id.; see also In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 271 B.R. 228, 240 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (“We easily conclude from the totality of circumstances . . . that a continuous conflict of interest by the CEO of the Debtor precludes the Debtors from proposing a plan in good faith under 1129(a)(3).”). In In re Unichem Corp., 72 B.R. 95, 100 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987), the court concluded that the plan at issue was designed to reward its proponent, an individual whose “inequitable conduct was the cause of [the debtor’s] financial distress.” Such a result was inherently “in conflict with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. Thus, we do not rule out the possibility that a plan could be unconfirmable under § 1129(a)(3) because of the proponent’s conflicts of interest or improper conduct. Nonetheless, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s decision because no conflict of interest or unethical action on the part of ConsumerInfo or the Trustee demonstrated a lack of good faith in this case.
34 SMDI argues that conflicts of interest prevented Jubber from proposing a plan as a disinterested trustee. This argument turns on the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that trustees be “disinterested.” § 1104(b), (d). In relevant part, the Code defines a disinterested person as someone who “does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other reason.” § 101(14)(C).5 SMDI relies on the “for any other reason” portion of this definition. It contends, in essence, that ConsumerInfo’s payment to the estate of the Trustee’s litigation expenses under the APA—and its promise to continue to pay his fees as Trustee for the Liquidating Trust—created a disabling conflict. According to SMDI, the resulting “lack of disinterestedness tainted his administration of the case, the Joint Plan, and the plan confirmation process.” Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 32. “These are serious matters that . . . go to the very integrity of the bankruptcy process in this case.” Paige, 584 F.3d at 1348. We hold bankruptcy trustees and the professionals they employ to a high standard where conflicts of interest are concerned; the “catch-all clause” upon which SMDI relies “is broad enough to exclude [a trustee] with some interest or relationship that ‘would even faintly color the independence and impartial attitude required by the Code and Bankruptcy Rules.’” Winship v. Cook (In re 5 The Trustee’s law firm was also subject to the disinterestedness requirement. Professionals employed by a trustee to administer the estate must be disinterested, and also cannot “hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate.” § 327(a). 35 Cook), 223 B.R. 782, 789 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re BH&P, Inc., 949 F.2d 1300, 1309 (3d Cir. 1991)). We are satisfied, however, that no such interest or relationship was present here. We emphasize, first, that although ConsumerInfo provided the funds which paid the Trustee’s fees, ConsumerInfo was not paying the fees directly. Rather, the estate itself paid the Trustee (upon his application for and receipt of the court’s approval), with money the estate received from ConsumerInfo pursuant to the court-approved APA. As the district court noted, “SMDI has failed to cite . . . a single case where a trustee’s court approved and non-personal relationships resulted in the denial of . . . confirmation [of a] plan because the trustee was not disinterested.” Paige, 439 B.R. at 793. We agree with the view the BAP expressed in the Fee Appeal that the bankruptcy court’s Sale Order—and not the Trustee or ConsumerInfo—was the source of any potential conflict or appearance of impropriety. Paige, 2010 WL 3699747, at  n.74; Paige, No. 08-62, slip op. at 7–8. SMDI never appealed or challenged that order. See Paige, 2007 WL 4143212, at . We recognize, as a general proposition, that “[a]n attorney representing a debtor should not receive payment, either directly or indirectly, from any of the creditors.” In re Huntmar Beaumeade 1 Ltd. P’ship, 127 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (quoting In re WPMK, 42 B.R. 157, 163 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But under the circumstances of this case, we are unwilling to take this principle so far as to bar the estate from paying the Trustee and his firm with 36 funds the estate received under a court-approved asset sale.6 A contrary conclusion, we believe, would have placed the estate in an untenable position. SMDI asks us to hold that the Trustee lost his disinterested status after the APA had already been approved, when ConsumerInfo acquired the CCB Claims. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 32. But as the BAP noted in the Fee Appeal, any other trustee stepping into Jubber’s shoes at that point would have been subject to the same obligations to ConsumerInfo under the APA, and any such trustee would have been paid by the estate with money from ConsumerInfo.7 Thus, if the Trustee was not disinterested, we fail to 6 We note that nothing in the record suggests that ConsumerInfo deliberately delayed asserting the CCB Claims so that it could first obtain court approval of the APA and then create a conflict. CCB filed its proof of claim in October 2006 for expenditures it made on development of the Domain Name. Fee App., Aplee. Br. at 10. In December, the court entered the Sale Order. CCB amended its claim in January 2007, and ConsumerInfo bought CCB’s rights and interests in the Domain Name that same month. As the Trustee points out in his Fee Appeal response brief, ConsumerInfo’s actions look less like a deliberate attempt to manufacture a court-endorsed conflict of interest, and more like an effort to “hedg[e] its bets” once it discovered that a new party might have a claim to the Domain Name. Id. at 32. 7 The BAP reasoned as follows: We observe, as a factual matter, that even if the Trustee and Counsel resigned from representing the estate when ConsumerInfo purchased the CCB conversion claim (as SMDI contends should have occurred), any successor trustee and its counsel would have inherited exactly the same alleged “adversity” or “conflict” that SMDI imputes to the Trustee and Counsel. The APA and Sale Order imposed obligations on the estate, the breach of which could have exposed the estate to litigation for specific performance and/or the assertion of an administrative claim by ConsumerInfo. SMDI contends that those very duties required the Trustee to favor ConsumerInfo’s interests over the interests of the estate’s other creditors, and created a conflict between the Trustee and the estate. This argument was rejected by the bankruptcy court in (continued...) 37 see how any substitute trustee could have been disinterested either. SMDI suggests that special counsel or an examiner could have been appointed for the purpose of evaluating the CCB Claims. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 36 n.191. But since all of the money in the estate came from ConsumerInfo, any such professional still would have been receiving payment from ConsumerInfo via the estate, just as the Trustee and his firm did. SMDI also argues that it should have been allowed to object to the CCB Claims. Id. The bankruptcy court, however, told SMDI that it could contest ConsumerInfo’s claims by 7 (...continued) the unappealed Sale Order when it overruled “on [its] merits with prejudice” SMDI’s objection that the APA required the Trustee to “surrender [his] business judgment and independence to ConsumerInfo.” Under SMDI’s interpretation of Sections 327(a) and 101(14), no one could have qualified to be employed to represent the estate or to carry out the estate’s duties under the APA and Sale Order because every successor trustee would be faced with the same circumstances and thus the same alleged conflict. The alleged conflict was inherent in the position of trustee as a representative of the estate; it is not personal to this Trustee or Counsel. Paige, 2010 WL 3699747, at  n.74. The BAP stood by this analysis in its denial of SMDI’s motion for rehearing, stating: The alleged “conflict” between the Trustee’s duty to perform the APA and the Trustee’s duty to address the CCB-Related Claims was . . . situational and inherent in the posture of the case. . . . [I]f these two overlapping events disqualified the Trustee and Counsel from representing the estate, anyone else seeking to be employed to represent the estate would be confronted with the same conflict. Retaining special “independent counsel,” as suggested by SMDI, would not have altered the status quo because special counsel would still be employed and directed by the Trustee. Paige, No. 08-62, slip op. at 7–8. We find the BAP’s reasoning persuasive. 38 filing counterclaims within the Adversary Proceeding, and it chose not to do so. Paige, 2007 WL 4143212, at . Finally, SMDI suggests that “[t]he APA could have been modified.” Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 36 n.191. It does not explain how. Simply put, we see no effective solution the bankruptcy court could have implemented, short of barring ConsumerInfo outright from pursuing the CCB Claims or else taking over the role of the Trustee. SMDI offers no authority for either approach, and we are aware of none. iii. ConsumerInfo’s Pre-Sale Order Conduct Does Not Demonstrate Bad Faith SMDI also argues that ConsumerInfo’s pre-APA conduct demonstrates that the Joint Plan was not proposed in good faith. According to SMDI, ConsumerInfo acted in bad faith to prevent Paige from filing a joint plan with SMDI. Then, SMDI argues, ConsumerInfo was able to obtain court approval of the APA because no plan had been proposed. According to SMDI, the APA, in turn, prevented SMDI from gaining confirmation of its own plan. Thus, SMDI argues that the bankruptcy court should have refused to confirm the Joint Plan on the basis that it was not proposed in good faith. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 45–46. We disagree. The bankruptcy court made specific factual findings, in its memorandum decision confirming the Joint Plan, regarding the conduct of Paige and ConsumerInfo. The bankruptcy court “f[ound] any allegations of attempted bribery of Mr. Paige or subversion of a purported joint plan by the Debtor and SMDI unsubstantiated.” Paige, 2007 WL 4143212, at . The court also acknowledged that it had been troubled by 39 ConsumerInfo’s conduct, but said that “any concerns of the Court . . . have been addressed and allayed by the Joint Plan proponents in the evidence presented.” Id. The court concluded that “Mr. Paige ignored the advice of his own attorney and kept his attorney in the dark regarding his contacts with ConsumerInfo.” Id. Although the court thought “ConsumerInfo’s attorneys should have known that . . . Mr. Paige was being represented by counsel, . . . engaging in these communications, albeit possibly improper under ethical rules, does not translate into filing of a plan by ‘means forbidden by law’ and not in ‘good faith’ eight months later.” Id. In the court’s view, the passage of eight months from the sale hearing to when the Joint Plan was filed “erodes and waters down much of the argument that SMDI has made.” Id. at . The bankruptcy court also determined that SMDI was not prejudiced by ConsumerInfo’s conduct. Rather, SMDI’s failure to file a plan prior to the sale hearing resulted primarily from SMDI’s “mistaken belief that the Debtor had the exclusive right to file a plan after conversion of the case to one under Chapter 11. SMDI . . . was waiting on the Debtor to file a joint plan. SMDI has since acknowledged that this interpretation was incorrect.” Id. at . Furthermore, “if SMDI was prejudiced between October 13 and December 7,” the court determined that “it was because of Mr. Paige’s conduct and not because of any wrongdoing by ConsumerInfo or its counsel.” Id. These factual findings are not clearly erroneous.8 8 SMDI argues that the bankruptcy court only arrived at these conclusions because (continued...) 40 The district court concluded that even if the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of good faith under Pikes Peak was overly narrow, “SMDI’s allegations of improper interference by ConsumerInfo are unpersuasive.” Paige, 439 B.R. at 796. We agree. Even if ConsumerInfo’s attorneys acted improperly in the period preceding the Sale Order, these actions did not prevent the SMDI Plan from receiving “an adequate and balanced appraisal.” Paige, 584 F.3d at 1348. Considering the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact, “the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that ConsumerInfo’s conduct was not in bad faith.”9 Paige, 439 B.R. at 796. 8 (...continued) it refused to consider some of SMDI’s evidence. In particular, SMDI objects to the bankruptcy court’s failure to consider transcriptions of voicemails Paige left for ConsumerInfo’s attorneys and its refusal to allow SMDI to call ConsumerInfo’s attorneys as witnesses. Conf. App., Aplt. Reply Br. at 15–16 (citing Conf. App., Aplt. App. at 2685–97). As we read them, however, the transcribed voicemails do not contradict the bankruptcy court’s findings. We do not think the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in declining to make ConsumerInfo’s attorneys testify about them, see Paige, 439 B.R. at 797 (“The excluded voice mails did not show any evidence of bribery and it is unclear what testimony from ConsumerInfo’s counsel would have added.”), or in excluding any of the other evidence to which SMDI points, Rinehart v. Sharp (In re Sharp), 361 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2007) (“When a trial court excludes evidence upon which the offering party properly objects, we will reverse only if the exclusion is an abuse of discretion that results in manifest injustice to the parties.” (quotation omitted)). 9 We do not reach ConsumerInfo’s contention that SMDI’s good faith arguments are barred because SMDI did not appeal the bankruptcy court’s Sale Order. ConsumerInfo suggests somewhat vaguely that the Sale Order constitutes the law of the case, that the Sale Order “was res judicata on the parties and the court,” and that SMDI’s good faith arguments are an impermissible collateral attack on the Sale Order. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 40–41. Because we affirm the bankruptcy court’s determination that the Joint Plan was proposed in good faith, we need not rule on these arguments. 41
In addition to disputing whether the Joint Plan was proposed in good faith, SMDI raises substantive challenges to the Joint Plan’s terms. The Joint Plan, SMDI argues, should not have been confirmed because it was not fair and equitable. Section 1129(a)(8) requires that a plan be accepted by any class of claims or interests that is impaired. In § 1129(b), however, the Code provides an exception: if an impaired class does not accept the plan, the court “shall confirm the plan notwithstanding [§ 1129(a)(8)] if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class . . . that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.” § 1129(b)(1). The Code explains that “the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes” the requirement that “[w]ith respect to a class of interests . . . the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any property.” §§ 1129(b)(2), 1129(b)(2)(C)(ii). This requirement, known as the absolute priority rule, “requires that certain classes of claimants be paid in full before any member of a subordinate class is paid.” See Allen v. Geneva Steel Co. (In re Geneva Steel Co.), 281 F.3d 1173, 1180 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002). In this case, SMDI held the residual interest; there was no junior class of interests that could have received property. SMDI, therefore, does not dispute that the rule was satisfied. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 47. SMDI argues, however, that compliance with the absolute priority rule does not necessarily end the “fair and equitable” analysis. The bankruptcy court concluded that the Joint Plan complied with § 1129(b) 42 because it “d[id] not discriminate unfairly in that all similar claims [we]re treated the same” and because the absolute priority rule was satisfied. Paige, 2007 WL 4143212, at . The district court concurred. Although it acknowledged that “some courts have found that the absolute priority rule does not end the ‘fair and equitable’ inquiry,” it reasoned that “the Tenth Circuit has indicated that a plan can be ‘fair and equitable’ once the absolute priority rule is satisfied.” Paige, 439 B.R. at 800 (citing Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506, 1507–08 (10th Cir. 1993)). SMDI contends that the district court read Unruh and the statutory language too narrowly. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 47. There is some authority for SMDI’s open-ended view of the fair and equitable requirement,10 but we need not decide here whether to endorse it. Even if we did, none of the Joint Plan provisions SMDI points to would have precluded the plan’s confirmation.
SMDI first argues that the Joint Plan was unfair because it included a provision expressly preventing the Liquidating Trustee from voluntarily accepting a monetary 10 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Pacific Lumber), 584 F.3d 229, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Even a plan compliant with the[] alternative minimum standards [of § 1129(b)(2)] is not necessarily fair and equitable.”); In re Grandfather Mountain Ltd. P’ship, 207 B.R. 475, 487 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1996) (“[T]he plan must literally be fair and equitable. The determination . . . must be made on a case-by-case basis and depends upon the specific facts and circumstances of each case.” (citation omitted)); 7-1129 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.03[4][b][ii] (16th ed. 2012) (“[S]ome courts have incorrectly read the interplay of section 1129(b)(1) and section 1129(b)(2) to be an exhaustive delineation of the fair and equitable rule . . . .”). 43 recovery in lieu of the Domain Name if he prevailed in the AP. According to SMDI, the estate had the right, under the APA, to take the value of the Domain Name instead of recovering the name itself. This right, SMDI argues, was worth millions of dollars.11 Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 48–49. In consideration for the estate abandoning this right, ConsumerInfo promised in the Joint Plan to fund the Adversary Proceeding, subordinate the CCB Claims, and pay up to $300,000 to resolve claims (other than the CCB Claims) against the estate. Id. at 49. SMDI argues that the consideration the estate received was inadequate. This argument is flawed. We think the consideration ConsumerInfo provided was worth more and the right the estate waived was worth less than SMDI recognizes. While SMDI says ConsumerInfo failed to prove the value of subordination of the CCB Claims, the bankruptcy court estimated Claim 42-1 at $225,000, and nothing in the record suggests that Claim 27-2 was not worth its face value of over $130,000. SMDI also asserts that ConsumerInfo’s promise to fund the AP “provided no value to the estate” simply because the Trustee agreed not to elect a monetary remedy in lieu of the Domain Name. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 49. To the contrary, even if the estate planned to turn 11 SMDI reasons as follows: If the estate chose to accept the Domain Name, it had to turn it over to ConsumerInfo for no additional consideration. If, on the other hand, it accepted monetary compensation for SMDI’s conversion of the name, it would keep 75% of that recovery under § 1.1(d) of the APA. See APA § 1.1(d) (providing that ConsumerInfo would “receive 25% of the Net Proceeds from Monetary Recoveries”). Thus, if the Domain Name was worth $5,000,000, the estate waived the right to elect a $3,750,000 recovery. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 48–49. 44 over to ConsumerInfo the primary fruit of the AP—the Domain Name—it also hoped to recover monetary damages (of which it would retain 75%). Thus, it still stood to gain from ConsumerInfo funding the AP. More critically, however, SMDI overlooks the fact that the election of remedies waiver was worth very little if, as the bankruptcy court and district court both believed, the APA already required the estate to do its best to recover the Domain Name. In confirming the Joint Plan, the bankruptcy court concluded that the APA did not give the estate the option of accepting money instead of the Domain Name in the first place. Paige, 2007 WL 4143212, at  (“The court further finds that there is a reasonable basis for the Trustee to convey the Domain Name to ConsumerInfo, if recovered, because the Trustee is obligated to do so under the APA.”). The bankruptcy court restated the same conclusion more explicitly two years later in its Adversary Proceeding decision. There, it concluded that the “APA required that . . . if the Trustee was successful in proving that the Domain Name was the property of the estate, or otherwise recovered the Domain Name, he would be required to deliver the Domain Name to ConsumerInfo. The . . . APA did not contemplate the delivery of value of the Domain Name in lieu of the Domain Name itself.” Paige, 413 B.R. at 901. The district court agreed that the 75%-25% provision existed to allocate damages recovered in addition to the Domain Name. Paige, 443 B.R. at 891. To the extent it could do so in good faith, the Trustee had a duty to recover the Domain Name and turn it over to ConsumerInfo. If these courts were correct, then ConsumerInfo was not, as SMDI claims, buying a right worth $3,750,000. Rather, 45 ConsumerInfo was buying only peace of mind by gaining the estate’s express abandonment of a right it probably did not even possess. We need not decide whether the bankruptcy court and district court were right on this point or not. We only have to determine whether the chances of SMDI’s interpretation prevailing were sufficiently doubtful that the estate’s acceptance of less than 75% of the Domain Name’s value was fair. We think that even if the courts’ interpretation of the APA was not the only possible reading of that document, it was at least a reasonable one. Thus, the Joint Plan only deprived the estate of a right to elect remedies that likely did not exist. Even if an unfair compromise of claims could have made the Joint Plan unfair to SMDI’s interest under § 1129(b), we reject SMDI’s argument that the consideration the estate received was inadequate.
SMDI’s second argument has to do with the Joint Plan’s provision that objections to the CCB Claims “shall be deferred until there are Monetary Recoveries or other funds to pay them.” Conf. App., Joint Plan ¶ 3.3. Such funds would become available, if at all, only after the conclusion of the AP.12 SMDI, however, wished to object to the CCB Claims before the AP terminated. If, while the AP was pending, SMDI had been able to eliminate the CCB Claims or significantly lower their estimated value, SMDI argues that 12 Such monetary recoveries, of course, would have been paid by SMDI. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court did not award any damages to the Liquidating Trust. The Trustee appealed the issue to the district court, which affirmed, and he did not appeal further. 46 it would have had sufficient funds to settle the AP by paying all claims against the estate. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 12–13, 15. Once the AP was over, a successful objection to the CCB Claims could no longer permit SMDI to settle the AP and keep the Domain Name. SMDI argues, therefore, that deferment of objections to the CCB Claims was an inequitable term designed to inflict “special prejudice” on SMDI. Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 50 (quoting Grandfather Mountain Ltd. P’ship, 207 B.R. at 487). Like the bankruptcy court, we are not blind to the parties’ intentions in this litigation. We have no doubt that the objection-delaying provision was of strategic value in ConsumerInfo’s effort to see the AP litigated to its conclusion. But SMDI simply does not provide any authority for the proposition that this provision inflicted the kind of “special prejudice” that could require denial of the Joint Plan’s confirmation. Any legitimate claims or interests SMDI had in this case were protected under the Joint Plan. SMDI’s claims, like those of other creditors, were paid in full, with interest. Moreover, the Joint Plan specified that if the Liquidating Trust were to recover funds that could benefit SMDI’s interest, SMDI would have its chance to object to the CCB Claims (which would otherwise be paid first). In its capacity as an interest-holder, SMDI had nothing to gain from objecting to the CCB Claims unless and until there was a monetary recovery in the AP. To the extent that SMDI was prejudiced by the Joint Plan, the prejudice had nothing to do with its status as a creditor or interest-holder in the estate. Of course, SMDI wanted a plan that would ensure settlement of the AP, while ConsumerInfo wanted a plan 47 that would make settlement less likely. But to the extent that SMDI had a right to try to maneuver the confirmation process toward a settlement that would let it keep property it obtained in violation of the automatic stay, this simply was not a right the Joint Plan was obligated to protect. iii. Bar on SMDI Objecting to Post-Confirmation Fees Finally, the Joint Plan barred SMDI from objecting to the Liquidating Trustee’s fees and provided that only the U.S. Trustee had standing to do so. SMDI argues that this restriction on fee objections was also a term of “special prejudice.” Conf. App., Aplt. Br. at 50. We cannot agree. ConsumerInfo and the Trustee had a legitimate reason for including this term. If they had not included it, SMDI could have continued to challenge the Liquidating Trustee’s fees in order to impede his ability to litigate the AP against SMDI. We do not see how SMDI was unfairly prejudiced by its inability to do so.