Opinion ID: 3065761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The FEHA13

Text: DFEH appeals the district court’s conclusion that Lucent’s interaction with Carauddo was sufficient under California law. Lucent III, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at -40. For the following reasons, we agree with the district court. [12] Under the FEHA,14 “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to deter13 Although Carauddo’s only substantive claim on appeal is his common law claim of wrongful termination, we will consider the substance of his arguments regarding the FEHA, as his wrongful termination claim is entirely reliant on a finding of discrimination under the FEHA. See Lucent III, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at -42. 14 “[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying [its] own statutes.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000). Nevertheless, “because FEHA provides protections independent from those in the [ADA] and afford[s] additional protections [than thereof, the ADA] . . . state law will part ways with federal law in order to advance the legislative goal of providing greater protection to employees than the ADA.” Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 5370 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES mine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n). “[T]he interactive process requires communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual employees with the goal of identify[ing] an accommodation that allows the employee to perform the job effectively.” Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). [13] During Carauddo’s disability period, he was in contact with at least two Lucent employees, Utermahlen and his immediate supervisor, Claudine Strange, yet failed to bring to Lucent’s attention any possible accommodations that it had not considered. Any failure to interact adequately, therefore, was caused by Carauddo and, as a result, Lucent cannot be held liable. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourts should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown [in the interactive process] and then assign responsibility so that liability . . . ensues only where the employer bears responsibility for the breakdown.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Thus, this undisputed evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to DFEH’s failure to interact claim.15 15 Although Carauddo did not participate in any of Lucent’s internal conversation regarding available accommodation, this does not render Lucent in violation of the FEHA, as Carauddo never expressed a desire to return to work with accommodation. See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115. Furthermore, the law affords employers the ability to have some internal discussion. See id. (“The interactive process requires that employers analyze job functions to establish the essential and nonessential job tasks.”). DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5371
DFEH appeals the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Lucent on DFEH’s reasonable accommodation claim, arguing there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lucent failed to reasonably accommodate Carauddo. Lucent III, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at -36. For the following reasons, we agree with the district court. [14] Pursuant to the FEHA, it is unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical . . . disability of an . . . employee.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m). An employer, however, is not required to provide “an accommodation that is demonstrated by the employer . . . to produce undue hardship to its operation.” Id. “Reasonable accommodation may include either . . . [m]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities” or “[j]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(n). An “employer cannot prevail on summary judgment on a claim of failure to reasonably accommodate unless it establishes through undisputed facts” that “reasonable accommodation was offered and refused,” that “there simply was no vacant position within the employer’s organization for which the disabled employee was qualified and which the disabled employee was capable of performing with or without accommodation,” or that “the employer did everything in its power to find a reasonable accommodation, but the informal interactive process broke down because the employee failed to engage in discussions in good faith.” Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).16 16 It is clear that California law affords Carauddo a right to a reasonable accommodation, regardless of whether he specifically sought it. See Hum5372 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES [15] The essential functions of the installer position included “frequently” lifting up to thirty pounds from waist to overhead, “occasionally” lifting up to fifty pounds from floor to waist, and “frequently” carrying up to fifty pounds for as long as one hundred feet.17 ER 516. When Carauddo was no longer physically able to perform these functions,18 Lucent’s plan afforded him a disability period to rehabilitate.19 See Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487, 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that “a finite leave of absence has been considered to be a reasonable accommodation under phrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[o]nce an employer becomes aware of the need for accommodation, that employer has a mandatory obligation . . . to engage in an interactive process with the employee to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations”). 17 Lucent’s functional job description defines “occasionally” as constituting “6-33% of the time in an 8 hour work day,” “frequently” as constituting “34-66% of the time in an 8 hour work day,” and “continuously” as constituting “67-100% of the time in an 8 hour work day.” ER 516. 18 Lucent’s written job description, supported by numerous employee accounts, can be relied upon to establish the essential functions of the installer position, regardless of what Carauddo’s individual experience in that position may have entailed. See Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 2006) (providing that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of the job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 19 If Lucent had done nothing other than provide Carauddo with a paid leave of absence, it is likely that Lucent would have violated Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m) because it would have failed to consider other possibilities such as job restructuring, modification of equipment, and reassignment. See Jensen, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 68 (a leave of absence is a reasonable accommodation only if “the employee will be able to return to an existing position at some time in the foreseeable future”); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12926(n). During Carauddo’s disability period, however, the evidence shows that Lucent attempted, without success, to further accommodate him, as indicated in the text. DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5373 ADA, provided it is likely that following the leave the employee would be able to perform his or her duties”); Jensen, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 68. During this time, Lucent repeatedly considered whether Carauddo could perform the tasks of an installer given his physical restrictions or alternatively be placed in another position, but it determined that he could not.20 Lucent was not required to do more under California law, such as modifying the installer position or extending the disability period indefinitely. See Dark, 451 F.3d at 1089 (providing that reasonable accommodation “does not require an employer to exempt an employee from performing essential functions or to reallocate essential functions to other employees”); Hanson, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494 (providing that an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee “does not require the employer to wait indefinitely for an employee’s medical condition to be corrected” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nadaf-Rahrov, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 222. Furthermore, as previously discussed, Carauddo failed to engage in or seek to be included in any discussion regarding what accommodations were available. Thus, as a matter of law, the undisputed evidence cannot support a finding that Lucent failed to provide Carauddo with a reasonable accommodation.21 20 The question of whether an alternative position was available frequently raises a genuine issue of material fact in reasonable accommodation cases. See Spitzer v. Good Guys, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Neither DFEH nor Carauddo, however, raise this claim. 21 Although there is evidence that certain devices, such as dowels, dollies, Masonite, hoists, crowbars, and drift pins, were used by installers to alleviate lifting the heaviest weights, the same evidence shows that these tools did not eliminate all of the strenuous lifting. For instance, it is clear that installers had to tip heavy frames back in order to slide an assistive device underneath. In addition, even with the assistance of the such devices, installers had to manually maneuver heavy frames in order to “muscle [them] into place.” ER 281:4. The evidence also shows that battery hoists could be used to move heavy batteries, but these devices were limited to specific objects and certain locations. These tools, therefore, could not eliminate all lifting requirements from the installer position. Fur5374 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES
DFEH next challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Lucent on DFEH’s disability discrimination claim, arguing, inter alia, that genuine issues of material fact exist as to pretext. Lucent III, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at -36. For the following reasons, we affirm. [16] “The FEHA prohibits discrimination against any person with a disability but, like the ADA, provides that the law allows the employer to discharge an employee with a physical disability when that employee is unable to perform the essential duties of the job even with reasonable accommodation.” Green v. California, 165 P.3d 118, 119 (Cal. 2007); see Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)(1). “California has adopted the threestage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination . . . based on a theory of disparate treatment” because “such claims must usually be proved circumstantially.”22 Guz, 8 P.3d at 1113. Generally, “the plaintiff [has] an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220. When an employer moves for summary judgment, however, “the burden is reversed . . . because the defendant who seeks summary judgment bears the initial burden.” Hanson, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]o prevail on summary judgment, [the employer is] thermore, some of the very devices that DFEH claims could have accommodated Carauddo are listed as equipment used to perform the installer job by the same functional job description that described the fifty pound lifting and carrying requirements. This evidence shows that the lifting and carrying requirements of the installer position contemplated these assistive tools. 22 The McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), framework is applicable in this case because there is no evidence that “proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5375 required to show either that (1) plaintiff could not establish one of the elements of [the] FEHA claim or (2) there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment.” Avila v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
To demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Carauddo, Lucent “must show that the procedure by which [he] was terminated was validly and fairly devised and administered to serve a legitimate business purpose.” Hanson, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the FEHA, employers are afforded an inability to perform defense. See Green, 165 P.3d at 125; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 7293.8(b). Specifically, the FEHA provides: This part does not prohibit an employer from . . . discharging an employee with a physical or mental disability, or subject an employer to any legal liability resulting from . . . the discharge of an employee with a physical or mental disability, where the employee, because of his or her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger his or her health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable accommodations. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)(1). [17] As previously discussed, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Carauddo’s inability to perform the essential functions of the installer position, and Lucent’s inability to reasonably accommodate him.23 This same evidence estab23 The undisputed facts establish that Carauddo was not cleared by his doctor to perform the essential functions of the installer position because 5376 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES lishes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Carauddo’s termination. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)(1). Thus, the burden shifts to DFEH to show pretext.
[18] “Once the employer makes a sufficient showing . . . then the discharged employee seeking to avert summary judgment must . . . demonstrate either . . . that the defendant’s showing was in fact insufficient or . . . that there was a triable issue of fact material to the defendant’s showing.” Hanson, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted). The employee can satisfy its burden by “produc[ing] substantial responsive evidence that the employer’s showing was untrue or pretextual.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A “plaintiff may establish pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence to satisfy this burden, such evidence “must be specific” and “substantial.” Id. at 1221. “An employee in this situation can not simply show the employer’s decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise.” Morgan v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Rather, the employee must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence . . . and hence infer that the employer did not act for Dr. Kaisler-Meza’s January 2006 report only released Carauddo to spend a maximum of thirty-five percent of his day lifting or carrying between twenty-one and fifty pounds, whereas, an installer is required to carry up to fifty pounds for up to sixty-six percent of the day. Even in February, he was cleared to lift a maximum of only thirty pounds. DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5377 the . . . non-discriminatory reasons.” Id. (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted).24 First, DFEH argues that Lucent increased the lifting and carrying requirements for the installer position to one-hundred pounds when it was informed that Carauddo could lift and carry fifty pounds. The evidence shows that sometime during Carauddo’s disability period, Lucent’s Director of Operations for installation in the United States, Christopher Camacho, created an Occupational Requirements form (“the form”) for the installer position. The form indicated that installers were required to frequently lift and carry weights between fifty and one-hundred pounds, and occasionally lift and carry weights exceeding one-hundred pounds. This one-hundred pound requirement from the form is inconsistent with the official job description, and Camacho himself refers to only a fifty pound requirement in his October 2008 declaration. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the record is clear that at no time before Carauddo’s termination in January 2006 did any of his doctors clear him to perform the essential functions of the installer position as described by Lucent’s official job description. Any evidence of a one-hundred pound requirement therefore is inconsequential, as at the time of his termination Carauddo was not demonstrated to be physically capable of frequently carrying weights up to fifty pounds for onehundred feet. Next, DFEH and Carauddo argue that Lucent’s skepticism about Carauddo’s ability to lift fifty pounds is evidence of pretext. This argument, however, lacks merit because the evidence most favorable to Carauddo shows that in January he was released to work with certain restrictions, including only occasionally carrying amounts up to fifty pounds. The job description, however, required “frequent” carries of fifty 24 Although DFEH failed to argue pretext before the district court, we will consider pretext because the allegation of a “discriminatory animus” was raised below. See Morgan, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 670. 5378 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES pounds. His post-termination FCE and doctor report were even more limited. [19] DFEH and Carauddo also argue that the circum- stances surrounding the scheduling of Carauddo’s FCE raise a genuine issue of material fact. Carauddo additionally argues that Lucent’s failure to consider the results of the FCE could establish a pretext. The evidence suggests that Utermahlen originally requested an FCE for Carauddo on January 20, 2006, but cancelled this request three days later. On January 31, 2006, six days after his termination, Carauddo underwent a scheduled FCE and was cleared to return to work, but with various hour restrictions below that required of an installer. Furthermore, fatigue prevented Carauddo from physically demonstrating that he could lift or carry fifty pounds at the FCE. The scheduling of the FCE, therefore, fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext, as it did not show that Carauddo could perform the essential functions of the installer position. [20] Additionally, DFEH and Carauddo argue that Lucent has a one-hundred percent healed policy and that this raises a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. Although Utermahlen informed Carauddo’s wife that he “must be onehundred percent to return to gainful employment” and Lucent’s policy provides disabled employees with an additional six months of unpaid leave only if their “prognosis for full recovery is within six months of the expiration of [their] sickness disability benefits,” this evidence does not establish pretext because here the undisputed facts demonstrate that Lucent attempted to accommodate him by continually assessing him on an individual basis. ER 354, 441; see Gelfo, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 886 n.11 (a “policy requiring an employee be ‘100 percent healed’ before returning to work is a per se violation” when the employer does not make an individualized assessment of whether the employee can perform essential functions of position with accommodation). This evidence, therefore, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5379 [21] DFEH’s contention that Lucent’s continual reference to the degenerative nature of Carauddo’s disability establishes a pretext is similarly unavailing. DFEH cites evidence that Utermahlen characterized Carauddo’s condition as a “multilevel disc disease, in itself . . . a long term condition, which includes physical limitations,” ER 357, “degenerative in nature,” ER 358, and a “multi level disc disease,” ER 357. Utermahlen also characterized Carauddo’s ability to lift fifty pounds as a “miracle recovery.” ER 519. Indeed the January “occasional”-fifty-pounds assessment did not hold. In any case, this fleeting evidence does not establish a pretext because it is ambiguous and insubstantial. See Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. [22] Finally, Carauddo argues that Lucent’s failure to provide him with an additional six months of leave pursuant to its policy established pretext. Lucent informed Carauddo of his right to apply for an additional six month leave of absence, but he failed to do so. Thus, this evidence does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. For the aforementioned reasons, DFEH has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was not in error.
Necessary to Prevent Discrimination The district court granted Lucent summary judgment on DFEH’s claim that Lucent unlawfully failed to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination because there was no viable claim for discrimination. Lucent III, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at . We affirm. [23] Under the FEHA, it is unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k). The California courts have held that this subsec5380 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES tion is a separate unlawful employment practice. Carter v. Cal. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 135 P.3d 637, 645 n.4 (Cal. 2006). Nevertheless, employers are not liable for failing to take necessary steps to prevent discrimination, “except where the [discriminatory] actions took place and were not prevented.” Trujillo v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); see Carter, 135 P.3d at 645 n.4. DFEH, therefore, cannot prevail on this claim because the evidence does not show that Lucent discriminated against Carauddo. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim was not in error. IV. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy The district court held that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Carauddo’s wrongful termination claim because DFEH could not prevail on any of its claims under the FEHA. Lucent III, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at . We affirm. [24] Under California common law, although “an at-will employee may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy.” Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 45 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]his public policy exception to the at-will employment rule must be based on policies carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” Id. at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted). The elements for this tort are (1) the existence of a public policy and (2) a nexus between the public policy and an employee’s termination. See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1034 (Cal. 1994). Although “disability discrimination can form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim,” City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 959 P.2d 752, 763 (Cal. 1998), there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining as to any of DFEH’s disability discrimination DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5381 claims. The district court’s determination that Carauddo could not prevail on this cause of action, therefore, was correct.