Opinion ID: 3168298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eligibility for Asylum Relief

Text: Chen also challenges the IJ’s alternative finding that, even if his testimony was accepted as true, he is not eligible for asylum relief because he has not shown past persecution or a well‐founded fear of future persecution on account of a political opinion. As previously stated, the Attorney General may grant asylum to aliens who fall under the statutory definition of a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An applicant can establish asylum eligibility as a refugee in one of two ways: (1) “past persecution” or (2) “a well‐ founded fear of future persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). To establish “past persecution,” an applicant must show that “he or she has suffered persecution in the past” on ac‐ count of a protected ground, such as political opinion. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). If “past persecution” is established, it No. 15‐1831 13 creates a rebuttable presumption of a “well‐founded fear of persecution.” Id. To establish a “well‐founded fear of future persecution” regardless of past persecution, an applicant must show: (a) a fear of persecution in his or her country on account of a pro‐ tected ground, (b) there is a “reasonable possibility of suffer‐ ing such persecution if he or she were to return to that coun‐ try,” and (c) he or she is “unable or unwilling to return to, or avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country be‐ cause of such fear.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2).
Chen contends that he has established “past persecution” on account of a political opinion through his protest against the Chinese government’s appropriation of his land and his subsequent treatment by the police. Chen’s contention fails because his case is controlled by Weiping Chen. Like in Weiping Chen, Chen has not demon‐ strated past persecution on account of a political opinion, a protected ground, because he has not shown expression of a political opinion.5 In Weiping Chen, based on nearly identical facts, this court upheld the IJ’s finding that an asylum applicant did not ex‐ 5 Although the burdens of proof differ between asylum and withholding of removal, the protected ground analysis is the same in examining the underlying claim of potential persecution on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see Cardoza‐Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423–24. Therefore, Weiping Chen’s protected ground analysis, which pertains specifically to a claim of withholding of removal, is relevant to the present protected ground analysis, which relates to Chen’s claims of asylum and withhold‐ ing of removal. 14 No. 15‐1831 press a political opinion. 744 F.3d at 533–34. Weiping Chen was a Chinese storeowner, and in April 2004, the Chinese government developed the area containing Weiping Chen’s store, destroying it and other buildings. In response, Weiping Chen and one hundred other merchants and family members protested against the local government office and demanded “proper compensation.” Id. at 530. The local po‐ lice responded by dispersing the crowd with a water cannon. When Weiping Chen and other protestors refused to leave, the police arrested them. Subsequently, Weiping Chen was detained for three days, beaten, and forced to sign an agreement stating that he “would not approach the govern‐ ment asking for compensation.” Id. Weiping Chen was then released and required to report to the police station periodi‐ cally. Several months later, he entered the United States on a non‐immigrant visitor visa and stayed beyond his authoriza‐ tion date. Meanwhile, his wife remained in China and re‐ ported that the police were looking for him. In Weiping Chen, this court upheld the IJ’s finding that Weiping Chen had not suffered past persecution or had a well‐founded fear of future persecution on account of a po‐ litical opinion. The court described Weiping Chen’s protest as “non‐political” noting that he “was unable to articulate any political opinion, and he admitted that he did not belong to any political organizations, and that other than this pro‐ test, he participated in no other political activities.” Id. at 534. Moreover, the court upheld the IJ’s finding that Weiping Chen’s circumstances “should be characterized as a personal property dispute rather than an expression of political opin‐ ion” and held that a “personal property dispute, no matter how nasty, cannot support an alien’s claim of asylum.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). No. 15‐1831 15 Chen’s case is indistinguishable from Weiping Chen. In the present case, Chen claimed that his property was appropri‐ ated by the government without fair compensation. He par‐ ticipated in a protest with other landowners. Chen was al‐ legedly arrested, detained, beaten, and forced to sign an agreement to end the dispute. Furthermore, like Weiping Chen, there is no record evidence indicating that Chen articu‐ lated any political opinion, belonged to any political organi‐ zations, or participated in any political activities. Because Chen’s case is indistinguishable from Weiping Chen, we simi‐ larly uphold the IJ’s finding that Chen has not shown past persecution on account of a political opinion. Chen asked, at oral argument, for this court to overrule Weiping Chen. Chen argues that because the Chinese gov‐ ernment controls everything in China and excludes its citi‐ zens from the decision and political process, every confron‐ tation between the Chinese government and Chinese citizens “assumes a political significance.” We decline to overrule Weiping Chen. Chen offers no sup‐ port for his characterization of the Chinese political climate, nor does he provide adequate justification for such a broad interpretation of “on account of a political opinion” in Chi‐ na, a view that would greatly enlarge the scope of asylum eligibility for applicants from that country. Thus, Weiping Chen stands.
Chen additionally contends that he has demonstrated a “well‐founded fear of future persecution” on account of a political opinion through the following: (1) his post‐ 16 No. 15‐1831 detainment police surveillance and travel restrictions and (2) continued police inquiries into his location. To establish a well‐founded fear of future persecution, an asylum applicant “must satisfy both the objective and sub‐ jective prongs of the well‐founded fear standard.” Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009). The subjective com‐ ponent “often depends upon the applicantʹs own credibility and testimony.” Id. In contrast, the objective prong requires evidence that there is a “reasonable probability” that the ap‐ plicant “will be singled out individually for persecution” or that “there is a pattern or practice of persecution of an iden‐ tifiable group” to which the applicant belongs. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Chen first argues because he suffered past persecution in the form of post‐detainment police surveillance and travel restrictions and is therefore entitled to a presumption of a well‐founded fear of future persecution. Assuming that Chen could overcome Weiping Chen and establish expression of a political opinion, this argument still fails because of his inconsistent testimony and lack of cor‐ roborating evidence. Chen initially testified that he left Chi‐ na because he could not live under police surveillance but then conceded he only had to report to police twice and did not allude to any mistreatment during those times. Regard‐ ing police surveillance, Chen did not provide the required corroborating evidence to support this assertion. In terms of reporting to the police, we have held that periodic question‐ ing by police does not constitute persecution. E.g., Mekhtiev v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Chen is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well‐founded fear of future persecution. No. 15‐1831 17 Chen also argues that he has established a well‐founded fear of future persecution because of continued police in‐ quiries into his location. Chen’s argument is meritless because he has not demon‐ strated an objectively reasonable fear. His argument is un‐ dercut by his inconsistent testimony and lack of corroborat‐ ing evidence. On one hand, Chen had testified that he fears the police will be “enraged” at him and incarcerate him be‐ cause he was supposed to remain under surveillance. On the other hand, he gave conflicting testimony about whether the police were even still looking for him. Additionally, Chen initially stated that his wife had fled their home to avoid po‐ lice harassment but then admitted that his wife lived at home and had informed him that the police were still look‐ ing for him. Moreover, Chen provides no corroborating evi‐ dence to support any of these assertions. In other words, Chen has not shown a “reasonable possibility” that he will be persecuted if returned to China. Ayele, 564 F.3d at 868. We thus hold that the IJ’s alternative finding that Chen was ineligible for asylum relief was supported by substantial evidence, and the record does not compel a conclusion oth‐ erwise.