Opinion ID: 2807858
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: With regard to the 39-month deadline, the

Text: Commission argues that Sinclair’s claim of future injury is 27 unduly speculative because it is unknown whether any Sinclair station will in fact be subject to repacking. But Sinclair submitted a declaration from its Vice President of Advanced Technology asserting that the company owns “at least 27 stations in the portion of the television broadcast band that is most likely to be cleared and repacked in the auction.” Decl. of Mark A. Aitken ¶ 19 (Aitken Decl.) (Pet’rs’ Add. 46). That assertion draws support from Sinclair’s reasoned predictions about which channels the Commission will clear upon reaching certain “clearing targets”—i.e., amounts of spectrum obtained and sold—during the incentive auction. See id. ¶¶ 17-19 (Pet’rs’ Add. 45-46). In the Commission’s view, even if certain of Sinclair’s stations are repacked, Sinclair likely would be able to construct the necessary facilities before the go-dark deadline. That, however, is the very issue in dispute on the merits: Sinclair asserts that 39 months is insufficient time, see id. ¶¶ 7-15 (Pet’rs’ Add. 4045), and the Commission disagrees, see Order, ¶¶ 569-71. For purposes of the threshold standing stage, we need not (and should not) assume the accuracy of the Commission’s position. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2012); City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Rather, based on its description of the “inescapable challenges” facing broadcasters in the repacking process, Aitken Decl. ¶ 12 (Pet’rs’ Add. 43), Sinclair offers enough to show a “substantial risk” that one of its stations will miss the go-dark deadline. 2. Sinclair also has standing to raise its second challenge. As discussed below, the Commission interprets the requirement that “at least two competing licensees participate in the reverse auction” to be satisfied as long as two licensees anywhere in the country submit a valid application to take part in the auction and the two licensees are not commonly controlled. Order, ¶¶ 413-14. The Commission contends that 28 its interpretation cannot injure Sinclair because “a single licensee in any specific market (as opposed to in the auction as a whole) can only benefit from the absence of a directly competing bidder, as that absence will reduce downward pressure on reverse auction payments.” Resp’ts’ Br. 65. Sinclair, for that reason, might well lack standing if it claimed injury only as a future auction participant. But Sinclair also attests that certain of its stations will not participate in the reverse auction, which leaves those stations vulnerable to repacking and its attendant risks. Aitken Decl. ¶ 17 (Pet’rs’ Add. 45). Sinclair further explains that, if the Commission is able to acquire more relinquished spectrum in the reverse auction (as the Commission’s broad interpretation of the twoparticipant requirement would serve to enable), the Commission then would repack more stations against their will. Id. The Commission does not counter Sinclair’s articulation of the link between the Commission’s reverseauction clearing targets and the amount of spectrum it will subsequently repack. We therefore find that Sinclair has shown a substantial risk that the Commission’s interpretation of the two-participant restriction will ultimately work to Sinclair’s detriment.