Opinion ID: 1579863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether amended section 3.01 applies

Text: Whether an agency has primary or exclusive jurisdiction to resolve an issue determines if a party must first exhaust administrative remedies before a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute. See Cash Am., 35 S.W.3d at 15; see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 10 L.Ed.2d 915 (1963). If a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it does not have the authority to resolve the claims. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.1993). Here, the trial court's jurisdiction depends on whether amended section 3.01(a) applies and, if so, whether it grants the Board exclusive rather than primary jurisdiction. Although Subaru asks us to remand to allow Subaru to argue amended section 3.01(a)'s effects in the trial court, we exercise our authority to review the jurisdictional issue on rehearing. See Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446. Section 3.01(a)'s amendments became effective May 18, 2001. Because no savings clause exists, we would typically presume the Legislature intended that the amendments operate prospectively. Abell, 613 S.W.2d at 258; Blonstein, 831 S.W.2d at 472. But this presumption does not apply, because the statute is procedural and remedial in that section 3.01(a) determines what tribunal, the Board or the trial court, has the authority to initially decide a Code issue or claim. See Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 502; Abell, 613 S.W.2d at 260; Watkins, 263 S.W. at 907; Blonstein, 831 S.W.2d at 472. Section 3.01(a) also governs whether a party must exhaust administrative remedies before invoking a trial court's jurisdiction to resolve a dispute involving Code issues. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483; City of Kountze, 543 S.W.2d at 874-75. Additionally, we do not presume that amended section 3.01(a) only applies prospectively, because amended section 3.01(a) does not alter the parties' rights or obligations, or remove any remedies already available. See Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 502. The Code continues to authorize the Board to take certain actions when Code violations occur. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4413(36), §§ 6.01-.03. Likewise, other Code provisions continue to permit a party to seek actual damages in court if the Board determines Code violations occurred. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4413(36), §§ 6.06(a), (e). Therefore, amended section 3.01(a) merely determines the tribunal that will first resolve all Code-based issues and claims. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483; City of Kountze, 543 S.W.2d at 874-875. And the parties do not have a vested right to choose the tribunal that will make these determinations. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483; Middleton, 185 S.W. at 560; City of Kountze, 543 S.W.2d at 874-75 In sum, section 3.01(a) is a procedural and remedial statute that does not affect any vested rights here. See Baker Hughes, 12 S.W.3d at 4. Accordingly, we conclude that amended section 3.01(a) the version currently in effectconstitutionally applies retroactively in this case.