Opinion ID: 1881936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether goodin received effective assistance of counsel.

Text: ¶ 32. At trial, Will Rigdon, grandson of the victim, identified two videotapes of the occurrence in the victim's store and identified Goodin as the person on the tapes who was robbing his grandfather. Will Rigdon testified as follows: Q. Right here. What camera is showing this particular picture? A. It's the one, I have labeled two here. Q. All right. This would be this individual here coming in through this second set of doors here? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right. You have had an opportunity to view this film; is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Can you identify the person shown there? A. Mr. Goodin. Will Rigdon further testified from the video that it appeared to him that Goodin had a gun in his right hand. He explained this interpretation of the video as follows: Q. And, in fact, when we watched the tape, when he came around the corner and all the way through the tape, he's holding his hands up; is he not? A. Yes, sir. It looks like he is. Q. But, he is not holding them up above his head or shoulders, he is just holding them around his chest area; is that correct? A. Yes, sir. It appears to be so. Q. Now, the item that's there in the other man's hand is a dark item; is it not? A. Yes, sir, a dark item that appears to be a gun. Q. Appears to be a gun? A. Yes, sir. Q. But, that gun, it if is a gun, the dark item, is not raised there until about half way down the aisle; is that correct? A. Yes. sir. It's held by his side. Q Held by his side? A. Yes, sir. Q. And does that show up in this series of still photographs which is marked States Exhibit 17? A. Does the object allegedly a gun, show up, or does his raising it up show up? Which part were you asking showed up? Q. You said he was holding it by his side, the dark object, up until, you know, about halfway down the aisle? A. Yes. sir. Q. Does it show up in that? A. Yes, sir. If you watch it on the tape, you can see it clearly. It's a bit smaller here. With magnification, I think it could be easily noticed. Q. Okay. This exhibit 17 has five rows of pictures; does it not? A. Yes, sir, it does. Q. Going across, and there's six pictures per row? A. Right. Q. Now, on the second row here is where the pictures are when they are walking down the aisle; is that correct? A. Yes, sir, with one starting onwith the sixth one on the first and continuing through the second on the third. Q. Okay. Now, the particular photograph, enlargement, that you hold in your hand, which is Exhibit 15, shows up about the A. Fourth one on the second row? Q. Fourth one? A. Yes, sir. Q. But, on the first, second and third one, the Defendant's hands are both down, are they not, the Defendant's hands? A. The Defendant's hands, yes, sir, are down? Q. Now, do you see any object in the Defendant's right hand in those pictures? A. Yes, sir, I do. Right here and right there, the dark object (indicating). Q. The dark object? A. Yes. Q. And, you take from that to be a firearm, a gun? A. I would assume it would have to be a firearm for my grandfather to be walking with his hands raised up here. ¶ 33. Goodin asserts that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because his attorney did not object to Rigdon's identification. Goodin argues that the trial court would have sustained the objection pursuant to M.R.E. 602 which provides in pertinent part, a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Goodin argues that Will Rigdon was not in the store that night and therefore had no personal knowledge of the situation. ¶ 34. Goodin contends further that the State failed to produce any other testimony that identified him as the person in Rigdon's store that night. The record belies this assertion. John Raymond Roberts, the tow truck driver, testified that he identified Goodin from a television news broadcast which ran the surveillance tapes. He testified that after seeing the surveillance tapes on the news, he called the Sheriff. On direct examination he testified as follows: Q. All right; and, now, where did you go after you let Howard Goodin out? A. I went back to the house. Q. What did you do when you got back to the house? A. I called my cousin in Kemper County, and he said they had some trouble last night, and I said, What kind of trouble? And he says, Somebody shot somebody in Union. Q. Did you turn on the television? A. So, I turned the TV on. Q. What did you see when you turned on the television? A. I saw Mr. Goodin coming down the aisle with the gun. Q. You say Mr. Goodin coming down the aisle with the gun? A. Looked like the aisle or something. Q. On the news A. Yes, sir. Q. broadcast? A. Yes, sir, and I called Neshoba 1. Q. Called who? A. Glen, Mr. Glen Waddell. Q. Mr. Glen Waddell? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that the Sheriff of Neshoba County? A. Yes, sir. Finally, on direct examination, Goodin himself testified that he was in Rigdon's Store that night and identified Rigdon and himself as the persons in the video surveillance tapes. ¶ 35. The well-established test for determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). There the Supreme Court held, [t]he benchmark for judging claims of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In Strickland, the Court explained: A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Accord, Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 476-77 (Miss.1984) The Court, through Justice O'Connor, further stated: In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.... No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d [196] at 208. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-134 [102 S.Ct. 1558, 1573-1575, 71 L.Ed.2d 783] (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. See Michel v. Louisiana, Supra, [350 U.S. 91] at 101 [76 S.Ct. 158 at 164, 100 L.Ed. 83]. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.... 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. ¶ 36. The standard set forth in Strickland was adopted by this Court in Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d at 476-78, and has since been consistently followed. Employing this standard we will examine this claim of ineffectiveness made by Goodin. ¶ 37. First, Goodin must show that the defense counsel's performance was deficient. Perhaps Goodin's defense counsel should have objected to the identification by Will Rigdon pursuant to M.R.E. 602. However, this does not automatically mean that the error made was so serious as to deny Goodin the counsel guaranteed him under the Sixth Amendment. Goodin must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Goodin has failed to show any evidence that would overcome this presumption. However, even if Goodin had indeed met his burden of proof under the first prong of this test, he has failed to meet the second requirement set out in Strickland. ¶ 38. Goodin must show secondly that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. The record simply does not support this argument. Even if defense counsel had objected to the identification by Will Rigdon and had the trial court sustained the objection, the tow truck driver later testified that he identified Goodin from the surveillance tapes shown during a news broadcast. This identification prompted him to call the police. Finally, Goodin identified himself on the tapes from Rigdon's Store during direct examination. ¶ 39. We find that Goodin's argument does not in any way satisfy the requirements of Strickland. The conduct of defense counsel did not fall below the level of effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This argument is without merit.