Opinion ID: 1151065
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Former section 904.1(a)

Text: Prior to 1983, former section 904.1(a) stated, An appeal may be taken from a superior court in the following cases, [¶] (a) From a judgment, except (1) an interlocutory judgment ..., (2) a judgment of contempt which is made final and conclusive by Section 1222,[ [1] ] or (3) a judgment on appeal from a municipal court.... (Stats. 1968, ch. 385, § 2, p. 812, formerly codified as § 963 [enacted 1872].) Burrus v. Municipal Court (1973) 36 Cal. App.3d 233, 238, footnote 5 [111 Cal. Rptr. 539] (hereafter Burrus ), observed, It is apparent that [former section 904.1(a)] was written in conformity to the policy of California Constitution, article VI, section 11, and Code of Civil Procedure section 911[ [2] ] preventing further appeal of municipal ... court cases to the Court of Appeal, but the language of the statute fails to screen out review by appeal from denial of an extraordinary writ.  (Italics added.) Accordingly, pursuant to former section 904.1(a), it was long held that a superior court judgment denying relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition was appealable as a matter of statutory right. (E.g., Palache v. Hunt (1884) 64 Cal. 473, 474 [2 P. 245] [an appeal may be taken ... from a judgment of a Superior Court, granting or denying an application for a writ of mandamus]; see also Burrus, supra, 36 Cal. App.3d 233, 236-239 [court obligated to entertain appeal from superior court judgment denying petition for writ of mandate challenging pleading ruling in municipal court]; Gilbert v. Municipal Court (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 723, 728-734 [140 Cal. Rptr. 897] (hereafter Gilbert ) [same; appeal from superior court judgment denying petition for writ of mandate or prohibition].) Without specifically addressing the issue of appealability, courts also routinely entertained appeals of superior court judgments in matters like the present one, i.e., an appeal of the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari following an order of contempt in the municipal court. (See Bobb v. Municipal Court (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 860 [192 Cal. Rptr. 270, 39 A.L.R.4th 432]; Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal. App.2d 428 [67 Cal. Rptr. 216]; Vaughn v. Municipal Court (1967) 252 Cal. App.2d 348 [60 Cal. Rptr. 575]; Thorne v. Municipal Court (1965) 237 Cal. App.2d 249 [46 Cal. Rptr. 749]; Blake v. Municipal Court (1956) 144 Cal. App.2d 131 [300 P.2d 755]; Ingold v. Municipal Court (1948) 85 Cal. App.2d 651 [193 P.2d 808]; Turkington v. Municipal Court (1948) 85 Cal. App.2d 631 [193 P.2d 795]; Gillen v. Municipal Court, etc. (1940) 37 Cal. App.2d 428 [99 P.2d 555]; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 78, p. 103 [When a municipal court makes an order in a contempt proceeding, that order is reviewable in the superior court by certiorari. But the judgment of the superior court in the certiorari proceeding is appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding.].) In the face of growing concerns about overworked appellate courts, however, two courts addressing mandate and prohibition matters ( Burrus, supra, 36 Cal. App.3d 233, and Gilbert, supra, 73 Cal. App.3d 723) strongly questioned the wisdom of a system under which such appeals were allowed. Burrus noted, [T]he law which permits an intermediate ruling of a ... municipal court to go to the Court of Appeal by an appeal of right must be regarded as a loophole in our appellate system.... The policy expressed in the Constitution [and] the statute ... is that litigation arising in [the] municipal ... court[] will not go beyond the superior court except under very limited circumstances.... [¶] Nevertheless it is possible for any litigant in the municipal ... court to apply at any time to the superior court for the issuance of a prerogative writ to prohibit, delay, review or revise any action or ruling taken or threatened, or to command any action refused in the inferior court. Such petitions are commonly denied out of hand, without a hearing, if in the opinion of the superior court the petition fails to state grounds for extraordinary relief. ( Burrus, supra, 36 Cal. App.3d at p. 238) Burrus went on to explain, however, that the superior court's denial of such writ relief is a judgment of the superior court, and as such is appealable to the Court of Appeal under Code of Civil Procedure, [former] section 904.1, subdivision (a). No matter how frivolous the petition, or how trivial the issue which it raises, the petitioner is entitled, as a matter of right, to go through the entire appellate procedure, with preparation of record, briefs, calendaring and written opinion in the Court of Appeal. ( Burrus, supra, 36 Cal. App.3d at p. 238, fn. omitted.) The Burrus court noted that the consequence of such an intermediate appeal is often the awkward delay of proceedings in the lower court (36 Cal. App.3d at p. 239), and observed, The existence of a right to appeal seems unnecessary when the purpose of the petition is to review a ruling of an inferior court, and the superior court has denied it without a trial of an issue of fact. If the aggrieved litigant has an issue of such gravity or significance as to justify the use of a prerogative writ, he may file an original petition in the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court after denial in the superior court. Such new petitions are far less burdensome than appeals, since those petitions which lack merit on their faces can be screened out by summary denial. ( Ibid. ) Nevertheless, the Burrus court conceded that the statute as it then existed allows the use of the appellate process in this kind of situation ( ibid. ), and thus concluded the appeal before it was proper. In apparent response to Burrus, supra, 36 Cal. App.3d 233, the Judicial Council in 1976 proposed an amendment to former section 904.1(a), to preclude appeals from the superior court to the Court of Appeal from a judgment denying a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition directed to a municipal court.... (Judicial Council of Cal. Ann. Rep. to Governor and Leg. (1976) p. 45, italics added.) An Assembly bill was drafted to effectuate that change, but it died in committee. ( Gilbert, supra, 73 Cal. App.3d at p. 730.) The Court of Appeal in Gilbert, supra, subsequently issued a renewed call for legislative action. It noted that former section 904.1(a) produced anomalous results under which municipal court litigants are entitled to far greater review protection than the superior court litigant with the identical legal problem (73 Cal. App.3d at p. 728, italics in original), and concluded, [w]e believe the procedure of forcing written opinions from the Court of Appeal on pretrial rulings of the ... municipal court[] to be a loophole which needs plugging. ( Id., at p. 729.)