Opinion ID: 1273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Drivers:

Text: It will be recalled that when the prosecution rested, very little evidence had been admitted as against Drivers. The extrajudicial statements and confessions of Hickman, Robinson and Guliex had been admitted as binding only on the respective individuals. The evidence which linked Drivers with the crime consisted only of: (a) his fingerprints on the Ford automobile, (b) testimony of the police that Drivers gave conflicting and evasive replies when queried in regard to his whereabouts during the weekend of the crime, and (c) the alleged adoptive admission set forth hereinabove. Drivers offered no evidence in rebuttal of the People's case. Thus, if his codefendant Hickman had not taken the stand in his own defense, there would have been nothing in the record binding on Drivers other than the three items mentioned immediately above. As a result of Hickman's defense there was admitted, as against all defendants, the judicial confession in which each defendant was specifically named as a participant who was present at the attempted robbery which resulted in the killing of Grego. We have already held that the latter testimony was obtained through improper cross-examination, erroneously admitted over valid objection. But even if such testimony had been properly admitted, and was binding on Drivers, we find that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Hickman's confession from the witness stand constituted neither more nor less than the testimony of an accomplice. As such, it was insufficient to sustain a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence connecting Drivers with the commission of the crime (Pen. Code, § 1111, supra, fn. 21). Respondent claims that the necessary corroborating evidence is to be found in the fingerprints, the evasive replies and the alleged admission by failure to deny an accusation made in his presence. None of those three items, independently or cumulatively, constituted the requisite corroboration. [10a] The fingerprints showed no more than that Drivers had been present in or about the Ford on some recent date. The fingerprint expert produced by the prosecution testified that he could not place the date on which the prints were put on the car, but that he believed them to be relatively recent because of the fact that the car was out of doors. He was of the opinion that prints on such a surface disappear sooner when exposed to the elements, but was still unable to state that they had been placed on the car within the last day or two prior to the date of the crime. As opposed to this, the evidence (also produced by the prosecution during its case in chief) showed that Drivers was Hickman's cousin, and spent much time at the Hickman apartment which was in the same building as the apartment of Campbell (the original owner of the car), and that Campbell was also a frequent visitor to the Hickman apartment. Thus, Drivers' fingerprints on the Ford are as equally susceptible to an inference that they came there innocently, as they are to any inference that their presence connects defendant with the commission of the crime. In addition, the prosecution witnesses (police sergeants) testified that when they queried Drivers concerning his movements during the evening of the crime, his reply included a claim that he and Robinson, together, had eaten dinner at Hickman's, and that immediately after dinner took one of the Hickman children, in Robinson's Ford, to visit a friend, after which Robinson and Drivers parted company for the evening. That portion of Drivers' explanation of his whereabouts was not subject to the claim that Drivers told conflicting stories as to his movements during the weekend. It was definitely subject to check by the police, inasmuch as it placed Drivers in the company of various persons, some of whom were unconnected with the crime or the family. Yet the prosecution offered no evidence that such portion of Drivers' explanation of his whereabouts was untrue. The truth or falsity of this portion of his explanation is unimportant. The important feature is that the explanation (evidently accepted by the police) shows that Drivers' fingerprints could have been placed on the Ford in a manner entirely unconnected with the crime. To hold that the presence of those prints connects him with the commission of the crime is tantamount to saying that the fingerprints of any relative of a person known to have committed a crime, found on the automobile of such person, tend to connect the relative with the crime, even though it is known that the relative has had the opportunity to be in and out of that car on various occasions other than during the commission of the crime. Such a theory is unsound. Certainly association with a criminal is not to be equated with connection with the crime. Moreover such a contention asks the jury to speculate on how and why the fingerprints appeared, with no evidence at all on that question. Even if the fact of the fingerprints be deemed to cast suspicion, even grave suspicion, on Drivers, such is insufficient. [22] [11] `It is necessary that the evidence corroborating an accomplice shall connect or tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Corroborative evidence is insufficient where it merely casts a grave suspicion upon the accused. It must not only show the commission of the offense and the circumstances thereof, but must also implicate the accused in it....' ( People v. Robbins, 171 Cal. 466, 470 [154 P. 317].) [10b] At best, the fingerprints merely placed Drivers in the car at some time prior to the time the car was discovered. According to the inferences to be derived from the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses, that could have been around the dinner hour, and before Drivers claimed to have parted company with the man who confessed to the commission of the crime some five or six hours later. This merely proves association. [12] In People v. Reingold, 87 Cal. App.2d 382, 399-400 [197 P.2d 175], it was said: There can be no question that it is insufficient corroboration merely to connect a defendant with the accomplice or other persons participating in the crime, but evidence independent of the testimony of the accomplice must tend to connect a defendant with the crime itself, and not simply with its perpetrators. It is not with the thief that the connection must be had but with the commission of the crime itself. [23] [13] The testimony of the police to the effect that Drivers gave two conflicting versions of his movements on the weekend of the crime does not satisfy the requirement that the accomplice's testimony must be corroborated. The police were here testifying to an extrajudicial interview with Drivers, which took place after the latter voluntarily turned himself in to the police department. When the witness (Sergeant Wrona) was asked to point specifically to the conflict in Drivers' statements which indicated untruth, he was able to point to but one conflict in the repetition of a narrative covering Drivers' movements for three days (i.e., the place in which he slept during the early morning hours of February 4th). Respondent contends that this is corroborative evidence for the reason that it indicates a guilty frame of mind. Of course, a guilty frame of mind may be proved, in proper circumstances, by evidence that the defendant made inconsistent or conflicting statements. But ordinarily that rule is applied in relation to circumstantial evidence of the guilt of a defendant who has otherwise been connected with the crime. Where, as here, it is offered in corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice a necessary element is lacking. At best, it tends to prove that Drivers, while talking to the police, had a guilty frame of mind. But in regard to what? It may be reasonable to assume that he had in mind some activity which he desired to hide from the police. But, there is no reasonable inference that his conflicting replies were made for the purpose of hiding connection with the crime with which he is now charged. To hold that such is inferable from his replies is to put on him the burden of proving that he had no connection with the crime, whereas the burden is on the prosecution to produce corroborating evidence which, of itself, connects him with this specific crime. Such corroborating evidence must not only connect him with the crime with which he is charged, but it must do so without aid or direction from the testimony of the accomplice (or accomplices) whose testimony is to be corroborated ( People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 257 [324 P.2d 556]; People v. Brown, 49 Cal.2d 577, 583-584 [320 P.2d 5]; People v. MacEwing, supra, 45 Cal.2d 218, 223-225). People v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319 [273 P.2d 249], is not in point. There it was held that the defendant's statements to the police and other acts were of such a nature that they corroborated the testimony of the accomplice. But in that case the court pointed out that the independent testimony which was sufficient to connect defendant with the crime consisted of certain admissions made to the officers, together with a rigged alibi so false that it stretched the credulity of this court, and flight by the defendant after she knew that she was suspected. Here none of those elements are present. Drivers did not make any admissions. Instead of fleeing, he turned himself in when he learned that the police were looking for him. If his alibi was a rigged one, the prosecution offered no evidence that they had checked it and found it to be false. The single inconsistency in his repeated narrative to the police shows no more than a sense of guilt of something he wanted to hide. There is nothing in such inconsistency to connect Drivers with this crime, unless aid and direction is borrowed from the testimony of Hickman. [14a] This leaves, as the only claimed corroboration, the alleged admission by reason of failure to deny a claimed accusation. Neither appellant nor respondent has properly briefed this point, but an examination of the testimony shows that here there was no adoptive admission. [15] To constitute such the evidence must show that an accusation was made under such circumstances that the defendant heard and understood the same, and had the opportunity to deny, and that, having such opportunity, he either failed to reply or made a reply so equivocal as to be consistent with guilt. In the absence of these factors, the evidence would be inadmissible ( People v. Briggs, 58 Cal.2d 385, 407-409 [24 Cal. Rptr. 417, 374 P.2d 257]). [14b] When such evidence is offered (and it was here offered in chambers prior to production) it is the duty of the court to determine whether all of the necessary elements are present before allowing the jury to hear the testimony ( id., at p. 408). The failure of the court to do so in this case may constitute sufficient prejudicial error to require reversal. [24] For when the evidence was admitted it became clear that when Hickman confronted Drivers with the statement that he (Drivers) was at the scene of the crime, Drivers unequivocally replied, No. I was not there, and that's that. The unequivocal denial having been made, there was neither room for testimony of Hickman's accusation, nor for testimony regarding the balance of the conversation. It is worthy of note that the very police officer who was called upon to testify did not claim that there had been a failure to deny an accusation. He stated unequivocally both on direct and cross-examination, that Drivers at no time admitted participation in the crime, and at all times denied it. Thus, the claim that the conversation constituted an admission by failure to deny is not borne out by the very witness called in an effort to prove the same. [16] Some mention should be made of the five variations of the reply that is alleged to have been made. Immediately upon making the reply quoted above, Drivers was advised by the police sergeant that a murder had taken place and that he was suspected of complicity. He is alleged to have replied in one or another form of the phrase, I am not copping out to nothing, even if my own mother said it. In all five statements he used some form of the phrase to cop out. The same police sergeant, when testifying at another point in the trial, was qualified by the prosecution as an expert on language of the underworld, and testified that the verb to cop out is synonymous with to admit. Thus, by its own definition, the first portion of Drivers' answer meant only that he had nothing to admit. Because of this dilemma, respondent bases its entire argument on the contention that the phrase even if my own mother told on me infers an admission of guilt, because otherwise there would be nothing for defendant's mother to tell. Even if the phrase on which the prosecution seizes is subject to that inference it was but one of the versions which the witness used. The same inference is not to be found in the phrase even if my own mother said it, or in the other phrases used by the prosecutor and his witnesses herein (if my mother said she saw me, if my own mother said I was there, or, I don't care who saw me there). It would appear that the witness was not attempting to quote Drivers' statement verbatim, but was simply trying to indicate the substance of the conversation. If the trained detective sergeant did not infer any admission in the conversation which he had with Drivers (and he testified that he did not), certainly the jury should not be permitted to indulge in such inference. To assume that the questionable quotation infers an admission of guilt, and thus placing this man's life in jeopardy, would be to go far beyond the rules which require independent proof to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. The respondent makes certain other contentions on this issue which are clearly devoid of merit. [17] Thus, respondent claims that the independent evidence shows that the crime was committed by three persons. This is true, since Morrisey so testified, although he was unable to identify any of the three. Respondent then argues that the independent proof shows that two of the criminals escaped in one direction and the third in another direction. This is also true. Respondent then argues that since Robinson and Guliex have both confessed to having escaped together, via the golf course, the third, who escaped via the cemetery, must have been Drivers. Such argument is unsound. In the first place, the confessions of Robinson and Guliex were not admitted against Drivers. Even if they had been, they do not indicate that Drivers escaped by the alternate route, since that is the route on which the shotgun was found, and no one disputes the fact that Robinson carried and used that gun. The argument simply indicates that some third person left via the cemetery. In order to connect Drivers with the crime it is necessary that that particular evidence be given both meaning and direction by the testimony of Hickman, who placed Drivers at the scene of the crime. Thus it is not corroborating evidence. [25] The only other argument that respondent makes in regard to corroboration seems to be connected in some vague way with the rules of conspiracy. The applicability of such argument is not apparent. As already pointed out the prosecution accomplished nothing when, at the start of the trial, it announced that it would rely on the law of conspiracy. At no time did it offer evidence by which a conspiracy might be proved against Drivers, other than the accusations of coconspirators. Three extrajudicial accusations were admitted under the express ruling that they were limited to the case against the defendant whose statement was being admitted. The fourth was Hickman's judicial confession made in open court. Although we have found it to have been improperly admitted for other reasons, it did not require any rule of conspiracy to make it binding against a codefendant. [18] Thus it is clear that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of Drivers. Even if we were to consider Hickman's judicial confession as properly admitted against Drivers, it constitutes as a matter of law the testimony of an accomplice, uncorroborated by competent evidence tending to connect him with the commission of the crime. Without Hickman's confession there is nothing in the record on which to convict Drivers other than the extrajudicial statements which, concededly, were not binding upon him.