Opinion ID: 795002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Step Five Inquiry

Text: 8 SSR 00-4p requires an ALJ who takes testimony from a vocational expert about the requirements of a particular job to determine whether that testimony is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. 1 The Ruling's language unambiguously sets out the ALJ's affirmative duty: 9 When a VE or VS provides evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that VE or VS evidence and information provided in the DOT. In these situations, the adjudicator will: 10 Ask the VE or VS if the evidence he or she has provided conflicts with information provided in the DOT; and 11 If the VE's or VS's evidence appears to conflict with the DOT, the adjudicator will obtain a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict. 12 SSR 00-4p (emphasis added). The ALJ here took testimony from an expert as to whether certain job requirements were compatible with Prochaska's various limitations, but did not ask whether the expert's analysis conflicted with the DOT. 13 Relying on Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir.2002), the magistrate judge here decided that Prochaska forfeited her SSR 00-4p argument by failing to raise it at the hearing. Donahue is our only interpretation to date of the ALJ's obligation under that Ruling. It notes in dicta (because the Ruling was promulgated after the hearing in that case) that SSR 00-4p requires the ALJ to `[e]xplain [in the] determination or decision how any conflict [with the Dictionary] that has been identified was resolved.' Id. at 279 F.3d at 446. But the Ruling emphasizes that before relying on [a vocational expert's] evidence to support a disability determination or decision, an ALJ must perform the required inquiry. SSR 00-4p (emphasis added). And since Donahue, other circuits have held that the Ruling imposes an affirmative duty on the part of an ALJ to inquire about conflicts between vocational expert testimony and the DOT. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir.2005); see also Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2005); Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (3d Cir.2002). In Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir.1999), the Tenth Circuit explained the Ruling's core requirement: 14 [B]efore an ALJ may rely on expert vocational evidence as substantial evidence to support a determination of nondisability, the ALJ must ask the expert how his or her testimony as to the exertional requirement of identified jobs corresponds with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and elicit a reasonable explanation for any discrepancy on this point. 15 See also Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1175 (SSR 00-4p essentially codifies Haddock ). Prochaska was not required to raise this issue at the hearing, because the Ruling places the burden of making the necessary inquiry on the ALJ. 16 The government concedes that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 00-4p and explicitly waives any argument that Donahue excuses that failure, but contends that the error was harmless because for a significant number of the jobs that the ALJ cited, there were no inconsistencies between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT. The specific positions identified by the ALJ were cashiering, assembly, packaging and visual inspection. 17 But Prochaska counters that each job, as defined by the DOT, requires specific physical capabilities that are beyond her limitations. She points out, for example, that according to the DOT the packaging and assembly work identified by the expert requires stooping, which the ALJ acknowledged she cannot do. And, she contends, the ALJ asked the expert for work that could be done by someone who could only occasionally reach above shoulder level while a cashier's requirements, under the DOT, include reaching frequently. 18 It is not clear to us whether the DOT's requirements include reaching above shoulder level, and this is exactly the sort of inconsistency the ALJ should have resolved with the expert's help. We cannot determine, based on the record, whether the expert's testimony regarding stooping or reaching was actually inconsistent with the DOT. That determination should have been made by the ALJ in the first instance, and his failure to do so should have been identified and corrected by the Appeals Council. We will defer to an ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, but here there is an unresolved potential inconsistency in the evidence that should have been resolved. Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d at 626. We vacate the district court's judgment upholding the Commission's decision and remand this case so that the ALJ can determine whether the job requirements identified by the vocational expert are, in fact, consistent with the definitions in the DOT and Prochaska's limitations.