Opinion ID: 848578
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: negligent retention claim

Text: Plaintiff's first theory is that defendant negligently retained Bennett as a supervisor after learning of his propensity to sexually harass women. In general, an employer is not responsible for an intentional tort in the workplace committed by its employee acting outside the scope of employment. Martin v. Jones, 302 Mich. 355, 358, 4 N.W.2d 686 (1942). However, this Court has previously recognized an exception to this general rule of liability when the employer `knew or should have known of his employee's propensities and criminal record before commission of an intentional tort by [that] employee . . . .' Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 385 Mich. 410, 412, 189 N.W.2d 286 (1971) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that defendant knew of Bennett's propensity to engage in sexually harassing behavior because of: (1) Bennett's 1995 indecent exposure conviction; and (2) Maldonado's complaints to defendant's supervisor (Howard) and labor relations representative (Rush) concerning Bennett's harassment. Plaintiff concludes that defendant breached its duty of reasonable care by retaining Bennett despite its knowledge of his previous actions. The Court of Appeals held that whether defendant knew or should have known of Bennett's propensities was a question of fact for the jury. [6] However, in those cases in which we have held that an employer can be held liable on the basis of its knowledge of an employee's propensities, the underlying conduct comprised the common-law tort of assault. See Hersh, supra at 412, 189 N.W.2d 286; Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 563, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951). In the instant case, however, the entire premise for plaintiff's negligent retention claim is the statutorily based tort of sexual harassment. Before passage of the CRA, Michigan did not provide a common-law remedy for workplace discrimination. Pompey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 552, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971). Plaintiff's protections against being sexually harassed in the workplace are wholly creatures of statute. `Where a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.' Monroe Beverage Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 454 Mich. 41, 45, 559 N.W.2d 297 (1997), quoting Lafayette Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm., 287 Mich. 488, 491, 283 N.W. 659 (1939). Here, the CRA provides the right to be free from sexual harassment, M.C.L. § 37.2103(i), and accords an aggrieved worker the remedy of a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both. M.C.L. § 37.2801(1). Plaintiff's remedy, then, for any act of sexual harassment is limited to those provided by the CRA. Accordingly, there is no common-law claim for negligent retention in the context of workplace sexual harassment. [7] Plaintiff invokes M.C.L. § 37.2803, which states that the CRA shall not be construed to diminish the right of a person to direct or immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state. However, contrary to the dissent's theory, post at 178, this statutory language does not allow a worker to bring a CRA claim under the guise of a negligent retention claim. Rather, this provision simply allows a worker to bring suit under any legal theory that existed before the passage of the CRA. Thus, a worker would not be barred by the CRA from bringing a common-law negligent retention claim, as long as the premise for that claim is a tort that existed before passage of civil rights legislation. [8] Therefore, because the CRA provides the exclusive remedy for a claim based on sexual harassment, plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of negligent retention, [9] and no inquiry into whether defendant possessed sufficient notice that Bennett was engaged in sexual harassment is necessary.