Opinion ID: 4511970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Law enforcement must inform a suspect of his Miranda rights, but a suspect can waive those rights if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 475). Accordingly, courts consider both the voluntariness inquiry and the knowing inquiry. Id. Alvarado-Palacio argues that the waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid because the agents misrepresented his right to counsel. For a waiver of Miranda rights to be voluntary, it must be “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. “[T]rickery or deceit is only prohibited to the extent it deprives the suspect ‘of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’” Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 424). “The voluntariness determination is made on a case-by-case basis and is viewed under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” United States v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 367 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004)). The facts here are rather straightforward—the agents informed Alvarado-Palacio of his Miranda rights, including his right to consult with an attorney before or during any interrogation; Alvarado-Palacio indicated he understood his rights; Hernandez slid over a waiver and Flores mentioned that Alvarado-Palacio could read the rights again; Alvarado-Palacio wrote his name, signature, and date on a Spanish form that included his Miranda rights and a waiver of these rights; Alvarado-Palacio took a moment to review the form; the agents asked him if he understood the form and Alvarado-Palacio responded, “Yes, that I may have an attorney, it says?”; Hernandez answered 5 Case: 17-51030 Document: 00515328024 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/02/2020 No. 17-51030 while holding the rights and waiver form, “Yes you may have an attorney, but right now is when we can speak with you”; and Alvarado-Palacio responded, “Ah ok.” Nothing from the record indicates that Alvarado-Palacio did not make a free and deliberate choice to waive his right to counsel. Accordingly, this appeal hinges on the question of whether there was a knowing waiver. See Soffar, 300 F.3d at 592–93 (noting that the waiver decision must be made with “full awareness of the right being abandoned” and the consequences of doing so (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421)).
A signed waiver form, though not conclusive, is “usually strong proof” of a knowing and voluntary waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). Both parties agree that agent Flores told Alvarado-Palacio that he could read the document and that Alvarado-Palacio reviewed the document after signing it. See Garcia v. Stephens, 793 F.3d 513, 522 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[W]aivers may be direct or, in some instances, they may be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); see also United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding intelligent waiver even though suspect “testified at the hearing that he had not read the form at the time he signed it, but two government witnesses said he did”). Examining the totality of circumstances here—including AlvaradoPalacio’s initial affirmation that he understood his right to an attorney prior to or during interrogation, the video of him signing the Spanish translated waiver, his second affirmation that he understood his rights, and his agreement to speak with the agents—the district court’s finding that AlvaradoPalacio knew and understood his rights is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Venegas, 594 F. App’x 822, 828 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding 6 Case: 17-51030 Document: 00515328024 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/02/2020 No. 17-51030 that a suspect may validly waive his or her Miranda rights even when the interrogating officer administers a written warning alone). Alvarado-Palacio contends that the agents misrepresented when he could seek counsel. The agents asked Alvarado-Palacio, for the third time, if he understood his rights. In response, Alvarado-Palacio asked a question or made a statement. Whether a statement or a question, the result in this case flows from the circumstances which preceded Alvarado-Palacio’s response. Prior to this exchange, the agents told Alvarado-Palacio at the start of the recording he had the right to an attorney before and during any interrogation, Alvarado-Palacio received a written Spanish waiver that he signed, he answered affirmatively about understanding the form, and Alvarado-Palacio said he was “ok” with speaking with the agents. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (holding that suspect need not “know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver”). Moreover, we have held that an officer’s misleading statement does not “invalidate[ ] the multiple waivers [a defendant] had given prior to the interview.” Soffar, 300 F.3d at 596 (noting that the defendant “was well aware of his rights because he had been given numerous Miranda warnings and had waived his rights multiple times prior to his interview” with officers). Our sister courts have similarly rejected Miranda arguments from detained individuals who asked officers even more direct questions about the right to counsel. See, e.g., United States v. BezansonPerkins, 390 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding valid Miranda waiver and no coercion where officer stated that there was no immediate access to an attorney and explained that the defendant would have to hire his own lawyer); United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding valid Miranda waiver where officer brought suspect to interview room before answering suspect’s question about access to an attorney). 7 Case: 17-51030 Document: 00515328024 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/02/2020 No. 17-51030 At most, Alvarado-Palacio can protest that the agents’ failure to go back to reiterate his Miranda rights is “objectionable as a matter of ethics.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 423-24. However, the Constitution does not “require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his selfinterest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.” Id. at 422. Absent a definite conviction that a mistake has been made, we must “giv[e] due deference to the credibility determinations of the district court” and “[v]iew[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 437 (5th Cir. 2002). After agents verbally informed Alvarado-Palacio of his Miranda rights, the “waiver signed by [AlvaradoPalacio] acknowledged that his statements could be used against him,” which made his subsequent statements not “constitutionally involuntary.” United States v. Tapp, 812 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1987). We also have held that a failure to “pay attention to the waiver form [a suspect] signed” is insufficient to show that a waiver was made involuntarily or unknowingly. United States v. Guanespen-Portillo, 514 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that reading a waiver form and affirming one’s understanding of that form without coercive action demonstrates a valid waiver). After Alvarado-Palacio signed the rights and waiver form, agents asked him if he understood his rights. Alvarado gave an ambiguous reply, “that I can have an attorney, it says?” but then clearly stated “Ah ok” when agents informed him that they were going to speak with him. We cannot view this exchange in a vacuum. De La Rosa v. State of Texas, 743 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We cannot accept the position that would have us ignore the repeated full and accurate warnings to focus only on the remark that appointing an attorney would take some time.”). Just moments before, the agents verbally told Alvarado-Palacio about his Miranda rights and asked if he understood. He answered yes. The agents also asked if Alvarado-Palacio 8 Case: 17-51030 Document: 00515328024 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/02/2020 No. 17-51030 understood his rights and would be okay if they asked him a few questions. He answered that he was ok. Finally, Alvarado-Palacio’s reliance on California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 357 (1981) is misplaced because Prysock involved warnings that did “not apprise the accused of his right to have an attorney present if he chose to answer questions.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 205 (1989) (finding that Miranda warnings were not defective because two sentences described the right to counsel before interrogation and the right to stop answering questions at any time to speak with a lawyer). Moreover, “[w]e have previously held that ‘there is no requirement that an accused be continually reminded of his rights once he has intelligently waived them.’” Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v. Anthony, 474 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1973)). As indicated in the video, the agents first verbally informed Alvarado-Palacio that he could have an attorney before or during any interrogation, and those rights and waiver were set out on the Spanish translated form. While holding Alvarado-Palacio’s signed waiver, agent Hernandez informed Alvarado-Palacio that they would speak with him and he replied, “Ah ok.” Accordingly, the video indicates that the agents “fully advise[d] [Alvarado-Palacio] of his right to appointed counsel before such interrogation” and fails to show that the agents’ “reference to appointed counsel was linked to a future point in time after police interrogation.” Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360.