Opinion ID: 1599552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the bank previously had waived the claims presented in its motion for reconsideration.

Text: ¶ 27. Finally, Holland argues that it was error for Judge Lee to take up the Bank's motion for reconsideration because the motion was filed seventeen months after the entry of Judge Coleman's order denying the Bank's previous motion and eleven months after this Court denied the Bank's interlocutory appeal. Furthermore, Holland contends that the Bank was dilatory in filing its motion and that such delay should be held to constitute a waiver of claims by the Bank (citing East Mississippi State Hospital v. Adams, 947 So.2d 887, 891 (Miss.2007) (failure to timely pursue affirmative defense, together with active participation in the litigation, served as a waiver of the affirmative defense)). See also MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So.2d 167, 181 (Miss.2006) (absent extreme and unusual circumstances-an eight month unjustified delay in the assertion and pursuit of any affirmative defense or other right which, if timely pursued, could serve to terminate the litigation, coupled with active participation in the litigation process, constitutes waiver as a matter of law.) (n. 9 omitted). ¶ 28. The Bank gives the following timeline in support of its assertion that it timely filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 8, 2007, an order was entered replacing Judge Coleman with Judge Lee. Renasant first discussed the motion for reconsideration via telephone conference with Judge Lee and Holland in January 2007. On January 23, 2007, a completed, bound set of all prior pleadings was prepared for Judge Lee for the purpose of reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment. Renasant caused two fact depositions to be conducted on April 26 and 27, 2007, at its expense. In March 2007, there was a second telephone conference among the parties and the trial judge, with an order setting the case for trial immediately following. The Bank's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Summary Judgment was filed on July 19, 2007. MS Credit Center, Inc. v. Horton, 926 So.2d 167, 181 (Miss.2006), also stands for the premise that whether a motion is timely is to be a discretionary determination and is left to the trial court on a case by case basis considering the facts and circumstances. Thus, Judge Lee was well within his authority to consider and grant the motion. This Court has held that only [t]he commencement of trial closes the season for granting motions for summary judgment. Hurst v. Sw. Miss. Legal Servs. Corp., 610 So.2d 374, 384 (Miss. 1992) (overruled on other grounds). Even in a case where trial was a few weeks away, this Court upheld a trial court's grant of summary judgment as being within the trial court's discretion where the threshold under Rule 56(c) was satisfied. Noxubee County Sch. Dist. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 883 So.2d 1159, 1163 (Miss.2004). Accordingly, based on our discussion of this issue, we find this issue to be without merit.