Opinion ID: 1970507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Jurisdiction Over All Potential Defendants

Text: Another important factor in the trial court's assessment of the case was the fact that some of the potential defendants are beyond the jurisdictional reach of the District of Columbia courts. Kaiser asserts  and Ms. Ussery concedes  that the District of Columbia courts lack jurisdiction over both Southern Maryland Hospital, where Ms. Ussery's emergency hysterectomy was performed, and the doctors who performed the hysterectomy. Ms. Ussery suggests that Kaiser can overcome this jurisdictional hurdle by filing a separate suit for contribution or indemnity in Maryland. We see no reason whatever to require Kaiser to do so, however, when there is a readily available alternative remedy: dismissal of the instant action so that all the potential claims, cross-claims, and third-party claims can be resolved in one proceeding. Allowing two substantially identical lawsuits to proceed on parallel tracks would place an unjustifiable burden on Kaiser. In comparable circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259, 102 S.Ct. 252, 268, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), that [i]t would be far more convenient ... to resolve all claims in one trial. We said essentially the same thing in Crown Oil & Wax Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co., 429 A.2d 1376, 1381 (D.C. 1981): Our regard for the convenience of the parties to this lawsuit compels the conclusion that the matter should be tried in one action in one forum. See also Guevara v. Reed, 598 A.2d 1157, 1160 (D.C.1991) (plaintiff's choice of District of Columbia as a forum must ... founder because [the District of Columbia court] lacks personal jurisdiction over one of the two defendants). In the Ott case, although the court found this judicial efficiency factor not dispositive in and of itself, it ruled nevertheless that it could not justify the double expenditure of time necessitated by requiring two judges and two juries to try this case. 689 F.Supp. at 14. Guided by these and similar precedents, we cannot discern any abuse of discretion on the record before us. We think the trial court was plainly correct in reasoning that separate civil actions in the District of Columbia and Maryland would be seriously inconvenient when all the likely defendants were amenable to suit only in the Maryland courts.