Opinion ID: 1292001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual Claim

Text: On appeal, Lee argues there is not substantial evidence to show he had an alcohol concentration greater than .15 at the time he was driving. As indicated, however, the issue in this administrative hearing is whether his alcohol concentration exceeded .15 at the time of the test. Accordingly, we do not reach Lee's factual claim. The agency's finding that Lee's alcohol concentration exceeded .15 at the time of the test stands, and we affirm on the temporary restricted license issue. We have considered all other arguments Lee presents and find them insufficiently preserved, lacking merit, or necessarily resolved in the foregoing analysis. We specifically point out, however, that our decision in Pietig v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 385 N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1986), which Lee briefs extensively, is inapposite. Pietig is irrelevant to our disposition of this case because it merely judicially defined revocation as the termination of the licensee's authority to drive. 385 N.W.2d at 253. Implicitly premised upon the differences between administrative and criminal proceedings, Pietig held that an administrative revocation that was never implemented did not preclude a later criminal revocation. 385 N.W.2d at 251-54.