Opinion ID: 2521330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special Verdicts Control General Verdicts

Text: Former RCW 4.44.440 clearly dictates that a special finding controls over a general verdict. It states, When a special finding of facts shall be inconsistent with the general verdict, the former shall control the latter, and the court shall give judgment accordingly. Former RCW 4.44.440 (emphasis added). The majority refuses to follow former RCW 4.44.440, claiming it is civil in nature, inapplicable to criminal proceedings, see majority at 186, even though the text of that statute allows no such distinction. The majority asserts State v. Robinson, 84 Wash.2d 42, 523 P.2d 1192 (1974), and McNeal, 145 Wash.2d 352, 37 P.3d 280, support its conclusion. But they don't. In Robinson the defendant was a police officer convicted of bribery. Robinson, 84 Wash.2d at 42-43, 523 P.2d 1192. When the jury returned the general verdict to the judge, it attached a note which indicated the jurors could  only find him guilty of the crime of accepting drinks while in uniform. Id. at 43 n. 1, 523 P.2d 1192. The court declined to apply former RCW 4.44.440, not because the statute applied only to civil matters, but rather because the note submitted by the jury was not a special verdict or special finding[] of fact as specified in the statute, and because juries are not permitted to make special findings on their own initiative. Id. at 45, 523 P.2d 1192. Like Robinson, the court in McNeal declined to apply former RCW 4.44.440 because the facts in that case did not support the statute's application: Even assuming that RCW 4.44.440, a civil procedure statute, applies to criminal cases, it is clear that that statute does not control here. A plain reading of the statute reveals that a special finding controls only the general verdict on the charge to which it relates. This does not mean, as the dissent asserts, that a special finding to one charge controls a verdict on a separate charge. Had the legislature such an intention, it would likely have used the phrase general verdicts rather than the phrase  the general verdict. McNeal, 145 Wash.2d at 358 n. 2, 37 P.3d 280. Here we have one general verdict, precisely the fact McNeal found necessary to invoke former RCW 4.44.440. Even though I viewed the case as controlled by former RCW 4.44.440, see id. at 369-70, 37 P.3d 280 (Sanders, J., dissenting), the majority's rejection of my conclusion on grounds different from the statute's applicability to criminal proceedings does not mean the issue is resolved, and we recently held such an approach was erroneous. See State v. Smith, 150 Wash.2d 135, 147-48, 75 P.3d 934 (2003) (noting it is error to view an argument in a dissenting opinion as rejected by a majority of this court because the majority may base its holding on a completely separate analysis and may not even consider those arguments addressed by the dissent), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1616, 158 L.Ed.2d 256 (2004). In Smith the court held State v. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d 652, 921 P.2d 473 (1996), was not controlling merely because the arguments raised by the dissent, see id. at 685-97, 921 P.2d 473 (Madsen, J., dissenting), were not adopted by a majority of the court. Smith, 150 Wash.2d at 147-48, 75 P.3d 934. Viewing McNeal as controlling in this case to the effect that former RCW 4.44.440 does not apply to criminal cases is just as erroneous as it was for the Court of Appeals in Smith to view Manussier as controlling authority there. See Smith, 150 Wash.2d at 147-48, 75 P.3d 934; see also Natasha Shekdar Black, A is not A: Washington's Unconstitutional Law of Single-Consent, Single-Defendant Inconsistent Verdicts in State v. Goins, 78 Wash. L.Rev. 557, 577 (2003) (Until Goins, Washington courts had not determined whether section 4.44.440 applied to criminal proceedings.). Quite the opposite of holding former RCW 4.44.440 completely inapplicable to criminal cases, this court has repeatedly held that the civil rules are applicable in criminal cases if the criminal rules are silent on the issue at hand. State v. Cronin, 130 Wash.2d 392, 397, 923 P.2d 694 (1996) (CR 5); State v. Clark, 129 Wash.2d 805, 815, 920 P.2d 187 (1996); State v. Hackett, 122 Wash.2d 165, 170, 857 P.2d 1026 (1993); State v. Gonzalez, 110 Wash.2d 738, 744, 757 P.2d 925 (1988). The criminal rules do not address the remedy where a special verdict is irreconcilable with a general verdict. The only criminal rule that is arguably relevant is CrR 6.16(b), which states, When a special finding is inconsistent with another special finding or with the general verdict, the court may order the jury to retire for further consideration. (Emphasis added.) Notably absent from CrR 6.16(b) is the mandatory language which exists in former RCW 4.44.440. Compare CrR 6.16(b) (use of the word may) and former RCW 4.44.440 (use of the word shall). Fundamental to statutory construction is the doctrine that shall is construed as mandatory language and may is construed as permissive language. Accord Rios v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 145 Wash.2d 483, 501 n. 11, 39 P.3d 961 (2002) (construing shall as mandatory language); Petrarca v. Halligan, 83 Wash.2d 773, 776, 522 P.2d 827 (1974) (construing may as permissive language). And we use statutory construction principles to construe criminal court rules. City of Seattle v. Guay, 150 Wash.2d 288, 300, 76 P.3d 231 (2003). Thus, contrary to former RCW 4.44.440 which mandates the court to give judgment in accordance with the special verdict, CrR 6.16(b) merely vests the judge with discretion to order the jury to continue deliberating. CrR 6.16(b) does not address the appropriate remedy for inconsistent verdicts once rendered. That situation is addressed only by former RCW 4.44.440. Accordingly, the jury's special finding that Goins did not act with sexual motivation controls the general verdict of guilty (which is required for indecent liberties), and his second degree assault conviction must be reversed. [6] I therefore dissent. ALEXANDER, C.J. (concurring in the dissent). I concur in Justice Sanders' dissent to the extent that he concludes the jury's general verdict and its special finding are irreconcilable, thus requiring the reversal of Matthew Goins' conviction. I write separately because I believe that in State v. Hurley, 4 Wash.App. 781, 483 P.2d 1274, review denied, 79 Wash.2d 1005 (1971) Division Three of the Court of Appeals decided this issue persuasively. In addition, I wish to state my view that the proper remedy here is a remand for a new trial. In Hurley, the defendant was charged with robbery, which required the jury to find that the defendant `was armed with a deadly weapon.' Hurley, 4 Wash.App. at 782, 483 P.2d 1274 (emphasis omitted). The jury was also asked to make a special finding of whether the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the occurrence, which was solely for the use of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles in fixing a minimal term of confinement as required by former RCW 9.95.015 (LAWS OF 1961, ch. 138, § 1). Id. at 783, 782, 483 P.2d 1274. The Hurley jury found the defendant guilty of robbery but answered the special interrogatory in the negative. Id. at 783, 483 P.2d 1274. The Court of Appeals held in Hurley that when there is a conflict within the same count, between a general verdict and a special finding that is required by a separate statute for a distinct purpose, a conviction will not stand. The court, therefore, reversed the robbery conviction and remanded for a new trial. Because Hurley is indistinguishable from the present case and, I believe, decided correctly, I would have us follow it. I, therefore, dissent. Unlike Justice Sanders, however, I would remand for a new trial on the second degree assault charge, the remedy imposed in Hurley.