Opinion ID: 732421
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unwarrantable Failure

Text: 36 Section 104(d)(1) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that 37 [i]f, upon any inspection of a coal or other mine, an authorized representative of the Secretary finds that there has been a violation of any mandatory health or safety standard, ... and if he finds such violation to be caused by an unwarrantable failure of such operator to comply with such mandatory health or safety standards, he shall include such finding in any citation given to the operator under this chapter. 38 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). A finding of an unwarrantable failure is a condition precedent for the issuance of a withdrawal order under this subsection, i.e., an order that the operator withdraw personnel from the area affected by the violation until a representative of the Secretary finds that the violation has been abated. Id. Section 104(d)(2) provides for the issuance of an additional order, i.e., a (d)(2) order, should a subsequent inspection of the same mine reveal similar violations. Id. § 814(d)(2). 39 The Commission has defined unwarrantable failure as aggravated conduct, constituting more than ordinary negligence, by a mine operator in relation to a violation of the Act. Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, MSHA, 9 F.M.S.H.R.C.1997, 2004 (1987). It is characterized by indifference, serious lack of reasonable care, reckless disregard, or intentional misconduct. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, MSHA, 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1610, 1615 (1994) (citations omitted). If an operator reasonably, but erroneously, believes in good faith that the cited conduct is the safest method of compliance with the applicable regulations, its actions will not constitute aggravated conduct that exceeds ordinary negligence. Id. 40 The ALJ determined that Jim Walter's violation on the July 21 owl shift constituted an unwarrantable failure to comply with the standards, Jim Walter Resources, 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1449-50, and rejected its argument that it had been trying diligently to comply with section 72.630(a) and would have but for problems it had encountered with its drills and the condition of the mine's [322 U.S.App.D.C. 320] roof. Id. at 1450. Jim Walter contends that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored the undisputed testimony of Jim Walter's witnesses that the company went to great lengths to develop a water-equipped drill in order to comply with section 72.630(a) but that compliance on the July 21 owl shift was not feasible due to the poor condition of the roof that the miners were required to drill during that shift. 41 Jim Walter first learned that the Secretary intended to apply section 72.630 to longwall mining in March 1994, when it received two citations for failing to control rock dust adequately with ventilation. At that time, portable drills of the kind employed by Jim Walter for such operations were not equipped to use water. Those drills, which weighed about 150 pounds and were carried by two persons, were equipped with hollow drill steels that connected the drill to the drilling bits. Pressurized air injected through the steels rotated the bits, which, in turn, generated rock dust that, unless wetted down or otherwise suppressed, would be injected into the air of the mine as a visible cloud. 42 The hearing record shows that following the issuance of the March 1994 citations, Jim Walter proceeded to test various ways of adapting its drills for the use of water for dust suppression, but none of these proved successful. For example, when it ran water through one type of steel, it tended to drill curved holes into which roof bolts could not be inserted; when another kind was used, dispersed water caused the steel to hang in the rock if the drill hit a crack, which the miners had difficulty withdrawing. Tr. at 278. Following these initial failures, Jim Walter worked with the distributor of its drills to develop a system in which the water would flow through the handle of the drill. Tr. at 279. After initial setbacks, an alternative method was devised that ran water from the drill head through the steel. Tr. at 280. 43 Six of these modified drills were delivered to the Number 4 mine on July 19, 1994, in time to be used in the longwall recovery operation. The miners found, however, that the drills were operable for only short periods. During the evening shift of July 20, a miner reported that the water was tearing the [drill] heads up and that rock was falling from the roof. Tr. 283-84. Because the drills were not functioning properly, the miners had difficulty inserting pins into the roof. Maddox, the longwall manager, testified that Jim Walter then contacted the distributor and asked for delivery of the additional drills that Jim Walter had been holding in reserve. These were brought into the mine, and the damaged drills were returned to the distributor for repair. Even when the drills were working, water hindered the miners' vision and dispersed in the cracks that were encountered in this section of the roof, which caused the drill steels to get stuck in the roof. Jim Walter concluded that to continue injecting water into this bad top would create a new hazard as the roof became heavier and more likely to fall. The severity of the hazard facing Jim Walter is not diminished by the fact that Greer observed miners successfully drilling with water on the shift immediately following the July 21 owl shift because the condition of the roof in this type of operation is extremely variable. 44 None of this testimony was disputed. In fact, the poor condition of some of the roof being drilled during the July 21 owl shift was corroborated by Burgess. Tr. at 199. Greer himself testified that bad top is scary, Tr. at 138; and the employees' 103(g) complaint confirmed that some drill operators as well as management were concerned that if water was used in the drill, the drill steels will not work properly and would creat [sic] a hazard. Nevertheless, rather than rely on any of this evidence, the ALJ concluded that Jim Walter had not tried diligently to comply with section 72.630(a). Jim Walter Resources, 17 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1450. He reasoned that 45 [i]f, in fact, Jim Walter was having compliance problems, it is logical that this would have been explained to Greer. It was not, and Maddox's excuse--that Greer did not ask about the problems--strains credulity given the consequences of Jim Walter's indifference. 46 Id. (citations to hearing transcript omitted). As the ALJ acknowledged, however, Maddox also testified that when he saw that Greer [322 U.S.App.D.C. 321] was writing the (d)(2) order, he became angry and abruptly ended the meeting. Id. at 1441. 47 Whatever the reason for Maddox's silence on the matter, his failure to detail the compliance problems Jim Walter had encountered was not a sufficient reason for ignoring the uncontradicted evidence that the company had in fact worked diligently to develop a method for using water with portable drills, had brought six water-equipped drills into the mine for no discernible reason other than an intent to suppress the dust, and had abandoned their use only after running into mechanical problems and encountering conditions with the roof that caused at least some of the miners to fear for their safety. This evidence trumped whatever inference might fairly be drawn from Maddox's failure to explain the company's inability to comply with the regulation. 48 Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ's finding of unwarrantable failure is not supported by substantial evidence. Having made that determination, we need not address Jim Walter's argument that 30 U.S.C. § 814(d) only authorizes such a finding when accompanied by a violation that could significantly and substantially contribute to a safety or health hazard; nor need we determine whether the company's Petition for Discretionary Review and Motion for Reconsideration were properly denied.