Opinion ID: 797987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fear Instruction

Text: 19 Holly challenges the district court's jury instruction on the element of fear in two respects. First, he argues it was error to instruct the jury that [t]he requirement of fear may be satisfied when the defendant's actions implicitly place the victim in fear of some bodily harm. Second, he argues it was error to allow the jury to infer fear from a disparity in power between the defendant and the victim or a defendant's control over a victim's everyday life. Because the district court's use of language suggesting the victim need only be placed in fear of some bodily harm impermissibly reduced the degree of fear necessary to sustain a conviction, this court concludes the instruction on fear was erroneous. 20 As noted above, a defendant commits aggravated sexual abuse in violation of § 2241(a)(2) only by threatening or placing [another] person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. Although the victim's fear may alone support a conviction without the use of actual force, a specific and severe form of fear is required. It is this heightened degree of fear that distinguishes aggravated sexual abuse from the separate crime of sexual abuse set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2242. A violation of § 2242(1) merely requires that the defendant causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any other person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping). Thus, § 2242(1) sets forth a lesser degree of fear than § 2241(a)(2). A defendant commits sexual abuse if he places the victim in fear, but commits aggravated sexual abuse only if that fear rises to the level of fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. 21 The jury instruction given by the district court failed to make this critical distinction between §§ 2241(a)(2) and 2242(1). Although the court began by paraphrasing the statutory language of § 2241(a)(2), it then used language more closely resembling that of § 2242(1). By instructing the jury that the fear element is satisfied by fear of some bodily harm, the district court eliminated the heightened degree of fear required to support a conviction for aggravated sexual abuse. In doing so, the district court essentially made §§ 2241(a)(2) and 2242(1) identical, a result explicitly precluded by the language of the statutes. While it was not inappropriate for the court to describe circumstances that may generally give rise to fear, its use of the some bodily harm language constituted independent error, regardless of any other language used in the jury instruction. 22 In formulating its jury instruction, the district court relied on language derived from United States v. Lucas. 157 F.3d at 1002-03. To the extent that language defined the severity of fear required to support a conviction, however, it is inapposite because Lucas addressed the meaning of fear within § 2242(1), which expressly excludes the specific category of heightened fear necessary to satisfy § 2241(a)(2). Id.; see also United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 885 (10th Cir.1998) (using some bodily harm language in the context of § 2242). While fear of some bodily harm certainly satisfies the broad definition of ordinary fear under § 2242(1), it cannot sustain a conviction under § 2241(a)(2). Because the jury instruction did not clearly require the jury to find the heightened level of fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping necessary to convict Holly of felony deprivation of rights under color of law, involving aggravated sexual abuse, the instruction was erroneous.