Opinion ID: 267450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Conner and Brownfield.

Text: 59 Conner and Brownfield, the concrete subcontractor, sought to recover their final estimate and for damages allegedly caused by specified acts of the prime contractor. On the other hand, the prime contractor insisted that Conner and Brownfield failed to perform fully their subcontract by not doing their work in a good and workmanlike manner. The prime contractor alleged that it expended $37,195.05 to complete this subcontract and that Conner and Brownfield owed it $24,762.85. 60 The district court found that Conner and Brownfield substantially performed their subcontract and were therefore entitled to recover the full contract price (including the agreed to extras) less the amount that was necessary to correct deficiencies so as to bring the subcontract performance into exact compliance. See 210 F.Supp. at 514. 61 The district court found that the total contract price, exclusive of any extras was $109,523.67; it found that Conner and Brownfield were paid $88,978.12, leaving a balance of $20,545.55. To the balance of $20,545.55, it added a credit of $1,786 which represented the difference between the sum of $10,150 and the prime contractor's actual cost of form work deleted by an amendment to the subcontract. The total amount due was $24,511.99. 62 For the amount necessary for the prime contractor to correct deficiencies, the district court found that a credit of $11,704.11 to complete the contract would be fair. 210 F.Supp. at 156. The prime contractor contended that it spent $37,195.05 to complete the subcontract. The evidentiary basis for this amount consists of detailed Foreman's Daily Reports and payroll. See 210 F.Supp. at 516; Defendant's Exhibit 58. The court noted that the employees worked on different jobs on the same day and then approximations were made by the foreman or the bookkeeper as to what proportions were chargeable to what subcontract. Therefore, the court accepted the Foreman's Daily Reports and payroll [Defendant's Exhibit 58] as proof that much work was necessary but not as proof that $37,195.05 was spent to complete the job. 210 F.Supp. at 516. The court noted that $19,000 of this amount was spent for work which the prime contractor itself considered to be unreasonable, unnecessary, and over and above the contract requirements. As noted earlier, the court found that on this record a credit to the prime contractor of $11,704.11 to complete the contract would be fair. The court stated: Incidentally, the figure of $11,704.11 is 10 per cent of the total contract price, plus extras, which under normal circumstances would have been the retainage to correct defects. 210 F.Supp. at 516. 63 From this statement of the district court, Conner and Brownfield urge that it is obvious that the court did not find that it cost $11,704.11 to correct the alleged deficiencies, but, instead, the court just allowed an arbitrary figure of 10% of the contract price for the correction of deficiencies. 64 After examining Defendant's Exhibit 58, as well as other portions of the record cited to us by the prime contractor, 26 and cited by Conner and Brownfield, 27 we conclude that the district court's finding that defects existed was not clearly erroneous. However, we note that by Louisiana law the prime contractor must establish not only the existence of the defects    [of which he complains], but also the amount of the reduction to which he is entitled, i. e., the expenditures necessary to correct the defects. Papa v. Louisiana Metal Awning Co., 131 So.2d 114, 117 (La.Ct.App. 1961) (Emphasis added.); see Loeb v. Nielson, 128 So.2d 447, 448 (La.App. 1961). That court noted that the difficulty of introducing evidence as to damages does not justify a discretionary assessment of damages by the trial judge. 131 So.2d at 117; see Loeb v. Neilson, 128 So.2d 447, 449 (La.App. 1961). In light of these authorities, we think that the prime contractor is not entitled to a discretionary assessment of 10 per cent of the total contract price, but that the amount should be the expenditures necessary to correct the defects which the prime contractor can determine and prove. We, therefore, reverse and remand on this point. 65 However, in remanding, we feel it necessary to dispose of two other contentions made by Conner and Brownfield. They urge that the district court should have entered judgment for Conner and Brownfield against their cement-finishing subcontractor, Sam Young, for the prime contractor's costs to correct deficiencies since the court found that the record was replete with evidence that it was Mr. Young's work that was so very defective. 210 F.Supp. at 517. The simple answer to this contention is that no such request was made (or at least it has not been pointed out in the record). We recognize that the plaintiffs filed a motion to bring in Sam Young's surety, United States Casualty Company, as a third-party defendant. But Conner and Brownfield's basis for the motion was that complete relief could not be granted because the defendants, the prime contractor and its surety, had filed a counter-claim; the counterclaim alleged that the cost of completing Conner and Brownfield's contract was increased by their failure to comply with plans and specifications and defective workmanship, necessitating large expenditures in correcting the work improperly performed by Conner and Brownfield. See Record, pp. 213-214. The motion stated that the subject of the counterclaim was the cement finishing done by Sam Young. The district court denied that motion with full rights to refile when and if there is a judgment herein against Conner-Brownfield — July 25th-1961. Record, p. 215. The defendants' counterclaim was not granted. We fail to see why this motion to bring in a third-party defendant should operate as an automatic judgment for the cost to correct deficiencies against Sam Young and his surety without opportunity to litigate the question of their liability since the motion to implead was denied. It may be that the district court should have granted the plaintiff's third-party motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(b); Wright, Federal Court § 76 (1963). At least it would not seem that the test for granting or denying the motion is whether or not there is a judgment actually entered against the plaintiff seeking to implead. However, we note that Conner and Brownfield have not specified as error the denial of this motion. They assert, as we stated above, that judgment should have been entered against Sam Young for the amount deducted from Conner and Brownfield's claim against the prime contractor. 66 Conner and Brownfield also contend that they are entitled to recover the extra cost incurred in performing the concrete work which was caused by the failure of the prime contractor to prepare the site, coordinate the work and furnish materials. The district court found that they had failed to prove the extra cost. 210 F.Supp. at 514. They urge that the prime contractor admitted the extra cost since it filed a claim against the Government and alleged as a fact that this subcontractor was damaged in the sum of $24,000. But they note in their brief: It should be remembered that this is the section of the claim that the prime contractor insisted was solely for the benefit of the subcontractors and covered their claims. Brief for Subcontractors, p. 256. Since the prime contractor's claim was solely for the benefit of the subcontractors and covered their claims, we do not think that the allegation that this subcontractor was damaged in the sum of $24,000 is an admission by the prime contractor of such extra costs. 67 The prime contractor contends that the district court erred in determining the basic contract price. The parties stipulated that the base contract figure totalling the Conner and Brownfield subcontract for concrete work is $109,523.67. 210 F.Supp. at 517. The prime contractor urges that the stipulated figure was the base contract price before the deduction of $10,150, omitted from the subcontract by the amendment of June 27, 1957. The district court concluded that the stipulated figure was the base contract price after the deduction of $10,150. After studying the position of the parties as to what was meant by the stipulation, Record pp. 95-102 (letter to Judge Hunter from DeWitt Mettwin, Jr., June 2, 1962; letter to Judge Hunter from David A. Sheffield, June 19, 1962), we are in accord with the district court. 28 68