Opinion ID: 2053481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the employment handbook plaintiff received in 1973

Text: As the majority recognizes, the handbook plaintiff received when she was hired in 1973 stated in relevant part, No employee will be terminated without proper cause or reason and not until management has made a careful review of the facts. It also stated, The contents of this booklet are not intended to establish, and should not be interpreted to constitute any contract between ... any employee.... The majority relies on Heurtebise v. Reliable Business Computers, Inc., 452 Mich. 405, 550 N.W.2d 243 (1996), to state that provisions in a handbook will not create enforceable rights when the handbook expressly states that such provisions are not intended to create an employment contract. Op. at 913. I disagree that Heurtebise compels summary disposition against the plaintiff. First, the majority states that the handbook specifically disclaims any intent to create contractual or binding obligations to employees. Op. at 913 (emphasis added). However, the disclaimer only relates to contractual obligations. Recall, the provision states, The contents of this booklet are not intended to establish ... any contract.... The distinction is significant as it relates to this case. As this Court stated in Rood v. General Dynamics Corp., 444 Mich. 107, 118, 507 N.W.2d 591 (1993), a legitimate-expectations analysis is not a contract analysis: In other words, there are two alternative theories of enforceabliity that may support a claim of wrongful discharge in Michigan. While the first theory is grounded solely on contract principles relative to the employment setting, Rowe [v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 437 Mich. 627, 632, 473 N.W.2d 268 (1991) ], the second theory is grounded solely on public policy considerations. As Justice Boyle noted in her concurring opinion in In re Certified Question ( Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co. ), 432 Mich. 438, 458, 443 N.W.2d 112 (1989), the pure legitimate expectations leg of Toussaint [v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)] was founded on the Court's common-law authority to recognize enforceable obligations that arise `outside the operation of normal contract principles.' Indeed, Justice Boyle stated that where the enforceable obligation arises out of a personnel policy handbook, a contract theory is not appropriate.... In re Certified Question, 432 Mich. at 458, 443 N.W.2d 112 (Boyle, J., concurring). Therefore, a disclaimer of contractual intent should have no affect on a policy contained in a handbook that gives rise to legitimate expectations of just-cause employment that are outside the operation of normal contract principles. Heurtebise is inapplicable because it was not grounded on a legitimate expectations theory; rather, it was grounded on a theory that the plaintiff was contractually obligated to arbitrate her civil rights claims. [1] We stated in Heurtebise that [i]t is undisputed that an arbitration provision is unenforceable if it is not a binding contract.  452 Mich. at 413, 550 N.W.2d 243 (emphasis added). [2] In Rood, supra at 139, 507 N.W.2d 591, we stated, Once it is determined that a promise has been made, the second step is to determine whether the promise is reasonably capable of instilling a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment.... I would hold that the employer's policy stating that [n]o employee will be terminated without proper cause or reason is reasonably capable of instilling a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment. Because I believe the contractual disclaimer did not contradict the just-cause provision, I would hold that a question of fact exists whether plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment. The majority does not reach the remaining issues in plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim because it holds that no reasonable person could find that plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment (despite an express statement indicating such employment in her employment manual). Therefore, for the reasons already set forth by the majority in Lytle v. Malady, 456 Mich. 1, 566 N.W.2d 582 (1997), I dissent from the majority's disposition and result of plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim.