Opinion ID: 1659535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: sentencing phase constitutional application of aggravating circumstances

Text: A corollary to the general argument that imposing the death penalty for felony murder is not constitutional is that Tennessee's death penalty statute does not sufficiently narrow the population of death-eligible defendants under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. The argument is that it fails to narrow by allowing the use of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7) as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing. As applied in this case, prior to the revision of the Criminal Code of 1989, the aggravating circumstance of committing a murder during a felony essentially duplicated the elements of the offense of first-degree felony murder. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-202(a)(1) (Supp. 1988) provided, in part, that [e]very murder ... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any murder in the first degree, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, is murder in the first degree. The aggravating circumstance set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982), allowed a sentence of death upon a conviction of first-degree murder where [t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in the commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. This duplication of the elements of the offense by one of the aggravating factors has been challenged by capital defendants in the past. Some of the earlier attacks were based on double jeopardy and the argument that conviction under the felony murder aspect of § 39-2-202 required an automatic or mandatory death penalty because the jury had already found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance at the guilt phase of the trial. These arguments were rejected by the Court. State v. Barnes, 703 S.W.2d 611, 618 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Laney, 654 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn. 1981); Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267, 276 (Tenn. 1980). Our legislature, however, has seen fit to prohibit such duplication by statute in non-capital sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-111 (1982) and § 40-35-114 (1990), and we are of the opinion that Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits such duplication in capital sentencing, as well. Our sister state of North Carolina has accepted the double-counting challenge to its death penalty statute, which contained similar duplicative aggravating circumstances. In State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), the North Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that their felony murder aggravating circumstance would always be supported by the evidence in a felony murder conviction, since the felony murder, by definition, must have occurred during the commission or attempted commission of one of the enumerated felonies. Id., 298 N.C. at 112, 257 S.E.2d at 567. The North Carolina court held: The problem here presented arises because [the felony murder aggravating] circumstance is inherent in, and a necessary element of, the capital felony, to-wit, felony murder. ... A defendant convicted of a felony murder, nothing else appearing, will have one aggravating circumstance pending for no other reason than the nature of the conviction. On the other hand, a defendant convicted of a premeditated and deliberated killing, nothing else appearing, enters the sentencing phase with no strikes against him. This is highly incongruous, particularly in light of the fact that the felony murder may have been unintentional, whereas, a premeditated murder is, by definition, intentional and preconceived. ... . We are of the opinion that, nothing else appearing, the possibility that a defendant convicted of a felony murder will be sentenced to death is disproportionately higher than the possibility that a defendant convicted of a premeditated killing will be sentenced to death due to the automatic aggravating circumstance dealing with the underlying felony. To obviate this flaw in the statute, we hold that when a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule, the trial judge shall not submit to the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial the aggravating circumstance concerning the underlying felony. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. at 113, 257 S.E.2d at 567-68. See also, State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E.2d 450 (1981); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981). In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), the United States Supreme Court said that in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment, aggravating circumstances must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Id., 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. at 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d at 249-50. It seems obvious that Tennessee's statute fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty because: Automatically instructing the sentencing body on the underlying felony in a felony-murder case does nothing to aid the jury in its task of distinguishing between first-degree homicides and defendants for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. Relevant distinctions dim, since all participants in a felony-murder, regardless of varying degrees of culpability, enter the sentencing stage with at least one aggravating factor against them. ... . A comparison of the sentencing treatments afforded first-degree-murder defendants further highlights the impropriety of using the underlying felony to aggravate felony-murder. The felony murderer, in contrast to the premeditated murderer, enters the sentencing stage with one aggravating circumstance automatically charged against him. This disparity in sentencing treatment bears no relationship to legitimate distinguishing features upon which the death penalty might constitutionally rest. Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 560 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting). See also Wiley v. Mississippi, 479 U.S. 906, 107 S.Ct. 304, 93 L.Ed.2d 278 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991) (adopting Justice Rose's position). In his thoughtful article analyzing the jurisprudence of death, Professor Richard Rosen correctly notes that the movement by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitutionally narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty began in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), a case in which a majority of the Justices held the existing systems of capital punishment constitutionally deficient at that time. Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C.L.Rev. 1103, 1106 (1990). The pre- Furman capital sentencing statutes in the various states were similar in that the defendant was made eligible for capital punishment by the substantive law of homicide. Id., 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1107. After a guilty finding, then the sentencer, usually as part of the same proceeding, was given unfettered discretion to impose the death penalty. Id., 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1107-08. The Justices in the majority in Furman focused on the random, arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory application of the death penalty under these statutes. Id., 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1108. In reviewing the statutes passed by states since Furman , the Court's focus has been on the process of selecting those to be killed, with the over-arching goal of ensuring that those defendants chosen for execution be in some way worse, or materially more depraved, than those other first-degree murderers not executed. Id., 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1109-10 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1767, 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 409 (1980)). The Court has relied primarily on procedural protections to realize its Eighth Amendment goals. Id., 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1110. A state first must narrow the class of homicide defendants who are eligible for the death penalty to ensure that even if some materially more depraved murderers manage to avoid the death penalty, those chosen will, at least, be among the worst offenders. Id. This narrowing, however, is insufficient by itself to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. Id. The Court has prohibited a mandatory death penalty for even the narrowest class of murder defendants. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987). Instead, after restricting the class of death-eligible offenses, a state must utilize additional procedures that assure reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a given capital case. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). To meet this reliability requirement, a state must permit the sentencer to make an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. at 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d at 251 (1983). The defendant thus is entitled to present and have the sentencer fully consider all relevant evidence in mitigation of sentence. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-71, 90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6 (1986). The state also is allowed, but not required, to present a wide range of evidence in aggravation, as long as it is relevant to the sentencing decision and promotes the reliability of that determination. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). In theory, both the restriction of discretion attendant upon the narrowing requirement and the increase in discretion caused by the full and unfettered consideration of mitigation, serve the underlying goal of weeding out those who do not convincingly deserve the death penalty. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1111. As a constitutionally necessary first step under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has required the states to narrow the sentencers' consideration of the death penalty to a smaller, more culpable class of homicide defendants than the pre- Furman class of death-eligible murderers. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). A state, however, must not only genuinely narrow the class of death eligible defendants, but must do so in a way that reasonably justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. at 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d at 249-50. A proper narrowing device, therefore, provides a principled way to distinguish the case in which the death penalty was imposed from the many cases in which it was not, Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767, 64 L.Ed.2d at 409, and must differentiate a death penalty case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantially rational way from the many murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed. Zant, supra, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. at 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d at 251. As a result, a proper narrowing device insures that, even though some defendants who fall within the restricted class of death-eligible defendants manage to avoid the death penalty, those who receive it will be among the worst murderers  those whose crimes are particularly serious, or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). The critical role played by this narrowing requirement is especially significant in light of the discretion which the Court has mandated for the sentencing body in a capital case. Because a capital sentencer now must be allowed wide discretion  a discretion not unlike that used before Furman  to impose a life sentence based upon any mitigating evidence concerning the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime, the sentencer should be restricted to using this discretion on a class of murderers that is demonstrably smaller and more blame worthy than the class of pre- Furman murderers eligible for the death penalty. States have adopted different methods to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, but in the large majority of states, the class is narrowed by aggravating circumstances. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1122. Tennessee has not chosen to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants by re-defining its murder statute, but rather has chosen to do so by listing a number of specific aggravating factors and expressly requiring the finding of a least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty can be imposed. It joins 24 other states in that requirement. Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 1129, 1240, n. 732 (1984). A few states have chosen to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants by providing restrictive definitions of first-degree, or capital, murder. Rosen, Felony Murder, 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1123. In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), the Supreme Court approved this alternative approach, holding that no requirement existed for narrowing the class at the sentencing stage, provided that the class of death-eligible defendants is, in fact, genuinely narrowed at the definitional stage. Id., 484 U.S. at 244-46, 108 S.Ct. at 554-55, 98 L.Ed.2d at 581-83. Recognizing that Tennessee has not chosen to narrow at the definitional stage, it should be noted that the legislature has, in fact, broadened its first-degree murder statute by adding death by child abuse, which makes the class even larger than pre- Furman . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-202(a)(2) (Supp. 1988) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991). But see State v. Hale, 840 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1992), in which this Court held the statute unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of due process under Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. In addition to having different methods for narrowing the class of death eligible defendants, states have different definitions of first-degree felony murder. As noted earlier, some states are pure felony murder states; that is, they allow the defendants to be sentenced to death solely because the killing took place during an accompanying felony. Tennessee was one of those states before 1989 [7] . In these states, a defendant first can be convicted of first-degree murder because of the felony. Then, the defendant can be sentenced to death because the felony is used as an aggravating circumstance, unqualified at either stage by any mens rea requirement. Rosen, Felony Murder, 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1125-26. Rosen points out that in those states, which includes Tennessee, the felony murder narrowing device fails to meet both the quantitative and qualitative requirements for a narrowing device. It provides no meaningful narrowing and, to the extent that narrowing does exist, it does not serve to identify the defendants most deserving of death. In these states, felony murderers are treated essentially the same as they were pre- Furman ... the simple fact of the accompanying felony makes the defendant death-eligible [and] the jury then can exercise its unfettered discretion to determine whether defendant is to live or die. Id., 31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1127. Commentators have always criticized the felony murder rule for its bootstrapping effect. Id. It vaults an offense into the class of murders without the malice finding usually required, and then, still without any culpability finding, elevates what otherwise might not be a murder to first-degree murder. Id. In addition, in pure felony murder states, such as Tennessee before 1989, a third level of bootstrapping arises as the felony murder defendant is moved up into the supposedly restricted class of defendants eligible for death. Id. The perverse result of the felony murder narrowing device is even more troubling because the usual class of first-degree murders is made up largely of two groups of defendants  felony murderers and premeditated and deliberated murderers. The only defendants who are eliminated by the felony murder narrowing device are those who kill with premeditation and deliberation  i.e., in cold blood  but not during the course of a felony. A simple felony murder unaccompanied by any other aggravating factor is not worse than a simple, premeditated, and deliberate murder. If anything, the latter, which by definition involves a killing in cold blood, involves more culpability. A few states qualify their felony murder narrowing devices by requiring that the defendant possess a specified mens rea of recklessness or culpable negligence at either the guilt or sentencing stage. Tennessee has done so since 1989. See 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 591, § 1. All felony murderers, however, potentially meet a recklessness standard; that is, one who purposely undertakes a felony that results in a death, almost always can be found reckless. Therefore, the narrowing devices in these states are essentially no different from those in the pure felony murder states. Furthermore, the Supreme Court case of Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), now places a nationwide threshold of culpability at the reckless indifference level, meaning that a defendant who acts without reckless indifference is not constitutionally eligible for the death penalty. Id., 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1687-88, 95 L.Ed.2d at 144-45. Therefore, since the absence of reckless indifference constitutionally immunizes a defendant from the death penalty, its presence cannot meaningfully further narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. In Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.1985), the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Zant, supra , and the principles of Godfrey, supra , to hold that duplication by an aggravating circumstance of the underlying capital felony violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. [8] The Court commented: The question, rather, is whether use of an aggravating circumstance that duplicates an element of crime itself is a violation of the Eighth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Two recent Supreme court opinions, Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (plurality opinion), and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), clearly indicate that such a violation has occurred here. Aggravating circumstances, in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment, must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and .. . reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Id. [462 U.S. at 875-878,] 103 S.Ct. at 2742-43 (footnote omitted). An aggravating circumstance is an objective criterion that can be used to distinguish a particular defendant on whom the jury has decided to impose the death sentence from other defendants who have committed the same underlying capital crime. Aggravating circumstances serve to reduce the danger that the death penalty will be wantonly or arbitrarily imposed, a danger that was uppermost in the Court's mind when Furman v. Georgia ... was decided... . We see no escape from the conclusion that an aggravating circumstance which merely repeats an element of the underlying crime cannot perform this narrowing function. Id., 754 F.2d at 263-64. This Court has previously refused to follow the Collins rationale by finding it inapplicable under the Tennessee Constitution. See State v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Tenn. 1988); State v. King, 694 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Laney, 654 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tenn. 1983); and State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn. 1981). In State v. Smith, supra, the Court's reason for rejecting the Collins rationale was as follows: This precise question, however, was before the Supreme Court of the United States in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), cert. granted 483 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct. 3227, 97 L.Ed.2d 734 (1987). There the Court upheld the position that we have taken herein and in Pritchett and King, supra , that use of the underlying felony, in this case armed robbery, as an aggravating circumstance upon which the jury may base a death penalty is constitutionally permissible. Id., 755 S.W.2d at 768. The difficulty with that conclusion is that in Lowenfield v. Phelps, supra , the United States Supreme Court held that the Louisiana death penalty statute sufficiently narrowed the class of death eligible murderers by narrowly defining capital murder so that the class of death eligible defendants did not have to be further narrowed by aggravating circumstances. 484 U.S. at 244-46, 108 S.Ct. at 554-55, 98 L.Ed.2d at 581-83. Since the statute sufficiently narrowed the class of death eligible by narrowly defining capital murder, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute, despite the fact that the sole aggravating circumstance found was identical to an element of the capital crime of which the petitioner had been convicted. Id. In upholding the Louisiana statute, the Court concluded that the narrowing function required may be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase, and that the legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses, as Louisiana has done, or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase. Id., 484 U.S. at 244-45, 108 S.Ct. at 554, 98 L.Ed.2d at 581-82. It is clear that Tennessee has a broad definition of murder and has not narrowed in the definitional stage. Accordingly, Lowenfield is inapposite and provides no rationale for constitutionality under the Tennessee Constitution. We have determined that in light of the broad definition of felony murder and the duplicating language of the felony murder aggravating circumstance, no narrowing occurs under Tennessee's first-degree murder statute. We hold that, when the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder, the aggravating circumstance set out in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) and 39-13-204(i)(7) (1991), does not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers sufficiently under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution because it duplicates the elements of the offense. As a result, we conclude that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7) is unconstitutionally applied under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution where the death penalty is imposed for felony murder. Accordingly, we expressly overrule State v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn. 1988), and its progeny on this issue. As stated at the beginning of this Opinion, under our holding today, felony murder continues to be a death-eligible offense. However, a finding of an aggravating circumstance other than Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) and § 39-13-204(i)(7) (1991) is necessary to support death as a penalty for that crime. Because, in this case, the jury has found two aggravating circumstances are supported by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, it is necessary for this case to be remanded for re-sentencing. Even though the evidence amply supports the aggravating circumstance of the murder being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982), we are unable to conclude that the elimination of the aggravating circumstance (i)(7) is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we remand this case for re-sentencing where the State will be free to reseek the death penalty if it so desires. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee. DROWOTA and O'BRIEN, JJ., concurring in Parts I and II and dissenting in Part III. See separate Opinion. REID, C.J., and DAUGHTREY, J., concurring in Parts I and III and dissenting in Part II. See separate Opinion.