Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Threat Against Deputy Crisp

Text: On May 30, 1993, while in custody at the Orange County jail, defendant complained that he was not provided a lunch tray. When his cell door was opened, however, he came out with a tray in his hands. Deputy Crisp, who supervised the distribution of lunch trays, refused to provide defendant with another tray. In response, defendant flew into an [a]bsolute rage, shook the cell door, and screamed repeatedly that he was going to kill Deputy Crisp with a shank the next chance he got. Deputy Crisp took the threat very seriously. Defendant claims that the foregoing did not establish a criminal offense. We disagree. Threatening to kill a sheriff's deputy for the performance of his duty would appear to violate section 71, which provides that [e]very person who, with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, ... any public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a public offense.... (See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 777, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) This was not a random outburst uttered while officers patrolled outside (cf. People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 590, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142); rather, defendant's threat was plainly uttered in response to the deputy's proper execution of his duties. ( People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572 [to the extent his official duties included overseeing the custody and control of defendant and his fellow inmates, a threat to kill a deputy constituted an attempt to deter or prevent Deputy Shafia from performing his official duties].) Nor did Crisp believe the threat was an idle one (cf. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 590, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142 [the recipients of these threats indicated they did not actually fear for their safety]), since inmates had been able to manufacture shanks and other weapons despite the jail's best efforts to prevent it and defendant's rage was unmistakable. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1060, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Thus, this incident was properly admitted as an aggravating factor. We also reject defendant's claim that his threats against Deputy Crisp were protected speech under the First Amendment. `As long as the threat reasonably appears to be a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm [citation] and its circumstances are such that there is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out,' a statute proscribing such threats `is not unconstitutional for lacking a requirement of immediacy or imminence.' ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1061, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388, quoting In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 714, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365.)