Opinion ID: 3207072
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Portions of Kargel’s deposition testimony in

Text: which she acknowledged that there were mechanisms 3 Kargel’s affidavit and deposition testimony refer to the top five percent of the SPIS as a criterion for funding eligibility, while the 2010 ODOT Highway Safety Program Guide that Colip submitted into the record refers to the criterion as the top ten percent of the SPIS. The difference seemingly arises from the different time period that the Program Guide speaks to (notably, the 2007 Quick Fix Program bulletin that Colip submitted into the record refers to the criteria in the Highway Safety Program Guide as “SPIS top 5%.”). In the trial court, ODOT did not challenge the relevance of the 2010 Highway Safety Program Guide to its theory of discretionary-function immunity as it pertains to its actions in 2008 (the time of the accident) and earlier. In fact, it chose to supply the 2010 Program Guide, rather than an earlier version, in response to plaintiff’s discovery request for “documents describing the factors, procedures or analysis    by which defendant selects highway safety construction projects.” Cite as 359 Or 644 (2016) 657 outside of the SPIS, such as requests from citizens, ODOT maintenance personnel, and other public bodies, that could trigger an investigation into whether a safety improvement is needed; that ODOT could make “minor” or “low-cost” improvements to portions of a roadway that are not in listed in the STIP; that ODOT sometimes used money from maintenance and general budgets to fund such improvements; and that removing parking spaces or reconfiguring parking on Highway 101 at Collins Street would qualify as low-cost. Colip also submitted documentary evidence, including emails, meeting minutes, and planning documents suggesting that ODOT employees had been aware of the lineof-sight problems at the intersection for a number of years, had offered recommendations relating to the problem, and had participated in planning efforts, along with representatives of the city and county, that resulted in proposals for addressing the danger. Plaintiff had submitted many of the same materials in opposition to ODOT’s motion for summary judgment against his claims. As noted, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. It likened the circumstances to those in Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 335 Or 19, 56 P3d 396 (2002). In that case, this court rejected the defendant city’s contention that its adoption of a capital improvement plan that did not include fixing the storm drain problem at issue in the case amounted to a policy decision for which it was immune under ORS 30.265(6)(c). Noting that the decision in Vokoun appeared to turn on (1) evidence that the city had a supplemental budget system for paying for repairs outside of the capital improvement plan and (2) the fact that there was no evidence that the city had considered using a supplemental budget to pay for the repairs, the Court of Appeals in the present case looked for similar alternatives to the SPIS-to-STIP funding process on which ODOT relied. The court concluded that the summary judgment record failed to establish “that all of the Highway 101 modifications in question were considered and rejected in the STIP process or that other available processes were used to decide to not make those changes. 270 Or App at 367. Summary judgment was not proper, the court concluded, because ODOT had failed to show that it had made policy 658 Turner v. Dept. of Transportation choices for which ODOT was entitled to immunity. Id. at 368.