Opinion ID: 772486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Suppression Rulings and Our Prior Decision on Appeal

Text: 29 In pretrial motions, Dhinsa moved, inter alia, to suppress the fruits of both the July 1, 1997 car stop and search and the July 7, 1997 inventory search. After conducting hearings, the district court granted both motions, albeit for differing reasons. The district court suppressed the fruits of the July 1, 1997 stop and search because both detectives testified that, although they observed Dhinsa commit a traffic violation, it was not the basis of their decision to stop him. See Dhinsa, 171 F.3d at 722. With regard to the events on July 7, 1997, the district court held that the seizure of Dhinsa's car was entirely appropriate because the police had probable cause to believe that [the car] was used in the commission of a murder or an attempted murder, and not seizing the car gives the defendant or those associated with him an opportunity to destroy evidence. Although the district court stated that the detectives did not have probable cause to search Dhinsa's car for evidence of the murder when they commenced their search, it noted that there was arguably probable cause to believe that a weapon might be found in the car given that Dhinsa was arrested based on his involvement in Satinderjit's murder. 30 The district court found that the search of Dhinsa's car was lawful because (1) Conroy directed Verma to conduct an inventory search; (2) Verma erroneously believed he could conduct an investigatory search; and (3) regardless of Verma's intent or belief, the scope of the search he conducted did not exceed the permissible bounds of an inventory search until items he observed in plain view supplied him with probable cause to conduct a more extensive search. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d at 724. Despite express findings of fact and law that supported a denial of Dhinsa's suppression motion, the district court nevertheless suppressed the fruits of the July 7, 1997 search, stating that it presented a close question of law, and reasoning that by placing the issue in an appealable posture Dhinsa would not have to wait until the end of the trial in order to seek appellate review of the district court's denial of the suppression motion. 31 On appeal, we reversed both suppression orders. With respect to the July 1, 1997 stop, we held that an observed traffic violation legitimates a stop even if the detectives do not rely on the traffic violation as a basis for the stop. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d at 725 (footnote omitted). We went on to hold that the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and other Fourth Amendment cases require that we judge the reasonableness of an officer's actions based on the objective circumstances surrounding her actions and not on her subjective intent. Id. (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 814). Accordingly, because Dhinsa's traffic violation was an objective circumstance that justifie[d] a traffic stop, we held that the stop was lawful notwithstanding the officers' subjective intent. Id. Next, we summarily reversed the July 7, 1997 suppression order because it directly contradict[ed] [the district court's] findings of fact and conclusions of law, but permitted Dhinsa to challenge the admission of the evidence of the July 7 search in his post-trial appeal. Id. at 728. Accordingly, we left Dhinsa's challenge to the constitutionality of that search to any post-trial appeal. That appeal is currently before us.