Opinion ID: 442046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: They hear the evidence and make the decision.

Text: II R. 42-43. 7 The Unification Church brought suit in federal district court. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional. III R. 87. This litigation was settled when the church and the City of Golden agreed in a stipulation that an exemption should have been awarded, III R. 88, and the Unification Church was permitted to proselytize or to solicit in the City of Golden 8 We note in passing that one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) 9 It also appears that making the distinctions envisioned by the ordinance would run afoul of the principle enunciated in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed.2d 1213 (1940). In Cantwell the Court struck down a statute that empowered the secretary of the public welfare council of the state to determine if a cause was a religious one. If he determined that the cause was not religious, he was authorized to refuse to issue a certificate, and soliciting without a certificate was a crime. Id. at 305, 60 S.Ct. at 904; see Schaumburg, supra, 444 U.S. at 629, 100 S.Ct. at 832 (Although Cantwell turned on the Free Exercise Clause, the Court has subsequently understood Cantwell to have implied that soliciting funds involves interests protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.); see also Espinosa v. Rusk, supra, 634 F.2d 477. At least to the extent that the ordinance permits the City Council of Golden to determine whether an organization is religious for purposes of granting an exemption, it suffers from the same constitutional defect as that found in Cantwell