Opinion ID: 1695513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Initially, we address HRS's jurisdictional objections to the action. HRS first claims that collateral estoppel bars any claims by B.J.M. concerning his care by HRS because at each judicial review the court specifically found that B.J.M. was appropriately placed and that HRS had complied with its duties toward him... . In order to find that HRS was in compliance with its duties, the juvenile court judge necessarily had to find that the deficiencies alleged in the guardian ad litem's written reports did not constitute violations of the duties imposed upon HRS by law... . Thus, as to all matters relating to B.J.M.'s care and placement ... the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 39, 40. Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been decided. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977). The essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. The courts have emphasized that collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated in a prior proceeding. See Hochstadt v. Orange Broadcast, 588 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The district court held that collateral estoppel does not bar an action for damages, and reasoned that: The prior judicial reviews of B.J.M.'s placement did not determine whether HRS had breached a duty of care to B.J.M.; the orders indicate that the court merely noted, with some reluctance, that the placements were not inappropriate. The parties never litigated before the juvenile court the issue of whether HRS breached a duty of care once it placed B.J.M. in Montanari. 627 So.2d at 517-18. We agree with the district court's reasoning and analysis on this issue. We next consider HRS's claim that the filing of a civil action in the general jurisdiction division of the circuit court constitutes an unlawful interference with the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the circuit court. Again we agree with the district court's rejection of this claim. This case was properly within the circuit court's general jurisdiction division since the complaint sought civil relief in mandamus and tort law. The filing of such a claim does not interfere with the authority of the juvenile division of the court which is organized to consider dependency and delinquency actions. The internal operation of the court system and the assignment of judges to various divisions does not limit the circuit court's jurisdiction. In re Peterson, 364 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). It is the court, and not the particular judges thereof, that has jurisdiction over a particular cause... . Willie v. State, 600 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citation omitted). Finally, we reject HRS's contention that the guardian ad litem did not have standing to sue on behalf of B.J.M. The Juvenile Division Order Appointing Attorney and Guardian Ad Litem granted broad authority for Legal Services' representation of B.J.M. as guardian ad litem. We agree with the district court that there was nothing improper about Legal Services' role as guardian ad litem in this litigation. 627 So.2d at 514 n. 2. The juvenile court initially entered an order empowering Legal Services to represent B.J.M. not only in juvenile court but also in proceedings outside the court when appropriate. Such representation would appear to be especially appropriate considering the fact that B.J.M. had been abandoned and had no one else to assume the role of legal guardian.