Opinion ID: 775693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(b)

Text: 39 Gracia argues two issues under sec. 3B1.1(b): that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence pursuant to sec. 3B1.1(b) on the ground that he was a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity involving five or more participants; and that the court did not make sufficient findings of fact in support of its decision. Gracia maintains that there is no way to conclude from the trial record that Mr. Gracia was a 'manager or supervisor.' 40 Section 3B1.1(b) states, If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels. A participant is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. n.1. Whether a defendant is a manager or supervisor is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Hall, 101 F.3d 1174, 1176 (7th Cir. 1996). A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 41 The central purpose of sec. 3B1.1(b) is to punish a defendant for his relative responsibility within a criminal organization. United States v. Fones, 51 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1995). If it is determined that a defendant had no greater role than any other participant, he cannot receive a sec. 3B1.1 increase. United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1103 (7th Cir. 1994). In determining whether a defendant played a greater role as a manager or supervisor, 42 [f]actors the court should consider include the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. 43 U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; Fones, 51 F.3d at 665 (listing cases). All factors need not be present, but the defendant must have exercised some control over others involved in the commission of the offense. United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283 (2000) (citing United States v. House, 110 F.3d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original)). It is sufficient that the defendant orchestrated or coordinated the activities of others. Fones, 51 F.3d at 666 (citations omitted). While the criminal activity must involve five or more participants, to qualify for the increase as manager or supervisor, the district court had to find that Gracia had control over only one participant. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. n.2; Fones, 51 F.3d at 668. 44 The PSR noted that Gracia directed and supervised the actions of Angie, Daniel, and Mota: driving Angie to the bank, giving her money to open a bank account, driving her to withdraw money, driving her to cash a check and purchase money orders; driving Daniel to the credit union and instructing him to withdraw money, taking Daniel to Western Union and giving him money to send wire transfers to individuals unknown to Daniel; and giving money to Mota and driving him to Western Union to place wire transfers on two occasions. Although Angie, Daniel, and Mota were not charged as co- conspirators, all three testified at Gracia's trial as to the criminal scheme in which they were involved. Gracia also directed the actions of Bonillas' aunt and involved his own brother in the conspiracy. Bonillas' aunt also testified concerning her involvement in the conspiracy at Gracia's trial. In addition, as a mid-level manager, Gracia provided or directed large sums of money far greater than the $50 or $75 paid to the minor participants and received a correspondingly far larger share. Gracia not only recruited participants and claimed a larger share, but both the PSR and the record provide more than sufficient evidence that he coordinated and orchestrated the activities of Angie, Daniel, Mota, and Bonillas' aunt. He had a real and direct influence on those participants in the conspiracy. Mustread, 42 F.3d at 1103. The district court made no mistake in enhancing Gracia's sentence under sec. 3B1.1(b). 45 As to the findings of fact issue, it is true that district courts are required to make specific findings which present the evidentiary basis for a sentencing determination. See United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 1993). Although Gracia is correct that the district court gave an abbreviated explanation in finding Gracia was a manager, 7 in addition to specifically adopting the findings of the PSR at the sentencing hearing, the district court relied on the evidence presented at trial and noted that the government has certainly carried its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence regarding [the sec. 3B1.1(b)] matters. This circuit has held that the district court must adopt the PSR's recommended findings or make independent findings sufficient to support its conclusion in applying an enhancement under sec. 3B1.1(b). United States v. Patel, 131 F.3d 1195, 1203 (7th Cir. 1997). The district court not only adopted the findings of the PSR, which in turn are supported by the record, but referenced the evidence from the trial record concerning this enhancement when it noted that the government had satisfied its burden of proof. These statements make the findings sufficiently clear to support the sec. 3B1.1(b) enhancement.