Opinion ID: 2625596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 1: The May 28 Letter and Invoice

Text: ¶ 18 The Bar alleges that Poole is subject to discipline for violating RPC 3.4(b) and/or RPC 8.4(c) [b]y backdating the May 28, 2001 invoice and/or presenting it to opposing counsel in the lien matter. CP at 7. As to this charge, the hearing officer found that Poole did not prepare a May 28th, 2001 invoice to Mr. Matson until much later, probably between October 5 and 8, 2001. FOF 61. Then, in October, Poole knowingly and intentionally backdated the May 28, 2001 billing statement and sent it to Mr. Lee in a deliberate attempt to mislead Mr. Lee and Mr. Matson, and that in doing so violated both RPC 3.4(b) and RPC 8.4(c). [4] Conclusions of Law (CL) 67. ¶ 19 RPC 3.4(b) provides that [a] lawyer shall not ... [f]alsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law. RPC 8.4(c) provides that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. ¶ 20 Poole asserts here that the Bar failed to prove by a clear preponderance of the evidence that he `knowingly and intentionally' fabricated and `backdated' the May 28 invoice reflecting a zero balance. DP at 41 (quoting CL 67). Poole rests his challenge on his assertion that the Bar failed to prove he did not create and send such an invoice in May 2001. While the Bar claims that the two documents dated May 28, 2001 were created in October, backdated, and never sent to Matson, see FOF 58, Matson, on direct examination by the Bar counsel, testified that he received the May 28 letter and invoice. See Transcripts (TR) at 220-22. Despite Matson's testimony, the hearing officer, while finding there was conflicting and insufficient evidence to determine if Mr. Poole sent the May 28, 2001 letter to Mr. Matson, concluded that the Bar in fact met its burden of proving that Mr. Poole did not prepare or send to Mr. Matson the invoice on or about May 28, 2001. FOF 59, 60 (emphasis added). Several factors led the hearing officer to draw this conclusion. First, Poole claimed that he was unable to locate the hard copy of the invoice even though he has one for every other bill. FOF 60(a). Second, while Poole gave various explanations for why the credit failed to appear on subsequent invoices, the hearing officer, relying on testimony from the Bar's expert, Carol Pearson, [5] found Poole's explanations were not credible. FOF 60(a), 60(e). Finally, the hearing officer concluded that the only plausible reason for Poole to send the backdated May 28 statement to Lee without explanation was to deceive Lee into thinking that the statement was sent to Matson on May 28, 2001. FOF 60(h). In sum, the hearing officer, after reasonably determining that Poole could not adequately explain why he had no hard copy of the invoice nor why the credit was not reflected on any subsequent account, found that the invoice was never sent in spite of Poole's and the grievant's testimony that it was in fact sent and received. In essence, she concluded that an invoice was never created, and as such, could never have been sent. FOF 60. ¶ 21 Despite both Poole and Matson's testimony, the hearing officer and the Board refused to find that the Poole sent Matson an invoice in May 2001. We have previously stated that we will not reject a factual finding based simply on an alternative explanation or version of the facts previously rejected by the hearing officer and Board. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 152 Wash.2d 124, 133, 94 P.3d 939 (2004). As the hearing officer, and not this court, is tasked with making factual determinations, and as substantial circumstantial and expert testimony support her findings, we decline to overturn them here. ¶ 22 In spite of Poole's efforts to cloud the issue by refocusing the dispute on whether the May 28 invoice was ever sent, the principal issue remains whether he created a new invoice on October 8 and assigned it a May 28 date. In fact, it remains undisputed that Poole created and then backdated an invoice in October 2001 to appear to be an invoice created in May 2001. FOF 60(b); TR at 128-31. Poole testified that he believe[d] he sent a similar invoice in May, TR at 555, but this belief is irrelevant as to whether he violated RPC 3.4(b) and 8.4(c). Based on this belief, Poole attempts to characterize the date change as an immaterial misrepresentation and asks this court to impose a materiality requirement in order for misrepresentations to warrant discipline. Reply Br. of Poole at 14. We decline to accept Poole's rationalization as a legal defense. Cf. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 152 Wash.2d 601, 616, 98 P.3d 444 (2004) (finding attorney's motivation... inapposite and rejecting attorney's attempts to deconstruct his declarations); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dann, 136 Wash.2d 67, 77-78, 960 P.2d 416 (1998) (rejecting justifications for initial-switching on billing invoices even when same resulted in lower fees); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wash.2d 81, 94-95, 985 P.2d 328 (1999). ¶ 23 As set forth above, RPC 3.4(b) and 8.4(c) instruct that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to [f]alsify evidence or [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. We have stated that to determine whether an attorney violated RPC 8.4(c) we are tasked with determining simply whether the attorney lied. Dann, 136 Wash.2d at 77, 960 P.2d 416. Poole's attempts to minimize the creation of a new document as not material and not a misrepresentation as it accurately reflect[ed] a zero balance are unpersuasive. Br. of Attorney Poole at 26-27. Poole's arguments that the date change was immaterial is simply wrong. The dispute between Poole and Matson, as of that date, was whether Poole had zeroed out Matson's bill as of May 2001. Despite the fact that Matson continued to receive invoices reflecting a balance in excess of $16,000 over the summer, see FOF 38-39, Poole claimed to have documents supporting his position that he credited Matson's account. For whatever reason, either because of a technical error, as he asserts, or because none was ever created, as the Bar charges, he was unable to locate an invoice. He then created one, and in both deposition testimony and direct testimony at the hearing admitted to preparing and backdating an invoice in October 2001 with a May 28, 2001 date. When he provided this invoice to Matson's attorney he offered no explanation as to its authenticity. In doing so, Poole engaged in a blatant misrepresentation in an effort to mislead Matson and his attorney into believing Poole possessed evidence that he wrote off Matson's account. ¶ 24 We thus reject Poole's rationalizations as insufficient and affirm the Board's conclusion that Poole violated RPC 3.4(b) and 8.4(c) by creating an invoice in October 2001, dating it May 28, 2001, and providing it to an opposing counsel, [6] in this case counsel for a former client.