Opinion ID: 1611019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was summary judgment proper because of the presence of material factual disputes?

Text: The first theory of recovery in this suit is on the basis of strict liability in tort. The plaintiff alleged that the wellhead equipment, known in the industry as the Christmas tree, contained a design defect rendering the equipment unreasonably dangerous for its intended use. The valve of the wellhead was closed by use of a handle; however, the valve handle turned into a ladder placed close to the handle so as to prevent full closure. In order to completely close the valve, it was necessary to remove the handle and close the valve manually with thirteen revolutions of a crescent wrench. The plaintiff alleged that his injury was caused by the inability to close and seal the master valve due to the positioning of the ladder and handle. It is alleged that this positioning constituted a design defect present when the well was constructed by Skelly and for which Getty was strictly liable by its assumption of Skelly's liabilities. These facts are undisputed except as to the presence of a design defect. Upon motion for summary judgment, affidavits in support and in opposition thereto, briefs of counsel and arguments, the trial court found that as a matter of law there was no genuine issue of any material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of Getty on the strict liability theory of recovery. Applicable to the disposition of this assignment is Rule 56(c), Miss.R. Civ.P. which provides as follows: The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The standard of review applied by this Court when analyzing the granting of a summary judgment motion under M.R.C.P. 56 is found in the case of Pearl River County v. Southeast Collection Agency, 459 So.2d 783 (Miss. 1984), in which this Court stated: Summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The power to grant summary judgment is not discretionary with the trial court and the above test must be met in all cases. 459 So.2d at 784-785. In Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1983), this Court stated: The argument that there exists no genuine triable issue of material fact is the functional equivalent of a request for a peremptory instruction. It merely occurs at an earlier stage in the life of a civil action. The trial court must review carefully all of the evidentiary matters before it  admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If in this view the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise the motion should be denied. Compare generally, Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 652, 657 (Miss. 1975); City of Jackson v. Locklar, 431 So.2d 475, 478-479 (Miss. 1983). The legal argument upon which Getty's motion for summary judgment was based was that this action is not covered by products liability law. The seminal case in which this Court adopted Sec. 402A of Restatement of Torts, in which strict liability was enunciated, was the case of State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966). The Restatement section 402A reads: 1. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to this property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 2. The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. Ibid. at 118. In Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 213 (Miss. 1985), this Court explained that the rationale for the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers is two-fold: [T]o shift the cost of injuries from the public to the manufacturer, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962); and to assist the plaintiff in establishing what would otherwise be a near-impossible burden of proof. J.W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 826 (1973). The first part of the rationale represents a policy decision. As Justice Traynor stated in Greenman: The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. 59 Cal.2d at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901. 482 So.2d at 215, 216. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the appropriate standard of responsibility of § 402A is applicable to manufacturers of a product who sell defective products if the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product. The primary issues to be addressed are: (1) Is the oil well a product as contemplated by § 402A; and (2) was Getty a seller engaged in the business of selling such a product.