Opinion ID: 1750800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: application of the glaskox decision

Text: Subsequent to the grant of the summary judgment now before this Court, the Mississippi Supreme Court at least partially abrogated parent-unemancipated child immunity in Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906 (Miss. 1992). Glaskox involved a child who sustained injuries while her father was operating a motor vehicle. Id. at 907. This Court held that the judicially created doctrine of parental immunity has outlived its purpose and adopt[ed] the majority view abrogating the principle as it applies to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Id. at 912. However, the Court did not explicitly provide that parents would be allowed to sue their children under like circumstances. [5] The case sub judice involves a mother who has sued her unemancipated daughter for injuries caused during an automobile accident where the daughter was driving  the same basic scenario as presented in Glaskox with parent-child roles being reversed. This Court holds that parents have a right to sue their children for injuries sustained due to negligent operation of a motor vehicle. There are several rationales that have been offered in support of parent-unemancipated child immunity including: (1) the possibility of parental inheritance of the child's recovery; (2) the need to insure the parent's right to discipline, care and control; (3) the need to avoid the depletion of family assets; (4) the need to maintain domestic tranquility and harmony; (5) the possibility of fraud and collusion among family members; and (6) the analogy to spousal immunity. Wingerter, Isabel, Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 50 La.L.Rev. 1131, 1135 (1990). Rationales numbered (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to these facts. With regard to the remaining rationales, the Glaskox Court discussed the analogy of parent-child immunity to spousal immunity and noted that spousal immunity was abrogated by this Court in Burns v. Burns, 518 So.2d 1205 (Miss. 1988). Id. at 911. The Glaskox Court further stated that family tranquility ... is not a proper justification to deprive a minor child of the right to sue for injuries to his person. Moreover, domestic peace and harmony may be more threatened by denying the cause of action. Id. In considering the potential for fraud and collusion, rationale number 5, the Court answered that [w]hile a possibility, this factor does not justify denial of otherwise meritorious claims. Id. at 912. Thus, having eliminated all the rationales justifying parent-child immunity, the Court grants parents reciprocal rights to sue their children for injuries arising out of negligent use of motor vehicles. The Restatement (Second) of Torts reads a parent or child is not immune from tort liability to [the] other solely by reason of that relationship. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G(1) (1979). Other jurisdictions have similarly recognized that reciprocal rights exist between parent and child. The Nevada Supreme Court stated the doctrine of parental immunity is reciprocal. Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1974) (declining to adopt doctrine of parental immunity). In addressing the question of whether a father could sue a son for ordinary negligence, the court in Wallace v. Wallace, 466 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.Civ.App. 1971), announced that the doctrine would be applied with equal force regardless of whether the suit is one by an unemancipated minor child against its parent or a parent against an unemancipated child. Indeed, it would seem illogical for the door of legal relief to swing open only for the benefit of an unemancipated child against his parent. In Diehl v. Diehl, 421 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Iowa 1988), the court shared the view that these familial immunities, to the extent they are recognized at all, should be reciprocal. See also Guterman v. Guterman, 66 N.J. 69, 328 A.2d 233 (1974) (supporting reciprocal rights for parent and child). Additionally, several states have allowed parents to sue their unemancipated child for negligent operation of a motor vehicle. [6] Consequently, to the extent parental immunity was abolished in Glaskox, this Court recognizes that parents may maintain suits against their children. The trial court entered judgment before the Glaskox decision; thus, his ruling was correctly based on then-existing law. However, the law has changed since the case sub judice was appealed. Therefore, this Court finds that summary judgment in favor of Barbara Ales, the daughter, is reversed in accord with the Glaskox decision and its expansion here today.