Opinion ID: 1486394
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Heading: The Central Equitable Principle as Stated in Cases from Other Jurisdictions

Text: Several cases from other jurisdictions which adopt a relative fault system of distributing joint tort liability are cited in Whitehead and Kales, 566 S.W.2d 474 n. 7. [2] These cases state the central equitable principle in a variety of ways. In Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971), the court stated: [The] right of contribution among unintentional joint tort-feasors is an equitable right founded upon acknowledged principles of natural justice. [ Id. at 179.] The doctrine of contribution is a judicial concept predicated upon the equitable principle that one of two or more tort-feasors should not in fairness be required to undertake the entire burden of indemnifying the injured party. [ Id. at 180.] We see no reason why in logic or in justice the law should expect that the joint tort-feasor should ultimately be required to contribute moreor lessthan a share of the total damages proportionate to his causal fault. [ Id. ] The court in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972), speaks of the courts' struggle toward fairness and undertakes to re-examine the basic fairness of the system of indemnity: The conclusion reached is that where a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. 30 N.Y.2d at 148-149, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387, 282 N.E.2d at 292. In Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 286 N.E.2d 241 (1972), the court states that the new rule of apportionment [adopted in Dole is] . . . pragmatically sound, as well as realistically fair. 31 N.Y.2d at 29, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854, 286 N.E.2d at 243. The fairer rule, we believe, is to distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault. Id. In Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956), the rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors is traced to its origin in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng.Rep. 1337 (K.B.1799), as founded on the policy that the intentional wrongdoer is not entitled . . . to the aid of the law in adjusting any claims against his confederate . . . in causing a deliberate and planned injury to a third party. 247 Iowa at 807, 77 N.W.2d at 28. Thus, the court held that where there is no claim or showing of an intentional wrong, or of moral turpitude or any concerted action by the alleged tortfeasors . . . there is at least a right of equitable contribution between them. 247 Iowa at 810, 77 N.W.2d at 29. In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the amount of liability for contribution of tortfeasors who sustain a common liability by reason of causal negligence should be determined in proportion to the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each. 16 Wis.2d at 6, 114 N.W.2d at 107. The court noted: In discussing the right of contribution and its effect, we have often used such terms as his fair and equitable share, equity and natural justice, more than his proportion, more than his just share, and more than his proportionate share. If the doctrine is to do equity, there is no reason in logic or in natural justice why the shares of common liability of joint tortfeasors should not be translated into the percentage of the causal negligence which contributed to the injury. This is merely a refinement of the equitable principle. 16 Wis.2d at 9, 114 N.W.2d at 109 (footnotes omitted). The court observed that No one denies the proposed change is more just in distributing the loss in proportion to the degree of negligence or fault which caused it. 16 Wis.2d at 10, 114 N.W.2d at 109. The court also observed that it was stressing the basic goal of the law of negligence, the equitable distribution of the loss in relation to the respective contribution of the faults causing it. 16 Wis.2d at 17, 114 N.W.2d at 113. Finally, in Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977), the Supreme Court of Minnesota adopted the rule that: Tortfeasors must now accept responsibility for damages commensurate with their own relative culpability. 255 N.W.2d at 367. By limiting the reallocation of loss between joint tortfeasors to contribution based upon relative fault, the more culpable tortfeasor will continue to bear a greater share of the loss, but at the same time his joint tortfeasor will not continue to escape all liability as in the past. Id. The court states that indemnity in cases where the one seeking indemnity has only derivative or vicarious liability for damages caused by the one sought to be charged is justified by the fundamental principle that one who is guilty of injurious misconduct is himself liable therefor. Id. at 366. The supreme courts of two other states have recently adopted a rule of contribution among joint tortfeasors based upon relative degrees of fault. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill.2d 1, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 834, 374 N.E.2d 437, 442, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 2849, 56 L.Ed.2d 787 (1977); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183, 190 (1975). The opinions in both cases quote the following statement from W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 50, p. 307 (4th ed. 1971): There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free. Skinner, 70 Ill.2d at 13, 15 Ill.Dec. at 834, 374 N.E.2d at 442; Royal Indemnity, 193 Neb. at 763, 229 N.W.2d at 189. Whether called logic, or natural justice, or equity, or fairness, or proportion, the principle which lies at the very center of our system of tort liability is the principle that one is liable for the damage which he wrongfully causes. The converse of this principle, that one is not liable for damage which he did not wrongfully cause, is the true basis of our relative fault system and our rules governing contribution and indemnity.