Opinion ID: 569210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disablement and Pain

Text: 26 The Social Security Act provides that, in considering whether a person is disabled under Title II, [o]bjective medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques must be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the individual is under a disability. (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). This requirement equally applies to disability determinations for the purpose of supplemental security income benefits. Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(G). 27 Under this standard, our evaluation of subjective complaints of disabling pain is two-pronged. We must determine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: 28 1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or, 29 2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. 30 Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir.1986). 31 We find that the Secretary has not met this standard. First, the agency failed to follow its own guidelines in evaluating the severity of Jones' subjective complaints of pain. Second, the Secretary compounded this error by wholly discounting the medical evidence indicating that her underlying medical condition was of such severity that it reasonably could have been expected to produce the alleged disabling pain.