Opinion ID: 619765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Trial Evidence

Text: The government called Lou Ann Finkelstein, an agent with the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. Agent Finkelstein's job was to investigate allegations of fraud in connection with the IRS, and she was assigned to Defendant Brown's case. After investigating, Agent Finkelstein determined that Brown was a suspect in the case and arrested him in California in August 2008. After Agent Finkelstein arrested him, Brown waived his Miranda rights and answered a series of questions from Agent Finkelstein. Brown stated that his purported signature on the Weinstein application was his, but he did not know Weinstein, Cassidy, or Winnick. Brown admitted that he had done business with Clark and was familiar with the mutual funds. Finally, Brown claimed that Weinstein had stolen his identity and that Brown needed to talk to Clark. Agent Finkelstein also obtained Brown's California driver's license with his signature on it. The license was admitted as an exhibit, in addition to other documents, mostly court-related, that Brown had signed in Agent Finkelstein's presence on the day of his arrest. Next, Agent Finkelstein testified about the Weinstein, Cassidy, and Winnick account applications. On the Weinstein account, Defendant Brown was the only applicant for whom the name, social security number, and date of birth all matched. Agent Finkelstein's testimony about the Cassidy and Winnick transactions largely repeated earlier testimony about the accounts. As to the Cassidy account, Agent Finkelstein did not have a handwriting expert verify that the signatures on the checks and documents were Brown's, because based on their appearance, they looked the same as Brown's signature on his license. Agent Finkelstein also testified that all of the U.S. Treasury checks at issue in the investigation belonged to California taxpayers. Defendant Brown did not object to Agent Finkelstein's testimony concerning the Cassidy and Winnick accounts. However, after Agent Finkelstein's direct testimony, Brown requested a limiting instruction on the evidence's permissible uses. The district court instructed the jury accordingly, stating: Members of the jury, Defendant is on trial only for the offenses specifically charged in the indictment. And you will have the indictment with you during your deliberations. Now, you have heard evidence during the testimony of Ms. Finkelstein tending to show that at some other time than the statements stated in the indictment of this case, that the Defendant allegedly committed acts similar to the acts that are charged in the indictment. Now, you may consider that evidence not to prove that the Defendant did the acts charged in the case, in this case, but only to prove the Defendant's state of mind. That is that the Defendant acted with the necessary intent and not through accident or mistake. Now, therefore, when you are considering the evidence, if you find first that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did in fact commit the acts charged in the indictment and, two, that the Defendant also committed similar acts at other times, then you may consider the similar acts in deciding whether the Defendant committed the acts charged in this case willfully and not through accident or mistake.