Opinion ID: 1235068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jimenez's Statutory Construction Argument is Unavailing

Text: Jimenez primarily relies upon principles of statutory construction in arguing that his prior § 843(b) convictions should not qualify as drug trafficking offenses. He argues that because the Sentencing Commission specifically amended the Guidelines in 1997 to expressly include a § 843(b) conviction within the meaning of controlled substance offense, but failed to include it within the meaning of drug trafficking offense, the Commission specifically intended for a § 843(b) conviction to not qualify as a drug trafficking offense. Jimenez's argument is unavailing. In Orihuela, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly rejected this argument when it acknowledged that the Guidelines were not similarly amended to include a § 843(b) offense within the definition of drug trafficking offense, a fact that the district court focused upon in refusing to apply the enhancement. Id. at 1304 n. 7. The 1997 Amendments to the Guidelines codified the already existing case law that had recognized § 843(b) convictions as controlled substance offenses. Id. at 1304. At the time of the 1997 Amendments  and continuing until the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Orihuela in 2003  no court had yet decided whether a § 843(b) offense fell within the meaning of drug trafficking offense. See id. (There are no reported decisions resolving the issue of whether a telephone facilitation crime in violation of [§ 843(b)] is within, or beyond, this definition of `drug trafficking offense' as used in Chapter Two of the Sentencing Guidelines.). As Orihuela was the first case to decide this issue, there was no case law to codify regarding this issue by 1997. As such, Jimenez cannot demonstrate that the Commission clearly intended to not include § 843(b) convictions within the meaning of drug trafficking offense and his statutory construction argument must fail.