Opinion ID: 2789948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: revoke the conditional release;

Text: (4) continue the present conditions of release; or (5) extend the conditional release by an additional term of 5 years. (d) Reapplication. — (1) Not earlier than 1 year after the court action on the application for change filed by the committed person, and not more than once a year thereafter, a committed person may reapply for a change in conditional release. (2) Notwithstanding the time restrictions in paragraph (1) of this subsection, a committed person may apply for a change in conditional release at any time if the application is accompanied by an affidavit of a physician or licensed psychologist that states an improvement in the mental condition of the committed person. Whether CP § 3-122 authorizes the extension of the conditions of a release after the expiration of the immediately previous order depends on the legislative intent underlying the choice to use in the statute the terms—“any time” in (a)(1)(i), “shall” in (c), and “extend” in (c)(5). Harrison-Solomon, pondering the use of “extend” in CP § 3-122(c)(5), argues that its plain meaning is that the General Assembly intended for extensions of a patient’s 8 CP § 3-114(b) allows “for discharge from commitment only if that person would not be a danger, as a result of a mental disorder or mental retardation, to self or to the person or property of others if discharged.” CP § 3-114(c) allows for conditional release if the patient would not be dangerous because of conditions imposed by the court. 10 conditional release to be valid only if the current conditional release order was in effect at the time the extension is granted. According to him, the conditions may not be “extended” where, as here, the order of conditional release expired before the Circuit Court acted.9 Indeed, “extend” has been defined as “to continue; to prolong.” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged 645 (1983).10 For something to be continuous, a stop-andstart scenario would be inconsistent. It is not uncommon, however, for courts to extend or prolong a deadline or time period retrospectively (often referred to still by reference to the Latin phrase “nunc pro tunc”—“then as now”). Opportunities for retrospective extensions are recognized in Maryland and Federal courts. See Md. Rule 1-204(a) (allowing courts to extend a deadline before its expiration and, if the failure to act to seek timely an extension was the result of excusable neglect, after its expiration); Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Neal, 160 Md. App. 496, 509, 864 A.2d 287, 294 (2004) (“Rule 7-204 expressly grants 9 The nature of this dispute does not require us to determine the vitality of the conditions placed previously on Harrison-Solomon’s release between the expiration of the 2006 Order of Conditional Release on 3 July 2011 and its extension on 31 August 2011. It is not alleged that any conditions were violated during that period. 10 It is the sounder practice, when looking to the meaning of words used in a statute, for a court to “resort to a dictionary, legal or otherwise, [which] should logically include consultation of those editions (in addition to current editions) of dictionaries that were extant at the time of the pertinent legislative enactments.” Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 260 n.11, 884 A.2d 1171, 1181 n.11 (2005). The language of CP § 3-122 had its genesis in 1984, see 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501 (S.B. 645). Other dictionaries did not include the “to continue” definition of “extend,” see Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 439 (1989); Extend, https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=extend. Other alternative definitions attributed to “extend” in Webster’s New Universal Unabridged did not contain any sense of continuance. 11 the court discretion to extend the time for filing a response to the petition; and the language of Rule 7-204 does not preclude the court from exercising that discretion to extend the filing deadline retroactively, after it has passed”); Birt v. Surface Transp. Bd., 90 F.3d 580, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had authority to extend retrospectively a Certificate of Interim Trail Use eight days after the Certificate had expired); In re Minh Vu Hoang, 484 B.R. 87 (D. Md. 2012) (retrospectively granting a motion for extension of time to file motions). These circumstances do not support Harrison-Solomon’s interpretation of “extend” in CP § 3- 122(c)(5), even if the dictionary definition tends to support his reading and might suggest ambiguity. The other key statutory terms tend to support the State’s reading. Criminal Procedure § 3-122(a)(1)(i) states that “[a]n application to the court for a change in conditional release of a committed person may be made by the Health Department or the State’s Attorney at any time . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Further, CP § 3-122(c) states that “[a]fter the court considers the application for change in conditional release and the evidence, in accordance with § 3-114 of this title, the court shall” either change the set of conditions, revoke the release, continue the present conditions, or extend the conditional release. Id. (emphasis added). The term “any time” is not ambiguous. We have considered frequently the meaning of “shall” as used in statutes. “As this Court and the intermediate appellate court have reiterated on numerous occasions, the word ‘shall’ indicates the intent that a provision is mandatory.” Perez v. State, 420 Md. 57, 63, 21 A.3d 1048, 1052 (2011) 12 (citing State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 82, 785 A.2d 1275, 1287 (2001)). Combining the terms, it appears that the Legislature intended here that the State or the Department may propose a change in the conditional release whenever it feels justified to do so (as long as it files the request during the “life” of an extant order), and the court is required to rule on the application (as long as it does so within a reasonable time, as we shall discuss infra Part II.B). The statute provides no specific time parameters for filing the application or ruling by the court. Because a court is required to take one of the specified actions once the application has been filed, it retains jurisdiction to rule on the request. We conclude that the text of the statute, as a whole, tends to support the State’s position that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to rule on the Department’s application after the facial expiration date of the 2006 Order of Conditional Release. Although the Court of Special Appeals found that the plain meaning of the text was unambiguous, the reading offered by Harrison-Solomon is not entirely irreconcilable with the text. Thus, it does not follow necessarily that the meaning of CP § 3-122 is unambiguous. As noted, the text of the statute allows on its face for an application to change the conditions to be filed at any time. No time limits are set specifically for the filing of the application by the State or Department or the ruling by the court. The intermediate appellate court noted, however, that “[i]n a situation where an application is not filed within the term of conditional release, however, once the [Order of Conditional Release] expires, the court no longer would have jurisdiction to extend it.” HarrisonSolomon, 216 Md. App. at 151 n.10, 85 A.3d at 319 n.10. Thus, an aroma of ambiguity 13 lingers in the air.11 Against that whiff of ambiguity, we shall look, in an abundance of caution, to other signposts to discern the direction of legislative intent.12 2. CP § 3-122 Viewed in the Context of the Relevant Title of the Maryland Code Other provisions of Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article point in the direction of the interpretation of the text of CP § 3-122 urged by the Department. The General Assembly demonstrated elsewhere in Title 3 that it understood how to impose unambiguously temporal deadlines for various actions in other contexts. See, e.g., CP § 3- 115(a) (“Within 50 days after commitment to the Health Department under § 3-112 of this title, a hearing officer of the Health Department shall hold a hearing . . . .”); CP § 3- 115(c) (“[A]t least 7 days before the release hearing is scheduled, the Health Department shall complete an examination and evaluation of the committed person.”); CP § 3-116(a) 11 The State argues that the expiration of an order of conditional release (presumably without an application to extend filed before expiration) results only in termination of the conditions, but does not discharge the patient from the jurisdiction of the court under the statute. Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article contains no provision for releasing a patient without conditions (as distinct from discharging the patient). Discharge is governed, however, by CP § 3-114, which requires that the committed person prove that he or she would not be a danger if discharged. Because a person who is released conditionally has not demonstrated that he or she would not be a danger if discharged, it is conceivable, as the State argues, that the expiration of the conditions of release is not equivalent to a full and unqualified discharge. We need not to decide in the present case whether persons released conditionally need to seek discharge to end the jurisdiction of the court to place conditions on them. Neither of the parties briefed nor argued significantly this point. 12 The Court of Special Appeals considered also the purpose of the statute, its legislative history, policy considerations, and the interpretation of analogous statutes by the appellate courts of other states, finding ratification for its plain meaning reading of the text of CP § 3-122. Harrison-Solomon v. State, 216 Md. App. 138, 148 n.8, 151-54, 85 A.3d 310, 317 n.8, 319-320 (2014). 14 (“Within 10 days after the hearing ends, the Office shall prepare a report of recommendations to the court . . . .”); CP § 3-116(d) (“ The committed person, the State’s Attorney, or the Health Department may file exceptions to the report of the Office within 10 days after receiving the report.”); CP § 3-117 (“Within 30 days after the court receives the report of recommendations from the office: (1) the court on its own initiative may hold a hearing; or (2) if timely exceptions are filed, or if the court requires more information, the court shall hold a hearing . . . .”); CP § 3-118 (“Within 15 days after a judicial hearing ends or is waived, the court shall determine whether the evidence indicates that the committed person proved by a preponderance of the evidence eligibility for release, with our without conditions . . . and enter an appropriate order . . . .”); CP § 3- 121(i) (“After the court considers the report of the Office, the evidence, and any exceptions filed, within 10 days after the court receives the report, the court shall” revoke, modify, continue, or extend the conditional release.). When CP § 3-122 is considered against the clear deadlines in other provisions of Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article, whether directory or mandatory, it seems obvious that the Legislature did not intend to impose a strict or finite deadline (jurisdiction stripping or otherwise) on courts deciding timely-filed applications to extend the conditions of a patient’s conditional release. There is no obvious reason why the Legislature, if it intended to limit the jurisdiction of courts, would do so by forced inference (from a dictionary definition of “extend” as used in CP § 3-122, as argued by 15 Petitioner), instead of using unambiguous language as it used elsewhere in the same title.13 The context of CP § 3-122 within Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article suggests that the Legislature did not intend to strip the courts of jurisdiction to consider and act upon a timely filed application to extend a patient’s conditional release after the expiration of the previous conditional release order, although we shall interject a judicial gloss to be discussed infra Part II.B. 3. Legislative History The legislative history of CP § 3-122 points in a similar direction. The genesis of the current scheme of commitment and conditional release of defendants in criminal cases who are found not criminally responsible was the “Task Force to Review the Defense of Insanity” created by Governor Harry Hughes in 1982. See Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hyg., 310 Md. 217, 220, 528 A.2d 904, 906 (1987).14 As a result of the report of the Task Force, Senate Bill 645 of 1984 was enacted by the General Assembly, altering significantly Maryland’s insanity defense in criminal cases. See id.; 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501. The Task Force was created and submitted its recommendations in the wake of the verdict that John Hinckley was not guilty, by reason of insanity, of any crimes for his 13 The explicit deadlines of Title 3 had their genesis in the same legislative bill as CP § 3- 122. See 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501 (S.B. 645). 14 Title 12 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland Code primarily contained the regulatory scheme later re-codified as Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article. 2001 Maryland Laws Ch. 10 (S.B. 1). CP § 3-122 was previously HG § 12-121. 16 attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan. Governor’s Task Force to Review the Defense of Insanity, Report to the Governor at 3 (1984) (hereinafter Report of Governor’s Task Force). Ultimately, the Task Force found that, although the insanity defense was an appropriate and integral part of Maryland’s criminal justice system, problems existed with the commitment and release of insane defendants. Id. at 8-9. According to the Task Force, it had become increasingly difficult to commit involuntarily individuals, even where treatment was in their best interest and would prevent future dangerous behavior. Id. at 9. The Task Force found also that many chronically mentally ill people found guilty of misdemeanors had become “‘street people’ in numbers that represent[ed] a real contemporary problem.” Id. These concerns motivated a legislative response. Prior to Senate Bill 645, a plea of insanity and the introduction of prima facie evidence of insanity by a defendant necessitated that the State, in order to obtain a conviction, prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was sane when he or she committed the crime. Anderson, 310 Md. at 220, 528 A.2d at 906. If the State failed to prove the defendant’s sanity, the statute in existence before 1984 required the trial court to commit immediately the defendant for evaluation. Anderson, 310 Md. at 221, 528 A.2d at 906. To continue commitment beyond the evaluation phase, the State was required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant met the requirements for indefinite civil commitment. Id. Meanwhile, a committed defendant could travel any of several avenues to secure release from commitment. He or she could pursue a direct judicial release proceeding 17 provided for in the relevant statute, at which he or she had the burden of proving, by preponderance of evidence, fitness for release. Id. A habeas corpus petition provided also for judicial scrutiny of the confinement. Id. Finally, the defendant could seek an administrative release hearing at which the State had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued confinement was appropriate. Id. Senate Bill 645 reconfigured the allocation of the burdens of proof and made continued confinement and supervision of defendants found previously not criminally responsible somewhat easier to achieve by the State. During a criminal trial, the burden was shifted to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was not criminally responsible. Id. The initial commitment examination and hearing were discarded and, in their place, the defendant became automatically committed indefinitely. Id. Finally, the defendant, rather than the State, was charged with demonstrating eligibility for discharge, conditional release, or the necessity of changes in the conditions of release. Id. An aim of Senate Bill 645 was to make more difficult raising successfully an insanity defense and easier for the State to maintain restrictions on those found not criminally responsible. The tenth “major” recommendation of the Governor’s Task Force concerned exclusively the status of conditional release. Report of Governor’s Task Force at 31. The Task Force recommended that the General Assembly enact legislation to “[p]rovide more efficient procedures for revocation of conditional release and permit the court to extend a conditional release for an additional term of 5 years.” Id. The Task Force proposed language similar to the current CP § 3-122 for changes resulting from a violation of the 18 conditional release and for applications to change conditional release in the absence of a violation. 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501 (HG §§ 12-120 and 12-121).15 When the change of conditional release was the result of a violation of the existing conditions of release, however, the Task Force recommended that the court, “within 10 days after the court receives the report [from a hearing officer from the Department], the court shall” make its 15 The language proposed for HG §12-220 for modifying conditional release where a violation of the conditions of release existed stated in pertinent part: After the court considers the hearing officer’s report, the evidence, and any exceptions filed, within 10 days after the court receives the report, the court shall: (1) revoke the conditional release and order the committed individual to return to the facility designated by the department; (2) modify the conditional release as required by the evidence; (3) continue the present conditions of release; or (4) extend the conditional release by an additional term of 5 years. 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501. The language proposed for HG §12-221 for modifying conditional release in the absence of a violation of the conditions of release stated in pertinent part: After the court considers the application for change in conditional release and the evidence, in accordance with §12113 of this title, the court shall: (1) change the conditions; (2) impose appropriate additional conditions; (3) revoke the conditional release;