Opinion ID: 2461173
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Public trust doctrine principles inherent from limitations on the state's sovereign power

Text: The final underpinning of our formal adoption of the public trust doctrine arises from the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign power, as recognized in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892). In Illinois Central, the United States Supreme Court established the principle that [t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace. Id. at 453, 13 S.Ct. 110. In other words, because the state holds such property in trust for the public's use, the state is simply without power to dispose of public trust property when it is not in the public's interest. See id. (A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.); Kootenai Environ. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1983) ([A] state, as administrator of the trust in navigable waters on behalf of the public, does not have the power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties.); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895) (The title of the state to the seacoast and the shores of tidal rivers is different from the fee simple which an individual holds to an estate in lands. It is not a proprietary, but a sovereign, right; and it has been frequently said that a trust is ingrafted upon this title for the benefit of the public, of which the state is powerless to divest itself.). Under the public trust doctrine, the Legislature has the power only to act as a fiduciary of the public in its administration of trust property. The public trust doctrine is thus not simply common law easily abrogated by legislation; instead, the doctrine constitutes an inseverable restraint on the state's sovereign power. In sum, although the public trust doctrine has roots in the common law, it is distinct from other common law principles because it is based on a policy reflected in the Nevada Constitution, Nevada statutes, and the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign power, as recognized by Illinois Central. Accordingly, in the words of Justice Rose, it is appropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to expressly adopt the doctrine to ensure that the state does not breach its duties as a sovereign trustee, and we do so here. Mineral County, 117 Nev. at 248, 20 P.3d at 808 (Rose, J., concurring). Thus, contrary to the County's position, any legislation that purports to convey public trust lands is subject to judicial review. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (1999) (It is for the courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority.).