Opinion ID: 2630928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review/principles of law

Text: Inverse condemnation proceedings are initiated by the party having a property interest and are available when private property has been taken for public use without the initiation of formal condemnation proceedings by the government. Estate of Kirkpatrick v. City of Olathe, 289 Kan. 554, 559, 215 P.3d 561 (2009). To establish a claim for inverse condemnation, a party must establish an interest in the real property and a taking. Korytkowski v. City of Ottawa, 283 Kan. 122, 128, 152 P.3d 53 (2007). The factual component of the issue relates to the nature of an interest in the real property and the nature of the public use or regulation of that property. Here, the City submits that the facts related to those inquiries were not controverted, leaving only the question of whether those circumstances constituted a compensable taking. That question, i.e., the question of whether there has been a compensable taking, is one of law. Korytkowski, 283 Kan. at 128, 152 P.3d 53. The Fricks disagree and argue there were controverted issues of material fact and, as a result, summary judgment should not have been granted. When such an argument is raised in an appeal from an order of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the same summary judgment rules as does a district court. Adams v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 577, 584, 214 P.3d 1173 (2009). The standard a district court applies when considering a motion for summary judgment is a familiar one: `Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case.' Adams, 289 Kan. at 584, 214 P.3d 1173 (quoting Miller v. Westport Ins. Corp., 288 Kan. 27, Syl. ¶ 1, 200 P.3d 419 [2009]). When there is no factual dispute, appellate review of an order for summary judgment is de novo. Estate of Draper v. Bank of America, 288 Kan. 510, 517, 205 P.3d 698 (2009); Cooke v. Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, 754, 176 P.3d 144 (2008). As we apply the summary judgment standard, we must also consider the procedural requirements of Supreme Court Rule 141 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 225), Rule 6.02 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 38), and Rule 6.03 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 42). Rule 141 facilitates the examination of whether there are genuine issues of material fact. It requires the moving party to set forth concisely in separately numbered paragraphs the uncontroverted contentions of fact relied upon by said movant (with precise references to pages, lines and/or paragraphs of transcripts, depositions, interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, exhibits, or other supporting documents contained in the court file and otherwise included in the record). Rule 141(a) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 225-26). A similar requirement is imposed on any party opposing the motion for summary judgment. That party must set forth in separately numbered paragraphs (corresponding to the numbered paragraphs of movant's memorandum or brief) a statement whether each factual contention of movant is controverted, and if controverted, a concise summary of conflicting testimony or evidence, and any additional genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. The party opposing the summary judgment also must make precise references to the transcripts, depositions, interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, exhibits, or other supporting documents in the record. Rule 141(b) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 226). Over the years, this court has repeatedly emphasized that `Rule 141 is not just fluffit means what it says and serves a necessary purpose.' [Citation omitted.] Rhoten v. Dickson, 290 Kan. 92, 104, 223 P.3d 786 (2010). Nevertheless, we have concluded an initial failure to comply with Rule 141 may be considered harmless and will not be considered fatal if the party complies with the rule in subsequent filings before the district court renders judgment. Rhoten, 290 Kan. at 105, 223 P.3d 786. The corollary to this conclusion is that a failure to comply with Rule 141 may be fatal if nothing is cited to support a party's evidentiary allegations before the district court renders judgment. As we will discuss, this requirement becomes important as we examine some of the Fricks' efforts to controvert facts. Similar implications arise from Rule 6.02, relating to an appellant's brief, and its counterpart provision in Rule 6.03, relating to an appellee's brief. Those rules require that statements of the facts be keyed to the record on appeal by volume and page number so as to make verification reasonably convenient. Any material statement made without such a reference may be presumed to be without support in the record. Rule 6.02(d) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 38); see Rule 6.03(c) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 42-43). We have found that the Fricks' citations to the record are frequently missing from or inaccurate in their briefs, making it difficult to find documents or support for their position in the record. Again, as more fully discussed, these failures impact the outcome of this appeal. ISSUE 1: Did the district court err in granting the City's motion for summary judgment with respect to the Fricks' claim that the City interfered with the Fricks' use of the relocation site, which resulted in an inverse condemnation of that property? (Appellants' Issues I, III, and V.) The Fricks first contend that the district court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment on their claim that the City interfered with their use and development of the relocation site. The Fricks specifically argue that all reasonable access was denied in that (a) they were required to remove the Lot 3 driveways, (b) the City passed a moratorium prohibiting the construction of driveways, culverts, or other improvements within the right-of-way of the Project and on Pacific Avenue, and (c) the City failed to issue a building permit sought by the Fricks.