Opinion ID: 792372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Presumption of Correctness and the Federal Evidentiary Hearing

Text: According to the habeas corpus statute: 18 In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 19 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 20 As noted, the Commonwealth contends that the presumption of correctness from § 2254(e)(1) was ignored by the Magistrate Judge in granting the evidentiary hearing, and that evidence from this hearing should not have been considered by the District Court. Although the Commonwealth rests its arguments entirely on § 2254(e)(1), the propriety of the grant of an evidentiary hearing is the province of § 2254(e)(2). That section proscribes a federal court from holding an evidentiary hearing [i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings. § 2254(e)(2). 21 By its terms § 2254(e)(2) applies only to prisoners who have `failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.' Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 430, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Our first inquiry is whether the factual basis was indeed developed in state court, a question susceptible, in the normal course, of a simple yes or no answer. Id. at 431, 120 S.Ct. 1479. The Commonwealth appears to be arguing that the factual basis for Thomas's claim was in fact developed in state court because the subjective intent and motivation of counsel in taking (or not taking) actions during trial, that are later challenged as ineffective assistance, are irrelevant to the Strickland inquiry. 5 However, as we discuss in the next section, the intent or motivation of counsel is relevant to the Strickland inquiry, and therefore the factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim here was not developed in the Pennsylvania proceedings. As we observed in Marshall v. Hendricks, in the course of declining to defer to a state court strategy determination similar to the one reached here: 22 We conclude that Strickland requires an analysis based on a complete record. The reviewing court's reasoning under the first prong needs to be made with an understanding of counsel's thought process, . . . so that a conclusion whether counsel was ineffective can be made based on facts of record, rather than on assumptions. 23 307 F.3d 36, 115 (3d Cir.2002). 24 The failure inquiry does not end once it is determined that the factual basis of a claim had not been developed in state court. Because [i]n its customary and preferred sense, `fail' connotes some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person who has failed to do something, a person is not at fault when his diligent efforts to perform an act are thwarted, for example, by the conduct of another or by happenstance. Williams, 529 U.S. at 431-32, 120 S.Ct. 1479. Accordingly, [u]nder the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2), a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel. Id. at 432, 120 S.Ct. 1479. Here, Thomas requested an evidentiary hearing before the Commonwealth PCR court to develop the record with respect to counsel's choice not to object to or file a motion to suppress the identification. The hearing was denied, and therefore Thomas is not at fault for failing to develop the factual basis for his claim. Section 2254(e)(2) is thus inapplicable. See, e.g., Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 621 n. 6 (6th Cir.2003). Accordingly, we find no fault in the Magistrate Judge's holding of a hearing.