Opinion ID: 160066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: petitioner’s inculpatory statements

Text: Petitioner argues that the trial court should have suppressed his inculpatory statements. He also asserts that independent evidence did not sufficiently corroborate those statements, as required by Oklahoma law. We have already held that the trial court’s admission of petitioner’s statements made to informant Allen was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Petitioner contends that he was unlawfully arrested on a warrant based upon his impermissibly obtained statements to informant Allen and petitioner’s wife. The state appellate court rejected this claim, determining petitioner’s statements -16- 16 to both Allen and petitioner’s wife were properly obtained. See Johnson , 911 P.2d at 927. That determination was reasonable. Petitioner further asserts that his waiver of his Miranda rights and his statement made to police following his drunk driving arrest were not knowing and voluntary because he was intoxicated. In determining whether petitioner’s statements are knowing and intelligent, clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires consideration of whether petitioner appreciated the consequences of his actions. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois , 487 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1988); Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). The voluntariness inquiry turns on whether the confession was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception, see Moran , 475 U.S. at 421, and focuses on police overreaching, see Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). Both of these inquiries are based upon the totality of the circumstances. See Moran , 475 U.S. at 421. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the state courts’ determination that petitioner’s confession to police was knowing, intelligent and voluntary was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). B. Petitioner’s inculpatory statements to his wife Petitioner challenges his wife’s testimony that, on one occasion, he told her Holt and Crain had asked him to kill the victim and, after the murder, petitioner -17- 17 told her that he had in fact killed the victim. Oklahoma law does provide that “[a]n accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication between the accused and the spouse.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2504(B). Relying on Oklahoma authority, the trial court held petitioner had waived this privilege because he had also made similar statements to informant Allen. See also Johnson , 911 P.2d at 927-28 (affirming trial court’s determination on direct appeal). Although federal and state courts have adopted marital communication privileges, it is apparent that this claim resting upon state law cannot meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). C. Independent corroboration of petitioner’s confessions Petitioner contends the trial court did not properly instruct the jury concerning the need for independent evidence corroborating petitioner’s inculpatory statements. Oklahoma has adopted the rule in federal criminal cases requiring substantial independent evidence of the trustworthiness of a defendant’s confession. See Fontenot v. State , 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Opper v. United States , 348 U.S. 84 (1954)). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held, in this case, that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury on the need for independent corroboration, but that error did not warrant reversal because there was sufficient independent evidence in the record to -18- 18 corroborate petitioner’s inculpatory statements under the proper standard. See Johnson , 911 P.2d at 925-26. Although Oklahoma law relies on authority from federal criminal cases, petitioner fails to cite any clearly established Supreme Court authority holding that the need for independent corroboration of a defendant’s confession is constitutionally required. Cf. Foster v. Ward , 182 F.3d 1177, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999) (despite Oklahoma law requiring corroboration of accomplice’s testimony, there was no such constitutional requirement to support federal habeas claim), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 1438 (2000). State law errors are not sufficient to warrant federal habeas relief, and the admission of this evidence did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. See, e.g., Estelle , 502 U.S. at 67-68, 70; cf. Foster , 182 F.3d at 1193-94.