Opinion ID: 2525568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The State's Appeal

Text: ¶ 19 Rule 402 requires that the trial court give a defendant certain admonishments before accepting a guilty plea, including the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law. Ill. S.Ct. R. 402 (eff. July 1, 1997). ¶ 20 In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court failed to substantially comply with Rule 402(a)(2) in that it failed to admonish defendant as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The issue on appeal is whether the proper remedy for failing to admonish defendant, who entered a partially negotiated guilty plea, as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution is to vacate the restitution order or give her the opportunity to withdraw her plea. Here, defendant did not move to withdraw her guilty plea, and, at oral argument before this court, defense counsel made it clear that defendant does not want to withdraw her plea. ¶ 21 Because this issue concerns the interpretation of a supreme court rule, a question of law, our review is de novo. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill.2d 324, 332, 266 Ill.Dec. 915, 775 N.E.2d 987 (2002). ¶ 22 In vacating the restitution order in the present case, the appellate majority relied heavily on Jenkins, 141 Ill.App.3d 602, 95 Ill.Dec. 861, 490 N.E.2d 953. In Jenkins, the defendant entered an open guilty plea. Id. at 604, 95 Ill.Dec. 861, 490 N.E.2d 953. The trial court admonished him pursuant to Rule 402 before he entered his plea but did not mention restitution. The trial court ordered him to pay restitution as part of his sentences. On appeal, he argued that his guilty plea must be vacated because he was not admonished that his sentences might include restitution. Id. at 608, 95 Ill.Dec. 861, 490 N.E.2d 953. The Fourth District concluded that the restitution order exceeded the `maximum sentence' of which the defendant had been admonished upon entry of his guilty plea. Id. at 609, 95 Ill.Dec. 861, 490 N.E.2d 953. Although the defendant sought to vacate his plea, the Jenkins court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the restitution order, noting that as long as the restitution order was vacated, the sentences imposed were within the limits stated to the defendant before he entered his plea. ¶ 23 In his dissent from the appellate majority's vacatur of the restitution order in the present case, Justice Schmidt relied on Seyferlich, 398 Ill.App.3d 989, 338 Ill. Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212. In Seyferlich, the defendant, who entered an open plea, was admonished that her sentence could include a fine of up to $25,000 but not that she could be ordered to pay restitution. Id. at 990, 338 Ill.Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212. She was ordered to pay $46,311 in restitution. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in failing to admonish her of the possibility of restitution. Citing Jenkins, she argued that the amount of restitution must be reduced to $25,000 the maximum financial penalty she was told she faced as a result of her guilty plea. ¶ 24 In rejecting her argument, the Second District in Seyferlich explained that the Fourth District's remedy in Jenkins  vacatur of the restitution orderwas inappropriate. Id. at 991, 338 Ill.Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212. The Seyferlich court noted that the cases upon which the Jenkins court relied characterized the trial court's admonishments as implied promises and viewed the admonishments as part of a bargaining process between the court and the defendant. The Seyferlich court rejected this view, noting that the admonishments, which are required by Rule 402, are designed to ensure that the defendant's guilty plea is intelligently and understandingly made, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The Seyferlich court noted that it is not the trial court's role to bargain with a defendant to obtain his or her guilty plea. ¶ 25 The Seyferlich court also recognized that the Fourth District's opinion in People v. Harris, 359 Ill.App.3d 931, 296 Ill.Dec. 549, 835 N.E.2d 902 (2005), called into doubt the continued viability of its prior opinion in Jenkins. Seyferlich, 398 Ill.App.3d at 991-92, 338 Ill.Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212. In Harris, the court held that if the trial court's failure to properly admonish a defendant results in the denial of real justice or in prejudice to the defendant, the reviewing court should vacate the guilty plea. Harris, 359 Ill. App.3d at 936, 296 Ill.Dec. 549, 835 N.E.2d 902. The Harris court noted that the defendant did not seek to vacate his guilty plea but, instead, sought the wrong remedyto amend the sentencing order. Id. at 937, 296 Ill.Dec. 549, 835 N.E.2d 902. ¶ 26 The Seyferlich court concluded that [i]f defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for the incomplete admonition, her remedy was to seek leave to withdraw her plea. Seyferlich, 398 Ill.App.3d at 992, 338 Ill.Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212. The court found that Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d 177, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658, did not dictate a different result. Seyferlich, 398 Ill.App.3d at 992, 338 Ill.Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212. We agree. ¶ 27 In Whitfield, the defendant entered a negotiated plea to first degree murder in exchange for a 25-year prison term. Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d at 179, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. The court failed to admonish him that he would have to serve three years of MSR in addition to the negotiated prison term. Id. at 180, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. He argued that the MSR was not part of the negotiated sentence and that he was entitled to enforce his bargain with the State. Id. at 186-87, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. Recognizing that the MSR could not legally be stricken, he argued that, to best approximate his bargain with the State, his prison term should be reduced by three years. Id. at 187, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. ¶ 28 As we noted in Whitfield, the benefit of the bargain theory espoused by defendant was rooted in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d at 184-85, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. In Santobello, the Court held that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495. In Whitfield, we restated that holding as follows: if a defendant shows that his plea of guilty was entered in reliance on a plea agreement, he may have a due process right to enforce the terms of the agreement. Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d at 189, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. In Whitfield, we agreed with the defendant's argument that his constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated because he pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, but received a different, more onerous sentence. Id. at 188-89, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. In granting his request to reduce his prison term, we concluded that adding the statutorily required three-year MSR term to defendant's negotiated 25-year sentence amounts to a unilateral modification and breach of the plea agreement by the State, inconsistent with constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness. Id. at 190, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. ¶ 29 In vacating the restitution order in the present case, the appellate majority, citing Whitfield, stated that [t]he Jenkins approach has been adopted by our supreme court. 403 Ill.App.3d at 642, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137. Despite the appellate majority's statement to the contrary, we did not rely on or adopt Jenkins' reasoning in Whitfield. Instead, our holding in Whitfield was premised on the benefit of the bargain analysis, which was appropriate because of Whitfield's fully negotiated plea. ¶ 30 The significant difference between Whitfield and the present case is that Whitfield fully negotiated for a specific prison term, whereas, here, defendant pled guilty with no promise as to sentencing. She pled guilty in exchange for the State's agreement to drop the remaining charges against her, which the State has done. Therefore, she has received the full benefit of her bargain. The remedy in Whitfield was fashioned to give Whitfield the benefit of the bargain he made with the State. In Whitfield, we concluded that we should give weight to Whitfield's preference, rather than simply giving him an opportunity to withdraw his plea. Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d at 202-03, 205, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658. However, nothing in Whitfield indicates that this specific enforcement remedy is available where, as here, a defendant enters a partially negotiated plea. Contrary to the appellate court's holding, Whitfield's remedybased on a benefit of the bargain analysisis inapplicable to defendant's partially negotiated plea because she received the benefit of the bargain she made with the State. ¶ 31 We agree with and adopt the Second District's reasoning and conclusion in Seyferlich and hold that the appropriate remedy for the trial court's failure to admonish defendant, who entered a partially negotiated guilty plea, as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution is to allow her the opportunity to withdraw her plea. In so holding, we expressly overrule the Fourth District's holding in Jenkins that the appropriate remedy for failing to admonish a defendant who entered a partially negotiated plea as to the possibility of restitution is to vacate the restitution order instead of allowing him the opportunity to withdraw his plea. ¶ 32 Therefore, as in Seyferlich, if defendant in this case would not have pleaded guilty but for the incomplete admonishment, she should have sought leave to withdraw her guilty plea. See Seyferlich, 398 Ill.App.3d at 992, 338 Ill.Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212. Allowing a defendant a fresh opportunity to decide whether to plead guilty, with full knowledge of the possible consequences, adequately protects her rights and avoids awarding a windfall due to the trial court's error. It also provides both the parties and the trial court an incentive to ensure adequate admonishments, while taking into consideration victims' rights to obtain restitution. ¶ 33 However, in the present case, we need not determine whether the incomplete admonishment requires vacatur of defendant's guilty plea because, at oral argument, defense counsel made it clear that defendant does not want to withdraw her plea. Instead, she seeks a remedy to which she is not entitledvacatur of the restitution order. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the appellate court's judgment vacating the restitution order.