Opinion ID: 2194805
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Heading: Graham-Field Obtained the Right to Pursue an Equitable Indemnity Claim Against the Medical Providers

Text: We have previously recognized a cause of action for equitable indemnity whereby one of the several persons liable for the same harm, or an exacerbation of the harm, discharges their liability, and then seeks to be indemnified by the non-settling parties. Washington Hosp. Ctr., supra, 722 A.2d at 332; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 22 (2003). In general, [i]ndemnity is a common law remedy that arises from an express or implied contract giving the right of complete reimbursement to one party who has been compelled by law to pay what the other party should pay . . . [a]n obligation to indemnify exists where the equities of the case and the relationship of the parties support shifting responsibility from one party to another. Howard Univ. v. Good Food Servs., Inc., 608 A.2d 116, 122 (D.C. 1992) (internal citation omitted); accord Nat'l Health Labs., Inc. v. Ahmadi, 596 A.2d 555, 557-58 (D.C.1991). Unlike contractual indemnity, equitable indemnity is based upon principles of equity and implied out of a relationship between the parties to prevent a result which is unjust. Howard Univ., supra, 608 A.2d at 123. The issue of indemnification arises in the instant case because Graham-Field, the initial wrongdoer, could be held liable to the injured party [Mr. Caglioti] for the whole loss, including aggravation of the injuries due to subsequent medical negligence. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., supra, 722 A.2d at 337. In those circumstances, however, Graham-Field could attempt to recover part of the damages it paid to Mr. Caglioti from the successor tortfeasors [the medical providers]. In somewhat analogous circumstances, in R & G Orthopedic Appliances & Prosthetics, Inc. v. Curtin, 596 A.2d 530, 546-48 (D.C.1991), we noted that the medical supplier could be entitled to indemnity from the hospital for the difference between what that plaintiff's damages would have been without the hospital's subsequent malpractice and the full amount of damages suffered. Partial indemnity allows the initial tortfeasor to recoup that portion of the damages attributable to the conduct of the second tortfeasor. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., supra, 722 A.2d at 340 (internal citation and quotation omitted). Mr. Caglioti is attempting to assert Graham-Field's claim for partial equitable indemnity. In order for the indemnitee, Graham-Field, to obtain a claim for equitable indemnity, it was required to: (1) obtain releases for DHP, MFA and GWU in the Settlement Agreement; and (2) fully compensate Mr. Caglioti for his injuries, thereby discharging the liability of DHP, MFA, GWU. See Washington Hosp. Ctr., supra, 722 A.2d at 341-43. The medical providers first argue that appellant's equitable indemnity claim fails because he did not meet the first requirement of releasing the medical providers (DHP, MFA, GWU) from liability. Alternatively, appellees argue that even if the Settlement Agreement released the medical providers, then that release discharged the medical providers from all future claims, including the indemnification claim that Mr. Caglioti attempted to assert against the medical providers in the Superior Court litigation. This, appellees argue, would therefore nullify Mr. Caglioti's cause of action against the medical providers. Such a provision in the Settlement Agreement, the medical providers contend, is inherently contradictory since appellant purports to release the medical providers from liability, while simultaneously attempting to assert liability against the medical providers for his injuries by pursuing the equitable indemnity claim. Whether a settlement agreement released a joint tortfeasor is a question of fact, which we typically answer by looking at the words the parties chose to use in the agreement. See Wash. Hosp. Ctr., supra, 722 A.2d at 342 (Where the language [of the release] is clear and unambiguous its plain language is relied upon in determining the parties' intention.). We also look to the language in the contract to determine whether the plaintiff intended to release all wrongdoers or only the particular party named in the release and whether the amount settled for fully compensated the plaintiff. If the [release] is facially unambiguous, its language should be relied upon as proving the intent; if the document is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties' subjective intent may be resorted to. Lamphier v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 524 A.2d 729, 732 (D.C. 1987). Mr. Caglioti intended that the Settlement Agreement would release the medical providers. As we reasoned in Lamphier, the parties' intentions are paramount to construction of the release. Lamphier, supra, 524 A.2d at 732. In Lamphier, Stephen Lamphier was injured in a car accident and he and his wife accepted a settlement from Ronald Gordon, the other driver involved in the accident. Id. at 730. Thereafter, Lamphier sued the Washington Hospital Center alleging that he received negligent treatment for his injuries sustained in the car accident. Id. Washington Hospital Center filed for summary judgment, asserting that the general release executed between Lamphier and Gordon (releasing all other persons, firms, or corporations), also released Washington Hospital Center from liability for all claims arising out of the car accident. Id. at 730. [5] Washington Hospital Center also argued that the medical malpractice claim was barred because Lamphier fully recovered for his injuries from Gordon. Id. The court concluded, considering the circumstances of the settlement agreement, that it was possible that only successors in interest were to be released, and as such, a contested issue of fact regarding the meaning and effect of the release existed. Id. at 733. Here, by contrast, the unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement supports Mr. Caglioti's assertion that the appellees were released. The plain language of the Settlement Agreement also distinguishes this case from District of Columbia v. Washington Hospital Center , and demonstrates that appellant intended to release Graham-Field, as well as MFA and DHP. [6] In that case, the District of Columbia entered into a settlement agreement with a pedestrian who was struck by a car and was thereby released from liability for all claims arising out of the accident. Washington Hosp. Ctr., supra, 722 A.2d at 335. However, the agreement failed to discharge Washington Hospital Center from liability to the pedestrian and, therefore, the District could not recover from Washington Hospital Center for equitable indemnity. Id. at 342. The consent judgment stated that this case . . . is dismissed with prejudice as to all parties and claims. Id. Washington Hospital Center was not a party to the litigation, and while the consent judgment expressly released the District of Columbia and its officers, agents and employees . . ., no other entities or individuals, including Washington Hospital Center, were mentioned in the consent judgment. Id. We reasoned that the contractual language was facially unambiguous and did not provide for Washington Hospital Center's release from liability. In contrast, the language in the Settlement Agreement in this case makes it clear that Mr. Caglioti intended a comprehensive release from any claim he directly had against the released parties. With respect to the second requirement for establishing an equitable indemnity claim, the medical providers contend that Mr. Caglioti was not made whole because the lump sum monetary payment from the settlement with the manufacturer did not cover all of his monetary damages. The medical providers argue that Paragraph 8 of the Settlement Agreement (providing that any claims for contribution, indemnification, equitable indemnification or other similar claims that the Released Parties have shall be assigned to Mr. Caglioti) was an acknowledgment by appellant and Graham-Field that the lump sum payment had not made Mr. Caglioti whole. In determining whether Mr. Caglioti was made whole by the Settlement Agreement, the essential issue with regard to compensation is did the amount settled for fully compensate the plaintiff, or was it taken merely as the best obtainable compromise for the settler's liability. Lamphier, supra, 524 A.2d at 735. Here, the plain language of the Settlement Agreement makes clear that the parties intended that the terms of the Settlement Agreement fully compensate Mr. Caglioti for his injuries: the parties identified above desire to enter into this settlement and discharge of all claims which are or might have been subject of the Complaint. The language of the Settlement Agreement in this case is key because Mr. Caglioti accepted the settlement as full compensation. McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 233, 134 F.2d 659, 664 (1943) (when one makes full reparation for all loss, the others are discharged from liability to the injured person). In Washington Hospital Center, the settlement document explicitly stated that it was a negotiated compromise which was fair and reasonable, and we therefore concluded that because the settlement was taken in compromise rather than full compensation, and did not release Washington Hospital Center from liability, no claim for equitable indemnification could lie. Washington Hosp. Ctr., supra, 722 A.2d at 342. Here, by contrast, Graham-Field's promise to pay money to Mr. Caglioti plus the promise to assign its right to pursue a claim for equitable indemnification (with the possibility of recouping additional money) together constituted full satisfaction of Mr. Caglioti's claims. [7] Even if the monies received in the settlement did not cover what Mr. Caglioti claimed to be his damages in the complaint, he accepted the lump sum monetary payment, the additional periodic payments, and the assignment of the equitable indemnification claim, intending for the entire package to serve as full compensation for his injuries. See Lamphier, supra, 524 A.2d at 735 n. 12 ( Where there has been such a full satisfaction, or where it is agreed that the amount paid under the release is so received, no claim should remain as to any other tortfeasor.) (emphasis in original). We are satisfied that Graham-Field obtained an equitable indemnification claim because the Settlement Agreement (1) released the joint tortfeasors and (2) fully compensated Mr. Caglioti for his injuries. Now we address appellees' further contention that even if an equitable indemnification claim arose, and could have been assigned to Mr. Caglioti, the Settlement Agreement nullified it because appellant purported to release all claims which the Plaintiff ever had, . . . or which may hereafter accrue or otherwise be acquired  for his injuries and failed to expressly reserve for Mr. Caglioti the right to pursue an assigned indemnification claim. (emphasis added). We are unpersuaded by this contention. Here, the plain language of the Settlement Agreement makes clear that Mr. Caglioti intended to release the medical providers from direct claims he had against the medical providers. Moreover, the plain language makes clear that the parties did not intend to release any claims for contribution or indemnification. [8] Paragraph 8 of the Settlement Agreement provides for the assignment of claims to appellant and Paragraph 1 (the release paragraph) contemplates the subsequent assignment in Paragraph 8. [9] Additionally, further evidencing the intent of the parties, the agreement is titled Settlement Agreement, General Release & Assignment of Claims. See Robarts, supra note 8, 581 So.2d at 916 (noting that the plain language and format of the agreement supported the court's interpretation). Our reading of the contract as a whole leads us to reject the argument that Mr. Caglioti's failure to expressly reserve a right to pursue a claim for equitable indemnification when executing the release, extinguished that right. [10] We are required to interpret the Settlement Agreement as a whole, giving reasonable effect to all of its parts. [11] Specifically, we must construe Paragraphs 1 and 8 together, in a manner that does not render the language of either paragraph null and void. Appellees' interpretation, which we reject, would render a significant portion of the Settlement Agreement, namely the assignment clause, meaningless. See A.S. Johnson Co. v. Atlantic Masonry Co., 693 A.2d 1117, 1122-23 (D.C.1997) (rejecting the interpretation that would render part of an agreement meaningless); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 422, 426 n. 15, 510 F.2d 802, 806 n. 15 (1975) (It is a settled rule of contract interpretation that contract language should not be interpreted to render the contract promise illusory or meaningless.).