Opinion ID: 3043800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Addenda

Text: The existence of a valid contract between an employer and a labor organization is a necessary prerequisite for federal jurisdiction under Section 301(a). The district -7- court determined that no contract existed between Locals 373 and 516 at the time of Miner’s discharge. In reaching its conclusion, the district court granted some deference to the Committee’s conclusion that the Addenda was invalid. The Locals argue that the Committee’s conclusion binds the court. When there is no question about the validity and scope of a CBA, it is axiomatic that courts “should not undertake to review the merits of arbitration awards but should defer to the tribunal chosen by the parties finally to settle their disputes.” Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1987). The Master Agreement provides for the creation of state or multi-state grievance committees to “adjust the disputes which cannot be settled between the Employer and the Local Union.”4 (J.A. at 204.) The Committee, however, did not reach the merits of Miner’s claim. Rather, it determined that it did not have authority to address the merits because there was no valid CBA between Locals 373 and 516. Therefore, the issue is not whether a court should review the merits of an award by the Committee but rather whether a court should defer to the Committee’s threshold determination of the Addenda’s invalidity. We look to what the parties agreed upon to ascertain who determines whether a dispute is arbitrable. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (“Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter.” (citations omitted)). Here, the Locals argue that the Addenda was no longer in force at the time 4 Although the grievance procedures outlined in the Master Agreement are not referred to as arbitration, the actions of the committees “have consistently been considered just as final and binding as if the actions had been called arbitration.” Warren v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 340 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). -8- of Miner’s discharge. Nevertheless, the Locals contend that the Committee’s conclusion regarding the Addenda’s invalidity binds the court. We find no support for such a proposition. Rather, “whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement that binds them is a question for judicial determination.” Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, and Reinforcing Ironworkers, Shopman’s Local 493 v. EFCO Corp., 359 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2004). Therefore, we grant no deference to the Committee’s determination. Federal labor law governs a CBA’s validity, and we are not bound by technical rules of contract. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1981). Rather, the crucial inquiry in determining the validity of a CBA “is whether there ‘is conduct manifesting an intention to abide and be bound by the terms of an agreement.’” NLRB v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 748 F.2d 348, 350 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting CapitolHusting Co. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 237, 243 (7th Cir. 1982)). This inquiry is a question of fact, see Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, 835 F.2d 1164, 1168 (6th Cir. 1987), and focuses on the objective intent of the parties—not their subjective beliefs. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Int’l Union, UAW, 856 F.2d 579, 592 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Here, the Locals argue that even if the Addenda was at one point a valid CBA their subsequent conduct terminated the agreement. Therefore, taking all evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to Miner, the issue is whether the conduct of the Locals manifested an objective intent to terminate the Addenda before Miner’s discharge. The district court concluded that “[t]he undisputed facts demonstrate the Titan messages sent are clear that any such contracts are to be disclaimed.” (Order at 8.) We disagree. Neither Titan message is self-executing by its terms. The 1995 Titan articulated the inherent conflict of interest that exists when one IBT Local represents employees -9- of another IBT Local. The message, however, did not expressly disclaim any such existing agreements. Rather, the message provided that: from this date forward no new bargaining relationship should be established covering the employees of a Teamster affiliate by another Teamster affiliate. In cases involving Teamsters Locals where collective bargaining agreements covering the employees of another local union currently apply, the Local Union shall conduct a review upon expiration of those agreements to determine whether federal labor law dictates the disclaimer of future representation of that unit. (J.A. at 256.) This message was issued on May 25, 1995. The parties’ conduct subsequent to the issuance of the message indicates no change in the Addenda’s continued validity. Indeed, on September 11, 1995, Sanderson sent Garner a letter requesting his signature on a new Master Agreement, and Miner continued paying fees to Local 516 for more than two years. Moreover, the effect of the 1997 Titan is ambiguous. Although it referenced the conflict addressed in the 1995 Titan, the substance of the 1997 Titan was dual unionism. Specifically, the express terms of the 1997 Titan limited the message’s mandate for the issuance of honorable withdrawal cards “to all employees and staff who are members of, or represented by, another labor organization and are also dues paying members of a Teamster Local Union.” (J.A. at 254-55.) There is no express indication that the 1997 Titan also required withdrawal cards to be issued to the employees described in the 1995 Titan. Therefore, the conduct of the Locals determines whether the Addenda remained in effect beyond the issuance of the 1997 Titan. Certain conduct by the parties suggests that the Locals terminated the Addenda in response to the 1997 Titan: Miner stopped paying her fee to Local 516 around the -10- same time the 1997 Titan was issued; there was no written communication between the Locals or Miner about the Addenda from September 11, 1995, until after Miner’s discharge; Sanderson testified that Local 516 disclaimed the Addenda in 1998 in response to the 1997 Titan and that Garner sent him a letter to that effect; and Van Allen noted that the Addenda was not part of the active files at Local 516 when he took over in July 1998. Other conduct by the parties, however, suggests that the Locals intended to be bound by the Addenda even after the 1997 Titan. First, Miner contends that she voluntarily paid the monthly fee to Local 516, that her representation was not dependent upon payment of that fee and that she stopped payment at the prompting of Garner. Second, the alleged letter from Garner to Sanderson disclaiming the Addenda is not in the record. Moreover, Garner’s secretary, Kaye Mogck (“Mogck”), indicated that Garner discussed the 1997 Titan with her and had her type a letter to Sanderson advising him that Local 516 would no longer accept Miner’s fees. Mogck, however, noted that the letter “addressed only the fees and did not cancel the [Addenda],” and that Garner told her that he did not intend to cancel the Addenda. (J.A. at 653.1.) Third, Sanderson testified that no change occurred in his working relationship with Miner and that he never conveyed to her that Local 516 would no longer adhere to the terms of the Addenda.5 Fourth, affidavits from certain members of both Locals’ executive boards indicate that the Addenda remained in force. Finally, Van Allen knew of the agreement between Rogers and Garner, but because no copy could be produced, he determined that Local 516 had no duty to represent Miner. However, upon receiving a copy of the Addenda that was not signed by Garner, Van Allen pursued Miner’s grievance on her behalf and argued before the Committee that the Addenda was valid. Notwithstanding Local 516's current position, such behavior manifests Local 516's intent to abide and be bound by the terms of the Addenda. Therefore, taking all inferences and reviewing all evidence 5 We recognize that the relevant inquiry is the objective intent of the Locals, not Miner’s subjective understanding of the validity of the Addenda. However, Sanderson’s failure to communicate to Miner that she was no longer covered by the Addenda objectively suggests that it remained in effect. -11- in a light most favorable to Miner, we conclude that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Locals 373 and 516 objectively manifested an intent to be bound by the Addenda on the date of Miner’s discharge. In addition to their argument that the Locals’ conduct establishes that they terminated the Addenda, the Locals argue that the Addenda was invalid at the time of Miner’s discharge for three independent reasons. First, Local 373 argues that the court lacks jurisdiction because a CBA covering a bargaining unit of one is unenforceable under the NLRA. Pursuant to the so called “single-employee unit” rule, the NLRB does not have the authority to certify single-employee bargaining units because “‘the principle of collective bargaining presupposes that there is more than one eligible person who desires to bargain.’” Int’l Transp. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F.3d 160, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Luckenbach Steamship Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1936)).6 This, however, does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that all agreements between an employer and a labor organization on behalf of a single employee are invalid. Rather, the NLRB has recognized that an employer may consent to bargain with a labor organization on behalf of a single employee. See Louis Rosenberg, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 1450, 1453 (1959). Here, Local 373 consented to Local 516's representation of Miner under the Addenda, making the Addenda a valid CBA. The only issue is whether the Addenda remained valid on the date of 6 Later decisions by the NLRB have expansively interpreted the “singleemployee unit” rule to mean that “when a unit consists of no more than a single permanent employee at all material times, an employer has no statutory duty to bargain and thus, will not be found in violation of the [NLRA] for disavowing a bargaining agreement and refusing to bargain.” Haas Garage Door Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187 (1992); see also J.W. Peters, Inc. v. Bridge, Structural & Reinforcing Iron Workers, 398 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2005). The issue here, however, is not whether Local 373 had the right to disavow the Addenda but whether it actually disavowed the Addenda before Miner’s discharge. Therefore, we need not address the validity of the NLRB’s expansive application of the “single employee unit” rule. -12- Miner’s discharge. Therefore, this action falls within Section 301(a)’s grant of jurisdiction. See Gen. Teamsters Union Local No. 174 v. Trick & Murray, Inc., 828 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] district court can exercise jurisdiction over an action brought under section 301 even though it involves a contract with a labor organization representing less than two employees.”). Second, Local 516 argues that the Addenda was never effective because Miner was not an “employee” as defined by the NLRA. The NLRA excepts from the definition of an employee “any individual employed by his parent or spouse.” 29 U.S.C. § 152. Although Rogers, Miner’s father, was Local 373's principal officer at the time the parties signed the Addenda, he did not employ her. Rather, she was hired by Local 373's executive board and employed by Local 373 as an entity. Moreover, even if Miner was not properly characterized as an “employee” under the NLRA at the time the parties signed the Addenda, she was an “employee” from the time Sanderson became principal officer later in 1991. Cf. Campbell-Harris Elec., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1143 (1982) (child of majority shareholder parents in a close corporation not an “employee” but may have become an “employee” when parents no longer had ownership interest). Thus, Local 516's argument fails. Finally, relying on Carpenter Benefit Fund v. Holleman Construction, 751 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1985), Local 516 argues that the Addenda terminated upon expiration of the Master Agreement. Carpenter Benefit Fund, however, is distinguishable. In that case, the court concluded that a short-form agreement incorporating a master CBA was “ambiguous both as to whether it would continue in existence if there were no existing master agreement and as to whether it incorporates future master agreements.” Id. at 769. Therefore, the court deferred to the lower court’s factual determination that “the short-form agreement was parasitic upon the existence of a master agreement, and perished with its host.” Id. at 769-70. Here, the Addenda explicitly contemplates the incorporation of future agreements providing that “[t]his -13- Agreement automatically renews when the [Master Agreement] expires and the new Contract is negotiated and no notice is necessary by Local Union 516.” (J.A. at 19.) Therefore, expiration and renegotiation of the Master Agreement did not terminate the Addenda. Accordingly, for these reasons, we determine that a genuine issue of fact exists as to the Addenda’s validity on the date of Miner’s discharge.