Opinion ID: 163083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disparity Studies

Text: 82 The district court, inter alia, concluded that the 1990 Study, the 1995 Study, the NERA Study, and the other disparity studies upon which Denver relied were significantly flawed because they measured discrimination in the overall Denver MSA construction industry, not discrimination by the City itself. See id. at 1070 (The question, [Denver says], is what happens in the market without [the ordinances]. That may be consistent with scientific methodology but it does not square with the applicable law.). The court may have believed that marketplace data is irrelevant because such data would not answer question four: Would Denver's use of those discriminating firms without requiring them to give work to certified MBEs and WBEs in the required percentages on each project make Denver guilty of prohibited discrimination? Id. at 1066. The district court's conclusion, however, is directly contrary to our holding in Adarand VII that evidence of both public and private discrimination in the construction industry is relevant. See 228 F.3d at 1166-67. 83 Consistent with the district court's conclusion, CWC continues to argue, as it did in Concrete Works II, that marketplace data is irrelevant because the ordinances can be justified only by evidence of discrimination by the City itself or by prime contractors while working on City projects. See supra n. 12. CWC's argument is based on language used in Croson but taken out of context by CWC and by memorandum orders issued by two federal district courts. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 502, 109 S.Ct. 706; Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council, 83 F.Supp.2d 613, 619 (D.Md. 2000); Webster v. Fulton County, 51 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1368-69 (N.D.Ga.1999), summarily aff'd, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir.2000). In Croson, the Court criticized Richmond's data, in part, because it did not show what percentage of total city construction dollars minority firms now receive as subcontractors on prime contracts let by the city. Croson, 488 U.S. at 502, 109 S.Ct. 706. Relying on this language, CWC argues that the City cannot meet its burden of demonstrating strong evidence of discrimination unless it demonstrates that it directly participates in discrimination or indirectly participates by utilizing contractors who discriminate on City projects. It further argues that evidence of marketplace discrimination is irrelevant to this determination and can never assist the City in meeting its burden. 84 CWC's argument is not supported by the language it cites from Croson when that language is read in context. In the Croson majority opinion, the Court noted, by example, some of the flaws in the evidence presented by the city of Richmond. In addition to criticizing the city because it did not present data showing the percentage of city dollars received by minority subcontractors on city construction projects, the Court also faulted Richmond's evidence that MBE membership in local contractors' associations was extremely low. See id. at 503, 109 S.Ct. 706. The Court's criticism, however, was not that the evidence of low participation in such associations was irrelevant. Instead, the Court criticized the information because it did not consider nondiscriminatory explanations for the low level of membership. See id. Importantly, the Court specifically concluded that if Richmond had linked the evidence showing low MBE participation in trade associations to the number of local MBEs eligible for membership, any resulting statistical disparity, if large enough, could support an inference of discriminatory exclusion. See id. If such an inference could be drawn, the city would have a compelling interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting these organizations in maintaining a racially segregated construction market. Id. Thus, contrary to CWC's mischaracterization of the Court's statements in Croson, the Court actually concluded that evidence of marketplace discrimination could be used by a municipality to meet its burden of producing strong evidence but that Richmond failed to meet its burden because, inter alia, it failed to offer any such evidence. 85 The conclusion reached by the majority in Croson that marketplace data is relevant in equal protection challenges to affirmative action programs is consistent with the approach later taken by the Court in Shaw v. Hunt. In Shaw, a majority of the Court relied on the majority opinion in Croson for the broad proposition that a governmental entity's interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the proper case justify a government's use of racial distinctions. 517 U.S. at 909, 116 S.Ct. 1894. The Shaw Court did not adopt any requirement that only discrimination by the governmental entity, either directly or by utilizing firms engaged in discrimination on projects funded by the entity, was remediable. The Court, however, did set out two conditions which must be met for the governmental entity to show a compelling interest. First, the discrimination must be identified discrimination. Id. at 910, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (quotation omitted). The City can satisfy this condition by identifying the discrimination, ` public or private, with some specificity.' Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 504, 109 S.Ct. 706) (emphasis added). The governmental entity must also have a strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial action was necessary. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, Shaw specifically stated that evidence of either public or private discrimination could be used to satisfy the municipality's burden of producing strong evidence. 86 CWC's argument that the marketplace data is irrelevant is also inconsistent with binding precedent in this circuit. In Adarand VII, we specifically concluded that evidence of marketplace discrimination can be used to support a compelling interest in remedying past or present discrimination through the use of affirmative action legislation. See 228 F.3d at 1166-67 ([W]e may consider public and private discrimination not only in the specific area of government procurement contracts but also in the construction industry generally; thus any findings Congress has made as to the entire construction industry are relevant.  (emphasis added)). Further, in this very case we rejected the argument CWC reasserts here that marketplace data is irrelevant and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Denver could link its public spending to the Denver MSA evidence of industry-wide discrimination. Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1529. We clearly stated that evidence explaining the Denver government's role in contributing to the underutilization of MBEs and WBEs in the private construction market in the Denver MSA  was relevant to Denver's burden of producing strong evidence. Id. at 1530 (emphasis added). 87 Consistent with our mandate in Concrete Works II, the City attempted to show at trial that it indirectly contributed to private discrimination by awarding public contracts to firms that in turn discriminated against MBE and/or WBE subcontractors in other private portions of their business. Id. The City can demonstrate that it is a `passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry by compiling evidence of marketplace discrimination and then linking its spending practices to the private discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 706 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, J.). Therefore, evidence of marketplace discrimination is not only relevant but, in this case, it is essential to the City's claim that it is an indirect participant in private discrimination. Consequently, we again reject CWC's argument and conclude that the district court's determination that the marketplace data was irrelevant was a legal error that significantly affected the court's analysis of Denver's evidence. 88 At trial, the City presented testimony from M/WBEs doing business in the Denver MSA to support its assertion that it is a `passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry because it contracts with firms which discriminate against women and minorities. Id. At least eight M/WBEs testified that general contractors who use them on City construction projects refuse to use them on private projects. The witnesses specifically named the contractors who engaged in this practice. An employee of the MOCC identified eighteen of those contractors as firms that have performed City contracts. Based on this testimony, the district court found that, 89 The City does not want to pay tax dollars to support firms that discriminate against other firms because of their race, ethnicity and gender. Yet, the anecdotal evidence shows that Denver has repeatedly and knowingly done just that. During the taking of testimony about the experiences of minority and woman-owned firms in dealing with other contractors on projects not involving Denver, the City's lawyers carefully demonstrated that those same contractors often do business with the City. 90 Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1075-76 (discussing narrow tailoring). CWC does not challenge this finding. The anecdotal evidence supporting the district court's finding would not be sufficient on its own to support Denver's burden of demonstrating a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. However, this evidence links Denver's spending to private discrimination. See Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1529. Consequently, we conclude that the anecdotal evidence and the district court's factual finding based on that evidence amply support Denver's position that it indirectly contributes to private discrimination in the Denver MSA construction industry. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 706 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, J.) (It is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice.). 91 CWC's argument that the lending discrimination studies and business formation studies presented by Denver are irrelevant is also foreclosed by circuit precedent. In Adarand VII, we concluded that evidence of discriminatory barriers to the formation of businesses by minorities and women and fair competition between M/WBEs and majority-owned construction firms shows a strong link between a government's disbursements of public funds for construction contracts and the channeling of those funds due to private discrimination. 228 F.3d at 1167-68. Evidence that private discrimination results in barriers to business formation is relevant because it demonstrates that M/WBEs are precluded at the outset from competing for public construction contracts. See id. at 1168. Evidence of barriers to fair competition is also relevant because it again demonstrates that existing M/WBEs are precluded from competing for public contracts. See id. Thus, like the studies measuring disparities in the utilization of M/WBEs in the Denver MSA construction industry, studies showing that discriminatory barriers to business formation exist in the Denver construction industry are relevant to the City's showing that it indirectly participates in industry discrimination. 13 92 The City presented evidence of lending discrimination to support its position that M/WBEs in the Denver MSA construction industry face discriminatory barriers to business formation. Denver introduced a disparity study prepared in 1996 and sponsored by the Denver Community Reinvestment Alliance, Colorado Capital Initiatives, and the City. The study's stated purpose was to determine what barriers, if any, small businesses face when seeking credit from financial institutions, and whether there is any difference in treatment among small business owners seeking credit based on their ethnicity. The study ultimately concluded that despite the fact that loan applicants of three different racial/ethnic backgrounds in this sample were not appreciably different as business-people, they were ultimately treated differently by the lenders on the crucial issue of loan approval or denial. In Adarand VII, this court concluded that this very study, among other evidence, strongly support[ed] an initial showing of discrimination in lending. 228 F.3d at 1170; see also id. at 1170 n. 13 (Lending discrimination alone of course does not justify action in the construction market. However, the persistence of such discrimination ... supports the assertion that the formation, as well as utilization, of minority-owned construction enterprises has been impeded. (citation omitted)). The City also introduced anecdotal evidence of lending discrimination in the Denver construction industry. See Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1072-73. 93 CWC did not present any evidence that undermines the reliability of the lending discrimination evidence but simply repeats the argument, foreclosed by circuit precedent, that it is irrelevant. The district court criticized the evidence because it failed to determine whether the discrimination resulted from discriminatory attitudes or from the neutral application of banking regulations. See Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1072. We have already concluded, however, that discriminatory motive can be inferred from the results shown in disparity studies. Because the district court's criticism is not directed at the methodology used or conclusions drawn in the lending discrimination study, it does not undermine the study's reliability as an indicator that the City is passively participating in marketplace discrimination. Indeed, in Adarand VII we took judicial notice of the obvious causal connection between access to capital and ability to implement public works construction projects. 228 F.3d at 1170. The district court's other criticisms are erroneous in light of this court's holding that the study support[s] an initial showing of discrimination in lending. Id. 94 Denver also introduced evidence of discriminatory barriers to competition faced by M/WBEs in the form of business formation studies that were included in the BBC and NERA Studies. The 1990 Study and the 1995 Study both showed that all minority groups in the Denver MSA formed their own construction firms at rates lower than the total population but that women formed construction firms at higher rates. The 1997 NERA Study employed a more sophisticated analysis to examine self-employment rates and controlled for gender, marital status, education, availability of capital, and personal/family variables. As discussed, supra, the NERA Study concluded that African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans working in the construction industry have lower rates of self-employment than similarly situated Whites. Asian Americans had higher rates. The NERA Study did not calculate business-formation rates for women working in the construction industry. The NERA Study also concluded that minority and female business owners in the construction industry, with the exception of Asian-American owners, have lower earnings than white male owners. This conclusion was reached after controlling for education, age, marital status, and disabilities. 95 Although CWC asserts that the district court correctly concluded that the business formation studies cannot be used to justify the ordinances, the court's conclusion conflicts with our holding in Adarand VII. See 228 F.3d at 1167-68. [T]he existence of evidence indicating that the number of [MBEs] would be significantly (but unquantifiably) higher but for such barriers is nevertheless relevant to the assessment of whether a disparity is sufficiently significant to give rise to an inference of discriminatory exclusion. Id. at 1174. Further, the district court's conclusion that no inference of discrimination can be drawn from the studies because such a conclusion would require the problematic assumption of a direct relationship between the rate of formation of new businesses and the number of persons working as employees in the industry erroneously ignores the fact that the NERA Study controlled for variables like education and level of experience. Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1066. 96 In its written closing argument, CWC asserted that the business formation study included in the 1995 Study is flawed because it did not control for variables such as the type of educational degree received and types of work experience. 14 Conceding that the NERA Study was better, CWC nevertheless argues that it too is flawed because it did not control for, inter alia, quality of education or culture. The district court faulted the 1995 Study because it did not control for marital status, veteran status, availability of other sources of income and hours worked during the previous year. Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1057-58. The court also noted that the NERA Study failed to control for prior business experience, religion, cultural history and whether parents were self-employed. Id. at 1060. 97 Even assuming that it is possible to adequately measure variables like quality of education and culture, neither the district court nor CWC provided any explanation of how the failure to control for any of these variables undermines the reliability of the business formation studies. While the report prepared by CWC's expert, George LaNoue, indicated that cultural differences or immigration status may affect business-formation rates, LaNoue did not explain what he meant by the term cultural differences, did not conduct a study that controlled for these variables and, more importantly, did not testify that controlling for the variables would eliminate the disparities. [G]eneral criticism of disparity studies, as opposed to particular evidence undermining the reliability of the particular disparity studies ... is of little persuasive value. Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1173 n. 14. 98 In sum, the district court erred when it refused to consider or give sufficient weight to the lending discrimination study, the business formation studies, and the studies measuring marketplace discrimination. That evidence was legally relevant to the City's burden of demonstrating a strong basis in evidence to support its conclusion that remedial legislation was necessary. See id. at 1167-68. CWC's generalized denouncements of the studies fall far short of the credible, particularized evidence necessary to rebut the City's evidence. Id. at 1175.
99 Beyond its conclusion that Denver's disparity studies were largely or wholly irrelevant because they measured marketplace discrimination and not discrimination by the City itself or by contractors working on City projects, the district court identified numerous perceived flaws in the studies. Acknowledging that disparity studies may, when properly conducted, constitute persuasive evidence in equal protection cases, the district court relied on language in Croson 's plurality opinion to set the standards those studies must meet. According to the district court, 100 the probative force of statistical disparity studies depends upon whether the data used provide meaningful measurements of the number of minority firms qualified and willing and able to perform a particular service as well as the number actually used in public contracting, directly or indirectly. 101 Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1065 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 501, 109 S.Ct. 706). As we have already concluded, disparity studies that measure the use of M/WBEs in the relevant marketplace, in addition to those that measure the direct or indirect use of M/WBEs in public contracting, are also probative. The court, however, also discredited the conclusions reached in Denver's disparity studies either because those studies failed to address the six questions developed by the court or because they failed to control for certain variables. 102
103 In Concrete Works II, this court reversed the grant of summary judgment, in part, because it was unclear from the record whether the 1990 Study overstated the availability of M/WBEs in the Denver construction market. We noted that a disparity index calculated on the basis of the absolute number of MBEs in the local market may show greater underutilization than does data that takes into consideration the size of MBEs and WBEs. Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1528. At trial, both parties had the opportunity to present evidence on the effect firm size and capacity had on the disparities shown in Denver's studies. 104 CWC challenges Denver's disparity studies as unreliable because the disparities shown in the studies may be attributable to firm size and experience rather than discrimination. CWC's argument is based on a report submitted by its expert, George LaNoue, which contains an extensive discussion of firm size and experience. LaNoue first asserts that M/WBEs are generally smaller and less experienced than majority firms. He then contends that smaller and less experienced firms are less qualified and less able to undertake City construction projects. He concludes that because Denver's disparity studies do not control for firm size and experience, the M/WBE availability figures used in those studies are inflated. Thus, CWC argues the disparity indices calculated in the studies are unreliable because they are not based on the availability of only those firms qualified, willing, and able to work on City projects. 105 The district court noted that Denver's disparity studies contain no analysis of the actual qualifications and capacities of the MBEs and WBEs in the Denver MSA, but instead assume that, at any given time, all M/WBEs are available to perform each contract. Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1065-66. The court criticized Denver's assumption as implausible and concluded that [a]ggregating all of the MBEs and WBEs in estimating availability without regard for the size of the businesses ... is a serious flaw in the methodology and impairs the value of the results. Id. at 1066, 1068. 106 Denver acknowledges that M/WBEs are generally smaller than majority-owned firms in terms of revenues and number of employees and are slightly less experienced. Additionally, in his written report, another CWC expert, John Lunn, asserts that the only conclusion that can be drawn from Denver's studies is that minority-and women-owned firms are smaller and less experienced than the average of all construction firms in the Denver construction market. Although CWC did not conduct its own marketplace disparity study that controlled for firm size and experience, its argument that the disparity studies are unreliable because they fail to control for size and experience is deserving of consideration in light of the uncontroverted evidence that M/WBEs are generally smaller and less experienced than majority firms. 107 Denver counters, however, that a firm's size has little effect on its qualifications or its ability to provide construction services and that M/WBEs, like all construction firms, can perform most services either by hiring additional employees or by employing subcontractors. At trial, Denver introduced evidence that the median number of employees of all construction firms in the Denver MSA is three and presented testimony that even firms with few permanent employees can perform large, public contracts by hiring additional employees or subcontractors and renting equipment. Additionally, the district court found that most firms have few full-time permanent employees and must grow or shrink their performance capacity according to the volume of business they are doing. Id. at 1064. 108 CWC responds that elasticity itself is relative to size and experience; M/WBEs are less capable of expanding because they are smaller and less experienced. The district court found that a firm's ability to expand depends upon [its] access to increased resources, including workers with the needed skills, equipment, material and operating capital. Id. The court did not find that a firm's size affected its ability to obtain these resources but concluded that the firm's access to information, its reputation in the community and the skills of its managers all had an effect. Id. Thus there is no finding by the district court that smaller, less experienced firms are less able to expand. 109 Even if we assume that M/WBEs are less able to expand because of their smaller size and more limited experience, CWC does not respond to Denver's argument and the evidence it presented showing that experience and size are not race-and gender-neutral variables and that M/WBE construction firms are generally smaller and less experienced because of industry discrimination. The lending discrimination and business formation studies both strongly support Denver's argument that M/WBEs are smaller and less experienced because of marketplace and industry discrimination. In addition, Denver's expert David Evans testified that discrimination by banks or bonding companies would reduce a firm's revenue and the number of employees it could hire. Robin Hackett, the owner of a WBE, testified that she has difficulty finding and retaining white male employees because they are ridiculed by others in the industry for working at a WBE. Hackett also testified that she is excluded from participating in a labor pool of non-union employees shared by other local firms. Those firms sharing this labor pool are able to bid a bigger volume of work and not worry about manning the projects. Even Lunn, CWC's expert, admitted during cross-examination that the size and revenue differences between M/WBEs and majority-owned firms could be due in part to the presence of discrimination. 110 Denver also argues that CWC's argument lacks merit because the 1990 Study, the DGS Study, the 1995 Study, and the NERA Study all controlled for size and the 1995 Study controlled for experience. It asserts that the 1990 Study measured revenues per employee for construction M/WBEs and concluded that the resulting disparities, suggest[] that even among firms of the same employment size, industry utilization of MBEs and WBEs was lower than that of non-minority male owned firms. Similarly, the 1995 Study controlled for size, calculating, inter alia, disparity indices for firms with no paid employees which presumably are the same size. CWC responds by simply making the bald allegation that the 1995 Study's control for size is a pretense and that the control is meaningless. This glib response is wholly inadequate to rebut Denver's argument and the conclusions drawn in the disparity studies. 111 Based on the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the district court did not give sufficient weight to Denver's disparity studies because of its erroneous conclusion that the studies failed to adequately control for size and experience. Denver is permitted to make assumptions about capacity and qualification of M/WBEs to perform construction services if it can support those assumptions. The assumptions made in this case are consistent with the evidence presented at trial and support the City's position that a firm's size does not affect its qualifications, willingness, or ability to perform construction services and that the smaller size and lesser experience of M/WBEs are, themselves, the result of industry discrimination. Further, CWC did not conduct its own disparity study using marketplace data and thus did not demonstrate that the disparities shown in Denver's studies will decrease or disappear if the studies controlled for size and experience to CWC's satisfaction. Consequently, CWC's rebuttal evidence is insufficient to meet its burden of discrediting Denver's disparity studies on the issue of size and experience. 112
113 The district court also faulted Denver's disparity studies because they do not control for firm specialization. See Concrete Works III, 86 F.Supp.2d at 1068 (Aggregating all of the MBEs and WBEs in estimating availability without regard for... the particular services or type of work in which they specialize is a serious flaw in the methodology and impairs the value of the results.). The court's criticism would be appropriate only if there was evidence that M/WBEs are more likely to specialize in certain construction fields. CWC has failed to marshal any such evidence. Its appellate brief contains only the conclusory statement that M/WBEs tend to be... congregated in certain construction specialities. This assertion is unsupported by any citation to the record and CWC does not direct this court to any corroborative study or other evidence. Further, there is no identified evidence showing that certain construction specializations require skills less likely to be possessed by M/WBEs. In fact, CWC's statement appears to contradict the testimony of the City's expert, Dr. Evans, that the data he reviewed showed that MBEs were represented widely across the different [construction] specializations. 15 114 In his expert report, Lunn criticizes Denver's disparity studies because they aggregate construction firms without regard to specialization or size. Although Lunn's report contains an example that illustrates his criticism, he conceded during cross-examination that the example was purely hypothetical and was not based on any data from the Denver MSA construction industry even though he had access to that data. Lunn also testified that he had not done any investigation into whether aggregation bias caused the disparities shown in Denver's studies. 115 Not only does CWC offer no support for its position that M/WBEs are clustered in certain construction specialities, but it has failed to demonstrate that the disparities shown in Denver's studies are eliminated when there is control for firm specialization. In contrast, the NERA Study, which controlled for SIC-code subspecialty yet still showed disparities, provides support for Denver's argument that firm specialization does not explain the disparities. 116
117 In his report, CWC's expert, LaNoue, contends that the M/WBE availability data used in Denver's disparity studies is unreliable because it is not a measure of only those firms actually bidding on City construction projects. LaNoue asserts that, All other measures than bidding are merely proxies for availability.... [U]nless a firm makes a bid, it is not actually available for public contracting. LaNoue's position appears to constitute an implicit conclusion that only studies which equate M/WBE availability with actual bids on a contract-by-contract basis can be used to support Denver's burden. To calculate availability at the level of certainty urged by CWC, Denver would be compelled to survey each MBE, WBE, and majority firm each time bids are sought for a construction project to determine which firms actually bid on the project, either as a prime contractor or as a subcontractor. While this approach may provide an accurate count of available firms, it says nothing about whether those firms are qualified. If availability is calculated on an individual basis using LaNoue's approach, it is possible that unqualified firms would be included in the availability figure simply because they bid on a particular project. Conversely, qualified firms would not be included if, for any reason, they chose not to bid on the project. Thus, LaNoue's approach itself illustrates why disparity studies must make assumptions about availability as long as the same assumptions can be made for all firms. 16 118 CWC does not identify any evidence showing that M/WBEs bid on City projects at a different rate than non-M/WBE firms. Thus, it has not demonstrated that differences in bidding practices may explain the disparities found in Denver's studies. Additionally, we do not read Croson to require disparity studies that measure whether construction firms are able to perform a particular contract. The studies must only determine whether the firms are capable of undertak[ing] prime or subcontracting work in public construction projects. Croson, 488 U.S. at 502, 109 S.Ct. 706.
119 John Lunn, CWC's expert, criticized Denver's studies because they used stock data and not flow data. Studies utilizing stock data provide information on an industry at a discrete point in time. Flow data show changes that occur in the industry over time. Lunn testified that substantial changes in a market situation and substantial changes in flows do not show up in studies utilizing the stock concept. He then speculated that a study utilizing flow data might show no disparities even though an analysis of stock data may indicate that discrimination is present. Lunn, however, illustrated his point by using a hypothetical involving law school admissions: he did not test his hypothesis on actual flow data from the Denver construction market and he did not testify that any substantial change had occurred in the Denver construction industry which would make a study using flow data more reliable than the disparity studies conducted by BBC and NERA. 120 Denver's individual studies examined the Denver construction industry from the 1970s through 1997. Each study showed disparities between M/WBEs and non-M/WBEs. Thus, considered in the aggregate the disparity studies themselves undermine CWC's unsupported assertion that the use of flow data would explain the disparities.