Opinion ID: 2790613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Shooting Incident

Text: The district court granted the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of an alleged shooting in Missouri that did not involve Mr. Hohn. But at trial, as the government was questioning a witness concerning the contents of a notebook found in her bedroom, the witness identified names in the notebook as “names of the people that were involved in the shootout in Kingdom City.” R., Vol. 2 at 1305. The defendants immediately moved for a mistrial based on the witness’s reference to the Missouri shooting. The district court determined that the government had inadvertently elicited the comment. As a curative matter, it called each of the jurors individually into the courtroom and informed each juror that the statement was being stricken from the record and that they should disregard it. The court also reminded the jurors that the names mentioned in the notebook were not those of the defendants. Finally, it asked each juror three questions: whether they could disregard the statement as instructed; whether they were still able to be fair and impartial to all parties in the case; and whether they were still able to decide the case based solely on the evidence admitted at trial and the court’s instructions. Each juror -9- answered all three questions affirmatively. The district court then denied the motion for mistrial. We review the district court’s denial of the motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1039 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 298 (2014). Where inadmissible evidence is admitted, “a cautionary instruction is ordinarily sufficient to cure any alleged prejudice to the defendant and declaring a mistrial is only appropriate where a cautionary instruction is unlikely to cure the prejudicial effect of an error.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the shooting reference was unintentionally elicited, and the district court very carefully instructed and questioned each juror about the reference, satisfying itself that “the character of the testimony [was not] such that it [would] create so strong an impression on the minds of the jurors that they [would] be unable to disregard it in their consideration of the case, although admonished to do so.” Id. at 1040. Denial of the motion for a mistrial was therefore not an abuse of discretion. III. Denial of Motions to Suppress Results of Truck Searches Law enforcement officers searched Mr. Hohn’s 1997 Ford F150 truck twice, on December 23, 2011, and on April 20, 2012. The district court denied his motions to suppress the evidence found during the searches. “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2014). “We review the district - 10 - court’s ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de novo.” Id. December 23, 2011 search. On December 23, 2011, officers searched a residence in Gardner, Kansas pursuant to a state-court search warrant. At the time of the search Mr. Hohn’s 1997 Ford F150 truck was parked in the driveway and he was on the premises. Mr. Hohn and his girlfriend shared a bedroom at the residence and a significant number of his personal possessions were found there. The search warrant affidavit recited that Mr. Hohn’s truck was known to have been used in connection with his drug trafficking activities, that the truck was often in the driveway of the residence, and that the Gardner address was known to be Mr. Hohn’s primary and only residence. When he was later arrested, Mr. Hohn gave the Gardner address to law enforcement as his address. Officers seized firearms and other evidence they found in Mr. Hohn’s truck. He moved to suppress the evidence, reasoning that the search and seizure of his truck exceeded the scope of the warrant because when they seized the items the officers knew he was not the actual owner of the premises being searched. The scope of a search warrant for a premises “include[s] those automobiles either actually owned or under the control and dominion of the premises owner or, alternatively, those vehicles which appear, based on objectively reasonable indicia present at the time of the search, to be so controlled.” United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459, 1461 (10th Cir. 1990). Mr. Hohn contends that because the officers - 11 - knew he was not the legal owner of the premises—he merely lived there—his truck was not within the scope of the warrant. Mr. Hohn’s reading of Gottschalk is unnecessarily narrow, and could lead to untoward results. It could preclude the search of a renter’s vehicle, for example, where the renter occupied all or part of the premises to be searched and was the target of the search but did not hold fee simple title to the premises. While Gottschalk rejects a broad authority to search any vehicle located within the curtilage of a premises to be searched—it would, for example, prevent officers from searching a guest’s vehicle that was incidentally present within the curtilage at the time of the search, see id. at 1460-61—its holding and rationale are sufficiently broad to encompass vehicles actually or apparently owned or controlled by long-term residents who exercise possessory ownership of the premises. Mr. Hohn was thus properly treated as an “owner” of the Gardner residence and the district court properly denied the motion to suppress items found during the search of his truck. April 20, 2012 search. In December 2010, members of the conspiracy allegedly killed Greg Price, who owed a drug debt. The homicide was not included among the charges in this case. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to exclude any evidence regarding the killing at trial. After the homicide, Mr. Price’s body was placed inside a refrigerator and loaded into Mr. Hohn’s truck. The improvised casket was transported to and left at a - 12 - remote location. There it remained, unknown to law enforcement, for approximately sixteen months. On April 19, 2012, as a result of their investigation, officers learned of Mr. Price’s death and the location of his body. They obtained a search warrant for the property where it was located. There, they discovered what was left of the body inside the refrigerator. They also learned that Mr. Hohn’s truck had been used to transport the body to its resting place. By the time officers learned of the homicide and the role Mr. Hohn’s truck played in disposal of the body, Mr. Hohn was in jail. His girlfriend had control of the truck, which was parked in Miami County, Kansas. Officers seized the truck on April 19 and towed it to the Johnson County Criminalistics Laboratory in Olathe, where it was stored in a secured garage. The next day, a deputy sheriff obtained a search warrant for the truck, seeking any trace evidence concerning the homicide. The truck was searched, but little or no evidence was recovered. Mr. Hohn complains that the truck was seized without a warrant and that the evidence used to establish probable cause to search it was stale. He also argues that it was improper to seize the truck in one county and transport it to another county where the search warrant was obtained. Mr. Hohn’s challenge to this search is meritless. Evidence of Greg Price’s alleged killing was specifically excluded from his trial. In any event Mr. Hohn points to no evidence found during the April 20 search of his truck that should have been - 13 - suppressed.5 Under the circumstances, any alleged error involving the search of Mr. Hohn’s truck was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.