Opinion ID: 788147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The River Search

Text: 340 After receiving information from Yunkin and Lambert regarding their disposal of evidence in the Susquehanna River, law enforcement officials conducted a search of the river on December 21, 1991. The police were specifically looking for a pink plastic bag containing at least one pair of sneakers. Appellate App. 1561. They found a knife and a pink plastic bag. The police videotaped the search and provided Lambert's counsel with an edited version of the tape. 341 The police conducted another, more extensive search two days later, on December 23, 1991. Using a dog scented with Buck's sweater, the police found a piece of white nylon rope. The police also found a sneaker. The December 23 search was not video-taped. 342 The police did not indicate in any reports regarding the river searches that they found a pink bag or a sneaker, nor did they in any way inform Lambert about the finds. A police report provided to Lambert indicated that the rope was found, but it did not indicate that it was found using a dog scented with Buck's sweater. 343 We discern four arguments of constitutional error from the unstructured discussion of the river searches in Lambert's brief. First, Lambert argues that the government violated Brady by failing to inform her that they found the pink bag and sneaker. Second, she appears to argue that the government knowingly elicited false testimony at the trial that the police never found a pink bag or sneakers. Third, she argues that the government violated Brady by failing to inform Lambert that the rope was found using a dog scented with Buck's sweater. Finally, Lambert appears to argue that the government violated her due process rights by destroying exculpatory evidence (the pink bag and sneaker) prior to trial. 344
345 Again, to make out a Brady violation Lambert must show that (1) the government withheld evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable, either because it was exculpatory or of impeachment value; and (3) the withheld evidence was material. See Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1272. The PCRA Court found that the pink bag was not exculpatory and that, in any case, the police did not withhold the pink bag's discovery from Lambert. With respect to the sneaker, the Court found that it was not exculpatory. Once again, the PCRA Court's determinations were reasonable. 43 346 The edited version of the videotape provided to Lambert shows an empty pink bag embedded in ice. Indeed, Lambert's counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he saw the pink bag in the videotape but did not question police witnesses about it at trial because he assumed it was a bag that had nothing to do with this case. App. 6461, 6637. The pink bag was therefore disclosed to Lambert. Needless to say (though apparently we must), Brady does not require the government to inform a defendant about information that the defendant possesses. See United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir.1992); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 686 (4th Cir.2002) (Certainly ... information that is not merely available to the defendant but is actually known by the defendant would fall outside of the Brady rule.). Put differently, evidence is not suppressed if the defendant knows about it and has it in her possession. 347 Detective Ronald Barley testified about the sneaker. He estimated that it was approximately a size six or seven sneaker, and it was a white old type hightop sneaker with the laces. Appellate App. 1157. More importantly, however, he testified: 348 The sneaker was stained brown from being in the mud. And around the sides of the sneakers it had what I would call black rot and threads in that area of black rot were beginning to rot away from the material and I felt that the sneaker was in there for a lot longer than three days to get in that condition. 349 App. 3466-67. The government need not provide a blanket disclosure to a defendant regarding all evidence found during an investigation. [T]here is `no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.' Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1992)). If the police had found a rusty Swiss army knife during the river search, for example, it certainly would not have violated Brady if they failed to disclose the find to Lambert. The state does not have an `obligation to communicate ... speculative information.' Id. at 110 n. 16 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 350 Lambert argues that it was unreasonable for the PCRA Court to credit Barley's PCRA testimony because he lied about not finding a sneaker or pink bag in 1992 and Lambert did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him at the PCRA hearing. Lambert Br. 89. As we describe below, however, the PCRA Court reasonably found that Barley did not lie. And, as we explained above, we do not believe that Lambert's inability to ask Barley leading questions obviates the probative value of his testimony. 351
352 The following exchange occurred when Lambert's counsel cross-examined Barley at trial: Q. How many items were you searching for [at the river]? 353 A. Specifically, I was looking for sneakers. 354 Q. All right. 355 A. We were not sure what else we were looking for. 356 Q. You were told there were sneakers there? 357 A. Supposedly, yes. 358 Q. You weren't told there was a knife and a rope there? 359 A. No. 360 Q. Were you told to look for a bag? 361 A. Yes, another trash bag. 362 Q. Another trash bag? 363 A. That's correct. 364 Q. Containing sneakers? 365 A. That's right. 366 Q. That's all it contained? 367 A. There was other items; did not know what else was in it. 368 Q. Did you ever find sneakers? 369 A. No. 370 Q. Did you ever find a trash bag? 371 A. No. 372 App. 188. Examined in isolation, Barley's testimony that he did not find sneakers or a trash bag appear to indicate that he did not find any trash bag or sneakers. The PCRA Court read Barley's testimony in the context of Shirk's questioning, however, and it concluded that Barley testified that he had not found the pink bag and sneakers that the police were seeking. 373 The Court made this determination in part because Shirk similarly interpreted Barley's testimony. Shirk testified at the PCRA hearing that he did not impeach Barley with the video of the river search, which showed that they found a pink bag, because he felt that the bag in the video was not relevant to the case. As the PCRA Court explained: 374 As Mr. Shirk's testimony reveals, it is reasonable to interpret Detective Barley's answer as a denial that a trash bag with evidence in it, i.e., Mr. Yunkin's sneakers, the rope, the knife, two pairs of sunglasses and the hats, was found during the search. 375 PCRA Decision 217. We agree. Implicit assumptions often underlay conversational exchanges, so that a participant in the exchange can communicate more information than what his words would mean in isolation. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 1105, 1131 (2003) (More can be communicated than what is explicitly said, and this can occur by means of conversational implicature.) (citing Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in Studies in the Ways of Words 22, 26 (1989)). Here, it was reasonable for the PCRA Court to infer that when Barley responded to Shirk's question he did not mean that he did not find any bags or sneakers at all. Rather, he meant that he did not find bags and sneakers within the parameters of those the police were looking for; but the pink bag he found was embedded in ice and the sneaker was decomposed. It follows from this determination that Barley did not lie, and the government did not knowingly use perjured testimony. 376
377 At the PCRA hearing, Allen Means explained how a bloodhound found the nylon rope after it was scented with Buck's sweater. Means, the dog's handler, testified that he called over an individual named John Forwood to come retrieve it. But the police report from the river search, which was provided to Lambert, stated: A white sweater worn by def. Tabatha Buck was brought to the scene by myself for use of the bloodhound. . . . The dog was unable to locate any evidence. A foot search was conducted along the banks and wooded areas. At approx. 1045 hrs. John Forwood of W.E.S.T. found white nylon rope on the bank approx. 2 feet south from where the knife was found the previous day. 378 Appellate App. 1563. Thus, Lambert never learned that the rope was found using a dog scented with Buck's sweater. 379 The PCRA Court determined that the government did not violate Brady by failing to turn over this evidence because the fact that the dog was scented with Buck's sweater was not exculpatory. Lambert argues that the PCRA Court's determination was erroneous because Buck's scent on the rope was inconsistent with the Commonwealth's theory of the case (that Lambert killed Show while Buck passively watched). Lambert Br. 90. 380 But Lambert mischaracterizes the government's position at trial. We have come across no portion of the trial record where the government contended that Buck watched passively while Lambert murdered Show. The government never disputed that Buck was present in Show's apartment and involved in the murder, and the presence of her scent on the rope neither inculpates nor exculpates Lambert. As the PCRA Court explained, just because Ms. Buck's scent was on the rope does not mean that Ms. Lambert's was not. There was no testimony that the dog attempted to trace Ms. Lambert's scent and failed. This `evidence' that Ms. Buck's scent was on the rope does not exculpate Ms. Lambert. PCRA Decision 141. We agree. The PCRA Court's determination was not contrary to or an unreasonable interpretation of federal law. 381
382 Lambert appears to argue that the government violated the Constitution by failing to preserve the pink bag and sneaker. The Supreme Court's decisions in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) establish standards for determining whether the government has infringed on a defendant's due process rights by failing to preserve evidence. See United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 69 (3d Cir.1994). Of relevance here is the requirement of bad faith on the part of the government. In Youngblood, the Supreme Court held that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333; see also United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir.1991). 383 The PCRA Court determined that Barley discarded the sneaker because he felt that, given its decomposed state, it could not have been Yunkin's sneaker. Other than spurious allegations and shadowy conspiracy theories, Lambert offers no evidence that suggests Barley acted in bad faith.