Opinion ID: 154605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Morales' Appeal

Text: Mr. Morales argues the district court's excusal of over half the original jury panel, off the record and outside the presence of the defendants and counsel, violated the Jury Selection and Service Act, as well as Mr. Morales' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) requires all motions challenging -10- compliance with the Jury Selection and Service Act to be accompanied by a sworn statement of facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure to comply with the [Jury Selection and Service Act]. In the recent appeal of Mr. Morales' co-defendant Doloras Contreras, we determined Ms. Contreras' claim under the Jury Selection and Service Act was barred by the defendants' failure to accompany their motions challenging the district court's jury selection procedures with an adequate sworn statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d). United States v. Contreras, __ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. Mar. 11, 1997). Here, as in Contreras, Mr. Morales failed to file a sworn affidavit in support of his motion challenging the district court's jury selection procedures. Consequently, Mr. Morales' Jury Selection and Service Act claim is barred. Also in Contreras, we denied Ms. Contreras' Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges to the jury selection procedures. See id. at ___. We determined Ms. Contreras could not establish a prima facie case of a fair cross section violation or an equal protection violation, and we concluded Ms. Contreras' Sixth Amendment impartial jury claim was without merit. Id. For the reasons stated in Contreras, we likewise find no merit in Mr. Morales' constitutional challenges to -11- the district court's jury selection procedures. 4
Mr. Morales argues the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial by denying his motion for severance and forcing him to trial with [five] co-defendants against whom the [United States] had overwhelming evidence. Mr. Morales alleges the government had substantially less incriminating evidence against him than it had against his co-defendants. According to Mr. Morales, the overwhelming evidence the government introduced at trial against his co-defendants resulted in a spillover effect, which led to Mr. Morales' convictions. A decision to grant or deny severance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an affirmative showing of abuse of discretion. United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846 (1991). To establish an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show actual prejudice resulted from the denial. Id. 4 In Contreras, we also determined the district court did not violate Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 or 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1994) by failing to dismiss the 132 jurors in open court and in the presence of the defendants. See id. at ___. To the extent Mr. Morales asserts claims under Rule 43 or 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), these claims are rejected pursuant to our reasoning in Contreras. -12- Furthermore, [i]n deciding on a motion for severance, the district court has a duty to weigh the prejudice resulting from a joint trial of co-defendants against the expense and inconvenience of separate trials .... Neither a mere allegation that defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial, nor a complaint of the spillover effect from the evidence that was overwhelming or more damaging against the co-defendant than that against the moving party is sufficient to warrant severance. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 668 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986)). We note as an initial matter that Mr. Morales was properly joined for trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Rule 8(b) permits the joinder of two or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Rule 8 is construed broadly to allow liberal joinder to enhance the efficiency of the judicial system. United States v. Hopkinson, 631 F.2d 665, 668 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 969 (1981). The evidence at trial revealed Mr. Morales was involved with his co-defendants in a common scheme or plan to launder illegally derived drug proceeds. Thus, the joinder of Mr. Morales was proper and in accordance with Rule 8(b). -13- Under Fed. R. Crim P. 14, the district court may grant a severance of defendants if it appears joinder results in a prejudice to a defendant. In Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that: a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Such a risk might occur when evidence that the jury should not consider against a defendant and that would not be admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted against a codefendant. For example, evidence of a codefendant's wrongdoing in some circumstances erroneously could lead a jury to conclude that a defendant was guilty. When many defendants are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, this risk of prejudice is heightened. Evidence that is probative of a defendant's guilt but technically admissible only against a codefendant also might present a risk of prejudice. Rule 14 leaves the determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy for such prejudice to the sound discretion of the district court. Id. at 541. Having thoroughly examined Mr. Morales' arguments, we do not believe the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Morales' motion to sever. The evidence at trial revealed Mr. Morales was involved with co-defendants Gabriel Aguirre and Doloras Contreras in the purchase of race horses with illegally derived proceeds. Evidence also established Mr. Morales, Mr. Aguirre, and codefendant Eleno Aguirre purchased the E & J Lounge with illicit funds. Thus, the evidence against Mr. Morales and his co-defendants was overlapping and -14- intertwined. Although the joinder of Mr. Morales may have resulted in the admission of some evidence that would not have been admitted if the court tried Mr. Morales alone, we do not find the district court's denial of severance caused Mr. Morales unfair prejudice. The fact that the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to Mr. Morales on the illicit investment count shows the jury carefully evaluated the evidence presented as to each defendant and each count. In denying Mr. Morales' motion to sever, the district court appropriately determined considerations of judicial economy and expediency outweighed the potential prejudice to Mr. Morales. Given the considerable discretion afforded the district court under Rule 14, we cannot say it abused its discretion.
Mr. Morales contends the district court should have dismissed the superseding indictment because of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The United States increased the charges against Mr. Morales in the superseding indictment filed after the mistrial. Mr. Morales asserts the United States was aware of the information giving rise to the increased charges prior to his first trial. Given this prior knowledge, along with the negative publicity the United States suffered -15- following the mistrial, Mr. Morales contends there is a reasonable likelihood the increased charges were motivated by prosecutorial vindictiveness. In Contreras, we decided a virtually identical vindictive prosecution claim asserted by Ms. Contreras. __ F.3d at ___. Looking to the totality of the circumstances, we determined there was no reasonable likelihood the increased charges against Ms. Contreras stemmed from prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id. at ___. In the present case, based upon our reasoning in Contreras, we likewise conclude there is no reasonable likelihood the enhanced charges against Mr. Morales were motivated by prosecutorial vindictiveness. 5 5 Unlike Ms. Contreras, Mr. Morales alleges he rejected a number of plea offers from the United States prior to the filing of the superseding indictment. Mr. Morales ostensibly contends this is another factor establishing a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. Assuming Mr. Morales' allegations are true, we are not persuaded by his argument. The Second Circuit denied an almost identical claim of vindictive prosecution in United States v. Khan, 787 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1986). In Kahn, as in the present case, the first trial of the defendant resulted in a mistrial caused by a hung jury. Id. at 30. Neither the United States nor the defendant objected to the mistrial. Id. at 33. Thereafter, the United States initiated plea discussions with counsel for the defendant. Id. at 30. When the defendant refused to enter into a plea agreement, however, the United States obtained a superseding indictment that added charges against the defendant. Id. The defendant was tried on the superseding indictment and found guilty on each count. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arose from the addition of new counts following the defendant's rejection of a plea offer and assertion of his right to a jury trial. Id. at 30-31. -16-
Next, Mr. Morales asserts the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction on Count XII, money laundering. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, '[t]he evidence -- both direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom -- is sufficient if, when taken in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1470 (quoting United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986)). The evidence presented to support a conviction must be substantial; it must do more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt. Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1470 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit disagreed, concluding the defendant did nothing likely to inspire the wrath of the United States. Id. at 33. In discussing the defendant's claim, the court noted in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining there is no element of retaliation so long as a defendant remains free to accept or reject the offer. Id. at 31 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)). Consequently, the court held it was unrealistic to assume that the government's probable response to a defendant's choice to exercise his fundamental right to a trial would be to seek to penalize and deter, even if that choice follows on the heels of a mistrial. Id. at 33. We agree with the Second Circuit. Notwithstanding Mr. Morales' rejection of the United States' plea offers, we do not believe Mr. Morales engaged in any conduct that was reasonably likely to inspire the wrath of the prosecutor. See id. Thus, Mr. Morales cannot prevail on his vindictive prosecution claim. -17- The jury in this case convicted Mr. Morales of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1996) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) by participating in the purchase of the E & J Lounge. The jury determined Mr. Morales and two codefendants (Eleno and Gabriel Aguirre) purchased the lounge with fifty payments, each in an amount less than $10,000.00, and each designed to avoid a federal transaction reporting requirement. To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), 6 the government must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant willfully conducted or caused to be conducted a financial transaction; (2) the defendant knew at the time of the financial transaction that the money represented proceeds of some unlawful activity; (3) the money involved was in fact the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and (4) the defendant knew at the time that the transaction was designed in whole or in part to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under federal law. On appeal, Mr. Morales contends the United States failed to establish 6 As noted, the government also charged Mr. Morales with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2. This statute provides: Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids [or] abets ... its commission, is punishable as a principal. This statute is not relevant for our analysis on the sufficiency of the evidence issued. -18- beyond a reasonable doubt the first element of this statute -- that he willfully conducted or caused to be conducted a financial transaction. According to Mr. Morales, there is no evidence in the record to support the inference that Mr. Morales was involved in any of the fifty payments made in connection with the purchase of the E & J Lounge. Our review of the record reveals Mr. Edward Lopez testified he entered into an agreement to sell the E & J Lounge to Mr. Morales, Gabriel Aguirre, and Eleno Aguirre for $434,000.00. The agreement to purchase, the commercial lease, and the warranty deed were all signed by Mr. Morales. The purchase of the E & J Lounge was effectuated through payments made directly to the law offices of Lloyd Bates, Mr. Lopez's attorney. Ms. Patricia Alvillar, Mr. Bates' secretary, testified that she issued a number of receipts for payments made to David Morales. Although none of the employees of Mr. Bates' law office could identify Mr. Morales as having made any of the payments, at least one of the payments to the Bates law firm was made with a cashier's check issued by Silver Savings and Loan, listing David Morales as the remitter. Ms. Shirley Madrid, who issued the cashier's check on behalf of Silver Savings and Loan, testified she knew Mr. Morales and his wife, and she would not have -19- allowed anyone other than Mr. Morales or his wife to purchase the check. Finally, the record reveals FBI Special Agent Sam Macaluso testified at trial concerning a post-arrest statement made by Mr. Morales. Special Agent Macaluso testified that Mr. Morales stated he was the owner of the E & J Lounge and he believed a down payment on the bar was made with the proceeds of drug activity. Although Mr. Morales contends the testimony of Agent Macaluso was contrary to all of the other evidence in the case and given with little confidence by the agent,'we may neither weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the credibility of witnesses.' United States v. Harrod, 981 F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Darrell, 828 F.2d 644, 647 (10th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 913 (1993); United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599, and 116 S. Ct. 220 (1995). Such assessments are within the exclusive province of the jury. United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 811 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 910 (1993). In our view, looking at the entire evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Morales willfully conducted at least one of the fifty financial transactions specified in Count XII of the superseding indictment. -20-
Finally, Mr. Morales contends the district court erred in failing to grant a new trial based upon the jury's misconduct in using a dictionary to look up the definition of the word distribution. In the recent appeal of Mr. Morales' codefendant, Eleno Aguirre, we determined a presumption of prejudice arose from the jury's improper conduct in researching the dictionary definition of distribution. United States v. Aguirre, __ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. Mar. 11, 1997). Nevertheless, because there was no evidence any of the jurors relied upon or attached any significance to the dictionary definition, we concluded the jury's misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to Mr. Aguirre. Id. at ___. Based on our reasoning in Aguirre, we likewise conclude the jury's misconduct in researching the dictionary definition of distribution was harmless to Mr. Morales beyond a reasonable doubt.