Opinion ID: 203433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Famania-Torres's Testimony

Text: Famania-Roche also challenges the admission of testimony by his uncle, Michael Famania-Torres, a local police officer. Famania-Torres testified that he had been involved in investigating the Santiago-Bez organization. The following colloquy then occurred: Government: Sir, as part of your investigation, knowledge and per your intervention and investigation, do you know if Mr. Jerry Famania was involved in this gang? Famania-Torres: Correct. Government: In what capacity? Famania-Torres: He operated the drug point at the Rincon Taino housing project at the midpoint as a seller. Government: And what else, if you know? Famania-Torres: With trafficking and transportation of weapons at different points. Government: Are you related in some form with Mr. Famania? Famania-Torres: Yes. Government: What is the relation? Famania-Torres: He is my nephew. On cross-examination, Famania-Torres admitted that he had never arrested his nephew and had never seen him transporting weapons or selling drugs. On appeal, Famania-Roche characterizes the evidentiary flaw in his uncle's testimony by stating that it lacked any probative value, R. Evid. 401, yet presented the danger of unfair prejudice. It is difficult to know what his argument is. Taking a generous view, the appellant may be arguing that his uncle's testimony about his nephew's involvement in the conspiracy had no probative value because, in the absence of any personal knowledge of his nephew's involvement, there was no foundation for his testimony. The government's brief on appeal did not understand this to be the argument. Even if that is the argument Famania-Roche is making, the record is unclear whether or not Famania-Torres had personally observed his nephew's conduct in relation to the conspiracy. It may be that his testimony was based entirely on statements that he had heard from others during the course of his investigation. We have no idea whether the informants who testified at trial, or informants who did not testify, or other investigators may have passed along the information regarding Famania-Roche's role. Thus we have no way to determine whether, for example, the information may be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) as coconspirator statements. It would have been preferable for the government to have laid a proper non-hearsay foundation. Cf. United States v. Garcia-Morales, 382 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.2004) (Hearsay does not become admissible merely because it is provided by a government agent in the form of an overview of the evidence.). There is a risk here that this was improper testimony for some of the same reasons we have condemned the use of improper overview testimony. See Rodriguez, 525 F.3d at 95 (collecting cases). Nonetheless, Famania-Roche did not object to the testimony at trial and, thus, he must demonstrate plain error. He cannot meet the prejudice prong of the plain error test. Famania-Torres's testimony was entirely cumulative of the testimony of the government's other three witnesses. See United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 132 (1st Cir.2008) ([I]t is difficult to imagine how the district court's failure to strike what, in essence, amounted to cumulative testimony could have prejudiced Defendant.). The uncle's testimony offered no additional specificity or detail. Given the strength of the government's case, which we further discuss in our sufficiency analysis below, and the limited impact of Famania-Torres's generalized statements, we are convinced that the verdict was not affected by any error in admitting this testimony. See Rodriguez, 525 F.3d at 97.