Opinion ID: 1131887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The News Broadcast.

Text: An evening news broadcast of proceedings at the first day of trial was made by radio and television. The following morning appellants' counsel moved for mistrial on the ground that the news report, although factually correct, contained a conclusion of the reporter which would have been prejudicial if heard by the jury. The motion was denied. Counsel requested the magistrate to examine the jurors to determine whether or not they heard the broadcast, but he made it clear he did not want them examined as to any effect the report may have had on them. Following counsel's suggestion, the magistrate asked the jury if any had heard the broadcast, and three indicated they had. He then instructed those jurors to disregard the broadcast, and reminded them they were to make a determination on the case solely on the evidence presented in court and the instructions. This instruction had been approved by appellants' counsel. As we stated in Oxenberg v. State, [8] the fundamental question to be determined in an instance of this type is whether the news report was prejudicial  whether it is likely that the jury's verdict was affected by reason of what the reporter had said. Such likelihood does not appear. We have examined the entire transcript of the testimony referred to in the broadcast, and find that it was an accurate report of what transpired in court, as appellants concede. Appellants, however, argue that the report was prejudicial because it contained in part a comment on the testimony of the state's witnesses. To a limited extent such comment was made by the reporter. But it was fair comment, and we see nothing in it that reasonably could have influenced the jury to find appellants guilty. It is also argued that the report had a prejudicial effect because it included only excerpts of the most damaging parts of the state's evidence, without including other features of the cross-examination. The result of this argument is that no person charged with a criminal offense could ever receive a fair trial unless (1) the public was kept completely uninformed of what took place in court, or (2) unless the publicity given to what occurred at the trial always included a report of facts which favored the defense. The concept of a fair trial does not require us to go that far. The appellants have failed to show any prejudice resulting to them from the news broadcast. We hold that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. [9] The judgment is affirmed. The stay of judgment as to appellant, Norman D. Tate, ordered by this court on June 30, 1961, is vacated.