Opinion ID: 2602153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of the Mistrial.

Text: The estate argues that it should have been granted a new trial on its negligence cause of action because the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial on that claim and allowed the jury to reach a verdict only on the estate's products liability claim. In response, Honda notes that the special verdict form allowed the jury to award the same categories of damages for both causes of action. According to Honda, the products liability and negligence theories were alternative causes of action, and the jury's verdict on the products liability claim therefore resolved all damages issues, leaving no reason for trial on the alternative theory of negligence. Honda additionally argues that, in any event, the estate waived its right to ask for a retrial on negligence. As a threshold matter, we agree with the estate that the trial court acted sua sponte in declaring a hung jury and mistrial on the negligence claim. Upon receiving the foreperson's note that the jury had debated for eight hours and failed to reach a verdict on the negligence issue, the trial judge stated: I think the indication, they spent eight hours at it and there has been no change ... [j]ustifies a finding that, as to the issue of the negligence claim, there is a mistrial. In response to concerns by Honda's trial counsel, the court later expressly confirmed that it had issued the mistrial order by motion of the court. Because the judge declared the mistrial without a motion from either party, we believe that the finding of a mistrial can only be characterized as sua sponte. We reject Honda's assertion that the estate waived its right to a retrial on the negligence cause of action by supporting the trial court's decision to declare a mistrial on that action. The estate did acknowledge that the jury appeared to be deadlocked on the negligence claim at that point; but it declined to move for a mistrial or to adopt the position that it would relinquish its right to seek a retrial on the mistried negligence claim. While it may be true that the trial court could have required the estate to elect between a mistrial on all issues and a waiver of its negligence cause of action, the court did not require such an election. Instead, it simply opted to declare a mistrial sua sponte. Given these circumstances, we hold that the estate's actions cannot properly be construed as a waiver of the right to a retrial. This conclusion leads us to a slightly more vexing question: whether the trial court's sua sponte mistrial order entitles the estate to retry its negligence claim. As Honda correctly observes, the special verdict form for the products liability and negligence causes of action listed identical categories of damages for both claims, and the jury's verdict on the products liability cause of action assessed the damages that the jury found appropriate in each category. The question, then, is whether, under the evidence presented, the estate realistically might have recovered any additional award for the same categories of damages had the jury not deadlocked on the negligence cause of action. The estate's dual claims for negligence and products liability were independent causes of action in the sense that they were sufficiently distinct and separable to stand alone. Yet most of their shared categories of damages were obviously coextensive. For example, the damages for past loss of support and services and future loss of support, services and inheritance would be identical regardless of the theory under which they were awarded. Because these damages have already been decided by the jury in the products liability verdict, it would be an injustice to subject Honda to the expenses and risks of redetermining those damages in a retrial. [9] Similarly, the issue of punitive damages was essentially identical for both causes of action; on each claim, the jury was required to determine whether Honda's conduct was outrageous and would therefore support punitive damages. The special verdict form contained a single question relating to both claims on punitive damages: Have plaintiffs proven by clear and convincing evidence that Honda engaged in outrageous conduct? (Answer yes or no). [10] The jury answered this question in the negative. Neither the jury instructions nor the evidence at trial differentiated between the kinds of conduct that would be outrageous under the estate's theories of negligence and products liability. Given these circumstances, the jury's finding that Honda had not engaged in outrageous conduct must be deemed to preclude an award of punitive damages under both causes of action. As to all issues of compensatory and punitive damages, then, because retrying the negligence theory would merely allow the estate to relitigate issues that the first jury has already considered and fully decided, we conclude that no retrial is warranted. But one point remains to be considered: comparative fault. As to this point, we find it possible that a retrial on the estate's negligence theory could lead to a different result based on a new jury's consideration of factual issues that the original jury's verdict on products liability does not fully resolve. Because a finding of comparative relative fault requires the jury to allocate relative degrees of fault among joint wrongdoers, there is good reason to believe that if the original jurors had found Honda liable on the basis of actual negligence rather than strict products liability, they would have assessed greater comparative fault to Honda than they did when they allocated fifty percent fault to Gologergen in response to special verdict question 15. We thus conclude that a new trial will be necessary on the issue of comparative fault unless Honda agrees upon remand to accept full liability for the damages awarded by the original jury.