Opinion ID: 700633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: other points of error

Text: 62 Appellant Jefferson makes three objections to the court's charge, none of which has merit. He objects first to the court's boiler plate instruction on note-taking by the jurors. Jefferson did not object to the instruction and the court's charge is certainly not plain error. 63 He argues next that his proposed charge on the CCE count, D-J-23 was a perfectly legitimate instruction that should have been granted. Jefferson does not argue that the court's instruction failed to correctly state the elements of the crime and the definitions of the terms used in the statute. Because Jefferson has not demonstrated that the court's charge is erroneous, his contention that he was entitled to the particular language in his proffered charge is meritless. 64 Finally, Jefferson argues that the court should have granted his charge D-J-22 regarding limitations on the jurors' use of transcripts of taped conversations admitted into evidence. Again, he points to no error in the instruction given by the court. The court's instruction correctly stated the law, and Jefferson's argument that the court should have given his proffered instruction is meritless.
65 Appellant Williams complains that his right to a fair trial was violated by various incidents in which the trial court questioned witnesses in the presence of the jury. He also points to comments made by the trial court in the course of ruling on objections. 66 A federal district judge may comment on the evidence, question witnesses, bring out facts not yet adduced, and maintain the pace of the trial by interrupting or setting time limits on counsel. United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir.1994). We have carefully reviewed the portions of the record Williams complains of and conclude that none of the comments or questions to which Williams refers was improper or went beyond the proper role of the trial judge.
67 Williams argues next that his life sentence without parole for his conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In addition to the amount of crack cocaine proved at trial, the district court accepted the presentence report finding that the conspiracy involved seventy-five kilograms of cocaine base. Williams' constitutional attack is clearly without merit. The Supreme Court recently upheld a life sentence without parole for possession of 650 grams of cocaine by a defendant with no prior convictions. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).
68 Appellant Davis challenges the district court's order disqualifying Davis' original attorney, Johnny Walls. Following the government's disqualification motion, the court held a hearing and learned that attorney Walls had earlier represented Jefferson as a co-defendant in this case, as well as defendant Randy Williams in a related prosecution involving Williams' alleged purchase of narcotics from The Side Effect, Jefferson's night club. Randy Williams entered a guilty plea and was expected to testify against Davis and his fellow defendants. Thus, attorney Walls faced the prospect of cross-examining his client Williams, who had a 5K1 motion pending before the court. It is also possible that he would have been required to cross-examine his previous client, Jefferson. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court disqualified Walls and made detailed findings in support of its ruling. Our review of the record reveals that the district court's findings are fully supported by the record, and we find no error in this ruling.
69 Appellant Davenport argues that the district court erred in determining that he was responsible for twenty-five kilograms of cocaine. The evidence revealed that Davenport was a participant in the conspiracy from 1989 or 1990 until the organization was dismantled in 1992. Jefferson gave Davenport a number of responsible jobs in the conspiracy. Davenport was a street dealer. From time to time, he distributed crack cocaine packages to the street dealers and collected money from them. He occasionally handled the entire business in Jefferson's absence. He also was authorized to draw on The Side Effect bank account. Given this evidence, the district court made specific findings that Davenport knew or should have reasonably foreseen that the conspiracy distributed at least twenty-five kilograms of crack cocaine after he joined it. Davenport offered no evidence to refute this finding. The district court did not err in determining the amount of cocaine attributable to Davenport.VIII. CONCLUSION 70 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 71 AFFIRMED.