Opinion ID: 2635704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The NCIAA passes a facial vagueness challenge for civil enforcement

Text: Having concluded that the district court properly severed the criminal enforcement provisions from the NCIAA, we now address whether the statute passes a facial vagueness test for civil enforcement. Because the statute does not contain criminal provisions in its severed state and, as all parties agree, does not involve constitutionally protected activity, we review the statute under the lower standard of whether it is vague in all its applications. [12] We conclude that the statute's civil enforcement is not vague, and therefore, it survives appellants' facial constitutional vagueness challenge. Under the lower standard test of whether the statute is vague in all its applications, the NCIAA is sufficiently clear if, in any application, it does not (1) fail[ ] to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited and does not (2) lack[ ] specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 685; Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186. We conclude that the statute is not vague in all its applications and, therefore, survives a facial challenge for civil enforcement because there are very clear applications of the statute in which no one could reasonably question whether a particular act would violate the statute. For example, smoking is clearly prohibited in certain areas, including bars and restaurants where food is served. This prohibition is unquestionably enforceable against someone who is smoking inside these restricted areas and, thus, illustrates how the statute is not impermissibly vague in all its applications. Another example as to why the statute survives a facial challenge is that the statute is clear that certain businesses cannot allow smoking and must post no-smoking signs. [13] It cannot be reasonably disputed that this portion of the statute clearly outlines the requirements that a business owner prohibit smoking and post no-smoking signs. Once again, this requirement demonstrates that the statute is not unconstitutional in all its applications. Thus, under the lower level test of requiring appellants to show vagueness in all its applications, the statute is sufficiently clear to provide notice of what conduct is prohibited and adequate guidance to enforcement officials to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. While there may be uncertainty as to what affirmative actions, if any, a business owner must take if someone smokes within his or her business in violation of the statute, there is no question that the business owner is required to make his or her establishment nonsmoking and post signs designating it as such. As the main restrictions of the Act are sufficiently clear to establish specific prohibited conduct that a reasonable person could understand and does not promote arbitrary enforcement, the statute survives a facial vagueness challenge. [14] Therefore, under a facial challenge the statute is not unconstitutionally vague for civil enforcement because the general restrictions under the statute have clear, constitutional applications. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling upholding civil enforcement of the statute.