Opinion ID: 2507043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Causes of Action for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation

Text: (5) The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another's reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 173 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 65 P.3d 1255].) (6) The tort of negligent misrepresentation, a species of the tort of deceit ( Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 407 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51, 834 P.2d 745]), does not require intent to defraud but only the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true. ( Small, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 173-174.) The complaint alleges that the Willed Body Program, through its agents, represented that James Conroy's body would be used for research and teaching purposes (and not for gain or profit) and that the body would at all times be handled in a respectful and dignified manner. The complaint alleges further that these representations were false, in that defendant conducted or allowed to be conducted private, for-profit tutoring classes using donated bodies; conducted or allowed to be conducted the transport of bodies for profit and the sale of body parts for profit; failed to ensure that use of the bodies conformed to the purpose of the donation; failed to keep records pertaining to the identification of bodies requested to be returned to family members; and failed to return James Conroy's remains to plaintiff. Finally, the complaint alleges that defendant made these representations to induce plaintiff to participate in the Willed Body Program; that plaintiff, who was ignorant of the falsity of these representations, relied on them in electing to participate in the Willed Body Program; and that plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a consequence. Once again, though, the summary judgment record does not support the allegations of the complaint. As discussed in the preceding section, there is no evidence in the record that James Conroy's body was used in a clandestine private tutoring class, transported or dismembered for profit, or used in any manner other than that specified in the donation agreement. Moreover, the record also reveals that plaintiff did not request or expect that her husband's remains would be returned to her. Because plaintiff failed to identify any false representations, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. (7) Plaintiff's claims fail for an additional reason: she has not shown that she actually relied on the alleged misrepresentations, which is an essential element of both claims of deceit. ( Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1088-1089 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 101, 858 P.2d 568].) Actual reliance occurs when a misrepresentation is `an immediate cause of [a plaintiff's] conduct, which alters his legal relations,' and when, absent such representation, `he would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered into the contract or other transaction.' [Citations.] `It is not ... necessary that [a plaintiff's] reliance upon the truth of the fraudulent misrepresentation be the sole or even the predominant or decisive factor in influencing his conduct.... It is enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has been a substantial factor, in influencing his decision.' ( Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 976-977 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903].) The actual donor in this case was the decedent, James Conroy, and it was he who executed the donation agreement. Plaintiff attempted to demonstrate that her husband detrimentally relied on defendant's representations by reciting in her declaration that [i]n reliance on Chris Brown's statements to me, my husband and I agreed to donate our bodies to UCI and to participate in the Willed Body Program. The trial court sustained the Regents' objection to this statement as speculative to the extent it purported to describe James Conroy's motivation and ordered the words my husband stricken from the declaration. Plaintiff did not challenge that ruling in the Court of Appeal or in this court. (8) In other words, the declaration now purports to say only that plaintiff relied on Brown's statements. (See Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1037.) It is true, as plaintiff points out, that she delivered her husband's body in a particular manner, i.e., unembalmed and unautopsied, and she claims she was induced to do so in reliance upon the promises made by Chris Brown. But as the Court of Appeal observed, plaintiff did not execute her husband's donation agreement, or make any decision regarding disposition of his body and thus had no legal right to control the disposition of her husband's body. The right of plaintiff, as the surviving spouse, to control the disposition of her husband's body was superseded by the terms of the written donation agreement executed by her husband. (Health & Saf. Code, former § 7154, subd. (a) [Rights of a donee created by an anatomical gift are superior to rights of others....]; see also id., § 7100.1, subd. (a); see generally 8A West's U. Laws Ann., supra, Anatomical Gift Act (1987) prefatory note, p. 6 [consent of next of kin after death is not required if the donor has made an anatomical gift].) That agreement recited that James Conroy's body was to be donated to UCI immediately following his death and that the body, when delivered, was to be unembalmed and in good condition. Those instructions were to be faithfully carried out upon his ... death and could not be altered, changed, or otherwise amended in any material way, except as may be required by law. (Health & Saf. Code, § 7100.1, subd. (a).) Plaintiff has not identified any legal basis for altering her husband's instructions. Accordingly, although plaintiff did deliver her husband's body to UCI, her actions are not cognizable as reliance for purposes of a claim of deceit, inasmuch as her husband's gift was already irrevocable upon his death. (Health & Saf. Code, former § 7150.5, subd. (h).) Plaintiff did not enter into an agreement with UCI regarding her husband's body, nor did Brown's representations cause her to alter her legal relations with UCI. James Conroy's gift of his body in an unembalmed and unautopsied condition, as specified in the donation agreement, did not require her consent, concurrence, or approval. ( Id., former § 7150.5, subds. (h), ( l ); see 8A West's U. Laws Ann., supra, Anatomical Gift Act (1987) com. to § 2, pp. 26-27 [the Uniform Act `recognizes and gives legal effect to the right of the individual to dispose of his own body without subsequent veto by others'].) For these reasons, the order granting summary judgment was not erroneous as to plaintiff's fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action.