Opinion ID: 2747917
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for a Continuance to Admit Additional

Text: Evidence Owino first challenges the agency’s refusal to consider the arrest documents that he moved to submit on September 23, 2011. Under the regulations implementing CAT, an IJ must consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). At the same time, the regulations vest the IJ with discretion to manage the presentation of evidence, including setting deadlines for the admission of evidence. See id. § 1003.31(c). If evidence in support of a CAT claim is proffered beyond deadlines prescribed pursuant to section 1003.31(c), an IJ has discretion in deciding whether to consider it. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29; Umezurike v. Holder, 610 F.3d 997, 1004 (7th Cir. 2010); 10 OWINO V. HOLDER Tang v. United States Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2009); Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 559 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007); Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2005).1 In determining whether to exercise discretion to grant or deny a continuance, “the IJ – and, on appeal, the BIA – should consider factors including ‘(1) the nature of the evidence excluded as a result of the denial of the continuance, (2) the reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously granted.’” An Na Peng v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009)). The BIA abuses its discretion “when it fails to . . . show proper consideration of all factors when weighing equities and denying relief.” Id. (quoting Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1014). The agency also abuses its discretion “when it makes an error of law.” Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008). In denying Owino’s motion to admit additional evidence, the IJ did not address each of the An Na Peng factors. She simply stated that Owino had failed to explain why he had not provided the documents earlier, and that the warrant did not appear to be properly authenticated. The BIA affirmed on the same grounds. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that this denial constitutes an abuse of discretion, as 1 Owino did not formally move for a continuance, but his “Motion to Admit Additional Evidence” past the deadline was the equivalent of such a motion, and the BIA analyzed it as a motion for a continuance. OWINO V. HOLDER 11 the agency’s reasoning is based on legal error and is inconsistent with the An Na Peng factors. As to the nature of the evidence excluded, the BIA erred as a legal matter in concluding that the arrest warrant was not properly authenticated. In so concluding, the agency relied on 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(b), which provides that an official record of a foreign country may be admitted if it is “evidenced by an official publication thereof, or by a copy attested by an officer so authorized,” and is then “certified by an officer in the Foreign Service of the United States, stationed in the foreign country where the record is kept.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(b). We have held, however, that documents submitted in immigration proceedings “may be authenticated . . . through any ‘recognized procedure, such as those required by [Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)] regulations or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’” Khan v. INS, 237 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 309–10 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The procedure specified in ‘8 C.F.R. § 287.6 provides one, but not the exclusive, method.’” Id. (quoting Iran v. INS, 656 F.2d 469, 472 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981)). Here, the copy of the arrest warrant had been properly authenticated by an investigator with the Federal Defenders of San Diego pursuant to Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We also find that the agency’s statement that Owino failed to explain why he waited to submit this evidence is inconsistent with the record. Owino’s counsel informed the IJ that she provided this information in response to the government’s contention – made in proceedings between November 2010 and May 2011 – that the previously submitted warrant was not authentic. Although the agency 12 OWINO V. HOLDER possibly might have found Owino’s explanation wanting, or, in the language of An Na Peng, that his conduct was not reasonable, its finding that no explanation was given is not supported by the record. We also note that other An Na Peng factors weigh in favor of admission. The warrant evidence is critical to Owino’s claim: As the Board itself recognized, evidence of an arrest warrant is “central to the respondent’s claim that he will be tortured upon return by the Kenyan police.”2 We also note that although the IJ had initially set the deadline for submission of evidence for July 9, 2010, she granted several continuances to the government to present opposing evidence between July 2010 and May 2011. By contrast, it appears that Owino neither sought nor received any continuance during the remand proceedings until he made his request in September 2011. We remand to the BIA for reconsideration in light of the factors outlined in An Na Peng and as discussed above. We do not reach Owino’s argument that the denial of a continuance also denied him due process.