Opinion ID: 1402588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Excusal of a Juror for Cause

Text: {50} Coffin's final argument related to the death penalty aspect of this case rests on the trial court's excusal for cause of a potential juror, Estella Bachicha. On voir dire, the State, defense counsel, and the trial court questioned Ms. Bachicha about the death penalty. The trial court asked Ms. Bachicha if she could impose the death penalty in some situations, to which Ms. Bachicha answered, I don't think so. Upon hearing this answer, the trial court followed up with the question, You don't think you could in any situation? Ms. Bachicha responded no and that her answer was based on her belief in God. Ms. Bachicha also told the trial court, I don't know if I can take another person's life. Finally, Ms. Bachicha told the prosecutor that she could not impose the death penalty on Coffin under any circumstances. Based on these responses, the trial court excused Ms. Bachicha for cause. {51} Coffin claims that the trial court improperly discounted Ms. Bachicha's response to defense counsel that she thought she could listen to both the State and the defense, weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and vote for either the death penalty or life imprisonment. Coffin also notes that Ms. Bachicha indicated that her views on the death penalty would not affect her ability to determine guilt or innocence. Coffin argues that the improper excusal of Ms. Bachicha violated his due process rights and that the proper remedy for this error is the reversal of his conviction. {52} With respect to a potential juror's views on capital punishment in a death penalty case, it is well established that a juror is properly excludable for cause if the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror in accordance with his [or her] instructions and his [or her] oath.' State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 129, 753 P.2d 1314, 1317 (1988) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980))). Because a trial court's decision to excuse a prospective juror for cause based on his or her views on the death penalty will necessarily depend on a judge's determination of that juror's demeanor and credibility, id., the trial court is in the best position to `assess a juror's state of mind.' State v. Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 128 N.M. 119, 990 P.2d 793 (quoting Sutphin, 107 N.M. at 129, 753 P.2d at 1317). As a result, we review a trial court's excusal for cause of a prospective juror for a clear abuse of discretion or manifest error. Sutphin, 107 N.M. at 130, 753 P.2d at 1318. {53} The trial court in this case concluded that, despite some minor inconsistency, Ms. Bachicha's overall response clearly indicated that she could not give the death penalty under any circumstances. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In any case, we reject Coffin's argument that the proper remedy for any error in this circumstance would be the reversal of his conviction. The improper excusal of a prospective juror for cause based on the juror's views on capital punishment requires that a death sentence be vacated. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 659-61, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). However, an excusal of this nature affects only the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial and does not affect the determination of guilt. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Because Coffin did not receive the death penalty and has presented no evidence that the jury was unable to impartially determine his guilt or innocence, any potential error in excusing Ms. Bachicha for her inability to impose the death penalty could not have caused any prejudice to Coffin.