Opinion ID: 2457391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Reasonableness of the Annexation

Text: As we noted at the outset, the relevant facts essentially are not in dispute. It is the conclusion to be drawn from those facts that has created this controversy. The record is voluminous; some of the evidence was pertinent. The trial judge found facts as follows: a. that there are no residential dwellings on the annexed property. We agree. b. that Preston Farm Associates intends to develop its 309 acres as a residential subdivision. We agree. c. that Sullivan County owns a 63 acre tract where a new high school is to be constructed. We agree. d. that Crown Enterprises and Mason & Dixon are substantial corporate entities, employing large numbers of persons in the Kingsport area and paying substantial taxes. We agree. e. that M&D has an adequate sewage treatment plant and its connection with the city sewer line is unnecessary. We agree. f. that the annexation study report shows that the 806 acre territory is in need of zoning and other municipal service in order to coordinate an orderly development of the entire area. We agree that the report so shows and we accept this to be a fact. g. that the City of Kingsport has adequate service in the areas of police protection, fire protection, education, planning, traffic engineering and refuse collection, all of which could be extended to the annexed area. We agree. h. that the city plans to expend approximately $321,000.00 to extend city sewer and water lines into the annexed area. We agree. i. that the total tax revenue accruing to the city from the annexed property would be $85,281.00, of which appellees would pay approximately fifty-six percent. We agree. j. that the site in question constitutes a site of substantial industrial development. We agree that M&D is a site of substantial industrial development. After finding the site to be industrial, the trial judge's memorandum reads as follows: Having so found, it further appears that the statute does not provide complete immunity from the reach of annexation ordinances but only in situations where it appears that industrial plants are being annexed for revenue purposes and with no significant benefit to the industry. As to whether or not the annexation is for revenue purposes, a numbers (sic) of factors must be considered in addition to the industry's contribution in tax payments. After examining all of the evidence in this very lengthly (sic) record and after reviewing the considerations and requirements of the annexation statutes, the court finds that the City has failed to carry the burden of proof as defined under T.C.A. 6-310, paragraph 5. In so holding and finding, this conclusion does not support any finding of bad faith or wrongful intent upon the members of the city council or other city officials but does support the finding that the practical result and effect of the ordinance is to violate the express purpose of the statute. It is evident that the trial judge based his judgment upon the following conclusions: 1. that the site of M&D's operations is industrial; 2. that M&D provided virtually all of its own services; 3. that the annexation of the M&D property was solely for the purposes of obtaining additional tax revenue with no significant benefit to the industry. The trial judge does not specifically point out wherein the City failed to carry the burden of proof or precisely why the result of the ordinance was to violate the express purpose of the statute. The self-evident purpose of the industrial amendment is to prevent the annexation of a substantial industrial plant development without consideration being given to four areas; viz.: a. whether the annexation is necessary for the welfare of the residents and property owners of the affected territory and the municipality as a whole. See Sec. 6-310, T.C.A., first paragraph; b. the necessity or use of municipal services; c. the present ability and intent of the municipality to render the service, when and as needed; d. the annexation must not be for the sole purpose of increasing municipal revenue with the corresponding ability or intent to render municipal services. This annexation passes muster under these criteria, which are applicable to all annexations. The basic fallacy in the trial judge's conclusion is that he treated the controversy as if the Crown-M&D property were the only territory being annexed as opposed to being but a small portion of a substantially larger territory being annexed in good faith. We find from the record that this annexation is necessary for the welfare of the property owners in the affected territory as well as the municipality as a whole. The whole theory of annexation is that it is a device by which a municipal corporation may plan for its orderly growth and development. Heavily involved in this is control of fringe area developments and zoning measures to the end that areas of unsafe, unsanitary and substandard housing may not ring the City to the detriment of the City as a whole. In a word, annexation gives a city some control over its own destiny. The preservation of property values, the prevention of the development of incipient slum areas, adequate police protection within a metropolitan area, and the extension of city services to whose who are already a part of the city as a practical proposition, are the legitimate concern of any progressive city. We are not impressed by the argument that Crown Enterprises and Mason & Dixon do not use or need city services. All that is required is that consideration be given to the necessity for or use of city services and that they be available when and as needed. This latter phrase would indicate that the legislature realized that some annexed areas would not at the time need any city services. The whole process of annexation would be frustrated if the city could only annex those properties then in need of city services. The result of this would tend to create islands of unincorporated areas within a city and the archipelagic monstrosity thus created would thwart the rendition of essential city services and would not be in the public interest. Appellees do not contest the annexation of the remaining property. Should we uphold their contention the result would be the creation of an 85 acre island or enclave, completely surrounded by the City of Kingsport. The area thus omitted would be within, but not a part of a city. Absent the most compelling considerations, such a situation would be intolerable and an annexation that produced such a result would not meet the test of reasonableness. [3] We have no hesitancy in holding that any annexation having as its sole purpose the collection of additional revenues is totally void. We do not here have such a case. See State ex rel. Spoone v. Mayor and Alderman of Morristown, 222 Tenn. 21, 431 S.W.2d 827 (1968). When consideration is given to the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the annexation ordinance under consideration represents a fair, reasonable and responsible effort of the City of Kingsport to cause its municipal boundaries to keep apace of the growth and development of the city. [4] To the extent of the issues involved in this suit, we declare the ordinance in question to be valid. We note that another suit challenging the same ordinance now pends in the trial court. The principles we announce here will be controlling in that suit; however, differing issues may be involved and we do not consider it appropriate to finally adjudicate the full validity of this ordinance until the parties to the pending suit shall have been heard fully. The decision of the trial court is reversed and this action is remanded for the entry of such decree, and at such time, as may be appropriate. FONES, COOPER, BROCK and HARBISON, JJ., concur.