Opinion ID: 453009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unconscionable Delay in Prosecution

Text: 100 Robert Falvo argues the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of an unconscionable delay in prosecution. He alleges prejudice to his defense accruing from the death of an associate of Falvo's, Frank Dante, between 1979 and the date of prosecution. A government prosecutor testified at a pretrial hearing in his case that the government was ready to indict Falvo as early as 1979. The five-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282 (1982), had not expired at the time this prosecution was commenced. 101 Statutes of limitations provide the primary guarantee against stale criminal charges. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 317-19, 92 S.Ct. 455, 462-63, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38, 38-39 (5th Cir.1981). Additionally, to succeed on a motion for dismissal of an indictment based upon unconscionable delay a defendant must demonstrate both a substantial prejudice to his right of a fair trial and an intentional delay on the part of the government made in order to gain tactical advantage over the accused. Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir.1984). As we have observed, this standard is an exceedingly high one.... Id. We hold that Falvo has demonstrated neither that the government delayed for tactical advantage, nor that he sustained sufficient prejudice to overcome the high standard upon which we review his claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court as to prosecutorial misconduct by unconscionable delay is affirmed.