Opinion ID: 1043887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-103(a) (2008 & Supp. 2012) provides that injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury” are compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law. The phrase “arising out of” means the origin of the incident in terms of causation, while “in the course of” refers to time, place, and circumstance. Phillips v. A & H Const. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tenn. 2004) (citing McCurry v. Container Corp. of Am., 982 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tenn. 1998)). It is undisputed that Ms. Vandall was acting in the course of her employment at the time she fell. The dispute in this case, however, is whether Ms. Vandall’s injury arose out of her 4 employment. The trial court concluded that Ms. Vandall’s shoulder injury was compensable because her injury arose out of her employment. We review issues of fact in workers’ compensation cases de novo on the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the trial court’s findings. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2). A trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo on the record with no presumption of correctness. Seiber v. Reeves Logging, 284 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tenn. 2009). The mere presence of an employee at her place of employment at the time of an injury does not mean that the injury is deemed to have arisen out of the employment. Rogers v. Kroger Co., 832 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Jordan v. United Methodist Urban Ministries, 740 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tenn. 1987)). Instead, the phrase “arising out of” requires a causal connection between the resulting injury and employment conditions. Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 240 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tenn. 2007). If reasonable doubt exists as to whether an injury arose out of employment, it is to be resolved in favor of the employee. Phillips, 134 S.W.3d at 150. However, the plaintiff in a workers’ compensation case has the burden of proving every element of the case by a preponderance of the evidence. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass’n, 725 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tenn. 1987). Allenbrooke argues that Ms. Vandall has failed to carry her burden of proving the required causal connection between the employment conditions and the injuries she sustained as a result of her fall. In particular, Allenbrooke contends that Ms. Vandall’s injuries resulted from an idiopathic fall and not from any hazard incident to her employment. An “idiopathic fall” occurs “when the fall is caused by a condition of unknown origin.” Dickerson v. Invista Sarl, No. E2006-02144-WC-R3-WC, 2007 WL 4973735, at  (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 18, 2007). In Wilhelm v. Krogers, 235 S.W.3d 122 (Tenn. 2007), this Court summarized the principles governing idiopathic falls or conditions. In that case, we reiterated that workers’ compensation benefits are usually not awarded when the employee’s injury is due to an idiopathic condition and not a “‘special hazard’ of the employment.” Wilhelm, 235 S.W.3d at 128 (quoting Sudduth v. Williams, 517 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tenn. 1974)). An idiopathic injury will be compensable, however, “if an employment hazard causes or exacerbates the injur[y].” Wilhelm, 235 S.W.3d at 128 (quoting Phillips v. A & H Constr. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tenn. 2004)). A causal link must exist between the employment and the injury for the incident to be considered as arising out of employment. Wilhelm, 235 S.W.3d at 128. Our courts have repeatedly held that an injury that occurs while walking is not compensable unless an employment hazard, such as a puddle of water, exists and causes the injury. Wilhelm, 235 S.W.3d at 128-29 (citing Williams v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 5 Cnty., No. M2002-03038-WC-R3-CV, 2004 WL 370296, at  (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel March 1, 2004)). Turning to the facts of this case, we must determine whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Ms. Vandall proved that an employment hazard caused her fall. Ms. Vandall testified that she had previously observed substances such as spit, urine, and spilled medications on Allenbrooke’s floors. Ms. Vandall also stated that certain medications could make the floor “sticky” when spilled. In describing her fall, Ms. Vandall stated that the ball of her right foot “stuck” and that her inability to lift her foot interrupted her gait, causing her to fall forward. She further stated that she knew that something on the floor caused her to fall. Although Ms. Vandall conceded that it was “speculation” as to what, if any, substance was on the floor, the trial court accredited Ms. Vandall’s testimony that the fall had occurred as she described and concluded that the hazard was incident to Ms. Vandall’s employment. When credibility and weight to be given to testimony are involved, considerable deference is given to the trial court because the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and to hear in-court testimony. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 & 900 (Tenn. 2009). Although Allenbrooke’s witnesses testified that they carefully inspected the area where Ms. Vandall had fallen and found no substance on the floor or any irregularity in the floor that might have caused her to fall, the trial court concluded that the nursing staff could have tracked away whatever substance was present on the floor. We must give deference to the trial court’s determination of credibility. The public policy of our Workers’ Compensation Law requires us to resolve any doubts or conflicts in favor of the employee. See Curtis v. Hamilton Block Co., 466 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tenn. 1971); see also Phillips, 134 S.W.3d at 150. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Vandall sustained a compensable injury arising out of her employment.