Opinion ID: 1563772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Redemption Amount

Text: Finally, we turn to plaintiff's contention that the hearing justice erred when he assessed the redemption costs. The plaintiff contends that it was entitled to be made whole and that it should have recovered all the property taxes it paid, plus interest, the amount of its expenditures for repairs and capital improvements, attorneys' fees, as well as certain rents collected by defendants. The hearing justice disagreed and awarded plaintiff the amount it was entitled to under the redemption agreement, plus $1,000 in attorneys' fees. In Albertson v. Leca, 447 A.2d 383 (R.I. 1982), this Court summarized the Rhode Island tax sale statute: The Rhode Island tax statute strikes a fair balance between the interests of the government and private property rightsthe state may move quickly to obtain by sale the taxes due, but the owner has ample opportunity to redeem his real estate. The law provides that the taxes assessed on a parcel of real estate constitute a lien against the property. Section 44-9-1. If payment is overdue, the tax collector, after proper notice and advertisement, may sell the property or some portion of it at public auction for the amount of taxes and other costs due. Sections 44-9-8 and 44-9-9. One who purchases property at a tax sale acquires a title that is contingent upon the owner's nonredemption. Section 44-9-12. The owner unconditionally may redeem the real estate at any time prior to the filing of a petition to foreclose the right of redemption. Section 44-9-21. Upon the filing of a foreclosure petition and an answer by the owner seeking redemption, a justice of the Superior Court will conduct a hearing to determine whether or not redemption should be granted. Sections 44-9-25 and 44-9-29. If redemption is denied, the purchaser's title becomes absolute. Section § 44-9-24. The purchaser may not file a foreclosure petition until one year after the date of the tax sale, and he has no right to the possession, rent, or profits of the property for that one-year period. Sections 44-9-25 and 44-9-12. Albertson, 447 A.2d at 388-89. We do not disagree with the plaintiff's asseveration that G.L.1956 § 44-9-29 provides that the redeeming party, may, in the court's discretion, be allowed to redeem upon payment to the petitioner of an amount sufficient to cover the original sum, costs, penalties, and all subsequent taxes, costs, and interest to which the petitioner may be entitled, together with the costs of the proceeding and counsel fee as the court deems reasonable. Section 44-9-29. However, the matter before us was not a typical redemption case under § 44-9-29. After the plaintiff first filed a petition to foreclose on the defendants' right of redemption, the parties, on March 19, 2002, entered into an agreement that controlled the terms of redemption. Therefore, when the hearing justice ordered redemption, he was not doing so in response to a petition to foreclose a right of redemption and subsequent answer as is typically the case under § 44-9-29. Instead, when the hearing justice vacated the default decree and ordered redemption, he simply put the parties back into their pre-default positions. Therefore, we are drawn to the inescapable conclusion that the terms of the redemption agreement controlled. That agreement contained no provisions regarding taxes, rents, capital improvements, or attorneys' fees. The hearing justice based his ruling on the specific facts of this case and awarded the plaintiff the balance due under the redemption agreement, plus accrued interest. Because we believe that the hearing justice did not err or abuse his discretion in assessing the redemption amounts, we affirm the judgment awarding the plaintiff $5,371. [13]