Opinion ID: 885041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 20 Did the District Court err when it concluded that the arresting officer had the necessary particularized suspicion to administer the standard field sobriety tests after the DUI investigatory stop? ¶ 21 The standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. See Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686(citing Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04). See also Kreger v. Francis (1995), 271 Mont. 444, 447, 898 P.2d 672, 674. ¶ 22 As we previously stated, at the time the District Court denied Bramble's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the standard field sobriety tests, we had not yet rendered our decisions in Hulse and Steinmetz which held that field sobriety tests constitute a search. As a result, relying on State v. Purdie (1984), 209 Mont. 352, 680 P.2d 576, overruled by Hulse v. Montana Dep't of Justice, 1998 MT 108, 289 Mont. 1, 961 P.2d 75, the District Court concluded that field sobriety tests are not searches. ¶ 23 In Hulse, we held that field sobriety tests are searches and, therefore, must be based upon a particularized suspicion to be constitutionally permissible. Hulse, ¶¶ 32-33. To show a particularized suspicion, the State must establish (1) objective data from which an experienced officer had sufficient cause to conduct the field sobriety tests, and (2) a resulting suspicion that the person to be so tested has been driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Hulse, ¶ 12. Bramble argues that in this case there was no erratic driving such as there was in Hulse. He claims that the over and back movement of his vehicle over the center line, his speeding, and the report from the unreliable, unknown informer, is insufficient objective data to establish the particularized suspicion required to administer the standard field sobriety tests. Bramble disputes that he crossed the centerline, and notes that at the location where he was driving there was no clear centerline because of left turn lanes and highway construction. Once stopped, Bramble notes that none of the officers observed any signs indicating that he was possibly under the influence of alcohol. ¶ 24 In Hulse, we discussed the kind of driving which might alone raise a particularized suspicion and justify both an investigative traffic stop, and the administration of field sobriety tests. We noted in particular; driving all over the road, crossing the center line and the fog line, weaving in and out of traffic, and breaking for green lights. We agree with Bramble that such erratic driving is not present in this case, especially when considering that the center line over which Bramble allegedly crossed was unmarked. Thus, while Bramble's speeding provided a particularized suspicion to justify the initial investigative stop, there were no other aspects of his driving, behavior, or physical symptoms that provided a particularized suspicion that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, we conclude that because Bramble's driving did not approximate the kind of driving described in Hulse, the arresting officer did not have the requisite particularized suspicion to administer the standard field sobriety tests.