Opinion ID: 6320313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: referendums and initiatives

Text: As indicated, the Michigan Constitution reserves to the people the ability to approve legislation that the Legislature has already adopted (the referendum), and to propose laws to the Legislature and enact them if the Legislature refuses (the initiative). Const 1963, art 2, § 9. Direct democracy in Michigan is a series of powers that the people have reserved to themselves from the Legislature. “The initiative provision set forth in art 2, § 9 . . . serves as an express limitation on the authority of the Legislature.” Woodland v Mich Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich 188, 214; 378 NW2d 337 (1985). However, the Legislature is directed to “implement the provisions” of Const 1963, art 2, § 9. The Legislature’s power and duty to “implement” Const 1963, art 2, § 9 does not support an ability to enact the 15% geographic-distribution requirement. Looking first to the text of the provision, the word “implement” means “[t]o put into practical effect; carry out[.]” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed). 7 It carries the connotation that some received set of rules is being carried out, not that a new set of rules is to be created. In keeping with this vision of a limited role for the Legislature, Const 1963, art 2, § 9 says that “[t]he power of referendum . . . must be invoked in the manner prescribed by law within 90 days following the final adjournment of the legislative session at which the law was enacted.” (Emphasis added.) This language has significance because, as this Court has recognized: 7 Dictionaries that are more contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution give essentially identical definitions. See Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (defining “implement” as “to carry out : FULFILL; esp : to give practical effect to and ensure of actual fulfillment by concrete measures”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (“to carry out : ACCOMPLISH, FULFILL”). 10 The committee on style and drafting of the constitutional convention of 1961 made a distinction in the use of the words “prescribed by law” and the words “provided by law.” Where “provided by law” is used, it is intended that the legislature shall do the entire job of implementation. Where only the details were left to the legislature and not the over-all planning, the committee used the words “prescribed by law.” [Beech Grove Inv Co v Civil Rights Comm, 380 Mich 405, 418-419; 157 NW2d 213 (1968).] This text empowers the Legislature only to adopt rules that further the principles already set forth in Const 1963, art 2, § 9—which has no geographic-distribution requirement. Even so, the Legislature has adopted several valid rules for direct-democracy petitions—deadlines, type-size requirements, and the like—that are not set out in the Constitution. To truly make sense of the scope of this power to “implement,” we must understand this section in the context of what it replaced. The original referendum and initiative provisions in Michigan were amendments of the legislative vesting clause; while Const 1908, art 5, § 1 originally did no more than vest the Legislature with the legislative power of the state, an amendment ratified by the voters in 1913 added some 1,300 words of additional detail clawing back from the Legislature the right of the people themselves to initiate legislation and approve legislation enacted by the Legislature: The initiative found its birth in the fact that political parties repeatedly made promises to the electorate both in and out of their platforms to favor and pass certain legislation for which there was a popular demand. As soon as election was over their promises were forgotten, and no effort was made to redeem them. These promises were made so often and then forgotten that the electorate at last through sheer desperation took matters into its own hands and constructed a constitutional procedure by which it could effect changes in the Constitution and bring about desired legislation without the aid of the legislature. [Hamilton v Secretary of State, 227 Mich 111, 130; 198 NW 843 (1924) (opinion of BIRD, J.).] It was in this atmosphere of mistrust that the people ratified an amendment to the Constitution that specified such details as the size of the type to be used (and its color), 11 various required aspects of the form of petition certificates, extensive deadlines, and so on. We therefore held from early on that the provision was self-executing: The section of the Constitution under consideration is not a mere statement of principles. On the contrary, it points out in detail the various steps to be taken in referring an act of the legislature to the electors, and undoubtedly intends that the conduct of the election and the canvass and return of votes shall be in accordance with the general laws of the State. And the legislature in its session of 1915 made certain amendments to the general election laws, with the evident purpose of adapting them more fully to the requirements of the referendum. Perhaps further action by the legislature may be advisable in aid of the constitutional provision; but, so far as the proceedings are under review in this case, the course to be taken is plainly pointed out, and this court should not, at the present time, enter into a minute investigation for the purpose of discovering whether there may not be somewhere in the election laws an inapplicable provision, or a step not clearly provided for. [Thompson v Secretary of State, 192 Mich 512, 520; 159 NW 65 (1916).] When this constitutional material was reviewed at the most recent constitutional convention, it was substantially slimmed down to the language we have now. As the Address to the People said, the revision “eliminat[ed] much language of a purely statutory character.” 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3367. Matters of legislative detail contained in the present section of the constitution are left to the legislature. The language makes it clear, however, that this section is self-executing and the legislature cannot thwart the popular will by refusing to act. [Id.] It is in this context, then, that the Legislature was directed to “implement the provisions of this section,” Const 1963, art 2, § 9. 8 The Legislature was empowered to, in effect, 8 Intervening defendant relies heavily on a case from another jurisdiction: Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc v State, 94 P3d 217; 2004 UT 32 (2004). However, the use of the word “implement” in our state Constitution significantly distinguishes this case from that one. In Utah, the state constitution “grant[ed] the right to initiative,” but 12 prescribe the sorts of details that had previously been written directly into the Constitution—deadlines, type sizes, requirements of form, and so on. As the chair of the committee on legislative powers reported to the convention when the language was first considered: The committee is of the opinion there is much within the existing section 1 of a purely legislative character and therefore several exclusions and changes are suggested.