Opinion ID: 2088953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Admission of Driver's License

Text: Finally, Kennedy asserts that the admission of a certified copy of his drivers license was error because his right to confront witnesses was violated. During trial, evidence was presented by Kennedy that his eyes were blue. One of the eyewitnesses described the taller bank robber, determined at trial to be Kennedy, as having green eyes. A certified copy of Kennedy's license which listed his eye color as green was admitted over his objection. The State did not produce at trial the official who had recorded the information about eye color on the license. Kennedy argues that the license was hearsay because the official was not shown to be unavailable. Kennedy claims that, although the license was trustworthy as evidence that Kennedy had a valid Ohio driver's license on him at the time of his arrest, the item was not reliable hearsay as to the color of his eyes. He asserts that the failure of the State to show what procedures were used by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles in determining the color of an applicant's eyes rendered the item inadmissible hearsay and violated the standard established in Ohio v. Roberts (1980), 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (admission at trial of sworn testimony given at a preliminary hearing was allowed where the witness was unavailable and defendant had been given the opportunity during the hearing to cross examine the witness). We do not agree with Kennedy that error was committed in the admission of the license. The license was properly admitted as a properly certified official record. Barnett v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 625, 628. The license contains information about Kennedy and was signed by him. Thus, it is admissible as a prior statement. Hart v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 358, 359, 375 N.E.2d 221, 222. Finally, we do not percieve any prejudice from the admission of the license. The State did not assert that the license showed his eye color to be green. Each jury member had the opportunity to observe Kennedy's eye color during the course of trial and was able to make his or her own determination about the color of his eyes. Absent prejudice, we find no cause for reversal. Brown v. State (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 10, 18. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, but reverse the sentence of death and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing determination in light of this opinion. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, J., concur. GIVAN, J., concurring and dissenting, with opinion. DeBRULER, J., dissenting with opinion.