Opinion ID: 1414363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a protective order.

Text: The petitioner contends that he is entitled to a protective order because his brother will abuse the discovery process by giving the videotape to the press. Pretrial depositions are not public parts of a civil trial. They were not open to the public at common law and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. [17] Much of the information surfacing during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Traditionally, discovered information, not yet admitted, is not a public source of information. [18] Unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions are sealed until admitted into evidence. [19] In Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash.2d 226, 654 P.2d 673, 681 (1982), aff'd, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983), the Washington Supreme Court addressed these concerns. The Rhinehart Court found that parties utilizing the processes of discovery have acquainted themselves with the applicable rules, and that the attorneys are aware that it is professionally improper to exploit the fruits of discovery by using them for other than authorized purposes. Nevertheless, it issued the protective order because the defendants were seeking to discover a list of the donors and financial affairs of a religious sect and the court found that privacy rights of these non-parties should be protected. The Code of Professional Responsibility, 5 O.S.Supp. 1986 Ch. 1, App. 3-A Rule 3.6, precludes counsel from commenting on litigation unless the information is contained in a public record. [20] An attorney cannot make or assist another person in making an extrajudicial statement if the attorney knows or reasonably should know that the statement would materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding. Attorneys who violate the Code subject themselves to professional discipline. We find Rhinehart to be controlling. Although attorneys are subject to discipline for extrajudical public dissemination of depositions, others involved in the process are not. Because of the nature of a video deposition, we are aware that the potential for abuse is greater than for a deposition taken by stenographic means. Here, the potential for prejudice is especially acute. Non-contextual, non-sequential film clips and sound bytes could be particularly devastating, not only to the specific pending litigation, but also to the electoral process in general. If this happens, the petitioner, a public figure, is without recourse. Under the principle outlined in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 706, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412, 1435 (1964), a public figure cannot recover damages for defamation in the absence of proof of actual malice. The standard of actual malice standard would require the petitioner to prove that the press had acted with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. [21] To prevent this type of possible malignment, and to prevent this case from being tried in the press, a protective order should be issued. [22] ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; WRIT OF PROHIBITION DENIED; WRIT OF MANDAMUS GRANTED. HODGES, LAVENDER, DOOLIN, ALMA WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. OPALA, V.C.J., concurs in the Court's assumption of jurisdiction and in its disposition of this original proceeding. SIMMS, J., not voting. HARGRAVE, C.J., dissents.