Opinion ID: 3135618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill 2d at 18; see Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d at 456.

Text: In the present case, we conclude that defendant failed to establish an actual conflict of interest in the joint representation of himself and Lowell that adversely affected Prusak’s performance at trial. In defendant’s postconviction petition, the only alleged specific defect in Prusak’s representation that defendant attributes to the claimed conflict is that Prusak failed to call defendant’s proffered witnesses, who would have testified that only Lowell was involved in the -15- shooting.6 Indeed, at oral argument, defendant argued that an “actual” conflict manifested solely on defendant’s proffer of his witnesses. First, an actual conflict of interest never manifested. A conflict of interest was not inherent in the joint representation of defendant and Lowell. At most, defendant’s proffered witnesses merely raised the possibility that the interests of defendant and Lowell may diverge. At defendant’s trial, defendant and Lowell each denied his guilt and did not implicate the other. Prusak vigorously cross-examined the State’s witnesses, impeached their credibility, and argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This strategy alone does not reveal an actual conflict. See Vriner, 74 Ill. 2d at 341. The mere availability of a strategy that would have helped one criminal codefendant at the expense of another does not create hostility between their interests. Defendant merely attempts to create an actual conflict of interest through conjecture and hindsight as to what strategy might have been pursued. This court will not overturn a conviction based on possible or hypothetical conflicts. See Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d at 456-57; Griffin, 109 Ill. 2d at 306. Second, the record fails to establish any specific adverse effect in Prusak’s performance attributable to the alleged conflict. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing, in which the court heard defendant and his witnesses testify. According to their postconviction hearing testimony, defendant’s witnesses would have testified at defendant’s trial that defendant did not hand a gun to Lowell. Further, according to defendant’s witnesses, Prusak did not call them to testify at defendant’s trial because they would have identified Prusak’s other client, Lowell, as the shooter. At the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court also heard Prusak testify. According to Prusak, his decision not 6 In his reply brief and at oral argument, defendant also speculates that Prusak’s alleged conflict of interest manifested not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations. Defendant argues that he was entitled to an attorney who could make a decision to use or not use the testimony of his proffered witnesses or to engage in plea negotiations unfettered by the effect of those decisions on Lowell’s case. However, because defendant did not include this specific alleged defect in his postconviction petition, he has procedurally forfeited this contention. See People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 158 (1993). -16- to call defendant’s proffered witnesses was not attributable to any alleged conflict of interest, but rather because, in his professional judgment, they were weak witnesses, who offered inconsistent testimony and who were not credible. For example, Anderson testified that defendant did not hand a gun to Lowell because defendant was smashing the victim’s car windows. Prusak testified that defendant likewise told him that defendant smashed the victim’s car windows, however, with a gun. As earlier discussed, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing was contradictory, setting up a question of fact as to whether Prusak’s decision not to call defendant’s proffered witnesses was attributable to the alleged conflict of interest. For example, Prusak denied telling defendant, his parents, or his witnesses that the case was already “beat” or that he would not call the witnesses because to do so would hurt Lowell’s case. Defendant denied telling Prusak that he used a gun to smash the victim’s car windows. The determination of this question rested substantially on the credibility of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. “Credibility is not, of itself, a question for a court of review .” Griffin, 109 Ill. 2d at 307. Rather, in a postconviction evidentiary hearing, the circuit court, which saw and heard the witnesses, is in a better position than a reviewing court to engage in fact-finding and credibility determinations. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998) (and cases cited therein); People v. Rose, 48 Ill. 2d 300, 303 (1971); People v. Burton, 46 Ill. 2d 135, 141 (1970). In the present case, the circuit court evidently found Prusak’s testimony more credible. See People v. Logue, 45 Ill. 2d 170, 174-75 (1970); People v. Wease, 44 Ill. 2d 453, 457 (1970). We observe that during his testimony, Prusak commented: “If they [defendant and Lowell] had the same trier of fact it would have been a conflict.” Defendant points to this comment and a few others in contending that Prusak operated under a legal misunderstanding of the concept of conflict-free representation. Defendant posits that “severance does not automatically cure potential conflicts.” We cannot accept defendant’s contention. The clear weight of Prusak’s testimony demonstrates his belief that the evidence against defendant was weak, and that defendant’s proffered witnesses were inconsistent and not credible. Prusak requested a bench trial for defendant for those reasons and not to cure a perceived conflict of -17- interest. The circuit court’s acceptance of this conclusion was not manifestly erroneous.7 Indeed, the circuit court’s credibility determination is particularly justified based on the contradictions among defendant and his witnesses. See People v. Downen, 45 Ill. 2d 197, 201 (1970) (affirming circuit court’s denial of postconviction petition following evidentiary hearing; noting contradictions in testimony of defendant’s witnesses); Wease, 44 Ill. 2d at 457 (same). Bingham’s testimony did not remove defendant from the fight. However, Plummer testified, consistent with Woods’ affidavit, that defendant was not involved in the fight. Further, Anderson testified that defendant was not involved in the fight because he was destroying the victim’s car; however, Anderson admitted on cross-examination that he could not see defendant from where Anderson stood. Defendant testified that he was smashing the victim’s car windows, but he admitted that he did not tell this to police. We find no basis for upsetting the circuit court’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. See Griffin, 109 Ill. 2d at 307 (concluding that appellate court erroneously substituted its view of witness credibility for that of circuit court; finding circuit court’s denial of postconviction petition following evidentiary hearing not manifestly erroneous); Logue, 45 Ill. 2d at 174-75; Wease, 44 Ill. 2d at 457. We lastly note that defendant cites cases in which a conflict was found to exist. See, e.g., People v. White, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1056 (2005). Those cases are inapposite, as Prusak’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing supports a finding that no such conflict existed in the present case. Whether a conflict of interest exists must be evaluated on the specific facts of each case. See People v. Johnson, 227 Ill. App. 3d 800, 811 (1992). In sum, Prusak’s joint representation of defendant and Lowell did not result in a per se conflict of interest. Further, defendant failed to 7 In any event, while not an automatic cure, the trial of codefendants before separate triers of fact “ ‘significantly reduce[s] the potential for a divergence in their interests.’ ” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638, 651, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3120 (1987), quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 346, 100 S. Ct. at 1718. -18- demonstrate how an actual conflict of interest adversely affected Prusak’s performance at defendant’s trial. The circuit court found as more credible Prusak’s testimony that his decision not to call defendant’s proffered witnesses was not attributable to any alleged conflict of interest, but rather was based on trial strategy and tactics, and Prusak’s professional judgment. After reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the circuit court’s finding that defendant failed to establish a substantial violation of his constitutional right to conflict-free representation was manifestly erroneous. Therefore, we uphold the circuit court’s order denying defendant’s postconviction petition.