Opinion ID: 437448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Authority to Enforce its Prior Rulings

Text: 22 The district court based the September order on its conclusion that there is substantial doubt that defendants could supersede this Court's [NAACP II ] order simply by promulgating a new regulation without obtaining modification of that order. We disagree. Under the terms of the court's decisions in NAACP I and NAACP II, the Labor Department was free to amend its regulations through proper rulemaking proceedings. The orders of the district court in both NAACP I and NAACP II were premised on a finding that the Labor Department had violated its own regulations. In NAACP I, the court established a standard rate of productivity from which the piece rate should be calculated unless and until the DOL undertakes a proper and lawful rulemaking proceeding to establish a different rate of productivity. 558 F.Supp. at 223 (emphasis added). In NAACP II, the court indicated that the entire AER method of calculating rates was not mandated by statute, but was within DOL's discretion to determine how to effectuate its mandated duties. 566 F.Supp. at 1206 n. 7. Thus, while the court's orders enjoined DOL from using any productivity rate other than the one described by the court, it is clear that those injunctions were premised on the finding that DOL had violated its own regulations. 23 It is both logical and precedented that an agency can engage in new rulemaking to correct a prior rule which a court has found defective. See Center for Science in the Public Interest v. Regan, 727 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (D.C.Cir.1984); Action on Smoking and Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795, 802 (D.C.Cir.1983). Where an injunction is based on an interpretation of a prior regulation, the agency need not seek modification of that injunction before it initiates new rulemaking to change the regulation. This case is unlike the situation we faced recently in International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 733 F.2d 920 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Donovan II ) where DOL issued, without notice or comment, an emergency rule that suspended the effect of a prior court order. In Donovan II, the only effect of the emergency rule was to avoid compliance with that court order. No such claim can be made here. It is clear from our prior decisions and from the district court's holdings in NAACP I and NAACP II that the district court could not enjoin implementation of the amended regulation on the ground that it violated the court's earlier order. 24