Opinion ID: 1188886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Trial counsel's failure to object to allegedly improper statements of the prosecutor and appellate counsel's failure to raise these instances of alleged misconduct on direct appeal.

Text: Riley also argues that he was denied reasonably effective assistance of counsel because Dahl failed to object to improper statements made by the prosecutor. Although this court considered and rejected, on Riley's direct appeal, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Riley now points to even more egregious instances of prosecutorial misconduct ... during the guilt phase. Riley claims that the state impermissibly shifted the burden of proof at closing when the prosecutor said [the] drawing that counsel did with all the measurements and the angle and everything, are you wondering what, to yourself, why, you know, some witness like his investigator or some expert witness, even Dr. Green on cross-examination wasn't asked to draw that in front of you? Well, a witness can be cross-examined. A defense attorney who is making stuff up in closing argument can make up anything he wants to. Riley fails to specify how this statement shifted the burden of proof to him. The prosecutor was commenting on the chart used as demonstrative evidence. However, the prosecutor did not comment on Riley's failure to call witnesses, he merely asked why the witnesses who did testify (including the investigator and forensic pathologist) did not construct the chart or validate it. This was not prosecutorial misconduct. Even if it were, and if failure to object fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, Riley does not persuasively argue that the jury's verdict was unreliable because of this error. Accordingly, this claim is without merit. Riley also challenges another statement as misconduct. The prosecutor began his closing argument with the statement, Okay, let me tell you what happened. Riley claims that this was a verbal wink and nod that was unfairly prejudicial, in that it was both a veiled reference to matters not in evidence, and an improper attempt to superimpose [the prosecutor's] credibility via [his] status as a government attorney.... This statement is fairly seen as an introduction to the state's version of the case, which differed from Riley's. Thus, the prosecutor was merely indicating that what was to follow was his version of events. This is not improper. So long as matters outside the record were not argued, and so long as the statements following the comment were supported by the testimony, there is no misconduct. Riley's only support in Nevada case law involved an egregious case in which the prosecutor said, [W]e, of course, have access to our information that didn't come out in trial and can't present ..., and [W]e have access to things that are not available, so we can't really get into that about what happened before. See Schrader v. State, 102 Nev. 64, 65, 714 P.2d 1008, 1008 (1986). The state's comment in this case is not even close to that in Schrader and the other cases cited by Riley. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 663-64 (5th Cir.1979) (prosecutor repeatedly testified as to witnesses' credibility); United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir.1978) (same). Accordingly, we do not perceive prosecutorial misconduct from this statement by the prosecutor.