Opinion ID: 2633549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exercise of Jurisdiction is Unreasonable

Text: ¶ 23 Even if minimum contacts were satisfied, the assertion of jurisdiction over Mleads would still violate the due process clause because it fails to comport with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [44] In other words, the exercise of jurisdiction must be fair and reasonable. Generally, under the reasonableness factor, a court weighs and balances a variety of interests, including the inconvenience to the plaintiff and to the defendant, the regulatory concerns of the forum state, and the location of the witnesses and evidence. [45] ¶ 24 Adopting a blanket one-email rule imposes a substantial burden on corporations. Practically speaking, companies would be required to know the laws of each state and to be prepared to litigate in all fifty of them. Precisely because of this complication, the federal government preempted the Act and those similar in other states with CAN-SPAM, which states: [t]here is a substantial government interest in regulation of commercial electronic mail on a nationwide basis. [46] The federal statute goes on to explain that state legislation regarding spam has been ineffective, in part because, since an electronic mail address does not specify a geographic location, it can be extremely difficult for law-abiding businesses to know with which of these disparate statutes they are required to comply. [47] In sum, even if Utah maintains a strong interest in regulating spam, the burden on businesses remains substantial. ¶ 25 We accordingly conclude that the reasonableness inquiry also requires us to reverse the court of appeals's holding. Exercising specific personal jurisdiction under these particular circumstances is unreasonable and violative of the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice sustained by the federal due process clause.