Opinion ID: 515771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ill Rev.Stat. ch. 26, 2-314(2).

Text: 7 The parties also stipulated that [Chicago Eastern] does not contend that the steel sheets [did] not comply with ASTM 446 Grade C, nor does [Chicago Eastern] contend that the steel sheets do not have a yield strength of 40,000 PSI. 8 Chicago Eastern also points to a comment made during Bethlehem's cross-examination of Levinson where he stated: [a] designer would not ordinarily include a material which showed a brittle fracture at an anticipated service temperature and condition in a design or use of a material for that application. But this general statement was never developed by Chicago Eastern. Indeed, Levinson later specifically testified in cross-examination that he did not know either the weather conditions or the stresses which existed at the time any of the grain bin fractures occurred 9 Indeed, Chicago Eastern conceded at oral argument that the steel it acquired would pass without objection under the contract description of ASTM 446 Grade C steel. Although this designation does not speak to brittleness or provide for a particular level of nitrogen, if the steel was in fact too brittle to be used for ordinary purposes it is difficult to understand how it would pass without objection in the trade 10 The complete jury instructions on the issue of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose were as follows: For CEC to succeed on its claim that Bethlehem breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, CEC must prove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following four elements: One, the seller, Bethlehem must have reason to know the buyer's, CEC's, particular purpose. The seller must have reason to know the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to furnish appropriate goods. That was the second. The third, buyer must, in fact, rely upon the seller's skill or judgment. And four, buyer's damages, if any, must be caused by the unsuitability of the goods furnished by the seller. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these four elements has been proved, then your verdict should be for CEC. But if on the other hand you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these four elements has not been proved, then your verdict should be for Bethlehem. If a buyer has taken upon himself the responsibility of furnishing technical specifications, you may find that he is not relying on the seller's skill or judgment, and no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose exists. Whether or not the buyer furnished technical specifications is for you to determine. 11 Chicago Eastern also claims that the former head of Bethlehem's metallurgy department, Donald Mongeon, was improperly permitted to testify, after reviewing the same reports relied on by Levinson, that the pattern of failures seems to occur geometrically on the bin. Chicago Eastern contends that this was unfairly prejudicial. We disagree. The district court sustained Chicago Eastern's objection for lack of foundation and this line of questioning ceased. Rather than establishing the necessary foundation, Bethlehem pursued another approach and Mongeon's testimony culminated with his statement that there was insufficient information available in the material reviewed by Levinson to give a judgment as to what caused the fractures in the grain bins. Even viewing this testimony in conjunction with the other evidence challenged by Chicago Eastern, we do not find this evidence unfairly prejudicial 12 In paragraph 7 of its counterclaim, Chicago Eastern asserted that Bethlehem's actions constituted a tortious misrepresentation of the quality of the goods sold to [Chicago Eastern]. This paragraph was also dismissed by the district court. Moorman holds that economic loss is not recoverable under a theory of negligent misrepresentation, 61 Ill.Dec. at 755-56, 435 N.E.2d at 452-53, and Chicago Eastern has apparently not appealed this issue 13 Section 302 of the Act provides: Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them.