Opinion ID: 48719
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interference with Public Duties

Text: 20 Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.15, Interference with Public Duties, provides that a person commits an offense if she interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with: (1) a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law. The statute contains an express defense to prosecution, however, if the interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech only. Id. 21 The deputies argue that Freeman's conduct upon emerging from her home—yelling and screaming at the deputies—created probable cause to arrest her for Interference with Public Duties because she was interfering with their ability to investigate the whereabouts of her son, Kevin. The district court rejected the deputies' argument. It found that Freeman only interfered with the deputies' attempt to conduct an unlawful, warrantless search of her home, not with the deputies' general ability to investigate Kevin's whereabouts. Because the deputies were not granted the authority by law to conduct a warrantless search of Freeman's home, the court held that a reasonable officer could not conclude that Freeman was committing the offense of Interference with Public Duties. 22 Viewing the facts in Freeman's favor, her allegedly disruptive conduct was essentially limited to insisting that the deputies could not enter her home unless they had a search warrant. Had Deputy Gore not told Freeman that he did not need a warrant to search her home and that he could arrest her if she did not permit them to search the home, it is not at all clear that Freeman would have disrupted the deputies' broader investigation. Although the probable cause inquiry is an objective one, it must nevertheless be conducted in light of the actual facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152, 125 S.Ct. 588 (Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.). Here, at the time of Freeman's arrest, the deputies knew that Freeman would not consent to a search of her home without a warrant; that they did not have a warrant to search Freeman's home; and that Freeman's son Kevin resided not in Freeman's home, but in the mobile home next door. On those facts, a reasonable officer would have known that he could not lawfully search Freeman's home, 6 and Freeman was not, therefore, interfering with the exercise of any authority granted to the deputies by law. 23 Moreover, the deputies did not have probable cause to arrest Freeman because her conduct consisted exclusively of speech. Texas courts have recognized that merely arguing with police officers about the propriety of their conduct, including about whether they have the legal authority to conduct a search, falls within the speech exception to section 38.15. In Carney v. State, 31 S.W.3d 392, 394, 398 (Tex. Ct.App.2000), the court reversed a defendant's conviction for Interference with Public Duties where the defendant's conduct consisted solely of arguing with officers over validity of a search warrant, which resulted in delaying the officers' entry into the home. After noting that the defendant had not made physical contact with any of the officers or physically obstructed their entry into the home, the court concluded that the evidence could not support a conviction because [u]nder section 38.15, arguing with the officers does not constitute an actionable offense. Id. at 398. As in Carney, Freeman's conduct here consisted only of arguing with the deputies about whether they had the right to search her home. Although Freeman was, in the district court's words, yelling and screaming, that alone does not take her conduct out of the realm of speech, 7 and, viewing the district court's summary judgment facts in the light most favorable to Freeman, there is nothing to indicate that her conduct involved anything other than speech or that she physically obstructed the deputies in any way. Accordingly, the deputies did not have probable cause to arrest Freeman for Interference with Public Duties.