Opinion ID: 1322365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The voluntary cessation exception to mootness

Text: As the district court noted, [w]hen a defendant has voluntarily ceased challenged conduct, in order to prove mootness the defendant has the burden to establish both (1) that it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur, and (2) that interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. 469 F.Supp.2d. at 1008 (citing County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379; W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894). Under both prongs of the inquiry, I am not convinced that the defendants have carried their heavy burden.
As to the first prong of recurrence, in determining that the Environmental Groups' challenges are moot, the majority fails to sufficiently consider the formidable burden that rests upon the federal agencies to satisfy this stringent test. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. at 203, 89 S.Ct. 361 (The test for mootness in cases such as this is a stringent one. Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be compelled to leave `[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.') (quoting W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632, 73 S.Ct. 894) (emphasis added); County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379; Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir. 2004). Although the majority acknowledges the existence of this heavy burden, Maj. Op. at 1116 (citations omitted), it apparently concludes that it is `absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.' Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)). But the district court, which has a better feel for this epochal litigation, concluded otherwise. See Cook, 192 F.3d at 697 (The judge acquire[s] a feel for the case that we could not match without an inordinate expenditure of time.). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that the determination of the likelihood of further violations in the mootness context is a matter for the trial judge. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. at 203-04, 89 S.Ct. 361. The majority accurately recounts the increased solicitude we may afford the voluntary actions by governmental actors, Maj. Op. at 1116 n. 15, and it notes Wright, Miller & Cooper's suggestion that the process of prediction also is shaped by the character of the defendantclaims of discontinuance by public officials are more apt to be trusted than like claims by private defendants. Id. (quoting 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra § 3533.5, at 236, 238-39). Some courts, may trust public defendants to honor a professed commitment to changed ways. Id. at 1116 n. 15 (quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra § 3533.7, at 319, 321); see also Coral Springs St. Sys., 371 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir.2004) (in a moot case, defendant expressly disavowed any intention of defending the ceased conduct). However, whether or not public defendants are more trustworthy than private defendants, here we have no claim of discontinuance or a professed commitment to changed ways. Reviewing for an abuse of discretion or de novo, the record is clear that the federal agencies have made no similar commitment here (indeed, their refusal has been described as dogged), likely because it is a commitment the federal agencies are unwilling to make. 469 F.Supp.2d at 1009. The federal agencies' only argument in support of mootness is that the Environmental Groups have not challenged the 2003 Biological Opinion. Cf. Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir.2003) (In the present case, as the promulgation of work rules appears to be solely within the discretion of the MDOC, there is no guarantee that MDOC will not change back to its older, stricter Rule as soon as this action terminates.). The federal agencies' unwillingness to claim a commitment to change their ways does not discomfit the majority. The majority is reassured by the federal agencies' concrete step in issuing the 2003 Biological Opinion, and views such a step as something more than a mere informal promise or assurance on the part of the [governmental] defendants that the challenged practice will cease. Maj. Op. at 1118 (quoting Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 748 (7th Cir.1975)). But, in my view, the 2003 Biological Opinion seems far from the secure foundation for mootness that a genuine self-correction may provide. Id. at 1117-18 (quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra § 3533.7, at 326 ([S]elf-correction again provides a secure foundation for mootness so long as it seems genuine.)). Moreover, earlier in this litigation, the federal agencies explained that even after adopting the 2003 Biological Opinion, the legal question of Reclamation's discretion to use Project water for endangered species may well recur, noting that the Bureau might be unable to obtain sufficient water to comply with the [Biological Opinion's] flow requirements. See Fed. Supp. Br. on Mootness, 10th Cir. Nos. 02-2254 et al., p. 5. Furthermore, I am uncertain how we could conclude there was no reasonable basis for the district court's decision, W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 634, 73 S.Ct. 894, while also recognizing that the district court's 2002 order played a role in the FWS's issuance of the 2003 [Biological Opinion]. Maj. Op. at 1117. As the majority acknowledges, the issuance of the 2003 Biological Opinion was at least in part in direct response to the district court's rulings. Id. at 1131. And, if, as the court observes, Reclamation has not abandoned its narrow view of the scope of its discretion, id. at 1118, it is far from absolutely clear that the federal agencies have completely discontinued the practice or that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. See id. at 1119; Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693); W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894 (noting that district court considers the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past violations when determining the risk of recurrence). Here, the 2003 Biological Opinion, together with the 2003 and 2004 minnow riders, demonstrate that Congress deliberately left the issue of discretion over [Middle Rio Grande Project] water for decision by the federal agencies and the courts. 469 F.Supp.2d at 1009. And Reclamation, perhaps somewhat uncharacteristically, appears to shrug its shoulders at the suggestion it has full discretion. If history serves as any lesson, given the (1) federal agencies' grudging resistance (described by the district court as their dogged refusal) and (2) the equivocal nature of the 2003 Biological Opinion, I believe we must agree with the district court and assume that the federal agencies may sidestep their self-mandated practices. See 469 F.Supp.2d at 1009 ([The federal agencies] have failed to establish that it is absolutely clear that they would not return to their wrongful use of an impermissibly narrow and limited scope of discretion in future ESA consultations.); United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952) (It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentance and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is probability of resumption.). The district court's well-reasoned conclusion, together with a public interest in having the legality of the practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632, 73 S.Ct. 894.
The second prong of the Supreme Court's voluntary cessation calculus is [that] interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. Davis, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. The majority concludes, I believe correctly, that the 2001 and 2002 Biological Opinions have been superseded, but the majority seems to draw the incorrect conclusion that the effects of these Biological Opinions have been eradicated. The district court acted reasonably in expanding its inquiry beyond the four corners of the Biological Opinions to the actual effects of the agencies' conduct on the minnow's habitat: [E]ven though an unusually wet spring in 2005 resulted in a dramatic increase in minnow spawning, it may never be known how the agencies' dogged refusal to consider using project water in past years to prevent unnecessary river drying has affected the downward spiral of the silvery minnow. 469 F.Supp.2d at 1010. As the recently released Rio Grande Silvery Minnow Recovery Plan observes, Threats to [the silvery minnow] and its habitat indicate[] that it could be expected to become extinct in the foreseeable future. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow Recovery Plan, First Revision, Southwest Region, U.S. FWS, Approved 01/15/10. Cf. County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 633, 99 S.Ct. 1379 (holding that the second condition of mootness [has been met] because petitioners' compliance. . . has completely cured any discriminatory effects of the . . . proposal) (emphasis added). Thus I conclude that the district court acted quite reasonably when it determined that the federal agencies cannot show that the effects of the ESA violation have been completely and irrevocably eradicated. 469 F.Supp.2d at 1010. Furthermore, even reviewing the record de novo, I would conclude that the federal defendants cannot show a complete cure of the ESA violation.