Opinion ID: 2291475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: restriction of evidence

Text: In late January 1988, two of Dean's sons and one of his foster children were killed and one of his daughters was critical injured in an automobile accident. [2] Prior to Dean's second trail, the court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the accident because evidence of the overwhelming tragedy might evoke sympathy in the jury that would be unfairly prejudicial to the State's case. We agree with Dean's contention that the ruling impermissibly denied him the latitude to present the defense to which he was entitled by limiting evidence of the circumstances under which he made incriminating statements. In April of 1988, Dean was interviewed by State Police Detective Barry DeLong as part of the investigation into the abuse of the victims. During that interview, at which the accident was discussed, Dean made incriminating statements that the State used against him in its case in chief at trial [3] There were some references made a trial to the fact that Dean's children died in an accident, and Dean did bring out in his cross-examination of Detective DeLong that the accident was discussed during the interview. The ruling limited references to the accident, however, and Dean contends that it prevented him from relating in his testimony the exact nature of the accident and in his own words how its details affected him emotionally and influenced the statements that were so damaging to his case. Although the trial court should exclude evidence offered by a defendant if the evidence is irrelevant, see State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 134 (Me.1990), and has broad discretion to exclude evidence if its introduction would result in undue delay, waste of time or jury confusion, State v. Houston, 534 A.2d 1293, 1294 n. 1 (Me. 1987), a defendant is accorded wide latitude to present all evidence relevant to his defense. State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me.1984); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me.1981); State v. Leclair, 425 A.2d 182, 186 (Me.1981). After the trial court ruled that Dean's inculpatory statements were admissible, the weight to be given those statements remained an issue for the jury as the ultimate factfinders at trial. Accordingly, all the evidence of the confession-taking circumstances presented at the suppression hearing on the admissibility question was properly admissible before the ultimate factfinders as bearing on the weight question. State v. Curtis, 399 A.2d 1330, 133 (Me.1979). In attempting to persuade the jury that his confession should be given little or no weight, Dean was entitled to show all the circumstances tending to destroy or weaken its probative power. State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 632 (Me.1972) ( quoting in Curtis, 399 A.2d at 1333) (emphasis added). Dean admitted to the touchings that the victims testified to that constituted the alleged unlawful sexual contact, but claimed that the touchings were for purposes other than sexual gratification. Because the credibility of the victims and of Dean was crucial, the inculpatory statements he made to the officer became all the more important. In an effort to prevent the jury from being unduly influenced by sympathy, the court shielded the jury from the details of the accident, correctly described by the court as an overwhelming tragedy. It is Dean's contention that it is precisely because the accident was such an overwhelming tragedy that it impacted on his state of mind at the time he made the statements. Because he is entitled to present evidence of all the circumstances surrounding his inculpatory statements that might diminish the probative value of those statements. Dean should have been allowed to fully develop in his testimony the circumstances of the accident, and in his own words to describe when and how he learned of it, to explain how the accident affected his state of mind and influenced his statements. Cf. State v. Vaughn, 171 Conn. 454, 370 A.2d 1002, 1005-06 (1976) (jury should carefully scrutinize circumstances surrounding defendant's confession, including physical and mental condition of confessor, especially in rape or related assault cases where principal witnesses are defendant and complaint and decision as to defendant's culpability is largely dependent on questions of credibility). In addition, Dean contends that his defense was further limited because his cross-examination of the detective was restricted, and he was prevented from fully developing the impact the subject of the accident had no the interview. Dean asserts that during the interview in April 1988, less than three months after the accident, Detective DeLong brought up the subject of the accident, which upset Dean and affected the statements he made. The limits the court placed on Dean's cross-examination of the detective, especially as to what extent the details of the accident were discussed during the interview, violated Dean's right to bring to the attention of the jury the circumstances under which his incriminating statements were made. [4] Dean has raised several other points on appeal. Because the court in a retrial may be called upon to rule on them, we address them here.