Opinion ID: 261478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the collective bargaining agreement with building trades employers association.

Text: 4 In 1959, Local 138 entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Building Trades Employers Association of Long Island, Inc., an association of employers in the construction industry. In 1960, another contract, effective until 1963, was executed. Both contracts included clauses which the Board found to be violations of § 8(b) (1) (A) of the act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A). 2 The clauses in question provided (1) that No member of the Union shall be subject to a physical examination in order to be employed; (2) that union members shall be entitled to changes in shift at regular intervals; and (3) that union members shall be paid their accrued wages immediately upon termination of employment. In addition, the contracts provided that In case any employee becomes ineligible under the rules of the Union and the employer is notified, then the said employer shall promptly discharge such employee. 5 The Board argues that by referring only to union members in the above clauses dealing with physical examinations, shifts, and payment of wages, the contract discriminates against nonmembers. Such discrimination, it is urged, goes beyond permissible limits in inducing employees to join the union. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40-42, 74 S.Ct. 323, 335-336, 98 L.Ed. 455 (1954). The discharge clause is similarly unlawful, the Board argues, because the union rules provide that a member becomes ineligible for reasons other than nonpayment of lawfully exacted fees. For example, the constitution of the International, followed by Local 138, provides that a member may be expelled for subscribing to the principles of communism or similar doctrines, etc. 6 We think that our decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Revere Metal Art Co., 280 F.2d 96 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894, 81 S.Ct. 224, 5 L.Ed.2d 188 (1960), requires that enforcement of this provision of the Board's order be denied. We there indicated that the failure to include in a union security agreement an express negation of a right of the union to seek the discharge of an employee after union membership had been terminated for reasons other than nonpayment of dues or initiation fees was not by itself a violation of the act even though the union rules provided for expulsion from the union for such other reasons. Id. at 103. We pointed out that the safeguard to the employee is postponed until discriminatory action is taken. Id. at 105. The Board has not pointed to any case of an employee who was discharged by his employer for failure to comply with union rules. As to that aspect of the case, Revere Metal Art, supra, is controlling. As to the other disputed clauses of the agreement, the Board has not shown or even attempted to show that any of them has been discriminatorily applied. For aught that appears, references to union members in the agreement are simply references, naturally phrased by a union entering into an agreement with an employer, to all employees. And, while we might be tempted, as we were in Revere Metal Art, supra, at 103, to construe the act to prohibit the creation of a setting in which employees would think discrimination by the employer was likely to result from nonmembership, the Board's proof has not gone even so far as to suggest that such a setting exists apart from pointing to the bare words of the agreement. We will not approve a finding of a violation which is based solely on words in an agreement which lend themselves as easily to a construction consistent with the act as to a construction which, if carried into effect, would result in conduct illegal under the act. Enforcement of this provision of the Board's order is denied. 7