Opinion ID: 512433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cognizability of Brady Claim After Guilty Plea

Text: 28 It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Federal habeas inquiry focuses on the competence of counsel's advice and the voluntariness of the plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1607, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Id. at 267, 93 S.Ct. at 1608. 29 We know of no case where a habeas petitioner has challenged the voluntary and intelligent character of his Alford -type guilty plea with a Brady claim pertaining to the very element the petitioner denied when he tendered his plea. One case analyzing whether a Brady violation can be the basis for a collateral attack upon an outright plea of guilty is Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, 106 S.Ct. 1268, 89 L.Ed.2d 576 (1986). 5 30 Campbell, with the advice of counsel, entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated murder and in open court admitted the killings. He later challenged his conviction in part on the prosecution's failure to disclose that a handgun was found in the pants pocket of one of the victims, information supporting a self-defense claim that Campbell contended he would have taken to a jury. 31 The Sixth Circuit assumed without deciding that under Brady v. Maryland if Campbell had gone to trial and been convicted without the suppressed evidence having come to light, a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights would have been established. Id. at 318. 6 The court believed the evidence was probably material and exculpatory in nature, and also important to Campbell's attorney, both because it was requested and because it certainly could have borne upon the defense counsel's negotiating power in arriving at a plea. Id. The court phrased the issue as whether this nondisclosure renders involuntary Campbell's otherwise voluntary plea, given without knowledge of this evidence. Id. 32 After a detailed examination of Tollett and its ancestors, the Brady trilogy, 7 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court did not intend to insulate all misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny solely because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise passes constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent. Id. at 321. 8 The Sixth Circuit believed the proper approach was to evaluate[ ] the validity of the challenged plea in light of all the attendant circumstances, including the assistance of counsel, a plea-taking procedure compliant with Boykin v. Alabama, [395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969),] and a factual basis for the plea. Id. at 323-24. The court emphasized that Campbell's own statements at the plea proceeding    fully established his factual guilt and were entitled to great weight. Id. at 321-22. 33 Acknowledging that the suppressed evidence was unavailable to aid Campbell and his attorney in evaluating the chance for success at trial, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that 34 a plea decision is not made with any perfect knowledge of the results were a trial to be held.    By entering the plea Campbell was foregoing the possibility that any [unpredicted] events would have resulted in a not guilty verdict. Certainly the knowledge of the gun's presence was important to Campbell and his attorney, but we cannot say it would have been controlling in the decision whether to plead. Especially given Campbell's own statements at the time of the plea, the constitutional wrong, if such it was, did not compromise either the truth or the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea. 35 Id. at 324. 36 Thus, under the Sixth Circuit's approach, the Tollett line of cases does not preclude a collateral attack upon a guilty plea based on a claimed Brady violation, but habeas relief would clearly be the rare exception. We adopt this approach as our analytical framework. Of the factors which Campbell considered in evaluating the plea, neither the competence of counsel's advice nor the propriety of the plea-taking procedure is at issue here.