Opinion ID: 2778157
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Acceptance

Text: TCP contends that post-acceptance modification is supported by Bley v. Clickship, discussed above, and by Brozo v. Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003). Bley is inapposite for such a proposition6 and the facts of Brozo are distinguishable. In Brozo, the court considered a bonus and commissions plan that reserved a right for the company to make changes to individual awards “at any time, during or after the close of the fiscal year.” 324 F.3d at 663 (emphasis added). The plan also noted that bonuses would “not vest until the Company ma[de] any and all final changes.” Id. The Brozo court relied on this “unambiguous” language in holding that the company was entitled to reduce a commission even after it had been fully earned. Id. at 667. The C&I Bonus Plan contained no language suggesting that Bahr’s bonus could be changed after the fiscal year closed or that it would not vest until the point at which she received the payout. Moreover, the C&I Bonus Plan was distinct from Bahr’s employment contract. On its own, the plan in Brozo was not a sufficiently definite offer to contract because its promises were no more than a mirage in light of the company’s ability to retroactively affect what would 6 The plaintiffs in Bley were fired before any bonus was paid out. Bley, 2001 WL 1640093, at . Naturally, the bonus plan required that the employees still be with the company at the close of the bonus period. Id. at . Thus, the appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the company fired its employees in good faith or as an attempt to free itself of its bonus obligations which it would otherwise be contractually obligated to pay. Id. at . 16 No. 14-3356 otherwise be vested rights. The dissent noted as much, but could not overcome the parties’ agreement that the bonus plan was simply part of a larger negotiated contract. Id. at 671 (J. Lay, dissenting) (“[T]hat his employer may act within its sole discretion to do whatever it wants to do, renders the contract illusory.”). Therefore, we find no support in Brozo’s holding that Minnesota law allows for the post-acceptance modification of Bahr’s vested rights. Absent a valid defense by TCP, Bahr was entitled to summary judgment on her breach of unilateral contract claim.