Opinion ID: 2173929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the federal probation statute as an aid in construing the d.c. statute

Text: While worth less weight than the legislative history of the District of Columbia Probation Act itself, the legislative history of the Federal Probation Act is a useful extrinsic aid in construing the District of Columbia Act. Both acts were passed by the same legislative body on the same subject within a fifteen-year period. The acts have substantially the same language. The original federal act provided, in part, the following powers of suspension and probation: [T]he courts of the United States having original jurisdiction of criminal actions, except in the District of Columbia, when it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public, as well as the defendant, will be subserved thereby, shall have power, after conviction or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for any crime or offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem best; or the court may impose a fine and may also place the defendant on probation in the manner aforesaid. [Act of March 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976)).] As discussed above, the for such time phrase in the District of Columbia Probation Act affects the length of time of the suspension of sentence and has nothing to do with split sentencing. The fact that the placement of the for such time phrase is different in the federal act than in the District of Columbia Act is insignificant. While the statute's language was changed, the statute's substance, as far as split sentencing is concerned, was not changed until the 1958 amendment specifically allowing split sentences. Split sentences were not contemplated by the Congress when it passed the Federal Probation Act in 1925. The House Committee on the Judiciary report stated that the result of long experience with the probation system shows that it is far easier to reclaim an unhardened early offender without commitment to a prison than after it. H.R.Rep.No.1377, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1925). In United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357-58, 48 S.Ct. 146, 149, 72 L.Ed. 309 (1928), the Supreme Court, in discussing the concept of probation, stated: What was lacking in these provisions was an amelioration of the sentence by delaying actual execution or providing a suspension so that the stigma might be withheld, and an opportunity for reform and repentance granted before actual imprisonment should stain the life of the convict. This amelioration had been largely furnished by a power which trial courts, many of them, had exercised to suspend sentences. In some sections of the country it had been practiced for three-quarters of a century. By the decision in Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129, . . ., that remedy was denied. In that case, however, this court suggested legislation to permit probation. For eight years thereafter Congress was petitioned to enact it, and finally the Probation Act was passed. The great desideratum was the giving to young and new violators of law a chance to reform and to escape the contaminating influence of association with hardened or veteran criminals in the beginning of the imprisonment. Experience had shown that there was a real locus poenitentiae between the conviction and certainty of punishment, on the one hand, and the actual imprisonment and public disgrace of incarceration and evil association, on the other. If the case was a proper one, great good could be done in stopping punishment by putting the new criminal on probation. The avoidance of imprisonment at time of sentence was therefore the period to which the advocates of a Probation Act always directed their urgency. Probation was not sought to shorten the term. [Emphasis added; citation partially omitted.] While that case held that probation could not be granted once service of the sentence had commenced, the case is helpful in discerning what the philosophy was in connection with the granting or withholding of probation and to further show that probation had a special and precise meaning: probation avoided imprisonment. In short, this was not a philosophy into which could be read a concept of split sentencing. This would have to wait an additional thirty years to be legally brought about. Congress believed that courts could not split sentences under the 1925 Federal Probation Act. In 1958, the federal probation statute was specifically amended to allow split sentences. The House of Representatives Judiciary Committee's report gave the following account of the then existing law: Under present law when a person is convicted on more than one count of an indictment, the court may sentence him to a short period of imprisonment on one count, and place him on probation for a longer period on another count. Under one count indictments a judge may not do this. [H.R.Rep.No.1658, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).] The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in its report, stated that, if a court wanted to place a convicted defendant on probation, [i]t is clear that in such a case the court, under the existing law, must suspend the whole sentence and not just a part of it. S.Rep.No.2135, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1958] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 3841, 3841. The Judicial Conference of the United States supported the legislation and distinguished judges testified on the need for the amendment. In its written submission to the Congress, the Judicial Conference stated that numerous judges believed that a term of imprisonment preceding probation may be advisable, but when the conviction is on a single-court indictment this course is not open. S.Rep.No.2135, supra at 3, reprinted in [1958] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 3841, 3843. In hearings held by the House Judiciary Committee, Chief Judge John T. Parker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit testified that, while the Supreme Court has upheld a court's authority to sentence a defendant to imprisonment on one count and place him on probation on another count, when the conviction is on a one-count indictment this combination sentence is not possible. Appeals From Interlocutory Order and Confinement in Jailtype Institutions: Hearings on H.R.7260 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1958, p. 3841. Thus, the extensive legislative history to the Federal Probation Act shows that Congress never intended to allow split sentences when it passed the 1925 Federal Probation Act and that the 1958 amendment was necessary to give federal judges, including those sitting in Washington, D.C., such authority. [5] Appellant, relying on Basile v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 38 A.2d 620 (1944), argues that the fact that Congress amends a federal act to give more power to the federal courts does not indicate a lack of such power under a D.C. act. We agree with this proposition. This, however, is not a reason for ignoring the legislative history of the Federal Probation Act in our construction of the D.C. Act; it would be a reason for giving less weight to this legislative history if split sentencing, like the power to order restitution discussed in Basile, were well grounded in the D.C. Act. But split sentencing is not grounded at all, let alone well, in the D.C. Act. The distinction between the Basile case and the case at hand is that the power to order restitution can be found in the broader powers of the D.C. Act, namely the power to set terms and conditions for probation; [6] a split sentence, with its attendant jail sentence, is not a term or condition of probation and the power to order split sentences cannot be found in the D.C. Act.