Opinion ID: 4389621
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Text: 3. Lack of jurisdiction over the person or property. 4. Insufficiency of summons or process. 5. Untimeliness or insufficiency of service of summons or process. 6. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 7. Failure to join a party under s. 803.03. 8. Res judicata. 9. Statute of limitations. 10. Another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. ¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.06(2) confirms the general rule of § 802.02(3): that affirmative defenses shall be raised in a responsive pleading. However, § 802.06(2) provides an exception to that general rule, which indicates that the ten enumerated defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion. If any of the listed defenses are raised by motion, § 802.06(2)(b) dictates that such a motion shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. ¶44 For our purposes, it is significant that the ten enumerated defenses that may be raised by motion do not include noncompliance with the notice of claim statute. Unlike the list of affirmative defenses in Wis. Stat. § 802.02(3), the list of ten defenses in § 802.06(2)(a) is exhaustive. There is no language indicating that the list is not limited to the enumerated defenses as there is in § 802.02(3). 18 No. 2016AP2296 ¶45 The plain language of these two statutes in tandem therefore indicates that affirmative defenses, except the ten enumerated defenses, must be raised in a responsive pleading. Because noncompliance with the notice of claim statute is not one of the ten enumerated defenses, it likewise must be raised in a responsive pleading. ¶46 Despite the clear statutory language, the court of appeals arrived at an opposite result. Although it questioned the decision and signaled its disfavor, the court of appeals determined that it was bound by Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d 457. Maple Grove Country Club, No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op., ¶14; see Cook, 208 Wis. 2d at 190. In Lentz, the court of appeals stated that a defendant may raise an affirmative defense by motion. Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d at 467. As the court of appeals here correctly observed, such a broad statement is inconsistent on its face with Wis. Stat. §§ 802.02(3) and 802.06(2). See Maple Grove Country Club, No. 2016AP2296, unpublished slip op., ¶7. ¶47 The Lentz court cited Robinson v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 137 Wis. 2d 1, 16-17, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987), for the broad proposition that any affirmative defense may always be raised by motion. However, Robinson's language explicitly limits its determination to the defense of statute of limitations, which was the specific defense raised in that case: The affirmative defense of the statute of limitations must be raised in a pleading, or by a motion, or be deemed waived. Id. at 17. This is an unremarkable proposition given the language 19 No. 2016AP2296 of Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)9., which provides that statute of limitations is a defense that may be raised by motion prior to a responsive pleading. ¶48 Thus, Lentz misinterpreted this passage from Robinson to apply to all affirmative defenses. Lentz cannot be reconciled with the plain statutory language of Wis. Stat. §§ 802.02(3) and 802.06(2). Accordingly, we overrule Lentz because it allows a defendant to initially raise by motion an affirmative defense not listed in § 802.06(2).14 ¶49 In an attempt to compel the opposite conclusion, the Sanitary District argues first that by denying in its answer the Country Club's allegation of compliance with the notice of claim statute, it has sufficiently raised the defense. We disagree. A plaintiff is not required to plead compliance with the notice of claim statute in the first instance. Rabe, 72 Wis. 2d at 498. The Sanitary District's denial was the result of the mere fortuity that the Country Club pled compliance. ¶50 Instead of simply denying the allegation of compliance, case law establishes that [a] governmental entity must affirmatively plead that a plaintiff did not comply with the notice of claim statute. Thorp, 235 Wis. 2d 610, ¶24; 14 The Lentz court's holding that an employer's intentional sexual harassment of an employee is not an 'accident' within the parameters of the [Worker's Compensation Act] retains vitality. Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis. 2d 457, 462, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1995). However, that conclusion was subsequently limited by Peterson v. Arlington Hosp. Staffing, Inc., 2004 WI App 199, ¶¶16-21, 276 Wis. 2d 746, 689 N.W.2d 61. 20 No. 2016AP2296 Weiss, 79 Wis. 2d at 228 (The city was required to plead the lack of compliance with sec. 895.43(1), Stats., as a defense.). As analyzed above, Wis. Stat. §§ 802.02(3) and 802.06(2) compel this result. ¶51 After failing to raise the notice of claim statute in a responsive pleading, the Sanitary District could have amended its answer once as a matter of course at any time within 6 months after the summons and complaint [were] filed . . . . Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1). It could have done so any time thereafter by leave of court, which shall be freely given at any stage of the action when justice so requires. Id. Yet it has not availed itself of that option. ¶52 Even if the Sanitary District could raise noncompliance with the notice of claim statute in a motion for summary judgment, its attempt to do so here would still be unsuccessful. Wisconsin Stat. § 802.06(2)(b) dictates that such a motion shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. The Sanitary District brought its motion far later than this. ¶53 The Sanitary District contends next that Anderson v. City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 18, 559 N.W.2d 563 (1997), compels the conclusion that noncompliance with the notice of claim statute cannot be waived. This argument misses the mark. ¶54 In Anderson, this court addressed the damages limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3),15 determining that it is 15 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) provides: (continued) 21 No. 2016AP2296 not an affirmative defense that is deemed waived if not raised in a responsive pleading or by motion. Id., ¶21. Significant in the Anderson court's analysis was its observation that the damages cap in § 893.80(3) is not a complete bar to recovery. Id. (citing Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Minn. 1989) ([A]s the cap also does not bar plaintiff's action completely it would appear Wright and Miller's surprise factor does dictate the cap need not be pled as an affirmative defense.). Stated differently, § 893.80(3) does not prevent a plaintiff from maintaining an action, but rather limits the amount of damages that may be recovered. ¶55 In contrast, if noncompliance with either the notice of injury or notice of claim provision of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d) is properly raised and established and the Except as provided in this subsection, the amount recoverable by any person for any damages, injuries or death in any action founded on tort against any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency thereof and against their officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done in their official capacity or in the course of their agency or employment, whether proceeded against jointly or severally, shall not exceed $50,000. The amount recoverable under this subsection shall not exceed $25,000 in any such action against a volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213 or its officers, officials, agents or employees. If a volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213 is part of a combined fire department, the $25,000 limit still applies to actions against the volunteer fire company or its officers, officials, agents or employees. No punitive damages may be allowed or recoverable in any such action under this subsection. 22 No. 2016AP2296 plaintiff fails to demonstrate actual notice and lack of prejudice, then dismissal of the action is required.16 Anderson's analysis was specific to the language, history, and context of § 893.80(3) and therefore does not inform our analysis of § 893.80(1d). ¶56 Accordingly, we conclude that noncompliance with the notice of claim statute is an affirmative defense that must be set forth in a responsive pleading. Because the Sanitary District failed to set forth the defense in its answer and it has not amended its answer to include it, such a defense is deemed waived.17 ¶57 We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 16 That is, [f]ailure to give the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, corporation, subdivision, or agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial . . . . Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a). 17 The Country Club also raised in its petition for review the issue of whether it complied with the substantive requirements of the notice of claim statute. It argues that the Sanitary District had actual notice of the need to institute condemnation proceedings and the relief that the Country Club sought, and that the Sanitary District was not prejudiced by the lack of a timely formal notice. Because we deem waived the Sanitary District's defense of noncompliance with the notice of claim statute, we need not address whether the Country Club met the statute's substantive requirements. 23 No. 2016AP2296 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court. ¶58 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from participation. 24 No. 2016AP2296 1