Opinion ID: 1298761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial court's failure to give charge

Text: 3. Our state habeas corpus statute provides relief only for a substantial denial of constitutional rights under the United States Constitution or the Georgia Constitution. [15] To obtain habeas relief, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judgment attacked is invalid because a constitutional right was violated. [16] Whether Bruce is entitled to substantive relief on his habeas claim depends on whether the trial court's omission of the requested charge at his murder trial violated his constitutional right to due process. A jury charge that places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to establish innocence violates the defendant's constitutional right to due process. [17] In Lofton v. State, we concluded that the trial court did not impose any burden of persuasion on the defendant by failing to tell the jury that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was not caused by accident. [18] Likewise, the omission of a similar jury charge at Bruce's trial did not place any burden of persuasion on him. Moreover, a review of the charge given shows that the trial court correctly informed the jury on the state's burden of proof. The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was presumed innocent, the state had the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the intent to commit the crime was an essential element that the state had to prove, the burden of proof remained with the state and never shifted to the defendant, and the jury had a duty to acquit if the evidence showed the incident occurred as a result of misfortune or accident. Adhering to our ruling in Lofton, we hold that the trial court's failure to additionally charge the jury that the state must disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt did not violate Bruce's constitutional right to due process by shifting the burden of persuasion on the accident defense to him. [19] This holding is consistent with our decision in Bishop adopting a rule of criminal procedure. As a result of Bishop, trial judges are required to give a jury charge on the state's burden to disprove an affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt when (1) the defendant raises an affirmative defense and offers evidence to support it; (2) the defendant requests a specific charge on the state's burden of proof concerning the defense; and (3) the requested charge is a correct statement of the law and is adjusted to the evidence. [20] Neither Bishop nor any of our earlier cases hold that the federal or state due process clause mandates the giving of the charge. Instead, we adopted the rule as a judicial remedy to increase the fairness of the trial, eliminate jury confusion on the issue, and establish uniformity among trial courts. [21] Because the rule involves an issue of state procedural law that does not rise to the level of constitutional significance, it cannot be the basis for a collateral attack, such as Bruce's petition. [22] In conclusion, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Bruce's petition because it was not successive or barred by res judicata. On the merits, we conclude that the trial court's failure to give the requested charge did not violate Bruce's constitutional rights and he is not entitled to habeas relief for a violation of state procedural law. On remand, the habeas court should deny Bruce's petition on its merits. Judgment reversed with direction.