Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other Alleged Guilt-Phase Instruction Errors

Text: Although we are reversing defendant's death sentence on the basis of the sequential instruction error, we review nonetheless defendant's other contentions of error. With regard to his guilt trial, defendant's remaining contentions concern aspects of the instructions to the jury.
Defendant asserts that the court erred by instructing the jury that it could find him guilty of murdering Mc-Lean by his own conduct even if he was responsible only for inflicting the blunt force injuries. According to defendant, the medical examiner's testimony was insufficient to prove that blunt force injuries were a direct and immediate cause of death. Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by charging the jury that it could find him guilty of serious-bodily-injury murder if he intended to injure McLean seriously, but was unaware that the injuries were likely to result in death, contrary to the holding in State v. Cruz, 163 N.J. 403, 417-18, 749 A. 2d 832 (2000). To address this issue, we turn first, as we must, to the controlling statute. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ny person convicted under [ N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2) ] who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value ... shall be sentenced in accordance with the Act's capital punishment provisions. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c (emphasis added). In Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 96, 549 A. 2d 792, we considered the meaning of the own conduct provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c. There, the victim's death was caused by blunt-force injuries to the head, inflicted by blows of the fists and feet from multiple persons. Id. at 50, 549 A. 2d 792. Because the expert testifying was unable to isolate who administered the fatal blows, the defendant argued that he was not death eligible. Id. at 92-93, 549 A. 2d 792. That argument was rejected, the Court holding that to find a defendant guilty of own-conduct murder, the pertinent jury determination must be that the defendant actively and directly participated in the homicidal act, that is, in the infliction of injuries from which the victim died. Id. at 97, 549 A. 2d 792. In this case, we are satisfied that the court properly instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty of murdering McLean by his own conduct even if he was responsible only for inflicting the blunt-force injuries. Dr. Catherman testified that, to some extent, although small, the four blunt-force injuries to McLean's head contributed to his death in combination with the six gunshot wounds. Undoubtedly, that testimony did not prove that the blunt-force injuries were the exclusive, or even the primary, cause of McLean's death. However, all that was necessary was that the testimony establish that defendant actively and directly participated in the homicidal act. Id. at 97, 549 A. 2d 792. Given Dr. Catherman's testimony, there is no doubt that a reasonable jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that McLean died from a combination of injuries, including blunt-force trauma. Because it was appropriate for the trial court to refer to the blunt-force injuries in addition to the gunshot wounds in the own conduct charge, we find no error in that aspect of the court's charge. In any event, any error here was harmless. Because defendant also was found guilty of murdering Mitchell, who suffered only from gunshot wounds, the jury must have concluded that defendant possessed a gun. Moreover, Mitchell was shot with the .45 caliber gun and the nine millimeter gun; because Emil testified that Junior shot at him with the latter weapon, the jury must have found that defendant used the former. Not coincidentally, McLean also was shot with the .45 caliber gun. It is logical, then, that the jury concluded that defendant shot McLean with the .45 caliber gun. Defendant further contends that the trial court committed error by charging the jury that it could find him guilty of serious-bodily-injury murder if he intended to seriously injure McLean, but was unaware that the injuries were likely to result in death, in contravention of our holding in Cruz, supra, 163 N.J. at 417-18, 749 A. 2d 832. Because defendant failed to raise an objection to the charge at the time the charge was given, we review defendant's claim under the plain error standard. State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538, 257 A. 2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930, 90 S.Ct. 2254, 26 L.Ed. 2d 797 (1970) (stating that jury charge will qualify as plain error if there is legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result). At the close of the guilt phase, the trial court instructed that there are several different types of conduct which constitute murder, including purposeful and knowing murder and serious-bodily-injury murder. To convict defendant of purposeful and knowing murder, the jury had to find that defendant acted with the purpose of causing death or with the knowledge that it was practically certain that death would occur; and that his actions caused the death of one or more victims. To convict of serious-bodily-injury murder, the jury had to find that defendant purposefully or knowingly inflicted injuries on one or more of the victims, but, nevertheless, the injuries caused the death of the [victim or victims]; and the injuries were serious. The court defined serious bodily injury as bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part of the body. Concerning the applicable mental states, the court stated that [a] person who causes another's death does so purposely when it is the person's conscious object to cause death, and that [a] person who causes another's death does so knowingly when the person is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause death. With respect to murder by one's own conduct, the jury was instructed that it had to find that defendant, acting with the requisite mental state, inflicted the bullet wounds and/or the blunt instrument wounds that caused the death or serious bodily injury resulting in the death of Mc-Lean or committed the same along with Junior. If the jury found only that defendant inflicted some minor injuries to the decedents and those wounds did not contribute in any substantial way to the death of the victims, then it could not convict him of murder by his own conduct because he did not cause the death of the victims. Again, we turn to the statutory language. Serious bodily injury is defined as bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member organ. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1b. State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 737 A. 2d 1 (1999), held that to convict a defendant of serious-bodily-injury murder, the State must prove that the defendant purposely or knowingly caused an injury from which death is practically certain to ensue. Id. at 449, 737 A. 2d 1. The issue was revisited in Cruz, in which we held that to convict a defendant of purposeful serious-bodily-injury murder, the State must prove that it was the defendant's conscious object to cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, [and] knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable that death would result. Supra, 163 N.J. at 417-18, 749 A. 2d 832. Here, the court charged the jurors on purposeful or knowing infliction of serious bodily injury, but failed to instruct them that they must find that defendant had knowledge that the injury created a substantial risk of death. Although the trial court did not specifically instruct the jurors that they could not convict defendant of serious-bodily-injury murder unless they found that defendant knew the injury created a substantial risk of death, and knew it was highly probable that death would result, we find that the court's instructions, considered as a whole, achieved the same result. The trial court did define serious bodily injury as bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death. Further, there is no reasonable likelihood that defendant was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency in the serious-bodily-injury instructions. As noted earlier, logic dictates that the jury convicted defendant of the murders of both McLean and Mitchell because it found that he was the shooter of the .45 caliber gun. Consistent with this Court's prior decisions, the jury was instructed that if it found that defendant used a deadly weapon such as a firearm in committing the murders, it could draw an inference that he had the intent to kill. See generally, State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 269-72, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995) (approving of that instruction); Simon, supra, 161 N.J. at 450, 737 A. 2d 1 (noting that common sense informs us that when someone shoots at another person in the upper body region, such as the neck and head, the shooter's purpose is either to cause serious bodily injury that results in death or to actually cause death, especially where no other plausible explanation is given). Such an inference is clearly permissible here where it was found that McLean was not only beaten on the head with a blunt instrument, but also shot six times, twice in the head, and that Mitchell was shot four times, including three times in the head and once in the chest, by different guns including the .45. The wounds demonstrate a purposeful and knowing intent to cause death. Therefore, there is very little risk that the jury would have found that he intended only to cause serious bodily injury and not death. Because any technical failing in the jury instruction does not convince us that it had the capacity to bring about an unjust result, we hold that the error in the serious-bodily-injury instructions does not constitute plain error.
Defendant's final contentions concern the denial of his request for a charge on self-defense, defense of others, and the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter. The trial court declined to give those charges because they were unsupported in the record.
The use of force against another in self-defense is justified when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4a. Self-defense requires an actual, honest, and reasonable belief by the defendant of the necessity of using force. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198-99, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984). The reasonableness of the defendant's belief is determined by the jury, using an objective standard of what a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have done at the time the force was used. Id. at 199-200, 478 A. 2d 364. The jury is not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's belief was honest and reasonable. Id. at 200, 478 A. 2d 364. Rather, if any evidence raising the issue of self-defense is adduced, either in the State's or the defendant's case, then the jury must be instructed that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the self-defense claim does not accord with the facts. Ibid. For a defense of others charge, it must be shown that the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when ... [t]he actor would be justified under section 2C:3-4 in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-5a(1). The defense is applicable if the defendant reasonably believed that the person he sought to aid was unlawfully attacked and that the force used was necessary to protect the person from the attack. State v. Bryant, 288 N.J.Super. 27, 35, 671 A. 2d 1058 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589, 677 A. 2d 761 (1996). Similar to the self-defense doctrine, the trial court is required to instruct on defense of another if there is a rational basis in the record to support it. State v. Doss, 310 N.J.Super. 450, 458-60, 708 A. 2d 1219 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 155 N.J. 589, 715 A. 2d 992 (1998). To support his claim to the charges, defendant cites to several parts of the record: Emil's testimony that tensions had been mounting in the apartment; the testimony of Fonceta Young and Joyce Poole, the two neighbors who heard thumping noises and who thought that some guys in the apartment were wrestling, playing around, or fighting before the shootings occurred; and the fact that McLean had been beaten with a steam iron before he was shot as indicating that McLean either threatened or attacked defendant causing defendant to pick up the iron and use it in self-defense. Defendant's recitation of the evidence would require a jury to make several inferences: that the sounds heard by the neighbors were fights, that one of the victims was the aggressor, that defendant was provoked into attacking the victim, and finally that deadly force was necessary to protect defendant or another person. Defendant failed to point to any facts that provide a rational basis from which a jury could reasonably infer that he acted in self-defense or in defense of another. The trial court did not err by declining those charges.
Defendant's contention concerning the trial court's denial of a passion/provocation manslaughter charge suffers from similar infirmities. Murder is reduced to manslaughter if the murder is committed in the heat of passion in response to a reasonable provocation. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2). Passion/provocation manslaughter has four elements: (1) reasonable and adequate provocation; (2) no cooling-off time in the period between the provocation and the slaying; (3) a defendant who actually was impassioned by the provocation; and (4) a defendant who did not cool off before the slaying. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411, 568 A. 2d 879 (1990). The first two elements of the offense are objective; thus, if they are supported by the evidence, the trial court should instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, leaving the determination of the remaining elements to the jury. State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476, 491, 643 A. 2d 591 (1994). In support of the passion/provocation manslaughter claim, defendant theorizes that based on the neighbors' testimony of possible wrestling or fighting before the shootings, a fight broke out between defendant and Junior and the victims after Junior attempted to shoot Emil. Under that version of events, defendant claims he had little time to cool off as a result of the provocation. Further, defendant submits that Emil, McLean, or Mitchell may have threatened defendant with a weapon, which also would have added to the adequacy of the provocation. Although mutual combat may constitute adequate provocation, State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 274, 508 A. 2d 167 (1986), defendant's suggestions of mutual combat are nothing more than rank speculation and are unsupported by the record. We find no basis on which to overturn the trial court's refusal to give a passion/provocation manslaughter charge that lacked a rational basis in the record.