Opinion ID: 2299767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Excluding, Without Hearing a Proffer From Dawkins, Evidence of a Civil Lawsuit for False Arrest Pending Against Officer Solgat

Text: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Hunter v. United States, 980 A.2d 1158, 1164 (D.C.2009) (quotation marks omitted). This threshold is relatively easy to surmount; evidence certainly need not be unambiguous to have some probative value. Id. (quotation marks omitted). It is beyond argument that the bias of a witness is always relevant in assessing a witness' credibility. Foreman v. United States, 792 A.2d 1043, 1056 (D.C.2002). The trustworthiness of a witness' testimony may be undermined by demonstrating that bias or partiality motivates the witness. Id. Cross-examination concerning bias is especially important where ... the credibility of a key witness is a central factor to be weighed by the trier of fact. Id. Bias need not imply a deliberate attempt to lie; rather, bias describes the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest. Coles v. United States, 808 A.2d 485, 489 (D.C.2002) (quotation marks omitted). In Martinez v. United States, 982 A.2d 789 (D.C.2009), the defendant sought to cross-examine a police officer about an internal investigation of the officer that was being conducted by the MPD. Id. at 793. The trial court permitted the defendant to ask the officer about the existence of the investigation but precluded him from asking about the subject matter of the investigation or any procedures associated with it. Id. We held that the trial court unquestionably erred because it shut-off defense cross-examination about the subject matter and details of the investigation and failed to obtain additional background about the pending ... investigation (from the prosecutor, or through voir dire questioning of the Sergeant) that would have given the court a more informed basis for ruling on defense counsel's request for broader bias cross-examination. Id. at 795. Similarly, in Blunt, 863 A.2d at 833, we held that a trial judge may not prohibit all inquiry about an event from which the finder of fact may infer bias. See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (it is error for the trial court to prohibit[ ] all inquiry into the possibility that the government's witness is biased). In this case, the trial court excluded as irrelevant any questioning about a civil lawsuit for false arrest pending against Officer Solgat without first hearing Dawkins's proffer. If the trial court had permitted Dawkins's proffer, it might have determined that the existence of, and some details about, this civil suit were relevant to Officer Solgat's credibility because they offered Dawkins the opportunity to expose the potential for bias, unconscious or otherwise, in the officer's testimony. Officer Solgat may have believed that the outcome of his civil suit would be affected by his testimony at the suppression hearing. For example, he may have believed that an admission that he searched Dawkins without unambiguous consent could be used against him in his civil suit. Whether this belief would have been objectively reasonable is not determinative, Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C.1989); rather, the mere fact that Officer Solgat knew that he was a party to the civil suit at least arguably ... gave him a motive to slant his testimony. Martinez, 982 A.2d at 794 (quotation marks omitted). Because the trial court might have concluded that the fact of the lawsuit and its subject matter were relevant, it was incumbent on the court to hear Dawkins's proffer so that it could make an informed decision about the permissible scope of bias cross-examination. Indeed, had the trial court permitted the proffer, it might well have concluded that Dawkins's proposed cross-examination would have been irrelevant; we cannot say on this record that such an exercise of discretion would have been an abuse of the court's power. Here, however, by completely shutting off cross-examination on a subject that it might have determined to be relevant had it first heard Dawkins's proffer, the trial court denied itself the opportunity to fairly assess Officer Solgat's credibility, which, in the absence of any corroborating evidence, was the sole basis for its ruling on the suppression motion. See Foreman, 792 A.2d at 1056 (Cross-examination concerning bias is especially important where ... the credibility of a key witness is a central factor to be weighed by the trier of fact.). By declining to hear the proffer, the trial court denied itself a firm factual foundation, which would have allowed it to make an informed choice among the alternatives before it. Johnson, 960 A.2d at 295. As a result, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the pending civil suit against Officer Solgat without hearing Dawkins's proffer.