Opinion ID: 1704579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession as a Basis for Civil Forfeiture

Text: Ala.Code 1975, § 20-2-93(a), provides in pertinent part: (a) The following are subject to forfeiture: . . . . (5) All conveyances, including ... vehicles, ... which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of any [controlled substances.] (Emphasis added.) In Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 746 So.2d 960 (Ala.1999), this Court stated: `When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, ... courts must enforce the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their ordinary plain meaningthey must interpret that language to mean exactly what it says and thus give effect to the apparent intent of the Legislature.' ... `In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature. As we have said: ``Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.'' Id. at 964 (citations omitted). There is no ambiguity in the word possession. Section 20-2-93(a)(5) clearly provides that a vehicle that has been used, or that is intended to be used, in any manner to facilitate the possession of a controlled substance is subject to forfeiture. Accordingly, we must enforce the plain language of § 20-2-93(a)(5), which authorizes the civil forfeiture of a vehicle. We do not read Weldon, Gilbert, and Dent as standing for the proposition that criminal conduct involving more than mere possession of a controlled substance is required in order for there to be a forfeiture under § 20-2-93. In Weldon, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the forfeiture of the claimant's 1993 BMW automobile, which was valued at $37,500 and on which the driver had paid about $12,000 to $13,000, for possession of .067 ounce (about a teaspoon) of marijuana constituted an excessive fine and thus violated Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [3] See 718 So.2d at 53. In Dent, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the forfeiture of the claimant's 1993 Chrysler van, which was valued at $18,000, for possession of 5.32 grams of marijuana (about 1/6 of an ounce) constituted an excessive fine and thus violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See 714 So.2d at 987. In Gilbert, the Court of Civil Appeals upheld the forfeiture of the claimant's 1987 Chevrolet S-10 truck, which had been used to transport marijuana for the claimant's personal use and possession. See 686 So.2d at 267. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the fact that the truck had been used to transport marijuana for the claimant's personal use and possession was sufficient to support a forfeiture under § 20-2-93. [4] Gilbert, 686 So.2d at 267. Thus, neither Weldon, Gilbert, nor Dent holds that mere possession of a controlled substance is not a sufficient basis for forfeiture under § 20-2-93. It is undisputed that Dorough possessed a controlled substance in his truck. Thus, Dorough's truck was used in some manner to facilitate that possession. Therefore, we hold that Dorough's mere possession of a controlled substance in his truck is a sufficient basis for the civil forfeiture of the truck under § 20-2-93(a)(5).