Opinion ID: 484752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: consistency with the fourth amendment

Text: 28 It is well established that the fourth amendment constrains the power of Congress to authorize searches and seizures. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2578, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983). The Supreme Court has stated that a cardinal principle of the fourth amendment is that: [S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 35 [T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2414. 29 It is also established that appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his checked luggage. As we stated in United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), when airport security is not involved, every passenger who has luggage checked with an airline enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy that the contents of that luggage will not be exposed in the absence of consent or a legally obtained warrant. (emphasis omitted). 36 Our conclusion in Goldstein is supported by Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 99 S.Ct. 2425, 61 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979). In Torres, the appellant took a non-stop flight from Miami to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Upon arriving in Puerto Rico, local police searched Torres's luggage without probable cause or a warrant. The Supreme Court held that the search violated Torres's fourth amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the court: 30 The search of appellant's baggage ... did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as we have heretofore construed it. First, the grounds for a search must satisfy objective standards which ensure that the invasion of personal privacy is justified by legitimate governmental interests. The governmental interests to be served in the detection or prevention of crime are subject to traditional standards of probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found. Second, a warrant is normally a prerequisite to a search unless exigent circumstances make compliance with this requirement impossible. 31 442 U.S. at 471, 99 S.Ct. at 2429-30 (citations omitted). 32 Section 5317(b) authorizes luggage searches without consent, a warrant, probable cause, any risk to airport security, or exigent circumstances. The government apparently concedes that, unless the border search exception to the fourth amendment applies, the measure violates the fourth amendment. 33 The Supreme Court has discussed the scope of the border search exception in the context of incoming persons and property. 37 The Court has indicated that the border search exception is based upon the sovereign's authority to protect itself by examining incoming persons and property. 38 The Court has not, however, decided any case involving searches of outgoing persons and property. 39 We decline to construe the Court's general statements of the border search rationale so narrowly as to foreclose the proposition at issue here. 34 In several prior decisions, this Circuit has reserved the question of whether the border exception extends to departing persons and instrumentalities. See United States v. Arends, 776 F.2d 262, 264 n. 2 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). However, the time has come to determine whether Congress may, consistent with the fourth amendment, authorize warrantless searches of persons and property 40 departing from the United States on the basis of reasonable suspicion to search. 35 Every circuit 41 that has considered the question has ruled that the rationales for the border exception apply both to incoming and outgoing persons and instrumentalities. See United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.1979); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896, 104 S.Ct. 245, 78 L.Ed.2d 234 (1983); United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.1976); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 103 S.Ct. 2436, 77 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1983). The Ninth Circuit, in Stanley, summarized the rationale for its holding as follows: 36 [B]oth incoming and outgoing border-crossing searches have several features in common: (1) the government is interested in protecting some interest of United States citizens, such as restriction of illicit international drug trade, (2) there is a likelihood of smuggling attempts at the border, (3) there is difficulty in detecting drug smuggling, (4) the individual is on notice that his privacy may be invaded when he crosses the border, and (5) he will be searched only because of his membership in a morally neutral class. 37 545 F.2d at 667. 38 Although we need not decide here whether the border exception applies equally in all respects to incoming and outgoing searches at the border, we conclude that Congress may, consistent with the fourth amendment, authorize Customs officers to conduct warrantless searches of persons and property departing the United States on the basis of reasonable suspicion that a currency reporting violation is occurring. The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3309, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (quoting United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2579, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983)). 39 The governmental interest in stemming the flow of unreported currency out of the United States is substantial. 42 Large amounts of undeclared currency departing the United States bear an obvious relationship to the veritable national crisis in law enforcement 43 caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics and money laundering schemes often associated with organized crime. 44 The long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself 45 that underlies the traditional rationale for the border search exception is implicated to a substantial degree where the international borders of the United States are penetrated by large sums of undeclared currency departing this country. 40 Balanced against this governmental interest is the fourth amendment rights of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The statute grants authority for only a limited exception to the fourth amendment warrant and probable cause requirements for a search. Section 5317(b) allows Customs officers to search for section 5316 violations only where reasonable suspicion to search is present; thus searches for section 5316 violations on less than reasonable suspicion remain unlawful. See United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir.1984). 41 An individual's expectation of privacy is also less at international borders. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3310, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985). Although an individual may have a more substantial expectation of privacy when departing the country than when entering, individuals attempting to depart from the United States are on notice that they may be questioned and searched. Finally, the fourth amendment balance between the interests of the government and the privacy right of the individual is struck much more favorably to the government at the border. Id. 42 Balancing these considerations leads us to conclude that section 5317(b) does not authorize unreasonable searches and seizures. Finding that the statute is constitutional both on its face and as applied to appellant, we AFFIRM appellant's convictions. 43