Opinion ID: 2515588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(4)

Text: Regulation Counsel argues Fisher violated the rules prohibiting false statements of material fact to tribunals [7] when he failed to update Ms. Varner's financial affidavit showing his interest in the marital residence. Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) states a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal. Under 3.3(a)(1), failure to disclose material information to a tribunal is the equivalent of making a false statement of material fact. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, cmt. 3; In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897 (Colo.2002) (holding when client pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, criminal defense attorney had obligation to inform the court client committed perjury when he denied previous alcohol-related convictions). Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(4) disallows an attorney from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and later learns that the evidence is false, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(4). Therefore, the focus of a Rule 3.3(a)(1) inquiry is not on the falsity of the statement, but on the materiality of the statement. Similarly, when a lawyer learns that previously submitted evidence is false, under Rule 3.3(a)(4), he must only correct it if the evidence was material. Here, the affidavit provided to the trial court showing security interests in the Varner residence was false in that it was not amended to include Fisher's deed of trust once he obtained it from Ms. Varner. However, the focus of the Board's inquiry was on the materiality of the failure to amend the affidavit. The ABA comments to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1, requiring lawyers not make false statements of material fact in transactions with others, provides a statement is material if it could have influenced the hearer. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1, cmt. 1. This definition squares with this court's holding in People v. Small, 962 P.2d 258 (Colo.1998), where we found an attorney violated Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) even though his misrepresentation to a trial court did not affect the outcome of the case. Accordingly, the concept of materiality encompassed in Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) is not directed by the outcome of a particular matter, but rather whether there is potential that the information could influence a determination as to that matter. Under the Colorado attorney's lien statute, an attorney has a lien on money, property, claims, or judgment which she aids in obtaining. § 12-5-119. The lien arises by operation of law as soon as the attorney commences representation. Id. Therefore, Fisher already had an interest, represented by an attorney's lien, in Ms. Varner's equity in the home at the time the trial judge issued the permanent orders. [8] The fact of Fisher's interest in Ms. Varner's equity was surely material to the trial court when dividing Mr. and Ms. Varner's equity and determining maintenance. However, the trial court was aware Fisher had an interest in Ms. Varner's equity in the marital residence, whether secured by the deed of trust or an attorney's lien. Because the trial court was aware of this interest, it is possible the Hearing Board could have determined Fisher's deed of trust in the marital residence was not material information. Accordingly, because we can articulate at least one reasonable explanation as to why the Board may have been unconvinced of violations of Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(4), we cannot find that no reasonable fact finder could be unconvinced of such violations by a clear and convincing evidence standard. We therefore affirm the trial court's determination Fisher did not violate Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(4).