Opinion ID: 1441972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statutory Exclusive Remedy Provisions

Text: Because the injuries alleged occurred in 1981, they are governed by the Act as it read before 1982. Former Labor Code section 3600 stated: Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person except as provided in Section 3706 [i.e., where the employer fails to obtain compensation coverage], shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes death, in those cases where the ... conditions of compensation concur.... (Italics added. See Stats. 1978, ch. 1303, § 5, p. 4262.) The conditions of compensation as then enumerated [5] included: (1) that the employer and employee are subject to the Act, (2) that, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing services growing out of and incidental to [the] employment and is acting within the course of [the] employment, (3) that the injury is proximately caused by the employment, and (4) the injury is not caused by the employee's intoxication, the injury or death is not intentionally self-inflicted, the injury does not arise out of an altercation in which the employee is the initial physical aggressor, and the injury does not arise out of voluntary participation in recreational activities not reasonably required as part of the employment. [6] (Former Lab. Code, § 3600; see Stats. 1978, ch. 1303, § 5, p. 4262.) Former Labor Code section 3601 provided in pertinent part as follows: (a) Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided in Section 3706, the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his employment.... [7] (Italics added.) Former Labor Code section 3602 provided: In all cases where the conditions of compensation do not concur, the liability of the employer is the same as if this division had not been enacted. [8] In a series of decisions culminating in 1987 in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d 148, this court and the Courts of Appeal have struggled with the problem of defining the scope of these exclusive remedy provisions. Reviewing many of the earlier decisions in Cole, we there synthesized certain principles pertinent to that question. (3) First, [t]he basis of compensation and the exclusive remedy provisions is an injury sustained and arising out of the course of employment (former Lab. Code, §§ 3600, 3601).... ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d 148, 160.) Second, if the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment, the exclusive remedy provisions apply notwithstanding that the injury resulted from the intentional conduct of the employer, and even though the employer's conduct might be characterized as egregious. [A]n employee suffering emotional distress causing disability may not avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor Code by characterizing the employer's decisions as manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance resulting in disability. ( Ibid. ) Further, we noted that the legal theory supporting such exclusive remedy provisions is a presumed compensation bargain, pursuant to which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort. ( Id. at p. 158; see also Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 474 [165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948, 9 A.L.R.4th 758]; Riley v. Southwest Marine, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 1242, 1258 [250 Cal. Rptr. 718]; Van Horn v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1963) 219 Cal. App.2d 457, 467 [33 Cal. Rptr. 169].) The function of the exclusive remedy provisions is to give efficacy to the theoretical compensation bargain. However, in Cole we also identified a number of instances in which the exclusive remedy provisions are not applicable. (4) First, the fundamental basis of workers' compensation is an injury sustained in and arising out of the course of employment when the injury is personal physical injury or death. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d 148, 160.) Conversely, the exclusive remedy provisions apply only in cases of such industrial personal injury or death. (See, e.g., Howland v. Balma (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 899 [192 Cal. Rptr. 286] [workers' compensation not exclusive remedy for defamation]; Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal. App.2d 386, 402 [343 P.2d 787] [workers' compensation does not bar cause of action for fraudulent deprivation of claim against a third party].) In addition, the exclusive remedy provisions are not applicable under certain circumstances, sometimes variously identified as conduct where the employer or insurer stepped out of their proper roles ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d 148, 161; Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d 1063]; see also Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.3d 465, 477-478), or conduct of an employer having a `questionable' relationship to the employment ( Cole, supra, 43 Cal.3d 148, 161; Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 760, 779 [121 Cal. Rptr. 621]), but which may be essentially defined as not stemming from a risk reasonably encompassed within the compensation bargain. ( Cole, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 159, 161 [actions for damages permitted where employer's misconduct was not considered a risk of the employment or where injury ... did not occur while the employee was performing service incidental to the employment and which would not be viewed as a risk of the employment]; Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.3d 465, 476, 477; Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 268, 277 [179 Cal. Rptr. 30, 637 P.2d 266] [The purpose of the Act [is] to compensate for losses resulting from the risks to which the fact of employment in the industry exposes the employee.].) With these principles and limitations in mind, we turn to an examination of the allegations of plaintiff's third amended complaint. [9]