Opinion ID: 2007965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mental Health Act

Text: ¶ 11 The parties agree that the statements of emergency detention that Watton seeks are created under provisions of the Mental Health Act, ch. 51 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The custodian contends, however, that the Mental Health Act specifically exempts the statements from disclosure, when read in combination with Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1). The custodian argues that the statements are registration records, as described in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(am), which also categorizes them as confidential and . . . privileged treatment records, as provided in § 51.30(1)(b) and (4). Accordingly, the custodian maintains that Watton does not have a clear legal right to Gray's statements of emergency detention. Greer, 287 Wis.2d 795, ¶ 6, 706 N.W.2d 161. Moreover, the custodian argues, a writ of mandamus cannot issue because the Mental Health Act provides Watton another remedy at law, i.e., under § 51.30(4)(a)4, he may petition the court to obtain the records. ¶ 12 Watton counters that statements of emergency detention cannot be considered treatment records because only those records that are maintained by the Department of Health and Family services, its county branches or its staff, or by treatment facilities constitute treatment records, under Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(b). He argues that the City of Milwaukee Police Department does not fit within these categories of entities maintain[ing] the statements of emergency detention. Accordingly, he contends that the Mental Health Act does not specifically exempt statements of emergency detention that are in the possession of the police department from disclosure, under Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1). ¶ 13 Because he contends there is no statutory exemption to the open records law that would keep statements of emergency detention private, Watton argues that, in weighing the balance between private and public interests under the open records law, the balance tips toward disclosure because there is no overriding public interest in keeping the records confidential. Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis.2d 178, 181, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996). Watton contends this is so because Gray has put his mental competency at issue in defending the criminal charges filed against him related to the Thomas Moore shooting. [11] The psychological evaluation Gray underwent after pleading not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect is available through the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. Accordingly, Watton argues that Gray cannot keep private those facts he has already made public. ¶ 14 To resolve the parties' dispute over the statements of emergency detention, we interpret various provisions of chs. 51 and 19 of the Wisconsin Statutes. [S]tatutory interpretation `begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.' State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 236 Wis.2d 211, 232, 612 N.W.2d 659). Plain meaning may be ascertained not only from the words employed in the statute, but from the context. Id., ¶ 46. We interpret statutory language in the context in which those words are used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id. ¶ 15 If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a plain, clear statutory meaning, without ambiguity, the statute is applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms. Id., ¶ 46 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶ 20, 260 Wis.2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656). However, if a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses[,] then the statute is ambiguous. Id. at ¶ 47. It is not enough that there is a disagreement about the statutory meaning; the test for ambiguity examines the language of the statute `to determine whether well-informed persons should have become confused, that is, whether the statutory . . . language reasonably gives rise to different meanings.' Id. (quoting Bruno, 260 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 21, 660 N.W.2d 656). When a statute is ambiguous, we may consult extrinsic sources to discern its meaning. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 50. While extrinsic sources are usually not consulted if the statutory language bears a plain meaning, we nevertheless may consult extrinsic sources to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation. Id., ¶ 51. ¶ 16 We begin with Wis. Stat. § 51.15, which describes the role of a police officer in creating a statement of emergency detention, and with Wis. Stat. § 51.30, which defines certain types of mental health records and describes how one may obtain access to those records. We consider the relevant language of these sections of ch. 51 to ascertain whether the legislature intended to protect statements of emergency detention from disclosure. ¶ 17 The relevant portions of Wis. Stat. § 51.15(1)(a) and (4)(a) are contained in footnote 3, supra. Section 51.15(2) is also relevant to our inquiry, and it provides in pertinent part: Facilities for detention. The law enforcement officer or other person authorized to take a child into custody under ch. 48 or to take a juvenile into custody under ch. 938 shall transport the individual, or cause him or her to be transported, for detention and for evaluation, diagnosis and treatment if permitted under sub. (8) to any of the following facilities: . . . . (c) A state treatment facility[.] ¶ 18 Portions of Wis. Stat. 51.30(1) and (4) also bear on the issue presented. They provide in relevant part: (1) Definitions. In this section: . . . . (am) Registration records include all the records of the department, [12] county departments . . . treatment facilities, and other persons providing services to the department, county departments, or treatment facilities, that are created in the course of providing services to individuals for mental illness. . . . (b) Treatment records include the registration and all other records that are created in the course of providing services to individuals for mental illness . . . and that are maintained by the department, by county departments . . . and their staffs, and by treatment facilities. . . . . . . . (4) Access to registration and treatment records. (a) Confidentiality of records. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and ss. 118.125(4), 610.70(3) and (5), 905.03 and 905.04, all treatment records shall remain confidential and are privileged to the subject individual. . . . (b) Access without informed written consent. Notwithstanding par. (a), treatment records of an individual may be released without informed written consent in the following circumstances . . . : . . . . 4. Pursuant to lawful order of a court of record. ¶ 19 From the text of these statutory provisions, we observe the following relevant legislative directives: (1) a police officer may take a person into custody if the officer has reason to believe the person is mentally ill, and it is substantially probable that the person will cause physical harm, Wis. Stat. § 51.15(1); (2) when an officer takes a person into custody under such circumstances, the officer fills out and signs a statement of emergency detention related to the individual and to the circumstances the officer witnessed that justify taking the person into custody, § 51.15(4); (3) the officer is obligated to either transport or arrange for the transport of such a person to a state treatment facility for evaluation, diagnosis and potential treatment, § 51.15(2); (4) records that are created in the course of providing services to persons for mental illness and maintained by the department or treatment facility are registration records, Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(am); (5) treatment records include all registration records that are maintained by treatment facilities, § 51.30(1)(b); (6) treatment records must [13] remain confidential and are privileged, § 51.30(4)(a); and (7) treatment records may be released by court order, when the person to whom the records relate does not provide written informed consent authorizing their release, § 51.30(4)(b)4. ¶ 20 We conclude that the sum of these directives, as they relate to Gray, is that the statements of emergency detention are registration records; and therefore, they are exempt from the public records request. They are also confidential and . . . privileged treatment records protected by statute. Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(b) and (4). Our conclusion rests on the following rationale. Registration records are records of the Department of Health and Family Services created as a result of providing services to individuals for mental illness. § 51.30(1)(am). Statements of emergency detention fit within this definition of registration records because the officer creating the statement of emergency detention provid[es] services to . . . individuals in regard to mental illness. Id. The officer provides services in at least two respects: (1) as required by Wis. Stat. § 51.15(4)(a), the officer fills out and signs the statement of emergency detention form, thereby relaying important factual information that the person who is in need of assistance may not be able to provide to the treatment facility; and (2) as required by § 51.15(2), the officer either transports the individual to a state treatment facility, or arranges for the individual to be transported to a state treatment facility. The transport also benefits the treatment facility, as well as the individual. These services that the officer provides cause the statements of emergency detention to fit squarely within the Mental Health Act's description of registration records. § 51.30(1)(am). ¶ 21 Watton contends, however, that notwithstanding the inclusion of some statements of emergency detention within the classification of registration records, the records he seeks are not treatment records because they are not being maintained by a treatment facility or a department of the type listed in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(1)(b). Watton asserts that these records are maintained by the City of Milwaukee Police Department. Watton concedes that ch. 51 precludes him from obtaining the statements of emergency detention that are physically in the possession of a treatment facility. However, he contends that ch. 51 does not preclude him from obtaining statements of emergency detention in the physical possession of the police department. Watton reasons that, although the copies of statements of emergency detention kept within the police department are duplicate copies of the statements maintained by the treatment facility, the original and its duplicate do not warrant the same treatment under the statutes. We disagree. ¶ 22 The plain language of ch. 51 coupled with our obligation to construe statutes to avoid absurd results causes us to conclude that copies of statements of emergency detention in the possession of the police department do not lose their classification as records maintained by a treatment facility. Accordingly, the copies of the statements of emergency detention in the possession of the police department continue to be treatment records exempt from disclosure. ¶ 23 First, Wis. Stat. § 51.15(4)(b) states that the treatment facility may, within its discretion, alter the statement of emergency detention the officer completes and files with the facility. The facility then files the original statement of emergency detention and the supplement to that statement, if any, with the court having jurisdiction in the county in which the officer took the person into custody. Section 51.15(4)(b) provides in relevant part: (b) Upon delivery of the individual [to the treatment facility and] . . . [i]f the individual is detained, the treatment director or his or her designee may supplement in writing the statement filed by the law enforcement officer . . ., and shall designate whether the subject individual is believed to be mentally ill, developmentally disabled or drug dependent, if no designation was made by the law enforcement officer. . . . The treatment director or designee shall then promptly file the original statement together with any supplemental statement and notification of detention with the court having probate jurisdiction in the county in which the individual was taken into custody. When the treatment facility has the original and copies of the statement of emergency detention and it files the original with the court, the copies the treatment facility retains do not change their character. They contain the same confidential mental health information as they did when all the documents were physically in the hands of the treatment facility, and the concern for maintaining their confidentiality remains the same. ¶ 24 The obligations that Wis. Stat. § 51.15(4)(b) places on treatment facility directors or their designees with respect to statements of emergency detention indicate that the copies of the statements of emergency detention in the possession of the City of Milwaukee Police Department are nevertheless records maintained by the treatment facility. For example, facility directors or their designees are charged with supplementing the record filed by the police officer, if needed, and with filing the statement of emergency detention and any supplement with the appropriate circuit court, § 51.15(4)(b), thereby maintaining the statement in the form most helpful to the circuit court. [14] In contrast, the City of Milwaukee Police Department is not charged with any obligation with respect to statements of emergency detention, after the original statements have been delivered to the detention or treatment facility. The police department retains a copy merely to keep track of transport costs and whether the Department of Health and Family Services, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(14), has reimbursed the police department for those costs. [15] ¶ 25 Second, Wis. Stat. § 51.30 evidences the legislature's decision to keep mental health treatment information confidential. See Billy Jo W. v. Metro, 182 Wis.2d 616, 632, 514 N.W.2d 707 (1994). As we have explained, there is a strong [legislative] interest in keeping private the details of an individual's mental and emotional condition. Id. The confidentiality provisions of ch. 51 are not designed to protect pieces of paper; they are designed to protect information about individuals who receive mental health care services. Accordingly, we would offer an absurd interpretation of § 51.30(1)(b), which describes treatment records, if we were to conclude that the copies of statements of emergency detention physically kept at the City of Milwaukee Police Department are not treatment records simply because those duplicate copies are not in the physical possession of a treatment facility or another department listed in § 51.30(1)(b). Such an interpretation would not protect the confidentiality of mental health information about individuals. Accordingly, we conclude that statements of emergency detention in the possession of a treatment facility, or a department listed in § 51.30, or in the possession of the police department, are treatment records within the meaning of § 51.30(1)(b). ¶ 26 Watton acknowledges that ch. 51 prohibits him from obtaining the statements of emergency detention kept by the treatment facility absent written informed consent or a court order; however, he argues that ch. 51 does not prohibit him from obtaining the statements of emergency detention kept by the police department. As we have explained, Watton's interpretation is contrary to the confidentiality provisions of ch. 51 and, if applied, would lead to an absurd result. We avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results. See, e.g., Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. In any event, as we have recounted, the plain meaning of the provisions of ch. 51 do not permit such an interpretation. [16] ¶ 27 Our analysis of ch. 51 shows that statements of emergency detention are treatment records. The Mental Health Act specifically exempts such records from disclosure, designating them as confidential and . . . privileged to the subject individual. Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4). Accordingly, the custodian has succeeded in showing that the statements of emergency detention withheld by the City of Milwaukee Police Department fit within a statutory exemption from disclosure set out in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1). Correspondingly, Watton has not succeeded in showing that he has a clear legal right to the statements of detention, as the standard for the granting of a writ of mandamus requires. [17] Greer, 287 Wis.2d 795, ¶ 6, 706 N.W.2d 161. Consequently, we reverse the court of appeals and uphold the circuit court's denial of Watton's petition for a writ of mandamus. [18] ¶ 28 Because we conclude that the Mental Health Act by its terms defines statements of emergency detention as treatment records, which it expressly exempts from disclosure without written informed consent or a court order, we need not address Watton's argument that the balance of interests between Wisconsin's policy of open government and Gray's interests in keeping his mental health records private tips in favor of disclosure. See Woznicki, 202 Wis.2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699. ¶ 29 We also note that our decision does not necessarily thwart Watton's attempt to obtain Gray's statements of emergency detention. As provided in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4)(a)4, Watton may petition the appropriate circuit court for an order compelling release of the statements. Beyond what we have just stated, we express no opinion with respect to the issuance of such an order. If Watton chooses to seek a § 51.30(4)(a)4 order, we leave it to the sound discretion of the circuit court to grant Watton's motion for an order, deny Watton's motion, or to grant the motion in part, permitting only partial disclosure of the statements of emergency detention.