Opinion ID: 772281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Missouri Supreme Court Decision

Text: 39 We also examine the Missouri Supreme Court's decision because it was based on different grounds than the state trial court decision. Cf. Ward v. French, 989 F. Supp. 752, 761 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (addressing the presumptive correctness of factual findings made by both a state trial court and the North Carolina Supreme Court). The Missouri Supreme Court did not review the trial court's prima facie determination, but instead made its own express factual finding that the prosecutor gave race-neutral explanations for his two peremptory strikes. See Weaver, 912 S.W.2d at 509. 40 Findings of fact made by state appellate courts have the same presumptive correctness as findings of fact made by state trial courts. Cf. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981) (applying the pre-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. 2254 (e)(1)); Jones v. Jones, 938 F.2d 838, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Sumner v. Mata and addressing findings of fact made by Missouri appellate courts on a Batson claim). 41 As with the state trial court's fact-finding, Weaver has failed to rebut the presumptive correctness of the Missouri Supreme Court's determination that the prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons for striking two venirepersons. The only point that bears elaboration is the prosecutor's comment that [i]n any event, I was not persuaded that [Burns] could give the death penalty, particularly to a fellow black person. (Emphasis added). Weaver argues that this statement is racially discriminatory on its face, and requires a finding of a Batson violation. The Missouri Supreme Court held that this comment did not violate Batson because it was clear that the prosecutor's decision to strike B[urns] was not based solely upon race or upon any assumptions about persons of [Burns's] race but was based upon the way she behaved and answered questions, that is, hesitation, lack of eye contact, flippancy and other intangibles observed only by those present in the courtroom. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d at 509 (emphasis added). 42 The Missouri Supreme Court's analysis is consistent with the dual motivation analysis that we have recognized. See United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995). In Darden, we rejected a Batson claim where the prosecutor gave several race-neutral reasons for striking a venireperson before adding one reason that was discriminatory. The district court did not expressly find that the prosecutor's peremptory strike was based solely on the race-neutral reasons, but said the other reasons you expressed give cause that are . . . racially neutral - the other reasons you stated. . . . For that reason I'm allowing the strike. . . . [T]he other reasons you gave give the basis for being a strike. Id. (quoting the trial transcript). We held that the district court's decision was equivalent to a finding that the prosecutor would have exercised the strike even without the one non-racially neutral motive. Id. (emphasis added). 43 Here, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the peremptory strike was based upon the several race-neutral reasons given by the prosecutor. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d at 509. That decision, as in Darden, is equivalent to a finding (and necessarily implies) that the prosecutor would have exercised the strike even if he hadn't expressed a facially discriminatory motive. Thus, we find no unreasonable error in the Missouri Supreme Court's factual determination. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2); cf. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1522.