Opinion ID: 4248047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court’s denial of a continuance

Text: We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision regarding a continuance. Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2008). The denial of a request for a continuance does not constitute an abuse of 3 The notice of appeal was actually filed on behalf of both plaintiff Rosario and coplaintiff Gonzalez. However, in a footnote, the plaintiffs made clear that with respect to coplaintiff Gonzalez, the appeal was “really a Cross Appeal.” Co-plaintiff Gonzalez, who had prevailed in the district court, wished only to “preserve all of her rights” in the event the defendants appealed from the final judgment. In any event, the appellant’s brief in this appeal was submitted only on behalf of plaintiff Rosario. Co-plaintiff Gonzalez has since filed a separate appeal from the final judgment, which is proceeding as Appeal No. 17-13740. Nothing herein relates to that appeal. 10 Case: 17-12751 Date Filed: 02/23/2018 Page: 11 of 17 discretion unless it is “arbitrary and unreasonable and severely prejudices the moving party.” Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Levin, 849 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2017). In determining whether a denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion, we consider four factors: (1) the moving party’s diligence in case preparation; (2) the likelihood that granting the continuance would have remedied the need for it; (3) the level of inconvenience the court and the opposing party would have experienced had the continuance been granted; and (4) the harm that the moving party suffered. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1320. With respect to the second factor, “[i]t is well-settled that a district court may deny a continuance when there is no guarantee that granting one will enable a party to secure the crucial testimony.” Id. at 1320-21. As an initial matter, we note that the plaintiffs did not formally move for a continuance. To the contrary, attorney Kleppin stated that he would be “happy to rest well before” Thursday morning, when plaintiff Rosario was said to be available to testify. And on Wednesday morning, when Kleppin raised his final objection regarding Rosario, he conceded that the case would likely conclude that same day. However, to the extent plaintiffs’ counsel requested more time for Rosario to appear, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. We 11 Case: 17-12751 Date Filed: 02/23/2018 Page: 12 of 17 look to the Romero factors. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1320. Admittedly, the fourth Romero factor argues in favor of granting the continuance: without Rosario’s testimony, her case was effectively gutted, so she was harmed when the district court did not continue the trial over to Thursday. The other three factors, however, amply support the district court’s action. First, plaintiff Rosario was not diligent in prosecuting her case. She never attended the trial, despite knowing as early as October 19, 2016 that it would take place during the two-week period beginning May 1, 2017. This amounts to more than six months of notice. Furthermore, the district court confirmed on April 24, 2017 that the parties were to be available for the entire trial period; and, on April 26, 2017, the district court set the trial for the week of May 1, 2017. Plaintiff’s counsel said it was difficult for Rosario to attend the trial. But, as the district court noted, “there are ways to have dealt with that,” especially considering the amount of notice of the trial date she was given. Second, there was no guarantee that a one-day continuance would have enabled attorney Kleppin to “secure the crucial testimony.” See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1320-21. Rosario did not tell the defendants she would be unable to attend her deposition until the day before the deposition. A similar last-minute conflict may well have arisen for Rosario, which would have prevented her from attending and testifying even if a continuance had been granted. 12 Case: 17-12751 Date Filed: 02/23/2018 Page: 13 of 17 Third, given that the entire case and jury verdict were completed by 5:00 on Wednesday afternoon, a continuance would have inconvenienced the district court, and jury, and the defendants. The defendants presented their entire case on Wednesday. It would have been unfair to tell defense counsel, after the close of his case, that the chief witness for the plaintiffs would now be testifying the next day. It may also have inconvenienced the district court and confused the jury to have the plaintiffs’ case presented in a piecemeal manner. In sum, applying the Romero factors, and given the fact that Rosario had not appeared for the first three days of her trial, we conclude that the district court’s ruling was not arbitrary or unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1320; Levin, 849 F.3d at 1001.