Opinion ID: 2979255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Basis for the Stop

Text: A Terry stop is a “brief investigatory stop[] of persons,” United States v. Cambell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), that is justified under the Fourth Amendment when an officer has reasonable suspicion “to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). We look to the hypothetical reasonable officer’s assessment of a situation, because a Terry stop requires a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of criminal activity.” Cambell, 549 F.3d at 371 (internal quotation omitted). We determine whether reasonable suspicion exists based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 588 (6th Cir. 2001). -3- No. 08-5429 USA v. Johnson Here, the government argues that Tennessee Code section 39-17-1305 (2006) provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop Johnson. That law prohibited “a person [from] possess[ing] a firearm within the confines of a building open to the public where liquor, wine or other alcoholic beverages . . . are served for on premises consumption.” Tenn. Code § 39-17-1305 (2006). Because Johnson does not contest that Club Karma was a public establishment serving alcohol, the only question is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to believe Johnson possessed a firearm in Club Karma. The relevant facts are: (1) the presence of a box of ammunition in the automobile; (2) the location of the automobile in the parking lot of a public establishment serving alcohol; (3) the time of day; and (4) the history of alcohol consumption and firearm-related violence on Mule Day. While a time of day or dangerous location cannot alone provide reasonable suspicion, “police officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location [or time] in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, we have noted that the presence of a box of ammunition in an automobile—albeit confirmed through inquiry—is adequate to provide reasonable suspicion that the owner possesses a firearm. See United States v. Isham, 501 F.2d 989, 990-91 (6th Cir. 1974). In Isham, an arrestee asked to lock his automobile before police officers transported him to jail. Id. at 990. Monitoring the arrestee, the officers saw a box of ammunition on the front seat and asked the arrestee if he had a gun. Id. He said that he did. Id. Analyzing this exchange, we noted: “The police suspicion about a weapon (based on the plain view of the ammunition) was . . . turned into something more than -4- No. 08-5429 USA v. Johnson probable cause when [the arrestee] admitted that he had a [firearm].” Id. at 991 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131, 142 (1st Cir. 2009) (“We think it uncontroversial that the discovery of ammunition—but not a gun—in the car from which a suspect fled could . . . lead an officer to reasonably suspect that the fleeing suspect possessed the gun that went with the ammunition.”). Johnson protests, arguing that the circumstances did not warrant a belief that he was behaving in a suspicious or dangerous manner. Johnson objects to the adequacy of the factors here, in particular the background of Mule Day and the connection between the box of ammunition and the firearm. However, “individual factors, taken as a whole, [may] give rise to reasonable suspicion, even if each individual factor is entirely consistent with innocent behavior when examined separately.” Smith, 263 F.3d at 588. Furthermore, the factors combined needed only provide the officers with reasonable suspicion that Johnson violated the prohibition on carrying a firearm into an establishment serving alcohol. This level of suspicion “is satisfied by a likelihood of criminal activity less than probable cause, and falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Cambell, 549 F.3d at 370-71 (internal quotation omitted). Given this standard, we find that the circumstances here provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to believe Johnson carried a firearm into Club Karma, in violation of Tennessee Code section 39-17-1305 (2006).