Opinion ID: 2287139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: PRIMARILY FOR PERSONAL, FAMILY, OR HOUSEHOLD PURPOSES UNDER THE Pa.U.T.P.C.P.L.

Text: The principal restriction placed upon the private cause of action for treble damages under the Pa.U.T.P.C. P.L. is that the purchase must be primarily for personal, family or household purposes. . . . 73 P.S. § 201-9.2. Mameco argued, and the trial court agreed, that the Condominium Association was a business consumer, rather than a consumer for personal, family or household purposes. We cannot agree. The primary purpose restriction of 73 P.S. § 201-9.2 has not been construed previously by the appellate courts of this Commonwealth. Consequently, on this issue of first impression, we turn initially to the federal district court decisions construing this portion of the act. In a series of cases, federal district courts have construed the primary purpose restriction of 73 P.S. § 201-9.2 to preclude a cause of action by one business against another business for various types of unfair competition. See e.g. Merv Swing Agency, Inc. v. Graham Co., 579 F.Supp. 429 (E.D.Pa. 1983) (disparagement of business); Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F.Supp. 404 (E.D.Pa. 1983) (commercial disparagement); Klitzner Industries v. HK James, Co., 535 F.Supp. 1249 (E.D.Pa. 1982) (passing one's goods off as another's); Permagrain Products v. U.S. Mat & Rubber, Co., 489 F.Supp. 108 (E.D.Pa. 1980) (same). In another case, a district court held that no cause of action could be presented under 73 P.S. § 201-9.2, by the purchaser of a truck, when the lease and insurance papers conclusively established that the purchase was primarily for commercial purposes. Waldo v. North American Van Lines, 669 F.Supp. 722 (W.D.Pa. 1987). Those cases appear to correctly apply the primary purpose limitation to the facts presented. Unfortunately, those cases provide little, if any, guidance as to the proper application of the primary purpose limitation to the facts presented here. Mameco argues that liability is precluded for two reasons: its roofing materials were not typical consumer products, and the Condominium Association was in the business of managing the condominium, and so was not a purchaser for personal, family, or household use. The trial court agreed with the latter argument. We agree with neither. Mameco's focus upon the type of product involved is misplaced. The restriction included in the act addresses itself solely to the purpose of the purchase, not the type of product purchased. The following example illustrates this distinction. If a laundry business were to purchase a home-use model, department store dryer for the primary purpose of drying clothes for the laundry business, such a purchase would be primarily for a business purpose, despite the fact that the dryer may have been a typical consumer product. On the other hand, if the parents of twelve growing children purchased an industrial washer and dryer from a business supplier to be used primarily to do the family's laundry, the purchase would be primarily for a family purpose and come within the ambit of 73 P.S. § 201-9.2, notwithstanding the fact that industrial washers and dryers generally might not be considered typical consumer products. In previous cases, the purchase or lease of a home, condominium, or apartment for residential purposes has been implicitly treated as being primarily for personal, family, or household purposes under the Pa.U.T.P.C.P.L.. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, supra ; Gabriel v. O'Hara, supra; 1000 Grandview Association v. Mt. Washington Association, supra. We can see no reason why, if a purchase or lease of the whole residential unit comes within the act, a contract regarding part of the unit ( i.e. its roof) would not also be covered by the act. That bricks, mortar, and roofing materials are not commonly characterized as consumer products is irrelevant. The purpose of the purchase, and not the type of product purchased, controls. When a roof is purchased to cover a residential unit, whether it is the first roof or a replacement roof, the roof purchased is being purchased primarily for a personal, family, or household use, i.e. as a necessary part of a personal, family, or household residence. Hence, we reject the type of product rationale asserted by Mameco for sustaining the demurrer. Mameco argues further that the Condominium Association is in the business of managing the condominium building, and is therefore a business purchaser. The trial court agreed. We cannot. The fundamental error in this reasoning is the characterization of the Condominium Association as being in the business of managing the condominium building. It is true that Pennsylvania law permits condominium associations to incorporate as a for-profit or as a non-profit corporation. See 68 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301. Regardless, such condominium associations act in a representative capacity on behalf of the unit owners when contracting, and when bringing suit. 68 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302; see also 1000 Grandview Association v. Mt. Washington, supra. [3] In 1000 Grandview Association v. Mt. Washington Association, supra , this Court held that a condominium association could represent individual unit owners who had purchased units for residential purposes by pursuing legal redress acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the individual unit owners. Implicit in our recognition of the condominium association's standing in that case was a conclusion that the representee's residential use, rather than the condominium association's putative business purpose of managing the condominium building, was the relevant purpose in applying the primary purpose restriction of 73 P.S. § 201-9.2. What was implicit there, we make explicit here. When a condominium association acts in its representative capacity on behalf of unit owners, it is the purpose of the unit owners' purchases which controls for the purposes of the primary purpose restriction of 73 P.S. § 201-9.2. According to the pleadings, the condominium building upon which the roof was placed here, was primarily used for personal, family, or household residential use by the unit owners and/or their lessees. While the record reveals that some of the units in the building were used for business purposes, neither the number of such units, nor the square footage involved, would provide a basis to conclude at this nascent stage in the proceedings that business rather than residential use predominated. We note in this regard, that because a leak-proof roof is ultimately essential to the structural integrity of the whole condominium building, it is the primary (preponderate) purpose (use) of the whole building, and not the most directly affected units which would control. Hence, we conclude that, giving the Condominium Association the benefit of all facts pled and all favorable inferences reasonably derivable therefrom, the roof was purchased primarily for personal, family, or household purposes within the meaning of those words in the Pa.U.T.P.C.P.L.