Opinion ID: 2077873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Confrontation Clause and the Admission of the Pre-Trial Statement of a Witness with Limited Recall

Text: Hall's first argument is that the repeated failures of memory of William Bronson, one of the State's witnesses at trial, together with the admission of his pre-trial statement, violated Hall's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. [4] The State argues that the Confrontation Clause guarantees only the opportunity to cross-examine and not the effectiveness of that cross-examination, and that Hall did indeed receive this opportunity. William Bronson also worked for Kelly Maintenance. Hall would often pick him up from work. During their investigation of Hall, the police spoke with Bronson. Bronson made a statement to police that incriminated Hall in several ways. First, Bronson said that when Hall picked him up from work that day, his thumb had been injured. Second, Bronson's description of a jacket Hall was wearing that day matched McDermott's description of her attacker's jacket. Hall and the State both agree that Bronson is mentally challenged. [5] The State called Bronson as a witness for two reasons: to let the jury hear his testimony and to establish his availability in order to admit his prior statement to police. [6] Bronson answered all the questions readily and to the best of his abilities. He remembered giving a statement to police and voiced his intention to stick to that statement. His testimony, however, was equivocal and confused. For example, in response to a question about what Hall was wearing on the day in question, Bronson said, Well, I don't look at people's clothing, and, [H]e wore a maroon sweat-shirt a lot. Later, he asserted that Hall had been wearing a new Christmas jacket, but then promptly agreed with the State that it was a gray and black jacket. Bronson asserted first that Hall came to pick him up in a blue pick-up truck, then said it was green, then responded to the State's question about this inconsistency by equivocating: Yeah. I recall  it was a while back, but I think that's what happened. At one point, the State commented that Bronson was having difficulty remembering these events, and Bronson responded, I didn't think I'd have to come to court and go over every little thing. Bronson evinced an intention to stick to his prior report because it was more fresh in my mind at the time. Bronson's testimony had the same character on direct examination as it did on cross-examination. The State then moved to introduce Bronson's prior statement to police. Hall objected that Bronson's failure of memory violated Hall's right to cross-examine Bronson under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court ruled that Bronson was available for cross-examination for the purposes of both Section 3507 and the Confrontation Clause. This Court reviews de novo claims of violations of the United States or Delaware constitutions. [7] Both the Delaware and United States constitutions guarantee the basic right of cross-examination, which has aptly been characterized as the `greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth....' [8] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives a defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. [9] The Delaware Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right ... to meet the witnesses in their examinations face to face. [10] The Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution represents the floor of protection due a defendant, not the ceiling, and states are free to provide more protection. [11] The U.S. Constitution's Confrontation Clause guarantees only the opportunity to cross-examine, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. [12] It does not guarantee that a witness will refrain from giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. [13] There are some circumstances, however, in which a defendant has so little opportunity to cross-examine that the Confrontation Clause has been violated even though the witness is physically present. For example, courts have ruled that limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court [14] or assertions of privilege by the witness [15]  [16] can be so limiting as to constitute a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Thus, determining whether a defendant has had so little opportunity to cross-examine that his or her Confrontation Clause rights have been violated is, to some extent, an exercise in line-drawing. This case, however, does not come close to that line. Cases in which courts have found a violation of the Confrontation Clause when the witness was physically present have involved witnesses who do not answer questions to an entire area of necessary inquiry. [17] By contrast, here Bronson answered readily and willingly all of Hall's questions relating to his prior statement and gave a fair amount of detail. The normal remedy for testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion is impeachment. [18] Hall was free to highlight the fact that Bronson could not independently verify the details of his statement that had incriminated Hall. Hall was also free to highlight Bronson's mental condition. These factors would have reduced Bronson's reliability as a witness in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, Hall could have argued at closing that Bronson seemed suggestible and eager to please, factors that could further have reduced the value of his initial statement to police. Hall's proper remedy was not to exclude Bronson's prior statement but, rather, to attack its credibility. Such issues of the weight of evidence, as distinct from its admissibility, are for the jury. In Johnson v. State, [19] this Court addressed the issue of a witness' limited recall. [20] In that case, the victim, a seventy-five year old woman, was assaulted and raped. [21] The State sought to introduce various prior statements by the victim in which she gave a description of her attacker. [22] On the witness stand, however, the victim indicate[d] that she did not recall anything during a time which included the first three [out of four of her] out-of-court statements.... [23] Furthermore, the victim was not able to describe her attacker. [24] This Court noted that the issue of whether limited recall implicated the Confrontation Clause was then unsettled in the federal courts. [25] We held, however, that the issue was a matter of weight for the jury, not a constitutional violation. [26] Unlike the victim in Johnson, Bronson was able to recall his prior statement to the police, and that it was accurate at the time he gave it. Moreover, unlike the victim in Johnson, Bronson was able independently to describe some of the facts described in his prior statement. Thus, Bronson's recall was less limited than that of the victim in Johnson, a case in which this Court failed to find a Confrontation Clause violation. United States v. Owens, [27] a United States Supreme Court case decided after Johnson, supports our opinion in Johnson and our conclusion in this case. Owens involved the testimony of a prison counselor who had been the victim of a brutal prison attack in which his assailant beat him in the head with a metal pipe. [28] The FBI obtained a statement from the victim in which he identified his attacker as the defendant. [29] At trial, however, the victim admitted that he could not remember whether he saw his assailant during the attack, nor whether any visitor had suggested that the defendant was his attacker. [30] Defense counsel tried unsuccessfully to refresh the victim's memory with hospital records, including one in which he identified another as his assailant. [31] Owens characterized an earlier case, Delaware v. Fensterer, [32] as addressing the Confrontation Clause implications of a witness who testified to a current belief but could not recall the basis on which he had formed that belief. [33] In contrast, Owens concerned the related issue of the witness who is unable to recollect the reason for [a] past belief. [34] The United States Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the Confrontation Clause in Owens because successful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee. [35] Thus, Owens supports our holding in Johnson because the witnesses in both cases had testified to a past belief for which they were unable to recall their reasons. It also forecloses Hall's argument in this case, for two reasons. First, like the witnesses in Johnson and Owens, Bronson's failure of memory here went to the reasons for a past belief. The United States Supreme Court has held that this fact alone may not, as a matter of law, constitute a violation of the Confrontation Clause. [36] Second, Bronson's failure of memory was not as total and sustained as that of the witness in Owens.