Opinion ID: 169489
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tribal Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction The Analytical Framework

Text: Originally the Indian Tribes were separate nations within what is now the United States. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959). As separate nations, they enjoyed the same degree of sovereignty as that enjoyed by all other sovereign nations the world over. Through their original incorporation into the United States as well as through specific treaties and statutes, however, they have lost several important aspects of their inherent sovereignty. Id. As to which aspects of inherent sovereignty have been retained and which have been divested, [t]he areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). But the Indian tribes' status as dependent nations has not divested them of the powers of self-government. See id. Despite the fact that the Navajo Nation retains control over its self-government, [i]t is true that in the exercise of the powers of self-government, as in all other matters, the Navajo Tribe, like all Indian Tribes, remains subject to ultimate federal control. Id. at 327, 98 S.Ct. 1079. This is because the Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that [the Supreme Court has] consistently described as `plenary and exclusive.' United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004). Congress's plenary and exclusive powers in respect to the tribes derive from the Indian Commerce Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3), treaties entered into by the Executive Branch, and preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any federal government. See id. at 200-01, 124 S.Ct. 1628. The upshot of Congress's plenary power over the tribes is that it may enact legislation that both restricts, and in turn, relaxes . . . restrictions on tribal sovereign authority. Id. at 202, 124 S.Ct. 1628. In the absence of congressional legislation, however, tribal governments retain regulatory authority over all matters falling within their inherent sovereignty. In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), the Supreme Court laid down a general rule that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. Id. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245. There are, nevertheless, two narrow exceptions to the general rule against tribal authority over nonmembers. First, [a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Id. Second, [a] tribe may . . . exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245. Although Montana dealt exclusively with the tribes' regulatory authority over non-Indians, see Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) ( Montana immediately involved regulatory authority. . . .), the Supreme Court has since announced that a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction, id. It has also since explained that it has left open the question whether a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants equals its legislative jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001). Thus, our analysis must proceed as follows: initially, we must determine whether each party's status is such that Montana 's general rule against regulatory authority over nonmembers is implicated; in other words, we must determine whether the party over whom the tribe is seeking to assert regulatory authority is a nonmember of the Navajo Nation. If the party in question is a nonmember, then we must decide whether either of the two exceptions identified in Montana applies. If one of the two Montana exceptions applies and the tribe therefore possesses regulatory authority over the nonmember, we must determine whether the nonmember's activities also fall within the Tribe's adjudicative authority. Before conducting this analysis, we must resolve two matters. First, there does not appear to be, and Plaintiffs have not identified any, congressional legislation expressly authorizing the Navajo Nation to exercise regulatory authority over Defendants in this case. Stated slightly differently, Congress has passed no law which permits the Navajo Nation to exercise regulatory authority over nonmember entities or individuals who employ members of the tribe within the confines of the reservation; nor has it passed a broader statute which arguably encompasses nonmember employers. Consequently, any regulatory authority the Navajo Nation might possess is strictly a byproduct of its retained inherent sovereignty. Second, Plaintiffs contend that laws and/or policies enacted by Congress and the Executive Branch subsequent to Montana nullified its framework for defining the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes. This argument is unavailing. Many of the sources on which Plaintiffs rely predate Montana and thus cannot serve as the basis for overturning that decision. We have, nonetheless, reviewed each policy, statute, treaty, and contract relied upon by Plaintiffs and can find no indication whatsoever that Montana has been altered in any way. [6] Finally, as recently as 2001, the Supreme Court applied the Montana framework in determining whether the Navajo Nation possessed regulatory authority over nonmembers of the tribe, see Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 654-57, 121 S.Ct. 1825 strong indication that the Montana framework remains alive and well. Consequently, we will proceed to apply the Montana framework.