Opinion ID: 418703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutionally protected interests

Text: 28 It is beyond dispute that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Constitution. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). 47 That freedom encompasses a wide variety of choices and activities: the decision to marry; 48 procreation; 49 the use of contraception; 50 the decision not to carry a child to term; 51 and cohabitation with members of one's extended family. 52 Among the most important of the liberties accorded this special treatment is the freedom of a parent and child to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing relationship. 53 29 The constitutional interest in the development of parental and filial bonds free from government interference has many avatars. It emerges in a parent's right to control the manner in which his child is reared and educated 54 and in the child's corresponding right not to have the content of his instruction prescribed by the state. 55 It contributes heavily to a parent's right to direct the religious upbringing of his child. 56 And, above all, it is manifested in the reciprocal rights of parent and child to one another's companionship. 57 30 When asserted by a parent and child in a traditional nuclear family, the foregoing rights are acknowledged to be potent. It might be argued, however, that they are less formidable when asserted by a non-custodial parent--one who retains and regularly exercises visitation rights but who participates little in the day-to-day care and nurturing of his children. 31 To assess that argument we turn first to the case law. That inquiry unfortunately proves inconclusive; while the bulk of the pertinent precedent seems to suggest that we should not differentiate between custodial and noncustodial contexts when deciding what protections are constitutionally due a parent-child relationship, each of the germane cases has dealt with a factual situation or legal issue significantly different from the problem before us. 32 Dicta favorable to the plaintiffs may be found in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978). Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, seemed to imply that a [once] married father who is separated or divorced from the mother and is no longer living with his child could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. Id. at 255-56, 98 S.Ct. at 554-55. 58 That suggestion is reinforced by some language in two of the Court's decisions dealing with the procedural adequacy of state laws making possible the termination of interests of non-custodial parents. In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1190, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965), the Court took for granted that the interest of a divorced father in the preservation of his visitation rights is a liberty interest sufficient to trigger the application of procedural due process doctrine. And in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 749, 753-54, 102 S.Ct. at 1392, 1394, decided last term, the Court expressly held that the interest of a parent, who has temporarily lost custody of his child, in avoiding elimination of his rights ever to visit, communicate with, or regain custody of the child is important enough to entitle him to the procedural protections mandated by the Due Process Clause. The relevance of these two decisions to the instant case is limited by the fact that the establishment of a liberty interest sufficient to warrant application of procedural due process doctrine does not necessarily mean that that interest will be deemed fundamental and thereby entitled to the full panoply of substantive constitutional protections. Nevertheless, the Court's willingness, in each case, to assimilate the interests at stake to the rights enjoyed by custodial parents 59 affords some support for the proposition that, for constitutional purposes, all (exercised) parental rights should be treated as equivalent. 60 33 Some language inconsistent with that proposition may be found in the two decisions rendered by the Second Circuit in the only appellate case comparable to the one before us. In Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 3011, 37 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1973), a father in a position similar to that occupied by William sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Marshals Service to reveal to him the whereabouts of his children. The court ruled that, in view of a state's substantial range of authority to protect the welfare of children ... [which] extends to the determination of parental custody and visitation rights, there is no clear constitutional right to custody or visitation rights. Id. at 713 (emphasis added). In Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908, 101 S.Ct. 1975, 68 L.Ed.2d 295 (1981), a subsequent damage action growing out of the same controversy, the court concluded that the federal officials' removal and concealment of the children on the consent of their mother and sole custodian, did not violate the children's constitutional rights .... Id. at 620. 34 However, the differences between the Leonhard cases and the suit before us are sufficiently marked that the foregoing comments bear only lightly on the question with which we are grappling. Most importantly, in Leonhard there was no suggestion that the Marshals Service was capable of arranging secret meetings between the father and the children without endangering anyone's life; the court of appeals thus assumed that the defendants' only option, if they wished to protect the children, was to deny the father access to them. In the first case, the court's inquiry was further circumscribed by the nature of the remedy sought; presented with a stark choice between granting or denying an order that would reveal the location of the children, the court not surprisingly was reluctant to accord much weight to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. In the second suit, the court's attention was deflected from the main issue by a different set of circumstances: the father's constitutional claims were, by then, time-barred and the children had been returned to him. The only remaining relevant question was whether the children were entitled to damages for the violation of their rights during the period in which they had been denied the company of their father. The court concluded that the defendants, when deciding whether to reveal the location of the children, were entitled to rely on the (putatively reliable) judgment of the mother concerning what was necessary to ensure their safety. In this action, by contrast, a safe way of affording the father access to the children does exist, the question whether the defendants should make use of it is properly before us, and the mother's awareness of the option undermines any presumption that she is acting solely in the best interests of her offspring. In short, the reflections of the Second Circuit are sufficiently intertwined with the idiosyncracies of the cases before it as to be of little moment in the present context. 35 To summarize, the balance of germane precedent inclines in favor of according similar constitutional status to custodial and non-custodial parent-child relations, but none of the cases is controlling. Consequently, to assess fairly the strength of the interests asserted by the plaintiffs in this case we must explore the concerns that underlie the constitutional protection traditionally accorded parental and filial bonds. 36 Three considerations account for the skepticism with which, when determining the constitutional validity of governmental action, we regard any interference with parent-child relations. The first is the important place such relations have long held in our culture. In the United States, parents historically have participated heavily in the rearing of their children. 61 More importantly, persons in this country traditionally have believed that parents have a right to maintain contact with and shape the development of their children. 62 37 The second factor consists of recognition that shielding relations between parents and children serves two complementary social functions. On one hand, it facilitates socialization of the children. We rely on parents to instill in their offspring the values and motivations necessary to develop them into mature, socially responsible citizens. 63 We assume that this is a function the state cannot effectively perform; only parents (or some close substitute) are sufficiently sensitive to the myriad, constantly fluctuating needs and drives of children to be able to provide them the combination of support and guidance necessary to prepare them for later life. 64 Such preparation, in turn, is essential not only to enable each child to think and act independently when he comes of age, 65 but to preserve and promote our system of government 66 and our way of life. 67 On the other hand, vesting in parents primary responsibility for the upbringing of children ensures the preservation of diversity and pluralism in our culture. As the Supreme Court explained long ago: 38 The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 39 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). 68 The undesirability of cultural homogenization would lead us to oppose efforts by the state to assume a greater role in children's development, even if we were confident that the state were capable of doing so effectively and intelligently. 69 In short, our collective wish to preserve and promote the enlivening variety of our social and political life prompts us to be wary of any tampering with our highly decentralized, substantially unregulated, parent-dominated child-rearing system. 70 40 The third consideration is our appreciation of the profound importance of the bond between a parent and a child to the emotional life of both. 71 Frequently each party to the relationship depends heavily on his ties with the other for his sense of self-worth, for his very self-definition. To rephrase the point in the language of entitlements, a parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his offspring. 72 A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsive, reliable adult. 73 41 To determine the strength of the constitutional interests asserted in the instant case, we must access the relevance of the foregoing considerations to the plaintiffs' relationship as it existed prior to the defendants' alleged interference with it. We begin by asking what features distinguish the relationship between William and his offspring from the paradigmatic parent-child bond in a nuclear family. The answer turns upon a subtle distinction. It is well established that the strength and scope of constitutionally protected familial rights are not determined by the contours of state (or federal) law; what is important is the nature of the bond in question, not the way in which it has been categorized by a legislature or court. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2110, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (dicta); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). 74 It is equally well established, on the other hand, that the state possesses substantial--and virtually exclusive--regulatory authority in the field of domestic relations. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404, 95 S.Ct. 553, 559, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). Thus, there is no question that the Pennsylvania court in the instant case had authority to vest in Catherine custody over the children and to award William no more (and no less) than visitation rights. 75 What this means is that, for the purpose of weighing the plaintiffs' constitutional interests, we should eschew inferences drawn from the manner in which the state describes their rights or deals with them in other contexts, 76 but we must consider carefully the manner in which state law defines and limits William's access to and responsibility for the children. 42 A nuanced analysis of the sort just indicated would require detailed knowledge of domestic relations law in Pennsylvania--specifically of the practical concomitants of the terms custody and visitation rights. We lack such knowledge and the parties have made little effort to educate us. For reasons that will become apparent, however, we believe that our inquiry may proceed upon two crude assumptions: 77 (1) The non-custodial parent in a legally reorganized family generally spends considerably less time with his children than the custodial parent. (2) The custodial parent legally has the principal, if not exclusive, authority to make decisions regarding the child's education, religious training, and discipline 78 and, in practice, is usually the dominant force in the child's upbringing, but the non-custodial parent (assuming he exercises his visitation rights) in most instances retains some influence over the child's intellectual and moral development. On the basis of these rough generalizations, how should the reciprocal constitutional interests of a non-custodial parent and his children in one another's companionship be measured? 43 The first of the three factors discussed above--the existence of a tradition of respect for the institution in question--provides us little guidance. It seems undeniable that recognition of the sanctity of the bond between a child and his non-custodial parent is far less firmly embedded in our cultural heritage than respect for the autonomy of the relations between a child and parent in a nuclear family. But that discrepancy is readily explainable on the basis of the relative rarity, in United States society in the past, of regularly exercised visitation rights. That situation is rapidly changing, however; the hegemony of the nuclear family is steadily being undermined. It has been predicted that the proportion of marriages fated to end in divorce will soon reach forty percent. 79 In light of the fact that a divorced parent who is not granted custody is routinely awarded visitation rights, 80 the result will be a large and growing number of children whose time and affection are divided between a custodial and a non-custodial parent. 81 In short, the institution of the broken family is becoming ever more socially important. To rely on the absence of a strong tradition of respect for one of the constituent relationships of that institution in determining its constitutional status seems senseless. Recognition of the need to adjust the meaning of the Constitution to conform to changes in social life 82 requires, in this instance, that we eschew reliance on history. 44 Reference to the second of the three factors is more productive of insight. Neither of the two complementary social functions fulfilled by traditional parent-child relations would appear to be specially dependent upon non-interference with the bond between a child and his non-custodial parent. Socialization of the children in such situations presumably can be adequately performed by the custodial parent (with or without the aid of a new spouse). And the values transmitted by a custodial parent are likely to be as distinctive as those transmitted by a non-custodial parent; vesting exclusive responsibility in the former for the child's upbringing, consequently, would not affect the overall diversity of the society. These points should not be overstated. To the extent that a child remains emotionally dependent upon a non-custodial parent, cutting off his access to that parent will be painful and disorienting and will in some measure reduce his ability to absorb any system of values. 83 But, on balance, it would appear that, insofar as our willingness to use the Constitution to shield parental and filial bonds from state interference derives from our recognition of the social needs served by those relations, we would be warranted in according diminished protection to the relation between a child and his non-custodial parent. 45 The force of the third consideration in the present context is somewhat harder to assess. The emotional importance of the bond between some parents and their children diminishes following the disintegration of the original family unit and the parent's loss of custody. 84 For others, however, the relationship remains important--even intensifies in response to the disruption or termination of other attachments. 85 Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the emotional stability of children of divorced parents is often tied to the quality of their continuing relationships with their non-custodial parent. 86 On this point, in short, it appears impossible to say with any confidence that the concerns that underlie our willingness to accord fundamental status to parent-child bonds are any less telling when the relationship in question consists of mere visitation. 46 Our analysis thus far appears inconclusive. One of the two relevant factors suggests that the plaintiffs are entitled to only diminished constitutional protection; the other would place them on a par with parents and children in traditional settings. To choose between those options, we must examine more closely both the particularities of the case before us and the practical implications of attempting to differentiate it from a nuclear family. 47 We observe, to begin with, that the alleged infringement in this case is no mere disruption or curtailment of the parent-child relation but its permanent termination. Under these circumstances, the emotional-attachments consideration seems especially relevant and equally relevant to situations involving custodial and non-custodial parents. Arguably, state regulation of, for example, a child's education or religious upbringing threatens only moderately the emotional ties between the child and his parents--and is less likely significantly to affect the relations between the child and a non-custodial parent than the relations between the child and a custodial parent. Severance of the filial bond, on the other hand, obviously cuts deeply into the emotional interests of both parent and child--and may well be as painful and disorienting to a non-custodial parent as to one with whom the child enjoyed more frequent contact. 48 The foregoing generalization will not always hold. But to determine the severity of the emotional damage likely to be caused by any particular severance would be extremely difficult. The strength and psychic significance of a specific familial relation would be very hard to assess. Certainly no one objective index (such as frequency of visitation or degree of financial support) would be reliable. Moreover, the thorough inquiry necessary to make even a competent judgment of this sort would be time-consuming, degrading to the parties, and itself highly disruptive of the relationship in question. 87 49 In light of these considerations, we conclude that the constitutional interests asserted by the plaintiffs are, in critical respects, roughly comparable to the interests of a parent and child in a viable nuclear family. We stress, however, that our analysis extends only to the question of the constitutional status of the right of a non-custodial parent and his or her children not to be totally and permanently prevented from ever seeing one another. In other words, we are considering here a narrow factual situation in which the government has acted to sever completely all ties between a non-custodial parent and his children without their participation or consent. In addressing this specific situation, we do not mean to suggest that a parent (or child) has a fundamental right to maintain visitation privileges in any particular way. 50 It is undisputed that the plaintiffs' protected interests have been invaded. We have established that the defendants are constitutionally responsible for that invasion. See Part II. supra. We now turn to the question whether, on the facts as alleged in the complaint, the defendants can justify their actions and the effects thereof.