Opinion ID: 612451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Jury Instructions Pursuant to Grants of Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: Appellants argue that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that there was privity as a matter of law between the purported predecessors of I.O.B. Realty and I.O.B. Realty as well as between I.O.B. Realty and the Syosset and Staten Island appellees. The instruction being a question of law, we review it de novo. See Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir.1999). However, appellants waived any claim of error regarding the privity issue by failing to raise them with the district court. See Gwozdzinsky ex rel. Revco D.S., Inc. v. Magten Asset Mgmt. Corp., 106 F.3d 469, 472 (2d Cir.1997). Appellants made no objection whatsoever to the finding of privity between I.O.B. Realty's predecessors and I.O.B. Realty. As for the finding of privity between I.O.B. Realty and the other defendants, counsel for appellants stated only that: we object to reference to the license agreement as being a valid agreement.... Perhaps you could take out the word valid'; then there would be more consistency there. Later, appellants clarified their objection stating [w]e don't believe that a naked license is a valid license. Notably, the issue of naked licensing went to the jury. Appellants similarly challenge the district court's instruction to the jury that there was, as a matter of law, use of the marks in interstate commerce. They argue in that regard that appellees were required to demonstrate use in interstate commerce as part of their prior use defense because a mark must be used in interstate commerce in order to be eligible for federal registration. No provision of the Lanham Act supports that contention. The Lanham Act merely provides that a mark is not registrable if there is a likelihood of confusion between that mark and a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned.... 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). A party need not meet the statutory requirement of use in interstate commerce to oppose, or seek cancellation of, a registration based on confusion. See id.; First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Grp., Inc., 476 F.3d 867, 870-71 (Fed.Cir.2007). Likewise, prior use as a defense against a trademark infringement suit does not require use in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(6). Indeed, as discussed above, even appellees' local rights would be sufficient to warrant cancellation of appellants' marks due to a likelihood of confusion. See 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 20:15. Nevertheless, even if use in commerce had to be shown, the evidence showed such use as a matter of law. Due to the different nature of the marks, use in commerce is defined differently for trademarks and service marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. A service mark is used in commerce when, among other things, it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, where commerce includes all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress. Id. We have previously recognized that this broad definition reflects Congress's intent to legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause. Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants rely on the failure to show use of the mark in advertising materials, but there is no requirement that a mark be so used. Rather, it is enough to show use or a display of the mark in the sale of services rendered in commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, as was the case here. Appellees' mark was prominently displayed on numerous versions of the Patsy's Pizzeria menu entered into evidence as well as displayed on the exterior of the East Harlem building. Additionally, these services were rendered in commerce. The provision of services to interstate customers is sufficient to show that the services were rendered in commerce. See Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 666 (Fed.Cir.1991); Application of Gastown, Inc., 51 CCPA 876, 326 F.2d 780, 782-83 (1964). A map in evidence demonstrates that Patsy's Pizzeria is easily accessible from several nearby interstate highways. Numerous articles about Patsy's Pizzeria were also in evidence, including one from the New York Times, which undoubtedly extends to an interstate audience. Furthermore, reviews for Patsy's Pizzeria from guides such as the 2003 Not For Tourists Guide to New York City and the 2004 Zagat Survey for New York City Restaurants were also entered into evidence. Finally, there was testimony that cab drivers knew where Patsy's Pizzeria was, that people [came] from all over to go there, and even that pizza was shipped to the west coast. Thus, the district court properly instructed the jury to find that appellees used their mark in interstate commerce as a matter of law.