Opinion ID: 2234021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Interview Room

Text: Bormann claims that the videotaped statement at police headquarters should be inadmissible because it includes 20 minutes of questioning before he was administered the Miranda warnings. The trial court found the statement to be admissible. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (routine booking exception allows collection of questions to secure biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services without administration of Miranda warnings). We conclude that the information obtained went beyond the collection of facts necessary for routine booking. However, this does not mean that the evidence was inadmissible. The information, while beyond that necessary for a routine booking, was obtained in order to determine if Bormann was competent to talk to police. Information obtained in initial questioning is not necessarily considered interrogation under Miranda. U.S. v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272 (8th Cir.1996). The court stated: A request for routine information necessary for basic identification purposes is not interrogation under Miranda, even if the information turns out to be incriminating. Only if the government agent should reasonably be aware that the information sought, while merely for basic identification purposes in the usual case, is directly relevant to the substantive offense charged, will the question be subject to scrutiny. Id. at 1274, quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.1985). Bormann was in an interrogation room for about 45 minutes before the Miranda rights were administered. He was alone for more than 15 minutes before the detective entered and asked for identification. Bormann had none, and the detective obtained a notepad and asked Bormann for his name, date of birth, address, telephone number, and Social Security number. The detective left, returned, and asked Bormann if he had any sharp instruments in his possession. Biographical information was reviewed, and Bormann was offered water. The detective left to retrieve the water, returned with it, and left again. The detective returned and again asked for biographical information. Bormann voluntarily described where he had lived for the previous several years. The detective asked Bormann about his educational background to ensure that Bormann understood the questions. Because the detective smelled the odor of alcohol, he asked for Bormann's drug and alcohol history. Bormann said he had last used marijuana a few weeks earlier. He had previously used cocaine and had once been charged with possession. Bormann said he had recently abused inhalants. Bormann said he had been drinking that night while he was watching a football game and had consumed a bottle of whiskey. The detective said he was trying to determine whether Bormann understood what was happening. He asked whether Bormann had taken any prescription medication and whether he had any disabilities. Bormann denied taking any medication other than Tylenol for headaches. The detective said he wanted to give Bormann a chance to talk. Bormann then said he had possession of a high-powered rifle that night, but that he had not shot at any police. At that point, about 1 hour after the videotape began, the detective read the Miranda rights advisory to Bormann, and he signed the rights advisory form. In reviewing a motion to suppress a confession based on the claimed involuntariness of the statement, including claims that it was procured in violation of the safeguards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. With regard to historical facts, we review the trial court's findings for clear error. Whether those facts suffice to meet the constitutional standards, however, is a question of law, which we review independently of the trial court's determination. State v. Goodwin, 278 Neb. 945, 774 N.W.2d 733 (2009). The issue is whether Bormann's statements prior to being given the Miranda warning tainted his waiver such that the statements cannot be said to be freely and voluntarily given. It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to say that an unwarned statement `so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.' State v. Ray, 266 Neb. 659, 665, 668 N.W.2d 52, 57 (2003), quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). We conclude that Bormann's pre- Miranda statement did not render his post- Miranda statements inadmissible. The pre- Miranda questions concerned basic identification and Bormann's ability to understand the nature of the questioning. Bormann smelled of alcohol and had consumed an entire bottle of whiskey the day of the shooting. He had previously told police that he had a high-powered rifle and that he had not shot at any police. This statement cannot be said to have tainted the voluntariness of his waiver. Bormann's statement concerning his drug use was not related to the shooting incident and provided basic information relating to his physical and mental condition. The trial court did not err in finding that Bormann's videotaped statement was voluntary. The questioning prior to the time Bormann was given his Miranda advisory did not affect the voluntariness of Bormann's post- Miranda statements. Bormann freely and voluntarily executed the waiver of his Miranda rights.