Opinion ID: 1266339
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Heading: Plaintiffs' Railway Labor Act Claims

Text: Plaintiffs contend that American Airlines violated those provisions of the RLA codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152, First and Seventh by supplanting an existing collective bargaining agreement with the Restructuring Participation Agreement. Section 152, First states as follows: It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First. Section 152, Seventh states as follows: No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title. Id. § 152, Seventh. No party has pointed us to any case law addressing whether these sections provide for a private right of action by individual employees, nor have we identified any. In considering this question of first impression, we begin by reviewing the general enforcement structure of the RLA.
The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 to encourage collective bargaining by railroads and their employees in order to prevent, if possible, wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148, 90 S.Ct. 294, 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969); see also 45 U.S.C. § 181 (amending RLA to apply to interstate air carriers). Toward this end, the RLA provides an arbitral mechanism for the prompt and orderly settlement of two classes of disputes between unions and employers. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a). The first class, referred to as major disputes, relates to the formation of collective [bargaining] agreements or efforts to secure them. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second class, known as minor disputes, see id. at 303, 109 S.Ct. 2477, grow[s] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, 45 U.S.C. § 151a(5). In other words, major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. at 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239.
Beyond the arbitral scheme for resolving disputes between employers and unions, the RLA also provides for federal criminal enforcement. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (It shall be the duty of any United States attorney to whom any duly designated representative of a carrier's employees may apply to institute in the proper court and to prosecute under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of the provisions of this section.). Although the RLA does not explicitly provide a private civil cause of action, the Supreme Court has found such an action by a union implicit in the statutory scheme. In Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, the Supreme Court recognized a private right of action by a union alleging that the defendant company was interfering with, influencing, or coercing the clerical employees of the railroad company in the matter of their organization and designation of representatives in violation of § 152, Third. 281 U.S. 548, 555, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930). The Court concluded that Congress, in the legislation of 1926, while elaborating a plan for amicable adjustments and voluntary arbitration of disputes between common carriers and their employees, thought it necessary to impose, and did impose, certain definite obligations enforceable by judicial proceedings. Id. at 567, 50 S.Ct. 427. In fact, private civil proceedings constitute the bulk of cases arising under the RLA. See United States v. Winston, 558 F.2d 105, 108 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1977) (noting [t]he paucity of criminal proceedings under § 152, when contrasted with the active pursuit of civil relief thereunder). Although much of the case law involving private causes of action under § 152 concerns claims brought by or against a certified union, our sister circuits have recognized an implied private right of action for individual employees against their employer under certain RLA provisions, notably § 152, Third and Fourth. See, e.g., Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d 298, 318 (3d Cir.2004) (collecting cases); Fennessy v. Sw. Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1362-64 (9th Cir.1996); Stepanischen v. Merchs. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir.1983). The Third Circuit explained that [i]mplying a private cause of action for individual employees under 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third & Fourth is appropriate given that those sections prohibit carriers from discriminating against employees in connection with union organizing activities. [1] Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d at 318 (emphasis in original). By contrast, the Third Circuit declined to find an implied private cause of action for individual employees in § 152, Second and Ninth because, although the statute may indicate a congressional intent to create a private cause of action for a duly certified representative that is injured pursuant to these provisions, that does not imply that Congress intended to create a private right of action for any group or groups of individual employees claiming to act on behalf of the relevant employees. [2] Id. at 319.
Against this background, we consider whether § 152, First or Seventh provides an individual employee with a private right of action against his employer. Because our task is to ascertain Congress's intent, we look first to the text and structure of the statute. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). If Congress has manifested no intent to provide a private right of action, we cannot create one. See id. We identify nothing in the RLA's text or structure suggesting Congress's intent to create a private remedy. We next proceed to consider whether a private remedy is implicit in [the] statute. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). In undertaking this second inquiry, four factors guide our analysis: First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted  that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [3] For the reasons stated in the next three subsections of this opinion, we conclude that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action for employees to enforce § 152, First or Seventh. The appropriate remedy for injuries of the sort plaintiffs allege is a claim against their union for breach of the duty of fair representation. [4]
The text of § 152, First and Seventh reveals no congressional intent to create a private right of action. Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir.2007) ([T]he absence of `rights-creating language' indicates a lack of congressional intent to create private rights of action.). Section 152, First imposes a duty on all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees. Likewise, § 152, Seventh bars certain actions by a carrier, its officers, or agents. Because both provisions focus on the regulated parties, we discern no intent to confer privately enforceable rights. The statute's structure also supports this conclusion. As the Supreme Court has recognized, [t]he express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Here, Congress expressly contemplated that the RLA would be enforced through arbitral panels, see 45 U.S.C. § 184, and criminal prosecution, see 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth. [5] Congress's failure to provide similarly for private enforcement signals caution in inferring any such right of action. The prior implication of private rights under other subsections of 45 U.S.C. § 152 warrants no different conclusion. Indeed, Sandoval involved Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. In an earlier Title VI case, the Court had noted that private plaintiffs could sue under § 601. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Nevertheless, that consideration was not relevant to Sandoval 's textual and structural analysis of whether § 602 created a similar private remedy. We therefore conclude that the RLA's text and structure does not manifest Congress's intent to create a private enforcement mechanism for all provisions of the statute.
Our analysis of the four Cort v. Ash factors bolsters this conclusion. The statutory requirement in § 152, First that carriers strive to maintain agreements concerning rates, rules, and working conditions, may well benefit individual employees, the first relevant factor under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080. This is not sufficient, however, to imply a private right of action because the statutory scheme achieves its purpose by collectivizing employees' individual interests. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967) (noting that majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, § 152, First is distinguishable from § 152, Third and Fourth, for which private rights of action have been recognized, in that the latter provisions are specifically aimed at preventing employer interference with individual employees ' ability to join a collective bargaining scheme. With that interest protected, however, Congress clearly intended that individual preferences give way to the collective position embodied by the certified union representative. It is agreements reached by such representatives with employers that are the focus of § 152, First. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937) (observing that § 152, First is concerned with negotiations between an employer and the authorized representative of its employees). Indeed, the second Cort v. Ash factor signals that Congress did not intend to provide a private cause of action for individual employees in § 152, First. See 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080. Section 152, Second states that [ a ] ll disputes between a carrier ... and its ... employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedition, in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier... and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (emphasis added). Section 152, Fourth explains that the very right to organize and bargain collectively is accomplished  through representatives of [the employees'] own choosing. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (emphasis added). That provision further states that [t]he majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter. Id. Taken together, these provisions leave no doubt that, where, as here, a craft or class of employees has selected a representative union, Congress intended the power to make and the duty to maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, id. § 152, First, to run between the representative union and the company. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that members [of a craft or class] cannot bargain individually on behalf of themselves as to matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 200, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944); see also Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. at 548, 57 S.Ct. 592. Relatedly, we conclude under the third Cort v. Ash factor that it would not be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply a private cause of action for employees under § 152, First. By its terms, § 152, First links its requirement to make and maintain agreements to the larger RLA purpose to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First; see also id. § 151a(1). As described above, the statute seeks to achieve this goal by vesting collective bargaining authority in representative unions. The Supreme Court has explained that, in enacting the RLA, Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents, but it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. at 202, 65 S.Ct. 226. As such, the RLA is consistent with a [n]ational labor policy ... built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001. The union's ability to exercise this vested authority is protected by the RLA. At the same time, it is the union's corresponding duty to those it represents that ensures the fair exercise of this authority. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. at 202, 65 S.Ct. 226. It could not be otherwise in a statutory regime that prioritizes continuity and majority-rule over the complete satisfaction of all who are represented. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001. The facts of this case demonstrate why individual employee actions under § 152, First would be inconsistent with a statutory scheme embodying these principles. The Restructuring Participation Agreement, which plaintiffs complain fails to maintain a 2001 collective bargaining agreement (CBA), was agreed to by APFA on April 8, 2003, and approved by APFA's members on April 16, 2003. In that document, the parties agree that the 2001 CBA shall remain in full force and effect except as modified herein. Among the modifications here at issue was the date for possible amendment of the CBA, with the union and its membership agreeing to an extension from November 30, 2004, to April 30, 2009. Following the disclosure of the Special Executive Retirement Plan on April 17, 2003, the union extracted a concession from American Airlines on the point, making the 2001 CBA amendable one year earlier, on April 30, 2008. However dissatisfied individual employees may be with these modifications to the 2001 CBA, allowing them to sue American Airlines under § 152, First to set aside a Restructuring Participation Agreement agreed to by their union representative and ratified by the union membership would risk the very disruption in commerce that the RLA seeks to avoid. Indeed, under the agreed-to modifications, American Airlines cannot simply revert to the original terms of the 2001 CBA. Plaintiffs' dispute is thus not with American Airlines, which could not take the action plaintiffs seek without violating the modified CBA, but rather with the union, which negotiated for the modified CBA terms that now bind American Airlines and that form the basis of plaintiffs' claim. A claim of this nature is appropriately brought against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 181, 87 S.Ct. 2001 (It was because the national labor policy vested unions with power to order the relations of employees with their employer that this Court found it necessary to fashion the duty of fair representation.); see also infra 60-63 (discussing plaintiffs' duty of fair representation claim).
The statutory provision prohibiting carriers from changing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions except as prescribed by agreement or statute, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh, may also benefit employees, but here too we do not recognize an implied private right of action by individual employees against an employer. As the Supreme Court has observed, the purpose of § 152, Seventh is twofold: it operates to give legal and binding effect to collective agreements, and it lays down the requirement that collective agreements can be changed only by the statutory procedures. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. at 156, 90 S.Ct. 294. Thus, § 152, Seventh is a status quo provision, requiring that parties to a CBA governed by the RLA maintain objective working conditions during the pendency of any dispute arising under (or during the re-negotiation of) their CBA. In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 483 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007). More specifically, in the event of a major dispute, § 152, Seventh preserves the status quo while the employer and the union engage in the negotiation required by 45 U.S.C. §§ 155 and 156. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 U.S. at 302-03, 109 S.Ct. 2477. Precisely because the statutory scheme as interpreted by the courts recognizes the representative union as the proper party to invoke § 152, Seventh, we conclude that the second and third Cort v. Ash factors weigh heavily against recognition of a private right of action by individual employees. See 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080. The provision is only implicated where a craft or class of employees has already selected a representative to bargain collectively on its behalf, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth, and where an employer attempts to make changes that affect the employees as a class, § 152, Seventh. Under those circumstances, an individual employee's power to order his own relations with his employer is extinguishe[d] in favor of a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001. Because we conclude that neither § 152, First nor § 152, Seventh provides a private cause of action to individual employees against their employers under the circumstances presented here, we affirm the district court's dismissal of these claims and its entry of judgment in favor of defendants.