Opinion ID: 490124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of Qualified Speech or Debate Claim in Light of Gillock

Text: 48 As we have discussed, the core rationale for the speech or debate privilege has traditionally been the protection of legislative independence through a prophylactic rule assuring members of Congress that their legislative activities cannot lead to harassment by the executive or the judiciary. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182, 86 S.Ct. 749, 756, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); see also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 502, 95 S.Ct. at 1821. The need to prevent this harassment has overridden the danger of legislative misconduct inadvertently protected by the privilege. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516, 92 S.Ct. at 2539. Gillock made clear, however, that the concern with potential harassment rests on an underlying concern for maintenance of the separation of powers. 445 U.S. at 370, 100 S.Ct. at 1192. Federalism and comity do not raise the same concerns because the Supremacy Clause sanctions interference with state legislatures by the federal executive and judiciary so long as they pursue legitimate federal aims. Accordingly, Gillock 's reasoning suggests that prevention of intimidation is simply not a legitimate rationale for extension of the privilege to state legislators. 49 As a practical matter, Gillock 's holding also makes the prevention of intimidation and harassment impossible. The greatest potential for intimidation, of course, lies in the power of the federal government actually to prosecute legislators for their actions. The prophylactic function of the privilege is therefore undermined once federal officials may prosecute legislators for their legislative acts and obtain and use evidence of legislative acts for that purpose. Although the federal government may have less interest in intruding on state legislative functions when no misconduct is alleged, a qualified privilege that gives way when misconduct is alleged cannot insulate state legislators from intimidation. A qualified privilege therefore cannot serve a purpose for state legislators similar to that which lies at the core of the privilege for members of Congress. 7 50 In addition to this core rationale, Gillock also recognized that legislative independence may in some senses be unrelated to the threat of intimidation. Even apart from the potential impact federal intimidation may have on a legislator's activity, a subpoena may burden a state legislator with onerous production requirements or may force a state legislator to disclose confidential communications. Having found that the core rationale is inapplicable here, we must still examine whether these threats to the functioning of the legislature justify creation of a qualified privilege that may apply to cases in which the federal interest is less compelling than it was in Gillock. 51 We certainly agree that a subpoena directed at the records of an ongoing legislative investigation could be unduly burdensome and may intrude on important legislative interests. We take this problem seriously because the citizenry not only has a strong interest in the success of federal criminal prosecutions to punish and to deter misconduct, but also a strong interest in the success of state legislative investigations that may lead to changes preventing future misconduct. Furthermore, the burden on legislators is a speech or debate concern. The Supreme Court has held analogously that the Speech or Debate Clause shields Congressmen from suit to block a Congressional subpoena because making the legislators defendants creates a distraction and forces Members [of Congress] to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503, 95 S.Ct. at 1821. 52 We do not believe, however, that a state legislator's interest in avoiding the burdens of compliance with a subpoena is alone sufficient to justify creation of a speech or debate privilege. Gillock instructs us that any such privilege must be qualified, not absolute, and must therefore depend on a balancing of the legitimate interests on both sides. Yet Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure already authorizes a district court to quash or modify a subpoena that is unreasonable or oppressive. That rule permits the district court to protect state legislators from undue disruption of their activities while still accommodating the need for information by the party issuing the subpoena. Interests of comity and federalism require that a district court respect the needs of state legislators, but Rule 17 continues to be the proper vehicle for accommodating the competing interests. 53 The state legislator's need for confidentiality is more troublesome. As a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit has noted, the legislator's need for confidentiality is similar to the need for confidentiality in communications between judges, between executive officials, and between a President and his aides. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C.Cir.1973). The need for a full, frank exchange of ideas has led courts to recognize qualified privileges for each of these governmental decisionmakers. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3107-08, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (recognizing privilege for Presidential communications because [a] President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately); United States v. Weber Aircraft, 465 U.S. 792, 802, 104 S.Ct. 1488, 1494, 79 L.Ed.2d 814 (1984) (recognizing privilege for executive officials because history of governmental privileges recognizes a need for claims of privilege when confidentiality is necessary to ensure frank and open discussion and hence efficient governmental operations) (citations omitted); In Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit (Hastings), 783 F.2d 1488, 1519 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 3273, 91 L.Ed.2d 562 (1986) (recognizing judicial privilege because [j]udges, like Presidents, depend upon open and candid discourse with their colleagues and staff to promote the effective discharge of their duties.). 54 Even while granting governmental officials a qualified, confidentiality privilege, however, the courts have taken pains to insure that the privilege applies only to the very limited extent that the public good in confidentiality transcends the value of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth. Trammell, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. at 912 (quotation omitted). In Nixon, for example, the enormous importance and sensitivity of the President's personal communications motivated the Supreme Court to hold that these communications are presumptively privileged, requiring the prosecutor to make a threshold showing of need and permitting the prosecutor access only to relevant, admissible evidence. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713-16, 94 S.Ct. at 3110-11. However, the Court held that the President's generalized interest in confidentiality, id. at 713, 94 S.Ct. at 3110, could not prevail over the need for evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial, id. at 712, 94 S.Ct. at 3110. 55 When dealing with lesser governmental officials, courts have treated claims of privilege even more strictly. They have required a threshold showing that communications of executive or judicial officials involve confidential deliberations about the decisions entrusted to them before those communications become presumptively privileged. See, e.g., Hastings, 783 F.2d at 1520-22 (11th Cir.1986) (judicial privilege applies only upon showing that matters under inquiry implicate communications among a judge and his staff concerning performance of judicial business such as ... the framing and researching of opinions, orders and rulings); N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-54, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 1516-18, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975) (executive privilege for agency officials applies only to documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated) (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C.1966). 56 These precedents reflect the judicial reasoning and experience required by Rule of Evidence 501. In accordance therewith, we do not believe that the needs of state legislators for confidentiality justify the creation of a qualified privilege for the full range of legislative activities normally protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Not all acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process, Brewster, 408 U.S. at 525, 92 S.Ct. at 2544; will involve confidential communications, and many communications actually made in confidence have only limited need for confidentiality. For this reason, our prior decisions have recognized that confidentiality does not lie at the root of the concerns motivating a privilege for all legislative speech or debate. The speech or debate privilege is at its core a use privilege not a privilege of nondisclosure. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 523 (3d Cir.1985); In re Grand Jury (Eilberg), 587 F.2d 589, 595-96 (3d Cir.1978). 57 Our survey of the suggested rationales for the speech or debate privilege for members of Congress convinces us that after Gillock even a qualified speech or debate privilege for state legislators would not realistically serve the purposes that the Speech or Debate Clause is intended to advance. Neither the threat of harassment, the dangers of distraction, nor the potential disruption of confidential communications justifies a qualified privilege for the full range of legislative activities normally protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. We therefore refuse to recognize such a privilege; hence we reject the underlying rationale for the district court's decision.