Opinion ID: 289736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Disposition of This Appeal

Text: 19 Because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Febre possessed the narcotics which led to his convictions on counts three and four of the indictment, we conclude that his convictions on these two counts must be reversed. Until recently we could confidently have ended our inquiry with the conclusion that Febre's conviction on count two was supported by sufficient evidence. Since Febre received four concurrent sentences, if we were to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine we would not be required to reach his objections to his convictions on counts three and four. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L. Ed. 1774 (1943). Last Term, however, in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the Supreme Court declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and suggested that there was no satisfactory explanation for its existence. 395 U.S. at 789, 89 S.Ct. 2056. In declining to apply the doctrine, the Court was concerned that convictions which the principle precluded from being reviewed could later have undesirable collateral consequences for defendants. As we read Benton the doctrine may still be employed if it is reasonable to conclude in the particular case that no undesirable collateral consequences would flow from its application. In fact, we have applied the concurrent sentence doctrine in a case decided after Benton. See United States ex rel. Weems v. Follette, 414 F. 2d 417 (2d Cir.1969). But Weems was a collateral attack on a conviction rather than a direct appeal, and the Court remarked in Benton that a stronger case for total abolition of the concurrent sentence doctrine may well be made in cases on direct appeal. 395 U.S. at 793, n. 11, 89 S.Ct. at 2062. 20 Although in this case we have determined not to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and, instead, to reverse Febre's convictions on counts three and four, we see no reason to vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial on the other two counts. Mindful of the Benton rationale, we consider it highly unlikely that the evidence presented on the two counts we have reversed could have been mistakenly considered by the jury as tending to establish guilt under the second count of the indictment. Count two arose from a discrete series of events, transfer of the narcotics on February 20 and payment on February 23; none of the evidence presented on the other substantive crimes charged in the indictment related to events which occurred prior to March 8. Furthermore, the testimony on the reversed counts would have been before the jury even had these counts been dismissed, for all of this evidence tended to show the existence of the conspiracy charged in count five. For this reason, we consider inapposite the analogy drawn by our brother Hays between this evidence and inadmissible evidence of other crimes. 21 Neither do we discern any cause to remand for resentencing, as we have done on occasions where the convictions on the reversed counts may have affected the sentences imposed on the remaining counts. See United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561 (2d Cir.1958). Since Febre's six-year sentence was only one year longer than the statutory minimum, we believe it unlikely that resentencing would result in a reduced sentence. Strong evidence that the number of counts on which each defendant was convicted had no influence on the court's decision on sentencing buttresses this conclusion. Pego, convicted on all five counts of the indictment, was sentenced to only five years' imprisonment; Bless, convicted only on the fourth count, received a seven-year sentence. 22 The convictions on counts two and five of the indictment are affirmed and those on counts three and four reversed.