Opinion ID: 542009
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sec. 437h Certification.

Text: 43 When Congress passed comprehensive amendments to FECA in 1974, it also established a system for expedited review of any constitutional challenges. Section 437h provides in full: 44 The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of this Act. The district court immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc. (emphasis added). 45 The legislative history of this unusual provision is thin. According to Justice O'Connor, when Senator Buckley introduced this amendment, he limited his explanation to the following comments: 46 [I]t is a modification that I am sure will prove acceptable to the managers of the bill. It merely provides for the expeditious review of the constitutional questions I have raised. I am sure we will all agree that if, in fact, there is a serious question as to constitutionality of this legislation, it is in the interest of everyone to have the question determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time. 47 Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 582, 102 S.Ct. 1235, 1238, 71 L.Ed.2d 432 (1981) (quoting 120 Cong.Rec. 10562, 1974). 48 Although the language of the statute requires the district court to certify all constitutional questions, courts have held that this mandatory phrasing should not be read to require them automatically to certify every constitutional question to an en banc court of appeals. In CALMED, 453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1980), the Court explained in a footnote that it did not construe Sec. 437h to require certification of constitutional claims that are frivolous ... or that involve purely hypothetical applications of the statute ... or in cases where the resolution of such questions required a fully developed factual record. Id. at 193-94, n. 14, 101 S.Ct. at 2720, n. 14. 14 49 The District Court was acting within its discretion when it refused to certify the case once it found the constitutional questions frivolous; the issue we face is whether the court properly concluded that the constitutional questions were frivolous. Frivolous is not a transparent or unproblematic concept as applied in this context. Once a core provision of FECA has been reviewed and approved by the courts, unanticipated variations also may deserve the full attention of the appellate court. At the same time, not every sophistic twist that arguably presents a new question should be certified. Once the statute has been thoroughly reviewed by the Court, questions arising under blessed provisions understandably should meet a higher threshold. 50 There have been few reported decisions that dismissed FECA challenges on the ground that they were frivolous. Although no courts explicitly have addressed the issue, determining what constitutes a frivolous question for the purposes of Sec. 437h certification should not necessarily be the same as what constitutes a frivolous question, for example, for Rule 11 or perhaps even for 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) purposes. 15 For obvious reasons, the court should have a higher threshold for a frivolous finding in the latter two contexts than in the case where the issue is certification to an en banc appellate court. Further, as the Court observed in CALMED, 453 U.S. 182, 193, n. 13, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 2720, n. 13, the Federal Election Campaign Act is not an unlimited fountain of constitutional questions, and it is thus reasonable to assume that resort to Sec. 437h will decrease in the future. The time may come when all provisions of the Act will have been reviewed for facial constitutionality--the apparent impetus for the expedited judicial review provision. An as applied challenge by a party whose acts fall within one of the already approved provisions may not merit consideration by the full appellate court, yet certainly should not necessarily subject the pleader to Rule 11 sanctions. 51 Two courts have viewed the district court's role in a Sec. 437h case as similar to that of a single judge presented with a motion to convene a three judge court to hear constitutional challenges. Mott v. FEC, 494 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C.1980); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C.Cir.), aff'd 431 U.S. 950, 97 S.Ct. 2667, 53 L.Ed.2d 267 (1977). Under that standard, a single judge could dismiss constitutional claims which already had been decided. We believe this is a more appropriate standard. Such a standard may more closely resemble that applied under Rule 12(b)(6) to the failure to state a claim than it does the frivolousness standard under Sec. 1915(d). See Neitzke v. Williams, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (holding that a complaint filed pro se is not automatically frivolous within the meaning of Sec. 1915(d) because it fails to state a claim). A complaint is frivolous where none of the legal points are arguable on their merits. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1831. Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive rule of law. Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously insupportable. On the contrary, if as a matter of law 'it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,' [citation omitted], a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one. Id. at 1832. We conclude that at least where the legal issue has been resolved by the Supreme Court, the district court need not certify the constitutional challenge.