Opinion ID: 806193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Venue Requirement

Text: A defendant’s right to be tried in the state and district in which the charged crime “shall have been committed” is grounded in two provisions of the Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI, and reiterated in Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. The requirement derives from colonial grievances against the Crown, which had sometimes transported American colonists across the sea to stand trial in England. See Drew L. 10 Kershen, Vicinage, 29 Okla. L. Rev. 801, 807 (1976) (noting specific reference to this grievance in Declaration of Independence). Thus, the Constitution’s venue requirement was adopted to shield a federal defendant from “the unfairness and hardship” of prosecution “in a remote place.” United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958); see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1775, at 654 (photo. reprint 1999) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (observing that object of Constitution’s vicinage clause is to prevent “accused from being dragged to a trial in some distant state”). Despite its constitutional pedigree, venue is not an element of any crime, so as to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, venue need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 318 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2007) (collecting cases).2 The sufficiency of the evidence to support a preponderance finding of venue is a question of law that we review de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d at 318. 2 Indeed, because venue is not an element of a crime, a question might be raised as to whether venue disputes must, in fact, be submitted to a jury. See United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d at 119 n.5 (noting issue without deciding it); United States v. Hart-Williams, 967 F. Supp. 73, 76–78 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that venue need not be decided by jury and collecting cases). As in Rommy, no such question was raised in this case, and thus we do not attempt to answer it here. 11 Where, as here, a defendant is charged with multiple crimes in a single indictment, the government must satisfy venue with respect to each charge. See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d Cir. 1989). In considering whether the government has carried this burden, we begin by determining the locus delicti of the particular crime at issue, employing the two-step analysis set forth in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, which seeks first to “identify the conduct constituting the offense,” and then to “discern the location of the commission of the criminal acts.” 526 U.S. at 279–80; see also United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1998) (“[T]he locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.”); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2005). Although statutory language necessarily informs the first step of the analysis, the Supreme Court has “rejected a rigid ‘verb test’ that ‘unduly limits the inquiry into the nature of the offense and thereby creates a danger that certain conduct prohibited by statute will be missed.’” United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280). Similarly, at the second step, the law recognizes that not all crimes consist of a single, non-continuing act, so as to locate venue in a single district. See United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d at 139. “The commission of some crimes can span several districts.” United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d at 119. In such circumstances, Congress has 12 instructed that venue properly lies in “any district” in which the charged offense “was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). To comport with constitutional safeguards, we have construed this language to require more than “some activity in the situs district”; instead, there must be “substantial contacts,” considering “the site of the defendant’s acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding.” United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985); accord United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 895 (2d Cir. 2008). Further, to support venue, what is begun or continued in a district must be a part of the actual charged crime, not merely steps preparatory to the crime. See United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d at 319; United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1190. Finally, there must be some “sense of [venue] having been freely chosen” by the defendant. United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d at 481. This does not mean that evidence must show that a defendant had actual knowledge that particular acts would occur in a particular district to support venue at that location. Rather, it asks whether the acts’ “occurrence in the district of venue [would] have been reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant. United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d at 123. With these principles in mind, we consider Davis’s venue challenge. 13 B. The Conduct Constituting the Crimes of Conviction Although Davis challenges venue on three counts of conviction—the Hobbs Act attempted Elmont robbery (Count Two), § 924(c)(1) use of a firearm in furtherance of the Elmont robbery (Count Four), and § 924(j) use of a firearm in furtherance of the Elmont robbery resulting in death (Count Five)—we need focus only on the Hobbs Act count in light of Supreme Court precedent holding that “[w]here venue is appropriate for the underlying crime of violence,” it is also appropriate for related § 924 firearms offenses committed in furtherance of the act of violence. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 282. In identifying the “conduct constituting” the charged Hobbs Act offense, id. at 279, we begin with the statutory text. The Hobbs Act prohibits, among other things, “in any way or degree obstruct[ing], delay[ing], or affect[ing] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The statute defines “robbery” to mean “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another . . . by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property.” Id. § 1951(b)(1). Because the Hobbs Act criminalizes a particular type of “robbery”—i.e., one that “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce,” id. § 1951(a)—venue for a substantive Hobbs Act charge is “‘proper in any district where interstate commerce is affected or where the alleged acts took place.’” United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 14 383 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n a prosecution under the Hobbs Act, venue is proper in any district where commerce is affected because the terms of the statute itself forbid affecting commerce in particular ways.”). This is consistent with Congress’s ability to “provide that the locality of a crime shall extend over the whole area through which force propelled by an offender operates.” United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944); accord United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d at 312–13 (“Congress may, consistent with the venue clauses of Article III and the Sixth Amendment, define the essential conduct elements of a criminal offense in terms of their effects, thus providing venue where those effects are felt.”).3 Davis argues that basing venue on a potential effect on interstate commerce would effectively eliminate all constraints on venue in Hobbs Act cases. This is because even a potential effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act, see United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2007), regardless 3 Another crime for which the law recognizes venue both in a district where a defendant commits an act and in the district where the act has an effect is obstruction of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(i) (providing that prosecution for obstructing justice may be brought not only in “district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred,” but also in “district in which the official proceeding . . . was intended to be affected”); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1054 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that § 1512(i), then § 1512(h), codifies prior judicial decisions holding venue proper in “district where government proceedings were affected”); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d at 486 (“The contacts with the Southern District for jurisdictional and enforcement purposes are no less because the attempt to obstruct the proceeding there failed.”). 15 of the defendant’s state of mind with respect to the commerce element, see United States v. Silverio, 335 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2003). But we have had no occasion to consider whether the same conclusion applies to venue, particularly in light of our precedent discussing the need for some “sense” that the defendant chose venue, United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d at 481, even if only by foreseeing the effect of his actions in the venue district, see United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d at 123. The point warrants little discussion on this appeal because the evidence shows both that an effect on interstate commerce in the Southern District of New York from the Elmont robbery was reasonably foreseeable to Davis, see infra at [19–21], and that Davis purposefully took steps in the Southern District of New York to advance the robbery at a point where it seemingly had stalled, see infra at [21–24]. Further, Davis stands convicted of attempted rather than completed Hobbs Act robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Attempt is an inchoate offense, requiring that a defendant have taken a “‘substantial step’ in furtherance of the intended crime” to support conviction. United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2011) (collecting cases discussing how “substantial step” requirement widened ambit of attempt liability beyond that provided at common law), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 833. Where a particular attempt involves criminal activity spanning more than one district, venue can properly lie, consistent with caveats already discussed, “wherever the attempt . . . was begun, 16 continued, or completed.” United States v. Drachenberg, 623 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Most obviously, venue for attempt will lie in the district where a substantial step toward commission of the offense occurred. In the case of a Hobbs Act robbery, this means venue will lie in any district where a substantial step toward robbery took place. But because a Hobbs Act robbery must affect interstate commerce, venue may also be informed by where the defendant knew or reasonably should have foreseen that interstate commerce would be affected. As we have recognized in the context of conspiracy, another inchoate offense, venue may lie in a district where the defendant knows or reasonably should foresee that acts in furtherance of the criminal enterprise would take place, even if such events have not yet occurred. See United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d at 123. Thus, in reviewing Davis’s challenge to venue in the Southern District of New York, we consider whether a reasonable jury could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that Davis (1) knew or reasonably should have foreseen that interstate commerce would have been affected in the Southern District by completion of the attempted Elmont robbery, or (2) took a substantial step in furtherance of that intended robbery in the Southern District. We identify record support for both these findings. 17 C. The Location and Effects of the Attempted Elmont Robbery In proceeding to “discern the location of the commission of the criminal acts” constituting the charged crime, United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279, we readily identify any number of significant steps taken by Davis in the Eastern District of New York intended to culminate in the commission of Hobbs Act robbery. On the morning of October 31, 2002, an armed Davis traveled to Elmont, Long Island, to commit the robbery. There, he forcibly entered the target residence. Once inside that residence, Davis shot and killed a woman in response to efforts to prevent him from carrying out the robbery. These substantial steps brought the intended Hobbs Act robbery about as close to fruition as possible while still constituting an attempt. Indeed, the only reason Davis’s conduct qualified as an attempt rather than a completed crime was that his use of force resulted in the loss of human life rather than personal property. These substantial steps in the Eastern District, however, are not the only circumstances relevant to venue. 1. The Effect of the Attempted Elmont Robbery on Interstate Commerce in the Bronx First, there is no question that the crime Davis came so close to committing would have affected interstate commerce directly in the Southern District of New York. DeLeon was a large-scale drug dealer who acquired his contraband from out of state and sold it to customers in the Bronx and Manhattan. Insofar as the planned Elmont robbery would 18 have stolen drugs intended for sale in these boroughs or money (the proceeds of such sales) that would have financed DeLeon’s future drug sales in these boroughs, the robbery would have affected commerce in the Southern District of New York. See United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 682 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that commerce element may be satisfied by showing that “robbery depleted assets that would have purchased goods in interstate commerce,” whether putative transactions are “legal or illegal”). To the extent there is any question as to whether Davis—in addition to Gunn and Needham—had actual knowledge of the Southern District locus of DeLeon’s drug trafficking,4 Davis’s prior participation with Gunn and Needham in a pattern of robberies of persons dealing drugs in the Bronx, together with the proximity of DeLeon’s home in Elmont to the Bronx, was enough to show that it was more probable than not that Davis understood the likelihood that this also would be a robbery of a drug dealer who sold drugs in the Bronx. See generally United States v. Rowe, 414 F.3d 271, 279 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant who posted advertisement for child pornography from home computer in Kentucky was properly prosecuted in Southern District of New York because he “must have known or contemplated” world-wide transmittal of advertisement); United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 483 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that 4 Davis did not raise this question in the district court, and the parties appear to have given it little attention at trial. In moving for a judgment of acquittal on Counts Two, Four and Five, Davis’s counsel mistakenly called “[t]he fact that Mr. DeLeon may have run a drug business in the Southern District of New York” simply “irrelevant” to venue. Trial Tr. 1540. 19 “savvy investor” would reasonably foresee that his stock trades would be executed on either NYSE or AMEX in Southern District of New York); United States v. Kim, 246 F.3d 186, 193 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant who knew victim paid invoices from bank located in Southern District of New York could reasonably foresee faxes and wire transfers in that district). Thus, this case does not require us to delineate the constitutional limits of a venue determination based on a de minimis or collateral effect on interstate commerce unforeseeable to the defendant.5 In this case, Davis attempted to affect illicit commerce that he reasonably could have foreseen was conducted in the Southern District of New York by committing a robbery in the Eastern District of New York, circumstances that support venue in both districts. 2. Davis’s Substantial Steps in the Bronx in Furtherance of the Attempted Elmont Robbery We need not here decide, however, whether this foreseeable potential effect on commerce in the Southern District of New York is sufficient, by itself, to support the challenged venue under our substantial contacts rule. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d at 481. Any concern in that respect is removed by a second circumstance relevant to venue: Davis’s own actions on the morning of the attempted robbery directed at the Southern District of New York. On October 31, 2002, an armed Davis arrived at the DeLeon home ready to commit robbery. Such conduct, by itself, went beyond “mere 5 We do not consider or decide whether Davis could have been prosecuted for crimes related to the Elmont robbery in California, the source location of DeLeon’s drug supply. 20 preparation,” United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir. 1980); it was a substantial step “planned to culminate” in the commission of the attempted Hobbs Act robbery, United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.) (citing Model Penal Code § 5.01(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), in explaining “substantial step” requirement of attempt),6 abrogated on other grounds by National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 254–55 (1994); accord United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d at 147. Having thus begun the attempt, Davis found his ability to proceed unexpectedly stalled by the failure of other members of the robbery crew to arrive on site as planned. To ascertain their whereabouts, Davis telephoned Needham at her Bronx residence. Upon learning from Needham that these crew members could not participate in the robbery that morning, Davis signaled his continued determination to proceed with the robbery by asking Needham to come to the site and act as his lookout. When she replied that she could not do so, Davis had her secure the assistance of another person. In short, having taken one substantial step intended to culminate in the commission of the Elmont robbery, but having found the crime stalled by others, Davis used a telephone to reach into the Southern District of New York to commit a further substantial 6 Ivic held that a defendant’s agreeing to participate in a bombing authorized by a co-defendant, examining the target site, and having the explosives “readily available” were sufficient to constitute a substantial step toward the bombing’s commission, although barely. 700 F.2d at 67. Here, not only had Davis agreed to participate in the robbery after the target site had been surveyed, but he had arrived at the site on the morning of the robbery, armed and ready to commit the crime. 21 step, procuring persons who could immediately provide the assistance necessary to restart the crime. See United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d at 122 (discussing how defendant “propels” himself into district to which he makes telephone calls); see also United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d at 895 (holding that defendant’s “electronic transmissions” into district supported venue where received). Indeed, because Davis made this telephone call as he stood outside the DeLeon home ready to enter and rob it, the identification of the call as a substantial step intended to culminate in the commission of Hobbs Act robbery is even more apparent than in United States v. Stephenson, where we held that telephone calls placed into the Southern District of New York laying the groundwork for bribes were “part and parcel” of a bribery offense culminating weeks later. 895 F.2d at 875. Although “not physically present” in the Bronx on October 31, 2002, Davis could not—and, as the evidence indicates, would not—have forged ahead with the robbery had he not “enter[ed], by telephone, the Southern District.” Id. at 874. Further, insofar as Needham, in the Bronx, then proceeded to make calls to secure the assistance Davis needed, her actions in the Southern District of New York in furtherance of the planned robbery are also fairly chargeable to Davis. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (holding defendant responsible for actions of others that he “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures”); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recognizing that defendant who did nothing himself in venue district may nevertheless be held to account there if he aided and abetted confederates’ acts in 22 district); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 212 (subjecting principal “to liability for the consequences of another’s conduct which results from his directions” if principal “intends the conduct, or if he intends its consequences”). In sum, when we consider in the aggregate that (1) the elements and nature of the Hobbs Act required that Davis attempt a robbery that would have an effect on interstate commerce; (2) the effect on commerce of the attempted Elmont robbery would fall directly in the Southern District of New York; (3) the effect on commerce in the Southern District was at least reasonably foreseeable to Davis; (4) at a critical point after Davis had already taken a substantial step intended to culminate in Hobbs Act robbery, he took a further substantial step in the Southern District of New York that was essential to allowing him to proceed with that robbery; and (5) the Southern and Eastern Districts were equally suitable for accurate factfinding, we conclude that venue for the Hobbs Act and firearms crimes pertaining to the Elmont robbery was proper in the Southern District of New York. See United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d at 894–95.7