Opinion ID: 2339668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does the record clearly reflect the alleged error?

Text: [¶ 12] The record is clear, and the State concedes, that the trial court did not give the advisements that are customarily given to a defendant after the State rested its case. In Sanchez v. State, 841 P.2d 85 (Wyo.1992), we recommended that trial courts should inquire of a defendant if he understands his right to testify or not to testify and that his choice is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 89, 841 P.2d 85. We made this recommendation to insure[ ] a valid waiver of the defendant's right and to assist in any subsequent appellate review of the defendant's claim to the contrary. Id. [¶ 13] Because the procedure was only a recommended procedure, failure to follow it does not automatically result in a reversible error. In Lobatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716 (Wyo.1994), we clarified that the recommended procedure was merely a suggestion and not intended to establish any mandatory procedure that required reversal if the trial court failed to follow it. Id. at 724. This issue was again raised in Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1125 (Wyo.1997). We reiterated, In Lobatos, however, we made it clear that questioning the defendant on the record is not mandatory. 875 P.2d at 724. The trial court's failure to inquire as to whether the defendant wants to testify is not a denial of the defendant's right to testify. Harris, 933 P.2d at 1125. [¶ 14] Here, the trial court did advise Mebane at arraignment of his right to remain silent; Mebane requested, and received, an instruction to the jury informing jurors that he did not have to testify; the record indicates he was Mirandized when arrested; and the record indicates that during the recess after the State rested its case, Mebane's attorney requested time to visit with him on whether or not he would testify. The record is clear that Mebane understood he did not have to testify unless he chose to. [¶ 15] Mebane's choice to testify may have been the result of a sincere, but subjective, belief that the jurors secretly held the same view as the two jurors who were struck and that he had to testify or he would be found guilty; but there is nothing in the record that indicates the jurors who decided the case held that view. In fact, the record shows they understood and respected Mebane's right not to testify. In hindsight, his decision to testify may have been unwise; but he also has a right to testify even if it turns out to be the wrong choice. As long as a defendant understands he has a right to testify, or not, the choice he makes is a matter of trial tactics. The choice, however, must be one the defendant makes. [¶ 16] The court in LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991), explained it well: In the narrow world of the courtroom the defendant may have faith, even if mistaken, in his own ability to persuasively tell his story to the jury. He may desire to face his accusers and the jury, state his position, and submit to examination. His interest may extend beyond content to the hope that he will have a personalized impact upon the jury or gain advantage from having taken the stand rather than to seek the shelter of the Fifth Amendment. Or, without regard to impact upon the jury, his desire to tell his side in a public forum may be of overriding importance to him. Indeed, in some circumstances the defendant, without regard to the risks, may wish to speak from the stand, over the head of judge and jury, to a larger audience. It is not for his attorney to muzzle him. Id. at 221 (quoting Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1078 (5th Cir.1978) (Godbold, J., dissenting)). [¶ 17] Nor is it for the trial court to muzzle him. [¶ 18] In summary, it is not error for the trial court to fail to advise a defendant of his right not to testify if such an advisement was given at arraignment as it was here. If on appeal a defendant contends he still didn't understand that right, he must point to evidence on the record that supports his contention of being uninformed. Mebane has not done that here. Moreover, the evidence in the record is to the contrary. [¶ 19] It has been nearly twenty years since we recommended in Sanchez that trial courts advise a defendant of his right to testify, or not, and of the choices he must make at the close of the State's case. We continue to recommend this procedure and will restate it here as a reminder: [T]rial judges should take steps to insure that a criminal defendant's failure to take the stand in his or her own defense was the result of a knowing and voluntary decision made by the defendant. Sanchez, 841 P.2d at 89 (quoting LaVigne, 812 P.2d at 222). Trial judges should, out of the presence of the jury, advise the defendant of the choice of rights he has to exercise and point out that by exercising his right to testify, he will be waiving the right that is not exercised. Whichever right a defendant elects to exercise, the trial court should, out of the presence of the jury, inquire of a defendant if he understands and voluntarily chooses the right he is exercising and voluntarily waives the right he is not exercising. Such action insures a valid waiver of the defendant's right. It will also assist in any subsequent appellate review of a defendant's claim to the contrary. Id. [¶ 20] We again emphasize that this is only a recommendation and not a required procedure. We also note that a defendant's attorney has a special duty to ensure that the defendant has been advised of the full array of matters associated with the basic constitutional right to remain silent to the extent that they relate to the defendant's circumstances. This includes the benefits flowing from an exercise of that right at trial and the consequences stemming from a waiver of that right. People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 124 (Colo.1986). There is nothing in the record to indicate that was not done in this case. [¶ 21] Having concluded that no error occurred in this case, there is no need to proceed with the remainder of the plain error analysis. The judgment and sentence of the district court is affirmed.