Opinion ID: 2629208
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Degree Murder Conviction Pursuant to Accomplice Liability Instruction

Text: Thomas contends that the accomplice liability instruction was erroneous because it relieved the State of its burden to prove he acted with knowledge that his actions would promote or facilitate the murder. Relying again on Roberts, Thomas points out that his instruction suffers from the same deficiencies as the accomplice liability instruction in that case. Namely, the instruction here specified that [a] person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she either: (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing a crime. CP at 1450 (emphasis added). The shortcoming of this instruction is that it does not require that the defendant had knowledge he was facilitating the crime for which he was charged. See Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 510-11, 14 P.3d 713; State v. Brown, 147 Wash.2d 330, 338, 58 P.3d 889 (2002). In contrast, the accomplice liability statute does require a mens rea of knowledge of the crime meaning, the charged offense. RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a); see also Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 510, 14 P.3d 713.