Opinion ID: 894916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Burden of Proof

Text: Yancy argues that, as the movants, the respondents bore the burden of conclusively negating an open courts violation, and that because their motions did not address the open courts provision, they failed to meet their burden. To support her position, she relies on authority requiring a defendant to negate the discovery rule as a matter of law once the plaintiff has pleaded it. See Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. 2000); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex.1997). We confronted this very question in Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 846-47 (Tex. 2001). In that case Moss sued Shah for medical negligence, and Shah moved for summary judgment based on section 10.01's limitations provision. Id. at 839. Moss countered that section 10.01 violated the open courts guarantee. Id. at 841. We said, it was Moss's burden to raise a fact issue demonstrating that . . . the open courts guarantee applies. Id. at 846-47. Unlike the discovery rule, which a defendant must negate once the plaintiff has pleaded it, a plaintiff who asserts that the open courts provision defeats limitations bears the burden of raising a fact issue. See also Brown v. Shores, 77 S.W.3d 884, 888-89 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (Brister, C.J., concurring). Thus, Yancy had the burden to present evidence of Yates's continuous mental incapacity. See Tinkle v. Henderson, 730 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1987, writ ref'd). The court of appeals held that Yancy failed to provide competent summary judgment evidence regarding Yates's mental capacity and, therefore, failed to meet that burden. 170 S.W.3d at 192-93. We disagree. When reviewing a summary judgment, we must examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824-25 (Tex.2005) (emphasis added). Here, the evidence included not only the two affidavits discussed by the court of appeals, but the anesthesiologist's deposition testimony and Yates's medical records. [4] Theuerkauf averred that she personally visited and assessed Carletha Yates in her home, and it was her opinion based upon personal observations, assessment, interviews and review of her medical records and diagnoses of her treating physicians that Carletha Yates is in a comatose, vegetative state, and, based on [her] review of [Yates's] medical records, she has been in such a condition consistently and uninterrupted since . . . May 3, 2000. The court of appeals concluded that the affidavit was not competent evidence because Theurkauf did not show herself qualified to render an opinion on Yates's medical diagnosis, and Theurkauf's statement that Yates had been in a comatose, vegetative state consistently since her surgery was wholly conclusory in nature. 170 S.W.3d at 191-92. Theuerkauf's qualifications consisted of a statement that she is a certified rehabilitation registered nurse, certified case manager, and life care planner who has been duly licensed in nursing in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee. Even assuming that she was not qualified as an expert, she was still free to offer testimony of her personal observations. The lower court recognized that Theuerkauf, a registered nurse, would have been competent to testify that the plaintiff was unresponsive, uncommunicative, and incapable of caring for herself. [5] 170 S.W.3d at 192. We see no meaningful distinction between that description and Theuerkauf's actual testimony that Yates was comatose and in a vegetative state. Theuerkauf's affidavit supports an inference that Yates is currently mentally incapacitated. Also included in the summary judgment evidence were Valley View's medical records of Yates's lithrotripsy procedure. Those records show that, during surgery, Yates suffered a cardiac arrest during which her blood-oxygen levels dropped, necessitating cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Sacker's affidavit describes a ten-minute period during which Yates had no respirations. The records further reflect that when Yates was transferred from the surgery center by ambulance she was unresponsive, with pupils fixed and dilated. Dr. Ramirez, who rode with Yates during the transfer to Medical City, testified that Yates had not regained consciousness when he last saw her and that it was his understanding she was incapacitated. While these facts alone may not absolutely exclude the possibility that Yates regained consciousness after she was transferred from the surgery center, her current comatose condition supports a reasonable inference that she never recovered. The affidavits, taken in conjunction with the medical records and Dr. Ramirez's testimony, raise a fact issue as to whether Yates has been continuously mentally incapacitated since the surgery, and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise.