Opinion ID: 3162662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: John Doe II has waived his standing argument.

Text: Idaho Code section 16-2004 provides that a petition for the termination of parental rights may be filed by: (a) either parent when termination is sought with respect to the other parent; (b) the guardian of the person or the legal custodian of the child or person standing in loco parentis to the child; (c) an authorized agency; or (d) any other person possessing a legitimate interest in the matter. The magistrate court held that John Doe I had standing under part (a) as a person acting in loco parentis or, alternatively, had standing under part (d) as an individual who had a legitimate interest in the matter. The magistrate court based its decision on the contents of the file and noted the long relationship between John Doe I and H.T.’s biological mother, Jane Doe. John Doe II asserts that the magistrate court erred in ruling that John Doe I had standing in loco parentis because the magistrate court’s decision was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. John Doe II has not advanced any argument regarding the magistrate 3 court’s determination that John Doe I had standing as a person having a legitimate interest in the matter. “This Court has consistently followed the rule that it ‘will not review the actions of a trial court, unless the action has been listed as an issue on appeal, especially where no authorities are cited and no argument is contained in the appellate briefs.’ ” Andersen v. Prof’l Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005) (quoting Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 93, 803 P.2d 993, 999 (1991)). “When a decision is ‘based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds.’ ” Id. at 746, 118 P.3d at 78 (quoting MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 671, 889 P.2d 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1995)). Because John Doe II has failed to present any argument that the magistrate court erred when it concluded that John Doe I had standing under of Idaho Code section 16-2004(d), we do not reach his claim that the magistrate erred by determining that John Doe I had standing to petition for termination of his parental rights. B. The inconsistency between the magistrate court’s oral findings of fact and written conclusions of law require this Court to vacate the order terminating John Doe II’s parental rights. This Court has consistently held that “each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 150 Idaho at 41, 244 P.3d at 185. Thus, “[g]rounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. . . .” Id. John Doe I’s petition asserted abandonment as the basis for termination of John Doe II’s parental rights. On appeal, John Doe II argues that the magistrate court’s written decision evinces a failure to evaluate the evidence presented at trial and thus, it cannot be said that the magistrate’s decision was based upon clear and convincing evidence. We find that the magistrate’s written decision is inconsistent with its oral statements and the trial judge’s manifest abdication of his duties in a case such as this requires that the order terminating John Doe II’s parental rights be vacated. Idaho Code section 16-2002(5) defines abandonment as follows: “Abandoned” means the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact. Failure of the parent to maintain this relationship without just cause for a 4 period of one (1) year shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment under this section. . . . “No hard-and-fast rule controls the question of whether a parent has abandoned his or her child; instead, each case must be decided on its own particular facts. No universally applicable normal parental relationship exists; whether such relationship exists depends on the circumstances of each case.” In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the statute unambiguously requires that the failure to maintain a normal parental relationship be willful. At the conclusion of trial, the magistrate stated: [John Doe II] is the biological father of [H.T.] and so, um, I can’t find in this particular case that [John Doe II] has intentionally tried to abandon or—or has not intentionally—I can’t find that he’s intentionally tried not to have a father-son or parental relationship with his son. Instead, the magistrate found that John Doe II: really never has had any kind of a relationship with [H.T.] because he’s been in prison and that his uh, chances of having any kind of normal relationship with him um, are slim and none because he’s going to be in prison for at least another twelve or thirteen years it appears at a minimum. And so, I will find that the—that the Petitioner in this case has indeed um, met the burden even though it is a high burden ah that it will be in the best interest of both parent and child under the circumstances because of the incarceration of that biological father…. Thus, it is clear that the magistrate found that John Doe I had failed to meet his burden of proving willful abandonment and instead found that termination should be granted based upon John Doe II’s past and future incarceration. The latter, of course, may be ground for termination of parental rights, provided that such termination is in the best interests of the minor child. I.C. § 16-2005(1)(e).1 The difficulty presented by this appeal is that the trial judge’s oral pronouncement is contradicted by his subsequent memorandum decision. The memorandum decision purports to find that John Doe II “has abandoned the child by his willful failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child.” The contradiction in findings is quite evidently the result of the trial judge’s willingness to let a pro se litigant do his job for him. 1 Idaho Code section 16-2005(1)(e) provides that an order of termination may be entered when the court “finds that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child” and that “[t]he parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time during the child’s minority.” 5 We note that the entirety of the trial judge’s efforts in preparing “his” memorandum decision were: (1) writing the case number in the caption; (2) striking the word “ORDER” from the caption and substituting the words “MEMORANDUM DECISION” by handwritten interlineation; (3) filling in the blank for the date of hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights with “04/17/2015”;2 (4) dating his signature; and (5) signing the document. The fundamental divergence between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and written decision require us to vacate the order terminating John Doe II’s parental rights. This matter is remanded with directions for the magistrate to prepare new findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our decision today is not intended to suggest that there is no basis for terminating John Doe II’s parental rights or that John Doe I should not be permitted to adopt H.T. Instead, this decision is entirely driven by a fundamental failure by the trial judge to fulfill his duties in such a case.3