Opinion ID: 1433877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant-Appellant Guthrie's Issues on Appeal

Text: Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee Guthrie raises six issues on appeal, arguing that the district court erred by: (1) permitting the Assistant United States Attorney to speak with the victim-witness during her cross-examination; (2) permitting the introduction of audio recordings of 911 calls; (3) permitting the introduction of video recording of a police pursuit; (4) refusing to issue a writ to produce a witness at trial; (5) instructing the jury on the wrong standard for intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; and (6) denying Guthrie's motions for judgment of acquittal on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendant Guthrie first argues that the district court erred by improperly and abruptly halting the cross-examination of Shavonne Williams, the victim, in order to recess for the day, and then permitting the prosecutor to speak to the witness during the recess, before the conclusion of Williams's cross-examination. Guthrie characterizes this error as a failure to sequester the witness and a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. Guthrie, however, grossly mischaracterizes the recess taken during Williams' testimony. Rather than improperly and abruptly halting the cross-examination, the district court merely called a routine recess at the end of a day of trial. The district court allowed defense counsel to finish his line of questioning. The district court called the recess after asking whether the defense was at an appropriate transition point. Although the court then allowed two prosecution witnesses to testify before calling an end to the day's proceedings, they were brief witnesses with valid reasons necessitating their immediate testimony. [2] More importantly, the possibility of these final two witnesses testifying at the end of the day was not raised until after the court had announced the recess that interrupted Williams' testimony. Defense counsel did not object to either the interruption of Williams' testimony or the inclusion of the two prosecution witnesses. We find that the district court did not abuse her discretion in interrupting Williams' testimony for an overnight recess and then allowing two brief prosecution witnesses to testify before the recess began. In considering the district court's decision to allow the prosecutor to speak with Williams while she was still on cross-examination, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Rugiero, 20 F.3d 1387, 1394 (6th Cir.1994). Guthrie fails to show any abuse of discretion. Moreover, even if the district court had abused its discretion, to reverse on these grounds we must find that the error was prejudicial to the defendant's receiving a fair trial. Id. (citation omitted). At trial, the district court called the described recess during the cross-examination of Williams, the victim in this case. As she was being dismissed, defense counsel asked that [the prosecutor] not have any conversation with [the witness]. She is on cross-examination at this point. Defense counsel then formally objected. Guthrie thus sought to prevent Williams from speaking to the prosecutor. In permitting the prosecutor to speak with the victim while she was still on cross-examination, the district court did not explicitly violate the rule on sequestration of witnesses. Federal Rule of Evidence 615 provides that at the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.  FED.R.EVID. 615 (emphasis added). Sequestration orders, even when granted, do not prohibit witnesses from speaking with counsel. See United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1011-12 (6th Cir.1998). Defendant Guthrie nonetheless argues that the district court's ruling violated the spirit of Rule 615, because the purposes of the sequestration of witnesses are to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to that of other witnesses; to facilitate the detection of less than candid testimony; and to prevent improper attempts to influence witness testimony. The district court enjoyed discretion to address those concerns by means other than prohibiting the prosecutor from speaking with the witness. In fact, the district court clearly and correctly articulated the limits of the prosecutor's permitted interaction with the witness by stating: [The prosecutor] may have conversations with his witness. He may not coach the witness. Despite the trial court's invitation to Guthrie's counsel to make any record that the prosecutor improperly communicated with Williams, Guthrie's attorney asked no questions on this when Williams retook the stand the following day. In overruling the Defendant's objection, the court told defense counsel, She is going to be here tomorrow morning at 9:00 o'clock, and you may examine her about anything improper in the interim. Moreover, the Defendant does not allege, much less demonstrate, that anything improper occurred over the recess. Although the court had encouraged the Defendant to inquire as to any impropriety over the break, when the witness resumed her testimony the following morning the Defendant did not even question the victim about the issue. Thus, there is no evidence that the court's failure to prevent the prosecutor from speaking to the victim while she was on cross-examination was prejudicial to the defendant's receiving a fair trial. Rugiero, 20 F.3d at 1394. Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate the Confrontation Clause by allowing the prosecutor to speak with the witness over the recess.
Defendant Guthrie also claims that the district court erred by permitting the introduction of audio recordings of conversations between Williams (the victim) and 911 operators. Guthrie argues that the recordings should not have been admitted because statements made in the recordings were hearsay not falling within an exception. Further, the Defendant says the recordings were unduly prejudicial. This Court reviews evidentiary rulings by the district court for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 544 (6th Cir.2008); United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 184 (6th Cir.2007) (applying abuse of discretion review to a district court's application of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(d) to 911 calls). In Arnold, this Court considered the introduction of 911 calls despite hearsay challenges. We noted that three elements must be shown to satisfy the excited utterance exception: First, there must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement. Second, the statement must be made before there is time to contrive or misrepresent. And, third, the statement must be made while the person is under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. Arnold, 486 F.3d at 184 (quoting Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.1983)). At Guthrie's trial, audio recordings of two separate 911 calls were played. The first call (chronologically as it occurred on the night of the offense) started when a 911 dispatcher called Williams' cell phone inquiring about her safety. Williams calmly told the 911 operator that she was not in any danger. She stated that she had not been abducted at gunpoint, that her cell phone battery was dying, and that she was on the expressway. The district court found that this call did not fall within the excited utterance hearsay exception because the victim sounded calm and because she not only had time to contrive, but did in fact contrive, as all of her responses were lies. Nonetheless, because the United States did not object, Guthrie played this recording at trial and questioned the victim about it on cross-examination. The second audio recording played at the trial was a clip of one of several calls made by Williams to the police during the police pursuit of the vehicle. In these later calls, Williams told police to back off in their pursuit or else she would be killed. The district court allowed the introduction of the recording of the later call based on the exited utterance hearsay exception. Assuming that the statements made during the latter 911 call were hearsay, [3] the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the statements qualified for admission under the excited utterance exception. In ruling on the issue, the district court addressed the three elements of the test applied in Arnold. At the conclusion of proof, the district court explained that it was not considering the abduction at the apartment to be the startling event. Although that event would have been sufficient to trigger the excited utterance exception, the court acknowledged that during the first 911 call, the victim exhibited a calm demeanor as she lied to the police. Thus, the statements made during subsequent 911 calls could not have been the result of the stress of being initially abducted at gunpointanother intervening startling event must have occurred. The court therefore clarified that ... [A]nother traumatic event occurred before the second call. And that was that the police had come on the scene... So I find that the other traumatic event that occurred was the police chase. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the police chase acted as an exciting catalyst. Just because the victim was calm after being abducted at gunpoint does not mean she necessarily preserved her calm. The district court could reasonably have found that when the situation turned into a police chase, the victim reacted accordingly. Based on this theory, the initiation of the police chase could have served as a new and independent startling event, sufficient to effectuate the excited utterance hearsay exception. Moreover, the district court found that admission of the recordings of the 911 calls did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the probative value of th[e] victim's call[s] from the car outweighs any prejudicial ... effect. Within the context of Rule 403, `[u]nfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis.' United States v. Lawson, 535 F.3d 434, 442 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir.2006)). The 911 calls were highly probative of the charged carjacking offense and the evidence did not suggest a decision on an improper basis. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the introduction of the 911 calls.
Defendant Guthrie also claims that the district court erred when it permitted the introduction of video recordings of the police pursuit. Guthrie argues that the recordings should not have been admitted because they were unduly prejudicial. Further, the Defendant claims that the introduction of the video recordings violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial, as well as the presumption of innocence. This Court reviews evidentiary rulings by the district court for abuse of discretion. Moon, 513 F.3d at 544. Here, Guthrie argues that the video was overly dramatic and identified Guthrie as a dangerous criminal to the jury because it showed the Defendant being pursued by numerous police officers with their lights and sirens blazing. But the Defendant again mischaracterizes the evidence. Contrary to the Defendant's argument, the single video recording shown at trial (without audio) did not depict essentially an arrest in progress. [4] The video depicted a crime in progressthe carjacking for which the Defendant was on trial. Therefore, this evidence did not violate the presumption of innocence, it merely contributed to a finding of guilt. The district court, having viewed the video and heard the parties' arguments, concluded that the video even if it is slightly cumulative ... is illustrative and makes [the event] clear actually, clearer to the jury. In so deciding, the district court did not abuse its very broad discretion in determining if the prejudicial danger of the evidence outweighed the probative value. See United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1989).