Opinion ID: 2310654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion for Severance

Text: Appellant Stone contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a separate trial under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 14. Specifically, Stone argues that he was impermissibly prejudiced when his counsel's cross-examination of Rufus Mayfield, a government witness, was curtailed as an accommodation to his co-defendant Boone. In a previous case, Mayfield and Boone had been jointly charged with burglary in 1993. Mayfield entered into a plea agreement with the government and testified against Boone at that trial, which resulted in a conviction. In the present case, Stone's counsel wanted to impeach Mr. Mayfield by questioning him on cross-examination about the full parameters of his agreement with the United States and to demonstrate the exposure that Mr. Mayfield potentially faced in the event he did not cooperate with the United States. Stone's counsel, anticipating objections from Boone, moved for a separate trial so that she could freely impeach Mayfield. The trial court denied the motion. There is a long-standing presumption that defendants jointly charged with a criminal offense should be tried together. E.g., Sterling v. United States, 691 A.2d 126, 135 (D.C.1997). In such circumstances a motion for severance under Rule 14 is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Bright v. United States, 698 A.2d 450, 454 (D.C. 1997); Walker v. United States, 630 A.2d 658, 663 (D.C.1993). This court will reverse the denial of such a motion only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Bright, 698 A.2d at 454; Parks v. United States, 656 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 873, 116 S.Ct. 198, 133 L.Ed.2d 133 (1995). To meet his burden, a defendant must show `the most compelling prejudice' . . . from which `the court would be unable to afford protection' if both offenses were tried together. Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519, 526 (D.C.1981) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Elliott v. United States, 633 A.2d 27, 34-35 (D.C.1993) (defendant must show that manifest prejudice resulted from joinder). We can discern no prejudice on this record. The trial court's denial of the severance motion did not preclude Stone from impeaching Mr. Mayfield. The court, cognizant of the potential problems that Mayfield's testimony presented for Boone, instructed Stone's counsel not to mention Boone's name when cross-examining Mayfield about the earlier case. See Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 323 (D.C.1990) (in exercising its discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination, a trial court may impose reasonable restrictions to avoid such problems as harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issue, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant). As the court remarked to Stone's counsel: [I]t still won't matter what the name of the person was. His co-defendant could have been Winfield [the judge's name]. It doesn't matter who he testified against. He had a co-defendant. He made a deal with the Government. He testified against that co-defendant, whoever it was, and then maybe if no name is mentioned and that person was convicted, that is to say you did a good job for the Government and the person was convicted. On cross-examination of Mr. Mayfield, Stone's counsel elicited testimony that he agreed to testify against the co-defendants in that [earlier] case in exchange for a reduced sentence. In addition, Mayfield admitted that as a result of his plea agreement he would be eligible for parole after six years and expect[ed] to be out in a couple of years. Contrary to Stone's present assertions, little or no value would have been added to this testimony if Mr. Mayfield had been allowed to state that the co-defendant to whom he referred was actually Boone. The jury heard that he helped the government in exchange for leniency, which was the primary objective of Stone's counsel. It was then for the jury to decide whether to credit the testimony of such a snitch. On this record we can find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Stone's motion for severance. Winestock, 429 A.2d at 526.