Opinion ID: 2621639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Possession of Razor Blade in Jail

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence he possessed razor blades in his jail cell and by instructing the jury regarding the use of this evidence, and that the evidence and instructions violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. After the jury had returned the guilt verdicts, and before the penalty phase began, the defense moved to exclude evidence that defendant had possessed razor blades in his jail cell, arguing that the evidence did not fall within any statutory aggravating factor. The trial court held a hearing out of the jury's presence at which Rae Ballard testified that on March 7, 1990, while employed as a deputy sheriff, she found a razor blade in defendant's cell at the county jail. The blade had a single edge and was approximately two and one-half inches long by one-quarter inch wide. It had been removed from a disposable razor. In the jail, possession of such a blade in a cell was not permitted, and inmates were known to use such blades as weapons, often after fastening them to handles. After hearing this testimony, the trial court denied the defense motion to exclude evidence. Thereafter, during the penalty trial, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant had been found in possession of a razor blade in his jail cell on four occasions between March 7 and September 15, 1990. At the penalty phase, the jury is permitted to consider [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) In this context, the term criminal activity includes only conduct that violates a penal statute. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1133, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) Here, defendant argues that possession of a razor blade in jail did not violate any penal statute unless the blade was fastened to a handle of some sort, and that the evidence thus did not fall within the reach of section 190.3, factor (b). Section 4574 makes it a felony for a county jail inmate to possess a deadly weapon[ ]. Within the meaning of this penal statute, an object is a deadly weapon if it has a reasonable potential of inflicting great bodily injury or death. ( People v. Martinez (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 912, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334; People v. Savedra (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 745, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115.) Even without a handle, a razor blade could be used to slice a victim's throat, wrist, or other vital spot, and thus a detached razor blade has a reasonable potential of causing great bodily injury or death. Accordingly, a county jail inmate's possession of detached razor blades violates section 4574, and evidence of such violations is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1152-1153, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572; see also People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142 [It is settled that a defendant's knowing possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody is admissible under factor (b).].) The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to exclude at the penalty phase evidence that he possessed detached razor blades while incarcerated in county jail awaiting trial in this case. Defendant challenges the trial court's instructions to the jury on the use of this evidence. The court gave these instructions: Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed the following criminal activity which involved the express or implied use of force or violence or threat of force or violence. Before you may consider such criminal acts or activity as an aggravating circumstance in this case, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did, in fact, commit such criminal activity or acts. [¶] ... This criminal activity which I just referred to as  as violence or threat of violence concerns the violation Section 4502 of the Penal Code, which is possession of a weapon, to wit, the razor blades, being  while the defendant was being confined in the county jail. The trial court's reference in the instructions to section 4502 was mistaken. Before its amendment in 1994 (Stats.1994, ch. 354, § 1, p. 2154), section 4502 applied only to state prison inmates and not to county jail inmates. (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 382 & fn. 23, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) Defendant was not prejudiced by this mistake, however, because, as we have explained, another penal statute, section 4574, prohibited possession of deadly weapons such as razor blades by county jail inmates. ( Hughes, at pp. 383-384, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) Defendant argues that whether the detached razor blades were deadly weapons within the meaning of section 4574 was a question of fact for the jury to decide, and that the trial court's instructions were erroneous insofar as they stated that detached razor blades were deadly weapons as a matter of law. We will assume, without deciding, that defendant is correct. (See People v. Rodriquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 389, 396, 123 Cal.Rptr. 185 [stating that whether a razor blade is a deadly weapon is a question of fact].) Defendant was not prejudiced, however, by the jury instructions. To find prejudice, we would need to infer that the jurors, or some of them, (1) thought the razor blades did not have a reasonable potential to inflict great bodily injury or death, and (2) despite such finding, gave the evidence of defendant's possession of the razor blades such weight that it affected the penalty determination. As in People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432, we consider this combination too unlikely to constitute prejudice. As we said there: It is quite unlikely that the jury would find the object to be ... not a deadly weapon. But if the jury made that improbable finding, thus minimizing the seriousness of the evidence, it is also quite unlikely that it would then consider the evidence to be so important as to control, or even have a significant impact upon, the penalty determination. The combination of these circumstances (unlikelihood that a properly instructed jury would have disregarded the evidence because it would not believe the shank was deadly plus the unlikelihood that a jury so finding nonetheless would give the evidence significant weight) convinces us that the error was harmless. ( Id. at p. 384, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432, fn. omitted.) Defendant argues that under the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, he had a right under the federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment to a jury determination of every factual issue relevant to the penalty determination. Not so. As this court has explained, the Ring and Apprendi decisions do not apply to the penalty phase of a capital trial under California's death penalty law. ( People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 971-972, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277; People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 453-454, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.)