Opinion ID: 2980755
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Prosecutorial Immunity

Text: The district court held in the alternative that all of Sanders’s actions were protected by qualified immunity even if absolute immunity did not apply. We also affirm the judgment on this basis. In order for qualified immunity not to apply, we must answer two questions in the affirmative: (1) do “the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right”; and (2) was “the right at issue [] ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (internal citations omitted). We need not consider these questions in any particular order. Id. at 236; Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 213-14 (6th Cir. 2011). Unlike absolute immunity, the burden lies on the plaintiff to refute a defense of qualified immunity once properly pleaded. Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1007 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136 (2000). Here, the defendant properly raised qualified immunity in his motion to dismiss. Howell, on appeal, argues that three different actions by Sanders violated her constitutional rights: (1) her “[w]rongful [a]rrest,” (2) Sanders’s “[f]ailure to [d]isclose [e]xculpatory [e]vidence,” namely certain cell-phone records, and (3) his “[m]alicious [p]rosecution” of her.7 Appellant Br. at 37, 38, 39. The latter two are easily disposed of as both are established prosecutorial actions covered by absolute immunity. Failure 7 Confusingly, these are not the actions that Howell discusses in her argument against absolute immunity, where she refers to only the polygraph cancellation and the command to arrest. Although Howell takes great issue with the purported cancellation of the polygraph in discussing absolute immunity, she never explains what constitutional right Sanders violated even if he did deny her the exam. No. 10-5797 Howell v. Sanders Page 11 to disclose purportedly exculpatory evidence clearly falls within the judicial stage and is protected by absolute immunity. See Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 82 (2010). Also, a prosecutor may bring and litigate charges with absolute immunity, even if the prosecutor acts with malice and without probable cause. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. The “malicious prosecution” cases cited by Howell were brought against other participants in a prosecution, not the prosecutor himself.8 The only act remaining that could be a constitutional violation is Sanders’s order that the police arrest Howell. However, “[i]n the context of arrest warrants, the Supreme Court affords officials broad qualified immunity protection.” Ireland, 113 F.3d at 1448. Qualified immunity generally applies unless “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court noted that “although there were some inconsistencies” in the complaining student’s testimony, “probable cause existed from the time the complaining student first gave an interview in the presence of the investigating police officer.” Howell, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 797-98. On review, we need not decide precisely the point at which probable cause appeared in order to hold that a reasonably competent officer could have concluded that a warrant should issue in this case. This court has previously upheld a finding of probable cause to arrest on the basis of a complaining witness’s statement alone. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999). However, as noted in Ahlers, more may be required when the officers have reason to doubt the truthfulness or reliability of the complaint. Id. Here, the complaining witness initially denied that he had sexual relations with Howell. His statements in his initial interview with the police also had some inconsistencies—first 8 See, e.g., Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (malicious criminal prosecution claim against non-prosecutors); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting absolute immunity in a malicious criminal prosecution claim against a police officer explicitly because he was not a prosecutor). No. 10-5797 Howell v. Sanders Page 12 he stated that they had sex the first time he visited her apartment, but later he stated that on his first visit they only visited and ordered food. The arrest warrant, however, was not obtained on this information alone. The police were able to corroborate the complaining witness’s description of Howell’s apartment and a tattoo, and they had a statement from Howell admitting to exchanging sexually explicit text messages with the student. Howell argues that the corroboration should be insufficient because some of JS’s descriptions were generic, which is true, or could have been visible through other sources, such as sneaking on to her neighbor’s deck. But these arguments do not defeat a finding of probable cause. At most they demonstrate that reasonable people may have disagreed on the issue of probable cause, not that Sanders was unreasonable in thinking probable cause existed to arrest Howell. And unlike in Harris, 513 F.3d at 510-11, where the prosecutor made the probable cause determination on her own with no input from others based on patently unreliable evidence, numerous other officials confirmed probable cause on the basis of this evidence, including Detective Frodge and Judge Easterling. The district court was therefore correct in concluding that, because Sanders did not violate Howell’s asserted constitutional rights, qualified immunity also applied.9