Opinion ID: 1791277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the lower court err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment based on plaintiff's protected liberty interest?

Text: McFadden's complaints under this assignment of error are many. He alleges that he has a protected liberty interest in continued classification at the RCCF, in continued visitation with his wife and child, and in continued participation in his job assignment in the law library. Furthermore, he alleges that he was denied procedural due process.
In considering a Motion for Summary Judgment, the lower court must take as true those allegations which are well pleaded. Considering these and any defenses which have been raised, the Motion must be overruled unless, beyond any reasonable doubt, the court believes that the plaintiff would be unable to prove any facts which would support his claim. McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871, 874 (Miss. 1989). The court must review carefully all of the evidentiary matters before it  admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If in this view the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise the motion should be denied. Dennis v. Searle, 457 So.2d 941, 944 (Miss. 1984) [quoting Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983)]. On appeal, we conduct de novo review of the grant or denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment. See Newell v. Hinton, 556 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Miss. 1990); Allison v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 543 So.2d 661, 663 (Miss. 1989). Although we must accept well pleaded allegations, where a prisoner is proceeding pro se, the fact that the complaint is not precisely stated nor consistent will not harm his case. A pro se complaint is held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 529, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, 654 (1972). See also McFadden, 542 So.2d at 875.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court addressed in two separate opinions the question of whether a prisoner has a liberty interest in being transferred from one correctional institution to a less favorable institution. In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), several Massachusetts prisoners alleged that they were denied due process because they were transferred to a less favorable institution without an adequate hearing. The Court said that a valid conviction allows a state to subject the prisoner to the rules promulgated in regard to its prison system as long as the conditions imposed are constitutional. The conviction, in itself, has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224, 96 S.Ct. at 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d at 459. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered applicable Massachusetts law and found that prison officials in that state have the discretion to move prisoners for any or no reason. A prisoner's expectation of remaining in one facility is too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever reason or for no reason at all. Id. at 228, 96 S.Ct. at 2540, 49 L.Ed.2d at 461. The Supreme Court again considered that question in Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). There, a New York prisoner was transferred from one maximum-security facility to another. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Meachum that no Due Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one prison to another within the State, whether with or without a hearing, absent some right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he will not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified events. Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 2547, 49 L.Ed.2d at 471. The Supreme Court has also approved an interstate transfer. In Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983), the Court found that the prisoner had no protected liberty interest in being transferred from Hawaii to California. The Court summarized its holdings by saying that [t]hese cases demonstrate that a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion and the prisoner must show particularized standards or criteria in order to prove that the interest has been created. Olim, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d at 823. These decisions by the Supreme Court have been the yardstick by which all subsequent decisions concerning the transfer of a prisoner have been measured. Restated, the rule is that there is no constitutionally based liberty interest that entitles a prisoner to a hearing or any other safeguards before being transferred from one prison to another, absent a state law or regulation conditioning such transfer on proof of misbehavior or other specified events. Matiyn v. Henderson, 841 F.2d 31, 34 (2nd Cir.1988). The language contained in the statute or regulation must be mandatory in nature using such words as `shall', `will' and `must'. Castaneda v. Henman, 914 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir.1990). In Lewis v. Thigpen, 767 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit considered the transfer of a prisoner from Leflore County Restitution Center to the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the regulations of the Restitution Center created a protectable liberty interest. The regulations concerning transfer from the Center contained the language that the resident may be transferred for all `major' violations of rules and regulations or `flagrant' nonadherence to treatment plans. Lewis, 767 F.2d at 262. Given that language, the court said that Lewis could very well have expected that he would not be transferred from the Center absent misbehavior or other specified events. Id. In accordance with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, McFadden does not have a protected liberty interest in being transferred from the RCCF to Parchman unless a state law or regulation or prison policy or procedure has by its language conditioned the transfer on misbehavior or some other event. The lower court determined that McFadden was lawfully transferred to Parchman within the lawful discretion of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Summary judgment is precluded if there is a genuine issue of material fact. We have examined state law and prison policies and procedures and believe that an issue exists as to whether the language contained therein has created a protectable liberty interest in the transfer of an inmate and if so, whether the State followed the regulations without using fraud in the process. We remand to the lower court for a full factual development on this issue.
An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in a particular job assignment under the Due Process Clause. See Wallace v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 869, 873 (7th Cir.1990) and Chapman v. Plageman, 417 F. Supp. 906, 907 (W.D.Va. 1976). However, a liberty interest may be created by state law or prison regulations. To determine whether the inmate has a state created liberty interest, the statute or regulation must contain particularized substantive standards or criteria or must use mandatory language. Hake v. Gunter, 824 F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir.1987). For instance, the words in so far as possible are discretionary in nature and allow prison officials to weigh the assignment against other needs of the institution. Wallace, 914 F.2d at 875. Job assignment is an administrative task with which the courts should not tamper absent evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination. Chapman, 417 F. Supp. at 908. The record is silent on the reassignment of McFadden. Again, we examined state law and prison policies and procedures regarding job reassignment and we believe that the language contained therein needs to be examined to determine if the policies create a protectable liberty interest in job reassignment and if so, whether those procedures were followed in McFadden's case. Summary judgment was improper on this issue so we reverse and remand for a full factual development.
In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that Kentucky prison regulations did not give prisoners a liberty interest in being allowed visitation with certain people. Several persons were denied visitation with inmates because they had in some way been instrumental in bringing contraband into the facility. This action was taken by prison officials without a hearing. First, the Court said that the right to visitation with a certain person is not protected by the Due Process Clause since the denial of such is `well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.' Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461, 109 S.Ct. at 1909, 104 L.Ed.2d at 515 [quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)]. Secondly, the State had not created a liberty interest because the regulations are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably expect to enforce them against the prison officials. Id. at 465, 109 S.Ct. at 1911, 104 L.Ed.2d at 518. The Court said that the regulations did not contain mandatory language in that [t]hey stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met. Id. at 464, 109 S.Ct. at 1910, 104 L.Ed.2d at 517. The Fifth Circuit has indicated that a temporary suspension of an inmate's visitation privileges without a hearing does not violate the inmate's due process rights. To require such a hearing would place the Due Process Clause `astride the day-to-day functioning of state prisons and involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal judges.' Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1017 (5th Cir.1979) [quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)]. The Fifth Circuit has also held that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to conjugal visits. See Davis v. Carlson, 837 F.2d 1318, 1319 (5th Cir.1988), and McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir.1975). Instead, visitation privileges are a matter subject to the discretion of prison officials. McCray, 509 F.2d at 1334. But, limitations must meet legitimate penological objectives, such as rehabilitation and the maintenance of security and order. Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir.1980). In Lyons v. Gilligan, 382 F. Supp. 198 (N.D.Ohio 1974), the question of whether a prisoner should be allowed conjugal visits with his or her incarcerated spouse was considered. The court said that the absence of such is not excessive punishment nor disproportionate to the crimes committed by the prisoners. The denial of conjugal visitation is merely a customary concomitant of the punishment of incarceration. Lyons, 382 F. Supp. at 201. We have examined state law and prison policies and procedures as to visitation rights of inmates. We believe the reason given by prison officials for denying McFadden visitation with his wife, that allowing visitation would place an undue administrative burden on the facility since transportation was unavailable, is within the visitation policies which allow prison officials to limit visitation as is necessary to maintain order and security. Summary judgment was proper on this issue.