Opinion ID: 4558818
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific Jurisdiction over Andonie and Jarufe

Text: Specific jurisdiction over Andonie and Jarufe presents a different question: when may a court exercise jurisdiction over individuals based on their contacts with a forum on behalf of a corporation? Andonie and Jarufe contend that a court may not consider such contacts at all. Instead, they argue, a court may consider only the actions they took in an individual capacity on their own behalf. Our precedent rejects this limitation on personal jurisdiction over corporate officers. In Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1989), employees of a corporation contended that their actions on behalf of the corporation could only subject them to jurisdiction in circumstances that would allow the court to pierce the corporate veil for purposes of liability. We held that constitutional due process imposed no such limitation. We noted that the Supreme Court had allowed the exercise of specific jurisdiction over employees based on actions they took on behalf of a corporation. See id. at 521; see, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“their status as employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction”); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 n.13. As a matter of Arizona law, we held that the state’s long-arm statute allowed the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits of the federal Constitution, and therefore did not shield corporate officers from jurisdiction over their persons based on actions within the scope of their employment. Davis, 885 F.2d at 522. California’s long-arm statute, like Arizona’s, imposes no limitations on personal jurisdiction beyond those required by GLOB. COMMODITIES TRADING GRP. V. 15 BENEFICIO DE ARROZ CHOLOMA due process. See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. Andonie and Jarufe’s actions on behalf on Bachosa, like the actions of the employees in Davis, Calder, and Keeton, may therefore give rise to personal jurisdiction over them as individuals. Although their status as officers of Bachosa does not foreclose personal jurisdiction over Andonie and Jarufe, their status also does not guarantee it. Personal jurisdiction over an individual who acts as an agent of a third party must be assessed on the individual’s actions alone. See Sher, 911 F.2d at 1366; see also Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 n.13 (“[J]urisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which employs him. . . .”). We do not impute a corporation’s forum contacts to each of the corporation’s employees. Instead, we assess whether each individual had minimum contacts with the forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction over that individual would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. Two of our cases are illustrative. In Davis, we held that two corporate officers had sufficient contacts with Arizona when they conducted meetings with clients in Arizona and ultimately entered into six agreements with Arizona residents on behalf of the corporation. See Davis, 885 F.3d at 522–23. In In re Boon Global Ltd., 923 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2019), on the other hand, we suggested that signing a single contract with a forum resident on behalf of a corporation would not subject a corporate officer to personal jurisdiction in a claim for breach of that contract. However, with the limited factual record before us on a petition for writ of mandamus, we stopped short of holding in that case that the district court clearly erred in exercising jurisdiction. See id. at 652. 16 GLOB. COMMODITIES TRADING GRP. V. BENEFICIO DE ARROZ CHOLOMA Interpreting genuine factual disputes in Global’s favor, Andonie and Jarufe had extensive contacts with California. Like the corporate officers in Davis, Andonie and Jarufe met with Global’s employees in the forum state to negotiate the commodities transactions at issue in the suit. While in Global’s office in California, Andonie and Jarufe falsely assured Global that Bachosa had extended its importation permits. Further, they had previously traveled to California on multiple occasions as part of the ongoing business relationship between Global and Bachosa. We hold that these contacts are sufficient to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Andonie and Jarufe. The guaranty signed by Andonie and Jarufe may provide an independent basis for personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. Global contends that in the guaranty Andonie and Jarufe assumed personal liability for the note. We have held that a corporate officer who personally guarantees a corporation’s obligation “interject[s] himself into the transaction,” subjecting the officer to personal jurisdiction on like terms as the corporation. Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1978). Not all of our holding in Forsythe survived the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Calder and Keeton. Our statement in Forsythe that “a corporate officer who has contact with a forum only with regard to the performance of his official duties is not subject to personal jurisdiction in that forum,” Forsythe, 576 F.2d at 783–84, is clearly irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s decisions subjecting corporate employees to suit in exactly those circumstances. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Davis, 885 F.2d at 521 (rejecting the fiduciary GLOB. COMMODITIES TRADING GRP. V. 17 BENEFICIO DE ARROZ CHOLOMA shield doctrine based on Calder and Keeton). However, our holding in Forsythe that a personal guaranty of a corporation’s debt may give rise to personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer remains good law. Global presented evidence that Andonie and Jarufe were key players in Bachosa’s years-long business relationship with Global and that they personally assumed liability for Bachosa’s obligations under the note. In these circumstances, they “could have reasonably foreseen that they would be haled into [California’s] courts” if their actions caused harm there. Davis, 885 F.2d at 523. We therefore conclude that the district court had personal jurisdiction over them in this action. Because we hold that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Andonie and Jarufe based on Global’s claims in its initial complaint, we do not reach the question whether its proposed amendments to the complaint would cure any jurisdictional defect.