Opinion ID: 750084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Davidson's Entry into Plaintiffs' House

Text: 28 Plaintiffs claim that Davidson violated the Fourth Amendment when he entered Tierney's house without a warrant. 6 The Officers counter (i) that Davidson's entry into Tierney's house was lawful because it fell within the exigent circumstances or emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, or (ii) at a minimum, it was objectively reasonable for Davidson to have believed that the search was legal under this exception. 29 Warrantless searches inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, [p]olice officers may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance. Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir.1971); see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990); United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 770 (2d Cir.1990) (in banc); United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1987). Courts must apply an objective standard to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.). However, [t]his probable cause requirement[ ] must be applied by reference to the circumstances then confronting the officer, including the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences. 3 Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 391 (3d ed.1996). 30 Courts have recognized the combustible nature of domestic disputes, and have accorded great latitude to an officer's belief that warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances when the officer had substantial reason to believe that one of the parties to the dispute was in danger. For example, in Magnuson v. Cassarella, 813 F.Supp. 1321 (N.D.Ill.1992), police were called to the scene of a domestic disturbance by a neighbor who heard screams and was concerned about the infant in the house. Id. at 1322. When the police arrived outside the house, the neighbor reported--and the officer could hear--the screaming. The court found that the unannounced, warrantless entry into the house was justified by exigent circumstances: 31 [The officer] arrived at the ... home in response to a call from a neighbor who reported a domestic disturbance in progress. [The officer] himself heard screams coming from the ... home, and was informed at the scene by the neighbor that an infant was involved. There is no question that a reasonable police officer faced with the situation encountered by [this officer] would believe that entry into the home was necessary to protect the safety of others. Indeed, as noted by [the officer] [t]his type of situation has the possibility of an explosive and sudden eruption of violence.... 32 Id. at 1323. 33 Similarly, the police in State v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), arriving at the scene in response to a priority domestic violence call, heard noises indicating that violent activity was occurring inside. Id. at 944. The court held that their subsequent entry was justified by exigent circumstances. Id.; see also State v. Greene, 162 Ariz. 431, 784 P.2d 257, 259 (1989) (en banc) (These calls commonly involve dangerous situations in which the possibility for physical harm or damage escalates rapidly.... The call itself creates a sufficient indication that an exigency exists allowing the officer to enter a dwelling if no circumstance indicates that entry is unnecessary.). 34 Here, there is little doubt that it was reasonable for Davidson to believe that the search was justified by exigent circumstances. Davidson had been trained to treat these calls as priority and to expect violence in many such disputes. He was responding to what he was told was a bad domestic disturbance, the worst yet at this location according to experienced observers; when he arrived at the scene, he was informed by neighbors that the shouting had ended right before his arrival; and as he approached the house, Davidson heard nothing and found a broken window pane. It was reasonable for Davidson to believe that someone inside had been injured or was in danger, that both antagonists remained in the house, and that this situation satisfied the exigent circumstances exception. Accordingly, Davidson is immune from suit for any claims arising from his entry. 35