Opinion ID: 2310175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Irreconcilable defenses

Text: Prejudice can arise when two defendants present conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.... Rhone v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 48, 365 F.2d 980, 981 (1966). The key word here is alone. See, e.g., Sweet v. United States, 438 A.2d 447, 451 (D.C.1981); Williams v. United States, 382 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C.1978). [T]he problem which Rhone addresses does not arise from the kind of minor differences which are inevitable among codefendants' presentations, and which are generally left to the jury to sort out.... Rather, severance under Rhone requires a clear and substantial contradiction between the respective defenses, causing inherent irreconcilability between them. Tillman v. United States, 519 A.2d 166, 170 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted); see Ready v. United States, 445 A.2d 982, 987 (D.C.1982) (once irreconcilable defenses are shown, court must find, with substantial certainty, that the conflict in defenses alone would not sway the jury to find appellant guilty). Jones argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to sever his case from Taylor's sua sponte because their defenses were conflicting and irreconcilable. The record does not support his argument. The only issue at trial with regard to Jones was whether his accomplice was Taylor or Williams. Jones' defense was that his accomplice was Williams, not Taylor, and that he had therefore not committed perjury by telling the grand jury that his accomplice was Williams. Jones took the stand and testified that his accomplice was Williams. The government introduced his grand jury testimony, in which he also stated that Williams was his accomplice. Taylor's defense was also that Williams was Jones' accomplice, and that he himself was asleep in the back seat of the car while the shootings took place. There was simply no conflict here; on the contrary, Jones' and Taylor's defenses were essentially identical. There is thus no basis for severance under Rhone, and the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to order a severance sua sponte.