Opinion ID: 2162170
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual support for the punitive damages award

Text: We turn to Daka's alternative argument that there was insufficient evidence of the indispensable element of malice to support the jury's award of punitive damages. Daka insists that the record contains a wealth of evidence of good faith on its behalf, precluding exemplary damages. We disagree with Daka's assessment of the evidence. The twofold purpose of punitive damages is to punish unlawful conduct and to deter its repetition. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1595, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996); Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1041, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991); [24] Sutherland, supra, 631 A.2d at 372. This court has held, therefore, that punitive damages may be awarded only when the defendant acted with a mental state which in Sutherland we characterized as evil motive or actual malice. Id. Other cases have used different language, but they all make clear that the requisite mental state goes well beyond a mere intention to be annoying or unpleasant. E.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoades, Inc., 492 A.2d 580, 593 (D.C.1985) (outrageous conduct which is malicious, wanton, reckless, or in willful disregard for another's rights (citations omitted)); Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 288 (D.C.1975) (willful and outrageous conduct). In general, this state of mind need not (and usually cannot) be proven by direct evidence, but may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the case.... Once the necessary malice is established, the amount of punitive damages is left to the jury's discretion. Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 906 (D.C.1988) (citations omitted). In this case, although the issue is a fairly close one, we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence of malice or evil motive to support the jury's award of punitive damages. [25] Because there was no formal grievance procedure at Daka, Breiner directly told Sakell, at least three times, to stop making age-based comments because they were against the law or illegal. Instead, Sakell persisted in his ridicule, condoned or encouraged other Daka employees when they made similar remarks, and did nothing to improve the workplace environment. The tone and context of all the remarks, taken together, would support a finding that Sakell deliberately intended to humiliate and embarrass Breiner, even though he knew (because Breiner told him) that his remarks were unlawful. Indeed, the fact that Sakell persisted in his hostile comments even after Breiner urged him to stop is perhaps the strongest single piece of evidence supporting the jury's finding of malice. As in Sutherland, the evidence did not merely show that [Daka] was a rather unpleasant place for [older employees] to work because of the benighted attitudes of some of the senior staff. 631 A.2d at 372-373. Rather, it established that supervisory personnel both participated in and otherwise condoned conditions in which [Breiner was] subjected to [age-based] comments on a regular basis. This offending conduct was not the product of chance, mistake, or ignorance. It manifested itself in one of the most pernicious ways possible: by depriving its victim[] of the right to work in a decent environment.... Id. at 373. Viewed in the light most favorable to Breiner, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable jury that Sakell's i.e., Daka'sconduct was accompanied by the requisite degree of malice or evil motive to justify an award of punitive damages.