Opinion ID: 199507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver in the Instant Case.

Text: 40 Having constructed a framework for determining when waivers of appellate rights will be enforced, we ponder the waiver in this case. The following language appears in paragraph five of the plea agreement: 41 The Defendant is aware that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a) affords a defendant the right to appeal the sentence imposed. Knowing that, in exchange for the Government's concessions made herein, the Defendant waives to the full extent of the law any right to appeal . . . the conviction and sentence, or the manner in which it was determined . . . . 42 This explicit text is followed by a statement acknowledging the appellant's voluntary acceptance of the entire plea agreement and confirming that she has read and understood it. The appellant and her attorney signed the document immediately beneath this acknowledgment. These desiderata furnish prima facie evidence of the appellant's knowledge and volition. 43 What occurred next is somewhat more problematic. During the change-of-plea colloquy, the district court questioned the appellant concerning her overall understanding of, and acquiescence in, the terms of the plea agreement, but did not direct her attention to the waiver provision. As we have said, the validity of a waiver of appellate rights depends on whether the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily undertaken. Here, the court - hampered, no doubt, by the newness of Rule 11(c)(6) and the consequent lack of any precedential guidance -neither directed the appellant's attention to the waiver provision nor discussed it with her. Compounding that problem, the court, near the end of the Rule 11 colloquy, asked the appellant: [D]o you also understand that both you and the government will have a right to appeal any sentence I impose? This unqualified query - to which the prosecutor (not the same person who appears as counsel for the government in this court) inexplicably failed to take exception - drew an affirmative response from the appellant. The premise of this question directly contradicted the tenor of the waiver provision. 44 Given the court's failure to make inquiry into the waiver, its unfortunate contradiction of the waiver's terms, and the lack of any correction, then or thereafter, 11 we cannot say with the requisite assurance that the appellant's surrender of her appellate rights was sufficiently informed. Accordingly, we find that the district court transgressed Rule 11(c)(6). The government has not argued that this error was other than prejudicial. We think that the proper remedy, given the circumstances, is to sever the waiver of appellate rights from the remainder of the plea agreement, allowing the other provisions to remain in force. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1353-54. Thus, we permit Teeter's appeal to proceed.