Opinion ID: 1910498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Declaratory Relief[25]and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Text: The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-402 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The Act is remedial in nature and shall be liberally construed and administered. CJP § 3-402. Our cases have repeatedly recognized the broad remedial purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Com'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 595, 386 A.2d 1216, 1222 (1978) (recognizing the strong legislative policy favoring the liberal use and interpretation of the Declaratory Judgments Act . . .); Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 206, 254 A.2d 181, 186 (1969) (stating that `the object of the declaratory judgment act is to supplement and enlarge procedural relief in a field not wholly or adequately occupied by subsisting remedies of law and equity.') (quoting Schultz v. Kaplan, 189 Md. 402, 56 A.2d 17 (1947)). Even though the Declaratory Judgment Act is to be liberally construed, there are certain restrictions in its application. Section 3-409(b) of the Declaratory Judgment Act states that:  If a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.  (Bolding added) (Emphasis added). This Court has echoed that requirement on several occasions: It is well settled in Maryland that when there is a special statutory remedy for a specific type of case, and that remedy is intended to be exclusive or primary, a party `may not circumvent those [special statutory] proceedings by a declaratory judgment . . . action. . . .' Utilities, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 362 Md. 37, 45, 763 A.2d 129, 133 (2000) (quoting Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, 360 Md. 438, 456-61, 758 A.2d 995, 1005-08 (2000)); see Maryland Reclamation Assoc's, Inc. v. Harford County, 382 Md. 348, 362, 855 A.2d 351, 359 (2004) (recognizing that when a statute provides for administrative remedies, those remedies must be pursued instead of pursuing declaratory relief). Thus, declaratory relief is barred by some statutory and judicially-crafted restrictions in limited circumstances. Converge Services Group, 383 Md. at 478, 860 A.2d at 880. It is the general rule in this State that when an administrative remedy is provided by the General Assembly, administrative process must be exhausted before the aggrieved party may resort to the courts for other relief. Prince George's County v. Ray's Used Cars, 398 Md. 632, 642, 922 A.2d 495, 501 (2007); Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 63, 706 A.2d 1060, 1069 (1998) (stating that there is a presumption that the administrative remedy is intended to be primary, and [ ] a claimant cannot maintain the alternative judicial action without first invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy.). See e.g., Maryland Reclamation Assoc's, 382 Md. at 362, 855 A.2d at 359 ([W]hen administrative remedies exist in zoning cases, they must be exhausted before other actions, including requests for declaratory judgments, mandamus, and injunctive relief, may be brought. (citing Josephson v. City of Annapolis, 353 Md. 667, 674-78, 728 A.2d 690, 693-95 (1998))); Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., 376 Md. 118, 128, 829 A.2d 271, 277 (2003) ([T]he presumption that a statutory administrative remedy is primary is reflected in the Declaratory Judgment Act.). [26] By enacting the Public Utility Companies Article, the General Assembly provided a special form of remedy for specific types of cases such as the present one. The fact that petitioners failed to avail themselves of that legislatively provided remedy does not enable them to deny the existence of the remedy found in the Public Utility Companies Article nor does it entitle them to declaratory relief in lieu of the administrative remedy. Were we to allow petitioners' action for declaratory relief to proceed, the Commission (and other similar administrative agencies) would never be able to have a final decision and litigation could continue as each geographically successive owner of property in the vicinity of such a large scale facility files his or her own declaratory judgment action, ad infinitum. At the time this action was filed and resolved, petitioners had failed to exhaust the applicable administrative remedy found in the Public Utility Companies Article because Clipper I was still pending before the Court of Special Appeals. In Clipper I, the central issue was whether the respondents in that case properly applied for rehearing and if such application was then timely, whether the application stayed the time for petitioning for judicial review. Until a final decision was reached in Clipper I, it was still possible that the final decision of that case would result in a finding that the petition for judicial review was timely filed. If that result were to have occurred, the Clipper I respondents (some of whom were plaintiffs below in this case) would not have exhausted their administrative remedies because they would have succeeded in obtaining a new hearing before the Commission and, under the statutory scheme, would only have been able to seek judicial review after another adverse ruling by the Commission. Therefore, this action for declaratory relief was premature at the time it was filed (and decided) under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Most importantly, we have previously determined that, as a general rule, it is inappropriate for a court to entertain a declaratory judgment action `if there is pending, at the time of the commencement of the action for declaratory relief, another action or proceeding involving the same parties and in which the identical issues that are involved in the declaratory action may be adjudicated.' Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 160, 707 A.2d 806, 814 (1998) (quoting Waicker v. Colbert, 347 Md. 108, 113, 699 A.2d 426, 428 (1997)). The reasons for this limitation are, or should be, obvious. In situations such as the present one, where identical parties bring identical claims in two different courts, limited judicial resources are wasted in addition to the possibility that conflicting judgments could be entered by the different courts involved. [27] Initially, we note that the parties in Clipper I and this case were substantially the same at the time that each action was filed. In Clipper I, the original plaintiffs were: Eric Tribbey, Paul Sprenger, Russell Bounds, and Troy Gnegy. In the declaratory judgment action, the present case, the original plaintiffs were: Eric Tribbey, Paul Sprenger, Russell Bounds, Paul Roderick, and Rebecca Harvey. The two cases have three original plaintiffs in common. The plaintiffs in both actions were represented by the same counsel. Some of the original plaintiffs in both Clipper I and this case dropped out of litigation as each case proceeded through the appeals process, but that fact does not alter our conclusion that the parties were substantially the same for the purposes of determining whether the declaratory judgment was appropriate. As we have already explained, supra, Clipper I was still pending at the time the petition for declaratory relief was filed (and decided) in this case. Even though counsel for petitioners argued, incorrectly, before the Circuit Court for Garrett County that Clipper I was not still pending, he conceded that: The issues raised in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City are almost exactly the same issues that I raised in Garret County. I mean . . . there's no secret there.  (Emphasis added). Counsel was ethically bound to make that admission, but the concession is fatal to petitioners action for declaratory relief. The parties in Clipper I and this case are substantially the same, the issues in both cases were identical at the time they were filed, and at the time the present action for declaratory relief was filed, Clipper I was still pending. Judge Sherbin was legally correct in dismissing the petition for declaratory relief.