Opinion ID: 663689
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent Counsel's Position

Text: 27 Unfortunately for movants, and perhaps for the tradition of fairness, the statute does require that the Independent Counsel file a report. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(b)(1) (1982). It is on that statutory requirement that the Independent Counsel relies in urging that we should release his Report even though it contains accusations of crime. As he notes, the purpose of the Final Report is to ensure the accountability of the Independent Counsel to the government of the United States and the public by providing a detailed and official record of the activities of the [independent counsel] which may be reviewed and analyzed at the appropriate time. S.REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4286. This reflects the sui generis nature of the independent counsel, in that he is an officer performing an executive function almost entirely without oversight from the Executive Branch of government. See generally, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-09, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2626, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 28 Independent Counsel specifically relies on the legislative mandate that the Report required by the statute is to include the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel which was not prosecuted. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(b)(2) (1982). He rightly contends that this compels him to comment on cases that were not taken to grand juries and potential charges that were not prosecuted. 29 It is not clear that this section has anything to do with comments on convictions that were ultimately vacated or reversed on appeal, but at least as to the greater portion of the unproven accusations the statute bears relevance. While it is clear that the statute supports the power of the prosecutor to comment, it is not clear that it supports the form that the present comments take. It is one thing for a report to say we did not prosecute the allegations of the obstruction of justice against John Doe because we did not have sufficient evidence to constitute probable cause; and quite another to say John Doe was guilty, but we didn't prosecute him because we could not prove it; and still a third to say the Court of Appeals reversed John Doe's conviction, but he was factually guilty anyway.