Opinion ID: 6318081
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mental Health Conditions

Text: When assessing an excessive force claim, “[t]he totality of the circumstances includes ‘the fact that at the time of the . . . struggle, the defendant officers had reason to believe that [the person] was . . . mentally unstable.’” Roell, 870 F.3d at 482 (quoting Landis v. Baker, 297 F. App’x 453, 465 (6th Cir. 2008)). While true that this factor is only relevant if Johns knew about Palma’s mental illness, see Simmonds, 682 F.3d at 445, the district court erroneously found that “the dispatcher did not advise Johns of [Palma]’s serious mental condition,” Palma, 2021 WL 798405, at . In fact, the dispatcher specifically told Johns that Palma was a “Code 76”— meaning Palma suffered from mental health issues. (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #732, #823.) Johns was “therefore required to take into account [Palma]’s diminished capacity before using force” against him. Roell, 870 F.3d at 482 (citing Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 904 (6th Cir. 2004)). As Johns correctly point outs, an officer is not absolutely barred from using lethal force on mentally ill individuals. See Reich, 945 F.3d at 979. But only in extreme cases have we found that an officer reasonably used lethal force against a mentally ill person. In every case that Johns cites, the officers used lethal force against a mentally ill person who was armed and threatening officers. See Gaddis, 364 F.3d at 772–73, 776–77 (reasonable to shoot mentally ill man who attacked police officers with a knife and stabbed an officer before officers shot him); Rucinski, 655 F. App’x at 339–42 (reasonable to shoot schizophrenic man who pulled a switchblade on officers, yelled “bring it on” or “here we go,” and began walking towards officers with the knife in hand); see also Summerland v. Cnty. of Livingston, 240 F. App’x 70, 72, 77 (6th Cir. 2007) (reasonable to shoot mentally ill man who posted a sign in his yard saying, “no police you be shot” and charged at officers with either an axe or a gun). The district court pointed to one other unpublished district court opinion, see Palma, 2021 WL 798405, at , but even that case involved a mentally ill man who “charged at [the officers] with a knife,” Johnson v. Combs, No. 04-cv-19, 2005 WL 2388247, at  (W.D. Ky. Sept. 27, 2005). No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 22 Johns knew that Palma was a “Code 76,” meaning he was mentally ill, and he knew that he was responding to a domestic dispute over a remote control. (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #823.) A reasonable officer would take these facts into account when assessing whether Palma posed a threat. If a person who is not suffering from mental illness acts in a way that is objectively threatening, an officer may believe that the person poses an imminent danger because their actions—under normal circumstances—convey hostility towards the officer. But if the officer knows that person is suffering from some mental illness, the officer must consider this fact and respond accordingly. See Gambrel, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 369348, at  (citing Studdard v. Shelby Cnty., 934 F.3d 478, 480–82 (6th Cir. 2019)). Stated differently, behavior that ordinarily seems threatening may present a lower risk of harm if the officer has reason to believe that the behavior is a symptom of a mental condition. See generally Graves, 810 F. App’x at 417, 423 (lethal shooting unreasonable even when mentally ill man ignored officers’ commands and continued “staring vacantly ahead”). Here, Palma’s unresponsiveness was consistent with his mental illness, thus undermining Johns’ belief that it was threatening. This is especially true because Palma was silent and made no physically threatening gestures. The dissent agrees that officers can and should consider a person’s mental state when analyzing the amount of risk that they face. But the dissent says that this factor will always support the use of force. It believes that people with known mental illnesses inherently “pose[] a heightened risk,” therefore giving officers probable cause to believe that they face a risk of imminent harm, and goes as far as to say that the use of force, including lethal force, is more easily justified even if officers are merely conducting a wellness check because “a mentally ill individual in the midst of a psychotic break will not respond to reason, or to anything other than force.” (Infra Dissent at 43 (emphasis in original) (quoting Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (Bea, J., dissenting in part)).) But police routinely respond to non-criminal mental health calls and wellness checks. See Black’s Law Dictionary, What is a Police Welfare Check?, available at https://thelawdictionary.org/article/what-is-a-police-welfare-check/. Accordingly, under this Court’s precedent, officers should use their training and expertise in crisis management to determine whether and how to de-escalate a situation before resorting to force. See Martin, No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 23 712 F.3d at 958–59 (denying qualified immunity because a reasonable officer “would try to deescalate the situation and reduce the level of force needed to gain control”). Officers must use this experience to assess the level of risk in light of a person’s mental illness. We are not saying, as the dissent suggests, that officers may never use force against mentally ill persons. We have recognized many cases finding reasonable uses of force against mentally ill persons. See Reich, 945 F.3d at 979. In reality, mental illness may mitigate the risk in one situation and aggravate the risk in another. Therefore, we cannot simply defer to an officer’s post hoc use of mental illness as a justification for using force. Rather, if a jury could find that a reasonable officer would not perceive an imminent threat of danger—or would use other de-escalation tactics— then qualified immunity is unwarranted. See Martin, 712 F.3d at 958–59; Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 353 (3d Cir. 2016). Based on the undisputed facts that Johns knew Palma was mentally ill and that Palma was unresponsive but not threatening throughout the entire encounter, mental illness in this case was a mitigating factor showing that Palma did not pose an immediate threat. See Graves, 810 F. App’x at 417, 423. Furthermore, Palma’s mental illness is relevant when considering whether Johns used excessive force. “The diminished capacity of an unarmed [person] must be taken into account when assessing the amount of force exerted.” Roell, 870 F.3d at 482 (quoting Champion, 380 F.3d at 904) (emphasis added). While we have found that using a taser or pepper spray on a mentally ill person was reasonable, see id. (likely not excessive to repeatedly tase a man suffering from a psychotic break after he “aggressive[ly]” approached officers with a garden hose and physically resisted arrest); Estate of Erwin, 861 F. App’x at 5 (reasonable to tase a mentally ill women who yelled at officers to leave and approached them while holding a rake above her head), we have never held that shooting a mentally ill person was reasonable when the officers had little reason to suspect that the person was armed.4 A jury is best positioned to balance these considerations. 4 Only twice have we said it was reasonable to shoot a mentally ill person who turned out to be unarmed. In both instances, however, officers had ample reason to believe that the suspect was armed with either a gun or an explosive device. Thus, these cases are more akin to those involving lethal force against a visibly armed mentally ill person. First, in Beans v. City of Massilon, 706 F. App’x 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2017), we held that officers reasonably used lethal force in a hostage situation when officers raided the crime scene and found the mentally ill suspect trying to “ignite [a] lighter and cause an explosion.” Though perhaps not armed in the traditional sense, this case is more No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 24