Opinion ID: 2540605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Waiver of Constitutional Right to Jury Trial under Halbert

Text: The key issue as to which I disagree with the principal opinion is whether in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 623-24, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005), the United States Supreme Court established that, in pleading guilty, one waives only those constitutional rights that are inconsistent with a guilty plea such as, in this case, the right to trial by jury on guilt but that one does not thereby waive one's right to a jury trial on the facts necessary to punishment, and that one cannot waive such a right as to punishment before it is recognized. [1] In Halbert, the defendant was denied the right to counsel on appeal under a statute that denied counsel to most of those who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. 545 U.S. at 612-13, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Michigan contended that even if the defendant had a constitutional right to appointed counsel, he necessarily waived that right because he knew that a Michigan statute provided that a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere will not receive the assistance of counsel in applying for discretionary appeal. Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 770.3a (West 2000). Therefore, by pleading nolo contendere he had to know that the statute would deny him a right to court-appointed counsel, resulting in an implied waiver. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Halbert held that Mr. Halbert could not have waived his constitutional right to counsel on appeal because, [a]t the time he entered his plea, Halbert, in common with other defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to appointed appellate counsel he could elect to forgo. Id. In so holding, Halbert rejected the argument made by the principal opinion, for it is the same argument made by Justice Thomas in dissent. Justice Thomas said that assuming Mr. Halbert did have a statutory right to counsel on appeal, he waived it when he decided to plead guilty with knowledge that the consequence likely would be that he would not get counsel on appeal. Id. at 637-43, 125 S.Ct. 2582 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The principal opinion's argument in this case similarly fails if one cannot constitutionally condition the exercise of the right to a jury trial of punishment on whether one waives a jury trial on guilt, and that is what Missouri law provided at the time of Mr. Nunley's choice to waive a jury trial. In fact, even Justice Thomas recognized, Whether Michigan law provides for such counsel says nothing about whether a defendant possesses (and hence can waive) a federal constitutional right to that effect. That Michigan, as a matter of state law, prohibited Halbert from receiving appointed appellate counsel if he pleaded guilty or no contest, is irrelevant to whether Halbert had (and could waive) an independent federal constitutional right to such counsel. [2] Id. at 640, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Here, Mr. Nunley did not know he had, and therefore did not waive, his Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, for that right had not yet been recognized at the time of his plea. As the principal opinion notes, Mr. Nunley does not raise this issue on appeal. Because this Court is addressing this issue in the companion case of State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 650-51; Id., dissenting opinion of Judge Stith, at 667-69 (Mo. banc 2011), also handed down this date, and because Mr. Nunley would be entitled to raise this issue in a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus in light of our decision in Taylor, I believe it appropriate to address it here, to the extent applicable, for a waiver of the statutory right to jury trial simply is a separate issue from whether there is a valid waiver of the constitutional right to jury trial. I do agree with the principal opinion that Mr. Nunley would have a right to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to jury trial, however, should he choose to do so.