Opinion ID: 1536799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Trial Court Exercise Its Discretion Erroneously?

Text: Having concluded that Criminal Rule 24(c) sets out an enforceable standard for the replacement of an empaneled juror with an alternate, and that the defendant has standing to invoke it, we turn to consider whether the trial court violated that standard when it removed Juror 8 over Hinton's objection. Recognizing the trial judge's superior ability to observe the demeanor of the juror and [her] familiarity with the proceedings, our review is for abuse of discretion. [84] Deferring, for the moment, the question whether abuse requires a specific showing of prejudice in this context, the pertinent parameters of our review are well established. Briefly put, we will find that the trial court exercised its discretion erroneously if it replaced the juror for an improper or legally insufficient reason, [85] if its ruling lacked a firm factual foundation, [86] or if the trial court otherwise failed to exercise its judgment in a rational and informed manner. [87] We will inquire whether the trial court failed to consider a relevant factor [or] relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion. [88] It is not our function, however, to second-guess a reasonable judgment of the trial court. [89]
Although the trial judge did not advert explicitly to the criteria of Rule 24(c), the record satisfies us that the judge sought to apply the correct legal standard. We take it that in considering whether Juror 8 could effectively deliberate with other jurors, whether his behavior was strange and bizarre, and whether he adequately th[ought] along the wavelength of normal functioning people, the judge was scrutinizing whether he had the capacity to continue to serve as a juror. [90] The record is inadequate to justify the judge's implicit finding that Juror 8 was unable to perform his juror duties, however. The judge expressly based her decision on the juror's written questions to the witnesses. Apart from those questions, the record is undeveloped, because the judge did not interview Juror 8 (or any other juror) in order to evaluate his fitness, and there is no other evidence that Juror 8 lacked the capacity to serve. [91] But as the panel concluded in Hinton I, the questions Juror 8 posed were coherent and relevant; and even if some of them seemed unusual or immaterial, they were not indicative of an incapacity to follow and understand the evidence or to communicate and deliberate rationally and fairly with the other jurors. [92] The questions had a reasonable basis in the evidence, and they were not objectionable. Indeed, they focused, intelligently, on the central issue in dispute, the alleged connection between Hinton and the jacket in which the arresting officers claimed to have found PCP. The questions simply do not support a finding that Juror 8 was unable to perform his duties as a juror. Although we do not doubt that the judge acted in good faith, the removal of a juror on account of his questions to witnesses comes perilously close to removing a juror because of his views of the evidence  one of the principal evils against which Rule 24(c)'s restrictions are directed. Indeed, that was the essence of defense counsel's objection to the removal of Juror 8 (whom counsel perceived as receptive to his defense). This is therefore an area where a trial judge must proceed with great caution. Unless a juror's questions unmistakably reveal his incapacity, bias or other basis for disqualification  for instance, because their total irrelevance to the trial or incoherence indicate that the juror is delusional or otherwise unable to follow the proceedings  it is difficult to imagine that they could justify his removal. [93] We conclude that the trial court exercised its discretion erroneously in this case by removing Juror 8 in violation of Criminal Rule 24(c).
Having shown that the trial court violated Rule 24(c), must Hinton also demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the court's action to be entitled to relief? Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have required the defendant to show prejudice from a Rule 24(c) violation before finding that the trial court abused its discretion, [94] or, equivalently, have demanded that the defendant show he was prejudiced in connection with a harmlessness inquiry. [95] In (Nathaniel) Thomas, we followed those courts when, assuming that a juror had been removed in violation of Rule 24(c), we affirmed the appellant's conviction because he presented no evidence whatever of prejudice. [96] The panel in Hinton I, bound by the holding of (Nathaniel) Thomas, was obliged to deny relief on this ground, though it expressed uncertainty as to its rationale. [97] In Donato, as the panel pointed out, the D.C. Circuit rejected the requirement that a defendant must show prejudice from a Rule 24(c) violation to prevail on his claim, opting instead to apply the usual harmless-error protocol of Kotteakos v. United States (under which the burden in criminal cases is on the beneficiary of an error to show that it was harmless). [98] We went en banc to reconsider the issue in light of Donato, and we are persuaded by several considerations to follow its lead. First, the authorities that require the defendant to show prejudice are not as uniform as they appear  they differ in their definition of prejudice. In (Nathaniel) Thomas, we held that a defendant could demonstrate prejudice only if, as a result of the removal of [the impaneled juror], a member of the defendant's jury failed to conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. [99] Some other courts have taken the same tack. [100] Another line of authority, however, acknowledges that the requisite prejudice exists, and that no further showing of prejudice is required for reversal, whenever the trial court removes a juror (over defense objection) without factual support or for a legally irrelevant reason. [101] In other words, these courts have declared that if the trial court replaces an empaneled juror with an alternate in violation of Rule 24(c)'s conditions, prejudice to the defendant is presumed. In criminal matters, there is no difference between presuming prejudice whenever the trial court has erred and the usual harmless-error inquiry. [102] Second, requiring Hinton to show specific prejudice is difficult to reconcile with the usual practice in criminal cases, in which preserved errors are deemed to be reversible unless the reviewing court is satisfied they are harmless. [103] To be sure, for certain assignments of error, we do require the defendant to demonstrate specific prejudice from the ruling in order to show that the trial court erred at all. But Rule 24(c) violations do not belong in that category. Although we have not always been clear about this, when we require a defendant to show specific prejudice as an aspect of error, as a rule it is (or should be) because the defendant also must demonstrate prejudice to the trial court in order to be entitled to the ruling he desires. For example, a defendant may be entitled to severance [i]f it appears that [he] ... is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants. [104] Consequently, to prevail on a motion to sever, the defendant must show prejudice. If the motion is denied and the defendant raises the issue on appeal, he must convince us that he was prejudiced by the joinder  because if he was not, the trial court's ruling was correct. [105] Similarly, because a showing of prejudice is usually a precondition for winning relief from the trial court when a defendant seeks a continuance, he also must show prejudice to prevail on an appeal of that denial. [106] And where a defendant must establish materiality (which equates to the potential for prejudice) in the trial court to secure a favorable ruling, he likewise must show materiality on appeal to establish that the denial of the ruling was error. [107] Rule 24(c), by contrast, does not require any showing of prejudice (or materiality) for its requirements to be applicable. In support of a specific-prejudice requirement, the government argues that a mid-trial decision to replace an empaneled juror with an alternate is analogous to a decision to excuse a prospective juror in pretrial voir dire. We assumed the aptness of that comparison in (Nathaniel) Thomas. [108] But on closer examination, we think the two situations are not analogous. Voir dire serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges. [109] Peremptory challenges, in turn, are themselves auxiliary in nature; they are granted to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury. [110] Thus, what is ultimately at stake for the defendant when a juror is erroneously excused for cause in voir dire is the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. [111] Ordinarily, the erroneous excusal of a prospective juror for cause can have no adverse effect on the impartiality of the chosen jury or the defendant's rights, for it cannot cause the seating of a biased juror. [112] All the empaneled jurors, having been vetted for cause ... [are], by definition, fair and impartial. [113] Since a defendant generally has no right to have any particular person sit on the jury [114] so long as the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is preserved, it makes sense that a defendant complaining on appeal of the erroneous excusal for cause of a prospective juror should have to show prejudice  specifically, as we said in Tate, that as a result of the error, an empaneled juror failed to conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. [115] In effect, the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice, normally on the government, is shifted to the appellant because the record of the voir dire shows affirmatively that the error was cured by the selection of an impartial juror. But that is not necessarily so with respect to erroneous mid-trial removals of empaneled jurors. Once they start hearing and considering the evidence, individual jurors may evaluate it differently, and they may no longer be viewed as fungible merely because they have passed muster in voir dire. At that point, more than just the defendant's right to an impartial jury is at stake when the judge erroneously replaces a juror with an alternate. Then, as explained above, such an error also may threaten the independence of the jury's decision-making from undue judicial influence and the defendant's basic rights to trial by jury and a unanimous verdict  threats that we have concluded Rule 24(c) is intended to prevent. [116] This is not to say that the erroneous replacement of an empaneled juror can never be found harmless  a matter we discuss below, in Section III  only that the impartiality of the substituting alternate and the resulting jury does not, by itself, necessarily dispose of the issue. As a practical matter, while the erroneous mid-trial replacement of an empaneled juror with an alternate may jeopardize the defendant's substantial right to have his fate determined by the unanimous verdict of a jury free of undue judicial influence, in most cases, it will be difficult to prove specific prejudice stemming from a Rule 24(c) violation. [117] That may be an understatement; the Donato court opined that [i]t will nearly always be impossible... for a defendant to show prejudice from a violation of [Federal] Rule 24(c). [118] This constitutes a serious objection, as the D.C. Circuit explained: If the government is correct that an appellant alleging a Rule 24(c) violation must show a specific prejudice from that violation, then Rule 24(c) would be entirely precatory. We are unwilling to conclude that a right as important as this one is incapable of being vindicated on appeal. [119] We agree. Ordinarily, when this court determines that the trial court erred in a criminal case and that the error was preserved by a timely and appropriate objection, the burden is not on the appellant to show prejudice in order to obtain relief. Rather, we will grant relief  reverse the judgment on appeal  unless we are convinced the error was harmless. There are sound reasons to adhere to that general rule, and no good reason to depart from it, when the trial court has jeopardized a defendant's basic jury trial rights by erroneously replacing an empaneled juror with an alternate in violation of Rule 24(c). [120] The holding of (Nathaniel) Thomas that a defendant must demonstrate he had a biased jury in order to obtain relief on appeal because of a Rule 24(c) violation is hereby overruled.