Opinion ID: 1520716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Adequacy of Summary Procedure.

Text: Appellant challenges the summary nature of his criminal contempt convictions. Relying upon Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974), he argues that, because the aggregate of the sentences imposed exceeds six months' imprisonment, he should have been afforded the right to a jury trial. Appellant's reliance is misplaced. Codispoti holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial on multiple charges of direct criminal contempt when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the court postpones adjudication and sentence for contempt until the end of trial; and (2) the court imposes sentences which either alone, or when aggregated, exceed six months' imprisonment. The rationale underlying the rule enunciated in Codispoti is that, unlike during trial, at the end of trial there is no overriding necessity for instant action to preserve order and no justification for dispensing with the ordinary rudiments of due process. Id., 418 U.S. at 515, 94 S.Ct. at 2692. Because on this record the charges of criminal contempt were adjudicated and punished during trial as the contemptuous conduct occurred, and because no individual sentence for contempt exceeded six months' imprisonment, appellant was not entitled to a jury trial. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). Appellant's remaining challenge, that the summary procedure denied him due process of law, is equally without merit. Contrary to appellant's assertion, it is clear that, prior to summarily citing and punishing appellant for contempt, the court gave appellant sufficient notice that his conduct was contemptuous and sufficient opportunity to desist. Nor does this case present, as appellant contends, a running bitter controversy between the judge and appellant which would have required the judge to recuse himself and refer trial to another judge. Compare Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971) with Commonwealth v. Patterson, 452 Pa. 457, 308 A.2d 90 (1973). As the American Bar Association Standards state, [t]he only purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused as required by law, and the trial judge should not allow the proceedings to be used for any other purpose. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 1.1 (Approved Draft, 1972). Here, the trial judge properly used his power to cite and, if necessary, punish summarily anyone who, in his presence in open court, willfully obstructs the course of criminal proceedings. Id. at § 7.1. Because the evidence of record satisfies each of the elements of criminal contempt, we affirm judgments of sentence. Judgments of sentence affirmed.