Opinion ID: 1842460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Disqualification

Text: After we remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez moved to disqualify the trial judge, Leslie B. Rothenberg. He alleged that the judge's comments in a separate capital case, that of Gerardo Manso, Manso v. State, 704 So.2d 516 (Fla.1997), raised a reasonable fear that Arbelaez would not receive a fair and impartial hearing. Manso had alleged in his own disqualification motion that Judge Rothenberg stated that if found competent to proceed, the Defendant would be getting a jolt of electricity which the undersigned takes to mean a sentence of death. Judge Rothenberg granted Manso's disqualification motion, but later denied Arbelaez's motion as legally insufficient. Arbelaez appeals that denial. Whether a motion to disqualify the judge is legally sufficient is a question of law we review de novo. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087 (Fla.2004); Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 842 (Fla.2002). Such a motion will be deemed legally insufficient if it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of the movant that he will not receive a fair hearing. Arbelaez, 775 So.2d at 916 (citing Correll v. State, 698 So.2d 522, 524 (Fla.1997)). A mere subjective fear [ ] of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986). The primary consideration is whether the facts alleged, if true, would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. Id. Arbelaez failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a well-grounded fear that he would not receive a fair and impartial hearing before Judge Rothenberg. Nothing in Arbelaez's motion directly linked the judge's alleged comment in the Manso case to Arbelaez. Although the comment certainly evinced a predisposition regarding the outcome of Manso's case  namely, that Judge Rothenberg intended to impose a sentence of death  the comment did not, on its face, evince a predisposition about all capital cases or show a personal bias or prejudice against Arbelaez simply because he was a capital defendant. Arbelaez, 775 So.2d at 916 (citing Tafero v. State, 403 So.2d 355 (Fla.1981)). Arbelaez essentially argues that Judge Rothenberg was biased toward all capital defendants. As we stated in Maharaj v. State, 778 So.2d 944 (Fla.2000), however, such serious allegations of judicial bias cannot be left to surmise from differing interpretations. Id. at 952. Arbelaez also asks us to revisit the denial of his previous, unsuccessful motion to disqualify Judge Rothenberg. See Arbelaez, 775 So.2d at 916. He argues that, in light of the recent allegations in the Manso case, Judge Rothenberg's tough-on-crime judicial campaign and her prosecutorial background have taken on new meaning. We decline Arbelaez's request. Nothing about Judge Rothenberg's judicial campaign or prosecutorial background has changed over the past four years. The trial court's denial of Arbelaez's recent disqualification motion, like its denial of his initial disqualification motion, was proper.