Opinion ID: 2625764
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analysis Under the First Amendment[6]

Text: (10) As the scope of permissible regulations of speech varies depending on the nature of the forum, it is essential to determine which forum applies to this case. As [[we have]] noted, For purposes of [a] forum analysis the high court has divided all public property into three categories. The first is the traditional public forumi.e., a place that by long tradition has been used by the public at large for the free exchange of ideas. ( Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 841 P.2d 975].) Public streets and parks are prototypical public forums. ( Id. at p. 482.) (11) Regulations restricting speech in public forums must satisfy exacting tests in order to pass constitutional muster: In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. [Citation.] The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. [[(1983)]] 460 U.S. 37, 45 [[74 L.Ed.2d 794, 103 S.Ct. 948]].) (12) The second category of public property is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited characterproperty that the [[S]]tate has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public. [7] ( International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) 505 U.S. 672, 678 [120 L.Ed.2d 541, 112 S.Ct. 2701].) The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. [Citations.] Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, fn. omitted.) Thus, regulations of expression in the context of a designated public forum must satisfy the same standards as those that apply in the context of a public forum. (13) `Finally, there is all remaining public property' [citation], a category usually referred to as the `nonpublic forum.' `Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this last category of property must survive only a much more limited review. The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with the speaker's view.' [Citation.] ( Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 483, fn. omitted.) (14) As the United States Supreme Court has explained: Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by different standards. We have recognized that the `First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.' [Citation.] In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view. [Citation.] As we have stated on several occasions, ``[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.'' [Citations.] ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 46.) (15) [[We have]] observed: To apply the public forum doctrine a court proceeds in a series of steps. In step one the court defines the `forum' by deciding whether the forum is the entire property to which access is sought or only a portion of that property. In step two the court decides whether the forum thus defined is a traditional `public forum,' a `designated public forum,' or a `nonpublic forum.' If it is either of the first two kinds of forums, in step three the court decides whether the challenged law restricts the content of speech in that forum or only its time, place, or manner. And in step four the court tests the challenged law by the standard that governs both the class of forum it has selected in step two and, if relevant, the type of speech restriction it has identified in step three. ( Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 484.) Proceeding with step one, both sides agree that the forum is the internal school district mailboxes. As to step two, both sides agree that this forum is not a traditional public forum. They disagree, however, as to whether the forum is a designated/limited public forum or a nonpublic forum. Relying on Perry, [[the District]] argue[[s]] that the mailboxes are a nonpublic forum. The issue in Perry was whether it was constitutional for the school district to limit access to the school mailboxes to the union that represented district employees, thus denying access to a rival union that had previously been allowed to use the mailboxes. ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 39.) As the court stated: The primary question presented is whether the First Amendment, applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated when a union that has been elected by public school teachers as their exclusive bargaining representative is granted access to certain means of communication, while such access is denied to a rival union. ( Perry, supra, at p. 44.) The high court disagreed with the rival union's position that the school mail facilities have become a `limited public forum' from which it may not be excluded because of the periodic use of the system by private non-school-connected groups, and [the union's] own unrestricted access to the system prior to [the rival union's] certification as exclusive representative. ( Id. at p. 47.) The court concluded that teacher mailboxes in a school district's interschool mail system were not a public forum, and that the district could therefore validly prevent unions other than the teachers' exclusive bargaining representative from using the system. ( Id. at p. 46.) In the present case, the trial court found that the District's mailboxes are a forum that has been opened to SLTA by statute, by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, [8] and by the conduct of the District. Thus as to this designated group, any restrictions by the District are subject to strict scrutiny. The trial court found that Perry did not apply, observing that the court in Perry itself had noted that The very concept of the labor-management relationship requires that the representative union be free to express its independent view on matters within the scope of its representational duties. ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 51, fn. 10.) The court thus limited Perry to its holding that the school district was justified in excluding the rival union from using the mailboxes while allowing the representative union such access. (16) We first observe that `[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.' [Citation.] ( Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier [[(1988)]] 484 U.S. 260, 267 [[98 L.Ed.2d 592, 108 S.Ct. 562]].) In the present case, we do not believe that the Legislature or the District has created a designated public forum in the District's mailboxes. This is not a case where by policy or by practice the District has opened its mail system for indiscriminate use by the general public, in which case one could justifiably argue a public forum has been created. ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 47.) It is undisputed that the District only grants selective access to the mailboxes to outside interests. Moreover, the access granted by statute to SLTA is indistinguishable from the access accorded to the prevailing union in Perry. (17) [[SLTA]] reiterates the trial court's rationale that Perry involved the issue of access to the forum based on speaker identity, rather than the content of the speaker's message. However, the court in Perry specifically stated that Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., supra, 460 U.S. 37, 49, italics added.) [[This court]] relied, in part, on Perry in holding that it was constitutional for the Legislature to limit the statements of candidates for office that are placed in voter pamphlets to a brief factual statement of the candidate's own background and qualifications. ( Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 494-495.) Thus, we read Perry to apply to restrictions based on content as well as speaker identity. (18) [[Thus, under established First Amendment public forum doctrine, school mailboxes would be considered nonpublic forums. Although Government Code section 3543.1, subdivision (b) permits limited access by a recognized employee organization, as noted `[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.' [Citation.] ( Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 267.) Here, Government Code section 3543.1 was not designed to open up school mailboxes to the general public and create a public forum, but to allow access by a single group with which the school's employees were affiliated. Therefore, the mailboxes are nonpublic forums and school districts would be able to impose viewpoint-neutral subject matter regulations on the content of what is placed in those mailboxes. ( Clark v. Burleigh, supra, 4 Cal.4th 474, 483.) The prohibition of candidate endorsement literature is such a viewpoint-neutral regulation.]]