Opinion ID: 3015108
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicable Legal Principles.

Text: The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Moreover, the Supreme Court has proclaimed that “the guiding hand of counsel” must be made available in criminal trials to those that can not afford to hire an attorney on their own. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 308 (1973); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). “Compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938). The Sixth Amendment is unique, however, because it not only guarantees a substantive right - the right to counsel - it also guarantees the converse right to proceed without counsel at trial. “[T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1975), (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1943)). The Sixth Amendment thus embodies two competing rights because exercising the right to self-representation necessarily means waiving the right to counsel. Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 789 (3d Cir.2000). Concomitantly, proceeding to trial represented by counsel as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment means that a defendant has not articulated a desire to waive that right and exercise his/her right to proceed pro se. “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” and must be the product of a free and meaningful choice. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 20 464. “[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. In order to protect the right to counsel, the Constitution requires that any waiver of that right be the product of the voluntary exercise of free will. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's waiver of a constitutional right must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Therefore, the constitutional right of self- representation in a criminal case is conditioned upon a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be represented by counsel. Buhl, 233 F.3d at 789. “If in a habeas corpus hearing, [a petitioner] . . . convinces the court by a preponderance of evidence that he neither had counsel nor properly waived his constitutional right to counsel, it is the duty of the court to grant the writ.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 469. However, where appropriate, “[a] criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly procedures, to choose between waiver and another course of action.” Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976). Indeed, a defendant cannot always obtain habeas relief by alleging that a waiver was not voluntary because the trial court denied a requested continuance and forced the defendant to decide 21 between proceeding pro se and proceeding with unwanted counsel. Nevertheless, [a] clear choice between two alternative courses of action does not always permit a petitioner to make a voluntary decision. If a choice presented to a petitioner is constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be voluntary. A defendant may not be forced to proceed with incompetent counsel; a choice between proceeding with incompetent counsel or no counsel is in essence no choice at all. The perm issibility of the choice presented to the petitioner . . . depends on whether the alternative to self-representation offered operated to deprive him of a fair trial. Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a reviewing court must be “confident the defendant is not forced to make a choice between incompetent counsel or appearing pro se.” United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 22 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 1997).10 The “court [must] decide whether the defendant was bowing to the inevitable or voluntarily and affirmatively waiving his right to counsel.” United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted); see also United States ex rel. Martinez, 526 F.2d 750, 755-6 (2d Cir. 1975) (“appellant was given no freedom of choice to decide whether he wished to defend himself. His choice, if choice it can be called, was based entirely on his bowing to the inevitable.”). This imposes on the trial court, “the weighty responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and understanding as well as voluntary.” United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2002). “A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and 10 In referring to defense counsel here as “incompetent” we in no way intend to suggest anything about her ability or professionalism. Rather, we are only referring to the fact that the circumstances here (including the prosecution’s piecemeal approach to tendering discovery) put her in a position where she could not competently proceed to represent Pazden at trial absent more time to adequately prepare. Indeed, from what we can determine from the trial judge’s comments, Ms. Bartos is an exceptionally talented and professional attorney who would have done a commendable job of representing Pazden if she had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. 23 comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is rendered.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). In conducting this examination a court can evaluate the motives behind defendant’s dismissal of counsel and decision to proceed pro se. United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 2002). Moreover, although the record here does not suggest that Pazden’s request for a continuance was manipulative, we have cautioned that “even well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and manipulative tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries necessary to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights.” United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir.1982); see also Buhl, 233 F.3d at 796.11 Although, a trial court ruling on a request for a continuance may certainly consider such factors as “the importance of the 11 In United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir.1982), we explained the two part inquiry a trial court must make to determine if there is “good cause” to grant a requested continuance on the eve of trial to afford a defendant an opportunity to retain substitute counsel. Although Welty was decided on direct appeal, “[t]he same standard for determining whether a defendant waived his right to counsel applies in federal court habeas corpus review of state court proceedings. Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728, 731 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)). However, the Welty two part inquiry is not relevant here because it is clear from this record that Pazden did not request substitute counsel. Rather, he relented to the trial court’s insistence that trial proceed, and went to trial without the benefit of counsel. 24 efficient administration of justice,” Buhl, 233 F.3d at 797, we have also cautioned that “a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.” Martinez, 526 F.2d at 755.