Opinion ID: 2226823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Errors Alleged

Text: Defendant summarily alleges the occurrence of a number of other errors that it believes entitles it to a new trial. We have examined defendant's contentions and fail to find any grounds for reversal.
Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine attempting to preclude defendant from making any reference to plaintiff's investments other than those investments made by Newell. The trial judge granted the motion over defendant's objection. Defendant contends that plaintiff's other investments show that plaintiff knowingly employed investment advisors who utilized highly speculative investment strategies, and the risk of plaintiff's investment strategy is relevant to whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in its dealings with Newell. We note that during arguments on the motion in limine, defendant contended that plaintiff had a history of retaining investments which were initially unprofitable. Defendant, however, does not pursue that theory here, and we therefore do not address this argument. Plaintiff asserts that its investment strategy bears no relevance to its claims that defendant negligently valued the Newell investments or that defendant breached its contract with plaintiff. We agree with plaintiff that the trial court properly allowed the motion in limine. Plaintiff's claims relate to the manner in which defendant recorded the Newell investments and not to the risks inherent in those investments. We believe, therefore, that the risks involved in plaintiff's other investments had no relevance to plaintiff's claims. Defendant next alleges that the circuit court committed reversible error by limiting the scope of voir dire. Prior to voir dire, defendant proposed that the venire be asked the following questions: (1) Is there anyone here who has made a financial contribution to the Roman Catholic Church or to any order or institution of the Roman Catholic Church including hospitals, monasteries or schools? (2) Have you or any member of your family ever made a financial contribution to the Passionist Fathers? The trial judge rejected these questions. The jurors, however, were asked questions concerning membership in, or employment by, any religiously affiliated institution or organization. Prospective jurors were also asked whether they would give more weight to the testimony of persons who belonged to a religious order. Finally, potential jurors were made aware of the identity of the parties and asked if there was any reason they could not be fair and impartial. The appellate court found no error in the trial court's actions regarding voir dire. In support of the trial judge's ruling, plaintiff contends that the proposed voir dire questions were improper because they could have caused potential jurors to reveal their religious affiliation. Plaintiff argues that the other questions asked during voir dire were sufficient to disclose the venire's prejudices, and that the additional inquiry suggested by defendant was not necessary in this case. Under our Rule 234 (134 Ill.2d R. 234) the primary responsibility for initiating and conducting the voir dire examination lies with the trial judge, and the scope and extent of the inquiry rests within the discretion of the judge. ( Kingston v. Turner (1987), 115 Ill.2d 445, 464, 106 Ill.Dec. 14, 505 N.E.2d 320.) When a proposed voir dire question could uncover religious affiliation, therefore, it is within the trial court's discretion whether to allow the question. Generally, when religious affiliation is relevant to potential prejudice, subjects related to religious affiliation are proper subjects of inquiry on voir dire. See Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1957), 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627. We believe, however, that the suggested question regarding contributions to the Catholic Church was too remote from plaintiff's losses to be a proper subject for voir dire in this case. Any relationship between a potential juror's contribution to the Catholic Church and plaintiff's losses would be indirect. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to ask defendant's first question. With regard to defendant's second proposed question, concerning contributions to plaintiff itself, defendant argues that a juror might be biased if the juror believed that a portion of the money lost had been contributed to plaintiff by the juror or a member of the juror's family. We agree. Where a juror's contributions to plaintiff could have been included in the funds at issue in the case, the juror's impartiality might be questioned. We believe that the better procedure would have been for the trial judge to ask the venire whether they had made contributions to the Congregation. We do not believe, however, that the trial judge's refusal to ask potential jurors about contributions to plaintiff denied defendant its right to a trial before a fair and impartial jury. All potential jurors were made aware of the identity of the parties and asked whether they could be fair and impartial. Potential jurors were also asked whether they were members of, or employed by, any religiously affiliated institution or organization, and whether they would give more weight to the testimony of priests and brothers. Finally, we note that the evidence of defendant's liability was overwhelming. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the trial judge's failure to ask the second question proposed by defendant warrants reversal.
During trial, plaintiff was allowed to introduce, over defendant's objection, evidence that Newell had been declared bankrupt. Defendant argues that Newell's bankruptcy had no bearing on the issues involved in the present case and that this evidence was highly prejudicial. In support of the trial judge's ruling, plaintiff contends that defendant characterized Newell in both the opening statement and closing argument as having caused plaintiff's losses. Plaintiff claims, therefore, that defendant opened the door to evidence of Newell's bankruptcy, so that the jury could be told why Newell was not a defendant at trial. Our review of the record reveals that defendant did not attempt to hold Newell responsible for plaintiff's losses. We do not believe, therefore, that defendant opened the door for plaintiff to introduce evidence of Newell's bankruptcy. The circuit court erred in admitting this evidence, which was not relevant to the present case. We believe, however, that any error in allowing evidence of Newell's bankruptcy was harmless. Plaintiff did not attempt to foster jury bias by portraying defendant as its last possible avenue of recourse. The trial in the present case lasted nearly four weeks, and the trial transcript consumed more than 5,000 pages. The jury was presented with overwhelming evidence on which to find defendant liable. Given the strength of the evidence presented to the jury on the question of defendant's liability, we do not believe that the admission of this evidence denied defendant a fair trial. Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly allowed the redaction of plaintiff's financial statements to exclude references to investments not made by Newell. Defendant argues that to avoid jury confusion these documents should have been admitted into evidence in their entirety. The appellate court found that the redaction was proper. We agree. Defendant cites Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey (1988), 488 U.S. 153, 172, 109 S.Ct. 439, 451, 102 L.Ed.2d 445, 465, in which the Court stated that when one party has made use of a portion of a document, such that misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another portion, the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant. Defendant has made no showing of how redacting the documents could have confused the jury. The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and its ruling should not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse. ( People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill.2d 443, 79 Ill.Dec. 142, 463 N.E.2d 696.) We find no error in admitting the redacted documents into evidence. Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff was improperly allowed during trial to characterize defendant as a large international accounting firm with offices throughout the world. Prior to trial, the trial judge denied defendant's motion in limine to exclude any reference to defendant's size. Defendant maintains that the only purpose of identifying it in this manner was to suggest to the jury that defendant had ample resources with which to compensate plaintiff for its losses. Plaintiff argues that the references to defendant's size did not make reference to defendant's wealth. Plaintiff further claims that it relied on defendant's expertise, in part, because of defendant's size and resources, and that defendant's size was relevant to the question of plaintiff's reliance on defendant's advice and financial reports. We agree. Plaintiff, as part of its case in chief, asserted that it had relied on defendant to give advice regarding the manner in which Newell's investments were recorded. Plaintiff accepted this advice although its members did not understand the underlying transactions involved. The reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance could have been considered by the jury in determining whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Because plaintiff contends that defendant's size and reputation were the basis of its reliance on defendant, the trial court acted properly in allowing reference to evidence related to this issue.
Defendant alleges that the jury's verdict of $3.9 million on the tort count of plaintiff's complaint was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence clearly shows that it was not responsible for the loss of $500,000 entrusted to Newell in April 1981. Defendant alleges that plaintiff entrusted an additional $500,000 to Newell after plaintiff was fully informed of Newell's losses. It is not contested that plaintiff entrusted an additional $500,000 to Newell in April 1981. There was conflicting testimony, however, concerning whether plaintiff was fully informed of Newell's losses at that time. Defendant claims that Melchert informed plaintiff of Newell's losses at a meeting of the Council on February 11, 1981. Plaintiff, however, insists that Melchert provided only limited details to the Council at that time, and that Melchert stated he still believed the cost of the Newell investments was approximately equal to their market value. Further, it was established at trial that both the letter containing the correct 1978 market values of the Newell investments and the final 1980 financial report were delivered to plaintiff after it had forwarded the additional $500,000 to Newell. At what point plaintiff became aware of Newell's losses is a question of fact, the determination of which depended heavily on the credibility of the witnesses. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters for the jury to determine, and unless the jury's determination is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, its verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. ( Albaugh v. Cooley (1981), 87 Ill.2d 241, 249-50, 57 Ill.Dec. 720, 429 N.E.2d 837.) For the reasons mentioned, we do not believe that the inclusion of the additional $500,000 in plaintiff's award of damages was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant also contends that the jury verdicts returned on the tort and contract counts of plaintiff's complaint were inconsistent and did not conform to the evidence. The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff for $3.9 million on the tort count and $1.5 million on the breach of contract count. Plaintiff's total damages, however, were only $3,819,352. The trial court ordered remittitur to that amount on the tort count, and $0 on the breach of contract count. Plaintiff consented to remittitur on the tort count, but not on the breach of contract count. The trial court then entered a judgment of liability on both counts, and awarded damages of $3,819,352 on the tort count only. Plaintiff agreed to remittitur to $0 on the breach of contract count in the appellate court as a condition for the appellate court's not remanding the cause for a new trial on the issue of damages. Defendant contends that the verdicts are irreconcilable and should be set aside. Plaintiff alleges that the jury clearly intended to compensate the Congregation in full for its losses, and that the jury's apparent confusion over awarding damages on each separate count does not warrant reversal. [A] verdict must be set aside where the amount of the verdict bears no relationship to the loss suffered by the plaintiff. ( Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1978), 73 Ill.2d 127, 148, 23 Ill.Dec. 58, 383 N.E.2d 929.) Verdicts are to be liberally construed, however, and may be amended to conform to the pleadings and evidence contained in the record whenever the intention of the jury is clear. ( Churchill, 73 Ill.2d at 148, 23 Ill.Dec. 58, 383 N.E.2d 929.) Although the $3.9 million verdict returned by the jury on the tort count of the complaint is slightly greater than the amount of the losses suffered by plaintiff, we believe that the relatively minor deviation from plaintiff's actual damages shows that the intent of the jury was to award plaintiff the full amount of its damages on the tort count. The $1.5 million verdict returned by the jury on the contract count does not bear any ascertainable relationship to the loss suffered by plaintiff. Where plaintiff recovered the full amount of its damages on the tort count, however, the amount of damages awarded on the contract count should not affect its recovery. It is well established that a plaintiff may have only one satisfaction for an injury. ( McLane v. Russell (1989), 131 Ill.2d 509, 523, 137 Ill.Dec. 554, 546 N.E.2d 499.) Both the tort and contract counts were based on the same facts and sought recovery for the same injury. Plaintiff, therefore, could not recover under both counts. Plaintiff acknowledges this limitation on recovery of damages and concedes that $3,819,352 is the maximum amount of its allowable recovery. Because the jury's intent regarding damages on the tort count of plaintiff's complaint is clear, and damages awarded on the contract count could not affect plaintiff's recovery, we do not believe that the conflicting verdicts warrant reversal of this case.