Opinion ID: 6330216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of a Colorable Claim

Text: Plaintiffs’ lack of colorable claim implicates the first element of standing—injury-in-fact. An Article III injury requires the “invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Foundational to establishing an injury-in-fact, the plaintiff must allege “a ‘colorable’ or ‘arguable’ claim that the defendant has invaded a legally protected interest.” CHKRS, LLC v. City of Dublin, 984 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). In this inquiry, we must take care not to conflate standing with the merits. See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 31 (1993) (per curiam). But lack of a colorable claim could turn a failure on the merits “into a jurisdictional defect.” CHKRS, LLC, 984 F.3d at 489 (citations omitted); see also Gerber v. Herskovitz, 14 F.4th 500, 508 (6th Cir. 2021). Black’s Law Dictionary defines a colorable claim as a “plausible claim that may reasonably be asserted, given the facts presented and the current law (or a reasonable and logical extension or modification of the current law).” Claim, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). An implausible claim is grounds for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). And a constitutional claim “founded completely on a mistaken reading” of the Constitution is implausible. Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). If the legal claim is implausible, then the plaintiff lacks standing No. 21-3268 Rice, et al. v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio Page 20 because there is no legal interest to protect. See Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiffs do not have a colorable claim. The problem with Plaintiffs’ claim is not that they failed to establish a protected interest. While they have certainly failed in that regard, that failure goes to the merits of their claim, not their standing to bring it. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that their Eubank claim does not require a protected interest at all. Plaintiffs’ interpretation of their claim completely misreads the Constitution because it ignores the text of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, contradicts well-settled law that the Supreme Court established nearly 50 years ago in Roth, and flouts a threshold element required for all procedural due process claims, see Valentino, 756 F.3d at 904. Assertion of a procedural due process theory that does away with this well-established, threshold element cannot be the assertion of a reasonable or logical extension of current law. For this reason alone, I would hold that Plaintiffs lacked standing. See Glenn, 183 F.3d at 479 (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s implausible constitutional claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the “near frivolous” arguments for the plaintiff’s constitutional claims are insufficient to confer standing).