Opinion ID: 1088850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prejudice to the Plaintiffs

Text: Although Stutts may have violated Rule 8.4 by asking Miller to obtain and review documents for Stutts as he prepared for this case, we must also consider the prejudicial effect of the disqualification of Spain & Gillon on Wheeler and Phillips themselves. The defendants cite Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 893 F.Supp. 1349 (N.D.Ohio 1995), in support of their argument in favor of disqualification based on Rule 8.4. In Baker, the Ohio court disqualified an attorney and one of two law firms representing the plaintiffs in a products-liability action. The court disqualified one firm because of frequent contacts between it and the disqualified lawyer, stating that [t]he weight of the evidence therefore makes it more likely than not that on isolated occasions additional disclosures were made. 893 F.Supp. at 1369. However, the court noted that, [w]ere [the firm] the Bakers' sole attorney, the Court would be inclined . . . to stop short of disqualification, 893 F.Supp. at 1369, because the disclosure case against the [firm] [wa]s weak and any resulting taint [from the possible disclosures] is more formal than real. 893 F.Supp. at 1368-69. The court did stop short of disqualifying the second firm, holding that [t]he facts strongly suggest that confidential information, if any, wrongly passed to [the second firm] will have no impact on the just resolution of this litigation. 893 F.Supp. at 1368. The court, quoting an expert from an exhibit in the litigation, stated: `To completely disqualify [the second firm] at this late stage, merely because of the theoretical possibility that it gained some small advantage by having had access to the material provided by [the disqualified lawyer] for a brief period of time, would not only be an overreaction, but would be largely symbolic and would do little to protect the defendant's interests in any event.' 893 F.Supp. at 1368. This Court similarly considers the interests at stake when deciding whether to disqualify counsel: `Disqualification of counsel, like other reaches for perfection, is tempered by a need to balance a variety of competing considerations and complex concepts. Disqualification in spasm reaction to every situation capable of appearing improper to the jaundiced cynic is as goal-defeating as failure to disqualify in blind disregard of flagrant conflicts of interest. Between these ethical extremes lie less obvious influences on the interest of society in the orderly administration of justice, on the interest of clients in candid consultation and choice of counsel, and on the interest of the legal profession in its representational soul.' Taylor Coal, 401 So.2d at 7 (quoting Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir.1979)). In this case, the defendants filed their joint motion to disqualify counsel one week before the trial date and more than two years after this litigation had commenced. The parties have taken over 29 depositions, and the plaintiffs have obtained thousands of pages of documents. According to the affidavit of Steve R. Burford, an attorney with Spain & Gillon, the lawyers with Spain & Gillon have spent more than 2,469 hours working on this case. Unlike the disqualified firm in Baker, Spain & Gillon is the only firm representing Wheeler and Phillips. Wheeler and William Newton Phillips, both elderly individuals living outside the State of Alabama, would undoubtedly suffer a great deal of prejudice if Spain & Gillon was disqualified from representing them in this case. Moreover, the defendants have not shown any actual disclosure of confidential information from Miller to Spain & Gillon. Although Stutts's request for Miller to obtain documents from the State and to review those documents was improper in light of Rule 1.11, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., the resulting harm to the defendants was minimal. Miller testified that he did not analyze the documents or discuss them with Stutts; he says he merely passed them on. The documents were matters of public record, and Miller's acquiring them did not provide Spain & Gillon with confidential information. To disqualify Spain & Gillon under these circumstances, based on the evidence provided by the defendants, would amount to the overreaction the Baker court sought to avoid. [6]