Opinion ID: 2584029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary Absence as Waiver

Text: A defendant has a right, under the Washington and United States Constitutions, to be present at trial. State v. Thomson, 123 Wash.2d 877, 880, 872 P.2d 1097 (1994). This right is considered fundamental. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983). However, the defendant may waive this right. Thomson, 123 Wash.2d at 880, 872 P.2d 1097. The waiver must be voluntary and knowing. Id. Once trial has begun in the defendant's presence, a subsequent voluntary absence operates as an implied waiver, and the trial may continue without the defendant. Thomson, 123 Wash.2d at 880-81, 872 P.2d 1097; CrR 3.4(b). The determination of whether the defendant's absence is voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Thomson, 123 Wash.2d at 881, 872 P.2d 1097. Under the test adopted in Thomson: The trial court will (1) [make] sufficient inquiry into the circumstances of a defendant's disappearance to justify a finding whether the absence was voluntary, (2) [make] a preliminary finding of voluntariness (when justified), and (3) [afford] the defendant an adequate opportunity to explain his absence when he is returned to custody and before sentence is imposed. Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 34 Wash.App. 410, 414, 661 P.2d 605 (1983)). The Thomson court approved this inquiry as ample protection of the right to be present at trial because [t]he 3 prong voluntariness inquiry ensures the court will examine the circumstances of the defendant's absence and conclude the defendant chose not to be present at the continuation of the trial. Id. at 883, 872 P.2d 1097. In addition, it provides an opportunity for the defendant to explain his or her disappearance and rebut the finding of voluntary absence before the proceedings have been completed. Id. In performing the analysis, the court indulges every reasonable presumption against waiver. See id. at 881, 872 P.2d 1097. See also State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash.App. 380, 389, 568 P.2d 808 (1977) (citing Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 408, 412, 1 S.Ct. 307, 27 L.Ed. 169 (1882); State v. Williams, 87 Wash.2d 916, 921, 557 P.2d 1311 (1976); Little v. Rhay, 8 Wash.App. 725, 728, 509 P.2d 92 (1973)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hammond, 121 Wash.2d 787, 791, 854 P.2d 637 (1993). This presumption is the central focus of our inquiry today. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the parties appear to have made a proper application. For instance, Garza argues that because the court is required to indulge in reasonable presumptions against waiver, the State has the burden of proving that the waiver was voluntary, something it failed to do. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the presumption against waiver does not require the State to rebut it. Garza, 112 Wash.App. at 321-22, 48 P.3d 385. Instead, the presumption tempers the trial court's application of the third prong of the Thomson inquiry. Id. at 322, 48 P.3d 385. According to the Court of Appeals' interpretation, once the court has made an appropriate preliminary finding of voluntary absence (i.e., applied the first two prongs of the Thomson inquiry), the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that his or her absence was not voluntary .... [including a showing] that he or she made reasonable attempts to contact the court and counsel. Id. at 321, 48 P.3d 385. At this point, the presumption against waiver simply ensures that the court will review the circumstances of the defendant's absence and attempts to contact the court in a generous light. Id. at 322, 48 P.3d 385. We agree that the burden does not shift to the State to prove that a defendant's absence was voluntary. However, the Court of Appeals' application of the presumption only to the final prong of the Thomson inquiry is needlessly limiting. The presumption against waiver must be the overarching principle throughout the inquiry. Otherwise, the right to be present is not safeguarded as the Thomson court intended. This case illustrates the point. Garza called ahead to say he was on his way and warn his attorney he was going to be late, something he had not previously done. When Garza did not arrive at the appointed time, the judge could reasonably have presumed that something outside Garza's control was delaying him. Indulging this presumption the judge should have waited a more reasonable time than five minutes for Garza to arrive. Instead, the judge immediately deemed Garza's absence voluntary. This hasty determination of voluntary absence does not satisfy the Thomson court's requirement that the trial court sufficiently inquire into the circumstances of a defendant's absence. The court's decision to proceed after only five minutes was manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, the determination of voluntary absence without reference to the presumption against waiver was an abuse of discretion.