Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Failure to Present a Diminished Capacity Defense

Text: At the guilt phase of the trial, defense counsel defended the charge that defendant was guilty of murdering Radford in the first degree by attempting to persuade the jury that defendant did not intend to kill Radford, but only to knock him unconscious. As to Levoy, counsel argued both that the killing did not occur during the commission of the rapes because the sexual assaults had long since terminated by the time defendant killed her, and that defendant had strangled Levoy when she bit him on the thumb, enraging him and causing him to lose contact with reality. As to Levoy, then, counsel argued the criminal homicide was not elevated to first degree murder on either a felony-murder or a premeditation theory. Despite possession of a large amount of expert evidence related to defendant's mental condition, counsel chose not to present a defense of diminished capacity. [8] Defendant claims this decision demonstrates he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. `[I]n order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel's performance was deficient because his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra ,] 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]) Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel's performance or lack thereof. ( Strickland, supra, at pp. 691-692 [104 S.Ct. 2052]) Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( In re Sixto [, supra , ] 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257 [259 Cal.Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164]; Strickland, supra, at p. 694 [104 S.Ct. 2052])' ( People v. Jennings [ supra, ] 53 Cal.3d 334, 357 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]) ( In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 721, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, first ellipsis in Avena. ) Reviewing courts defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 412 [276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]), and there is a `strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436-437, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) [W]e accord great deference to counsel's tactical decisions ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 979, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183), and we have explained that courts should not second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354). Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and counsel's decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) In the usual case, where counsel's trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel's acts or omissions. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 896, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; see also People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144 [on appeal, a conviction will be reversed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission].) In this case, however, counsel set forth on the record specific reasons for deciding to forgo a diminished capacity defense. [T]here are many tactical considerations that the defense has to review prior to commenting on evidence and taking a basic theory of defense when arguing the case at the conclusion of the evidence. We made a determination that we didn't want to attack diminished capacity or use diminished capacity as an argument, although we felt it was necessary as a jury instruction because of some of the evidence brought up; however, if we had argued the fact that there was diminished capacity, we would have not had proceeded [ sic ] on argument that we did, which is [defendant] looked at the possibility of personally attempting to kill someone, reflected [on] that [possibility] and ma[d]e the decision, a thinking decision of only attempting to knock the man out. We couldn't have faithfully argued that to the jury if we had the counter argument that he didn't have the ability to deliberate and premeditate so we decided to go with the strongest evidence we had, which was no intent to kill. [¶] . . . [¶] Further, we decided not to submit any evidence of diminished capacity by way of medical testimony, reserving that defense for the insanity phase rather than coming in and destroying whatever evidence we were presenting relative to his ability to decide and make a logical conclusion as to his actions. We felt that there would be an inconsistent argument which would water down our credibility with the jury if we were to go both ways, so we decided to go and approach it one way. Those were tactical decisions and I am not saying that what we did was right, looking at the results, but it was a decision that we had to make and we believe that they were considered opinions predicated upon the evidence, [and the] state of the law as we knew it to be. As is clear, counsel had a reasoned explanation for their decision to forgo a diminished capacity defense at trial and to rely on what they considered their stronger arguments, namely, that defendant did not premeditate the killings and that Levoy's killing came after the rape had terminated. Defendant makes a number of arguments why he believes counsel's admittedly tactical decision was deficient, but none is availing. He claims counsel were mistaken in believing that a diminished capacity defense would have been inconsistent with the defense that defendant made a thinking decision to knock Radford out but not to kill him. Yet defendant admits that in his pretrial statement to police, he said he intended merely to knock Radford out. At trial, moreover, defendant testified he did not think Radford would suffer serious injury. Defendant also contends trial counsel were mistaken in concluding a diminished capacity defense would have been inconsistent with their defense that Levoy's killing did not occur during the commission of the rapes. But in making the temporal argument that the rapes had terminated, defense counsel David Huffman may well have believed that reliance as well on a diminished capacity defense would have undercut the thrust of the main defense theory of the case. We take counsel's statement that he could not have faithfully argued his chosen defense theory if he also used a diminished capacity argument to mean as much. We reach the same conclusion with respect to defendant's claim that the unconsciousness defense, that is, that defendant became enraged and lost consciousness when Levoy bit his thumb, was not inconsistent with a diminished capacity defense. That may be true, but counsel's decision to reserve the mental evidence for the sanity phase so as not to blunt its impact was not unreasonable. (See People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 562, 572, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089 [evidence of mental incapacity would lose much of its impact at the sanity phase if presented earlier].) Although the case was governed by the pre- Pope legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, [9] People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d 562, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089, posed the exact issue we confront in this case: was counsel ineffective for deciding to forgo presentation of mental incapacity evidence at the guilt phase and to reserve it instead for the sanity phase? We found counsel's tactical decision there was not unreasonable, explaining: We touch here on a difficult tactical problem facing every defense counsel who possesses psychiatric evidence bearing on his client's condition at the time of the crime. Since the development of the Wells-Gorshen line of cases, [10] this evidence is usually admissible at both the guilt phase and the sanity phase. Counsel's dilemma is, therefore, at which phase should he introduce this evidence? In People v. Coogler (1969) . . . 71 Cal.2d 153, 169 [77 Cal.Rptr. 790, 454 P.2d 686], we upheld the competency of counsel who chose to introduce such evidence at the guilt phase only: `His decision not to enter an insanity plea may have been based upon a fear that such a plea would prejudice his client's claim of diminished capacity; if the jury knew that an insanity hearing would follow in the event of defendant's conviction, it might treat summarily the psychiatric testimony as to whether defendant could form the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged.' Even more certain than this conjecture, however, is that a trier of fact would tend to `treat summarily' such evidence if it were introduced at the sanity phase after the same trier had already rejected it at the guilt phase. It follows that when, as here, counsel concludes his client has a valid defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, it might be unwise for him to prematurely expose that evidence to the scrutiny of the trier of fact at the guilt phase. It is no solution to this dilemma for us to engage in the perilous process of second-guessing whichever of the alternatives counsel chooses. . . . Nothing is seen more clearly than with hindsight. The most that can be fairly said on this record, however, is that counsel's decision to delay introducing his evidence of defendant's mental state until the sanity phase was a debatable trial tactic. Yet as we reminded the bench and bar not long ago, even `debatable trial tactics' do not `constitute a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel' ( People v. McGautha (1969) 70 Cal.2d 770, 784 [76 Cal.Rptr. 434, 452 P.2d 650], affd. sub nom. McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711]) When, as here, `there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense' ( In re Hawley (1967) . . . 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [63 Cal.Rptr. 831, 433 P.2d 919]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel's judgment in the matter. ( People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counsel were constitutionally ineffective under either the state or federal Constitution because they chose to withhold the evidence of defendant's alleged diminished capacity until the sanity phase of the trial.