Opinion ID: 771970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elaiho's Constructive Possession of Recently Stolen Goods

Text: 33 The unexplained possession of recently stolen property may permit an inference that the possessor knew that the property was stolen. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845-46 (1973). Such possession may be either actual or constructive. Constructive possession exists when a person has the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object. United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1998). However, mere presence at the location of contraband does not establish possession. United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir.1988). 34 In this case, Elaiho never exercised the dominion and control necessary to find that he was in constructive possession of the goods. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, showed that during the November 13, 1998 pickup, Samaria placed a box in Elaiho's car, following which Elaiho rode in the same car as a passenger. 7 During the November 18, 1998 pickup, the boxes were not placed in Elaiho's car at all, but rather in the yellow cab in which Samaria rode. Elaiho stayed in his car while Samaria removed the boxes from the yellow cab and set them down on the curb for Glover to stand near. There is no evidence that Elaiho handled any of the boxes or directed where they were to be taken or what was to be done with them. At all times, Elaiho appeared to follow the directions of Samaria and Glover. Elaiho did not, therefore, exhibit the dominion and control over the boxes necessary to find that he constructively possessed them. See United States v. Infanti, 474 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding no constructive possession of stolen stock certificates when [t]here was no evidence that [the defendant] could set the price for the securities, that he had the final say as to their means of transfer or that he was able to assure their delivery.); see also United States v. Ramirez, 176 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a passenger's mere knowledge of the presence of contraband, without evidence suggesting a passenger's dominion or control of the contraband, is insufficient to prove possession); United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that mere proximity, mere presence, or mere association is insufficient to support a finding of possession). 8