Opinion ID: 1244738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Argument Regarding Waiver and Estoppel.

Text: The thrust of Douglass and Hassing's argument goes to the language of the notice of trustee's sale and similar language in the notice of default: [t]he beneficiary elects to sell or cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy said obligation. Essentially, Douglass and Hassing are saying that Frontier has waived or is estopped from asserting its right to a deficiency judgment, as set forth in I.C. § 45-1512, because the relevant language in the notice of trustee's sale and notice of default provides that the sale of the property will satisfy the obligation. Idaho Code § 45-1505 (1957) [1] sets forth the conditions under which the trustee may foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale. It provides: 45-1505. Foreclosure of trust deed, when.  The trustee may foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale under this act if: (1) The trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a successor trustee are recorded in mortgage records in the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated; and (2) There is a default by the grantor or other person owing an obligation the performance of which is secured by the trust deed or by their successors in interest with respect to any provision in the deed which authorizes sale in the event of default of such provision; and (3) The trustee or beneficiary shall have filed for record in the office of the recorder in each county wherein the trust property, or some part or parcel, is situated, a notice of default identifying the deed of trust by stating the name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the book and page where the same is recorded, or a description of the trust property, and containing a statement that a breach of the obligation for which the transfer in trust security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of such breach and his election to sell or cause to be sold such property to satisfy such obligation; and a copy of such notice by registered or certified mail to any person requesting such notice of record as hereinafter provided. (4) No action, suit or proceeding has been instituted to recover the debt then remaining secured by the trust deed, or any part thereof, or if such action or proceeding has been instituted, the action or proceeding has been dismissed. (Emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 45-1512 permits a beneficiary under a deed of trust to seek a deficiency judgment after a trustee's sale under a deed of trust. It provides: 45-1512. Money judgment  Action seeking balance due on obligation.  At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of trust, as hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be sought for the balance due upon the obligation for which such deed of trust was given as security, and in such action the plaintiff shall set forth in his complaint the entire amount of indebtedness which was secured by such deed of trust and the amount for which the same was sold and the fair market value at the date of sale, together with interest from such date of sale, costs of sale and attorney[] fees. Before rendering judgment the court shall find the fair market value of the real property sold at the time of sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the entire amount of indebtedness due at the time of sale exceeds the fair market value at that time, with interest from date of sale, but in no event may the judgment exceed the difference between the amount for which such property was sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust. The above-quoted statutes, I.C. § 45-1505 (1957) and I.C. § 45-1512, were both enacted in 1957 as part of an act relating to deeds of trust. An Act Relating To Deeds Of Trust, ch. 181, §§ 5, 12, 1957 Idaho Session Laws 345, 347, 351-52. Thus, these statutes are in pari materia and must be construed together as parts of the act. Curtis v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 122 Idaho 73, 82, 831 P.2d 541, 550 (1992); Achenbach v. Kincaid, 25 Idaho 768, 775, 140 P. 529, 531 (1914). Subdivision (3) of I.C. § 45-1505 requires that the trustee or beneficiary file a notice of default identifying the deed of trust and containing, among other things, a statement setting forth his or her election to sell or cause to be sold such property to satisfy such obligation. (Emphasis added.) Douglass and Hassing argue that the relevant language of the notice of trustee's sale and notice of default, regarding Frontier's election to sell the property to satisfy the obligation, is inconsistent with I.C. § 45-1512, resulting in Frontier waiving or being quasi-estopped from asserting its right to seek a deficiency judgment. However, it is clear that the relevant language in the notice of trustee's sale and notice of default is required by I.C. § 45-1505(3). It is well settled that [w]aiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. Tiffany v. City of Payette, 121 Idaho 396, 403, 825 P.2d 493, 500 (1992), quoting Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981). Nothing in the record before this Court establishes that Frontier voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its right to seek deficiency judgment. We must construe I.C. §§ 45-1505 and 45-1512 together, since they are both parts of the same act, directly relating to the same subject matter. If Douglass' and Hassing's argument were correct, I.C. § 45-1505(3) would render I.C. § 45-1512 meaningless. Every time a beneficiary or trustee complied with the requirements of I.C. § 45-1505(3), they would not be permitted to seek deficiency judgment after the sale because, as appellant argues, they would have agreed to accept the amount received at the sale in full satisfaction of the obligation. In order for quasi-estoppel to apply, Frontier would have had to have taken an earlier position, with knowledge of the facts and its rights, inconsistent with its later position that it was entitled to seek deficiency judgment, to the detriment of Douglass and Hassing. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 282, 486 P.2d 992, 994 (1971). The record clearly shows that Frontier complied with the relevant statutes. In other words, Frontier's actions evidence its intent to follow the statutory scheme so that it could seek a deficiency judgment on Douglass' and Hassing's note obligation.