Opinion ID: 1998751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Additional Mitigating Evidence

Text: The mitigating evidence Rouster asserts should have been presented stems from his misfortune in having been born to a mother who abused heroin. He believes that had the jury heard evidence about the physiological and emotional effects Rouster incurred due to his mother's addiction and her early abandonment of him, he would not have been sentenced to death. On direct appeal, Rouster's counsel made arguments similar to those furthered by Rouster's post-conviction counsel. In response to these arguments, we held: Rouster concedes in his brief that the State presented evidence sufficient to prove the aggravators. He contends, however, that mitigating circumstances exist which are not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances and thus the death penalty should not be imposed. He points to facts in the record detailing the unfortunate childhood which he endured: born to a fourteen year old prostitute, abandoned at birth, raised as a ward of the state, shuttled from foster homes to institutions, more than a dozen different living arrangements in eighteen years. The jury heard this evidence before making its recommendation that Rouster receive the death penalty for robbing and killing his elderly foster parents. There are indications in the record that the trial judge also considered Rouster's history in reaching his decision. The judge concluded, however, that [Rouster's] lack of family support and traditional human relationships, though a factor in his antisocial behavior, cannot excuse that conduct . . . Record at 147. The court then found that the aggravating circumstances predominated. The evidence supports this conclusion about the relative weight of all the circumstances and thus the decision regarding the penalty to be imposed on Rouster. Rouster, 600 N.E.2d at 1350. Rouster attempts to differentiate his present claim from the one he made on direct appeal by arguing his trial counsel should have hired expert witnesses to testify on the issue of how his troubled circumstances affected his mental capacity. [6] During sentencing, trial counsel did note several times, however, that Rouster was emotionally disturbed. Counsel also referred the jury to opinions given earlier at trial by members of the Department of Public Welfare which stated Rouster was emotionally disturbed. The additional testimony offered by the petitioner during post-conviction would have given the jury neither additional nor crucially different information. Based on this information and the findings of the post-conviction court, we conclude counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to offer additional mitigating evidence about Rouster's mental state.