Opinion ID: 1702189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence was limited by jury instructions and the state's closing argument.

Text: ¶ 49. First, Berry claims that the sentencing instructions prevented the jury from considering all the evidence presented regarding his mental problems. He recognizes that we considered this issue in Berry II, but argues that its review was flawed because we placed too much reliance on the catchall instruction and should reconsider the catchall in light of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) ( Penry II ); and because we misapplied Blystone v. Pennsylvania 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990), which is distinguishable from the instant case. The State argues that the matter is procedurally barred. ¶ 50. In Berry II we considered whether the jury instructions limited consideration of his mental state. We dismissed this issue citing the inclusion of the catchall provision and the fact that defense counsel argued exhaustively to the jury that they should not impose the death sentence due to the extenuating circumstances relating to Berry's mental and emotional state. Berry, 703 So.2d at 287. ¶ 51. Berry argues that the issue in Blystone was whether Pennsylvania's capital statute violated the Eighth Amendment. He argues that any reliance on the majority's discussion regarding instructions or catchall provisions is misplaced because it was not directly at issue. For this point, he cites the Justice Brennan's dissent in Blystone . 494 U.S. at 316 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1078. Such claims regarding our analysis from Berry II should have been raised on motion for rehearing and is therefore procedurally barred. The analysis now shifts to the issue regarding the closing arguments by the State and the Supreme Court's holding in Penry II. ¶ 52. Second, Berry argues the State misled the jury because it made the jury believe that, because he was competent to stand trial, all other evidence should not be considered; and that there was a heightened standard for mitigating evidence. The State's closing may have confused jurors in regards to evidence of mental and emotional problems. The State argued, inter alia, that: ... the bottom line, [Berry is] competent to stand trial, competent to know right from wrong, in his mind competent to be executed.... In doing so, the State argued in unison issues of insanity, competency, and mental retardation. The State argued that, because he knew the difference between right and wrong and because he was competent to stand trial, Berry was competent under the law to be executed. As noted later in the discussion of mental retardation, supra, competency, mental retardation, and insanity are distinct principles that are not used interchangeably. Berry claims that the decisions from Penry I and Penry II support his position. However, these two cases do not support Berry's claim regarding the State's closing. ¶ 53. In Penry I, the Supreme Court considered whether the jury instructions during capital sentencing allowed the jury the ability to properly consider the mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental retardation and childhood abuse. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) ( Penry I) . The Court ruled that in a capital murder trial the jury should be able to consider and give effect to [a defendant's mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence. Id. ¶ 54. In Penry II, the Supreme Court considered whether on resentencing the state court complied with its holding from Penry I. Finding that it did not, the Supreme Court stated that instructions that mere[ly] mention or instruct the jury to consider mitigating circumstances do not satisfy the Eighth amendment. Penry II, 532 U.S. at 797, 121 S.Ct. 1910. The Court found the sentencing instructions to be internally contradicting, id. at 798, 121 S.Ct. 1910, and suggested that the contradiction may be resolved by considering that instructions in the light of all that had taken place at the trial (i.e., comments by the court or either side) or with the presence of a more clearly drafted catchall instruction on mitigating evidence. Id. at 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910. However, without such, the Court held that a reasonable juror could well believe that there was no vehicle for expressing their view [that the defendant] did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence. Id. at 804, 121 S.Ct. 1910. ¶ 55. Considering how the instructions may have been clarified, the Supreme Court stated, Moreover, even if we thought that the arguments of defense counsel could be an adequate substitute for statements of the law by the court,... the prosecutor effectively neutralized defense counsel's argument, ... by stressing the jury's duty `[t]o follow your oath, the evidence and the law.' Id. at 802, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (citation omitted). Berry maintains that similarly, the State's closing argument effectively neutralized defense counsel's closing argument. The instant case is easily distinguishable from Penry II, which is therefore not applicable, because there is no alleged internal contradiction with the instructions presently at issue. ¶ 56. Post-conviction review based on the jury instructions and the State's closing argument is denied. Though we are concerned with the State's interchangeable use of the principles of mental retardation, competency and insanity, this alone does not warrant review.