Opinion ID: 625001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the District Court Erred by Reserving the Question of Qualified Immunity for the Jury

Text: Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). Thus, [w]here the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). While this Court at one time was of the view that district courts should not decide the issue of qualified immunity unless a rational jury could reach only one conclusion, the Supreme Court, in Hunter v. Bryant, rejected that approach for two reasons. 502 U.S. 224, 227-28, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991); see also Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 872. First, the Supreme Court found that such an approach too often failed to protect defendants from the expenses of trial. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534. Second, the Supreme Court noted that the question is whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed. Id. After Hunter, this Court altered its approach to resolving questions of qualified immunity. See Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 873. Under the current approach, a district court should decide the issue of qualified immunity as a matter of law when the material, historical facts are not in dispute, and the only disputes involve what inferences properly may be drawn from those historical facts. Peng, 335 F.3d at 979-80. Only where historical facts material to the qualified immunity determination are in dispute should the district court submit the issue to a jury. Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir.2008). [2] Here, the district court found that a reasonable jury could find a lack of probable cause at this stage, not because the parties disputed what Heiman and Neil knew about Conner's actions, but instead because, in the court's view, those actions were consistent with the inference that Conner had committed no crime. In doing so, the Court implicitly acknowledged that no material dispute existed concerning what facts Heiman and Neil knew. Instead, the only material disputes concerned what inferences properly may [have] be[en] drawn from those historical facts. Peng, 335 F.3d at 979-80. Accordingly, under Peng, the district court should have decided whether probable cause existed when Neil and Heiman arrested Conner, and reserving this question for the jury was error. Id.