Opinion ID: 1861064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of brewer and ccri?

Text: ¶ 8. This issue can be phrased simply as whether the owner of an aircraft can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-employee pilot who borrows the aircraft for the benefit of his personal friends. The Malones cite two statutes they believe were improperly construed by the trial court and which render Brewer vicariously liable for Jones's negligent acts. First, the Malones note the relevant definitions concerning the operation of an aircraft that are found in Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1996): For the purposes of the laws of the state relating to aeronautics the following words, terms and phrases shall have the meanings herein given, unless otherwise specifically defined, or unless another intention clearly appears, or the context otherwise requires: (a)Aeronautics means transportation by aircraft; the operation, construction, repair or maintenance of aircraft, aircraft power plants and accessories; the design, establishment, construction extension operation, improvement, repair or maintenance or airports or other navigation facilities and air instruction; (b)Aircraft means any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used or designed for navigation or flight in the air; . . . (j)Operation or aircraft or operate aircraft means the use of aircraft for purpose of air navigation, and includes the navigation or piloting of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of the statutes of this state: . . . Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1996). ¶ 9. The Malones argue that CCRI and Brewer are liable under the definitions in § 61-1-3 because they authorized the use of the aircraft by Jones. They note the statute merely requires authorization and is silent as to whether the use would have to be within the course and scope of employment. ¶ 10. Second, the Malones cite Miss. Code Ann. § 61-11-1 which states in relevant part as follows: It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an aircraft in the air or on the ground or water, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics or other habit-forming drug, or to operate an aircraft in the air or on the ground or water, in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. In any proceeding charging careless or reckless operation of aircraft in violation of this section, the court in determining whether the operation was careless or reckless shall consider the standards for safe operation of aircraft prescribed by federal statutes or regulations governing aeronautics. Miss.Code Ann. § 61-11-1(1) (1996). ¶ 11. The Malones argue these statutes have been interpreted by both the Fifth Circuit and this Court as meaning that the owner of an aircraft is also an operator and is vicariously liable for all acts of the pilot, citing Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.1955); Cannon v. Jones, 377 So.2d 1055 (Miss.1979); and Brunt v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 243 Miss. 607, 139 So.2d 380 (1962). The circuit court, however, in granting the motion for summary judgment, accepted CCRI's and Brewer's argument that these cases were distinguishable from the instant case. ¶ 12. We agree with Malones' argument and find accordingly that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Brewer and CCRI. The circuit court determined that the pilot or operator was liable. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j) (2000), the owner is also deemed to be engaged in the operation of the plane. [1] Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the owner of the plane, and summary judgment should not have been rendered. ¶ 13. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j), any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft. The statute is clear that the owner of a plane will be treated as an operator just like the pilot actually operating the plane. Since the owner also stands as the operator of the plane, then logically if the pilot is found negligent then the owner of the plane will also be determined to be negligent as a co-operator of the plane. In Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir.1955), the Fifth Circuit stated that, [t]he liability of the owner is there just as much as if he were the operator of the aircraft; [therefore] [t]he owner who authorizes a pilot to use his plane becomes liable for the negligence of the pilot in the operation of the plane. While Hays is a Fifth Circuit case, this Court has followed the interpretation provided by the Fifth Circuit in Hays. See Cannon v. Jones, 377 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Miss.1979); Brunt v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 243 Miss. 607, 618-19, 139 So.2d 380, 386 (1962). Since the owner is deemed the operator under the interpretation of Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j) provided by Hays, a triable issue of fact exists. Therefore, the summary judgment should not have been granted by the trial court. ¶ 14. Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j) has not been repealed, and the interpretation provided in Hays and adopted by this Court in Brunt and Cannon has not been overruled. See Hays, 221 F.2d at 482-83; Cannon, 377 So.2d at 1057. Therefore, we apply the Hays and Cannon interpretation of the predecessor of Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j) and reverse the summary judgment. Since the Legislature based the statutory language on Hays and Brunt, it is the Legislature's place to redefine Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3(j) if the meaning of the statute has changed. We hereby reverse the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment as to the owner of the plane and remand this matter for trial.