Opinion ID: 215733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Drug Quantity at Sentencing

Text: Garcia-Ruiz challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. He maintains the district court erred when it rejected his claims that the evidence was - 13 - insufficient to demonstrate the conspiracy distributed more than 150 kilograms of cocaine during his involvement. We review the district court’s calculation of drug quantities at sentencing for clear error and “will reverse only if the district court’s finding was without factual support in the record or we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Ryan, 236 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001). The government has the burden of proving the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The district court overruled Garcia-Ruiz’s objection to the PSR’s drug quantity calculation as follows: As the government has summarized, the evidence presented at trial covered a time period beyond the [sic] January 7, whatever the particular date was; and the evidence, although there was some conflict and you could certainly pick and choose perhaps what you wish to emphasize, but in general, that this was an ongoing, every-other week, significant amount of cocaine and cash being distributed and there’s no question that a reasonable jury could conclude and a reasonable fact finder could conclude that this defendant was involved in a conspiracy that involved more than 150 kilograms of cocaine. (R. Supp. Vol. 2 at 23.) Garcia-Ruiz contends the government only proved, at best, he was involved in the distribution of 80-100 kilograms of cocaine. The government contends “the district court reasonably estimated the amount of cocaine attributable to Mr. Garcia-Ruiz to be over 150 kilograms of cocaine based on the testimony relating to the frequency of the shipments over the course of the conspiracy, the size of the shipments, and the length of Mr. Garcia-Ruiz’s involvement in the conspiracy.” (Government’s Br. at 34.) Unfortunately the government offers no record support for its summary statement. - 14 - Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we must agree with Garcia-Ruiz. Garcia-Ruiz was involved in the conspiracy from late October 2006 until his arrest in April 2007. During that time, the government presented evidence of four specific shipments: one in late October or early November 2006, one on November 28, 2006, one on December 13, 2006; and the shipment confiscated on January 8, 2007. Luis Camacho-Levario testified the quantity of drugs in the early November 2006 and the January 8, 2007 shipments were each close to 25 kilograms, totaling 50 kilograms. The runner who retrieved the December 13, 2006 shipment testified it was “about” 24 kilograms. (R. Vol. 2 at 469.) Giving the government the benefit of the doubt, another 25 kilograms would total 75. Luis testified, generally, the shipments were 25 to 30 kilograms “about every other week.”6 (Vol. 2 at 216.) Given that testimony, we will assume the November 28, 2006 shipment was 30 kilograms and will also assume an additional 30 kilogram shipment was made between the October/early November 2006 and November 28, 2006 shipments.7 These assumptions add another 60 kilograms, totaling 135 kilograms. Luis said there were no further shipments from Mexico after the January shipment was confiscated and the government did not show the conspiracy received equivalent shipments from any source after January 2007. Thus, the quantity of cocaine from the Mexico shipments during Garcia-Ruiz’s 6 Although there was other testimony regarding the quantity of drugs, Luis’s testimony was the most generous to the government. We defer to the district court when reviewing the credibility of witnesses on whose testimony the district court relies in making its drug quantity factual findings. United States v. Nieto, 60 F.3d 1464, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1995). 7 The remaining known shipments were approximately two weeks apart. - 15 - involvement from October 2006 through April 2007 was 135 kilograms. The record clearly indicates the availability of cocaine after the January confiscation decreased dramatically. But one of Alejandro Camacho-Levario’s customers testified as to how Garcia-Ruiz assisted him in the purchase of one kilogram of cocaine on January 28, 2007. And a diligent review of the taped telephone conversations beginning in November 2006 and continuing through April 25, 2007 – the day before the arrests – reveals Luis purchased and sold approximately a kilogram of cocaine in February. Even if we were to credit the amount discovered during Garcia-Ruiz’s traffic stop in February 2007 -- 226 grams – for the purpose of sentencing, Garcia-Ruiz was responsible for, at most, 137.226 kilograms of cocaine. We recognize that “[w]hen the actual drugs underlying a drug quantity determination are not seized, the [sentencing] court may rely upon an estimate to establish the defendant's guideline offense level so long as the information relied upon has some basis of support in the facts of the particular case and bears sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Dalton, 409 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). However, the government does not point to any basis in the facts which would allow the district court to reach an estimate that the conspiracy distributed over 150 kilograms during Garcia-Ruiz’s participation. The government relies solely on Luis’s testimony that the conspiracy distributed a quantity of 25-30 kilograms every two weeks. But, as explained above, that mallet cannot ring the bell given testimony of specific quantities in specific shipments. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred when it calculated this portion of - 16 - Garcia-Ruiz’s base offense level. It should have begun with a base offense level of 36, see USSG § 2D1.1(c)(2) (at least 50 kilograms but less than 150 kilograms of cocaine), rather than beginning its calculations with a base offense of 38. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1) (trafficking 150 kilograms or more of cocaine). Any error in the guidelines calculation requires a remand unless the error is harmless. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 2006). A harmless error is one which we can say “did not affect the sentence selected.” United States v. Tom, 494 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2007). It is the government’s burden to convince us by a preponderance of the evidence the error is harmless. United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). A district court must begin every sentencing proceeding by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290, 1300 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). “A sentence cannot . . . be considered reasonable if the manner in which it was determined was unreasonable, i.e., if it was based on an improper determination of the applicable Guidelines range.” Tom, 494 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055). If the district court had applied a base offense level of 36, Garcia-Ruiz’s guideline range would have been 292 to 365 months imprisonment rather than the 360 month to life. The government argues “the question of what the applicable base offense level should have been is largely academic because Mr. Garcia-Ruiz received a much lower sentence than he would have received even if the drug quantity evidence had only supported a base offense level of 36, as opposed to 38.” (Government Br. at 34.) It contends because “the district court’s variance was tied to the average sentences that - 17 - were recommended by the Government for the leaders of the drug organization . . . 180 months,” there is no “assurance” Garcia-Ruiz’s sentence would be lower on remand. (Id. at 36.) While this argument has obvious weight, it cannot carry the day. At the time of sentencing, the court thought Garcia-Ruiz, like the “kingpins,” was responsible for the distribution of over 150 kilograms of cocaine. It was faced with a difficult situation and wanted to “measure that in a fair way and come up with a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary.” (R. Supp. Vol. 2 at 26.) It recognized the disparity between the actions of the different conspirators as compared to those of Garcia-Ruiz (several years of distributing well over 150 kilograms of cocaine and Garcia–Ruiz’s active involvement for no more than four months) as well as the proposed sentences for others who had been significantly involved for a substantial period of time (sentences ranging from 47 months for another runner in a position similar to GarciaRuiz’s up to 194 months for Jose Muñoz, the main partner with Alejandro in the Camacho Group.) We recognize these other defendants pled guilty prior to trial,8 but we cannot know what the court would do in dealing with a correct drug amount. Therefore, the error in calculation cannot be said to be harmless in this instance and we remand for resentencing. It may be that the already lenient sentence would not change because the amount of drugs was 130+ kilograms rather than 150. But that is a decision for the trial 8 We note some of these defendants’ agreements with the government occurred less than one week before trial, thereby causing the government significant work over a three-year time span. - 18 -