Opinion ID: 1515839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exceptions for Present Sense Impressions and Excited Utterances

Text: A hearsay statement is admissible under the present sense impression exception set out in D.R.E. 803(1) [3] if the statement satisfies the following requirements: [T]he declarant must have personally perceived the event described; the declaration must be an explanation or description of the event, rather than a narration; and the declaration and the event described must be contemporaneous. The statements, however, need not be precisely contemporaneous with the triggering event but must be in response to it and occur within a short time after the stimulus. [4] The exception for present sense impressions is based on the theory that spontaneous statements describing an event are trustworthy because the declarant has no time to fabricate the statements and because there is less concern that the statements reflect a defect in the declarant's memory. [5] Warren also implicitly argues that a hearsay statement is admissible as a present sense impression only if there is independent evidence to corroborate the statement. Although several courts have reached this conclusion, [6] we find that independent corroboration of the statement is not a prerequisite for admission under the present sense impression exception. [7] In some cases, corroborating evidence may be required to determine whether the declarant made the statement at the time of the triggering event or whether the declarant actually perceived the triggering event. [8] But the language of the rule does not require corroborating evidence under all circumstances, and we find no reason to infer such a general requirement. In the present case, there is no dispute that Felton perceived the underlying events or that she made the first recorded 911 call during or immediately after the underlying events  that is, the alleged assault and break-in. Instead, Warren argues that the 911 calls were a narration rather than a description of the events. After reviewing the transcript of the first 911 call, we find that Felton's statements were not a narration because Felton related her account of the recent events to the 911 operator with little embellishment or extraneous commentary. We therefore conclude that the recording of the first 911 call was properly admitted as a present sense impression under D.R.E. 803(1). The stronger argument is that the second 911 call included portions of a heated argument between Felton and Warren in which Felton recounted parts of their earlier confrontation and repeated her characterization of the assault and breakin. Although present sense impressions need not be precisely contemporaneous with the triggering event, courts generally find statements admissible as present sense impressions if the statements were made within about ten or twenty minutes of the event. [9] Because Felton's statements during the second 911 call describe events that occurred over an hour before the call, the statements were too far removed from the first encounter to be present sense impressions of the assault and break-in. Nevertheless, the trial court's decision to admit the recording of the second call under D.R.E. 803(1) was, at most, harmless error because the statements were admissible under D.R.E. 803(2), the excited utterances exception to the hearsay rule. [10] To establish the admissibility of a statement under D.R.E. 803(2), the proponent must show that: (1) the excitement of the declarant [was] precipitated by an event; (2) the statement being offered as evidence [was] made during the time period while the excitement of the event was continuing; and (3) the statement [was] related to the startling event. [11] In this case, the triggering events for the second call were Warren's return to Felton's apartment and, to some extent, the initial confrontation. Felton's statements during the second call fit within the excited utterance exception (1) because, according to the officer's testimony, Felton was still under the excitement of the triggering events when she made the call and (2) because Felton's statements during the second call were all related to the triggering events. As a consequence, even if the trial court erred in admitting the recording of the second call under the present sense impression exception, the error was harmless because the statement was admissible as an excited utterance.