Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor's notice of aggravating evidence was deficient and, for that reason, the trial court should have excluded testimony that defendant shot at the owner of the A & J Market during a robbery attempt on March 6, 1979. Defendant relies on former section 190.3, which provided: Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time, as determined by the court, prior to trial. (Stats.1977, ch. 316, § 11, p. 1259.) In its notice of aggravating evidence, the prosecution stated it would present evidence establishing that on or about March 6, 1979, defendant did commit an act of armed robbery while armed at the A & J Market. . . . Defendant argues the prosecutor was required to specify more precisely what the evidence would be, including the testimony reflecting that defendant shot at the owner. No such requirement exists. Notice is sufficient if it affords the defendant a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 798, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) [T]he prosecutor is not prevented from introducing all the circumstances of a duly noticed incident or transaction simply because each and every circumstantial fact was not recited therein. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 258, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) We have no doubt the notice given was sufficient to permit counsel to prepare a defense, particularly because testimony concerning the shooting was presented at defendant's first trial as part of the evidence of this attempted robbery, and the record demonstrates that defense counsel was aware of the circumstances of the incident. For the same reason, the prosecution's notice that it would offer evidence indicating that defendant had committed an armed robbery of a gas station in Salt Lake City on or about February 15, 1979 was sufficient even though the evidence presented was of a robbery committed on February 5, not February 15, of that year. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Floyd Cowdell reflecting that defendant had admitted returning fire after he had been fired upon after the attempted robbery of the A & J market. Defendant asserts the testimony was improper because the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti for any crime of assault or attempted murder. As noted above, the corpus delicti rule requires some evidence that a crime occurred, independent of the defendant's own statements. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1181, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) As also noted above, however, the quantum of evidence required is not great, and need only be `a slight or prima facie showing' permitting an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a criminal agency, after which the defendant's statements may be considered to strengthen the case on all issues. ( Ibid. ) Contrary to defendant's argument, the shooting, which took place as defendant was fleeing from the A & J market, was part of the attempted robbery. Evidence of the corpus delicti of that crime was established by the testimony of one of the victims, Alaire Fivas, who witnessed the crime and testified that she heard a gun fire shortly after defendant ran out of the store.