Opinion ID: 1278622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lesser-included Offense Instruction Analytical Framework

Text: Having adopted the rule that trial courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, we now seek to provide an overview of the analytical framework trial courts must apply when determining whether a lesser-included offense instruction must be given. Under Minn.Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2004), a defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both. An included offense includes a lesser degree of the same crime. Id., subd. 1(1). In Minnesota, every lesser degree of murder is intended by § 609.04 to be characterized as an included offense. Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 421, 228 N.W.2d at 125. It is well established in our jurisprudence that we review the denial of a requested lesser-included offense instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e. g., Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 421, 228 N.W.2d at 125 (stating that it is preeminently the trial court's duty in the exercise of its discretion to determine what lesser degrees of homicide to submit). It is equally well established that where the evidence warrants a lesser-included offense instruction, the trial court must give it. See, e. g., Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 273 (The determination of what, if any, lesser offense to submit to the jury lies within the sound discretion of the trial court,    but where the evidence warrants an instruction, the trial court must give it.). Further, we have stated that the failure to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury is grounds for reversal only if the defendant is prejudiced thereby. State v. Shepherd, 477 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn.1991) (citing Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 273). Taken together, these three dimensions of our lesser-included offense jurisprudence may create confusion regarding how the trial court's discretion, the trial court's duty, and the conditions giving rise to reversible error relate. We seek to clarify these issues here. As a preliminary matter, we emphasize that when a defendant fails to request a lesser-included offense instruction warranted by the evidence, the defendant impliedly waives his or her right to receive the instruction. Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 422, 228 N.W.2d at 126; Jordan, 272 Minn. at 86, 136 N.W.2d at 604; Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(3). If a defendant expressly waives the right to receive an instruction, the trial court may, in its discretion, withhold the instruction. Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 274 (stating that defendant's request that the court not give a warranted lesser-included offense instruction constituted a waiver and the trial court did not err in refusing to give it); State v. Walker, 306 Minn. 105, 120-21, 235 N.W.2d 810, 820 (1975) (holding that when a defendant knowingly waived a lesser-included offense instruction warranted by the evidence, the defendant could not subsequently allege that the trial court erred in not sua sponte giving the instruction). Thus, absent plain error affecting a defendant's substantial rights, a trial court does not err when it does not give a warranted lesser-included offense instruction if the defendant has impliedly or expressly waived that instruction. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998). We emphasize, however, that [n]either the prosecution nor the defense can limit the submission of such lesser degrees as the trial court determines should be submitted. Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 421, 228 N.W.2d at 125. Even when a defendant has expressly or impliedly waived a jury instruction, a trial court may, in its discretion, ignore the waiver and give any instructions warranted by the evidence. The more difficult questions arise in cases where a trial court has refused to give an instruction requested by the defendant. As our court has made clear, trial courts must give a lesser-included offense instruction when 1) the lesser offense is included in the charged offense; 2) the evidence provides a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged; and 3) the evidence provides a rational basis for convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense. Stiles v. State, 664 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn.2003) (citing Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 273; Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 421-22, 228 N.W.2d at 125-26)). In addition to this three-part test, we have clarified in this opinion that trial courts must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction when determining whether a lesser-included offense instruction is warranted. Trial courts may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations when determining if a lesser-included offense instruction is warranted. See Part I.B, supra. Our adoption of the light most favorable standard raises the question of to what degree  if any  a trial court may exercise its discretion in determining whether a requested lesser-included offense instruction must be given. We hold that, under the light most favorable standard, when evidence exists to support the giving of the instruction, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court judge to weigh the evidence or discredit witnesses and thereby deny an instruction. In other words, on appeal we will review the record in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding the instruction was not warranted by the evidence. The determination of whether the requested lesser-included offense instruction is warranted by the evidence does not, however, end our inquiry. As noted above, the failure to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury is grounds for reversal only if the defendant is prejudiced thereby. Shepherd, 477 N.W.2d at 516 (citing Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 273); see also State v. Edwards, 343 N.W.2d 269, 276 (Minn.1984) (stating that [a]lthough we believe that the court erred in failing to submit the offense, we do not believe that the error was prejudicial); Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 422, 228 N.W.2d at 126. Accordingly, when we determine that an instruction requested by a defendant and denied by the trial court was warranted by the evidence, we then must proceed to an analysis of whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to give it. Under our case law, when determining if a defendant has been prejudiced by the court's failure to give a requested lesser-included offense instruction, appellate courts should consider the instructions actually given and the verdict rendered by the jury. For example, in State v. Shepherd , we concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by the court's failure to give a second-degree unintentional felony murder instruction. 477 N.W.2d at 516. The court in Shepherd instructed the jury on first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. Id. at 514. We stated that the jury's conclusion that the defendant acted with premeditation, despite the option of acquitting him of premeditated murder and finding him guilty of only intentional murder or heat-of-passion manslaughter, demonstrated that the jury would not have found the defendant guilty of unintentional felony murder. Id. at 516; see also State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Minn.1978) (stating that when the trial court instructed the jury only on first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder, the failure to give requested lesser-included offense instructions did not prejudice the defendant on the issue of intent because the jury's verdict of guilty of first-degree premeditated murder indicated that it not only believed the defendant acted with intent, but that he acted with premeditation as well). [2] When an appellate court determines that a requested lesser-included offense instruction was warranted by the evidence, and the denial of that instruction prejudiced the defendant, reversal is required. State v. Griffin, 518 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.1994); Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 419, 228 N.W.2d at 124; see also State v. Shannon, 514 N.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Minn.1994) (stating that lesser-included offense instruction should have been given, but reversing for new trial on other grounds); accord Keeble, 412 U.S. at 213, 93 S.Ct. 1993 (stating that where the jury was faced with either convicting on instruction given or acquitting outright, a different verdict may have been reached had the jury been given the requested lesser-included offense instruction).