Opinion ID: 2182093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: schmidt's appeal

Text: The dispositive issue in Schmidt's appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the seven quitclaim deeds Schmidt received from other lot owners in 1979 and 1980 did not assign any cause of action the grantors had to sue the Club for rescission. We agree with the trial court's resolution of this issue. Some sources suggest it is doubtful whether the right to sue for rescission of a contract is assignable. Because of the equitable and personal character of the right to sue for rescission, claims for rescission are ordinarily not assignable. Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F.Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Ill.1987). See also 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments § 31 (1963); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 35 (1975); Hipp v. McMurry, 263 Ala. 11, 81 So.2d 531, 534 (1955) [The right to rescind, which the grantor has in a conveyance... is a personal right, not a property right, and is not transferable until the grantor has elected to rescind during his lifetime and has taken proceedings in equity to annul the conveyance.] Assuming, however, that the right to sue for rescission is assignable, that right would not pass to the grantee by a mere quitclaim conveyance of the property absent an express assignment contained in the deed. E.g., 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds, §§ 70 and 71 (1983); 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 106(d) (1956); Irvine v. City of Oelwein, 170 Iowa 653, 150 N.W. 674 (1915); Cochran Timber Co. v. Fisher, 190 Mich. 478, 157 N.W. 282 (1916); In re Witherill's Estate, 178 Or. 253, 166 P.2d 129 (1946). The quitclaim deeds in this case contain no express provision for assignment. We have said that, [i]n this State, `a chose in action may be transferred either by parol or by written assignment.' Willow City v. Vogel, Vogel, Brantner & Kelly, 268 N.W.2d 762, 764 (N.D.1978) [quoting Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N.D. 474, 79 N.W. 993 Syllabus 3 (1899) ]. Schmidt has not pointed to any evidence supporting either an oral or written assignment of the right to sue for rescission and the trial court specifically found that the former lot owners who sold their property to [Schmidt] did not assign any of their rights to sue for a rescission. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Schmidt could not sue the Club for rescission with regard to the lots he purchased from other individuals in 1979 and 1980.