Opinion ID: 848578
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: civil rights act claim

Text: Plaintiff's second theory is that defendant failed to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. M.C.L. § 37.2202(1) states in pertinent part: An employer shall not do any of the following: (a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. (b) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a way that deprives or tends to deprive the employee or applicant of an employment opportunity, or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee or applicant because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. (c) Segregate, classify, or otherwise discriminate against a person on the basis of sex with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment, including, but not limited to, a benefit plan or system. Discrimination based on sex includes sexual harassment. M.C.L. § 37.2103(i). The statute defines sexual harassment as follows: Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions: ( i ) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. ( ii ) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. ( iii ) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment. [M.C.L. § 37.2103(i).] Plaintiff claims that CRA forbids any entity classified as an employer from discriminating against any individual, including nonemployees. Therefore, because the actions of defendant's employee allegedly created a sexually hostile work environment, defendant can be held liable under the CRA. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that an employer can only be held liable for discrimination against a nonemployee if some form of employment relationship exists between the parties. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was required to prove at least a quasi-employment relationship before a claim under the CRA could be maintained. We conclude that, unless an individual can establish a genuine issue of material fact that an employer affected or controlled a term, condition, or privilege of his or her employment, a nonemployee may not bring a claim under the CRA. Fundamental canons of statutory interpretation require us to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed by the language of its statutes. DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 461 Mich. 394, 402, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000). If the language is unambiguous, as is generally the case, Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 468 Mich. 459, 663 N.W.2d 447 (2003), we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed-no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. DiBenedetto, supra at 402, 605 N.W.2d 300. M.C.L. § 37.2201(a) defines an employer for purposes of the CRA as a person who has 1 or more employees, and includes an agent of that person. As recognized by plaintiff, the language of the statute does not otherwise narrow the scope of who may be considered an employer. Thus, M.C.L. § 37.2202 forbids any employer from engaging in acts of discrimination that are prohibited by the CRA. M.C.L. § 37.2202 does not state that an employer is only forbidden from engaging in such acts against its own employees. Indeed, the CRA appears to clearly envision claims by nonemployees for the failure or refusal to hire or recruit, M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(a); the improper classification of applicants by a status prohibited under the CRA, M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(b); and the discrimination against former employees by operation of a benefit plan or system, M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(c). Accordingly, to limit the availability of relief under the CRA to those suits brought by an employee against his or her employer is not consistent with the statute. However, the language of the statute is also clear in requiring some form of nexus or connection between the employer and the status of the nonemployee. M.C.L. § 37.2202 forbids an employer from using a classification protected by the CRA: to discriminate against an individual with respect to ... a term, condition, or privilege of employment, M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(a); to deprive the ... applicant of an employment opportunity, M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(b); or to discriminate against a person ... with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment, M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(c). In other words, an employer is liable under the CRA when it utilizes a prohibited characteristic in order to adversely affect or control an individual's employment or potential employment. Thus, the key to liability under the CRA is not simply the status of an individual as an employee; rather, liability is contingent upon the employer's affecting or controlling that individual's work status. Accordingly, an employer can be held liable under the CRA for discriminatory acts against a nonemployee if the nonemployee can demonstrate that the employer affected or controlled a term, condition, or privilege of the nonemployee's employment. [10] In Chiles v. Machine Shop, Inc., 238 Mich.App. 462, 606 N.W.2d 398 (1999), the Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion while interpreting similar language in the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), M.C.L. § 37.1202. [11] In Chiles, an employee injured his back on the job and filed for worker's compensation benefits. After he was laid off, the employee brought suit under the PWDCRA. The employer, who laid off the plaintiff, argued that it was not liable under the PWDCRA because the employee was technically employed by a separate, though affiliated, company. The Court in Chiles noted that the PWDCRA addresses the conduct of an employer who takes adverse employment action against an individual because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job. M.C.L. § 37.1202(1)(a); M.S.A. § 3.550(202)(1)(a). The act does not limit the definition of employer to the plaintiff's employer but, instead, simply defines it as a person who has 1 or more employees. M.C.L. § 37.1201(b); M.S.A. § 3.550(201)(b). [ Chiles, supra at 468, 606 N.W.2d 398 (emphasis supplied).] [12] Thus, liability under the PWDCRA does not require that an employment relationship exist, but it does require that the employer defendant have the authority to affect a plaintiff's employment or potential employment. Id. at 468-469, 606 N.W.2d 398. However, the authority to affect a worker's employment alone is not sufficient to impose liability upon an employer defendant. [13] Rather, in order to be liable under the PWDCRA, the employer defendant must also take[] adverse employment action against the worker plaintiff. Accordingly, under Chiles, the employer defendant must (1) have the ability to affect adversely the terms and conditions of an individual's employment or potential employment, id. at 468, 606 N.W.2d 398; and (2) take[] adverse employment action against an `individual' because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job . . ., e.g., discriminatorily refusing to hire an applicant on account of a disability, id. at 468, 606 N.W.2d 398, quoting M.C.L. § 37.1202(1)(a). In other words, the more precise articulation of the Chiles rule is that the employer defendant must, in fact, use such authority by tak[ing] adverse employment action against an individual in violation of the PWDCRA. Thus, to be liable under the PWDCRA, the employer defendant must actually affect or control a term, condition, or privilege of an individual's employment. The Court of Appeals in Chiles determined that the employer defendant directly supervised the employee, controlled what tasks he worked at, and had the ability to fire or discipline the employee. Further, the employer defendant actually affected the plaintiff's employment by laying him off. As a result, the Court of Appeals determined that the parties' relationship fell within the scope of the PWDCRA and, therefore, the plaintiff could maintain an action under the PWDCRA. We hold that a worker is entitled to bring an action against a nonemployer defendant if the worker can establish that the defendant affected or controlled a term, condition, or privilege of the worker's employment. In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant affected or controlled a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. [14] Plaintiff was hired, paid, and subject to discipline by AVI. AVI placed plaintiff in the Wixom plant and had the sole authority to move her to different cafeterias or even to another plant. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendant affected or controlled whether she was hired, her benefits of employment, or where she was assigned to work. Further, although the cafeterias were located in the Wixom plant, they were operated solely by AVI, and were off-limits to defendant's employees except during break-times. We conclude that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that defendant affected or controlled a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Accordingly, plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action under the CRA against this defendant, and, again, no inquiry into whether defendant possessed sufficient notice that Bennett was engaged in sexual harassment is necessary.