Opinion ID: 1106451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Public Records Claims

Text: In his fourth issue on appeal, Rutherford asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claims arising from his public records requests. On December 9, 2005, Rutherford filed a motion to compel access to public records, directed to the State Attorney's Office for the First Judicial Circuit, the Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Office, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), and the Medical Examiner's Office for the First District. In the motion, defense counsel acknowledged that Rutherford previously received public records from these agencies in 1992 and 1996. However, defense counsel stated that she now fears that she no longer has a complete file of [Rutherford's] records. Rutherford v. State, No. 57-85-I-476, at 2 (1st Cir. Ct. order filed Dec. 14, 2005) (emphasis omitted). Rutherford also filed a motion requesting production of additional records from the Medical Examiner's Office for the Eighth District pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(h)(3), and a demand for production of additional public records directed to the DOC. On December 14, 2005, after conducting a hearing on the matter, the circuit court denied Rutherford's motion to compel access to public records and his motion for production of additional records, and sustained the DOC's objection to the demand for additional records. [9] The circuit court explained that rule 3.852(h)(3), which governs requests for production of public documents after a death warrant has been signed, does not provide for additional access to agency records, when those documents have already been provided to [Rutherford] or his counsel. Rutherford, No. 57-85-I-476, order at 3. Further, the circuit court observed that defense counsel's assertion that she `fears' that she no longer has a complete file of [Rutherford's] records falls well short of the allegations and proof required to obtain additional records pursuant to Rule 3.852(i). Id. The circuit court next addressed Rutherford's requests for additional records concerning lethal injection. The circuit court observed that the record does not reflect that Rutherford had previously sought records from the Medical Examiner for the Eighth District. The circuit court determined that it is clear on the face of the motion that the only reason [Rutherford] would be making such a request would be to obtain records which are unrelated to a colorable claim for post conviction relief contrary to the prior rulings of the Court. Id. The circuit court further determined that when considered in conjunction with Rutherford's motion directed to the DOC, the documents could have been requested solely to reassert the exact claim previously rejected in Sims and subsequent decisionsthat execution by lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment. Rule 3.852(h)(3) allows for the production of public records within a limited period of time after a defendant's death warrant has been signed, and provides: Within 10 days of the signing of a defendant's death warrant, collateral counsel may request in writing the production of public records from a person or agency from which collateral counsel has previously requested public records. A person or agency shall copy, index, and deliver to the repository any public record: (A) that was not previously the subject of an objection; (B) that was received or produced since the previous request; or (C) that was, for any reason, not produced previously. The person or agency providing the records shall bear the costs of copying, indexing, and delivering such records. If none of these circumstances exist, the person or agency shall file with the trial court and the parties an affidavit stating that no other records exist and that all public records have been produced previously. A person or agency shall comply with this subdivision within 10 days from the date of the written request or such shorter time period as is ordered by the court. In Sims v. State, 753 So.2d 66 (Fla.2000), this Court explained the purpose of rule 3.852: The language of section 119.19 and of rule 3.852 clearly provides for the production of public records after the governor has signed a death warrant. However, it is equally clear that this discovery tool is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief. To prevent such a fishing expedition, the statute and the rule provide for the production of public records from persons and agencies who were the recipients of a public records request at the time the defendant began his or her postconviction odyssey. The use of the past tense and such words and phrases as requested, previously, received, produced, previous request, and produced previously are not happenstance. This language was intended to and does convey to the reader the fact that a public records request under this rule is intended as an update of information previously received or requested. To hold otherwise would foster a procedure in which defendants make only a partial public records request during the initial postconviction proceedings and hold in abeyance other requests until such time as a warrant is signed. Such is neither the spirit nor the intent of the public records law. Rule 3.852 is not intended for use by defendants as, in the words of the trial court, nothing more than an eleventh hour attempt to delay the execution rather than a focused investigation into some legitimate area of inquiry. Id. at 70 (emphasis supplied); accord Mills v. State, 786 So.2d 547, 552 (Fla.2001); Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 253 (Fla. 2001). In this case, Rutherford requested records from the DOC and the Medical Examiner's Office relating to his lethal injection claim. However, Rutherford's requests are not authorized under rule 3.852(h)(3), which is designed to allow an update of records previously requested, because he has failed to demonstrate that he previously requested records from these agencies concerning lethal injection in Florida. Further, the records sought from these agencies are not related to a colorable claim for postconviction relief because the scientific evidence Rutherford relies on does not require this Court to reconsider our holding that Florida's lethal injection procedure does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Next, Rutherford asserts that under rule 3.852(h)(3), he should have been granted access to public records in the custody of the Office of the State Attorney for the First Judicial Circuit, the Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Office, the FDLE, and the Medical Examiner's Office for the First District of Florida. Rutherford contends that he merely sought an opportunity to inspect the files of these agencies in order to verify the completeness of his files and records and to obtain copies of any files he was missing. Rule 3.852(h)(3) does not authorize a defendant under an active death warrant renewed access to files that have been previously provided. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on these claims because the motion, files, and record in this case conclusively show that Rutherford is not entitled to relief.