Opinion ID: 607860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sequestering of the Maleks' Expert Witness

Text: 42 Fed.R.Evid. 615 provides that a district court may sequester witnesses to prevent them from hearing the testimony of other witnesses. Rule 615(3) provides an exception for a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. The advisory committee notes specify that the exception contemplates an expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation. Fed.R.Evid. 615(3) advisory committee notes; see Trans World Metals, Inc. v. South Wire Co., 769 F.2d 902, 911 (2d Cir.1985) (expert allowed to remain in the courtroom for the testimony of the adversary's expert); see also Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 630 (6th Cir.) (where a fair showing has been made that the expert witness is in fact required for the management of the case, and this is made clear to the trial court, we believe that the trial court is bound to accept any reasonable, substantiated representation to this effect by counsel), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801, 99 S.Ct. 44, 58 L.Ed.2d 94 (1978). We review the district court's evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 620 (2d Cir.1991) (district court evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also Morvant, 570 F.2d at 630 (district court's decision about whether to sequester witness reviewed for abuse of discretion). 43 The district court did not permit Friedell to remain in the courtroom during Redsicker's testimony even though the Maleks' counsel asserted that Friedell's presence was necessary to assist him in preparing to cross examine Redsicker. The district court concluded that counsel could have prepared his cross examination in advance by using Redsicker's reports submitted before the trial but granted a ten-minute recess between the testimony of the two experts to permit the Maleks' expert to confer with counsel. 44 In Trans World Metals, we approved a ruling permitting an expert to remain in the courtroom to hear the testimony of an adversary's expert. In that case, an expert witness was permitted to remain in the courtroom during the direct testimony of the adversary's expert and was later called to rebut the testimony of the adversary's expert. We said: 45 [The expert] may well have been entitled to remain pursuant to the exception in Rule 615(3) for a person whose presence is essential to the presentation of a case.... He was not a fact witness whose recollection might have been colored by accounts of prior witnesses. 46 Id. at 911 (citation omitted). Here, Friedell also was not a fact witness whose recollection might have been colored by the testimony of other witnesses; rather, he was an expert whose assistance was important to the presentation of plaintiffs' case and who should have been permitted to remain in the courtroom. 47 Under the circumstances revealed in this case, we find that the district court erred in sequestering Friedell. Our review of the record reveals that Redsicker's testimony differed from his reports: Redsicker testified that the fire was an intense fire but did not make that specific finding anywhere in his report. Since this was an important finding bearing on the question of arson and was not made in Redsicker's reports, Friedell's presence in the courtroom was important to the presentation of the Maleks' case, and a ten-minute recess was not an adequate substitute for his presence. 48