Opinion ID: 63262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Federal Jurisdiction Over USERRA Claims Brought by an Employee Against a State as an Employer

Text: USERRA is a federal law that protects employees from being discriminated against by their employers because of their military service. 38 U.S.C. § 4311. McIntosh argues that he was suspended and ultimately terminated from his position at RSS because of his military service in Iraq, and thus he brought a claim of discrimination under USERRA against Partridge, in his official capacity as medical director of RSS. [2] Partridge and the United States argue that 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2) strips the federal courts of jurisdiction over suits by an individual against a state as an employer, and that the district court erred by not dismissing McIntosh's USERRA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. USERRA's operative text lays out three separate types of claims and identifies which courts have jurisdiction over those claims. (1) In the case of an action against a State (as an employer) or a private employer commenced by the United States, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction over the action. (2) In the case of an action against a State (as an employer) by a person, the action may be brought in a State court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the State. (3) In the case of an action against a private employer by a person, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of the action. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b). All parties agree that McIntosh's cause of action falls under subsection (b)(2) of this statute. In its order, the district court reasoned that, since the statute provides that suits by individuals against a state may, rather than must, be brought in state court, Congress was not restricting jurisdiction to state courts. Based on its interpretation of the word may, and because the previous version of the statute mandated federal jurisdiction over USERRA claims brought by individuals against states as employers, the district court concluded that McIntosh's USERRA claim could be brought in either state or federal court. [3] This reasoning, however, departs from the proper standard for determining abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985). The district court erred by assuming that federal jurisdiction existed because the statutory text did not expressly limit jurisdiction solely to state courts. Under Atascadero, Congress must affirmatively and clearly grant jurisdiction to federal courts to abrogate state sovereign immunity. USERRA's jurisdictional statute provides that in an action against a State (as an employer) by a person, the action may be brought in a State court.  38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2) (emphasis added). This language provides no indication that Congress intended for these cases to be brought in federal court. [4] This omission is significant when compared with Congress's explicit provision for federal jurisdiction in cases where the federal government brings an USERRA claim or when the defendant is a private employer. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1), (3). These provisions demonstrate that Congress knew how to provide for federal jurisdiction but specifically chose not to do so for USERRA claims brought by individuals against states as employers. The Seventh Circuit has interpreted the statute in a similar manner. See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (holding that Congress's intention to limit USERRA suits against states to state courts is unmistakable). This interpretation is also supported by a comparison of the current statute with its prior version. Previously, Congress had authorized the United States district courts to exercise jurisdiction over USERRA claims, with claims against a state as an employer to be brought in any district in which the State exercises any authority or carries out any function. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b) (amended 1998). By amending the statute to its current form, Congress removed the blanket grant of jurisdiction to federal courts over all USERRA claims, and replaced it with a provision that only mentions the ability of individuals to bring claims against states as employers in state court. If we were to hold that the removal of the statutory language authorizing federal jurisdiction for these suits did not actually remove federal jurisdiction, we would be violating a basic tenant of statutory construction: when Congress amends a law the amendment is made to effect some purpose. Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir.1968). After examining the text of the statute in its current and prior forms, we see no unmistakably clear intention by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity by allowing individuals to bring USERRA claims against states as employers in federal court. Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to hear McIntosh's USERRA claim. [5]