Opinion ID: 2345108
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Section 17203 and Section 17154(9)

Text: [¶ 23] The District argues that application of sections 17203 and 17154(9) would be improperly retroactive. In support of its argument, it notes that it erroneously classified employees from July 1973 to March 1989, and that it corrected the erroneous classifications before either section was enacted. See P.L. 1989, ch. 95, § 3 (effective Sept. 30, 1989); P.L. 1991, ch. 857, § 1 (effective June 30, 1992). The District further argues that the System had no preexisting authority to collect monies owed, and that the System has never been able to collect back contributions directly from the District. The pivotal question, the District thus notes, is whether it is appropriate or lawful to imply an agency right to shift employee/member contribution obligations to an employer, in the face of an express statutory scheme requiring that those amounts to be paid by the member/employee. [¶ 24] The District's analysis fails to recognize that at all relevant times, it was required by statute to deduct employee contributions and submit them to the System. See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 1062(2)(A), 1091(5) (1964). The District not only failed to make the required employee contributions; it actually deducted Social Security contributions from the employees' pay. The System did not require the District to fund employee contributions to it; it assessed the District for its failure to deduct and then forward the employee contributions, as required by statute. [¶ 25] The System's general authority to collect monies owed predates the enactment of sections 17203 and 17154(9). See 5 M.R.S.A. § 1062(2)(A) (1964). When a statute d[oes] not alter existing rights or obligations, [but] merely clarifie[s] what those existing rights and obligations ha[ve] always been, the statute is not retroactive in its operation. See Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 506 (3rd Cir.2008). As we have previously observed, An authorizing statute grants [a public body] such powers as may be fairly implied from its language . . . [and] [t]he public body may employ means appropriate for the purpose of carrying out the authority directly conferred upon it. State v. Fin & Feather Club, 316 A.2d 351, 355 (Me.1974) (quoting Lynch v. Commissioner of Ed., 317 Mass. 73, 56 N.E.2d 896 (1944)). The District's articulation of the question presented as whether the System may shift responsibility for funding contributions to the District is inapposite. Instead, the appropriate questions are: (1) whether the System had implied authority to enforce, through administrative action, the District's preexisting duty to deduct and submit the employee contributions to the System; and (2) whether the System had the additional implied authority to assess the District for late fees such as interest. If the System had this implied authority, sections 17203 and 17154(9) are properly regarded as clarifying the System's preexisting authority. [¶ 26] Overall, the Board has long been charged with [t]he general administration and responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system and for making this chapter [governing the retirement system] effective  5 M.R.S.A. § 1031(1) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added); 5 M.R.S. § 17103(1) (2008). This fairly implies that the Board has authority to enforce the payment of delinquent submissions. A statute is of little effect if it cannot be enforced. Further, given the overall administrative regulatory scheme of Chapter 5, it is reasonable to infer that a power to enforce is implicit within the overall regulatory scheme. Therefore, the System had implied authority to enforce, through administrative action, the payment of delinquent submissions. [¶ 27] The Legislature also gave broad authority and discretion to the Board in managing the System: [I]t is expressly provided that the board of trustees shall in all cases make the final and determining decision in all matters affecting the rights, credits and privileges of all members of the system . . . [and] shall make the final and determining decision on all matters pertaining to administration, actuarial recommendations, the reserves and the investments of the system. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1032 (Supp.1972); see also 5 M.R.S. § 17103(6), (7) (2008). The assessment of late fees for delinquent payments, especially assessment for interest, affects the rights of the employee members. This language reasonably suggests that the Board had the ability to assess the District both for deductions currently owed and for interest or additional fees on those deductions. [¶ 28] Thus, review of preexisting law establishes that the System had implied authority to assess the District for delinquent payments, including assessment of additional fees such as interest, prior to the enactment of sections 17203 and 17154(9). The application of these sections is not improperly retroactive because they merely clarify the System's preexisting authority. We are not persuaded by and do not address the District's remaining arguments. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.