Opinion ID: 1707939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applications of Padgett to Section 39.806(1)(i)

Text: While we have not previously considered the application of Padgett to section 39.806(1)(i), several district courts have struggled to interpret the statute in light of Padgett's constitutional requirements. In A.B. v. Department of Children & Families, 816 So.2d 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), a mother challenged the constitutionality of section 39.806(1)(i). The Fifth District upheld the statute, stating that: [A] parent whose rights have been involuntarily terminated as to one child may avoid termination as to another child if he or she comes forward with evidence that the circumstances or pattern of conduct that led to termination of parental rights to the other child cannot serve as a predictor of his or her conduct with the child at issue. Id. at 686. A.B.'s interpretation, that the statute creates a presumption sufficient for termination but subject to rebuttal by a parent, has been endorsed in other appellate cases. See, e.g., T.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 860 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); In re T.S., 855 So.2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, the constitutionality of such a rebuttable presumption in this context has been disputed. In C.W. v. Department of Children & Families, 814 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), Judge Ervin wrote separately to express the view that section 39.806(1)(i) should not be used to terminate parental rights based solely on the parent's conduct with previous children. Id. at 495. Judge Ervin argued that to comport with Padgett, the state must also prove that the behavior of the parent is likely to continue, thereby placing the unharmed child at risk. Id. at 498. The Fourth District in the present case agreed with Judge Ervin and disapproved the rebuttable presumption created by A.B. See F.L., 849 So.2d at 1123. F.L. stated that the rebuttable presumption of A.B. impermissibly shifts to the parent the burden to show a lack of substantial risk of harm to the current child. 849 So.2d at 1123. This relieves the state of the burden of proof, violating Padgett's requirement that to pass constitutional muster, the state must be required to prove that reunification with the current child would pose substantial risk to the child. F.L., 849 So.2d at 1123 (citing Padgett, 577 So.2d at 571).