Opinion ID: 1119219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: drott's claims

Text: Drott argues on appeal that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on proximate cause. The trial judge gave the following instruction to the jury: An act, or a failure to act, is a `legal' or `proximate cause' of an injury, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act or omission. When I use the terms `legal cause' or `proximate cause' in these instructions, I am using them synonymously. This does not mean that the law recognizes only one legal cause of an injury or damage, consisting of only one factor or thing, or the conduct of only one person. On the contrary, many factors or things, or the conduct of two or more persons, may operate at the same time, either independently or together, to cause injury or damage; and in such a case, each may be a legal cause. Drott proposed that the jury be instructed that, [a] proximate cause of an injury is the cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. The proposed jury instruction incorporates the but for or sine qua non rule for determining causation. We have recognized on several occasions that the but for rule is inapplicable in the situation where two or more forces operate to bring about an injury, and any one of them, operating alone, is sufficient to cause the injury. Wilson v. City of Kotzebue, 627 P.2d 623, 630 (Alaska 1981); Sharp v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 569 P.2d 178, 181 n. 7 (Alaska 1977); State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 727 (Alaska 1972). In such cases, using the but for test would result in each force being absolved of liability. Wilson, 627 P.2d at 630. In the present case, either the defectively designed brakes or the negligently repaired brakes would have been sufficient to cause Gordon's accident. Thus, the jury instruction urged by Drott using but for language would have been improper. Drott additionally argues that the court's failure to give a separate jury instruction on superseding cause constituted reversible error. [4] One of Drott's arguments at trial was that even if the crane's brakes were defectively designed, the subsequent negligent acts of Yukon or its lessee were superseding causes relieving Drott of any liability. Drott proposed a separate jury instruction on superseding cause which was refused without explanation. The superseding cause rule was embodied in an instruction given by the superior court. That instruction required, that the injury or damage [be] either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act or omission. In order to find that the defective design of the brakes was a proximate cause, the jury was required to find either that Gordon's injury was a direct result of the design defect, because there was no intervening cause, or that Gordon's injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defectively designed brakes, and thus, not extraordinary. We conclude that although a separate instruction on superseding cause may have been helpful, the instruction was adequate as given.
The question we now turn to is whether the failure to give an instruction regarding the impact of federal taxes on an award of damages constituted error. The trial court refused a jury instruction proposed by Drott which stated: Your award of damages in this case, if any, will not be subject to any income taxes and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award. This issue is one of first impression in Alaska. Drott urges us to adopt the approach taken in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 1667, 64 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980). In Norfolk, the United States Supreme Court held that it was reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury that the award of damages would not be subject to income taxation. Although the weight of authority does not require an instruction on federal taxes, persuasive arguments exist on both sides of the question. See Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1366 (Wyo. 1981); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1408 (1959). On the one hand, such an instruction serves to prevent the jury from improperly increasing the award to protect the plaintiff from the impact of income taxes. Norfolk, 444 U.S. at 498, 100 S.Ct. at 759, 62 L.Ed.2d at 696; Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613, 629 (N.J. 1975). On the other hand, a jury may do just the opposite, and mitigate the award by reason of the income tax exemption. Raines v. New York Central Railroad Co., 51 Ill.2d 428, 283 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ill. 1972) cert. denied 409 U.S. 983, 93 S.Ct. 322, 34 L.Ed.2d 247 (1972). Another reason for not requiring an instruction on federal taxes is the belief that a jury should not receive such an instruction when it is not also instructed with respect to attorney's fees, the costs incurred in preparing a case, or the various types of insurance that may be involved. Barnette, 622 P.2d at 1367. We are persuaded by the reasoning of Judge Friendly in McWeeney v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1960), that, [b]efore an appellate court should hold that failure to give such a cautionary instruction was reversible error, there ought to be evidence either that juries in general increase recoveries on this account or that the particular jury did so. In the absence of such evidence in the case at bar, we hold that the superior court's failure to give a tax instruction did not amount to reversible error.
Consistent with our ruling in Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967), the trial court instructed the jury that [i]n determining future damages, you may not consider factors such as taxes, increases in wages, or inflation, to alter that sum, either upward or downward. (Emphasis added). Drott now argues that giving this instruction was reversible error, and that this court should overrule Beaulieu. In Beaulieu, we explained our reason for holding that an amount representing future income taxes should not be deducted from the award: Income tax rates, provisions relating to deductions and exemptions, and other aspects of income tax laws and regulations are so subject to change in the future that we believe that a court cannot predict with sufficient certainty just what amounts of money a plaintiff would be obliged to pay in federal and state income taxes on income that he would have earned in the future had it not been for a defendant's tortious conduct. 434 P.2d at 673. Cases holding to the contrary argue that future taxes are no more speculative than other considerations about future losses. Norfolk, 444 U.S. at 494, 100 S.Ct. at 757, 62 L.Ed.2d at 694 (1980); Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 292-93 (9th Cir.1975). These cases insist that their approach more accurately harmonizes with fair economic reality, more justly achieves the goal of compensating claimants for the actual loss suffered, and safeguards against the injustice of overcompensation. Burlington Northern, Inc., 529 F.2d at 298 (footnotes omitted). The rationale of our holding in Beaulieu remains valid today, and we refuse, therefore, to overrule our decision in that case. If we were to overrule Beaulieu, we would risk making the tax question a collateral trial issue, a result more burdensome than beneficial to the administration of justice. As we recognized in Beaulieu, a court cannot predict [the amount of future taxes] with sufficient certainty. 434 P.2d at 673. Balanced against this consideration is the burden of having to speculate regarding the extent of the plaintiff's future tax liability for his damage award. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury to disregard income taxes in determining future damages.
Drott argues on appeal that the lower court erred in denying its motion for remittitur of $200,000 or a new trial on Susan Gordon's claim for loss of consortium because the jury's award of $250,000 was excessive as a matter of law. When reviewing a jury's verdict, the trial court shall not find an award of damages excessive unless it is so large as to be manifestly unjust, i.e., the result of passion, prejudice, or a disregard for evidence or rules of law. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 145 (Alaska 1972). The reasonableness of the jury's award is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be interfered with, except in the most exceptional circumstances, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. See City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162, 173 (Alaska 1977). The jury's damage award in the case at bar does not amount to a miscarriage of justice. Robert Gordon suffered serious and permanent injuries which, together with a resulting change in personality, have had a substantial impact on his marriage and sexual activity. Based on the record as a whole, it is our opinion that the superior court did not err when it refused to order remittitur or grant Drott a new trial. The superior court's judgment as to Drott's motion is accordingly affirmed.
Drott contends that the trial court's instruction on the limited purpose for which certain hearsay was admitted was inadequate. During the course of the trial, twenty-eight warranty claim request forms were introduced into evidence by the various parties. These forms were filled out by independent distributors of Drott cranes. Each contained customer complaints and the specific action taken by the distributor in response to the complaints. When the first form was admitted, the trial court instructed the jury that the forms were admissible to show that Drott had notice of design defects, but that the forms were inadmissible hearsay for other purposes. The remainder of the forms were introduced into evidence without a similar limiting instruction. The trial court refused to give Drott's proposed supplemental jury instruction regarding the limited purpose for which the forms were admitted since it had already so instructed the jury. [5] Drott argues that the court's original instruction to the jury was not enough because three weeks had passed from the time of the original instruction to the end of the trial. According to Drott, the danger that the jury would consider the evidence for inadmissible purposes was particularly strong because the claim forms were exhibits the jury would take into the jury room. We find that the limiting instruction given when the reports were first offered at trial was sufficient to alert the jury that it was to consider the evidence for limited purposes only. When evidence is received it is important that a limiting instruction be given simultaneously: Timing of the instruction on limited admissibility is particularly important. The jury may be instructed either as the evidence is admitted or as part of the general charge. There are sound reasons for encouraging the practice of giving limiting instructions as the evidence is received. The impact of evidence in a case tends to be cumulative, each segment building on the evidence that preceded it. The jury will probably get a clearer picture of the interrelation between the evidence and the factual issues to which they are relevant if the limitations of the evidence are spelled out as it is presented. (Footnotes omitted). 1 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 105[05], at 105-37 through 105-38 (1982). In this case, it would have been preferable for the court to re-instruct the jury. Its failure to do so, however, did not so prejudice Drott as to constitute reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the superior court's ruling on the offered instruction.
Shortly before trial, Rohloff (Yukon's mechanic), Sundborg (Yukon's expert mechanic) and Yukon's attorney conducted experiments on the brake system of the same crane involved in Gordon's accident. Drott attempted to introduce evidence of the experiments at trial. The trial court determined that the evidence was relevant, but that it was inadmissible because it was cumulative. Drott argues that the evidence should have been admitted. The purpose of the proffered testimony was not to have the jury draw conclusions about the particular crane, but to show the capabilities of Drott 250 cranes in general. According to Drott, the results of the experiments showed that the brake system, if properly maintained, was not defective. Drott argues that having an adverse party perform the tests merely made the results dramatic and probative. Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. As Gordon argues, there was a danger of unfair prejudice from the brake test evidence because the testing procedure was slipshod and no written records were kept. Because the tests were performed on the same crane that was involved in Gordon's accident, there was also a danger that the issues would be confused, or the jury would be misled by the test results. Further, as the trial court found, the evidence was cumulative. In light of these considerations, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the probative value of Yukon's experiment results was outweighed by the possibility of resulting jury prejudice and undue trial delay. The judgment below is AFFIRMED.