Opinion ID: 464724
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: plaintiffs were entitled to a hearing before their discharge.

Text: 10 Defendants seemingly concede that plaintiffs would have been entitled to notice and hearing before their discharge as tenured public employees absent a reorganization of the Chicago Health Systems Agency (Br. 9). Section 25.1-6 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides for a hearing on all charges brought against any career service employee for purposes of discharge. Similarly, the Illinois Municipal Code provides that no classified municipal civil service employee may be removed except for cause upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard in his or her own defense. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 24, Sec. 10-1-18. Under Illinois law it is clear that plaintiffs, as career service employees, had an enforceable right to be dismissed only for cause. That is the effect of the pertinent provision of the Illinois Municipal Code. 3 This provision gave them a Fourteenth Amendment property interest in their continued employment. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Dauel v. Board of Trustees, 768 F.2d 128, 129 (7th Cir.1985). Indeed plaintiffs had legitimate claims of entitlement to be dismissed only on charges that could be sustained by evidence. Since plaintiffs had a property interest in their jobs, they could be dismissed only in accordance with federal due process standards. Dauel, 768 F.2d at 131. Nevertheless they were discharged without the procedural protections accorded by the due process clause in that they did not receive prior notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond prior to termination. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170, 195-196, 226-227, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1652, 1664-1665, 1680, 40 L.Ed.2d 15; Schultz v. Baumgardt, 738 F.2d 231, 234-235 (7th Cir.1984). 11 In a case decided about two months after Misek, the same district judge held that members of the Chicago Police Department enjoyed a property interest in their jobs through custom. Auriemma v. City of Chicago, 601 F.Supp. 1080 (N.D.Ill.1984), reproduced in R. Item 25. But here the plaintiffs' property interest is stronger because it stems from the Illinois Municipal Code and a Chicago Municipal Ordinance. Because Auriemma required notice and a hearing for demotions, these plaintiffs were entitled to notice and a hearing.
12 As Judge Aspen recognized, there is an exception to a hearing right when the discharge is caused by reorganization. Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill.2d 567, 216 N.E.2d 799 (1966); Fitzsimmons v. O'Neill, 214 Ill. 494, 73 N.E. 797 (1905). However, plaintiffs have consistently claimed in their complaint and in their briefs that the so-called reorganization of the Chicago Health Systems Agency was purely pretextual in an effort to replace plaintiffs with others favored by the acting Executive Director of the agency. In view of the allegations in their complaint and the arguments in their briefs, it was erroneous for the district court to assume that the plaintiffs were discharged in a reorganization. Slip op. 5 Plaintiffs' App. A-1. Indeed defendants submitted no affidavits or evidence to contradict plaintiffs' assertions that there was no reorganization of the agency. 13 The cases relied upon by the district court are easily distinguishable. In each of those cases the plaintiffs were questioning the motives behind actual reorganizations; here plaintiffs allege no reorganization took place. For example, in Fitzsimmons, 214 Ill. 494, 73 N.E. 797, the plaintiff's position was abolished when the city council failed to appropriate funds. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute conferring the property interest did not apply where the incumbent is dismissed for want of funds, or in order to reduce expenses. Id. at 503, 73 N.E. 797. Similarly, in Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill.2d 567, 216 N.E.2d 799 (1966), the court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to an administrative hearing when their jobs in the Department of Conservation were abolished. On remand to the state court of appeals, plaintiffs argued that their job abolitions were tainted by political motives. The court held that because the jobs had been eliminated, plaintiffs' discharges were not for cause. 77 Ill.App.2d 281, 288, 222 N.E.2d 36 (1966). Finally, in Thomas v. City of Springfield Civil Service Cm., 106 Ill.App.3d 939, 62 Ill.Dec. 726, 436 N.E.2d 752 (1982), the plaintiffs admitted that their jobs were abolished, but complained that the reorganization was the result of improper discriminatory motives. The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a pre-termination hearing to determine bad faith in the event of reorganization. Id. at 942, 62 Ill.Dec. 726, 436 N.E.2d 752. 14 These cases are factually distinguishable from the case before us. In each of the above cases the plaintiffs admitted that their jobs had been abolished and that a reorganization had in fact taken place. Here the plaintiffs assert that the reorganization was a sham and that their jobs were never abolished. Thus the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they were fired for cause to afford them the protections of due process. To hold otherwise would allow government officials to cry reorganization in order to circumvent the constitutional and statutory protections guaranteed Illinois and Chicago employees. 15
16 Defendants do not contend that plaintiffs were mere employees at will with no protectible property interest. Lyznicki v. Board of Education, School District 167, 707 F.2d 949, 950 (7th Cir.1983). Accordingly, absent good cause, they were improperly dismissed unless on remand it should be determined that their discharge was pursuant to an actual reorganization of the agency. Because of the existence of their property rights, plaintiffs were entitled to prior notice, genuine reasons for the discharge, and an opportunity to respond prior to termination. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 170, 94 S.Ct. at 1652; Smith v. Board of Education, 708 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir.1983). 17 The complaint was improperly dismissed because it does not appear beyond doubt that plaintiffs could prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. Of course, if defendants on remand could show that plaintiffs were discharged pursuant to a reorganization in fact, plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief. See supra at IIB. 18 While the original complaint adequately charges that the reorganization was a sham, the amended complaint expands on this point. Therefore, on remand plaintiffs should be granted leave to file the amended complaint.