Opinion ID: 853469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Record Supports the Court's Findings

Text: The plaintiffs argue that many of the trial court's findings of fact are unsupported by evidence of record. We review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and do not reweigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Ind. Trial Rule 52; Chidester v. City of Hobart, 631 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Ind.1994). We consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Id. (citations omitted). Three of the disputed findings basically establish that the Council passed the resolution, which contained provisions described above, by a five to four margin. [5] The plaintiffs correctly point out that the June 27th Council meeting minutes contained in the record only evidence approval of an amendment to the resolution, not approval of the resolution itself. (Appellants' Br. at 9, R. at 130-32.) The record copy of the resolution, however, carries the signature of the presiding Council officer affirming that the Council passed the resolution on June 27th as amended. (R. at 37-39.) Furthermore, the plaintiffs themselves conceded in their verified complaint that the motion [that the resolution be adopted as amended] was seconded and passed on a vote of 5 yes votes and 4 no votes. (R. at 17.) Three challenged findings [6] relate to the issue of whether the Council's deferral of a vote on the resolution constituted a special order and, therefore, whether the June 27th meeting was properly convened. Another relates to whether the plaintiffs have met their burden to produce sufficient evidence of a substantial question to be tried. [7] These issues are addressed above and require no further discussion. Another challenged finding [8] is that the plaintiffs' lawsuit has delayed progress on the project. At the August 18th evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony by an investment banker with experience in public finance. She testified that the lawsuit was holding up the letter of credit necessary for issuance of the bonds that will finance the project. This testimony sufficiently supports the trial court's finding of fact. Yet another challenged finding [9] is that a delay will increase the significant anticipated cost of renovating Mercy Hospital. (Appellants' Br. at 11.) Mayor King testified at the August 18th hearing that $15 million would be allocated to the hospital renovation. A civil engineer with knowledge of the construction industry in the northwest Indiana and Chicago area testified that the annual rate of construction cost inflation in that area is five percent. The evidence supports both this finding and the challenged finding [10] that a one-year project delay could increase the $47 million cost (all of which is for construction, per the affidavit of Gary Deputy Mayor Suzette Raggs) by $2.35 million. (R. at 85.) Finally, plaintiffs challenge the finding [11] that a delay due to the lawsuit puts the City at risk of failing to meet certain contractual commitments. This finding is supported by the testimony of Mayor King, (R. at 444-46), the testimony of the investment banker, (R. at 406), and an affidavit by Deputy Mayor Raggs, (R. at 84). In summary, the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.