Opinion ID: 170085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recovery

Text: CNE argues that the Forest Service's consultation after designation of critical habitat violated the ESA because it did not consider how livestock grazing in critical habitat would impact the mouse's recovery and therefore did not satisfy the basic legal requirement of section 7 of the ESA. Aplts. Br. at 18. It asserts that agencies must insure that actions not only prevent the extinction of species but also allow for the recovery of the species, that is, allow the species to increase sufficiently in population that it can be removed from the list of endangered or threatened species (an action referred to as delisting, see 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d)). We agree with CNE's interpretation of the law governing this case. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), describes a federal agency's duty to consult: Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior, see § 1532(15)], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary [of the Interior], after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical. . . . The Forest Service is thus obligated to insure, through consultation with the FWS on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, that its action is not likely to . . . result in the destruction or adverse modification of the Preble's mouse's critical habitat. FWS regulations explain that it may satisfy this obligation through either formal or informal consultation. As a general matter, formal consultation is required when agency action may affect listed species or critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). An agency may forgo formal consultation, however, if it engages in informal consultation with the FWS and determines, with the written concurrence of the FWS, that even if the proposed action may affect listed species or critical habitat, id., it is not likely to adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat, id. § (b)(1). Informal consultation includes all discussions, correspondence, etc., between the [FWS] and the Federal agency. Id. § 402.13(a). Although neither § 1536(a)(2) nor the consultation regulations expressly describe what must be considered by a federal agency during consultation on critical habitat, the ESA's definitions clarify the matter. In relevant part the definition of critical habitat is the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . ., on which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special management considerations or protection. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(I) (emphasis added). Thus, critical habitat is impaired when features essential to the species' conservation are impaired. The definition of conservation is found in § 1532(3), which states that it mean[s] to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Under this definition, conservation encompasses recovery. See also 68 Fed.Reg. at 37,280 (incorporating information from Preble's mouse's recovery plan, which describes the actions necessary for conservation of the species, into designation of critical habitat). It follows that critical habitat is adverse[ly] modif[ied] by actions that adversely affect a species' recovery and the ultimate goal of delisting. [1] Accordingly, we agree with CNE's view of what the Forest Service was required to do: Section 1536(a)(2) requires federal agencies, when considering the effect of their actions on a species' critical habitat, to consider the effect of those actions on the species' recovery. Contrary to CNE's contention, however, we read the record as showing that the Forest Service did what was required. As the Forest Service points out on appeal, after the critical habitat for the Preble's mouse was designated in June 2003, it did in fact consider recovery when it considered the effect of grazing on the conservation of the Preble's mouse. In 2004, shortly after CNE's notice to file suit was submitted, the Forest Service met with the FWS to review the 1998 BA because of several interim developments, including [d]esignation of Preble's [mouse] critical habitat within Pole Mountain Grazing Allotments. Aplts. App. Vol. 1 at 214. The area of Pole Mountain identified as the Preble's mouse's critical habitat in 2003 had been expressly designated to address two of three small recovery populations called for . . . in [the FWS's] conservation strategy. 68 Fed. Reg. at 37,308 (emphasis added). As the FWS's official notice of designation explained: Restoring an endangered or threatened species to the point where it is recovered is a primary goal of our endangered species program. Id. at 37,280. In light of the purpose of the critical-habitat designation recovery of the mouseit is hard to see how the Forest Service's review in 2004, and the FWS's ultimate concurrence with the conclusions of that review, could have been directed at anything but recovery. In any event, the review undeniably considered recovery by considering conservation. On December 30, 2004, the Forest Service sent to the FWS for concurrence the report by its wildlife biologist determining that livestock grazing, as described in the Pole Mountain AMPs and implemented annually, is `Not Likely to Adversely affect Critical Habitat for the Preble's mouse.' Aplts. App. at 124. That report relied on prior reports, including the Forest Service's December 15, 2004, update to the 1998 BA. The update, which reviewed the 11 previously identified mitigation measures, stated that measures considered in the 1998 BA and again in the update were important to the conservation of Preble's meadow jumping mice and their habitat. Aplts. App. Vol. 1 at 136. Most importantly, the update's conclusions addressed conservation. After a detailed review of the 11 measures, the update concluded that they were satisfied, leading to a stable or improving trend in riparian areas. These areas provide the mainstay of Preble's habitat and are most important to conservation of the species. Id. at 146 (emphasis added). And the update's plan of action was also directed at conservation. To counteract recent indications of more intense grazing pressure in some areas of Preble's mouse habitat, said the update, the Forest Service was taking additional actions, including reduced stocking, increased herding [apparently referring to movement of livestock], and pasture rotation adjustments in order to continue to provide the necessary conservation measures for Preble's mouse. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is clear that (1) the Forest Service had considered the conservation of Preble's mouse when it forwarded the update to the FWS on December 30, 2004, and stated its determination that livestock grazing . . . is Not Likely to Adversely Affect Critical Habitat for the Preble's mouse, id. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted), and (2) the FWS likewise had considered conservation when it concurred in writing on January 12, 2005. CNE nevertheless claims that `implicit[]' consideration of recovery violates basic APA judicial review principles. Aplts. Reply Br. at 3. We assume that CNE's argument is targeted at the Forest Service's alleged failure to use the word recovery in the 2004 update to the 1998 BA. But, as noted above, the ESA itself speaks only in terms of conservation, not recovery. It states that critical habitat is habitat essential to the conservation of the species, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(I) (emphasis added), and that conservation is the methods and procedures which are necessary to allow the species to recover to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to [the ESA] are no longer necessary, id. § 1532(3). We cannot fault the Forest Service for employing the statutory term. Criticism would be more justifiable if it did not. For this reason, CNE's reliance on Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1072 n. 9, is unavailing. In that case the Ninth Circuit rejected the Forest Service's position because it had failed to consider explicitly either recovery or conservation. See id. ; id. at 1072-73. That is not a problem here. CNE also insists that the Forest Service could not have considered recovery because its 2004 consultation on critical habitat addressed no issues that it had not considered in 1998 when it consulted on the species itself. But the questions to be answered on the two occasions are intimately related, so it would not be surprising that the same considerations would control the answers. We find it significant that CNE never identifies for us any particular issue or factor relevant to recovery of the mouse that the Forest Service failed to consider in 2004. In short, the Forest Service's consideration of the effect of grazing on the conservation of the Preble's mouse complied with 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). CNE half-heartedly argues that the Forest Service did not adequately raise below the ground on which we rely to affirm the district court's ruling. In a footnote in its brief-in-chief, and without citation to the record, it asserts that The [Forest Service] did not argue to the district court that it did address recovery in this process, but rather that it need not consider recovery. Aplts. Br. at 24 n. 5. But even if the assertion is correct, we may affirm a district-court judgment on any ground appearing from the record so long as the litigants had a fair opportunity to develop the record, see Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 939 (10th Cir. 2005), and to address the ground on which we rely, see Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir.2006). The purpose of requiring presentation of the issue in the lower court is to ensure that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence or to present whatever legal arguments they may have. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod., 77 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir.1996) (ellipsis, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). There is no unfairness here. First, because judicial review is based on the administrative record, see 5 U.S.C. § 706, we doubt that CNE could have introduced further evidence on the matter, and it does not suggest otherwise. And second, CNE had ample opportunity to present its legal arguments in its briefs and at oral argument to this court. Indeed, its appellate opening brief argues that the Forest Service had not considered recovery. In sum, we conclude that the Forest Service's analysis of the effect of its actions on the conservation of the mouse, and the FWS's concurrence with that analysis, satisfied § 1536(a)(2)'s requirement that recovery be considered.