Opinion ID: 1268089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: fairly debatable standard

Text: The County's first assignment of error applies to both Cowardin and Duke. The County claims that the trial court erred in ruling that the denial of the landowners' conditional use permits was unreasonable. Determinations regarding applications for conditional use permits, like the adoption of zoning regulations, constitute legislative action. Thus, such action is presumed to be valid and will not be disturbed by a court absent clear proof that the action is unreasonable, arbitrary, and bears no reasonable relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. City Council of Virginia Beach v. Harrell, 236 Va. 99, 101, 372 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1988). If the reasonableness of the action is fairly debatable, it will be upheld by a court because the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body. Id. at 101-02, 372 S.E.2d at 141. Accord Loudoun Co. v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30, 34, 267 S.E.2d 100, 102-03 (1980); Fairfax County v. Snell Corp., 214 Va. 655, 658-59, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892-93 (1974); Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959). If the presumptive reasonableness of the action is challenged by probative evidence of unreasonableness, the legislative body must produce evidence of reasonableness. The action must be sustained if such evidence of reasonableness is sufficient to make the issue fairly debatable. If such evidence of reasonableness is not sufficient, the presumption is defeated by the evidence of unreasonableness, and the action cannot be upheld. Snell Corp., 214 Va. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893. Here, we will assume that the proposed use (with a boathouse) is an appropriate use. We also will assume that the denial of the use permits is probative evidence of unreasonableness. See County Board of Arlington v. Bratic, 237 Va. 221, 228, 377 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1989); Fairfax County v. Jackson, 221 Va. 328, 334, 269 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1980). These assumptions are warranted because the zoning ordinance, article 4, § 4-1-11, specifically allows the proposed use. The question then becomes whether the Board produced sufficient evidence of reasonableness to make the use-permit issue fairly debatable. See Bratic, 237 Va. at 228, 377 S.E.2d at 371; Jackson, 221 Va. at 334, 269 S.E.2d at 385. Here, we conclude that the Board produced sufficient evidence of reasonableness to make the issue fairly debatable. The Board's evidence shows that, in Cowardin's case, the Board denied his request, in part, because the primary structure was not completed. The zoning ordinance, article 13, § 13-3, requires a certificate of occupancy before a conditional use permit is issued. While the use is reasonable, Cowardin failed to meet the conditions of the ordinance for the grant of the permit. Therefore, the Board's denial was reasonable. In the Duke case, no boathouses were located on Little Branch, the location proposed for Duke's boathouse. The zoning ordinance, article 13, § 13-3, provides that a conditional use permit shall be approved only if it is found that the location is appropriate and not in conflict with the Land Use Plan, [and] that the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare will not be adversely affected. Pursuant to this provision, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that the construction of Duke's boathouse where no others existed would have been inappropriate and would have had an adverse effect on the local waters. We hold that the Board's evidence of reasonableness was sufficient to defeat the landowners' evidence of unreasonableness. Therefore, we must uphold the Board's action as to Cowardin.