Opinion ID: 2338335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Exclude an Uncharged Act of Sexual Misconduct

Text: The next issue on appeal is whether the trial justice erred in admitting into evidence testimony concerning defendant's uncharged act of sexual assault against Ben. At trial, Ben testified that, over July Fourth weekend in 1999, about one month before the assault at Yawgoog, he went camping and slept in a trailer park with defendant and the nine-year-old son of one of defendant's friends. At night, while sleeping on a fold-out couch, Ben awoke to find defendant sexually touching him. In response to defendant's in limine motion to exclude this evidence, the trial justice ruled that testimony on the July assault was admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence for the limited purpose of establishing defendant's lewd disposition toward Ben because the incident was similar in nature and location to the count before the jury, and the uncharged act occurred five or six weeks before the incident at issue. Rule 404(b) provides in pertinent part: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident   . This Court has recognized four restrictions on the use of prior bad acts: (1) the acts must not be too remote in time from the charged act; (2) the evidence should be used sparingly and should be excluded if it is merely cumulative; (3) the evidence should be admitted only to prove charges lodged against the defendant; and (4) the trial justice should designate the specific exception to which the evidence is relevant and should instruct the jury on the limitations within which the testimony should be used. State v. Sorel, 746 A.2d 704, 706-07 (R.I.2000) (per curiam) (citing State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 316-17 (R.I.1997), and State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 627, 382 A.2d 526, 533 (1978)). Provided that the trial justice comports with these restrictions, [a]dmission of uncharged sexual misconduct evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence is a decision left to the exercise of the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Mulcahey, 762 A.2d 1214, 1216 (R.I.2000) (per curiam). The trial justice in this case closely abided by the restrictions we have delineated. This Court has affirmed the admission of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct more remote in time from a charged act than the five or six weeks that separated the two acts here. In State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 969-71 (R.I.1994), for example, the two acts were seven years apart. In our opinion, therefore, the uncharged incident and the charged assault here were relatively contemporaneous with each other, State v. Rice, 755 A.2d 137, 147 (R.I.2000), and not so remote as to be inadmissible. In admitting evidence of the July incident, the trial justice pointed out the proximity in time and the similarity of the circumstances and nature of the charged and uncharged acts in finding the evidence necessary and relevant. Gomes, 690 A.2d at 317. Moreover, it is undisputed that the evidence was admitted solely to prove charges against the defendant. The trial justice also designated the specific exception under which the evidence was admitted and gave an appropriate limiting instruction. He found the evidence of the previous encounter relevant to show that defendant had a lewd disposition toward this witness, one of the acceptable purposes for which uncharged sexual acts may be admitted. Mulcahey, 762 A.2d at 1216. Such evidence is relevant in circumstances in which it demonstrates a defendant's lewd intent and lascivious designs toward [a] particular victim of his charged sexual misconduct. Rice, 755 A.2d at 147. The conduct here, which established that defendant touched the same complainant in a sexual manner twice in five or six weeks, clearly demonstrated defendant's lewd disposition toward Ben. In addition, the trial justice gave an adequate and appropriate limiting instruction, directing the jury that it could not draw the inference that the Defendant committed the criminal offense he is on trial for simply because on a prior occasion he may have acted improperly. He pointed out that evidence of other bad acts cannot be used to prove a person's character, nor could it be used to show that defendant was acting in conformity with that character when he committed the alleged acts at issue. The trial justice added, To the extent that you decide to consider this evidence, it is admitted for your consideration for the limited purpose of deciding whether the Defendant exhibits a lewd disposition toward this witness. You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. This instruction properly made clear to the jury the limited purpose for which the evidence could be used. State v. Hopkins, 698 A.2d 183, 188 n.5 (R.I. 1997). Given the trial justice's compliance with all the relevant restrictions on admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, we conclude that he did not abuse his discretion in admitting Ben's testimony describing the earlier uncharged incident of sexual assault.