Opinion ID: 1917118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Actual Harm

Text: [18] To recover compensatory damages in a § 1983 action, the claimant must show that the violation of his or her rights resulted in some actual harm. [19] This requires both proof of some actual harm to the claimant and a causal relationship between that harm and the violation of the claimant's federal rights. Case does not seem to dispute that Amanda actually suffers from numerous social problems. Rather, Case seems to argue that those problems did not result from any misconduct by Case, but stem from a number of other threats to Amanda's ordinary social development. As Case points out, Amanda was abused by her mother, Carol; removed from her biological home at an early age; relocated from Kimball to Omaha to live with Clyde and Connie; and was unable to see Richmond on a regular basis, if at all. All of these things, Case argues, affected Amanda's development and cannot be attributed to Case. At bottom, this argument refers to causation. [19-21] Causation issues in § 1983 actions are generally resolved according to common-law tort principles. [20] As a general matter, a proximate cause is defined as that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, without any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. [21] So, ordinarily, a plaintiff must meet three basic requirements in establishing proximate cause: (1) that without the [misconduct], the injury would not have occurred, commonly known as the but for rule; (2) that the injury was a natural and probable result of the [misconduct]; and (3) that there was no efficient intervening cause. [22] [22] We have also held, however, that an act need not be the sole cause of harm to qualify as a proximate cause. When multiple causes act to produce a single injury, any one of those acts can still qualify as a proximate cause of that harm so long as it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. [23] In support of her motion for summary judgment, Amanda presented deposition testimony and an accompanying affidavit from Scharf, a psychologist licensed in the State of Nebraska. Scharf evaluated Amanda and reviewed her file. Scharf's testimony supports the conclusion that the relinquishment was a substantial factor in bringing about Amanda's subsequent social problems. Scharf acknowledged that Amanda faced a number of risk factors in addition to Richmond's relinquishment of custody and thus, that the relinquishment [was] one of a couple of risk factors affecting Amanda's development. However, Scharf also noted that Amanda seemed to handle most of the other developmental risk factors without many adverse effects. Scharf found that until about age 12 or 13, the approximate time of the relinquishment, Amanda had adjusted fairly well... and done real well in school and done well with friends. But soon after the relinquishment, Amanda faced a decrease in scholastic achievement, ... substance abuse, [and] difficulties with depression. Ultimately, this led Scharf to conclude that the relinquishment did have an effect on Amanda. Scharf's testimony not only supports a finding that Amanda suffered actual harm, but also that the relinquishment was a substantial factor in causing that harm. Scharf's testimony suggests that the relinquishment was at least as significant an agent as the other obstacles Amanda faced in bringing about her downward social spiral. Amanda's presentation of such evidence therefore shifted the burden to Case to present contradictory evidence that Amanda did not suffer actual harm or at least evidence that the formal relinquishment was not a substantial factor in bringing about such harm. Case did not present any such evidence. The court did not err, therefore, in concluding that summary judgment was proper on the issue of proximate causation.