Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Sever the Carlos Adkins Murder Charge

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's denial of his motion to sever the murder charge of Carlos Adkins from the murder charges of the two police officers was error and denied him a fair trial. In the trial court, defendant argued that evidence regarding the shooting of the police officers was likely to inflame the jury so much that he could not receive a fair trial on the Adkins homicide. Additionally, defense counsel indicated there was a possibility that defendant might testify regarding self-defense or imperfect self-defense in the trial of the Adkins homicide, but would not testify in connection with the police officer counts. The trial court denied the motion. (6) Defendant concedes that joinder of the three murder charges was proper under section 954, which permits joinder of two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses. ( Ibid.; see People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 188, 200 P.3d 816] ( Soper ).) This requirement was clearly met in the present case because all three counts alleged murder. Even when the requirements for joinder are satisfied, however, the court in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately .... (§ 954.) On appeal, defendant must show that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion. ( Soper, supra, at p. 774.) In order to establish an abuse of discretion, defendant must make a clear showing of prejudice. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) (7) In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion under section 954 in declining to sever properly joined charges, `we consider the record before the trial court when it made its ruling.' ( Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774, quoting Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 185 P.3d 708].) We consider first whether the evidence of the two sets of offenses would have been cross-admissible if the offenses had been separately tried. ( Soper, supra, at pp. 774-775.) If the evidence would have been cross-admissible, then joinder of the charges was not prejudicial. Defendant contends that the evidence would not have been cross-admissible in separate trials, and we agree. The two sets of crimes were entirely unrelated and the only similarity between them is that a nine-millimeter handgun (but not the same gun) was used in each incident. Respondent does not argue to the contrary. However, this does not end our inquiry. Because the evidence would not have been cross-admissible, we next inquire whether the benefits of joinder were sufficiently substantial to outweigh the possible `spill-over' effect of the `other-crimes' evidence on the jury in its consideration of the evidence of defendant's guilt of each set of offenses. ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 938 [251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996]; accord, Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775; see § 954.1 [lack of cross-admissibility does not require severance].) We consider [1] whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; [2] whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and [3] whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case. ( People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 161.) We then balance the potential for prejudice to the defendant from a joint trial against the countervailing benefits to the state. ( Soper, supra, at p. 775.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the Adkins case. As to the first consideration, there may have been a potential to inflame the jury because of the evidence of the murders of Officers Burrell and MacDonald. The victims were police officers and the killings were particularly callousboth officers were taken by surprise during a traffic stop and shot at close range multiple times after they had fallen. However, defendant's shooting of Adkins was also callous; it arose from defendant's brief and unwelcome entry into a residencedefendant was inexplicably hostile, armed with a gun and threatening the occupants. Adkins was killed after a struggle that was preceded by defendant putting a gun to Adkins's head, and threatening to blow his brains out. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the charges of the police officer shootings were particularly likely to inflame the jury against defendant. Second, this is not a case in which a weak case has been joined with a stronger case. In support of the motion to sever in the trial court, defendant contended that the evidence supporting the Adkins case was relatively weak, because Dickson had refused to testify at the preliminary hearing and Janice Chappell had not positively identified defendant. He argued that, by contrast, the evidence as to the murders of the two officers was strong and was also highly inflammatory. The prosecution fully expected Dickson to testify at trial, however, and expected that he would not only identify defendant, but that he also would describe defendant's attempts to dissuade him from testifying. Thus, based on the record before the trial court at the time of the motion, it appeared that the evidence in both cases was strong. Even if the evidence in one case might be considered stronger than the other, [a] mere imbalance in the evidence ... will not indicate a risk of prejudicial `spillover effect,' militating against the benefits of joinder and warranting severance of properly joined charges. ( Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 781.) (8) Third, although joinder did not convert the matter into a capital case, the charges of murdering the two officers were capital offenses and joinder resulted in the Adkins homicide being charged as a capital offense. Our concern in such situations is whether joinder would tend to produce a conviction when one might not be obtainable on the evidence at separate trials. Clearly, joinder should never be a vehicle for bolstering either one or two weak cases against one defendant, particularly where conviction in both will give rise to a possible death sentence. ( Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 454 [204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699].) Here, there was no significant risk of an unjustified conviction on any of the murder charges because, as discussed above, evidence in both cases was strong. (9) In light of the strength of the evidence in both cases, any potential to inflame the jury based on the nature of the evidence of the shootings of the police officers was not significantly likely to influence the jury's verdict in the Adkins case. Weighing against the small risk of prejudice are the substantial benefits of joinder, which include efficiencies in both the trial and appellate courts. ( Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 781-782.) Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the Adkins case. (10) Defendant argues that a factor supporting the severance motion was defense counsel's indication that defendant might wish to testify in the Adkins case but not in the case involving the police officers. (See Cross v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1964) 118 U.S. App.D.C. 324 [335 F.2d 987, 989] [holding joinder to be prejudicial when defendant wanted to testify on one count but not, with good reason, on the other count, which involved an entirely separate incident].) This court has recognized, however, that severance is not required on such grounds unless the defendant makes a showing that `he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and [a] strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.' ( People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 174 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862], quoting Baker v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1968) 131 U.S. App.D.C. 7 [401 F.2d 958, 977].) The showing must be specific enough to permit the court to weigh the considerations of economy and expedient judicial administration against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. ( Sandoval, supra, at p. 174.) In Sandoval, we concluded that the defendant's showing was insufficient because he merely made a passing reference to the circumstance that he wanted to testify in one case and not the other, and did not explain the nature of the testimony he wanted to give in the one case or his reasons for not wanting to testify in the other. ( Id. at p. 173.) Likewise here, defense counsel merely indicated that defendant might wish to testify in the Adkins case as to self-defense or imperfect self-defense. He made no offer of proof as to what the testimony might be or why he did not wish to testify in the other case. Consequently, the court was not afforded sufficient information to enable it to weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. ( Id. at p. 174.) Even if the trial court properly denied severance of the Adkins charge, we look to the evidence actually introduced at trial to determine whether `a gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law.' ( People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 940, quoting People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 313 [208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669].) Viewing the case as it was actually tried, we find no such gross unfairness. The evidence in the Adkins case proved to be strong, just as the prosecution contemplated. Dickson positively identified defendant as the perpetrator and also testified as to defendant's attempts to dissuade him from testifying. The testimony in the other case was equally strong. Although the eyewitnesses who viewed the shooting of the officers had only a brief, fleeting opportunity to view the perpetrator, their testimony was bolstered by ballistics evidence tying defendant to the crime. The jury rejected the first degree murder charge as to Adkins, and convicted him of second degree murder. Thus, it is clear that the jury was able to follow the instructions to consider each offense separately and was not prejudiced by evidence of the other offenses when it considered defendant's state of mind in the Adkins case. (See CALJIC No. 17.02 [You must decide each Count ... separately.].)