Opinion ID: 2510879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The receipt of Aranda's letter of denial

Text: The district court summarized its core findings as follows: The facts that have led the Court to its conclusion are simple. The party standing behind the Plaintiff and probably in all likelihood, the real interested party in this suit is National Union Fire Insurance Company. They received information from Aranda within two months of this accident that he was not the owner of the horse and was not responsible for the damage to their insured. The Plaintiff, nevertheless, insisted on attempting to collect damages from Aranda and they should not have done so. If the counsel for the Plaintiff received the insurance file as they claim they did, they should have seen Aranda's letter in there, and then made reasonable inquiry before filing this suit, which they did not do. (Emphasis added.) Upon reconsideration, the district court reiterated: What did National Union Fire Insurance Company do with that letter? Nothing. Apparently, they ignored it. This is the wrong; this is what is bad in this case. Apparently, they never even included it in the `insurance file' that was eventually sent to their counsel in this proceeding. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Aranda claimed he sent, by certified mail, his denial letter in the self-addressed envelope that accompanied Lasowski's demand letter. Nevertheless, it held that the record does not contain any evidence to support a finding that Aranda's letter was received : We acknowledge that the district court heard testimony of Aranda and apparently chose to believe that Aranda did indeed respond to the first demand letter and mailed his response in the self-addressed envelope. We do not and need not quarrel with this finding. The problem is that the district court based its conclusion on the improper inference that if Aranda took these steps, the letter must have been received by Evenson's agents or attorneys. This was unsupportable by if not contrary to the evidence.... . . . . There was simply no evidence offered on the issue of receipt of Aranda's letter. In fact, the insurance company was not a party to the proceeding and was not subpoenaed or deposed on the question of receipt. There is no presumption that incorrectly addressed mail is received. See Miller v. Kansas City C. of C., 141 Kan. 459, 462, 41 P.2d 715 (1935); see PIK Civ. 3d 102.74. Absence of evidence on the question of whether the letter was properly addressed deprives the letter of the presumption of delivery. Breedlove v. General Baking Co., 138 Kan. 143, 144, 23 P.2d 482 (1933). (Emphasis added.) Evenson Trucking Co. v. Aranda, slip op. at 5-6. We disagree with the Court of Appeals for several reasons. First, substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding of receipt. According to Aranda's hearing testimony, he possessed a receipt from certified mail that had been mailed to the address contained on a self-addressed envelope provided by Lasowski's demand letter. While that envelope is not in the record on appeal, a copy of Aranda's enclosed letter of denial is; it is addressed to American International Recovery, Inc., P.O. Box 105795, Atlanta, Georgia. A court therefore can infer that the envelope containing Aranda's letter of denial carried an identical address  again, provided by Lasowski. See U.S.D. No. 233 v. Kansas Ass'n of American Educators, 275 Kan. at 320 (appellate court accepts as true all inferences to be drawn from the evidence which support or tend to support the findings of the district court). A court can also infer that because Aranda testified he had not called to verify the addressee's receipt of the letter because he had the certified mail receipt, that the receipt in his possession demonstrated successful delivery, e.g., a receipt signed by the addressee. See Rounsavell v. Tipton, 209 Kan. 366, 368, 497 P.2d 108 (1972) (when using certified or restricted delivery, reliance on the presumption of delivery is substituted by the sureness of proof by the return receipt). The court in Moya v. United States, 35 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1994), addressed the significance of the sender not having the receipt: While the law presumes delivery of a properly addressed piece of mail, no such presumption exists for certified mail where the return receipt is not received by the sender. [Citation omitted.] The reason is that the sender of a certified letter who does not receive the return receipt is on notice that the addressee may not have received the letter. [Citation omitted.] It is then incumbent upon the sender either to inquire with the addressee or send the letter again. Second, the Court of Appeals' declaration that there is no presumption that incorrectly addressed mail is received, is inapplicable here. Evenson, slip op. at 6. The district court found: [A]fter the original demand letter from the Plaintiff through their agent, Aranda responded in writing directly to the insurance company for the Plaintiff and denied his involvement. We observe that according to Aranda's testimony and his copy of the denial letter, the letter was mailed  in the self-addressed envelope Lasowski provided  to the Atlanta address for National Union Fire Insurance Company, the company for whom Lasowski admitted in his letter he and his organization (American International) served as recovery agents.  (Emphasis added.) We also observe that Evenson's counsel argued at the sanctions hearing that the demand letters were admissible into evidence because they had been written by Evenson's agents. Accordingly, Aranda's letter was properly addressed to Lasowski's principal at P.O. Box 105795, Atlanta, Georgia. We acknowledge that Aranda's failure to provide the return receipt during discovery  or to introduce it into evidence at the hearing  could create a presumption that no such evidence existed, or was adverse to him. See Blackburn v. Colvin, 191 Kan. 239, 244, 380 P.2d 432 (1963) (failure of a party to throw light upon an issue particularly within his or her own knowledge raises a presumption that the concealed information is unfavorable to him or her); PIK Civ. 3d 102.73. However, by its finding of receipt, the district court essentially determined that any such presumption was rebutted.