Opinion ID: 798530
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Convictions for Bribery

Text: Salesman contends the evidence was insufficient to support his two convictions for bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). This statute makes it a crime for a state official to corruptly accept anything of value from another person “intending to be influenced or rewarded” for official actions in that person’s favor. Salesman argues he was not an agent of Miramar when he helped Target obtain the first gazebo project, and he did not act corruptly in receiving the two cash payments because he was not involved in the gazebo contract after reinstatement as commissioner. See 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1) (defining “agent” as one who is “authorized to act on behalf of another person or a government”). To the extent Salesman’s arguments rest on his assertion that there must be a “quid pro quo,” they are without merit. In United States v. McNair, we squarely rejected the proposition that a bribery conviction under § 666(a)(1)(B) requires such proof. 605 F.3d at 1188; see also White, 663 F.3d at 1214 (reaffirming McNair’s conclusion in the wake of Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010)).3 3 Salesman points to language in United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011), that arguably suggests there must be a quid pro quo. However, the jury instructions in Siegelman contained a quid pro quo instruction, and this Court expressly stated it was not deciding whether § 666 required a quid pro quo instruction. Regardless, we are obligated to follow McNair under the prior panel precedent rule. See United States v. Fulford, 662 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2011). 16 While it is unclear whether Salesman makes a sufficiency claim beyond his misplaced quid pro quo argument, regardless, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings. As to Salesman’s suggestion that he could not be convicted for actions taken while suspended, that much is true. Indeed, the jury was instructed on this point, and the government acknowledged at trial that it made “no contention that the defendant may be convicted of bribery based on actions taken prior to March 26, 2007.” But Salesman took numerous actions while not suspended that support his convictions. These continual efforts included contacting city personnel such as Borges about Target, meeting with the undercover FBI agents to discuss future city projects for Target, and telling Agent McGowan when he accepted the July 28 payment that he would continue to deliver future contracts for Target. Under § 666(a)(1)(B), “the government is not required to tie or directly link a benefit or payment to a specific official act” by Salesman. McNair, 605 F.3d at 1188. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Salesman accepted the two cash payments not as a reward for his prior efforts in securing the first gazebo project, but as a reward for his efforts on behalf of Target to find more Miramar projects. See Ospina, 823 F.2d at 433. The evidence was also sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Salesman “corruptly” accepted the two payments. The district court instructed the 17 jury that “corruptly” meant acting “voluntarily, deliberately and dishonestly for the purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful end or lawful result by any unlawful method or means.” Salesman argues that he was paid for his work as a “consultant” for Target only during the period of his suspension. However, Salesman presented that argument to the jury, and the jury rejected that theory. The jury’s finding as to that element is supported by the evidence showing Salesman was aware that his behavior after he was reinstated was potentially illicit. In a September 2007 meeting with the agents, for example, Salesman told them that he had to be “very careful” in helping Target obtain Miramar construction contracts because of state law prohibiting “kickback[s].” The jury also heard evidence refuting Salesman’s claim that he acted as a consultant, such as refusing to sign a contract and failing to declare any of the payments he accepted from the agents on his income tax returns for 2005–2007. From all of this, a reasonable jury could conclude that Salesman was guilty of both bribery counts. 2. Convictions for Attempted Extortion Under Color of Official Right Salesman’s second contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted extortion under color of official right, in 18 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (the Hobbs Act).4 The statute defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” Id. at § 1951(b)(2). In Evans v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the quid pro quo requirement of the offense does not require fulfillment of the quid pro quo, but only that “the public official receive[] a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts.” 504 U.S. 255, 268, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992). In other words, “the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” Id. Salesman argues only that his acceptance of the two payments was not “wrongful” because they were for his “consulting” services performed while suspended as a commissioner, and thus there was no quid pro quo for an official act. We reject Salesman’s argument and conclude sufficient evidence exists to 4 This section states: Interference with commerce by threats or violence (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires to do so, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 19 support his attempted extortion conviction. A reasonable construction of the evidence shows that Salesman accepted the payments and contemporaneously agreed, in response to inquiry by the undercover agents, to try to help Target obtain more city construction projects. Before accepting the $340 payment, Salesman told Agents Osa and Billitier that he would contact city officials to obtain information about the renovation project and then provide confirmation to them. A couple weeks later, Salesman, before accepting the $3,000 payment, told Agent McGowan that he had more projects to deliver, including the renovation project. Salesman contends the payments were a “1% fee” and “bonus” for the original gazebo project, but “[a] jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” Ospina, 823 F.2d at 433. We cannot say the jury’s construction and verdict were unreasonable. 3. Entrapment Salesman argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was predisposed to commit the bribery and extortion offenses. An entrapment defense has two elements: (1) government inducement of the crime, and (2) the defendant’s lack of predisposition. United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). The defendant bears the initial burden of showing government inducement. Id. The burden then shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 20 defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime. Id. Salesman contends the government failed to meet its burden because it offered no proof of similar conduct before the FBI investigation began. This argument is meritless. Our inquiry on the second element focuses not on “the defendant’s ability to engage in criminal acts,” but rather on whether the defendant “prompt[ly] commi[tted] . . . the crime at the first opportunity,” which “is enough to show predisposition.” Id. at 624. “The government need not produce evidence of predisposition prior to its investigation.” Id. at 625. Here, the evidence demonstrated that Salesman was ready and willing to commit the charged crimes. At the initial meeting with Agent Velazquez, Salesman was informed that his new companion had engaged in insurance fraud and money laundering. Nonetheless, Salesman was not dissuaded from continuing his relationship with Agent Velazquez and his associates. Salesman himself recognized that his activities on their behalf were fraud with potential criminal repercussions, observing at one point in May 2007 that there was a possibility of jail if problems arose with Target’s construction projects. Further, before offering the $3,000 cash to Salesman, Agent McGowan gave Salesman the opportunity to leave if McGowan’s methods bothered him. Salesman nonetheless stayed and pocketed the money. We also note that throughout the agents’ interactions with Salesman, they 21 did not beguile him into committing the crimes by assuring him that his actions would be lawful. Cf. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992) (“The evidence that petitioner was ready and willing to commit the offense came only after the Government had devoted 2 1/2 years to convincing him that he had or should have the right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by law.”). Thus, after reviewing the evidence, we conclude the government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Salesman was predisposed to commit the bribery and extortion offenses.