Opinion ID: 3170715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Motions

Text: Following the close of the State’s case, the defense moved to strike C.W.’s identification from the record, arguing that it was “tainted.” In support of that argument, defense counsel noted that C.W. testified that she did not see defendant’s face, that she recognized defendant only once the jacket was placed on him, that the officers never showed C.W. any other suspects, and that Wimbush and the officer were standing next to defendant when he was identified. Defense counsel asserted that had he known all of those facts in advance of C.W.’s testimony, he would have moved for the evidence’s exclusion. 10 In denying the motion, the court noted that, although oneon-one showup identifications are inherently suggestive, C.W.’s testimony was reliable because it was corroborated by Wimbush, who identified defendant and who provided a description of the suspect’s physical appearance that was essentially the same as the one provided by C.W. Specifically, the court stated: Now with regard to the motion to strike . . . the victim[’s] . . . description of the defendant, at least as she testified to it in court, based on [United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967)] and the taint caused when the police had the defendant put on the jacket that had been identified by her at the time she viewed him at the school, I would note that one-on- one showup[] [identifications] are inherently suggestive. . . . . Here, there was a showup [identification] when Officer Olschewski brought the defendant to the school where the victim . . . was. She identified the jacket which the defendant was made to wear by the officer, and I have placed on the record her testimony. I’ll just review it quickly. She said the jacket -- she observed the jacket the man had on, that was how she was able to make her identification. She remembered the man wearing the jacket. She testified she did not see his face, nor did she recognize it when first shown. Now, that’s how she identified the defendant, as the man in the jacket. She did not identify him in court, as I pointed out. She testified to what occurred on [the date of the incident], that was her basis for identifying the man wearing the jacket. 11 The court analogized the case to Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967), in which the police took a defendant to the hospital room where a victim was being treated and conducted a showup identification. In finding that case analogous, the trial court noted: Here, only [the victim] could identify the defendant as having exposed himself to her. I note that the school was nearby where this occurred. And . . . if it wasn’t this defendant, then the flasher, the person who was exposing himself, was still on the loose and probably nearby. I find that this is not a due-process violation. The procedure here occurred very soon after the incident. And I note that Mr. Wimbush also testified that he had seen a man [wearing] a distinct pattern, a plaid lumber jacket in the bushes. So I find this is not a due-process violation that would result in suppression or striking [the victim’s] identification from the trial record or her testimony in that regard. Defense counsel persisted and requested a clarification of the court’s ruling: [Defense Counsel]: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, I want to be also asking for clarification on your ruling, because what I was arguing as far as the identification, what was wrong with the identification, was not that they brought Mr. Jones to the school but what they did when they brought him to the school as far as placing evidence upon him. THE COURT: No, your basis was that they brought him to the school -- [Defense Counsel]: And changed his appearance. 12 THE COURT: -- and made him wear the jacket. [Defense Counsel]: Correct. THE COURT: And that he was brought to the school by the police. [Defense Counsel]: Correct. But the main emphasis of my argument is them placing the jacket upon him. Because you have a witness who didn’t see his face, who couldn’t identify him, and then you place evidence from the charge, something that at least looks like evidence, if it wasn’t from the original perpetrator or not, but it’s the same jacket or similar, either way, you’re placing that upon my client to look more -- in other words, you’re making him fit the description as opposed to him fitting it just by being there. THE COURT: No, I understand your argument. That is part of the totality of the considerations. [Defense Counsel]: Okay. THE COURT: At least the totality of factors I took into account in my ruling. I think, though, what I am saying also to you, I’m denying that motion that you made. The only additional point of concern in this appeal is that after the parties rested, an issue arose as to the court’s obligation to charge lewdness as a lesser-included offense of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact based on C.W.’s testimony that the man she had seen in the bushes had “flashed” her. After discussion in which the defense argued against the charge being given and the State reviewed law that was suggestive of an obligation to provide the charge, the trial court determined not 13 to charge lewdness as a lesser-included offense. After giving the issue thoughtful attention, the court concluded that, although the definition of a “lewd” act includes similar language to that of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, the language regarding knowledge contained in “lewdness” as a disorderly persons offense differed significantly from that of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); that difference, according to the court, meant that the disorderly persons offense was not a lesser-included offense of fourthdegree criminal sexual contact. Defendant was convicted on both counts of the indictment and was sentenced to a five-year term for endangering the welfare of a child, with a two-year period of parole ineligibility, and a concurrent eighteen-month term for fourthdegree criminal sexual contact. The court imposed appropriate fines and fees. On appeal, defendant asserted that “[b]y placing the incriminating jacket on defendant after C.W. failed to identify defendant without the jacket, the police violated defendant’s [due process] right to be free from suggestive police identification procedures that create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Defendant also claimed on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge lewdness as a lesser-included offense 14 of both counts one and two, endangering the welfare of a child and criminal sexual contact, and that his sentence was excessive. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. As to the first issue, the panel agreed that the showup procedure used here was suggestive, but found it to be reliable nonetheless and thus the testimony was properly admitted. In so concluding, the panel pointed to the following facts: 1) the procedure occurred “very soon” after the incident; (2) the victim and Wimbush gave matching descriptions of defendant’s clothing before the show-up; (3) without being prompted, defendant told Officer Olschewski that “the gentleman who was exposing himself is on the track bed”; (4) after Olschewski told defendant that he was a witness, defendant dropped the yellow can and started running away towards the track bed; (5) Olschewski searched the surrounding area and found a blue-and-white jacket by the recycling can behind the house on Oakland Street; (6) Cruz testified that defendant was the man the victim identified at the school; (7) Wimbush testified that defendant was the man he had seen jump out of the bushes; and (8) the victim and Wimbush testified that the jacket Olschewski found was the one they had seen on defendant. The panel dispensed with the lesser-included-offense argument on the basis of the doctrine of invited error and held that defendant’s sentence was not excessive. 15 Defendant petitioned for certification on the admissibility of C.W.’s identification and on whether the disorderly persons offense of lewdness constituted a lesser-included charge on which the jury should have been instructed. We granted the petition. State v. Jones, 218 N.J. 531 (2014). We also granted amicus curiae status to the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ).