Opinion ID: 34467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Question for the Jury

Text: Officer Villareal is apparently the only witness to have stated unequivocally that he was operating under the assumption that the subject would be found at the Maddux residence, rather than the house next door or either of the houses as related by Officer Candelari, who conducted the surveillance. Officer Villareal’s testimony was not developed to an extent that either the district court or the jury could have determined with any certainty whether he had actually been told that the subject was supposedly going to be, or could be, found in the Maddux residence, i.e., whether he believed that information had been obtained that the subject was believed to be at a third-party residence at 2631 Goldenrod, or whether he was merely confused about the information -23- that had been relayed during the briefing for officers participating in executing the felony arrest warrant. Assuming that one or more officers did enter the Maddux residence, a patent variance in the testimony as to whether they did so intentionally was evident even before Officer Villareal testified. Bryan and Gary Maddux both reported hearing the same radio transmission using the words, “wrong house.” Neither of them overhead anything more substantive that might have clarified what exactly was meant by the transmission. The district court concluded, based on the testimony of these two individuals alone, that only one meaning could have been assigned: that the officers who purportedly entered the Maddux residence did not do so on purpose, but in the mistaken belief that the subject was supposed to be in the house where the Maddux family resided and not in the one next door at 2635 Goldenrod. Implicit in the ruling was the district court’s belief that the officers involved never anticipated that the subject might be located at either house, but instead had identified one house as the location where the subject was reasonably expected to be; and that certain officers might have thought that the Maddux residence was the correct location and accidentally gone there. But the equally reasonable inference — and certainly the one more favorable to Plaintiffs as non-movants — was that advanced by Maddux during the Rule 50 arguments at the close of her case and in -24- the brief she submitted to this Court. According to this theory, which is amply supported in the testimonial evidence, officers descended on the 2600 block of Goldenrod with information that the subject could possibly be found at either of the two residences. Maddux thus argues that they intended to go into both houses essentially simultaneously to apprehend the subject of the felony arrest warrant. Officer Candelari admitted that he had warned in a radio transmission relayed to other officers assembling to execute the arrest warrant that he had seen “traffic” between the two houses. That he in fact did not see actual travel in and out of the two residences is irrelevant because the officers relying on his surveillance were never fully apprised of exactly what he had or had not seen. With the exception of Officer Villareal, all of the officers who testified, including Lieutenant Jackson in his supervisory capacity, acknowledged that it was their understanding from the outset that, based on the surveillance that had been conducted, the subject could plausibly have been found in either house. Officer Marshall in particular conceded that the subject could have been found in the Maddux residence as easily as in the residence at 2635 Goldenrod. Review of the record under the prescribed standard of review demonstrates that the district court ruled in favor of the City based in part on its erroneous conclusion that Plaintiffs had -25- presented no legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which a reasonable jury could have found that the predicate constitutional violation had been proven. In this regard, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, and without judging the credibility of witnesses or weighing their testimony, a fact issue for jury consideration was presented.23 A reasonable jury might have found evidence of a constitutional deprivation — that the testimonial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom did not favor the City so profoundly that reasonable minds could not disagree. The meaning of the radio transmission overheard by Bryan and Gary Maddux is equivocal,24 but more compelling are the portions of the officers’ testimony categorically endorsing Plaintiffs’ — and now Maddux’s — argument that both residences were targeted as private premises in which officers could reasonably expect to find the subject of the felony arrest warrant. The district court thus erred in determining as a matter of law that, even accepting as true Plaintiffs’ contention that officers entered the Maddux residence on June 3, 1998, in doing so, they were at most negligent in transgressing Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. 23 While the district court did not explicitly state that it had to any extent considered the testimony of the officers called as adverse witnesses, the testimony had been presented during trial and was available for consideration. 24 It is unnecessary for the Court to speculate as to whether the testimony of these two individuals could, without more, have supported Plaintiffs’ theory of an intentional act. -26- The evidence adduced as to whether Maddux’s constitutional rights were intentionally violated created an issue of fact within the province of the jury. V. Official Policy: Written Policy vs. Unwritten Practice A. Finding by District Court of a Constitutional Policy and Practice Even positing an intentional violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, the district court concluded that judgment as a matter of law was nevertheless proper because Plaintiffs had not shown that either the City or its policymakers had promulgated or adopted an official policy with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious consequences that constitutional violations would result. In order to reach that conclusion and grant judgment in favor of the City, the district court determined the City’s official policy to be one that requires consent to enter as prerequisite to execution of arrest warrants. The district court found that the City had promulgated a policy designed to avoid constitutional deprivations on the order alleged by Plaintiffs. Even if officers had in fact entered the Maddux residence as part of their efforts to apprehend the subject of the felony arrest warrant, such entry without the validation of any of the three Steagald exceptions would only have signified the officers’ direct violation of the City’s policy. The officers, not the City, would then be the moving force behind any injuries sustained by Plaintiffs. Neither Plaintiffs at trial nor Maddux in -27- her appeal has disputed that the City’s liability for the claimed constitutional violation cannot be derived from a theory of respondeat superior. Instead, Maddux argues that for twenty years the City has ignored the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Steagald and affirmatively “enacted and implemented a policy in complete derogation of this decision and the Fourth Amendment.” According to Maddux, the district court erred in simply “absolv[ing] the City of an arrest warrant policy that was in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Steagald.” The question for this Court is whether the City of Pasadena Police Department’s written policy respecting the planned execution of arrest warrants constitutes a legally sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could have premised the City’s liability under § 1983 for a violation of Maddux’s Fourth Amendment interest in being free from an unreasonable search of her home by City officers. More precisely, did the district court dismiss the jury after making a factual finding that the City’s unwritten policy trumps its written policy and requires its officers to obtain permission from a person in authority before executing a felony arrest warrant at a private residence? Analysis of this issue is tangled for reasons evident from our review of the record in this case. To begin with, it cannot be argued that the district court -28- decided what the City’s policy for executing arrest warrants entailed. Neither the colloquy between the bench and counsel during arguments on the Rule 50 motion nor the district court’s recitation of its findings helps us to understand whether or to what degree the court considered the significance of the City’s written policy published in the Rules and Procedures Manual. The City insisted that both its written policy and its practice of obtaining consent assured its compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. In other words, either source of policy was independently capable of surviving scrutiny for purposes of ferreting out potential municipal liability. The district court heard this argument without expressing an opinion as to whether it also thought these two sources of official policy adhered in equal measure to the Fourth Amendment. The court did state, however, that “[i]f they’ve got a policy that says you’ve got to get consent, then they don’t have a policy promulgated with known or obvious consequences that a constitutional violation would result.” Thus, the district court repeatedly characterized the official policy as one of getting consent, without reconciling the wording in the Rules and Procedures Manual with an unwritten policy requiring that consent be obtained; without acknowledging a possible infirmity in the wording that was overcome by an unwritten practice; and without stating that the wording, infirm or not, was -29- irrelevant by virtue of that unwritten practice.25 B. The Written Policy and Creation of a Fact Issue for the Jury Whatever the relationship between the written policy and the unwritten practice, we conclude that it was error for the district court to find that the evidence adduced at trial led inexorably to the conclusion that the City’s policy was to train and require its officers to get consent as a precondition to entering a private residence in the course of executing an arrest warrant. That, at the close of Plaintiffs’ case, the City’s official policy was benign in all relevant respects was not irrefutable from the evidence. Rather, this Court is of the opinion that: (1)the written policy in the Rules and Procedures Manual was indeed facially unconstitutional; and (2) the evidence in which the district court so firmly rooted its finding that the City required its officers to gain consent before entering a private premises to execute an arrest warrant is conflicting. The district court’s ruling granting judgment in favor of the City as a matter of law was therefore incorrect. To begin with, we shall explain why we have concluded that the 25 The only manner in which the district court overtly examined the contents of the written policy was done in reference to the City’s admitted failure to remain abreast of developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. She found that the City’s failure to incorporate expressly in its Rules and Procedures Manual the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Steagald and its implications for entering thirdparty residences to execute arrest warrants was extremely neglectful but insufficient to show deliberate indifference. -30- written policy is infirm. It is necessary in doing so to return to the actual text of the section of the City’s Rules and Procedures Manual dealing with planned execution of arrest warrants: 90.06 Planned Execution of [Arrest] Warrants A. A warrant may be served at any time of the day or night. B. The warrant may be served at any place, public or private, where the actor is reasonably believed to be. C. When it is necessary for officers to enter a private premises to execute an arrest warrant, they will, before entering, announce their identity and purpose and demand admittance.