Opinion ID: 489887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nexus Between the Appellees and the Constitutional Violation Alleged

Text: 27 The District Court's dismissal of Haynesworth's complaints against the District of Columbia, Miller, Jefferson and Cullinane, and its judgment in favor of Gildon, were not based on any defect in the constitutional claim alleged. Instead, those orders were premised on a determination that these defendants were not sufficiently implicated in the retaliatory prosecution averred to establish liability. We now consider the validity of that assessment by examining the participation of each in the constitutional infringement charged, and the theories under which that participation might form a basis for recovery.
28 Haynesworth stated that Officer Gildon participated willfully and directly in the prosecution. 97 It seems beyond peradventure that a complaint averring knowing participation by the defendant in an actionable constitutional deprivation sets forth a colorable claim. Nonetheless, the District Court summarily granted Gildon's motion for judgment on the pleadings, 98 but since the court did not articulate its reasons therefor, we are left uncertain as to its rationale. The only basis existent at the close of the pleadings for a determination on Gildon's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law 99 was the complaint's narration of the conference attended by Gildon, Haynesworth and others. Although the complaint tells us that Gildon informed Haynesworth that he would be prosecuted if he refused to waive his civil claim, it also discloses that prosecutor Miller stated that any decision to proceed with or drop the charges would be made by him and not the police. 100 We can only surmise that the District Court viewed this latter averment as an indication that Gildon had no authority over--and thus no responsibility for--prosecutorial decisions. 29 We do not believe, however, that the asserted exchange exculpates Gildon at this very preliminary stage of the litigation. Miller's statement can plausibly be taken as no more than an admonition that Gildon should allow the prosecutor to handle the negotiations. Even accepting the statement as immutable proof that Gildon could not have exerted any influence on the decision to go forward, Gildon's actions could still have contributed to a constitutional violation, since Haynesworth may not have known that she was powerless in that regard, and might have waived his right to sue in partial reliance upon her statement. 101 Under the applicable standard, 102 the District Court should not have terminated litigation of this claim at such an early stage. 103
30 Haynesworth averred that former Chiefs of Police Jefferson and Cullinane were directly responsible for the alleged retaliatory prosecution because they did not adequately instruct their subordinates on the impropriety of such prosecutions, 104 and vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior. 105 The District Court dismissed Jefferson and Cullinane from the suit on the grounds that the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply and that there was an insufficient showing of personal involvement by them in the purported constitutional violation. 106 While we concur in the District Court's rejection of the respondeat superior claims and in the determination of insufficient participation by Jefferson, we find that the court's exoneration of Cullinane did not take adequate account of Haynesworth's allegation of improper supervision. 31 We can easily dispose of the assertion of respondeat-superior liability. Haynesworth contends that the two former chiefs are responsible for the actions of the police officers by virtue of their dominant roles in the employment relationship. 107 This argument collides with the firmly entrenched principle that public officials are not vicariously responsible for the acts of their subordinates. 108 Analytically, high-level public officials, are not employers of their subordinates but rather are fellow governmental servants, and it thus is inappropriate to hold them liable on the basis of respondeat superior. 32 We also concur in the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Jefferson. He took office as Chief of Police as the events in question drew to a close, and was properly dismissed from the litigation because the complaint does not adequately allege any failing on his part. 109 However remiss he may have been in failing to remedy the District's alleged policy of retaliatory prosecution--a matter on which we intimate no view--no corrective action on his part could have aided Haynesworth since the harm he asserts had already taken place. 33 Haynesworth's claim that Cullinane is liable for failure to supervise the officers under his command is not so easily discarded. It requires us to consider the parameters of supervisory liability for constitutional violations and to view the allegations of the complaint against that template. This analysis leads us to disagree with the District Court's conclusion that Cullinane's role in the constitutional infringement charge could not under any circumstances support a finding of liability. 34
35 It is well established that a governmental officer may be held liable in damages for constitutional wrongs engendered by his failure to supervise or train subordinates adequately. 110 This responsibility is not premised on the notion of vicarious liability; rather, it is bottomed on the principle that in some contexts failure of an official to safeguard against constitutional transgressions by those under his control constitutes an actionable wrong under Bivens and Section 1983. The party seeking to impose liability must demonstrate that the official had an obligation to supervise or train the wrongdoer in the manner alleged, that the duty was breached, and that this breach was a proximate cause of the injury. 111 But while there is consensus on the existence of an actionable duty in this regard, the contours of that duty are unclear. 112 36 This court held in Carter v. Carlson 113 that a police chief would be liable for negligent failure to prevent constitutional impingements by his subordinates, thereby implying that such officials have a duty to supervise and train to foreclose all reasonably foreseeable constitutional harms. 114 While this decision arguably carries weight, 115 we have reason to question its continuing vitality in light of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court 116 and other circuits 117 suggesting that the standard of culpability is higher. 118 Accordingly, we consider the question anew. 37 In Rizzo v. Goode, 119 the Supreme Court vacated an order providing equitable relief against city officials for failure to supervise municipal police officers. The Court noted that supervisory liability under Section 1983 had important limitations: it required an affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners--express or otherwise--showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. 120 Rejecting the amorphous proposition[ ] that the officials implicated shared a constitutional 'duty' ... to 'eliminate' future police misconduct, 121 the Court saw no foundation for the asserted liability absent a showing of direct responsibility by the supervising official for the infringement. 122 38 Applying the tenets of Rizzo, numerous courts have concluded that something more than mere negligence on the part of the supervisor is necessary to state a claim under Bivens or Section 1983. 123 These courts have asserted that, in order to construct a basis for liability, the injured party must establish that the supervising official was either grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in failing to take precautions against the constitutional violation that did in fact occur. 124 This standard of culpability for supervisory officials has been justified by a recognition that imposition of a duty of care to prevent all foreseeable misconduct by subordinates would thrust an excessive burden on supervisors and hamper performance of official duties. 125 Despite differences in articulations of the applicable standard 126 and the underlying rationale, 127 the overwhelming majority of courts faced with claims of supervisory liability after Rizzo have determined that, where responsibility is predicated on inattentiveness rather than affirmative misconduct, the plaintiff must establish a high degree of fault in order to implicate the supervisor in the constitutional infractions of his subordinates. 39 We agree that Rizzo mandates a retreat from the standard proclaimed in Carter v. Carlson, and join the majority of courts calling for something more than mere negligence to forge the affirmative link between the constitutional infringement and the supervisor's conduct. Consideration of the exigencies of criminal law enforcement also suggests that a higher standard is appropriate, given the wide range of constitutional breaches arguably foreseeable in the daily operations of a law enforcement agency, and the difficulty of providing meaningful guidance to ward off all possible wrongs. 128 The duty to supervise is triggered by proof that, absent effective supervision, harm was not merely foreseeable, but was highly likely, given the circumstances of the case. When inaction in the face of a substantial threat of harm is shown, it can be said that the supervisor acquiesced in the resulting constitutional violation, thereby linking the non-feasance with the injury in the manner required by Rizzo. 40 It remains to delineate those situations that trigger the duty to supervise under Bivens and Section 1983. Courts requiring gross negligence or deliberate indifference have held that standard satisfied where a supervisor remains passive in the face of past constitutional violations about which he knew or should have known. 129 Some of these courts have also concluded that a duty to supervise may arise, even absent a pattern of past transgressions, where training has been so clearly deficient that some deprivation of rights will inevitably result absent additional instruction. 130 In general, the existence of a duty to supervise to prevent a particular harm is a question of fact rather than law, and depends on the particulars of each dispute. 131 41 We hold today that the close analogy to Rizzo requires us to constrict the ambit of supervisory liability for constitutional wrongs. Our decision does not shift the level of culpability required to establish the underlying violation; that must turn on the nature of the constitutional provision allegedly infringed. 132 Nor does it affect the showing essential to municipal liability for inadequate supervision, since the problem of determining whether a governmental entity should be charged with responsibility for the acts of its employees is conceptually distinct from the question whether the wrongs of one municipal worker should be imputed to another. 133 Our holding is that, in order to find a supervisory official personally liable in damages for the unconstitutional acts of his subordinate, it must be shown that he was responsible for supervising the wrongdoer; that a duty to instruct the subordinate to prevent constitutional harm arose from the surrounding circumstances; and that, as a result of the official's failure to instruct, the plaintiff was harmed in the manner threatened. We turn now to Haynesworth's complaint against Cullinane to ascertain whether it states a colorable claim for relief under this standard. 42
Cullinane 43 As we have stated, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be denied if it appears from the complaint that the plaintiff might be able to prove some set of facts which would provide a basis for liability. 134 Evaluated according to this liberal standard, we think the District Court's dismissal of Cullinane from the lawsuit was premature. Haynesworth's complaint alleged that Cullinane was charged with the responsibility of supervising the wrongdoing officers; 135 that a practice of retaliatory prosecution had unfolded in the District of Columbia; 136 that Cullinane failed to supervise or instruct his officers in order to guard against further outbreaks of retaliation; 137 and that Haynesworth's injuries resulted from that failure. 138 Additionally, we may infer 139 that the police participated in the prior acts of retaliatory prosecution, and that the police chief was or should have been aware thereof. Cast in the light most favorable to Haynesworth, these facts, if proven, could sustain a finding of liability on the part of Cullinane. 44 It will be for Haynesworth to substantiate his claim that there was a past practice of retaliatory prosecutions, and that the police participated therein with the knowledge--or at least the indifference--of Cullinane. Haynesworth should be afforded some opportunity to verify these claims through discovery since the operative information is largely in the hands of adverse parties. 140 Correspondingly, Cullinane should be given a chance to counter Haynesworth's allegations with factual information, and to develop the affirmative defense of good faith immunity. 141 We do not, of course, assess Haynesworth's chance of prevailing at trial, but believe that his complaint sets forth enough to withstand a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and to enable him to proceed with discovery. 142
45 Haynesworth's complaint asserted liability against Assistant Corporation Counsel Miller on the ground of direct complicity in the prosecution alleged, and on the further ground of supervision and promotion of the retaliatory policy. 143 The District Court dismissed the claims against Miller in the belief that he enjoyed complete prosecutorial immunity from suit. 144 We concur in this determination, but are constrained to elaborate upon the principles underlying the application of prosecutorial immunity in this case. Accordingly, we discuss the legal theory of policymaking liability asserted against Miller, the sufficiency of the complaint in charging liability, and the bases for our conclusion that, notwithstanding Haynesworth's allegations, Miller is absolutely immune from liability therefor. 46
47 Governmental officials may also be held personally liable in damages for constitutional infringements resulting from their establishment of unconstitutional policies. 145 5] In contrast to supervisory or training liability, policymaking liability rests upon the official's misfeasance rather than his nonfeasance. 146 For an official to be held accountable on this basis, he must actually prescribe policy--formally or de facto 147 --that encourages improper means or ends. To succeed on a policymaking theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official against whom liability is asserted has the power--vested either formally or as a practical matter--to formulate policy, and has exercised that policymaking authority to generate improper practices. As in the case of supervisory liability, a plaintiff seeking to recover against a policymaking official must demonstrate a causal connection between the policy established and the wrong committed against him. 148 48
49 The complaint adequately sets forth a cause of action against Miller, both for direct participation in the retaliatory prosecution alleged and for his policymaking role. With regard to the latter, the complaint points to Miller's responsibility for establishing and implementing policy for the Corporation Counsel, 149 and his promotion and pursuance of an agenda of retaliatory prosecution. 150 But while we find that the complaint's allegations of wrongdoing against Miller meet the requirement of particularity, we conclude that he is absolutely immune from this suit. 50
51 As an officer of the District of Columbia, Miller has at least qualified immunity from suit for all activities undertaken within the scope of his duties as Assistant Corporation Counsel. 152 Haynesworth initially contends that, regardless of the protection otherwise applicable, Miller's conduct was so palpably beyond the scope of his authority that the cloak of official immunity should be cast aside. 153 Haynesworth directs our attention to a decision by this court 154 and a prior directive of the Corporation Counsel's Office, 155 both reflecting disapproval of the practice of retaliatory prosecution, and argues that Miller's actions taken in derogation of these authorities do not merit immunity. We believe Haynesworth presumes a sphere of protected activity far narrower than that countenanced by the caselaw. 52 The Supreme Court has staked out expansive boundaries for official immunity, so that a governmental employee forfeits protection only when he acts manifestly or palpably beyond his authority. 156 Under this standard, the conduct at issue did not destroy Miller's immunity. As Chief of the Law Enforcement Section, Miller possessed authority to establish and implement policies governing criminal prosecutions. 157 Since Haynesworth's claim for damages against Miller rests on the establishment and implementation of prosecution policy, the activities challenged fall clearly within the realm of official immunity. And Miller does not lose this protection simply because his exercise of authority impinged upon Haynesworth's constitutional rights; if an allegation of unconstitutional action sufficed to remove the immunity shield, immunity would never be available in Bivens actions and only seldom in suits under Section 1983. 158 Nor are we constrained to cast immunity aside simply because Miller may have contravened a thirteen-year-old policy directive. Even assuming that the policy statement might otherwise have still been in force during the period relevant here, it is entirely plausible that the power to amend outdated directives reposed within the parameters of Miller's general policymaking authority. Accordingly, we conclude that the conduct challenged was not so far afield of Miller's official duties as to deprive him of the immunity applicable. 53 We must now ascertain the nature of the immunity that attaches to Miller's activities, and a great deal turns on this determination. If Miller enjoys only qualified immunity for the conduct at issue, then additional pleadings are necessary to evaluate whether he is entitled to protection in this case. 159 Accordingly, if qualified immunity carries the day, the District Court's disposition of the complaint against Miller under Rule 12 was erroneous. If, on the other hand, Miller is entitled to absolute immunity for the establishment and implementation of prosecution policies, then Haynesworth's suit against him is defeat[ed] at the outset, 160 and the dismissal of the complaint was correct. 161 In order to decide whether Miller's activities fall within the narrow ambit of absolute immunity, we must carefully consider the caselaw and the policies underlying the immunity doctrine. It is this task to which we now attend. 54 --The Scope of Absolute Immunity 55 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 162 the Supreme Court ruled that a state prosecutor was absolutely immune from liability for constitutional violations allegedly arising from his initiation and maintenance of a criminal prosecution. 163 Such conduct, the Court reasoned, was functionally equivalent to the acts of a judge in a criminal proceeding 164 --acts which had earlier been held to merit absolute protection under Section 1983. 165 The Court concluded that the policies underpinning the extension of complete immunity to judges and prosecutors at common law also necessitated absolute protection from constitutional claims asserted against prosecutors acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. A substantial threat of vexatious litigation could hinder vigorous performance of the prosecutor's public duties, and this inhibition would have an adverse effect on the functioning of the criminal justice system. 166 Moreover, since sufficient alternative safeguards exist to defuse the threat of prosecutorial misconduct, the systemic benefit of recognizing a civil remedy against the prosecutor would be slight in comparison to the harm likely to result from the chilling of prosecutorial discretion. 167 56 The Court subsequently held in Butz v. Economou 168 that certain activities by members of executive agencies are absolutely shielded from liability because of the functional similarities between their official duties and those of a judge or prosecutor. 169 Again the Court pointed to the likelihood that official energies would be diverted by the threat of suit, 170 and the availability of alternative mechanisms to ward off misconduct. 171 Its analysis of the officials' activities led the Court to conclude that they too warranted absolute protection. 57 The Imbler Court did not hold, however, that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for all conduct within the scope of his authority. Rather, the Court determined only that complete protection from liability is appropriate when the prosecutor acts in the capacity of an advocate. 172 While the Court adverted to several circuit court decisions extending only qualified immunity to prosecutors engaged in investigative activities, 173 it did not decide whether non-advocatory conduct merited lesser protection. The Court also declined to delineate the parameters of the protected realm of advocacy, holding only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune.... 174 Although the Court recognize[d] that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom, it did not address the difficult questions of demarcation that absolute immunity claims could pose. 175 58 In the wake of Imbler, this circuit and others have resumed their practice of according only qualified immunity to prosecutors functioning in their administrative or investigative capacities, 176 and thus frequently have been forced to confront more squarely the difficult questions left open by the Supreme Court. As we have heretofore noted, [d]elineation of the precise scope of protected advocatory conduct beyond the boundaries established in mbler has proved to be exceedingly difficult, 177 and divergent approaches to the problem have been employed in the circuits. 178 But at bottom these decisions turn upon the same concerns that guided the Supreme Court in Imbler and Butz: the centrality of the challenged conduct to the criminal justice system; 179 the substantiality of the threat of vexatious litigation, and the extent to which that threat would inhibit performance of important public duties; 180 and the availability of alternative mechanisms to safeguard against prosecutorial misconduct. 181 The courts have drawn rough boundaries around the class of absolutely-immunized prosecutorial activities, and have treated functions such as filing charges, 182 plea-bargaining, 183 presenting evidence, 184 and negotiating parole 185 as falling within the protected sphere, and those such as executing search warrants, 186 interrogating suspects, 187 disseminating information to the press, 188 and storing evidence 189 as meriting only qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has loosely endorsed the circuits' practice of applying the functional test of Imbler to distinguish absolutely-protected prosecutorial conduct from those activities accorded lesser protection. 190 59 --Prosecutorial Policymaking and Advocacy 60 We now must apply the somewhat nebulous doctrine of prosecutorial immunity to the facts of the present case. Our first and simplest task is to determine whether the Imbler Court spoke directly to the conduct at issue. If we find no explicit reference, we nonetheless must consider whether Miller's activities fall under the umbrella of advocacy advertently to the criteria developed in Imbler and Butz. Our judgment will be informed by rulings of this court and other circuits mapping out the area of absolute immunity, but we recognize that this case presents a unique species of prosecutorial conduct 191 that must be assessed on its own under the standards of Imbler. 61 Haynesworth alleged harm resulting both from promulgation of a general agenda of retaliatory prosecution and from implementation of that policy against him in a criminal proceeding. We do not hesitate to extend to Miller absolute protection from liability for the latter conduct, since Imbler explicitly held that initiation of a criminal prosecution is absolutely protected from a suit for damages. 192 As to the formulation of general policies on prosecution, however, we find Imbler provides less clear guidance regarding the degree of immunity that should attach. It thus becomes necessary to compare Miller's behavior with the activities in question in Imbler and to summon the policies that led to the grant of absolute immunity therein. 62 First, we find Miller's conduct to be functionally analogous to the activities immunized absolutely in Imbler. In that case, the Court noted the systemic importance of the decision to initiate the prosecution; 193 we find no meaningful distinction between a decision on prosecution in a single instance and decisions on prosecution formulated as policies for general application. 194 Both practices involve a balancing of myriad factors, including culpability, prosecutorial resources, and public interests; 195 both procedures culminate in initiation of criminal proceedings against particular defendants, and in each it is the individual prosecution that begets the asserted deprivation of constitutional rights. 196 The decision to focus prosecutorial energies upon particular classes of law violations or violators clearly bears many features in common with a decision to commence a single proceeding. We find in this resemblance ample reason to invoke the broad protections of Imbler herein. 63 Analysis of Miller's conduct with reference to Imbler's underlying principles leads to the same result. There is no doubt that, were we to decline to insulate prosecutorial policymaking, an abundance of vexatious litigation would result. As we observed in Gray v. Bell, 197 [t]he prosecutor is far more likely to be the target of vindictive hostility once he has initiated criminal proceedings. 198 Since general prosecutorial policies culminate in the initiation of particular criminal actions, those policies raise the same spectre of invidious lawsuits as individual decisions to inaugurate single prosecutions. Indeed, the threat to the policymaker may be amplified; he or she, as policymaker, faces the risk of recrimination from the potentially larger number of parties prosecuted in accordance with the agency directive. The threat of litigation is very real, and indubitably would inhibit the performance of prosecutorial duties. 199 64 Additionally, there are alternative safeguards sufficient to check official misconduct in the formulation of prosecutorial policies. Those policies will frequently result in criminal proceedings, 200 and therein the defendants will be accorded the full panoply of trial and appellate mechanisms to attack suspect practices. 201 Furthermore, prosecutors are subject to professional discipline, public censure, and perhaps even criminal penalties for unsavory acts; 202 and to the extent that policy decisions have wider impact than conduct in individual prosecutions, they are more likely to produce a backlash. The rationale underlying absolute immunity does not require perfect substitutes for the remedy of civil damages; 203 rather, it demands no more than that available mechanisms adequately reduce the likelihood of misconduct. We think that test is satisfied herein. 65 We are mindful that our determination that Miller is absolutely immune may leave a genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress, 204 but we realize, as the Court did in Imbler, that  'the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative.'  205 Were we to extend only qualified immunity to promulgation of standards of prosecution, we would deter the formulation of policy, 206 thereby jeopardizing individual defendants and the criminal justice system as a whole. Given the means currently available to deter misconduct in this area, we view the additional protection afforded by the civil remedy for damages as insufficient justification to tie the prosecutor's hands in this regard. We thus affirm the District Court's ruling that absolute immunity attaches to Miller's policymaking activities, and we find that Haynesworth's complaint against him was properly dismissed.
66 Haynesworth alleged that the District of Columbia is responsible for its employees' acts of retaliatory prosecution. He invoked the doctrine of respondeat superior as a basis for vicarious liability, 207 and further contended that the District is directly responsible because the practice of retaliatory prosecution was sufficiently prevalent to constitute official policy. 208 The District Court rejected both theories, finding that respondeat superior did not apply to municipalities and that retaliatory prosecution was not sufficiently promoted by the District to support liability. 209 We conclude that the court was correct in its disposition of the respondeat superior claim, but in error in its ruling on direct accountability. 67 The District Court was on firm ground in discarding Haynesworth's respondeat-superior theory of liability. Although we had decided in Dellums v. Powell 210 that the District of Columbia could be deemed vicariously accountable in a Bivens-type action, 211 the District Court accurately discerned 212 that our holding in Dellums had been seriously undermined by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services. 213 Monell specifically rejected respondeat superior as a basis for municipal liability, in consequence of its analysis of the legislative history underlying Section 1983. 214 That decision, thus predicated, did not necessarily preclude derivative liability in Bivens-type actions, 215 but since the District Court considered the question we have flatly decided that a Bivens action against a municipality cannot be grounded on respondeat superior. 216 68
69 Although the law was once to the contrary, 217 Monell firmly established that a municipality can be held directly liable in damages for constitutional violations. 218 That liability attaches under Section 1983 when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury.... 219 Although Section 1983 is unavailable in this case, 220 this form of responsibility seems clearly imposable in a constitutionally-implied action as well. 221 70 The municipal liability of which we now speak is direct, not vicarious. It is premised, not on the mere fact that the wrongdoing officer is municipally employed, but on the existence of some policy fairly attributable to the municipal government itself. The primary justification for this type of liability is the recognition that a municipality can act only through those who enable it to function. 222 When an officer or employee has been delegated power or responsiblity to act for the municipality in a given area, he may be acting as a unit of the municipal government, thus rendering the municipal entity liable for his constitutional wrongdoings. 223 The critical issue, then, is whether the municipal representative, when engaging in the activity challenged, can properly be said to have acted as the alter ego of the municipality. This inquiry poses a question of fact rather than law, 224 and in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must set forth a plausible nexus between the action assailed and the authority conferred by the municipality. 225 71 The question whether policymaking by a municipal officer should be deemed a municipal act for liability purposes turns on the scope and nature of the officer's authority. 226 If the official possesses final authority to promulgate policy in the relevant sphere, his decisions constitute the municipality's final decisions and hence provide a basis for municipal accountability. 227 The clearest case is presented when final say over the challenged edict reposes in the decisionmaker by law or official pronouncement. 228 But an individual further down the municipal chain of command may as a practical matter possess final authority to exercise judgment in a particular area, and in such cases it may be feasible to attribute his actions to the municipality for liability purposes. 229 Possession by a lower-level official of de facto final authority may be evidenced by the failure of supervisory personnel to oversee his decisions, 230 or by a tendency of subordinate employees to acquiesce in his directives. 231 These directives may be embodied in formal rules established through official lawmaking procedures, but they may also be promulgated through more informal channels. 232 72
Columbia 73 The District Court, in dismissing Haynesworth's claim against the District of Columbia, stated that he had failed to show that the activities complained of had been authorized by policymaking officials. 233 The court adverted to the existence of the policy directive prohibiting retaliatory prosecution, as well as to the ultimate dismissal of the charges against Haynesworth by supervisory officials, in an effort to support its conclusion that the practice of retaliatory prosecution was unauthorized. 234 While we agree that those factors were relevant in determining whether municipal liability should attach, we deem them insufficient to defeat the claim against the District at the outset of this litigation. 74 Viewed in the light most favorable to Haynesworth, 235 we believe that his complaint presented sufficient information to proceed against the District for the retaliatory prosecution asserted. Haynesworth alleged that Miller was responsible for establishment and implementation of policies for the Law Enforcement Section of the Corporation Counsel's Office. 236 The complaint also charged that Miller pursued a policy of retaliatory prosecution, 237 as did other District attorneys acting under his direction. 238 These allegations, if proven, could supply an adequate foundation for attribution of Miller's conduct to the District. 75 At any trial of this issue, the District may attempt to show that Miller's decisions were routinely monitored by his superiors, and that showing could serve to insulate the municipality from liability. Evidence that the charges against Haynesworth were dropped when he lodged an administrative complaint would be relevant in this regard, but the bare allegation of that fact does not preclude municipal liability for the prosecution. Nor does the mere existence of a policy directive condemning retaliatory prosecutions defeat Haynesworth's claim against the District. If the District can establish that the directive was vigorously enforced, it may be that Miller acted without municipal authority. Absent such a showing, if Haynesworth can establish that the Corporation Council's office actually adhered to a policy of retaliatory prosecution, the directive will be rendered meaningless. 239 76 As noted, the question of municipal responsibility for unconstitutional official actions is one of fact so long as the plaintiff sets forth a plausible basis for the assertion of liability. 240 We find that Haynesworth's complaint sets forth adequate ground for attributing the challenged conduct to the District, and that he is entitled to an opportunity to prove the District's legal responsibility for harm caused by the retaliatory prosecution. 241