Opinion ID: 895210
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Heading: Is TCHRA's two-year period for filing suit jurisdictional?

Text: USAA argues that TCHRA's two year deadline for filing suit is jurisdictional, precluding application of the tolling statute. But `[j]urisdiction,' as the United States Supreme Court has observed, `is a word of many, too many, meanings.' Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1996)). Nineteen years ago, in a footnote, we observed that the time period for filing a TCHRA lawsuit was mandatory and jurisdictional. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 487 n. 10 (1991). [8] In support, we cited Green v. Aluminum Co. of America, 760 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex.App.-Austin 1988, no writ), which in turn relied on our decision in Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084 (1926). Mingus held that the requirements of the Workmen's Compensation Act were jurisdictional, and that [t]he general rule is that where the cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from the statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable. Mingus, 285 S.W. at 1087. But we, like the U.S. Supreme Court, [9] have recognized that our sometimes intemperate use of the term jurisdictional has caused problems. Characterizing a statutory requirement as jurisdictional means that the trial court does not have-and never had-power to decide the case. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex.2004) (The failure of a jurisdictional requirement deprives the court of the power to act (other than to determine that it has no jurisdiction), and ever to have acted, as a matter of law.). Thus, [n]ot only may an issue of subject matter jurisdiction `be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court', a court is obliged to ascertain that subject matter jurisdiction exists regardless of whether the parties questioned it. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). In Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex.2000) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. b. at 118 (1982)), we observed that `[t]he classification of a matter as one of jurisdiction... opens the way to making judgments vulnerable to delayed attack for a variety of irregularities that perhaps better ought to be sealed in a judgment.' Thus, [a]lthough Mingus represented the dominant approach when it was decided, `the modern direction of policy is to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction.' Dubai, 12 S.W.3d at 76 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e. at 113). We overruled Mingus to the extent that it characterized the plaintiff's failure to establish a statutory prerequisite as jurisdictional. Id. Instead, we held that `[t]he right of a plaintiff to maintain a suit, while frequently treated as going to the question of jurisdiction, has been said to go in reality to the right of the plaintiff to relief rather than to the jurisdiction of the court to afford it.' Id. at 76-77 (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 16, at 23 (1990)). Since Dubai, we have been reluctant to conclude that a provision is jurisdictional, absent clear legislative intent to that effect. City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Tex.2009). We have held that the Payday Law's 180-day period for filing a wage claim, though a mandatory condition to pursuing the administrative cause of action, was not ... a bar to ... [the] exercise of jurisdiction; that the Tort Claims Act's notice provision was a complete defense to suit but [did] not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction; that the failure to comply with dismissal dates in parental rights termination cases did not deprive trial courts of jurisdiction; that the noncompliance with a mandatory notice requirement in the Fire Fighter and Police Officer Civil Service Act did not divest a hearing examiner of jurisdiction over an appeal; and that the statutory requirement that a condemnor and a property owner be unable to agree on damages was not jurisdictional but that a failure to satisfy the requirement would result in abatement. City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 398; In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tex.2009); Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Group, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex.2008); Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 354; Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 191 (Tex.2004). We have been careful to emphasize, however, that a statutory requirement commanding action, even if not jurisdictional, remains mandatory. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 359 (The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim, but that failure must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived.). And some requirements, such as a timely notice of appeal, remain jurisdictional. See In the Interest of K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex.2005); accord Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (concluding that party's failure to file his notice of appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction). Moreover, when elements of a statutory claim involve the jurisdictional inquiry of sovereign immunity from suit, those elements can be relevant to both jurisdiction and liability. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex.2009). But we have never revisited our statement in Schroeder, even though courts have questioned whether Schroeder remains the law after Dubai. See, e.g., Ramirez v. DRC Distribs., Ltd., 216 S.W.3d 917, 921 n. 8 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. denied) (noting that [a]lthough the Texas Supreme Court held in Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works ... that exhaustion of the TCHRA's administrative remedies is mandatory and jurisdictional, several courts of appeals have questioned whether its decision in Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi indicated a retreat from this position) (collecting cases). Most recently, although we observed that in the past we have described a statutory time limitation in the Commission on Human Rights Act as `mandatory and jurisdictional,' we stated only that those cases predate Dubai and dealt with a different statutory scheme than presented here. Igal, 250 S.W.3d at 83 n. 5 (quoting Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486). Today we reexamine whether section 21.256's time limit is jurisdictional. We begin with the statutory language, presuming that the Legislature did not intend to make the [provision] jurisdictional; a presumption overcome only by clear legislative intent to the contrary. City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 394. The statute provides that an action may not be brought ... later than the second anniversary of the date the complaint relating to the action is filed. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.256. The Legislature titled the provision Statute of Limitations, id., and while such a heading cannot limit or expand the statute's meaning, TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.024, the heading gives some indication of the Legislature's intent, Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 361; see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (noting that legislative history indicated that Title VII filing deadline was intended to operate as a statute of limitations rather than jurisdictional requirement). We too have characterized the deadline as a statute of limitations, calling it a limitation period and noting that [t]he statute of limitations for such action runs from the date of filing the complaint with the Commission. Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 487 n. 10. In Schroeder, a case that dealt primarily with whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to bringing a civil action for age discrimination in employment, the legal character of the section 21.256 deadline was not at issue. Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 484; accord Zipes, 455 U.S. at 395, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (stating that [a]lthough our cases contain scattered references to the timely-filing requirement as jurisdictional, the legal character of the requirement was not at issue in those cases, and as or more often in the same or other cases, we have referred to the provision as a limitations statute). While the phrase may not be brought makes the provision mandatory, see TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.016(5), the statute does not indicate that the provision is jurisdictional or that the consequence of noncompliance is dismissal. City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 396 (observing that statute did not contain explicit language indicating that requirement was jurisdictional nor did it provide a consequence for noncompliance); accord Igal, 250 S.W.3d at 84 (noting that statutory language did not indicate that statute was intended to address jurisdiction, as it merely establish[ed] a procedural bar similar to a statute of limitations and does not prescribe the boundaries of jurisdiction); see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (noting that statutory time period for filing EEOC claim under Title VII does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts). Our procedural rules, which have the force and effect of statutes, and our cases classify limitations as an affirmative defense. TEX.R. CIV. P. 94; In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001); see also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006) (A statute of limitations defense... is not `jurisdictional,' hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.). While the Legislature could make the Labor Code filing deadlines jurisdictional, as it has in cases involving statutory requirements relating to governmental entities, see TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.034 (providing that statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity), it has not done so here. We also consider the statute's purpose. See Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d at 360; Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tex.2001). The TCHRA was enacted to provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001(1). It is modeled after federal civil rights law, NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex.1999), and [o]ne of the primary goals of the statute is to coordinate state law with federal law in the area of employment discrimination, Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir.2000). Thus, analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the TCHRA. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.2001) The United States Supreme Court has consistently construed Title VII's requirements as mandatory but not jurisdictional. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006); Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127; see also Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding that equitable tolling applied to Title VII suit against federal employer); Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983) (rejecting argument that time period was jurisdictional and holding that filing of class action tolled limitations under Title VII). In Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, the Court held that the timely filing of an employment discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under Title VII, a conclusion compelled by [t]he structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of [the Court's] cases. In a later case, the Court decided that Title VII's 15-employee minimum was an element of the claim, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516, 126 S.Ct. 1235. In reaching that conclusion, the Court adopted a readily administrable bright line rule: If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.... But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. Id. at 515-16, 126 S.Ct. 1235 (footnote omitted). This is not unlike our own post-Dubai approach: we have been reluctant to conclude that a provision is jurisdictional, absent clear legislative intent to that effect. City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 393. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the time period for filing suit under Title VII is jurisdictional, every federal circuit that has considered the issue has held that it is not. See Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239-40 (3d Cir.1999); Smith-Haynie v. D.C., 155 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C.Cir.1998); Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 646 (6th Cir.1998) (Although Zipes dealt only with the time limit for filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC, its logic has been extended to the ninety-day time limit for filing suit in the district court after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.) (citations omitted); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir.1993); Scheerer v. Rose State Coll., 950 F.2d 661, 665 (10th Cir.1991); Hill v. John Chezik Imps., 869 F.2d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir.1989); Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir.1986) (concluding that Supreme Court precedent firmly establish[es] that the 90-day filing period is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances); Espinoza v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1248 n. 1 (5th Cir.1985); Brown v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 48, 50 (7th Cir.1985); Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 146 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that [t]he Supreme Court ... has evinced a policy of treating Title VII time limits not as jurisdictional predicates, but as limitations periods subject to equitable tolling); see also Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151-52, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (holding that plaintiff had not shown herself entitled to equitable tolling of filing deadline, but not rejecting equitable tolling as inapplicable to that deadline). We also consider the consequences that result from each interpretation. Helena Chem., 47 S.W.3d at 495. A judgment is void if rendered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction. Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990). If TCHRA's limitations period were jurisdictional, trial courts that have denied summary judgment motions based on the failure to satisfy that requirement would forever have their judgments open to reconsideration. Conversely, those courts that granted such motions would have had no power to do so, nor would appellate courts have had the power to affirm the judgments. See, e.g., Vu v. ExxonMobil Corp., 98 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment because TCHRA suit not filed until more than two years after charge of discrimination); see also Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (observing that, if the timely filing requirement were jurisdictional, the District Courts in Franks [ v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976),] and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 [95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280] (1975), would have been without jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of those who had not filed as well as without jurisdiction to award them seniority, but [w]e did not so hold). It is preferable to avoid a result that leaves the decisions and judgments of [a tribunal] in limbo and subject to future attack, unless that was the Legislature's clear intent. City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 394. In keeping with the statute's language, Dubai and subsequent cases, as well as the purposes behind TCHRA and federal interpretations of Title VII, we conclude that the two-year period for filing suit is mandatory but not jurisdictional, and we overrule Schroeder to the extent it held otherwise.