Opinion ID: 2508188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Shackling jurisprudence

Text: Consistent with due process requirements, a defendant may be shackled [109] during trial only as a last resort. It is a long-standing rule in this jurisdiction [ [110] ]... that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary circumstances. [111] This rule exists to assure the guaranty under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution that the defendant receives a fair and impartial trial by protecting certain constitutionally recognized rights, including the right to be presumed innocent, the right to testify on one's own behalf, and the right to assist and confer with counsel during trial. [112] Although physically restraining a defendant with shackles or handcuffs during trial is a potentially prejudicial practice, employing such a technique is not of itself unconstitutional. [113] A substantive claim of unconstitutional shackling in this State is subject to harmless error analysis. [114] Under that analysis, the defendant must show that the shackling had substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict. [115] We have found unconstitutional shackling harmless in cases where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. In State v. Clark , we stated: The test for harmless error is whether the state has overcome the presumption of prejudice when a constitutional right of the defendant is violated when, from an examination of the record, it appears the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether the evidence against the defendant is so overwhelming that no rational conclusion other than guilt can be reached. [[[[ [116] ] Because visible shackling or handcuffing a defendant during trial is likely to prejudice a defendant, [117] the practice should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial. [118] Only factors that indicate a manifest need for some measure to maintain the security of the courtroom should be considered. The trial court must base its decision to physically restrain a defendant on evidence which indicates that the defendant poses an imminent risk of escape, that the defendant intends to injure someone in the courtroom, or that the defendant cannot behave in an orderly manner while in the courtroom. To do otherwise is an abuse of the trial court's discretion. [119] The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has concluded that in order to satisfy due process requirements while shackling a defendant during trial, the court must engage in an analysis of the security risks posed by the defendant as well as consider less restrictive alternatives before permitting a defendant to be restrained. [120] The test is `whether what [the jurors] saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's rights to a fair trial.' [121] The United States Supreme Court has stated that [w]henever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial, ... the question must be not whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but rather whether `an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.' [122] The unjustified shackling of a defendant in front of a jury for a prolonged period can have a prejudicial impact on the rights of the defendant. In State v. Finch , we held that shackling a defendant during the penalty phase of a capital murder case may have an effect on the jury's determination of future dangerousness and reversed the defendant's death sentence. But we concluded the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that the shackling error during the guilt phase of the trial was harmless. We found that although future dangerousness had not been specifically argued, the fact that the defendant had not only been shackled but also had been handcuffed to his chair and leg-cuffed to the table during testimony of two of his intended victims precluded a finding that the shackling during the penalty phase was harmless. In State v. Damon we concluded that the unjustified placing of defendant in a restraint chair during trial was prejudicial and that the trial court's error in ordering the restraint was not harmless. We stated that [b]ecause the jury must have observed that the defendant was being restrained and that the restraints were unusual, ... the defendant has satisfied his burden to show that the restraints influenced the jury's verdict. [123] We concluded the error was not harmless because the defendant offered credible testimony to support his diminished capacity defense and the State's testimony was not so overwhelming that it would require a verdict of guilty. [124] In Rhoden v. Rowland, [125] the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant's visible and unjustified shackling throughout the entire trial was prejudicial. The court held there was a strong likelihood of prejudice because five jurors actually saw the shackles during trial, at least two jurors remembered other jurors making comments to them about the shackles, and the defendant provided evidence that the shackles caused him physical and emotional pain. In concluding the shackling error was not harmless, the court found that the shackles essentially branded [the defendant] as having a violent nature in a case where his propensity for violence was the crucial issue, and that the evidence on this issue was disputed and the jurors deliberated for over nine hours over three days, which suggests that [the jury] did not find the case to be clear-cut. [126] In Clark, we held that the defendant was not prejudiced when the jury saw him shackled on the first day of voir dire and on the day the verdict was returned, but the defendant sat unrestrained throughout the trial. We found the error in shackling the defendant was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt [b]ecause the impact of shackling on the presumption of innocence is the overarching constitutional concern, it would logically follow that in the minds of the jurors [defendant's] shackling on the first day of voir dire was more than logically offset by over the two weeks of observing [defendant] in the courtroom without shackles.... Furthermore the presumption of innocence was not at stake on the day the verdict was read because the jury had already judged [defendant] guilty.... [ [127] ] We also found the error in shackling the defendant during the sentencing phase of his trial did not prejudice him and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court made certain the defendant was not moved in or out of the [court]room in the presence of the jury, both counsel tables had protective skirts, the shackles were taped to eliminate any noise, and the jury never saw [defendant] in motion during the guilt phase. [128] A jury's brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in restraints inside or outside the courtroom does not necessarily constitute reversible error. Such circumstances are not inherently or presumptively prejudicial and do not rise to the level of a due process violation absent a showing of actual prejudice. [129]