Opinion ID: 78421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether this case should be remanded for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Text: Carroll alternatively argues this Court should remand his Atkins claim to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine his mental capacity. The Supreme Court has held federal courts must take into account the deferential standards prescribed by AEDPA in determining whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 474, 127 S.Ct. at 1940. In this case, the factual record is sufficient for this Court to conclude the state court's adjudication was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See supra III.A.2. Ample evidence, in the form of exhaustive expert testimony from Carroll's competency hearing, trial, and initial post-conviction evidentiary hearing, supports the state court's determination that he is not mentally retarded. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing on Carroll's Atkins claim is unnecessary. [11]
In addition to his mental retardation claims, Carroll maintains he is also exempt from execution because he is mentally ill. He maintains the rationale behind the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins applies equally to persons who are unable to control their conduct due to mental illness. Specifically, he notes mentally ill persons, like the mentally retarded, act with a lesser moral culpability, and this lesser culpability does not merit retribution in the form of the death penalty. Carroll also asserts executing mentally ill persons does not further the goal of deterrence because, like the mentally retarded, the mentally ill cannot process the possibility of execution as a penalty and control their conduct based on that information. Carroll argues the state court's failure to apply Atkins to the mentally ill was a violation of his right to equal protection. Atkins did not explicitly address the suitability of capital punishment within the context of mentally ill individuals. Carroll, however, requests this Court extend Atkins to prohibit the execution of the mentally ill. Such an extension would constitute a new rule of constitutional law. See Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1042 (11th Cir.1994) (Even if the result the habeas petitioner seeks is within the logical compass of a prior Supreme Court decision; even if prior Supreme Court decisions inform, or even control or govern, the analysis of the claim; it is still a new rule claim unless the rule is actually dictated by pre-existing precedent. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Under AEDPA, however, this Court cannot create new rules of constitutional law within the context of a habeas petition by a state prisoner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (stating a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner unless the adjudication of his claim in state court resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States  (emphasis added)). Accordingly, sans a decision from the Supreme Court barring the execution of mentally ill prisoners, we reject Carroll's claim that he is exempt from execution because he is mentally ill.