Opinion ID: 1692959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Investigative Stop and Reasonable Suspicion

Text: Soukharith also argues that the initial stop was unconstitutional because Chatfield did not have a reasonable suspicion that Soukharith had committed or was committing a crime. `[P]olice can constitutionally stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the police have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity exists, even if probable cause is lacking under the fourth amendment.' ...  `Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for detention, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.'... (Citations omitted.) State v. Bowers, 250 Neb. 151, 159, 548 N.W.2d 725, 730 (1996) (quoting State v. Childs, 242 Neb. 426, 495 N.W.2d 475 (1993)). Whether a police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on sufficient articulable facts requires taking into account the totality of the circumstances. State v. Ellington, 242 Neb. 554, 559, 495 N.W.2d 915, 919 (1993). Soukharith argues that the dispatch report Chatfield relied on in making the stop was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion because Chatfield did not observe any facts corroborating the report. It is clear that [a] reasonably founded suspicion to stop a vehicle cannot be based solely on the receipt by the stopping officer of a radio dispatch to stop the described vehicle without any proof of the factual foundation for the relayed message. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14, 17, 251 N.W.2d 659, 661 (1977). Accord State v. Thompson, 231 Neb. 771, 438 N.W.2d 131 (1989). However, if a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). See State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975) (upholding stop made solely on basis of radio bulletin that was based on facts creating reasonable suspicion or probable cause). Thus, it is irrelevant whether an officer making a stop in reliance on a radio bulletin is aware of the factual foundation for the bulletin, so long as the factual foundation is sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hensley, supra . In the instant case, if the officers who put the information regarding Karen's vehicle into the NCIC system had articulable facts sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion, Chatfield could have made the stop on the basis of the NCIC results alone. Jorgensen, the officer who originally assisted Gerald in putting out the health and welfare stop on the car and starting the missing person and stolen car reports, knew that Karen had not come to work that morning as she always did and also knew that Gerald and Myrna had received strange phone calls from Karen, which obviously indicated she was in some kind of distress. Although these facts would be sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion in the minds of Jorgensen and the Des Moines Police Department, we need not decide the issue on that basis alone. An investigative stop, like probable cause, is to be evaluated by the collective information of the police engaged in a common investigation. State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479, 500, 495 N.W.2d 630, 644 (1993). Prior to making the stop, Chatfield personally observed facts that supported the dispatcher's broadcast. The dispatcher told Chatfield there was a missing person associated with the vehicle and described that person's features. Before Chatfield made the stop, he pulled alongside Soukharith to see if a person fitting the missing person's description was inside the vehicle. He made the stop only after he determined that the alleged missing person was not present. Thus, Chatfield observed facts that clearly corroborated what the Des Moines Police Department knew. From our de novo review, we conclude that Chatfield had sufficient reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop.