Opinion ID: 771391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Som's Restitution Order

Text: 59 Under the MVRA, imposition of restitution for the losses suffered by the victims of certain offenses is mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) ([T]he court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.) (emphasis added). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, which governs the imposition of restitution in this case, the court must issue and enforce the restitution order in accordance with section 3664. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(d). Section 3664 instructs the district court to 60 specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid, in consideration of -- 61 (A) the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including whether any of these assets are jointly controlled; 62 (B) projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and 63 (C) any financial obligations of the defendant[,] including obligations to dependents. 64 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). 65 Som does not challenge the imposition of restitution, but rather contends that the district court failed in its duty to consider the statutory factors, including his earning capacity, before determining a payment schedule for his payment of restitution. Som is incorrect in asserting that 28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10 & 545.11 and 18 U.S.C. § 3663 required the district court to ascertain his earning abilities before imposing a restitution payment schedule, 5 but he is correct that the district court is required to consider certain statutory factors. As noted earlier, 18 U.S.C. § 3664 instructs the district court that it must consider certain factors before imposing a restitution payment schedule. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). 66 Som did not object below to the installment plan for payment of restitution, and therefore we review the restitution order for plain error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). The government concedes that Som's failure to object below is no bar to appellate review because improperly ordered restitution constitutes an illegal sentence amounting to plain error. United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (failed to raise objection below); see United States v. Kinlock, 174 F.3d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). Thus, '[i]f the record fails to demonstrate that the court considered these mandatory factors, [we] will vacate [the] restitution order.' Kinlock, 174 F.3d at 299-300 (quoting United States v. Giwah, 84 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1996)); see Thompson, 113 F.3d at 14. If the record reflects that the district court considered the statutory factors, we review the restitution order for abuse of discretion. See Kinlock, 174 F.3d at 300; Thompson, 113 F.3d at 15. 67 The threshold issue . . . is whether the record reflects that the district court engaged in the factor analysis which Congress has mandated . . . . Giwah, 84 F.3d at 114. We find that it does not, and we therefore vacate the restitution order. 68 In Kinlock, as in this case, the defendant was challenging the setting [of] terms for the payment of restitution. 174 F.3d at 299. The Court first stated what the record must provide in order to sufficiently indicate that the district court considered the appropriate factors: 69 While the district court need not make detailed factual findings on each factor, the record must demonstrate that the court considered the factors. Moreover, even if the presentence report adequately considers the statutory factors, that fact alone is not enough to insulate a restitution order from being vacated by this court. Rather, there must be an affirmative act or statement allowing an inference that the district court in fact considered the defendant's ability to pay. 70 Id. at 300 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see Thompson, 113 F.3d at 15. Notwithstanding the sentencing court's obligation to consider the factors . . . , we do not insist on any particular recitation of facts or references to the record. Further, failure to make such a recitation or reference cannot be an adequate basis for appeal of an otherwise legal sentence. Kinlock, 174 F.3d at 301 (citations omitted). 71 After reviewing the entire record, and making all reasonable inferences from the district court's statements, the KinlockCourt found that the record adequately indicated that the district court had considered the statutory factors: 72 Just after imposing restitution, Judge Kahn stated, [a]fter considering your present financial condition and the period of incarceration just imposed, the Court does not impose any fine or cost of incarceration or supervised release. This refusal to impose a fine or costs supports an inference that the court considered Kinlock's ability to pay restitution. Furthermore, this court has held that the adoption of the PSR tends to support a finding that the court in fact considered the mandatory factors. Here, we may infer that the court considered the statutory factors not only because the PSR, which the district court adopted by a preponderance of the evidence, contained six paragraphs detailing Kinlock's financial situation, ability to pay, family income, financial needs and the needs of his dependents, but also because the court specifically commented on Kinlock's family expenses and his earning potential. . . . With respect to Kinlock's future ability to pay, Judge Kahn stated, Obviously, you are bright, you've got talent and you can succeed honestly in life. These remarks indicate that the restitution order was a proper exercise of discretion. . . . Therefore, we find that the record on the whole permits a reasonable inference that Judge Kahn considered the statutory factors in deciding to impose restitution. 73 Id. at 300-01 (citations omitted). 74 In this case, the entire restitution order consists of the following: 75 [Y]ou are further ordered to pay restitution jointly and severally . . . to be paid in monthly installments $25 per month while you're incarcerated and in monthly installments no less than $200 per month or 10 percent of your gross income, whichever's greater, when you are released from prison. Interest on the restitution is waived. 76 The district court stated that it had reviewed the PSR in detail in the context of determining the applicable offense level, but the court did not mention the PSR in the context of imposing the restitution order. 77 The PSR in this case contains detailed findings about Som's intelligence and ability to work in prison and indicates that he is single with no assets or liabilities, but the district court did not adopt the findings of the PSR. The court did not discuss Som's potential, or mention his ability to pay. The court did not give any indication of why it was not imposing interest or a fine. We have held that it is not enough for a district court to have before it a PSR which includes information that would be relevant to the consideration mandated by § 3364[]. Giwah, 84 F.3d at 114. [E]ven if the presentence report adequately considers the statutory factors, that fact alone is not enough to insulate a restitution order from being vacated by this court. Kinlock, 174 F.3d at 300 (internal alterations and quotations omitted). The district court's statement that it reviewed the PSR in detail is not enough to indicate that it considered the specific statutory factors in imposing the restitution payment schedule. 78 The only other act or statement in this record that allows any inference that the district court considered Som's ability to pay is the court's act of imposing payment of only $25 per month during incarceration, versus a percentage of income after incarceration. This simply is not sufficient to indicate to us that the court engaged in the factor analysis which Congress has mandated. Giwah, 84 F.3d at 114. 79 On this record, we cannot say that the district court considered the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including whether any of these assets are jointly controlled; [the] projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and . . . any financial obligations of the defendant[,] including obligations to dependants. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C). Thus, we must vacate the restitution order and remand with the direction that the district court develop an adequate record reflecting its consideration of these factors.