Opinion ID: 889496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err in affirming the Trial Court's admission of evidence pertaining to Miller's homosexuality?

Text: ¶ 11 Miller maintains on appeal that the Trial Court erred in allowing repeated references to her homosexuality during the trial. Relying on State v. Ford, 278 Mont. 353, 926 P.2d 245 (1996), and extra-jurisdictional cases, she claims her sexual orientation is unrelated to the elements of the charged crime and therefore it was irrelevant. She further opines that admission of this evidence was highly prejudicial, had no probative value, and constituted reversible error. Miller had suggested to the Trial Court during pretrial discussion of motions that the relationship between Miller and Benware be characterized as close or best friends to the jury. ¶ 12 The City argued to the Trial Court that characterizing the women's relationship as anything other than what it wasan intimate homosexual relationshipwas to lie and mislead the jury. It argued that knowledge that the women were intimate partners put both Benware's and Miller's conduct during that evening in context. ¶ 13 The Trial Court denied Miller's pretrial motion to exclude evidence of homosexuality, noting that had Miller and Benware been a man and a woman, the nature of their relationship would be relevant and admissible. The District Court affirmed the Trial Court's ruling concluding that [t]he salient aspect of the evidence is the romantic nature of the relationshipnot whether it was lesbian or heterosexual. ¶ 14 While the Trial Court and the District Court equated homosexuality and heterosexuality for purposes of legal analysis, we conclude it was prejudicial error to do so under the circumstances presented here. Society does not yet view homosexuality or bisexuality in the same manner as it views heterosexuality. Because there remains strong potential that a juror will be prejudiced against a homosexual or bisexual individual, courts must safeguard against such potential prejudice. ¶ 15 In Ford, Ford was charged with sexual intercourse without consent with another man. At trial, Ford testified that he was bisexual. The jury returned a guilty verdict and Ford appealed, in part, on grounds that the district court erroneously overruled his objections to the admissibility of evidence of his bisexuality. While we affirmed the district court in Ford, noting that Ford's sexuality was relevant to, and probative of an essential issue in this case, we also cautioned: There is, unquestionably, the potential for prejudice in this situation. There will be, on virtually every jury, people who would find the lifestyle and sexual preferences of a homosexual or bisexual person offensive.. . . [O]ur criminal justice system must take the necessary precautions to assure that people are convicted based on evidence of guilt, and not on the basis of some inflammatory personal trait. Therefore, we caution prosecutors and district courts not to assume, based on this opinion, that evidence of a defendant's sexual preference would be admissible under most circumstances. Ford, 278 Mont. at 362, 926 P.2d at 250. ¶ 16 Unlike the situation in Ford, where Ford's sexual orientation was squarely at issue, Miller's sexual orientation and the existence of an intimate relationship with Benware was not probative or relevant evidence vis-à-vis the crime with which Miller was charged. As Miller suggested before trial, if the State was concerned that the jury understand Miller's motive for calling off the KPD welfare check, it could have simply explained that the two women were good friends. There was no need to make repeated references throughout the trial to the homosexual nature of their relationshipeither as an element of the crime or to establish context. As we noted in Ford, if there is no need for purposes of proof of a crime to introduce to the jury a potentially inflammatory personal trait, then it may well be error to do so. Ford, 278 Mont. at 362, 926 P.2d at 250. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that introduction of the nature of the parties' sexual relationship was an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion. Therefore, we reverse the District Court on this issue.