Opinion ID: 2638996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Motion to Suppress

Text: [¶ 15] Mr. Gompf contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the searches of his residence. Mr. Gompf presents a multi-faceted argument, claiming that the searches violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He asserts the officers had no right to come to the house unexpectedly to inquire about the stolen gun; the officers exceeded the scope of the occupants' consent when they entered the basement; Ms. VanLitsenborgh lacked the authority to consent to the search of Mr. Gompf's bedroom; and no exigent circumstances existed to search the residence. With the exception of his first contention  the officers did not have reasonable cause to come to his house to question him  these arguments are raised for the first time on appeal. [¶ 16] In general, a criminal defendant may not raise an argument for the first time on appeal. Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, ¶ 19, 65 P.3d 378, 384 (Wyo.2003); Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 225 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Kennedy v. State, 890 P.2d 37, 38 (Wyo.1995)). Our rule is that in the absence of fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the appellant an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 55, 73 P.3d 1041, 1090 (Wyo.2003), quoting, Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 (Wyo.1993). Violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment protections would, of course, amount to fundamental error. [¶ 17] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. It provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. It is axiomatic that the `physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). [A] home is entitled to special dignity and special sanctity and ... the proper way to search a home is to obtain a search warrant. Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wyo. 1987). Thus, searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, but there are a few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 19, 99 P.3d 987, 995 (Wyo.2004). Consent and the existence of exigent circumstances are two of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo.2004); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 24, 65 P.3d 33, 40 (Wyo.2003). [¶ 18] The appellant has the burden of establishing plain error when the claim is not raised in the district court. Belden, ¶ 55. Plain error is: [t]he violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the abridgment of a substantial right of the party to his material prejudice. Id. See also, Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo.1997). [¶ 19] The limited record in the instant case does not support the Fourth Amendment claims Mr. Gompf raises for the first time on appeal. Ms. VanLitsenborgh clearly had the authority to consent to the officers entering her home, and there is no question that she invited the officers to follow her to the basement to retrieve the handgun. The area Ms. VanLitsenborgh led the officers to in the basement was a family room which was used as a common area by the occupants of the house and their guests. In fact, Mr. Gompf and another person were sitting in the area when the officers entered. [¶ 20] Once the officers were lawfully in the basement common area, they smelled burnt marijuana. At this point, the officers had probable cause to justify issuance of the search warrant. Indeed, Mr. Gompf does not claim that the officers lacked probable cause to procure the search warrant. It was pursuant to this warrant that the officers eventually searched Mr. Gompf's bedroom and discovered the drug evidence. [3] Thus, Mr. Gompf's arguments that Ms. VanLitsenborgh did not have the authority to consent to the search of his bedroom or that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the search of his bedroom are not valid or even relevant under the facts of this case. Because the search was authorized by the warrant, it is unnecessary to consider any exceptions to the warrant requirement. Mr. Gompf obviously cannot establish plain error on the record presented here; consequently, we decline to further consider the issues Mr. Gompf raises for the first time on appeal. [¶ 21] We turn now to Mr. Gompf's argument that the district court erred by failing to suppress the evidence because the officers had no right to approach the house in the first instance. Our resolution of this issue revolves around the police officers' initial encounter with the occupants of the residence. Mr. Gompf claims the officers conducted a warrantless search of the residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment merely by knocking on the door and asking about the handgun. The State contends the initial encounter, commonly known as a knock and talk, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. [¶ 22] A knock and talk investigation involves officers knocking on the door of a house, identifying themselves as officers, asking to talk to the occupant about a criminal complaint, and eventually requesting permission to search the house. Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). The phrase knock and talk was apparently first used by an Oregon appellate court in State v. Land, 106 Or.App. 131, 806 P.2d 1156 (1991). See generally Swingle & Zoellner, Knock and talk consent searches: If called by a panther, don't anther, 55 J Mo B 25 (1999). Since then, the use of this new shorthand description for a long-established police investigative technique has become commonplace across the country. Id. Nevertheless, this is apparently the first opportunity for the Wyoming Supreme Court to directly consider the knock and talk procedure. [¶ 23] The prevailing rule is that, absent a clear expression by the owner to the contrary, police officers are permitted to approach a dwelling and seek permission to question an occupant in the course of their official business. See Scott v. State, 347 Ark. 767, 67 S.W.3d 567, 575 (2002); see also United States v. Johnson, 170 F.3d 708, 720 (7th Cir.1999); United States. v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir.2001); Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 782 A.2d 862, 872-73 (Ct.App. 2001); People v. Frohriep, 247 Mich.App. 692, 637 N.W.2d 562, 566 (2001) Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.2001). There is no requirement that law enforcement have probable cause or reasonable suspicion before they may approach a home and ask for permission to enter. Swingle & Zoellner, Knock and talk supra, 26. When police utilize a knock and talk procedure, whether as a spur of the moment response to an anonymous tip or the final culmination of a long but successful effort to develop probable cause for a search warrant, they are merely asking for permission to search a person's home, recognizing and risking that a refusal would not only alert the suspect that he is being watched but would quite likely leave the police empty handed. Swingle & Zoellner, Knock and talk supra, 25. [¶ 24] Thus, at the heart of the knock and talk procedure lies consent, which has long been recognized as one of the many exceptions to the search warrant requirement. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or in a person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. Id. at 231-232, 93 S.Ct. 2041. [¶ 25] With this discussion in mind, we proceed to apply this law to the instant facts. There can be little doubt that the officer's presence at Ms. VanLitsenborgh's house at 2:00 a.m. was unexpected and surprising. However, there is no evidence that she or her tenants clearly indicated to law enforcement that they were not welcome to approach the front door of the residence. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the officers acted in a manner which would communicate to a reasonable person that he could not refuse their requests. The officers did not brandish their weapons, raise their voices or command the residents to let them into the house. Rather, the record clearly shows the opposite occurred. The lights were on in the house and the officers, therefore, assumed people were awake inside. In addition, the officers did not believe that the gun had been stolen by any of the residents of the home, and, initially, they were not there to investigate any wrongdoing by the occupants of the home. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that no illegal search occurred as a result of the knock and talk investigation in this case. [¶ 26] Mr. Gompf also contends the entire exchange between the police and the occupants of the house was tainted because an unreliable tip from Mr. Frazier directed the officers to the residence in the first place. Mr. Gompf's argument ignores the fact that the officers were not required to have probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to approach the front door and ask for permission to enter. In the context of the knock and talk procedure, the officers were not relying on the informant's tip to procure a warrant or to seize anyone; rather, they were merely investigating evidence of a possible crime, in this case the theft of a handgun. This is not unusual or illegal behavior by law enforcement. See for example United States v. Bernitt, 392 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.2004) (acting on an informant's tip that marijuana plants were growing alongside Bernitt's home, [police officers] went to do a knock and talk investigation the purpose of which was to gather more information); United States v. Miller, 104 Fed.Appx. 591 (8th Cir.2004) (an unidentified caller reported suspected drug dealing and subsequent knock and talk to further investigate); United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.2004) (investigation of a tip regarding possible drug use and stolen property involved officers observing lights on inside the house and knocking on the door to talk). Accordingly, the fact that the officers relied on a possibly unreliable tip is irrelevant to our analysis and did not undermine the officers' right to approach the residence and ask for permission to enter.