Opinion ID: 888162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: White's Statutory-Based Arguments

Text: ¶ 14 For purposes of the ensuing discussion, we note that the law in effect at the time an offense is committed controls as to the possible sentence for the offense, as well as a revocation of that sentence. West, ¶ 21 n. 1. White's offense was committed on or about October 25, 1993; thus, the 1993 version of the Montana Code Annotated applies, and all statutory references below are to the 1993 MCA, unless otherwise indicated. ¶ 15 As noted, the District Court in August 1994 revoked White's three-year deferred sentence and imposed a ten-year suspended sentence, subject to the conditions in the February 1994 judgment as well as the additional conditions imposed in the August 1994 judgment. The court then, in July 1996, amended its February 1994 judgment. Finally, in May 1997, the District Court found that White had violated one or more conditions of her suspended sentence by consuming alcohol. Under § 46-18-203(7), MCA, if a district court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence, the court may (a) continue the suspended ... sentence without a change in conditions; (b) continue the suspended sentence with modified or additional terms and conditions; or (c) revoke the suspension of sentence and require the defendant to serve either the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence. Section 46-18-203(7)(a)-(c), MCA. ¶ 16 One of White's theories on appeal (which is presented as an alternative to her main argument) is that the District Court in 1997, pursuant to § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, continued the ten-year suspended sentence imposed in August 1994 and that this sentence, therefore, expired in August 2004, long before the State filed its petitions. See § 46-18-203(2), MCA (The petition for a revocation must be filed with the sentencing court during the period of suspension or deferral.). Under this theory, the District Court lacked jurisdiction in 2007 to entertain the State's October 2006 and February 2007 petitions for revocation because there was no sentence for the District Court to revoke. Consequently, the new sentence imposed in 2007 is void. ¶ 17 The District Court, however, considered this argument and determined that in 1997, it had revoked White's suspended sentence pursuant to § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA. White does not dispute this determination with any analysis or argument. As a result, the theory is not properly presented for appellate review. See State v. Miller, 2008 MT 106, ¶ 15, 342 Mont. 355, ¶ 15, 181 P.3d 625, ¶ 15. ¶ 18 White's alternative theory aside, her primary argument rests on the premise that the District Court in 1997 revoked her ten-year suspended sentence. (The State agrees with this view of events.) According to White, however, the District Court did not then follow the mandate of § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA, which states that when a district court revokes a suspended sentence, it may require the defendant to serve either the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence. White points out that the District Court in 1997 imposed the same sentence it had imposed in August 1994, but that the court also imposed new probation conditions, which have now been carried forward into White's 2007 sentence (the sentence at issue on this appeal). ¶ 19 The crux of White's argument is that adding the new conditions to the 1997 sentence was not authorized by § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA, and those conditions, therefore, were illegal when imposed. As support for this proposition, White cites State v. Rudolph, 2005 MT 41, 326 Mont. 132, 107 P.3d 496, and State v. Richardson, 2000 MT 72, 299 Mont. 102, 997 P.2d 786. See Rudolph, ¶ 17 (Here ..., the court revoked Rudolph's suspended sentence and, pursuant to § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA (1997), it had no authority to add conditions to the newly imposed sentence.); Richardson, ¶ 27 (Nothing in [§ 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA (1997),] authorizes a court to impose additional restrictions when revoking a suspended sentence.). [1] Hence, White argues, her current sentence is illegal because the District Court carried forward the illegal conditions of her 1997 sentence. ¶ 20 Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the parameters of White's sentencing challenge. White may not, within the context of the present revocation proceeding, challenge the legality of the conditions imposed on her 1997 suspended sentence, as such a challenge is untimely. See State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47, ¶ 22, 309 Mont. 1, ¶ 22, 43 P.3d 318, ¶ 22. She may, however, challenge the legality of the conditions imposed on her 2007 sentence. See Muhammad, ¶ 23. Furthermore, we held in State v. Seals, 2007 MT 71, 336 Mont. 416, 156 P.3d 15, that a district court under § 46-18-203(7), MCA, may not continue or reimpose an illegal sentence, but may only impose any lesser sentence that is legal. See Seals, ¶¶ 14-18. Accordingly, we consider here the question of whether White's 1997 sentence was legal only for the purpose of determining whether the District Court had authority under § 46-18-203(7), MCA, to reimpose it. ¶ 21 In response to White's arguments, the State asserts that our decision in Rudolph was not dictated by the wording of § 46-18-203(7), MCA. According to the State, § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA, limits the authority of the court to impose a longer term of sentence rather than its ability to condition the terms of the court's sentence. In other words, when a court revokes a suspended sentence, it is limited to the term of the suspensionwhich in this case was ten yearsbut the statute does not limit the court's authority to condition the terms of a subsequent suspension so long as those conditionslike the term of sentencecould have been imposed initially. The only authority cited by the State for this proposition is Seals; however, we did not articulate any such holding in Seals. ¶ 22 Moreover, the State approaches this issue from the wrong perspective, asking whether the statute limits the court's sentencing authority. District courts do not have inherent authority to impose criminal sentences except as limited by statute. To the contrary, it is well-established that a district court's authority to impose a criminal sentence is defined and constrained by statute, and a district court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. See State v. Ruiz, 2005 MT 117, ¶ 12, 327 Mont. 109, ¶ 12, 112 P.3d 1001, ¶ 12; State v. Hatfield, 256 Mont. 340, 346, 846 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1993). A sentence not based on specific statutory authority is an illegal sentence. Ruiz, ¶ 12. Thus, the question here is whether § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA, authorizes the sentence at issue. ¶ 23 Again, when a court revokes a suspended sentence, § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA, authorizes the court to require the defendant to serve either the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence. Given its context, the term lesser sentence must be understood as signifying a sentence which is lesser than the sentence imposed. The State attempts to portray a ten-year suspended sentence subject to Conditions A, B, and C as no different (for purposes of § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA) than a ten-year suspended sentence subject to Conditions A, B, C, D, E, and F. We are not persuaded. It is self-evident that if the sentence imposed was a ten-year suspended sentence subject to Conditions A, B, and C, then a ten-year suspended sentence subject to Conditions A, B, and C plus Conditions D, E, and F is neither the sentence imposed nor a lesser sentence. ¶ 24 We accordingly hold that the District Court was not authorized in 1997 to add new conditions to the newly imposed suspended sentence. Rudolph, ¶ 17; Richardson, ¶ 27. Therefore, the District Court could not reimpose those illegal conditions upon revocation of the sentence in 2007. Seals, ¶ 17. Rather, the court had to impose any lesser sentence that was legal. Seals, ¶ 17; § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA. ¶ 25 The State points out that even if certain conditions on White's 2007 sentence are not statutorily authorized, the proper remedy would be for this Court or the district court to strike the offending conditions. We agree. See DeShields v. State, 2006 MT 58, ¶ 11, 331 Mont. 329, ¶ 11, 132 P.3d 540, ¶ 11 (A sentence in excess of one prescribed by law is not void ab initio because of the excess, but is good insofar as the power of the court extends and is invalid only as to the excess.). White, however, contends that [t]he entirety of her August 1997 sentence was illegal and void because it imposed new conditions not authorized by statute and, thus, her 2007 sentence is illegal as well and must be vacated. Yet, at the same time, citing ¶ 11 of DeShields, White acknowledges that an illegal sentence ... is void to the extent it exceeds statutory authority. We agree with this statement and hold that the proper remedy here is to strike the unauthorized conditions on White's 2007 sentencenamely, any conditions not included in the District Court's February 1994, August 1994, and July 1996 judgments. ¶ 26 As a final matter, we note that it is not necessary to disturb the District Court's decision in 2007 to revoke White's 1997 suspended sentence. White's February 1994 sentence included a condition that White not consume alcohol, and the District Court had authority to reimpose this condition (as the court did) in all of her subsequent sentences. See § 46-18-203(7)(c), (d), MCA. Thus, given White's admitted consumption of alcohol in 2006 and 2007, the District Court had a valid basis to revoke her suspended sentence. ¶ 27 In sum, when it revoked White's suspended sentence in 1997, the District Court had no authority to add new conditions to the newly imposed suspended sentence. Accordingly, the court had no authority to reimpose those illegal conditions in 2007, and the conditions must therefore be stricken. White's 2007 sentence is not otherwise illegal on the statutory grounds she raises in this appeal.