Opinion ID: 1439056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Disability Discrimination Claim

Text: Unlike his age discrimination claim, Daugherty's disability discrimination claim involves a dispute about whether he has shown that he is entitled to the protections of the MHRA on this claim. As such, before the contributing factor analysis can be applied to his disability discrimination claim, this Court must determine whether his claim survives summary judgment on the issue of whether he has a disability within the protections of the MHRA.
The MHRA defines disability as: [A] physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities, [9] being regarded as having such an impairment, or a record of having such an impairment, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job, utilizing the place of public accommodation, or occupying the dwelling in question. Section 213.010(4) (emphasis added). Daugherty's discrimination claim alleges that he was terminated because the City regarded him as disabled. As a regarded as MHRA plaintiff, Daugherty must prove that the City either: (1) wrongly believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities or (2) wrongly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limited one or more major life activities. 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(E); see also Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir.2001). Daugherty was substantially limited in performing a major life activity for purposes of the MHRA if he was unable to perform or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which he could perform a particular major life activity. Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (disability discrimination case brought by terminated police officer under the MHRA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)). A plaintiff's `inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.' [10] Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(j)(3)(i)); Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir.2006). A substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means that an individual must be `significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.' Epps, 353 F.3d at 592 (quoting 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). The City claims that Daugherty is not disabled within the protections of the MHRA simply because he was unable to perform the particular job of police captain. However, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Daugherty, as is required by the standard of review, Daugherty's evidence shows that the City believed he was incapable of performing an entire class of jobsuniformed officer positions of any rank. As such, summary judgment is inappropriate on this issue, because the record shows genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the protections of the MHRA apply to Daugherty as a regarded as plaintiff. [11]
Although Daugherty presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on the issue of whether he was regarded as disabled, he must also present sufficient evidence that he was capable of performing his job as a police captain. This standard must be imposed given that the MHRA definition of disability includes that an MHRA-protected impairment cannot interfere with performing the job, utilizing the place of public accommodation, or occupying the dwelling in question. Section 213.010(4). The MHRA protects employees from disability discrimination for a disability that is unrelated to a person's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position and that does not substantially interfere with a person's ability to perform the essential functions of the employment at issue. 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(F). In determining whether a particular function is essential, courts may consider evidence concerning the following factors: (1) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before the employer began advertising or interviewing for the position; (3) the amount of time on the job spent performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function; and (5) the past or current work experience of employees in similar jobs. See 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(n)(3); see also Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1998). The City's personnel manual defines an essential function to include a required task or assignment actually performed by a specific position that, if removed, would fundamentally change the job. Deputy Chief of Police Major Kozuszek prepared a memorandum detailing the job description for a police captain that was used by the City's doctor who evaluated Daugherty. Major Kozuszek's description cited parts of the City's official position description, which states: GENERAL PURPOSE Performs a variety of routine and complex public safety work in the supervision of the police department. Supervises police patrol, investigation, traffic regulation, and related law enforcement activities. . . . . ESSENTIAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Supervises police sergeant, police officers and support staff in their assigned duties. . . . . Oversees and assists, as needed in the response to emergency radio calls and investigates accidents, robberies, civil disturbances. . . . Takes appropriate law enforcement action. . . . . [C]onducts follow-up investigations of crimes committed during assigned shift, seeks out and questions victims, witnesses and suspects, develops leads and tips, searches scene of crimes for clues, analyses and evaluates evidence and arrests offenders. . . . . . . . PHYSICAL DEMANDS . . . . While performing the duties of this job, the employee is regularly required to stand; sit; talk or hear; and use hands to finger, handle, or operate objects, controls, or tools. . . . occasionally required to stand; walk; reach with hands and arms; climb or balance; stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and taste or smell. Major Kozuszek, however, also listed specifications for the position that were not taken from the City's official written job description: The point to be made here is the fact that commanders may find themselves required to participate in the actual physical process of conducting an investigation and affecting an arrest. This process might entail chasing a suspect over fences, running up stairs, climbing over boxes or crawl under equipment stored in warehouses. It may include the ability to overtake and physically wrestle with a suspect at the time of arrest. He might have to jump out of a window or off of a porch, or to climb a ladder and onto a roof while in the process of a foot chase with a suspect. He may be required to carry heavy boxes or pieces of evidence from crime scenes [and] drag a body. . . . He may be required to help push a vehicle. . . . The City argues that Daugherty fails to show that he is entitled to the disability discrimination protections of the MHRA because he was incapable of performing these essential functions of his job. The City asserts that all police officers are required to perform front-line officer duties and its evaluators determined that Daugherty cannot perform these tasks. Daugherty admitted in his deposition that the captain's job might require front-line officer tasks, but he disputes that those tasks are essential functions of the captain's job. He argues that the captain's job descriptions provided to the doctor did not match the job descriptions in place when he was promoted to captain. Major Kozuszek's description was, in part, created concurrent to the time Daugherty was sent for a disability evaluation and added physical requirements, such as suspect chase and capture, that were not a part of the city's official written job description, which was basically supervisory. Daugherty points out that other officers testified that they also viewed the captain's position as supervisory in nature. Daugherty had performed the captain's job since 1999 without being asked to submit to a fitness for duty evaluation. His performance evaluation in April 2002 scored him satisfactory in the Appearance/Fitness category. [12] At Daugherty's termination appeal hearing, Chief O'Connor stated that, prior to the City's doctor's evaluation, there was no documentation or first hand observation that Daugherty was unable to effectuate an arrest or assist at an accident site. Chief O'Connor also admitted that Daugherty had passed all required firearm qualification tests. The City's doctor determined that Daugherty could perform at a heavy work demand level for 4 hours, and Daugherty's experts concluded that he was physically capable of performing his daily captain's duties and limited heavy work load duties. The record reveals that there are genuine issues of material fact as to what were the essential functions of the captain's job. As such, this issue is an inappropriate ground for summary judgment.
Having found that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Daugherty has an MHRA-protected disability and the capacity to perform his job, this Court must now assess whether his claim survives summary judgment because there are genuine issues as to whether his perceived disability was a contributing factor in the City's termination decision. The City maintains that it asked Daugherty to submit to a fitness for duty examination after his increasing absenteeism caused concerns that he was unable to perform the duties of a front-line officer. The City attempts to argue that Daugherty was rightfully terminated due to his poor pattern of attendance, but he alleges facts showing that it originally informed him that he was terminated only because his fitness for duty evaluations indicated he was incapable of performing front-line officer duties. Daugherty's taped conversation with Chief O'Connor mentions a discussion between Chief O'Connor and the City's attorney about getting Daugherty off the street by putting him in an administration position only. His evidence showed that he was encouraged to take disability retirement to avoid losing his job as police captain. [13] The record also supports his complaint that he was the only similarly-situated officer to be sent for a fitness for duty examination. [14] Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Daugherty, as the standard of review requires, the record supports a finding that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Daugherty was wrongly singled out for a fitness for duty evaluation and whether his perceived disability was a contributing factor in the City's decision to terminate him.