Opinion ID: 195289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the revocation decision

Text: 28 The standard of appellate review pertaining to revocation decisions is not in doubt. When a district court, after holding an evidentiary hearing, finds a probation violation and determines that revocation is a condign response, we will not prepare a palimpsest, but will scrutinize the district court's decision only for abuse of discretion. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 222, 53 S.Ct. 154, 156, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932); United States v. Nolan, 932 F.2d 1005, 1006 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Morin, 889 F.2d 328, 331 (1st Cir.1989). 29 To reach the point at which revocation of probation is appropriate, a district court must complete a two-step pavane. The first component is historical; it involves the retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985). The second component is judgmental; it involves a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation. Id. We proceed to review the district court's determinations as to each component, mindful, withal, that [t]he Due Process Clause ... imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation. Id. at 610, 105 S.Ct. at 2257.A. The Violation. 30 At a revocation proceeding, the prosecution need not prove the conduct charged beyond a reasonable doubt; it is enough if the proof, reasonably viewed, satisfies the court that a violation occurred. See United States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Czajak, 909 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Lacey, 661 F.2d 1021, 1022 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S.Ct. 2036, 72 L.Ed.2d 484 (1982). 31 The government met this burden in the instant case. Despite being fully apprised of Dr. Geller's views and receiving an urgent request from the probation officer, appellant did not agree to institutionalize himself. Even after the judge drew a line in the sand, appellant remained adamant in his insistence that he would not submit to inpatient care. On this stark record, the district court's explicit finding that appellant knowingly and wilfully elected to ignore a condition of his probation is entirely supportable. It follows that the first step in the two-step pavane is easily ventured. 7 32 B. The Disposition. 33 When revocation of probation is committed to judicial discretion, judges should not regard it as a routine response to every probation violation. Rather, revocation should be reserved for those instances in which the case history, coupled with the probationer's behavior, indicates that it is a fair, just, and sensible outcome. See, e.g., Nolan, 932 F.2d at 1006; United States v. Fryar, 920 F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 981, 111 S.Ct. 1635, 113 L.Ed.2d 730 (1991); see also Steven A. Childress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review, Sec. 11.39 at 11-161 (2d ed. 1986). This second step of the revocation analysis necessitates individualized attention to the particular probationer and to the idiosyncratic circumstances of his situation. And, it requires a predictive decision, based in part on the court's assessment of the probationer's propensity toward antisocial conduct. See Lacey, 661 F.2d at 1022; United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir.1978). 34 Although the trial court possesses wide latitude in making such determinations, that latitude is not unbounded. The test for abuse of discretion is well settled in this circuit: 35 In making discretionary judgments, a district court abuses its discretion when a relevant factor deserving of significant weight is overlooked, or when an improper factor is accorded significant weight, or when the court considers the appropriate mix of factors, but commits a palpable error of judgment in calibrating the decisional scales. 36 United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992); accord, e.g., Independent Oil & Chem. Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925, 109 S.Ct. 308, 102 L.Ed.2d 327 (1988). Applying this test, we are unable to discern any smidgen of abuse in the district court's decision to revoke probation in order to ensure that appellant receive necessary medical treatment. Based on a careful combing of the record we conclude that the court considered all the appropriate factors and made no detectable mistake in weighing them. 37 Nor is this conclusion undercut by appellant's lament that the district court, in revoking probation, impermissibly punished him for faultless conduct. This thesis finds its genesis in appellant's view that because his mental health status is involuntary (most recently induced, he claims, by the government, which placed him on, then tried to wean him away from, Haldol), revocation of probation is an improper punishment for it. This argument is lame. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2070 n. 9, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) (explaining that the probationer's lack of fault in violating a term of probation [does not] necessarily prevent a court from revoking probation). In this vein, United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir.1990), appropriately reminds us that though a probation violation may result in incarceration ..., this punishment is imposed not for the violation itself but for the prior criminal offense for which the probationer was convicted. 38 We will not belabor the obvious, for it is difficult to imagine a much clearer case than the case at bar. As appellant's outpatient treatment program progressed, his mental and social state deteriorated; he began hallucinating about messages from inanimate objects and felt threatened by satellites. Moreover, he made it plain that he did not consider himself mentally ill; that, left to his own devices, he would not take medication to alleviate the manifestations of his disorder; and that he would not submit voluntarily to inpatient care. Especially in light of appellant's defiance of the doctor's instructions and his previous involvement in threats of grievous bodily harm against a public official, his situation called out for remediation. The district court, after finding that appellant had violated the terms of probation, simply answered the call, effecting a disposition that ensured appropriate treatment for appellant's affliction and, at the same time, alleviated a cognizable risk to public safety.