Opinion ID: 1111406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the state's police power, article i, section 6, and the correct resolution of the present appeal

Text: As the plurality notes, Mallan was arrested in the parking lot of the Waik&imacr;k&imacr; Shell after Honolulu police officers, attracted by the odor of burning marijuana, found a partially burnt marijuana cigarette in Mallan's automobile. Plurality opinion at 442, 950 P.2d at 180. At trial, the prosecution did not dispute Mallan's contention that there was no one in the vicinity of his automobile at the time he lit up. No one was forced to breathe his secondhand smoke. Mallan was not operating his vehicle or otherwise engaging in hazardous activity while under the influence of the intoxicant. In short, at the time of his arrest, Mallan was harming no one. In this case, Mallan was not charged with driving under the influence of drugs, in violation of HRS § 291-7. See supra note 4. Nor was he charged with the functional equivalentswhich, to my knowledge, do not exist in this jurisdictionof consuming or possessing intoxicating liquor while operating a motor vehicle, in violation of HRS § 291-3.1 (1993), or consuming or possessing intoxicating liquor while a passenger in a motor vehicle, in violation of HRS § 291-3.2 (1993). Rather, he was charged with and convicted of the crime of mere unadorned possession of marijuana in any amount. See supra note 2. At the hearing on his motion to dismiss, the parties stipulated to the testimony of Mallan's expert witnesses. The witnesses would have testified that, in their opinion, marijuana is not addictive and that there is no proof that the use of marijuana is harmful to the user or to others. However, the witnesses would also have testified that the effects of marijuana have been the subject of debate. The experts would further have testified that, in their opinion, the studies concluding that marijuana has harmful effects are speculative and flawed. Plurality opinion at 442, 950 P.2d at 180. The prosecution did not present any evidence [bearing upon] the constitutionality of the marijuana possession statute. ICA's decision at 2. Instead, the prosecution simply arguedreminiscent of the Richardson/Marumoto plurality opinion in Kantner, see supra section I.C.1that the fact, in and of itself, that the harmful effects of marijuana were a matter of controversy provided a sufficient basis upon which the district court could uphold the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1249. The district court obliged. In rejecting Mallan's position, the district court ruled that possession and use of marihuana... does not rank as any kind of fundamental freedom and that the statute need only be supported by a rational basis [and] not a compelling state interest[,] ... noted that the question whether marijuana has harmful effects is ... controversial ... [,] noted that, according to the stipulated evidence, some literature supports the conclusion that marijuana is harmful, while other literature supports the conclusion that it is harmless[,] ... [and] ruled that, in applying the rational basis test, the statute [was] constitutional. Plurality opinion at 442, 950 P.2d at 180 (some ellipsis points in original and some added). In so doing, the district court followed the Richardson/Marumoto plurality opinion in Kantner, as well as Baker, Renfro, Bachman, and Mueller right down the line. Those authorities, however, do not reflect the current law of this state. Consonant with Kraft, see supra section I.A, Lee, see supra section I.B.1, the Abe thesis first articulated in the Lee dissent, see supra section I.B.2, Cotton, see supra note 8, the  Kantner trio, see supra section I.C.1, the history underlying the adoption of article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution, see supra section II.A, and Kam, see supra section II.B.2, I would hold as follows: (1) wholly separate and apart from any consideration of the constitutional right to privacy, the harm to others principle circumscribes the exercise of the state's police power to criminalize conduct in Hawai`i; [66] (2) article I, section 6, creating an express constitutional right to privacy, confers upon people the right to be left alone, which gives to all individuals the right to personal autonomy, to dictate his or her own lifestyle, and to be oneself, and which further constrains and limits the state's exercise of the police power; (3) the right to be left alone/personal autonomy/privacy, expressly enumerated in article I, section 6, is a fundamental rightsubject, not merely to rational basis review, but to strict scrutinythat cannot be abridged absent a showing by the government that there is a compelling state interest justifying the abridgment and that the statute infringing the fundamental right is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights; [67] (4) HRS § 712-1249 infringes the fundamental constitutional right to privacy in the personal autonomy sense; (5) Mallan's fundamental privacy right to possess marijuana for personal use is in conflict with the sovereign police power to regulate the use of and trafficking in drugs; (6) the prosecution failed to demonstrate either that HRS § 712-1249 furthers a compelling state interest in the infringement or that the interference with the fundamental constitutional right employs the least restrictive means available; and, therefore, (7) HRS § 712-1249 is an unconstitutional infringement of the right to be left alone/personal autonomy/privacy, as guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution (1978). Accordingly, I would reverse the ICA's decision, vacate Mallan's judgment of conviction, and remand to the district court for the entry of an order granting Mallan's motion to dismiss.