Opinion ID: 1790101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to quash: constitutionality of 7:4.404

Text: We now address defendant's contention and the city court's finding that Section 7:4.404 of the Baton Rouge Municipal Ordinances is unconstitutional. Section 7:4.404 provides: Belt courses, eaves, cornices and ornamental features may project half the yard depth but not more than four (4) feet in a required yard. Where there is a servitude on a lot, no part of a building shall be built upon or overhang any part of the servitude, except where that servitude is obtained from the developer by Gulf States Utilities Company, Dixie Electric Membership Corporation or South Central Bell Telephone Company, is provided and used for underground facilities only, and the using utility company provides written approval to the building official. (emphasis added) The court found this section unconstitutionally vague because it did not put persons of ordinary intelligence on notice that their actions are proscribed by this ordinance and that such actions carry a criminal penalty with them. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, words and phrases used in statutes and ordinances must not be so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation would constitute a taking of liberty or property without due process of law. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); State v. Mallett, 357 So.2d 1105 (La. 1978); State v. Tucker, 354 So.2d 1327 (La. 1978). The constitutional guarantee that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation requires that penal statute describe unlawful conduct with sufficient particularity and clarity such that ordinary persons of reasonable intelligence would be capable of discerning the statute's meaning and conforming their conduct thereto. La.Const. Art. I § 13; State v. Azar, 539 So.2d 1222 (La. 1989); State v. Powell, 515 So.2d 1085 (La.1987); State v. Tucker, supra. The ordinance in question here is not unconstitutionally vague. The ordinance puts defendant on notice that he may not build on a servitude. No part of a building shall be built or overhang any part of a servitude. This language clearly puts persons of ordinary intelligence on notice as to what actions are proscribed. The city court also implied in its oral reasons for judgment that defendant and others similarly situated are not put on notice that their actions may constitute a criminal offense because the penalty provisions are not contained within Section 7:4.404, the very section proscribing the impermissible conduct. The penalties for a violation of any section of Chapter 7 of the Municipal Ordinances for the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge (including Section 7:4.404) are indeed contained in a different section, 7:11.1. [1] This same argument however was rejected by this Court in Shreveport v. Dusis, 150 La. 911, 91 So. 294 (1922). In that case, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that there was no penalty attached to the ordinance, finding that a catch-all penal clause (similar to the one here), which stated that any violation of the municipal building code was a misdemeanor and carried with it a certain penalty, was sufficient to include a penalty for the specific act with which defendant was charged. That the penalties here for any violation of Chapter 7 are set forth in an independent section of the Code does not render the statute vague. The city court made a short reference to the ordinance being overbroad. Overbreadth invalidations of statutes are generally inappropriate when the allegedly impermissible applications of the challenged statute affect conduct rather than speech. State v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374, 377 (La. 1987), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). The regulation here does not affect defendant's freedom of speech or any other constitutionally protected right. Since the conduct proscribed by this ordinance is not protected by the federal or state constitutions, Section 7:4.404 is not unconstitutionally overbroad. State v. Tucker, 354 So.2d 1327, 1329 (La.1978). Finally, defendant argues in brief an entirely different rationale for finding Section 7:4.404 unconstitutional. The ordinance provides that three named utility companies may sanction encroachments on servitudes obtained by them from the developer and used for underground facilities only, by their giving written approval. The defense argues that this grant of authority to purely private utility companies constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative and executive authority. First of all, it is not at all clear that excepting from application of the penal provisions a situation in which a given utility company with an acquired property right authorizes an encroachment on that right is an impermissible delegation of legislative authority. Additionally however, this servitude was not provided solely for an underground facility nor is it being used for an underground facility, and therefore the exception is not applicable. Because defendant has not been adversely affected by this provision of Section 7:4.404, he may not challenge its constitutionality. State v. McMahon, 391 So.2d 1120 (La.1980); State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La.1980). Next, we address the City's argument that the city court erred in accepting defendant's oral motion to quash. La.C.Cr.P. art. 536 clearly requires that a motion to quash be in writing. Failure to comply with this statutory requirement normally results in a waiver of the rights sought to be asserted in the motion and the loss of an opportunity to have such arguments considered by the trial court. State v. Rheams, 352 So.2d 615 (La.1977); State v. Lewis, 255 La. 623, 232 So.2d 294 (1970). However, there have been exceptions to this strict rule where a trial court may allow an oral motion to quash in the interests of fairness. State v. Lang, 464 So.2d 776 (La.App. 4th Cir.1985). The city court here apparently acted within its discretion in excusing defendant's failure to file a written motion to quash, where defendant appeared without counsel. However, as we have already found that the city court erred in granting the motion to quash, the argument as to whether the court correctly entertained the motion has been rendered moot. The ordinance provision under attack (Section 7:4.404) is therefore not unconstitutional for vagueness or overbreadth. Furthermore, defendant's motions to dismiss, including the one involving arguments concerning double jeopardy, are not meritorious.