Opinion ID: 782263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union

Text: 32 A more recent religious-symbols case is County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989). That case involved two holiday displays located on public property. The first was a crèche displayed on the Grand Staircase of the county courthouse during the Christmas season. The crèche include[d] figures of the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm animals, shepherds, and wise men, all placed in or before a wooden representation of a manger, which ha[d] at its crest an angel bearing a banner that proclaim[ed] `Gloria in Excelsis Deo!' Id. at 580, 109 S.Ct. 3086. A fence and a backdrop of greenery and poinsettias surrounded the Nativity scene, and a sign indicated the name of the donor, but no other secular symbols or decorations accompanied the display. Altogether, the crèche, the fence, the poinsettias, and the trees occupied a substantial amount of space on the Grand Staircase, which was the `main,' `most beautiful,' and `most public' part of the courthouse.... Id. at 579-80, 109 S.Ct. 3086. 33 The second holiday display was located at the entrance to the main office building for the city and county. The display contained an 18-foot-tall Chanukah menorah 6 standing next to a 45-foot-tall evergreen Christmas tree. A sign referred to the display as a Salute to Liberty. The ACLU argued that the use of the crèche and the menorah violated the Establishment Clause. 34 A splintered Court held that the crèche display violated the Establishment Clause but that the use of the menorah did not. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, believed that both displays were constitutional; Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, would have found both to be unconstitutional. Only Justices Blackmun and O'Connor believed that the menorah display was constitutional and that the crèche display was not, but, as they were the swing votes in the case, their view prevailed. 35 In holding the crèche display unconstitutional, the Court focused on the display's effect. The Court began its analysis by explaining that [u]nder the Court's holding in Lynch, the effect of a crèche turns on its setting and that, unlike the display in Lynch, the crèche in this case stood alone as the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase. Id. at 598, 109 S.Ct. 3086. [N]othing in the context of the display detract[ed] from the crèche's religious message. Id. Furthermore, because the crèche sat on the Grand Staircase, which was the `main' and `most beautiful part' of the building that is the seat of county government, the Court reasoned that [n]o viewer could reasonably think that it occupie[d] this location without the support and approval of government. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 3086. The Court explained that by permitting the `display of the crèche in this particular physical setting,' the county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God that is the crèche's religious message. Id. at 600, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (internal citation omitted). The Court concluded, The display of the crèche in this context, therefore, must be permanently enjoined. Id. at 602, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (emphasis added). In short, the Court assessed the crèche's endorsement effect by analyzing the display's overall context and the display's likely impact on reasonable viewers. Id. at 598-602, 109 S.Ct. 3086. 36 As part of its discussion of the crèche display, the Court explicitly rejected the proselytization approach, which Justice Kennedy had proposed as an alternative to the Court's endorsement inquiry. Id. at 602, 109 S.Ct. 3086. Furthermore, the Court declined Justice Kennedy's reading of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983), explaining that history cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular sect or creed. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 603, 109 S.Ct. 3086. 37 The Court did not agree on the reason for upholding the menorah display, so it issued only a judgment declaring that the menorah display was constitutional. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, the swing votes, focused their individual opinions on the importance of context when applying the effect prong, just as the Court had done in its opinion regarding the crèche display. See id. at 595-97, 613-21, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 624-27, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 7 38 Supreme Court precedent in the most recent religious-symbols cases makes one thing clear: when applying Lemon 's effect test, the constitutionality of the government's use of a predominantly religious symbol depends upon the context in which it appears. In religious-symbols cases, context is the touchstone; we therefore must inquire whether observers would reasonably believe that the government's use of a predominantly religious symbol sends a message of governmental endorsement of religion. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 598-600, 109 S.Ct. 3086; Adler, 206 F.3d at 1101; Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1391 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Courts must evaluate challenged governmental practices on a case-by-case basis, judging each practice in its unique circumstances and in its particular physical setting.