Opinion ID: 788340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to instruct the jury on the meaning of the phrase ad hoc

Text: 155 Appellants argue that the district court erred by failing to define the term ad hoc in its instructions regarding the definition of a RICO enterprise. We review the district court's formulation of jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1240-41 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 858, 124 S.Ct. 161, 157 L.Ed.2d 106 (2003). 156 In its instructions regarding what constitutes an enterprise under the RICO statute, the district court explained to the jury that an enterprise must have a structure for making decisions. It then instructed the jury that[t]he structure must provide a mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the entity on an ongoing continuous basis, rather than an ad hoc basis.  (emphasis added). The district court did not further define the term ad hoc. 157 In reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury's deliberation. Shryock, 342 F.3d at 986 (citation omitted). Appellants do not claim that the instruction as a whole is misleading or inadequate, a wise course since the language of the instruction is virtually identical to that set forth by this court in Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that, to constitute an enterprise under RICO, the enterprise's structure must provide some mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an ongoing, rather than an ad hoc, basis). Appellants are therefore left to argue that the district court should have defined the term ad hoc because it is beyond the understanding of the general population. Cf. Shryock, 342 F.3d at 986 ([T]he district court need not define common terms that are readily understandable to the jury.). Even accepting the debatable proposition that ad hoc is beyond the understanding of the average juror, we conclude that the jury would have been able to understand what type of structure a RICO enterprise must have (i.e., one that provides a mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the entity on an on-going continuous basis) from the remainder of the instruction. Moreover, we have previously held that a district court is not required to define terms that would normally be beyond the general knowledge of jurors if the terms have been covered extensively during the trial. United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1486 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that the district court was not required to define pro forma because of extensive discussions regarding the term at trial). In this case, the structure of the alleged RICO enterprise was a significant point of contention before the jury, and at least one defense counsel provided a homey but accurate definition of the term ad hoc for the jury during closing arguments. 32 158 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of ad hoc. 159