Opinion ID: 1621755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: whether the trial court's limitation at the suppression hearing of cross-examination of sheila bush hammock violated the appellant's right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the united states constitution and article i, section 9 of the tennessee constitution.

Text: The appellant contends that, at the suppression hearing, he was limited and restricted from confronting [his] accuser, Sheila Bush (Hammock), and thereby denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The right to confrontation set forth in the Sixth Amendment includes the right to conduct cross-examination. [2a] However, we have previously observed, [I]t is elementary that the exclusion of immaterial or irrelevant evidence does not abridge an accused's right to confrontation. State v. Marquadis, 649 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)(trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant); Tenn. R. Evid. 611(a) ([t]he court shall exercise appropriate control over the presentation of evidence and conduct of the trial when necessary to avoid abuse by counsel). In other words, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense counsel might wish.' Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (citation omitted). We have already concluded that the testimony at the suppression hearing concerning the contents of the appellant's statements to Ms. Hammock would have been superfluous. Moreover, this court has held that the `confrontation' guaranteed by the United States Constitution is confrontation at trial. Haggard v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 620, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1971), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1971). Similarly, in Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 999, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court observed that the right to confrontation is a trial right. See also United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 881 n. 5 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. De Los Santos, 819 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Boyce, 797 F.2d 691, 693 (8th Cir.1986). [3a] Defense counsel was able to fully and extensively cross-examine Ms. Hammock at trial. This claim is without merit.