Opinion ID: 2509027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: Did the district court err by denying defendant's motion to suppress all evidence?

Text: Horn filed a motion to suppress all the evidence found at the Weaver house, arguing that the officers' opening of the door and looking inside was the beginning of a search and seizure which violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. His motion included his statements to the police, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963) (verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest is no less the fruit of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion). After a hearing at which only Officer Johnson testified, the district court denied the motion. On appeal, Horn renews the arguments made to the district court; if he is successful, the remaining issues are moot. Our standard of review is well known: `When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of a district court's decision `by a substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts by a de novo standard. An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. The ultimate determination of the suppression of the evidence is a legal question requiring independent appellate review.' [Citations omitted.]' State v. Mendez, 275 Kan. 412, 416, 66 P.3d 811 (2003) The district court made the following statement when denying Horn's motion to suppress: All right. Based on  I have reviewed, in fact, the motions that have been filed here. And after considering the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, it's obvious to this Court that exigent circumstances, in fact, existed in this situation given the officer  information and knowledge the officers had prior to opening the door. Opening the door was appropriate under those circumstances and necessary. After opening the door, it was patently obvious that exigent circumstances existed by any measure and further entry was appropriate and necessary. Now, as to the penile swabs and evidence collected there, there was an emergency situation existing. The question as to whether or not Detective Landwehr could have directed health care providers to provide  to not provide treatment they had already deemed to be appropriate and necessary to a later unspecified time to await a warrant, I don't think that option was available. I believe that it would have been inappropriate if not impossible to put off such procedures once medical personnel had made that determination absent the use of threat or force by the police against the health care providers. And, therefore, the motions and all requests by the defense at the time are overruled. We begin by determining whether a search occurred. The district court apparently concluded that one had. A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370, 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985). One's reasonable expectation of privacy in the home is entitled to unique sensitivity. State v. Platten, 225 Kan. 764, 769, 594 P.2d 201 (1979). The viewing by police into an area where an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy that society accepts as reasonable constitutes a search. State v. Morris, 27 Kan. App. 2d 155, 158, 999 P.2d 283, rev. denied 269 Kan. 938 (2000). Accordingly, the officers' opening the door and looking into the house where Horn was living was a warrantless search. See Mitchell v. State, 294 Ark. 264, 269, 742 S.W.2d 895 (1988) (even though door was unlocked and officer slightly opened door to peek inside, warrantless entry into home clearly violated Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches). We acknowledge that unreasonable searches and seizures are constitutionally prohibited and, unless a search falls within one of a few exceptions, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable. Mendez, 275 Kan. at 420-21. We further acknowledge that the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of the fruits of illegally seized evidence, i.e., any information, object, or testimony uncovered or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the illegally seized evidence or any leads obtained therefrom. 275 Kan. at 421. While a warrantless search was performed in the instant case, the State argues that the search was valid under the emergency doctrine, one of several exceptions to the search warrant requirement recognized in Kansas. See Mendez, 275 Kan. at 421. As the United States Supreme Court described the doctrine in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978): We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid . . . `The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' [Citation omitted.] Our Court of Appeals echoed Mincey in State v. Jones, 24 Kan. App. 2d 405, 409-10, 947 P.2d 1030 (1997): The emergency doctrine reflects a recognition that the police perform a community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime. [Citation omitted.] Under this function, the community looks to the police to render aid and assistance to protect lives and property on an emergency basis regardless of whether a crime is involved. In Mendez, 275 Kan. at 425, this court approved the use in Jones of a three-part test from People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976), for analyzing the applicability of the emergency doctrine: `(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that [1] there is an emergency at hand and [2] an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; `(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. `(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.' All three elements must be met to satisfy the emergency doctrine. See Mendez, 275 Kan. at 428. However, Horn disputes only the first element. The burden of establishing this element is on the State. See State v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16, Syl. ¶ 1, 910 P.2d 180 (1996) (on a motion to suppress evidence, State bears the burden of proving the lawfulness of the search and seizure). As the Jones court further observed: It is important to keep in mind that reasonable grounds under the emergency doctrine differs from the probable cause required under the more familiar crime-related exigent circumstances exception. 24 Kan. App. 2d at 414. It quoted from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41, 686 P.2d 750, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984), regarding this crucial difference: `The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has just been committed in a dwelling and the delay attendant to obtaining a warrant endangers the safety or life of a person therein. [Citations omitted.] . . . . `Conversely, the emergency aid doctrine is triggered when the police enter a dwelling in the reasonable, good-faith belief that there is someone within in need of immediate aid or assistance. In cases in which this doctrine applies there is no probable cause which would justify issuance of a search warrant, . . . and the police are not entering to arrest, search, or gather evidence.' (Emphasis added.) 24 Kan. App. 2d at 414. As the Jones court stated, ultimately the question of whether the officer had a reasonable, good faith belief that there is someone within in need of immediate aid or assistance is based upon what the officer understood at the time  not necessarily whether such immediate aid or assistance was needed. 24 Kan. App. 2d at 408. We agree that an objective standard as to the reasonableness of the officer's belief must be applied, i.e., whether there is evidence which would lead a prudent and reasonable officer to see a need to act. See Jones, 24 Kan. App. 2d at 416 (the officers' actions are judged on the basis of the facts facing them at moment of their decision and are evaluated objectively). We also acknowledge that as this standard is applied to the circumstances then confronting the officer, it also includes the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences. Stated a different way: The question is whether `the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise.' See 3 La Fave, Search and Seizure, § 6.6(a) pp. 391-92 (3d ed. 1996). In the instant case, Horn predictably claims that the police did not have reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency existed. He further argues that the district judge failed to make any specific findings of fact and then found that exigent circumstances, not an emergency, existed. The State responds that the district court's use of the term exigent was simply a mixing with the term emergency, that does not invalidate the court's conclusion that a warrantless search exception existed. The district court based its finding of an exception on the information the officers had prior to opening the door, but as evidenced by its statements set forth previously in this opinion, it did not specify what that information was. It also did not articulate clearly the specific legal doctrine relied upon in upholding the search. We agree with the State that the district court's use of the terms exigent and emergency when referring to the actions at the Weaver home and at the hospital, respectively, does not invalidate the court's conclusion that an exception existed. Moreover, the emergency doctrine may be used to uphold the search, even if not relied upon by the court. See State v. Bryant, 272 Kan. 1204, 1209, 38 P.3d 661 (2002) (appellate court may uphold decision of trial court on grounds alternate to those relied on at the trial level). We hold that the district court's findings, while by no means copious, are supported by substantial competent evidence as provided by Officer Johnson's testimony at the suppression hearing. The information known to him before Officer Woodrow partially pushed open the door occurred in the following chronological order. Dispatch sent Officer Johnson to a residence at 422 N. Custer to check the welfare of an elderly woman. Checking on the welfare of the elderly is part of his regular job duties and he does it on a regular basis. He arrived at approximately 3 p.m., the same time as Officer Woodrow. He and Woodrow contacted the neighbor, Mrs. Betty Roux, and Roux's adult daughter at 420 N. Custer in their front yard. Betty Roux told him that she had called 911 because she was concerned for her neighbor, Tina Weaver, whom she had not seen in a couple of days. Roux told Johnson that Weaver lived at 422 N. Custer, that Weaver was 89 years old, and that not seeing Weaver was unusual. She explained she [u]sually would see her at the door either collecting mail or coming out the door for one reason or another. Roux expressed concern for Weaver's health and welfare because Weaver was elderly. Roux explained that earlier in the day she had gone to Weaver's door and knocked. Ted, Weaver's son, yelled through the door and said they were ok. Roux knew Ted because he had previously lived with Weaver off and on and had just recently returned from somewhere. She told Johnson that Ted would not open the door, which concerned her because it was very unusual. In the past, he had always opened the door and let her talk to Weaver. Officer Johnson then approached the Weaver house with Officer Woodrow. He confirmed one of Roux's statements by observing the mail was still in Weaver's slot. He could not see in the windows so he knocked on the door. He heard a male voice from inside ask Who is it? Johnson replied, It's the police. Johnson continued to knock on the door and yell through the door for Ted to come to the door, calling him by name. Johnson testified that after 4-5 minutes: When we still didn't hear anything, we didn't hear any movement or anything in the house and we knew somebody was in there, we were concerned, of course, for the elderly lady that lived there so we decided to see if the door was unlocked, maybe we could actually see if Ted was in the front room so we could talk to him and check on what I thought was his mom at the time. (Emphasis added.) Officer Woodrow then reached down, turned the door knob, and pushed the door open. Having found substantial competent evidence to support the district court's findings regarding the information the officers had prior to opening the door, we next consider step two in our analysis of the suppression issue, a de novo review of the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those factual findings. The district court concluded the search was valid, albeit under a somewhat different basis than a pure emergency. We acknowledge that ultimately search and seizure cases are all fact sensitive and determinative. Mendez, 275 Kan. at 429. We hold, however, that this case's findings of fact support the trial court's legal conclusion that the search was valid. We base our holding in large part upon Jones. There, a Topeka police officer was dispatched to an apartment complex on a check the welfare of a subject call where he met with the parents of Tony Flamez, who were concerned about their son. 24 Kan. App. 2d at 406. They had made plans to have dinner with him 3 days before, but he had not shown up and they had not seen him since. They had called his apartment several times and left answering machine messages, but he had never answered or returned the calls. The parents said this was unusual behavior for him and that he had made a recent acquaintance of whom he was afraid. Several police officers, together with the parents and an apartment employee, went to Tony's apartment. After knocking on the door, calling for Tony, and receiving no response, the police asked the employee to open the door with the manager's key, which he did. Inside the police discovered a man, a woman, and drugs. The Court of Appeals upheld the search and seizure under the emergency doctrine. Tony was later located in another apartment. Similarly, in the instant case, before the police opened the Weaver door, they possessed information that an 89-year-old woman had broken from her distinct, almost rigid, routine and had not been seen for several days. Additionally, they knew Horn had broken from his practice and had refused to open the door to allow neighbor Roux to see his grandmother that day. We acknowledge that the Jones facts are slightly different because there the resident completely failed to respond to the officers' knocking on the door and calling his name, while here Horn did respond orally to the knock, but then silently stalled for 4-5 minutes upon learning it was the police. Despite this difference, in the instant case the police were justified in opening the door to yell for Weaver or for Horn, or to look for Weaver. Horn's question, followed by his lengthy silence and refusal to come to the door, certainly did nothing to alleviate the officers' concerns about Weaver as expressed by Roux and as confirmed by their observations. If anything, their concerns became greater. In short, based upon what the officers knew at the time, they had a reasonable, good faith belief that there was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life. As stated by the court in Jones : [P]olice are often forced to make judgment calls under circumstances where it is better to err on the side of safety. The fact that Tony was not discovered in need of help in his apartment is of no relevance. [Citation omitted.] The officers' actions are judged on the basis of the facts facing them at the moment of their decision and are evaluated objectively with due consideration for the stress of the moment and the pressure to make important decisions based on often ambiguous facts. It would indeed be tragic if Tony had lain injured or dying, or had been under restraint in the apartment, and the police had refused to take seriously the concerns of a mother and father who knew their son's habits and disposition. 24 Kan. App. 2d at 416. Stated another way, [t]he question is whether the `officers would have been derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise.' We conclude that under the facts of the instant case, they would have been. Once it is established that the opening of the door and the officers' looking inside are permissible, they may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392-93; see State v. Gocken, 71 Wash. App. 267, 279, 857 P.2d 1074 (1993) (once officers lawfully inside residence performing health and safety check, their discovery of evidence falls within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement). Consequently, the officers' finding of Weaver's body and the evidence surrounding it in plain view in the living room, plus Horn's repeated inculpatory statements, are admissible against him.