Opinion ID: 1190343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Guilty Plea

Text: Appellant pleaded guilty in open court after signing an eight-page written waiver form. The form, entitled Waiver of Constitutional Rights and Plea of Guilty or `No Contest,' included printed, numbered paragraphs initialed by appellant describing the rights he waived and the consequences of his plea and the signatures of appellant and his attorney. By executing the form, appellant represented he had personally initialed the paragraphs and discussed them with counsel and he understood each of the rights described in the form and waived them in order to enter his plea. Appellant initialed paragraphs stating he offered an unconditional plea of guilty to the described charges and affirmed his knowledge of the consequences of such a plea, i.e., that a penalty trial would take place in which the only possible outcomes were life in prison without possibility of parole or the death penalty and that each of appellant's pleas could be considered, individually and collectively, as aggravating circumstances in assessing the appropriate penalty. He also initialed separate paragraphs evincing his understanding and waiver of specifically described constitutional rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses, to testify or refuse to testify, and to call witnesses. Finally, he affirmed in the waiver form that he had discussed his plea with counsel, informed counsel of all facts and circumstances of the case known to him and received legal advice as to his rights, and voluntarily elected to plead guilty because he was guilty or believed there was sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's attorney also signed the form, affirming he had explained appellant's rights to him, discussed possible defenses with him, found a factual basis for appellant's plea, and concurred in appellant's decision to plead guilty. By their signatures, both appellant and his attorney also represented that no promises or threats had been made to obtain the guilty and special circumstances pleas. After reviewing and executing the waiver form, appellant and his attorney appeared in open court. Before accepting appellant's plea, the trial judge asked the prosecutor to review the form with appellant on the record and informed appellant he was free to consult with his attorney at any time if he had any questions about the waiver of his rights. In response to questions from the prosecutor, appellant reaffirmed his signature and initials on the waiver form. The prosecutor asked appellant about each count, enhancement, and special circumstance and obtained appellant's express assurances that he understood a penalty trial would be held and that his pleas would be used as aggravating circumstances to determine whether the penalty would be death or life in prison without possibility of parole. In addition, the prosecutor explained each of appellant's constitutional rights; appellant reaffirmed on the record his understanding and voluntary waiver of each right. After the prosecutor's questions, the court interrogated appellant, verifying appellant's understanding that he would be stuck with and unable to withdraw his pleas at a later date and that, regardless of the pleas, the prosecutor would be able to present all the evidence about all of appellant's crimes to the jury at the penalty phase. At the close of the interview, appellant responded guilty to each of the charges and admit it to each of the special circumstance allegations. The trial court accepted the pleas and admissions, specifically finding they were voluntarily made after a valid waiver of appellant's constitutional rights. (1) Under both the state and federal Constitutions, a valid plea of guilty must be preceded by a knowing and voluntary waiver of defendant's rights. [T]he record must contain on its face direct evidence that the accused was aware, or made aware, of his right to confrontation, to a jury trial, and against self-incrimination, as well as the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea. ( In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449], italics in original; see also People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1180 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315].) No specific formula is required, as long as the record shows by direct evidence that the accused was fully aware of his rights. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 839 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865].) The California Constitution also provides that a jury may be waived by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) Finally, under section 190.4, subdivision (a), special circumstance issues are to be tried by jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and by the people. Appellant contends the record does not establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to jury trial as required by the constitutional and statutory provisions just cited. (2) Initially, he maintains that the on-the-record proceedings failed to inform him the jury would have to be convinced of his guilt of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant cites no authority that such an admonition is required; we are aware of no such authority and perceive no reason to impose a required admonition in the form proposed by appellant. (3) Second, appellant argues there must be a waiver of jury trial on the special-circumstance allegations, separate and distinct from the crimes charged, citing People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 700-705 [214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446]. In Memro, the trial court accepted a stipulation to a court trial of a special-circumstance allegation without any on-the-record expression by defendant of a jury waiver. We held that a separate, personal waiver from defendant was required. In contrast with Memro, such a separate, personal waiver occurred in this case. Among the questions and answers in the on-the-record colloquy between appellant and the prosecutor appear the following: [The Prosecutor]: You understand you have a right to a trial by jury, which means that 12 citizens selected by your lawyer and by myself would hear all the facts of this case and decide whether or not you were guilty of the charges, the enhancements, the special allegations, or any other special allegations that are charged in this particular case ? Do you understand that?  The Defendant: Yes. [The Prosecutor]: All 12 citizens would have to agree that you were guilty in order to be convicted of any charge against you. And all 12 citizens would have to agree that you are not guilty in order to acquit you. And all twelve would have to agree of [ sic ] any enhancements, prior prison terms, any serious allegations, or the special circumstances. Do you understand that ? The Defendant: Yes. [The Prosecutor]: By initialing that box [indicating the jury waiver box on the waiver form] you're indicating that you did hereby waive and give up your right as to the charges we've discussed earlier, any enhancements and special allegations that we've already talked about; is that right ? The Defendant: Yes. [ The Prosecutor ] : In other words, you don't want a jury trial on the issue of guilt or the special circumstances or the enhancements, right ? The Defendant: Right. [The Prosecutor]: And you've discussed that with your lawyer, Mr. Cannon? The Defendant: Yes. (Italics added.) The dialogue set forth above, considered in light of the remainder of the record preceding the acceptance of appellant's plea, reflects an express and personal understanding and waiver of appellant's right to jury trial on the special circumstance allegations. The mere fact that the prosecutor's questions combined issues of guilt, special circumstances, and enhancements did not vitiate the waiver. As in People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 565 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171], defendant was made aware that the waiver of his right to trial by jury applied to all aspects of his special circumstances case, from beginning to end and defendant himself informed the court that he had taken advantage of the opportunity to discuss the issue of jury-trial waiver with defense counsel. ( Ibid., italics in original.) Under these circumstances, no more was required to meet constitutional or statutory standards. (See also People v. Simpson (1991) 2 Cal. App.4th 228, 233-237 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 589].) Certain other appellate decisions, including People v. Sandoval (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 1428, 1431 [234 Cal. Rptr. 97], People v. Gastile (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 1376, 1380-1381 [253 Cal. Rptr. 283], and People v. Moreno (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 564, 571-572 [279 Cal. Rptr. 140], might be read to state or imply that our decision in Memro, ( supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 700-705) somehow demands that a defendant's waiver of his jury-trial right on special circumstance allegations be taken in accordance with a prescribed ritual, e.g., a separate interrogation of defendant about his special circumstance jury trial rights as distinct from his other jury trial rights. As we have explained, Memro does not so hold. It simply requires that a valid waiver of the jury-trial right on a special circumstance actually cover the special circumstance. It does not require such a waiver to be taken in accordance with any particular procedure. To the extent the appellate decisions just cited hold or suggest to the contrary, they are disapproved. (4) Third, appellant maintains the court's finding of waiver is invalid because, immediately after the questions and answers set forth above, appellant responded no when the prosecutor asked: You feel like you know all the ins and outs of that [i.e., jury trial], do you? While it might have been preferable for the prosecutor or the trial judge to have explored the reasons for appellant's cryptic negative answer in this regard, any failure to do so did not prejudice his rights. There is no constitutional requirement that appellant understand all the ins and outs of a jury trial in order to waive his right to one. The record contains a complete description of the essential elements of jury trial as conveyed to appellant as well as affirmation of his express understanding of those elements and his desire nonetheless to enter a plea of guilty and to admit the special-circumstance allegations. For the reasons stated above, there was no error in the receipt by the trial court of appellant's waivers and plea of guilty.