Opinion ID: 4574286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Impeachment Instruction

Text: Finally, Blocker contends that the trial court improperly delivered to the jury the written instruction for impeachment by a prior criminal offense of a testifying defendant (“impeachment by crime — defendant”) rather than the written instruction for impeachment by a prior criminal offense of a testifying witness (“impeachment by crime — witness”). The parties stipulated as to Blocker’s prior conviction for purposes of the FIP statute, but Blocker argues that the erroneous, written instruction allowed the jury to use this stipulation to evaluate his — the “defendant[’s]” — credibility or to “improperly infer he was in possession of a weapon.” The government deflects the argument by disputing that the instructions included in the record on appeal were the actual instructions given to the jury. Because Blocker acknowledges that he did not object at trial, we review for plain error.51 50 See text accompanying supra note 47. 51 See supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text. 27 We need not decide whether the trial court erred by providing the wrong instruction to the jury, for even if there was error it was not “plain error.” Before jury deliberations began, the trial court correctly read to the jury the “impeachment by crime — witness” instruction as it related to Blocker’s witness. During deliberations, the jury never sent a note to the judge indicating confusion over the instructions. Most importantly, Blocker never took the stand, a fact the trial court reminded the jury of while reading the instructions. Indeed, if the written “impeachment by crime — defendant” instruction was accidentally given to the jury during deliberations, the very terms of that instruction precluded the jury from considering it because the instruction would apply only in evaluating Blocker’s “credibility as a witness” — which he was not. “We recognize, as we have repeatedly said, that jurors are presumed to follow instructions.” 52 Accordingly, we conclude that any potential trial court error attributable to inclusion of the instruction was not “plainly” so, and in any event surely did not affect Blocker’s “substantial rights.”53 52 Tann v. United States, 127 A.3d 400, 459 (D.C. 2015). 53 See Malloy 186 A.3d at 802. 28