Opinion ID: 2168236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Attenuation Motion, Hearing, and Order

Text: On November 12, 1985, the State, through an assistant State's Attorney who had recently been assigned to the trial judge's courtroom, filed a motion to reconsider the issue of probable cause for defendant's arrest or, in the alternative, to conduct a hearing on attenuation. On November 13, 1985, the trial judge heard argument on the State's motion and stated that, while he was inclined not to reopen the issue of probable cause on which the original judge had ruled, he was inclined to allow the State to offer additional evidence on attenuation or independent basis under Brown, Dunaway, and other cases, because the trial judge did not believe that Judge [McCollom] specifically ruled on this precise point. Defense counsel argued that, under Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407, the original judge could not properly have based a suppression order solely on the primary illegality of defendant's arrest but was also obliged to consider a second question: whether the suppressed evidence was obtained by exploiting that illegality, rather than by some other means so distinguishable from such exploitation as to attenuate the evidence from the taint of the unlawful arrest. Defense counsel argued that the State therefore had simply failed to raise and thus had waived the attenuation issue, rather than the original judge's having failed to consider it. Defense counsel also argued that all the facts alleged in the State's pending motion for an attenuation hearing were reflected in the transcript of the first suppression hearing and therefore must have been considered by the original judge. Defense counsel also pointed out that the State could have appealed or moved to reconsider the original judge's suppression order and that the State did file a notice of appeal but then chose to procure dismissal of the appeal, thus abandoning it. The trial judge expressed doubt that, at a suppression hearing, a judge such as the original judge would have reason to know whether certain physical evidence might have had a source other than the defendant's statements that flowed from the arrest, or to know whether there were any question about [attenuation] or independent basis or inevitability during the course of the usual Motion to Suppress. The State argued that the original judge had not addressed the attenuation issue and that he had not addressed which evidence was suppressed and which evidence was not suppressed. After considering the State's motion, defendant's written response, and the parties' oral arguments, the trial judge cited case law on the power of a court to correct its errors, as well as People v. Althide (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 963, to hold that the original judge's suppression order had not decided such questions as independent basis, inevitability, or attenuation and that the State should be granted a hearing on attenuation and independent basis in order to show by clear and convincing evidence that there was an independent basis or inevitability or attenuation. The trial judge also held that the original judge had not decided whether defendant's statements were voluntary for purposes of the fifth and sixth amendments; accordingly, the trial judge ruled that at the hearing the defense could also present evidence concerning unresolved issues that might benefit defendant, including raising the issue of voluntariness. The trial judge ruled that, if the defense presented evidence showing involuntariness, the State would have the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's statements were voluntary. After conducting the hearing that he had granted in response to the State's motion, the trial judge found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's statements were voluntary for purposes of the fifth and sixth amendments. Applying tests for attenuation derived from Brown v. Illinois , the trial judge also found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that all statements made by defendant after being confronted with Davis' statement were attenuated from defendant's unlawful arrest, and the trial judge ordered that they would not be suppressed. However, the trial judge ordered that defendant's statements made prior to being confronted with Davis' statement would be suppressed. As for physical evidence, the trial judge ordered that all items in defendant's possession when he was taken into police custody would be suppressed. By contrast, the trial judge found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the gun and the radio were obtained through an independent source purged of the taint of defendant's unlawful arrest, and the trial judge ordered that these items of evidence would not be suppressed. Finally, the trial judge found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an independent basis and attenuation with respect to all witnesses, and the trial judge ordered that their testimony would not be suppressed. The matter was then set for trial, defendant was convicted, and this appeal followed.