Opinion ID: 78615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: certification of this class

Text: Unsurprisingly, the class in this case is broad and diverse, encompassing both salaried and hourly employees in a range of positions, who are or were employed at one or more of Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores across the country. The district court found that the large class is united by a complex array of company-wide practices, which Plaintiffs contend discriminate against women.
At the outset of considering the district court's certification order in light of the above-clarified standard, we note two facets of the district court's review. First, this case reached us after a significantly more searching review than cases in other circuit courts explaining the Rule 23 standard. In Szabo, for example, the district court assumed that whatever [the plaintiff] allege[d] must be true, and it [p]roceed[ed] as if class certification under Rule 23 were governed by the same principles as evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). 249 F.3d at 674-75. In Gariety, the case came to the Fourth Circuit after the district court had concluded that the fact that the plaintiffs have asserted that the Keystone market was efficient is enough at the certification stage to find the market efficient. 368 F.3d at 361 (emphasis added); see also Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (10th Cir.2009) (district court abused its discretion in thinking it was barred from any consideration of action's merits); IPO, 471 F.3d at 30 (district court finding that only plaintiffswho have the burden of proof at class certificationmust make `some showing' ). In other words, previous circuit courts addressing similar issues have been faced with district courts making the same mistake that we described a small number of district courts in this circuit have made in citing Blackie out of context: refusing to consider any issue overlapping with the merits, and assuming the plaintiffs' substantive allegations as true for the Rule 23 inquiry. As we demonstrate below, such review is entirely dissimilar from the district court's review in this case. Second, we also note that resolving this case requires a close reading of the district court's lengthy opinion to determine the standard the district court applied in deciding to certify the class. Contrary to the claims of Wal-Mart and the dissent, such a reading of the district court's individual determinations on Rule 23(a) shows that the district court actually weighed evidence and made findings sufficient under the standard we have described above. In broadly discussing the standard of review, the district court stated the following: A party seeking to certify a class must demonstrate that it has met all four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) requires that all of the following four factors be met . . . . In short, the class must satisfy the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.. . . The party seeking certification must provide facts sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements. In turn, the district court must conduct a rigorous analysis to determine that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been met. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon., 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). If a court is not fully satisfied, certification should be refused. . . . See Fed. R.Civ.P. 23 advisory committee's note to 2003 amends. . . . . . . . [A]lthough some inquiry into the substance of a case may be necessary to ascertain satisfaction of the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a), it is improper to advance a decision on the merits to the certification stage. Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir.1983) (citation omitted); see also Nelson v. United States Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 679-80 (11th Cir.1983) (plaintiffs' burden at class certification entails more than the simple assertion of [commonality and typicality] but less than a prima facie showing of liability) (citation omitted). Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143-44 (some citations omitted) (last alteration in original) (emphasis added). Unlike some other district courts, which have assumed facts in a complaint, the district court here spent significant effort explaining a nuanced standard that clearly comprehended the need to look well beyond the pleadings in the case. Most importantly, as we will now explain, the district court's standard led to a review that complies with Falcon and with our herein-described standards that a district court must follow when deciding whether to certify a class.
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Wal-Mart does not contest this point.
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Commonality focuses on the relationship of common facts and legal issues among class members. See, e.g., Conte & Newberg, supra, § 3:10, at 271. We noted in Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019: Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively. All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class. The commonality test is qualitative rather than quantitativeone significant issue common to the class may be sufficient to warrant certification, see, e.g., Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 346, 352 (E.D.N.Y.1997), aff'd, 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Conte & Newberg, supra, § 3:10, at 272-74, a standard that dovetails with our discussion above, requiring plaintiffs to show common questions or issues. The district court found that Plaintiffs had provided evidence sufficient to support their contention that significant factual and legal questions are common to all class members. After analyzing Plaintiffs' evidence, the district court stated: Plaintiffs have exceeded the permissive and minimal burden of establishing commonality by providing: (1) significant evidence of company-wide corporate practices and policies, which include (a) excessive subjectivity in personnel decisions, (b) gender stereotyping, and (c) maintenance of a strong corporate culture; (2) statistical evidence of gender disparities caused by discrimination; and (3) anecdotal evidence of gender bias. Together, this evidence raises an inference that Wal-Mart engages in discriminatory practices in compensation and promotion that affect all plaintiffs in a common manner. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166. Discussing commonality, the district court alluded to the determinations Rule 23 requires in certifying a class. The court stated, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that common questions of law or fact exist among class members. Id. at 144. Recognizing this requirement of Rule 23, the district court went on to make reasoned determinations that commonality was met, concluding that th[e] evidence more than satisfies plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). Id. at 145. The district court then detailed the four categories of commonality evidence to which we now turn. Id. We conclude, as explained in more detail below, that it was within the district court's discretion, and in line with Falcon and the standard we have clarified today, to determine that the commonality prerequisite to class certification was satisfied. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2). [20]
Pursuant to Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, Plaintiffs presented four categories of commonality evidence that the district court subjected to a rigorous analysis: (1) facts supporting the existence of company-wide policies and practices that, in part through their subjectivity, provide a potential conduit for discrimination; (2) expert opinions supporting the existence of company-wide policies and practices that likely include a culture of gender stereotyping; (3) expert statistical evidence of class-wide gender disparities attributable to discrimination; and (4) anecdotal evidence from class members throughout the country of discriminatory attitudes held or tolerated by management. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145-66. Wal-Mart contends this evidence is insufficient to suggest a common factual or legal question related to the existence of discrimination.
As factual evidence, Plaintiffs presented evidence of the following: (1) uniform personnel and management structure across stores; (2) Wal-Mart headquarters's extensive oversight of store operations, company-wide policies governing pay and promotion decisions, and a strong, centralized corporate culture; and (3) consistent gender-related disparities in every domestic region of the company. Such evidence supports Plaintiffs' contention that Wal-Mart operates a highly centralized company that promotes policies common to all stores and maintains a single system of oversight. Wal-Mart does not challenge this evidence.
Plaintiffs presented evidence from Dr. William Bielby, a sociologist, to interpret and explain the facts that suggest that Wal-Mart has and promotes a strong corporate culture  a culture that may include gender stereotyping. Dr. Bielby based his opinion on, among other things, Wal-Mart managers' deposition testimony; organizational charts; correspondence, memos, reports, and presentations relating to personnel policy and practice, diversity, and equal employment opportunity issues; documents describing the culture and history of the company; and a large body of social science research on the impact of organizational policy and practice on workplace bias. Dr. Bielby testified that he employed a social framework analysis to examine the distinctive features of Wal-Mart's policies and practices and evaluated them against what social science shows to be factors that create and sustain bias and those that minimize bias. [21] In Dr. Bielby's opinion, social science research demonstrates that gender stereotypes are especially likely to influence personnel decisions when they are based on subjective factors, because substantial decisionmaker discretion tends to allow people to seek out and retain stereotyping-confirming information and ignore or minimize information that defies stereotypes. Id. at 153(internal quotation marks omitted). Dr. Bielby concluded that: (1) Wal-Mart's centralized coordination, reinforced by a strong organizational culture, sustains uniformity in personnel policy and practice; (2) there are significant deficiencies in Wal-Mart's equal employment policies and practices; and (3) Wal-Mart's personnel policies and practices make pay and promotion decisions vulnerable to gender bias. See id. at 153-54. The district court reviewed Plaintiffs' and Wal-Mart's competing claims as to Wal-Mart's uniform culture and determined that the evidence indicates that in-store pay and promotion decisions are largely subjective and made within a substantial range of discretion by store or district level managers, and that this is a common feature which provides a wide enough conduit for gender bias to potentially seep into the system. Id. at 152. Having evaluated this evidence in detail, the court determined that given the evidence regarding strong uniform culture and policies, the degree and impact of this practice is a significant question of fact common to the class as a whole. Id. at 153. Such a reasoned determination is what our standard for Rule 23 requires. Wal-Mart vigorously challenges Dr. Bielby's third conclusion as vague and imprecise because he concluded that Wal-Mart is vulnerable to bias or gender stereotyping but failed to identify a specific discriminatory policy at Wal-Mart. Specifically, Wal-Mart contends that Dr. Bielby's testimony does not meet the standards for expert testimony set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), which held that a trial court must act as a gatekeeper in determining whether to admit or exclude expert evidence. Wal-Mart made an identical argument to the district court and the district court properly rejected it. A close reading of the district court's order demonstrates its correct understanding of its role at the Rule 23(a)(2) certification stage  to make factual determinations regarding evidence as it relates to common questions of fact or law but not to decide which parties' evidence is ultimately more persuasive as to liability. The court stated, Dr. Bielby presents enough of a basis, both in his review of the scientific literature and on the facts of the case, to provide a foundation for his opinions. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154. The court correctly explained that whether the jury was ultimately persuaded by those opinions was a question on the merits. For the class certification, however, Dr. Bielby's opinions, for which Wal-Mart did not challenge the methodology, raised a question of corporate uniformity and gender stereotyping that is common to all class members. Id. We cannot say that considering Dr. Bielby's opinions in this method was an abuse of discretion. This conclusion is furthered by the fact that Wal-Mart did not (and does not) challenge Dr. Bielby's methodology or contend that his findings lack relevance because they do[ ] not relate to any issue in the case, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wal-Mart challenges only whether certain inferences can be persuasively drawn from his data. But because Daubert does not require a court to admit or exclude evidence based on its persuasiveness, but rather requires a court to admit or exclude evidence based on its scientific reliability and relevance, id. at 587-92, 113 S.Ct. 2786(relevance standard is a liberal one, under which evidence is relevant if it has `any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence' (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 401)), testing Dr. Bielby's testimony for  Daubert reliability would not have addressed Wal-Mart's objections. It would have simply revealed what Wal-Mart itself has admitted and courts have long accepted: that properly analyzed social science data, like that offered by Dr. Bielby, may support a plaintiff's assertions that a claim is proper for class resolution. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36, 255, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (considering similar evidence offered by expert social psychologist). Accordingly, Wal-Mart's contention that the district court was required to strike Dr. Bielby's testimony under the Daubert test at the class certification stage, simply because the conclusion he reached seemed unpersuasive absent certain corroborating evidence, is misplaced. [22] See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.). While a jury may ultimately agree with Wal-Mart that, in the absence of a specific discriminatory policy promulgated by Wal-Mart, it is not more likely than not, based solely on Dr. Bielby's analysis, that Wal-Mart engaged in actual gender discrimination, that question must be left to the merits stage of the litigation (and presumably will not have to be decided as there will be other evidence). At the class certification stage, it is enough that Dr. Bielby presented scientifically reliable evidence tending to show that a common question of fact  i.e., Does Wal-Mart's policy of decentralized, subjective employment decision making operate to discriminate against female employees?  exists with respect to all members of the class. [23] This he did and, thus, we find no error in the district court's acceptance of Dr. Bielby's evidence to support a finding of commonality.
It is well established that plaintiffs may demonstrate commonality by presenting statistical evidence, which survives a rigorous analysis, sufficient to fairly raise a common question concerning whether there is class-wide discrimination. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n. 15, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364; Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292; [24] see also Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 278 (4th Cir.1980) (recognizing that statistical data showing comparable disparities experienced by protected employees may indicate a policy or practice that commonly affects the class members and raises a common question concerning whether the pattern or practice is discriminatory). A careful reading of the district court's treatment of the competing statistical evidence demonstrates that, in conducting its analysis, the district court followed the correct standard as explained in Falcon and our earlier cases, and clarified today. Dr. Richard Drogin, Plaintiffs' statistician, analyzed data at a regional level. He ran separate regression analyses for each of the forty-one regions [25] containing Wal-Mart stores. [26] He concluded that there are statistically significant disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart in terms of compensation and promotions, that these disparities are wide-spread across regions, and that they can be explained only by gender discrimination. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154. Dr. Marc Bendick, Plaintiffs' labor economics expert, conducted a benchmarking study comparing Wal-Mart with twenty of its competitors, concluding Wal-Mart promotes a lower percentage of women than its competitors. [27] See id. Wal-Mart challenges Dr. Drogin's findings and faults his decision to conduct his research on the regional level, rather than analyze the data store-by-store. [28] However, the proper test of whether workforce statistics should be viewed at the macro (regional) or micro (store or sub-store) level depends largely on the similarity of the employment practices and the interchange of employees at the various facilities. See Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir.1975) (recognizing that the focus of analysis depends on the nature of a defendant's employment practices); 2 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1598, 1723 (3d ed.1996). Here, Dr. Drogin explained that a store-by-store analysis would not capture: (1) the effect of district, regional, and company-wide control over Wal-Mart's uniform compensation policies and procedures; (2) the dissemination of Wal-Mart's uniform compensation policies and procedures resulting from the frequent movement of store managers; or (3) Wal-Mart's strong corporate culture. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 157. In conducting its rigorous analysis of these claims, the district court first restated its standard of review. Its decision makes clear that the district court made determinations that Plaintiffs' statistics raised common questions of fact or law only after it rigorously analyzed them, probing significantly behind the pleadings and resolving facts necessary to make determinations on Rule 23(a)(2). Discussing the proper standard for evaluating the statistics, the district court said it rejected a full-blown merits evaluation of the evidence but had to view[ ] the statistical evidence and testimony through the proper lens of the standards applicable to a class certification motion. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 155. Though noting it would not decide the actual merits of the claims, the court did delve[ ] into the substance of the expert testimony ... to the extent necessary to determine if it [wa]s sufficiently probative of an inference of discrimination to create a common question as to the existence of a pattern and practice of gender discrimination at Wal-Mart. Id. This is the precise inquiry that cases such as IPO have required, and it clearly meets the standard we outline above, particularly given the depth of the district court's review, the evidentiary posture of the case as a Title VII pattern and practice case, and the underlying procedural standard where the district court here was reviewing evidence under Rule 23(a)(2), to raise a common question, rather than, like the cases Wal-Mart cites, Rule 23(b)(3), to determine predominance. See Hnot, 241 F.R.D. at 210. In addition to formulating a review that complied with Falcon and our precedent, the district court, contrary to Wal-Mart's claims, did not improperly rely on out-of-circuit cases the Second Circuit overruled in IPO. Specifically, Wal-Mart cites Visa Check and Caridad as decisions IPO rejected, noting the district court's supposed reliance on this reasoning renders its decision error. As an initial matter, the district court did not cite Visa Check at all. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 passim. While it did cite to Caridad, nothing about its citation to Caridad was erroneous. The district court cited Caridad five times. Two instances of this reliance can be immediately set aside as unproblematic because they relied on Caridad 's holding that excessive subjectivity in corporate policies can contribute to a finding of commonality. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149-50, 154. IPO neither addressed nor overruled this holding in Caridad, and it still remains controlling authority in the Second Circuit. Hnot, 241 F.R.D. at 210. A third citation to Caridad supported the district court's statement that, although some inquiry into the substance of a case may be necessary to ascertain satisfaction of the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a), it is improper to advance a decision on the merits to the class certification stage. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 144(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292). This statement is entirely consistent with Falcon, our precedent, and our ruling today. The two other citations to Caridad equally show that the district court did not adopt the some showing standard that the Second Circuit properly rejected. Instead, the district court refused to consider the merits  it would not conclusively find whether Wal-Mart had discriminated  but it analyzed the evidence to the extent, under Rule 23(a)(2), that it had to determine whether there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2); Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143. [29] Critically, the district court did not shy away from issues overlapping with the merits; rather it devoted fifteen pages of its opinion to probing the parties' statistics. The district court merely refused to decide the underlying merits themselves and examined evidence only to the extent necessary to satisfy itself under Rule 23(a)(2) that Plaintiffs raised common questions. In doing so, it joined dozens of other district courts in this circuit that have engaged the proper analysis, all using different wording, but all probing behind the pleadings to make determinations on the Rule 23 requirements. See, e.g., In re Cooper Cos. Sec. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 628, 641 n. 7 (C.D.Cal.2009); Bishop v. Petro-Chem. Transp., LLC, 582 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1305 (E.D.Cal.2008); Alexander v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 237 F.R.D. 628, 629(D.Mont.2006); Westways World Travel, Inc., 218 F.R.D. at 230. Turning to the factual assertions in Plaintiffs' evidence, the court made a preliminary determination, based on the following largely uncontested statistics: [W]omen working in Wal-Mart stores are paid less than men in every region, that pay disparities exist in most job categories, that the salary gap widens over time even for men and women hired into the same jobs at the same time, that women take longer to enter into management positions, and that the higher one looks in the organization the lower the percentage of women. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 155. Importantly, and as instructed by Falcon, these factual determinations were arrived at after looking beyond the pleadings to Plaintiffs' expert's deposition. Id. Correctly noting that descriptive statistics do not address causation, the district court then analyzed not the pleadings, but Plaintiffs' and Wal-Mart's statistics, finding, In short, all of Dr. Drogin's regressions show that gender is a statistically significant variable in accounting for the salary differentials between female class members and male employees at Wal-Mart stores. Id. at 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364. The court specifically analyzed whether aggregation of statistics for regional units was proper or whether Wal-Mart was correct to insist upon a store-level evaluation. The district court first stated the relevant sub-standard: The proper test of whether workforce statistics should be viewed at the macro (regional) or micro (store or sub-store) level depends largely on the similarity of the employment practices, and the interchange of employees, at the various facilities. Id. at 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (citation omitted). It continued, Dr. Drogin contends that it is proper to conduct the analysis on a regional level because the subjective decision-making in compensation and promotions takes place within parameters and guidelines that are highly uniform.... Plaintiffs also have shown, as discussed above, that the primary salary decision-makers, Store Managers, experience frequent relocation among the various stores. Id. at 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364. On appeal, Wal-Mart contends that the district court erred by not finding Wal-Mart's statistical evidence more persuasive than Plaintiffs' evidence because, according to Wal-Mart, its analysis was conducted store-by-store. However, contrary to Wal-Mart's characterization of its analysis, and the dissent's concerns regarding statistical aggregation, [30] Wal-Mart's own research was not conducted at the individual store level. Dr. Joan Haworth, Wal-Mart's expert, did not conduct a store-by-store analysis; instead she reviewed data at the sub-store level by comparing departments to analyze the pay differential between male and female hourly employees. [31] Moreover, our task here is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that, based on all the evidence presented, there existed common questions of fact sufficient to justify class certification. See Gonzales v. Free Speech Coal., 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir.2005); Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 867. We are not to re-examine the relative strength or persuasiveness of the commonality evidence ourselves. Thus, even if we were to find, based on an independent review of the record, that Wal-Mart's statistical evidence was more persuasive than Plaintiffs'  which we do not, in any event  this alone would not allow us to find that the district court improperly relied on Dr. Drogin's testimony as a valid component of its commonality analysis or that the district court erred in its ultimate conclusion that the commonality prerequisite was satisfied. That the jury might later find Wal-Mart's statistical evidence more persuasive does not detract from the district court's determination, after extensive review, that Dr. Drogin's regional analysis raises common issues appropriate for class adjudication. Here, again, the district court followed the Supreme Court's guidance to thoughtfully probe behind the pleadings, Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, and did not abuse its discretion when it relied on Dr. Drogin's use and interpretation of statistical data as a valid component of its determination that Plaintiffs raised common questions. It considered Wal-Mart's challenges to Dr. Drogin's statistics and made the specific determination that the Court is not persuaded that Dr. Drogin's aggregated statistical analysis should be rejected because he did not choose to utilize the Chow test, as Wal-Mart had urged. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 158. In other words, for the purposes of class certification, the district court reasonably made the determination to credit Plaintiffs' statistics. Wal-Mart also claims the district court erred in determining that Wal-Mart provided little or no proper legal or factual challenge to Dr. Drogin's analysis, [32] and that, contrary to Wal-Mart's contention, Dr. Haworth's Store Manager survey evidence  which was stricken for failing to satisfy the standards of Rules 702 and 703 of Evidence [33]  did not undermine or contradict Dr. Drogin's evidence. In rejecting the inclusion of Wal-Mart's Store Manager surveys as a challenge to Dr. Drogin's statistics because they were not based on a scientifically valid reasoning or methodology, Dukes II, 222 F.R.D. at 197-98 (discussing Rules 702 and 703), see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, the court noted that even if the evidence were included, [t]he survey would not provide sufficient additional weight to Defendant's challenge to Dr. Drogin's analysis to sway the Court from its conclusion that his testimony supports an inference of discrimination, and thus the existence of substantial questions common to the class, Dukes II, 222 F.R.D. at 198 n. 9 (emphasis added). In so ruling, the district court went even further into the merits than necessary to make a reasoned, justifiable determination, after proper review under the correct standard, that Plaintiffs' claims were appropriate for class adjudication due to common questions. Thus, because Dr. Drogin adequately explained, and the district court rigorously analyzed, why his statistical method best reflected the alleged discrimination, the court did not abuse its discretion when it credited Dr. Drogin's analysis of statistical evidence of common discrimination questions. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that Dr. Drogin's analysis supported Plaintiffs' contention that there is a common core of facts flowing from Wal-Mart's corporate structure and policies that affects class members generally with regard to their discrimination claims. While Plaintiffs and Wal-Mart disagree on whose findings are more persuasive, the disagreement is not one of whether Plaintiffs have asserted common questions of law or fact. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157, 159, 102 S.Ct. 2364. The disagreement is the common question, and deciding which side has been more persuasive is an issue for the next phase of the litigation. Requiring even more findings and further analysis from the district court would be to force a trial on the merits at the certification stage. Finally, and discussed further below, the district court's review of statistics showing discrimination regarding promotions was also not an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs and Defendant disagree over whether Dr. Drogin's analysis of internal promotion data was proper. Specifically, both sides agreed that Wal-Mart's actual applicant flow data for promotions during the class period was limited and contained significant gaps. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 162. Dr. Drogin's statistics estimated the applicant flow by tabulating `the incumbents in historical feeder jobs for each promotion.' Id. Wal-Mart argued that the data, while limited, is nonetheless sufficient to justify an extrapolation for all job openings during the entire class period. Id. The district court, addressing this statistical dispute, found Plaintiffs' statistics sufficient to create an inference of discrimination. Id. at 164. In doing so, the district court found Dr. Drogin's reasoning and methodology valid and applicable in the case. While the court noted in passing that Dr. Drogin's statistics were reasonable, the court also, and more appropriately, stated that it is well recognized that where actual applicant flow data is inadequate or unavailable, other measures of applicant flow  including but not limited to `feeder pools'  are deemed acceptable so long as they are used in a reliable manner. Id. at 162-63. In doing so the district court cited an evidence treatise, Ninth Circuit precedent, and a district court case that had accepted the same type of feeder pool methodology in a dispute of the very same experts  Dr. Drogin and Dr. Haworth. Id. at 163 & n. 37 (citing Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1185-86 (9th Cir.2002); R. Paetzold and S. Willborn, The Statistics of Discrimination §§ 4.02-4.04 (2002); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F.Supp. 259, 333-34 (N.D.Cal.1992)). Thus, properly considering Dr. Drogin's statistics, the court made a determination on the applicant pool data. It found that Defendant's assertion that its approach is necessarily superior does not withstand scrutiny. Rather, Defendant's arguments, which go to the weight of the evidence [i.e., the persuasiveness on the merits], merely highlight the presence of a significant issue affecting all class members which supports, rather than defeats, granting class certification. Id. at 164. This determination was thus made after a rigorous analysis of the parties' statistical claims. In short, the district court stated the legal standard, analyzed Plaintiffs' and Wal-Mart's competing claims to the propriety of aggregating statistics on a regional level and addressing Wal-Mart's missing applicant flow data, noted Plaintiffs have shown reasons to accept their statistics, dismissed Wal-Mart's statistical challenges, demonstrated these finding were supported by relevant Ninth Circuit precedent (and an identical dispute involving the same two experts), rejected Wal-Mart's reliance on a district court case purportedly explaining why the sub-store statistical analysis was proper, and, finally, determined that at the class certification stage all of this analysis was sufficient to support Dr. Drogin's analysis and raise questions of law or fact common to the class. This searching analysis was solid, well founded and in no way an abuse of discretion.
Circumstantial and anecdotal evidence of discrimination is commonly used in Title VII pattern and practice cases to bolster statistical proof by bringing the cold numbers convincingly to life. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339, 97 S.Ct. 1843; see also Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 517 (9th Cir.2002). Wal-Mart contends that the district court erred by concluding that the anecdotal evidence, presented by Plaintiffs in the form of sworn declarations, supported a finding of commonality. [34] Wal-Mart maintains that the declarations depict a handful of widely divergent events that cannot be deemed probative or representative of discrimination in pay or management-track promotions. In their declarations, the potential class members testified to being paid less than similarly situated men, being denied or delayed in receiving promotions in a disproportionate manner when compared with similarly situated men, working in an atmosphere with a strong corporate culture of discrimination, and being subjected to various individual sexist acts. The district court credited this evidence. Wal-Mart argues that 120 declarations cannot sufficiently represent a class of this size. However, we find no authority requiring or even suggesting that a plaintiff class submit a specific number of declarations for such evidence to have any value. Moreover, the district court did not state that this anecdotal evidence provided sufficient proof to establish commonality by itself, but merely noted such evidence provides support for Plaintiffs' contention that commonality is present. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166 (This anecdotal evidence, in combination with the other evidence previously discussed, further supports an inference that [Wal-Mart's] policies and procedures have the effect of discriminating against Plaintiffs in a common manner.). [35] Because the combination of these declarations and Plaintiffs' other evidence, discussed below, raise an inference of common discriminatory experiences, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it considered Plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence. [36] Finally, in arguing against certification based on affidavits, Plaintiffs' personal allegations, statistics, and expert testimony, the dissent intersperses references of Falcon immediately with discussion of Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 879, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984), claiming individual stories do not constitute significant proof that Wal-Mart has adopted a general policy of discrimination or that such a policy prevails at Wal-Mart. Dissent at 635. This criticism, and particularly its temporary suspension of consideration of the statistical evidence, is indicative of the dissent's repeated attempts to go beyond the Supreme Court's concern with the need for more precise pleadings in class actions, Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (citing Johnson, 417 F.2d at 1125), and the Court's command that sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question, id. at 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, in an effort to reframe the question as one on whether Plaintiffs can actually succeed on the merits. Cf. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140(explaining that the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits is not part of deciding whether certification is proper). Contrary to the dissent's proposed standard, Plaintiffs here need not establish a prima facie case on the merits. Dissent at 643. Class certification in Cooper had already taken place and, in fact, the case had gone through a trial. 467 U.S. at 872, 104 S.Ct. 2794. The decision for the Supreme Court was whether the class's loss at trial precluded a class member from maintaining his own, separate civil action subsequent to the loss. Id. at 869, 104 S.Ct. 2794. This is an entirely different posture than the present case presents, and the standard for winning a claim under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), is, of course, different than that for certifying a class action. See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 875-76, 104 S.Ct. 2794; Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364.
As discussed above, the district court found substantial evidence suggesting common pay and promotion policies among Wal-Mart's many stores. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 148-51. The court also reasoned that Wal-Mart's decision to permit its managers to utilize subjectivity in interpreting those policies offers additional support for a commonality finding. See id. Relying on Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 924 F.Supp. 1346 (D.N.J.1996), Wal-Mart challenges the latter conclusion, contending that managers' discretionary authority does not support a finding of commonality because [d]ecentralized, discretionary decisionmaking is not inherently discriminatory. It is well established that subjective decision making is a ready mechanism[ ] for discrimination and that courts should scrutinize it carefully. Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Wal-Mart is correct that discretionary decision making by itself is insufficient to meet Plaintiffs' burden. The district court recognized this, noting that managerial discretion is but one of several factors that supported a finding of commonality. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149-50 (And while the presence of excessive subjectivity, alone, does not necessarily create a common question of fact, where, as here, such subjectivity is part of a consistent corporate policy and supported by other evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination, courts have not hesitated to find that commonality is satisfied.). Wal-Mart is incorrect, however, that decentralized, subjective decision making cannot contribute to a common question of fact regarding the existence of discrimination. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2364. Indeed, courts from around the country have found [a]llegations of similar discriminatory employment practices, such as the use of entirely subjective personnel processes that operate to discriminate, [sufficient to] satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.1993); see also supra note 7 and cases cited therein. Plaintiffs produced substantial evidence of Wal-Mart's centralized firm-wide culture and policies, see Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151-54, thus providing a nexus between the subjective decision making and the considerable statistical evidence demonstrating a pattern of lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. See id. at 154-65; see also Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 670-72 (N.D.Ga.2001) (subjective decision making may give rise to an inference of discrimination where evidence shows a nexus between decision making and discrimination). Therefore, for the reasons stated above, there was no abuse of discretion in determining that Wal-Mart's subjective decisionmaking policy provides support for Plaintiffs' contention that commonality exists among potential class members.
The district court's analysis of Rule 23(a)(2) complies with the standard the Supreme Court has set down and we have explained today for a district court adjudicating a motion for class certification. Plaintiffs' factual evidence, expert opinions, statistical evidence, and anecdotal evidence provide sufficient support to raise the common question whether Wal-Mart's female employees nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate policies (not merely a number of independent discriminatory acts) that may have worked to unlawfully discriminate against them in violation of Title VII. Evidence of Wal-Mart's subjective decision-making policies suggests a common legal or factual question regarding whether Wal-Mart's policies or practices are discriminatory. Many other courts have reached the same conclusion based on similar evidence. See, e.g., Staton, 327 F.3d at 955; Shipes, 987 F.2d at 316; Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th Cir.1986); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1984).
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs contend that Wal-Mart has waived a challenge to the district court's typicality finding by failing to offer specific objections to the district court's typicality determination. However, because Wal-Mart refers, somewhat obliquely, to the typicality factor in its opening brief and because typicality and commonality are similar and tend to merge, see Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, [37] we conclude that Wal-Mart did not waive its opportunity to challenge the district court's findings with regard to typicality. Thus, although Wal-Mart did not raise a specific challenge, it nevertheless raised a general objection to the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs' evidence satisfies the typicality requirement. As discussed below, to satisfy the typicality pre-requisite, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their claims and their class representatives are sufficiently typical of the class.
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). We stated in Hanlon that, [u]nder the rule's permissive standards, representative claims are `typical' if they are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical. 150 F.3d at 1020; see also Staton, 327 F.3d at 957(stating that a class representative [from each job category] for each type of discrimination claim alleged ... is not necessary). Thus, we must consider whether the injury allegedly suffered by the named plaintiffs and the rest of the class resulted from the same allegedly discriminatory practice. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 957. Even though individual employees in different stores with different managers may have received different levels of pay or may have been denied promotion or promoted at different rates, because the discrimination they claim to have suffered occurred through alleged common practices  e.g., excessively subjective decision making in a corporate culture of uniformity and gender stereotyping  the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that their claims are sufficiently typical to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3).
Typicality requires that the named plaintiffs be members of the class they represent. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364. There is no dispute that the class representatives are typical of the hourly class members, because almost all of the class representatives hold hourly positions. Instead, Wal-Mart contends that the class representatives are not typical of all female in-store managers because only one of the class representatives holds a salaried management position, and she holds a somewhat low-level position. However, because all female employees faced the same alleged discrimination, the lack of a class representative for each management category does not undermine Plaintiffs' certification goal. See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (An employee can challenge discrimination in different job categories where the primary practices used to discriminate in the different categories are themselves similar. While it may be prudent to have the class divided into sub-classes represented by a named plaintiff from each of the differing job categories, it would not be necessary to the validity of the class certification to do so.); Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 562 (8th Cir.1982) (Typicality is not defeated because of the varied promotional opportunities at issue, or the differing qualifications of the plaintiffs and class members.). In addition, because the range of managers in the proposed class is limited to managers working in Wal-Mart's stores and excludes those at regional or national offices, it is not an excessively diverse class; a named plaintiff occupying a lower-level, salaried, in-store management position is sufficient to satisfy the permissive typicality requirement. Staton, 327 F.3d at 957(recognizing that, `[u]nder the rule's permissive standards,' plaintiffs are not required to offer a class representative for each type of discrimination claim alleged (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020)). Because Plaintiffs' claims and Plaintiffs' representatives are sufficiently typical of the class, the district court acted within its discretion when it found that Plaintiffs satisfied the typicality prerequisite.
Rule 23(a)(4) permits certification of a class action only if the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). This factor requires: (1) that the proposed representative Plaintiffs do not have conflicts of interest with the proposed class, and (2) that Plaintiffs are represented by qualified and competent counsel. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020; see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 955 (9th Cir.2003). Before the district court, Wal-Mart argued that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this factor because of a conflict of interest between female in-store managers who are both plaintiff class members and decision-making agents of Wal-Mart. Relying on Staton, the district court recognized that courts need not deny certification of an employment class simply because the class includes both supervisory and non-supervisory employees. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 168; see also Staton, 327 F.3d at 958-59. This decision was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, because Wal-Mart does not challenge the district court's finding that Plaintiffs' class representatives and counsel are adequate, we need not analyze this factor.
The district court certified Plaintiffs' promotion claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and punitive damages, but concluded that manageability concerns required that any lost pay remedy on Plaintiffs' promotion claim would be limited to that subset of the class for whom objective applicant data exists. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 183. Wal-Mart objects to the certification of Plaintiffs' promotion claims, even with this limitation, on commonality and manageability grounds. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, object to the district court's limitation of eligibility for back pay to positions for which objective applicant data exist. Title VII pattern and practice class actions frequently include both salary and promotion claims. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 406, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986) (per curiam); Cooper, 467 U.S. at 870, 104 S.Ct. 2794. As discussed above, the district court found that Plaintiffs here have provided evidence sufficient to support their contention that company-wide corporate practices and policies  including excessive subjectivity in personnel decisions, gender stereotyping, and maintenance of a strong corporate culture  affected both compensation and promotion of all Plaintiffs in a common manner. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166. Although there may be some variation among individual promotion decisions, variation does not prevent class certification of common issues of fact. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 (Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively. All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.). Given its findings regarding Wal-Mart's company-wide promotion policies and minimum guidelines, see Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 148-49, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was a sufficient common factual basis among putative class members' promotion claims to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). We also affirm the district court's conclusion that a back pay remedy for promotion claims would be manageable only with respect to those positions for which objective applicant data is available to document class member interest. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 183. Wal-Mart's extensive database containing information on each employee individually with respect to job history, seniority, job review ratings, and many other factors, see id. at 183-85, would enable a determination of each class member's qualifications for promotion without the need for potentially unmanageable individualized hearings. The district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting eligibility for back pay, however, because allowing class members to demonstrate post hoc their previous interest in promotions might indeed be unmanageable. See id. at 181-82.
Based on the evidence before the district court, which it rigorously analyzed pursuant to Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, and the standard herein described, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Rule 23(a) elements were satisfied.
As mentioned earlier, Plaintiffs moved to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires showing that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief ... is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). [38] The district court agreed with Plaintiffs. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 170-71. Wal-Mart argues the district court merely paid lip service to Rule 23(b)(2) and erred in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) because claims for monetary relief predominate over claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate for all classes and does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 1966 amends., 39 F.R.D. at 69, 102; see also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1195 (Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate only where the primary relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.). An interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) that prevented any claim for monetary relief would render this advisory committee requirement redundant or irrelevant. We first turn to the appropriate standard for determining when monetary relief predominates over declaratory and injunctive relief and therefore precludes certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. We have previously joined the Second Circuit in adopting a test that focuses on the plaintiffs' subjective intent in bringing a lawsuit. See Molski, 318 F.3d at 950; Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir.2001). In contrast, several other circuits use the incidental damages standard that was first enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415-16 (5th Cir.1998). See, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 646-51 (6th Cir.2006); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001); Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir.2000). Under the Allison approach, monetary relief predominates over other forms of relief unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 415. We see no need to employ either approach, which are both, essentially, glosses on the text of the Advisory Committee's Note's statement that Rule 23(b)(2) does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages. Merriam-Webster defines predominant as having superior strength, influence, or authority: prevailing. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 978 (11th ed.2004). To be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), therefore, a class must seek only monetary damages that are not superior [in] strength, influence, or authority to injunctive and declaratory relief. An analysis of a plaintiff's subjective intent in bringing a suit, as required by the standard set forth in Molski, is, at best, an incomplete method for answering this question. By eschewing consideration of the practical impact of a request for monetary relief on the litigation itself, the sole emphasis on the plaintiff's intent ignores important indicators of the strength, influence, [and] authority of a request for specific monetary relief. In short, Molski 's focus on subjective intent and its concomitant failure to consider the pragmatic impact of a request for monetary relief render it fatally flawed. The Molski approach is troubling for the additional reason that it requires courts to engage in a nebulous and imprecise inquiry into the plaintiffs' intent in bringing a particular suit. Only in those cases in which a request for injunctive relief is obviously a ruse will this inquiry provide a clear answer. More often than not, we suspect that the answer will be equivocal and, therefore, essentially an entirely discretionary one. Although the standard set forth in Allison is an objective one that does consider the practical effect of a request for monetary damages, it suffers from a different deficiency. By requiring monetary relief to be no more than incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief, the Allison approach is in direct conflict with the text of the Advisory Committee's Note, which forbids certification under Rule 23(b)(2) if monetary relief is the predominant form of relief. See 151 F.3d at 412-16. Predominant is not synonymous with more than incidental. As a result, the Allison approach would preclude the certification of some Rule 23(b)(2) classes that the drafters of the Rules intended to allow. Allison 's standard also usurps the district courts' authority granted by Rule 23... to rigorously analyze the case, probe behind the pleadings if necessary, and exercise its own discretion within the framework of the rules in determining whether the action is to be so maintained. Id. at 431(Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165 (describing Allison 's incidental damages test as a one-size-fits-all approach). Such a limitation is in direct conflict with the Federal Rules' intention that district courts be afforded discretion. The predominance test suggested by the Advisory Committee's Note, by contrast, is consistent with the wide discretion given to district courts in making the class certification decision and accomplishing Title VII's remedial objectives. To the extent Molski required the district court to inquire only into the intent of the plaintiffs and focus primarily on determining whether reasonable plaintiffs would bring suit to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief even in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, see Molski, 318 F.3d at 950 & n. 15, it is overruled. In light of the inadequacy of both the Allison and Molski approaches, we adopt instead the standard that Rule 23(b)(2)'s drafters straightforwardly indicated: Rule 23(b)(2) certification is not appropriate where monetary relief is predominant over injunctive relief or declaratory relief. To determine whether monetary relief predominates, a district court should consider, on a case-by-case basis, the objective effect of the relief sought on the litigation. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 416. Factors such as whether the monetary relief sought determines the key procedures that will be used, whether it introduces new and significant legal and factual issues, whether it requires individualized hearings, and whether its size and nature  as measured by recovery per class member  raise particular due process and manageability concerns would all be relevant, though no single factor would be determinative. Under this standard, as discussed more fully below, the district court's decision to include claims for back pay in a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) was not an abuse of its discretion. On the other hand, the district court did abuse its discretion by failing to analyze whether certifying Plaintiffs' punitive damages claims under Rule 23(b)(2) caused monetary damages to predominate, notwithstanding its decision to require notice and an opportunity for Plaintiffs to opt-out of the punitive damages claims.
Wal-Mart first asserts that the district court failed to even evaluate Rule 23(b)'s requirement that the challenged conduct be generally applicable to the class. Wal-Mart's contention that its unrebutted statistics demonstrate that there is no evidence of pervasive discrimination that would justify injunctive relief and that, therefore, the challenged conduct does not affect all members, is simply not persuasive. As explained above, Wal-Mart's evidence was rebutted by Plaintiffs to the extent that Plaintiffs' evidence and theories remain viable at this pre-merits analysis stage. Further, the issue before us is whether monetary relief predominates, not whether Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail.