Opinion ID: 1138780
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the Mocks were injured by the Bank's acts.

Text: This recital is sufficient, as a bare minimum, to give notice that the Mocks were complaining of a lawful act, conducted with the intent to injure and without sufficient economic or social justification, that did injure them, i.e. a prima facie tort. See Azby Brokerage, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 681 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). It is insufficient for the Bank to complain that they did not recognize the theory underlying the allegations, and, in fact, they were apprised of the Mocks' theory before the trial began. In the present case, although we recognize that the Mocks' initial pleadings were not a model of clarity, we are convinced that they adequately presented the elements of prima facie tort. The Bank did not object at trial to the introduction of evidence, and yet it claims that it did not consent to the theory and was prejudiced by the amendment. Simply because the Bank did not recognize the prima facie tort claim is not grounds for a finding that the court abused its discretion. However, because of the novelty of the prima facie tort claim and in the interest of justice, we have examined the Bank's claim of prejudice, and we find that the Bank vigorously defended the issues pertaining to the prima facie tort claim and was not prejudiced. Leave to amend pleadings should be freely given when justice so requires. SCRA 1986, 1-015(A). Amendments are within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Montano v. House of Carpets, Inc., 84 N.M. 129, 130, 500 P.2d 414, 415 (1972). Amendments to conform the pleadings to the evidence should be allowed when the issues are tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. SCRA 1986, 1-015(B); Csanyi v. Csanyi, 82 N.M. 411, 412, 483 P.2d 292, 293 (1971). Even if the party has not consented to amendment, a trial court is required to allow it freely if the objecting party fails to show he will be prejudiced thereby. SCRA 1986, 1-015(B); Wynne v. Pino, 78 N.M. 520, 523, 433 P.2d 499, 502 (1967). The Bank argues that, although issues and evidence relating to the prima facie tort may have been presented at trial, the evidence was relevant to the claims initially pleaded by the Mocks, fraud and negligence, and was only incidental to the prima facie tort cause of action. As such, the Bank maintains that it cannot be charged with impliedly consenting to the theory. Courts have found that, although evidence is not objected to at trial, there is no implied consent to a new theory or issue when the evidence is relevant to other pleaded issues, see Moya v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 75 N.M. 462, 406 P.2d 173 (1965); Wynne v. Pino, 78 N.M. at 523, 433 P.2d at 502, and have determined that the amendment should not be allowed if the opposing party has been prejudiced by the amendment. See Camp v. Bernalillo County Medical Center, 96 N.M. 611, 613, 633 P.2d 719, 721 (Ct.App. 1981) (finding prejudice when the party was not allowed to present evidence that would have rebutted the moving party's theory as later presented in the amended complaint). We agree with the Bank that they did not consent to the trying of the case on a prima facie tort theory, and we proceed to determine whether in fact the Bank was prejudiced by the amendment. The test of prejudice is whether the party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it could offer additional evidence on the new theory. Id. Prejudice means undue difficulty in prosecuting the suit because of the change in theory. Deakyne v. Comm'rs of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.1969). The Bank initially claims prejudice because it had no notice of Mocks' theory and could not present evidence of economic self interest, profit motive and business advantage as a defense. It also contends that the Mocks had to show that the Bank was motivated solely by disinterested malevolence, and the Bank was prejudiced because it was unable to contest this element. As our discussion of the elements of prima facie tort, infra, shows, the Bank states the elements too strongly, but we also find that the Bank did present such evidence. Throughout the trial, the Bank attempted to demonstrate that it was only acting out of its own interest in moving against the note. However, the evidence also demonstrates that the jury could find that, in ruthlessly and recklessly pursuing its own interest, the Bank acted with disregard for the interests of others and should have known that its actions would inflict injury. This adequately fits within the contours of a New Mexico prima facie tort. The Bank argues that it was prejudiced because it was unable to gain the knowledge that punitive damages may not be available under prima facie tort. The Bank, however, does not direct the court to any authority stating that punitive damages are not available, citing only Brown v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 720 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S.Ct. 2180, 95 L.Ed.2d 836 (1987), which found it unnecessary to address the issue of punitive damages. Our research indicates that punitive damages are contemplated under prima facie tort. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 comment m (1977). Because we see no reason why punitives should not be available, we find no prejudice to the Bank on this point. The Bank claims prejudice because it did not know that a prima facie tort claim must be exclusive and that no established tort theory can be available. However, the evidence shows that the Mocks did not have any other tort claim available upon which they could recover, and consequently there was no prejudice. The Bank also contends that a prima facie tort theory requires that the act complained of must be otherwise lawful, and it was prejudiced because it was unable to develop evidence to contest this element. We find it hard to believe that the Bank is now claiming that its actions in moving against the note were unlawful and therefore they should be relieved of their tort liability because they were prejudiced in being unable to present such evidence. In any case, courts considering prima facie tort claims have determined that this requirement merely restates the issue discussed above, that the plaintiff can have no other tort theory available to support recovery, and we therefore find the Bank was not prejudiced by this claim. See Bandag of Springfield, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Lastly, the Bank argues that it was prejudiced because it could not develop evidence for the balancing approach we adopt today in determining whether an act complained of can be determined tortious as a matter of law before the facts are submitted to the jury. The judge must engage in the balancing process and apply the factors discussed infra to determine whether liability in tort will exist for the type of injury complained of. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 comment k (1977). The jury then applies the standards developed by the court to the facts it finds. Id. We find that the trial judge did engage in this balancing test, that the factors to be considered were fully developed at the trial, and therefore the Bank was not prejudiced. Thus, we hold that the Bank was not prejudiced by the pleading amendment. The Mocks pleaded with sufficiency to give the Bank notice of its claim, and, in any case, the Bank was not prejudiced by the amendment to conform to the evidence.