Opinion ID: 1058303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of hung jury and motion to impose a life sentence in prieto i, mistrial for manifest necessity, and denial of motion to bar retrial in prieto ii

Text: We next address issues concerning whether the circuit court erred in denying Prieto's motion for a mistrial in Prieto I when the jury raised the issue whether it could reach a unanimous determination regarding mental retardation and in denying Prieto's motion to impose a life sentence. We also consider the court's declaration of a mistrial for manifest necessity on the grounds of juror misconduct and the consequent retrial of the entire case. In Prieto I, the circuit court did not bifurcate the trial into two separate phases for determination of guilt or innocence and sentencing. Instead, the circuit court trifurcated the first trial into three phases: (1) determination of innocence or guilt, (2) determination of mental retardation, and (3) sentencing. During jury deliberations on the issue of mental retardation, the jury foreman provided the circuit court with a note stating: We have been unable to get a unanimous decision. It appears we will be unable to. At the same time, the court also received a note from Juror D, which read: Again, I feel that I am being pressure [sic] by my fellow juror[s] to go along with their decision. I am the only one differing from the the [sic] rest. My decision this time is firm and final and deliberation has crossed the line into peer pressure. Please end this deliberation. Upon being notified of these comments, Prieto's counsel moved to dismiss the jury on the grounds that the comments of both the jury foreman and Juror D made it clear that the jury would be unable to reach a verdict on the issue of mental retardation, and therefore, an Allen charge would not help the jury reach a decision through the deliberative process. Rather, defense counsel contended an Allen charge would only force or compel Juror D to a different decision. Defense counsel argued that a life sentence should be imposed pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.4(E). [4] The Commonwealth argued that due to the length of time the jury had been involved in the case and its apparent split, the jury should at least be given a modified Allen charge. The Commonwealth also argued that because Prieto bore the burden to convince the jury on the issue of mental retardation and failed to meet that burden, the trial should proceed to sentencing. The circuit court denied Prieto's motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the jury was hung and gave a modified Allen charge, which reminded the jury to resume its deliberations following lunch. Before returning to the jury room to continue deliberations following lunch, Juror D submitted a second note to the circuit court, stating: Now, during the deliberation of whether defendant is mentally retarded or not, I am once again facing absolute pressure to go along with the other jurors ... I ... AGAIN ask that your Honor end this deliberation.... Since I don't believe that the prosecution has proved that the defendant is guilty of the capital murder charges, I kindly ask the court to immediately dismiss me. The circuit court adjourned the jury until the following morning and addressed the issue of a mistrial with the parties. Prieto's counsel asserted that the guilt phase of the trial had concluded and the sentencing phase was taking place, that despite trifurcating mental retardation into being different from the penalty phase, ... the reality is that we're in the penalty phase. We're not in the guilt and innocence phase. That's done. It's been determined and so there's only two stages to the trial. Prieto contended that the jury was hung on the issue of mental retardation, as part of the sentencing phase, and the circuit court should therefore impose a sentence of life without parole pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.4(E). The Commonwealth argued that the trial was not yet in the sentencing phase, that the jury had received no penalty evidence, and although the jury [could not] agree on retardation, [it was] hardly hung on penalty. The circuit court made a factual determination that Juror D did not follow the Allen charge when instead of returning to the jury room to continue deliberations after lunch, he gave the deputy sheriff his second note. The circuit court held that Juror D engaged in clear misconduct by not following [the court's] instructions to maintain his honest convictions during the guilt phase and later failing to abide by the Allen charge. The circuit court declared a mistrial due to manifest necessity resulting from Juror D's misconduct. At the outset of the retrial in Prieto II, Prieto filed a motion to bar retrial and to impose a life sentence, arguing that the jury's deadlock on the issue of mental retardation was akin to a deadlock on the issue of penalty, and therefore the court must impose a life sentence as the death penalty was precluded. The circuit court denied Prieto's motion, stating that [t]he basis for the retrial here is that Judge [Dennis] Smith [who presided over Prieto I] declared a mistrial based on manifest necessity. And I find that there was a manifest necessity and that Judge Smith had no choice but to declare a mistrial and start this case from scratch. The circuit court cited as grounds of misconduct by Juror D his failure to vote his conscience in the guilt phase and to follow the Allen charge to resume and continue deliberations. The circuit court, in noting that Prieto had not challenged Judge Smith's factual findings, stated that the finding of misconduct was based upon three factors: (1) Judge Smith's contemporaneous finding that Juror D refused to resume deliberations; (2) Testimony from a deputy sheriff that he received Juror D's second note before deliberations resumed following the Allen charge and the lunch recess; and (3) The court clerk's notes corroborating Judge Smith's determination of the sequence of events. The circuit court also concluded that the jury during Prieto I was not hung on the issue of mental retardation when the Allen charge was given. On appeal, Prieto assigns error to the circuit court's denial of his motion to bar a retrial and impose a life sentence. Prieto maintains that the circuit court erred in declaring a mistrial in Prieto I and in allowing the Commonwealth to seek the death penalty in Prieto II. Prieto contends that when the jury informed the circuit court that they could not reach a unanimous verdict on the issue of mental retardation in Prieto I, the jury had deadlocked on the appropriate sentence. Therefore, Prieto argues the circuit court should have sentenced him to life without parole, in accordance with Code § 19.2-264.4(E), and barred the Commonwealth from retrying him for capital murder in Prieto II. Prieto further asserts that because it was clear that the jury had deadlocked on the issue of mental retardation when the circuit court proceeded to give the jury an Allen charge, giving the Allen charge was unduly coercive. Prieto argues that because Juror D said that his decision at this time is firm and final and then opted to end his participation in the deliberations, the jury was hung and it made no difference whether Juror D followed the circuit court's instruction to continue deliberations. Prieto further argues that since mental retardation is a bar to a death sentence, if any juror concludes that a defendant is mentally retarded, then that jury can never reach a unanimous verdict for death. Prieto continues, if there is no unanimity for death, then there can be no death sentence. Finally, Prieto argues that it was not Juror D's alleged misconduct that created a manifest necessity for a mistrial. According to Prieto, if any manifest necessity for a mistrial existed in Prieto I, it resulted from the circuit court's own error in failing to declare the jury deadlocked when the court received the notes from the jury foreman and Juror D, and in delivering an unduly coercive Allen charge. The Commonwealth argues that the circuit court in Prieto I did not err in declining to declare a hung jury on the issue of mental retardation. The Commonwealth contends that the circuit court also did not abuse its discretion by giving an Allen charge. According to the Commonwealth, the circuit court properly found that the jury had ceased to function as a jury even before it returned the guilt stage verdicts because of Juror D's misconduct. The Commonwealth argues that Juror D's misconduct continued when he refused to comply with the Allen charge by refusing to continue deliberations. The Commonwealth asserts that the circuit court was left with an incomplete jury to continue deliberations and a mistrial for manifest necessity was the only appropriate alternative.
We first address whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Prieto's motion for a mistrial in Prieto I upon receipt of the notes from the jury foreman and Juror D. The circuit court is authorized to discharge the jury either when it appears that the jurors cannot agree on a verdict  are hung  or when there is a manifest necessity for such discharge. Code § 8.01-361. The power to discharge a jury is discretionary and the court must exercise this power carefully, according to the circumstances of the case. Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 926, 15 S.E.2d 62, 64 (1941). The object of the law is to obtain a fair and just verdict, and whenever it shall appear to the court that the jury impanelled cannot render such a verdict, it ought to be discharged, and another jury impanelled. Id. at 927, 15 S.E.2d at 64. When a jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, it is within the sound discretion of the circuit court to determine at what point a mistrial should be granted because the jury is hung. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 267, 389 S.E.2d 871, 884 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 221, 112 L.Ed.2d 177 (1990), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 848, 113 S.Ct. 142, 121 L.Ed.2d 95 (1992). The circuit court is authorized to allow deliberations to continue, in consideration of the seriousness of the matter to the community, and the length and complexity of the trial proceedings. See Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 258-59, 397 S.E.2d 385, 398-99 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824, 112 S.Ct. 88, 116 L.Ed.2d 60 (1991). Among the alternatives available to the circuit court is the provision of an Allen charge, reminding the jury of the need to reach a verdict if one can be reached without any individual juror giving up his or her conviction. Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 212, 215, 191 S.E.2d 200, 203 (1972). In a capital proceeding, the citizens of this Commonwealth have a strong interest in having a jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death, and the court is entitled to direct the jury to continue its deliberations for a reasonable time even after the jury has indicated that it is deadlocked. Eaton, 240 Va. at 259, 397 S.E.2d at 399; Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). The imposition of a life sentence upon the jury's failure to reach a unanimous verdict at the sentencing stage pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.4(E) is mandated only after a reasonable period of deliberation, and the trial judge determines that further deliberations would be fruitless and the jury's deadlock is final. Eaton, 240 Va. at 259, 397 S.E.2d at 399. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Prieto's motion to declare a mistrial on the grounds that the jury was hung because it could not agree on a verdict. Among the considerations relevant to the issue of whether further deliberation would be fruitless were the following: (1) The trial had been in progress for approximately four weeks; (2) The jury had successfully arrived at a verdict of guilty in the guilt or innocence phase; (3) The jury had been deliberating the determination of mental retardation for approximately a day and a half; and (4) The jury foreman's note did not state that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision, only that it appeared to be unable to do so. Based on these circumstances, the circuit court acted within its discretion in instructing the jury to continue deliberations. The language from an excerpt of a portion of the modified Allen charge addresses some of the reasons the circuit court instructed the jury to continue its deliberations: This is an important case. There appears no reason to believe either side could try the case better or more exhaustively than it has been tried before you.... [T]here appears no reason to believe that the case could ever be submitted to twelve citizens who were more conscientious, more impartial, and more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence could be produced on behalf of either side.... It is your duty as jurors, however, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view towards reaching a unanimous agreement if you can do so without doing violence to your individual judgment.... Remember at all times that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious belief he or she may have as to the weight or the effect of the evidence, but remember also that in a full deliberation and consideration of all the evidence in the case, it is your duty to agree upon the verdict, if you can do so without violating your individual judgment and your conscious [sic]. Prieto argues that Juror D's first note indicated that he was the only dissenter, his decision was firm and final, and deliberations had crossed into peer pressure. However, the circuit court interpreted the two notes differently when Judge Smith contrasted Juror D's note with the foreman's note and stated: [I]t doesn't sound to me like it's a jury that's trying to force him when they say it appears we're unable to. We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Prieto's motion for a mistrial based on Prieto's argument that the jury was hung due to an inability to reach a verdict. The factual findings made by Judge Smith support his exercise of discretion in allowing the jury more time in its deliberations in this lengthy, complex and important case.
Therefore, the next issue we address is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a mistrial for manifest necessity and granting a retrial of the entire case. We review this matter for an abuse of discretion. Smith, 239 Va. at 267, 389 S.E.2d at 884. The granting of a mistrial for manifest necessity may become necessary when the jury ceases to function as a jury. When Juror D refused to continue deliberations, and in effect impeached his verdict rendered in the guilt or innocence phase, the circuit court was faced with the novel issue whether to continue a trial when juror misconduct not only affected the sentencing phase, but also the prior phase of guilt or innocence. A circuit court has the authority to discharge the jury when it determines there exits a manifest necessity to do so. Code § 8.01-361. In determining whether manifest necessity exists, a trial court is vested with broad discretion. Smith, 239 Va. at 267, 389 S.E.2d at 884. Absent a showing that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting a mistrial, this Court will not disturb the circuit court's ruling on appeal. Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 40, 393 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1990). In assessing whether manifest necessity existed, the circuit court considered the fact that Juror D refused to follow the court's instructions in two respects. First, Juror D revealed that he had not maintain[ed] his honest convictions during the guilt phase when he expressed that he did not believe the Commonwealth had proved that Prieto was guilty of capital murder after the jury had returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Secondly, Juror D refused to follow the Allen charge when he gave the circuit court a note prior to returning to the jury room after lunch which clearly stated both Juror D's belief that Prieto was not guilty of capital murder as well as Juror D's unwillingness to continue deliberations. Based on these circumstances, the circuit court made a factual determination that Juror D did not follow the Allen charge and had engaged in clear misconduct. Prieto has not assigned error to these factual determinations, which find ample support in the record. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it declared a mistrial due to manifest necessity arising out of juror misconduct, discharged the jury, and granted a retrial of the entire case.
Prieto's motion to bar a retrial in Prieto II is based upon his argument that the jury was unable to reach a verdict, or was hung, in the penalty phase of Prieto I, which required a sentence of life imprisonment. Prieto also argues that a deadlock in the mental retardation phase constitutes a deadlock under Code § 19.2-264.4(E), even if the issue of mental retardation was separated from the rest of the sentencing phase. A sentence of life without parole is only mandated if the jury is deadlocked in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. Code § 19.2-264.4(E). We need not resolve the issue whether a jury that is deadlocked on the determination of mental retardation cannot agree as to the penalty pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.4(E) when that issue has been separated within the sentencing phase because of our decision that the jury in Prieto I was not deadlocked. The jury was not deadlocked because it was in a position to continue deliberations if not for Juror D's failure to follow the circuit court's Allen charge and his impeachment of his guilty verdict in the guilt or innocence phase. We find no error in the circuit court's denial of Prieto's motion to bar a retrial and impose a life sentence.