Opinion ID: 2550838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Parties Were in a Domestic Relationship

Text: The jury found defendant guilty of violating § 11-5-2, namely felony assault. Section 11-5-2(a) provides that [e]very person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, with a dangerous weapon    shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years. Section 11-5-2(b) also says that [w]here the provisions of the `Domestic Violence Prevention Act'    are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include penalties as provided in § 12-29-5. Section 12-29-2 provides the definitions that inform § 12-29-5. Specifically, § 12-29-2(a) defines domestic violence as includ[ing], but    not limited to, [a felony assault] when committed by one family or household member against another   . Family or household member is defined as spouses, former spouses, adult persons related by blood or marriage, adult persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past three (3) years, and persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together, or if persons who are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year which shall be determined by the court's consideration of the following factors: (1) the length of time of the relationship; (2) the type of the relationship; (3) the frequence [ sic ] of the interaction between the parties. Section 12-29-2(b) (emphasis added). As soon as the state rested after presenting its evidence, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal based on Rule 29 concerning the issue of the existence of a domestic relationship. He argued that the state had failed to present any evidence concerning the frequency of the interactions between the couple and that Mary's testimony that the relationship was an intimate one failed properly to describe the nature of the relationship. In short, defendant argued that the testimony had been too conclusory for a reasonable juror to find that the parties were in a domestic relationship. The trial justice denied defendant's motion. This Court has not yet had an opportunity to consider what minimum facts serve as a foundation for a conclusion that a couple has been in a substantive dating    relationship under § 12-29-2. This is, by its very nature, a somewhat flexible concept. Other jurisdictions that have considered this issue also have struggled in determining whether the parties are in a dating relationship, even when statutory factors are delineated for the courts' consideration (as they are here). See, e.g., Hobdy v. State, 919 So.2d 318, 322-25, 325 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (looking to six factors that might be suggestive of a dating relationship, but concluding that such factors are not exhaustive and must allow for the consideration of additional facts and/or factors that may be relevant); Oriola v. Thaler, 84 Cal. App.4th 397, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827-32, 832 (2000) (noting the difficulty posed by a lack of a statutory definition of dating relationship and looking to myriad factors considered by other states, including Rhode Island, to conclude that a dating relationship means a serious courtship); People v. Disher, 224 P.3d 254, 256-58 (Colo.2010) (holding that a couple need not have a sexual relationship in order for an intimate relationship, to exist under a state domestic violence statute); C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass. 648, 815 N.E.2d 582, 586, 586-88 (2004) (concluding that a state statute that listed four factors to be considered in determining the existence of a substantive dating relationship was written with purposeful flexibility in its definitions). We begin our own analysis by noting that the General Assembly has enunciated that the intent of this particular statute is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide. Section 12-29-1(a). [6] [A]s final arbitrator on questions of construction, it is this [C]ourt's responsibility in interpreting a legislative enactment to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes. State v. Badessa, 869 A.2d 61, 65 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987)). That intent is discovered from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute. Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 71 (R.I.2011) (quoting Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 247, 397 A.2d 889, 892 (1979)). When we determine the true import of statutory language, it is entirely proper for us to look to `the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.' Id. (quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 150 (R.I.2006)). [I]t would be `foolish and myopic literalism to focus narrowly on' one statutory section without regard for the broader context. Id. (quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d at 150). The statute directs the court to look to three factors (length, nature, and frequency) as indicative of the substance of the relationship as a whole. [7] The statute does not require a specific demonstration of each of the factors, nor does it limit the court to only those three factors. After all, the essential and core task of the trial justice is to determine whether the evidence is capable of proving the existence of a substantive dating relationship. It is that determination that is the primary focus; the enumerated factors serve to guide the court's considerations in making that determination. Requiring specific findings about the precise number of times two people saw each other before reaching a conclusion that the parties are in a substantive dating relationship is not required by the statute, nor does it support the legislative intent. When she ruled on the motion, the trial justice considered the testimony offered by the victim that (1) the couple started dating in January 2008, (2) they met through a dating website, (3) they had an intimate relationship, (4) defendant had terminated the relationship within a couple of weeks preceding the assault, [8] (5) they had had communication since the breakup relative to affairs of the heart, and (6) the parties met that night in August so that the victim could return jewelry defendant had given her during the course of their relationship. Officer Joshua Eidam testified that defendant said at the scene that he had an argument with his girlfriend. Although Mary did not offer specific evidence about the number of times each week or month she saw defendant, she did testify that the couple dated for six months. From this, combined with other evidence ( e.g., defendant referring to Mary as his girlfriend), a reasonable juror certainly could infer that the couple saw each other on a regular basis over a period of six months. When she was asked if the relationship was an intimate relationship, Mary testified that it was. It is clear to us that this statement is evidence of the nature of the interactions between the parties. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice considered the nature of the interactions as well. We agree with the trial justice's conclusion that the evidence, overall, indicated that Mr. Enos and Mary were in a substantive dating relationship. We are convinced that the trial justice viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, as was her task, and correctly denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Forbes, 779 A.2d at 640-41; Mercado, 635 A.2d at 263.