Opinion ID: 1590948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Degree of Inconsistency Required

Text: The first issue we must resolve is whether Kim's professed lack of memory of the particular details of the incident rendered her trial testimony inconsistent with her prior statement to police. This court has previously recognized that an `inconsistent statement' as used in Rule 613, is not limited to those instances in which diametrically opposite assertions have been made. Roseby v. State, 329 Ark. 554, 564, 953 S.W.2d 32, 37 (1997), overruled on other grounds, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), (citing Truck Ctr. of Tulsa, Inc. v. Autrey, 310 Ark. 260, 836 S.W.2d 359 (1992); Flynn v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co., 287 Ark. 190, 697 S.W.2d 114 (1985)). See also United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 873 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 795 (8th Cir.1980)) (holding that under Fed.R.Evid. 613, inconsistency may be found in evasive answers, inability to recall, silence, or changes of position). This court has adopted Judge Weinstein's view that a statement is inconsistent whenever a reasonable person could infer on comparing the whole effect of the two statements that they have been produced by inconsistent beliefs. Roseby, 329 Ark. at 564, 953 S.W.2d at 37. Considerable discretion is given to the trial court when determining where the line is drawn in the impeachment of a hostile witness, and those rulings will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; Hughey v. State, 310 Ark. 721, 840 S.W.2d 183 (1992). The leading Arkansas case on this issue is Chisum, 273 Ark. 1, 616 S.W.2d 728. In that case, the appellant's sister, called as a witness for the state, testified that she had forgotten many of the details of the crime and had also forgotten what she had told the police in a prior interview. Due to her lack of memory, the trial court allowed the state to impeach her testimony by having the sheriff and his secretary narrate the statements given by the witness to the sheriff. On appeal, this court held that the statements were unquestionably admissible for the purpose of impeachment[.] Id. at 6, 616 S.W.2d at 730. This court reasoned that the fact that the witness had professed not to remember what she had said to the sheriff did not preclude the prosecution from using her prior inconsistent statements. Id. at 8, 616 S.W.2d at 731. This court relied on the case of Billings v. State, 52 Ark. 303, 12 S.W. 574 (1889), in which it was held: The statute does not place the right to impeach a witness by proof of contradictory statements, upon the condition of his denial. It requires his cross-examination upon the matter; nothing more. This is exacted in order that he may explain apparent contradictions and reconcile seeming conflicts and inconsistencies. If he cannot remember the fact, he is unable to do what the law affords him the opportunity to do. If he cannot remember the statement made, it is quite as probable that his recollection of the occurrence about which he testifies is inaccurate or incorrect. If contradiction properly affects the value of his testimony when he denies, it is difficult to see why it should not when he ignores the contradictory or inconsistent statements. The testimony is discredited because he affirms today what he denied yesterday; the legitimate effect of such contradiction cannot depend upon his power to remember it. If the defect in the memory is real, the proof of the contradiction apprises the jury of this infirmity of the witness; if he has made a false statement under the pretense of not remembering, he should not escape contradiction and exposure. We think the evidence was properly admitted. Chisum, 273 Ark. at 8, 616 S.W.2d at 732 (emphasis added) (quoting Billings, 52 Ark. at 308, 12 S.W. at 575). Similarly, in Roseby, 329 Ark. 554, 953 S.W.2d 32, the witness, who was related to the defendant, admitted making statements to the police, but claimed that she could not remember what she had said. After she was given the opportunity to review her prior statements, the witness stated that she could not remember saying those things because she was under the influence of drugs at the time. The prosecutor then proceeded to ask the witness about specific information that she had given to the police. Each time, the witness responded that she did not remember. On appeal, the appellant argued that the prosecutor should not have been allowed to impeach the witness with her unsworn statements because she did not directly contradict her prior statements; rather she merely declared that she could not remember them. This court disagreed, relying in large part on the decision in Chisum . This court noted that just as in Chisum , the witness's statements that she `forgot' were sufficiently inconsistent to allow the introduction of her prior sworn statement. Id. at 564, 953 S.W.2d at 37. This court then observed that it has reached this same conclusion in numerous cases where a witness claimed to have forgotten a prior statement that is unfavorable to the defendant. Id. (citing Hughey, 310 Ark. 721, 840 S.W.2d 183; Flynn, 287 Ark. 190, 697 S.W.2d 114; Humpolak v. State, 175 Ark. 786, 300 S.W. 426 (1927); Billings, 52 Ark. 303, 12 S.W. 574). The facts of the present case are very similar to those in Chisum and Roseby . Here, the witness, Kim Kennedy, is married to the Appellant's first cousin. Kim gave the police a detailed account of the fight, approximately one week after the incident had occurred, in which she stated that Appellant had a knife, and that he threw the first punch. At trial, however, she claimed that she had forgotten many of the details that were crucial to the State's case. When questioned by the prosecutor about many of those details, she repeatedly claimed that she could not remember them. The pertinent parts of her testimony are as follows: BY MR. JAMES: Q. Okay. Kim, were you very close to what happened and saw what happened that night? A. I don't quite remember all that happened. I was pregnant at the time. Q. Okay. Kim, you made a statement to the police just a few days after this happened, isn't that right? A. Yes, sir. Q. And have you had a chance to review or would you like to review your statement? A. I've already reviewed it, Sir. Q. Okay. So, what you told the police that day, was that what you remember happening? A. Part of it. Q. Part of it? A. Uh-huh. Q. Are you saying that now that you've read your statement you're not sure about something? A. II can't quite remember all for sure. I wasn't really for sure. Q. Uh. A. If it all happened. `Cause me and my husband was in an argument. We were fussing and fighting. .... Q. Okay. All right. Now, during the fight, did you see a knife? A. Not, I can't remember. I don't quite remember. Q. Oh. Well, do you remember telling the police officer that you saw Michael Drew Kennedy with a knife in his hand? A. I don't remember seeing Michael Drew Kennedy with a knife. Q. And that youyou rememberdo you remember telling the police officer that you saw him hit Lanny in the face with his fist? A. That's what I don't remember. I cannot remember if he did or not because that's when me and my husband both were standing there fighting; `cause we were arguing. Q. Do you remember telling the police officer that the next thing you saw was that Michael had the knife in his left hand, he had moved it from the right hand to the left hand? A. No, sir, I don't. Q. And then Lanny fell to the ground. Do you remember telling the police officer that? A. I can't remember if I did or not, sir. Q. Okay. Do you remember yelling to Mark to stop the fight? A. Pardon me? Q. Do you remember yelling to Mark at that point to stop the fight? A. I was, no. All I can remember was that [we] were talking about something and I was ready to go. Q. You were just talking about something and you were ready to go? A. Uh-huh. I can't quite remember. .... Q. Okay. I'd like to show you a photograph. I'm going to show you a picture it's State's Exhibit No. 4. Did you see a wound on Lanny Bates like that on his neck? A. I can't remember. I don't remember seeing noI didn'tall I saw was him laying on the ground. Q. Do you remember telling the police officer that when Lanny turned his head while laying on the ground you could see that his throat was cut? A. That's all I can remember. That's all I could see was blood. That's just all I could see. Q. You don't remember telling the police officer A. I don't remember if his throat was cut or what. All I know I saw was blood. .... Q. Well, do you believe that you told the police officer the truth on the day that you talked to him? A. All I remember is what I told him what I saw and that's all I could remember at what I seen. Q. All right. But you weren't lying to him when you talk[ed] to him, were you? A. No, sir. Q. Okay. So, if the police officer said that you told him these things on here, he would be telling the truth, wouldn't he? A. Well, sir, all I know is Iwhat I told the cop is what I think I know. I didn'tI wasn't for sure. I just know what I thought. Q. Okay. A. But I was not for sure. Q. But you wouldn't make up some specific things if you weren't pretty sure; like Michael Drew Kennedy having a knife in his hand, like Lanny Bates having his throat cut. You wouldn't have guessed on these things, would you? A. No, sir. I do not guess on them things. I'm justI'm for sure. Based on the foregoing exchange, we conclude that the witness's trial testimony was sufficiently inconsistent with her prior detailed statements to the police. Her claimed loss of memory, which was conveniently favorable to Appellant, her husband's first cousin, was similar to the testimony given by the witnesses in Chisum and Roseby . Accordingly, it was not error to allow impeachment of the witness.