Opinion ID: 1453231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: racially motivated peremptory challenge

Text: Finally, Span contends that the prosecutor used a racially motivated peremptory challenge to remove the only minority juror from the venire. Before the jury was sworn, Span moved to quash the jury, alleging that the prosecutor had exercised his final peremptory challenge based on the race of the juror removed. The defendant's counsel cited Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988), in making the challenge. The prospective juror in question was Mr. Viet Phung. Mr. Phung is a naturalized citizen who had apparently been born in Vietnam, although that fact was never established at trial. Mr. Phung stated that he worked at a supermarket chain, was married and had three children, and that he had graduated from high school in Vietnam. The only question asked of Mr. Phung was by the trial court concerning how long he had been a citizen of the United States, to which Mr. Phung responded approximately nine years. Mr. Phung was asked no other questions and did not give any indication that he could not be a fair and objective juror. Mr. Phung was the last venireman stricken by the prosecutor. In response to Span's motion to quash, the prosecutor attempted to explain his peremptory challenge by describing the general method that he used to pick jurors. Then, the prosecutor stated: It has nothing to do with his  in fact, I didn't even think about a study that says they are more likely to be [more favorably disposed toward the defendant]  I think perhaps he has been around long enough, and perhaps I can speculate. He's been through enough, having come from Viet Nam, that I think that the study would be different with Mr. Phung. But he was just one I had a question about initially, and so he ended up being the one that I  had to take someone off, and I took him. It was not directed at him as a minority. The prosecutor's unarticulated question about Mr. Phung's competence as a juror arose despite the fact that the prosecutor asked no questions of Mr. Phung. The trial court denied Span's motion to quash the panel on two grounds. First, the trial court ruled that the issue had not been timely presented. Second, the trial court stated that the defendant had to be a member of a cognizable minority group to raise such a challenge. On appeal, the State concedes that the trial court's first basis for denying Span's motion, that the motion was not timely, was erroneous. The motion was made immediately after the peremptory challenges to the jurors were completed and before the jury was sworn. The State notes that the defendant's citation to Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16 (Supp. 1990) and Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18 (1982) (repealed effective July 1, 1990), supports the position that the motion was timely. See, e.g., State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (§ 78-46-16(1) requires that any challenge to the jury must be lodged before the jury is sworn).
The real issue here concerns Span's argument that the trial judge erroneously ruled that a defendant must be a member of a cognizable minority group before he may raise a Batson -type challenge. [4] A review of Batson, as well as case law before and after it, is necessary to a complete understanding of the problem. Prior to Batson, the issue of discriminatory peremptory challenges was controlled by Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). In Swain, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause. 380 U.S. at 203-04, 85 S.Ct. at 826-27. The Court, however, also sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical right to use peremptory challenges without judicial control. The Swain Court thus refused to scrutinize a prosecutor's action in an individual case. 380 U.S. at 221-22, 85 S.Ct. at 836-37. Rather, the Court stated that a defendant could demonstrate a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination if he showed that a prosecutor in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries... . 380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 837. Therefore, under Swain, a defendant was required to demonstrate continual systematic removal of minorities from venires to prevail on an equal protection challenge. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Court removed the requirement that a defendant demonstrate systematic discrimination. In Batson, the Court recognized, The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. 476 U.S. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718. Since the decision in Swain, the Court had recognized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.  476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 (emphasis in original). Based on this change and underlying concerns about racial discrimination in any given case, the Court removed the impediment imposed by Swain. The Court stated: These principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. [559] at 562, 97 L.Ed. 1244, 73 S.Ct. 891 [at 892 (1953)]. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. ... . Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption  or his intuitive judgment  that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24 (citations omitted). Batson allowed an individual defendant to attack the allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges of a prosecutor in a particular case. However, the Batson court stated that the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the removed veniremen are members of the defendant's race. 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. On its face, Batson appears to impose a standing requirement which prohibits a defendant of a race different from the stricken venireman from raising an equal protection challenge. In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990), a majority of the Court held that while a white defendant has standing to raise a sixth amendment fair cross-section/impartial jury challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory removal of Afro-Americans from his jury, the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement cannot be interpreted to prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges. [5] However, five members of the Court, Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, stated that a defendant situated in the same position as Holland (i.e., a white defendant challenging the exclusion of minorities from the jury) would also have standing under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause to raise a claim of discriminatory peremptory challenges (i.e., a Batson -type claim). [6] In Powers v. Ohio, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may raise a Batson -type equal protection challenge to the allegedly discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge without regard to the sameness of the race of the defendant and the excluded prospective juror. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated: If the defendant has no right to object to the prosecutor's improper exclusion of jurors, and if the trial court has no duty to make a prompt inquiry when the defendant shows, by adequate grounds, a likelihood of impropriety in the exercise of a challenge, there arises legitimate doubts that the jury has been chosen by proper means. The composition of the trier of fact itself is called in question, and the irregularity may pervade all the proceedings that follow. ... . ... To bar [a defendant's] claim because his race differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury service. 111 S.Ct. at 1371-73. The majority further stated that Batson 's emphasis on racial identity between the defendant and the excluded prospective juror was not inconsistent. The Court explained: Racial identity between the defendant and the excused person might in some cases be the explanation for the prosecution's adoption of the forbidden stereotype, and if the alleged race bias takes this form, it may provide one of the easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a conclusive showing that wrongful discrimination has occurred. 111 S.Ct. at 1373-74. Powers clearly eliminated any standing requirement which Batson imposed and held that a defendant of any race may challenge the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges on equal protection grounds. [7] This Court has not considered the standing issue in either of its two previous Batson -type cases. In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) ( Cantu I ), the Court stated verbatim the Batson criteria for establishing a prima facie case. The first criterion was not an impediment to the standing of the defendant to raise a Batson challenge, however, because the defendant was a member of the same racial group as the excluded juror. In Cantu I, a majority of the Court concluded that the defendant had established a prima facie case of discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, and on that basis, the case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the exercise of the peremptory challenge violated the defendant's right to equal protection under Batson. 750 P.2d at 597. Subsequently, in State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989) ( Cantu II ), which involved the same defendant, this Court held that the prosecutor's motivation in exercising the peremptory challenge, as determined by his explanation after remand, was indirectly related to the juror's race. The Court held that the prosecutor's challenge was racially motivated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. 778 P.2d at 518-19. Discriminatory peremptory challenges harm the individual criminal defendant and the juror who is the subject of discrimination, and they are an affront to the judicial system. Despite the longstanding tradition of restricting judicial interference in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the judiciary cannot be a party to the discriminatory use of the challenge. The discriminatory peremptory challenge of a minority juror simply because a prosecutor believes that the juror's race may influence the juror's decision in the case is offensive regardless of the defendant's race. The assumption that a minority juror cannot fairly hear a case because of his or her race or ethnic origin simply has no place in the American system of justice. Such an assumption is antithetical to the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Based on our analysis of the issue and Powers, we hold that no standing requirement exists which requires the defendant to be of the same race as the challenged juror. Therefore, the trial court was in error when it concluded that Span must be of the same race as the stricken juror in order to raise a Batson -type challenge.
Because the trial judge ruled that the motion was not only untimely but failed because of the defendant's race, an important issue was not reached by the trial court: whether Mr. Phung belongs to a cognizable minority group. Because such a finding is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we remand to the trial court on this issue. The State asserts that our previous cases on the issue of cognizability, Cantu I and Cantu II, have resulted in ambiguity which requires clarification. Because of the nature of the issues on remand and because Cantu I and Cantu II may have created confusion on the issue, we take this opportunity to define what constitutes a cognizable minority group. Under any legitimate theory asserted by a defendant that a prosecutor has unconstitutionally discriminated in the use of a peremptory challenge, a defendant must demonstrate that the excluded prospective juror was a member of a cognizable minority group. See Holland, 110 S.Ct. at 805; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575 (Utah 1987) (A prima facie violation of the fair cross-section guarantee is established where a defendant shows: ... `that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community... .' (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)). Although courts have pointedly disagreed upon the proper standard to apply in determining cognizability under Batson and have struggled repeatedly in deciding whether a particular classification satisfies the cognizability standards, Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 Harv.L.Rev. 1013, 1020 (1989), some evidence is required that the excluded juror is a member of a cognizable minority group. The cognizability of a particular group may, in fact, be different depending on the context in which a challenge is made. In Tillman, this Court stated that one component of establishing a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section guarantee of the sixth amendment in selecting the jury venire is that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668). The Court then stated: Although [the defendant] claimed that all racial and ethnic minorities were excluded from Salt Lake County venires, defendants focus on appeal upon Hispanics. [The defendant] contends that Hispanics are distinctive because they are designated in a separate category in census figures and because they are segregated by religion, economic status and cultural background from the majority of county residents. Similarly, the State would have us assume that Hispanics are a distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes. We believe such an assumption is too hastily made. For purposes of the equal protection clause, Hispanics may be a distinctive group. But it does not necessarily follow that they are distinctive in Salt Lake County for fair cross-section purposes. 750 P.2d at 575 (footnotes and citations omitted, emphasis added). Cantu I recognized the cognizability of Hispanics in Salt Lake County in cases of discriminatory peremptory challenges, which suggests that cognizability is context-specific. The requirements for proving a cognizable group with respect to the selection of a jury venire and peremptory challenges do appear to be different. When confronted directly with the question in the Batson context, the Court in Cantu I, stated, Hispanics or Spanish-surnamed persons are a `cognizable racial group' for purposes of equal protection analysis under Batson.  Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 596 (footnote omitted) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987)). However, the Fields case, cited in Cantu I, specifically adopted the sixth amendment fair cross-section standard for determining cognizability that the California Supreme Court set forth in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). In Wheeler, the court held that a group is legally cognizable if it is defined on the basis of race, national origin, religion or sex. 732 P.2d at 1153-54 & n. 15. Cantu I 's reliance on Fields for its conclusion that Hispanics or Spanish-surnamed persons are a `cognizable racial group' for equal protection analysis under Batson  is not consistent with a footnote in Cantu I, where the Court reserve[d] judgment on whether Hispanics are a distinctive group under sixth amendment fair cross-section analysis. 750 P.2d at 596 n. 3 (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)). Moreover, the Court's Cantu II citation to the elements of a prima facie case of group bias as those enunciated in People v. Wheeler  which include a showing that persons excluded belong to a cognizable group under the representative cross-section rule  compounds the problem and requires clarification. See Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518. The conflict between equal protection and fair cross-section standards of cognizability is brought into sharp focus in United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 1312, 103 L.Ed.2d 581 (1989). There, the court stated: In order to satisfy the first prong of the Batson three-part test, it must be shown that Italian-Americans constitute a cognizable racial group. The standard for determining cognizability for equal protection objections to peremptory challenges during jury selection under Batson is the one set out in Castaneda v. Partida , as is clear from the Batson Court's direct citation to Castaneda. This standard defines as cognizable any group that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494, 97 S.Ct. at 1274. The government urges that, instead of following Castaneda, the Court should adopt the reasoning of the First Circuit in United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.1987), which found the evidence insufficient to establish that Italian-Americans are a cognizable racial group under Batson. There the First Circuit chose to borrow the cognizability standard developed for the Sixth Amendment requirement that the jury venire represent a fair cross-section of the population. See Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33 (employing the characteristics outlined in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), and Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir.1985) (en banc)). The Sgro court's borrowing act is initially suspect because the Supreme Court in Batson quite clearly commanded that Castaneda govern its own use of the term cognizable racial group. See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Furthermore, there is an important difference between the meaning of cognizability in these two different contexts. Discrimination against a group in the cross-section of the venire, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, may be demonstrated by mere statistical underrepresentation of that group. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n. 26, 99 S.Ct. at 670 n. 26. Discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges in violation of the equal protection clause, by contrast, necessitates a showing of the essential element of discriminatory purpose. Id.; see Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. Because discrimination in the venire under the Sixth Amendment may be statistical, the definition of a cognizable group must be narrowly drawn lest any group imaginable by defense counsel be found numerically underrepresented. See Barber, 772 F.2d at 999 (en banc) (warning that blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an endless variety of other classifications could receive protection). Because the guarantee against discrimination through peremptory challenges requires a showing of purpose, cognizable racial groups may be defined less rigidly, for it is precisely the evidence of intentional exclusion of the group that helps to identify the group. The First Circuit itself made this distinction clear: That is not to say, however, that if a classification were specifically and systematically excluded from jury duty the same standard would be used as here, where defendant simply relies on a statistical disparity in the venires to challenge its constitutionality [under the fair cross-section rule]. If certain people are specifically and systematically excluded from jury duty, then the jury-administrating authority would have created its own group. Barber, 772 F.2d at 999-1000 (en banc) (emphasis in original). 673 F. Supp. at 99-100 (citations omitted, emphasis added except as indicated). Biaggi illustrates the difficulties created by the absence of a clear standard for determining cognizability. Here, the State concedes that for a Batson /equal protection analysis, the Biaggi court is correct in concluding that the standard set forth in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), which is specifically cited in Batson and is less restrictive, is more appropriately applied than is the test of Duren. The Duren test, which analyzes the distinctiveness of the group within the community, is appropriate when a challenge is being made to the selection of the venire from which the petit jury is chosen. See Redd v. Negley, 785 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Utah 1989); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575 (Utah 1987). However, the Castaneda-Biaggi test, which focuses on the intentional exclusion of an individual on the basis of membership in a group, is more appropriate to the Batson peremptory challenge case. In such a case, it is the prosecutor's perception that a member of a particular group will not as favorably receive his case as a member of another group which defines the prejudice of the discriminatory challenge. Therefore, it is the discrimination against a specified group which helps define the group. If the prosecutor peremptorily strikes a juror simply because of a perception that the juror's race or ethnic origin will make a difference in the juror's weighing of the case, that is sufficient to meet the Batson and Cantu criteria to establish a cognizable group.
Because the trial court based its ruling on timeliness and the defendant's race, another issue was not reached: whether the prosecutor's challenge was race-neutral. In Cantu II, we adopted the criteria of State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1988), to be used when a court evaluates a prosecutor's explanation of his allegedly racially motivated peremptory challenge. Slappy 's list of factors that may cast doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly raceneutral explanation because they tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually supported by the record or are an impermissible pretext include: (1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged. Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518-19 (citing Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22). In this case, the prosecutor referred to Mr. Phung's country of origin in explaining the reason for the challenge, asked no questions of Mr. Phung during voir dire, and articulated only a vague reason not related to the facts of the case for striking Mr. Phung. From this it is difficult to determine whether or not the prosecutor's reason for striking Mr. Phung was race-neutral. Furthermore, the trial court did not rule on this issue, and the State has not argued for the race-neutrality of the prosecutor's strike as a basis for affirming the trial court. Therefore, if the trial court determines on remand that Mr. Phung is indeed a member of a cognizable group, then the next step would be to determine the basis for the prosecutor's challenge of Mr. Phung. See Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597 (Utah 1988). In sum, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction against Span; that the prosecutorial misconduct, though deliberate and subject to evaluation on remand, did not prejudice Span's case; and that the trial court's bases for refusing to hear Span's challenge to the jury selection were erroneous. On remand, the trial court should determine if Mr. Phung is a member of a cognizable group as we have defined it and, if he is, evaluate whether the prosecutor's challenge was race-neutral. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in parts I, II, III, IV.A, and IV.C and in the result of part IV.B.