Opinion ID: 4516132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compelled Statutory Immunity

Text: ¶ 32. Defendant next argues that, even if the court’s refusal to grant judicial immunity to Edwards was correct, it nonetheless erred by not compelling the State to grant him immunity. Defendant submits that the State engaged in misconduct when it threatened to bring escape charges against Edwards if he testified he was with defendant on the night in question and the State’s interest in refusing to grant immunity to Edwards must give way to defendant’s right to present eyewitness testimony. We conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that either basis provides grounds to compel the State to grant immunity to his witness. ¶ 33. Defendants seeking to compel the State to grant immunity rely on the due process right to a fundamentally fair trial, which stems from both the Sixth Amendment and the Due 11 Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In general, “a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to the testimony of a potential witness who has invoked the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination; therefore, the defendant has no Sixth Amendment right that could outweigh the Government’s interest in using its immunity power sparingly.” United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 468 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The established content of the Sixth Amendment does not support a claim for defense witness immunity. Traditionally, the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause gives the defendant the right to bring his witness to court and have the witness’s non-privileged testimony heard, but does not carry with it the additional right to displace a proper claim of privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimination.”). When, however, the prosecution prevents a defendant from putting on exculpatory testimony, impairing a defendant’s ability to present a defense, this can violate a defendant’s right to due process. Quinn, 728 F.3d at 261-62. Therefore, when necessary to prevent a violation of due process, the court may properly put the prosecution to a choice of either granting immunity to a defense witness or facing dismissal of the charge. See United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that while “court cannot order the government to immunize a defense witness, courts can dismiss an indictment where the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity has violated the defendant’s right to due process”); Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 467 (noting that “[t]he Fourth Circuit, consistent with the majority rule, has held that a district court may compel the government to grant immunity upon a showing of prosecutorial misconduct and materiality”). ¶ 34. Although courts have generally rejected judicial immunity, many have embraced “the carrot-and-stick approach,” under which the decision of whether to grant a witness immunity is left with the executive branch but the judiciary reserves the power to force the prosecution to choose between certain actions. Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331, 341 (D.C. 1996) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). Essentially, courts threaten dismissal unless the prosecutor requests 12 immunity. Courts use different tests to determine when this remedy is warranted. Regardless of the test adopted, courts emphasize that this is an area of the law “requiring sensitivity,” and that “absent a strong showing by the defense,” courts should be hesitant to find that the State committed misconduct in denying immunity to a witness. Quinn, 728 F.3d at 260; see Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 441 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that courts should order immunity only in “extraordinary circumstances”). Not only are courts hesitant to interfere in a prosecutor’s decision of whom to prosecute, but courts are cognizant of the need to “reduce the possibility of cooperative perjury between the defendant and his witness.” Blissett, 924 F.2d at 442. ¶ 35. There are generally two kinds of tests used: the deliberate-distortion test and the effective-defense theory. Under the former, courts focus on whether the government deliberately distorted the factfinding process by interfering with an important defense witness’s free choice to testify. The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have developed tests that are, to some degree, hybrids of the deliberate-distortion test because they require a showing of prosecutorial overreaching or discriminatory immunization, and of the testimony’s importance. See, e.g., United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring that “for a defendant to compel use immunity the defendant must show that: (1) the defense witness’s testimony was relevant; and (2) either (a) the prosecution intentionally caused the defense witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination with the purpose of distorting the fact-finding process; or (b) the prosecution granted immunity to a government witness in order to obtain that witness’s testimony, but denied immunity to a defense witness whose testimony would have directly contradicted that of the government witness, with the effect of so distorting the fact-finding process that the defendant was denied his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial”). ¶ 36. The Third Circuit in Quinn also articulated a test that aims to determine when the prosecution has abridged the defendant’s right to due process by improperly interfering with the defendant’s ability to put on important testimony, even in the absence of obvious witness 13 intimidation or discriminatory immunization of witnesses. Some courts refer to this test as the effective-defense theory. See State v. Collymore, 148 A.3d 1059, 1075-76 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016), aff’d, __ A.3d __, 334 Conn. 431 (2020) (explaining that under “effective defense theory” immunity can be granted when court finds that “potential defense witness can offer testimony which is clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense case and when the government has no strong interest in withholding immunity” (quotation and alteration omitted)). ¶ 37. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether to adopt one of these tests because defendant has failed to meet the requirements of either test. There is no indication that the prosecutor’s actions caused defendant’s witness not to testify. Moreover, defendant has not demonstrated that the proffered testimony was clearly exculpatory.
¶ 38. Even if prosecutorial misconduct that deliberately distorts the factfinding process could warrant forcing the State to elect between immunization of an important defense witness or dismissal, defendant has not demonstrated the necessary causal link in this case. ¶ 39. Defendant claims that the State improperly threatened to charge Edwards with a crime and dissuaded Edwards from testifying. Defendant asserts that the State’s threat of charging Edwards with escape was based on a false understanding of the law because Edwards could not have been charged with felony escape where he was out of place for only a few hours. See 13 V.S.A. § 1501 (delineating terms of escape from custody). ¶ 40. Prosecutorial misconduct can include intimidation or threats designed to dissuade a witness from testifying or selectively immunizing prosecution witnesses to gain a tactical advantage. See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that due process may require government to grant immunity “when prosecutorial misconduct caused the defendant’s principal witness to withhold out of fear of self-incrimination testimony which would otherwise allegedly have been available to the defendant”). The defendant must, however, show a 14 “causal nexus” between the government’s actions and the witness’s decision not to testify to establish a due process violation. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1193 (1st Cir. 1990); see People v. Stewart, 93 P.3d 271, 304 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that to demonstrate interference with right to compulsory process, defendant must show “causal link” between prosecution intimidation and witness’s refusal to testify (quotation omitted)). ¶ 41. The evidence fails to demonstrate that the State’s action threatened or intimidated Edwards into not testifying.3 Although the State indicated, in the presence of Edwards’s lawyer, that it would charge Edwards on the basis of his proffered testimony, the record does not support that this interchange led Edwards to invoke his right against self-incrimination. At the time of the prosecutor’s remarks, Edwards’s counsel had already informed the court that Edwards would invoke his right against self-incrimination if he testified. Before Edwards’s lawyer said he would invoke the privilege, the prosecutor had said only, “It is our belief that either Mr. Edwards is going to admit to an escape, or Mr. Edwards is going to be perjuring himself. And if that’s what we expect him to say, I think the Court should provide him with legal counsel prior to testifying.” Neither Edwards nor the lawyer who was subsequently appointed to represent him were present for that remark, and moreover, the prosecutor’s remark was appropriate; it seemed calculated to ensure only that Edwards had counsel to help him weigh his choice to testify, not to prevent him from testifying. 3 Moreover, we reject defendant’s inference that Edwards did not have a basis to claim a privilege against self-incrimination because his actions did not amount to a crime. The privilege is “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). It is not necessary for the prospective witness to demonstrate that a prosecution will follow or that answers to questions will