Opinion ID: 705951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Shackles and Prison Clothes at Sentencing

Text: 55 Duckett appeared for his sentencing hearing dressed in prison clothes and wearing handcuffs and a security chain. His prison clothing consisted of white tennis shoes with blue stripes, dark pants and a service station type shirt. Before the hearing began, Duckett's counsel objected to his client appearing before the jury in prison dress and shackles. The trial court overruled the objection, pointing out that Duckett was guilty of two counts of murder in the first degree with use of [a] deadly weapon, among other things. Duckett argues that requiring him to wear prison clothes and shackles during his sentencing hearing was inherently prejudicial and violated his right to due process. 56 The claim Duckett raises presents a question of first impression in this circuit. 6 Although a number of cases have dealt extensively with the constitutionality of requiring a defendant to wear prison clothes and shackles during the guilt phase of trial, only the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the constitutionality of shackling during the sentencing phase of trial, and no court has considered the constitutional implications of requiring a defendant to wear prison clothing during sentencing. See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir.1987). 57 We hold, drawing upon the reasoning of cases which have dealt with these issues in the trial context, that requiring a defendant to wear prison clothes during sentencing is not prejudicial and does not violate due process. However, we hold that shackling a defendant during a sentencing hearing before a jury is an inherently prejudicial practice which comports with due process only when used as a last resort to protect an essential state interest--such as maintaining public safety or assuring the decorum of the proceedings. 58 In this case, the record does not indicate any compelling reason for shackling Duckett during his sentencing hearing. Therefore, we conclude his constitutional rights were violated when he was forced to appear in shackles before the sentencing jury. Because the record is not sufficiently developed to enable us to determine whether or not this constitutional error was harmless, we remand this question to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
59 The first issue Duckett presents is whether his fundamental right to a fair sentencing hearing was violated when the trial court forced him to appear before the sentencing jury dressed in prison clothing. 60 It is clear that a court cannot, without violating the Due Process Clause, compel an accused to wear identifiable prison clothing during his trial. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). This is because the practice furthers no essential state interest, and the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment and impair the presumption of innocence, which is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Id. at 503, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. at 1692-93, 1693-94. 61 The presumption of innocence, however, no longer applies in the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial. At the penalty phase, the defendant stands convicted. His condition as a prisoner is no surprise to the jury, which just found him guilty. Prison clothing cannot be considered inherently prejudicial when the jury already knows, based upon other facts, that the defendant has been deprived of his liberty. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. at 507, 96 S.Ct. at 1694 (recognizing that [n]o prejudice can result from seeing that which is already known) (quotations and citations omitted); United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that when circumstances permit shackling defendant during trial, compelling defendant also to wear prison clothing is not inherently prejudicial because his condition as a prisoner is already apparent to the jury); United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556, 556-57 (5th Cir.) (holding that, where defendant was charged with murdering another prisoner while confined in prison, no prejudice resulted from trying him in jail clothes), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S.Ct. 2166, 36 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973). 62 We conclude the fact Duckett was compelled to wear prison clothing at his sentencing hearing could not have undermined the fairness of that proceeding, because the jury already knew--based on the trial in which it had participated and the verdict it had rendered--Duckett was a convicted murderer.
63 The analysis regarding the constitutionality of shackling is different. Unlike the Supreme Court's reasoning regarding prison clothes, its rationale in shackling cases has not been grounded only in the presumption of innocence. See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d at 1451 (recognizing that the Supreme Court has not bottomed the prohibition against shackling on the presumption of innocence alone). But see id. at 1454 (Edmondson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the presumption of innocence is the single major analytical thrust of the shackling cases). 64 In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), the Court recognized two additional inherent disadvantages to shackling a defendant at trial: physical restraints may not only cause jury prejudice and impair the presumption of innocence, they may also detract from the dignity and decorum of the proceeding and impede the defendant's ability to communicate with his counsel. Id. The lower courts have observed two further weaknesses in imposing physical restraints: they may confuse and embarrass the defendant, thereby impairing his mental faculties; and they may cause him pain. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 720-21 (9th Cir.1989) (citing cases from other circuits), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910, 110 S.Ct. 1937, 109 L.Ed.2d 300 (1990). 65 With the exception of the presumption of innocence, these inherent limitations of shackling continue into the penalty stage of a trial. Because there seems to be no reason to restrict the[se] principles to the guilt-innocence stage of trial, we conclude the constitutional rules regarding shackling at trial apply equally in the sentencing context. Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d at 1451. 66 This conclusion is supported by analogy to the treatment of the shackling issue in civil cases. There, the presumption of innocence does not apply. Nonetheless, relying on criminal case precedents, courts have held that when an individual's level of dangerousness is a question the jury must decide in a civil proceeding, it is a violation of the right to a fair trial to compel that individual to appear before the jury bound in physical restraints. See, e.g., Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284-85 (9th Cir.1983) (unconstitutional to compel the subject of a civil commitment hearing to wear physical restraints at trial); Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 356-58 (7th Cir.1993) (impermissible to shackle plaintiff prison inmate in a civil rights action alleging excessive force by corrections officers). Cf. Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir.1992) (constitutional to shackle plaintiff prison inmate in civil rights action challenging constitutionality of living conditions in state prison, because plaintiff's status as dangerous felon irrelevant). 67 In the penalty phase of a capital trial, the jury knows the defendant is a convicted felon. But the extent to which he continues to be dangerous is a central issue the jury must decide in determining his sentence. [N]ot all convicted felons are so dangerous and violent that they must be brought to court and kept in handcuffs and leg irons. Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d at 357. Unlike prison clothes, physical restraints may create the impression in the minds of the jury that the court believes the defendant is a particularly dangerous and violent person. Therefore, in the absence of a compelling need to shackle the defendant during his sentencing hearing, such a practice is inherently prejudicial. 68 The right to appear before a jury free of shackles, however, is not absolute. Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (9th Cir.1985). Shackling is inherently prejudicial, but it is not per se unconstitutional. See Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d at 716. Under certain circumstances, shackling ... may be appropriate because of the public's competing interest in courtroom security and the just administration of law. Id. at 722 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S.Ct. at 1061). Because of the potential for prejudice, however, due process requires that shackles be used only as a last resort. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S.Ct. at 1061. 69 In this circuit, it is a denial of due process if a trial court orders a defendant shackled without first engaging in a two-step process. Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 147-48 (9th Cir.1992), as amended by, 997 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.1993). First, the court must be persuaded by compelling circumstances 'that some measure [is] needed to maintain security of the courtroom.'  Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir.) (quoting Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d at 720), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832, 111 S.Ct. 95, 112 L.Ed.2d 67 (1990). Second, the court must 'pursue less restrictive alternatives before imposing physical restraints.'  Id. (quoting Spain, 883 F.2d at 721). See also United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1401 (9th Cir.1993). In this case, the state trial court did not abide by either criteria. 70 The state trial court summarily overruled Duckett's objection to the shackles. There is no indication in the record that the court considered whether any less restrictive alternatives were available and would be adequate. The court's only stated reason for requiring Duckett to appear in shackles during the penalty phase of the case was that he had just been convicted of two counts of murder. 71 A defendant's status as a convicted felon may justify a trial judge's concern for security. Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d at 1482. Standing alone, however, this is not sufficient reason to impose physical restraints. Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1458 (9th Cir.1993). See also State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 350-51, 351 n. 97 (Utah 1993) (holding that a murder conviction alone is not a sufficient basis for shackling a defendant at sentencing). In all the cases in which shackling has been approved, there has also been evidence of disruptive courtroom behavior, attempts to escape from custody, assaults or attempted assaults while in custody, or a pattern of defiant behavior toward corrections officials and judicial authorities. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F.3d 49, 51 (9th Cir.1994); Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1154-55 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d at 1401; King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.1992); Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d at 885; Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 498 (9th Cir.1988); Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d at 1485. Here, the record does not indicate any of these factors existed. 7 We conclude, therefore, that the state trial court committed constitutional error by requiring Duckett to appear before the sentencing jury in physical restraints. 72 The remaining question is whether this error prejudiced the outcome of the sentencing hearing. Shackling, except in extreme forms, is susceptible to harmless error analysis. Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d at 669. Because this is a habeas case dealing with a state court sentence, the question is whether the shackling had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1714, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). If we are in grave doubt whether the error affected the verdict, the error is not harmless. O'Neal v. McAninch, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995). 73 Duckett has not presented any evidence of prejudice. Moreover, despite the severity of his crime, the jury did not find him eligible for the death penalty but sentenced him instead to life without the possibility of parole. 74 The risk of doubt, however, is on the state. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 996 (rejecting language in Brecht v. Abrahamson which places on defendant burden of showing prejudice). Because in this case the trial court summarily overruled Duckett's objection to the shackles, the record does not reflect how onerous the shackles were, or the extent to which they were visible to the jury. See Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d at 149 (finding shackling at trial harmless error because defendant only wore waist chain that could not be seen by jury). Given the inadequacy of the record, we cannot conclude without grave doubt that, absent the error, the jury would not have sentenced Duckett to life with the possibility of parole, an option which was available to it. Therefore, we must remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of prejudice. See Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d at 1460 (remanding for evidentiary hearing where record not properly developed on issue of prejudice caused by shackling).