Opinion ID: 1303713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Faulty Instructions on Prior Inconsistent Statements

Text: At the completion of the second trial, and prior to the penalty phase, the jury was instructed on the subject of a witness's prior inconsistent statements. The jury was properly told that evidence of a witness's prior statement (whether consistent or inconsistent with his present testimony) may be considered both to test his credibility and as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated on the former occasion. (CALJIC No. 2.13.) The jury was further advised that If you believe a witness's testimony that he no longer remembers a certain event, such testimony is inconsistent with the prior statement or statements by him describing that event. (Italics added.) Defendant takes issue with the foregoing variation on CALJIC No. 2.13, which uses the word disbelieve instead of believe. We agree that the modification seems to make little sense, for the fact that a witness presently cannot recall an event, if believed, nevertheless logically casts no serious doubt upon, nor reinforces, that witness's prior description of the event. ( Disbelief of the witness's memory lapse, however, might well support an inference of the truth of the facts formerly recited.) Defendant contends that the instruction in effect told the jury that even if it believed his supposed memory lapse during the murder of Mrs. Bert, it could consider that testimony inconsistent with (and thus impeachable by) his prior statements to Dr. Raffle to the effect that indeed he remembered raping and stabbing his victim. To the contrary, no reasonable juror would have assumed that defendant's credibility could be impeached by a believable memory loss. It is not reasonably probable that the error contributed to the jury's verdict.