Opinion ID: 1676965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Counsel Attaches When Adverse Judicial Criminal Proceedings Begin

Text: In 1972, a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel cannot attach prior to the initiation of adverse judicial criminal proceedings. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). The plurality reasoned that because the purpose of the right to counsel is to assure rough equality of legal representation between the defendant and the state in court proceedings, the right does not come into play until the adversarial or judicially supervised accusatory phase of the criminal process is reached. The opinion of the court elaborated: The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that the defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the criminal prosecutions to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. Id. at 689-690, 92 S.Ct. at 1882 (citations omitted). Subsequently, the Court adopted the Kirby plurality's rationale and held that while a person is entitled to assistance of counsel during confrontations that may be considered critical stages of the criminal process, the right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of adverse judicial criminal proceedings. McNeil v. Wisconsin, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). The plurality in Kirby did not draw a single, bright fact-based line marking the earliest point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. But the plurality clearly indicated that the right attaches when the state's role shifts from investigation to accusation, as signalled by the initiation of adverse judicial criminal proceedings. The Court's later decisions have consistently followed this view. McNeil v. Wisconsin, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). See also Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has plainly indicated that in most jurisdictions a person's initial court appearance or first judicial hearing signals the beginning of judicial criminal proceedings and the shift of the state's role from investigation to accusation for purposes of the attachment of his right to counsel. McNeil v. Wisconsin, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (Right to counsel attached and had been invoked when defendant was brought before a county court commissioner for his initial appearance on an armed robbery charge.); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (The defendant's arraignment, actually a first appearance rather than a pleading-stage formal arraignment, marked the initiation of adverse judicial proceedings.); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (The defendant's arraignment on the warrant caused the right to counsel to attach.). The arraignment on the warrant that occurred in Brewer v. Williams, supra, was substantially similar to the first step in judicial criminal proceedings in most American jurisdictions. This first step is also referred to as the first appearance, initial presentment, or preliminary arraignment. 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 1.4, p. 21 (1984); Kamisar, LaFave & Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 8-9 (4th ed. 1974); Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 Amer.Crim.L.Rev. 1, 28-29 (1979).