Opinion ID: 2790078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of BWS Expert

Text: Navedo-Ramirez sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Romey, an expert on BWS, who would have testified about the general nature of the syndrome. More specifically, defense counsel sought to have Dr. Romey testify about the impact of domestic abuse on -6- women generally in order to provide context for the defendant's testimony and possibly explain the potential impact that the history of violence Navedo-Ramirez had experienced may have had on her. Navedo-Ramirez maintains that the testimony was relevant to whether she possessed the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged and to whether she acted under duress. Before defendant testified, the district court agreed that, in general, testimony about the long-term effects of being battered or domestic violence in general could well be relevant in a case where a defendant claimed that she engaged in criminal activity only because she was forced to by an abusive domestic partner. United States v. Ramírez, No. 10-344(PG), 2012 WL 733973, at  (D.P.R. Mar. 6, 2012); see generally United States v. Marenghi, 893 F. Supp. 85, 92-97 (D. Me. 1995) (holding that expert testimony on BWS may be admitted to support a duress defense). After defendant testified, her counsel offered the expert testimony. The court excluded Dr. Romey's testimony, finding that it would not be helpful to the jury because Navedo-Ramirez's testimony had adequately conveyed her contention that she participated in the drug transaction because she feared for her son's life and her own: Based on the history that's before the jury as to her treatment by her first husband, her third husband and by [Rivera-Ruperto] . . . . [s]he was fearful of him, the photographs, . . . the pulling of the hair, the punch, whatever, when he said you are going to go -7- with me, she felt fear and she went with him. That is why she went. You don't need to have a psychologist come in and say, well, a woman who has had all these experiences is going to act not as a reasonable person would act under those situations. She would act based on that fear that she has ingrown into her because of her previous experiences. Therefore, she was there . . . because . . . . [s]he was afraid for herself and her son and that justifies her actions. You don't need a psychologist for that. . . . . . . . She was fully articulate on what she felt, . . . what she thought during . . . . She just went there because . . . . [s]he was afraid for her son. If the jury believes that then they would have to acquit, I think . . . . At this time it's a question of credibility. . . . . . . . She has testified as to the duress. If you believe that all that she says put her in such a state of mind that she was completely under duress and acted out of duress, we don't need an expert . . . . Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that [a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if, among other requirements, the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. If a layperson is capable of understanding an issue without the aid of an expert, a district court may properly decline to admit expert testimony on that issue on the ground that it would not be helpful to the jury. See United States v. Salimonu, 182 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 1999). -8- The proposed expert testimony did not fit this case snugly. This is not a case in which a battered spouse tries to explain why she continues to live with the batterer. NavedoRamirez dated Rivera-Ruperto for two months, and then broke off the relationship. Furthermore, the threats to which Navedo-Ramirez testified were such that any person, unaided by expert testimony, could readily appreciate their impact. To be blunt, any person might well be placed under much duress if her child's life were threatened by a supposed hit man, or if she were raped while involuntarily intoxicated. This is not to say that all of the proposed expert testimony was inadmissible. Instead, it is to say only that we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling that the jury would not be aided by expert testimony in determining whether Navedo-Ramirez acted under duress and whether she had the requisite mens rea for the crimes charged. The real issue in this case was whether the jury accepted her testimony as credible. An expert would not be helpful on that. The government's contention was not that abuse could not produce duress, but that she was not credible in attributing her presence and commission of the crime to duress. The court reasonably concluded that testimony from an expert on BWS would have been cumulative of Navedo-Ramirez's own testimony and, thus, unhelpful to the jury. Cf. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court's exclusion of expert -9- testimony regarding defendant's limited intelligence, intended to suggest that defendant did not realize that a gift he had accepted was a bribe, because defendant's limited intelligence was clearly revealed to the jury during [his] testimony and accordingly the jury was able to determine whether [defendant] realized that he was accepting a bribe without the assistance of expert testimony), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 690-92 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Byers, 730 F.2d 568, 57071 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that the district court has wide latitude in admitting or excluding psychiatric evidence directed to the capacity of a defendant to entertain a specific intent or directed to the credibility of a witness (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). B. Rivera-Ruperto's Prior Domestic Violence Conviction Navedo-Ramirez also sought to introduce a prior domestic violence conviction of Rivera-Ruperto. The district court excluded it as inadmissible propensity evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1) (Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.). Navedo-Ramirez contends that this was error, arguing that it was relevant to her duress defense. A duress defense requires proof that the defendant committed a crime as a result of: '(1) an immediate threat of -10- serious bodily injury or death, (2) a well-grounded belief that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise to frustrate the threat.' González-Pérez, 778 F.3d at 13 (quoting United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448 (1st Cir. 1996)). Navedo-Ramirez says that Rivera-Ruperto's domestic violence conviction supported her contention that she had a wellgrounded belief that his threats against her and her son would be carried out. This argument would have some force, were there any evidence suggesting that she knew about the conviction. Cf. United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 177 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that the objective situation in which the defendant was allegedly subjected to duress is relevant to the defense of duress and that evidence concerning the defendant's past history with the person making the unlawful threat can help show that the defendant's fear was well-grounded). But there is no such evidence or even an offer of proof in the record. Defense counsel admitted as much at oral argument. Without evidence establishing that Navedo-Ramirez knew about Rivera-Ruperto's conviction, the district court did not err in excluding the conviction. See United States v. Garcia, 729 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that prior violent acts by a purported aggressor could not have affected the defendant's state of mind if the defendant did not know about the violent acts). -11- C. Navedo-Ramirez's PRPD Performance Evaluations We likewise find no abuse of discretion as to the district court's exclusion of Navedo-Ramirez's PRPD performance evaluations. It is true that Rule 404(a) allows a criminal defendant to offer evidence of a pertinent character trait. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A). But the district court permissibly concluded that the character trait that the evaluations purport to show -- general competence at her job as a police officer -- is not pertinent to the drug and gun possession crimes of which NavedoRamirez was convicted. See United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 990, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's refusal to admit under Rule 404(a) commendations defendant had received while on the police force, reasoning that defendant's 'dedication, aggressiveness and assertiveness' in investigating drug dealing and carjacking [was not] 'pertinent' to . . . his supposed lack of predisposition to provide security for drug transactions); cf. United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1168 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that commendations received by defendant in military service and as a police officer were not pertinent to defendant's perjury and mail fraud charges).