Opinion ID: 72878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 1991 Act Amends Section 1981

Text: In response to Patterson and its progeny, Congress enacted the 1991 Act and added the 10 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981 and all Fifth Circuit Unit B decisions after October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc); Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 33 (11th Cir.1982). current subsection (b) to section 1981, which gives a new, broader definition to the terms make and enforce contracts in subsection (a). Subsection (b) states that  make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Both the Supreme Court and this Court have acknowledged that the 1991 Act was a direct response to Patterson and its progeny. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1489, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 302, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 1514, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (explaining that section 1981's prohibition against racial discrimination now applies to all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship, including discriminatory contract terminations); Vance, 983 F.2d at 1577; Jones, 977 F.2d at 534. This Court has noted that one effect of the 1991 Act ... is to make the rule in Patterson obsolete by statutorily adding certain categories of post hiring discrimination to the list of practices liable to suit under section 1981. Vance, 983 F.2d at 1577. In 1994, the Supreme Court next faced whether to apply the 1991 Act retroactively to claims arising prior to the Act's effective date. See generally Rivers, 511 U.S. 298, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274. In Rivers, the plaintiff contended that the 1991 Act should apply retroactively, arguing that the 1991 Act only restored pre-Patterson law. Id. at 304, 114 S.Ct. at 1515. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the 1991 Act does not apply retroactively. Id. at 304-314, 114 S.Ct. at 1515-20. The Court described the Act's function as  expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination,'  id. at 308, 114 S.Ct. at 1517 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166 § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 § 3(4) (1991)), and concluded that the text of the Act does not support the argument that § 101 of the 1991 Act was intended to restore' prior understandings of § 1981 as to cases arising before the 1991 Act's passage. Id.11