Opinion ID: 2831586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 1120, 1121-22, 1124-27 (Del. 1981).

Text: 80 Pernic testified: “This invoice was not in his inbox . . . . Because I never put invoices in his inbox because they would get lost, and then they would be gone, and then we wouldn‟t pay them, and then we would get a late fee . . . .” Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A68-69. 30 The UIAB Did Not Err as a Matter of Law by Determining That the Firm Was Required to Warn Pernic of the Consequences of Violating the Firm’s Unwritten Financial Policy Finally, the Majority contends that the Board erred as a matter of law when it determined that the Firm was required to inform Pernic what the “trigger” for her discharge would be “in terms of timing, conduct, or failure to improve.” 81 As the Majority holds, “An employer need not specify the types of conduct that could lead to termination so long as the employee is aware that certain types of conduct are improper and prohibited.”82 Moreover, the “[v]iolation of an established employer policy may constitute just cause to terminate an employee . . . [only if the employee is] aware that the policy exists and that a violation of the policy may result in termination.”83 The Majority, again making its own factual finding, has determined that Pernic had knowledge of the unwritten policy and thus received adequate warning. The Board, however, made no such finding.84 As discussed above, Pernic testified that she was unaware of the Firm‟s unwritten policy and never received a warning regarding the unauthorized payment of invoices. The Firm was required to show that Pernic had 81 Majority Opinion at 16. 82 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 83 Optima Cleaning Sys. Inc, 2010 WL 5307981 at ; see also McCoy v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 1996 WL 111126, at  (Del. Super. Feb. 7, 1996) (“Violation of a reasonable company rule may constitute just cause for discharge, but the employee must be aware that the policy exists and may be cause for discharge.”). 84 In its decision, the Board stated: “Where the company policy has been clearly communicated to the employee, the employer has given adequate notice to justify termination.” The Board went on to find that the payment of a single invoice, without approval, in violation of an “unwritten policy” is clearly insufficient evidence of willful and wanton conduct. Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A130. 31 knowledge of the unwritten financial policy to justify her termination,85 and it was within the purview of the Board to accept or reject the Firm‟s testimony. Because the Board‟s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be said that its legal conclusion was erroneous.86 III. Conclusion The UIAB considered all of the evidence regarding Pernic‟s misconduct, the counseling she received for her deficient performance, and the actual cause of her termination. After reviewing the conflicting evidence, the Board chose to accept Pernic‟s testimony as credible. Such was the Board‟s right as factfinder. The Majority has rejected the Board‟s findings not because there is “no satisfactory proof in [their] favor,” but merely because it disagrees with them.87 I adhere to the deferential standard of review that governs administrative agency appeals and find that the Board‟s judgment was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Accordingly, I dissent. 85 See Smoot v. Comcast Cablevision, 2004 WL 2914287, at  (Del. Super. Nov. 16, 2004) (“An employee‟s violation of a company policy of which that employee is aware may create just cause for termination of employment.”) (citing Fader v. Burris Foods., 1997 WL 366889, at  (Del. Super. May 14, 1997)). 86 Admittedly, the Board‟s opinion should have provided more clarity regarding what rule of law it was relying on to affirm the Appeals Referee‟s decision. Nevertheless, the Board reached the correct legal conclusion and its decision should be affirmed on appeal. 87 See Steppi, 2010 WL 718012, at  (quoting Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66). 32