Opinion ID: 2180953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Defects in Informations

Text: The defendant raises numerous issues regarding the informations filed in this case and subsequent amendments to those informations. To put the issues in proper perspective, it is necessary to understand the sequence of pleadings and motions involved. On February 16, 1984, the defendant was charged with a single count of forgery and six counts of attempted theft. All seven counts were charged in separate informations. On February 17, 1984, an initial hearing was held, wherein the court established an April 14, 1984, omnibus date. On February 20, 1984, the defendant moved to dismiss the attempted theft charges, contending that the facts alleged constituted at most only a single offense. On May 24, 1984, the State filed an amended information adding a habitual offender count. On July 9, 1984, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion to dismiss the attempted theft counts. The State's theory on the attempted theft charges was based on the allegation that the defendant's acts of stealing the blank checks each constituted a substantial step toward separate thefts of the victim's money. This is reflected in the prosecutor's argument to the court where she stated: Count number two, the check was made out but not signed for the amount of six hundred and fifty dollars and the other ones are all blank and it's our belief because they were going, we feel they were going to be presented at different times for different amounts of money that therefore they are separate counts of Attempted Theft. (emphasis added). On July 20, 1984, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss but simultaneously granted the State time to file an Amended Information charging the alleged Theft of multiple articles. The State, on August 14, 1984, filed a motion to amend information with respect to Count II, an amended Count II and an amended information on Count I (Forgery), which was in essence a duplicate of the original information on Count I. As for the amended information on Count II, the State replaced the original six counts of attempted theft with one count of theft. Following the State's filing of the amended information, the defendant filed a prompt objection contending that the amendment was one of substance because it changed both the identity of the offense and the theory of prosecution and was thus precluded by Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(b), which provides that an information charging a felony may be amended in matters of substance upon giving written notice to the defendant at any time up to thirty days before the omnibus date. However, Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(c) states: Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may, at any time before, during, or after the trial, permit an amendment to the indictment or information in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. The defendant argues that the amended information involved matters of substance and was thus untimely under subsection 5(b) rather than a defect, imperfection, or omission in form, for which a belated amendment would be permissible under subsection 5(c). The defendant contends that the State is absolutely precluded from amending in a manner which changes the theory of prosecution and identity of the offense and cites as supporting authority Trotter v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 637, and Gibbs v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 1217. However, such holdings of these cases are no longer controlling precedent because they were based upon an express statutory prohibition of such amendments, formerly Ind. Code § 35-3.1-1-5(e) (Burns 1979), which was repealed effective September 1, 1982. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the amended information constitutes a change in substance rather than a defect, imperfection, or omission in form, it is the province of this Court to determine the proper appellate remedy upon challenge to a conviction resulting from such an amendment. The defendant claims the following resulting prejudice: (1) [t]he incumbent prejudice that a jury infers from the theory of a State prosecution, (2) the additional State presentation of evidentiary proofs, and (3) evidentiary rulings. The State argues that there was no resulting prejudice because the amended information did not alter the availability of defenses nor the potential penalty facing the defendant. We observe that the evidence which the defendant would have anticipated upon the original charge of attempted theft would necessarily have included the evidence relevant to the amended information. Evidence showing the taking of the checks as the charged substantial step constituting the attempt does not materially differ from evidence of the same conduct as proof of the amended charge of theft. We are not persuaded that the defendant suffered resulting prejudice. Because the defendant has not demonstrated sufficient resulting harm, it is therefore unnecessary to address whether the amended information was untimely filed because it involved matters of substance rather than matters constituting a defect, imperfection, or omission in form. In a related argument, the defendant contends that the amended information failed to comport with Ind. Code § 35-36-6-6, which requires that if a new prosecution is initiated in the court to which the change of venue is taken, the information must state how the proceeding came into the court. Our research has failed to disclose a single case construing this statute. However, we disagree with the defendant's characterization of the charges alleged in the amended information as a new prosecution. Arguably, the theft charge could constitute a new prosecution because it was not a crime initially charged in the original information. However, the defendant cites no authority, nor can we find any, for the proposition that the forgery charge (count I) is a new prosecution. Although the forgery count was included in the amended information, the amended forgery count was identical to the forgery count charged in the original information. Thus, the amended forgery information was outside the scope of Ind. Code § 35-36-6-6, and it was unnecessary for the amended information to state how the proceeding came into the court to which the change of venue was taken. In another collateral argument, the defendant asserts he was denied his alleged statutory right under Ind. Code § 35-36-6-4 to have the case transferred back to Morgan County. This argument fails under three rationales. First, Ind. Code § 35-36-6-4 involves new prosecutions, which, again, implies the dismissal of charges and subsequent refiling of new charges. Second, the defendant never moved to transfer the case pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-36-6-4; rather, he moved to dismiss because of the State's alleged failure to comply with Ind. Code § 35-36-6-6 (discussed above). Third, and perhaps most persuasive, even if the charges were deemed a new prosecution, this Court has previously held that where some counts of an indictment were dismissed and later refiled, it was not a ground for reversal that the court did not afford defendants an opportunity to elect which county they wished to be prosecuted in where they were not prejudiced by such denial. Pollard v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 599, 388 N.E.2d 496. The Court in Pollard reasoned as follows: Appellants contend that the refiling of Counts I and IV constituted a new prosecution on those charges within the meaning of this statute and thus, the trial court erred by not affording them an opportunity to elect as to which county they wished to be prosecuted in. Assuming, without deciding, that appellants had a statutory right to make such an election, we fail to see how they were prejudiced by the denial of such right. If appellants had been allowed to elect, their only options would have been a choice between having the cause remain in Monroe County or having it returned to Vanderburgh County where extensive pre-trial publicity had occurred earlier. It is also true that since the alleged new prosecution related only to Counts I and IV, the appellants, had they opted for a return to Vanderburgh County, would have been required to first defend against Counts II and III in Monroe County and then have to stand trial on Counts I and IV in Vanderburgh County; a prospect which would have been more prejudicial to appellants' rights than what actually occurred. There is thus no merit to this argument as a ground for reversal. Id. at 608-09, 338 N.E.2d at 504. Likewise, in this case the trial had been venued out of Morgan County because of adverse publicity, and the defendant has failed to show any prejudice whatsoever in not transferring the case back to Morgan County. Thus, there was no error. The defendant also predicates error on the trial court's denial of his motion to strike the habitual offender information. The defendant argues that the habitual offender information was attached or linked to the original information, and since the original charges were dismissed and the amended charges superceded the original charges, the habitual offender information was not a valid attachment to the amended charges. The defendant cites Griffin v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 160, as his primary support for this argument; however, Griffin is inapposite. In Griffin, the defendant was convicted of theft, and his sentence was enhanced by 30 years on the habitual offender determination. Griffin was originally charged in five counts, the first four charging theft and the fifth alleging the habitual offender status. The information was later amended, and the amended information alleged only one count of theft (receiving stolen property). All parties agreed that the amended information intended to and did take out all five of the original counts and was the only remaining charge against the defendant. The State subsequently filed a pleading titled Notice of Intent to Seek Habitual Offender Status. On appeal, this Court held that the defendant's status as a habitual criminal would be set aside because the State's notice of intent to seek habitual offender status was not under oath and did nothing more than make a statement that the State intended to submit the habitual offender question to the jury. The Court determined that the pleading was not part of the charging information and that it failed to comply procedurally with the bringing of the original charges. Griffin cannot be construed to stand for the proposition that an otherwise valid habitual offender charge ceases to be a part of the charging information upon the filing of an amended information. We can find no basis, nor has the defendant provided any rationale, for concluding that the amended information in this case invalidated the habitual offender count or that such a result was intended. Moreover, the defendant has failed to show any actual prejudice. The record indicates his clear awareness that the State was proceeding with the habitual offender allegation and that he had sufficient opportunity to prepare his defense. We therefore reject this argument.