Opinion ID: 582726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy and related counts

Text: 74 Appellants all challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their conspiracy convictions, and their convictions for the substantive offenses committed during the conspiracy. To convict appellants of conspiracy, the Government had to prove that they entered into an agreement with at least one other person and that the agreement had as its objective a violation of the law. United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir.1991). The Government may rely wholly on circumstantial evidence to prove the existence of a conspiracy. United States v. Schmidt, 922 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir.1991). Members of the conspiracy are liable for all substantive crimes committed by their co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy that were reasonably foreseeable to them. United States v. Williams, 902 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1183-84, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946)). 75 Bruton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all his remaining counts. In proving Count II, engaging in a CCE, the Government presented more than sufficient proof to convict Bruton of conspiracy. 10 Count III, alleging Bruton acquired marijuana from Jack Mikulenka, is supported directly by Mikulenka's testimony. Bruton argues Mikulenka did not testify credibly. We will not reverse a conviction resting on the testimony of a co-conspirator unless no reasonable juror could believe the witness's testimony. United States v. Jackson, 959 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir.1992). Several pieces of evidence, such as phone records and rental car receipts, document Mikulenka's testimony that he drove from Texas to Kansas City to deliver marijuana. A reasonable jury could have believed Mikulenka. Therefore, sufficient evidence supports Count III. 76 Bruton challenges Counts VI, IX and XIV, alleging that he possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. Bruton argues that FBI agents never witnessed marijuana in his presence. However, constructive possession, supported by circumstantial evidence, will support a conviction of possession with intent to distribute. United States v. Schubel, 912 F.2d 952, 955 (8th Cir.1990). Before each visit by Leal, Bruton called Leal, who told Bruton over the phone the count. The count Leal gave Bruton on April 5 almost exactly matched the pounds of marijuana police found in Leal's car later that day while he was driving north. 11 Additionally, the FBI found a huge amount of cash in the car driven by Bruton and Hathcock. The jury could use these facts to deduce that when Leal told Bruton the count in March, February and April, he really meant I will be bringing X pounds of marijuana to sell to you. After each of those phone calls, Bruton visited a hotel where Leal stayed, drove Leal's car to a different location, and then returned Leal's car to the hotel. The jury had sufficient circumstantial proof to infer that Bruton purchased large amounts of marijuana from Leal on February 19, and March 10, and was preparing to purchase more on April 6. 77 Counts IV, VIII, X, XII and XIII allege that Bruton discussed the conspiracy on the telephone. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the facts discussed above that Bruton was discussing the conspiracy on the phone with his co-conspirators during the conversations taped by the Government. 78 Count XI accused Bruton and Cullen of manufacturing methamphetamine on March 28, 1990. Bruton argues that he was never near the methamphetamine lab on that day, and therefore cannot be liable for Cullen's activities. However, Bruton knew Cullen was manufacturing methamphetamine on that day. Cullen called Bruton from the lab that day and told Bruton that he was working. Bruton stated: Yeah, well, when you get, uh, the fires put out, well, uh, come over. Additionally, Bruton aided the operation of the methamphetamine laboratory in several ways, indicating his responsibility for its product. Bruton delivered trash for the lab, stored chemicals for the lab at a different location, and ordered glassware for it. Thus, Bruton was liable both for Cullen's manufacture of methamphetamine, and for the methamphetamine found at the laboratory. The Government presented sufficient evidence supporting all of Bruton's convictions. 79 Calia challenges his conviction for Count I, conspiracy. Calia argues that the Government has shown only that he was present during several transactions, and not that he participated in the conspiracy. We disagree. Calia's conversations with Bruton indicate that Calia knew of Bruton's marijuana purchases from Leal. Calia's call to Glorioso telling him the amount of marijuana Leal was bringing furthered the conspiracy. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably have found Calia guilty of conspiracy. 80 Calia challenges Count VI, arguing that he was not present during the purchase of marijuana by Bruton from Leal on February 19, 1990. We disagree. The jury could have reasonably inferred that the following occurred on February 19 from the record: Calia drove to Glorioso's house that night and lent Bruton his car for Bruton to use in picking up marijuana from Leal. When Bruton returned from the hotel, he unloaded the marijuana at Glorioso's house while Calia and Glorioso were in the house. 81 Glorioso challenges his convictions for conspiracy, Count I, and possession of marijuana, Count VI, arguing the Government presented insufficient evidence. The evidence indicates that Glorioso at least allowed the other conspirators use of his house as a drop-off point for marijuana. Calia's conversation with Glorioso on February 19, in which Glorioso inquired as to how much marijuana Bruton would be purchasing, also provided ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer Glorioso's guilt. 82 Montanye challenges his conviction for conspiracy, Count I, arguing that the Government presented insufficient evidence. Montanye argues that he merely delivered glassware, and did not know that doing so was illegal, or that he was joining a conspiracy. We disagree. As we discussed above, the Government presented strong evidence that Montanye knew of the conspiracy, and knew that his delivery of glassware was in furtherance of the conspiracy. 83 Montanye also challenges his conviction for attempted manufacturing of methamphetamine, Count VII, arguing that his delivery of glassware did not constitute a substantial step towards commission of the crime. The elements of an attempt are as follows: (1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct; (2) conduct constituting a substantial step towards commission of the substantive offense which strongly corroborates the actor's conduct. United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir.1982). Whether a defendant's conduct amounts to a substantial step depends on the particular facts in the case at hand. United States v. Wagner, 884 F.2d 1090, 1097 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1829, 108 L.Ed.2d 958 (1990). This court has held that conduct consisting of ordering and receiving the equipment and chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine constituted a substantial step towards manufacturing methamphetamine. See Wagner, 884 F.2d at 1096-97; United States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Mazzella, 768 F.2d 235, 239-40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006, 106 S.Ct. 528, 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985). Possession of laboratory glassware, by itself, does not constitute a substantial step towards making methamphetamine. We have held that a defendant must at least obtain equipment and precursor chemicals before he may be convicted of attempt. See Wagner, 884 F.2d at 1096-97; Felix, 867 F.2d at 1071-72; Mazzella, 768 F.2d at 239-40. Montanye never possessed or intended to possess precursor chemicals. We therefore reverse Montanye's conviction for attempted manufacture of methamphetamine.