Opinion ID: 848684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: for public purposes within the scope of its powers

Text: Wayne County's assertion that the proposed condemnations are for public purposes within the scope of its powers [16] raises two discrete questions  first, whether Wayne County is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain at all and, second, whether this particular exercise of the eminent domain power is within the county's powers. There is no question that the state possesses the power of eminent domain. [17] The state's authority to condemn private property for public use is preserved by our Constitution [18] and has been expressly acknowledged by this Court on a number of occasions. [19] But whether that eminent domain power extends to counties within the state is another matter. Plaintiff argues that the Legislature has expressly conferred that power upon public corporations such as Wayne County through the plain language of MCL 213.23. This statute begins by stating that [a]ny public corporation or state agency is authorized to take private property.... [20] Plaintiff argues that this language is a separate and independent delegation of the power to condemn private property for public purposes. Because § 23 authoriz[es] public corporations to condemn property in certain circumstances, a public corporation need not rely on any other statutory provision in order to exercise the power of eminent domain. Defendants maintain, however, that plaintiff's reading renders the second sentence of MCL 213.23 a nullity. This sentence provides: When funds have been appropriated by the legislature to a state agency or division thereof or the office of the governor or a division thereof for the purpose of acquiring lands or property for a designated public purpose, such unit to which the appropriation has been made is authorized on behalf of the people of the state of Michigan to acquire the lands or property either by purchase, condemnation or otherwise.[ [21] ] If the first sentence of MCL 213.23 is a separate grant of authority to condemn, defendants argue, the second sentence  which also confers the authorization to condemn land  is redundant. A careful reading of MCL 213.23 reveals that this statute is indeed a separate grant of authority and, thus, that plaintiff has parsed this statute correctly. The first sentence of MCL 213.23 states that a public corporation such as Wayne County is authorized to condemn private property if the other preconditions of § 23 are met. To authorize is to give the authority or official power to or to empower. [22] By its plain language, this first sentence is an affirmative grant of eminent domain power to public corporations and state agencies. Contrary to defendants' arguments, giving effect to the plain language of the first sentence does not render the remainder of § 23 nugatory. The second sentence applies only to condemnation by the state, its agencies or their divisions; thus, it applies to a subset of the groups covered by the first sentence. Further, it establishes a precondition to the condemnation for a public purpose designated by the Legislature  namely, the appropriation of funds to the state agency or division for that purpose. Finally, the second sentence, unlike the first, authorizes specific methods of exercising the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, the second sentence of MCL 213.23 does not alter the plain meaning of the first: Wayne County, as a public corporation, is authorized by MCL 213.23 to condemn property, albeit subject to other constitutional and statutory limitations. The second question raised by the county's reliance on the for public purposes within the scope of its powers phrase in § 23 is whether these particular condemnations are within the scope of [Wayne County's] powers. The power upon which plaintiff relies  the authority to condemn for public purposes within the scope of its powers   calls for an analysis of the scope of Wayne County's powers, and an assessment of whether the proposed condemnations are within those powers. Art. 7, § 1 of our 1963 Constitution provides that [e]ach organized county shall be a body corporate with powers and immunities provided by law. The Constitution also declares that a county may codify in its charter the power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its concerns. [23] These constitutional provisions are to be liberally construed: The provisions of this constitution and law concerning counties, townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers granted to counties and townships by this constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this constitution. [[ [24] ] Given the broad authority conferred by the Constitution upon local governments, this Court has acknowledged that Michigan is a home rule state, in which local governments are vested with general constitutional authority to act on all matters of local concern not forbidden by state law. [25] The Legislature has also recognized that the Michigan constitution establishes a system of home rule. The charter county act, [26] enacted in 1966, states that county charters may expressly provide for [t]he authority to perform at the county level any function or service not prohibited by law, which shall include, by way of enumeration and not limitation: Police protection, fire protection, planning, zoning, education, health, welfare, recreation, water, sewer, waste disposal, transportation, abatement of air and water pollution, civil defense, and any other function or service necessary or beneficial to the public health, safety, and general welfare of the county. [ [27] ] Plaintiff Wayne County has claimed all the authority granted by these constitutional and statutory provisions. Its charter states: Wayne County, a body corporate, possesses home rule power enabling it to provide for any matter of County concern and all powers conferred by the constitution or law upon charter counties or upon general law counties, their officers, or agencies.[ [28] ] With this charter provision, Wayne County has claimed for itself the power to act in all matters not specifically reserved by statute or constitution to the state. The county's powers include the authority to pursue any end that is necessary or beneficial to the public health, safety, and general welfare of the county, [29] assuming that the pursuit of that objective is not reserved by our Constitution or by statute to the state. In this case, Wayne County has condemned the defendants' real properties for the following purposes: (1) the creation of jobs for its citizens, (2) the stimulation of private investment and redevelopment in the county to insure a healthy and growing tax base so that the county can fund and deliver critical public services, (3) stemming the tide of disinvestment and population loss, and (4) supporting development opportunities which would otherwise remain unrealized. [30] The analysis provided in this opinion demonstrates that, unless the pursuit of one or more of these objectives has been assigned to the state by law, any condemnation in furtherance of these goals is within the scope of Wayne County's powers, as required by MCL 213.23. Defendants have adduced no constitutional or statutory support for the proposition that a home rule county such as Wayne County may not pursue these objectives. Accordingly, the proposed condemnations are  at least for statutory purposes  within the scope of Wayne County's powers. The pursuit of the goals cited above is within the scope of Wayne County's powers, and each goal certainly advances a public purpose. A public purpose has been defined as that which `has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within the municipal corporation, the sovereign powers of which are used to promote such public purpose.' [31] A transition from a declining rustbelt economy to a growing, technology-driven economy would, no doubt, promote prosperity and general welfare. Consequently, the county's goal of drawing commerce to metropolitan Detroit and its environs by converting the subject properties to a state-of-the-art technology and business park is within this definition of a public purpose. That is not to say, of course, that the exercise of eminent domain in this case passes constitutional muster. While the proposed condemnations satisfy the broad parameters established by MCL 213.23, it must also be determined whether these condemnations pass the more narrow requirements of our Constitution. We address this question later.