Opinion ID: 1882654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issue 1. constitutionality of search

Text: In his first claim in this appeal, Seibert asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence discovered at his apartment and all statements made as a result of that discovery because the officers' entry into the apartment and subsequent search were in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In his 911 call, Green claimed that Seibert had locked him out of the apartment all morning and that the last time Green knocked on the door, Seibert threatened to commit suicide. Two MBPD officers arrived at the apartment a short time after receiving the call about an attempted suicide. [5] Officer Bales arrived first and testified that he spoke with Green upon his arrival. Green confirmed that he had called 911 and that his roommate was threatening to kill himself. He told the officers that Seibert was unarmed but that there was a large kitchen knife in the soil of a plant kept by the front door. Green directed Officer Bales and Sergeant Zeifman, who arrived just after Bales, to the apartment. The officers knocked on the door of Seibert's apartment and announced themselves. No answer came at first, but the officers realized that there was someone in the apartment because they saw the peephole darken after they knocked. The officers told Seibert that they would get a key to the apartment if he did not open the door. The officers then told Seibert that they needed to make sure he was not hurt, at which point Seibert opened the door four or five inches, and told the officers that they could leave and that he was okay. He then shut the door. Officer Bales testified that he had been able to see only Seibert's torso and that the area in which they were standing was dark, so the officers were not convinced that Seibert was all right. Bales testified that merely seeing Seibert's torso was not good enough to comply with the standard operating procedures of the MBPD in attempted suicide calls. The officers knocked again, informing Seibert that they had to see all of him to ensure that he was not hurt before they could leave. Bales signaled to Sergeant Zeifman that if the door was opened again, Zeifman should place his baton in the opening so that Seibert could not close the door. Seibert eventually opened the door, and at that time the officers pushed their way into the apartment, having to force the door open because a couch was blocking the door. The officers then had Seibert sit on the bed in the studio apartment, and Sergeant Zeifman remained to Seibert's right, in the kitchen area, while Bales stood four or five feet in front of him. The officers confirmed that Seibert was okay, and Bales glanced around the apartment, backing up a bit, to make sure no one else was in the apartment and that there were no objects around that indicated Seibert was attempting to commit suicide (e.g., pills, a rope, or knives). Bales asked Seibert whether there were other people in the apartment. As he asked this question, he looked to his right and was able to see through the slightly open bathroom door the severed foot of the victim on the edge of the bathtub. It was estimated that Bales was about six feet from the bathroom when he was able to see the foot. The trial court, following a hearing at which the above evidence was presented, denied the motion to suppress. The trial court reasoned that the officers were presented with exigent circumstances because of the report of an attempted suicide and in light of Seibert's suspicious behavior at the door when the officers arrived. The trial court then stated that the search was justified because, given the small size of the apartment, Officer Bales was merely looking around to ensure that there was no one else in the apartment  he was not conducting a search in the traditional sense of the word. A warrantless search of a home is per se unreasonable and thus unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). However, several exceptions to this rule have developed. One exception is the presence of an emergency situation which requires the police to assist or render aid. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) ([T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.). Under this exception, police may enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the officer to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or substantial property interests. Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293-94 (Fla.1997). It is immaterial whether an actual emergency existed in the residence; only the reasonableness of the officer's belief at the time of entry is considered on review. State v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). However, this search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Thus, an officer must cease a search once it is determined that no emergency exists. Rolling, 695 So.2d at 293. We recently thoroughly considered the exigency exception and its application to a situation where a child was found wandering alone in an apartment complex. Riggs v. State, 918 So.2d 274, (Fla.2005). We concluded that the officers in that case were reasonable in their belief that the child's caretaker was in need of medical attention and were also reasonable in relying on strong circumstantial evidence in their decision to enter the defendant's apartment. In discussing previous decisions of this Court concerning the exigency exception, we confirmed that authorities may enter a private dwelling based on a reasonable fear of a medical emergency. Id. at 281. We noted that [i]n those limited circumstances, the sanctity of human life becomes more important than the sanctity of the home. Id. Because a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact, we defer to the trial court on the factual issues but consider the constitutional issues de novo. Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 510 (Fla.2005). We must consider both whether the entry was permissible under these facts and whether the subsequent search of the apartment exceeded the parameters allowed if the entry was warranted. As stated above, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement generally permits the police to enter a home if there is an apparent emergency justifying their entry. Whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. Zeigler v. State, 402 So.2d 365, 371 (Fla.1981). The most urgent emergency situation excusing police compliance with the warrant requirement is, of course, the need to protect or preserve life. United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir.2002). We have stated that the `emergency exception' permits police to enter and investigate private premises to preserve life ... or render first aid, provided they do not enter with an accompanying intent either to arrest or search. Hornblower v. State, 351 So.2d 716, 718 (Fla.1977). Thus, we determined that exigent circumstances existed when an officer entered the defendant's home after he received a report that the defendant had not shown up for military duty and when the officer went to investigate, he found a broken window at the defendant's residence. Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So.2d 688, 695 (Fla.2003) (the officer testified that he feared for the welfare of whomever may have been in the house at that time, thinking that there may have been a burglary, the family may have been on vacation, or something like that). Exigent circumstances have been determined to exist when 911 calls were received, even in cases when the callers did not identify a life-threatening emergency, when the officers arrived at the source of the 911 call to find suspicious circumstances at the residence. See Campbell v. State, 477 So.2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (after defendant's 911 call that she had overdosed on cocaine, police were permitted to enter even though she only requested paramedics and told the police to leave); State v. Barmeier, 878 So.2d 411, 413 (Fla. 3d DCA) (entry was permitted after 911 call from defendant about problems with his tenant, when responding officers found front door open and received no response when they called out to the residents, because the officers were concerned the people inside the residence might have been injured), review denied, 891 So.2d 549 (Fla.2004); In re J.B., 621 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (entry permitted after 911 call received from address though caller hung up; defendant, a juvenile, told officer to leave and that everything was okay, but officer observed place in disarray and so was concerned for defendant). It has also been determined that an emergency situation did not exist, however, when officers, after responding to a be-on-the-look-out (BOLO) call, entered an apartment because the officers observed that one of the individuals inside had a metal object in his hand, which the officers thought might be a weapon. See Alvarez v. State, 573 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (court reasoned that the BOLO did not mention a weapon and that suspect was cooperative with officers, so they had no reason to think that anyone was in danger); see also Hornblower, 351 So.2d at 718 (search not permitted because sounds of scurrying in residence that officers heard when they knocked did not create sufficient exigent circumstances to justify entry); Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133, 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (officers' mere speculation that sting operation would get out of control and put lives of officers in danger was not sufficient exigent circumstance to justify entry). In this instance, the police officers testified that they were operating under the impression that Seibert was suicidal. At no point did they have any reason to believe that a crime was occurring  their stated purpose in entering was to ensure that Seibert was not attempting to commit suicide. Zakrzewski, 866 So.2d at 695 (Court emphasized that officer did not enter defendant's home with the intent to seize evidence or make an arrest in concluding that entry was permissible). Green's 911 call about the possible suicide established the necessary exigent circumstance because the officers reasonably believed that Seibert's life was in danger. Although it was eventually determined that there was no suicide attempt, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that there was something wrong with Seibert. Moreover, the officers had a sufficient basis to corroborate Green's 911 call. Green was at the apartment building when the officers arrived and confirmed that he had placed the 911 call and that his roommate was suicidal. Seibert argues that the police could have established that Seibert was all right by asking him to come out of the apartment or by giving him another chance to open the door all the way so that they could observe him and ensure that he was in fact all right. However, given Seibert's strange behavior in not answering the door for four or five minutes after the officers first knocked, after which he immediately slammed the door, we find no error in the trial court finding that the officers' entry was justified by the exigent circumstances. The officers could have reasonably thought that they would not get another opportunity to assist Seibert if they allowed him to slam the door again and that other means of entry (e.g., obtaining a key to the apartment) might take too long. The officers had no reason to doubt Green's statement that the defendant was suicidal. [6] Seibert's actions reasonably furthered the officers' suspicions that he was attempting suicide because he refused to open the door for several minutes, and when he opened it, he only allowed them to see his torso, which the officers indicated was insufficient to settle any doubts that they had about his safety. From the officers' perspective at the time of these events, walking away, allowing Seibert to stay in his apartment without ensuring that he was okay, or even spending any more time trying to gain entry could have been considered a dereliction of their duty to protect Seibert. State v. Hetzko, 283 So.2d 49, 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (officers had reasonable belief that resident was in trouble and would have been considered derelict in their duty had they not entered the apartment). We next consider whether the subsequent search that led to the discovery of the victim's body was constitutional. As to what may be done by the police or other public authorities once they are inside the premises, this must be assessed upon a case-by-case basis, taking into account the type of emergency which appeared to be present. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 400 (3d ed.1996). The subsequent search following a warrantless entry must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Thus, as the Fifth District Court of Appeal stated, if the police enter a home under exigent circumstances and, prior to making a determination that the exigency no longer exists, find contraband in plain view, they may lawfully seize the illegal items. Davis v. State, 834 So.2d 322, 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). However, if the police determine the exigency that initially allowed their entry into the residence no longer exists, any subsequent search is illegal and any contraband discovered pursuant to the illegal search is inadmissible. Id. We affirm the finding of the trial court that this search was constitutional. Green testified that not much time passed between the officers' entry into the apartment until he heard Seibert running away. [7] The officers' quick look around the apartment was not an extensive search because they did not open any containers or even enter any other rooms. There has been no evidence that any pretense existed on the part of the police in this case. It was objectively reasonable for them to glance around to ensure that the apartment and Seibert were secure. Moreover, insufficient time had elapsed for the officers to determine that the exigency had passed. Although the officers observed upon their entry that Seibert appeared unharmed, the officers had not had sufficient time to determine that he was not preparing to harm himself. The instant situation is different from that in Mincey, where the search was found unwarranted because no emergency existed when the officers began their search and all persons in the apartment had been located. See 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408; see also Anderson v. State, 665 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (although particular search exceeded limits of exigency because officer went through documents in plastic bag in apartment, [t]he officer was entitled to examine what was in plain view while on the premises). In the present case, the officer's look from the main room of the studio apartment into the open bathroom was a limited extension of the initial entry, and since that entry was permissible, the subsequent actions of the officers were also lawful.