Opinion ID: 2324309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Diggs's Speedy Trial Claims

Text: Michael Smith's body was found on November 13, 2000. Diggs was arrested on September 1, 2004, and his trial commenced on February 1, 2007. He contends that the nearly four-year delay in effecting his arrest violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process, and that the 29-month delay between his arrest and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. [32] We conclude that Diggs has not made the showing necessary to prevail on either of these claims. In order to establish a due process violation in pre-arrest delay, appellant must show at a minimum that he actually was prejudiced by the delay and that the government's reasons [for failing to arrest more expeditiously] were unjustified. [33] Diggs's claims of prejudicefor example, that he lost the opportunity to locate witnesses to the shooting or to dig up evidence that Smith actually was shot and killed some time later than November 9are too speculative to show actual prejudice to his defense. [34] Nor does Diggs show that the police delayed his arrest for constitutionally unacceptable purposes. The record is less than clear as to the reasons for the extended delay, though the police investigation evidently was impeded by Fisher's overseas military service and other witness difficulties. (Phelps, the only other person who could identify Diggs, was a reluctant and inconsistent witness.) But whether the police were less than diligent in pursuing the investigation is not the issue. At least in the absence of severe prejudice to the defense, negligence (even gross negligence) on the part of the police is not enough to support a due process claim. [35] At a minimum, it must be shown that the police deliberately sought to hinder the defense or acted recklessly in failing to arrest [the defendant] in a timely manner. [36] The record before us does not reveal such improper motivation or recklessness. Accordingly, we hold that Diggs was not denied due process by the pre-arrest delay in this case. He fares no better with his Sixth Amendment claim. As instructed by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, [37] we assess a speedy trial claim in light of four factors: the [l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. [38] The balance of these factors weighs against finding a constitutional violation in this case. Length of Delay. Twenty-nine months elapsed between Diggs's arrest and trial. That is more than enough to trigger the Barker enquiry. [39] We recognize, however, that the more serious and complex the charge, the greater is the delay that will be tolerated because of the extended pretrial preparation required. [40] In cases such as this one, a first-degree murder case with two co-defendants, comparable and even longer delays have been countenanced by this court when all factors were considered. [41] Reasons for the Delay. In evaluating the causes of the delay, we focus primarily on whether and to what extent it was due to a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to gain tactical or other advantage; a more neutral reason, such as scheduling difficulties or negligence; or a valid reason, such as a missing witness. [42] In this case, none of the 29-month delay was due to deliberate obstruction, procrastination, or gamesmanship on the part of the government. On the contrary, all of the delay had a neutral or valid explanation, consisting mainly of: (1) the government's difficulties in locating witnesses while the case was pending before the grand jury; (2) scheduling difficulties and conflicts of various sorts, for which no blame can be assessed against either party; (3) Fisher's medical emergency, which caused him to be unavailable for a period of time; and (4) the protracted inquiry, initiated by appellants, into Fisher's competency to testify, which culminated in the pretrial litigation of appellants' unsuccessful motion to bar the prosecution from calling him as a witness. [43] These reasons, considered in their entirety, lend little weight to Diggs's claim that his right to a speedy trial was violated. Diggs complains that the government prolonged the pretrial period when, on August 31, 2006 (five months before trial began), it obtained a superseding indictment that added a count of conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon. We disagree. The late addition of the conspiracy charge did not occasion any delay of trial. [44] Assertion of the Right. Diggs invoked his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial on four occasions. He briefly asserted the right at his April 21, 2005, arraignment. Next, he declared at a status hearing in December 2005 that he did not waive his right to a speedy trial by agreeing to a three-month continuance so that a defense expert could examine Fisher's medical records. Diggs did not mention the subject of a speedy trial again until June 2006, when the government having just received the defense expert's report on Fisher's competencysought time for its own expert to evaluate the report and examine Fisher himself. Along with his co-defendant, Diggs opposed that request and moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Appellants cited the right to a speedy trial again when, in September 2006, they jointly moved to dismiss the superseding indictment. In neither motion did Diggs (or Griffin) request a prompt trial as an alternative to dismissal. The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, the Supreme Court has said, `is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.' [45] But not all invocations are equal: [T]he assertion of the right must be considered in light of its `frequency and force' in order to avoid `attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection.' [46] With that principle in mind, we attach little evidentiary significance to Diggs's sporadic assertions. The first two were merely pro forma, and Diggs's later invocations in the motions to dismiss are weakened by his failure to move for an immediate trial in the alternative. [47] Diggs never evinced a sincere desire for a prompt trial. [48] Prejudice. The speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is intended to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimize the anxiety and concern of the accused, and limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. [49] Of these three forms of prejudice, the Supreme Court has said, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. [50] Diggs did suffer one form of cognizable prejudice from the delay of his trial: He was held in pretrial confinement without bond for 21-1/2 months. His incarceration was alleviated in June 2006, when the trial court released him into a high-intensity supervision program. Diggs has not established that he suffered the other types of prejudice the speedy trial guarantee is meant to forestall. He has not demonstrated that anxiety and concern had a specific impact on his health or personal or business affairs. [51] Nor, critically, has he shown that the delay impaired his defense. Diggs has not, for example, identified any exculpatory evidence that has been lost or any defense witness whose recollection has faded as a result of the post-arrest delay. The speculative possibility that an opportunity for earlier defense investigation might have generated evidence favorable to the defense is not enough. While Mark Fisher suffered memory loss during the relevant period, we fail to see how that prejudiced Diggsdeficiencies in the testimony of government witnesses generally benefit a defendant's case rather than work to its detriment. [52] If anything, Fisher's memory loss hindered the prosecution in this case. Weighing the Four Factors. The four Barker factors are related and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances in `a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' [53] The record here shows a lengthy but not exceptional delay in a complicated and serious case; neutral and valid reasons for the delay; a feeble and half-hearted assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and limited prejudice resulting from the delay. There was no evident impairment of Diggs's defense, and [t]he absence of this most serious form of prejudice weighs heavily in our determination of whether appellant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. [54] In cases comparable to this one, we have concluded that the balance tilted against finding a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation. [55] We come to that same determination here.