Opinion ID: 1111377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court erred in failing to allow the testimony of appellant's appraiser.

Text: The above assigned errors relate to the refusal of the lower court to allow the witness Tom Ruffin, an appraiser for appellant, to testify or to admit into evidence the written appraisal of Tom Ruffin because of a discovery violation. Appellee propounded interrogatories to the appellant shortly after the complaint was filed, pursuant to Rules 26 and 33, Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting, inter alia, that appellant disclose in writing: 4. For each expert you shall call as a witness at the trial of the case, please state: the expert's name and address; the area or science of his expertise; the subject matter upon which the expert shall testify; the substance of the facts and opinions as to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; and a description of any article, book, paper or similar work by the expert on or about the areas upon [which] you will testify including a description of the location of such work. Appellee further submitted a request for the production of documents, including: (e) All appraisals, contracts, offers, communications or other documents pertaining to any evidence of value of all or part of the land, minerals, timber or other interest in, under, or concerning the land which is the subject matter of this suit from 1980 to the trial of this cause. Appellant failed to respond to appellee's request for production of appraisals or other documents concerning the land in question until January 21, 1986, one day prior to trial, when appellant supplemented her previous discovery responses and served same on appellee. The supplemental responses advised appellee that Tom Ruffin would be called as an expert appraiser by the appellant at trial. On that afternoon, appellee received a copy of Ruffin's appraisal of the property in question. On January 22, 1986, appellee presented a motion in limine to the trial court seeking to bar Ruffin from testifying at trial and disallowing the admittance of Ruffin's appraisal. In Harris v. General Host Corp., 503 So.2d 795 (Miss. 1986), this Court said: We have long been committed to the proposition that trial by ambush should be abolished, the experienced lawyer's nostalgia to the contrary notwithstanding. We have sought procedural justice through a set of rules designed to assure to the maximum extent practicable that cases are decided on their merits, not the fact that one party calls a surprise witness and catches the other with his pants down. One of the most obviously desirable and rigidly enforced of these rules is that requiring pretrial disclosure of witnesses. Specifically, Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1) provides: Trial preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, ... may be obtained only as follows: a party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter of which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. Procedural rights created under this rule must be taken seriously. Boyd v. Lynch, 493 So.2d 1315, 1320 (Miss. 1986); Winston v. Cannon, 430 So.2d 413, 416 (Miss. 1983); Square D Company v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327 (Miss. 1982); Huff v. Polk, 408 So.2d 1368 (Miss. 1982); Clark v. Mississippi Power Co., 372 So.2d 1077 (Miss. 1979). 503 So.2d at 796-97. On the motion in limine, appellee argued that appellant did not disclose the name of her expert seasonably and sufficiently in advance of trial to afford appellee and his counsel a reasonable opportunity to prepare to meet the evidence via cross-examination, comparables, etc. When a breach of the discovery rules occurs, one of the sanctions authorized under our rules is an order ... prohibiting him [the defaulting party] from introducing designated matters in evidence. Rule 37(b)(2)(B) and (d), Miss.R.Civ.P. We are of the opinion that, on the record before this Court, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in applying the sanctions and disallowing the testimony and appraisal of Tom Ruffin and the assigned errors I and II are rejected.