Opinion ID: 469047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Considerations of So-Called Public Policy

Text: 33 There is one final point in this case that deserves mention. The Postal Service claims that, even if the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the contract, it should be set aside as violative of public policy. We reject this contention as baseless under existing law. 34 As noted above, it is well-understood that courts will not enforce an arbitration award if the award itself violates established law or seeks to compel some unlawful action. However, this rule, which is sometimes referred to as a public policy exception, is extremely narrow. In W.R. Grace, the Supreme Court has explained that, in order to provide the basis for an exception, the public policy in question must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.'  22 Obviously, the exception is designed to be narrow so as to limit potentially intrusive judicial review of arbitration awards under the guise of public policy. 35 It is not at all clear that the reference to public policy in W.R. Grace denotes anything more or different than what the courts have said over the years in construing Enterprise Wheel. 23 But, in any event, it is plain from the language in W.R. Grace itself that the Court meant to say only that an arbitration award may not be enforced if it transgresses well defined and dominant laws and legal precedents. It is also clear from the opinion in W.R. Grace that judges have no license to impose their own brand of justice in determining applicable public policy; thus, the exception applies only when the public policy emanates from clear statutory or case law, not from general considerations of supposed public interests. 24 36 There is surely no doubt that the instant case does not pose a situation requiring the invocation of a public policy exception. The arbitrator's award was not itself unlawful, for there is no legal proscription against the reinstatement of a person such as the grievant. And the award did not otherwise have the effect of mandating any illegal conduct. In other words, even if the arbitrator's view of Miranda was wrong, his decision to exclude the grievant's statements did not in any manner violate the law or cause the employer to act unlawfully. 25 In addition, and most importantly, the grievance plainly raised an arbitrable issue; the arbitrator was properly designated and authorized to hear the case; and the arbitral judgment rested on an interpretation of the contract. 37 The Postal Service seeks some solace from a decision of the First Circuit in which the court refused to enforce an arbitrator's reinstatement of a convicted felon. 26 Frankly, we find it difficult to square either the rationale or the result in the cited case with the Supreme Court's decision in W.R. Grace; however, we need not labor over the question here. In the instant case, the grievant was acquitted of all criminal charges; therefore, the case relied upon by the Postal Service is inapposite. In short, there is no valid basis whatsoever for us to decline to enforce the arbitrator's award on grounds of public policy. For us to embrace the employer's argument here would be to run the risk of allowing an ill-defined public policy exception to swallow the rule in favor of judicial deference to arbitration. We will not endorse any such blatant disregard of the teachings of Enterprise Wheel and W.R. Grace.