Opinion ID: 1356292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Decision Whether to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing is Subject to the Discretion of the District Court

Text: Prior to AEDPA, new evidentiary hearings [in habeas cases] were required in several circumstances. Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963)) (emphasis in original). We have been clear that AEDPA, in contrast, permits evidentiary hearings on habeas review, but only in a limited number of circumstances. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)) (emphasis in original). In particular, a district court is permitted to hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim asserted in a § 2254 petition so long as such a hearing is not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Under that section, a habeas court is barred from holding an evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner was diligent in his attempt to develop a factual basis for his claim in the state court proceedings, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 430, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 665 (3d Cir.2005), or the petitioner satisfies the criteria set forth in § 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B). [2] In cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a hearing rests in the discretion of the district court. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 468, 127 S.Ct. 1933; see also Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287 (AEDPA, unlike Townsend and [ Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992)], does not require that such a hearing be held. Instead, federal courts have discretion to grant a hearing or not.). Although such a decision is discretionary, it is not unconstrained, and Schriro identifies two related considerations that guide the habeas court's exercise of discretion. [3] First, in determining whether or not to hold an evidentiary hearing, courts should consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933. In other words, courts considering the appropriateness of an evidentiary hearing should determine whether the petition presents a prima facie showing which, if proven, would enable the petitioner to prevail on the merits of the asserted claim. See, e.g., Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir.2008); Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 259 (3d Cir.1991); Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d 331, 338 (3d Cir.1989). The reasons underlying such a consideration are self-evidentgiven AEDPA's acknowledged purpose of reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, Schriro, 550 U.S. at 475, 127 S.Ct. 1933 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted), a court should be reluctant to convene an evidentiary hearing to explore the claims of a petitioner whose pleadings are factually insufficient to suggest any entitlement to habeas relief. See, e.g., Campbell, 515 F.3d at 184 (bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not afford a sufficient ground for an evidentiary hearing) (quoting Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir.1987)); Anderson v. Att'y Gen. of Kansas, 425 F.3d 853, 858-59 (10th Cir. 2005) (to warrant an evidentiary hearing, a habeas petitioner's factual allegations must be specific and particularized, not general or conclusory) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933. That is, even if the factual allegations in the habeas petition are sufficient to make out a prima facie claim for habeas relief, a district court may decline to convene an evidentiary hearing if the factual allegations are contravened by the existing record. Id. (citation omitted); see also Campbell, 209 F.3d at 290. As the Supreme Court has explained, [i]f district courts were required to allow federal habeas applicants to develop even the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary hearings, district courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were conclusively resolved in the state courts. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 475, 127 S.Ct. 1933. With these twin considerations in mind, we turn to Palmer's petition to determine whether the District Court abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition without first convening an evidentiary hearing.