Opinion ID: 2274894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: denial of motion for funds to hire expert on false confessions

Text: On February 20, 2008, Appellant filed a motion requesting funds to hire an expert on the psychology of false or wrongful confessions. The defense theory of the case was that Appellant falsely confessed in order to cover for his cousin Demond Tunstull, whom he loved like a brother. An ex parte hearing on the matter was conducted on March 5, 2008. On March 10, 2008, the trial court entered an order denying the motion, finding that the employment of a false confessions expert was not reasonably necessary under the circumstances presented. Appellant renewed his motion for funds on the first morning of trial, following the Commonwealth's turning over last minute discovery indicating that only Demond's fingerprints were found on the car (Sloss's rental car) used in the October 23, 2006, National City robbery. The trial court again denied the motion. The court explained that lying to cover for another person was not a false confession of the type for which expert testimony was necessary, as opposed to the types of situations where it is alleged, for example, that police used interrogation techniques which overcame a person's free will or made him believe that he did something he did not do. The court explained that it is the latter type situations that cause great concern to the court and give rise to the need for an expert. In this case, however, the allegation was that Appellant made a conscious decision to falsely confess, in order to protect his cousin. The trial court did not believe that an expert was necessary to explain this concept to the jury. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for funds. In determining whether an indigent defendant is entitled to funding for an expert witness under KRS 31.110(1)(b), a trial court must consider 1) whether the request has been pleaded with requisite specificity; and 2) whether funding for the particularized assistance is `reasonably necessary'; 3) while weighing relevant due process considerations. Benjamin v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 775, 789 (Ky.2008). A trial court's denial of a request for funds is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Davenport v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 763, 773 (Ky.2005), and Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Ky. 1999)). In this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying funds for an expert. Appellant testified that he falsely confessed to cover for his cousin Demond, whom he loved like a brother and wanted to protect. Appellant further testified that the police had also threatened to arrest his mother, brother, and girlfriend (Sloss) if he did not admit to the crimes. [11] There was no allegation in this case that, for example, Appellant's confession was unreliable due to a mental condition, that his will had been overcome, or that police made him believe he did something he did not do. See Holloman v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 764 (Ky.2001). [12] Appellant's claim was simply that he falsely confessed to protect others. We agree with the trial court that the jury was fully equipped to evaluate Appellant's claim, and that there was no reasonable necessity for an expert. In his testimony, Appellant intelligently and clearly articulated his reasons for making what he claimed was a false confession. In fact, it is clear that the jury believed Appellant's testimony in part, finding him not guilty of one of the robberies he confessed to. [13] No abuse of discretion occurred.