Opinion ID: 2306386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Wright's Restraint of Steck's Liberty Was Independent of the Underlying Robbery

Text: Wright next argues that, because he did not restrain Steck's liberty more than that which was required to rob him, the restraint was incidental to the robbery. The State responds that the restraint of Steck's liberty exceeded what was necessary for the robbery; therefore, the restraint was a crime separate from and independent of the robbery. This legal dispute rests on competing interpretations of the critical terms incidental to and independent of. Wright's argument presupposes that criminal conduct is legally incidental to an underlying offense, where that conduct is committed only to further the commission of the underlying offense. [14] The State's argument assumes that criminal conduct is legally independent of an underlying offense, if that conduct constitutes an act that is not an element of the underlying offense. Wright's argument rests on a faulty premise, because under our case law on Kidnapping, the inquiry is whether the defendant interfered much more with the victim's liberty than the level of interference typically associated with the underlying offense. [15] As the Superior Court stated in State v. Amad: [16] The degree or amount of restraint which is ordinarily incident[al] to robbery consists of that restraint which is necessary to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking and retention of property, or to compel or otherwise cause the victim to deliver up the property. [17] Wright argues that the restraint required to move Steck into the vestibule and to duct tape him did not exceed the level ordinarily incidental to robberyto conceal the robbery from passersby and to prevent Steck from resisting. Wright points to Steck's earlier refusal to relinquish the bag containing the Lodge's receipts. Amad, which involved facts analogous to this case, completely undercuts Wright's argument. In Amad, four armed men entered a credit union, restrained the employees by binding their hands behind their backs with duct tape, took cash out of the registers, and fled. [18] The Superior Court held: In this case, each of the credit union employees had their hands bound behind their backs with duct tape, while they were face down, on the floor. This restraint commenced during the robbery and continued after the robbery was concluded. The fact that the victims were able to escape their bindings so quickly does not diminish the nature of the restraint imposed. While the restraint imposed was obviously done to facilitate the robbery and the flight therefrom, the Court remains convinced that the restraint could be viewed by a reasonable juror as much more restraint than that necessary to accomplish the theft of the credit union money. Therefore the issue was properly presented to the jury for its determination pursuant to the instructions given. [19] Here, as in Amad, Wright duct taped Steck to facilitate the robbery and his flight. Even if it is assumed, without deciding, that ordering Steck into the building's vestibule to conceal the robbery was ordinarily incidental to that offense, duct taping Steck was much more restraint than that typically associated with a robbery. The level of restraint necessary to accomplish the typical robbery would be pointing a weapon at the victim and commanding the victim to stay still or move to a different location. Attempting to distinguish Amad, Wright points out that Amad involved four robbers and three firearms and that nothing was taken from the employees personally. That distinction is without merit. First, that there were more robbers and guns in Amad than here is unresponsive to the legally significant issuethe restraint of the victim's liberty. That there were more robbers (and guns) in Amad establishes only that the robbery there was larger in scale. Second, Wright fails to explain the legal significance of the fact that in Amad nothing was taken directly from the employees. Even if the theft of the Lodge's money and of Steck's personal items constituted one single robbery, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to conclude that ordering Steck back into the Lodge and then duct taping him constituted much more of a restraint than would ordinarily be incidental to a robbery. [20] Wright's argument that binding Steck was necessary because of Steck's earlier resistance (his refusal to turn over the bag containing the lodge's money until Wright hit him), created at most a factual dispute. A rational juror could (and evidently twelve did) resolve that dispute in favor of the State. Finally, Wright's argument that binding Steck was not a significant restraint because he was able to escape shortly after the police left is without merit. The degree or duration of the restraint is legally irrelevant to whether the restraint was incidental to, or independent from, the underlying offense. [21]