Opinion ID: 1091131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Powell was Contemporaneously Engaged in Criminal Activity.

Text: ¶ 35. The city argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to find it immune from liability under § 11-46-9(1)(c) because Powell was contemporaneously engaged in criminal activity. Section 11-46-9(1)(c) states: (1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim: (c) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c)(emphasis added). Judge Kidd found that Powell was not engaged in criminal activity at the time of his injuries because evidence presented at trial showed that [Powell] offered no resistance after he was forced to the ground. The trial court further stated the injury occurred after the commission of any alleged offense and after [Powell] was subdued and handcuffed. There was evidence to the contrary presented by the city and the officers. ¶ 36. The MTCA is the exclusive remedy for filing a lawsuit against governmental entities. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1); Brister, 838 So.2d at 278. Although the MTCA waives sovereign immunity for tort actions, it also prescribes exemptions from this statutory waiver under which a governmental entity retains its sovereign immunity. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Durn, 861 So.2d 990, 994 (Miss.2003). Immunity under the MTCA protects the city from lawsuits arising out of the performance of a police officer's duties in law enforcement with respect to the alleged victim. Perry, 764 So.2d at 379. However, the exemption is not designed to protect grossly negligent or intentional tortfeasors from liability where the fact that the victim is engaged in criminal activity has no relation to the transaction out of which liability arose. Id. In order to prove that a victim is engaged in criminal activity it must be shown that the criminal activity has some causal nexus to the wrongdoing of the tortfeasor. Id. ¶ 37. The city argues that the present case is analogous to two cases where this Court held a governmental entity immune from suit under § 11-46-9(1)(c): Estate of Williams v. City of Jackson, 844 So.2d 1161 (Miss.2003), and Bridges v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 793 So.2d 584 (Miss.2001). In Estate of Williams, the estate of James Williams sued the City of Jackson after a municipal fire truck responding to an emergency collided with Williams's vehicle at an intersection. Williams's vehicle caught fire and he died at the scene. Evidence demonstrated that Williams failed to yield the right of way and tried to beat the fire truck across the intersection. In addition, toxicology reports revealed Williams's blood alcohol content was .20, which was twice the legal limit. Williams, 844 So.2d at 1163. ¶ 38. In Estate of Williams, the City of Jackson claimed immunity pursuant to § 11-46-9(1)(c), arguing that Williams was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the accident. Id. at 1164-65. This Court held that operating a vehicle involves both the moving and the stopping of a vehicle and when these are done under the influence of alcohol, it is considered criminal activity.... Id. at 1165. Additionally, this Court found that there was a causal nexus between Williams's criminal activity and the actions of the municipal employees. The Court stated that had [Williams] not been driving while intoxicated, Williams would not have attempted to beat the fire truck through the intersection and would not have been killed. Id. Consequently, this Court held the City of Jackson was immune to suit. ¶ 39. The city also cites Bridges in support of its contention that there is a causal nexus between Powell's criminal activity and the officer's actions. In Bridges, the plaintiff sued the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, alleging that a security officer employed by the District used excessive force in arresting Bridges. Bridges, 793 So.2d at 586. This Court noted that Bridges was convicted of resisting arrest in the incident. Id. Furthermore, Bridges's injuries occurred while he was actively resisting arrest and being handcuffed. [5] It was Bridges's active resistance which exacerbated the amount of force that the officer applied in making the arrest, and that extra force is what caused the injury. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Bridges, 878 So.2d 1013, 1015 (Miss.Ct.App.2004). As a result, this Court held that where an officer has probable cause to arrest and proceeds to do so, there is the requisite nexus between criminal activity and the action causing injury. Bridges, 793 So.2d at 588. Accordingly, this Court held that the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District was immune. ¶ 40. The city's reliance on Estate of Williams and Bridges is misplaced. In both cases, the plaintiffs' criminal activity [driving under the influence and resisting arrest] was a direct cause of their injuries. It is easy to distinguish Estate of Williams from the present facts, but Bridges is a closer call and requires explanation. In Bridges, the plaintiff was actively resisting arrest while force was being applied. Bridges, 878 So.2d at 1015. Bridges's resistance to the arrest was a direct cause of the escalation of the force used by the officer in handcuffing him. Id. Further, Bridges's injuries were to his wrist, arms and shoulders and were directly related to the police officer placing his hands into the handcuffs. Id. However, Bridges's injuries occurred before and during the cuffing. There was no evidence that force continued to be applied by the officer after that time. ¶ 41. In the present case, there was widely contradictory evidence presented to the trial court. Powell and six witnesses testified that Powell's injuries occurred after the officers subdued and handcuffed him. It is undisputed that Powell violated several laws, including resisting arrest, but when the officers subdued and handcuffed Powell, his criminal activity had ceased. Powell's offenses that led to his arrest and subsequent escape attempt did not cause the officers to continue to beat and kick Powell after he had been subdued and handcuffed. ¶ 42. The statute granting conditional immunity to police officers is designed to protect law enforcement personnel from lawsuits arising out of the performance of their duties. Perry, 764 So.2d at 379. Physically abusing a person in custody is not one of the duties of law enforcement personnel. As the Court of Appeals has correctly held, immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c) applies only to claims brought by individuals who are engaged in criminal activity at the time of the injury. City of Jackson v. Calcote, 910 So.2d 1103, 1111-12 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). In that case the police arrested an individual and after subduing and handcuffing him, proceeded to beat him. Id. The Court of Appeals found that at the time of the injury the individual was not engaged in the commission of the crime but had earlier been engaged in criminal activity. Id. Therefore, it did not meet the requirements of § 11-46-9(1)(c). We agree with this analysis and apply it to the present case. The crimes for which Powell was charged and convicted ceased prior to the delivery of the offensive blows by the officers. His attempt to resist arrest ended, at the latest under the facts of this case, when he was handcuffed. The trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in its finding. ¶ 43. If immunity is found in situations like this, there is risk that it might grant police officers carte blanche to use unnecessary force on arrested individuals, yet still seek shelter under immunity. To hold the city immune from suit for Powell's injuries would lead to the disturbing result of police having immunity for abusive actions against a person after being subdued and handcuffed. Therefore, the city is not immune from suit due to Powell's previous criminal activity and escape attempt. However, the analysis does not stop there. Whether the Officers' Actions were done in Reckless Disregard to Powell's Safety. ¶ 44. The city also argues that it is immune from liability under § 11-46-9(1)(c) because the trial judge failed to make a finding that the officers acted in reckless disregard of Powell's safety and well-being at the time of his injury. In order to recover under the MTCA, a plaintiff must prove that the officer acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c); see City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973, 977-79 (Miss.2005). Reckless disregard has been described by this Court as a higher standard than gross negligence and `embraces willful or wanton conduct which requires knowingly and intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act.' Collins v. Tallahatchie County, 876 So.2d 284, 287 (Miss.2004)(quoting Turner v. City of Ruleville, 735 So.2d 226, 230 (Miss.1999)). ¶ 45. The city's argument that it cannot be liable to Powell because the trial judge did not make a finding of reckless disregard is incorrect. In Richardson, the trial judge found only that the defendant officer acted in disregard for the safety and well-being of others but this Court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's judgment against the City of Ellisville. Richardson, 913 So.2d at 977-78, is without merit.