Opinion ID: 884022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Analysis of Montana Jurisdiction

Text: Under the first requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f), a Montana district court must have jurisdiction to make the child custody determination pursuant to Montana law. See 28 § 1738A(f)(1). Since the custody dispute in this case has interstate ramifications, Montana's version of the UCCJA governs whether a Montana district court has jurisdiction to make a custody determination under Montana law. See §§ 40-7-101 through 40-7-125, MCA. Section 40-7-104, MCA, provides that [t]he jurisdictional provisions of 40-4-211 apply to this chapter. Section 40-4-211(1), MCA, sets forth four alternative bases under which a Montana district court has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree. Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, only one of the stated bases need exist in order for a Montana court to have jurisdiction under Montana law. The District Court addressed each alternative and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to make a custody determination under § 40-4-211(1), MCA. Given the facts of this case, it is appropriate to limit our review to the District Court's findings and conclusion under the § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, basis for jurisdiction. Section 40-4-211, MCA, provides in pertinent part: (1) A court of this state competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if: .... (b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because: (i) the child and his parents or the child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with this state; and (ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.... The District Court found that neither the significant connection factor referenced in § 40-4-211(1)(b)(i), MCA, nor the substantial evidence factor referenced in § 40-4-211(1)(b)(ii), MCA, was satisfied in this case. Based on those findings, the District Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction pursuant to § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, to make a custody determination. We review a district court's findings of fact to determine whether the findings are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Brownell (1993), 263 Mont. 78, 81, 865 P.2d 307, 309 (citation omitted). A court's findings are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence, the court misapprehends the effect of the evidence, or our review of the record convinces us that a mistake has been committed. Marriage of Brownell, 865 P.2d at 309 (citation omitted). We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine if the court's interpretation of the law is correct. In re Marriage of Kovash (1995), 270 Mont. 517, 521, 893 P.2d 860, 863 (citation omitted). The District Court found that [t]here are not significant contacts with Montana and did not further elucidate. Although the District Court used the language significant contacts, it apparently was referring to the significant connection factor contained in § 40-4-211(1)(b)(i), MCA; as set forth above, that statutory subsection, as it pertains to this case, requires that Megan and either Yancy or Pamela have a significant connection with Montana. Here, Yancy lives and works in Montana and, as a result, clearly has a significant connection with this state. Indeed, Pamela does not dispute Yancy's significant connection with Montana and the court did not find otherwise. With regard to Megan's connection to Montana, the record reflects that she resided in Montana for nearly three months almost immediately preceding Yancy's petition. In addition, she has visited Montana on numerous occasions and for varying periods of time since the parties' divorce. Moreover, the record indicates that Megan's paternal grandmother lives in Montana. Pamela argues that [t]here is clearly sufficient evidence in the record to support the District Court's determination and, in support of her argument, sets forth facts of record indicating that Megan has a significant connection with Utah. However, evidence that Megan has a significant connection with Utah does not equate to a lack of a significant connection with Montana. We note that the District Court's ultimate finding that [t]here are not significant contacts with Montana is irreconcilable with its underlying findings regarding Megan's, and even Pamela's, connection with Montana. For example, the court found that Yancy and Pamela both agree that [Pamela and Megan] resided in Montana from January, 1995 until March, 1995. The court further found that Pamela opened a bank account in Montana in January of 1995 and that Pamela and Megan spent periods of 1994 in Montana. Thus, the District Court's finding that there are not significant contacts with Montana is not supported by substantial evidence and is clearly erroneous. In light of the District Court's multiple findings regarding Pamela and Megan's connection with Montana and the evidence of record as set forth above, it is clear that Megan had a significant connection with Montana as required by § 40-4-211(1)(b)(i), MCA. As previously stated, the parties do not dispute that Yancy has a significant connection with Montana and the District Court did not find otherwise. Thus, the additional § 40-4-211(1)(b)(i), MCA, requirement that one of the contestants also have a significant connection with Montana is satisfied in this case. The District Court also found that there is not substantial evidence in Montana concerning Megan's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships. Pamela argues that the District Court's finding in this regard is supported by substantial evidence because she and Megan were only in Montana for a short period of time. However, evidence that Megan and Pamela were only in Montana for a short period of time does not necessarily mean that substantial evidence regarding Megan's present and future care, protection, training and personal relationships does not exist in Montana. Moreover, § 40-4-211(1)(b)(i), MCA, which contains the foregoing substantial evidence prerequisite to jurisdiction, is not time-related. The record contains the following evidence which exists in Montana and which the District Court did not address in ultimately finding that there is not substantial evidence in Montana regarding Megan's present and future care, protection, training and personal relationships. Officer Silk It Wak Rivera, the highway patrol officer who investigated Pamela and Megan's accident, testified about the details of the accident and Pamela's DUI citation. Marilyn Kober, the Stillwater County Justice of the Peace, testified that Pamela had alcohol on her breath when she appeared on her DUI charge. Moreover, the record reflects that Pamela and Yancy's neighbors and friends in Nye, Montana, have information about the parties' roles in caring for Megan. For example, Cleo Eberhart (Cleo) testified that she did not have any concerns about Pamela's capabilities as a mother and that she thought Pamela was a good mother. Cleo further testified that Pamela was Megan's primary caregiver. Finally, as previously stated, Yancy and his mother  who is Megan's paternal grandmother  live in Montana. In light of the foregoing evidence, we conclude that the District Court's finding that there is not substantial evidence in Montana regarding Megan's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships for jurisdictional purposes under § 40-4-211(1)(b)(ii), MCA, is not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, is clearly erroneous. Based on our conclusions that the District Court's jurisdictional findings under § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, are clearly erroneous, we hold that the District Court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction under § 40-4-211(1), MCA, to make a custody determination.