Opinion ID: 2337292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Trial Court's Award

Text: The trial court awarded the Wife alimony in solido but declined to award rehabilitative alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the in solido award but concluded that rehabilitative alimony was also appropriate. We recently held in Crabtree that alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony are mutually exclusive, reasoning that to allow concurrent awards of alimony in futuro and rehabilitative alimony would require a trial court to engage in an act of clairvoyance. The trial court would not only be required to anticipate the duration necessary for rehabilitation but would also be required to anticipate the future needs of a spouse who, it has been determined, can be rehabilitated. See Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 360. Thus, we stated that if an award of rehabilitative alimony is justified by the parties' circumstances, a trial court initially should award rehabilitative alimony only.  Id. (emphasis added). This holding, along with the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, raises the question of whether rehabilitative alimony can be combined with an award of alimony in solido. The comparison between alimony in solido and alimony in futuro discussed above makes it clear that only the latter is inconsistent with a concurrent award of rehabilitative alimony. The very definition and purpose of rehabilitation means that if a spouse can be rehabilitated he or she has no need of alimony in futuro. This is the meaning of our decision in Crabtree . As noted above, however, an award of alimony in solido is for a definite sum of money, to be paid all at once or in installments over a definite period of time, and is often awarded to adjust the division of marital property. Such an award cannot be modified. This is quite different from alimony in futuro, which is indefinite and modifiable. Both in terms of logic and the purposes of alimony, we think it clear that alimony in solido is not inconsistent with a concurrent award of rehabilitative alimony. Purely as a matter of law, therefore, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err simply because it ordered a concurrent award of alimony in solido and rehabilitative alimony. However, we find that the record does not reveal good cause for disturbing the trial court's award. Provided that the trial court considers the purposes of alimony, discussed above, and the specific factors listed in the statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d), it has wide discretion in determining the appropriate award. See Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 360. Although a trial court may award alimony in solido along with rehabilitative alimony if the circumstances of the parties permit, the trial court in this case did not err by awarding only alimony in solido. The Court of Appeals emphasized the following facts in holding that rehabilitative alimony was appropriate: the Wife's earning capacity is substantially less than the Husband's; the Husband contributed to the termination of the marriage based on his inappropriate marital conduct; the long duration of the marriage; and the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. These facts are worthy of emphasis. But they are also clearly reflected in the record, and we have no reason to think that the trial court failed to consider them. Nor does the trial court's award appear too low in light of the two most important factors: the Wife's need and the Husband's ability to pay. The parties' agreed that the Wife would take $377,400, or 60.7% of the marital property. On top of this sum, the trial court ordered the Husband to pay $220,000 in non-modifiable alimony in solido over an eight-year period, $2,100 per month in child support, and $7,032 per year for Geoff's educational expenses. The Wife can also be expected to earn $30,000 per year once she starts to work full-time again; given her substantial education, she may earn more than this amount. The Wife argues that she should have been awarded alimony in futuro rather than alimony in solido. The trial court did not fully explain the basis of its award, but it is clear that the court did not think the Wife was incapable of being rehabilitated. Her prior experience as a full-time registered nurse and her education, including several graduate degrees, indicate that she is capable of being rehabilitated. Indeed, the Husband argues that the Court of Appeals erred because she is already rehabilitated. Whether the Wife is fully rehabilitated or almost rehabilitated is a close question but it is clear that she is not incapable of being rehabilitated; thus, she is not a candidate for alimony in futuro. As to the Husband's contention, we need not decide whether the Wife is fully rehabilitated. By inference from its award, the trial court agreed with the Husband. Although it is a close question, after examining the record we do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's ruling. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to award rehabilitative alimony. Finally, the Husband argues that the alimony in solido award of $220,000 is excessive. Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals agreed. We see no reason to reduce the amount of the award. For these reasons we think that the trial court's alimony award should be upheld in its entirety. [2]