Opinion ID: 2452941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligent Delay

Text: ¶ 8 The State argues, in accord with several jurisdictions outside Washington, that only intentional delay in bad faith can violate due process, while merely negligent delay can never result in a due process violation. [2] See United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1511-12 (5th Cir.1996). This court, however, has never made a definitive statement on the issue. See Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293 (It has been suggested that negligently failing to bring charges promptly may also establish a constitutional violation.); Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 139, 86 P.3d 125 ([I]f the delay only is negligent, due process may or may not be violated.). ¶ 9 Circuits holding that negligent delay alone can never violate due process explicitly reject a balancing or weighing approach like the one adopted by this court. E.g., Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1514 (we reject the ... balancing test and hold that for preindictment delay to violate the due process clause it must not only cause the accused substantial, actual prejudice, but the delay must also have been intentionally undertaken by the government... for some ... bad faith purpose (citation omitted)). Instead, those circuits that have rejected balancing invariably require the defendant to show (1) actual prejudice and (2) intentional bad faith by the government. [3] Id. at 1511-12 (reviewing the various formulations of the test in the various circuits). ¶ 10 Circuits that apply a balancing test similar to ours, on the other hand, have held that negligence can result in a due process violation. [4] Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (adopting a balancing approach and finding a due process violation where the State's delay was negligent and defendant was seriously prejudiced); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir.1985) (If mere negligent conduct by the prosecutors is asserted, then obviously the delay and/or prejudice suffered by the defendant will have to be greater than that in cases where recklessness or intentional governmental conduct is alleged.). ¶ 11 The jurisprudence of this court and the better reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits support adopting the approach that negligent delay can violate due process. See Howell, 904 F.2d at 895; Moran, 759 F.2d at 782. The core question is whether the action by the government violates fundamental conceptions of justice. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044; Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293. The answer to this question does not necessarily turn on the intent of the government actors. ¶ 12 As we said in Calderon, [u]ltimately, the test suggested by the United States Supreme Court is `whether the action complained of ... violates those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.' Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293 (alteration in original) (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (quoting Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112, 55 S.Ct. 340)). We also stated that in making its due process inquiry, the court must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. Id. at 352, 684 P.2d 1293. The formalistic and rigid two-part test used in the majority of circuits does not accurately reflect the more nuanced approach suggested by the United States Supreme Court and adopted by this court in Calderon. As one Court of Appeals opinion correctly observed, [I]f mere negligent conduct is asserted, the... prejudice suffered by the defendant will have to be greater than where intentional or deliberate government conduct is alleged. State v. Schifferl, 51 Wash.App. 268, 273, 753 P.2d 549 (1988) (citing Moran, 759 F.2d 777).