Opinion ID: 1621756
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dobbins' Right to Remain Silent and Right to Counsel

Text: Dobbins argues that the state improperly cross-examined him about his constitutional right to remain silent and his constitutional right to counsel. Dobbins asserts that the following line of questioning was improper: Q: [The police detective] was asking you questions? A: Yeah. He tried to ask me questions, but I said I [would] just take a lawyer. I still want a lawyer. Talk to a lawyer. Q: And before that, you never told [him] anything about that you saw Myshohn King shoot anybody? A: I was  That's what I was [going to] tell [him]. Q: That's  Answer my question. A: Yeah. Q: You didn't tell him? A: I didn't tell [him] anything. Q: Anything about Myshohn King shooting anybody; did you? A: I didn't tell [him] anything. Q: You didn't tell him at the time as it happened you were in your back bedroom ironing your new Globetrotters outfit; did you? A: I didn't tell [him] anything. Q: And he was asking you at that time? A: He asked me if I still wanted a lawyer, and I told [him], you know, then again I think I might be comfortable with a lawyer present, so that's how that conversation ended, and all the conversation with the police was [nothing] but a few seconds. It wasn't a long conversation. Once he told me I had a right to have a lawyer there, that's what I requested. At this point, the district court asked the parties to approach the bench. A discussion was held at the bench, after which the questioning resumed, but on a different topic. The record indicates that after Dobbins was arrested, he was questioned by the police on two occasions, December 6, 2003, and December 16, 2003. [2] On December 6, he was given a Miranda warning, was asked a few questions, and then stated, I'm not here to answer your questions today. He then said, I think I need a lawyer for that. After these statements, the questioning ended. Dobbins was questioned again on December 16 after he indicated he wanted to talk to the police. It was the December 16 session to which the foregoing cross-examination referred. Dobbins was given the Miranda warning at the beginning of this session and the questioning continued until Dobbins once again stated that he wanted to talk to a lawyer, at which point the questioning ended. We have held that the state generally may not refer to or elicit testimony about a defendant's post-arrest silence and/or request for counsel. State v. McCullum, 289 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn.1979). In addition, [e]vidence that a defendant exercised his rights to remain silent or to have an attorney present for questioning is generally inadmissible at trial. State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 199 (Minn.2006) (citing State v. McCullum, 289 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn.1979)). The state nonetheless argues that its line of questioning did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct because the questions during cross-examination focused on the timeframe before Dobbins asked for counsel and asserts that it is proper to cross-examine a defendant about what he didn't say to police before asking for counsel. The state correctly notes that, as Dobbins' testimony indicates, the police stopped questioning Dobbins once he asserted his right to counsel. It then relies upon our prior case law that holds that the constitution does not bar the use of postarrest silence to impeach the defendant's credibility where no Miranda warning was given. State v. Morrison, 351 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn.1984) (citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982)). The state's argument raises a key point when it focuses on Dobbins' silence before he asked for counsel, but ignores the fact that Dobbins had been given two separate Miranda warnings and the state's line of questioning focused on Dobbins' silence after he was given the Miranda warnings. The United States Supreme Court has held that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). In explaining its holding, the Court said: Silence in the wake of [ Miranda ] warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested (citation and footnote omitted). Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial (footnote omitted). Id. at 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240. Shortly after Doyle was decided, we adopted its holding in State v. Billups, 264 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Minn.1978). In Billups, we said that it was error to permit the impeachment of defendant by cross-examination which showed his failure to offer alibi evidence at any time prior to the trial and that the prosecutor should not discuss this facet of the case in his argument. Id. Therefore, based on both Supreme Court case law and our case law, we conclude that the state's line of questioning in cross-examination of Dobbins about his failure to implicate Myshohn King when he was interrogated by the police constitutes unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. [3] But we also note that the line of questioning was limited  seven questions  and ended immediately after the judge asked the parties to approach the bench.