Opinion ID: 1684864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Death Penalty Form and Murder of a Single Person

Text: In Isom v. State, supra , this court recently observed that the proper test to be used in releasing a prospective juror for cause is whether that person's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions and oath. Jurors in a capital case must be able to consider imposing a death sentence if they are to perform their function as jurors. See Isom v. State, supra . In the instant case, Anderson's counsel objected only twice to the State's questioning on whether the juror could sign a verdict form imposing death on the basis that the law does not require a juror to be able to sign a death verdict. [9] According to defense counsel, the law merely requires the juror to consider death as a punishment. The juror excused for cause on this basis was Karen Soils. The decision to excuse a juror for cause is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995). The circuit court must decide if the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair performance of his or her duty as a juror, and we give great deference to the circuit court that sees and hears the potential jurors. See id. In Nooner, this court concluded that where a juror could not actually sign her name to a verdict form in which the death penalty was imposed[,] the juror's views on the death penalty would have either impaired or prevented her performance as a juror. Id. at 98, 907 S.W.2d at 683. The same rationale is applicable in the instant case. Arkansas law requires that the jury shall impose a sentence of death if it unanimously returns written findings that: (1) aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) aggravating circumstances outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist; and (3) aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603(a) (Repl.1997). In addition, AMI Crim.2d 1008, Form 4, requires that if the jury returns a verdict of death, each juror must sign this verdict. AMI Crim.2d 1008, Form 4. Consequently, if a prospective juror states that he or she would be unable to actually sign the verdict form imposing death, his or her views would prevent or substantially impair his or her performance as a juror. Here, Ms. Soils stated that she did not think that she would be able to sign a verdict form imposing the death penalty even if she believed it to be an appropriate case and one that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Ms. Soils indicated that she would be impaired in her ability to perform as a juror due to her inability to sign the form, the circuit court did not err in striking her for cause. The same holds true with respect to the State's questioning of venire persons regarding the imposition of death for the murder of a single person. Anderson urges that the State, through this line of questioning, cannot be allowed to ask jurors to commit to a verdict during voir dire. And yet it is apparent that the State was simply exploring whether the jurors could follow the court's instructions with respect to capital murder. Once again, the circuit court has great discretion in managing the extent and scope of voir dire. See Isom v. State, supra ; Bader v. State, supra . We hold that such a question did not lead to a jury organized to return a verdict of death.