Opinion ID: 6108017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Submissibility of the Verdict Director

Text: In any action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, and the defendant's breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P. , 75 S.W.3d 247 , 257 (Mo. banc 2002). The touchstone for the creation of a duty is foreseeability. Id. (internal quotations omitted). A duty to protect against the criminal acts of third parties is generally not recognized because such activities are rarely foreseeable. Id. However, this Court has recognized two 'special facts and circumstances' exceptions to the rule that businesses generally have no duty to protect invitees from criminal acts of third persons. Id. This appeal concerns the differences between these exceptions and Owner-Operator's allegation of error regarding the distinctions between these exceptions. In recognizing the two exceptions to the no duty rule, this Court essentially adopted the rule established by § 344, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc. , 758 S.W.2d 59 , 62 (Mo. banc 1988). That rule provides: Duty to police premises. Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur . He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f (emphasis added). As further explained: The [rule] underscores two rather different situations in which the duty may arise. The first is when the defendant knows, or has reason to know, that a third party is harming or is about to harm an entrant . At this point the defendant may be able to protect the entrant only by warning him, summoning the police or utilizing already available security measures. The second is when the nature of defendant's business or past experience provides a basis for the reasonable anticipation on defendant's part that the criminal activity of third persons might put entrants at risk . In this class of cases the defendant may be liable for failing to adopt security  measures which might have kept the third person from inflicting harm upon the entrant. The distinction between these categories is significant, because the duty to foresee a general risk of criminal activity and to take steps to safeguard entrants from it may require substantial expenditures on the part of the possessor. The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6 (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted). Notably, the Restatement's rule is phrased in terms of knows or has reason to know. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, cmt. f. Unlike should know or could know, reason to know creates no duty of care on the part of the business to preemptively discover the facts in question; rather, reason to know means a duty of care arises only after the business has information from which a reasonable actor would infer those facts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12 cmt. a. Accordingly, this Court has explained, Under the first exception, 'the duty may arise when a person, known to be violent, is present on the premises or an individual is present who has conducted himself so as to indicate danger and sufficient time exists to prevent injury.'  L.A.C. , 75 S.W.3d at 257 . Because the first exception concerns when a business knows or has reason to know a specific third person is both (1) on its premises and (2) dangerous, no duty of care arises until after that specific person has entered the business's premises. See id. at 257 , 263 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f and § 12 cmt. a; The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6. In contrast, the second exception recognizes 'a duty [on the part of business owners] to protect their invitees from the criminal attacks of unknown third persons' under certain special circumstances. L.A.C. , 75 S.W.3d at 257 (emphasis added). Because the second exception concerns when a business knows or has reason to know of dangerous persons in general frequenting its premises, a duty of care arises without regard to any specific person entering the business's premises. See id. at 257-58 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f and § 12 cmt. a; The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6. In other words, with the second exception, the business is tasked with taking precautionary actions to protect its business invitees against the criminal activities of unknown third parties. L.A.C. , 75 S.W.3d at 258 . While Owner-Operator notes the distinctions between the two exceptions to the no duty rule, it does not allege in its first point on appeal that the verdict director failed to properly submit the elements of the first exception, as it argued in the circuit court. In its first point on appeal, Owner-Operator argues the circuit court erred in submitting the verdict director but alleges this error occurred because the submission was based on the first exception, 1 which it alleges was not supported by substantial evidence. Owner-Operator contends Wieland's evidence did not support the circuit court's verdict director because her evidence focused only on precautions Owner-Operator could have taken before Lovelace entered the employee parking lot and, pursuant to the substantive law of the first exception, it had no duty of care until after Lovelace entered the employee parking lot. Owner-Operator is correct that [a]ny issue submitted to the jury in an  instruction must be supported by substantial evidence 'from which the jury could reasonably find such issue.'  Hayes v. Price , 313 S.W.3d 645 , 650 (Mo. banc 2010). Owner-Operator, however, did not raise this instructional challenge either during the instructions conference or in its motion for new trial, and so it has not been preserved for appellate review. See Rules 70.03 and 78.07(a); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 410 S.W.3d 623 , 640 (Mo. banc 2013). During the instructions conference and in its motion for new trial, Owner-Operator argued the language of the verdict director misstated the substantive law for the first exception because it imposed a duty of care on Owner-Operator before Lovelace entered the premises. But, on appeal, Owner-Operator has changed its argument. Owner-Operator no longer claims the language used in the verdict director was incorrect. To the contrary, Owner-Operator expressly abandons any challenge to the language of the verdict director. Instead, Owner-Operator argues in its first point Wieland failed to present substantial evidence to support the verdict director based on the first exception. Owner-Operator did argue in its motion for new trial that if the verdict director were based on the second exception, then it was not supported by substantial evidence because there was no evidence of prior violent crimes on Owner-Operator's premises. This argument, of course, is not the same argument Owner-Operator now makes on appeal. 2 For these reasons, the allegation of error made in Owner-Operator's first point on appeal has not been properly preserved. Even if Owner-Operator's first point had been preserved for appeal, its argument is meritless. Owner-Operator and the dissent mistakenly compare the evidence submitted at trial to the substantive law rather than to the language of the verdict director. Owner-Operator and the dissent argue there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict director because Wieland's evidence focused only on precautions Owner-Operator could have taken before Lovelace entered the parking lot and, pursuant to the substantive law of the first exception, Owner-Operator had no duty of care until after Lovelace entered the parking lot. This reasoning would be appropriate if Owner-Operator were arguing Wieland's claim was not submissible. Rather than arguing Wieland's claim was not submissible, Owner-Operator's first point argues the verdict director was not submissible. Specifically, Owner-Operator's first point asserts the actual verdict director submitted to the jury was not supported by substantial evidence. Owner-Operator does not contend in its first point that a hypothetical verdict director flawlessly stating the substantive law was not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, Owner-Operator's first point necessarily requires a comparison of the evidence introduced at trial to the language used in the verdict director actually submitted. 3  As is discussed in the analysis of Owner-Operator's remaining points, though the verdict director must have been based on the first exception, the language of the verdict director suggests Owner-Operator had a duty of care before Lovelace entered the parking lot. Pursuant to the language actually used in the verdict director, the jury could have considered evidence of Owner-Operator's failure to take precautions before Lovelace entered the parking lot. Although Wieland's evidence may not have supported a hypothetical verdict director flawlessly stating the substantive law for the first exception, Wieland's evidence supported the verdict director actually submitted to the jury. The dissent even acknowledges this, stating: The jury should only have considered what [Owner-Operator] knew or could have known after Lovelace's arrival. By submitting this verdict director, the trial court permitted the jury to impermissibly speculate about what [Owner-Operator] could have known before Lovelace entered the property and enter a verdict based upon inadequate evidence. This was error. op. at 857 (emphasis in original). The error identified by the dissent is not that the verdict director submitted to the jury was not supported by substantial evidence as argued by Owner-Operator, but rather that the language of the verdict director allowed the jury to consider evidence irrelevant to the first exception. Indeed, the dissent makes abundantly clear it is treating Owner-Operator's substantial-evidence challenge as a challenge to the language of the verdict director. But these are wholly distinct challenges. 4 See Deckard v. Webster Cnty. , 467 S.W.3d 283 , 290 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015) ; Roy v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. , 43 S.W.3d 351 , 363 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001). Owner-Operator even differentiates these two distinct challenges. In the midst of making a substantial-evidence challenge in its first point, Owner-Operator expressly  abandons any challenge to the language of the verdict director, stating in its brief that the language of [the verdict director] is not being challenged in this appeal on the basis that it did not properly instruct upon the elements of the [first] exception. While this Court is required by rule to disregard Owner-Operator's abandoned challenge to the language of the verdict director, the dissent elects to revive it under the guise of a substantial-evidence challenge. 5 See Rule 84.13(a) (stating allegations of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not be considered in any civil appeal). It is not this Court's role to make an appellant's argument. See, e.g., Manzara v. State , 343 S.W.3d 656 , 659 n.8 (Mo. banc 2011). This ensures the opposing party has proper notice and opportunity to respond and brief the argument. Point I is denied.