Opinion ID: 1573383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Edmond Requires Individualized Suspicion.

Text: The United States Supreme Court specifically held in Edmond that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures prohibits stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation may reveal evidence of criminal activity. 531 U.S. at 44, 121 S.Ct. 447. [1] For this reason, the Supreme Court said, [w]e have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. Id. at 41, 121 S.Ct. 447 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court specifically distinguished drug checkpoints from checkpoints the Court had previously approved for purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Id. By contrast, it held that the interdiction of drugs through road checkpoints is not related to highway safety, but is simply intended to detect general criminal activity. Id. at 43, 121 S.Ct. 447. While Edmond recognized the serious and alarming dangers created by drug-related activity, it noted that society has similar concerns about the deleterious effects of other criminal activities, if only to a lesser degree. Id. at 42, 121 S.Ct. 447. But, it explained, the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose. Id. The Court concluded: We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime. Id. at 44, 121 S.Ct. 447. Numerous cases have applied Edmond and invalidated checkpoints openly set up along our nation's highways and streets where the primary purpose of those checkpoints was to detect general criminal activity. See, e.g., State v. Lidster, 319 Ill.App.3d 825, 254 Ill.Dec. 379, 747 N.E.2d 419 (2001) (search for evidence of a crime); Trent v. Commonwealth, 35 Va.App. 248, 544 S.E.2d 379 (2001) (narcotics); Buchanon v. Commonwealth, 2001 Ky.App. LEXIS 1255, 2001 WL 1555654, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Dec. 7, 2001) (narcotics); Davis v. State, 788 So.2d 1064 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (narcotics). A number of pre- Edmond cases had anticipated its holding and similarly declared invalid checkpoints the primary purpose of which was drug interdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (10th Cir.1992); Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C.1991).