Opinion ID: 2569599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Both Parties' Requests for Attorney's Fees and Costs

Text: [¶ 48] Both parties filed motions for attorney's fees and costs relying on the lease purchase agreement's terms. The sellers also sought costs pursuant to Rule 501(a)(1) of the Uniform Rules for District Courts of the State of Wyoming. The trial court denied each request concluding that neither party prevailed in this maze of claims and counterclaims, and we agree. [¶ 49] The sellers' request for costs under U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1), based on the buyers' failure to object to the demand, fails because the parties entered into a contractual agreement regarding costs. In Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1091 (Wyo.1999) (emphasis added and citations omitted), we said: Costs are purely statutory, as they did not exist at common law. However, this is true only in the absence of an agreement concerning costs between the parties. Parties to an agreement are free to bargain for payment of costs, just as they can bargain for payment of attorney's fees. The parties' agreement to an allocation of costs is not subject to the provisions of U.R.D.C. 501. In the face of a valid contractual agreement imposing a clear standard, we will not apply the provisions of U.R.D.C. 501(a)(1). [¶ 50] In Wyoming, we follow the American rule which states each party is responsible for his own attorney's fees in the absence of an express contractual or statutory provision to the contrary. McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 533 (Wyo.2000). Even in the face of a valid contractual provision for attorney's fees, we have clearly stated that a trial court has the discretion to exercise its equitable control to allow only such sum as is reasonable or the court may properly disallow attorney's fees altogether on the basis that such recovery would be inequitable. Id. at 534. Here, the parties rely on two express contract provisions regarding attorney's fees and costs. First, the counteroffer incorporated substantially all the terms and conditions of the offer including: In the event that any party shall become in default or breach of any of the terms of this Contract, such defaulting or breaching party shall pay all reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses which the nonbreaching or nondefaulting party may incur in enforcing this Contract with or without suit. This provision shall not limit any other remedies to which the parties may otherwise be entitled. Second, the lease purchase agreement provided in pertinent part: In the event that any action is filed in relation to this lease agreement, the unsuccessful party in the action shall pay to the successful party, in addition to all the sums that either party may be called on to pay, a reasonable sum for the successful party's attorney fees. In light of its various rulings and the jury's verdict, the trial court determined that neither the sellers nor the buyers could be considered the prevailing party; therefore, it denied the cross-motions for attorney's fees and costs. We conclude the trial court made an equitable decision and did not abuse its discretion. Contrary to the parties' divergent opinions that the prevailing party's identity was clear, the record tells a quite different story. We hold the trial court exercised sound judgment in concluding neither party prevailed and denying all requests for attorney's fees and costs.