Opinion ID: 812339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Pretrial Delay

Text: Hagler next argues that the pre-indictment delay in his case was unconstitutionally excessive. The district court denied Hagler’s request to dismiss the case for unreasonable pre-indictment delay, and we review that decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. McMutuary, 217 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir. 2000). The primary safeguard against unreasonable prosecutorial delay is the statute of limitations, not the Constitution. Id. Nevertheless, “ ‘we have also noted that the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause plays a limited role in assuring that the government does not subject a defendant to oppressive delay.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Spears, 159 F.3d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1998)). Hagler bears the burden of demonstrating that the delay caused actual 12 No. 11-2984 and substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial. See id. at 481-82. This burden “is an exacting one; the showing must rest upon more than mere speculative harm,” id. at 482, and Hagler must present “facts that are specific, concrete, and supported by evidence.” United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 2003). If he were to make this showing, the burden would shift to the government “to demonstrate that the ‘purpose of the delay was not to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant or for some other impermissible reason.’ ” Id. (quoting McMutuary, 217 F.3d at 482). The court then balances the government’s reasons and the defendant’s prejudice to determine whether the defendant was denied due process. Id. Hagler has not cleared the first hurdle. Hagler identifies three general ways in which he believes the preindictment delay prejudiced him, but we do not think that any of them cause him any actual and substantial disadvantage. First, Hagler notes that some of the physical evidence had degraded by the time of trial; specifically, one of the Halloween masks had “degraded quite a bit” and become “brittle.” But Hagler does not even suggest, much less demonstrate, how this im- peded his ability to defend himself. Similarly, Hagler complains that he was not able to present the jury with the list of “hits” generated by his initial, mixed DNA profile because the list was deleted in 2007. But another, apparently more-accurate DNA test was later per- formed on the same genetic material, and that test matched the material to Shawn, not to Hagler. Given that No. 11-2984 13 Hagler later received the results of a second, more-accurate test, we do not believe that he was prejudiced by missing out on the results of the first test. Third and more generally, Hagler argues that he was prejudiced because the witnesses’ memories have faded over time, and, as a result, they disagreed on various details at trial. But the mere fact that memories have faded is not enough to establish excessive delay. Id. at 920; see also United States v. Baker, 40 F.3d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1994) (statutes of limitations reflect “a legislative judgment that so long as prosecutions are brought within the designated timeframe, then, notwithstanding the possible loss of crucial evidence or failure of memory, a defendant will be able to adequately defend himself”); United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1414 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s speedy trial claim because his “general allegation that his witnesses’ memories faded during the delay does not rise to the level of specificity required to show actual prejudice”). Here, some of the government’s witnesses failed to remember specific details or contradicted each other on insignificant factual matters, but all of the witnesses told the same basic story. Moreover, Hagler was able to bring all of these issues to the jury’s attention through argument and cross-examination. And, most importantly, none of the witnesses’ faded recollections calls into question the significant DNA and fingerprint evidence against him. Accordingly, Hagler has not shown that the pre-indictment delay prejudiced him, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to dismiss the case. 14 No. 11-2984