Opinion ID: 1454558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: controversy presented

Text: Beaman next relies on language in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cy. Dist. Coun. of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 56 L.Ed.2d 209, 98 S.Ct. 1745 (1978) and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 77 L.Ed.2d 798, 103 S.Ct. 3172 (1983) to argue that his state action is not preempted because the controversy to be presented to the state court is not identical to that which could be presented to the NLRB. In so doing, Beaman disregards threshold determinations that must be made and oversimplifies the Court's reasoning, giving the language too literal and narrow a reading by taking specific language out of context. Furthermore, both cases are readily distinguished from the present case. In Sears, the Supreme Court held that a state trespass action, which was brought by Sears against picketers who refused to leave Sears' property, was not preempted by federal labor law. The picketers, who were members of a carpenters union, were not Sears' employees and Sears did not have a collective bargaining agreement with the union. Sears was being picketed for using non-union carpenters. Sears sought, and was granted, an injunction removing the pickets to the public sidewalk. Sears, at 183. [4] In holding that the state action was not preempted, the Supreme Court noted that the state action, which was limited by the scope of the injunction, was concerned only with the location of the picketing. In contrast, any arguable unfair practice determination by the NLRB would focus on the objective of the picketing. Sears, at 198. The Court noted that `the decision to pre-empt ... state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies'. Sears, at 189 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180, 17 L.Ed.2d 842, 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967)). Thus, the critical inquiry under Garmon is whether controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which could be presented to the NLRB. Sears, at 197. Beaman contends that the issues here are not identical because the state court need only decide if Valley complied with the terms of the implemented offer in discharging him. He totally disregards the threshold determination that must be made. His claim is directly based on either an individual contract, the existence of which is arguably an unfair labor practice, or an implemented offer, the validity of which has never been determined. Beaman concedes that the questions of unfair labor practices and the validity of the implemented offer are within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. Further, Beaman's focus on the Court's use of the word identical disregards the Court's concern with the interests being asserted and the effect on labor policies. Beaman does not adequately address these interests. He acknowledges that section 301 preemption would apply to this case if there were a current collective bargaining agreement in effect to be interpreted. Yet, he asks this court to hold that if an agreement is not in effect because of a breakdown in negotiation, that somehow the NLRB's interest in the process is extinguished. This we will not do. The NLRB has a strong interest in any action that interferes with the relationship between union employees and their employer, especially as it relates to the collective bargaining process. Moreover, Sears is readily distinguished from the present case. Beaman was employed by Valley and had been covered by the expired collective bargaining agreement. In contrast, there was no pre-existing management-labor relationship between Sears and the union picketers. There was not even an employer-employee relationship between them. [7] Belknap is also readily distinguished from the present case. There, the Court was called on to decide if the NLRA preempts a misrepresentation and breach of contract suit brought in state court by strike replacements who were displaced by reinstated strikers. The replacements had been offered, and had accepted, permanent jobs. They were told that they would not be fired to accommodate returning strikers. The Court held that the action was not preempted under Garmon because the NLRB would focus on the rights of returning strikers, while the state interest was in protecting the rights of the replacements, whom the Court clearly viewed as third parties not directly involved in the ongoing labor dispute between the strikers and the employer. Belknap, at 510. As an employee admittedly covered by a series of collective bargaining agreements, Beaman cannot be characterized as a third party. Nor does a breakdown in negotiations for a successor agreement place him in a position analogous to the replacement workers in Belknap. Those workers based their breach of contract claim on the employer's promise of permanent employment, not a current or expired collective bargaining agreement. [5] Beaman cites Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63, 15 L.Ed.2d 582, 86 S.Ct. 657 (1966) to support the assertion that [s]hould Mr. Beaman's claim be preempted, `[t]he Board can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other relief' to Mr. Beaman. Brief of Appellant, at 17 (quoting Linn, at 63). Beaman does not say why he has not, or cannot, look to the NLRB for relief. More importantly, the fact that a given remedy cannot be granted by the NLRB does not necessarily mean his claim is not preempted. [R]emedies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation[;] to allow the State to grant a remedy here [damages] which has been withheld from the National Labor Relations Board only accentuates the danger of conflict. San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959).