Opinion ID: 1797600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Records, supra, Sept. 26, at 1445.

Text: Delegate Avant explained that this amendment would make it abundantly clear ... the legislature can exercise the police power of the state for the good of all of the citizens of the state irrespective of where they may live. Id. The next day, however, the convention deleted Mr. Avant's amendment and replaced it with an amendment offered by Delegate Casey of the City of New Orleans that became Article VI, § 9(B), viz., (B) Notwithstanding any provision of this Article, the police power of the state shall never be abridged. Mr. Casey and other delegates complained that the Avant amendment might cancel out grants of home rule powers contained in the sections of the Local Government Article previously approved by the convention. They expressed concern that under the Avant amendment home rule municipalities and parishes would have less autonomy than was afforded by the 1921 Constitution because, for example, the legislature could preempt our local ordinances establishing our zoning laws, Records, supra, Statements of Delegate Casey, Sept. 27, at 1454, and in many other ways virtually take over local self-government. Id. Statements of Delegate Burson, at 1455. Delegate Casey expressed the prevailing view of the delegates that the amendment which became Section 9(B) would represent a medium of compromise between the home rule provisions, which standing alone could be viewed as granting absolute and unqualified local autonomy, and the Avant provision, which had gone too far in the other direction and might be interpreted as annulling all local governmental powers of immunity. Mr. Casey indicated that the amendment was intended to give to the state those things that are due rightfully for regulation by the state and give to municipalities those police powers which it rightfully should enjoy to conduct its own business. Records, supra, Sept. 27, Statements of Delegate Casey, at 1460. However, later that day the convention by a vote of 52 to 68 rejected a proposed amendment that would have added the provision that (C) This article shall not limit the power of the legislature to enact laws of statewide concern. Id. at 1461-65. The purpose of that proposal, as explained by its author, was to give as much local home rule as possible, but yet to preserve to the state its interest to deal with statewide concern. Id. at 1462. Many delegates who successfully opposed the amendment favored strong home rule and acknowledged the need to reserve the power of the legislature to enact necessary general statewide laws. Id. Statements of Delegate Burson, at 1463-64. Nevertheless, they objected to a reservation of the power of the legislature to enact laws of statewide concern. Id. Statements of Delegate Conroy, at 1464. They contended that this term was too open-ended and might be interpreted to allow the legislature to intrude into local government even when state laws were not necessary to protect the interest of the people as a whole. Id. Statements of Delegate Zervigon, at 1463. From our reading of the foregoing passages within the context of the drafting history as a whole, we conclude that it was the aim of the constitutional convention by Section 9(B) of Article VI to vest in home rule municipalities and parishes the powers of immunity and initiation as provided for in Sections 4, 5, and 7 of Article VI, subject to a reservation to the state of that residuum of the police power required to enact and enforce laws necessary to protect and promote the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of its people as a whole. Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of the legislature's authority to exercise the state's police power must be consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. See New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of New Orleans, 422 So.2d 402, 406-07 (La.1982). The reserved power cannot be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be construed in harmony with each other. This principle precludes a construction which would permit the legislature the unqualified power to withdraw, preempt, or overrule a local law that is consistent with the constitution and was enacted pursuant to a constitutionally maintained preexisting home rule charter. But it does not follow that conditions may not arise in which the legislature will be required to enact legislation that, despite its conflict with a valid local law, is necessary to protect the vital interests of the state as a whole and thus be found to be within the range of the reserved power of the state. Cf., Home Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439, 54 S.Ct. 231, 240, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1933) (explaining a similar principle of harmony between the contract clause and the police power). We believe that this also was the public intent as to the meaning of Section 9(B), that is, the intention and understanding of the ratifiers that could have been gathered by a knowledgeable but objective observer from the text of that section and the Local Government Article in which it occurs. See Succession of Lauga, 624 So.2d 1156, 1164-65 (La.1993); City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507 So.2d 215 (La.1987); Board of Com'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281 (La.1986); Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Seavey, 383 So.2d 354 (La.1980); Chehardy v. Democratic Executive Comm., 259 La. 45, 249 So.2d 196 (1971); Devlin, supra, at 689-90. Article VI on Local Government imposes limits or exceptions upon the powers of all local governments that would have been unnecessary if the drafters and ratifiers had intended by Section 9(B) to reserve to the legislature the authority to withdraw, preempt, or reverse any local law. These constitutional exceptions or limitations to local government legislative power provide that the localities may not enact: (1) Local laws providing for the punishment of a felony, § 9(A)(1); (2) Ordinances governing private or civil relationships, except as provided by law, § 9(A)(2); (3) Local laws reducing the compensation of an elected official during the term for which he is elected, § 12; (4) Local laws establishing or affecting courts and their officers, § 25. These limitations on the powers of local governments would be virtually superfluous if Section 9(B) were read to grant the legislature the power to usurp a local government's exercise of the police power within its boundaries. By the same token, if the constitutional intention by Section 9(B) had been to reserve plenary power to the legislature, Article VI, § 14(5) creating an exception to local home rule powers of immunity regarding laws providing for civil service, minimum wages, hours, working conditions, and employment benefits for firemen and policemen would have been unnecessary and meaningless. See New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n, 422 So.2d 402, 406-07 (La. 1982). That the drafters and ratifiers intended and understood Section 9(B) to preclude a construction that would reserve to the legislature unlimited power to supersede home rule authority is also borne out clearly by the daily newspaper coverage of the controversial constitutional convention debates concerning home rule and the police power. See e.g., Gillis & Hargroder, Strong Home Rule Boasted in CC-73 Move: Sections on Police Power is Amended, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 28, 1973, § 1, at 1; Hargroder & Gillis, Police Power Voted to State: CC May Have Undone Home Rule Provisions, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 27, 1973, § 1, at 1. As this court has observed, Article VI of the 1974 Louisiana constitution adopts a new philosophy of the state-local government relationship and strikes a balance in favor of home rule that calls for a corresponding adjustment in judicial attitude. Francis v. Morial, 455 So.2d 1168, 1173 (La. 1984); City of Shreveport v. Kaufman, 353 So.2d 995, 996-97 (La.1977); City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So.2d 1318, 1322 (La. 1983) (Concurring opinion); Kean, Local Government and Home Rule, 21 Loy.L.Rev. 63, 64, 66 (1975); Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980: Local Government Law, 41 La.L.Rev. 481, 487-88 (1981). Consequently, home rule abilities and immunities are to be broadly construed, and any claimed exception to them must be given careful scrutiny by the courts. Francis v. Morial, supra. In accordance with the expectations of the drafters and ratifiers, the principles which courts have developed in accommodating individual rights with the state's exercise of its police power are applicable by analogy to the resolution of conflicts between police measures and the constitutionally protected rights of home rule governments. Board of Com'rs v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281 (La.1986); Francis v. Morial, supra. Accordingly, a litigant claiming that a home rule municipality's local law abridges the police power of the state must show that the local law conflicts with an act of the state legislature that is necessary to protect the vital interest of the state as a whole. To establish that the conflict actually exists, the litigant must show that the state statute and the ordinance are incompatible and cannot be effectuated in harmony. Further, to demonstrate that the state statute is necessary it must be shown that the protection of such state interest cannot be achieved through alternate means significantly less detrimental to home rule powers and rights. Cf. State v. McHugh, 630 So.2d 1259, 1267-69 (La. 1994); State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 755-61 (La.1992); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398, 415 (La.1988) (on rehearing). For a similar analysis compare Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of LSU, 477 So.2d 1094, 1107-09 (La.1985) (on rehearing).