Opinion ID: 2828001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Endangering the Welfare of a Child

Text: [¶23] The availability of a duress instruction on the charge of endangering the welfare of a child requires consideration of the factual basis for the charge.7 The indictment alleges that Gagnier committed this crime “on or about between” August 24 and 28, 2012. These are the same alleged offense dates accompanying the drug charge, which suggests that the State’s theory is that Gagnier endangered B.G.’s welfare by illegally providing her with prescription medication. In fact, the State argued this theory at trial, and during her closing argument, Gagnier herself contended that the two charges were predicated on the same evidence. To the extent that the evidence supporting the child endangerment charge is co-extensive with the drug furnishing charge, the evidence did not generate a duress defense for the same reasons that it was not generated as to the drug charge. 7 Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) (2014), “[a] person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child if that person . . . [o]therwise recklessly endangers the health, safety or welfare of a child under 16 years of age by violating a duty of care or protection.” 14 [¶24] In addition to pressing its theory that furnishing drugs was a form of criminal endangerment, however, the State took a broader view of the endangerment charge both in its argument to the court that Gagnier was not entitled to a duress instruction and in its closing argument to the jury. In both contexts, the State more generally argued, at least implicitly, that Gagnier had a duty to protect B.G. from Michael’s abusive conduct.8 The State was not foreclosed from arguing that theory of guilt, because even though the dates of the endangering conduct, which were not specified in the charge, were the same as those for the drug charge, the State is entitled to prove that a crime occurred anytime within the dates suggested by the evidence, subject here only to the three-year statute of limitations that applies to a class D crime. See 17-A M.R.S. § 8(2)(B) (2014); State v. Woodard, 2013 ME 36, ¶ 27, 68 A.3d 1250. This allowed the State to ask the jury to find Gagnier guilty of child endangerment based on conduct other than providing a prescription drug to B.G., thereby presenting a theory that the endangering conduct encompassed, for example, Gagnier’s failure to alert others in some way to Michael’s abuse of B.G. 8 For example, during the colloquy with the court about the duress instruction, the State said, “I think the State would be arguing that [Gagnier] had a duty to protect the child in all kinds of ways that she didn’t do during that time period.” To the jury, the State argued that Gagnier “is responsible for giving drugs to that child and she is responsible for not exercising and taking care of [B.G.] when she had a duty of care to protect this child, she made those decisions, and not only did she not act, she purposely acted to make the situation worse.” 15 [¶25] For the duress defense to be generated by this broader factual view of the endangering conduct, the evidence must have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that during the entire time she was subject to a duty to protect B.G., Gagnier was never free from a threat of imminent serious bodily injury or death posed by Michael that induced her inaction. Putting it conversely, the duress defense was not generated if, looking at the entire period of time when she knew that Michael was abusing B.G., Gagnier indisputably had even one opportunity to take steps to protect B.G.’s health, safety, or welfare—just as B.G. herself twice reported her own victimization. [¶26] The record is not sufficient to have allowed a fact-finder to conclude that Gagnier was subject to a threat of imminent harm at all times when she otherwise had at least one opportunity to seek protection or help for B.G. The evidence showed, for example, that Michael worked regularly and that there were times when he would briefly stop at home after work but then leave for the night. Occasionally he did not stop at home and sometimes was out until as late as 5:00 a.m. Also, Gagnier regularly attended doctor’s appointments and took classes three or four days each week. Thus, although, as the trial court recognized, there is evidence that Gagnier was engaged in an abusive relationship and harbored a generalized fear of Michael, the evidence does not generate a factual contention that Gagnier was deprived of her free will at every moment. The defense of duress 16 is narrowly drawn and requires production of evidence of specific threats of impending harm that is of substantial magnitude, rather than generalized fear, as well as the absence of any reasonable opportunity to resist, escape, or seek help. Here, the evidence did not generate that defense on a broadly-viewed theory of child endangerment.