Opinion ID: 867374
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Denial of a third-party culpability instruction.

Text: ¶ 68 Garza claims that the penalty phase jury was improperly instructed on possible third-party culpability. The jury, however, was instructed that it could consider as a mitigating circumstance evidence that [t]he defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another as an accomplice but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution. This instruction tracks the language of A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(3) and appropriately allowed the jury to consider Garza's level of culpability as mitigation. 10. Instructing the jury not to consider sympathy or sentiment. ¶ 69 The jury was instructed twice in the penalty phase not to be swayed by sentiment, passion, prejudice, or public feeling or opinion. Although Garza concedes that these instructions were proper under both California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541-43, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987), and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487-95, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), he argues that those cases are inapposite because they were decided prior to Arizona jury sentencing in capital cases. We have rejected this argument. Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 92, 111 P.3d at 391; State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 70-71 ¶¶ 81-87, 107 P.3d 900, 916-17 (2005). 11. Instruction that the jury must unanimously determine that mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. ¶ 70 Garza argues that requiring the jury to unanimously agree that mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency violates Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).  Mills . . . forbids states from imposing a requirement that the jury find a potential mitigating factor unanimously before that factor may be considered in the sentencing decision. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408-09, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004). ¶ 71 The instructions given here  which are consistent with A.R.S. §§ 13-703(C) and  703.01(H)-complied with Mills. In contrast to the instructions in Mills, the charge here made clear that, although the jury must unanimously determine that the death penalty is not appropriate, it need not unanimously find the existence of any particular mitigator. [15] See Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 99, 111 P.3d at 392 (upholding similar instructions). 12. A.R.S. § 13-703 creates an unconstitutional presumption of death. ¶ 72 Garza claims that A.R.S. §§ 13-703(E) and -703.01(H) create an unconstitutional presumption of death. We have repeatedly rejected this argument. See, e.g., Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 72, 116 P.3d at 1212; Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 77, 111 P.3d at 388.