Opinion ID: 572629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of the Environmental Offense and Multiple-Count Sections

Text: 99 Under 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1, which covered the RICO offenses and mail fraud offenses, the district court calculated that Paccione and Vulpis would, considering enhancements for offense characteristics and adjustments for their leadership roles, have an initial offense level of 23. The court observed, however, that the Guidelines recognize that RICO and mail fraud statutes are often used as jurisdictional bases for the prosecution of other offenses, and that Application Note 15 to 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1 provided that [i]n such cases the most analogous guideline ... is to be applied. Finding that defendants' illegal dumping of waste had caused serious environmental harm, 751 F.Supp. at 376, the court concluded that the most analogous Guidelines provision was § 2Q1.2, which deals with offenses involving the mishandling of hazardous or toxic substances. Calculating offense levels under this section, with enhancements for offense characteristics and adjustments for leadership roles, the court concluded that the proper initial offense level was 26. These calculations followed the recommendations of the Presentence Reports (PSRs) prepared by the Probation Department. They were not objected to by Paccione or Vulpis in the district court. 100 The court also noted that if Paccione and Vulpis were to be sentenced under § 2F1.1, the mail fraud section, instead of under § 2Q1.2, their initial offense level would still have been 26, not 23, because the court would have departed upwardly under Guidelines § 5K2.0 or § 5K2.5 to take into account the serious environmental harm and its very strong nexus with the fraud. 751 F.Supp. at 375 n. 4. The court stated as follows: 101 This court could have chosen not to look at the environmental offenses at all but rather to sentence the defendants pursuant only to the fraud offense. If that had been the case, this court would have had to substantially depart upward to capture the harm which defendants caused to both the CSX land and the environment. In deciding how many levels to depart upward, this court would have looked to the environmental offense guidelines as a template. Thus the defendants would have had the same offense level whether this court ... looks at the environmental offenses or whether this court used its discretionary powers under § 5K2.0 or § 5K2.5. 102 751 F.Supp. at 375 n. 4. 103 Having calculated defendants' initial offense level as 26, the court next looked to the Guidelines' multiple-count rules and determined that the environmental offenses were separate from the mail fraud offenses, and thus could not be grouped together as a single offense under § 3D1.2 but rather required a further adjustment under § 3D1.4. The court concluded that application of the latter section resulted in a two-level adjustment, giving these defendants an interim offense level of 28. This calculation too followed the recommendations of defendants' respective PSRs and was not objected to by Paccione or Vulpis in the district court. 104 The court also noted, however, that if it had not concluded that the Guidelines required this upward adjustment under the multiple-count rules, it would have departed upwardly by two levels, still resulting in an interim offense level of 28: 105 Alternatively, if this court were only able to look at the environmental offense, this court would have had to depart upward under § 5K2.0 to take into account the fact that the defendants had defrauded various agencies and individuals. Under these circumstances, this court would have departed at least two levels. Thus the resulting level would have been the same even if the court did not use the multiple count adjustment. 106 751 F.Supp. at 378 n. 7. 107 Paccione and Vulpis contend here that the sentencing court erred (a) in calculating their offense levels using the environmental offense section of the Guidelines, rather than the section dealing with mail fraud, resulting in an initial offense level of 26, rather than 23, and (b) in using the multiple-count sections to increase their interim offense levels to 28. Though the latter contention has some merit and the former gives us pause, we conclude that, given the court's alternative rulings, these matters do not require recalculation of the sentences. 108 Preliminarily, we note that, as indicated above, these two adjustment objections were not voiced in the district court. Given the complexity and novelty of this type of case, however, we find it appropriate to consider these issues on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.1990); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 215, 216-17 (2d Cir.1991). Accordingly, we address the propriety of the court's use of the environmental sections found in Chapter Two of the Guidelines and the multiple-count sections found in Chapter Three. 109 The challenge to the district court's use of the environmental offense sections presents interesting questions. The Guidelines provide that, for calculation of a defendant's offense level, the applicable guideline section is generally to be determined with reference to the offense of conviction. Thus, § 1B1.2(a) instructs the court, where there has been no plea of guilty or nolo contendere establishing a more serious offense than the offense of conviction, to [d]etermine the offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) most applicable to the offense of conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted). 110 In the present case, the indictment charged defendants with mail fraud, wire fraud, and RICO offenses; they were convicted of mail fraud and RICO offenses. Thus, under § 1B1.2(a), defendants' offense level would have been calculated under the Guidelines section dealing with mail fraud, i.e., 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1, yielding an offense level of 23. See Guidelines § 2E1.1 (for RICO, base offense level is 19 or offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity, whichever is higher). A problem arises because an application note to the mail fraud section stated that 111 [i]n certain other cases, the mail or wire fraud statutes, or other relatively broad statutes, are used primarily as jurisdictional bases for the prosecution of other offenses. For example, a state law arson where a fraudulent insurance claim was mailed might be prosecuted as mail fraud. In such cases the most analogous guideline (in the above case, § 2K1.4) is to be applied. 112 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1 Application Note 15 (emphasis added). On the face of it, this Note appears to direct the district court to proceed precisely as it did in the present case, i.e., not to use the fraud section but to use the section dealing with environmental offenses. The difficulty, since defendants were not charged with or convicted of environmental offenses, is that 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1 Application Note 15 appears to conflict with § 1B1.2(a)'s requirement that calculation of offense level proceed under sections dealing with the offense of conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted). 113 Our view that the two provisions were in conflict here is supported by the current version of the corresponding application note (now numbered 13) to § 2F1.1. This version, which became effective on November 1, 1989, authorizes the court, upon a mail fraud conviction, to apply a section other than § 2F1.1 only if the other section deals with an offense that was establish[ed] in the information or indictment. Thus, the amended version deleted the language of the 1988 version's Note 15 emphasized above and substituted the following: 114 Where the indictment or information setting forth the count of conviction (or a stipulation as described in § 1B1.2(a)) establishes an offense more aptly covered by another guideline, apply that guideline rather than § 2F1.1. Otherwise, in such cases, § 2F1.1 is to be applied, but a departure from the guidelines may be considered. 115 Guidelines § 2F1.1 Application Note 13. The explanation of the Sentencing Commission reveals that the major purpose[ ] of this amendment [was] to ensure that this guideline is interpreted in a manner consistent with § 1B1.2. Guidelines App. C, Amendment 155. 116 This amended version of § 2F1.1 was in effect at the time defendants in the present case were sentenced, and were we to apply the amended version, we would likely conclude that the district court should not have calculated their offense levels under the environmental offense sections. Normally, of course, the court is to apply the version of the Guidelines that is in effect at the time of sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553, unless there is an ex post facto problem. United States v. Adeniyi, 912 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1990); cf. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2453-54, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (application of state's revised sentencing guidelines, in effect at time of defendant's sentencing, violates ex post facto clause if it  'makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment' ) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 968, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). The application of the amended § 2F1.1 here would have created an ex post facto problem because the amended § 2F1.1 also modified the offense level enhancements for specific offense characteristics; thus, the initial offense level for Paccione and Vulpis under the amended version, after enhancements and leadership adjustments, would be 28, as contrasted with a level of 23 under the 1988 version. As a result, though application of the version of § 2F1.1 in effect at the time of sentencing would appear to prevent calculation of defendants' offense levels under the sections governing environmental offenses, it would also result in a higher offense level. Hence, the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing could not be applied, and application of the 1988 version of the Guidelines was required. 117 Accordingly, we are left with the question of whether the direction given in Application Note 15 to 1988 Guidelines § 2F1.1 overrode the instructions given in § 1B1.2. From the 1989 amendment and the Commission's explanation for the amendment, it is clear that the Commission recognized the possibility of erosion of § 1B1.2, but that none was intended. Fortunately, however, we need not resolve the conflict between apparent effect and later-clarified intent, for the district court stated an alternative basis for its arrival at an offense level of 26. 118 The court stated that if it had sentenced Paccione and Vulpis under § 2F1.1 it would have, under Guidelines § 5K2.0 or § 5K2.5, substantially depart[ed] upward to capture the harm which defendants caused to both the CSX land and the environment. 751 F.Supp. at 375 n. 4. Section 5K2.0 provides that the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating ... circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.'  Guidelines § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)); see generally United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 681-83 (2d Cir.1990). Since there is no indication that when it formulated punishments for mail fraud, the Commission took into account the possible causation of massive environmental damage such as that proven here, a § 5K2.0 departure would not have been an abuse of discretion. We therefore see no basis for disturbing the court's arrival at an initial offense level of 26. 119 There is also a difficulty, together with a similar curative alternative holding, in connection with the court's use of the Guidelines' multiple-count provisions to increase defendants' offense level from 26 to 28. The court referred to § 3D1.2 to determine whether the fraud offense and the environmental offense can[ ] be grouped together, 751 F.Supp. at 377; determining that they could not be grouped, it concluded that § 3D1.4 therefore required a two-level upward adjustment. The multiple-count sections, however, provide rules for calculating, either by grouping or by adjustment, a single offense level that takes into account all of the counts of which the defendant is convicted. Guidelines Chapter Three, Part D--Multiple Counts, Introductory Commentary. The underlying premise of either grouping or adjustment under these rules is that there have been multiple counts and multiple convictions. See generally United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907, 909-11 (1st Cir.1989) (Guidelines provide[ ] that, for the most part, the court will determine the applicable guideline by looking to the charge of which the offender was convicted (emphasis in original); other conduct not charged as an offense may be taken into account under relevant conduct rules or in departure from the Guidelines, not under multiple-count rules). Here, no counts of the indictment charged Paccione and Vulpis with violation of federal environmental laws, and they were not convicted of environmental offenses. Accordingly, the only offenses subject to the multiple-count rules were the RICO and mail fraud offenses. 120 Again, however, there is no basis for resentencing, for the court stated that if no upward multiple-count adjustment were proper, the court would, under § 5K2.0, depart upwardly by two levels. For the reasons indicated above, such a departure would not have been an abuse of discretion. 121