Opinion ID: 1837734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was the defendant's trial attorney ineffective?

Text: To be successful on an ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984), and adopted by this Court. Knight v. State, 577 So.2d 392, 394 (Miss. 1991). The Strickland test requires a showing of (1) deficiency of counsel's performance (2) sufficient to constitute prejudice to the defense. McQuarter v. State, 574 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1990). We must determine whether counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial based upon the totality of the circumstances. Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 780 (Miss. 1988). Ivy claims the failure to file any motion for discovery was ineffective assistance by his attorney. The filing of pre-trial motions is within the bounds of trial strategy and Ivy has provided no evidence tending to show that the omission complained of was anything other than counsel's trial strategy. Unlike Barnes v. State, 577 So.2d 840 (Miss. 1991), there is no allegation here of critical evidence that may have come to light as a result of discovery. Indeed, no reason has been stated as to why this omission constitutes deficient performance and this Court has said ... the mere fact that an attorney did not file a motion for discovery is not sufficient to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Knight v. State, 577 So.2d 392, 394 (Miss. 1991). The record further does not reflect any surprise to Ivy's counsel as a result of the state's case or its witnesses. Counsel was sufficiently familiar with the state's case and its witnesses that a discovery motion would not have elicited any change in the defense. Ivy has failed to meet either prong of the Strickland test with this contention. Ivy argues that his attorney failed to test the validity of the search warrant before trial or to challenge the reliability of the confidential informant at trial and allowed all evidence resulting therefrom to be introduced by the State without objection. From the record before us, it appears that the search warrant in this case was valid. Police testified that the confidential informant had been reliable in the past and the informant's tip included specific details. The police testimony also reflected that the underlying facts and circumstances were before the Municipal Court Judge, who obviously found sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant. The importance of these points has previously been addressed by this Court. Meyer v. State, 309 So.2d 161, 165 (Miss. 1975); Wolf v. State, 260 So.2d 425, 428-29 (Miss. 1972). In light of all the facts available, it appears that a challenge to the validity of the search warrant would have been fruitless. Again Ivy fails to meet the burden of proof on the second prong of Strickland. Ivy complains of his attorney's failure to object to the prosecution's remarks and argument that Ivy was dealing dope. Counsel is allowed considerable latitude in the argument of cases. Craft v. State, 271 So.2d 735, 737 (Miss. 1973). The boundaries are well established, limiting counsel to the facts introduced in evidence, deductions and conclusions he may reasonably draw therefrom, and the application of the law to the facts. Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 701-02 (Miss. 1988). The facts in evidence show that Ivy was in possession of over thirteen (13) pounds of marijuana and various paraphernalia commonly used in packaging drugs for sale and, therefore, the prosecutor and/or the jury could have reasonably concluded that Ivy was dealing dope. This assignment of error is without merit. In further support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Ivy points to his attorney's failure to request a circumstantial evidence instruction. Such an instruction must be given when the evidence for the prosecution is wholly circumstantial. Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 267 (Miss. 1985). While Ivy's conviction is based on a theory of constructive possession, it is not solely supported by circumstantial evidence. Both Chief of Police Ladd and Police Officer Moore provided the trial court with direct evidence that the drugs were within Ivy's constructive possession. No circumstantial evidence instruction was therefore required. This assignment of error is without merit. Ivy also contends that erroneous jury instructions were given and his trial counsel did not object. The jury was given the choice of finding Ivy guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to transfer or finding him guilty of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. The jury was not given the option of finding Ivy guilty of possession of marijuana in an amount greater than one ounce. Ivy now contends that this confused the jury and was not a full and clear statement of the law. We do not give jury instructions unless there is an evidentiary basis in the record for it. Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 701 (Miss. 1988). The evidence of possession of more than thirteen pounds of marijuana was a sufficient basis for the possession with intent to transfer instruction. Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 268 (Miss. 1985). The evidentiary basis for the possession of less than one ounce instruction was a small amount of marijuana actually found on Ivy's person when he was arrested. There was no evidence introduced that Ivy intended the more than thirteen (13) pounds of marijuana for his own personal use; therefore, no instruction for mere possession in an amount greater than one ounce was warranted. Davis, 530 So.2d at 701. Omission of this instruction caused no confusion to the jury. Trial counsel's failure to object to the instructions was not deficient and resulted in no prejudice to Ivy. Ivy then states that trial counsel should have demurred to the indictment because it did not specifically state whether Ivy was charged with possession of less than or more than a kilogram of marijuana. In fact, the indictment properly charged Ivy with possession of more than one ounce of marijuana with the intent to transfer. As the amount was not further specified, punishment for a conviction would be imposed under the statute, of those applicable, which provides for the lesser penalty. Broadus v. State, 392 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss. 1980). There is no merit to this assignment of error. Finally, Ivy asserts that his trial counsel failed to preserve any error except that of the verdict being against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. None of the other allegations presented in this record constitute error, therefore there was nothing for counsel to preserve on appeal and whatever shortcomings may be attributable to defense counsel, they do not rise to the level required to prove ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland. There is not a reasonable probability that without counsel's errors the outcome of the trial would have been any different. Reed v. State, 536 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss. 1988). Ivy's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.