Opinion ID: 2609775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Use of Settlement Agreements For Impeachment in Cross-Examination

Text: Appellants next claim that they should have been allowed to use the pleadings and the settlement agreements to cross-examine appellee. The trial court ruled that use of the settlement agreements in cross-examination of appellee was not permissible under W.R.E. 403 because the risk of prejudice in introducing the settlement agreements outweighed their probative value. We leave evidentiary rulings to the discretion of the trial judge, reviewing only whether there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Waggoner, 771 P.2d at 1200. Appellants have not identified a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court properly served the policy behind both W.R.E. 408 and 403 by ruling that the settlement agreements were not available for impeachment during the cross-examination of appellee. Appellants concede this issue in their reply brief. They admit they should not contest the trial court's decision to deny cross-examination of appellee with the settlement agreements because they are not appealing the damage award portion of the verdict. After this significant concession, however, appellants argue that there were numerous other opportunities during the trial for cross-examination with respect to the pleadings. Appellants do not support this claim with examples in the record where such cross-examination would have been appropriate. They do not advance cogent argument but, rather, unsupported assertion. This court will not review incomplete assertions. Arguments must be reasoned, supported, and refer to the record. As we have said before [t]his perfunctory argument does not rise to the level of cogent argument supported by pertinent authority, which we have stated many times is a requirement for consideration by this court. Weisbrod v. Ely, 767 P.2d 171, 176 (Wyo.1989) (citing Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338 (Wyo.1988)).