Opinion ID: 780969
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Define Mitigation

Text: 137 Mason complains that the trial court failed to explain the meaning of mitigation or mitigating factor, leaving the jury to speculate throughout the trial as to what it was they were supposed to be considering. Petitioner's Br. at 135. We note as an initial matter that, contrary to Mason's claims, the Supreme Court precedent that existed prior to Mason's conviction did not clearly establish a defendant's due process right to a jury instruction on the definition of mitigation. 19 Mason's reliance on Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), is unavailing. Although the trial court in that case did define mitigating circumstances as circumstances not constituting justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or punishment, id. at 590-91, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (internal quotation marks omitted), the question before the Supreme Court was whether a sentence of death for the crime of rape was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 586, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Indeed, the trial court gave the instruction pursuant to state statute. Id. at 589, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Coker therefore provides no support for the due process claim that Mason must successfully make for us to review a challenged jury instruction. 138 Mason also contends that the jury's discretion was not sufficiently guided under Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Petitioner's Br. at 137. Gregg, however, simply recommended that juries in death penalty cases be apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of [the death] sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909. The trial court provided such guidance in this case; it instructed the jury of its duty to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors, the latter including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and background of the Defendant, and any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the Defendant should be sentenced to death. J.A. at 1288. We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that the instructions, considered as a whole, adequately guided the jury and did not restrict its consideration of mitigating evidence. Mason, 694 N.E.2d at 953. We therefore deny habeas relief with respect to this claim.