Opinion ID: 891566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: for purposes of section 66-8-124(a), arrest includes a temporary detention

Text: {18} What constitutes an arrest under the provisions of Section 66-8-124(A) is pivotal to our determination in this case. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals devotes a significant amount of time distinguishing an arrest from a temporary detention and delineating when an arrest has occurred. Slayton, No. 27,892, slip op. at 9-12. The Court of Appeals directs its focus to State v. Werner, 117 N.M. 315, 871 P.2d 971 (1994), to determine at what point `an investigatory seizure is invasive enough to constitute an arrest[.]' Slayton, No. 27,892, slip op. at 9 (quoting Werner, 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973). Though the definition of arrest can be narrowly construed to include only custodial arrests, for the purpose of determining which actions are governed by the Motor Vehicle Code, we have interpreted arrest broadly to include not only custodial arrests but also temporary detentions. {19} As used in Section 66-8-124(A), the term arrest does not refer solely to custodial arrest or incarceration; it also includes a temporary detention. See State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 15, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130 (construing the misdemeanor arrest rule and Section 66-8-123, [w]e hold that the Court of Appeals improperly applied New Mexico's misdemeanor arrest rule to this case, because the `arrest' at issue was an investigatory stop for a seatbelt violation); State v. Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 513, 134 P.3d 800 (While the statute [NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-123 (1978, as amended through 1989)] uses the words `arrest' and `custody,' we believe the Legislature intended those terms to refer to a temporary detention rather than a traditional custodial arrest in which a person is arrested and taken to the police station for booking.); State v. Archuleta, 118 N.M. 160, 163, 879 P.2d 792, 795 (Ct.App.1994) (construing Section 66-8-124(A), the Court developed two tests to determine if the officer is in uniform; the second test evaluated whether the person stopped and cited either personally knows the officer or has information that should cause him to believe the person making the stop is an officer with official status) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1130 n. 1 (10th Cir.1985) (construing Section 66-8-123: Despite the statute's use of the words `arrest' and `custody,' when a New Mexico police officer stops a car merely to issue a traffic summons for a minor speeding infraction, we think that for Fourth Amendment purposes that stop is more in the nature of an investigative detention than a traditional arrest.). {20} We have never interpreted the Legislature's intent to restrict the term arrest in Section 66-8-124 only to custodial arrests, and we believe that under Chapter 66 of the New Mexico statutes, unless otherwise noted, arrest includes temporary detentions. See State v. Marquez, 2008-NMSC-055, ¶ 11, 145 N.M. 1, 193 P.3d 548 (Nothing in the Fresh Pursuit Act indicates that the Legislature intended `authority to arrest' to be limited to a custodial arrest. In fact, reference to other statutes indicates that the Legislature intended no such limit. Under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-123(A) (1989), which provides for citations in lieu of custodial arrest for certain violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, `a person is arrested' for the offense, `the arresting officer' prepares the citation, `the arrested person' signs the citation, and `the arrested person' receives a copy of the citation before being released. (alterations omitted)); Archuleta, 118 N.M. at 162, 879 P.2d at 794 (construing Section 66-8-124(A), [i]t seems clear enough that the intention of the legislature in requiring the officer to wear a uniform plainly indicating his official status was to enable the motorist to be certain that the officer who stops him is, in fact, a police officer). Therefore, legislative intent and previous New Mexico case law leads us to conclude that temporary detentions are covered under the term arrest as used in Chapter 66 as well as custodial arrests, and Blake's actions in detaining Defendant constitute an arrest under Section 66-8-124(A). As a result, we need not address the de facto arrest analysis employed by the Court of Appeals in this case.