Opinion ID: 1409085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the wades' appeal

Text: The Wades assign error to the trial court's action in striking their negligence count. They maintain that the evidence showed that the Board breached its duty to them by failing to use ordinary care to protect them from the continued child sexual abuse of their father. [3] Relying primarily on Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699, 299 S.E.2d 514 (1983), Wright v. Everett, 197 Va. 608, 90 S.E.2d 855 (1956), and Spence v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 92 Va. 102, 22 S.E. 815 (1895), the Wades assert that breach of a duty imposed by contract provides the cause of action in tort, and proof of an independent, willful tort is only necessary for the award of punitive damages. The cases cited by the Wades establish the principle that punitive damages are recoverable only if an independent tort is pled and proved. They do not, however, stand for the proposition that the breach of a contractual duty constitutes an independent tort, the basis of a negligence action. Wright and Kamlar each addressed the propriety of an award of punitive damages in an action for breach of contract. We recognized that in certain circumstances the actions of the party breaching the contract can show both a breach of the contract terms and a tortious breach of duty. Kamlar, 224 Va. at 705, 299 S.E.2d at 517. But the duty tortiously or negligently breached must be a common law duty, not one existing between the parties solely by virtue of the contract. Spence, 92 Va. at 116, 22 S.E. at 818. The trial court held that the Board had no common law duty of care to the Wades, and that ruling was not appealed. In essence, the Wades seek to establish a tort action based solely on the negligent breach of a contractual duty with no corresponding common law duty. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the negligence count and we will affirm its judgment. Record No. 901690: Reversed and final judgment. Record No. 901729: Affirmed.