Opinion ID: 1960956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Immunity Claim

Text: 1. The Trustees Right to Assert This Immunity. Before analyzing whether any immunity exists, we must first settle the question of whether the Trustees have a right to the protection of the possible immunity. Johnson maintains, under two alternative theories, that the Trustees may not assert the immunity. Johnson claims first that he sued the Trustees in their individual capacities under D.C.Code § 29-707 (2001) (formerly § 29-907 (1996)), and therefore they may not avail themselves of the protections the First Amendment's affords to churches. Johnson's reliance on this Code section is misplaced, since it specifically refers to the corporate powers of trustees of religious societies and consequently delineates their susceptibility to suit as trustees, not as private individuals. D.C.Code § 29-707. Furthermore, although the complaint names each of the Trustees individually, the complaint discusses actions taken by the Trustees as trustees of Mt. Airy, and Johnson's brief in this appeal notes that the complaint named the `Trustees' as Trustees of the Church, and later states that the Trustees were named as defendants in this suit. From all this, it seems plain that the individuals named in Johnson's complaint were named precisely because they were trustees of the church and were being sued as trustees, not as individuals. [3] Thus it is clear that the Trustees may raise this claim of immunity, just as bishops and other officials in hierarchical churches have raised the immunity defense where appropriate even though they were not the church itself. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) (defendant Archbishop's assertion of immunity allowed); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808, 111 Md.App. 616 (Md.1996) (defendant Archbishop's assertion of immunity allowed); Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 258 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.Ct.App.1989) (defendant Bishop's assertion of immunity allowed). In the alternative, Johnson claims that the Trustees waived their right to assert immunity because they did not appeal the decision rendered in their suit against Johnson. Hollingsworth v. Johnson, Case No. 98-CA-65 (D.C.Super.Ct. February 11, 1998). The Trustees could not have raised the immunity issue in their suit against Johnson since they were plaintiffs in that case, and the immunity is a defense. Even if the immunity had been available to any party when the Trustees sued Johnson, the case was treated as a contract dispute by the trial judge. As such, the case would have fallen into a clearly delineated exception (discussed below) to a church's First Amendment immunity from suit. Since the Trustees could not have raised the immunity in their suit against Johnson, they did not waive it by choosing not to appeal when they lost that case. 2. Immunity from Suit under the First Amendment and Its Exceptions. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... The United States Supreme Court, in a line of cases stretching back to 1871 ( Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871)), has consistently interpreted the Free Exercise Clause as a constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization ... on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2382, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). [4] This does not mean, however, that churches are above the law or that there can never be a civil court review of a church action. [N]ot every civil court decision ... jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). There are several areas in which civil courts continue to have jurisdiction over church actions. Courts may employ neutral principles of law in adjudicating disputes over church property. Id. (state has legitimate interest in adjudicating property disputes but may only use neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes); Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970) (resolution of property dispute between church bodies was made on basis of state law, did not involve inquiry into religious doctrine, and therefore presented no substantial federal question); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (states may resolve disputes over church property using neutral principals of law approach so long as there is no need to analyze or examine a church's ecclesiastical polity or doctrine). Civil courts also may have jurisdiction over employment disputes where the employee provides a purely secular service for the church. See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1982) (Civil Rights Act applied to editorial secretary in a church publishing house); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 3143, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981) (Civil Rights Act applied to secular employment decisions of religious institution). But see Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (holding that the section of the Civil Rights Act exempting religious organizations from the Act's ban on religious discrimination in employment did not violate the Establishment Clause and that the exemption shielded a church-run gymnasium from liability under the Act in a suit brought by a building engineer); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979) (teachers in church-run schools are not within coverage of National Labor Relations Act). In addition, churches may be held liable under valid contracts. See Watson, supra, 80 U.S. at 714 (religious organization's right of contract protected by law); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, et al., 894 F.2d 1354, 282 U.S.App. D.C. 314 (1990) (claim arising from oral contract between pastor and church within jurisdiction of court if provable without resort to impermissible avenues of proof). Finally, some courts have found jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that church officials lacked the authority to effect a pastor's discharge. See, e.g., Stony Island Church of Christ v. Stephens, 54 Ill.App.3d 662, 12 Ill.Dec. 299, 369 N.E.2d 1313 (1977) (no element of religion involved in deciding issue of church elders had authority to terminate pastor's employment); Antioch Temple Inc. v. Parekh, 422 N.E.2d 1337, 383 Mass. 854 (Mass.1981) (court gave effect to decision of congregation); Vincent v. Raglin, 318 N.W.2d 629, 114 Mich.App. 242 (Mich.Ct. App.1982) (church trustees did not have authority to remove pastor). None of these exceptions apply to Johnson's defamation claim, which is the only issue remaining in this case as it now stands before us. [5] This appeal does not involve ownership of church property; Johnson was a minister, not a secular employee, of Mt. Airy; Johnson's breach of contract claim has already been dismissed; and Johnson has never questioned the authority of the church to remove him as pastor. Johnson appears to rely on one other possible exception to the general rule of non-interference, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez, supra, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131. There, the Court said, In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are@ accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive.... Id. at 16, 50 S.Ct. at 7-8. However, the Court has never given concrete content to or applied this apparent exception, and later characterized the entire phrase as dictum only. Serbian, supra, 426 U.S. at 712, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. Because an adjudication of arbitrariness would require an inquiry into whether a church followed its internal laws and regulations, the Serbian Court held that any theoretical arbitrariness exception would not be consistent with the constitutional mandate against civil inquiry into the decisions of religious organizations in matters of discipline, faith, internal organization or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. Id. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. The Serbian Court also noted that the only possible application of the fraud or collusion language would be when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, ( Id. ) but declined to address whether ... there is room for marginal civil court review under the[se] narrow rubrics. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Clearly the Court was not endorsing such a review, but was only leaving the possibility open for future consideration. Even so, the Court was clearly taking a firm position in protecting First Amendment rights by forbidding inquiry into the ecclesiastical decisions of a church absent extraordinary circumstances. See Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 277, 93 L.Ed.2d 253 (1986). Johnson seems to ask us to apply this potential fraud or collusion exception to the Trustees' immunity claim. We decline to do so for many reasons. The fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness exception was enunciated as dictum in Gonzalez. Serbian, supra, 426 U.S. at 712, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. The Supreme Court has already found the arbitrariness portion of the Gonzalez exception impossible to apply without infringing on First Amendment protections. Id. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. Even if the fraud or collusion portion of the Gonzalez exception has concrete content, it is likely to be as impossible to apply as the arbitrariness portion of the exception. Furthermore, the Serbian Court's discussion of the fraud or collusion portion of the Gonzalez exception was itself dictum, since there was no claim or evidence of either fraud or collusion in the Serbian case. Finally, there are no extraordinary circumstances here that would warrant an application of a possible exception to First Amendment protections for church decisions. Even if we were inclined to rush in where the Supreme Court has refused to tread, Johnson has made no showing that the exception should be applied here. On a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the crucial question is whether we can conclude from reading the complaint that the ... claim falls within the trial court's constitutionally circumscribed secular jurisdiction. Bible Way Church, supra, 680 A.2d at 427 (emphasis added). In discussing the possibility of a fraud or collusion exception, the Supreme Court noted that it would only apply when a church tribunal[] act[s] in bad faith for secular purposes. Serbian, supra, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. In his complaint, Johnson never asserts that the allegedly defamatory manual was published for secular purposes by a church tribunal. [W]hen the First Amendment casts a shadow over the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff is obliged to plead unqualified jurisdictional facts that clearly take the case outside the constitutional bar. Bible Way Church, supra, 680 A.2d at 430; see also Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F.Supp. 702, 706 (E.D.Mich.1992) (courts have required greater specificity in pleading where the case implicates conduct which is prima facie protected by the First Amendment). Johnson has pleaded no facts that would take his case outside the First Amendment strictures on our jurisdiction under a theory of fraud or collusion. 3. Applying First Amendment Immunity Here. As noted above, courts have consistently held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits judicial encroachment into church decisions where those decisions turn on church policy or on religious doctrine or practice. Except for contractual disputes, this prohibition includes church decisions concerning the employment of ministers because selection and termination of clergy is a core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance not subject to interference by a state. See Serbian, supra, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382 (civil courts are constitutionally bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization... on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law) (emphasis added); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154-55, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) (Freedom to select the clergy ... must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference); Gonzalez, supra, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (declining to assert jurisdiction over a dispute as to whether an Archbishop had acted properly in determining who would be appointed to a chaplaincy); Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1356 (whose voice speaks for the church is per se a religious matter) (internal quotation omitted); Hutchison, supra, 789 F.2d at 396 (declining to assert jurisdiction over a dispute relating to appellant's status and employment as a minister of the church); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.1972) (a minister's assignment is a matter of church administration and government and thus, purely of ecclesiastical cognizance), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 132, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972); United Methodist Church, supra, 571 A.2d at 794 (employment disputes concerning the status of pastors are inherently ecclesiastical and cannot constitutionally be subject to review). Clearly the Free Exercise Clause guarantees Mt. Airy the freedom to decide to whom it will entrust ministerial responsibilities. A church's freedom in these matters is not, however, absolute. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2152, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (Our cases have long recognized a distinction between the freedom of ... belief, which is absolute, and the freedom of ... conduct, which is not absolute.); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) ([T]he [First] Amendment embraces two conceptsfreedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.). Even though the selection or ouster of a minister is a purely ecclesiastical decision taken in accord with the religious convictions of the church, it is not totally free from legislative restrictions. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961)) (internal punctuation omitted). State restriction on religious activity is allowed when the activity pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. Id. (citation omitted). For example, a church could not select its ministers on the basis of their demonstrated willingness to commit a crime, or by forcing the candidates to play a game of Russian roulette and hiring whoever survived. See Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1357. Nor may a church seek confidential medical information from a pastor's psychiatrist in making a reappointment determination as to that pastor. See Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 395 Mass. 59 (Mass.1985), cert. denied sub nom., Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985). Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the religion clauses allow for some state restriction, weighing the free exercise protections against important state interests requires a delicate balancing. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 1328 n. 8, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject [of First Amendment protection] is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.). In applying this balancing test, the Court has concluded that some civil rights and common law claims, which would be protected in a secular setting, are not sufficiently compelling to overcome certain religious interests. Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1357 (citing Gonzalez, supra, 280 U.S. at 16, 50 S.Ct. at 5). See, e.g., Serbian, supra, 426 U.S. at 715, 96 S.Ct. at 2383 (declining to assert jurisdiction over a case brought by a defrocked bishop to have himself declared the true bishop of a diocese, and noting constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of `fundamental fairness' or impermissible objectives, are... hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.). In the specific area of the church-minister relationship, other courts have expanded the universe of claims that do not overcome the First Amendment protections to include Civil Rights Act protection from race and sex discrimination and a variety of common law claims. See, e.g., Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1354 (pastor's claim for violation of federal age discrimination statute dismissed); Hutchison, supra, 789 F.2d at 392 (minister's common law claims challenging forced retirement by church dismissed); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.1985) (First Amendment protections precluded application of Civil Rights Act protection to an Associate in Pastoral Care); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.1974) (minister's suit for wrongful discharge dismissed). Under most circumstances, defamation is one of those common law claims that is not compelling enough to overcome First Amendment protection surrounding a church's choice of pastoral leader. When a defamation claim arises entirely out of a church's relationship with its pastor, the claim is almost always deemed to be beyond the reach of civil courts because resolution of the claim would require an impermissible inquiry into the church's bases for its action. See, e.g., Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989) (discharged pastor's claims, including a claim that his reputation was tarnished, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Hutchison, supra, 789 F.2d at 392 (minister's claim of defamation (among others) arising from his enforced retirement, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Yaggie v. Indiana-Kentucky Synod, Evangelical Lutheran Church, 860 F.Supp. 1194 (W.D.Ky.1994), aff'd, 64 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 1995) (pastor's defamation claim arising from an attempt to obtain his resignation, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F.Supp. 1286 (D.Minn.1993) (pastor's defamation claim arising from de facto termination, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Goodman v. Temple Shir Ami, 712 So.2d 775 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (rabbi's defamation claim, arising from termination of his services, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), review dismissed, 737 So.2d 1077 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1075, 120 S.Ct. 789, 145 L.Ed.2d 666 (2000); Downs, supra, 683 A.2d at 808, 111 Md.App. at 616 (former seminarian's defamation claim, arising from a denial of a petition for ordination, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, 773 N.E.2d 929, 437 Mass. 505 (Mass.2002) (pastor's multiple claims, including defamation, arising from church disciplinary proceedings, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church of Washington, 553 S.E.2d 511, 262 Va. 604 (Va.2001) (fired educational pastor's defamation claim dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1791, 152 L.Ed.2d 650 (2002). But see Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993) (court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defamation and interference with contract claims in a dispute between a pastor (who had not been hired) and a church official because those claims did not require resolution of a church dispute or the determination of the pastor's qualifications); Joiner v. Weeks, 383 So.2d 101, 102 (La.Ct.App.1980) (court noted that it had found subject matter jurisdiction on previous appeal (unpublished opinion) because the former minister plaintiff had alleged defamation which was a quasi-offense under the Louisiana code). In most of these cases, the alleged defamatory statements did not overtly express any religious principles or beliefs, but all the actions resulted from conflicts confined within the churches involved. Yaggie, supra, 860 F.Supp. at 1198; cf. Conley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 85 Cal.App.4th 1126, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 (2000) (court had jurisdiction over intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims where an allegedly defamatory letter had been published in the local newspaper); Hayden v. Schulte, 701 So.2d 1354 (La.Ct.App.1997) (jurisdiction existed for defamation claim of applicant for pastor status where alleged defamation had been intentionally disseminated outside the church). Furthermore, the courts found that it was impossible to consider the plaintiffs' allegations of defamation in isolation, separate and apart from the church[s'] decision to terminate [the plaintiffs'] employment. Jae-Woo Cha, supra, 553 S.E.2d at 516; c.f. Marshall v. Munro, supra, 845 P.2d at 424 (jurisdiction existed because resolution of claims did not involve examination of church's determination of pastor's qualifications). Questions of truth, falsity, malice, and the various privileges that exist often take on a different hue when examined in the light of religious precepts and procedures that generally permeate controversies over who is fit to represent and speak for the church. Downs, supra, 683 A.2d at 812. Examining such controversies is precisely the kind of inquiry that is forbidden to civil courts since [w]hose voice speaks for the church is per se a religious matter. Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1357 (internal punctuation omitted). This is not to say that religious organizations are immune from all tort claims arising out of employment decisions relating to their pastors. Torts such as battery, false imprisonment or conversion probably would fall within the exception to church immunity set out in Sherbert because they pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S. at 403, 83 S.Ct. at 1793; see also Higgins, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at 1168, 1176, 258 Cal.Rptr. 757. It is also conceivable that torts such as defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy might be so unusual or egregious as to fall within the Sherbert exception. For example, a potentially defamatory charge of child molestation might be actionable under the Sherbert exception. See, e.g., Hayden, supra, 701 So.2d at 1356 ([W]here child molestation is at issue, it cannot be considered just an internal matter of Church discipline or administration.). In light of all the foregoing, we hold that constitutional protections afforded by the Free Exercise clause (prohibiting civil court interference in disputes between ministers and churches) extend to defamation claims, when: (1) such a claim flows entirely from an employment dispute between a church and its pastor so that consideration of the claim in isolation from the church's decision as to the pastor is not practical, (2) the alleged publication is confined within the church, and (3) there are no unusual or egregious circumstances. This, then, is the outline of the constitutional shadow on our subject matter jurisdiction over such defamation cases. Since, as we noted above, a District of Columbia court does not have jurisdiction to hear claims when the First Amendment casts a shadow over the court's subject matter jurisdiction unless the plaintiff pleads unqualified jurisdictional facts that clearly take the case outside the constitutional bar, Bible Way Church, supra, 680 A.2d at 430, we now look to see if, in his complaint, Johnson has specifically and unequivocally plead[ed] all facts necessary to establish the court's jurisdiction. Id. There is no question that the defamation claim flows entirely from employment dispute so that consideration of the claim in isolation is impossible. The manual was published during the pendency of Johnson's wrongful eviction suit against the church and while Johnson was holding himself out as the pastor of Mt. Airy. The manual documents the grievances against Johnson and the attempts the congregation had made to remove Johnson as pastor of Mt. Airy. As noted earlier, Mt. Airy had formally adopted Hiscox's Principles and Practices for Baptist Churches as its guide for internal procedures. Hiscox provides that the final action of a Church, as to an accused minister, may take any one of the following forms: ... c. That of withdrawal of fellowship from him as a minister of the Gospel, with a declaration that in their opinion he is unworthy of, and unfit to continue in, the ministerial office. Hiscox, supra, pp. 211-212 (emphasis added). The manual is the declaration required by Hiscox. It is essentially a record of the church congregation's ecclesiastical indictment of Johnson and a declaration, pursuant to the religious doctrine of Mt. Airy, that Johnson was not fit to continue as Mt. Airy's pastor. This means that any analysis of the possible defamatory nature of the manual would require us to examine the reasons for Mt. Airy's dismissal of Johnson as pastor. This is the sort of inquiry forbidden to us since we are constitutionally bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization ... on matters of ... internal organization. Serbian, supra, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. Whose voice speaks for the church is per se a religious matter. Minker, supra, 894 F.2d at 1357 (internal punctuation omitted). Johnson's complaint cites only specific statements from the manual as defamatory, thereby implying that the court should not consider the manual as a whole, but only those statements. This further implies that the court could analyze these statements without reference to Mt. Airy's reasons for dismissing Johnson. But if we were to treat these implications as specific and unequivocal facts, we are bound by our prior rulings, which teach us that in determining whether any publication is defamatory, the publication must be considered as a whole, in the sense it would be understood by the readers to whom it was addressed. Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 989 (D.C.1984). [A] statement in [the manual] may not be isolated and then pronounced defamatory, or deemed capable of a defamatory meaning. Rather, any single statement or statements must be examined within the context of the entire [manual]. Klayman v. Segal, 783 A.2d 607, 614 (D.C.2001). Thus the defamation claim requires consideration of the entire manual. This a court may not do because, as we have already noted, it is impossible to analyze the entire manual without reference to the clerical employment dispute. Although Johnson claims inappropriate publication of the manual, he never denotes to whom it was published, and certainly never alleges publication to anyone other than the members of Mt. Airy. [6] This generalized claim of publication simply does not meet the Bible Way Church standard for specific and unequivocal pleading of jurisdictional facts that would take us outside the strictures on our jurisdiction. Although he specifically cites several accusations of misconduct contained in the manual, Johnson makes no claim that the alleged defamation involved unusual or egregious circumstances. The accusations Johnson cites appear to be little more than a cataloguing of Mt. Airy's perceived grievances against Johnson. Even if some of the language may be overwrought in the view of some, none of it is noticeably unusual or egregious. Accusations of misconduct, discussions of that misconduct within the church, and the emotional distress and exaggerated language that accompany such activities seem to us to be unavoidable parts of the difficult process by which dissatisfied churches end employment relationships with their pastors. Again, Johnson has failed to make his allegations with the specificity required by Bible Way. [7] Since Johnson failed to plead specific and unequivocal facts that would take the court out of the constitutional stricture on its jurisdiction, he has not survived the Trustees' factual attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court erred in denying the Trustees' motion to dismiss. Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss.