Opinion ID: 2538584
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Possibility of an Impaired Defense

Text: We now turn to the third and most important interest bearing on prejudice: the possibility that the defense will be impaired. As we recently stated in Miller v. Commonwealth, speculative and generic claims are insufficient to support a claim of prejudice. 283 S.W.3d 690, 702-03 (Ky.2009); see also Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345 (Conclusory claims about... the possibility of an impaired defense are not sufficient to show prejudice.). Accordingly, Appellant must demonstrate actual prejudice. Appellant claims that his incarceration impeded his ability to pursue and investigate his defense that another man, Joseph Pelfrey, committed the robbery. Toward the end of June 2009nine months after his arrest and just weeks before his scheduled trialAppellant told police that Pelfrey had come to his home and confessed to robbing K.D.'s. Appellant stated that Pelfrey had come to a residence he was at directly after committing the robbery to buy Oxycontin. Deputies from the sheriffs department investigated this claim and interviewed Pelfrey on July 13, 2009. [12] It is Appellant's contention, apparently, that Pelfrey would trust Appellant, and only Appellant, enough to confess to the robberythat the fact that Pelfrey did not confess to the sheriffs deputies is of no consequence, and that it would have been futile for the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) to pursue an investigation. Thus, he argues, his incarceration and his curfew condition on bond prejudiced him to the extent that he was hindered from investigating Pelfrey. We find this argument to be without merit. Appellant was not precluded from interviewing Pelfrey while out on bond, but he never did. The investigators at the DPA were not precluded from interviewing Pelfrey, but they never did. Appellant's attorney apparently never followed up on Appellant's allegation that Pelfrey confessed to the robbery. There is nothing in the record to show these failures to investigate an alternative suspect were hampered by Appellant's incarceration and subsequent bond conditions. In short, this is a conclusory claim about the possibility of an impaired defense. Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345. As stated above, speculative and generic claims are insufficient to support a claim of prejudice. Miller, 283 S.W.3d at 702. In sum, Appellant suffered some prejudice by his twenty-month incarceration; however, any prejudice suffered thereby is outweighed by the fact that all but three weeks of his twenty months in jail is attributable to Appellant violating the conditions of his bond. Moreover, Appellant failed to show any unusual anxiety and concern necessary for a finding of a violation of that interest. Finally, Appellant suffered no actual prejudice to his ability to prepare a defense. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in Appellant's favor. Having considered each Barker factor individually, we must now weigh them together. First, the delay in bringing Appellant's case to trial was presumptively prejudicial, and sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. However, Appellant was responsible for half of the delay, so the reasons-for-delay factor weighs neither for nor against him. Although he repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial (the third Barker factor), he was not prejudiced in any meaningful way by his incarceration (the fourth Barker factor): (1) he must bear the burden of any prejudice assumed by a twenty-month incarceration, as his behavior accounts for all but three weeks of the twenty months he spent in jail; (2) he made no showing of unusual anxiety and concern; and (3) he suffered no actual prejudice to his ability to prepare a defense. Based on the foregoing, after balancing all four Barker factors, we conclude that Appellant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated.