Opinion ID: 626081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality of Order

Text: We must independently ascertain whether we have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 358 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004). We have jurisdiction to hear appeals from all final decisions of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by appeal. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). There is no traditional final decision or judgment here. Instead, the court entered a stay pending the Section 638 reference. [A] stay is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes of § 1291. ... Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). However, courts will in limited circumstances permit immediate appeal if the stay order effectively puts the plaintiff out of courtcreating a substantial possibility there will be no further proceedings in the federal forum, because a parallel proceeding might either moot the action or become res judicata on the operative question. See id. (noting this usually occurs with cases under  Colorado River [2] , abstention, or a closely similar doctrine); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1102-03 (9th Cir.2005) (stay appealable where bankruptcy court proceeding might moot action); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 911-13 (9th Cir.1993) (stay appealable where court stayed action under Colorado River doctrine). But here, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the reference puts them out of court. The principal cases on which Plaintiffs rely to support this claim involve parallel proceedings. That is not the case here. There is no ongoing, separate court proceeding; rather, it is this very same proceeding which has been referred, not to state court, but to a non-jury proceeding before a referee. A decision by the referee cannot possibly moot this action or be res judicata; rather, it will supply a statement of decision under § 638(a), the basis for the currently nonexistent final judgment. Plaintiffs nonetheless argue they have been effectively put out of court because there will be no further merits review by the district court. Although they are correct that with consensual references under Section 638, the decision of the referee... must stand as the decision of the court, and ... judgment may be entered thereon in the same manner as if the action had been tried by the court, Cal. Code Civ. P. § 644, the California reference statutes also state that the decision of any such referee may be excepted to and reviewed in like manner as if made by the court. Id. § 645. The reference is thus not the effective end of these proceedings, because the case may be reviewed by the district court upon a motion for new trial or other post-judgment motions. See, e.g., Kajima Engineering & Constr., Inc. v. Pac. Bell, 103 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1401, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 464 (2002) ([G]eneral reference `preserve[s] the court's power regarding new trial motions and other postjudgment remedies.') ( quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 69 Cal.App.4th 709, 716, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 (1999)); Estate of Bassi, 234 Cal.App.2d 529, 540, 44 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1965) ([I]n any event the court had power to review the matter on motion for new trial even if it were a general reference.); see also Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 42 Cal.2d 719, 722-23, 269 P.2d 3 (1954) (referee's decision may be attacked through a motion for new trial in referring court); Calderwood v. Pyser, 31 Cal. 333, 337 (1866) (it is within referring court's power to set aside a referee's erroneous conclusions of law and to direct a proper judgment on the facts found). Plaintiffs suggest in a footnote that a motion for new trial is properly made before the Section 638 referee rather than the referring court, citing Clark v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 216 Cal.App.3d 606, 623-25, 265 Cal.Rptr. 41 (1989). However, in Clark, the parties had expressly stipulated that the referee's decision would be a complete and final adjudication of the matter. Id. at 623, 265 Cal.Rptr. 41. Here, the Agreement makes no mention of the finality of the referee's decision. Furthermore, even Clark acknowledged that, under Calderwood, the referring court would still have the authority to set the judgment aside and correct errors of law. Id. at 625, 265 Cal.Rptr. 41. Also unavailing is the Plaintiffs' claim that the district court contemplated no further proceedings. Although the court's order quoted the California Code provision that the referee's judgment must stand as the decision of the court, it also quoted the provision that such decision may be excepted to and reviewed as would any other court decision. Cal.Code Civ. P. § 645. That the district court stayed the proceeding rather than dismissing it tells us it expects further involvement. In any event, as discussed further below, appeal of the merits would also eventually lie in this court upon entry of a final judgment in district court. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs fail to explain how the reference puts them effectively out of court, we decline to treat the order as sufficiently final to permit immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.