Opinion ID: 2543899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of Statutory Remedies

Text: [¶ 28] Jensen contends that the trial court erred by refusing to award the statutory remedies allowed by Wyo. Stat. Ann § 27-4-104 (LexisNexis 2001). That statute reads: (a) Whenever an employee quits the service or is discharged, the employee shall be paid whatever wages are due him in lawful money of the United States of America, or by check or draft which can be cashed at a bank, within five (5) working days of the date of termination of employment. The employer may offset from any monies due the employee as wages, any sums due the employer from the employee which have been incurred by the employee during his employment. This section does not apply to the earnings of a sales agent employed on a commission basis and having custody of accounts, money or goods of his principal where the net amount due the agent may not be determinable except after an audit or verification of sales, accounts, funds or stocks. (b) Whenever an employee who has quit or has been discharged from service has cause to bring suit for wages earned and due, and shall establish in court the amount which is justly due, the court shall allow to the plaintiff interest on the past due wages at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date of discharge or termination, together with a reasonable attorney fee and all costs of suit. Prosecution of a civil action to recover unpaid wages does not preclude prosecution under W.S. 27-4-105. [¶ 29] Generally, in Wyoming attorney fees are the responsibility of each party. These fees are only recoverable from the opposing party when expressly provided for by statute or contract. Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Savings Bank, 954 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo.1998). In this case, the relevant statute, § 27-4-104, allows for the payment of reasonable attorney fees when an employee shall establish in court the amount which is justly due (emphasis added). [¶ 30] Jensen was awarded contract damages, but he did not establish that any or all of these contract damages amount to wages justly due. At trial, Jensen presented evidence consistent with amounts that he asked for in his closing arguments. In closing argument, Jensen's attorney requested $32,592.44 for lost wages, $1,053.20 for the move from Denver to Cody, $2,087.52 for the move from Cody back to Denver, $10,928 for the loss on the sale of his home in Denver prior to moving to Cody, and $19,494 for loss on the sale of his home in Cody after he moved back to Denver. Thereafter, the jury awarded a lump sum of $20,496. [¶ 31] Clearly, Jensen was seeking contract damages above and beyond past due wages, as the damages related to losses on the sale of his homes or moving expenses after Jensen resigned from Fremont do not qualify as wages in accordance with the wage statute. [3] Proceedings that are outside the scope of the wage claim statute, although related to employment, do not allow for recovery of attorney fees. NL Indus., Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo.1989). Moreover, in NL Indus. we found that expenses incurred in defending a separate suit brought by the employer will not support an award of attorney fees. Id. In Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 812 (Wyo.1984), we determined that when a party failed to establish in court that wages were justly due, he cannot recover attorney fees pursuant to § 27-4-104. It is pure speculation to consider that the contract damages awarded in Jensen's favor were exclusively wages covered under the wage payment statute. Jensen failed to present any evidence to the district court which clarified this issue. [¶ 32] Additionally, the jury was given a special verdict form prior to deliberation. This form did not provide for a segregation of damages pertaining to wages from any non-wage contract losses, and Jensen did not object to the use of this form. Jensen knew from the date of asserting his counterclaim that he ultimately would be asking for an award of attorney fees. It would have been simple enough for Jensen to request that these claims be separated on the verdict form. Had Jensen done so, wages justly due would have been established for the court. [¶ 33] Furthermore, even if we were to speculate that the damage award was comprised entirely of back due wages, Jensen would still not have met his requisite burden of proof. Jensen's submitted evidence for an award of attorney fees combined all wage and non-wage claims. This Court has repeatedly held that segregation of fees between multiple clients and/or multiple claims is required when it is possible. Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 952 (Wyo.2000) (citing Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Air Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 925 (Wyo.1989); Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Wyo.1988)). Implicit in this directive is the requirement that a party must show segregation is impossible before he may recover for claims for which there is no authorization of fee shifting. Jensen made no attempt to show that segregation of the fees for each claim was impossible. [4] As the district court recognized, wages justly due and the amount spent on each claim were never established. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to deny recovery of statutory attorney fees. [¶ 34] Jensen also contends that the district court erred in denying each of the remedies allowed by the statute because the claim was unliquidated. One of the district court's stated reasons for denying the claim was The Jensen claim was unliquidated. While the statute does not explicitly require a liquidated claim, as stated previously, the statute does require that the remedies be provided upon establishment of wages justly due. Damages are liquidated if they are certain or by computation made certain. Blittersdorf v. Eikenberry, 964 P.2d 413, 416 (Wyo.1998). Here, the amount asserted by Jensen is unliquidated in the sense that we are uncertain as to what the figure for wages justly due is. For instance, according to the statute eighteen percent interest is to be applied to past due wages from the date of discharge. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104(b). In this case, the amount to which interest may be applied cannot be calculated with a simple mathematical calculation. Therefore, the claim of Jensen is unliquidated because uncertainty still exists as to the exact amount of wages past due. Hence, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the award of interest to Jensen in these circumstances. [¶ 35] Finally, costs were unknown at common law. Costs, therefore, were never awarded to either party. Costs may only be recovered if authorized by statute and then may be awarded only to parties to the litigation in amounts supported by evidence as having been incurred and reasonable. Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 712 (Wyo.1987). Again, the applicable statute provides for all costs of suit, to be awarded, but as we look to the plain language of the statute, we note that the suit referred to is the suit for wages earned and due. As indicated previously, this suit encompassed more than simply wages earned and due. [¶ 36] We have the same problem with Jensen's request for an award of costs as his request for an award of attorney fees. Besides not establishing the amount of wages justly due, Jensen has not segregated the costs associated with the wage claim from those associated with non-wage claims. Again, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny all costs of suit in this circumstance.