Opinion ID: 2595083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Court's Restriction on Defendant's Cross-examination of Prosecution Witnesses

Text: Defendant claims the trial court improperly restricted his cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses, thereby violating state law as well as the state and federal Constitutions. Specifically, he argues he should have been permitted to ask questions on three subjects: whether the prosecution made offers of leniency in exchange for the testimony of witness Ybarra; whether Ybarra was using drugs at the time he testified; and whether Ybarra had information about the murder of Esther Alvarado before he told deputies that he had heard defendant, Alfredo Padilla, and Brenda Prado conspiring to commit the crime. We address each of these claims below.
The defense theory was that prosecution witness Ybarra had falsely implicated defendant in the murder of Esther Alvarado so he would not be prosecuted for the theft of Johnny Alvarado's lawn mower. Both Ybarra and Holly Berrett, Chief Deputy in the Stanislaus County District Attorney's Office, testified that no such agreement had been made. Berrett explained that Ybarra had not been charged with the theft because, although Ybarra was initially a suspect, Detective Nirschl had concluded after further investigation that Ybarra's brother Gilbert had stolen the lawn mower without Ybarra's help. During defendant's cross-examination of Ybarra, this exchange occurred: Q: So now when you had been talking with Detective Nirschl were you worried at all about being charged with receiving stolen property, helping to sell stolen property? A: No sir. Q: You hadn't thought about that one? A: I wasn't worried. Q: You weren't worried because your brother was going to say it was all his doing, right? The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to this question as argumentative. Defendant argues the trial court should have overruled the objection, claiming it unfairly restricted his attempt to show that Ybarra's lack of concern was based on an undisclosed deal with the prosecution. We disagree. Ybarra had already testified that he did not steal the lawn mower, and that he had told his brother not to blame him for the theft. Defendant merely asked whether Ybarra believed his brother would admit that he stole the lawn mower without Ybarra's help, a question which had little or no bearing on whether the prosecution had made a deal with Ybarra. Later, when defendant tried to ask Detective Nirschl whether he considered Ybarra's apology to Johnny Alvarado for the theft of his lawn mower to be evidence that Ybarra had participated in the crime, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection that the question called for a conclusion. The court also sustained the prosecutor's relevancy objection when defendant asked Detective Nirschl whether Detective DeLeon, who had also talked to Ybarra, was excited when he commented to Nirschl that Ybarra's statement provided grounds for charging defendant with a financial gain special circumstance. Defendant argues these questions were proper because they were likely to elicit evidence tending to show that the two detectives believed that Ybarra had participated in the theft of the lawn mower and that they had an incentive to make a bargain with him. The questions, however, were only marginally relevant to the underlying issue of whether the prosecution actually had such an agreement with Ybarra. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court should have overruled the prosecutor's objections, the error was harmless under any standard of prejudice.
In an effort to show that prosecution witness Ybarra was still using heroin at the time he testified, defense counsel, who apparently noticed Ybarra's sniffling, asked on cross-examination whether he had a cold. When Ybarra blamed the sniffles on the weather, counsel asked if he was still using heroin; Ybarra replied he was not. Counsel then asked if Ybarra got sniffles when he used heroin. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the last question as argumentative. Three days later, still during cross-examination, counsel asked if Ybarra still had a cold. The prosecutor objected without stating a ground, and the trial court sustained the objection. In sustaining these two objections, defendant argues, the trial court deprived him of the opportunity to undermine Ybarra's testimony by showing that he was using drugs when he testified. We disagree. Ybarra had denied he was using drugs, and the questions by the defense were purely rhetorical, implying that Ybarra's sniffles were a result of drug use, not a cold, and that by insisting on the latter Ybarra was lying. Moreover, even if the trial court should have permitted the questions, the error was harmless, because the jury knew that Ybarra had used drugs in the past, and whether he was using them at the time of trial was only tangentially relevant to his veracity as a witness.
Defense counsel asked prosecution witness Ybarra on cross-examination whether the people in Grayson were talking about [Alvarado's murder] a lot on the day after it took place. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's relevancy objection. Defendant insists the question was relevant and should have been allowed. He explains that if the residents of Grayson were talking about Alvarado's murder, Ybarra could thus have learned details about the murder from them, instead of through a conversation among defendant, Padilla, and Prado, that Ybarra claimed to have overheard. Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant is correct, the error was harmless. Ybarra testified that he had heard about the killing from Esther Alvarado's brother and a friend and that he had read about it in the newspaper. Thus, the jury knew Ybarra could have learned details of the murder from these sources; whether he had also discussed it with other people in Grayson was of minimal significance.
Defendant asserts that by sustaining the above-discussed prosecutorial objections to his cross-examination of prosecution witnesses Ybarra and Detective Nirshl, the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) We disagree. The confrontation clause allows `trial judges ... wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.' ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 656, fn. 3, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705, quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674; see also People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1047, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Here, the challenged rulings all pertained to marginally relevant matters; defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Ybarra to probe his veracity.