Opinion ID: 2361881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sheriff's Sales

Text: A sheriff's sale falls into one of the three categories of forced sales under the Maryland Rules. The Court of Special Appeals examined the three categories in Fowler v. Fitzgerald, 82 Md.App. 166, 570 A.2d 866 (1990), when Judge Wilner, then on that court, wrote: A forced sale of real property can occur in three principal settings: through foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust; through a judicial sale; and through a sheriff's sale pursuant to a writ of execution or garnishment. The legal bases for these respective proceedings are quite different, and so are some of the procedures attending them. In the case of a judicial sale, such as a tax sale or a sale in lieu of partition, and in the case of a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a power contained in the mortgage, the court itself is regarded as the vendor, and the trustee conducting the sale is considered to be the court's agent. That is the historical, and practical, reason why the trustee must report to the court and the court must, in the end, ratify the sale. The procedures governing foreclosure sales are set forth in Ch. 1100, Subt. W of the Md. Rules; those governing judicial sales appear in Subt. BR of that Chapter. A sheriff's sale, under traditional common law theory, arises in a different legal setting. As noted in Rorer, Judicial and Execution Sales § 46 (1873), quoted with approval in McCartney v. Frost, supra, 282 Md. 631 at 636, 386 A.2d 784. `In making ordinary execution sales, simply by virtue of his office, the sheriff or marshal acts as the ministerial officer of the law, not as the organ of the court. He is not its instrument or agent, as in judicial sales, and the court is not the vendor. His authority to sell rests on the law and on the writ, and does not, as in judicial sales, emanate from the court. The functions of the court terminate at the rendition of the judgment, except where confirmation of the sale is the practice. The court does not direct what shall be levied or sold, or how the sale shall be made. The law is the officer's only guide.' Id. at 173-74, 570 A.2d at 869-70 (footnote omitted) (some internal citations omitted); see 91st Street Joint Venture v. Goldstein, 114 Md.App. 561, 577-78, 691 A.2d 272, 280-81 (1997). We noted in Buckeye Development Corp. v. Brown & Shilling, Inc., 243 Md. 224, 220 A.2d 922 (1966), that: The sale of an interest in land under a writ of fieri facias [6] at common law was impossible because of the inhibitions inherent in feudal tenure. An exception was provided, in Maryland and certain other colonies, by the Statute of 5 Geo. II, c. 7, which allowed the sheriff to deliver the debtor's land to the creditor under the writ of elegit. The present power of sheriffs to sell land under writs of fieri facias is derived from Chap. 160, § 1 of the Acts of 1810, now Code, Art. 83, § 1 (and virtually unchanged). Hartogenis, Maryland Statutory Modification of the Common Law of Real Property, 1 M.L.Rev. 238, 244 (1937). Id. at 229, 220 A.2d at 925. Moreover, a sheriff's sale can, and often does, convey just as strong a title as regular conveyances, and so long as there are no irregularities in the manner of the sale and the purchaser is a bona fide purchaser not involved in fraud, titles derived from sheriff's sales have overcome actual fraudulent conduct on the part of prior record holders of title. The old case of Boring v. Lemmon, 5 H. & J. 223 (1821), involved an unique case of land patent fraud, and the subsequent holding of a sheriff's sale on a writ of fieri facias, that apparently wiped out the taint of the prior fraud. A man named Singery, during the process of attempting to patent a portion of land, caused a survey to be made. After the certificate of survey was furnished him, he altered the metes and bounds description (by inserting a call for the beginning of Petticoat's Loose,) as to make it embrace the whole of the lands afterwards included in Boring's Habitation Rock and in 1775 used the altered certificate of survey to obtain a patent from the Lord Proprietor. Id. at 223. The description, as altered, and the patent as issued to Singery, erroneously included the land known as Boring's Habitation Rock. Subsequently, in 1795, Boring brought an action in ejectment against Singery and, at the trial court level, received a judgment against him in 1799. Singery appealed and the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded by writ of procedendo. [7] At the retrial, Singery obtained a judgment against Boring. While the original proceeding arising out of the original trial was being addressed on appeal, Boring, in the name of the Attorney General, had filed a second suit against Singery, alleging Singery's fraud in altering the certificate of survey to the land Singery patented. While the second case against Singery was pending, Singery obtained a judgment for costs relating to the reversal arising out of Singery's appeal of the first case. Singery then caused a writ of fieri facias to issue to the sheriff, based on the judgment for costs. The sheriff then levied on Boring's property, Boring's Habitation Rock. Boring was then living in Pennsylvania and was unaware that Singery had caused the writ to issue. The property, Boring's Habitation Rock, was sold at a sheriff's sale in 1806. Lemmon bought it, delivered the purchase price to the sheriff, who passed it on to Singery. The sheriff then made a return certifying that the property had been purchased at a sheriff's sale by Lemmon. Lemmon then took possession of the property. In the meantime, the second suit between Boring and Singery, brought by Boring, in the name of the Attorney General, was proceeding. Ultimately, Boring prevailed and Singery, in 1809, was directed to convey so much of Boring's Habitation Rock that had been included in the 1775 fraudulent certificate of survey to Boring. In 1812, Singery made the conveyance. At that point, both Boring, as a result of the 1809 decree and deed, and Lemmon, as a result of the 1806 purchase at the sheriff's sale and the sheriff's return, claimed the property. Boring filed suit to eject Lemmon. The Court, finding for Lemmon, held that: The Court are also of opinion, that the legal estate in Boring's Habitation Rock being vested in Ezekiel Boring at the time the fieri facias [resulting from the assessment of costs against Boring in the first appeal, which he lost] was levied on said land, the same was transferred by the sale of the sheriff to the vendee, Thomas Lemmon, by operation of law. Id. at 226. This Court has further examined the duty that a sheriff has when conducting a sheriff's sale in Buckeye Development Corp., 243 Md. at 229-30, 220 A.2d at 925, when we stated that: While the only reason for a sale by the sheriff under the writ of fieri facias is to accomplish a satisfaction of the judgment, the sale should be so conducted as to promote competition and to secure the best price. Judge Raine (the trial judge) felt the sheriff is entrusted with a certain amount of discretion in conducting execution sales and it must be conceded that this is generally true. Nevertheless, whatever may be the limits of that certain amount of discretion it must be fairly and impartially exercised for the benefit of all concerned. Ordinarily the sheriff may follow the reasonable directions of the judgment creditor but he should be at all times aware that he is not merely the servant of the creditor and that the debtor may have interests which he has a duty to protect. Indeed, in some circumstances, the bidders at the sale may be drawn within the purlieus of his duty to be fair and impartial. [Emphasis added.] The procedures a sheriff is to follow in conducting a sheriff's sale are found in the Maryland Rules and Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.), sections 11-501 through 11-513 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The relevant portions for the case sub judice are contained in Maryland Rule 2-644(b) and Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.), section 11-502(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. [8] Maryland Rule 2-644(b) states: Rule 2-644. Sale of property under levy. (b) Notice of sale. The sheriff shall give notice of the time, place, and terms of the sale. The notice shall be posted on the courthouse door or on a bulletin board in the immediate vicinity of the door of the courthouse and published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the property is located at least (1) ten days before the sale of an interest in personal property or (2) 20 days before the sale of an interest in real property. When the property under levy is perishable, the sheriff may sell the property with less notice or with no notice, if necessary to prevent spoilage and loss of value. [Emphasis added.] Section 11-502(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states: § 11-502. Notice of sale by sheriff. (a) Required.  A sheriff shall give notice of the time, place, and term[s] of the sale of any property under execution before the property can be sold. [Emphasis added.] In the case sub judice, the notice given by the sheriff provided the time, place, and terms of the sale as required by Maryland Rule 2-644(b) and section 11-502(a). The problem with the notice was that it also misrepresented information not required by the Maryland Rules or the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The notice provided a list of nine encumbrances and also stated that: MORTGAGES AND OR JUDGMENTS DUE: $17,240.00 plus interest. The sheriff had no duty to provide this last information and the notice failed to include in that MORTGAGES AND OR JUDGMENTS DUE section a mortgage against the real property in the amount of $105,761.04. Respondent relied on the amount listed on the notice when bidding on the property. The threshold question before us is whether the misrepresentation in the notice was unfair to bidders and, thus, grounds to have the sale set aside or whether the misrepresentation is merely surplusage and does not provide grounds to have the sale set aside.