Opinion ID: 1653930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court's imposition of dismissal as a sanction.

Text: ¶ 26. Having decided the trial court was correct in finding Scoggins's conduct warranted some sanction, we now turn to the question of the appropriateness of the trial court's sanction. Scoggins argues the trial court's decision to impose the death penalty of dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for her discovery violations was an abuse of discretion. This Court recently addressed the question of when dismissal is an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation by stating: We have repeatedly held dismissal is to be used as a sanction only as a last resort. `Lower courts should be cautious in either dismissing a suit or pleadings or refusing to permit testimony.... The reason for this is obvious. Courts are courts of justice not of form. The parties should not be penalized for any procedural failure that may be handled without doing violence to court procedures.' Caracci [ v. International Paper Co. ], 699 So.2d [546,] 556 [(Miss. 1997)] ( quoting Clark v. Mississippi Power Co., 372 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Miss. 1979)). Robert v. Colson, 729 So.2d 1243, 1247-48 (Miss.1999). ¶ 27. In appropriate circumstances under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, trial courts may impose sanctions by dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof. Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Such dismissals by the trial court are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. When this Court reviews a decision that is within the trial court's discretion, it first asks if the court below applied the correct legal standard. If the trial court applied the right legal standard, then this Court will affirm a trial court's decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors. Pierce v. Heritage Properties, Inc., 688 So.2d 1385, 1388 (Miss.1997) ( quoting Cooper v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 568 So.2d 687, 692 (Miss. 1990)). ¶ 28. In Pierce, this Court affirmed the trial court's imposition of dismissal as a discovery sanction under Rule 37(b)(2) & (e) and the court's inherent power to protect the integrity of the judicial process where the plaintiff willfully concealed the fact that another person was present when she was injured. Pierce, 688 So.2d at 1387. The plaintiff in Pierce submitted false responses to various discovery requests and swore to false testimony in depositions. Id. at 1390. Pierce admitted her misconduct only after she discovered the defendant uncovered the truth. Id. ¶ 29. In Pierce, this Court adopted the position of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.1985), for evaluating the appropriateness of dismissal as a sanction: First, dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with the court's order results from wilfulness or bad faith, and not from the inability to comply. Dismissal is proper only in situations where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions. Another consideration is whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client, or when a party's simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court's orders. Pierce, 688 So.2d at 1389 ( quoting Batson, 765 F.2d at 514 (citations omitted)). ¶ 30. Applying the facts of the case sub judice and the trial court's findings to the requirements listed in Pierce, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Scoggins's suit with prejudice: ... dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with the court's order results from wilfulness or bad faith, and not from the inability to comply.  ¶ 31. The trial court's findings that Scoggins's failure to comply with Ellzey's discovery requests was willful and that Scoggins's attempts to explain her misconduct were not credible were supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Dismissal is proper only in situations where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions.  ¶ 32. The trial court addressed the necessity of imposing dismissal as a sanction because no other sanction would achieve the deterrent value of dismissal. The trial court also described the possible effects of other, less drastic, sanctions, and it concluded no other sanction was appropriate.  Another consideration is whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced.  ¶ 33. Although in Pierce we stated there is no requirement that the defendant be substantially prejudiced by the absence of evidence in order for a sanction based on the plaintiff's discovery violation to be warranted, Pierce, 688 So.2d at 1391, the trial court did consider the prejudicial effects of Scoggins's actions. As discussed above, Ellzey was put through major inconvenience in time, attorney fees and general frustration. The trial court further stated any sanction other than dismissal would cause the Ellzey further time and expense that might never be recovered.  Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client, ... ¶ 34. The trial court specifically found there was no evidence to suggest Scoggins's attorney was responsible for any neglect. ... or when a party's simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court's orders.  ¶ 35. The trial court found Scoggins's claim of confusion and memory loss was not supported by credible evidence because the only things she failed to recall were relevant portions of her medical history. ¶ 36. Dismissal with prejudice is a sanction that should be imposed only in those rare instances where the conduct of a party is so egregious that no other sanction will meet the demands of justice. In the case sub judice, all evidence before us points to one conclusion, Mildred Scoggins wilfully submitted false answers to interrogatories and knowingly did not answer deposition questions truthfully. For these reasons, we find the trial court's dismissal of her suit against Ellzey Beverages, Inc. with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion.