Opinion ID: 4539372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Offense-Level Enhancements

Text: Ellis challenges the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) for using sophisticated means in the fraud offenses while also applying a two-level enhancement for engaging in sophisticated money laundering under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3). She contends that application of both enhancements was impermissible double-counting, and she also argues that the sophisticated money-laundering enhancement is not factually supported. We find no error. 3 The defendants contend that the district court failed to make sufficiently specific findings about the scope of conduct agreed to by the defendants. Even assuming the court’s findings were not sufficient, reversal is not required because the record amply supports the district court’s findings. See Petrie, 302 F.3d at 1290 (“[A] sentencing court’s failure to make individualized findings regarding the scope of the defendant’s activity is not grounds for vacating a sentence if the record support the court’s determination with respect to the offense conduct, including the imputation of others’ unlawful acts to the defendant.”). 17 Case: 17-14716 Date Filed: 06/05/2020 Page: 18 of 27 “Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines.” United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Ellis recognizes, the district court applied the § 2B1.1(b)(10) enhancement because of the use of sophisticated means in the commission of the fraud, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), but also because “a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States,” id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B). The enhancement under § 2B1.1 thus addresses the harm caused by international fraud schemes, while the enhancement under § 2S1.1 addresses the very different harm caused by sophisticated money laundering schemes. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) (enhancement applies if the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and “the offense involved sophisticated laundering”); id. cmt. n.5(A) (“‘[S]ophisticated laundering’ means complex or intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of the 18 U.S.C. § 1956 offense.”). And because the enhancements are premised on different conduct, the Guidelines do not prohibit application of both. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 cmt. n.5(B) (stating that the sophisticated laundering enhancement should not be applied if “the conduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under the guideline applicable to the underlying offense is the only conduct that forms the basis for 18 Case: 17-14716 Date Filed: 06/05/2020 Page: 19 of 27 application of subsection (b)(3) of this guideline”) (emphasis added). The district court therefore did not err by applying the § 2B1.1 and 2S1.1 enhancements. See United States v. Stevenson, 68 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“We presume that the Commission intended to apply separate guideline sections cumulatively unless specifically directed otherwise.”). As to Ellis’s argument that the sophisticated laundering enhancement was not factually warranted, we note that the evidence before the district court showed that the defendants laundered their funds using fictitious transactions, shell corporations, and offshore accounts. The district court therefore did not err in applying the enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 cmt. n.5(A) (“Sophisticated laundering typically involves the use of (i) fictitious entities; (ii) shell corporations; (iii) two or more levels (i.e., layering) of transactions, transportation, transfers, or transmissions, involving criminally derived funds that were intended to appear legitimate; or (iv) offshore financial accounts.”). Ellis also contends the district court erred by concluding that she qualified as a manager or supervisor and applying a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. We disagree. The enhancement applies “[i]f the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). For the 19 Case: 17-14716 Date Filed: 06/05/2020 Page: 20 of 27 enhancement to apply, “the defendant need only manage or supervise one other participant in the criminal activity. However, a section 3B1.1 enhancement cannot be based solely on a finding that a defendant managed the assets of a conspiracy, without the defendant also managing or exercising control over another participant.” United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence in this case established that Ellis supervised the creation of the counterfeit checks and gave direction to multiple conspirators and participants, including Cortese, Johnson, and Mullins. The district court therefore did not err in applying the enhancement. See id. at 1300 (“We review for clear error . . . a district court's decision to impose an aggravating-role increase . . . . Under the deferential standard of clear-error review, we will not disturb a district court’ findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Cortese contends that the district court erred by concluding that Cortese used a special skill and applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. We find no error. The enhancement applies “[i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. “‘Special skill’ 20 Case: 17-14716 Date Filed: 06/05/2020 Page: 21 of 27 refers to a skill not possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial education, training or licensing. Examples would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and demolition experts.” Id. cmt. n.4. The record before the district court was sufficient to support the conclusion that Cortese acted as an attorney when advising victims whose accounts had been frozen and when negotiating with the banks to reopen the accounts. His status as an attorney and his assurances helped lull the victims into believing that nothing was amiss, which helped conceal the fraud for as long as possible. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in finding that Cortese used his skills as an attorney when committing the offenses. See United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1219 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The district court’s legal interpretation of the term ‘special skills’ is reviewed de novo, but whether the defendant possesses a special skill under § 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.”).