Opinion ID: 764164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: eeoc authority in title vii cases

Text: 13 In order to analyze the role of the EEOC in addressing and rectifying unlawful employment practices, and in order to understand Congress' intent in balancing the implementation of the public interest and the enforcement of private rights in the context of Title VII proceedings, we must review at the outset the applicable statutory structure and legislative history of Title VII. These make clear that Title VII itself imposes or allows very few limitations on the EEOC's power to sue in federal court to eliminate, for the public benefit, unlawful employment discrimination.
14 Under Title VII, once an individual files a charge alleging unlawful employment practices, the EEOC must investigate the charge and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it is true. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1998). By filing a charge, an individual does not file a complaint seeking relief, but merely informs the EEOC of possible discrimination. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984). If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred, it must endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. If the EEOC cannot secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer, it may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1998). If the court agrees with the EEOC that the defendant-employer has intentionally engaged in unlawful discrimination, the court may order injunctive relief and such remedies as the reinstatement or hiring of employees, back pay, and compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e-5(g)(1) (1998). 15 While allowing the EEOC to bring suit against employers in federal court, Title VII retains a private cause of action--apart from any action the statute entitles the EEOC to bring--for the individual victim of employment discrimination. Where the EEOC investigates a charge and, after 180 days, either concludes that there is no reasonable cause to believe it is true or fails to make a finding of reasonable cause, the EEOC must notify the aggrieved individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1998). If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe an employer has violated Title VII but chooses not to bring suit on behalf of the federal government, the EEOC will issue a notice of right to sue on the charge to the aggrieved party. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b) (1998). Or, if after 180 days the EEOC fails to make a reasonable cause finding, the aggrieved individual may request a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See id. An individual may not file suit under Title VII if she does not possess a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir.1998). 16 Therefore, for 180 days after the filing of a charge, the EEOC retains exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of that charge. General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). This 180-day period is critical to the statutory scheme. EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir.1997). During that period, the EEOC may distinguish between those cases in which it believes it may vindicate the public interest by filing suit itself, and those in which it chooses not to file suit and instead leaves to the individual aggrieved the decision of whether to file suit in order to advance her own interests. Indeed, it is only at the termination of the 180-day period of exclusive jurisdiction that a complainant whose charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated may bring a lawsuit. See Occidental Life Ins. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). Not only does Title VII bar an aggrieved individual from suing a private employer in federal court during that period without authorization from the EEOC, see Hearst, 103 F.3d at 466, it bars an aggrieved individual from ever bringing such a suit should the EEOC choose to sue on its own. In such cases, the only right Title VII reserves to an aggrieved individual is the right to intervene in the EEOC's action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1998). 17 Moreover, an aggrieved individual may not withdraw her charge without the consent of the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1998). If the EEOC denies an individual consent to withdraw her charge, the EEOC may proceed under Title VII to prosecute its own civil action against an employer on the basis of that charge. See EEOC v. McLean Trucking, 525 F.2d 1007, 1009 & n. 2 (6th Cir.1975). Indeed, the EEOC depends on the filing of charges for notification of possible discrimination. See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 69. Consequently, courts have observed that an individual may not contract away her right to file a charge with the EEOC, as such contracts are void as against public policy. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1987); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (9th Cir.1987). Significantly, an individual may not, in an effort to effectuate her own interests, take away the enforcement authority of the EEOC even if she wishes to withdraw her charge of discrimination.
18 The legislative history surrounding the creation of this enforcement scheme sheds light on the unique nature of an EEOC action, and illustrates that Congress granted the EEOC exclusive jurisdiction over cases of unlawful employment discrimination to shift much of the responsibility of ensuring compliance with Title VII from private individuals to the EEOC. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the EEOC and authorized it merely to investigate charges of employment discrimination, and to pursue informal methods of conciliation in efforts to resolve those charges. See Pub.L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1998)). As originally enacted, the Civil Rights Act provided that the failure of such conciliation efforts would terminate the EEOC's involvement in the case and would enable the charging party to bring a private cause of action in federal court within thirty days after EEOC notification that conciliation had failed. See Pub.L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1998)). Thus, where the EEOC could not convince employers to voluntarily comply with Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prior to amendment, left the task of eradicating unlawful employment practices largely to the private initiative of the victims. 19 However, Congress realized in 1972 that the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964[was] not adequate, for the voluntary approach ... failed to eliminate employment discrimination. H. Rep. No. 92-238, at 3 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139. It seemed clear that the failure to grant the EEOC meaningful enforcement powers [had] proven to be a major flaw in the operation of Title VII. S.Rep. No. 92-415, at 4 (1971). Moreover, Congress concluded that it was essential that effective enforcement procedures be provided the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to strengthen its efforts to reduce discrimination in employment. H. Rep. No. 92-238, at 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139. Indeed, Congress expressed its concern that in the most profound cases, employers had more often than not shrugged off the [EEOC's] entreaties and relied upon the unlikelihood of the parties suing them. H. Rep. No. 92-238, at 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144. 20 Congress resolved to remedy the failure of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include effective enforcement powers by amending Title VII. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Significantly, members of Congress debating the amendments agreed that the EEOC needed additional enforcement powers. Rather, they differed on what procedures [would] insure the most effective enforcement of the substantive provisions of Title VII. H. Rep. No. 92-238, at 31, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2168. While the majority favored granting the EEOC cease-and-desist authority, the minority preferred to permit the EEOC to file actions in federal court after the failure of conciliation instead of requiring the EEOC to conduct its own hearings. See id. Ultimately, the minority view prevailed in both houses, and Congress authorized the EEOC to bring suit in federal court, after conciliation efforts have failed, to enforce Title VII against private employers. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 105. 21 Congress intended to retain a cause of action for the aggrieved individual while conferring a right of action upon the EEOC. Moreover, Congress wished to avoid duplicitous proceedings. Specifically, the House noted that: 22 The committee was concerned about the interrelationship between the newly created cease and desist enforcement powers of the Commission and the existing right of private action. It concluded that duplication of proceedings should be avoided. The bill, therefore, contains a provision for termination of Commission jurisdiction once a private action has been filed.... It contains as well a provision for termination of the right of private action once the Commission issues a complaint or enters into a conciliation or settlement agreement which is satisfactory to the Commission and to the person aggrieved. 23 H. Rep. No. 92-238, at 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2148. Accordingly, Congress ultimately created an alternative enforcement procedure allowing employees to pursue private actions once the 180-day period of exclusive EEOC jurisdiction terminates. See Occidental, 432 U.S. at 361. Still, the provision allowing a private cause of action did not change the intent of Congress that the EEOC, not private parties 'would have complete authority to decide which cases to bring to Federal district court.'  EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 & n. 12 (6th Cir.1975) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 698 (Jan. 21, 1973) (Senator Domenick)).
24 On the basis of both the clear language and legislative background of Title VII, the Court has rejected attempts to characterize the EEOC as an ordinary plaintiff, or to bind the EEOC to the procedural requirements that private litigants under Title VII face. In Occidental Life, the Court observed that the EEOC alone possesses the discretion as to how and when it shall carry out its administrative duties and thus does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties. 432 U.S. at 368. Thus, the Court held that even where the EEOC seeks monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of a single aggrieved individual, state statutes of limitations cannot bind the EEOC. See id. at 368-73. Significantly, the Court thereby rejected the notion that [i]nsofar as the EEOC seeks to recover backpay for individuals, it stands in the shoes of the individuals and is not suing in its sovereign capacity. See id. at 381 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 25 The Court again addressed a proposed limitation on the EEOC's ability to maintain an action on behalf of aggrieved individuals in General Telephone. See 446 U.S. at 318. In that case, the Court recognized that by its 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress sought to implement the public interest as well as to bring about more effective enforcement of private rights. Id. at 326. The Court further observed that congressional authorization of both a private cause of action and an EEOC cause of action suggests that the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination and that [w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. Id. Accordingly, the Court rejected the claim that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure binds the EEOC when it seeks classwide relief as it would bind a private Title VII class action litigant. 5 See id. at 322. In particular, the Court noted the fact that the EEOC may not be an adequate representative of aggrieved employees because the EEOC's obligation to secure the public interest may well conflict with individual interests. See id. at 331. 26 Similarly, numerous lower courts have acknowledged the independent authority and responsibility of the EEOC to bring suit against an employer whom the EEOC has reasonable cause to believe has engaged in unlawful employment discrimination. We ourselves have recognized that the EEOC represents the public interest when it sues to enforce Title VII, not solely the interests of the private charging parties. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d at 1359. While the EEOC acts, in some respects, as the representative of an aggrieved individual when it sues on that individual's behalf, the EEOC never ceases to represent the public interest as well. Indeed, whenever the EEOC sues in its own name, it sues both for the benefit of specific individuals and the public interest. See EEOC v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., 91 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir.1996). The EEOC may thereby, in the public interest, provide relief which goes beyond the limited interests of the charging parties. Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir.1969). 27 Therefore, the plain language of Title VII, the legislative history and purpose of the 1972 amendments, and the interpretation of the statute by courts illustrate that Congress granted to the EEOC the right to represent an interest broader than that of a particular individual when it exercises its authority to sue. To empower a private individual to take away this congressional mandate, by entering into arbitration agreements or other contractual arrangements, would grant that individual the ability to govern whether and when the EEOC may protect the public interest and further our national initiative against employment discrimination, and to thereby undo the work of Congress in its 1972 amendments. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing the EEOC's claim for monetary relief on behalf of Adams by relying on principles of preclusion and waiver, and on the FAA. Moreover, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the EEOC's claim for general injunctive relief against further racial discrimination at Frank's by impermissibly holding the EEOC to procedural requirements that restrain only private Title VII litigants.