Opinion ID: 2466689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adult certification

Text: In 2006, K.S.A. 38-1636 was repealed; thereafter, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 38-2347 has provided for the certification of juveniles as adults for prosecution. Bailey was certified as an adult on January 10, 2008, for crimes occurring in August 2007. The parties agree that K.S.A. 38-2347 controls. The factors enumerated in K.S.A. 38-1636(e) and K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 38-2347(e) are identical except for the use of juvenile in place of the word respondent. Of potentially more import, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 38-2347(f) requires that the court find from a preponderance of the evidence that the individual should be prosecuted as an adult for the offense, rather than finding that there is substantial evidence as required by K.S.A. 38-1636(f). The preponderance of the evidence standard is a more rigorous standard than substantial evidence. In re Due Process Hearing of Bailey, 233 Kan. 714, 722, 664 P.2d 1379 (1983) (quoting Town of Burlington v. Department of Ed., Etc., 655 F.2d 428, 431 [1st Cir.1981]). The statutory change applies to the standard used by the trial court, but does not change our standard of review. When a trial court considers a question of fact which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, this court's review is limited to determining whether substantial competent evidence supports the trial court's finding. See, e.g., State v. Loggins, 40 Kan.App.2d 585, 588, 194 P.3d 31 (2008) (Whether the State has met its burden to prove a prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence is a question of fact, and an appellate court's review is limited to determining whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding.); State v. Thompson, 37 Kan.App.2d 589, 593, 155 P.3d 724 (2007) (reviewing whether the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly given under a substantial evidence standard). An appellate court reviews the trial court's decision to authorize prosecution of a juvenile as an adult to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. State v. Davis, 37 Kan.App.2d 650, Syl. ¶ 10, 155 P.3d 1207 (2007) (reviewing adult certification under K.S.A. 38-1636). This court does not review the analysis of the trial court; instead, the standard of review applies to the evidence. State v. Avalos, 266 Kan. 517, 521, 974 P.2d 97 (1999). The journal entry indicates the following which support finding that the adult certification was proper: (1) the State's motion for adult prosecution was pursuant to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 38-2347; (2) Bailey did not contest the motion for adult prosecution; (3) the trial court accepted Bailey's stipulation to the motion; and (4) the trial court considered each of the statutory factors listed in K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 38-2347. The troubling part of the journal entry is the concluding language: Therefore, after considering all eight (8) factors pursuant to K.S.A. 38-1636(e), the Court finds that there is substantial evidence that the Respondent should be prosecuted as an adult for the offense(s) alleged in the amended complaint filed herein. Bailey argues that the trial court's citation of the old statute invalidates the certification for adult prosecution; however, Bailey was unable to identify any factors in the current statute which were not considered by the trial court. The State points out that Bailey did not contest the adult certification and the trial court did consider the eight statutory factors. The State also asserts that the factors considered by the court, and listed in the journal entry, are sufficient to support a finding under either the substantial evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard. In State v. Smith, 268 Kan. 222, 246, 993 P.2d 1213 (1999), this court reversed a juvenile's stipulation to adult prosecution because the trial court had not considered both the juvenile's stipulation and evidence of the eight statutory factors. But in State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 1148-50, 221 P.3d 1105 (2009), this court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider adult certification when the juvenile consented to the order and the trial court considered the eight statutory factors before waiving juvenile jurisdiction. In this case, the journal entry indicates that the trial court considered both Bailey's stipulation and the eight statutory factors before waiving juvenile jurisdiction. But the trial court apparently reviewed the factors under the wrong standard; therefore, this court will review the adult certification using the facts found by the trial court. The trial court made the following findings: (1) Bailey was 17 years old at the time of the offenses; (2) the seriousness of the alleged offenses is so great that the protection of the community requires criminal prosecution; (3) the offenses were committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (4) Bailey was charged with first-degree murder and other offenses against persons; (5) Bailey had one prior adjudication as a juvenile offender; (6) Bailey had a history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence; (7) there are no facilities or programs available which are likely to rehabilitate Bailey prior to the expiration of juvenile jurisdiction; and (8) the interests of Bailey or the community would be better served by criminal prosecution. These stipulated facts provide substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision to certify Bailey as an adult for prosecution.