Opinion ID: 773411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hostile Work Environment Harassment and Merithew's Actions

Text: 19 In dismissing his complaint, the District Court determined that Weston could not establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim based on the PDOC's failure to adequately reprimand Merithew. It concluded that the alleged discrimination was not pervasive, regular, or objectively detrimental, and that respondeat superior liability did not apply. 20 Weston alleged in his complaint that the PDOC was liable for Merithew's harassment because it failed to prevent her from assaulting him and did not adequately discipline her. This argument has no merit. Our rule envisions prompt remedial action when the hostile environment is discovered. Bouton v. BMW of N. America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994). In other words, when the source of the alleged harassment is a co-worker, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint, or, if the employer was aware of the alleged harassment, that it failed to take appropriate remedial action. Kunin, 175 F.3d at 293 (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486 (liability exists where the defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action)); see also 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(d) (1999) (employer is liable for co-worker harassment if it knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.); Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1997). 21 Under our jurisprudence, the PDOC's failure to prevent an act of co-worker harassment, in and of itself, does not end the hostile environment inquiry. After Weston officially complained about Merithew's conduct, she received a written reprimand for violating the PDOC's policies against sexual harassment. Weston does not allege that the offensive conduct continued after the reprimand. We have instructed that an effective grievance procedure -- one that is known to the victim and that timely stops the harassment -- shields the employer from Title VII liability for hostile environment. Bouton, 29 F.3d at 110. Moreover, when an employer's response stops the harassment, there can be no employer liability under Title VII. Kunin, 175 F.3d at 294 (By definition, there is no negligence if the [sexual harassment grievance] procedure is effective.) (citing Bouton, 29 F.3d at 110). The PDOC's grievance procedure was obviously known to Weston (he filed a complaint) and, by his own admission, it was effective. Liability cannot be imputed to the PDOC for Merithew's conduct or for its alleged failure to adequately reprimand her. 22 C. Hostile Work Environment and the Comments, Jokes, and Jibes of Co-workers, Managers and Inmates 23 Weston's complaint averred that the PDOC should be held liable for the comments, jokes, and jibes of inmates. In Slayton v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Serv., 206 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that, without more, objectionable conduct by prison inmates cannot, in and of itself, be a sufficient predicate for a hostile work environment claim. Id. We agree that prisoners, by definition, have breached prevailing societal norms in fundamentally corrosive ways. By choosing to work in a prison, corrections personnel have acknowledged and accepted the probability that they will face inappropriate and socially deviant behavior . Id. (citations omitted). 24 However, this is not an absolute rule. Prison liability for inmate conduct may indeed apply when, for example, the institution fails to take appropriate steps to remedy or prevent illegal inmate behavior. See id.; Waymire v. Harris County, Tex., 86 F.3d 424, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that because prison took prompt remedial action, jailer did not establish a hostile environment where a fellow jailer circulated sexually offensive inmate drawing). Moreover, we can find no authority which suggests that there is an absolute bar to Title VII liability when prison personnel encourage or instigate illegal inmate behavior . 25 Weston's complaint indicates that he was subjected to comments, jokes, and jibes by unspecified inmates. Complaint at P 18. Absent further amplification -- for instance that prison officials encouraged the inmate's comments, or that prison officials knew of the harassing conduct but failed to remedy it -- this mere allegation is insufficient to state a Title VII claim. However, Weston should have an opportunity to amend his complaint so as to make allegations, if possible, as to prison officials' instigation and/or knowledge of these events. We believe the District Court erred in not providing Weston an opportunity to amend his complaint in this fashion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2000); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976). We reverse the District Court and remand with instructions to grant Weston a specified period of time in which to amend the complaint. 26 Weston's second basis for employer liability is more complex. In his complaint, Weston alleges that he was subjected to sexually offensive comments, jokes and jibes by fellow PDOC employees, managers and inmates. Complaint at P 18. On appeal, he has argued that the PDOC is liable for the jokes of its managers and Weston's co-workers because of the PDOC's negligent response to these comments. His central argument is that the jokes, jibes, and comments continued unabated, thereby creating a hostile work environment. 27 While the Supreme Court has stated that Title VII grants employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult, Meritor Savs. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S. Ct. at 2405, it has likewise emphasized that not all workplace conduct that has sexual overtones can be characterized as forbidden harassment. See id. at 67, 106 S. Ct. at 2405-06. The alleged harassment must affect a term, condition or privilege of employment in order to fall within Title VII's purview. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed that a plaintiff must allege that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted gender discrimination. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998). The mere utterance of an epithet, joke, or inappropriate taunt that may cause offense does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII liability. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). 28 Weston's complaint includes little detail about the content of the offensive comments, jokes, and jibes. Instead, it merely claims that they were the result of Merithew's actions, and were made in retaliation for his filing of a grievance against her. See Complaint at P 18. By his own admission, the comments, jokes, and jibes were not directed at his gender. In fact, Weston's complaint fails to allege that he was targeted because of his gender. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. Furthermore, the complaint makes no allegation that the conduct altered the conditions of Weston's employment or created an abusive environment in which he had to work. See Meritor Savs. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S. Ct. at 2405-06 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 29 However, at oral argument, Weston's counsel argued that his allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss based on our liberal notice pleading requirements. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Generally, in federal civil cases, a claimant does not have to set out in detail the facts upon which a claim is based, but must merely provide a statement sufficient to put the opposing party on notice of the claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 264 (3d Cir. 2001); Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co., 144 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 1998). In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957), the Supreme Court set out the proper role of pleadings: 30 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Such simplified notice pleading is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. 31 Id. (citations omitted); see also Universe Tankships, Inc. v. United States, 528 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1975) (notice pleading requires a party only to disclose adequate information as the basis of his claim for relief.); Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1273 (3d Cir. 1974) ([A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief). 32 Dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) is inappropriate because Weston's complaint states a claim for hostile work environment and therefore provides adequate notice to the defense. Although Weston's allegations are not strong, they are nonetheless sufficient to meet our lenient standards of notice pleading. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000). Complaints need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory. Krieger v. Fadely, 341 U.S. App. D.C. 163, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 1999); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless P.L.C., 331 U.S. App. D.C. 226, 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ([A] plaintiff need not allege all the facts necessary to prove its claim.); Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 318, 73 F.3d 418, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (A complaint . . . need not allege all that a plaintiff must eventually prove . . .); Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co., 744 F.2d 354, 357-59 (3d Cir. 1984) (eschewing highly technical pleading rules, which only serve to trap the unwary practitioner, in favor of notice pleading;) accord Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 229 U.S. App. D.C. 13, 711 F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out the precise facts on which the claim is based . . . . 'Notice pleading' is sufficient.); Williams v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 232 U.S. App. D.C. 251, 721 F.2d 1412, 1418 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1983). Discrimination and other civil rights claims are clearly subject to notice pleading. Conley involved a class action by African-American railroad clerks who alleged that their union had breached its duty of fair representation and discriminated against them in violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. In reversing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint, the Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that dismissal was proper because the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination.  Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S. Ct. at 99. Thirty-five years later, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County, the Court reaffirmed Conley and rejected the suggestion that a  'heightened pleading standard' -- more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)-- should apply in civil rights cases. 507 U.S. 163, 164, 167-68, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1162, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517. 33 Therefore, although we question the merits of Weston's claim for hostile work environment due to the comments, jokes, and jibes of his co-workers and managers, he has satisfied the extremely lenient requirement of notice pleading. We will reverse the District Court and remand that portion of the case with instructions to permit further discovery. 34 We note that, at this stage of the litigation, Weston does not present the most compelling of Title VII hostile work environment claims. Were this an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we would be hard-pressed to reverse a disposition in PDOC's favor. However, this is an appeal from a 12(b)(6) dismissal and, although we consider the question to be an extremely close one, we conclude that Weston's allegations of a hostile work environment created by the remarks of co-workers and managers suffices to state a Title VII claim.