Opinion ID: 161232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Arbitration Panel's Jurisdiction to Order Abatement

Text: 31 Under Oklahoma statutes, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over many activities and properties affected by oil and gas, including construction and operation of pipelines and associated rights-of-way and related site remediation. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 52(A)(1)(h) & (A)(2); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, 139(B)(2). Amoco argues that this statute abrogates the arbitration panel's jurisdiction over the Bowens' equitable request for abatement of the hydrocarbon contamination. Amoco argues that, because the arbitration panel did not have jurisdiction to order cleanup, they exceeded their powers and acted in manifest disregard of the law. 32 We have recognized the well-settled rule that any doubt about the arbitrability of an issue should be resolved in favor of arbitration and that arbitrators have broad authority in fashioning remedies: Parties who agree to submit matters to arbitration are presumed to agree that everything, both as to law and fact, necessary to render an ultimate decision is included in the authority of the arbitrators. Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Continental Materials Corp. v. Gaddis Mining Co., 306 F.2d 952, 954 (10th Cir. 1962) ([T]he jurisdiction to make [arbitration] awards is derived from the agreement of submission . . . .). The arbitrators' power to award equitable relief is also well established. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32; accord Brown v. Coleman Co., 220 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2000). In response to the Bowens' objection to Amoco's motion to compel arbitration of all issues, Amoco arguedand the district court agreedthat the arbitration panel could grant injunctive relief and remediation, a position Amoco advocated throughout the arbitration and only now wishes to abandon. 33 Furthermore, what exclusive jurisdiction means under the Oklahoma statutes is not entirely clear. The language is the product of several 1993 amendments and no post-amendment case squarely addresses its meaning. The Bowens argue that exclusive jurisdiction only refers to the OCC's jurisdiction relative to other agencies, not courts. Case law prior to 1993 provides some support for this argument. Prior to 1993, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the OCC's exclusive jurisdiction over certain oil and gas activities was implicit in the statute and precluded other agency review. Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 742 P.2d 15, 17 (Okla. 1987). In addition, the state appellate court has concluded that a district court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nuisance claim does not prevent the [OCC] from proceeding to abate existing contamination. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. Jackson, 909 P.2d 131, 139 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added) (under pre-1993 statutes). 34 But Oklahoma courts have not yet decided that a district court lacks all jurisdiction to order a cleanup when the OCC has not yet exercised its jurisdiction. The case cited by Amoco, Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1995), does not support the conclusion that courts lack jurisdiction; the Schneberger court merely mentioned in recounting the facts of the case that the OCC had exercised its exclusive jurisdiction on pollution matters and ordered a cleanup. Id. at 849. Such a passing reference is not a statement that Oklahoma courts would conclude the statutory language forecloses their jurisdiction. 35 Furthermore, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has applied the public-rights doctrine as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in determining how to apportion jurisdiction between the OCC and the district courts. Tenneco Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 687 P.2d 1049, 1053-54 (Okla. 1984). Under the doctrine, Congress may commit 'matters arising between the Government and persons subject to its authority' to nonjudicial executive bodies but '[p]rivate-rights disputes . . . lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.' Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67, 70 (1982)). In Tenneco, the Oklahoma court recognized that the liability of one individual to another under the law is a private right and held that Tenneco sought equitable relief for a private right, which was not an attack upon the public rights function of the [OCC] i.e. to regulate and administer the conservational laws and policies of the sovereign state. Id. 36 Citing Tenneco, we have held that an action under Oklahoma law to recover damages to property and water caused by the drilling of an oil well is a private rights dispute properly within the jurisdiction of the district court. Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1989) (analyzing the question of primary jurisdiction). Although these cases do not consider the 1993 amendment to the Oklahoma statute, they are persuasive evidence that the meaning of the OCC's exclusive jurisdiction is far from clear. Furthermore, the rules under which the arbitration was conducted clearly provide that the arbitrators have the power to decide challenges to their jurisdiction. NABD, R. 8. Despite this provision, Amoco chose not to challenge their jurisdiction to order abatement before or during arbitration. We therefore hold the arbitration panel did not exceed its powers or act in manifest disregard of the law in ordering cleanup of the Bowens' property.