Opinion ID: 692007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII & the Missouri Human Rights Act

Text: 13 The following elements will establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff met applicable job qualifications; and (3) despite qualifications, plaintiff was displaced. In addition, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the adverse employment decision occurred in  'circumstances which allow the court to infer unlawful discrimination.'  Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir.1984)). 14 The moving party, Pendaflex, has met its initial burden of showing that there is a lack of evidence to support McLaughlin's case. Therefore, McLaughlin may not rely upon her pleadings but must set forth specific facts to demonstrate that she has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. McLaughlin is a female and Gumpenberger, a male, now performs what McLaughlin contends is the Parts Clerk position that she formerly held. Therefore, at issue is whether McLaughlin can meet the requirements with respect to the second, third, and fourth elements of the prima facie case-- i.e., that she was qualified for the position now held by Gumpenberger and despite her qualifications she was reassigned because she is female. 15 McLaughlin contends that her former position as Parts Clerk was not eliminated but renamed Maintenance Coordinator and is currently held by Gumpenberger. Pendaflex concedes that Gumpenberger, in the position of Maintenance Coordinator, is performing the tasks that McLaughlin formerly performed. However, the Maintenance Coordinator is also responsible for supervising the two machinists who work in the Die Shop, assisting in supervision of the Machine Shop, developing and monitoring a budget of approximately $425,000 per year, properly handling hazardous waste, and developing technical improvements such as increasing die life. Furthermore, McLaughlin concedes that Gumpenberger continues to perform some of the supervisory duties he performed prior to reorganization. Therefore, the Maintenance Coordinator position requires Gumpenberger to perform significantly different responsibilities from those McLaughlin performed as Parts Clerk. 16 McLaughlin fails to establish that she is qualified for this new Maintenance Coordinator position currently held by Gumpenberger. There is great disparity between McLaughlin's level of experience and Gumpenberger's level of experience. As Parts Clerk, McLaughlin's duties included providing parts to employees from the storeroom, ordering parts requisitioned by employees, and counting parts in inventory. In addition, she had authority to make purchases up to $250. Prior to that she performed clerical duties. Prior to reorganization Gumpenberger supervised McLaughlin and approximately eleven technicians. In his former position as Maintenance Supervisor, Gumpenberger was responsible for the maintenance of all equipment in the plant. He also had supervisory duties over the machinists in the die shop and the machine shop. He assisted with development of the maintenance department budget and was responsible for ensuring that the maintenance department remained within its budget. Furthermore, Gumpenberger's twenty-nine year plus employment history includes a significant amount of managerial, mechanical, and supervisory experience. The position of Maintenance Coordinator requires supervisory, mechanical, and administrative skills Gumpenberger possesses and McLaughlin lacks. Therefore, McLaughlin has failed to establish that she was denied a position for which she was qualified. As a result, she fails to establish the second and third elements of the prima facie case. 17 Furthermore, McLaughlin also fails to demonstrate that her reassignment occurred under circumstances that would allow the Court to infer that it was motivated by gender discrimination. If her treatment was so different from what could be expected it may give rise to an inference of gender discrimination. Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir.1994). McLaughlin may offer either direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence to support her claim. Bashara, 26 F.3d at 825. However, cursory and conclusory allegations ... are insufficient. Id. (citing Kypke v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company, 928 F.2d 285, 287 (8th Cir.1991)). 18 Although Title VII tolerates no discrimination whether subtle or otherwise, this circuit has also acknowledged that employers have wide latitude to make business decisions. [A]n employer has the right to ... assign work, to change an employee's duties, to refuse to assign a particular job, and to discharge--for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, absent intentional ... discrimination. Walker v. AT & T Phone Ctr., Inc., 995 F.2d 846, 849-50 (8th Cir.1993); Neufeld v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 335, 340 (8th Cir.1989) (recognizing that courts have no business telling [companies] how to make personnel decisions, which may be objectively or subjectively based); Smith v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719, 723 n. 3 (8th Cir.1985) (recognizing that an employer may develop arbitrary, ridiculous and even irrational policies as long as they are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct. 1273, 89 L.Ed.2d 581 (1986). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that the fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose [the employer] to Title VII liability.... Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). It is not sufficient for McLaughlin to raise an issue regarding whether it was a wise decision to transfer her. She meets her burden only if she can present evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the decision was based on her gender. This McLaughlin fails to do. 19 As evidence of discrimination, McLaughlin refers to statements allegedly made by Gumpenberger, who was her supervisor at the time the statements were made. She contends that shortly after learning of her reassignment she remarked to Gumpenberger that she thought her reassignment was because she was a woman, and Gumpenberger allegedly responded, Yes, I believe that's right. McLaughlin Dep. at 89-90. Gumpenberger indicated that he did not recall the conversation. Gumpenberger Dep. at 23. For purposes of summary judgment, we resolve this in favor of McLaughlin. 20 McLaughlin contends that discriminatory statements made by supervisors may be evidence of discriminatory intent. However, all of the cases McLaughlin relies on involved statements made by persons involved in the decision-making process. See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1323 (1994); Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir.1991); Gray v. University of Ark., 883 F.2d 1394, 1398 (8th Cir.1989); Easley v. Empire Inc., 757 F.2d 923, 930 n. 7 (8th Cir.1985). Statements made by employees not involved in the decision to relocate McLaughlin do not give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination, see Frieze v. Boatmen's Bank of Belton, 950 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir.1991), nor does the functional equivalent of a stray remark. Bashara, 26 F.3d at 824. Although Gumpenberger was informed of Pendaflex's decision to transfer McLaughlin out of the maintenance department, he did not take part in the decision-making process to eliminate the Parts Clerk position or transfer McLaughlin. Furthermore, McLaughlin acknowledges that Gumpenberger opposed her transfer out of his department. For these reasons, this remark is insufficient to infer discriminatory animus. 21 McLaughlin also alleges that the decision to transfer her despite Gumpenberger's objection is evidence of Pendaflex favoring male employees over her. Apparently she believes that, because the Project Engineer position Stump formerly held was eliminated, Stump should have been dismissed and she should have retained her previous position. However, McLaughlin fails to provide evidence that Pendaflex based this decision on gender rather than legitimate business considerations. The newly created Maintenance Engineer position, which Stump currently holds, combines some of Stump's previous duties as Project Engineer and some of the duties previously performed by Gumpenberger. For example, Stump is responsible for supervising the maintenance technicians, improvements, and upgrading plant equipment and performance. He has a master's degree in business administration and a mechanical engineering degree. Other than the alleged remark by Gumpenberger, McLaughlin offers no evidence from which it can be inferred that Pendaflex based this decision on gender rather than legitimate business interests. And stray remarks in the workplace, such as this statement, do not rise to the level necessary to create an inference of discriminatory intent. See Bashara, 26 F.3d at 824; Frieze, 950 F.2d at 541. 22 Finally, McLaughlin presents statistics that she contends show a pattern of discrimination. However, the fact that Pendaflex employs more males than females is insufficient to support this inference. McLaughlin does not present any evidence to show that this purported underselection is the result of discriminatory hiring practices. The crucial statistical questions, however, must focus on the effect of the reduction-in-force: do the statistics show that the layoffs and firings discriminated against [a protected class of] employees. Holley v. Sanyo Manufacturing, Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1167 (8th Cir.1985). In this case the statistics clearly do not support McLaughlin's contention. It is uncontested that Pendaflex underwent a plant-wide reorganization. As part of that reorganization many employees were laid off or discharged, including two males in McLaughlin's former department. McLaughlin, however, was offered her choice between two positions and continues to receive the same salary she did prior to reorganization. It is reasonable that a company faced with a reduction in force would attempt to shift its employees around to adjust to the situation. 23 Considered as a whole and in the light most favorable to McLaughlin, the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that McLaughlin was denied a position for which she was qualified on the basis of impermissible gender discrimination. McLaughlin fails to establish that she was denied a position for which she was qualified. Moreover, she fails to establish that her reassignment was motivated by gender discrimination rather than legitimate business reasons. Therefore, she has not made out a prima facie case of gender discrimination. And although McLaughlin raises additional arguments, after full consideration we find them without merit and do not discuss them here. For these reasons, we hold that the District Court properly granted Pendaflex's motion for summary judgment on this issue.