Opinion ID: 4579673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background on the legal landscape

Text: To provide context for the issue presented, it is first necessary to briefly review the law regarding the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the government’s authority to nevertheless compel unwilling individuals to provide potentially incriminating information. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Likewise, article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution provides, “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give 4 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 evidence against himself.” The federal and state provisions give the same level of protection. State v. Mendes, 180 Wn.2d 188, 194, 322 P.3d 791 (2014). “The right against self-incrimination is liberally construed.” State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 236, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996) (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951)). Therefore, the right is not limited to testimony given at a trial. Instead, it “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972) (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]he power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence.” Id. Compelled testimony may be obtained pursuant to “immunity statutes,” which provide that under certain circumstances, an unwilling person may be compelled to give information and testify as a witness, even though their statements could be incriminating. “The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.” Id. at 446. However, in order to lawfully compel a 5 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 person’s testimony without violating the Fifth Amendment, an immunity statute must grant the person immunity that is at least “coextensive with the scope of the privilege.” Id. at 449. There are three types of immunity that may be granted: “transactional” immunity, “use” immunity, and “derivative use” immunity. Id. Transactional immunity is the broadest because it “accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates.” Id. at 453. Use immunity is much narrower, protecting “only against the use of the specific testimony compelled from” the person. Id. at 450. Finally, derivative use immunity prevents the government from using “any information directly or indirectly derived from such [compelled] testimony or other information.” Id. at 453. Thus, when a person is granted derivative use immunity, the government has an “affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.” Id. at 460. In order to compel testimony without violating the Fifth Amendment, an immunity statute must provide, at a minimum, both use and derivative use immunity. Together, use and derivative use immunity “prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.” Id. at 453. However, the combination of use and derivative use 6 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 immunity still “permits prosecution if the State can show the source of its evidence is wholly independent from and untainted by the fruit of the witness’ testimony.” State v. Bryant, 146 Wn.2d 90, 98, 42 P.3d 1278 (2002) (plurality opinion). By comparison, transactional immunity “affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege” and is therefore not constitutionally required, even where a person is compelled to provide incriminating information. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. Against this background, we must consider the statute at issue here, RCW 26.44.053(2), which provides that in dependency proceedings, a court may “order the examination by a physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist, of any parent . . . if the court finds such an examination is necessary to the proper determination of the case.” Clearly, statements given at such an examination might incriminate the parent and support criminal charges against them, such that the parent may invoke the Fifth Amendment and decline to answer specific questions during the evaluation. The statute accommodates this concern by providing, “No information given at any such examination . . . may be used against such person in any subsequent criminal proceedings against such person . . . concerning the alleged abuse or neglect of the child.” RCW 26.44.053(2). This statute “speaks only of ‘use’ immunity. It does not purport to provide immunity for evidence derived from immunized statements.” In re Dependency of J.R.U.-S., 126 Wn. App. 786, 7 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 798, 110 P.3d 773 (2005). Thus, the statute provides only use immunity, not derivative use or transactional immunity. 3 The father argues that the trial court was required to go beyond the statute and grant him derivative use immunity, despite the prosecutor’s objection. In considering the father’s argument, it is important to note the specific contentions he does not make. First, he does not contend that derivative use immunity was required pursuant to Kastigar. There is no indication that the father was prevented from invoking the Fifth Amendment in response to any specific question asked at his evaluation, and he concedes that information provided at a court-ordered evaluation in the course of a dependency proceeding is not the equivalent of compelled testimony for constitutional purposes. Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 (June 30, 2020), at 5 min., 19 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org. We therefore assume, without deciding, that derivative use immunity is not constitutionally required in this context. The father also does not contend that trial courts have discretion to determine whether to grant derivative use immunity in this context on a case-bycase basis. Id. at 12 min., 47 sec. We therefore need not reach that issue. Instead, 3 No party contends that we should revisit this holding of J.R.U.-S. 8 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 we limit our analysis to the father’s position before this court, which is that “[w]here a juvenile court finds . . . that questions asked during a court-ordered evaluation or service would pose a real and substantial danger of selfincrimination, then the court can and must grant use and derivative use immunity to the parent’s statements during that evaluation or service.” Id. at 11 min., 47 sec. B. Under these circumstances, courts are not required to grant derivative use immunity over a prosecutor’s objections The scope of a court’s inherent authority is a question of law reviewed de novo. In re Dependency of A.K., 162 Wn.2d 632, 644, 174 P.3d 11 (2007). We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that where derivative use immunity is not constitutionally required, the question of whether to grant such immunity is properly left to the executive and legislative branches, not the courts. We therefore hold that the trial court was not required to grant the father’s request for derivative use immunity in this case. There is no question that legislatures have the authority to grant immunity through immunity statutes. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446. There is also no question that the executive branch, through its prosecuting attorneys, has the authority to grant immunity in individual cases. See generally Bryant, 146 Wn.2d 90. The question is whether the judiciary also has the authority to grant immunity in the absence of statutory authority and over the prosecutor’s objections. 9 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 The father contends this question has already been decided in his favor, relying primarily on State v. Decker, 68 Wn. App. 246, 842 P.2d 500 (1992). However, Decker is distinguishable in several ways that counsel against extending it to this context. In Decker, a juvenile defendant who pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault was ordered by the court to attend a psychological evaluation prior to his disposition hearing. The trial court ruled that the defendant’s attorney could not attend the evaluation, but the court also granted the defendant use and derivative use immunity for any statements made during the evaluation about unadjudicated offenses. Decker, 68 Wn. App. at 248. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the trial court was merely limiting the scope of the evaluation and attempting to fashion a means by which to protect Decker’s Fifth Amendment rights. The protective order was not an attempt to interfere with the prosecutorial function. This is especially true because there were no charges pending against Decker. Id. at 252. The father cites no case extending Decker beyond the specific facts of that case; in fact, published opinions have explicitly refused to do so. In re Dependency of Q.L.M., 105 Wn. App. 532, 544, 20 P.3d 465 (2001) (“Decker created a single narrow exception to the normal rule that granting immunity is a prosecutorial executive function.”); State v. Diaz-Cardona, 123 Wn. App. 477, 488-89, 98 P.3d 136 (2004) (same). 10 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 Moreover, this case is distinguishable. The prosecutor’s office had a pending investigation against the father at the time the trial court denied his motion for derivative use immunity, and the dependency context presents unique concerns about whether derivative use immunity would interfere with the prosecutorial function. Where a person has been granted derivative use immunity, it is not sufficient for the government to show that its witnesses gained their knowledge from an independent source. Instead, the government must bear the “heavy burden” of showing that its witnesses were not influenced to give information based on the immunized information. State v. Bryant, 97 Wn. App. 479, 491, 983 P.2d 1181 (1999). As the Court of Appeals observed, in a dependency case, the same family members who are parties to the case, and therefore have access to the sealed evaluation, are likely to be key witnesses in any related child abuse prosecution. A.M.-S., 11 Wn. App. 2d at 440. “So a grant of derivative use immunity would inevitably have a significant impact on a State’s ability to prosecute a parent for child abuse under these circumstances,” potentially preventing the State from bringing charges at all. Id. Finally, we note that trial courts have authority to grant protective orders, just as the trial court here did. The court not only recognized the use immunity granted by statute but further ordered that “[t]he Department shall not provide copies of the parents’ evaluations to the Prosecuting Attorney, nor shall the 11 In re Dependency of A.M.-S., No. 98094-2 Department discuss the evaluations/recommendations with the Prosecuting Attorney.” CP at 237. No party has challenged this portion of the trial court’s ruling, and the father does not show that it was inadequate to protect his rights or the integrity of the dependency proceedings.