Opinion ID: 1916148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion of Recusal

Text: Section 6, Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940, among other things forbids any judge of any court to sit in any cause or proceeding in which he is interested without the consent of the parties entered of record, or put in writing. The statutory causes of disqualification of a judge are not exclusive of the common law principles on the same subject, one of which is that no judge ought to act where, from interest or any other cause, he is supposed to be partial to one of the suitors. Smith v. Pitts, 139 Ala. 152, 36 So. 20; Bryce v. Burke, Probate Judge, 172 Ala. 219, 55 So. 635. Nor should a judge act if he has any interest, the probable and natural tendency of which is to create a bias in the mind of the judge for or against a party to the suit. Woodmen of the World v. Alford, 206 Ala. 18, 89 So. 528. Here the record shows that these proceedings were instituted by the circuit judges. After they had investigated the salaries paid secretaries in surrounding circuits and in law offices, and industries, they sent their proposed salary schedule for secretarial salaries to the County Commission. By letter, the Chairman of the County Commission, apparently acting for the Commission, informed the judges that the salary schedule would continue as that recommended by the report of the representative of the State Personnel Board. The judges then issued a show cause order to the Commission, signed by all three judges. The motion that each of the three judges recuse himself followed. This motion being denied, the Commission filed its answer hereinabove mentioned. The decree later entered was signed only by the presiding judge. In other words, we have here a show cause order issued by the three judges, based upon evidence they themselves had gathered, and a decree by one of the judges, based upon this same evidence. Under the circumstances it appears that the only inference that could be drawn is that the judges, individually and collectively, could hardly be considered as impartial arbiters, nor lacking in any interest the natural tendency of which would be to create bias in favor of the correctness of their recommendations as to the salaries of their secretaries. We hold, therefore, that the motion that the judges recuse themselves should have been granted and its refusal was error. In this connection, we note that of the cases cited in the decree here appealed from, Smith v. Miller (Colo.); Noble County Council v. State (Ind.); Commissioners Court of Lubbock County (Tex. Civ.App.); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate (Pa.); Judges etc. v. State of Michigan (Mich.); McAfee v. State ex rel. Stodola (Ind.), all cited supra, were heard before specially appointed judges. Birdsall v. Pima County (Ariz.) and State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County (Mo.), all cited supra, were originally brought in appellate courts. In six of the cases cited in the decree either special judges were not appointed, or the opinion does not indicate either way. The question of whether the Act providing for secretaries for the Judges of the Eighth Judicial Circuit is a local Act and void because not advertised. This point was raised in the amicus curiae brief filed by counsel for the Association of County Commissioners of Alabama. We pretermit consideration of this point for the following reason: The question was not raised in the proceedings below, nor was it raised in the brief filed by the appellants. An amicus curiae is limited to the issues made by the parties to a suit, and issues not made in proceedings below, nor raised in brief of appellant, cannot be injected into a review by any action on the part of the amicus curiae. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. City of Huntsville, 275 Ala. 184, 153 So.2d 619; Anderson v. Smith, 274 Ala. 302, 148 So.2d 243. Reversed and rendered. MERRILL, COLEMAN, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur. JONES, J., concurs specially. HEFLIN, C. J., and FAULKNER, J., dissent. BLOODWORTH, J., recuses himself.