Opinion ID: 1889683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: There is no right of appeal from a judgment of criminal contempt. Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S.W. 990, 997 (1907). The only remedy available is to file a writ of habeas corpus. Id.; Rule 91.01(b) (A person may seek a writ of habeas corpus when the person is restrained of liberty within this state [in order] to inquire into the cause of such restraint.). When this Court issues a writ of habeas corpus, as the Court did in November 2009, the petitioner, Smith, is permitted to brief and argue his grounds for relief so that the court may inquire into the cause of [petitioner's] restraint, Rule 91.01(b), and determine whether a release from custody is warranted. State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Mo. banc 2010). The decision whether to grant relief is limited to determining the facial validity of confinement, which is based on the record of the proceeding that resulted in the confinement. State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo. banc 2001). The habeas court may grant relief by ordering the petitioner discharged from unlawful restraint or deny relief by permitting the petitioner to remain in custody. Rule 91.18; Rule 91.20; Zinna, 301 S.W.3d at 513. Missouri courts have both an inherent power under the constitution to punish for contempt as well as authority to try contempt-of-court cases under the statutory crime of contempt, section 476.110, RSMo 2000. [6] Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005, 1012 (Mo. banc 1952). Missouri's contempt statute, section 476.110, provides for a finding of contempt only where the actions being punished are committed in the court's presence, the actions actually interrupt the court's proceedings or a person disobeys an order of the court. The contempt statute, however, does not limit the power of the courts to punish for contempt as at common law. [7] Osborne, 244 S.W.2d at 1012 (It is settled law that every constitutional court of common-law jurisdiction has the inherent power to punish for contempt, and cannot be shorn of such power by statute.). [8] The courts' inherent power includes those incidental powers [that] are necessary and proper to [ensure] the performance of the courts' judicial function under the constitution  the trying and determining of cases in controversy. Coleman, 152 S.W.2d at 646. The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, wisely, temperately and with judicial self-restraint. In re Estate of Dothage, 727 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo.App.1987). [T]here are two classes of contempt  civil and criminal, each class having two subcategories  direct and indirect. Chassaing, 887 S.W.2d at 578. Criminal and civil contempt are distinguished by the content of the judgment. Id. Criminal contempt is punitive in nature and acts to protect, preserve, and vindicate the authority and dignity of the judicial system and to deter future defiance. Id. Civil contempt is intended to benefit a party for whom relief has been granted by coercing compliance with the relief granted. Id. In this case, Judge Carter sought to punish Smith by criminal contempt for the language he had used in his writ petition. A direct contempt occurs in the immediate presence of the court or so near as to interrupt its proceedings. Id. The judge may punish a direct contempt summarily if the judge saw the conduct constituting contempt. Id.; Rule 36.01(a). However, an indirect, or constructive, contempt arises from an act outside the court that tends to degrade or make impotent the authority of the court or to impede or embarrass the administration of justice. Chassaing, 887 S.W.2d at 578. Acts of indirect contempt require that the defendant be given notice and a hearing as set out in Rule 36.01(b). Id. at 379. In this case, the criminal contempt alleged was indirect.