Opinion ID: 222763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: An indictment is duplicitous if it charges the defendant with two or more separate offenses in the same count. United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 888 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Trammell, 133 F.3d at 1354) (internal quotation marks omitted). When this occurs, it present[s] a danger that the jury may convict a defendant although not reaching a unanimous agreement on precisely which charge is the basis for the conviction, United States v. Schneider, 594 F.3d 1219, 1228 (10th Cir.2010), which would run afoul of [t]he Sixth Amendment guarantee[]... to a unanimous jury verdict, United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir.1994). We also have identified both the fact that [a] defendant may be prejudiced in a subsequent double jeopardy defense, and that [a] court may have difficulty determining the admissibility of evidence, as other dangers that may stem from a duplicitous indictment. Trammell, 133 F.3d at 1354. Mr. Washington claims that a single count of his indictment implicated the crimes of attempt and conspiracy, which he notes are discrete charges, with their own set of elements. Aplt. Opening Br. at 13; see United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1292 (10th Cir.1988) (indicating that conspiracy and attempt are distinct crimes requiring proof of unique elements (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932))). Mr. Washington first raised this issue in his motion to dismiss the indictment, and he now suggests that a principal danger of duplicitous indictments (i.e., a jury verdict of guilt without unanimous juror agreement regarding the crime) was realized here. This was supposedly evidenced by the jury's request for clarification... between the terms conspiracy to attempt to kill listed on the indictment versus the listed section, quote, `law, attempt to kill.' Joint Resp. to Order of Feb. 2, 2011; see supra note 5. [11] As support for his duplicitous-indictment argument, Mr. Washington relies heavily upon the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975). There, the government charged a Hobbs Act violation, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), alleging in a single count that the defendants did unlawfully and willfully conspire and attempt to obstruct, delay and affect commerce by virtue of their extortion plot. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit agreed with the defendants that the indictment was duplicitous: The Hobbs Act proscribes a number of separate offenses: (1) robbery; (2) extortion; (3) attempted robbery or extortion; and (4) conspiracy to commit robbery or extortion. Each such offense also requires the federal jurisdictional element of obstruction, delay, or effect on interstate commerce. The indictment charged two such offenses; conspiracy to extort and attempt to extort. Since both were improperly charged in a single count, the defendants' pre-trial motions that the indictment be dismissed, or that the government be required to elect, should have been granted. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted). Starks, however, may be readily distinguished from the present case. The indictment in Starks charged the defendants in a single count with two distinct offenses prosecutable under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) of the Hobbs Act. Specifically, it alleged that the defendants both conspire[d] and attempt[ed] to obstruct, delay and affect commerce. Starks, 515 F.2d at 115 (emphasis added). In contrast, even though Mr. Washington's indictment referenced conspiring behavior in offering factual details concerning the defendants' conduct, its legally operative language charged only a single offense, prosecutable under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) of the witness-tampering statute  specifically, tampering with a witness through an attempt to kill him. R., Vol. I, at 24. Mr. Washington's astigmatic focus on the conspiracy-related language of the indictment simply does not advance his cause. That language cannot be reasonably read as incorporating the formal elements of a conspiracy offense. [12] In sum, we hold that the indictment charged a single offense  witness tampering; consequently, it is not duplicitous.