Opinion ID: 198294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Double Jeopardy and Waiver

Text: 134 There is no merit whatsoever in Reyes-Padilla's contention that she was subject to double jeopardy because the government commenced its case with a civil seizure, but concluded it by proceeding under the substitute assets provision of the criminal forfeiture statute. Nor did the government's initial inclusion, and subsequent dismissal, of the Montanez property from Counts 48 and 49 of the Superseding Indictment constitute a waiver of the right to seek forfeiture of the property as a substitute asset. 135 A completed civil forfeiture of property does not constitute jeopardy under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and does not bar the subsequent criminal prosecution and punishment of the defendant whose property was forfeited. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court has consistently concluded that the Clause does not apply to [civil forfeitures] because they do not impose punishment). A fortiori, a civil forfeiture action that goes no further than a seizure, and never results in the entry of any civil forfeiture judgment cannot constitute jeopardy. Moreover, this Court has recognized that it is perfectly proper to begin a forfeiture action with a civil seizure, and then to convert the action to a criminal forfeiture once an indictment is returned. See United States v. Kingsley, 851 F.2d 16, 18 & n. 1 (1st Cir.1988). Indeed, that procedure is commonplace. 136 Nor is it uncommon for the government to shift theories of criminal forfeiture--from direct forfeiture to substitute assets--upon return of an indictment. We held in Voigt that when the government's attempt to forfeit the defendant's property directly was unsuccessful, the remedy was for the government to seek forfeiture of the same property as a substitute asset under § 853(p). See Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1088. If, as Voigt illustrates, it is proper to seek the forfeiture of property as a substitute asset even after a jury has rejected the government's attempt to forfeit the property directly, then there is no error in allowing the government to dismiss the property from the forfeiture allegation before it goes to the jury and to seek the forfeiture as a substitute asset after trial. In dismissing the Montanez property from the forfeiture allegation in Count 49, the government simply shifted its theory of forfeiture from § 853(a) to § 853(p). Doing so before submission of the case to the jury was entirely proper in light of the prosecutor's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support direct forfeiture under § 853(a).