Opinion ID: 1652339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Nazar's Vicarious Liability

Text: Having determined that the jury was correctly allowed to resolve the issue of Dr. Nazar's individual liability, we must now determine whether the jury should have been permitted to address his vicarious liability. The trial court twice rejected Branham's contentions that Dr. Nazar is vicariously liable for the conduct of Norton's nursing staff during his operation. First, the court denied his motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, and second the court refused to instruct the jury on that theory at the close of evidence. Branham v. Nazar, No.2003-CA-001110-MR. Because it ruled that Dr. Nazar was liable as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals did not address this issue in its majority opinion. On appeal, however, Branham renews his claim that Dr. Nazar should be held vicariously liable for the failure of the nursing staff to fulfill their duties to remove the Durahook from his scalp. To hold Dr. Nazar vicariously liable for the nursing staffs negligence, Branham must establish that the nurses were Dr. Nazar's agents. Where the facts are in dispute and the evidence is contradictory or conflicting, the question of agency, like other questions of fact, is to be determined by a jury. However, where the facts [regarding the parties' relationship] are undisputed, the question becomes one of law for the court. Wolford v. Scott Nickels Bus Co., 257 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ky. 1953). Here, Branham argued to the trial court that Dr. Nazar's admissions that he supervised the nurses and was in charge of the placement and removal of the Durahooks demonstrated that he was in control of the nurses and they were his agents. Disagreeing that those admissions proved an agency relationship, Dr. Nazar contended that the hospital's manual, which directs nurses to follow certain steps when assisting surgeons, and his reliance on the nurses to count the sharps showed that they were not his agents. Thus, the parties did not dispute the facts surrounding Dr. Nazar's and the nurses' relationship that Dr. Nazar relied on the nurses to count the sharpsthey simply disagreed with whether or not these facts established an agency relationship. Therefore, because the facts surrounding the parties' relationship were undisputed in this case, the question of whether an agency relationship existed between Dr. Nazar and the nurses was a question of law for the trial court. See CSX Transportation, Inc. v. First National Bank of Grayson, 14 S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky.App.1999) ([a]s the facts surrounding the relationship between CSXT and CTI are undisputed, the trial court properly made the determination of the issue of agency rather than to submit the question to the jury). A principal may be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his or her agent, but generally is not held liable for the conduct of an independent contractor. Williams v. Kentucky Dept. of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Ky.2003). An individual is the agent of another if the principal has the power or responsibility to control the method, manner, and details of the agent's work. See City of Winchester v. King, 266 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Ky.1954). If, however, an individual is free to determine how work is done and the principal cares only about the end result, then that individual is an independent contractor. See Pancake v. Cull, 338 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Ky. 1960). Relying upon City of Somerset, supra , Branham argues that nurses are the dual agents of the hospital and the surgeon during surgery. Like the facts in the present case, the plaintiff in City of Somerset was a patient who had the unfortunate experience of having a surgical item left in his body during an operation. 549 S.W.2d at 815. Unlike the present case, however, the defendant doctor settled before trial, leaving only the hospital and nursing staff as defendants. Id. Because the operating surgeon was authorized to supervise and direct the staff in the operating room[,] it was assumed that the nurses were his agents. Id. at 816. Thus, the hospital defended against liability by arguing that the nurses could not be the agents of the hospital during the surgery because they were the doctor's agents at the time. This Court rejected the hospital's argument and held that though the nurses were the borrowed servants of the surgeon during the operation, they remained the agents of the hospital. The Court noted that under traditional agency law, the issue of control is determinative, and since the nurses were paid, trained, and employed by the hospital their agency status was clear. City of Somerset, 549 S.W.2d at 816. In borrowed servant cases, agency for one party is only destroyed by agency for another if the fulfillment of one role requires the abandonment of the other. Because the nurses' conduct during the operation was in pursuit of the health of the patient, which was the end goal of both the doctor and the hospital, there was no conflict which terminated or suspended the nurses' agency relationship with the hospital. Therefore, the Court concluded that the nurses remained the agents of the hospital even if they were the surgeon's agents for the same act. Id. at 817. Branham suggests that City of Somerset requires the conclusion that a surgeon and a hospital are dual principals of the nursing staff which assists the surgeon during an operation. The decision cannot be read to compel such an outcome. In City of Somerset , the court held that where there are facts sufficient to support a dual agency relationship, a surgical nursing staff may be the dual agents of both a surgeon and a hospital. See 549 S.W.2d at 816-17. City of Somerset did not displace the traditional inquiry required for all agency determinations, but instead was founded upon it: agency relationships are created when one party has the authority to control the details of another's work. See Winchester, 266 S.W.2d at 345; Pancake, 338 S.W.2d at 392. Branham was, therefore, required to present evidence of the facts and circumstances which supported his theory that an agency relationship existed between Dr. Nazar and the nursing staff. As stated above, the trial court should have granted Branham's motion for summary judgment only if it appeared that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Dr. Nazar's vicarious liability and that Branham was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d at 480. Under this standard, Branham was required to show that the members of the Norton nursing staff were Dr. Nazar's agents as a matter of law. This, Branham simply could not do. He relies only on the testimony that as the surgeon during the operation, Dr. Nazar supervised the conduct of the nursing staff and the fact that Dr. Nazar admitted that he was in charge of the placement and removal of the Durahooks. Dr. Nazar, however, submitted affidavits which stated that he justifiably relied upon the nursing staff to count the sharps. Dr. Nazar presented evidence that he relied upon the nursing staff, rather than instructing them on how, to count the sharps because it was common surgical practice to do so. In addition, the hospital's manual lists over seventeen steps for nurses to follow when assisting surgeons during surgery, but no evidence was presented which suggested that Dr. Nazar attempted to augment or supplement the hospital policy with his own direction. The evidence suggests that Dr. Nazar lacked the authority to control the details of the nurses' work, their training, and terms of employment, and that they were not his agents during Branham's surgery. As a result, the trial court correctly concluded that Branham was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his vicarious liability theory. Due to the lack of evidence supporting Branham's vicarious liability theory, the trial court likewise correctly refused to submit the issue to the jury. A party plaintiff is entitled to have their theory of the case submitted to the jury if there is any evidence to sustain it. Clark v. Hauck Mfg. Co., 910 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Ky.1995). Trial courts, however, have the authority to deny requested instructions and their decision to do so will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. See Office Inc. v. Wilkey, 173 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Ky.2005). Though Dr. Nazar testified that he supervised the nursing staff and placed the Durahooks, Branham presented no other evidence tending to support his agency theory. Nurse Ball and Meshon Daniels, who both assisted Dr. Nazar on the day of Branham's surgery, made no mention of Dr. Nazar's orders during the operation, but instead both testified that they followed hospital protocol in their decision not to count the Durahooks. In his brief, Branham cites no other evidence that Dr. Nazar ordered or instructed the nursing staff on how to assist him during the operation. In the absence of more evidence establishing that Dr. Nazar had the right to control the details of the nurses' work, we cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on Branham's vicarious liability theory.