Opinion ID: 2136226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof. Maytag is correct in claiming the board has the burden of proof of upholding the assessment. Section 441.21 provides:

Text: The burden of proof shall be upon any complainant attacking such valuation as excessive, inadequate, inequitable or capricious; however, in protest or appeal proceedings when the complainant offers competent evidence by at least two disinterested witnesses that the market value of the property is less than the market value determined by the assessor [as reduced by the board, in this case], the burden of proof thereafter shall be upon the officials or persons seeking to uphold such valuation to be assessed. Section 441.39 provides that on appeal to district court there shall be no presumption as to the correctness of the valuation of assessment appealed from. Additionally, under these sections the taxpayer is no longer required to prove, in order to prevail, that more is involved than a difference of opinion or that a grossly excessive valuation was made which resulted from the will rather than the judgment of the assessor. Tiffany v. County Board of Review in and for Greene County, 188 N.W. 2d 343 (Iowa). Maytag introduced competent evidence by two disinterested witnesses that the exchange value of Plant 2 is less than the value fixed by the board. The burden of persuasion on valuation therefore passed to the board in both the district court and on this de novo appeal. See § 441.39; Rule 334, Rules of Civil Procedure (case is in equity). Like the trial court, we must thus ascertain where the preponderance of the evidence lies on the valuation issue. V. Exchange Value of the Plant. We come then to the task of determining the exchange value of Maytag's Plant 2 as shown by a preponderance of the evidence and in accordance with the applicable principles of law the amount the plant would probably bring if offered for sale in its condition and use on January 1, 1969, between a willing buyer and seller. We take into consideration the values of the three principal components land, machinery, and buildings for their bearing on the exchange value of the whole. The parties have little disagreement about the value of the land. Under the evidence, we agree with the assessor's valuation there. As to the machinery, we find Maytag's evidence based on used machinery prices to be of little weight. The board's evidence, on the other hand, is persuasive. The board's adjustment in the assessor's valuation of the machinery reflects the evidence. We disagree with the assessor's valuation of the buildings. On the plus side, the buildings are extraordinarily well-maintained, and engineers continually study methods of using the structures in most efficient ways. On the minus side, the nature of the Plant 2 buildings limits efficiency. This is not one large building created for the present production of 5,000 appliances daily. The original building was constructed in 1948, and 16 buildings or additions were thereafter put up. The existence of several buildings hampers operations. In addition, some headroom is too low for today's machinery. Functional depreciation thus exists. The assessor allowed no functional depreciation, but the board adjusted the buildings downward by 15%. We believe that adjustment reflects the evidence. Applying the second approach of other factors and considering the values of the three components for their bearing on the value of the whole, we conclude that the valuation of the plant fixed by the board and upheld by the trial court should stand. On the evidence we might not find the same exact dollar amount, but valuations are at best approximations. Deere Mfg. Co. v. Zeiner, 247 Iowa 1364, 1377, 78 N. W.2d 527, 535 (We have pointed out several times that valuations for tax purposes are not capable of exact ascertainment and cannot be more than approximately correct.). We think the valuation by the board and the trial court represents the plant's exchange value. We therefore hold the exchange value of Maytag's Plant 2 on January 1, 1969, to be $18,848,905. Affirmed.