Opinion ID: 1603534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: does the mississippi accident contingent fund statute violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution, by constituting invidious discrimination between a foreseeable and identifiable class of school age children who of necessity must place their lives and safety in the hands of bus drivers employed by elected school boards to transport students to and from school, and all other victims of vehicular accidents who have a tort remedy under common law?

Text: Wells argues that the Accident Contingent Fund statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by discriminating between a foreseeable and identifiable class of school age children ... and all other victims of vehicular accidents who have a tort remedy under common law. He further argues that under the Accident Contingent Fund statutes, while a severely injured victim of a school bus accident will receive only limited compensation for his or her injuries, those less severely injured, or those using private transportation, may gain full recovery. This legislative classification, Wells contends, is not rationally related to any remedial purpose of Mississippi statutory or common law, and treats the victims arbitrarily. Wells also contends that the Accident Contingent Fund should be judged by strict, or at least intermediate scrutiny, rather than by a mere rational relation test. The Board argues that the Accident Contingent Fund makes no classification  that is, that any student injured while riding a school bus is subject to the same rules as any other. The Board argues that the Accident Contingent Fund had a rational basis in protecting public coffers from large or numerous damage awards, providing for effective risk management, while affording some measure of relief to the victims of government tortfeasors. The Board contends that strict scrutiny should not be applied to the Accident Contingent Fund because no fundamental right has been violated. In Turrentine v. Brookhaven, Miss. School Dist., 794 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.Miss. 1992), the court noted that as with due process challenges, strict scrutiny is only warranted where a statute implicates a suspect class or a fundamental right. Id., 794 F. Supp. at 624. Because the plaintiff challenging the Accident Contingent Fund could show no membership in a suspect class, or interference with a fundamental right, the rational relation test applied. The court stated: Plaintiff contends that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it makes no distinction between plaintiffs to whom $10,000 would be ample recovery in satisfying a claim, and victims to whom, like Jennifer Turrentine, $10,000 is completely inadequate compensation for her injuries. The Court disagrees. All that must be shown is that a statutory classification, which in this case is technically a failure to recognize a distinction between classes of plaintiffs, is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Turrentine, 794 F. Supp. at 625. The court held that the blanket statutory damage limitation applicable to all plaintiffs bore a rational relationship to the protection of State funds. In Dependents of Nosser v. Natchez Jitney Jungle, Inc., 511 So.2d 141 (Miss. 1987), we held that the Worker's Compensation Act limiting payment to dependents and denying compensation to non-dependent heirs at law had a rational basis and furthered a valid state purpose, and thus was not unconstitutionally discriminatory. Addressing the requirements of the equal protection clause, we cited Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 481, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1159, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970): In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations  illogical, it may be, and unscientific. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. Nosser, 511 So.2d at 143 ( quoting Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161 (citations omitted)). The Accident Contingent Fund statutes may fairly be placed in the described area of economics and social welfare. Therefore, the proper question in Wells' equal protection challenge is whether a statute is reasonably or rationally related to some permissible government purpose. Strict scrutiny, suggested by Wells as proper, is applied only where a fundamental right, or a suspect class, such as race, is implicated. Parties injured by government tortfeasors, or by any tortfeasors, are not a suspect class. There is no fundamental right to sue the government for damages. Therefore, a statute limiting damages recoverable from the government is not properly subjected to strict scrutiny on either basis. In Walters, we held that the Workmen's Compensation Act did not deny equal protection of the laws in excluding firms having fewer than eight workmen. We cited the United States Supreme Court's reasoning that with such classifications, the legislature, of course, [was] the proper judges to determine precisely where the line should be drawn. Walters, 220 Miss. at 512, 71 So.2d at 443. One of our sister states has upheld statutory damage limitations challenged on equal protection grounds, and has done so applying a rational relation test. In Jetton, the Florida Appellate Court found no violation of equal protection in a $50,000 recovery limit against the State: (t)here being a rational relationship between the statutory classifications of tort victims and the object of the legislation. Here the classifications were designed to enable enhanced recoveries in most cases while recognizing that requiring local governments to protect themselves against full liability could impose too heavy a financial burden on local taxpayers. Jetton, 399 So.2d at 399. See also Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1981). Classifications distinguishing among types of tort victims have been upheld in other jurisdictions, generally applying a rational relation test. In Continental Insurance Company v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 709 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.1983), pursuant to a rational basis test, the court held a statutory limitation of $100,000 on damages recoverable against the State in motor vehicle accidents not to violate equal protection, even though no monetary limit was placed on other types of actions against the State. See also Crowe v. John W. Harton Memorial Hospital, 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) ($20,000 limit on damages recoverable against governmental tortfeasors had rational basis in protecting tax revenues from unlimited claims); Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704 (1979); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (Wis. 1979); Lyles v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa.Cmwlth. 509, 490 A.2d 936, app. gr. 509 Pa. 542, 505 A.2d 599 and aff'd 512 Pa. 322, 516 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1985); Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 444 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 453 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1990); Texas Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Petty, 817 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). The Accident Contingent Fund was economic or social legislation properly subject to a rational relation test. We have held that protecting the public treasury is a legitimate legislative purpose; limiting damages recoverable from the State for school bus accidents is rationally related to the achievement of that goal. Therefore, the statutes did not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.