Opinion ID: 2804968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony about Mr. Mathis’s Spinal Injury

Text: On Mr. Mathis’s back injuries, Dr. Beer testified for Mr. Mathis. Dr. Mark Hadley, a neurosurgeon, and Dr. Toby Hayes, a biomechanical engineer, testified for the Defendants. Dr. Beer testified that “the degenerative changes present in Mathis’ cervical and lumbar spine became symptomatic because of the February 2008 collision.” App. at 86. Dr. Beer applied a “differential diagnosis approach,” concluding the accident caused the injuries because Mr. Mathis’s “spondylosis was asymptomatic before the accident, and symptomatic after.” Id. As the court observed, “[a]ccording to Dr. Beer, this finding is consistent with an acute or subacute process, consisting of trauma causing or contributing 2 The court also heard competing evidence regarding causation of the accident. The court concluded Mr. Stewart was 100 percent at fault. This finding is not disputed on appeal. -5- to a material aggravation of Mathis’ preexisting asymptomatic degenerative disease present in the cervical and lumbar areas of the spine.” Id. Dr. Beer said bulging discs and a small annular tear in Mr. Mathis’s L4/L5 disc supported his findings. He further described Mr. Mathis’s “two-year gap in treatment as consistent with a patient who is attempting to avoid surgery for as long as possible.” Id. at 86-87. Dr. Hadley testified Mr. Mathis’s “medical records show no evidence of injury from the collision other than temporary muscular-skeletal injuries.” Id. at 87. He explained the images of Mr. Mathis’s spine “show a typical degenerative lumbar spine,” caused by aging. Id. He acknowledged there were disc bulges, but said they were all old. He disagreed with Dr. Beer’s determination that Mr. Mathis suffered a very small annular tear. Dr. Hadley testified that because the white dot Dr. Beer identified as an annular tear appeared on both the 2008 and 2011 images, it is related to age “because such tears don’t remain acute for three years.” Id. He concluded the 2011 surgery “addressed only agerelated narrowing,” and no further operation would help relieve Mr. Mathis’s pain. Id. He further identified age, arthritis, deconditioning, and smoking as potential factors contributing to Mr. Mathis’s pain. Dr. Hayes testified regarding biomechanical injury causation. He evaluated the forces of the collision and whether those forces were likely to cause the types of injuries Mr. Mathis claimed he suffered. Dr. Hayes concluded “the forces involved in the accident are far below the ‘more-likely-than-not’ known injury tolerance thresholds for risk of injury to Mathis’ low back, cervical spine and brain.” Id. at 88. Specifically, he -6- explained the potential for low back injury—like the type of injury Mr. Mathis claims he suffered from the accident—is “particularly low in rear-end automobile collisions when the low back stays in contact with the seatback.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 168-69. 3. Testimony about Mr. Mathis’s Alleged Mild Traumatic Brain Injury In February 2013, Mr. Mathis saw a life-care planner, Francine Mazone, who suggested he might have an MTBI. 3 At her suggestion, Mr. Mathis saw a neuropsychologist, Dr. Dennis Helffenstein. Thereafter, the Defendants also hired a neuropsychologist, Dr. Paul Richards, to test Mr. Mathis for MTBI. Dr. Helffenstein testified Mr. Mathis suffered an MTBI from the 2008 accident. He further explained as follows. Mr. Mathis meets the diagnostic criteria for MTBI because “there is a notable gap in [Mr. Mathis’s] memory” immediately after the accident. Aplee. Supp. App. at 143-44. Mr. Mathis had no memory of pulling himself upright or pulling his vehicle to the side of the road after the impact. This suggested “a brief period of post-traumatic amnesia for some events immediately following the accident.” Id. at 144. The application of the diagnostic criteria is “the beginning point of the [MTBI] diagnosis process; it is not the endpoint.” Trial Tr., Vol. IV at 780. Mr. 3 According to the widely-accepted MTBI diagnostic standard, a patient who has suffered an MTBI must exhibit one of the following four criteria: (1) “any period of loss of consciousness,” (2) “any loss of memory for events immediately before or after the accident,” (3) “any alteration in mental state at the time of the accident (eg, feeling dazed, disoriented, or confused),” or (4) “focal neurological deficit(s) that may or may not be transient.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 141 (Thomas Kay et al., Definition of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 8 J. Head Trauma Rehabilitation 86, 86 (1993)). -7- Mathis’s neurological test scores showed memory impairment, his auditory and visual concentration scores ranged from impaired to average, and his verbal reasoning and judgment results were below average—all of which are “pretty classic findings” for patients with an MTBI. Id. at 831. To support his MTBI claim, Mr. Mathis also offered the testimony of his wife, Nada Mathis; his stepdaughter, Hope Waldner; and his former boss, Gregg Waldner. Mrs. Mathis testified that since the accident her husband had been short-tempered, frustrated, and depressed, and that, about a year and a half before trial, Mr. Mathis began stuttering. 4 Ms. Waldner and Mr. Waldner both testified Mr. Mathis’s personality changed after the accident, and that he had trouble focusing at work. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Richards, testified Mr. Mathis did not suffer an MTBI from the collision. He cited the lack of documentation indicating confusion or memory loss immediately after the accident. He disagreed with Dr. Helffenstein’s “notable gap” testimony, reporting that in his interview with Mr. Mathis, he did not find any gap in Mr. Mathis’s memory immediately after the accident, but rather that Mr. Mathis “had a quite good recollection of the time immediately post-injury.” Trial Tr., Vol. VI at 1498. Finally, Dr. Richards testified that “[i]n comparison to his same-aged male peers with comparable education . . . Mr. Mathis generally demonstrated an intact ([a]verage and above) neuropsychological profile with only one documented deficit,” relating to his 4 Evidence presented at trial indicated Mr. Mathis stuttered as a child, and the stutter re-emerged several months after the accident. -8- processing speed. Aplee. Supp. App. at 131. Dr. Richards explained that many nonneurological factors could deflate Mr. Mathis’s processing speed score, including depression, chronic pain, or lack of sleep. And “[a]ny recent problems [Mr. Mathis] is reportedly experiencing, with stuttering, work finding, or cognitive functioning are naturally occurring problems, and not caused or aggravated by any injury from [the accident].” Aplee. Supp. App. at 133. Dr. Hayes also testified that the force of the collision was “well below the levels necessary to produce concussion or mild traumatic brain injury.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 169. 4. District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law On August 9, 2013, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court rejected Mr. Mathis’s claim he suffered permanent spinal injuries. Instead, it concluded “[t]he weight of the evidence supports finding that [Mr.] Mathis suffered various temporary muscular-skeletal sprains from the collision, which resolved in approximately mid-2009 following conservative therapy.” App. at 89. The court listed eight reasons explaining its finding, and it rejected Dr. Beer’s differential diagnosis conclusion. It explained, “While Dr. Beer’s differential diagnosis testimony might be persuasive if that were the only testimony in the case, such testimony is overwhelmed by the other evidence listed above.” Id. at 90. The district court also found Mr. Mathis did “not suffer MTBI from the 2008 collision.” Id. at 92. It based this finding on its “view that the testimony from Dr. -9- Richards and Dr. Hayes is more persuasive than the testimony from Dr. Helffenstein.” Id. It said Dr. Helffenstein placed “undue emphasis” on Mr. Mathis’s claimed memory loss, which was both inconsistent with Mr. Mathis’s other statements in the record and inconsequential given the details from the accident Mr. Mathis “admittedly remembers.” Id. at 92. The court further explained that “no medical documentation indicates that [Mr.] Mathis was confused, disoriented, or repeated information or questions indicative of MTBI.” Id. It stated, “[I]t strains credulity to attribute [Mr.] Mathis’ below-average testing scores to [an] MTBI from a collision that occurred five years earlier.” Id. at 93. Based on its findings, the district court awarded Mr. Mathis $145,582 in damages: $30,000 for reasonable medical and out-of-pocket expenses incurred through mid-2009; $100,000 for past emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life; and $15,582 for loss of income from 2008 to mid-2009. 5. Alleged Undisclosed Law Clerk Conflict Two weeks after trial, Mr. Mathis’s attorney, Frederick Harrison, learned of a potential issue regarding the district judge’s law clerk and her husband, a partner at a Wyoming law firm. 5 On July 15, 2013, Huff & Puff’s insurer, American International 5 Mr. Harrison stated in his affidavit before the district court that he learned of the potential conflict “over a week after the trial.” App. at 108. He subsequently clarified, in a 28(j) letter to this court, that he learned of the potential conflict on August 2, 2013, two weeks after trial had concluded. -10- Group, Inc. (“AIG”), hired the husband’s firm to monitor the second week of trial. 6 It did so after learning that, over the prior weekend, Mr. Harrison had met with Huff & Puff’s personal attorney to discuss the possibility of entering into a consent judgment with Huff & Puff in excess of its policy limit with AIG and pursuing a bad faith action against AIG. 7 This did not happen, but AIG hired the husband’s firm to monitor the remainder of trial, paying on an hourly basis. Three partners, including the law clerk’s husband, shared monitoring responsibility. Although Mr. Harrison was aware the husband was monitoring the trial, he did not know the clerk and her husband were married until another attorney brought it to his attention after trial had ended. The law clerk was present for all pretrial proceedings and was in the courtroom throughout trial. The day her husband first appeared in the gallery, she advised the judge she had learned the previous evening her husband had been asked to monitor the trial for AIG. The clerk inquired if she should separate herself from the case. The judge responded that she—the judge—would be drafting and finalizing the opinion in the case herself, and that AIG “was not a party in the proceeding and it had no visible presence at trial,” nor had the clerk’s husband entered an appearance in the case. Id. at 153. The 6 AIG had previously hired Patrick J. Murphy and his firm, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, to represent its insureds, Huff & Puff and Mr. Stewart, in Mr. Mathis’s negligence suit. 7 Huff & Puff would enter into a judgment for an amount in excess of Huff & Puff’s $1 million policy limit with AIG and assign its rights against AIG to Mr. Mathis. Mr. Mathis would covenant not to collect the judgment against Huff & Puff, but instead would seek to collect the entire judgment against AIG if he could later prove AIG acted in bad faith. -11- judge told the clerk she had no duty to separate herself from the case, but allowed the clerk to attend trial only in a ministerial and observational role. The judge wrote in the memorandum order denying Mr. Mathis’s motion for a new trial that once trial concluded and the case was taken under advisement, the law clerk had no further contact with the case, and that she—the judge—researched, drafted, and finalized the opinion based on the record and her personal notes. 6. Mr. Mathis’s Motion for a New Trial On September 6, 2013, seven weeks after trial had ended and five weeks after he had learned about the law clerk and her husband’s relationship, Mr. Mathis filed a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). In his motion for a new trial, Mr. Mathis argued: (1) the evidence did not support the district court’s factual findings that Mr. Mathis suffered only a temporary sprain and did not suffer an MTBI; (2) the court erroneously relied on Dr. Hayes’s testimony because it went beyond his qualifications as a biomechanical engineer; and (3) the law clerk had an undisclosed conflict of interest. The motion to alter or amend the judgment argued the judgment should be amended to correct an inadequate damages award based on the court’s erroneous rulings. The court denied both motions. Mr. Mathis timely appealed. -12-