Opinion ID: 808641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Victor

Text: Victor raises four arguments on appeal, three challenging his conviction and one challenging his sentence. We address these claims seriatim.
Victor first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the conspiracy conviction, Count 1. We disagree. At trial, government witnesses placed Victor at the organization’s main residence and at its other residence on several occasions interacting with other co-defendants. Victor was also found within the main residence when law enforcement executed the search warrant. Once seen by law enforcement, he fled within the residence, physically resisted arrest, and had to be subdued with a Taser. From this evidence, the jury could infer a guilty state of mind. See United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 2001). A government witness additionally testified that Victor was found in a bedroom of the main residence lying on the floor with his hands next to a mattress where a revolver was later found, showing his apparent knowledge of the location of firearms in the main residence. With this collective evidence, a reasonable juror could convict Victor on Count 1. 12
Victor’s second argument is that the district court erred in admitting testimony of Jose Quinones, a DEA informant. We review this claim for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255-56 (4th Cir. 1992). At trial, over a defense objection, Mr. Quinones testified that in 2008, Fernando Cruz-Carrasco, an unindicted co-conspirator, and Javier, a co-defendant in this appeal, both independently told him that their drug trafficking organization was capable of transporting 1-3 tons of marijuana from the Mexican border in Texas to Greenville, South Carolina. The district court admitted this testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which excepts from the hearsay rule statements “offered against an opposing party” that are “made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” On appeal, Victor contends that the district court erred in admitting this testimony because Victor was not a member of the conspiracy at the time the statements were made and because the DEA informant was not a co-conspirator himself. As to the former contention, it is of no import that Victor may not have joined the conspiracy at the time the statements were made because “upon joining the conspiracy, earlier statements made by co-conspirators after inception of the conspiracy become admissible against the defendant.” United States v. Jackson, 13 757 F.2d 1486, 1490 (4th Cir. 1985). As to the latter contention, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not require that the witness be a co-conspirator; it only requires that the declarant be a co-conspirator. See United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 268 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]hat a comment was made to . . . a government informant does not, without more, render it inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Mr. Quinones’ testimony.
Victor’s third argument, which he raises for the first time on appeal, is that the district court constructively amended the indictment by instructing the jury on Count 3 in the disjunctive—possession with intent to distribute or aiding and abetting—because the indictment charged Count 3 in the conjunctive—possession with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting. However, in this circumstance, “an indictment may be phrased in the conjunctive, when the . . . jury instructions are phrased in the disjunctive, without creating a constructive amendment of the indictment.” United States v. Farish, 535 F.3d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. Perry, 560 F.3d 246, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen the Government charges in the conjunctive, and the 14 statute is worded in the disjunctive, the district court can instruct the jury in the disjunctive.”); United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 495 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that aiding and abetting is not an essential element of an offense and need not even be charged in an indictment). Therefore, the district court’s jury instruction did not amount to plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
Victor’s final argument is that the district court committed procedural error at sentencing, a claim we review “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2012). Victor contends that the district court failed to provide an individualized explanation of its sentence and failed to recognize the proper burdens of proof when applying a firearm enhancement and when refusing to apply a mitigating role adjustment. At sentencing, however, the district court adopted Victor’s presentence report “for purposes of supporting the [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) facts,” J.A. 748, listened to the parties’ arguments about application of the § 3553(a) factors, and directly addressed Victor’s arguments about sentence enhancements and adjustments. Thus, having reviewed the record, 15 we are satisfied that the district court committed no procedural error at sentencing.