Opinion ID: 168528
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing the interests of the State and Mr. Short

Text: 80 It is undisputed that the State received no notice of Mr. Bayless's status as a witness until the first day of trial. We agree that, had Mr. Bayless been allowed to testify at trial, defense counsel's failure to abide by Oklahoma's discovery code would have prejudiced the State to some extent: the prosecutor would have had only a very limited time to investigate and prepare for cross-examination. Moreover, Mr. Short has failed to explain the delay in notifying the State. Mr. Brown—the witness whose testimony Mr. Bayless would have impeached—testified at the preliminary hearing, which took place nearly eighteen months before the trial began. 81 Nevertheless, the exclusion of relevant, probative, and otherwise admissible evidence is an extreme sanction that should be used only when justified by some overriding policy consideration. United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981); see also 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11-4.7(a) (2d ed. 1980) (The exclusion sanction is not recommended because its results are capricious.). At trial, defense counsel contended that the appropriate remedy would be to grant the State the needed time to talk to Mr. Bayless, or to grant a recess. The trial court did not address these options, but rejected them implicitly: 82 we have our discovery rules which . . . should have some meaning. It's to prevent both sides from trial by ambush. . . . Sometimes there are exceptions where—for reasons that could not be avoided, some witness could not be secured in time to provide the other side that witness's name. I don't believe that's the case here. 83 Rec. vol. IV, at 199. 84 However, prejudice . . . could [have been] minimized by granting a continuance. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413, 108 S.Ct. 646; see United States v. Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002) (It would be a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district court should exclude evidence rather than continue the proceedings.); United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting lesser sanctions for the violation of a discovery order, such as censuring the government attorney); Rojem, 130 P.3d at 297 (Where the discovery violation is not willful, blatant or calculated gamesmanship, alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate.). The state had already presented its case-in-chief, as Mr. Brown was its final witness, so a recess would not have created an unnatural break in its presentation of evidence, although a recess would have likely required holding the jury over during the delay. (Indeed, we note that the trial court did grant a continuance on the following day, Friday April 11, 1997, until Tuesday April 15, 1997, because defense expert Ms. Eddings was unavailable.) 85 In addition, the State's interest in the exclusion of Mr. Bayless's testimony is mitigated by the absence of evidence that Mr. Short or his counsel acted in bad faith. While we do not hold that bad faith is an absolute condition to exclusion, we agree with those circuits that have treated bad faith as an important factor but not a prerequisite to exclusion. United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 911 (D.C.Cir. 1992) (citing Eckert v. Tansy, 936 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1991) and Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 29-32 (1st Cir. 1988)); see Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417, n. 23, 108 S.Ct. 646 (noting Illinois state courts' use of the preclusion sanction in the exceptional case where the uncooperative party demonstrates a deliberate contumacious or unwarranted disregard of the court's authority) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there was no finding of counsel's bad faith, and no evidence of Mr. Short's complicity in the discovery violation. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417, 108 S.Ct. 646 (Whenever a lawyer makes use of the sword provided by the Compulsory Process Clause, there is some risk that he may wound his own client.) (footnote omitted); id. at 433, 108 S.Ct. 646 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that [t]he threat of disciplinary proceedings, fines, or imprisonment will likely influence attorney behavior to a far greater extent than the rather indirect penalty threatened by evidentiary exclusion). 86 As to Mr. Short's interest in offering testimony from Mr. Bayless, the fact that he was facing the death penalty is very significant. See Morgan v. Dist. Court of Woodward County, 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okla.Crim.App. 1992) (stating it would be inappropriate to exclude defense witnesses from testifying in a death penalty case . . . when the actions of defense counsel, and not the defendant[], have prevented compliance with the Trial Court's order); Rojem, 130 P.3d at 297 (same); Allen v. State, 944 P.2d 934, 937 (Okla.Crim.App. 1997) (exclusion too severe a sanction); Wisdom v. State, 918 P.2d 384, 396 (Okla. Crim.App. 1996) (concluding that the improper exclusion of a defense witness warranted re-sentencing); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (`Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case.'). Moreover, unlike other cases in which we have upheld the exclusion of evidence, we cannot say that Mr. Bayless's testimony would have been only marginally relevant. Richmond, 122 F.3d at 874; see also Wooten, 377 F.3d at 1141 (observing that an exhibit that was admitted into evidence accomplished as much (and perhaps more) for [the defendant] than if he had been permitted to call [the excluded witness] to the stand). 87 In light of these competing considerations, we conclude that the interests of the State and Mr. Short are at least in equipoise. We therefore proceed to examine the OCCA's conclusion that Mr. Bayless's testimony was not material. 88