Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Appellant's Statements of Hatred of Police and Threats to Kill Police

Text: (10a) Over objection the trial court admitted testimony of several prosecution witnesses that at various times in 1978 they had heard appellant express contempt and hatred for police and declare that he would kill any officer who attempted to arrest him. The witnesses included persons whom appellant and Klaess had known as friends and neighbors, or as apartment mates, in Southern California, appellant's jail cellmate in Sacramento in November 1978, and the woman companion who stated she had not only heard appellant's threats but physically stopped him from reaching for a shotgun when an officer stopped their car while appellant was driving. Appellant now contends it was reversible error to admit this testimony, relying on Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. In relying on Evidence Code section 1101, appellant assumes that the statements in question constituted conduct and that they were introduced to prove his disposition to commit the crimes rather than to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)). [4] A defendant's threat against the victim, however, is relevant to prove intent in a prosecution for murder. ( People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 778 [69 Cal. Rptr. 102, 441 P.2d 942].) The statements here in question did not specify a victim or victims but were aimed at any police officer who would attempt to arrest appellant. Such a generic threat is admissible to show the defendant's homicidal intent where other evidence brings the actual victim within the scope of the threat. ( People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 557 [297 P.2d 999]; People v. Wilt (1916) 173 Cal. 477, 481-483 [160 P. 561]; People v. Craig (1896) 111 Cal. 460, 466 [44 P. 186]; People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 102, 140-141 [132 Cal. Rptr. 265]; 1A Wigmore, Evidence (Tillers ed. 1983) § 106; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th ed. 1972) § 203.) Hence the statements were relevant and not excludable under Evidence Code section 1101. Appellant contends that the threats should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as cumulative to the evidence of the robberies, kidnappings, and other crimes committed by appellant, together with Klaess, on December 20 and 21. Those crimes, however, tended to prove a different aspect of appellant's state of mind. Whereas the threat, repeated over a period of several months preceding the charged murders, tended to show a design or intent to kill members of a class of persons under certain circumstances, the crimes, committed less than 48 hours before the murders, tended to show a motive for killing the officers, i.e., a natural desire to escape the severe punishment that could be anticipated if defendant were arrested. The prior crimes were admissible for the latter purpose. ( People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 186-189 [74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198]; see People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 319, fn. 23 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) Appellant contends that because his defense was his absence from the time and place of the crimes, he did not challenge the proof of homicidal intent and premeditation, based on the evidence found at the scene, e.g., that Officer Freeman was shot five times and Officer Blecher was shot while handcuffed. Appellant argues that consequently, [t]he only real issue during the guilt phase was identity, and therefore the evidence of his prior conduct offered to prove homicidal intent and premeditation should have been excluded. There are two answers to that contention. First, appellant's alibi defense was not revealed until after the close of the prosecution's case. The amended information charged the willful murder, with malice aforethought and with premeditation and deliberation, of each of the victims. The prosecution had the burden of proving those elements before the close of its case in chief. (§ 1118.1.) Second, the prosecution was not required to assume that the jury would find premeditation and deliberation simply on the basis of the circumstances of the killings inferable from the testimony of Klaess and the evidence found at the scene. (11) Evidence of premeditation and deliberation typically shows not only the manner of killing, but also planning activity and motive. ( People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942].) (10b) The evidence of appellant's prior threats and crimes furnished proof of planning and motive that did not duplicate the evidence of what happened at the scene.