Opinion ID: 304012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the claim for reinstatement

Text: 12 Traditionally, the procedural avenue to reinstatement for an ex-employee of the federal government claiming to be the victim of improper discharge has been a petition for mandatory injunction or writ of mandamus directed to the head of the agency concerned commanding the re-employment of the petitioner. Schwartz and Jacoby, Litigation with the Federal Government (1970), Chapter XVI. The exhaustion of available administrative remedies was a prerequisite to maintenance of such a mandamus action. Bolger v. Marshall, 1951, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 30, 193 F.2d 37. See, also, Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of United States, 1970, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S.Ct. 1648, 26 L.Ed.2d 100. The remedy of mandamus directed against an agency has been regarded as an exception to the doctrine that suits may not be maintained against the United States without its consent. Clackamas County, Oregon v. McKay, 1954, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 219 F.2d 479, vacated as moot 1955, 349 U.S. 909, 75 S.Ct. 599, 99 L.Ed. 1244. In 1962, Congress broadened the availability of the mandamus remedy by investing the district courts generally with jurisdiction to issue the writ which eliminated the previous requirement that reinstatement suits be maintained only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Public Law 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (October 5, 1962), codified as Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1361. The legislative history of that act clearly reflects that Congress did not intend to modify the requirement of exhaustion of available administrative remedies in mandamus suits. 1962 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, pp. 2784, 2787. 13 For purposes of this appeal the complaint's request for Beale's reinstatement with back pay will be considered as an action in the nature of a petition for writ of mandamus. This bypasses the obstacle of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, so that we get directly to the issue of exhaustion of available administrative remedies. The issue of exhaustion, as we find it here, raises two separate questions: 14 (a) Does the allegation of racial discrimination on the part of a federal agency excuse a discharged employee from the requirement that he exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing suit to compel his reinstatement? 15 (b) Assuming that exhaustion of available administrative remedies is required where racial discrimination is alleged to have been the motivation behind the decision to terminate employment, has Beale satisfied that requirement in this case? 16