Opinion ID: 458564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellate Review of the District Court's Findings

Text: 72 The scope of our review of district court decisions, of course, depends on (1) the nature of the question that has been decided and (2) the procedural context in which the decision was made. Mitchell argues that, because the district court granted a motion for summary judgment, we should in effect conduct a de novo review of its decision. The plaintiffs and the Corps have not bothered to address this threshold issue. 73 Generally speaking, we owe substantial deference to a district court's resolution of fact questions, but review de novo its pronouncements on questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Mitchell is, of course, correct that, when we review a summary judgment, we apply the same standards that the district court has applied. See, e.g., Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir.1985). That is because the district court's role in the summary judgment context is simply to identify, not to resolve, questions of fact and to apply correctly the law--matters upon which we owe no special deference to district courts. 74 The scope of our review is not, however, necessarily determined by the label that the parties or the district court have used to characterize the proceedings. See John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir.1985). In fact, we may in certain circumstances disregard those labels altogether and apply the standard that is appropriate for reviewing what has really happened in the district court. See, e.g., Marathon Manufacturing Co. v. Enerlite Products Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 216-218 (5th Cir.1985), slip op. at 6015-16 (A trial procedure which accomplishes what the parties and court intend does not become erroneous merely because it is misnamed.). The problem arises most often when the parties, in a case involving an extensive discovery record, administrative record, or the like, file cross-motions for summary judgment. Not infrequently, the parties in such a case do not really mean to suggest that there are no material questions of fact. Rather, they intend to submit the remaining fact questions to the district court for resolution on the existing record. If the parties and the district court intended to resolve the case in that manner, we will, despite any misnomers to the contrary, review the decision according to what has really happened--a trial on a stipulated record. See, e.g., Marathon Manufacturing, 767 F.2d at 216-218; John, 757 F.2d at 706 n. 4 (collecting cases); Vetter v. Frosch, 599 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir.1979). 75 The district court expressly found that the summary judgment proof in this case showed an absence of genuine issues of material fact. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this is a case, like Marathon Manufacturing, in which we must disregard the court's label and inquire further. As Marathon Manufacturing makes clear, it is appropriate for us to do so when (1) the district court has in reality decided questions of fact and (2) the parties have effectively agreed to that procedure. See also John, 757 F.2d at 706 n. 4. 76 We note first that, following the submission of summary judgment motions, both sides informed the court that they had submitted all of the evidence that they had to offer. Said the court, in a docket entry: 77 The Court heard argument ... concerning cross-motions for summary judgment. Both parties informed the Court that no significant new evidence would be adduced if the case were to proceed to trial.Accordingly, the Court CANCELLED the trial setting on 12/27/83 and indicated that it would rule on the summary judgment motions in the near future. 78 (Emphasis added.) 79 Moreover, if ever there was a case in which the parties disagree about material questions, this is it. As our extended discussion of the administrative and judicial record should make clear, the parties, each with evidentiary support, surely disagree over at least the following: (1) whether Section 6 may have significant environmental impacts; (2) whether Section 6 is related to other projects on West Galveston Island; (3) whether the Corps' review of cumulative impacts was sufficient; and (4) whether the Corps' ultimate decision not to file an EIS was reasonable. At least the first two of these are questions of fact. See, e.g., Lee, 758 F.2d at 1081; Save Our Wetlands, 711 F.2d at 642; National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 782 (11th Cir.1983) (applying Fifth Circuit precedent). 80 Because the district court may have answered questions of fact, and because the parties effectively consented to that procedure, we will review the court's answers under the clearly erroneous test, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), notwithstanding the district court's view that this is a summary judgment case. That test allows us to reject findings of fact only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). It does not matter that the district court's decision is based on a record consisting primarily of documentary evidence. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, North Carolina, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). We will of course review de novo conclusions of law.