Opinion ID: 303767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facts and Proceedings Made the Basis of the District Court Order

Text: 3 According to the evidence given at the suppression hearing, on 27 June 1969 two armed men, identified by eyewitnesses as appellees Proctor and Brown, robbed a Washington liquor store. During the course of the robbery the retired store owner, Israel Burka, arose from where he had been seated and took a few steps. Without uttering a word, Proctor allegedly shot Burka in the back. According to the Government's evidence, while Burka lay face down on the floor in a large pool of blood, Brown forced the store manager to open the safe, and Proctor herded customers and clerks behind a counter. 4 As Mrs. Barbara Edgecomb, a customer who was the first to file behind the counter, stopped next to the fatally wounded Burka, she bent down to help him. As she looked up, the robber (identified as Proctor) who had fired the bullet into Burka's back was right there, only three and a half feet away. Mrs. Edgecomb had other opportunities to observe both robbers at varying distances during the seven to eight minutes the robbery consumed. One hour later Burka was dead.
5 By October 1969 the police had information that appellees Proctor and Brown had robbed the liquor store, and that appellee Williams had driven the getaway car. Proctor was quoted as saying that he had shot an old man. After arrest, in a lineup on 4 November 1969 two witnesses identified Proctor and Brown as the gunmen. 6 At the lineup Proctor was represented by the same counsel who later appeared for him at the pre-trial hearing and on this appeal. Brown was also represented by counsel at the lineup; different counsel were subsequently appointed for him and have represented him at the pretrial hearing and on appeal. 7 Brown does not claim that the lineup was unfair; Proctor contends it was. At the lineup the only objection clearly made by any counsel was that the defendants were brought there by an illegal arrest, an issue which is not before us on this appeal. In argument before the three-judge panel counsel for both sides agreed that the record is unclear whether Proctor's counsel objected to the lineup on the grounds that Proctor was the only one of the nine persons who had a goatee. It is agreed that the witnesses at the lineup gave no indication that Proctor was in any way unique. In the lineup picture which we have in the record, it appears that the man next to Proctor has a mustache and goatee, as does Proctor. Six of the nine appear to have mustaches of varying density and style. 8 Appellees' counsel on appeal agreed that, without the lineup photo having been shown to Mrs. Edgecomb, her testimony would be admissible at trial for whatever weight the jury chose to give it.
9 In the pre-trial hearing Mrs. Edgecomb described the gunmen as she saw them at the time of the killing, and was able to give a very detailed description of both men. She said the light in the liquor store was fairly good, that there was no trouble with the light at all. She saw Brown for about three minutes, at times as close as four feet. 1 Proctor she remembered specially when she was standing next to the head of the fallen Burka while Proctor hovered over Burka's feet. 2 Immediately after the killing she and her husband went to the police building, saw a great number of pictures, but were unable to identify either of the two gunmen; nor were they able to do so on three other occasions when shown other photographs by the police. 3 10 After the robbery was over Mrs. Edgecomb did not talk to her husband about what the gunmen looked like, because we wanted to forget about it at that time. While riding to the lineup on 4 November 1969, Mrs. Edgecomb told her husband that she thought she would know the robbers again. However, when she viewed the lineup, she was unable to identify anyone under the lights, which just made people's faces look like blobs. Particularly she could not tell differing complexions. Under the lighting conditions she felt that she could not fairly say for sure. 11 On the way out of the police headquarters Mrs. Edgecomb did say to one of the policemen, I wasn't sure about a certain person in the lineup, but that I wouldn't say yes for sure, that I'd like to see the lineup pictures. On 19 May 1970, about two weeks prior to the scheduled trial, Mrs. Edgecomb came to the office of the prosecutor who was to try the case. In the course of the pretrial interview of the witness, he said, You wanted to see the picture of the lineup, here it is. Mrs. Edgecomb, without being asked or instructed, in the presence of the prosecutor and a detective of the homicide squad (her husband was outside the office), picked up the lineup photograph and systematically went down the line, reading from left to right. Originally she focused on Procter; then she liked Proctor, Brown, and the man on the left end next to Proctor (with mustache and goatee); and finally she chose Proctor and then Brown as the two robbers. Originally Mrs. Edgecomb had described Proctor at the time of the killing as having the beginnings of a mustache and a goateetype beard. On seeing the lineup picture, she commented that the growth of his beard was different, that it was fuller in the lineup picture than at the time of the robbery. D. The Trial Judge's Suppression Order 12 The trial judge ruled that the 4 November 1969 lineup was properly conducted and that two other witnesses, liquor store employees, could testify as to their lineup identification and make whatever in-court identification they could. As to Mrs. Edgecomb,However, the Court feels that in view of the fact that she did not pick out the people at the time of the lineup, and with an abundance of caution on behalf of the defendants, the Court will deny the use of her identification of the defendants in the photograph at a later time. 13 The court further added, 14 In view of the fact that the photographic identification is excluded the Court feels that she should not make an in-court identification of the defendants at the time of her appearance here in fear it might be tainted in some way by the recent viewing of the photograph. 15 Although the trial court did not mention the Fifth or Sixth Amendment in making her suppression ruling, foot-noted in toto and sequentially below, 4 nor did she make a specific finding as to any independent source, it appears that the District Judge's ruling is relevant in the following manner to the two points alleged to be at issue on this appeal: 16 1. Appellees' Sixth Amendment claim under the doctrine of United States v. Wade 5 that representation by counsel was denied at a critical stage: 17 a. It is felt that since this was after the lineup and close to the trial that it would have perhaps been better if counsel had been present at the time. 18 b. I think that if they had been present there would have been no question about it. 19 c. But there is always a question in their minds, defense counsel's minds, as to just exactly what did happen at that time when she had not been able to determine prior thereto. 20 2. Appellees' Fifth Amendment claim of denial of due process on the grounds that the procedures followed were so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification, and the existence or non-existence of any independent source for the in-court identification: 21 a. It appears that Mrs. Edgecomb did have an ample opportunity to observe the two defendants while in the store. 22 b. However, the Court feels that in view of the fact that she did not pick out the people at the time of the lineup, and with an abundance of caution on behalf of the defendants, the Court will deny the use of her identification of the defendants in the photograph at a later time. 23 c. There is no question in the Court's mind that there was nothing improper insofar as her having seen the photograph in Mr. Shuker's office. 24 d. In view of the fact that the photographic identification is excluded the Court feels that she should not make an in-court identification of the defendant at the time of her appearance here in fear it might be tainted in some way by the recent viewing of the photograph. 25 e. In view of the fact that she had seen photographs over a period of time and not made the identification before or at the lineup of the defendants the Court feels that the later identification [of lineup photo] just might be subject to question. 26 f. I don't feel there was anything at all improper about counsel's having shown her the photograph or actually her looking it over. 27 Although the appellees have briefed and argued a Fifth Amendment due process justification for suppression of any in-court identification by Mrs. Edgecomb, the Government contends that an analysis of what District Judge Green said gives absolutely no support to forbidding photographic or in-court identification on Stovall 6 due process grounds, that the trial court clearly ruled that the display of the lineup photograph was itself proper, that the trial court impliedly found an independent source for the witness' identification at trial, and that the trial judge's rationale for suppression was simply the absence of defendants' counsel at the viewing of the lineup photograph, which is a Sixth Amendment ground under the rationale of Wade. 28 II. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Relation to a Witness' Post-Indictment Photographic Identification of a Defendant A. The Photograph in Question At the outset we note the following: 29 1. Counsel for both appellees Proctor and Brown were present at the lineup reproduced in the photograph shown to Mrs. Edgecomb. 30 2. We find no fault or unfairness in this lineup, judging from the picture itself and the testimony concerning it. Neither did the District Court. Brown even now makes no claim of unfairness. On the record it is agreed by both sides that it is unclear whether Proctor's counsel, the same at the lineup as on this appeal, made any allegation that Proctor was the only one with a goatee; it appears in the photograph that the first man on the left, standing next to Proctor, does also have a mustache and goatee. Proctor's only claim to unfairness in the lineup is a possible absence of sufficient goatees. 31 3. The lineup being fair, the photograph itself provides a fair comparison of nine persons from which Mrs. Edgecomb or any other witness at the robbery could make an identification. 32 4. The reason Mrs. Edgecomb did not make an identification at the lineup was plainly and clearly stated at the time to those present, i.e., all of the faces, their shapes and complexions, were equally indistinct to her because of the lighting, and she could not fairly make any kind of choice. We take this reluctance to make an identification under these conditions, not as any indication of Mrs. Edgecomb's uncertainty or lack of ability to make an identification under different conditions, but as an indication of Mrs. Edgecomb's desire to be fair and accurate. 33 5. The witness herself requested, at the time she was leaving the lineup, to see a photograph of the lineup, because she believed she might be able to make an identification of at least one person from a photograph. 34 6. The Government complied with this request, not immediately after the lineup, but some seven months later, two weeks immediately prior to trial, as part of its preparation for trial by interviewing the witnesses as to their prospective testimony. 35 7. The witness herself initiated the discussion of the lineup photograph, without any prompting from the prosecutor or the detective present. She first picked out Proctor as she went down the lineup from left to right, then picked Brown and one other standing next to Proctor (also with mustache and goatee), then finally settled on Proctor and Brown as the two robbers. B. The Authorities 36 Whatever might be said of another post-custodial photographic identification with a type photo or photos different from that we have in the case at bar, there is little in the rationale of Wade which supports the trial judge's action or appellees' position here. Throughout Part IV of the majority opinion in Wade there runs a two-factor rationale for the required presence of counsel at a lineup: 37 A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. 7 38 And, 39 There is serious difficulty in depicting what transpires at lineups and other forms of identification confrontations. . . . The defense can seldom reconstruct the manner and mode of lineup identification for judge or jury at trial. 8 40 From this Justice Brennan's opinion concluded: 41 Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pre-trial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself. 9 42 However, prior to the enunciation of this rationale for right to counsel at lineups in Wade, the Supreme Court in Part III of its opinion had considered other pre-trial preparatory techniques, and concluded that these were different from the lineup. The Government had urged that the lineup was a mere preparatory step, not different for Sixth Amendment purposes from various other actions, such as scientific analysis of fingerprints, blood samples, clothing, hair, and the like. The Court said: 43 We think there are differences which preclude such stages being characterized as critical stages at which the accused has the right to the presence of his counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government's expert witnesses in the presentation of the evidence of its own experts. The denial of a right to have his counsel present at such analysis does not therefore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might derogate his right to a fair trial. 10 (Emphasis supplied.) 44 Obviously the pre-trial photo identification here is not similar to the scientific tests cited by the Court as examples of investigative steps, but we think the same reasoning-there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might derogate his right to a fair trial-applies. Since appellants were represented at the lineup by counsel, the lineup itself met the Sixth Amendment requirements of Wade. The photograph of that lineup is a completely neutral and wholly exact reproduction. 11 As for the possibility of manipulation by the prosecuting attorney in the showing of the photograph to the witness, we do not think the risk of impeding justice is such-considering the professional responsibilities and status of the prosecuting attorney, and the defense counsel's right of cross-examination-as to require that this phase of preparation for trial by the busy prosecuting attorney be encumbered with attendance by defense counsel who has already attended the identification lineup recorded in the photograph. 45 There are many different kinds of photographs, and a wide variety of circumstances in which the validity of their use for criminal identification purposes may arise. The case before us involves a very special kind of photograph and a very special set of circumstances giving rise to its exhibition to the witness. To hold that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in this case, we need not, as some courts apparently have, embrace a general principle to the effect that no photographic showing can ever fall afoul of the Sixth Amendment for the reason that the right to counsel attaches only to confrontations, and confrontations by definition involve the presence of the accused. 12 46 In the case before us there was a confrontation with counsel present. That was the lineup. All we have to decide is whether the subsequent showing of a photograph of that lineup to the witness occurred under circumstances necessitating the presence of counsel. This record shows no such need. Since defense counsel was present at the lineup, the lineup array was fair, and the picture was of the lineup itself, there is thus preserved for reconstruction at trial most of the factors which the Supreme Court in Wade felt required the presence of counsel, even by appellees' definition. 13 As for the manner in which the photograph was presented to the witness, all three persons present were subjected to vigorous cross-examination, and no hint of suggestivity or unfairness in the presentation on the part of the prosecution was elicited. 14 Having had the benefit of this pre-trial hearing, defense counsel is now thoroughly prepared for cross-examination on this pretrial photographic identification. 15 The rationale of Wade 16 has no application here. 47