Opinion ID: 3013899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 577 (Pa. 1993) (table).

Text: evidence showed the following. Shortly before Fauntleroy was killed, he became Fielder initiated a proceeding under involved in an argument with a man Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act named Stefan. Stefan then went into the (PCRA) in which claims of ineffective bar and emerged with Fielder, who began assistance of counsel and after-discovered to argue with Fauntleroy. Several minutes evidence were raised. Fielder’s afterlater, Antonio Goldsmith, a friend of discovered evidence claim was based on Fauntleroy, entered into the argument as the discovery of an alleged eyewitness to well. After the parties came to blows, the shooting, Daran Brown, who stated Fielder reentered the bar and returned to that a man whom he knew by the name of the street with a .38 caliber handgun. As Nike was the one who actually shot Fauntleroy was fleeing, Fielder shot and Fauntleroy. According to Brown, Fielder fatally wounded him. and Fauntleroy were walking down Market Street when “Nike came running down the Two witnesses gave testimony that street” behind them and “started shooting tended to show that Fielder was the one in their direction.” He continued: who shot Fauntleroy. Latonia Shawyer, who was waiting for a bus and did not T his is whe n Za rk previously know either Fauntleroy or [Fauntleroy] was shot and Fielder, testified that she saw Fielder shoot fell down in the middle of Fauntleroy. Goldsmith testified that he ran Market Street. After Zark from the scene when Fielder came out of got shot another guy who I the bar with a gun. Goldsmith stated that, didn’t know chased Nike up while running, he heard two shots and that the street with a gun. At when he turned around, he saw that Fielder this point I left the scene. was chasing him with the gun in his hand. App. 16. The jury found Fielder guilty of Brown stated that he did not come first-degree murder and possession of an forward with this information at the time instrument of crime, and he was sentenced of the shooting because he did want to get to imprisonment for life on the murder involved and because on the street “the conviction and to a lesser concurrent term general feeling is that it is best if you mind for the weapons conviction. Fielder your own business.” App. 16. According appealed, claiming among other things that to Brown, he did not learn that Fielder had 2 been convicted for the shooting until Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Fielder October 1997. Id. argued, first, that the Pennsylvania courts erred when they rejected his claim of The PCRA court denied the newly-discovered evidence and, second, petition, and Fielder appealed and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct advanced two arguments. First, he at trial. The Magistrate Judge to whom the contended that the PCRA court should petition was referred concluded that the have conducted an evidentiary hearing entire petition was untimely. The regarding the after-discovered evidence. Magistrate Judge began by noting that Second, he argued that the attorney who Fielder’s conviction had become final represented him in the trial court during before April 24, 1996, the effective date of the PCRA proceeding was ineffective for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death failing to contact Brown. The Superior Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which Court rejected both arguments. The Court imposed the present statute of limitations held that it was not likely that Brown’s for federal habeas petitions, 28 U.S.C. § testimony would have compelled a 2244(d)(1). As a consequence, the different result if it had been offered at Magistrate Judge stated, Fielder’s time to trial and that therefore the standard under file his petition began to run one year Pennsylvania law for granting a new trial thereafter, on April 24, 1997. See Burns v. based on after-discovered evidence was Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1998). not met. The Court then concluded that The Magistrate Judge concluded that the because the underlying after-discovered one-year period for filing the petition was evidence claim lacked merit, Fielder’s tolled under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2) from lawyer could not be deemed ineffective the date when Fielder filed his PCRA “for failing in his efforts to find Daran petition (January 14, 1997) until the date Brown.” when the Superior Court affirmed the The Superior Court’s decision was dismissal of that petition (June 10, 1999). issued on June 10, 1999, and Fielder failed When the time again began to run after to file a timely allocatur petition with in this period, the M agistrate Judge the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Instead, calculated, approximately three and oneafter the expiration of the time for filing an half months of the one-year period allocatur petition, he submitted a request remained, and therefore Fielder had until for permission to seek allocatur on a nunc “the end of October 1999” to file the pro tunc basis. The state supreme court federal petition. Because he did not file dismissed that request in an order dated until May 2000, the Magistrate held, the October 25, 1999. petition was time-barred. On May 17, 2000, Fielder filed an The District Court approved and application for a writ of habeas corpus in adopted the report and recommendation the United States District Court for the without elaboration and therefore 3 dismissed the application. The District (A) the date on which Court also denied a certificate of the judgment became final appealability, but a motions panel of our by the conclusion of direct Court granted a certificate and set out review or the expiration of issues to be addressed in the briefs. The the time for seeking such order of the motions panel stated: review; The parties shall address (B) the date on which whether appellant’s § 2254 the impediment to filing an petition was timely filed. application created by State Specifically, the parties shall action in violation of the address (1) whether the Constitution or laws of the cognizability of Fielder’s United States is removed, if claim of newly discovered the applicant was prevented evidence affects the from filing by such State application of § action; 2244(d )(1)(D), and (2) (C) the date on which whether § 2244(d)(1)(D) the constitutional right applies to the entire petition a s s e r te d wa s initially if the time period under § recognized by the Supreme 2244(d)(1)(A) for trial Court, if the right has been claims had not expired at the newly recognized by the time of the discovery of the Supreme Court and made factual predicate of the retroactively applicable to claim of new evidence. cases on collateral review; App. at 10. or