Opinion ID: 2610902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Mental Condition and Age as Aggravating Factors

Text: The court gave the standard instructions setting forth the list of aggravating and mitigating factors. (CALJIC former No. 8.84.1.) Defendant asserts the instructions were inadequate in failing to explain that certain factors, including defendant's mental condition and age, must be deemed mitigating ones. He maintains the prosecutor improperly labelled defendant's sociopathic condition and age (41) as aggravating factors. (23) We have held the standard instructions adequate despite their failure to identify the aggravating or mitigating character of the various sentencing factors, because such matters should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 316 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; see People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 118 [249 Cal. Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569].) As for the prosecutor's remarks, no error or misconduct appears: At no time did the prosecutor argue that defendant's mental condition should be deemed an aggravating factor. Our review of the record indicates that, in context, the prosecutor was simply observing that defendant's sociopathic condition, and the resulting antisocial conduct, should not be deemed a mitigating factor. (See People v. Fields, supra, 35 Cal.3d 329, 369-370.) (24) Although he did argue that defendant's age should be deemed aggravating, that argument was interwoven with the theme that, unlike an extremely young or old person, defendant was a mature, experienced individual who made a well-considered decision to undertake the various crimes he committed. Such an argument is a legitimate one. (See People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 302.) As Lucky observes, the statutory word age is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. (45 Cal.3d at p. 302.) We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider Lucky. (See People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d 468, 538-539; People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1062; People v. McLain, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 111.)