Opinion ID: 1827084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Whether he was sentenced in an inappropriate setting and on the basis of erroneous facts.

Text: Arguello was sentenced to ninety years in the state penitentiary for first-degree manslaughter and fifteen years, to be served concurrently, for aggravated assault. He argues that this case should be remanded for resentencing because the sentencing court erroneously considered matters made known in an ex parte conversation, incident reports from the jail that were never made available to him, and testimony concerning an assault by Arguello in the jail while awaiting trial. Prior to Arguello's sentencing hearing on January 10, 1992, a scuffle occurred between Arguello and the jailers. Judge Tice asked for an explanation from a jailer, which led to an ex parte communication prior to defense counsel's arrival in chambers. Arguello asked for a continuance, which was denied. The State's witnesses testified in aggravation of sentence to a prior assault by Arguello against an officer in jail and other jail behavior of Arguello. Arguello presented five mitigating witnesses on his behalf. The court could have sentenced Arguello to life in prison for the first-degree manslaughter conviction. It is well settled that when a sentence is imposed within statutory limits, the discretion exercised by the trial court in fixing it is generally not reviewable on appeal. State v. Christians, 381 N.W.2d 214, 217 (S.D.1986) (citation omitted). The sentencing judge may exercise wide discretion with respect to the type of information used as well as its source. He should have full access to the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. Information which should be available to the court includes general moral character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record. A sentencing judge's access to information should be almost completely unfettered in order that he may acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before him. .... Due process does not require that the scope of information reviewed by the sentencing judge be controlled by the rules of evidence, and consideration of out-of-court information and hearsay evidence is not precluded. State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 508-09 (S.D.1986) (citations omitted). Judge Tice stated in the February 12, 1992 motions hearing that his ex parte discussion with the jailer prior to Arguello's sentencing did not impact his sentences and that his reason for inquiry was solely to determine whether or not I should keep him manacled during the period of time for sentencing purposes and control in the courtroom. Although Judge Tice should not have had this conversation outside the presence of Defense Counsel and State's Attorney, it was necessary to maintain order and control in his courtroom. In addition, Arguello was given an opportunity to counter this information and it appears to us that no undue prejudice resulted. We find no reversible error. While this court has previously held that a trial court's reliance upon erroneous or false information in passing sentence required remanding for reconsideration of the defendant's sentence, State v. Ellefson, 287 N.W.2d 493, 496-97 (S.D.1980), this is not such a case. In sentencing Arguello, the court looked to his past, his lies and his propensity to lie, his conduct in jail, and the egregious crimes he had committed and stated: Your history of criminal conduct as far as convictions are concerned is limited. But the underlying history is troublesome to this Court; as a juvenile, Youth Forestry Camp, training school, job corps; as an adult, constant problems. It's not just Rapid City in which you've had your problems. It's other communities. In trial the jury found that you lied. They found that you were not telling the truth. I fully, totally and completely agree with the jury that your statement was not true. It was a concoction based upon your determination that this is the best way in which you could avoid the consequences for a horrendous crime. The crime is horrendous to this Court in that it was a crime of violence, and as counsel stated, there is no reason why you would kill Mr. High Crane. I can sort of understand why you would have stabbed Mr. Poor Thunder because that was after you had killed his friend. I believe there was no gang or no group of individuals gathering around you. Mr. High Crane was simply asking for a ride home, and for whatever reason, you developed an antagonism against him and you chose to utilize the knife which you had at the time. There was no mutual combat. There was no threat to you in any way, shape or form in the opinion of the Court, and your story is entirely fabricated. It's the opinion of this Court that your conduct in jail has been outrageous. It displays no signs of contrition on your part, no willingness to accept or comply with appropriate standards of conduct within the community, within an environment in which you should have no choice. But you still insist upon conducting yourself in a violent fashion even after the killing of another human being and the stabbing of a second. You threaten officers. You repeatedly spit in their face, repeatedly assaulted officers, repeatedly refused to cooperate. I have reviewed the history in the Pennington County Jail and I'm satisfied you have intentionally not cooperated and made frequent threats. You have a basic problem in the mind of this Court. You cannot control your emotions. You're a very disturbed young man. You believe everyone hates you and you're incapable of doing otherwise at this point. I do not believe this sentence should be for retribution, to deter individuals, or rehabilitation. I think the only thing I can do is treat you as a dangerous individual, potentially dangerous individual. Arguello has not shown that his opportunity to counter aggravating testimony was inadequate or that his sentence was based upon inaccurate information. See Grosh, 387 N.W.2d at 509. We affirm. WUEST and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. MILLER, C.J., concurs specially. HENDERSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.