Opinion ID: 3066139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Foreseeable Loss

Text: In addition to challenging the court’s intended loss calculation, Prakash argues that he should not be held accountable for claims submitted to Medicare under Popov’s provider number. He contends that he did not know Popov and was not aware that Popov was billing Medicare for the Sacramento clinic. Thus, he argues that Popov’s claims for reimbursement were not foreseeable to him. This argument is not persuasive. UNITED STATES V. POPOV 13 When calculating loss attributable to a defendant on the basis of a conspiracy, the Guidelines provide that the relevant conduct includes “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). “The principles and limits of sentencing accountability under this guideline are not always the same as the principles and limits of criminal liability.” Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 1. The focus is on acts for which a defendant should be held accountable rather than criminally liable. Id. Testimony during trial revealed that Prakash saw Popov’s name next to his own name on the clinic sign. Although Prakash argues that employees told him that Popov no longer worked for the clinic, evidence suggests that Prakash knew that Popov had at one time held a role in the conspiracy similar to his own. Furthermore, during trial and at sentencing, the government presented patient charts containing both Popov’s printed name and Prakash’s signature. When viewed in conjunction with the evidence that Popov and Prakash were the only two named physicians on the clinic’s sign, these documents were sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Popov’s bills to Medicare were foreseeable to Prakash. Even though we might have decided the issue differently, we cannot conclude with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Prakash therefore, fails to demonstrate that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous. VACATED AND REMANDED for resentencing.