Opinion ID: 768957
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conviction as to counts three and four--attempted robbery

Text: 14 Count three of the indictment charged Chester with attempting to rob the Kroger grocery store on August 26, 1996 in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Count four charged Chester with carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to this attempted robbery. Chester claims that there was insufficient proof to support his convictions on these two counts because the evidence, at most, supports a finding that he intended to burglarize the Kroger store, not rob it. 15 A conviction must be sustained if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1137 (1999).Robbery is defined as the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b). Burglary, in contrast, does not require the use or threat of force, and consists simply of the unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building or structure with the intent to commit a crime. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990). 16 Conviction for attempting to commit a crime requires [t]he intent to finish the crime, coupled with affirmative acts toward that end. United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 1136 (6th Cir. 1997). Once a defendant takes a substantial step towards the completion of the crime, however, abandonment of the crime is not a defense. United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702, 705-06 (6th Cir. 1994). 17 Chester admitted that he and his brother began to drill a hole in the Kroger store's roof with the intent to enter and commit a crime. The relevant question, then, is whether their intent was to steal from the store and leave before it opened, or to wait inside for an employee to arrive and commit a robbery. 18 When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the facts support a finding that the Adams brothers intended to rob the Kroger store. Both men were carrying guns that morning and, until they were interrupted by the store's alarm, they were following the identical plan that they successfully executed three days later in robbing the Walgreens drugstore. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude from this circumstantial evidence that the Adams brothers intended to rob the Kroger store. 19 B. Sentencing as to counts thirteen, fourteen, twenty-five, and twenty-six--felony possession of a firearm or ammunition 20 Chester next challenges the district court's imposition of separate sentences for four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. These counts are based upon his possession of three handguns and one ammunition clip. The appropriate test when multiple weapons are confiscated is set forth in United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 1976): [O]nly one offense is charged under the terms of § 1202(a)(1) regardless of the number of firearms involved, absent a showing that the firearms were stored or acquired at different times or places. It is the government's burden to establish separate offenses under the statute. See id. 21 The government met its burden in this case as to three of the four counts. It is clear from the face of the indictment that the Bryco 9-millimeter handgun charged in count thirteen, the Ruger 9-millimeter handgun charged in count fourteen, and the Smith & Wesson .380-caliber handgun charged in count twenty-five were each discovered by the police on separate occasions and in different places. Each gun therefore properly served as the basis for a separate violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729, 734 (6th Cir. 1977) (stating, for the guidance of the district court on remand, that a conviction on two separate counts of firearms possession was appropriate where the evidence indicated that the defendant had acquired the two weapons on separate occasions). 22 Chester nevertheless argues that the district court erred by failing to explicitly instruct the jury to determine whether these weapons were separately stored or acquired. Because Chester failed to contemporaneously object to the court's failure to give an instruction on separate possession, we review this omission under the plain error standard. See United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 213 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that [a]ny objection to lack of instruction was waived by defendant's failure to make timely request for a limiting instruction and proceeding to review the omission for plain error affecting substantialrights). Plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Piccolo, 723 F.2d 1234, 1238 (6th Cir.1983). 23 In light of the fact that both the indictment and the evidence demonstrated incontestably that the firearms charged in counts thirteen, fourteen, and twenty-five were possessed in separate places and at separate times, we do not believe that the district court's failure to instruct as to separate possession constituted a grave miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Bonavia, 927 F.2d 565, 570-71 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding separate possession was not plain error where there was sufficient evidence adduced to find that the defendant possessed the two weapons on separate occasions). 24 Chester does raise a valid objection, however, to the appropriateness of count twenty-six of the indictment as a separate charge. Chester dropped or discarded the Smith & Wesson .380-caliber handgun--charged in count twenty-five--when he jumped out of the moving pickup truck on September 7, 1997. When the police caught up with him a few minutes later, they discovered a .380-caliber ammunition clip on his person, for which Chester was charged separately in count twenty-six. Aside from this brief gap in the time of possession, the government introduced no evidence demonstrating that Chester stored or acquired the ammunition clip separately from the gun. 25 Because there was no showing that Chester separately stored or acquired these items, we reverse Chester's conviction on count twenty-six. See Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d at 721 (reversing the defendant's conviction on two of his three counts of firearms possession because there was no showing that the guns were stored or acquired separately). This will not affect Chester's overall sentence, however, because Chester was sentenced to concurrent life terms on these four counts. 26 C. Sentencing as to count fourteen--enhancement for assaulting a police officer 27 Chester received a three-level enhancement on count fourteen (one of the firearm possession counts) for assaulting Officer Roach by firing at her car on the night of September 12, 1996. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for an enhancement if the defendant, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that a person was a law enforcement or corrections officer, assaulted such officer in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b). Chester argues on appeal that he did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that Officer Roach, who was not in uniform and was driving an unmarked car on the night of September 12, was a law enforcement officer. 28 The district court found that Chester did know or have reasonable cause to believe that Officer Roach was a police officer. This finding was based on a whole sequence of events, during which Officer Roach first pulled up alongside the Adams brothers' car and watched them, then pursued them along a circuitous route for an extended time, and came to a stop a block away when the brothers turned into a driveway. Finally, the district court noted that the brothers fired ten to fifteen shots at Officer Roach's car. 29 A district court's finding at a sentencing proceeding that the defendant knew or had cause to believe that he was assaulting a law enforcement officer will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 196 (6th Cir. 1999). After observing Officer Roach's investigative behavior and then opening fire on her vehicle, Chester cannot plausibly maintain that he reasonably believed Officer Roach to simply be an inquisitive civilian. Because the totality of the circumstances supports the district court's finding, we affirm Chester's three-level sentencing enhancement. D. Restitution order 30 Chester finally argues that, pursuant to the recent case of United States v. Dunigan, 163 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. 1999), the district court erred in ordering him to pay $23,890 in restitution. This court in Dunigan held that a district court must consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate when ordering restitution. Id. at 981. Chester contends that [t]he district court made no finding that the defendant had even a minimal chance to pay almost $24,000 in restitution. 31 We review de novo whether a restitution order is legally permissible. See Dunigan, 163 F.3d at 981. If a restitution order is appropriate, the amount of restitution will not be disturbed unless the district court abuses its discretion. See id. We conclude that the district court in the present case did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of restitution. First, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that a restitution order far exceeds his resources and earning potential. See id. at 982; see also United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 774 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that a district court need not make specific findings concerning a defendant's financial condition). Chester has not made such a showing in this case. Second, a restitution order is permissible even if the defendant lacks the present ability to pay. See United States v. Blanchard, 9 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 1993). 32 The fact situation presented in Dunigan was unusual and is distinguishable from that of the present case. In Dunigan the district court ordered the indigent defendant, whose prior income had been under $2,000 a month, to pay the relatively enormous sum of $311,605 within the three-year period of his supervised release. See Dunigan, 163 F.3d at 980. On appeal, this court found that, absent a miracle, such a payment would be impossible. Id. at 982. Chester, on the other hand, was only twenty-nine years old at the time of his sentencing and has a life sentence during which to pay off his $23,890 restitution obligation through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Under these circumstances, the amount of the restitution order does not constitute an abuse of the district court's discretion.