Opinion ID: 70440
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum

Text: 12 The proper method for securing a prisoner's presence at trial is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 4 The denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is committed to the sound discretion of the district court; the district court's ruling is subject to reversal on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. 5 A district court should consider several factors in determining whether to issue the writ. After the defendant shows that the presence of the witness is necessary for an adequate defense, the district court should consider 13 whether the prisoner's presence will substantially further the resolution of the case, the security risks presented by the prisoner's presence, the expense of the prisoner's transportation and safekeeping, and whether the suit can be stayed until the prisoner is released without prejudice to the cause asserted. 6 14 We affirm the district court's denial of the writ because Appellant failed to show that the defense witness was necessary for an adequate defense; Appellant failed to show whether the prisoner's presence would substantially further the resolution of the case. 15 Appellant contends Albert was a critical witness that would have substantiated Appellant's defense of entrapment. However, Appellant failed to proffer the witness's testimony to the district court. In Rinchack this Court found the lack of a proffer sufficient grounds to deny a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 16 The trial transcript from the trial reflects that [the defendant's] request for the presence of his two codefendants was not accompanied by any offer of proof as to the testimony they might be expected to offer ... [T]he burden of showing necessity and relevance is on the defendant ... [T]he failure to carry this burden is a legitimate basis to deny a request to procure the presence of a witness. 7 17 The only indication of what might be expected of the witness was the statement that Appellant would testify, and the witness's testimony would, in essence, be the same testimony, that they would say the same thing. This does not constitute a proffer. A proffer details the facts to which the witness is expected to testify. 8 The mere statement that the absent witness would say the same thing, without detailing what Appellant planned to state, is not sufficient to show that the witness is necessary to an adequate defense of Appellant's case. 18 Appellant's own testimony did not support his entrapment defense. Appellant's underlying reason for the initial rejection of the CI's offer was based on his lack of money. 9 Once the CI told Appellant that he would make a profit from the cocaine when it was resold, Appellant agreed. Appellant's own testimony reveals that it took only ten minutes for Appellant to agree to front the money. Furthermore, Appellant admitted he had been convicted in state court for possession of marijuana with intent to sell approximately two years prior to the drug transaction involved in the appeal sub judice. Appellant's own testimony does not support a defense of entrapment. 10 Even considering Appellant's statement, he would say the same thing as a proffer does not support his defense of entrapment, and therefore does not satisfy Appellant's burden to show that the witness was necessary for an adequate defense.