Opinion ID: 4024341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Extender Statute applies to statutory

Text: claims. We now turn to whether the Extender Statute applies to statutory claims, and not merely to common law claims. We conclude that it does. “The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to ‘presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (quoting Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)). As our Court has long held, “[i]f the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is 20 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN coherent and consistent, judicial inquiry must cease.” Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The text of the Extender Statute is unambiguous. The Extender Statute applies to “any action brought by the [NCUA]” as conservator or liquidating agent, regardless of whether the action is state or federal, or whether the NCUA asserts statutory or common law claims. Because the Extender Statute applies to “any action,” it is improper to read its description of the six-year limitations of contract claims and three-year limitations of tort claims as limiting its scope to only common law contract and tort claims. Instead, the natural reading of the Extender Statute is that it also applies to statutory claims. Indeed, this natural reading of the Statute’s text was adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that a materially similar statute in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act was applicable to actions in which the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) asserted both state and federal claims. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., 712 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit found that “[b]y explicitly stating that ‘the’ statute of limitations for ‘any action’ brought by FHFA as conservator ‘shall be’ as specified in § 4617(b)(12), Congress clearly provided that the extender statute [applied].” Id. at 141–42. (emphasis in original). Because the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry need not go any further. Miranda, 684 F.3d at 849. But if there were any remaining doubt, the legislative history confirms our reading. FIRREA was enacted to “significantly increase the amount of money that can be recovered by the Federal NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 21 Government through litigation, and help ensure the accountability of the persons responsible for the massive losses the Government has suffered through the failures of insured institutions.” 135 Cong. Rec. S10205 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Senator Riegle)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that “[a]s a result [of the financial crisis of the 1980s], Congress enacted . . . [FIRREA] . . . with the objects of preventing the collapse of the industry, attacking the root causes of the crisis, and restoring public confidence.” United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 856 (1996). We find that FIRREA’s legislative history and purpose clearly reflect that Congress intended the Extender Statute to apply to statutory claims. See Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1238–39 (concluding that restricting the Statute to common law claims, “would flatly contradict FIRREA’s explicit purpose”).5 We find unconvincing Appellees’ argument that allowing the Extender Statute to supply the applicable statute of limitations would result in a repeal of a portion of the 1933 Act. When enacting FIRREA, Congress carved out a specific set of rules that applies only to agencies like the NCUA when 5 Though the Tenth Circuit found that the Extender Statute’s text was ambiguous as to whether it was limited to common law claims, it ultimately held that the Statute did apply to statutory claims in part because of FIRREA’s legislative purpose. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1236–42. Additionally, it found that an analysis of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415, the default federal statute of limitations that Congress used as a model when drafting the Extender Statute, also demonstrated that Congress intended for FIRREA to apply to statutory claims. Id. at 1239. The Tenth Circuit held, and we agree, that because § 2415 had been used by courts to apply to statutory claims, this is further evidence that the Statute should not be limited. Id. at 1239, 1241. 22 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN they pursue claims on behalf of failing or failed financial institutions. Thus, applying the Extender Statute results in a narrow exception to the 1933 Act for federal agencies in a limited capacity, and not for any other litigants who file suit. There is no implicit repeal. Given the plain text of the Extender Statute and the legislative history of FIRREA, we hold that the Extender Statute applies to statutory claims, including those brought pursuant the 1933 Act that the NCUA asserts in this action.