Opinion ID: 200371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Walker Evidence

Text: At oral argument, the parties made two helpful and important concessions regarding the scope and significance of the Walker Evidence for Brady analysis purposes. For its part, the government conceded that the Walker Evidence was in its possession and should have been turned over to the defense under Brady and its progeny. Consequently, we are not faced with any dispute regarding what the government knew, or when it knew it. Conley's attorney also narrowed the scope of our Brady inquiry by providing us with what was described as a complete inventory of the possible Brady material pertinent to the -43- testimony of Richard Walker. Conley has identified four documents relating to the Walker's testimony which he claims should have been disclosed under Brady. These are: (1) Walker's March 27, 1995 testimony to the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) of the Boston Police Department (the IAD Testimony); (2) an internal FBI memorandum concerning a proposed polygraph examination of Walker (FBI Memorandum); (3) a January 30, 1995 memorandum by Lieutenant Kevin Foley of the BPD Anti-Gang Unit (Foley Memorandum); and (4) a skeletal BPD report prepared by Walker on February 20, 1995 (the Skeletal Report). -44-
On March 27, 1995, IAD agents interviewed Walker about his observations on the night of the Cox assault. During the interview, Walker was shown a group of photographs in order to identify the plainclothes officers Walker observed at the bottom of the incline. When asked to describe the tall white male he saw at the bottom of the hill, Walker testified, All I know is he was a very tall white male. He was medium build. I forget what he was wearing. Walker was then given a group of photographs of officers from the Anti-Gang Unit, a unit that Conley was not in, and asked him to try to identify the officers he saw. During the interview, Walker identified the photographs of two officers, Joseph Teahan and Michael DeStefano. He was notably tentative in his identification, stating, Like I said, I'm not sure about these photographs, but it looks like the tall officer. Conley claims that he was prejudiced by the suppression of the IAD Testimony because access to the testimony would have enabled him to make an issue of Walker's credibility at trial. The testimony would have allowed him to impeach Walker's memory of events, because Walker's subsequent inability to identify the tall white officer conflicts with the inference made at trial that Conley was the tall white officer at the bottom of the hill. -45- In response, the government offers a number of arguments why the IAD Testimony offers no significant impeachment value, and further, why Walker's unimpeached testimony helped, rather than hurt, the defense's theory of the case. First, the government argues that neither Walker nor the government ever suggested that Walker could identify Conley as the tall, white officer he observed. Instead, it was circumstantial evidence, corroborated by Conley's own testimony, that established that the tall, white officer was the same one he chased after and to whom he returned the dropped radio. Second, the misidentification evidence would have actually weakened the defense offered at trial. That the tall, white officer described by Walker's testimony was in fact Conley was a point defense counsel diligently tried to prove at trial. Placing Conley at the bottom of the hill ahead of Walker helped the defense by allowing it to argue that Conley would not have had time to witness Cox's beating before Conley scaled the fence. Defense counsel's closing argument shows that Conley went to great lengths to use the Walker testimony to prove that Walker observed Conley at the bottom of the incline. Discussing Walker's testimony, defense counsel stated, I believe from the evidence it is fair to say that there can be no doubt in your mind that the tall white officer in plainclothes was Ken Conley. The defense alluded to the ample -46- circumstantial evidence tending to show that the tall, white officer was indeed Conley. During the chase, the tall white officer dropped his radio. Officer Walker says he picked it up. And when the tall white officer apprehended the suspect, put the cuffs on him, with Walker assisting, he gave him back his radio, you dropped this. Walker cannot identify Ken Conley as being that officer. He did not know him, he had not seen him before, and, if you will note, he did not identify him in this courtroom as being that officer. But if you take that testimony in conjunction with [Conley's] Grand Jury testimony that was read to you, you will see that Ken Conley, when he testified before the Grand Jury, said that during the pursuit, I dropped my radio and a black uniformed officer picked it up and gave it to me. There is no doubt that Ken Conley was the tall white officer who apprehended Brown. Tr. IV:51-52 (emphasis added). According to the government, whatever impeachment value the IAD Testimony might have in the abstract, it was never in Conley's interest to impeach Walker's ability to recall events at Woodruff Way. Finally, the government argues that the core of Walker's testimony was that he observed Cox running closely behind Brown, chasing him to the fence and reaching for him. This testimony was corroborated by both Cox and Brown and stood in stark contrast to Conley's statement that he followed Brown to the fence and did not observe anyone chasing after Brown. Thus, although Walker's IAD identifications may have sewn confusion about who was at the bottom -47- of the hill, it was immaterial to the essence of Walker's corroborated testimony.
The second document in Conley's Brady claim is an FBI memorandum concerning a proposed polygraph examination of Walker regarding inconsistent statements he made in his accounts of the assault. At Walker's first interview with IAD on February 23, 1995 (properly disclosed to the defense), Walker stated three times that he saw someone he believed to be a police officer running behind Cox as Cox chased the suspect to the fence. However, in subsequent testimony (also disclosed), Walker made no mention of seeing anyone running behind Cox. When the federal investigation began and the government reviewed Walker's IAD interview on April 9, 1997, investigators met with Walker and questioned him about the discrepancy. After that interview, investigators prepared a memorandum requesting permission to polygraph Walker regarding the inconsistencies. Walker agreed to take a polygraph examination. However, an attorney representing Walker later notified the FBI that Walker would decline to take the polygraph. The FBI Memorandum, which was not turned over to the defense, related: (1) Walker's initial willingness to submit to a polygraph examination; (2) his present belief that he did not see anyone running behind Cox; (3) that when investigators confronted -48- him about the inconsistency between his present belief and his prior statements, he explained that because of his friendship with Cox, he must have convinced himself that he actually saw someone or something when in fact he did not; and (4) that Walker suggested that perhaps if he was hypnotised [sic] he might truly recall what was going on versus what he indicates was tunnel vision. Most of these facts ((1)-(3)) were thoroughly elicited in Walker's testimony before the federal grand jury on June 5, 1997. There, Walker testified that he did not see anyone running behind Cox. During his grand jury testimony, Walker's IAD interview was read back to him at length, and Walker was asked to explain the discrepancy between his grand jury testimony and his prior inconsistent statements. Walker acknowledged the inconsistency and explained his prior statements by asserting that he was probably motivated by a feeling of guilt for not seeing more than [he] saw. Because Conley had access to the IAD interviews, as well as Walker's grand jury testimony, the defense was in possession of nearly all the information contained in the FBI Memorandum. It already possessed substantial information regarding Walker's inconsistent statements and his explanation of the discrepancy between those statements. The only information Conley would have gleaned from the disclosure of the FBI memorandum that he was not -49- already in possession of was (1) that Walker consented to submit to a polygraph examination (which he later refused to take); and (2) the FBI's notes regarding Walker's cryptic statement that if hypnotized, he might be better able to explain the discrepancy between his inconsistent statements.
Conley also alleges that a January 30, 1995 memorandum by Lieutenant Kevin Foley of the BPD Anti-Gang Unit is Brady material that must be considered in his challenge. The three-page memo, prepared less than a week after the Cox assault, summarizes facts that Foley believed justified launching an investigation into the assault. According to Conley, the Foley Memorandum states that Officers Ryan and Teahan came upon Cox lying on a patch of ice as they were returning to their police cars -- not when they arrived on Woodruff way. This statement would support the defense view that it was actually Ryan and Teahan who Walker encountered at the bottom of the hill, not Conley. The government argues that the Foley Memorandum proves very little. First, the government notes that nowhere in the report, written five days after the incident, does Foley indicate that he spoke with members of the Gang Unit, much less Teahan or Ryan in particular. Thus, whether Teahan and Ryan even gave a conflicting account of their actions, or to whom, is not shown by -50- the memorandum. Second, because Officers Teahan and Ryan gave sworn testimony at trial and to previous grand juries contending that they drove down the cul-de-sac and spotted Cox lying on the ground, it is immaterial whether Lieutenant Foley believes they were actually returning to their vehicle.
The final piece of evidence in Conley's Brady claim is Walker's February 20, 1995 report of events, which he was ordered to write by his commanding officer. According to Conley, the report is significant because it was prepared by Walker almost contemporaneously with the assault, yet it lacks any of the facts he recounted at trial. The report is indeed skeletal, containing only a few sentences of text explaining the events on Woodruff Way. Conley argues that its omissions could have been usefully exploited during cross examination. The government contends that although the skeletal report does not contain any details, its usefulness for impeaching Walker would be greatly diminished by the fact that in the same memo in which Walker was instructed to write the report, he was ordered to appear for an interview with IAD three days later. At that interview, Walker gave a highly detailed accounting of his observations.