Opinion ID: 1152460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the trial court's order a final order?

Text: As a threshold issue, we consider whether the trial court's order is a final, appealable order. Although none of the parties have raised this issue, we raise it sua sponte because this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a non-final order. See, e.g., B.L. Goldberg & Assocs. v. Uptown, Inc., 103 N.M. 277, 278, 705 P.2d 683, 684 (1985). The trial court's order [1] states, in pertinent part: 1. Daniel Britt sustained an accident on April 22, 1994; 2. Daniel Britt may be legally entitled to recover damages [from] the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle; 3. The accident arose out of the use of an uninsured motor vehicle; 4. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.... IT IS THEREFORE, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff Daniel Britt is covered [under the uninsured motorist provisions of the insurance policies] and that this matter should proceed to arbitration[ [2] ] to determine whether Daniel Britt is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle and if so, in what amount. Both Dairyland and Phoenix timely filed notices of appeal after entry of this order, and arbitration has apparently been stayed pending this appeal. Although the trial court's judgment resolved the question whether the circumstances surrounding Britt's injury constituted an accident ar[ising] out of the use of an uninsured motor vehicle, the court did not resolve two other key issues in this litigation: (1) whether Britt is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of the uninsured vehicle; and (2) whether the insurers must indemnify Britt for his damages. In this jurisdiction an order is ordinarily interlocutory, and thus it is not appealable, unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible. Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1992) (quoting B.L. Goldberg & Assocs., 103 N.M. at 278, 705 P.2d at 684). We conclude that this order is a final order from which an appeal may be taken. In reaching this determination, we adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning that an order compelling arbitration is final if it is the `last deliberative action of the court' with respect to the controversy before it. Manning v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 833 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004, 1005 (2d Cir.1933)). Although the trial court may confirm or vacate any award following arbitration, its review is very narrow and, as far as the merits of the controversy are concerned, the court is finished with the case when it goes to the arbitrators. See Krauss Bros. Lumber Co., 62 F.2d at 1005. We hold that the trial court's order was final for purposes of appeal.