Opinion ID: 2126069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Petitioner alleges on appeal that he was inadequately advised of certain of his constitutional rights prior to the entry of his guilty plea. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1979) provides that before a trial judge accepts a plea of guilty, he must first, among other things, inform the defendant of the possible sentence which he may receive, and inform him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment or information. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial judge read count II of the charging indictment for felony murder and delegated the responsibility of reading the statute upon which the charge was based, to the prosecutor. The petitioner was then questioned by the court as to whether he fully understood the charge and the penalty, to which he answered in the affirmative. Petitioner alleges on appeal that such procedures do not fully comply with the statute which mandates that the trial judge make each and every advisement provided therein. We agree with the petitioner that the trial judge erred in delegating the reading of the statute to the prosecutor. However, in view of our recent decision in Neeley v. State, (1978) Ind., 382 N.E.2d 714 (Prentice dissenting with opinion in which DeBruler joined), wherein the court retreated from the dicta of Justice Hunter, [1] cited by petitioner, it is not material who gives the advisements, so long as the record of the guilty-plea hearing reflects that the defendant was advised of and understood the substance of his rights. With respect to petitioner's claim that he was not advised that by pleading guilty he would be admitting the truth of the facts contained within the indictment, once again the trial court's advisement failed to comply literally with the language in the statute, however, we do not find it to be reversible error in this case. In establishing a factual basis for the plea, the State introduced into evidence a statement made by the petitioner subsequent to his arrest. In his statement the petitioner admitted to having been a participant in the felony murder with which he was charged. At the guilty plea hearing, in response to questions by the trial judge, the petitioner stated that the facts contained in the statement were true. Inasmuch as the truth of the statement was acknowledged, and inasmuch as the facts therein related constituted the crime charged and to which the petitioner entered his guilty plea, we find that the trial court's advisement under the circumstances of this case, sufficiently conformed with § 35-4.1-1-3 as to constitute an adequate inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea.