Opinion ID: 616864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wirth is entitled to qualified immunity as to Wheeler's claim regarding the alleged seizure of certain items without probable cause.

Text: Because a reasonable officer would have believed that there was probable cause to seize all of the items listed in the warrant, Wirth is entitled to qualified immunity as to this aspect of Wheeler's Fourth Amendment claim. The warrant to search Wheeler's apartment listed fourteen categories of items to be searched for and seized, but Wheeler argues that only four of those fourteen categories were sufficiently supported by the warrant affidavit. In listing the facts establishing probable cause, the warrant affidavit only referred to information gathered in regard to two of the burglaries being investigated by Wirth and Sharp. This is because, in seeking the warrant, Wirth and Sharp were relying mainly on the admissions of Tywone Brown, and he only claimed to have been involved in two home invasions, both of which he alleged took place in the City of Lansing on January 22, 2008. The warrant affidavit accordingly referred only to items allegedly taken in those robberies, which included televisions, a digital camera, game systems, and cash. However, the warrant described the following as the items to be searched for and seized: proof of ownership and/or occupancy; and evidence of home invasions, including shotguns, long guns, computer and stereo equipment, cameras, DVD players, video game systems, big screen televisions, necklaces, rings, other jewelry, coin collections, music equipment, and car stereo equipment. Wheeler contends that this disparity between the warrant affidavit and the warrant led to the inclusion of items in the warrant without the requisite probable cause, but Wirth is entitled to qualified immunity even if there was a constitutional violation. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides that an affidavit must contain adequate supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377 (6th Cir. 1996). From whatever source, the information presented must be sufficient to allow the official to independently determine cause; `his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.' Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). However, [G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In order to determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we must look at the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in relation to clearly established law. Id. An officer is not entitled to this immunity when the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred[;] ... the violation involved a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known[; and]... the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights. Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). But we need not determine each of these elements in that order, as we can hold that an official is entitled to qualified immunity without determining whether a constitutional violation has actually occurred. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-42, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). This is exactly what we do here. Even assuming that Wirth violated Wheeler's Fourth Amendment rights, Wheeler has not shown that it was a clearly established violation for Wirth to rely on the warrant issued to search Wheeler's apartment. For a right to be a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known, [t]he contours of that right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has been previously held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Id. (citation omitted). Fourth Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that a warrant must be supported by probable cause, which is usually laid out in the warrant affidavit. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971). Further, we can assume for the sake of this qualified-immunity analysis that Wheeler's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers seized items that were identified in the warrant but not supported by probable cause in the warrant affidavit. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808. Regardless, such a deficiency is unusual, and thus it was reasonable for Wirth to fail to recognize it, especially considering the fact that the warrant affidavit and the warrant were drafted by a prosecuting attorney and that the warrant was approved by the state magistrate. Much of the problem Wheeler alleges here is not with the warrant, but with the warrant affidavit. Moreover, unlike in most cases dealing with a defective warrant affidavit, this affidavit is clearly not deficient in establishing probable cause to search, and Wheeler acknowledges that the affidavit obviously provides such probable cause. Instead, the deficiency alleged is in establishing probable cause to seize certain items listed in the warrant, an error that would not be apparent to the reasonable police officer. The fact that officers can seize items not listed in a warrant also makes Wirth's reliance on the allegedly defective warrant in this case reasonable. We have held that even evidence `not described in a search warrant may be seized if it is reasonably related to the offense which formed the basis for the search warrant.' United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Fortenberry, 860 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1988)). Thus, if something constitute[s] evidence of the commission of a criminal offense and was an instrumentality of a crime[,] [i]t [can] be seized although not specifically listed in the search warrant. United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Alloway, 397 F.2d 105, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1968)). Though the situation here is somewhat differentthat is, Wheeler alleges not that the officers were seizing items that were not in the warrant, but instead that they were seizing items that were included in the warrant without a proper foundation for their seizure being laid in the affidavitthis ability to seize items not even included in the warrant makes it more reasonable for Wirth to believe that he could seize items identified in the warrant, even if the warrant affidavit failed to properly support their seizure. The basis for the warrant, in Wirth's view, was the commission of the home invasions in both Ingham County and Eaton County. Thus, it was reasonable for him to believe that, as long as the search warrant established probable cause for the search, which it clearly did, he could seize any items he encountered that constituted evidence of the commission of the home invasions, which stolen property clearly does. Wirth is thus entitled to qualified immunity from this aspect of Wheeler's Fourth Amendment claim. Even though Wirth urges us to determine whether the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the seizure of certain items in the warrant, we need not do so for purposes of granting qualified immunity and do not have jurisdiction to do so for purposes of Wirth's cross-appeal. In his cross-appeal, Wirth challenges the district court's determination that Wirth violated Wheeler's Fourth Amendment rights, even though the district court ultimately held that he was immune from suit pursuant to this violation. Because Wirth was ultimately successful in his motion for summary judgment, we lack jurisdiction to consider this cross appeal. There is generally no appellate jurisdiction when the appellant does not seek a change in the relief ordered by the judgment appealed from. For instance, we stated in ASARCO, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 206 F.3d 720, 722 (6th Cir. 2000), that a prevailing party cannot appeal an unfavorable aspect of a decision in its favor, and that [a]ppellate courts review judgments, not statements in an opinion. We acknowledge the Supreme Court's recent holding in Camreta v. Greene, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2032, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011), that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a lower court's holding that a party violated the Constitution even though the party prevailed on qualified immunity grounds in the lower court. The Court based this conclusion on the fact that the lower court's ruling would be considered to settle a question of constitutional law and thereby guide the conduct of officials in the future. Id. The purpose and effect of such a ruling, the Supreme Court reasoned, permits its being reviewed at the behest of the prevailing immunized official. Id. The Court emphasized in Camreta, however, that its holding addresse[d] only [the Supreme Court's] authority to review cases in this procedural posture. Id. at 2033. It did not address whether lower courts of appeals must hear appeals brought by similarly prevailing parties. Moreover, the Court recognized that the considerations persuading [it] to permit review of petitions in this posture may not have the same force as applied to a district court decision, because such decisions by a district court are not binding precedent in any future matters. Id. at n. 7. In light of this difference, at least one court of appeals has noted that prevailing immunized parties cannot appeal a district court's newly declared constitutional right in the higher courts. Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1999); but see Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 96 (D.C.Cir. 2000) (assuming that when plaintiffs in Bivens cases appeal adverse immunity rulings, the winning officials can cross-appeal the ruling against them regarding the constitutionality of their actions). Permitting review of a prevailing party's claim creates tension with Article III's prohibition against issuing advisory opinions. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126, 65 S.Ct. 459, 89 L.Ed. 789 (1945). This is because the prevailing party has already obtained a judgment in his or her favor, and thus is not asking the court to review the lower court's judgment on appeal but instead a basis or reason for that judgment. The duty of this court... is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895). This consideration, and the fact that the district court's decision below does not present the sort of concern with the creation of precedent that the Supreme Court confronted in Camreta, lead to the conclusion that we are without jurisdiction to review Wirth's cross-appeal. Further, as explained above, we need not determine on Wheeler's appeal whether the warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the seizure of certain items in the warrant in order to hold that Wirth is entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, we state no opinion as to whether a constitutional violation occurred from the execution of the warrant with respect to items not identified as stolen in the crime descriptions supporting the existence of probable cause.