Opinion ID: 1777366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: defective product as negligence per se

Text: Because our holding rejects the no-fault strict liability concept of the Restatement, we deem it appropriate to reemphasize that our retention of the fault concept is to be treated in the context of a defective condition, which renders the product unreasonably dangerous or unsafe when put to its intended use, rather than in the context of traditional notions of negligence law. The gravamen of the action is not that the defendant failed to exercise due care in the manufacture, design, sale or placing in the commercial stream a defective product; rather, the gravamen of the action is that the defendant manufactured or designed or sold a defective product which, because of its unreasonably unsafe condition, injured the plaintiff or damaged his property when such product, substantially unaltered, was put to its intended use. Vital to the fault concept, of course, are the allowable defenses which are discussed in a later section of this opinion. We re-emphasize at the outset, however, that, given the allegation and proof of injury resulting proximately from the product's defective condition, the defendant may not avail himself of proof that he exercised due care in the manufacture and sale of the product. Subject to the allowable defenses, the care with which a defective product is manufactured and sold is immaterial. Before closing our discussion under this section of the opinion, we hasten to ease the minds of those who may feel that our holding here is a radical departure from established case law. It is not. A few observations respecting our cases dealing with manufacturer's liability will demonstrate that this fault based defective product theory should not be viewed as either radical or novel to established precedents in our jurisdiction. This Court has frequently treated the defective condition of the product as the basis of a cause of action although negligence was charged. Ford Motor Co. v. Thomas, 285 Ala. 214, 231 So.2d 88 (1970); Norton v. Harrelson, 278 Ala. 85, 176 So.2d 18 (1965); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Morris, 273 Ala. 218, 136 So.2d 883 (1961). And see the concurring opinion of Justice Maddox in Geohagan v. General Motors Corp., 291 Ala. 167, 279 So.2d 436 (1973). These cases indicate a recognition by this Court that a plaintiff has an almost impossible burden of meeting the due care test required in traditional negligence cases. We believe this burden, however, can be lightened without abandoning the philosophy of a long line of cases and short of adopting the so-called doctrine of strict liability in tort. A mere extension of the holding of those prior cases leads us to conclude that selling a dangerously unsafe chattel is negligence within itself. It is important to understand that we are not saying (by the use of the term negligence within itself) that the proof of a defective condition, which renders the product unreasonably dangerous, is evidence or circumstances from which the jury may infer negligence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not here applicable since it is an evidentiary principle within the traditional law of negligence. As Dean Wade has observed: In essence, strict liability in this sense is not different from negligence per se. Selling a dangerously unsafe product is the equivalent of negligence regardless of the defendant's conduct in letting it become unsafe . . . selling a dangerously unsafe chattel is negligence within itself. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 14 (1965). This amounts to no more than saying in traditional language that a defendant is liable if he puts on the market a product which is not reasonably safe, and the plaintiff is injured as a result of a contemplated use of that product. By this rule, we do not abandon the fault concept as has been done in some jurisdictions. By holding that selling a dangerously unsafe product is negligence per se, we are not adopting a no-fault concept. The fault of the manufacturer, or retailer, is that he has conducted himself unreasonably in placing a product on the market which will cause harm when used according to its intended purpose. The manufacturer, or retailer, is held liable because he has created an unreasonable risk of harm. The historical and traditional purpose of tort law has been to protect individuals against such risks. The only real difference between strict tort liability and the traditional negligence theory in products liability cases is that those courts which have adopted the rule of strict liability look to the dangerous characteristics of the end product, rather than the methods or processes by which it was produced. This represents a shift in emphasis from the manufacturer's or retailer's, conduct to the performance of his product. While the results may be the same when applied to the liability of any given defendant  meaning simply a defendant must pay the consequences of placing an unreasonably dangerous product on the market  it does not preclude a defendant from asserting as a defense against such claims the lack of any causal relationship between his conduct and the defective condition of the product. Liability, subject to allowable defenses, attaches solely because the defendant has exposed expected users of a product not reasonably safe to unreasonable risks. When this is shown, scienter is supplied as a matter of law. In the words of Dean Wade: [I]t is negligence to sell a product which lacks the attribute of due safety. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, 44 Miss.L.J. 835. This is morally and legally correct. To establish liability: (1) A plaintiff must prove he suffered injury or damages to himself or his property by one who sold a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if (a) the seller was engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it was expected to, and did, reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. (2) Having established the above elements, the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case although (a) the seller had exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer had not bought the product from, or entered into any contractual relation with, the seller. American Motors argues that the public policy of Alabama is that negligence is the basis of liability in products liability litigation. We agree. To base liability on anything else would be in violation of long-established principles. A number of cases are cited for the proposition that manufacturers', or retailers', liability has been based on negligence. We adhere to this proposition. We simply hold that selling a dangerously unsafe product is negligence as a matter of law. We do not believe that adopting this rule conflicts with the public policy of this State. Changes to the proposed Uniform Commercial Code by the Alabama Legislature enlarged the concept of privity, in extending the seller's warranty to any natural person who might be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods. American Motors argues that these changes were not meant to imply the adoption of strict tort liability. We agree; but it is an indication of the legislature's recognition that the old privity shield against liability was no longer to be tolerated in this State. American Motors also argues that the leading case of Greenman, and its progeny, the Restatement of Torts 2d, § 402A; the Comment to it; and the writings of Dean Prosser, Dean Wade, Kenneth B. Wright, and other legal scholars are not binding authority on the courts of Alabama. We agree that such authorities are not binding on us. Furthermore, it is contended that the conclusion of some of these scholars that Alabama has adopted strict tort liability by statute is to be given no weight. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966). Whether the legislature has adopted strict liability by statute is not presented. We do, however, find some guidance in Alabama's version of the UCC of what the legislative policy is. The non-uniform version of the UCC, adopted in 1965 as Act No. 549, effective January 1, 1967, attached six major amendments to the UCC. They are as follows: (1) § 2-316 was amended to add subsection 5 prohibiting the seller from limiting or excluding his liability for damages for injuries to the person in the case of consumer goods. (2) § 2-318 was amended to extend the ambit of the seller's warranty to any natural person who might reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. (3) § 2-714(2) was amended so as to make it clear that the damages allowable in actions for injury to the person are the same as those damages ordinarily allowable in such actions at law. (4) § 2-715(2)(b) was added to allow the recovery of consequential damages in cases involving injuries to personal property resulting from a breach of warranty. (5) § 2-719(4) was added to prevent the seller from contractually modifying or limiting the buyer's remedy in cases for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods. (6) § 2-725(2) was amended to provide that a cause of action for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods arises when the injury occurs as opposed to when the sale takes place, thus extending the statute of limitations. These amendments serve as an expression of public policy. In adopting these amendments, the legislature departed from the strict rule of privity in products liability cases and otherwise augmented the rights of injured consumers. These amendments have led Dean Prosser, as mentioned above, to conclude that Alabama has adopted strict tort liability by statute. We do not necessarily agree with this. We do believe, however, that defendants who are ordinarily engaged in the business of marketing products should be liable for the foreseeable harm proximately resulting from defective conditions in the products which make them unreasonably dangerous. Such a policy is not unreasonable and is compatible with the policy of the legislature as demonstrated by the amendments to the UCC. We are of the opinion that the legislature has made manifest that policy of the state by expanding the UCC. Relevant to both parties' arguments is Geohagan. There, this Court held that even though the legislature had expanded the cause of action for breach of warranty, the Wrongful Death Statute, Title 7, § 123, Code, was not affected, as the basis of the action was still contractual. American Motors implies that since the legislature has not spoken on the subject since Geohagan, it does not want to expand the law of torts in Alabama to include strict liability. This may be true, but, since we are not adopting the doctrine, we see no need to speak to that argument. Developing case law in accord with the announced public policy of the State has always been conceded to be a proper role for this Court. Proving want of due care in products liability cases involving complicated manufacturing processes can be almost impossible; the plaintiff should not be forced to prove more than that the defendants placed on the market a product not reasonably safe when used for its intended purpose and that, as a proximate result, injury ensued.