Opinion ID: 848860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of the Case on Appeal

Text: Turning to the facts of this case, the prosecution seeks to extend the transaction that began with the in-store taking to include the struggle in the parking lot. We point out that defendant not only failed to escape, but, more importantly, did not accomplish his taking by the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. [17] While store security personnel observed him, defendant removed several items from the display shelves of the Meijer store and concealed them beneath his coat. He continued to retain possession of this property as he picked up two quarts of oil, went to a checkout lane, paid for the oil and walked from the store. The first use of force or violence was in the parking lot when a security guard attempted to restrain him. Hence, his use of force or violence was not to take the property, but to retain it and escape apprehension. It follows that defendant did not commit the offense of unarmed robbery. The dissent makes much of the fact that the unarmed robbery statute applies to a taking from the person of another, or in his presence,  but overlooks the context of that language. The dissent relies heavily on the notion of constructive possession and the intent to permanently deprive. However, we are left without a satisfactory explanation of why the use of force that does not accomplish a taking would escalate the offense of larceny to unarmed robbery. The dissent asserts that force used after a taking, while the victim has constructive possession of stolen property or while it is in the victim's presence, supports a charge of robbery. Notably, however, in each of the dissent's examples, the force used was to accomplish the ultimate taking. That did not occur in this case. The dissent attempts to merge a subsequent force not used to accomplish a taking with the completed taking that preceded the force. [18] We think it significant that the statute identifies unarmed robbery as the taking of another's property in the other's presence  by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear. MCL 750.530 (emphasis added). If the physical taking were accomplished without force, assault, or fear, the statute does not permit treating the larcenous crime as a robbery because of a subsequent forceful act. Such force used to retain stolen property is simply outside the scope of M.C.L. § 750.530. [19] That defendant cannot be convicted of unarmed robbery is particularly clear here, because his force by no means accomplished a severing of the store's constructive possession of the merchandise. We note that defendant's taking of the merchandise in this case is indistinguishable from the taking in Bradovich. Therefore, when defendant placed the merchandise under his clothing, he committed a taking without force, and his conduct constituted a completed larceny. The concealment evidences that, at the time he took the merchandise, defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner, Meijer, of it. Defendant's later acts, whether viewed as an unsuccessful attempt to retain the property or as an attempt to escape, are too removed from the completed taking to be considered contemporaneous. [20] The dissent's reliance on People v. Podolski [21] is misplaced. In Podolski, this Court held the defendant responsible for felony murder when, after a robbery, one police officer shot and killed another while the robbers exchanged fire with the police. This Court did not base the felony murder on a transactional notion of robbery. Rather, the unanimous Court asserted that `when a felon's attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.' Id. at 515-516, 52 N.W.2d 201, quoting Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 190-191, 53 A.2d 736 (1947). Where the issue is whether the force exerted during a robbery was used in taking the property of another, not whether it was a foreseeable consequence, Podolski is not on point. Therefore Podolski and its progeny are not persuasive by analogy as the dissent contends. Finally, we disagree with the dissent's claim that we have created an impractical framework for unarmed robbery. The dissent greatly exaggerates the confusion generated by overruling the transactional approach. The rule is simple: a defendant commits an unarmed robbery when he takes the property of another by the use of force, violence, or putting in fear. After the initial larcenous act has been completed, the use of force against the victim to retain the property taken does not transform it into armed robbery. [22] The force, violence or putting in fear must be used before or contemporaneous with the taking. We overrule the transactional approach to unarmed robbery and reassert that the force, violence, assault or putting in fear underlying the robbery must occur before or contemporaneously with the felonious taking. Because this defendant did not use force, violence, assault, or putting in fear to accomplish his taking of property, he did not commit unarmed robbery. [23] Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals panel, albeit using a different analysis, that the charge of unarmed robbery was not supported by the evidence. Therefore, we affirm its decision insofar as it reverses defendant's conviction.