Opinion ID: 182136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: congressional purpose in acquiring the memorial

Text: Under both Lemon and Van Orden, we first inquire as to the purpose of the government action to determine whether it is predominantly secular in nature. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701-02, 125 S.Ct. 2854; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105. We hold that Congress's acquisition of the Memorial was predominantly secular in its goals. As an initial matter, Jewish War Veterans argues that, to determine purpose, we need look no further than the Cross itself. In its view, the government action itself besp[eaks] the purpose because the Latin cross is the preeminent symbol of Christianity. This argument is at bottom one regarding the Memorial's predominant effect, and we consider it more appropriate to address in our discussion of effects below. See infra Section III. The Supreme Court explained in McCreary that the purpose inquiry does not call for any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Rather, [t]he eyes that look to purpose belong to an objective observer, one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the secular purpose must be genuine, not a sham, id. at 864, 125 S.Ct. 2722, when a statute is at issue, we must defer to Congress's stated reasons if a plausible secular purpose ... may be discerned from the face of the statute, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983). The purpose of Congress's acquisition of the Memorial was predominantly secular in nature. The Act sought to preserve a historically significant war memorial ... as a national memorial honoring veterans of the United States Armed Forces. Pub.L. No. 109-272, § 2(a). As the district court noted, the statute is not directed to the cross per se, nor does it require the continued presence of the cross as part of the memorial; it simply requires the Mount Soledad site be maintained as a veterans' memorial. The Act's statement of purpose likely ends the inquiry. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95, 103 S.Ct. 3062. Nevertheless, the Act is arguably ambiguous to the extent that it seeks to preserve a historically significant war memorial. Pub.L. 109-272 § 2(a) (emphasis added). In Paulson, the case invalidating the City's 1998 land sale to the Association, we held that only the Cross on Mount Soledad bears historical significance. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132 n. 5 (emphasis added). Under Paulson, the Act could be read to aim at preserving the Cross, which would arguably make its purpose predominantly religious. But even assuming that the Act is ambiguous, the legislative history reflects Congress's predominantly secular purpose in acquiring the Memorial. [9] Representative Hunter, for example, described the Cross as not only a religious symbol, but also a venerated landmark beloved by the people of San Diego for over 50 years and a fitting memorial to all persons who have served and sacrificed for our Nation as members of the Armed Forces. 152 Cong. Rec. H5423 (daily ed. July 19, 2006); see also id. at H5422-02 (stating that Mount Soledad is without question a world-class memorial, dedicated to all of those, regardless of race, religion[,] or creed, who have served our armed services). Representative Issa similarly stated that the Memorial was intended to do what it does for the vast majority of San Diegans and people who come to our fair city. It honors our war veterans for the sacrifice they made. Id. at H5424. According to Representative Issa, the acquisition was consistent with how we as Americans have honored our war dead and those who have given in service to our country and advanced the freedom for people to observe their God as they chose fit. Id. Representative Bilbray argued for the Act on the grounds of religious tolerance and the memorial's secular historical significance. He cited the presence of many religious symbols on public lands in San Diego County and argued that this is not about religion; it is about the tolerance of our heritage and the memorials to those who have fought for our heritage across the board. Id. at H5425. Finally, although Senator Sessions introduced the Senate bill as intended to preserve the cross that stands at the center of Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial ... that is under attack by the ACLU, he underlined that the Cross was part of a memorial that has secular monuments also. 152 Cong. Rec. S8364 (daily ed. July 27, 2006). Taken together, the floor statements support the text's demonstration of Congress's predominantly secular purpose in acquiring the Memorial. Jewish War Veterans's arguments to the contrary do not change our view. In particular, the evidence of the role of Christian advocacy organizations in the Act's passage is not probative of Congress's objective. Although such advocacy can form part of the context for determining an act's purpose, see, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-09 & n. 16, 89 S.Ct. 266, we must take into account the often complex, attenuated, and mediated relationship between advocacy and legislation. Although the advocacy by Christian organizations may have been a contributing factor to the Act's drafting and passage, the record does not establish that the sectarian goals of the advocates can be reasonably attributed to Congress as a whole. In the end, what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249, 110 S.Ct. 2356 (emphases omitted). [10] In crediting congressional purpose, we underscore, however, that these congressional statements reflect congressional sentiment and are not necessarily reflective of the factual record before us. We turn to the actual record to assess the primary effect of the Memorial.