Opinion ID: 1496361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Disciplinary Standards

Text: The DHP found, and the record confirms, that Mr. Madison made statements in court and in letters to two Jackson County circuit court judges in which he suggested a lack of integrity of judges before whom he had appeared and of the judicial process, including accusations that the judges were arbitrary and ill-qualified to be judges, that one judge was part of an evil network of judges and lawyers, that one judge acted with a ruthless abuse of power and contempt for the law, and that one judge was unethical and the other had stained her judicial robes forever by her improprieties. Mr. Madison admits he made the statements at issue but stands by them. He asserts that his comments were carefully researched, and that his conduct and statements neither violate the disciplinary rules nor subject him to sanction and certainly do not merit suspension. The DHP found that, to the contrary, Mr. Madison's actions violated Rule 4-3.5(d), Rule 4-8.2(a) and Rule 4-8.4(d). Rule 4-3.5(d), directed toward a lawyer's conduct toward a tribunal, states: A lawyer shall not: ... engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. Rule 4-8.2(a), directed toward false or reckless allegations by the lawyer as to the qualifications or integrity of a judicial officer, states: A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office. Rule 4-8.2(a). Rule 4-8.4(d), directed toward the conduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court in general, states: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Mr. Madison implicitly suggests that, in determining whether he violated these disciplinary rules, this Court should consider his subjective intent. Unless it finds that he subjectively intended to disrupt the tribunal when he continued to argue with one judge after the judge ruled against his client in a landlord-tenant matter, and unless it disagrees that he researched each and every assertion carefully before coming to an `honest' opinion about each statement about both judges, he argues the Court should find that no violations occurred. In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. banc 1991), rejected a subjective standard. Westfall held that an objective standard applies, under which the finding of a violation depends on what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his professional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances. Id. at 837, quoting In Re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322, cert. denied sub nom., Graham v. Wernz, 498 U.S. 820, 111 S.Ct. 67, 112 L.Ed.2d 41 (1990).