Opinion ID: 197636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: By the District Court

Text: A. By the District Court We first address appellants' contention that the district court was required to defer both to the hearing officer's findings of fact and to her rulings of law, and that alleged errors require that we reverse and order judgment for appellants for full reimbursement. The IDEA provides that upon appeal from a state administrative officer's decision, the federal district court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2). In exercising its authority under the statute, a district court must address the following questions: -3- First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? Second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). On appeal from a district court judgment in a case arising under this statute and these precedents, parents must do more than show that a defendant school district or a state agency did not in every respect comply formally with (as phrased in the first question identified in Rowley) the procedures set forth in the act, including prescribed requirements for placement and for developing an IEP. The parents must show some default or deficiency material to outcome. See Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1088 (1st Cir. 1993). In this instance, the magistrate judge's introductory statement of the standard of district court review is consistent with the statute and Rowley. Order of March 17, 1997 at 8-9. In developing their argument that the magistrate judge's reasoned explanation of his decision failed to consider and give 'due deference' to the Administrative Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law, appellants allude from time to time to testimony of Mrs. F that had not been transcribed. At no point in the record before us, however, or indeed in oral argument, has any suggestion been made of deliberate destruction or withholding of a tape or transcript. In proceedings before the magistrate judge, each party had the opportunity to call attention to any -4- evidence and argument that could raise a genuine dispute of material fact fatal to the other party's motion for summary judgment. In these circumstances, the record does not support an argument that either the district court or this court, in determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact existed, should infer that Mrs. F's relevant observations and opinions, and reasons for them, were not adequately presented in the record that was before the magistrate judge despite the missing transcript. The magistrate judge's reasoned explanation of his decision, in the 25-page ORDER issued, satisfied the terms and conditions of district court review and deference explained in Burlington, 736 F.2d at 792 (A federal trial court is free to accept or reject the findings [of the hearing officer] in part or in whole as long as it considers and responds to all material findings). Appellants' assertion that statutes and precedents require deference to an administrative hearing officer's rulings of law is not well founded. Legal rulings are subject to de novo review, both in the district court and in this court. A district court reviewing an administrative officer's rulings of law under the IDEA framework is acting appropriately in disregarding any rulings about applicable law that are not in conformity with applicable statutes and precedents. See Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 231 (1st Cir. 1983). An administrative hearing officer's rulings of law, even if fully reasoned (and the more so when stated without an explained basis, as were some of the -5- rulings that the district court disregarded in this instance) are not entitled to deferential review. No deferential review is appropriate even if the rulings of law concern interpretation of a state statute or state judicial decisions rather than federal law. With respect to a hearing officer's findings of fact, it is true that a reviewing district court is directed to give deference to them. Due deference, however, does not require deference to a finding the cogency of which is impaired by the hearing officer's dependence on an error of law. A district court can disregard an administrative officer's findings of fact whenever the court determines that they are unreliable or incorrect in light of the totality of the record. See Abrahamson, 701 F.2d at 230. In this case, because of the officer's errors in applying both federal and state law as the officer considered the facts (as explained in subsequent parts of this opinion), the magistrate judge's decision, as a matter of law on motion for summary judgment, not to defer to the officer's factual findings was not erroneous as a matter of law and was not an abuse of discretion. B. Appellate Review of the Magistrate Judge's Decision B. Appellate Review of the Magistrate Judge's Decision Appellate review of rulings of law is plenary. Meghan's parents could receive the full reimbursement they seek only if, under applicable law, they had the choice by their unilateral actions, and without the approval of any administrative official or court, to place Meghan at the Dublin -6- School without consent of the Milford School District and at the Milford School District's expense. See Burlington, 736 F.2d at 798. In Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 999-1000 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 12 (1991), we held that an unjustified unilateral placement in a private school does not give rise to a right to reimbursement unless it is finally adjudged both that the parents' placement was appropriate and that an inappropriate IEP, or none at all, had been developed by the school district. The parents are not completely barred from reimbursement because they acted unilaterally. But they act unilaterally at a financial risk that serves as a deterrent to hasty or ill-considered transfer, and reimbursement will not be available to the parents if it turns out that the school system had proposed and had the capacity to implement an appropriate IEP. Burlington, 736 F.2d at 798. In this case, the district court determined that the parent's unilateral, out-of-district placement did not satisfy these requirements because (i) Meghan's IEP was appropriate under federal and state law, (ii) the Dublin School, as a matter of law, was not an appropriate placement, and (iii) the school district offered an alternative appropriate placement at Milford High. On appeal, the parents must show that the district court, in determining that Meghan's placement and IEP were appropriate, made mistakes of law or committed an abuse of discretion in reaching the decision to allow summary judgment for the Milford School District. -7-