Opinion ID: 6348771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims against Faughn

Text: O’Hara alleges that Faughn violated his constitutional rights by stopping him without reasonable suspicion that O’Hara had committed a crime, intending instead only to hassle and harass him because he was a Cherry Valley police officer. See Garcia v. City of New Hope, 984 F.3d 655, 663 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Because a traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, it ‘must be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.’” (quoting United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 705–06 (8th Cir. 2012)). “Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause,” requiring “at least some minimal level of objective justification”—something more than unparticularized suspicion or a hunch—for the belief that a suspect has committed a crime. Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 736 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if “a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed she had reasonable suspicion.” Id. Faughn asserts that he had reasonable suspicion to stop O’Hara because O’Hara’s tag lights did not properly illuminate his license plate, as required by Arkansas law. See Ark. Code Ann. § 27-36-215(c)(1)(A) (“Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible for a distance of fifty feet (50') to the rear.”). O’Hara submitted only the photograph of his license plate and tag lights as evidence to support his claim that Faughn lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. The photograph shows that the tag lights were functioning, but dim, and it further shows that the license plate numbers were obscured by darkness. Without any testimony, photographs, or other evidence to show that his rear registration plate was visible on that night, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Faughn had -6- reasonable suspicion to stop O’Hara for a traffic infraction. Faughn is thus entitled to qualified immunity on O’Hara’s claim.2 Hess argues that Faughn violated her constitutional rights by conspiring with Officer Mears to stop and arrest her without probable cause as a pretext to continue a pattern of harassment against her. “Government officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). To determine whether Faughn is liable for any alleged constitutional violation, we must thus perform “an individualized analysis” of his conduct as it relates to the stop. See id. (quoting Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 2014)). Hess has not set forth evidence showing Faughn to be responsible for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations that occurred when Mears stopped her in August 2018. Hess saw Faughn at a restaurant at some point before the stop. But there is no evidence in the record that Faughn asked Mears to initiate the stop or that Mears and Faughn communicated with one another before Mears pulled Hess’s vehicle over. Faughn’s twelve-minute-later involvement in the stop resulted from his response to Mears’s call for assistance in performing additional field sobriety test on Hess. Further, it is clear from the body camera footage that Mears, not Faughn, made the decision to place Hess under arrest. Hess’s allegations about Faughn’s inappropriate behavior towards her on other occasions do not support her claim that Faughn, rather than Mears, caused her to be stopped or arrested in August 2018. We 2 O’Hara’s complaint seems to raise a separate claim that Faughn deprived him of the wages from his Cherry Valley police job without due process by calling O’Hara’s supervisor, who later terminated him. O’Hara did not meaningfully pursue this claim in the district court or on appeal, however, and so we do not consider it. -7- thus reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Faughn based on Hess’s claims.3