Opinion ID: 793602
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Similar Cases Addressing Delusional Disorder

Text: 245 Trial counsel in two situations with striking similarity to the instant case presented an insanity defense to the jury, as least in part, on the basis of the defendant's delusional disorder. In a rural Nebraska setting in the early 1980s, Michael Ryan formed and led a religious cult developed out of the teachings of a group called the Posse Comitatus. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610, 617 (1989). Like Lundgren, Ryan stockpiled weapons in apocalyptic anticipation, practiced polygamy, and frequently talked to Yahweh. Id. at 618-19. In 1985, Ryan claimed that Yahweh ordered the appalling torture and death of one cult member who was lacking in faith so as to purify the farm before the immaculate birth of one of the cult member's children. Id. at 620-22; Ryan v. Clarke, 281 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1058 (D.Neb.2003), aff'd, 387 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2526, 161 L.Ed.2d 1119 (2005). 246 At his trial in 1986, Ryan plead not guilty by reason of insanity. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d at 632. To bolster this defense, Ryan presented the testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist. The psychiatrist diagnosed Ryan as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations, delusions, and psychosis. Ryan, 281 F.Supp.2d at 1059. At the penalty phase, the same psychiatrist further testified that Ryan was actively psychotic and clearly delusional. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d at 644. The defense's psychologist did not diagnose paranoid schizophrenia but instead concluded that Ryan suffered from a delusional disorder. Ryan, 281 F.Supp.2d at 1061 n. 10. The psychologist further stated that Ryan had a paranoid personality disorder and a paranoid disorder characterized by active delusional thinking. Id. at 1059. The state's psychiatrist disagreed with both of the defense's experts, concluding that Ryan was not mentally ill and exhibited no evidence of psychosis. Id. at 1060-61. Although the jury ultimately rejected the insanity defense, Ryan's counsel did present the issue to the jury. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d at 617. 247 Another strikingly similar situation arose out of two murders in Utah on July 24, 1984. Ron and Dan Lafferty, two Mormon fundamentalist brothers, joined a School of the Prophets where they received revelations from God and embraced the doctrine of plural marriage. State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 351 (Utah 2001); Jon Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven 247, 260 (large print ed.2003). In the spring of 1984, Ron received a removal revelation ordering the deaths of his sister-in-law and her infant daughter, who, according to the revelation, had become obstacles in God's path. Lafferty, 20 P.3d at 352. Two years later, the Lafferty brothers fulfilled the revelation with murders so horrific they inspired Jon Krakauer's full-length book Under the Banner of Heaven. That same day, the brothers abandoned a plan to murder the local Mormon leader who had previously excommunicated Ron from the Mormon church. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1988). 248 At his first trial in 1985, Ron refused to present the insanity defense because he believed the jury would interpret that defense as an admission of guilt. 7 Id. at 1250. He appealed the conviction and sentence in part on the ground that he was not competent to stand trial. Id. at 1242. While in prison awaiting his 1985 trial, Ron attempted to hang himself, apparently resulting in some organic brain damage due to oxygen deprivation. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1552 (10th Cir.1991). At a competency hearing prior to his 1985 trial, medical examiners diagnosed him with two mental disorders: (1) an amnestic syndrome resulting from his suicide attempt, and (2) delusional disorder, also called a paranoid delusional system. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1242-43; see also DSM-III-R at 199 (referring to delusional disorder as Delusional (Paranoid) Disorder and noting that this category was called Paranoid Disorder in DSM-III). Over two years before Lundgren's trial, the Utah Supreme Court summarized the examiners' findings of Ron's mental condition: 249 In describing the symptoms of the paranoid disorder, the examiners stated that Lafferty's pervasive religiosity, which had been noted during the November, 1984 evaluation, had since developed into a religious delusional system, that Lafferty was unable to determine the boundaries between himself and spiritual beings, that he was experiencing blurred ego boundaries, that he was suffering from a religious martyr complex, that his mind had created a paranoid pseudo-community involving the legal and social systems, that one of Lafferty's revelations was reflective of Messianic grandiosity, that Lafferty felt the hospital and the judicial system were agents of corrupt man-made law and were on trial before God, and that it was impossible for him to [understand] the inconsistency of his objecting to others infringing on his liberty [while he claimed] an entitlement from God to infringe on the liberty of others. 250 Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1242-43. In 1991, the Tenth Circuit granted Ron's habeas petition on the ground that the Utah court misapplied the competency standard in light of Ron's paranoid delusional system. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1556. 251 Ron was retried in 1996 and, after spending over a decade in prison, allowed his counsel to pursue the insanity defense. Lafferty, 20 P.3d at 363. The defense called a psychiatrist and a clinical and forensic psychologist who both testified that Ron suffered from a delusional disorder. Krakauer, supra, at 493-94. The state's experts offered a different analysis, concluding that Ron's extreme beliefs were not psychotic and, if anything, exhibited the symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder. Id. at 495-511. The jury again rejected the insanity defense, but, unlike Lundgren's case, the jury, not counsel, decided the issue of sanity. Lafferty, 20 P.3d at 355. 252 Counsel in other deific decree cases have also presented the insanity defense at least partly on the basis of the defendant's delusional disorder. See, e.g., People v. Coddington, 23 Cal.4th 529, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, 1103, 1110-14 (2000), overruled on different grounds by Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.4th 1046, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618, 633 n. 13 (2001); State v. Hudson, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00270, 1999 WL 77844, at -4 (Tenn. Crim.App. Feb.19, 1999). 253 Therefore, in light of Dr. Smalldon's diagnosis, the psychiatric literature, and similar cases, the issues of whether Lundgren suffered from delusional disorder with grandiose themes and whether that condition constitutes a mental disease or defect should have been presented to the jury. 254