Opinion ID: 771550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Penalty-Phase Closing

Text: 53 Simmons further argues that the prosecutor's penalty-phase closing argument deprived him of his constitutional rights. Specifically, he takes issue with comments that jurors should impose the death penalty for the benefit of his family and that his young age should not dissuade the jury from imposing the death penalty. 6 His claim regarding the prosecutor's closing arguments presents both Eighth Amendment and due process issues. 7 54 The Eighth Amendment imposes a heightened need for 'the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discretion' in capital cases and, therefore, a prosecutor's closing argument must not diminish the jury's sense of responsibility in imposing the death penalty. Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985)). [I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29. In Antwine, the prosecutor's unfounded assurance that the defendant would be put to death instantaneously diminished the jury's sense of responsibility and undermined the Eighth Amendment's heightened requirement of reliability. Antwine, 54 F.3d at 1361, 1363. Similarly, in Caldwell, the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to believe that, if it imposed the death penalty, it would not actually be responsible for determining whether the defendant would die because a death sentence would ultimately be reviewed for correctness by an appellate court. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323. The prosecutor, thereby, undermined the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discretion in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 328-29. 55 In the present case, although we find the prosecutor's closing sprinkled with improper comments, 8 the prosecutor's remarks did not diminish the jury's sense of responsibility. Unlike the comments made by prosecutors in Antwine and Caldwell, here, the prosecutor's closing argument did not dilute the gravity of a death sentence or place the responsibility of imposing a capital sentence in hands other than those of the jurors. We find that the district court did not err in rejecting Simmons' Eighth Amendment claim. 56 Simmons also asserts that the improper comments violated his due process rights. Under due process analysis, it is not enough that a prosecutor's remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned, but they must have so infected the hearing with unfairness so as to deny the defendant of due process. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (addressing closing arguments during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial). Not only must the prosecutor's comments be improper, they must also be prejudicial. Therefore, upon finding that a prosecutor has made improper comments in his closing argument, we: (1) measure the type of prejudice emanating from the argument; (2) examine what defense counsel did in his argument to minimize the prejudice; (3) review jury instructions to determine if the jury was properly instructed; and (4) determine if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been different in light of all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Antwine, 54 F.3d at 1363. 57 In the present case, the prosecutor's comments that jurors should show some mercy to [Simmons'] family [and] give him death are analogous to those we condemned in Antwine. 9 On cross-examination during the penalty phase, the prosecution elicited testimony from Simmons' ten-year-old brother that he looked up to his brother. 10 We find improper, not to mention illogical, the prosecutor's suggestion that the jury should impose the death penalty to [s]pare those kids of growing up to be like Simmons. We admonish the prosecutor to consider the implications of placing the burden of an execution on the shoulders of a child, even if that burden exists only in the child's mind or in prosecutorial rhetoric. Reiterating what we said in Antwine, such comments have no place in an American courtroom. 54 F.3d at 1363. There is 'no legal or ethical justification for imposing the death penalty on this basis and it is not a proper factor to be considered by the jury, for it does not reflect the properly considered circumstances of the crime or the character of the individual.' Id. at 1364 (quoting Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1323 (8th Cir. 1990)). 58 Likewise, we condemn the prosecution for teetering on the edge of misstating the law with regard to the significance of Simmons' age as a mitigating factor. Both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit precluding considering age as a mitigating factor, and the chronological age of a minor is a relevant mitigating factor of great weight. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 116 (1982). With that said, we recognize that the sentencer ultimately determines the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence and is merely prohibited from giving it no weight by excluding it from consideration. Id. at 114-15. In Eddings, the trial and appellate courts refused to consider certain mitigating circumstances. Id. In contrast, jurors in the present case were not precluded from considering Simmons' age and, therefore, the prosecutor's comments did not violate the Eighth Amendment. They were, however, improper. 59 Although we find the prosecution's statements to be improper, we are unable to find that the offending comments prejudiced Simmons. First, with regard to the type of prejudice, the prosecutor's comments were not so egregious that they would undermine the jury's sense of responsibility and its individualized consideration of the defendant. Antwine, 54 F.3d at 1364. Nor were they combined with comments already determined to violate the Constitution, as was the case with comments regarding the defendant's family in Antwine. Id. The prosecution's arguments regarding the defendant's youthful age addressed the weight of that mitigating circumstance but did not preclude the jury from considering it. In addition, during the guilt phase, witnesses testified that Simmons had included his youth in his risk calculations prior to killing Mrs. Crook, thus bringing age into play for the purpose of closing argument. The prosecutor's comments about Simmons' age were of the same tenor as the properly presented evidence. Furthermore, unlike Antwine, in the present case there is no Eighth Amendment violation to bolster a finding of a due- process violation. Id.; see also Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1337 (8th Cir. 1989). 60 Second, although defense counsel did not object to the prosecution's arguments, he made significant efforts to minimize prejudice the comments may have caused. Counsel focused a substantial portion of his closing argument on stressing that Simmons' youth should make a huge difference in the jury's decision-making process and specifically addressed the prosecutor's age-related arguments. With regard to the prosecution's comments to spare Simmons' family by imposing the death penalty, we look at the defense counsel's opening summation to determine the effect of the comments on the sentencing as a whole. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 182 (addressing the prosecutor's closing argument during the guilt stage). Albeit unartfully, the prosecutor was responding to the defense counsel's plea to the jury to give [Simmons] a life sentence for his family['s benefit]. Furthermore, although the prosecutor's argument that jurors would be showing mercy to Simmons' family by sentencing him to death is illogical, defense counsel further undermined the argument by presenting testimony by Simmons' family that clearly demonstrated imposing the death penalty on their loved one would not amount to showing them mercy. Defense counsel's presentation of testimony favorable to Simmons by family members themselves, his persistent appeal to jurors' consciences, as well as his concentration on jury instructions favorable to Simmons, effectively countered any prejudice the prosecutor's comments may have caused. 61 Third, the jury was properly instructed that it was free to consider age as a mitigating factor, that the attorneys' arguments were not evidence, and that the jury should govern its deliberations based on the laws provided in the instructions, the evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. The jury instructions explicitly limited the aggravating circumstances the jury could consider. The jury was also instructed that it was not compelled to fix death as the punishment even if [jurors did] not find the existence of one or more mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances which [it] found to exist. Defense counsel vigorously stressed that the jury should apply the mitigating factors to Simmons' benefit. 62 Finally, taking into consideration the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we find no reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been different had the prosecution not made its improper comments. See Preston v. Delo, 100 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1996) (disapproving of the prosecutor's argument as mean-spirited and unnecessary, but concluding that the comments presented no reasonable probability that the statement more than minimally affected the outcome of the sentencing phase). The trial court limited the aggravating circumstances the jury could consider to four. The jury found three of those statutorily-defined aggravating circumstances. 11 It gave no indication that it considered Simmons' age or the effects on his family as aggravating circumstances. It was given wide latitude to sentence Simmons to life even if it found no mitigating circumstances. Looking at the sentencing phase as a whole, we do not find it reasonably probable that the jury would have decided to impose a life sentence rather than death but for the prosecutor's improper comments. 12 63 We cannot say that the prosecutor's closing arguments at the sentencing stage of the trial rendered Simmons' sentence fundamentally unfair or deprived him of the reliability the Eighth Amendment requires.