Opinion ID: 1349586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assessment on the Harris Case

Text: According to Riepen, the MDL assessment, even if properly applied to the initial opt-out and PPH plaintiffs, should not have been applied to the recovery of his client Jana Harris because her case did not belong in federal court in the first place. In February 1999, Riepen field suit in a Kansas state court on the behalf of Harris, a citizen of Kansas. Among the defendants named in the suit was a pharmacy with its principal place of business in Kansas. Wyeth argued that the pharmacy was fraudulently joined to defeat removal, and it proceeded to file a notice of removal to shift the case to federal court. Riepen's co-counsel filed a motion to remand, but before the United States District Court for the District of Kansas could rule on the motion, the case was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of the MDL. Harris settled her case with Wyeth, and the case was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a motion that Riepen did not oppose, before the District Court denied the remand motion on December 7, 2000. [56] It is well-settled law that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any point before final judgment, In re Kaiser Group Intern. Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir.2005) (citation omitted), but the necessary corollary is that subject matter cannot be challenged after such judgment is entered. See Hodge v. Hodge, 621 F.2d 590, 592 (3d Cir.1980) (It was settled long ago ... that when a federal court proceeds to final judgment on the merits, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is res judicata even though it was not litigated .... (citation omitted)). Here, final judgment was entered in Harris's case when the District Court dismissed it with prejudice. Riepen argues that the matter is still open because the District Court retained the ability to exempt him from the assessment until it issued its final, appealable attorneys' fee order in July 2008. But authority from the Supreme Court and our Court makes clear that a decision on the merits is separate from orders regarding attorneys' fees for the purposes of finality and appealability. See White v. N.H. Dept. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451-52, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982) ([A] request for attorney's fees ... raises legal issues collateral to and separate from the decision on the merits.); In re Colon, 941 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir.1991) (treat[ing] attorneys' fees apart from the merits for purposes of appeal). Thus, while Riepen may challenge the attorneys' fees and cost assessments that were imposed on him, he cannot do so by attacking subject matter jurisdiction on a case that was dismissed with prejudice almost ten years ago. [57]