Opinion ID: 1284985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Search of the Package

Text: We have concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred prior to the seizure of the package. Likewise, in opening the package, without a warrant, we find that no constitutional infraction took place. Like furtive gestures, the appearance of tin-foil packages and similar containers is a common phenomenon in law-enforcement. We have repeatedly held, however, that the privacy interests attaching to such containers are not exempt from constitutional protection. As the court of appeals correctly noted in this case, the mere fact that a package is in plain view does not automatically warrant intrusion into its contents. People v. Casias, supra ; see People v. Counterman, supra ; People v. Ware, supra ; People v. Branin, supra ; but see People v. Montoya, supra . Nor does the mere fact that tin-foil packages often contain narcotics provide a basis for a warrantless intrusion. Cf. People v. Olson, 175 Colo. 140, 485 P.2d 891 (1971). In this case, however, the record discloses that the officers possessed probable cause to place the defendant under arrest at the time the package was opened. Significant information relating the defendant to possession of narcotics was contained in the warrant affidavit which Officer Cinquinta had signed. [13] Moreover, the defendant was personally before them in a condition which, based upon their experience as police officers, they reasonably concluded to be the result of the use of narcotics. Finally, the defendant had acted suspiciously when confronted by the officers, resulting in the discovery of the small package of the type often used to conceal drugs. When viewed as a totality, these facts would warrant a police officer, exercising reasonable caution, to conclude that the defendant was engaged in criminal activitythe possession of narcotic drugs. See Finley v. People, supra ; Stone v. People, supra . In our opinion, this search of the package was validly conducted as a search incident to arrest. First, it was not necessary that the defendant be immediately apprised that he was under arrest. The key index of the reasonableness of the detention was the existence of probable cause to arrest. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973); cf. People v. Stevens, supra (labels in search and seizure context are mere shorthand which should not be confused with underlying substantive analysis). For purposes of analyzing the search of the container, we treat this situation as one of arrest from the time the officers had probable cause to hold the defendant and charge him with a crime. As noted above, this occurred prior to the time the package was opened. Second, the arrest without a warrant was proper, since exigent circumstances existed. The officers faced a suspect whom they had probable cause to believe was committing a crime. Moreover, they objectively faced the clearly exigent circumstances that, to understate the matter, the suspect knew that he was under heavy suspicion. See Cupp v. Murphy, supra . Finally, the police were not required to enter the defendant's house or other place where an expectation of privacy existed, in order to effect the arrest. These factors indicate the constitutional propriety of the warrantless arrest under even the strictest historical standards. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (Fourth Amendment may require more than probable cause when intrusion into residence occurs during arrest); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (upholding warrantless arrest in public place); People v. Hoinville, Colo., 553 P.2d 777 (1976) (exigency required to excuse warrantless arrest based upon probable cause under Colorado law); People v. Tangas, Colo., 545 P.2d 1047 (1976) (same). Third, the search of the container was not unreasonable. Once the package was in Officer Cinquinta's hand, it arguably was removed from the defendant's zone of control or grabbing area. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). However, when faced with a suspect who has already made one sudden movement with the apparent intent of reaching for the package, and who was apparently under the influence of drugs, a rigid analysis of grabbing area seems distinctly out of place. This was not a general rummaging through the defendant's possessions under the pretext of a search incident to arrest. Rather, it was the opening of a small package which the officers clearly had probable cause to believe contained heroin, a highly evanescent substance. The possibility that, in the close quarters of the moment, the defendant could have suddenly grabbed the package away from the officer and either swallowed it or flung it away cannot be ignored. See Finley v. People, supra (defendant placed cellophane package in mouth). The reasonable grabbing area of the defendant, under these circumstances, focused upon the package in the officer's hand. Compare People v. Burley, supra (defendant reaching for object on floorboard of automobile). [14]