Opinion ID: 2209558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Motion to Withdraw the Plea

Text: Almost a year and a half after that affirmance, new counsel for appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that there was a fatal defect in the Rule 11 inquiry because the court took part in discussions or communications regarding the sentence to be imposed prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or conviction, or submission to [her] of a plea agreement. Counsel also maintained that the guilty plea should be withdrawn because justice demands withdrawal. Third, counsel asserted that after appellant had denied certain elements of some of the offenses, the court should have either started the trial or given him more time to discuss the evidentiary proffer with his attorney. Finally, new counsel claimed that trial counsel was ineffective because he had failed to ask for more time to discuss the plea offer and its ramifications with appellant. At the hearing on the motion, appellant's trial counsel testified that he advised his client to accept the plea offer because the government had strong evidence against him for most of the forty-one counts and that, if he were convicted after a trial, his sentence could be astronomical. Trial counsel further stated that he did not try to stop the plea proceedings when the charges were amended because the new charges carried either the same or a lesser penalty. Furthermore, appellant did not deny participating in any of the incidents underlying the charges, other than to dispute some of the details of his exact role in the crimes. When the hearing resumed after a break, appellant testified that he agreed to the plea offer only after his trial counsel urged him to accept it by saying, If you don't take this plea, they're going to give you life imprisonment without parole. He said he was confused by the different sentences that had been discussed in the plea negotiations and thought he would get eight to twenty-four months. The court found appellant's testimony wholly unbelievable and ruled that he had failed to show manifest injustice, as required by Rule 32(e) in a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The court also held that appellant's claim of a defective Rule 11 inquiry was procedurally barred because this argument had not been raised on direct appeal, when it could have been remedied. Moreover, the court ruled that in any event the judge who accepted the plea took careful and considered measures to ensure that the plea to these very serious charges was going to be fully understood by Mr. Johnson, that the judge had conducted a model Rule 11 inquiry, that there was a factual basis for each of the pleas, and that [each plea] was voluntarily entered. Any suggestion that the judge in some fashion coerced the plea or somehow . . . took part in the discussions of the communications regarding the sentence to be imposed prior to the plea was, the court ruled, completely belied by the record and without any basis whatsoever. Finally, the court held that appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet either part of the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [8] The court concluded that appellant pleaded guilty for his own reasons. And there was nothing in the taking of the plea vis-à-vis an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel that in any way causes me to question [counsel's] performance in representing his client.