Opinion ID: 168285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Consider Lay-W itness Testimony

Text: W e next examine M r. Blea’s contention that the ALJ’s decision requires remand because of the ALJ’s failure to discuss or consider the lay testimony of his wife. Becky Blea, M r. Blea’s wife since 1994, testified before the ALJ about M r. Blea’s depression, as well as his problems with his foot that developed after the gunshot wound. M rs. Blea stated that her husband began expressing suicidal thoughts w hile he was hospitalized after the gunshot incident, and continued to talk about suicide regularly thereafter. Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 332-33. She also testified about the physical limitations her husband faced as a result of his injury: since 1997, her husband had only rarely left the house with her and their son; he has not shopped, cooked, or cleaned since then; and he cannot sleep through the night. The A LJ’s written decision fails to mention any of the particulars of M rs. Blea’s testimony, and in fact, never even mentions the fact that she did testify regarding the nature and severity of her husband’s impairments. M r. Blea contends that the A LJ committed reversible error by failing to mention or discuss 23 his w ife’s testimony corroborating his account of the progression of his posttraumatic arthritis and depression. The Commissioner replies that the A LJ’s omissions are not reversible error because “the ALJ is not required to make a written finding about each witness’s credibility.” Aple’s Br. at 16 (citing Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1996)). The Commissioner is incorrect by only stating part of the rule in this circuit. In actuality, the ALJ is not required to make specific written findings of credibility only if “the written decision reflects that the ALJ considered the testimony.” Adam s, 93 F.3d at 715. “[I]n addition to discussing the evidence supporting his decision, the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). Here, the ALJ made no mention of M rs. Blea’s testimony, nor did he refer to the substance of her testimony anywhere in the written decision. Thus, it is not at all “clear that the ALJ considered [M rs. Blea’s] testimony in making his decision.” Adam s, 93 F.3d at 715. Additionally, M rs. Blea’s testimony regarding her husband’s suicidal thoughts is not only uncontroverted; it serves to corroborate Dr. Padilla’s psychiatric examination of M r. Blea, where he stated that M r. Blea has been dysthymic for years. See Aplt’s App. at 243-46. Thus, the A LJ’s refusal to discuss why he rejected her testimony violates our court’s precedent, and requires remand for the ALJ to incorporate M rs. Blea’s testimony 24 into his decision. “W ithout the benefit of the ALJ’s findings supported by the weighing of this relevant evidence, we cannot determine whether his conclusion[s] . . . [are] supported by substantial evidence.” Threet, 353 F.3d at 1190; see also Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289, 291 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[W]here the record on appeal is unclear as to w hether the ALJ applied the appropriate standard by considering all the evidence before him, the proper remedy is reversal and remand.”). Additionally, M r. Blea contends that the failure to include discussion of M rs. Blea’s testimony contradicts two regulations: (1) SSR 83-20, which directs an ALJ to assess how lay evidence impacts the determination of an onset date; and (2) SSR 85-16, which relates only to mental impairments, and instructs that “relevant, reliable information, obtained from . . . family members . . . may be valuable in assessing” whether a mental impairment is disabling. SSR 85-16, at 4. The Commissioner argues that neither of these regulations is applicable to M r. Blea’s claim. W e agree with the Commissioner that neither of these regulations necessarily apply to M r. Blea’s claim before the ALJ, but caution that the ALJ should nevertheless be mindful of the regulations on remand. SSR 83-20 instructs an ALJ to consider “other sources of documentation” such as testimony from family when “reasonable inferences about the progression of the impairment cannot be made on the basis of the evidence in file and additional relevant 25 medical evidence is not available.” SSR 83-20, at 3. Depending upon the “reasonable inferences” that the ALJ makes in consultation with a medical advisor on remand, it may be necessary to consider M rs. Blea’s testimony pursuant to this provision of SSR 83-20. W ith regard to SSR 85-16, we similarly believe it is premature to address whether that regulation applies. SSR 85-16 concerns “the issues to be considered when an individual with a mental impairment requires an assessment of the residual functional capacity (RFC) in order to determine the individual’s capacity to engage in basic work-related activities.” SSR 85-16, at 1. W hether the ALJ will need to follow SSR 85-16 on remand depends upon whether the A LJ’s analysis of M r. Blea’s mental impairments reaches steps four or five of the fivestep sequential analysis. See id. at 2 (explaining that an RFC assessment is unnecessary if an impairment is found to be of listing severity at step three because “[f]or impairments of listing severity, inability to perform substantial gainful activity (SGA) is presumed from prescribed findings.”).