Opinion ID: 196298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: baker's testimony

Text: 29 There are two arguments concerning the testimony of Richard Baker, the witness who permitted the Murrays to store marijuana at his farm near Boston. Besides participating in the marijuana operation at issue in this trial, Baker also allowed his property to be used by an organization involved in manufacturing fentanyl, a dangerous synthetic drug, reported to have caused numerous deaths. This was the operation that Michael Murray claimed to have uncovered pursuant to his cooperation agreement with the government. 30 First, Michael Murray claims that Baker's testimony should be inadmissible because it was derived from Murray's immunized statements, citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). He argues that the government would not have had access to Baker had not Murray introduced him while cooperating in exposing the fentanyl operation. The government then flipped Baker and used Baker against Murray, instead of vice versa. 31 Simply put, this is not a Kastigar issue, in which the government must prove it did not derive evidence from immunized statements. The district court in this case specifically found: There was no grant of immunity here, implicit or explicit. Indeed, having reviewed my notes, it's clear to me, and I so find, that the only offer was an offer against direct use of the testimony and not any derivative use. The district court's findings as to the terms the government offered Michael Murray are reviewable only for clear error. See United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir.1992). This finding is supported by the prosecutor's testimony that he told Murray the government was free to make derivative or indirect use of anything he said ... against him. The district court was free to accept this testimony, especially in light of the fact that Murray offered no contrary evidence that he had obtained any agreement of derivative use immunity. These findings were not clearly erroneous. 32 Second, the Catanos argue that the district court erred in refusing to recall Baker as part of the government's case, after the mid-trial discovery of certain notes which the Catanos say would have helped them impeach Baker. After Baker had been cross-examined, 8 he failed to appear on time for court the next day, apparently because of a snowstorm. The government waived its right to redirect, but also revealed that the government had located for the first time notes DEA Agent O'Hara had taken of a meeting with Baker. The prosecutor explained that the government had not been able to locate O'Hara's notes earlier because they were in O'Hara's personal files and O'Hara was away from the office dealing with a health crisis in his family. The prosecutor summarized the notes, which revealed that Baker admitted knowing involvement in the fentanyl operation. Though the government had produced documents earlier in which others implicated Baker in the fentanyl operation, the defendants had not cross-examined Baker about whether his testimony in the present case was affected by his hopes of leniency in the fentanyl case. Counsel for Leonel Catano explained his earlier decision not to cross-examine Baker about the fentanyl case as fear of opening a Pandora's box without any written documents to indicate what Baker had said before about the fentanyl operation. (The fear of a Pandora's box was certainly not chimerical, since the same notes which state Baker confessed to knowing participation in the fentanyl business also refer to the involvement in the fentanyl business of two Hispanic males [Baker] ... thought were brothers, one of whom he testified to be Jaime Catano.) After the disclosure of O'Hara's notes, which counsel could use to impeach Baker on the stand, Leonel Catano's counsel asked to recall Baker for cross-examination about the fentanyl case. The district court declined to recall Baker as part of the government's case, but stated that the defendants could call Baker as their witness and that the court would give them latitude in examining him. The defendants refused to call Baker in their cases. 33 The Catanos now argue that there was a Brady-Giglio 9 violation in that the government failed to produce impeachment information in time for the defendants to use it in cross-examining Baker. When the [Brady ] issue is one of delayed disclosure rather than of nondisclosure, ... the test is whether defendant's counsel was prevented by the delay from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant's case. United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st Cir.1986). We review the district court's decision on how to handle delayed disclosure of Brady material for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1178-79 (1st. Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994). 34 In this case, the prosecution offered a reasonable explanation of its failure to find the notes earlier. Most importantly, the Catanos have not shown that the delay prevented them from using the materials. The defendants cross-examined Baker at length on the theme that he was testifying in order to get a lenient sentence for his participation in the marijuana ring. Further impeachment about his hopes to receive leniency in an additional case would have been cumulative, although admittedly the fentanyl case was more serious because of the deaths involved. Moreover, the Catanos were perfectly free to call Baker in their case to explore the fentanyl issue, and they simply chose not to. In view of the possibility that O'Hara's notes would implicate them in the fentanyl operation, their decision not to open the door to this testimony seems to have been the better part of valor, rather than the result of the government's delayed disclosure. The district court did not abuse its discretion on this issue.