Opinion ID: 901558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: [¶ 5.] Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is de novo. State v. Tofani, 2006 SD 63, ¶ 35, 719 N.W.2d 391, 400 (citing State v. Disanto, 2004 SD 112, ¶ 14, 688 N.W.2d 201, 206). As we recently stated in Tofani:  [A]ll of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). There must be substantial evidence to support the conviction. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), superseded on other grounds, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). The inquiry does not require [an appellate] court to `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (emphasis in original) (quoting Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 282, 87 S.Ct. 483, 486, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966)). Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence is insufficient, and therefore not substantial, when no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Id. In construing a statute, we attempt to ascertain its intent. Krukow v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 2006 SD 46, ¶ 12, 716 N.W.2d 121, 124 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 8, 625 N.W.2d 275, 278). The `intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.' Id. (citations omitted).