Opinion ID: 199930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Informations

Text: 9 The informations charged that Ayala and Ortíz had entered onto lands reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which provides for punishment of [w]hoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, goes upon any military, naval, or Coast Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation. Ayala and Ortíz moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case, arguing, inter alia, that the piece of land on which they were arrested, the South Salinas Finger, is not reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, as the informations allege. In their view, the South Salinas Finger is not part of a military, naval, or Coast Guard reservation, but instead is submerged land[] which has been placed under the control of the government of Puerto Rico pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 749. Our review of the district court's denial of a Rule 29 motion is de novo. United States v. Frigerio-Migiano, 254 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001). 10 We agree with Ayala and Ortíz that the government failed to prove that the South Salinas Finger is encompassed within the boundaries of the Camp García naval reservation proper. Petty Officer Larry Werner Roberts II described the South Salinas Finger as a little island on the south side of Vieques. He testified that [i]t has a little land that connects the beach to the island, a natural bridge of approximately 35 feet. 3 However, a line on the map the prosecution offered into evidence depicting the ordinary high-tide line at Vieques — the boundary of the Navy's holdings — does not encompass the location of the South Salinas Finger. Instead, the portion of the map that corresponds to its location is blank. 11 As the line on the Navy's map marking the mean high-tide line around Camp García does not depict the South Salinas Finger, Ayala and Ortíz argue that it must therefore be among Puerto Rico's submerged lands, which are under the control of the government of Puerto Rico. 48 U.S.C. § 749. 4 The statute defines control to include all right, title and interest in and to and jurisdiction and authority over the submerged lands underlying the harbor areas and navigable streams and bodies of water in and around the island of Puerto Rico and the adjacent islands and waters. Id. § 749(3). Ayala and Ortíz assert that the South Salinas Finger is a classic example of submerged coastal [lands] over which `all right, title and interest in and to and jurisdiction and authority' has been placed in the hands of Puerto Rico (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 749(3)), and that their venture onto the South Salinas Finger thus could not have been an entrance onto lands reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, as the informations allege. 12 Again, Ayala and Ortíz have a point. Because the government failed to prove that the South Salinas Finger is above the mean high-tide line, we must accept the proposition in this case that it is indeed submerged land[] placed under the control of the government of Puerto Rico by 48 U.S.C. § 749. Such submerged lands are not  reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, as the informations allege. However, [c]onvictions generally have been sustained as long as the proof upon which they are based corresponds to an offense that was clearly set out in the indictment. A part of the indictment unnecessary to and independent of the allegations of the offense proved may normally be treated as a useless averment that may be ignored. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, [s]urplusage in an indictment need not be proved. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1196 (10th Cir.1998). The phrase on lands reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States is surplusage. 5 If we disregard it, the informations still charge unmistakably that Ayala and Ortíz knowingly and unlawfully entered the Camp García Naval Installation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382. 6 13 The government's proof at trial established this unlawful entry. In United States v. Ventura-Meléndez, another Vieques trespassing case, we held that `government ownership of the property in question is not a requisite to violating Section 1382.' 275 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Allen, 924 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir.1991)). Instead, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 requires only that the government demonstrate either a possessory interest in, or occupation or control of, the area reserved by the military. Id. at 17. Applying that rule to the installation on Vieques, we held that a portion of the area beyond the mean high-tide lines [was] under the occupation and control of the Navy for purposes of § 1382 because a large swath of area extending beyond the shoreline of the beach was permissibly designated as part of a `danger zone' by federal regulation and therefore was subject to Navy occupation and control. Id. at 17 (citing 33 C.F.R. §§ 334.2, 334.1480). We explained that Puerto Rico's jurisdiction over the shoreline was established subject to the control of the United States. Id. 14 There was uncontested evidence at trial that the South Salinas Finger, the land on which Ayala and Ortíz were found, was located inside a danger zone established by federal regulation. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 334.2, 334.1470. A danger zone is [a] defined water area ... used for target practice, bombing, rocket firing or other especially hazardous operations, normally for the armed forces, and may be closed to the public on a full-time or intermittent basis, as stated in the regulations. 7 33 C.F.R. § 334.2(a). 15 Ayala and Ortíz counter that they were not charged with violating 33 C.F.R. § 334.1470 (barring entry into a danger zone), but rather 32 C.F.R. § 770.40 (barring entry onto U.S. Naval installations and properties). However, we held in Ventura-Meléndez, 275 F.3d at 16-18, that the language of § 1382, which on its face is limited to [w]hoever ... goes upon any military, naval, or Coast Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, also extends to those who enter into a danger zone in proximity to a reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation. That being so, the distinction Ayala and Ortíz advance, between entering a danger zone and entering a naval installation, is without significance in this context. 8