Opinion ID: 1620388
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Heading: Negligence and Res Ipsa Loquitur

Text: Proof of negligence requires the establishment of a duty and a breach thereof that proximately caused damage to the plaintiff. Thompson v. Lee, 439 So.2d 113, 115 (Ala.1983). Mere proof that an accident and an injury occurred is generally insufficient to establish negligence. Id. ; Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Padgett, 285 Ala. 463, 233 So.2d 472 (1970). However, in limited circumstances, a jury will be allowed to infer negligence if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is deemed to be applicable. Thompson, supra .  South Coast Props., Inc. v. Schuster, 583 So.2d 215, 217 (Ala.1991) (emphasis added). For the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur ] to apply, there are at least three essentials: (1) the defendant must have had full management and control of the instrumentality which caused the injury; (2) the circumstances must be such that according to common knowledge and the experience of mankind the accident could not have happened if those having control of the management had not been negligent; (3) the plaintiff's injury must have resulted from the accident. ... Berry, 254 Ala. at 236, 48 So.2d at 238 (emphasis added). `The plaintiff need not ... conclusively exclude all other possible explanations... It is enough that the facts proved reasonably permit the conclusion that negligence is the more probable explanation. ...' Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So.2d 282, 289 (Ala.2000) (Hooper, C.J., dissenting and quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. e (1965)) (emphasis added). Whether the presumption of negligence arises in the first instance is ordinarily a question of law, which we review de novo. Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc., 452 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir.2006); Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill.2d 515, 877 N.E.2d 1064, 315 Ill.Dec. 735 (2007); Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wash.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324, 327 (2003). Whether the presumption is rebutted is a question for the jury. Smith v. Kennedy, 43 Ala.App. 554, 563, 195 So.2d 820, 828 (1966). As early as 1916, this Court recognized the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the context of an electrocution caused by a provider of electricity. In Bloom v. City of Cullman, 197 Ala. 490, 73 So. 85 (1916), Frank Bloom, a pedestrian on a sidewalk in the City of Cullman was killed when he grasped a `chain' used by the city of Cullman in raising and lowering a street light operated by the municipality to light public thoroughfares therein. 197 Ala. at 492, 73 So. at 86. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident at the actual moment of contact. 197 Ala. at 494, 73 So. at 87. A complaint filed against the City of Cullman by Agnes Bloom, the administratrix of Bloom's estate, averred that the City of Cullman negligently allowed the chain to become charged with a [deadly] current of electricity. 197 Ala. at 491, 73 So. at 85-86. The trial court gave the general affirmative charge for the defendant, 197 Ala. at 494, 73 So. at 87, and judgment was entered for the City of Cullman. The resolution of Bloom's appeal turned on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 197 Ala. at 496-97, 73 So. at 88. The only evidence as to the source of the electric current in the chain was the proximity of the chain and a suspension cable that held the streetlight to [f]eed wires conveying electric current. 197 Ala. at 492, 73 So. at 86. [T]here was evidence tending to show that the insulation on the feed wires had rotted and had fallen away, exposing the feed wire to at least possible contact with the suspension cable and the `chain' or with some of the metal mechanism connected therewith. 197 Ala. at 492, 73 So. at 86 (emphasis added). This Court reversed the judgment for the City of Cullman, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in the case, where ... a pedestrian in a public street was stricken by contact with electric current passing from feed wires to a street light and communicated to the `chain' ..., through some deficiency in the maintenance or repair of the mechanism owned by and under the supervision and control of the municipality. 197 Ala. at 497, 73 So. at 88 (emphasis added). The Court explained: `In many cases the maxim  res ipsa loquitur  applies. The affair speaks for itself. The accident, the injury, and the circumstances under which they occurred are in some cases sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence, and thus cast upon the defendant the burden of establishing his freedom from fault. Proof of an injury occurring as the proximate result of an act of the defendant, which would not usually, if done with due care, have injured any one, is enough to make out a presumption of negligence. When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from a want of care. So also: Where it is shown that the accident is such that its real cause may be the negligence of the defendant, and that, whether it is so or not, is within the knowledge of the defendant, the plaintiff may give the required evidence of negligence, without himself explaining the real cause of the accident, by proving the circumstances, and thus raising a presumption that, if the defendant does not choose to give the explanation, the real cause was negligence on the part of the defendant. ' 197 Ala. at 496, 73 So. at 88 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence § 59 (5th ed. 1898)). Similarly, we agree with George that the facts and circumstances render this case particularly appropriate for the application of the doctrine. It is apparent that George does not know why he was injured, assuming, as we do for purposes of review of a summary judgment, that he contacted the neutral wire. He has proposed various theories as to how the wire became energized in the first place. One theory is that APCo allowed its primary lines to sag so closely to the neutral wire that somethingeither the wind, a tree limb, or the collision of an automobile with a power polecaused the wires to make contact. He has also proposed that, regardless of how the neutral line became energized, APCo's grounding system was somehow ineffective. The trial court characterized the testimony of his expert as merely conjecture and speculation. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that, in a properly functioning electrical-distribution system in which the neutral wire is properly grounded, the neutral wire cannot become energized and, thus, one who touches it will not be injured. Obviously, APCo's system was not functioning properly when George came in contact with the neutral wire. Moreover, whether the real cause of the accident is attributable to APCo's negligence is peculiarly within the knowledge of [that] defendant. Bloom, 197 Ala. at 496, 73 So. at 88. Indeed, it is in APCo's own interest to determine the cause of this accident. This is so, because its own personnel may well be at risk operating a system in which a serious malfunction occurs and remains inexplicable. The ordinary-occurrence prong is satisfied. However, APCo argues that the management-and-control prong is not satisfied. In particular, APCo says: George was part of a City work crew that was managing and controlling the lines at the time of the accident, and the poles supported telecommunication lines that APCo did not own, allowing the owners of those lines some access as well. APCo did not have exclusive management or control of the intersections or the tree limbs.  APCo's brief, at 51-52 (emphasis added) (citations to the record omitted). This argument is entirely inapposite, for two reasons. First, it is undisputed that the electrical-distribution system was owned and managed by APCo. George was not attempting to manage, control, or manipulate any part of that system but was, instead, working from a bucket truck on the City's own poles and wires when he was injured by contact with a portion of APCo's system. Second, for APCo to have the requisite management and control to invoke the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it need not have charge of all such collateral processes as weather and traffic. Instead, APCo must produce evidence that one such collateral process caused George's injury without any negligence on its part. See Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So.2d 1220, 1224 (Ala.1992) (the `control requirement is subordinated to its general purpose, that of indicating that it probably was the [alleged wrongdoer's] negligence that caused the accident' (quoting 57B Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 1874 (1989))). APCo also relies on Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, supra. Its reliance is misplaced. To be sure, this Court held in Berry that the trial court erred in refusing APCo's requested affirmative charge. It did so, howevernot because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in an electrocution case, as APCo reads the opinion, see Bloom, supra but because the instrument alleged to have caused the injury, namely, a fine piece of copper wire, of the sort used in the coil of a T-model Ford, 254 Ala. at 233, 48 So.2d at 235, was not owned, maintained or controlled by the defendant. 254 Ala. at 236, 48 So.2d at 238. That small wire, which was allegedly dangling from APCo's power line, was no part of its equipment nor under its control, and information or knowledge in regard to it was as accessible to the plaintiff as [APCo]. Id. In this case, by contrast, the offending instrumentalitythe neutral wirewas undisputedly part of APCo's equipment. Like the chain in Bloom, the neutral wire was an integral part of a system that was owned by and under the supervision and control of the [defendant]. 197 Ala. at 497, 73 So. at 88. The management-and-control prong is satisfied in this case. The trial judge acknowledged that if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case, then [her] order is clearly wrong. Because we hold that the doctrine does apply, we must hold that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for APCo as to the claim that it negligently constructed, operated, or maintained its power lines. To that extent, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.