Opinion ID: 1237980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rehabilitative Alimony and a Material and Substantial Change of Circumstances

Text: Distinctions which have been recognized between the nature of permanent alimony and rehabilitative alimony are determinative of the issues in this appeal. In Voyles v. Voyles , we held that remarriage automatically terminates permanent spousal support, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. 644 P.2d 847, 849 (Alaska 1982). [5] In this regard we stated remarriage should serve as an election between the support provided by the alimony award and the legal obligation of support embodied in the new marital relationship. Id. In contrast, an award of rehabilitative alimony does not create a continuing legal obligation to provide for the reasonable needs of a former dependent spouse. Rehabilitative alimony is awarded for a short duration and a specific purpose limited to job training or other means directly related to entry or advancement within the work force. [6] Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Alaska 1989). This distinction and its implications have often been recognized by this court. See Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska 1981); Larson v. Larson, 661 P.2d 626, 632 n. 4 (Alaska 1983) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (Rehabilitative alimony in contradistinction to permanent alimony, is an award of spousal support of limited duration and for a specific purpose.); Richmond, 779 P.2d at 1215 (Although alimony is generally not just and necessary when a property division can adequately provide for the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking alimony, rehabilitative alimony can be awarded for a specific purpose and a short duration even with an adequate property division if it is limited to job training or other means directly related to entry or advancement within the work force.); Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986); Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 224 (Alaska 1986); Bays v. Bays, 807 P.2d 482 (Alaska 1991). Rehabilitative alimony is modifiable only when there is a material and substantial change in circumstances related to its purpose. In the absence of a special agreement, we agree that [i]f a recipient of equitable rehabilitative support achieves rehabilitation or stops trying to obtain education or training to improve her employment skills and earning capacity, that changed circumstance justifies termination of maintenance. .. . [H]owever, achievement or cessation of rehabilitative efforts cannot be presumed by the fact of remarriage. O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D.L.Rev. 225, 259-60 (1985). Neither intimate personal relationships between the dependent former spouse and a third party or reasonable efforts by the dependent former spouse to reduce expenses constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances. [7] Thus, based on our review of the record, we hold that the superior court did not err in finding that no material and substantial change of circumstances occurred. Loita is a full time nursing student, who will graduate with a B.S.N. in nursing from Eastern Washington University in December 1991. Ron has not alleged or proven that Loita completed or ceased her rehabilitative efforts. Without such a finding or a special agreement, Ron's efforts to terminate rehabilitative spousal support were correctly denied. [8] There was no special agreement terminating rehabilitative alimony upon cohabitation or de facto marriage. Ron specifically agreed to pay alimony to Loita of $1500 per month in spousal support until 1-1-92 or until the recipient dies or remarries or until wife ceases to be a full time student during the school year (roughly Sept. through June). Ron's claim that the term marriage encompassed cohabitation or de facto marriage was based solely on his statements. Despite Ron's assertions, the master did not find any evidence of the contracting parties' intent to provide other grounds for terminating spousal support beyond those specifically enumerated in the dissolution agreement. Based upon our review of the record, the master's finding with regard to the intent of the parties in the dissolution agreement was not clearly erroneous. Thus, the superior court did not err in concluding that there was no legal basis for the failure to pay. AFFIRMED.