Opinion ID: 4527147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Peterson Triviality Standard

Text: ¶51 The majority adopts today a “triviality” standard first articulated by the Second Circuit in Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996). In that case, the court concluded that “even an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violate” a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Id. at 40. There, following the proper closure of the courtroom during the testimony of an undercover officer, the trial court accidentally forgot to reopen the courtroom for twenty minutes, during which time the defendant testified. Id. at 41–42. The Second Circuit narrowly held that “in the context of this case, where the closure was 1) extremely short, 2) followed by a helpful summation, and 3) entirely inadvertent,” the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated. Id. at 44. The Peterson court repeatedly focused on the brief and inadvertent nature of the closure, relying on Snyder v. Coiner, 365 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D. W. Va. 1973), and United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 154–55 (10th Cir. 1994), both of which involved inadvertent closures that went unnoticed by any of the trial participants. Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42–43. The court emphasized that it was not holding that the Sixth Amendment is not violated just because a closure is brief, or inadvertent, or because what occurs in camera is later repeated in open court. Id. at 44. In fact, the 29 court expressly noted that an intentional improper closure “could threaten a defendant’s right to a fair trial,” even if the closure is brief and its contents summarized in open court. Id. at 44 n.8. ¶52 More recently, in United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit emphasized the limits of its ruling in Peterson as it considered the intentional closing of a courtroom during voir dire. Noting that several courts have adopted the Peterson triviality analysis, the Second Circuit took pains to emphasize the doctrine’s “narrow application.” Gupta, 699 F.3d at 688. There, the court held that “[w]hatever the outer boundaries of our ‘triviality standard’ may be . . ., [the] trial court’s intentional, unjustified closure of a courtroom . . . cannot be deemed ‘trivial.’” Id. at 689. It emphasized that “the value of openness” guaranteed by a public trial “lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed” because “the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known.” Id. (quoting Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 508). The Second Circuit stressed that “it is the openness of the proceeding itself, regardless of what actually transpires, that imparts ‘the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system’ as a whole.” Id. (quoting Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 508). 30 ¶53 Where courts have adopted the Second Circuit’s triviality standard, including in the cases cited by the majority, they generally apply it only where the closures were either unintentional, e.g., Kelly v. State, 6 A.3d 396, 407 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (holding closure was trivial where a sheriff’s officer had closed the courtroom to the public); or partial, e.g., United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding exclusion of the defendant’s eight-year-old son was trivial); Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917–19 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding court’s exclusion of a former member of the jury venire from the trial was trivial); or both unintentional and partial, e.g., State v. Decker, 907 N.W.2d 378, 381, 385 (N.D. 2018) (holding closure was trivial where deputies excluded one person who was unrelated to the case). ¶54 Even where the triviality standard has been applied to closures that were not merely inadvertent or partial, courts have focused on other factors that showed the public trial right was not undermined. Some courts have focused on whether the closure concerned “an administrative jury problem,” such as a discussion about jurors’ safety that did not affect the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 957–58, 960 (9th Cir. 2003). Still others have emphasized the defendant’s failure to object to a closure, reasoning that “the lack of objection is some indication that the trial remained fundamentally fair.” State v. Schierman, 438 P.3d 1063, 1082 (Wash. 2018). Notably, in concluding that the 31 closure in that case was trivial, the Washington Supreme Court emphasized in Schierman the importance of striking a “careful balance” to avoid treating violations of the public trial right as harmless after the fact: On one hand, we must craft a rule that avoids . . . the conflation of specific procedural rights with a vague right to fundamentally “fair” proceedings. The temptation created by that approach, to excuse procedural violations as harmless after the fact, leads predictably to the result that procedural rights become entirely unenforceable. . . . [T]his outcome poses unacceptable risks to our system of justice . . . . Id. at 1081 (citations omitted). ¶55 Finally, I note that although several courts have adopted the Second Circuit’s triviality analysis, it has never been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Ironically, the triviality analysis is triggered only where a closure fails to comply with Waller and therefore is “unjustified”—in other words, only where the right to a public trial has been violated. And though the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that such error is structural (and therefore not susceptible to a harmless error analysis), Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908, the triviality standard effectively places a burden on the defendant to show prejudice to the values promoted by a public trial, including, specifically, the value of a “fair trial,” maj. op. ¶¶ 28–29 (citing 32 Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42).5 Although the majority stresses this is not a harmless error analysis, id. at ¶ 24 (citing Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42), it is difficult to square this approach with the idea that a violation of the right to a public trial is structural error. III. Application ¶56 Although there may be some closures that are so insignificant that they do not implicate the constitutional right to a public trial, we need not rule today on the propriety of the Second Circuit’s triviality analysis because even if that standard applied, the closure here plainly was not trivial. See Hassen, ¶ 15, 351 P.3d at 422. Unlike the “entirely inadvertent” closure in Peterson, the courtroom closure here was “total, intentional, and unjustified,” Lujan, ¶ 19, and undermined the interests served by a public trial. ¶57 First, unlike many cases cited by the majority applying the triviality standard to a court’s exclusion of specific individuals, see Perry, 479 F.3d at 890–91; Braun, 227 F.3d at 917–19; Decker, 907 N.W.2d at 385, the closure here was total in scope: the court barred not only the public from the courtroom, but also 5Peterson’s reference to the value of a “fair trial” is its own articulation of the values described in Waller; this phrasing does not appear in Waller’s discussion of those values. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. 33 counsel and even Lujan himself.6 The majority also points out that the bailiff and court reporter remained in the courtroom, maj. op. ¶¶ 8, 32, but the presence of court personnel in the courtroom is no substitute for the public’s attendance at a trial, let alone a substitute for the presence of counsel or the defendant himself. Moreover, although the majority states that “the trial judge did what he said he would do,” id. at ¶ 32; see also id. at ¶ 29, in fact, the transcript shows that the judge did not lay the record requested by defense counsel. And for that matter, that the exchange was “transcribed by the court reporter” and made part of the record, id. at ¶ 26, is not a substitute for a summation in open court of what occurred during the closed proceedings. Cf. Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44 (noting that “what went on in camera was later repeated in open court”). ¶58 Next, in stark contrast to the “entirely inadvertent” closure in Peterson and similar cases cited by the majority, see Kelly, 6 A.3d at 407; Decker, 907 N.W.2d at 385, the closure here was clearly deliberate. Importantly, the Second Circuit acknowledged in Peterson that an intentional improper closure “can threaten a defendant’s right to a fair trial, even when the closure is for a brief time.” 85 F.3d 6Lujan also argued on appeal that the closure violated his constitutional right to be present at trial. Lujan, ¶ 8. Under this court’s ruling today, the case must be remanded to the court of appeals to address this contention. See id.; maj. op. ¶ 38. 34 at 44 n.8. Whatever the boundaries of the triviality doctrine may be, even the court that came up with the standard held that an “intentional, unjustified exclusion of the public” violated the Sixth Amendment. Gupta, 699 F.3d at 685. And unlike Peterson and other cases relied on by the majority, the closure here did not go unnoticed by the trial participants, nor did defense counsel acquiesce in the closure. To the contrary, the court closed the courtroom over defense counsel’s express objection. See Schierman, 438 P.3d at 1081. ¶59 Importantly, the closure here was plainly unjustified, and the People do not argue otherwise. The court offered no “overriding interest” required by Waller to justify excluding the public, counsel, and Lujan from the proceedings. Instead, it closed the courtroom based solely on its mistaken belief that the jury could never be brought back into open court during deliberations.7 7Colorado courts have previously acknowledged that trial courts can bring juries back into the courtroom during deliberations, DeBella v. People, 233 P.3d 664, 669 (Colo. 2010) (holding that a court may require that video evidence be viewed in open court rather than give a jury unfettered access during deliberations), and that the defendant has a constitutional right to be present when the court does so, People v. Payne, 2014 COA 81, ¶ 20, 361 P.3d 1040, 1044 (holding that the “defendant had a constitutional right to be present while the trial court read the modified Allen instruction in open court and that his constitutional right was denied”). 35 ¶60 Finally, the courtroom was not closed in this case to address an administrative matter. Rather, the closure here took place during the court’s verbal instructions to the jury, a critical stage of the proceedings encompassed by the public trial right. State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 2012) (applying the public trial right to the court’s closure of the courtroom for jury instructions). Although the majority emphasizes that the court merely reread a previously given instruction, maj. op. ¶¶ 2, 8, 29, 36, I am unpersuaded that this makes any difference. Under the majority’s logic, the court could close the courtroom after the close of evidence when instructing the jury on reasonable doubt or the prosecution’s burden of proof, yet such a closure would be “trivial” because the court would be merely repeating the same instructions given to the jury at the beginning of the trial. That cannot be. Here, the court was instructing the jury on a key evidentiary issue about which the jury had expressed confusion during deliberations. ¶61 Once the court decided to read the instruction aloud to the jury, the proceeding needed to be open to the public. Instruction of the jury historically has occurred in open court; doing so ensures that the judge and jurors are “keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (quoting Gannett, 443 U.S. at 380). The intentional and total closure of the courtroom, during a critical stage of the proceedings, “undercuts the 36 legitimacy of the criminal justice process.” United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 363 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding court’s failure to read the verdict in open court violated the defendant’s right to a public trial). Accordingly, Lujan’s constitutional right to a public trial was violated, and he should receive a new trial. III. Conclusion ¶62 Unfortunately, I take no solace in the majority’s purported limitation of this holding to the “narrow facts” of this case. Maj. op. ¶ 37. To adopt a triviality standard in an appropriate case and apply it to truly trivial closures would be one thing. But here, the majority has deemed a closure “trivial” where the closure was total, intentional, and unjustified. Because the majority’s adoption of a triviality standard is not warranted on these facts, and because the closure here was not trivial in any event, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE GABRIEL and JUSTICE HART join in this dissent. 37