Opinion ID: 677450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Court's failure to inquire about discussions with prosecutor

Text: Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d) provides as follows: 22 The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the government and the defendant or the defendant's attorney. 23 Michlin contends that his plea was infirm because the district court did not make the inquiry called for in the second sentence of Rule 11(d). If the court had made this inquiry, Michlin argues, it would have learned that he had engaged in a proffer session with government counsel. 24 The purpose of the inquiry required by Rule 11(d) is to determine whether or not promises have been made by the government, and what those promises are. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d), Commentary to 1974 Amendment ( 'The plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be known' ) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)); see also United States v. Gray, 584 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir.1978) (Rule 11 requires an inquiry ... into the question whether or not there had been any plea bargaining). 25 In this case, there would have been little point in the district court's inquiring whether the prosecutor had engaged in prior discussions with Michlin or his attorney because it was obvious that this had happened: the prosecutor read into the record a plea memorandum which Michlin stated represented the agreement he had entered into with the government. There could not have been a plea agreement if there had not been prior discussions. The purpose of the inquiry was fulfilled without the inquiry having been made: the court learned that plea negotiations had taken place. 26 Michlin appears to place great emphasis on the district court's obligation to inquire into prior plea discussions, and suggests that the court had a duty to examine discussions entered into prior to the execution of the plea agreement. The commentary to Rule 11(d), however, and the facts of the case which is cited in the commentary, Santobello, reveal that the drafters' concern was with the disclosure of discussions entered into prior to the guilty plea--i.e., the plea agreement itself. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258-60, 92 S.Ct. at 496-98 (vacating sentence where plea agreement was never disclosed and as a result was never enforced). 27 In any event, the court did ask Michlin, in accordance with the first sentence of Rule 11(d), whether or not any threats or promises other than the plea agreement had been made to him in order to induce him to plead guilty. Michlin replied that none had. The district court's colloquy ensured that all promises, both those set forth in the plea agreement and any which may have preceded or exceeded the terms of the plea agreement would be disclosed. The district court was clearly in substantial compliance with Rule 11(d), see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h), and created a record from which we can easily ascertain that Michlin's waiver was knowing and voluntary. 28