Opinion ID: 1130023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Compensatory Payment to Client

Text: Leigh urges the PRT's recommendation that he pay restitution of $3,200 to his client neither is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct nor can be supported by the record. We agree. It was called to the PRT's attention that the rights of respondent and his client, inter se, were in controversy in pending civil litigation. According to Leigh, his clients paid him $3,200 for legal fees and costs [20] and he received a jury verdict against Mays for another $1,580.75, the majority of which has been collected. [21] Respondent appealed from both the judgment on the three verdicts against him (in Mays' third-party action) and from the dismissal of his bankruptcy case. These appeals were pending at the time of the PRT hearing. We are not advised as to the outcome of the appellate review. [22] The PRT imposed against respondent a monetary sanction, which was apparently intended to adjust the rights of the parties vis-a-vis one another. Its sanction cannot be termed restitution stricto sensu. [23] The latter contemplates restoring the person to his (or her) former position. In Bar disciplinary cases, restitution [24] generally refers to (a) a monetary payment by the respondent lawyer to the former client for the money, interest or thing of value that has been paid or entrusted to the lawyer by a client (or third party) in the course of the representation, [25] (b) a refund of unearned fees [26] or (c) a compensatory payment for the harm respondent has caused. [27] It is highly improper to adjust private claims in a disciplinary case by resort to restitution when the rights of the parties vis-a-vis one another are to be settled in pending civil litigation. Although the exact nature of the compensatory-payment sanction is not shown in the PRT report, it appears to be part and parcel of the controversy respondent and his client were then in process of litigating. Because the PRT's monetary-payment sanction cannot be surgically severed from those claims, now sub judice, we hold that it is an impermissible part of the controversy and of the disciplinary sanction. Moreover, it would indeed be a denial of due process to saddle respondent with a compensatory sanction that is unrelated to and unsupported by any evidence. [28] That approach would transform the disciplinary process into a constitutionally impermissible punitive sanction. According to the record, Leigh had on hand no unearned money of the client. There is no paper trail in the transcript of an effort by the Bar to adjust, in monetary terms, the amount of harm respondent's actions may have caused his client; neither is there any reference to a refund of some unearned attorney's fee. We cannot give the court's imprimatur to the PRT-recommended compensatory sanction. There is no record support either for a fee refund claim, restitution of client funds or a monetary sanction for harm caused by respondent. On de novo review of the record, we (a) find the one-count complaint amply supported by clear and convincing record proof, [29] (b) declare the respondent's conduct to have violated Rules 1.5, 4.1, 7.1, 7.4, 7.5 and 8.4(c), [30] and (c) conclude that a suspension from the practice of law for 180 days with payment of costs constitutes the proper discipline to be imposed. Within thirty days of the date of this opinion Leigh shall pay the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $540.54. RESPONDENT SHALL STAND SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF 180 DAYS FROM THE DAY THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL; COSTS OF THIS DISCIPLINARY PROSECUTION SHALL BE PROMPTLY PAID IN FULL AS A PRECONDITION FOR RESPONDENT'S REINSTATEMENT. KAUGER, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, HARGRAVE and WATT, JJ., concur. WILSON, C.J., and HODGES and SUMMERS, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. SIMMS, J., dissents.