Opinion ID: 767621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Krocka's Disability

Text: 10 In order to make out a claim under the ADA, an individual must first show that he is a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112. A qualified individual is one who can perform the essential functions of the employment position in question. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(8). In this case, it is undisputed that Krocka has at all times been able to perform the duties of a Chicago police officer. He is thus a qualified individual for purposes of the ADA. Under the ADA, a disability is: 11 (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities . . .; 12 (B) a record of such an impairment; or 13 (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 14 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2). Krocka's ADA claim is based on the first (actually disabled) and third (regarded as disabled) prongs of this definition. The district court concluded on summary judgment that CPD did not regard Krocka as disabled, and a jury determined that Krocka was not actually disabled. Thus, Krocka was found not to be an individual with a disability who is covered by the protections of the ADA, and the district court entered judgment against him on his ADA claim.
15 After the jury returned its verdict finding that Krocka was not actually disabled under the ADA, Krocka moved for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new trial. The district court denied both of these motions. Krocka now alleges that the district court erred in denying him a new trial because the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We review the district court's decision to deny a new trial for a clear abuse of discretion. Slane v. Mariah Boats, Inc., 164 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 1999). 16 To show that an individual has an actual disability under the ADA, he must demonstrate that he 1) has an impairment that 2) substantially limits one or more of the major life activities. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2)(A). An impairment is any physiological disorder, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one of the body's systems, or any mental disorder. Harrington v. Rice Lake Weighing Sys., Inc., 122 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(h). [M]edically diagnosed mental conditions are impairments under the ADA. Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 1998). Because Krocka's severe depression is a medical condition diagnosed by a health professional, it qualifies as an impairment under the ADA. See Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000) (In some circumstances, major depression can be a covered disability under the ADA. ). However, not all impairments are disabilities for purposes of the ADA. Krocka must also show that his depression substantially limits a major life activity. See id. (It is notenough . . . to demonstrate that [the plaintiff] suffers from depression . . . . [S]he must also demonstrate in the record that her depression substantially limits her ability to perform a major life activity.). 17 To be substantially limited means that the individual is either unable to perform, or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which the individual can perform, a major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1998); 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii). To make this determination, a court must consider the individual's ability to perform major life activities notwithstanding the use of a corrective device. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999). In other words, if an impaired individual employs measures to mitigate that impairment, such as taking medication or using a prosthetic device, the individual must be evaluated taking into account the ameliorating, or aggravating, effects of the measures on his ability to perform a major life activity. 18 In this case, Krocka contends that his depression substantially limits his ability to perform the major life activity of working. In order to show a substantial limitation on his ability to work, an individual must demonstrate that his impairment significantly restricts the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(j)(3)(i); see Schneiker, 200 F.3d at 1061. Krocka asserts that his depression affects his ability to work in that he is more irritable, less able to concentrate, and more prone to fatigue than the average police officer. He argues that these effects are substantial limitations on his ability to work as a police officer. 19 The record does not support Krocka's contention. Krocka has been a police officer for almost twenty years. During that time he has consistently received good performance evaluations, although he has occasionally received disciplinary citations. While Krocka's depression may have affected his interactions with others, it does not appear to have impacted his ability to perform the duties of a Chicago police officer. Furthermore, as noted above, we are to evaluate Krocka's condition taking into consideration the ameliorating effects of the medication he is taking to control that condition. Krocka acknowledges that when taking Prozac he exhibits no symptoms of depression and is able to perform the duties of his job adequately. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Krocka a new trial as there is ample evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that Krocka is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working and, therefore, is not actually disabled under the ADA.
20 Krocka also argues that he was disabled under the regarded as prong of the ADA definition. See 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2)(C). He contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to CPD on this issue. A district court is to grant summary judgment only where no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding a particular issue. Harrington, 122 F.3d at 458. In making this determination, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Harrington, 122 F.3d at 458. 21 The regarded as prong of the ADA's disability definition is intended to provide a remedy for discriminationbased on misperceptions about the abilities of impaired persons. As we have previously stated: 22 Many . . . impairments are not in fact disabling but are believed to be so, and the people having them may be denied employment or otherwise shunned as a consequence. Such people, objectively capable of performing as well as the unimpaired, are analogous to capable workers discriminated against because of their skin color or some other vocationally irrelevant characteristic. 23 Vande Zande v. State of Wisc. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has noted that in order to make out a claim under the regarded as prong, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150. These misperceptions may take the form of believing either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment, when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. Id. 24 We do not find evidence in the record to support the contention that CPD suffered under either of these misperceptions regarding Krocka's ability to work as a police officer. As noted above, Krocka's clinically diagnosed severe depression is an impairment under the ADA. There is ample evidence in the record that CPD was aware of Krocka's severe depression. Therefore, it is a reasonable inference in favor of Krocka that CPD regarded him as having the impairment of severe depression. However, there is no evidence in the record that CPD perceived Krocka as having an impairment he did not in fact possess. Therefore, he cannot make out a claim under the first type of misperception described above. 25 Krocka's claim is more appropriately classified under the second type of misperception--that CPD regarded his impairment as substantially more limiting than it truly is. Krocka's primary evidence of this mistaken belief is that CPD required him to participate in the PCP as a condition of his employment as a police officer. Krocka argues that his impairment was completely corrected by medication and that his placement in the PCP reflected CPD's mistaken belief that his depression acted as a significant limitation on his ability to perform his job and thus required that he be intensively supervised. However, after becoming aware of his impairment, CPD allowed Krocka to continue working as a police officer, without any restrictions on the type of duties he could perform, his ability to carry a weapon, or any other aspect of his work. Participation in the PCP entailed additional monitoring of Krocka but does not appear to have affected his duties or responsibilities as a police officer in any way. 26 It is apparent from these facts that CPD did not consider Krocka substantially limited or restricted in his ability to do his job, and this is what Krocka must show in order to prove that CPD regarded him as disabled. Placement in the PCP may have been an inappropriate response or an overreaction to Krocka's impairment. However, this is evidence that CPD took an adverse and unjustified employment action against Krocka because of his impairment. It is not evidence that CPD regarded that impairment as substantially limiting, and, thus, it is insufficient to show that CPD regarded Krocka as disabled. As the Supreme Court noted in Sutton, the ADA only provides protection from adverse employment actions for individuals with disabilities. Employers do not run afoul of the ADA when they make employment decisions based on physical or mental characteristics that are not impairments or that are limiting, but not substantially limiting such that they do not rise to the level of a disability under the ADA definition. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150. Krocka has provided evidence that his employer took an adverse employment action against him. However, he has provided insufficient evidence that his employer regarded him as disabled. Therefore,he has not shown that he is an individual with a disability who can bring a claim under the ADA. See Harrington, 122 F.3d at 461 (The notion that Rice Lake must have fired Harrington because it regarded him as disabled and that it plainly regarded him as disabled because it fired him is attractive but circular--it lacks a causal antecedent.). 27 Krocka further argues that the fact that CPD required him to undergo a medical evaluation and to continue to be supervised by a physician is evidence that CPD regarded him as disabled. We have stated that where inquiries into the psychiatric health of an employee are job related and reflect a concern[ ] with the safety of . . . employees, the employer may, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, require specific medical information from the employee and may require that the employee undergo a physical examination designed to determine his ability to work. See Duda, 133 F.3d at 1060. The position of Chicago police officer certainly presents significant safety concerns, not only for other CPD employees but for the public at large. It was entirely reasonable, and even responsible, for CPD to evaluate Krocka's fitness for duty once it learned that he was experiencing difficulties with his mental health. CPD did not make broad and unfounded assumptions about Krocka's fitness for duty based on his mental illness or the medication he was taking to mitigate that condition. Instead, it performed an individual evaluation of his particular situation and determined that he was capable of working as a Chicago police officer. 28 The steps taken to reassure an employer that an employee is fit for duty where there is a legitimate concern about an employee's ability to perform a particular job are not proof in a case such as this one that the employer regarded the employee as disabled. The results of that evaluation, however, may indicate the employer's perception of the employee's ability to function on the job and thus provide some evidence that the employer regarded the employee as disabled. In this case CPD determined after its evaluation of Krocka that he was able to perform the duties of a police officer, the job he desired to perform. Therefore, CPD did not consider him substantially limited in the major life activity of working and did not regard him as disabled. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152 (affirming dismissal of ADA claim where petitioners did not show that their employer regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the employer did not consider petitioners' myopic vision to be a disqualification for performing the job of airline pilot even though this impairment restricted the type of piloting job petitioners could hold). 29 CPD was aware of Krocka's mental impairment and took an adverse employment action against him because of it. However, Krocka has not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether CPD regarded him as disabled. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Defendants on this issue.