Opinion ID: 1721404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Basic Constitutional Principles Involved.

Text: The broad but vital principles of constitutional law asserted by the appellants will require cautious analysis when related to the situation presented by these appeals. We are currently passing through what appears to be a period of transition in the application of established constitutional principles. While vocally expressing adherence to the biblical admonition that we remove not the ancient landmark[s], Deuteronomy 19:14, some admittedly sincere jurists, with the support of many equally sincere political scientists, have, in our view, undertaken to transplant many of the ancient landmarks of constitutional law. The result we think has been an application of these traditional concepts to situations for which they were never intended or, in other respects, a failure to apply them to situations for which they were intended. In our effort to resolve some of these difficult and troublesome constitutional problems, we have reminded ourselves that it might be well to note the admonition of Section 15, Declaration of Rights of Virginia, which antedated our Declaration of Independence. In the cited document, the author George Mason, who was regarded as one of the most astute and farsighted of the architects of our government, suggested: XV. That no free government, or the blessings of liberty can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.  (Emphasis added.) In similar fashion the authors of the Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts in Article 18 of that document stated:  A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution, and a constant adherence to those of piety, justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality, are absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government.  M.G.L.A.Const. pt. 1, art. 18. (Emphasis added.) In recurring to certain fundamental principles the instant record invites our attention to two concepts of our constitutional democracy which we deem basic to our consideration of the problems presented and the ultimate solution thereof. The first of these simply is that under the Bill of Rights incorporated in the Constitution of the United States, an individual citizen, regardless of race or creed, is entitled to enjoy certain inalienable rights which cannot be denied to him except in a proper case by due and orderly process of law. While recognizing the rights of the individual, we must of necessity at times reconcile the enjoyment of those rights with the sovereign prerogatives of the state. If and when the two come into conflict in a particular case, it often becomes a judicial responsibility to determine which shall be subordinated to the other under controlling provisions of the organic law. The second basic principle to which we must here recur is a recognition of those aspects of our governmental structure which have produced a federalism of separate states. Consistent with the above mentioned tendencies in some quarters, we deem it appropriate to recall that American federalism is a co-ordinate union of divided sovereignties. E pluribus unum. If it be true, as our own State Constitution reminds us, that All political power is inherent in the people, Section 2, Declaration of Rights of Florida, F.S.A., it is equally fundamental that the powers enjoyed by the federal government are those only which are specifically defined in the Constitution of the United States supplemented by those powers essentially implicit in the ones specified. In equal measure powers not so delegated to the federal government nor prohibited to the states were, by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, expressly reserved to the respective states or to the people thereof. It might be well to recall that the Federal Constitution was ratified by conventions of the individual states as separate sovereignties representing the people of each particular state. Madison, Federalist 39. At no time did the people of all of the states as one composite nationwide electorate ever pass on the organic document. See also Florida Law Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, p. 65, Counter-Revolution  An Estimate of the Situation by R.C. Alley. In approaching our discussion of the legal questions presented by the instant record, we do so in the belief that certain tendencies toward paternalistic nationalism, which we think we detect in the opinions of some courts and the philosophies of some leaders of government, are, in our humble view at least, inconsistent with these traditional concepts of our constitutional democracy. Rather than call upon the pristine exponents of the concept such as Jefferson, Madison, Mason and others of their colonial political persuasion, let us look to the most consecrated judicial advocate of centralized nationalism. In Barron, for Use of Tiernan v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 250, 8 L.Ed. 672, 675, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the constitution of the United States, was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government  not against those of the local governments.  (Emphasis added.) Spanning the gap of more than one hundred years, in 1958 Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed the views of the majority of the highest court of the land when in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 1305, 2 L.Ed.2d 1393, he wrote: It is relevant to remind that our Constitution is one of particular powers given to the National Government with the powers not so delegated reserved to the States or, in the case of limitations upon both governments, to the people. Except insofar as penal remedies may be provided by Congress under the explicit authority to `make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' the other powers granted by Art. 1, § 8, the bulk of authority to legislate on what may be compendiously described as criminal justice, which in other nations belongs to the central government, is under our system the responsibility of the individual States. We submit that we are not without respectable support for our view. As we proceed now to a more detailed discussion of the problems at hand we remain fully conscious of the rights of appellants as citizens. These must be reconciled with any conclusion regarding the extent of the State's power to act. We must also consider the effect of certain decisions bearing on the State's authority when equated with the power of the federal government. In all of these involved deliberations, we must admittedly evaluate the influence of the authoritative voice of the Supreme Court of the United States in its interpretation of the federal organic law. All of this we now undertake.