Opinion ID: 2321057
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Free from Conflicts

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution [6] and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, [7] as a safeguard necessary to ensure fundamental human rights of life and liberty, guarantee to any criminal defendant the right to have the assistance of counsel. Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 33, 746 A.2d 392, 396 (2000). The Supreme Court has explained that `the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984) (citations omitted); accord Mosley v. State, 378 Md. 548, 557, 836 A.2d 678, 683 (2003); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724, 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 440, 509 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1986). This right has been accorded, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] said, `not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.' Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1240, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 300 (2002) ( quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 667 (1984)). Moreover, in Austin v. State, 327 Md. 375, 381, 609 A.2d 728, 730-31 (1992), we stated that [t]he constitutional right to counsel, under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, includes the right to have counsel's representation free from conflicts of interest. ( citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230 (1981)); accord Lettley, 358 Md. at 34, 746 A.2d at 396; Graves v. State, 94 Md.App. 649, 656, 619 A.2d 123, 126 (1993). Furthermore, [a] defense attorney's representation must be untrammeled and unimpaired, unrestrained by commitments to others; counsel's loyalty must be undivided, leaving counsel free from any conflict of interest. Lettley, 358 Md. at 34, 746 A.2d at 396. The Maryland Rules of Professional Responsibility also prohibit attorneys from representing a client if that representation involves a conflict of interest. [8] To establish a violation of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both that his or her attorney's representation was deficient and that he or she was prejudiced as a result of that deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696. We have explained, however, that: A narrow exception to the Strickland standard exists where defendant's ineffective assistance claim is based on a conflict of interest. . . . In addressing an ineffective assistance claim alleging conflict of interest, we do not apply the Strickland two-pronged test but rather a more lenient standard that does not require a showing of prejudice. Lettley, 358 Md. at 34-35, 746 A.2d at 397. In Lettley, 358 Md. at 35-39, 746 A.2d at 397-99, we outlined the three significant Supreme Court cases regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from conflicts of interest. Writing for the majority, Judge Raker explained: In Glasser, which is sometimes referred to as the watershed conflict of interest case, the Supreme Court, in the context of co-defendants, reversed Glasser's conviction primarily on the grounds that Glasser's counsel struggle[d] to serve two masters because his conflict of interest violated Glasser's right to effective assistance of counsel. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 75, 62 S.Ct. 457. The Court noted that the possibility of the inconsistent interests of Glasser and the co-defendant was brought home to the court, but instead of jealously guarding Glasser's rights, the court created the conflict by appointing, over objection, counsel with conflicting interests, thereby depriving Glasser of his right to have the benefit of undivided assistance of counsel. See id. at 71, 62 S.Ct. 457. As to Glasser's prejudice, the Court said: To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's appointment of Stewart as counsel for [a co-defendant] is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Id. at 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457. In Holloway, again in the context of co-defendants at trial, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that counsel's conflict of interest deprived the defendants of effective assistance of counsel. Three defendants were on trial for robbery and rape, in a consolidated trial. Defense counsel asked the court before trial to appoint separate counsel for the three defendants, the request based on the defendants' statements to him that there was a possibility of a conflict of interest in each of their cases. The trial court denied defendants' requests and the case proceeded to trial. All three defendants were convicted. The Supreme Court noted that trial counsel, as an officer of the court, alerted the court to the conflict, and focused explicitly on the probable risk of a conflict of interests. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173. The trial court, however, failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel. Id. The Court held that this failure, in the face of the representations made by counsel weeks before trial and again before the jury was empaneled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of `assistance of counsel.' Id. Recognizing that joint representation is not per se violative of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, the Court nonetheless said that since the decision in Glasser, most courts have held that an attorney's request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding conflict of interests, should be granted. Id. at 485, 98 S.Ct. 1173. Turning to the question of proof of prejudice, the Holloway Court concluded that prejudice is presumed, regardless of whether it was shown independently. See id. at 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173. The Court read the Court's opinion in Glasser . . . as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic. Id. at 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173. The Court recognized that joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing, and that a rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict, which he and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objection, prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded application. See id. at 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173. Again rejecting a harmless error standard, the Court said: But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil  it bears repeating  is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation. Id. at 490-91, 98 S.Ct. 1173. Two years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the conflict of interest issue, in Cuyler. In Cuyler, the potential conflict of interest was not brought to the trial court's attention. Three co-defendants were jointly represented by two attorneys. Sullivan did not object to the multiple representation until after he was convicted and he moved for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In establishing a standard to be applied to cases in which the potential conflict is not brought to the trial court's attention, the Supreme Court held that in order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (emphasis added). In this context, the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708. Commenting on Glasser, the Court held: Glasser established that unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless error. Once the Court concluded that Glasser's lawyer had an actual conflict of interest, it refused to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice attributable to the conflict. The conflict itself demonstrated a denial of the right to have the effective assistance of counsel. 315 U.S. at 76, 62 S.Ct. at 467. Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. But until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708. Contrary to the resolution in Holloway, Sullivan, who did not object before trial, was required to show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. To date the Supreme Court has never squarely resolved the question of whether proof of an adverse effect of a conflict of interest is required to reverse a conviction. See e.g., Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1043, 110 S.Ct. 1506, 108 L.Ed.2d 641 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Numerous cases in other jurisdictions addressing conflict of interest conclude, however, that the time at which a conflict of interest, or a potential one, is raised and is brought to the court's attention governs how this issue is to be treated. See, e.g., Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir.1994); Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1992); People v. Burchette, 257 Ill. App.3d 641, 628 N.E.2d 1014, 1023, 195 Ill.Dec. 550 (1994); State v. Wille, 595 So.2d 1149, 1153 (La.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 880, 113 S.Ct. 231, 121 L.Ed.2d 167 (1992); State v. Marshall, 414 So.2d 684, 687 (La.1982); State v. Lemon, 698 So.2d 1057, 1061 (La.Ct.App.1997); State v. Dillman, 70 Ohio App.3d 616, 591 N.E.2d 849, 852 n. 1 (1990). See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.2, at 414 (1986) (The different, and lesser, showing that obtained reversal in Holloway depended on the lawyer's trial objection there.). The cases reason that when a possible conflict exists, but the trial court is not advised of the conflict in a timely manner, the Cuyler standard applies. In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. On the other hand, when the defendant advises the trial court of the possibility of a conflict of interest, the Glasser/Holloway standard applies. [A] court confronted with and alerted to possible conflicts of interest must take adequate steps to ascertain whether the conflicts warrant separate counsel. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). The trial court is required to either appoint separate counsel, or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173. If the trial court fails to take adequate steps or improperly requires joint or dual representation, then reversal is automatic, without a showing of prejudice, or adverse effect upon the representation. After this Court's decision in Lettley, the Supreme Court decided Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). In Mickens, the Supreme Court evaluated, with regards to the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, whether the criminal defendant was entitled to the automatic reversal of a conviction when the trial judge failed to inquire into a potential conflict of interest. The Court reviewed its prior decisions and explained, as the State points out, that Holloway creates an automatic reversal rule only where defense counsel is forced to represent co[ ]defendants over his [or her] timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168, 122 S.Ct. at 1241-42, 152 L.Ed.2d. at 302. The Supreme Court also explained, however, that for Sixth Amendment purposes, `an actual conflict of interest,' mean[s] precisely a conflict that affect[s] counsel's performance  as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. at 1243, 1244 n. 5, 152 L.Ed.2d. at 304, 304 n. 5. The Court ultimately held that the criminal defendant had to establish that the potential conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance before he would be entitled to reversal. [9] This last principle is essential to our analysis of the case sub judice, as we have determined that an actual conflict of interest existed. This Court addressed ineffectiveness of counsel due to a conflict of interest in Austin, 327 Md. at 381-82 n. 1, 609 A.2d at 731 n. 1, infra. We stated that: In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance.... One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 345-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1716-19, 64 L.Ed.2d at 343-47, the [Supreme] Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e.g., Fed.Rule Crim. Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. ( quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696). We shall discuss Austin in more detail, below.