Opinion ID: 2166584
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Heading: Jury Instructions/Lesser Included Offense.

Text: Shearon was charged with the offense of lascivious acts with a child, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.8. His counsel requested a jury instruction on the offense of indecent contact with a child, alleging it to be a lesser-included offense. The district court refused to give the requested instruction on indecent contact, a matter Shearon cites as error on appeal. We review a charge of instructional error for correction of errors at law. State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Iowa 1992). It is the trial court's duty to instruct not only as to the public offense charged but as to all lesser offenses of which the accused might be found guilty under the indictment and upon the evidence adduced. Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.6(3). We are committed to the impossibility test when it comes to determining whether one offense is a lesser included of another. See State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 740 (Iowa 1988). The test is satisfied when the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing all elements of the lesser offense. State v. Coffin, 504 N.W.2d 893, 894 (Iowa 1993); State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Iowa 1990). Based on the trial information, the court gave the following marshalling instruction for the crime of Lascivious Acts with a Child: [T]he State must prove all of the following elements: 1. On or about the 15th day of November, 2000, the defendant with or without [K.D.J.'s] consent permitted or caused [K.D.J.] to fondle or touch the defendant's genitals. 2. The defendant did so with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant or [K.D.J.]. 3. The defendant was then 18 years of age or older. 4. [K.D.J.] was then under the age of 14 years. A jury instruction for Indecent Contact with a Child fitting charges similar to this case would include the following elements: 1. On or about the 15th day of November, 2000, the defendant with or without [K.D.J.]'s consent: a. Fondled or touched the inner thigh, groin, buttock, anus or breast of [K.D.J.]; or b. Touched the clothing covering the immediate area of the inner thigh, groin, buttock, anus or breast of [K.D.J.]; or c. Solicited or permitted [K.D.J.] to fondle or touch the inner thigh, groin, buttock, anus or breast of the defendant; or d. Solicited [K.D.J.] to engage in acts described in sections 709.8(1), (2) or (4). 2. The defendant did so with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant or [K.D.J.]. 3. The defendant was then 18 years of age or older.... 4. [K.D.J.] was then under the age of 14 years.... Iowa Criminal Jury Instr. 900.7; Iowa Code § 709.12. Because elements two through four of each crime are identical, our analysis focuses on the first element of each crime. Shearon was charged under the lascivious acts alternative requiring proof that he permitted or caused [the victim] to fondle or touch the defendant's genitals. By contrast, the crime of indecent acts criminalizes the touching or fondling of non-genital body parts, e.g., inner thigh, groin, buttock, anus or breast. See Iowa Code § 709.12. Alternatively, indecent contact is committed when a person solicits a child to engage in any act prohibited in section 709.8. Id. The State argues [i]t is entirely possible for a defendant to `permit or cause' a child to fondle or touch his or her genitals without also `soliciting' the child to do so. [1] Whereas a defendant might cause the lascivious act by placing a child's hand on his genitals or permit the child to crawl across his lap and thereby touch them, the word solicit connotes asking or urging conduct. State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Iowa 1974). Put another way, the crime of solicitation is in the asking. State v. Anderson, 618 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). Thus, the State argues, once the defendant solicits the child under section 709.12(4), the crime is complete. Because no actual touching or fondling is necessary, the crime of indecent contact does not qualify as a lesser-included offense of lascivious acts. Shearon relies on State v. Capper, 539 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 1995) as his sole basis for countering the State's argument. His reliance is misplaced. Our focus in Capper was on whether lascivious acts or indecent contact were lesser-included offenses of the principal crime charged there, second-degree sexual abuse. We held they were not. Capper, 539 N.W.2d at 367. Without comparing the elements, we then summarily observed in passing that [h]owever, indecent contact with a child is a lesser included offense of lascivious acts with a child. Id. at 368. We now reconsider that dictum and hold to the contrary. Because it is possible to commit the crime of lascivious acts without also committing indecent contact with a child, the latter crime is not a lesser-included offense of the former. The district court was correct in so ruling.