Opinion ID: 451968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence from State Wiretaps

Text: 16 Appellants argue next that the indictment should have been dismissed because the government disclosed to the grand jury evidence intercepted by state wiretap, which had been obtained without securing a disclosure order, as required by 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2517(5). Section 2517 sets forth the authorization requirements for use of intercepted wire or oral communications. Subsection (3) provides that any person who has received ... evidence derived [from a wire or oral communication] intercepted in accordance with the provision of this chapter may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath ... in any court of the United States.... But Subsection (5) creates an exception where the intercepted material relates to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization. In such cases, the government must obtain an authorization from a judge of competent jurisdiction, reflecting his determination that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provision of this chapter, before it can disclose such materials. 17 In the instant case, one state order authorized interception of communications relating to the delivery and sale of controlled substances, to wit: Diazepam, commonly known as valium; Lysergic Acid Diethylamine, commonly known as LSD; Cannabis; Methaqualon .... A second state order included communications relating to the delivery and sale of Cannabis and Diazepam (valium). Appellants argue that, by disclosing these materials to a grand jury considering RICO (rather than drug law) violations without obtaining any prior authorization, the government violated Section 2517(5). 6 Appellants cite two cases, United States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214 (7th Cir.1975), and Marion v. United States, 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.1976), in which indictments were dismissed after the government used intercepted materials in grand jury proceedings relating to a violation not described in the original order, without obtaining an authorization. They claim that this precedent requires the dismissal of the indictments in this case. 18 Marion and Brodson, however, are not binding precedent in this Circuit; the single binding case that has considered the effect of Section 2517(5) on grand jury evidence, United States v. Campagnuolo, 556 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.1977), was far less rigid in its conclusions. 7 The court concluded that the phrase relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization must be understood by reference to congressional intent: Congress wished to assure that the Government does not secure a wiretap authorization order to investigate one offense as a subterfuge to acquire evidence of a different offense for which the prerequisites to an authorization order are lacking. 556 F.2d at 1214. Although the court in Campagnuolo did not elaborate, understanding the authorization requirement as a means of preventing governmental subterfuge appears to permit a more flexible interpretive approach. For example, courts could relax the authorization requirement in cases where the offense for which the wiretap was authorized and the offense for which the information was used were so similar in nature that there would be little chance that the original authorization was a subterfuge to obtain evidence of an offense for which the prerequisites to authorization are lacking. Cf. United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485, 502 (D.C.Cir.1975) (similar offense exception to District of Columbia analogue to Section 2517(5)). 19 Even if Campagnuolo does not go so far as to permit a general similar offense exception to the authorization requirement, two features of the instant case suggest that the rationale of Campagnuolo would authorize the use of the wiretap evidence here. First, the prosecution under the RICO statute bears a unique kind of similarity to the prosecution under the drug law. It is not merely a question of crimes which have some common elements or some overlapping proof: where, as here, a drug offense is one of the predicate acts for the RICO violation, every element of that offense must be proven before the RICO violation can be established. Although the object of the RICO statute might be different, the extent of similarity in what must be proved makes subterfuge virtually impossible; the government might seek, in the long run, to offer additional proof against the enterprise, but in the context of the intercepted conversation, it is most likely that the government is interested in offering evidence of the predicate offense. Second, the authorization order in this case did not specify any offense by statute or code reference. Not only does this distinguish the instant case from Brodson and Marion, both of which had orders specifying particular statutes; but the generality of the state's object drastically reduces the possibility of federal subterfuge. It is difficult to claim that the federal government had a different object in mind in disclosing the material than the state did in intercepting it, when the state defined its object with such generality. 20 Finally, some courts have held that dismissal of the indictment may not be an appropriate response, even where the requirements of Section 2517(5) have not been met. See United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 856 (3rd Cir.1976); United States v. Aloi, 449 F.Supp. 698, 721 (E.D.N.Y.1977). These cases suggest that sanctions should be applied flexibly, and with an awareness of the purposes of the provision. 449 F.Supp. at 721. The special similarity of the offenses and the failure to specify a particular statute in the original order make it clear that the goals of the provisions of Section 2517(5) would not be served by a dismissal of the indictments.