Opinion ID: 2085464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Confounding Defenses

Text: We first consider defendant's contention that he was confounded in presenting his defenses. During the hearing on his motion to sever, defendant argued that he desired to testify so he could deny the charges in count 1, but might not want to testify with respect to counts 2 or 3 because he had made a potential admission relevant to those counts. He argued, therefore, that his right to a fair trial would be denied because he had a right to testify about the charges in one count and to decline to take the stand with respect to the others. On appeal, defendant advances those same arguments. He asserts that because the trial justice refused to sever the charges, he was forced to exercise his right not to testify at all and therefore was deprived of the opportunity to deny the charges set forth in count 1. This, he says, is particularly harmful to him because he wanted to testify that the charge was fabricated against him by his hostile wife in cahoots with her family members and friends. This Court previously has had occasion to address this theory of prejudice. See Hightower, 661 A.2d at 954; Lassor, 555 A.2d at 346. In Lassor, 555 A.2d at 346, the defendant argued that he was prejudiced when the trial justice denied his motion to sever the four charges against him because as a result, he opted not to testify. He argued that had the charges been severed, he would have testified on two of the charges. Id. The defendant in Lassor did not explain what testimony he would have offered had the charges been severed, nor did he supply specific reasons why he did not want to testify on the other counts. Id. In denying his appeal, this Court held that this vague and indefinite assertion did not establish the real or substantial prejudice that would require a reversal of a trial justice's decision under Rule 14. Lassor, 555 A.2d at 346-47. The Court observed the federal rule that: [N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing both that he has important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. In making such a showing, it is essential that the defendant present enough informationregarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count and his reason for not wishing to testify on the otherto satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh the considerations of `economy and expedition in judicial administration' against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. Id. at 347 (quoting United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 763 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279, 1283 (1st Cir.1993). In Hightower, 661 A.2d at 954, we considered an argument that the defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced improperly by a dilemma caused by the defendant's desire to testify about the charges in one count but to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege on another count. There, we held that the defendant's suggestion and speculation were insufficient to overturn the trial justice's decision not to sever the counts in the indictment. Id. We see the wisdom in the rule adopted by the federal courts. Severance should not be mandatory every time a defendant wishes to testify to one charge but to remain silent on another. If that were the law, a court would be divested of all control over the matter of severance and the choice would be entrusted to the defendant. United States v. Archer, 843 F.2d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir.1988) (citing United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1287 (7th Cir.1986)). Therefore, a defendant must offer in timely fashion `enough information' so that the court can weigh `the considerations of judicial economy' against the defendant's `freedom to choose whether to testify' as to a particular charge. United States v. Alosa, 14 F.3d 693, 695 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir.1985)). In the case before us, defendant has not offered any particularized showing of prejudice. Pereira did not inform the trial justice what important testimony he wished to give on count 1 concerning the allegations made by his daughter. He made no offer of proof and submitted no affidavit, nor did he even give any general indication of what the substance of any testimony would be. Cf. United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 187, 190-93 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that the defendant made particularized showing after considering affidavit submitted to trial court providing the specific testimony the defendant wanted to give); United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.1997) (holding defendant likely deprived of defense to tax charges after considering offer of proof submitted at trial that recited the proposed testimony constituting his defense). On appeal, even though defendant now suggests that he would have testified that his wife fabricated the allegations against him, he has failed to state specifically what testimony he would have offered. At the trial, Pereira's wife testified, and he was afforded ample opportunity to cross-examine her on her bias and motive. Indeed, defendant's lawyer elicited from Mrs. Pereira an acknowledgment that the couple had experienced marital problems that had started before the allegations of abuse were made. Mrs. Pereira conceded that as a result of their divorce, defendant conveyed the marital domicile to her. Defense counsel's cross-examination also elicited testimony that Mrs. Pereira called a lawyer almost immediately after Amy's revelation, even before anyone contacted the police, and that within one or two days later, she withdrew a large sum of money from the couple's joint bank account. It is unclear what more defendant could have offered by his own testimony that could have been more compelling to his theory about his wife's motives to give false testimony. Furthermore, defendant's mere assertion that he is not guilty has not been found to be the type of important testimony, that is necessary to mount a defense that would outweigh the trial justice's consideration of judicial economy in a joint trial. See United States v. Martin, 18 F.3d 1515, 1519 (10th Cir.1994) (defendant's testimony that he is not guilty of the offense, that he did not possess the weapon or carry it for the purpose of a drug-trafficking offense is not important testimony requiring severance); Alosa, 14 F.3d at 695 (defendant's testimony that he did not use the gun for drug trafficking and that he owned guns for fun, not crucial testimony requiring severance). Therefore, it is our opinion that defendant has not shown that he has been prejudiced by the loss of an opportunity to offer vital testimony to the extent that it would deny him a fair trial. B