Opinion ID: 1847690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court's approval of instruction d-6 was reversible error.

Text: ¶ 5. Davis objects to the trial court's approval of the following jury instruction: The Court instructs the jury that in order to question a person to investigate whether merchandise of a store had been taken without payment therefor, the store must show that it acted in good faith and had probable cause to question a customer, and the jury is further instructed that under such circumstances, the questioning of the Plaintiff must be in a reasonable manner, and if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Wal-Mart questioned the Plaintiff in good faith and having probable cause to reasonably believe he was guilty of shoplifting or had merchandise that had not been paid for, and questioned him in a reasonable and prudent manner, then your verdict should be for the Defendant. Counsel for Davis asserts that the portion of the instruction which reads, merchandise that had not been paid for goes to the weight of the evidence and amounts to a grant of a directed verdict for Wal-Mart. Davis argues that the instruction wrongfully tells the jury that if the defendant thought appellant at any time had unpaid merchandise [sic], then they had a right to do the acts complained about in this case. Davis asserts that the instruction effectively told the jury that if someone walks out of the store, Wal-Mart has a right to search them. Wal-Mart contends the instruction was narrowly drawn to match the statutory language and accurately depicted the law. The statute which allows stores like Wal-Mart to question customers upon suspicion of shoplifting reads as follows: If any person shall commit or attempt to commit the offense of shoplifting, or if any person shall wilfully conceal upon his person or otherwise any unpurchased goods, wares or merchandise held or owned by any store of mercantile establishment, the merchant or any employee thereof or any peace or police officer, acting in good faith and upon probable cause based upon reasonable grounds therefor, may question such person in a reasonable manner for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not such person is guilty of shoplifting as defined herein. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-95 (1994). ¶ 6. Davis notes and we have held that if jury instructions fail to set out the applicable law, the case must be reversed and remanded. See Boone v. Wal-Mart Stores, 680 So.2d 844 (Miss.1996). In Boone, the instruction was much the same as the one here. However, it failed to instruct the jury that questioning of the alleged shoplifter must be done in a reasonable manner. Id. at 847. Aside from this flaw, the trial court's choice of language in the Boone case was almost identical to the language used in the instant case. It read in pertinent part: The law of the State of Mississippi allows a merchant to stop and question a person to investigate whether merchandise of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. had been taken, if you find a preponderance of the evidence that WalMart's employees acted in good faith and upon probable cause, based upon reasonable grounds therefore, to suspect [defendants] of shoplifting. Id. ¶ 7. We agreed in Boone that this language stated the proper determination for a jury, but held a jury must also be instructed regarding the reasonableness of questioning the alleged shoplifter. Id. The instruction in the instant case properly requires the jury to determine whether or not the questioning by Wal-Mart employees was reasonable. ¶ 8. Our shoplifting statute states it is prima facie evidence of shoplifting when a person removes or causes removal of unpurchased merchandise from a store. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-93(2)(b) (1994). The jury instruction in the instant case stated, if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Wal-Mart questioned the Plaintiff in good faith and having probable cause to reasonably believe he was guilty of shoplifting or had merchandise that had not been paid for.... It is undisputed that Davis was either leaving or had already left the store when the events in question occurred. The final portion of the instruction merely restated the definition of shoplifting and was written so that it must be read to include probable cause to believe he ... had merchandise that had not been paid for. ¶ 9. Counsel for Davis asserted at trial that if probable cause were added before the last portion, he would have no strong objection to the instruction. The instruction given includes this probable cause language and states the law accurately. Therefore, there was no error in the trial court's grant of jury instruction D-6.