Opinion ID: 888088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: ¶9 A review of the record reveals the State and H.C.R. agreed that if H.C.R. were to violate any conditions of the 2004 Order, the Youth Court would transfer the case to district court “and transfer [H.C.R.’s] supervision to adult probation services.” We view this sentencing stipulation as equivalent to a plea agreement in the criminal context. ¶10 We have held that a district court abuses its discretion when it fails to require the State to abide by the terms of a plea agreement. State v. Rardon, 1999 MT 220, ¶ 17, 296 Mont. 19, ¶ 17, 986 P.2d 424, ¶ 17 (Rardon I), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Munoz, 2001 MT 85, ¶ 38, 305 Mont. 139, ¶ 38, 23 P.3d 922, ¶ 38. Where counsel for one party objects to the sentencing recommendation of the other party, we also review the district court’s discretionary ruling under the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Rardon, 2002 MT 345, ¶ 14, 313 Mont. 321, ¶ 14, 61 P.3d 132, ¶ 14 (Rardon II). Thus, because H.C.R. argued against the State’s sentencing recommendation and asserted the 4 State could not make a recommendation outside of the 2004 Order, we review the Youth Court’s decision here under the abuse of discretion standard of review.