Opinion ID: 2533183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the sentencing phase instructions were deficient.

Text: ¶ 164. Pitchford's fourteenth assignment of error is that Sentencing Instruction 1 did not expressly inform the jury that, even though it might find the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances, it could nevertheless sentence him to life. He claims the trial court should not have refused his proposed instruction DS-7, which stated: You may find that death is not warranted even if there are one or more aggravating circumstances and not a single mitigating circumstance. You are not required to find any mitigating circumstances in order to return a sentence of life imprisonment. Nor does the finding of an aggravating circumstance, require that you return a sentence of death. You, as a juror, always have the option to sentence Pitchford to life imprisonment, whatever findings you may make. ¶ 165. As stated above, jury instructions are within the sound discretion of the trial court. [112] On review, jury instructions should be read together, taken as a whole, and no one instruction should be taken out of context. [113] A defendant is entitled to have his theory of the case presented in the jury instructions. [114] But the entitlement is limited, and the court may refuse an instruction if it incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. [115] ¶ 166. Sentencing Instruction 1 reads, in pertinent part: [T]o return the death penalty, you must find the mitigating circumstances  those which tend to warrant the less severe penalty of life imprisonment without parole  do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances  which tend to warrant the death penalty. . . . If none of the aggravating circumstances are found to exist, the death penalty may not be imposed. . . . If one or both of the. . . aggravating circumstances are found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must consider whether there are mitigating circumstances which outweigh the aggravating circumstances. . . . If you find from the evidence that one or more of the . . . elements of mitigation exists, then you must consider whether it (or they) outweigh(s) or overcome(s) any aggravating circumstances you previously found. In the event that you find that the mitigating circumstance[s] do not outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstance, you may impose the death sentence. Should you find the mitigating circumstance(s) outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstances, you shall not impose the death sentence. ¶ 167. The instruction does not require the jury to impose the death penalty, even should it find the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The instruction merely informs the jury that, should it find the mitigating circumstance[s] do not outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstance, [it] may impose the death sentence. The trial court's use of the term may  while not the strongest language to make the point  was sufficient to convey to the jury that it was not required to impose the death penalty, even should it find the aggravating factors outweighed those submitted in mitigation. ¶ 168. Furthermore, this Court has specifically held, a defendant is not entitled to an instruction that the jury may return a life sentence even if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances or if they do not find any mitigating circumstances. [116] Based on the trial court's instruction and our precedent, we find this argument has no merit. ¶ 169. Pitchford also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to give four of his proposed sentencing instructions, which are as follows: DS-8: The Court instructs you, the jury, that if you cannot, within a reasonable amount of time, agree as to punishment, the Court will dismiss you and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without the benefit of parole. DS-13: I have previously read to you the aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider. These are the only aggravating circumstances you may consider. However before you may consider any of these factors you must find that factor is established by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. DS-15: If you the Jury chooses [sic] to sentence Mr. Pitchford to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, Mr. Pitchford will never be eligible for parole. Further, his life sentence without possibility of probation or parole cannot be reduced or suspended. ¶ 170. The Supreme Court of the United States has said, as a requirement of individualized sentencing, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to mitigation, and that a state statute that permits a jury to consider any mitigating evidence comports with that requirement. [117] The Court also pointed out that: while the Constitution requires that a sentencing jury have discretion, it does not mandate that discretion be unfettered; the States are free to determine the manner in which a jury may consider mitigating evidence. So long as the sentencer is not precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence, a capital sentencing statute cannot be said to impermissibly, much less automatically, impose death. [118] ¶ 171. Pitchford correctly argues that DS-8 complies with the letter of Mississippi Code Section 99-19-103. [119] Still, the trial court was within its discretion to deny the instruction, reasoning, [t]his would indicate to the jury that a certain deadline was going to be set for them and after that they couldn't  that the case would be taken away from them. We will not hold the trial court in error for refusing the instruction. ¶ 172. The trial court refused DS-13 as cumulative, stating, [The jury] has already been instructed that they are cautioned not to be swayed by, among other things, prejudice. . . . [The jury instruction] also tells them what factors they have to use. And so I don't think they need to be told what factors they don't have to use since they have already been told which factors they do have to use. ¶ 173. The trial court was within its discretion to deny DS-13 as covered fairly elsewhere under Thorson. [120] ¶ 174. As to DS-15, the trial court held: S-1A already tells them that it's either life without parole or death penalty. So [the jury] is aware of that. And I don't see that DS-15 needs to be given. It's already been, been given once. Pitchford nevertheless argues that, without a more specific instruction, the jury was left to speculate as to whether he actually would be sentenced to spend the remainder of his natural life behind bars. ¶ 175. This Court has said a trial court's failure to include the statutorily required sentencing option of life without the possibility of parole constitutes reversible error. [121] Here, however, the trial court clearly included an instruction that Pitchford could be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Thus, we find the trial court was within its discretion to deny DS-15, as it was fairly covered elsewhere under Thorson. ¶ 176. Pitchford complains that two critical instructions  one regarding a verdict of life without parole, and the other concerning what the jury was to do in the event it was unable to agree unanimously on a sentence  were on a separate page from the instructions concerning a possible death sentence. He claims this possibly suggested to the jury that death was the preferred sentence. ¶ 177. The trial court, responding to this argument, evaluated the form of the instructions and found that, [i]t is not in the least bit suggestive they are to do one over the other. We agree, and find no merit to this argument. ¶ 178. Finally, Pitchford argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow the mitigating factor  Mr. Pitchford had mental health problems as a child that were never treated  to be considered by the jury. When presented with this argument, the trial court stated, The fact is we don't have any doctor that has testified to that. We don't have anything in the record that at all supports that Pitchford had any mental health problems. ¶ 179. We will not hold the trial court in error for refusing to submit a mitigating factor to the jury which was not grounded in the evidence. Thus, this issue has no merit.