Opinion ID: 751138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Garcia's Guilty Plea

Text: 67 The Sentencing Guidelines call for an additional one-level reduction for a defendant who accepts responsibility under § 3E1.1(a) and who timely notif[ies] authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently. USSG § 3E1.1(b)(2). A defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the one-level reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Wetwattana, 94 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir.1996). We review the district court's factual findings regarding acceptance of responsibility for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 65 F.3d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir.1995). 68 The facts regarding Garcia's plea negotiations are somewhat hazy, largely because the Government prosecutor with whom Garcia had been negotiating left the U.S. Attorney's office during the course of the negotiations. According to an affidavit filed by Garcia's attorney in the district court, plea negotiations had reached the penultimate stage when the Assistant U.S. Attorney conducting the negotiations, Frank Lipuma, informed Garcia's attorney that he was leaving the office. The new prosecutors assigned to the case indicated their intent to request a three-level enhancement due to Garcia's managerial status, an enhancement that Lipuma had apparently indicated he would not request. This change in the terms of the agreement derailed the negotiations and rendered Garcia's ultimate guilty plea untimely. 69 Garcia argues that a plea agreement was in place and that, but for the change in prosecutors, a timely plea would have been entered. At Garcia's sentencing hearing the Assistant U.S. Attorney addressed Garcia's contention by denying knowledge of any negotiations that preceded him: I want to say right up front, I don't know what Mr. Lipuma may or may not have said in plea negotiations. He is not with the office. The Government also responded that it was preparing for trial against Garcia while the negotiations were proceeding. 70 We regard the Government's disavowal of any knowledge of the negotiations between Lipuma and Garcia with disfavor. Even when the Government changes its position in the course of plea negotiations, it retains an obligation to present fully the history of those negotiations to the district court. This obligation is particularly salient in the context of the district court's determination of acceptance of responsibility, since [t]he timeliness of the defendant's acceptance of responsibility ... is context specific. USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n. 6). In some circumstances, intentional prosecutorial footdragging that slows a timely plea may be a fact for the district court to consider under § 3E1.1(b)(2). 71 Nonetheless, we believe that the district court was correct in determining that Garcia was not entitled to the additional one-level reduction. He concedes that his negotiations with Assistant United States Attorney Lipuma were never finalized; even if those negotiations were complete, any agreement was still subject to the approval of Lipuma's supervisors. Accordingly, while Garcia's negotiations may have indicated an intent to enter a guilty plea, his expressed intent was insufficient in this case to save the Government from trial preparation. As Judge Norgle stated, Garcia could have pleaded guilty at a much earlier time had he so desired. See Covarrubias, 65 F.3d at 1367-68 (finding a one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b)(2) unwarranted because the defendant failed to make a conditional offer to plead guilty); United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir.1994) (Until the defendants actually pleaded guilty, they could still change their minds and the government still had to prepare for the contingency that the defendants might elect to go to trial.). Although § 3E1.1(b)(2) requires timely notification of an intention to plead guilty, and not a guilty plea itself, courts are still required to consider whether this expressed intent actually resulted in conserving Government and court resources. See, e.g., Wetwattana, 94 F.3d at 285-86; Francis, 39 F.3d at 808. Because a defendant is not bound by an expressed intention to plead guilty, it may indeed be a rare case in which intent, without more, actually will result in the conservation of resources. 72 In the instant case, Garcia failed to introduce any evidence that either his intention to plead guilty or his guilty plea allowed the Government to avoid preparation, or that court resources were conserved. In fact, the Government was required to prepare extensive transcripts of taped conversations regarding Garcia's participation in the conspiracy. Moreover, at such a late date the Government could not expediently eliminate all of the evidence that it had prepared against Garcia from its case against Garcia's co-defendants, thereby requiring the jury to hear evidence that the Government otherwise would not have presented. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in determining that Garcia was not entitled to a one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b)(2).