Opinion ID: 522203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Traditional Maritime Activity

Text: 20 Even were we mistaken regarding the plaintiff's failure to satisfy the first prong of the Executive Jet requirements for finding admiralty jurisdiction, it is plain that he also fails to meet the second prong. To meet Executive Jet's second requirement for admiralty jurisdiction the wrong must have a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Executive Jet, supra, 409 U.S. at 268, 93 S.Ct. at 504. 21 We have developed factors to aid in determining whether a wrong bears a sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity. The factors we consider were first set out in Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.1973): 22 1) the functions and roles of the parties; 23 2) the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; 24 3) the causation and the type of injury; 25 4) and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. 26 Id. at 525. 27 This is not a mechanical test, but an aid in determining whether a wrong may reasonably be regarded as having a significant relationship to maritime activities. In respect to the first factor--the functions and roles of the parties--the plaintiff was a mud man and the defendants were landside physicians. Unlike the plaintiffs in both Kelly and Parker, who were the captain and the pilot of their vessels respectively, today's plaintiff had no responsibility for navigating a vessel. Nor is there anything maritime about the defendants, physicians who practiced medicine and treated the plaintiff on shore. 4 28 The second factor considers the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved. The only vehicle involved was a vessel, which is of course sufficiently maritime, but the vessel has no relationship to the plaintiff's cause of action in this appeal. On appeal is the dismissal of a suit against the doctors, and on that issue there is no vehicle to consider. The instrumentality, if any, would perhaps be any surgical equipment used to treat the plaintiff. We find nothing distinctively maritime about equipment used by a physician to treat a patient. 29 The third factor looks to the causation and the type of injury. The causation was allegedly medical malpractice, which bears no special relationship to maritime activities. The plaintiff's injury is two-fold: the fall from the ladder and the alleged medical malpractice. While the fall from the ladder is certainly a maritime injury, 5 the appellants are not complaining of that injury, but rather of the alleged medical malpractice. Thus, medical malpractice is the fault that we must consider in evaluating the connection to maritime injury. We conclude that medical malpractice on these facts bears no relationship at all to maritime injuries. These facts do not resemble the Moser case, in which an employee was injured on a vessel by a maritime instrumentality while performing a maritime activity. 6 30 In addition, we note that in Sohyde we found a well blowout in a navigable canal could just as easily have occurred on land, 7 and in Woessner that the plaintiff's injuries were no different from those affecting land-based workers. 8 Even injuries occurring in a maritime setting require some maritime connection. In the instant case, the alleged malpractice neither occurred in a maritime setting nor fairly constituted a maritime related injury. We find arguments for admiralty jurisdiction unpersuasive on this issue. 31 Finally, we consider the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. As we stated in Kelly, The admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts stems from the important national interest in uniformity of law and remedies for those facing the hazards of waterborne navigation. Kelly, supra, at 526. See also Foremost Insurance Co., 457 U.S. 668, 676, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2659, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982). The appellants have failed to persuade us that the national interest would be served by applying admiralty jurisdiction to a malpractice claim against land based doctors who dispensed medical treatment to an onshore mud man, far removed from the hazards of waterborne navigation. We are in fact convinced that finding admiralty jurisdiction for medical malpractice suits with no more relationship to maritime activities and dangers than is presented here would clearly violate principles of federalism and advance no federal interest. 9 32 The appellant also argues that the district court erred in applying the principles set out in Molett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419 (5th Cir.1987), without also reviewing the test in Kelly. We disagree. In Molett we made the following observation: 33 The Court's decisions in Executive Jet and Foremost suggest that indicia of maritime flavor can be found in (1) the impact of the event on maritime shipping and commerce (2) the desirability of a uniform national rule to apply to such matters and (3) the need for admiralty expertise in the trial and decision of the case. 34 Id. at 1426. The three indicia listed above were divined from Executive Jet and Foremost. Id. We find no fault in the district court for following our own interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions. As we have stated, the factors used to evaluate the maritime flavor of a case are not mechanical and unbending. 35 The Molett test may bring a court to precisely the same result as the Kelly test. Indeed, we discern little difference between the two tests. The first Molett factor, the impact on maritime shipping, requires a court to consider the Kelly factors of the functions of the parties and the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved. A court cannot determine whether a tort claim is maritime without considering where and how it originated and to whom the injury occurred. The second Molett factor, the desirability of a uniform national rule, is no different from the Kelly factor examining the traditional role of admiralty law. The last Molett factor, the need for admiralty expertise, requires a court to consider the type of injury and its cause. There is no conflict.