Opinion ID: 1201769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimonial Competence of Kevin P.

Text: (20a) The victim's youngest son, Kevin P., testified at trial as a prosecution witness. When he gave this testimony, Kevin was seven years old. Defense counsel did not challenge Kevin's competency as a witness, and neither counsel nor the trial court questioned Kevin on voir dire. Defendant advances these contentions on the subject of Kevin's testimony: (1) the trial court erred in not raising the issue of competency on its own motion; (2) admission of the testimony violated defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution; (3) admission of the testimony violated defendant's right to a reliable verdict under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution; (4) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on its own motion to view the testimony with caution; and (5) defense counsel's failure to challenge Kevin's testimonial competence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Except as provided by statute, every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness. (Evid. Code, ง 700; see also Pen. Code, ง 1321.) The primary statutory grounds for disqualification are inability to express oneself comprehensibly on the subject of the testimony and inability to understand the obligation to tell the truth. (Evid. Code, ง 701.) (21) A party who claims that a witness lacks either or both of these basic qualifications bears the burden at trial of proving disqualification. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 444.) Moreover, to preserve for appeal a claim that a witness lacked testimonial competence, a party must object on this ground in the trial court. ( People v. Singh (1920) 182 Cal. 457, 484 [188 P. 987]; People v. Scaggs (1957) 153 Cal. App.2d 339, 353-354 [314 P.2d 793].) Defendant may not circumvent this objection requirement by claiming that the trial court should have inquired into the witness's qualifications on its own. [6]
(20b) The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution gives an accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him [or her]. (See also Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15; Pen. Code, ง 686.) Although the right of confrontation requires that an accused receive an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses ( U.S. v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 554, 557 [98 L.Ed.2d 951, 956-957, 108 S.Ct. 838]), it does not protect against testimony that is `marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion' ( id. at p. 558 [98 L.Ed.2d at p. 957], quoting Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 21 [88 L.Ed.2d 15, 20-21, 106 S.Ct. 292]). We have carefully reviewed the testimony of Kevin P., and, in particular, his testimony on cross-examination. Not surprisingly, the testimony contains some inconsistencies, and the witness did not demonstrate total recall of the events on the day his mother died. But the witness's answers on the whole were lucid and responsive, and nothing in his testimony reveals either an inability to distinguish truth from falsehood (or perception from imagination) or a failure to appreciate his obligation as a witness to tell the truth. We are satisfied that the process of examination and cross-examination gave the jury an adequate basis on which to evaluate the truth of the witness's testimony. The Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause requires no more. ( U.S. v. Owens, supra, 484 U.S. 554, 559 [98 L.Ed.2d 951, 957-958].)
Also without merit is defendant's challenge under the federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment, which forbids infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. Although the Eighth Amendment imposes heightened reliability standards for both guilt and penalty determinations in capital cases (see Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 638 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 403, 100 S.Ct. 2382]), defendant gives us no reason to conclude that those standards were not met here. As this court remarked in rejecting essentially the same contention, defendant was given an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine in a judicial forum. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 445.)
(22) As we have seen, a defendant seeking relief on the basis of ineffective assistance must show both that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates, and that it is reasonably probable a more favorable determination would have resulted in the absence of counsel's failings. ( People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 584; see also Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-699].) If the record contains an explanation for the challenged aspect of counsel's representation, the reviewing court must determine whether the explanation demonstrates that counsel was reasonably competent and acting as a conscientious, diligent advocate. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) On the other hand, if the record contains no explanation for the challenged behavior, an appellate court will reject the claim of ineffective assistance unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.... ( Id. at p. 426.) Here, the record contains no explanation for defense counsel's failure to challenge Kevin P.'s testimony, nor does it show that counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, nor, finally, is this a situation in which there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's conduct. Acting as a reasonably competent defense attorney, counsel may have declined to challenge the competence of the child witness because, in counsel's judgment, the challenge would have been futile or because counsel believed that the child's testimony would on balance be helpful to the defense. Under the rule set forth above, we therefore reject the claim of ineffective assistance.
(23) We also reject defendant's claim that the trial court should have instructed the jury on its own initiative to view Kevin P.'s testimony with caution. Section 1127f requires the trial court, upon the request of a party, to instruct the jury on evaluation of the testimony of a witness who is 10 years of age or younger. [7] Absent a request, however, the trial court is not required to give either the statutory instruction or some other form of cautionary instruction. (See People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 445.)