Opinion ID: 2087646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History of the Fair and Just Reason Standard

Text: ¶ 37 This court first adopted the fair and just reason standard, proposed by the American Bar Association (ABA) Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, in 1967. See State v. Reppin, 35 Wis.2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967). At that time, the ABA's tentative draft provided that [b]efore sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea. Id. at 385 n. 2, 151 N.W.2d 9 (quoting American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal JusticePleas of Guilty § 2.1 (Tentative Draft, Feb., 1967)) (emphasis added). ¶ 38 This language becomes clearer when it is placed in the context of the broader rule: 2.1 Plea Withdrawal (a) The court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. . . . (b) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court. Before sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea. American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Pleas of Guilty § 2.1 (Tentative Draft, Feb. 1967) (emphasis added); see Reppin, 35 Wis.2d at 385 n. 2, 151 N.W.2d 9. ¶ 39 In Libke (1973) and Dudrey (1976), we applied the ABA's 1968 approved draft (which was in pertinent part the same as the tentative draft), but instead of providing that the court may allow the plea withdrawal, we used the word should in our analysis: (1) [W]e are convinced that the trial court applied the wrong standard [manifest injustice] and since the defendant did present a `fair and just reason' to permit a plea withdrawal, the defendant should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Libke, 60 Wis.2d at 129, 208 N.W.2d 331.(2) Under this [ABA 2.1(b)] standard, leave to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely granted prior to sentencing where there is a fair and just reason for doing so presented by the defendant. Dudrey, 74 Wis.2d at 482, 247 N.W.2d 105. ¶ 40 In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before sentence, the court should allow the defendant to withdraw the plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea. See Canedy, 161 Wis.2d at 581, 469 N.W.2d 163 (quoting American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal JusticePleas of Guilty § 14-2.1 (1979)). ¶ 41 The commentary on the new ABA standard noted that [t]his change from [ may to should ] reflects the belief that prior to sentencing, when there is a basis for the defendant's motion and the absence of compelling prosecutorial reason for its denial, withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere normally should be allowed. Id. at 582, 469 N.W.2d 163 (citing Note, American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal JusticePleas of Guilty § 14-2.1 (1979)). This commentary appears to reject the commentary to the 1968 rule, which reads in part: There does not appear to be any good reason for allowing withdrawal as a matter of right, absent a showing of manifest injustice, once the court has accepted the plea. The standard does recognize the generally acknowledged discretion of the judge to permit withdrawal before sentence even in the absence of a manifest injustice. This is a matter solely within the discretion of the judge; he may but need not grant the motion. American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Pleas of Guilty § 2.1(b) (Approved Draft, 1968). ¶ 42 There is no dispute that the shift from may to should constituted movement toward a more lenient standard of presentence plea withdrawal. At the same time, however, this court never abandoned the discretion that was so prominent in the 1967-68 rule. We emphasized the trial court's discretion in Libke, 60 Wis.2d at 126-27, 208 N.W.2d 331 (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 428 F.2d 578, 580 (2d Cir., 1970)); see also Libke, 60 Wis.2d at 129, 208 N.W.2d 331 (Hansen, Robert W., J., concurring); Dudrey, 74 Wis.2d at 482-83, 247 N.W.2d 105 (withdrawal is a determination addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion); and Canedy, 161 Wis.2d at 579, 584, 586, 469 N.W.2d 163. Discretion appears to temper fair and just reason in all our cases.