Opinion ID: 195082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construing the Statute

Text: 15 Amica makes a number of arguments attacking the district court's construction of the statute. The overarching argument is that the district court did not apply the rules of statutory construction that would have been applied by the Rhode Island Supreme Court and, as a result, improperly construed the statute. Because our review is de novo without any deference to the district court, we do not think it necessary to discuss point-by-point defendant's attack on the district court opinion. The only question is whether the ultimate conclusion of the district court should be affirmed. We are not concerned with the route taken by the court in reaching its result. 16 We start our analysis with a determination of the purpose of the rejected-settlement-offer statute, Sec. 27-7-2.2. Although the construction of this statute is one of first impression, the purpose of the prejudgment interest statute, Sec. 9-21-10, has been articulated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. In Martin v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty, 559 A.2d 1028 (R.I.1989), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the prejudgment interest did not apply to condemnation cases. In the course of its opinion it stated: 17 Statutes that award prejudgment interest generally serve the dual purposes of encouraging the early settlement of claims, Pray v. Narragansett Improvement Co., 434 A.2d 923, 930 (R.I.1981), and compensating plaintiffs for waiting for recompense to which they were legally entitled, Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 901 (1st Cir.1984). 18 Martin, 559 A.2d at 1031; see also Isserlis v. Director of Public Works, 111 R.I. 164, 300 A.2d 273, 274 (1973) (clear purpose of such legislation was to accelerate settlement of tort cases). We have echoed this finding of settlement purpose. Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1135 (1st Cir.1978) (The Rhode Island prejudgment statute was enacted to promote the expeditious settlement of claims.). 19 We think it plain from its terms that the rejected-settlement-offer statute has the same purpose as the prejudgment interest statute--to accelerate the settlement of tort cases. This purpose is readily apparent from its provision that if the plaintiff's offer of settlement 20 is rejected by the defendant's insurer then the defendant's insurer shall be liable for all interest due on the judgment entered by the court even if the payment of the judgment and interest thereon totals a sum in excess of the policy coverage limitation. 21 Section 27-7-2.2. 22 This language tells the insurer in no uncertain terms that it runs the risk of paying a stiff price for shrugging off an offer of settlement. 23 We next turn to the wording of the two implicated statutes. The prejudgment interest statute says: In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision is made for pecuniary damages, interest shall be added to the amount of damages from the date the cause of action accrued. Sec. 9-21-10. It is beyond cavil that this case was a civil action, that plaintiff's offer of settlement was for an amount equal to ... the coverage limits on the liability policy in force at the time the action accrue[d], and the offer was rejected by the insurer. Section 27-7-2.2. It is manifest that the prejudgment interest statute applies directly to the case at bar. 24 It also seems evident to us that, by its very words, Sec. 27-7-2.2 requires the payment of prejudgment interest. It says that if the plaintiff's offer is rejected then the defendant's insurer shall be liable for all interest due on the judgment entered by the court even if the payment of the judgment and interest thereon totals a sum in excess of the policy coverage limitation. (Emphasis added.) Despite the labored argument of defendants to the contrary, it seems obvious that all interest can only mean prejudgment and postjudgment interest. And this is the only interpretation that makes sense if the purpose of the statute is to promote settlement, as is obvious. There would be no pressure on the insurer to consider a settlement offer if all it had to pay for rejecting the offer was post-judgment interest. Defendant's suggested construction of the statute would take all of the bite out of it. 25 We think the following statement by the Rhode Island Supreme Court applies to the statute in issue: 26 In the face of a statute so clear and unambiguous there is no room for the application of the usual canons of statutory construction. In such a case the statute declares itself. Vezina v. Bodreau, 86 R.I. 87, 133 A.2d 753; Long v. Langlois, 93 R.I. 23, 170 A.2d 618. We may not where no ambiguity exists search beyond the statute for a different meaning. Hathaway v. Hathaway, 52 R.I. 39, 156 A. 800. Even hardship does not justify a court in reading into a statute something contrary to its unequivocal language. Clark v. Orabona, 1st Cir., 59 F.2d 187. Only when the legislature sounds an uncertain trumpet may the court move in to clarify the call. But when the call is clear and certain as it is here we may not consider whether the statute as written comports with our ideas of justice, expediency or sound public policy. In such circumstances that is not the court's business. Blais v. Franklin, 31 R.I. 95, 77 A. 172. 27 Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 95 R.I. 366, 187 A.2d 262, 264-65 (R.I.1963). 28 Out of an abundance of caution we have examined similar statutes in other jurisdictions because we think the Rhode Island Supreme Court might possibly have done so. Of the more than thirty states surveyed, many have prejudgment interest statutes accompanied by rejected-settlement-offer provisions, or separate statutes that are invoked in tandem to expedite claims settlement. See, e.g., Cal.Civ.Code Sec. 3291 (West Supp.1993); Conn.Gen.Stat. Sec. 52-192a(b); Minn.Stat.Ann. Sec. 549.09, subd. 1(b) (West Supp.1993); Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 408.040.2 (Vernon 1990); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 1343.03(C) (Anderson Supp.1993). Our survey has not disclosed a single instance where prejudgment interest has been held not to apply to a rejected-settlement-offer statute. Given the rejected-settlement-offer statute's plain language and the Rhode Island courts' long history of applying the prejudgment interest statute in tort cases, we think the Rhode Island Supreme Court would apply its prejudgment interest statute to the rejected-settlement-offer statute. 29 Affirmed. Costs on appeal awarded to appellee.