Opinion ID: 2598595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of Detention

Text: [¶ 14] Although Eckenrod does not agree that the initial encounter between himself and Officer Edmundson was consensual, he raises no issue concerning it on grounds that it should be considered an arrest requiring probable cause, or that it was an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and we agree that the officer's initial contact with Eckenrod by appearing at the door of his home in an undercover capacity is not at issue. We, thus, focus on the intrusiveness of the agents' actions at three other discrete times where it appears the nature of the encounter changed. First, we examine the nature of the encounter when Agent Peters approached Eckenrod with a drawn gun, grabbed him, and conducted a weapons search; second, we consider the circumstances present that caused the agents to move Eckenrod across the street and advise him of his Miranda rights; and, lastly, we consider the nature of the encounter that resulted when Eckenrod was handcuffed and transported to the sheriff's office. [¶ 15] The district court ruled, and the State agrees, that the nature of the encounter remained a valid seizure under Terry after Agent Peters arrived on the scene with a drawn weapon. We disagree with the assessment that the entirety of the encounter was a Terry seizure for the purpose of investigating Eckenrod's criminal involvement in a drug conspiracy. We nevertheless believe that, as the nature of the encounter changed, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Eckenrod was not arrested without probable cause. [¶ 16] Agent Peters testified that, in response to seeing Edmondson signal that he was in trouble and something had gone wrong, Agent Peters approached Eckenrod with a drawn gun, grabbed him, and conducted a weapons search. These facts require that we examine whether the agent's use of force for safety reasons transformed the encounter into an arrest requiring probable cause. We have previously considered the use of intrusive measures in making Terry stops and held that police officers may draw their weapons without transforming an otherwise valid Terry stop into an arrest. Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168 (Wyo.1997). Brown agreed with the following statement: While Terry stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive, officers may take necessary steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures. [T]he use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe [the weapons] are necessary for their protection. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983).     This holding is consistent with the recent trend allowing police to use handcuffs or place suspects on the ground during a Terry stop. Nine courts of appeals, including the Tenth Circuit, have determined that such intrusive precautionary measures do not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1172 (quoting United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 (10th Cir.1993)). [¶ 17] We examine whether the seizure by Agent Peters was justified at the inception, and whether articulable facts existed to demonstrate that Agent Peters had a reasonable suspicion to justify the intrusive measures used to ensure his and the other agents' safety. Brown, 944 P.2d at 1171. We recently summarized our review: [W]e have a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: (1) whether the officer's actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance. An officer's conduct is judged by an objective standard which takes into account the totality of the circumstances. In applying this test, the Court has consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. The government has the burden of demonstrating that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). [¶ 18] Based on seeing the prearranged signal of trouble or that something had gone wrong, Agent Peters had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that Eckenrod was threatening the safety of Officer Edmundson who had represented himself as a member of the drug conspiracy. Although Edmundson gave the signal for reasons other than to indicate that his safety was jeopardized, Agent Peters acted appropriately in light of the information he possessed. The facts show that Agent Peters feared for Officer Edmundson's safety, and this fact justified the display of some force and was not unreasonable under the circumstances. [¶ 19] The district court concluded that a custodial seizure occurred when the agents moved Eckenrod across the street and advised him of his Miranda rights. The district court determined the seizure to be an investigative detention supported by reasonable suspicion; presumably, the reasonable suspicion was the information that Eckenrod was involved in a marijuana trafficking conspiracy. Eckenrod contends that having been approached by an agent with a drawn weapon, grabbed, searched, moved across the street, and then advised of his Miranda rights, he justifiably assumed that he was under arrest and not free to leave. He contends that the district court erred in failing to conclude that he had been arrested without probable cause. [¶ 20] Because the district court concluded that the agents moved Eckenrod across the street, we must examine whether this forcible move was an arrest. The record shows that Eckenrod was moved after Agent Peters learned that Eckenrod was not carrying a weapon and safety concerns were no longer an issue to any of the agents because all three law enforcement agents had encircled an unarmed Eckenrod. However, the record shows that another safety issue factor had arisen which justified this intrusive measure as a reasonably necessary precaution and did not change the lawful Terry stop into an unlawful arrest without probable cause. Agent Peters testified that he believed that it was his idea to move across the street, because persons attending the party had begun to yell insults at the three agents and were calling them names like pig, etc. Both agents testified that it seemed appropriate to move away from the hostile crowd and place some distance between the men and the crowd. Courts generally accept that, although rare, factual situations do occur that permit a transport detention without transforming a Terry stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. People v. Harris, 15 Cal.3d 384, 124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d 632, 636 (1975); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(g) at 84 (3d ed.1996). Harris stated that when an investigating officer is confronted by a hostile crowd, the Fourth Amendment does not mandate that an investigating officer choose between continuing the investigation at the risk of personal safety or abandoning his investigation. Harris, 124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d at 636. We agree that the agents' precautionary measure here was justified. We also find that the trial court properly concluded that the officers' advising Eckenrod of his Miranda rights indicated that he was a criminal suspect being subjected to custodial interrogation; however, being placed in police custody for purposes of Miranda can occur before a suspect has been arrested. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464. We hold the trial court properly concluded that this part of the encounter was a valid Terry stop. [¶ 21] Finally, the district court did not make findings or conclusions about the agents' handcuffing and transporting Eckenrod to the sheriff's office for further interrogation. The State contends that this was part of the investigative detention; however, handcuffing and transporting a suspect is an arrest if no circumstances otherwise justify the removal. Harris, 124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d at 635-36. After receiving advice of his Miranda rights, Eckenrod agreed to speak with the agents and confirmed the information the agents had concerning his involvement in the drug conspiracy. The question is whether Eckenrod was arrested with probable cause when he was handcuffed and transported to the sheriff's office. In deciding whether probable cause is sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, it must be determined that the facts and circumstances within the peace officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the person arrested has committed    an offense. Ostrowski, 665 P.2d at 476. [¶ 22] Here, the agents were investigating Eckenrod's involvement in a drug conspiracy based upon information from a recorded telephone conversation and a confidential informant. The agents had probable cause to arrest Eckenrod when he confirmed the agents' information and indicated that he would show them where the marijuana was being stored, and we find no constitutional violation occurred by the agents' handcuffing him and transporting him to the sheriff's office. [¶ 23] Having examined the nature of the encounter at each point where it changed, we conclude that Eckenrod's seizure was a constitutionally valid investigative detention until his statements provided probable cause for his warrantless arrest. We affirm the district court's order denying the motion to suppress on grounds that he had been unlawfully arrested. [¶ 24] Eckenrod contends that this Court has indicated that the Wyoming Constitution may provide greater protection when the question is one of a person's seizure, and because the record does not show that at the suppression hearing any actual, articulable reasons were given for his detention, his convictions should be reversed. The record does not support this assertion, and as Eckenrod does not make any other argument, we decline to consider the lawfulness of his detention and arrest under the state constitution.