Opinion ID: 2262050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: A More Conservative Consensus?

Text: The parties and the trial judge focused their attention at the Frye hearing on the question whether, consistent with Frye, the prosecution was entitled to introduce expert evidence to the effect that the probability of a coincidental match was thirty (or forty) million to one. The judge correctly found that there was no general acceptance by the relevant group of scientists for the proposition that the FBI's methodology is sufficiently accurate to support a calculation of these specific odds. There was no inquiry below, however, as to whether such a consensus existed in support of a more conservative figure. A criminal trial is not a game, but a quest for truth. Womack v. United States, 350 A.2d 381, 383 (D.C.1976); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 & n. 18, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108 & n. 18, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). The twofold aim of criminal justice is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S. at 709, 94 S.Ct. at 3108 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). In the present case, the prosecution seeks to introduce the DNA evidence to corroborate an anticipated identification of Kevin Porter by the complaining witness. [W]ith today's technology, which uses 3-5 loci, [21] a match between two DNA patterns can be considered strong evidence that the two samples came from the same source. NRC REPORT, supra, at 74. There is thus no doubt that such evidence is strong; the only real question is: how strong? If the odds against a random match are substantial, then it would be a remarkable coincidence, to say the least, if the complaining witness identified Porter as her rapist, but if the crime was nevertheless committed by someone else whose DNA just happened to match Porter's with respect to each of four loci. Coincidences happen, but an alternative explanation not predicated on happenstance is often the one that has the ring of truth. Byrd v. United States, 614 A.2d 25, 32 (D.C.1992) ( quoting Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 139 (D.C. 1992)). The odds against a coincidental match do not have to be thirty million to one for evidence of the match to be admissible. [I]f the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in controversy, it should go to the jury. Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 438, 440, 20 L.Ed. 197 (1870); see also Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 128-29 (D.C.1991). Accordingly, [p]opulation percentages on the possession of certain combinations of blood characteristics, based upon established facts, are admitted as relevant to identification. State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 59-60, 622 P.2d 986, 995 (1981) (0.6% of the population had defendant's combination of blood factors); see also Commonwealth v. Gomes, 403 Mass. 258, 273, 526 N.E.2d 1270, 1279 (1988) (defendant among 1.2% of blacks in United States whose blood was consistent with evidentiary sample); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 841 (Okla.Cr.1986) (blood with characteristics of victim found in 0.48% of population); cf. Jones, supra, 548 A.2d at 44-45; but see State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.1987) (contra, expounding minority rule); Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 942, No. 90-163 (Wyo. Oct. 30, 1992). These principles apply with equal force in DNA cases. Smith v. Deppish, 248 Kan. 217, 235-39, 807 P.2d 144, 157-59 (1991); Martinez v. State, 549 So.2d 694, 696-97 (Fla. App.1989); People v. Mohit, supra, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 993, 999. [22] In Mohit, the court hit the nail on the head in the following revealing passage: If, as will be found in this case, a reliable match is made, but the probabilities attached are not reliable, should the proponent of the evidence be denied its admissibility altogether? Shouldn't the jury know that there was a match and that the possibility of the perpetrator being someone other than the defendant is remote, even if it is difficult to say precisely how remote? If, for example, many in the scientific community would agree that a probability is 1 in 1,000,000, but others, reasonably doubting the accuracy of that number, can only agree to 1 in 100,000, shouldn't a jury at least know the more conservative number? The defendant could not reasonably claim prejudice, and the prosecution could still bring important and reliable evidence to a jury's attention. 579 N.Y.S.2d at 993. After describing the disagreement among scientists which we have discussed at pages 638-639, supra, the judge in Mohit stated that the fact that it is difficult, given the present state of knowledge, to be precise, does not mean that conservative numbers cannot be used. Id. 579 N.Y.S.2d at 999. Expressing confidence that no credible segment of the scientific community would claim that the probability estimates ... in this case or any other could be higher than 1 in 100,000, id. [23] (rather than 1 in 67,000,000 as claimed by the People), the judge held that the prosecution would be permitted to introduce evidence of the match, but that the FBI probability estimates would be limited in accordance with his decision. Id. We agree with this analysis.