Opinion ID: 4508211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Embezzlement Statute Is Ambiguous

Text: ¶30 The majority falters right out of the gate. It concludes that the embezzlement statute is clear and unambiguous. Maj. op. ¶ 14. It is not. ¶31 Section 18-8-407(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Every public servant who . . . comes into possession of any . . . public property of whatever description, being the property of the state . . . , and who knowingly converts any . . . such public . . . property to his 1 By way of example, people who finance the purchase of a car nevertheless claim they “own” the car and that the car belongs to them. The same holds true for people who take out a mortgage on a house; they nevertheless claim that they “own” the house and that the house belongs to them. Such individuals may not technically have a proprietary interest in their car or their house. But, for all intents and purposes, they own their car and their house while making payments on them. 4 own use or to any use other than the public use authorized by law is guilty of embezzlement of public property. The majority correctly notes that the legislature did not define “public property” in this statute. Maj. op. ¶ 13. It simply referred to “public property of whatever description.” § 18-8-407(1). But, as the majority acknowledges, we must consider the phrase that follows in attempting to decipher the meaning of “public property.” Maj. op. ¶ 13. After all, the legislature provided some guidance there as to what it meant by “public property”: “public property of whatever description, being the property of the state.” § 18-8-407(1) (emphasis added). ¶32 Where the majority and I begin to part ways is in its largely conclusory determination that “‘property of the state’ clearly means that the property at issue belongs to the state.” Maj. op. ¶ 16. Neither of the cases the majority cites, Wright v. People, 91 P.2d 499, 502–03 (Colo. 1939), and Starr v. People, 157 P.2d 135, 137–38 (Colo. 1945), holds that “property of the state” in the embezzlement statute “clearly means that the property at issue belongs to the state.” As the majority admits elsewhere in its opinion, the question we confront today is one “of first impression.” Maj. op. ¶ 1. It is just as easy to cite a different Colorado case and reasonably maintain that “property of the state” clearly means property in which the state has a proprietary or possessory interest. See Price v. People, 240 P. 688, 689 (Colo. 1925) (an embezzlement case in which this court treated money held in 5 trust, as opposed to owned, by a municipality as money that “belonged to the municipality” (emphasis added)). ¶33 Even assuming the majority draws a fair inference in defining “property of the state” as “property . . . [that] belongs to the state,” it arbitrarily equates “belongs” with ownership. In Wright and Starr, we did not entertain whether property in which the state has only a possessory interest may be deemed property of the state for purposes of the embezzlement statute. That issue simply wasn’t before the court in those cases. In fact, neither case dealt with the embezzlement statute. And the majority does not articulate why having a possessory interest in property cannot suffice to support a claim that the property belongs to the state. In other words, if the state has the present right to control the property and to exclude others from it, why isn’t it accurate for the state to claim that the property belongs to it? ¶34 The definition of “belong” highlights the flaw in the majority’s analysis. Property “belong[s]” to someone if it’s “the property of [that] person.” Belong, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/belong; [https://perma.cc/A65F-UPT6]; see also Belong, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “[b]elong” as “[t]o be the property of a person or thing”). In ruling that the embezzlement statute applies only to property owned by the state, the majority explains that this is so because “property of the state” 6 means property that “belongs” to the state. Maj. op. ¶ 16. But given the definition of “belong,” that does nothing more than beg the question. The majority essentially says that the embezzlement statute is limited to property in which the state has a proprietary interest because “property of the state” is “property of the state.” See id. In my view, this type of circular reasoning cannot support the majority’s assertion that the statute clearly and unambiguously excludes property in which the state has a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest. ¶35 Nor do I find persuasive the majority’s contention that its position is corroborated by the fact that what the embezzlement statute prohibits is the conversion of public property “to any use other than the public use authorized by law.” Id. at ¶ 17. I agree that this language limits the scope of the embezzlement statute to property that has a “public use authorized by law.” But relying on this phrase, the majority takes an unjustified leap and announces that “the statute’s intended focus is on property owned by the state.” Id. The majority does not explain why this is so. Why can’t property in which the state has a possessory interest be property with a “public use authorized by law”? Asked differently, why does the state have to own property in order to put it to a public use authorized by law? ¶36 The majority turns to the facts of this case to buoy its hypothesis, but this case’s facts actually undercut the majority’s proposition. Though the majority says 7 that the firearms Berry took from the evidence locker had no “public use authorized by law,” id., the opposite is true. The firearms were being held by the sheriff’s office as part of the prosecution of J.V. They were part of the evidence collected in J.V.’s criminal case. As such, they absolutely had a “public use authorized by law,” even though the state had a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest in them. ¶37 The dictionary definitions of “public property” on which the majority relies do not alter the analysis either. To begin, the majority’s focus on “public property” misses the mark; the focus must be on “property of the state” because that is what the legislature has told us “public property” refers to in the embezzlement statute. Thus, rather than embark on a quest to unearth dictionary definitions of “public property,” I would hone in on “property of the state” and inquire whether the legislature intended that phrase to restrict the ambit of the embezzlement statute so as to exclude property in which the state has a possessory, but not a proprietary, interest. ¶38 In any event, as the majority concedes, Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “property” as “something owned or possessed.” Id. at ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Black’s Law Dictionary likewise defines “property” as including “the right to possess and use.” Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps recognizing that these definitions undermine its holding, the majority dismisses them out of hand, choosing instead 8 to speculate that “the more common meaning of the word ‘property’ is something owned.” Id. The majority cites no authority in support of this pronouncement, and I’m not aware that any exists. The very dictionary definitions of “property” quoted by the majority belie its claim. In my view, the definition of “public property,” considered in a vacuum, cannot rescue the majority. It makes no sense to admit that “property” includes something possessed but to claim in the same breath that “public property” does not. If “property” is not limited to something owned, how can property that happens to be “public” be so limited? ¶39 Because the legislature did not define “property of the state,” and because that phrase is subject to different reasonable interpretations—i.e., it could be construed as property in which the state has a proprietary interest or as property in which the state has a proprietary or possessory interest—it is ambiguous. “A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations.” Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 725, 729. ¶40 Therefore, I would discern the legislature’s intent by looking beyond the language of the statue and considering “other tools of statutory construction.” Id. I would invoke two such interpretive aids here: (1) “other statutes bearing on the same or similar subjects,” see People v. Sorrendino, 37 P.3d 501, 503 (Colo. App. 2001); accord § 2-4-203(1)(d), C.R.S. (2019) (“If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the general assembly, may consider . . . laws upon the 9 same or similar subjects.”); and (2) “the consequences of any given construction,” Carrera, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d at 729; accord § 2-4-203(1)(e) (“If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the general assembly, may consider . . . [t]he consequences of a particular construction.”).