Opinion ID: 706916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NTU's Standing as an Organization

Text: 19 In order for NTU to assert standing to challenge Section 13208 on its own behalf, it must meet the general standing requirements applied to individuals. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). As to these requirements, 20 the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 [96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450] (1976). Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id., at 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. at 1924, 1926. 21 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (footnote, citations, and internal quotations omitted). Therefore, we must determine whether NTU has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant the invocation of federal-court jurisdiction. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 378-79, 102 S.Ct. at 1124-25. In particular, NTU must demonstrate that the organization has suffered injury in fact, including [s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities--with [a] consequent drain on the organization's resources--constitut[ing] ... more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests. Id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124; see also American Legal Foundation v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 91 (D.C.Cir.1987). Such a showing requires more than allegations of damage to an interest in 'seeing' the law obeyed or a social goal furthered. Id. at 92. Indeed, [t]he organization must allege that discrete programmatic concerns are being directly and adversely affected by the challenged action. Id. 22 We find NTU's alleged injuries insufficient to establish injury in fact. The allegation that Section 13208 has frustrated NTU's objectives is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39-40, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924-25, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (An organization interested in issues relating to access to medical care could not establish ... standing simply on the basis of that goal.); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1253-54 (D.C.Cir.1983) (A consumer organization could not establish standing on the basis of its abstract interest in seeing that consumers receive dairy products at the lowest possible price.), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). 23 The more specific harms discussed in Keating's affidavit likewise do not rise to the level of the concrete injury required for injury in fact. The impact NTU assumes Section 13208 will have on its future fundraising initiatives is entirely speculative, particularly in light of the fact that NTU has not yet implemented one of the programs alleged to have suffered as a result of Section 13208. 24 NTU's assertion that one of its members has announced that the new estate and gift tax rates will absolutely affect his future donations comes closer to actual injury in fact, but still is neither sufficiently concrete nor imminent to confer standing upon NTU. Whether NTU will receive future donations from this particular member and how much those contributions might be is speculative, even without regard to Section 13208. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 ( '[S]ome day' intentions--without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be--do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our [standing] cases require.). In addition, the only reason offered to explain why Section 13208 will affect the member's contributions is that higher estate and gift tax rates will decrease the member's disposable income at some undetermined point in the future. According to NTU's reasoning, any organization would have standing to contest any Internal Revenue Code provision that increases the tax liability (or other expenses) of one of its members. Because such a result is untenable, we require more concrete allegation of harm to an organization's income before finding sufficient injury in fact. 25 The impact of Section 13208 upon NTU's programs, such as its educational and legislative initiatives, also does not constitute an injury in fact. An organization cannot, of course, manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980, 111 S.Ct. 508, 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); see also Association for Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Center Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir.1994) (The mere fact that an organization redirects some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization.). 26 Similarly, NTU's self-serving observation that it has expended resources to educate its members and others regarding Section 13208 does not present an injury in fact. There is no evidence that Section 13208 has subjected NTU to operational costs beyond those normally expended to review, challenge, and educate the public about revenue-related legislation. Unlike the injury alleged in Havens Realty, where the defendant's practices perceptibly impaired the plaintiff's ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers, 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124, Section 13208 has not forced NTU to expend resources in a manner that keeps NTU from pursuing its true purpose of monitoring the government's revenue practices. See also Spann, 899 F.2d at 28-29 (Housing organizations established injury in fact where defendants' illegal acts necessitated increased education and counseling ... to identify and inform minorities ... that defendants' housing is by law open to all.). NTU cannot convert its ordinary program costs into an injury in fact from Section 13208. 27 However, even if we were to find that NTU meets the ordinary constitutional requirements for standing, NTU faces another problem in this case. It is well-recognized that the standing inquiry in tax cases is more restrictive than in other cases. See, e.g., Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights, 426 U.S. at 46, 96 S.Ct. at 1927 (Stewart, J., concurring) (I cannot now imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else.); Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1991) (While Justice Stewart's separate concurrence does not, of course, constitute binding precedent, we have noted previously that it 'dramatically denotes the special problems attendant upon the establishment of standing in ... tax cases'.... (quoting American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 150 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947, 98 S.Ct. 1533, 55 L.Ed.2d 546 (1978))), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048, 112 S.Ct. 912, 116 L.Ed.2d 812 (1992). For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that statutory limits on the form of challenges to tax assessments do not deprive litigants of due process. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2050, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (The Court dismissed the argument that forcing a petitioner to delay suit against the Internal Revenue Service until after a tax liability was incurred was a violation of due process.); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122, 36 S.Ct. 275, 276, 60 L.Ed. 557 (1916) (same). As noted in South Carolina, the Supreme Court has expressly disfavored granting taxpayer organizations, such as NTU, standing to challenge the tax liabilities of their members. See 465 U.S. at 381 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. at 1115 n. 19. 28