Opinion ID: 182792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guest's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: Capitol next challenges the order granting summary judgment for Guest. The district court granted that motion because Capitol had failed to present the expert testimony required under District of Columbia law to prevail upon its claims, which sound in tort and contract. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., 627 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (2009). Our review is de novo. McFadden, 611 F.3d at 3. First, Capitol argues summary judgment was inappropriate because the district court had concluded there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the escort worked for Guest, whether Guest was Gallaudet's agent, and whether the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards were incorporated into the contract between Guest and Capitol. Guest responds that, although disputed, none of these three issues is material because Capitol's failure to disclose, pursuant to Rule 26, expert testimony concerning the standard of care or contractual duty independently dooms its claims respectively for negligence and for breach of contract. Both claims are premised upon applying the NFPA standard for building owners' dealings with inspectors. Under that standard, a building owner must provide ready accessibility to components of water-based fire protection systems that require inspection, testing, or maintenance. As the district court noted, 627 F.Supp.2d at 11-12, Capitol did not disclose any expert testimony concerning the meaning of ready accessibility, served only a cursory disclosure that did not address the standard of care and did not designate any of its hybrid witnesses to offer expert testimony. Capitol's argument it could have relied upon St. Paul's expert witness is also unpersuasive because, as Guest notes, his report does not address the meaning of ready accessibility. Capitol's fallback argument is that expert testimony was not required in any event: If the court had provided guidance on the statute's interpretation, a jury could have come to a conclusion regarding whether Guest provided Capitol with `ready accessibility,' all the more so because the disputed issue  whether the drum drip was readily accessible if the inspectors had to wait five to ten minutes to gain access  is factually straightforward. The controlling case law is less forgiving than Capitol assumes; in the District of Columbia an expert witness is required to establish the standard of care or the contractual duty, see Sherman v. Adoption Ctr. of Washington, Inc., 741 A.2d 1031, 1036 n. 11 (D.C.1999) (same analysis for both), when the subject in question is so distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson, Briggs v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 845 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the last cited case the court held expert testimony was required in order to establish the standard for adequate lighting of a temporary walkway in a construction area of a Metrorail station and to establish when it was safe to replace plywood barriers around the construction area with chain-link fencing. Id. at 846. As there noted, District of Columbia cases call for expert testimony concerning the maintenance of leaning trees, the application of hair relaxer, and even the tightness of hand cuffs. Id. at 845-86 (collecting cases). Capitol relies upon McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 580 (D.C. 1996), because the court there observed that guidance from the court might, in a negligence per se case, provide an alternative to expert testimony to assist the jury's understanding. The case stands, however, for the more narrow proposition that in some circumstances, as where a statute uses terms familiar to a lay person, the district court's jury instructions may provide sufficient guidance. In the light of these precedents, Capitol clearly was required to present expert testimony on what it means to have ready accessibility to a drum drip. Although accessibility of a drum drip is not a complex technical issue and might appear to be within a jury's understanding, id. at 845, the specific requirements of a set of rules for fire protection, like the specific requirements for safely lighting a subway station, are not a matter of common knowledge. Because Capitol did not offer expert testimony to explain the NFPA standard, summary judgment for Guest was appropriate.