Opinion ID: 2576334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: scope of discretion

Text: ¶ 15 Having established that the exercise of judicial discretion in such matters is both necessary and proper, we now must define the extent of that discretion. Because Utah case law is not fully developed on this issue, we look to the case law from other jurisdictions for guidance. Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, ¶ 17, 991 P.2d 584. ¶ 16 In regard to accepting or rejecting plea agreements, jurisdictions vary, as to precisely what degree of discretion is appropriate and the manner in which that discretion must be exercised. The numerous approaches, each with its own particular nuances, do not lend themselves to easy categorization. However, we are able to extract principles common to the majority of jurisdictional approaches that inform our analysis. Those principles are: (1) that trial courts retain broad discretion to reject plea agreements, but may not do so arbitrarily; (2) that courts need not methodically consider a list of mandatory factors before rejecting a plea agreement; and (3) that courts must state their reasoning for rejecting a proposed plea agreement on the record.
¶ 17 With a few notable exceptions, [6] the vast majority of jurisdictions require some affirmative exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court before rejecting a plea agreement; that is, courts are not permitted to categorically reject all plea bargains. [7] See, e.g., Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (holding that trial courts cannot reject a plea on an arbitrary basis but must give the plea agreement due consideration before reaching a decision on whether to grant [it]). [8] This rule against arbitrary or blanket rejections of plea agreements makes sense in light of the fact that plea bargaining is an essential component of the administration of justice, and that, when properly administered, it is to be encouraged. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260, 92 S.Ct. 495. We therefore adopt the majority rule in requiring an affirmative exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court prior to rejecting a plea agreement.
¶ 18 Even while recognizing the need to exercise discretion, few jurisdictions have imposed rigid boundaries on a trial court's exercise of this discretion. See, e.g., State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Iowa 2001) (noting that in the context of plea bargains, there are no established criteria or standards to consider in the exercise of discretion); State v. Brown, 268 Neb. 943, 689 N.W.2d 347, 351 (2004) (noting that, judicial discretion to reject plea bargains is not unlimited but declin[ing] to adopt specific limitations). Similarly in the federal courts, the rules of procedure do[] not purport to establish criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement. United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1986). [9] Indeed, [j]ust how much `consideration' should be given to the disposition agreed to by the prosecutor and just how `independent' the judge should be in these circumstances is a most difficult issue, seldom addressed in the cases. [10] 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.3(e) (2d ed.1999). ¶ 19 Given the absence of clear guidelines, the prevailing approach among those courts that have considered this issue is decidedly ad hoc. Courts generally limit their investigation of what constitutes a valid reason for rejecting a plea agreement to the individual circumstances of the case at hand. We likewise decline to set forth a specific list of mandatory factors that a judge must consider before rejecting a plea agreement. Rather, the trial court must simply demonstrate that it gave sufficient consideration to the plea prior to rejecting it such that the decision to reject was not arbitrary.
¶ 20 As a means of demonstrating that the trial court gave all due consideration to the plea, the majority of jurisdictions require that judges make their reasoning for rejecting a proposed plea agreement a matter of record. See, e.g., Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (The trial court must ... articulate the reasons for rejecting an agreement on the record.). [11] We agree that requiring district courts to articulate a sound reason for rejecting a plea is the surest way to foster the sound exercise of judicial discretion. Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136. By adopting this rule, we facilitate[] appellate review when the defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting a plea. United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir.1998); see also Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 (Requiring district courts to articulate the reasons for rejecting a plea agreement not only helps insure the court is aware of and gives adequate deference to prosecutorial discretion, it is the surest, indeed the only way to facilitate appellate review of rejected plea bargains.). ¶ 21 To summarize, the weight of authority stands for the following propositions: (1) while a trial court retains broad discretion to reject a proposed plea agreement, it may not do so arbitrarily; (2) a court need not apply a list of mandatory factors in rejecting a plea; but (3) it must state its general reasoning for rejecting the plea on the record. We adopt these principles for review of plea agreements in Utah.