Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Motion to Bar Expert's Testimony in Rebuttal

Text: At the penalty phase, defendant called two experts in his case-in-chief: Dr. David Smith, a physician with specialties in clinical toxicology and addictionology, and Dr. Jules Burstein, a clinical psychologist with a specialty in forensic psychology. Each opined that at the time of the murder of Hanson and Blount, as a result of both psychopathology and long-term and heavy polysubstance abuse, defendant did not have the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law  or at best, any capacity he may have had was severely or significantly impaired. Each expert's opinion was based in large part on information provided by defendant himself. The People called an expert in rebuttal: Dr. Kate B. Yago, a psychiatrist with a specialty in polysubstance abuse. Before Dr. Yago took the stand, defendant moved, outside the presence of the jury, to bar her from testifying. At bottom, his grounds were in substance that any opinion she might have formed was inadmissible under sections 801 et seq. of the Evidence Code, which deal with expert opinion testimony. Evidence Code section 801 provides: If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: [¶] (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and [¶] (b) Based on matter ..., whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion. Evidence Code section 802 declares: A witness testifying in the form of an opinion may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter ... upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion.... Evidence Code section 803 states: The court may, and upon objection shall, exclude testimony in the form of an opinion that is based in whole or in significant part on matter that is not a proper basis for such an opinion.... In his motion, defendant argued in substance as follows: Dr. Yago's opinion was based in some part on matter derived from a telephone interview with Allison, who by then had divorced him and remarried  viz., information about his drug history; and that such matter was not the kind on which an expert might reasonably rely in forming an opinion as to his mental condition. The People opposed the motion, conceding the first point in defendant's argument but denying the second. They also represented that they intended to introduce the information provided to Dr. Yago by Allison  but only for the partial basis of Dr. Yago's opinion, and not for the truth of the information itself. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. Implicit in its ruling was a determination that the matter Dr. Yago derived from her interview with Allison was in fact of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject of defendant's mental condition. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) Dr. Yago subsequently took the stand in the presence of the jury. She opined to the effect that defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not impaired at the time of the offenses. She stated in substance that she based her opinion on matters including the following: defendant's Honolulu admissions; various letters by defendant; a letter by Allison; crime scene and autopsy photographs; property taken from the Hanson residence; certain statements by various witnesses; certain testimony by Edward Rogers; a substance abuse history prepared by Dr. Smith from information provided by defendant; the entire testimony of both Drs. Smith and Burstein; and the interview with Allison. As the prosecutor began to ask Dr. Yago questions to elicit the matter she had derived from her interview with Allison, solely  he stated  for the purposes and the basis of this expert's opinion, defense counsel interjected, Renew our objection, Judge, at this time, and the trial court responded, All right, overruled. Before Dr. Yago responded, the court instructed the jury that the testimony of the doctor as to any information she received on the telephone from Allison is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It is only being offered for the purposes of why the doctor has come to the conclusion that the doctor has come to.... (Paragraphing omitted.) Under the prosecutor's questioning, Dr. Yago proceeded to summarize the information Allison provided  to the effect that in the period from about February 1978 until September 1980, defendant did indeed engage in some polysubstance abuse but not heavily. At one point in the course of her direct testimony she conceded that perhaps the drug history I got from Allison is very incomplete.... (49a) Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to bar Dr. Yago from testifying in rebuttal. The crucial issue here is whether the matter Dr. Yago derived from her interview with Allison  viz., information about defendant's drug history  was of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject of his mental condition. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) As noted, the trial court impliedly resolved that question in the affirmative. The standard of review for such a determination is abuse of discretion. (See Board of Education v. Haas (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 278, 282 [147 Cal. Rptr. 88]; Board of Trustees v. Porini (1968) 263 Cal. App.2d 784, 794-795 [70 Cal. Rptr. 73].) On this record, no abuse appears. At trial, defendant did not introduce any evidence in support of his position that the information provided to Dr. Yago by Allison was not reasonably reliable for a psychiatrist forming a psychiatric opinion. He did indeed present vigorous argument. His words, however, were lacking in persuasive force: they did little more than beg the question. On appeal, defendant presents argument more vigorous still. But again, his words are lacking: he simply does not show that the challenged information was not reasonably reliable for a psychiatrist forming a psychiatric opinion. Certainly, such information is not unreliable per se. (See People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 87-93 [211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189] (plur. opn.).) We agree with defendant that a psychiatrist forming a psychiatric opinion could not have reasonably relied on the information provided to Dr. Yago by Allison unless he subjected it to critical scrutiny. Dr. Yago did so. But we simply do not agree that such an expert forming such an opinion could not have reasonably relied on such information at all. Indeed, we observe in passing that, as a general matter, the challenged information was not internally inconsistent or in conflict with evidence introduced at trial by the People and defendant. In any event, it is apparent from Dr. Yago's testimony that her opinion was not based in any significant part on the information in question. Defendant argues against our conclusion that the trial court's denial of his motion was not error. To the extent that he invokes sections of the Evidence Code dealing with expert opinion testimony, we reject the point on the merits for the reasons stated above. He faults the trial court's statements attending its ruling in certain particulars. Any deficiency is basically verbal and therefore of no consequence here. What matters is whether the ruling itself is sound. It is. Indeed, any other ruling would have been improper on this record. Contrary to what appears to be defendant's implication at one point, the plurality opinion in People v. Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d 69, 90-92, does not stand for the proposition that on direct examination an expert may never testify to extrajudicial statements when he gives the reasons for his opinion and the matter ... upon which it is based (Evid. Code, § 802). To the extent defendant invokes other provisions of law, including Evidence Code section 352, we reject the point on procedural grounds. As stated above, the rule is that a defendant may not complain on appeal that evidence was inadmissible on a certain ground if he did not rely on that ground in a timely and specific fashion in the trial court. (50)(See fn. 16.), (49b) At trial, defendant did not effectively rely on a basis other than Evidence Code section 801 et seq. [16] He now maintains that the foregoing rule is inapplicable here, but he is not persuasive. [17]