Opinion ID: 1940051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence upon resentencing

Text: Though we need not address any other claim of error for the purpose of disposing with the instant matter, we will address the scope and nature of evidence that may be admitted in the new penalty phase proceeding. We reaffirm the determination made in our initial review of this case, that [u]pon remand, the trial court ... may assess the defendant's relative culpability in light of the facts, established by the record, that Lebron was an orchestrator of and major participant in the felonies charged, and that no other known participant was proven to be the shooter. Lebron I, 799 So.2d at 1021. We have never suggested that the evidence be changed or falsified. However, we do instruct that in conducting that assessment, the trial court must exclude any and all evidence and testimony which specifically names Lebron as the individual who actually shot Larry Neal Oliver. It is axiomatic that the trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence in penalty phase proceedings. See, e.g., Perry v. State, 801 So.2d 78, 89-90 (Fla.2001); Hildwin v. State, 531 So.2d 124, 127 (Fla.1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 638, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 104 L.Ed.2d 728 (1989). Moreover, this Court has determined that, upon resentencing, the trial court may allow the jury to hear probative evidence to aid it in understanding the facts of the case so that it may render an appropriate advisory sentence. See Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413, 419 (Fla.1996); Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). The trial court may not, however, admit evidence that simply relitigates the issue of the defendant's guilt, see Teffeteller, 495 So.2d at 745, or evidence that fails the test balancing probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2002); Mendyk v. State, 545 So.2d 846, 849 (Fla.1989). This is particularly true where the evidence advanced is directly and precisely to the contrary of a specific factual finding by a prior jury. Applying those rules to the evidence submitted during the proceeding below, evidence that may be submitted again during the new penalty phase, we determine that it would be error for the trial court to admit those portions of the hearsay testimony of Detective Lang in which he specifically relayed that Lebron had admitting to firing the shots which caused the death of the victim. Detective Lang could certainly testify that Lebron had requested several witnesses to provide an alibi for him for the night of the murder, and that no other known participant was proven to be the shooter. He simply could not testify that the investigation proved that Lebron shot the victim, that eyewitnesses reported seeing Lebron commit the actual shooting, or that Lebron, himself, admitted to actually firing the death shots. The State could certainly recall Charissa Wilburn, or sponsor other witnesses, to provide testimony regarding the events that occurred the night of Oliver's murder. Such testimony can focus on Lebron's possession of the shotgun during the events leading up to the murder, his role in luring Oliver to the murder scene, his statements in the car prior to arriving at the Gardenia house, his beckoning the victim toward the back bedrooms, his voice being heard in the hallway ordering the victim to the ground, the sounds of weapon discharge, his agitated or excited state after the murder occurred, [4] his ordering the others to clean up the crime scene and dispose of the body, and his role in possessing and disposing of the victim's property. Again, however, the trial court must exclude any evidence or testimony that specifically states that Lebron was seen actually shooting the victim, that others heard that it was Lebron who shot the victim, or that Lebron admitted that he was the shooter. So that we may be abundantly clear, our determination today does not, as the State contends, require the change, alteration, modification, or falsification of any witness testimony. We are simply mandating that the trial court fulfill its capacity as the guardian of the constitutional rights accorded every criminal defendant in this state. A jury has already considered whether Lebron actually personally shot Oliver, and determined that he did not. The State may not submit to a new penalty phase jury that Lebron actually committed the specific act for which he was acquitted. The witnesses need not change their versions of events. All that is required for the trial court to fulfill its duty is to foreclose lines of questioning, summaries, or approaches designed to elicit testimony that Lebron was the shooter, require the State to tailor questions regarding the events on the night of the murder and subsequent investigation carefully, and ensure that the parties inform the witnesses of the scope of proscribed testimony to avoid any confusion that may produce even an unintended slip of prohibited facts. The trial court must also ensure that the State's opening and closing arguments are not based on excluded evidence. Despite the State's protestations, the exclusion of evidence in this manner to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, as with most rules concerning the exclusion of certain evidence otherwise probative, is not a novel or extreme measure. To the contrary, it is precisely what our constitution, state laws, and rules of evidence require.