Opinion ID: 1147539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction to the jury satisfied the requirements of due process.

Text: Adkins also argues that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury at the close of the evidence. Specifically, Adkins contends that the trial judge's explanation of the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt allowed the jury to find Adkins guilty based on a lower degree of proof than that required by the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution. Adkins also argues that the trial judge improperly referred to the same explanation of beyond a reasonable doubt during the sentencing phase of the trial. The United States Supreme Court has stated: Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of guilt with utmost certainty. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970). [2] A trial judge's error in explaining the beyond a reasonable doubt standard could adversely affect[ ] the substantial rights of a defendant, Rule 39(k), A.R.App.P., or affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding. Ex parte Bankhead, supra . Accordingly, this Court must determine whether the trial judge's explanation of the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. In explaining the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: In considering the evidence, there are certain rules of law that guide you as to the evidence that has been offered. The State of Alabama has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden remains on the State throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence. So we use the term, and you have heard it over and over again. What is reasonable doubt? `A reasonable doubt' is one of those terms that many times you make more confusing by trying to explain what it is. You all have common sense. You have all heard the term `reasonable.' But in this context, `reasonable doubt' as used in a lawsuit has been defined to us through the law. Let me give you a few things that the law says about `reasonable doubt.' A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based on reason and common sense and arising from the state of the evidence. While it is rarely possible to prove anything to an absolute certainty, a reasonable doubt is not a mere guess or surmise. A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced, but also from a lack of the evidence. The burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the offense charged. We will get to the elements in just a minute. A defendant has a right to rely upon the failure of the prosecution to establish such proof. A defendant may also rely on the evidence brought out on cross-examination of any of the State's witnesses. The phrase `reasonable doubt'it may be helpful to say that a reasonable doubt is the doubt which would justify acquittal. It must be an actual and substantial doubt, and not a mere possible doubt. If after considering all of the evidence in this case, you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, then you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and it would be your duty to convict the defendant. The reasonable doubt which entitles an accused to an acquittal is not a mere fanciful, vague, conjectural or speculative doubt, but a reasonable substantial doubt arising from the evidence and remaining after a careful consideration of the testimony such as reasonable, fairminded and conscientious persons would entertain under all the circumstances. Now, you will observe that the State is not required to convince you of the defendant's guilt beyond all doubt, but simply beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. If, after comparing and considering all of the evidence of this case, your minds are left in such a condition that you cannot say that you have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt, then you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant should be entitled to an acquittal. During the sentencing phase, the trial judge referred to this explanation of the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt several times. Adkins's lawyers cite Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), in support of their argument on this issue. In Cage, the United States Supreme Court reversed Cage's conviction because the Louisiana trial court had given a constitutionally inadequate definition of beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's definition of the term included the statement that a reasonable doubt must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty. Cage, 498 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 329, 112 L.Ed.2d at 342 (emphasis in original). The trial court also stated that [a] reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty. Cage, 498 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 329, 112 L.Ed.2d at 342 (emphasis in original). The United States Supreme Court stated that [i]n construing the instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have understood the charge as a whole. Cage, 498 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 329 (citation omitted; emphasis added). The Supreme Court's reversal was based on its determination that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. Cage, 498 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 330 (footnote omitted). This Court has reviewed the trial judge's entire explanation of beyond a reasonable doubt in Adkins's case, and we hold that the charge is distinguishable from that in Cage. First, the trial court in this case did not make the mistake of equating a reasonable doubt with a grave uncertainty; such a mistake was one of the major flaws of the charge in Cage, and that fact was re-emphasized by Justice Stevens in his special concurrence in Gaskins v. McKellar, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2277, 114 L.Ed.2d 728 (1991). Perhaps most importantly, at Adkins's trial the court repeatedly emphasized that a reasonable doubt must be based on the evidence or on a lack thereof, i.e., that it must be based on the evidence presented at trial or on a deficiency in the proof presented by the State in its attempt to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, when the trial court used the term a moral certainty, a term whose use was questioned in Cage, the court limited it by the additional instruction that the jury must have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt. Thus, we conclude that the court's charge here is not subject to the criticism that a reasonable juror could have misunderstood the meaning of beyond a reasonable doubt, or to the criticism that it could have allowed a conviction based on a constitutionally inadequate degree of proof.