Opinion ID: 2350621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The court's refusal to admit testimony as to an exculpatory statement by the defendant.

Text: The defendant's brother was called as a witness by the State and testified on direct examination concerning a conversation he had with the defendant while the latter was incarcerated before trial in the Cumberland County Jail. The witness testified, among other things, that the defendant told him, Cressey threatened to kill the kids, to kill her and kill him, and said he was going to start on him right away. On cross-examination by the defendant's counsel, the following exchange took place: MR. LATTY: You say you came to Maine and did talk with Joseph Ryder? WITNESS: Yes. MR. LATTY: And at that time he said he did it? WITNESS: Yes. MR. LATTY: And he also said it was self-defense? WITNESS: Yes. The State objected at this point, and the court ordered the witness' last answer stricken. The defendant's counsel requested the court's permission to make an offer of proof, and the jury was duly excused. The discussion continued: THE COURT: May I make the Court's position clear. You are equating what this witness said the defendant said and that was, as he recalled, Cressey threatened to kill the children and Beverly and myself, or something of that nature as being the same as saying I killed him in self-defense, and that is not the same as far as the Court understands the English language, or what this witness testified to, and what is meant by the words self-defense. You are drawing a conclusion. MR. LATTY: In answer to that, I would suggest I am not drawing a conclusion. That is not the reason for the question. The reason for the question is I believe the answer would be, But it was self-defense. THE COURT: You may ask the witness what, if anything, the witness said to him in addition to or other than what he has already testified to, and because there is that great danger, and I use it advisedly, when you talk self-defense which means one thing as far as we are here concerned, and it means another thing as far as someone else is concerned. MR. LATTY: I appreciate that in view of the status of his testimony relative to what he said, I fully agree that would equate self-defense. That is not the basis for my question. THE COURT: You may make whatever offer of proof you wish. I will permit you to ask this witness what else or if his brother did in fact say other than what he has testified to in direct examination. The defendant's counsel apparently elected to stand by his offer of proof because, when the jury returned, he declined to ask any further questions of the witness. The defendant argues that, since the presiding Justice permitted the State to introduce, on direct examination, part of the defendant's statement to his brother, the Justice should have permitted the defendant to introduce the remainder of the statement on cross-examination. This would seem to follow, the defendant suggests, from the widely recognized rule of evidence that, when part of an oral statement has been introduced by one party, the party-opponent may introduce the remainder of the statement, even though it is favorable to, or exculpatory as to, the party-opponent. VII Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed. 1940), § 2115; State v. Savage, 161 Conn. 445, 290 A.2d 221, 223 (1971); Commonwealth v. Britland, 300 Mass. 492, 15 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1938). We have no quarrel with this general principle. See, e. g., Storer v. Goren, 18 Me. 174, 176-77 (1841). We think, however, that the defendant has completely misconstrued the trial court's reason for disallowing the proffered question, And he also said it was self-defense? As we read the pertinent portion of the record bearing on this issue, we are convinced that the presiding Justice excluded the question only because it was improper in form. It is evident that defendant's counsel, by asking the witness to characterize the defendant's statement as a claim of self-defense, was attempting to elicit a legal conclusion from the witness. While it is too well known to require citation that leading questions are permissible on cross-examination of a witness, it is equally true that a witness should not be permitted to express an opinion that in effect would be dispositive of the issues of law in the case. State v. Huff, 157 Me. 269, 275, 171 A.2d 210, 213 (1961); State v. McNaughton, 132 Me. 8, 11, 164 A. 623, 625 (1933). We think it is immaterial that the witness here was not asked to express his own opinion, but was instead asked to characterize the defendant's explanation of the killing. The issue of seminal import was whether the defendant shot the victim in self-defense. It was a sound exercise of the trial court's discretion to exclude the flagrantly leading question addressed to the witness concerning the defendant's claim of self-defense. The scope of cross-examination is a matter for the discretion of the trial court and, on appeal, we will consider only whether there was an abuse of discretion. State v. Gervais, Me., 317 A.2d 796, 800-01 (1974); International Paper Co. v. State, Me., 248 A.2d 749, 753 (1968). We find no abuse of discretion here. The presiding Justice made it abundantly clear that the defendant's counsel was not prohibited from asking the witness what, if anything, the defendant said to him in addition to I did it. As the excerpt from the record supra indicates, defendant's counsel chose not to rephrase his question, though the presiding Justice gave him ample opportunity to do so, but instead counsel elected to stand by his offer of proof. Whether this strategy was motivated by the hope of reversal on appeal is a matter on which we decline to speculate, but we will not reverse a conviction merely because a trial tactic backfired. Assuming arguendo that we agreed with the defendant that the presiding Justice erred by excluding the testimony in question, in light of the formidable evidence pointing unerringly to the appellant's guilt, we would be constrained to hold that the defendant's substantial rights were not thereby prejudiced. See Towle v. Aube, Me., 310 A.2d 259, 264 (1973). The record reveals other evidence in the case which raised the issue of self-defense, and the court's charge adequately detailed for the jury the law of self-defense. In this context, the effect of the presiding Justice's ruling could only have been harmless. M. R.Crim.P. 52(a). [1]