Opinion ID: 1386623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Zoning Administrator's Authority

Text: First, in the Jefferson Utilities matter and then second, in the consolidated Kletter cases, [12] the trial court undertook to identify the role and authority of the zoning administrator. Looking to statutory language which refers to the actions that the Board can take with reference to administrative rulings, the circuit court concluded that such language required that the Board review all matters appealed to it from a zoning administrator pursuant to a de novo standard. W.Va.Code § 8-24-55 (1969) (Repl.Vol.2003). In both of the opinions at issue in this consolidated matter, the circuit court concluded sua sponte that the Board was without authority to accord any deference to determinations reached by a zoning administrator based on the applicable standard of review. [13] See id. In deciding that the authority of the zoning administrator was severely limited, the trial court looked to the language of West Virginia Code § 8-24-55 setting forth the actions that a board of zoning appeals may take upon its review of administrative rulings: In exercising its powers and authority, the board of zoning appeals may reverse or affirm, in whole or in part, or may modify the order, requirement, decision or determination appealed from, as in its opinion ought to be done in the premises, and to this end shall have all the powers and authority of the official or board from whom or which the appeal is taken. W.Va.Code § 8-24-55 (emphasis supplied). From this language alone, the trial court concluded that the Board's power of review with regard to determinations made by the zoning administrator is de novo. Because the Board gave deference to certain factual determinations made by Mr. Raco, [14] the circuit court concluded that the Board had applied an erroneous principle of law which required reversal. See Wolfe, 159 W.Va. at 35, 217 S.E.2d at 900, syl. pt. 5. In attempting to define the authority of the zoning administrator, the trial court limited its analysis to one statutory provision that authorizes a municipal or county planning commissions to [d]elegate to employees authority to perform ministerial acts in all cases except where final action of the commission is necessary. See W.Va.Code § 8-24-14(5) (1969) (Repl.Vol.2003). Because the enabling legislation that creates such planning commissions permits the hiring of employees for the accomplishment of ministerial acts combined with the fact that the Ordinance provides that the zoning administrator will be under the direct supervision of the Planning and Zoning Commission, [15] the trial court concluded that a zoning administrator is necessarily someone hired by the commission solely to perform ministerial acts. [16] W.Va.Code § 8-24-14(5). This narrow reasoning, which focuses solely on a planning commission's authority to hire individuals for routine administrative matters that are ministerial in nature, [17] fails to appreciate that the enabling legislation grants additional authority to planning commissions. The same statutory provision that authorizes the hiring of ministerial employees also grants to a planning commission general authority to [p]rescribe the qualifications of, appoint, remove and fix the compensation of, the employees of the commission. W.Va.Code § 8-24-14(4); see also W.Va.Code § 8-24-12 (1969) (Repl.Vol.2003) (granting authority for hiring of employees necessary for the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of the commission). Under the Jefferson County ordinance, the zoning administrator is supposed to be hired by the planning commission. Consequently, the job duties and responsibilities assigned to the zoning administrator are to be determined by the planning commission or the ordinance language setting forth the duties of the zoning administrator. Contrary to the circuit court's approach to this issue, the ministerial acts statutory language is not the sole basis for identifying the zoning administrator's authority or job description. W.Va.Code § 8-24-14(5). As additional authority for the creation of the zoning administrator position, we have previously recognized that county commissions and municipalities derive their general authority to adopt zoning ordinances from West Virginia Code § 8-24-39 (1988) (Repl. Vol.2003). See Dewey v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 185 W.Va. 578, 581, 408 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1991); Wolfe, 159 W.Va. at 39, 217 S.E.2d at 903. That statutory provision expressly grants authority to municipalities and county commissions for the implementation of zoning laws. We have further observed that the enactment of a zoning ordinance is an exercise of the broad police power of the state, as delegated to the local governing body. See Par Mar v. City of Parkersburg, 183 W.Va. 706, 709, 398 S.E.2d 532, 535 (1990). An integral part of extending the state's police powers to local governing bodies is the related enforcement powers that are implicitly granted to such bodies for the purpose of carrying out local laws. See State ex rel. State Line Sparkler v. Teach, 187 W.Va. 271, 275, 418 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1992) (recognizing that [t]he general rule is that a grant of the police power to a local government or political subdivision necessarily includes the right to carry it into effect and empowers the governing body to use proper means to enforce its ordinances). These principles are illustrated in the case at bar by the fact that the County Commission has reposed in the Planning Commission the responsibility for effectuating various laws, such as zoning matters, that pertain to land use. In turn, fulfillment of that responsibility for land use governance requires the employment of both employees and administrators. Central to the administration of the Ordinance under discussion is the position of zoning administrator. The following Ordinance provisions address the responsibilities assigned to the zoning administrator: [18] Section 3.2 Zoning Administrator (a) It shall be unlawful to develop, construct, alter, or reconstruct any structure or to change the use of any structure or property without first obtaining a zoning certificate from the Zoning Administrator....       (b) Use of any property, developmental arrangement, or construction on any property other than that authorized in the zoning certificate is a violation of this Ordinance....       Section 3.3 Enforcement (a) The Zoning Administrator shall promptly investigate any written complaint alleging a violation of this Ordinance and determine if a violation has occurred. In addition to the above provisions, the Ordinance grants the zoning administrator the responsibility for making determinations of prohibited uses of land in section 4.4 and further charges the zoning administrator in section 7.4 with the duty for determining whether the sketch plan and support data required as part of the DRS are adequate. The Board maintains that these duties impliedly require the exercise of some discretion. As additional support for its position, the Board posits that the appeal, which is statutorily provided by West Virginia Code § 8-24-55, would not be necessary if the zoning administrator was charged only with the execution of ministerial duties  ones that involved no element of discretion. We agree. Review of the Ordinance provisions demonstrates that the purely ministerial box into which the circuit court attempts to make the position squarely fit does not accurately reflect what is required of the zoning administrator to effectuate the duties he or she is charged with performing. For example, in charging the zoning administrator with the duty to determine in the first instance whether the sketch plan and support data submitted in support of a conditional use permit are adequate, the drafters of the Ordinance reposed the individual responsible for fulfilling the duties that accompany this position with a certain amount of discretion. Other courts have had little difficulty in concluding that a zoning administrator is charged with varying amounts of discretion for the performance of his or her respective duties, and that the degree of discretion reposed in such individual is determined by the terms of the ordinance. In Biser v. Deibel, 128 Md.App. 670, 739 A.2d 948 (1999), the appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that the zoning administrator acted in a discretionary capacity. Id. at 953. In discussing the issue of the zoning administrator's discretion, the appellate court found evidence for such exercise in the provision of the zoning ordinance that provided: It shall be the duty of the Zoning Administrator to issue a Zoning Certificate provided he [or she] is satisfied that the building or premises and the proposed use thereof conform with all the requirements of this Ordinance. Id. The court reasoned that the zoning administrator was required to exercise her judgment when making determinations relevant to the issuance of a permit, and that these decisions were not ministerial in nature. Id.; accord West Coast Advert. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 256 Cal.App.2d 357, 64 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96 (Cal.App.1967) (holding that zoning administrator acted within his discretion in denying application for permit to construct billboard); Community Housing Trust v. Dep't of Consumer and Reg. Affairs, 257 F.Supp.2d 208, 214 n. 7 (D.D.C.2003) (noting that zoning administrator had discretion regarding classification of house within one of seven categories); Ancient Art Tattoo Studio v. City of Virginia Beach, 263 Va. 593, 561 S.E.2d 690, 692-93 (2002) (finding that zoning administrator's decision regarding classification of tatoo parlor was discretionary and was not the performance of a purely ministerial duty); Door County Envtl. Council v. Door County, 616 N.W.2d 923 (Wis.2000) (recognizing that zoning ordinance specifically gives discretion to the zoning administrator to determine when an application for a particular use provides sufficient information) (unpublished decision). Consequently, we are compelled to conclude that the position of zoning administrator necessarily entails the use of limited amounts of discretion in complying with the provisions of the Ordinance. As support for its contention that the position of zoning administrator is solely ministerial in nature, the circuit court looked to a decision issued by the North Carolina Supreme Court in County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg County, 334 N.C. 496, 434 S.E.2d 604 (1993), in which the appellate court examined the distinctions between administrative and quasi-judicial zoning decisions. At issue was the constitutionality of a county zoning ordinance that authorized a zoning administrator to make a determination as to the fulfillment of six conditions as a prerequisite to approving a zoning permit application for the siting of a landfill. Id. at 607. In upholding the delegation of power by the county commission to the zoning administrator to issue landfill permits on a due process challenge, the North Carolina Supreme Court examined whether the zoning administrator's decision was a quasi-judicial zoning decision or a routine administrative matter. The appellate court reasoned as follows: Zoning decisions are typically characterized as being in one of four different categories  legislative, advisory, quasi-judicial, and administrative. In this case, the question is whether the issuance of a permit for a landfill as a permitted use with prescribed conditions is properly characterized as a quasi-judicial decision or as an administrative zoning decision. In making quasi-judicial decisions, the decisionmakers must investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In the zoning context, these quasi-judicial decisions involve the application of zoning policies to individual situations, such as variances, special and conditional use permits, and appeals of administrative determinations. These decisions involve two key elements: the finding of facts regarding the specific proposal and the exercise of some discretion in applying the standards of the ordinance. Administrative decisions are routine, nondiscretionary zoning ordinance implementation matters carried out by the staff, including issuance of permits for permitted uses. In general, the zoning administrator is a purely administrative or ministerial agent following the literal provisions of the ordinance. The zoning administrator may well engage in some fact finding, as in making an initial determination as to whether a nonconforming use was in existence at the time a zoning ordinance was adopted. But, in such instances, this involves determining objective facts that do not involve an element of discretion. 434 S.E.2d at 612 (citations omitted and emphasis supplied). The appellate court in Mecklenburg County concluded that the zoning decision was an administrative decision rather than a quasi-judicial determination, which would have required an evidentiary hearing and the use of fair trial standards. While the circuit court in the case at bar placed great emphasis on language opining that the zoning administrator was not using discretion when he applied fact-finding to ordinance provisions, it was not the use of a nominal degree of discretion in Mecklenburg County that was key to declaring whether fair trial procedures were required, but instead the nature of the decision-making process at hand. If the decision required the use of fair trial procedures by the nature of the matters being addressed, then a quasi-judicial decision process was involved. Conversely, such procedures were not required if the decision was the type of administrative matter routinely capable of being resolved by the zoning administrator along with advice from his staff. Just as the Jefferson County Zoning Administrator is called upon to use discretion in limited situations when applying the provisions of the Ordinance, the zoning administrator involved in the Mecklenburg County case was similarly required to engage in the application of specific facts to the provisions of the county ordinance at issue in that case. The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the County Board of Commissioners' characterization of instances where the zoning administrator had to apply specific facts to make a determination regarding a specific factor or condition under the ordinance as an objective finding. Examples of such objective findings included when the zoning administrator was required to determine whether the anticipated future use of the property was consistent with the county's land use plan and whether the cost estimates for reclamation were `reasonable.' 434 S.E.2d at 614. Despite the fact that the court in Mecklenburg County preferred to shroud the occasional employment of discretion by a zoning administrator in terms of an objective finding, this does not mean that discretion was not employed in making those decisions. Id. More importantly, while the North Carolina appellate court may have arguably sidestepped the exercise of discretion by a zoning administrator, it correctly formulated the process for determining whether an administrative decision requires the enhanced protections attendant to quasi-judicial proceedings. In explaining how the zoning permit decision at issue in Mecklenburg County was not a special use zoning decision, one that would clearly involve the due process protections attendant to a quasi-judicial proceeding, the North Carolina court explained: It is not the terms used by the ordinance to describe these permits that has legal significance; it is whether the nature of the decision to be made is, in fact, quasi-judicial or administrative.  434 S.E.2d at 613 (emphasis supplied). In the same vein then, the critical factor in determining whether the use of some limited discretion by a zoning administrator requires the additional protections that typically attach in evidentiary proceedings is whether the determination being made is one that qualifies as administrative or quasi-judicial in nature. As the court was quick to acknowledge in Mecklenburg County quasi-judicial special use permit decisions may not be assigned to the zoning administrator. 434 S.E.2d at 613. Those proceedings, which entail the presentation of evidence and the making of findings, are clearly quasi-judicial in nature. Like the ordinance under review in Mecklenburg County, the Ordinance at issue in the case sub judice does not permit the zoning administrator to issue a conditional use permit. [19] Such a decision would clearly be outside the realm of the administrative functions he or she is charged with performing under the Ordinance. But the fact that the zoning administrator makes LESA determinations as an initial fact gatherer that are then looked to by the Board and ultimately the Planning Commission in deciding whether to issue a conditional use permit does not elevate the factual determinations reached by the zoning administrator to quasi-judicial in nature. The determinations made by the zoning administrator clearly do not involve the type of issues that require due process protections such as evidence production; cross-examination; document inspection; and sworn testimony. See Mecklenburg County, 434 S.E.2d at 612. Consequently, the fact that some minimal degree of discretion is involved by the zoning administrator in making his/her determinations regarding the LESA score does not remove the decisions reached by the zoning administrator from the administrative realm. See id. The nature of the decisions required to be made by the zoning administrator are, as a rule, administrative in nature. Where a local ordinance requires the application of a finding of fact to a provision of an ordinance to make a specific determination, that determination may indeed involve the exercise of some discretion. This fact alone  the exercise of discretion or judgment in applying facts to a provision of the Ordinance  is insufficient to transform a finding made by a zoning administrator into a quasi-judicial determination. Only those decisions that clearly demand that due process standards be utilized in reaching the decision at hand can transform an otherwise administrative decision into a quasi-judicial determination. From the record before us, we do not see any indication that the determinations complained of that the zoning administrator reached (i.e. sufficiency of submitted support data) were of the nature that required the application of such standards. In its haste to defrock the zoning administrator of authority to exercise even a limited amount of discretion in applying the duties he or she is charged with administering under the Ordinance, the lower court disregarded established principles of administrative and property law, as well as the fact that the law seeks to avoid absurd results. See Charter Commun. VI, v. Comm. Antenna Serv., Inc., 211 W.Va. 71, 77, 561 S.E.2d 793, 799 (2002) (recognizing that [i]t is the `duty of this Court to avoid whenever possible a construction of a statute which leads to absurd, inconsistent, unjust or unreasonable results') (quoting State v. Kerns, 183 W.Va. 130, 135, 394 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1990)). The circuit court overlooked the necessity for allowing the individual who holds this position to exercise limited amounts of discretion. The day-to-day decisions that are demanded of the zoning administrator cannot be postponed until the Board, a group of unpaid lay people who lack a comparable degree of expertise that the zoning administrator along with his/her staff have by virtue of their customary application of zoning procedures, holds its monthly or bi-monthly meetings. If the decisions typically made by the zoning administrator are transferred to the Board or the Planning Commission, the Board maintains that those bodies would be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of decisions that are routinely presented and which require prompt attention. Zoning matters would virtually grind to a halt if this Court were to adopt the position articulated by the circuit court. The lynchpin on which the trial court based its rulings regarding the erroneous application of a legal principle was its conclusion that the zoning administrator's decisions were not entitled to any deference by a reviewing body such as the Board. We reject the trial court's reasoning and hold that the provisions of West Virginia Code § 8-24-55, which set forth the authority and power of a board of zoning appeals, do not expressly or implicitly prevent that administrative body from utilizing principles of deference typically employed in administrative proceedings in reviewing determinations reached by a zoning administrator. See, e.g., Corliss, 214 W.Va. at 542, 591 S.E.2d at 100 (discussing weight to be accorded to administrative bodies charged with handling zoning matters). Moreover, the fact that the Board has the power to reverse, affirm, or modify does not mean that the Board cannot defer to specific factual findings reached by the zoning administrator. See W.Va.Code § 8-24-55. It is this Court's opinion that the statutory powers of review extended to the Board by West Virginia Code § 8-24-55 place the decision of when, or if, to defer to a specific decision reached by a zoning administrator within the prerogative of the Board. Consequently, the fact that the Board adopts a finding reached by the zoning administrator, such as the adequacy of the support data submitted in connection with a conditional use application, is not fatal with regard to a Board's review of a zoning matter. To conclude otherwise would require a duplication of efforts that simply is not required or warranted. While we certainly recognize that the review mechanism established by West Virginia Code § 8-24-55 plays a vital role with regard to challenged zoning matters, there is no basis for concluding that this review process mandates that the Board is required to start from scratch in conducting its review of a matter before it. Cf. W.Va. Code § 8-24-64 (1969) (Repl.Vol.2003) (expressly providing that circuit court's review of appealed zoning matters shall not be by trial de novo). Moreover, we decline to label the powers of review set forth in West Virginia Code § 8-24-55 for zoning boards of appeal as entailing de novo review. [20] As a quasi-judicial body [21] created by statute, the powers of review afforded to a zoning board of appeals are delineated solely by statute and should not be analyzed under standards that apply to judicial determinations. See Dewey, 185 W.Va. at 582, 408 S.E.2d at 334 (recognizing that scope of zoning board's authority is determined by W.Va.Code § 8-24-55).