Opinion ID: 788575
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Use Of The Term Safe House

Text: 62 Burton also alleges that his counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the prosecutor's repeated reference to a residence linked to Burton as a safe house where firearms were kept. Burton contends that the prosecutor used the term safe house for the purpose of impermissibly characterizing Burton as a person with a propensity to commit illegal acts, citing as an example the prosecutor's statement during closing argument: `Why do I keep a 9 mm in the safe house? These are all the acts, ladies and gentlemen, of a very innocent person, aren't they? It's all evidence on this record.' J.A. at 32. (Br. in Support of Pet. for Habeas Corpus) (quoting Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 52). 63 Burton's contention that the prosecutor's references to a safe house where firearms were kept constituted inadmissible other-acts evidence is undermined by the fact that the prosecution seems to have intended to use such testimony to establish that Burton had access to a nine-millimeter handgun like the one used to kill the victim. 3 Because the murder weapon itself does not appear to have been introduced in evidence at trial, evidence of Burton's connections to the West Lapeer residence and the presence at that location of the particular type of weapon used to kill McClayton did have probative value with respect to a material issue other than Burton's character. See People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 508 N.W.2d 114, 122, 126 (Mich.1993) (noting that [r]elevant other acts evidence does not violate Rule 404(b) unless it is offered solely to show the criminal propensity of an individual to establish that he acted in conformity therewith, and establishing that, for other-acts evidence to be admissible, the prosecutor must offer the other acts evidence under something other than a character to conduct theory, the evidence must be relevant under Rule 402, as enforced through Rule 104(b), to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and the danger of undue prejudice [must] substantially outweigh[ ] the probative value of the evidence) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Waters v. Kassulke, 916 F.2d 329, 336 (6th Cir.1990) (finding that due process was not violated by the admission of other-acts evidence because the evidence was relevant to the case's central issues of knowledge and intent and the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect). 64 Although the use of the term safe house might have been somewhat prejudicial, it cannot be said that the term was so prejudicial as to render Burton's trial fundamentally unfair. Moreover, the prosecutor's use of the term safe house without objection by Burton's trial counsel may have factored in the decision of Burton's counsel not to raise this issue on direct appeal. See People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870 n. 7 (1992) (rejecting argument that trial court erred by admitting other-acts evidence because the defendant failed to raise any timely objection at trial on the basis of MRE 404(b)); see also People v. Buck, 197 Mich.App. 404, 496 N.W.2d 321, 330 (1993) (Appellate review of prosecutorial misconduct is foreclosed where the defendant fails to object or request a curative instruction, unless the misconduct was so egregious that no objection or curative instruction could have removed the prejudice to the defendant or if manifest injustice would result from our failure to review the claims of misconduct.). Hence, Burton's counsel on direct appeal was not constitutionally defective for failing to raise this claim, and there is not a reasonable probability that Burton's conviction would have been reversed on appeal. Because Burton has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this claim remains procedurally defaulted. 65