Opinion ID: 889224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Similarity and Remoteness

Text: ¶ 56 Next, Anderson contends that some of the State's evidence does not meet the Modified Just Rule's similarity and remoteness criteria. The Modified Just Rule, however, is no longer the correct analytical approach. Rather, when presented with a claim that evidence is being offered for an impermissible propensity inference, the court should simply apply Rules 402 and 404 (and, if requested, Rules 403 and 105). There is no requirement in Rule 404(b) that all uncharged acts must be similar and near in time to the charged act. Rather, these criteria are holdovers from our pre-Rule 404(b) jurisprudence and are not necessarily applicable to every nonpropensity theory of logical relevance. These points were explained in ¶¶ 95-101 of the Stout dissent and need not be detailed again here. Suffice it to say that the prosecutor's theory of logical relevance may require that the uncharged act be similar to the charged acte.g., if offered to identify the defendant by showing that she committed the uncharged act with a modus operandi strikingly similar to that of the charged actbut this will not always be the case. And the same is true about remoteness, which is an issue that bears more on the probative value of the evidence and, thus, should be considered in a Rule 403 analysis. In short, similarity and nearness in time are no longer prerequisites for the admission of all other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence. Rather, when a defendant raises a Rule 404(b) objection, the trial court should carefully analyze whether the evidence in question is relevant for a purpose that does not involve drawing an impermissible inference of action in conformity with character. If it is, then Rule 404(b) does not require its exclusion.