Opinion ID: 1388285
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Premature?

Text: Since it is a drastic remedy, summary judgment should be cautiously invoked so that no person will be improperly deprived of a trial of the disputed factual issues. Watson v. Southern Ry. Co. , 420 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D.S.C. 1975); see also Holloman v. McAllister , 289 S.C. 183, 186, 345 S.E. (2d) 728, 729 (1986) (an extreme remedy to be cautiously invoked). This means, among other things, that summary judgment must not be granted until the opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery. 10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2741, p. 543 (1983); 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.02[6], p. 56-39 (2d) ed. 1990); see, e.g., First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange Co. , 836 F. (2d) 1375 (D.C. Cir.1988); Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 756 F. (2d) 230 (2d Cir.1985); Tyler v. City of Enterprise , 521 So. (2d) 951 (Ala. 1988); Gangadean v. Leumi Fin. Corp. , 13 Ariz. App. 534, 478 P. (2d) 532 (1970); Commercial Bank of Kendall v. Heiman , 322 So. (2d) 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Board of Education v. Van Buren & Firestone, Architects, Inc. , 165 W. Va. 140, 267 S.E. (2d) 440 (1980); cf. Rule 56(f), S.C.R.C.P. [4] Under the circumstances, we agree with Plaintiffs that the grant of partial summary judgment on the personal injury claims was premature. First, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood that further discovery will uncover additional evidence relevant to the issue of medical causation and that they are not merely engaged in a fishing expedition. Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co. , 376 N.W. (2d) 209 (Minn. 1985); cf. Lamb's Patio Theatre, Inc. v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. , 582 F. (2d) 1068 (7th Cir.1978). This fact is confirmed by Dr. Panitz's letter of November 29, 1988, which indicates that Plaintiffs' illnesses are entirely consistent with exposure to toxic substances and that there is considerable evidence they were caused by chemicals emitted from Nassau's facility. While, as discussed earlier, the opinion expressed does not reach the degree of certainty necessary to overcome summary judgment, it does highlight the need for further testing and analysis of Plaintiffs' medical conditions. Second, Plaintiffs were not dilatory in seeking discovery on the issue of causation, but have been reasonably diligent in pursuit of a qualified expert to substantiate their claims. Bixler, supra; Harrison v. Falcon Products, Inc. , 103 Nev. 558, 746 P. (2d) 642 (1987); cf. Sitts v. United States , 811 F. (2d) 736 (2d Cir.1987); Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America , 694 F. (2d) 1017, 1031 (5th Cir.1983) (listing factors). We acknowledge that more than three years elapsed between the filing of these actions and the final granting of partial summary judgment as to personal injury. The delays in completing discovery, however, may not fairly be attributed solely to Plaintiffs' inaction. See George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp. , 554 F. (2d) 551 (2d Cir.1977). Rather, from the beginning, discovery was dominated by Nassau's demands and Plaintiffs' efforts to respond: the taking of hundreds of depositions, including that of almost every named plaintiff; waves of interrogatories addressed to each plaintiff individually; then, requests for admissions seeking information, in addition to stipulations. Moreover, two years into the litigation, Plaintiffs had not yet received satisfactory responses to their interrogatories regarding the substances emitted from the Nassau plant, information critical to their obtaining expert opinion evidence concerning causation. Finally, the delay in locating Dr. Panitz is tempered by the complexity of these cases and the hardship encountered in proving causation. Other courts have recognized that proof of causation is especially difficult in actions seeking recovery for prolonged exposure to toxic substances. Elam v. Alcolac, Inc. , 765 S.W. (2d) 42, 173-74 (Mo. App. 1988); [5] Ayers v. Jackson Township , 106 N.J. 557, 585, 525 A. (2d) 287, 301 (1987). The following statement by the Supreme Court of Nebraska concerning the difficulty of obtaining expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions is even more applicable to toxic tort cases: [T]he real and obvious obstacle, by the very nature of the case  medical malpractice  was access to and availability of a qualified physician who was ready, willing, and able, in terms of time and temperament, to be a witness or affiant in [the] case. In practicality, the complexities of an action for malpractice and the problems of gaining information and enlisting a reliable expert witness as well as formulating and preparing a malpractice case are myriad and usually major, a situation almost a matter of judicial notice. Wachtel v. Beer , 229 Neb. 392, 403-4, 427 N.W. (2d) 56, 64 (1988). Plaintiffs acted with due diligence in the procurement of an expert medical witness in this protracted litigation. Now that they have located such an expert in the person of Dr. Panitz, the development of this evidence should not be precipitously terminated by summary judgment. Accordingly, entry of all partial summary judgments on claims for personal injury is reversed. Of course, Nassau may renew its motions once Plaintiffs have been afforded an adequate opportunity to complete discovery on the issue of medical causation. [6]