Opinion ID: 1176033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Parental Duties Under K.S.A. 59-2136(d)

Text: The Court of Appeals found that the father failed in both his positive financial obligations and in his responsibilities to provide even a minimum of parental love and affection. 24 Kan. App.2d at 221. The district court reasoned that the social security payments in and of themselves were not sufficient to require the father's consent. Because of its ruling that the social security payments were not credits on the child support obligation, the Court of Appeals did not reach the difficult question now before us. The question is: Must the father fail in both the financial and the affection, care, and interest aspects of parenting to fail under K.S.A. 59-2136(d) in assuming the duties of a parent? The Court of Appeals observed: Because of the complete failure of the father to provide either [support or affection, care, and interest], we need not and do not make the difficult decision of determining how little of either one or both responsibilities is enough to stave off a finding of a failure to exercise parental duties. 24 Kan. App.2d at 221. Having stated the question, we examine two cases each with similarities to this case: In re Adoption of S.E.B., 257 Kan. 266, 891 P.2d 440 (1995), and In re Adoption of C.R.D., 21 Kan. App.2d 94, 897 P.2d 181 (1995). The father in each of these cases failed the affection, care, and interest side of parenting. The children in S.E.B. were the same ages (9 and 7) as the two younger children here. We observed in S.E.B. that children age 9 and 7, unlike in In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 16 Kan. App.2d 311, 822 P.2d 76 (1991), are of an age where they are well aware of their father. 257 Kan. at 273. The district court, in S.E.B., found that the father had showed little or no interest in the children for the five years preceding the adoption petition. 257 Kan. at 268. The stepfather and the mother during their marriage of over 4 years had provided the sole financial support for S.E.B. and K.A.B. In reversing the district court and vacating the stepparent adoption, we said: The question in this case is whether the statute [K.S.A. 59-2136(d)] requires that a parent be financially able to pay the ordered support for the two-year period before the presumption is applicable.... To apply the statutory presumption of K.S.A. 59-2136(d), the courts are required to take into consideration the period of time that the father was incarcerated and unable to support the children. Here, Father was incarcerated for 7 of the 24 months, approximately 30% of the two-year period. It is obvious from the facts that while in prison Father was not financially able to support the children. Because the fitness of the nonconsenting parent and the best interests of the children are not controlling factors under K.S.A. 59-2136(d), we must find that under the circumstances the judge improperly granted the adoption. 257 Kan. at 274. The father in S.E.B. failed both the affection, care, and interest and financial tests; however, because of his incarceration he was not financially able under 59-2136(d) to provide support. Although he failed in affection, care, and interest, he did not fail in assuming parental duties under K.S.A. 59-2136(d). The father in C.R.D. had no contact with the child and did not call or send letters or gifts during the 59-2136(d) 2-year period. The district court granted the stepparent adoption. In a split decision, Green, J., dissenting, the Court of Appeals reversed. C.R.D. however, affirmed the district court's finding of the father's failure on the love and affection side of parenting. 21 Kan. App.2d at 96. The C.R.D. father did pay some child support (approximately 23% during the 2-year period). The C.R.D. issue was whether the father otherwise failed to assume the duties of a parent, having failed on love and affection. 21 Kan. App.2d at 96. C.R.D. reasoned that payment of $1,000 during the 2 years when $4,800 was due plus furnishing an insurance card sent by the father's ex-wife was sufficient. The C.R.D. court said: Basic parental rights are fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The right to be the legal parent of a child is one of these rights, which cannot be abrogated except for compelling reasons. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 54 L. Ed.2d 511, 98 S. Ct. 549, reh. denied 435 U.S. 918 (1979); In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814, 869 P.2d 661 (1994). 21 Kan. App.2d at 98. We agree. C.R.D. concluded: In the instant case, we do not believe the support payments and insurance benefits provided can reasonably be called insubstantial, as we believe that term must be defined in this context. The father's support of his child in this case was certainly not what it should have been. But it was not so insubstantial as to deprive him of his rights of parenthood. 21 Kan. App.2d at 100.