Opinion ID: 5648768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues #1 & #2: juror bias

Text: Nichole Mikesell served as the jury foreperson for Cunningham’s trial. R. 194-2 (Trial Tr. at 1498) (Page ID #10708). On her jury questionnaire, Mikesell indicated that she worked as a child-abuse investigator at Allen County Children Services and as a crisis counselor at Crime Victims Services. R. 192-4 (Mikesell Questionnaire) (Page ID #5301, 5306). She wrote that she worked closely with the Allen County sheriff’s office, the Lima police department, and the juvenile court. Id. (Page ID #5302–04). To the prompt “[d]o you know of any reason you could not sit as a juror and be absolutely fair to the Defendant and the State of Ohio and render a verdict based solely upon the evidence presented you[,]” Mikesell checked “no.” Id. (Page ID #5308). At voir dire, the judge asked the prospective jurors “do any of you have any personal knowledge of the facts of this case?” R. 194-1 (Voir Dire at 13) (Page ID #9181). Mikesell said nothing. Id. at 14 (Page ID #9182). The court, the prosecution, and defense counsel confirmed that Mikesell knew several of the prosecutors and a defense lawyer from work, that she worked at children services, and that she had friends “on the police department,” but Mikesell assured the court that she would be impartial. Id. at 24–25, 37, 72, 207–09 (Page ID #9192–93, 9205, 9240, 9375–77). The jury found Cunningham guilty on all counts and specifications and sentenced him to death. See Cunningham II, 824 N.E.2d at 512–13. Cunningham appealed his conviction and sentence to the Ohio Supreme Court. See id. at 513. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 4
During the pendency of Cunningham’s direct appeal, Jackson’s investigator endeavored to interview Cunningham’s jurors. The investigator secured interviews with six members of Cunningham’s jury, including foreperson Mikesell and jurors Staci Freeman and Roberta Wobler, and an alternate. R. 192-4 (Investigator Rep.) (Page ID #5122). The investigator prepared a report of these seven interviews, and he swore to their veracity in an affidavit dated July 16, 2003. R. 192-4 (Ericson Aff.) (Page ID #5121). The investigator wrote— [Mikesell] said that there was nothing in Jeronique’s life that could have possibly explained his participation in the instant offense. She said that Jeronique is an evil person. She said that some social workers worked with Jeronique in the past and were afraid of him. She also said that if you observe one of the veins starting to bulge in his head, watch out and stay away because he might try to kill you. She also said that Jeronique had no redeeming qualities. . . . She said that the defense knew what she did at children’s services but did not ask her if she had any direct information regarding the instant offense. As it turned out, she did not have any pertinent information regarding the instant offense but said that the defense would not be aware of this. R. 192-4 (Investigator Rep.) (Page ID #5132) (emphasis added). Freeman relayed that she voted last for finding Cunningham guilty of aggravated murder. Id. (Page ID #5125). “After a while,” the report provides, “[Freeman] was convinced by the other jurors that Jeronique had in fact been guilty of aggravated murder as opposed to murder.” Id. Cunningham timely petitioned for state postconviction relief on August 1, 2003, raising a jury-bias claim based on the investigator’s affidavit and report. R. 192-4 (2003 Postconviction Pet.) (Page ID #5047, 5085–91). Pointing to Mikesell’s interview, Cunningham asserted that Mikesell’s colleagues told her “extraneous” and “highly prejudicial information” that Mikesell had failed to divulge during voir dire or in her jury questionnaire. Id. (Page ID #5087). Asserting that his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights were violated, Cunningham requested a new trial or, at a minimum, discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Id. (Page ID #5088, 5090–91). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 5 The state trial court denied Cunningham’s postconviction petition without permitting discovery or an evidentiary hearing, and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Cunningham asserted that the presence of Juror Number 21, Nichole Mikesell, on the jury was prejudicial to him and violated his rights to a fair and impartial jury. . . . The only comment made by Mikesell that would have any bearing on Cunningham’s assertion is that she was provided information by some social workers regarding Cunningham. However, the investigator’s interview summary of Mikesell does not indicate whether Mikesell obtained this information from the social workers prior to, during, or subsequent to Cunningham’s trial. The record also does not provide when the investigator conducted these interviews with the jurors. However, the record does provide that Mikesell was thoroughly examined during the voir dire process and that she informed the court regarding the information she had about the case. Mikesell never indicated that she could not be a fair and impartial juror. State v. Cunningham (Cunningham I), 2004 WL 2496525, at  (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). The Ohio Supreme Court denied Cunningham’s claims on direct appeal, Cunningham II, 824 N.E.2d at 532, and later declined to review Cunningham’s postconviction petition, State v. Cunningham, 824 N.E.2d 92 (Ohio 2005).
In 2006, Cunningham petitioned for habeas relief. He reasserted that his constitutional rights were violated by Mikesell’s knowledge of extrajudicial information about Cunningham. R. 19-2 (Habeas Pet. at 7) (Page ID #243). The district court allowed Cunningham to depose the jurors, Mikesell’s colleagues at Allen County Children Services, and Jackson’s investigator. R. 79 (4/18/08 Mot. at 2–3) (Page ID #1501–02); R. 86 (6/9/08 Order at 10–12) (Page ID #1861– 63). Cunningham acquired affidavits from Freeman and Wobler. R. 104-1 (Freeman Aff. at 1) (Page ID #1955); R. 103-1 (Wobler Aff. at 1) (Page ID #1952). Freeman averred that during guilt-phase deliberations, Mikesell told the other jurors that she worked at the county’s childrenservices agency. R. 104-1 (Freeman Aff. at 1) (Page ID #1955). When Freeman expressed that the ballistic evidence pointed to Jackson’s—not Cunningham’s—gun, Mikesell apparently Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 6 responded: “[y]ou don’t understand. I know the families of the people that were shot in the kitchen. The families know me and I am going to have to go back and see them. These families are my clients.” Id. at 1–2 (Page ID #1955–56). Freeman “interpreted Mikesell’s comments as pressure to vote guilty.” Id. at 2 (Page ID #1956). Wobler attested that “[o]ne young woman on the jury was adamant that Jeronique was not guilty. Mikesell told the young woman and the jury that the young woman did not have to work in the local community.” R. 103-1 (Wobler Aff. at 1) (Page ID #1952). Cunningham also deposed Mikesell. When pressed about her comments to Jackson’s investigator, Mikesell avouched that none of her social-worker colleagues had spoken to her about Cunningham but conceded that she had read Cunningham’s files posttrial. R. 188-1 (Mikesell Dep. at 13–14) (Page ID #2915–16). Mikesell claimed that she had not relayed to the other jurors any information from these records. Id. at 14 (Page ID #2916). The presiding magistrate judge barred Cunningham’s attorney from asking Mikesell if she worked with or had communicated with the victims’ families. Id. at 16–20 (Page ID #2916–17). The district court permitted Cunningham to amend his habeas petition to include a second juror-bias claim based on Mikesell’s knowledge and relationship with the victims’ families. R. 111 (3/27/09 Mot. at 4–5) (Page ID #2036–37); R. 120 (7/21/09 Order at 5) (Page ID #2321). Denying Cunningham’s request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court permitted depositions of Freeman and Wobler instead. R. 120 (7/21/09 Order at 5) (Page ID #2321). The district court explained that the necessity of an evidentiary hearing depended on the jurors’ testimony. Id. at 6 (Page ID #2322). Cunningham deposed Freeman and Wobler. Freeman reiterated that at guilt-phase deliberations, Mikesell told the jurors that she “dealt with the victims and their families, they knew who she was, and that if she would find him not guilty that she would have to deal with them and that’s just something she didn’t want to have to deal with because they knew who she was.” R. 137-1 (Freeman Dep. at 6) (Page ID #2455). Mikesell’s comments affected Freeman— Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 7 I felt, I felt pressured that . . . How do I put this? I think that [Mikesell] . . . I think that other people in the room felt pressured. I was honestly the last one holding out, and I felt that I was up against a wall, and she was very domineering and so I just . . . You know I regret, I shouldn’t have, but I voted guilty. . . . I mean I felt the sense in the room, I felt the pressure. She tried to steer everyone towards that. Id. at 11 (Page ID #2460). Freeman did not remember whether she had told Jackson’s investigator that she was “[c]onvinced by the other jurors that Jeronique had in fact been guilty of aggravated murder as opposed to murder.” Id. at 28–29 (Page ID #2477–78). But, Freeman insisted, she had mentioned to the investigator that Mikesell spoke during deliberations about the victims’ families. Id. at 15, 18, 19, 20 (Page ID #2464, 2467, 2468, 2469). After reading the investigator’s report, however, Freeman confirmed that her remarks to Jackson’s investigator were not in the report. Id. at 17–18 (Page ID #2466–67). Wobler likewise averred that Mikesell stated in guilt-phase deliberations that she “may in the future be working with the [victims’] families.” R. 136-1 (Wobler Dep. at 5) (Page ID #2435). Wobler swore, however, that her decision was unaffected by Mikesell’s comments. Id. at 6 (Page ID #2436).1 The case was subsequently assigned to a different district court, which denied Cunningham’s federal habeas petition. See Cunningham v. Hudson, No. 3:06 CV 0167, 2010 WL 5092705, at  (N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 2010). Applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) deference, the district court found that the Cunningham I court’s treatment of Cunningham’s initial juror-bias claim (involving Mikesell’s exposure to external information about Cunningham) neither contradicted nor unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. Id. at . The district court further found that Cunningham’s second juror-bias claim (involving Mikesell’s relationship to the victims’ families) was unexhausted, procedurally defaulted, and meritless. Id. at . 1Wobler could not recall having spoken to Jackson’s investigator but confirmed that it was possible. R. 136-1 (Wobler Dep. at 12) (Page ID #2442). Ohio moved to strike Freeman’s and Wobler’s depositions. R. 142 (3/15/10 Mot.) (Page ID #2504). The district court denied Ohio’s motion. R. 155 (5/26/10 Order at 3) (Page ID #2590). To the district court, Cunningham’s seeking discovery for his initial juror-bias claim in his state postconviction petition showed that Cunningham had diligently attempted to develop the facts underlying his second juror-bias claim in state court. Id. Accordingly, the district court reasoned, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) permitted the court to add the depositions to the record. Id. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 8 We vacated and remanded. Cunningham v. Hudson, 756 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Pointing to the Ohio courts’ obscure interpretations of Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and Ohio Revised Code § 2953.23(A)(1), we concluded that it was “at least debatable” whether Cunningham could raise his second juror-bias claim in a second state postconviction petition or a motion for a new trial. Id. at 485 (citation omitted). So Cunningham’s failure to exhaust his second juror-bias claim did not constitute procedural default. See id. at 487. The district court held Cunningham’s habeas petition in abeyance to allow Cunningham to exhaust his second juror-bias claim in state court. Cunningham v. Hudson, No. 3:06 CV 0167, 2014 WL 5341703, at  (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2014).
Back in state court, Cunningham filed a second state postconviction petition and a motion for a new trial. He raised his second juror-bias claim in both documents and requested discovery, an investigator, an evidentiary hearing, and permission to file the delayed motion. R. 188-1 (2018 Postconviction Pet. at 1) (Page ID #2828); R. 209-1 (Mot. New Trial at 1) (Page ID #11342). The Allen County Court of Common Pleas denied relief, and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The state appellate court ruled that Cunningham was not “unavoidably prevented” from discovering the facts underlying his second juror-bias claim. State v. Cunningham (Cunningham III), 65 N.E.3d 307, 312–15, 317–18 (Ohio Ct. App. May 23, 2016). The appellate court thus concluded that Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2953.23(A) and Ohio Criminal Rule 33 barred Cunningham’s new filings. See id. at 314–15, 317–18. The Ohio Supreme Court declined review. State v. Cunningham, 77 N.E.3d 987 (Ohio 2017) (Table). Deferring to the state court’s “unavoidably prevented” analysis, the district court found that Cunningham procedurally defaulted his second juror-bias claim. See Cunningham v. Shoop, No. 3:06 CV 167, 2019 WL 6897003, at –12 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2019). Cunningham appealed the district court’s decision, and we granted his motion to reinstate his initial appeal. CA6 No. 11-3005 R. 187 (7/28/20 Order at 2). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 9

To resolve Cunningham’s juror-bias claims, we consider three canonical cases: Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000); and Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
In Remmer, the Supreme Court held that a prima facie showing of juror bias—such as an allegation of “any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury” in a criminal case—entitles a defendant to a hearing, awards to the defendant a presumption of prejudice, and places on the Government the burden of showing that the contact was harmless. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. The Court followed up in Smith v. Phillips: “This Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (emphasis added). Put another way, the Phillips Court reaffirmed Remmer’s core holding that a showing of juror bias demands a hearing. See United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 94–95 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 1998). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions that address Remmer hearings confirm as much. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738–39 (1993); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119–20 (1983). The courts of appeals were forced to grapple with whether Phillips shifted the burden of proof at a Remmer hearing from the Government to the defendant and whether the presumption of prejudice survived Phillips. Every other circuit maintains that the Government shoulders the burden at a Remmer hearing of showing that the alleged juror bias was harmless and has reaffirmed that defendants are awarded a presumption of prejudice at that hearing. See B. Samantha Helgason, Opening Pandora’s Jury Box, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 231, 242–43, 249–50 (2020); Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d 338, 350 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). We charted our own course. In Zelinka, we reiterated that Remmer “outlined Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 10 the procedure that district courts should follow when advised of unauthorized contacts with a juror”— The trial court should not decide and take final action ex parte on information such as was received in this case, but should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate. Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 94–95 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229–30). We nonetheless concluded that Phillips shifted the burden of showing bias at Remmer hearings to defendants and stripped defendants of the presumption of prejudice. See id. at 95–96. Notwithstanding, we still guarantee defendants a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate juror bias, United States v. Lanier, 988 F.3d 284, 295 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637), and maintain that bias may be actual (“bias in fact”) or implied (“employ[ing] a conclusive presumption that a juror is biased” in “certain ‘extreme’ or ‘exceptional’ cases”), Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 437 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
In Michael Williams, the Court held that when the state courts have not adjudicated a habeas petitioner’s claims on the merits and the petitioner diligently attempted to develop the facts of that claim in state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) permits federal courts to hold an evidentiary hearing for that claim. See Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 437. Michael Wayne Williams was convicted of a capital crime. See id. at 426. He petitioned for postconviction relief in the Virginia courts, alleging that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose its unofficial deal with one of the witnesses. See id. at 427. The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the petition. See id. Williams sought federal habeas relief. See id. He reraised his undisclosed-agreement claim and set forth three new claims. Williams now alleged that Virginia violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a pretrial psychiatric examination of the same witness. Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 427. He also raised a juror-bias claim and a prosecutorial-misconduct claim. See id. One of Williams’s jurors was formerly married to a witness for Virginia, and one of the prosecutors had represented the juror in the divorce proceedings. See id. at 440–41. At voir dire, when the judge asked if any of the Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 11 prospective jurors were related to the witnesses, the juror said nothing. See id. And when the judge asked if any of the prospective jurors had been represented by the attorneys involved in the case, both the juror and the prosecutor remained silent. See id. at 441. The Michael Williams Court addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) barred a federal habeas court from holding an evidentiary hearing for these four claims. See id. at 432. Per that provision, “[i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the [federal habeas] court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that” they meet both exceptions listed in § 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The Court underscored that “failed to develop” turned on “diligence.” Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 432. Because Williams diligently explored the facts underlying his juror-bias and prosecutorial-bias claims, the Court concluded that the federal courts could hold a § 2254(e)(2) evidentiary hearing for those two claims. See id. at 440–44. But the Court determined that Williams had not diligently developed his Brady claim. See id. at 437–38. The Court also punted Williams’s failure-to-disclose claim. See id. at 444. Unlike the three new federal habeas claims, the Virginia Court of Appeals had rejected the failure-to-disclose claim on the merits, implicating 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)’s deferential standards of review of state courts’ merits decisions. The Michael Williams Court therefore found it “unnecessary to reach the question whether § 2254(e)(2) would permit a hearing on th[at] claim.” Id. The Court addressed the relationship between § 2254(d)(1) and (e)(2) more than a decade later in Pinholster. There, the Court concluded that federal courts must limit their review of a state court’s merits adjudication to the record before that state court. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. Thus, federal courts cannot consider evidence yielded at federal habeas evidentiary hearings when reviewing state courts’ merits decisions. See id. at 185–86.2 2The Pinholster Court reiterated Michael Williams’s analysis of § 2254(e)(2)’s application to claims that had not been adjudicated by state courts on the merits and reasoned further that Michael Williams’s leaving open the § 2254(d)(1) question “supported” the outcome in Pinholster. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 183–86. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 12 Faithfully applying Remmer, Michael Williams, and Pinholster, we conclude that Cunningham is entitled to an evidentiary hearing for both his juror-bias claims.
The Cunningham I court adjudicated Cunningham’s first juror-bias claim—that Mikesell’s social-worker colleagues fed her information about Cunningham—on the merits. Per 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and Pinholster, the appropriate inquiry is whether Cunningham I was contrary to or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent based on the record before it. See Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–11 (2000) (O’Connor, delivering majority opinion for standards governing § 2254(d)(1)’s contrary-to and unreasonable-application clauses); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (promulgating fairminded-jurists-could-disagree standard for § 2254(d)(1) unreasonable-application inquiry); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010) (explaining that decisions issued by courts of appeals do not constitute clearly established Supreme Court precedent for § 2254(d) purposes). So—as Ohio points out, Appellee’s Br. #2 at 55—we may consider the investigator’s affidavit and interview report that were presented to the state court, but we cannot include the affidavits and depositions generated during the federal habeas proceedings. We hold that Cunningham I unreasonably applied Remmer. Phillips retained Remmer’s core holding that a prima facie showing of juror bias entitles a defendant to an evidentiary hearing. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215 (“[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing . . . .” (emphasis added)). By attaching evidence to his state postconviction petition that raised the question whether Mikesell had spoken to her colleagues about him, Cunningham credibly alleged that a “private communication [occurred] . . . with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury . . . .” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. This colorable claim of extraneous influence entitled Cunningham to a Remmer hearing. See id.; see also Herndon, 156 F.3d at 635 (“Where a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised . . . a ‘Remmer hearing’ is necessary to provide the defendant with ‘the opportunity to prove actual bias.’” (quoting Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217)); Garcia v. Andrews, 488 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2007)) (“This court has defined ‘an extraneous influence on a juror [as] one derived from specific knowledge about or a relationship with either the parties or their witnesses.’” (alteration in Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 13 original) (quoting Herndon, 156 F.3d at 635)); Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1030 (6th Cir. 2019) (“When a trial court is presented with evidence that an extrinsic influence has reached the jury which has a reasonable potential for tainting that jury, due process requires that the trial court take steps to determine what the effect of such extraneous information actually was on that jury. In other words, where a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised, an evidentiary hearing must be held to afford the defendant an opportunity to establish actual bias.” (cleaned up)). The dissent notes that only our circuit precedent addressing juror bias on direct appeal uses the term “colorable claim,” and as such, per § 2254(d)(1), we may not rely on it in analyzing the state court’s interpretation of Remmer. Dissent Op. at 54. Requiring only a prima facie (i.e., colorable) claim of prejudice, however, is the only sensical interpretation of Remmer, which is Supreme Court precedent. Remmer instructed the trial court to “determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing” based on “information such as was received in this case,” but the point of that rule was to direct the district court to inquire further into the defendant’s credible allegations. 347 U.S. at 229–30. That language cannot be reduced to a mere “data point,” and cannot be reasonably interpreted, as the dissent suggests, to limit the future application of Remmer to its precise facts. Dissent Op. at 55. Nor does our requisite level of deference to Ohio courts require us to accept an unreasonable application of Remmer’s rule solely because Remmer involved different allegations of outside influence. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (“AEDPA does not ‘require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied.’” (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81 (2006))). Whether the defendant alleges that a third party offered a juror a bribe, as in Remmer, or that a third party provided a juror with outside information she otherwise would not have known, the principle is the same: a defendant must be afforded a chance to prove the juror’s bias in a Remmer hearing. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 216 (“Preservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury.” (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 167 (1950))). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 14 Ohio insists, and the dissent agrees, that Cunningham has not provided any evidence that Mikesell used extrajudicial information while a member of the jury. See Appellee’s Br. #2 at 21; Dissent Op. at 55–56. But Ohio has skipped a constitutional step. In Remmer, the Court did not require the defendant to prove “what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless” before receiving an evidentiary hearing. 347 U.S. at 229. Again, Phillips reiterated Remmer’s guarantee that a prima facie showing of juror bias entitles a defendant to an evidentiary hearing—“allegations of juror partiality” suffice. 455 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added). Per Remmer,—which, contrary to the dissent’s interpretation, also involved a “degree of speculation”—a hearing was the appropriate forum for a trial court to decide the nature, timing, and content of any communications about Cunningham between Mikesell and her colleagues. To receive a Remmer hearing, Cunningham had to colorably allege that the jury encountered extraneous influence—which he did in his state postconviction petition. The state appellate court thus unreasonably dismissed Cunningham’s first juror-bias claim based on the interview report. The Cunningham I court erroneously homed in on Mikesell’s statements during voir dire. Cf. Cunningham I, 2004 WL 2496525, at .3 Yes, Mikesell proclaimed that she could be fair and impartial notwithstanding that she had worked with members of the police department, the prosecution, and the defense. But Mikesell’s relationship with the Ohio justice system’s repeat players is immaterial to whether her colleagues may have provided her with external information during trial. Nothing otherwise stated in Mikesell’s jury questionnaire or during voir dire would have flagged to Cunningham’s trial counsel that Mikesell might have been discussing this case with her colleagues. Indeed, Mikesell confirmed that her employment at Allen County Children Services would not affect her partiality without saying more. Her statement weighs in favor— not against—finding that Cunningham’s lawyers had no notice that Mikesell or her colleagues possessed extrajudicial information about him. 3The district court similarly erred. See Cunningham, 2019 WL 6897003, at . Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 15 The Cunningham I court’s unsound reasoning that “the record [] does not provide when the investigator conducted these interviews with the jurors” puts us at sea. Cunningham I, 2004 WL 2496525, at . Neither Remmer nor Phillips states that the timing of a defendant’s allegation of an external contact erases their right to an evidentiary hearing. Indeed, the defendant in Remmer learned about an impermissible external contact between his jury foreperson and the FBI after his verdict came in—just like this case. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 228. Citing the timing of the juror interviews to deny Cunningham any investigation into juror bias involves an unreasonable application of Remmer. The interviewer’s affidavit, moreover, is dated July 16, 2003. R. 192-4 (Ericson Aff.) (Page ID #5121). Clearly, the investigator interviewed the jurors between Cunningham’s sentencing on June 23, 2002 and the affidavit’s signing on July 16, 2003. See R. 192-2 (Sentencing Order at 8) (Page ID #4326); R. 192-4 (2003 Postconviction Pet.) (Page ID #5047). Because the record indicates the period during which these interviews occurred, the Cunningham I court “unreasonabl[y] determine[ed] the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “This partial reliance on an erroneous factual finding further highlights the unreasonableness of the state court’s decision.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528 (2003). That Mikesell told Jackson’s investigator that she did not have “pertinent” or “direct” information about Cunningham’s “instant offense” is inapposite. R. 192-4 (Investigator Rep.) (Page ID #5132). Consider our recent decision in Ewing. In that habeas case, Ewing was convicted of a gang-related murder. One of Ewing’s jurors filed an affidavit postverdict. She swore that two other jurors mentioned during deliberations that they had looked up a picture of Ewing on Facebook; had read a eulogy online about the victim; and Googled information about gang codes, history, and hierarchy. Based on that affidavit alone, the State of Michigan conceded, and this court agreed, that Ewing deserved a Remmer hearing. Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1029–30. We emphasized that the external information “had a clear potential for tainting the jury.” Id. at 1030. We were unswayed by the Michigan Court of Appeals’s determination “that the extraneous information was duplicative of evidence produced at trial and thus harmless”; that the Facebook picture was “innocuous and similar to many photos that were shown at trial”; that “Watson’s eulogy contained no new, relevant information and presumably was discussed only in Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 16 passing”; and that “the information about gang activity and hierarchy was either patently obvious or easily inferred from witness testimony.” Id. at 1029–30. Likewise, any information that Mikesell’s social-worker colleagues may have told her about Cunningham or that she learned from reading his file poses a glaring risk of taint.4 Consider what Mikesell told Jackson’s investigator. Mikesell stated that “there was nothing in Jeronique’s life that could have possibly explained his participation in the instant offense” and that “Jeronique is an evil person.” R. 192-4 (Investigator Rep.) (Page ID #5132). She mentioned that “some social workers worked with Jeronique in the past and were afraid of him” before explaining “if you observe one of the veins starting to bulge in his head, watch out and stay away because he might try to kill you.” Id. She closed with: “Jeronique had no redeeming qualities.” Id. Of course, we cannot tell from the investigator’s report whether Mikesell developed these strong opinions because of information learned at trial or from her colleagues; a Remmer hearing is the appropriate forum to discern the answer. Just like the photo, eulogy, and gang information in Ewing, the information that might have been relayed to Mikesell is just as irrelevant to the crime but equally as charged with bias. Clearly, the prejudicial nature of the external information does not rise and fall on whether the information is “pertinent” or “direct[ly]” connected to a habeas petitioner’s “instant offense.” R. 192-4 (Investigator Rep.) (Page ID #5132). We are aware that the district court allowed Cunningham to conduct limited depositions of three of the jurors—Freeman, Wobler, and Mikesell. And during her deposition, Mikesell denied that she spoke to her colleagues about Cunningham or read from his file during the trial. Even if we could consider the affidavits and depositions—which, again, we cannot under 4The dissent portrays Cunningham’s claim of juror bias as “an allegation that, a year after trial Mikesell knew that some of her colleagues were afraid of Cunningham” and concludes that this “allegation, taken as true, is not nearly as prejudicial on its face as the bribery allegation in Remmer was.” Dissent Op. at 55. The dissent both mischaracterizes Cunningham’s allegations and conflates his allegations with one sentence in the investigative report read in isolation. Cunningham alleges that the information in the investigator’s report, read in context with Mikesell’s other statements and the timing of the investigation, plausibly give rise to an inference that Mikesell received during the trial information about Cunningham from social workers or Cunningham’s case file. That allegation—that Mikesell received during the trial outside information that social workers were afraid of Cunningham—taken as true, is even more prejudicial than an FBI agent’s inquiring about the juror’s own conduct in Remmer. 347 U.S. at 229. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 17 Pinholster—we would still grant Cunningham a Remmer hearing. Remmer was unambiguous: an allegation of extraneous influence entitles a defendant to a constitutionally meaningful investigation into juror bias at a hearing. Of course, we accord deference to state courts’ management of Remmer hearings in habeas cases per § 2254(d)(1). See Carroll v. Renico, 475 F.3d 708, 712 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007). But no Remmer hearing occurred on this juror-bias claim in the Ohio courts. And the depositions taken in the federal habeas proceeding did not comport with the constitutional contours of a Remmer hearing. See Lanier, 988 F.3d at 295. Because the jurors were deposed outside the presence of the district judge, no factfinder had the opportunity to assess Mikesell’s credibility as she testified that she did not talk to her coworkers about Cunningham and did not review his file until after the trial was over. The greater the probability of juror bias, moreover, the more searching the court’s investigation must be. See id. Mikesell’s statement to Jackson’s investigator indicated bias against Cunningham. Freeman and Wobler also supplied evidence that Mikesell knew the victims’ families (we explore this issue below). The discovery permitted in the habeas proceeding is not the constitutional equivalent of a Remmer hearing. The district court’s permitting defense counsel to question just three jurors and the magistrate judge’s limiting the scope of Mikesell’s deposition placed unconstitutional constraints on defense counsel. To that end, Mikesell’s denying during her deposition that she spoke to her colleagues does not eliminate Cunningham’s entitlement to a proper Remmer hearing, and we must remand because we cannot say on this record that the failure to provide a Remmer hearing was harmless. See Nian v. Warden, N. Cent. Corr. Inst., 994 F.3d 746, 756 (6th Cir. 2021).5 5We have treated a trial court’s failure to hold a Remmer hearing as a “trial error” subject to harmless-error review. See Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 370–73 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2000) (trial court’s failure to investigate extraneous influence on jury was trial error subject to harmless-error review); Nian, 994 F.3d at 756 (ordering Remmer hearing because state court’s failure to hold Remmer hearing for allegation of extraneous influence was not harmless). Here, Cunningham’s first juror-bias claim, which involves allegations of extraneous information learned from Mikesell’s coworkers and a casefile, fits into the framework we applied in other cases where there were allegations of extraneous influence during the trial. See, e.g., Nevers, 169 F.3d at 354; Nian, 994 F.3d at 753; Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1030. After a hearing, the trial court will be well equipped to make a finding whether the state court’s Remmer error in this case was harmless. See, e.g., Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 253 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding habeas petition to district court to hold Remmer hearing on claim of extraneous influence and to make harmless error determination). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 18 To sum up, Cunningham’s first state postconviction petition set forth a prima facie case of extraneous influence, i.e., that Mikesell’s colleagues at Allen County Children Services or Mikesell’s review of Cunningham’s file relayed to her external information about Cunningham. The Cunningham I court unreasonably applied Remmer by refusing to grant Cunningham an evidentiary hearing. Cunningham is thus entitled to an evidentiary hearing for his first juror-bias claim involving Mikesell’s obtaining prejudicial information about Cunningham from her colleagues or his file.
To refresh, the Cunningham III court decided that it could not entertain Cunningham’s second postconviction petition or motion for a new trial under Ohio law and refused to consider on the merits Cunningham’s second juror-bias claim involving Mikesell’s relationship with the victims’ family. Cunningham III, 65 N.E.3d at 315, 317.6 “It is axiomatic that state courts are the final authority on state law.” Hutchison v. Marshall, 744 F.2d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1984). And 6During oral argument, Ohio contradicted its brief’s position that Cunningham procedurally defaulted his second juror-bias claim by arguing for the first time that the Ohio Court of Appeals adjudicated this claim on the merits. Compare Appellee’s Br. #2 at 17–18, with Oral Arg. at 33:00–35:24. Ohio pointed to this sentence in Cunningham III: “Even were we to consider Cunningham’s arguments that he satisfied R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b), we would conclude that he has not shown that, but for any purported constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the offenses or found him eligible for a death sentence.” Cunningham III, 65 N.E.3d at 315; Oral Arg. at 34:41–35:17. After focusing on this sentence, we remain unswayed by Ohio’s belated argument. In the paragraph preceding this single sentence, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that Cunningham’s failure to satisfy Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.23(A)(1)(a) “alone” deprived the state courts of “jurisdiction” to review Cunningham’s second postconviction petition. Id. No doubt, the Ohio Court of Appeals clearly, expressly, and actually rested its judgment on a state procedural bar. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir. 2001). The in-the-alternative analysis following the words “even were we” is detached from the state appellate court’s conclusive procedural determination. No one, for that matter, can read Ohio’s selective slice of Cunningham III as a merits adjudication of anything. The Ohio Court of Appeals merely reasoned that Cunningham’s allegation of a structural error such as juror bias is insufficient to satisfy Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.23(A)(1)(b). See Cunningham III, 65 N.E.3d at 315–16. So the Ohio Court of Appeals issued yet another procedural determination—not a merits decision. To the extent that one could read Ohio’s chosen sentence as a merits adjudication of Cunningham’s innocence of the alleged crime or innocence of the death penalty (which would demand a dubious and implausible linguistic stretch), deciding Cunningham’s innocence is not pertinent to whether Mikesell was biased. Put simply: no merits determination of any juror-bias issue can be found anywhere in Cunningham III. Finally, if we did read this sentence, somehow, as a merits determination of the second juror-bias claim, Cunningham still prevails for the same reason that he succeeds for his first juror-bias claim. Per Remmer, there has been a credible allegation of juror bias via Mikesell’s relationship with the victims’ families. So if the Cunningham III court had denied Cunningham an evidentiary hearing on the merits, it unreasonably applied Remmer. But because no merits adjudication occurred in Cunningham III—which Ohio maintained all the way until our oral argument—we invoke § 2254(e)(2) instead of § 2254(d)(1). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 19 we must presume that the Cunningham III court’s factual findings are correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). But a faithful application of Michael Williams reveals that we may order an evidentiary hearing for this juror-bias claim under § 2254(e)(2). First, Cunningham was at least as diligent as Williams had been about pursuing a remedy in state court. In Michael Williams, state postconviction counsel “did attempt to investigate [Williams’s] jury” by petitioning for funding for an investigator “to examine all circumstances relating to the empanelment of the jury and the jury’s consideration of the case.” Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 442 (citations omitted). By denying this request, Virginia “depriv[ed] [Williams] of a further opportunity to investigate.” Id. The Court did not care that Williams’s state postconviction petition was “prompted by concerns about a different juror” from the juror underlying his federal habeas juror-bias claim. Id. Nor did the Court alter its conclusion because the state postconviction petition contained mere “vague allegations” that “irregularities, improprieties and omissions exist[ed] with respect to the empaneling [sic] of the jury.” Id. (alterations and emphasis in original, citation omitted). Here, Cunningham sought an evidentiary hearing and discovery from the Ohio courts for his initial juror-bias claim; his claim was more concrete and substantiated than Williams’s obscure juror-bias allegation had been. Compare R. 192-4 (2003 Postconviction Pet.) (Page ID #5085–91), with Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 442. Because “[d]iligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law,” Cunningham crossed the Court’s diligence threshold. See Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 437; see also Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 511–12 (6th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Howes, 663 F.3d 819, 824 (6th Cir. 2011); cf. Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d 452, 465 (6th Cir. 2012). Second, Cunningham had as little notice as Williams had about the facts underlying their respective juror-bias claims. In Michael Williams, the Court explained that nothing in the record would have notified a reasonable attorney that the juror deliberately omitted material information by remaining silent in voir dire. See Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 442. So too here. The jury questionnaire and the voir dire transcript do not indicate that Mikesell was connected to the Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 20 victims’ families. As in Michael Williams, Mikesell said nothing when the trial court asked if any prospective jurors had personal knowledge of the case. The investigator’s comprehensive interview report also never mentions Mikesell’s relationship with the victims’ families. Put simply, nothing Mikesell wrote in her questionnaire, nothing Mikesell said at voir dire, and nothing in the interview report would have alerted a reasonable attorney about Mikesell’s connection to the victims. Cf. Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 747–48 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that petitioner failed diligently to develop facts underlying Brady claim when prosecution referred to undisclosed report at closing arguments, petitioner personally spoke to report’s author, and subject of report came up in cross-examination). We accept that Freeman may have told Jackson’s investigator that Mikesell had brought up the victims’ families at deliberations, but we deem this fact inapposite. In Michael Williams, the Court rejected the argument that Williams was not diligent because his state postconviction investigator would have discovered the juror’s earlier marriage in the county’s public records— We should be surprised, to say the least, if a district court familiar with the standards of trial practice were to hold that in all cases diligent counsel must check public records containing personal information pertaining to each and every juror. Because of [the juror’s] and [the prosecutor’s] silence, there was no basis for an investigation into [the juror’s] marriage history. Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 443. That “[t]he investigator later confirmed [the juror’s] prior marriage to [the witness] by checking Cumberland County’s public records” did not sway the Court. Id. In short, the Court refused to draw the diligence bright line at what Williams could have discovered and underscored that diligence turned on notice. Turning back to the present case, we note that Freeman insisted that she had told the investigator about Mikesell’s remarks about the victims’ families during deliberations. R. 137-1 (Freeman Dep. at 15, 18, 19, 20) (Page ID #2464, 2467, 2468, 2469). But Freeman herself read the interview report, and she confirmed that the report contained no mention of her comments to the investigator about Mikesell. Id. at 18 (Page ID #2467). Ohio conceded at oral argument that Freeman’s comments are not in the report. See Oral Arg. at 45:58–47:57. We cannot expect Cunningham’s state postconviction counsel to read tea leaves in an empty cup. Because the report could not have Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 21 notified Cunningham’s state postconviction counsel about Mikesell’s relationship with the victims’ families, what Freeman may have said to the investigator does not alter our outcome. Third, Cunningham III sealed the diligence deal. In Michael Williams, the Court noted that state postconviction relief was unavailable to Williams when he had discovered the factual bases of his juror-bias and prosecutorial-misconduct claims. See Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 443. At the time, Virginia law required indigent petitioners to file a state postconviction petition within 120 days of appointment of state postconviction counsel. See id. at 443–44 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–654.1 (1999)). But Williams’s federal habeas investigator discovered the juror’s connections to the witness and the prosecutor long after that deadline. See id. at 444. So it was futile for Williams to return to the Virginia courts. See id. Here, Cunningham discovered the facts underlying his second juror-bias claim after the Cunningham I court rejected his first postconviction petition. When this case initially arrived at our doorstep, Cunningham urged us that “[u]nder Ohio law, . . . there is simply no avenue for postconviction petitioners to obtain discovery.” Appellant’s Br. #1 at 23. Ohio countered that Cunningham “could and should have” presented this claim in the state courts because AEDPA guarantees habeas petitioners a “fair opportunity” in state courts to raise a constitutional claim. See Appellee’s Br. #1 at 46. Because murky Ohio precedent did not clearly explain whether the state courts could hear this claim, we ordered Cunningham to attempt to seek relief in the Ohio courts. See Cunningham, 756 F.3d at 485. By refusing to consider the merits of the claim, the Cunningham III court vindicated Cunningham’s interpretation of Ohio law. Clearly, it was always “futile” for Cunningham to return to the Ohio courts. Like Williams, Cunningham “cannot be said to have failed to develop [his claims] in state court by reason of having neglected to pursue remedies available under [Ohio] law.” Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 444. Indeed, futility is clearer here than it was in Michael Williams. Conceivably, the Virginia courts could have interpreted state postconviction or equitable law to allow the commonwealth’s courts to hear Williams’s claim notwithstanding the state’s filing deadline. Yet Williams never tried to file his three new habeas claims with the Virginia courts. See Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 444. Compare Williams to Cunningham, Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 22 who sought and failed to obtain relief from the state courts. In this way, Cunningham acted more diligently than Williams had. We address one crinkle in this case. As we mentioned, Virginia’s postconviction-petition procedures had a hard filing deadline for indigent petitioners when Michael Williams was decided. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–654.1 (1999)). Ohio’s rules governing second or successive habeas petitions and motions for a new trial also have filing deadlines. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2953.21(A)(2) (2014); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(B) (2014). But Ohio excepts from the filing deadlines incarcerated persons who were “unavoidably prevented” from developing the facts underlying their claim. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) (2014); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 33(B) (2014). Virginia’s statute contained no such exception; so the face of Virginia’s statute made it “futile” for Williams to return to state court. Cunningham, by contrast, is not barred from pursuing state remedies by the black letter of Ohio’s statutes and rules. Rather, the Ohio Court of Appeals’s conclusion that Cunningham was not “unavoidably prevented” from developing the facts has rendered futile his return to state court. This interstice between Ohio law in 2014 and Virginia law in 1999 does not rupture Cunningham’s case. For one, Michael Williams’s futility analysis did not rise and fall on the reason why Williams could not return to the state courts. The Court merely determined that because “state postconviction relief was no longer available at the time the facts came to light, it would have been futile for petitioner to return to the Virginia courts.” Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 444. So too for Cunningham. After all, Cunningham III erased any doubt— Cunningham was never able to seek relief for his second juror-bias claim in the state courts. Nor is the Ohio Court of Appeals’s “unavoidably prevented” determination relevant to our § 2254(e)(2) diligence analysis. For one, diligence “is a question of federal law decided by federal habeas courts.” Boyle v. McKune, 544 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 429–38 (referring to no state-court findings and zero state law in promulgating and applying its diligence standards). “Unavoidably prevented,” on the other hand, is a question of Ohio law. See Cunningham III, 65 N.E.3d at 314–15 (citing State v. Creech, 2013 WL 4735469, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2013)). Therefore, even after taking the Cunningham III court’s findings of fact as true, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and deferring Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 23 wholly to Cunningham III’s interpretation of state law that controlled when Cunningham sought an evidentiary hearing, Boyle, 544 F.3d at 1136, nothing in Cunningham III alters our diligence analysis. To illustrate how the “unavoidably prevented” and diligence analyses are distinct, contrast Cunningham III with Michael Williams. The state appellate court, for example, cited state common law in reasoning that Cunningham’s claim of ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel suggests that his juror-bias claim could have been uncovered if he had been reasonably diligent. Cunningham III, 65 N.E.3d at 314. But the Supreme Court reasoned to the contrary—Williams’s state postconviction counsel’s half-baked attempt to investigate the whole jury based on a different juror’s apparently biased conduct favored determining that Williams had been diligent. See Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 442. The Cunningham III court also reasoned that Cunningham’s raising his first juror-bias claim shows that he was not unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts of his second juror-bias claim. Cunningham III, 65 N.E.3d at 314. On the contrary, the Michael Williams Court concluded that “[d]iligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” 529 U.S. at 437. The Cunningham III court, moreover, reasoned that Cunningham should have discovered the connection between Mikesell and the victims’ families because the investigator could have and did interview Mikesell, Freeman, and Wobler. Cunningham III, 65 N.E.3d at 314. For a § 2254(e)(2) analysis, however, “[t]he question is not whether the facts could have been discovered but instead whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts.” Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. Here, the investigator tried to interview every juror and thoroughly grilled seven of them, including Mikesell, Freeman, and Wobler. Clearly, the state-law “unavoidably prevented” inquiry is wholly distinct from the federal-law diligence assessment. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 24 Finally, Cunningham’s diligence excuses any procedural default. The Michael Williams Court explained that its analysis of Williams’s diligence “should suffice to establish cause for any procedural default petitioner may have committed in not presenting these claims to the Virginia courts in the first instance.” Id. at 444. Because, as we have explained, the facts of this case are on all fours with Michael Williams, Cunningham’s diligence likewise demonstrated cause. And Cunningham has made a colorable claim that Mikesell was biased by a pre-existing relationship with the victims’ families, and that her bias prejudiced him, requiring a § 2254(e)(2) hearing. Because cause and prejudice excuses any default, and we again cannot say at this point whether Mikesell was actually biased and Cunningham’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated, the federal courts may hold an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2).7 The dissent argues that Cunningham relies improperly on evidence—Freeman’s and Wobler’s testimony about Mikesell’s statements during deliberations—that would be 7The district court’s error arose from a misunderstanding of the relationship between diligence and procedural default. The district court reasoned that a diligence analysis under § 2254(e)(2) is “not relevant” to a procedural-default analysis and that the state courts are the final arbiters of when an imprisoned person can obtain an evidentiary hearing in the state courts. Cunningham, 2019 WL 6897003, at . Because Cunningham had procedurally defaulted his second juror-bias claim, the district court deemed Cunningham’s diligence to be irrelevant. See id. The district court further found that any diligence on Cunningham’s part could not constitute cause to excuse his procedural default, reasoning that the Michael Williams Court’s “discussion of the procedural default of the petitioner’s juror-bias claims is dicta, and the circumstances under which the court found cause for the default are easily distinguished.” Id. at . “Here, unlike in Williams, Cunningham was able to return to state court with his newly developed claim, and the state courts found that under Ohio law and court rules, he was not unavoidably prevented from discovering, or reasonably diligent in attempting to discover, the factual basis of his claim sooner.” Id. We conclude that the district court was wrong. True, we usually cannot upset Ohio courts’ procedural determinations, nor can we dictate Ohio’s rules for conducting evidentiary hearings. See Hutchison, 744 F.2d at 46. But § 2254(e)(2) governs the ability of the federal courts—not the state courts—to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 437. As Michael Williams makes clear, diligence can excuse a procedural default. The district court’s interpretation of the interplay between procedural default and diligence erases the plain text of § 2254(e)(2) and ignores Michael Williams and Pinholster. And Michael Williams’s discussion of procedural default was not dicta by any measure of what dicta means. If Williams’s diligence failed to excuse his procedural default, Williams could not have received an evidentiary hearing in any court. Put another way, whether diligence can excuse a procedural default was necessary to the outcome of Williams’s case. See Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Even if this were dicta, Supreme Court dicta is persuasive and cannot be ignored by lower courts for no good reason. See ACLU of Kentucky v. McCreary County, 607 F.3d 439, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the district court erroneously found that no cause exists in Cunningham’s case. The issue is not whether Cunningham could have returned to the state courts but whether it was futile for Cunningham to have returned. Again, Cunningham III eradicated any ambiguity: Ohio law does not allow Cunningham to litigate his unadjudicated juror-bias claim in the state courts. And, as we have already explained, the Ohio court’s state-law “unavoidably prevented” analysis is distinct from our federal-law diligence determination. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 25 inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) as “an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment.”8 Dissent Op. at 57–62. It is unclear whether the dissent faults Cunningham for relying on juror testimony to establish prejudice sufficient to excuse his procedural default or to meet the requisite showing to obtain a § 2254(e)(2) hearing. In either case, Cunningham does not, and need not, rely on juror testimony. First, Cunningham does not need to rely on juror testimony at this stage because a § 2254(e)(2) hearing will afford him an opportunity to show prejudice. In Michael Williams, the Supreme Court decided that lower courts on remand would be best positioned to decide the prejudice issue even though Williams offered only “suspicions” and “vague allegations” of juror bias. 529 U.S. at 442, 444. The Court’s reasoning for deferring to lower courts follows logically from the inextricable nature of the actual bias and prejudice inquiries. Whether a juror was actually biased sufficient to “taint the jury to [the defendant’s] detriment,” see Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1031, and whether that bias would have so prejudiced the defendant to change the outcome of the trial, see Jones v. Bell, 801 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2015), are closely related. 9 Thus, even if a defendant’s allegations are “vague” or not supported by any testimony, a defendant’s “reasonable efforts” in uncovering evidence of actual bias give him an opportunity to explore both actual bias and prejudice at an evidentiary hearing. Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 442, 444. A § 2254(e)(2) hearing will resolve whether Mikesell was actually biased (and for the reasons described below, Cunningham need not rely on juror testimony about trial deliberations to do 8Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides: (b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. (1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. 9Also closely related is the doctrine of harmless error. We have long established that the presence of a biased juror is a structural error not subject to harmless-error analysis. See Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 26 so). If Mikesell was actually biased, then Cunningham will likewise establish prejudice to excuse his default. As for the threshold evidentiary showing needed to obtain a hearing under § 2254(e)(2), the dissent misunderstands the nature of Cunningham’s second juror-bias claim. Although we have held that a habeas petitioner must conform to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) when seeking a Remmer hearing based on extraneous influence, see Smith v. Nagy, 962 F.3d 192, 200 (6th Cir. 2020), Cunningham’s second juror-bias claim, which involves an alleged undisclosed pre-existing relationship with the victims’ families, does not involve allegations of extraneous influences.10 We have treated a trial court’s failure to hold a Remmer hearing as a due process violation closely related to, but distinct from the underlying question of juror bias in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. See Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1030. Cunningham’s second juror-bias claim is thus more akin to Michael Williams and the line of cases addressing juror omissions during voir dire. See, e.g., English v. Berghuis, 900 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 2018) (applying framework under McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984), to determine whether juror bias warrants new trial). But even if Cunningham is not able to show that Mikesell was untruthful during voir dire, he is still entitled to relief if he is able to show at the § 2254(e)(2) hearing that Mikesell was actually or impliedly biased. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556–57 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that advent of McDonough test did not foreclose defendant from proving juror bias via a showing of actual or implied bias, regardless of truthfulness of juror’s voir dire answers); Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d 1181, 1186 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1995); Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 985–86 (10th Cir. 1996). It would therefore be possible for Cunningham to prove that Mikesell was actually biased without relying on juror testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). For 10Evidence supporting Cunningham’s first juror-bias claim—that Mikesell received information about Cunningham from her coworkers and from reading his casefile—would clearly constitute “extraneous prejudicial information” as defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)(2)(A) even if it did come in the form of juror testimony and would thus be admissible under that rule. See United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding extraneous influence where juror’s employee provided juror with information that members of the community were discussing juror’s role in the proceedings). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 27 example, Cunningham could rely on Mikesell’s testimony or the testimony of a victim’s family member to show that Mikesell answered untruthfully “a material question on voir dire” that “would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” English, 900 F.3d at 813 (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556). Cunningham could offer evidence to prove, for example, that Mikesell’s relationship with the victims’ families caused her to answer dishonestly that she did not have any personal knowledge of the facts of the case, R. 194-1 (Trial Tr. at 13–14) (Page ID #9181–82), or that working for family services would prevent her from being fair and impartial towards Cunningham, R. 194-1 (Trial Tr. at 208–09) (Page ID #9376–77). Or Cunningham could elicit testimony to show that the nature of Mikesell’s relationship with the victim constituted an “extreme situation[] that would justify a finding of implied bias,” sufficient to overturn a verdict. English, 900 F.3d at 816 (quoting Phillips, 455 U.S. at 222 (O’ Connor, J., concurring)). Allowing such an evidentiary proceeding would therefore not be fruitless even if Rule 606(b) were faithfully applied during the hearing. Whether or not Rule 606(b) bars the testimony of jurors Freeman and Wobler, Cunningham does not need to rely on that testimony to be granted an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2). Again, in Michael Williams, the court allowed Williams an evidentiary hearing to prove actual bias even though his allegations were “vague,” reasoning that “the vagueness was not [Williams’s] fault.” 529 U.S. at 442–43. Cunningham alleged in his 2018 post-conviction petition that Mikesell “did not reveal her connection to Cunningham or the victims” and that “Mikesell was biased against Cunningham because of a current or future relationship with the victims’ families.” R. 188-1 (2018 Postconviction Pet. at 8–9) (Page ID #2835–36). Such allegations were even more specific than the “vague allegations” of “irregularities, improprieties and omissions . . . with respect to the empaneling [sic] of the jury” Williams alleged. Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 442. Just like Williams, Cunningham attempted to offer more evidence in support of his allegations, but his failure to do so was not his fault. As Cunningham noted in his 2018 post-conviction petition, Cunningham asked Mikesell about her relationship with the victims during her deposition, but the district court did not allow Mikesell to answer. R. 188-1 (2018 Postconviction Pet. at 9) (Page ID #2836); R. 188-1 (Mikesell Dep. at 19–20) (Page ID #2917). Cunningham may not be able to rely on juror testimony at the evidentiary hearing, but he does not need to do so to be offered an opportunity to prove actual bias. The dissent makes Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 28 some valid points, which will no doubt constrain the parameters of the evidentiary hearing, but they have no bearing on Cunnningham’s right to such a hearing.