Opinion ID: 481419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of parratt v. taylor

Text: 9 In awarding summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the district court found that Section 1983 relief was unavailable under the rule of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). In Parratt, the Supreme Court held that a negligent deprivation of property that did not occur pursuant to an established state procedure does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Ever since Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202-05, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), this rule applies to intentional deprivations of property as well. However, Hudson did not eliminate the requirement that the deprivation not occur pursuant to an established state procedure. Therefore, if an intentional deprivation of property occurs pursuant to an established state policy, Parratt does not apply. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1157-58, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). 10 In seizing the cotton pickers without a hearing, P & M did act pursuant to an established state procedure. Ala.R.Civ.P. 64(a) provides for pre-judgment seizures in actions for money damages for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action.... Rule 64(a) does not specify any procedures but states merely that such seizures shall occur under the circumstances and in the manner provided by law.... Thus, whether P & M effected the seizures pursuant to an established state procedure depends upon the requirements of the particular attachment provisions on which P & M relied. 11 As previously indicated, P & M relied upon Alabama's mechanic's lien provisions. Ala.Code Sec. 35-11-110 (1975) creates a lien in favor of a repairman against any vehicle he repaired. Ala.Code Sec. 35-11-111 (1975) provides for the enforcement of such a lien by attachment upon the execution of a bond as in other cases of attachment and the making of an affidavit stating only that a mechanic's lien exists, that the amount owed for the repairs is due and unpaid, and that the attachment is not sued out for purposes of harassment. No pre-taking notice is required, and the affidavit need not state that a risk of destruction or concealment of the vehicle exists. Nor do the provisions of the general attachment statute incorporated by reference into Section 35-11-111 make any mention of a pre-taking hearing. Ala.Code Secs. 6-6-43 and -45 (1975). 12 The defendants point to Ala.R.Civ.P. 64(b) which requires a hearing before the issuance of a writ of attachment unless the court determines that there exists a risk of concealment, transfer or harm to the property. Because P & M's affidavit did not aver such a risk, they argue that the seizure of the cotton pickers without any pre-taking hearing contravened Rule 64(b) and therefore did not occur pursuant to an established state policy. 13 However, Rule 64(b) applies only to actions in detinue and to actions whereby the owner of a security interest in personal property seeks to recover possession of said personal property prior to judgment.... P & M's actions did not fall into either category. Detinue is an action for the recovery of personal property wrongfully detained. Ivey v. Verbeck, 461 So.2d 813, 815-16 (Ala.Civ.App.1984); Ala.Code Sec. 6-6-256 (1975). P & M sought payment on repair bills; therefore, its actions were in debt, not detinue. Foshee v. General Telephone Company of the Southeast, 295 Ala. 70, 322 So.2d 715, 717 (1975). Nor did P & M's actions satisfy the second category, for P & M lacked an enforceable security interest in the cotton pickers. A security interest is not enforceable and does not attach unless either the secured party is in possession of the collateral or the debtor has signed a security agreement that contains a description of the collateral. Ala.Code Sec. 7-9-203 (1975). P & M had neither possession of the cotton pickers nor a security agreement signed by Jones. Therefore, P & M could not have proceeded under Rule 64(b). Furthermore, P & M's affidavits and the state court's findings recite the language required by Sections 35-11-110 and 6-6-43 and not that required by Rule 64(b), confirming that P & M was acting pursuant to Rule 64(a). Cf. Ex parte Martin, 412 So.2d 815, 817 (Ala.Civ.App.1982) (enforcement of statutory landlord's lien falls within Rule 64(a) and not (b)). Therefore, the seizure of the cotton pickers without notice occurred pursuant to an established state policy, and Parratt does not apply.