Opinion ID: 2053901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Counsel's Defense Strategy

Text: Defendant first argues that his trial counsel based the entire theory of defense on a misunderstanding of the felony murder rule. According to defendant, counsel believed defendant could be found guilty of felony murder only if defendant fired the shot that killed the victim. Defendant argues that counsel's strategy had no chance of success because defendant could also be found guilty of felony murder if the security guard, and no defendant, fired the shot that killed the victim. See People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill.2d 233, 135 Ill.Dec. 543, 543 N.E.2d 1290 (counsel was ineffective because counsel's theory of defense was based on a misunderstanding of the law of accountability and felony murder). Defendant's allegation that his trial counsel misunderstood the felony murder rule is simply not supported by the record. At trial, counsel argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proving defendant guilty of murder or felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. This strategy was based on the security guard's testimony that he heard defendant fire three shots. One of these shots hit a garbage can in the cafeteria, another shot hit the security guard in the shoulder, and the final shot was fired at the security guard and in a direction opposite from where the victim was found. The security guard heard no further shooting as defendant was escaping. In closing argument, the State argued that defendant shot the victim while escaping, even though this was contrary to the security guard's testimony. At trial, the security guard's testimony was the only evidence of the number of shots fired by defendant and accounted for all the bullets fired by defendant. In addition, the State introduced a ballistics test showing that the bullet that killed the victim did not come from the security guard's gun. Counsel used this ballistics test to account for all of the bullets fired by the security guard. Thus, counsel argued that the State itself had accounted for all of the bullets fired during the confrontation, and none of these bullets could have killed the victim. Counsel argued that the State had failed to prove the causal connection between the shooting confrontation and the victim's death. (See People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 243-45, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146; People v. Brackett (1987), 117 Ill.2d 170, 176, 109 Ill.Dec. 809, 510 N.E.2d 877.) Accordingly, counsel argued, the State had failed to meet its burden of proof. At no time did counsel argue that defendant could be convicted of felony murder only if defendant himself fired the fatal gunshot. Defendant's argument that counsel misunderstood the felony murder rule is based on passages from the record that are taken out of context. In a related argument, defendant contends that, even if trial counsel properly understood the felony murder rule, counsel's strategy was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea to murder and felony murder. (See People v. Hattery (1985), 109 Ill.2d 449, 458, 94 Ill.Dec. 514, 488 N.E.2d 513.) Defendant argues that counsel should have challenged the State's evidence, which showed defendant's presence at the grocery store and defendant's armed confrontation with the security guard. According to defendant, once counsel pursued his defense theory, the trial judge had no alternative but to conclude that defendant was guilty of murder and felony murder. Essentially, defendant argues, counsel should have adopted a better theory of defense. Defendant cites certain parts of the record in support of his argument that trial counsel's theory of defense was inadequate. In the opening statement, counsel conceded that defendant was present at the Jewel store and fired his gun at the security guard. Counsel acknowledged that defendant committed aggravated battery based on the shooting of the security guard. During trial, counsel entered into a number of stipulations with the State. Some of these stipulations included identification by the eyewitnesses at the Jewel store who, according to the police reports, had seen defendant. Counsel also stipulated to a firearms examiner's opinion that the bullet that killed the victim did not come from the security guard's gun. Initially, we note that review of counsel's performance is deferential. As the Supreme Court stated: Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. [Citation.] A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' [Citation.] ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95.) We also note that the choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy, and counsel has the ultimate authority to decide this trial strategy. (See People v. Ramey (1992), 152 Ill.2d 41, 53-55, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275.) This court will generally not review a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel based on inadequate trial strategy. People v. Palmer (1994), 162 Ill.2d 465, 479-80, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797. This court, however, has recognized an exception where counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. ( Hattery, 109 Ill.2d at 464, 94 Ill.Dec. 514, 488 N.E.2d 513, citing United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 666.) In Hattery, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the murders of a mother and her two children. In spite of these not-guilty pleas, counsel conceded that defendant committed the murders during opening argument and was eligible for the death penalty. Counsel stated that the only issue in the case was whether the defendant should receive the death penalty. In Hattery, counsel failed to present a theory of defense, failed to present evidence, failed to make closing argument, and did not hold the State to its burden of proof. Instead, counsel argued that the defendant's conduct in committing the crimes was the result of compulsion. Compulsion may be a mitigating circumstance when a defendant is eligible for the death penalty, but it is not a defense to murder. This court held that counsel's conduct was per se ineffective because counsel unequivocally conceded the defendant's guilt to the murder charges and eligibility for the death penalty. In People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill.2d 253, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118, this court stated that the holding of Hattery must be construed narrowly. In Johnson, counsel conceded the defendant's guilt for murder but contested the charge of felony murder which would make the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Counsel was not ineffective because counsel asserted a theory of defense to a number of charges, not just a theory of mitigation, and this theory was pursued during opening and closing arguments and during cross-examination. ( Johnson, 128 Ill.2d at 270, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118.) Counsel did not abandon the defense of the defendant. The court also stated that counsel's concession of guilt does not constitute  per se ineffectiveness whenever the defense attorney concedes his client's guilt to offenses in which there is overwhelming evidence of that guilt. ( Johnson, 128 Ill.2d at 269, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118.) Counsel would lose credibility by contesting all the charges. See also People v. Fair (1994), 159 Ill.2d 51, 201 Ill. Dec. 23, 636 N.E.2d 455 (counsel argued that, although the defendant may be guilty of murder, the defendant did not have the intent required to support conviction for first degree murder); People v. Horton (1991), 143 Ill.2d 11, 155 Ill.Dec. 807, 570 N.E.2d 320 (counsel's trial strategy was not ineffective in stipulated bench trial where counsel only contested those charges that were not supported by overwhelming evidence); Caballero, 126 Ill.2d 248, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 533 N.E.2d 1089; United States v. Simone (7th Cir. 1991), 931 F.2d 1186 (counsel conceded the defendant's guilt to lesser drug charges but contested charges which carried greater punishment). In this case, counsel did conduct meaningful adversarial testing of the State's case. As noted, counsel presented a theory of defense that required the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel used the security guard's testimony and the ballistics test to argue that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof. Counsel pursued this theory during trial and during opening and closing arguments. Counsel also cross-examined the State's witnesses in a manner consistent with this theory. At no time did counsel concede that defendant was guilty of murder or felony murder or abandon defendant's defense. Contrary to the facts in Hattery, counsel pursued a theory of innocence. In addition, before trial and during trial counsel repeatedly challenged the State's failure to produce the bullet that injured the security guard. At trial, the security guard testified that he was shot in the shoulder by defendant. While he was being treated at a hospital, the security guard saw a uniformed police officer take possession of the bullet. The State, however, was unable to produce this bullet at trial. Counsel made a motion to dismiss the murder counts, a motion for mistrial, and a motion for a new trial based on the State's failure to produce the bullet. Counsel argued that a ballistics test could be performed to see if the bullet that killed the victim matched the bullet that injured the security guard. The trial judge ultimately denied the motions after several police officers testified that they had never seen any such bullet. When faced with overwhelming evidence, counsel faces a difficult task. Here, counsel pursued a strategy consistent with defendant's pleas of not guilty to murder and felony murder. Counsel challenged the State's case based on the State's alleged loss of physical evidence and failure to meet the burden of proof. Although counsel's motions and defense theory were unsuccessful, counsel subjected the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing.