Opinion ID: 362303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bethel's Complaint

Text: 32 Applying this standard, we find Bethel's case relatively easy. Within 30 days of receipt of the Mayor's decision, Bethel complained to both the Civil Service Commission and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights. As we pointed out earlier, the Mayor's decision was the final step in what for Title VII purposes allegedly was a single, continuous course of discrimination that began with an incident transpiring in July, 1971. 88 Bethel sought relief from the Office of Human Rights within 15 days of receipt of the Mayor's decision, but that agency rejected his complaint because he had not first sought its aid in 1971. 33 That, we say, was not a reasonably imposed restriction on access to agency redress of discrimination. No published regulation of the Office of Human Rights 89 or of the Metropolitan Police Department 90 defined discriminatory acts in such fashion as to put Bethel on notice that he had to complain in 1971 instead of waiting to see whether and to what extent his employment status would be adversely affected. 91 Indeed, instead of removing Bethel from the force as the trial board had recommended in 1971, the Mayor in 1974 ordered a period of suspension without pay. It is quite understandable that a governmental employee would deem it wiser to refrain from rocking the boat with a complaint of racial discrimination unless and until he is confronted with a final personnel action unfavorable to him. 34 Until September, 1974, Bethel did not know whether he would suffer removal or some lesser penalty or, on the other hand, receive reinstatement and backpay. 92 Since, until then, the allegedly discriminatory conduct was inchoate for suit purposes, only by circumventing the statute could the employing agency require an earlier complaint. 93 Moreover, and all else aside, the Office of Human Rights violated its own regulation requiring it to notify Bethel of his right to appeal the decision on timeliness. 94 35 Appellee further argues that Bethel also violated a regulation requiring that an informal complaint be made to an equal employment counselor within the Metropolitan Police Department before a formal complaint is submitted to the Office of Human Rights. 95 Since the point was not adverted to in the decision of the Office of Human Rights, it cannot avail anyone here, 96 and in any event we could not accept it. Even if the Office had expressly relied upon this violation of the rule, judicial review still would not be foreclosed, 97 for we perceive no palatable excuse for not referring Bethel's complaint to such a counselor. 98 It is the duty of the Office of Human Rights and as well of the Metropolitan Police Department to root out discrimination, and that responsibility is hardly discharged by reliance on technical miscues that could easily have been rectified without harm to anyone. The legislative purpose served by administrative recourse was fulfilled when the Office of Human Rights received prompt notice of Bethel's charge, 99 and was thus accorded sufficient opportunity to resolve his employment status administratively. 100 36 In sum, Bethel reasonably attempted to bring his complaint before the administrative tribunal and it unreasonably refused to consider his claims. He could have done little more, and the agency could hardly have done less.