Opinion ID: 2599498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether probable cause existed in the present case

Text: ¶ 14 Penalty clauses work a forfeiture, which is disfavored in the law. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Chapman, 176 Ariz. 326, 329, 861 P.2d 611, 614 (1993) (forfeiture clause in a contract); RESTATEMENT § 9.1 Reporter's Note 7; Annotation, What Constitutes Contest or Attempt to Defeat Will Within Provision Thereof Forfeiting Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 3 A.L.R.5th 590, 611 (1992). Because of this, the statute should be liberally construed, especially when the grounds include such matters as undue influence. The court of appeals presumed the judge knew and applied the appropriate law when making her decision. Shumway, 197 Ariz. at 64-65 ¶ 24 n. 6, 3 P.3d at 984-85 ¶ 24 n. 6. We might indulge the same presumption, but the absence of findings and lack of any comment or explanation in the trial judge's orders leaves us not only to speculate as to the standard she applied in a case of first impression, but also to our own devices in attempting to find support for her unexpressed but implicit conclusion that there was no probable cause. ¶ 15 Prior to filing the present action, Gavette obtained a written opinion by Decedent's doctor that he was borderline competent during the last week of his life, that he showed marked deterioration, was waxing and waning, and that by June 30 (four days after the will was signed), he clearly was incompetent. See Letter by Dr. Michael S. Roberts, dated July 3, 1997, Exhibit No. 10 to Statement of Facts in Support of Virginia Gavette's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed February 17, 1998). One important factor used to determine whether the will contest was filed with probable cause is that the beneficiaries relied on the advice of disinterested counsel, sought in good faith after a full disclosure of the facts. See Peppler, 971 P.2d at 697 (citing RESTATEMENT § 9.1 cmt. j). The attorney advised Gavette of the legal presumption of undue influence when one who occupies a confidential relationship to a decedent is active in procuring the execution of the will and is one of the principal beneficiaries. See In re Estate of Harber, 102 Ariz. 285, 289, 428 P.2d 662, 666 (1967). ¶ 16 The facts also showed that Rodriguez, as she concedes, had a confidential relationship with Decedent. See Shumway, 197 Ariz. at 62 ¶ 14, 3 P.3d at 982 ¶ 14. [W]here a confidential relationship is shown the presumption of invalidity can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair and voluntary. Stewart v. Woodruff, 19 Ariz.App. 190, 194, 505 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1973). This is a difficult standard of proof. Though Rodriguez met it to the trial judge's satisfaction after presentation of all evidence, when Gavette filed the contest she could reasonably have questioned Rodriguez' ability to do so, given the other circumstances surrounding execution of the will. ¶ 17 These circumstances include the following: Rodriguez helped Decedent prepare his will with computer software she had previously purchased; she was named the personal representative; and she arranged for Decedent to sign the will in the hospital six days before his death, with two of her relatives as the only witnesses. Rodriguez was not a beneficiary under Decedent's prior will and was not related to him, but she would inherit twenty-five percent of his estate under the will she prepared. After Decedent's death, Rodriguez transferred to her account $13,000 from Decedent's bank account and a $5,000 certificate of deposit. She had access as a beneficiary of these joint accounts. [4] ¶ 18 Decedent was legally blind, and Gavette may reasonably have believed that he did not truly know what the will said. A previous draft had been prepared and read in her presence on June 25, the day before the contested will was executed. Decedent seemed to be asleep during this reading and did not agree that the will expressed his testamentary desires. The will was revised overnight and then read only in the presence of Rodriguez' relatives. The person who notarized the will's signatures did not witness its reading. Cole said Decedent could not remember things when she was talking with him prior to Rodriguez' arrival on the day the will was executed. It is also unclear whether Decedent intended to include the penalty clause. The software program used by Rodriguez did not allow the user to pick and choose which clauses were desired, so the penalty clause very well may have been included automatically. In fact, Decedent may not have known it was there. Thus, whether the will expressed Decedent's testamentary intent was in question. It is therefore impossible to conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable person would not have believed there was a substantial likelihood of success in contesting this will. ¶ 19 Rodriguez argues that Decedent was not close to Gavette, that he was a very strong-willed person, and that she provided clear and convincing evidence that he was competent to execute this will. However, the definition of probable cause does not require certainty of success. The question is whether Gavette had enough facts to establish probable cause at the time the contest was filed. Simply because the trial judge concluded there was no undue influence does not mean no probable cause existed to contest the will. If that were the case, the only contestants to a will would be either those who were absolutely certain of the will's invalidity or those who had little or nothing to lose should the contest fail. Any person who had a substantial interest under a will would face the choice of letting a questionable will stand or forfeiting his or her share of the estate should the challenge fail. ¶ 20 In light of the undue influence challenge, including the presumption applicable in this case and the public policy militating against forfeiture and favoring access to the courts, the factors that weighed against a probable cause finding do not overcome the information known to Gavette at the time the contest was filed. Based on the circumstances surrounding the drafting and execution of this will, the doctor's concern regarding Decedent's competence, the lack of clarity of Decedent's intent, the presumption of undue influence, and the policy of Arizona law on this subject, we conclude there was probable cause to contest the will. In reaching this conclusion, we do not resolve disputed factual issues. There is no dispute concerning the evidence Gavette knew at the time the contest was filed. ¶ 21 Without the benefit of any findings from the trial judge or any information on the standard she applied, we must ourselves solve the legal question as to the existence of probable cause. We have not been asked to and do not disturb the trial judge's ultimate factual conclusion that the will was valid. Though the presumption of undue influence by Rodriguez was eventually overcome, at the time of filing the contest, Gavette, as a reasonable person properly informed and advised, had grounds to believe there was a substantial likelihood of successprobable cause to contest the will. After full development of the facts at trial, hindsight cannot be utilized to later justify a finding that the contest was unreasonable. The RESTATEMENT provides an example, very similar to the case at hand: O, by an otherwise effective will, gives one-half of his property to the person who served as his nurse during the last three years of his life. His will gave the other one-half of his property to his only son. The will was made one year before O died. During the last three years of O's life, he was mentally incompetent most of the time but did have some lucid intervals. The will contained a provision that if his son contested the will or any provision thereof, all of the property subject to disposition by O's will would go to the nurse. The son contested the will on the ground that his father did not have the mental capacity to make a will. His contest failed because it was determined that the will was executed during a lucid interval of his father. The conclusion is justified that there was probable cause for the contest and thus the son's interest under the will is not forfeited. RESTATEMENT § 9.1 cmt. j, illus. 10. ¶ 22 We reach a similar conclusion here. Accordingly, Gavette's interests under the will are not forfeited.