Opinion ID: 731583
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bullard

Text: 30 The Government estimated that Bullard's fraudulent activities relating to 27 bank accounts resulted in a directly attributable loss of $308,685. (J.A. at 473-74.) The Government also estimated that reasonably foreseeable losses attributable to Bullard totalled $94,892. (J.A. at 474-75.) Like Evans, Bullard concedes that some loss, in his case $22,000, should be directly attributed to him (Appellants' Br. at 47), but contends that the Government's calculation of directly attributable fraud loss and reasonably foreseeable fraud loss, both of which were adopted by the district court (J.A. at 462-65), is clearly erroneous. 31 We agree with the district court that losses suffered by six of the 27 accounts should be directly attributed to Bullard because Bullard (employing an alias) acted as either a drawer, payee, or maker of checks written from the account. (J.A. at 256 (Staci Parreco and C. & J. Duplaa accounts), 273 (Glenn Eckanger and Sean McCoart accounts), 274 (Myrtle Jackson and Charles Longworth accounts).) With respect to these six accounts, which suffered losses totalling $75,746, the district court was correct in directly attributing the fraud loss to Bullard. 32 The record on appeal, however, does not support the Government's contention that 14 of the remaining 21 accounts can be directly attributed to Bullard. Each of the 14 accounts was connected by the Government to Bullard entirely through evidence found in the search of his residence. 7 The record on appeal does not indicate that Bullard (or one of his aliases) was a drawer, payee, or maker on any of the 14 accounts, nor does it establish that he aided or abetted the fraud affecting these accounts. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Adding the $181,665 in losses on these accounts to the losses directly attributable to Bullard was therefore improper. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district court correctly attributed fraud losses from these accounts directly to Bullard. Accordingly, we remand for consideration of these accounts. 33 With respect to the remaining seven accounts, namely, the Purnell Walker, Ruth Paul, William Ecker, Silver Spring Rehabilitation Center, Steven Guttenberg, Alliance for Aging Research, and Holzbierlein accounts, the record is so unclear and the findings of the district court so nonspecific (J.A. at 274-77), that we are unable to assess whether the losses on these accounts should be attributed to Bullard. Accordingly, we remand consideration of these accounts to the district court. See Wilson, 980 F.2d at 260, 262; see also Tice, 908 F.2d at 1208. 34 On remand, a minimum of $75,746 of loss must be attributed to Bullard. Such a minimal loss calculation, however, would decrease Bullard's total offense level only from 22 to 21, and his guideline range from 63-78 to 57-71 months imprisonment. 8 In some instances, because the sentence of 63 months imprisonment imposed on Bullard falls within both guideline ranges, we would declare the district court's erroneous loss calculation to be harmless error and decline to remand. Remand is not necessary when the reviewing court con cludes, on the record as a whole, that the error was harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (citations omitted). 35 In Kelly v. United States, 29 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir.1994), the district court applied an incorrect sentencing range, but came up with a sentence that nevertheless fell inside the correct range. The Government argued that the district court's error was harmless because the sentence fell within both ranges. The court rejected this argument, stating that 36 absent an express statement that the [district] court would impose the same sentence even if a different range were applicable, it is difficult to imagine a case in which an appeals court could declare with the requisite degree of confidence that the application of an incorrect range would amount to a harmless error.... 37 Id. at 1111; see also United States v. Mount, 966 F.2d 262, 265 (7th Cir.1992) (An appellate court may be confident that the choice of range did not affect the sentence when the district judge says so.). 38 Here, the record as a whole suggests that Bullard was sentenced at the bottom of the guideline range because the district court found Wells and Bullard to be equally culpable. (J.A. at 465, 467 ([B]ecause I don't see any distinction between [Mr. Wells] and Mr. Bullard, [Mr. Wells] will be given the same sentence as Mr. Bullard was given.).) On remand, Wells' guideline range, and his corresponding sentence, may be lowered. See post at 15-17. As a result, we remand to allow the district court to determine both the proper guideline range for sentencing Bullard, and where within that guideline range Bullard's sentence should fall. United States v. Surasky, 976 F.2d 242, 247 (5th Cir.1992) (remanding and stating that [f]rom the record before us, it is not unreasonable to conclude that ... the district court might well choose to give [the defendant] a lesser sentence.).