Opinion ID: 1690126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: did the trial court commit reversible error by overruling defendant's objections during the prosecution's closing arguments and by allowing the special prosecutor to characterize mr. jordan's mitigation evidence as a reason to impose death?

Text: ś 77. Jordan cites numerous statements made by the State during closing argument for his claim that the trial court committed reversible error by overruling his objections thereto. A review of most of these statements reveals that no contemporaneous objection was made. In fact, during the entire closing argument, the defense objected only twice. ś 78. The first objection pertained to the following statement by the State: Put an end to this charade. It's time for Richard Gerald Jordan and the likes of Richard Gerald Jordan to be stung ad infinitum. The defense objected on the basis that what other people ought to get was improper and the State should be restricted to arguments about Jordan only. The objection was sustained, and we find that this statement did not unduly prejudice the defense in any way. ś 79. The second discourse objected to by Jordan was as follows: BY MR. OWEN: Richard Gerald Jordan... has tested this system to the fullest extent. And I submit to you that he uses it, he misuse[s] it, he abuses it, and heâ BY MR. SUMRALL: Object to that, Your Honor, there hasn'tâ BY MR. OWEN: I'm getting to the pointâ BY THE COURT: I can't hear. Hold up, Mr. Sumrall, just a minute. The young lady has to track whatever we say. Don't override each other. Make your objection and I'll rule on it. BY MR. SUMRALL: Yes, sir. There hasn't been any evidence about him testing the system. The only thing before this jury is his sentence today. And, Your Honor, I'm going to move for a mistrial because of that last remark. BY MR. OWEN: May it please the court, I didn't finish my statement. BY THE COURT: I understand that you didn't. Based on what's in the record and based upon the objection I will overrule the objection on the motion, and I will overrule the motion for a mistrial. BY MR. OWEN: Richard Jordan has tested, abused and misused the penal system in this state. He's turned it into a mockery. Trusteeship and the things that you have at Parchman have a purpose, but he's abused it and misused it in my opinion, the State of Mississippi's opinion, when a prisoner charged with this terrible crime can do the things that he's doing at Parchman and can engage in the outside activities that he's engaging in, and ladies and gentlemen of the jury you cannot say that justice is being served. ś 80. Although an objection was made at the very beginning of the remarks complained of by Jordan, the basis of the objection was that Owen's comments were not based on the evidence before the court. After Owen resumed his remarks, it was clear that he was commenting on the privileges Jordan enjoyed at the State Penitentiary at Parchman, and testimony about these privileges had been admitted into evidence by Jordan himself. ś 81. No other objection was made during the State's closing argument. Therefore, Jordan's claims pertaining to the court's failure to sustain Jordan's objections are procedurally barred. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we will address the merits. [4] ś 82. Jordan introduced character evidence that he was a good prisoner and had caused no trouble in his 22 years at Parchman. He attained trusty status while under a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, indicating that he was not a threat to himself or others and that he was not an escape risk. ś 83. The State used this character evidence to argue that the imposition of the death penalty was appropriate because Jordan had used and misused the system; because a person who had committed a terrible crime such as that one committed by Jordan should not be eligible for the benefits that Jordan received at Parchman; and because Jordan could use the phone, watch television, write his short stories, go to the law library, ride around on a tractor, etc., implying that Jordan was not being punished severely for his crime. ś 84. Jordan, relying upon Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), claims that the State unconstitutionally turned around the mitigation evidence presented by the defense and used it as evidence of aggravating circumstances. We have reviewed Zant and do not find much support for Jordan's claim. We quote from the opinion to put into context the portion (emphasized by bold face) relied upon by Jordan: Respondent contends that the death sentence was impaired because the judge instructed the jury with regard to an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance, a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, for these instructions may have affected the jury's deliberations. In analyzing this contention it is essential to keep in mind the sense in which that aggravating circumstance is invalid. It is not invalid because it authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected. Georgia has not, for example, sought to characterize the display of a red flag, the expression of unpopular political views, or the request for trial by jury, as an aggravating circumstance. Nor has Georgia attached the aggravating label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant, or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness. If the aggravating circumstance at issue in this case had been invalid for reasons such as these, due process of law would require that the jury's decision to impose death be set aside. Id. at 884-85, 103 S.Ct. at 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d at 255 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ś 85. Zant is distinguished from the case sub judice because the invalid aggravating circumstance was included in an instruction to the jury. Owen's characterization of Jordan's mitigation evidence was made in his closing remarks and was not incorporated into a jury instruction. ś 86. Nevertheless, while Owen's comments about the privileges Jordan might enjoy if he were sentenced to life imprisonment instead of subjected to the death penalty may have been improper, we find that they did not unduly prejudice the jury and that the error, if any, was harmless. The jury's verdict was amply supported by the evidence and was not the result of prejudice, bias or passion.