Opinion ID: 852198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Brown Car

Text: Kubsch's next ineffective assistance claim is based on counsel's failure to introduce evidence that a neighbor saw a brown car speeding out of the Prism Valley neighborhood around the time of the murders. At the first trial, Kathy Kruszewski testified that she lived two blocks south of the Kubsch residence. Tr.1 at 5018. She testified that on the day of the murders at approximately 3:05 p.m. she saw a brown or burgundy car approximately the same size as her Cavalier speeding out of the Prism Valley neighborhood. Tr.1 at 5021-24. Kruszewski was unable to reliably describe the driver or give any more detailed description of the car. Tr.1 at 5022, 5027-30. In fact when Kruszewski reported seeing the car a few days after the murder, she told police she would not recognize the driver. Tr.PCR at 191. Furthermore, Kruszewski testified that it was not unusual for her to encounter cars speeding through the neighborhood, and in fact she had spoken to neighbors and police about the problem prior to the date of the murders. Tr.1 at 5025-26, 5031. The evidence does not, as Kubsch contends, support the defense theory that someone other than Kubsch committed the murder. The description of the car and driver are vague at best, and the fact that speeding cars were not unusual in the neighborhood at the time makes this particular speeding car less significant. It is impossible to conclude that this evidence has any exculpatory value. See, e.g., Tessely v. State, 432 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind.1982) (refusing to second-guess the strategy of counsel on the basis of conjecture where the issue of counsel's decision not to introduce allegedly exculpatory evidence is reduced to a matter of speculation as to the value of the evidence). Kubsch has not demonstrated that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in deciding not to present this evidence during the second trial.