Opinion ID: 3191566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dismissal discussion

Text: Koresko additionally appeals the District Court’s August 4, 2015 order appointing an independent fiduciary and requiring Koresko to pay future costs. We lack jurisdiction to review this appeal because the August 4, 2015 order was not a final decision of the 27 District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . .”). A “final decision” is defined as a decision of a district court that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). An order that “finds liability and imposes a monetary remedy, but does not reduce that award to a specific figure” will usually be considered interlocutory and not a final decision. Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of N.Y., 860 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1276 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that “the norm is that an award . . . which does not fix the amount of the award or specify a formula allowing the amount to be computed mechanically is not a final decision”) (quoting John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have elaborated on an exception to the rule that if a judgment does not fix the amount of damages, it is not a final decision: However, “even when a judgment fails to fix the amount of damages, if the determination of damages will be mechanical and uncontroversial, so that the issues the defendant wants to appeal before that determination is made are very unlikely to be mooted or altered by it—in legal jargon, if only a ‘ministerial’ task remains for the district court to perform—then immediate appeal is allowed.” Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 200 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Prod. & Maint. Emps. Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397, 1401 (7th Cir. 1992)). Appellant contends that only ministerial tasks remain, rendering the District Court order a final decision. We do not agree. 28 We believe the District Court order requiring Koresko to pay future costs incurred by the independent fiduciary is not a final decision at this point because the order imposed an unquantified and uncertain monetary award without a mechanical computation to ascertain these damages. The Court ordered that “[t]he costs of the Trustee’s appointment ordered herein will be borne by the Koresko Defendants.” (App. 1631). The Court did not define “[t]he costs of the Trustee’s appointment” or provide a method to calculate these costs. Instead the Court specified that the trustee’s services would initially be paid out of trust assets to be later reimbursed by Appellant. (Id.). The District Court retained jurisdiction over this case in order to enforce compliance with the order and to calculate the costs Appellant will owe to reimburse the plans for paying the trustee. (Id.) (“At the close of its appointment, the Court shall issue a separate order specifying the total amount the Koresko Defendants are liable to the Plans to restore on account of this appointment.”). The Court recognized the complexity of these damages and the importance of determining exactly what costs were incurred by the appointment of the independent fiduciary. The Court’s contemplation that a subsequent order would be necessary to calculate these costs does not evince that “the determination of damages will be mechanical and uncontroversial.” Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 200 n.8 (quoting Prod. & Maint. Emps. Local 504, 954 F.2d at 1401) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellant relies on Vitale v. Latrobe Area Hospital as an example of a case in which we determined that a district court order was a final decision even though it did not specifically fix damages. 420 F.3d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 2005). Vitale is distinguishable because in that case we determined “that the benefits calculation required by the District 29 Court would be entirely mechanical” as set forth by a “precise mathematical formula for calculating the monthly retirement benefit.” Id. In this case, the calculation of costs is far from mechanical or ascertainable, which is why the District Court explained that it would issue a separate order specifying the amount Koresko owes. The August 4, 2015 order is not a final decision because it did not specify fixed damages or a mechanical method to calculate damages. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Brodka, 643 F.2d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 1981) (“It is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction ‘that where liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undetermined, there is no final order.’”) (quoting Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefit Review Bd., U.S. Dept. of Labor, 535 F.2d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1976)). We also agree with Appellee that we lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) for appeals from interlocutory orders pertaining to injunctions and receiverships. Further, the District Court order does not fall within the collateral order doctrine, which would allow it to be appealed. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) allows appeals from certain interlocutory orders pertaining to injunctions, the District Court order is not an injunction because it was not “directed to a party” or “enforceable by contempt.” In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 392 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The order is directed at the newly appointed independent fiduciary, which is not a party in this case. Further, because the order does not direct Koresko to pay a specified amount, it is not enforceable by contempt. See Santana Prods., Inc. v. Compression 30 Polymers, Inc., 8 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that an order is not injunctive because “the order does not compel [a party] to take any action nor does the order restrain [the party] from doing anything”). Koresko is not compelled to take any action at this point where the court has not yet calculated damages Koresko owes to the plans. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2), we have jurisdiction to review “[i]nterlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property.” The purpose of § 1292(a)(2) is “to relieve the parties from interlocutory orders affecting control over property.” Martin v. Partridge, 64 F.2d 591, 592 (8th Cir. 1933); see also 16 Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3925 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining the purpose behind the statute that “[a] receivership can drastically curtail existing property rights, foreclosing independent action and decision in irreparable ways”). The concern over property rights, which justifies taking appeals from interlocutory orders involving receiverships, does not apply in this case. The August 4, 2015 order did not affect the parties’ control over trust property. Koresko lost control over the trusts through the Court’s September 16, 2013 and March 13, 2015 orders. (App. 325–27, 1448–52). Koresko timely appealed the final judgment in this case, which removed him from his position as a fiduciary. (Id. at 1, 325–326). Therefore, the August 4, 2015 order is not a receivership order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) because the order did not affect Koresko’s control over trust property assets. The collateral order doctrine allows appeals from district court orders that meet a “stringent” standard. In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d at 396; (quoting Will v. 31 Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The order must: “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. at 395–96 (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 349) (internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to meet any one of the three requirements renders the doctrine inapplicable. Id. By its own terms, the August 4, 2015 order does not conclusively determine the disputed question because the order states that “the Court shall issue a separate order specifying the total amount the Koresko Defendants are liable to the Plans.” (App. 1631). The order did not conclusively determine the issue of damages in this case and accordingly the collateral order doctrine does not apply. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s August 4, 2015 order, we will dismiss the appeal of that order.