Opinion ID: 484946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: alleged conflict of interest claims

Text: 12 The standard for assessing whether an attorney's conflict of interest renders his assistance ineffective is set forth in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Id. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719. In examining this question, we consider first whether the district court had a duty under either Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) or the Constitution to inquire at the time of trial into Mr. Evseroff's representation of Scaduto and Salvatore Bartolotta. 13 Appellants' argument that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing into Mr. Evseroff's dual representation as required by Rule 44(c) is misplaced. The language of Rule 44(c) itself indicates that a hearing is required only in cases where defendants have been jointly charged or joined for trial. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the Rule confirms this: Rule 44(c) establishes a procedure for avoiding the occurrence of events which might otherwise give rise to a plausible post-conviction claim that because of joint representation the defendants in a criminal case were deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) Advisory Committee Note. Moreover, appellants do not point to--nor has research uncovered--any case where a court has applied Rule 44(c) when one attorney represents two defendants--one of whom is a potential witness in the trial of the other--in two different forums. 1 Thus, we conclude that in this instance the trial court had no duty under Rule 44(c) to conduct an inquiry. 14 The Sixth Amendment also imposes a duty upon a trial court to inquire when it knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, 100 S.Ct. at 1717. Appellants argue that there were three separate occasions when Mr. Evseroff indicated that he was representing both Bartolotta and Scaduto. Yet, taken together these instances were insufficient to alert the trial court to a possible conflict of interest. First, attorney Evseroff's remarks made it clear that Bartolotta and Scaduto were facing separate proceedings. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, 100 S.Ct. at 1718 (The provision of separate trials for [the petitioner] and his codefendants significantly reduced the potential for a divergence in their interests.); Mosier v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 65 (10th Cir.1986) (following Cuyler ). Second, the attorney's comments indicated that Bartolotta's and Scaduto's interests converged, rather than diverged, on the particular issue that Evseroff was raising before the court. Cuyler instructs that the consistency or compatibility of co-defendants' defenses is a factor to be considered in determining whether the trial court had notice of a potential conflict. See Cuyler at 347, 100 S.Ct. at 1717. Finally, appellants did not object at trial to the dual representation. See id. at 347, 100 S.Ct. at 1717. Thus, we conclude that the district court was not obliged by Cuyler to conduct an inquiry at the trial.
15 Even without an affirmative duty to inquire at trial, the relevant question on this appeal becomes: Should the district court have denied the appellants' post-trial application without further inquiry? While it would go too far to say that it was error for the district court to have failed to conduct a full evidentiary hearing; nevertheless, it was not an appropriate case for summary dismissal of the petition. The language of Sec. 2255 states that [u]nless the motion and the files and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt hearing. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 (1982). As a result, we look with disfavor on summary rejection of a habeas petition when it is supported by a sufficient affidavit. Dalli v. United States, 491 F.2d 758, 760 (2d Cir.1974) (emphasis in original). 16 When considering a Sec. 2255 habeas application the supporting affidavits must be examined first. Opposing affidavits should also be considered in order to test the sufficiency of the petitioner's allegations, but not for finding them false. See, e.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495, 82 S.Ct. 510, 514, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962); United States v. Franzese, 525 F.2d 27, 30-31 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921, 96 S.Ct. 1128, 47 L.Ed.2d 328 (1976). Not every application that is supported by a set of facially meritorious allegations will survive a motion to deny the writ. To warrant plenary presentation of evidence, the application must contain assertions of fact that a petitioner is in a position to establish by competent evidence. See Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 495-96, 82 S.Ct. at 514; Dalli, 491 F.2d at 761. Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact depends upon the sufficiency of those factual allegations. Airy generalities, conclusory assertions and hearsay statements will not suffice because none of these would be admissible evidence at a hearing. See Franzese, 525 F.2d at 31. Hence, like a motion for summary judgment in civil cases, both the petitioner's and government's affidavits--taken together--are used to determine the existence of genuine issues of material fact. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-81, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec. 599 at 499 (2d ed. 1982). If the affidavits disclose such material issues, then the application will survive a motion to dismiss and a contrary ruling that summarily disposes of the petition is error. See Allison, 431 U.S. at 82-83, 97 S.Ct. at 1633. 17 The affidavits submitted here disclosed genuine issues of material fact that should have been explored further. As noted, they reveal sharp disputes concerning who paid trial counsel, how much such counsel received, whether fees were withheld, and whether the fees were divided as a form of a referral fee. If these questions were resolved in appellants' favor, 2 it would then appear that attorney Evseroff was in a position to control other defense counsel. If that in fact was what occurred, it would be tantamount to his representing all the appellants and constitute, therefore, an impermissible conflict. The other dispute concerns whether Mr. Evseroff had an actual conflict of interest in representing both Scaduto and Salvatore Bartolotta. Again, the affidavits sharply disagree on whether the appellants wanted Salvatore Bartolotta to testify, whether the defense counsel did or did not want him and, if not, why not. 18 Two other factors persuade us that summary disposition of appellants' application was inappropriate. Appellants have not previously had an evidentiary hearing on this claim, see Dalli, 491 F.2d at 761, and the circumstances providing the factual basis for appellants' application occurred outside of the courtroom. Thus, the files and records of the case would be of little or no aid to the trial court in passing on it. See Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 494-95, 82 S.Ct. at 513-14. 19 For these reasons, we reverse the district court's order that denied their application for a writ and remand the case for further inquiry into appellants' claims. Of course, such inquiry may take the form of an evidentiary hearing, or the district court, in its discretion, may utilize any of the habeas rules designed to supplement the record without the necessity of conducting a full-blown evidentiary hearing. See Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases, 28 U.S.C. app. fol. Sec. 2255 (1982). See also Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 81-82, 97 S.Ct. at 1632-33 (discussing the advantages of Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus for supplementing the record while avoiding the necessity of a hearing).