Opinion ID: 67485
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Is Appropriate

Text: Harris next challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of MTC. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard as did the district court. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007); Willis v. Coca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c). We construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Willis, 445 F.3d at 416, but where the movant has asserted that evidence supporting the nonmovant’s claim is lacking, the onus is on the nonmovant to “go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial,” Wright v. Ford Motor Co., 508 F.3d 263, 276 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., — F.3d. —, No. 07-20661, slip op. at 13 (5th Cir. June 5, 2009) (“The nonmovant must then point to or produce specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact.”). Under Title VII, “an employer may not discriminate against an employee because the employee has ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII.” LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2007) (omission in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3). A retaliation claim such as 7 No. 09-60043 this is governed by the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); see also McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556. Under that framework, Harris must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that (1) “he participated in an activity protected by Title VII”; (2) “his employer took an adverse employment action against him”; and (3) “a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 557. After making such a showing, MTC must articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment action. See id. If MTC articulates such reasons, the burden falls back on Harris to show that MTC’s proffered reasons are a pretext for its actual retaliatory purpose. See id. at 556–57. Here, neither party questions that Harris has made out a prima facie case of retaliation. Nor do they contest that MTC met its burden to articulate legitim a te, n on d iscrim in atory reasons for term in atin g H arris’s employment—that (1) he solicited bribes and (2) he threatened his superior. The question, then, is whether Harris can point to sufficient evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether MTC’s proffered reasons are a mere pretext for unlawful retaliation. To carry his burden of showing pretext, Harris “must put forward evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer articulates.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001). In considering Harris’s arguments, we focus our attention on “whether [MTC’s] perception of [Harris’s] performance, accurate or not, was the real reason for [his] termination.” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 580 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 391 (“Our antidiscrimination laws do not require an employer to make proper decisions, only non-retaliatory ones.”). 8 No. 09-60043 Harris raises four arguments in asserting that MTC’s reasons are pretextual, none of which gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext. First, he points to the affidavit of Jimmy Forrest, an MTC employee who stated that “[w]e had a lot of whites getting stuff from contractors,” as evidence of MTC’s disparate treatment of white employees who were not fired for accepting bribes. Disparate treatment is indeed one way of demonstrating unlawful retaliation, but the conduct that led to the plaintiff’s termination must be “nearly identical to that engaged in by an employee not within [his] protected class whom the company retained.” Wallace, 271 F.3d at 221 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005) (“To establish disparate treatment, [the plaintiff] must show that [the employer] gave preferential treatment to another employee under ‘nearly identical’ circumstances.” (citations omitted)). Harris’s argument fails because he has proffered no evidence indicating that the white employees actually solicited these bribes from contractors in exchange for passing inspections, nor does he point to specific evidence demonstrating that the items allegedly received by white employees were, in fact, bribes. Thus, Harris has not shown that the white employees were retained under circumstances nearly identical to Harris’s. Further, Harris must rebut each justification offered by MTC, and he does not argue to this court that MTC retained white employees who threatened a superior, as did Harris. See, e.g., Wallace, 271 F.3d at 221–22 (holding that, while the plaintiff succeeded in demonstrating a genuine issue of fact concerning the pretext of one of her employer’s reasons for terminating her employment, she failed to meet her burden of “presenting evidence rebutting each of the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons” put forward by the employer and, hence, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate). Second, Harris denies that he solicited bribes and that he threatened Johnson, and MTC’s refusal to conduct a polygraph test, according to Harris, 9 No. 09-60043 shows that MTC believes Harris’s denials are truthful. “Simply disputing the underlying facts of an employer’s decision is not sufficient to create an issue of pretext.” LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 391; see also id. (“Our job as a reviewing court conducting a pretext analysis is not to engage in second-guessing of an employer’s business decisions.”). To the extent that Harris suggests that MTC normally offers polygraph exams to employees it investigates, this inference is belied by Parks v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 246 F. App’x 282, 283 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[MTC] does not routinely require an employee who asserts [a Title VII protected] claim to take a polygraph test . . . .” (emphasis added)). At bottom, MTC determined without the use of a polygraph test that Hodges’s statements were more credible than Harris’s explanations, and, correct or not, we will not second-guess MTC’s decision to disbelieve Harris absent a showing of actual retaliatory purpose. See LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 391 (“Despite [plaintiff]’s denial of these actions, we will not second-guess [the employer]’s decision to disbelieve [plaintiff]’s explanation, given the conflicting factual accounts.”). Third, Harris points to the EEOC Letter as evidence that MTC’s reasons are pretextual, but we have determined above that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding that letter from the evidence. As such, we do not consider the EEOC Letter as part of the summary judgment record. See Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., 202 F.3d 746, 751 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nly materials in the pretrial record that would have been admissible evidence can be considered.”); Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that we first review the district court’s evidentiary rulings in order to define the record with which to review the district court’s judgment). Fourth and finally, Harris points to an unwritten order denying MTC’s motion for summary judgment in a discrimination case brought by Maverick Hughes, Hughes v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, No. 3:06-CV-80. Harris argues that the court’s decision there is evidence of MTC’s pretext here. 10 No. 09-60043 He does not articulate how the mere fact that summary judgment was denied in Hughes’s case creates a genuine issue of material fact in this case; thus, Harris again fails to meet his burden of producing some evidence that MTC’s reasons were a pretext for retaliation. Harris has failed to identify specific facts creating a genuine issue for trial. As such, summary judgment in favor of MTC is appropriate.