Opinion ID: 717462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: car wash's two proposals

Text: 10 Before turning to the Board's ruling on each of Car Wash's proposals to preserve witness anonymity, we briefly set forth the applicable standard for reviewing the Board's decisions. On questions regarding representation, we accord the Board an especially wide degree of discretion. NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330, 67 S.Ct. 324, 328, 91 L.Ed. 322 (1946); see also C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 882 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citations omitted); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers, 736 F.2d at 1564 (the scope of our review of the Board's decisions in cases involving certification is extremely limited) (citing Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818, 827 (D.C.Cir.1970)). We will affirm the Board's order to bargain unless the Board abused its discretion in overruling Car Wash's objections in the underlying election proceeding. See C.J. Krehbiel Co., 844 F.2d at 881-82.
11 Car Wash argues that the Board misinterpreted its own rules and abused its discretion by refusing to conduct an attorneys-eyes-only hearing. The hearing officer stated that the Board's rules, which give each party the right to have a representative of its choice present at a hearing, precluded use of the restricted type of hearing procedures requested by Car Wash. Rule 102.66(a) provides in relevant part that [a]ny party shall have the right to appear at any hearing in person, by counsel, or by other representative. 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(a) (1995). Car Wash contends that instead of affirming the hearing officer's construction of the rule, the Board should have interpreted it as allowing the presence of either an attorney or a representative at a hearing, but not necessarily both. Had the Board adopted this construction of the Rule, it could have assented to the attorneys-eyes-only request. 12 The Board's interpretation of its own rule is given controlling weight, unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation itself. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); S.G. Loewendick & Sons, Inc. v. Reich, 70 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945))). The Board's failure to interpret its rules so as to accommodate potential witnesses in some manner--even if it did not adopt the attorneys-eyes-only procedure proposed by Car Wash--is troubling, since the serious allegations leveled against the union by Car Wash were never investigated. But this decision is not such an egregious error as to require vacation of the Board's order, for several reasons. 13 First, the Board's decision to reject the specific procedure advanced by Car Wash was permissible. Rule 102.66(a), on which the Board relied, does not expressly bar attendance by counsel plus some other representative, and petitioner has not pointed to any statutory provision that would require the Board to restrict attendance to counsel alone. Nor is the Board's construction of the rule as barring an attorneys-eyes-only procedure otherwise without reason. What Car Wash asked the Board to do was to conduct a hearing on allegations of illegal threats by union members, without permitting the union's attorney to disclose the identities of adverse witnesses to those officials in the course of defending them. When asked at oral argument how the union officials could have defended against these charges if the hearing officer had used an attorneys-eyes-only procedure, counsel for Car Wash suggested the officials make a blanket claim that they never threatened any employees. That approach leaves much room for an erroneous decision. It might be the case, for example, that a union representative made a remark which was misunderstood by an employee, perhaps because of language barriers, 4 or one which, in context, is more accurately characterized as part of the give-and-take of a union campaign, rather than an impermissible threat of reprisal. A union official would be able to offer a credible defense along these lines only if he knew the identity of the employee witness, so that he could provide the hearing officer with additional details about the incident. Or, it might be that the employee declarations are untrue, and motivated by animosity between the employee declarants and the union officials that is unrelated to the union election. If the identity of employee declarants is not disclosed to the union representatives accused of misconduct, their ability to provide additional information necessary to a fair decision could be significantly diminished. 14 Even if the Board did not abuse its discretion in construing § 102.66(a) as prohibiting an attorneys-eyes-only procedure, the question remains whether its failure to make some other accommodation for employee witnesses requires reversal. The Board did nothing to reassure the employees that if they testified against the union, their safety would be protected--a step that is certainly not barred by § 102.66(a) or any other Board rule or regulation that we have uncovered. For example, it might have issued a protective order prohibiting union officials from intimidating employee witnesses or restricting their contact with those employees. Or, the Board itself could have suggested an alternative hearing procedure, perhaps one which would include negotiations between the union and the company as to who would serve as the union's representatives. Yet it did none of the above. Nor did the Board explain why it did not independently investigate Car Wash's allegations of threats made against potential witnesses, or even take in camera testimony from those witnesses to determine if further steps were warranted. 5 15 On the other hand, the Board's Regional Director did offer to investigate the allegations of witness intimidation, and indicated that the anonymity of witnesses could be maintained until the investigation was taken over by a U.S. Attorney, who presumably would have even more weapons at his disposal for protecting potential witnesses. Car Wash, however, rejected that offer, both in conversations with the Regional Director and again before the hearing officer. More importantly, Car Wash took the position that it would not accept any hearing procedures that did not guarantee witness anonymity. While it might well be an abuse of discretion for the Board to interpret its rules in a manner that fails to protect witnesses, it is reasonable for the Board to refuse to conduct its hearings without revealing the identity of witnesses to an accused party. 6 Although we would be more inclined to vacate the Board's order had Car Wash indicated its amenability to some alternative accommodation directed at the employees' safety, rather than only their continued anonymity, that was not petitioner's stance before the Board's hearing officer. Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in construing § 102.66(a) to prohibit the use of an attorneys-eyes-only procedure.
16 Car Wash also contends that the Board abused its discretion by refusing to admit into evidence the declarations of Car Wash's employees with all identifying information redacted. In excluding the declarations, the hearing officer relied upon Rule 102.66(a), which provides in relevant part that [w]itnesses shall be examined orally under oath. That construction accords with Board precedent expressing a strong preference for live oral testimony. See, e.g., Waterbed World, 301 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (1991) (affidavits are not admissible in lieu of testimony unless the witness is either deceased or so seriously ill that accepting the oral testimony poses a threat to the health of the witness (citations omitted)), enf'd by NLRB v. Omnix Intern. Corp., 974 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir.1992). The Board's interpretation is also a permissible one in light of the facts of this case, even though Car Wash was left with no admissible evidence as a result. As with its proposal for an attorneys-eyes-only hearing, Car Wash focused its request to admit redacted declarations on the need to keep secret the identities of witnesses who testified against the union. Reviewing the Board's rejection of this proposal, though, is an easier call than evaluating its decision on the attorneys-eyes-only hearing. Not only would the identities of witnesses remain undisclosed to the union officials themselves if the redacted declarations were admitted, they would be kept secret from union attorneys. Moreover, the hearing officer would be deprived of the manifold benefits that live oral testimony offers in comparison to documentary evidence. Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying this request. 7 17 Finally, Car Wash contends that the Board's negative decisions on its two requests violated its due process rights. Petitioner has not framed its due process argument with much precision. In its brief to this court, Car Wash appears to contend that the due process clause confers the right to a meaningful hearing prior to government action, so that the Board was required to accept at least one of the two specific proposals Car Wash made to keep secret the identities of employee witnesses. See Petitioner's Brief at 16-20. At oral argument, however, counsel for Car Wash argued that the Board violated its right to a fair hearing by failing to come up with some alternative mechanism to protect the employees, given that it had decided not to adopt either of the two suggestions put forth by Car Wash. Whichever way we consider this objection to the Board's ruling, it does not merit reversal. In determining what procedural safeguards are required before the Board may certify the union, we must weigh the private interest affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation under existing procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards, and the government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Here, we conclude the Board was not constitutionally required to adopt procedures that concealed the identities of employee witnesses from the accused union officials. By offering to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of witnesses, the Board could presumably fulfill any due process obligation it might have to protect Car Wash's interest in a fair adjudication of its election objections, without the increased risk of an erroneous decision that stems from witness anonymity. The Board's failure in this instance to take any steps on its own to assuage employees' fears or even to further investigate the credibility of counsel's allegations is sufficiently disturbing to make this a close case, but understandable in view of petitioner's rigid position that only a guarantee of witness anonymity would permit the hearing to move forward. In light of that stance, we can understand the Board's reluctance to prod uncooperative parties on both sides of this dispute into an investigation of Car Wash's allegations. 18