Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limiting the Scope of Cross-Examination

Text: Muhammad contends that the trial court improperly prevented his counsel from asking a series of questions during his cross-examination of Wayne Brown about whether Brown knew if anyone had been prosecuted for shooting two members of the Rushtown Crew. This claim was not raised in the trial court, however, and we find no plain error in the court's handling of the matter. [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 857 (D.C. 1978). If the trial court has permitted enough cross-examination on an appropriate issue to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, any limitation on further cross-examination will be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 151 (D.C.1986). In exercising that discretion, the court must balance the importance of the subject matter and the credibility of the witness against the degree of cross-examination permitted. Id. In this case, Muhammad's counsel sought to demonstrate through cross-examining Brown that members of the Rushtown Crew shot at the Littles brothers to avenge the wounding of Russell Tyler and the murder of Lawrence Lynch. The trial court prohibited this line of questioning because it was irrelevant and did not suggest a justifiable motive for the killing. The court noted that the only inference to be drawn from such questions would be that the murder of the Littles brothers was some sort of justice, which of course could not excuse or justify a double homicide. On appeal, Muhammad argues that if the Rushtown Members knew that the attackers of their friends were being prosecuted, the government's evidence of motive would be greatly discredited. Because this argument was not raised below, Muhammad must demonstrate plain error in order to win reversal. Under the plain error standard of review, the appellant bears the burden of first establishing error, a deviation from the legal rule, and second, demonstrating that the error was so plain that the judge was derelict in countenancing it. McCullough v. United States, 827 A.2d 48, 55 (D.C.2003); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). We find no plain error  indeed, we find no error at all  because there was substantial evidence of Muhammad's guilt, including most obviously his own statement in which he confessed to the murders.