Opinion ID: 3015071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Benn was employed by the Judicial District as a probation and parole officer from 1977 until 1997. Throughout most of that period he was engaged in clerical and administrative tasks. In 1996, he was transferred to work in the Enforcement Unit and was appointed a Special Deputy by the United States Marshals Office. It is apparent from the record that Benn was not pleased by the transfer. As his brief recites, in the new position he had to wear a firearm and a bullet-proof vest, use handcuffs, and locate and apprehend dangerous criminals. In his complaint, Benn alleges that “he was not mentally suited for this position” and, shortly after his transfer, began experiencing job-related anxiety and stress. App. at 19. He allegedly suffered post-traumatic shock after seeing a co-worker assaulted. In October 1996, he was accidentally struck by a car after seeing a probation violator on the street. He took leave from work for the next eight months, citing physical injuries from the accident, post-traumatic shock disorder, and chronic depression. Benn alleges that the Judicial District refused to offer any accommodation for his stress disorder, and that he was wrongfully terminated. Benn filed a formal charge with the EEOC and received a right to sue letter on August 20, 1998. He filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on October 29, 1998, claiming not only discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA but also violations of state law by the Judicial District, the City of Philadelphia, and the Board of Pensions and Retirement Municipal Pension Fund of the City of Philadelphia (“Board of Pensions”).2 After some activity in the District Court, the Judicial District filed a motion 2 In its answer to the complaint, the Judicial District denied Benn’s allegation that it failed to offer him accommodation, and denied Benn’s allegation that he was wrongfully terminated. For purposes of this appeal, the Judicial District accepts Benn’s alleged facts as true. 3 for summary judgment on September 27, 1999 on the ground of its entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity. That motion was granted by order of the District Court dated September 6, 2001 and entered on the docket on September 10, 2001.