Opinion ID: 1058642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statements outside the record

Text: The majority opinion accurately recites that the record reflects that Haugen participated in the termination of parental rights hearing by telephone while incarcerated in a federal prison. Haugen was able to talk with her attorney during the hearing and also gave testimony via telephone. After nearly seven hours of proceedings, Haugen's participation by telephone ended. As previously noted, the only explanation of this event in the record is in the court reporter's log, which reflects that at 3:49 p.m., Ms. Haugen hangs up the phone. The record is devoid of any other evidence as to why Haugen's telephone participation in the hearing ended. The majority opinion's recitation that federal prison authorities directed Haugen to leave the room in the penitentiary where she was using the telephone and [they took her] to another area [in the penitentiary] where she would not be permitted to participate in the hearing by telephone is without support in the record. This is an important distinction because, since the record gives no basis to determine whether Haugen voluntarily or involuntarily ended her participation in the hearing, we cannot reach on appeal any issue regarding the consequences of that termination. Rule 5:11 requires this result for the same reason that we could not reach the issue of whether Haugen acquiesced to the circuit court's initial ruling that she participate in the hearing by telephone. The representations in the majority opinion that federal prison authorities directed [Haugen] to terminate her . . . participation as the basis to avoid the lack of a record to show Haugen's lack of acquiescence or consent to terminating participation in the hearing is puzzling. To reach its conclusion the majority departs from the record and relies on a statement by counsel in response to a question from this Court during oral argument. The majority opinion states: Counsel for the Shenandoah Valley Department of Social Services admitted, during oral argument before this Court, that federal prison authorities directed Haugen to leave the room in the penitentiary where she was using the telephone and to go to another area of the prison where she would not be permitted to participate in the hearing by telephone. There was no such admission. Even if our caselaw permitted us to use a colloquy at oral argument as a substitute for evidence not in the record, [3] which it does not, the majority's statement is inaccurate. The entire content of counsel's statement at oral argument is as follows: Ms. Haugen had the opportunity, because of the scheduling of her prison, to determine whether or not she would continue or she would comply with what her holding facility was asking her to do, which was return to another area of the prison and not in the room where the phone was located. And she, at that point, I don't think she had a completely voluntary termination of her telephone call, but it was not a technical malfunction nor was it the court terminating her telephone call. (Emphasis added). A plain reading of counsel's statement is that Haugen had a choice in terminating her participation in the hearing and, for whatever reason, she chose to end the telephone call. There simply is not a basis in the record for the majority's conclusion that Haugen was compelled to quit the hearing by federal prison authorities. Consequently, as there is no ground in the record by which an appellate court could determine whether Haugen acquiesced to the termination of her telephone participation, the appeal should be dismissed.