Opinion ID: 200500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Plaintiffs' Alternative Antitrust Theories.

Text: 45 The plaintiffs next contend that they presented three alternative antitrust theories before the district court, namely, (1) that the physician members of the defendants' boards were part of an anticompetitive conspiracy that included non-physician board members; (2) that there was a conspiracy among physicians who influenced, though they did not control, the defendants and their policies; and (3) that the defendants were parties to an anticompetitive conspiracy among community-based medical doctors who compete with podiatrists. These theories are viable, the plaintiffs say, notwithstanding the absence of physician control vis-à-vis the defendants. Consequently, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the antitrust claims. 46 To put these nascent claims into perspective, we examine the record below. None of these additional theories is readily apparent from a thoughtful reading of the amended complaint, and neither Triple-S nor Blue Cross addressed them in their initial summary judgment memoranda. The plaintiffs sought to widen the playing field by mentioning the additional theories in their oppositions to the defendants' motions. Triple-S disregarded these allusions. Blue Cross, however, argued in a reply brief that none of the three alternative theories, as stated, articulated a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that, in all events, the evidence did not support any of them. 47 In allowing Blue Cross's motion for summary judgment, the district court deemed these alternative theories to be within the umbrella of the plaintiffs' structural conspiracy claim. The court did, however, entertain the possibility that the third theory amounted to a separate claim but ruled that the plaintiffs' failure to provide any semblance of detail doomed it. The court handled the matter differently in regard to Triple-S. Because that defendant, unlike Blue Cross, had not responded to the plaintiffs' belated exposition, the district court allowed the alternative theories to survive as against Triple-S. The plaintiffs later stipulated to dismissal without prejudice of the residuum of these claims vis-à-vis Triple-S. We must deal, therefore, only with the three alternative theories as they affect Blue Cross. 48 This motley need not detain us long. The first alternative theory suggests the existence of a physician-dominated conspiracy that included non-physicians (and, thus, constituted a majority of the Blue Cross board sufficient to exercise control). But this theory is not anchored in the record. The plaintiffs have neither identified a single non-physician participant in this alleged cabal nor otherwise furnished even a scintilla of evidentiary detail. Because the claim relies solely on unsupported conjecture, it cannot withstand summary judgment. See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990). 49 The plaintiffs' second alternative theory suggests that a minority coalition of physicians unduly influenced the formulation of Blue Cross's benefits packages. That claim is factually unsupported, and we swiftly discard it based on the logic previously articulated. See supra Part II(A)(2). 50 The third alternative theory, like the first two, is a barebones allegation wrapped in the gossamer strands of speculation and surmise. The plaintiffs have neither identified a single physician outside Blue Cross who is part of the alleged conspiracy nor pinpointed any agreement with such a physician that might violate Section 1. Because this theory lacks evidentiary support, it was not a barrier to the entry of summary judgment. 51 The plaintiffs attempt to confess and avoid. They blame the dearth of evidence on a denial of discovery and complain that summary judgment was premature because they had insufficient opportunity to flesh out these alternative theories and pursue supporting evidence through discovery. A careful perscrutation of the record belies this plaint. The district court's discovery order embraced any and all antitrust theories including, by definition, the embedded formulations that the plaintiffs belatedly found lurking in the penumbra of the amended complaint. We explain briefly. 52 Blue Cross's motion for brevis disposition broadly requested the entry of summary judgment on the [p]laintiffs' claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 2 of Puerto Rico's antitrust statute. Blue Cross did not limit this prayer to any particular antitrust theory, but, rather, sought to scotch the antitrust claims as a whole. The district court's ensuing order matched the scope of Blue Cross's motion; it permitted discovery, without limitation, as to the issues raised in [Blue Cross's] motion for summary judgment on the antitrust claims. Consequently, to the extent that the amended complaint raised alternative theories of antitrust liability, the plaintiffs had adequate opportunity to discover facts in support of them. They cannot now complain that the lack of evidence in the record should be excused. See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 585 (1st Cir. 1994). 53 We add one final note. Had the plaintiffs genuinely believed that they had been unfairly limited in the availability of discovery, they had an obligation to bring the matter to the district court's attention by means of a timely motion under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f). See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 44-45 n. 15 (1st Cir.1998); Resolution Trust Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir.1994). In the absence of such a motion — and none was filed here — a subsequent complaint of denied discovery will ordinarily be rejected. See, e.g., Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 248 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir.2001); Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 44. This case falls well within that general proscription. 54