Opinion ID: 78439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Penalty Phase

Text: Ferguson asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of both of his trials because his attorneys failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding his family background and history of mental illness. He contends that his counsel failed to pursue all such evidence that reasonably could have been obtained and thus did not conduct the kind of reasonable investigation contemplated in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). He maintains that this failure was highly prejudicial because of the compelling nature of the undiscovered mitigating evidence. Ferguson cites a number of relevant facts of which his attorneys were not aware: that he was raised in extreme poverty and had no running water or electricity at times; that he had an alcoholic father who died when Ferguson was thirteen years old, that he had to deal with his mother's abusive boyfriends; and that, at age twenty-one, he was shot four times and almost killed by a police officer. He also asserts that he repeatedly was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, was placed in multiple mental hospitals during the late 1960s and early 1970s, was twice found not guilty by reason of insanity, and was examined by multiple doctors in the years preceding the Carol City and Hialeah murders, all of whom diagnosed him as schizophrenic, psychotic, or hallucinating. We analyze IAC claims under the two-prong test established in Strickland, which requires us first to determine whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and then to decide whether this deficient representation prejudiced the petitioner's defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In assessing the first prong of the Strickland test, we apply a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For an attorney's performance to be unreasonable, it must fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. We have noted that an attorney's duty to conduct a reasonable investigation includes looking at a defendant's background for possible mitigating evidence. See Williams, 542 F.3d at 1337. Though [t]his duty does not necessarily require counsel to investigate every evidentiary lead, an attorney's decision to limit an investigation must flow from an informed judgment. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, when evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation we must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. at 2538. With respect to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, we focus on whether the petitioner has established that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result in the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. For a probability to be reasonable it must be sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. We must consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's errors. See Williams, 542 F.3d at 1342.
Ferguson maintains that the performance of his counsel in the Carol City case, Fred Robbins, was deficient because Robbins conducted an inadequate investigation into potential mitigating evidence regarding Ferguson's mental history and family background. According to Ferguson, Robbins's mental health investigation consisted solely of reading four reports, written in 1978, that discussed Ferguson's competence to stand trial. Those reports noted that Ferguson had undergone psychiatric examinations during the early 1970s; however, Robbins did not attempt to locate records from those examinations. Additionally, Robbins did not examine Ferguson's criminal records, which would have shown that Ferguson twice had been found not guilty of various crimes for reason of insanity. Ferguson contends that Robbins's family history investigation was equally unreasonable. Robbins spoke with Ferguson's mother and sister but never asked them about his upbringing, and Robbins's conversation with Ferguson's sister addressed only Robbins's potential retention as counsel. Robbins also apparently made no attempt to locate public records about Ferguson or to contact his siblings, even though they lived nearby. [7] The Florida Supreme Court rejected this claim during the 3.850 proceedings. The court noted that, although Robbins had not exhaust[ed] all available sources of information ..., this was not a case in which the attorney conducted only minimal investigation. Ferguson IV, 593 So.2d at 510. It found that Robbins was aware of Ferguson's mental history and made the tactical decision not to call as witnesses those doctors who had investigated Ferguson. The court found this strategy to be reasonable since presenting such evidence could have opened the door to damaging rebuttal evidence from the State, i.e., that Ferguson had sociopathic tendencies and was exaggerating his symptoms. It therefore concluded that Ferguson had not satisfied his burden of showing either deficient performance or prejudice under the Strickland test. See id. at 511-12. The district court reached the same conclusion in the federal habeas proceedings. It found that Robbins had conducted some investigation into Ferguson's history of mental illness and, based on that investigation, made a reasonable tactical decision... to avoid potentially greater prejudice from damaging information that would have been introduced to the jury regarding [Ferguson's] malingering and anti-social personality disorder. R4-108 at 32. The court likewise found that the Robbins had conducted a reasonable investigation into [Ferguson's] background and made a reasonable tactical decision in light of this investigation to focus on creating lingering doubt about his guilt. Id. It also determined that, even if the investigation was unreasonable, any failure in that regard would not undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings given the overwhelming aggravating factors involved. The court therefore concluded that Ferguson had not met the second prong of the Strickland test. [8] Even assuming arguendo that Robbins's performance was deficient, Ferguson has not shown prejudice resulting from that deficient performance. The resentencing judge found five aggravating circumstances in this case: (1) Ferguson previously had been convicted of three felonies involving the use of, or threat of, violence to some person [9] ; (2) the murders were committed while Ferguson was engaged in the commission of multiple robberies; (3) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (4) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious and cruel; and (5) the crimes involved homicides committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. [10] App. MM, Vol. 3 at 1-6. [11] By comparison, the only possible mitigating circumstance identified by any of the courts assessing Ferguson's case was that there was some evidence to indicate that Ferguson might have been suffering severe mental disturbance at the time of murders and that he had an impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. [12] All of these findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, and the parties identify no basis for questioning this presumption. See Hardwick, 320 F.3d at 1158. In our view, the aggravating circumstances far outweigh any mitigating factors, even taking into account the evidence that Robbins failed to uncover. The facts of this case are extreme, including multiple execution-style killings after a prolonged period in which the victims were bound and blindfolded. We agree with the resentencing court that [t]he entire action of [Ferguson] and his co-conspirators reflects not only an absolute lack of concern for human life or dignity but also a barbaric cruelty. App. MM, Vol. 3 at 6. As a result, we do not believe it is reasonably probable that the evidence Ferguson cites would lead a jury to disregard such cruel circumstances and impose a different sentence. We thus find that Ferguson has not established prejudice from this ineffective assistance and therefore conclude that the district court correctly denied habeas relief with respect to this part of Ferguson's IAC claim.
Ferguson also contends that his counsel's performance during the sentencing phase of the Hialeah trial was deficient. He asserts that Bruce Phelps, the attorney in charge of his penalty phase presentation, made no meaningful effort to investigate Ferguson's family history. In support of this argument, Ferguson cites Phelps's failure to discuss potential mitigating evidence with Ferguson's siblings and to recall Ferguson's mother as a witness during sentencing after she broke down on the witness stand before he could elicit any meaningful testimony. [13] Ferguson also maintains that Phelps was deficient in not presenting evidence of Ferguson's mental illness during sentencing. Ferguson concedes that Phelps put forth mental health history evidence during the guilt phase of the trial as part of an unsuccessful insanity defense. Nevertheless, Ferguson contends that Phelps had a responsibility to recall the mental health experts so they could speak directly to the statutory mitigating factors because of the inherent difference between those factors and the requirements needed to make out an insanity defense. Furthermore, Ferguson maintains that this deficiency prejudiced his case, particularly since at least two jurors voted against the death penalty, even in the absence of the missing evidence. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Ferguson's arguments during the 3.850 proceedings, finding both that Phelps's performance had not been deficient and that there was no resulting prejudice to Ferguson even assuming deficiency. The court noted that, although Phelps failed to present any mitigating evidence regarding Ferguson's mental history during the penalty phase, it was reasonable to assume that there would have been no net benefit to presenting more mental health evidence since there already had been testimony about Ferguson's mental health during the guilt phase. The court also noted that Phelps had spoken with family members and found that his failure to recall Ferguson's mother was reasonable in light of her emotional state. Ferguson IV, 593 So.2d at 511. The district court in the federal habeas proceedings reached a similar conclusion. It found that Ferguson's counsel made a tactical decision to focus on mental health mitigators during sentencing[] and to appeal to the jury's sense of sympathy for [Ferguson's] mental health condition. R4-108 at 34. The court deemed it reasonable, in light of this trial strategy, for Ferguson's counsel not to recall his mother or to reintroduce potentially duplicative mental health evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. In addition, the court noted that there was no reasonable probability that any juror would find that the unpresented mitigating evidence outweighed the overwhelming aggravating factors present in the case. [14] Id. at 35. As in the Carol City trial, even if we assume that Ferguson's Hialeah trial counsel was deficient during the penalty phase, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have imposed a different sentence had they considered the missing mitigation evidence. On resentencing, the circuit court found six aggravating factors: (1) Ferguson previously had been convicted of four felonies involving the use or threat of violence [15] ; (2) the murders occurred while Ferguson was engaged in the commission of rape and robbery; (3) the murders were committed to avoid a lawful arrest; (4) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain; (5) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and (6) Ferguson's crimes were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. [16] App. MM, Vol. 3 at 13-16. The only potential mitigating factor the court identified was that Ferguson might have been suffering from extreme mental disturbance and been impaired in his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. We find that the aggravating factors significantly outweighed any mitigating evidence, including that which was not presented to the jury. The facts of the Hialeah murders are just as cruel and shocking as those of the Carol City killings. One of the victims, Worley, suffered extreme physical abuse, including being apparently raped, prior to being shot in the head and left partially nude by the roadside. The other victim, Glenfeld, was shot twice, both before and after Worley had been sexually assaulted, and murdered. Admittedly, at least two jurors decided not to impose the death penalty even in the face of such circumstances. [17] Nevertheless, the missing evidence likely would not have changed the outcome. Notably, most of the evidence regarding Ferguson's medical background already had been presented during the guilt phase of the trial, so the jury considered that evidence in sentencing him to death. The missing evidence thus primarily involved Ferguson's family history. Although it is possible that evidence of Ferguson's mental history might have caused some jurors to recommend a sentence rather than death, we do not find that this was reasonably probable given the wealth of aggravating circumstances. See Parker v. Secretary for the Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 783 & n. 16 (11th Cir.2003) (noting that the proper standard of review is whether the jury's failure to hear the mitigating evidence undermines the confidence in its verdict, thus demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different result rather than whether the result would have been different absent the deficient performance) (alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). Accordingly, we find that Ferguson has not met the prejudice prong and conclude that the district court correctly denied Ferguson habeas relief with respect to his IAC claim regarding the penalty phase of the Hialeah trial. [18]