Opinion ID: 2527227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Demand Speedy Trial

Text: ¶ 51 Both the District and the Attorney General argue that the appellate court failed to apply the holding of Blue Island, which, they contend, provides that a condemnation defendant who wishes to correct a situation where a case lingers for a long time and the property's value increases should either (1) move to dismiss the condemnation case or (2) file a demand for a speedy trial. Failure to do so, they argue, results in forfeiture of any claim to constitutional injury resulting from the delay. The Attorney General adds that the fifth amendment does not prohibit states from requiring landowners to follow particular procedures (such as those set forth in Blue Island ) to perfect their right to just compensation; all it demands is that the State's procedures be reasonable, certain and adequate ( Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985)) and comport with due process. ¶ 52 We disagree that Blue Island controls the outcome here. First, the case is distinguishable on its facts. In Blue Island, the landowner maintained that a four-year delay in the condemnation proceeding had deprived him of just compensation because the value of the land had increased from the date the complaint was filed to the date the judgment was entered. This court noted that the defendant was represented by an experienced condemnation attorney during the four-year period that the case was pending, who did not make a demand for a hearing, but instead agreed to 20 continuances that were requested by the condemning authority. Blue Island limited its holding to the facts, finding that [u]nder these facts and the law as stated in Chapin and Winkelman we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's traverse as to the constitutional issues involved in the delay. Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 412, 274 N.E.2d 56. ¶ 53 We note that Blue Island seemed to assume that there was no constitutional problem with a long delay where the landowner shared complicity in the delay. Here, in contrast to Blue Island, it does not appear that defendants acquiesced to any unnecessary delay. Rather, it appears that both sides in the proceedings below vigorously litigated the issues as they arose. The District points to the delay incurred as a result of defendants' efforts to resolve ownership of the property and to gain control of the right to direct the litigation, but we do not believe that these efforts were unnecessary or that they wrongfully prolonged the litigation so that they could be said to result in holding defendants chargeable for delay and denying them their constitutional right to just compensation. ¶ 54 Second, we note that Blue Island looked at the case through the lens of Winkelman and Chapin and saw the issue more in the nature of a tort-like action for damages to compensate for the government's wrongful delay, rather than as a simple constitutional question. Blue Island, of course, did not have the benefit of the Kirby decision, as it was decided 13 years before Kirby. In looking to Winkelman and Chapin, Blue Island began its analysis by noting that the rule requiring valuation as of the date of filing could be productive of injury to the land owner. Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 411, 274 N.E.2d 56. It then cited Winkelman for the notion that the condemning authority should prosecute the suit with diligence and that it is liable to the land owner for damages occasioned by a wrongful delay. Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 411, 274 N.E.2d 56; Winkelman, 213 Ill. 360, 72 N.E. 1066. It also cited Chapin for the proposition that a court may properly dismiss a condemnation suit for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute it with diligence, `where no sufficient excuse is presented.' Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 411, 274 N.E.2d 56 (quoting Chapin, 226 Ill. at 501, 80 N.E. 1017). Blue Island then observed that the right to recover damages for the delay is not based simply upon the fact that there is a delay, but on the theory that there is a wrongful delay. Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 411, 274 N.E.2d 56. It also implied that a landowner confronted with the possibility of delays caused by the government had a duty to request a speedy trial based on the following language from Winkelman: `The defendant who stands by and makes no effort to bring his cause to trial should be considered as waiving damages caused by the delay. If he desires a speedy trial, it is his duty to advise the court of that fact.' Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 411, 274 N.E.2d 56 (quoting Winkelman, 213 Ill. at 364, 72 N.E. 1066). ¶ 55 We find that the discussion in Blue Island with respect to wrongful delay and the need for a speedy-trial request, which relies upon Winkelman and Chapin, is not applicable here. Defendants are not seeking damages, but rather just compensation. We do not believe that the holding of Kirby can only be applied where there is wrongful conduct on the part of the government. Nor do we believe that defendants were required to demand a speedy trial under the circumstances of the present case. A defendants' need to push for a timely trial makes sense in the context of a situation where a landowner is encountering problems with delay in the government's prosecution of the case, as was the case in Winkelman, Chapin and Blue Island. But if neither party is doing anything other than vigorously litigating the issues that legitimately come up in the proceeding, we see no valid reason why a speedy-trial demand would be required to preserve a landowner's right to just compensation, nor can we envision what practical good it would do to make such a demand. As the appellate court presciently noted, Would such a request require the parties to cut short discovery? Would it require a defendant to forgo its right to file a traverse opposing the condemnation, or prevent the plaintiff from bringing motions for summary judgment on the issues raised in the traverse, as the plaintiff did here? Would the trial court be required to grant such a request for a speedy trial? If it did not, would that restore the defendant's right to seek a more current valuation for the property that the plaintiff seeks to take? What about cases where, as here, the ownership of the property was the subject of a pending legal dispute when the condemnation complaint was filed? Illinois law provides no answers to these questions. Indeed, we have not found any case in which a speedy condemnation trial was requested. Because it is unclear what is meant by the `speedy trial' remedy that [the District] and [the Attorney General] argue the defendants should have sought, that remedy is not sufficiently `certain and adequate' under Williamson County to serve as a viable alternate method for seeking just compensation. 401 Ill. App.3d at 997, 341 Ill.Dec. 267, 930 N.E.2d 477. We agree with the appellate court's assessment. Accordingly, we do not believe that defendants' failure to follow the strictures of Blue Island constituted a forfeiture of its just compensation claim.