Opinion ID: 6346618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We begin our analysis by setting forth standards that are applicable to our review of postconviction claims. We then review each of Cullen’s claims under those standards, and as discussed below, we determine that the district court did not err when it denied Cullen’s claims without an evidentiary hearing. Postconviction Standards. [2] Postconviction relief is available to a prisoner in custody under sentence who seeks to be released on the ground that there was a denial or infringement of his or her constitutional rights such that the judgment was void or voidable. Id. Thus, in a motion for postconviction relief, the defendant must allege facts which, if proved, constitute a denial or violation of his or her rights under the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution, causing the judgment against the defendant to be void or voidable. Britt, supra. [3] A court must grant an evidentiary hearing to resolve the claims in a postconviction motion when the motion contains factual allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringement of the defendant’s rights under the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution. Britt, supra. If a postconviction motion alleges only conclusions of fact or law, or if the records and files in the case affirmatively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief, the court is not required to grant an evidentiary hearing. Id. [4-7] Cullen’s claims for postconviction relief assert that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. A proper - 394 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleges a violation of the fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial. State v. Parnell, 305 Neb. 932, 943 N.W.2d 678 (2020). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense. Britt, supra. To show prejudice under the prejudice component of the Strickland test, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for his or her counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Britt, supra. A reasonable probability does not require that it be more likely than not that the deficient performance altered the outcome of the case; rather, the defendant must show a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The two prongs of this test may be addressed in either order, and the entire ineffectiveness analysis should be viewed with a strong presumption that counsel’s actions were reasonable. See State v. Munoz, 309 Neb. 285, 959 N.W.2d 806 (2021). [8] Cullen was represented on direct appeal by counsel different from her trial counsel. In addition to asserting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Cullen alleges that her appellate counsel performed deficiently when counsel failed to consult with her and to assign error on direct appeal asserting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. When a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is based on the failure to raise a claim on appeal of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (a layered claim of ineffective assistance of counsel), an appellate court will look at whether trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland test. Parnell, supra. If trial counsel was not ineffective, then the defendant was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue. Id. Much like claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the defendant must show that but for appellate counsel’s failure - 395 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 to raise the claim, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Id. With these principles in mind, we review Cullen’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We note that the sole claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that Cullen preserved in her direct appeal was the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call a medical expert to testify on her behalf. In her motion for postconviction relief now under review, Cullen set forth claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel not raised on direct appeal which would ordinarily be procedurally barred for failure to raise the claims on direct appeal. See State v. Kipple, 310 Neb. 654, 968 N.W.2d 613 (2022) (when trial counsel is different from counsel on direct appeal, defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance known to defendant or apparent from record; otherwise, issue will be procedurally barred). However, Cullen also sets forth a claim of ineffective assist­ ance of appellate counsel in which she asserts, inter alia, that appellate counsel failed to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including the claims she now sets forth in her postconviction motion. As noted above, reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise claims on direct appeal requires an assessment of whether trial counsel was ineffective. We therefore review each of Cullen’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and her claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to determine whether the district court erred when it concluded that Cullen’s claims were not sufficiently pled. Cullen Did Not Allege Sufficient Facts to Support Her First Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel. Cullen claims that the district court erred when it refused an evidentiary hearing on her claim that trial counsel “failed to adequately investigate [her] defenses and advise [her] of - 396 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 her options, including but not limited to the alternate theories of the cause of the severity of the injuries.” The district court generally determined that Cullen set forth no specific allegations of what potential evidence would have been found with an adequate investigation or how such an investigation would have resulted in a different outcome in her trial. We agree. The district court stated that Cullen simply listed the names of potential witnesses that should have been contacted but that she provided “no facts as to what information that they would have provided or how any such information might have impacted cross-examination of the State’s witnesses.” In her claim, Cullen asserted that counsel should have investigated a defense asserting “alternate theories” for the cause of Cash’s injuries, including the possibility that one of Cash’s parents caused his injuries. She asserted that trial counsel should have focused on the evidence that Chris came home briefly on the morning that Cash was injured. Cullen also alleged that an anonymous witness had contacted her original counsel and claimed that Ashley had anger management issues and that she had been involved in an altercation at her workplace. Cullen alleged that her original counsel provided trial counsel with the name of a person who might have been the anonymous witness, as well as the name of a contact at Ashley’s workplace who might have information regarding the alleged altercation. Cullen alleged that her trial counsel failed to follow up on this information provided by her original counsel. [9] Our case law is clear that in a motion for postconviction relief, a defendant is required to specifically allege what the testimony of potential witnesses would have been if they had been called at trial in order to avoid dismissal without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Munoz, 309 Neb. 285, 959 N.W.2d 806 (2021). Absent specific allegations, a motion for postconviction relief effectively becomes a discovery motion to determine whether evidence favorable to a defendant’s position actually exists. Id. - 397 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 Cullen’s allegations regarding potential defenses were generally that an investigation might have uncovered helpful evidence. Although she asserts trial counsel could have argued a defense which would have placed suspicion on Cash’s parents, she makes no specific allegations of actual evidence or testimony that would have implicated either parent. Cullen speculates about Chris’ reasons for briefly returning home that morning, and regarding Ashley’s alleged anger issues, Cullen only asserted that if trial counsel contacted the potential witnesses identified by her original counsel, those witnesses might have provided some evidence regarding an altercation at her workplace. She alleged no specific evidence that would have been discovered, and to the extent she alleged that counsel might have found evidence of an altercation at work, Cullen did not show why evidence regarding an alleged workplace altercation would translate or prove that Ashley had injured Cash. We determine that Cullen’s allegations did not set forth sufficient facts to support her first claim of ineffective assist­ ance of trial counsel. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err when it refused an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Cullen Did Not Allege Sufficient Facts to Support Her Second Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel. Cullen claimed that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel “failed to investigate the hiring of expert witnesses to support [her] description of how the injury occurred and failed to utilize [a] trial consultant with 25 years of experience who had examined the facts and met with [Cullen].” The district court generally determined that Cullen made no specific allegations of what such experts would have testified. We agree. Cullen alleged that the trial consultant identified specific potential expert witnesses, and Cullen provided the list of names in her motion. However, regarding the substance of such expert’s testimony, Cullen alleged only that the trial - 398 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 consultant asserted that their testimony would have been helpful to her defense. Such allegations are not allegations of specific fact and instead are conclusory. She made no allegations of the specific testimony those experts would have given in her defense, and she therefore did not show how their testimony would have resulted in a different outcome in her trial. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err when it denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing. Cullen Did Not Allege Sufficient Facts to Support Her Third Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel. Cullen also claims that the district court erred when it refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing on her claim that trial counsel “failed to meet with her on a single occasion to discuss the facts of the case, failed to consult with her about her right to testify and fail[ed] to inquire as to her desire to testify at trial.” The district court determined that Cullen failed to make specific allegations of what she would have told counsel or the substance of her potential testimony and failed to make allegations that showed that her testimony would have resulted in a different outcome in the trial. We agree. [10] Cullen generally alleged that counsel did not discuss the case with her, and in particular, she alleged that counsel did not discuss with her her right to testify and whether or not she should testify in her defense. We have recognized that a defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to testify, but a trial court does not have a duty to advise the defendant of his or her right to testify or to ensure that the defendant waived this right on the record. State v. Iromuanya, 282 Neb. 798, 806 N.W.2d 404 (2011). We have recognized that defense counsel bears the primary responsibility for advising a defendant of his or her right to testify or not to testify, of the strategic implications of each choice, and that the choice is ultimately for the defendant to make. Id. - 399 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 In a postconviction action when a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to counsel’s failure with regard to advising the defendant on his or her right to testify, we have subjected the claim to the Strickland standard and required the defendant to show how trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In Iromuanya, we concluded that “because the record show[ed] that the jury heard [the defendant’s] statement of events from his police interview, he was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged failure to reasonably advise him to testify.” 282 Neb. at 812-13, 806 N.W.2d at 423. See, also, Yannai v. U.S., 346 F. Supp. 3d 336, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (relying on Weaver v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 198 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2017), to the effect that on direct review, prejudice resulting from structural error may be presumed but even if denial of right to testify may be structural error, in habeas corpus action, Strickland applied to claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel with regard to right to testify and defendant was required “to demonstrate prejudice flowing from failure to testify”). See, similarly, State v. Fuentes, 302 Neb. 919, 926 N.W.2d 63 (2019) (citing Weaver, supra). Therefore, even if we presume that trial counsel did not discuss with Cullen her right to testify and whether she should testify in her defense as Cullen has alleged, she was required to show how such failure prejudiced her defense. Cullen made general allegations that she would have testified that she would have told her side of the story. However, she does not specify what that story would have been. The evidence in this case already included her statements to police in which she set forth four versions of what happened to Cash that morning. As we noted in Iromuanya, supra, there was no prejudice when the defendant’s side of the story was already in evidence through statements the defendant had made to police. Cullen does not allege whether the version she would have testified to at trial was one of those four versions or yet another account. It is unclear how her telling her story would - 400 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 have changed the outcome of the trial, especially in light of the fact that the evidence already included four versions of what she told police. Cullen also asserts that she would have testified she loved Cash and was upset about what had happened to him and that this would have countered the State’s arguments that she was cold and uncaring. We believe her hypothetical testimony would have opened the door to harsh cross-examination, further diminishing any impact it might have had on the trial’s outcome. We think the district court was correct to find that such testimony would not reasonably have resulted in a different outcome to the trial, in light of the other evidence against Cullen. Even assuming as we have done that Cullen was not advised by counsel regarding her right to testify, we agree with the district court’s determination that Cullen did not adequately allege how she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to so advise her and that the record is to the contrary. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err when it refused an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Cullen Did Not Allege Sufficient Facts to Support Her Fourth Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel. Cullen claims that the district court erred when it refused an evidentiary hearing on her claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel “failed to adequately prepare for trial in that they did not depose a single witness or prepare for cross examination of any of the medical or expert witnesses.” The district court determined that she alleged no specific testimony. We agree. As we discussed with Cullen’s other claims, Cullen was required to identify specific witnesses who could have testified, what their specific testimony would have been, and how that would have resulted in a different outcome. Instead, in her motion Cullen alleged only generalities. - 401 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383 The district court did not err when it refused an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Cullen Did Not Allege Sufficient Facts to Support Her Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel. Cullen claims that the district court erred when it refused an evidentiary hearing on her claim that her appellate counsel “fail[ed] to meet with her and discuss the ineffective assistance of trial counsel so as to effectively set out those complaints in her appellate brief and thereby limiting the parameters of her [postconviction] proceedings.” The district court determined that Cullen failed to allege how the outcome of her appeal would have been different if appellate counsel had raised the claims. We agree. Because Cullen’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was a layered claim based on the failure of appellate counsel to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we review whether trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland test. See State v. Parnell, 305 Neb. 932, 943 N.W.2d 678 (2020). Cullen must show that but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the claims, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal would have been different, and if Cullen failed to adequately allege that trial counsel was ineffective, then Cullen was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issues. See id. For her claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Cullen relied on the claims she set forth in her postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As discussed above, we agreed with the district court’s determination that each of those claims was not sufficient. Therefore, Cullen’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to raise those claims on direct appeal is of no avail. We conclude the district court did not err when it rejected Cullen’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel without an evidentiary hearing. - 402 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports STATE v. CULLEN Cite as 311 Neb. 383