Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the April 3, 1995, search warrant sufficiently particular?

Text: Clark contends that because the April 3 search warrant merely authorized a search for trace evidence it failed to meet the constitutional requirement of particularity about the thing to be searched and the evidence to be seized. The trial court at Clark's Franks hearing rejected that contention. Whether a warrant meets the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 691, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 1193, 140 L.Ed.2d 323 (1998). In Stenson we gave the particularity requirement thorough treatment. We recalled: To comply with the mandate of the Fourth Amendment particularity clause, a search warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the officer executing the warrant can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty. Thus, search warrants are to be tested and interpreted in a common sense, practical manner, rather than in a hypertechnical sense. In general, the degree of specificity required varies according to the circumstances and the type of items involved. A description is valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity, or crime, under investigation permits. The fact that a warrant lists generic classifications ... does not necessarily result in an impermissibly broad warrant..... [W]here the precise identity of items sought cannot be determined when the warrant is issued, a generic or general description of items will be sufficient if probable cause is shown and a more specific description is impossible. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 691-92, 940 P.2d 1239 (citations omitted). The scope of the search warrant Detective Herndon sought was based on the following language in the affidavit: [Y]our affiant is requesting the search warrant for Mr. Clark's van, a 1978 Dodge van, beige in color, Washington license 45297H ... registered to Mr. Richard Clark.... Mr. Clark was seen at the residence with the above listed van and left several times in this van. If Roxanne was removed from her residence by use of the van, there would be trace evidence from the victim in the van. 7 CP at 1265 (emphasis added). As a term of art, trace evidence means small items of a foreign material left on another, Br. of Resp't at 31 (citing 13A Seth A. Fine & Douglas J. Ende, Washington Practice: Criminal Law § 507, at 100 (2d ed.1998)), of which there are many possible types, including blood, hairs, fibers.... 4 Cyril H. Wecht, Forensic Sciences § 36.04(d)(1)(i), at 36-44, 36-45 (1998). Due to the inherent size and multiplicity of kinds of trace evidence, their prior identification in a warrant is impossible and thus a generic classification, under Stenson, is appropriate. Such generic classifications are frequently upheld. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 211-12, 687 P.2d 861 (1984) (specific items plus `any other evidence of the homicide' (quoting language of warrant)); State v. Lingo, 32 Wash.App. 638, 640-42, 649 P.2d 130 (1982) (`any and all evidence of assault and rape including but not limited to' specified items (quoting language of warrant)); State v. Benner, 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 533 N.E.2d 701, 709 (1988) (fibers and hairs and other trace evidence for comparison). It therefore appears the April 3, 1995, search warrant was not impermissibly broad, as it limited the search to trace evidence in Clark's van of Roxanne Doll. Merely because the search for trace evidence involved the search of many items in the van for trace evidence, including parts of the walls and floors of the vehicle, does not therefore make the search a `general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings' prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)).