Opinion ID: 884311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: Did the Workers' Compensation Court err when it concluded that the settlement agreements entered into between claimants and the State Fund foreclose claimants' rights to additional benefits? During the pendency of this litigation, four of the claimantsJay Harbrige, Susan Vernon, Steve Prickett, and James Brownreached settlement agreements with the State Fund. The Workers' Compensation Court concluded that those agreements foreclose claimants' rights to all further workers' compensation benefits, including increased temporary total and impairment rating benefits. On appeal, claimants contend that the settlement agreements foreclose only their entitlements to wage supplement and rehabilitation benefits and, therefore, that the Workers' Compensation Court erred when it concluded that those agreements foreclose their rights to all further benefits. In support of this contention, they assert the following two arguments: (1) pursuant to Ingraham v. Champion International (1990), 243 Mont. 42, 793 P.2d 769, the settlement petitions used by the parties (DOLI Form LF820) cannot be applied to impairment awards; and (2) because the settlement petitions are ambiguous, the court can and should analyze extrinsic evidence in order to determine the parties' intent. Claimants' first argument asserts that: (1) pursuant to Ingraham, impairment awards are not subject to the lump sum conversion requirements of § 39-71-741, MCA;(2) the settlement petitions used in this case (DOLI Form LF820) are specifically designed to implement the provisions of § 39-71-741(2), MCA; and (3) therefore, the settlement petitions cannot be applied to impairment awards. Although § 39-71-741(2), MCA (1987-89), permits permanent total disability and permanent partial wage supplement benefits to be converted to a lump sum, it does not preclude claimants who are entitled to either type of those benefits from fully and finally settling their potential rights to other types of benefits. Furthermore, Ingraham merely provides that lump sum awards of impairment benefits are not subject to the requirements set forth in § 39-71-741(2), MCA (1987-89). Ingraham, 243 Mont. at 47, 793 P.2d at 772. We therefore conclude that claimants' reliance upon Ingraham is misplaced. Second, claimants contend that the settlement petitions are ambiguous and, therefore, that the court can and should analyze extrinsic evidencethe contemporaneous correspondence between the partiesin order to determine the parties' intent. In their brief, they concede that there is language in the body of the petitions which could be construed as closing all claims for all types of benefits. The exact language of the settlement petitions to which they refer provides, in part, that the parties agreed to fully and finally conclude all compensation and/or rehabilitation payments due the claimant and that the claimant petitions the Division of Workers' Compensation ... for approval of this petition and that the claim be fully and finally closed. Despite that operative language in the petitions, claimants allege that, based on the following factors, the settlement petitions are ambiguous: (1) the petitions are standardized forms, produced by the DOLI; (2) the petitions are designed to implement, and correspond directly to § 39-71-741(2), MCA; and (3) the petition is captioned: (Permanent Partial Wage Supplement and/or Rehabilitation Benefits). Although the settlement petitions are, in fact, standardized forms produced by the DOLI pursuant to § 39-71-741(2), MCA, claimants' counsel selected and prepared the petitions, and then forwarded them to the State Fund for execution. Claimants' counsel, however, did not attempt to modify the unambiguous language in the petitions; nor did they use the additional spaces provided to insert any special provisions or to indicate the retention of any specific rights. Had they intended to enter into only a partial settlement, they could easily have inserted an express provision which retained their rights to further benefits. Therefore, even if we assume, without deciding, that the settlement petitions in this case are, in fact, ambiguous, we conclude that any such ambiguities must be strictly construed against the party who created them. Mueske v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. (1993), 260 Mont. 207, 216, 859 P.2d 444, 449-50; Lauterjung v. Johnson (1977), 175 Mont. 74, 78, 572 P.2d 511, 513. Accordingly, we hold that the Workers' Compensation Court did not err when it concluded that the settlement agreements entered into between claimants and the State Fund foreclose claimants' rights to all further benefits, including increased temporary total and impairment rating benefits. That part of the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court is affirmed.