Opinion ID: 1160222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the defense of abandonment

Text: Both orders granting a new trial were based in part on the belief of the trial judge that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on the defense of abandonment. At trial defendants tried to show they abandoned their plan before the crime of attempt was committed. They proposed an instruction on abandonment derived essentially from a New York statute which sets up abandonment of criminal purpose as an affirmative defense to the crime of attempt. The trial courts both rejected the proposed instruction and gave an instruction properly based on our attempt statute, RCW 9A.28.020. [4] The instruction given correctly stated that a person is guilty of attempt if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. The instruction qualified the meaning of a substantial step by stating that the conduct must be more than mere preparation. It was proper to use language from the statute in the instruction. State v. Hardwick, 74 Wn.2d 828, 447 P.2d 80 (1968). Defendants contend, however, that the statutory language, substantial step, is unconstitutionally vague unless further defined, that an instruction on abandonment is necessary in order to properly define it, and that without the requested instruction they were precluded from arguing their theory of the case to the jury. [5] We must disagree. The question of what constitutes a substantial step under the particular facts of the case is clearly for the trier of fact. The instruction given informed the jury that mere preparation would not be sufficient, that something more must be present in order to constitute a substantial step. When preparation ends and an attempt begins, we have held, always depends on the facts of the particular case. State v. Nicholson, 77 Wn.2d 415, 463 P.2d 633 (1969). We cannot agree that the instruction given was unconstitutionally vague. Furthermore, an instruction relating to abandonment is neither necessary nor even particularly helpful in defining the meaning of a substantial step. Once a substantial step has been taken, and the crime of attempt is accomplished, the crime cannot be abandoned. See State v. McGilvery, 20 Wash. 240, 55 P. 115 (1898). See also 1 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 76, at 161 (1957). The defendants' attempt to show they abandoned their plan is thus relevant only if the abandonment occurred before a substantial step was taken. Through arguing their theory at trial, they could only have hoped to show they never took a substantial step toward the specific crime. Abandonment is not, however, a true defense to the crime of attempt under our statute  that is, a showing of abandonment does not negate the State's allegation that a substantial step occurred. Thus, pursuing the theory of abandonment could only be a strategy for showing why a substantial step was never taken. Defendants could not thereby show whether such a step was taken. We therefore conclude an instruction on abandonment is not necessary as a matter of law to properly define a substantial step. Moreover, in this case the instruction given did not preclude defendants from arguing to the jury their theory that they abandoned their plan. It should be noted that the instruction proposed by defendants was not a correct statement of Washington law and could not properly have been given. It implies that abandonment, even after a substantial step was taken, would be a defense. As explained above, this is not the case under our statute. While we do not find the courts below erred as a matter of law in failing to give an abandonment instruction, we note that some further definition of substantial step by this court may be helpful. RCW 9A.28.020, the attempt statute, was enacted in 1975. It changes the language defining the crime of attempt. Under the earlier statute, RCW 9.01.070, now repealed, the elements of the crime were intent and an act tending but failing to accomplish the crime. We held under that statute that the act, however slight, must be overt and clearly show the design of the person to commit a crime. State v. Nicholson, supra . We must assume, of course, that the legislature's adoption of different language in the newer statute was intentional. The standard of a substantial step will not be identical to the standard of an over act. We note that the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute employs the substantial step standard in its definition of criminal attempt. Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). [1a] Under the code, conduct is not a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Model Penal Code § 5.01(2). That subsection also lists examples of conduct which would not be insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a substantial step. [2] We find it appropriate to adopt the Model Penal Code approach to the definition of a substantial step. As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in an opinion adopting the Code definition as a standard for the Ohio statute: [T]his standard does properly direct attention to overt acts of the defendant which convincingly demonstrate a firm purpose to commit a crime, while allowing police intervention, based upon observation of such incriminating conduct, in order to prevent the crime when the criminal intent becomes apparent. State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d 127, 132, 357 N.E.2d 1059 (1976). This approach does not conflict with the doctrine already developed in this state regarding the crime of attempt. See State v. Nicholson, supra . It does, however, give full recognition to the changes in the statute adopted by the legislature. We therefore hold it would be proper for a trial court to include in its instruction to a jury on the crime of attempt the qualifying statement that in order for conduct to be a substantial step it must be strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose.