Opinion ID: 63326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. High v. E-Systems Inc., 459 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). However, because the language of this ERISA plan grants GEGLAC the discretion to interpret the Plan and determine a claimant’s eligibility for benefits, we will set aside GEGLAC’s benefits decision only for an abuse of discretion. Id. 3 No. 07-10739 This court applies a two-step analysis to determine whether the plan administrator abused its discretion in construing plan terms. Plyant v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2007). First, we determine whether the administrator’s interpretation is “legally correct.” Id. If so, there is no abuse of discretion and the inquiry ends. Id. However, if the administrator has not given the plan a legally correct interpretation, we must consider whether the administrator’s interpretation constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id; see High, 459 F.3d at 577 & n.2. Our precedents recognize that we need not take the first step in the analysis if we can determine that the administrator’s benefits decision was not an abuse of discretion. High, 459 F.3d at 577; MacLachlan v. ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 2003). This means that GEGLAC’s interpretation of the Plan, even if legally incorrect, will be affirmed so long as it constitutes a reasonable exercise of interpretive discretion. When reviewing the exercise of discretion, we must “analyze whether the plan administrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously.” Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999). “A decision is arbitrary only if made without a rational connection between the known facts and the decision or between the found facts and the evidence.” Id. at 215 (quotation marks omitted). This court’s “review of the administrator’s decision need not be particularly complex or technical; it need only assure that the administrator’s decision fall somewhere on a continuum of reasonableness – even if on the low end.” Corry v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 398 (5th Cir. 2007). We will explain the reasons that we find GEGLAC did not abuse its discretion when it interpreted the Plan to include only commissions actually paid in the BME calculation. That conclusion means we need not determine whether the interpretation was also “legally correct.” We note, however, that the decision to skip the first step is not tantamount to endorsing the district court’s 4 No. 07-10739 conclusion that GEGLAC’s interpretation of the Plan was not a legally correct one. Instead, it is a recognition that an analysis of legal correctness is superfluous in a case such as this, where the minimally-conflicted administrator has given a reasonable interpretation to ambiguous plan language. In accordance with our precedent, we turn directly to the second step in our analysis and consider whether GEGLAC abused its discretion.