Opinion ID: 2638972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 10 Smith first asserts that exhibit two, the statement from the DOL custodian of records, was improperly admitted into evidence because it contained hearsay not within the scope of any exception. We would normally address this rule-based argument first before addressing the constitutional questions raised by Smith. See State v. Hall, 95 Wash.2d 536, 539, 627 P.2d 101 (1981). However, we do not reach the merits of Smith's hearsay argument because the issue was not properly preserved at trial. [4] See RAP 2.5(a). ¶ 11 When the State moved to admit exhibit two into evidence, Smith's counsel merely objected to foundation. This is insufficient to preserve a hearsay objection for appeal. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 422, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Avendano-Lopez, 79 Wash.App. 706, 710, 904 P.2d 324 (1995); City of Seattle v. Carnell, 79 Wash.App. 400, 403, 902 P.2d 186 (1995). ¶ 12 As the State argued here, the judge reasonably reviewed the exhibit to determine whether it had the appropriate seal from the State of Washington to establish its authenticity under ER 902. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 11 n. 8. Having no objection requiring him to rule on hearsay, the judge allowed the exhibit into evidence.
¶ 13 Smith next contends that there is insufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the crime. In a criminal prosecution, due process requires the State to prove every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Teal, 152 Wash.2d 333, 337, 96 P.3d 974 (2004); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). [5] Implicit in this principle is the requirement that jury instructions list all of the elements of the crime, since failure to list all elements would permit the jury to convict without proof of the omitted element. See State v. Linehan, 147 Wash.2d 638, 653-54, 56 P.3d 542 (2002). In determining the elements of a statutorily defined crime, principles of statutory construction require us to give effect to all statutory language if possible. See State v. Tandecki, 153 Wash.2d 842, 847, 109 P.3d 398 (2005); Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d at 624, 106 P.3d 196. ¶ 14 RCW 46.20.342 provides in part: (1) It is unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle in this state while that person is in a suspended or revoked status or when his or her privilege to drive is suspended or revoked in this or any other state.... (a) A person found to be an habitual offender under chapter 46.65 RCW, who violates this section while an order of revocation issued under chapter 46.65 RCW prohibiting such operations is in effect, is guilty of driving while license suspended or revoked in the first degree, a gross misdemeanor.... ¶ 15 Under the plain terms of this statute, and as charged in the information, the criminal act is DWLS in the first degree as a result of being found to be an habitual traffic offender under chapter 46.65 RCW. RCW 46.20.342(1)(a); CP (51816-0-I) at 12. Accordingly, Smith now asserts that the State was required to prove not only that his license was revoked on May 7, 2002, but that his license had been revoked due to a finding that he was an habitual traffic offender. He further claims that the State's evidence on this element  exhibit two and Smith's statement on the stand  was insufficient because it showed only that his license had been revoked in the first degree, without providing any explanation as to the meaning of this designation. Similarly, he claims that the to convict instruction was defective because it merely required the jury to find that his license had been revoked in the first degree. We agree. ¶ 16 The Court of Appeals concluded, and the State argues here, that a person who has his license revoked in the first degree is an habitual traffic offender as a matter of law. Smith, 122 Wash.App. at 703, 94 P.3d 1014. [6] An accused can be convicted of first degree driving with a revoked license only if his license has been revoked due to a finding that he is an habitual traffic offender under chapter 46.65 RCW. However, the jury was never informed of this fact. ¶ 17 The root problem here is that the prosecutor, trial court, and Court of Appeals all treat the crime as consisting of driving with a license that has been revoked in the first degree. DOL too seems to treat revocations as occurring in degrees, hence, its representation in exhibit two that Smith's license had been suspended/revoked in the first degree. State's Ex. 2. ¶ 18 While it may be convenient shorthand to describe revocations in this way, the DWLS statute describes no degrees of revocations. Under the statute's plain terms, the crime is driving with a license that has been suspended or revoked, the degree of which depends on the reason for the revocation. See RCW 46.20.342(1)(a)-(c). [7] ¶ 19 The evidence in this case, however, merely shows that Smith's license was revoked in the first degree, without any explanation as to the reason Smith's license was revoked. In the absence of evidence providing such an explanation, no juror could find that Smith's license had been revoked because he had been found to be an habitual traffic offender under chapter 46.65 RCW. Had the State introduced evidence that contained a finding that Smith was an habitual traffic offender under chapter 46.65 RCW, e.g., the revocation order, this element would have been satisfied. But as noted above, though exhibit two purported to attach such an order, no portion of Smith's actual driving record was ever offered into evidence. ¶ 20 To uphold Smith's conviction under these circumstances would render the portions of RCW 46.20.342(1) that distinguish between crimes defined in that statute meaningless. Accordingly, we hold that in a prosecution for DWLS in the first degree, the State must prove that the accused was under an order of revocation as an habitual offender under chapter 46.65 RCW at the time of his violation. The State failed to produce evidence on this element necessary to support Smith's conviction.
¶ 21 If a reviewing court finds insufficient evidence to prove an element of a crime, reversal is required. State v. Hickman, 135 Wash.2d 97, 103, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). Retrial following reversal for insufficient evidence is `unequivocally prohibited' and dismissal is the remedy. Id. The State asserts, however, that if any error occurred in this case, it was harmless in light of defense counsel's statement during closing argument. We cannot adopt this theory. ¶ 22 As noted by the jury instructions in this very case, [t]he attorneys' remarks, statements and arguments are intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law. They are not evidence.  CP (51816-0-I) at 19 (emphasis added); see also State v. Refuerzo, 102 Wash.App. 341, 345, 7 P.3d 847 (2000); but see State v. Lord, 117 Wash.2d 829, 860, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (finding that any prejudice that may have resulted from the admission of certain evidence was eliminated by counsel's concession during closing argument). ¶ 23 Here, the State produced no evidence regarding Smith's habitual offender status under chapter 46.65 RCW. To give defense counsel's remarks the effect argued by the State would be to treat them as a guilty plea. But a guilty plea must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wash.2d 294, 297, 88 P.3d 390 (2004); see also CrR 4.2(e). There is no suggestion that these conditions were met here.