Opinion ID: 2543513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sexual Proclivity Evidence

Text: ¶ 39 Finally, the trial court ruled that the newly discovered evidence was inadmissible because it violated Utah Rule of Evidence 412's prohibition on sexual proclivity evidence. The court held, [T]his evidence runs afoul of Utah Rule of Evidence 412, if [Martin]'s argument is that because Ms. Egan has willingly gotten into a car with a strange man in the past, she has a certain sexual predisposition. ¶ 40 We have previously held that evidence of an alleged rape victim's past sexual activities with someone other than the accused carr[ies] a presumption of unfair[ness] due to its unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury, and thus, distort the deliberative process and skew a trial's outcome. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980). In line with this presumption, Utah Rule of Evidence 412 provides both substantive and procedural restraints against the introduction of evidence concerning an alleged victim's past sexual acts. See Utah R. Evid. 412. Specifically, rule 412 prohibits in all criminal proceedings the introduction of evidence offered either (1) to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior or (2) to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition. Utah R. Evid. 412(a). [5] ¶ 41 In the case now before us, the trial court excluded the newly discovered evidence concerning Egan's acceptance of a ride from a stranger in September 1996 based on the assumption that Martin was offering the evidence to prove that because ... Egan ha[d] willingly gotten into a car with a strange man in the past, she has a certain sexual predisposition. Despite this reasoning, Martin argued both below and on appeal that he is not seeking to admit into evidence any information concerning Egan's sexual behavior or predisposition. Rather, Martin avers that he wishes to introduce the evidence for the limited purpose of demonstrating Egan's casual attitude toward strangers, her impulsiveness, and her irresponsibility. Indeed, the trial court itself admitted that Martin did not intend to introduce evidence of Egan's past sexual behavior. In its order denying Martin's motion for a new trial, the court reasoned: [T]he State argues that any evidence concerning the prior rape is inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 412. This argument is moot because ... the defense [previously] clarified it would not seek to introduce any evidence of Ms. Egan's prior sexual activity, including the prior rape. Instead, the defense is seeking solely to introduce evidence of Ms. Egan's willingness to meet and travel with a stranger under very similar circumstances to [this] case. Importantly, however, the lower court's determination in this regardthat any objection to the newly discovered evidence on the basis of rule 412's prohibition against evidence of an alleged victim's sexual behavior is moot in this casemust likewise apply to the rule's prohibition on evidence of an alleged victim's sexual predisposition as it applies here. Id. ¶ 42 Although rule 412 precludes evidence that directly refer[s] to sexual activities or thoughts as well as evidence that  may have a sexual connotation for the fact finder, the evidence of Egan's accepting a ride from a stranger in September 1996 simply possesses no sexual connotation, insinuation, or overtone. Utah R. Evid. 412 advisory committee note (emphasis added). Rather, given Martin's averment that he will not introduce any evidence concerning Egan's sexual behavior or predisposition, including the alleged prior rape, a jury could no more reasonably deduce that Egan engaged inor was forced to engage insexual acts with the stranger than it could conclude they played board games, built model airplanes, or ate sandwiches. While we acknowledge that rule 412 should be construed broadly in order to fully effectuate the policy considerations underlying its prohibitions, we refuse to extend the rule's circumference of influence to evidence as sexually innocuous as that at issue here. See id. Such a result would both impermissibly contradict the purpose of the rule itself and endanger the delicately balanced scope and effect of this jurisdiction's other evidentiary rules. See, e.g., State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ¶ 31, 20 P.3d 271 (When interpreting an evidentiary rule, we apply principles of statutory construction.); Butler v. Naylor, 1999 UT 85, ¶ 9, 987 P.2d 41 (same); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396-99 (Utah 1989) (noting the careful balance among certain evidentiary rules); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 554 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (same). Moreover, we note that to the degree information concerning Egan's sexual behavior or predisposition might somehow become implicated by the introduction of evidence concerning her acceptance of a ride from a stranger in September 1996, nothing in rule 412 would prevent the trial court from carefully directing the scope of questioning away from such inadmissible information or from issuing a limiting instruction to ensure that evidence prohibited by rule 412 is not considered by the jury as a general matter. See Utah R. Evid. 412; see also, e.g., State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 281 (Utah 1989) (noting that trial courts may properly protect interests of a witness by limiting scope of questioning to exclude inadmissible evidence); State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1981) (same). ¶ 43 Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred by deeming inadmissible the newly discovered evidence at issue here as violating rule 412's prohibition on sexual proclivity evidence. Therefore, in accordance with our determination that the evidence is relevant and would not have constituted impermissible character propensity evidence at trial, we further hold that the court erred in reaching its ultimate conclusion that the evidence was inadmissible. See supra ¶¶ 34, 38.