Opinion ID: 1198908
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proof of collectibility

Text: PCI further argues that the trial court erred in instructing that PCI was required to prove that any judgment would have been collectible from A/H or Ebasco. Professional negligence consists of four elements: duty, breach, causal connection between negligent conduct and injury, and actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence. Belland v. O.K. Lumber Co., 797 P.2d 638, 640 (Alaska 1990). When a legal claim is lost through professional negligence, actual damage occurs only if the claim is meritorious and has value; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving these elements of damage. See Ridenour v. Lewis, 121 Or. App. 416, 854 P.2d 1005, 1006 (1993). In such cases, however, it is far from clear whether proof of a lost claim's value requires evidence showing that a judgment on the lost claim would actually have been collectible. This court has never faced the issue; authorities elsewhere are divided. See generally Jourdain v. Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1987). Some decisions hold that collectibility of the [underlying] judgment is an element of proof in a legal malpractice action and that the burden is ... placed on the plaintiff to prove collectibility. Id. at 1306. [13] Others, like Jourdain itself, adopt a contrary view. See id. at 1307 (uncollectibility of a judgment should be treated as a matter constituting an avoidance or mitigation of the consequences of one's negligent act). [14] Recently, in Kituskie v. Corbman, 452 Pa.Super. 467, 682 A.2d 378, 382 (1996), appeal granted in part, 548 Pa. 628, 693 A.2d 967 (1997), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that, when legal malpractice results in the loss of a meritorious claim, the malpracticing attorney should bear the burden of disproving collectibility. In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that the plaintiff should not have the added burden ... since he or she has already been allegedly wronged by two parties (the third party and the attorney). Id. We find Kituskie persuasive. Because the need to determine collectibility is caused by professional negligence, and the requirement of proving collectibility arises only after malpractice has been proved, [15] policy would seem to militate in favor of requiring the malpracticing attorney to bear the inherent risks and uncertainties of proving uncollectibility. Practicality seems to point to the same conclusion: there is no good reason to presume from a record silent on the issue of collectibility that the underlying judgment at issue would not eventually be collected. [16] We thus adopt the rule imposing upon defendants the burden of proving uncollectibility. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that PCI bore the burden of proving collectibility. But the error does not require reversal. Here, by awarding damages to PCI, the jury necessarily found that PCI had met its burden of proving collectibility. [17] Accordingly, the error did not result in actual prejudice and was therefore harmless. See Beck v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 114 (Alaska 1992).