Opinion ID: 715048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stay Pending Appeal

Text: 27 10th Cir. R. 8.1 requires the applicant to address the following: (a) the likelihood of success on appeal; (b) the threat of irreparable harm if the stay or injunction is not granted; (c) the absence of harm to opposing parties if the stay or injunction is granted; and (d) any risk of harm to the public interest. These factors require individualized consideration and assessment in each case. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776-77, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 2119-20, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987); United States v. Various Tracts of Land in Muskogee and Cherokee Counties, 74 F.3d 197, 198 (10th Cir.1996). The Defendants' counsel has complied with 10th Cir. R. 8.2 which imposes additional requirements when emergency relief is sought. Relief has been sought at the earliest practicable time. Counsel also has complied with 10th Cir. R. 8.3 and has notified opposing counsel in accordance with the rule. 28 Fed. R.App. P. 8(a) requires that an application for a stay must ordinarily be made first in the district court. 29 A motion for such relief may be made to the court of appeals or to a judge thereof, but the motion shall show that application to the district court for the relief sought is not practicable, or that the district court has denied an application, or has failed to afford the relief which the applicant requested, with the reasons given by the district court for its action. 30 Fed. R.App. P. 8(a). Defendants' counsel has represented that the district court failed to afford the [requested] relief, when he requested that the portion of the order concerning prior inspection and approval of facilities be modified. Aplts./Pet. Emergency Application at 5. Although it is the court's strong preference that a stay be sought first in the district court, the rule admits of exceptions, and under the circumstances, it would serve little purpose to require another application to the district court. Moreover, the district court's resolve is demonstrated by a briefing schedule and imminent hearing on civil contempt.
31 If Defendants can meet the other requirements for a stay pending appeal, they will be deemed to have satisfied the likelihood of success on appeal element if they show questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation. See Walmer v. United States Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir.) (preliminary injunction context), cert.denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 474, 133 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995); Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir.1980) (same). See also 16 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Eugene Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3954 (1995 Supp. at 706) (serious legal questions); Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir.1981) (substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved). The purpose of a stay is to preserve the status quo pending appellate determination. See Lundgrin, 619 F.2d at 63; Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1964). 32 Defendants have satisfied the above standards regardless of whether the district court's imposition of the condition in question is viewed as a modification of the permanent injunction concerning the population caps or a new preliminary injunction. Defendants have shown a likelihood of success on two alternative and independent grounds. 33
Fed. R.Civ. P. 65(d) provides: 34 Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise. 35 The district court's oral ruling in this case does not appear to have been committed to writing in accordance with Rule 65(d). The Supreme Court has explained that this is not a mere technical requirement: The Rule was designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S.Ct. 713, 715, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974) (per curiam). It has been held that [o]ral statements are not injunctions, and that a defendant is under no judicial compulsion when an injunction is not recorded on a separate document in accordance with Rules 58 and 65(d). Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424, 1427-28 (7th Cir.1990). Absent a written order with sufficient specificity, see B & C Truck Leasing, Inc. v. ICC, 283 F.2d 163, 167-68 (10th Cir.1960), there are serious questions concerning not only enforceability, but also appellate jurisdiction. See Burgess v. Ryan, 996 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 923, 127 L.Ed.2d 216 (1994); Bates, 901 F.2d at 1427-29. A single circuit judge may not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal, Fed. R.App. P. 27(c), and I go on to address the next ground. 36
37 In institutional reform litigation, the constitutional violation provides the authority for a court-imposed remedy which displaces local control: 38 The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation means simply that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation.... 39 Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 281-82, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2758, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (citations omitted). See also Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247, 111 S.Ct. 630, 636-37, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991). Federal courts simply may not force local governments, over their objections, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389, 112 S.Ct. 748, 762, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Of course, the parties are free to consent to remedies beyond what the Constitution requires given a finding, either express or implied, of unconstitutional conditions. Id. See generally Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d 540, 544-45, supplemented, 41 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.1994); Diaz v. Romer, 961 F.2d 1508, 1510-11 (10th Cir.1992); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 865, 107 L.Ed.2d 949 (1990). Even with a consent decree, however, the district court is not free to enter a modification of the injunction which would be inconsistent with the governing law. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 527-28, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3078-79, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2588, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984). 40 In this case there is an express finding that whether a class-wide constitutional violation exists will remain undecided. Moreover, the preliminary injunction that gave way to the permanent injunction was issued largely on a showing of irreparable injury: 41 Without deciding whether overpopulation alone can amount to punishment sufficient to constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause, from the stipulated fact of overpopulation in relation to BCDC's design capacity, the Court concludes there is a substantial likelihood that, unless the Court intervenes, the unabated continuation of a population in excess of design capacity places such additional burdens on all aspects of BCDC, its staff, its residents, its services and its systems as to substantially increase the likelihood that irreparable harm, whether it rises to the level of a constitutional violation or not, will occur between now and the trial of this matter. 42 D. Ct. Order filed August 23, 1995 at 9-10 (doc. 106). At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs-Intervenors acknowledged that no finding of a constitutional violation has been made. 43 Although pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment standards applicable to convicted persons provide the benchmark in this case. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1871-72, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Howard v. Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978, 981 (10th Cir.1994). Proof of a constitutional violation in conditions of confinement cases cannot be presumed, and that is particularly true here--the district court's preliminary injunction and subsequent rulings before me do not address the current requirements (or cases) for obtaining relief in conditions of confinement cases. The district court has made no determination that the overcrowding at BCDC, let alone the conditions at any other temporary facility, have resulted in a constitutional violation with respect to any inmate. 44 While the Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishments, there are two components of an Eighth Amendment claim which must be proven to support a remedy: an objective component, the alleged deprivation must deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and a subjective component, the responsible official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e. deliberate indifference, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324-27, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (conditions of confinement case). See Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1525-26 (10th Cir.1992) (en banc) (acknowledging Wilson components). See also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-37, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2481-82, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (discussing objective and subjective components of Eighth Amendment violations); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (it is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize conduct prohibited....); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150 (7th Cir.1995) (No intent to injure means no 'punishment'; and no 'punishment,' no violation.); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (discussing objective component). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) and (b) (enacting limits upon remedies for individual overcrowding claims under the Eighth Amendment). 45 While the district court is to be accorded flexibility in administering the permanent injunction, Defendants have made a strong showing that the permanent injunction does not preclude them from assigning inmates to facilities other than BCDC, let alone require them to obtain the district court's permission after Plaintiffs' counsel previews/inspects the facilities and has the opportunity to lodge objections. The district court has acknowledged repeatedly that alternative sites are not foreclosed, thus, while the permanent injunction prescribes population caps for BCDC, it does not require use of the MRS if alternatives can be found to avoid overpopulation. 46 Requiring inspection by Plaintiffs' counsel and court approval of any temporary site, whether it be Montessa Park, the state penitentiary or the soon-to-be-operational Westside facility, reaches far beyond maintaining an acceptable population level at BCDC. Such requirements necessarily involve the district court in the operation of other institutions, something generally proscribed absent a condition which offends the Constitution. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 337, 101 S.Ct. at 2394-95. District courts must bear in mind that their inquiries 'spring from Constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility.'  Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1874, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Moreover, the district court's requirements seem particularly inappropriate here, notwithstanding the lack of proof of a constitutional violation, because the temporary locations represent an effort on the part of the Defendants to comply with the permanent injunction concerning population caps. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837-38, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (comity requires an opportunity for prison officials to correct conditions); Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir.1994) (vacating injunctive relief after staying it pending appeal and noting that intrusive and far-reaching federal judicial intervention in the details of prison management is justifiable only where state officials have been afforded the opportunity to correct constitutional infirmities and have abdicated their responsibility to do so); Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 214 (2d Cir.1986) (vacating preliminary injunction). 47 Though too generalized to support a constitutional violation, the district court has been candid about where it believes the fault lies: 48 The order we entered as a result of the stipulation by the parties last August spoke [ ] to the overcrowding issue and recognized that the fault was not with BCDC officials. It recognized that the blame for overcrowding had to rest on the public who pressured legislators to increase criminal penalties yet at the same time deny the authority for public expenditure for new or improved facilities or programs directed toward persons against whom these laws are enforced. 49 It is obvious that stiffer penalties result in more incarcerated individuals, and the public has to follow through and take responsibility for ensuring that penal institutions are equipped and staffed to handle increased inmates. 50 Likewise, politicians who are quick to support public cries for stiffer penalties and incarceration must not shy away from supporting the unpopular measures necessary to meet the corresponding demands of an overused system. 51 Aplt./Pet. Emergency Request, ex. 2, Tr. at 80-81. While I appreciate the concern shown by the district court and the district court's willingness to be available to the parties as needed, the proper, and properly limited, role of the federal courts requires evaluation of these claims within the existing legal framework and appropriate support by competent proof. Taylor, 34 F.3d at 269, 271. While the conditions in this case deserve careful scrutiny, they must be evaluated with proper regard for the limited competence of federal judges to micromanage prisons. See Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164-65 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3193, 105 L.Ed.2d 701 (1989); Taylor, 34 F.3d at 269-70. 52 If the inspection and approval requirements are viewed independently, Defendants have made a strong showing that such requirements must fail under the current constitutional standards for conditions of confinement claims, as well as the standards for governing preliminary injunctive relief.
53 If the stay is not granted, Defendants will be forced to release 163 inmates. Defendants maintain that they need flexibility to house inmates elsewhere on short notice to meet the population caps imposed by the permanent injunction and to undertake local law enforcement initiatives. Requiring district court approval, after inspection and probable objection by Plaintiffs' counsel, is a cumbersome procedure that is tantamount to a presumption that Defendants will act in an unconstitutional manner regarding these other facilities. Moreover, the district court's procedure will interfere with law enforcement initiatives, prosecutorial discretion and state judicial power. 54
55 Given that no finding of a constitutional violation has occurred, it does not appear that opposing parties will be harmed in a way that is redressable in federal court. Moreover, a new facility on the Westside should open within sixty days and be available to house inmates over the population cap at BCDC. Finally, while the district court's inspect and approve requirements substantially alter the status quo, a stay pending appeal will restore it. See Lundgrin, 619 F.2d at 63.
56 It is in the public interest to have these claims resolved prior to implementing the Matrix Release System. Federalism and concern for local control concerning law enforcement, prosecution and adjudication, counsel in favor of an orderly resolution of the serious claims involved. 57 The stay pending appeal is granted and the petition for a writ of prohibition is referred to the Clerk for panel assignment. 58 IT IS SO ORDERED.