Opinion ID: 3171885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ordinance 34 Materially Impedes the Stateâs Sex Offender Scheme

Text: Â¶58Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Colorado law promotes public safety through an extremely comprehensive sex offender management system. Decades in the making, this statutory and regulatory system concentrates on simultaneously monitoring, rehabilitating, and reintegrating sex offenders. See, e.g., Â§ 16-11.7-101, C.R.S. (2015). At the helm are the Sex Offender Management Board (âSOMBâ) and state parole and probation authorities, which carefully oversee virtually every aspect of a sex offenderâs life, from the initial decision whether to release the offender into the community to the terms and conditions dictating the offenderâs existence once there. Â¶59Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Ordinance 34 hinders the stateâs comprehensive system in at least three crucial ways: (1) it causes some sex offenders to evade the ban by registering falsely or foregoing registration altogether, thereby causing such offenders to drop off the radar that the state uses to enhance the safety of all Colorado citizens; (2) it impairs the stateâs efforts to maximize public safety through individualized case management; and (3) it lays the groundwork for a ânot-in-my-backyardâ domino effect that will only causeÂ these statewide public safety concerns to fester. To more plainly illustrate Ordinance 34âs interference with state law, I address and expand on each of these points in turn. Â¶60Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â First, Ordinance 34 undermines the stateâs ability to carefully oversee sex offenders through the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (âCSORAâ), Â§Â§ 16-22-101 to -115. The state uses this centralized registration system to track offenders in order to âprotect the community and . . . aid law enforcement officials in investigating future sex crimes.â See People v. Carbajal, 2012 COA 107, Â¶ 37, 312 P.3d 1183, 1189. Ordinance 34 impedes registration by causing some sex offenders to register falsely or not register at all. Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1251. Naturally, as a SOMB official testified, losing track of offenders frustrates not only the registration system but also the stateâs overall sex offender management scheme. The majority ignores this evidence. Â¶61Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Second, Ordinance 34 undermines the stateâs ability to assure the successful rehabilitation and reintegration of sex offenders into society in a way that best protects public safety. 3 In order to improve the likelihood of successful reintegration, sexÂ offender release must be discretionary, evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and closely linked to supervision and treatment conditions specific to each offender. See Â§Â§ 18-1.3-1005 to -1009, C.R.S. (2015); see also Â§ 17-22.5-404(1)(e), C.R.S. (2015) (recognizing connection between âoffenderâs likelihood of successâ and âaligning the intensity and type of . . . supervision, conditions of release, and services with assessed risk and need levelâ). Thus, the legislature created âintensive supervisionâ parole and probation programs for sex offenders that âshall be designed to minimize the risk to the public to the greatest extent possible,â Â§Â§ 18-1.3-1005(2), -1007(2), and required that release into either program be conditioned on a determination that the offender âwould not pose an undue threat to the community,â Â§Â§ 18-1.3-1006(1)(a), -1008(1.5). The legislature also directed the SOMB to promulgate standards for evaluating sex offenders on an individual basis and determining offender-specific conditions of release necessary to manage, monitor, and treat each offender. See Â§ 16-11.7-103(4)(a)â(b); Â§ 17-22.5-403(8)(b); Â§Â§ 18-1.3-204(1)(a), -1009(1)(a).Â And bec ause the goals of rehabilitation and reintegration âdepend on the creation and maintenance of a stable environment and support system, close to family ties, employment, and treatment options,â Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (quoting Fross v. Cty. of Allegheny, 612 F. Supp. 2d 651, 658 (W.D. Pa. 2009)), Colorado statutes and regulations reflect the importance of placing each sex offender in a living situation designed to further that offenderâs chance of success. Â¶62Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Before an offender is released, his or her treatment provider must make recommendations to the state parole office âregarding ongoing treatment needs, living arrangements and conditions of supervision related to the offenderâs rehabilitative needs.â See Colo. Sex Offender Mgmt. Bd., Standards and Guidelines for the Assessment, Evaluation, Treatment and Behavioral Monitoring of Adult Sex Offenders Â§ 3.650(b) (2011) [hereinafter Standards and Guidelines] (emphasis added). If parole is granted, the parole office is charged with providing âsupervision and assistance in securing employment, housing, and such other services as may affect the successful reintegration of the sex offender into the community . . . .â Â§ 17-22.5-403(8)(b) (emphasis added). The scheme provides that successful reintegration can be facilitated by the support systems available in Shared Living Arrangements, see Standards and Guidelines Â§Â§ 3.170, 3.171; see also Â§ 16-11.7-103(4)(b) (âTreatment options may include . . . shared living arrangements . . . .â), or in living with an Approved Community Support Person, see Standards and Guidelines Â§ 5.710. 4 Â¶63Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The scheme further contemplates a direct state role in selecting and monitoring sex offendersâ residences. In order for an offender to show that he or she âwould not pose an undue threat to the communityâ under section 18-1.3-1006(1)(a), the offender must submit for approval a Parole Plan which demonstrates, among other things, that the offenderâs âhome living situation is free from former and potential victimsâ and that â[t]he appropriate level of supervision and containment is available where the offender plans to live.â Colo. Sex Offender Mgmt. Bd., Lifetime Supervision Criteria Â§ LS 1.010(I) (1999) [hereinafter Supervision Criteria] (promulgated pursuant to Â§ 18-1.3-1009). Offenders must receive prior approval from their supervising officer before changing residences, Standards and Guidelines Â§ 5.620(K), and are not allowed to reside with children under age eighteen, id. Â§ 5.620(E). If an offender is assigned to a Shared Living Arrangement, its location must be approved in advance by state officers. See id. Â§ 3.170. In addition, state courts can require as a condition of probation that an offender reside in a particular facility or remain within the jurisdiction of the court. Â§ 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(III), (XI). And in order for an offender on probation to receive reduced supervision or discharge, the offender must âmaintain a stable and safe residence,â which is a residence that âlimits the offenderâs contact with victims, potential victims, and minors.â Supervision Criteria Â§ LS 3.010(D) (promulgated pursuant to Â§ 18-1.3-1009). Â¶64Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In sum, state law places in the hands of state officials the authority to select or approve a sex offenderâs residence. Ordinance 34 overrides that authority by legislatively disapproving any residence located in Englewood. To me, approval by theÂ state, plus disapproval by a locality, equals conflict. Thus, the âoperational effectâ of Ordinance 34âbanning sex offender residency in an entire cityââwould conflictâ with state law by âmaterially imped[ing]â the stateâs interest in sex offender management, rehabilitation, and reintegration. See Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d at 1056â57, 1059. By closing off an entire city without considering the nature of the offender in any way, bans like Ordinance 34 fail to respect the stateâs individualized approach to sex offender management and materially impede the state scheme for offenders whose best chances for successful reintegration depend on residing in a city with a ban in place. Such bans force the state to deviate from individualized assessments that would otherwise lead to an offenderâs placement in a banned locality. Â¶65Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Finally, I share the federal district courtâs apprehension about the domino effect that likely will follow from this courtâs approval of local residency bans. The majority seeks to downplay this concern by noting that only six Colorado cities have implemented residency bans. See maj. op. Â¶ 29. What the majority fails to acknowledge, however, is that such bans have never, until now, received a Colorado courtâs stamp of legal approval. Now able to hold up the majorityâs opinion as a shield to costly legal challenges, other home-rule cities will almost certainly enact residency bans of their own. Â¶66Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The likelihood of this result, and the severity of its impact on the stateâs sex offender scheme, is magnified by the fact that all six cities that currently restrict sex offender residency are located within or very near the greater Denver metropolitanÂ area, which is home to a majority of the stateâs population. 5 No longer hindered by the prospect of viable lawsuits, the remaining metro-area cities now have every incentive to pass residency bans in order to prevent sex offenders from moving into their communities. Indeed, the majority acknowledges that â[t]his is precisely why Englewood passed Ordinance 34 in the first placeâas a response to the passage of a similar restriction in Greenwood Village.â Id. at Â¶ 28. And an Englewood police officer testified at the trial below that Denver already has complained because Ordinance 34 causes sex offenders to move to Denver after Englewood rebuffs them. Â¶67Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Clearly, the stateâs sex offender scheme would be materially impeded if all cities enacted bans mirroring Ordinance 34. If six is insufficient, then I wonder, where would the majority draw the line? And wherever that line falls, would the majority find preempted only those bans enacted after the acceptable quota is filled? What if only four more cities enacted bans, but those four were Denver, Colorado Springs, Aurora, and Fort Collinsâthe four most populous cities in the state? And if itâs assumed that there is a line beyond which the stateâs sex offender scheme would be materially impeded, how can Englewoodâs ban not be preempted while the final cityâs ban would be? Our preemption doctrine should not condone such differentiation among coequal parts; yet, the majorityâs decision sets the stage for exactly that.    Â¶68Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â These many considerations lead me to conclude that Ordinance 34 materially impedes, and therefore operationally conflicts with, the stateâs sex offender scheme. Perhaps the conspicuousness of this clash helps explain why the majority seeks refuge in section 16-22-108(1)(a)(I) of the CSORA. That provision, however, cannot bear the weight of the interpretation the majority places on it. Â¶69Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â I turn now to the reasons why. B. Section 16-22-108(1)(a)(I) Does Not Embrace Laws like Ordinance 34 Â¶70Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Unlike the majority, I do not believe the legislature would impose on localities the obligation to register local sex offendersâ residences while simultaneously intending that section 16-22-108(1)(a)(I) would allow such localities to completely avoid that obligation by enacting sex offender residency bans. Not only is such an interpretation debatable under the plain language of the provision, it is contradicted by the provisionâs legislative history and defies common sense. Â¶71Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â For one, I find the provision ambiguous with respect to local law enforcement agenciesâ authority to reject registrants. The majority references only the latter clause of the relevant statutory sentence; but the full sentence states: A local law enforcement agency shall accept the registration of a person who lacks a fixed residence; except that the law enforcement agency is not required to accept the personâs registration if it includes a residence or location that would violate state law or local ordinance. Â§ 16-22-108(1)(a)(I). Read as a whole, it is unclear whether the exception for contrary state or local law applies to any registrant, as the word âresidenceâ in the second clause suggests, or only those registrants who lack a fixed residence, as the sentenceâs overallÂ construction suggests. Because I find this provision ambiguous, see State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500â01 (Colo. 2000) (â[W]here the words chosen by the legislature are . . . capable of two or more constructions leading to different results, the statute is ambiguous.â), I turn to the legislative history and consider the entire statutory scheme in order to ascertain the General Assemblyâs intent, id. Â¶72Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â This ambiguous provision was added to section 16-22-108 in 2012 by House Bill 12-1346. Ch. 220, sec. 4, Â§ 16-22-108, 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 817, 942. The legislatureâs sole purpose in enacting H.B. 12-1346 was to address the problem that had arisen from certain localitiesâ decisions not to register homeless or transient sex offenders. See, e.g., Hearings on H.B. 12-1346 before the H. Judiciary Comm., 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter House Hearings]. Because the localities had justified their decisions based on the fact that the stateâs sex offender laws then required registration only where an offender âresides,â id.; see also Â§ 16-22-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2011), H.B. 12-1346 amended those laws to expressly require registration of offenders who âlack a fixed residence,â see Ch. 220, secs. 1â7, Â§Â§ 16-22-102 to -109, Â§ 18-3-412.6, Â§ 16-11-102, 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 817, 940â46. Â¶73Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Nothing in the legislative history explains, or even references, the exception in the sentence added to section 16-22-108(1)(a)(I). Adding an exception to local policeâs obligation to register offenders with fixed residences not only would have been extraneous to the purpose of H.B. 12-1346, it would have been counterproductive. After all, the billâs purpose was to broaden the scope of localitiesâ registration obligations. In light of this purpose, had the legislature intended for H.B. 12-1346 to create a newÂ exception to localitiesâ obligation to register fixed-residence offenders, it is difficult to believe the bill would have passed through both the House and Senate without any mention of that fact. See House Hearings; Hearings on H.B. 12-1346 before the S. Judiciary Comm., 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (May 4, 2012). Â¶74Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â And even if the legislature did intend to create such an exception, I see nothing to suggest that it intended to accommodate decisions by localities to shut out sex offenders entirely. CSORA sets forth a top-down system of requirements and protocols to establish a centralized, accessible, and effective registration program and ensure that sex offenders are monitored in a coordinated manner. It tasks local law enforcement agencies with numerous information-sharing, notification, and verification duties and requires that such agencies report to state-level organizations. See, e.g., Â§Â§ 16-22-106(3); -107(3)â(4); -109(1), (3)â(3.5), (5); -110(4). It makes little sense that the legislature would enlist local police as a cog in this statewide system while at the same time contemplating that localities could unilaterally remove themselves from the system by passing self-exclusionary ordinances. Â¶75Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â For these reasons, I do not believe the General Assembly intended to embrace local bans on sex offender residency when it enacted the current language in section 16-22-108(1)(a)(I). I therefore reject the majorityâs repeated resort to that provision as evidence that state law contemplates, and even clears the way for, laws like Ordinance 34. III. Conclusion Â¶76Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The sum of these considerations leads me to conclude that Ordinance 34, and local sex offender residency bans in general, materially impede, and therefore operationally conflict with, the stateâs sex offender scheme. I therefore would find Ordinance 34 preempted and would answer the certified question in the affirmative. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part II.D of the majority opinion.