Opinion ID: 4237534
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requests for evidentiary hearing

Text: ¶21 Hulsey argues that the trial court abused its discretion by twice refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motions to dismiss for bad faith destruction thereby “preclud[ing] this Court [from] . . . 7 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court meaningfully review[ing] its resolution of fact intensive issues.” A failure to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 289 (1996). We conclude that neither denial of the requests for evidentiary hearings was error. ¶22 At oral argument on the first motion to dismiss for bad faith destruction of evidence, the trial court concluded that Hulsey failed to show that, at the time of the destruction, the State believed the fragments had evidentiary value. The defense argued that the medical examiner allegedly disobeyed clear protocol when he saw the fragments on the x-ray and did not retrieve them; instead, the medical examiner asked Detective Bustoz whether he should gather them and the detective purportedly told him “no.” 1 The court found that the lack of apparent evidentiary value at the time of destruction militated against finding the State acted in bad faith. 2 ¶23 Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, but “should err on the side of granting an evidentiary hearing so that they can gather as much relevant information as possible before making their rulings.” Id. Apart from an uncontested claim that the medical examiner may not have followed proper protocol— 1 At trial, Detective Bustoz denied making the decision not to preserve the bullet fragments, and Dr. Hu could not recall any such statement by Detective Bustoz. 2 Hulsey claimed at trial that bad faith was shown when the medical examiner saw the fragments but did not retrieve them at Detective Bustoz’s directive. Regardless whether such a directive occurred, we note that Dr. Hu explained that the fragments were too tiny to extract and too difficult to find without mutilation. There was also no bad faith in Detective Bustoz describing his understanding of the circumstances of the shooting to the doctor. Dr. Hu stated that it was common practice for the homicide detective to be present at the examiner’s office and that the information he received was that “the suspect produced a gun, fired a couple shots and Officer Holly received a gunshot wound.” 8 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court that is, to “recover foreign bodies of evidentiary value”—the defense failed to present any evidence that would show bad faith as required by Youngblood. State v. Walker, 185 Ariz. 228, 238 (App. 1995) (“[B]ad faith has less to do with the actor’s intent than with the actor’s knowledge that the evidence was constitutionally material.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 61)). Nothing alerted Detective Bustoz or Dr. Hu that Hulsey would allege that Officer Goitia shot Officer Holly. Because at worst the failure to extract the fragments only amounted to negligence, the court did not abuse its discretion in not granting an evidentiary hearing. ¶24 When Hulsey renewed his motion, he claimed that he could “now affirmatively demonstrate that he has been prejudiced by the bad faith actions of the State.” The pertinent addition from the first motion was an affidavit from Jaco Swanepoel, Hulsey’s firearms expert. Swanepoel declared that “no piece of forensic evidence . . . should arbitrarily be left unrecovered. . . . Fragments should be recovered for examination, irrespective of size.” Hulsey argued that bad faith was established when the “experienced prosecutor, experienced homicide detective and the medical examiner all recognized the constitutional materiality of the bullet fragments left within the victim’s head, yet they intentionally failed to preserve the evidence.” ¶25 The trial court agreed that it was reasonable to assume that fragments could be used to establish the identity of the weapon, but remained convinced that it was “merely potentially exculpatory at best.” We agree. It is not clear to us now, nor was it clear to the trial court at the time, that the fragments would definitively confirm Hulsey’s theory. When he renewed the motion, Hulsey’s only new basis for his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing was Swanepoel’s affidavit, which addressed harm rather than bad faith and therefore did not support an evidentiary hearing. Cf. State v. Grounds, 128 Ariz. 14, 15 (1981) (explaining that because the record was “devoid of evidence,” there was nothing upon which the trial court could base its ruling). Therefore, the evidence was only potentially exculpatory and Hulsey provided no new reason for granting an evidentiary hearing. The court’s refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion. 9 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court