Opinion ID: 803466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interstate or Foreign Commerce

Text: The laptop seized on November 21, 2008, contained morphed images -- images digitally altered to depict children apparently engaging in sexual activity. Ramos argues that the government failed to establish that the original or source images came through the internet or otherwise traveled in interstate and foreign commerce. He further argues that the government failed to show that the images were produced using materials that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Hence, he contends, there was insufficient evidence of a nexus to interstate or foreign commerce. This Court has rejected the argument that a similar statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2251, is unconstitutional when applied to child pornography that has not crossed state lines. United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). For our purposes here, there is no meaningful distinction between § 2251 and § 2252A.8 We held in Holston 8 Section 2251(a) criminalizes sexual exploitation of children and, employing language virtually identical to the - 30 - that even child pornography created entirely intrastate had a significant impact on interstate commerce because the producer of the pornography supplied the interstate market, and we rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the federal child pornography laws. See id. at 88-91; accord United States v. Harris, 358 F.3d 221, 222 (2d Cir. 2004). Hence, we consider here the specific question of whether the interstate commerce nexus is established by a defendant's use of a foreign-manufactured computer to produce child pornography. This Court has not considered the issue in a published decision.9 Other Circuits, however, have held that a defendant's use of non-American-made computers or digital equipment to produce child pornography satisfies the language of § 2252A, bars producing a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor using materials shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). 9 But see United States v. Porter, 184 F. App'x 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order) (holding, in rejecting challenge to sufficiency of evidence as to interstate commerce nexus, government may satisfy this element by showing that the computer that produced the images has traveled in interstate commerce). - 31 - interstate or foreign commerce element. See United States v. Schene, 543 F.3d 627, 639 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding sufficient evidence of interstate or foreign nexus under § 2252A(a)(5)(B) where government's evidence showed each 'image of child pornography' had been copied or downloaded to Schene's [Singapore-manufactured] hard drive in one capacity or another); United States v. Mugan, 441 F.3d 622, 628-30 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding interstate commerce element of § 2252A fulfilled where child pornography stored on digital memory card transported in interstate and foreign commerce); United States v. Anderson, 280 F.3d 1121, 1123-25 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding jurisdictional prong was met where government proved defendant downloaded or copied images of child pornography onto hard drive manufactured in Malaysia and refurbished in Singapore); United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding jurisdictional prong was met where government proved defendant copied images onto computer disks manufactured abroad). We agree with these decisions, and hold that the act of using - 32 - computer equipment manufactured outside the United States to produce child pornography meets the jurisdictional requirement of § 2252A(a)(5)(B).10 The morphed images at issue here were found on Ramos's laptop, which was manufactured in Korea. Its hard drive was manufactured in Thailand. Both pieces of equipment were thus materials that had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce under § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The government also offered into evidence two innocent images found on the laptop that were the sources for the morphed pornography as well as evidence that Ramos's laptop contained Microsoft Picture It, an image editing program that the jury could infer Ramos used to 10 Some courts have held that the mere copying or downloading of an image is production for purposes of the federal child pornography statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 2011); Schene, 543 F.3d at 638-39; United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1052 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 546 U.S. 801 (2005); Anderson, 280 F.3d at 1125 (Computerized images are produced when computer equipment is used to copy or download the images. (citing United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 341 (7th Cir. 2000))); Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 871. We need not decide the issue, as Ramos did far more than simply copy or download images here: the evidence showed that he altered innocent images and created morphed images, thereby producing child pornography. - 33 - create the morphed images. A reasonable juror easily could have concluded that Ramos knowingly possessed an image of child pornography . . . that [he] produced using materials . . . shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, namely, a computer manufactured in Korea and a hard drive manufactured in Thailand. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Finally, Ramos argues that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because the evidence could only show that he created the images alone in his trailer, engaging in private conduct on his laptop, using images that could only have been his personal family photos that never traveled across the internet, without any evidence suggesting he intended to distribute the morphed images to anyone else. This argument fails. As we explained in Holston, Congress understood that much of the pornographic material involving minors that feeds the [national] market is locally produced, and this local or 'homegrown' production supports demand in the national - 34 - market and is essential to its existence. Holston, 343 F.3d at 90. [W]hen Congress regulates a class of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, the fact that particular activities within that class do not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce is 'irrelevant.' Id. at 90 (quoting Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). The government need not demonstrate a nexus to interstate commerce in every prosecution. Holston, 343 F.3d at 91. As § 2252A clearly lies within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, the fact that Ramos neither shipped [his images] interstate nor intended to benefit commercially from [them] is of no moment. Id. We conclude that the jury's verdict convicting Ramos of possession of child pornography under § 2252A(a)(5)(B) was sufficiently supported by the evidence. - 35 -