Opinion ID: 2399351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Historic District Landowner/Resident Standing

Text: The three petitioners who own property in the Historic District argue that they have standing on the basis that any land-owner owning property in a designated historic district would have standing to challenge the construction of a nonconforming structure in the historic district because such landowners have an interest in the vitality of the historic district as a whole. In support of that argument, the petitioners cite Harvey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Odessa; [26] Healy v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of New Castle, [27] and Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn. [28] The petitioners in this case submit that the issue of standing presented in Harvey and Healy is identical to the issue of standing presented in this action. In Harvey, the petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to challenge the construction of a veteran's memorial in the historic residential district of Odessa. In that case, the Superior Court was called upon to determine whether the petitioner was an aggrieved person who had standing to challenge the governmental action at issue. In Harvey, the Superior Court held the owner of land in an historic district has an enforceable right in the aesthetic benefit derived from the historic district as a whole. [29] In reaching that conclusion, the Superior Court relied upon the Lynn decision by the Southern District of New York. [30] In Lynn, a citizens group asserted that it had standing, as an adversely affected or aggrieved party within the meaning of the applicable statute, to prevent the proposed demolition of an old courthouse complex as part of an urban renewal project. [31] In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the proposed demolition would deprive them of the aesthetic benefit they derived from the courthouse. In Lynn, the court stated: While it is true that such a benefit hardly can be quantified, this is not to say that it is thereby so insufficient that loss of it will not support a finding of standing. Injury due to loss of benefits that might be derived from natural resources such as camping, hiking, fishing, sight-seeing and the like is similarly of an intangible character and yet potential injury to such interests was found ... to be enough to support standing. The fact that we are concerned here with esthetic enjoyment of a cultural resource with alleged historical and architectural value rather than a natural resource is not significant distinction since injury to such interests can well be said to fall into the same category. [32] Based upon that reasoning, the court in Lynn held: a mere declaration of harm to such an interest may be sufficient under some circumstances to demonstrate that plaintiffs fall within the group of persons whose interest may be injured.... [33] In Harvey, the Superior Court found that the petitioner was a property owner within and adjacent to the Historic District of Odessa and that she had an interest in the aesthetics of the Historic District. [34] Therefore, in Harvey, the Superior Court held that the petitioner who owned land in the historic district was an aggrieved person for purposes of standing. Similarly, in Healy, the Superior Court acknowledged that the owner of property within New Castle's Historic Residence District would be an aggrieved person with standing to challenge a government action within that historic district. [35] In addition to the Superior Court decisions in Harvey and Healy, the Third Circuit's analysis and holding in Society Hill Towers provides persuasive authoritative guidance for our examination of the land-owner/residents' standing issue in this appeal. In Society Hill Towers, the Third Circuit held that a group of residents living in the historic district of Society Hill had standing to challenge a Housing and Urban Development grant to the City of Philadelphia to build a hotel and parking garage in the residents' neighborhood. [36] In that case, the residents argued that a proposed project to be funded by a UDAB grant would have a detrimental effect on the ambiance of their historic neighborhood; that it would impair the use and enjoyment of their property; and that it would decrease their property values. In Society Hill Towers, the City of Philadelphia argued, as do the appellees here, that the residents had not identified injuries to any cognizable legal interests. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the City of Philadelphia's arguments against the Society Hill residents' standing conflates issues of standing and questions of proof. [37] The Court determined: it is clear that the [residents of the historic district] are alleging injury to a legally protected interest  that of maintaining the environmental and historic quality of their neighborhood. [38] The Court aptly noted that if the residents of the historic district in the City of Philadelphia did not have standing to protect the historic and environmental quality of their neighborhood, it is hard to imagine that anyone would have standing to oppose this UDAG grant. If that is the case, the requirement for public hearings, and public input would be little more than a meaningless procedural calisthenic that would provide little or no protection to those most directly affected by the governmental action  the people who live in the vicinity of a federally funded project and who lives are most directly impacted by the expenditure of UDAG funds. [39] In this case, the Superior Court properly noted that a generalized grievance shared by the population at large cannot be a basis for standing. [40] But, as the United States Supreme Court has held, the fact that a grievance is widely held does not make it abstract and not judicially cognizable if individual plaintiffs can demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury. [41] Most significantly, however, the United States Supreme Court has held that aesthetic injuries can constitute an injury in fact that is sufficient to support a plaintiff's standing. [42] In deciding the issue of standing, the Superior Court opinion did not address the relevance of the aesthetic aspects of the Historic District or the Historic District Guidelines and Standards. It appears, however, that all construction in the Historic District must comport with the aesthetic standards in the City of Dover Code and the Historic District Guidelines and Standards. In setting forth the standards that must be complied with prior to the issuance of an architectural review certificate, the City of Dover Code provides: An architectural review certificate may be issued if it is found that the architectural style, general design, height, bulk and setbacks, arrangement, location and materials and structures affecting the exterior appearance are generally in harmony with neighboring structures and complementary to the traditional architectural standards of the historic district as set forth in the Historic District Guidelines and Standards adopted by the [Commission].... [43] The Historic District Guidelines and Standards provide that construction of new buildings in the Historic District should be discouraged, if not prevented, even if those new buildings would be constructed in an historical style. The petitioners Horsey, H. Johnson and C. Johnson own property and/or reside in the Historic District, to wit: the Ridgely House, the Golden Fleece Tavern and the Bradford-Loockerman House. The Green in the Historic District, remains as a public square in the area designated by William Penn for the courthouse. [44] The Ridgely house, facing The Green in Dover, was built in 1728. [45] The Golden Fleece Tavern on The Green, purchased by French Battell in 1774, was the de facto seat of Delaware state government from 1777 to 1791, and it was the site of the historic convention that resulted in Delaware's first ratification of the new Federal Constitution in 1787. [46] The Loockerman house, on the east side of State Street, in Dover, was built in 1742. [47] The purpose of the Historic District, as set forth in the City of Dover Code, is to: preserve and enhance that unique character and value of the older portion of Dover as an area of special charm and interest. It is particularly intended that the regulations prevent, in the Historic District, any change of conditions that would be deemed to be a disfigurement or degradation of the present unique visual and architectural qualities of the district. [48] The purpose of the ordinance establishing an Historic District within the City of Dover reflects the policy that aesthetic concerns pertaining to the integrity and cohesiveness of the Historic District and individual historic sites are important to the citizens of Dover. That interest by the general public, however, does not render those same aesthetic concerns any less concrete and particularized as to the landowners/residents within the Historic District. [49] In this case, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in Pye, the injuries asserted by owners of land in the Historic District of Dover do not arise from a `common concern for obedience to the law' but from individual concerns about the integrity and cohesiveness of historical sites in their own backyard. [50] We hold the landowner/residents in the Historic District of Dover have an enforceable right in the aesthetic benefit derived from the Historic District as a whole. [51] Accordingly, we hold that the petitioners Horsey, H. Johnson and C. Johnson have alleged facts that demonstrate the requisite standing to challenge the determination of the Planning Commission that an architectural review certificate be issued. Therefore, as to those three petitioners, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.