Opinion ID: 779089
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the FRCD to Wrongful Death Claims

Text: 138 Defendants' contention that the FRCD does not apply to wrongful death claims presents a somewhat closer question on the surface but is ultimately unpersuasive. Defendants argue that, although New York law characterizes survival claims as personal injury claims, it does not so characterize wrongful death claims, and hence the latter are not actions brought under State law for personal injury[] or property damages within the meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Given the possible variations among the laws of the several states, that phrase is not entirely free of ambiguity; but in light of Congress's intent in creating the Federal Commencement Date, we conclude that wrongful death claims under New York law were meant to be encompassed by § 9658. 139 As discussed in Part II.B. below, the FRCD was introduced as one of the 1986 Superfund Amendments to CERCLA. Section 301(e) of CERCLA, as originally enacted in 1980, required Congress to obtain a study of the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1) (emphasis added). After reviewing the commissioned study, congressional committees noted that the report, prepared by a distinguished panel of lawyers, concluded that because of the accrual dates selected by state law, certain State statutes deprive plaintiffs of their day in court. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962 (1986) (FRCD Conf. Rep.), at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354; Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R.Rep. No. 99-253(I) (1985) (FRCD House Rep.), at 105, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2887. The congressional committees recognized that [i]n the case of a long-latency disease, such as cancer, a party may be barred from bringing his lawsuit if the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the first injury — rather than from the time when the party `discovers' that his injury was caused by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354; see also FRCD House Rep. at 105, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2887. As a result, the FRCD was introduced to address[] the problem identified in the 301(e) study, by provid[ing] for a Federal commencement date for State statutes of limitations which are applicable to harm which results from exposure to a hazardous substance,  defining that commencement date as the date the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, that the personal injury referred to above was caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354 (emphases added). Thus, Congress's focus was on hazardous wastes' harm to man, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1), and its intent was to make the FRCD applicable to claims for harm which results from exposure to a hazardous substance, FRCD Conf. Rep. at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3354. 140 Given this background, we see no valid basis for inferring that Congress meant § 9658 to distinguish between an action for wrongful death, as maintainable under New York law, and an action brought by a living victim. A living victim in a personal injury action may recover for, inter alia, damages for lost future earnings. See, e.g., Lopez v. Kenmore-Tonawanda School District, 275 A.D.2d 894, 895, 713 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (4th Dep't 2000) (mem.). Such a recovery would usually to some extent benefit the victim's dependents. If the victim has died, damages for his lost future earnings are recoverable only in a wrongful death action. Compare Sand v. Chapin, 238 A.D.2d 862, 863, 656 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (3d Dep't 1997) (mem.) (lost future earnings not recoverable in survival action), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. § 11-3.3 Practice Commentaries at 346 (McKinney 2001) (permissible recovery in survival action includes only damages accruing until [the decedent's] death), with Parilis v. Feinstein, 49 N.Y.2d 984, 985, 429 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166, 406 N.E.2d 1059 (1980) (mem.) (in a wrongful death action, recovery is permissible for loss of support, voluntary assistance and possible inheritance), and N.Y.E.P.T.L. §§ 5-4.3(c)(ii) and (iii) (factfinder in a wrongful death action must consider the amount of income taxes the decedent would have been required to pay from the sum that would otherwise be available for the support of persons for whom the action is brought). 141 Indisputably, the claim by a living victim for future earnings lost as a result of the injuries he suffered from exposure to hazardous wastes is one for personal injury within the meaning of § 9658(a)(1). Yet under defendants' proposed interpretation of the FRCD, wrongful death claims by the decedent's distributees for relief paralleling that which would have been available to the victim had he lived, including claims seeking their respective shares of the decedent's earnings lost as a result of that exposure, would not be within the scope of § 9658. Quite clearly then, under defendants' view of the FRCD, a company whose handling of hazardous wastes caused personal injury would be financially better off if its victim died. We conclude that this was not Congress's intent.