Opinion ID: 1237709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: free speech challenge.

Text: Migliorino, Miller and Defendants all argue that sec. 943.145, Stats., restricts their right to express their views on abortion. They maintain the purpose of the statute is to prevent abortion protesters from advocating their position. We disagree. Section 943.145(2), Stats., provides: 943.145 Criminal trespass to a medical facility. ... (2) Whoever intentionally enters a medical facility without the consent of some person lawfully upon the premises, under circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace, is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. The statute does not regulate what a person may say or express; it is content neutral. Rather it regulates conduct which is prohibited in medical facilities, regardless of the message, if any, the offender is expressing. The statute prohibits entry into a medical facility, without consent, under circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace. Section 943.145, Stats., does not limit its coverage to specific communications or communicative purposes. This statute could regulate the conduct of one who comes uninvited into an abortion clinic without any feelings, pro or con about abortion, but who merely resents the location of a medical facility of any kind in the neighborhood. His intention might only be to disrupt operations in the hope that the facility might move. Or one may have a personal dislike for a member or members of the staff of a medical facility and hope to interfere with the facility's function; the sole purpose to cause that member or members embarrassment. We recognize that conduct such as that displayed by the various defendants here may be expressive conduct and as such would be legally regarded as speech and protected by the first amendment. See Texas v. Johnson, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3115, 12. Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985). Assuming there is protected speech under the first amendment here, this court must identify the nature of the forum, because the extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic. Id. 473 U.S. at 797. The United States Supreme Court has identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum. Id. 473 U.S. at 802. We conclude a medical facility as defined in sec. 943.145, Stats., is a nonpublic forum. These facilities are not traditional public forums such as streets and parks. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Nor have they been opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity which would make them a public forum by government designation. Id. The medical facilities as defined in the statute are undoubtedly nonpublic forums. Justice Steinmetz in his dissent finds it significant that public medical facilities may be included in the statute's scope of coverage. The First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 quoting United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assn., 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981). The state, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. Id. 473 U.S. at 800 quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities. Id. 473 U.S. at 799-800. The United States Supreme Court has held that various types of property may constitute a nonpublic forum despite government ownership. See Id. 473 U.S. at 803-04. Consequently, public property may still be a nonpublic forum. Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. Id. 473 U.S. at 806. The reasonableness of the restriction must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances. Id. 473 U.S. at 809. We further note that the First Amendment does not demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum merely because use of that forum may be the most efficient means of delivering the speaker's message. Id. 473 U.S. at 809. Section 943.145, Stats., is content neutral. We also conclude that it is a reasonable regulation when assessed in the light of the purpose of medical facilities and the circumstances surrounding them. Any medical consultation, treatment or procedure usually is a very personal, very private activity. It often creates a great deal of apprehension and tension even under the most optimum circumstances. Except in emergencies such activities are usually conducted away from the gaze or the comments of outsiders. No patient should be subjected to conduct tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace in such circumstances. This statute very properly prohibits such conduct. It is a reasonable regulation in furtherance of significant state interests such as privacy, health, property, and security. The legislature may constitutionally protect these interests and this statute does so. Defendants also contend that the statute is unconstitutional because the hecklers' reaction is a predicate for depriving [a] viewpoint of First Amendment protection. Expression such as that displayed by the various defendants in these cases may be constitutionally regulated. The United States Supreme Court has stated that: Although the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting speech in a public forum, a nonpublic forum by definition is not dedicated to general debate or the free exchange of ideas. The First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a non-public forum and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose. Id. 473 U.S. at 811. We therefore find this hecklers argument unpersuasive. Justice Ceci in his dissent concludes sec. 943.145, Stats., is unconstitutionally vague. This argument was not briefed or asserted in this court by any of the parties on this appeal. The test to determine vagueness is whether the statute or ordinance is so obscure that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applicability ... [it] must be sufficiently definite so that potential offenders who wish to abide by the law are able to discern when the region of proscribed conduct is neared and those who are charged either with enforcing or applying it are not relegated to creating their own standards of culpability instead of applying the standards prescribed in the law. City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 434, 446-47, 439 N.W.2d 562 (1989), quoting Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 16, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980) (footnotes omitted). [2] Justice Ceci finds the phrase under circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace insufficiently definite. Impossible standards of clarity, however, are not required. Id. 149 Wis. 2d at 448, citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983). Nor must statutes be drafted with mathematical exactitude. Milwaukee v. KF., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 33, 426 N.W.2d 329 (1988). Rather, a fair degree of definiteness is all that is required to uphold a statute or regulation, and a statute or regulation will not be voided merely by showing that the boundaries of the area of proscribed conduct are somewhat hazy. Id. quoting State ex rel. Hennekens v. City of River Falls Police & Fire Commission, 124 Wis. 2d 413, 420, 369 N.W.2d 670 reconsideration denied 126 Wis. 2d 39, 373 N.W.2d 672 (1985). We conclude the phrase provides a fair degree of definiteness, and that is all that is needed. This court in City of Oak Creek v. King, 148 Wis. 2d 532, 548, 436 N.W.2d 285 (1989), held that the disorderly conduct statute was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied in the case. This court concluded that conduct which was not violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous or unreasonably loud, but had a tendency to disrupt good order and to provoke a disturbance constituted an offense. Id. Because the above language and that of sec. 943.145, Stats., is substantially similar, we conclude that as applied to a medical facility, which is a nonpublic forum, the language of sec. 943.145 is not impermissibly vague.