Opinion ID: 760681
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Martinez, Garcia, and Herpin's Challenges to Sentencing

Text: 27 Martinez, Garcia and Herpin challenge the drug quantities attributed to them by the district court. Martinez and Garcia also challenge sentence enhancements for possessing firearms and in Martinez's case, for being a leader or organizer. We review sentence enhancements and calculations of drug quantities for clear error, and will affirm unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that mistake has been committed. United States v. Hall, 109 F.3d 1227, 1233 (7th Cir.1997). In assessing the defendants' relevant conduct, the district court is to consider all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, considered, commanded, induced, procured, willfully caused by the defendant; and in the case of a [conspiracy] all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) & (B). The district court is to examine evidence such as the price generally obtained for the controlled substance, financial or other records, similar transactions in controlled substances by the defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory involved. United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1433 (7th Cir.1994) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 12). The government must establish these acts by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Howard, 80 F.3d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir.1996). 28 The district court found Martinez responsible for selling in excess of 150 kilograms of cocaine. Surveillance tapes recorded Martinez stating that he sold 10 to 15 kilograms of cocaine per week. While this evidence does not indicate for how long a period he averaged such sales (and we doubt it was for the entire two years he operated the conspiracy), even a sizable discount of this evidence of sales would support the district court's finding that Martinez was responsible for at least 150 kilograms of cocaine. Further, records seized from Martinez's home revealed drug transactions in excess of $700,000 over a two-month period. While it is unclear from the record whether the transactions were wholesale or retail, this evidence certainly lends some support to Martinez's own estimate. Additionally, Raymond Smith testified that he cooked crack cocaine out of approximately 70 kilograms of cocaine, and he was not Martinez's exclusive cocaine cooker. Further, this evidence pertaining to specific drug quantities must be examined in light of the conspiracy as a whole. Beler, 20 F.3d at 1433. During this time, Martinez repeatedly bought multiple kilograms of cocaine and reinvested the proceeds from the sale of the cocaine into more cocaine. He also operated a massive operation, with over twelve drug houses, several employees and a working drug laboratory, for two years. Given this, and all the other evidence in the record, the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. 29 On appeal, Herpin attacks the district court's finding that five to fifteen kilograms [of cocaine] is clearly established by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Herpin concedes that the government adequately linked him to the five-kilogram transaction which occurred at the Hospitality Inn, and he merely challenges other evidence that would bring him over the five-kilogram amount. This concession of Herpin's involvement with five kilograms of cocaine is fatal to his claim because the Sentencing Guideline provides the amount of cocaine must be [a]t least 5 KG but less than 15 KG of Cocaine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(4). Despite this unambiguous language, Herpin incorrectly asserts that the Guideline mandates that the possession of more than five, but less than fifteen, kilograms of cocaine yields the base offense level found by the district court. (The sentencing transcript, however, reveals that the trial counsel correctly understood § 2D1.1(4)). As the district court had to find at least five kilograms to be affirmed, and Herpin concedes that such a finding is supportable, Herpin's argument is legally flawed and utterly without merit. 30 The district court found Garcia responsible for 15-50 kilograms of cocaine. Again, Garcia principally argues that the district court improperly relied on testimony by Raymond Smith. Smith testified that Garcia would accompany him to Chicago three to four times per month to pick up between two and eight kilograms of cocaine, for a period of eighteen to twenty-four months. This evidence establishes that Garcia is responsible for far more than 15 kilograms of cocaine. Also, Smith testified that he cooked at least 70 kilograms of cocaine at a laboratory in Garcia's house. The district court accepted this evidence, and it clearly supports the district court's determination of the relevant drug quantities. 31 Garcia asserts that because the district court relied on the testimony of Raymond Smith, a convicted drug dealer whose testimony is uncorroborated, the district court's finding of this fact is clearly erroneous. This court will discredit a credibility determination only if the defendant establishes that the testimony was incredible as a matter of law. United States v. Alcantar, 83 F.3d 185, 189 (7th Cir.1996). Testimony is incredible as a matter of law if it would have been physically impossible for the witness to observe what he described, or impossible under the laws of nature for those events to have occurred at all. Id. We will not disturb a credibility determination even if the testimony is totally uncorroborated and comes from an admitted liar, a large-scale drug dealer, a convicted felon, or an individual with a motive to provide evidence favorable to the government. Id.; United States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir.1995). Here, the district court found Smith to be credible, and as no grounds exist to disregard the district court's credibility findings, we must affirm the district court. 32 Garcia and Martinez both challenge the district court's finding that they possessed firearms in connection with the drug conspiracy, which resulted in a two-point enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Smith testified that Garcia would always carry a gun when he went to pick up drugs in Chicago. The district court found Smith to be credible, and Smith's testimony was not impossible or so fantastic that no reasonable trier of fact could accept it as true. Again, we see no clear error by the district court. 33 The district court also imposed a two-point sentence enhancement against Martinez for possessing a firearm. Martinez contends that there is no evidence that he used or displayed a firearm during any of the [drug] transactions. This argument might have some force if Martinez had been charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes using or carrying a firearm in the commission of a drug felony, but the standard under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) is different. The Guidelines require a district court to apply this adjustment if a weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.3). United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1193 (7th Cir.1998). When officers searched Martinez's residence and the V & M Garage, they found several guns, drug money from a controlled buy, a digital scale, and empty bottles of Inositol, a substance frequently cut (mixed) with cocaine. This evidence supports the district court's finding that Martinez possessed the weapons while buying and selling drugs. 34 We're not done, because Martinez also challenges the district court's decision to impose a four-point enhancement for his role as leader or organizer of a conspiracy. Rather, he contends that he was a supervisor or manager, and implies that someone else gave orders to him: There was evidence from several witnesses that another individual, from Chicago, who was specifically described by witnesses, appeared from time to time to confer with Martinez. But Martinez gives us no citations to the record to support this assertion, and we will not scour the record to see if this claim can be substantiated. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(6) (argument must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.). We have refused to consider unsupported or cursory arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991). Furthermore, the district court had substantial evidence before it that Martinez controlled many employees, negotiated purchases of cocaine and supervised the process of creating crack cocaine, and maintained drug houses for the purpose of selling cocaine, all of which suggests that the district court's enhancement was not plain error.