Opinion ID: 1320911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Results Prong

Text: Under the results prong, this court must determine whether defendants' program, after being employed for a period of time sufficient to give the plan a legitimate trial, [failed] to produce results indicating that the language barriers confronting students are actually being overcome, and thus, no longer constitute[s] appropriate action. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010. Under this prong, the district court determined that the evidence presented including drop-out rates, retention rates, and the achievement scores of LEP secondary studentsindicated widespread program failure. Further, the court held that the totality of this data conclusively proved that defendants' failure to effectively monitor LEP programs caused such LEP secondary student failure at the ground level. We disagree. To begin with, we note that, statewide, the total secondary school LEP population is only some twenty percent of the total LEP student population. This court does not dispute that secondary LEP student performance data is alarming. It is clear that LEP students at all secondary grades are not performing satisfactorily on TAKS, and the performance data indicate significant achievement gaps as compared to passage rate targetsroughly falling anywhere between a thirty-five to forty-five percent gap in achievement. This court is further concerned that there is little evidence that these gaps are steadily decreasing over time or that secondary LEP students are showing signs of steady improvement on standardized tests. But in spite of these real concerns, we find that the district court over-emphasized the significance of student achievement scores. As mentioned previously, it is difficult for standardized tests administered in English to accurately capture an LEP student's knowledge of core curriculum. And, [i]t is inevitable that [LEP] students (who by definition are not yet proficient in English) will underperform as compared to native speakers. Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2603 n. 16. See also Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1014. Last, the system is incapable of crediting high-performance by non-native speakers who have already completed the program because they are no longer classified as LEP. [22] Thus, it is unsurprising that the achievement scores of secondary LEP students illustrate a significant gap in achievement. Further, the district court's analysis of student achievement data was not restricted to the longitudinal data derived from the PBMAS system. Instead, the district court reviewed data over a period of four years, from the 2003-2004 school year to the 2006-2007 school year, even though the PBMAS system was not implemented until the 2004-2005 school year, and data from the 2006-2007 school year was not in evidence. Thus, only two-years worth of PBMAS data was properly in evidence and before the court. We find this period of time insufficient to show whether defendants' use of PBMAS enables them to effectively monitor LEP programs and ensure EEOA compliance. See Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010 (explaining that LEP programs must be given a sufficient period of time to work). The court failed to analyze longitudinal data provided during the time when PBMAS was in effect; thus, the comparisons made, and conclusions reached in making them, are unreliable. Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2603 n. 16. ([An] absence of longitudinal data in the record precludes useful comparisons.). Due to PBMAS's nascent development and the absence of longitudinal data, we find that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the PBMAS system had not achieved satisfactory results. We also take issue with the district court's conclusion that the totality of [the] data establishes causation. [23] LULAC IV, 572 F.Supp.2d at 779, 779-80. Included in the totality of data were comparisons of the achievement scores discussed above as well as drop-out rates, retention rates, and participation rates in advanced courses. For example, the district court found that in 2003-2004, 2.0% of secondary LEP students dropped out of school, while only 0.9% of secondary non-LEP students dropped out. The district court also pointed out that in 2003-2004, the retention rate of secondary LEP students was 13.8%, while only 6.3% of non-LEP students were retained. And the trial court determined that LEP students are far less likely to participate in a dual enrollment, advanced placement, or international baccalaureate program, e.g., in 2004, 8.5% of LEP students, compared to 19.9% of all students, completed a dual enrollment course. The above comparisons have little significance. First, these comparative factors suffer the same faults as student achievement scoresthe data was collected prior to PBMAS implementation, and because the system was implemented only for the 2004-2005 school year, the comparative factors are not based on longitudinal data. Second, a 1.1% difference in the drop out rate between LEP and non-LEP students is not significantly probative. And though the retention rates show a more significant gap, it is foreseeable that LEP students would have greater difficulty in mastering core curriculum while simultaneously trying to achieve English proficiency. Last, the rate of LEP secondary student participation in advanced courses is of little probative valueit is to be expected that those students still attempting to achieve English proficiency are not as likely to take part in advanced courses. More significantly, the totality of the data does not explain how the failure of LEP students was caused by errors or omissions on the part of TEA. To find a violation of the EEOA, a court must make sufficient findings of fact to support a conclusion that student failures stem from [defendants'] failure to take `appropriate action.' Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2605. The evidence in this case, which essentially is only comprised of statewide aggregate student performance data and participation rates, cannot support such a causal connection. Under Texas law the school districts are the ones having  the primary responsibility for implementing the state's bilingual and ESL programs, TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.002 (emphasis added), and the boards of trustees of such districts have primary responsibility for ensuring the district ... complies with all applicable requirements of state educational programs. Id. § 7.028(b). Further, each school district determines whether ESL or bilingual programs (or other transitional language instruction) are used in the seventh and eighth grades. Id. § 29.053(d)(2). There is essentially no evidence, findings or analysis of the performance of any individual school districts or any groups of districts (whether grouped geographically, or by either overall and/or LEP student population size, or by some socio-economic criteria, or on any other basis), or of the presence or absence or the extent or nature of differences in performance of LEP students (or students as a whole), or the nature of the bilingual or ESL programs and the implementation thereof, as between different districts, or groups of districts, or the like. [24] There is simply no substantial evidence that diverse implementation deficiencies in numerous different school districts did not primarily cause the poor performance of so many secondary LEP students. Moreover, the district court erred in failing to consider other possible causes for the secondary LEP student failure. See, e.g., note 22, supra. The district court did not explore alternative causes because it concluded that primary and secondary LEP students suffer similar socio-economic conditions, but show significantly different levels of achievement; thus, social and economic factors ... are not the culprit. LULAC IV, 572 F.Supp.2d at 780. The trial court provided no additional evidence to support its assumption. While we agree that primary and secondary LEP students in a given school district likely exist in similar social and economic situations, we do not believe they are exposed to the same challenges. For example, the Supreme Court recently recognized that secondary LEP students face a greater number of obstacles: There are many possible causes for the [under-]performance of students in [LEP programs]. These include the difficulty of teaching English to older students (many of whom, presumably, were not in English-speaking schools as younger students) and problems, such as drug use and the prevalence of gangs. Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2605 n. 20. [25] Thus, any comparison between LEP and non-LEP students must take into account other variables that may explain [their differences in achievement] in order to accurately determine the true cause of student failure. Id. The district court abused its discretion in failing to address other possible causes of student failure. In light of the above errors, we hold that the evidence relied upon by the district court does not establish that TEA has failed to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers nor does it establish that TEA has somehow abdicated responsibility in monitoring the secondary LEP program. Nonetheless, we recognize that LEP student performance is alarming, and we encourage the district court and the parties involved to reconsider whether one or more individual school districts should be added to this litigation in order for it to proceed (with transfer to the proper district and division as appropriate). By adding individual districts, the court can better examine the circumstances of specific students, schools, and districts, which will be invaluable evidence for determining the cause of LEP student failure and how best to remedy it. We do not suggest that state defendants cannot be held liable under the EEOA. Instead, we merely hold that an appropriate analysis of an EEOA claim should be conducted with regard to a particular district or districts, with state educational agencies serving as additional parties. [26]
This court reviews the district court's order granting in part, and denying in part, defendants' motion to modify the order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), for abuse of discretion. Frazar v. Ladd, 457 F.3d 432, 435 (5th Cir.2006). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when applying it prospectively is no longer equitable. The party seeking to modify an injunction bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in factual conditions or the law warrants revision of the injunction. See Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383-84, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Defendants argue that this court's decision in Samnorwood Independent School District v. Texas Education Agency, 533 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.2008), constitutes a significant change in the law and requires this court to limit the reach of the Modified Order to the nine all-black school district defendants in the original lawsuit. In Samnorwood, two school districts that voluntarily desegregated in the 1960s and were not party to the original 1970 litigation challenged whether the Modified Order could be appropriately applied to them. This court held as follows: [T]he prophylactic provisions created by the Modified Order to remedy the segregative conduct on the part of TEA and all-black schools in East Texas should not be imposed on these two panhandle school districts that had long previously already desegregated and have never since been found to have acted with segregative intent. Id. at 269. Central to the court's analysis was the fact that there had been no showing of a constitutional violation by the school districts themselves, and the modified order and TEA's actions pursuant to it constitute a remedy that must flow from a constitutional violation. Id. at 268, 267-68. The trial court read Samnorwood very narrowly, determining that this Court's decision was largely based on the fact that the two school districts involved had been unitary prior to the implementation of the Modified Order. LULAC V, 2008 WL 5334404 at . Ultimately, the district court modified the order in a very restrictive manner, exempting only those districts situated almost identically to the Samnorwood districts. We find that this modification was overly restrictive. The Modified Order was issued for the purpose of eliminating the diverse continued local practices and vestiges of de jure racially segregated public education. [27] Since its issuance, nearly forty years have elapsed, and the racial composition of public schools in Texas has changed drastically. See United States v. Texas, 457 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir.2006). And while this court recognizes that some local vestiges of discrimination and segregation might still remain, it is clear that the Modified Order certainly has, at best, dwindling relevance. Id. In light of the above, and this court's supervisory powers, we hold that the Modified Order's reach should be further limited. Related concerns led us to modify the original order on direct appeal to provide that [no]thing herein shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of any other district court with respect to any presently pending or future school desegregation suits. United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir.1971). See also, e.g., United States v. Texas, 466 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir.1972) (transferring case as to San Felipe Del Rio School District to Western District of Texas). Time has shown that further restriction of the modified order's scope is necessary and appropriate. See, e.g., Samnorwood, 533 F.3d at 269; Gregory-Portland, 654 F.2d at 993-94. The district court was correct to exempt school districts similarly situated to the Samnorwood districts. In addition, we find that the same modification must be made for local school districts declared unitary in federal cases; school districts currently under federal court desegregation orders or decrees or which are parties to pending federal court desegregation suits; and any other specific school district not a party to the case when the Modified Order was issued which requests, or for which the State requests, exemption from the Modified Order unless a plaintiff shows the district is not then unitary. As to such districts that are thus now or subsequently exempted from the Modified Order, the district court may no longer direct TEA with regard to such districts pursuant to its remedial jurisdiction over the Modified Order. [28]