Opinion ID: 852853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony by Investigating Officer

Text: At trial, the defendants called Officer Christopher McCarty, who investigated the accident scene. McCarty testified that Witte's version of the accident as reported to him shortly after the accident was consistent with Witte having less than one second to react. He also expressed his conclusion that Witte was not at fault. Mikayla objected to this testimony, arguing that McCarty was not an eyewitness and was not qualified to testify as an expert. Specifically, Mikayla argued that McCarty should not be permitted to give his opinion on fault. The trial court overruled the objection and Mikayla asserts that as error on appeal. The defendants do not claim that Officer McCarty qualified as an expert. Rather, they first assert that it is possible that further testimony could have been elicited from Officer McCarty that would have qualified him as an expert. The defendants do not point to any evidence that was offered to shore up McCarty's expertise. Nor do they cite any legal authority in support of the proposition that the possibility that further evidence might qualify an expert is sufficient to permit unqualified testimony. The defendants had the burden of establishing the ability of their witness to give the proffered testimony. Lytle v. Ford Motor Co., 814 N.E.2d 301, 308 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). In view of their failure, the trial court erred in admitting McCarty's opinion on fault and his conclusion on the reaction time available to Witte. The defendants next argue that admission of McCarty's testimony was harmless because it was cumulative of testimony provided by Mikayla herself and also by John Wiechel, a biomechanical engineer. Mikayla was asked on cross-examination whether she thought the person driving the car that hit her did anything wrong and she answered No. Mikayla objected to this exchange at trial, but does not raise it as error on appeal. John Weichel, a mechanical engineer called by the defense, also testified that according to his reconstruction of the accident, Witte could not have avoided the accident. We think admission of Officer McCarty's testimony cannot be sustained as cumulative. Error in the admission of evidence may be harmless when the evidence is merely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. Ind. Trial Rule 61; Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ind.2002). Black's Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed.2004) defines cumulative evidence as additional evidence that supports a fact established by the existing evidence (especially that which does not need further support). We think it is obvious that the admission by an eight-year-old child on cross-examination that someone did not do anything wrong in an accident that occurred three years earlier is not very persuasive. The child's admission surely requires further support. Similarly, because the opposing parties presented accident reconstruction experts who rendered opposing conclusions, and thus turned on disputed factual inferences, McCarty's evidence was not merely cumulative of Weichel's testimony. Newell v. Walker, 478 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). The ultimate question in evaluating cumulative evidence is essentially the same as for harmless error: was the admission of the improper evidence a serious candidate to influence the trier of fact? Although not cumulative, we think the officer's testimony was harmless under these circumstances. Harmlessness is ultimately a question of the likely impact of the evidence on the jury. Boatright v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ind.2001). Officer McCarty was asked whether he determined after his investigation whether Witte was at fault for the accident and answered simply, she was not. The entire body of Officer McCarty's challenged testimony was as follows: Q. But if you could tell the jury what you found based on your investigation. Based on talking to [Witte]. Based on looking at the scene. Everything. A. That the vehicle, the car was traveling west on Ninth Street when a child on a bike came through the intersection and into her path of travel. Q. Do you know which way the bike came? In other words, did it come north to south, was it going south to north, or do you know? A. It was, uh, north to south. Be from right to left. As you're going to the west. Q. And, you don't have to tell us exactly what was said but, was ... Monica Witte at the scene was she calm or was she shaken up? A. Shaken up. Q. Okay, Did she know exactly where the bike came from, where it was going? How it got into the intersection? A. No; she did not. Q. Would that be consistent with having less than one second to react? A. Yes; it would. At this point, Mikayla objected, arguing that there was no foundation laid for Mr. McCarty to be able to determine whether or not she had one second to react. This objection was overruled. Officer McCarty was then asked over Mikayla's objection whether he concluded if Monica was at fault: Q. After your investigation, did you make a determination whether Monica Witte was at fault for this accident? A. Yes; I did. Q. And what was that determination? A. That she was not. On cross-examination. McCarty was asked how he determined what direction Mikayla was traveling and answered Through statements, uh, from the driver of the vehicle. Mikayla pointed out that other testimony and evidence indicated that Mikayla was riding south to north rather north to south as Officer McCarty had concluded. McCarty was also asked whether he performed any calculations or speed formulae and answered, No. I'm not a reconstructionist. We think it clear that McCarty's opinion was based solely on what Witte told him, and he did not claim expertise in accident reconstruction. It therefore had minimal impact on the jury. We hold that the erroneous admission of McCarty's brief testimony was harmless.