Opinion ID: 1826076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedure By Which Venue Was Changed.

Text: At no time during the proceeding has it been suggested that (a) safety of court personnel, witnesses or others was a factor in the change of venue or (b) defendant's desire to remain in Milwaukee was not knowingly and intelligently made. These situations are not before us and we express no opinion on them. [12] A motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. [9] But a decision made without reasonable inquiry and examination of facts in the record is, on its face, an abuse of discretion. In McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 277-278, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971) this court discussed what the exercise of discretion means. In the first place, there must be evidence that discretion was in fact exercised. Discretion is not synonymous with decision-making. Rather, the term contemplates a process of reasoning. This process must depend on facts that are of record or that are reasonably derived by inference from the record and a conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon proper legal standards. As we pointed out in State v. Hutnik (1968), 39 Wis.2d 754, 764, 159 N.W.2d 733, `. . . there should be evidence in the record that discretion was in fact exercised and the basis of that exercise of discretion should be set forth.' . . . Unless there is evidence that the trial judge has undertaken a reasonable inquiry and examination of the facts as the basis of his decision, his decision will be disregarded by this court. Such a decision on its face shows an abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied.) [13] When the defendant himself moves for a change of venue, he is required to make a proper record from which the trial court and ultimately this court can make a decision or exercise review. Thus, the decision is to be based on the evidence elicted, properly considered. State v. Kramer, supra, 45 Wis.2d at 30; Ruff v. State, supra, 65 Wis.2d at 720. What is required is evidence, not mere allegations. Garcia v. State, 73 Wis.2d 174, 190, 242 N.W.2d 919 (1976). In this case the trial court based its findings regarding prejudicial publicity on its own personal contact with the community and its own informal poll, without disclosing its identity . . . in shopping centers, restaurants and other public places . . . . In Moore v. Russell, 294 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), a habeas corpus proceeding, the court found defendant was deprived due process of law when the state trial court judge denied motions for change of venue and severance without a hearing. At the habeas corpus proceeding the state trial court judge testified it was his considered judgment that the amount of pre-trial publicity was insufficient to warrant a change of venue. The federal court in its opinion wrote the trial judge . . . was not authorized to use as evidence his own conceptions of what the facts might be ... Mr. Moore's chances for a fair trial depended entirely at that moment on the sound exercise of discretion by the trial judge, . . . . His was an option, but in exercising it he was not permitted to disregard solid and settled principles of law established for the protection of the petitioner and others similarly situated, including the principle of law that the judicial findings and conclusions be founded on legal evidence . . . The trial judge has no judicial power as contradistinguished from the power of the law. His discretion is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the proper course prescribed by law with the consequent duty to follow that course. His will as a person is not to be done, but rather the will of the law. Osborn v. The Bank of the United States (1824), 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U.S. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204. Whatever may have been the personal observations and individual views of the judge as a person, these factors have no place whatever in his exercise of judicial discretion . . . 294 F. Supp. at 620-621 (citations omitted.) As noted, approximately eleven months after the order, during consideration of motions after verdict, the court granted the state's motion to add to the record evidence of pre-trial publicity consisting of radio and television news transcripts and newspaper clippings. In McCleary, this court said that when the trial judge fails to set forth his reasons for a decision this court examines the record ab initio. Accord, Roehl v. State, 77 Wis.2d 398, 419, 253 N.W.2d 210 (1977). This is consistent with this court's duty, on a change of venue question, to examine the record independently in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Turner v. State, supra, 76 Wis.2d at 27; Jones v. State, supra, 66 Wis.2d at 109. [14] But these principles presume this court has a record to rely on. This court's examination of the eleven month late addition to the record, even if revelatory of prejudice, could not reveal whether such prejudice could have been mitigated by means less costly to the defendant than a trial far from his home. Thus, a continuance or extensive voir dire could well have accomplished the trial court's purpose. [15] Among the factors this court will consider in reviewing a trial court's discretion on a venue question are the amount of difficulty encountered in selecting a jury, the extent to which jurors were familiar with the publicity and the defendant's utilization of challenges, both peremptory and for cause, available to him on voir dire. Jones v. State, 66 Wis.2d 105, 109, 223 N.W.2d 889 (1974). These factors cannot be considered by this court because the trial court never attempted to empanel a jury in Milwaukee county.