Opinion ID: 3039370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: application of the a naly sis to

Text: LANGFORD’S SENTENCE The present case is not that rare case where we can be sure that an erroneous Guidelines calculation did not affect the sentencing process and the sentence ultimately imposed. Contrary to the government’s view, we cannot conclude that the miscalculation of Langford’s criminal history category was harmless. 27 At Langford’s sentencing, the District Court said that the Sentencing Guidelines “have been deemed to be advisory in nature. They still, however, remain a factor that Court is required to consider in imposing sentence.” App. 122. The District Court did an admirable job of considering the 3553(a) factors and evaluating the characteristics specific to Langford and his offense. The Court then imposed a sentence at the lowest point in the advisory Guidelines range it had calculated. The government is correct that the 46-month sentence was within the Guidelines range in either case. However, if the criminal history point had not been added, the Court could have imposed a 37-month sentence without departing from the Guidelines, and the 46 months it did impose would have been at the top, not at the bottom, of the proper range. There is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that the District Court would have imposed the same sentence under a lower Guidelines range. We must decline the government’s invitation to affirm on the theory that the District Court might have imposed the same sentence. See Thayer, 201 F.3d 214; United States v. Duckro, 466 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that, even where the district court departed downward significantly from the originally (incorrectly) calculated range, one could not presume that the court would have departed less under a correct and lower Guidelines range).5 We are not 5 Indeed, given that the Court imposed a sentence at the low end of the erroneous Guidelines range, a more reasonable inference is that it would have selected from the low end of the correctly calculated range. Duckro, 466 F.3d at 447 (finding 28 persuaded that the record is clear that the sentence imposed was not a result of the erroneous sentencing Guidelines range. We will remand for the District Court to determine the sentence that should be imposed in light of the correct Guidelines range, considering the 3553(a) factors. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983) (“[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.”).6 that, because the sentencing court had selected from the low end of the Guidelines range it believed to be correct, “it stands to reason that it might choose an even lower sentence when presented with” a lower range); Harris, 390 F.3d at 573 (suggesting that the proper inference to draw from a sentence imposed at the bottom of the overlapping area might be that the court would have imposed a lower sentence under a correct Guidelines calculation). 6 Langford further contends that because his uncle and codefendant Charles Collier has now been sentenced, a downward variance will be called for on remand. At Collier’s sentencing, the District Court departed downward one criminal history category and twelve offense levels, such that Collier’s sentence was 57 months, with a mandatory statutory consecutive minimum of 84 months, for a total of 141 months. Langford suggests that in order to avoid disparity in sentencing, given Collier’s career offender status, age, and role in the offense, the Court will likely depart downward for his sentence as well. We will not speculate as to any downward departures the Court may 29 The goals of uniformity and sentencing discretion are furthered by a remand. Where we conclude that the District Court might have ended up with a different sentence had it started at the right point, giving the Court the opportunity to reconsider the sentence and start at the right place in resentencing actually affords deference and respect for the District Court judge. Our failure to do so would be presumptuous on our part; it is not our role to say that the sentencing judge would consider the sentence he gave, which was at the low end of the incorrectly calculated range, to be appropriate when the correct Guideline range is lower than was assumed. Moreover, insisting on a uniform point of departure from which all sentencing courts can exercise their discretion promotes uniformity in the sentencing of defendants with similar criminal history and offense levels. Surely, a remand with opportunity for reasoning anew is required in order to further both goals.