Opinion ID: 159988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: MR. McGREGOR'S INCULPATORY STATEMENTS

Text: 39 Mr. McGregor asserts that his confession was not voluntary, and the waiver of his Miranda 4 rights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The voluntariness inquiry turns on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the confession was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). The focus of this inquiry is on police overreaching. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). 40 Mr. McGregor asserts that his confession was involuntary because of his mental illness, and in light of the conduct of police in refusing to give him his medication and not permitting him to smoke cigarettes. Mr. McGregor's mental illness, without any evidence of police coercion, is insufficient to render his confession involuntary. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164, 167; see also, e.g., Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403, 410-11 (10th Cir. 1996). Although he might be more susceptible to government coercion due to his mental illness, that is relevant only if there has been police coercion. See United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998). 41 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the record did not indicate any police coercion. See McGregor, 885 P.2d at 1377-78. This determination was reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Mr. McGregor testified in camera that he had not been taking his medication prior to his arrest. The record does not indicate that police provided him with any medication as a result of his confession. There is no evidence, therefore, that police withheld his medication in an effort to coerce his confession. Cf. Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 519-21 (1968) (per curiam) (under totality of circumstances, police coerced confession where, among other coercive circumstances, accused required high blood pressure medication twice daily and police held accused without medication for over twelve hours, until he confessed). 42 Mr. McGregor further asserts that he is a chain smoker who confessed due to his desperate need for a cigarette. But cf. United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 61-62 (1st Cir.) (rejecting claim that confession made by heroin addict was involuntary because he was suffering withdrawal symptoms), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2756 (2000). There is no dispute that the jail's policy forbids smoking. The sheriff testified that police officials interviewing inmates could and did sometimes give inmates cigarettes. The Oklahoma appellate court's determination, that even assuming officers would permit Mr. McGregor to smoke when he gave statements, nothing suggests and the record does not support the argument that this police activity rises to the level of coercion, McGregor, 885 P.2d at 1378, was reasonable. 43 For these same reasons, the state courts' determination that Mr. McGregor voluntarily waived his Miranda rights was reasonable. He further asserts, however, that the waiver of his rights was not knowing and intelligent. Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the relevant inquiry is whether Mr. McGregor appreciated the consequences of his actions, based on a totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1988); Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. The Oklahoma appellate court determined that the record did not suggest that he could not understand what he did when he made these statements. McGregor, 885 P.2d at 1378. In light of the record, this determination was reasonable.
44 Pursuant to Oklahoma law, once the trial court determines a defendant's confession was voluntary, as an additional safeguard[], the question of voluntariness is submitted to the jury, together with all the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession. Hopper v. State, 736 P.2d 538, 539-40 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). See generally Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378-79 & 378 n.8 (1964) (noting this procedure does not . . . pose hazards to defendant's rights). Mr. McGregor challenges the trial court's instructions to the jury concerning its consideration of the voluntariness of his inculpatory statements and the weight to be afforded them. In particular, he argues the instructions required the jury to perform an analysis similar to that applicable to his insanity defense, before the jury could consider the effects of his mental illness on the voluntariness of his inculpatory statements. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court had inappropriately inserted the standard for presentation of the insanity defense, resulting in an ambiguous jury instruction. McGregor, 885 P.2d at 1380. Nonetheless, that court further held that [t]he instructions neither denied McGregor a constitutional or statutory right nor went to the foundation of the case. Id. 45 In these habeas proceedings, Mr. McGregor argues that these instructions deprived him of due process, at both the first and second stages of trial, by depriving him of a state law right to have the jury consider his mental illness in determining the voluntariness of his statements. State law errors, however, are not grounds for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Nor did this instruction otherwise render his trial fundamentally unfair. See id. at 70.