Opinion ID: 4413253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Exposure of Nude Body of Detainee

Text: In our view, any reasonable adult in our society would understand that the involuntary exposure of an adult’s nude body is a significant imposition on the victim. 3 The dissent argues that the proper approach to Fourteenth Amendment claims against executive action would be to determine whether the action shocks the conscience. Kingsley, however, is to the contrary for claims relating to the treatment of pretrial detainees. 10 And law-enforcement officers in this circuit have been taught this lesson repeatedly. In Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010), the plaintiff had been placed in a holding cell after her arrest, awaiting transfer to the city jail. She told the arresting officer that she needed to pump breastmilk to be used by her infant child in her absence. See id. He required her to do so under the observation of a female cadet, even though she could have been afforded privacy in a room with a guard outside. See id. at 1191. We held that the officer had violated the Fourth Amendment, because he had “not demonstrated any justification for requiring [the plaintiff] to expose her breasts to a female cadet while she performed an essential bodily function in providing milk for her baby.” Id.; see May v. City of Nahunta, Geo., 846 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2017) (woman subject to mental-health detention forced to disrobe in presence of male officer); see also Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (in holding that officers did not act improperly in executing search warrant, Court notes that officers did not delay detainees from putting on clothes “longer than necessary to protect their safety”). Similarly, in Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir. 1984), a man arrested on a bench warrant for traffic violations was forced to “drop his pants and undershorts” as part of the booking process in a jail’s “lobby area where he observed ten to twelve people in the immediate vicinity.” We held that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because the search was unnecessary to discover contraband or weapons, and took place in front of multiple people in a public area. See id. at 394–95. 11 We have recognized the significance of such an imposition even on prisoners after they have been convicted and are serving time in prison. In Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002), a female inmate challenged a prison’s alleged policy of requiring a “visual search” of inmates’ naked bodies in view of other inmates after trips to the prison yard. We held that she had “the right not to be subjected to a humiliating strip search in full view of several (or perhaps many) others unless the procedure is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 1260 (emphasis omitted). It appears, although it is not certain, that our decision in that case relied on the Fourth Amendment; but several other circuits have recognized that officials can violate the Eighth Amendment by forcing inmates to expose their naked bodies for the purpose of humiliation. See Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003); Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1227–28 (6th Cir. 1987); Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981). And in Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 713 (10th Cir. 1982), we considered a prisoner’s complaint that his constitutional rights had been violated because female prison guards “are assigned to posts where they observe[d] him dressing and undressing and using the toilet and the shower.” We held that the complaint was improperly dismissed as frivolous, saying that “[a]lthough the inmates’ right to privacy must yield to the penal institution’s need to maintain security, it does not vanish altogether.” Id. at 714. We did not reference any particular provision of the Constitution. All we need to take from these cases is a conclusion that was obvious without them: exposing a person’s naked body involuntarily is a severe invasion of personal privacy. The conclusion that Defendants’ alleged conduct constituted a violation of the 12 Fourteenth Amendment readily follows. The only issue is whether the exposure of Plaintiff’s body was “not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or [was] excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74. In our view, the facts alleged in the Complaint satisfy this condition. Defendants argue that Plaintiff needed medical treatment urgently, and that finding another covering for him before transporting him through the hospital would have taken too much additional time and effort. But Plaintiff has alleged facts supporting the reasonable inference that no vital urgency justified Defendants’ actions. His complaint states that Defendants took more than two hours to transport him to the hospital. It also alleges that at the end of his walk through the hospital he was chained to a hospital bed, not immediately x-rayed or provided with treatment. The district court ruled that these allegations were sufficient to support the inference that Plaintiff’s condition was not so urgent that Defendants could not have delayed walking him into the hospital for “[t]he additional moment that would have been required to locate and place a smock” on him. District Court Order at 17. We agree with the district court. It is common sense that acquiring some replacement clothing at a hospital would be at most a matter of minutes, and we can reasonably infer from the long delay in transporting Plaintiff that Defendants’ actions were not based on a medical need so pressing that they could not spare a little time to obtain a dignified covering.