Opinion ID: 1198833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of Xcel Inn Room 322

Text: James contends that the search of Xcel Inn Room 322 was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment because Officer Prust entered the room twice and conducted a warrantless search. James contends he maintained an expectation of privacy in Room 322 despite his absence. When moving to suppress evidence on the basis of an alleged unreasonable search, the defendant has the burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. United States v. Pierson, 219 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2000). Whether a defendant has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy involves a two-part inquirythe defendant must show that (1) he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched or the items seized, and (2) society is prepared to accept the expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable. United States v. Hoey, 983 F.2d 890, 892 (8th Cir.1993). In this case, the district court denied James's motion to suppress the evidence from Room 322, concluding that James had abandoned the room prior to any entrance or search of the room by law enforcement, and thus, he lacked any expectation of privacy in the room at the time of the entries or searches. It is well established that the warrantless search of abandoned property does not constitute an unreasonable search and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. A district court's determination of abandonment is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir.1997). Thus, we must affirm the district court's abandonment finding unless its decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, in light of the entire record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). We thoroughly discussed the issue of abandonment in Tugwell, stating: A warrantless search of abandoned property does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, for any expectation of privacy in the item searched is forfeited upon its abandonment. United States v. Segars, 31 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir.1994). The issue is not abandonment in the strict property right sense, but rather, whether the defendant in leaving the property has relinquished h[is] reasonable expectation of privacy so that the search and seizure is valid. United States v. Hoey, 983 F.2d 890, 892-93 (8th Cir.1993) (other citations omitted). Whether an abandonment has occurred is determined on the basis of the objective facts available to the investigating officers, not on the basis of the owner's subjective intent. See United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir.1993). This determination is to be made in light of the totality of circumstances, and two important factors are denial of ownership and physical relinquishment of the property. United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir.1986). We consider only the information available to the officers at the time of the search. See Rem, 984 F.2d at 811 (In order to determine whether a pre-search abandonment has occurred, the flow of information considered stops at the moment the police officer opened the suitcase). Tugwell, 125 F.3d at 602. Following this precedent, we must examine the objective facts available to Officer Prust at the time he entered Room 322 at the Xcel Inn. Officer Prust knew that: (1) an assault had been reported by a female victim; (2) the alleged victim stated that she had been attacked by Calvin James; (3) the victim stated that James attacked her after the two had packed their bags in preparation for leaving the motel; (4) the victim reported that James fled with all his belongings after the assault; (5) the motel manager reported that the alleged attacker fled the motel and that he chased the suspect for a couple of blocks before losing sight of him near a city bus; and (6) the motel manager told Officer Prust that James had rented Room 322 but that he was scheduled to leave that day. Given these objective facts, it was not clear error for the district court to find that James had abandoned Room 322 before Officer Prust's initial entry into the room. Moreover, Officer Prust's initial entry into Room 322 uncovered no evidence. This entry, in fact, only produced information consistent with abandonment. Officer Prust saw that the room contained no personal belongings and that all of the occupants' debris had been placed into the room's trash can. Given these additional objective facts supporting abandonment and the lack of anyone claiming occupancy to the room at any time prior to the second entry, substantial evidence supported a finding of abandonment prior to the second warrantless entry into the room. See United States v. Caballero-Chavez, 260 F.3d 863, 867-68 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that defendants' abandonment of motel room and its contents was a voluntary act untainted by officers' prior search of room and contents, such that defendants had no interest justifying suppression of evidence discovered in room). Thus, James had relinquished h[is] reasonable expectation of privacy in the room prior to the warrantless search of the room, and therefore the search did not implicate his Fourth Amendment rights. Tugwell, 125 F.3d at 602 (A warrantless search of abandoned property does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, for any expectation of privacy in the item searched is forfeited upon its abandonment). [3] Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that James abandoned Room 322 prior to any search of the room, and the evidence subsequently seized from the room pursuant to the search warrant was not tainted.