Opinion ID: 2040858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Exchange Program a Public Accommodation Within the Meaning of Section 601A.2(10) (1977)?

Text: Good's complaint alleged that Rotary International violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act, which prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of sex in a public accommodation. Specifically, Iowa Code section 601A.7 (1977), states: 1. It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any owner, lessee, sublessee, proprietor, manager, or superintendent of any public accommodation or any agent or employee thereof: a. To ... deny to any person because of ... sex ... the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges thereof, or otherwise to discriminate against any person because of ... sex ... in the furnishing of such accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges. b. To directly or indirectly advertise or in any other manner indicate or publicize that the patronage of persons of any particular ... sex ... is unwelcome, objectionable, not acceptable, or not solicited. Because section 601A.7 specifically applies only to public accommodations, jurisdiction over this case exists only if the Rotary offer was a public accommodation within the meaning of that statute. The relevant definitional statute is section 601A.2(10) (1977), which provides: Public accommodation means each and every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee or charge, provided that any place, establishment, or facility that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public gratuitously shall be deemed a public accommodation if the accommodation receives any substantial governmental support or subsidy. Public accommodation shall not mean any bona fide private club or other place, establishment, or facility which is by its nature distinctly private, except when such distinctly private place, establishment, or facility caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for fee or charge or gratuitously, it shall be deemed a public accommodation during such period. This section, therefore, clearly indicates that a private club or organization, like Rotary, is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex only if it offers goods or services to the general public. The crucial question before this court then is whether Rotary International offered the group exchange program to the general public. [1] Petitioner claims that when Rotary International, concededly a private club, offered the group study exchange program to the general public, it functioned as a public accommodation within the meaning of Iowa Code section 601A.2(10) (1977). Chapter 601A generally defines public accommodation as a place or facility that serves the general public. Unfortunately, it does not define the term general public, except to say that general public is what makes the private club a public accommodation and brings it within the jurisdiction of the act. For all practical purposes, the issue of the definition of general public within the meaning of Iowa Code section 601A.2(10) (1977) is one of first impression. [2] In reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute, this court may give some weight to the agency's determination, but the meaning of a statute is always a matter of law, and final construction and interpretation of Iowa statutory law is for this court. Schmitt v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 263 N.W.2d 739, 745 (Iowa 1978). Our review in this case, however, is not without its limited perimeters. Although construction of this statute is a function of the courts, we have always held that a reviewing court should give appropriate weight to the judgment of agencies charged with the special duty of administering a particular statute. West Des Moines Education Association v. Public Employment Relations Board, 266 N.W.2d 118, 124-25 (Iowa 1978). See also 2 A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 49.05, at 362-63 (4th ed. 1984). Here, the civil rights commission ruled that Good was not covered by the act, and we give weight to that interpretation. On the other hand, the legislature has specifically required that the act be construed liberally to effect its purposes. Iowa Code § 601A.18 (1977). Good argues that a public accommodation under the interpretation given to it by the commission and Rotary, could easily evade the act. A bar or restaurant, for example, otherwise qualifying as a public accommodation under section 601A.2(10), could not lawfully discriminate on the basis of impermissible criteria. However, if the bar or restaurant set up some nondiscriminatory criteria for its customers ( e.g., minimum age of 19, which all bars must legally do), the restaurant is no longer serving the general public, only a class of the public. Since it does not serve the general public, it is not a public accommodation covered by the provisions of 601A. The act would, therefore, be successfully evaded, according to her argument. In this case, however, several criteria were applied by Rotary to each candidate's application: 1. He must be high moral character. 2. He must be intelligent. 3. He must be cooperative. 4. He must be presentable in appearance. 5. He must be able to express himself clearly and logically. 6. He must be in good health. 7. He must have a good sound general education. 8. He must be interested in and show enthusiasm for his chosen vocation. 9. He must have outstanding or at least above average skill. 10. He must have been employed in any recognized business or profession on a full-time basis for a period of at least two years prior to making application for membership on a group study team. 11. He must by his interest and active participation in community affairs be a good citizen. 12. He must be a citizen of the county in which he resides. 13. He either be employed or reside in the rotary district which endorses his candidacy. 14. He must not be a relative of a rotarian by blood or marriage. 15. He must be between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five, inclusive, at the time of his application. Should a class of persons, limited by these criteria, nevertheless be considered the general public for purposes of the civil rights act? Even under a liberal reading of the act, we think not. Statutes should be given their ordinary meaning unless defined by the legislature or possessed of a particular and appropriate meaning in law. American Home Products Corp. v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review, 302 N.W.2d 140, 143-44 (Iowa 1981). Each word and each part of the statute have a presumed purpose. Iowa Department of Transportation v. Nebraska-Iowa Supply Co., 272 N.W.2d 6, 11 (Iowa 1978). Under these principles, we must look very closely at the terms general and public and determine whether they should be separately construed to effect their ordinary meaning. Black's Law Dictionary 812 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines general as follows: GENERAL. From Latin word genus. It relates to the whole kind, class, or order. Pertaining to or designating the genus or class, as distinguished from that which characterizes the species or individual; universal, not particularized, as opposed to special; principal or central, as opposed to local; open or available to all, as opposed to select; obtaining commonly, or recognized universally, as opposed to particular; universal or unbounded, as opposed to limited; comprehending the whole or directed to the whole, as distinguished from anything applying to or designed for a portion only. Extensive or common to many. (Citations omitted.) The term public is defined as of, relating to, or affecting the people as an organized community. Webster's Third International Dictionary 1836 (1976). The connotation of the definition is that public can mean a segment of a population while the term general appears to involve the whole of the group that it speaks of. This court has had the opportunity to interpret the term general public in another context. In Iowa Farm Purchasing Association, Inc. v. Huff, 260 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1977), we distinguished between the public and the general public in construing Iowa Code chapter 503A. We held that the public, as opposed to the general public, can mean any group or segment, however characterized, of the aggregate of the citizens of a political entity. Based upon this distinction, we concluded that a purchasing association which dealt with farmers does deal with the public, rather than the general public. We agree with the commission and the district court, that the activities complained of here did not involve the general public under the meaning of our civil rights act. We have considered other alternative arguments presented by the Rotary. Under our disposition in this case, it is not necessary to resolve these other grounds for affirmance. We affirm the district court. AFFIRMED.