Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Close the Trial Proceedings During Defendant's Testimony

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied her request to close the guilt phase proceedings to the public so that she might testify regarding the actions of the second man, Beto, without fearing for her safety. After the prosecution had rested its case-in-chief, defendant moved to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom while defendant testified, asserting that their presence during her testimony will be so prejudicial to the defendant that she will be deprived of a fair trial. Defendant's declaration in support of the motion summarized her intended testimony and stated she feared retaliation from the other male Hispanic if she testified in open court. The declaration concluded: If I testify in public so the newspapers get the information and I identify this male Hispanic, I believe my family will be harmed because the man is still out in the community. [¶] I cannot and will not testify unless my testimony is taken in a closed courtroom with my testimony sealed. Defendant further declared that the second Hispanic man induced her to murder Autumn Wallace by threatening to harm her and her family if she did not do something about Autumn. During the colloquy with defense counsel at the hearing, the trial court observed there was no evidence that defendant's mother or children ever had been threatened with harm, or that the unidentified man was even in the area or counsel would have been able to locate the person. The court further advised that the defense of duress was not available in a capital murder case, that the facts did not support an aider and abettor theory of culpability, and that therefore it was unclear that defendant could present a defense based upon the proposed testimony. The court observed that the clear inference from the declaration was that defendant did, in fact, know the identity of the second man and that therefore her testimony in open court might facilitate his identification and apprehension. The court also explained that closing the courtroom to the public during defendant's testimony might lead the jury to infer that the court attached some credibility to defendant's testimony or in fact, believed that there was a valid threat to exclude the public during her testimony. And I don't believe any instruction to the contrary would alleviate the possible danger of that interpretation. Although many of defendant's claims on appeal are founded upon the premise that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by presenting a third-party culpability defense, she implicitly embraces that same defense in advancing her present claim of error. She contends the trial court's failure to close the trial prevented her from testifying because of her fear for the safety of her family, and was prejudicial because her testimony would have provided evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase. As we have recognized, the trial court in unusual circumstances may exercise its discretion to close portions of a criminal trial to the public without the consent of the defendant for good cause in order to promote the interests of justice or for the protection of witnesses or parties. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1298-1299, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1 ( Cummings ); People v. Cash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 841, 846, 345 P.2d 462, citing discussion in Kirstowsky v. Superior Court (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 745, 300 P.2d 163.) The trial court in Kirstowsky , ordered the courtroom closed during the testimony of the defendant at a murder trial because she intended to testify regarding embarrassing abnormal sexual practices that had been enforced upon her, and because she was experiencing extreme emotional disturbance and would be unable to testify on her own behalf unless she could do so in a courtroom closed to the public and the press. ( Kirstowsky, supra, 143 Cal.App.2d at p. 748, 300 P.2d 163.) The trial court below distinguished Kirstowsky , because the present case did not involve any abnormal practices, sexual or otherwise, and there was no evidence that our accused is in the condition of extreme emotional disturbance and bewilderment at the prospect of testifying. [10] A court may restrict attendance by members of the public only if restriction is necessary to preserve a defendant's right to a fair trial. ( Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1233 at p. 1299, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) In the present case, we find no error, because defendant has not established she was denied the right to a fair trial by the court's ruling. ( Id. at pp. 1298-1299, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Defendant was aware of her right to testify and willingly chose not to exercise that right. She admitted that she had not been threatened to refrain from testifying, and that the only actual threats were those allegedly made by the unidentified man on the day of the murder and several days thereafter, a time (as the trial court noted) one and a half years earlier. In any event, defendant did not suffer any prejudice from the denial of her motion. She testified during her first penalty phase trial. When the subject of the second man's identity was raised during defendant's cross-examination, defendant refused to answer, stating she was scared to identify him. As the Attorney General points out, defendant could have taken a similar course of action during the presentation of testimony at the guilt phase portion of her trial. Finally, in view of the admission in evidence of defendant's lengthy and detailed videotaped confession, it is not reasonably probable that her testimony regarding the involvement of the second man in the murder would have changed the outcome of the guilt phase. Defendant contends her testimony would have provided mitigating evidence at the second penalty phase trial. But her testimony at the first penalty phase trial was read to the jury at the penalty phase retrial, and therefore any error in denying the motion to exclude the public from the trial during the guilt phase would have been harmless.