Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence defendant was the direct perpetrator

Text: Defendant argues the record contains insufficient evidence to convict him of first degree murder as the direct perpetrator. The relevant law is well established. ``[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceโthat is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valueโsuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'' ( People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 419.) The standard is the same under the state and federal due process clauses. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1082-1083 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].) We presume `in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.' ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015].) The prosecution's main evidence was Mercurio's testimony that defendant robbed and shot Gitmed. Defendant contends Mercurio's testimony of itself was insufficient to support his conviction as the direct perpetrator and that evidence of his actions after the shooting cannot support the conviction. Considered in isolation, he argues, his actions after the crime merely support the conclusion he was an accessory after the fact. We are not, however, limited to considering his postcrime actions in isolation. (7) In the context of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of premeditated and deliberate murder, we have noted that evidence of a defendant's attempts to conceal the crime by cleaning up the crime scene or telling false stories is highly probative of whether defendant committed the crime, but it does not bear upon the state of the defendant's mind at the time of the commission of the crime. ( People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 33 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942].) While our comment in Anderson thus warns against using evidence of a defendant's postcrime actions and statements as the sole support for upholding a finding of premeditated and deliberate murder, such postcrime actions and statements can support a finding that defendant committed a murder for which his specific mental state is established by his actions before and during the crime. In the week following the shooting, defendant, with Mercurio's help, methodically disposed of Gitmed's property. That defendant knew the location of and entry code to Gitmed's storage facility reasonably supports the inference he gained that information from Gitmed before the murder as part of a plan to obtain Gitmed's property after he killed him. Other postcrime evidence supports defendant's guilt as the actual perpetrator of the murder. Charlene Triplett saw defendant cleaning a gun, which supports the inference he had brought and used the gun that killed Gitmed. When after the shooting defendant returned to Michelle Keathley's house to retrieve his bicycle, he gave conflicting stories about Gitmed's whereabouts. When interviewed by the police on September 13, 1991, he acknowledged having met Gitmed at Michelle Keathley's house, but denied leaving the house with him. He told Barbara Triplett about a man floating in Canyon Lake who was not able to make decisions for himself, and boasted to Danny Dalton about leaving someone floating in the lake. Charlene Triplett heard defendant implore Mercurio to get Charlene and her family to go along with our story. Defendant's postcrime actions and statements clearly support the conclusion he was the direct perpetrator of the murder.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient that he premeditated Gitmed's murder because nothing in Mercurio's testimony established that he acted other than impulsively in shooting Gitmed. Defendant notes Mercurio testified he was surprised when he heard shots and, just before the shooting, defendant raised his voice in an increasing volume. Defendant contends the only reasonable conclusion this testimony supports is that he shot Gitmed in the anger of the moment. (8) We disagree. At best, defendant establishes only that, based on Mercurio's testimony, a reasonable jury could have concluded defendant shot the victim in anger and without premeditation. But as we have noted, [i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the reviewing court may not reverse the judgment merely because it believes that the circumstances might also support a contrary finding. ( People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55].) The evidence here reasonably supports a finding of premeditation. `Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. The test is not time, but reflection. `Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.'' ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 697 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640].) Mercurio testified that as defendant's voice grew louder and angrier, defendant was ordering Gitmed to take off his clothes. The jury reasonably could have inferred from these facts that, before shooting Gitmed, defendant had decided to rob him and, further, that he had decided to kill him after robbing him. Gitmed was killed by three gunshot wounds, one of which was immediately fatal. Mercurio testified defendant was just a few feet from Gitmed when he shot him. This manner of killing, a close-range shooting without any provocation or evidence of a struggle, reasonably supports an inference of premeditation and deliberation. ( People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 230 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222].) Other evidence at trial, moreover, reasonably supports the inference that defendant lured Gitmed to an isolated area to rob and kill him as part of a plan to obtain all his worldly possessions. Testimony at trial supports the inference that defendant had planned to kill Gitmed as early as when he convinced Gitmed to leave Michelle Keathley's house with him. Defendant had no car at that time and, as Eric Arias testified, defendant had previously offered Arias money to give him a ride to the Lake Elsinore area to collect a debt and mentioned he would be bringing a gun. After Arias backed out of the agreement, defendant made a similar offer to Gitmed, who accepted. A reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant, after persuading Gitmed to accompany him, planned to rob him and kill him for his car when the opportunity presented itself. A further reasonable inference is that defendant brought along the gun he had mentioned to Eric Arias. Testimony established that defendant persuaded Gitmed to drive to the Triplett compound, where Mercurio was staying. A reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant brought Gitmed to Mercurio, whom defendant had met in prison, in order to obtain Mercurio's assistance in committing the robbery and murder. Later that night, Mercurio drove defendant and Gitmed to an isolated area of Canyon Lake. A reasonable inference is that defendant had planned to get Gitmed to a remote area where he could carry out the robbery and murder without hindrance and without detection. (9) In sum, the record contains ample evidence to support defendant's conviction of first degree premeditated murder.
(10) One who unlawfully kills a human being during the commission of a robbery or an attempted robbery is guilty of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487]; งง 187, 189.) Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (ง 211.) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that, at the time of the shooting, Gitmed was in possession of any property or that defendant took any property from him. Defendant's argument ignores the substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the killing occurred during the commission of a robbery. Mercurio's testimony provided direct evidence that defendant took personal items from Gitmed before killing him. Mercurio testified that before the shooting defendant told Gitmed to take off his clothes, which he did, and that after the shooting defendant returned to the truck and threw some things into the back of it, including Gitmed's clothing and some small items that might have been Gitmed's wallet or some change. Gitmed's body was found with no shirt or jacket, which further supports the inference that personal items were taken from him. Defendant contends Mercurio's trial testimony establishing the robbery contradicted his testimony before the grand jury, which defense counsel read into the record as impeachment. However, Mercurio's grand jury testimony constituted, if anything, even stronger evidence that defendant had taken personal items from Gitmed. Before the grand jury, Mercurio testified that after defendant pointed a gun at Gitmed, Gitmed started taking off his clothes and removed items from his pockets, such as his wallet and change, and handed them to defendant, who placed them on the hood of the truck. Mercurio's grand jury testimony therefore did not conflict with his trial testimony; rather, it included some details (such as Gitmed's removing items from his pockets) that he did not recount at trial, but that were consistent with his trial testimony. Even if Mercurio's grand jury testimony was inconsistent, it was admitted for its truth. (See Evid. Code, ง 1235.) Therefore, whether the jury accepted Mercurio's trial testimony exclusively, his grand jury testimony exclusively, or a combination of both, the testimony provided substantial evidence that a robbery took place.