Opinion ID: 885110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Standard for Risk of Harm

Text: ¶ 29 With respect to the correct legal standard for risk of harm, Hafner argues that the court erred in applying the expansive  may subject the person to physical harm language of § 49-4-101, MCA, and failing to apply the more restrictive  reasonable probability of substantial harm  standard articulated in Mantolete. Hafner lists several reasons in support of his argument. First, Hafner notes that this Court specifically rejected an expansive interpretation of the language in § 49-4-101, MCA, when determining whether an employer's failure to hire a person based on safety concerns is pretextual or unlawful. Hafner I, 268 Mont. at 406, 886 P.2d at 953. He notes that the Court indicated that such a loose interpretation would allow easy circumvention of the Montana Human Rights Act because any employer could regard a disabled person with a progressive condition as subject to future harm. Hafner I, 268 Mont. at 406, 886 P.2d at 953. ¶ 30 Second, Hafner points out that § 49-4-101, MCA, was modeled after a similar statute in New Jersey. See Minutes of the Meeting of the Labor and Employment Relations Committee, Montana State Senate (1974) (statement of Tony Softich on HB 654). Hafner states that the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the risk of harm defense under that state's anti-discrimination statute and held that the correct legal standard for risk of harm was the Mantolete standard. See Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., (1988), 110 N.J. 363, 541 A.2d 682. Hafner argues the Jansen decision is persuasive authority. The Jansen court held: [A]n employer may consider whether the handicapped person can do his or her work without posing a serious threat of injury to the health and safety of himself or herself or other employees. That decision requires the employer to conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that the handicap will probably cause such an injury. The mere fact that the applicant is an epileptic will not suffice. Otherwise, unfounded fears or prejudice about epilepsy could bar epileptics from the work force. The appropriate test is not whether the employee suffers from epilepsy or whether he or she may experience a seizure on the job, but whether the continued employment of the employee in his or her present position poses a reasonable probability of substantial harm. Jansen, 541 A.2d at 687-88 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Jansen court also indicated that its holding was consistent with several other jurisdictions. Jansen, 541 A.2d at 688. ¶ 31 Lastly, Hafner states that the Mantolete standard is consistent with federal regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA). The regulations provide: An employer may require, as a qualification standard, that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of himself/herself or others. . . . An employer, however, is not permitted to deny an employment opportunity to an individual with a disability merely because of a slightly increased risk. The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e. high probability of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1997) (emphasis added). Hafner cites several cases in which this Court has looked to federal regulations interpreting the ADA for guidance in interpreting provisions of the Montana Human Rights Act, and urges the Court to continue this practice. See Reeves; Walker v. Montana Power Co. (1996), 278 Mont. 344, 924 P.2d 1339; Hafner I; Martinell v. Montana Power Co. (1994), 268 Mont. 292, 886 P.2d 421; Hearing Aid Institute v. Rasmussen (1993), 258 Mont. 367, 852 P.2d 628; McCann v. Trustees, Dodson School Dist. (1991), 249 Mont. 362, 816 P.2d 435. ¶ 32 Further, the amici curiae in this case note that in 1996, after this Court's decision in Hafner I, the Montana Human Rights Commission included the Mantolete standard in promulgating Rule 24.9.606(7), ARM, which provides: If an employer defends an adverse employment action against a person with a physical or mental disability on the grounds that an accommodation would endanger the health or safety of a person, the employer's failure to independently assess whether the accommodation would create a reasonable probability of substantial harm will create a disputable presumption that the employer's justification is a pretext for discrimination on the basis of disability. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 33 The amici also note that when this Court first addressed the Mantolete standard in Hafner I, it did so in the context of the McDonnell test. The Court held that while Mantolete would not control in determining whether an employer has produced a non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action, Mantolete would provide useful guidance in determining whether such reason was a mere pretext. Hafner I, 268 Mont. at 406, 886 P.2d at 953. The amici argue that in light of Reeves, and the employer's expanded burden of proving absence of unlawful motive in direct evidence cases, the Mantolete standard is the most appropriate standard in determining risk of harm. ¶ 34 We find Hafner's and the amici's arguments persuasive. Equally persuasive is the need to effectively balance the disabled individual's interest of enjoying true equal employment opportunities with the employer's interest of ensuring that employment of disabled individuals does not pose a risk of harm to themselves or others. As Hafner and the amici have argued, it appears our pronouncement in Hafner I, that the Mantolete standard serves as useful guidance in determining risk of harm, has not been effective in correcting the imbalance created by the expansive may language in § 49-4-101, MCA, and implementing the remedial purposes of Montana's anti-discrimination statutes. We are required to construe statutes in a manner consistent with their intended purpose. Section 1-2-102, MCA. Therefore, in keeping with this duty, and in an effort to provide employees, employers, lawyers, and judges definitive guidance concerning the risk of harm defense, we hold that in all employment discrimination cases, the appropriate standard to be applied when determining whether employment of a job applicant poses a risk of harm to himself or others, is the Mantolete standard, that is, whether employment of the job applicant poses a reasonable probability of substantial harm to himself or others.