Opinion ID: 457943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Instruction on Eyewitness Identification.

Text: 16 Jones next claims that the trial court committed an error of constitutional magnitude when it refused, without explanation, to give the following jury charge: 17 The court charges the jury that the possibility of human error or mistake, and the probable likeness or similarity of objects and persons are elements that you must act upon in considering testimony as to identity. You must carefully consider these factors passing upon the credibility that you attach to the witness' testimony, and you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the witness' identification of the Defendant. 18 This requested instruction is an extremely truncated version of the Telfaire charge, which derives its name from a model charge recommended by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C.Cir.1972). The court in Telfaire did not make its proposed charge mandatory. In fact, it affirmed the defendant's conviction because the trial court's instructions--both the initial instruction on the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense, and the follow-on instructions dealing with the defense of alibi, and the problem of mistaken identity--when considered in the overall context of the case, significantly focused the jury's attention on the issue of identity. Id. at 556. 19 This Court has yet to decide whether a Telfaire charge should be constitutionally required in every case where identification of the defendant is a major issue at trial. Instead, in the few similar cases we have decided thus far, we have held that the more general instructions actually given fairly covered the essence of the identification issue. Most recently, in United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir.1985), we affirmed a district court's refusal to give a requested Telfaire instruction because the portions of the charge actually given concerning reasonable doubt and the credibility of witnesses adequately covered the identification issue. In Martinez, the district court had not mentioned identification testimony specifically, 2 but it had instructed the jury to [c]onsider the witness' ability to observe the events to which he had testified and to evaluate whether he impresses you as having an accurate recollection of these events. Id. at 1304 n. 7. 20 Here, the trial court did not expressly instruct the jurors to consider Shorty Banks' ability to observe or his accuracy in recalling who had last hired the taxi on the morning of the murder. But the court did fully instruct the jurors on the requirement that they find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before returning a guilty verdict. Moreover, as did the defendant in Telfaire, Jones proffered an alibi defense. The trial court's instruction on this defense focused precisely on the issue of whether it was in fact Jones, or someone else, whom Banks had seen at the taxi stand. 3 The instructions given in Telfaire are nearly identical. 4 Without endorsing or rejecting the model charge proposed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, we find the disposition of that case persuasive, particularly in light of the fact that at trial the accuracy of Banks' identification of Jones was a major focus of his testimony and cross-examination. In sum, we hold that the charge given to the jury, when taken as a whole and considered along with the manner in which the case was tried, clearly conveyed to the jury the State's burden of proving beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant, and not someone else, committed the crime charged. 21