Opinion ID: 552196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conspiracy To Induce Breach

Text: 120 Caren C. Grant was a director and officer of Mercury, Milam, IBR, and RBI while the Facility Agreement was executory. Hutton asserts a claim against her and Aubin for conspiracy to induce breach of the Facility Agreement. In Texas, the elements of this civil conspiracy variant are: (1) the existence of an enforceable contract; (2) two or more non-parties' agreement to induce a party to breach a contract; (3) a party to the conspiracy commits an overt act in furtherance of the conspiratorial objective; (4) the overt act proximately causes the plaintiff actual damages; and (5) the conspirators lack justifiable excuse or privilege. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.1968); MacDonald v. Trammell, 351 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1961), writ dism'd w.o.j., 163 Tex. 352, 356 S.W.2d 143 (1962). 121 We understand the district court to have dismissed Hutton's conspiracy claim because Hutton produced insufficient evidence of collusive intent and conduct on Grant's part. Or, the court dismissed Hutton's claim because, as an agent of RBI and the S&Ls, Grant was privileged to interfere with the Facility Agreement. We believe that a fact issue is presented on this Hutton conspiracy claim. 122 Hutton's evidence of the following raises an issue that Aubin and Grant agreed to induce Haralson and RBI to breach the Facility Agreement: 123 --As an officer and director of Mercury and Milam, Grant had some influence over whether the S&Ls were run in the ordinary course of business from March 8, 1985 to March 14, 1986. 124 --Grant received over $27,000 in gifts from Aubin between the date the Facility Agreement was signed and the date the FHLBB placed the S&Ls in conservatorship. 125 --When the S&Ls were insolvent, Grant voted for the S&Ls to give herself and ten other S&L employees expensive cars. 126 --In April 1985, Grant and other directors approved the renewal of a $1 million note from Aubin's Wichita Land & Cattle Co. The TS&LD complained to Mercury that this renewal violated the Supervisory Agreement. 127 --As an officer of IBR, Grant transferred liens against and stock powers of the S&Ls to Aubin's companies in exchange for loans from Aubin to Haralson. 128 --After a conservator was appointed for the S&Ls, Grant accepted an extremely lucrative position with Aubin's companies. 129 The existence of a conspiracy is usually proved with circumstantial evidence, and our assessment of the record is that Hutton has adduced enough such evidence to survive summary judgment. See Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 836-37 (5th Cir.1988). 130 To the extent that the district court's summary judgment was premised on Grant's having agent immunity from Hutton's contract interference claim, we disagree. A jury could find that Grant, like Aubin, acted out of personal greed and therefore receives no immunity. See B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 553. 131 During summary judgment hearings, there was some confusion as to whether it was possible for Grant, an officer and director of RBI, to interfere with RBI's promises under the Facility Agreement. Not finding any contrary authority, we hold that Grant may interfere with RBI's promises while acting in a capacity other than RBI's agent. Thus, Grant's actions as an officer and director of Mercury and Milam could further a conspiracy to induce RBI to breach the Facility Agreement and Note. 132 Grant tries to avoid Hutton's conspiracy claim by explaining that Hutton cannot prove whether Aubin used S&L funds to purchase her gifts. But such expensive gifts to an unrelated party could reasonably signal a quid pro quo regardless of where the money for them originated. Next, Grant explains that RBI could not have been induced to breach the Facility Agreement because there is no evidence that RBI engaged in any transaction other than the Facility Agreement. But actual inducement is not an element of Hutton's conspiracy claim. Grant also cites the testimony of the TS&LD official who continuously monitored the S&Ls' affairs until the FHLBB placed them under conservatorship. While the TS&LD official may not have known of any transgressions by Grant, such ignorance is only evidence in her favor. It does not conclude Hutton's claim as a matter of law. 133 For these reasons, we reverse the district court's summary judgment on Hutton's claim of conspiracy to induce breach of contract and direct the court to reconsider this claim on remand.