Opinion ID: 2639110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the More than 8-Month Delay Between Mays' Arraignment and Trial Violate His Right to a Speedy Trial?

Text: Mays was arraigned on April 12, 2000, and a jury trial was scheduled for July 10, 2000. On June 13, 2000, the State filed a motion for continuance, which was granted. The trial was rescheduled for October 3, 2000. On October 6, 2000, during voir dire, the trial court declared a mistrial because of the unavailability of jurors and rescheduled the trial for January 2, 2001. Mays argues that the more than 8-month delay between his arraignment and trial violated his speedy trial rights. First, Mays complains that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for a continuance because the State needed additional time to have its ballistics evidence evaluated. Mays argues the State should have been required to put on some evidence to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to obtain that evidence. K.S.A. 22-3402(1) provides that a person charged with a crime and held in jail solely because of that crime must be brought to trial within 90 days of arraignment unless the delay is the result of the application or fault of the defendant or the trial court orders a continuance under subsection (3). K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c) provides that the time for trial may be extended under the following circumstances: There is material evidence which is unavailable; that reasonable efforts have been made to procure such evidence; and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence can be obtained and trial commenced within the next succeeding ninety (90) days. The State accurately points out that Mays' codefendant White made the same argument in his direct appeal. This court quoted the trial court's finding that material evidence was unavailable and that the State acted in good faith: `If there's over a hundred pieces of ballistics evidence that needs to be examined, that's all very meticulous work, it's very time consuming. Unfortunately, the people that can do that are very few and far between, and it appears to me that there has not been any sort of delay that's caused simply for the purpose of delay, that [the State's] request is based upon a good faith basis.' White, 275 Kan. at 600. This court rejected White's argument, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuance. 275 Kan. at 600. Mays offers no reason why this court should change its previous ruling. Next, Mays argues that the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial after the State would not agree to proceed to trial with only 10 jurors. Mays argues that because the jury had not been sworn, there could be no mistrial and the court should have discharged the jury panel and called a new one within speedy trial limits. The trial court declared a mistrial on October 6, 2000, because of the unavailability of jurors. After 12 jurors were impaneled and 2 alternates selected, 4 jurors were dismissed after they indicated they could not be impartial. The jury had not yet been sworn. While the defendants agreed to proceed with fewer than 12 jurors, the State did not consent. The district court declared a mistrial. In White, this court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the mistrial. 275 Kan. at 602. However, the court was not faced with the argument Mays makes here, that a mistrial cannot be granted before a jury is sworn. In support, Mays cites cases from other jurisdictions which hold that trial does not begin and jeopardy does not attach until a jury is sworn, thus no mistrial can be declared. See Pollard v. State, 175 Ga. App. 269, 270, 333 S.E.2d 152 (1985) (for purposes of determining whether defendant has been absent from trial and has therefore waived his right of confrontation, trial begins when jeopardy aattaches; jeopardy had not attached where jury had not been sworn); Brown v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 315, 326, 504 S.E.2d 399 (1998) (mistrial could not be declared based upon juror misconduct where jury had not been sworn, trial had not commenced, and jeopardy had not attached). These cases have no precedential value and involved different issues than the one presented here. K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(a) permits a trial court to terminate a trial and order a mistrial at any time termination is necessary because it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law. The statute does not define trial or state that a trial begins only when the jury has been sworn and, therefore, that jeopardy has attached pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c). However, other statutes include jury selection within references to trial. For example, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3405 requires the defendant's presence at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury. Furthermore, in State v. Bierman, 248 Kan. 80, 88-89, 805 P.2d 25 (1991), this court held that brought to trial for purposes of computing a speedy trial deadline under K.S.A. 22-3402(1) does not mean when a defendant is placed in jeopardy. The issue in Bierman was whether Bierman's right to a speedy trial was violated when voir dire commenced on the 90th day following arraignment but jeopardy under K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) did not clearly attach until the 91st day, when the jury was sworn. This court held the speedy trial obligation under K.S.A. 22-3402(1) was not violated. 248 Kan. at 89. The trial court's determination that a mistrial could be granted is consistent with Bierman. We hold that, under K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(a), a trial court may declare a mistrial during voir dire even before the jury is sworn and jeopardy has attached. Thus, the trial court correctly invoked the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3402(4), which state that [i]n the event a mistrial is declared . . . the time limitations provided for herein shall commence to run from the date the mistrial is declared. . . . Mays' speedy trial rights were not violated.