Opinion ID: 2326251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ministerial Exception and Sexual Harassment

Text: The ministerial exception is rooted in both the Free exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. [8] The Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental action that encroaches upon the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154-155, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952)) (explaining that the free exercise clause protects the power of religious organizations to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine). The Establishment Clause prohibits excessive entanglement between government and religion. [9] In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the United States Supreme Court established the following three part test to determine whether the ministerial exception is applicable to a particular statute: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose, second its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances or inhibits religion, finally the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111 (internal citations omitted). M.C.C. § 27-19, like its federal counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) [(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) has an obvious secular purpose, and neither advances nor inhibits religion. Petitioners argue that (in the words of their brief) the ministerial exception applies not just to matters of religious scriptures or dogma but also more broadly to matters of church governance. Although some federal appellate courts have applied the ministerial exception broadly, [10] we agree with the following analysis by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Insofar as race, sex, and national origin are concerned, the text of Title VII treats an employment dispute between a minister and his or her church like any other employment dispute. The statute does provide two exemptions from its non-discrimination mandate for religious groups. One permits a religious entity to restrict employment connected with the carrying on . . . of its activities to members of its own faith, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); the other permits parochial schools to do the same, id. § 2000e-2(e). But neither of these statutory exceptions removes race, sex, or national origin as an impermissible basis of discrimination against employees of religious institutions. Nor do they single out ministerial employees for lesser protections than those enjoyed by other church employees. Bollard v. California Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir.1999). In Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: The First Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships from judicial scrutiny, for to do so would necessarily extend constitutional protection to the secular components of these relationships . . . [T]he constitutional guarantee of religious freedom cannot be construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an otherwise religious relationship. . . . To hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious leader in a preferred position in our society. Id. at 335-36. Sanders was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (2002). While reversing the dismissal of sexual harassment claims asserted by a former seminarian, the McKelvey Court stated: Even when [a] dispute arises from activity that occurred in a religious setting, such as a relationship between a church and a ministerial-type plaintiff, to sweep away all of a minister's or seminarian's claims against the church out of fear of encroaching upon the First Amendment not only neglects, but actually may intrude upon, the two overarching purposes for which the Religion Clauses stand: (1) preventing sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1411, 25 L.Ed.2d 697, 701 (1970); and (2) promoting the freedom of an individual to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine [he or she] desires, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 884 (1990), and of churches to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154-55, 97 L.Ed. 120, 136 (1952).    Declining to impose neutral and otherwise applicable tort or contract obligations on religious institutions and ministers may actually support the establishment of religion, because to do so effectively creates an exception for, and may thereby help promote, religion. Fenton, supra, 8 Mich. J. Gender & L. at 75; see also Jones v. Trane, 153 Misc.2d 822, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 932 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1992) ([A] contrary holdingthat a religious body must be held free from any responsibility for wholly predictable and foreseeable injurious consequences of personnel decisions, although such decisions incorporate no theological or dogmatic tenetswould go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak such bodies with an exclusive immunity greater than that required for the preservation of the principles constitutionally safeguarded.); Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Note, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Court Access to Ministerial Employees, 74 Ind. L.J. 269, 284 (1998) ([L]ower courts . . . have blindly applied the Lemon test, concentrating exclusively on the third prong, excessive entanglement, without considering the fact that an exemption [from neutral laws] may have the [effect] of advancing religion. . . . [B]y allowing religious organizations immunity from discrimination suits brought by their clergy, courts give them an advantage that no secular employer enjoys.). Id. at 52-53, 800 A.2d at 856-57. In Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.App.1991), an associate pastor of a Lutheran church asserted sexual harassment and related claims against her supervising pastor, alleging that [the supervising pastor] repeatedly made unwelcome sexual advances toward her including referring to the two of them as lovers, physically contacting her in a sexual manner, and insisting on her companionship outside the work place, despite her objections. Id. at 717-718. Black's remaining claim for sexual harassment is based on pre-discharge conduct by Snyder and the church. She claims that Snyder's conduct created a hostile work environment, which the church failed to prevent or to remedy, and that these conditions violated the Human Rights Act. We recognize that sexual discrimination inheres in the pastoral appointments of some churches and has been granted, in effect, a constitutional exemption under both the free exercise and establishment clauses. However, no court has extended a similar protection over sexual harassment claims based on conduct during the employment relationship. Black's sexual harassment claim is unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of church doctrine. Because she does not seek reinstatement but only monetary damages, any prospective remedy would not require extensive court oversight.    . . . Permitting Black's claim to go forward presents no greater conflict with the church's disciplinary authority than that presented in cases enforcing child abuse laws . . . We hold, therefore, that the first amendment does not bar Black from litigating her sexual harassment claim. We are unpersuaded that enforcing the Human Rights Act's harassment prohibitions would actually burden the church's religious practices, in light of the church's own policy against such conduct. Even if this regulation would incidentally burden religious activity or belief, Black is entitled to assert this claim because the state's interest in eradicating sexual harassment in the work place is compelling, and we perceive no adequate, less restrictive alternative to enforcement. 471 N.W.2d at 720-721 (internal citations omitted). In the case at bar, the Church has not argued that there is any doctrinal reason for the harassment alleged by Respondent. Moreover, the Church has promulgated the following sexual harassment policy: Whereas, All persons were created by God in the divine image and human sexuality is a gracious gift of God; and Whereas, Our baptism into the family of God calls us to stand firmly and pastorally against all forms fo abuse and to respect and empower our brothers and sisters in Christ; and Whereas, Sexual violence of many kinds is widespread in our society (including sexual harassment on the job, rape and sexual assault, incest, and child sexual abuse), and experts estimate that two-fifths of working women experience sexual harassment, two-fifths of all American women experience one or more incidents of sexual assault, and one-third of American children experience sexual abuse before the age of 18; and Whereas, sexual harassment and sexual abuse betray God's creation, inflict grievous suffering on the harm victims, and rend the fabric of the whole community, of the people of God; therefore be it RESOLVED, that the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America commit itself to work to make our church a safe place for all persons by working to eliminate these abuses; and, be it further RESOLVED, that the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America will not tolerate any forms of sexual abuse or harassment by any of its personnel . . . We agree with the above quoted analysis and therefore hold that the ministerial exception does not operate to bar every claim of sexual harassment asserted against church officials by a former ministerial employee.