Opinion ID: 200100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Immunity

Text: 80 We have examine[d] the evidence and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1987) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is warranted here because the evidence is so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled to judgment, for reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome. Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994) (describing standard for granting judgment as a matter of law, which also applies at the summary judgment stage). Given the overwhelming evidence of the care taken in the peer review process and the absence of any material dispute over historical facts, no reasonable jury could reject Blue Cross's assertion that its professional review actions were taken in the reasonable belief that they would further quality health care, were warranted by the facts known, were based on adequate fact-finding, and afforded Dr. Singh fair notice and procedure. Blue Cross is thus immune from liability for damages for the professional review actions which resulted from the first and second audits. Dr. White is also immune from liability because HCQIA immunity extends to any person who participates with or assists [a peer review] body with respect to actions arising out of a peer review. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1)(D).