Opinion ID: 755176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Batson

Text: Challenge 28 The government cannot use its peremptory challenges in a criminal case to exclude members of the venire from the jury solely on the basis of their race. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a defendant opposing the government's use of a peremptory strike on the basis of race makes out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing: 29 that he is a member of a cognizable racial group ... that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race .... [and] that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. 30 Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court has subsequently modified the requirements of a prima facie Batson case to allow defendants to challenge the prosecution's allegedly race-based strikes of potential jurors even where the defendant and the stricken juror are of different races. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). If the defendant successfully makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for its challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). [T]he trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). We may reverse that finding of fact only where we find clear error. Id. at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859. 31 In Purkett, the Court explained that the three steps involved in the Batson analysis are separate and distinct, reversing a Court of Appeals decision which had erroneously combined the second and third steps of the analysis. 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. The Purkett Court further instructed that in order to satisfy its burden under the second step of the analysis, the government's race-neutral justification need not be persuasive, or even plausible, but merely facially valid. Id. at 768-69, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (finding an explanation that the stricken jurors had long, unkempt hair and goatees facially valid). See also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (involving a challenge on the basis that the Latino veniremen might be unable to accept an interpreter's version of witness' testimony rather than interpreting the Spanish on their own);United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142 (6th Cir.1996) (upholding a challenge to a prospective Latino juror deemed too unintelligent and disinterested to serve); United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1466 (8th Cir.1994) (deeming satisfactory the explanation that the stricken black venireman was the only one who volunteered the verdict reached in his previous jury service); United States v. Ferguson, 23 F.3d 135, 141 (6th Cir.1994) (finding sufficient the explanation that the stricken black venireman claimed to have been wrongly beaten by police 20 years earlier). However, the government must articulate some race-neutral reason for the strike; merely denying that [the prosecutor] had a discriminatory motive or ... merely affirming his good faith will not meet the government's burden of production. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769.
Step One--Prima Facie Case 32 In this case, Hill's counsel, Mr. Gore, attempted to satisfy his burden of showing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by pointing out that the government struck the only black member of the venire and that the defendants in this case were black, whereas this same potential juror had served the previous week on a criminal jury with the same prosecutor in a case where the defendants were white. We need not decide whether, under these circumstances, defense counsel satisfied his burden of making out a prima facie case under Batson, for this issue became moot when the prosecutor offered his explanation for the strike and the court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859. It matters not, therefore, that the district court never ruled on whether the opponent of the strike had successfully made out a prima facie case; because the district court here issued its ruling after considering the prosecution's explanation, the question in the instant case boils down to whether the appellants established by a preponderance of the evidence that the peremptory strikes were intentionally discriminatory. Tucker, 90 F.3d at 1142.
33 Step Two--Facially Valid Reason for the Strike 34 The prosecutor's attempt to meet his Batson burden consisted of repeatedly claiming that he did not know why he struck Juror 101 any more than he knew why he struck other potential jurors, but he assured the court that he did not exercise the challenged strike because of Juror 101's race. The prosecutor explained that he based his strikes in this case on his gut feelings about the potential jurors: You have certain feelings about certain jurors in certain cases, .... there was just some jurors I just didn't want.... Whenever the names are called out, you know, I generally just have certain people that I'll just strike. 35 Under Batson and Purkett, a mere denial of an impermissible motive and assertion of good faith would not satisfy the government's burden in responding to a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769. We are also aware, however, that the prosecutor's burden of production at the second step of the analysis is light. Id. The prosecutor in Purkett partially explained his strikes thus: And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and beards look suspicious to me.  Id. at 766, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasis added). We view the prosecutor's articulated reason in Tucker, a reason we held met the burden of production, to be little more than an expression about the prosecutor's gut feelings about the particular Latino venireman struck in that case. See 90 F.3d at 1142 (upholding a strike of a prospective juror deemed too unintelligent and disinterested to serve). 36 The issue of whether the prosecutor met his second-step burden needs an articulated explanation by the district court. The third step of the Batson analysis, not the second, may also be the proper place to assess the strength of the prosecutor's asserted reason. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. We shall also proceed to the third step of the analysis.
37 Step Three--Proof of Purposeful Discrimination 38 At this step of the analysis, the district court has the responsibility to assess the prosecutor's credibility under all of the pertinent circumstances, and then to weigh the asserted justification against the strength of the defendant's prima facie case under the totality of the circumstances. Thus, even though the issue of whether the defendants made out a prima facie case is moot for purpose of deciding whether they met their burden of production at step one, the district court may still assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding the strike in the analysis of whether the defendants have met their ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369-70, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (holding, in a case where the sufficiency of the prima facie showing at step one was moot, that [t]he trial court took a permissible view of the evidence in crediting the prosecutor's explanation and listing circumstances the court might have considered in reaching that conclusion). 39 The record before us indicates nothing about the district court's thought processes in its step three analysis, apart from its abrupt conclusion indicating the apparent view that the prosecutor's asserted justification outweighed Mr. Gore's showing under the totality of the circumstances. Without a fuller indication of the circumstances that apparently led the district court to this conclusion, however, we cannot properly review the decision. See United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1520 (6th Cir.1988) (indicating the need for a full record for intelligent appellate review). We indicated in Sangineto-Miranda that some of these circumstances might include: 40 1) the racial composition of the initial group seated and the final jury panel sworn; 2) the number of peremptory strikes allowed each side; and 3) the race of those who were struck or excused from the jury panel throughout voir dire (whether for cause or by a peremptory challenge), the order of strikes, and by whom they were exercised. In an appropriate case, it may also be useful to consider evidence as to the percentage of the cognizable racial group in the jury pool, or the racial composition of the district wherein the jury pool is selected. 41 Id. (footnote and citation omitted). 42 The appellate record before us indicates that there was only one black member of the venire and that the final jury panel was otherwise composed entirely of white people. We therefore also surmise that all of the for-cause and peremptory challenges, with the exception of the strike exercised to exclude Juror 101, were used to exclude white potential jurors. The record also indicates that defendants Hill and Gunn shared 11 peremptory strikes and that the prosecution had seven such challenges. However, the current record tells us nothing about the order of strikes, who exercised them, or the racial composition of the district in which this case was tried. The record also denies us the district court's thoughts as to how these factors, and any others not enumerated in Sangineto-Miranda, weighed on the district court's conclusion in the third step of the Batson analysis. Lacking the benefit of a detailed explanation of the district court's thinking on this issue, we cannot satisfactorily review its decision. 43 We therefore REMAND the Batson issue to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 44