Opinion ID: 78507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Waiver of motion to sever murder counts

Text: Pardo argues that his defense attorney unreasonably and prejudicially withdrew his motion to sever the counts and agreed that the murder counts could all be tried together. He contends that his attorney's actions were motivated by his concerns for his own financial situation instead of concern for Pardo's best interests. He maintains that the facts of numerous charges, including the nine murder charges, made it difficult for the jury to evaluate each charge separately. The State responds that the issue is not within the certificate of appealability. Our review on the merits of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition is limited to those issues specified in a certificate of appealability and to those issues for which the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Hodges v. Attorney Gen., 506 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2007). Although the certificate of appealability issued by us did not specify any issues, Pardo did not raise the issue of the ineffectiveness of his counsel for his waiver of the severance motion in his motions for certificate of appealability in the district court or in this court, or in his request for reconsideration in this court. See generally R1-19 at 3, 8-9. He thus waived the issue in this court. However, he also fails on the merits of this issue. During pretrial proceedings, Pardo's attorney moved for severance of various counts and the defendants. The trial court denied the motion in part but severed the trial of each defendant and of two of the murder counts. R1-10, Exh. App. L., Vol. 7 at 1522-31, 1536; R1-10, Exh. App. L, Vol. 8 at 1577. During the jury selection, however, Pardo's attorney withdrew the motion to sever the counts and agreed that all of the murder counts, including the earlier severed counts, should be tried together. The trial court granted the request, directed that all of the charged counts would be tried together, and observed that in the view of [Pardo's insanity] defense, [Pardo's attorney] feels, obviously, and I can see why, it best to try his client on all counts. R1-10, Exh. App. L, Vol. 8 at 1841-42. When the prosecution requested confirmation that Pardo had been advised that the counts would all be tried together and asked whether he had any objections, the trial court commented that it had observed Pardo's attorney confer with him and Pardo's attorney confirmed that he did so. Id. at 1908. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Pardo's counsel testified that he decided to try all of the murder charges at one time because, based on the insanity defense, he believed that he had a better chance of prevailing. R1-10, Exh. App. N, Vol. 29 at 232-33. The trial court denied the claim, finding that [t]he strategy used by [Pardo's attorney] was reasonable. R1-10, Exh. App. N, Vol. 27 at 374. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Pardo had failed to satisfy either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Pardo III, 941 So. 2d at 1072. It held that Pardo's attorney made a reasonable strategic decision involving an informed choice among alternatives which was reinforced by Pardo's own testimony in which he acknowledged killing all nine victims and opined that his acts were not murders because his victims were drug-dealing parasites rather than human beings. Id. at 1071. It also noted that Pardo's claim that the strategy was based on Pardo's attorney's financial concern was not supported by the record as the only evidence was the unfiled motion to withdraw which was prepared fifteen months before his attorney decided to seek a single trial. Id. at 1071-72. It also concluded that, although the counts were severable, Pardo failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result if the counts had been tried separately because both the physical and testimonial evidence against Pardo was strong. Id. at 1072. The district court denied the claim for ineffective assistance for waiving severance, finding that the Florida Supreme Court's rejection of the claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. The district court's ruling on this was correct. The state court's factual finding that the severance decision was strategic was supported by the record. Pardo's attorney testified that it was a strategic decision made after the defense of insanity was pursued and after consultation with Pardo. Although Pardo's attorney may have had financial concerns fifteen months before the severance waiver was made, he never filed his motion to withdraw based on that reason. Further, the Florida Supreme Court held the strategy reasonable. Pardo's insanity defense was that he was compelled to kill the victims by unconscious impulses. See R1-10, Exh., App. L, Vol. 12 at 3492-93, 3497. The Florida Supreme Court thus reasoned that counsel's decision to try the charges together provided more credibility to the assertion of compulsion.