Opinion ID: 2613560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant v. Arizona Public Service Co.

Text: The grant or denial of a motion for new trial on grounds of misconduct is a matter within the trial judge's discretion. In exercising that discretion, the judge must decide whether the misconduct materially affected the rights of the aggrieved party. Grant v. Arizona Public Service Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 454, 652 P.2d 507, 527 (1982). Reversal will be required only when it appears probable that the misconduct actually influenced the verdict. Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Stremel, 95 Ariz. 392, 395, 391 P.2d 557, 559 (1964)). Because this is a factual determination, no presumption of prejudice or lack of prejudice should be applied. If the misconduct is serious, however, the judge should resolve any doubt in favor of the party aggrieved. Id. at 455, 652 P.2d at 528 (citing Sadler v. Arizona Flour Mills Co., 58 Ariz. 486, 121 P.2d 412 (1942)). The judge did not do so in this case, denying the motions for new trial even though she recognized that the case was very close. She must also have recognized that under the peculiar facts of this case, the credibility and accuracy of the witnesses for each side were the keys to the jury's verdict. We are mindful that in Grant we said: We are left here with a case in which the record could justify either a conclusion of prejudice or no prejudice.... Thus, ... if the trial court had granted a new trial, we would have no hesitancy in affirming. On the other hand, since the record also supports the contrary finding, we must affirm the order denying a new trial, unless some reason exists for departing from the usual rule. Id. at 456-57, 652 P.2d at 529-30 (emphasis added). In Grant, a wrongful death case, during final argument plaintiff's counsel drew improper inferences from the admitted evidence. These comments were made primarily to support plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. Counsel also speculated on facts that were not only irrelevant but not in evidence, suggesting that the victim's widow was not dating and had no plans to remarry. Counsel also peppered his closing remarks with improper personal views and comments. We found that the trial judge had not erred in denying the motions for mistrial and for a new trial. Various factors distinguish this case from Grant. First, the misconduct in this case was much more egregious than in Grant. Counsel deliberately and knowingly did what the judge expressly ordered him not to do. This was not a case of a lawyer getting carried away and injecting improper issues or comments in final argument. Such misconduct occurs, improper though it may be. Instead, with what the judge accurately called malice aforethought, counsel deliberately and knowingly violated the judge's orders on the motions in limine. [1] Second, one of the improper remarks was directly relevant to the issue of witness credibility, the essential issue in this case of diametrically conflicting stories. In Grant, on the other hand, the main purpose of counsel's improper argument was to procure punitive damages. If the jury had awarded punitive damages, we would have no hesitation in concluding that the misconduct probably influenced the jury. Id. at 453, 652 P.2d at 526. In the present case, defense counsel sought to tip the scales in his client's favor by implying Leavy was negligent by failing to use his seat belt and by possessing or using alcohol; counsel also sought to bolster the credibility of a key defense witness on the issue of liability. We believe that because the evidence was quite evenly divided between the parties, defense counsel's deliberate and knowing acts of misconduct throughout the trial, some of which violated explicit, unambiguous court orders, may well have produced the very result sought. How, then, should a trial judge resolve a close question of prejudice in deciding whether counsel's acts probably influenced the jury?