Opinion ID: 1060583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Facilitation of a Felony as a Lesser-Included Offense

Text: We begin our analysis by reviewing the statutory provisions governing both criminal responsibility and facilitation. As applicable in this case, a person is criminally responsible for the conduct of another person if that person, [a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, ... solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (1997). As noted in the sentencing commission comments, this statute sets forth what formerly was known as accessories before the fact and aider and abettors. Id. In contrast, a person is criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for criminal responsibility under § 39-11-402(2), the person knowingly furnishes substantial assistance in the commission of the felony. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-403(a) (1997). The statute applies to a person who has facilitated the commission of a felony by another by furnishing substantial assistance but without the intent to promote, assist in or benefit from the felony's commission. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-403 (Sentencing Comm'n Cmts.). Sentencing for facilitation is in the class next below the felony committed. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-403(b). In State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn.1999), we recently adopted the following framework and concluded that an offense is a lesser-included offense of another if: (a) all of its statutory elements are included within the statutory elements of the offense charged; or (b) it fails to meet the definition in part (a) only in the respect that it contains a statutory element or elements establishing (1) a different mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability; and/or (2) a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property or public interest; or (c) it consists of (1) facilitation of the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offense in part (a) or (b); or (2) an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense that otherwise meets the definition in part (a) or (b); or (3) solicitation to commit the offense charged or an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offense in part (a) or (b). Id. at 466-67. In applying this analysis, we concluded that facilitation is a lesser-included offense when a defendant is charged with criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. Id. at 470. In this case, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that facilitation was not a lesser-included offense. The court's analysis was predicated on State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 (Tenn.1997), in which this Court held that criminal responsibility under Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) embraces the common law concept that one who aids and abets criminal activity is guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose, or as a natural or probable consequence thereof. Carson, 950 S.W.2d at 954 (quoting Key v. State, 563 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tenn.1978) (citation omitted)). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that under Carson , facilitation is not a lesser included [sic] offense of the charged § 39-11-402(2) offense when the commission of the charged offense is preceded by concerted criminal activity and is either in furtherance of the original common purpose or a natural and probable consequence thereof. We disagree with the analysis for two reasons. First, the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision predated our decision in Burns and is, therefore, inconsistent with our holding that facilitation is a lesser-included offense where a defendant is charged with criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. Second, we disagree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation of Carson . Evidence that the charged offense was preceded by concerted criminal activity is relevant to whether an instruction on facilitation is appropriate in a given case, but it is not dispositive on whether facilitation of a felony is a lesser-included offense as a matter of law. Instead, a defendant may attempt to demonstrate that facilitation is raised by the evidence notwithstanding the fact that a charged offense was preceded by concerted criminal activity. [2] Accordingly, we reiterate our holding in Burns that facilitation of a felony is a lesser-included offense when a defendant is charged with criminal responsibility for the conduct of another.