Opinion ID: 1197787
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The DeMary Approach

Text: The parties' arguments in this appeal bear out the confusion that currently exists in this jurisdiction over which method of lesser-included offense analysis is appropriate when the State requests a lesser-included offense instruction. This Court last addressed the issue in State v. DeMary, 99 N.M. 177, 655 P.2d 1021 (1982), in which we said: For the offense to be necessarily included, the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser offense. In order to determine whether the [lesser offense] is necessarily included in the greater offense ..., the specific [statutory] elements of [the greater and lesser offense] must initially be construed in light of the evidence. The particular facts of each case must then be reviewed in light of the specific elements of each crime. When the evidence justifies the instructions, the proof of such particular circumstances will be determined by a jury. Id. at 179, 655 P.2d at 1023 (citations omitted). Meadors argues on appeal that with this language the DeMary Court embraced the strict elements approach. Meadors buttresses his argument by pointing out that this Court applied the strict elements approach in Henderson, 116 N.M. at 541, 865 P.2d at 1185, a case involving a defendant's request for a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. The State, on the other hand, argues that DeMary embraced the cognate approach rather than the strict elements approach, and that the Henderson opinion does not control the present case. As these arguments demonstrate, DeMary has left some confusion in its wake. It is likely that some of this confusion arises from the statement in DeMary that [f]or the offense to be necessarily included, the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser offense. 99 N.M. at 179, 655 P.2d at 1023. We recognize that this language provides a basis for Meadors' view that the DeMary Court adopted a strict elements approach. However, the result in DeMary demonstrates that this interpretation is incorrect. After examining the statutory elements of the crimes and the evidence adduced at trial, the DeMary Court concluded that, under the facts of that case, aggravated assault was a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery. Id. at 179-80, 655 P.2d at 1023-24. The defendant in DeMary was convicted of the lesser offense of aggravated assault, which included the essential elements of unlawfully assaulting or striking at another with a deadly weapon. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-2). The elements of aggravated battery for which DeMary was also charged were the unlawful touching or application of force to the person of another with intent to injure that person or another. Id. at 178, 655 P.2d at 1022 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Section 30-3-5). Under these definitions, it is possible to commit the crime of aggravated battery without also committing the crime of aggravated assault. The DeMary Court concluded however that, under the particular circumstances of this case, it would not be possible to commit aggravated battery without also committing aggravated assault. Id. at 179, 655 P.2d at 1023 (emphasis added). Because aggravated assault included a statutory element that was not a statutory element of aggravated battery, it follows that the DeMary Court could not have been applying a strict elements method of analysis. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716, 109 S.Ct. at 1450-51. Instead, we conclude that the DeMary Court intended that [f]or the offense to be necessarily included, the greater offense cannot be committed [ under the facts of the case as alleged in the charging document and supported by the evidence ] without also committing the lesser offense. See DeMary, 99 N.M. at 179, 655 P.2d at 1023. The Court of Appeals took a similar view of DeMary in State v. Jacobs, 102 N.M. 801, 804, 701 P.2d 400, 403 (Ct.App.1985). After considering the language of DeMary in light of some of the decisions of the courts of our sister states and other authorities, we conclude that the State accurately characterizes DeMary as adopting the hybrid approach, which combines the cognate-pleadings and the cognate-evidence approaches, similar to that used in Alaska and Connecticut. See Marker v. State, 692 P.2d 977, 980 (Alaska Ct.App.1984); State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639, 462 A.2d 1021, 1029 (1983). One commentator has described this approach as follows: Some courts have blended the cognate theory, with its emphasis upon analyzing the accusatory instrument, and the evidentiary facet of the statutory theory to produce a two-pronged inquiry. These courts assess both the greater offense, as charged in the accusatory pleading, and the evidence developed at trial to determine the propriety of lesser-included offense instructions to the jury. This approach reflects a concern that it is unrealistic to apply the reasonable-doubt standard of proof solely in terms of the offense as charged in the accusatory pleading. It is more realistic, and just, for a court to determine the need for lesser-included offense instructions by examining not only the offense alleged in the charging instrument but also the evidence adduced at trial, for it is that evidence which will ultimately confirm or invalidate the accuracy of the accusatory pleading. Mascolo, supra, at 276 (footnotes omitted). [4] As in Marker, we shall refer to this hybrid test simply as the cognate approach. See Marker, 692 P.2d at 980. We will continue to adhere to the cognate approach as set forth in DeMary. This method avoids what we view as the overly technical inflexibility of the strict elements approach, see id., yet provides the defendant with adequate notice of the crime against which he must defend. Furthermore, in order to guide the trial courts in their application of the DeMary standard, we provide the following clarification. First, the trial court should, when faced with a request from the State for a lesser-included offense instruction, grant the request when the statutory elements of the lesser crime are a subset of the statutory elements of the charged crime. In addition, the trial court should grant such an instruction if (1) the defendant could not have committed the greater offense in the manner described in the charging document without also committing the lesser offense, and therefore notice of the greater offense necessarily incorporates notice of the lesser offense; (2) the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to sustain a conviction on the lesser offense; and (3) the elements that distinguish the lesser and greater offenses are sufficiently in dispute such that a jury rationally could acquit on the greater offense and convict on the lesser. See Marino, 462 A.2d at 1029. Application of these principles to the case at bar supports the conclusion that the trial court properly instructed the jury on aggravated battery as a lesser-included offense of attempted murder. Here the State's theory of the case differed from the defendant's theory only on the issue of his mental state. Meadors testified that he had thrown the cup of gasoline down in disgust, inadvertently splashing Walker and that he had then struck the match to protect himself from Walker. Based upon the allegations in the indictment and the evidence adduced at trial, a jury could reasonably conclude that Meadors had intended to throw gasoline on Walker and ignite him, but that he had lacked the intent to take Walker's life. This would support a conviction of aggravated battery, but not of attempted murder.