Opinion ID: 462301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: variance from the bill of particulars

Text: 28 Stephens claims that the trial court erred in permitting the government to vary its proof and argument from the bill of particulars. The bill of particulars dealt with Count Two which charged Stephens with devising a scheme to defraud the FmHA. As part of that scheme, paragraph 1C of Count Two alleges that Stephens did ... pretend, represent and promise that the statements in the loan applications were true and correct. The court ordered the government to specify which statements in the loan applications were not true and correct. The government listed sixteen debts of Stephens that he had omitted from his application even though the application required him to list all his debts. At issue is Stephens' alleged $1,016,398.89 debt to Staple Cotton. Stephens' specific complaint is that the government presented proof and argued that CMW's application was false because it omitted the Staple Cotton debt. This is an impermissible variance, Stephens contends, because the government did not state in the bill of particulars that CMW had omitted a debt to Staple Cotton, but that Stephens had omitted such debt. 29 Stephens mischaracterizes what occurred at trial. In its case in chief, the government claimed CMW owed no debt to Staple Cotton on May 22, 1979, when CMW's application was submitted. The government's position was at odds with Stephens' defense. Stephens claimed at trial that he did not defraud FmHA by using loan proceeds to make two loan payments to Connecticut General Life Insurance Company totaling $181,153.98 because these payments benefited CMW. Connecticut General was the first mortgagee on Florida property owed by S & W Farming, Inc., a closely held company of Stephens and Wiygul. Stephens' witness, Mr. Lenahan, testified that these two payments to Connecticut General, made on August 1, 1979 and October 22, 1979, indirectly benefited CMW because this payment kept the property from being foreclosed upon and ultimately enabled the property to be sold. Mr. Lenahan claimed this benefited CMW because the proceeds of the sale were applied to CMW's debt to Staple Cotton in April of 1980. 30 On cross-examination, the government pointed out a flaw in this defense. If CMW owed a debt to Staple Cotton at this time, as the defense claimed, it should have been reflected on CMW's financial application. 12 Lenahan admitted CMW did not list Staple Cotton as a debtor on its application. In closing argument, the government again pointed out the discrepancy in Stephens' defense. 13 The government could properly bring out on cross-examination an inconsistency in the defense witness' testimony with the other evidence already admitted in the trial. Cf. United States v. Halperin, 441 F.2d 612, 617 (5th Cir.1971) (witness may be contradicted on a material point by extrinsic evidence showing a contrary state of facts). In any event, Stephens cannot say he was surprised since he was the one who opened up this line of inquiry by claiming CMW was in debt to Staple Cotton.