Opinion ID: 4422273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misleading Statements: Presence of Counsel

Text: Mitchell takes issue with the Michigan Supreme Court’s reliance on Duckworth, in which the warnings given to the defendant included the sentence: “We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court.” 492 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added). The Michigan Supreme Court noted that the Duckworth Court upheld that warning. The Duckworth Court determined that “Miranda does not require that attorneys be No. 17-2444 Mitchell v. MacLaren Page 8 producible on call, but only that the suspect be informed, as here, that he has the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one.” Id. at 204. Finding that the warnings given to Mitchell satisfied this standard, the Michigan Supreme Court found no issue with the Miranda warnings he received. Mitchell attempts to distinguish Duckworth. He argues that the Michigan Supreme Court failed to consider why the Duckworth Court upheld the warnings: according to Mitchell, it was because the Court determined that the eight sentences of warnings that included the “if and when” sentence at issue clearly conveyed enough information to satisfy Miranda. Id. at 205. Here, by contrast, Mitchell argues that Collins’s response regarding appointment of counsel “down the line” deliberately “suggested [a] limitation on the right to the presence of appointed counsel different from the clearly conveyed rights to a lawyer in general.” Appellant Br. at 24 (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360–61 (1981)). But Mitchell does not take issue with the written warnings he received, and, as in Duckworth, these initial warnings were valid. In Duckworth, as here, the valid warnings were accompanied by further explanation from the interrogator about when the defendant could obtain counsel. The further explanation in Duckworth (“if and when you go to court”) was in written form, whereas here, it was follow-up in the form of Collins’s oral statement (“down the line”). Mitchell points to no clearly established law from the Supreme Court making such a distinction relevant or dictating a conclusion that is different from the one in Duckworth. Under Duckworth, therefore, the Michigan Supreme Court reasonably determined that nothing in Collins’s response tempered or negated the previously given warnings regarding Mitchell’s right to counsel before and during interrogation, his right to refuse to answer or stop answering questions, or his right to appointment of counsel. Collins indicated when counsel would be appointed, but he did not imply that the right to an attorney was tied to a future event. See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 204–05. True, when this exchange is considered in the totality of the circumstances, some courts might conclude (as the Michigan Court of Appeals did) that Collins’s statement created sufficient ambiguity to raise a question about the adequacy of the warnings. But other jurists could reasonably conclude (as the Michigan Supreme Court did) that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s case law, the warnings Mitchell received were adequate under Duckworth’s No. 17-2444 Mitchell v. MacLaren Page 9 statement that Miranda requires “only that the suspect be informed . . . that he has the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one.” Id. at 204. Under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, this reviewing court may not grant relief simply because it might have come to a different conclusion; rather, the state court’s application of law must have been unreasonable. See Taylor, 529 U.S. at 386 (“Congress intended federal judges to attend with the utmost care to state-court decisions, including all of the reasons supporting their decisions, before concluding that those proceedings were infected by constitutional error . . . .”). Because the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, we deny relief on this portion of Mitchell’s habeas petition. 2. Misleading Statements: Availability of Counsel Mitchell also contends that the Duckworth Court acknowledged that the “if and when you go to court” language “accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana,” 492 U.S. at 204,2 and so it was relevant to the Duckworth Court that the detective did not lie or commit an act of deceit. See id. (“We think it must be relatively commonplace for a suspect, after receiving Miranda warnings, to ask when he will obtain counsel. The ‘if and when you go to court’ advice simply anticipates that question.” (footnote omitted)). In further support of his argument that the veracity of the information given by the officer is relevant to the analysis, Mitchell cites Prysock. There, the Supreme Court found Miranda warnings to be sufficient when, after the interrogating officer administered them, the juvenile defendant’s mother asked the officer a question about the availability of an attorney post-questioning, and the officer correctly responded that the defendant had a right to an attorney now and “when he went to court.” 453 U.S. at 357; see id. at 360–61. Mitchell argues that the officer’s response in 2 We note that the parties contest whether Collins’s statement about the availability of an attorney accurately describes the law. Mitchell argues that in the county where he was interrogated, there is a defense attorney on call twenty-four hours per day who is available to attend line-ups and interrogations. However, in the state of Michigan, courts appoint counsel at the arraignment stage. Mich. Comp. Laws § 775.16. Regardless, we assume for the purposes of our analysis that Collins did not accurately describe the availability of an attorney in the jurisdiction where Mitchell was interrogated. No. 17-2444 Mitchell v. MacLaren Page 10 Prysock clarified matters, whereas Collins’s response to Mitchell was incorrect and deceptive because it was made to “deliberately confuse[]” Mitchell about the appointment procedure in the county where he was interrogated. Appellant Br. at 23. Thus, according to Mitchell, the Michigan Supreme Court “failed to account for the impact that [Collins’s] response . . . had on the sufficiency of the warnings.” Id. We disagree. Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2003), is instructive. In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that an officer’s giving an inaccurate description of state law while delivering Miranda warnings is not, on its own, a basis for relief in a § 2254 petition. See Jackson, 348 F.3d at 665. In Jackson, the defendant was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at 660. The defendant then asked if the detective could arrange for an attorney. Id. The detective stated that he could not, and that he was going to end the interview. Id. The defendant then stated that he wanted to talk, but “asked . . . if he could have a lawyer right now.” Id. The detective understood this to mean the defendant’s “intent . . . was to have a lawyer present there, then and there, right now, and if I could arrange for that.” Id. The detective said no. Id. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the detective’s response about the availability of a public defender did not accurately describe state law in Wisconsin, where the interview took place. Id. at 661. The defendant ultimately confessed to the crime and later filed a motion to suppress the confession, which the state court denied. Id. The defendant then filed a § 2254 petition and appealed its denial to the Seventh Circuit. Id. The crux of the defendant’s claim was that “1) the detective misstated the availability of a public defender under Wisconsin law, and 2) the detective’s statement may have misled [the defendant] to believe that he did not have a right under the Fifth Amendment to have counsel present during interrogation.” Id. at 663. In support of the second argument, the defendant argued (as does Mitchell) that the detective’s statement was particularly misleading because, unlike in Duckworth, “in this case the police could have provided counsel.” Id. at 664. The Seventh Circuit responded to each argument in turn. As to the first argument, the court held: No. 17-2444 Mitchell v. MacLaren Page 11 Although the detective may have failed to follow state law by not allowing [the defendant] to contact the public defender’s office and mischaracterized the provisions of the law, review of a habeas petition by a federal court is limited to consideration of violations of federal law or the United States Constitution. Neither Miranda nor any other provision of federal law requires a public defender to be immediately available to a suspect during interrogation. Thus, to the extent [the defendant’s] petition alleges violations of protections guaranteed under state law that are more generous than those required under federal law, we may not enforce these state law provisions through habeas relief. Id. at 663 (internal citations omitted). As to the second argument, the court continued: While the Court in Duckworth certainly noted the accuracy of the officer’s statement under state law, it is far from clear that the Court’s conclusion rested on that fact. The Court did not explain, for example, how, if this were so, differences in the provision of public defenders under state law should affect a petitioner’s understanding and exercise of his federal constitutional rights. Id. at 664 (emphasis added). Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that “[g]iven the similarities between this case and the Supreme Court’s decision in Duckworth, and the lack of clarity regarding the effect of an officer’s misstatement on the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver,” the defendant could not demonstrate a violation of clearly established federal law, necessary to prevail under § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 665. We find the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning persuasive and adopt it here. It is true that in Jackson, the Seventh Circuit did not cite Prysock, but Prysock does not dictate a different conclusion. Duckworth was decided after Prysock. Although the Supreme Court indicated in Prysock that a Miranda warning may not be sufficient “if the reference to . . . appointed counsel was linked [to a] future point in time after the police interrogation,” Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added), the Duckworth Court clarified that “the vice referred to in Prysock was that such warnings would not apprise the accused of his right to have an attorney present if he chose to answer questions,” Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 205. Here, as in Duckworth, “[t]he warnings . . . did not suffer from that defect,” id., because the five sentences in the initial warning explained that Mitchell had a right to counsel before and during questioning, and another sentence detailed the right to stop answering questions. And Mitchell does not dispute that the written warnings conveyed this information. In sum, the Michigan Supreme No. 17-2444 Mitchell v. MacLaren Page 12 Court did not unreasonably apply Duckworth when it found the Miranda warnings that Mitchell received to be constitutionally adequate. Resisting this conclusion, Mitchell points to United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1992), in which we found the warnings issued to be constitutionally deficient. But the Tillman warnings were plainly deficient: they did not inform the defendant, at any point, that any statements he made could be used against him. See id. at 140. As the Tillman court noted, “[o]f all of the elements provided for in Miranda, this element [that any statements made can be used against a defendant] is perhaps the most critical because it lies at the heart of the need to protect a citizen’s Fifth Amendment rights.” Id. at 141. It is likely that we could have remanded on this point alone in Tillman. Accordingly, Tillman is not persuasive on the issues in this case. Finally, Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1968), abrogation recognized by United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1982), is also inapposite. There, the Fifth Circuit held that the Miranda warnings were deficient because the defendant “was not advised that he could have an attorney appointed and present . . . before he uttered a syllable.” Id. at 535. Here, the written warnings given to Mitchell fully advised him of his right to have an attorney present prior to, and during, questioning. See Contreras, 667 F.2d at 979 (“Prysock . . . stands for the proposition that a Miranda warning is adequate if it fully informs the accused of his right to consult with an attorney prior to questioning and does not condition the right to appointed counsel on some future event. A Miranda warning need not explicitly convey to the accused his right to appointed counsel ‘here and now,’ and to the extent that Lathers and other precedents of this court require such explicit warnings, they are overruled.” (footnote omitted)).