Opinion ID: 3158630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Burden of Providing the Requested

Text: Procedure Turning to the third Mathews inquiry, affording the procedure requested by the plaintiffs would place no burden on the Housing Authority. The plaintiffs do not ask for a hearing, an individual meeting, or even an explanation of the precise amount by which their portion of the rent would increase. They ask only for an elementary explanation of what a change to the payment standard means and what effect it has on tenants’ rights. The Housing Authority’s argument that it could not have sent a more precise notice because it could not have prospectively calculated whether the plaintiffs’ rent would increase at the time it sent the flyer NOZZI V. HACLA 35 stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of the plaintiffs’ challenge. The plaintiffs recognize that there are situations in which a tenant’s subsidies would not decrease despite the change to the payment standard.23 The plaintiffs merely seek a uniform notice that adequately explains the effect of the change in payment standard in a manner sufficient to reasonably ensure that plaintiffs knew that they might well have to plan for and adjust to a potential decrease in their subsidy and an accompanying increase in the rent they must pay commencing one year from the time they received the flyer. Surely this information could be readily incorporated into the standard form without placing any burden on the government’s fiscal and administrative resources. There is no reason to conclude, after all, that “printing six paragraphs of information is any more burdensome than printing four paragraphs of information.” Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1986). Indeed, the Housing Authority printed a more thorough explanation in letters that it sent to people other than those directly affected by the change. Around the same time that the Housing Authority sent the flyer to the existing tenants, it sent a letter to Voucher Program beneficiaries who had not yet found a unit to rent. That letter explained that the payment standard “is the most the Housing Authority can pay for a unit. If the rent for your unit is higher, you must pay the difference in rent.” An even clearer explanation was sent to the Mayor, to members of the Los Angeles City Council, and to the members of the United States Congress from California just before the change in the 23 A change in the payment standard would not affect, for example, a tenant whose entire unit cost less to rent than the new, decreased payment standard. 36 NOZZI V. HACLA payment standard was implemented. Those letters explained that the change to the payment standard “means many tenants will soon begin paying more rent or, if they choose, move to a less expensive unit,” and that the “average increase is estimated at $100/month.”24 Notably missing from the list of people who received an adequate explanation are the people who needed it most—the same people that due process requires receive adequate notice—those Section 8 beneficiaries whose rent might actually be increased by the change. Accordingly, all of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors weigh in favor of the notice that the plaintiffs seek. The Housing Authority’s flyer, with its total absence of any effort to explain the payment standard and its relation to tenants’ obligations, was inadequate on its face, and the Housing Authority has not shown that any additional steps were reasonably calculated to actually inform the plaintiffs of the necessary information.25 Moreover, it is beyond dispute that the Housing Authority could, at no extra cost or expense, 24 The letters sent to high-ranking officials, unlike the flyer that was sent to the plaintiffs, also provided a list of people who could help the Section 8 beneficiaries with a housing search. 25 We reject the Housing Authority’s arguments that (1) there was a minimal risk that plaintiffs would have been erroneously deprived of their property interest because it legally decreased the payment standard and that (2) any error connected with the notice was harmless because the “benefit change would have admittedly been the same.” Again, these arguments stem from a misunderstanding of the nature of plaintiffs’ protected property interest. While the Housing Authority could lawfully change the payment standard, the plaintiffs have a legitimate expectation in a one-year term of benefits to plan for and adjust to upcoming changes. The Housing Authority’s failure to provide adequate notice deprived them of that right. NOZZI V. HACLA 37 have provided the notice that would have afforded the tenants the due process they requested. The state due process claims are subject to the same analysis, except that under state law there is an additional factor to consider: the “dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action.” Today’s Fresh Start, 303 P.3d at 1150. This factor strongly favors the plaintiffs. The district court, therefore, erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on both due process claims.