Opinion ID: 868783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues

Text: Due process. Respondent argues that the Commission failed to comply with procedures regarding additional charges of misconduct beyond those in Jane Doe's grievance, particularly those related to allegedly false statements in the civil litigation and the disciplinary proceeding, citing Admis. Disc. R. 23(10)(d). Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commission failed to follow the letter of this rule, the Commission's verified complaint fully apprised Respondent of all the charges on which he was tried. We find no violation of due process. Discovery. Respondent also accuses the Commission of violating its duties to respond to his discovery requests. A review of the documents he cites shows detailed responses by the Commission to his discovery requests. We detect no prejudicial deficiency in the Commission's responses. Alleged concession by Commission. Respondent argues that the Commission has conceded that his responses to the RFAs in the civil case were literally true. In support, he cites a statement in correspondence from a Commission staff attorney, which was not introduced into evidence. We have nevertheless examined this document and conclude that it refers only to some statements in Respondent's initial response to the Commission. The Commission has never conceded that Respondent's responses to RFAs in the civil case were literally true. Findings of fact. After a review of the evidence and consideration of the parties' arguments, we conclude that the hearing officer's findings of fact, as summarized above and supplemented by Respondent's own testimony, are supported by the evidence, and we therefore 3 We note that Respondent's counsel was required to abide by Respondent's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and to consult with Respondent as to the means by which they were to be pursued. See Prof. Cond. R. 1.2(a). 8 adopt them as this Court's findings. Additional details will be supplied as needed in the discussion of the charges below. C. Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1). The hearing officer concluded that Respondent violated this rule, which prohibits knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal, by submitting false responses to RFAs in Jane Doe's civil action. Respondent expends much effort in trying to defend his responses to the RFAs. For example, he argues that he was justified in denying a RFA that he composed the email because he interpreted composed to mean preparing the email that was actually transmitted, that he was justified in denying that he asked or directed another person to send the email because he did not select the recipients or the email account name, and that he was justified in denying that he knew who sent the email because KB might have asked someone else to send it. In defense of his disclaimer of any knowledge about whether the email was sent at his suggestion, he testified that he merely put[ ] the idea out there for KB, and whether this was a suggestion went to KB's mental state, which he could not know. Respondent asserts he was entitled to exploit the infirmities of the discovery requests. Hyper-technical parsing of ordinary English words and sentences has been rejected in prior cases. See Matter of Fieger, 887 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. 2008) (discipline imposed for calculated omissions on application for temporary admission); Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 (Ind. 1999) (even if literally true, counsel's affidavit created potential for misperception and was thus prejudicial to administration of justice); Matter of Fletcher, 694 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Ind. 1998) (although judge's inquiries were not perfectly phrased or formulated with pinpoint precision, Court found respondent actively concealed facts from judge); Binder v. Benchwarmers Sports Lounge, 833 N.E.2d 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (even if technically correct, counsel's statements were calculated to mislead opposing counsel). Respondent's hide-and-seek approach to the RFAs reflects a gaming view of the legal system, which this Court has soundly rejected. See Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d at 1264. 9 We concur with the hearing officer's conclusion that Respondent violated Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1) by knowingly submitting false responses to RFAs in Jane Doe's civil action.4 Rule 8.1(a). The Commission charged that Respondent violated this rule, which prohibits knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the Commission in connection with a disciplinary matter, by falsely denying in his answer to the Commission's complaint that he had drafted the subject line of the email. At the hearing in the matter, Respondent testified that he had, in fact, drafted the entire email from the subject line down. Respondent offers no explanation for this discrepancy. We conclude that Respondent violated this rule as charged. Rule 8.1(b). This rule requires a respondent to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter. Respondent admits that, in his response to the grievance against him, he was less than entirely forthcoming about his involvement with the email and thus violated this rule. Indeed, we find that Respondent's response seems crafted to create misapprehensions rather than to dispel them. Rule 8.4(a). We agree with the hearing officer's conclusion that Respondent violated this rule, which prohibits violating the Rules of Professional Conduct through the acts of another, by procuring the aid of KB in disseminating the email. Rule 8.4(b). This rule prohibits engaging in a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. The Commission charged Respondent with violating this rule by committing criminal identity deception, Indiana Code section 35-43-5- 3.5, in connection with the email. The hearing officer concluded that the Commission had failed to meet its burden of proof that Respondent's actions rose to the level of being criminal. We defer to the hearing officer's conclusion on this point. 4 We also note that Respondent's responses to the RFAs do not comply with Trial Rule 36(A), which states: A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. 10 Rule 8.4(c). This rule bars a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. We have already concluded that Respondent made misrepresentations in his responses to the Commission in this disciplinary action and in his responses to the RFAs in the civil suit. We also conclude that he engaged in misrepresentation and dishonesty in his conduct involving the email—by giving it the false appearance of consisting of actual communications between female attorneys and other professionals, by including statements and implications he knew to be false, and by telling KB that the email was just a prank when it was actually a personal and professional attack on Jane Doe. Respondent says that he crafted the email based on conversations he had with at least one female in-house counsel, naming just one. However, even if the views expressed in the email comported with those of an unnamed real person, this does not undermine the conclusion that Respondent made misrepresentations in the email, including that real in-house counsel were advocating a boycott of Bose based on its employment of Jane Doe. We reject Respondent's attempt to dismiss the email as some sort of prank or parody when it contained deliberate misrepresentations of fact intended to embarrass Jane Doe personally and to harm Jane Doe and possibly Bose professionally. Rule 8.4(d). We conclude that Respondent violated this rule, which prohibits conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, by obstructing the civil action and this disciplinary action through knowingly making false statements of fact in those proceedings. Rule 8.4(g): The Commission charged Respondent with violating this rule, which prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct that is not legitimate advocacy, in a professional capacity, manifesting bias or prejudice based upon gender. The hearing officer concluded that the Commission had not met its burden of proof on this charge. We agree. The evidence supports a finding that the email was motivated by personal anger at Jane Doe in particular rather than by bias or prejudice against women in general. 11 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. After the hearing officer filed his report, Respondent filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. For the reasons above, we deny this motion. D. Discipline Our analysis of appropriate discipline entails consideration of the nature of the misconduct, the duties violated by the respondent, any resulting or potential harm, the respondent's state of mind, our duty to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the public should we allow the respondent to continue in practice, and matters in mitigation and aggravation. See Matter of Newman, 958 N.E.2d 792, 800 (Ind. 2011). Respondent's misconduct involves pervasive dishonesty in the email, the civil action, and this disciplinary action. His misconduct involving the email was motivated by personal revenge and his intent was to harm Jane Doe personally and professionally. He continues to advance hyper-technical interpretations of various discovery requests as an excuse for his failure to provide truthful answers. His evasive attitude toward his duties in the civil and disciplinary actions suggests a danger to the profession and to the public if he continues in practice. The hearing officer found the following facts in mitigation: (1) Respondent has no disciplinary history; (2) he expressed some remorse, but only about involving KB in his plan to humiliate Jane Doe; and (3) he was dealing with news that his sister had been diagnosed with cancer.5 The hearing officer found the following facts in aggravation: (1) Respondent has not clearly shown that he appreciates the harm he has done to Jane Doe, and he still believes that the 5 We note that Respondent cites depression as contributing to deficiencies in his initial response to the grievance. There is some dispute about when Respondent's depression began and whether there is sufficient proof to back his assertion. In any event, depression is more appropriate to consider as a mitigator when the misconduct is caused by neglect or oversight. Here, Respondent's misconduct was deliberate and dishonest. 12 email was, in some way, justified; (2) Respondent's email was the result of a carefully crafted plan; and (3) Respondent used a trusting subordinate to distance himself from the email and shield himself from the consequences. Respondent has shown no substantial remorse or insight into his misconduct. It is this lack of insight that leads us to believe that a substantial sanction is necessary to ensure that the seriousness of his misconduct is impressed upon him and that similar misconduct is not repeated in the future. See Newman, 958 N.E.2d at 800. We conclude that Respondent should be suspended for a period of at least three years and that any possibility of reinstatement thereafter be available only upon satisfaction of Indiana's rigorous standards for reinstatement, which require clear and convincing evidence of the petitioner's remorse, rehabilitation, and fitness to practice law. See Admis. Disc. R. 23(4)(b).