Opinion ID: 799364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Decision to Reinstate the Jury's Verdict

Text: The ruling on a motion for a new trial is a matter committed to the district court's discretion, see Latino, 58 F.3d at 314, and we review a district court's ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, see Davis v. Wis. Dep't of Corrs., 445 F.3d 971, 979 (7th Cir.2006). Our review of a decision denying a new trial is extremely deferential, as opposed to our somewhat more exacting review of a decision granting a new trial. See In re Innovative Constr. Sys., 793 F.2d 875, 888 (7th Cir.1986). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep't, 590 F.3d 427, 444-45 (7th Cir.2009). Judge Shadur granted the new trial based on his conclusion that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence; Judge Chang then reconsidered this ruling and reinstated the jury's verdict. We review Judge Chang's decision to determine whether he abused his discretion in concluding that no new trial was warranted because the verdict was not actually against the manifest weight of the evidence. We have recognized that [if], after evaluating the evidence, the district court is of the opinion that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a new trial is appropriate. Mejia v. Cook Cnty., 650 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir.2011). Although the district court has the power to get a general sense of the weight of the evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial, id. at 633, we have cautioned that [t]he district court's power to grant a new trial on weight grounds is not unlimited: a certain deference to the jury's conclusions is appropriate, id. at 633 n. 1. The district court also has less freedom to overturn a jury verdict in cases involving issues that are easily understood by laypeople. See Latino, 58 F.3d at 314. We recently clarified the standard for a district court's assessment of a motion for a new trial: In conducting its own assessment of the evidence presented, the district court cannot remove a piece of evidence from the calculus merely because the court believes it was not credible and then, with that piece excluded, grant a motion for a new trial because the verdict is now against the weight. Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 315-17 (7th Cir.1995). In weighing the facts, the district court is bound to the same evidence the jury considered, and can strike a piece of evidence from its weighing process only if reasonable persons could not believe it because it contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws. Id. at 315. Put simply, if the evidence was admitted before the jury, the district court is usually stuck with it in ruling on a motion for a new trial, for better or worse. Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633-34. We have similarly expressed that the party moving for a new trial must demonstrate that no rational jury could have rendered a verdict against [him]. King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir.2004); see also Latino, 58 F.3d at 315 ([N]ew trials granted because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are proper only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.). Judge Chang provided a detailed explanation as to why the jury's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. He emphasized that there was no direct evidence contradicting Lucas's testimony about receiving a tip or about the tip's details. Judge Chang criticized Judge Shadur's opinion for rel[ying] on what it viewed as the common-sense notion that the tip was too good to be true. But there was no actual evidence, let alone a manifest weight of evidence, that required the jury to reject the testimony that Lucas had received the tip. Judge Chang concluded that the combination of Lucas's, Norberg's, and Porebski's testimony supplied sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Lucas had actually received the anonymous tip. Judge Chang also found the case report to serve as additional evidence in support of the verdict. He further pointed out that if the tip was an after-the-fact cover-up, Lucas would have had to start laying the groundwork before the lab reports came back negative and would have had just two hours between the arrest and the report to fabricate the story. Judge Shadur's perception of the anonymous tip is understandable, given the conflicting testimony and the lack of details in the case report; however, the standard for granting a new trial requires the jury's verdict to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633. We agree with Judge Chang's assessment that sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support its verdict. We also agree with Judge Chang's view that the tip was not necessarily too good to be true. He pointed to the discrepancy about the occupants' ages as illustrating that the tip was not perfect. Judge Chang stated that the jury could have plausibly concluded that the tipster in fact was someone with some familiarity with Galvan or Luna or that there was indeed a tipster who saw another truck matching the same details, and that Galvan was in the wrong place at the wrong time. According to Judge Chang, a person familiar with the truck and with Luna or Galvan's work schedule would have been able to provide all of the information in the tip. The hay sat in the truck for four days, allowing ample time for someone to observe it, and anyone who had seen the truck would have been able to describe it to police. The tip could have been provided by someone who mistook the hay for marijuana or by someone who knew that it was hay but wanted Luna or Galvan arrested. Thus, Judge Chang properly concluded that the jury's verdict rests on plausible theories of the evidence presented. Judge Chang acknowledged that portions of the testimony were inconsistent or conflicting, but he reasoned that [t]he jury heard all of the conflicting and inconsistent testimony, bad memories and impeachment and all, and then did precisely what it is called upon to do, which is make a credibility determination that was not manifestly outweighed by other evidence. Judge Chang further explained that the jury could have attributed the inconsistencies to the passage of time and the fading of memories. Judge Chang did not abuse his discretion by deferring to the jury's credibility determinations. The jury weighed the evidence, including the conflicting testimony, and arrived at a verdict that is supported by the evidenceor at least a verdict that is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Our task is not to determine whether Officer Lucas fabricated the anonymous tip but rather to determine whether Judge Chang abused his discretion in concluding that the jury's verdict was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. [5] In this case, regardless of whether the district court believed that the jury arrived at the correct outcome, there was no direct evidence contradicting Lucas's testimony about the details of the tip or the fact that he received it. It was well within the province of the jury to decide whether the inconsistencies called into question the existence of the tip. The case report, Norberg's testimony, and Porebski's testimony all support Lucas's testimony and the jury's verdict. Judge Shadur's theory that Lucas fabricated the tip and obtained the cooperation of other officers is plausible, but the theory that defendants presented (and the jury accepted) is also plausible. We therefore hold that Judge Chang did not abuse his discretion by concluding that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and reinstating the jury's verdict.