Opinion ID: 1107717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Demonstrating Prejudice in the Postconviction Context

Text: As demonstrated above, the standard for obtaining a reversal upon the erroneous denial of a cause challenge is relatively lenient: a defendant need only show that an objectionable juror  whether or not actually biased  sat on the jury. Our consideration of postconviction claims, however, is more restrictive. As we recently reiterated: We have emphasized that once a conviction has been affirmed on direct appeal `a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.' . . . [T]he test for prejudicial error in conjunction with a direct appeal is very different from the test for prejudice in conjunction with a collateral claim of ineffective assistance. Sanders, 946 So.2d at 959 (citations omitted) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999), and Sanders, 847 So.2d at 506). A defendant's claim that his counsel offered ineffective assistance at trial, for whatever reason, must be analyzed under the standard the Supreme Court enunciated in Strickland. The purpose of the right to the effective assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair trial, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, defined as one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. Id. at 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court established the following standard for determining when counsel has provided ineffective assistance warranting postconviction relief: A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Specifically, the Court stressed that [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment. Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla.1980) (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979)).