Opinion ID: 1404685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental Disorder

Text: Hubbart argues that involuntary commitment statutes must be limited by their terms to persons suffering from mental illness  a concept which he defines as serious cognitive, perceptual or affective dysfunction. Hubbart notes that the diagnosed mental disorder needed to qualify a person as an SVP under section 6600, subdivision (a) is not phrased in this manner, and that it includes any congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others. ( Id., subd. (c).) In Hubbart's view, this definition is flawed because it permits commitment based on a range of diagnosed mental impairments broader than what is constitutionally allowed, including mental disorders characterized primarily by an inability to control sexually violent impulses and behavior. The claim lacks merit for reasons set forth in Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, which rejected a similar due process challenge under a related statutory scheme. We describe Hendricks in some detail. [20] In Hendricks, supra, Kansas invoked its Sexually Violent Predator Act for the first time against Hendricks, a convicted serial child molester. The Kansas law took effect in 1994, shortly before Hendricks was scheduled to be released into the community after serving a long prison term imposed for his most recent crimes. Much like California's SVPA, which was enacted one year later, the Kansas scheme subjects certain sexually violent offenders to compulsory commitment immediately upon the expiration of their prison terms. If an inmate is found to be a sexually violent predator, the Kansas law requires that he be placed in the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services until the underlying condition `has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.' (521 U.S. 346, 353, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) The custodial agency is charged with providing `control, care and treatment' to persons so confined. ( Ibid. ) Annual judicial review of the commitment must occur, and either the custodial agency or the committed person may initiate release proceedings at any time. The burden rests on the state to prove, in court, that release from confinement is not warranted. In a preamble similar to the one accompanying California's SVPA, the Kansas Legislature made clear that it was targeting a `small but extremely dangerous group' whose members `do not have a mental disease or defect' within the meaning of the general involuntary civil commitment statute already in existence in the state. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 351, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) The Kansas scheme was enacted to address `anti-social personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities[,]' and which require `long term' care under circumstances `Very different' from those surrounding commitment under the other, more traditional scheme. ( Ibid. ) The Kansas Legislature found that sexually violent predators were highly likely to reoffend, and that confinement and treatment was necessary to reduce the `risk' such individuals pose to society. ( Ibid. ) In light of these findings, a sexually violent predator is defined in the body of the Kansas act as `any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.' ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 352, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) [21] A `mental abnormality is defined as a `congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.' ( Ibid. ) Consistent with the version of the Kansas act in existence at the time, prison officials notified the local prosecutor shortly before Hendricks's anticipated release that he appeared to be a sexually violent predator. The prosecutor then filed a petition for commitment in state court. As required under the Kansas scheme, the trial court found probable cause to support a finding that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator, and ordered his transfer to a secure facility for psychiatric evaluation. The trial court declined to dismiss the petition on grounds the commitment scheme was unconstitutional, as requested by Hendricks. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 354, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) At the ensuing trial, expert and lay testimony established that Hendricks suffered from pedophilia, that his sexual urges towards children were uncontrollable, and that he had sexually molested children for over 30 years despite several prison terms and treatment attempts. Persuaded the state had carried its burden of proof under the statutory scheme, the jury found that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 354-355 & fn. 2, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) Hendricks appealed, renewing various federal constitutional challenges that had not been accepted as grounds to dismiss the case in the trial court. Over a vigorous dissent, a majority of the Kansas Supreme Court agreed with Hendricks that the sexual predators' scheme violated substantive due process guarantees. The court essentially reasoned that mental abnormality and personality disorder, as defined under the act, did not satisfy a mental illness requirement which had purportedly been established in such cases as Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, and Addington, supra, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804. Hence, the act was invalidated and Hendricks's commitment was set aside. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari by the state challenging the due process theory on which Hendricks had prevailed in the lower court. A cross-petition by Hendricks renewing ex post facto and double jeopardy claims not addressed by a majority of the Kansas Supreme Court was also granted. The United States Supreme Court ultimately rejected all constitutional challenges to the Kansas scheme, and reversed the judgment that had been entered in Hendricks's favor. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 350, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) [22] At the outset, Hendricks reaffirmed the longstanding rule that dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. (521 U.S. at p. 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) [S]ome additional factor indicating that the person is dangerous as the result of mental impairment is required. ( Ibid. ) The court reviewed its prior decisions and observed that involuntary commitment statutes had been upheld even though they used different phraseology to describe the requisite mental impairment (e.g., mental illness, mental retardation, mental disorder, and psychopathic personality). The court also noted that it had used disparate language to describe persons who could be involuntarily confined because they were dangerous and mentally impaired (e.g., emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, incompetent, and insane). ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 358-359, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) According to Hendricks, civil commitment is permissible as long as the triggering condition consists of a volitional impairment rendering [the person] dangerous beyond their control. (521 U.S. at p. 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) The court made clear that due process does not dictate the precise manner in which this volitional impairment is statutorily described. Indeed, we have never required state legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes. ( Id. at p. 359, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) In explaining this approach, Hendricks emphasized the importance of deferring to the legislative branch in an area which is analytically nuanced and dependent upon medical science. The court reiterated a theme that has long appeared in cases addressing the permissible scope of commitment laws  mental health professionals do not necessarily agree on what constitutes mental illness. Hence, the Legislature, not the judiciary, is best suited to weighing the scientific evidence, and defining terms of a medical nature that have legal significance. (521 U.S. at p. 359, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) The court recognized that because of their specialized purpose, civil commitment statutes may not express mental health concepts in terms identical to those used by the psychiatric community. [23] Based on the foregoing principles, the court rejected Hendricks's claim that the Kansas law was invalid because it did not contain an explicit mental illness requirement. Hendricks emphasized that the phrase mental illness has no talismanic significance for purposes of determining the sufficiency of a civil commitment scheme under the due process clause. (521 U.S. at p. 359, 117 S.Ct 2072.) The court also agreed with the State that its statutory scheme, including the mental abnormality requirement, provided for the permissible confinement of persons found to be sexually violent predators. Consistent with due process requirements, the mental disorder required for commitment was defined in terms of an emotional or volitional impairment predisposing the person to commit sexually violent behavior and making it likely he would reoffend. [The statute] requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a `mental abnormality' or `personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. [Citation.] The precommitment requirement of a `mental abnormality or `personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of [other valid statutes] in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) Finally, based on the evidence that had been introduced at trial, the court concluded that the pedophilia from which Hendricks suffered satisfied both due process and the statute. [The] lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) Also, the court noted that past criminal conduct served an important evidentiary function in establishing the dangerous mental impairments of sex offenders like Hendricks. As we have recognized, `[p]revious instances of violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies.' ( Id. at p. 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072, citing Heller, supra, 509 U.S. 312, 323, 113 S.Ct. 2637.) Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court, we reject Hubbart's challenge to the SVPA based on the lack of an express mental illness requirement. Section 6600, subdivision (a) requires a diagnosed mental disorder, whereas the Kansas law refers interchangeably to mental abnormality and personality disorder as the conditions triggering commitment as a sexually violent predator. (See Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 352, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) However, these differences in labeling are purely semantical. With the exception of nonsubstantive differences in grammar, the SVPA tracks the Kansas scheme verbatim in describing the requisite mental disorder as a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others. (§ 6600, subd. (c).) Through this language, the Act targets sexual offenders who suffer from a diagnosed volitional impairment making them dangerous beyond their control. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) Nothing requires the Legislature to express this impairment as mental illness or to use any other terms suggested by Hubbart. The SVPA also establishes the requisite connection between impaired volitional control and the danger posed to the public. Much like the Kansas law at issue in Hendricks, our statute defines an SVP as a person who has committed sexually violent crimes and who currently suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (§ 6600, subd. (a).) [24] Through this language, the SVPA plainly requires a finding of dangerousness. The statute then links that finding to a currently diagnosed mental disorder characterized by the inability to control dangerous sexual behavior. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) This formula permissibly circumscribes the class of persons eligible for commitment under the Act. Hubbart claims, however, that the high court expressly held in an earlier case, Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, that a diagnosed antisocial personality disorder can never be used as a basis for civil commitment. Due process, he argues, requires more than predictions of dangerousness based on an antisocial personality disorder. Hubbart seems to suggest that the SVPA must be struck down because the definition of a diagnosed mental disorder does not expressly exclude antisocial personality disorders or other conditions characterized by an inability to control violent antisocial behavior, such as paraphilia. We note that Foucha did not prevent the high court from upholding the sexual predators' scheme at issue in Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072. And, contrary to what Hubbart suggests, due process requires an inability to control dangerous conduct, and does not restrict the manner in which the underlying impairment is statutorily defined. (See id. at pp. 358-359, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) Because the SVPA meets this standard, the scheme is not flawed for the reasons Hubbart now suggests. However, because Hubbart mischaracterizes Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, and because Foucha might cause confusion in other cases, we explain why Foucha does not affect the outcome in the present case. (See People v. Superior Court ( Blakely ) (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 202, 211-213, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 [trial court erroneously ruled that Foucha barred extended commitment of insanity acquittee based on antisocial personality disorder as a matter of law].) In Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 73-74, 112 S.Ct. 1780, a criminal defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed under Louisiana law to a psychiatric facility until his release was medically recommended and judicially approved. The relevant statutory scheme barred the release of a person committed in this manner as long as he posed a danger to himself or others, whether or not he was also insane or mentally ill. The committed person bore the burden of proving he was not dangerous in seeking release. After four years in confinement, proceedings began to determine whether Foucha should be released. The trial court ultimately found that Foucha was still dangerous within the meaning of the Louisiana scheme and recommitted him. The evidence showed that Foucha was no longer insane or mentally ill, because the drug-induced psychosis leading to his initial commitment had dissipated. The State made no claim to the contrary. Also, no expert opined that Foucha posed a danger to himself or the public if released. Instead, the doctors who examined Foucha refused to certify that he would not be dangerous based on his unruly behavior while institutionalized and certain antisocial personality traits. ( Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 74-75 & fn. 2, 82, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) The trial court's decision denying release was upheld on review in state court. However, the judgment was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. The high court began by noting that, consistent with the seminal case of Jones, supra, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, an insanity acquittee may initially be held without complying with the procedures applicable to civil committees. ( Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 76, fn. 4, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) In other words, the state may automatically commit a person who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity, and need not conduct a de novo trial at which clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness is introduced. For reasons that need not be repeated here, Foucha reaffirmed Jones, supra, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, insofar as the latter case held that the prerequisites for civil commitment could properly be inferred from the verdict in the criminal case, even though insanity had been established as a defense to the crime only by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the court found no constitutional justification for Foucha's continued confinement in light of new evidence adduced at the hearing to determine his eligibility for release. Foucha cited Jones, supra, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, for the proposition that an insanity acquittee may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer. (504 U.S. 71, 77, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) The court noted that since there was no evidence or claim that Foucha was presently insane or mentally disturbed, the basis for confining Foucha as an insanity acquittee had disappeared. ( Id. at p. 78, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) The court next observed that assuming Foucha could no longer be held as an insanity acquittee consistent with Jones, supra, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, his continued confinement was improper absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings of current mental illness and dangerousness. ( Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 78, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) The court concluded that this standard had not been met in proceedings leading to Foucha's recommitment, because clear and convincing evidence of a mental disorder had not been introduced. [I]ndeed, the State does not claim that Foucha is now mentally ill. ( Id. at p. 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) Finally, the court considered whether compliance with the standards generally applicable in civil commitment proceedings should be excused on the ground the Louisiana law was narrowly drawn to address the particular risks posed by dangerous insanity acquittees, including those whose sanity had been restored. In making this argument, the State relied by analogy on United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, in which the government's acute interest in preventing crime permitted the pretrial detention of dangerous arrestees under certain circumstances. The court rejected the claim. Unlike the statute in Salerno, the Louisiana law under which Foucha was detained did not require the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he posed a danger to the community. The court emphasized that the State need prove nothing to justify continued detention, for the statute places the burden on the detainee to prove that he is not dangerous. ( Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 81-82, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) The court summarized the evidence that had been introduced against Foucha  including expert testimony concerning his antisocial personality  and found little evidence of dangerousness. ( Id. at p. 82, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) It was in the context of discussing the lack of evidence of dangerousness that the Foucha court made the statement emphasized by Hubbart in the present case. Specifically, the court said that Foucha's continued confinement could not be based solely on the fact he once committed a criminal act and now has an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a disorder for which there is no effective treatment.... This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder that may lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even though he has completed his prison term. It would also be only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond [a] reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law. ( Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83, 112 S.Ct. 1780, italics added.) Nothing in the quoted excerpt, or in Foucha as a whole, purports to limit the range of mental impairments that may lead to the permissible confinement of dangerous and disturbed individuals. (504 U.S. at p. 83, 112 S.Ct. 1780.) Nor did Foucha state or imply that antisocial personality conditions and past criminal conduct play no proper role in the commitment determination. The high court concluded only that Foucha's due process rights were violated because the State had sought to continue his confinement as an insanity acquittee without proving that he was either mentally ill or dangerous. Thus, Foucha is not inconsistent with the general due process principles set forth in Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, or with the court's approval of the statutory criteria needed for commitment as a sexually violent predator in the latter case. For similar reasons, Foucha does not support Hubbart's attack on language defining a diagnosed mental disorder under the SVPA