Opinion ID: 149119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of AEDPA Deference

Text: The majority holds that AEDPA deference does not apply here, and that we are free to consider Miller's Confrontation Clause claim de novo using outcome-determinative legal principles that were not available to the Michigan state courts at the time of Miller's trial and appeal. I believe that the majority's interpretation of AEDPA skirts the statute's purposes of promoting deference to reasonably decided state-court decisions and respect for the states' interest in the finality of their own criminal convictions. As an initial matter, this case presents a relatively rare situation. As the majority notes, the Michigan trial court correctly ruled the suicide note admissible under then-controlling Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. In June 2003, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued a reasoned decision, also correct under the law as it stood at the time, affirming the trial court's Confrontation Clause analysis. On March 8, 2004, after briefing had been completed in the Michigan Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which effected a sea change in Confrontation Clause doctrine. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 1, 2004, which was entirely within its discretion, see Mich. Ct. R. 7.302; it also denied a motion to reconsider (in which Crawford was specifically brought to its attention) on June 30, 2004. Miller did not apply to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. As the majority recognizes, we afford modified AEDPA deference whenever state courts adjudicate claims on the merits without articulating their reasoning. See, e.g., Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2000). In such cases, a habeas court [must] focus on the result of the state court's decision, id. at 943 n. 1 (emphasis added), and uphold the state court's summary decision unless [the habeas court's] independent review of the record and pertinent federal law persuades [it] that [the state court's] result contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law as expressed in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, id. at 944 (quoting Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir.1999)) (emphasis added). The majority does not dispute that the Michigan Court of Appeals's result its finding of no Sixth Amendment violation under these circumstancesdoes not contravene[] or unreasonably appl[y] any United States Supreme Court holding. Accordingly, in this case, had the Michigan Court of Appeals (or the Michigan Supreme Court in denying leave for appeal) simply said we have considered Miller's Sixth Amendment claim or we have considered Miller's Confrontation Clause claim, and rejected it without further reasoning, we would be obliged to respect that result. Nonetheless, here, even though the Michigan Court of Appeals took the extra step of explaining its reasoning, the majority holds that we now cannot give its decision any deference, even though that decision in fact correctly applied the law that governed at the time. This result seems anomalous, and is not compelled by any of the cases cited by the majority. See Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir.2005) ([I]t is the state court's decision, as opposed to its reasoning, that is judged under the `unreasonable application' standard.); Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir.2001) (stating that, in applying § 2254(d)(1), we are determining the reasonableness of the state courts' `decision,' not grading their papers.). Further, it is not even clear that Crawford is relevant to the question of AEDPA deference. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), state-court judgments are immune from attack on habeas unless they are contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. (emphasis added). In Terry Williams v. Taylor , one of the Supreme Court's seminal AEDPA cases, the Court made two contradictory statements as to the crucial time frame we must look to for determining what constitutes clearly established Federal law. Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and four other justices, said that this phrase refers to this Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.  529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (O'Connor, J.) (stating that `clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.  (emphasis added)). However, Justice Stevens, writing for a different majority in Terry Williams, stated that AEDPA requires us to look to law that was clearly established at the time the state-court conviction became final.  529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (emphasis added). This disjunction has been little noted, perhaps because it is rare to have a situation such as the one we face here, where the relevant law changed between the two alternative times (and where the defendant did not seek certiorari, which would usually have resolved the matter). Our cases have cited the O'Connor formulation far more often than the Stevens formulation, although we appear not to have confronted a case up to this point where the formulation chosen would make a difference. The Eleventh Circuit has noted the contradiction and chosen to follow the O'Connor formulation, noting that the Supreme Court has cited it at least four times after Williams, while not citing the Stevens formulation again. Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1198 n. 62 (11th Cir.2008). [1] As the Supreme Court has explained in no uncertain terms, AEDPA's purpose [is] to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. There is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance these doctrines. Federal habeas corpus principles must inform and shape the historic and still vital relation of mutual respect and common purpose existing between the States and the federal courts. In keeping this delicate balance we have been careful to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the States' interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings. Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Because our interference in a state criminal proceeding is a matter of considerable gravity, infringing on these principles of comity, finality, and federalism, I would at least lean toward the O'Connor formulation, which requires that we defer unless the state court actually committed error. See Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir.1998) ([AEDPA] tells federal courts: Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on an error grave enough to be called `unreasonable.' (emphasis added)). [2] The majority opts for the Stevens formulation, primarily on the ground that it matches up with the temporal dividing line between old rules and new rules which the Supreme Court established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (stating that a rule of law is old, and therefore applies on collateral review, if it was established by the time a habeas petitioner's conviction became final). While this symmetry may be superficially pleasing, I see no a priori reason why the temporal divide between old and new rules for purposes of Teague must align with the relevant temporal divide for purposes of AEDPA. To the contrary, it makes perfect sense that the respective dividing lines should differ, for, as the majority acknowledges, the Supreme Court has observed that [t]he AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct. Maj. Op. at 920 (quoting Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272, 122 S.Ct. 2147, 153 L.Ed.2d 301 (2002)). [3] The Teague inquiry is functional; it determines what law governs the merits of a petitioner's habeas claim. See Maj. Op. at 920. The Teague Court had to select a cutoff point to determine what rules would apply on habeas, and settled on the time at which a conviction becomes final, primarily because the Court felt that this was the point at which the systemic interest in repose and reliance on concluded litigation outweigh[ed] ... the [petitioner's] competing interest in readjudicating [his] conviction[] according to [newly declared] legal standards.... 489 U.S. at 306, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). AEDPA, by contrast, embodies Congress's desire to create an initial hurdle to be surmounted before the remedy of habeas becomes available at all. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 10, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (The provisions of [AEDPA] create an independent, high standard to be met before a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to set aside state-court rulings.); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 309, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that unlike the Teague inquiry, which determines whether new or old law should apply in a particular case, AEDPA represents Congress's intent to control ... federal courts' ability to grant postconviction remedies). In other words, by enacting AEDPA, Congress intended to superimpose an added layer of deference to state-court decisions as such i.e., to tell[] federal courts: Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on [a state-court] error grave enough to be called `unreasonable.' Herbert, 160 F.3d at 1135. The Teague inquiry does not share AEDPA's primary concern with fostering respect for state-court decisions and protecting the States' interest [as against the federal government] in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings. Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479. Thus, the majority's desire to match up the two inquiries' temporal dividing lines is misplaced. Rather, as stated previously, it is eminently reasonable that the AEDPA dividing line should be drawn so as not to penalize state courts for making correct decisions that merely fail to predict the future. The majority correctly observes that in her opinion in Terry Williams, Justice O'Connor stated that [w]ith [the] caveat [that the inquiry is restricted to the decisions of the Supreme Court ], whatever would qualify as an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute `clearly established Federal law ...' under [AEDPA]. 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. However, the majority reads too much into this statement. As one judge on this circuit has observed, Justice O'Connor was not discussing Teague 's temporal aspect in this passage, but rather, Teague 's approach to the proper level of specificity with which a rule must have been pronounced as of the relevant time to qualify as established: The Supreme Court has adopted the spectrum of abstraction of Teague v. Lane to determine whether a particular legal principle was clearly established at the relevant time. See [ Terry] Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (With the caveat that the source of clearly established law is Supreme Court jurisprudence, whatever would qualify as an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute `clearly established Federal law ...' under § 2254(d)(1).). At one end of the spectrum lie legal principles with such a high level of generality, like the Eighth Amendment principle of reliability in sentencing, whose application does not necessarily lead to a predictable development in the relevant law and therefore cannot be considered clearly established. On the other end are narrowly drawn bright-line rules with little application beyond factually indistinguishable situations. In the middle of the spectrum lie those general principles of law crafted by the Supreme Court to constitute clearly established law in a wide range of factual situations. Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281, 292 (6th Cir.2005) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In other words, it appears that all Justice O'Connor meant to imply with her comment was that a rule that had been announced at a sufficient level of specificity to qualify as old under Teague will also have been announced with a sufficient level of specificity to qualify as clearly established under AEDPA. She was not, however, addressing the proper time frame for making this assessment. For these reasons, I have serious doubts about the majority's adoption of the Stevens standard as the law of this circuit. Even under the majority's timing rule, however, I would still accord the state court's result as to Miller's Confrontation Clause claimi.e., the Michigan Court of Appeals's holding of no Sixth Amendment violationthe same degree of deference as we would afford it if that court had simply been silent as to its reasoning.