Opinion ID: 783410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ammar's appeal

Text: 18 On appeal, Ammar contends principally (a) that the district court made errors of law by applying principles of assumption of risk rather than principles of comparative negligence, and (b) that the court's factual findings were clearly erroneous as to methods of operating the starboard stores crane, the existence of options available to Ammar, and negligence on the part of Ammar. He also contends that the court erred in refusing to award the full amount of his claimed medical expenses. His contentions have no merit. 19
20 Ammar contends that the district court, in reducing his damages award, mistakenly applied principles of assumption of risk rather than contributory negligence or comparative negligence. We see no indication that this is so. 21 Assumption of risk is the knowledgeable acceptance by an employee of a dangerous condition when and if such acceptance was necessary for the performance of his duties. Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1973) ( Rivera ). Assumption of risk has long been eliminated from maritime injury law by statute. See id. at 256-57 (citing 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1946) (railroad employees), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1946), made applicable to seamen by 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1946)). 22 Instead, the Jones Act incorporates the doctrine of comparative negligence, under which recovery is reduced if the plaintiff is found to have been negligent and his negligence contributed to his injury. See, e.g., Rivera, 474 F.2d at 257. Such contributory negligence in a Jones Act case connotes some careless act or omission on the part of the employee over and above [mere] knowledgeable acceptance of a risk. Id. The defendant must show more than that the seaman simply had knowledge of a hazard; it must show that the seaman fail[ed] to adopt safer alternative courses of action, and the inquiry at trial should thus center[] on what choices were available to [the Plaintiff] and how he exercised those choices. Akermanis v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 688 F.2d 898, 904 n. 2 (2d Cir.1982). 23 In the present case, the district court, citing Rivera, expressly discussed the differences between the concepts of assumption of risk and comparative or contributory negligence. Noting that [n]othing about [its] findings suggest[ed] that [the court thought] it was necessary for the performance of Mr. Ammar's duties that he accept the risk of climbing on board the crane, the court stated that its findings all relate to the theory of contributory or comparative negligence, which connotes some careless act or omission on the part of the employee, over and above that knowledgeable acceptance of risk. (Dec. 5 Tr. at 26.) 24 As discussed in Part II.B. below, the court's findings focused not simply on Ammar's knowledge of the danger in the approach he took but also on the existence of less dangerous approaches and Ammar's awareness of those alternatives. Thus, Ammar's contention that the court applied erroneous legal principles finds no support in the record. 25
26 Ammar argues that the district court erred in finding as a factual matter that he was contributorily negligent, i.e., that he not only was aware that it was dangerous to stand on the crane's pedestal and step on the remote control box but also knew that safer alternatives were available. He argues, inter alia, that the court's finding that such safer alternatives existed was based on its understanding of the workings of the crane as reflected in a court-drawn diagram that Ammar contends was flawed. He also contends that the court should have allowed him to place in evidence a different diagram of the crane. These contentions provide no basis for reversal. 27 First, we reject Ammar's contention that the court's use of the diagram it sketched constituted error. The court drew its diagram of the crane during the trial in order to understand how the crane functioned, because the court found Ammar's presentation confusing. The court showed its diagram to Ammar during his testimony and asked whether the diagram correctly depicted, inter alia, the position of the crane on the 03 deck in relation to the pertinent 02 deck hatch, the location of the control box on the crane, the direction toward which the boom was pointing, the directions in which the boom would be moved at various times, the resulting location of the control box in relation to those boom movements, and the relation of the control box to the 03 deck and its railing. ( See Trial Transcript October 24, 2001, at 177-81.) In every instance, Ammar responded that the court's diagram and its understanding of the positions, movements, and relationships were correct. 28 The court noted that [t]he parties ha[d] put [the court's diagram] into evidence (Oct. 30 Tr. at 8); that the court had shown the sketch to other witnesses to be sure the court's understanding was correct ( see id.; Dec. 5 Tr. at 6); and that then the defendant and the plaintiff started using it regularly with respect to various witnesses (Dec. 5 Tr. at 6). As the court noted, [c]ertainly if there was any error in that sketch, any witness who was asked about it who had a different view could have explained that. ( Id. ) Only after the trial ended and the court announced its finding that Ammar had been contributorily negligent did Ammar suggest that the diagram was flawed. In all the circumstances, Ammar's contention that the court impermissibly used the diagram is specious. 29 Nor is there any basis for overturning the court's finding that Ammar's own conduct constituted contributory negligence that was in part responsible for his injury. Findings of fact made by the district court after a bench trial may not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949). Further, when a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504. 30 Here, the district court heard the testimony of witnesses from both sides as to the movement and operation of the starboard stores crane, and it received in evidence photographs showing that the on-crane controls could be manipulated by a worker standing on the bottom rung of the 03 deck's railing. The court credited the testimony of the witnesses who stated that Ammar thus could have operated the crane without stepping on the flimsy control box at the base of the crane, and it therefore found that there was an alternative available to [Ammar] other than climbing on board the crane (Dec. 5 Tr. at 27), i.e., that he could have manipulated the controls by moving around the railing area of the deck ( id. ), and that Ammar did negligently ignore a safer way for him to operate this crane at a time when the body pack was inoperable ( id. at 31). These findings were based on credibility determinations that we are not entitled to second-guess and on inferences that were permissible in light of the evidence at trial. The district court properly applied the principles discussed in Part II.A. above, reviewing Ammar's actions for reasonableness in light of the alternatives that the court found were both available to him and known to him, and we see no clear error in its finding that Ammar's decision to mount the pedestal and step on the flimsy control box, rather than adopt the safer alternative of standing on a rung of the ship's railing, constituted contributory negligence. 31 Finally, there is no merit in Ammar's contention that the court should have granted his motion, made after the trial had concluded and the court had announced its liability findings, for permission to present a new diagram and an affidavit from his expert witness as evidence that the crane could not have been operated in accordance with the court's finding that Ammar had been contributorily negligent. A motion to reopen the record for the presentation of new evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 342 (2d Cir.1986). We see no abuse of discretion here. Ammar had ample opportunity to provide evidence during the trial. As discussed above, the court's diagram was used extensively at trial by the court and the parties. Further, after the court had posed questions to the defense expert as to the functioning of the crane, the court had expressly invited Ammar to conduct further cross-examination, or to resume his own testimony, or to recall his own expert witness to the stand. The court was not required to allow Ammar to reopen the evidence after he learned of the court's liability ruling.
32 Ammar's other contentions include his challenge to the district court's refusal to award him medical expenses other than the sum of $3,900 for future psychiatric care. These contentions are without merit. The court's rejection of Ammar's evidence as to other recoverable medical fees was expressly based on its findings that the testimony of Ammar's medical witnesses at trial was not sufficiently credible and that the charges had been inflated for purposes of litigation. (Oct. 30 Tr. at 14 (To a certain extent their credentials, certainly their methodology, and also their motives since both of them have a real financial interest in this case, [are] such that the Court is not prepared to rely on them .... Mr. Ammar's condition does not appear to be as represented by these doctors, at least I don't find adequate medical evidence to support their diagnoses.).) As discussed above, we are not entitled to overturn the trial court's credibility determinations. Hence, there is no basis for reversal. 33 Ammar's remaining contentions similarly lack merit and do not warrant discussion.