Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Attorney Meetings

Text: The first defense motion to recuse the LADA arose from a statement the lead prosecutor filed that trial evidence would show the Bryant Family had ―people inside‖ the office, as well as other public agencies. Defendants argued the LADA‘s failure to provide discovery on the subject and, apparently, to prosecute the infiltrators showed there was a conflict of interest that would prevent defendants from receiving a fair trial. The LADA argued that the statement had been misinterpreted, no discoverable information had been withheld, and no conflict of interest existed. To facilitate the court‘s resolution of the motion, the LADA agreed to disclose to the court the basis for the prosecutor‘s statement. It asserted that this information concerned completed and ongoing internal investigations and was confidential under the ―official information‖ privilege, section 1040 of the Evidence Code.73 The trial court observed that it would need to conduct in camera hearings to determine whether the privilege applied. It promised to provide the defense with any material it deemed discoverable. No defendant objected. The court then conducted a series of ex parte in camera meetings with LADA attorneys and investigators. The court also directed the LADA to conduct further investigation and report back. In the midst of these hearings, Bryant asserted in a written filing that the privilege did not apply because the LADA had publicly disclosed the allegations of infiltration, and, in any event, the defendants‘ need for the information outweighed any confidentiality interest. The court ultimately ruled: (1) there was no evidence of infiltration or of undisclosed exculpatory material; (2) the information 73 In relevant part, this provision establishes a public entity‘s privilege to withhold confidential information when ―[d]isclosure of the information is against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice[.]‖ (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b)(2).) 153 provided to the court in the ex parte meetings was privileged; and (3) no conflict of interest required recusal of the LADA. Defendants now claim the trial court erred by conducting the ex parte meetings. The court did not err. A criminal defendant has the right under the state and federal Constitutions to be personally present and represented by counsel at all critical stages of the trial. For purposes of the right to be present, a critical stage is ―one in which a defendant‘s ‗ ―absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings‖ [citation], or ―whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.‖ ‘ ‖ (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 133.) As to the right to counsel, a critical stage is one ―in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake‖ (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 362), and ―the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant‘s basic right to a fair trial‖ (United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227). Defendants did not specifically object to the court‘s decision to conduct in camera proceedings. After the meetings began, they argued that the court should not apply the official information privilege. They later pointed out that their absence from the meetings made it difficult for them to address the merits of the issue. They did not directly challenge the court‘s decision to hold the ex parte meetings as a denial of their constitutional rights to presence and counsel. The appellate claim is forfeited. Even if not forfeited, the claim fails. In general, a court ―has inherent discretion to conduct in camera hearings to determine objections to disclosure based on asserted privileges.‖ (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 383, fn. 21.) We have acknowledged that, as to an assertion of the official information privilege, a trial court may properly conduct in camera proceedings to ―weigh the People‘s claim of privilege against defendant‘s asserted need for the information.‖ (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 955.) As in People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at page 302, defendants fail ―to 154 persuade that [they have] a constitutional right to be present at an in camera hearing at which the prosecution will reveal sensitive and possibly privileged information.‖