Opinion ID: 1355753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional protections for the news media

Text: (29) The common-interest privilege codified in section 47(3) and the fair-comment defense were intended to ameliorate the harsh effects of the common law rule of strict liability for defamation. (Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 114, p. 815.) As we have noted, that rule was restricted in New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254, and subsequent cases and abrogated in Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. 323. (See discussion at pp. 721-723, ante. ) Defamation defendants now have a panoply of constitutional protections. New York Times has been characterized as overturning 200 years of libel law ( Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, supra, 472 U.S. 749, 766 [86 L.Ed.2d 593, 607] (conc. opn. of White, J.)); almost a transformation of defamation law (Rest.2d Torts, vol. 3, div. 5, special note, p. 151); and revolutionary ( Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., supra, 424 A.2d 78, 84). (30), (31) Even as to private-figure plaintiffs, there are now significant constitutional restrictions on the right to recover damages. A private-figure plaintiff must prove at least negligence to recover any damages and, when the speech involves a matter of public concern, he must also prove New York Times malice, supra, 376 U.S. 254, to recover presumed or punitive damages. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 347 and 349 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 809-811]; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 756 [86 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601].) This malice must be established by clear and convincing proof. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 342 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 807].) For the New York Times standard to be met, the publisher must come close to willfully blinding itself to the falsity of its utterance. ( Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, supra, 475 U.S. 767, 783 [89 L.Ed.2d 783, 797] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.), citing Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64 [13 L.Ed.2d 125, 85 S.Ct. 209] and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U.S. 130.) (32) When the speech involves a matter of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of the defamation. ( Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, supra, 475 U.S. 767, 777 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 793].) (33) Contrary to the normal rule of appellate review, a reviewing court must independently review all the evidence on the issue of malice. ( Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 510-511 [80 L.Ed.2d 502, 523]; McCoy v. Hearst Corp., supra, 42 Cal.3d 835, 845.) These constitutional obstacles to recovery provide even greater protection for the news media than the common law privileges. The original reason for those privileges  strict liability for defamation  has disappeared. It is therefore unnecessary to expand the privileges. One of the foremost tort law commentators has explained that when some degree of fault is required, as is now the law, there is no need for any privilege. (Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, p. 808.) Moreover, expansion of the statutory privilege would unnecessarily complicate defamation law, which is now largely governed by constitutional doctrine. We agree with the Michigan Supreme Court's observation in this regard when it rejected a public-interest privilege: The `policy' behind the public-interest privilege has now been largely engrafted onto the penumbra of our First Amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court has chosen to formulate a constitutional privilege that is intended to advance `robust and wide-open debate' by measuring the `public' status of the injured parties, rather than the content of the publication.... Ours is not a constitutional mission, and it is not given to us to redesign that standard. We do not think we ought to fashion our state's tort law in a manner that would only fine tune the United States constitutional standard in one respect. ( Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, supra, 398 N.W.2d at p. 264.) The Michigan court's concern for unnecessary complexity was not theoretical. Almost everyone agrees that the complexities created by New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254, and its progeny have rendered the law unmanageable. The Libel Reform Project  a group of defamation law scholars, practitioners, journalists, and others  recently reported that, The attacks have come from all quarters  from judges, academics, journalists, victims of libel, defendants in libel suits and attorneys for both defendants and plaintiffs. The current system does not work well for anyone.  (Libel Reform Project, supra, p. 9, italics added.) [34] We decline to add yet another wrinkle to the already crumpled face of constitutional defamation law.