Opinion ID: 4552833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Firearms and Ammunition Evidence

Text: During the hearing on Hagar’s motion in limine concerning the firearm evidence obtained from his residence, the government explained that the evidence basically . . . goes to one of the intent elements of the stalking statute which requires the intent to kill, injure, harm, intimidate. It goes directly to that in preparation for the plan to carry that out to have that intent . . . . It also goes to establishing whether or not these are true threats under [18 U.S.C.§.] 875 and whether they were enacted with a purpose . . . to threaten or injure . . . . In two of the government’s exhibits, Exhibits 128 and 129, Hagar specifically threatened to shoot people. The court overruled Hagar’s motion. -13- No. 19-3591, United States v. Hagar A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ashraf, 628 F.3d 813, 826 (6th Cir. 2011). Admission of the firearms and ammunition found in Hagar’s residence was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence was directly relevant to the elements of the cyberstalking charge and the interstate threats charges. As to the interstate charges, Hagar sent emails to the victims stating that he intended to shoot them. Possession of firearms and ammunition was direct evidence that his threats to shoot his victims were “true threats” to injure and not “merely idle or careless talk.” See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); United States v. Howard, 947 F.3d 936, 943 (6th Cir. 2020). Hagar’s ability to carry out his threats to shoot people was certainly a fact “of consequence in determining” whether his communications were true threats. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. Violent threats go hand-in-hand with firearms and ammunition. See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 309 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s possession of firearms made his threats to carry out his violent threats “more than mere puffery”) (cleaned up). This is equally true for the cyberstalking count. That count required the government to prove that Hagar “engaged in a course of conduct with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate” R.G. or members of her family. Hagar threatened to hurt R.G. and others. He also made handwritten notes about R.G.’s family. The possession of instruments to carry out such threats is certainly relevant to the question of intent. See United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 230 (1st Cir. 2011) (“murder kit” containing a knife, rubber gloves and duct tape was “unarguably relevant” to show intent in interstate stalking case). Any prejudicial effect to Hagar did not outweigh its probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Hagar barraged his victims with extremely threatening communications, which they perceived as real, as reflected by the security measures they took. The firearms and ammunition -14- No. 19-3591, United States v. Hagar provided direct evidence that the victims’ perception that Hagar meant what he said was not unfounded.