Opinion ID: 2791468
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prejudice to Mr. Velarde

Text: Finally, the delay did not prejudice Mr. Velarde. In assessing prejudice, we examine “the particular evils the speedy trial is intended to avert: ‘pretrial incarceration; . . . anxiety and concern of the accused; and . . . the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’” United States v. Batie, 433 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 1991)). “The most serious of these is impairment of the defense ‘because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.’” Id. (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)). Mr. Velarde remained on release until shortly before opening statements. Oral Arg. 10:48-10:54; see also Appellant’s Opening Br. at 31 (concession by Mr. Velarde that he “was not incarcerated and was on pretrial release” during the delay). And, as noted above, the court postponed the trial only because Mr. Velarde’s attorney said he needed more time. The delay did not prejudice Mr. Velarde; it helped him by giving his attorney the time he said he needed. According to Mr. Velarde, the delay was prejudicial because he was subject to release conditions during the delay and the jury could have 6 researched the case on the internet with the additional time. Both arguments are invalid. The conditions of pretrial release are not in our record on appeal. But, we can take judicial notice of the conditions. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1127 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that we can take judicial notice of district court filings omitted in the record on appeal). These conditions involved a deposit of $2,500 into the Clerk’s office as security and a variety of restrictions. See United States v. Velarde, No. 1:13-cr00160-NDF-1 (D. Wyo. Aug. 15, 2013) (Appearance Bond); United States v. Velarde, No. 1:13-cr-00160-NDF-1 (D. Wyo. Aug. 15, 2013) (Order Setting Conditions of Release). But, prejudice is the most serious when it impedes the ability of the defendant to prepare his case. See p. 6, above. As noted above, the district court postponed opening statements only because Mr. Velarde’s attorney said he was not ready. Mr. Velarde’s restrictions on his liberty were a substantial, but unavoidable cost of giving his attorney the time he said he needed. Mr. Velarde argues that by selecting the jury two months before opening statements, the court created an opportunity for the newly selected jurors to research the case on the internet. This argument rests on speculation. As Mr. Velarde concedes, the district court told the newly selected jurors not to read or research anything about the case. Appellant’s 7 Opening Br. at 31. There is nothing to suggest that the jury violated the court’s instructions in this two-month period. The absence of prejudice weighs against a constitutional violation.