Opinion ID: 1189686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: peremptory challenges based on race

Text: In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that equal protection forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race. [2] Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To successfully attack a peremptory challenge, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury. 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The purpose of the prima facie case requirement is to separate meritless claims of discrimination from those that may have merit. United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332, 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 215, 121 L.Ed.2d 154 (1992). To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must demonstrate facts and circumstances that raise the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The Batson Court gave only sparing, `illustrative' guidance as to what circumstances give rise to such an inference. State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723). These included a `pattern' of strikes against minority jurors and discriminatory questions or statements by the prosecutor during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. However, in determining whether a prima facie showing has been made, trial courts are to examine all relevant circumstances. Id. In State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989), we delineated in greater detail the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination: The elements necessary to such a prima facie case include (1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded belong to a cognizable group ... and (3) a showing that there exists a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias. Id. at 518 (citing People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 280, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 905 (1978)). The trial court's conclusion as to whether a prima facie showing has or has not been made is accorded deference on appeal and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. [3] Abuse of discretion means that the trial court's ruling is beyond the limits of reasonability. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). The venire in defendant's case consisted of seventy-seven persons, five of whom were possibly Hispanic. Four of these five potential jurors had Hispanic surnames  Robert Galvez, Wendy Mayeda, Annie Sanchez, and Madolyn Ramos. The fifth, Joan Anderson, appeared to defense counsel to be Hispanic. The court excused Ramos for cause. The prosecution then used its first and fifth peremptory challenges to strike Sanchez and Mayeda. Defendant followed, using his eighth peremptory to strike Anderson. Galvez remained and served on the petit jury. Prior to the swearing of the jury, defense counsel objected to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike Mayeda and Sanchez. To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, counsel argued (1) that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike two of three Hispanic persons on the venire; and (2) that defendant is Hispanic. At the prosecutor's request, the court determined that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. [4] Considering the limited grounds upon which defendant relied to establish a prima facie case and the requirement that he demonstrate a strong likelihood of purposeful discrimination based on race or ethnicity, Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518, this ruling was not beyond the limits of reasonability and must therefore be upheld. [5] We note at the outset that as a general rule, a defendant who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful discrimination is obligated to develop [some] record beyond numbers, in support of the asserted violation. United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 656, 659 (8th Cir.1991). While a single challenge based on race is impermissible ... `it is not unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more [Hispanics] from the jury.' Cantu, 750 P.2d at 597 (citation omitted) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 102, 106 S.Ct. at 1726, 90 L.Ed.2d at 91 (White, J., concurring)). Numerical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern of peremptory strikes against minority jurors, but a defendant must show that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 905. Defendant argues that the prosecution challenged and removed sixty-seven percent of the Hispanics on the venire. That figure is inaccurate and self-serving. After the court excused juror Ramos for cause, four Hispanic jurors remained. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike two of those jurors, Mayeda and Sanchez. Of the two remaining Hispanic jurors, defendant struck one, Joan Anderson, notwithstanding his belief that she was Hispanic. [6] Disregarding his own strike against a Hispanic juror, defendant concludes that the prosecutor struck two of three or sixty-seven percent of the Hispanics from the venire. Under this method of calculation, defense counsel might have used a peremptory challenge to strike juror Galvez and then accused the prosecution of striking, not sixty-seven, but one hundred percent of the Hispanics from the venire. A defendant cannot exercise a peremptory strike against a Hispanic juror and then rely on the reduced number of Hispanic jurors remaining on the venire to calculate the percentage of such jurors that have been previously excluded by the prosecution. Such a practice skews the resulting percentage in favor of the defendant, not because the prosecution has challenged more minority jurors, but because the defendant has reduced the number in the class. [7] This is unacceptable, particularly because of the small numbers from which these percentages are calculated. When Joan Anderson is included in the calculation, the prosecution struck not sixty-seven, but fifty percent of the Hispanic jurors from the venire. Excluding two of four is not most or all of the Hispanic jurors on the panel. Moreover, the prosecutor did not use a disproportionate number of his peremptory challenges to strike Hispanics. The court dismissed fourteen jurors for cause and excused three others, leaving a sixty-person venire, seven percent of which was Hispanic. The prosecution used only seventeen percent of its peremptory challenges (two of twelve) to strike Hispanic jurors. Standing alone, defendant's numerical evidence is insufficient to prove a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Defendant seeks to bolster this evidence with the fact that he and jurors Mayeda and Sanchez are Hispanic. The mere fact that the subject of the peremptory strike is a minority member does not alone raise the inference of discriminatory intent. Cantu, 750 P.2d at 597. However, racial or ethnic identity between the defendant and excused prospective jurors may make it easier to prove a prima facie case. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); see Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 906 (the fact that a defendant is a member of the challenged jurors' racial or ethnic group and that the victim is a member of the group to which the majority of remaining jurors belong is relevant to establishing a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination). The inference of discrimination that might be drawn from this racial or ethnic identity, however, is undercut by the fact that three of the prosecutor's key witnesses were Hispanic. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1871, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 412 (1991). It is certainly arguable that Hispanic jurors might be prone to find credibility in the prosecutor's Hispanic witnesses. This being the case, the prosecution suffered the same harm of which defendant complains when defense counsel struck Joan Anderson from the venire. Concluding on these facts that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing was not beyond the limits of reasonability. Defendant did not establish a pattern of strikes against minority jurors, nor did he point to discriminatory statements or questions by the prosecutor during voir dire. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. It is true that the prosecutor excluded two of four jurors belonging to defendant's ethnic group. However, this does not of necessity raise a strong likelihood that the jurors were challenged because of their group membership, especially where three key witnesses for the prosecution shared the same ethnicity as the excluded jurors. We find no abuse of discretion. Because defendant failed to make a prima facie showing, the burden of proof did not shift to the prosecutor. We therefore need not consider the adequacy of the race-neutral reasons proffered by the prosecutor. [8]