Opinion ID: 6221816
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reporting and Disclaimer Claims

Text: Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in determining they lacked associational standing to raise the claims of their donors. For an association to have such standing, it must demonstrate, among other things, that “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” Chamber of Commerce of United States. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 756 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). As mentioned, one requirement of constitutional standing is an “injury in fact,” defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs base their associational standing argument solely on NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). But we agree with the district court that NAACP is distinguishable because, as we explain, it involved a compelled disclosure, whereas Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding independent expenditures show they have not and will not be compelled to disclose donor information if they engage in issue advocacy. NAACP involved a court order enforcing a state request for production of the names and addresses of the NAACP’s members. See id. at 452–53. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the NAACP had standing to 8 Appellate Case: 21-2015 Document: 010110645360 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 9 represent the First Amendment interests of its members “to be protected from compelled disclosure by the State of their affiliation with the [NAACP] as revealed by the membership lists.” Id. at 458 (emphasis added). In contrast here, Plaintiffs alleged that they had not made and would not make any independent expenditures that would trigger the reporting or disclaimer requirements. Therefore, compelled disclosure of donor information per those requirements is not plausible. Absent a plausible chance of such disclosure, there can be no chilling effect on any donor’s willingness to donate. See D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a “chilling effect [on the exercise of a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights] can, in some circumstances, amount to a sufficient injury to support standing” if it “arise[s] from an objectively justified fear of real consequences, which can be satisfied by showing a credible threat of prosecution or other consequences following from the statute’s enforcement”). 5 In their opening brief, Plaintiffs wholly ignore the effect of their affirmative disclaimer regarding independent expenditures. Those allegations mandate the conclusion that Plaintiffs have not established their donors have suffered or are likely to suffer an injury in fact due to the reporting or disclaimer 5 Plaintiffs fault the district court for not taking into account the “uniquely permissive” nature of First Amendment standing analysis. See Aplt. Br. at 7, 9. But they cite no source for this characterization, and our independent research has uncovered none. To the extent Plaintiffs intend “uniquely permissive” to refer to the “chilling effect” basis of First Amendment standing, our analysis, like the district court’s, takes that into account. 9 Appellate Case: 21-2015 Document: 010110645360 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 10 requirements. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot establish associational standing because they have failed to show that their donors “would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs’ next argument, that they have standing to assert their own First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and privacy in association, fares no better. They allege, for the first time on appeal, that the Secretary “ordered [Cowboys for Trump] to disclose [its] contributions and expenditures, despite [Cowboys for Trump] not having made independent expenditures.” Aplt. Br. at 11. 6 But they did not make this allegation in their complaint, so we must disregard it. See Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[A]t the motion-to-dismiss stage our review is limited to the sufficiency of the allegations in the [c]omplaint.”). And based on the allegations Plaintiffs did make—that they have not and will not make independent expenditures—they cannot demonstrate either that they will be subject to the CRA’s reporting or disclaimer requirements, or that those requirements will chill their speech. As the district court observed, “the CRA has not plausibly chilled Plaintiffs’ speech 6 Plaintiffs also argue that “redressability is not in doubt,” Aplt. Br. at 10–11, but the district court did not reach redressability, and neither do we. 10 Appellate Case: 21-2015 Document: 010110645360 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 11 because Plaintiffs have not alleged that, but for the existence of the CRA, they would be making independent expenditures.” Aplt. App. at 69.
In their reply brief, Plaintiffs advance new allegations and provide documentary evidence showing that, before they filed their complaint, the Secretary had sent Cowboys for Trump a “Notice of Final Action” to register as a political committee, file all delinquent finance reports, and pay $7,800 in fines for failing to comply with the CRA’s reporting requirements. Also, before the complaint was filed, Cowboys for Trump challenged the Secretary’s notice by requesting binding arbitration, and the Secretary filed a motion for summary judgment with the arbitrator. Plaintiffs do not explain why they did not include these allegations in their complaint, and for several reasons, we decline to consider them or the related documentary evidence attached to their reply brief. First, “[w]e generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Sierra Club v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 816 F.3d 666, 676 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016). Second, our review in this case is confined to whether the complaint’s allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and we will not look beyond the record on appeal. See Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 913 n.9 (10th Cir. 1997) (denying motion to file a video as part of the appellate record on review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim, stating “our review is confined 11 Appellate Case: 21-2015 Document: 010110645360 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 12 to allegations made in the . . . complaint”). Third, the district court dismissed the complaint in December 2020 with leave to amend. But Plaintiffs did not avail themselves of that opportunity to cure the standing defects. Had they done so, they could have included these allegations as well as the fact that, shortly after the complaint was filed, the arbitrator summarily granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment and awarded her all the relief she sought. 7 Finally, we reject Plaintiffs’ suggestion to take judicial notice of statecourt filings related to confirmation of the arbitration award, all of which occurred after the district court dismissed the action. Those events are irrelevant because “standing is determined at the time the action is brought, and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.” Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs also argue that Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021), conclusively establishes that Plaintiffs have associational standing. 8 We disagree. Americans for Prosperity involved a California regulation requiring tax-exempt charities renewing their state registrations to disclose IRS forms containing the names and addresses of donors who 7 Plaintiffs point out that the Secretary noted in her motion for judgment on the pleadings that an arbitrator had upheld her determination that Cowboys for Trump is a political committee subject to the CRA and had to register and pay fines for noncompliance with the CRA’s reporting requirements. But our review is limited to the allegations in the complaint. See Summum, 130 F.3d at 913 n.9. 8 Because the Supreme Court decided Americans for Prosperity after Plaintiffs filed their opening brief, it was appropriately raised in their reply brief. 12 Appellate Case: 21-2015 Document: 010110645360 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 13 contributed more than $5,000 in a tax year. See id. at 2380. The Supreme Court held that the regulation “impose[d] a widespread burden on donors’ [First Amendment] associational rights” and was “facially unconstitutional, because it fails exacting scrutiny in a substantial number of applications judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 2389 (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). But standing was not at issue in the case. Unlike Plaintiffs here, who disclaimed having engaged in, or an intent to engage in, the activity (independent expenditures) triggering the challenged donor-disclosure requirements, each of the charities had renewed its registration but declined to make the required donor disclosures associated with registration, see id. at 2380. Americans for Prosperity, therefore, is inapplicable to the standing issues in this case.