Opinion ID: 835328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the interest statute

Text: We come, finally, to plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay interest on plaintiff's damages award at a lower rate than ordinarily would apply. In general, money judgments are subject to a nine percent per annum interest rate under ORS 82.010(2). However, there are some exceptions to that nine percent rate, including the one set out at ORS 82.010(2)(f): The rate of interest on a judgment rendered in favor of a plaintiff in a civil action to recover damages for injuries resulting from the professional negligence of a person licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners    is the lesser of five percent per annum or three percent in excess of the discount rate in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve district where the injuries occurred. After the jury returned its verdict for plaintiff, defendant submitted a form of judgment specifying the interest rate set out in ORS 82.010(2)(f) as the applicable rate. Plaintiff objected and submitted her own form of judgment, specifying a nine percent interest rate. The trial court accepted and entered defendant's form of judgment, implicitly rejecting plaintiff's objections to the reduced interest rate. On appeal, plaintiff assigned error to the trial court's application of the reduced interest rate on statutory and constitutional grounds, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. 204 Or.App. at 622-24, 131 P.3d 798. Before this court, plaintiff argues, first, that ORS 82.010(2)(f) does not apply to her money judgment against defendant because her action was not one to recover damages for injuries resulting from professional negligence within the meaning of that statute. Plaintiff contends that the term injuries is used in the statute in the narrow sense of bodily injury, exclusive of death  the outcome in her daughter's case. She notes that, in a variety of statutes, the legislature refers separately to damages for injury and damages for death. See, e.g., ORS 30.265(2) (public bodies immune from claim for injury to or death of any person); ORS 30.805(1) (no person may maintain an action for damages for injury, death or loss resulting from acts of person providing emergency medical assistance); ORS 31.600 (contributory negligence no bar to recovery in action to recovery damages for death or injury to person or property). She concludes that, in view of the legislature's ordinary practice, it is significant that it did not specify in ORS 82.010(2)(f) that the special interest rate applies to actions for injuries or death resulting from professional negligence. We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the legislature intended the term injuries in ORS 82.010(2)(f) in the broad legal sense of a violation  any violation  of the legal rights of another. In considering the issue, we can think of no rational explanation for the statute that would accommodate the meaning that plaintiff contends for: Why provide a limited interest rate on money judgments in medical malpractice actions, but only if the patient did not die? Moreover, we think that it is significant that ORS 82.010(2)(f) uses the plural form  injuries  while all of plaintiff's statutory examples refer to injury and death in the singular. In plaintiff's examples, the singular form is used because the legislature is identifying a category of harms  bodily injury, as opposed to death or loss. The fact that ORS 82.010(2)(f) uses the plural form  injuries  demonstrates that the legislature was not focusing on a category of harms but on injuries in a diverse, collective sense. In sum, we think that it is clear from text and context alone that the legislature used the term injuries in ORS 82.010(2)(f) to refer to any violation of a legal right. It follows that the money judgment at issue here  damages for injuries to plaintiff that resulted from medical negligence  is subject to the interest rate provided in ORS 82.010(2)(f). Plaintiff argues, finally, that the trial court erred in applying ORS 82.010(2)(f) to her money judgment because that provision violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. Article I, section 20, provides: No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens. However, we are unpersuaded by plaintiff's arguments and do not think that they warrant an extensive discussion. The trial court did not err. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed. DURHAM, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which WALTERS, J., joined. WALTERS, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which DURHAM, J., joined. DURHAM, J., dissenting. The trial jury in this wrongful death action returned a verdict for plaintiff that included an award of $1 million in noneconomic damages. After the court dismissed the jury, the court granted the motion of defendant Peace-Health to reduce that part of the jury's award to $500,000 pursuant to ORS 31.710. [1] That statute places an upper limit, or cap, of $500,000 on the noneconomic damages award in any civil action seeking damages arising out of bodily injury, including    death    of any one person   . Plaintiff argues that the elimination of one-half of the jury's noneconomic damages award pursuant to ORS 31.710 constitutes an interference with her right to a trial by jury under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides: In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate. According to plaintiff, this action is a civil case within the meaning of the constitutional phrase all civil cases and, as a result, the trial court's action of cutting the jury's noneconomic damages award in half undermines plaintiff's jury trial right. The majority disagrees with that argument because, the majority contends, the common law did not recognize, in 1857 or now, a right to unlimited damages in wrongful death actions   . 344 Or. at 157, 178 P.3d at 234. The majority also asserts that wrongful death in Oregon is purely statutory and has no secure basis in the common law as it existed in 1857   . Id. at 156, 178 P.3d at 233. Consequently, according to the majority, the legislature is free to impose any cap that it desires on plaintiff's statutory wrongful death damages. The majority's focus on the specific claim at issue here and whether a plaintiff had a common-law right to unlimited damages on that claim in 1857 is too narrow and, consequently, is not accurate. This court has held that the constitutional jury trial right refers to the historically recognized civil jurisdiction of the courts of law and their traditional practice of trying actions at law before juries. The constitutional right does not turn narrowly on whether, at statehood, the common law recognized a particular claim or cause of action, as the majority contends. Justice Walters also concludes that the majority's reasoning and result violate Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. I agree with that conclusion. I write separately to draw attention to an aspect of this court's case law under that provision that requires a different analysis and result from that offered by the majority. To begin, the majority can take no solace in its observations that plaintiff had    a [jury] trial and that wrongful death cases always have been tried to a jury. 344 Or. at 156 n. 12, 178 P.3d at 233 n. 12. If this action is one to which the constitutional right to trial by jury attaches, Article I, section 17, prohibits the legislature from interfering with the full effect of a jury's assessment of noneconomic damages   . Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or. 62, 78, 987 P.2d 463 (1999). Under Article I, section 17, the legislature may not create a scheme, applicable to a constitutionally protected jury trial, under which the court must cut in half a jury's verdict for noneconomic damages to satisfy a legislative cap. The jury trial right, as this court has held, includes having a jury determine all issues of fact, not just those issues that remain after the legislature has narrowed the claims process. Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or. 290, 297-98, 744 P.2d 992 (1987). The majority likewise inhibits rather than advances a correct interpretation of Article I, section 17, by relying heavily on Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 906 P.2d 789 (1995), for the view that the legislature, consistently with Article I, section 17, may impose a cap on a jury's verdict for noneconomic damages because the legal action in question  wrongful death  exists by reason of a statute. That reliance is erroneous for two reasons. First, this court in Lakin reexamined and rejected a key conclusion in Greist, i.e., that Oregon courts historically had authority to reduce the amount of a jury's verdict over the objection of the aggrieved party. Lakin concluded that that authority did not exist. 329 Or. at 76, 987 P.2d 463. That flawed conclusion in Greist was the basis for the court's determination that no jury trial right applied in wrongful death proceedings. 322 Or. at 295, 906 P.2d 789. Because that determination was legally unfounded, this court cannot any longer assume without deciding, as Greist did, that a wrongful death action is of like nature to a personal injury action to which the right of jury trial attaches. [2] Second, by declaring that Greist was distinguishable, Lakin, 329 Or. at 77, 987 P.2d 463, the Lakin court concluded only that Greist provided no assistance to the resolution of the jury trial issue in Lakin; the court did not endorse, and had no occasion to endorse, the view stated in Greist that the statutory nature of an action at law, such as a wrongful death, eliminates the constitutional right to a jury trial. Other case law, that Greist never cited or discussed, shows the error of that view. What, then, is the correct understanding of the scope of legal disputes to which the constitutional phrase all civil cases applies? In addressing that question, it is important to recall that Article VII (Amended), section 3, states, in part, that [i]n actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $750, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved   . (Emphasis added.) In Molodyh, this court described the latter provision as an implied limitation on the range of civil cases to which Article I, section 17 applied and confirmed that the jury trial right does not apply literally in all civil matters. 304 Or. at 295, 744 P.2d 992. Molodyh concerned a contract action regarding an insurance policy. Using the more recently adopted terminology in Article VII (Amended), section 3, the Molodyh court expressed the interpretive principle regarding the claimed jury trial right as follows: [A]s long as this form of dispute is tried as an action at law, a jury trial is required. Id. at 297, 744 P.2d 992 (emphasis added). Each constitutional provision provides helpful context for the determination of the meaning of the other. Although Article VII (Amended) creates a $750 value in controversy qualification on the jury trial right, it appears that the forms of disputes that the two constitutional provisions address, i.e., civil cases and actions at law, are substantively identical. This court's case law, discussed below, confirms the correctness of that interpretation. Article I, section 17, was a part of the original Oregon Constitution. This court's early cases construing that provision recited that it preserved the right to jury trial as it existed at or before statehood, but gave no clear indication of the nature of the civil cases to which the jury trial right attached before statehood. See, e.g., Deane v. Willamette Bridge Co., 22 Or. 167, 169, 29 P. 440 (1892) (This provision of the constitution creates no new right to trial by jury. It simply secures to suitors the right to trial by jury in all cases where that right existed at the time the constitution was adopted.). This court explained the reach of Article I, section 17, in 1927 in State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car et al., 120 Or. 254, 251 P. 701 (1927). In 1920 Studebaker, police had arrested plaintiff's husband after they discovered that he had been driving her car while carrying a container of liquor on his person. A grand jury refused to indict him for any crime. The wife had no knowledge that her husband had used her car to transport intoxicating liquor. Nevertheless, the state commenced a statutory proceeding in rem to forfeit the vehicle to the state, because the husband had used it to transport a bottle of liquor. The statute authorized the wife to enter the forfeiture proceeding as a defendant by filing a statement of her interest in the property as well as any ground for a defense to forfeiture. The wife did so. The statute also expressly authorized the circuit court to try the forfeiture proceeding without a jury. Id. at 257, 251 P. 701. The question before the court was whether that provision deprived the wife of her right under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution to try the statutory forfeiture proceeding before a jury. The court began by reciting, as it had in previous cases, the broad proposition that the state constitution preserved the right to jury trial as it had existed at statehood: The right of trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution of this state, embraces every case where it existed before the adoption of the Constitution, and it is not within the power of the legislature to enact any law which deprives any litigant of that right. Hence if as contended for here, this appellant before the adoption of the Constitution of this state, in having the question determined of whether her property should be forfeited, would have been entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right, then this act, since it deprives her of such right, is unconstitutional and void   . Id. at 259, 251 P. 701 (citations omitted). The court then concluded that a forfeiture of property was analogous to the imposition of a penalty for a violation of law and that, traditionally, jury trials had accompanied efforts of the legal authorities to judicially enforce penalties, including in the context of felony criminal proceedings. The court then explained the three-part division of Oregon's courts at statehood that provided the specific context for the constitutional right to jury trials in all civil cases: At the time when our state Constitution was adopted, courts were classified according to the nature and extent of their jurisdiction, their forms of proceeding, or the principles upon which they administered justice, either as courts of admiralty, courts of equity, or courts of law. Controversies concerning forfeitures of rights or property could be adjudicated only in some one or more of these courts, since in this country there were no other courts in which controversies of that nature could be adjudicated. Id. at 261, 251 P. 701. The court explained that, in courts of admiralty and courts of equity, no constitutional jury trial right applied: Courts of admiralty had jurisdiction to enforce forfeitures, without the aid or presence of a jury, but its jurisdiction was limited to cases arising under the admiralty or maritime law, and it never had jurisdiction to enforce a forfeiture where the seizure was made on land. Courts of equity have always refused to lend their aid to the enforcement of a forfeiture, `It is a well-settled and familiar doctrine,' says Professor Pomeroy, `that a court of equity will not interfere on behalf of the party entitled thereto, and enforce a forfeiture, but will leave him to his legal remedies, if any, even though the case might be one in which no equitable relief would be given to the defaulting party against the forfeiture. The few apparent exceptions to this doctrine are not real exceptions, since they all depend upon other rules and principles.   There are, in fact, no exceptions to this doctrine; those which appear to be exceptions are not so in realty.' 1 Pom. Eq. Juris (3 ed.), §§ 459, 460. Id. at 261-62, 251 P. 701. The court distinguished courts of equity and admiralty from courts of law, in which the right to trial by jury, by tradition, did apply: Courts of law administer justice according to the rules of the common law, and are held for the trial of civil causes with the presence and aid of a jury, and where there are issues of fact to be determined, the trial ordinarily must be by jury. Id. at 262, 251 P. 701. The phrase rules of the common law was a reference to the jurisdiction of the law courts (as opposed to courts of equity or admiralty) under the English and American common-law systems. That phrase did not refer only to specific claims or causes of action cognizable under the common law. The court made that point clear in a succeeding passage that addressed and rejected the state's argument that the statutory character of the forfeiture proceeding, and its enactment after adoption of the state constitution, precluded any constitutional right to jury trial: It is argued that these proceedings concern matters in respect to prohibitory laws enacted since the adoption of the Constitution, and for that reason are not within the guarantee of the Constitution, and that controversies concerning violations of them may be disposed of by the courts in any manner the legislature sees fit to adopt. The answer to this contention is, that the constitutional right of trial by jury is not to be narrowly construed, and is not limited strictly to those cases in which it had existed before the adoption of the Constitution, but is to be extended to cases of like nature as they may hereafter arise.         It is contended, however, that because the procedure authorized by this act is a special statutory proceeding in rem against certain specific offending property, it is a proceeding unknown to the common law, and therefore does not entitle the claimant or owner of the property sought to be forfeited to a jury trial. Where, as in this case, the seizure was made on land, and a libel or information was filed to condemn the seized property, which as in this case was purely a proceeding in rem, the rule before the adoption of the Constitution was and still is, that the suit is at common law, and that the claimants or owners of the property are entitled to a jury trial before a judgment can be passed forfeiting the seized property. Id. at 263-64, 251 P. 701 (emphasis added). The court also confirmed that the relevant inquiry is whether, under the traditional scheme of the common law, the underlying dispute would be resolved by a court of admiralty, a court of equity, or a court of law: In 12 R.C.L., page 133, in stating the law applicable to forfeitures, the authors say: `In the trial of all cases of seizure, on land or on waters not navigable, the court sits as a court of common law, and as in all cases at common law where there are issues of fact to be determined, the trial must be by jury. In cases however of seizure made on navigable waters the court sits as a court of admiralty, and, as in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction generally, it is settled that the trial is to be by the court. Although the two jurisdictions are vested in the same tribunal, they are as distinct from each other as if they were vested in different tribunals, and can no more be blended than a court of chancery with a court of common law.' Id. at 265-66, 251 P. 701. The court then applied the analysis that it had set out. There was no contention that the forfeiture proceeding belonged in a court of admiralty, because the seizure of the car was made on land. After lengthy discussion, the court concluded that the statutory proceeding did not invoke the remedial jurisdiction of a court of equity. That is, the statutory proceeding sought the divestment of the wife's property, not an injunction to restrain an illegal use of property. The fact that the statutory proceeding involved an action against the property itself did not alter that conclusion: The fact that because the proceedings authorized under this act are in rem and not in personam does not change the character of the suit from that of a commonlaw action into a suit in equity, nor does it affect the question of the right of the owner to a trial by jury in this case. Id. at 269, 251 P. 701. The court ultimately concluded that the wife had a state constitutional right to a jury trial in the statutory forfeiture proceeding. The court declared that the legislature's requirement that the court should try the proceeding without a jury was merely surplusage, and beyond the power of the legislature to enact   . Id. at 271, 251 P. 701. The court remanded the case for a new trial before a jury. [3] This court has cited and followed 1920 Studebaker consistently since 1927. Not once has this court reconsidered or withdrawn any aspect of the reasoning or result in that case, and it remains today as the most detailed examination in our case law of the classes of proceedings to which the right to jury trial applies under Article I, section 17. Yet, the majority cites 1920 Studebaker, but fails to follow the analysis in that case, and ultimately concludes, in direct opposition to 1920 Studebaker's holding, that the statutory nature of a wrongful death proceeding precludes any right to a jury trial. That answer simply ignores the analytical approach that our case law requires. Any analysis of the question whether the jury trial right applies here must begin with the statute that describes the wrongful death action, ORS 30.020, which provides, in part: (1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the decedent, for the benefit of the decedent's surviving spouse, surviving children, surviving parents and other individuals, if any, who under the law of intestate succession of the state of the decedent's domicile would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the decedent, and for the benefit of any stepchild or stepparent whether that stepchild or stepparent would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the decedent or not, may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might have maintained an action, had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the same act or omission. The action shall be commenced within three years after the injury causing the death of the decedent is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered by the decedent, by the personal representative or by a person for whose benefit the action may be brought under this section if that person is not the wrongdoer.      (2) In an action under this section damages may be awarded in an amount which: (a) Includes reasonable charges necessarily incurred for doctors' services, hospital services, nursing services, other medical services, burial services and memorial services rendered for the decedent; (b) Would justly, fairly and reasonably have compensated the decedent for disability, pain, suffering and loss of income during the period between injury to the decedent and the decedent's death; (c) Justly, fairly and reasonably compensates for pecuniary loss to the decedent's estate; (d) Justly, fairly and reasonably compensates the decedent's spouse, children, stepchildren, stepparents and parents for pecuniary loss and for loss of the society, companionship and services of the decedent; and (e) Separately stated in finding or verdict, the punitive damages, if any, which the decedent would have been entitled to recover from the wrongdoer if the decedent had lived. In ORS 30.020, the legislature has created a statutory extension of the traditional common-law claim for personal injury to authorize a recovery of damages by the injured party's family members when the injury is so severe that it results in death. The vehicle for that recovery is an action against the wrongdoer. ORS 30.020(1). The authorized remedy is an award of noneconomic, economic, and punitive damages against the wrongdoer. ORS 30.020(2). ORS 30.020 embodies an action at law and a civil case within the meaning of the jury trial guarantees in our state constitution. Or. Const., Art. I, § 17; Art. VII (Amended), § 3. Stated differently, the courts of law established in the common law before statehood would have addressed the action at law that the wrongful death statute authorizes, and would have tried the action to a jury. In no sense is that action one that would have been addressed at common law by courts of equity or courts of admiralty. It is unnecessary to decide whether the common law recognized, before statehood, a specific tort claim for wrongful death. The jury trial right, according to 1920 Studebaker, extends to actions at law that were known at statehood and also to cases of like nature that may arise after statehood. The legislature has complete authority, for example, to authorize injured parties to bring a statutorily defined action at law in Oregon courts to recover damages from a tortfeasor for causing a wrongful death. Such a statutory action at law is a case of like nature to an ordinary common-law tort claim in which the injured party can recover a similar range of damages, even though the injury stops short of causing death. Properly interpreted, the constitutional right to a jury trial applies to the trial of each of those actions at law. The majority errs in concluding that the application of the statutory damages cap in ORS 31.710 to the jury's verdict here is consistent with plaintiff's right to jury trial. Lakin explains why application of a damages cap interferes with full effect of a jury's assessment of damages in an action at law. 329 Or. at 78, 987 P.2d 463. By the same reasoning, the conclusion is inescapable that cutting the jury's noneconomic damages in half, pursuant to a statutory damages cap, constitutes a deprivation of the constitutional right to jury trial. Jensen v. Whitlow, 334 Or. 412, 51 P.3d 599 (2002), is not to the contrary. This court stressed repeatedly in that case that it was resolving a facial challenge to a statute, ORS 30.265(1), that eliminated a tort remedy against an individual public employee tortfeasor and substituted instead a capped damages remedy against the public body that employed the tortfeasor. Before addressing the jury trial issue under Article I, section 17, the court determined that the statute survived a facial challenge under the Remedy Clause in Article I, section 10. That was so because, in at least some cases, a damages award below the statutory cap against the public body would constitute a sufficient remedy under Article I, section 10. Id. at 421, 51 P.3d 599. Turning to the jury trial issue, the court repeated that, in the context of the facial challenge, the statute had permissibly eliminated the tort remedy against the individual tortfeasors. As a result, the plaintiff had no cognizable claim against those defendants. The court stated: It follows that there is no claim to which a right to a jury trial can attach. Thus, ORS 30.265(1), on its face, does not violate Article I, section 17. Id. at 422, 51 P.3d 599. In the present case, it is uncontested that ORS 30.020 does authorize an action at law by plaintiff against defendants for wrongful death. Thus, the premise for the Jensen court's response, on a facial challenge, under Article I, section 17, is absent here. It must also be noted that Jensen repeated a quotation from Lakin that purported to present a shorthand version of the holding in Molodyh, limiting the jury trial right to `civil actions for which the common law provided a jury trial when the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857[.]' Jensen, 334 Or. at 422, 51 P.3d 599 (quoting Lakin, and noting that Lakin cited Molodyh ) (brackets in Jensen ). That shortened version does not describe the rule in Molodyh accurately, because it omits cases of like nature from the scope of the right of jury trial. The majority repeats that error here. The accurate quotation from Molodyh is: This court also has stated that a jury trial is guaranteed only in those classes of cases in which the right was customary at the time the constitution was adopted or in cases of like nature.  Molodyh, 304 Or. at 295, 744 P.2d 992 (emphases added). For that proposition, Molodyh cited three cases, including 1920 Studebaker. Id. The cases of like nature aspect of the state constitutional jury trial right thus has been settled law in Oregon for at least 80 years. In order to provide some semblance of reasoning to support its result, the majority takes several odd steps that do not withstand scrutiny. First, the majority cites but fails to engage in any analysis of the key authorities that support recognition of the jury trial right here: 1920 Studebaker and Molodyh. Next, as noted, the majority relies extensively on statements about legislative and judicial authority to limit damage awards in Greist that this court undermined and abandoned in Lakin. The majority then asserts that plaintiff seeks to use the constitutional jury trial right to create or retain a substantive claim or theory of recovery. That is not accurate. ORS 30.020 grants plaintiff authority to bring the action at law that she had brought and that action closely resembles other actions at law that, at Oregon's statehood, were traditionally accorded a jury trial in the courts of law. The majority's unsuccessful search for an exact match at common law for the current statutory wrongful death action at law disregards 1920 Studebaker and incorrectly narrows the intended flexible application of the jury trial right to actions at law of like nature that Oregon law may recognize after statehood. The correct question  whether the statutory wrongful death action is, in constitutional terms, a civil case and an action at law, or a case of like nature  is one that the majority never addresses. Oregon's constitution commits this state to protecting the right to jury trial in all civil cases and in all actions at law where the controversy exceeds $750 in value. In a textual command that should have particular significance for the judiciary, Article I, section 17, declares that the right of jury trial shall remain inviolate. Those three words, written at statehood by the framers, is a candid acknowledgment that, over time, assaults on the right to jury trial will come not only through efforts at overt withdrawal, as in 1920 Studebaker, but also through the indirect effects of statutes and rules that condition and qualify the right by more subtle means. Those words charge the judiciary with an important duty: to guard the people's right to jury trial against erosion, including from complex statutory schemes that enjoy the support of powerful legislative majorities. Unlike other constitutional provisions, for which the framers intended a fixed and inflexible application over time, the right of jury trial is, and was meant to be, timeless. The right applies to actions at law never imagined, let alone legally recognized, at statehood. The majority violates the true conception of the right to jury trial by confining it to nonstatutory claims that Oregon law recognized before statehood. Qualifications of that sort have no basis in the constitutional text or in our precedents that govern the right to jury trial. I cannot join in their creation here. Because plaintiff's challenge to the statutory damages cap under Article I, section 17 is well taken, I do not address plaintiff's challenge to the damages cap under the Remedy Clause in Article I, section 10. I respectfully dissent. WALTERS, J., joins in this dissent. WALTERS, J., dissenting. The right of trial by jury occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935), that it can be said to define our system of justice. So central is the right to jury trial that this court should not retreat from principles it has recognized as essential to the preservation of that right without doing so directly and with clear justification. Because the majority has so retreated, I must dissent. Since 1927 the court has consistently held that the right to jury trial is not to be narrowly construed and is not limited strictly to those cases in which it had existed before the adoption of the Constitution, but is to be extended to cases of like nature as they may hereafter arise. State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car et al, 120 Or. 254, 263, 251 P. 701 (1927) (emphasis added). Accord Jensen v. Whitlow, 334 Or. 412, 421, 51 P.3d 599 (2002); Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or. 62, 82, 987 P.2d 463 (1999); Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 293, 906 P.2d 789 (1995); Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or. 290, 295, 744 P.2d 992 (1987); Cornelison v. Seabold, 254 Or. 401, 404-05, 460 P.2d 1009 (1969). In 1999, in Lakin, the court unanimously held that the right to jury trial is a right of substance that withstands legislative interference. 329 Or. at 82, 987 P.2d 463. The court held that a plaintiff with a right to jury trial has the right to have the jury determine the facts in the case, including the amount of damages to be awarded, and that a statutory cap on damages unconstitutionally limits the jury's fact-finding ability. The court explained the reach of its holding as follows: We conclude that Article I, section 17, prohibits the legislature from interfering with the full effect of a jury's assessment of noneconomic damages, at least as to civil cases in which the right to jury trial was customary in 1857, or in cases of like nature.  329 Or. at 78, 987 P.2d 463 (emphasis added). Thus, the appropriate paradigm for analysis of the issue presented here is straightforward: Is an action for negligently caused death of like nature to other negligence actions for which the right to jury trial existed at common law? If so, the plaintiff has a right to jury trial, and Article I, section 17, prohibits the legislature from interfering with the jury's fact-finding ability and assessment of damages. The majority begins correctly and states plaintiff's assertion plainly: [Plaintiff's] wrongful death action is `of like nature' to an ordinary common-law personal injury action. 344 Or. at 155, 178 P.3d at 233. Then, without directly addressing that assertion, and without a bow to the step it skips, the majority questions whether plaintiff has the same right to a jury determination of damages, unfettered by legislative or judicial interference, that a plaintiff in an ordinary personal injury action enjoys under this court's Article I, section 17, decision in Lakin.  344 Or. at 155, 178 P.3d at 233 (emphasis omitted). Without deciding that plaintiff does not have a right to trial by jury, the majority concludes that she does not have a right to have a jury assess her damages [b]ecause the common law does not, and did not in 1857, recognize a right to unlimited damages in wrongful death actions[.] 344 Or. at 156-57, 178 P.3d at 234. The new bar the majority raises subverts both the principle that the right to jury trial is not confined to actions recognized at common law and the principle that the right to jury trial is a right of substance with which the legislature cannot interfere. In 1857 there was ordinarily a right to jury trial for causes of action tried to courts of law. 1920 Studebaker, 120 Or. at 262, 251 P. 701. At that time, courts were classified as either courts of admiralty, courts of equity, or courts of law: At the time when our state Constitution was adopted, courts were classified according to the nature and extent of their jurisdiction, their forms of proceeding, or the principles upon which they administered justice, either as courts of admiralty, courts of equity, or courts of law. Id. at 261, 251 P. 701. Cases tried to courts of admiralty or courts of equity could be tried to a judge, but juries ordinarily determined issues of fact in actions at law: Courts of law administer justice according to the rules of the common law, and are held for the trial of civil causes with the presence and aid of a jury, and where there are issues of fact to be determined, the trial ordinarily must be by jury. Id. at 262, 251 P. 701. In 1920 Studebaker, the state seized an automobile that had been used to transport liquor and brought a case in rem against the vehicle seeking its forfeiture. The state brought suit pursuant to a statute that was enacted after 1857, which permitted trial to the court, without a jury. The owner of the car protested, claiming that the statute violated her right to jury trial under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. The state and the dissent argued that the statute created a special in rem procedure unknown at common law and that the action was not, therefore, within the jury trial guarantee of the constitution. The dissent stated its position succinctly: It would seem that the power which created the proceeding could also prescribe the procedure. 120 Or. at 276, 251 P. 701 (Coshow, J., dissenting). The majority view, the prevailing view, was that the right to jury trial was not limited to actions recognized prior to 1857. The court reasoned that the right to jury trial extends to cases of like nature to those that existed before the adoption of the constitution, and that the legislature does not have the prerogative to eliminate the litigants' rights to jury trial in such actions. The court held that because the new statutory action was not an action in admiralty or equity, but was a species of forfeiture actions, which were tried to juries at common law, the car owner had a right to have a jury determine the facts. Id. at 264, 269, 251 P. 701. In 1987, the court relied on that 1927 case when it considered the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, included in a fire insurance policy, that an appraiser determine the amount of loss. Molodyh, 304 Or. at 295, 744 P.2d 992. The court held that the Oregon Constitution mandates a jury trial in those classes of cases in which the right was customary at the time the constitution was adopted or in cases of like nature.  Id. (emphases added). The court considered the insureds' action to recover their losses to be in the same class of cases as a contract action and reasoned that as long as this form of dispute is tried as an action at law, a jury trial is required. Id. at 296-97, 744 P.2d 992. The Molodyh court explained the meaning of the right to jury trial: This right includes having a jury determine all issues of fact, not just those issues that remain after the legislature has narrowed the claims process. Id. at 297-98, 744 P.2d 992. Applying those principles here is not difficult. A wrongful death action is an action at law and it is therefore in the same class of cases as other actions at law for which Article I, section 17, guarantees a right to jury trial. [1] Furthermore, a wrongful death action is simply a negligence action in which the injury ultimately results in death. A wrongful death claim is one that the decedent might have maintained   , had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the same act or omission. ORS 30.020(1). That claim may arise while the decedent is still alive, and it arises where the injurious act, and not the death, occurs. See Howell v. Willamette Urology, P.C., 344 Or. 124, 129, 130, 178 P.3d 229, 230, 2008 WL 384189, at  (2008) (so stating). [T]he purpose of a wrongful death action is to remove death as a bar to bringing the claim, not to make death the central event of the action. Id. at 129, 178 P.3d at 228-29, 2008 WL 384189, at . The majority does not reject my conclusion that a wrongful death action is of like nature to a common-law negligence action. Instead, the majority states that, in the case at bar, there is no separate question respecting trial by jury because plaintiff tried her case to a jury and so far as we are aware, wrongful death cases always have been tried to a jury. 344 Or. at 156 n. 12, 178 P.3d at 233 n. 12. The majority also refers to any right to a jury trial that plaintiff might have[,] indicating that it may agree that plaintiff does have a right to jury trial. 344 Or. at 157, 178 P.3d at 233. The majority's refusal to directly state and confront the obvious conclusion that a wrongful death plaintiff has a right to jury trial allows it to sidestep the logical implication of that conclusion. A plaintiff who has a right to jury trial has a right to have the jury decide all the facts in that action, including damages, without legislative limitation. Lakin, 329 Or. at 82, 987 P.2d 463. Logically, then, if plaintiff in the case at bar has a right to jury trial, she has the right to have the jury assess the full extent of her damages without legislative interference. The majority avoids that result, not by concluding that plaintiff does not have a right to jury trial, but by declaring that plaintiff does not have a different right: a right to unlimited damages. 344 Or. at 156-57, 178 P.3d at 234 (emphasis added). The majority states: Because the common law does not, and did not in 1857, recognize a right to unlimited damages in wrongful death actions, the only relevant source of substantive law respecting damages is the statutory law, which expressly places a cap on noneconomic damages. Id. If, as the majority opines, the common law did not recognize wrongful death actions at all in 1857, [2] the common law could not possibly have recognized the measure of damages in such actions. But because the right to jury trial extends to actions that were not recognized by the common law in 1857, that right also extends to actions in which the measure of damages had not been determined in 1857. The court in Lakin did not decide that the plaintiff had a right to have a jury determine his damages because a plaintiff in an ordinary negligence action had a right to unlimited damages in 1857. The court decided that the plaintiff had a right to have a jury determine his damages because the amount of those damages was a question of fact and, throughout history, it was the function of the jury, not the legislature, to decide questions of fact. 329 Or. at 73, 987 P.2d 463. The court reached its conclusion because `[t]he amount of damages    from the beginning of trial by jury, was a fact to be found by the jurors.' Id. (quoting Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 6, 24 (1935)). The majority quotes Jensen for the proposition that Article I, section 17, is not a source of law that creates or retains a substantive claim or theory of recovery in favor of any party. 334 Or. at 422, 51 P.3d 599. I agree that Article I, section 17, does not create a right to bring a wrongful death action. By the same token, Article I, section 17, does not create a right to bring a common-law negligence action. A plaintiff in a wrongful death action brings suit pursuant to ORS 30.020. A plaintiff in an ordinary negligence action relies on the common law to bring that claim. In both instances, plaintiffs' rights to bring their claims arise from sources of law outside of Article I, section 17. Similarly, the measure of damages for both actions is determined by sources outside Article I, section 17. Because both actions are actions at law, of like nature, both plaintiffs have the right to have a jury determine the facts in those actions  including damages  without legislative interference. The majority follows its quote from Jensen with the statement that, [u]nder that rule, plaintiff is entitled to a jury's determination of her damages, both in type and amount, only to the extent that    the statute[ ] pertaining to her claim so provides. 344 Or. at 155, 178 P.3d at 233. The majority does not explain, however, why that is so, and it is not logic that compels that conclusion. The rule that Article I, section 17, does not grant a plaintiff a right to bring a claim does not speak to, much less dictate, whether a plaintiff who does have a right to bring a claim also has the right to have a jury determine her damages in that claim. Article I, section 17, is not the source of any claim, statutory or common law, but it is the source of the right to jury trial. In Lakin, the statute pertaining to plaintiff's claim imposed a limitation on the damages he could receive. 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463 (considering ORS 18.560). But the court nevertheless held that statutory cap unconstitutional, not because the plaintiff had a right to damages rooted outside Article I, section 17, but because the plaintiff brought an action at law, and a jury, and not the legislature, must decide the facts in such an action. 329 Or. at 79, 82, 987 P.2d 463. The majority cites no other authority for its conclusion that, if the legislature gives birth to an action, the legislature can eliminate the constitutional right to have a jury decide the facts in that action. [3] Actually, the opposite has been true for nearly 100 years, the point with which I began my dissent. In 1920 Studebaker, the court considered and rejected the argument that the legislative power to prescribe an action included the power to preclude the jury from finding the facts in that action. 120 Or. at 263, 251 P. 701. In Molodyh, the applicable statute and the rights it provided were unknown at common law. Nevertheless, the plaintiff had a right to have a jury determine all issues of fact, not just those issues that remain after the legislature has narrowed the claims process. 304 Or. at 297-98, 744 P.2d 992. The majority disregards those cases and does not explain in any satisfactory way why it builds the cornerstone of our judicial system on the happenstance of whether an action was initially recognized by the courts or the legislature and in what year. [4] Our constitution does not hang the right to jury trial on such anomalies. It provides that the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate in all civil cases. Or. Const., Art. I, § 17. The right to trial by jury is not to be narrowly construed, and yet that is exactly the rule of construction the majority has adopted. In doing so, the majority raises questions about the future vitality of that most precious right. If we limit the substantive right to jury trial to those actions that existed in 1857, how, over time, will that right remain inviolate? Will not the court or the legislature be called upon to identify and redress new harms not known in 1857? Cannot the legislature, under the majority's decision, limit or eliminate the jury's right to decide the facts in those actions? How will the right to trial by jury remain robust in the days to come if the legislature can scale it back to times of old? The majority's reference to some other, undefined, right to a jury trial that plaintiff might have under Article I, section 17, 344 Or. at 157, 178 P.3d at 234 (emphasis added), provides scant consolation. The 12 in whom our constitution places its trust are the 12 who hear each word spoken from the stand, and the silences between. They are the 12 whose eyes watch others' eyes and take their measure. By their absence, legislators cannot fill that role. Legislators may decide the categories of harm the state should address and the categories of persons who may bring claims in courts of law. But only jurors can shake right out from wrong for individual human beings and do them justice. Since long before 1857 it has been the role of the jury to find the facts, including the fact of damages, in civil actions at law. The constitution requires that the jury's historical fact-finding function continue in the future and remain inviolate. I respectfully dissent. DURHAM, J., joins in this dissent.