Opinion ID: 545289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equal Protection Argument

Text: 14 Defendant's second appellate argument is that the Sentencing Guidelines provision requiring those convicted and sentenced to pay the costs of their incarceration, Guidelines Sec. 5E1.2(i), violates equal protection principles. 2 Brief of Appellant at 4. Doyan's argument is that requiring convicts to pay the costs of confinement amounts to an irrational and arbitrary classification, impermissibly burdening a narrow group of citizens. 3 The government argues that defense counsel failed to raise this constitutional argument below. Although as a rule, [i]ssues not raised in the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal, United States v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971, 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860, 107 S.Ct. 208, 93 L.Ed.2d 138 (1986), we choose to address briefly defendant's equal protection argument in the interests of clarifying the application of the Sentencing Guidelines and the fundamental nature of the constitutional claim asserted. 15 Our analysis of the constitutionality of a Sentencing Guidelines provision begins with the understanding that a strong presumption of constitutionality attends a law which has been produced by the solemn prerequisites of Congressional enactment and Presidential approval. United States v. Belgard, 694 F.Supp. 1488, 1494 (D.Or.1988), aff'd., 894 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.1990), citing, inter alia, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2771-72, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980). Where a federal statute neither abridges a fundamental right, nor imposes a suspect classification, we apply a rational basis test to determine whether the statute has a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Vanater v. Village of South Point, 717 F.Supp. 1236, 1244 (S.D.Ohio 1989). Rational basis scrutiny is appropriate in the present case because the constitutional claim concerning the fine implicates no fundamental constitutional right on the part of convicted felons to have the costs of their imprisonment and supervision paid by the taxpayers. 4 Nor is there any suggestion that the contested fine has been imposed on the basis of a suspect classification such as race. See generally, ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Sec. 18.8 at 382 (1986) (classifications based on race or national origin are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny). 16 The narrow question before us, therefore, is whether requiring such reimbursement from a convicted felon for the costs of his incarceration and supervision bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1405, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). Clearly, the federal government, has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons--rich and poor--who violate its criminal laws. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2071, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). Whether the purpose of the contested fine is to punish, deter, or to spare the taxpayers a substantial expense that has been generated by an intentional criminal act, we cannot say that Guideline Sec. 5E1.2(i) as applied here bears no rational relation to the legitimate governmental interest in criminal justice. 17 AFFIRMED.