Opinion ID: 835026
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Ingle's surviving interests were adverse to Hohn's interests during the subsequent representation

Text: A conflict of interest exists under RPC 1.9(a) when the current client's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client. A conflict of interest exists under DR 5-105(C) when the interests of the current and former clients are in actual or likely conflict. An actual conflict of interest exists when the lawyer has a duty to contend for something on behalf of one client that the lawyer has a duty to oppose on behalf of another client. DR 5-105(A)(1). A 'likely conflict of interest' exists in all other situations in which the objective personal, business or property interests of the clients are adverse. DR 5-105(A)(2). A 'likely conflict of interest' does not include situations in which the only conflict is of a general economic or business nature. Id. So framed, the analysis under RPC 1.9(a) and DR 5-105(C) is not materially distinct. The Bar contends that Ingle's surviving interests and Hohn's interests were per se materially adverse and patently in conflict due to their former relationship as debtor and creditor. We agree. As previously discussed, Ingle's interests in the loan transactions as debtor -- i.e. , to minimize her legal debt as much as reasonably possible within the bounds of the law -- survived Ingle's death and were represented by her personal representative. ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 17-18). On the other hand, Hohn's interests as creditor in the debt collection were to maximize the amount that Ingle owed under the loans as much as was reasonable within the bounds of the law and to collect as much of that amount as possible. Those interests are different and adverse. See In re Wittemyer , 328 Or 448, 455, 980 P2d 148 (1999) (conflict of interest existed when a lawyer represented both the lender and borrower in a loan transaction); In re Moore , 299 Or 496, 506, 703 P2d 961 (1985) (debtor and creditor had different interests). Thus, Ingle's surviving interests and Hohn's interests were in likely conflict and materially adverse during the subsequent representation. The accused disagrees, contending that Ingle's and Hohn's interests were not adverse because the Bar failed to prove that Hohn actually sought to collect on any loans that were not just. According to the accused, the Bar's assertions that Hohn sought to collect on undocumented loans or loans beyond the statute of limitations are not supported by the record. The accused conflates adversity with injury. The rules against conflicts of interest require an attorney to assess whether the interests of the former and prospective new client are adverse at the time the attorney seeks to undertake the subsequent representation. Ingle's surviving interests and Hohn's interests as debtor and creditor were adverse from the outset. Whether the subsequent representation ultimately caused actual injury to Ingle is an inquiry relevant to sanctions, and not to whether Ingle and Hohn's interests are adverse or in conflict. See American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 7 (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) (defining actual and potential injury for purposes of sanctions). In sum, we find that the debt collection was significantly and substantially related to the loan transactions and Hohn's interests were in likely conflict with and materially adverse to Ingle's surviving interests during the subsequent representation. We therefore conclude that the accused violated both DR 5-105(C) and RPC 1.9(a) in the Ingle matter.