Opinion ID: 2670611
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hall’s Negligence

Text: Norris argues that by failing to determine who had the rightof-way at the intersection, the court failed to give proper consideration as to whether Hall’s contributory negligence should bar his recovery as a matter of law.
In actions brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, an appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong.29 [14] Where neither party requests that the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, if there is a conflict in the evidence, the appellate court in reviewing the judgment rendered will presume that the controverted facts were decided in favor of the successful party, and the findings will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.30 28 See Downey v. Western Comm. College Area, 282 Neb. 970, 808 N.W.2d 839 (2012). 29 Blaser, supra note 17. 30 C. Goodrich, Inc. v. Thies, 14 Neb. App. 170, 705 N.W.2d 451 (2005). Nebraska Advance Sheets 986 287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Court Findings The court found that “regardless which driver had the right[-]of[-]way, both drivers were negligent for approaching the intersection at a rate of speed that was too fast for the circumstances.” The court further found that Aden’s negligence was greater than that of Hall because Aden was familiar with the intersection, knew the intersection was completely blind, and believed traffic from the north was not required to stop, but entered the intersection at the maximum permissible speed.
Norris claims that the district court erred by failing to make a finding regarding whether Hall or Aden had the right-of-way. Norris argues that because the vehicles arrived at the intersection at approximately the same time, Aden had the right-ofway. Hall argues that the statutory right-of-way is only one factor to be used in evaluating a person’s conduct and that he complied with the applicable standard of care. He directs us to Hodgson v. Gladem,31 where we stated: The statutory right-of-way rule, if it is to be effective, must be accompanied by an observance by both parties of the rules applicable to the exercise of due care and in particular the duty to keep a lookout and make effective observations at a time when such observations can have an effect consonant with [the] underlying purpose of the rules. [15] The district court was not required to make a specific factual finding regarding the statutory right-of-way. In the absence of a request by a party for specific findings, a trial court is not required to make detailed findings of fact and need only make its findings generally for the prevailing party.32 Neither Norris nor any other party requested specific findings by the district court. Accordingly, the court was not obligated 31 Hodgson v. Gladem, 187 Neb. 736, 741, 193 N.W.2d 779, 782 (1972). 32 Lesser v. Eagle Hills Homeowners’ Assn., 20 Neb. App. 423, 824 N.W.2d 77 (2012). See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1127 (Reissue 2008). Nebraska Advance Sheets HALL v. COUNTY OF LANCASTER 987 Cite as 287 Neb. 969 to make a specific determination regarding which driver had the right-of-way.
Because no party requested specific findings of fact by the district court, we presume that any issue regarding the statutory right-of-way rule was decided in Hall’s favor. But because we remand for reallocation of the 20 percent of fault initially allocated to the County, we do not know whether the fault allocated to Norris will be equal to or greater than that allocated to Hall.