Opinion ID: 6984389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: O’Hea/m’s Reinstatement Viewed in Light of NRC Enforcement Policy and Prior Enforcement Actions

Text: The NRC, if faced with the Arbitrator’s findings as to O’Hearn’s actions, might well conclude that the Company would be unable to conduct licensed activities safely as long as O’Hearn was still employed. In particular, based on the Arbitrator’s findings one might argue that O’Hearn violated the NRC’s “Deliberate Misconduct Rule,” found at 10 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1): If the failure to report the alarm formed the basis of a violation of a Nuclear Safety Rule, subsection one would be violated, as it specifies that a licensee’s employee may not “[e]ngage in deliberate misconduct that causes ... a licensee ... to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order.” There is an even greater likelihood, however, that O’Hearn violated section 50.5(a)(2), which prohibits employees from “[djeliber-ately submitting] to the NRC [or its] licensee ... information that the person submitting the information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC.” 10 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(2). His deliberate submission of alarm information would be “material to the NRC” because, as the NRC has observed, “[information concerning the cause and response to security alarms is material to the determination the licensee must make regarding the adequacy of their security program pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 73.55, and is information relied upon by the NRC and reviewed during security inspections.” See Smith, IA 97-056, 1997 WL 896242. But even assuming that O’Hearn did commit such a deliberate omission, that fact is insufficient to establish that his reinstatement, after a thirty day suspension, would be in direct conflict with the public policy as expressed in the NRC regulations. Rather, the NRC’s previous enforcement decisions do not preclude the possibility that O’Hearn’s conduct, while unacceptable, would be categorized as a Severity Level III violation and result in a stern rebuke but not -a ban from future involvement in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC’s treatment of Donald Smith, supra, demonstrates this point. The decision not to ban Smith does not suggest that the ÑRC viewed Smith’s conduct lightly, or that no consequences flow from his wrongdoing. To the contrary, he was put' on clear notice that further wrongdoing would likely prevent his future eligibility for involvement in NRC-licensed activities. But the NRC’s course of action is significant here because, when faced with conduct similar to O’Hearn’s, the NRC did not conclude, as it has in other cases, that it “lack[ed] the requisite reasonable assurance that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s requirements and that the health and safety of the public would be protected” if Smith “were permitted ... to be involved in NRC-licensed activities.” See Barnhart, 1997 WL 896225. That conduct like Smith’s can — consistent with public policy as defined and interpreted by the NRC itself — escape terminal censure highlights our inability to conclude that public policy unequivocally proscribes reinstatement of an employee like O’Hearn. We simply cannot with reasonable certainty divine what result the NRC would reach in O’Hearn’s case if it were to evaluate it in the first instance. Our inability to do so precludes us from vacating the reinstatement award on the ground that its enforcement would unequivocally violate public policy. Looking, as we must, to “laws and legal precedents” rather than “general considerations of supposed public interests,” Pa- perworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted), and consistent with the analysis we have undertaken in this case, we can discern circumstances in which, despite an arbitrator’s decision to reinstate a nuclear plant employee, a judicial override of that decision on the ground that the employee is not “trustworthy and “rehable” would be warranted as a matter of public policy. For example, as NRC enforcement actions suggest, reinstatement may well be inappropriate for an employee who is habitually dishonest or who lies in an attempt to cover up criminal activity, particularly if it results in a conviction. See supra at [5712-13]. Moreover, in Iowa Electric, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to enforce an award reinstating an employee who had wilfully disregarded safety procedures that were not merely “in house procedures,” but rather rules that had been “put in place pursuant to a strict regulatory scheme devised by Congress for the protection of the public from the hazards of nuclear radiation.” 834 F.2d at 1428. None of these circumstances was present here: O’Hearn’s conduct strikes us as grossly negligent, not wilful, and his lies, while reprehensible, were one-time attempts to cover up his mistake, not a criminal past. If the NRC, at the Company’s request, had investigated the incident and determined that continued employment was incompatible with its “trustworthy” and “reliable” standard, that, too, would have constituted unequivocal evidence of a public policy prohibiting reinstatement. However, with the NRC regulations and precedents in their present posture, we are unable to conclude that Niagara Mohawk has met its burden of showing a clear and unequivocal public policy precluding reinstatement sufficient to override the arbitrator’s award. This is not, of course, to say that O’Hearn’s termination would offend public policy; as did the district court, we believe that O’Hearn’s dishonesty should not be countenanced. But the just cause for termination decision is a matter that the Company agreed to leave to the Arbitrator’s discretion. By now asking us to overturn that bargained-for decision on public policy grounds, the Company submits to a much more exacting standard of review, one that it has not met. We are not charged with exercising the NRC’s enforcement duties on its behalf. Rather, we are beholden to the “firmly-established, legislatively-entrenched policy favoring resolution of labor disputes through arbitration.” Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 45. That policy prevents us from overturning an arbitral award on public policy grounds unless it can be conclusively shown that a clearly defined and dominant public policy militates specifically against the award in question. Because such a showing has not been made here, the Company has not met its burden and -the Award must stand.