Opinion ID: 552796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good Conduct Time

Text: 5 Story alleges that the TDC improperly denied considering him for administrative good conduct time under the 1987 version of the PMA. He argues that he was eligible for such good conduct time under the 1983 version of the PMA, which was in effect on the date that he committed the offense, but not under the 1987 amendments. The state's retroactive application of the 1987 version of the PMA, he contends, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. Article I, Sec. 10, cl. 1. 6 The district court dismissed Story's administrative good conduct time claim without prejudice because [j]urisdiction over such a claim is based on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241, as distinguished from that available under [28 U.S.C.] Sec. 2254. The district court reasoned that in order [t]o entertain a petition for habeas corpus relief under Sec. 2241, the district court must have jurisdiction over the prisoner or his custodian at the time the petition is filed. Story is confined in the Wynne Unit of the TDC at Huntsville, Texas--a location outside of the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court, therefore, dismissed the claim without prejudice to Story's right to refile in the appropriate district court. 7 A prisoner may bring a claim for good conduct time under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (Sec. 2254 habeas petition is sole remedy for state prisoner seeking speedier release from imprisonment based on application of good conduct time). Section 2241, however, provides the general jurisdictional basis for federal courts to consider challenges to both state and federal judgments. Section 2254 specifically confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to consider collateral attacks on state court judgments, Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services, 458 U.S. 502, 509 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 3236 n. 9, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982), but Sec. 2241, rather than Sec. 2254, specifies the court in which a petition attacking a state court judgment must be brought. 8 Section 2241(a) provides that [w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. In Ahrens v. Clark, the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if the prisoner or his custodian is not confined within the district court's territorial boundaries. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443, 92 L.Ed. 1898 (1948). 9 This interpretation proved unfortunate, however, because the district court that has jurisdiction over the prisoner frequently is not the most convenient forum in which to entertain the prisoner's habeas petition. The necessary records and witnesses often are located near the sentencing court rather than the court with jurisdiction over the prisoner, and courts with prisons within their jurisdiction receive an inordinate proportion of habeas petitions. In response to this situation, Congress in 1966 passed 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(d). Section 2241(d) provides: 10 Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. 11 Section 2241(d) applies only to prisoners confined under the judgment of a state court. If the petitioner is a federal prisoner, or if the state sentencing court is in a different state from the prisoner or his custodian, the district court still must have jurisdiction over the prisoner or his custodian. In the instant case, the district court applied the rule applicable to federal prisoners to Story, who is confined under the judgment of a state court. Section 2241(d), however, directly applies to Story's petition. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas had jurisdiction over the Dallas state court that convicted Story, and thus had concurrent jurisdiction under Sec. 2241(d) and Sec. 2254 to entertain Story's claim that he should be considered for administrative good conduct time. 12 The state argued that the district court should not entertain Story's claim because that claim should have been the subject of a separate petition. If the state's contention is correct, we should affirm the district court's dismissal without prejudice on that basis. The state noted that Rule 2(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states: 13 A petition shall be limited to the assertion of a claim for relief against the judgment or judgments of a single state court (sitting in a county or other appropriate political subdivision). If a petitioner desires to attack the validity of the judgments of two or more state courts under which he is in custody or may be subject to future custody, as the case may be, he shall do so by separate petitions. 14 The state argued that the TDC, which calculates good conduct time, is the only authority attacked by Story's good conduct time claim. His other claims, they observe, attack the validity of the state court judgment. Under Rule 2(d), the state concludes, Story must bring his claim challenging the TDC's refusal to consider him for good conduct time in a separate petition. We disagree. 15 Story's habeas petition challenges only one judgment--the state court judgment of conviction for aggravated sexual assault. The TDC is not a state court, and the application of good conduct time is not a judgment. Story's good conduct time claim attacks the conditions of his restraint under his judgment of conviction for sexual assault. Story, therefore, was not required to bring his good conduct time claim in a separate petition. 16 Story's good conduct time claim, however, fails on the merits. If a state computes good conduct time on the basis of a law that became effective after the offense that resulted in the prisoner's incarceration, and if that computation is less favorable to the prisoner than the computation that he would have received under the law that was effective on the date that he committed the offense, the state violates the constitutional provision against ex post facto laws. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 966-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). 17 The Texas courts have concluded that retroactive application of the 1987 amendments to the PMA in order to deny consideration for administrative good conduct time to prisoners who otherwise would receive such consideration violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions. See Ex Parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (retroactive application of the 1987 amendment of the PMA is violative of the ex post facto clause and the applicant's eligibility for parole is to be determined in accordance with the version of [the PMA] in effect at the time of the offense for which he is convicted); Ex parte Ruiz, 750 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (the list of ineligible offenses contained in the 1987 amendments to the PMA may not be applied retroactively to one who committed his or her crime prior to the effective date of those amendments). 18 The 68th Texas legislature passed the PMA in 1983 as a stopgap measure to control prison overcrowding. When the TDC reaches an occupancy level of ninety-five percent, the PMA provides that certain classes of inmates become eligible for a grant of thirty days administrative good conduct time. The grant of good conduct time has the effect of advancing the date of the inmate's parole eligibility and the date on which the state is required to release the prisoner to mandatory supervision. Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d at 460. 19 The PMA in effect on or about June 17, 1985, the date on which Story committed the aggravated sexual assault, provided that prisoners may not receive administrative good conduct time if they are serving a sentence for an offense listed in Subdivision (1), Subsection (a), Section 3f, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965.... Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6184o, Sec. 2(b)(2) (Vernon 1983). The section to which the PMA refers lists offenses that disqualify an inmate for probation, and the PMA provides that prisoners convicted of those offenses also are ineligible for administrative good conduct time. Prior to the legislature's 1983 amendments, Sec. 3f(a)(1) referred to aggravated rape and did not refer to aggravated sexual assault. The legislature enacted the PMA in the same legislative session in which it amended Sec. 3f(a)(1) to include aggravated sexual assault. Story argues that the legislature intended for the PMA to refer to the unamended rather than the amended version of Sec. 3f(a)(1). 20 The magistrate rejected Story's good conduct time claim on the merits. The magistrate reasoned that the law that controlled Story's eligibility for parole at the time of his conviction was Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, Sec. 15(b) (Vernon 1983), rather than the PMA. Section 15(b) stated: 21 If a prisoner is serving a sentence for the offenses listed in Section 3f(a)(1) of this Article ..., he is not eligible for release on parole until his actual calendar time served, without consideration of good conduct time, equals one-third of the maximum sentence or 20 calendar years, whichever is less, but in no event shall he be eligible for release on parole in less than two calendar years. 22 The magistrate reasoned that this section sets the earliest date for which Story is eligible for parole at one-third of his maximum sentence without reference to good conduct time, and thus makes the computation of administrative good conduct time irrelevant. We agree that Sec. 15(b) sets the earliest date on which Story may be considered for parole, but disagree that Sec. 15(b) makes the computation of good conduct time irrelevant. Although Sec. 15(b) prohibits considering good conduct time in determining the earliest date on which a prisoner is eligible for parole, it does not prohibit the accumulation of good conduct time. Presumably, Story's accrued good conduct time will affect the date when the state must release him to mandatory supervision, even if it does not affect the date on which he is first eligible for parole. 1 23 Story errs, however, in asserting that the version of Sec. 3f(a)(1) to which the 1983 version of the PMA referred did not include aggravated sexual assault. The Texas legislature amended Sec. 3f(a)(1) in 1983, during the same session in which they enacted the PMA, and substituted the crime of aggravated sexual assault, which the legislature had just made a crime, for aggravated rape, which the legislature repealed. 2 The PMA had an effective date of August 29, 1983, and the amendments to Sec. 3f(a)(1) had an effective date of September 1, 1983. Story argues that the PMA refers to the version of Sec. 3f(a)(1) that existed prior to the 1983 amendments because the PMA became effective two days before the effective date of those amendments. We disagree. 24 Story places great importance on the fact that the PMA refers to Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965 and does not state 1965 as amended or 1965 amended. The legislature, however, clearly did not intend to refer to the unamended 1965 version of article 42.12. The 1965 version of article 42.12 did not contain a Sec. 3f or an applicable list of offenses. The critical question for this appeal is whether the legislature intended the statute to refer to the amended version of article 42.12 in effect before or after the 1983 amendments. The question is one of legislative intent, and the Texas courts have reasoned that: 25 Germane to judicial ascertainment of legislative intent are such matters as surrounding circumstances, legislative history, caption of the act and consequences of a particular construction, as well as a legislative mandate to reconcile, if possible, amendments to the same statute enacted at the same session. 26 Stanfield v. State, 718 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (citing Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. Secs. 311.023 and 311.025). 27 In Sec. 2(b)(2) of the PMA, the legislature provided that prisoners convicted of crimes for which probation was unavailable under Sec. 3f(a)(1) should not be eligible for administrative good conduct time. Story, however, would have us conclude that the legislature intended to refer to an outdated list of crimes that included aggravated rape, which the legislature had just repealed, and that did not include aggravated sexual assault, which the legislature had just enacted. In addition, Story's interpretation results in a different list of crimes for determining who may receive probation than for determining who may receive administrative good conduct time, contrary to the legislature's apparent intent. The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the PMA, and the consequences of accepting Story's construction of that statute, indicate that the legislature did not intend such a result. We conclude that the 1983 legislature intended the PMA to refer to the version of Sec. 3f(a)(1) that it had just amended rather than the superseded version. 28 Story correctly observes, however, that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a recent unpublished, per curiam opinion decided that a prisoner convicted of aggravated sexual assault in 1985 should be considered for administrative good conduct time. See Ex parte Luther Malone, 757 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, provides that unpublished Texas opinions may not be cited as authority by counsel or by a court, and such unpublished opinions have no value as precedent. Tex.R.App.P. 90(i) (West 1989); Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Banque de Paris Et Des Pays-Bas, 889 F.2d 674, 675 (5th Cir.1989). The Malone court's short per curiam opinion not only is not authority for Story's position, it is not persuasive on the issue of whether the 1983 version of the PMA referred to aggravated sexual assault. The Malone court assumed, without discussion, that the version of Sec. 3f(a)(1) in effect in 1983 did not include aggravated sexual assault. Our examination of the applicable statute, however, indicates the contrary. 29 In order for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto, it must be applied retroactively, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 966-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). Even if Story is correct in asserting that retroactive application of the 1987 version of the PMA to someone who otherwise would have been available for administrative good conduct time violates the ex post facto clause (a question we need not decide), he cannot show that he has been disadvantaged by such application because he is not entitled to be considered for administrative good conduct time under either the 1983 or 1987 version of the PMA. We therefore vacate and remand with instructions to the district court to dismiss Story's good conduct time claim with prejudice.