Opinion ID: 1988124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: general versus specific statute of limitations

Text: Motor Club argues that the general statute of limitations for written contracts should not control where a specific limitation on uninsured motorist coverage exists. That is, Motor Club claims that § 44-6413(1)(e) is the applicable statute to Kratochvil's claim because it is a specific statute of limitations and therefore supercedes § 25-205, a general statute of limitations. In this regard, the district court found that § 44-6413(1)(e) controlled because it was specific to uninsured motorist coverage. Generally, absent a more specific statute, actions on written contracts may be brought within 5 years, pursuant to § 25-205. See, e.g., Grand Island School Dist. # 2, supra . In the instant case, however, the Nebraska Legislature has directly addressed the limitation on uninsured motorist coverage. See § 44-6413(1)(e). This is significant given our holding that [a] special statute of limitations controls and takes precedence over a general statute of limitations because the special statute is a specific expression of legislative will concerning a particular subject. Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275, 278, 481 N.W.2d 422, 426 (1992). The adoption of § 44-6413(1)(e) makes it clear that the Legislature chose to limit the time period in which a claim could be filed against an insurer, rather than leave it to a generally applicable limitation period. Moreover, it is well settled that it is competent for the Legislature to change statutes prescribing limitations to actions and that the one in force at the time suit is brought is applicable to the cause of action. Schendt, supra ; Grand Island School Dist. # 2, supra . Therefore, § 44-6413(1)(e) should control, since it is a specific expression of the Nebraska Legislature's will concerning uninsured motorist coverage and it was in force at the time Kratochvil brought his action.