Opinion ID: 2966666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A sentence of death, upon the judgment thereon

Text: becoming final in the circuit court, shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court. B. The proceeding in the circuit court shall be transcribed as expeditiously as possible, and the transcript filed forthwith . . . and transmit[ted] . . . to the Supreme Court. C. In addition to consideration of any errors in the trial enumerated by appeal, the court shall consider and determine: 50
under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defen- dant. D. In addition to the review and correction of errors in the trial of the case, with respect to review of the sentence of death, the court may: 1. Affirm the sentence of death; 2. Commute the sentence of death to imprison- ment for life; or
proceeding. ... F. Sentence review shall be in addition to appeals, if taken, and review and appeal may be consolidated. That this section addresses only direct review is self-evident. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 357 S.E.2d 500, 508 (Va.) (In death penalty cases, . . . a defendant is afforded a direct, full review as a matter of right. Code § 17-110.1. (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 (1987). As part A provides, the section is operative only upon the judgment [of a sentence of death] becoming final in the circuit court. A sentence of death does not become final when a subsequent court denies a writ of habeas corpus; it becomes final upon the entry of the judgment by the trial court. Likewise, the proportionality review and independent examination of the sentence for arbitrariness provided for in part C occur on direct review, not habeas. And the remedies provided in part D -- affirm[ing] the sentence of death, commut[ing] the sentence of death, andremand[ing] to the trial 51 court -- are not available at all to a court reviewing a denial of habeas; they are possible only on direct review. Finally, part F makes absolutely clear that the entire section is addressed only to direct review of the death sentence itself (as even the title of the section sets forth), not even to the underlying conviction for capital murder. That underlying conviction may be, but, under this section need not necessarily be (if taken), consolidated with the direct review of the death sentence. Indeed, under Rule 5:22, that consolidation is automatic: The case shall thereupon stand matured as if an appeal had been awarded to review the conviction and the sentence of death . . . . Thus, the Virginia statutory scheme is not at all ambiguous. As a general rule, a petition for appeal must be filed in every case for which review is sought by the Virginia Supreme Court. For direct review of death sentences and their accompanying capital convictions, Rule 5:22 (itself, denominated a special rule) creates an exception, providing that assignments of error should instead be filed. But nowhere in that exception, or in section 17-110.1(B) to which it refers, is there any possible reference to appeals from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus. The only relevant reference to denials of writs of habeas corpus is in section 17-116.05:1, which provides merely that jurisdiction shall lie in the Supreme Court. And that section makes no reference to the form those appeals should take; so the general rule requiring a petition of appeal necessarily obtains. We recognize that Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, questioned whether the Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal of these claims as untimely constituted a state ground adequate to bar federal habeas review. See O'Dell, 502 U.S. at 997-98 (Blackmun, J.). Justice Blackmun commented that the ground may not be adequate under James and Ford because of the ambiguity of the Virginia statute. We believe, however, that upon closer inspection, there is no ambiguity at all.22 Therefore, we hold that the Vir_________________________________________________________________ 22 Because these procedural rules are expressly set out in unambiguous state statutes and supreme court rules, and because in Virginia they have been regularly followed, see supra note 19, they are qualitatively differ52 ginia Supreme Court's dismissal of O'Dell's appeal from the denial of the writ of habeas corpus as untimely was a state ground adequate to bar federal habeas review. 2. Although the district court did not agree, J.A. at 288, Justice Blackmun also commented that the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection may not have been independent, in that it fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983), because, as in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985), the State has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law. Justice Blackmun observed, the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection may not be based on an independent state ground because Tharp v. Commonwealth, 175 S.E.2d 277 (Va. 1970), requires the Virginia Supreme Court to consider whether a constitutional right was abridged before denying an extension of time for filing a petition for appeal. O'Dell, 502 U.S. at 998. Justice Blackmun then noted that this case may be distinguishable, id. at 620 n.5, from Coleman , which rejected a nearly identical _________________________________________________________________ ent from the rule at issue in James. In James, the distinction between jury instructions and admonitions was not always clear or closely hewn to, as evidenced by the fact that the Kentucky Supreme Court had recognized that the content of admonitions and instructions can overlap, had acknowledged that `sometimes matters more appropriately the subject of admonition are included with or as a part of the instructions,' and had used the terms interchangeably for a number of years (as had the trial courts). 466 U.S. at 346-47. Likewise, because Virginia's rules existed long before the commencement of O'Dell's state habeas proceeding, they are nothing like the procedural rule that Georgia had applied retroactively in Ford to a proceeding that had been completed long before the creation of the rule. 53 claim, because here the Virginia Supreme Court was considering an untimely petition for appeal rather than the untimely notice of appeal at issue in Coleman. See also J.A. at 292 n.7 (federal district court distinguishing Coleman on same ground). But this possible distinction is refuted by the express language of Coleman . As Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court, Ake was a direct review case. We have never applied its rule regarding independent state grounds in federal habeas. But even if Ake applies here, it does Coleman no good because the Virginia Supreme Court relied on an independent state procedural rule. ... We are not convinced that Tharp stands for the rule that Coleman believes it does. Coleman reads that case as establishing a practice in the Virginia Supreme Court of examining the merits of all underlying constitutional claims before denying a petition for appeal or writ of error as time barred. A more natural reading is that the Virginia Supreme Court will only grant an extension of time if the denial itself would abridge a constitutional right. That is, the Virginia Supreme Court will extend its time requirement only in those cases in which the petitioner has a constitutional right to have the appeal heard. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 741-42 (first and second emphases added).23 We agree that the rule of Ake concerning the state procedural rules and underlying federal claims does not apply in the habeas context, and, regardless, because we read Tharp the same way that the Court in Coleman did, we hold that the Virginia Supreme Court's applica_________________________________________________________________ 23 The Court in Coleman did comment that the Virginia Supreme Court had there not applied Tharp because that case concerns only petitions for appeal, as contrasted to the purely ministerial notice of appeal at issue in Coleman -- but it did so only as an alternative holding, following the aforementioned analysis of Tharp and the qualifying phrase, [e]ven if we accept Coleman's reading of Tharp. Id. 54 tion of Va. S. Ct. Rule 5:17(a)(1) was also an independent state ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review. 3. Because the Virginia Supreme Court's application of Rule 5:17(a)(1) was an adequate and independent state ground, federal habeas review of O'Dell's defaulted claims, which are meritless in any event,24 is barred absent cause and prejudice. That the default was _________________________________________________________________ 24 The district court, because it found that Rule 5:17(a)(1) was not an adequate and independent state ground under James, proceeded to rule against O'Dell on the merits of these claims. Principally, the claims were that O'Dell was not competent to waive his right to counsel, that, at a minimum, his competency was never appropriately determined, and that even if he was competent, his waiver of the right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Although it should not have reached the claims, on the merits, the district court correctly rejected them. First, the standard for competency to waive the right to counsel is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). After examining O'Dell, Dr. Kreider, the court-appointed psychiatrist, questioned the reliability of an earlier diagnosis of schizophrenia, J.A. at 2666, and concluded that O'Dell was competent to make a voluntary and intelligent decision to waive his right to counsel and prepare his own defense, J.A. at 312, an assessment with which both O'Dell's attorney and the trial court agreed. J.A. at 2511, 2709, 2712. Moreover, because Dr. Kreider was familiar with the standard for finding a defendant competent to stand trial, J.A. at 313, 2642-45, 2682-83, and because that standard is identical to the standard for waiving the right to counsel, Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397, Dr. Kreider's determination was more than adequate, as both the state and federal habeas courts found, J.A. at 2760, 2776-77, 313-14. Second, O'Dell claims that his competency was never appropriately determined because Dr. Kreider is a therapeutic psychiatrist and not a forensic psychiatrist. Although O'Dell cites Ake for the proposition that [w]hen the mental state of a defendant is at issue, due process requires that a defendant be provided with a qualified expert psychiatrist to assist with his defense, Petitioner's Br. at 61, he misreads Ake to establish a general due process right to psychiatric assistance where none exists. In Ake, the Court held only that, 55 only procedural, does nothing to insulate the claims from this bar. As Justice O'Connor explained for the Court in Coleman, _________________________________________________________________ when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in . . . the defense. 470 U.S. at 83 (emphasis added). Ake thus says nothing about determining competency to stand trial or waive counsel; it deals only with a defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, as the state habeas court properly held, J.A. at 2776. And in Godinez, the Court noted that a court is not required to make a competency determination in every case in which a defendant seeks to plead guilty or to waive his right to counsel. As in any criminal case, a competency determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant's competence. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.13. Regardless, Dr. Kreider was more than qualified to make the competency determination; he has an M.D. from the University of Chicago School of Medicine, has completed a psychiatric residency at the Philadelphia Naval Hospital, and has served as a psychiatrist in the Navy and in private practice from 1965 to the present. J.A. at 2640-42. Both the state and federal habeas courts found Dr. Kreider fully qualified to make the competency determination. Finally, O'Dell claims that his conviction must be vacated because he did not waive his right to counsel voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. O'Dell claims that the district court's refusal to replace defense counsel, with whom O'Dell had a confrontational and distrustful relationship, left O'Dell no choice but to dismiss counsel and proceed pro se. But [t]he determination of whether or not the motion for substitution of counsel should be granted is within the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988). The trial judge was in a far better position than a fed- eral habeas court to assess the relationship between O'Dell and his attorney. As the trial court stated on the record, [f]rom everything I've seen, since Mr. Ray was appointed in this case, he's done everything in his power to get those material things that should be heard before the Court for a hearing, and 56 we [have repeatedly] emphasized the important interests served by state procedural rules at every stage of the judicial process and the harm to the States that results when federal courts ignore these rules:  . . . `Each State's complement of procedural rules . . . channel[s], to the extent possible, the resolution of various types of questions to the stage of judicial process at which they can be resolved most fairly and efficiently.' 501 U.S. at 749 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1986) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984))). Nor does the fact that O'Dell's failure to timely file the required petition for appeal was almost certainly unintentional insulate him from the consequences of that failure: _________________________________________________________________ I've absolutely no evidence whatsoever that this man hasn't done an outstanding job for you at this point or that there is any credibility whatsoever in the allegations which you have made with respect to him. None whatsoever. J.A. at 319; see also J.A. at 3008. Although his opinion on Ray varied, at times, O'Dell also shared this assessment of Ray's competency. J.A. at 435, 2513, 3008; Tr. 9/8/86 Vol. 53, 201-02. In any event, the trial court found that O'Dell was receiving adequate counsel and accordingly refused to substitute counsel. And, once the trial court has appropriately determined that a substitution of counsel is not warranted, the court can insist that the defendant choose between continuing representation by his existing counsel and appearing pro se. Gallop, 838 F.2d at 109. It also appears that O'Dell's waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. The trial court repeatedly warned O'Dell of the dangers of proceeding pro se, O'Dell was repeatedly asked if he understood what he was doing, and the court even allowed him to change his mind several times. J.A. at 318-19, 3007-08, 3011-12, 3016, 3021-22, 3332-33, 3340. If there was any problem in the attorney-client relationship, it was likely caused by O'Dell. As the federal habeas court concluded, O'Dell's distrust of Ray was not based on objective facts; it was based on pure speculation. J.A. at 320. And, an independent and thorough examination of the record reveals that O'Dell, who was very intelligent, had a college equivalency education, and exhibit[ed] tremendous [courtroom] skills, J.A. at 3011, 2406, 3333, defended himself far more ably than many practicing attorneys could have done. 57 By filing late [petitioner] defaulted his entire state collateral appeal. This no doubt an inadvertent error, and[Virginia] concedes that [petitioner] did not understandingly and knowingly forgo the privilege of state collateral appeal. . . . [Nonetheless] federal habeas review of the claims is barred [absent cause and prejudice]. Id. at 749-50.