Opinion ID: 488109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the $1.6 Million Purchase Order.

Text: 33 Godfather's argues that the district court erred in admitting Chicago Metallic's $1.6 million purchase order into evidence, 2 and that this error requires us to reverse the district court's denial of its motion for a new trial. 34 A new trial may be granted when evidence has been improperly admitted or excluded only when the error has affected the substantial rights of the parties. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Secs. 2882, 2883, 2885 (1973). The district court's denial of a new trial motion is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See Central Microfilm Service Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204, 103 S.Ct. 1191, 75 L.Ed.2d 436 (1983). 35 The district court held that the purchase order was relevant to Universal's damages because the jury could have concluded that had Godfather's not breached its contract with Universal, Universal would have obtained an order for the same amount of goods as on the purchase order. The court, however, failed to keep in mind that Universal's contract with Godfather's was a requirements contract, and that under this type of agreement, damages are calculated by looking to [Godfather's pizza pan] purchases from any other source during some relevant and comparable time period as a method of establishing [Godfather's]good-faith requirements under the [Universal] contract. City of Louisville v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., 482 F.2d 159, 166 (6th Cir.1973) (emphasis added). The purchase order, however, did not represent Godfather's actual purchases or good-faith requirements during the relevant period; it merely represented Godfather's possible requirements. See Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 400.2-306(1) (quantity under requirements contract is measured by actual output or requirements). 36 By admitting the purchase order into evidence and by refusing Godfather's tendered jury instruction which would have limited Universal's damage base to $911,927.35, the stipulated-to amount of goods paid for and actually distributed by Chicago Metallic, we believe that the district court committed prejudicial error; it is clear that the jury's $400,000 damage award was based on the erroneous $1.6 million figure. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, Sec. 2885, at 289-90 (if evidence is insufficient to support jury verdict without the erroneously admitted evidence, the error is prejudicial). 3 Because this error does not affect the issue of liability, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an entire new trial. This error, however, does require a new trial solely on the issue of damages, unless Universal consents to a remittitur, an issue we later discuss more fully. 37