Opinion ID: 1964615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Express Easement

Text: [¶ 14] Construction of the language in a deed is a question of law, which we review de novo. Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 53, 770 A.2d 592, 610. The scope of a party's easement rights must be determined from the unambiguous language on the face of the deed. Id. Only if language in a deed is ambiguous may a court consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Id. [¶ 15] The easement deed provides: The Grantees, by acceptance of delivery of this deed, covenant and agree for themselves, their heirs and assigns, that they will continue to use the existing woods road crossing the land of the Grantor as access to their said lot and that they will not exercise the easement hereby granted until the Grantor, his heirs andassigns [ sic ], notifies them to discontinue the use of said existing road after which they will use only the easement hereby granted. [¶ 16] Both the Sheas and Jordan agree that the language of the deed does not contain a patent ambiguity, nor does the easement deed contain a latent ambiguity. See Wallingford v. Kennedy, 2000 ME 112, ¶ 15 n. 7, 753 A.2d 493, 497 n. 7 (A latent ambiguity is an uncertainty which does not appear on the face of the instrument, but which is shown to exist for the first time by matter outside the writing when an attempt is made to apply the language to the ground. (internal quotation marks omitted)). [¶ 17] Although the deed is clear and unambiguous, the Superior Court found that it did not embody the true agreement between Emmons Shea and Lewis Smith because they misunderstood exactly who owned the land where the woods road was located. The Superior Court construed the language in the easement agreement, concluding that the single term grantor referred to two different property owners, with Duschek the grantor for purposes of terminating use of the woods road, and Shea the grantor for purposes of imposition of the easement on his property as a result of Duschek's action. [¶ 18] Extrinsic evidence contradicting the parties' intention as manifested by the unambiguous language of a deed may only be considered in an action for reformation. Perreault v. Toussaint, 419 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Me.1980). Reformation is an equitable remedy by which an instrument may be corrected when a mistake is discovered so as to reflect the real intention of the parties. ROBERT TREAT WHITEHOUSE, EQUITY JURISDICTION PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN MAINE § 548 (1900). Although Jordan did not expressly plead reformation, the evidence presented by both parties at trial generated the issue of mutual mistake. Reformation was therefore tried by consent. See Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng'rs, 2001 ME 17, ¶ 22, 770 A.2d 97, 105 (noting that issues are tried by consent where it appears from the record that both parties consented to a trial of the issue). [¶ 19] The testimony presented at trial supports the conclusion that Emmons Shea and Lewis Smith labored under a mutual mistake regarding the true owner of the woods road. See Sargent v. Coolidge, 433 A.2d 738, 740 n. 3 (Me.1981) (parol evidence admissible to prove mutual mistake). [¶ 20] However, the Superior Court incorrectly determined the intent of the parties in executing the easement deed. A party's intent to contract is a question of fact reviewed for clear error. Forrest Assocs. v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 2000 ME 195, ¶ 9, 760 A.2d 1041, 1044. Other than the testimony that the Sheas and the Smiths had been friends for years, there is no evidence that Emmons Shea intended to grant an easement across his land regardless of who owned the woods road, or that he intended to permit a stranger to the transaction to act in his place as grantor to trigger the right of way easement. [¶ 21] Absent extraordinary circumstances, not present here, a deed may not be reformed to make a stranger an active party to the transaction. In the agreement, if Duschek is the grantor to terminate use of the woods road, then he would also have to be the grantor to accept imposition of the resulting easement. He may not be the grantor for one purpose but not the other. The Superior Court could not reform the deed to reflect that Duschek, in place of Shea as grantor, could exercise the power Shea reserved to himself to take actions that would trigger the grant of the easement in place of use of the woods road.