Opinion ID: 2277244
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror Kozlowski

Text: Defendant contends that Kozlowski, who opposed the death penalty on religious grounds, was erroneously excluded because he indicated that despite his view, he understood the societal concerns were served by the death penalty. After the juror stated his opposition to the death penalty for religious reasons, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: That opinion that you have right now, as you have expressed it, is that opinion so firm that you are stating to the Court that under no circumstances would you vote for the death penalty, assuming the proofs are there, because of your religious belief? MR. KOZLOWSKI: I really can't answer that question. But in my own conscience, I don't know. This is the first time it was put to me in my life. I don't know really what to say. THE COURT: How firm is your religious belief that you should not take a life? In other words, in this instance, vote for the taking of a life? How firm is your religious conviction on that point? MR. KOZLOWSKI: I always believe that a man deserves a second chance in life. He only has one life, and I can't really condemn a man to life myself. If I had anything to do with it, really, a man could be put away or something, but I can't say that, you know, because he maybe committed a terrible crime and then I would like to condemn him to death. I would be like judge, God and jury altogether. I couldn't do that. I don't know what to answer to that, honestly. THE COURT: All right. MR. KOZLOWSKI: I would be afraid. THE COURT: All right. MR. KOZLOWSKI: When the day comes that I will be judged, I will be afraid. THE COURT: Are you stating to the Court that if you were to be selected in this case, that regardless of the evidence or regardless of the manner in which this alleged crime of a homicide was committed, you would not be able to consider the imposition of the death penalty? MR. KOZLOWSKI: As far as my conscience is concerned, I don't think I would be able to, no. The prosecutor moved to excuse Kozlowski because the juror had expressed firm opposition to the death penalty. Thompson's counsel, however, urged the court to ask whether the juror would be able to put aside his religious convictions. The trial court agreed, and elicited the following response from Kozlowski: Well, I am not a highly religious man, Your Honor, but it's a thing that's born into you. You see, thou shalt not kill and things like that are born into you. Even if a man is a criminal, he is supposed to be forgiven or you put the man in a place where he will do no harm to anyone or something like that, you know? But taking a life, I mean, I don't know. In response to a further question whether Kozlowski was saying that he could not even consider the death penalty, the juror responded: I don't know what to say to you. To harm someone, even though he is a criminal or whatever, if he is proven guilty like you said beyond a shadow of a doubt like earlier, I don't know what to say, really. It's something inside of you that you feel that it's not right. You may be doing right for society but you are not doing right for yourself. The court excused the juror. Jurors cannot be expected to state unambiguously or with unmistakable clarity that they would never impose the death penalty. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 257. Here, the trial court was obliged to determine from the juror's responses whether his scruples against the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair his ability to perform his duties as a juror in a capital case. We find that the trial court's questioning manifested a sufficiently sensitive appraisal of the juror's capabilities, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in excusing this juror for cause.