Opinion ID: 1703518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Appointments Clause

Text: Plaintiff contends that the Legislative Budget Committee solely performs legislative functions and that since the appointments clause of the Louisiana Constitution limits the governor's power of appointment to the appointment of heads of departments or members of commissions in the executive branch of government, he is precluded from appointing members to this legislative committee. The appointments clause is contained in Article IV § 5(H) of the Constitution and provides: (1) The governor shall appoint, subject to confirmation by the Senate, the head of each department in the executive branch whose election or appointment is not provided by this constitution and the members of each board and commission in the executive branch whose election or appointment is not provided by this constitution or by law. (2) Should the legislature be in regular session, the governor shall submit for confirmation by the Senate the name of an appointee within forty-eight hours after the appointment is made. Failure of the Senate to confirm the appointment, prior to the end of the session, shall constitute rejection. (3) If the legislature is not in regular session, the governor may make interim appointments, which shall expire at the end of the next regular session, unless submitted to and confirmed by the Senate during that session. (4) A person not confirmed by the Senate shall not be appointed to the same office during any recess of the legislature. Plaintiff relies upon the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). In Buckley the United States Supreme Court construed the federal Constitution's appointments clause (Art. II § 2, cl. 2) to limit the power to appoint officers exercising executive functions to the President. That case does not support plaintiff's position. The federal article [4] differs from our constitutional provision and was utilized in Buckley to prohibit the legislative body from appointing officials to serve on a commission. The court found that members of the Federal Election Commission (granted by statute both rule-making, policy-making, investigative and enforcement power) could not constitutionally be appointed by the legislature, but were officers whose appointment was controlled by Art. II § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution. The separation of powers question in the Buckley case was not whether the executive could appoint legislators to a commission, but whether the legislature could name executive officers to enforce its laws. [5] Plaintiff's argument that the appointments clause limits the governor to appointing only officials exercising executive powers is based upon a misconception of the nature of our state Constitution. The federal Constitution is a document of enumerated powers (Amendment X, U.S. Const.). The Louisiana Constitution is different. Complete legislative power, except as limited by the Constitution, lies within the state legislature: A general principle of judicial interpretation of a state constitution is that, unlike the federal constitution, a state charter's provisions are not grants of power, they are rather limitations on the power of the people exercised through the state legislature. In its exercise of the entire legislative power of the state, the legislature may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit. Thus, to hold legislation invalid under the state constitution, it is necessary to rely upon some particular constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature to enact the statute assailed. In re Gulf Oxygen Welder's Supply Profit Sharing Plan and Trust Agreement, 297 So.2d 663, 665 (La.1974). See also Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577 (La.1975); Kane v. Louisiana Commission on Governmental Ethics, 250 La. 855, 199 So.2d 900 (1967). Involved in this case is the legislative power to grant the governor the right to appoint a number of legislators to serve on the budget committee. Art. IV § 5(H) cannot be construed to mean that the governor can appoint to these and only these executive offices. The section does not provide that the governor may appoint executive officials; nor does it prohibit other appointments by the governor. In fact, Art. IV § 5(K) of the Louisiana Constitution provides that the governor shall have other powers and perform other duties authorized by this constitution or provided by law. Under R.S. 39:311 the governor merely appoints legislators, already duly elected, to serve on a committee whose function is to aid in the cooperation between the legislative and executive branches on matters pertaining to the state budget. Since the appointments clause does not operate to restrict the legislative power to enact R.S. 39:311(A), and does not limit the power of the executive to appoint, it does not affect the constitutionality of R.S. 39:311 unless there is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. II. The Separation of Powers Article The Separation of Powers (distribution of powers) article of the Constitution provides: Section 1. The powers of government of the state are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others. La.Const. 1974, Art. II §§ 1 and 2. As the plain language of section 2 indicates, this provision of the Constitution is violated only if one branch of government or its members exercises power belonging to either of the others. The plaintiff alleges that the clause is violated because the governor is exercising legislative authority by appointing twenty-four of twenty-eight members of this legislative committee. This argument is without merit. The committee was established and exists as a result of a statute enacted by the legislature. All of the members of the committee are legislators. The legislature determined the method of selection and authorized the governor to appoint twentyfour members of the committee from its own number. The legislative power is the power to make laws. As stated in Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202, 48 S.Ct. 480, 482, 72 L.Ed. 845, 849 (1928): Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. In the federal system it is clear that the legislature may not appoint officers to enforce its laws ( Buckley v. Valeo, supra ; Springer v. Philippine Islands, supra; see Guidry v. Roberts, 335 So.2d 438 (La.1976)), because it would invade the exclusive realm of the executive. In the case before us, does the appointment of legislators by the governor invade the exclusive realm of the legislature? We think not. The exercise of such power of appointment does not make laws, nor does it so influence the law-making process that there is an indirect invasion of the legislative process. The Legislative Budget Committee in the exercise of its duties (R.S. 39:312) gathers information about the fiscal affairs of the state, works with the executive in the preparation of the state budget (which the governor must prepare and submit to the legislature pursuant to Art. VII § 11, La.Const. 1974 and R.S. 39:41) and makes such reports and recommendations to the legislature as the committee determines. The members serve for a term of four years. R.S. 39:311. The preparation and submission to the legislature of fiscal legislation and budgetary planning are not exclusive functions of either the legislature or the executive in Louisiana. The executive must prepare (Art. VII § 11, La.Const.1974) but only the legislature can enact the appropriations bill. It could not have been contemplated that the doctrine of separation of powers should prevent a cooperative effort by the executive and legislative branches in fiscal planning for the state. Since we find no violation of the appointments clause or the separation of powers doctrine, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. DENNIS, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons. SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.