Opinion ID: 2366205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the bar provided mr. mcbride adequate procedural due process

Text: ¶ 16 We first consider Mr. McBride's argument that the Bar deprived him of procedural due process. Procedural due process requires, [a]t a minimum, `timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.' In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983)). Despite this, due process is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, the demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved. Id. at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. McBride's procedural due process claim fails because we conclude that the Bar provided him with sufficient notice and an adequate hearing.
¶ 17 The Bar's seven separate notices gave Mr. McBride adequate notice of the consequences of failing to upload his answers. Under the due process notice requirement, [t]he notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); see also Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 601-02 (Utah 1980) (Under the due process clause, [a] plaintiff [is] entitled to have . . . essential information imparted to him. . . .) Mr. McBride claims the notices were insufficient. Specifically, he argues that he should only be held accountable for the signed Acknowledgment of Participation in Laptop form and that this form indicated only that failure to upload his answers may result in their disqualification, rather than indicating that failure to upload would automatically result in disqualification. [2] We are not persuaded. ¶ 18 The use of the permissive verb may meets the notice requirement since it reasonably. . . convey[s] the required information. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652. The notices adequately warned Mr. McBride that if he failed to upload his answers within the designated time frame the Bar may not accept them. And the Bar's use of the term may was accurate because the Bar does not penalize examinees who attempt to, but cannot successfully, upload their answers for technical reasons. This procedure accounts for fair handling of technical difficulties while still providing notice of potential disqualification to those examinees who make no effort to upload their answers. In short, the notice needed only to inform examinees that they may be expelled from the Exam if they failed to follow certain procedures and the notices given to Mr. McBride did just that. The oral instructions further clarified that an examinee who failed to successfully upload his or her exam answers would be allowed to sit for the second Exam day only if the examinee had attempted to upload his or her answers but was unsuccessful due to technical difficulties. We conclude that any one of the seven notices given to Mr. McBride was sufficient to satisfy the notice prong of procedural due process.
¶ 19 A pre-deprivation evidentiary hearing is not a requirement, nor is it always the most effective decisionmaking method. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation.); see also Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1103 (5th Cir.1975) (While the opportunity to be heard is generally considered a fundamental component of due process, entitlement to a hearing does not automatically flow from a finding that procedural due process is applicable.). Instead, the type of hearing required by due process depends on: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 16, 52 P.3d 1246 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893). ¶ 20 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that `[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). In Mathews, the Supreme Court applied three factors in determining that due process did not require an evidentiary hearing before terminating an individual's disability benefits. Id. at 339-50, 96 S.Ct. 893. The Court ultimately denied Mathews' due process claim because (1) Mathews' private interest was low, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the probable value of procedural safeguards was low, and (3) the government interest in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources was high. Id. Similarly, procedural due process has been met here where (1) Mr. McBride's private interest is low, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of procedural safeguards is low, and (3) the Bar's interest in administrative efficiency is high.
¶ 21 While Mr. McBride's interest in taking the Exam may be great, it is not so great as to require that he be given a full hearing prior to disqualification from the Exam. A bar applicant may have an interest in taking the Exam, but an individual does not have an absolute right to practice law. See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957) (noting that while [a] State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law . . . for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause . . . [a] State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law). ¶ 22 In Arnovick, this court applied the Mathews factors in a challenge to a Bar decision denying admission to applicants who failed the Exam after a faulty torts question was thrown out of the grading scale. In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶¶ 2-3, 16, 52 P.3d 1246. We determined the bar applicants' interest did not satisfy the first Mathews factor since the Bar's decision [did] not permanently deny [them] the ability to practice law in Utah; they [could] retake the examination until they pass[ed] it. Id. ¶ 16. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in a bar challenge case, holding that [t]he interest of the unsuccessful bar examinee pales by comparison with the interest of the welfare recipient, or even the disability benefits recipient who was found not to deserve a pre-termination hearing in Mathews.  Lucero v. Ogden, 718 F.2d 355, 357 (10th Cir.1983). ¶ 23 Here too, Mr. McBride's interest is not so great that it required a full hearing prior to his disqualification from the Exam. Mr. McBride was not permanently denied the ability to practice law in Utah but could retake the Exam and follow the Exam procedures. And, as was the case in Lucero, Mr. McBride's interest in taking the Exam pales in comparison with the interests of a welfare recipient or a disability benefits recipient. Moreover, unlike the disability benefits recipient in Mathews, Mr. McBride has no pre-existing benefit to deny since he did not have a professional license to lose. See Lander v. Indus. Comm'n, 894 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (determining that an individual applying for workers' compensation claims did not have a private interest under Mathews since [t]hese are not benefits to which [the plaintiff] has already been deemed entitled, but ones he hopes to receive). Thus, Mr. McBride's interest is low and did not require a full hearing prior to his disqualification.
¶ 24 When examining the second Mathews factor, courts have evaluated the adequacy of the grievance procedures in determining the presence of an erroneous deprivation. See In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 16, 52 P.3d 1246. In Arnovick, we held that the second Mathews factor was met where petitioners [had] received the benefit of an extensive review process culminating in their appearance before this court. Id. There, the extensive review process included: (1) the filing of their complaint, (2) the review of their complaint by the Admissions Committee. . ., (3) the petitioners' written response to those findings and recommendations, (4) an oral hearing, and (5) a review and formal findings by the Executive Committee of the Bar. Id. ¶ 10. We reasoned that, [g]iven the extensive nature of this review process, the risk of error in the Bar's decision seems to us to be small and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards would be minimal. Id. ¶ 16. In Lucero, the Tenth Circuit similarly determined that there is a low risk of erroneous deprivation where there is no evidence that the procedures are unfair, e.g. that the graders engaged in insidious discrimination. Lucero, 718 F.2d at 358. ¶ 25 Here, there is a relatively low risk of erroneous deprivation since Mr. McBride has made use of the extensive grievance procedures available to him. Much like the petitioners in Arnovick, Mr. McBride has received the benefit of an extensive review process culminating in [his] appearance before this court. In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 16, 52 P.3d 1246. This process has included (1) his initial discussion with the proctors at the Exam, (2) the filing of his request for review with the Bar, (3) the review of his request by the Admissions Committee of the Bar by a three-member panel, (4) the filing of his Supplemental Memorandum with the Committee, (5) the Committee's review and supplemental decision, and finally, (6) this appeal. As in Arnovick, the risk of error in the Bar's decision seems . . . to be small and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards would be minimal. Id. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the available procedures were unfair to Mr. McBride or that the Exam proctors engaged in insidious discrimination. Lucero, 718 F.2d at 358. The Exam proctors properly applied the standard test-taking procedures to Mr. McBride. Mr. McBride was not singled out or treated unfairly in comparison with other examinees. Mr. McBride simply failed to comply with the standard test-taking procedures. ¶ 26 Moreover, the Bar's use of the permissive verb may in its computer contract demonstrates that there are already reasonable procedures in place to prevent erroneous deprivation. If an examinee fails to upload his or her exam because of technical difficulties, rather than simple forgetfulness, the Bar allows the examinee to sit for the second day of the Exam while technicians determine if the examinee attempted to upload the answers the night before. This process ensures that an examinee who tries to follow the Exam procedures, but cannot upload his or her answers for a technical reason, is not unfairly disqualified from taking the second day of the Exam. Indeed, it would be curious logic to condemn the examiners for utilizing practices designed to recognize the inherent limitations of testing and for attempting to give the benefit of the doubt to applicants who may have been adversely affected by those limitations. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1103. ¶ 27 In sum, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards is relatively low since there is an extensive review process, no unfair treatment, and the Bar's current procedures help prevent erroneous deprivation.
¶ 28 Courts have found that governmental interests, including the fiscal and administrative burdens caused by additional procedures, can outweigh the other Mathews factors. See In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, ¶ 16, 52 P.3d 1246 (noting that the fiscal and administrative costs of imposing any additional procedures on the Bar outweigh the benefit that such procedures could provide, especially given the ever-increasing number of Bar applicants); see also Lucero, 718 F.2d at 358 (holding that the requirement of a full evidentiary hearing every time a bar applicant fails the bar would place an intolerable burden upon the Board (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 29 In this case, the administrative burden of providing a pre-disqualification hearing to every examinee who failed to abide by testing protocol would be significant. Even assuming that the hearing would not have to be a formal proceeding, waiting for technicians to determine whether answers had been altered could take tremendous time, especially if more than one student failed to abide by the testing procedures. The Bar's strong interest in the efficient administration of the Exam outweighs Mr. McBride's private interest and the low risk of erroneous deprivation. In short, we conclude that Mr. McBride's procedural due process rights did not require the Bar to provide Mr. McBride with a full hearing prior to his disqualification.