Opinion ID: 1726189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alm I

Text: In Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tex.1986) ( Alm I ), we held that Alcoa had a duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the dangers associated with bottle caps manufactured with a closure system which it designed, built, and sold. We further held that this duty to warn could be discharged by warning an intermediate user of the closure system if there were reasonable assurances that the warning would reach the ultimate consumer. [1] Id. The court today seeks to avoid remanding the negligence portion of this case by asserting that Seven-Up was not, as a matter of law, an appropriate intermediary through which Alcoa could have discharged its duty to warn the ultimate consumer. Alm II, at 140. Arguably, under these facts, Seven-Up was a proper intermediary to warn, given our decision in Alm I. Furthermore, we did not hold in Alm I, as the court today deceptively and erroneously maintains, that Alcoa's duty to warn the ultimate consumer could be satisfied by proof that Alcoa's intermediary, JFW, `was adequately trained and warned.' Alm II, at 138 (emphasis added). Instead, we held that Alcoa could satisfy its duty to warn by proving that its intermediary was adequately trained and warned. Alm I, 717 S.W.2d at 592 (emphasis added). We never mentioned JFW by name, nor does anything in the opinion suggest that it was the only appropriate intermediary. The court today in Alm II rewrites our opinion in Alm I to reach its desired result. Under its franchise agreement with JFW, Seven-Up controlled the labeling on both the bottle and its cap. Accordingly, Seven-Up arguably was in the best position to warn the ultimate consumer of the danger of a bottle cap explosion. As such, Seven-Up should not be ruled out as a proper intermediary through which Alcoa could discharge its duty to warn. In fact, the passage from comment n to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) cited by the court supports the conclusion that Seven-Up should not be excluded as a proper intermediary: In all such cases the question may arise as to whether the person supplying the chattel is exercising that reasonable care, which he owes to those who are to use it, by informing the third person through whom the chattel is supplied of its actual character. Giving to the third person through whom the chattel is supplied all the information necessary to its safe use is not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from liability. It is merely a means by which this information is to be conveyed to those who are to use the chattel. The question remains whether this method gives a reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it. (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the rule announced in Alm I is to insure that the ultimate consumer receive any warnings necessary to make the product in question safe, while recognizing the inherent difficulty of transmitting such warnings when the manufacturer is not in the direct chain of production.