Opinion ID: 5197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness of the Departure.

Text: 9 We nevertheless must ascertain, as the second prong of the Williams test requires, whether the extent of the departure imposed by the district court was warranted. In engaging in such a review, we are reluctant to tread with too heavy a step upon the district court's discretion.3 A departure such as the instant one, under section 5K2.0, is essentially an unguided one.4 The district court, however, determined that it could look to section 2B3.2 (Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious Damage) for an analogy to Lara's egregious offense conduct.5 In oral argument, counsel for Lara contended that, at over seven times the maximum initial guideline range, the sentence ultimately imposed was unreasonable in the extent of its departure from the guideline norm. We note, at the outset, that the mere fact that a departure sentence exceeds by several times the maximum 3 See United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989) (Reasonableness of length of departure is quintessentially a judgment call. District courts are in the front lines, sentencing flesh-and-blood defendants. The dynamics of the situation may be difficult to gauge from the antiseptic nature of a sterile paper record. Therefore, appellate review must occur with full awareness of, and respect for, the trier's superior 'feel' for the case. We will not lightly disturb decisions to depart, or not, or related decisions implicating degrees of departure.). 4 See United States v. Lambert, 963 F.2d 711, 718 n.3 (5th Cir.), vacated for reh'g en banc, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16194 (July 14, 1992). A guided departure is one for which the Guidelines provide explicit direction as to the extent of adjustment to be imposed, such as that under § 2G1.1, comment., application note 1 (8-level downward departure if offense lacked profit motive or physical force or coercion). A departure pursuant to § 5K2.0, in contrast, is unguided in that the guidelines specify no set number of levels by which the district court must calibrate the degree of its departure. 5 The actual wording used by the district court in applying § 2B3.2 by analogy is important to the determination of this case, as will become apparent below. The court stated, In attempting to structure an upward departure, I looked to the sentencing guideline section 2B3.2, which involved extortion by force or threat of serious criminal offense . . . . I think the application of the sentencing guideline section 2B3.2 is most analogous to the defendant's actual conduct. 10 recommended under the Guidelines is of no independent consequence in determining whether the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 606 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861 (1989).6 Nor is a sentencing court obliged to provide reasons justifying the extent of its departure. Id. at 607. Even so, the district court provided clear and cogent justification for the extent of its departure. When departing on the basis of offense characteristics, the sentencing court should extend or extrapolate from other Guidelines levels or principles, or employ analogies to closely related circumstances or conduct addressed by the Guidelines. United States v. Strickland, 941 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 614 (1991). The district court here analogized Lara's egregious conduct to the offense of extortion defined by section 2B3.2. By departing on that basis, the court reconciled the guidelines' broad objective of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing with the statutory directive in the individual case to impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes of deterrence, just punishment, and the protection of the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),(b) (1988); see also United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 202 (1990); 6 In Roberson, we upheld a sentence more than three times the guideline maximum. Departures of even greater multiples have been upheld as well. See, e.g., United States v. Geiger, 891 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1989) (4½ times), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1087 (1990); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (more than 4 times); United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1988) (more than 5 times). We also note the multiple and independent grounds for departure cited by the district court, as not all the enhancement of Lara's sentence is attributable to the § 2B3.2 departure. 11 United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1990).7 We thus cannot say the district court's imposition of a nine-point departure for the extortive aspects of Lara's conduct in this case was unreasonable.