Opinion ID: 884650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 35 Did the District Court err when it concluded as a matter of law that defendant Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc., was not vicariously liable for the negligence of Brent Bacon? ¶ 36 Gentry contends that even if a dangerous condition on the ranch property was not responsible for Barbara Gentry's injury and death, the ranch company is vicariously liable for the negligence of Bacon because he was at the ranch to perform services for the ranch company on the date of Barbara's injury. However, A claim of respondent superior against an employer requires there to have been an employment relationship between the defendant and the tortfeasor when the injury to the third party occurred. In the absence of statutory or contractual provisions to the contrary, a public or private entity is ordinarily not vicariously liable for, or obligated to pay expenses associated with, the tortious acts of those who are not its employees. Distinctions between the terms employer and employee, master and servant, and principal and agent are immaterial for respondeat superior purposes. 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment Relationship § 461 (1996). ¶ 37 We apply the same limitation to the principle of respondeat superior in Montana. See Clawson v. Schroeder (1922), 63 Mont. 488, 498-99, 208 P. 924, 927. ¶ 38 Furthermore, an employment relationship is contractual in nature and generally requires the mutual assent of the parties, as well as consideration. See 27 Am. Jur.2d Employment Relationship § 14 (1996). In this case, none of the elements of an employment relationship were proven. Bacon's gratuitous offer to help his wife's grandmother open the garage door, and his willingness to help start the furnace so that his wife and her friend would be warmer while they painted the walls of the new house did not make him the ranch's employee. ¶ 39 Finally, respondeat superior only applies to an employee or agent who is acting within the scope of his duties owed to his employer or principal. See Kornec v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co. (1947), 120 Mont. 1, 8, 180 P.2d 252, 256; Hoffman v. Roehl (1921), 61 Mont. 290, 298-99, 203 P. 349, 350. In this case, it is undisputed that Bacon was not acting on behalf of the ranch company or the cattle company at the time that his conduct caused Barbara's injury. He had abandoned his effort to start the furnace in the new house. He had gone to his personal vehicle to pick up his rifle, and was returning to borrow the pickup so that he could go hunting. Nothing about his activity at the time that he stumbled and shot Barbara was remotely related to ranch business. ¶ 40 For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it held, as a matter of law, that Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc., was not vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of Brent Bacon on November 5, 1994, when he injured Barbara Gentry. ¶ 41 We affirm the judgment of the District Court. NELSON, LEAPHART, HUNT and GRAY, JJ., concur.