Opinion ID: 1827757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PEOPLE v ADAMS

Text: The defendant argues that the record fails to show that Judge Borradaile considered his perjurious testimony as a rehabilitative factor. We cannot agree. At the original sentencing, Judge Borradaile indicated his reasons for the sentence imposed stating: The Court: Mr. Adams, I have read through the presentence investigation report. And, of course, I've heard the entire trial of this matter because I was the presiding Judge at the trial of the matter. I consider that you got on the witness stand and lied to the Court, lied to the jury. And, the Court is satisfied that the evidence was exactly as I believe you told the probation officer in your comment that you say, quote, If I had been on the jury, I would have come to the same decision, end quote. I'm satisfied you did it. I don't know if your ex-brother-in-law was involved with you. That's something that apparently the prosecutor and the police could not determine as to whether he had in fact was [sic] involved as well. So they did not proceed against him. But I'm satisfied you proceeded and I'm satisfied that you got on the witness stand and lied to the jury and to the Court. And, for that reason I don't consider that there is any basis, when somebody lies, to justify attempting probation when they can't tell the truth when they're under oath. So I intend to incarcerate you. [Emphasis added.] Mr. Kittendorf, you may address the Court at this time relative to allocution. Mr. Kittendorf: Judge, first of all, Mr. Adams does have employment available to him. And, if the Court should see fit to send Mr. Adams to the county jail, we would request that he have a work release program so that he can both honor his support obligation to his previous family and his support obligation to his present family. And, in addition to that, we recognize the  Of course, I was here during the course of the trial. And, I discussed the issue that you've raised right now with the young lady that did the probationary report. And, I'm not certain that I can totally  I can agree with you that he lied. I can certainly agree that  with Mr. Adams' comment that there was a significant amount of circumstantial evidence that was involved in this particular case. I would hope that the Court would decide this matter on the basis of what Mr. Adams can contribute to the community. And, that's really all that I have to say. The Court: All right, anything you wish to add, Mr. Adams? The Defendant: No, your Honor. The Court: All right, I don't consider that someone who takes advantage of a family where he had apparently been a guest before and then lies in the trial of the matter has any basis for rehabilitation. And, that's the Court's determination as to sending him to the state penitentiary. [Emphasis added.] After remand from the Court of Appeals ordering an explanation of the court's reasons in imposing this sentence, Judge Borradaile similarly stated: And the Court notes that the testimony was quite clear in the instant case that the defendant had been a family friend of the family who was victimized in this matter. It was quite apparent that he knew that there was going to be a wedding and that the family would be away from the home. And the Court feels that he played upon that personal knowledge as well as his buddy and apparent brother-in-law who also attended the wedding and the wedding reception thereafter. And the Court is satisfied that the defendant used that acquaintance with the family and the personal knowledge through his brother-in-law that they were going to be away as the basis for his going to the house when he knew that there would be no one there for a period of time. So that the Court feels that that is an  is a factor that calls for increasing the sentence over what the sentence might have been as a matter of departure from what the guidelines would show. The Court also felt that even though he had no previous record, and thus under some circumstances if there [sic] weren't for this violation of trust that he might be a fit subject for probation, the amount of money involved  over $3,000 was paid  the fact that he took the witness stand and the Court was satisfied that he told a bald-faced lie in the courtroom, and despite the Supreme Court recently ruling that there is a difference between various types of perjury committed in a criminal offense, the Court is of the opinion that he is not a fit subject for probation. [Emphasis added.] Thus those two factors, the violation of trust and the lying on the witness stand, were the two factors, as noted in the previous transcript of the sentencing, that the Court took into account in determining the sentence of five years minimum to fifteen years maximum. Review of these proceedings illustrates that the defendant's false testimony was but one element considered, and that rehabilitation was a motivating factor in Judge Borradaile's sentence. There is no indication from the record that punishment for perjury was intended or contemplated. In this case, the record reveals that defendant's perjured testimony was material to his defense. The defendant freely chose to testify after consulting with his defense counsel and offered corroborating testimony from other witnesses to substantiate his alibi defense. The defendant's testimony was entirely exculpatory and bore directly on the question of his guilt. The record supports Judge Borradaile's conclusion that the defendant lied while testifying and that, therefore, his use of that fact when assessing defendant's prospects for rehabilitation was not error. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant's original sentence. In light of the foregoing analysis, we need not decide whether Adams' appeal should forfeit because he escaped during its pendency. In Michigan, a first appeal is a constitutional right. To wade into the waters of waiver or forfeiture is thus unnecessary. We adhere to the Court's practice not to grapple with a constitutional issue except as a last resort. Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, 154; 103 NW2d 769 (1960).