Opinion ID: 483528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parcels Regulation

Text: 25 The starting point for our analysis is this court's opinion in White House Vigil for the ERA Committee v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518 (D.C.Cir.1984). In White House Vigil, we identified the legal standards to be applied in reviewing regulations that impose time, place and manner restrictions on speech. Such regulations are valid so long as the restrictions are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 746 F.2d at 1527 (footnote omitted); see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). There is no question that, as to speech, the parcels regulation is content-neutral. It is also clear that it leaves open ample alternate channels of communication. The crux of the issue is whether the parcels regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The CCNV members contend that the governmental interest at stake is safety and safety alone. They admit that the Government has an interest in restricting unattended parcels because of the possibility of such parcels containing explosives. But, when the parcel is attached to the body, as in a parcel that is held or a chair that is being sat in, there is little danger of explosion. 23 Thus, according to the appellants, the parcels regulation is not narrowly tailored if interpreted to proscribe sitting on chairs. 26 This argument assumes, however, that safety is the only interest served by the regulation. While safety is an important, if not primary interest, traffic flow and aesthetics are also legitimate interests: 27 The regulations also clearly serve a substantial governmental interest. No one can deny the substantiality or the significance of America's interest in presidential security. At stake is not merely the safety of one man, but also the ability of the executive branch to function in an orderly fashion and the capacity of the United States to respond to threats and crises affecting the entire free world. Nor is the interest in pedestrian safety and traffic insubstantial; the value of sidewalks as public fora would be considerably vitiated were the state unable to provide for the orderly passage of those persons who use them. Finally, the government has a substantial interest in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment; aesthetics are a proper focus of governmental regulation. 28 White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 1528 (footnotes omitted); see also Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. at 296, 104 S.Ct. at 3070 (Government has a substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition.). 29 But, even if it were possible to write a regulation that is more narrowly tailored to its objectives than is the parcels regulation, it is not our job to fashion such a regulation: 30 The expertise of courts lies in determining whether an agency's decision is within the zone of constitutionality, not in choosing between options within that zone. A court may not require that the agency adopt the least restrictive alternative, thereby substituting its judgment for that of the regulators. 31 White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 1531 (footnotes omitted); see also Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. at 299, 104 S.Ct. at 3072 (We do not believe that [prior cases] ... assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks....). 32 Just as we rejected the finetuning of clear language in White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 1541 & n. 145, we limit our inquiry here to whether the regulation as written is unconstitutional. Just as in White House Vigil, we find the regulation to be narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate objectives of security, traffic flow and aesthetics. 33 The words of the regulation clearly cover this event. CCNV members admit that if they had placed the chairs on the sidewalk but had not sat in them, they would have violated the parcels regulation. We do not see any relevant difference in the fact that, after placing the chairs on the sidewalk, the appellants then sat in the chairs. 34 We admit that it is possible to read other property in the parcels regulation to encompass many items, including a cane, a person's shoes or a handicapped person's wheelchair, thus potentially making virtually anybody who is on the White House sidewalk more than momentarily subject to arrest based on the parcels regulation. However, we believe that the Government is entitled to the benefit of assuming that it will exercise some common sense in its enforcement of the regulation. Moreover, some people, such as the handicapped, might be able to avail themselves of other defenses to a prosecution, such as an equal protection claim. It is also possible that, if faced with such a situation, a court could decide that objects indispensible to the person, such as a wheelchair for a handicapped person, are not other property. In any event, we do not think it necessary for such a small tail to wag such a large dog. Virtually all statutes and regulations are susceptible of interpretations that would encompass nonsensical results. Absent some demonstrable possibility that the regulation would be so interpreted, we decline to invalidate the regulation on that basis.