Opinion ID: 1866280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the chancellor err in awarding appellant attorney's fees?

Text: A chancellor has broad authority and discretion in setting appropriate attorney's fees and unless he is manifestly wrong, this Court will not disturb his award of attorney's fees. Walters v. Walters, 383 So.2d 827 (Miss. 1980). However, the allowance of an attorney's fee has been held erroneous where the wife has ample means to engage the services of an attorney. Bernard v. Bernard, 43 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1949). Appellant, in the present case, earned approximately $12,000 per year, was purchasing her own home, and owned jewelry and silver with a substantial value (approximately $18,000-$22,000). She also owned a $2000 certificate of deposit and a savings account with a $300 balance. Although appellant certainly had adequate means with which to employ and pay an attorney, this case is controlled by Gresham v. Gresham, 199 Miss. 778, 25 So.2d 760 (1946), wherein we stated: This brings us to the question of attorney's fees. The learned chancellor denied application of appellant for any amount for her solicitors. Appellee cites Miller v. Miller, 173 Miss. 44, 159 So. 112; Parker v. Parker, 71 Miss. 164, 14 So. 459; Rees v. Rees, 188 Miss. 256, 193 So. 334, 194 So. 750. But they have no application here, except that appellant is entitled to representation by a competent solicitor, and solicitor's fees accordingly. Her alimony allowance and rentals cannot be termed large enough for her to pay her counsel out of it. (The house in Brookhaven is mortgaged.) The appellant brought her into court on this matter resulting from their former marital status, seeking, without justification, an alteration of his liability to her from a court decree fixing it, and we think should pay her an attorney's fee. Otherwise, he could sue her so often as to impose an oppressive burden on her allowance in resisting his repeated applications. We think allowance of an attorney's fee should have been made her by the court below. (199 Miss. at 784-85, 25 So.2d at 762). Because it was the appellee's action that required appellant's hiring an attorney, we believe an attorney's fee was proper in the instant case. Based on the foregoing, this cause is reversed and rendered as to appellant's alimony and affirmed as to all other parts. REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., SUGG and WALKER, P.JJ., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS and PRATHER, JJ., concur.