Opinion ID: 2399846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: secondmental or testamentary capacity.

Text: Mental or testamentary capacity as must be possessed by a testator in order for him to make a valid will has been defined by this Court many times in two lines of cases, which are: The rule has been generally expressed that sound mind and disposing memory, constituting testamentary capacity, is (a) the ability on the part of the testator to retain in memory without prompting the extent and condition of property to be disposed of; (b) to comprehend to whom  he is giving it; and (c) to realize the deserts and relations to him of those whom he excludes from his will. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405; Boone v. Boone, 114 Ark. 69, 169 S.W. 779; Mason v. Bowen, 122 Ark. 407, 183 S.W. 973, Ann.Cas.1917D, 713; Griffin v. Union Trust Company, 166 Ark. 347, 266 S.W. 289; Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S.W.2d 695; Petree v. Petree, 211 Ark. 654, 201 S.W. 2d 1009. Testamentary capacity means that the testator must be able to retain in his mind, without prompting, the extent and condition of his property, to comprehend to whom he is giving it, and relations of those entitled to his bounty. Tatum v. Chandler, 229 Ark. 864, 319 S.W.2d 513; Sullivant v. Sullivant, 236 Ark. 95, 364 S.W.2d 665; O'Dell v. Newton, 228 Ark. 1069, 312 S.W.2d 339. Complete sanity in a medical sense is not essential to testamentary capacity, provided power to think relationally exists when a will is made. A will executed in a lucid interval is valid. Thus, the time to be looked into in determining a testator's mental capacity to make a will is when the document was executed. In dealing with this subject, this Court in Scott v. Dodson, Executor, 214 Ark. 1, 214 S.W.2d 357, said: FifthThe Applicable Law.The test is whether Mrs. Boykin, on September 13, 1938, had a fair comprehension of the nature and extent of her property, of her relationship to those who had claims upon her, of their situation as it affects financial need, or financial sufficiency; and of other obligations existing at the time she acted. Complete sanity, in a medical sense, is not essential; provided, that the power to think rationally exists when the individual's will to act is exercised. The word will of itself connotates purpose, intent, deliberation, violation, freedom from unreasonable restraint, voluntariness, desire, the power to choose, discretion. In 56 Am. Jur., page 89, under subject of WILLS and under the sub-head of Lucid Intervals it is stated: which is quoted with approval in Thiel, Special Adm'r v. Mobley, 223 Ark. 167, 265 S.W.2d 507, A will executed in a lucid interval by one who was before and after a confirmed lunatic is valid   . The following section, also in point here, states that The time to be looked to in determining the capacity of a testator to make a will, in reference to his mentality, is the time when the will was executed. See also Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S.W.2d 695. The same degree of mental capacity is necessary to revoke a will as to make one. Revocability is an essential characteristic of a will. Except where a testator subsequently becomes incompetent, he retains the power of revocation as long as he lives. Thus the same test of mental capacity applies to the revoking of a will as to the making thereof. See 57 Am. Jur. 458, Wills, page 322. We adhere to these rules and find that the lower Court's finding of competency of the decedent at the time of the revocation of Will 1 and execution of Will 2 is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. All of the witnesses for the proponents testified to facts, according to these rules, which established the competency of the decedent at the time she made the Will and other documents. Witnesses for contestants testified that in their opinion she was not able to make a will, but did not testify to facts or acts which supported their opinion. True she may have had peculiarities or eccentricities, but these are not sufficient to indicate mental incapacity.  As heretofore stated, we have examined the entire record and have reached the conclusion that the Order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and, therefore, the Order should not under this rule be disturbed.