Opinion ID: 1060577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: statutory definition of second degree murder

Text: The defendant contends that the statutory definition of second degree murder is unconstitutionally vague and was incapable of clear definition by the trial court or understanding by the jury. Thus, the jury could not fully consider the charge of second degree murder. He contends that the absence of a true distinction between first degree murder and second degree murder deprived him of due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Article 1, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. We disagree. In accordance with the definition of second degree murder, as set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (Supp.1995), the trial court gave the following instruction regarding second degree murder: Any person who commits second degree murder is guilty of a crime. For you to find the Defendant guilty of this offense, the State must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following essential elements. 1. That the Defendant unlawfully killed the alleged victim, and 2. That the Defendant acted knowingly. The distinction between voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder is that voluntary manslaughter requires that the killing result from a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. Bear in mind, that if you find a knowing killing with adequate provocation, that is voluntary manslaughter. A person acts intentionally when that person acts with a conscious objective either to cause a particular result, or to engage in particular conduct. A person acts knowingly if that person acts with an awareness, either that his or her conduct is of a particular nature, or that a particular circumstance exists. The requirement of knowingly is also established if it is shown that the Defendant acted intentionally. The second degree murder statute was challenged in State v. Jerry Taylor, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9612-CC-00499, 1998 WL 424570 (Tenn.Crim.App. filed July 29, 1998, at Nashville), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. February 1, 1999), including an assertion that the statute failed to properly differentiate the varying degrees of homicide. In reviewing this claim, this Court held: In our view, the words of Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-210 are sufficiently precise to put an individual on notice of prohibited activities. The language sets out boundaries sufficiently distinct for the courts to fairly administer the law. See State v. Thomas, 635 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tenn.1982). 1998 WL 424570 at 8. While in State v. Jerry Taylor, the defendant was specifically concerned that the statute failed to differentiate between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, the same reasoning is applicable in the present case. In addition to being properly instructed on second degree murder, the jury was clearly instructed that first degree murder required a finding of premeditation, which was fully defined. This issue is without merit.