Opinion ID: 2111871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Person in Position of Trust

Text: The only remaining class of individuals encompassed within West Virginia Code 61-8D-5(a) that is potentially applicable to Appellant's conviction is a person in a position of trust in relation to a child. The statute was specifically amended in 2005 to add this class of persons as subject to the enhanced penalties for committing sexual abuse on children. By definition, this class of individuals includes any person who is acting in the place of a parent and charged with any of a parent's rights, duties or responsibilities concerning a child or someone responsible for the general supervision of a child's welfare, or any person who by virtue of their occupation or position is charged with any duty or responsibility for the health, education, welfare, or supervision of the child. W.Va.Code § 61-8D-1(12). The State proposes that Appellant occupied a position of trust with regard to Marissa G. based on his familial relationship of being an uncle by marriage. Citing extrajurisdictional case law, the State argues that it is the position of `trust, authority or supervision' which often provides a heightened opportunity for ... sexual assault to occur. People v. Kaminski, 246 Ill.App.3d 77, 186 Ill.Dec. 4, 615 N.E.2d 808, 811 (1993). Following that observation, however, the court in Kaminski proceeded to determine whether the alleged abuser held a position of supervision with regard to the victim on the night of the alleged abuse. 186 Ill.Dec. 4, 615 N.E.2d at 811-12. After reviewing the evidence that included the victim's parents expressly giving her permission to stay with Appellant, her brother-in-law, and his wife, following a group meeting that had taken place at the victim's parents' home, the trial court had no difficulty concluding that both defendant and Roberta [his wife] were responsible for looking after the welfare of the victim on the night in question. 186 Ill.Dec. 4, 615 N.E.2d at 812. These facts contrast severely to the evidence in this case. Marissa G. did not leave the premises of her own home on the day in question and she was not under the supervision, or to be statutorily-specific care, custody or control, of Appellant when she was subject to the alleged abuse. While we do not mean to minimize the criminal significance of adults who prey upon their victims based on a familial or any other relationship that typically implies a sense of security to the child, the relationship must still play a part of the actual incident of abuse to come within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-5(a). See Williams v. State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind.App.2008) (recognizing that familial relationship is not tantamount to being in a position of trust and that previous residence of alleged abuser in victim's neighborhood is not proof of element of trust at the time of the offenses). This is clear from the statutory language that follows the delineation of the classes of individuals who are subject to the offense. Not only does the statute require proof that the alleged abuser fell within the specified class of delineated individuals, but the offense requires that the act of abuse must occur with a child under his or her care, custody or control. W.Va.Code § 61-8D-5(a). The State argues that the evidence makes clear that Appellant occupied a position of trust in relation to Marissa G. on June 8, 2007, the date of the alleged abuse for which Appellant was convicted. Yet, the only evidence that the State relies upon as proof that Appellant occupied the temporally relevant status of a person in position of trust with regard to the victim on the date in question is prior instances of supervision of Marissa G. that took place at the residence of Appellant and his wife. [18] While those previous instances could be relied upon to establish that there were occasions when Appellant was responsible for the general supervision of the victim's welfare, those instances do not establish that he was acting in that capacityas a person in a position of trust on the date in question. [19] W.Va.Code § 61-8D-1(12). The record in this case falls woefully short of demonstrating either that the victim's mother or her sister Kacy had charged Appellant with supervisory responsibilities towards Marissa G. on the subject date or that Appellant occupied any position by which he was statutorily charged with such responsibility. See W.Va.Code § 61-8D-1(12). As we discussed at length in the custodian section of this opinion, the evidence presented at trial was that the victim's sister, Kacy, was the individual who was charged with and retained that supervisory responsibility. Accordingly, we conclude that the State did not establish that Appellant was a person in a position of trust with regard to the victim within the meaning of West Virginia Code 61-8D-5(a). Based on the foregoing conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant for committing an offense under West Virginia § 61-8D-5(a) as either a custodian or a person in a person of position of trust, [20] we find that the trial court-committed error by not granting Appellant's post-trial motion for an acquittal. [21] Accordingly, we reverse. Reversed.