Opinion ID: 1702179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the in-court identification of appellant by the complaining witness had been impermissibly tainted by prior investigatory procedures?

Text: Nichols identified Fleming in open court as having been in the group with which he spoke at the park at the time he was attacked. Fleming contends on appeal that the in-court identification was tainted by impropriety in Nichols' prior identification of Fleming from photographs which Sergeant Butler showed him three days after the attack. According to Fleming, the photographic identification was highly suggestive and prejudicial since the spread contained no photographs of other persons who had been in the park at the time of the attack. Fleming also objects to the in-court identification on grounds that it fails the totality of circumstances test set out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) and often followed by this Court. Under this test, the Court evaluates an in-court identification in terms of the following: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the crime; (2) the degree of attention exhibited by the witness; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty exhibited by the witness at the confrontation; (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Ray v. State, 503 So.2d 222, 223 (Miss. 1986); Magee v. State, 542 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 1989). Fleming argues that Nichols had very little opportunity to observe appellant prior to the assault, that it was dark, that Nichols had been drinking alcohol, and that nearly a year passed between the incident and the in-court identification. As the state is quick to point out, Fleming did not object to the in-court identification at trial. Opinions are legion in which this Court has held that a failure to object is fatal for purposes of preserving error. See, e.g. Smith v. State, 530 So.2d 155, 161-62 (Miss. 1988); Williams v. State, 512 So.2d 666, 672 (Miss. 1987); Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 214 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1958, 90 L.Ed.2d 366 (1986); see also Singleton v. State, 518 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss. 1988); Crawford v. State, 515 So.2d 936, 938 (Miss. 1987); Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981). Accordingly, Fleming has waived his objection to Nichols' in-court identification. Even if Fleming had made a timely objection and the trial court had overruled it, his assignment of error would still fail. Nichols' in-court identification proved no more than what the defendant readily admitted at trial  that he was present at the scene. It makes no sense for Fleming to object to Nichols' identifying him as being there when Fleming himself states that he was in fact there. Fleming's application of the totality of circumstances test likewise rings hollow. He argues that Nichols had very little opportunity to observe appellant prior to the assault, and yet he testified at trial that he held a conversation with Nichols prior to the assault. He notes that Nichols had been drinking alcohol, but nothing in the record indicates that Nichols was drunk at the time. The assignment of error is without merit.