Opinion ID: 1826076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Power Of The Court To Change Venue.

Text: The fundamental question presented is whether the trial court had authority, on its own initiative, to order the place of trial changed over the timely objection of the defendant on whose behalf the order was made. We hold the trial court did not have such authority under the facts in this case. [1] A consideration of the possible sources of court authority to change the place of venue under circumstances such as were present in this case must include the constitution, the statutes, this court's interpretation of those laws, and the inherent power of the court. It is appropriate to begin with the constitution and the statutes. Wisconsin Const. art. I, sec. provides: Rights Of Accused. Section 7. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecution by indictment or information, to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed, which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law.  [3] (Emphasis added.) Sec. 971.19 (1), Stats. reads, Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed, except as otherwise provided. And finally, sec. 971.22, Stats. is as follows: 971.22 Change Of Place Of Trial. (1) The defendant may move for a change of the place of trial on the ground that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county. The motion shall be made at arraignment, but it may be made thereafter for cause. (2) The motion shall be in writing and supported by affidavit which shall state evidentiary facts showing the nature of the prejudice alleged. The district attorney may file counter affidavits. (3) If the court determines that there exists in the county where the action is pending such prejudice that a fair trial cannot be had, it shall order that the trial be held in any county where an impartial trial can be had. Only one change may be granted under this subsection. The judge who orders the change in the place of trial shall preside at the trial. Preliminary matters prior to trial may be conducted in either county at the discretion of the court. The judge shall determine where the defendant, if he is in custody, shall be held and where the record shall be kept. The literal language of these provisions is clear with respect to who, under these provisions, may bring a motion to change the place of trial. Const., art. I, sec. 7 states, the accused shall enjoy. . . . Sec. 971.19, Stats. provides that except as otherwise provided, (c) riminal actions shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed, and sec. 971.22, states, (t)he defendant may move for a change of the place of trial. [2, 3] This court has interpreted this constitutional section and the predecessors of these statutes a number of times. The precedent is clear that the literal language of these sections accurately states the law on the subject: Only the defendant can waive his right to venue where the crime was committed. In Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737 (1910) the court held that the right to be tried where the crime is committed belongs to the defendant. Thus, any statute providing for a change of venue must be in harmony with that right: The constitution makes no provision for a change of venue in a criminal case, so any such change must be referable to some statute which is in harmony with the guaranteed right, unless such right may be waived. French v. State, 93 Wis. 325, 67 N.W. 706. The Statutes, at sec. 4680 (Stats. 1898), provide for a change of venue in specified circumstances upon application of the accused. That contemplates competency to waive the constitutional right by invoking the statutory privilege to a change and has been held valid on the ground of such competency in fact existing. The idea is that the trial must be held in the county where the crime shall have been committed, unless changed upon application of the defendant ( Wheeler v. State, 24 Wis. 52; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 75, 14 N. W. 912), and as the right to a change is purely statutory, unless it is invoked upon the terms and in the manner provided by the statutes, it does not exist at all. French v. State, supra . 143 Wis. at 257. (Emphasis supplied.) Consistent with this analysis is the earlier case of Wheeler v. State, 24 Wis. 52 (1869) in which venue was changed on the motion of the district attorney made upon his affidavit stating his belief that an impartial trial could not be had in that county, by reason of its being a small county, and the case having been notorious, and having occasioned much excitement. 24 Wis. at 52. This court held that the statute authorizing a change of venue on the motion of the prosecutor, over the objection of the accused, was unconstitutional and void. [4] A defendant may apply for a change of venue and thereby waive his right under the constitution. [5] The authority to change venue has been held to be strictly statutory. In French v. State, 93 Wis. 325, 67 N.W. 706 (1896) the court said, The right to a change of venue depends entirely upon the statute. It is not guaranteed by Art. I, sec. 7, or by any other provision of the constitution. As the right exists only by virtue of the statute, a change of venue can be had only upon the terms the statute prescribes. 93 Wis. at 335. Accord, Baker v. State, 56 Wis. 568, 575, 14 N.W. 718 (1883); Hanley v. State, 125 Wis. 396, 400, 104 N.W. 57 (1905); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Backus, 165 Wis. 179, 182, 161 N.W. 759 (1917). Conceding sec. 971.22, Stats. authorizes only the defendants to change venue, the state argues that never-theless the statute must be read in light of State v. Dean, 67 Wis.2d 513, 227 N.W.2d 712 (1975). The critical language of that case is found at 67 Wis.2d page 526: The first issue raised by the defendant is that the trial court should have ordered a change of venue on its own motion because of media publicity even though no motion for a change of venue was made by defense counsel, nor was any motion made to postpone the trial. This court has many times recognized that a trial court should act on its own motion when confronted with aggravated circumstances from which it appears that a jury's dispassionate evaluation of the evidence is rendered doubtful because of the pressure of publicity surrounding a case. State v. Alfonsi (1967), 33 Wis.2d 469, 481, 147 N.W.2d 550; State v. Kramer (1969), 45 Wis.2d 20, 30, 171 N.W.2d 919. In neither Dean nor the cases on which it relied did the defendant oppose a change of venue. In State v. Kramer, supra , the defendant moved for change of venue. In Dean and State v. Alfonsi, supra , defendant's trial counsel did not so move but on appeal the change of venue was advocated by the defendant. In Alfonsi, 33 Wis.2d at 480, it was said, The defendant's attorneys did not request a change of venue, nor did they seek a continuance of the trial. Although it may be said that the defense thus waived two of the available safeguards, we note that under proper circumstances a trial court has an affirmative duty to take steps to protect the right of a defendant to a fair trial. In Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333, 362, . . . the court said: `Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications, and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused.' (Emphasis added.) When it appears that dispassionate evaluation of the evidence is rendered doubtful because of the pressure of publicity, the trial court must act sua sponte. In the Sheppard Case, at page 363, the court observed: `. . . where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity.' Of the three Wisconsin cases these things can be said: In none did the defendant protest a change of venue; in none did the court consider Const. art. I, sec. 7 or the cases already cited holding that only the defendant can waive his constitutional right; in none did the court conclude that the court should have changed the place of trial on its own motion. These cases did not hold, moreover, that the court could disregard the demand of the defendant to a jury from the county or district where the crime was committed. What they did hold is that the trial court is not a passive spectator in the effort to insure a fair trial. [6] Because Dean, Kramer, Alfonsi and Sheppard were all concerned with the defendant's right to a fair trial, it is important to note that the right to a jury of the county or district where the crime was committed is also a component of the right to a fair trial. See, United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944). [7] In the instant case defendant, aided by competent counsel, [4] consciously determined that he wished to be tried by a jury in Milwaukee. This consideration included the desire to have jurors from the same environment in which the crime took place chosen from a pool having a Mexican-American community; the effect a trial far from home would have on a defendant who might otherwise enjoy the moral support of family and friends; the ability to investigate during the trial and to locate and secure rebuttal witnesses; and the convenience of counsel in being close to his office, both from a logistical and financial point of view. (Br. App. 63-64). Because these factors do play a part in the consideration of fairness of a trial, the strategic choice, made by the defendant and guaranteed by the constitution must be respected. It is the state's position that the right to be tried where the crime is committed is predicated on the right to an impartial jury. If an impartial jury is unobtainable, the state reasons, then the place of trial guarantee is unavailable. [8, 9] But because the venue right is grounded on policy considerations of its own, we think it unwise, particularly in light of the aforementioned precedent, to construe one right as contingent upon another. Both rights seek to insure the ultimate right to a fair trial. And in most cases, the rights are not mutually exclusive. The right to an impartial jury may be vindicated in ways other than the compelled relinquishment of the right to venue where the crime was committed. As this court said in McKissick v. State, 49 Wis.2d 537, 182 N.W.2d 282, 286 (1971): The constitutional guarantee of a fair trial before an impartial jury is not, however, synonymous with a change of venue. Change of venue is only one method of guaranteeing a fair trial; others are voir dire and continuance. [10] Certainly, if the defendant objected to a change of venue, he would not be heard later to complain that he was entitled to a change of venue, because he would have waived such opportunity. Cf. Dolan v. State, 48 Wis.2d 696, 703, 180 N.W.2d 623 (1970). But so long as his choice is made knowingly and intelligently, it should be his. [5] Other jurisdictions are divided on the question before the court. We have read the cases supporting both the state's [6] and the defendant's [7] position but derive from this examination no reason to depart from our own precedent. [8] [11] That precedent holds that any venue change must be pursuant to defendant's waiver of his right to a jury from the county or district where the crime was committed. The trial court erred in moving the place of trial to Sparta over the objection of the defendant. We hold that the proceedings held there are void. Wheeler, supra, 24 Wis. at 59.