Opinion ID: 1107705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Class-Certification Order

Text: On March 12, 2003, the trial court entered its class-certification order, certifying a class composed of [a]ll women who underwent breast augmentation at [the center] with saline breast implants (not pre-filled from the manufacturer) between April 1, 2000, and January 31, 2001. After reciting the factual background of the case, the court discussed application to the facts of the various requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), Ala. R. Civ. P., discussing in turn numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and finally predominance and superiority. With respect to predominance, the court declared: An exposure type mass tort is `particularly appropriate' for class action treatment.13 In this particular matter it is the view of the Court that the question of predominance requires an analysis as to whether questions of law and fact regarding liability predominate over questions of law and fact as to the individual class members' damages. Counsel for Plaintiffs outlined a number of liability issues common to all members of the class. Among those issues, which are compelling to the Court, are the cause of the fungus, the exposure to the fungus, the source of the fungus, matters involving informed consent, the use of the open bowl method, the same filling method, and the same storage of the saline at the Center. The court would add to this list that all class members used just two physicians at one facility. Also all were exposed during roughly the same time period as the women whose contaminated implants were removed. In addition to these common facts, the questions of law regarding liability are the same with all of the class. Even in questions of damages the law would be the same with each member of the class. In the event the jury determines liability, factual issues of damages will vary from member to member; however, issues of non-compensatory damages will be fairly common to all members of the class. For example, the question of lost income, if any, will vary from member to member;14 however, should the jury award mental anguish or punitive damages, many common issues of law and fact would be involved. 13 Ex parte Russell Corp., 703 So.2d 953 (Ala.1997). 14 On the other hand, present medical expenses of the large majority of the subclass who have had their explants removed have already been absorbed by [SAMC] thus obviating a jury determination of these amounts. With respect to the introductory sentence of this section of the trial court's order, we note the following: This Court's opinion in Ex parte Russell Corp., which the trial court cites as authority, although vacating the order certifying the class, does contain the statement that the facts and issues involved in that case make it particularly appropriate for class relief. 703 So.2d at 965. That statement was clearly dictum, as the special writing of Justice Houston, joined by Chief Justice Hooper, points out. 703 So.2d at 966 (Houston, J., concurring in the result). Of the seven Justices participating in the case, only the author of the opinion and two other Justices approved the statement. 703 So.2d at 968 (Cook, J., dissenting, joined by Shores, J.). Therefore, as this Court later pointed out in Regions Bank v. Lee, 905 So.2d 765, 771 n. 5 (Ala.2004): [T]he law [on the adequacy issue] as stated in Russell is not binding on this Court. The class-certification order in the instant case certified the entire action for class-action treatment without discussing, or discriminating among, the various claims involved, much less the elements of those claims. The court did state that because Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, the requirements of Rule 23(b) must be established. This subsection requires a showing of predominance and superiority. Obviously, the court's reference related specifically to Rule 23(b)(3).