Opinion ID: 1786870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Counts Six (Alleging Wrongful Interference) and Eight (Alleging Conversion)

Text: Lynch alleges tortious interference in Count Six by averring that the News has wrongfully interfered with plaintiff's business relations. He alleges that, [s]pecifically, defendant has interfered with plaintiff's operations in wrongfully canceling plaintiff's contracts. Lynch alleges conversion in Count Eight by averring that the News converted his newspaper sales racks. The News refers to paragraph 10 of the agreements, providing that [p]ending the settlement of [a] dispute [i.e., a dispute regarding a termination that a party contends was unwarranted] the business and method of operation under the Agreement shall continue in accordance with the contention of [the News]. The News concedes that it replaced Lynch's sales racks, but contends that its replacing Lynch's racks was consistent with its right under paragraph 10 to continue the business and method of operation in the territory covered by the agreements. Lynch relies upon Old Republic for the proposition that claims alleging conversion and tortious interference are not within the scope of an arbitration clause that calls for arbitration of claims arising out of a contract. In Old Republic, this Court stated that the plaintiff's count alleging conversion and intentional interference with business relationships ` appears to raise issues largely distinct from the central conflict over the interpretation and performance of the [agreements themselves].' 644 So.2d at 1263 (quoting Mediterranean Enterps., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1983)) (emphasis added) (interpolation in Old Republic ). In later proceedings involving Old Republic, after remand and trial, the tort claims that this Court had initially thought appeared distinct turned out, in fact, not to be claims that could be separated from the interpretation and performance of the contracts. Accordingly, this Court recognized that those very tort claims were arbitrable. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So.2d 1258 (Ala.2000). Suffice it to say that Counts Six and Eight depend heavily upon the construction of the terms of the agreements, and, under these circumstances, we cannot say that Counts Six and Eight are collateral to, and do not arise out of, the agreements. Hence, Counts Six and Eight are subject to arbitration. The trial court's order must be reversed insofar as it denied arbitration of the claims stated in Counts Six and Eight.