Opinion ID: 744609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Representational Evidence

Text: 34 SNET contends that, while it is permissible to award back wages to an entire group of employees based on the testimony of a representative sample, the sample of 2.5 percent used by the district court was inadequate. We disagree. 35 When a defendant in a suit for lost wages under the FLSA fails to maintain employment records as required by the Act, an employee (or the Secretary on behalf of a group of employees) may submit sufficient evidence from which violations of the Act and the amount of an award may be reasonably inferred. Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1296-97 (3d Cir.1991). In doing so, an employee (or in this case the Secretary) is simply following the instructions of the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687-88, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 1192-93, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946): 36 where the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes ... [t]he solution ... is not to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a result would place a premium on an employer's failure to keep proper records in conformity with his statutory duty; it would allow the employer to keep the benefits of an employee's labors without paying due compensation as contemplated by the Fair Labor Standards Act. In such a situation we hold that an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence. If the employer fails to produce such evidence, the court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result be only approximate. 37 In meeting the burden under Mt. Clemens, the Secretary need not present testimony from each underpaid employee; rather, it is well-established that the Secretary may present the testimony of a representative sample of employees as part of his proof of the prima facie case under the FLSA. See Reich v. Southern Maryland Hosp., Inc., 43 F.3d 949, 951 (4th Cir.1995); Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 701-02 (3d Cir.1994). 38 The Secretary's burden in such cases, while not overly onerous, is to establish a prima facie case. See Gateway Press, 13 F.3d at 701; Secretary of Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 793 (1st Cir.1991) (noting that the Secretary's initial burden in these cases is minimal). He is not required to do so in complete detail as to the wages lost by each employee. However, he must produce sufficient evidence to establish that the employees have in fact performed work for which they were improperly compensated and produce sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687, 66 S.Ct. at 1192; cf. Gateway Press, 13 F.3d at 701. Upon meeting this burden, the burden shifts to the employer, and if the employer fails to produce evidence of the precise amount of work performed or evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence, the court may then award damages to the employee[s], even though the result be only approximate. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687-88, 66 S.Ct. at 1192. 39 The Secretary presented the testimony of thirty-nine employees, accounting for each of the five job categories in question. See DeSisto, 929 F.2d at 793 (Where the employees fall into several job categories, it seems to us that, at a minimum, the testimony of a representative employee from, or a person with first-hand knowledge of, each of the categories is essential to support a back pay award.). These witnesses served directly in four of the job categories (OPTs, network deployment technicians/cable splicers, network delivery technicians/cable repair workers, and service delivery technicians/installation and maintenance workers), and some of the witnesses (particularly the OPTs) had firsthand knowledge of the fifth (ASCs). See SNET, 892 F.Supp. at 391-96, 402. Although the district court did not make express findings that the sample covered the three types of sites at which SNET's work is performed, it is clear from the findings and the record that witnesses had worked in all three areas and testified broadly about their experiences. See id. at 392. 40 Although SNET is correct that most cases resting on representational evidence involve a fairly small employee population, a limited number of employee positions, and uniform work tasks, Reich v. Southern Maryland Hosp., Inc., 43 F.3d 949, 952 (4th Cir.1995); see, e.g., Bel-Loc Diner, 780 F.2d at 1115 (testimony of 22 employees for DoL supporting award of backpay to group of 98 employees); Donovan v. Williams Oil Co., 717 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir.1983) (testimony of 19 supported award to group of 34); Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 672 F.2d 221, 224-25 (1st Cir.1982) (testimony of six employees from six restaurants, with stipulations from 20 others, found to support backpay award to 246 employees at 44 restaurants); Brennan v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 482 F.2d 825, 826, 829 (5th Cir.1973) (testimony of 16, award to 26), there is no bright line formulation that mandates reversal when the sample is below a percentage threshold. It is axiomatic that the weight to be accorded evidence is a function not of quantity but of quality, DeSisto, 929 F.2d at 793 ( 'the adequacy of the representative testimony necessarily will be determined in light of the nature of the work involved, the working conditions and relationships, and the detail and credibility of the testimony' ) (quoting, with approval, brief of Secretary of Labor), and that, depending on the nature of the facts to be proved, a very small sample of representational evidence can suffice. Cf. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 690-91, 692-93, 66 S.Ct. at 1193-94, 1194-95 (testimony of 8 of approximately 300 employees, or 2.7% of group, sufficient to establish entitlement to recovery under the FLSA). Our focus is not on the numbers in isolation but on whether the district court could reasonably conclude that there was sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of ... [uncompensated] work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. Id. at 687, 66 S.Ct. at 1192. In the case at bar, we cannot say that the district court's conclusion is in error. 41 Ultimately, we are untroubled by the quantum of representational evidence in this case because the testimony covered each clearly defined category of worker; there was actual consistency among those workers' testimony, both within each category and overall; SNET offered no contradictory testimony; the abuse arose from an admitted policy of the employer that was consistently applied; and the periods at issue were the employees' lunch hours, which are predictable, daily-recurring periods of uniform and predetermined duration. Compare Southern Maryland Hosp., 43 F.3d at 952 (finding that district court abused its discretion in relying on a representational sample consisting of 1.6% of employees covering a variety of departments, positions, time periods, shifts, and staffing needs when the sample failed to include employees from several departments). In other words, the focus of attention was not the level of activity of outside craft employees at open sites during their lunch break but whether and for what reasons the employees were required to remain on-site. The evidence, wholly apart from its representational nature, supported the district court's finding that the workers had the significant responsibility during their lunch break of ensuring the security of the site and the equipment and the safety of any passers-by. The district court heard testimony covering every relevant combination of workers and work site. Accordingly, we are unable to find error in Judge Daly's conclusion that the Secretary produced sufficient evidence on which to base a just and reasonable inference that SNET failed to compensate its employees in a manner consistent with the FLSA.