Opinion ID: 2369882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A. Did the University engage in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process by closing Mills's disciplinary hearing to the public?

Text: ¶ 11 The APA requires agency hearings to be open to public observation, except for the parts that the presiding officer states to be closed under a provision of law expressly authorizing closure. RCW 34.05.449(5). The APA also states that, as an `[i]nstitution[] of higher education,' the University is an `[a]gency.' RCW 34.05.010(7), (2). Because the University based its decision to close Mills's disciplinary hearing to the public on section XVII.2.d of its Faculty Handbook, the question before us is whether that rule is a provision of law within the meaning of RCW 34.05.449(5). ¶ 12 This court has said that a `rule has the force and effect of law, if promulgated in accordance with a legislative delegation.' Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wash.2d 439, 445, 932 P.2d 628 (1997) (quoting 2 AM.JUR.2D Administrative Law § 160, at 182 (1994)). Significantly, the legislature has authorized institutions of higher education to establish rules governing peer review proceedings. The pertinent statute, RCW 28B.10.648(2), provides, in part, that [p]eer review proceedings shall be pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the respective institutions of higher education. It is undisputed that Mills's hearing before a panel of his fellow professors was a peer review proceeding. ¶ 13 The Court of Appeals determined, however, that the University's rule authorizing the closure of faculty disciplinary hearings was not a provision of law because the APA's definition of `Rule' specifically excludes the rules of institutions of higher education involving ... employment relationships. RCW 34.05.010(16). In other words, according to the Court of Appeals, a rule must fall within the APA's definition of `Rule' to have the force of law. Mills, 150 Wash.App. at 277-78, 208 P.3d 13. ¶ 14 This neat dichotomy between Rules with a capital R, which have the force of law, and second-rate rules, which do not have the force of law, finds no support in our jurisprudence. Rather, as the University points out, the paramount consideration is whether the rule (or regulation, order, directive, or policy) was promulgated pursuant to legislative delegation. Indeed, in State v. Brown, 142 Wash.2d 57, 62, 11 P.3d 818 (2000), we said, To have the force of law, an administrative regulation must be properly promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation. In keeping with that principle, we held that, because the Department of Corrections (DOC) had promulgated its list of serious infraction[s] pursuant to the wrong statute, the regulation in question lacked the force of law. [3] Id. at 61, 11 P.3d 818. We explained that [a]gencies are creatures of law and are required to promulgate regulations pursuant to the statute or statutes authorizing them. Id. at 62, 11 P.3d 818; see also Joyce v. Dep't of Corr., 155 Wash.2d 306, 323, 119 P.3d 825 (2005) (because the Department's policy directives are not promulgated pursuant to legislative delegation, they do not have the force of law). ¶ 15 Our focus on legislative delegation is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). In that case, the Court explained that, in order to have the force and effect of law, a regulation must be rooted in a grant of ... power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes. Id. at 302, 99 S.Ct. 1705. The Court went on to say that [w]hat is important is that the reviewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority contemplates the regulations issued. Id. at 308, 99 S.Ct. 1705. [4] ¶ 16 Thus, the question becomes whether section XVII.2.d of the University's Faculty Handbook was promulgated pursuant to legislative delegation. As we have seen, the legislature has provided that [p]eer review proceedings shall be pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the respective institutions of higher education. RCW 28B.10.648(2). More broadly, the legislature has granted the board of trustees of ... regional universities the authority to promulgate such rules and regulations ... as the board ... may in its discretion deem necessary or appropriate to the administration of the regional university. RCW 28B.35.120(12). We conclude that these grants of authority contemplate a regulation such as section XVII.2.d of the University's Faculty Handbook directing that faculty disciplinary hearings be closed to the public. ¶ 17 Our conclusion is bolstered by legislative history. In its summary of Substitute House Bill 915, which became RCW 28B.10.648, the House Committee on Higher Education said, Peer review procedures shall be conducted privately under rules adopted by the institution. 1984 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 48th Wash. Leg., at 48 (emphasis added). [5] We are satisfied that the University's rule authorizing the closure of faculty disciplinary proceedings is consistent with legislative intent. Because section XVII.2.d of the University's Faculty Handbook was promulgated pursuant to legislative delegation, we hold that it is a provision of law expressly authorizing closure within the meaning of RCW 34.05.449(5). The University, therefore, did not engage in an unlawful procedure by closing Mills's disciplinary hearing to the public. [6]