Opinion ID: 490916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Habeas Relief

Text: 18 Casper argues that because he was not tried within 180 days of his request for a full and speedy disposition of the Pennsylvania charges against him as required by Article III of the IAD, 7 he was entitled to a dismissal of the charges with prejudice under Article V(c) of the IAD. 8 Casper also argues that the Pennsylvania Superior Court incorrectly concluded that he refused to sign the Montgomery County Form 2 and that he withdrew his earlier request to be transferred to Pennsylvania. The district attorney argues first, that the mere assertion that a state prisoner has not been timely tried under the IAD does not, without more, present a claim cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action and, second, that in any event, Casper's letter received March 12, 1981 was insufficient to trigger the 180 day provision of Article III of the IAD. 19 We consider first the District Attorney's argument that habeas relief is not available for the type of violation of the IAD that is at issue here. As a general rule,  'collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements' of a rule of criminal procedure in the absence of any indication that the defendant was prejudiced by the asserted technical error. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962)). [T]he appropriate inquiry [is] whether the claimed error of law was 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether '[i]t ... present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.'  Id. (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471). 20 In dismissing Casper's application for a writ of habeas corpus based on an IAD violation, the district court appeared to construe the scope of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 as limited to constitutional violations. The court stated, the decisive issue in the present context is whether petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated and that [a] possible technical violation of state law does not add up to denial of a speedy trial under the United States Constitution, violation of due process, or inadequate representation by counsel. App. at 184. The language of section 2254 is not limited to constitutional violations since it also requires a district court to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner who alleges that he is in custody in violation of the ... laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. For purposes of federal habeas corpus proceedings under Sec. 2254, the IAD is a federal law. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438, 101 S.Ct. 703, 706, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Shack v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 776 F.2d 1170, 1172 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1234, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). 21 In addition, the district court did not discuss the effect of our decision in United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585 (3d Cir.1980), upon which Casper relies. In Williams, we held that a claimed violation of Article IV(e) of the IADA, which requires the receiving authority to dispose of all pending charges prior to returning the defendant to the original place of imprisonment, amounted to a fundamental defect or exceptional circumstance and we concluded that Williams' allegation of an IADA violation is the type of statutory claim cognizable in a section 2255 action. Id. at 590. Even before the Williams decision, we had held in United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 834-39 (3d Cir.1975), that a state prisoner stated a cause of action cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 when he alleged that he had been transported from a federal prison at the state's request and returned to the federal prison without having been tried in the state in violation of Article IV(e) of the IADA. Relying on these two cases, and on Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878 (3d Cir.1984), rev'd sub nom Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985), where we affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief when the receiving state failed to try a prisoner within the 180 days allowed by Article III, Casper argues that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus or at least to a hearing in the district court on his petition. 22 We believe that Casper confuses two separate issues: the question whether a claim of an IAD violation is cognizable in a section 2254 or 2255 proceeding is a different one than whether the petitioner who can establish only a minor violation is entitled to the writ sought. The binding precedent of our decisions in Williams and Esola is that the IAD is a law[ ] of the United States and that a prisoner is therefore entitled to invoke sections 2254 or 2255 by alleging an IAD violation. However, in Williams, we also stated, Whether collateral relief is granted may turn on the merits of the alleged violation, but we do not believe the availability of collateral relief should be so determined. 615 F.2d at 590 n. 4 (emphasis in original). In fact, we denied collateral relief to Williams because the method by which he was transferred had not then been held to be governed by the IADA. Id. at 592-93. Similarly, in Esola, we stated: [w]e emphasize that we decide no more in this case than that a cause of action is stated by the apparent failure of New Jersey to comply with the terms of the Agreement. 520 F.2d at 839. In light of the very incomplete record before this Court, we remanded the matter to the district court for development of a full record. Id. We specifically noted that what we were deciding was that a claimed IAD violation stated a claim over which the federal court had jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus relief. Id. at 834 & n. 16, 839. 23 In this case, the district court did not hold that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as Casper states. Appellant's Brief at 16. Instead, the court considered and dismissed the petition on the merits of the claim based on the amplified record before it, which included the record of the Pennsylvania proceedings. While the district court's limited view of section 2254 was erroneous, it is also possible to read its opinion as holding that Pennsylvania's possible technical violation of the IAD in commencing Casper's trial a couple of weeks late does not provide a basis for granting habeas relief. 24 We are bound by our holdings in Williams and Esola that a violation of the anti-shuttling provision of the IADA may warrant habeas relief, even without a showing of prejudice, 9 notwithstanding that this is contrary to the mainstream of precedent elsewhere. See Greathouse v. United States, 655 F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir.1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 926, 102 S.Ct. 1289, 71 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982) (Absent special circumstances, violations of [Article IV(e) of] the IADA are not grounds for collateral attack ... under Sec. 2255); Huff v. United States, 599 F.2d 860, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 428, 62 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (alleged violation of Article IV(e) trial before return provision not cognizable under Sec. 2255 absent showing of prejudice); Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.1977) (per curiam) (violation of Article IV(e) trial before return provision not cognizable under Sec. 2255 because no showing of fundamental defect). But see Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 414 (7th Cir.1986) (violation of Article IV(e) trial before return provision cognizable in a federal habeas petition). 25 However, neither Williams nor Esola stands for the proposition that any minor violation of any IAD provision requires a federal court to grant habeas relief. 10 It is particularly significant that in both Williams and Esola, the claimed IADA violation was the failure of the receiving state to try the prisoner before returning him to the custody of the sending jurisdiction. In Shack v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 776 F.2d 1170, 1173 (3d Cir.1985),cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1234, 89 L.Ed.2d 3 (1986), we construed Williams and Esola as holding that transfer and return without trial is a fundamental defect. 26 Of course we recognize that in Williams, one of the reasons given for the holding that a violation of IADA Article IV(e) is a fundamental defect was Congress' provision of the remedy of automatic dismissal of the charge with prejudice. Based on that language the court in Shack held that a state's failure to provide a prisoner with a pre-transfer extradition hearing as required by IAD Article IV(d) did not constitute a fundamental defect warranting habeas relief since the IAD provided no comparable sanction for that violation. 776 F.2d at 1173. 27 Concededly, the IAD also provides the remedy of dismissal with prejudice as the sanction for a trial that is untimely under Article III or Article IV. See note 8 supra. If we believed that under our controlling precedent, the sanction alone elevates such untimeliness, irrespective of how short the delay, to a fundamental defect for which habeas relief is mandated, we would be obliged to suggest that this matter be reconsidered by the in banc court. We believe, however, that the mandatory sanction of dismissal was just one of the factors that led the Williams court to its decision. More significant, we believe, was the court's concern about the effect of shuttling a prisoner. We stated, The basic goal of the Act is to prevent transfer back and forth between competing jurisdictions, its theory being that such transfers undermine the right to a speedy trial and the rehabilitative process of the system in which the prisoner is currently serving a sentence. Williams, 615 F.2d at 588. We cannot view a violation of the anti-shuttling provision, which involves the removal of the prisoner from one jurisdiction, transfer, and return without trial, as comparable to the inception of a trial several weeks after required, particularly when the 120 day and 180 day provisions of the IAD themselves allow for an extension of the time for good cause. See Articles III(a), IV(c). 28 Thus, we are free to consider whether delay in a state trial for less than a month beyond the 180 day limit, which is all the prisoner alleges in his application for habeas corpus, is such a fundamental defect that a federal court is required to grant a writ of habeas corpus releasing the prisoner. We believe that such a holding would be counter to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Davis. See Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 929, 106 S.Ct. 263, 88 L.Ed.2d 269 (1985) (violation of the 180-day time provision of Article III(a) does not constitute a fundamental defect entitling a prisoner to relief under Sec. 2254 absent a showing of prejudice arising out of the alleged violation). 29 Although the IAD itself provides strict sanctions for noncompliance with its mandated time schedules and a federal court applying the IADA would be obliged to impose those sanctions in a federal criminal proceeding, we believe that our function as a habeas court is not to act as an appeal court for minor violations of the statute by state authorities. Such action would trivialize the habeas corpus writ. It is significant that Casper did not allege that the claimed IAD violation prejudiced his ability to defend at trial or the circumstances of his incarceration. 30 We therefore hold as one basis for our decision affirming the district court's refusal to grant a writ of habeas corpus that on the amplified record before us, Pennsylvania's failure to try Casper on the charges until October 6, 1981, which was more than 180 days after the date of March 12, 1981 when the District Attorney's office received Casper's letter, does not constitute a fundamental defect warranting the grant of habeas corpus relief.