Opinion ID: 773564
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: she is a member of a protected class;

Text: 30 (2)she made herself available to receive and pay for services ordinarily provided by the defendant to all members of the public in the manner in which they are ordinarily provided; and 31 (3)she did not enjoy the privileges and benefits of the contracted for experience under factual circumstances which rationally support an inference of unlawful discrimination in that 32 (a)she was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not deprived of those services, and/or 33 (b)she received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable. Id. at 707. 7 34 According to Callwood, subparts (1) and (2) are consistent with the standard prima facie elements as adopted by other courts. Subpart (3)(a) is designed to invoke the similarly situated test, but is written with the understanding that the comparison will never involve precisely the same set of ... [conduct] occurring over the same period of time and under the same sets of circumstances. Id. at 707 (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, the phrase deprived of services in subpart (3)(a) is written to encompass more than just an outright denial of services. By encompassing the deprivation of services ... , subpart (3)(a) protects against discriminatory conduct by retailers which, while not necessarily constituting a denial of services, nevertheless impinges on the 'benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.' Id.(citation omitted). 35 Subpart (3)(b) is written as an alternative to (3)(a) to account for situations in the commercial establishment context in which a plaintiff cannot identify other similarly situated persons. See id. at 708. Under this subpart, a retailer's markedly hostile conduct may give rise to a rational inference of discrimination sufficient to support a prima facie case without any evidence of how similarly situated persons were treated. Id. Factors relevant to subpart (3)(b)'s markedly hostile component include whether the conduct is (1) so profoundly contrary to the manifest financial interests of the merchant and/or her employees; (2) so far outside of widely-accepted business norms; and (3) so arbitrary on its face, that the conduct supports a rational inference of discrimination. Id. 36 We believe that while the three-part test employed by the district court in the instant case adequately represents the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof in a §1981 action, it is inappropriate for use as a prima facie standard. Although plaintiffs advocate its use, we believe that it propagates the false notion that a plaintiff must provide direct evidence of the defendant's intent to discriminate as part of the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework. Because the implementation of the three-part test would turn the purpose of the prima facie case on its head, we reject that test. 37 We also cannot adopt the four-part test put forth by the defendant in this case because it narrows the methods available to a plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination. 8 By holding a plaintiff to the requirement that she produce similarly situated persons who were not discriminated against, we would be foreclosing other methods of proving intentional discrimination. This test is also particularly onerous because of the difficulty in replicating a particular shopper's experience. The challenge of locating similarly situated persons is highlighted by the case, Singh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-1613, 1999 WL 374184,  (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1999), to which Wal-Mart cites approvingly. In Singh, the district court rejected a plaintiff's §1981 claim where the plaintiff could not show he was similarly situated in all respects to other customers who were provided a different level of service. According to the district court, plaintiff's claim failed because he could not point to any other customer who had attempted to return an out-of-warranty appliance, purchased another identical appliance and then again attempted to make a return the next day at the same store in the presence of an employee who witnessed the events of the prior day and had been alerted to a conversation in which the customer or his companion discussed replicating the purchase and using the new receipt to do a swap. Singh, 1999 WL 374184, . By virtue of its inflexibility and severity, the Singh court's similarly situated test virtually forecloses the possibility that a plaintiff could ever successfully raise a §1981 disparate treatment claim in the commercial establishment context. 38 Upon consideration, we conclude that the Callwood court's three-part prima facie test is the most useful to courts evaluating claims of race discrimination in the commercial establishment context and we therefore adopt it as our own. In a §1981 commercial establishment case, a plaintiff must prove: 39 (1)plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 40 (2)plaintiff sought to make or enforce a contract for services ordinarily provided by the defendant; and 41 (3)plaintiff was denied the right to enter into or enjoy the benefits or privileges of the contractual relationship in that (a) plaintiff was deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were not and/or (b) plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory. 42 The test's advantages are many. First, it best accounts for the differences in circumstances between employment and commercial establishment claims. The test offers the most traditional method of proving discrimination, namely by demonstrating discriminatory treatment with respect to similarly situated persons. It also allows a plaintiff to state a claim when similarly situated persons are not available for comparison, as will often be the case in the commercial establishment context. 43 Second, the language in subpart (3)(a) which makes actionable the deprivation of service, as opposed to an outright refusal of service, better comprehends the realities of commercial establishment cases in which an aggrieved plaintiff may have been asked to leave the place of business prior to completing her purchase, refused service within the establishment, or refused outright access to the establishment. It is thus in harmony with the promise of §1981(b), which guaranties all persons equal rights in the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 44 Finally, this broader protection also accords with our circuit precedent. In Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235, 243 (6th Cir. 1990), this court held that in order to state a claim for discrimination under §1981 a plaintiff need not actually be refused service by a private club because such a standard would allow commercial establishments [to] avoid liability merely by refusing minorities entrance to the establishment before they had the chance to order. Id. UnderWatson, the plaintiff need only show that she intended to make a purchase and was asked to leave the establishment in order to prevent her from making the purchase on account of her race in order to satisfy the make and enforce contracts clause of §1981. 9