Opinion ID: 4536576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Meraz-Magana

Text: Meraz-Magana challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in attributing to him the drugs found in the two separate storage units: A22 and D16-27. See generally USSG § 1B1.3(a). We apply the standard of review explained above. Section 1B1.3 provides, in relevant part, that a Guidelines determination shall be based on “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). The district court relied on Application Note 3D, which states that “the defendant is accountable . . . for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved . . ..” USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) cmt. n.3D. MerazMagana contends that the court’s reliance on this Application Note was in error, citing United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis, we held that “[t]he Guidelines’ -6- Nos. 18-4235/19-3169 United States v. Juan Caro-Silva, et al. definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ does not include attempt crimes,” and thus the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by issuing commentary that listed attempts as “controlled substance offenses” under USSG § 4B1.2(b). Id. at 385–86. Application Note 3D does not similarly add to or expand upon the text of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)—it simply interprets “all acts and omissions committed” to include drugs. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1993) (holding that “[c]ommentary which functions to interpret a guideline or explain how it is to be applied . . . controls, and if failure to follow, or a misreading of, such commentary results in a sentence selected from the wrong guideline range . . ., that sentence would constitute an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines” (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). The district court did not err in applying Application Note 3D. We turn to the facts. Agents discovered mail inside unit A22 addressed only to MerazMagana. The owner of the facility identified Meraz-Magana as the renter of unit D16-27, and agents found a copy of the rental agreement for that unit in Meraz-Magana’s room at his residence. Unit D16-27 was also rented the day after Meraz-Magana informed someone, in an intercepted communication, that he planned to rent another storage unit at the same facility where he already had a unit, the facility where unit A22 was located. Agent Alvord personally observed, and surveillance footage captured, Meraz-Magana visiting and accessing both A22 and D16-27 on numerous occasions. The record provides ample grounds to establish that Meraz-Magana was “directly involved” with the drugs found inside the units. The district court did not clearly err in attributing the drugs to Meraz-Magana as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). Meraz-Magana also challenges the district court’s determination that 72,270 kilograms of converted drug weight was attributable to him. For drug determinations, the district court must rule on disputed calculations and explain its factual foundation for doing so. See Fed. R. Crim. P. -7- Nos. 18-4235/19-3169 United States v. Juan Caro-Silva, et al. 32(i)(3)(B); United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 512–13 (6th Cir. 2011). Quantity determinations are a finding of fact and are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2013). “An estimate will suffice as long as it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. The Government presented, and the district court relied on, the following: In unit D16-27, agents discovered nine same-sized, mostly empty bags, one of which was labeled “1000g,” and two of which contained visible white powder. The bags containing white powder or residue tested positive for cocaine. Agents found three additional bags, two of which were marked “2.5lb” and one labelled “2.5,” containing residue that tested positive for methamphetamine and a crystal that effectively tested as 100 percent pure methamphetamine. Based on the presence and testing of the residue, the bags’ labels, and the inference that the bags were once full, the district court attributed approximately 72,270 kilograms of drugs to Meraz-Magana. The district court identified the particular evidence it relied on in making its calculation, see United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 515–16 (6th Cir. 2004), and the record supports its ultimate determination. The court did not clearly err. Lastly, Meraz-Magana challenges the district court’s application of a four-level enhancement for Meraz-Magana’s leadership role in the drug conspiracy. See generally USSG § 3B1.1(a). We review the court’s factual finding for clear error and review de novo the legal conclusion that Meraz-Magana was an organizer or leader. See United States v. Sexton, 894 F.3d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 2018). “In general, ‘a defendant must have exerted control over at least one individual within a criminal organization for the enhancement of § 3B1.1 to be warranted.’” United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 811 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Gort-Didonato, 109 F.3d -8- Nos. 18-4235/19-3169 United States v. Juan Caro-Silva, et al. 318, 321 (6th Cir. 1997)). We consider other factors, including a defendant’s decision-making authority, the nature of his participation in the commission of the offense, whether he recruited accomplices, the degree of his participation in planning or organizing the offense, and the degree of his control and authority exercised over others. USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. The record demonstrates that Meraz-Magana decided to whom drugs should be sold and the method of payment, collected money, sold drugs himself, and obtained drugs for others to sell. For example, Meraz-Magana instructed a co-conspirator, Ignacio Gutierrez, over the phone where the drugs were located, to whom he was to sell, and when and where he was to meet the drug purchaser. The purchaser then would deliver the payment to Meraz-Magana himself. In another instance, Gutierrez told Meraz-Magana that his customer was anxious to receive his cocaine; Meraz-Magana responded that the customer would have to wait until he was ready. MerazMagana’s conduct demonstrates that he exercised decision-making authority and played a leadership role in the conspiracy. Meraz-Magana argues that Gutierrez was the leader, but a conspiracy can have multiple leaders or organizers. See USSG § 3B.1.1 cmt. n.4; see also United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2014). That Gutierrez occasionally assumed a leadership position does not diminish the leadership role Meraz-Magana played. Ample grounds supported the enhancement.