Opinion ID: 1458058
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: An antitrust plaintiff seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act must prove an antitrust violation, fact of damage or injury, and measurable damages. Danny Kresky Enter. Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir.1983). Columbia argues that Plaintiffs failed to provide the jury with sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of individual and market-wide damages. Columbia recognizes that Leitzinger opined that every class member who sold ferrous scrap incurred a 16.4 percent undercharge for every sale during the class period, resulting in aggregate damages of $20.9 million. But because the jury reached a verdict of $11.5 million in damages, Columbia argues, the jury must have resorted to speculation and conjecture to arrive at such a figure, illustrating the insufficiency of the damages evidence on damages. Columbia's challenge to the jury's verdict on damages is therefore directed at the accuracy of the amount of damages and not the fact of damages. Columbia's argument, in essence, is that Leitzinger's testimony alone was insufficient for the jury to have accurately fixed Plaintiffs' damages. The district court, rejecting Columbia's argument, explained: In sum, Leitzinger testified that, if a conspiracy to depress prices via customer allocation existed during the alleged period, it would have uniformly impacted the relevant scrap metal market, and that impact would have been one that was shared in common by all of the ferrous generators. He went on to testify that the uniform injury experienced by all of the ferrous class members was a 16.4% undercharge during the conspiracy period. Further, Leitzinger testified that the undercharge experienced by the named Plaintiffs specifically was 16.4% as well. .... If credited, therefore, Leitzinger's testimony clearly established evidence of injury to the named Plaintiffs and the class as a whole, and measurable damages to the named Plaintiffs and the class as a whole.... If the jury credited Leitzinger's conclusions  in whole or in part  it reasonably could have reached the conclusions that it did. In re Scrap Metal, 2006 WL 2850453, at -18. We agree. First, a jury is entitled to award damages in an antitrust case based on expert testimony. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 572, 110 S.Ct. 2535, 110 L.Ed.2d 492 (1990) (holding that expert testimony ... provided a sufficient basis for an acceptable estimate of the amount of damages). Second, [t]he antitrust cases are legion which reiterate the proposition that, if the fact of damages is proven, the actual computation of damages may suffer from minor imperfections. South-East Coal Co. v. Consol. Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 794 (6th Cir.1970). Once liability is established, therefore, a plaintiff's proof of damages is evaluated under a more lenient standard. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 567, 101 S.Ct. 1923, 68 L.Ed.2d 442 (1981). As the Supreme Court has stated in explaining its traditional rule excusing antitrust plaintiffs from an unduly rigorous standard of proving antitrust injury, id. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1923, it does not `come with very good grace' for the wrongdoer to insist upon specific and certain proof of the injury which it has itself inflicted. Id. at 566-67, 101 S.Ct. 1923 (quoting Hetzel v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 169 U.S. 26, 39, 18 S.Ct. 255, 42 L.Ed. 648 (1898)). Any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the expense of his victim. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264, 66 S.Ct. 574, 90 L.Ed. 652 (1946). Further, the fact that the jury chose to assess damages in an amount substantially below that recommended by plaintiff's expert does not mean that the evidence offered in support of lost profits was inadequate as a matter of law. Falls Steel Tube & Mfg. Co. v. Trumark, Inc., No. 94-3981, 1995 WL 750541, at  (6th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (explaining that even though defendant identified weaknesses in the evidence of damages, we do not find it to be so `speculative or remote' that the matter should have been taken from the jury). See also Rodney v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 146 Fed.Appx. 783, 791 (6th Cir.2005) (A plaintiff need not calculate a specific damage figure so long as he proposes an acceptable method for calculating damages.). We conclude that Leitzinger's testimony is sufficient to support the jury's damage award.