Opinion ID: 2762561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Patdown

Text: We have previously identified a number of factors relevant to whether an officer had reasonable suspicion a subject was armed, which are present in this case. For example, an officer’s knowledge that a subject is presently armed is sufficient standing alone to justify a protective frisk. See United States v. Brakeman, 475 F.3d 1206, 1212– 13 (10th Cir. 2007). And an officer need not confine his search to the weapon he already knows the subject possesses. Id.at 1213. Rather, he is entitled to determine whether the subject is carrying any other weapons. Id. In this case, Officer Thatcher testified he observed a knife clipped to Mr. Bong’s jacket pocket. Once the officer had certain knowledge Mr. Bong possessed a weapon, he was entitled to conduct a protective frisk to ensure no other weapons were present. -8- Moreover, “[a]n officer’s knowledge of past criminal conduct is probative of whether the defendant is armed and dangerous, especially if a weapon was involved.” United States v. Garcia, 751 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir. 2014). Officer Thatcher testified he had previously arrested Mr. Bong for drug and weapons charges. This previous interaction, in which Mr. Bong illegally possessed a firearm, supports an inference that Mr. Bong was armed and dangerous on the night in question. Also, “an individual’s known connection with drug transactions is a factor supporting reasonable suspicion to frisk that individual for weapons” because drug crimes are frequently associated with weapons. United States v. Garcia, 459 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (10th Cir. 2006). Officer Thatcher’s prior arrest of Mr. Bong involved the possession of methamphetamine. And the officers observed Mr. Bong and his wife drive away from a house under observation on suspicion of drug trafficking. Taken together, these facts support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Finally, a subject’s evasive body positioning can be a relevant factor in establishing reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Oglesby, 597 F.3d 891, 894–96 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Raymond, 152 F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lazos, 314 F. App’x 127, 133 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).3 In Oglesby, officers approached a group of men standing at a bus stop in a high-crime area because 3 Though not precedential, we find the reasoning of this court’s unpublished opinions instructive. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (“Unpublished opinions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”). -9- the men were obstructing the sidewalk in violation of a city ordinance. 597 F.3d at 892. As the officers approached, the defendant angled his body away from the officers such that the right side of his body was obscured from their view. Id. at 894. The officers testified during the defendant’s pretrial suppression hearing that they suspected such an angled stance was being used to conceal a weapon. Id. at 894–95. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held this evasive body positioning was a valid factor in the officer’s calculation of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 895. In this case, Officer Thatcher testified Mr. Bong exited the car while keeping the right side of his body away from the officer. This type of evasive body positioning is a factor that supports a finding of reasonable suspicion. In summary, the totality of the circumstances supporting the patdown includes Officer Thatcher’s observation that Mr. Bong was presently armed with a knife, the officer’s prior arrest of Mr. Bong while he was in possession of a firearm, Mr. Bong’s prior known and current suspected involvement with drug transactions, and Mr. Bong’s suspicious body positioning.4 Based on the totality of the circumstances and viewing the 4 In his briefing to this court, Mr. Bong admits these circumstances, stating, “The officer [Officer Thatcher] testified that he believed Mr. Bong was acting nervous, that he knew that Mr. Bong had possessed a gun—in a locked glovebox—on a previous occasion, that Mr. Bong had a folded up pocket knife clipped to an exterior pocket of his jacket, and that Mr. Bong was positioned with his hip away from the car.” Aplt. Br. at 19. Although Mr. Bong disputes the legal significance of these factual circumstances, he has conceded their existence. We also note Mr. Bong’s recitation of the factual circumstances surrounding the patdown includes one allegation that is not supported by the evidence presented to the district court. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked Officer Thatcher if the gun was in the locked glove compartment of the vehicle during his previous encounter with Mr. Bong, but Officer Thatcher could not recall if that was the Continued . . . -10- evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination, we conclude Officer Thatcher had reasonable suspicion to justify frisking Mr. Bong for weapons. Because we conclude the patdown was proper, we next turn our attention to the officers’ use of force.