Opinion ID: 2195687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Business profits expectancy five years from accident

Text: On redirect examination, the plaintiff was asked: [H]ow much do you feel that you could earn working in your business five years, approximately five years after June 8, 1970, had your business been able to continue running? . . . Assuming you weren't hurt? Over objection, Mr. Ginn stated: I figured the way my business was getting along, I could earn up to $20,000 a year with my equipment and stuff. The defendant had articulated his objection on two grounds, 1) the plaintiff was attempting to prove loss of future earning capacity by proving loss of future business profits and 2) the question called for testimony in the realm of pure speculation by the witness on matters nowhere to be found in the evidence. It is unnecessary to belabor the first ground of objection except to say that under certain circumstances lost profits may be admitted as evidence of earning capacity. These circumstances are limited to those in which the individual's contribution to the enterprize is the substantial income producing factor rather than the investment of capital or the labor of others. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages, § 95 and 45 A.L.R. 3d 345. We believe that the charge given by the presiding Justice sufficiently clarified the difference between the income of the business and the plaintiff's contribution to that business when used in connection with proof of earning capacity. The defendant's second ground for objection, however, is well taken. The plaintiff's assertion that he could earn up to $20,000 a year with my equipment and stuff the way my business was getting along within five years after June 8, 1970, the date of the accident, was completely unsupported by any evidence and utter speculation. As a matter of fact, the specific evidence on the subject showed business losses for three years prior to the injury date. Where an established business has been interrupted by reason of a tortious injury to the operator, a resulting loss of prospective profits may become the basis of a recovery, provided there be evidence of past experience or from persons with expertise in the field sufficient to render the extent of such loss reasonably certain and fairly susceptible of proof. See Bogart v. Pitchless Lumber Co., 1913, 72 Wash. 417, 130 P. 490; Webster v. Beau, 1914, 77 Wash. 444, 137 P. 1013, 51 L.R.A., N.S., 81. In Pierce v. Seattle Electric Co., 1915, 83 Wash. 141, 145 P. 228, the plaintiff was permitted to testify that she had conducted a hairdressing establishment for some four years in the past, that prior to her injury, she intended to go into that business, that the opportunities for that type of business were very good. In disposing of the claimed error, the Washington Court said: The evidence was competent as tending to show a loss of earning capacity, and, as no specific statement was made of any specific amount of anticipated profits which plaintiff claimed she had lost, we fail to understand how the defendant was injured or prejudiced. Prospective profits are allowable only if they can be estimated with reasonable certainty. The plaintiff's opinion that, after the operation of his business for five years, had he not been injured, he would have earned $20,000 per year, was mere guesswork and conjecture. Opinion evidence to be admissible must be informed opinion. The jury cannot be expected to weigh such evidence in proper perspective, unless they have before them not only the opinion, but the facts which give rise to the opinion. In the instant case, we have nothing more than the plaintiff's bald assertion of future anticipated profits. To admit such evidence without a proper foundation was error. In speaking of opinion testimony, this Court has stated: The opinion, if not based upon his own firsthand observation, should at least be grounded upon facts supplied by others for which there is support in the evidence. Unless the factual foundation which underlies the opinion is known and subject to the test of cross-examination, it is virtually impossible to conduct intelligent and effective cross-examination as to the opinion itself. Brouillette v. Weymouth Shoe Company, 1961, 157 Me. 143, 170 A.2d 412, 413. See also Kittery Electric Light Co. v. Assessors of the Town of Kittery, Me., 1966, 219 A.2d 728, 742; Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, Me., 1967, 235 A.2d 295, 298; Parker v. Hohman, Me., 1969, 250 A.2d 698, 702. In the present case, the defendant was prejudiced by such evidence of anticipated business profits, since it provided the jury with an additional enlarged aspect of damage which was not grounded on established fact but rested wholly upon surmise and conjecture. Viewing the case in its entirety, we do not believe that this specific error tainted in any way the jury's verdict on liability, which has ample support in the evidence. We cannot say, however, that the testimony of Charles R. Ginn relating to his future earning capacity from the operation of his business up to $20,000 a year, had he not been injured, did not materially prejudice the defendant. The entry will be If the plaintiffs remit all of the judgment in excess of three hundred eighty-three thousand six hundred eleven dollars and one cent within 30 days after the rescript in this case is received, the appeal is denied; otherwise the appeal is sustained and a new trial on the issue of damages only is granted.