Opinion ID: 2545785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense Counsel's Failure to Object to Prosecutor's Questions

Text: Defendant argues his counsel was ineffective on five occasions for not objecting to certain questions by the prosecutor. We disagree, and discuss each instance below. 1. Defendant asserts counsel should have objected to testimony that on the day Chrissy and Teddy were killed, they were playing at Chrissy's house and asked Chrissy's father for permission to go to the park. He claims this evidence was irrelevant and erroneously allowed [the prosecution] to present to the jury a picture of the victims as two playful children who were innocently engaged in a trip to the local park. That defendant killed two playful children who were innocently engaged in a trip to the local park was a circumstance of the murders and was therefore admissible. (See generally People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436 [a circumstance of the crime is one `which surrounds materially, morally, or logically' the crime].) Thus, an objection by defense counsel to the testimony in question would have been unavailing. Counsel may not be deemed incompetent for failure to make meritless objections. ( People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 625, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081.) 2. We reject defendant's contention that counsel should have objected when, after the defense introduced evidence that defendant had participated in the condemned-workers program at San Quentin Prison, the prosecution elicited testimony that the program had been terminated because some workers in the program had illegally passed items to other inmates. Defense witnesses testified that defendant never violated any rules while he was a member of the program. Counsel may reasonably have concluded that evidence of other inmates violating the rules of the program was favorable to the defense, when contrasted to defendant's obedience of those rules. 3. Defendant contends counsel should have objected when, after defendant offered evidence that he had served three tours of duty in Vietnam, where he was awarded a Purple Heart and a Combat Infantry Badge, the prosecutor elicited testimony that he had been court-martialed for falling asleep on guard duty, had been disciplined for having a Vietnamese woman in his quarters and for being in villages that were off-limits, and had misappropriated a truck. According to defendant, he introduced evidence of his military service in Vietnam for the primary purpose of showing that he suffered from PTSD, and evidence of his misdeeds while in the military was irrelevant to this purpose and therefore inadmissible. But defendant also relied on his service in Vietnam to show that, as mentioned elsewhere in his brief, he had served his country above and beyond the call of duty in war and that his sendee for his country in Vietnam was both lengthy and, for the most part, exemplary. Defense counsel stressed this point in closing argument: We know that Sonny Lucero did serve his country. He did receive a Purple Heart and other ribbons. The prosecution was entitled to reduce the mitigating impact of the evidence that defendant had served three tours of duty in Vietnam and was awarded two medals by showing that his conduct while serving in Vietnam was not exemplary. 4. Defendant characterizes as irrelevant the testimony of Chrissy's father that a necklace Chrissy wore when she died was a present from her mother. Dr. Harry Scott, who conducted the autopsy, testified that Chrissy was strangled, possibly by a necklace. Chrissy's father identified a necklace that was introduced into evidence as the one Chrissy had been wearing the day she died. Thus, his testimony that the necklace was a present from Chrissy's mother was relevant to show his familiarity with the necklace, which strengthened the reliability of his identification of the necklace as the one Chrissy had worn. 5. Defendant complains about counsel's lack of an objection when, after defense witness Isabel Rivera asked the jury to spare defendant's life, the prosecutor asked Rivera whether she had met the victims or knew their names, and whether she knew how they had died, questions to which Rivera gave negative answers. According to defendant, the prosecutor's questions were rhetorical, argumentative, and beyond the scope of direct examination. Defense counsel, however, had no basis for objection. The prosecutor was entitled to ask questions designed to show that Rivera's belief that defendant's life should be saved did not take into account the circumstances surrounding the murder, because she was unfamiliar with all of the facts of the case. An objection by defense counsel would not have been appropriate. Defendant also faults counsel for not objecting to three comments by the prosecutor in closing argument. We disagree. In each instance, the prosecutor's argument was proper. 1. In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: [Y]ou sit in this case only as the conscience of the community. [¶] And by your decision in this case, you will tell the defendant ... what you think about his conduct on April the 12th, 1980. (Italics added.) Defendant argues this statement had the effect of diminishing the jurors' sense of personal responsibility for their decision whether to impose the death penalty, by suggesting that jurors should make the penalty determination based on what they thought the community would regard as an appropriate punishment, rather than what the jurors themselves regarded as appropriate. The prosecutor, however, never suggested that the jury should abrogate its responsibility to personally determine whether death was the appropriate penalty. It was proper for the prosecutor to describe the jurors as the conscience of the community. ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 185-186, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960; see also People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1041, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) Inapposite is defendant's reliance on United States v. Koon (9th Cir.1994) 34 F.3d 1416, reversed in part on other grounds sub nom. Koon v. U.S. (1996) 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392. There, the federal appellate court held: An appeal to the jury to be the conscience of the community is not impermissible unless it is `specifically designed to inflame the jury.' ( Koon, supra, 34 F.3d at p. 1444.) In this case, when the prosecutor's statement is considered in context, it is clear that it was intended not to inflame the jurors but only to remind them of their role in the judicial process. We find no error. 2. In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: You also know from the testimony of a number of people in [defendant's] unit, Smallwood, Noel, Painter, Sharp and Williams that people that had the same type of experience in Vietnam did not turn out like the defendant, did not end up like the defendant. Defendant contends that by asking the jury to compare him to others who had allegedly similar life experiences, the prosecutor violated his right to individualized sentencing, which the Eighth Amendment requires in capital cases. He argues that many of the others may not have had his experience of a deprived childhood, and he faults counsel for not objecting. When, as here, a defendant asserts that the death penalty should not be imposed because the defendant has experienced hardship, the prosecutor may properly point out that others with similar experiences did not commit murder. There was no reason for counsel to object. 3. Defendant also complains about counsel's lack of objection to the prosecutor's comment in closing argument that going to Vietnam and having bad experiences and returning to this country and remembering them, that does not give anyone a blank check to commit murder, adding, you can't find the answer to this crime in defendant's deprived childhood. The prosecutor did no more than urge the jury to discount defendant's mitigating evidence. This was proper (see People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730); an objection would have been futile.