Opinion ID: 3014171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense counsel at the time, Sandra

Text: Dean, a public defender, who had become The relevant facts regarding Johnson’s trial counsel mid-way through Johnson’s conviction and sentence are trial, voluntarily informed the judge of the undisputed. The charges set forth in the background inform ation re gard ing indictment stemmed from the alleged Johnson’s alleged threat to Liguori kidnaping of his estranged sixteen-year-old eighteen years before, in 1981. Liguori, daughter, Karen Vincent, on October 6, then a state prosecutor, prosecuted 1997. Johnson in an unrelated matter. Johnson, Immediately before sentencing having been convicted and imprisoned, Johnson following his conviction, the state sent a Christmas card to Liguori in 1981. court trial judge held a conference with The Christmas card read: “You had fun in both the prosecutor and defense counsel in ’81 and will be free in ’83.” Johnson his chambers. The judge voluntarily escaped from prison, and it was debated disclosed that he “had an out-of-court then whether he posed a threat, conversation” with James Liguori, a presumably to Liguori and his family. The Delaware attorney and former state judge told Dean that he had no knowledge of the background information that she had just related and commented that it perhaps 1 explained why Liguori made the comments The respondent-appellants are about Johnson. Thomas Carroll, warden of the state prison where Johnson is jailed, and the Dean then informed the judge that Attorney General of the State of the local newspapers had reported the Delaware. To simplify reference, we purported threat at that time and that the refer to them as the State of Delaware. 2 Public Defender’s Office had included the would request a different judge for the newspaper clippings among the documents pending sentencing. The judge concluded submitted to the court in relation to the conference by stating that he would not Johnson’s present trial. Dean assured the allow Liguori to be a witness at Johnson’s judge that Johnson’s 1981 Christmas card sentencing hearing. was part of “public record.” The judge and Dean both agreed that the purported B. threat was well documented and that the documents were all in the “whole file” Johnson obtained new counsel and earlier submitted to the court. appealed his conviction and sentence. As to Johnson’s sentence, the Delaware The state prosecutor, Robert Supreme Court rejected his claim that the O’Neill, in turn mentioned his own trial judge had erroneously failed to recuse “recollection” of Johnson’s purported himself sua sponte. The court analyzed the threat to Liguori and his family. He then issue first under the Delaware Judges’ told the judge that Liguori’s comment Code of Judicial Conduct and found the about Johnson’s character was relevant to situation was not one of those enumerated the court in meting out the sentence to him in the Code that would mandate recusal. because he was charged as a “habitual Johnson v. State, 2002 WL 714520, at . offender” under state law. He informed The court analyzed the issue then under a the judge further that the court should two-prong test set forth under its prior consider Johnson’s propensity for violence decisions. Id. (citing Stevenson v. State, and his entire criminal history in 782 A.2d 249, 255 (Del. 2001); Los v. determining the term of sentence. He also Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991)). told the judge that Liguori arguably could Under the subjective prong, the court be presented as a witness at Johnson’s noted the trial judge’s statement that “I sentencing hearing. don’t view [the contact] to have any impact on my view of the case or my Finally, in response to O’Neill’s decision with regard to sentencing,” and question as to whether she intended to file found it sufficient. Under the objective any motion regarding the ex parte prong, the court did not find any communication disclosed by the judge, “appearance of bias sufficient to cause Dean told the judge she had no such doubt as to the judge’s impartiality.” intention because the alleged incident was Specifically, the court observed that the “nothing new,” “a matter of record,” “[trial] judge did not engage in any active “happened a long time ago,” and the judge conduct demonstrating the appearance of had indicated that he would not give it impropriety.” Id. (emphasis added) “any undue weight.” Dean told the judge (distinguishing this case from Stevenson, also that she would discuss the matter with 782 A.2d at 251, 257 n.3 (finding Johnson and expressed doubt that he appearance of impropriety when a judge 3 who had previous contact with a victim standard of review is a question of law affirmatively requested that the case be subject to review by this Court de novo. assigned to him)). The court observed Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 605 additionally that Johnson’s previous n.6 (3d Cir. 2002). counsel at trial admitted, and his new counsel on appeal did not deny, that the A. record in his case available to the trial AEDPA severely circumscribes a court had already contained a more federal habeas court’s review of a state detailed account of his alleged threat to court decision. AEDPA provides in Liguori. Id. relevant part: The District Court issued an order An application for a writ of habeas corpus and opinion ruling against Johnson as to on behalf of a person in custody pursuant his conviction but in favor of him as to his to the judgment of a State court shall not sentence. Johnson v. Carroll, 250 F. be granted with respect to any claim that Supp.2d at 398. Specifically, the court was adjudicated on the merits in State agreed with Johnson that the trial court court proceedings unless the adjudication judge erroneously failed to recuse himself of the claim— sua sponte from sentencing Johnson (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary following his voluntary disclosure that he to, or involved an unreasonable application had received an out-of-court ex parte of, clearly established Federal law, as communication from a former prosecutor determined by the Supreme Court of the regarding Johnson. The court agreed that United States; or the failure to do so created an appearance (2) resulted in a decision that was based on of bias on the part of the judge in violation an unreasonable determination of the facts of Johnson’s due process rights under the in light of the evidence presented in the United States Constitution. State court proceeding.