Opinion ID: 2053552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: apportionment of the verdict

Text: Defendants argue that the finding of the jury that the city was eighty percent and Montgomery was twenty percent at fault was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree. To make its decision, the jury must weigh the testimony of the witnesses and determine their credibility. Johnson v. Corbet, 423 Mich. 304, 314, 377 N.W.2d 713 (1985). The testimony at trial was that Montgomery's initial offense was minor; he had squealed his tires before making a rolling stop at a stop sign. Both pursuing police officers testified that they did not learn that the Montgomery automobile had been stolen until after the pursuit terminated. In addition, the testimony showed that the police officers were supposed to, but failed to, activate their lights and siren when engaging in the automobile pursuit. The purpose of the requirement is to warn other motorists, such as Rogers, of the chase. When Montgomery accelerated in a residential area during rush-hour, the officers sped up to continue the chase rather than discontinuing it. The jury was entitled to conclude from that evidence that the city was eighty percent at fault. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals in this regard.
Plaintiff Rogers alleges that the Court of Appeals misconstrued M.C.L. § 600.6304; M.S.A. § 27A.6304 [25] when it limited the city's liability to paying no more than eighty percent of the verdict. Montgomery was uncollectible. Consequently, plaintiff argues, the statute requires that the city be liable for an additional amount, eighty percent of Montgomery's uncollectible twenty percent. We agree and reverse the Court of Appeals holding that the city was liable for none of Montgomery's twenty percent. The statute required that, in rendering a verdict, the judge or jury determine what percentage of fault is ascribable to each party. [26] At subsection 7, it stated: Notwithstanding subsection (3)[ [27] ], a governmental agency, other than a government or medical care facility, shall not be required to pay a percentage of any uncollectible amount that exceeds the governmental agency's percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1). [M.C.L. § 600.6304(7); M.S.A. § 27A.6304(7).] The expression a percentage of any uncollectible amount that exceeds the [defendant's] percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1) appears also in subsection 6. There, the meaning of the language is clear: Where a party's share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, it may be reallocated among the other parties according to their respective percentages of fault. Each must then pay a percentage of the uncollectible amount equal to its own percentage of fault. We conclude that the language in subsection 6, which is repeated in subsection 7, has the same meaning in both subsections. We find it incredible that the Legislature would use the same language in two successive sections to carry different meanings. It is apparent that subsection 7 was included in the statute to limit the liability of governmental agencies, excepting hospitals and health care facilities. Without it, a governmental agency could be liable for as much as one hundred percent of any uncollectible amount. That is because subsections 5 and 6, which limit a party's liability for an uncollectible amount to its percentage of fault, do not apply where the plaintiff is not at fault. In the present case, the jury found the plaintiff to be not at fault. Consequently, subsection 7 serves to apply the same liability and limitation of liability to the city as subsections 5 and 6 would have applied had plaintiff been at fault. This is evidenced by the Legislature's use, in subsection 7, of the same language as appears in subsection 6. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision regarding the apportionment of the verdict and hold that the city does bear a reallocation burden equal to its initial percentage of fault. The city is liable for eighty percent of the verdict plus eighty percent of the twenty percent ascribed to defendant Montgomery.