Opinion ID: 3000936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: In March 2002, two armed men robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit Union (“Credit Union”) in Decatur, Illinois, of $113,000. Nine days later one of the suspected robbers, Alban Woods, was found shot to death. The investigation of the robbery and murder led the police to Mr. Stevens, who was staying at a house in Decatur. The Macon County Sheriff’s Department secured the premises and later executed a search warrant for the residence. The search resulted in the seizure of various items, including crack cocaine, firearms and ammunition, a postal scale covered with cocaine residue, a cellular phone, $49,312 in currency1 and two cars—one Buick Roadmaster and one Lincoln Towncar—that Mr. Stevens had purchased with cash within days of the robbery. Mr. Stevens was charged in a three-count indictment with federal drug and firearms offenses stemming from the search in the Central District of Illinois. In 2004, a jury found Mr. Stevens guilty of the drug and firearms offenses, and he was sentenced to a term of 327 months’ imprisonment to be followed by a consecutive term of life imprisonment. The district court also imposed a special 1 The Government, in its response to Mr. Stevens’ motion for return of property, identifies $15,750 recovered from Mr. Stevens’ bedroom, $1,580 found hidden above ceiling tiles and another $31,982 also hidden above ceiling tiles. Theses amounts come to a total of $49,312. However, the response states that the total currency found was “approximately $40,000.” The Government offers no explanation for these discrepancies in its response. No. 07-1063 3 assessment of $300, but the sentence made no reference to any restitution or forfeiture of the items seized as a result of the search of his home. We affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See United States v. Stevens, 380 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2004). In November 2006, Mr. Stevens filed a motion under the docket number of his criminal case under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g); he demanded return of unspecified property seized in connection with that prosecution. Mr. Stevens attached a letter from the Illinois State’s Attorney for Macon County, which informed him that property, other than that identified in a state forfeiture proceeding, had been handled by federal authorities. The district court ordered a response, and the Government replied that the motion should be denied on the ground that it no longer possessed any of the items seized during the search of Mr. Stevens’ Decatur residence. The Government stated that items seized had been disposed of as follows: (1) Both cars had been forfeited judicially in proceedings in the Central District of Illinois. (2) The $15,750 found in Mr. Stevens’ room and the $1,580 found hidden above ceiling tiles had been used as evidence in Mr. Stevens’ criminal trial and subsequently turned over to the Macon County Sheriff’s Department for state forfeiture proceedings identified in the letter attached to Mr. Stevens’ motion. (3) The cellular phone and postage scale had been used as evidence in Mr. Stevens’ federal criminal trial and subsequently had been destroyed by the clerk of the court. 4 No. 07-1063 (4) The crack likewise had been used as evidence in Mr. Stevens’ federal criminal trial and subse- quently had been returned to the Macon County Sheriff’s Department, which, in turn, had de- stroyed the crack. (5) The guns and ammunition also had been used in Mr. Stevens’ federal criminal trial and subse- quently had been turned over to the Macon County Sheriff’s Department for use in its investigation into the murder of Woods, Mr. Stevens’ suspected confederate in the Credit Union robbery. (6) The $31,982 recovered from the ceiling tiles had been turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation (“FBI”) for its investigation into the robbery of the Credit Union and subsequently was returned to the Credit Union by the FBI. The Government offered no evidence in support of these assertions in its response brief. The Government also informed the district court that Mr. Stevens’ motion must be treated as a civil proceeding and, therefore, was governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”). The day after receiving the Government’s response brief, the court denied Mr. Stevens’ motion. In the order denying the motion, the court summarized the Government’s “arguments” and stated that it agreed with them. The court did not address the PLRA’s procedural requirements. Mr. Stevens then filed a reply to the Government’s response. In this document, Mr. Stevens identified the No. 07-1063 5 specific items he wanted returned. These items included the currency, cars, cellular phone and postage scale identified in the Government’s response brief. Mr. Stevens also identified several items of clothing and jewelry, a pager and videos that he alleged also had been seized. Further, Mr. Stevens asserted that no forfeiture actions had been conducted with respect to his vehicles. After evaluating Mr. Stevens’ reply, the district court concluded that it found “no reason to change its conclusion” that Mr. Stevens was “not entitled to the relief sought.” The court then denied as moot Mr. Stevens’ pending application to proceed in forma pauperis on his motion for return of property.