Opinion ID: 694763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Co-conspirator Hearsay Exception

Text: 79 Defendant Tate contends that the district court erred by admitting hearsay testimony. Tate argues that co-conspirators' statements should not have been admitted against him because the prosecution did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a member of the conspiracy involving Gordon and Johnson. He argues that, while the evidence may have proven that a conspiracy existed between Johnson and Gordon, there was no evidence to support the finding that Tate was a part of that conspiracy. He does not indicate any particular co-conspirator statements to which this contention is directed. 80 1. Relevant facts. 81 Tate's introduction into the conspiracy occurred late in 1991 when he oversaw Jones' cocaine distributions to Johnson while Jones vacationed in Hawaii. Following the FBI raid of Jones' residence in February, 1992, Jones went to Tate's home and used the phone to warn Johnson. Jones instructed Johnson to contact Tate for all future cocaine transactions. Over an approximate one-month period, there were numerous telephone and repeated personal contacts between Tate and Johnson which resulted in cocaine distributions totalling roughly twelve (12) kilograms. 82 2. Analysis. 83 This court reviews a district court's determination that a statement comes within an exception to the definition of hearsay for abuse of discretion. United States v. Curro, 847 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 843 (1988). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator exception, a statement is not hearsay if the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant against whom the statement is offered was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (the Enright requirements). United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir.1978). 84 A preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that Tate participated in a cocaine distribution conspiracy. This is true even under Tate's characterization of the facts since a person may be involved in only a small part of a conspiracy's operations and still be considered a member of that conspiracy. The district court ruled that sufficient evidence had been introduced by the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that the prosecution had, thus, satisfied the Enright requirements. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statements of Tate's co-conspirators. 85 J. Admission of Excerpts of Recordings of Telephone Conversations 86 Defendant Tate argues that the district court erred by admitting edited versions of the intercepted telephone conversations rather than the original full recordings. He argues that the original tapes were necessary to allow the jury to accurately assess whether the participants in the conversations were actually speaking in code. He contends that, had the jury heard the entirety of the conversations, it would have been better able to decide whether the recorded people were indeed speaking in code. 87 1. Relevant facts. 88 At trial, the prosecution presented recordings of phone conversations intercepted by wiretapping. Rather than presenting the entirety of each recorded conversation, the prosecution presented only excerpts from some of the recordings. The government sought to prove that the participants in the conversations were speaking in code in order to mask their wrongdoing. To make that showing, the government had Johnson explain to the jury the true meaning of the facially innocent conversations. 89 2. Analysis. 90 When a party fails to make a timely objection, stating the specific grounds for the objection, this court's review is limited to plain error. United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991). At trial, Tate objected only generally to admitting the recordings. This court will therefore review for plain error only. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Tate did not move to require the prosecution to present the deleted parts of the conversations; nor did he seek to introduce those parts during his case. 91 Because Tate does not allege that the deleted parts of the conversations directly rebut the parts introduced at trial, it cannot be said that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the composite tapes rather than sua sponte requiring the prosecution to present the original, unedited tapes. K. Admissibility of Physical Evidence 92 Defendants Ross, Dillehay, and Saikaly challenge various district court evidentiary rulings. This court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, maximizing the probative value and minimizing the prejudicial effect of the evidence. United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 389 (6th Cir.1984). 93 1. Defendant Ross' argument. 94 Defendant Ross contends that the district court erred by admitting, as evidence against him, three (3) kilograms of cocaine and packaging materials seized from Johnson's house. Since, according to Ross, nothing linked that evidence to him, its tendency to cause unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value, and the evidence should therefore have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 95 a. Relevant facts. 96 The evidence at trial revealed that on March 6, 1992, Johnson obtained three (3) kilograms of cocaine from Tate, two of which were ordered by defendant Saikaly with the other one for Gordon. Johnson's testimony was corroborated by a series of intercepted telephone calls beginning March 4, 1992 and continuing until a call from Saikaly seconds before Johnson's arrest. Intercepted telephone calls on Gordon's line on March 6, 1992, revealed that Gordon contacted his long-time cocaine dealers, including Ross, in anticipation of receiving his share of the cocaine. 97 b. Analysis. 98 Contrary to Ross' assertion, the cocaine was linked to him. Trial evidence strongly indicates that some of the three (3) kilograms were en route to Ross. Thus, the evidence was highly probative, since it showed his involvement in the conspiracy, showed his relationship to the cocaine, and did not have a tendency to cause unfair prejudice. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the cocaine and packaging materials. 99 2. Defendant Dillehay's argument. 100 Defendant Dillehay contends that the district court improperly admitted a loaded gun as evidence against him. He claims that no evidence linked the gun to him and points out that the district court dismissed the charge that he was a felon in possession of a firearm. 14 101 a. Relevant facts. 102 Gordon testified that Dillehay lived at 580 Wildwood with his sons. The subject firearm was seized from defendant's bedroom at 580 Wildwood. Johnson testified that he met defendant Dillehay at both the Wildwood and Auten addresses throughout the period of the conspiracy and broke down kilogram quantities of cocaine into smaller quantities at those locations. 103 b. Analysis. 104 The district court's dismissal of the felon in possession of a firearm count against Dillehay is irrelevant to the admissibility of the gun because guns are probative in drug prosecutions since they are tools of the drug trade. See United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1499 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120, 1123 (6th Cir.1981). The evidence revealed that Dillehay was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, he lived in the house in which police seized the gun, slept in the bedroom in which they found it, and had previously handled drugs at that address. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the gun into evidence. 105 3. Defendant Saikaly's argument. 106 Defendant Saikaly argues that the district court erred by admitting a gun and $22,000 cash that New York police seized from him when he was arrested on charges unrelated to the present case. 15 He contends that the evidence was not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Saikaly contends that, since this evidence did not lead to a finding of wrongdoing in New York, it should not have been admitted against him in his federal trial. 107 a. Relevant facts. 108 Defendant Saikaly was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and with three substantive gun offenses, two of which involved the subject gun. Trial testimony revealed, in part, that on April 30, 1992, while responding to a robbery call, New York City police stopped a car occupied by defendant Saikaly and seized the subject gun. Among the items seized from Saikaly's bedroom on May 22, 1992, were a plastic gun case, corresponding to the subject gun. In an intercepted telephone call on March 2, 1992, Johnson stated that Saikaly had been to his house earlier that day with the subject gun. Johnson testified that Saikaly gave him $48,000 cash in late February 1992 for two (2) kilograms of cocaine and that Saikaly had ordered another two (2) kilograms which he obtained from Tate on March 6, 1992. 109 b. Analysis. 110 The evidence against Saikaly was properly admitted. Since the evidence had some tendency to establish facts necessary to the prosecution's case, the evidence satisfied the liberal Rule 401 test. L. Sentencing Issues 111 1. Dillehay's Life Sentence. 112 Dillehay asserts that the district court erred by determining that he could be held accountable for 15-50 kilograms of cocaine for purposes of establishing a base offense level and argues that the district court erred by finding him to be a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. 113 The district court sentenced Dillehay under 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A) which imposes a mandatory life sentence on a defendant with two or more prior drug convictions who is convicted of a narcotics offense involving five (5) kilograms or more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A) (West Supp.1994) Dillehay has two prior drug convictions and, according to trial testimony, personally handled more than twelve (12) kilograms of cocaine during the course of the conspiracy. The district court was compelled to impose the life sentence. The applicability of the statutory mandatory sentence renders Dillehay's contentions irrelevant. 114 2. Mitigating Role Sentence Reduction. 115 English argues that the district court erred by refusing to grant him a mitigating role reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines. He contends that he was entitled to a reduction since his conduct, acting as a drug courier on a few occasions, was less culpable than that of his co-conspirators. 116 In setting English's base offense level, the district court, instead of considering the amount of cocaine that English could have foreseen being involved in the conspiracy, considered only the amount of drugs that, according to trial testimony, English personally handled. The district court, in effect, took English's minor role into account when calculating his base offense level. 117 While a mitigating role reduction would have certainly been appropriate, had English's base offense level been calculated by considering the total amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy, the district court accounted for the fact that he played a minor role in the overall conspiracy by considering only the amount of cocaine that he personally handled in setting his base offense level. The district court properly declined to grant English a mitigating role reduction.