Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Canto's preliminary hearing testimony

Text: Defendant next claims the court erred in admitting Canto's preliminary hearing testimony. Because defendant objected only to the deletion of certain portions of Canto's testimony and not to its admission per se, he failed to preserve this claim for appeal. (Evid.Code, § 353.) In addition, the claim lacks merit. The confrontation clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const.[,] art. I, § 15.) That right is not absolute, however. An exception exists when a witness is unavailable and, at a previous court proceeding against the same defendant, has given testimony that was subject to cross-examination. ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) Such statements are not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the cross-examination was made with an interest and motive similar to that at the prior proceeding. (Evid.Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).) In this case, Canto's death rendered him unavailable to testify at trial. (Evid.Code, § 240, subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, the prosecution introduced an edited version of Canto's preliminary hearing testimony. ( Id., § 1291, subd. (b).) [3] Defendant argues that at the time of the preliminary hearing, counsel did not know of Canto's illegal drug activities, and consequently he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine with the same interest and motive as he would have, had Canto been available at trial. He asserts that the testimony gave the jury a false and misleading impression of Canto's credibility and thereby undermined defendant's right to a fair determination of guilt and penalty. Defendant cannot now be heard to complain that the defense did not know of Canto's drug dealing prior to the preliminary hearing; by his own admission at trial, he and Canto had been engaged in drug dealing for some time before August 9, 1994. Moreover, a defendant's interest and motive at a second proceeding is not dissimilar to his interest at a first proceeding within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2), simply because events occurring after the first proceeding might have led counsel to alter the nature and scope of cross-examination of the witness in certain particulars. ( People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 784, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192.) The motives need not be identical, only `similar.' ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 850, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have concluded that `when a defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at the time of his or her prior testimony, that testimony is deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation requirement [citation], regardless whether subsequent circumstances bring into question the accuracy or the completeness of the earlier testimony.' ( People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 343, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758; see California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489.) Defendant's interest and motive in cross-examining Canto at the preliminary hearing were similar to those at trial: to challenge Canto's credibility and discredit his account of the shooting. Defense counsel conducted an in-depth cross-examination twice as long as the direct examination, which succeeded in eliciting evidence that challenged Canto's credibility. [4] Accordingly, defendant's opportunity to cross-examine Canto at the preliminary hearing satisfied the confrontation clause, and any objection to the preliminary hearing testimony would have lacked merit.