Opinion ID: 1187817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Best-Interest Criteria

Text: The rationale used by the court in construction of the statute and disagreement with the trial court on factual findings, is, however, for the delivery of BGD to the mother by removal from the adopting parents, the reason I write this dissent. See thoughtful comments of Judge Ilsley in In re Adoption of Hiatt, supra; Matter of Adoption of D.P., Wyo., 583 P.2d 706 (1978). The decision of this court places the predilection to sustain the natural family before the best interest of the child. Matter of Adoption of BGD, supra, 713 P.2d at 1193. This explains the conclusion that a written post-birth relinquishment is required by our statute, as it prevents a natural parent    from giving consent to adoption without counsel and careful deliberation. Id. at 1193. Construing the adoption statutes based on this predilection was, in my opinion, error.    [T]he paramount question at all times, when the custody and control of a minor child is in dispute, is the welfare of such child. Kennison v. Chokie, 55 Wyo. 521, 100 P.2d 97, (1940); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78 (1949). This approach may, however, conflict with the rule of strictly construing adoption statutes in favor of the natural parent's claim. Matter of Adoption of Voss, supra (which case was in obvious conflict with earlier Wyoming cases). Other courts have recognized these conflicting goals in construing consent provisions and concluded that since the paramount purpose of the adoption laws is to make provision for the welfare of children, the better rule is to construe adoption statutes in a manner which will promote this purpose. S.O. v. W.S., supra, 643 P.2d at 1002 n. 7; [4] In re Adoption of Barnett, 54 Cal.2d 370, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562, 354 P.2d 18, 22-23 (1960). The court here, in the first opinion, in construing the statute for child-custody disposition, failed to fully consider the best interest of the child. `   [T]he best interests standard involves a careful weighing of the myriad factors, such as the character and maturity of the parents, their commitment to the care of the child, the child's present bonds of affection, the family setting and stability, and so forth, which together form the foundation for a stable and happy home for the child.' S.O. v. M.S., 643 P.2d at 1006, quoting In re Anderson, 99 Idaho 805, 589 P.2d 957, 974 (1978), Bakes, J., dissenting. Commentators often recognize that permanent placement decisions should be made as soon as possible in order to prevent the trauma of separating the child from the adult with whom the dependency and affection relationship exists. See Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 446, 451 (1976); and Note, Alternatives to Parental Right in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151, 161 (1963). In this case, only passing reference was made to the child's best interest, even though the court professed that the policy of this Court, in adoption cases, is to look at what is best for the child under all circumstances. Matter of Adoption of BGD, supra, 713 P.2d at 1193. No mention of factors important to consideration of best interest is made, other than to note the three-year association between the child and her adoptive parents. Thus, the only factor considered is labeled an association, and quietly discarded. I believe raising a child from newborn to the third year of life constitutes more than an association, and I would place appropriate emphasis on the relationship existing between the child and the adoptive parents.    [F]or the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not the direct cause of his emotional attachment. This attachment results from day-to-day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation.          Where there are changes of parental figure    the child's vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship becomes evident. The child regresses along the whole line of his affections, skills, achievements and social adaptation. Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 17-18 (1979). In addition to the thoughtful review and evaluation in the most current case of S.O. v. W.S., supra, an exhaustive analysis, Note, Family Law: Natural Parent Preference or the Child's Best Interests: The Court's Dilemma in S.O. v. W.S. (Alaska 1982), 12 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. 141 (1982-83), is of singular interest. Alaskan law had a differing feature in that a provision for a withdrawal of the consent and relinquishment was provided. [That law] does recognize the special status of the biological parent by providing the absolute right to withdraw the consent within ten days. However, beyond that time period, the `statute ceases to accord the natural parents a right superior to that of the adoptive parents and instead mandates that the withdrawal be permitted only if such is in the best interest of the child being adopted.' A minority of jurisdictions have applied the parental preference in cases involving a biological parent's withdrawal of consent. 12 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. at 147, citing Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 424. In further reviewing the general law and the Alaska case, the case-note author detailed: The focus in these minority jurisdictions, despite any language to the contrary, rests on the rights of the parents rather than on the welfare of the child. Undoubtedly the parents' rights should be respected. But a young child's emotional and physical welfare hangs in the balance, and courts ignore a large body of relevant evidence by restricting their inquiry to the question of parental fitness.   .       The Alaska Supreme Court correctly rejected the parent-centered focus of the minority jurisdictions    [and] the result it reached is strongly supported by legal commentators, judicial decisions in related kinds of child placement cases, and in the research and clinical experience of child development specialists. The dominant theme interwoven throughout the work of these diverse professionals is that a child's physical, mental and emotional development depend largely upon the creation and maintenance, early in life, of strong, stable relationships with an adult who consistently provides attention, stimulation and affection, in addition to the fulfillment of basic physical needs. In their highly-regarded book concerning children cast into the legal world of child placement, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit [in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973)]    refer to these adults as `psychological parents.' Psychological parents may be, and ordinarily are, the biological parents. But biology is not determinative. The mere physical tie between a woman and the child she bears does not form the foundation of a strong attachment bond, at least from the child's perspective. Rather, strong bonds form after continuous periods of positive stimulation and interaction. Many child development specialists agree with the Goldstein approach. When talking of `parent-child separation,' child development professionals typically mean the psychological parent rather than the biological parent. Once a child has developed strong attachment bonds with the psychological parent, a separation can be both physically and psychologically traumatic, even for infants and toddlers. Studies conducted by Anna Freud and her colleagues indicate that disruption in the continuity of care may cause physical discomfort, chronic crying, digestive problems, sleeping problems, and delays in the infant's orientation and adaption to his or her surroundings. On a long-term basis, such discontinuity of affection and care may cause the child to form shallow and indiscriminate attachments.       Testimony regarding considerations such as separation trauma and continuity needs in children of a particular age will be useful, as will expert testimony addressing the psychological make-up of the child in question. Other important factors which might be introduced during the hearing include (1) the quality and length of the emotional attachments; (2) the amount of time the child has lived with the prospective adoptive parents; (3) the amount of time the child lived with, and has been separated from, the natural parent; (4) evidence of the character, moral fitness, and maturity of the parents and prospective adoptive parents; (5) the commitment to the care and development of the child; (6) the home environment and family setting, and its stability; (7) the age, sex and health of the child; and (8) the desirability of continuing the existing child-third party relationship. Finally, and certainly not to be overlooked if the child is of a reasonable age, the wishes of the child should be respectfully considered. 12 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. at 149-153. Directly stated, I would contend that the best interest of BGD, a girl now slightly more than three years old, has simply disappeared as a responsive test in the adjudicatory demarche. It was improper to invalidate the consent to void the adoption, but surely more unjustified to commit the child to the natural mother with whom no post-birth association has existed, for an improbable future, without otherwise determining present concerns for the best interest of this young child.