Opinion ID: 1191875
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Correctly Instructed the Jury on the Issue of Testamentary Capacity.

Text: In particular, Soth argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give his proposed jury instructions Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 8, regarding testamentary capacity. In this regard, the ICA stated, in Estate of Coleman, 1 Haw.App. at 139, 615 P.2d at 762, the following: [T]he presumption of law is in favor of testamentary capacity and one who insists on the contrary has the burden of proof. The effect of the [ Estate of] Lopez[, 25 Haw. 197 (1919)] presumption of testamentary capacity is to place the burden of proving lack of capacity on contestants. This burden was correctly placed on the contestants in this case in four instructions given to the jury, the relevant portions of which are as follows: (1) Contestants have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testatrix was incompetent on October 19, 1974 and that the October 19, 1974 will was the product of undue influence ...; (2) Unsoundness of mind must be proved by the contestants by a preponderance of the evidence; (3) To find that Margaret Coleman was not of sound mind and memory at the time she executed the will of October 19, 1974, the evidence must preponderate in favor of unsoundness of mind; and (4) The burden of proving permanent and continuous type of unsoundness of mind is upon the contestants in this case. A trial judge does not exceed the limits of his discretion by refusing a requested instruction which is substantially covered by other instructions given. Kometani v. Heath, 50 Haw. 89, 431 P.2d 931 (1967). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to separately instruct the jury on the presumption of competence. (Emphasis and brackets added.) The trial court in the instant case, as in Estate of Coleman, instructed the jury that First Church must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Herbert lacked the necessary capacity by showing that she was lacking in at least one of the following. One, the ability to understand that she was signing a will; two, the ability to understand and know the nature and extent of her property; three, the ability to know the natural objects of her bounty; and, four, the ability to formulate a rational plan for the distribution of her property after she died. Although the preferable instruction would include both the presumption of testamentary capacity and the burden of proof to be established by the contestant, the instruction given in this case accurately stated the law and adequately instructed the jury. As stated in Estate of Coleman, the jury can infer the presumption of testamentary capacity from the court's instruction that the contestant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator/testatrix lacks testamentary capacity. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give Soth's proposed jury instructions Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 8, because the issue of testamentary capacity was substantially covered by the instruction given by the trial court.