Opinion ID: 748839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether DVR's plan is illegal

Text: 33 Mallett claims that DVR's program violates the federal guidelines and regulations governing the Act. By 1989, DVR had adopted a policy that disfavors graduate school assistance and encourages vocational objectives which require no graduate level training. 6 According to Mallett, this policy violates the Rehabilitation Act's mandate of providing highly individualized services to each beneficiary. In its barest form, Mallett argues that this policy prevents the State from adopting a plan that satisfies a direct obligation which the statute places on the State. It is precisely this type of claim that § 1983 may enforce for federal-state funding statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause like the Rehabilitation Act. 34 We therefore turn to the three-part Wilder analysis to determine whether Mallett may enforce this alleged right. Neither party disputes that Mallett is an intended beneficiary. States that participate in Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program must provide services to all handicapped individuals, and DVR accepted Mallett into its program as a handicapped individual who satisfied the Act's criteria. See 29 U.S.C. § 711(e). Thus, Mallett satisfies the first prong. 35 The Rehabilitation Act also imposes a binding obligation on participating states to provide individual rehabilitation services. The Act contains thirty-six detailed requirements for all state plans, one of which is an individualized written rehabilitation program meeting the requirements of section 722 of this title. See 29 U.S.C. § 721(a)(9)(B). Each individualized written rehabilitation program must be designated to achieve the employment objective of the individual, consistent with the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabilities, of the individual. Id. § 722(b)(1)(B)(i). The services provided are any goods or services necessary to render an individual with handicaps employable, including ... vocational and other training services. Id. § 723(a)(3). Together, these provisions impose explicit requirements on federally funded state rehabilitation programs that meet the second prong of the Wilder analysis. See Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir.1993) (concluding that obligatory services in the Medicaid program meet Wilder's second prong); Stowell, 976 F.2d at 69 (deciding that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c)(1) is not an enforceable right as it provides incentives--not commands--to the States). 36 Finally, Mallett's interest is not so vague and amorphous that it is beyond the judiciary's competence to enforce it. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. Title I requires that individualized written rehabilitation programs must be consistent with the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabilities, of the individual. 29 U.S.C. § 722(b)(1)(B)(i). This language is specific, unambiguous, and mandatory. The term's meaning does not vary with the circumstances of each case so as to be insusceptible to judicial enforcement. Albiston, 7 F.3d at 264. Rather, it provides clear notice to the States that they, by accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply with these provisions. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25, 101 S.Ct. at 1544. At its barest level, Mallett's assertion is a question of statutory construction. It is unquestionably within the competence of the judiciary to perform this type of analysis. Thus, the requirement of an individualized written rehabilitation program in § 722(b) creates an enforceable right. See Marshall v. Switzer, 10 F.3d 925, 929 (2d Cir.1993) (permitting beneficiary of Title I of Rehabilitation Act to challenge failure to provide mandatory service under sec.sec. 721(a)(8), (a)(9) through § 1983); McGuire, 734 F.Supp. at 112 (concluding that sec.sec. 722, 723 create rights enforceable under § 1983); Ryans, 542 F.Supp. at 847 (same). 37