Opinion ID: 2799729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: right to appeal to this court under the

Text: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT We now turn to the question of whether there is a right to appeal claim determinations from the district court to this court under the Settlement Agreement. While Class Counsel insist that the Final Rules are merely 6Because we conclude that jurisdiction is proper under the collateral order doctrine, we pretermit a determination as to whether there is also jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(3). 9 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 10 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843 operational rules for administering the Settlement Program that should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, see Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999), the dispute before us results from a disagreement in how the Settlement Agreement should be interpreted as to appellate review. After all, BP claims that the Final Rules do not provide for appellate review by this court, which it argues it is entitled to under the Agreement absent an express waiver. It argues that this right to appeal has been violated by the Final Rules limiting the ability to file submissions regarding judicial review on the civil docket, as well as the Final Rules categorically precluding any judicial review for certain categories of cases. Class Counsel, on the other hand, argue that there is no right of appeal of individual claim determinations under the Agreement and that the Final Rules comply with the Agreement. The crux of the problem is that the Settlement Agreement is not clear one way or another, and our circuit has not yet specifically addressed the question of how to treat a settlement agreement’s silence on whether there is a right to appeal from district court decisions on individual claims to this court. We review issues related to interpreting settlement agreements de novo. Waterfowl Ltd. Liab. Co. v. United States, 473 F.3d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 2006). It is a “well-settled rule that the construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law applicable to contracts generally.” Fla. Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Atkinson, 481 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1973). The Settlement Agreement provides that it “shall be interpreted in accordance with General Maritime Law.” Agreement § 36.1. “A basic principle of contract interpretation in admiralty law is to interpret, to the extent possible, all the terms in a contract without rendering any of them meaningless or superfluous.” Chembulk Trading LLC v. Chemex Ltd., 393 F.3d 550, 555 (5th Cir. 2004). 10 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843 In Deepwater Horizon I, this court interpreted the Settlement Agreement as preserving the parties’ right to appeal to this court, but did so in dictum. After finding jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, the court opined, Moreover, the procedures for resolving disputes concerning the Administrator’s administration of the Settlement specify that a disagreement is “referred to the Court for resolution” if it is not resolved by the Claims Administration Panel. Based on its use throughout the Settlement, the term “the Court” appears to refer to the district court. Such an interpretation of the parties’ agreement would render the district court’s ruling final. However, the parties clearly intended a broader interpretation of the term— one that retained their right to appeal to this court—as shown by BP’s appeal and Class Counsel’s failure to object. Deepwater Horizon I, 732 F.3d at 332 n.3. BP relies on this heavily to argue that it has a right to appellate review of claim determinations. Class Counsel, on the other hand, claim that the conclusion was faulty, noting that [w]hile [they] are mindful of [the] observation that Class Counsel did not explicitly make this argument [that district court reviews are discretionary and not appealable] in response to the original appeal of [Deepwater Horizon I], Class Counsel did specifically raise this issue in the District Court[] [in its opposition to the motion for injunction and during the motion hearing], and strongly suggested that this Court had no jurisdiction to hear that appeal [in its brief]. After examining each of these references, we find that Class Counsel did argue that the court did not have jurisdiction over that appeal. BP asserted appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, and the collateral order doctrine for the appeal of the district court’s decision to uphold the Claims Administrator’s interpretation. Class Counsel addressed each of these in turn to argue that there was no appealable order under these bases, and argued that jurisdiction was only proper over the dismissal of BP’s separate suit 11 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843 against the Claims Administrator pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). While Class Counsel did not make any arguments specific to whether there was appellate review by this court of claim determinations under the Settlement Agreement, it did not have to as the issue was not relevant in that case. We are not persuaded to follow the Deepwater Horizon I interpretation for the purpose of deciding the issue at hand because dictum by one panel does not bind future panels. See Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 286 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000). In any event, the rationale for that dictum does not apply here given that Class Counsel have clearly objected to BP’s appeal. To support its position that there must be an express waiver of what is otherwise a right to appeal, BP relies on criminal and other unrelated cases for the proposition that waivers require proof of an “‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of’ a ‘known right,’ and cannot be inferred from silence or by implication.” Appellants’ Br. 38 (quoting United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 951 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation omitted) (defining waiver in the context of conducting plain error review of the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act and noting that deviation from a legal rule is error unless there has been a waiver)) (citing Harris v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 435 F. App’x 389, 396 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that plaintiff waived discovery issue by withdrawing motion to compel discovery); United States v. Dodson, 288 F.3d 153, 160 (5th Cir. 2002) (considering waiver of rights under 21 U.S.C. § 851); Wells Fargo Bus. Credit v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 695 F.2d 940, 947 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying this concept of waiver to question of whether party waived its rights to no-offset agreement)). None of these cases directly address the question of whether there is a known right to appeal from district court decisions 12 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 13 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843 regarding claims from settlement agreements, and thus whether this concept of waiver would apply in that context. 7 On the other hand, Class Counsel do not show convincing authority that parties may waive appellate rights without an express waiver in the context of settlement agreements. Instead, they summarize the appeals process to show that the rules regarding appeals are “exhaustive” and that the district court’s review “serves as the last step in a multi-layered claims process.” They then contrast this to the relative lack of guidelines regarding the district court’s discretionary review to argue that this “clearly demonstrates that the Settlement Program, not the parties, were to enact the administrative rules” and that [t]his deference clearly evidences that the parties intended the Claims Administrator, through the Claims Coordinator, pursuant to Section 8 of Exhibit 25 of the Settlement Agreement, to amend and/or adopt procedures as necessary for administrative rules of timing, length of appeal documents, record evidence, and filing related to discretionary review. They also argue that “parties to a settlement are free to contract away appellate review, especially when the parties privately contract for a separately detailed appellate review within the settlement program itself.” However, they cite to no source for the proposition that parties may do so 7 BP also relies on Federal Practice & Procedure, which states, “The most likely occasion for waiver [of the right to Court of Appeals review] arises from a settlement agreement that calls for resolution of some disputed matter by the district court, coupled with an explicit agreement that the district court decision shall be final and that all rights of appeal are waived.” 15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3901 (2d ed. 2014). However, the idea that this is “the most likely occasion” is not an indication of an express waiver requirement. 13 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 14 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843 without an express waiver. 8 In their motion to dismiss the appeal, Class Counsel argue, It is settled in this Court that a negotiated settlement that limits appellate review may be binding, and that by failing to negotiate for the inclusion of appellate review before the signing of the Settlement Agreement, BP has waived its right of appeal beyond that provided for in the Settlement Agreement; thus its appeal here is barred and should be dismissed. For support, they cite to Hill v. Schilling, 495 F. App’x 480 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), in which this court applied criminal cases dealing with appeal waivers in plea agreements to an interpretation of a settlement agreement, id. at 487 (citing United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2005); Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3901 (2012)). The Hill panel dismissed the appeal as barred by the appeal waiver. Id. at 487-88. Yet Hill is not as helpful to Class Counsel as they wish because, unlike in Hill, see id. at 487, the instant case does not involve an express waiver. Favorably for the class, the court did not say that the waiver had to be an express one. Nevertheless, Hill was an unpublished opinion and therefore not binding precedent with respect to whether this panel should also apply criminal cases dealing with appeal 8 Citing to another class action settlement, Class Counsel assert that “the rule for settling parties is to exclude any right to court appellate review on claimant-specific issues. Typically, the claims administrator’s determinations are final; there may be limited review by a special master.” Appellees’ Br. 36-37 (citing In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644-45 (E.D. La. 2010)). However, that settlement agreement expressly stated that certain determinations of the Claims Administrator, Gate Committee, Chief Administrator, and Special Master were “final, binding and Non-Appealable.” E.g., Vioxx Settlement Agreement §§ 2.6.1, 2.8, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 4.2.7, 8.1.2, available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement%2 0-%20new.pdf; see id. § 17.1.62 (defining “Non-Appealable” to include, inter alia, “any right of appeal to the MDL Court, any other Coordinated Proceedings court or any other court”). 14 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 15 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843 waivers in plea agreements to the settlement agreement context. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. We find that similar cases from other circuits provide guidance in relation to this question. Class Counsel seek to emphasize the Settlement Agreement’s use of the word “exclusive” in § 18.1 to refer to the district court’s jurisdiction, but we find that a district court having such authority in the Settlement Program does not necessarily preclude further review by this court. In United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1990), a consent decree provided that the court-appointed administrator’s decisions be “‘final and binding, subject to the [district] Court’s review as provided herein,’ and . . . further provide[d] that the district court ‘shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any and all issues relating to the Administrator’s actions or authority’ under the Consent Decree,” id. at 615 (alteration in original). The Second Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because “the phrase ‘exclusive jurisdiction,’ read in the context of the Consent Decree, [did] not unambiguously exclude appellate review” and was instead a venue requirement. Id.; see also DeLoach v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 391 F.3d 551, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The district court’s maintenance of ‘continuing and exclusive jurisdiction’ over an agreement is not inconsistent with this court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders.”). We interpret the “exclusive” jurisdiction conferred on the district court by the Settlement Agreement to also leave open the possibility of further review by this court. In Montez v. Hickenlooper, 640 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2011), a class action alleging violations of disabled prisoners’ rights resulted in a consent decree that set forth a plan for the defendants to bring the state prison system into compliance and established a claims procedure for injured inmates in which claims would be reviewed by a special master, subject to review by the district 15 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 16 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843 court, id. at 1129. Like the instant case, the consent decree was silent about further review by the Court of Appeals after review by the district court. Id. Building off International Brotherhood, the Tenth Circuit stated, We simply hold that, when a consent decree does not resolve claims itself but instead simply establishes a mechanism under which the district court will resolve claims, the parties may appeal the district court’s final resolution of such claims to this court unless the consent decree contains a clear and unequivocal waiver of the right to appellate review. Id. at 1132. 9 Addressing whether there was appellate jurisdiction despite the fact that litigation was still ongoing and the district court’s decision was not a final judgment as to all parties, the Tenth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction over the appeal of the district court’s claim determination under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 1132-33. We choose to follow these other circuits’ decisions in similar cases involving consent decrees to hold that, where a settlement agreement does not resolve claims itself but instead establishes a mechanism pursuant to which the district court will resolve claims, parties must expressly waive what is otherwise a right to appeal from claim determination decisions by a district court. Given that there has been no such express waiver in the instant case, the parties have preserved their right to appeal from the district court to this court. Having found this, we next consider whether the Final Rules are in violation of this right to appeal by reviewing the Rules’ lack of docketing provisions. 9 The Montez court also relied on “the somewhat analogous situation of appeals from district court orders reviewing arbitration decisions.” 640 F.3d at 1132 (citing MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 830 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that “contractual provisions limiting the right to appeal from a district court’s judgment confirming or vacating an arbitration award are permissible, so long as the intent to do so is clear and unequivocal”)). 16 Case: 13-30843 Document: 00513036264 Page: 17 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 No. 13-30843