Opinion ID: 3011740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Burden of Proof as to the Content of

Text: South African Law Because the substance of South African immigration law will prove highly relevant to the final disposition of the firm resettlement issue, and in the interest of providing some further guidance on remand, we need to consider the issue of which party--Abdille or the government--will bear the burden of establishing the content of South African law on remand. We note in this regar d that in our discussion above, we implicitly addressed part of this bur den allocation issue when we referenced the government's burden to make the prima facie showing of fir m resettlement. We now make this discussion explicit. Although this precise issue was not addr essed by the BIA's decision in Abdille's matter, a long line of BIA case law establishes that [f]oreign law is a matter to be proven by the party seeking to rely on it. Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 106 (BIA 1989). Ordinarily, it is the asylum applicant who seeks the benefit of foreign law, and thus carries the burden of demonstrating its content. See, e.g., Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1994) _________________________________________________________________ 11. On appeal, Abdille argues in the alter native that the BIA's finding of firm resettlement in South Africa was erroneous because Abdille fell within one of the two exceptions to the fir m resettlement bar contained in 8 C.F.R. S 208.15--i.e., he established [t]hat his or her entry into that nation was a necessary consequence of his or herflight from persecution, that he or she remained in that nation only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish significant ties in that nation. 8 C.F .R. S 208.15(a) (2000). Because we remand to the BIA for further proceedings in connection with the firm resettlement issue, we will not address the merits of Abdille's contention. 21 (Placing the burden of proving for eign law on a petitioner is consistent with the general rule that the petitioner bears the burden of proof ); Matter of Annang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 502, 503 (BIA 1973) ([T]he law of a for eign country is a question of fact which must be proved by the petitioner if he relies on it to establish eligibility for an immigration benefit.). The BIA, however, has had occasion to apply this rule in order to place burdens on the gover nment. In Soleimani, the immigration judge found that an Iranian Jew hadfirmly resettled in Israel, relying principally on the assumption that, because Israel's Law of Return granted all members of the Jewish faith the right to Israeli citizenship, it was probable that the alien had received an of fer of resident status, citizenship, or some other type of per manent resettlement from the Israeli gover nment. See 20 I. & N. Dec. at 102. Observing that the record contained no evidence documenting the nature and purpose of Israel's Law of Return or the specific provisions of that law, the BIA reversed the immigration judge's finding on the ground that [f]oreign law is a matter to be pr oven by the party seeking to rely on it, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service has submitted nothing of r ecord regarding Israel's Law of Return. Id. at 106. The rule that foreign law is a matter to be pr oven by the party seeking to rely on it must, at all events, be read in conjunction with the INS regulations establishing the general burden of proof allocation with r espect to the firm resettlement issue. The pertinent regulatory provision is 8 C.F.R. S 208.13(c)(2)(ii), which states the following: If the evidence indicates that one of the above gr ounds [including the firm resettlement bar] apply to the applicant, he or she shall have the burden of proving by a pr eponderance of the evidence that he or she did not so act. 8 C.F .R. S 208.13(c)(2)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added). 12 The burden _________________________________________________________________ 12. As a formal matter, we note that, by its terms, the burden scheme contemplated in 8 C.F.R. S 208(c)(2)(ii) applies only to firm resettlement bar contained in 8 C.F.R. S 208(c)(2)(i)(B), which itself applies only to asylum applications filed before April 1, 1997. Abdille's application was filed after April 1, 1997, and thus the fir m resettlement bar applicable to 22 allocation regarding firm r esettlement is thus evident from the language of S 208.13(c)(2)(ii). Under the regulations, the INS bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies, and, should the INS satisfy this threshold bur den of production, both the burden of production and the risk of non- persuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country. See, e.g., Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the S 208.13(c)(2)(ii) burden framework, and noting that [o]nce the INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that [the applicant] had been `firmly resettled' in Germany, [the applicant] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled); see also Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1399 (10th Cir. 1994) (Once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on gr ounds of firm resettlement . . . the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.) (citations and inter nal quotation marks omitted); Chinese American Civil Council v. Attorney General, 566 F.2d 321, 328 n.18 (D.C. Cir . 1977) (Resettlement is largely a factual question which, once that fact appears of record, the applicants bear the burden of overcoming.). We conclude that the burden allocation scheme established by the applicable INS regulations is controlling. Both the INS and Abdille may, at differ ent points in the immigration proceeding, constitute parties seeking to rely on foreign law and, under the regime cr eated by the regulations, both may consequently bear the bur den of producing evidence of the substance of South African immigration law and practice. Specifically, the INS will _________________________________________________________________ his case is found not in the INS regulations, but rather in the federal asylum statute, at 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, we find no r eason to believe that Congress, by codifying the firm r esettlement bar, intended to alter the burden scheme contained in 8 C.F.R.S 208.13(c)(2)(ii) and, accordingly, will apply that scheme to Abdille's case. 23 clearly carry the initial burden of setting forth evidence that indicates that Abdille had firmly r esettled in South Africa, and, to the extent that the INS relies on pr ovisions of South African law--e.g. asylum provisions found in the Aliens Control Act--to demonstrate that the South African government granted Abdille an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of per manent resettlement within the meaning of 8 C.F .R. S 208.15's firm resettlement definition, it will thus carry the burden of setting forth evidence of the substance of that law. Should the INS meet this threshold burden of production, however, the burden of introducing evidence to overcome the firm resettlement finding would shift to Abdille, the asylum applicant. If Abdille then seeks to use the substance of South African law to rebut thefirm resettlement finding--e.g., by pointing to particular provisions of the Aliens Control Act thatfix the term of refugee status to two years in order to r ebut the suggestion that he was issued an offer of permanent resettlement-- Abdille will carry the burden of setting forth the relevant content of South African immigration law and practice. Moreover, as contemplated in S 208.13(c)(2)(ii)'s allocation scheme, once the government carries its bur den of production by setting forth evidence that indicates that firm resettlement has occurred, Abdille also bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. That is, insofar as Abdille relies on provisions of South African law to defeat the firm resettlement bar, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that those provisions render thefirm resettlement bar inapplicable to his case.