Opinion ID: 1708431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: did the court err in admitting statement made by florence jordan to officer henley, which included remarks uttered by jordan to his wife at the time of the shooting?

Text: The crux of this assignment of error is the testimony of Officer Sandra Henley, who interviewed Mrs. Jordan at the hospital. Henley's testified, on rebuttal, that Mrs. Jordan told her that after Jordan shot her, he told Hargett, You're next. Thus, Henley's testimony contained hearsay and, allegedly, constituted a violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1986) on spousal immunity. Furthermore, the appellant asserts that it was inherently an unreliable statement, due to Florence's medicated state, and was admitted before the State laid the proper predicate for impeachment. The State argues that Jordan is procedurally barred from appealing this statement because he did not object to the testimony on these grounds. The record shows that Sandra Henley was called to the stand after the defense rested. She testified that she went to the hospital with another officer for the purpose of interviewing Mrs. Jordan. Henley testified that Florence was conscious when she talked to her in the X-ray room. Then, the following exchange occurred: Q. What did she tell you? BY MR. BOYCE HOLLEMAN: We object to that. That's not the proper way to do it. BY THE COURT: Sustained. Ask the question, you ask the specific question on what you... . Q. (Interposing) Did she tell you where she was standing in the room when Henry Paul Jordan... . BY MR. BOYCE HOLLEMAN: (Interposing) We object to that. That's not proper. BY THE COURT: Overruled. Henley went on to testify that Florence told her that she was standing in front of the sofa when she was shot. Q. All right, sir. Did she tell you whether or not Henry Paul Jordan made any statements after she was shot? A. Yes, sir. Q. What statement did she make? BY MR. BOYCE HOLLEMAN: Now, we object to that. Q. I mean, what statement did he make? BY MR. BOYCE HOLLEMAN: Now, wait just a minute. We object to this. BY THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. BOYCE HOLLEMAN: We object to it on two grounds, one is that it's not the proper way to prove it. The second place, it's an effort to prove a statement by the Defendant made outside the presence of the Defendant, something he said. BY THE COURT: I'll overrule it. Compare this case to Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1984), which also involved a general objection to hearsay testimony. There, Justice Sullivan wrote: The contention that the testimony was improperly or untimely objected to is without merit. Defense counsel promptly objected. Conceding that he did not state his grounds of objection, it is obvious from the response of the prosecutor and the ruling of the trial judge, as well as the totality of the setting in which these objections were interposed, that everyone clearly understood that the objection was based upon the hearsay rule. There simply can be no doubt of that. In such circumstances it would be vain and foolish to demand that in the heated flow of trial, where the grounds of objection are reasonably apparent from the context, that counsel state his grounds or waive his objection. Id. at 1293. Using this rationale, we conclude that Jordan preserved his right to appeal the admissibility of the statements on grounds of hearsay and failure to lay a proper predicate. Whether the ground of inter-spousal immunity was clear from the context of the objections is not as certain. However, even if Jordan had preserved the issue on appeal, there is no merit to the objection. We recognize the holding of Smith v. State, 193 Miss. 474, 478, 10 So.2d 352, 353 (1942) that, If the wife could not have so testified personally and directly, she could not be made a witness nor the testimony made competent in this indirect and hearsay manner. However, in Smith, there was no indication that the wife was offered to testify, as Florence Jordan was here. Since we find that Florence Jordan testified voluntarily, this case is distinguishable from Smith. The statements offered by Henley were hearsay. However, testimony is not hearsay if it is offered only to impeach the testimony of a witness, and not as substantive evidence. Moffett v. State, 456 So.2d 714, 719 (Miss. 1984). The jury was so instructed here. Florence's testimony on direct was that she did not remember giving a statement to anyone in the hospital. On cross-examination, she reiterated the lack of memory about the conversation. Where a witness neither admits nor denies a statement previously made, impeachment, in the form of testimony about the statement, is proper. Pool v. State, 483 So.2d 331, 337 (Miss.) cert. den Pool v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2280, 90 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986). The appellant also asserts, however, that, even if the statement was admissible as non-hearsay, the State failed to lay the proper predicate. The questioning of Florence as to the statement to Henley occurred when she was describing the events which took place at the hospital the night of the shooting: Q. Do you know Investigator Sandra Henley, with the Waveland Police Department? A. No, sir, I don't. Q. You don't remember having a conversation with her that night? A. No, sir. Q. Did she ask you where, did anybody ask you where you were standing, when you were shot? A. Not that I know of. I don't remember. Q. Did anybody ask you whether or not, whether or not Paul, Henry Paul Jordan said anything when he came through the door? Did anybody ask you that question? A. No, sir, not that I remember. Q. You don't recall Sandra Henley asking you where you were standing, when you were shot? A. No, sir. Q. You don't recall telling Sandra Henley that after Paul shot you, he made the statement that Hargett was next? A. No, sir. [I]n laying the predicate to introduce prior inconsistent statements of a witness, the questions should include whether or not on a specific date, at a specific place, and in the presence of specific persons, the witness made a particular statement. Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d 765, 766 (Miss. 1977). See also Hubbard v. State, 437 So.2d 430 (Miss. 1983). This is exactly what the prosecutor did in this case. It was obvious from the tenor of the questions immediately preceeding this colloquy that the prosecutor had reference to a statement allegedly made in the hospital on the night of the shooting. Thus, the specific date and specific place requirements were met. The prosecutor also named the specific witness to the statement, and referred to its specific contents. Thus, the proper predicate was laid. We, therefore, find no reason for reversal on this assignment of error. Since Florence Jordan testified voluntarily, she was subject to impeachment, and the admission of her prior statement was proper. The prosecution laid the requisite groundwork for the admission of Henley's testimony. Finally, any question of Jordan's mental or physical state at the time of questioning should go only to the weight of Henley's testimony, not to its admissibility. Finding no reversible error in the trial of this case, we, therefore, affirm the conviction and sentence of Henry Paul Jordan. AFFIRMED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. GRIFFIN, J., not participating.