Opinion ID: 2106628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Court Identifications

Text: Besides identifying the defendant in court as one of the two men who robbed her tavern, Mrs. Read also testified to two prior out-of-court identifications of the defendant. Fourteen days after the robbery Mrs. Read identified the defendant from some photographs shown to her by the police. The next day the police held a lineup, and Mrs. Read again identified the defendant as one of the men who robbed her tavern. The defendant challenges Mrs. Read's testimony concerning her prior out-of-court identifications as inadmissible hearsay. [11] Any previous out-of-court statement of a witness which is offered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted meets the definition of hearsay in sec. 908.01 (3), Stats. See also: Green v. State, 75 Wis.2d 631, 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977). Such prior out-of-court statement of a witness is excepted from the definition of hearsay only if one of three circumstances contained in sec. 908.01 (4) (a), Stats., is met: The statement is 1. Inconsistent with his testimony, or 2. Consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 3. One of identification of a person made soon after perceiving him. Thus Mrs. Read's prior out-of-court identifications of the accused, offered to prove that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, is inadmissible hearsay unless it meets one of these three exceptions. The State concedes Mrs. Read's prior identification testimony was not a prior inconsistent statement and was not a prior consistent statement offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication. Therefore, this testimony is admissible only if it is testimony of identification of a person made soon after perceiving him, under sec. 908.01 (4) (a) 3, Stats. The defendant argues that a statement of identification of a person made soon after perceiving him must mean a statement of identification made soon after having perceived the suspect at the scene of the crime. The defendant argues that, since Mrs. Read's identification of the defendant was not made until fourteen days after the crime, her statements of identification were not made soon after perceiving him and are not admissible under sec. 908.01 (4) (a) 3, Stats. The State argues that a statement of identification of a person made soon after perceiving him is a statement made soon after perceiving the accused during the identification process. Since it is undisputed that upon viewing the photographs and the lineup Mrs. Read immediately recognized the robber, the State argues that the requirements of sec. 908.01 (4) (a) 3 have been met. Sec. 908.01 (4) (a) 3, Stats., was modeled on what is now Fed. R. of Evid. 801 (d) (1) (C). [2] It is identical to the federal rule except that in the state rule the drafters added the word soon. The weight of authority at the time the federal rule was drafted was that any prior out-of-court identification of the accused was admissible as a hearsay exception on the issue of the identity of the perpetrator and that the manner and circumstances under which the identification was made, presumably including the length of time between the crime and the identification, merely affected the weight to be given the identification testimony. Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960). The notes of the federal drafters show that the federal rule was intended merely to codify the existing majority view that all prior identification testimony is a hearsay exception. See: Federal Advisory Committee's Note, reprinted in 59 Wis.2d at R239-40. The federal drafters' notes point out that the basis for the admission of prior out-of-court identification testimony is the generally unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as compared with those made at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions. 59 Wis.2d at R239. The Judicial Council Committee's Note contains no suggestion of how the state drafters intended to affect the operation of the federal rule by the addition of the word soon. If by that addition the drafters intended to limit the admissibility of testimony of prior out-of-court identifications only to those identifications which occur soon after the events of the crime, then the drafters would have intended to make a substantial change in the federal rule. Under the federal rule the time elapsing between the original perception of the accused at the scene and the perception of him during the identification is a matter of weight and not admissibility. We believe that, if the drafters intended to make such a significant change in the federal rule, they would have pointed it out in their note. The defendant argues that a construction of soon after perceiving him in this case to mean soon after perceiving the accused during the identification process is contrary to the language of the rule which refers to a perception of the accused rather than to a perception of a likeness of the accused, such as a photograph. The defendant suggests that, since it is unlikely that the drafters intended to permit live lineup identification evidence while excluding photographic or videotape identification evidence, the phrase soon after perceiving him must be construed to mean soon after perceiving the accused during the events giving rise to the case. [12, 13] However, we do not agree that soon after perceiving him cannot be construed to mean soon after perceiving the accused or a likeness of the accused during any identification procedure. The meaning of this rule is unclear, and in interpreting it we must try to effectuate the intent of the drafters. The rationale for admitting prior identification testimony in the first instance is that identifications made closer to the events of the crime and before judicial proceedings have commenced are typically more reliable than an identification made at trial. A construction of our rule which would exclude some testimony of prior identifications merely because the lineup or other identification procedure did not occur soon after perceiving the person at the scene of the crime would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the rule. Though we recognize that our construction is not required by the language of the rule, it is the one which we believe best effectuates the intent of the drafters to make prior out-of-court identification testimony admissible as a general rule. We hold that sec. 908.01 (4) (a) 3, Stats., excepts from the hearsay rule all statements of identification made soon after perceiving the suspect or his likeness in the identification process. As so construed, Mrs. Read's testimony concerning her two prior identifications of the defendant clearly meets this test.