Opinion ID: 1945660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statements Made to Stepsister and Medical Providers.

Text: Upon our review of the record, we conclude the State has met its burden to show the statements made by Bergan to her stepsister and to her medical providers were nontestimonial. Reckner testified that, when Bergan called her, Bergan was hysterical and crying. Bergan told her stepsister they had gotten into a fight and that she left and [Reckner] needed to come pick her up. When Reckner picked up Bergan in the church parking lot a few minutes later, Bergan was still hysterical, crying, ... freaking out. Bergan was covered in blood, so Reckner took Bergan to the hospital. The nurse who examined Bergan upon her arrival at the emergency room testified Bergan was upset, tearful, and anxious. In assessing Bergan's condition, the nurse noticed Bergan's face and eye were swollen, she had blood in her hair, and she appeared to be injured. The nurse asked Bergan what happened, and Bergan told her she had been beaten by [her] ex-boyfriend. Within a few minutes, the emergency room physician arrived. The doctor testified Bergan was extremely distressed and in quite a bit of pain from her injuries. (Bergan suffered a blowout orbital fracture of her eye, bruises, bite marks and other injuries.) In taking a history from her, the physician asked Bergan how she sustained her injuries. Bergan replied that she had been punched and bitten several times by her significant other, and identified that person as David Schaer. Upon our de novo review, we find Bergan's statements to her stepsister and treatment providers were nontestimonial. See People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205, 207-08 (2007) (holding victim's identification of his assailant to treating physician who asked victim what happened was nontestimonial statement); Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 880-81 (Colo.2005) (holding victim's account of assault, including identity of perpetrator, to her friend was not testimonial statement). Her statements as to what happened were not solemn declarations made for the purpose of proving some fact. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192 (stating `[t]estimony' ... is typically `[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact' (quoting 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828))). They were made to obtain assistance and treatment for her injuries. Furthermore, Bergan's statements did not occur during a deposition, while under oath, or during a police interrogation. Nor were her statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective person to reasonably believe the statements would be available for use at a later trial. As the California Supreme Court observed in concluding a victim's statement to his doctor under very similar conditions was nontestimonial, the victim's statement lacked those attributes of testimony by a witness that are the concern of the confrontation clause. Cage, 56 Cal. Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d at 208. The circumstances surrounding Bergan's statements to her treatment providers are distinguishable from those present in Bentley, where we held statements identifying the perpetrator made by the victim to her counselor were testimonial. 739 N.W.2d at 299. In Bentley, the interview of the minor victim was conducted with the participation of representatives of the police department and the department of human services, and the questions posed to the victim were calculated to elicit factual details of the past criminal acts perpetrated against her. Id. The participants in the interview ... acknowledged ... the interview served an investigative function for the State. Id. The victim was informed a police officer was listening to the interview, and it was important for the police to know everything that happened. Id. at 300. After the interview, a tape of the interview was provided to the police, marked as evidence, and retained by the police department. Id. Under these circumstances, we concluded the interview of [the minor victim] was essentially a substitute for police interrogation at the station house. Id. at 299. The present case lacks the indicia of formality that characterized the interview in Bentley. Although hospital personnel informed the police of Bergan's assault, there is no indication in the record of any relationship between the emergency room personnel and law enforcement authorities that would support a finding the medical providers' questioning of Bergan as to the cause of her injuries was a substitute for police interrogation at the station house. Id.; see also State v. Her, 750 N.W.2d 258, 265 (Minn.2008) (holding statements made to non-government questioners who are not acting in concert with or as agents of the government are considered nontestimonial); State v. Sandoval, 137 Wash. App. 532, 154 P.3d 271, 273-74 (2007) (holding statements made by victim to treating physician identifying her attacker were nontestimonial where made for diagnosis and treatment purposes, no indication witness expected the statements to be used at trial, and doctor [was] not employed by or working with the State). Because Bergan's statements identifying her attacker to her stepsister and medical personnel were nontestimonial in character, hearsay testimony regarding these statements is not prohibited by the Confrontation Clause. The trial court did not err in admitting this testimony.