Opinion ID: 1788580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the testimony of James Traywick.

Text: ¶ 4. The standard of review for the admission or exclusion of testimony is abuse of discretion. City of Jackson v. Estate of Stewart ex rel. Womack, 908 So.2d 703, 708 (Miss.2005). Kindred argues that the trial court erred in excluding Traywick's testimony. He argues that Traywick's credibility should not have been for the judge to decide, but should have been a jury issue. ¶ 5. The Court of Appeals stated the following with respect to Traywick's testimony: ¶ 16. We do not believe that under these facts the trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing the witnesses to testify. First, it is only an assumption on Kindred's part that the witness, Traywick was telling the truth. He may have been, but there is no evidence, other than Traywick's testimony, that Traywick and his boss cut limbs from the tree in question and informed the Country Club that the tree needed to be taken down. It seems to me that the trial judge's suspicion of Traywick was not without reasonable basis, given the turn of events during the trial and Traywick's almost magical appearance thereafter. If Traywick was mistaken about cutting the limbs from the tree, the Country Club certainly would not have had any basis for disclosing his identity to Kindred. Kindred, 918 So.2d at 723. ¶ 6. The Court of Appeals, in holding that the trial court did not err, relied heavily on the fact that there was no evidence that Traywick was telling the truth, other than his own testimony. However, this Court has repeatedly held that decisions as to the weight and credibility of a witness's statements are the proper province of the jury, not the judge. Blake v. Clein, 903 So.2d 710, 723 (Miss.2005); Doe v. Stegall, 757 So.2d 201, 205 (Miss.2000). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A mere suspicion that a witness is not truthful, does not warrant exclusion, on that basis alone. ¶ 7. Kindred further argues that the trial court erred when it refused to allow Traywick's testimony on the basis that Traywick had not been disclosed as a witness prior to trial and that he was not listed on the pretrial order. Kindred argues that he could not have given the Country Club notice that Traywick would testify, because Traywick was never revealed by the Country Club in its answers to the plaintiff's interrogatories as someone who had trimmed, cut or removed the tree. Specifically, the trial judge remarks in refusing Traywick's testimony were as follows: These names were not disclosed. They've not been deposed. They're not in the pretrial order, and people don't walk in off the street and testify in Court. ¶ 8. While it is true that Traywick's name was not disclosed in pre-trial discovery, it was the Country Club, not Kindred, which had a duty to disclose Traywick, if in fact Traywick was known by the Country Club to have cut, trimmed, or inspected the tree. Once an opponent requests discoverable material, an attorney has a duty to comply with the request. . . . City of Jackson v. Internal Engine Parts Group, Inc., 903 So.2d 60, 65 (Miss.2005). Kindred's first set of interrogatories to the Defendant included the following request: INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please state the name(s) and address(es) of all persons, entities, companies and/or corporations who have been consulted, contacted, employed or contracted to view, inspect, trim, and/or cut and remove trees located on the Defendant's property, the date(s) and description of service, and the name(s), address(es) and telephone number(s) of every person or persons who did so for or on behalf of Defendant for the past ten (10) years. The Country Club's response to this question was that it was unknown. It was this evasive answer by the Country Club that resulted in Traywick's surprise appearance. An unknown response might cause one to believe that no person or company was consulted, contacted, employed, or contracted to view, inspect, trim, and/or cut and remove trees located on the Defendant's property. The Country Club should have either 1) made a reasonable and diligent inquiry of its business records whether such entity existed, and then answered either none or have identified the entity with relevant knowledge, if one existed or 2) could have chosen to utilize M.R.C.P. 33(d) and given Kindred a reasonable opportunity to examine business records that might have contained such information. M.R.C.P. 26-37. Nothing in the record reflects that Kindred knew of Traywick's existence before he appeared at the courthouse during trial. ¶ 9. This Court has long held that the rules of discovery are to prevent trial by ambush. Busick v. St. John, 856 So.2d 304, 320 (Miss.2003). Procedural rules are designed to assure to the maximum extent practicable that cases are decided on their merits, not the fact that one party calls a surprise witness and catches the other with his pants down. Broadhead v. Bonita Lakes Mall, Ltd. P'ship, 702 So.2d 92, 102 (Miss.1997). ¶ 10. Where as here, a person claiming relevant evidentiary knowledge shows up at trial, both sides must be given an opportunity to learn what the surprise witness knows about the case. In the case of surprise testimony ... counsel need a reasonable opportunity to explore the witness' background and character. Galloway v. State, 604 So.2d 735, 739 (Miss.1992). This Court has stated that, [e]xclusion of evidence is a last resort. Every reasonable alternative means of assuring the elimination of any prejudice to the moving party and the proper sanction against the offending party should be explored before ordering exclusion. Holladay v. Holladay, 776 So.2d 662, 671 (Miss. 2000). The trial judge in the case sub judice when faced with this dilemma inquired of plaintiff's counsel, do you want to continue this case . . ., but Kindred did not request a continuance. The court said the following with respect to allowing the surprise witnesses testimony: I'm not going to allow it. These are two witnesses  do you want to continue the case and mistry it and give them a chance to depose these people? I will do that or consider it, but the that's  there is no that I'm going to allow a witness to appear at the eleventh hour and testify in rebuttal without their names having been disclosed in discovery. (emphasis added). However, Kindred failed to seek the offered relief and proceeded with only a proffer, but did not move for a continuance. Subsequent to the proffer of Traywick's testimony, two other rebuttal witnesses testified, and one additional motion regarding McCoy was heard. Prior to finally resting, the following exchange occurred between Kindred's attorney and the trial court: BY MR. WAIDE: Your Honor, the purpose of this inquiry, your Honor indicated earlier that you would consider granting a continuance. In view of your Honor's ruling on the motion  that rebuttal evidence [sic] and I just needed a minute to confer with my client to determine whether he wants me to ask for one or not. BY THE COURT: No. No. No. I'm not going to continue the matter. There may be  if there's a continuance required it's going to be a mistrial involved in this case and I would have to address those issues when they were presented to me. BY MR. WAIDE: All right, sir. BY THE COURT: But I'm not going to continue the matter just  BY MR. WAIDE: I understand. All right. Your Honor, in that event the plaintiff finally rests. ¶ 11. The court stated it would not then continue the case, but would consider a motion for mistrial. However, the plaintiff elected to rest and did not move for a mistrial. ¶ 12. This Court has often enforced waivers when there has been no request for a continuance. Id. at 738 citing Roberson v. State, 595 So.2d 1310, 1316 (Miss. 1992); Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 868 (Miss.1991); Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 675 (Miss.1991). Because Kindred did not request a continuance and/or a mistrial after the judge first offered the plaintiff an opportunity to move for a continuance and then to move for a mistrial, this Court finds that Kindred waived his right to complain of the exclusion of the witnesses. Accordingly, the trial court properly excluded Traywick and the other witnesses. This issue is without merit.