Opinion ID: 6357502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Revocation Decision

Text: ¶ 22. Defendant challenges the trial court's revocation decision, arguing, among other things, that the court impermissibly weighed defendant's inadequate sex-offender therapy against him. Whether a trial court revokes youthful-offender status is an exercise of discretion. See 33 V.S.A. § 5285(c) (stating court may modify juvenile probation if court finds youth has violated his or her probation conditions); Marsigli Estate v. Granite City Auto Sales, Inc. , 124 Vt. 467 , 470, 207 A.2d 158 , 160 (1965) (stating Legislature's use of may in statute indicates decision is discretionary). Accordingly, we review the revocation decision for an abuse of discretion: [D]ecisions regarding probation status are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.... A trial court's ruling will not be set aside absent a finding of abuse of discretion. State v. Lucas , 2015 VT 92 , ¶ 16, 200 Vt. 239 , 129 A.3d 646 (quotation omitted). A court has abused its discretion if it has failed to exercise its sound discretion or exercised it for clearly untenable reasons. Id . (quotation omitted). Discretionary rulings will not be disturbed if they have a reasonable basis in the record, even if another court might have ruled differently. State v. Dixon , 2008 VT 112 , ¶ 27, 185 Vt. 92 , 967 A.2d 1114 . Nevertheless, the court's discretion, though broad, is not unbridled. Id. (quotation omitted). ¶ 23. We conclude that the revocation decision was an abuse of discretion. Although the court concluded that defendant was not amenable to treatment based on multiple findings, the court failed to give sufficient weight to the one factor we consider most significant: defendant's inadequate sex-offender therapy. Had it done so, it would not have revoked his youthful-offender status. See Lucas , 2015 VT 92 , ¶ 16, 200 Vt. 239 , 129 A.3d 646 (stating to prove abuse of discretion, defendant must show court has failed to exercise its sound discretion or exercised it for clearly untenable reasons. (quotation omitted) ); cf. Blaise , 2012 VT 2 , ¶ 27, 191 Vt. 564 , 38 A.3d 1167 (remanding case for resentencing because [w]e cannot know what sentence the court might have imposed if it had found fewer probation violations). The court found that defendant's probation officer assigned him to a therapist who was not qualified to provide sex-offender  therapy and who enable[d] defendant's refusal to accept responsibility for his offense. The court also observed that despite the confidentiality limitations of a youthful offender, a more appropriate therapist could have been found to address [defendant's] needs as a sex offender and the Department of Corrections may have failed in assigning defendant an inadequate therapist. However, the court concluded that defendant probably would still have issues of compliance, given the inattention he gave several of his probation conditions, ... his attitude toward probation, probation conditions, and his probation officer in general. ¶ 24. This conclusion does not align with the circumstances of this case. As a youthful offender, defendant should have received opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation as part of his juvenile probation. See 33 V.S.A. §§ 5281 - 5288. Given that defendant's underlying conviction was for a sex offense, it was particularly important that treatment include appropriate sex-offender therapy. Based on the court's findings, defendant was never offered adequate sex-offender treatment. His failure to rehabilitate while participating in inappropriate therapy hardly demonstrates that defendant was unamenable to treatment. See State v. Dixon , 2008 VT 112 , ¶ 31, 185 Vt. 92 , 967 A.2d 1114 (By weighing [the Department for Children and Family's] failings against the juvenile, the court improperly penalized the juvenile for the failings of a state agency over which he had no control.); State v. Bubar , 146 Vt. 398 , 405, 505 A.2d 1197 , 1201-02 (1985) (Compliance with probation terms may not be put beyond the probationer's control.). We find too speculative the court's prediction that defendant would have violated his probation conditions even if he had received appropriate sex-offender therapy. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court exceeded its discretion in revoking defendant's youth-offender status based, in part, on defendant's inadequate sex-offender therapy. In determining whether defendant is amenable to rehabilitation on remand, the court should give proper consideration to the adequacy of defendant's treatment. ¶ 25. We acknowledge that remanding this case presents some procedural difficulties. Defendant is now older than twenty-two years old, and the statute permits participation in the youthful-offender program only until age twenty-two. 33 V.S.A. § 5286(d) (If the Court finds that it is in the best interest of the youth and consistent with community safety to continue the case past the age of 18, it shall make an order continuing the Court's jurisdiction up to the age of 22.). An appropriate solution to the procedural dilemma will depend on an updated record, reflecting, for example, whether defendant is currently on adult probation and what treatment he has received. We do not have that record. In addition, neither party raised or briefed this issue. We therefore restrict our opinion to those issues raised by the parties and supported by the record before us. See State v. Settle , 141 Vt. 58 , 61, 442 A.2d 1314 , 1315 (1982) (stating Court will not consider unbriefed issues except in exceptional circumstances). We affirm the violations of probation for failing to attend school without excuse; failing to comply with defendant's GPS-monitoring requirements; and failing to participate in the Restorative Justice Panel. We reverse the superior court's decision to revoke defendant's youthful-offender status. We remand to the criminal division of the superior court with instructions to transfer the case to the family division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion . ROBINSON, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the mandate.  ¶ 26. Although I concur in the majority's assessment of the school and GPS-monitoring conditions, and defendant's violation thereof, I part ways on both the law and the facts with respect to its analysis of defendant's claimed violation of the requirement that he complete a restorative justice program. In particular, I do not concur in the majority's description of the applicable law, and I part ways on the facts insofar as the majority concludes that defendant's conduct amounted to a refusal to comply in this case. Because I conclude that the trial court's determination that defendant violated this condition was error, I would reverse and remand on that basis. ¶ 27. On the law, I disagree with the majority's suggestion that in the absence of any specific requirement concerning the time within which a probationer is expected to complete a probation condition, as a matter of law the probationer risks violation of the probation condition by not commencing to comply with the condition at the beginning of the probationary period. Ante , ¶18. Due notice that an act, or a failure to act, constitutes violation of the terms of probation is an essential precondition to a determination that a probationer has violated those terms. Accordingly, where the probation certificate sets no time for commencement or completion of a particular required task-whether programming, payment of restitution, or some other such task-and ample time remains in the probation period for completion of the task, a probationer cannot be deemed to have violated the condition unless the probation officer provides notice that the probationer must comply with the condition by a certain time, or unless the probationer, by words or deeds, manifests an intention to refuse to complete the task. 7 ¶ 28. That a defendant can only be punished for violating probation after due notice of the expectation giving rise to the violation is well established in Vermont. [D]ue process requires that a convicted offender be given fair notice as to what acts may constitute a violation of ... probation, thereby subjecting [the probationer] to loss of liberty. State v. Peck , 149 Vt. 617 , 619, 547 A.2d 1329 , 1331 (1988). A probationer has fair notice only of conditions that are express or so clearly implied that the probationer, in fairness, can be said to have notice of [them]. State v. Austin , 165 Vt. 389 , 398, 685 A.2d 1076 , 1082 (1996) (quotation omitted). The State bears the burden of showing that defendant had fair notice of a condition. State v. Provost , 2014 VT 86A, ¶ 15, 199 Vt. 568 , 133 A.3d 826 . ¶ 29. I reject the majority's suggestion that in the absence of any express timing requirements in the probation condition itself, a requirement that a condition be completed at the beginning of the probation period is clearly implied. I can easily think of many reasons why it may not make sense for a probationer to complete a particular task at the very beginning of a lengthy probation period. It may make sense for a probationer to find housing before looking for a job, if both are required; it may make sense for a probationer to complete a substance abuse assessment before beginning counseling, if both are required. And a probationer may need time to marshal the resources to pay a restitution obligation. In fact, defendant's probation officer testified that he did not  want to focus on getting defendant into a restorative justice program immediately at the beginning of his probation. Instead, he said he wanted to hold off on that for a little bit to get [defendant] acquainted to probation, and that his real focus at the outset of the probation was to get defendant into counseling and school. This record belies the suggestion that a start immediately requirement is implicit in probation conditions that do not specify a time for completion. ¶ 30. That isn't to say that a probation officer can never put a defendant on notice of an expected time frame. This Court has upheld a probation violation determination for failure to complete programming when ample time remained in the probation period to allow for completion of that programming and the defendant had been expressly notified by the probation officer that completion within a specified time frame was expected. In Provost , for example, this Court applied plain error review in rejecting the defendant's argument that he could not be deemed to have violated the requirement that he complete a domestic violence program eight months into his probation, when the State could not show that he could not have completed the program by the end of his probationary term. 2014 VT 86A, ¶¶ 13-17, 199 Vt. 568 , 133 A.3d 826 . In doing so, the Court emphasized that the defendant was specifically informed by his probation officer that he must complete the third scheduled intake for [the program] or he would be cited for violating probation. Id. ¶ 15. ¶ 31. Moreover, I agree with the majority that where a defendant indicates an intention to not complete the task or programming required by the probation condition, a court may find a violation. As the majority notes, we have concluded that a probationer's repeated refusals to discuss sex-related issues with his psychotherapist supported a determination that he had violated the counseling requirement in his probation conditions. State v. Gleason , 154 Vt. 205 , 216, 576 A.2d 1246 , 1258-59 (1990) ; see also ante , ¶ 15. And where the court ordered a probationer to complete a mental health screening by a date certain, and defendant then missed two out of three appointments for the screening and refused to discuss the details of his offense at the appointment he kept, we concluded the trial court's violation determination was supported by the evidence. State v. Foster , 151 Vt. 442 , 446-47, 561 A.2d 107 , 109 (1998) ; ante , ¶ 15 ; see also Peck , 149 Vt. at 620-21 , 547 A.2d at 1331 (affirming probation violation determination where defendant attended counseling sessions and continued to refuse to admit sex-related misconduct after a series of warnings that he must do so). ¶ 32. That there is no implied requirement of immediate performance of probation conditions is consistent with our case law. In State v. Blaise , we considered a probation violation complaint against a defendant who had not paid certain fines pursuant to the probation order. 2012 VT 2 , 191 Vt. 565 , 38 A.3d 1167 (mem.). Given the time remaining in the defendant's probationary term, we reversed the trial court's violation determination, explaining: Defendant was on probation for two years, from October 2007 to October 2009. The probation condition authorized the probation officer to set a payment schedule for repayment during that period. The probation contract itemized the amount defendant owed but failed to establish a payment schedule. There was no testimony that a payment schedule was established. In the absence of a payment schedule, and well before the expiration of defendant's probation, there was no support for the claim that defendant had violated the probation  condition by failing to make a payment before the VOP complaint was filed. We cannot find a violation. Id. ¶ 23. By distinguishing Blaise on the basis that the probation officer in that case had not communicated any fine repayment schedule, and there was no evidence that the defendant had refused to pay them, the majority implicitly concedes that in the absence of one of these two factors, the mere failure to complete a task required by a probationer's conditions cannot support a probation violation complaint when ample time remains in the probationary term for those payments. ¶ 33. That leads to my second major disagreement with the majority: I take issue with its characterization of the record in this case. There is no dispute that there was ample time for defendant to complete the restorative justice program requirement of his probation; the probation violation complaint came five months into his two-year probationary term, and the restorative justice program was a three-month program. ¶ 34. Nor is there any evidence that defendant's probation officer notified him that completion of the program earlier than the end of the probationary term was required. To the extent the majority suggests that defendant's probation officer informed him that failure to complete the intake for the restorative justice program at the time of defendant's initial meeting with program staff could constitute a violation, ante , ¶ 17, the record does not support this assertion. Defendant went to an intake meeting for the restorative justice program on July 28. At that time, the representatives of the program asked him to go home and think about what happened and to call them back by July 30 at 8 a.m. to continue the intake. They-not defendant's probation officer-told him that failing to complete the program would result in a probation violation. Defendant left them a voicemail before the appointed time indicating that he wanted to speak with his lawyer before signing anything, and that he needed to meet after 4:00 p.m. so his parents could attend. That same day, the Restorative Justice Panel wrote defendant's probation officer declining to accept him into their program. Defendant's probation officer testified that he met with defendant on August 4 and informed him that he was filing a violation of probation complaint, which he did the next day. The probation officer did not testify that defendant was required to complete the program by a set time, that he instructed defendant to contact the restorative justice program to request another intake opportunity, or that he gave defendant any other opportunity to try to reengage with the restorative justice program. In fact, the probation officer's only testimony concerning his communications about the timing of the restorative justice programming was that at the beginning of the probationary period the probation officer wanted to hold off on the restorative justice requirement in order to focus on other programming. ¶ 35. Nor does the evidence support the conclusion that defendant refused to engage in the restorative justice programming. This is not like the cases cited above in which a defendant in programming repeatedly declined to take responsibility for criminal actions, or failed to do so after repeated warnings that such failure would lead to a violation complaint. See supra , ¶ 31. In this case, defendant failed to admit his criminal actions during his initial intake session, was afforded an opportunity to think about his actions, and then indicated that he wanted to talk with his lawyer before proceeding further. He said nothing to suggest that he did not intend to reengage after consulting with his lawyer. He did not fail to take responsibility after  multiple warnings. He did not repeatedly deny responsibility over a course of time. There isn't even any evidence that he dragged his feet in conferring with his lawyer. Defendant's probation officer filed a probation violation complaint a week after defendant's unsatisfactory intake session without giving defendant any opportunity to talk with his lawyer or to reengage with the restorative justice program. Where defendant was given time to reflect on his answers to the restorative justice program's intake questions, and then indicated that he wanted to talk to his lawyer before proceeding, I do not believe the record can support the conclusion that defendant has indicated by words or actions that he will not timely complete the required programming. ¶ 36. Because I believe the trial court erred in concluding that defendant violated the restorative justice panel condition, and because this violation was central to the trial court's decision to revoke defendant's youthful offender status, I would reverse the revocation as well as the violation and remand for further proceedings.