Opinion ID: 4577993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lifetime Protective Order

Text: Finally, Mr. Tewalt argues the circuit court erred in imposing a lifetime protective order in Mrs. Tewalt’s favor at the sentencing hearing. Essentially, the lifetime protective order provided that Mr. Tewalt was prohibited from having any contact with the victim for life. Mr. Tewalt objected to the imposition of that protective order below on the basis that the circuit court identified no authority under which it could sustain such an order. We have held that we “review[] sentencing orders, including orders of restitution made in connection with a defendant’s sentencing, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.” 15 As we are unable to identify any authority permitting the circuit court to impose this lifetime protective order, we agree with Mr. Tewalt that the circuit court committed clear error in this regard. The West Virginia Code provides for different types of protective orders, including what may be considered permanent protective orders, in specific contexts. First, under West Virginia Code § 48-5-608(a) (2005), a circuit court may enter a lifetime 15 Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997). 17 protective order in conjunction with a divorce. Second, under West Virginia Code § 4827-505 (2010), a court may enter a domestic violence protective order which has an initial duration of 180 days, with a possible extension of 90 days. Upon violation of the initial order, the court may enter a second extension lasting up to one year. 16 If there is a second violation of the order, the court may enter a third and final extension in a duration to be determined by the court. 17 Here, § 48-5-608(a) is clearly inapplicable because this is not a divorce proceeding. On the other hand, § 48-27-505 is technically applicable in that the trial court could have entered an initial 180-day order with a possible 90-day extension. 18 But, in the absence of evidence that Mr. Tewalt violated the initial order, the court could not have extended it for an additional year, let alone indefinitely. There was no evidence presented below, nor is there anything in the record, to illustrate that Mr. Tewalt ever violated a domestic violence protective order imposed under West Virginia Code § 48-27-505. We are further unable to identify any authority under which the trial court could have imposed a lifetime protective order. As such, we conclude the circuit court clearly erred and we reverse its sentencing order insofar as it imposes a lifetime protective order. 16 W. Va. Code § 48-27-505(b) (2010). 17 W. Va. Code § 48-27-505(c) (2010). 18 As noted above, there is some dispute as to whether the magistrate finalized an initial 180-day order after the November 2017 incident. 18