Opinion ID: 3160366
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of Privacy Interest

Text: As before, we must consider the nature of the privacy interest compromised by the drug-testing policy. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. In Barrett, addressing only whether Appellees were able to sustain a facial challenge to the policy at issue, we held that some college students that attend Linn State have a diminished expectation of -15- privacy because they are seeking accreditation in heavily regulated industries and industries where drug testing, in practice, is the norm, and thus held Appellees could not maintain a facial challenge. 705 F.3d at 323. Based on this statement, the district court held that only those students in programs for which specific evidence and expert testimony were presented at trial showing that industry testing was the norm or that the industry involved was heavily regulated, would be considered to have a diminished expectation of privacy. Outside of that limited context, the court found no diminished privacy interest whatsoever for the Linn State students, thus granting all remaining students with full, substantial privacy expectations common to all adults. The court erred in so limiting its analysis. While the determination in Barrett remains relevant in the instant analysis because those students engaged in, or who will soon be working in, heavily regulated industries where drug testing is the norm, have diminished privacy expectations, our review today requires additional considerations. The Supreme Court has recognized circumstances in the educational system (outside the context of employees in especially hazardous occupations or safety-sensitive positions) that give rise to a substantial need that justifies suspicionless drug testing. See Veronica, 515 U.S. 646; Earls, 536 U.S. 822. In the educational setting, specifically in the public school setting where the schools have a custodial and tutelary responsibility for the children they are educating, the Supreme Court has acknowledged an important interest in deterring drug use among student athletes and those students participating in competitive extracurricular activities. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831, 834; Veronica, 515 U.S. at 661-63. This court has likewise sanctioned random drug testing of an entire high school student body, applying a similar analysis. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 581 (8th Cir. 1999). That this case involves students is a key component of the privacy interest at stake although not determinative on its own. We fully recognize that the privacy interests discussed in cases such as Earls, Veronica, and Miller, rely heavily on the -16- tutelary aspect of our nation's public schools, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults. Veronica, 515 U.S. at 655. We additionally recognize that the privacy interests of college students in a public technical school are more akin to those we bestow upon individual adults. But, the evidence establishes that Linn State certainly maintains a level of supervision appropriate for students in this particular college setting. Previously mentioned, the privacy interest here is a unique combination of that discussed for those adults subjected to suspicionless testing due to their participation in closely regulated industries or working in safety-sensitive positions, and students in more protected educational settings. Accordingly, the expectation of privacy for all Linn State students is somewhat diminished as they are either entering into areas of instruction and future fields of employment in highly regulated and safety-sensitive positions; or they are juxtaposed with students who are doing so; or they are attending classes in such areas on an intermittent basis due to the actuality of or potential of cross enrollment. The district court found unpersuasive Linn State's argument that the possibility of cross enrollment renders this drug testing reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because students enrolled in non-dangerous programs could, according to Linn State, elect to take courses in programs that include tasks that pose a significant safety risk. The district court held this possibility was abstract and unsubstantiated. We disagree, as the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. There is evidence that cross enrollment does, and can, occur. In any event, while there are certainly some programs that pose little safety risk relative to other programs where the risk is more prominent, the environment at Linn State on whole is the critical consideration because the student body does not participate in their respective disciplines in a vacuum. Indeed, by way of example and applying the district court's analysis, there is nothing prohibiting a student from enrolling in a program without testing, and then later taking classes in, or even transferring to, a program that requires testing–a -17- scenario difficult to address in the current circumstances even from a logistical and bookkeeping standpoint. The district court's refusal to acknowledge Linn State's unique role in this educational setting is error. In its exhaustive risk analysis of specific programs offered at Linn State, the court often mitigated the safety risks in programs based upon the supervision of Linn State staff in the classroom. Yet, by doing so, the court emphasized the important role of the instructors in the educational setting where students need supervision, and quite clearly acknowledged the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy of all Linn State students. Many of the Linn State students are performing dangerous work for the first time. If this technical college is to shoulder the obligation to educate its students in these vocational fields, that responsibility requires at least a concomitant obligation from its students to participate drug and alcohol free. Thus, this unique environment requires a heightened level of supervision and somewhat diminished expectation of privacy.