Opinion ID: 2576427
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnson's Postconviction Procedure Foundation

Text: ¶ 20 As previously discussed, in adopting coram nobis-type relief in Johnson, we found [t]he postconviction hearing procedure to be a successor to pleading the writ of coram nobis and directed defendants to seek relief under rule 65B(i). 635 P.2d at 38. This was so because the 1977 version of rule 65B abolished pleading special forms of writs in favor of actions under these Rules. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (1977) (amended by 65B(b)( l )(1992)). ¶ 21 Additionally, rule 65B was well-suited as a procedural avenue for seeking Johnson relief because it authorized the court to take action when there had been a substantial denial of . . . rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Utah, [5] Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(1)(1977) (amended by 65B(b)( l ) (1992)), including the constitutional right to appeal. Upon finding such a denial, rule 65B(i) authorized a court to enter as a remedy an appropriate order, such as an order for Johnson resentencing. [6] Id. 65B(i)(8). ¶ 22 Therefore, both the mechanism for filing a claim in the criminal case and the remedy via a resentencing order were available under the 1977 version of rule 65B(i), and even the extensive 1991 amendments to rule 65B did not interfere with this. [7] However, in 1996, the Legislature enacted the PCRA and this court subsequently substantially revised rule 65B, wherein former rule 65B(i) (or, after 1991, rule 65B(b)) became, in revised and expanded form, rule 65C. As we explain below, these changes affected the relief available under Johnson and the former rules. ¶ 23 For one thing, a defendant may no longer file a petition pursuant to rule 65B(b) in instances governed by Rule 65C. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(1). In addition, the specific grounds for which extraordinary relief may be sought under rule 65B are now enumerated in subsection (a) of that rule, and the broad language permitting proceedings resulting from the substantial denial of rights, constitutional or otherwise, no longer exists. Id. 65B(b)(11). ¶ 24 Such language also does not appear in rule 65C, which now govern[s] proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under [the PCRA]. Id. 65C(a). The PCRA proclaims itself as a remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(1) (2002). Subsection (2) does not expressly address the situation where a defendant has failed, for whatever reason, to timely file a direct criminal appeal. [8] Id. § 78-35a-102(2). Currently, rule 65C and the PCRA do not permit motions for Johnson relief for defendants who have not filed a direct appeal because their right to appeal has been unconstitutionally denied. While a defendant who simply fails to file an appeal within the time limits required by rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure would reasonably be considered to have exhausted any remedies he might have obtained thereby for purposes of the PCRA, the same is not true for a defendant who is unconstitutionally denied his right to appeal. See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1166 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (Wilkins, J., concurring) (the denial of the right to appeal consists of a defendant having been prevented in some meaningful way from proceeding with [his or her] appeal[]). Such a defendant must have a means of regaining that right. It follows that there must be a mechanism for distinguishing those defendants who have truly exhausted their remedy of direct appeal from those whose right to appeal has been unconstitutionally denied. ¶ 25 Therefore, the unintended result of the transformation of rule 65B(i) since this court issued its decision in Johnson is that a defendant who has been unconstitutionally denied a direct criminal appeal may no longer seek Johnson relief under either rule 65B or rule 65C and the PCRA. Because of this, and because the Johnson remedy also independently relied on coram nobis principles, we deem it inappropriate to continue to rely on the Johnson remedy, and conclude that the restoration of a denied direct appeal through resentencing to establish a new appeal time frame is no longer feasible. Instead, we direct defendants who claim denial of their right to appeal to follow the procedure set forth below.