Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The First Motion to Sever (April 3, 1992)

Text: Following the successful severance motions of Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones, defendant faced a joint trial with her codefendant, Phillip Sanders. On April 3, 1992, defendant made her first motion to sever her trial from that of Phillip Sanders, raising three arguments in support: (1) Phillip‘s confession to a jail visitor, Juanita Williams, would not be admissible against defendant were she and Phillip tried separately;6 (2) Defendant would be prejudiced in a joint trial with Phillip because the evidence of Phillip‘s guilt was much stronger than the evidence against her; and (3) she anticipated that her defense and Phillip‘s defense would be mutually antagonistic. In court to argue the motion, the parties engaged in a protracted discussion concerning whether Juanita Williams‘s statement could be effectively redacted to eliminate any specific mention of defendant in order to preserve defendant‘s confrontation rights. (See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123.) Eventually, the prosecution asserted it would rather forgo using Williams‘s statement than hold separate trials. In light of that assertion, the trial court suggested the question of redaction might be moot and so turned to the question of inconsistent defenses. 6 Juanita Williams reported to police that she met Phillip Sanders when she visited her son at the jail. During these visits, according to Williams, Phillip confessed to her his part in the murder of Melvin Thompson and referred to the wife of the victim as being involved in the crime. 37 After defendant‘s attorneys made an offer of proof in chambers to describe their intended defense, the court announced: ―I‘m not convinced. I heard the offer of proof as to these allegedly inconsistent defenses, and these problems arise always when you have a joint trial. I don‘t see anything here that is any different from what happens in many situations, and nothing that would preclude Catherine Thompson from having a fair trial with the cases joined as it is, and it‘s thoroughly within the court‘s discretion, and I am exercising my discretion in denying the motion to sever on that basis.‖ The prosecution eventually decided not to have Williams testify. Defendant first argues reversal is required because Judge Weisberg ―failed to exercise her discretion under a correct view of the law‖ because she ―did not regard the existence of conflicting defenses as a potential reason to sever.‖ Further, she claims the judge ―did not appreciate that the defenses in this case were not merely inconsistent but particularly antagonistic and mutually exclusive.‖ The record belies this claim. After hearing defendant‘s lawyers describe their expected defense strategy in camera, Judge Weisberg found the claimed conflicts with Phillip‘s expected defense to be nothing unusual. The expected defenses were indeed conflicting, but not in any manner in which the jury would necessarily conclude that both defendants were guilty, or—given the copious evidence of a conspiracy—that acceptance of one party‘s defense necessarily meant the other was guilty. ―Severance is not required simply because one defendant in a joint trial points the finger of blame at another.‖ (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 850.) The record thus demonstrates that Judge Weisberg exercised her discretion to deny the motion, and that she was aware that the degree to which the codefendants‘ expected defenses conflicted was a factor to consider. Nor does the mere existence of conflicting defenses demonstrate Judge Weisberg abused her broad discretion. ―Although there was some evidence before 38 the trial court that defendants would present different and possibly conflicting defenses, a joint trial under such conditions is not necessarily unfair. [Citation.] ‗Although several California decisions have stated that the existence of conflicting defenses may compel severance of codefendants‘ trials, none has found an abuse of discretion or reversed a conviction on this basis.‘ [Citation.] If the fact of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone required separate trials, it would negate the legislative preference for joint trials and separate trials ‗would appear to be mandatory in almost every case.‘ ‖ (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 168, second italics omitted, quoted with approval in People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 41.) ― ‗Thus, ―[a]ntagonistic defenses do not per se require severance, even if the defendants are hostile or attempt to cast the blame on each other.‖ [Citation.] ―Rather, to obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.‖ ‘ [Citation.] When, however, there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance.‖ (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 41.) Defendant argues the existence of antagonistic defenses between codefendants should weigh more heavily in favor of severance than our cases have suggested, citing several lower federal court decisions that she claims require severance whenever jointly tried defendants present antagonistic defenses. (See U.S. v. Tootick (9th Cir. 1991) 952 F.2d 1078, 1081–1082; U.S. v. Romanello (5th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 173, 177; U.S. v. Ziperstein (7th Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 281, 285.) Defendant‘s cited authorities all predate the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, where the high court 39 explained that ―[m]utually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. Moreover, Rule 14 [Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 18 U.S.C.] does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court‘s sound discretion.‖ (Id. at pp. 538–539.) Proceeding with a joint trial despite the existence of inconsistent or mutually antagonistic defenses is thus consistent with constitutional guarantees, at least in the absence of some greater showing of prejudice or an unfair trial, as we recently held. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 380 [―the federal Constitution [does not] compel severance when codefendants present conflicting defenses‖].) We also reject defendant‘s argument that reversal is required because Judge Weisberg failed to appreciate that heightened scrutiny of joinder was required because this was a capital case. We have held severance motions in capital cases should generally receive heightened scrutiny for potential prejudice (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1173; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 44), but Judge Weisberg undoubtedly knew this was a capital case, and her assessment that the inconsistencies between the anticipated defenses were routine and commonplace was not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, ample evidence—all of which would have been admissible in a separate trial—shows any error was harmless. Such evidence includes the web of evidence demonstrating that defendant participated in a conspiracy with Phillip and Carolyn Sanders and Robert Jones to kill the victim for financial gain, including defendant‘s many refinancing and insurance frauds, the evidence of many telephone calls between her and Phillip in the days leading up to the murder, her lies about recycling cans the day of the murder and about the allegedly stolen Rolex watch, her lie about having seen a tall unidentified man leave the scene of the crime (when other witnesses identified Phillip Sanders and Robert Jones 40 leaving the scene), her blurted-out statement upon leaving the hospital that she ―didn‘t mean for it to happen this way,‖ and her blurted-out statement upon her arrest that she ―didn‘t know Phil at all. I only met him once and that was about the sale of a car.‖ Under the circumstances, defendant fails to show Judge Weisberg abused her discretion in denying defendant‘s pretrial motion to sever (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 41), or that denial of severance resulted in such gross unfairness as to deprive defendant of a fair trial or due process of law (People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 726).