Opinion ID: 720250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance of the Escape Charge.

Text: 19 Bell argues that the district court committed plain error in failing to sua sponte sever the escape charge from the other charges, citing United States v. Peoples, 748 F.2d 934 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067 (1985). Bell urges us to consider the following dispositive factors in reviewing whether wholly unrelated counts should be joined: (1) the temporal relationship between the offenses; (2) whether the motive for flight was avoidance of prosecution for the underlying offense; and (3) whether custody was derived directly from the substantive offense. The crux of Bell's argument is that the lapse of time between the original offense (February 21, 1993), and his attempted escape (October 19, 1994), required the court to sever the escape charge from the other charges. 20 In response, the Government asserts that evidence of Bell's attempted escape was admissible to show consciousness of guilt, that the joinder of the charges was not prejudicial, and that the attempted escape was not remote in time from Bell's placement in federal custody. 21 Bell's trial counsel failed to move for a severance of these counts, nor did he raise the issue in any fashion at the trial court. Therefore, we review the issue for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 22 Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) provides us with limited power to notice errors affecting substantial rights, despite the failure of trial counsel to bring them to the attention of the district court. The Supreme Court has stated that the error must be a deviation from a legal rule that is clear or obvious, and the deviation must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78. The Defendant bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Id. 23 Bell has failed to demonstrate a clear deviation from a legal rule. Joinder of charges is permitted by Fed.R.Crim.P. 8. Moreover, Bell's only evidence of prejudice is a single, conclusory statement that overall unfair prejudice resulted from the joinder of the charges. Here, as in United States v. Elliott, 418 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir.1969), the Defendant took the stand and admitted the attempted escape. Bell simply has not proven the existence of any prejudice arising from the joinder of the charges. Therefore, even though a valid basis existed for the granting of a severance motion, or for the court to so rule, sua sponte, we do not find plain error in the district court's failure to sever the escape charge from the underlying charges. 24