Opinion ID: 1887718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: General or Local Law

Text: The trial court held that the Act was a local law under § 110 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 and was thus invalid because no local notice had been published. The Proponents contend that the Act, when viewed as a whole, is a general law and that § 7 merely implements the purpose of the Act to eliminate duplication of electric facilities by assigning service territories. The Opponents argue that § 7 is separate and distinct from the balance of the Act and that it exempts 15 localities from the Act's operation, thereby providing 15 local laws within the meaning of § 110 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. Section 110 of the Alabama Constitution, as amended by Amend. No. 397, provides in pertinent part:  A general law is a law which in its terms and effect applies either to the whole state, or to one or more municipalities of the state less than the whole in a class. A general law applicable to such a class of municipalities shall define the class on the basis of criteria reasonably related to the purpose of the law.... No general law which at the time of its enactment applies to only one municipality of the state shall be enacted, unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been given and shown as provided in Section 106[ [13] ] of this Constitution for special, private or local laws.... A special or private law is one which applies to an individual, association or corporation. A local law is a law which is not a general law or a special or private law. (Emphasis added.) This Court has consistently recognized that a statute is a general law if, when viewed as a whole, it fulfills its chief purpose with respect to the particular object at which the purpose is directed. See Dillon v. Hamilton, 230 Ala. 310, 313, 160 So. 708, 710 (1935) ([A statute] cannot be divided so that a part will be local and a part general requiring notice as to a part, and none as to the balance.). This Court has stated: To hold that every law enacted as a general one, and which deals with state-wide questions, becomes local, because qualified and limited in some of its details to meet local requirements and conditions, would render it practically impossible to pass general laws ... and at the same time vary the minor details thereof, so as to meet the exigencies or differences of various localities confronted with different conditions. State ex rel. Collman v. Pitts, 160 Ala. 133, 143, 49 So. 441, 444 (1909). Further, this Court has stated: A court is duty bound not to construe the act as a local one when it is so framed as to be reasonably susceptible of interpretation as a general law. Crosslin v. City of Muscle Shoals, 436 So.2d 862, 863 (Ala.1983) (citation omitted). In Collman, 160 Ala. 133, 49 So. 441, this Court upheld a statute that prohibited the manufacture and the sale of alcoholic beverages in every county of the state. Although the statute provided exceptions from its prohibition against the sale of alcoholic beverages for localities covered by local acts that in some fashion prohibited such sales, the statute's prohibition against the manufacture of alcohol applied to every county. 160 Ala. at 137-38, 49 So. at 442. Because the object of prohibiting the manufacture of alcoholic beverages existed in every county, a chief feature of the act, that is, the prohibition of such manufacture, had to apply to every county in the state for the statute to be a general law. Id. at 142-47, 49 So. at 443-45. In Crosslin, 436 So.2d at 863-64, this Court upheld a statute that imposed a state-wide beer tax on wet counties, and provided separate formulas for the distribution of the tax revenues for certain counties. This Court held the statute was a general law because its chief feature the imposition of a uniform taxapplied generally. Id. at 864. Although the tax did not affect every county, it was nonetheless general, because it applied to every county in which the object of the taxthe sale of beerwas present. Accord, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, No. 349, 665 So.2d 1378, 1379, 1382 (Ala.1995) (opining that a bill to amend a statute by adding an additional fish habitat to a protected list would be a general law where it was reasonable to conclude that in the Legislature's judgment the amended statute would protect similarly endangered fish habitats in every portion of the state in which there were such endangered habitats); Horgan v. Dauphin Island Water & Sewer Auth., 409 So.2d 1359 (Ala.1982) (holding that a statute providing for water, sewer, and fireprotection improvements in resort areas was a general law because it applied to every portion of the state in which a resort area was located). The main purpose of the Act is to prevent the unnecessary duplication of retail-electric-distribution facilities. The Act accomplishes this purpose in every area of the state in which there is actual or potential duplication. It does so by its chief feature, the assignment of service territories to electric suppliers. If § 7 of the Act and the Nonduplication Agreements were viewed separately from the closer to and option rules, the closer to and option rules would nonetheless be general in nature. Because the parties to the Nonduplication Agreements have agreed to an assignment of service territories that eliminates unnecessary duplication within a particular geographic area, the object of the Act to avoid actual or potential duplication is not present in the covered areas. Thus, the closer to and option rules, even if viewed in isolation, would apply to every area of the state in which there was actual or potential duplication. [14] Collman, 160 Ala. at 142-47, 49 So. at 443-45; Crosslin, 436 So.2d at 864. If, on the other hand, § 7 and the Nonduplication Agreements are properly viewed as an integral part of the Act, then the Nonduplication Agreements serve as one of three means by which the Legislature avoids the unnecessary duplication of electric-service facilities. The chief feature of the Act is the assignment of service territories to electric suppliers. Ala. Act No. 85-645, § 1 (To accomplish these objectives, it is necessary and in the public interest to establish, mandate and implement procedures for determining which electric supplier shall furnish electric service to customers at retail within various areas of the State including areas within the corporate limits of municipalities in the State.) (emphasis added). The Act employs three procedures, or means, by which its chief feature is effected: (1) the assignment of service territories outside municipal limits; (2) the assignment of service territories inside municipal limits; and (3) the assignment of service territories pursuant to agreements that sufficiently eliminate duplication in particular geographic areas. Section 7 of the Act does not exempt specific localities from the chief feature of the Act, the assignment of service territories. Nor does § 7 allow the parties to the Nonduplication Agreements to assign and reassign service territories pursuant to their wishes as embodied in agreements that form no part of the Act. Instead, § 7 of the Act expressly incorporates the assignment of service areas contained in the Nonduplication Agreements, binding the parties to the terms of those agreements by the force of statutory law. [15] Thus, the chief feature of the Actthe assignment of service territoriesaccomplishes the purpose of the Actthe elimination of actual or potential duplication of electric-service facilitiesthroughout the state. Collman, 160 Ala. at 142-47, 49 So. at 443-45; Crosslin, 436 So.2d at 864. Therefore, we hold that the Act is so framed as to be reasonably susceptible of interpretation as a general law, for which local notice was not required. Crosslin, 436 So.2d at 863.