Opinion ID: 390860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 8 Gunny argues that under the Georgia Long-Arm Act (the Act) the district court lacked in personam jurisdiction in that the contract was neither executed nor breached in Georgia. Our recent decision in Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream, 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980) convinces us that Gunny's argument must fail. Noting that a federal court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must comply both with the long-arm statute of the forum and the basic requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, we held that Baskin-Robbins' Georgia contacts conferred such jurisdiction. 9 The Georgia Long-Arm Act, Ga.Code Ann. § 24-113.1, provides in pertinent part: 10 A court of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use of possession enumerated in this section, if in person or through an agent, he: 11 (a) Transacts any business within this state 12 In Baskin-Robbins, we pointed to the fact that the Georgia Supreme Court liberally interprets the Georgia Long-Arm Act and that Georgia courts have held that the Act confers jurisdiction over actions arising either directly or indirectly out of such transactions, id. at 379, and claims arising from or connected with  (emphasis in Baskin-Robbins) such acts or transactions. From these facts, we concluded that a defendant's activity within Georgia, as long as it was purposeful, could be very slight and yet constitute transacting business within the state. Baskin-Robbins' agents had come to Georgia to inspect plaintiff's plant and to conduct preliminary negotiations. Furthermore, part performance had occurred within Georgia. Although we found it unnecessary to address the question of whether any of these contacts standing alone would have been sufficient to sustain jurisdiction, we noted that the Georgia courts had considered each alone to be a relevant contact. Looking to the totality of circumstances, we held that the Georgia Long-Arm Act, as interpreted by the Georgia courts, conferred in personam jurisdiction over Baskin-Robbins. 13 Gunny's contacts with Georgia with respect to Bigelow are less than those of Baskin-Robbins in Gold Kist in the sense that neither Gunny agents nor executives met with Bigelow representatives in pre-contract negotiations in Georgia 6 nor did execution of the contract occur there. 7 But Gunny's contacts are also greater than those of Baskin-Robbins in that it had maintained permanent employees and agents within Georgia and shipped jute through the Savannah ports for more than a decade. Specifically with respect to the instant contract, Gunny had delivered in Savannah 22,228 of the 100,000 linear yards of jute promised. In Gold Kist, we took note of the fact that the Georgia Court of Appeals, in Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 152 Ga.App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979), had recently ruled that if a nonresident corporation purposely seeks to avail itself of business opportunities in Georgia, the resulting business transactions have the requisite connection with Georgia to sustain jurisdiction, regardless of whether the nonresident itself comes into the state or has agents or independent contractors effect this result. 623 F.2d at 380. In light of this liberal interpretation given the Act by Georgia courts, we conclude that Gunny's actions within Georgia more than met this test: it both employed agents and conducted purposeful activity within Georgia, thus conveying in personam jurisdiction. 14 The only remaining question in this respect is whether personal jurisdiction over Gunny may be exercised consistent with the dictates of due process. The test is two-pronged: 1) the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state 'such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' (and 2)) the defendant must 'purposefully (avail) itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'  Gold Kist at 381. In Gold Kist, we held that by entering into the stream of Georgia commerce, Baskin-Robbins satisfied the latter requirement. The same is true here. With respect to the first requirement, we discussed the general relations between the nature of the claim and the entity's contacts with the forum, recounted in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945): 15 Presence in the state in (the due process) sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there 16 (T)here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities 17 Finally, the commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate agent , because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit. 18 In the instant case, Gunny's conduct falls squarely within the first category. For more than a decade, it has maintained an employee and sales agent who have conducted business within the state, and it has imported jute from India and shipped it to Savannah for purchase by, among others, United States carpet manufacturers. This is the precise activity giving rise to Bigelow's claim. Hence, the district court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction was consistent with due process. 8