Opinion ID: 544229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: propriety of sentence imposed

Text: 11 Finding, as we do, that the applicable statute at the time of the commission of the offense was 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(a), we look to its penalty provision to determine the propriety of appellant's sentence. The penalty provision of that statute provides that: 12 Any person who commits an offense defined in this section shall be punished in accordance with the penalties set forth in section 1010 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. Sec. 960). 13 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(g)(1). Section 960 of Title 21 states that, in the case of marihuana, any person who possessed, on board a vessel, 1000 kilograms or more of marihuana, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten (10) years and not more than life and a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provisions of Title 18, or $4,000,000.... The statute also mandates that a term of supervised release, in addition to the term of imprisonment, be imposed. Accordingly, we find that appellant's sentence for possessing 3,465 pounds of marihuana was not only within the statutory minimum, but it was the statutory minimum. 14 Although appellant also argues that his marginal involvement in the enterprise for which he was convicted entitled him to a presumption that his punishment ought to be less than that of his co-defendants, we find that the district court properly sentenced him in accordance with the applicable sentencing guidelines. Since the government did not request a departure from those guidelines, the district court had no authority to sentence him below the minimum term of 10 years. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(e). 15 As to appellant's contention that the fine imposed upon him was improper because he is indigent, we find that the issue is premature for appeal. See United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 598 (1990). As we stated in Levy, [w]e see no reason either to speculate unnecessarily about the possibility of future harm or to intervene to protect [defendant] from what is, at the moment, 'a merely hypothetical injury.'  Id. (citing United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1324-25 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 734 F.2d 1481 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 790, 83 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985)). 5 16 We need go no further. For the reasons expressed above, the concurrent sentences and convictions imposed for Counts 2 and 3 are hereby vacated, and the conviction and sentence imposed for Count 1 is affirmed. 17 Vacated in part, affirmed in part.