Opinion ID: 773894
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inconsistent BIA Case Law

Text: 25 The BIA has, through its adjudications, created a set of established policies concerning the meaning of the Matter of Chen exception. In Matter of B-, Interim Decision 3251, 1995 WL 326740 (BIA 1995), the Board granted asylum to an individual from Afghanistan who had been interrogated, physically abused, detained for thirteen months, and forced to serve in the army on the basis of his assistance to the mujahidin. Id. at 9. The Board noted that despite the changes in Afghanistan since the abuse had occurred, the applicant should be granted asylum because the past persecution suffered by the applicant was so severe insofar as it involved physical torture and psychological abuse, inadequate diet and medical care, and the integration of political prisoners with criminal and mentally ill prisoners. Id. at 10. Nowhere does the Board find, much less rely on, the existence of an ongoing physical or emotional disability. 26 In Matter of H-, the BIA remanded to the IJ for exercise of discretion when it found that an individual who was detained, beaten, and separated from his family in Somalia on the basis of his clan membership, was eligible for asylum. Matter of H-, Interim Decision 3276, 1996 WL 291910 (BIA 1996). In its page-length discussion of the Matter of Chen exception, the Board again did not mention - as a requirement or as a factor - the existence of an ongoing physical or emotional disability. Id. at 16-17. Instead, it noted that the IJ should consider compelling, humanitarian considerations when determining whether an applicant qualified under the exception. Id. at 17. Citing Chen, the Board concluded that the rule applies to those applicants who have suffered such severe persecution that [they] should not be expected to repatriate. Id. 27 Finally, in Matter of N-M-A-, the BIA determined that an individual who was detained for one month, beaten, and deprived of food for three days by Afghan authorities because he was suspected of being an anti-communist, had not demonstrated that his past persecution was severe enough to establish eligibility for the humanitarian exception. Matter of N-M-A-, Interim Decision 3368, 1998 WL 744095 (BIA 1998). The Board examined Ninth Circuit case law and its own practice, and concluded that to demonstrate that [an applicant] is eligible for asylum on the basis of his past persecution alone, the applicant must also show that he belongs to the smaller group of persecution victims whose persecution (including the aftermath) is so severe that the `compelling reasons' standard [of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii)] has been met.  Id. at 16-17. While the Board does indicate that it considers theaftermath of persecution as part of its evaluation of the severity of the abuse, it also cites to both Matter of Chen and Matter of B-in support of its construction of the governing regulations. Id. at 17. As discussed above, Matter of B-did not refer to an ongoing physical or mental disability. 28 In sum, then, BIA case law demonstrates that while the existence of lasting physical or emotional disability may sometimes be a factor in determining the severity of an applicant's past persecution, it has not been a requirement. This means, by necessity, that the Matter of Chen exception, as interpreted by the Board and now codified in the regulations, does not require the demonstration of an ongoing physical or emotional disability. 29 By changing its settled practice with respect to this rule, the BIA acted impermissibly and committed an arbitrary and capricious act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).Though the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and follows - by rule or by settled course of adjudication - a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned . . . . INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1997). The Supreme Court has further held: 30 An additional reason for rejecting the INS's request for heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years. An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is `entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view. 31 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n.30 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)). Cf. Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting, in dictum, that an agency's past interpretations of a regulation are more binding on the agency than its past statutory interpretations because [o]therwise, the agency could evade its notice and comment obligation by`modifying' a substantive rule that was promulgated by notice and comment rulemaking). 32 The BIA has consistently interpreted the Matter of Chen exception without requiring ongoing disability. To suddenly change course and add this requirement now is an arbitrary act that is impermissible and, even giving the BIA the deference it is due, should be overturned. Cf. Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 339-40 (1999) (refusing to give Chevron deference to the Census Bureau's interpretation of a statute regarding statistical sampling because the Bureau had taken the opposite position on the issue for years). 33 We accordingly find that the Board's arbitrary use of the physical or emotional disability factor as a requirement in Mr. Lal's case was contrary to its own regulations and case law. Its rejection of Mr. Lal's application was therefore an irrational departure from its policy, which must be overturned. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447 n.30. 34