Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threatening Statements to Deputies

Text: Next, defendant challenges the admission of several factor (b) incidents arising from his clashes with CYA deputies. All of the evidence was properly admitted. Deputy Tammy Wyatt reported defendant for passing hot water to another inmate, a rules violation. Angry about his limited access to hot water, defendant 78 warned a deputy that anyone who tried to enter his cell would be assaulted. When Deputy Wyatt brought him a food tray that week, he shoved it back at her. Defendant was interviewed about the disciplinary report and stated that ―if he wanted to get a write-up, he could get one for a much more severe incident.‖ He then repeated there would be ―trouble‖ if deputies entered his cell. When the interview ended and defendant‘s restraints were removed, he refused to step into the pod. Instead, he turned to Deputy Wyatt and told her she had ―better not come up to his cell.‖ Contrary to defendant‘s claim, this remark could only have been intended, and understood, as a threat. Defendant was visibly angry with Deputy Wyatt, had recently tried to hit her with a tray, and had repeatedly threatened to physically assault any deputy who visited his cell. Defendant‘s warning to Wyatt clearly implied that defendant planned to assault her if she came to a place where he was unrestrained. Defendant made a similar threat to Deputy William Humphries when the deputy had to tell him repeatedly to end a telephone call and return to his cell. Defendant yelled, ―You better check your attitude. You came in here with attitude today. You don‘t know who you are dealing with. I‘ll be here everyday, Humphries.‖ When the deputy began writing up a discipline report, defendant added, ―I don‘t care if you are writing me up. . . . I don‘t care where I get sent. You need to check your stuff. You still have to come in my room.‖ Although defendant now minimizes this incident as mere ―mouthing off,‖ his words clearly implied a threat to assault Deputy Humphries when the opportunity arose, and the deputy understood the statements as threatening. Defendant also challenges the admissibility of Humphries‘s testimony that this incident occurred when defendant was in an administrative segregation unit for high-profile or violent inmates. Rather than object, defense counsel chose to cross examine the deputy on procedures in the segregated unit. Absent an objection, defendant‘s current challenge to the testimony is forfeited. (See People 79 v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.)26 In any event, as defendant‘s reply brief concedes, this evidence was relevant context for Deputy Humphries‘s perception of defendant‘s statements as a threat. Finally, defendant argues a deputy impermissibly testified that he had a reputation for violence. (See People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1233.) Deputy Charles Foster testified briefly about a factor (b) incident involving Patterson. In cross-examination, defendant‘s attorney solicited the deputy‘s views about defendant‘s demeanor in prison. Deputy Foster recalled having no real problem with defendant, whom he considered no different than most other inmates. On redirect, the prosecutor asked whether defendant had a reputation in the sheriff‘s department as being excessively violent toward staff. The court allowed the question, finding that counsel‘s cross-examination had opened the door to inquiry about defendant‘s character. Foster answered ―yes‖ and confirmed hearing about defendant‘s reputation over many years from many different deputies. Evidence offered in rebuttal to defense mitigation evidence need not relate to any specific aggravating factor under section 190.3. (Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 109.) We have repeatedly held that impeachment is permissible in the penalty phase when a defense witness offers testimony bearing on the defendant‘s character. (People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1066; People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 619.) Defense counsel elicited testimony from Deputy Foster suggesting defendant was no more violent than other inmates. The People were entitled to rebut that suggestion with evidence that, notwithstanding Deputy Foster‘s view, defendant was known to be an especially 26 Defendant also did not object when Patterson‘s attorney elicited testimony from Deputy Judith Miller-Thrower that defendant‘s administrative segregation status required that he be transported in chains, even inside the jail. His present challenge to this testimony was therefore not preserved. (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 354; People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.) 80 violent inmate. ―A defendant has no right to mislead the jury through one-sided character testimony during either the guilt or penalty trial. We do not believe that defendant was entitled to elicit testimony suggesting that he was [nonviolent], and at the same time to preclude the People from introducing contrary evidence.‖ (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 578.)