Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: James Williams

Text: Smith contends the trial court erred by admitting part of a recording in which James Williams told police Smith and Settle drove the bodies away from the murder 44 Evidence Code section 1237 provides: ―(a) Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement would have been admissible if made by him while testifying, the statement concerns a matter as to which the witness has insufficient present recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, and the statement is contained in a writing which: [¶] (1) Was made at a time when the fact recorded in the writing actually occurred or was fresh in the witness' memory; [¶] (2) Was made (i) by the witness himself or under his direction or (ii) by some other person for the purpose of recording the witness' statement at the time it was made; [¶] (3) Is offered after the witness testifies that the statement he made was a true statement of such fact; and [¶] (4) Is offered after the writing is authenticated as an accurate record of the statement. [¶] (b) The writing may be read into evidence, but the writing itself may not be received in evidence unless offered by an adverse party.‖ 95 scene. Bryant and Wheeler did not object at trial. In fact, they sought to introduce the entire tape with only one unrelated redaction. The claim is forfeited. At trial Smith objected only that the statements reflected inadmissible speculation. The trial court overruled Smith‘s objection finding Williams had sufficient personal knowledge on the point. Nothing in the record showed that this statement was based on information gleaned from someone else. The court‘s ruling that other statements in the recording could be admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing Williams‘s credibility did not change the court‘s ruling on the statement at issue here. Accordingly, the hearsay claim is both forfeited and meritless. 10. Documentary Evidence Defendants contend the trial court improperly admitted various documents including Western Union receipts detailing money transfers to people connected to Andre Armstrong and assorted records seized from the Bryant Family drug houses. No defendant objected to this evidence at trial. The claims are forfeited. C. Admission of Photographs of the Victims Defendants contend the court violated their constitutional rights by admitting various photographs taken where the bodies were found and during the autopsies. The evidence was admissible. ― ‗ ―The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. [Citations.] The court‘s exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. [Citations.]‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citations.] . . . Autopsy photographs are routinely admitted to establish the nature and placement of the victim‘s wounds and to clarify the testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding the crime scene and the autopsy, even if other evidence may serve the same purposes. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 33.) The court properly ruled the challenged items were relevant. 96 As to undue prejudice, we have reviewed the photographs at issue. As is usually the case in a murder, they are unpleasant. The trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason in finding that the probative value of the photographs was not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.45 Moreover, the court rejected some photographs proffered by the prosecution, and admonished the jurors, in essence, to avoid letting any emotional reaction affect their consideration of the evidence.46 D. Admission of Opinion Evidence Regarding Drug Business Operations Detective James Dumelle testified about the police raids and arrests during the 1984-1985 investigation of the Bryant Family. During Bryant‘s cross-examination, Dumelle testified that in his opinion, at the time of the Wheeler Avenue murders, Jeff Bryant was in charge even though he was in prison. During redirect examination, the prosecutor asked the detective, ―based on your understanding of the people running the organization, what‘s your opinion as to who [Jeff Bryant] would leave in charge of‖ the ―people on the outside of the prison?‖ Bryant objected to the question on the grounds of lack of foundation and improper opinion. The trial court overruled the objection, and Dumelle answered that defendant Bryant would be in charge. On appeal, Bryant renews his contention that the detective‘s answer was improper, because it constituted 45 Defendants challenged the admission of X-ray images taken during the autopsy of Chemise only on relevance grounds, not as unduly prejudicial. Their section 352 challenge to these items is forfeited. (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 138-139 (Valdez).) 46 The court instructed the jury as follows: ―You are going to be allowed during the testimony of [the pathologist] to view some photographs that he is going to describe for you, photographs of the four decedents in this case. The photographs are not given to you with the idea of inflaming you or trying to affect you emotionally, but because the court feels there is some relevance to the photographs that is not outweighed by any potential damaging effect by your seeing the photographs. I want you to keep in mind that they are simply evidence like every other piece of evidence in this case.‖ 97 unsupported opinion testimony. Smith and Wheeler forfeited the claim for failure to object. The evidence was also admissible. Bryant relied on Dumelle as an expert on the structure of the organization by eliciting the opinion that Jeff was in charge despite his imprisonment. The trial court properly admitted his opinion about an additional aspect of organization structure and operations. (See Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a) [―A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.‖]; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 672 (Fuiava).) Moreover, Bryant was free to challenge the persuasive value of Dumelle‘s opinion on recross-examination. E. Questioning of Bryant by the Trial Court Defendants contend that during the prosecutor‘s cross-examination of Bryant, the court posed a series of hostile questions demonstrating a failure to remain impartial, and violating their rights to due process. No defendant objected at trial; the claim is forfeited. (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 350.) The failure to object is particularly significant here because the claim may rest on an error in the reporter‘s transcript in attributing the questions to the court, rather than the prosecutor.47 47 In response to the first question supposedly asked by the court — whether Bryant was ―selectively answering questions you choose to answer because you figure they‘re safe questions to answer‖ — Bryant answered, ―I‘m answering the questions to the best of my ability when you ask me and the other attorneys,‖ implying that it was an attorney, i.e., the prosecutor, asking this question and those that followed, not the trial judge. During a remand from this court to allow the trial court to make other specified record augmentations and corrections, the trial court found that the reporter‘s transcript was, indeed, erroneous in the attribution of the questions at issue. Bryant contends the trial court‘s finding was outside the scope of its authority granted by the remand order. We need not resolve the propriety of the trial court‘s finding here because defendants‘ appellate claim is forfeited. 98 F. The Trial Court’s Comments on Costs of Trial Defendants contend the trial court improperly mentioned to the jury the expense of the trial. They point to a few instances over the course of several months in which the court referred to trial costs. They assert that these references may have prejudicially coerced the jury when it deliberated. Assuming the challenges are not forfeited (see § 1259),48 they lack merit. The first references came early in the trial. The court told the jurors about arrangements made to protect their privacy, such as having them escorted to court and keeping them together in a jury room during the day. The court explained, ―we simply cannot afford to have trials blow up because the jury cannot follow the court‘s instructions. . . . It costs a lot of money to run this courtroom. I won‘t bore you with the details, only to say it is astronomical. That means we must have everybody on the same wavelength, not speaking about the case, not doing anything for no good reason that would result in a mistrial.‖ After several days of testimony, the court asked jurors whether the arrangements were causing any problems. The court stated that ―the arrangements that we have to get you to court in the morning and to keep you in the building during the day and to provide lunches and so forth, those are being done for your benefit and at considerable expense. [¶] I won‘t bore you with the details about those bills I sign every single day and you would be very surprised. So I will not get into that with you.‖ Later in the discussion, the court reminded the jury that it was not ―do[ing] this lightly at all. We certainly do not need to get into any more expense than we have to, but it is appropriate for the reasons I stated earlier.‖ 48 Section 1259 provides, in relevant part, ―The appellate court may . . . review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.‖ 99 We addressed similar comments in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200. There, the trial court mentioned the cost of running the courtroom and the expense of a retrial to stress the importance of the jurors following the admonition not to discuss or investigate the case outside of the court proceedings. We concluded there was no reasonable likelihood of any improper effect on the jury because ―[t]he comments merely constituted an attempt by the trial court to stress the importance of obeying the court‘s admonitions.‖ (Id. at p. 221.) The same considerations apply here. The comments were made in the context of explaining the necessity for the special arrangements regarding the jury‘s coming and goings and the importance of the court‘s instructions. Moreover, the court explicitly admonished the jurors that the special arrangements and costs should not bear on their deliberations.49 The other two references defendants point to were even more oblique. In light of trial testimony that in the past the Bryant Family had hired attorneys to represent employees who were being prosecuted, defendants requested that the trial court instruct that the attorneys representing defendants in this case had been appointed. The court invited defendants to formulate the language of the instruction. It is unclear whether they did so. The court ultimately instructed that the defense attorneys had been appointed, and repeated that instruction in a slightly expanded form the next day when a juror asked for clarification. The court first said, ―You heard some testimony in this case about Family 49 During the first discussion, the court stated, ―Let me explain what you cannot do with this information I have given you. First of all, you are not to allow any arrangements that I have made for my reasons to affect your verdict in this case, whatever that verdict is, at any phase, guilt phase, or if we have a penalty phase.‖ In the second discussion, the court stated, ―This is being done because the court thinks it is appropriate. That is about all I will say at this point in time. [¶] And whether you think we are going overboard with the accommodations or being too accommodating, you are entitled to your opinion. But I don‘t want those opinions to in any way influence the manner in which this case is decided . . . .‖ 100 attorneys, things of that nature, two or three times. I don‘t remember what witness but let me assure you as follows: That none of the defense attorneys in this case have been retained by the defendants in this case. These attorneys are on our approved, very elite death penalty list and they are the ones that the court calls upon and appoints to handle cases wherein a potential penalty is death. These people, whether there are or are not Family attorneys, these lawyers are not among that group.‖ In response to the juror‘s question the following day, the court explained that the defense attorneys were not Family attorneys, but had been appointed and paid by the court. The court then stated, ―I‘ll tell you this, too. Nobody can hire a lawyer for a death penalty case. I don‘t care who you are, it costs too much money. I‘ve not yet seen a retained counsel on a death penalty case, so these are appointed and paid by the State of California, all the lawyers in this case.‖ The court told the jury that the fact that defense counsel were being paid by the state was ―not an issue that is of any interest to you right now, shouldn‘t be,‖ nor was it ―evidence of anybody‘s indigency or lack thereof,‖ the court was only trying to inform the jury of the status of the attorneys, and that this information should not ―detract or add to any other evidence in the case.‖ The court then asked the attorneys if what it had told the jurors was ―agreeable to all counsel.‖ No counsel expressed any dissatisfaction. Again, the court‘s comments in no way suggested that the expense of the attorneys representing defendants should play a role in the jury‘s deliberations. The indirect references came in the context of instructing the jury on a proper subject and at defendants‘ request. The court admonished the jury not to take from the court‘s instructions more than a clarification that the attorneys had not been hired by the Family. There is no possibility that the court‘s comments regarding the cost of representation for defendants had any prejudicial effect on the jury‘s deliberations. 101 G. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendants contend the prosecution committed misconduct during the guilt phase in both the presentation of evidence and argument. They forfeited nearly all of their claims by failing to object and to request admonitions. (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1275.) Defendants‘ blanket assertion that admonitions could not have cured the prejudice from the asserted misconduct is unpersuasive, as is their assertion that we should apply a ―plain error‖ standard to review otherwise forfeited claims. (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 727; Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 204.) Defendants‘ failure to object prevented the prosecution from developing the record to refute these claims and prevented the trial court from taking steps to avoid or remedy any prejudice. We therefore decline to address them. The only two claims of misconduct preserved for appeal involve one statement of law and one concerning the facts. Both claims are meritless. ― ‗The standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled. ―A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal Constitution when they infect the trial with such ‗ ―unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.‖ ‘ [Citations.] Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‖ [Citation.] . . . When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor‘s comments before the jury, ― ‗the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.‘ ‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.]‖ (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1275.) Defendants contend the prosecutor misstated the appropriate legal definition of what constitutes an accomplice. The prosecutor argued, ―Jay Williams is not an accomplice in this case, and the reason he is not an accomplice is he has to be subject to prosecution for exactly the same crimes, meaning he has to be guilty of these crimes.‖ 102 Following a defense objection that the prosecutor had misstated the law, the trial court stated to the jury, ―Well, he has to be shown to be an accomplice by the evidence, I think, within the confines of the court.‖ Defendants contend the prosecutor‘s statement was improper because ―[n]ot everyone who is ‗subject to prosecution‘ is guilty.‖ They appear to base this contention on the notion that the term ―guilty‖ means only a formal adjudication of guilt in a court proceeding. The trial court‘s admonition and the prosecutor‘s subsequent argument adequately conveyed, however, that it was up to this jury to decide for itself whether Williams was an accomplice in that he had aided and abetted the murders. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury interpreted the prosecutor‘s isolated comment to mean Williams could not be an accomplice because he had not been convicted. Wheeler contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing against facts he knew to be true.50 A prosecution witness had testified that Wheeler sold drugs for the Family as far back as 1986. Wheeler denied that was so, testifying he had been confined in county juvenile and California Youth Authority facilities from 1985 through late 1987. He testified that he did not join the Family until February 1988, only six months before the murders. In closing argument, Wheeler‘s counsel contrasted Wheeler‘s brief connection to the Family with the lengthy relationships of the other defendants, and suggested that Williams framed Wheeler because he was the ―odd man out.‖ The prosecutor addressed Wheeler‘s ―alibi‖ in argument to the jury as follows: ―Now, he admits yeah, I am a dope dealer, but they could not have met me then because I was in custody. Well, that is a fine defense, but nonetheless, he went to juvenile camp, and the juvenile camp had him in and out of custody.‖ Wheeler objected that the 50 Bryant and Smith did not object to this asserted misconduct or raise it as a claim on appeal; the issue does not appear to relate to them at all. 103 prosecutor had misstated the evidence, and the trial court agreed, stating, ―There is no evidence. Jury is admonished to disregard.‖ The prosecutor went on, ―There is no evidence, no records to show when Wheeler was in custody and when he was not. And if it was true he was in custody that entire time, how easy to show that. If there is any truth at all to that, how easy to show that. Oh, just take Leroy Wheeler‘s word for it. Leroy Wheeler, the man lied to the police with every word he said, and lied to you a number of times. But take my word for that. Yeah right.‖ Wheeler later raised an objection that the prosecutor had, in effect, argued that Wheeler‘s testimony was false when records the prosecution had provided confirmed that he was in custody during the relevant period. Wheeler also raised this issue in his motion for a new trial and provided confirming records. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for a new trial. On appeal, Wheeler renews his claim that the prosecutor‘s statements were improper. The Attorney General responds that the prosecutor permissibly commented on the state of the evidence, urging that Wheeler‘s own testimony was not credible, and that he had failed to present other available evidence to support his testimony. (See People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 407; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 263.) We agree with Wheeler, however, that this assertion misses the point. It is misconduct for a prosecutor to urge a failure of proof and argue the contrary is true, when the prosecutor knows or should know the assertion is, in fact, false. Further, ― ‗[u]nder well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the evidence it presents . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 242.) Wheeler‘s juvenile records reflect that Wheeler was arrested in 1985, committed to the county juvenile hall, then a California Youth Authority facility, and ultimately paroled in November 1987. There is no indication that Wheeler was ever released from custody, even temporarily, during that time. It was improper to suggest that a failure to produce the records could be relied upon to show that Wheeler‘s testimony was not true 104 when the prosecutor knew or should have known the records appeared to corroborate Wheeler. We nonetheless conclude any misconduct was not reversible. It clearly fell within the jury‘s province and capability to weigh the credibility of the conflicting testimony on this tangential subject. It was undisputed that Wheeler sold drugs for the Family and processed money at Wheeler Avenue. The jury was instructed that the parties were not required to present all available evidence concerning an issue.51 Moreover, Wheeler‘s credibility had already been substantially undermined. By his own admission he had lied extensively to police officers investigating the murders. The trial was not fundamentally unfair, nor is there a reasonable probability the outcome would have been more favorable to Wheeler in the absence of the prosecutor‘s brief and sarcastic argument suggesting yet another reason to disbelieve his testimony on a collateral issue. H. Accomplice Determinations and Jury Instructions Defendants raise several challenges relating to accomplice testimony. The trial court did not err. 1. Accomplices as a Matter of Law Defendants‘ primary claim that Williams was an accomplice as a matter of law relies on section 1111. The statute provides, ―A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. 51 The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.11: ―Neither side is required to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any of the events disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have some knowledge of these events. Neither side is required to produce all objects or documents mentioned or suggested by the evidence.‖ 105 [¶] An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.‖ (Ibid.) ― ‗[A]n accomplice is one who aids or promotes the perpetrator‘s crime with knowledge of the perpetrator‘s unlawful purpose and an intent to assist in the commission of the target crime . . . .‘ [Citation.] ‗In order to be an accomplice, the witness must be chargeable with the crime as a principal (§ 31) and not merely as an accessory after the fact (§§ 32, 33).‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1353.) ―Whether someone is an accomplice is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury; only if there is no reasonable dispute as to the facts or the inferences to be drawn from the facts may a trial court instruct a jury that a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law.‖ (Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 145-146.) ―[A] court can decide as a matter of law whether a witness is or is not an accomplice only when the facts regarding the witness‘s criminal culpability are ‗clear and undisputed.‘ ‖ (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 679.) The trial court here instructed the jury that defendants bore the burden of proving that Williams was an accomplice. If it found he was an accomplice, it was required to find corroboration for his testimony, and it should view his testimony with caution. (See CALJIC Nos. 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.18, and 3.19; see also CALCRIM No. 334.) Defendants claim a number of facts establish that Williams assisted in the murders as an accomplice. That is a jury question. The court’s task was not to determine whether the jury could reasonably find Williams was an accomplice, but rather whether it could only reasonably find that he was an accomplice.52 Williams testified that he followed 52 Similarly, defendants at times mischaracterize the trial court‘s ruling as its having found that Williams was not an accomplice, e.g., that the court treated Williams‘s ―self- (footnote continued on next page) 106 Bryant‘s orders. He suspected the possibility of an armed conflict at Wheeler Avenue between the Family employees and unknown people who were to arrive there. However, he did not actually know what was going to happen and did not intend to assist in murdering the visitors. If the jury credited this testimony, it would have properly found he was not an accomplice to murder because he lacked the required knowledge and intent. ―Providing assistance without sharing the perpetrator‘s purpose and intent is insufficient to establish that a person is an accomplice.‖ (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 191; see also People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1227 [an accessory after the fact under §§ 32 and 33 is not an accomplice].) An accomplice must ―share[] the perpetrator’s criminal purpose‖; even providing ―assistance with knowledge of the perpetrator‘s criminal purpose‖ is insufficient. (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 194 (Balderas).) The trial court correctly declined to find Williams was an accomplice as a matter of law. (Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 146-147; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 91.) The trial court, contrary to defendants‘ arguments, did not apply an incorrect standard in resolving this issue, nor did defendants raise the assertion below, forfeiting this challenge. The court did not state or imply that Williams was not an accomplice because he had not been convicted of the murders. It did not substitute a generic sufficiency of the evidence standard for the ―liable to prosecution‖ standard in section 1111. The court made clear that the basis for its ruling was the disputed evidence regarding Williams‘s status. (footnote continued from previous page) serving exculpatory statements as dispositive of his accomplice status.‖ To the contrary, the court clearly, and properly, left that question to the jury, and instructed it accordingly. 107 Defendants also raise two related arguments. First, they observe that Williams was initially charged with the same crimes as defendants, including participating in the illegal drug distribution conspiracy. Accordingly, they urge he was ―not only ‗liable‘ to prosecution for the murders, he was actually prosecuted.‖ The trial court properly ruled the filing of charges did not establish as a matter of law that he was an accomplice. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th 248, is instructive. There, the trial court properly declined to find the witness was an accomplice as a matter of law even though she had already been convicted and sentenced for the same murder at issue. (Id. at pp. 312-313.) Similarly, we held in People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 772, ―[t]he fact that a witness has been held to answer for the same crimes as the defendant and then granted immunity does not necessarily establish that he or she is an accomplice.‖ Defendants‘ argument that Williams was an accomplice because he was still ―liable to prosecution‖ for the drug conspiracy offense, which had been severed from the murder charges, is unsupported by the language of the statute. Under section 1111, an accomplice is ―one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.‖ (Italics added.) In determining whether Williams was an accomplice to murder, the jury was not called on to decide whether defendants were guilty of drug conspiracy. Next, defendants contend Williams was an accomplice as a matter of law under the natural and probable consequences theory of aider and abettor liability. They urge that because Williams admittedly participated in the Bryant Family drug conspiracy, he was liable for these murders as the natural and probable consequences of the drug operation. This theory fails. ―A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable.‖ (People v. Mendoza 108 (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133.) There is no doubt that drug dealing and violence commonly go hand in hand, and that the Bryant Family organization historically used violence against those who crossed them. However, those facts standing alone do not establish as a matter of law that one of the reasonably foreseeable results of the drug dealing conspiracy was this particular set of murders. (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 880 [murder is not ―a natural and probable consequence of any drug deal ‗involving a large sum of money‘ ‖]; People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 213 [murder is not a natural and probable consequence of any drug sale]; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 183 (Garceau) [the record failed to establish as a matter of law that the murders at issue were a natural and probable consequence of an illegal drug manufacturing conspiracy, despite prior threats by members of the organization to ―kill ‗snitches‘ ‖].) Defendants also contend Bryant‘s ex-wife Tannis was an accomplice as a matter of law. Again the claim lacks merit. As with Williams, the fact that Tannis was initially charged in the case is not dispositive. Defendants further suppose that she had planned to lure Armstrong to Wheeler Avenue ―as a guarantee that he would be safe because of her presence.‖ There is scant and conflicting evidence on this point, including the fact that she ultimately did not accompany the victims. Even if the jury could have found that Tannis planned to act as a lure to the victims, there is no evidence she knew a murder was planned or that she acted with the requisite intent. The trial court properly declined to instruct that Williams and Tannis were accomplices as a matter of law. Because the jurors reasonably could have found Williams was not an accomplice, we need not, and do not, decide whether there was sufficient corroborating evidence as to each defendant. 109 2. “Equally Guilty” Instruction Defendants contend the trial court‘s instructions to the jury were erroneous because the definition of principals in a criminal offense — those who commit and aid and abet the offense — provided that each principal is ―equally guilty.‖ The court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.00 (5th ed. 1988), that ―[t]he persons concerned in the commission or attempted commission of a crime who are regarded by law as principals in the crime thus committed or attempted and equally guilty thereof include [those who commit and aid and abet the crime].‖ Defendants claim the instruction prevented the jury finding that Williams was an accomplice to the murders because he had not been convicted of the murders. They also argue that the jury might have determined he was guilty of a lesser degree of homicide and thus was not ―equally guilty‖ with defendants of first degree murder. Even assuming that this point is not forfeited by the failure to object below (§ 1259), the instructions were proper. As given CALJIC No. 3.10 defined an accomplice as ―a person who is or was subject to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial by reason of aiding and abetting.‖ CALJIC No. 3.01 as given defined an aider and abettor as a person who, ―with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the crime, by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.‖ Essentially, defendants claim the CALJIC No. 3.00 instruction led the jury to infer that, in addition to the requirements set out in the court‘s other instructions, Williams could not be an aider or abettor, and therefore an accomplice, unless the jury found him to be ―equally guilty‖ of the murders as defendants. ―It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the court‘s instructions.‖ (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 940.) ― ‗A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the 110 jury understood the instruction in the way asserted by the defendant. [Citations.]‘ [Citation.] ‗ ―[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.‖ [Citations.]‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 822 (Solomon).) Since defendants‘ 1995 trial, CALJIC No. 3.00 has been revised to address the circumstance that aiders and abettors are not always guilty of the same crime as the actual perpetrators. (See Use Note to CALJIC No. 3.00 (Spring 2010 rev..) (Fall 2010 ed.)); People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122.) Currently, if an aider and abettor might be guilty of a different crime than the actual perpetrator, the court should modify the instruction to state, ―Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of participation is guilty of a crime.‖ (CALJIC No. 3.00, italics added; see also CALCRIM No. 400 [―A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator. [¶] [Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.]‖].) This revision, however, addresses quite different circumstances from the present case. The instruction given generally stated a correct rule of law. All principals, including aiders and abettors, are ―equally guilty‖ in the sense that they are all criminally liable. (§ 31.) The instruction could be misleading if the principals in a particular case might be guilty of different crimes and the jury interprets the instruction to preclude such a finding. However, defendants‘ challenge to the instruction is not based on that potential problem. Instead, they posit that the jury would interpret from this instruction an additional requirement regarding the accomplice finding: that before finding Williams was an aider and abettor, they must find he was guilty of the same crimes as the actual perpetrators. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have parsed the instructions in this tortuous manner, particularly in light of the court‘s other instructions 111 correctly defining accomplices, and the absence of any argument by the parties suggesting this interpretation. 3. “Slight Evidence” Instruction The trial court instructed, without objection, that the evidence of corroboration ―is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime even though it is slight and entitled, when standing alone, to little consideration.‖ Defendants now contend the instruction violated their constitutional right to due process by nullifying the prosecution‘s burden to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Assuming the claim is not forfeited, the instruction correctly stated the law of corroboration. (People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 969.) Section 1111 reflects a legislative determination of how accomplice testimony must be treated. It does not create a new element of any criminal offense, nor does it involve ―an issue bearing on the substantive guilt or innocence of the defendant.‖ (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 968 (Frye).) Defendants‘ reliance on the decisions of the federal courts of appeals concerning proof of a defendant‘s participation in a conspiracy is inapt. Contrary to defendants‘ arguments, the instruction did not convey to the jury that it ―could convict if there was slight corroboration.‖ Instead, the instruction properly explained the corroboration requirement as it related to the jury‘s consideration of accomplice testimony. The challenged instruction in no way lowered the prosecution‘s burden of proof. 4. Instruction Regarding Lack of Prosecution The trial court told the jury, ―There has been evidence in this case indicating that a person other than a defendant was or may have been involved in the crime for which that defendant is on trial. [¶] There may be many reasons why that person is not here on trial. Therefore, do not discuss or give any consideration as to why the other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or whether he or she has been or will be prosecuted. Your duty is to decide whether the People have proved the guilt of the defendants on trial. The 112 second paragraph of this instruction does not apply to the testimony or prior statements of James Williams.‖ (See CALJIC No. 2.11.5; see also CALCRIM No. 373.) Defendants contend Tannis should have been included in the final sentence. We assume this claim was not forfeited by defendants‘ failure to raise it at trial. We also assume, arguendo, that there was some evidence supporting an inference that Tannis might have been an accomplice in the murders. Nonetheless, any error was manifestly harmless. Other than making general assertions of prejudice, defendants do not explain how including Tannis in the instruction could have helped them. In fact, her in-court testimony was favorable to defendants. She denied that Bryant told her he had put the bomb in Keith Curry‘s car and would continue to try and kill him. Her contradictory out-of-court statement was made at a beauty parlor long before the Wheeler Avenue murders. Furthermore, it was not made to anyone with a possible interest in inducing her to lie at trial. The jurors were properly instructed on witness credibility with CALJIC No. 2.20, which told them they could consider ―the terms of any arrangement or agreement utilized to obtain the testimony of the witness, including any immunity from prosecution.‖ Including Tannis in the instruction at issue would have made no difference in the trial, nor did the failure to do so lessen the prosecution‘s burden of proof or render defendants‘ trial fundamentally unfair.