Opinion ID: 2633469
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Facts must be averred in the indictment pertaining to timeliness of prosecution.

Text: It is true, as the prosecution urges, that an indictment need not allege facts solely related to negating defenses that may be raised by the accused. State v. Adams, 64 Haw. 568, 571, 645 P.2d 308, 309 (1982) (It has long been held that indictments need not anticipate and negate possible defenses; rather, it is left to the defendant to show his defenses at trial.). It is equally true that the statute of limitations is a waivable affirmative defense. See Adams v. State, 103 Hawai`i at 226, 81 P.3d at 406 (citing Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305, 307-09 (1st. Cir.1992) (concluding that statute of limitations is a waivable affirmative defense)); Timoteo, 87 Hawai'i at 115-16, 952 P.2d at 872-73 (holding that [the defendant] waived the statute of limitations for the time-barred lesser included offense of simple trespass by requesting that the trial court instruct the jury on it). Nevertheless, while statutes of limitation may be invoked, and waived, as affirmative defenses, that is not the sum total of their nature or function. As set forth in HRS § 701-114(1)(e), the timeliness of the prosecution in satisfaction of HRS § 701-108 constitutes a baseline substantive component that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial; silence by the defendant on the issue of timeliness does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving that component. Rather, facts establishing timeliness, like facts establishing jurisdiction, must be averred in order to fulfill due process notice requirements. [23] This court's holding in Kaakimaka implicitly established this proposition. In Kaakimaka, the defendant was charged, inter alia, with conspiracy to commit second degree murder, in violation of HRS § 705-520 (1993), [24] three years and eleven months after the victim's murder. Pursuant to HRS § 701-108(2)(c), see supra note 3, prosecution for conspiracy to commit second degree murder, as an unclassified felony, had a statutory limit of three years. Therefore, in an effort to preserve the conspiracy charge in the face of the three-year limit, the prosecution alleged that the conspiracy included an underlying felony of concealment of murder which ran continuously past the date of the murder such that the statute of limitations had not expired by the time of the indictment. This court held that because concealment was not an identifiable underlying felony offense set forth in the HPC, as required by HRS § 705-520, see supra note 24, the indictment was insufficient. 84 Hawai'i at 293, 933 P.2d at 630. This court demanded specificity as to which particular felony underlay the conspiracy charge because of the correlative nature of punishment for a conspiracy conviction, where the grade and class of the conspiracy is contingent upon the grade and class of the most serious underlying offense that is an object of the conspiracy. 84 Hawai'i at 295, 933 P.2d at 632 (citing HRS § 705-526 (1993)). [25] Thus, we ruled that failure to aver an identifiable underlying offense deprives the defendant of notice of the class and grade of conspiracy and, therefore, deprives him or her of notice of the possible punishment and the statute of limitations. Such failure to notify a defendant of the charges he or she must prepare to meet deprives him or her of due process. Id. Our decision in Kaakimaka supports the proposition that an indictment is insufficient if: (1) on its face, it is untimely; and (2) it fails to allege facts that invoke an exception to the standard statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 701-108(2) so that [the accused] may adequately prepare his [or her] defense, Vanstory, 91 Hawai'i at 44, 979 P.2d at 1070, as required by due process. That is because facts necessary adequately to prepare a defense include those that put the accused on notice as to any exception to the applicable statute of limitations upon which the prosecution is relying. We therefore hold that, on the facts before us, when the charged offense is theft by deception, as defined by HRS § 708-830(2), and the prosecution is relying on the tolling provision of HRS § 701-108(3)(a), relating to [a]ny offense an element of which is ... fraud, the prosecution must not only allege the timely date or dates of commission of the offense in the indictment, but also the earliest date of the discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or ... a person who has a legal duty to represent [the] aggrieved party. Inasmuch as the indictment in the present matter failed to aver facts pertaining to the date of discovery of the aggrieved party, DAGS, the circuit court correctly determined that it was insufficient. [26]