Opinion ID: 163853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Claims

Text: 13 The district court held that Ms. Brockman's FMLA claims against all defendants were barred by collateral estoppel, reasoning that the results of the administrative hearing precluded the same issues from being retried in a federal court. We consider first the threshold question of whether Ms. Brockman's claims are barred by sovereign immunity and conclude that sovereign immunity is a bar only to Ms. Brockman's FMLA claims against DFS. Accordingly, we then address, and ultimately affirm, the district court's grant of summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. Sovereign Immunity 14 The Family and Medical Leave Act authorizes qualified employees to take leave from their jobs in certain circumstances. Three of the four categories of eligibility relate to the care of family members: birth and care of a child, see 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A), adoption or foster care of a child, see § 2612(a)(1)(B), and care for a spouse, child, or parent who has a serious health condition, see § 2612(a)(1)(C). The final category is not directly related to the care of family members, allowing leave [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 15 In Hibbs, the Supreme Court addressed whether the FMLA's third provision, for care of a close family member, validly abrogated states' sovereign immunity. See ___ U.S. at ___ _ ___, 123 S.Ct. at 1977-84. In concluding that § 2612(a)(1)(C) was a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity, the Court focused exclusively on the gender discrimination that motivated Congress's enactment of the FMLA. See, e.g., id. at 1979 (describing the pre-existing state leave policies as being attributable to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work); id. at 1983 ([S]tate practices continue to reinforce the stereotype of women as caregivers.). Accordingly, the Court's holding rested squarely on the heightened level of scrutiny afforded gender discrimination, id. at 1982, requiring that congressional remedies be narrowly targeted to alleviate the effects of such discrimination. See id. at 1983 (The FMLA is narrowly targeted at the fault line between work and family — precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.) 16 Because the Supreme Court's analysis in Hibbs turned on the gender-based aspects of the FMLA's § 2612(a)(1)(C), the self-care provision in subsection (D) is not implicated by that decision. The legislative history accompanying the passage of the FMLA reveals two motivations for the inclusion of the self-care provision. First, Congress was attempting to alleviate the economic burdens to both the employee and to his or her family of illness-related job-loss. See S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 11 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 13-14; H.R.Rep. No. 101-28(1), at 23 (1990). Second, Congress was attempting to prevent those with serious health problems from being discriminated against by their employers. See S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 12; H.R.Rep. 101-28(I), at 23. The legislative history does not, however, identify as the basis for subsection (D) a link between these two motivations and any pattern of discriminatory stereotyping on the part of the states as employers. 17 There is a colorable argument to the effect that the self-care provision of the FMLA must be viewed as part of the Act as a whole, and that it would therefore be a valid abrogation of states' sovereign immunity. See Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.2001) (Lipez, J., dissenting). We decline to adopt that view here, because [e]ven with the heightened standard of review for gender-based discrimination,... we do not find that the legislative history sufficiently ties the FMLA's personal medical leave provision to the prevention of gender-based discrimination. Id. at 11 (majority opinion). 3 Moreover, [t]here is no showing ... that establishes any nexus between gender-neutral medical leave for one's own health conditions and the prevention of discrimination on the basis of gender on the part of states as employers. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original). 18 We thus hold that through subsection (D), Congress did not effect a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity does not, however, bar suits for money damages against employees of a state, see Alden, 527 U.S. at 757, 119 S.Ct. 2240, nor does it bar claims for injunctive relief. See Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n. 9, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). We therefore consider the district court's ruling as it relates to those claims. Preclusive Effect of the State Administrative Hearing 19 The administrative hearing officer found that Ms. Brockman was fired for cause. In particular, in findings cited by the district court, Aplt's App. at 629 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed May 10, 2001), the hearing officer noted that no medical evidence was submitted to DFS, nor to this Office, that supports Brockman's contention that she would have been able to return to work but for the improper FMLA leave calculation. Aplt's App. at 468 (Administrative Hearing Order Granting Summary Judgment, dated Dec. 30, 1999). Instead, the hearing officer found that the evidence from Brockman's testimony, as well as her psychiatrist, shows that Brockman was incapacitated and unable to return to work from February 19, 1999 through August 17, 1999, well beyond the 90 days allowed by the FMLA. Id. Also, Brockman submitted no evidence ... that her FMLA leave was improperly calculated. Id. As noted above, Ms. Brockman did not appeal the hearing officer's decision. 20 As the district court correctly concluded, the hearing officer's decision is preclusive so long as the Wyoming courts themselves would give it preclusive effect. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that since administrative agency decisions deal primarily with issues rather than with causes of action or claims, collateral estoppel is the appropriate preclusion doctrine to be applied to final administrative agency decisions. The collateral estoppel doctrine prevents relitigation of issues which were involved actually and necessarily in a prior action between the same parties. Kahrs v. Bd. of Trs. for Platte County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo.1995) (reviewing the finality of an administrative hearing when the losing party did not appeal the administrative hearing's outcome) (internal citation omitted). 21 The United States Supreme Court has long favored application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). Some federal statutory schemes abrogate this federal common-law rule. See id. at 110, 111 S.Ct. 2166 (ADEA); Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220 (Title VII). 22 The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that four factors should be analyzed in this inquiry: 23 (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. 24 Kahrs, 901 P.2d at 406. All four of those requirements are met here: the issue is identical, the hearing officer issued a judgment on the merits of the factual claims, Ms. Brockman was a party, and she was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claim. 25 Addressing similar concerns, the United States Supreme Court has also held that an administrative decision must satisfy three fairness requirements: 1) the agency must have been acting in a judicial capacity; 2) it must be resolving issues that are properly before it; and 3) the parties must have an adequate opportunity to litigate those issues before the agency. See United States v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966). 26 The district court found that the hearing examiner engaged in a thorough and far reaching examination of Brockman's claims arising from her discharge. Aplt's App. at 629. Ms. Brockman was represented by counsel at the administrative hearing, she raised numerous issues, and the agency provided an opportunity for discovery. Further, the officer conducting the hearing ruled with respect to Ms. Brockman's claims. We therefore see no reason to question the district court's conclusion that the administrative hearing comported with judicial standards, and we conclude that the agency was acting in a judicial capacity. 27 Similarly, we find no reason to doubt that the second and third factors are satisfied, i.e., that the hearing officer was resolving issues of fact properly before it and that Ms. Brockman had an adequate opportunity to litigate those issues. Cf. Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 988 F.2d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir.1993) (concluding that the parties at a similar administrative proceeding were given an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues, noting that both parties were represented by counsel, opening and closing statements were made, witnesses were examined and cross-examined, exhibits introduced, and ... the hearing itself extended over some six days). 28 Ms. Brockman argues that the hearing officer incorrectly interpreted the FMLA's requirements and asserts that the hearing officer is inherently biased by virtue of serving at the pleasure of the governor. If Ms. Brockman believed that the hearing officer was biased, however, she should have exercised her right to appeal the ruling to the state district court. She did not do so. She argues that she fell into a deep depression because of the hearing officer's rulings against her and that, because her union attorney could no longer represent her, she was unable to appeal the decision against her. Aplt's Br. at 21-22. Ms. Brockman cites Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe, 975 F.2d 683, 689 (10th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that courts should look at the nature and relationship of the parties in assessing whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Aplt's Br. at 45. Given the facts described above, however, we see nothing in the nature and relationship of these parties that would bring into doubt the fullness or fairness of Ms. Brockman's opportunity to litigate her claims. 29 Ms. Brockman's principal argument on appeal, however, is that the hearing officer cannot adjudicate matters of federal law. She notes that preclusive effect is given to the determination of factual issues by an administrative hearing officer, not the examiner's interpretation of federal law. Aplt's Br. at 26-27. As noted above, the hearing officer concluded that [Ms.] Brockman submitted no evidence that her FMLA leave was improperly calculated. Aplt's App. at 468. Ms. Brockman argues that the hearing officer's findings of fact are not facts at all, because [i]n order to determine whether Ms. Brockman's leave was improperly calculated or not, she had to have interpreted the language of the FMLA regarding leave requirements. Aplt's Br. at 27. To the extent that Ms. Brockman is arguing that the hearing officer's finding of a lack of evidence was only possible if the hearing officer had interpreted the FMLA, this is incorrect. A hearing officer can discern a lack of evidence without making a legal ruling. Furthermore, when the hearing officer noted that the evidence presented showed that Ms. Brockman would not have been able to return to work until August 17, 1999, the hearing officer's observation that this date is well beyond the 90 days allowed by the FMLA, Aplt's App. at 468, was not a legal interpretation. 30 We therefore hold that Ms. Brockman's FMLA claims that are not precluded by state sovereign immunity are barred by collateral estoppel. The hearing officer's factual findings, which have preclusive force, leave Ms. Brockman unable to prove liability on the part of any defendants. She was fired for cause, she did not present evidence to support her claims, and she did not appeal the administrative ruling to that effect.