Opinion ID: 16333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Dr. Grigson's Testimony

Text: 28 In habeas actions, this court does not sit to review the mere admissibility of evidence under state law. See Peters v. Whitley, 942 F.2d 937, 940 (5th Cir.1991). However, a state trial court's evidentiary rulings will mandate habeas relief when errors are so extreme that they constitute a denial of fundamental fairness. See Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir.1987). Thus, only when the wrongfully admitted evidence has played a crucial, critical, and highly significant role in the trial will habeas relief be warranted. See Andrade v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir.1986). 29 Dr. Grigson's testimony regarding Little's potential for future dangerousness, based on a hypothetical set of facts, was properly admitted by the trial court. Little argues that the testimony of Dr. Grigson was so unreliable that its mere admission violated due process. In Barefoot v. Estelle, the Supreme Court discussed the admission of psychiatric expert testimony during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. See 463 U.S. at 896-906, 103 S.Ct. at 3396-401. The Barefoot Court addressed the same issues raised by Little regarding predictions of future dangerousness with respect to the testimony of Dr. Grigson--the same expert that testified during Little's sentencing hearing. Of particular note, the Court considered the propriety of basing an expert opinion on a hypothetical question, see id. at 903-04, 103 S.Ct. at 3399-400, and the asserted accuracy of Dr. Grigson's prediction of future dangerousness, see id. at 904-05, 905 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. at 3400-01, 3401 n. 11. 30 Dismissing the petitioner's claim, the Barefoot Court reinforced the general admissibility of expert testimony buttressed against counsel's ability to cross-examine the purported expert and offer rebuttal expert testimony and the jury's ultimate determination of the appropriate weight to afford the testimony. See id. at 898-99, 103 S.Ct. at 3397. The petitioner attempts to distinguish Barefoot by attacking the reliability of Dr. Grigson's expert testimony and arguing the inadequacy of trial counsel's sentencing hearing strategy. These efforts prove fruitless. Dr. Grigson's testimony at Little's hearing was substantially similar to the offer approved by the Supreme Court in Barefoot. See id. at 905 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. at 3401 n. 11. Furthermore, the courts have previously found that the representation provided by Little's trial counsel was adequate, particularly with respect to Dr. Grigson's testimony at the sentencing hearing. 11 As such, Little's due process claim must fail.