Opinion ID: 1309738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: restrictions on authority to grant a special use permit

Text: XII. Article XXI of the ordinance governs issuance of permits for unclassified and special uses. Section 6(A) thereof provides, in relevant part: Authorization for a special use permit shall not be granted for failure to comply with the following conditions: 1. Buildings involving the large assemblages of people shall not be located less than three hundred (300) feet from any existing dwelling site. 2. Uses involving nuisances such as noise, vibration, pollution, etc. shall not be located less than five hundred (500) feet from an `R' or `EU' District or less than one thousand (1,000) feet from an existing dwelling. (emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs acknowledge the somewhat cumbersome language in which § 6(A) is cast, but seek a reversal on the grounds either the large assemblages of people or nuisance prohibition, or both, will be violated by placement of the proposed mortuary. If they are correct, the Board had no authority to issue the permit. As a preface to our resolution of this issue, additional facts must be disclosed. Counsel for the Board, Mr. Rogers, tendered a written opinion for that tribunal's consideration in which he concluded § 6(A) was not meant to apply to special uses, but only to unclassified uses. Defendants here adopt the same view. In effect, we are told the specific reference to special uses is the result of a clerical or drafting error. Although defendants' adoptive construction of § 6(A) is more than minimally cogent, we need not resolve the instant issue on that basis. Nor is it necessary to set forth other sections of the ordinance which lend support to their position. For present purposes, we share defendants' doubts that Article XXI was intended to impose stringent controls on special uses such as churches, parks, country clubs, museums, schools and mortuaries, while no similar restrictions apply to unclassified uses such as amusement parks, quarries, mining operations, garbage dumps, sewage plants and shooting ranges. But, mindful of the extreme caution and great reluctance which circumscribe judicial authority to make changes in legislative enactments, we need not invoke our rule of statutory construction which requires us, if possible, to avoid conclusions which lead to absurd results. State v. Kramer, 231 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Iowa 1975), and citation. Rather, it is assumed arguendo § 6(A) is applicable, as it facially purports to be, in special use permit proceedings. XIII. Prefatorily, the very existence of Mr. Rogers' legal opinion may have obviated findings of fact on the large assemblages of people and nuisance prohibitions of § 6(A). Plaintiffs contend this possibility, coupled with the absence of specific written findings on these matters, warrant reversal. Insofar as this contention renews their attack on the Board's failure to state its findings and reasons in greater detail, plaintiffs will not be heard to complain of this largely self-inflicted wound, for reasons set forth above. Equally unacceptable is their facile assumption that failure to state its findings as to these ultimate facts means the Board did not make such findings. Thus limited, the question now presented is whether the Board applied or disregarded a pertinent provision of the ordinance in discharging its administrative duty. If the latter, the Board impermissibly amend[ed] or set aside the zoning ordinance under the guise of a special use permit. See Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment, etc., supra, 254 Iowa at 389, 118 N.W.2d 78 at 83. Simply stated, a board of adjustment cannot disregard the provisions of, nor exceed the powers conferred by, a zoning ordinance. See Zimmerman v. O'Meara, 215 Iowa 1140, 1146-1147, 245 N.W. 715 (1932). We are satisfied, however, the possibility of illegality urged by plaintiffs is outweighed by two factors: (1) existence of evidence before the Board as to (a) seating capacity of the mortuary (the large assemblages of people provision) and (b) its impact on surrounding areas (the nuisance clause); and (2) a presumption of administrative regularity. A well settled tenet of administrative law establishes a presumption of regularity of administrative action. 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 11.06, at 63 (1958 ed.). A frequently cited statement of the rule appears in United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 6, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926): The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties. We have invoked this presumption of administrative regularity in numerous cases. See e. g., Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 1968); Cedar Rapids Steel Transp. v. Iowa State Com. Com'n, supra, 160 N.W.2d at 836. Where, as here, it is argued the administrative body acted in disregard of applicable laws or regulations, the presumption of regularity applies until clearly rebutted. As observed in Board of Education v. State Bd. Pub. Instn., 261 Iowa 1203, 1210, 157 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1968): [A]ll inferences in favor of the legality of official steps will be observed, and only where it clearly appears there was a failure to substantially comply with the statutory requirements will there be found jurisdiction violations. Moreover, this court declared in Anderson v. Jester, supra, 206 Iowa at 461, 221 N.W. at 358: The proceedings of the board [of adjustment] are presumed to be regular. [Citations]. The board is presumed to have found the existence of such facts as were necessary to sustain its action. [Citations]. Any speculative possibility the Board incorrectly deemed § 6(A) inapplicable does not, under the circumstances, rebut the strong contrary presumption. Had defendants presented no evidence in this regard, our holding would be otherwise. See Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment, etc., supra, 254 Iowa at 385, 118 N.W.2d 78. But probative evidence as to the large assemblages of people and nuisance factors was presented. The existence of such evidence, in turn, permits a presumption the Board found therefrom the facts necessary to sustain its action. See Anderson v. Jester, supra ; Zimmerman v. O'Meara, supra, 215 Iowa at 1148, 245 N.W. 715. We are fully aware of Professor Davis' criticism of [o]ccasional holdings elsewhere    to the same effect: The obvious disadvantage of assuming that a general finding includes all specific findings necessary to support it is that the assumption may often be contrary to the fact; the various practical reasons for requiring findings are subverted by the assumption. 2 Davis, supra, § 16.07, at 456. Nevertheless, a contrary holding is precluded by plaintiffs' failure to raise the findings issue below. Had they done so, much uncertainty would have been avoided. But on the record presented, it cannot be said plaintiffs' version of the Board's decisional process is accurate. Nor do we conclude, on the strength of conjecture alone, the Board neglected its duty to conscientiously apply § 6(A). XIV. Proceeding on the presumption facts were found adverse to plaintiffs on the large assemblages of people and nuisance provisions of § 6(A), the inquiry is reduced to familiar proportions. On certiorari, the Board's findings, express and implied, were binding on trial court so long as supported by substantial evidence resulting from application of correct legal standards. See Bennett v. Guthridge, 225 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Iowa 1975). In the same vein, if trial court's finding of adequate facts to warrant issuance of a special use permit is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by such holding. See Vogelaar v. Polk County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1971); Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f)(1). Mindful of these guidelines, we separately consider the two restrictions imposed by § 6(A). XV. As heretofore noted, § 6(A)(1) proscribes special uses involving the large assemblages of people within 300 feet of an existing dwelling site. At least one such site is 208 feet from the planned mortuary. Thus, if the building will involv[e] the large assemblages of people, § 6(A)(1) is violated. A. Plaintiffs contend the mortuary, with an undisputed seating capacity of 200 persons, involves large assemblages as a matter of law. In Jersild v. Sarcone, supra, 260 Iowa at 294, 149 N.W.2d at 184, we said: The construction of the ordinance before us, under the undisputed facts, is a question of law. But Jersild does not address the narrower question now before us. Plaintiffs' brief admits, The question of what constitutes a large assemblage of people might in some instances be a matter upon which reasonable minds might differ. We are satisfied this is one such instance. Whether 200 people constitute a large assemblage is best described as a question of fact, for reasonable minds might draw different inferences therefrom. Plaintiffs overlook this distinction between undisputed evidentiary facts and the reasonable, but disputed, inferences arising therefrom. Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f)(17) deems the distinction so well established that authorities need not be cited to support it. The words as a matter of law signify no other factual finding could be reasonably drawn from the evidentiary facts. Kress Packing Company, Inc. v. Kottwitz, 61 Wis.2d 175, 212 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1973). See also Village of Prentice v. Industrial Comm., 38 Wis.2d 219, 156 N.W.2d 482, 483 (1968). We are not persuaded a seating capacity of 200 compels a conclusion the mortuary will involv[e] the large assemblages of people as a matter of law. That the evidence might well support an opposite finding by the zoning authorities is of no consequence. See Bennett v. Guthridge, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 139. Ignoring the inferences which may here be drawn from the undisputed evidentiary facts is demonstrably fatal to plaintiffs' instant contention. A tried of cases illustrates the folly of uncritically deciding the question presented as a matter of law. In syllogistic format: (1) If a building is public or semi-public, then the number of persons having access thereto is large. See La Freda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489, 15 A.2d 798, 801 (1940). (2) But [a] funeral home is not a public nor a semipublic building within the meaning of [a zoning ordinance]. Provo City v. Claudin, 91 Utah 60, 63 P.2d 570, 573 (1936). Accord, Fox v. Shriver-Allison Co., 28 Ohio App.2d 175, 275 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1971); 58 Am.Jur., Zoning, § 116, n. 10; 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 174, n. 73. (3) Therefore, a funeral home is not accessible to large numbers of people. Since the instant question is one of fact, not law, the foregoing syllogism is useful only to show the subtle dangers of resolving an essentially factual question on conclusory legal precepts, without reference to the undisputed evidentiary fact, i. e., 200 people. Plaintiffs' argument the mortuary will involve large assemblages of people as a matter of law cannot be accepted under the circumstances here presented. B. Because trial court's determination of the matter was one of fact, it is entitled to the weight and status of a jury verdict. See Trailer City, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, supra, 218 N.W.2d at 648. The trial judge could not substitute his judgment for that of the board of adjustment in the absence of arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious action by the board   . Zilm v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 260 Iowa 787, 794, 150 N.W.2d 606, 611 (1967). Nor may we substitute ours for that of the trial judge if his determination rests on substantial evidence. See Vogelaar v. Polk County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra . The record reveals nothing from which trial court could hold the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in finding compliance with § 6(A)(1). Certainly the Board did not act in disregard of other ordinance provisions in making its factual determination. The only legislative guideline is Art. XXI, § 2(C), setting forth examples of [e]stablishments or enterprises involving large assemblages of people or automobiles. The list includes amusement parks, circuses, race tracks, convention halls and auditoriums. Although § 2(C) is not directly involved here, we accord recognition thereto because it discloses an underlying purpose common to § 6(A)(1). See Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris, supra, 226 N.W.2d at 235, and citations. As stated in City of Burlington v. Turner, 336 F.Supp. 594, 603 (S.D.Iowa 1972), mod. on other grounds, 471 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1973): [I]dentical statutory language in different statutes should be given much the same meaning   . Zoning ordinances are subject to the same rules of construction. See Kordick Plumbing and Heating Company v. Sarcone, 190 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Iowa 1971). In brief, the ordinance defines large assemblages of people by example, not by number. Although the examples are helpful, they do not foreclose exercise of the Board's judgment. Cf. Lower Merion Township v. Enokay, Inc., 427 Pa. 128, 233 A.2d 883, 886 (1967). At the very least, the ordinance leaves the matter doubtful, and we resolve such doubts in favor of the unrestricted use of property. Maher v. Park Homes, Inc., 258 Iowa 1291, 1296, 142 N.W.2d 430, 434 (1966). Trial court's determination § 6(A)(1) is not contravened stands affirmed. XVI. Turning now to § 6(A)(2), prohibiting [u]ses involving nuisances such as noise, vibration, pollution, etc. within 500 feet of a residential district or 1000 feet of an existing dwelling, plaintiffs contend the mortuary is a nuisance due to its proximity to their homes. We find no merit in this argument. First, plaintiffs overlook the fact Art. XXI, § 4(L) of the ordinance classifies mortuaries as special uses. As such, a mortuary may be located in any zoning district, subject to conditions not relevant here. In this regard, 2 Anderson, supra, § 11.19, at 281-282, aptly notes: Where a funeral home is a permitted use, it cannot constitute a nuisance per se, and if it is operated in a proper manner it cannot be enjoined as a nuisance. (Citing Kirk v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N.W. 759 (1933)). Accord, Bauman v. Piser Undertakers Company, 34 Ill.App.2d 145, 180 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1962); Mutual Service Funeral Homes v. Fehler, 257 Ala. 354, 58 So.2d 770, 775 (1952). See generally 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.131i, at 420-423, and § 25.178a, at 612-613 (rev. 3d ed. 1965); Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1955). The foregoing authorities clearly establish a mortuary is not a nuisance as a matter of law. Plaintiffs concede mortuaries are a necessary function, which must be located somewhere. But contrary to plaintiffs' interpretation, this court's holdings in Kirk v. Mabis, supra , and Bevington v. Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273 N.W. 98 (1937), do not say commercial zones are the proper place for mortuaries. Nor did Bevington hold a mortuary located in a purely residential neighborhood is a nuisance per se. In fact, this court expressly rejected the latter view in Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 857-858, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950); cf. City of LeMars v. Fisch, 251 Iowa 149, 153-154, 100 N.W.2d 14 (1959). Plaintiffs also overlook the plain fact that the proposed mortuary will not be located in a purely residential neighborhood, nor even in a residential district. The mortuary site is zoned for agricultural uses and adjoins a mausoleum located within a cemetery. These factors diminish the credibility of plaintiffs' claim that: The residents of a once beautiful and serene district of single-family homes will be unable to escape the gloomy atmosphere of impending death which inevitably surrounds a mortuary.  The Board was entitled to consider the palpable similarity of all three uses in reaching its decision. Only one judicial pronouncement has been found enjoining a mortuary as a nuisance despite its proximity to a cemetery in a residential area. But that case is factually inapposite because it involved unzoned land and substantial evidence of nuisance, circumstances not here involved. See Mitchell v. Bearden, 255 Ark. 888, 503 S.W.2d 904 (1974). It is of no aid to plaintiffs. The foregoing discussion demonstrates the issue is again one of fact, even under the commercial nuisance test espoused by plaintiffs. See Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Company, 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974), and citations. Thus, as heretofore explained, we may reverse only if trial court's determination lacks substantial evidentiary support. Our review of the record discloses ample evidence from which it could find compliance with § 6(A)(2). Finally, plaintiffs advance a related contention in support of a reversal. Article XXI, § 5(A)(2) of the ordinance proscribes issuance of special use permits for uses which violate Iowa statutes regulating nuisances. We are then referred to Code § 657.2(5), defining nuisance to include [t]he obstructing or encumbrancing by fences, buildings, or otherwise    [of] burying grounds. It is assumed burying ground is synonymous with cemetery. See 5A Words and Phrases, Burial Ground, at 585; Burying Grounds, at 595 (1968 Perm. Ed.). But no showing is made upon which it could be reasonably found the cemetery will be obstructed or encumbered by a mortuary located on private property. Plaintiffs have shown no reversible error involving § 6(A)(2). Consequently, there is no basis for reversal on the ground the Board exceeded its authority in granting the special use permit.