Opinion ID: 527561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fact and Opinion

Text: 16 At the outset, we must also consider whether the challenged statements are opinion and therefore absolutely protected. The separation of opinion from fact acts as a limit on government power. 17 Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. 18 Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. at 3006-07; 3 see also Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y.1917) (per Hand, J.). This is a question of law, and we have recently established how we are to proceed. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (Janklow II ) (reversing in part, Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644 (8th Cir.1985) (Janklow I )), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). 19 In Janklow II, we established a four-part framework for distinguishing fact and opinion, drawing on Judge Starr's plurality opinion and the concurring opinion of Judge Bork in Ollman v. Evans, supra note 3. The four criteria are tools to help us determine from the totality of circumstances whether the first amendment protects a statement sufficiently that resort to the jury is unnecessary; they are: the specificity of the statement, its verifiability, the literary context and the work's public context. This enterprise is only superficially linguistic. Ultimately, we must decide--not whether a statement in isolation is by virtue of its phrasing factual--but rather whether, when taken in context, the statement functions and would be understood as an unqualified assertion of fact rather than as an element of an opinion. Id. at 994 (Bork, concurring). In this light, fact and opinion take on special meanings, and we therefore pause and consider the four factors. Specificity 20 The precision and specificity with which an assertion is made may reflect the extent to which it actually recites specific factual events. Specificity also goes to the singularity of a statement's meaning. Where a statement or phrase is susceptible of more than one meaning, we will not presume either that the phrase means what the plaintiff asserts it does or that it is factual where it can be understood as an opinion. Letter Carriers, supra note 3, 418 U.S. at 283-84, 94 S.Ct. at 2780-81; Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1247, 1250 (8th Cir. 1989). We do not recognize defamation by implication. Janklow II, 788 F.2d at 1304. Accord Fudge v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1016 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 65, 102 L.Ed.2d 42 (1988). 4 Verifiability 21 Assertions whose elements are unverifiable, including statements regarding motive, are intrinsically unsuited to serve as a basis for libel. Janklow II, 788 F.2d at 1302, 1304. Where quantification for a general assertion is impossible, allowing any fact-finder to decide its truth or falsity invites the exercising of personal dispositions regarding the contents of the statement, its author, or its subject. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 981; see also, id. at 1006-08 (discussion by concurring judges). 22 Specificity and verifiability thus function as limits on majoritarian bias and government intervention. By examining each statement for a precise core of meaning for which a consensus of understanding exists, Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979, we hope to avoid both liability conditioned on public sentiment, and putting judges and juries in the role of declaring what the truth is about disputed social issues. Literary Context 23 The third factor to be examined is the condition and tone of the work as a whole. Various considerations include cautionary or qualifying language, language or style which signals opinion, the type of publication, the location of the statement or work within the publication, and the intended audience. For example, the challenged article in Janklow II appeared in a magazine, and the magazine's generally freer style of personal expression and the article's transparently pro-Banks posture would signal the reader to expect a fair amount of opinion. Id. In Ollman, it was significant that an editorial was challenged. 750 F.2d at 986. Public Context 24 Lastly, we consider whether the statements played a role in a public debate. Where core values of the first amendment are implicated, even some false statements of fact must be protected. [I]t cannot be avoided if the political arena is to remain as vigorous and as robust as the first amendment and the nature of our polity require. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 1002 (Bork, concurring). Statements made in the course of a political debate are also more likely to be understood as opinion. Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300 (8th Cir.1988); Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1987) (per Kennedy, J.). 25