Opinion ID: 2537835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Law Requirements for a Motion to Suppress

Text: The provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 703 govern the procedures for a motion to suppress. That article provides that a defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence for use at the trial on the merits on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained and may move on any constitutional ground to suppress a confession or statement of any nature made by the defendant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(A) and (B). The motion must be filed in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 521, which provides it must be filed within 15 days of arraignment or whatever date is set by the court for the filing of such motions, unless opportunity therefor did not exist or neither the defendant nor his counsel was aware of the existence of the evidence or the ground of the motion, or unless the failure to file the motion was otherwise excusable. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(C)(emphasis added). The court in its discretion may permit the filing of a motion to suppress at any time before or during the trial. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(C). At the trial of the motion, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the ground of his motion, except that the state shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant.... La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); La. R.S. 15:451 (before the state may introduce a confession into evidence, it has the burden of proving that the statement was free and voluntary and not induced by threats, promises or coercion). If a statement is a product of custodial interrogation, the state additionally must show that the person was advised before questioning of his right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him, and, that he has a right to counsel either retained or appointed. State v. Blank, 04-0204 (La.4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 103. Where the defendant alleges police misconduct in reference to the statement, the state must specifically rebut these allegations. State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938, 942-43 (La.1984). A hearing on the motion shall only be held when the defendant alleges facts that would require the granting of relief. La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(E)(1). The defendant may testify at the motion to suppress without being subject to interrogation into other matters and his testimony cannot be used by the state at trial except to attack the credibility of his testimony at trial on the merits. La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(E)(1). If the defendant testifies at trial, he can be cross-examined on the whole case. La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(E)(2). The rules further provide that [a] ruling prior to trial on the merits, upon a motion to suppress, is binding at the trial and failure to file a motion to suppress evidence in accordance with this Article prevents the defendant from objecting to its admissibility at the trial on the merits on a ground assertable by a motion to suppress.  La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(F) (emphasis added). Finally, subsection (G) provides: When a ruling on a motion to suppress a confession or statement is adverse to the defendant, the state shall be required, prior to presenting the confession or statement to the jury, to introduce evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession or statement for the purpose of enabling the jury to determine the weight to be given the confession or statement. A ruling made adversely to the defendant prior to trial upon a motion to suppress a confession or statement does not prevent the defendant from introducing evidence during the trial concerning the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession or statement for the purpose of enabling the jury to determine the weight to be given the confession or statement. La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(G). [15] The trial court is afforded great discretion in ruling on a motion to suppress, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La.1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 122. Read in conjunction, and with reference to each other, these provisions allow a defendant to object to the admission of a confession by the filing of a motion to suppress on any constitutional grounds. He must file this motion within the time limitations set by the trial judge, which may even be during the trial on the merits, and must assert the constitutional grounds under which the confession must be suppressed and the facts entitling him to relief thereunder. The only exception to this rule is if the defendant or his counsel was unaware of the evidence or the ground of the motion, or the failure was otherwise excusable. A ruling on the motion is binding at trial and the defendant may not object to its admissibility at trial on a ground that was assertable by a motion to suppress. He may, however, present testimony at trial surrounding the making of the confession for the purpose of enabling the jury to determine the weight to be given the statement. Louisiana courts have long held a defendant may not raise new grounds for suppressing evidence on appeal that he did not raise at the trial court in a motion to suppress. State v. Brown, 434 So.2d 399 (La.1983) (rejecting defendant's alternative argument regarding the denial of his motion to suppress because he had not raised the issue at trial); State v. Johnson, 07-1040 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/10/08), 993 So.2d 326 (failure to raise a ground for suppressing an item of evidence in a properly filed motion to suppress waives such a basis for exclusion on appeal); State v. Jackson, 04-1388 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 907, writ denied, 05-1740 (La.2/10/06), 924 So.2d 162 (defendant is limited on appeal to the grounds he articulated at trial and a new basis for a claim, even if it would be meritorious, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); [16] see La.C.Cr.P. art. 841 (providing that a new basis for an objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). We have previously considered the problems arising when a party does not file a motion to suppress, and then later testifies at trial as to facts that suggest the evidence should have been suppressed. State v. Lipscomb, 00-2836 (La.1/25/02), 807 So.2d 218 and State v. Watson, 00-1580 (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 81. In Lipscomb, the defendant alleged on appeal that his attorney at trial provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress evidence. This Court found ineffective assistance claims are to be considered in post-conviction proceedings and not on appeal, and, in so holding, explained the reasons why motions to suppress are required pre-trial: [T]he constitutional validity of a seizure is ordinarily a matter for the court to determine in the context of a pre-trial motion to suppress if counsel elects to file one. La.C.Cr.P. art. 703. This requirement insures that all disputes over police conduct unrelated to the guilt or innocence of the accused are eliminated from the jury trial' and thereby avoids unwarranted delay and jury confusion. State v. Christian, 26,589 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/25/95), 649 So.2d 806, 808, writ denied, 95-0791 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 448. 807 So.2d at 219-20. The Court recognized that with the constitutional validity of the search not at issue, neither the state nor the defense had any particular need to delve in detail into the circumstances surrounding [the officer's] seizure of the evidence. Id. at 221. In the similar case of State v. Watson, supra , a police officer testified at trial explaining the circumstances which led to the seizure of drugs and defendant's arrest. The defendant then testified, in contrast to the officer's testimony, that the officers pulled him off his bike, questioned him and beat him before arresting him. The appellate court properly found the defendant was estopped from raising the issue that the evidence should have been suppressed as counsel did not raise the issue in a motion to suppress; however, it reversed the conviction on an ineffective assistance claim. State v. Watson, 99-0243 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/3/00), 763 So.2d 713. This Court reversed, again finding an ineffective assistance claim was better reserved for post-conviction. We explained that a motion to suppress is required so that a full evidentiary hearing can be held to address the issue and that a defendant is not allowed to first bring these claims up after the State has rested its case: In this case, the question of the constitutional validity of the seizure of [the evidence] was not at issue in the trial court. Thus, when the State tried this matter, its witnesses were not required to elaborate on why they stopped the defendant. Accordingly, neither the State nor the defendant had any need to scrutinize the detailed circumstances surrounding the seizure of [the evidence] and explore the evidence attendant to that police action. Therefore, the trial testimony of [the officer] focused only on the State's burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the heroin. 817 So.2d at 84. That is similar to what happened in this case. Defendant never raised the claim to the trial court in a motion to suppress that the letter should have been suppressed because he asserted his right to counsel when approached by police on Sept. 10 or the police misled him to thinking he did not have a lawyer. Although the burden of proof was on the State on the trial of the motion to prove its admissibility, the defendant must raise all grounds for suppression of the evidence that are knowable or available at that time. The defendant bears this burden in order to give the State adequate notice so that it may present evidence and address the issue at trial on the motion. Because Montejo did not raise these grounds in a motion to suppress or allege facts supporting those grounds, the State had no need to put on evidence tending to show that defendant never made a clear assertion of his right to counsel or that the police never misled him. It simply put on evidence at the motion hearing as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D) and La. R.S. 15:451 that the letter was admissible, and put on evidence at trial as required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(G) concerning the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession or statement for the purpose of enabling the jury to determine the weight to be given the confession or statement. Thus, the officers only testified at the suppression hearing and at trial that basically they asked if he had a lawyer, he said no, and then they read him his rights. It was not until the defendant testified at trial that he told the police he thought he had a lawyer and they told him he did not, that this potential Edwards violation and waiver issue was ever even alluded to. The State had no need, and was not required, to rebut this testimony because the evidence had already been admitted and it had never been claimed that the letter was obtained illegally on those grounds. See State v. Joseph, 434 So.2d 1057, 1061, n. 3 (La.1983) (where defendant testified at trial that confession was beaten out of him and court had already ruled the statement was admissible in motion to suppress, because that ruling was binding at trial under La.C.Cr.P. art. 703, the state was not obligated to present rebuttal evidence to rehabilitate the confession). As stated earlier, the Supreme Court recognized in remanding the matter that Montejo's testimony came not at the suppression hearing, but rather only at trial, and we are unsure whether under state law that testimony came too late to affect the propriety of the admission of the evidence. The defendant argues under Louisiana law, in reviewing the trial court's ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress, this Court has stated that it will look to the totality of the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing and the trial. State v. Burkhalter, 428 So.2d 449, 455 (La.1983); State v. West, 408 So.2d 1302, 1308 (La.1982) (Although the state put on no evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress, we look to the totality of the evidence produced both at that hearing and at trial when we assess whether the state has carried its burden). However, this jurisprudential rule will only be applied where the defendant has filed a motion to suppress alleging a statement was inadmissible on a specific constitutional ground and later a reviewing court looks to his trial testimony, in addition to the testimony presented at the motion hearing, to determine whether the motion to suppress should have been granted on those grounds. The jurisprudential rule is not applied where the grounds for suppression were not asserted in the motion to suppress. [17] We have never allowed a defendant to allege facts for the first time in trial testimony which would support a new argument for suppression of evidence, and have a reviewing court consider those facts in determining whether the district court should have granted a motion to suppress on grounds that were never argued to, or considered by, the district court. This is prohibited by La.C.Cr.P. arts. 703 and 841 and would allow rejection of the district court's determinations at the suppression hearing without any indication of abuse of discretion. [18] We agree with the State that the entire criminal justice system will become chaotic if the Court allows defendants to withhold testimony which they allege is relevant to a suppression issue until the end of trial after the evidence has been admitted, then raise the issue on appeal, when the trial court has had no opportunity to rule with all evidence before it. In summary, under state law cited above, a defendant must allege the grounds on which he claims that evidence should be suppressed in a motion to suppress: Failure to file a motion to suppress evidence in accordance with this Article prevents the defendant from objecting to its admissibility at the trial on the merits on a ground assertable by a motion to suppress.  La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(F). The only exception to this is if opportunity therefor did not exist or neither the defendant nor his counsel was aware of the existence of the evidence or the ground of the motion, or unless the failure to file the motion was otherwise excusable. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(C). Thus, the answer to the Supreme Court's query regarding whether defendant's testimony came too late to affect the admissibility of the evidence because it came at trial, and not at the suppression hearing, is tied to the rules governing the motion to suppress, and depends upon whether the defendant or his counsel were aware of the ground of the motion at the time when Jackson was still good law. The Supreme Court expressed its opinion that Montejo should be given an opportunity to contend that his letter of apology should still have been suppressed under the rule of Edwards  and that Montejo understandably did not pursue an Edwards objection, because Jackson served as the Sixth Amendment analogy to Edwards and offered broader protections. Montejo, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2091. The Supreme Court further stated that Montejo may also seek on remand to press any claim he might have that his Sixth Amendment waiver was not knowing and voluntary, e.g., his argument that the waiver was invalid because it was based on misrepresentation by police as to whether he had been appointed a lawyer, cf. Moran [v. Burbine], 475 U.S. [412] at 428, 429, [106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)]. Id., 129 S.Ct. at 2091-92. However, under state law, the defendant does not get a second chance to assert arguments on appeal that he could have asserted to the trial court in a motion to suppress. [19] Regarding the potential Edwards' claim, as Montejo was in custody on September 10, his Fifth Amendment rights were implicated regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment had also been violated. [20] As the Supreme Court stated, the right to have counsel during custodial interrogation... [is] guaranteed (once the adversarial process has begun) by two sources of law and it is irrelevant that the doctrine established by Miranda and Edwards is designed to protect Fifth Amendment, not Sixth Amendment, rights. Montejo, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2090. The Supreme Court explained that the protections of Miranda/Edwards/Minnick [21] overlap with the protections offered by Jackson, [22] and operate before the defendant's arraignment as well as after his arraignment. Id., 129 S.Ct. at 2090. Thus, the claim Montejo now wants to raise under Edwards existed in addition to Jackson and provided an independent basis to suppress the apology letter; therefore, if Montejo had this claim to make, he was required to assert it in a motion to suppress. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703. Although defendant vigorously pressed a Fifth Amendment claim regarding the earlier videotaped interrogations, the protections of the Fifth Amendment did not cease when Montejo attended the 72-hour hearing a few days later on September 10, yet defendant did not contend at the suppression hearing that, before agreeing to accompany the officers on the evidence seeking expedition, he requested counsel but was worn down through badgering into accompanying the officers. The need to raise this claim is especially true in light of the fact that Montejo's Jackson claim was particularly tenuous under Louisiana law, given that he stood mute at the 72-hour hearing, and cases from this Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had interpreted Jackson to mean that in order for Sixth Amendment protections of Jackson to apply, there must have been a request for, retention of, or acceptance of counsel at the initial appearance. State v. Carter, 94-2859 (La.11/27/95), 664 So.2d 367, 383 ([s]omething more than mere mute acquiescence in the appointment of counsel is necessary to show the defendant has asserted his right to counsel sufficiently to trigger the enhanced protection provided by Michigan v. Jackson's prophylactic rule); Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1992) (the rule of Jackson is only invoked when a defendant makes an actual, positive statement or affirmation of the right to counsel at the time counsel is appointed), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1036, 113 S.Ct. 820, 121 L.Ed.2d 692 (1993); cf. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (indictment does not trigger Sixth Amendment protections unless defendant indicates he wants the assistance of counsel). Thus, under controlling state law precedent interpreting Jackson, a defendant who does not assert his right to counsel at a court appearance where counsel is appointed can be subsequently questioned by police after a valid Miranda waiver; therefore, Montejo's Jackson claim could not have been valid on the grounds he asserted in the motion. Given the precariousness of his Jackson claim, he clearly should have, and would have, asserted that he made a clear assertion of his right to counsel but was worn down by badgering, if he also believed this had occurred. In fact, defendant has previously asserted quite the opposite. In brief to this Court on original hearing, defense counsel conceded that [b]y Mr. Montejo's own admission his request for counsel [on September 10] was not a clear assertion or invocation of his `right.' Indeed, the Supreme Court directed in this case, [o]ur cases make clear which sorts of statements trigger [ Edwards' ] protections, see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ... Montejo, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2091, [23] and, in our view, the statements Montejo made did not trigger these protections. In Davis, the Supreme Court described with specificity the requirements for a clear assertion of the right to counsel: Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of attorney. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. at 2209. But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. See ibid. ([T]he likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test for applicability of Edwards ); Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S., at 485, 101 S.Ct., at 1885 (impermissible for authorities to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel) (emphasis added). Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. [24] In Davis, the Supreme Court found that the statement Maybe I should talk to a lawyer was not a clear and unambiguous request for counsel. Nor, as defense counsel has previously recognized, did Montejo's alleged statement to police that Well, and I don't, I don't, I don't really want to go with you ... I got a lawyer appointed to me.... Yeah, I think I got a lawyer appointed to me constitute an unambiguous request for counsel. It is more properly characterized as a statement that the defendant might want counsel, or an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel, or an indecisive request for counsel, each of which the Davis Court stated would be insufficient to trigger Edwards' protections against further questioning. Thus, even if his testimony could be considered in determining the letter's admissibility and was accepted as true, this request did not meet the criteria described in Davis. As to the waiver issue, the Supreme Court instructed: Montejo may also seek on remand to press any claim he might have that his waiver was invalid because it was based on misrepresentations by police as to whether he had been appointed a lawyer, c.f., Moran, 475 U.S. at 428, 429, 106 S.Ct. 1135. Montejo, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2092. The Court added that [t]hese matters have heightened importance in light of our opinion today. Id. However, although more important now, the waiver argument is based on jurisprudence that was equally in force at the time of the motion. Further, as Montejo's Jackson claim was questionable under the grounds he asserted in the motion, i.e., mere appointment of counsel invokes the protections of Jackson, contra, State v. Carter, supra , an invalid waiver would have been a critical argument. With or without Jackson, if in fact the officers misled him or kept him from counsel, Montejo had an independent argument under Moran [25] and numerous other Supreme Court cases that his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights were violated by that police action. [26] In fact, he may have had an even stronger case under Louisiana law, because conduct approved by federal jurisprudence might not be permitted under state law. See State v. Reed, 390 So.2d 1314, 1315 (La. 1980) (when the government interferes with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by giving erroneous information to a defendant's attorney, it cannot take advantage of any time gained by that ploy to obtain incriminating statements); State v. Trevathan, 414 So.2d 316, 318-19 (La. 1982) (violation of Sixth Amendment for police to interrogate defendant after his attorney instructed police not to interrogate him without counsel present or take him to the scene where the victim's body was found); State v. Hattaway, 621 So.2d 796, 798 (La.1993) (police violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights when they unlawfully removed him from the trial venue without notice to his court appointed counsel and transported him to another parish, confining him there without means of contacting his attorney, friends, family, or potential defense witnesses), overruled on other grounds, State v. Carter, supra . Montejo asserted no arguments to the trial court on a motion to suppress that his subsequent waiver was unknowing or involuntary because of misrepresentations made by police, in spite of this strong, existing case law in support of that claim. The waiver issue was highly relevant, especially in light of the fact that his Jackson claim was so tenuous. In fact, the waiver issue was clearly contemplated by defendant before Jackson was overruled, as he argued on original hearing to this Court that his waiver was unknowing, albeit for slightly different reasons. [27] If Montejo had any claims that he did not make a knowing, intelligent, and valid waiver of the right to counsel when he was approached by police on September 10 because he was misled and lied to by police, those claims would have been just as valid under the law as it stood then as they would be now, and he clearly would have, and should have, asserted those claims had facts existed to support them claims.