Opinion ID: 1505898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implied Libel Instruction.

Text: Neither the Court of Appeals nor the majority opinion of this Court has discussed the propriety of the instruction that permitted the jury to find for Kentucky Kingdom if it believed that [t]he WHAS Reports in July 1994, taken as a whole, conveyed and created false inferences or implications concerning Kentucky Kingdom and the management, maintenance and safety of the amusement park. However, an allegedly false implication arising out of true statements is generally not actionable in defamation by a public official.... Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn.1990). See also Strada v. Conn. Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 477 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1984) (A publisher cannot be responsible for every strained interpretation that a plaintiff might attribute to its words.); Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So.2d 185, 188 (La.1981); Mihalik v. Duprey, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 602, 417 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (1981) (insinuating overtone insufficient to constitute libel of public figure); DeFalco v. Anderson, 209 N.J.Super. 99, 506 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Ct.App.Div.1986); C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 Iowa L.Rev. 237, 305 (1993) (There are an increasing number of cases that at least purport to reject a cause of action based upon an implied libel when the plaintiff is a public figure and the expression at issue involves a matter of public concern.). Even jurisdictions that do not adhere to this general rule define implied libel as a publication that convey[s] a substantially false and defamatory impression by omitting material facts or suggestively juxtaposing true facts. Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex.2000). See also Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable and Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir.1996) ([T]he touchstone of implied defamation claims is an artificial juxtaposition of two true statements or the material omission of facts that would render the challenged statement(s) non-defamatory.). Kentucky Kingdom does not identify any material omissions or juxtapositions in the WHAS broadcasts that could give rise to a claim of implied libel. It simply asserts that the three statements claimed to be libelous are not true. The taken as a whole instruction should have been deleted from the jury instructions. IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES. The award of $2,500,000.00 in punitive damages exceeds the amount authorized by the compensatory damages award of $475,000.00. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), the United States Supreme Court identified three guideposts for determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive: the degree of reprehensibility, the disparity between the harm suffered and the amount of the punitive damages award, and the difference between the punitive damages and the civil penalty authorized in comparable cases, with the degree of reprehensibility being the most important indicia of reasonableness. Id. at 575, 116 S.Ct. at 1598-99. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), the Court held that one factor to be considered in determining the degree of reprehensibility was whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic, id. at 419, 123 S.Ct. at 1521, and that [i]t should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages .... Id. Campbell pointed out that [i]n Haslip , ... we concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety, id. at 425, 123 S.Ct. at 1524 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1046, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991)), and noted that [w]e cited that 4 to 1 ratio again in Gore ,  and further referenced a long legislative history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 581, 116 S.Ct. at 1589). While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution .... Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. at 1589). Both Gore and Haslip , like the case sub judice, involved claims only for economic damage. In Campbell, which did not involve a personal injury per se, but did involve damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court held that the appropriate award of punitive damages would be at or near the amount of compensatory damages. Id. at 429, 123 S.Ct. at 1526. Here, even if the statements WHAS made about the Starchaser accident had not been substantially true, it was highly speculative that they caused any more economic damage to Kentucky Kingdom than would have resulted if WHAS had merely reported that two roller coaster cars collided, causing a life-threatening injury to a seven-year-old child, and that the ride had been shut down by state inspectors for safety violations. From those literally true facts, WHAS's viewers probably would have concluded for themselves that a key component of the roller coaster malfunctioned and that the inspectors shut it down because they thought it was unsafe. Cf. Masson, 501 U.S. at 517, 111 S.Ct. at 2433 ([T]he statement is not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Under these circumstances, the award of compensatory damages was more than generous and the punitive damages award should have been at or near the same amount. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429, 123 S.Ct. at 1526. Accordingly, I dissent. GRAVES, J., joins this opinion.