Opinion ID: 674629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grove's Claim

Text: 5 In counts I and II of his amended complaint, Grove seeks a declaratory judgment that Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 9-92-080 and the City's post-tow hearing procedures are unconstitutional. Within three months after Grove's car was towed, however, the City responded to Grove's complaints that the tows were improper and offered to refund his money. At that point, Grove had not sought certification from the district court of his putative class. As we shall explain, these developments forced the district court to dismiss the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 6 Article III of the United States Constitution confers on the federal courts jurisdiction over cases and controversies. Both litigants must have a personal interest in the case at the beginning of the litigation, and their interests must persist throughout its entirety. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). A case becomes moot when the dispute between the parties no longer rages, or when one of the parties loses his personal interest in the outcome of the suit. Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2336, 124 L.Ed.2d 247 (1993). 7 In this case, the City has offered Grove all the damages due him; he does not argue that the offer does not adequately reimburse him or that the City's offer is insincere. Grove may not spurn this offer of all the damages he is owed and proceed to trial. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir.1987). Once the defendant offers to satisfy the plaintiff's entire demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate, and a plaintiff who refuses to acknowledge this loses outright, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), because he has no remaining stake. Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). Hence, Grove's claim is moot. 8 Ordinarily, simply determining that a plaintiff's case is moot dictates that his claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. But mootness requirements are somewhat different where the plaintiff attempts to represent a class. If the district court has certified the class before the expiration of the plaintiff's claims, mootness is avoided. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398, 100 S.Ct. at 1209. Here, Grove cannot claim the benefit of this exception to the mootness doctrine because the district court did not certify the class; indeed, Grove did not even move for class certification prior to the evaporation of his personal stake. Grove, then, cannot avail himself of the class action exception to the mootness doctrine. 9 The only other vehicle by which Grove may avoid dismissal because of mootness is to demonstrate that his claim on the merits, while no longer live, is capable of repetition, yet evading review. To do so, Grove must prove that: 1) his claim is so inherently transitory that the trial court [did] not have enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative's individual interest expire[d], County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1667, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (citations omitted); and 2) he will again be subject to the alleged illegality, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). See Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959, 967 (7th Cir.1989). He cannot make the showing required by either prong. 10 Regarding the transitory nature of his claim, Grove achieved standing at the onset of this suit only because he refused to wait until the administrative proceeding had run its course. This proceeding concluded within three months of the tows with a result in Grove's favor, seemingly an altogether reasonable time frame in which to conduct such an investigation and determination. It was only because Grove jumped the gun in joining this action that his claim is transitory at all or, for that matter, even existed. The claim, however, is not so inherently transitory that Grove can evade the mootness doctrine. 11 Even if this claim were to be considered transitory, it is not likely that Grove will be subject to the City's procedures in the future. The mere physical or theoretical possibility of Grove being improperly towed is insufficient to satisfy this prong. Jones v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 801, 806 (7th Cir.1991). Instead, there must be a reasonable expectation or a demonstrable probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same parties. Id. at 807 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)). Grove cannot make such a showing, and as a result, his claim is not capable of repetition, yet evading review. Grove's claim, therefore, is moot.