Opinion ID: 695560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Otherwise Clause

Text: 17 Next, we must determine whether Rutherford's conduct presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another under the otherwise clause. 11 The government asserts that drunk driving creates a serious risk of injury and thus falls squarely within the plain language of Sec. 4B1.2(1)(ii). Rutherford makes two arguments in response. First, he contends that crimes of pure recklessness should not be considered crimes of violence. In the alternative, he argues that his conduct did not create a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 We decline to accept Rutherford's argument that crimes of recklessness may never constitute crimes of violence under the otherwise clause. Certain reckless conduct is just as dangerous as intentional conduct, and the Sentencing Commission obviously intended some dangerous, reckless criminal acts to qualify as crimes of violence. See United States v. Rutledge, 33 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir.1994) (conviction for reckless endangerment where defendant fired shot in direction of co-worker held crime of violence under Sec. 4B1.2: although defendant claimed shot was fired in jest, conduct was at least reckless ... [and] obviously placed ... [the co-worker] in imminent danger of serious injury), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1258, 131 L.Ed.2d 138 (1995); Parson, 955 F.2d at 861, 873 (defendant's prior conviction for first-degree reckless endangering, where, while shoplifting meat from a store ... [defendant] 'pushed and slapped' a store clerk, constituted a crime of violence under Sec. 4B1.2). A court must, however, tread carefully when interpreting the otherwise clause. Conjecture or speculation about possible harm is not sufficient to create a crime of violence under Sec. 4B1.2; instead, there must be evidence that the crime, by its nature, presents a substantial risk or an affirmative indication in the indictment or information that the defendant engaged in conduct presenting a serious risk of physical injury. Lee, 22 F.3d at 740-41. Accordingly, it was held in Lee that theft from the person of another (e.g., pick-pocketing or purse-snatching) does not constitute a crime of violence under Sec. 4B1.2(1)(ii), for the risk of injury to the victim is little more than conjecture, and such speculation is not a sufficient basis ... to hold that the conduct ... is a 'crime of violence.'  Id. at 741. 12 19 The government argues that driving under the influence of alcohol always presents a serious risk of injury to another.  'Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage.'  Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485-86, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (footnote omitted), quoting 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment Sec. 10.8(d), p. 71 (2d ed. 1987). Furthermore, Rutherford's decision to drive while intoxicated resulted in serious injury to another person in this case, and the government contends that this fact conclusively demonstrates that his conduct posed a serious risk to others. 20 This Court has never determined whether a vehicular assault committed by a drunk driver or any similar offense constitutes a crime of violence under Sec. 4B1.2. Nor, to the best of our knowledge, has any other court. The Fourth Circuit has held that involuntary manslaughter is a crime of violence, United States v. Payton, 28 F.3d 17, 19 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 452, 130 L.Ed.2d 361 (1994), and the Ninth Circuit has held that vehicular manslaughter is a crime of violence under an old version of the guideline. United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir.1990). However, both the current Application Notes and the ones in effect when O'Neal was decided specifically list manslaughter as a crime of violence. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2, Application Note 2; U.S.S.G. Appendix C, Amendment 268 (Amending Application Notes). 13 Thus neither Payton nor O'Neal provides us with any assistance in the present case. 21 We must therefore determine as a matter of first impression whether drunk driving presents a serious risk of physical injury under the otherwise clause. The government urges that we need not reach this question, because an element of Rutherford's assault conviction was that he caused serious bodily injury to another person. Ala.Code Sec. 13A-6-20(a)(5). Seemingly, the risk is 100% that someone convicted of assault under this Alabama provision will cause physical injury to another, because physical injury is an element of the offense. This argument, however, confuses the analysis under Sec. 4B1.2(1)(i) with that under Sec. 4B1.2(1)(ii). Subsection (i) requires courts to look at the elements of the offense. Subsection (ii), however, makes no mention of the statutory elements per se. Rather, subsection (ii) focuses on the conduct involved in the offense; the sole concern is with the actions of the offender. It is necessary to separate the offender's actions from the effect of his actions. The otherwise clause in Sec. 4B1.2(1)(ii) requires us to discuss the conduct that creates the risk of physical injury (i.e., driving while intoxicated), not the effect of that conduct (i.e., causing serious bodily injury to another). To say that Rutherford's conduct created a serious risk of injury because he in fact injured another person is nonsensical. Injury may occasionally result from conduct that presents a minimal risk, and the fact that an injury occurred will not automatically convert, for instance, a case of minor neglect into a crime of violence (cf. Part II, supra ). Thus we must determine whether drunk driving--the act that Rutherford engaged in as opposed to the effect of his act--creates a serious risk of physical injury to another. 22 Drunk driving is a reckless act, perhaps an act of gross recklessness. Any drunk driver who takes to the road should know he runs a risk of injuring another person. The extent of the risk will of course vary from case to case, depending on how intoxicated the driver is, how far he drives, how fast he drives, and how many other drivers and pedestrians are sharing the road with him. But these facts are not before us in the case at hand, nor are they likely to be in subsequent cases, for Lee and Application Note 2 limit our consideration to the conduct expressly charged in the indictment or information. Regardless of the details, however, it is hardly surprising that Rutherford's decision to drive while intoxicated resulted in physical injury to another person. Similarly, the defendant in Rutledge should not have stood in amazement had his bullet, even if fired in jest, struck an unintended target. Our laws often impose severe penalties on people who engage in reckless activity that is also highly dangerous, and with good reason. [R]eckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an 'intent to kill.'  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) (holding death penalty constitutional for felony with mental state of reckless indifference that results in murder). 23 By driving while intoxicated, Rutherford present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The dangers of drunk driving are well-known and well documented. Unlike other acts that may present some risk of physical injury, such as pickpocketing (cf. Lee) or perhaps child neglect or certain environmental crimes like the mishandling of hazardous wastes or pollutants, the risk of injury from drunk driving is neither conjectural nor speculative. Driving under the influence vastly increases the probability that the driver will injure someone in an accident. Out of the more than 34,000 fatal traffic accidents in 1992, 36.1 percent involved a driver with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of over .10 percent, and another 9 percent involved a driver with a BAC of between .01 and .09 percent. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 114th ed., Table 1016, p. 633 (1994). 14 Drunk driving, by its nature, presents a serious risk of physical injury, and the courts have held that other crimes that often lead to violence or injury are crimes of violence under the otherwise clause. Cf. United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994) (escape from prison is a crime of violence under Sec. 4B1.2(1)(ii): although not every escape results in violence, escape ... is a powder keg ... [and] violence could erupt at any time.); United States v. Lonczak, 993 F.2d 180, 181-82 (9th Cir.1993) (child stealing, defined as enticing away any minor child--forcibly or fraudulently, is a crime of violence even though it does not necessarily require an exertion of force). Drunk driving is a reckless act that often results in injury, and the risks of driving while intoxicated are well-known. This is sufficient to satisfy the serious risk standard of the otherwise clause. 15 Thus Rutherford's Alabama conviction for first-degree assault qualifies as a crime of violence under Sec. 4B1.2(1)(ii). 16