Opinion ID: 2570341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying Mother's Motion to Relocate

Text: Having clarified that both parents share equally the burden of demonstrating what arrangement will serve the child's best interests in a modification proceeding, we now address the trial court's application of subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) to the facts of this case. A best interests determination under subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo. App.1996). Accordingly, we review the trial court's findings for an abuse of discretion. Here, the trial court committed an abuse of discretion where it prematurely concluded that it would be in Connor's best interests to remain in close proximity to both parents. The effect of this conclusion was to create a presumption in Father's favor contrary to the legislative intent of subsection 14-129(2)(c). First, the trial court erred when it failed to properly address whether remaining with his primary caregiver would provide Connor any advantages pursuant to subsection 14-10-129(2)(c)(VI). The term primary caregiver is not defined in the statute, so we must give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. See e.g., Weld County Sch. Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550, 554 (Colo.1998). The plain meaning of the term primary is first in importance; chief; principal; main; the plain meaning of caregiver is a person who takes care of someone requiring close attention, as a young child or invalid. Webster's New World College Dictionary 222, 1140 (MacMillan 4th ed.1999). In this case, Mother's larger share of parenting time and her status as primary residential parent suggest that she is the primary caregiver. Accordingly, to properly analyze this factor, a court must determine whether Connor would enjoy any advantages in remaining with Mother if she were to relocate to Arizona. Based on the evidence, a court reasonably could have concluded that Connor would benefit directly and indirectly by remaining with Mother if she were to relocate to Arizona. As a direct benefit, Connor would enjoy the stability of remaining with his majority time parent. Connor also would benefit from having day-to-day relationships with his grandfather, uncle, aunt, and nephew. Finally, Mother's increased financial stability and family support would undoubtedly increase her own happiness, which would benefit Connor by giving him a more stable home life. This indirect benefit to Connor is not diminished simply because it primarily benefits Mother. The trial court, however, failed to consider any of these potential advantages to Connor, and instead discussed Mother and Father's parenting styles, stating: Connor is close to his mother and is also close to his father. Both parents are somewhat controlling in their parenting style father being more so. Neither parent seems to be very successful in eliciting Connor's view on the important issues; rather they approach him by having him understand what they would like him to believe about certain issues. The school states that they cannot tell any difference in Connor when he has been with his mother or his father. It is a positive sign that where Connor resides is not affecting him at school. This is a situation where both parents could benefit from expanding their parenting style. It would be important for both households to agree on some basic rules and guidelines, and ways of approaching discipline. This would be in Connor's best interests. Having failed to discuss advantages to Connor in relocating with Mother, the trial court then proceeded to relate its concern that Mother: continues to believe that whatever is in her best interest is also in Connor's best interest. The Court notes her reasons to relocate. They are all from her point of view and her benefit, job, help from her family which then, I guess, are indirect benefits to Connor but there was nothing directly about how this would enhance Connor. (emphasis added). As discussed in Part II.C, supra, requiring a parent to show that a move will enhance the quality of life for the child is a remnant of the Francis test that the General Assembly did not adopt in amending section 14-10-129. See § 14-10-129(2)(c); Francis, 919 P.2d at 785. Furthermore, none of the factors listed in subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) requires the majority time parent to establish that the move will directly benefit the child. Most importantly, the trial court did not impose an equal burden on Father to demonstrate the benefits to Connor using the subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) factors. Thus, the trial court improperly required Mother to show enhancement, it improperly ignored indirect benefits in its subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) analysis, and it erroneously imposed a burden on Mother that it did not impose on Father. As a result, Mother was required to carry an unequal share of the burden in demonstrating Connor's best interests. The trial court aggravated these errors in its subsection 14-10-129(2)(c) analysis by relying on a general conclusion that parents should remain in close proximity to the child. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court cited an article from the Journal of Family Psychology. Braver, supra note 18. Though the article's authors stated, our data cannot establish with certainty that moves cause children substantial harm, [21] the trial court nevertheless interpreted the article as concluding that a child is generally not benefited by moving away with the custodial parent from a non-custodial parent. Presumably based upon the Braver's article, the court then concluded that [p]arenthood results in some sacrifice and it is better off for parents to remain in close proximity. The only way for a trial court to adhere to this generalization in relocation disputes would be to categorically deny the majority time parent's request to modify parenting time. The trial court ostensibly tempered this hard-line approach by suggesting that Mother could overcome this presumption by showing that the move would enhance Connor. However, as discussed above, this was also in error because enhancement should not be part of the analysis, and because the trial court would not accept evidence of indirect benefits to Connor. As a result, the effect of this generalization was to create a presumption in favor of the minority time parent opposing relocation. Moreover, Braver's article represents only one of many schools of thought on how parenting time affects children. See supra note 18. One theory provides that a child's interests are so aligned with the well-being of the majority time parent that that person's decision on behalf of the child should be honored unless there is proof that the decisions are bad ones. See e.g., Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 18. Another theory suggests that both parents are entitled to raise the child and that it is extremely important for a child to develop a relationship with both parents. See e.g., Kelly & Lamb, supra note 18. A court's duty is not to determine which of these theories is correct. Rather, a court's sole duty in relocation cases is to determine the best interests of a child based upon the facts of each individual case. In performing this duty, the court shall specifically set forth its considerations with respect to all relevant factors, including any benefits the child may enjoy by relocating with the majority time parent. The trial court in this case failed to perform its duty in accordance with the statute because it imposed an unequal burden on Mother and created a presumption in favor of Father that was potentially contrary to Connor's best interests. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' holding and remand with instructions to return the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.