Opinion ID: 2650943
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shifting Reasons for Termination

Text: Next, Davis argues that the City gave shifting reasons for his termination. As the district court correctly noted, “an employer’s failure to articulate clearly and consistently the reason for an employee’s discharge may serve as evidence of pretext.” Decision on Summ. J. at 39 (citing Hulbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006)). However, an employer’s further elaboration of a general reason is not evidence of pretext. Id. at 40 (citing Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998)). Gilmore testified that Davis was not terminated because of any misconduct or disciplinary issue. Davis argues that the evidence suggests that the City considered him to be guilty of misconduct, rather than, as the City proffers, failing to fit into Gilmore’s vision of the Department, and what is required of her secondin-command. Davis points to the impressions of two members of the community after speaking to Gilmore about Davis’s termination, a statement by an unnamed City representative reflected in an EEOC Determination Letter that Davis was an “insubordinate subordinate,” and Gilmore’s testimony that whether Davis was insubordinate was a “matter of interpretation.” 11 Case: 13-11340 Date Filed: 01/23/2014 Page: 12 of 15 However, Davis’s attempt to establish that the City has offered inconsistent reasons for his termination falls short. Rather, the evidence shows that the City’s description of Davis’s shortcomings forming the basis for his termination are all variations on the same non-retaliatory theme—that Davis refused to fit into and adhere to the management vision of the new sheriff in town. Community members’ statements recounting Gilmore’s reasons for Davis’s termination are not inconsistent with Gilmore’s own statements about Davis—that he was resentful of her, and that he “did not possess the skill set necessary for a captain and did not fit into her command structure.” In fact, they are wholly consistent, and are merely “further elaboration of a general reason” for Davis’s termination. Similarly, the EEOC Determination Letter does not evidence shifting reasons for termination. That letter states that an unnamed City representative said that Davis was fired for being an “insubordinate subordinate,” but does not describe the conduct on which that representative based his or her statement. There is no indication of what was meant by the rather vague term “insubordinate subordinate.” Webster’s Dictionary, for example, defines “insubordinate” as “not obeying authority; refusing to follow orders.” “Insubordinate,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com (Jan. 13, 2014). As synonyms, Webster’s offers “balky,” “contrary,” and “defiant.” Id. Gilmore’s suggestion that whether Davis was insubordinate was “a matter of interpretation” 12 Case: 13-11340 Date Filed: 01/23/2014 Page: 13 of 15 highlights the variable uses of the word “insubordinate.” 8 Certainly, Gilmore’s sense that Davis was resentful of her and resistant to following her lead could be interpreted by some as being “insubordinate,” even though Davis may not have committed any wrongdoing rising to the level of affirmative misconduct. Nor, as the district court noted, does the EEOC letter make clear whether the City’s representative even used the term “insubordination” or whether the EEOC investigator drew that conclusion based on the conduct that the City’s representative described. Moreover, the letter clearly states that the City’s position was that Davis’s termination was not based on “any misconduct or performance issue.” Without more context, the statement in the EEOC Determination Letter, on its face, does not evidence any deviation from the City’s stated reason for Davis’s termination. Therefore, we find Davis’s attempt to create an issue of fact as to shifting reasons for his termination unconvincing. The record evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Davis, shows the City consistently voicing the same non-retaliatory reason for Davis’s termination. 8 As we recently observed, “‘Definitions belong to the definers, not the defined.’” United States v. Contreras, 11th Cir. 2014, __ F.3d __ (No. 13-10928, Jan. 2, 2014), quoting Toni Morrison, Beloved 190 (1987). It seems apparent that Gilmore’s interpretation of “insubordination,” as applied to Davis, would include his resistance to Gilmore’s management philosophy. 13 Case: 13-11340 Date Filed: 01/23/2014 Page: 14 of 15 iii. Deliberate Avoidance of Progressive Discipline Policy Davis also argues that the City’s failure to make a finding of misconduct may have been orchestrated to avoid the City’s progressive discipline policy. To begin with, this argument is purely speculative. Moreover, the record does not contain a factual issue as to whether Davis committed misconduct that would invoke that policy. As discussed above, the City has consistently stated that Davis did not meet Gilmore’s requirements for a supportive second-in-command. Therefore, his termination would not, under any reasonable interpretation of the facts, have triggered the City’s obligation to follow its progressive discipline policy. iv. Gilmore’s Immediate Decision to Terminate Davis Davis argues that Gilmore’s immediate decision to recommend his termination after their “one-on-one” meeting is suspicious in light of Davis’s statements that he “took copious notes when meeting with [Gilmore] to discuss his job duties,” and did not refuse to follow any of her directives. However, Gilmore had several weeks of working closely with Davis before the November 3, 2009 one-on-one meeting to determine whether he was suited to be her second-incommand. Over that time, Gilmore observed Davis to be resentful of her, difficult to work with, and unwilling to buy into her management philosophy. Therefore, 14 Case: 13-11340 Date Filed: 01/23/2014 Page: 15 of 15 the immediacy of Gilmore’s decision to terminate Davis following the one-on-one meeting does not demonstrate pretext. v. City’s Failure to Follow its Own Policy Finally, Davis argues, without any citation to the record, that the City’s policy stated that “an employee could only be recommended for termination for poor job performance or misconduct.” That the City terminated him without citing poor job performance or misconduct, Davis argues, is evidence of pretext. However, because Davis points to no record evidence, nor could we find any support in the record for Davis’s assertion that the City’s policy required misconduct or poor job performance for termination, we will not consider this argument as a basis for pretext.