Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Betty F.

Text: Prospective Juror Betty F. was a 54-year-old African-American who worked for a federal defense contractor. She was generally in favor of the death penalty, writing: ―I feel [the death penalty] is necessary to deter the increase in [the] unnecessary killing of . . . innocent people.‖ Asked in what type of crime the death penalty should be imposed, she suggested the death penalty was appropriate 30 for crimes that victimized the mentally ill and children. She ―strongly disagreed‖ with the propositions that an offender should ―always,‖ or ―never,‖ receive a sentence of either life or death, opining that the circumstances of individual cases must be reviewed. Betty F.‘s voir dire began with her largely confirming her written responses. Although she initially expressed reluctance when asked whether she could ―personally vote to have somebody executed,‖ she affirmed she could vote for death in some unspecified circumstances. She would not change her vote to avoid a penalty phase nor would she do so in order to get to a penalty phase so she could sentence someone to death. She initially stated that in a case of murder for financial gain, she would not always vote for either life or death, but then admitted she ―would prefer life imprisonment‖ to the death penalty in such cases. Asked to elaborate, Betty F. said she would not prefer life imprisonment ―in every situation‖ or ―no matter what the facts [were],‖ but on a scale of one to 10, with one being someone who would always impose a life sentence, the juror put herself at two on the scale. Questioned by defense counsel, Betty F. agreed she thought the death penalty was appropriate for ―horrible‖ murders such as for those who tortured and killed children. Questioned by the prosecutor, the juror explained her initial answer to the court suggesting she would be reluctant to vote for the death penalty: ―I wasn‘t really prepared to—I didn‘t think I was going to be able to explain why I felt I could go for the death penalty, but with him I did explain whether or not kind of—what had to be a horrible [crime], and I could in those instances, that I could separate from some of them.‖ But she placed herself as a two on the scale because she ―would have a hard time voting for death if all of the circumstances led me to believe it wasn‘t horrible, horrible.‖ She agreed with the prosecutor that, for a murder that was not ―horrible‖ or ―gross,‖ such as involving children, sexual 31 brutalization or dismemberment, it would be extremely unlikely she would vote for death. At this point the trial court intervened to clarify the juror‘s views. ―THE COURT: Let me—Here you are not dealing with a child and dismemberment, and you are not dealing with a situation of torture, you are not dealing with a number of murders. One murder that‘s deliberately done, intentionally done for the purpose of getting money. ―Can you see yourself imposing the death penalty in that type of case? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Betty F.]: No. ―THE COURT: No matter what the facts were? It‘s not as gruesome as what you were talking about. ―Would you always vote for life in prison? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Betty F.]: Yes.‖ (Italics added.) Thereafter the trial court excused her for cause, explaining: ―I find she‘s substantially impaired,‖ and ―I think she‘s honest. I think this is the difficulty we have with a lot of these people. They just don‘t comprehend the subject.‖ Although initial indications suggested Betty F. could fulfill the duties of a juror in a capital case, her later elaboration of her views made clear she would never vote for the death penalty in a case of murder for financial gain. It was for the trial court to resolve these ambiguities regarding her true state of mind, and because substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s determination that she was impaired within the meaning of Witt (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424), we defer to the court‘s decision to sustain the prosecution‘s challenge for cause. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316). 32