Opinion ID: 2317480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Power to Order Expungement of Arrest Records

Text: In Morrow v. District of Columbia, [4] the court, in a limited holding, ruled that the Court of General Sessions had power to issue an order regarding [an] arrest record in a criminal case which [had] been before the court. [5] This court has also held that where collateral has been posted, but no information later filed, the trial court has power to grant some relief to one seeking a limitation on the use of arrest records. Irani v. District of Columbia, supra . Although Menard v. Mitchell, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 430 F.2d 486 (1970), treated the general problem of limiting arrest records, that decision related to an F.B.I. record of an arrest by Los Angeles police and in no way dealt with the power of local courts to order expungement of local police records under applicable statutes. In short, it can be said that the question of power to order outright expungement has not been squarely met in this jurisdiction. To be sure, we spoke in In re Alexander, D.C.App., 259 A.2d 592 (1969), of unusual facts which might justify ordering a particular arrest record completely expunged. Such was not a holding since this court decided the case without necessarily reaching the question of judicial power to order complete expungement. We simply held on the facts presented that a lesser form of relief, administrative in nature, was sufficient. Likewise, the holding in Irani v. District of Columbia, supra , is no more than that an uncontroverted affirmative showing of factual innocence of objective wrongdoing is sufficient for some relief. The case was remanded for the trial judge to consider in the first instance the appropriate available relief. It must be recognized, however, that the decision in Irani contemplated the difference between an affirmative showing of no culpability on the one hand, and a verdict of not guilty by the reasonable doubt standard, or an unresolved question as to guilt due to lack of prosecution of the case, on the other. The requests for complete expungement in these cases are in terms of destruction so that no record of the arrest or of the fact that a record existed shall remain. Appellants expressly do not request destruction of court records. In their brief they also concede, consistent with Morrow v. District of Columbia, supra, 135 U.S. App.D.C. at 173-174, 417 F.2d at 741-742, that destruction of the entry in the arrest book could not have been ordered. See note 3, supra. In that case the United States Court of Appeals recognized that D.C.Code 1967, § 4-134(4), requires arrest books to be publicly maintained so that no arrest can be secret. Thus, as to physical destruction, the motions relate to all other records including photographs and fingerprints. In deciding if complete expungement is properly within the scope of ancillary equity power of a court, or for that matter within general equity jurisdiction, the first question to be answered is whether the law requires maintenance of the relevant records. In the District of Columbia there is such a requirement. D.C.Code 1967, § 4-137 provides: All records of the Metropolitan Police force shall be preserved, except that the Board of Commissioners, upon recommendation of the major and superintendent of police, may cause records which it considers to be obsolete or of no further value to be destroyed. This provision obviously relates to records required to be kept under section 4-134, supra, and central criminal records required under D.C.Code 1967, § 4-134a, [6] as well as records of receipt and disbursement of money posted by appellants as collateral, [7] photographs and fingerprints. As just observed, the court in Morrow, supra at 173-174, 417 F.2d at 741-742, recognized that the statutory requirement that the arrest book records be public precluded their destruction or obliteration. Consistent with that conclusion, it is plain that section 4-137, supra, is controlling insofar as destruction of police records is sought. We, therefore, hold that in the absence of specific statutory authority, [8] destruction of records of the Metropolitan Police Department cannot be ordered. This holding is consistent with the requirement of maintaining police records of arrests later treated as detentions under D.C.Code 1967, § 4-140(a) (Supp. IV, 1971) ( see S.Rep. No. 912, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1967)), and the concept that secret arrests are odious to a democratic society [9] not only during but after detention when the threat of rearrest could be used to prevent disclosure of the detention by the person arrested. There remains yet another reason why destruction of arrest records, in the absence of specific legislative control, should not be permitted. As was observed in Morrow:    The inquiry might be better directed to the question: what valid law enforcement purposes are served by retaining    the arrest record in a particular case? [ Id. at 175, 417 F.2d at 743.] [10] Of recent date the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that an arresting officer, his superiors and the District of Columbia are subject to suit in the United States District Court, both at common law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for damages arising out of asserted police misconduct. See Baker v. Washington, D.C. Cir., 448 F.2d 1200 (decided August 11, 1971); Carter v. Carlson, D.C. Cir., 447 F.2d 358 (decided July 23, 1971). [11] Clearly, law enforcement interests are and must be served by preserving records of arrest if for no other reason than to permit a determination whether and how to defend in the event of an action based on asserted police misconduct. Upon destruction of arrest records in such cases the defense would be left at best with faded recollection by the arresting officer of an event lost in memory because of hundreds of subsequent cases. It may be well to point out in this context that a hearing on a motion regarding content and disposition of arrest records ordinarily would not involve all factual issues which may be presented in an action based on asserted police misconduct. Neither in such a motion, nor in one for amplification of arrest record as discussed, infra, should it be necessary to explore such factual questions with a view to establishing facts respecting reasonableness or propriety of police conduct. See note 15, infra. Such a hearing should not be permitted to become a proceeding where both sides jockey for position with an eye cast to a subsequent tort action. Rejection of the notion that court-ordered destruction of arrest records is permitted, absent specific legislative guidelines, is consistent with our national concept of open government based on democratic principles. Moreover, Congress in legislating for the seat of government ( see United States v. Thompson, U.S.App.D.C., (No. 71-1182, decided October 7, 1971), slip op. at 8)), may well have very good reason to want all current records of the police department preserved in order that it might be informed of need for change in its area of responsibility. Indeed, future ability to cope with demonstrations here may well depend upon Congress knowing all available facts (not just total numbers) regarding past arrests just like the ones revealed here. In any event, the hallmark of our system of government calls for the preservation of accurate official records rather than suppression of information.