Opinion ID: 1125347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: plaintiffs' claim under the dramshop act

Text: In 1981, Utah enacted the first dramshop act as part of the Intoxicating Liquor Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 32-11-1 (Interim Supp.1981). The act established a claim for relief against persons who furnished intoxicating liquor to others in violation of statutes that prohibited giving or selling liquor to minors, intoxicated persons, habitual drunkards, or interdicted persons. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-13.1(8)(d) (1973), 32-1-36.5( l ) (1974); 32-7-14 (1974), 32-7-24(b), (c) (1974). In 1985, the Intoxicating Liquor Code was repealed and replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Utah Code Ann. Title 32A, which contained the Dramshop Act as enacted in 1981, with minor modifications. Subsequent minor amendments were also made in 1989 and 1990. The provision in effect at the time of Berdette Richardson's accident, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991), read: (1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication:[ [2] ] (a) any person under the age of 21 years; (b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; (c) any person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or (d) any person who is a known interdicted person. Subsection (1) provides a claim for relief to two categories of injured persons: (1) third persons and (2) the spouse, child, or parent of that third person. Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun held that the Dramshop Act gives a cause of action to injured third parties, but not to the intoxicated person. 821 P.2d 1167, 1167 (Utah 1991); see also Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1986). Thus, Berdette Richardson was not a third person within the meaning of that term as used by section 32A-14-101(1). It follows that Berdette Richardson's family members are not within the category of spouse, parent, or child as stated in the statute. The district court held that plaintiffs had valid claims for relief under the Act for Berdette Richardson's death because each plaintiff was a third person within the meaning of subsection (1). In the abstract, that construction has some plausibility. But the term third person must be construed within its statutory context, not in the abstract. Moreno v. Board of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist., 926 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1996) (`One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.' (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989))). If we were to construe the term third person to include the spouse, child, or parent of an intoxicated person, as the trial court did, that construction would not be true to the context of the statute. The relevant statutory language states: Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides ... at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991) (emphasis added). While it is clear that a spouse, child, or parent of a third person may recover under the Act, it makes no sense to construe third person to include in its meaning a spouse, child, or parent, as the trial court did. The statute was intended to protect two categories of persons: (1) those directly injured by a drunk driver in an accident (i.e., third person[s]), and (2) those closely related to the third person (spouse, child, or parent). In this case, plaintiffs did not suffer direct injuries in an accident caused by an intoxicated person, and they are not therefore the third person[s] to which the statute refers. A contrary reading of the statute would result in an untenable position. If the term third person were read to include the spouse, child, or parent of an intoxicated person, then the language that allows recovery to a spouse, child, or parent of that third person would necessarily mean that the spouse, child[ren], or parent[s] of the intoxicated person's spouse, child, or parent could also recover. That would mean that an intoxicated person's grandparents, grandchildren, children's and parent's spouses, and certain other in-laws could also sue. In our view, that reading is unreasonable and cannot be what the Legislature intended. In sum, the Dramshop Act precludes a cause of action against Matador by plaintiffs in this case.