Opinion ID: 202337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Azimi's Claim for Compensatory Damages

Text: 9 Azimi was employed at the Jordan's Meats plant in Portland, Maine, from November 1999 to November 2001. During the period Azimi was employed, the company had about 150 full-time employees. Azimi worked in various positions while at the plant, including as a meat slicer and a meat stripper. At trial, Azimi testified that he had been the subject of discriminatory treatment and abusive and harassing behavior by some of his former co-workers and supervisors. The incidents of maltreatment are myriad and outrageous; we recite only a few examples. 10 On multiple occasions, one of Azimi's line leaders, Steve Mitton, physically obstructed the hot water tap so as to prevent Azimi from washing his hands, which were swollen from handling frozen meat. While Azimi was only allowed access to the cold water tap, Mitton permitted other, white employees to use the hot water. 11 Subsequently, Azimi was transferred to another department. There, a co-worker, George Libby, made numerous disparaging comments to Azimi about his religion, including: If you eat pork and pussy, you become strong like me. When Azimi told Libby that both oral sex and the consumption of pork were against his religion, Libby said, fuck you and fuck your God; fuck your religion. On separate occasions, Libby, whom Azimi described as weighing about three hundred pounds, also grabbed Azimi by the neck and tried to shove pork into Azimi's mouth; held Azimi by the waist and pumped him from behind, simulating sexual intercourse; and told Azimi to suck my dick and, when Azimi took umbrage at the comment, picked Azimi up and dangled him, off the floor, by his arms, while other co-workers watched and laughed. Libby and another co-worker, Phil Ryan, also called Azimi on one of the phones in the plant and said to him, among other things, Nigger, Sudan [sic] Hussein is waiting for you. 12 In addition to a number of other instances of verbal abuse and maltreatment by co-workers, Azimi was also subject to other offensive conduct, often by anonymous perpetrators. For example, he received an unsigned note in his locker; on one side of the note was scrawled a swastika and on the other side was written: 13 Hey MotherFucker Why don't You GO BACK to your Own Country. 14 You don't bE long HERE you Fucking musselum You PIECE of Shit WE HATE YOU ALL ThE MUSSELUMS 15 You Don't don't bElong here AT JORDANSMEAT. 16 YOUR NOTHing but a Fucking NIGGER . . . . 17 Azimi also once found pieces of pork in the pockets of his work jacket; found a picture in his locker of Osama Bin Laden, on which was written the words Abdul, Mother Fucker, and Your Dad need [sic] Help; and discovered that his goggles and hearing-protection equipment were smashed to pieces, and that his personal shoes had been taken from his work locker and stuck in the toilet. 18 Azimi testified that he reported the harassment to his supervisors; that Brian Smith, the Human Resources Manager, and other supervisors failed to adequately investigate the incidents and to impose appropriate punishment on the wrongdoers; and that the harassment continued despite his complaints and his supervisors' promises to address them. 19 After hearing the evidence, the jury found, by way of a special verdict form, that Azimi was subjected to an offensive work environment that was hostile to his race, religion[,] or ethnic origin, and that Jordan's Meats knew or should have known of the offensive hostile work environment and failed to take adequate and effective remedial measures. The jury, however, answered no to the question of whether Defendant Jordan's Meats, Inc.'s unlawful harassment legally caused [Azimi] to be damaged by emotional distress, pain, suffering, emotional anguish, loss of enjoyment of life[,] and/or inconvenience. 1 As a result of this finding, the jury followed the district court's instructions and the special verdict form, and did not go on to consider what amount Azimi was entitled to recover as compensation for any injuries suffered. There were no objections to the special verdict form and the jury instructions, a point that we analyze later. 20 On appeal, Azimi's contention is that the jury was required to award compensatory damages, either as a matter of law or because the evidence compelled it. 21 Azimi, supported by the MCLUF, first argues that inherent in a finding of a hostile work environment is a finding that the claimant suffered damages, such that any liability finding must be accompanied by an award of compensatory damages. 2 Azimi and amicus present the issue as one of inconsistency in the jury verdict. They also argue that the importance of the interests at stake requires that there be an award of damages. 22 Both arguments have been repudiated by the Supreme Court. Indeed, in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), the Court rejected, in the context of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the arguments (1) that injury should be presumed from the violation of a constitutional right and (2) that damages should be awarded for a deprivation of a constitutional right regardless of whether any injury was caused. See id. at 254, 98 S.Ct. 1042. The Court noted that [r]ights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum, and that [t]heir purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests, such that without proof of injury, no compensatory damages are possible. Id. (emphasis added); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (noting that compensatory damages must be grounded in determinations of plaintiffs' actual losses); Carey, 435 U.S. at 264, 98 S.Ct. 1042 ([W]e hold that neither the likelihood of [mental and emotional] injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused.). 23 Carey establishes that there is no presumption of injury and no automatic entitlement to damages. Cf. Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir.2000) (stating, in the context of reversing a class certification in a § 1981 case, that Carey makes clear that in order to receive compensatory damages, individual plaintiffs must prove that `injury actually was caused[,]' and that [t]his is especially true since compensatory damages under section 1981 can include damages for emotional and psychological distress). 24 In a later § 1983 case, the Court reiterated that damages based on the abstract `value' or `importance' of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310, 106 S.Ct. 2537; see also id. ( Carey thus makes clear that the abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 damages.). That role, if it is to be played at all, is played by nominal damages. Id. at 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537 ([N]ominal damages, and not damages based on some undefinable `value' of infringed rights, are the appropriate means of `vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.). So, too, here. 25 Nor do Title VII or § 1981 provide statutory authority for automatic or presumptive damages. The availability of noneconomic damages [under these causes of action] does not mean that their recovery is automatic whenever a plaintiff prevails. Lindemann & Grossman, 2 Employment Discrimination Law 1828 (3d ed.1996). An award of damages for emotional distress must be supported by competent evidence of `genuine injury,' Bailey v. Runyon, 220 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir.2000) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527, 531 (8th Cir. 1999)), the proof of which is distinct from the proof required to show discrimination, see id. (citing Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Mo., Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 636 (8th Cir.1998)); see also id. at 882 (rejecting the argument that emotional harm is inherent in a finding of liability for sexual harassment under Title VII, and noting that [t]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has made clear that `[e]motional harm will not be presumed simply because the complaining party is a victim of discrimination' (some internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 376 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting EEOC Policy Guidance No. 915.002 § II(A)(2) (July 14, 1992)))); Lindemann & Grossman, supra, at 1828 (To qualify [for noneconomic damages under the employment anti-discrimination statutes], a plaintiff must prove that he or she sustained noneconomic injuries, such as emotional distress, pain and suffering, harm to reputation, and other consequential injury, caused by the defendant's unlawful conduct.). Injuries allegedly caused by the violation of Title VII or § 1981 must be proven to the factfinder—here, a jury—which may reasonably find, within the law, that while there has been harassment, the plaintiff has not been injured in any compensable way by it. 3 The district court quite correctly and succinctly noted that Azimi was improperly trying to eliminate causation of damages from the case. 26 Azimi's alternative argument is that the jury's decision not to award him any compensatory damages is against the weight of the evidence. On that basis, he contends that the district court erred both in denying his motion for a new trial on damages and in refusing to reconsider that denial. We review the district court's denial of motions for a new trial and for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Valentín-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 103-04 (1st Cir. 2006); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1063 (1st Cir.1997). A district court may grant a new trial only if [it is] convinced that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, such that letting it stand would result in a miscarriage of justice. Valentín-Almeyda, 447 F.3d at 104. In general, this rule applies to a verdict premised on a finding that no damages have been satisfactorily proven. Quinones-Pacheco v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 979 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1992). When evidence of damage is equivocal, or a reasonable jury could determine that the plaintiff failed to prove an essential element of his or her case (such as causation), returning a `zero damages' verdict is acceptable and the non-award will be set aside only if manifest injustice is in prospect. Id. 27 As noted above, it was Azimi's burden to prove that he was injured by the hostile work environment at Jordan's Meats. The only testimony on compensatory damages he offered came from him, his wife, and a close friend from his mosque. Azimi testified that the abuse he suffered at work caused him, inter alia, to become stressed emotionally, to lose sleep and appetite, and to withdraw socially from his then fiancee (now wife), his son, and his friends. Azimi's wife testified that, as a result of the workplace harassment, Azimi became hurt, quiet, and withdrawn; that he developed sleeping problems; and that their marriage became strained. Azimi's friend also testified that during the time Azimi worked at Jordan's Meats, Azimi became distressed [and] sad and did not want to do anything. None of these witnesses testified that Azimi sought medical treatment or counseling because of the harassment, that he suffered any out-of-pocket costs for such treatment or counseling, or that he lost any wages or paid time from work as a result of what happened at work. 28 Jordan's Meats presented evidence that Azimi instigated or participated in some of the ugly exchanges with his co-workers and that he engaged in off-color joking and teasing with at least one of his harassers; that Azimi sought a permanent position at Jordan's Meats and continued to work at the plant despite the harassment; 4 and that Azimi's wife sought work at Jordan's Meats in 2001, well after most of the harassing incidents of which Azimi complained at trial had taken place. 29 The jury heard the testimony, and it was up to its members to evaluate it and the witnesses' demeanor and credibility. `Translating legal damage into money damages—especially in cases which involve few significant items of measurable economic loss—is a matter peculiarly within a jury's ken'; [f]or just this reason, `[w]e rarely will override the jury's judgment on the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded.' Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.1988) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 215 (1st Cir.1987); Brown v. Freedman Baking Co., 810 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir.1987)); see also Quinones-Pacheco, 979 F.2d at 3 (noting that a trial judge does not sit as a super-juror, free to disregard the considered verdict of a properly instructed jury `merely because he disagrees with it or would have found otherwise in a bench trial' (quoting Milone, 847 F.2d at 37)); Peckham v. Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 837, 839 (1st Cir. 1990) (observing that [c]ausation questions . . . are normally grist for the jury's mill and that the appellate court cannot reject possibilities rooted in the record merely because, if sitting as factfinders, we [might] have drawn a different set of conclusions). 30 Although a reasonable jury could have awarded damages based on the evidence presented, there is no plausible argument that on these facts a reasonable jury was compelled to give a compensatory damages award. See Bailey, 220 F.3d at 880-81 (rejecting plaintiff's theory that jury was required to credit his evidence of emotional harm stemming from sexual harassment, and finding no abuse of discretion in trial judge's denial of new trial on damages); see also id. at 881 (noting that `[m]edical or other expert evidence is not required to prove emotional distress' and that `[a] plaintiff's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain the plaintiff's burden in this regard,' but that plaintiff was nonetheless required `to convince the trier of fact that [he] actually suffered distress because of the [Title VII violation] itself' (alterations in original) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir.1997); Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1250 (4th Cir.1996))); cf. Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 803-04 (8th Cir.2001); Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 843 (11th Cir.1991).