Opinion ID: 1195464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the shellhouse deed

Text: Unoccupied land is presumed to be in the constructive possession of the true owner or the party with better title. [8] Since entry is presumptively with permission of the owner, the burden rests on the party claiming title by adverse possession to show a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner. [9] Thus, if the deed from Alaska Industrial to Shellhouse is valid, Young was required to prove the elements of adverse possession under either AS 09.10.030 [10] or AS 09.25.050, [11] by showing open, notorious, continuous, exclusive and hostile possession. [12] A valid deed must designate the land intended to be conveyed with reasonable certainty. However, ... [t]he purpose of a deed description is not to identify the land, but to furnish the means of identification. [13] Thus, a description is sufficient if it contains information permitting identification of the property to the exclusion of all others. [14] Older cases suggest that where the terms of the grant or deed leave the identity of the real property completely uncertain, the deed is void. [15] The general rule, however, is that where possible, deeds will be made operative and the intentions of the parties given effect. A deed is not void for uncertainty of description if the quantity, identity or boundaries of the property can be determined by reference to extrinsic evidence. [16] Such evidence may include parole and subsequent conduct of the parties as well as other documents. [17] There appear to be few restrictions on the use of extrinsic evidence in ambiguous or uncertain deed cases, although at least one court has cautioned that there must be sufficient information in the property description to base title substantially on written evidence and not principally on parol evidence. [18] The Shellhouse deed described the location of the property with reference to the Hubbell plat. This plat was not available at trial. Nevertheless, the trial court was able logically to determine the configuration of the lots from the street references in the deed. [19] It also found that the Shellhouse property was situated between Corner No. 1 and Point No. 2 on Exh. B and consisted of approximately 400 feet of beachfront. This configuration and location is inconsistent with Shilts' statement that the property conveyed to Shellhouse extended 1,200 feet along the beach. The basis for the court's determination of location, as indicated in the memorandum decision, rested on testimony regarding Shellhouse's improvements. We note further that in this case the Shellhouse deed when read in conjunction with the missing Hubbell plat presumably would have contained a description of the property which would have identified the property with sufficient certainty. In such a case, a resort to extrinsic evidence is clearly valid. Testimony at trial does indicate that Shellhouse occupied property between Corner No. 1 and Point No. 2 of Exh. B and made improvements thereon. This parol evidence along with the logical conclusions to be drawn from the street layout support Judge Schulz' findings regarding the configuration and location of the six lots. The trial court was able to test the credibility of witnesses and apparently disregarded Shilts' testimony in an effort to uphold the deed's validity. While the extrinsic evidence is equivocal, we find that the property was adequately described at the time the conveyance was executed. It referred to a plat prepared by Chas. S. Hubbell. While that plat cannot be located, the description refers to six blocks, each 200 feet square and bounded by certain named streets. The streets apparently were depicted on the plat but either were never constructed, or in any event, no longer exist. The configuration found by the trial court logically conforms to the descriptions of the lots as set forth in the deed so as to contain the street boundaries indicated. The description also indicates that the land is within the eighty acres of U.S.S. 691. When extrinsic evidence is added to the effect that the Shellhouses had improvements on the land extending westerly along the beach frontage from Corner No. 1 of U.S.S. 691, the boundaries of the property may be delineated. The initial course would commence at Corner No. 1 of that survey and extend westerly along the meander line of mean high tide until that meander line intersects a north-south line parallel to the easterly boundary of that survey and 400 feet from that easterly boundary. [20] The rest of the description may be prepared in accordance with the configuration found by the trial court. The lots designated as 1 and 4 would be slightly larger or smaller than 200 feet square depending on the meander line. The property would, of course, be subject to the reservations set forth in the patent. [21] We note further that the missing Hubbell plat was apparently relied upon for other deeds in U.S.S. 691. In keeping with the policy of giving effect to the intentions of the parties to deeds so as to make them operative when possible, we believe that the trial court did not err in reconciling the description in the deed with the existing plat of U.S.S. 691 and with the testimony as to improvements on the land. The trial court found, in effect, that William Shilts was the sole surviving heir of Aaron Shellhouse and succeeded to his interest in the six blocks. Unless his interest in that property has been extinguished by the adverse possession claim of Robert Young, Mr. Shilts would be entitled to prevail on his counterclaim seeking adjudication of title to that property. [22]