Opinion ID: 1985665
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: What is the proper role of a state court in enforcing such an administrative subpoena?

Text: Courts play a critical role in this administrative process. First, judicial involvement ensures administrative due process. The system of judicial enforcement is designed to provide a meaningful day in court for one resisting an administrative subpoena. United States v. Security State Bank & Trust, 473 F. 2d 638, 642 (5th Cir.1973). Bifurcation of the power, on the one hand of the agency to issue subpoenas and on the other hand of the courts to enforce them, is an inherent protection against abuse of subpoena power. United States v. Bell, 564 F. 2d 953, 959 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App. 1977). Second, judicial enforcement clarifies the rights arising from specific disputes in matters concerning both the general public and the individuals involved. One of the functions of a court is to compel a party to perform a duty which the law requires at his [or her] hands. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 487, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 1137, 38 L.Ed. 1047, 1061 (1894). Agency law invokes enforcement in the customary forms of judicial proceedings, because its effect may be to aid an administrative or executive body in the performance of duties legally imposed upon it   . Ibid. No question of contempt may arise until all issues are determined adversely to a party and that party has refused to obey a final order of the court. 154 U.S. at 488-89, 14 S.Ct. at 1137-38, 38 L.Ed. at 1061. For those reasons of fairness and efficiency of administration, federal courts have drawn a sharp distinction between agency power to issue subpoenas and judicial power to enforce them. United States v. Hill, 694 F. 2d 258, 263 (D.C. Cir.1982). Federal courts enforcing administrative subpoenas are strictly limited by their jurisdictional grants. On the other hand, the Legislature has given our courts plenary jurisdiction to enforce the agency's subpoena. N.J.S.A. 49:3-68. Respondent insists that because New Jersey's courts have not the power to issue subpoenas beyond state lines, they have not the power to enforce subpoenas issued to out-of-state witnesses by agencies of the State. Citing King v. Hochberg, 17 N.J. Super. 533, 86 A. 2d 307 (Ch.Div. 1952), respondent contends that New Jersey courts do not have the authority to compel the testimony of nonresident witnesses. Our Court Rules do limit the power to compel attendance of witnesses at a court hearing to those witnesses who may be served within the State of New Jersey. R. 1:9-4. And our Court Rules authorizing the use in this State of the deposition of a non-party witness in a foreign state apply only if the foreign state has a reciprocal procedure. Sylvia B. Pressler, Current N.J.Court Rules, comment on R. 4:11-5 (1995). We do not believe that those Rules resolve the issue of agency power. The Appellate Division reasoned that [a] court cannot accord an agency's subpoena greater power than a subpoena issued in the name of the court via enforcement. 276 N.J. Super. at 10, 647 A. 2d 160 (citing Doumani v. Casino Control Comm'n, 614 F. Supp. 1465, 1471 (D.N.J. 1985)). Doumani does not establish that proposition, but only that an agency's authority to regulate nonresident interests may not exceed the due process limits that restrain courts. 614 F. Supp. at 1471. The issue, then, is not what the Court Rules permit or do not permit New Jersey courts to do. The issue is whether the State may grant an agency extraterritorial authority over nonresident witnesses consistent with due process principles. If the Legislature grants such power, the proper role of a court under N.J.S.A. 49:3-68 is to ensure that principles of due process and comity between states have been observed in the issuance of the subpoena. In that connection, we turn first to the provisions of Rule 1:9-6. That Rule sets forth the procedures for enforcement of a subpoena of a public officer or agency. Any application for compliance shall be on notice to the party subject to subpoena. Because the Bureau's enabling act does not specify the sanction for failure of a person to obey a subpoena, we may infer that only the usual procedures for relief to litigants under Rule 1:10-3 would be available. See In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 60, 570 A. 2d 416 (outlining the difference between criminal contempt and civil contempt in the form of relief to litigants), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed. 2d 333 (1990). Because the party subpoenaed is, by definition, not within the jurisdiction, an order of confinement to achieve compliance would not be appropriate. See In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 468-69, 295 A. 2d 3 (App.Div.) (discussing civil sanctions and confinement to secure compliance with order), certif. denied. 62 N.J. 80, 299 A. 2d 78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991, 93 S.Ct. 1500, 36 L.Ed. 2d 189 (1973). A court granting relief to an agency seeking civil sanctions to enforce a subpoena would consider the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:10-5 (maximum $50 fine as penalty) and any payment to the aggrieved party authorized under Rule 1:10-3. In considering other interests of due process and comity, a court may be guided by the familiar principles of international relations that seek to minimize infringements upon foreign sovereignty. SGPM, supra, 636 F. 2d at 1324. In deciding whether to exercise enforcement jurisdiction, courts should balance the interests it seeks to protect against the interests of any other sovereign that might exercise authority over the same conduct. Republic of Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F. 3d 65, 76 (3d Cir.1994). Because each sovereign has an interest in the welfare of its citizens, we would add, in this context, that a court must consider (1) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose on the person subpoenaed; (2) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state; (3) the residence of the person subpoenaed; and (4) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state. To minimize the degree of intrusion on the sovereignty of the other state, we insist that in the future the process be served only by those authorized to do so under the laws of that state. There is a concern that the State's efforts to subpoena an out-of-state witness and the enforcement proceedings of the court will be pointless because there will be no effective way thereafter to enforce the subpoena in a New Jersey court without the physical presence of the party in the forum. Respondent reminds us that `[t]he doctrine that a court of equity will not do a useless or vain thing is an ancient maxim of hornbook learning and general recognition.' 55 N.Y.Jur.2d Equity § 106 (1994), and cites Fiedler v. Coast Finance Co., Inc., 129 N.J. Eq. 161, 169, 18 A. 2d 268 (E. & A. 1941) (Decrees that would in the final result be nugatory should not be made.). We agree that nugatory decrees should not be made. In the normal course of events, [w]hen the process of adjudication is complete, all judgments are handed over to the litigant or executive officers, such as the sheriff or marshal, to execute. Steps which the litigant or executive department lawfully takes for their enforcement are a vindication rather than a usurpation of the court's power. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641, 70 S.Ct. 357, 363, 94 L.Ed. 401, 410 (1950). The sheriff of a New Jersey county has no authority to enter New York. However, it does not follow that an adjudication of civil contempt under our Court Rules is a fruitless exercise; such civil sanctions are entitled to full faith and credit in the foreign jurisdiction. New York v. Sacco, 242 N.J. Super. 699, 577 A. 2d 1333 (Law Div. 1990); Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P. 2d 579 (Colo. 1981); Robinson v. Robinson, 487 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). By later resort to the courts of the other state, the subpoenaed witness will be further guaranteed due process of law. In considering whether to accord full faith and credit to a judgment of another state, a forum state must consider whether the state rendering the judgment had jurisdiction over the defendant. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, 97 L.Ed. 1221, 1226-27 (1953).