Opinion ID: 716699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disclosure requirement

Text: 11 The first issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly held as a matter of law that the disclosure requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) was not violated. We review such questions of law de novo. Jenkins v. Heintz, 25 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir.1994), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995). Resolution of this issue requires the interpretation of statutory language defining the following as one form of false or misleading representation: 12 Except as otherwise provided for communications to acquire location information under section 1692b of this title, the failure to disclose clearly in all communications made to collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose. 13 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 14 The precise legal question we address here is whether the required statutory disclosure of § 1692e(11) must be included in a verbal statement in communications to an attorney when the matters required to be disclosed would be clear to an attorney from the communication viewed in context. 8 15 In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). In the case before us, our inquiry begins with meaning of the word disclose. 9 However, in construing the statute we also look to other provisions of the Act to determine the purpose of the law and the context in which the word is used. 16 The term disclose used in the statute is, viewed in isolation, ambiguous as to whether a verbal statement is required. 10 We contrast the use of disclose in this subsection with the use of statement in § 1692g of the same subchapter to define the requirements for disclosure by creditors in a different context. The definition of the word statement focuses on express communication orally or in writing. The word statement also suggests intentional communication and, it also connotes literal verbal communication. The word disclosure does not have as strong a connotation of intention or verbal expression as does the word statement. 11 17 We also take note that § 1692e(11) does not place the required disclosure in quotation marks or set forth any specific required wording for the disclosure but merely defines what the content of the required disclosure will be: that the debt collector is attempting ... (emphasis added) Id. 18 The definition of the term disclose is sufficiently ambiguous that, in an appropriate context, it could be construed to include other forms of making facts known than verbal statements. To determine whether such a broad construction is appropriate with regard to this subsection in this circumstance we look to the nature of the legal requirement, the nature of the recipient of the communication, the larger statutory context and the purposes of the statute as stated at the beginning of the subchapter of which the disputed statutory language is a part. 19 We begin our analysis with the language of the section at issue. The disclosure requirement here is contained in a subsection of § 1692e. That section prohibits generally false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. The section then lists examples of such improper conduct [w]ithout limiting the general application of the foregoing. Id. The section does not say the reverse, however, that the more general language of § 1692e cannot be considered in limiting the scope of ambiguous terms used in the subsections. 20 In view of the purpose of § 1692e(11) to define a form of deceptive or misleading means used in connection with the collection of a debt, we are reluctant to conclude that there is a deceptive or misleading practice in the mere failure to disclose by verbal statement to a lawyer what should be clear to the lawyer from the fact of the communication, its nature, contents and context. 12 We are here inclined to adopt a broad construction of the word disclose in part because to do otherwise would characterize this particular form of innocent and sufficient communication as deceptive or misleading, contrary to the plain meaning of the language of the section in which the word is used. 21 In a factual situation where the failure to make the required disclosure by verbal statement might be misleading to a lawyer, the statute may require disclosure by verbal statement of such of the required information as is not obvious to a lawyer, 13 but those are not the facts before us here. In this case the lawyer to whom the communication was made requested the communication in the course of representing his clients on the collection matter. The verification contained a cover letter with a letterhead stating Continental Collection Agency, Ltd., a signed Statement of Deposit Accounts itemizing the rent and other fees claimed with a bottom line stating the TOTAL AMOUNT DUE OWNER, the lease agreement and copies of move in and move out reports on the condition of the property showing a cleaning charge of $160. 22 The legal implications of communicating with a debt collector would be especially within the professional competence of a lawyer hired to represent a client's interests in the collection process, and the fact that a communication is made to collect a debt is something that the lawyer's professional expertise would allow him or her to discern easily on facts such as these. In short, both elements required to be disclosed would have been clear to a lawyer from the requested verification. 23 In our interpretation of the word disclose, we also rely on the statement of purposes at the beginning of the subchapter in § 1692(e), which says: It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. (emphasis added) 24 The failure to make a verbal statement to a lawyer of what would be clear to a lawyer from the communication viewed in context is not fairly characterized as an abusive debt collection practice nor does failure to make a verbal disclosure give a competitive advantage to any debt collector, other than a de minimis savings of time, because the debtor's representative will know just as much regardless of whether a verbal disclosure is made. In addition, since the Act is for consumer protection and the disclosure requirement is designed to protect such consumers as may not have the sophistication to appreciate the significance of debt collection communications, it is not likely that Congress imagined that verbal statements of characterizations and legal implications obvious to an attorney would ordinarily be required in communications made to a debtor's attorney. 14 25 Accordingly, we hold that the fact of the debt verification and its content, viewed in context, was adequate to disclose to an attorney hired to represent the debtor that the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose within the meaning of § 1692e(11). 15 A disclosure pursuant to § 1692e(11) by verbal statement would be a pointless formality and is not required in such a situation.