Opinion ID: 1118335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the court err in dividing the marital assets?

Text: Under Alaska law, a three-step process is used to divide marital assets. First, the court determines what property is available for distribution. Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 570 (Alaska 1983). This determination is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, although it may involve legal determinations to which this court applies its independent judgment. Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 552 (Alaska 1990). Second, the court values that property. Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 570. This valuation is a factual determination, and will be reversed only if clearly erroneous. Lewis, 785 P.2d at 552. Finally, the court equitably allocates the property. Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 570. This court will reverse an allocation decision only if the trial court abuses its discretion in allocating the property, and then only if the allocation is clearly unjust. Lewis, 785 P.2d at 552.
The superior court's decision provides that [t]he wife is to receive ... one-half of the 1973 motorhome proceeds at $3,140.50, and the [d]efendant, husband, is awarded ... one-half of the 1973 Motor-home proceeds at $31,400.50. Billie argues that the discrepancy between the stated values of one-half the motorhome proceeds suggests that the court misvalued the proceeds and erroneously credited him with receiving more property than he actually received. [1] This argument is without merit. There is a typographical error in the decision regarding the amount of Billie's share of the proceeds. This error was harmless. On page four of the decision is a total of the marital assets being awarded, $92,438. This is the amount which results if Billie is credited with the proper amount of the motorhome proceeds.
Billie next claims that the superior court failed to take into account four transactions which allegedly occurred after the parties' separation. First, Billie argues that the court failed to consider Virginia's withdrawal of $26,720 from the couple's joint account by means of 130 automatic teller machine withdrawals between July 1988 and June 1, 1989. Citing Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1989), he claims that marital property dissipated after separation but prior to divorce must be recaptured in calculating the property available for distribution. In Hartland, we held that a party's share of marital assets can be reduced if he or she dissipated substantial amounts of marital assets for his or her own benefit during the parties' separation. Id. at 642. Virginia maintains that Billie's assertion that she made these withdrawals is supported solely by Billie's recollection that he withdrew money only from the Anchorage Airport automatic teller machine. She also claims that he ignores the court's decision to use June 1989, not September 1988, as the date for division of the retirement benefits. Citing Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 802 (Alaska 1989), she notes this court's holding that until a married couple ceases to operate as a financial unit, each party has the right to manage and control marital funds. The record indicates that the superior court was aware of Billie's allegations that Virginia withdrew money from the joint account. As Virginia suggests, the court apparently did not take these transactions into account because it determined that the parties continued to operate as a financial unit until June 1, 1989. That is the date which the court used to value Billie's retirement funds. The court's decision to value the marital estate as of June 1, 1989 was reasonable, for the parties did not initially view the separation as ending their marriage. Virginia testified that she did not know during the initial period of separation that the marriage was over, and that Billie told her that it was not. She did not file a complaint requesting an order of separate maintenance until May 19, 1989. Under Streb, the court therefore did not abuse its discretion in excluding from the marital estate the alleged withdrawals made prior to June 1, 1989. Hartland is inapposite because the record contains no evidence that Virginia spent money for her own separate purposes prior to the date the parties ceased functioning as an economic unit. Second, Billie argues that the court did not take into account Virginia's withdrawal of $3,326 from the parties' joint account on May 31, 1989. Because this withdrawal occurred prior to June 1, 1989, the date the court used in determining the property available for distribution, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the $3,326 from the marital estate. Third, Billie claims that the parties loaned $7,020 to their daughter on November 15, 1988, and that the daughter repaid all $7,020 to Virginia. He argues that the court should have forced Virginia to account for this repayment. While it is not entirely clear from the record whether this amount was repaid, the record suggests that it was repaid between September 1988 and June 1989, when both parties continued to operate from joint accounts. Virginia could not recall exactly when the money had been repaid, but she said she knew it wasn't very long afterwards the loan that her daughter repaid it, suggesting that the loan was repaid prior to the date the parties ceased functioning as an economic unit. Again, the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the loan repayments in the marital estate. Fourth, Billie claims the court should have considered the $9,701 which he gave Virginia on November 16, 1989, in an effort to balance the amounts received by the parties. While the court did not consider this money in its decision, it did consider the money in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and reduced the amount owed by Billie to Virginia by that amount. Billie's criticisms are therefore unfounded.
Despite the parties' stipulation that Billie retained a 1987 Subaru with an equity of $122, the superior court failed to discuss this vehicle in its decision. It is unclear why the court did not discuss this vehicle. On remand, the court should take the car into account and, if necessary, adjust the distribution of the property accordingly.
Billie submits that the purpose of the court's order awarding Virginia $2,900 per month in interim support was to redistribute the parties' property. He claims that the $2,900 payments greatly exceeded Virginia's needs. He also argues that in cases where the amount of interim support awarded is as large as in this case, [2] the trial court must take the interim support payments into account when making a division of marital property. As Virginia points out, Billie's argument is inconsistent with our holding in Lewis concerning the role of interim support in the allocation and distribution of marital property. Lewis, 785 P.2d at 552-54. Citing cases from other states, we wrote that [i]n other jurisdictions the distinction between alimony and the distribution of marital property is very clear: `[A]limony is in no way a property settlement, but is the provision made for the support of the wife.' [citations omitted] We agree with this approach and consider it to be consistent with our earlier decisions in this area. Id. at 553-54. We reversed the superior court's decision to treat the interim support as a distribution of marital property, stating that the court provided no explanation for treating the interim support as a distribution of marital property. Id. at 554. Because Alaska law distinguishes between interim support payments and marital property, Billie's argument that the court should have considered these payments when distributing the marital property is rejected. [3]
Billie claims that the court erred in its valuation of the proceeds from the sale of the family residence. Billie and Virginia received $42,739 from the sale of the house. The court credited each of the parties with one-half of this amount. Billie alleges that this was a mistake, because he made three house payments from post-separation income in the amount of $6,889. He claims that the court should have subtracted $6,889 from the amount it credited Billie as having received from the sale. Virginia disagrees, arguing that these payments appear to have been made from the joint accounts, and the court was therefore correct in not including them in the marital estate. The transcript indicates that Billie made these payments in June, July and August of 1989. Because these payments were made after the date the court determined the parties were no longer a financial unit, and because the payments were made from Billie's own funds, on remand the court should consider whether he should be given credit for the payments he made and, if necessary, adjust the distribution of the property accordingly.
Billie claims that the court failed to equitably allocate the marital assets. Relying upon his arguments that the court failed to consider many marital assets and failed to consider his interim support payments, Billie argues that the court did not achieve its goal of giving thirty percent of the marital assets to Billie. In reality, Billie argues, he received less than zero percent of the marital assets. The court's decision reveals that it carefully considered the factors for determining an equitable division of marital assets which were set forth in Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 n. 4 (Alaska 1962). [4] As such, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the property. [5] We recognize, however, that the court may alter its disposition of the marital property after it takes into account the Subaru and the mortgage payments made by Billie.