Opinion ID: 489887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Foundations

Text: 20 Haynesworth charges that he was victimized by an unmerited prosecution, undertaken in retaliation for his refusal to surrender his right to challenge official misconduct in court. 75 He contends that this course of conduct violated the First and Fifth Amendments. 76 Appellees do not dispute that dismissal of criminal charges cannot constitutionally be predicated upon the putative defendant's willingness to release civil claims against public servants, nor do they contest Haynesworth's ability to challenge this sort of prosecution policy in a Bivens-type action. We agree that the retaliatory prosecution constitutes an actionable First Amendment wrong 77 redressable under Bivens, but we feel that some elaboration on this conclusion is in order. 21 The Supreme Court has recognized that, embedded in the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, 78 is entitlement to seek recompense in the courts. 79 We ourselves have recently concluded that initiation of a prosecution in order to impede the putative defendant's efforts to vindicate his claims against law enforcement officers inflicted an injury of constitutional dimension. 80 Even earlier, the practice of tying the initiation or maintenance of criminal charges to an arrestee's unwillingness to abandon claims against police had been perceived as a deprivation of First Amendment rights. In Dixon v. District of Columbia, 81 the Corporation Counsel admitted that an alleged traffic violator was prosecuted solely because he had persisted in pressing a complaint against the arresting officers. 82 The panel agreed unanimously that dismissal of the criminal information was appropriate. 83 Chief Judge Bazelon wrote separately on the constitutional implications of the retaliatory prosecution:Of course, prosecutors have broad discretion to press or drop charges. But there are limits.... The Government may not prosecute for the purpose of deterring people from exercising their right to protest official misconduct and petition for redress of grievances. 84 22 Several other circuits have joined in rejecting the practice challenged in Dixon. 85 23 We realize, of course, that not every attempt to associate dismissal of criminal charges with waiver of civil claims will amount to prosecutorial misconduct or a deprivation of constitutional prerogative. In Town of Newton v. Rumery, 86 the Supreme Court found a release-dismissal agreement to be valid and binding against the putative defendant in his subsequent Section 1983 action. 87 While acknowledging that in some cases [release-dismissal] agreements may infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and of society as a whole, a majority of the Court held that the mere possibility of overreaching should not invalidate the agreement at issue in the face of overwhelming evidence that the bargain was entered into voluntarily, and that the prosecutor acted reasonably and in pursuit of legitimate law enforcement goals. 88 Among the circumstances impressing the majority were that Rumery's own attorney drafted the release-dismissal agreement and counseled his client at length on its benefits and implications, and that the prosecutor's decision to seek a civil release was motivated in large part by his desire to insulate the key witness in a related felony prosecution from the need to testify at Rumery's criminal trial or in his civil suit. 89 24 The fact that circumstances may render release-dismissal agreements valid and enforceable does not in any way excuse the conduct alleged in this case. The circumstances attending the decision to press charges against Haynesworth strengthen his assertion that the decision to prosecute was motivated solely by the desire to prevent him from seeking judicial redress for alleged police misconduct; the Rumery Court in no wise intended to legalize such an abuse of prosecutorial power. 90 It does not appear, at least as yet, that pursuance of the release was motivated by any legitimate law enforcement objective, and it may be that there was no good reason for lodging the criminal charge against Haynesworth in the first place. The Rumery Court concluded that the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct should not invalidate release-dismissal agreements entered into voluntarily and in good faith; by the same logic, the possibility of meritorious release-dismissal agreements in suitable circumstances does not condone the prosecutorial overreaching and coercion alleged in Haynesworth's complaint. 25 In sum, we see no reason to retreat from the settled principle that it is patently unconstitutional to penaliz[e] those who choose to exercise constitutional rights. 91 We share the conviction of forerunning determinations that retaliatory prosecution unconstitutionally impinges on the right of access to the courts guaranteed by the First Amendment. Haynesworth alleged that he was charged with disorderly conduct solely because he refused to release his civil claims against the arresting officers. 92 That averment, we think, partakes from the circumstances enough substance to entitle him to proceed directly under the First Amendment for damages. 93 This conclusion parallels our holding in Dellums v. Powell, 94 that a Bivens action can be utilized by complainants asserting an infringement of their First Amendment right to petition Congress for redress of grievances. 95 That Haynesworth avers interference with his right to entreat the courts rather than the legislature does not weaken the Dellums rationale. 96 26