Opinion ID: 844271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions Regarding the Other Crimes Evidence

Text: The court gave this instruction at the close of evidence in the guilt phase: If you find the defendant committed a prior sexual offense or sexual offenses, you may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit the same or a similar type sexual offense. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer he was likely to commit and did commit the crime of which he's accused. (Italics added; see CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (6th ed. 1996).) It gave a similar instruction just before the prosecution introduced the testimony of Ramona M. and L.S. The court also instructed at the close of the evidence that the prosecution bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had committed the prior sexual offense and told the jury not to consider the evidence for any purpose unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had committed it. (See CALJIC No. 2.50.1 (6th ed. 1996).) The court did not further define preponderance of the evidence. (14) Defendant contends these instructions were erroneous in three respects. His main contention is that the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, including especially the language and did commit, erroneously told the jury it could convict him of Monique's murder based solely on the evidence of his previous sexual crimes. This error, he argues, violated the constitutional requirement that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution does, indeed, have to prove all necessary elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 5 [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 114 S.Ct. 1239]; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068].) As a matter of logic, evidence that a defendant committed a prior sexual crime, standing alone and supported by no evidence connecting the defendant to the charged crime, can never constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime. Accordingly, an obvious specific application of the general rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that a jury may not convict the defendant based solely on evidence of a prior sexual crime. (See People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1013 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601] ( Reliford ); People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 920, 923.) But, as we explain, the jury instructions as a whole did not violate this constitutional requirement. In Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1007, we rejected a similar challenge to an instruction that contained substantially the same language from CALJIC No. 2.50.01 that the court here used, including the language and did commit. But the overall instruction in Reliford differed from the one given here in a significant respect. The Reliford instruction included a sentence added in a 1999 revision to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 that postdated the trial of this case. Specifically, the challenged instruction in Reliford, but not the one here, was followed by this sentence: `[I]f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense ..., that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crime.' ( Reliford, supra, at p. 1013; see CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (1999 rev.) (6th ed. pocket pt.).) We must decide, therefore, whether the sentence added to the standard instruction in 1999 admonishing the jury that evidence of the prior sexual offense is not sufficient by itself to convict was critical; that is, whether the instruction was constitutionally deficient without it. Cases predating Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1007, that involved the pre-1999 version of the standard instruction, i.e., cases on point here, divided badly on this question. The cases arose in two different but functionally identical situations. Some involved evidence admitted under section 1108 and instructions similar to the one given here. Others involved equivalent instructions concerning evidence of domestic violence admitted under Evidence Code section 1109. (See CALJIC No. 2.50.02 (6th ed. 1996).) Because there is no material difference between CALJIC No. 2.50.01 and 2.50.02, cases decided with respect to these instructions areat least for present purposes interchangeable. ( People v. Escobar (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1097, fn. 7 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 696].) Some of the cases have found instructions similar to the one given here unconstitutional. ( People v. Frazier, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 34-40 [CALJIC No. 2.50.01]; People v. Younger (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1379-1385 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 624] [CALJIC No. 2.50.02]; People v. James, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1349-1365 [error, but harmless, to give CALJIC No. 2.50.02]; People v. Orellano (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 179, 184-186 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 866] [CALJIC No. 2.50.01]; People v. Vichroy (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 92, 98-101 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 105] [CALJIC No. 2.50.01]; Gibson v. Ortiz (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 812, 820-825 [CALJIC No. 2.50.01].) People v. Orellano provides a typical explanation. It noted that the trial court had also instructed the jury that it could not consider the evidence of the prior sexual offense for any purpose unless the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had committed the offense, and that the court had defined what preponderance of the evidence means. ( People v. Orellan, suprao, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 183 [citing CALJIC Nos. 2.50.1, 2.50.2].) The court then explained: In combination, CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 (pre-1999), 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 permitted the jury to find by a preponderance of evidence that appellant committed the prior crimes, to infer from such commission of the prior crimes that appellant had a disposition to commit such crimes, and to infer from such disposition that appellant `did commit' the charged crimes, without necessarily being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the charged crimes. If the jury followed these instructions literally and arrived at a guilty verdict in that manner, appellant was denied his due process right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the charged crimes. [Citations.] A `constitutional infirmity arises' because taken literally these instructions authorized a conviction of the current charges based `solely' upon a finding that appellant committed the prior crimes. ( People v. Vichroy, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99, 101.) In Vichroy the trial court did not instruct the jury about the preponderance of evidence standard for proof of the prior crimes. The appellate court found error because, even assuming the prior crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, `[w]e do not believe proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a basic fact, that appellant committed prior sexual offenses, may act as proxy or substitute for proof of the ultimate fact, i.e., appellant's guilt of the currently charged offenses.' ( Id. at p. 99.) The `constitutional infirmity' is even greater where, as here, the jury was also instructed that the prior crimes need only be proved by a preponderance of evidence. ( People v. Orellano, supra, at pp. 184-185.) Other cases, although sometimes recognizing that the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 could be improved, have held that it (or the comparable instructions regarding evidence of domestic violence) did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. ( People v. Jeffries (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 15, 21-25 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 903] [CALJIC No. 2.50.01]; People v. Escobar, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1097-1102 [CALJIC No. 2.50.02]; People v. Waples (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1396-1398 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 45] [CALJIC No. 2.50.01]; People v. O'Neal (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1076-1079 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 248] [CALJIC No. 2.50.01]; People v. Regalado (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060-1063 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 83] [CALJIC No. 2.50.01]; People v. Van Winkle (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 133, 139-149 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 28] [CALJIC No. 2.50.01].) At least under the facts and overall instructions of this case, we believe the cases finding no constitutional infirmity in the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (or No. 2.50.02) have the better view. It is no doubt useful to admonish the jury specifically that evidence of the prior sexual offense alone is not sufficient to convict, as the current standard instructions do. (CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (7th ed. 2003); CALCRIM No. 1191.) But doing so is not critical. [O]mission of the admonishment is not fatal to the instruction that was given. ( People v. Regalado, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.) The Regalado court made the point rather colorfully but, we believe, correctly, when it said that the CALJIC committee, by adding the admonishment, added air bags to an instruction already equipped with seat belts. ( People v. Regalado, supra, at p. 1060, fn. 2.) (15) Although our opinion in Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1007, relied in part on the admonition that was not given in this case to uphold the instructions of that case, its analysis is relevant here. We explained that a reviewing court must consider the instructions as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instructions in an unconstitutional manner. ( Id. at p. 1013.) As applied to the issue here, we must determine whether it is reasonably likely the jury understood the instructions as a whole to mean it could convict defendant of Monique's murder based solely on the evidence of the prior sexual offenses. But, as in Reliford, the instructions never told the jury it may rest a conviction solely on evidence of prior offenses. ( Ibid. ) We concluded that, because of the instructions the jury heard concerning the reasonable doubt standard of proof, [n]o reasonable juror would believe those requirements could be satisfied solely by proof of uncharged offenses. ( Id. at pp. 1013-1014.) Indeed, we said, the concept that proof of the prior crime is not enough to convict is a `truism,' and that basing a conviction solely on uncharged conduct is `a logical impossibility.' ( Id. at p. 1014.) Specifically, we said it is not possible to find each element of the charged crimes, as the jury was instructed to do before returning a guilty verdict, based solely on the [prior] offense. Nor is it possible to find a union or joint operation of act or conduct and the requisite intent for each charged crime, as the jury was also instructed to do. Hence, no reasonable jury could have been misled in this regard. ( Id. at p. 1015.) The O'Neal court pointed out that the defendant urges us to read the instruction as if it had said: `If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer solely from this evidence of a prior sexual offense that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime[s] of which he is presently accused.' We think this is a strained and untenable reading of CALJIC No. 2.50.01. In order to make this inference, a juror would have to conclude that a defendant could be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the currently charged crime even if no evidence whatsoever had been presented to prove the elements of the charged offense. ( People v. O'Neal, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.) Indeed, such a reading of the instruction would mean that any sex offender could be convicted of every sexual crime committed anywhere in California even if no evidence whatever connected the defendant with any of those crimesan obviously absurd proposition. The instruction merely told the jury it could infer from defendant's prior sexual crimes that he committed the charged crime. It did not say such an inference itself constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was also instructed that an inference is a deduction of fact that can logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence. (See People v. Jeffries, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 22 [quoting a similar instruction].) But a logical deduction is not the same as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. No reasonable jury would assume that this inference, i.e., this logical deduction, substituted for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions given provide only that an inference of guilt may be drawn from prior offenses that have been proved by a preponderance of evidence. They do not suggest that an inference so drawn is sufficient for a finding of guilt. ( Id. at p. 23.) The jury still had to find that the facts of the charged crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at pp. 23-24.) Reviewing the instructions in this case as a whole bolsters this conclusion. The jury was told to consider the instructions as a whole and, as noted, were told what an inference is. Additionally, the court instructed repetitively and in detail on the reasonable doubt standard. It repeated again and again, both in general and in stating the elements of the charged crime and special circumstance, as well as the lesser included offense of second degree murder, that the prosecution bore the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury must give defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt at every step of the way. As in Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 1013, the court also instructed the jury there had to be a union or joint operation of act or conduct and the required intent. Additionally, nothing in the arguments of counsel suggested the jury could convict defendant of Monique's murder solely because of the prior sexual offenses. Indeed, even the prosecutor began her argument by emphasizing the reasonable doubt standard. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel discussed all of the evidence in detail, including, but far from limited to, the prior sexual offenses. Reviewing the overall instructions and arguments of counsel, we, like the Regalado court, are convinced the jurors would have realized that disposition evidence, while probative of defendant's guilt, must be assessed along with all the other evidence to determine whether every element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] They need not have been legal scholars to do so. They knew [defendant] was not charged with the [prior offense]. Reasonably intelligent people wouldon the instructions given heremerely have put the prior offense into the deliberative mix as a factor to be considered. They would not have stopped after evaluating the prior and started signing verdict forms.... ( People v. Regalado, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1062-1063.) For these reasons, we find no reasonable likelihood the jury would view the instructions as permitting it to find defendant guilty of Monique's murder based solely on his prior sexual offenses. ( Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1013.) Defendant also argues that the instructions allowed him to be convicted based on the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to the predisposition evidence, rather than on the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. We disagree. The court merely told the jury it could not consider the evidence of the prior sexual crimes for any purpose unless it found he had committed them by a preponderance of the evidence. Nothing in that instruction canceled the reasonable doubt instructions the jury also received. We do not find it reasonably likely a jury could interpret the instructions to authorize conviction of the charged offenses based on a lowered standard of proof. Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense.... The instructions instead explained that, in all other respects, the People had the burden of proving defendant guilty `beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1016; see also People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 383 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708] [rejecting a similar argument].) Defendant finally contends the court erred in not defining preponderance of the evidence. Because the court told the jury it could not consider the evidence of the prior sexual offenses for any purpose unless it found he committed them by a preponderance of the evidence, it probably would have been better for the court to define the term, although it is unlikely the jury would have interpreted the term as imposing an even lighter burden of proof than it actually does. But the jury could not have been confused in any way prejudicial to defendant. He had been convicted of the prior sexual offenses, so the evidence that he committed them clearly satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard. In short, although the instructions regarding the prior sexual offenses could have been better, they did not mislead the jury in any fashion prejudicial to defendant.