Opinion ID: 1772583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Validity of Resolution 1119-81

Text: The decision by an appropriate body to undertake a redevelopment project is legislative in character and must be upheld by the courts unless it is shown that the decision was the result of arbitrary and capricious action or was induced by fraud or was made in bad faith. Housing Authority of Roosevelt City v. Nunn, 292 Ala. 60, 288 So.2d 775, 776-77 (1974). The trial court found that the data compiled by the Community Development Department and provided to the city council in the proposed resolution were either false or so out of context so as to be materially misleading. The court concluded that the city's employees intentionally misled the City Council as to the conditions on Block 60. As a separate and independent ground for its decision, the court also found that the resolution was arbitrarily and capriciously adopted. We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the resolution was induced by fraud. It does appear that the city employees charged with collecting data and drawing up the proposed resolution presented the data in a manner calculated to make the condition of the buildings appear as poor as possible. Even if we accept the trial court's premise that the description of the buildings in the proposed resolution was misleading, however, we cannot accept its conclusion that the resolution was induced by fraud. Both the chronology of the events leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1119-81 and the ample availability of information about the true conditions on the block from a wide variety of other sources belie the conclusion that the resolution was fraudulently induced by the misleading representations made by the city's employees. Two years before Resolution 1119-81 was adopted, a Community Renewal Plan, which included Block 60 within the area targeted for revitalization, was passed. Four months before the adoption of Resolution 1119-81 the City Council approved the Master Plan, which provided for the redevelopment of Block 60. It was after the Master Plan, calling for the redevelopment of Block 60, was adopted by the City Council that the data in question were gathered. Coming as they did, after approval of the Master Plan, it does not seem reasonable to conclude that the alleged misrepresentations induced the City Council's adoption of the resolution. It appears that the decision to redevelop Block 60 had, in large part, already been made when the alleged misrepresentations occurred. The impact of the city's data on the Council's ultimate decision must, we think, be viewed within the context of the other information available to the Council about the conditions on the block. The proposed redevelopment of Block 60 was an issue of considerable public debate in Birmingham. There was a great deal of attention devoted by the local media to the question of the redevelopment of Block 60 in general and to the question of locating a hotel on the east half of the block in particular. Block 60 is in a central location and it contained numerous businesses, with which anyone working in the downtown area, including members of the City Council, would probably have been familiar. Interested parties, including the plaintiff, presented testimony to the council about the block. Given the intense public debate associated with the redevelopment project, the highly visible location of the property, and the abundance of information about the true conditions on Block 60 available to the Council from numerous and diverse sources, it was purely conjecture on the trial court's part to conclude that the allegedly misleading data supplied by the community development department induced the adoption of the resolution. It does not appear that the City Council acted fraudulently or in bad faith in adopting Resolution 1119-81. The Council did not, for instance, use the redevelopment statute as a pretext to oust some unpopular landowner or to benefit some private party. There was no evidence suggesting that the adoption of the resolution was not motivated by a desire to further the public good. The trial court also found that the City Council's adoption of the resolution was arbitrary and capricious. In so finding, the court applied the fairly debatable standard as set out in Jefferson County v. O'Rorke, 394 So.2d 937, 938 (Ala.1981), and City of Birmingham v. Morris, 396 So.2d 53, 55 (Ala.1981). Under that standard, the City Council's decision to redevelop Block 60 should not have been interfered with by the courts so long as it was based on a fairly debatable rationale. The courts are, of course, required to be more than rubber stamps for the city governments. Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112, at 120, 335 N.E.2d 327, at 333 (1975). The statute sets out the factors to be considered and it is the court's role to insure that the city's decision took into account a consideration of those factors. City of Phoenix v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 137 Ariz. 409, 671 P.2d 387, 391 (1983). Section 24-2-2(1), Code of Alabama 1975, empowers cities to carry out redevelopment projects by acquiring blighted areas. Blighted areas are defined as areas, including slum areas, with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community. Section 24-2-2(1). Using the fairly debatable standard to test the validity of the resolution under § 24-2-2(1), the resolution was valid if it was fairly debatable that Block 60 either (1) was a slum or (2) exhibited any combination of the blighting factors enumerated in the statute and that, as a result of the presence of those factors, the block was detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community. In addition to the power to acquire blighted areas under § 24-2-2(1), § 24-2-2(2) empowers cities to acquire other real property for the purpose of removing, preventing, or reducing blight, blighting factors or the causes of blight. Section 24-2-2(2). Adoption of the resolution was justifiable under § 24-2-2(2), therefore, if redeveloping Block 60 would remove, prevent, or reduce blight, blighting factors, or the causes of blight. Block 60 was clearly not a slum. Blankenship v. City of Decatur, 269 Ala. 670, 675, 115 So.2d 459, 463 (1959), describes slums as gathering places of filth, lust, crime, disease and degeneracy where people gather under the lowest possible standards of living, crowded together in dilapidated hovels which are unsafe, unsanitary and unhealthful in a sordid atmosphere in which disease is spread; and where offspring born in such conditions are damned, from the day of their arrival in this world, to the life of their fathers. Block 60 contained structures built during the early part of this century. [2] By contemporary standards they were not laid-out well. They were buildings of only a few stories which typically covered all or nearly all of their lots and housed primarily ground-level types of businesses. Their very low floor-area ratio and the decline in use of their upper floors generally amounted to an underutilization of the block in comparison to those blocks in the core area of downtown which contained more modern structures. Since the buildings were built prior to the proliferation of the automobile, no provisions were made for parking except on the street and on one lot where a building had been demolished. Most of the buildings had multiple violations of various building, plumbing, and fire codes. The violations were, for the most part, however, minor problems which could be corrected by regular maintenance and which posed no significant fire or health hazards. In short, as one of the city's inspectors pointed out, Block 60 was typical of much of downtown Birmingham. Block 60 was distinguished not so much by its condition as by its location. Being in the center of the downtown area and being in the midst of new high-rise office buildings made it an ideal location for new construction. Furthermore, since the block was owned by twenty-two separate owners, acquisition of the block by private developers without governmental assistance would have been more difficult than it would have been had there been fewer owners. Although it was not a slum, Block 60 clearly exhibited several of the factors of blight enumerated in the statute, such as obsolescence, faulty arrangement or design, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use, and obsolete layout. Although the statute does not specifically mention diversity of ownership as a factor of blight, the statute provides that if any combination of the listed factors or other factors are detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community the property may be redeveloped. If it inhibits needed redevelopment, diversity of land ownership may be considered a blighting factor. See Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal.App.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954); Stahl v. Board of Finance, 62 N.J. Super. 562, 163 A.2d 396 (1960); Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgewater, 57 N.J. 506, 274 A.2d 1, 45 A.L.R.3d 1054 (1971). Even though the statute is not limited to slum areas, the other cases before this Court dealing with the renewal and redevelopment statutes have all involved areas which could fairly be described as slums. In Housing Authority of Roosevelt City v. Nunn, 292 Ala. 60, 288 So.2d 775 (1974), the evidence showed that in the area of the proposed redevelopment there were cesspools, there were several abandoned homes, there were outhouses, and that livestock was kept within the area. In Blankenship v. City of Decatur, 269 Ala. 670, 675, 115 So.2d 459, 463 (1959), the Court concluded from the pictures in evidence and the testimony that there was no question that most of the territory was a slum area. Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham, 239 Ala. 280, 282, 195 So. 256, 257 (1940), does not discuss the condition of the structures in question. It does, however, refer to `slum districts' or quarters. Applying the redevelopment statutes to the facts of this case, and using the fairly debatable standard, we opine that there are at least three grounds on which the City Council's adoption of the resolution can be justified. First, Block 60 is part of a larger area which is blighted. The city's conclusion that the redevelopment of Block 60 as a part of the redevelopment of the downtown area would reduce blight in other areas of downtown Birmingham provided a justification for the resolution under § 24-2-2(1). Second, notwithstanding the question whether Block 60 is blighted, as that term is defined in § 24-2-2(1), factors of blight clearly existed on Block 60 and it was fairly debatable whether the block was in a deteriorating condition. The redevelopment was justified, therefore, under § 24-2-2(2) on the basis that the redevelopment of the block would prevent or reduce blighting factors or the causes of blight. Finally, there was a reasonable basis for the City Council to find that the buildings on Block 60 were obsolete, underutilized, and in the process of becoming blighted. Although Block 60 posed no direct threat to the health, safety, or morals of the community, it did exhibit several indicia of blight which the City Council could have found were detrimental to the welfare of the community within the meaning of § 24-2-2(1). Even if Block 60 was not blighted, it was part of a larger blighted area which was being redeveloped. A comprehensive plan aimed at eliminating blight in downtown Birmingham and at revitalizing the area was devised after careful study of the downtown area. The consensus opinion of the consultants participating in the studies culminating in the Master Plan was that the entire downtown area contained elements of blight which needed to be addressed and corrected and that the redevelopment of Block 60, along with the other downtown redevelopment, was consistent with the goals and objectives of the Master Plan. It is the condition of the entire redevelopment area as a whole, not the condition of the plaintiff's property, which determines whether redevelopment is warranted under the urban renewal and redevelopment laws. Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837 (1958); Crawford v. Redevelopment Authority, 418 Pa. 549, 211 A.2d 866, 869 (1965); Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699 (1959). The mere fact that some of the buildings in a redevelopment area are substantial and standard does not require their exclusion from the project. Blankenship v. City of Decatur, 269 Ala. 670, 115 So.2d 459, 463 (1959). Since the downtown area as a whole was blighted, it was proper to include Block 60 in the redevelopment of downtown Birmingham if it was reasonably necessary to do so in order to carry out the redevelopment plan, even if Block 60 itself could not properly have been considered blighted. The city's decision to redevelop Block 60 could also be justified on the basis that it was necessary to redevelop Block 60 in order to prevent it from becoming blighted. There was ample evidence to support the conclusion that elements of blight existed on Block 60. Section 24-2-2(2) authorizes the acquisition of property to remove or reduce blighting factors. Urban renewal and redevelopment statutes are not limited to perceptually offensive slums. Levin, supra, 57 N.J. 506, 274 A.2d 1, 18 (1971). Once the process of blighting begins, cities may redevelop deteriorating areas in order to arrest the spread of blight and to prevent blight from occurring. Finally, the City Council was justified in deciding that redevelopment was necessary because the presence of the blighting factors on Block 60 were detrimental to the general welfare of the community within the meaning of § 24-2-2(1). There is no doubt that the underutilization of property in the core of the downtown area is detrimental to the welfare of the community in the broad sense of the term welfare. Community redevelopment is an integral part of modern municipal government. Soundly planned redevelopment can make the difference between economic stagnation and a resurgence of healthy growth. Levin, supra, 57 N.J. at 540, 274 A.2d at 19-20. We are aware that some courts have ruled (or have suggested) that redevelopment statutes cannot constitutionally be used to condemn property which poses no direct threat to public health, safety, or morals. See Apostle v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 59, 422 P.2d 289, 292 (1966); Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of City of Tampa, 115 So.2d 745, 750 (Fla.1959); Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 70 Cal.App.3d 968, 139 Cal.Rptr. 196, 204-05 (1977); Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F.Supp. 705, 719-720 (D.D.C.1953). These cases were decided by courts which take a narrow view of what constitutes a public use for purposes of eminent domain, however. This Court has stated that the term public use should be given an elastic or liberal interpretation. Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham, 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256 (1940). The role of the judiciary in determining whether the legislature is exercising its power for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). Courts should not determine whether a particular urban renewal or redevelopment project is desirable. The desirability of a particular urban renewal project is a political question which, by its nature, is better suited to legislative than judicial determination. Brammer, supra; Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Mo.1976); City of Phoenix v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 137 Ariz. 409, 671 P.2d 387, 390-91 (1983). We opine that the City of Birmingham did not exceed its authority in adopting Resolution 1119-81 and that the resolution was valid and lawful. The trial court's decision regarding the validity of the resolution, the judgment based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the award of attorney's fees under § 1988 are hereby reversed. During the course of the trial it became apparent that the city had failed to fully respond to the plaintiff's requests for production of documents. Without advising the plaintiff or the court, and without seeking a protective order, the city unilaterally decided that certain documents were privileged and withheld those and other documents which, even under its own interpretation of the request for production, should have been produced. On the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, the trial court awarded the plaintiff and its attorney $7,175.00 to compensate for attorney's fees incurred as a result of the city's failure to comply with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The order on the motion for sanctions is hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. MADDOX, JONES, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur. TORBERT, C.J., and EMBRY, J., dissent. ALMON, J., not sitting.