Opinion ID: 352547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Introduction of Depositions From a Civil Trial.

Text: 78 Pro se counsel persists in the claim that it was improper to allow the introduction of some depositions from a civil trial in Maryland. The case was Civil Action No. 20001, Vecchiarello & Maturo v. Eisner, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Rockville, Maryland, October 27, 1969 (Tr. 689). There were depositions of Maturo (Tr. 689-697) and L. P. (Luigi Peter) Vecchiarello (Tr. 697-700). These depositions tended generally to prove that both men admitted they could not recall the names of the professors in the medical subjects they allegedly took at the Universities of Guadalajara and Yucatan respectively. Also, Maturo generally could not remember what courses he took in medical school or the name of the textbook used. Nor could he remember any person he lived with while allegedly attending school there or the names of any students who started out in (his) class (Tr. 696). He was also unable to translate his diploma which was in Spanish, though the examinations at the medical college were all in Spanish (Tr. 696-697). Counsel contends that the introduction of such depositions violated (1) the deponent's Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination, (2) their right not to have their character attacked when they had not placed their character in issue, and (3) their Miranda rights. Such contentions are all groundless. 79 The Fifth Amendment is based on the ancient maxim that no man is bound to accuse himself. It protects one's personal privacy from unwarranted intrusion. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415, 416, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). Had Maturo or Vecchiarello wanted to claim their privilege in the civil trial, they should have done so. When they failed to do so their testimony is in the public domain. Likewise, there was no violation of the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Miranda prohibits police interrogation, without proper warning, i. e., custodial interrogation . . . questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added). The depositions used here were taken on October 27, 1969 before a Special Master by the lawyers for the defendant in the civil action. No police interrogation was involved. The depositions do not constitute custodial interrogation. Maturo and L. Vecchiarello were present when the deposition was taken, they were represented by counsel throughout, and they did not object to the interrogation. This is significant because when a prior deposition of the same parties was taken in the same civil case on July 18, 1969, with the same lawyers appearing for the two deponents as those who appeared for them at the October 27, 1969 deposition, the defendants, through their counsel, did frequently claim their privilege against self-incrimination when they were asked questions along similar lines directed at verifying whether they had the medical training necessary to qualify as medical practitioners. Under such circumstances, the failure to claim their Fifth Amendment rights at the second deposition, part of which was read at their criminal trial, cannot be treated as other than a voluntary, knowing waiver. 80 The claim that the admission of the deposition material constituted an impermissible attack on the character of appellants, since they had not placed their character in issue by taking the witness stand in the criminal trial, misconstrues that rule and the ground upon which the depositions were admitted into evidence. 81 The depositions were admitted because they constituted substantive evidence on a principal issue in the case: that the defendants had committed the fraudulent acts with which they were charged by holding themselves out as duly qualified medical doctors, with M.D. degrees, when they were not. That the sworn testimony of Maturo and Louis Vecchiarello in the depositions was probative of such charges qualified the depositions for admission, and the fact that secondarily such proof of illegal and fraudulent conduct by the defendants would tend to disparage their character does not deprive the evidence of its admissible character. Actually, all proof of illegal conduct tends to disparage the character of individuals, if they were previously considered to have good character. Such evidence generally is admissible if it satisfies any of the many valid grounds for admission. This is the rule of multiple admissibility. It is a fundamental rule and we believe it applies to the facts of this case. Professor Wigmore states the rule to be as follows: 82 (W)hen an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose, and becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in that capacity, it is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some other capacity and because the jury might consider it in the other capacity. 83 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 13, p. 300 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original). Like all rules, there are exceptions and qualifications to this rule; but we find none that are applicable here. 84 At the time this case was tried in June, 1970, the admission of evidence in a criminal trial was governed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 26. This Rule provided: 85 Rule 26. Evidence . . . . The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 86 Fed.R.Crim.P. 26, as amended to July 1, 1968; 18 U.S.C. p. 3756 (1964 ed.). 5 Applying this rule to the evidence in the instant case leads to the conclusion that the portions of the sworn depositions of Louis P. Vecchiarello and Maturo 6 that were here introduced constituted admissions against interest, and, as such, were properly admitted as substantive evidence. 7 87 We have also considered all the other minor points raised by appellants and find them all to be insubstantial. In general, appellants' claims are completely frivolous and not based on sound theory or proven fact.