Opinion ID: 1689155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ordering the july 12 & 14 depositions to go forward.

Text: ¶ 14. Illinois Central contends that there was an egregious abuse of the discovery process, in that the heirs had only deposed two Illinois Central employees in the previous twenty-one months of discovery, prior to noticing the thirteen executives one week before the discovery deadline. Illinois Central argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying its motion for a protective order under Rule 26(d). Illinois Central further argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by ignoring the voluminous logistics of preparing for six different depositions on one day in Chicago, then two days later, preparing for six more depositions in Jackson. ¶ 15. We have on many occasions followed the reasoning of federal courts in interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the rules implicated are identical to our rules, and where this Court has not dealt with the specific issue raised. It is well known that our Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure were copied from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and we construe ours as the Federal courts construe the federal rules. Nichols v. Tubb, 609 So.2d 377, 383 (Miss.1992). ¶ 16. In Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control, Inc ., we stated the following with regard to discovery: (d) while the importance of the information must be weighed against the hardships and cost of production and its availability through other means, it is preferable for the court to impose partial limitations on discovery rather than an outright denial. Any record which indicates a failure to give adequate consideration to these concepts is subject to the attack of abuse of discretion, regardless of the fact that the order shows no such abuse on its face. Dawkins, 607 So.2d at 1236 (citing 23 Am. Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery, § 5 (1983))(emphasis added). ¶ 17. Pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. Miss. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1)(emphasis added). [2] Unfortunately, the rules fail to give any guidance as to what is reasonable, neither does it appear that this Court has specifically addressed this issue. Fortunately, federal courts interpreting the federal rules have given some insights as to what is, and is not, reasonable notice. In Hart v. United States, 772 F.2d 285, 286 (6th Cir.1985), the Sixth Circuit stated: The rules do not require any particular number of days, so that reasonableness may depend on the particular circumstances. ¶ 18. In C & F Packing Co., v. Doskocil Cos., Inc., 126 F.R.D. 662, 678 (N.D.Ill. 1989), the district court held that the party seeking deposition failed to give reasonable notice to opposing counsel. In that case, there was a factual dispute as to how much notice the deponent had, but it appeared to be either a couple of days or only a few hours. Id. The court held: Under these circumstances, the only reasonable notice would have consisted of both written notice and oral notice accompanied by a good faith effort to schedule the deposition at a mutually convenient time. Id. (emphasis added). As another district court has said: It is an accepted practice ... for attorneys to make an effort to agree among themselves on the arrangements for the taking of depositions before resorting to the giving of formal notice. This enables them to make arrangements that will suit the convenience of all interested parties. It is a very commendable procedure and one that should be encouraged. Warning Lites Co. v. Leggitt, 32 F.R.D. 431, 433 (W.D.Tex.1963). ¶ 19. In Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 430 F.Supp. 25, 26 (E.D.Tenn.1976), a district court in Tennessee quashed depositions for which the defendant had served notice on attorneys in Chattanooga, Tennessee and Washington, D.C. just before the start of the Memorial Day weekend, even though the depositions were to be taken the following Tuesday in Los Angeles, California. The district court held that giving only two working days notice was patently unreasonable in absence of any special need for haste. Id. The court further ordered the parties to engage in a telephone conference and undertake to agree orally upon a reasonable time for the taking of the depositions heretofore noticed. Id. See also Federal Aviation Admin. v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 634-35 (2d Cir.1983)(in which the court approved four days' notice for an out-of-town deposition); Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., 21 F.R.D. 113, 115 (N.D.Ill.1957)(in which the court approved written notice one day in advance for a deposition in Oslo, Norway, where both counsel were already in Oslo). But see Mims v. Central Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.1949)(holding that where on October 2, the party noticed the taking of 15 depositions on October 6, 1948, and one in New York on October 9, 1948, of witnesses in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, St. Louis, Alliance, Ohio, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Birmingham and Dallas, it was not reasonable notice). ¶ 20. In the case sub judice, the first time the heirs noticed the depositions, they did so with only three business days before the first six depositions would take place, and five business days before the next seven depositions would take place. The second time the heirs noticed the depositions, they did so with only ten business days before the first six depositions would take place, and twelve business days before the second six depositions would take place. However, these ten and twelve business days included the Fourth of July holiday break, so in effect, the notice was more like eight days. When the heirs noticed the depositions on June 23, there is no indication in the record that they first consulted with Illinois Central in order to select dates and places convenient to both parties. In their motion to extend deposition deadline for three weeks, also filed June 23, it states, it likely would be more convenient for all concerned to re-scheduled them at some mutually convenient time within the three-week period immediately following the present deadline of July 1st. (emphasis added) There is no indication in the record that the heirs discussed a mutually convenient time with Illinois Central before they renoticed the executives on June 28. However, the heirs clearly offered to do so after they noticed the executives, as this following statement on the fax cover sheet demonstrates: Per directions by Judge Lewis, we have re-noticed the subject depositions for July 12 and July 14. Should these dates cause any hardship to you or ... [Illinois Central's] named employees, please let us know promptly and we will be glad to consider any alternative dates you propose within the framework set by Judge Lewis. Illinois Central apparently did not respond to the heirs' offer to suggest alternative dates. ¶ 21. In their response to Illinois Central's motion for protective order, the heirs seem to reveal the real motive for noticing so many depositions, so close together, with such short notice, at the end of the discovery period: The central reason for the absolute lather that the Defendants seemingly now find themselves is revealed in the Conclusion to their brief: they aren't being allowed to engage in preparation time with their witnesses before the depositions. Plaintiffs would simply remind the Court of what the Court already knows from its own experience: spontaneous, unrehearsed testimony is more likely to contain the real truth than is testimony of the drilled, practiced and parroted variety. Why do any of the railroad's witnesses need to be prepared? Why can't they just be placed under oath and asked what they know about certain subjects before preparation? [3] ¶ 22. We find this discovery tactic employed by the heirs deplorable, not in keeping with the purpose of the discovery rules, and an abuse of the discovery process. As this Court has said: Rules of discovery are to prevent trial by ambush. Nichols, 609 So.2d at 384. What the heirs apparently were attempting to do was in effect, deposition by ambush, and we condemn this practice. ¶ 23. In C & F Packing, the district court said, counsel is entitled, when possible, to a date which does not conflict with other obligations and to an opportunity to prepare for the deposition. (Indeed, it may have been precisely a desire to prevent such preparation that created C & F's urgency.) C & F Packing, 126 F.R.D. at 679 (emphasis added). It seems that the heirs had a similar desire to prevent such preparation. ¶ 24. In their motion to extend the deposition deadline, the heirs stated that they had just discovered the identities of various individuals employed by Illinois Central who had held critical positions with the company at the time of the accident. In its motion for protective order and motion to reconsider extension of discovery, Illinois Central demonstrates this assertion by the heirs is either blatantly false or grossly misleading. First, it must be remembered that discovery had already been conducted for a period of over twenty-one months. Second, six of the executives noticed had been listed as persons with discoverable knowledge in Illinois Central's answers to interrogatories, anywhere from eight months to three and one-half years previously. Finally, the remaining six employees are either present or former chief corporate officers of Illinois Central, and their identities, as is true for any corporate officer, are a matter of public record which could have been easily learned at an earlier date through a minor investigation, or written discovery. We agree that the most plausible explanation for the heirs deposing only two Illinois Central employees during twenty-one months of discovery, then attempting to depose twelve or thirteen on the final week, was a discovery tactic intended to not allow Illinois Central the time to properly prepare for the depositions. ¶ 25. As the previously cited federal cases indicate, in order to facilitate discovery, the court should use its authority to stress the importance of, and encourage, the parties to find mutually convenient times to conduct depositions. It is disputed whether the trial court attempted to get the parties to agree to schedule the depositions at a mutually convenient time prior to ordering the depositions to go forward. In its response to Illinois Central's petition for writ of mandamus, the circuit court stated: The Defendants would not discuss an agreed time to extend the discovery deadline or schedule the depositions when Judge Lewis requested the same from the parties in the telephone conversation on June 28, 1999.... Judge Lewis' Order of July 9, 1999 was faxed to all parties at about 5:30 p.m. on Friday evening. Judge Lewis did not receive any telephone messages, e-mail or fax concerning the July 9, 1999 order on July 9, 10, 11, or 12th advising that Defendants could not physically conduct the depositions and/or requesting additional time to schedule the depositions. Subsequently, two (2) business days after the date in which the Defendants were to appear for depositions the Court received a letter dated July 13, 1999 ... and a motion to reconsider the July 9, 1999 Order. ¶ 26. Illinois Central argues that there are two significant inaccuracies in the preceding recitation of facts. First, Illinois Central taped the telephone conference of June 28, and produced a transcript of the conversation for the record. In that transcript there was no indication that Illinois Central was asked by the circuit court to discuss the extension of discovery or the scheduling of the depositions. Second, Illinois Central's motion for reconsideration of the July 9 order was dated July 12, 1999, and stamped by the clerk of the court as filed on July 12, in the p.m, not July 13, as the trial judge had claimed. Incidently, Monday, July 12, was the first day Illinois Central would have been able to file a motion for reconsideration, since the order was not delivered until 5:30 p.m. on Friday, and of course, the courthouse is closed on the weekend. ¶ 27. We conclude that under the unique facts and circumstances of this case, notice was not reasonable. In so concluding, we are not saying that notice of eight days is presumptively unreasonable. We could foresee a situation where notice of less than one day, or a few hours, might be reasonable, because of exigent circumstances. We are also not saying that noticing twelve deponents over a three-day period is presumptively unreasonable. However, except under the most exceptional circumstances, and with the agreement of both parties, scheduling six depositions, in a single day is not reasonable. ¶ 28. We conclude that under the facts of this case, where a party notices six deponents for one day, twice in a three-day period, in cities 700 miles apart, with only eight days' notice, in the last week of a twenty-one month discovery period, apparently with the purpose of catching the opposing party unprepared, then notice is unreasonable. ¶ 29. As the rules of procedure state: These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Miss. R. Civ. P. 1. As the official comment explains: There probably is no provision in these rules more important than this mandate: It reflects the spirit in which the rules were conceived and written and in which they should be interpreted. The primary purpose of procedural rules should be to promote the ends of justice; ... [through] a simplified procedure that minimizes technicalities and places considerable discretion in the trial judge for construing the rules in a manner that will secure their objectives. Miss. R. Civ. P. 1 cmt. ¶ 30. As the comment says, the primary purpose of the procedural rules is promote the ends of justice, and the trial judge is given considerable discretion to effect this purpose. We are concerned as to whether justice was promoted by extending discovery for three weeks, in this case, so the heirs could depose twelve high-level Illinois Central executives, even though there was a dubious showing of good cause, and no showing of excusable neglect. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the heirs' failure to notice the depositions of the executives until the last week of discovery was not merely a discovery tactic, it would clearly be a lack of due diligence. The heirs knew or should have known the identity of these individuals at least eight months prior. The heirs proffered good cause for extending discovery was, at the least, grossly misleading. ¶ 31. We are further troubled that, on July 7, the trial court scheduled a hearing for August 25, for the purpose of hearing Illinois Central's motion for protective order and motion to reconsider extending discovery. Then two days later, on July 9, without benefit of the hearing, the judge denied the motions and ordered the depositions to go forward the following week. The court's reasons for ruling on the matter, without the benefit of a hearing, was the court's schedule and the scheduling of the depositions. We are also concerned about the trial court issuing an order at 5:30 p.m. on Friday, after the courthouse is closed, that was not appealable because Illinois Central would be in contempt before the court house reopened on Monday. While we are cognizant of the fact that the trial date of October 4, 1999, [4] was near, it was the heirs who requested an extension of discovery, either as a discovery tactic or from a lack of due diligence. This would seem to warrant that Illinois Central should not be penalized because of the shortness of time, because it was not the source of the time problem. ¶ 32. Under the circumstances discussed above, we conclude that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying Illinois Central's motion for protective order and ordering the depositions to go forward. However, that does not necessarily relieve Illinois Central of its duty to make a good-faith effort to comply with the order. As this Court has explained: The person who disobeys the order of a court of general jurisdiction does so at his peril. It is no answer that the order was improvidently or erroneously granted. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice s 668 (2d ed.1950). If a party could disobey a decree by a court of general jurisdiction, and defend on the ground that in his opinion the decree was erroneous, appellees would be constitutionally free to ignore all of the procedures of the law and respect for judicial process. Appellees could not bypass orderly judicial review of the injunction by disobeying it. Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of America, 206 So.2d 171, 183 (Miss.1967). See also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458, 95 S.Ct. 584, 591, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975)(holding that orders of courts must be complied with promptly, and absent a stay, party who refuse to obey an order, even if it is ultimately ruled incorrect, risk being held in contempt).