Opinion ID: 185465
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Essential State Policy in Adjudicating Criminality

Text: 23 Preventing and punishing criminality are essential governmental policies. The Supreme Court has recognized that preventing crime is a compelling governmental interest. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987). This interest lies not just in incapacitating dangerous criminals, but also in demonstrating that transgressions of society's prohibitions will be met with an appropriate response by punishing offenders. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). The Court has repeatedly adverted to the government's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986); accord Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1343 (2001); Gray v. Mary land, 523 U.S. 185, 202 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987); Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 24 The Court in Riggins recognized the strength of the government's policy in adjudicating criminality when it stated that the government might be able to involuntarily medicate a defendant if it could not obtain an adjudication of guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means, 504 U.S. at 135, and when it cited Justice Brennan's statement that Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace, id. at 135-36 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). We do not believe the Court's use of might reflects any tentativeness about whether the government could ever justify medicating to restore competence to stand trial. If that were what the Court had in mind we doubt that it would have included the statement. We read might, rather, as indicating that the interest in adjudicating criminality is not necessarily an essential state policy under all circumstances. Cf. Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960-61 (no compelling interest in trying man accused of sending a threatening letter; factors relevant to this determination include seriousness of the offense, whether the pretrial detainee is dangerous, and whether the detainee will be released if not tried); Khiem, 612 A.2d at 176 & n.1 (Ferren, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (Whereas the District may have a compelling state interest in force-medicating Khiem [to try him for murder], the District will not necessarily have such an interest in forcemedicating pretrial detainees charged with lesser crimes.). 25 We need not decide under what circumstances trying and punishing offenders is not essential. The government's interest in finding, convicting, and punishing criminals reaches its zenith when the crime is the murder of federal police officers in a place crowded with bystanders where a branch of government conducts its business. The Court made the point in Salerno: While the Government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this interest is heightened when the Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its greatest. 481 U.S. at 750; see also Khiem, 612 A.2d at 167; but see Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984). The statutory sentences for the crimes Weston is accused of committing--life in prison and death--reflect the intensity of the government's interest in bringing those suspected of such crimes to trial. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114. 26 Weston concedes that in the ordinary case, the strength of the government's interest in trying a defendant accused of first degree murder is undisputed, but argues that when the government seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant in order to try him, however, the case is no longer ordinary, because presumptions against forced medication have deep roots in the law. Brief for Appellant at 43. This argument is a reprise of the medical ethics point we considered and rejected in determining whether antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate. It has no more purchase here. The presumption against forced medication goes to the importance of Weston's constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs (which we agree is substantial), not to the nature of the government's countervailing interest. 27 We also do not believe that the governmental interest in medicating a defendant in order to try him is diminished ... by the option of civil commitment. Note, Riggins v. Nevada: Toward a Standard for Medicating the Incompetent Defendant to Competence, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1206, 1223 (1993). The civil commitment argument assumes that the government's essential penological interests lie only in incapacitating dangerous offenders. It ignores the retributive, deterrent, communicative, and investigative functions of the criminal justice system, which serve to ensure that offenders receive their just deserts, to make clear that offenses entail consequences, and to discover what happened through the public mechanism of trial. Civil commitment addresses none of these interests. In Weston's case, civil commitment would be based on his present mental condition, not on his culpability for the crimes charged: criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offenses ... is a distinct issue from his competency to stand trial. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 739 (1972); see also 18 U.S.C. 4241(f) (A finding by the court that the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial shall not prejudice the defendant in raising the issue of his insanity as a defense to the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as evidence in a trial for the offense charged.). 28