Opinion ID: 3010227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: young's challenge to his current sentence

Text: The Commonwealth contends that under Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989), district court lacks jurisdiction; hence, we must examine that case. Cook, the pet in Maleng, was convicted of robbery in 1958 in state court and was sentenced to twe years imprisonment. Id. at 489. While on parole from that sentence, he was convic three state crimes and, in 1978, was sentenced to two life terms and one ten year t Id. The 1958 conviction increased by several years the mandatory minimum term Cook required to serve. Id. Cook was also convicted of a federal crime while on parole that sentence was to be served before the 1978 state sentences. Id. While in feder prison, Cook filed a habeas corpus petition attacking the 1958 conviction, claiming it had been used illegally to enhance the 1978 state sentences. Id. The district dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because, having served that sentenc was not in custody for the purposes of an attack on the 1958 sentence. Id. at 49 The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that Cook was in custody under 1958 conviction because that conviction had been used to enhance the length of his sentences for his 1978 convictions. Cook v. Maleng, 847 F.2d 616, 618-19 (9th Cir. The Supreme Court affirmed, but differed from the Court of Appeals in its reasoning think that [the Court of Appeals'] interpretation stretches the language `in custod far. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491. The Court observed that it had never held . . . t habeas petitioner may be `in custody' under a conviction when the sentence imposed that conviction has fully expired at the time his petition is filed. Id. A petit does not remain in custody under a conviction, the Court held, after the sentenc imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior 6 conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes which he is convicted.0 Id. at 492. Nevertheless, the Court did not reverse the Court of Appeals' decision be under Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), Cook could be considered in custody for 1978 sentences, even though he had not started serving them. The Court construed h petition, with the deference to which pro se litigants are entitled, as challengi 1978 sentences. Id. at 493. The Court expressed no view on the extent to which t conviction itself may be subject to challenge in the attack upon the 1978 sentences it was used to enhance. Id. at 494.
In the present case, the district court has jurisdiction over Young's pet for the same reasons the Supreme Court found jurisdiction in Maleng: although the district court lacks jurisdiction over a direct challenge to Young's 1989 convictio should have construed Young's petition as attacking the sentence he is currently se See 490 U.S. at 493-94. While Young's petition referred only to his expired 1984 conviction, his subsequent filings provided sufficient information concerning both 1984 and 1989 convictions and their relationship to his present sentence to support construction.0 Moreover, the purpose of Young's petition is presumably to terminate sentence he is presently serving. 0 It apparently made no difference to the Court that the 1958 conviction actually enhanced Cook's sentence for his subsequent conviction. Id. 0 The Commonwealth argues that, because Young did not fully apprise the cou the relationship between his 1989 conviction and his present custody until after th Report and Recommendation was filed, Young effectively waived such a claim. This ar has no merit. As noted above, the various documents that Young filed after the mag judge filed his Report and Recommendation explain the relationship between his sent and convictions. Not only should a habeas petition [be] construed with the defere which pro se litigants are entitled, Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493, but Fed. R. Civ. P. states that leave shall be freely given when justice so requires to a party seeki amend his pleadings. The Commonwealth made no waiver argument in response to Young objections to the Report and Recommendation and has cited nothing to support its im 7 It is true that the circumstances of Young's incarceration do not follow usual Maleng pattern of conviction A, whose sentence has been served, followed by conviction B, whose sentence is enhanced because of conviction A. See 490 U.S. at 4 also Tredway v. Farley, 35 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 9 (1995); Feldman v. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1990); Collins v. Hesse, 957 F. 747 (10th Cir. 1992); White v. Butterworth, 70 F.3d 573, 574 (11th Cir. 1995). How as the Commonwealth concedes, the differences do not render Maleng inapplicable. Yo presently serving a sentence which he plainly seeks to terminate and under which he currently in custody. Thus, we hold that Young's petition should have been const challenging his current sentence, that he is in custody under that sentence, and the district court has jurisdiction over Young's petition. See Brock v. Weston, 31 887 (9th Cir. 1994) (construing petitioner's attack on expired conviction allegedly as a predicate for his confinement under the Washington Sexually Violent Predators an attack on that confinement).