Opinion ID: 2043167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of Double Jeopardy Claims

Text: On the merits, when conduct results in the violation of two statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not ( see Missouri v Hunter, supra, 459 US at 366, quoting Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304 [1932]). That two statutes proscribe one offense under Blockburger creates a presumption that the Legislature did not intend that a defendant be punished under both. This presumption, however, can be rebutted by a clear indication of contrary legislative intent ( id., quoting Whalen v United States, 445 US at 692 [emphasis omitted]). As the People in the Gonzalez case conceded during oral argument, the application of Blockburger leads to the conclusion that criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds, as charged and proved, are the same offense. This is so because only the school grounds sale requires proof of an element not required by third-degree sale ( see, Penal Law § 220.44 [2], incorporating by reference all of the operative subdivisions of Penal Law § 220.39). Third-degree criminal sale, however, does not require proof of elements not required by criminal sale in or near a school ( id. ). Thus, the two statutes are like concentric circles rather than overlapping circles (4 LaFave, Israel and King, Criminal Procedure § 17.4 [b] [2d ed]). As noted, the presumption resulting from the concentric nature of both statutes can be rebutted by a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. That intent is found in the interplay of the two statutes in the Criminal Procedure Law and Penal Law. Section 1.20 (37) of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that [w]hen it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a `lesser included offense.' While it is impossible to commit sale in or near a school without also committing third-degree sale, they are both class B felony offenses, and thus, one is not of a lesser grade or degree than the other. Since both counts are concurrent ( see, CPL 300.30 [3]; Penal Law § 70.25 [2]), and the third-degree sale count is not a lesser included offense of sale in or near a school, they are non-inclusory, and the trial court had the discretion to submit both counts to the jury (CPL 300.40 [3] [a]). Had the Legislature intended not to punish the same conduct with two statutes, it would have ensured that the two counts met the definition of inclusory concurrent counts ( see, CPL 300.30 [4]; 300.40 [3] [b]). The Legislature's intention to allow for simultaneous convictions for third-degree sale and sale in or near a school is further evidenced by Penal Law § 70.25 (2), which addresses situations where, as here, more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act, and mandates that the sentences run concurrently. That the Legislature did not provide for cumulative sentencing is not evidence to the contrary since, as the Supreme Court held in Ball, a conviction is detrimental even if its sentence runs concurrently. Thus, while the merits of the double jeopardy argument should be addressed, defendants' contention must be rejected. With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended ( Missouri v Hunter, 459 US at 366). It is clear that the New York Legislature intended to punish both crimes for which each defendant was found guilty.