Opinion ID: 1771838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Libel and Slander Claims

Text: `In actions for damages for libel or slander, as in other civil actions, it is [a] well settled general rule that it is the province of the [trial] court to state the law and that of the jury to determine the facts. Where different conclusions may be reasonably drawn by different minds from the same evidence, the question, ordinarily, is one for the jury. But where the facts are wholly undisputed and admit of no conflicting inferences, the question is one of law.' [Citations omitted.] Alabama Ride Co. v. Vance, 235 Ala. 263, 266, 178 So. 438, 440 (1938). See, also, American Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. McIntyre, 375 So.2d 239 (Ala.1979). The elements of a cause of action for defamation are: 1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; 2) an unprivileged communication of that statement to a third party; 3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the defendant; and 4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication of the statement. Restatement (2d) of Torts § 558 (1977). The disposition of this appeal depends upon the resolution of issues that arise from the basic elements of defamation: 1) Were the statements contained in the Daily Home article false? and 2), if false, a) were those statements reasonably capable of being understood as defamatory? and b) were those statements intended by the publisher and understood by the recipients as defamatory? Our review of the defamation issue, in a summary judgment context, is guided by First Amendment considerations that limit restraint of free speech. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Thus, the applicable standard of review consists of a combination of factual issues for the jury's determination under a preponderance of the evidence standard, and legal issues for the court's determination. Once the movants' (the defendants') evidence in support of summary judgment shifts the burden of proof, the plaintiffs must meet that requisite burden with respect to all three of the contested elements to withstand the motion. With respect to the element of falsity, if the plaintiffs survive the summary judgment motion, the issue is a factual one for the jury's determination. Given the falsity element, these plaintiffs can survive a summary judgment motion only if the evidence meets a two-step test with respect to the issue of defamation: first, whether the false statements were capable of being understood as defamatory is a question of law for the trial court's determination; and second, given the falsity and defamatory meaning elements, whether those statements were intended by the publisher and understood by the recipients as defamatory (assuming the plaintiffs survive summary judgment) are questions of fact for the jury. The plaintiffs contend that the evidence before the trial courtthe newspaper article in the context of the facts supplied by the depositions of the parties and other witnesseswas sufficient to provide a genuine issue as to whether certain of the statements in the Daily Home article were false; and, assuming their falsity, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court was authorized to determine that the false statements were capable of a defamatory meaning, in turn authorizing the jury to find that such statements were intended by the defendants as defamatory and were perceived as defamatory to the plaintiffs by the readers of the publication. We, therefore, begin our review of the undisputed facts, as set out in the record, to determine whether the statements published in the Daily Home article were false. Joe Mitchell, W.W. Gaddie, and other employees of the Coosa Valley Electric Cooperative (hereinafter Co-op) state in deposition testimony that on February 10, 1986, they reviewed numerous Co-op accounts based on confidential reports they had received. Joe Mitchell testified that he took vacation time to check into these allegations. Both Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gaddie testified that they relayed their findings to Daily Home editor Jay Thornton and advised him that certain anomalies existed in some of the Co-op accounts. It is undisputed that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gaddie found a meter without a seal on it at the old McCaig Motel on Highway 78 near Embry's Crossroad. Plaintiffs Roy and Travis McCaig admit that they possessed a floating meter. (The term floating meter is used by the parties to represent a meter that is moved about from one location to another without an express order having been issued by the Co-op each time the meter is moved.) Billing supervisor Pauline Bowen, manager Leland Fuller, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Gaddie all state that when the meter number found on the floating meter at the McCaig Motel was punched into the Co-op computer on February 10, 1986, it was not listed as being in active service. All parties, including the McCaigs, state that a Co-op work order indicates that the floating meter was used at a yellow house at one time and at an old white house at another time. All parties admit that no written policies promulgated by the Co-op exist that authorize the use of a floating meter and that, at that time, on February 10, 1986, the only floating meter known to be in use was the one in the possession of Travis McCaig. Moreover, Ms. Bowen and Mr. Fuller testified that at no time, either before or after this incident, have individuals been allowed to apply for the use of a floating meter. Ms. Bowen further testified that the meters found at the McCaig Motel and the adjoining restaurant at Embry's Crossroad were billed as residences rather than as commercial sites. Ms. Bowen, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Gaddie, and Mr. Thornton all testified that Ms. Bowen prepared figures that reflected the difference in charging the McCaigs' property a residential rate as opposed to a commercial rate for electrical services. Finally, both Roy and Travis McCaig admit that they participated in the Save Our Co-op campaign. It is clear from a review of the article published in the Daily Home that the defendants never accused Roy or Travis McCaig of stealing any electricity or of being guilty of any fraud. The undisputed testimony of the parties indicates that facts set out in the article are in their most literal sense true. Given the truthfulness of the published statements, the trial court correctly determined that the statements, as a matter of law, were not capable of having a defamatory meaning, the first prong of the test of defamation. Because truth is always an absolute defense to any action for libel or slander, this court must affirm the trial court's summary judgment as to the McCaigs' defamation claim. Kirkpatrick v. Journal Publishing Co., 210 Ala. 10, 97 So. 58 (1923); Foley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 491 So.2d 934 (1986). Further, while the McCaigs allege that the defendants entered into a conspiracy to libel the plaintiffs, a civil conspiracy is defined as a combination between two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish, by any unlawful means, a purpose not itself unlawful. Webb v. Renfrow, 453 So.2d 724 (Ala.1984). Because the statements made by the defendants were not defamatory in nature, the conspiracy claim, too, must fail since there is no underlying actionable wrong to support the conspiracy theory. See, Tapscott v. Fowler, 437 So.2d 116 (Ala.1983). We, therefore, affirm the trial court's summary judgment as to the conspiracy claim.