Opinion ID: 3063132
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Charitable Donation Evidence

Text: As an initial matter, we will review the admission of the evidence that Isley donated $20,000 to the Atlanta Lesbian Center for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11 th Cir. 2005). While the Government points out that Isley did not contemporaneously object to the donation evidence when it was admitted, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides that “[o]nce the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”24 In this case, the district court definitively ruled prior to trial that the donation evidence would be admissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 404 prohibits evidence of other bad acts to prove the character of a person in order to show she acted in conformity therewith. This evidence is admissible, however, if it may show proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan . . . or absence of mistake.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of other bad acts is not extrinsic to the charged offense under Rule 404(b), however, “when it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence 24 “When the ruling is definitive, a renewed objection . . . at the time the evidence is to be offered is more a formalism than a necessity.” Fed. R. Evid. 103, advisory committee's note to 2000 Amendment. 26 regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Isley does not contest that the donation evidence was either inextricably intertwined with the scheme to defraud Orthoscript through the unauthorized use of its funds or offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Rather, Isley contends that its probative value was limited and substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Regardless of whether the donation evidence falls inside or outside the scope of Rule 404(b), the evidence must still satisfy the requirements of Rule 403.25 Id. The donation evidence was not the only evidence of unauthorized personal charges on the corporate American Express card. The Government also presented evidence that Isley used this credit card to pay for Christmas and birthday parties. There was also evidence that she took unauthorized salary increases throughout the relevant time period. All of these unauthorized expenditures occurred during the same time that Isley was paying her Capital One accounts with Orthoscript funds. It is probative of Isley’s intent and plan to defraud her employer and of her motive in defrauding Medicare. The charitable donation was simply part and parcel of such evidence. It was not unfairly singled out or emphasized by the prosecution. 25 Rule 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” 27 Moreover, the nature of the donation had to be revealed to show that it was personal and unauthorized, i.e., was not related to or did not further the business of Orthoscript. Finally, any prejudice arising from the fact that the charitable donation was made to the Atlanta Lesbian Center was mitigated by the defense’s qualification of the jury to ensure there was no bias against her sexual orientation. In short, the probative value of the charitable donation evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudicial. See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344 n.8 (“Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy, which should be used only sparingly, and the balance should be struck in favor of admissibility.” (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in its admission of the evidence.