Opinion ID: 1091246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Annie McIntosh.

Text: ¶ 8. McIntosh argues that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony by Annie McIntosh (Annie) at trial. Annie testified that about a week before the death of her mother, Creola McIntosh, Creola told Annie that she and Featherston planned to evict McIntosh from their home. McIntosh objected to the testimony as hearsay. The trial court admitted Annie's testimony at trial under M.R.E. 803(3), then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. The trial court ruled as follows: The State is offering the statements as an exception under Rule 803(3), then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. The Court, after considering the matter, has had an opportunity to read the case of State v. Nathaniel Edwards, which was cited to the Court by the defendant at 856 So.2d 578[587], a case that came out of this same county last year. The State also pointed the Court to the case of State v. Boggan, a case likewise out of this district several years ago. Each of those deal with statements that were admitted under Rule 803(3). The Court has reviewed the rule. The Court in considering this exception is going to allow the statement as it related to Creola's statement of what she intended to do, that is, if in fact she told her daughter that she intended to put him out of the house. As far as the further statements as to what McIntosh had told her, what she believed might happen, the Court does not feel that it is proper to be put in, at least not at this point in the trial and past the point of what Creola stated that day that she that she [sic] intended to do, which the Court finds would fall under 803(3), the Court will not allow that further testimony as proffered by the State. In Price v. State, 898 So.2d 641, 653 (Miss. 2005), this Court set out the standard of review for the admission of evidence: Relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court, and reversal may be had only where that discretion has been abused. White v. State, 742 So.2d 1126, 1134 (Miss.1999). Furthermore, the trial court's discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and reversal will be appropriate only when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs. Id. at 1134. A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless the judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse this ruling. Walker v. State, 878 So.2d 913, 915 (Miss.2004) (quoting Jefferson v. State, 818 So.2d 1099, 1104 (Miss.2002)). Price, 898 So.2d at 653. ¶ 9. The Court of Appeals addressed this same hearsay issue in Edwards v. State, 856 So.2d 587 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). The facts in Edwards are very similar to the case sub judice. Prior to his death, Nathaniel Edwards, Sr. (the victim) went to the home of his neighbor, a deputy police officer. Id. at 591. The victim stated I want you to come get my son out of the house because he is going to hit me in the head and take my money. Id. at 592. The next day the victim was found dead with a lacerated head. Id. at 591. The trial court admitted the evidence under M.R.E. 803(3) and allowed the officer to testify to the statement. Id. at 592. In Edwards, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay statement pursuant to M.R.E. 803(3). Id. However, the Court of Appeals found that the admission of the hearsay statement was harmless error because the properly admitted evidence was sufficient to support a jury verdict. Id. at 593. ¶ 10. We find that the statements in the case sub judice and Edwards are similar. The statements concerned two victims' desire to evict a defendant from their home prior to their deaths. Like Edwards, we find the trial court's admission of the testimony pursuant to M.R.E. 803(3) was error. However, the admission of the hearsay statement was harmless error because the properly admitted evidence was sufficient to support a jury verdict. In short, Featherston was an eyewitness to the fire and the victim of aggravated assault. He and McIntosh were in the burning house together. Featherston confronted McIntosh and asked why he was burning the house. There is also further evidence which will be discussed in more detail in Issue III that was sufficient to support the verdict. Accordingly, the admission of the statement was harmless, and McIntosh's fundamental rights were not violated.