Opinion ID: 2162009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dobson's delay.

Text: In light of the foregoing discussion, the issue before us would not be a difficult one if Dobson had acted promptly to vindicate his rights. In fact, however, eleven years elapsed between this court's decision in Dobson I and the filing of Dobson's § 23-110 motion. Any further factual inquiry in 1998 will embrace events that occurred twenty years ago, and a trial that took place eighteen years ago. Under these circumstances it is not at all surprising that trial counsel's recollection of the relevant events has faded. Indeed, as a result of Dobson's delay, it may be difficult for the court to evaluate retrospectively Dobson's claim that his attorney's performance at trial fell short of the Strickland standard. Moreover, with so much time having passed, the case bristles with potential prejudice to the prosecution. We paraphrase our observations under similar circumstances in Legrand v. United States, 570 A.2d 786 (D.C. 1990): If there had been a timely [§ 23-110 motion], the transcript would probably still have been available. Moreover, if the judgment had been reversed following such an appeal, and if a new trial had been ordered, the government might still have been in a position to present its evidence. Whether the government could now reassemble its proof of an [offense] that allegedly occurred in [June 1978] is surely dubious to say the least. By waiting so long to launch his collateral attack, [Dobson] has almost certainly made it exceedingly difficult and perhaps impossible for the government to retry him. Id. at 791 (footnote omitted). We stated in Legrand that a substantially greater showing of injustice is necessary to obtain relief in a collateral proceeding than on direct appeal. Id. [11] But the lapse of time and prejudice to the government cannot, by themselves, bar a § 23-110 motion.... Ramsey, supra, 569 A.2d at 148. [12] We declined in Ramsey to adopt judicially a legislatively enacted federal rule permitting dismissal of collateral proceedings on the ground of inexcusable delay which has prejudiced the government. Id. at 149-50. Ramsey is binding authority, and therefore we are not free to follow decisions applying the Congressionally enacted federal doctrine. See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 821 F.2d 1271, 1272-73 (7th Cir.1987). On remand, however, the trial court may consider the length of [Dobson's] delay ..., any excuses for that delay, and any resulting prejudice to the government.... Ramsey, supra, 569 A.2d at 149 (citation omitted). [13] [L]apse of time affects the quantum of required proof, as well as the good faith and credibility of the moving party. Id. (quoting United States v. Wiggins, 184 F.Supp. 673, 676 (D.D.C.1960)). Finally, if the passage of time has impaired the recollections of participants in the trialif, for example, Dobson's trial counsel no longer remembers events which he might very well have recalled if Dobson had filed his motion soon after his convictionthen it is the party responsible for the delay that must be chargeable with the consequences.