Opinion ID: 2600225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hearing Examiner's Approach

Text: The hearing examiner first set out the McDonnell Douglas framework, and then discussed how the test would apply to Raad's allegations. The allegations involved hiring decisions made by twelve school principals for thirty-one teaching positions over the course of three years. The hearing examiner then conducted a McDonnell Douglas analysis for the hiring decisions for each of the thirty-one positions. The hearing examiner observed that it was undisputed that Raad's religion is Islam, that her national origin is Lebanese, and that these are protected classes under Alaska law. [45] The hearing examiner then found that [i]t cannot be disputed that Raad's membership in these protected classes is not readily apparent. The hearing examiner observed that Raad is a Caucasian woman with light skin and dark hair. Overall, her features do not bespeak of any particular national origin. She does speak with a foreign accent and ... her accent will be relevant to her prima facie case of national origin discrimination. Nothing about her appearance indicates any particular religious preference. (Emphasis deleted.) Alaska Statute 18.80.220(a)(1) makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to hire a person because of the person's religion or national origin. Because the hearing examiner found that Raad's religion, national origin, and the fact that she filed a prior complaint were not readily apparent, the hearing examiner read AS 18.80.220(a)(1) and relevant case law as requiring Raad, in establishing her prima facie case, to show that the hiring principals knew that she was a member of the relevant protected class. The hearing examiner noted that under subsection .220(a)(1), an employer could not discriminate because of a person's national origin or religion if the employer was not aware of it. This approach is consistent with case law cited by the hearing examiner. [46] The hearing examiner then noted that it was undisputed that the district hired applicants for the thirty-one teaching positions that Raad applied for, that Raad was at least minimally qualified for each position, and that Raad was not hired for any of the positions. The hearing examiner therefore concluded that Raad would need to prove the following elements to establish her prima facie case of discrimination as to any given position: (1) that the principal who made the hiring decision knew of Raad's national origin or religion; and (2) that the individual hired for the position was neither Lebanese nor Muslim. With respect to the second requirement, the hearing examiner found that the district admitted that none of the successful applicants for the thirty-one positions was a member of Raad's protected classes. The examiner based this finding on Paragraph No. 6 of the district's answer to Raad's complaint. Paragraph No. 6 stated in part: Respondent affirmatively asserts its belief that complainant is the only Lebanese or Moslem applicant who has applied for a teaching position with respondent. Because of the district's admission, the hearing examiner concluded that Raad established the second prong of her prima facie showing. Under the framework applied by the hearing examiner, Raad only needed to show that a hiring principal was aware of her national origin or religion to make her prima facie showing on a given discrimination claim. With respect to Raad's claims of national origin discrimination, the hearing examiner's finding summary stated that [t]here was some evidence presented that a few of the hiring principals may have known Raad's national origin. The more persuasive evidence is that most did not. The hearing examiner then stated that [e]ven if Raad had established a prima facie case as to one or more of the 31 positions, the principals articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for their hiring decisions. The hearing examiner's summary findings suggested that only a few of the hiring principals may have known Raad's national origin. But the hearing examiner's specific findings-which addressed each principal's hiring decisions individuallyindicated that the hearing examiner concluded outright, or assumed for the purposes of the decision, that, for twenty-eight of the thirty-one hiring decisions, the principals either knew of Raad's national origin or were aware that she was of some foreign national origin. The hearing examiner concluded that there was no evidence presented that the hiring principals for the other three positions had, or could have had, any knowledge of Raad's national origin. The hearing examiner concluded that there was insufficient evidence presented to show that Principals Ofelt, Thibodeau, or Conwell knew of Raad's national origin at the time of the relevant hiring decisions. Raad argues on appeal that her name, Nada Hashem Itani Raad, is identifiably Arab, and that she speaks with a distinctive identifiable Middle East accent. The hearing examiner concluded that knowledge of Raad's accent would be relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, evidence of knowledge of Raad's national origin. [47] Despite the hearing examiner's initial suppositions to the contrary in the findings summary, we accept for the purposes of this appeal that Raad established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of national origin for the twenty-eight positions for which the hearing examiner concluded or assumed that she had established a prima facie case. Raad's resume on file with the district indicated that she had both training and work experience in Beirut and that she was fluent in Arabic. In light of Raad's name, her accent, and indications throughout her resume that she was Lebanese, we accept for the purposes of appellate review Raad's contention that Raad established that the principals either knew of Raad's national origin, or knew that she was of some foreign origin. Raad claims that she established a prima facie case of discrimination for all thirty-one positions, but we accept the hearing examiner's conclusion that Raad failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of national origin with respect to the three positions filled by Principals Ofelt, Thibodeau, and Conwell. The record demonstrates that substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner's conclusion that those principals were unaware of Raad's national origin. With respect to Raad's claims of discrimination on the basis of religion, the hearing examiner found that [t]he evidence was insufficient to establish that any of the principals knew Raad's religion. Thus, her religious discrimination claims fail from the outset. Because Raad's religion was not readily apparent, and because substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner's conclusions on this issue, we accept that Raad failed to establish her prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion. With respect to Raad's claims of retaliation, the hearing examiner found that it was undisputed that Raad had filed a prior complaint of discrimination and that she was therefore a member of the protected class identified in AS 18.80.220(a)(4). The hearing examiner also found that she was subject to adverse employment actioni.e., not hired for the thirty-one positions. The hearing examiner concluded that to establish a prima facie case of retaliation Raad would have to show: (1) that the principal making the hiring decision knew that Raad made a prior complaint; and (2) that there was a causal connection in time between Raad's prior complaint and any of the thirty-one hiring decisions, or that there was some other evidence establishing retaliatory motive. The hearing examiner found that there was evidence that two of the principals, responsible for four of the thirty-one hiring decisions, may have known that Raad had filed a prior complaint of discrimination. Thus, her retaliation claims as to the remaining 27 positions fail. We accept the hearing examiner's conclusion that Raad established her prima facie case of retaliation with respect to only four of the thirty-one positions because the conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. The hearing officer concluded that Raad established her prima facie case of retaliation with respect to the one position filled by Principal Murphy, and for three positions filled in 1996 by Principal Layral. The record supports the hearing examiner's findings regarding Murphy and Layral's knowledge of Raad's prior complaint, and the timing of the employment action. After outlining the requirements for the prima facie showings of discrimination and retaliation, the hearing examiner considered the reasons offered by the principals for not hiring Raad. The hearing examiner concluded broadly in his summary findings that [e]ven if Raad had established a prima facie case as to one or more of the 31 positions, the principals articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for their hiring decisions. (Emphasis deleted.) Despite this broad declaration, the hearing examiner seems to have only considered the district's reasons for not hiring Raad for twenty-eight positions. The hearing examiner did not make specific findings regarding reasons offered for not hiring Raad for the three positions filled by Principals Ofelt, Thibodeau, and Conwell. For these three positions, the hearing examiner simply concluded that Raad did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. In his position-by-position analysis, the hearing examiner found that the district offered legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-retaliatory reasons for not hiring Raad for each of the twenty-eight positions for which he concluded or assumed that Raad had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of national origin. These included the four positions for which the hearing examiner concluded that Raad had established a prima facie case of retaliation. Our review of the record confirms that substantial evidence justified the hearing examiner's conclusion that the district offered legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-retaliatory reasons for not hiring Raad for these twenty-eight positions. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden then shifted back to Raad to show that the reasons proffered by the district were pretextual.