Opinion ID: 1426902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jordache's Public Policy Arguments

Text: Limitations statutes are intended to enable defendants to marshal evidence while memories and facts are fresh and to provide defendants with repose for past acts. (See Romano v. Rockwell Internal, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 488, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1111-1112, 245 Cal.Rptr. 658, 751 P.2d 923; Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 898-899, 218 Cal.Rptr. 313, 705 P.2d 886.) As Laird observed, the legislative goal underlying limitations statutes is to require diligent prosecution of known claims so that legal affairs can have their necessary finality and predictability and so that claims can be resolved while evidence remains reasonably available and fresh. ( Laird, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 614, 618, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 828 P.2d 691.) As Laird also stated, a plaintiffs unilateral control of the statute's commencement can undermine these legislative goals. ( Id. at p. 618, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 828 P.2d 691.) Jordache acknowledges these purposes but argues for a countervailing policy, citing decisions that deem limitations statutes `technical defenses' that are strictly construed to avoid forfeiture of a plaintiffs rights. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 56, 210 Cal.Rptr. 781, 694 P.2d 1153; see, e.g., Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 399, 411, 154 P.2d 399.) However, this interpretive rule is subject to two caveats when applied to section 340.6. First, as the lead opinion in Adams stated: [S]tatutes of repose are in fact favored in the law, `designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.' [Citation.] ( Adams, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 592, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 904 P.2d 1205 (lead opn. of Arabian, J.).) Second, section 340.6 reflects the balance the Legislature struck between a plaintiffs interest in pursuing a meritorious claim and the public policy interests in prompt assertion of known claims. The courts may not shift that balance by devising expedients that extend or toll the limitations period. The Legislature expressly disallowed tolling under any circumstances not stated in the statute. ( Laird, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 828 P.2d 691.) In any event, as the lead opinion in Adams suggested, the discovery and continuous representation provisions of section 340.6 help protect legal malpractice plaintiffs from unknowing or inadvertent forfeiture of meritorious claims. (See Adams, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 592, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 904 P.2d 1205.) Consequently, to achieve fairness to plaintiffs and to avoid forfeiture of just claims, we need not artificially interpret actual injury to extend the time to sue after plaintiffs discover their attorneys' negligence and have cognizable damage claims. Jordache also suggests that statutes of limitation are designed to discourage prosecution of unnecessary lawsuits and promote judicial economy. Here, Jordache draws on excerpts from Romano v. Rockwell Internal., Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at pages 494-495, 500, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114. Romano concerned the commencement of the limitations period in a wrongful termination case alleging contract and tort claims, as well as violations of statutes making certain employee discharges unlawful employment practices. ( Id. at pp. 483-484, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114.) We held the limitations period began when the employment actually terminated, not when the employer gave notice of its intent to terminate. ( Id. at p. 484, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114.) We also discussed some of the subsidiary benefits of that rule, including not promoting premature and potentially destructive claims and the relative simplicity of determining the date of actual termination. ( Id. at pp. 494-495, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114.) From Romano's discussion Jordache attempts to glean policy rules generally applicable to all statutes of limitations and particularly applicable to section 340.6. Thus, Jordache reasons that the interests of judicial economy require parties to be able to determine promptly and accurately the date a limitations period commences and the viability of a limitations defense. Jordache also asserts judicial economy would be served if the plaintiff did not have to sue while a chance remained that the wrongful act might leave no damage. Lastly, Jordache contends the statutory period should not run when it is inconvenient or difficult for a plaintiff to sue, as when related litigation remains pending. Whatever the merits of these policies in other settings, the legislative scheme embodied in section 340.6 allocates their relative weight in legal malpractice actions. Section 340.6 does not commence the one-year limitations period with a single, immediately ascertainable event. Instead, the Legislature decided the statutory period would depend first on the factually intensive question of when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission. (§ 340.6, subd. (a).) The legislative scheme also effectively accommodates concerns about premature suits by tolling the limitations period if the plaintiff has not sustained any actual injury. (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(1).) As a result a plaintiff who actually or constructively discovered the attorney's error, but who has suffered no damage to support a legal malpractice cause of action, need not file suit prematurely. Rather, that plaintiff still has one year after sustaining actionable injury to assess whether, and how, to pursue a remedy against the attorney. The Legislature has accorded a measure of relief to a plaintiff who finds it impossible to bring suit by tolling the statutory period during the time the plaintiff is under a legal or physical disability which restricts the plaintiffs ability to commence legal action. (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(4).) Except for the circumstances specified in the statute, however, the Legislature expressly intended to disallow tolling or extension of the limitations period for other reasons. ( Laird, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 618, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 828 P.2d 691.) Jordache's other policy concerns likewise do not require us to interpret actual injury in a way that prolongs the limitations period, undermines the statute's fundamental purposes, and conflicts with the Legislature's intent. Jordache suggests that attorney-client relationships and privileges for confidential matters would be disrupted if clients had to sue their attorneys while pursuing related litigation. However, the explicit tolling provision for continuous representation addresses some of these concerns. (§ 340.6, subd. (a)(2).) Moreover, as Adams observed, existing law provides the means for courts to deal with potential problems that may arise from the filing of a legal malpractice action when related litigation is pending. ( Adams, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 592-593, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 594, 904 P.2d 1205 (lead opn. of Arabian, J.).) The case management tools available to trial courts, including the inherent authority to stay an action when appropriate and the ability to issue protective orders when necessary, can overcome problems of simultaneous litigation if they do occur. ( Ibid. )