Opinion ID: 605573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: edward leep

Text: 33 Edward Leep contends his right of allocution was denied and therefore he is entitled to a resentencing before a different district judge. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 directs that before a court imposes sentence it shall address the defendant personally and determine if the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1)(C). This is also known as allocution. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961); United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 274, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990); see also Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.1(f) (1984) (discussing right of allocution); Charles E. Torica, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 539 (13th ed. 1992) (listing cases). 34 Leep does not dispute that Judge Conlon addressed him personally and allowed him to present information in mitigation of the sentence. Leep does not deny that he took advantage of this opportunity. In his brief, Leep states the court allowed him to speak to his heart's content. Appellant's Br. at 5. During his allocution, Leep informed the court generally of his assistance to the Government in seven pending investigations and presented information on mitigating factors. 35 Despite this opportunity to personally address the court, Leep feels his right of allocution was improperly restricted. The error, in Leep's opinion, is that the judge did not allow Leep to make a statement in camera. Leep states that he was unable in open court to candidly detail the extent of his cooperation with the government in on-going criminal investigations. Leep says he would have exposed himself to serious danger had he fully disclosed his cooperation. Id. at 6. 36 There is, however, no right to in camera allocution. Rule 32 provides that the court may hear in camera the defendant's statement [u]pon a motion that is jointly filed by the defendant and by the attorney for the Government. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1) (emphasis added). Here there was no jointly filed motion, and even had there been, the district court would still have retained the discretion to refuse the motion. 37 In United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.1991), this court thoroughly examined the history and purpose of allocution. We concluded that district courts should apply Rule 32 liberally, to freely grant defendants the right to make a statement prior to the imposition of sentence in all circumstances. Id. at 328-29. Where a trial court fails to comply with Rule 32, we have remanded the case for resentencing in order to give the defendant the opportunity to speak. Id. at 332; United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855, 875 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548, 554 (7th Cir.1984). 38 Leep feels that the district court has ignored the mandate of Barnes to liberally apply Rule 32 by having refused his request to present a statement in camera. Liberally applying Rule 32, however, does not mean rewriting the rule so as to give a defendant a unilateral, unconditional right to privately address the court. Cf. United States v. Aquilla, 976 F.2d 1044, 1054 (7th Cir.1992) (defendant has no right to address court at any particular time in sentencing process). 39 Liberally applying Rule 32 means only giving the defendant a chance to address the court prior to the imposition of sentence in all circumstances. Barnes, 948 F.2d at 329; see also United States v. Core, 532 F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir.1976) (district court is not required to allow allocution before revocation of probation but it is the better practice to do so). Leep had that chance. 40 Was Leep's chance to address the court sufficient? We think so. As we said in Barnes, [t]he right to allocution is the right to have your request for mercy factored into the sentencing decision. 948 F.2d at 329. Although Leep may have felt it incautious to name names, he had adequate opportunity to stress his cooperation with federal officials in on-going investigations. Leep's cooperation, furthermore, was verified by the Government in its sentencing memorandum and by its statements in open court. The record plainly shows the district court heard and took note of Leep's cooperation and his request for mercy. The court, in fact, stated that it would have given Leep the maximum sentence of four years had it not been for Leep's extensive cooperation. Instead, Leep received only thirty months. Leep was not, we hold, denied his right to allocution.