Opinion ID: 2585492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application to the Evergreen Highlands Covenants

Text: As this summary of cases from other jurisdictions illustrates, there exists a split in the law with respect to this issue. Respondent contends that these cases can be distinguished by how narrowly or broadly the particular modification clause is written, and argues that the amendatory language in Evergreen Highlands' covenants is much more akin to the narrow language found in the Lakeland line of cases than the more expansive language found in the Zito line of cases. He therefore argues that the Lakeland reasoning should prevail here. There is little substance to the distinction between the broad or narrow amendatory language upon which Respondent relies. The covenant modification language in Lakeland and Boyles allowed a majority of lot owners to change the covenants, 459 N.E.2d at 1167, 517 N.W.2d at 613, and in Meresse to change or alter the covenants. 999 P.2d at 1269. The amendatory language in Sunday Canyon and in Windemere, however, provided that the covenants could be waived, abandoned, terminated, modified, altered or changed. 978 S.W.2d at 656, 990 P.2d at 772. In the latter cases, the first three wordswaived, abandoned, and terminatedall deal with ending a covenant, not adding a new one, and are therefore inapplicable here. The last three words modified, altered, or changedare the same as those in the Lakeland line of cases, with the addition of altered, which is simply a synonym for change and modify. Thus, distinguishing these cases from one another based on the breadth of the language used is an artificial, and ultimately unpersuasive, distinction. Moreover, from a linguistic standpoint, the Lakeland conclusion that change or modify can only apply to the alteration of existing covenants, and not the addition of new and different ones, is not well-founded. Webster defines change as to make different. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 373 (1986); see also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 177 Cal.App.3d 726, 223 Cal.Rptr. 175, 179 (1986) (the words `changed' and `modified' include any alteration whether involving an increase or decrease.). Applying this definition to the language at issue, covenants could certainly be changed or made different either by the addition, subtraction, or modification of a term. Confining the meaning of the term change only to the modification of existing covenants, then, seems illogically narrow. For these reasons, we find the court of appeals' reliance on a linguistic analysis to distinguish covenant modification language unsatisfactory. We instead conclude that the different outcomes in the Lakeland and Zito lines of cases are based on the differing factual scenarios and severity of consequences that the cases present. In those cases where courts disallowed the amendment of covenants, the impact upon the objecting lot owner was generally far more substantial and unforeseeable than the amendment at issue here. See, e.g., Caughlin Ranch, 109 Nev. 264, 849 P.2d 310 (covenants previously imposing assessments only on private lots amended to assess the sole commercial parcel in the subdivision at a substantially higher rate); Boyles, 246 Neb. 181, 517 N.W.2d 610 (changed setback requirement rendered plaintiff's lot unbuildable); Meresse, 100 Wash.App. 857, 999 P.2d 1267 (increased access road easement deprived plaintiff of a portion of his private lot). In contrast, Zito, Windemere, and Sunday Canyon, like this case, all specifically consideredand allowedthe amendment of covenants in order to impose mandatory assessments on lot owners for the purpose of maintaining common elements of a subdivision. We accordingly find the Zito line of cases more applicable to the situation here. This interpretation also avoids the absurd result that could follow from application of the Lakeland reasoning; Evergreen Highlands would be unable to adopt a mandatory-assessment covenant when its original covenants were silent on the subject, yet could adopt such a covenant if its original covenants had expressly prohibited a mandatory-assessment covenant. Moreover, the amendment at issue in this case was changed according to the modification clause of the original Evergreen Highlands covenants, and it is undisputed that Respondent was on actual notice of that clause when he purchased his lot in 1986. In addition, we note that, at fifty dollars per year, the mandatory assessment imposed on Respondent is neither unreasonable nor burdensome. [5] To the contrary, the existence of a well-maintained park area immediately adjacent to Respondent's lot undoubtedly enhances Respondent's property value. We conclude that the modification clause of the Evergreen Highlands covenants is expansive enough in its scope to allow for the adoption of a new covenant, and hold that the 1995 amendment to the Evergreen Highlands covenants, passed by the requisite majority of lot owners, is valid and binding on all lot owners in Evergreen Highlands.