Opinion ID: 2604128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Manifest Necessity for New Trial

Text: On the question of whether a mistrial was manifestly necessary or dictated by the ends of justice, we note first that Hylton made no objections nor complaints that his counsel was going to be so impaired in his examination of Chambers that Hylton would be denied a fair trial. As in the case of Chambers, the trial court did not choose to canvass defendant Hylton before granting the mistrial to the state. It is highly probable that Hylton, if asked, would have had no objections to Chambers's testifying because of the likelihood that Chambers would have testified in his favor. Chambers never asserted any claim of attorney-client privilege, and the trial court's granting of a new trial must, of necessity, have been based on the judge's assumption that Chambers was going to claim the privilege. Chambers may have waived the privilege and consented to defense counsel's examining him concerning the facts surrounding the accusation against Hylton. Until the trial judge knew whether or not the privilege was going to be asserted, he could not make a fully informed decision on the necessity of declaring a mistrial. Like the trial judge, we cannot safely tell if a mistrial was necessary and cannot properly conclude, therefore, that a mistrial was a manifest necessity. Circumstances constituting a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial should appear in the record. State v. Eisentrager, 76 Nev. 437, 357 P.2d 306 (1960). In Eisentrager, the trial court discharged the jury because it was unable to come to a conclusion. While the record did not reflect the jury foreman's statement that the members of the jury were unable to agree upon a verdict, the remarks of the judge in discharging the jury included his reference to the fact that the jury had been unable to come to a conclusion. This court reversed the district court's order dismissing the information on grounds of double jeopardy. The essential fact that Chambers invoked his attorney-client privilege is not in the trial transcript in this case. Chambers did not in fact personally invoke his privilege, rather the court presumed that Chambers would do so. Manifest necessity to declare a mistrial may also arise in situations in which there is an interference with the administration of honest, fair, even-handed justice to either, both, or any of the parties to the proceeding. People v. Clark, 705 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985). When the absence of a witness would effectively prevent the state from presenting its case, there can arise a manifest necessity for a mistrial. State v. Connery, 100 Nev. 256, 258, 679 P.2d 1266, 1268 (1984). In Clark, both state and defense counsel referred in their opening statement to fingerprint evidence; a mistrial was declared when the key fingerprint evidence was ruled inadmissible. The Clark court found manifest necessity since the jury had been given information during the course of the trial that they subsequently would not hear as evidence. In the instant case, both the prosecutor and defense counsel had referred in their opening statements to certain evidence which would be admissible by virtue of the testimony of Chambers. The mere fact, however, that counsel mentions evidence during opening statement which is later discovered to be inadmissible, does not mean that it is manifestly necessary to abort the prosecution and start over. Enright v. Siedlecki, 59 N.Y.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 418, 423, 451 N.E.2d 176, 181 (N.Y.Ct. App. 1983). A witness who admittedly will testify in favor of the defendant is of dubious rather than manifest value to the prosecution. Again, there is an absence of information in the record. Had the court carefully inquired into the substance of Chambers' testimony and the inconsistent statement, it would have been in a much better position to make a judgment on the necessity for Chambers's testimony (or rather the necessity to permit the prosecution to play the game of calling him and then contradicting him). We are forced to conclude that if there were a real necessity to declare a mistrial in this case, the necessity is certainly not manifest from the record before us.