Opinion ID: 627222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unrelated Evidence

Text: We have recognized that severance may be warranted if evidence that is not admissible against one defendant will be admitted against another. Chavez, 584 F.3d at 1360. However, we have rejected the idea that a disparity in the quantity of such evidence requires severance. Schlei, 122 F.3d at 984. To be sure, severance may be appropriate in light of the quality of the evidence that is to be introduced against one defendant. See Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1123, 1124 & n. 25. However, we have indicated that only gruesome, emotional, or highly inflammatory evidence will provide a basis for severance. See id. This is because of the strong presumption . . . that jurors are able to compartmentalize evidence in accordance with a district court's instructions. Id. at 1123. In light of these principles, we must reject the appellants' argument that their trial should have been severed from that of LaCour because he alone was charged with a large number of money-laundering counts. Again, the mere fact that there may be a significant difference in the quantity of the evidence is not enough to warrant severance. Schlei, 122 F.3d at 984. And the type of evidence that the government introduced in order to prove the money-laundering charges consisted largely of financial records. This is not the sort of gruesome, emotional, or highly inflammatory evidence that would prevent a jury from compartmentalizing the evidence as instructed. Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1123, 1124 & n. 25. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in having the appellants tried together here.