Opinion ID: 1813007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Constitutional Challenge to Capital Sentencing

Text: Hudson challenges the constitutionality of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2001), based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Hudson's Ring claim fails because the evidence established that he had a prior violent felony convictionthe second-degree murder conviction that he incurred as a juvenile and he was convicted by a unanimous jury of the contemporaneous kidnapping of Fizzuoglio in this case. See Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 961 (Fla.2007) (holding that relief is not available under Ring where one of the aggravators rests on the separate conviction for kidnapping, which satisfies Sixth Amendment requirements), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2056, 170 L.Ed.2d 2056 (2008); Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810, 823 (Fla.2005) (holding that Ring does not apply where one of the aggravating circumstances is a prior violent felony). The prior violent felony conviction alone satisfies constitutional mandates because the conviction was heard by a jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 286 (Fla.2003)). Hudson also claims that his death sentence is unconstitutional because it results from a sentencing scheme that does not properly narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, in violation of Furman. [T]his Court has `rejected the claim that the death penalty system is unconstitutional as being arbitrary and capricious because it fails to limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.' Williams, 967 So.2d at 767 (quoting Miller v. State, 926 So.2d 1243, 1260 (Fla.2006)); see also Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 119 (Fla.2003). This Court has held that Florida's capital sentencing scheme is constitutional in this regard because [a] capital sentencing scheme passes constitutional muster if it rationally narrows the class of death-eligible defendants and permits the sentencer to consider any mitigating evidence relevant to its determination. Johnson, 969 So.2d at 962 (citing Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006)). Johnson also noted that the channeled discretion required by the Eighth Amendment is provided by Florida's scheme requiring statutory and mitigating circumstances to be found and weighed first by the advisory jury and then independently by the trial court. Id. (citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-52, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976)). Because the Court has previously addressed all the constitutional claims raised by Hudson and found them to be without merit, relief will not be granted on these claims.