Opinion ID: 161063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admission of elliott's taped confession.

Text: 21 Elliott asserts the admission of his intoxicated statement to Detective Barela violated his constitutional right to a fair trial because it was involuntary under Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Elliott acknowledges Connelly stands for the proposition that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to any finding of involuntariness, but contends Barela's taping of his statement under circumstances where he knew or should have known he was under the influence of heroin constitutes such activity under United States v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1993)(coercion for purposes of Connelly may exist where police overreach by exploiting a weakness or condition known to exist). 22 The admissibility of Elliott's taped confession was considered before trial at a separate evidentiary hearing on Elliott's Motion to Suppress. (RP. 31.) 6 The trial court's form Order Denying Motion to Suppress included no findings of fact or conclusions of law. (RP. 47) A review of the cassette tapes of the hearing reveals the question of voluntariness was decided solely as a question of fact, even though Connelly and its predecessor, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1962), were raised at the outset of the hearing and argued by both sides. The judge, after hearing testimony from Detective Barela on behalf of the State and expert witness Dr. Walters on behalf of Elliott, rejected the implication from Dr. Walters' testimony that the fact Elliott was under the influence of heroin alone rendered his confession unreliable and involuntary. While confident that Mr. Elliott was to some extent under the influence of narcotic drugs at the time he gave his statement, the court found his sniffling and demeanor to have been more in response to his emotional state [than his] degree or effect of intoxication, so I am not going to rule [under] the circumstances that this is an involuntary statement. Audiotape of 12/23/92 Motions Hearing (R. Tape No. CR-2-TS, 12/23/92) (emphasizing that Elliott had had a big day, having committed these crimes, contemplated suicide and the loss of his children all in the same day). 23 In accordance with the New Mexico Court of Appeals summary calendaring/disposition procedures, the court of appeals' calendar notice proposed to hold that the trial court's finding of voluntariness was supported by substantial evidence, based on a review of the whole record. 7 Mem. Op. at 2. In his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Affirmance (R. Vol. I, Tab 13, Att. T), Elliott challenged the denial of his Motion to Suppress, arguing his statement was involuntary under applicable New Mexico state law such that its admission by the trial court violated his rights against self-incrimination under the federal and New Mexico state constitutions. Citing State v. Fekete, 901 P.2d 708, 716-17 (N.M. 1995) and related state court authorities, the Court of Appeals applied New Mexico's totality of the circumstances test to conclude there was no evidence in the record to support a finding of police misconduct, that in making the statement Defendant was not deprived of due process of law, and that the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. Mem. Op. (R. Vol. I, Tab 13, Att. W), slip op. at 2-4. Elliott's habeas petition ensued. 24 Because the state court addressed the merits of Elliott's argument on appeal, the district court's review was limited to a consideration of whether the determination that Elliott's statement was voluntary was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) & (2) (quoted in Recommendation at p. 5). We set forth the district court's application of these standards in its entirety: 25 Both parties agree that Colorado v. Connelly, 473 U.S. 157 (1986) governs this issue. The New Mexico Court of Appeals evaluated Elliott's claims under Connelly. 8 The facts of Elliott's case were different from the facts of Connelly. Thus, the result reached by the New Mexico Court of Appeals is not contrary to clearly established federal law within the meaning of 2254(d). The only question, therefore, is whether the New Mexico Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Connelly to the facts of this case. 26 Under Connelly, coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the due process clause. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. The New Mexico Court of Appeals found there was no evidence in the record to support a finding of police misconduct and concluded Elliott was not denied due process. Although Elliott had taken heroin, his ability to give a voluntary statement was not impaired. The state court's determination that the statement was voluntary and admissible was not so clearly incorrect that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the ruling was incorrect. White v. Scott, 1998 WL 165162  [unpublished disposition]; 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Therefore, Elliott is not entitled to relief under 22 U.S.C. 2254 with respect to this claim. 27 Am. Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, pp. 8-9. 28 We are puzzled at the rationale that led to the conclusion that the only question before the district court was whether the Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Connelly to the facts of Elliott's case: Not only did the Court of Appeals not undertake to apply Connelly, save indirectly by its application of Fekete, but it is an oversimplification at best to assert that the distinguishability of the facts in this case from those in Connelly satisfies the review standard set forth in 2254(d)(1). The district court offers no citation to support its assertion, and, in fact, the only case cited in the entire discussion of the Court of Appeals' treatment of Elliott's confession is again this court's unpublished decision in White. As previously explained, White, involved none of the issues raised by Elliott in these proceedings and is a merely pro forma citation. 9 29 Nevertheless, and in undertaking our own review of the state courts' rulings under 2254(d)(1) as elucidated by Williams and Van Woudenberg, we agree that the question before us on habeas review is whether the New Mexico Court of Appeals was unreasonable in its application of the standards for voluntariness articulated in Connelly and applied in Fekete to the facts of Elliott's case. We cannot conclude that it was. 30 As an initial matter, we are struck by the disjunct between the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in review of the suppression hearing proceedings and the suppression proceedings themselves. While we do not disagree with the Court of Appeals' determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding of police misconduct (Detective Barela expressly denied he coerced or threatened Elliott and the only evidence put on by the defense was the testimony of Dr. Walters, which was used to argue that it was the heroin, not Detective Barela, that rendered Elliott's statement something other than the product of his will) we note the trial judge did not analyze the issue as a legal question in terms of police coercion under Connelly at all. Rather, he addressed the question of voluntariness in strictly factual terms, concluding Elliott was coherent, had a sense of the present and future, and was not so overcome by the effects of heroin or heroin withdrawal that he could not comprehend what he was saying. (R. Tape No. CR-2-TS, 12/23/92.) 31 Nevertheless, we agree that the New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision that the admission of Elliott's statement was not an unreasonable application of Connelly. As we explained in Guerro, 983 F.2d at 1003-04, Connelly instructs that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to any finding of involuntariness regardless of a suspect's mental condition; 'absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.' Guerro at 1004 (quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164). We further explained that the constitutional due process guarantee does not protect against conduct by private parties [citation omitted], nor does it protect a defendant from his own compulsions or internally-applied pressures which are not the product of police action. Id. (citing United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1992)(finding statement of suspect who was experiencing drug withdrawal to have been voluntary)). Under these authorities, the conclusion of the New Mexico Court of Appeals that, in the absence of evidence of any misconduct by Detective Barela, Elliott was not deprived of due process was a reasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, the admission of Elliott's confession cannot form a basis for invalidating his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2254. 32 As set forth above, our inability to conclude that the admission of Elliott's confession was unconstitutional precludes us from finding that counsel's performance failures at trial altered the outcome of his case under Strickland's second prong. For this reason, our determination with respect to Elliott's second claim for habeas relief necessarily disposes of his first claim as well. 33