Opinion ID: 1119859
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructional Contentions Related to the Robbery Charge

Text: (18a) Defendant also contends that the court prejudicially erred in the robbery instructions. We agree, and reverse the robbery conviction, the related firearm-use enhancement, and the robbery special circumstance. We reject the contention that the error also requires reversal of the first degree murder verdict as to victim Houser. Although we have found sufficient evidence to support a verdict that the intent to steal arose before death, the evidence was not overwhelming. There was evidence to support a contrary finding, including defendant's statements to the police. The court gave the standard instructions on robbery and the robbery special circumstance, but did not specifically instruct that if defendant formed the intent to steal only after the killing, he was guilty at most of the lesser included offense of theft. We recently rejected defendant's contention that the court had a sua sponte duty to give such an instruction. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443-444 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].) However, the court also did not instruct on any lesser included offenses of robbery. This was error. Since there was evidence that defendant was guilty only of theft rather than robbery, the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on theft as a lesser included offense. ( People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 690; People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 351.) Nothing in the record suggests the error was invited. (See People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 827-831.) The error was prejudicial as to the robbery count and the robbery special circumstance. (19) An error in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses requires reversal unless it can be determined that the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions. ( People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 351-352.) We cannot so determine in this case. In People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 690-693, we found similar instructional error harmless, but for reasons which do not apply to this case. In Turner, the jury was given special instructions highlighting the issue of `after-formed intent.' ( Id. at p. 691, italics in original.) In contrast to Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d 346, the special instructions in this case did require the jury to confront and decide the issue of `after-formed intent.' The jurors were told emphatically not to convict defendant of robbery or first degree felony murder, or to find the robbery-murder special circumstance true, if they believed it reasonably possible that he killed for reasons unrelated to theft and stole only as an incidental afterthought. ( Id. at pp. 692-693.) (18b), (20) Here, the jury was instructed on and found true the robbery special circumstance, but the instructions did not focus on the after-formed intent question, or on whether the jury, having found defendant guilty of robbery, could find the robbery special circumstance not true. As we recently explained, although there is no sua sponte duty to give such instructions, their presence or absence is pertinent to deciding whether reversible prejudice had arisen from the trial court's erroneous failure to furnish any instructions or verdict forms on lesser included offenses supported by the evidence. ( People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 444, italics in original.) Other factors relied on in Turner in finding harmless error are absent here. In Turner, the jury found first degree felony murder based on robbery and returned a death verdict knowing that a murder in the commission of robbery was the sole basis of the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. (50 Cal.3d at p. 693.) Here, the jury was instructed on rape-felony-murder as well as robbery, and there were additional special circumstances, including three murders. Unlike Turner, we cannot say with confidence that the jury necessarily considered the question of `after-formed intent' and rejected this `mere theft' theory on its merits. ( Id. at p. 691.) Hence, we reverse the robbery count, the related firearm-use enhancement, and the robbery special circumstance. (21a) Defendant argues that the first degree murder conviction as to Houser must also be reversed because the court instructed on robbery-felony-murder as well as rape-felony-murder and premeditated murder. We disagree. (22) The general rule is that when the prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally correct and others legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the conviction cannot stand. ( People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 24; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 69.) (21b) Here, we can determine that the verdict rested on at least one correct theory. The jury found true the rape-murder special circumstance. Since the jury thus necessarily found the killing was committed in the course of a rape or attempted rape, the robbery instructions were of no consequence to the murder charge. ( People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 779 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].)