Opinion ID: 779795
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legislative History of the ACPA

Text: 27 The legislative history of the ACPA underscores the temporal sequencing that we have identified in § 1125(d)(2): 28 When a court of appropriate jurisdiction receives a complaint filed pursuant to this section, the court will notify the registrar, registry, or other authority who shall expeditiously deposit with the court documents to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name. 29 145 Cong. Rec. at H10,826. Congress's reference to a court of appropriate jurisdiction receiv[ing] a complaint filed pursuant to this section would be practically meaningless if it were read to suggest that the filing of a complaint in any district court in the United States could render that court one of appropriate jurisdiction. Clearly, appropriate jurisdiction is a status that precedes and is independent of the filing of the complaint, and is conferred by the presence of the registrar or other domain-name authority within that judicial district. Subsection (d)(2)(D) of the ACPA, echoing the language of subsection (d)(2)(A), reflects this intention of Congress: 30 Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority shall expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain name to the court. 31 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i)(I) (emphasis added). Thus, both the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that in rem jurisdiction is a preexisting fact determined by the location of the disputed domain name's registrar or a similar authority, and that the subsequent deposit of sufficient documents with a court of appropriate jurisdiction confirms the domain name's legal situs as being in that judicial district for purposes of the litigation. 32 Because we base our conclusion on an analysis of the language and structure of § 1125(d)(2), it is unnecessary to reach any constitutional questions. Cf. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448, 74 S.Ct. 190, 98 L.Ed. 179 (1953) (The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative.). Nevertheless, we note, as part of our analysis of the legislative history, that in enacting subsection (d)(2)(A), Congress plainly sought to allay any concerns that the ACPA's in rem jurisdiction might offend due process or principles of international comity: 33 This type of in rem jurisdiction still requires a nexus based upon a U.S. registry or registrar [that] would not offend international comity.... Finally, this jurisdiction does not offend due process, since the property and only the property is the subject of the jurisdiction, not other substantive personal rights of any individual defendant. 34 H.R.Rep. No. 106-412, at 14 (1999). This language makes it clear that Congress considered the registry or registrar to provide a nexus for in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA. Nowhere does the legislative history suggest that this nexus might be supplied by domain-name documentation alone. Rather, it is the presence of the domain name itself — the property [that] is the subject of the jurisdiction — in the judicial district in which the registry or registrar is located that anchors the in rem action and satisfies due process and international comity. 35 The legislative history also shows that Congress conceived of § 1125(d)(2) as authorizing the type of in rem proceeding that, in contrast to  quasi in rem `attachment' jurisdiction, was found by the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), to present few if any due process concerns. 8 145 Cong. Rec. S14,696, 14,714 (Nov. 17, 1999) (section-by-section analysis of the ACPA); see also 145 Cong. Rec. H11,769, 11,799 (Nov. 9, 1999) (conference report on H.R. 1554) (same). The Court in Shaffer observed that 36 when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest. 37 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08, 97 S.Ct. 2569; see also Chapman v. Vande Bunte, 604 F.Supp. 714, 716-17 (E.D.N.C.1985) (In a true in rem proceeding, in order to subject property to a judgment in rem, due process requires only that the property itself have certain minimum contacts with the territory of the forum.); cf. 145 Cong. Rec. at S14,714 (citing these passages from Shaffer and Chapman, and stating that the [ACPA] reinforces the view that in rem jurisdiction has continuing constitutional vitality); see also 145 Cong. Rec. at H11,799 (same). 38 In sum, we find that the legislative history of the ACPA reveals Congress's concern to establish a circumscribed basis for in rem jurisdiction that is grounded in the nexus provided by the registrar or other domain-name authority having custody of the disputed property. This congressional solicitude is fully consistent with what we find to be the plain meaning of § 1125(d)(2)(A): that an in rem action may be brought only in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located. 9 39