Opinion ID: 1597233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Royce Baker

Text: Royce Baker, mayor of Brandon from July 1977 to July 1981, acknowledged that the rezoning action on the MP & L property had been initiated by the Board in February of 1981. He stated that a rezoning action could be initiated by anyone, but was usually done by the property owner or prospective owner. However, he stated that there was never any agreement between the City and MP & L that MP & L would sell the City its building, the City would rezone the property for MP & L. He further denied any conspiracy to find MP & L a suitable property, or to rezone any property in an illegal fashion. At the close of Gray's deposition, attorneys for several of the defendants stated that they would demand to be dismissed from the suit, and would request sanctions against Roussel. Roussel denied that his suit was frivolous: Y'all make these statements that this thing is frivolous, but you don't give any reasons. I think we have plenty of evidence here to show that it's not frivolous even on Mr. Hutton. The fact that somebody didn't set down in a closed room with cigar smoke and make a plan to accomplish all of this does not keep it from being a conspiracy, and I think you attorneys need to go back and read what the Code says a conspiracy is, and I plan to pursue this thing all the way to the United States Supreme Court, if I have to, because I have been done wrong, and it has cost me almost  my health is going bad now it's getting so bad, it's dragging out so long, my health is going bad. I have considered moving out of the City of Brandon. I'm selling my place and just getting the hell out of here because I can't get any satisfaction out of the legal system in this county, and if it takes going  I have already contacted the ACLU. I hate to go to them. I've always been one of these people that thought they didn't take anything that was anything but racial, but I've already contacted the ACLU and if I have to go to some of these places outside of whatever the courts of Mississippi can do for me, I will do it because I have been done wrong, and just because Mr. Gray was maybe not a willing conspirator or Mr. Hutton was not a willing conspirator, and by that, I mean sitting down and making a plan, there still was a conspiracy by actions of these people to participate in this thing, and I plan to pursue it to the end. On September 29, 1989, the Chancellor granted MP & L's motion for summary judgment and sanctions. Finding the suit as against MP & L frivolous, the Chancellor ordered Roussel to pay MP & L $16,039.32 in attorney's fees and expenses. On October 6, 1989, the Chancellor granted Gray's motion for summary judgment and sanctions. Roussel was ordered to pay $12,041.25. On October 9, 1989, Roussel filed a Motion to Recuse, which stated in part: Lem Adams ... has had a long relationship with the Chancellor, Billy Bridges, and contributed $1000.00 to Judge Bridges' recent reelection campaign, which proved to be extremely successful. In the middle to late 1970's, Judge Bridges owned and developed property which was purchased from Morris Gray, one of the defendants herein. This property was in the same general area as the property which forms the subject of this lawsuit. Roussel asserted that because of these relationships, there is no way that Judge Bridges can render a fair and impartial decision in this case. The Final Judgment with respect to MP & L was entered on October 10, 1989. The Final Judgment with respect to Gray was entered October 20, 1989. On January 26, 1990, Roussel filed a Motion to Reconsider in the Rankin County Chancery Court. The motion stated that Judge Bridges had recused himself on October 9, 1989, and that discovery had not been completed. Roussel requested that the orders dismissing these defendants be vacated and set aside. On February 14, 1990, Roussel filed a motion with this Court styled Amendment To Motion To Reconsider, Request For Jury Trial, Filing of New Evidence, And Request For Oral Hearing With Court Reporter Present. The motion purported to present new evidence, including 1) a January 7, 1981 newspaper article, in which then-mayor Royce Baker stated the city's plan to buy the MP & L building in order to house all city operations under one roof, and: 2) a page of the minutes of the February 3, 1981 board meeting, in which it was stated that the board had initiated the matter of rezoning on the MP & L property. On May 10, 1991, Roussel filed a motion with this Court styled Motion For Leave To File Supplemental Material. Attached to this motion is a petition, apparently written and filed by Roussel himself, styled Petitioner's Response To Omissions In Appellant's Response to MP & L's Argument (And Hutton and Gray Arguments). [8] Roussel states that his attorney had failed to amend the Appellant's Response as (he) had asked, prompting him to submit this petition with various exhibits attached. Among other arguments, the petition suggests that sanctions were wrongfully imposed against him personally, because Rule 11(b) sanctions are intended for lawyers ... (they) are not intended for non-lawyers. [9] MP & L filed a motion to strike Roussel's Motion to Supplement and Petition, on the grounds that it was untimely, frivolous, and failed to comply with Supreme Court procedure. Hutton and Gray filed a Response to Roussel's motion and Petition, also requesting that both be stricken. On September 15, 1989, Roussel filed an appeal to this Court from the judgment dated August 18, 1989. On November 10, 1989, he filed an appeal from the judgment dated October 10, 1989. III. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING MELVIN B. HUTTON FROM THE LAWSUIT BY WAY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND FURTHER ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE FORM OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING MORRIS GRAY FROM THE LAWSUIT BY WAY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND FURTHER ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE FORM OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS. III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING MP & L FROM THE LAWSUIT BY WAY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND FURTHER ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE FORM OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS. Roussel contends that there are numerous disputed material facts which should have precluded the granting of summary judgments in favor of Hutton, Gray and MP & L. Roussel further contends that in awarding sanctions, Judge Bridges did not require any proof as to the amount of attorney's fees expended by Hutton. Roussel cites several excerpts from Hutton's deposition, claiming that such excerpts support his theory that Hutton was involved in the conspiracy. While it is difficult to be precise as to what, exactly, is evidence of the conspiracy, it appear that the excerpts provided are meant to show that 1) Hutton and Gray agreed that the deed would include language to the effect that a commercial building could be built on the property Gray was selling to Hutton; 2) Lem Adams represented both Hutton and Gray in the transaction; 3) the mayor had told Hutton he could construct a commercial building on the property, provided that construction begin within six months of the execution of the deed, and that he (Hutton) had obtained a permit from the City of Brandon and began construction; 4) Adams had drafted the clause concerning commercial building, based on information from Gray elicited during negotiations for the sale. Roussel cites excerpts from Gray's deposition, to support his theory that the relationship between Gray and Lem Adams is an integral part of this conspiracy. These excerpts illustrate that 1) Gray first employed Adams in 1973 or 1974; 2) Gray conveyed a residential lot to Adams as part payment for services, and had paid Adams' airfare for a trip to Honolulu; 3) Gray had discussed with Hutton his plans to build stores on the property, and had some casual discussion with the mayor about these plans, 4) Gray thought the land was zoned commercial because it was a dirt pit, and 5) Gray relied on Adams to prepare the deed and all documents relating to the closing on the property, but that he did not know at whose request the language about commercial construction had been written into the deed. As evidence of MP & L's participation in the conspiracy, Roussel suggests that MP & L and the City of Brandon attempted to have the property rezoned prior to the time MP & L actually owned it. Specifically, Roussel cites Pilgrim's deposition for evidence that the City heard the zoning application on the MP & L property one week prior to the purchase date of the deed. Roussel contends that (t)his evidence, by itself, should be sufficient to defeat MP & L's motion for Summary Judgment since it is a material disputed fact. It is not clear from this statement what, exactly, is disputed. The brief submitted jointly by Hutton and Gray asserts that summary judgment was properly granted, because the record is devoid of any evidence of involvement in the conspiracy Roussel alleges. [10] The brief also asserts that attorney's fees were properly awarded, the reasonableness of which were supported by submitted affidavits. They note that Roussel filed no counter affidavits contesting the amounts. Hutton and Gray contend that further sanctions are merited by Roussel's appeal of this case, arguing that since the suit was found by the trial court to be frivolous, the appeal is frivolous as well. MP & L's brief also asserts that Roussel totally and completely failed to develop any evidence supporting his allegations of a conspiracy. In answer to Roussel's argument concerning the initiation of rezoning procedures one week before the execution of the deed, MP & L argues that 1) MP & L did not initiate or participate in the rezoning application, and 2) the timing of the initiation of the rezoning process is immaterial, since all procedures were properly followed, Roussel had an opportunity to participate in them, and in fact ultimately prevailed. MP & L also contends that sanctions against Roussel were appropriate, and that additional sanctions are merited under Supreme Court Rule 38. A. Summary Judgment This Court employs a de novo standard in reviewing a grant of summary judgment. Owen v. Pringle, 621 So.2d 668 (Miss. 1993); Pace v. Financial Sec. Life of Miss., 608 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Miss. 1992). A trial court may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See M.R.C.P. 56; Morgan v. City of Ruleville, 627 So.2d 275 (Miss. 1993); Drummond v. Buckley, 627 So.2d 264 (Miss. 1993); Owen, supra . A material fact is one which tends to resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties. Morgan, supra, citing Webb v. City of Newton, 583 So.2d 946, 949 (Miss. 1991). Evidentiary matters before the court must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Skelton v. Twin County Rural Elec. Ass'n., 611 So.2d 931, 935 (Miss. 1992). However, the nonmoving party may not defeat the motion merely by making general allegations or unsupported denials of material fact; it must set forth specific facts showing that there are indeed issues for trial. Drummond, supra; Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, 564 So.2d 1346, 1356 (1990). We look to the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Roussel, to determine if he has raised any issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motions by Gray, Hutton and MP & L for summary judgment. B. Conspiracy Roussel alleges a civil conspiracy. In the context of civil conspiracy, this Court has stated that a conspiracy is a combination of persons for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose unlawfully. Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 255 (Miss. 1985), citing Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Coldwater, 234 Miss. 615, 636, 106 So.2d 375, 381 (1958). See also Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So.2d 1140, 1156 (Miss. 1990). Civil conspiracy resulting in damage may give rise to a right of recovery. Shaw, supra, citing Bailey v. Richards, 236 Miss. 523, 537-8, 111 So.2d 402, 407-8 (1959). For example, in Ryals, supra, this Court upheld the trial court's rejection of a civil conspiracy claim, which alleged that several landowners and a Sheriff had conspired to interfere with the plaintiff's business enterprises. The Court held that the trial judge had correctly found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the elements of a civil conspiracy. Ryals, 580 So.2d at 1156. In the case at bar, we examine the record to determine if Hutton, Gray, or MP & L combined with each other or with other defendants for an unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose unlawfully, as Roussel has charged in his complaint.