Opinion ID: 2464115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Summary judgment in favor of the Division of Parole and Probation

Text: On appeal, Stockmeier contends that summary judgment in favor of the Division of Parole and Probation was improper because the Division had a duty to correct his PSI. Stockmeier does not identify any express authority that permits the Division to amend a prisoner's PSI after sentencing, yet he insists that the Division has inherent authority to correct its own mistakes and an implied power to amend a prisoner's PSI at any time. These contentions are not supported by Nevada law. An administrative agency's powers are generally limited to the powers set forth by statute, although certain powers may be implied even though they were not expressly granted by statute, when those powers are necessary to the agency's performance of its enumerated duties. City of Henderson v. Kilgore, 122 Nev. 331, 334, 131 P.3d 11, 13 (2006). In other words, for implied authority to exist, the implicitly authorized act must be essential to carrying out an express duty. Id. at 335, 131 P.3d at 14. Thus, in order to determine whether the Division had express or implied authority to amend Stockmeier's PSI, it is necessary to review the relevant statutes. The Division of Parole and Probation is mandated by statute to prepare a PSI to be used at sentencing for any defendant who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a felony. NRS 176.135(1). A PSI contains information about the defendant's prior criminal record, the circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior and the offense, and the impact of the offense on the victim. NRS 176.145(1). Because the sentencing court will rely on a defendant's PSI, the PSI must not include information based on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. Goodson v. State, 98 Nev. 493, 495-96, 654 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1982). To that end, after preparing a PSI, the Division must disclose the report's factual content to the prosecuting attorney, defense counsel, and the defendant, and give the parties the opportunity to object to any of the PSI's factual allegations. [2] NRS 176.156(1); see also Shields v. State, 97 Nev. 472, 472-73, 634 P.2d 468, 468-69 (1981) (reversing and remanding a defendant's sentence because he was not provided with police reports that were included in the PSI and were material to the district court's sentencing decision). Once a defendant is sentenced, the Division has no further statutory duties with regard to the defendant's PSI. See generally NRS 176.133-.159; NRS 213.1071-.1078; NRS 213.1092-.10988. Apart from the duties identified in the statute set out above, the Division does not have any statutory duties with regard to a prisoner's PSI. Thus, the Division has no express statutory authority to amend a prisoner's PSI after sentencing. See NRS 176.133-.159; NRS 213.1071-.1078; NRS 213.1092-.10988. And because the Division does not have any express post-sentencing duties related to a prisoner's PSI, the Division does not have any implied authority to amend a prisoner's PSI once he has been sentenced. See City of Henderson, 122 Nev. at 335, 131 P.3d at 14. Given that the Division had no authority to amend Stockmeier's PSI, it could not have been liable in tort for declining to do so, and thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Division on Stockmeier's tort claim. [3]