Opinion ID: 660294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Examination of Brito

Text: 10 The district court has discretionary authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence, including the power to limit cross-examination. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-80, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435-36, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.1992). The district court's discretion is limited, however, by the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 8 Id. A central function of the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination is to expose the witness' motivation in testifying. Jenkins v. Wainwright, 763 F.2d 1390, 1392 (11th Cir.1985) (This court has long recognized the particular importance of searching cross-examination of witnesses who have substantial incentive to cooperate with the prosecution.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2290, 90 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). Full cross-examination by defense counsel is especially critical when the witness sought to be questioned is the chief government witness. Lankford, 955 F.2d at 1548. The right to cross-examine, however, is not unlimited. Once there is sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, further questioning is within the district court's discretion. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1337 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 2089, 77 L.Ed.2d 300 and cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1391 (1983). 11 In this case, the district court limited Chaves' cross-examination of the chief government witness against him, Orlando Brito. Chaves sought to elicit from Brito, as evidence of a possible motive for Brito's cooperation with the prosecution, the Florida state attorney's nolle prosequi of a 1983 state false imprisonment charge against Brito. 9 The district court also forbade cross-examination concerning alleged wife-beating by Brito and the fact that Brito had formerly been shot. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by so limiting the cross-examination of Brito. 12 As previously noted, [t]he Sixth Amendment does not require unlimited inquiry into the potential bias of a witness. United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1452 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987). The test for the Confrontation Clause is whether a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of the witness' credibility had counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. at 1436; United States v. Leavitt, 878 F.2d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 968, 110 S.Ct. 415, 107 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). Here, all seven defense counsel, including Chaves' attorney, had the opportunity to raise doubts about Brito's credibility, and their examinations brought out that Brito had provided testimony favorable to the government in exchange for lenient treatment. In particular, counsel for Chaves cross-examined Brito as to the terms of his federal plea agreement and entered the agreement into evidence. Furthermore, when asked by a defense attorney to list all the state charges for which he was receiving leniency, Brito excluded the false imprisonment charge. 10 Therefore, a reasonable juror would not have received a different impression about Brito's motivation for testifying had the district court permitted cross-examination about the state false imprisonment charge. See United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 874-75 (11th Cir.1984) (affirming district court's exclusion of cross-examination, in part because jury was exposed to potential for bias), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1166, 105 S.Ct. 928, 83 L.Ed.2d 939 (1985). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by forbidding this line of cross-examination. 11