Opinion ID: 2157565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the ordinance intend to include in its coverage members of the bar engaged in the practice of their profession?

Text: There are words in the title [1] and in the definitions section of the ordinance that compel an affirmative answer to that question. The title states that the tax is imposed on certain businesses but including, inter alia, professions, occupations and vocations. Then, in Section 1, business is defined as the carrying on of any . . . profession, vocation, . . . service or business. It would seem plain, therefore, that the intention of the ordinance was to impose the tax, notwithstanding its designation as a mercantile license tax, on professions, occupations and vocations as well as on mercantile establishments, an intention given strong emphasis by the fact that business is defined as carrying on or exercising for gain or profit of any  service or business. It is a familiar canon of construction of statutes and ordinances, as indeed of contracts, wills, and other written instruments, that presumably every word, sentence or provision therein is intended for some purpose, and accordingly must be given effect. It is argued that a so-called mercantile license tax, merely because of such designation, can be applied only to those engaged in trade or business, but we have frequently held that the name given to a tax is far from conclusive in determining its real nature. It is the substance of the law or ordinance, rather than the designation or name given it by the legislative body, that is controlling in that regard: Flynn v. Horst, 356 Pa. 20, 27, 29, 51 A. 2d 54, 58; Armour & Co. v. Pittsburgh, 363 Pa. 109, 112, 69 A. 2d 405, 407; National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 604, 615, 98 A. 2d 182, 187, 188. A legislative body may, in a statute or ordinance, furnish its own definitions of words and phrases used therein in order to guide and direct judicial determination of the intendments of the legislation although such definitions may be different from ordinary usage; it may create its own dictionary to be applied to the particular law or ordinance in question. It was entirely competent, therefore, for the ordinance to include professions in its definition of businesses in order to explain the coverage it intended by its use of the latter term. In National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 604, 609, 98 A. 2d 182, 185, it was stated, concerning this same ordinance, that while, ordinarily, mercantile license taxes have been imposed only upon merchants, there was neither law nor reason why a tax, even though so designated, could not be extended to persons otherwise engaged, and it was pointed out that the Acts of May 23, 1949, P.L. 1669, and May 10, 1951, P.L. 265, were in fact almost as broad as this ordinance and defined the word business in nearly the same language; also that the Pittsburgh Mercantile License Tax which was the subject of discussion in Federal Drug Co. v. Pittsburgh, 358 Pa. 454, 57 A. 2d 849, imposed liability upon persons engaged in many non-mercantile operations. In fact, the appellants in the National Biscuit Co. case included insurance agents and brokers, and we held that they were liable for the tax under this ordinance. Nor may it be amiss to add that, in a broader sense, a professional man sells [2] his services for a financial consideration just as a business man sells his merchandise, although his activities are attended, in the case of the lawyer or doctor, with a certain measure of idealistic and altruistic motivations which do not necessarily pertain to the market place. Plaintiff suggests that what the ordinance contemplated in regard to those engaged in professional activities was that the tax should apply, not to income derived from services rendered, but merely to receipts from sales transactions, if any, incidental to the practice of their professions,  in other words, not to their professional but to their non-professional activities. In support of that proposition plaintiff points to such cases as Commonwealth v. Lutz, 284 Pa. 184, 130 A. 410; Biser's Appeal, 317 Pa. 190, 176 A. 200; Commonwealth v. Dinnien, 320 Pa. 257, 182 A. 542; Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Heat & Power Co., 333 Pa. 46, 3 A. 2d 412; Commonwealth v. Miller, 337 Pa. 246, 11 A. 2d 141, in all of which the tax involved was held to apply to sales of merchandise  fixtures and supplies by a plumber, medicines by a pharmacist, caskets and shrouds by an undertaker, oil burners by a heat and power company, and eyeglasses by an optometrist  but not to apply to the skilled or professional services rendered in connection with those sales. In all those cases, however, the tax was levied under statutes which expressly imposed it only on vendors of, or dealers in, goods, wares and merchandise, and not, as in the present case, also upon those engaged in professions, occupations and vocations or rendering service. The cases thus relied upon by plaintiff are, therefore, not at all in point. We are, then, clearly of opinion that the ordinance here in question was intended to include those engaged in professions  and therefore lawyers  in its coverage.