Opinion ID: 1702591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: The parties correctly assert that the terms `legally resides,' `inhabitant,' `resident,' etc., when used in connection with political rights are synonymous with domicile. Mitchell v. Kinney, 242 Ala. 196 at 203, 5 So.2d 788 (1942). Osborn argues that he intended to retain his domicile in Attalla, but we find that when he sold his last residence within the city limits, his domicile of necessity was his residence on Highway 431. See Mitchell v. Kinney, supra . Nor could his domicile have changed from the Highway 431 house to the Fifth Street house until he actually moved out of the former into the latter. In order to acquire a domicile of choice there must be both an abandonment of the former domicile with no present intention of return, and the establishment of another place of residence with the intention to remain permanently, or at least for an unlimited time .... Ex Parte Phillips, 275 Ala. 80, at 83, 152 So.2d 144 (1963). Having acquired a domicile at the Highway 431 house, Osborn would have to show much more than that he was building a house in town to prove a change of domicile. Osborn contends that even if the trial court was correct in holding that he was not a resident of Attalla, the statute which requires a councilman to be a resident of the town in which he is elected is unconstitutional, at least as applied to him. The statute in question is Code 1975, § 11-43-1, Qualifications and residence of mayors, councilmen and officers: Every mayor, councilman and officer elected by the whole electorate of the city or town shall be a resident and qualified elector of the city or town in which he shall have been elected and shall reside within the limits of the city or town during his term of office. The councilmen shall be qualified electors of said city or town, residing within the limits of the ward from which they shall have been elected and shall reside within the limits of said ward during the term of their office. Osborn asserts that this statute is an infringement on the right to be a candidate for office, that it can be justified only by a compelling state interest, and that all doubts must be resolved in the candidate's favor. McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F.Supp. 289 (M.D.Ala.1972). We find no doubts to be resolved in Osborn's favor. He tries to distinguish Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F.Supp. 107 (M.D.Ala. 1970), aff'd 401 U.S. 968, 91 S.Ct. 1189, 28 L.Ed.2d 318 (1971), 405 U.S. 1035, 92 S.Ct. 1304, 31 L.Ed.2d 576 (1972), cited by appellee O'Barr. In Hadnott a three-judge federal district court upheld a one-year pre-election residency requirement for Alabama circuit court judges. The requirement of § 11-43-1 that a councilman be a resident of his ward at the time of his election raises no constitutional problems. See Hadnott, supra, McKinney, supra . We make no ruling on the 90-day pre-election requirement imposed by the form Mr. Osborn signed because the trial judge explicitly based his holding on the fact that Osborn was not a resident of Attalla at the time of the election. Osborn contends that even if this statute is constitutional on its face, it is unconstitutional as applied to him. We disagree with this contention, also. Because of the difference in treatment between residents within the city and those without in terms of taxation, utility service, police and fire protection, etc., we hold that the fact of Osborn's out-of-town residence outweighs any feeling he has that Attalla is his home in determining his qualification for office. We note that the facts of this case make no proof that Osborn has even yet abandoned his domicile on Highway 431. Having determined that Osborn was not a resident of the City of Attalla, the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.