Opinion ID: 2112402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnston's conduct constituted one act of Grand Theft and seventeen acts of Misuse or Alteration of a Brand.

Text: Johnston's second contention on appeal is that he was improperly convicted on 19 counts of Grand Theft and 17 counts of Misuse or Alteration of a Brand. He contends the State's position may be framed as follows: that these thefts were pursuant to one intention, general plan or scheme. Therefore, he posits that his conduct amounts to only one count of grand theft. He relies on the well-established rule that in a series of takings from the same individual, there is a single theft if the takings are pursuant to one continuing impulse, intent, plan or scheme, but multiple counts if each taking is the result of a separate independent impulse or intent. Annot. 53 A.L.R.3d 398 (1973); Z.R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law & Procedure § 450 (1957); State v. Kieffer, 17 S.D. 67, 95 N.W. 289 (1903). We adopt this authority and readopt this reasoning holding that where the State obtains an indictment or files an information or complaint which contains multiple charges that are premised upon a series of takings from one victim, the fact finder may, upon trial of those charges, determine if the successive takings are associated with a single sustained criminal intent or if each taking is the result of a separate independent impulse or intent. Those convicted of such crimes may, on appeal, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence which supports the jury's verdict. See, State v. Pedroncelli, 100 N.M. 678, 675 P.2d 127 (1984). This is precisely the advocacy before us. Johnston argues the only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence is that all the takings and brandings were, at best, pursuant to one general intent or scheme. In any event, he urges there is no reasonable basis in the record for concluding that he had 19 separate schemes of Grand Theft and 17 separate schemes of Misuse or Alteration of a Brand. We find some merit in Johnston's argument. Whether there were separate independent takings or one general scheme is a question of fact for the jury, based on the particular circumstances of each case. People v. Robinson, 97 Misc.2d 47, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1978); State v. Vining, 2 Wash.App. 802, 472 P.2d 564 (1970). Thus, our standard of review is whether or not there is evidence in the record, which if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each count. In making this determination, this Court will accept that evidence and the most favorable inferences that can fairly be drawn therefrom which will support the verdict. State v. Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 477 (S.D.1990). We must now judicially weigh the counts under consideration.