Opinion ID: 4195259
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Record Supports Conversion by

Text: Cities There is no dispute that Hall has now, at the very least, paid Cities’ bill in full. Indeed, as noted above, there are various ways in which the evidence could support a finding that Hall overpaid Cities. First, the record evidence does not place beyond dispute that the $169.70 tip on the final bill was mandatory. A jury could find that the tip was optional, but that Cities effectively extracted it from her with the aid of the police, amounting to conversion. Second, even if Hall owed a tip, the evidence showed she signed a credit card receipt for the full amount, including that tip, and that Hall’s party also put in the bill book cash which Cities never credited or returned to 18 her. The evidence thus could readily support a determination that Hall overpaid, having left cash, but also ultimately paying the full amount of the bill, including tip, with her credit card. Whether this claim is best analyzed under the conversion doctrine as Hall asserts, see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Burden, 489 A.2d 494, 495 (D.C. 1985) (conversion doctrine imposes liability for “any unlawful exercise of ownership, dominion or control over the personal property of another in denial or repudiation of his rights thereto”), or is more aptly viewed as a claim of unjust enrichment, see Falconi-Sachs v. LPF Senate Square, LLC, 142 A.3d 550, 556 (D.C. 2016) (unjust enrichment occurs where “a person retains a benefit (usually money) which in justice and equity belongs to another”), there is a triable factual dispute over whether Hall unwillingly overpaid Cities. The district court treated the tip as mandatory and as unpaid, but there is no record evidence to require that inference. See Hall, 2016 WL 1452325, at . Moreover, the record could support a finding that the circumstances under which Hall signed for the full amount of the bill—in handcuffs in the back of a police cruiser—were coercive. See Hall Dep. 32:12-14; Appellant Br. at 22. Regardless of whether the tip was required or Hall’s signature coerced, once Hall had signed for $1,104.74, the cash left in the bill book was a clear windfall to Cities. Count VII alleging conversion is thus remanded for further proceedings. II. Probable Cause-Related Claims Against Officer Lee Dismissed on the Pleadings The second cluster of claims turns on whether the police arrested Hall without the requisite justification under the Fourth Amendment and the common law. Unlike the claims just discussed, which the district court disposed of at the summary judgment stage, Officer Lee filed and the court 19 granted a motion to dismiss these claims on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The court determined that Hall’s own allegations supported probable cause, and that in any event Officer Lee was entitled to qualified immunity on the conduct alleged. It thus dismissed Hall’s section 1983 false arrest and common law false arrest and imprisonment claims for failure to state legally cognizable claims. Hall, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 121. We review those determinations de novo, asking whether, treating the plaintiff’s allegations as true and reading them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint shows that defendants necessarily acted with probable cause to arrest or, if not, whether Officer Lee would be entitled to qualified immunity from liability for her actions. Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 287; Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 129-30 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A Rule 12(c) motion considers the defendants’ answers together with the complaint, so we take into account Officer Lee’s Answer asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in response to the section 1983 claims. See Defendant Officer Alice Lee’s Answer to the Complaint at 12, 1:13-cv-00324 (filed July 11, 2013); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding that defendant bears the burden of pleading qualified immunity defense). We hold that the complaint alleges action by Officer Lee that no reasonable officer would have taken, and thus was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the common law. As discussed in more detail below, we remand the false arrest and imprisonment claims to the district court for further proceedings. 1 1 Because she did not raise them in her briefs on appeal, Hall forfeited her claims of intentional and negligent infliction of 20 a. Section 1983 False Arrest Claim Against Officer Lee Hall’s first count charged Officer Lee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Compl. ¶ 44. The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for any arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 20809 (1979). Officers may conduct brief investigatory stops supported only by reasonable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), which is a “less demanding standard than probable cause” in terms of both the reliability and the extensiveness of the information required. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); accord Navarette v. California, 134 emotional distress, and negligence by Officer Lee. See Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Hall argues that she preserved those claims on appeal by broadly contending that “[t]he trial [c]ourt had no legal basis to dismiss any of the Appellant’s claims,” and that “absolutely no basis whatsoever existed for judgment on the pleadings in any respect.” Appellant Br. at 5, 8; see Reply Br. at 6-7. The first statement appeared in the summary of argument and the latter in a section heading. Without any arguments advancing the disputed claims, such blanket, conclusory assertions are insufficient to preserve them. See Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Bryant v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Hall also failed to preserve her negligence claim against the District. Although she did include in her appellate brief a cursory discussion of that negligence claim, see Appellant Br. at 11, Hall did not defend it before the district court, see Hall, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 122; see also Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 1:13cv-00324 (filed May 6, 2014). It is therefore forfeited. See District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It is well settled that issues and legal theories not asserted at the District Court level ordinarily will not be heard on appeal.”). 21 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). In her deposition, Officer Lee characterized her encounter with Hall as a justified Terry stop. See Lee Dep., 25:20-21. But the character of Officer Lee’s seizure of Hall does not turn on whether she intended it to be an arrest. And, tellingly, Officer Lee does not maintain on appeal that the encounter was an investigative stop rather than an arrest. Instead, she argues only that the facts pleaded demonstrate that she acted with probable cause to arrest Hall. See Appellee Br. 19. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a stop that is unduly prolonged or intrusive transforms from an investigative stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). The point at which an investigative stop becomes an arrest is not marked with a bright line. See id. Rather, the Court has “emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.” Id. In other words, investigative detention must last “no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Hutchinson, 408 F.3d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)). Relevant to that inquiry, and particularly germane on these alleged facts, is “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. An investigatory stop “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information” would have been “most reasonable in light of the facts known to [Lee] at the time.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). Hall’s complaint alleges that Lee did not, however, undertake even the most basic means of investigation that could “confirm or dispel [her] 22 suspicions quickly.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686; accord Compl. ¶ 23. Officer Lee did not attempt to verify Cities’ contentions before handcuffing Hall, forcibly removing her from the bar, and putting her in the police cruiser. Compl. ¶¶ 23-28. And Lee failed to ask simple questions that might have uncovered that Hall had already provided her credit card, Cities may have already charged $935.04 to that card, Hall never actually refused to pay or left under circumstances suggesting she did not intend to return to settle her bill, and Hall’s friends were still present and might have had the authority and intention to pay or to contact Hall to confirm her intentions. See Id. ¶¶ 19, 35. Moreover, Lee detained Hall for forty-five minutes, which a jury could find to be far longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of an investigative stop, particularly given that the police found Hall close to Cities and all the relevant witnesses. On the facts as alleged, Officer Lee’s detention of Hall amounted to an arrest. We are mindful that courts should not indulge in “unrealistic second-guessing” of an officer’s assessment in a “swiftly developing situation.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. But here, on the facts as pleaded, the matter was quickly resolved once the police asked Hall a few, basic questions. In other words, we need not indulge any counterfactuals. Another officer’s actions at the scene show that, if Officer Lee had simply asked Hall about the bill Cities claimed that Hall refused to pay, Lee quickly would have discovered that Hall’s arrest and detention were unnecessary and unjustified. Having concluded that Hall’s detention was an arrest, not a mere investigatory stop, we consider whether Officer Lee acted with the requisite probable cause. Whether an officer acted with probable cause is an objective inquiry, dependent on whether the officer acted on the basis of “reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent 23 [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The precise point at which probable cause arises is “fluid,” and requires a “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 238-39 (1983). Probable cause to arrest requires at least some evidence supporting each element of the offense. The complaint alleges Officer Lee told Hall she was being detained for committing “[t]heft of services.” Compl. ¶ 24. Prima facie evidence of theft of services is evidence that “a person obtained services that he or she knew or had reason to believe were available to him or her only for compensation,” but the person “departed from the place where the services were obtained knowing or having reason to believe that no payment had been made for the services rendered.” D.C. CODE § 22-3211(c). According to the complaint, the officers acted on the basis of a phone call from Cities accusing Hall of theft of services. See Compl. ¶ 36. The complaint alleges the call was placed after Cities had already charged Hall’s bill to her card and received approval from the credit card company. The facts as alleged thus do not support the reported theft of services. There are no allegations, moreover, that officers took even the simplest steps to verify the details of the ostensible payment refusal. Taking the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to Hall and in the absence of information to corroborate Cities’ assertions that Hall abandoned her bill, the district court could not conclude as a matter of law that the police had probable cause to conclude that Hall had committed or was committing theft of services. A phone call from a member of the public lodging a complaint is not alone probable cause when the caller is not known to the police as reliable and when the complaint could readily be verified but is not (as here, where the police failed to 24 ask Hall whether she in fact refused to pay)—at least in a circumstance such as the complaint Cities lodged here, which did not implicate an emergency situation, threatening conduct, a matter of public safety, or similar urgent concerns. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 (known reliable informant’s tip “that was immediately verifiable at the scene” supported reasonable suspicion to justify a stop, but “may have been insufficient for a[n] arrest or search warrant”); see also Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (describing as a “close case,” but finding police had reasonable suspicion for a brief investigative stop of vehicle based on anonymous 911 call reporting that a specific vehicle had run caller’s car off the road); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272-73 (2000) (holding anonymous tip that accurately described subject’s location and appearance, but did not show reliability in its “assertion of illegality,” did not provide reasonable suspicion, while acknowledging potential “circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability.”). If it were otherwise, members of the public could routinely call the police and, on the caller’s word alone, get their enemies locked up. The decisions of courts reviewing similar circumstances reinforce the inadequacy of the facts as alleged to show probable cause. In Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985), police responded to a call from a manager at the Marketplace Restaurant who told them that five people consumed drinks, soups, and salads and left without paying. Id. at 1340. The manager described the suspects and their vehicles, said the suspects were staying overnight at a nearby camping area, and said they would press charges should the suspects be apprehended. Id. Police went to the campground, found the vehicles the manager had described, and knocked on the doors of the campers in which the suspects were sleeping. The officers entered the campers, asked whether the occupants 25 had been at the Marketplace Restaurant and, upon hearing they had, arrested them all. The officers took the suspects to jail where they detained them for approximately four hours. Id. at 1340-41. The Moore court lamented that the “entire episode [might] have been avoided if the officer[s] . . . had used reasonable judgment and conducted a proper investigation, inquiring both as to the plaintiffs’ presence in the restaurant and the dispute over the bill.” Id. at 1345-46. The record showed the campers presented no risk of flight nor any danger to officers. There was no allegation of any serious crime; only a small dinner bill was at stake in the claimed theft of services. Id. at 1345. Therefore, the court determined, the deputies’ investigation at the scene was potentially insufficient and the potential want of probable cause remained an open jury question. Id. at 1347. Similarly, in Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 1995), a family of three attempted to use a half-price coupon to pay for part of their $25 meal. Id. at 234. The restaurant told them the coupon could not be used. Id. In protest, the family left $15 and the coupon to cover the meal. Id. The restaurant called 911 and reported a theft. Id. A responding officer testified that the reported theft “did not seem to be [of] a very large amount.” Id. Nonetheless, officers tracked the family to a second restaurant where the family had relocated, followed one of the family members into the women’s restroom, and “after a brief discussion told [the woman] that she was under arrest.” Id. Before the arrest, the woman acknowledged that there had been a dispute over the cost of the meal and did not claim to have paid the full price demanded, but the court held that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest. Id. at 234-35. 26 When pressed at oral argument for any more direct support, the District of Columbia cited Royster v. Nichols, 698 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2012), but that decision also fails to support a determination that the officers had probable cause in this case. In Royster, the Eighth Circuit concluded that police had probable cause to arrest Royster for theft of services after he refused to sign his credit card receipt when prompted to do so by the police. Id. at 684-86, 689-90. Here, Hall did just the opposite. Finally, Officer Lee asserts qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields officers from suit for false arrest when, “in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed,” a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest was lawful. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)); accord Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In other words, “if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed” to arrest Hall on the facts as Hall alleged them, Officer Lee would be entitled to immunity. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228. Cities’ phone call giving a one-sided and uncorroborated account of events was not “reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent [officer] in believing” that Hall committed theft of services. Id. No reasonable officer would have arrested Hall for theft of services, as Officer Lee did, without even attempting to verify that Hall indeed refused and did not intend to pay her bill. Because on the allegations of the complaint Lee’s detention of Hall constituted a de facto arrest, and Lee acted without probable cause or even a reasonable claim thereto, judgment on the pleadings was not warranted on Hall’s section 1983 false arrest claim against Lee. 27 b. Common Law False Arrest and Imprisonment Claims Against Officer Lee The lack of probable cause for Hall’s arrest also supports vacatur of the order dismissing on the pleadings Hall’s common law false arrest and imprisonment claims. Under D.C. common law, false arrest and false imprisonment are as a practical matter indistinguishable. Enders v. District of Columbia, 4 A.3d 457, 461 (D.C. 2010). The essential elements of liability are “(1) the detention or restraint of one against his or her will, and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.” Id. (quoting 32 AM. J UR. 2d § 7 (2007)); see also Harris v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 776 F.3d 907, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The central question here is whether the arrest was justified—that is, whether it was supported by probable cause. As we discussed above, the allegations of the complaint do not show probable cause to arrest Hall. Accordingly, judgment on the common law false arrest and imprisonment claims against Officer Lee is vacated.