Opinion ID: 1179505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the relevance of oregon law

Text: Before moving on to my own analysis of warrantless automobile searches, it is worthwhile, for two reasons, to consider Oregon law on the question. First, the majority relies on an Oregon case, but it presents the case out of context. Returned to context, the case fails to support the majority. Second, Oregon has taken an approach to this question which, in general, I propose we follow. The majority relies on State v. Kock, 302 Or. 29, 725 P.2d 1285 (1986), and correctly points out that Kock involved facts similar to those presented in the case before us. The police, acting with probable cause but without a warrant, searched a parked car prior to arresting the suspect. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, however, the resemblance ends there. The majority states that: The Oregon court rejected an argument that this was a search incident to arrest and focused on the narrow issue that is also before us. Majority, at 734. This is incorrect. Kock and this case do not present the same issue for the simple reason that the governing law in Oregon is vastly different from the governing law in Washington. The relevant provision of the Oregon constitution reads as follows: No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. Oregon Const. art. 1, § 9. Obviously, this provision is modeled on the Fourth Amendment, which it paraphrases almost exactly. As we have often noted, however, our own constitutional convention expressly rejected the Fourth Amendment model in favor of an express guaranty of privacy. Const. art. 1, § 7; Ringer, 100 Wn.2d at 690; Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 148. In the course of construing Oregon's search and seizure provision, the Oregon court has fashioned a state law automobile exception which, not surprisingly, is similar to that recognized by the Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment. This case presents for us the heretofore unanswered question: Is there an automobile exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution? We hold that there is such an exception, provided (1) that the automobile is mobile at the time it is stopped by police or other governmental authority, and (2) that probable cause exists for the search of the vehicle. By adopting such a position, we align ourselves with the traditional federal automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement set forth in the seminal case of Carroll v. United States [267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925)]. State v. Brown, 301 Or. 268, 274, 721 P.2d 1357 (1986). Oregon's state law automobile exception is entirely distinct from either the warrant exception for searches incident to arrest or the exception for searches conducted under exigent circumstances. This much is evident from the Oregon court's statement of the issues in Kock. We allowed review to decide whether the warrantless entry of the car to retrieve the suspected stolen property was lawful as a search incident to arrest and whether the search of defendant's car was lawful either under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as described in State v. Brown [301 Or. 268, 721 P.2d 1357 (1986)], or, alternatively, under an individualized showing of exigent circumstances. 302 Or. at 32. The principal issue before the court in Kock was whether actual mobility is a necessary minimum for the application of the state law automobile exception. Put another way, the question was whether Oregon, in construing its own constitution, would follow the United States Supreme Court in concluding that inherent mobility is sufficient to trigger the automobile exception for warrantless searches. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 73 L.Ed.2d 750, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (1982); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n. 9, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970). Declining to follow the federal rule, the court in Kock decided to require actual mobility. Although logically it can be argued that the rationale of the seminal case of Carroll v. United States [267 U.S. 132, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925)], and its progeny, including United States v. Ross [456 U.S. 798, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982)], would justify extending the automobile exception to automobiles that are capable of mobility, we elect to draw the so-called bright line of Brown just where we left it in that case: Searches of automobiles that have just been lawfully stopped by police may be searched without a warrant and without a demonstration of exigent circumstances when police have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or crime evidence. Kock, at 32-33. The foregoing shows why it is incorrect to say that the court in Kock focused on the narrow issue that is also before us. Majority, at 734. The issue before the Oregon court was the scope of its state law automobile exception; specifically whether to follow a rule of inherent mobility. As for the issue before us  whether or not to require an individualized showing of exigent circumstances to justify warrantless automobile searches  Oregon had already decided it in Brown. And, as the majority does not say, Brown reached the same conclusion that Stroud implies. A case-by-case approach to exigent circumstances where automobiles are concerned is unrealistic from a police officer's point of view and unwise from society's point of view. We are convinced that adoption of a  per se exigency rule is a sound approach which provides the clearest guidelines for police in conducting automobile searches. Exigencies should not be determined on a case-by-case basis. Police need clear guidelines by which they can gauge and regulate their conduct rather than trying to follow a complex set of rules dependent upon particular facts regarding the time, location and manner of highway stops. 301 Or. at 277. Consequently, the majority is correct in spite of itself. We should follow our sister state. We should abide by the logic of Stroud and Brown and avoid foolish experiments with case-by-case analysis in this area. Instead, we should formulate a comprehensive bright-line rule to govern warrantless automobile searches. We have already articulated a bright-line rule for the incident to arrest leg of Ringer. We should use this case to articulate a bright-line rule for the exigent circumstances leg.