Opinion ID: 590027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dedication to Particular Use

Text: 27 Plaintiff relies on a series of cases involving marble slabs and articles fashioned from marble for the proposition that 90% dedication to a particular use is sufficient to make merchandise a manufactured article. In United States v. Quality Marble & Granite Co., 48 CCPA 50, C.A.D. 763 (1960), the merchandise consisted of square, rectangular, and round pieces of marble of three-quarters and five-eighths of an inch in thickness. The marble was polished on one side and the top edges were slightly rounded. The rectangular pieces had many uses. Ninety percent of the round pieces, however, were used as table tops. All of the merchandise was used in its imported condition. Id. at 51. 28 The government contended the merchandise was properly classifiable as wholly or partly manufactured articles. The importer claimed the correct classification was as the input material marble slabs. The Court of Appeals found that to use the marble in any way other than in the condition in which it was imported would nullify part of the work which had already been done on [it]. Id. at 53. The court held the merchandise was classifiable as wholly or partly manufactured articles even though it was susceptible to other uses. See also A.P. Baldechi & Son v. United States, 56 CCPA 112, C.A.D. 963, 420 F.2d 756 (1969) (following Quality Marble ). 29 In United States v. Selectile Co., 49 CCPA 116, C.A.D. 805 (1962), the court faced essentially the identical issue. In this case, however, the merchandise was often ... cut to the correct dimensions for the particular installation, either in length or width, or in both dimensions.... None of the larger pieces was used in the condition as imported. Id. at 118 (quoting opinion of the Customs Court). The court held the imported merchandise is nothing more than material which appellees stock in sizes most adaptable to their marble installation business. Under these circumstances, ... the merchandise cannot be considered 'articles'.... Id. at 119-20. The court distinguished Quality Marble on the fact that 90% of the merchandise in that case was used in its imported condition. Id. at 120. 30 In its brief, the government has made no attempt to distinguish these cases. Nevertheless, the government argues that following Quality Marble would produce results contrary to Congressional intent. 31 Plaintiff also relies on Permagrain Prods., Inc. v. United States, 9 CIT 426, 623 F.Supp. 1246 (1985), aff'd, 4 Fed.Cir. (T) 87, 791 F.2d 914 (1986), where the merchandise was wood parquet flooring tiles. Customs classified the merchandise as other wood flooring and the plaintiff maintained it was properly classifiable as hardwood lumber, rough, dressed or worked. Testimony at trial established that a de minimis percentage of the merchandise was put to a use other than as flooring. Id. at 437, 623 F.Supp. at 1255. 32 The court stated that if the lumber has been processed to the extent that it itself became the article for which the material was intended, then it is dutiable as a manufacture of wood and not as lumber. Id. at 435, 623 F.Supp. at 1253 (quoting A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States, 61 Cust.Ct. 66, 72, C.D. 3530, 287 F.Supp. 1016, 1021 (1968)) (emphasis in original). The court held the merchandise had been advanced to the degree that it ceased to be lumber and was classifiable as flooring. Id. 9 C.I.T. at 435-36, 623 F.Supp. at 1254. 33 These cases make it clear that merchandise may fall within a classification for manufactured articles even though as much as 10% of it is put to uses inconsistent with that classification. Consequently, the fact that 10% of the panels at issue are put to alternative uses is not dispositive. 34 The government relies upon C.T. Takahashi & Co. v. United States, 74 Cust.Ct. 38, C.D. 4583 (1975) as authority for its argument that the wall panels and ceiling tile are an input material classifiable as hardboard. See Defendant's Brief at 38-43. Takahashi considered the classification of plywood wall panels that had been decorated with face grooving and edgework. The paneling was known to the trade and advertised as plywood. Plaintiff maintained the proper classification was manufactures of wood rather than plywood. The court held the grooved plywood paneling had not been subjected to a manufacturing process that caused it to lose its identity as plywood. Id. at 49. 35 The Takahashi decision emphasized that each case stands upon its own particular facts and that whether merchandise is an article rather than an input material depends upon the nature of the material involved and the degree of processing to which it was subjected. Id. at 48 (quoting B.A. McKenzie & Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, 47 CCPA 42, 46, C.A.D. 726 (1959)). The manufacturing at issue in Takahashi was V-grooving. Id. at 49. Here, plaintiff's panels are subjected to more elaborate processing which may include machining or embossing with a stylized textured surface, printing with durable inks, face grooving and edgeworking. The resulting product is far removed from standard hardboard as exemplified by Plaintiff's Exhibit 14B. Plaintiff's merchandise has the look and feel of products as diverse as brick (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16C), roughly dressed wood (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8A) and stone (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3A). Takahashi is, therefore, factually distinguishable. 36 Takahashi is also distinguishable because it concerned an eo nomine provision for plywood that was without limitation. As a result, any form of plywood would be classifiable under that provision. Id. at 46. As the government has argued, under American Hardboard, TSUS item 245.30 is not an unlimited eo nomine provision but is limited to material commercially susceptible to multiple uses. A form of hardboard that does not have multiple uses is excluded from classification under that item. In this context, the threshold for a commercially significant multiple uses appears to be something more than 10% alternative use. 37 Having considered Customs' classification both independently and in relation to the plaintiff's proposed classification and the government's alternative classification, see Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 2 Fed.Cir. (T) 70, 75, 733 F.2d 873, 878, reh'g denied, 2 Fed.Cir. (T) 97, 739 F.2d 628 (1984), the Court finds plaintiff has overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to Customs' classification. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1988). The imported merchandise has been advanced beyond hardboard; a new and different product has been produced. While 10% of this merchandise is put to a use other than wall or ceiling panelling, that amount is not sufficient to make it a material with a variety of uses. See United States v. Quality Marble & Granite Co., 48 CCPA 50, C.A.D. 763 (1960). 38 The government raises several objections to this conclusion. First, it contends the variety of uses for the merchandise demonstrates it is merely one form of hardboard. The Court has already found those other uses to be insufficient to make this merchandise classifiable as an input material. 39 Second, the government asserts this Court's conclusion will conflict with Congressional intent by eviscerating many provisions in Schedule 2, Part 3, TSUS. This argument is based on the mistaken assumption that the Court's holding allows articles with divergent uses to be classified as manufactured articles. The Court's holding is based on the controlling authority of the Court of Appeals and is limited to the merchandise at issue in this action. The Court expresses no opinion whether the result would have differed if less than 90% of the merchandise sold was used as wall panels or ceiling tile. 40 Further, the Tariff Schedules indicate that building boards of plywood or gypsum would not fall within the provision for building board. Plywood is specifically defined in headnote 1(b), Part 3, Schedule 2, TSUS. Building board made of plywood is, therefore, both more specifically described and specially provided for under the provisions for plywood. Similarly, building boards of gypsum or plaster are also more specifically described and specially provided for under the provisions for gypsum and plaster board. The Court's holding, therefore, does not unduly expand the scope of the building board provision. 41 Finally, the government's reliance on industrial hardboard standards is misplaced. Industrial or commercial standards are useful in ascertaining the commercial meaning of a tariff term. See Toyota Motor Sales v. United States, 7 CIT 178, 182-83, 585 F.Supp. 649, 653-54 (1984), aff'd, 3 Fed.Cir. (T) 93, 753 F.2d 1061 (1985). In this case, however, the TSUS provision predates the commercial standard. The standard, therefore, does not reflect the congressional understanding of the term hardboard at the time the TSUS provision was enacted. II. Building Boards 42 Plaintiff claims the proper classification of its merchandise is under item 245.90, TSUS, covering building boards, whether or not face finished, of vegetable fibers. Building boards are defined in the TSUS as [p]anels of rigid construction, including tiles and insulation board, chiefly used in the construction of walls, ceilings, or other parts of buildings. Headnote 1(e), Part 3, Schedule 2, TSUS; American Hardboard, 12 CIT at 717. There appears to be no dispute as that plaintiff's merchandise is panels of rigid construction chiefly used in the construction of walls, ceilings, or other parts of buildings.III. Laminated Building Boards 43 The government's proposed alternative classification is as laminated building boards under item 245.80, TSUS. The government, however, has not briefed this issue and, in the event the Court finds the merchandise is not hardboard, seeks additional time for discovery and briefing. Plaintiff opposes this request asserting the government should have pursued this issue in a more timely manner. 44 The government contends it sought no discovery on the lamination issue because it was satisfied with deposition testimony from plaintiff's witness. The government now claims the witness dramatically changed his testimony at trial. Accordingly, the government seeks further proceedings on this issue. 45 At trial, the parties were advised that the Court might refer the case to Customs if it became necessary to reach the lamination issue.