Opinion ID: 2132663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: hamilton's claim for emotional distress

Text: Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude that Hamilton falls within the class of plaintiffs who may seek damages for emotional injury caused by the negligence of another. As the operator of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, Hamilton was clearly within the zone of danger. Because he was thus a direct victim of the alleged negligence of the other driver, and not a bystander, his right to recover is not dependent upon establishing a marital or intimate familial relationship with any other victim. See James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 55, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (1985). The remaining issue is whether the specific emotional injury sustained by Hamilton is actionable under the criteria established by our cases. The record includes the expert opinion of Moore, a psychiatrist, that Hamilton suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of the 1997 accident. Moore testified that Hamilton exhibits symptoms of this disorder, including dreams and flashbacks, which warrant treatment. Moore referred to these symptoms as clinically significant distress. This evidence is sufficient to meet the requirement that the emotional anguish or mental harm for which recovery is sought must be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity that it is medically significant. See, Sell v. Mary Lanning Memorial Hosp., supra ; Schleich v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., supra . However, as noted above, actionable emotional distress must also be `so severe that no reasonable person could have been expected to endure it.` Sell v. Mary Lanning Memorial Hosp., 243 Neb. at 272, 498 N.W.2d at 525. Accord Schleich v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., supra . Our case law establishes a high threshold of severity under this standard. For example, in Sell, the plaintiff was informed by hospital employees that her 17-year-old son had died in a motorcycle accident. On the following day, the plaintiff was asked by the mortician to view the body, and she discovered that it was not that of her son, but of another 17-year-old male who had died in the accident. The plaintiff then learned that her son was alive and receiving care at the hospital. The plaintiff testified that following this incident, she cried continually, had difficulty eating, and required medication in order to sleep. We concluded that [w]ithout minimizing plaintiff's apparent and understandable heartache upon being told of her son's death, she had failed as a matter of law to establish emotional distress meeting the standard of `so severe that no reasonable person could have been expected to endure it.` Sell v. Mary Lanning Memorial Hosp., 243 Neb. at 272, 498 N.W.2d at 525. Similarly, in Andreasen v. Gomes, 244 Neb. 73, 504 N.W.2d 539 (1993), disapproved on other grounds, Darrah v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 253 Neb. 710, 571 N.W.2d 783 (1998), parents sought recovery for emotional injuries resulting from the stillbirth of their child allegedly caused by the negligence of two physicians. The parents presented evidence that they suffered from headaches, nightmares, loss of sleep, and nausea, which an expert, characterized as `severe emotional distress.' Id. at 77, 504 N.W.2d at 542. We held that this evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to actionable emotional distress. See, also, Parrish v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 242 Neb. 731, 734, 496 N.W.2d 914, 916 (1993) (holding minor child's reaction to her father's death did not establish that death had extraordinary effect, either psychological or physical upon her, and therefore did not constitute `emotional distress ... so severe that no reasonable person could have been expected to endure it'). While the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to Hamilton shows that he did experience diagnosable and clinically significant emotional distress resulting from the accident, it was not of sufficient severity to be actionable under our case law. Moore testified that posttraumatic stress disorder may range in severity from mild to severe. According to Moore, the posttraumatic stress disorder experienced by Hamilton falls within the lower half of the range, [b]etween mild and moderate. On the basis of information obtained from Hamilton, Moore described him as pretty well beat up emotionally for a short period of time, but before too long he went on with his life. Viewing this medical testimony, as well as Hamilton's testimony describing his symptoms, in a light most favorable to Hamilton, we conclude that the emotional injury so described cannot, as a matter of law, be considered so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Accordingly, although our reasoning differs significantly from that of the district court, we conclude that the personal representative was entitled to summary judgment and that the district court did not err in denying Hamilton's motion for new trial. We therefore affirm. AFFIRMED. HENDRY, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., not participating.