Opinion ID: 2445379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appeal of beaumont pharmacy

Text: As indicated, Dorothy Krug instituted and prosecuted her cause of action against Sterling Drug, the manufacturer, and Beaumont Pharmacy, the retail pharmacist who filled the innumerable chloroquine prescriptions. Upon the plaintiff's cause of action, at the close of all the evidence, the court sustained Beaumont's motion for judgment and directed a verdict against Dorothy. In the main action Beaumont filed a cross claim against Sterling to recover the attorneys' fees and expenses of $5,753.80 it had necessarily incurred in defending itself against Dorothy Krug. The cross claim was separately tried before the trial judge who found that Sterling was not liable for these expenditures and Beaumont has appealed from that judgment. In its cross claim Beaumont alleged that Sterling had been negligent in selling its drugs without adequate warning and that in dispensing the drugs it had relied upon Sterling's representations. Sterling refused Beaumont's tender of the full defense of the principal action. It is not necessary to set forth the facts relating to the cross claim, it is sufficient to indicate Beaumont's theory of recovery upon this appeal. Beaumont states the question as whether (i)n an action for common law or non-contractual indemnity, such as the cause of action stated by the cross claim in this case, can the indemnitee recover his attorneys' fees and expenses even though he was not held to be liable to the original plaintiff? Beaumont concedes that there are no precisely applicable Missouri cases but argues that the basic theory of an implied contract of indemnity, as expounded in the excellent opinion in Hunter v. De Luxe Drive-In Theaters, Mo.App., 257 S.W.2d 255, should be extended to permit recovery, as here, by successful as well as unsuccessful defendants in comparable circumstances. In that case, however, Hunter was not only primarily liable to the original plaintiff, it was solely liable and the indemnitee had satisfied the plaintiff's judgment for Hunter's negligence in the sum of $3,259.00. It is interesting to note, however, that in that case as in other Missouri cases, when indemnity has been permitted attorneys' fees and expenses have been allowed as well as the principal sum. Other Missouri cases, cited by the parties, are listed here because they state the general rules of indemnity and on their faces are distinguishable from this appeal: Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Mo.App., 413 S.W.2d 550; Pierce v. Ozark Border Electric Co-operative, Mo., 378 S. W.2d 504; Ward v. City National Bank & Trust Co. of K. C., Mo., 379 S.W.2d 614; Union Electric Co. v. Magary, Mo., 373 S.W.2d 16; State ex rel. Siegel v. McLaughlin, Mo.App., 315 S.W.2d 499; McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh P. Co., Mo., 323 S.W.2d 788; Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corporation of America, Mo., 361 S.W.2d 694; Annotation 97 A.L.R. 2d 616. In the instances in which indemnity was allowed there was a prior express contract between indemnitee and indemnitor or there was vicarious liability (Inhabitants of Westfield v. Mayo, 122 Mass. 100, a leading case) as in the principal and agent cases. And, of course, relief was denied in the instances of joint and concurrent negligence and ultimately that in essence may be the difficulty here. But by analogy and from these cases Beaumont has distilled an ingenious argument based essentially upon the premise of Sterling's basic fault. Thus it is said that Beaumont brings its cross claim not because Dorothy was hurt by Sterling's fault but because it (Beaumont) was harmed by Sterling's breach of obligations which it owed to Beaumont. Beaumont's contention need not be set forth in detail, it is said, however, that the manufacturer, in contrast to a mere retailer, was the only one in a position to know the product and how to defend it and that because of its misconduct Beaumont as indemnitee has been exposed to liability by the act of the indemnitor. The argument is interesting, persuasive in several respects but two or more cases from other jurisdictions cogently and compellingly answer all the questions presented by this particular record and appeal. In Rauch v. Senecal, 253 Iowa 487, 112 N.W.2d 886, the purchaser of a water heater sued the manufacturer, the jobber and supplier for injuries when the heater exploded. The jury found against the manufacturer but exonerated the jobber and supplier and the supplier in a cross claim tendered the defense of the action to the other parties and asked for its costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending the principal suit. In the first place, the court held that the supplier could not recover from the jobber because the jobber was adjudged free from negligence in the first action and thus there was no wrong by the jobber which the supplier was compelled to defend. The general rules relating to indemnity and the recovery of expenses and attorneys' fees were set forth and it was pointed out that in determining whether the seller was defending its own negligent acts or those of the manufacturer was to be determined from the charges of negligence against Senecal (the supplier) in the original suit. The original petition was carefully analyzed and there as in this case it was alleged that the supplier or retailer was negligent (i)n failing to inform persons using the heater of its dangerous safety characteristics when operated according to the directions of the defendants. It was then pointed out and held that this was a direct charge of primary negligence against the supplier or retailer and, therefore, a defendant who successfully defends against his own primary negligence, in part at least, may not recover his expenses as indemnity against a co-defendant who is found liable for negligence. The Iowa case was followed in a similar relationship when unodorized liquid gas exploded in a basement in Leingang v. Bottled Gas Corporation, 7 Cir., 332 F.2d 959, and both cases were fashioned from Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140 Minn. 229, 167 N.W. 800. In her petition, insofar as material here, the plaintiff Krug alleged that Beaumont was liable to her because negligent in the following respects: that it failed to inform itself by literature or by any other means of the dangerous qualities of said drugs and of the reasonable likelihood of said drugs causing injury to persons using the same and that it failed to inform itself of the injuries being caused by said drugs and failed to warn the medical profession or the public through advertisements or in any other manner of the danger of the further use of said products   . These plainly, as indicated by the Rauch and Leingang cases, are charges of primary negligence against Beaumont. It may well be, had Beaumont been held liable in one or more submitted respects, that it in turn would have been entitled to indemnity against Sterling, but as far as this record is concerned it was defending its own alleged acts of primary negligence and that for the purposes of resolving this particular issue is the test. For the indicated reasons the judgments are affirmed. STOCKARD and PRITCHARD, CC., concur.