Opinion ID: 160912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tyler’s Qualification To Testify

Text: Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires the trial court to ensure that expert testimony is reliable. See United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2000). The court has broad discretion both in deciding how to assess reliability and in making the ultimate determination. See id. at 1208-09. -7- In this case, the trial court made no explicit finding on reliability, but Martinez did not call Tyler’s methodology or principles into question. Although the district court should nevertheless have made reliability findings, under these circumstances we will look to the record to discern support for the district court’s decision to allow the testimony. Here, it is evident the trial court had a sufficient basis to admit the vast majority of Tyler’s testimony. First, as C.’s clinical therapist, Tyler was able to testify as to her personal observations of C. “A treating physician is not considered an expert witness if he or she testifies about observations based on personal knowledge, including the treatment of the party.” Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999). Second, the court had considerable evidence of Tyler’s training and professional experience. Martinez’s counsel conducted voir dire on these qualifications. When Tyler did offer testimony that went beyond her treatment, this background generally sufficed to substantiate her opinions. For example, Tyler compared C.’s behavior to those of other children who have experienced trauma. Martinez objects specifically to two aspects of Tyler’s testimony. First, as noted above, she discussed typical behaviors of traumatized children. Second, she identified Martinez’s alleged assault of C. as the cause of the trauma in this case. We hold that the district court did not commit plain error in admitting these statements. -8- Even if we were to assume these statements should have been excluded, Martinez has not demonstrated that they affected his substantial rights. “The substantiality requirement of the plain error rule embodies a requirement that the defendant prove prejudice attributable to the error.” United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995). To satisfy this prong, Martinez must show a reasonable probability that (1) if the district court had inquired into reliability, it would not have accepted Tyler as an expert witness, and (2) if her testimony had been limited thus, Martinez would have been acquitted on the second count. Cf. United States v. Hanif, 1 F.3d 998, 1002 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that the defendant “must allege prejudice – i.e., that the district court admitted inadmissible evidence – to allege” a violation of Fed. R. Evid. 103(c)). We find nothing in the record to support Martinez’s allegation that Tyler’s testimony would have been excluded had the court made an explicit reliability determination. Martinez had an opportunity to ask about the foundations of Tyler’s testimony on cross-examination and recross, but declined to do so. Indeed, when she started to testify on redirect that the third phase of trauma reaction has “been written extensively about by experts in the field of child trauma,” defense counsel successfully objected that this was hearsay. It thus appears that Martinez himself prevented Tyler from establishing the reliability of her expert opinions. -9- On this record, Martinez has not met his burden to show that Tyler’s testimony would have been limited. Moreover, even if it had been limited, we do not find a reasonable possibility the outcome would have differed. Many of the statements Martinez objects to, such as those characterizing the typical behaviors of traumatized children, were too general and abstract to prejudice Martinez in this case. The other statements, such as Tyler’s reference to “her allegations of the – of sexual abuse,” constituted only a small part of the testimony, and Tyler qualified this reference to sexual abuse as an “allegation” rather than as a “fact.” Nearly all of Tyler’s testimony was unobjectionable, and on appeal Martinez has not objected to the testimony of any other witnesses. Cf. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly a small, albeit important, portion of the testimony admitted at trial was erroneously admitted.”). On this record, we cannot say Martinez has shown that his substantial rights were affected by the admission of Tyler’s testimony.