Opinion ID: 797991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior uncharged crimes

Text: 8 Defendant Gotti, joined by Carbonaro, contends that the receipt of evidence of uncharged murders committed by members of the Gambino Family was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. We reject the contention. 9 Prior to the trial of Peter Gotti and Carbonaro, the Government gave notice of intention to offer evidence of crimes not specifically alleged in the indictment. The Government justified this evidence as proof of the existence of the Gambino Family as a criminal enterprise in which the defendants participated, which was an essential element of the various racketeering charges under the RICO statutes. With the court's approval, over the objections of the defendants, the Government then introduced evidence of various crimes committed by Gambino Family members, including the participation of John Gotti in the murders of Louie Milito, Louie DiBono, and Robert DiBernardo. The court gave protective instructions to the effect that the jury may not conclude that a defendant is guilty of participating in criminal conduct merely from the fact that he was associated with other people who were guilty of wrongdoing. 10 The defendants contend that the receipt of this evidence violated Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. Rule 404(b), sometimes described as the other crimes rule, provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Fed. R.Evid. 404(b). The district court correctly ruled that this evidence did not violate Rule 404(b). The evidence was not offered to show any character trait of any defendant or that a defendant acted in accordance with such a trait. It was offered to prove an essential element of the RICO crimes charged — the existence of a criminal enterprise in which the defendants participated. The court's conclusion that there was no violation of Rule 404(b) was consistent with numerous prior rulings of this court in which criminal acts of non-defendants, including killings, were received to prove the existence of the criminal RICO enterprise in which the defendant participated. See United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 682 (2d Cir.1997) (uncharged acts admissible to prove the existence of the RICO enterprise alleged in the indictment); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812-13 (2d Cir.1994) (uncharged acts admissible as evidence of the existence and structure of the [RICO] enterprise). 11 More pertinent is the defendants' contention that the receipt of this evidence violated Rule 403. Rule 403 bars the receipt of evidence which is unduly prejudicial in that its capacity for unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value. See Fed. R.Evid. 403 (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.). Under this rule, the mere fact that evidence is relevant to an issue in dispute does not ensure its admissibility, if its capacity for unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value. 12 The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice. See United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 649 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir.1996). When a defendant engages in a criminal enterprise which involves very serious crimes, there is a likelihood that evidence proving the existence of the enterprise through its acts will involve a considerable degree of prejudice. Nonetheless, the evidence may be of important probative value in proving the enterprise. See United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir.1991) (evidence of uncharged acts of extreme violence by members of a RICO enterprise was certainly probative of the existence of the charged enterprise). The district court is commanded by Rule 403 to weigh the probative value against the unfair prejudice. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir.1980). We find no abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.