Opinion ID: 2281943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the involvement of an unlicensed attorney in appellant's trial was harmless error

Text: Appellant first contends that her conviction was improper because an unlicensed attorney participated in the presentation of the Commonwealth's case against her. While she has identified no specific prejudice resulting from his participation in the trial, she argues that the error was structural, and is therefore not subject to harmless error analysis. [2] At the final sentencing hearing, it was disclosed to the trial court that, at the time of the trial, Logan Sims, one of the two assistant prosecutors who presented the case against Appellant, had not been properly admitted to the Kentucky Bar pursuant to SCR 2.120. The other assistant prosecutor who tried the case, Arthur McLaughlin, was properly licensed as an attorney. It is uncontested that Sims passed the Kentucky bar examination in October 2008, but was out of the country at the time of the formal swearing-in ceremony before the Kentucky Supreme Court. When he returned, a circuit court judge administered the constitutional oath to him and he began working in the Commonwealth's attorney's office. [3] Sims and the judge who administered the oath were apparently unaware of SCR 2.120, which in relevant part provides: When an applicant is approved for admission [to the bar] that applicant must apply for and be granted a certificate of admission prior to engaging in the practice of law in this state. As prerequisites for the issuance of such a certificate an applicant ... shall be administered the Constitutional Oath of Office either by a Justice of the Supreme Court or by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Upon completion of the prerequisites, the Clerk shall deliver to the applicant a certificate of admission on a form approved by the Court, and the issuance of the certificate shall be duly recorded by the Clerk. (emphasis added). After the trial, Sims learned from the Kentucky Bar Association that the administration of the oath by the circuit court judge was insufficient for his admission into the bar. The Commonwealth concedes that Sims was not properly admitted to the bar at the time of the trial. Appellant does not contend that Sims or the Commonwealth's attorney had any knowledge of the mistake, or otherwise acted in bad faith. When informed of the error, Sims's work at the Commonwealth attorney's office was suspended until the oath was administered in accordance with the rule. KRS 15.760(3) provides, in relevant part, that All assistant Commonwealth's attorneys shall be licensed practicing attorneys. (emphasis added). Because Sims had not complied with the oath requirements of SCR 2.120, he was not properly licensed during Appellant's trial. For this reason, error occurred as a result of his participation in the trial as an assistant Commonwealth's attorney, even if as the Commonwealth suggests, his role at trial was subordinate to that of the other prosecutor, Mr. McLaughlin. The Kentucky Constitution Section 228 specifies who is required to take the constitutional oath, and the form of the oath: Members of the General Assembly and all officers, before they enter upon the execution of the duties of their respective offices, and all members of the bar, before they enter upon the practice of their profession, shall take the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and be faithful and true to the Commonwealth of Kentucky so long as I continue a citizen thereof, and that I will faithfully execute, to the best of my ability, the office of ... according to law; and I do further solemnly swear (or affirm) that since the adoption of the present Constitution, I, being a citizen of this State, have not fought a duel with deadly weapons within this State nor out of it, nor have I sent or accepted a challenge to fight a duel with deadly weapons, nor have I acted as second in carrying a challenge, nor aided or assisted any person thus offending, so help me God. (emphasis added). Significantly, however, our Constitution is silent upon the issue of who may or must administer the oath. Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution directs that the Supreme Court, shall by rule, govern admission to the bar and the discipline of members of the bar. SCR 2.120 is a clear manifestation of that constitutional directive. Though there was error relating to Sims's participation in the trial, it is fundamental that no error or defect in any ruling ... or in anything done or omitted by the court ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict ... unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. RCr 9.24. Moreover, we must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Id. Virtually all errors, therefore, are subject to harmless error analysis. Crossland v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Ky.2009). Appellant argues that this case presents a matter of structural error and is not subject to harmless error analysis. Structural errors are errors which are, per se, reversible because they undermine the fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process. Id. at 232. Structural errors are, therefore, not subject to harmless error analysis at all. In such cases, the error `necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.' Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) (citation and footnote omitted). [4] We are unable to discern any federal constitutional provision which implicates the right of a defendant to be tried by a licensed attorney. Moreover, because Section 228 of our Constitution provides only that the oath must be administered prior to entering the practice of law, without directing who must administer the oath, that fact that Sims swore the prescribed oath before an official generally authorized to administer oaths [5] avoided constitutional error. Thus, we cannot construe Sims's participation in the trial as an error of constitutional magnitude. Having the required educational background, and having passed the Kentucky Bar exam and the character/fitness review, he was otherwise competent to participate in the trial. Certainly the participation of an ineffectively sworn prosecutor does not measure up to the substantial constitutional reasons found to be structural error in the cases listed above (see footnote 4). The error here did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Thus, we conclude that the error, in this case, was not structural, and is subject to harmless error review. Appellant has identified no prejudice whatsoever as a result of Sims's taking the oath in means contrary to SCR 2.120. The manner in which he took the oath had no effect on his trial performance or the evidence presented, and the jury's verdict would have been the same. The status of Sims's law license played no part at all in Appellant's conviction. Thus, the error did not substantially sway the verdict, and is accordingly regarded as harmless. See Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky.2009). Additionally, we find that the long-standing de facto officer doctrine requires us to affirm the judgment. [6] In Rice v. Commonwealth, 66 Ky. 14, 3 Bush 14, 1867 WL 4050 (1867), a defendant in a criminal matter and his surety challenged the validity of a bail bond because the police judge [before whom the bond was executed] had been qualified before a notary public who had no legal authority to administer official oaths. Kentucky's then highest court rejected the challenge, holding: [W]hen a man is exercising and discharging the general duties of an office, claiming right thereto under a commission or appointment, he is an officer de facto; and generally, if not universally, his acts are good as to third parties, however irregular his appointment or qualification[.] ... We do not say that, even as the police judge was acting under a regular commission and appointment, that this oath would be void; but if it was legally invalid as to himself, his acts as to third parties, are binding. (emphasis added) More recently, in Trimble County Fiscal Court v. Trimble County Bd. of Health, 587 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Ky.App.1979), the Court of Appeals, upheld the validity of an action of a county health board despite the disqualification of a board member, stating, Mrs. Harmon did not automatically forfeit and vacate her Board membership, and that at the very least, she was a de facto member and was entitled to perform her duties while in possession of the office.... Mrs. Harmon was at least a de facto officer, and her vote and presence were properly counted. The United States Supreme Court applied the de facto officer doctrine in Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177, 180-181, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995): The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person's appointment or election to office is deficient.... The doctrine has been relied upon by this Court in several cases involving challenges by criminal defendants to the authority of a judge who participated in some part of the proceedings leading to their conviction and sentence. It is beyond reasonable dispute that if the defective oath-taking invalidated Sims's admission to the bar and his office as an assistant Commonwealth's attorney, he was, nonetheless, a de facto officer. While an apparent violation of SCR 2.120 may be a matter of concern to this Court in its constitutional oversight of the practice of law in courts of Kentucky, it affords Appellant with no legitimate complaint as to the validity of her conviction. Appellant and the Commonwealth have directed our attention to decisions of several states and federal courts that have considered this issue. We are satisfied that the opinion we reach today is consistent with a clear majority of those jurisdictions. We stand, however, not upon the numerical superiority of the courts that agree with us, but upon the superior foundation of law and reason upon which such decisions are based. Appellant is entitled to no relief under this argument.