Opinion ID: 852183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rejection of Baer's GBMI Plea

Text: Third, Baer says Maynard should have challenged the trial court's rejection of his GBMI plea. (Appellant's Br. at 34-36.) He argues that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea because two court-appointed mental health experts, Dr. Davis and Dr. Lawlor, both thought Baer was mentally ill. (Appellant's Br. at 35-36; Direct Appeal App. at 1491, 1581.) Although both trial counsel believed that the court's rejection of Baer's plea was erroneous, Maynard did not raise this issue on appeal, apparently because he believed that such a plea required the State's agreement, which it did not give. (PCR Tr. at 23, 60, 510.) The instant contention largely rests on two statutes. Indiana Code § 35-36-1-1 considers a person mentally ill if he has a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbs [the] person's thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the person's ability to function. Indiana Code § 35-35-1-3 says, The court shall not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime unless it is satisfied from its examination of the defendant or the evidence presented that there is a factual basis for the plea. Baer's argument assumes that once a factual basis for a mental illness exists, a trial court is required to accept a GBMI plea. ( See Appellant's Br. at 35-36.) The statute does not require a court to accept a GBMI plea once there is any factual basis for it; instead, it prohibits a court from accepting a GBMI plea without one. Indeed, we have held that a defendant does not have an absolute right to a guilty plea and that a trial court may refuse to accept one in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Elsten v. State, 698 N.E.2d 292, 295 (Ind.1998) (discretion not abused in rejecting a GBMI plea when two court-appointed physicians testified that the defendant was not mentally ill and a physician commissioned by the defendant disagreed). Dr. Davis's and Dr. Lawlor's conclusions were not so uncontradicted as Baer claims. (Appellant's Br. at 35-36.) Dr. Davis thought that Baer qualified as mentally ill based on his methamphetamine addiction. (Direct Appeal App. at 1419.) Although Dr. Lawlor agreed, he did not think that his psychiatric illnesses `grossly or demonstratively impair[ed] his perceptions.' (Direct Appeal App. at 1581.) The trial court also had before it a report from Dr. Groff's examination of Baer after he committed an unrelated crime shortly before the murders. (Trial Tr. at 222-23.) Dr. Groff expressly raised the possibility that Baer was malingering. (Direct Appeal App. at 1557-58.) Based on this issue of fact, an appellate court would not have found that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Baer's GBMI plea and submitting the GBMI issue to the jury. We do think most appellate lawyers would have raised this contention, and they would have lost. There is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of Baer's appeal would have been different but for Maynard's failure to raise the issue. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.