Opinion ID: 848846
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of Governmental Immunity

Text: A governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. MCL 691.1407(1). This Court has taken steps to clarify the origin and history of governmental immunity, most recently in Pohutski v. Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002). See also Ross v. Consumers Powers (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). The Court does not need to reiterate that history today, but we take this opportunity to clarify that governmental immunity is a characteristic of government. Canon v. Thumudo, 430 Mich. 326, 422 N.W.2d 688 (1988); Hyde v. Univ. of Michigan Regents, 426 Mich. 223, 393 N.W.2d 847 (1986); McCann v. Michigan, 398 Mich. 65, 247 N.W.2d 521 (1976); Markis v. Grosse Pointe Park, 180 Mich.App. 545, 448 N.W.2d 352 (1989); Ross, supra at 621, n. 34 , 363 N.W.2d 641; Galli v. Kirkeby, 398 Mich. 527, 532, 540-541, 248 N.W.2d 149 (1976). As such, plaintiff must plead her case in avoidance of immunity. See Hanson v. Mecosta Co. Rd. Comm'rs, 465 Mich. 492, 499, 638 N.W.2d 396 (2002); Haliw v. Sterling Heights, 464 Mich. 297, 304, 627 N.W.2d 581 (2001); Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 172, n. 29, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000); Ross, supra at 621, n. 34, 363 N.W.2d 641. To the extent that it holds otherwise, McCummings v. Hurley Medical Ctr., 433 Mich. 404, 446 N.W.2d 114 (1989), is overruled. Until 1989, it was well established in Michigan that governmental immunity was a characteristic of government. See, e.g., Hyde [14] and Canon. [15] In McCann, Justice RYAN stated that a plaintiff must plead facts in avoidance of immunity, reasoning: At first impression, it may appear appropriate to characterize governmental immunity as an affirmative defense. However, a careful analysis of the doctrine as construed by this Court indicates that, to plead a cause of action against the state or its agencies, the plaintiff must plead and prove facts in avoidance of immunity. In McNair v. State, 305 Mich. 181, 187, 9 N.W.2d 52 (1943), for instance, we held that the state's failure to plead sovereign immunity will not constitute a waiver because failure to plead the defense of sovereign immunity cannot create a cause of action where none existed before. In Penix v. City of St. Johns, 354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958), we held that a complaint which contained no averment that the defendant was engaging in a proprietary function, and which in fact alleged activity to which governmental immunity applied, stated no cause of action against the municipality. Thus, although we have on occasion referred to governmental immunity as a defense, see [McNair]; Martinson v. Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 599, 44 N.W.2d 148 (1950), our past treatment of the doctrine indicates that its inapplicability is an element of a plaintiff's case against the state. [ McCann, supra at 77, n. 1, 247 N.W.2d 521 (opinion of RYAN, J.).] This reasoning was reiterated nearly ten years later in Ross: In [Galli ], four members of this Court held that plaintiffs must plead facts in their complaint in avoidance of immunity, i.e., they must allege facts which would justify a finding that the alleged tort does not fall within the concept of sovereign or governmental immunity. This may be accomplished by stating a claim which fits within one of the statutory exceptions or pleading facts which demonstrate that the tort occurred during the exercise or discharge of a non-governmental or proprietary function. See [ McCann, supra at 77, 247 N.W.2d 521 ]. Sovereign and governmental immunity are not affirmative defenses, but characteristics of government which prevent imposition of tort liability upon the governmental agency. Galli, supra, p. 541, n. 5, 248 N.W.2d 149; McCann, supra, p. 77, n. 1, 247 N.W.2d 521. [ Ross, supra at 621, n. 34, 363 N.W.2d 641.] However, in McCummings, this Court departed from years of precedent and concluded that governmental immunity is an affirmative defense rather than a characteristic of government. The McCummings Court reasoned: The pronouncements in Hyde and Canon clearly do not square with the statement in Ross that [s]overeign and governmental immunity from tort liability exist only when governmental agencies are `engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.' If it takes a legislative decree for immunity to exist, and then only under circumstances defined by the Legislature, how can it be said that sovereign or governmental immunity is a characteristic of government? We are persuaded that the reasoning in Ross is correct, i.e., that immunity from tort liability exists only in cases where the governmental agency was engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. The question whether a governmental agency was engaged in a governmental function when performing the act complained of is a question best known to the agency and best asserted by it. It naturally follows that plaintiffs need not plead facts in avoidance of immunity, but that it is incumbent on the agency to assert its immunity as an affirmative defense. The fact that the source of the immunity is a legislative act makes the contention of immunity no less a matter for assertion as an affirmative defense. We are also persuaded that there is no sound basis for requiring individuals, but not agencies, to assert governmental immunity as an affirmative defense. The source of the immunity from tort liability is the same. MCL 691.1407. Nor do we perceive any basis for treating the alleged immunity of a governmental agency any differently, for pleading purposes, from any other type of immunity granted by law. Immunity must be [pleaded] as an affirmative defense. [ Id. at 410-411, 446 N.W.2d 114.] [16] See also Scheurman v. Dep't of Trans., 434 Mich. 619, 456 N.W.2d 66 (1990); Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). We conclude that McCummings was wrongly decided and, returning to our prior precedent, overrule McCummings' conclusion that governmental immunity is an affirmative defense. MCL 691.1407(1) states, [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if [it] is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Thus, by its terms, the GTLA provides that unless one of the five statutory exceptions applies, a governmental agency is protected by immunity. The presumption is, therefore, that a governmental agency is immune and can only be subject to suit if a plaintiff's case falls within a statutory exception. As such, it is the responsibility of the party seeking to impose liability on a governmental agency to demonstrate that its case falls within one of the exceptions. In addition to the textual support for this conclusion in the language of the GTLA, we note that the McCummings Court relied on a substantively flawed analysis in reaching the contrary opinion. First, the McCummings Court's reliance on Ross to support its conclusion that governmental immunity is an affirmative defense is perplexing, given that Ross itself described governmental immunity as a characteristic of government. Id. at 621, n. 34, 363 N.W.2d 641. Second, in support of its analysis the McCummings Court asked, If it takes a legislative decree for immunity to exist, and then only under circumstances defined by the Legislature, how can it be said that sovereign or governmental immunity is a `characteristic of government?' Id. at 410-411, 446 N.W.2d 114. In response, we merely observe that, historically, Michigan recognized at common law governmental immunity for all levels of government until this Court chose to abrogate governmental immunity for municipalities in 1961. Williams v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961). In response to Williams and the possibility that this Court would further erode the remaining common-law governmental immunity for counties, townships, and villages, the Legislature enacted the Governmental Immunity Act of 1964(GIA), thereby reinstituting governmental immunity protection for municipalities and preserving sovereign immunity for the state. In effect, the GIA restored the Williams status quo ante. Pohutski, supra at 682, 641 N.W.2d 219. Thus, contrary to McCummings, it did not take a legislative decree to create governmental immunity, but a legislative act to preserve the doctrine that this Court had historically recognized as a characteristic of government. The McCummings suggestion that governmental immunity could not be a characteristic of government because it was created by legislation misapprehends the history of the Court's actions and the legislative response. We believe that once the sequence of the judicial and legislative events is grasped, the analytical flaw at the root of McCummings is apparent. [17] For these reasons, [18] we overrule McCummings [19] to this extent and return to the longstanding principle extant before McCummings that, governmental immunity being a characteristic of government, a party suing a unit of government must plead in avoidance of governmental immunity. [20]