Opinion ID: 2625495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court Erred in Dismissing Jones's IIED Claim on Summary Judgment.

Text: Although the trial court should make a threshold determination whether the severity of the emotional distress and the conduct of the offending party warrant a claim of IIED, [1] Jones raised genuine issues of material fact as to both the outrageous nature of Ainsworth's conduct and the probability that he suffered severe emotional distress. He accomplished this by presenting to the superior court the following evidence in his opposition to summary judgment: (1) A copy of Ainsworth's termination memo, which contains racial and sexual slurs; [2] (2) Jones's deposition testimony that about a month after they started working together in the barbershop, Ainsworth intentionally mess[ed] with [Jones] ... to make it hard for [Jones] to try to keep that job; (3) Jones's deposition testimony that Ainsworth threatened him with a broomstick, brandishing the handle when Ainsworth was alone with Jones in the barbershop and threatening to do bodily harm to Jones with the stick; (4) Jones's deposition testimony that after receiving the August 4 memorandum, Jones was in fea[r] all the time because [he] didn't know what the next step was going to be because [Ainsworth] was still there and that he felt fearful every time [he] hear[d] the doors open or the keys ... because [he] never kn[ew] what [was] going to happen; (5) Jones's deposition testimony that he was labeled a rat by correctional staff in retaliation for causing trouble for Ainsworth about the memo; (6) An affidavit and expert report of Ernest C. Weber, a corrections and prison consultant with over thirty years of experience in the field, explaining the significance of the context of Ainsworth's conduct, the dependence of prisoners on staff for their safety and well being, and the importance of minor things that are so simple to us who are free [that] become greatly magnified to those who are incarcerated; (7) Weber's opinion that [i]f staff indicate that they are `out to get them' [prisoners] can then develop an extreme fear for their safety; (8) Weber's opinion that if a prisoner contemplates reporting inappropriate guard conduct, he must consider the possibility of being labeled a rat. Weber added: I cannot overstate the seriousness of an inmate being labeled a `rat' in an institutional correction environment. This label could and often does place the individual in very real danger during incarceration. (9) Weber's opinion that the racial and sexual harassment that Jones was subjected to could have caused him severe mental anguish and could have placed him in a position to be subject to serious physical harm. Although the court's opinion does not reach the question, the concurrence concludes that Jones presented insufficient evidence of severe distress to avoid summary judgment on his IIED claim, basing this view on Jones's purported failure to present evidence regarding the effect of Ainsworth's actions on him. [3] But on a summary judgment motion, [t]he non-moving party is entitled to have the record reviewed in the light most favorable to it and to have all reasonable inferences drawn in its favor. [4] And as the concurring opinion recognizes, Jones testified that he feared all the time because I didn't know what the next step was going to be because [Ainsworth] was still there. I didn't know if ... every time I hear the doors open or keys, it still bugs me, it bugs me today ... because I never know what is going to happen. [5] Jones also described in detail Ainsworth's systematic harassment and discrimination. Ainsworth's described conduct was so extreme and outrageous that standing alone it permits an inference of distress. A number of federal decisions have recognized that inferences of emotional distress may be drawn from conduct in the context of discrimination claims. [6] As the Seventh Circuit explained: The more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action; consequently, somewhat more conclusory evidence of emotional distress will be acceptable to support an award for emotional distress. [7] The Balistrieri court went on to conclude that even though the testimony offered was somewhat general and conclusory and even minimal, it was sufficient to support an emotional distress award. [8] Similarly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was proper to award damages for humiliation and distress to a husband and wife who suffered discrimination in their search for rental office space, where there was no testimony from the husband about his emotional distress. [9] That court concluded that the husband's humiliation could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of not being able to rent office space because he was African-American. [10] And in Hobson v. Brennan , the court relied on decisions of the D.C. Circuit to conclude that an absence of direct testimony about distress will not defeat a claim for compensatory damages. [11] The court in Hobson explained that [t]he defendants' construction of the term `testimony'... is overly narrow [because it] overlook[s] the [D.C. Circuit] Court of Appeals' further statement that `in appropriate circumstances... emotional distress may be inferred from the circumstances.' [12] The Hobson court reasoned that in a case involving an intrusive investigation by the FBI [t]estimony about something so obvious [as the plaintiff's emotional distress] would have been redundant and possibly viewed by the jury as so self-serving as to be counter productive. [13] Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that racial discrimination, `which is one of the relics of slavery' is the type of action that one could reasonably expect to humiliate or cause emotional distress to a person. [14] No reasonable person could be expected to endure the degrading racial and sexual slurs and routine threats allegedly made by Ainsworth without suffering severe emotional distress. And [t]he jury is in the best position to evaluate both the humiliation inherent in the circumstances and the witness's explanation of his injury.... [A] jury may glean as much if not more about a witness's emotional state from the witness's demeanor than from his attempts to explain the nature of his injury in words. [15] Although the concurrence places great reliance on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Alston v. King, [16] Alston's emotional distress claim arose from a municipal employer's failure to provide him with the pretermination hearing required by his employment contract. [17] In my view, the conduct underlying Jones's claims of emotional distress  degrading racial and sexual slurs and continuing threats made by a jail guard to a prisoner under his control  is significantly more serious than the conduct underlying Alston's claims, where Alston was taken back to his desk and forced to clean out his desk in the presence of his coworkers, without any explanation, while some coworkers cried and others laughed and mocked him. [18] Yet, in Alston, the court found that despite scant evidence of emotional distress, testimony about the sequence of events at the office was sufficient to raise a jury issue of emotional distress damages related to the denial of procedural due process. [19] The court concluded: In other words, there was enough evidence [from which] to infer that the humiliation [Alston] experienced was attributable to the summary nature of the proceedings, rather than to the termination itself. Alston therefore presented sufficient evidence of damages to withstand judgment as a matter of law. [20] Thus, in certain cases, severe emotional distress may be inferred from the circumstances underlying the plaintiff's claim. The outrageousness of Ainsworth's discriminatory and threatening conduct permits such an inference of severe emotional distress and raises a genuine issue of material fact. It is thus my view that the evidence submitted by Jones on the issues of outrageousness and severe emotional distress was sufficient to survive the State's motion for summary judgment.