Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Cross-Examine Lawyers Involved in Gibbons' Recantation

Text: Shelton makes the related claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the statements made by the individuals involved in the circumstances leading up to Gibbons' recantation. Shelton argues that he should have been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine all individuals directly involved in the recantation. He also argues that because of the self-interested nature of the lawyers' comments to the trial court, defense counsel should have objected to their unsworn testimony and requested to cross-examine the lawyers. Shelton also contends that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise the issue on appeal. According to Shelton, defense counsel's failure to protect his right to confrontation establishes cause for his procedural default under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3). As discussed above in II(a) of this Opinion, after Gibbons' initial recantation, the prosecutors and Gibbons' lawyer recited to the court the events leading up to Gibbons' recantation. Shelton's lawyer did not object to their discussion or request that he be permitted to cross-examine the lawyers' statements. Shelton's claim that trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness denied him the right to confrontation is unpersuasive. Here, Shelton essentially is arguing that the prosecutors and Gibbons' lawyer did not speak candidly or truthfully to the court. [36] While the Confrontation Clause does protect the right of a defendant in a criminal case to conduct cross-examination of witnesses against him, [37] [a] defendant has no right to confront a witness who does not provide any evidence at trial. [38] Here, the prosecutors and Gibbons' lawyer were not witnesses against Shelton as they did not provide any evidence against him. [39] Rather, the lawyers merely advised the court that Gibbons had initiated contact with her lawyer and the State, explaining that Gibbons sought to recant her testimony. Thus, because Shelton had no right to cross-examine the lawyers, counsel was not deficient in failing to raise the issue. In the alternative, even if the lawyers' statements to the court were considered evidence against Shelton, trial counsel made a well-reasoned strategic decision not to cross-examine the lawyers. Questioning the lawyers on the stand would only corroborate Gibbons' testimony further, as the lawyers would tell the jury the same incriminating story that Gibbons had provided during her recantation. That is, the lawyers would testify on cross-examination that Gibbons told them she had lied when she initially testified that Steven was not involved. Therefore, because questioning the lawyers on the stand only would have hurt Shelton, he is unable to prove that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's decision. Moreover, Shelton's trial counsel acted reasonably in forgoing the opportunity to cross-examine the lawyers. Whether to call a witness, and how to cross-examine those who are called are tactical decisions. [40] So long as the decision to cross-examine is made reasonably, it will not constitute a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. [41] We agree with the Superior Court that defense counsel's decision not to pursue cross-examination was reasonable. In short, Steven's counsel realized that to question Gibbons' lawyer and the prosecutors about the reasons for her return would only further harm his case. Even if he did not realize it at trial, he should not be criticized now for that lack of realization. To question these lawyers in front of the jury would only have repeated what Gibbons was now saying: Steven participated in Mannon's murder. To not question avoided that evil. To question them may have constituted ineffective assistance. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said trial counsel was ineffective. On that ground, this claim lacks merit. [42] Trial counsel's decision was calculated and well reasoned because counsel considered the damage that might have resulted had he cross-examined the lawyers. Accordingly, counsel's decision will not constitute a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because he cannot prove that counsel was ineffective, Shelton has failed to establish cause for his procedural default under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3). [43] Shelton also has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's omission. Therefore, Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) bars relief on Shelton's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.