Opinion ID: 856339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review: Strict Scrutiny

Text: On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the Grand Island Bridge toll scheme infringes upon a “fundamental right”—their constitutional right to travel—and therefore must be analyzed under the test of strict scrutiny. Courts have long recognized that the Constitution protects a right to travel within the United States, including for purely intrastate travel. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (noting that the right to travel “protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State”); Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008). Generally, “[w]hen a local regulation infringes upon a constitutionally-protected right, we apply [the test of] strict scrutiny, requiring the municipality to show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Selevan I, 584 F.3d at 100 (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 53 (2d Cir. 2007)). This principle, however, is not applicable to the current context because “minor restrictions on travel simply do not amount to the denial of a fundamental right.” Id. at 101 (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in Selevan I, we held that the Grand Island Bridge 7 toll scheme was a “minor restriction” on plaintiffs’ right to travel and not a “penalty.” Id. (“[P]laintiffs do not allege that they . . . pay the full toll in order to commute to work or that the toll has otherwise had a substantial financial impact on them. . . . [T]hey allege that they paid the toll en route to New Jersey for shopping and other activities. These facts suggest at most a ‘minor restriction’ on plaintiffs’ right to travel, rather than a ‘penalty.’”). Relying on our comments in Selevan I, plaintiffs now claim that the addition of plaintiffs Talarico and Taub—both of whom allegedly pay the commuter rate on a weekday basis—transforms the toll into a “penalty” rather than a “minor restriction.” Plaintiffs misread Selevan I. Our discussion of the facts alleged in the original complaint was merely illustrative of how and why the toll did not constitute a “penalty.” Contrary to plaintiffs’ view, we did not indicate that “the district court could and should apply strict scrutiny . . . if the plaintiffs included individuals who traveled the [Grand Island Bridge] in the course of commuting to work . . . .” Appellants’ Br. 20. Rather, in contemplation of a remand to the District Court, we drew the attention of the trial court and the parties to Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (“Evansville”), where the Supreme Court “recognized a difference between the sort of ‘invidious distinctions’ that penalize the right to travel and cases in which a state has simply levied ‘a charge designed only to make the user of state-provided facilities pay a reasonable fee to help defray the costs of their construction and maintenance.’” Selevan I, 584 F.3d at 102 (citations omitted) (quoting Evansville, 405 U.S. at 714). Indeed, the Evansville Court permitted the imposition of “fees designed to offset the cost of maintaining a state-provided facility . . . [so long as the fees] ‘reflect[ed] a uniform, fair and practical standard relating to public expenditures.’” Selevan I, 584 F.3d at 102 (quoting Evansville, 405 U.S. at 716). In Selevan I, we instructed the District Court on remand to reexamine the Grand Island Bridge toll policy with an eye to determining “whether the toll policy implicates the right to travel in the context discussed in Evansville.” 584 F.3d at 102. We explained that, if the District Court were to find 8 that the toll policy involved “invidious distinctions,” then the test of strict scrutiny would apply; if it were to determine that the toll policy was merely “a minor restriction on travel,” then the three-part test announced in the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Northwest Airlines, 510 U.S. at 369, would govern. Id. On remand, the District Court concluded that since the “toll structure constitutes a reasonable user fee designed to defray the costs of maintenance and construction . . . strict scrutiny is inappropriate.” Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., No. 06-cv-291(GLS/DRH), 2011 WL 5974988, at  (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011). In short, the mere addition of plaintiffs who pay the commuter rate did not transform a minor restriction on travel into an instance of invidious distinctions. See Selevan I, 584 F.3d at 101. Hence, as the District Court held, the toll policy is subject to the Northwest Airlines test and not the test of strict scrutiny.