Opinion ID: 2276329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Post-Judgment Interest Award

Text: The respondent first contends that awarding the petitioner statutory post-judgment interest was error under In the Matter of Nyhan and Nyhan, 147 N.H. 768, 771, 802 A.2d 1183 (2002). In Nyhan, the husband appealed the trial court's rulings upon various post-trial motions. Nyhan, 147 N.H. at 768-69, 802 A.2d 1183. As a result of one such motion, the trial court amended the parties' property settlement to award the wife statutory interest on certain assets pursuant to RSA 336:1 [b]ecause of the court delay in ruling upon the [husband's] motion for reconsideration of the parties' final divorce decree. Id. at 769, 802 A.2d 1183. The trial court's stated purpose was to compensate the [wife] for the unexpected delay in the distribution of the marital property due to post-divorce decree motions and the potential for further delay due to appellate review. Id. at 769-70, 802 A.2d 1183. The husband challenged this interest award. Id. at 769, 802 A.2d 1183. We ruled that awarding the wife statutory interest was error because any increase in the value of a marital asset because of its time value was itself a marital asset subject to equitable distribution under RSA 458:16-a (2004). Id. at 771, 802 A.2d 1183. The danger, we observed, was that [i]f the time value of money is unaccounted for, an otherwise equitable distribution of an asset may be rendered inequitable due to a delayed payment over a significant amount of time. Id. We, therefore, recognized that trial courts have the inherent discretion to take the time value of money into account when equitably dividing assets under RSA 458:16-a. Id. They can do this by providing for interest during the delay or by dividing the award on a percentage basis as of the date payment is tendered. Id. A trial court faced with such a situation may amend the property distribution to account for the time value of money due to delay. Id. at 772, 802 A.2d 1183. A trial court may not, however, apply statutory interest under RSA 336:1 because this kind of interest is imposed without considering the equities involved. Id. at 771-72, 802 A.2d 1183. As the actual increase of a marital asset due to its time value is, itself, an asset subject to equitable distribution, any award of interest must comply with RSA 458:16-a. Id. at 771, 802 A.2d 1183. Thus, we vacated the trial court's award of interest, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether imposing interest would be warranted and, if so, what would be a fair rate to achieve an equitable distribution of the marital assets. Id. at 772, 802 A.2d 1183. Nyhan is distinguishable from the instant case. At issue in Nyhan was an award of pre-judgment interest, whereas here, the award at issue is of post-judgment interest. Whereas the property division in Nyhan was not yet final because the appeal process had not been completed when the trial court awarded the wife interest, the property distribution here became final in 2006, a year before the trial court awarded the petitioner interest. The threshold question before us, therefore, is whether a property division that has become final is a judgment to which statutory post-judgment interest may apply. We conclude that it is. This is an issue of first impression. The majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have concluded that money judgments enrolled as a result of an equitable distribution award are judgments for the purpose of awarding statutory post-judgment interest. See Swope v. Swope, 122 Idaho 296, 834 P.2d 298, 303-04 (1992) (wife entitled to statutory interest on income earned by bond awarded to her in original decree; cash payment was money due on a judgment); In re Marriage of Carrier, 332 Ill.App.3d 654, 265 Ill.Dec. 893, 773 N.E.2d 657, 659, 663-64 (trial court did not improperly exercise discretion to award wife post-judgment interest on amount divorce decree entitled her to receive from husband's individual retirement account), appeal denied, 202 Ill.2d 599, 272 Ill.Dec. 340, 787 N.E.2d 155 (2002); Hoskins v. Hoskins, 15 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Ky.Ct.App.2000) (provision in property settlement and divorce decree requiring husband to pay wife $7,500 within three years from date of agreement became enforceable judgment when payment became delinquent, entitling wife to statutory post-judgment interest from date of original decree unless trial court determines that such an award would be inequitable); Coutant v. Coutant, 86 Md.App. 581, 587 A.2d 1125, 1132-33 (1991) (counsel fee reduced to monetary judgment in 1985 divorce decree was a judgment for the purposes of statutory post-judgment interest); Karellas v. Karellas, 54 Mass.App. Ct. 469, 766 N.E.2d 102, 103-05 (1996 divorce decree ordering husband to pay wife $100,000 was a judgment for the payment of money, which bore interest from the date of its entry until it was paid in full), review denied, 437 Mass 1104, 772 N.E.2d 588 (2002); Riley v. Riley, 385 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) (wife entitled to statutory post-judgment interest on sum husband was required to pay her under divorce decree where he did not pay her until one year after decree became final); In re Marriage of Gibson, 206 Mont. 460, 671 P.2d 629, 630, 632-33 (1983) (wife entitled to statutory post-judgment interest on lump sum cash payment husband was obligated to pay her under divorce decree); Gallner v. Gallner, 257 Neb. 158, 595 N.W.2d 904, 906, 907-09 (1999) (husband owed wife statutory post-judgment interest dating back to original 1994 decree where decree required him to pay her a lump sum, which appellate court increased in 1996 following wife's appeal); Dick v. Dick, 434 N.W.2d 557 (N.D.1989) (statutory post-judgment interest applied to lump sum cash payment required under divorce decree); Lipsky v. Lipsky, 276 A.D.2d 753, 715 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429-30 (2000) (trial court providently exercised its discretion in awarding statutory post-judgment interest on lump sum husband was required to pay wife); Rizzen v. Spaman, 106 Ohio App.3d 95, 665 N.E.2d 283, 293 (1995) (post-judgment interest statute applies to obligations arising out of divorce decrees), discretionary appeal not allowed, 74 Ohio St.3d 1509, 659 N.E.2d 1286 (1996); Casey v. Casey, 311 S.C. 243, 428 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1993) (trial court erred when it determined that statutory post-judgment interest did not apply to equitable distribution money awards); Martin v. Martin, No. W2008-00015-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 454009, at  11 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb.24, 2009) (cash awards in divorce cases are money judgments subject to statutory rate of post-judgment interest); Shackelford v. Shackelford, 39 Va.App. 201, 571 S.E.2d 917, 922 (2002) (statute regarding post-judgment interest applies to monetary awards in divorce cases, however statute itself states that judgment shall provide for such interest unless court orders otherwise and here court ordered otherwise); Summers v. Summers, 195 W.Va. 224, 465 S.E.2d 224, 228-29 (1995) (post-judgment interest on lump sum award under divorce decree should be awarded unless special hardship proven); 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 532, at 736 (2008) (noting that spouse to whom cash is awarded in property division or settlement is entitled to interest at the statutory rate until the payment is made). Courts in other jurisdictions have reasoned that a final property division is a judgment to which statutory post-judgment interest applies because there is no reason to distinguish an award of money in a dissolution action from judgments for the recovery of money in other types of cases. Riley, 385 N.W.2d at 888; see Casey, 428 S.E.2d at 716. As one court has explained: Clearly, the wife was deprived of the use of the money owed to her and the husband benefited from retaining the money for his own purposes, just as with any other money judgment where one party fails to satisfy a judgment owed to another. An amount of money determined to represent an equitable division in 1983 would not constitute the same division if payable in 1988 and, therefore, would no longer be equitable without the imposition of post-judgment interest to compensate for the decrease in value of the award. Moreover, allowing the enforcing court to reduce the amount of interest which would normally accrue on the judgment would effectively be a modification of the equitable distribution award which is not permitted. The running of post-judgment interest further encourages judgment debtors to pay judgments promptly. We can discern no reason to remove this incentive for domestic judgment debtors. Casey, 428 S.E.2d at 716 (citation omitted). We find this reasoning persuasive and hold that a property division set forth in a divorce decree that has proceeded to final judgment is a judgment subject to statutory post-judgment interest. To support his assertion that the final decree here was not a judgment for the purposes of statutory post-judgment interest, the respondent mistakenly relies upon Griffin v. Avery, 120 N.H. 783, 785-86, 424 A.2d 175 (1980), and McCrady v. Mahon, 117 N.H. 762, 763, 378 A.2d 1143 (1977). In Griffin, the issue was whether past-due child support installments were judgments within the meaning of RSA 508:5 (1997). Griffin, 120 N.H. at 785, 424 A.2d 175. We concluded that they were not judgments until they were reduced to final judgment by a court. Id. at 786, 424 A.2d 175. Because they were not judgments within the meaning of RSA 508:5, we held that the trial court erred by applying the statute of limitations for judgments to the mother's cause of action against the father to recover unpaid child support installments. Id. Having concluded that each installment of child support did not become a judgment when it fell due, we held that the mother was not automatically entitled to interest on the arrearages. Id. In McCrady, 117 N.H. at 763, 378 A.2d 1143, we observed, in dicta, that past-due installments of alimony and child support did not amount to judgments until reduced to judgment after accrual. Griffin and McCrady are no longer good law, however, as they were decided before the legislature enacted RSA 458:17, VII (2004) (repealed and reenacted as RSA 461-A: 14, VI (Supp.2008)), under which [a]ll support payments ordered or administered by the court under this chapter shall be deemed judgments when due and payable. See In the Matter of Giacomini & Giacomini, 151 N.H. 775, 777, 868 A.2d 283 (2005). Moreover, the instant matter involves a lump sum payment, not installment payments. We express no opinion as to whether a past-due installment owed under a final property distribution becomes a judgment when due and payable. See Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Award of Interest on Deferred Installment Payments of Marital Asset Distribution, 10 A.L.R.5th 191 (1993); Cline v. Cline, 90 P.3d 147, 156 (Alaska 2004) (past due installment required under property division became judgment when due and payable upon which post-judgment interest must be imposed); accord Morgan v. Morgan, 445 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), cert. denied, 445 So.2d 300 (Ala.1984). But see de la Garza v. de la Garza, 185 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex.Ct.App.2006) (past due installment did not become judgment upon which interest could be imposed until wife sought to have portion of decree requiring husband to pay her $10,000 in three installments reduced to a judgment). Although courts in other jurisdictions disagree as to whether awards of statutory post-judgment interest in divorce cases are mandatory or discretionary, compare Martin, 2009 WL 454009, at  11 (statutory interest on money judgments, including those resulting from divorce decrees, is mandatory), with Hoskins, 15 S.W.3d at 735 (wife entitled to statutory post-judgment interest unless award would be inequitable), we need not decide this issue because neither party argues that such awards are mandatory. Both parties agree that awarding post-judgment interest in a divorce case rests within the sound discretion of the court, and we will so assume for the purposes of this appeal. But see Giacomini, 151 N.H. at 777, 868 A.2d 283; Starr v. Governor, 151 N.H. 608, 610-11, 864 A.2d 348 (2004). The respondent contends that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion because it was the petitioner who delayed payment of the judgment. But for her refusal to accept partial payment earlier in the year, failure to provide certain documentation and refusal to meet with him, he asserts that payment would not have been delayed. Although there was conflicting evidence, we defer to the trial court's judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence. Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780, 829 A.2d 1059 (2003). The fact finder may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness or party, and is not required to believe even uncontroverted evidence. Brent v. Paquette, 132 N.H. 415, 418, 567 A.2d 976 (1989). The trial court was not compelled on the record before it to find that the petitioner was responsible for the respondent's failure to pay the judgment. To the extent that the respondent contends that the post-judgment interest award was inequitable, we disagree. Here, for more than a year, the respondent deprived the petitioner of $276,114.43 awarded her by the trial court in the divorce decree. We cannot say as a matter of law that awarding the petitioner statutory post-judgment interest on this sum was inequitable.