Opinion ID: 784757
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Factors on Remand

Text: 54 We intimate no view as to whether plaintiffs, under a proper application of the economic reality test derived from Rutherford, will have presented sufficient evidence to survive a renewed motion for summary judgment on remand. We note, however, that under our existing precedents, the inquiry as to whether an entity is an employer for purposes of the FLSA involves three types of determinations. First, there are historical findings of fact that underlie each of the relevant factors. Second, there are findings as to the existence and degree of each factor. Finally, there is the conclusion of law to be drawn from applying the factors, i.e., whether an entity is a joint employer. See Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059 (citing, inter alia, Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043-45 (5th Cir.1987)). 55 The first two determinations — the findings of historical fact and the findings as to the existence and degree of each factor — are findings of fact that must be accepted on appeal unless clearly erroneous. 13 See Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059; cf. Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545, 550, 67 S.Ct. 883, 91 L.Ed. 1088 (1947) (whether each of the individual factors exist that render an employee an executive under the FLSA is a factual question subject to the clearly erroneous standard set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)). Only the last determination — the ultimate decision as to whether a party is an employer — is a legal conclusion that is reviewed de novo. See Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059; see also Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, 89 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986) (The question whether [the plaintiffs'] particular activities exclude them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question of law.). 56 In order to grant summary judgment for defendants, the District Court would have to conclude that, even where both the historical facts and the relevant factors are interpreted in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants are still entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 14 To reach this conclusion, the Court need not decide that every factor weighs against joint employment. The Ninth Circuit, for example, recently concluded — in affirming a grant of summary judgment — that Air France did not jointly employ ground maintenance workers at the airline's San Francisco terminal for the purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 15 despite the fact that Air France representatives directly supervised many of the workers, and even trained some of them. See Moreau, 343 F.3d at 1189-90. The Court reasoned that, even if all reasonable inferences were drawn in the plaintiff's favor, 16 there was insufficient evidence in the record on which to base the conclusion that the plaintiff was an employee of the airline. Id. at 1190-91. 57 Although summary judgment might also be granted to plaintiffs even when isolated factors point against imposing joint liability, see, e.g., Antenor, 88 F.3d at 937-38 (growers are employers as a matter of law even though middleman rather than growers exercised some employer prerogatives), the District Court's conclusion that, in the present circumstances, the record cannot support summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor, remains undisturbed. This case is quite different from Rutherford, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the slaughterhouse was a joint employer as a matter of law. In Rutherford, unlike in this case, every relevant factor described above weighed in favor of a joint employment relationship, and the record as a whole compelled the conclusion that the slaughterhouse exercised functional control over the boners. See Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. 1473. Should the District Court, on remand, deny summary judgment in favor of defendants, it will be incumbent upon the Court to conduct a trial. 17