Opinion ID: 3012663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ECPA Claims and Parallel State Law Claims

Text: Fraser argues that, by accessing his e-mail on its central file server without his express permission, Nationwide violated Title I of the ECPA, which prohibits “intercepts” of electronic communications such as e-mail.6 The statute defines an “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other 5. The Pennsylvania Whistleblower’s Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1421, et seq., does not apply to private employers. 6. As noted, Fraser also argues that Nationwide has violated the Pennsylvania counterpart to ECPA Title I, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5702, et seq. Because this statute is interpreted in the same way as the ECPA, the analysis and conclusions in the text apply equally to this state-law claim, which Fraser also does not analyze separately. 9 device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Nationwide argues that it did not “intercept” Fraser’s e-mail within the meaning of Title I because an “intercept” can only occur contemporaneously with transmission and it did not access Fraser’s e-mail at the initial time of transmission. On this matter of statutory interpretation which we review de novo, Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1992), we agree with Nationwide. Every circuit court to have considered the matter has held that an “intercept” under the ECPA must occur contemporaneously with transmission. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997), summarily aff ’d, 172 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1998). The first case to do so, Steve Jackson Games, noted that “intercept” was defined as contemporaneous in the context of an aural communication under the old Wiretap Act,7 see United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976), and that when Congress amended the Wiretap Act in 1986 (to create what is now known as the ECPA) to extend protection to electronic communications, it “did not intend to change the definition of ‘intercept.’ ” Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted that the differences in definition between “wire communication” and “electronic communication” in the ECPA supported its conclusion that stored e-mail could not be intercepted within the meaning of Title I. A “wire communication” under the ECPA was (until recent amendment by the USA Patriot Act, see note 8) “any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception . . . and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. 7. The Wiretap Act was formally known as the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and was also found at 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq. As noted in the text infra, it was superseded by the ECPA. 10 § 2510(1) (emphasis added) (superseded by USA Patriot Act).8 By contrast, an “electronic communication” is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system . . . but does not include . . . any wire or oral communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (emphasis added). Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that because “wire communication” explicitly included electronic storage but “electronic communication” did not, there can be no “intercept” of an e-mail in storage, as an e-mail in storage is by definition not an “electronic communication.” Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62. Subsequent cases, cited above, have agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s result. While Congress’s definition of “intercept” does not appear to fit with its intent to extend protection to electronic communications, it is for Congress to cover the bases untouched. We adopt the reasoning of our sister circuits and therefore hold that there has been no “intercept” within the meaning of Title I of ECPA.
Fraser also argues that Nationwide’s search of his e-mail violated Title II of the ECPA.9 That Title creates civil liability for one who “(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). The statute defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication 8. The USA Patriot Act § 209, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209(1)(A), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001), amended the definition of “wire communication” to eliminate electronic storage from the definition of wire communication. 9. Fraser contends as well that Nationwide has violated the Pennsylvania counterpart to ECPA Title II, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5741, et seq. The analysis is identical to that of ECPA Title II. 11 service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” Id. § 2510(17). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Nationwide, holding that Title II does not apply to the e- mail in question because the transmissions were neither in “temporary, intermediate storage” nor in “backup” storage. Rather, according to the District Court, the e-mail was in a state it described as “post-transmission storage.” We agree that Fraser’s e-mail was not in temporary, intermediate storage. But to us it seems questionable that the transmissions were not in backup storage — a term that neither the statute nor the legislative history defines. Therefore, while we affirm the District Court, we do so through a different analytical path, assuming without deciding that the e-mail in question was in backup storage. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) excepts from Title II seizures of e- mail authorized “by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service.” There is no circuit court case law interpreting this exception. However, in Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996), a district court held that the Reno police department could, without violating Title II, retrieve pager text messages stored on the police department’s computer system because the department “is the provider of the ‘service’ ” and “service providers [may] do as they wish when it comes to accessing communications in electronic storage.” Id. at 1236. Like the court in Bohach, we read § 2701(c) literally to except from Title II’s protection all searches by communications service providers. Thus, we hold that, because Fraser’s e-mail was stored on Nationwide’s system (which Nationwide administered), its search of that e-mail falls within § 2701(c)’s exception to Title II.