Opinion ID: 4683791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New Jersey Second-Degree Robbery

Text: Applying the categorical approach here, the inquiry is whether a conviction for New Jersey second-degree robbery necessarily meets each element of the federal generic theft offense. As statutorily defined, second-degree robbery in New Jersey is premised on the commission of a theft: A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: (1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or (2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or identify which of those alternatives served as the basis for the prior conviction. 17 (3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree. An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(a) (emphasis added).3 As the statutory text makes clear, although there are three alternative formulations of New Jersey robbery, they share a common element: each must occur during the commission of a theft. See State v. Whitaker, 983 A.2d 181, 190 (N.J. 2009) (“Committing or attempting to commit a theft is a necessary element of the crime of robbery.”); State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d 308, 318 (N.J. 1995) (explaining that the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice “incorporates theft as an element of robbery”), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12; see also McCants, 952 F.3d at 425–26 (“[T]he New Jersey robbery statute sets out alternative elements for sustaining a conviction rather than the means of committing the offense.”). Thus, it has long been understood that in New Jersey, “all robberies are thefts.” Mejia, 662 A.2d at 318; accord State v. Lopez, 900 A.2d 779, 784 (N.J. 2006). 3 In the absence of aggravating circumstances, robbery is graded as a crime of the second degree. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(b) (explaining that robbery becomes “a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon”). 18 When K.A. was convicted of robbery in 2000, New Jersey recognized eight theft offenses – each of which could form a basis for robbery. At that time, the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice expressly provided that a person who committed any one of the following offenses was “guilty of theft”: (1) Theft by unlawful taking or disposition, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-3; (2) Theft by deception, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-4; (3) Theft by extortion, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-5; (4) Theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-6; (5) Receiving stolen property, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-7; (6) Theft of services, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-8; (7) Theft by failure to make required disposition of property received, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-9; and (8) Computer-related theft, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-25.4 4 Since the time of K.A.’s conviction in 2000, New Jersey has amended two aspects of its code regarding theft offenses. Neither of those alters the analysis here. First, in 2003, New 19 Because any of these eight theft crimes could form a basis for second-degree robbery, they each must satisfy the categorical approach for robbery to qualify as a “theft offense” under the INA. They do. Each of those New Jersey thefts matches the first element of the federal generic definition of theft offense – the taking of property or an exercise of control over property. See State v. Talley, 466 A.2d 78, 81 (N.J. 1983) (“The common unifying conception in all these [theft offenses] is the ‘involuntary transfer of property.’” (cleaned up) (quoting Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, Vol. II: Commentary (1971), § 2C:20–2, at 216)); accord State v. Gorman, 185 A.3d 902, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). Most of those offenses satisfy this element by explicitly referencing either the taking of property or the exercise of control over property. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-3(a), (b) Jersey changed the denomination of the computer-related theft crime so that it became a “computer criminal activity” crime, and not a theft crime. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-25. Second, in 2008, New Jersey enacted an additional theft crime: removal of headstones and other markers from gravesites. See id. § 2C:20-2.3. That amendment, however, has no bearing on the INA’s treatment of K.A.’s robbery conviction because the categorical approach evaluates the range of offenses that could have served as a basis for the conviction – not conduct subsequently criminalized. See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190– 91 (instructing courts to “presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized” because the categorical approach requires the examination of “what the state conviction necessarily involved” (internal quotation, citation, and alterations omitted)). 20 (requiring the taking or exercise of control over movable property, or the transfer of any interest in immovable property); id. § 2C:20-4 (requiring the obtaining of property); id. § 2C:20-5 (requiring the obtaining of property); id. § 2C:20-6 (requiring the coming into control of property); id. § 2C:20-7 (requiring the receiving or bringing into the state movable property of another); id. § 2C:20-9 (requiring the obtaining or retention of property); id. § 2C:20-25 (requiring the altering, damaging, taking, destroying of, or exercising of control over computer-related property). Theft of services also meets this element – not because services are property, but because it is through services that property in the form of compensation for those services or entitlement to those services is unlawfully obtained or diverted. See id. § 2C:20- 8(a), (b). The second element of the federal generic offense – the lack of consent – is also satisfied. Several of New Jersey’s theft crimes satisfy this element under either meaning of consent (as ‘assent only’ or as ‘voluntarily and intelligent assent’). See id. § 2C:20-3(a), (b) (unlawful taking, unlawful control over, or unlawful transfer); id. § 2C:20-5 (unlawful taking); id. § 2C:20-7 (knowing that the property of another has been stolen or believing that it is probably stolen);5 id. § 2C:20-9 5 At a purely theoretical level, it may be possible for a person to commit the crime of receiving stolen property, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-7, based on a mistaken belief that abandoned property was in fact stolen, which could undermine the without-consent requirement. But the Supreme Court has admonished courts not to overindulge in “legal imagination” and instead to focus on whether there is “a realistic probability, 21 (breach of agreement as evidence of lack of consent); id. § 2C:20-25 (without or exceeding authorization). Other thefts may involve the assent of the victim, but not the victim’s voluntary and intelligent assent. See id. § 2C:20-4 (theft by deception); id. § 2C:20-6 (lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake is not voluntary and intelligent assent); id. § 2C:20- 8(a), (b) (obtaining services available for compensation using deception, threat, or fraud to avoid payment; or diverting services to the benefit of someone not entitled to them). Those offenses predicate theft on deception or coercion. But, as explained above, the better understanding of the withoutconsent element of the federal generic definition is ‘without voluntary and intelligent assent.’ And under that construction, theft crimes predicated on deception or coercion would be committed without voluntary and intelligent assent – in satisfaction of this element. See Talley, 466 A.2d at 81 (identifying another “common unifying conception” in theft offenses as the appropriation of “property of the victim without not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (quoting Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193). Such an imagined conflict is particularly inappropriate for the New Jersey offense of receiving stolen property because the INA specifically references one offense of the entire extended family of theft offenses: receipt of stolen property. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). This reference to a specific circumstance may render the categorical approach unnecessary for this state offense. See, e.g., Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 32–40 (declining to apply the categorical approach to a monetary threshold in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)). Regardless, the abandoned-property hypothetical is too remote a possibility to prevent an otherwise categorical match. 22 his consent or with consent obtained by fraud or coercion” (quoting Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, Vol. II: Commentary (1971), § 2C:20– 2, at 216)); accord Gorman, 185 A.3d at 907. All eight New Jersey theft crimes similarly satisfy the third element of the federal generic theft offense – the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership (even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent). For purposes of the federal generic theft offense, criminal intent encompasses any “blameworthy” mental state. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)). The New Jersey Supreme Court has generally recognized that theft is a specific intent crime. See Lopez, 900 A.2d at 784 (“Theft is a specific intent crime. It follows that robbery, as an aggravated form of theft, is a specific intent crime as well.” (citations omitted)); see also Mejia, 662 A.2d at 316 (“Robbery, like larceny and the equivalent statutory offense of theft, requires proof of the defendant’s larcenous intent.”). Consistent with that assessment, each theft crime requires a criminal mental state among its elements. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-3(a) (exercises unlawful control over movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof); id. § 2C:20-3(b) (transfers any interest in immovable property of another with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto); id. § 2C:20-4 (purposely obtains property of another); id. § 2C:20- 5 (purposely obtains property of another); id. § 2C:20-6 (knowing the identity of the owner and with purpose to deprive that owner); id. § 2C:20-8(a) (purposely obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation); id. § 2C:20- 8(b) (knowingly diverts services of another to which he is not entitled); id. § 2C:20-7 (knowingly receives or brings into the 23 state movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen or believing that it is probably stolen); id. § 2C:20-9 (purposely obtains or retains property upon agreement or known legal obligation and fails to make the required payment or disposition); id. § 2C:20-25 (purposely or knowingly alters, damages, takes, or destroys computer-related property). For these reasons, each of the theft crimes that could have formed a basis for robbery in New Jersey at the time of K.A.’s offense requires all of the elements of the federal generic theft offense. As a result, each of those crimes constitutes a “theft offense” under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).6 With that conclusion, it follows that K.A.’s conviction for second-degree robbery necessarily required satisfaction of every element of the federal generic theft offense. Thus, under the categorical approach, at the time of K.A.’s conviction in 2000, second-degree robbery in New Jersey qualified as a theft offense under the INA. K.A. opposes this conclusion for two reasons, neither of which prevails. First, he contends that New Jersey robbery is not a categorical match with the federal generic theft offense because robbery can be predicated on theft by deception – which, he submits, can be committed with the victim’s consent. But that argument rests on the above-rejected premise that, for purposes of the second element of the federal generic theft 6 This does not mean that these are the only New Jersey crimes that can satisfy each of the elements of the federal generic theft offense. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-10 (unlawful taking of means of conveyance). It means only that each of these predicate thefts for New Jersey robbery is necessarily a theft offense under the INA. 24 offense, ‘consent’ means only ‘assent.’ Under the correct understanding – that consent means ‘voluntary and intelligent assent’ – K.A.’s argument fails because assent gained through deception is not voluntary and intelligent. Second, K.A. relies on the unavailability of the claim-ofright affirmative defense to robbery in New Jersey. Under that defense, proof that the defendant “[a]cted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved or that he had a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did,” generally operates as an affirmative defense to a theft prosecution. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-2(c)(2). K.A. couples that with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding that the claim-of-right affirmative defense is unavailable for robbery, see Mejia, 662 A.2d at 320, to contend that a robbery conviction could be based on an honest-but-mistaken claim of right to property. And if so, K.A. submits that his robbery offense could have been based on conduct that would not meet the criminal intent element of the federal generic definition of theft offense. But K.A. misconstrues the categorical approach, which considers only the elements of an offense, and not affirmative defenses. See Grijalva Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 978 F.3d 860, 867 n.4 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248–50 (emphasizing that the categorical approach focuses on the elements of an offense). And because affirmative defenses have no role in the categorical approach, the availability of the claim-of-right defense for theft but not robbery is inconsequential to whether the elements of K.A.’s robbery conviction categorically match those of the federal generic theft offense. For these reasons, neither of K.A.’s arguments alter the conclusion that, at the time of K.A.’s conviction, all thefts in 25 New Jersey, and thus second-degree robbery in New Jersey, categorially matched the federal generic theft offense.