Opinion ID: 2566866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: tobias and feld's slapp act counterclaim

Text: ¶ 35 We next consider Tobias and Feld's SLAPP Act counterclaim. The district court granted ADC's motion for summary judgment on the SLAPP Act counterclaim, holding that the SLAPP Act did not apply to ADC's suit against Tobias and Feld, which had commenced some three years before the Act's enactment. As we noted above, summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence `shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dalgleish, 2002 UT 59, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1142 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the lower court's legal conclusions for correctness. Id. ¶ 36 The Utah Legislature enacted the Citizen Participation in Government Act (SLAPP Act), sections 78-58-101 to -105 of the Utah Code, in 2001. Prevention of Retaliatory Lawsuits Act, ch. 163, 2001 Utah Laws 823, 823. Section 78-58-103 provides: (1) A defendant in an action who believes that the action is primarily based on, relates to, or is in response to an act of the defendant while participating in the process of government and is done primarily to harass the defendant, may file: (a) an answer supported by an affidavit of the defendant detailing his belief that the action is designed to prevent, interfere with, or chill public participation in the process of government, and specifying in detail the conduct asserted to be the participation in the process of government believed to give rise to the complaint; and (b) a motion for judgment on the pleadings in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c). Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-103(1) (2002). ¶ 37 Additionally, section 78-58-104 of the SLAPP Act provides that, once a party files a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court shall hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as possible with the moving party providing by clear and convincing evidence that the primary reason for the filing of the complaint was to interfere with the first amendment right of the defendant. Id. § 78-58-104(1)(b). If the district court finds that the primary purpose of the action is to prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's proper participation in the process of government, it shall grant the motion and dismiss the action. Id. § 78-58-104(2). ¶ 38 The last section of the SLAPP Act, section 78-58-105, provides as follows: (1) A defendant in an action involving public participation in the process of government may maintain an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim to recover: (a) costs and reasonable attorney's fees, upon a demonstration that the action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (b) other compensatory damages upon an additional demonstration that the action involving public participation in the process of government was commenced or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (2) Nothing in this section shall affect or preclude the right of any party to any recovery otherwise authorized by law. Id. § 78-58-105. ¶ 39 ADC advances five arguments in support of the district court's decision to grant its motion for summary judgment on the SLAPP Act counterclaim. First, ADC argues that the individual sections of the SLAPP Act are dependent upon each other, thereby limiting a party's ability to bring a claim or counterclaim under section 78-58-105 to those instances where the party has established a claim under sections 78-58-103 and -104. Second, ADC argues that the SLAPP Act is inapplicable here because its lawsuit against Tobias and Feld was filed prior to the enactment of the Act. Third, ADC argues that Tobias and Feld's claims must fail because ADC's lawsuit had a substantial basis in fact and law. Fourth, ADC claims the SLAPP Act is inapplicable because Tobias and Feld's activities, which are the subject of ADC's lawsuit, did not involve the governmental process. Finally, ADC asserts that the counterclaim violates its constitutional rights, including the constitutional prohibition against unlawful bills of attainder. We address each argument in turn. ¶ 40 We first address ADC's argument that Tobias and Feld are precluded from bringing a counterclaim under section 78-58-105 of the SLAPP Act because they failed to comply with the requirements of sections 78-58-103 and -104. [W]hen deciding questions of statutory interpretation, we do not look to language in isolation. Rather, we look first to the statute's plain language, in relation to the statute as a whole, to determine its meaning. Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, ¶ 18, 96 P.3d 916. [O]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795. Only if we conclude that the statutory language is ambiguous do we look to legislative history and other policy considerations for guidance. ExxonMobil Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 2003 UT 53, ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 706. ¶ 41 The unambiguous language of the SLAPP Act contemplates two distinct remedies for an individual who is improperly sued for participating in the process of government. The first remedy is specified in sections 78-58-103 and -104. Under those sections, a defendant may defend against the action by filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court must grant if it concludes that there is clear and convincing evidence that the primary purpose of the action is to prevent, interfere with, or chill the moving party's proper participation in the process of government. Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-104(2). Alternatively, the defendant may bring a separate cause of action for damages against the original complainant. This second alternative, specified by section 78-58-105 of the SLAPP Act, is distinct from the alternative specified by sections 78-58-103 and -104. ¶ 42 We recognize that section 78-58-103 is entitled Applicability and that section 78-58-104 is entitled Procedures, providing some support for ADC's argument that a claim brought under section 78-58-105 must first satisfy the rigors of sections 78-58-103 and -104. Nevertheless, a statute's title is not part of its text and cannot be used as a tool of statutory construction unless the statute's language is ambiguous. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, 935 P.2d 518, 521-22 (Utah 1997). ¶ 43 The language in sections 78-58-103 and -104 is not ambiguous. Those sections clearly specify the procedural requirements for succeeding on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and there is no indication that an individual must obtain a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to sections 78-58-103 and -104 before bringing a cause of action under section 78-58-105. Indeed, section 78-58-105 contains no reference at all to the prior sections of the SLAPP Act. We therefore hold that section 78-58-105 unambiguously provides a remedy independent from that provided by sections 78-58-103 and -104 for all actions commenced or continued under the conditions described in subsections 78-58-105(1)(a) and (b) and that a targeted individual is not required to comply with sections 78-58-103 and -104 before proceeding under section 78-58-105. ¶ 44 We further hold that a targeted individual is not required to prove a claim or counterclaim brought pursuant to section 78-58-105 by the burden of proof specified in section 78-58-104. The clear and convincing standard articulated in section 78-58-104 is applicable only to a motion for judgment on the pleadings brought under that section. Individuals asserting a claim or counterclaim under section 78-58-105 must meet the typical burden of proof applicable to civil actions generally, a preponderance of the evidence, and whether a targeted individual satisfies the elements of subsections 78-58-105(1)(a) and (b) by that standard is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder. ¶ 45 In its second argument, ADC argues that the district court properly granted summary judgment in its favor on the SLAPP Act counterclaim because the SLAPP Act was not intended to be applied retroactively and because ADC did nothing to inhibit the exercise of Tobias and Feld's First Amendment rights after the Act was enacted. We agree that the SLAPP Act cannot operate retroactively because the legislature did not expressly provide for such operation. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R., 2004 UT 80, ¶ 39, 104 P.3d 1185 (noting that a statute affecting substantive rights is not to be applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares that it operates retroactively). Nevertheless, we conclude that ADC may still be subject to liability under a prospective application of the SLAPP Act. Indeed, the SLAPP Act provides that a targeted individual may recover fees and costs if he is able to demonstrate that a complaint was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law. Utah Code Ann. § 78-58-105(1)(a) (emphasis added). It also provides that a party may recover compensatory damages if, in addition to demonstrating that an original complaint was brought without substantial basis in fact and law, he is able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the action was commenced or continued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of rights granted under the First Amendment. Id. § 78-58-105(1)(b) (emphasis added). ¶ 46 When construing statutes, we assume that each term included in the [statute] was used advisedly. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 30, 104 P.3d 1208. The legislature's explicit use of the phrase commenced or continued demonstrates its unmistakable intent to subject a party to liability under the SLAPP Act if that party either commenced or continued to pursue a proscribed lawsuit after the effective date of the Act. Although ADC initially filed its suit against Tobias and Feld before the passage of the SLAPP Act, it continued its lawsuit after the Act became effective. Consequently, the district court erred in holding that Tobias and Feld could not maintain their counterclaim under the SLAPP Act. ¶ 47 Moreover, because the statute includes harassment, intimidation, and punishment in its list of proscribed purposes, a party may be liable for commencing or continuing a lawsuit even if the suit was not brought solely to inhibit the targeted individual's exercise of First Amendment rights. Because Tobias and Feld's counterclaim alleges that ADC continued the lawsuit for the purpose of punishing Tobias and Feld for their opposition to the zoning change, we hold that they have pled a cognizable claim under section 78-58-105. ¶ 48 We pause to note, however, that if Tobias and Feld are ultimately successful on their SLAPP Act counterclaim, the costs, fees, and damages recoverable under section 78-58-105 will be limited to those incurred after the passage of the Act. To hold otherwise would result in a retroactive application of the statute, a prohibited result. See Olsen v. Samuel McIntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (A long-standing rule of statutory construction is that we do not apply retroactively legislative enactments that alter substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention.). ¶ 49 In its third argument, ADC asserts that we should uphold the summary dismissal of the SLAPP Act counterclaim because ADC's lawsuit against Tobias and Feld had a substantial basis in fact and law, as evidenced by the district court's refusal to dismiss the lawsuit on summary judgment. We are unpersuaded. Because dismissal of a claim based on either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment denies the nonmoving party of the right to litigate his claim on the merits, the threshold for surviving such a motion is relatively low. See Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 9, 99 P.3d 842 (Only if it is clear that the claimant is not entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proven to support the claim should a motion to dismiss be granted.); Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 429 (Utah 1990) (To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory. Indeed, it only requires one sworn statement to dispute the claims on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact. (footnote omitted)). Meeting this threshold does not equate to a demonstration that the claims are supported by a substantial basis in fact and law. Accordingly, Tobias and Feld may properly pursue their cause of action under section 78-58-105 despite the fact that ADC's claim against them for intentional interference with economic relations survived a motion to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. ¶ 50 In its fourth argument, ADC contends it was entitled to summary judgment on the SLAPP Act counterclaim because its lawsuit against Tobias and Feld was directed at activities not materially related to participation in the process of government. We disagree. Tobias and Feld have alleged that ADC sued them because of their vocal opposition to ADC's zoning application, which was before the City Council. This is sufficient to establish the element of participation in the process of government, and Tobias and Feld accordingly satisfied the requirements for pleading a cognizable claim under section 78-58-105. ¶ 51 Finally, ADC claims that any application of the SLAPP Act to its conduct would violate the Utah Constitution, including the prohibition against bills of attainder, the open courts clause, the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, and the separation of powers provision. A bill of attainder is one which imposes guilt, and inflicts punishment, upon an identifiable individual or group without judicial process. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1147 (Utah 1981). Applying this definition, we conclude that the SLAPP Act does not constitute an unlawful bill of attainder because it does not impose guilt on ADC without judicial process, but instead merely proscribes a certain act, and provides civil . . . remedies for a violation thereof. Id. ¶ 52 As to ADC's remaining constitutional claims, we decline to address them because ADC has failed to adequately brief them. See Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ¶ 74, 73 P.3d 334 (For the court to consider a state constitutional claim, a litigant must at least define the nature of that protection and provide some argument as to how legal precedent supports its position.). Accordingly, we move to Tobias and Feld's emotional distress counterclaims.