Opinion ID: 560347
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discharges

Text: 10 Two provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) apply to improper terminations. Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) forbids an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3). 11 Where a termination is alleged to be improper, the NLRB General Counsel bears the burden of demonstrating that an antiunion animus contributed to the employer's decision to discharge an employee. NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 395, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2471, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983) (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enf'd, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982)). Circumstantial evidence will suffice. See Property Resources Corp. v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 964, 966-67 (D.C.Cir.1988). 12 Once the General Counsel has made this prima facie showing, the employer may negate the unfair labor practice finding by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the worker would have been fired even if he had not been involved with the union. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 395, 103 S.Ct. at 2471. Engaging in union activities does not shield an employee from being fired; the NLRA proscribes only terminations that are motivated by the union activities. See Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 820 F.2d 453, 459 (D.C.Cir.1987). 13 Here, the Board concluded that Avecor had improperly discharged two men, Jeff Tidwell and Leroy Hamby. 14
15 Tidwell's job was to test pigment samples to ensure that the color matched the customer's order. On April 24, 1987, he experienced trouble with a large order. Production had to be halted while he tried various adjustments. In frustration, Tidwell kicked cans and jugs while cursing loudly. 16 Three days later, the laboratory manager, Ed Pollard, accused Tidwell of having lost his cool and offered him a choice between demotion and a written warning. ALJ Decision at 24 (appendix to Avecor, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 94). Tidwell chose the latter. The next day he stopped by Pollard's office to secure the warning but was told that it was not yet ready. 17 Later that day, another supervisor instructed Tidwell to report to Pollard and Larry Willoughby, the plant manager. Willoughby told Tidwell that the quality control job seemed to be more than he could handle. Pollard had erred in offering the write-up or demotion choice, Willoughby continued, because the company's policy was that if you don't make it, you go out the door. Id. Under that policy, he said, Tidwell was fired. Tidwell protested that he was not to blame for the problems he had encountered on the job and that, in any event, the company should not dismiss people who could ably handle other tasks at the plant. Willoughby was unswayed. 18 The ALJ concluded that the prima facie burden had been met. He found that Tidwell had secured the union telephone number, attended the midnight meeting, signed an authorization card, and persuaded another employee to sign a card. The ALJ also found that Avecor supervisors knew of the union from the outset and that Tidwell had discussed it with two supervisors. Finally, the ALJ believed that the circumstances of the firing suggested disparate treatment of Tidwell: the questionable validity of the basis for the discharge, Respondent's change of position regarding the discipline imposed on Tidwell, and the timing of the discharge in relation to the beginning of the union activity. Id. at 25. 19 No evidence directly showed that Willoughby and Pollard, the supervisors who fired Tidwell, knew of his union activities. In concluding that they did have such knowledge, the ALJ presumably applied the small-plant doctrine, although he cited it only in connection with another matter. The doctrine permits an inference that the company knew of the union activities of specific employees from evidence that union activities 'were carried on in such a manner, or at times that in the normal course of events, [the company] must have noticed them.'  Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 633 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 490, 496 (D.C.Cir.1974) (quoting Hadley Mfg. Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 1641, 1650 (1954)). In this case, the bargaining unit consisted of fewer than forty employees; the evidence supporting the prima facie showing, viewed through the small-plant doctrine, is ample. 20 Avecor argued that the upgraded discipline had a benign explanation that, if true, would rebut the prima facie showing and defeat the unfair labor practice charge. Tidwell's was not a first offense. After certain earlier outbursts, he had been disciplined and, in February 1987, warned that such conduct could cost him his job. The company president, Leonard Klarich, testified that he had instructed supervisors to fire Tidwell if he ever again sounds off or loses control. ALJ Decision at 26. In Avecor's version of events, Pollard, a relatively new employee, was unaware of this history when he imposed the initial punishment. Klarich, who was out of town, ordered the firing when he learned by telephone of Tidwell's misbehavior. The company also cited Willoughby's policy against demoting inadequate employees as an additional legitimate justification. Thus, Avecor contended, the supervisors acted properly in firing Tidwell. 21 The ALJ refused to accept nearly every element of Avecor's explanation. Tidwell's earlier outburst had been specifically different in type: racial slurs directed at a supervisor rather than an untargeted tantrum. Id. at 27. The company had not given him a written warning after the previous incident. His next job evaluation had been positive, had made no mention of the incident, and had resulted in a salary increase. Another supervisor, Sandy Thomas, evidently did not know of Klarich's instructions to fire Tidwell if he misbehaved again. No evidence indicated that Tidwell was at fault for the problems on the production line that provoked his tantrum. Willoughby's assertion that Pollard was a new employee was never substantiated; moreover, Avecor offered no excuse for failing to advise [Pollard] of past job deficiencies of those relatively few people under his supervision or for failing to advise him of the alleged policy against demotions. Id. at 27 n. 15, 28. 22 Finally, the ALJ found Klarich's account of the firing implausible. Klarich testified that he ordered the discharge upon learning that Tidwell, in the ALJ's paraphrase, had been involved in an incident. Id. at 27. According to the ALJ: 23 Klarich admittedly did not seek to ascertain any facts of Tidwell's conduct on April 24 before directing the reversal of Pollard. There was no concern shown by Klarich for whether Tidwell had repeated the offense of issuing racial slurs which Klarich had found so reprehensible in the earlier incident. Even the fact that Klarich issued the discharge decision by telephone reflects the highly unusual treatment of the Tidwell situation. Klarich could not recall ... a previous decision to discharge a rank and file employee by telephone. 24 Id. at 28. He found, in short, that the company's decision to upgrade the discipline constituted strong evidence of its unlawful motivation. Id. 25 We find one prong of the ALJ's argument unconvincing. A racial epithet directed at a supervisor is not different in type from a tantrum; a supervisor could reasonably view both as evidence of a temperament unsuited to quality control work. Otherwise the evidence cited by the ALJ appears sufficient. Avecor's alternative explanation for the Tidwell firing, while plausible, rests on too many unsupported assumptions to rebut the prima facie showing. Accordingly, we uphold the NLRB's conclusion that the Tidwell firing violated sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA. 26
27 Hamby was hired as a temporary maintenance helper in January 1987. In March he was given a choice between a lay-off or a demotion to janitor; Willoughby's no-demotion policy evidently was inapplicable. Hamby chose demotion. On April 27, Hamby secured a union authorization card from a fellow employee, Bucky Rodgers, and signed it. Four days later, Hamby's supervisor, Larry Murphy, fired him for inefficiency. Hamby did not press Murphy for any further explanation. 28 The ALJ acknowledged that [t]he weakness of the General Counsel's case was the absence of any direct evidence that Avecor knew of Hamby's connection to the union. Id. at 33. Hamby had spoken with Bucky Rodgers and signed the authorization card. That five-minute encounter was the sum of Hamby's involvement with the union. It occurred on premises during work hours, but Hamby was on a break and, when he signed the card, no supervisors were present. While some supervisors believed at the time that Rodgers was a union supporter, id. at 34, there is no evidence that any of them was aware of his brief encounter with Hamby. As will be detailed below, Hamby had twice discussed the union with supervisors; in neither instance, however, had he revealed his own sentiments. 29 The ALJ nevertheless concluded that the company knew of Hamby's involvement. First, Avecor submitted no evidence supporting the allegation that Hamby had been a poor employee. Second, at the time Hamby talked with Rodgers and signed the card, supervisor Murphy was closely monitoring Hamby's work performance in preparation for firing him. The implication, which the ALJ did not spell out, appears to be that Murphy probably saw Hamby and Rodgers together, and concluded that Hamby was a union supporter. Finally, four days after signing the union card, Hamby was fired. 30 Here the ALJ expressly applied the small-plant doctrine. He explained: Respondent employed less than 40 unit employees, and the plant was located in a small community. It was aware early on of union talk among its employees and specifically aware of the first union meeting after the second shift on April 24. Id. at 33-34. The evidence, as amplified through the small-plant doctrine, led the ALJ to conclude that it may be fairly inferred that Respondent was aware of Hamby's union involvement. Id. at 34. 31 The evidence supporting that inference is, we find, far from substantial. Murphy's testimony suggests that he might not have begun monitoring Hamby until sometime after the Rodgers encounter. In any event, Murphy would have had no reason to watch Hamby's work performance during a break. 32 Even if Murphy knew of it at the time, the fact that Hamby was talking to Rodgers revealed nothing about Hamby's union sympathies. What the NLRB terms Hamby's propensity to talk to other employees, Brief for Respondent at 36, was no secret to Avecor supervisors. Indeed, Murphy testified that the firing came about partly because Hamby spent too much time chatting with co-workers and neglecting his janitorial duties. 33 A discharge cannot stem from an improper motivation where the employer is ignorant of the employee's union activity. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 509 F.2d at 496 n. 27. Hamby's activity was isolated, brief, and not especially public. The small-plant doctrine reduces the weight of evidence necessary to impute knowledge of union activities to supervisors, but, as the Sixth Circuit noted, the doctrine does not wholly eliminate the need for evidence: 34 The small size of the facility ... does not give rise to a presumption of knowledge that an employer must rebut to prevent establishment of the Board's prima facie case. Rather, the doctrine permits an inference of employer knowledge only if the Board establishes by other evidence, direct or circumstantial, that an employer had reason to notice the union activities in the facility. 35 NLRB v. Health Care Logistics, Inc., 784 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir.1986) (emphasis in original). Even in a tiny plant with strongly anti-union management, supervisors are not omniscient. Because there is no substantial evidence that Avecor knew of Hamby's union activity, we conclude that the prima facie showing was not made. We therefore set aside the finding that Hamby's discharge violated the NLRA.