Opinion ID: 1366220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Partial Concession of Guilt.

Text: (11) Defendant contends that the murder conviction must be reversed because the court permitted counsel to enter what was tantamount to a guilty plea without obtaining defendant's waiver of the constitutional rights he was giving up. Defendant contends that when defense counsel in opening statement conceded defendant's responsibility for the killing, the trial court should have intervened to advise defendant of his constitutional rights and obtain a personal waiver of those rights under Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709] and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]. Defendant contends that since there was no such a waiver, the murder conviction must be reversed. Counsel's decision not to contest guilt on one or more charges at the guilt phase of a capital trial is not tantamount to a guilty plea. ( People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 592-594 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350].) We rejected the same argument in People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 365-366 [105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 503 P.2d 594], on the ground that in this situation, the defendant has not surrendered his rights since he has a jury trial with the opportunity to cross-examine, call witnesses, and testify. Further, any competent counsel will advise his client of his rights. (See People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 314 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149], plur. opn., accord.) The plurality opinion in People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396] made it clear that although counsel does not have authority to override his client's express objection to conceding guilt, there is no requirement of a Boykin/Tahl waiver. ( Id. at p. 818, fn. 8.) Here, unlike in Frierson, the record shows absolutely no indication that defendant disagreed with his attorney's tactical approach.