Opinion ID: 656840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process and Bifurcation

Text: 37 Fischl contends that the district court erred by, sua sponte,  deciding to bifurcate the trials of Kerkman and Fischl midstream. He raises the claim that to send Fischl's case to a jury that had heard twelve days of incriminating evidence against Co-Defendant Kerkman and nothing on behalf of either Kerkman or Fischl, Fischl's Br. at 19, violated his right to due process of law. We agree with the district court that this decision was made only with the consent of Fischl, in his presence, through counsel. The renewed motion to sever was granted only after the district court had confirmed that Fischl's motion to sever was still on the table. See J.A. at 888, 891. Second, on the merits of Fischl's due process argument, the district court concluded that the case as it related to Fischl was completed at the time of the severance of the case against co-defendant. Id. at 213. We agree with the district court that Fischl cannot, in good faith, claim that his own due process rights were violated by not letting his jury hear Kerkman's defense. 38 Fischl continues to maintain in his Reply Brief that, though he moved for severance before the joint trial began, the decision to sever after the government presented its case against Kerkman and Fischl was made by the district court sua sponte. This sua sponte decision was merely acquiesced in by counsel for Fischl. Fischl's Reply Br. at 6. See J.A. at 474 (deposition testimony of trial counsel for Fischl) (Well, first of all, I didn't renew the motion. At no time did I tell the Judge, 'Judge, I want a severance now.' That was the Judge's decision. He asked me whether or not the motion was still viable or whether we had withdrawn it, and I had indicated that the motion had not been withdrawn. And the reason for my comment that the motion had not been withdrawn was to protect the record.). Fischl also maintains that he was prejudiced by the midstream severance. Fischl's real bone of contention lies with the fact that the Kerkman/Fischl case was not severed at the outset. But we determined in Fischl I that it was eminently appropriate for the two men to be tried together. The discrimination the jury showed in convicting Mr. Fischl on some counts and acquitting him on others strengthens that conclusion, but is not essential to it. The joinder did not prevent Mr. Fischl from receiving a fundamentally fair trial.... 797 F.2d at 313. In the instant appeal, Fischl is merely trying to assert once more his prior severance argument. 39 Fischl's objection to the fact that his jury was able to hear the government's case against Kerkman without hearing Kerkman's defense to it is without merit. The presentation of evidence against both Kerkman and Fischl saved judicial resources. See United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir.1988) (There is a strong policy in favor of joint trials when charges will be proved by the same series of acts....) (citation omitted). When Fischl chose to rest without putting on any evidence, his case was closed. Any adverse inferences from the government's case against Kerkman were effectively quashed by the district court's instructions to the jury. Indeed, Fischl concedes that the jury was properly instructed not to consider Kerkman's case when evaluating Fischl's case. See Fischl's Reply Br. at 10. Furthermore, we presume that the jury will be able to sort out the evidence applicable to each defendant and render its verdict accordingly. United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1011 (6th Cir.1991). In fact, we specifically found the presumption to exist in this case. Fischl I, 797 F.2d at 313. Whether or not the decision to sever midstream was sua sponte or on motion by Fischl's counsel, Fischl's due process argument fails. 40 Fischl's assertion of error because no evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of whether the severance was sua sponte or pursuant to a motion by counsel for Fischl must also fail. Even if the decision to sever/bifurcate was sua sponte, Fischl cannot be said to have been prejudiced by the decision for the reasons stated. Thus, since the motion [to vacate sentence] and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, no hearing was or is required. 41