Opinion ID: 1998744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Prosecutorial Comments During Closing Arguments

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by sustaining the State's objection to defense counsel's closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation stage that defendant suffered from a severe mental illness, thereby giving the jury the impression that the court agreed with the State's position that no extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator had been established, when there was evidence presented of defendant's history of emotional deprivation and personality disorders. Defendant challenges the following exchange: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Look at his home environment. Because of that home environment, Geno Macri is diagnosably ill; severe mental disturbance. THE PROSECUTOR: Object to that. THE COURT: What's the basis? THE PROSECUTOR: To counsel's characterization of severe mental illness. THE COURT: It will be sustained. Defense counsel immediately thereafter continued his closing argument as follows: DEFENSE COUNSEL: He's diagnosed with several mental illnesses. One of which, I believe if the testimony was correct, is considered one of the most severe there is, and that's borderline personality disorder. And that renders him incapable of dealing with stress that maybe the rest of us could handle. Defendant contends that the court erred in sustaining the State's objection because there was substantial evidence that defendant had been emotionally deprived as a result of his home environment and that defendant suffered from severe mental and/or emotional disturbances, specifically three different personality disorders. Defendant therefore maintains that the court's ruling favored the State because it supported the State's argument that there was insufficient evidence of an extreme mental and emotional disturbance to defeat a death sentence. Defendant also complains that during the State's rebuttal argument, the court overruled the defense objection to the State's argument that defendant showed cowardice in trying to blame his mother for his actions in murdering another woman. Defendant contends that his rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments were violated because both of the court's rulings unduly burdened the defense in establishing his mitigation case under the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator of section 9-1(c)(2) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1994)). Regarding the trial court's sustaining of the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's use of the phrase severe mental disturbances, although defendant objected at trial to the complained-of remark, the record indicates that defendant did not raise this claim of error in his post-trial motions. Therefore, this specific claim is waived. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. However, in capital cases, this court has also recognized that the procedural bar will be excused if a timely trial objection has been made and the claims can be raised later in a post-conviction hearing petition. People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 10, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995); Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 190, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. Because defendant has framed his argument as a deprivation of due process based upon the fourteenth amendment, as well as an eighth amendment violation against cruel and unusual punishment, both of which may be entertained under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (see 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)), we address the merits of defendant's claim. The sustaining of an objection to defense counsel's statement is not an indication of the court's opinion as to the facts or the verdict. We reject defendant's assertion that the ruling improperly indicated to the jury that defendant had not established the existence of severe mental and emotional disturbances. To the contrary, the jury was presented with Dr. Wahlstrom's testimony that defendant was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time he killed Maria, and that he suffered from three disorders: antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder. Further, the record shows that when defense counsel proceeded with his argument and mirrored the expert's testimony concerning borderline personality disorder, no objections were made by the State. Finally, the jury was instructed that the court's remarks and rulings did not indicate the court's opinion regarding any facts or the verdict. We therefore conclude that defendant's claim lacks merit. Concerning defendant's challenge to the cowardice comment, which was properly preserved for review, it is well established that prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument, and a prosecutor's comments in closing argument will result in reversible error only when they engender substantial prejudice against the defendant to the extent that it is impossible to determine whether the verdict of the jury was caused by the comments or the evidence. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill.2d 258, 323, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (1990). Closing arguments must be reviewed in their entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed in context. People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill.2d 1, 38, 201 Ill.Dec. 1, 636 N.E.2d 433 (1994). Examining the challenged remarks in context, we determine that the comments of the prosecutor in the cause at bar do not constitute reversible error. Rather, the remarks were designed to rebut the defense claim that defendant's actions resulted from a mother who had emotionally abandoned him, which allegedly caused defendant to have violent sexual fantasies leading to murder. However, defendant presented no evidence that defendant's mother had ever perpetrated any sexual or physical abuse against defendant. Further, the evidence showed that shortly before the murder, defendant's mother on two occasions provided defendant with rent money when his rent was in arrears. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor may contest the significance and weight of the defendant's mitigating evidence, and is not required to agree that the evidence offered in mitigation by defendant is indeed mitigating. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 454-55, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993). Here, the prosecutor's statement did not restrict or limit the defendant's presentation of mitigating evidence, nor did it misstate to jurors the applicable law governing their consideration of the evidence. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d at 455, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161. Finally, the record reveals that the jury had also been instructed that the attorney's closing arguments were not evidence. In sum, the prosecutor's comment did not deny the defendant a fair trial and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection. Defendant's second point of error in connection with remarks made by the prosecutor at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the hearing is that his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated by the prosecutor's closing argument that mitigation evidence concerning defendant's allegation that he suffered from an antisocial personality disorder should be taken as aggravation. Defendant admits that this claim was not preserved, but urges us to consider it under the plain error doctrine. During its initial closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation phase, the State addressed the testimony given by Dr. Wahlstrom that defendant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder which frequently abates when individuals reach their forties. Defendant challenges comments made by the prosecutor in response to the assertion that defendant had an antisocial personality disorder: You heard the evidence that the defendant had an antisocial personality. And Dr. Wahlstrom told you that antisocial personality is a persistent pattern of conduct of breaking society norms, of breaking the law. And he's absolutely right when he says the defendant had an antisocial personality. He told you some of the things that go with an antisocial personality: They are liars. They don't have any remorse. They continuously break laws. And they are more likely to keep on breaking laws. He told you that most of the people that he sees in Stateville have antisocial personalities. If you think about it for a second, it makes perfect sense. They wouldn't be in jail if they followed society's rules. They wouldn't be in jail if they didn't break laws. Of course, an antisocial personality person is going to be in jail. By its very definition, they don't follow the laws. That's not mitigation. That's aggravation. The defendant has an antisocial personality, and that is aggravating, because the defendant is more likely to go out and commit more crimes. The defendant is not remorseful. Dr. Wahlstrom says, `Well, this antisocial personality persists in a lot of people.' And for $6,000, he came in here and told you the antisocial personality is basically someone who is a career criminal. Its somebody who continuously commits crimes. That is what a career criminal is. They continuously commit crimes. And that's what an antisocial person is, and that's the defendant. A similar argument was repeated by the State in rebuttal closing argument: But the antisocial personality disorder is not schizophrenia where he has voices in his head telling him to kill. It means he's a criminal. He doesn't like to conform his conduct to the norms of the law. He likes to violate other people's rights. It's not mitigation. Is that mitigation in any way sufficient to preclude the imposition of death, that he suffers from an antisocial personality disorder? Absolutely not. Defense counsel made no objection to these remarks. Defendant now contends that the prosecutor committed plain error in stating that defendant's mitigating evidence was actually aggravating evidence. According to defendant, the remarks made by the State improperly restricted the jury's consideration of the mitigating evidence introduced by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing, as the comments could have led the jury to believe that defendant's antisocial personality disorder constituted an aggravating circumstance which in and of itself was a reason to sentence defendant to death. Defense counsel neither raised an objection to the prosecutor's remarks at trial nor included this claim of error in defendant's post-trial motion. Accordingly, defendant's claim for relief has been waived. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. Although defendant urges us to consider this claim of error under the plain error rule, because the evidence is not closely balanced and the alleged error is not so fundamental and of such magnitude as to deny defendant a fair trial, defendant has met neither requirement of the plain error doctrine. See Miller, 173 Ill.2d at 191-92, 219 Ill.Dec. 43, 670 N.E.2d 721. We have repeatedly held that a prosecutor's remarks constitute reversible error only when they engender substantial prejudice against the defendant. E.g., Henderson, 142 Ill.2d at 323, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234; Peeples, 155 Ill.2d at 482, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294. We find that the remarks of the prosecutor fall within the parameters of proper closing argument. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the remarks of the prosecutor summarized Dr. Wahlstrom's findings. Dr. Wahlstrom testified that individuals with antisocial personality disorder are prone to deceit and manipulation, to the extent that they may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger, that they fail to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, constituting [a] disregard for and violation of the rights of others, and that they continue committing this pattern of repetitive behavior up to a certain point and then they tend to slow down, especially with relation to criminal behavior, and that's in the fourth decade of life, or in the 40s. Further, Dr. Wahlstrom could not state that defendant would cease to commit crimes. Thus, much of the prosecutor's argument reflected the testimony given by defendant's expert regarding the antisocial personality disorder. Further, we have rejected precisely the same argument made by defendant in the instant matter in People v. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d 335, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841 (1997). There, the defendant argued, as defendant does in the matter at bar, that the prosecutor violated the eighth amendment by remarking during closing arguments that the defendant's antisocial personality disorder constituted aggravating, rather than mitigating, evidence. In McNeal, the prosecutor argued as follows: And what is antisocial personality disorder? It's just being mean and violent is what it comes down to, and he told you that. Basically, what it comes down to is the person we have here, the doctors can put it into fancy words, the fancy words being antisocial personality disorder or whatever else they want to pick out of their book, but the bottom line is the character of this man, his meanness, his violence, his sadism. That's not a mitigating factor. That's an aggravating factor. It's not a mitigating factor that he has an antisocial personality disorder. It's an aggravating factor. It shows you how violent he can be. And the doctor himself told you that he can even be violent in prison. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 368, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. In rejecting the defendant's assertions in McNeal, we determined that defendant's antisocial personality disorder is    a double-edged sword for purposes of mitigation and aggravation    [as] not every mental or emotional condition that can be classified as a `disorder' will necessarily be mitigating. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 370, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. In McNeal, we concluded that the prosecutor merely disagreed with the defendant's characterization of that evidence as mitigation, as he is permitted to do. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 371, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. As in McNeal the prosecutor in the cause at bar at no time suggested to the jurors that the law did not allow them to consider the evidence presented in mitigation and defendant makes no assertion that the jury was not properly instructed by the trial court concerning its consideration of mitigation evidence. We adhere to our decision in McNeal and find that the prosecutor's characterization of defendant's antisocial personality disorder as a factor in aggravation did not deprive defendant of a fair and reliable sentencing hearing. Accordingly, no plain error occurred.