Opinion ID: 6316806
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Total-Restitution Amount

Text: Despite clinging to the benefits of the Plea Agreement (Williams emphasizes that he is not seeking to withdraw his favorable plea deal) and acknowledging that he stipulated to total restitution of $1,146,828.28 (the amount owing on his two loans comprising Counts One through Three), Williams now complains that the district court 12 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 13 exceeded its authority under the MVRA by imposing the exact amount of restitution he asked the district court to impose. 8 The invited-error and plain-error doctrines await.
As mentioned, Williams claims that the district court erred by imposing the total amount of restitution that he stipulated to in the Plea Agreement. He faults the district court, not himself. We, on the other hand, fault Williams, who invited any alleged error. “The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action by a court and later seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was error.” United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1178 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). And more specifically, a defendant cannot invite a district court to impose restitution and later complain that the court was without authority to require any restitution. Id. at 1179 (citation omitted) (ruling in a case in which the defendant stipulated to a smaller amount of restitution than the court ordered); see also United States v. Sukhtipyaroge, 1 F.4th 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2021) (ruling in a visa-fraud case that by expressly agreeing that a person “was entitled to at least some restitution as an ‘identifiable victim,’ [the defendant] cannot now make the exact opposite 8 In United States v. Peterson, 268 F.3d 533, 534 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.), the court addressed a similar claim from a defendant who on appeal “sings a different tune.” After reciting the plea-agreement benefits that the defendant sought to keep while contesting his stipulated restitution, the court observed that “[i]t is not clear that he understands the principal implication of this position: that his plea must be set aside, the four dismissed counts reinstated, and the prosecution resumed in the district court.” Id. The court noted that it was “not an option” for the defendant to have the benefits of the plea agreement without the detriments. Id. In the court’s words, “[t]he whole plea agreement stands, or the whole thing fails.” Id. (citation omitted). 13 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 14 argument on appeal” (citation omitted)); United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that defendant waived any challenge to the restitution amount when he stipulated to that amount in his plea agreement). By stipulating to the total-restitution amount, Williams did more than not object. With eyes open, he agreed that he owed $1,146,828.28 of restitution—the amount he still owed on his fraudulent bank loans. His stipulation on total restitution led the government to move to dismiss the remaining counts and agree not to charge him further. Yet Williams now complains that $1,146,828.28 in restitution exceeds the $787,574.58 he then owed on his fraudulent loan charged in Count One, his sole count of conviction. But Williams knew that $1,146,828.28 exceeds $787,574.58 when he stipulated to the totalrestitution amount. By stipulating to the total-restitution amount while referencing the MVRA, Williams necessarily agreed that the MVRA supported that amount. 9 And here, as 9 As we understand it, Williams may be trying to short-circuit this conclusion by suggesting that the MVRA disallows a defendant from stipulating in a plea agreement to total restitution. In this regard, he contrasts language in the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, stating that “[t]he court may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement” with the MVRA’s silence on that point. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). This misses the mark. The quoted language from subsection (a)(3) simply allows the parties to stipulate to restitution in “any criminal case,” not just cases involving the crimes specified in subsection (a)(1)(A). Otherwise stated, the “to the extent agreed” phrase modifies “any criminal case,” not “restitution.” Reading this sentence as Williams does requires treating “any criminal case” as surplusage. Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be ignored.”). Further, neither the MVRA nor the VWPA limits total restitution—by allowing parties to stipulate to restitution for nonvictims, both statutes take any cap off restitution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(1)(A), 3663A(a)(3). 14 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 15 explained below, the district court could consider both the MVRA “victim” definitions in accepting and adopting the parties’ stipulated total-restitution amount. In that circumstance, Williams is stuck with any error he invited with his stipulation. He cannot escape his invitation by now seeking to undermine its bank-fraud-scheme underpinnings with arguments for extensions or reinterpretations of our circuit law (as discussed later). By leading the district court to impose total restitution of $1,146,828.28, Williams necessarily conceded that his § 1344 bank-fraud scheme justified that amount of restitution under the MVRA. The parties couldn’t get to that high a figure without accounting for the losses from the entire scheme. Simply put, Williams invited any alleged error.
Williams stipulated to the total-restitution amount, so it’s no surprise that he didn’t object to the district court’s imposing it. Even if Williams had not stipulated to the totalrestitution amount, he would still lose. Because he didn’t object, we would review under the plain-error standard. “To prevail under this standard, [a defendant] must show (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Mendenhall, 945 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Williams falters at step two: Regardless of whether the district court erred, Williams fails to establish that any error was plain. “[I]n the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme,” the MVRA extends restitution to “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal 15 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 16 conduct in the course of the scheme.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). The Indictment details how Williams “knowingly engage[d] in a scheme to defraud a financial institution, namely, WebBank, and to obtain funds owned by and under the custody and control of it by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the scheme’).” R. vol. 1 at 9. After that, for Count One, the Indictment charges that Williams “did knowingly execute and attempt to execute the scheme described in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this [I]ndictment by causing WebBank to fund a loan in the amount of $800,000 to [WVC], all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1344 and 2(b).” Id. at 16. For the first time on appeal, Williams argues that the district court couldn’t lawfully impose restitution based on his bank-fraud scheme. 10 He notes that the bankfraud statute criminalizes the conduct of a person who “knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice,” 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (emphasis added), not just a “scheme” as required by the MVRA, § 3663A(a)(2). In short, he contends that “scheme The MVRA scheme provision is what enables the total restitution to exceed 10 the amount resulting from Williams’s conduct underlying his count of conviction, Count One, relating to the $800,000 loan. That is, the additional restitution is based on the bank-fraud scheme. That scheme makes it easier for Wells Fargo to also be considered a “victim.” The MVRA scheme provision requires merely a showing of direct harm; the other victim definition requires direct and proximate harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). But even without relying on the scheme “victim” definition, that is, on the bank-fraud scheme, Wells Fargo could still qualify as a victim, because its losses stemmed from the count of conviction. 16 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 17 or artifice” is broader than the MVRA’s condition that the offense “involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” He argues that “scheme or artifice” establishes alternative means of violating § 1344, not alternative elements. Williams bases his argument on Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), which established the elements-or-means test for categorical-approach analyses. But Mathis ruled on the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), language, which differs from the MVRA’s language in text and purpose. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247. The ACCA increases firearm-possession penalties (fines and imprisonment) for defendants with three predicate “serious drug offense[s]” or “violent felon[ies]” or a combination of them. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In considering whether a felony is violent, the ACCA asks whether the crime “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). In contrast, the MVRA extends restitution liability to an “offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” Id. § 3663A(a)(2) (emphasis added). Further, though the ACCA bears on criminal penalties, our circuit doesn’t treat restitution as a penalty (even though the Plea Agreement in this case defined it as such for appeal-waiver purposes). See United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that “we have recognized that the MVRA does not inflict criminal punishment, and thus is not punitive” (citations and footnote omitted)). Williams didn’t preserve a Mathis-type, categorical-approach argument, so we don’t review its merits de novo. Instead, as mentioned, Williams must meet the stringent 17 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 18 requirements of plain error. And as the government notes, Williams hasn’t cited a case ruling that Mathis’s categorical approach requires a finding that “scheme or artifice” captures conduct beyond “scheme.” Indeed, though pre-Mathis, our circuit has said the opposite about the federal wire-fraud statute’s “scheme or artifice” element in relation to restitution under the MVRA. See United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (examining the wire-fraud statute). Moreover, as the government notes, it’s an open question in our circuit whether artifice is something within every scheme. Cf. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (“An elaborate artifice of fraud is the central meaning of a scheme to defraud through false promises.”). Nor have we located a case ruling contrary to Gallant on this point. So we can cut to the simplest way in which Williams fails. Williams cannot meet the second prong of the plain-error analysis. He hasn’t identified any Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case (or any case from another circuit) applying the categorical approach to § 1344 bank fraud in calculating restitution under the MVRA. And we see a good reason why Williams didn’t make this sort of Mathis argument in district court—he likely would have jeopardized his Plea Agreement had he contested the total-restitution amount. Accordingly, Williams fails in his argument that the district court plainly erred in imposing $1,146,828.28 as restitution.