Opinion ID: 583683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Order Disclosure of Probation Report

Text: 19 We turn now to appellants' contention that the district court committed reversible error by failing to order disclosure of a confidential informant's probation report. 20 Simmons contends that the district court erroneously relied upon a Missouri statute to exclude from evidence the probation report of a confidential informant, Grenda Pierce. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 217.780 (1986) (repealed and replaced by Mo.Rev.Stat. § 559.125 (1990)). 9 Simmons first asserts that the probation report constitutes Brady material which the prosecution should have disclosed. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Simmons also claims that failure to allow impeachment by reference to information in the report violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation. Finally, Simmons contends that Pierce waived the statutory privilege by taking the stand and testifying that she had not been subject to drug testing during her probation. 21 Bowers maintains that the Government violated the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988), by neglecting to give notice that Pierce would testify and by failing to disclose a pre-trial statement in which Pierce described her drug transactions with Simmons and Bowers. Bowers argues that the exclusion of Pierce's probation report compounded the prejudicial effect of the Government's failure to disclose Jencks material. 22 We agree that the district court erred by excluding the probation report. We are persuaded, however, that we must deem the error harmless. 23 In federal criminal cases, the federal law of privilege applies. United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir.1988) (citing United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853, 97 S.Ct. 146, 50 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1084 (1989); United States v. Holmes, 594 F.2d 1167, 1171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 873, 100 S.Ct. 154, 62 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979). Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which sets forth the general rule of privilege, specifically provides: 24 Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 25 Fed.R.Evid. 501 (emphasis added). 26 Only if this were a civil case, which it is not, might we determine the privilege of a witness in accordance with state law. See Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir.) (attorney-client privilege is determined by state law in a products liability action in diversity), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917, 108 S.Ct. 268, 98 L.Ed.2d 225 (1987); see also 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 501 (1991) ([g]enerally in federal question cases, except those governed by the second sentence of Rule 501, federal privilege law will apply) (footnote omitted). 27 This court has already held that no privilege attaches under Rule 501 to statements made by a parolee to a probation officer. Holmes, 594 F.2d at 1171. In Holmes, the appellant contended that the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of a probation officer, which allegedly should have been privileged. This court not only rejected the appellant's claim of error, but observed that distinct dissimilarities characterized the probation officer-parolee relationship and relationships such as attorney-client and physician-patient, in which a privilege has been recognized. Id. 28 Grenda Pierce, a confidential informant, testified on cross-examination that she had never been subjected to urinalysis as part of her probation on a state felony marijuana conviction. II Trial Tr. at 353. Gail Joy Barnekow, Pierce's probation officer, refused to answer whether she had any record of drug screenings performed on Pierce. Barnekow claimed that probation records are confidential under section 217.780 of the Missouri Code. II Trial Tr. at 489. Without requesting production for in camera inspection, the district court declined to issue a production order, citing Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 608(b). The district court stated that [t]he statute says it's privileged and [p]rivilege is privilege. III Trial Tr. at 492. 29 As counsel for the defense pointed out to the district court at the sentencing phase, however, Pierce underwent urinalysis testing during the course of her probation. Indeed, she tested positive for cocaine and marijuana on August 25, 1990, less than two months before trial. 10 Even though the district judge did not receive notice of the probation violation until after the conclusion of the trial, Pierce's probation office knew about the urinalysis results five days before Pierce testified and six days before Barnekow testified. That the results of the urinalysis may not have been typed into a formal violation report until after the conclusion of the trial does not justify the wholesale exclusion of the records. The probation office knew that Pierce failed a urinalysis and that information in some form should have been disclosed in the Pierce file. A simple in camera investigation could have resolved the issue while Pierce was available for cross-examination and undoubtedly would have led to the timely production of the written report. 30 We conclude that the district court erroneously ruled that section 217.780 of the Missouri Code protected Pierce's probation records. This court's decision in Holmes and the explicit language of Rule 501 stand for the proposition that the federal law of privilege, not a contrary state statute, governs the confidentiality of the challenged records. Under Holmes, no privilege attached to the information in Pierce's probation files. See Holmes, 594 F.2d at 1171. The district court's ruling to the contrary, made expressly upon the basis of the Missouri statute, constitutes error. 11 31 We now consider whether the erroneous exclusion of the probation report violates the appellants' sixth amendment right of confrontation. The sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). The inability of defense counsel to conduct effective cross-examination into possible bias from the probationary status of an adverse witness constitutes a denial of the right of confrontation. Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111. A criminal defendant states a violation of the confrontation clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). 32 Each defense counsel attempted to impeach Pierce for bias by showing that her status as a probationer rendered her vulnerable to the prosecution. See II Trial Tr. at 347, 352-53, 403-04. Without the evidence that she recently failed a drug test given by her probation office, however, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness. Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111. Although we do not speculate as to whether the jury would have found the prohibited line of inquiry persuasive, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Id. Appellants have thus met the burden of showing a violation of the confrontation clause: the cross-examination permitted by the district court prevented them from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination into a prototypical form of bias, Pierce's status as a probation violator. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. at 1435-36. 33 We review denial of an opportunity to impeach for bias, like other confrontation clause errors, under Chapman harmless error analysis. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)); see also United States v. Copley, 938 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1139 (D.C.Cir.1989) (same); Lam v. Iowa, 860 F.2d 873, 876 (8th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069, 109 S.Ct. 2072, 104 L.Ed.2d 637 (1989). The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. The final harmlessness determination in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, including: 34 the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. 35 Id. (citing Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059-60, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728-29, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969)). 36 After reviewing the record as a whole, Lam, 860 F.2d at 876, we are persuaded that the exclusion of Pierce's probation records amounts to harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense attorneys impeached Pierce effectively during otherwise extensive cross-examination. Pierce provided cumulative testimony which the Government corroborated with overwhelming evidence of guilt. Cf. United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 199 (2d Cir.) (harmless error to exclude evidence of witness bias where witness admitted on cross as to incidents from which the alleged bias arose), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 133, 116 L.Ed.2d 100 (1991); United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1388 (8th Cir.1981) (harmless error to exclude juvenile jail records of chief government witness when witness's own testimony about her drug and alcohol use is already before the jury), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 103 S.Ct. 742, 74 L.Ed.2d 962 (1983). Accordingly, we affirm both convictions.