Opinion ID: 76722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Hobbs Act Instruction

Text: 72 The Defendants also contend that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act charge. We review this issue for plain error because neither Defendant objected to the jury instruction in the district court. United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1148 (11th Cir.2003). We will find plain error only where (1) there is an error; (2) the error is plain or obvious; (3) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights in that it was prejudicial and not harmless; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding. United States v. O'Neal, 362 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir.2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The district court instructed the jury: 73 While it is not necessary to prove that the defendant specifically intended to interfere with interstate commerce, it is necessary that the Government prove that it was realistically probable that the natural consequences of the acts alleged in the indictment would be to delay, interrupt or affect interstate commerce, which means the flow of commerce or business activities between two or more states. The effect shown may be minimal. 74 The evidence is insufficient if it rests only on speculation about whether individuals might have spent money differently but for any extortionate act which you might find. 75 (R.24 at 1896.) Specifically, the Defendants contend that the phrase realistically probable that the natural consequences of the acts alleged in the indictment would be to ... affect interstate commerce ... allowed the jury to convict them without proof of an actual effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1085 (11th Cir.2001) (requiring an actual effect on interstate commerce to support a Hobbs Act conviction.) 76 The instruction given the jury is similar to Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 66.3, 11 which we approved in United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir.1997). While the pattern jury instruction does not contain the phrase realistically probable, the Government contends that we have held that the government need only show a realistic probability of an effect, or some actual de minimis effect, on commerce to bring the extortion within the reach of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir.1999) (en banc). 77 Careful review of the cases themselves reveals a fracture in the Government's argument. In Kaplan, we spoke of reasonable probability in the context of the inchoate Hobbs Act offenses of attempt to extort and conspiracy to extort. 171 F.3d at 1354. But here, the Government sought convictions for violations of the Hobbs Act by means of actual extortion. The Kaplan case, therefore, is inapposite. 78 Even so, comparing the language of the pattern jury instruction — natural consequences — with the language the district court used — realistically probable — we conclude that any error that may have occurred had no effect on the Defendants' substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Therefore, the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the interstate commerce element. 79