Opinion ID: 1940064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Aramark's Arguments

Text: Aramark asserts several arguments for a contrary interpretation of the statute, which we now address. Aramark first asks us to adopt the rationale in Mostoufi. In that case, the court relied on the introductory language in section 376.313(3), which states that nothing contained in ss. 376.30-376.319 prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution. The court reasoned, because the statute is framed so as not to `prohibit' bringing a cause, we conclude we should not interpret the statute as `creating' a new cause of action that did not theretofore exist. It seems clear to us that the intent of the statute is to insure that it is not interpreted as preempting any private rights that were already in existence. 618 So.2d at 1376-77. We disagree that this one phrase conclusively resolves the question. While the phrase, standing alone, may be so interpreted, it is only one factor. Moreover, although the phrase permits such an interpretation, it does not require it. It does not follow necessarily that because the statute is framed so as not to prohibit bringing a cause of action, it does not create one. It is just as possible  and, given the other provisions we have examined earlier, we believe more probable  that the statute refers to a new cause of action created in the statute. Moreover, the narrow interpretation applied in Mostoufi ignores the directive in section 376.315 that the statutory scheme, of which section 376.313 is part, be liberally construed. Cf. Dixon v. Sprint-Florida, Inc., 787 So.2d 968, 971-72 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (refusing to interpret statutory language that an employee is entitled to file a complaint as limiting the employee to a single complaint, in part because it comported with the statutory command requiring a liberal construction of the statute). Aramark also argues that the First District's interpretation of the statute would produce inconsistent results because in circumstances such as those present here it would allow private individuals, but not the DEP, to sue owners of contaminated property. Aramark argues that the DEP may only enforce the statute if the owner either caused the discharge or owned or operated the facility at the time the discharge occurred. See § 376.308(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). In this case, neither situation applies. Therefore, Aramark argues, under the First District's interpretation of the statute, in this case a private individual could sue for damages but the DEP could not. We disagree both that the statute draws such a distinction and that, if it did, the result would be incongruous. Aramark relies on section 376.308(1)(a), which limits the entities DEP can sue. The very next subsection, however, section 376.308(1)(b), allows the DEP to sue all persons specified in s. 403.727(4). That section allows the DEP to hold liable the owner and operator of a facility for damages arising from the discharge of hazardous substances. Perchloroethlyene (PCE), which was found in Easton's groundwater, qualifies as a hazardous substance under both section 376.301(20) and section 403.703(29), Florida Statutes (2002). Chapter 403 does not define facility, see § 403.703, Fla. Stat. (2002). We therefore resort to its plain meaning. See, e.g., L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.1997) (stating that when the legislature has not defined a statutory term, a court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain its plain and ordinary meaning). Facility is defined as something that is built, installed, or established to serve a particular purpose. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 416 (10th ed.1994). Under this definition, Aramark is an owner of a facility under section 403.727(4)(a) and subject to suit by the DEP without proof of causation. Thus, allowing suits by private individuals without proof of causation will not grant greater rights to private parties than to the DEP. Even if our interpretation did grant greater rights to private parties than to the DEP, our conclusion would not change. Valid reasons exist for reducing proof requirements for those directly affected by pollutive agents. In fact, many statutes grant private parties the right to sue for damages, while granting public agencies only the right to enjoin the unlawful conduct. [2] The DEP's powers are regulatory and concern the conduct of specific violators. See, e.g., § 376.305(2) Fla. Stat. (2002) (If the person causing the discharge... fails to act immediately, the department may arrange for the removal of the pollutant....). The primary purpose of a DEP suit is to enforce the statute and eliminate the pollution. The main purpose of a private suit is to compensate the innocent victim of pollution. Section 376.313(6) reflects the essentially private purpose of individual suits by providing for attorney's fees and litigation costs only upon a determination that such an award is in the public interest. Cf. Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Tropic Tint of Jupiter, Inc., 668 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (noting that an attorneys fees award was sufficiently in the public interest under section 376.313(6), even though the private plaintiff unquestionably received a personal benefit from the lawsuit). Therefore, even if Aramark were correct that our interpretation of the statute would allow private parties to sue where the DEP could not, that would simply reflect the legislative policy decision to allow private parties, the actual victims of pollution, greater ability to recover damages from the owners of contaminated property.