Opinion ID: 1384601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: constitutional challenges under the various provisions of the oklahoma constitution

Text: The plaintiffs also claim that the present school finance system violates several provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution. A finding that the system does not violate the federal constitution does not preclude review under our state constitution. [46] In fact, since the decision in Rodriguez, a number of courts have examined school finance systems under their respective state constitutions, with the majority ruling in favor of constitutionality. [47] These courts have relied greatly on the particular language and interpretive history of their respective constitutions; and since the provisions differ from state to state, we do not find these cases especially helpful here. The plaintiffs argue first that the present system of financing denies them the equal protection of the laws. Although the Oklahoma Constitution does not contain a provision identical to the equal protection clause in the federal constitution, it is well established that a like guarantee exists within our state constitution's due process clause. [48] Although education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the federal constitution, the plaintiffs contend that it is a fundamental interest under our state constitution and so strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to the financing system. This argument is based upon what the plaintiffs call the  Rodriguez syllogism or test. In Rodriguez the Court held that education was not one of the rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the federal constitution, and so strict judicial scrutiny would not be employed to review legislation affecting education. Conversely, the plaintiffs here argue that since education is mentioned in our state constitution, [49] it is a fundamental interest or right, and therefore strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to the method of financing public education. The argument that education is a fundamental interest or right under our state constitution leads to several other questions. First, there is the question whether the mere mention of a subject in that constitution makes that subject a fundamental interest or creates a fundamental right. Second, if it does not, then the question arises whether by its terms the constitutional provision creates a fundamental right. Third, assuming that a fundamental right is created, there is the question of the exact nature of the right or guarantee. Once this has been ascertained, then we must also determine the appropriate standard of judicial review. We believe that there is a difference here insofar as a subject may be mentioned in the state constitution. If we were to adopt the Rodriguez test, then educational opportunity arguably would be a fundamental interest in Oklahoma entitled to strict judicial scrutiny. While that test may be applicable under the United States Constitution, it is not appropriate for determining fundamental rights under our state constitution. This is so because of the basic and inherently different nature of the two constitutions. The United States Constitution is one of restricted authority and delegated powers. [50] By contrast our state constitution is not one of limited powers where the State's authority is restricted to the four corners of the document. [51] Rather, the Oklahoma Constitution addresses not only those areas deemed fundamental but also others which could have been left to statutory enactment. While the Congress of the United States may do only what the federal constitution has granted it the power to do, our state Legislature generally may do, as to proper subjects of legislation, all but that which it is prohibited from doing. [52] Thus, under the Oklahoma Constitution, fundamental rights are not necessarily determined by whether they are provided for within the document. We accordingly reject the Rodriguez test as inappropriate. Nor is equal educational opportunity  in the sense of equal expenditures per pupil  guaranteed by the express terms of our state constitution. Article 1 § 5 states that [p]rovisions shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall be open to all children of the state... . Article 13 § 1 provides that [t]he Legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public schools wherein all children of the State may be educated. These sections merely mandate actions by the Legislature to establish and maintain a system of free public schools. They do not on their face guarantee equal expenditures per pupil. Assuming that education is a fundamental interest, the question remains as to what is the exact nature of the interest guaranteed. In Miller v. Childers [53] this court discussed the Legislature's obligations under Article 13 § 1 of the Constitution. We held that the school system should provide our youth with such degree of learning that when the work is done they may be educated young men and women and with such mental and moral training as will make them useful citizens of our great commonwealth. [54] Again, in School Dist. No. 25 of Woods County v. Hodge, this court held that State Aid was intended to aid in assuring a minimum educational program for all children of the state. [55] We also stated that the program was designed to insure uniformity of opportunity to all children of the state to receive at least the degree of instruction embraced by the minimum program. Thus, the right guaranteed in Article 13 § 1 is a basic, adequate education according to the standards that may be established by the State Board of Education. There is nothing in our previous decisions which suggests that the Legislature must provide equal expenditures per pupil in order to accomplish this objective. This conclusion is supported by other constitutional provisions. Article 13 § 1a, which provides for the appropriation of funds for the support of public schools, states in part: [s]uch monies shall be allocated to the various school districts in the manner and by a distributing agency to be designated by the Legislature ; ... [and] the amount of state funds to which any school district may be entitled shall be determined by the distributing agency upon terms and conditions specified by the Legislature, and provided further that such funds shall be in addition to apportionments from the permanent school fund.... [Emphasis added.] As is clear from this section, state funds do not have to be allocated to the districts on an equal per-pupil basis, but may be distributed as the Legislature sees fit. We find no authority to support the plaintiffs' contention that the school finance system should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. We previously have held that our constitution places few restrictions on the Legislature's power to provide a school system for the state and the methods employed by the Legislature in doing so are largely within its discretion. When these methods are challenged, the only justiciable question is whether the Legislature acted within its powers. Where the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature is in question, all reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of its validity and the act will be declared constitutional unless it can be clearly demonstrated that the Legislature acted arbitrarily and capriciously. [56] Such a demonstration has not been made here. The plaintiffs also argue that compulsory school attendance requires that schools be equally funded. They contend that it is a violation of both due process and equal protection to require children to attend schools under penalty for them and their parents [57] without requiring some standard of equality in the public support of those schools. Whatever merit such argument may have, it is of no avail where a charge fairly cannot be made that a child is not receiving at least a basic adequate education. The plaintiffs also claim that the present school finance system violates Article 5 §§ 59 and 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. We do not agree. Section 59 requires that general laws have a uniform operation throughout the state and that no special law be enacted where a general law can be made. Section 46 prohibits, inter alia, any special or local law regulating the affairs of school districts. There was no allegation in the petition that the school finance laws do not apply to all districts in the state. Rather, the plaintiffs' claim essentially is that the impact of the school finance system differs from district to district. It is well established  and the plaintiffs admit  that a law can be general even though it does not operate universally and alike on all persons throughout the state. [58] In deciding whether a law is general for the purposes of these provisions, we must look to see if there is a rational basis for the classification employed by the statute. [59] As stated earlier, there is a rational basis to support the present school finance system. In addition, the school finance laws cannot be said to regulate impermissibly the affairs of a school district merely because the district's financial situation limits the options available to it.