Opinion ID: 1794583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: admissibility of habit evidence in this case.

Text: Like any evidence, evidence of habit or routine practice is admissible only if relevant to a fact in issue. Compare Gregory v. State, 9 Ark.App. 242, 657 S.W.2d 570, 571 (1983) (in a trial for receiving stolen property, marijuana habit of witness who allegedly sold stolen property to defendant was not relevant to prove any issue in the case). Thus, whether Appellant smoked marijuana on the morning of the collision would not have been relevant to prove that he drove past the stop sign and into the intersection at Bloyds Crossing without slackening his speed. However, it was relevant to prove the element of a criminal mens rea of wantonness or recklessness, i.e., to prove why he ran the stop sign and drove into the intersection without slackening his speed. The Commonwealth's theory was that Appellant had smoked marijuana on the morning of December 12, 1997, and that his operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of the combined effects of marijuana, Valium, and Tylenol 3 amounted to wanton or reckless conduct. His admitted habit of smoking two marijuana cigarettes every day, one in the morning and another at night, was highly probative of that theory. The instances of past conduct (every morning) were numerous enough to base an inference of systematic conduct. Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 511 (4th Cir.1977) (quotation omitted). And since the habit was identified by occurrence, e.g., every morning, as opposed to circumstance, e.g., when stripping tobacco, there is no issue here with respect to similarity of circumstances or ratio of reactions to situations. Nor is there any issue here as to either competency or the knowledge of the person reporting the habit. The evidence was in the form of an admission by Appellant, himself, KRE 801A(b)(1), who was the person most knowledgeable of his own habits. Even if relevant and competent, evidence of a habit or routine practice, like other relevant evidence, is subject to exclusion under KRE 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. [13] The trial judge concluded that the probative value of the evidence of Appellant's alcohol habit was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (because his blood tested negative for alcohol content) but that such was not the case with respect to the evidence of his marijuana habit (because his urine tested positive for marijuana and because of his prior conflicting statements with respect to whether he had or had not smoked marijuana on the day of the accident). I discern no abuse of discretion with respect to either of these KRE 403 rulings. English, supra, note 13, at 945. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Green Circuit Court in all respects. GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.