Opinion ID: 2775233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Improper-Purpose Doctrine Gives Parties

Text: Inadequate Notice of Their Rights and Duties ¶51 Because improper-purpose findings are so dependent on fact-finders’ personal sympathies, and so insulated from appellate review, the outcome of an improper-purpose suit becomes unpredictable as soon as any evidence of improper purpose is introduced. This is a problem not merely because it may lead to unjust outcomes in individual cases, but because it makes it impossible for private parties to understand their rights and duties under tortious interference law. ¶52 Under the improper-purpose prong as it has developed, a business owner could be sued for undercutting his competitor’s prices if he held a grudge against her. An investor in a Ponzi scheme 13 Pratt, 885 P.2d at 788–89 (expressing deference to the jury’s finding of improper purpose); ProMax, 943 P.2d at 255 (“[T]here was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the trial court could have [found improper purpose].”); Luna Bronze, 2008 WL 4130021, at  (“The evidence, thus, presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.”). 14 The ProMax and Luna Bronze courts each cited only a single piece of evidence suggesting an improper purpose. In ProMax, the court mentioned only that the defendant could have sued to protect his contractual rights but chose not to. 943 P.2d at 255. In Luna Bronze, the court cited only testimony that the defendant had warned the plaintiff that their copyright dispute would cause “the owner of Luna Bronze to lose the business to Peterson and to be deported.” 2008 WL 4130021, at . And yet each court concluded that a single piece of ambiguous evidence was sufficient to support a finding of improper purpose. ProMax, 943 P.2d at 255; Luna Bronze, 2008 WL 4130021, at . 15 ELDRIDGE v. JOHNDROW Opinion of the Court might be sued for exposing the scheme if she did so with enough malice towards her swindlers. And a customer leaving angry reviews online might receive a response to her complaints via service of process. ¶53 It is of course likely that few juries would find a predominantly improper purpose in any of these cases, but that is beside the point. The mere risk that a jury might find liability, coupled with the low bar the claims need to clear in order to reach a jury in the first place, could become a substantial deterrent to socially beneficial speech and conduct if improper-purpose suits became common.15 In the First Amendment context, the tendency of a law to deter conduct it does not actually prohibit is known as a chilling effect, and is sometimes sufficient to invalidate the law as an infringement of the freedom of speech even when the object of the law is constitutionally unobjectionable. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV . 685, 693 (1978). ¶54 We do not hold that the improper-purpose doctrine actually violates the First Amendment—that question is not before us, and we have no need to reach it. But we are persuaded that the improper-purpose doctrine as it currently exists in Utah is in tension with First Amendment principles, and this tension is a further reason to abandon the precedent on which it is based. C. The Pratt Dissenters’ Concerns Are Adequately Addressed by the Improper Means Prong ¶55 Though the foregoing discussion demonstrates the disadvantages of improper-purpose liability, it does not weigh those costs against the doctrine’s benefits—benefits sufficient to persuade two justices of the Pratt court that the improper-purpose prong 15 The Seventh Circuit recognized this problem in a tortious interference case brought under Illinois law. In rejecting an argument that “[a] competitor’s privilege does not include a right to get business from a competitor by means of fraud,” the court pointed out that “[o]nce a case gets to the jury, all bets are off. The practical consequence of [this] approach, therefore, would be that a sports agent who lured away the client of another agent with a promise to do better by him would be running a grave legal risk.” Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 865–66 (7th Cir. 1999). 16 Cite as: 2015 UT 21 Opinion of the Court should be retained despite its dangers. 885 P.2d at 790–91 (Stewart, A.C.J., concurring in the result).16 ¶56 Specifically, two of the Pratt justices argued that although “[the improper-purpose] prong, if construed broadly, could seriously interfere with the forces of competition in the marketplace,” the doctrine was nevertheless “sound[].” Id. Without an improper-purpose prong, they argued, “[i]nfliction of gratuitous harm” might go unremedied. Id. at 790–91. Because of the need for a remedy in cases like Pratt, the two justices preferred to deal with the improper-purpose prong’s problems by letting the doctrine mature and narrow itself through the normal processes of commonlaw adjudication. Id. (“It is, indeed, the strength of the common law that general principles of law receive definition and limitation over time by their application in specific fact situations.” (emphasis added)).