Opinion ID: 289851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disqualification of chairman dixon

Text: 27 An additional ground which requires remand of these proceedings-- and which would have required reversal even in the absence of the above-described procedural irregularities-- is participation in the proceedings by the then Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Paul Rand Dixon. 28 Notice that the hearing examiner's dismissal of all charges would be appealed was filed by the Commission staff on February 1, 1968 (Brief for Petitioners at 18). On March 12, 1968, this court's decision was handed down in a prior appeal arising from this same complaint, in which we upheld the Commission's issuance of press releases which called attention to the pending proceedings. 9 Then, on March 15, 1968, while the appeal from the examiner's decision was pending before him, Chairman Dixon made a speech before the Government Relations Workshop of the National Newspaper Association in which he stated: 29 What kind of vigor can a reputable newspaper exhibit? The quick answer, of course, pertains to its editorial policy, its willingness to present the news without bias. However, that is only half the coin. How about ethics on the business side of running a paper? What standards are maintained on advertising acceptance? What would be the attitude toward accepting good money for advertising by a merchant who conducts a 'going out of business' sale every five months? What about carrying ads that offer college educations in five weeks, fortunes by raising mushrooms in the basement, getting rid of pimples with a magic lotion, or becoming an airline's hostess by attending a charm school? Or, to raise the target a bit, how many newspapers would hesitate to accept an ad promising an unqualified guarantee for a product when the guarantee is subject to many limitations? Without belaboring the point, I'm sure you're aware that advertising acceptance standards could stand more tightening by many newspapers. Granted that newspapers are not in the advertising policing business, their advertising managers are savvy enough to smell deception when the odor is strong enough. And it is in the public interest, as well as their own, that their sensory organs become more discriminating. The Federal Trade Commission, even where it has jurisdiction, could not protect the public as quickly. 30 (App. 134.) It requires no superior olfactory powers to recognize that the danger of unfairness through prejudgment is not diminished by a cloak of self-righteousness. We have no concern for or interest in the public statements of government officers, but we are charged with the responsibility of making certain that the image of the administrative process is not transformed from a Rubens to a Modigliani. 31 We indicated in our earlier opinion in this case that 'there is in fact and law authority in the Commission, acting in the public interest, to alert the public to suspected violations of the law by factual press releases whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that a respondent is engaged in activities made unlawful by the Act   .' FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 131 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 337, 404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (1968). This does not give individual Commissioners license to prejudge cases or to make speeches which give the appearance that the case has been prejudged. 10 Conduct such as this may have the effect of entrenching a Commissioner in a position which he has publicly stated, making it difficult, if not impossible, for him to reach a different conclusion in the event he deems it necessary to do so after consideration of the record. There is a marked difference between the issuance of a press release which states that the Commission has filed a complaint because it has 'reason to believe' that there have been violations, and statements by a Commissioner after an appeal has been filed which give the appearance that he has already prejudged the case and that the ultimate determination of the merits will move in predestined grooves. While these two situations-- Commission press releases and a Commissioner's pre-decision public statements-- are similar in appearance, they are obviously of a different order of merit. 32 As we noted in our earlier opinion, Congress has specifically vested the administrative agencies both with the 'power to act in an accusatory capacity' and with the 'responsibility of ultimately determining the merits of the charges so presented.' 131 U.S.App.D.C. at 338, 404 F.2d at 315. 33 Chairman Dixon, sensitive to theory but insensitive to reality, made the following statement in declining to recuse himself from this case after petitioners requested that he withdraw: 34 As    I have stated    this principle 'is not a rigid command of the law, compelling disqualification for trifling causes, but a consideration addressed to the discretion and sound judgment of the administrator himself in determining whether, irrespective of the law's requirements, he should disqualify himself.' 35 (App. 143.) To this tenet of self-appraisal we apply Lord Macaulay's evaluation more than 100 years ago of our American government: 'It has one drawback-- it is all sail and no anchor.' We find it hard to believe that former Chairman Dixon is so indifferent to the dictates of the Courts of Appeals that he has chosen once again to put his personal determination of what the law requires ahead of what the courts have time and again told him the law requires. If this is a question of 'discretion and judgment,' Commissioner Dixon has exercised questionable discretion and very poor judgment indeed, in directing his shafts and squibs at a case awaiting his official action. We can use his own words in telling Commissioner Dixon that he has acted 'irrespective of the law's requirements'; we will spell out for him once again, avoiding tired cliche and weary generalization, in no uncertain terms, exactly what those requirements are, in the fervent hope that this will be the last time we have to travel this wearisome road. 36 The test for disquaification has been succinctly stated as being whether 'a disinterested observer may conclude that (the agency) has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it.' Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896, 80 S.Ct. 200, 4 L.Ed.2d 152 (1959). 37 That test was cited with approval by this court in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 366 F.2d 754 (1964), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739, 85 S.Ct. 1798, 14 L.Ed.2d 714 (1965). In that case Chairman Dixon made a speech before the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, Inc. while a case against Texaco was pending before the examiner on remand. After restating the test for disqualification, this court said: 38 ( A) disinterested reader of Chairman Dixon's speech could hardly fail to conclude that he had in some measure decided in advance that Texaco had violated the Act. 39 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 372, 336 F.2d at 760. We further stated that such an administrative hearing 'must be attended, not only with every element of fairness but with the very appearance of complete fairness,' citing Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 107, 306 F.2d 260, 267 (1962). We therefore concluded that Chairman Dixon's participation in the Texaco case amounted to a denial of due process. 40 After our decision in Texaco the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was required to reverse a decision of the FTC because Chairman Dixon refused to recuse himself from the case even though he had served as Chief Counsel and Staff Director to the Senate Subcommittee which made the initial investigation into the production and sale of the 'wonder drug' tetracycline. American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (1966). Incredible though it may seem, the court was compelled to note in that case that: 41 The Commission is a fact-finding body. As Chairman, Mr. Dixon sat with the other members as triers of the facts and joined in making the factual determination upon which the order of the Commission is based. As counsel for the Senate Subcommittee, he had investigated and developed many of these same facts. 42 363 F.2d at 767. It is appalling to witness such insensitivity to the requirements of due process; it is even more remarkable to find ourselves once again confronted with a situation in which Mr. Dixon, pounding on the most convenient victim, has determined either to distort the holdings in the cited cases beyond all reasonable interpretation or to ignore them altogether. We are constrained to this harshness of language because of Mr. Dixon's flagrant disregard of prior decisions. 43 The rationale for remanding the case despite the fact that former Chairman Dixon's vote was not necessary for a majority is well established: 44 Litigants are entitled to an impartial tribunal whether it consists of one man or twenty and there is no way which we know of whereby the influence of one upon the others can be quantitatively measured. 45 Berkshire Employees Ass'n of Berkshire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 1941). This rationale was cited with approval in the American Cyanamid opinion; we adopt the position of our sister circuits on this point.