Opinion ID: 2639442
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Killing a Service Dog

Text: ¶ 47 Hamilton contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of killing a police service dog because Max had lost his status as a police service animal at the time he was killed. In his view, Max lost his status as a police service animal because his handler, Deputy Chambers, was not acting within his authority as a peace officer when Max was shot. ¶ 48 Section 76-9-306 of the Utah Code makes it a class A misdemeanor for a person to intentionally cause bodily injury or death to a police service animal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-306(2) (1999). [13] A police service animal is defined as any dog or horse used by a law enforcement agency, which is specially trained for law enforcement work, or any animal contracted to assist a law enforcement agency in the performance of law enforcement duties. Id. § 76-9-306(1)(b). ¶ 49 Hamilton urges this court to read into the service animal statute a specific limitation on police dog status: that a dog's police service status is contingent upon its handler's continuing status as a police officer. In other words, if a police handler acts outside the scope of his authority, his police dog also loses its status as a police service animal. We find Hamilton's reasoning problematic in light of the plain language of the statute. [14] However, we decline to decide whether a police service animal loses its status when its handler acts outside the scope of his authority because, as we have already held, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Chambers was both acting under the color of legal authority and on duty during the events at Vance Springs. ¶ 50 Moreover, defense counsel conceded in oral argument that Chambers acted within the scope of his police authority at least until Chambers fired shots at Hamilton. Since the evidence shows that Chambers did not fire shots at Hamilton until after Hamilton shot Max, by the defense's own admission, Chambers was acting within the scope of his police authority at the time Max was shot. Therefore, Max could not have lost his police service status at the time he was shot. We thus conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Hamilton's motion to dismiss the charge of killing a police service dog and that it was proper to submit this charge to the jury.