Opinion ID: 1743676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Lopez

Text: Appellant argues on appeal that it was error for the trial court to allow Dr. Lopez to testify as an expert witness on two grounds: (1) His opinion and evaluation were based in part on the hearsay statement of Appellee concerning the cause of her knee injury; and (2) the doctor's examination and recommendation of knee surgery, which preceded Appellee's stroke, may have no longer been valid because there was no indication that Appellee would ever walk again after the stroke. In the present case, Appellee was referred by her chiropractor to seek an evaluation of her injuries by Dr. Lopez. Dr. Lopez testified that in reaching his conclusion that Appellee needed to undergo knee-replacement surgery, he relied upon the patient history given by Appellee, as well as his physical examination of her and the information provided to him by Dr. Haymer. Dr. Lopez testified further that it was common practice for a physician to rely at least in part on the patient's history of the injuries. Dr. Lopez related that as to the symptoms of pain experienced by Appellee in her back and knee, Appellee stated the symptoms started after a motor vehicle accident that she had been involved in about a year prior to seeing Dr. Lopez. Specifically, Appellee told Dr. Lopez that she was experiencing pain, swelling, and stiffness in her right knee. Appellant argues that Dr. Lopez's opinion as to the cause or aggravation of Appellee's knee injury was based entirely on Appellee's statement, and that such a statement was hearsay and not included as an exception to the hearsay rule found in A.R.E. Rule 803(4) because it was made to the doctor after litigation had begun and was, therefore, self-serving. Appellee responds that Dr. Lopez's testimony, including statements made to him by Appellee, was admissible under A.R.E. Rule 703 and that there is no provision in Rule 803(4) that prohibits statements given after litigation has begun. Appellee responds further that Appellant's objection to Dr. Lopez's testimony goes to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility, and that there was no evidence presented at trial indicating that Appellee would never be able to walk again. We find no error in the trial court's decision to permit Dr. Lopez to testify on either ground raised by Appellant. This court has long recognized that the admissibility of expert testimony rests largely within the broad discretion of the trial court and the appellant bears the burdensome task of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Sims v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 297 Ark. 588, 764 S.W.2d 427 (1989); Dildine v. Clark Equipment Co., 282 Ark. 130, 666 S.W.2d 692 (1984). In support of his argument, Appellant asserts that Dr. Lopez was not Appellee's treating physician, and thus, he should not have been allowed to provide hearsay testimony concerning Appellee's patient history because such hearsay falls outside the medical-diagnosis exception found in Rule 803(4). Additionally, Appellant relies heavily on this court's decision in Ben M. Hogan Co., Inc. v. Nichols, 254 Ark. 771, 496 S.W.2d 404 (1973), in support of his contention that only a treating physician, as opposed to a medical expert witness consulted solely for the purpose of providing trial testimony, may give opinion testimony pertaining to injury. Appellant also cites this court to its decision in Carton v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 303 Ark. 568, 798 S.W.2d 674 (1990), in support of his contention that statements made by persons as to pain for the sole purpose of furnishing an expert with information on which to base his opinion are not admissible. Rule 702 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Rule 703 provides: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. [Emphasis added.] Pursuant to Rule 703, an expert witness may base his opinion on facts or data in evidence, which may otherwise be inadmissible, if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field; the test is whether the expert's reliance on such information is reasonable. Scott v. State, 318 Ark. 747, 888 S.W.2d 628 (1994); Dixon v. Ledbetter, 262 Ark. 758, 561 S.W.2d 294 (1978). In Wolner v. Bogaev, 290 Ark. 299, 718 S.W.2d 942 (1986), this court held that obviously the requirement of personal knowledge has no application to an expert witness who is, in many instances, testifying to an opinion based entirely on assumed facts. Id. at 303, 718 S.W.2d at 944. In Scott, 318 Ark. 747, 888 S.W.2d 628, this court stated: The very purpose of Rule 703 is to allow the courts to follow the same practice as do experts themselves in forming their opinions, illustrated, for example, by allowing a physician to base his diagnosis on reports from other medical sources. Moreover, when an expert's testimony is based on hearsay, the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the expert does not mandate the exclusion of the testimony, rather it presents a jury question as to the weight of the testimony. Id. at 749, 888 S.W.2d at 629 (citations omitted). Similarly, the court of appeals observed in Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Schell, 13 Ark.App. 293, 683 S.W.2d 618 (1985), that under Rule 703 an expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the basis facts for his opinion, as otherwise the opinion is left unsupported in midair with little if any means for evaluating its correctness. Id. at 298, 683 S.W.2d at 621. Rules 702 through 705 emphasize the function of cross-examination, with the burden being placed upon the opponent of the testimony to show that the expert's conclusion lacks adequate support in order for the testimony to be subject to being stricken by the trial court. Id. at 299, 683 S.W.2d at 622. In Carton, 303 Ark. 568, 798 S.W.2d 674, this court held that a portion of the plaintiff's statement to a doctor concerning the cause of her injury should have been excluded as it did not fall within the hearsay exception in Rule 803(4). Appellant relies on that holding in support of his argument, but the facts presented in that case differ greatly from those presented below. In fact, the holding in Carton clearly supports the trial court's decision in this case to admit the testimony of Dr. Lopez. In Carton , the plaintiff sued the railroad company claiming that she was injured when she slipped on some spilled diesel fuel and fell. The doctor's medical report, which was admitted into evidence, stated that, [a]t the time she was in the process of getting out of the truck her foot slipped having apparently accumulated some diesel fuel on her sole [.] Id. at 574, 798 S.W.2d at 677. This court held that the underlined words should have been excluded as that portion of her statement was not relevant for diagnosis and attempted only to fix blame. This court noted, however, that, `a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that the car was driven through a red light.' Id. at 575, 798 S.W.2d at 677 (quoting Cotchett and Elkind, Federal Courtroom Evidence 144 (1986)). The challenged information given by Dr. Lopez in the present case would likewise qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule found in Rule 803(4). In Hogan Co., 254 Ark. 771, 496 S.W.2d 404, which was rendered before this court adopted the Arkansas Rules of Evidence in 1986, the expert witness was a doctor who had been retained for purposes of testifying at trial. The doctor stated that the plaintiff had been referred to him by his attorney and that when the plaintiff consulted him, the plaintiff's wife and his attorney were also present and assisted the plaintiff in reciting his patient history. The doctor also stated that he had not intended to treat the plaintiff's condition. This court held that the trial testimony conclusively established that the witness was not a treating physician, but that he occupied the exclusive role of a medical expert witness whose testimony was secured for purposes of giving an opinion at trial. The facts presented below starkly contrast the facts presented in the Hogan Co. case since Appellee consulted Dr. Lopez for possible treatment. Contrary to Appellant's argument, Dr. Lopez was a treating physician for purposes of testifying as to the nature, extent, and cause of her injuries. His expert testimony was not sought by Appellee or her attorney for the purpose of testifying at trial; rather, Dr. Lopez examined Appellee's injuries upon referral by Dr. Haymer. That Appellee had not actually had the knee-replacement surgery prior to trial does not change the fact that Dr. Lopez examined Appellee for the purpose of diagnosing her injuries, and that the doctor made suggestions as to the proper treatment of those injuries. Ultimately, Dr. Lopez testified that in his opinion, Appellee's knee injury was not caused by the collision, but that it was very possible that her preexisting condition of degenerative arthritis was aggravated by the trauma of the collision. Likewise, Dr. Haymer also testified that he believed Appellee's condition was aggravated in the accident. Appellant has not met his heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the witness to testify or that he was unfairly prejudiced by Dr. Lopez's testimony, especially in light of the fact that Dr. Haymer had also testified as to the cause or aggravation of Appellee's injuries. The pertinent provisions of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence and case law clearly support the trial court's decision to admit the testimony. Furthermore, Appellant conducted extensive cross-examination of Dr. Lopez in an attempt to show that his opinion was unreasonable in that it was not supported by the facts. The fact that the jury chose to believe the testimony of the doctor is insufficient to meet Appellant's burden on appeal. As for Appellant's remaining contention that Dr. Lopez should not have been permitted to testify as to Appellee's need for knee-replacement surgery because she had since suffered a stroke, we agree with Appellee that such an argument is more properly directed toward the weight to be attached to the evidence, rather than its admissibility. As Appellee points out, Appellant could have chosen to put on evidence that Appellee would never be able to walk again, had such evidence existed, in an attempt to demonstrate that the surgery was no longer necessary. We find no error in the trial court's ruling upon either argument presented by Appellant.