Opinion ID: 1939457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of Jury Instructions

Text: The instruction appellant complains of reads as follows: The possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if, (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not realize or discover the danger, and (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and (c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the risk involved. See R.R. 44a (emphasis added). This instruction is a verbatim recitation of § 342 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. At trial, appellant testified that she knew of the condition of the steps and advised appellees of that condition. This testimony, of course, was necessary for appellant to prove a case under the warranty of habitability theory. Appellant asserts that the negligence instruction above precluded her from recovering under that theory because it erroneously directed the jury that no recovery was possible under any theory unless appellant was unaware of the condition that caused her injuries. For the reasons that follow, although we agree that the court's instruction was erroneous, we do not agree that appellant is entitled to a new trial. The trial court's charge is problematic for two reasons. First, the charge is clearly erroneous under Pugh v. Holmes , in that it suggests that appellant could not recover unless she was unaware of the condition of the premises. As we have noted above, Pugh requires that the plaintiff prove that she gave notice to the landlord of the defect or condition in order to recover under the warranty of habitability. In addition, the charge was erroneous because § 342 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not deal with the issue of the duty of landlords to their tenants. Instead, § 342 defines the duties of possessors of lands to licensees. The Restatement defines a licensee as a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent. See id. A tenant, of course, also is allowed to remain on the owner's property at the owner's consent; however, as the Restatement itself recognizes, the duty that a landlord owes to a tenant is not the same. Indeed, the Restatement contains some eight specific sections concerning the landlord-tenant relationship. See id. §§ 355-362. Unlike § 342, none of the sections governing landlord-tenant relationships purport to state an exclusive cause of action, and only one has a requirement that a tenant be unaware of the dangerous condition in order to recover. See id. § 358. Appellant thus rightly notes that an instruction based on these sections would not have prevented her from recovering under the warranty of habitability theory. In summary, the court's instruction was erroneous because it was contrary to Pugh v. Holmes and also because it was a mistaken statement of principles in the Restatement governing a landlord's duty. Although the § 342 instruction was erroneous, a close review of the trial record nevertheless convinces us that, in light of the unique facts of this case, the error was harmless. Central to this conclusion is the fact that the jury found appellant to be 58% contributorily negligent. In both Asper, supra and Rivera, supra, this court recognized § 17.6 of the Restatement (Second) of Property (1977) as the fundamental standard for analyzing cases involving warranty of habitability questions. Section 17.6 provides: A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence of the condition is in violation of: (1) an implied warranty of habitability; or (2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation. Comment B to § 17.6 states: a.) . . . . The implied warranty of habitability is the basis of a duty on the landlord to maintain the property in a habitable condition. By analogy to the negligence per se doctrine, when the landlord violates this duty, he becomes subject to liability for physical harm resulting from such violation. . . . b.) . . . [t]he landlord [however] . . . has available all the usual defenses to an action in negligence, including contributory negligence and assumption of risk. . . . Id. (emphasis added). In this case, therefore, appellant's warranty of habitability claim is subject to all of the defenses available in Pennsylvania to an action in negligence. Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute specifically recognizes that contributory negligence can be a defense in negligence cases: In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in . . . injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought. . . . 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a). Here, the jury found appellant to be 58% contributorily negligent, thereby barring her from recovering under the theory of negligence. Because the jury found that her liability was greater than appellees', this finding would also bar her from recovering under the warranty of habitability. Thus, even if the court had given the jury proper instructions, appellant would not be entitled to recover because of her contributory negligence. The court's giving of the wrong instruction, therefore, was harmless error. In summary, we hold that the trial court erred because its jury instruction based on § 342 precluded appellant from possibly recovering under a warranty of habitability theory. However, because contributory negligence is a defense to warranty of habitability actions, and because the jury found appellant to have been 58% contributorily negligent, appellant could not have recovered even if the court had given the jury proper instructions concerning the warranty of habitability. We hold, therefore, that the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury was harmless error. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment below. Judgment affirmed. WIEAND, J., concurs in the result.