Opinion ID: 2633354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony Regarding Witnesses' Guilty Pleas

Text: [¶ 18] Earll contends that the prosecutor elicited testimony from Yates and Larson regarding guilty pleas which arose out of the events on the morning of December 31, 1998. He claims this contravened this Court's decision in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo.1979), and its progeny. Earll also claims that the prejudice associated with the introduction of such testimony was exacerbated when the prosecutor's closing argument emphasized to the jury that Yates and Larson had taken their punishment. No objection was made to the testimony in question; thus, our review would be confined to a search for plain error which would be established if: (1) the record clearly reflects the incidents urged as error; (2) appellant is able to demonstrate violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is shown that a substantial right of the appellant was materially abridged. Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 911 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Seymour v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo.1997)). Because we are reversing and remanding for new trial on other grounds, we need not decide this issue; however, we would refer the State and the accused to the discussions of this issue in Capshaw and Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535-40 (Wyo.2000). [¶ 19] We have long held that `when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstances, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other.' Capshaw, 11 P.3d. at 911 (quoting Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1375). As we recently noted, the rationale behind this rule was set forth many years ago by Mr. Justice Jackson: It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790, 800 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion); Capshaw, 11 P.3d at 912. [¶ 20] In Mazurek, we set forth several nonexhaustive factors to be considered when evaluating whether there was prejudicial plain error at the trial level, including: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) the strength of competent proof to establish guilt, absent the remarks; (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters; (5) the presence or absence of a limiting instruction; (6) whether there was a proper purpose for introducing the conviction; (7) whether the conviction was improperly emphasized; (8) whether the conviction was used as substantive evidence of guilt; (9) whether the error was invited by defense counsel; (10) whether the failure to object could have been the result of tactical decisions; and (11) whether, in light of all the evidence, the error was harmless. Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 539 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 241-42 (4th Cir.1993)). [¶ 21] We reverse and remand for new trial.