Opinion ID: 2348552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Breach as a Matter of Law

Text: Under § 6A-2-312(1) of the Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that: (a) [t]he title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful. The UCC does not define good title. Thus, todetermine what is required of a seller to convey good title under § 6A-2-312(1)(a), we apply our well settled canons of statutory construction. `Generally when a statute expresses a clear and unambiguous meaning, the task of interpretation is at an end and this [C]ourt will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words set forth in the statute.' State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996). However, when the statutory language is ambiguous, `the primary object of the [C]ourt is to ascertain the legislative intention from a consideration of the legislation in its entirety, viewing the language used therein in the light, nature, and purpose of the enactment thereof.' Mason v. Bowerman Bros., Inc., 95 R.I. 425, 431, 187 A.2d 772, 776 (1963)   . Pierce v. Pierce, 770 A.2d 867, 871 (R.I.2001). The term good title as it is used in § 6A-2-312(1)(a) is ambiguous. The UCC does not provide whether a seller's obligation under § 6A-2-312(1)(a) is limited to transferring legally valid title or whether good title assumes some other associated qualities. Unlike most other statutory enactments, the UCC is accompanied by official commentary. While these comments are not controlling authority and may not be used to vary the plain language of the [UCC],    they are useful for determining the purpose of its provisions and ascertaining the intent of its drafters. Jefferson v. Jones, 286 Md. 544, 408 A.2d 1036, 1039 (Md. 1979). Official comment 1 to § 6A-2-312 declares that one of the purposes of the warranty of title is to provide for a buyer's basic needs in respect to a title which he in good faith expects to acquire by his purchase, namely, that he receive a good, clean title transferred to him    so that he will not be exposed to a lawsuit in order to protect it. That comment goes on to state that the warranty of quiet possession is abolished, but that a [d]isturbance of quiet possession    is one way, among many, in which the breach of the warranty of title may be established. Id. The language in official comment 1 evidences the General Assembly's intent to allow a buyer to establish a breach of warranty of title even if a seller did indeed deliver legally valid title. Without ruling on the official comment's abolition of the warranty of quiet possession, we do adopt its position that a buyer may establish a breach of warranty of title by showing a disturbance of quiet possession. After reading the official comment we conclude that disturbance of quiet possession does not depend on a buyer's ability to show that a seller transferred legally invalid title. Were we to limit the scope of § 6A-2-312 to those situations where title lawfully rested in a third party, buyers would be attempting to establish, rather than protect, their title and the language in official comment 1 would be rendered nugatory. Thus, the General Assembly apparently intended to provide a remedy for the buyer who successfully defends a title suit. James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-12 at 536 (4th ed.1995). There is, however, a split of authority concerning the scope of the warranty of title. C.f. Jefferson, 408 A.2d at 1039-40 (holding that proof of superior title in third party is not required to establish breach of warranty of title); American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., 111 N.J.Super. 322, 268 A.2d 313, 318 (Ch.Div.1970) (The mere casting of a substantial shadow over his title, regardless of the ultimate outcome, is sufficient to violate a warranty of good title.); Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172, 176 (S.D.1995) (holding that a seller breached its warranty of title by selling buyer a truck with conflicting vehicle identification numbers that was seized by the police under the mistaken belief that it was stolen) with C.F. Sales, Inc. v. Amfert, Inc., 344 N.W.2d 543, 555 (Iowa 1983) (holding that warranty of title is not breached unless superior title is established in a third party). We conclude that we are giving effect to the GeneralAssembly's stated intention by aligning ourselves with those jurisdictions that allow a buyer to establish breach of warranty of title if a substantial shadow is cast over a title, even if the buyer's title ultimately is proven to be legally valid. By adopting this position, we do acknowledge that there is some point at which [a] third party's claim against the goods becomes so attenuated that we should not regard it as an interference against which the seller has warranted. White & Summers, § 9-12 at 537. Here, the car and its parts were not stolen and defendant did indeed have and deliver a legally valid title to plaintiff. We are satisfied, however, that under the facts in this case, the claim made against plaintiff's car  the state police's impoundment  was not too far attenuated. Lieutenant Costa's inspection of the Corvette revealed that it had contradicting VINs and a missing Mylar sticker. Based on those facts Lt. Costa reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believed that the car was composed of stolen parts, and therefore impounded it. By doing so, the state police called plaintiff's ownership into question, thereby casting    a substantial shadow over his title. American Container Corp., 268 A.2d at 318. The Corvette in this case reminds us of a passage attributed to Abraham Lincoln when he asked, [h]ow many legs does a dog have if you count his tail as a leg? Four. You can call a tail a leg if you want to, but that doesn't make it a leg. Just as a dog's tail is not a leg, this car is not a typical 1985 Corvette. Although defendant argues that the car is a 1985 Corvette, the car has several unique qualities that distinguish it from most other 1985 Corvettes. Without knowing the colorful past associated with this car, plaintiff could not get the benefit of his bargain when he made his purchase. The Corvette was rebuilt after having previously been declared a total loss because of firedamage. Various parts were replaced from an assortment of other vehicles. Vehicle identification numbers embossed on certain parts did not correspond to one another. We conclude that those distinctive characteristics associated with the car and its title would lower its value in the eyes of a reasonably prudent purchaser. By imposing liability for breach of warranty of title in this scenario, the trial justice allayed buyers' fears of encountering a similar situation. Thus, we uphold the trial justice's ruling that defendant breached the warranty of title.