Opinion ID: 2634202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant of Millers' Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: [¶10] The Court first considers the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Millers. The district court's decision was two-fold: first, that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to Millers' nonacceptance or rejection of the Easement Deed such that the Easement Deed was null and void and, second, that Millers were without legally enforceable access to their lands.
[¶11] When reviewing an order granting a summary judgment motion, we consider the record de novo.  Hincks v. Walton Ranch Co., 2007 WY 12, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 669, 670 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Knapp v. Landex Corp., 2006 WY 36, ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2006)).
[¶12] In specifically addressing the Easement Deed and the unilateral easement recorded by Jenkins, the district court stated: [The] Court does not believe there is a material question of fact as to the acceptance of this unilateral agreement. Based on that narrow area of law and question, there is no question of fact. Therefore, the Court rules that the unilateral easement that was filed by Jenkins and the corrective easement is null and void, having been unaccepted by the Millers, and that based upon the reasons cited above, the Millers are not required to come to this court to enforce a potential oral agreement or easement or irrevocable license before they go to the county commissioners. [¶13] An easement is an interest in real property that is covered by the statute of frauds, Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 696 P.2d 76, 77 (Wyo. 1985) (internal citations omitted), meaning that, unless some exception to the statute of frauds applies, the easement must be in writing to be effective. [2] As a natural corollary, [a] grant of an easement is to be construed in accordance with the rules applied to deeds and other written instruments. 28A C.J.S. Easements § 57 (1996). As such, Wyoming law holds that Millers, as grantees, must accept the offered easement as proposed by Jenkins for that easement to be valid and binding: There are two essential elements to a legally binding delivery: 1) transferring possession of the deed by the grantor, and 2) acceptance of the deed by the grantee. . . . .    The requisites of acceptance are the grantee's knowledge of delivery or tender of the deed, an intention to take the legal title to the property which the deed purports to convey, and the manifestation of such intention by some act, conduct, or declaration.    Acceptance is primarily a matter of the grantee's intention; hence the significant inquiry is as to his intention as manifested by his words and acts. Express words and positive acts are not necessary; intention to accept may be inferred from such conduct as retaining possession of the deed, conveying or mortgaging the property, recording the deed, or otherwise exercising the rights of an owner   . 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 175, p. 196 (1983). . . . . The acceptance of a deed, like that of its delivery, is a matter of intention, to be determined by acts and words of both the grantor and grantee. Fitzpatrick v. Layne, 291 Ky. 523, 165 S.W.2d 13, 17 (1942). The delivery of a deed is the act by which the grantor divests himself, and the acceptance of the deed is the act by which the grantee vests himself with title to the property. B-T, Ltd. v. Blakeman, 705 P.2d 307, 312-13 (Wyo. 1985) (emphasis added). [¶14] Here, Millers argued that their February 7, 2005 letter and April 21, 2005 Notice of Non-Acceptance of Easement Deed were sufficient to demonstrate rejection of the September 24, 2004 Easement Deed and, thus, to invalidate it. Jenkins argued that genuine issues of material fact precluded a determination as to Millers' acceptance or rejection of the Easement Deed and/or any underlying easement. The district court agreed with Millers and concluded that they had not accepted the Easement Deed. [¶15] In favor of Millers, the facts demonstrate that their February 7, 2005 letter and April 21, 2005 Notice of Non-Acceptance of Easement Deed express an intent to reject the Easement Deed. On the other hand, the record reveals that Millers, apparently in an attempt to have it both ways, continued their use of the gravel road, which use had continued consistently for over twenty years. Clearly, this continued use was inconsistent with their denial of any prior agreement and their assertion that they did not have and never had any legally enforceable right to use the road Further, Millers delayed more than four months before their first notification of their rejection of the Easement Deed. Again, this calls into question their stated intent. Clearly, the record could support a conclusion in favor of either party at this point. Where there are genuine issues of material fact concerning Millers' intent and acceptance of the Easement Deed, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Hasvold v. Park County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 24, 45 P.3d 635, 640 (Wyo. 2002). [¶16] More importantly, the parties, the district court, and this Court recognize that this litigation involved more than just the Easement Deed or Corrective Easement Deed ; rather, both parties asked the [district] court to declare the rights and status of Millers' access in light of the Easement Deed or other legally enforceable access. (Emphasis added.) In this respect, Millers' declaratory judgment claim overlapped Jenkins' declaratory judgment counterclaim, which sought a declaration as to the validity of the underlying appurtenant easement agreement allegedly reflected in the Easement Deed. Thus, the district court also was asked to determine whether Millers had any legally enforceable access, which request would encompass possibilities such as an irrevocable license or an oral easement falling outside the statute of frauds. [¶17] Even had this Court concluded that the district court appropriately granted summary judgment as to the effect of the Easement Deed, it is one thing to say that Millers timely and appropriately rejected the Easement Deed, but quite another to say that they had no legally enforceable access to their lands when there was, arguably, an oral easement or irrevocable license that they historically had accepted. Indeed, the parties concede a process of negotiation whereby Millers and Betty Jenkins agreed to locate the gravel road in its current location in exchange for a grant of a permanent easement. This status quo existed for almost three decades before Millers decided that the gravel road no longer served their best interests. [¶18] Where reasonable inferences drawn from the parties' statements and actions create genuine issues of material fact as to the terms of an agreement, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Ewing v. Hladky Constr., Inc., 2002 WY 95, ¶ 11, 48 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wyo. 2002); Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 216 (Wyo. 2000). Given the debatable state of the record, summary judgment was inappropriate as to the issue of whether Millers are without legally enforceable access to a public road and whether, if some sort of easement or license is in effect, what the precise terms and conditions of that access are. The district court erred in its grant of summary judgment.