Opinion ID: 199869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the constitutional standards

Text: Leafletting is a respected tradition in our democratic society, and it ranks as one of the core free speech activities shielded by the First Amendment. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1983). Though solicitously protected, however, the right to leaflet is not absolute. E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 730 (2000). The constitutional standard by which the validity of a restriction on leafletting will be tested depends on two -15- variables: the nature of the forum in which a restriction applies and the type of restriction. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983). We discuss these sequentially.4 A forum can be a traditional public forum, a designated public forum (sometimes called a limited public forum), or a nonpublic forum. In a traditional or designated public forum, content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of expression must be narrowly tailored to serve some substantial governmental interest, and must leave open adequate alternative channels of communication. Id. at 45-46. In a non-public forum, the constitutional hurdle is considerably lower: to clear it, a viewpoint-neutral restriction need only be reasonable. Id. at 46. In such a setting, the reasonableness of a particular regulation is determined by a fact-intensive balancing test that takes into account such factors as the uses to which the forum typically is put, the particular risks associated with the speech activity at 4 In Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993), a panel of this court chose to analyze a leafletting ban without first determining the nature of the forum, maintaining that both the public and non-public forum inquiries converge when there is no credible reason why the regulations further the forum's purpose. Id. at 1324. This analytic approach is awkward, however, because it requires a reviewing tribunal to know the results of a test before knowing which test applies. Comparable cases, of more recent vintage, have indicated a preference for a more deliberate analysis, e.g., Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Expo. Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining the nature of the forum first), and we follow that path. -16- issue, and the proffered rationale for the restriction. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 687-93 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 68385 (plurality op.).5 Some spaces — such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks — are presumptively public fora, and in most cases no particularized inquiry into their precise nature is necessary. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988). We say most rather than all because this presumption can be rebutted in specific instances. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1990) (plurality op.) (rejecting the suggestion that all sidewalks are public fora). The problem of classification grows increasingly difficult in instances in which no presumption is available, and categorical distinctions are of little help in borderline cases. See, e.g., ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 681-82 (plurality op.) (rejecting the suggestion that all transportation terminals 5 The ISKCON Court upheld a ban on solicitation within an airport terminal. In a companion case, the Court struck down a concomitant ban on leafletting, basing that decision on the reasons stated in the concurrences and dissent in ISKCON. Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992) (per curiam). Because Justice O'Connor's ISKCON concurrence constitutes the narrowest ground for the decision, it is the most authoritative pronouncement on the standards applicable to leafletting in a non-public forum. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 764 n.9 (explaining that when no single rationale commands a majority, the holding of the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the narrowest of grounds) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). -17- should be analyzed in the same manner). In the end, an inquiring court must examine the nature of the locus, as well as its history, to determine whether it qualifies as a traditional public forum. See id. at 680-82. The situation is somewhat different in respect to designated public fora; for purposes of that classification, the Supreme Court has required evidence that the State intentionally has opened the area for expressive purposes. See id. at 680. In addition to this taxonomy, the case at hand also requires an understanding of the doctrine of prior restraints. This venerable doctrine guards against the threat of government censorship by requiring that public licensing and permit schemes contain adequate substantive and procedural safeguards against arbitrary (or content-based) State action. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990). Two lines of cases have sprouted in this soil: one focused on the substantive criteria that restrain official discretion and the other on procedural safeguards. See id. The substantive strand reflects the hoary principle that the First Amendment demands that such regulations contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)). The procedural strand is elaborated in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), in which the Court ruled, in the motion picture licensing context, that prior restraints may be imposed only -18- temporarily; that they must allow for prompt judicial review; and that the licensor must bear the burden of asking a court to suppress the speech. Id. at 58-60. Until very recently, it was unclear whether the Freedman formulation applied to content-neutral permit schemes designed to ensure public safety in a traditional public forum. Compare, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (stating that Freedman applies in a public forum), with Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403 (1953) (suggesting that a different standard applies if the license requirement reflects a ministerial police routine). The Supreme Court erased this uncertainty within the past few months. In Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 122 S. Ct. 775 (2002), the Court clarified that Freedman's procedural requirements do not apply to permit schemes that eschew any consideration of the content of speech, but, rather, limit themselves to addressing public safety concerns. Id. at 780. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed the pertinence of the Forsyth County line of cases to such permit schemes, holding that even content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations must contain adequate standards to guide the official's decision. Id. The framework erected by the Thomas Court governs this case.6 6 It does not require citation of authority to acknowledge that Thomas, which comes to us with the imprimatur of the Supreme Court, supersedes any contrary intimation contained in our earlier precedent, namely, Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, 1327 (1st Cir. 1993). -19-