Opinion ID: 1594360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Imposition of A More Severe Penalty Than In The Prior Proceeding.

Text: Lohnes contends that his life sentence was unconstitutional as it violated his right to trial by jury. He claims that certain statements in the record indicate that Judge Davis intended to punish him more severely if he proceeded to trial, rather than pleading guilty. However, a fair reading of the statements in the record provide little support for his contention. Lohnes' also claims that it was improper for Judge Davis to impose a stiffer sentence on retrial than the sentence previously imposed following his plea of guilty to the same charge. Lohnes cites to North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which requires a judge to specifically state on the record the reasons for the increased sentence on retrial. Judge Davis did not state his reasons on the record. The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that the procedural protections in Pearce are not always applicable: [V]indictiveness of a sentencing judge is the evil the Court sought to prevent rather than simply enlarged sentences after a new trial. The Pearce requirements thus do not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial. Like other `judicially created means of effectuating ... [constitutional] rights ...' we have restricted application of Pearce to areas where its `objectives are thought most efficaciously served, ...' [citations omitted]. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134,138, 106 S.Ct. 976, 979, 89 L.Ed.2d 104, 110 (1986). There is no indication that Judge Davis became vindictive and changed his attitude toward Lohnes because of prior appearances before him. Based on the previous sentences and the record, it is apparent that Judge Davis believed, throughout the proceedings, that Lohnes should receive a stern sentence if convicted. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.1985) involved a withdrawn guilty plea and the imposition of a stiffer sentence following the defendant's conviction. The Adamson court stated: In cases involving rejected or withdrawn plea bargains where a defendant receives a harsher sentence than that tendered to him, the procedural safeguards of Pearce have been found to have no application. [citations omitted]. Where a defendant makes a voluntary choice to reject or withdraw from a plea bargain, is convicted of the crimes alleged against him, and receives an otherwise lawful sentence for those crimes, he has no cause to complain that the sentence received is harsher than that originally tendered. Id. at 448. Under Adamson, and the circumstances of this case, the procedural protections of Pearce are inapplicable.