Opinion ID: 3172183
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Being seventeen (17) years of age or older, the

Text: actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim who is thirteen (13) through fifteen (15) years of age, and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the actor; (ii) Being sixteen (16) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact of a victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of age; (iii) Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact with a victim who is less than eighteen (18) years of age and the actor is the victim’s legal guardian or an individual specified in W.S. 6-4-402; or (iv) Being eighteen (18) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact with a victim who is less than sixteen (16) years of age and the actor occupies a position of authority in relation to the victim. (b) A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is subject to imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, unless the person convicted qualifies under W.S. 6-2-306(e). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315 (LexisNexis 2015) (emphasis added). [¶21] We reject Mr. Marfil’s proffered definition of the term “inflicts” for several reasons. First, the term “inflicts” is not defined in the statutes governing sexual assault offenses. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301 (LexisNexis 2015) (providing definitions for terms used in article governing sexual assault offenses). As noted above, this alone indicates the legislature attached no special meaning to the term. [¶22] Second, when we read the term “inflicts” in the context of the surrounding statutory provisions, Mr. Marfil’s proposed definition simply does not fit. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315 uses both the terms “inflicts” and “engages in” to specify four different prohibited acts, but each act constitutes the same offense, second degree sexual abuse, and is punishable by the same penalty. If the term “inflicts” carried the meaning Mr. Marfil urges, which is an unwelcome or forcible sexual intrusion, as opposed to the consensual act Mr. Marfil argues is contemplated by the term “engages in,” we would not expect this parity. We would instead expect that any act that is “inflicted” would carry a greater penalty given the absence of victim consent. See Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1998) (recognizing that disparity of punishment between offenses implies a 8 legislative view that the crime bearing the greater punishment is one that entails more culpable conduct).2 That the legislatively-prescribed penalty for the various sexual assault offenses does not necessarily vary depending on whether the act was “inflicted” or “engaged in,” is further evidence that the legislature used the terms “inflicts” and “engages in” interchangeably and attached no special meaning to its use of the term “inflicts.” [¶23] Finally, this Court has also held that “[w]hen this Court interprets a statute and the legislature makes no material legislative change in the provision thereafter, the legislature is presumed to acquiesce in the Court’s interpretation.” Kroenlein Trust, ¶ 27, 357 P.3d at 1127 (quoting Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue v. Qwest Corp., 2011 WY 146, ¶ 23, 263 P.3d 622, 629 (Wyo. 2011)). As the district court observed, this Court has long held that consent is not a defense to an offense involving sexual assault of a minor. Phillips v. State, 2007 WY 25, ¶ 16, 151 P.3d 1131, 1136 (Wyo. 2007) (consent of victim under age 2 The same is true with respect to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316, which governs sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree. It too uses both terms in specifying prohibited acts, with each act then punishable by the same penalty. Section 316 provides: (a) Except under circumstance constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first or second degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-314 and 6-2-315, an actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree if: (i) Being seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual contact with a victim who is thirteen (13) through fifteen (15) years of age, and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the actor; (ii) Being twenty (20) years of age or older, the actor engages in sexual intrusion with a victim who is either sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the actor, and the actor occupies a position of authority in relation to the victim; (iii) Being less than sixteen (16) years of age, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of age, and the victim is at least three (3) years younger than the actor; or (iv) Being seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor knowingly takes immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a victim who is less than seventeen (17) years of age and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the actor. (b) A person convicted under subsection (a) of this section is subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years. (c) A person charged with violating the provisions of paragraph (a)(iii) of this section shall be subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court, except the matter may be transferred to the district court having jurisdiction of the offense as provided in W.S. 14-6-237. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316 (LexisNexis 2015) (emphasis added). 9 of sixteen is not a defense); Ross v. State, 93 P. 299, 303 (Wyo. 1908) (minor “is to be regarded as resisting, no matter what the actual state of her mind may be at the time”). Importantly, this has been our holding even where the charging statute uses the term “inflicts.” Phillips, ¶ 16, 151 P.3d at 11363; see also Crain v. State, 2009 WY 128, ¶¶ 2-4, 218 P.3d 934, 936-37 (Wyo. 2009) (upholding conviction under same version of § 6-2- 315(a)(i) where sexual intercourse was consensual). Because the legislature has not revised any of the statutes defining sexual assault of a minor to correct our interpretation, we presume our past interpretation is consistent with the meaning the legislature intended for the language it used and will adhere to that interpretation. [¶24] Mr. Marfil’s proposed definition of the term “inflicts” would require a conclusion that if a sexual intrusion is consensual, it cannot be inflicted. This definition incorporates a consent defense that this Court has long rejected and otherwise finds no support in the statutes governing sexual assault offenses. For this reason, and because there is no distinction between the terms “inflicts” and “engages in,” as used in § 6-2-315, we reject Mr. Marfil’s definition. 3. District Court’s Refusal of Instruction [¶25] From our discussion above, it of course follows that we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal of Mr. Marfil’s proffered instruction defining the term “inflicts.” First, the instruction would have been a misstatement of law and for this reason alone was properly refused. Brown, ¶ 40, 340 P.3d at 1031 (instruction must accurately state the law). Additionally, as we noted above, where a term used in a criminal statute is not given a statutory definition, we presume the legislature did not mean for the term to have a specialized meaning. Masias, ¶ 25, 233 P.3d at 951; Ewing, ¶ 10, 157 P.3d at 946. “A district court is not required to define a statutory term unless the term has a technical or legal meaning different than its common meaning.” Masias, ¶ 25, 233 P.3d at 951 (no need to define “submission”); see also Dawes v. State, 2010 WY 113, ¶ 33, 236 P.3d 303, 311 (Wyo. 2010) (no need to define “owner”); Morris v. State, 2009 WY 88, ¶ 16, 210 P.3d 1101, 1105-06 (Wyo. 2009) (no need to define “knowingly”); Ewing, ¶ 10, 157 P.3d at 946 (no need to define “drawn”); Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 1999) (no need to define “intentionally”). The district court was not required to define the term “inflicts” and did not err in refusing Mr. Marfil’s proffered instruction. 3 In Phillips, our holding was in relation to a conviction for third degree sexual assault, which per the statute then in effect required a showing that “the actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years.” Phillips, ¶ 7, 151 P.3d at 1133, n.1 (emphasis added). 10