Opinion ID: 2387024
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jansing's authority to arrest defendant

Text: Defendant contends Jansing, as a federal officer, lacked authority to detain and arrest defendant on property owned by the City and County of San Francisco. We disagree, concluding that Jansing acted within the authority set forth in section 830.8, subdivision (b): Duly authorized federal employees who comply with the training requirements set forth in Section 832 are peace officers when they are engaged in enforcing applicable state or local laws on property owned or possessed by the United States government, or on any street, sidewalk, or property adjacent thereto, and with the written consent of the sheriff or the chief of police, respectively, in whose jurisdiction the property is situated. Defendant urges us to reject the application of section 830.8 on four grounds: (1) the prosecution did not attempt to justify the seizure on the ground that it occurred adjacent to federal property, and therefore cannot rely upon this theory on appeal (2) the arrest did not occur on property adjacent to federal property, (3) the prosecutor failed to prove that the head of Jansing's agency certified Jansing's relevant training, and (4) Jansing did not have authority to use a marked police vehicle to enforce state laws. First, it is clear the prosecution contended that the arrest was effected on property adjacent to federal property, as authorized by section 830.8, subdivision (b). In its opposition to the motion to suppress, the prosecution stated that Jansing had peace officer status because he had completed the training under section 832, and that the Park Police had the written consent of the chief of police to act as peace officers in San Francisco. In support of this contention, the prosecution cited section 830.8, subdivision (b). It was not required that the prosecution address in the trial court every factor set forth in subdivision (b) in order to rely upon this provision on appeal. Second, defendant contends the parking lot in which he was arrested is not adjacent to federal property, because the parking area is separated from Fort Mason by a yacht harbor, and because the driving distance between the entrance to Fort Mason and the location where defendant was arrested is, according to counsel's calculations on appeal, 595 yards. He asserts [t]he Legislature's intent was to limit the reach of federal officers to streets, sidewalks and similar property where offenders might stand and do damage to federal property. Defendant did not challenge Jansing's authority on this basis in the trial court. Therefore, he has forfeited this issue. (See People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 129 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52] ( Williams ) [when defendants move to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, they must inform the prosecution and the court of the specific basis for their motion].) (1) Even if defendant had preserved this contention, his argument would fail. The legislative history of section 830.8, subdivision (b), establishes that the term adjacent was not intended to restrict the area within which duly authorized federal employees act as peace officers to locations on nonfederal property that are within striking distance of federal property. The extension of federal officers' authority to adjacent property was proposed in Assembly Bill No. 3874 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 3874) during the 1984 legislative session. A report of the Senate Committee on Judiciary concerning this proposed legislation stated that [t]he purpose of the bill is to allow U.S. Park Police officers patrolling the Golden Gate National Recreation Area to make valid arrests in the surrounding community. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3874 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 6, 1984, p. 2.) The report explained that [t]he U.S. Park Police patrolling the Golden Gate National Recreation Area spend a considerable amount of time driving on city streets and highways in marked police vehicles. Consequently, these officers are often called on for assistance by the general public and have many times apprehended criminal suspects outside of their primary area of responsibilityi.e., the federally-owned property. [7] (Sen. Com. on Judiciary Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3874, supra, at pp. 2-3.) Based upon Jansing's testimony that the parking area where he arrested defendant served Gashouse Cove, which was right next to the national recreation area, the arrest clearly was made on property adjacent to federal property within the meaning of section 830.8. [8] (2) In a related contention, defendant asserts that section 830.8, subdivision (b) is unenforceable because the term adjacent thereto is vague. He relies upon the statement in Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855], that [w]here the legislature fails to provide ... minimal guidelines [to govern law enforcement], a criminal statute may permit `a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 358.) Kolender was referring to minimum guidelines concerning the elements of a crime. As Kolender explained, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 357, italics added.) In the present case, the alleged vagueness is unrelated to the definition of any crime. Third, defendant complains that the prosecution failed to prove that Jansing was certified by [his] agency head[] as having satisfied the training requirements of Section 832 .... (§ 830.8, subd. (a).) Although defendant asserted in his motion to suppress that the prosecution was required to establish that Jansing has satisfied the training requirement or its equivalent of both §§ 830.8(a) and (c), he raised no issue concerning certification by Jansing's agency head. Therefore, defendant has forfeited this issue. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 129.) Even if defendant had preserved this contention for appeal, it would fail. The requirement that the agency head certify that the officer has satisfied the training requirements is found in subdivision (a) of section 830.8, which sets forth various circumstances under which federal criminal investigators and law enforcement officials may exercise the powers of arrest of a peace officer. ... As explained above, Jansing was authorized to act pursuant to subdivision (b), which provides that duly authorized federal employees are peace officers when they enforce state and local laws in specified areas. As originally enacted, subdivision (b) applied only where the enforcement of state or local laws occurred on property owned or possessed by the federal government, with the written consent of the local sheriff or chief of police; the original version did not include any training requirement. When the Legislature amended subdivision (b) to extend its reach to federal employees who engage in law enforcement on property adjacent to federal property, the Legislature restricted the subdivision's reach to federal employees who comply with the training requirements set forth in Section 832. ... It did not, however, include the requirement imposed in the circumstances addressed in subdivision (a)that the investigators and officers shall have been certified by their agency heads as having satisfied the training requirements of Section 832.... Thus, in order to establish Jansing's status as a peace officer under subdivision (b), the prosecution was not required to establish that his agency head certified he satisfied the training requirements set forth in section 832. [9] Fourth, defendant contends Jansing did not have authority to use a marked police vehicle to enforce state laws, citing an opinion of the Attorney General. (80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 297 (1997).) Defendant did not advance this contention in the trial court, and therefore has forfeited it. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 129.) Even if defendant had preserved this contention on appeal, it would fail. The Attorney General opinion upon which defendant relies focused upon subdivision (a) of section 830.8, and concluded that Federal Protective Service (FPS) officers are not peace officers as that term is defined in sections 830 to 832.9. (§ 830.8, subd. (a).) Nothing in section 830.8 authorizes FPS officers to use marked police vehicles or other emergency equipment when enforcing state or local laws. (80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 305.) As noted above, Jansing was not merely exercising arrest powers under section 830.8, subdivision (a); rather, he was a peace officer under subdivision (b). Furthermore, as the legislative history set forth above reflects, a principal focus of the amendment was federal officers who spend a considerable amount of time driving on city streets and highways in marked police vehicles. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Report on Assem. Bill 3874, supra, pp. 2-3, italics added.) Accordingly, it is clear that among the federal employees whose actions were to be ratified by the amendment to subdivision (b) were those who carried out their duties in marked police vehicles. For these reasons, we reject defendant's contention. Because we conclude Jansing had authority under section 830.8, subdivision (b), to act as a peace officer when he arrested and searched defendant, we need not address whether Jansing also may have acted properly pursuant to subdivision (a) of section 830.8, or as a private citizen.