Opinion ID: 146661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent Act of Free Will

Text: “To determine whether the defendant’s consent was an independent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between the consent and the constitutional violation, we must consider three factors: 1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and the flagrancy of the initial misconduct.” Hernandez, 279 F.3d at 307 (citations omitted). Mere minutes separated the allegedly illegal entry into Trejo’s backyard and the officers’ efforts to gain Trejo’s consent to conduct a protective sweep. The first factor weighs in favor of suppression. However, while some officers entered the backyard to ascertain that Trejo was not trying to flee, destroy evidence, or obtain a weapon, other officers remained on the porch to pursue the knock and talk strategy. Trejo came to the door of his own accord, emerged onto the porch, and allowed the officers to enter his home. The officers’ execution of this permissible strategy was an intervening circumstance. See United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720-21 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that knock and talk may be a reasonable tactic when officers suspect drug-related activity but do not have probable cause). Finally, the officers’ entry into Trejo’s backyard was a mere breach of the home’s curtilage, not a full-scale storming of the home’s interior. We thus cannot consider the officers’ actions flagrant misconduct. See 11 Case: 09-50232 Document: 00511113066 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/17/2010 No. 09-50232 Payton, 445 U.S. at 585; Hernandez, 279 F.3d at 307. The main purpose of the actions was not to raid the home to search for evidence, but to ensure officer safety. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (noting that the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are “particularly” important). On the whole, there is not a causal chain between the initial potentially illegal conduct and Trejo’s act of free will allowing the officers into his home. See Hernandez, 279 F.3d at 307. Therefore, the officers’ observations during the protective sweep were not gained in derogation of Trejo’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.