Opinion ID: 1169308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: pleading strict liability

Text: Having decided that strict liability is a viable cause of action in Wyoming, we must next determine whether it was properly pled by appellant in his third claim for relief. Rule 8, W.R.C.P., establishes Wyoming as a notice pleading jurisdiction. Rule 8(a) states: A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief    shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Rule 8(e)(1) requires only that [e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required. And perhaps most importantly, Rule 8(f) declares that [a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. Taken together, these provisions of Rule 8 require that plaintiff plead only sufficient facts to constitute a legal cause of action. Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580, 583 (1979). No particular words are required such as strict liability or 402A. Id.; Zaleskie v. Joyce, supra, 333 A.2d at 114 (applying Rule 8); Boains v. Lasar Manufacturing Company, 330 F. Supp. 1134 (D.Conn. 1971) (also applying Rule 8). The essential elements of the cause of action must be raised, at least indirectly, by the plaintiff's factual allegations. Harris v. Grizzle, supra, at 583. In the case at bar appellant was required to allege facts stating the following elements of the strict liability cause of action: (1) That the sellers were engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the harm; (2) that the product was defective when sold; (3) that the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (4) that the product was intended to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold; and (5) that the product caused physical harm to the plaintiff/consumer. Restatement, Second, Torts § 402A. See also Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418, 424 (1967). In his third cause of action, appellant alleged facts which indicated that appellees were engaged in the business of selling earth-moving equipment; that the scraper was unsafe for its intended use and defective in design; that the scraper was inherently dangerous to human life when sold; and that the defects in the scraper directly caused his injuries. The final element, that the scraper reached appellant without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold, is at least by implication contained in the pleadings. Appellees were given notice by the original pleading that strict liability would be an issue in the case. In responsive pleadings they alleged that the condition of the scraper had been altered after delivery. They presented affidavits and exhibits to support of their defense of alteration of the product and relied upon this claim in support of their motion for summary judgment. As we pointed out earlier, a pleading must fairly give notice of the claim, but it does not have to contain key phrases like strict liability, or 402A to give such notice. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with an extremely vague complaint when it first adopted strict liability in tort but the court held: Since the plaintiff has broadly pleaded those facts necessary to a cause of action for defective products liability and since we are today adopting a new basis of liability, plaintiff will be permitted to amend his complaint to explicitly state a cause of action in trespass for defective products liability. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853, 854-855 (1966). We conclude that in this case the pleadings are sufficient to state a claim in strict liability.