Opinion ID: 1817972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the failure to attach the original contest letter of August 27, 2003 to the petition for judicial review.

Text: ¶ 12. The circuit court found as jurisdictionally fatal, Harpole's failure to attach his initial contest letter to his petition for judicial review. We set out verbatim, Harpole's initial letter to the KCDEC: To: Kemper County Democratic Executive Committee From: Johnny Harpole August 27, 2003 I, Johnny Harpole, request a manual recount of the ballots for the August 26, 2003 sheriff's race. I request this due to the closeness of the race, questionable legitimacy of some boxes and ballots and county (sic) procedures used. I also, request for the committee to investigate the number of convicted felons that voted on August 26, 2003. I would like to know how many voted, their convictions, and whether or not their votes were legal. Sincerely /s/ Johnny Harpole ¶ 13. The record is silent as to any action taken by the KCDEC as a result of this letter. Two days later, on August 29, 2003, within the statutorily mandated time, Harpole personally delivered a letter to Tisdale informing him that he was requesting an examination of the ballot boxes and designating his attorney as his representative. This letter also requested the KCDEC to make the necessary arrangements for the examination of the ballot boxes. Copies of this letter were sent to the Kemper County Circuit Clerk and to the KCDEC. It is on this letter that the KCDEC acted, and Harpole and his attorney thereafter conducted the examination of the ballot boxes. See Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-911 (Rev.2001). From this ballot box examination, Harpole then prepared and filed his original contest with the KCDEC on September 12, 2003. It is on this petition that the KCDEC thereafter acted by way of an investigation and ultimate findings as to Harpole's allegations as laid out in his petition. The August 27th letter means nothing. How could Harpole file a protest with the KCDEC before he obtained evidence via the examination of the ballot boxes? As we said in Waters v. Gnemi, 907 So.2d 307 (Miss. 2005); R'hg denied, August 4, 2005), it is hardly unusual for an aggrieved candidate to ask for a recount although this procedure is foreign to our election laws. Id. at 312, ¶ 5 n. 8. It is obvious that once Harpole retained counsel, then the correct statutory procedure was followed by way of a request for an examination of the ballot boxes (Sec.XX-XX-XXX), followed by a petition filed with the KCDEC (Sec.XX-XX-XXX). When considering the August 27th letter, the August 29th letter, and the September 12th petition filed with the KCDEC, the only one of these three documents which was statutorily required to be attached to the circuit court petition for judicial review was the September 12th petition filed with the KCDEC. Harpole dutifully attached a sworn copy of this KCDEC petition to his sworn petition for judicial review. ¶ 14. In fact Harpole meticulously complied with Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927. This statute requires that to a sworn petition for judicial review, there must be attached (1) a sworn copy of [the] said protest or complaint [filed with the county executive committee], (2) the certificate of two (2) practicing attorneys that they and each of them have fully made an independent investigation into the matters of fact and of law . . . . and that after such investigation they verily believe that the said protest and petition should be sustained. . . ., and (3) a cost bond in the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00), with two (2) or more sufficient sureties conditioned to pay all costs in case [the] petition be dismissed.. . . . When we review Harpole's sworn petition for judicial review, we find attached a sworn copy of the petition filed with the KCDEC, the certificates of at least two disinterested attorneys with the required statutory language, and a cost bond signed by Harpole and two sureties, binding themselves and assuring payment in the amount of $300 in the event that Harpole's petition is dismissed. ¶ 15. However, of significant import is that there are also two separate oaths attached to the petition for judicial review, both oaths being signed by Harpole before a notary public. One oath states, inter alia, that the matters set forth in the foregoing petition [for judicial review] are true and correct as therein stated of his personal knowledge and information and belief. The other oath states, inter alia, that the attached document is a true and correct [] of the Petition served on the Kemper County Executive Committee. Even though Waters was not decided by this Court until almost two years after Harpole filed his petition for judicial review in the case sub judice, Harpole followed to the letter what we said a contestant must do, procedurally, in filing a petition for judicial review, with an attached sworn copy of the petition filed with the county executive committee. We stated in Waters: What is required to be attached to the petition for judicial review is  a sworn copy  of the petition filed with the county executive committee, not a  copy of the sworn petition  filed with the county executive committee. If we accepted Waters's interpretation of Section 23-15-927 and our case law, we would in essence judicially abrogate Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921, which clearly does not require that a sworn petition be filed with the county executive committee. Further, Waters's interpretation of the statute would have us say that while Section 23-15-921 does not require that the petition filed with the county executive committee be sworn, that same petition has to be sworn when it is attached as an exhibit to the petition for judicial review which is subsequently filed in circuit court. This is an impossibility. 907 So.2d at 319-20 (¶ 24). Thus, we find that the circuit court erred in finding that the special tribunal was without jurisdiction to consider this election contest due to Harpole's failure to attach to the sworn petition for judicial review a copy of his initial letter of August 27, 2003, addressed to the KCDEC, when he requested, inter alia, a recount. However, because the circuit court made alternative findings notwithstanding his findings of fatal jurisdictional defects, we do not end our inquiry.