Opinion ID: 1378709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements of the District Attorney.

Text: We reach first the district attorney's argument to the effect that appellant lied in his testimony at the trial. Did the prosecutor exceed permissible bounds in making this argument? We think not under the facts of this case. That appellant may not have told the truth was a permissible inference from the evidence. If the jury believed the state's witnesses, they could disbelieve the defendant's testimony. Such an inference could be drawn from the evidence and did not amount to a personal opinion by the prosecutor in his jury argument. See, Moore v. State, 222 Ga. 748 (152 SE2d 570) (1966); Manning v. State, 123 Ga. App. 844 (182 SE2d 690). See, also Broznack v. State, 109 Ga. 514 (35 SE 123) (1899). What the law condemns is the injection into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial matters which have no basis in the evidence. Floyd v. State, 143 Ga. 286 (84 SE 971) (1915). See also Walker v. State, 232 Ga. 33 (205 SE2d 260) (1974). This claim of error is without merit. The second alleged error is the reference by the prosecutor in his argument to the testimony in evidence that appellant upon being taken downtown, booked, and advised of his constitutional rights asked for an attorney. No objection was made to the introduction of this evidence at the trial. The prosecutor argued this fact to the jury in closing argument after the defense in argument first made a point of the fact that the prosecution's witness, Coley, had refused to talk to the police until he had talked to an attorney. Defendant moved for a mistrial when the prosecutor made this argument. Appellant contends that while the testimony of the state's witness, Coley, may be impeached because of his assertion of his constitutional rights, the same rule does not apply to a defendant on trial because he is clothed with greater constitutional protection than a witness. The argument is that commenting on the defendant's insistence on his constitutional right to remain silent or to have an attorney upon being placed in custody creates an inference of the defendant's guilt in the minds of the jury. The Supreme Court of the United States has not given definitive guidance on this precise question or the closely related constitutional issue of the use of prior silence as an inconsistency to impeach the testimony of a defendant. That court has held that a defendant who takes the stand is subject to impeachment. Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971) the prosecution was permitted to use an otherwise inadmissible statement to impeach the defendant's credibility. In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391 (1957), the court found on the facts in that case that invocation of the Fifth Amendment during grand jury testimony was not probative of guilt and was not inconsistent with defendant's testimony at trial. Relying on Grunewald and the basic rule of evidence that statements must be inconsistent before they can be used to impeach a witness' credibility, the court found, in United States v. Hale, ___ U. S. ___ (95 SC 2183, 45 LE2d 99), that the government failed to show any probative value in silence at the police station as impeaching later testimony at trial. However, the court declined to reach the constitutional issue. Compare an earlier Fifth Circuit case which permitted impeachment by silence up until trial where the defendant claimed a coercion defense at trial. United States v. Ramirez, 441 F2d 950 (5th Cir., 1971). This problem most often can arise in a factual situation in which the defendant takes the stand as a witness to present either an alibi or an explanation of self-defense which he has never mentioned to the police. The prosecutor then comments on that fact with the implication that the story was recently fabricated by the defendant. If the comments are intended to be probative of guilt, they are clearly impermissible. Gillison v. United States, 399 F2d 586 (D.C. Cir., 1968); People v. Wright, 182 Col. 87 (511 P2d 460) (1973); Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252 (299 A2d 590) (1973). Since the Supreme Court chose to base Hale on its supervisory power over lower federal courts, it is unclear how state courts that have decided the question would now decide the same issue. In Kansas, it is permissible to impeach defendant if his silence on arrest is inconsistent with his trial testimony. State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168 (523 P2d 397) (1974). In Virginia, however, it is error for the prosecutor to use the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination either to discredit or convict the person who asserted it. Reid v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 790 (195 SE2d 866) (1973). The Michigan Supreme Court would only allow the use of silence upon arrest as impeachment of defendant's direct assertion that he did make a statement on arrest. See People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355 (212 NW2d 190) (1973). We have found no case in Georgia dealing with the specific issue presented for decision here. In the present case, the defense made no objection to the evidence later argued by the prosecutor at trial and the defense repeatedly referred to the fact that the state's witness, Coley, refused to talk to anyone until he had spoken to his attorney. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, there was no inference of guilt to be drawn by the jury from defendant's earlier insistence upon an attorney. Instead, the logical inference would be that since the witness, Coley, did the same thing, it was unimportant and irrelevant to the testimony given by them at the trial. While such an argument in other circumstances by a prosecutor might cause problems of constitutional dimensions, we do not believe the facts of the present case bring it to this level of concern. Therefore, we conclude that, even if the argument objected to was erroneously permitted, it must be considered harmless under the facts of this case. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.