Opinion ID: 1236308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeals from ERISA Remands

Text: 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides, in relevant part: The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... Thus, [f]ederal appellate jurisdiction generally depends on the existence of a decision by the District Court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have yet to decide whether a remand to an ERISA plan administrator is a final decision[] for purposes of § 1291. See Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 277 F.3d 635, 646 & n. 8 (2d Cir.2002) (We do not reach the issue of whether a remand to a[n] [ERISA] plan administrator is a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.); Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.1998) (noting we have not yet had occasion to rule on the issue). Other circuits have split on the issue: the Seventh and Ninth Circuits hold that appeals may be appropriate in certain circumstances, see Hensley v. Northwest Permanente P.C. Ret. Plan & Trust, 258 F.3d 986, 992-93 (9th Cir.2001); Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 979-80 (7th Cir.1999), while the First, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits bar all such appeals, see Petralia v. AT & T Global Info. Solutions Co., 114 F.3d 352, 353-54 (1st Cir.1997); Bowers v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 365 F.3d 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2004); Shannon v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 55 F.3d 561, 563 (11th Cir.1995) (per curiam). In Viglietta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 378, (2d Cir.2006), we dismissed an appeal after concluding that a remand to the claims administrator to clarify the factual record and for reconsideration in light of additional findings was not appealable under the case law of this or any other circuit. The Order challenged by Giraldo, like the remand examined in Viglietta, is similarly unappealable under any established body of case law. Thus, as in Viglietta, we need not decide whether to adopt (1) the majority position denying jurisdiction over appeals of remand orders or (2) the rules established by the Seventh or Ninth Circuits.
The Seventh Circuit analyzes ERISA remands as if they were remands of appeals from Social Security Administration decisions. There are two types of remands under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in the Social Security context. In the first, known as sentence four remands, the district court enters a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding for a rehearing. Perlman, 195 F.3d at 978 (quoting § 405(g)). The Supreme Court has held that this type of remand is immediately appealable. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990). In the second, known as sentence six remands, the court does not enter judgment as to the propriety of the Commissioner's decision, but instead remands for the receipt of new evidence. This type of remand is not final or appealable because no adjudication has taken place. Perlman, 195 F.3d at 978. This case would fall squarely into the second  sentence six  category because the district court's summary judgment order remanded the case and directed the Trustees to develop the factual record and to provide reasons for their decision. In view of the fact that there was no judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Trustees, Perlman, 195 F.3d at 978, the Order denying attorney's fees would not be eligible for appeal under the Seventh Circuit rule.
In the Ninth Circuit, an ERISA remand order is appealable only if: (1) the district court order conclusively resolved a separable legal issue, (2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable. Hensley, 258 F.3d at 993. Giraldo contends that the district court's summary judgment order directing the Trustees to consider her age, skills and education constituted a separable legal issue that would be eligible for appeal in the Ninth Circuit. But because Giraldo seeks to appeal only the Order denying her motion for attorney's fees, the Ninth Circuit rule  even if it were adopted by us  does not apply. Moreover, there would be no jurisdiction even if the Hensley factors did apply. The district court has not required the Trustees to apply a different rule from the one they applied in the initial administrative proceedings; the remand only seeks further development of the factual record. See Viglietta, 454 F.3d at 379. Accordingly, in view of the fact that the district court's ruling is not eligible for immediate appeal under either the Seventh or Ninth Circuit tests, we conclude that the Order is not a final judgment appealable under § 1291.