Opinion ID: 2264916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Revocation by Implication of Law

Text: Appellant finally urges this court to extend the rationale in Estate of Liles, 435 A.2d 379 (D.C.1981) to include present situation. In Liles, we held that under the doctrine of revocation by implication of law, D.C.Code § 18-109(a) (1989), a divorce automatically revokes any existing will's bequest to the former spouse, regardless of the actual intent of the testator. This adopted rule, we noted rests on the assumption based upon common knowledge and experience that it is so rare and so unusual for a testator under these circumstances to desire or intend that his divorced spouse should benefit further under his will, that it is not improper or unreasonable to require that such a testator make that extraordinary desire and intention manifest by a formal republication of his will or by the execution of a new will. Estate of Liles, supra, 435 A.2d at 382 (quoting Caswell v. Kent, 158 Me. 493, 186 A.2d 581, 582-83 (1962)). Even assuming that the analogy between the testamentary disposition of property and the designation of beneficiary rights for insurance proceeds were apt, we would have to construe Bolle's redesignation of Hume on the very day the Superior Court entered the Judgment of Absolute Divorce as reflecting a manifest intent that Hume be the ultimate recipient of those proceeds. [7] Accordingly, we decline to extend the revocation by implication doctrine to the situation before us. Affirmed.