Opinion ID: 2054559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: A Witness's Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Before a Jury

Text: I cannot, in good conscience, join a decision which effectively condones the use of a witness's invocation of his right to remain silent to purposely create an adverse inference of guilt against the witness in the minds of the jury. This is a matter which cannot fall, as the majority asserts, under a trial court's discretionary authority. Courts should, to every extent possible, protect the right to remain silent from adverse inferences of guilt by preventing a witness from taking the stand for the sole purpose of invoking his or her right to remain silent before the jury. The affirmation of this vigilance by the United States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746, (1886), is eloquent in this regard: It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Id. at 635, 6 S.Ct. at 535, 29 L.Ed. at 752 (emphasis added). We are to be vigilant in our protection of the constitutional rights of citizens, not just of defendants; and today's majority opinion both unnecessarily and abruptly drains the constitutional right to remain silent of the important principle that adverse inferences should not be drawn from invocation of this right. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution [10] and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights [11] provide a right, sacrosanct in our criminal justice system. By permitting, if not encouraging, the use of one's invocation of the right to remain silent to create an adverse inference of guilt, the majority today performs, in the Supreme Court's words, the obnoxious... in its mildest and least repulsive form.... Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635, 6 S.Ct. at 535, 29 L.Ed. at 752. Our Court has been steadfast in protecting the invocation of the privilege against self incrimination against the presumptions that are often inherent in such invocation. Smith v. State, 367 Md. 348, 351, 787 A.2d 152,153 (2001); Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 265, 600 A.2d 420, 426 (1992); Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 226-27, 507 A.2d 1098, 1126 (1986)(Eldridge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. granted, in part, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 269, 93 L.Ed.2d 246 (1986), and vacated, in part, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987); Littreal v. Redwine, 252 Md. 662, 668, 250 A.2d 894, 897 (1969); Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 179, 246 A.2d 608, 620 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948, 89 S.Ct. 1284, 22 L.Ed.2d 482 (1969). We cannot admonish courts and practitioners for purposely creating adverse inferences regarding a defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent, and yet effectively encourage those very inferences by allowing witnesses to take the stand for no other purpose but to invoke the right to remain silent in front of the jury. Nor can we expect jury members to distinguish between the (intentionally sought) adverse inferences created by a witness's invocation of the right to remain silent and the adverse inferences, which we caution against, created by a defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent. Granted, there may be occasions where a witness, unbeknownst to the State or defense counsel, decides to invoke his right to remain silent on the stand. The procedure for handling such occurrences, however, has long been established. See Richardson, v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265, 401 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1979)(stating that when a sworn witness invokes his right to remain silent in front of the jury, the jury should be dismissed and the trial court should determine whether the claim of privilege is in good faith or lacks any reasonable basis)(quoting Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 289, 164 A.2d 526, 530 (1960)). In determining whether a witness's invocation of his/her right to remain silent is justified, a court is required to question the witness outside the presence of the jury, see Midgett, 223 Md. at 289, 164 A.2d at 529; thereby minimizing to the extent possible, any adverse inferences that may result from the invocation. I agree with the majority's recitation of the proper procedure for determining whether a witness may invoke his right to remain silent. See maj. op. at 709-11. I further agree with the majority's recitation of the proper considerations for determining whether a witness is entitled to invoke the privilege against incrimination. We have utilized, on countless occasions, the Supreme Court's decree that invocation should be protected where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer ... it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124. As we articulated in Bhagwat v. State, 338 Md. 263, 658 A.2d 244 (1995), a witness is entitled to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when a reasonable basis for the invocation exists and the privilege is invoked in good faith. Id. at 272, 658 A.2d at 248. See also Adkins v. State, 316 Md. 1, 6-7, 557 A.2d 203, 205-06 (1989); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 309, 206 A.2d 250, 253 (1965) (stating that [t]he test is whether the State's Attorney calls the witness for the effect of the claim of privilege on the jury). The majority and I agree that the trial court, in this case, conducted the proper procedure and employed the correct legal standard in determining whether Gatton had a reasonable and good faith basis for invoking his right to remain silent. My departure from the majority opinion stems from the majority's granting of discretionary authority to trial courts in an area where I believe none should exist. [12] The sanctity of the right to remain silent is not dependent upon whether the party calling the witness is the defense or the State or whether the use of a witness's invocation of the right to remain silent prejudices the defendant i.e., it is acceptable to use the adverse inferences from a witness's invocation of the right to remain silent if it benefits the accused, but unacceptable if it prejudices the accused. See Vandegrift, 237 Md. at 308-09, 206 A.2d at 252 (describing the requirements for prejudicial error when a State witness invokes the right to remain silent). Not only is this anathema to our roles as guarantors of the civil liberties of our State citizenry, but there is far more at stake than the mere potential prejudice to an accused. The integrity of the constitutional right to remain silent is undermined when trial courts are forced to condone or even encourage an adverse inference from the invocation of that right when it benefits a defendant, but are required, often simultaneously, to discourage that same adverse inference each and every other time. We have tried valiantly throughout this Court's history to curb the adverse inferences that naturally result from one's invocation of his right to remain silent. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340 n. 10, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 1095 n. 10, 55 L.Ed.2d 319, 325 (1978) (explaining that [t]he layman's natural first suggestion would probably be that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear confession of the crime) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, p. 426 (J. McNaughton rev.1961)); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426, 76 S.Ct. 497, 500, 100 L.Ed. 511, 518 (1956) (acknowledging that [t]oo many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of a crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege). In fact, it is because the exercise of the right to remain silent often carries with it overtones of adverse inferences, standard jury instructions in this State and others direct the jury not to make such inferences from the failure to testify. See MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 3:17. Yet today, the majority devalues our resolute stance on impermissible inferences on an invocation of the right to remain silent because a defendant is entitled to have his defense fully presented to the jury. See maj. op. at 709. The defendant, indeed, is entitled to present his or her defense; I disagree, however, that the petitioner's right was impeded by the court's refusal to allow Gatton to invoke his right to remain silent before the jury. In fact, I do not believe that the mere ability to present a witness for the sole purpose of invoking the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury is an essential component of any defense, which is why, in part, I do not believe that a court should have discretion in this matter. The United States Supreme Court described the right to present a defense as including: [t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary ... the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 1023 (1967). A close analysis of some of the facets of presenting a defense, as articulated by the Supreme Court, demonstrates that in refusing to allow a witness who invokes his right to remain silent to take the stand for the sole purpose of making that invocation in the presence of the jury, a court is not depriving a defendant of the ability to present a defense. A defendant cannot be deprived of the right to offer testimony of witnesses because a witness who properly invokes his right to remain silent will not offer testimony. Nor is the defendant deprived of the right to present his version of the facts, as the exclusion of a self-declared mute witness does not alter the other methods (witnesses, circumstantial or concrete evidence) available to the defendant in order to establish reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that someone else did it. Nor is the defendant deprived of the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense; the natural caveat to presenting any witness being that, to present a witness, the witness must be available. When a witness invokes his constitutional right to remain silent, he or she is no longer available to either the State or the defense. The majority instructs trial courts to determine whether sufficient evidence has been presented, believable by any trier of fact, of the possible guilt of the witness the defendant wants to cause to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury. Maj. Op. at 714. This strikes me as self-contradicting. The majority argues that the defendant's right to present a defense could be hindered without a witness's invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, yet requires the defendant to present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that someone else might have committed the crime before he or she can call the silent witness to the stand. A defendant's ability to present a defense cannot be so impeded by the absence of the silent witness, or the adverse inferences therefrom, if he or she is able to procure sufficient evidence that someone else committed the crime without that silent witness. Stated differently, the majority believes that sufficient evidence warrants the use of a silent witness for the sole purpose of creating an adverse inference because a defendant's right to present a defense is otherwise hindered. That sufficient evidence exists, in my view, however, confirms that permitting the purposeful generation of an adverse inference from a witness's exercise of his or her constitutional right to remain silent, based largely on notions that a defendant's right to present a defense would otherwise be impeded, is completely without merit. Before the majority would permit the otherwise impermissible (i.e., the adverse inference from the exercise of one's right to remain silent), sufficient evidence is needed; yet because sufficient evidence is generated, the right to present a defense clearly could not have been hindered. The petitioner in this case would not have obtained any more evidence from Gatton had he been permitted to invoke his privilege before the jury, except for an adverse inference of guilt which this Court has repeatedly warned against. A defendant's right to present a defense should not be upheld at the expense of diminishing the constitutional protections afforded to others. Furthermore, an adverse inference from a witness's invocation of the right to remain silent is not, and never should be evidence whether favorable to the prosecution or to the defendant, and thus, a defendant cannot claim an entitlement to have a witness invoke his or her right to remain silent in the presence of the jury. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97, 63 S.Ct. 549, 553, 87 L.Ed. 704, 711 (1943) (quoting Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853)) (If the privilege claimed by the witness be allowed, the matter is at an end. The claim of privilege and its allowance is properly no part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn by them from the legal assertion by the witness of his constitutional right.); United States v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 71 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that [n]either side has the right to benefit from any inferences the jury may draw simply from the witness' assertion of the privilege either alone or in conjunction with questions that have been put to him) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.1973)); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995, 91 S.Ct. 1240, 28 L.Ed.2d 533 (1971) ([T]he jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision of a witness to exercise his constitutional privilege whether those inferences be favorable to the prosecution or the defense.) We recently explained that a court's refusal to allow a defense witness to testify compels consideration of the important protections afforded a criminal defendant by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, namely, the guarantees of compulsory process and due process. Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 634, 655 A.2d 390, 396 (1995). These considerations, unique to criminal defendants, are not present when a court denies the testimony of a State witness, nor for either of the parties in a civil action. See id. While noting that a criminal defendant's compulsory process and due process protections are not absolute, we acknowledged that where the appropriateness of excluding an accused's witness is a relatively close call, the trial court should avoid possible infringement of the constitutional rights by permitting the offending defense witness to testify. Id. at 635, 655 A.2d at 397. Thus, in Redditt, we held that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding a witness proffered by the defense because the witness was not properly sequestered in accordance with Rule 5-615. [13] Id. That we held that a sequestration violation should not be the basis for the court's ruling to prohibit the testimony of a defense witness, a possible infringement of a defendant's constitutional right to present witnesses in his or her defense, does not mean that we must hold similarly when the basis for the court's ruling was the protection of a witness's constitutional right to remain silent. The appropriateness of the exclusion of a defense witness is not, in this case, the relatively close call that we deemed an exclusion based on a sequestration violation to be. If a court affirmatively rules that a witness, whether proffered by the defense or the State, has a reasonable basis for invoking his or her right to remain silent, as articulated in Adkins, 316 Md. at 6-7, 557 A.2d at 205-06, and its progeny, and the court determines that the witness will elect to exercise his or her right to remain silent if he or she takes the stand, then a court has no choice but to exclude this witness. A court is obligated, not only to ensure a fair trial for, and protect the constitutional rights of, the defendant, but to also monitor and secure the constitutional protections of all those involved in the trial process, whether a party, litigant, jury member, or witness. This is not the first time the constitutional rights of a third party could be said to have impeded an action that the defendant would have liked to have taken. We have refused to permit peremptory challenges to jurors based on race or gender because of the court's greater interest in protecting the constitutional rights of jury members to be free from discrimination by the State. See Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 621-22, 667 A.2d 876, 883 (1995) (stating that [a]lthough, in the instant criminal case, the defendant rather than the prosecution exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, the Supreme Court has held that Batson's holding applies to peremptory challenges exercised by the defendant in a criminal proceeding) (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2353-54, 120 L.Ed.2d 33, 45 (1992)); see also Jones v. State, 343 Md. 584, 593, 683 A.2d 520, 524 (1996); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 62-63, 542 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1988). Just as courts should not become willing participant[s] in a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of our system of justice ... with respect to racial discrimination in jury selection, see McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49, 112 S.Ct. at 2354, 120 L.Ed.2d at 45 (quoting State v. Alvarado, 221 N.J.Super. 324, 534 A.2d 440, 442 (Law Div.1987)), courts should not become conduits for permitting adverse inferences to be drawn from invocation of one's constitutional right to remain silent by knowingly allowing a witness to take the stand for that sole purpose. Notwithstanding my strict posture against the purposeful creation of adverse inferences, having a witness assert the privilege in order to demonstrate unavailability, itself, lacks evidentiary or probative value and therefore, would fail to meet the requirements of relevancy. See People v. Dyer, 425 Mich. 572, 390 N.W.2d 645, 649 (1986) (stating that a witness's invocation of the right to remain silent produces no substantial evidence). It cannot, by its very nature, make a fact of consequence more or less probable because the act of invoking one's right to remain silent cannot be construed as an admission of guilt or involvement. The majority claims that if their stance is not followed, and a witness called by the defense is not allowed to invoke his right to remain silent in front of the jurors, then the jury may believe that the defendant (the petitioner) chose not to ask the witness (Gatton) any questions about the crime out of lack of confidence in his defense. Thus, the majority appears to be arguing that the act of invocation is relevant to explaining the reason for the witness's absence. Assuming, arguendo, that the witness's invocation is relevant evidence, it should still be excluded pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-403, which permits the exclusion of relevant evidence when there exists a danger that the evidence would confuse the issues or mislead the jury. See Md. Rule 5-403. The majority's concern that the jury would be left wondering why the witness was not questioned is better addressed by a court's issuance, in its discretion, of an instruction to the jury that the witness is unavailable to either the State or the defense. I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that [f]or the same reasons that the witness is not invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury, the neutralizing instruction should not inform the jury that the witness did not appear to testify because he invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Gray, 137 Md.App. at 520, 769 A.2d at 227. Thus, a neutralizing instruction may be given to inform the jury that for reasons developed out of their presence, the witness is not available to either side and they should draw no inference from the witness' nonappearance. Id. at 521, 769 A.2d at 227 (quoting John McCormick, Evidence § 121 at 297-98 (1984)). Courts, as protectors of the constitutional guarantees afforded to all citizens, should not condone the purposeful use of the invocation of one's right to remain silent to intentionally create the inference of guilt. Because the majority's stance would permit such use of a citizen's constitutional right, I must respectfully dissent.