Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Failing to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery, which violated his rights to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments thereof. Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 110, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence, and an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense constitutes a denial of that right. To protect this right and the broader interest of safeguarding the jury's function of ascertaining the truth, a trial court must instruct on an uncharged offense that is less serious than, and included in, a charged greater offense, even in the absence of a request, whenever there is substantial evidence raising a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged greater offense are present. ( People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 980-981, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 733, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) But this does not mean that the trial court must instruct sua sponte on the panoply of all possible lesser included offenses. Rather, to amplify on Heard, `such instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury. [Citations.] Substantial evidence in this context is `evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[ ]' that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.' ( People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 366-367, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432, italics deleted.) The classic formulation of this rule is expressed in People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 443, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273: When there is substantial evidence that an element of the charged offense is missing, but that the accused is guilty of a lesser included offense, the court must instruct upon the lesser included offense, and must allow the jury to return the lesser conviction, even if not requested to do so. We are not faced with the foregoing situation here. Defendant focuses on the asportation of Lees's jewelry, asserting he formed the intent to take it from her only after killing her. But this argument is beside the point, because whether the stealing of the jewelry (or of any property other than the shotgun) constituted robbery was never litigated. Although the formal robbery charge mentioned jewelry and cash, the state never attempted to prove robbery of those items. The prosecutor did not say in his opening statement that defendant robbed Lees of the jewelry and cash. In closing argument, the prosecutor focused exclusively on the shotgun when discussing robbery. He contended that defendant's tale of snatching at the shotgun from Lees before a struggle ensued over it constituted an admission of robbery of the shotgun, but he never argued that the taking of the jewelry and cash constituted robbery. When discussing the jewelry, the prosecutor implied that defendant's intent to steal it arose after Lees's death. Nor did the instructions to the jury describe the property allegedly robbed; the instructions merely listed the elements of robbery. In sum, the state's robbery case rested solely on defendant's stealing Lees's shotgun. Robbery, we reiterate, is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (ї 211.) As noted, to be convicted of robbery, the perpetrator must intend to deprive the victim of the property permanently ( People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th 598, 671, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175; People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th 610, 645-646, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80), and robbery requires the intent to steal . . . either before or during the commission of the act of force ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 34, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262), because [i]f [the] intent to steal arose after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is absent ( People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 443, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273). As explained in our discussion of claim IX, ante, even defendant's evidence supports the conclusion that defendant robbed Lees of her shotgun. Defendant testified that he took the shotgun from her as the two struggled, and harbored, from the outset of the struggle, the intent to steal it. The shotgun later was found in the pickup truck that defendant stole from the victim. The evidence points to a sole conclusion: defendant robbed her of her shotgun. Defendant asserts that he decided to take the shotgun from Lees only after he assaulted her. But there is no substantial evidence of this possibility. As noted, [i]f [the] intent to steal arose after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is absent ( People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 443, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273), and the offense is theft ( ibid. ). But we read the record differently from defendant. As alluded to, defense counsel asked defendant, [w]hen you first got that gun away from her, you had no intention of giving it back to her, did you? Defendant answered, [n]o, I didn't. The reasonable interpretation of defendant's admission, read against his description of his struggle with Lees and his eventual carrying of the shotgun to Lees's truck, is that he intended to take the shotgun from the moment he saw Lees holding it and keep it for himself. As stated, the prosecution's theory of the case also pointed to defendant's intent to steal the shotgun before he attacked and murdered Lees, an assault carried out in part to accomplish the stealing of the shotgun. There was no substantial evidence for the view defendant now offers, i.e., evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. ( People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 980-981, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 366-367, 116 Cal. Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) In sum, [w]e reject the claim that the evidence of after-formed intent rises to the level of substantial evidence justifying an instruction on theft. ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 620, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) Accordingly, we find no error under state law or violation of any constitutional guaranty.