Opinion ID: 118310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The federal officer removal provision at issue states:

Text: (a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: . . . . . (3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties. 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (1994 ed. and Supp. III). [3] It is the general rule that an action may be removed from state court to federal court only if a federal district court would have original jurisdiction over the claim in suit. See 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). To remove a case as one falling within federal-question jurisdiction, the federal question ordinarily must appear on the face of a properly pleaded complaint; an anticipated or actual federal defense generally does not qualify a case for removal. See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 152 (1908). Suits against federal officers are exceptional in this regard. Under the federal officer removal statute, suits against federal officers may be removed despite the nonfederal cast of the complaint; the federal-question element is met if the defense depends on federal law. To qualify for removal, an officer of the federal courts must both raise a colorable federal defense, see Mesa v. California, 489 U. S. 121, 139 (1989), and establish that the suit is  for a[n] act under color of office, 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(3) (emphasis added). To satisfy the latter requirement, the officer must show a nexus, a `causal connection' between the charged conduct and asserted official authority. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 409 (1969) (quoting Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U. S. 9, 33 (1926)). In construing the colorable federal defense requirement, we have rejected a narrow, grudging interpretation of the statute, recognizing that one of the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in a federal court. 395 U. S., at 407. We therefore do not require the officer virtually to win his case before he can have it removed. Ibid. Here, the judges argued, and the Eleventh Circuit held, that Jefferson County's tax falls on the performance of federal judicial duties in Jefferson County and risk[s] interfering with the operation of the federal judiciary in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine; that argument, although we ultimately reject it, see infra, at 435-443, presents a colorable federal defense. Jefferson County, 92 F. 3d, at 1572. There is no dispute on this point. See post, at 448 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We next consider whether the judges have shown that the county's tax collection suits are  for a[n] act under color of office. 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(3) (emphasis added). The essence of the judges' colorable defense is that Jefferson County's Ordinance expressly declares it unlawful for them to engage in [their] occupation without paying the tax, Ordinance No. 1120, § 2, and thus subjects them to an impermissible licensing scheme. The judges accordingly see Jefferson County's enforcement actions as suits for their having engage[d] in [their] occupation. The Solicitor General, in contrast, argues that there is no causal connection between the suits and the judges' official acts because [t]he tax . . . was imposed only upon [the judges] personally and not upon the United States or upon any instrumentality of the United States. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20. To choose between those readings of the Ordinance is to decide the merits of this case. Just as requiring a clearly sustainable defense rather than a colorable defense would defeat the purpose of the removal statute, Willingham, 395 U. S., at 407, so would demanding an airtight case on the merits in order to show the required causal connection. Accordingly, we credit the judges' theory of the case for purposes of both elements of our jurisdictional inquiry and conclude that the judges have made an adequate threshold showing that the suit is for a[n] act under color of office. 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a)(3). Justice Scalia maintains that the county's lawsuit was not grandly for the judges' performance of their official duties, but narrowly for their having refused to pay the tax. The judges' resistance to payment of the tax, he states, was neither required by the responsibilities of their offices nor undertaken in the course of job performance. See post, at 447. The county's lawsuit, however, was not simply for a refusal; it was for payment of a tax. The county asserted that the judges had failed to comply with the Ordinance; read literally, as the judges urge and as we accept solely for purposes of this jurisdictional inquiry, that measure required the judges to pay a license fee before engag[ing] in [their] occupation. Ordinance No. 1120, § 2. The circumstances that gave rise to the tax liability, not just the taxpayers' refusal to pay, constitute the basis for the tax collection lawsuits at issue. See Willingham, 395 U. S., at 409 ( It is enough that [petitioners'] acts or [their] presence at the place in performance of [their] official duty constitute the basis . . .of the state prosecution. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, those circumstances encompass holding court in the county and receiving income for that activity. In this light, we are satisfied that the judges have shown the essential nexus between their activity under color of office and the county's demand, in the collection suits, for payment of the local tax.