Opinion ID: 2331534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Victim's State of Mind

Text: Robbi Jones testified that one of the victims, Saunders, told Jones that he was going to meet someone from the wrestling team on the night he was killed. After giving this information to police investigators, Jones examined some police photographs and identified Luis Reyes, as the individual from the wrestling team. Jones told the police he thought Reyes' name was Alex. Reyes fourth argument on appeal is that the trial judge's decision to admit the testimony of Robbi Jones regarding Saunders' state of mind on the night of his murder was erroneous. Delaware Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides a hearsay exception for a present sense impression state of mind. [20] Rule 803(3) provides that: [a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification or terms of the declarant's will. [21] The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule is a venerable evidentiary precept. [22] In fact, it is firmly rooted for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. [23] In Derrickson v. State [24] , this Court identified five factors that need to be satisfied before a statement will be admitted as a present sense impression under state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. [25] First, the statement must be relevant and material. [26] Second, the statement must relate to an existing state of mind when made. [27] Third, it must be made in a natural manner. Fourth, it must be made under circumstances dispelling suspicion. [28] Fifth, it must contain no suggestion of sinister motives. [29] In Capano v. State [30] , applying Derrickson, this Court distinguished such [d]eclarations of intention, casting light upon the future, ... from declarations of memory pointing backwards to the past. [31] While a declaration of past events is generally not admissible, a declaration of future intention is admissible. [32] Jones testified about Saunders' statement that he planned to go meet Luis Reyes the evening he was killed  Saunders' intentions regarding the future. Jones testified that he had a telephone conversation with the decedent, Saunders, prior to Saunders' death. During the conversation, Saunders told Jones he planned to meet that Saturday night with the short wrestler with the glasses. Jones also stated that he did not recall Saunders giving that person's name. Jones told the police he thought the person described by Saunders was named Alex. When the police asked Jones to look at some photographs to identify the person he thought Saunders was describing, Jones identified Reyes. Reyes argues that because Saunders indicated the person's name was Alex the statement was not relevant. The record reflects that Saunders never told Jones the person's name was Alex. Rather, Saunders described the person to Jones. Jones mistakenly thought Reyes' name was Alex. Jones knew to whom Saunders was referring physically because he was able to identify him in the police photographs. In this case, Jones's testimony meets the five-factor test set forth in Derrickson v. State [33] and is consistent with the distinction recognized in Capano v. State. [34] The plans that Saunders related to Jones suggested that he would be in Reyes' presence the night of the murders. Jones's testimony about Saunders' statement related to the existing state of mind of Saunders at the time of its making and was communicated in a natural manner. The statement was made under a circumstance dispelling suspicion. It contained no suggestion of sinister motives. The testimony by Jones about the Saunders' self-described plans for the evening of his disappearance was material and relevant evidence at the trial of the victim's alleged killer. The trial judge properly permitted Jones's testimony under the state of mind hearsay exception in D.R.E. 803(3) and gave an appropriate limiting instruction. Reyes' arguments to the contrary are without merit.