Opinion ID: 2601723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applicability of the sudden-emergency jury instruction

Text: In order to be entitled to the sudden-emergency jury instruction, the proponent must show there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that [the proponent] had been suddenly placed in a position of peril through no negligence of his or her own, and in meeting the emergency,... acted as a reasonably prudent person would in the same or a similar situation. There must be evidence of a sudden and unforeseeable change in conditions to which a driver was forced to respond to avoid injury. 8 Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1081 (2007). In determining the standard of reasonable care, the Restatement (Second) of Torts further states, [t]he fact that the actor is not negligent after the emergency has arisen does not preclude his liability for his tortious conduct which has produced the emergency. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 296 (1965). [4] Therefore, a sudden emergency occurs when an unexpected condition confronts a party exercising reasonable care. [5] 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 198 (2004). Nevada has previously recognized the use of a sudden-emergency jury instruction but has not defined when it should be applied. See Rocky Mt. Produce v. Johnson, 78 Nev. 44, 369 P.2d 198 (1962); Jones v. Viking Freight System, 101 Nev. 275, 701 P.2d 745 (1985); Brascia v. Johnson, 105 Nev. 592, 781 P.2d 765 (1989). [6] We take this opportunity to clarify when a sudden-emergency instruction should be given. In this case, Horton advanced the position that the sudden-emergency instruction was properly given to the jury because she was not at fault since she was confronted with a sudden emergency. Horton's main argument is that the emergency was created by the pedestrian with the stroller crossing in front of Posas's car. [7] Horton argues that she met the burden for the sudden-emergency instruction because the emergency was created by the pedestrian suddenly and unexpectedly crossing the street, that she did not cause the pedestrian to cross the street, and that Horton and Posas each acted as a reasonable person would have by braking to keep from hitting the pedestrian. However, Horton's own testimony belies that fact in light of her statement that she was following too close. Thus, we conclude that Horton cannot appropriately claim that she faced a sudden emergency. She placed herself in a position of peril through her own negligence. The facts of this case are similar to those in Templeton v. Smith, and we take this opportunity to adopt the analysis in that case. 88 Or.App. 266, 744 P.2d 1325 (1987). In Templeton, the defendant was traveling behind the plaintiff and looked in her rearview mirror momentarily; when she looked back ahead, the plaintiff had stopped, and the defendant was unable to avoid the collision. Id. at 1326. After receiving an instruction on sudden emergency, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Id. The plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in giving the sudden-emergency instruction. Id. In reversing the jury's verdict, the court stated, [w]e doubt that an emergency charge should ever be given in an ordinary automobile accident case. Id. The court also reasoned that certain so-called emergencies should be anticipated, and the actor must be prepared to meet them when he engages in an activity in which they are likely to arise. Thus, under present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and persons in the highway, and of other vehicles at intersections. Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 83 (5th ed.1984)). The Oregon court concluded that the [d]efendant was not confronted with anything even closely resembling an emergency. Id. The fact that the plaintiff came to a stop sooner than the defendant expected is the type of hazard that should be anticipated under the circumstances of ordinary driving. There were no extraordinary circumstances, such as a truck careening out of control or a sudden mechanical failure. Id. Further, drivers must anticipate certain emergency situations such as the sudden appearance of obstacles or persons, darting children, crowded intersections and sudden stops.... These circumstances may be so routine as to make inappropriate the sudden emergency instruction. Gagnon v. Crane, 126 N.H. 781, 498 A.2d 718, 721 (1985) (internal citations omitted). As described above, in order to warrant a sudden-emergency jury instruction, Horton must show that she was suddenly placed in a position of peril through no negligence of her own, which she failed to do. As in Templeton, Horton was faced with an obstacle that normally arises in driving situationsthe car in front of her stopped to avoid hitting a pedestrian. [8] Horton's admitted act of following too closely created her peril, and she was unable to stop her vehicle in a timely and safe manner in response to that ordinary traffic situation. Thus, as articulated in Templeton, there were no extraordinary circumstances, and no emergency situation confronted Horton. Additionally, for the sudden-emergency doctrine to apply, the emergency must affect the actor. If there is an emergency, the actor must show that he or she was otherwise exercising due care to put forth a sudden-emergency instruction. It should be noted that even if an emergency situation had been created by the pedestrian in this case, it would have been an emergency that confronted Posas, not Horton. The doctrine is applicable to the party facing the emergency, not a party who creates his or her own emergency. See 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 213 (2004). Pursuant to our adoption of the Templeton analysis, the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury on sudden emergency in this case. The instruction tended to mislead or confuse the jury, and the error was prejudicial. Although the instruction itself properly described the sudden-emergency doctrine, Horton failed' to show she was exercising reasonable care. But for the error, as to the use of reasonable care by Horton, a different result may have been reached by the jury. Further, the record includes evidence to support Posas's claim that the error substantially affected her rights, namely, Horton's own admission that she was following Posas too closely at the time of the accident. Therefore, the sudden-emergency jury instruction, as used in this case, created prejudicial error that warrants granting Posas a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. [9] We concur: PARRAGUIRRE, C.J., HARDESTY, CHERRY, SAITTA, GIBBONS, and PICKERING, JJ.