Opinion ID: 1058543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instruction Regarding Evidence of Attack on Dorianne Brown

Text: The trial court admitted evidence of Leach's attack on Dorianne Brown at the Econo Lodge under Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence to show motive. Leach did not object to admission of the evidence on this ground. At the jury charge conference, however, the State requested the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider this evidence not only to show motive but also to provide the complete story of the crime. The trial court agreed and charged the jury as follows: If from the proof you find that the defendant has committed a crime other than that for which he is on trial, you may not consider such evidence to prove his disposition to commit such a crime as that on trial. This evidence may only be considered by you for the limited purpose of determining whether it provides: (a) the complete story of the crime; that is, such evidence may be considered by you where the prior crime and the present alleged crime are logically related or connected, so that proof of the other tends, or is necessary to prove the one charged, or is necessary for a complete account thereof. (b) motive; that is, such evidence may be considered by you if it tends to show a motive of the defendant for the commission of the offense presently charged. Such evidence of the other crime, if considered by you for any purpose, must not be considered for any purpose other than that, specifically, stated. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in not conducting a jury-out hearing as required by State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 272 (Tenn.2000), to determine whether the evidence was admissible to show contextual background. In addition, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the evidence in question was not properly admitted as contextual background evidence under Gilliland . The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, however, that the error was harmless because the evidence was admissible to prove motive. In this Court, Leach submits that admission of the evidence on another ground did not render harmless the trial court's instruction that the evidence could be used for the purpose of providing the complete story of the crime. Leach contends that this instruction invited the jury to consider the attack on Brown as establishing Leach's propensity to commit the crimes in this case, in violation of this Court's holding in State v. Parton, 694 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tenn.1985). In Gilliland , the Court set forth the following standard for determining when background evidence involving other crimes, wrongs or acts may be offered for other purposes under Rule 404(b): [W]hen the state seeks to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that is relevant only to provide a contextual background for the case, the state must establish, and the trial court must find, that (1) the absence of the evidence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the state's presentation of its case; (2) the void created by the absence of the evidence would likely result in significant jury confusion as to the material issues or evidence in the case; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 272 (emphasis added). By its own terms, this standard is limited to evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that is relevant only to provide a contextual background for the case. Id. (emphasis added). The State did not offer evidence of the attack on Brown as contextual background for the case. The evidence was offered and properly admitted to show motive, a material issue in the case. Therefore, no error occurred relative to admission of this evidence. The trial court properly instructed the jury that the evidence could be considered for the limited purpose of determining whether it tends to show a motive. Evidence proving motive necessarily serves the purpose of completing the story of the crime. Therefore, the portion of the instruction allowing the evidence to be considered for the purpose of providing the complete story of the crime was superfluous. Moreover, contrary to Leach's assertion, the instruction did not invite the jury to consider the attack on Brown as propensity evidence. In determining whether instructions are erroneous, this Court must review the charge in its entirety and read it as a whole. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tenn.1997). The instruction regarding the use of this evidence specifically directed the jury that it may not consider such evidence to prove [Leach's] disposition to commit such a crime as that on trial. The jury is presumed to have followed this instruction. See State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tenn.1998). We therefore conclude that, viewed as a whole, the instruction regarding evidence of the attack on Brown was not erroneous.