Opinion ID: 1393989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The first question is whether Rhonda's appeal is properly before this court. Neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction based on the timeliness of the appeal; however, it is well settled that it is our duty to determine that this court has jurisdiction. Haase v. Starnes, 337 Ark. 193, 194-95 987 S.W.2d 704, 705 (1999). The question of jurisdiction centers around a possible conflict between Ark. R.App. P.Civ. 2(d) (2001) and the requirement of a final appealable order. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure Civil 2(a)(1) (2001) limits our appellate review to final orders to avoid piecemeal litigation. Larscheid v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 343 Ark. 580, 36 S.W.3d 308 (2001). Rule 2 establishes a number of exceptions, including Rule 2(d) that provides: All final orders awarding custody are final appealable orders. The potential conflict is with Rule 54(b), which provides that [a]bsent the executed certificate required by paragraph (1) of this subdivision, any ... order ... which adjudicates fewer than all the claims ... shall not terminate the action.... Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2001). We have held that the exceptions identified in Rule 2 specify circumstances in which an issue is appealable even though the order of the chancellor was not final. East Poinsett County Sch. Dist. # 14 v. Massey, 317 Ark. 219, 876 S.W.2d 573 (1994). The issue here is whether Rule 2(d) permitted Rhonda to appeal directly from the May 15, 2000 divorce decree, and, if so, was she required to appeal within thirty days or forfeit her right to appeal. The resolution of this issue requires us to decide whether the phrase final orders awarding custody as used in Rule 2(d) means a final order as to all issues as required by Rule 54(b), or merely any order that is final in terms of custody. We hold that Ark. R.App. P.Civ. 2(d) permits an appeal from any order that is final as to the issue of custody, regardless of whether the order resolves all other issues. Therefore, Rhonda could have appealed directly from the May 15, 2000 divorce decree under Rule 2(d) because it was final as to the award of custody. Having determined that the divorce decree met the requirements of Rule 2(d), the issue then becomes whether Rhonda was required to file her appeal within thirty days of the divorce decree or lose her right to appeal. The resolution of this issue is found in Rule 2(b) that provides: An appeal from any final order also brings up for review any intermediate order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment. Ark. R.App. P. Civ. 2(b) (2001). In the instant case, while the May 15, 2000 divorce decree was a final award of custody, it was only an intermediate order with reference to property division issues, which were not addressed by the chancellor until the supplemental decree was entered on October 27, 2000. As such, the issues resolved in the divorce decree, as an intermediate order, were brought up for review along with the appeal from the supplemental decree. In summary, while Rhonda could have appealed directly from the May 15, 2000 divorce decree under Rule 2(d), she was not barred from raising the issues resolved in the divorce decree in her appeal from the October 27, 2000 supplemental decree. Therefore, Rhonda's notice of appeal, filed on November 27, 2000, was timely filed, and this court has jurisdiction. [1]