Opinion ID: 2226424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence on Theft and Possession of Weapons.

Text: Taylor also challenges his convictions on companion chargesfourth-degree theft and possession of a firearm by a felon. [2] He claims the State produced insufficient evidence to corroborate the incriminating testimony of David Newman, an alleged accomplice. Given the inadequacy of other evidence tying him to theft of the shotgun, Taylor argues, the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We disagree. Our analysis begins with the threshold question of Newman's status as an accomplice. The State does not seriously contest Taylor's claim that, on largely the same circumstantial evidence, Newman could have been charged and convicted of the same offenses for which Taylor stood trial. Newman had enjoyed shooting the shotgun earlier in the day; he resisted giving Hogue the names and phone numbers of guests who were at his house on the night of the theft; he called a potential suspect and told him not to tell the police anything about the gun if questioned; and only when threatened with the prospect of being charged with theft did he implicate Taylor. Clearly Newman fits the definition of accomplice. See Berney, 378 N.W.2d at 917. The question is whether Newman's testimony is sufficiently corroborated, as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(3). The rule provides: A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice or a solicited person, unless corroborated by other evidence which shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. Iowa R.Crim. P. 20(3). This corroboration rule serves two purposes: (1) to independently connect the defendant to the crime; and (2) to counterbalance the dubious credibility of a witness whose testimony may be motivated by self-interest in casting the blame elsewhere. State v. Larsen, 512 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa App.1993). Corroborative evidence need not be strong, nor must it confirm every detail of the accomplice's testimony. State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 41 (Iowa 1981). But it must furnish some material fact tending to connect the defendant to the crime, lending support to the accomplice's credibility. State v. Powell, 400 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 1987). The State offered several pieces of evidence to corroborate Newman's testimony. First it offered Hogue's testimony placing Taylor contemporaneously at the scene of the theft. That same circumstance was also confirmed by Taylor's own testimony. See State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Iowa 1979) (defendant may supply necessary corroboration). Taylor's own assertion of an implausible storythat a known thief at Hills Access Park might have stolen the gun, despite proof the gun was with Taylor, Hogue and Newman as they drove away from the parkalso implicates him in the theft. See State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 563 (Iowa 1995) (use of false story may be treated as implied admission). Jason Semler testified that when Newman spoke to him about the stolen gun, he understood that Taylor was involved. Finally, the gun eventually turned up at Hills Access Park in the hands of a regular there. The record shows that Taylor used the access park as his residence, both before and after his temporary sojourn at Newman's. Although this independent evidence against Taylor is not strong, it furnishes a sufficient basis for the district court's finding that Taylor took possession of Hogue's shotgun on or about August 13, 1994, with the intent to deprive Hogue of it. There is no dispute that the gun's value was greater than $100 but less than $500. See Iowa Code § 714.2(4). Taylor's possession of the weapon also violated Iowa Code section 724.26 because he is a felon. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment finding Taylor guilty of theft in the fourth degree and possession of a weapon as a felon. REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.