Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Chambers v. Maroney

Text: 166 While neither Geders, Holloway, nor Chapman is precedent for the view adopted by the dissent, another Supreme Court opinion, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), is strong authority for the rule that the burden of proving prejudice rests on the accused. 55 In Chambers, the defendant asserted that he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel because his new counsel at his second trial 56 did not confer with (him) until a few minutes before the second trial began. 399 U.S. at 53, 90 S.Ct. at 1982. The defendant contended that because his lawyer was unprepared, he failed to make an adequate effort to have (certain) guns and ammunition excluded from evidence. 399 U.S. at 54, 90 S.Ct. at 1982. The district court rejected petitioner's claim without a hearing and the court of appeals affirmed, noting that the guns and other materials seized from the car were admissible evidence. Id. In light of the defendant's inability to show that he was prejudiced, the Supreme Court (7-1) affirmed the conviction. Mr. Justice White wrote for the Court: 167 Unquestionably, the court should make every effort to effect early appointments of counsel in all cases. But we are not disposed to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy appointment of counsel or to hold that, whenever a habeas corpus petition alleges a belated appointment, an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine whether the defendant has been denied his constitutional right to counsel. 168 399 U.S. at 54, 90 S.Ct. at 1982-1983. From the foregoing it is obvious that a mere breach of duty to an accused is not a constitutional violation unless the defendant proves that he was prejudiced. If the principles advocated in the dissent had been applied in Chambers, then the failure of counsel to confer with the accused before trial (a violation of the American Bar Association guidelines) would have been sufficient to establish a constitutional error, thereby forcing the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced. Thus, Chambers is contrary to the basic contention of the dissent. 57