Opinion ID: 1572420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Validity of the February 5 Special Election

Text: We turn now to the substantive question presented, the validity of the February 5 special election. Two issues are presented by the parties for our consideration: (1) whether Act No. 784, Ala. Acts 1977, upon which the election was based, is unconstitutional in light of the prohibition of certain local laws imposed by § 105 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, and (2) whether Act No. 784 has been repealed by § 11-3-1(f). We first turn our attention to the latter issue because an affirmative response to it will make it unnecessary for us to address the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. See generally, e.g., Lowe v. Fulford, 442 So.2d 29, 33 (Ala.1983) (`Generally courts are reluctant to reach constitutional questions, and should not do so, if the merits of the case can be settled on non-constitutional grounds. White v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.1981).' (quoting trial court's order)); Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 706 So.2d 1134, 1142 (Ala.1997) (explaining that because we hold that [the federal statute] does not apply under the facts of this case, it is unnecessary for us to determine any constitutional issue concerning [that statute's] preemption of Alabama's applicable statute of limitations). We begin our analysis with a brief examination of the decision of this Court in Stokes v. Noonan, 534 So.2d 237 (Ala. 1988). At issue in Stokes was § 11-3-6, the precursor statute to § 11-3-1(b), the general law at issue in the present case. At the time Stokes was decided, however, § 11-3-6 contained no exception for local laws. It stated simply as follows with respect to a vacancy in a county commission seat: In case of a vacancy, it shall be filled by appointment by the governor, and the person so appointed shall hold office for the remainder of the term of the commissioner in whose place he is appointed. This general law was in place when the legislature enacted Act No. 85-237, Ala. Acts 1985. Similar to the local law at issue here, Act No. 85-237 was a local law intended to provide for filling vacancies on a county commission of one particular county, specifically Mobile County, by a special election. Addressing the constitutionality of Act No. 85-237, the Stokes Court reasoned that the legislature, by enacting a general law containing no ... provision or exception for contrary local laws, thereby intended that general law to be primary and the subject subsumed entirely by the general law. In that situation, § 105 does operate to prohibit the enactment of contrary local laws. Stokes, 534 So.2d at 239 (quoting Baldwin County v. Jenkins, 494 So.2d 584, 587 (Ala.1986)(emphasis omitted)). On this basis, the Stokes Court declared Act No. 85-237 to be unconstitutional. Riley v. Kennedy, 928 So.2d 1013 (Ala. 2005), dealt with the same local law as did Stokes, Act No. 85-237. By the time this Court decided Riley, however, the legislature had amended § 11-3-6 to add the beginning proviso [u]nless a local law authorizes a special election. Act No. 2004-455. The plaintiffs in Riley argued that that made all the difference: Kennedy argues that Act No. 2004-455, which amended § 11-3-6, Ala.Code 1975, manifests an intent by the legislature to cure the impediment to the enforceability this Court found as to Act No. 85-237 and to now give effect to that Act and that, consequently, a special election is the proper procedure by which to fill the vacancy created on the Mobile County Commission by Jones's resignation. 928 So.2d at 1016. The Court in Riley disagreed: This Court has consistently held that `statutes are to be prospective only, unless clearly indicated by the legislature. Retrospective legislation is not favored by the courts, and statutes will not be construed as retrospective unless the language used in the enactment of the statute is so clear that there is no other possible construction. Sutherland Stat. Const., § 41.04 (4th ed 1984).' Riley, 928 So.2d at 1016. The Court continued: Here, the plain language in Act No. 2004-455, amending § 11-3-6, Ala.Code 1975, provides for prospective application only, and that language must be given effect according to its terms. Nothing in the language in Act No. 2004-455 demonstrates an intent by the legislature that the amendment of § 11-3-6 apply retroactively. The argument that Act No. 2004-455 applies prospectively only is further supported by the preamble of the Act, which provides that the purpose of the Act is `[t]o amend Section 11-3-6 of the Code of Alabama 1975, relating to county commissions, to authorize the Legislature ... to provide for the manner of filling vacancies in the office of the county commission.' (Emphasis added.) The language `to authorize the Legislature ... to provide ' the means by which vacancies on the county commission are to be filled further indicates an intention by the legislature that the Act is to be prospectively applied. Therefore, we hold that Act No. 2004-455 applies prospectively only; consequently, Governor Riley is authorized to fill the vacancy on the Mobile County Commission by appointment. Riley, 928 So.2d at 1017 (most emphasis added; some emphasis omitted). The Election Commission and Sheriff Hale argue that the issue in Riley was whether Act No. 2004-455 could revive a local act, Act No. 85-237, which previously had been declared unconstitutional in Stokes. Act No. 784, they point out, was at no time before the enactment of Act No. 2004-455 judicially declared to be unconstitutional. It follows, according to the Election Commission and Sheriff Hale, that Act No. 77-784 does not need to be revived. Therefore, the issue before this Court in Riley v. Kennedy is not present in this case and the Riley v. Kennedy decision is inapposite to this case. The reasoning unanimously adopted by this Court in Riley does not admit of the distinction urged by the appellees. Again, as this Court stated, the plain language in Act No. 2004-455 ... provides for prospective application only; [n]othing in the language in Act No. 2004-455 demonstrates an intent by the legislature that the amendment [to the general law] apply retroactively, and the preamble of the Act... provides that the purpose of the Act is `... to authorize the Legislature by local law to provide  for exceptions to the general law. 928 So.2d at 1017. Thus, in Riley, the introductory proviso in § 11-3-6  [u]nless a local law authorizes a special election  was interpreted to apply only to local laws enacted after Act No. 2004-455. Approximately two years after this Court's decision in Riley was issued, the legislature, in Act No. 2007-488, reenacted the same language  including the aforesaid proviso  which had been interpreted in Riley. It did so without choosing to make any changes to it (other than to renumber it as § 11-3-1(b)). The Working plaintiffs, the Governor, and Bowman argue that the meaning of this language was decided in Riley and that this Court has now but to apply that meaning in the present case. We agree. Other than the renumbering of the section in which this language appears, there has been no change in this language since the decision in Riley. Our agreement with the appellants' position is buttressed by long-established and fundamental principles of statutory construction. [T]here exists, and has long existed, in this state, a principle that when the legislature readopts a code section, or incorporates it into a subsequent Code, prior decisions of this court permeate the statute, and it is presumed that the legislature deliberately adopted the statute with knowledge of this court's interpretation thereof. Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens, 282 Ala. 492, 495-96, 213 So.2d 225, 227-28 (1968). See also, e.g., Galloway Coal Co. v. Stanford, 215 Ala. 79, 81, 109 So. 377, 379 (1926) (`It is a settled rule, that, in the adoption of the Code, the Legislature is presumed to have known the fixed judicial construction pre-existing statutes had received, and the substantial re-enactment of such statutes is a legislative adoption of that construction.' Morrison v. Stevenson, 69 Ala. 448, [450 (1881)].); 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.09 (5th ed.1992) (compiling numerous Alabama cases to the same effect). As the Court aptly put it in the early case of Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 377, 18 So. 831, 836 (1895), it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that, where a reenacted statute has previously been construed by the courts, it is presumed the legislature intended the adoption of that construction, or [it] would have varied the words, adapting them to a different intent. Here, the legislature could have varied the words of former § 11-3-6 in an effort to adapt them to a different intent, but did not. In accordance with the previous decision of this Court in Riley v. Kennedy and based on well-established principles of statutory construction, we conclude that § 11-3-1(b) requires vacancies on a county commission to be filled by gubernatorial appointment and that the proviso at the outset of that subsection (making an exception for local laws that authorize special elections) does not apply retroactively, that is to local laws that predate the legislature's adoption of that proviso. Act No. 784, Ala. Acts 1977, is such a local law. In 2007, the legislature added subsection (f) to § 11-3-1. See Act No. 2007-488, Ala. Acts 2007. Section 11-3-1(f) now expressly repeals local laws in conflict with any other provision of § 11-3-1: Any existing local law or portion thereof in conflict with this section is specifically repealed to the extent of the conflict effective with the next election following September 1, 2007. Act No. 784, by purporting to provide for special elections to fill vacancies on the Jefferson County Commission, is in conflict with § 11-3-1(b), which requires vacancies to be filled by gubernatorial appointment, with no exception for preexisting local laws. Act No. 784, as a preexisting local law, therefore was repealed by the legislature's adoption of § 11-3-1(f). The trial court's validation of the February 5 special election on the basis that it was authorized by Act No. 784 is due to be reversed. [11]