Opinion ID: 2618245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Termination of the Conspiracy

Text: (29) Defendants also argue the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte to determine when the conspiracy ended. Had the jury been provided with such an instruction, they claim, it might have concluded that the charge of conspiracy to commit insurance fraud was not proved, and that many of the statements made by alleged coconspirators could not be considered. We reject this argument because the jury instructions clearly gave the jury the choice of finding the conspiracy charge untrue. Further, the jury was told that, No act or declaration of a conspirator that is committed or made after the conspiracy has been terminated is binding upon his coconspirators and they are not criminally liable for any such act. The jury was thus given the option of finding that the conspiracy had ended and that the statements made after such termination could not be held against the former conspirators. Defendants next contend the trial court should have determined as a matter of law, and instructed the jury, that the conspiracy ended no later than the day of Cliff Morgan's arrest. They argue it is constitutionally offensive to hold that a conspiracy can be ongoing at the time of trial, but refer us to no authority so holding. We reiterate that the conspiracy continued until its criminal objective (receipt of the insurance proceeds) was attained, or the goal was defeated. ( Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 436; Saling, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 852.) Defendants admit that at the time of Morgan's arrest, a determination had been made that the insurance proceeds would not be paid to him unless and until the issue of whether he was an intentional killer was resolved. Implicit in this statement is the possibility that the decision whether to pay was still pending. Thus, the conspiracy had not yet been defeated or permanently frustrated at the time of trial.