Opinion ID: 492349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government Informant's Alleged Contingent Fee Agreement

Text: 36 Appellants assert that the trial court erred when it denied their motion to suppress the testimony of the government's paid informant, Jose Montaner, thereby violating their Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and their Fifth Amendment right to due process. 37 The case against defendant Impemba and the other conspirators was developed through the investigative work of Montaner. Prior to trial, Montaner received approximately $17,000 from the Drug Enforcement Administration for providing information from 1983 to 1984, and $36,000 to relocate himself and his family under the Witness Protection Program, including monthly subsistence expenses, for a total of $53,000 received from the Government. 2 In addition, he expected to receive a potential maximum of $50,000 from the sale of the ADINA, which was seized on the strength of information he provided. 3 There was no written agreement regarding the arrangement between Montaner and the government; however, their oral understanding and the issue of rewards was fully explored on cross-examination. Also, a full accounting of all payments or benefits to Montaner was provided to defense counsel in writing before the trial began. 38 After carefully considering the briefs and the record in this case, we conclude that no reversible error exists as to the admission of Montaner's testimony. 4 A contingent fee arrangement is not per se impermissible; on a case by case basis, varying factors determine whether the arrangement in question is permissible. The fee for services can either be in the form of leniency, United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.1985), or direct financial compensation, as here. Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1962). 39 In United States v. Dailey, this court reaffirmed the long standing principle that the testimony of interested informants is not so inherently unreliable that it must be excluded. 759 F.2d at 196. Frequently, insiders are the only source of information about criminal activity, and the government has a legitimate law enforcement interest in procuring their cooperation. Id. While the risk of perjury is recognized, courts have chosen to rely upon cross-examination to ferret out any false testimony. Id. Rather than adopting an exclusionary rule, courts have chosen to leave the matter to the jury to consider in weighing the credibility of the informant. United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 396 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989, 91 S.Ct. 1684, 29 L.Ed.2d 155 (1971) (refusal to exclude testimony of informant paid under contingent fee agreement for conviction of specified persons for crimes not yet committed). 40 There are established safeguards that must be followed to ensure the veracity of the witness: the jury must be informed of the exact nature of the contingency agreement; the defense counsel must be permitted to cross-examine the witness about the agreement; and the jury must be specifically instructed to weigh the witness' testimony with care. See, e.g., Dailey, 759 F.2d at 196; United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir.1970). We believe these safeguards were adhered to in the instant case. The full nature of rewards to Montaner was presented to the jury in the government's direct case, 5 and was also explored extensively on cross-examination. Prior to trial, the government provided defense counsel with a written memorandum detailing all payments and benefits to Montaner. In the final instructions, the trial court gave the jury the appropriate standard against which to weigh the credibility of Montaner's testimony. See Dailey, 759 F.2d at 200. The jury was given the accomplice instruction on three occasions and was told to focus particularly on motives Montaner might have to lie, such as promises or benefits. 41 The final safeguard employed by the courts is whether the informant's testimony was corroborated. See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d at 198; United States v. Bithoney, 631 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Miceli, 446 F.2d 256, 258-59 (1st Cir.1971); Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir.1963). There is, of course, no federal evidentiary requirement that an accomplice's testimony be corroborated. See United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609 (1st Cir.1985). Unless an accomplice's testimony is incredible or unsubstantial on its face, which is not the case here, his uncorroborated testimony may be admitted, even though the accomplice is in a position to gain favors from the government by his testimony. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d at 198 (quoting Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir.1963)). Nevertheless, the evidence here fully satisfies any suggested safeguard of corroboration. Agents followed Montaner throughout his investigation and confirmed minute details of his testimony, from the various meetings he held with the different defendants, to the names of hotels where the defendants stayed, the types of cars rented, and the use of codes and content of radio transmission. Other accomplices who never met Montaner, gave accounts of this conspiracy from the offloaders' perspective that confirmed Montaner's testimony. The corroboration included such details as the geographical coordinates for the location of the ADINA at sea and testimony attributing the delay in the arrival of the marijuana to the presence of American military forces in Grenada. 42 The extent of the corroboration of Montaner's testimony, plus the fact that the jury was fully informed of the nature of the agreement, the thorough cross-examination about the agreement, and the specific instructions admonishing the jury to weigh the accomplice's testimony with care, are sufficient safeguards to outweigh the risk of inducing perjury that is present in any contingency fee agreement and ensure that the defendants were not denied their right to a fair trial. 6 43 Appellants also argue that (1) Montaner's agreement was contingent upon the conviction of the defendants; (2) Agudelo was pre-targeted; and (3) the defendants were entrapped.
44 Courts have generally allowed paid informants to testify as long as the agreements are not contingent upon the conviction of particular persons. United States v. Palow, 777 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir.1985). 45 In United States v. Grimes, the Sixth Circuit said: 46 No such overriding policy is present when an informer is paid on a contingent fee agreement for the conviction of specified persons for crimes not yet committed. Although it is true that the informant working under this type of arrangement may be prone to lie and manufacture crimes, he is no more likely to commit these wrongs than witnesses acting for other, more common reasons. Frequently, for example, one co-defendant testifies against another co-defendant with the expectation of favorable treatment as a reward for his testimony. Like the informant being paid on a contingent fee basis, a co-defendant so testifying may feel it imperative to obtain a conviction of his co-defendant in order to improve his own position. Similarly, informants paid on bases other than a contingent arrangement may feel that their employment will be terminated if they do not bring about a conviction. Therefore, despite admonitions to the contrary, they may believe that their future employment as an informant depends on the manufacture of crimes in order to prove their worth to the government. Neither of these methods of 'paying' informers has been seriously attacked by the courts; yet the potential for abuse is obvious in each case. Rather than adopting an exclusionary rule for a particular factual situation, irrespective of the mode of payment, we prefer the rule that would leave the entire matter to the jury to consider in weighing the credibility of the witness-informant (Citation omitted). In our view this approach provides adequate safeguards for the criminal defendant against possible abuses since the witness must undergo the rigors of cross-examination. 47 438 F.2d at 395-96. This court has agreed with the Sixth Circuit's general policy and reasoning although we refrained from stating whether or not we would go as far as the Sixth Circuit with respect to the testimony of informants. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d at 200. Here also we agree with the general policy and reasoning, but we distinguish the facts of this case from that of Grimes. In Grimes, the government explicitly promised the informer a reward for each conviction he made possible. The government made no such promise here and we would not condone such an agreement. 48 Montaner received the bulk of his compensation prior to trial; thus payment of this sum was not contingent upon the conviction of any of the defendants. See United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d at 1549. Montaner did make an isolated statement on cross-examination that he expected more generous treatment from the government if the defendants were convicted. However, the agents who supervised Montaner made clear that the important factor in determining what he received was nothing more specific than the nature and extent of his cooperation. For investigative work in an unrelated case, Montaner received $30,000; there have been no convictions or arrests made in that case, yet Montaner was rewarded. There was no reason then, for Montaner to believe his payment in this case would be contingent upon a conviction, nor was it. Montaner's isolated statement was not the product of a government promise. 7 49 When reviewing the entire testimony of the witness on this specific issue, which spanned over fifty pages of transcript, it appears that this one isolated statement was a product of confusion due to persistent cross examination. The witness repeatedly denied this assertion, both before and after the unfortunate statement was made. 8 Also, as the witness was born and raised in Spain, he did not have a strong command of the English language. The witness' isolated remark, which conflicted with the rest of his extensive testimony, viewed in the context of his testimony as a whole on this issue, combined with the language factor, leads us to believe that it should not be relied upon as a true reflection of the witness' belief. Montaner's testimony as a whole convinces us that the agreement between himself and the government, as understood by both, was not contingent upon the outcome of the case or whether there were any convictions, but rather upon his cooperation with the government.
50 In Williamson, 311 F.2d 441, the court overturned the convictions of the defendants because the informant in the case was to be paid a certain sum of money for each pre-targeted individual that was caught in a crime set up by the informant. The court stated that the pre-targeting of individuals would have been permissible if the government had demonstrated a prior knowledge that the defendant was engaged in illegal dealings. 311 F.2d at 444. Subsequent to Williamson, courts have seized upon this dicta and have been careful to confine its result to situations where a contingent fee is paid for the investigation of a pre-selected individual against whom the government lacks prior knowledge of his unlawful activity. See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 199 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Carcaise, 763 F.2d 1328, 1332 n. 11 (11th Cir.1985); Hill v. United States, 328 F.2d 988, 989 (5th Cir.1964); United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d at 499. Although the evidence in the instant case is conflicting, it appears that the government expressed considerable interest in Agudelo to Montaner. Even assuming Agudelo was pre-targeted, the government did have a reasonable basis for believing he was involved in criminal activity. See Harris v. United States, 400 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir.1968) (pre-targeting individuals is permissible if reasonable suspicion of illegal activity). At trial, Agudelo's motion to suppress evidence of his prior criminal history was granted because of the risk of undue prejudice. Agudelo cannot now come forward and claim there was no prior knowledge. And certainly, Agudelo was not the exclusive focus of Montaner's investigation. Montaner had previously testified at unrelated trials and expected to do so again in the future.
51 Williamson has also been limited to situations involving entrapment. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d at 199. The test for entrapment is whether the government actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1645, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). The informant can approach the defendant first and simply offer [him] the opportunity for a sale, as long as there is no inducement to commit a crime. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 444. Although there is conflicting evidence as to whether Montaner approached defendant Agudelo first or vice-versa, it is clear that there was no entrapment here. Montaner offered his services in obtaining a vessel and thereby became involved in a criminal operation that was already in progress. When Montaner went to Panama at Agudelo's request, Agudelo told him that another vessel, the ADINA, was at sea, loaded with marijuana, and ready to make a delivery. 52 Finally, we note that the amount paid to Montaner is a large sum, properly subject to scrutiny by this court, although not contested by appellants. See, e.g., United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir.1986) (payment of $31,000 for five-month undercover investigation, plus 25% of future sale of forfeited drug smuggling vessel, is not exorbitant); United States v. Garcia, 528 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898, 97 S.Ct. 262, 50 L.Ed.2d 182 (1976) (payment of $31,675 in eighteen months did not of itself mandate reversal, but amount did require scrutiny and created doubt as to the propriety of the practice of so heavily subsidizing informants); United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981). Montaner was paid $17,000 9 over a period of one year, plus the potential $50,000 from the sale of the vessel. The investigation exposed him and his family to many risks and dangers, and considering its duration, we do not find the sum to be excessive. 53