Opinion ID: 181935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appointees on the Policymaking Level

Text: The appellants brought their actions pursuant to the ADEA and contend that they are employees covered by the scope of that statute. The relevant section of the ADEA that defines the term employee reads: The term employee means an individual employed by any employer except that the term employee shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2010). The ADEA thus excludes from its coverage four types of persons: (1) elected officials; (2) the personal staff of an elected official; (3) appointees on the policymaking level; and (4) an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The appellees contend, and the district court held, that the appellants are situated within the third exception as appointees on the policymaking level. We agree that all Assistant State's Attorneys are appointees on the policymaking level and therefore are not within the coverage of the ADEA. The appellants argue that Assistant State's Attorneys are not appointees on the policymaking level and are employees covered by the scope of the ADEA. This circuit's case law regarding the interpretation of an appointee on the policymaking level is well-established. An individual is considered an appointee on the policy-making level if the position held by the individual authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into governmental decision-making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation. Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 141 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir.1993)). We derived this test from a pair of cases in which the Supreme Court permitted employee dismissals of individuals holding policymaking positions based on political affiliation. Id. at 144; see generally Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Drawing from these First Amendment political patronage cases, we articulated that in ADEA cases the test for determining if someone is an `employee'. . . is essentially indistinguishable from that applied in the political firing context under the Elrod/Branti doctrine. Americanos, 74 F.3d at 144 (citing Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1993)). The appellants contend that our use of the political patronage analysis is outdated and misplaced, a contention with which we strongly disagree. The appellants urge this court to overrule Americanos and follow the approach of some other circuits, an invitation we decline to accept. Whereas this court relies on a single test in determining whether an individual is an appointee on the policymaking level, the Second Circuit, for example, applies differing approaches in First Amendment cases and in ADEA/Title VII cases. Butler v. New York State Dep't of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746-47 (2d Cir.2000) (applying the Elrod/Branti doctrine for a First Amendment analysis and drawing on Title VII statutory language and Congressional intent for a Title VII analysis). We choose, however, not to draw a distinction between how aggrieved individuals are interpreted as policymakers under the First Amendment and under the ADEA. Appellants next argue that we should focus on an employee's actual job functions and duties rather than the powers inherent in that given position when making a policymaking level determination. The appellants further contend that each held a low-level position as an Assistant State's Attorney, and they were thus not on a policymaking level. To the contrary, we held in Tomczak v. City of Chicago that a court is to examine the powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the functions performed by a particular occupant of that office. . . . [W]e emphasize[ ] the functions of the office involved, not the officeholder. Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 640-41 (7th Cir.1985). The appellants maintain that we have in other cases required an examination of the individual's actual job duties. The appellants incorrectly apply this infrequent requirement to their own case. They correctly point out that in certain very limited situations, an individual's actual job duties are more relevant to the policymaker analysis. [1] Nonetheless, we clarified the application of this standard in our analysis in Vargas-Harrison v. Racine Unified School District. In that case, we made clear that in many cases the duties and responsibilities of a particular position are clearly outlined by law; in these cases, the court may make the determination, as a matter of law, that a certain position involves policymaking. Vargas-Harrison v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 964, 972 (7th Cir.2001) (finding that the plaintiff, an elementary school principal, was a policymaker as a matter of law because school district regulations clearly provided an undisputed description of her duties and powers). We thus held that determining the powers inherent in a given office may be done without the aid of a finder of fact when the duties and responsibilities of a particular position are clearly defined by law and regulations. Id. (citing Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir. 1999)). The duties and powers inherent to State's Attorneys and Assistant State's Attorneys with regard to setting policy are well-defined by Illinois statutes and our own case law. See 55 ILCS 5/3-9005. The State's Attorney has the broad discretion to set whatever policies he or she believes necessary to protect the interests of ... society. Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir.1983). In order to carry out the office's duties, as well as set and implement policy, the State's Attorney is empowered to name assistants who when so appointed shall take the oath of office in the same manner as State's Attorneys and shall be under the supervision of the State's Attorney. 55 ILCS 5/4-2003 (2010). Therefore, with regard to Assistant State's Attorneys, we have held that [u]nder Illinois law Assistant State's Attorneys are surrogates for the State's Attorney. Assistant State's Attorneys `possess the power in the same manner and to the same effect as the State's Attorney.' McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting People v. Tobias, 125 Ill.App.3d 234, 242, 80 Ill.Dec. 496, 503, 465 N.E.2d 608, 615 (1984)). Moreover, we have determined that an Assistant State's Attorney may, in carrying out his or her duties, make some decisions that will actually create policy. Livas, 711 F.2d at 801. The appellants contend that Assistant State's Attorneys merely implement policy actions on behalf of the State's Attorney. We disagree. An Assistant State's Attorney carries out policy on behalf of the government, and in doing so has meaningful input into governmental decision-making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation. For example, an Assistant State's Attorney's decisions and actions in the courtroom are binding on the government. The State's Attorney grants an Assistant State's Attorney the authority to conduct a case in court, and, from that point, the Assistant State's Attorney acts as the State's Attorney in all respects. The Assistant State's Attorney may choose to prosecute or dismiss a case, with or without the State's Attorney's input and guidance. This alone raises Assistant State's Attorneys to the level of policymakers. Because the appellants' positions as Assistant State's Attorneys gave them inherent policymaking authority, any arguments about their actual duties are irrelevant, and we need not conduct a factual analysis of the appellants' actual job duties. Because the appellants' roles as Assistant State's Attorneys were clearly defined by statute, we find that the district court's determination as a matter of law of the policymaking status of the appellants' positions was proper.