Opinion ID: 2315285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the challenge to the inflammatory remark and the preclusion of defendant's offer of a dying declaration in response

Text: The state presented in rebuttal to defendant's alibi defense a witness named Vicky Brown. This witness was the sister of Shorty Brown of whose murder defendant had been acquitted. Vicky Brown testified that she had seen defendant in Providence at a time when according to his alibi testimony he was in Texas. During the cross-examination the following exchange took place in respect to this witness: Q. Is it fair to say you would do anything before this court and jury to see Tony Lemon convicted? MR. LEACH: Objection. THE COURT: I will allow it. Answer the question. THE WITNESS: I rather see justice done. It wasn't done with my brother getting killed, that he killed my brother. I'd rather see him walk around here and keep on going to  why not do his time? In response to this question, no motion to strike was made by defendant and no cautionary instruction was requested. It is undisputed that representatives of the state had admonished this witness not to mention her brother's murder in any way. It was the ruling of the trial justice that this prejudicial statement was elicited by the zealous cross-examination and tended to show the witness's bias toward defendant. Thereafter, defendant sought to introduce in surrebuttal witnesses who would testify to a dying declaration on the part of Shorty Brown which had not implicated defendant as one who had participated in his murder. When this request was denied, defendant moved to pass the case. This request was also denied. There seems no question that the statement concerning the killing of the witness's brother was highly prejudicial. Ordinarily, in such a situation we would consider the issue to have been preserved on appeal only in the event that a request for an appropriate cautionary instruction had been made. State v. Anil, R.I., 417 A.2d 1367, 1373 (1980); State v. Pugliese, 117 R.I. 21, 25, 362 A.2d 124, 126 (1976). Absent a timely request for cautionary instructions, this court would grant relief by a new trial only if it was determined that such request for cautionary instruction would have been futile or any attempt to palliate the prejudice would have been ineffective. State v. Anil, R.I., 417 A.2d at 1373; see State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 728, 339 A.2d 253, 255 (1975). We are not convinced that a cautionary instruction indicating that the defendant had been acquitted by a jury of the crime to which the witness had adverted would not have sufficiently blunted the prejudicial comment so that the effect would have been substantially palliated. In any event, since the case is to be retried, it is to be hoped that the same prejudicial comment will not be repeated. The fact should also not be overlooked that this statement was elicited on cross-examination, although we recognize the difficulties encountered by counsel for the defense in probing the issue of bias without touching upon the reason for such bias. However, we cannot say that a witness who has relevant testimony to offer on the issue of alibi should not be presented merely because cross-examination may be difficult. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal is sustained in part and the conviction is vacated. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.