Opinion ID: 2980598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice

Text: Jones first argues that the district court erred in its decision on February 26, 2010, denying Jones’s motion to dismiss his complaint without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 41(a)(2) motion for an abuse of discretion. DWG Corp. v. Granada Investments, Inc., 962 F.2d 1201, 1202 (6th Cir. 1992). The district court abuses its discretion when it relies on erroneous findings of fact, applies the wrong -4- No. 10-3985 Jones v. WRTA legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or makes a clear error in judgment. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Pub., Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Rule 41 governs the dismissal of civil actions, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. Rule 41(a)(2) provides that if the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal is not filed before the defendant responds, or without the defendant’s consent, then the action may be dismissed “only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). “[T]he purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to protect the nonmovant . . . from unfair treatment.” Bridgeport Music Inc., 583 F.3d at 953. In determining whether WRTA would have been unfairly treated, we must look to whether WRTA “would suffer plain legal prejudice” by dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The mere prospect of having to face a second lawsuit does not satisfy this standard. Id. Rather, we must look at “the defendant’s effort and expense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, and whether a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant.” Grover by Grover v. Eli Lilly and Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Considering the record in this case, the district court was sound in its discretion to deny Jones’s motion. -5- No. 10-3985 Jones v. WRTA All but the last factor weigh in favor of WRTA.1 The docket indicates that prior to the filing of this motion, WRTA’s counsel participated in a telephone conference, filed at least seven procedural notices, and filed two substantive documents with the district court. Between the filing of the motion to dismiss and the district court’s decision, WRTA’s counsel filed an additional twelve procedural notices and three substantive documents. Jones does not dispute this, but instead states that WRTA’s filings are completed in nearly all civil cases, and are not, by themselves, enough to satisfy this first factor. This argument is not without merit, though it is not ultimately successful. If WRTA’s expended efforts could have been applied in a subsequent Ohio action, this factor would be Jones’s to claim. But, WRTA’s efforts were calibrated to defend against state and federal discrimination claims. As Jones’s own motion to dismiss alludes to bringing suit in Ohio courts under negligence, fiduciary duty, and contract theories, and abandoning all federal claims that had been previously presented, little to none of WRTA’s work could be salvaged. See Rosenthal v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 217 F. App’x 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding the district court’s grant of a Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss because much of the defendants’ effort and expense would be useful in a subsequent state action). 1 The district court weighed the final factor, whether the defendant had filed a motion for summary judgment, in favor of WRTA because WRTA had already started preparing a motion for summary judgment. Because the other factors all weigh soundly in WRTA’s favor, we need not reach the question of whether the preparation of a motion for summary judgment, as opposed to the filing of that motion, satisfies the last factor of the Grover by Grover test. -6- No. 10-3985 Jones v. WRTA The district court also noted that WRTA had been required to file, on more than one occasion, documentation to resolve discovery disputes, suggesting that Jones was dilatory in prosecuting his action. While the record prior to the filing is not clear on this point, Jones does not dispute the district court’s statements, arguing only that his decision to delay taking depositions was perhaps strategic. Yet, the new information that allegedly informed Jones’s decision to file the motion to dismiss was not new; it was made known to him at a November meeting with WRTA. Rather than filing his motion to dismiss immediately, he waited three months, and eventually only filed the motion because a looming discovery deadline was about to pass. This factor, too, weighs against Jones. Finally, Jones expressed no clear reasoning as to why the dismissal was needed. The motion, while lacking in clarity, essentially concedes that his federal claims have no merit. In fact, the only substantive discussion supporting a grant of the motion is that doing so “would be in the substantial interest of justice and judicial economy . . . .” Given the dearth of reasoning by Jones, the effort expended by WRTA in defending itself, and Jones’s dilatoriness, the district court in no way abused its discretion in denying Jones’s motion to dismiss.