Opinion ID: 1863488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Ryan's Testimony

Text: [24, 25] ¶ 75. Mental distress damages caused by an accident in which the plaintiff suffers physical injury are compensable. Rennick v. Fruehauf Corp., 82 Wis. 2d 793, 804-05, 264 N.W.2d 264 (1978). Damages for a specific species of mental distress, fear of possible future surgery, are compensable. Brantner v. Jenson, 121 Wis. 2d 658, 360 N.W.2d 529 (1985). Brantner is the leading case on this subject. In Brantner, the defendant contended that the circuit court should not have allowed the plaintiff and his surgeon to testify regarding possible future back surgery because the plaintiff did not prove to a reasonable degree of medical probability that his injury would require surgery. Id. at 665. ¶ 76. In Brantner, the plaintiff suffered a back injury as a result of an automobile accident. Id. at 661. The plaintiff's physician prescribed back exercises and a back brace to minimize pain. Id. The physician also advised the plaintiff his injury might require surgery if these techniques did not relieve the pain and keep him working. Id. at 661-62. At subsequent visits with the physician the plaintiff continued to report pain; the physician advised the plaintiff that if pain continued and interrupted his ability to work or live comfortably, surgery might be required. Id. at 662. ¶ 77. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages for past, present, and future mental distress relating to possible future back surgery. Id. at 660. The plaintiff's surgeon testified he had discussed the operation, recovery time, risks, chances of success and possible subsequent disability with the plaintiff on numerous occasions. Id. at 662. The plaintiff testified as to these conversations, as well as a conversation he had with his father concerning back surgery. Id. at 660. The defendant argued, however, that neither the physician nor the plaintiff properly testified because the plaintiff did not prove to a reasonable degree of medical probability that he will require the back surgery in the future. Id. at 665. ¶ 78. This court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals favoring the plaintiff, Brantner. The court stated: We conclude that fear of surgery may be reasonably certain, even though there is no certainty that surgery will occur and even though the physician cannot testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the consequence feared will occur. ...A doctor's realistic prediction as to the possibility of future surgery, illness or disability may give rise to reasonable fear and anxiety in the victim concerning his or her future health and well-being. . . . . ...Although the surgeon was not able to testify that back surgery was reasonably probable in the future, the disclosure of the realistic possibility of back surgery as a natural consequence of the injuries under the facts of this case is sufficient to enable a jury to find to a reasonable certainty that the plaintiff has sustained, and will sustain, mental distress as a result of the defendant's negligent conduct. Id. at 666-67 (footnote omitted). The Brantner court discussed a two-part test employed by the court of appeals in that litigation, but it did not explicitly adopt the test. Id. at 668-69 (analyzing Brantner v. Jenson, 120 Wis. 2d 63, 66-67, 352 N.W.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1984)). ¶ 79. The Brantner court qualified its recognition of the relevance of a plaintiff's evidence regarding possible future consequences, however. That is, fear of future surgery is not reasonably certain and a defendant would not be liable for damages for mental distress when a medical witness describes to the victim or to the jury remotely conceivable complications which may develop from the physical injury caused by the defendant's negligence. Anxiety about a fictitious or imagined or highly unlikely consequence is not a recoverable element. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974). Liability ceases at a point dictated by public policy and common sense. Wilson v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 310, 325, 274 N.W.2d 679 (1979) (quoting Justice Hansen's concurrence in Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc. ). Id. at 666-67. Applying the Brantner test here, if the evidence proffered by Martindale describes remotely conceivable complications from the possible surgery that he faced, he cannot recover for fear of those complications. ¶ 80. The circuit court allowed testimony by Dr. Ryan about the option of TMJ surgery on Martindale. Dr. Ryan first rated the chances of success at 85% for repair to the discs in his TMJ's and 75% for disc removal. In addition, moments after this assessment, Dr. Ryan rated the chances of success at 85% for Martindale's right side and 75% for his left side, although he did not indicate the procedure about which he was talking. The circuit court permitted this evidence over objections from the City based on Brantner. ¶ 81. Martindale, however, complains of the exclusion of testimony and exhibits relating to his alleged fear of possible future surgery that the circuit court did exclude. The exclusions by the circuit court included testimony by Dr. Ryan that he probably discussed all the potential complications of TMJ surgery with Martindale. The circuit court also excluded two exhibits that Dr. Ryan discussed during his deposition testimony. The first exhibit was entitled Post-Operative Complications. The second exhibit also related to post-operative complications. ¶ 82. At trial, the circuit court also ruled that Martindale himself could not testify regarding the possible complications of TMJ surgery. Martindale's counsel sought to elicit testimony from Martindale about the risks of surgery that he heard from Dr. Ryan and the risks of complications that he learned from the internet. [26] ¶ 83. In Brantner, this court considered whether a plaintiff has to prove to a reasonable certainty that his or her injury would require surgery in the future. This court answered that inquiry negatively, indicating that a plaintiff must prove to a reasonable certainty that he or she has a fear of surgery; a plaintiff need not prove to a reasonable certainty that he or she will need surgery. The plaintiff must do two things, however, in order to advance a claim for fear of future surgery: (1) The plaintiff must establish a reasonable fear of the possibility of future surgery, which according to Brantner may be accomplished with a doctor's realistic prediction as to the possibility of future surgery; and (2) the plaintiff may not present evidence of fear of future surgery if the evidence relates to remotely conceivable complications or a fictitious or imagined or highly unlikely consequence. Brantner, 121 Wis. 2d at 666-67. ¶ 84. This case requires an additional analytical step. The dispute here requires us to decide if, after a circuit court decides that a plaintiff may testify concerning his or her fear of surgery, the court may thereafter exclude testimony by the plaintiff and a medical witness about the specific possible complications of surgery. ¶ 85. Despite this extra analytical step, Brantner provides all the guidance this court needs in analyzing whether the circuit court made a sustainable use of discretion. Brantner said that a plaintiff cannot recover for damages for mental distress when a medical witness describes to the victim or to the jury remotely conceivable complications which may develop from the physical injury caused by the defendant's negligence. Brantner, 121 Wis. 2d at 666-67 (emphasis added). [27] ¶ 86. We must be mindful that our inquiry does not rest on what we would have done in the circuit court's position, but instead on whether a reasonable judge could make the same decision. Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d at 464. When the circuit court ruled that Dr. Ryan could not testify regarding potential complications, it stated that Martindale could get in the possibility of success [of surgery], but not impossible complications if surgery is had. We read this statement by the circuit court to mean the plaintiff had not offered sufficient evidence to show such complications were more than remotely conceivable, if conceivable at all. This reading of the record is supported by the numerous references the circuit court made to the possibility of complications from the surgery. ¶ 87. Martindale, however, takes issue with the circuit court's seemingly interchangeable use of words to describe the standard required of Dr. Ryan's testimony about the complications of surgery. The circuit court used the words reasonable probability, reasonable possibility, what complications might occur, complications that might result, and impossible complications, when it ruled that Dr. Ryan could not testify about the complications of potential future surgery. ¶ 88. Notwithstanding the inconsistent terminology used by the circuit court, it is apparent based on our reading of the record that the circuit court determined Martindale had not shown that the potential complications were anything more than remotely conceivable. We conclude the circuit court had a reasonable basis to make this decision because the record is devoid of any evidence from any qualified witness about the likelihood of any complications if surgery did occur. Dr. Ryan's statement in which he rated the chances of success of surgery is insufficient by itself to show that complications were not just remotely conceivable. Certainly, the surgery could be deemed a success, but also entail complications. ¶ 89. Had Martindale presented Dr. Ryan's realistic prediction as to the possibility of future surgery, and evidence that complications were more than remotely conceivable, we would be compelled to find the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. Brantner, 121 Wis. 2d at 666. This simply did not occur. [28] ¶ 90. The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the testimony of the doctor on potential complications on the basis that remotely conceivable complications do not give rise to damages for fear of possible future surgery. Accordingly, we also conclude the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the exhibits relating to post-operative complications and this excluded testimony.