Opinion ID: 3208719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Simpson’s Miranda claims.

Text: Howes compels a different resolution of certain aspects of Simpson’s case, but not a different end result. We affirm, on different grounds, the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief. In light of the totality of circumstances surrounding Simpson’s April 24 and April 27 jailhouse interrogations, no clearly established federal law confirms that they were custodial. Thus, Simpson’s Miranda claims as to his two April statements fail. However, Howes does not change the 2010 panel’s conclusion that Simpson’s June 20 statement was obtained and admitted against him in violation of Miranda. The Warden has made no argument to the contrary. Because the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was not harmless error, we reach the same result as the district court on remand: we vacate Simpson’s convictions for aggravated murder, murder, and attempted murder.2 1. Under Howes, Simpson’s April 24 and April 27 statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda, because he was not in custody when he made those statements. The district court erred on remand. We read Howes as confirming that Simpson was not in custody during his April 24 or April 27 interrogations. Thus, Kallay and Ozbolt were not required to Mirandize Simpson on either date. Simpson’s Miranda claims as to these two statements fail. 2 Simpson does not challenge the 2010 panel’s conclusion that his June 16 statement was admitted properly against him. 18 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. a. Simpson’s April 24 interrogation was non-custodial. The Ohio Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law when it held that Simpson was not in custody on April 24. The thrust of Howes is that “a prisoner is [not] always in custody for purposes of Miranda whenever a prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct outside the prison.” Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1188–89; see also Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010) (“[L]awful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in Miranda.”). Rather, whether a prisoner in that situation is “in custody” depends on a Miranda totality-of-thecircumstances analysis. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189. Because some factors suggest that Simpson was in custody on April 24, and others do not, AEDPA bars us from granting Simpson relief on this claim. Howes identified a number of factors relevant to the question whether a prisoner is “in custody” when he is interrogated in prison. As an “initial step,” this questions turns on whether a reasonable person in the prisoner’s position would have felt free to leave the interrogation, an inquiry that includes factors such as:

4. “[T]he presence or absence of physical restraints”; and 5. “[T]he release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” 19 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. Id. However, “standard conditions of confinement and associated restrictions on freedom”—i.e., the conditions and restrictions that attend prisoners’ daily lives—do not automatically render prison interrogations custodial. Id. at 1190–91. Howes gave three reasons why this is so: (1) “questioning a person who is already serving a prison term does not generally involve the shock that very often accompanies arrest”; (2) “a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release”; and (3) “a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted and sentenced, knows that the law enforcement officers who question him probably lack the authority to affect the duration of his sentence.” Id. Some of the factors Howes listed suggest that Simpson was in custody on April 24, and others do not. We see two strong arguments in Simpson’s favor. First, Kallay and Ozbolt never told Simpson that he could end the interview. See Supp. Br. of Resp.-Appellee (6th Cir. 083224, July 26, 2012) at 23 (“Simpson is also correct that the failure of the police to inform him he could stop the interview also weighs in favor of finding custody.”). Howes cited the fact that Fields’s interrogators told Fields that he could leave his interrogation as the “[m]ost important” factor suggesting that Fields’s jailhouse interview was non-custodial. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1193; see id. at 1194 (emphasizing “undisputed fact that respondent was told that he was free to end the questioning and to return to his cell”). That Kallay and Ozbolt never told Simpson he could leave the conference room strongly suggests that “a reasonable person” in Simpson’s position 20 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. would not have felt “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). Second, contrary to the hypothetical prison-interview scenarios Howes envisioned, Simpson knew that Kallay and Ozbolt could get him out of prison. They promised him as much: the officers told Simpson that they would secure his early release if he gave them information about the arson. Unlike the typical inmate Howes pictured, Simpson was likely “lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release,” Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1191—a longing strengthened by the then-recent birth of Simpson’s child. On the other hand, some of the Howes factors suggest that Simpson was not in custody on April 24. For one, the interview was short: it lasted less than an hour. Cf. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1193 (five-to-seven-hour prison interview that “continued well past the hour when respondent generally went to bed” was non-custodial); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437–38 (1984) (routine traffic stops are non-custodial because they are “presumptively temporary and brief”). Nor was Simpson physically restrained: we have read nothing in the record suggesting that Simpson was handcuffed or otherwise restrained when he spoke with Kallay and Ozbolt on April 24. See Simpson Br. at 26 n.5; cf. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (respondent was in custody when police officers handcuffed and surrounded him). Moreover, during the April 24 interrogation (and unlike the two June interrogations), Kallay and Ozbolt didn’t use aggressive questioning tactics: at that point, the officers didn’t consider Simpson a suspect, and they were trying to convince Simpson to cooperate with their arson investigation. Cf. Stansbury 21 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (although officers’ statements to suspects are relevant to custody analysis, “[e]ven a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue”). The upshot of these opposing factors is this: although Howes gives us good reason to conclude that Simpson was in custody on April 24, AEDPA requires more. The Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting Simpson’s Miranda claim was not an unreasonable application of federal law if “‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of [that] decision.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). AEDPA’s bar to relief applies with even greater force where, as here, we are evaluating a state-court decision that applied a flexible, fact-specific rule. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 776 (“‘[T]he more general the rule’ at issue—and thus the greater the potential for reasoned disagreement among fair-minded judges—‘the more leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664)). Because fairminded jurists could debate whether Simpson was in custody on April 24, we hold that the Ohio Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law when it held that Simpson was not in custody during his interrogation on that date. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. b. Simpson’s April 27 statement was also non-custodial. Likewise, the Ohio Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law when it held that Simpson was not in custody on April 27. The 2010 panel analyzed both April statements jointly when it considered whether they were inadmissible under Miranda. Simpson, 615 F.3d at 439–42. This approach is problematic because Howes requires more: whether Simpson was in 22 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. custody on April 27 is a fact-specific question that merits independent analysis. Relatedly, the original panel’s opinion could be read as adopting a rule that Howes disclaimed: that under Mathis and Miranda, a prisoner who is interrogated about an offense that took place “outside the prison walls” is categorically in custody. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1188. Looking to the totality of circumstances surrounding Simpson’s April 27 interview—as Howes instructs—we cannot say it would be unreasonable to hold that he was not in custody. Like the April 24 interrogation, some parts of the April 27 interrogation support Simpson’s argument that he was in custody, and some cut the other way. Among the factors supporting custody are: (1) Kallay and Ozbolt never told Simpson that he could end the April 27 interrogation, see Supp. Br. of Resp.-Appellee (6th Cir. 08-3224, July 26, 2012) at 30; and (2) Simpson was in the infirmary when he spoke to the officers on April 27, which suggests that he felt unable (or, perhaps, was unable) to walk away. On the other hand: (1) the interview lasted about thirty minutes (i.e., half the length of Simpson’s April 24 interview); and (2) Kallay and Ozbolt were still attempting to persuade Simpson to cooperate with their investigation, and thus did not aggressively question Simpson. In sum, whether Simpson was in custody on April 27 is fairly debatable. For that reason, we conclude that this claim does not warrant habeas relief. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. 2. Howes does not alter the 2010 panel’s conclusion that Simpson’s June 20 statement was admitted in violation of Miranda, and the trial court’s admission of this statement against Simpson was not harmless. That leaves Simpson’s June 20 statement. Because we hold that Simpson’s April 24 and April 27 statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda, whether Simpson deserves 23 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. habeas relief depends on two questions. First, does Howes alter the 2010 panel’s conclusion that Simpson’s June 20 statement was admitted against Simpson in violation of Miranda? Second, if Simpson’s June 20 statement was inadmissible, was its admission harmless? We answer “no” to both questions. Howes does not alter the 2010 panel’s analysis of Simpson’s June 20 statement: that statement was obtained in violation of Miranda, and the Warden makes no argument to the contrary. We are also satisfied that the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was not harmless as to Simpson’s convictions for the three specific-intent crimes of which he was found guilty: aggravated murder, murder, and attempted murder. We thus vacate Simpson’s convictions for those three offenses. a. Simpson’s June 20 statement was inadmissible under Miranda. For two reasons, we do not believe that Howes changes the 2010 panel’s conclusion that Simpson’s June 20 statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. First, Howes does not speak to the Miranda issue that Simpson’s June 20 statement raises. Second, the Warden has not argued on appeal that Simpson’s June 20 statement was admissible—under Howes or otherwise. For both reasons, we hold that Simpson’s June 20 statement was obtained and admitted against Simpson in violation of Miranda. To begin, Howes does not address the dispositive Miranda issue that Simpson’s June 20 statement implicates. Howes concerns the circumstances in which a prisoner may be considered “in custody” under Miranda. However, neither party disputes that Simpson was in custody on June 20; indeed, Walker gave Simpson a Miranda waiver form during the interrogation. Rather, the key issue—and the reason the prior panel found constitutional error—was that Walker 24 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. impermissibly discouraged Simpson from exercising his Miranda-guaranteed right to counsel. See Simpson, 615 F.3d at 436–39; R. 86 (11/10/14 R. & R. at 17) (Page ID #4295). Moreover, Howes speaks to interrogations that occur in prison. Simpson, however, was not in prison on June 20—he gave his statement at a Columbus police station. Howes thus does not change the 2010 panel’s conclusion that Simpson’s June 20 statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. The Warden appears to agree. Supp. Br. of Resp.-Appellee (6th Cir. 08-3224, July 26, 2012) at 40 (“[T]his Court’s decision in Simpson, and everything in it, remains correct, except what must be reexamined in light of Fields. Fields, of course, concerns how Miranda custody applies to a prisoner, a matter that only applies to the April interviews.”). Before the district court on remand, the Warden argued that Simpson’s June 20 confession was voluntary and that Walker did not improperly dissuade Simpson from invoking his right to counsel. R. 83 (Resp’t’s Br. in Response to Pet’r’s Supp. Br. at 22–27 (Page ID #4181–86); R. 91 (Resp’t Warden’s Response to Pet’r’s Obj. to R&R at 3) (Page ID #4363). On appeal, however, the Warden’s sole argument concerning Simpson’s June 20 statement is that the trial court’s admission of that statement was harmless. Resp.-Appellant’s Merit Br. at 32–33; Resp.-Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6–9. The Warden thus gives us no reason to question our conclusion that, even in light of Howes, Simpson’s June 20 statement was inadmissible under Miranda b. The trial court’s erroneous admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was not harmless. Although Howes does not change the 2010 panel’s conclusion that Simpson’s June 20 statement was admitted in violation of Miranda, it does change our harmless-error calculus. 25 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. Because the 2010 panel determined that three of Simpson’s statements were obtained in violation of Miranda—those on April 24, April 27, and June 20—it evaluated their cumulative prejudicial effect when it assessed whether their admission was harmless. Simpson, 615 F.3d at 442–45. Under Howes, however, Simpson’s April 24 and April 27 statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda. That narrows our harmless-error inquiry: was the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement—standing alone—harmless error as to Simpson’s convictions for aggravated murder, murder, and attempted murder? We answer that question: “no.” Before explaining why, a note about harmless error and our standard of review. When the last-reasoned state-court decision in a habeas case analyzes a petitioner’s constitutional claims for harmless error, “a federal court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007)); see id. at 2198 (“[T]he Brecht standard ‘subsumes’ the requirements that § 2254(d) imposes when a federal habeas petitioner contests a state court’s [harmlessness] determination . . . .”). The Ohio Court of Appeals determined that any error in admitting Simpson’s two April statements was harmless. However, that court did not address whether the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was harmless error. We thus assess the harmlessness of Simpson’s June 20 statement under Brecht, not Brecht viewed through the prism of § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 2197–99. To recap: under that standard, Simpson is “not entitled to habeas relief . . . unless [he] can establish that” the trial court’s 26 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. admission of his June 20 statement “resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. at 2197 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). For two reasons, we hold that the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was not harmless under Brecht. First, the Warden waived this harmless-error argument. Second, even if the Warden did not waive this harmless-error defense, it fails: the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was not harmless as to Simpson’s convictions for aggravated murder, murder, and attempted murder. We thus vacate Simpson’s convictions for those three offenses, reaching the same result but for different reasons than those of the 2010 panel. (1) The Warden waived the argument that the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was harmless error. The Warden waived the argument that Simpson’s June 20 statement was harmless. “[T]he harmless error defense can be waived.” Lovins v. Parker, 712 F.3d 283, 303 (6th Cir. 2013); see Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 31.2[a] (6th ed. 2011) (“Like other defenses to habeas corpus relief, the ‘harmless error’ obstacle does not arise unless the state asserts it; the state’s failure to do so in a timely and unequivocal fashion waives the defense.”). But see Gover v. Perry, 698 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2012) (when entertaining habeas petition, “this court has discretion to consider harmlessness sua sponte when reviewing for constitutional error”). Just so here: by failing to raise the issue below, the Warden waived the argument that admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was harmless error. 27 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. In the most recent round of briefs before this court, the Warden argues—for the first time—that the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was harmless error. Resp.-Appellant’s Merit Br. at 32–33. The Warden did not make this argument in response to Simpson’s initial habeas petition. R. 9 (Resp.’s Answer/Return of Writ) (Page ID #27). Nor did the Warden raise this harmless-error argument during the first round of briefs before this court. Br. of Resp’t-Appellee (6th Cir. 08-3224, June 23, 2009). Indeed, at oral argument in April 2010, counsel for the Warden conceded that the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 16 and 20 statements were not harmless. Simpson Supp. Br. (6th Cir. 08-3224, July 12, 2012), Addendum at 32a–33a. On remand, the Warden argued—in cursory, conclusory fashion—that admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was harmless. R. 83 (Resp’t’s Br. in Response to Pet’r’s Supp. Br. at 31–32 (Page ID #4190–91); R. 91 (Resp’t Warden’s Response to Pet’r’s Obj. to R&R at 2–3, 8) (Page ID #4362–63, 4368). “[S]uch a perfunctory discussion of harmless error” is insufficient to preserve this argument. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2006). The Warden thus waived the argument that the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was harmless. (2) Simpson’s June 20 statement was not harmless. Even if the Warden had not waived this harmless-error argument, it would fail on the merits: the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement was not harmless.3 “For 3 Simpson makes this argument—that the trial court’s admission of his June 20 statement, standing alone, merits habeas relief—in his brief, but the Warden argues that Simpson waived it. Simpson Br. at 44–56; Warden 28 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. reasons of finality, comity, and federalism,” Simpson is “not entitled to habeas relief” unless the trial court’s admission of his June 20 statement actually prejudiced him. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). In evaluating whether Simpson has satisfied Brecht, our “‘inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result’” of Simpson’s trial “apart from the phase affected by the error.” O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 438 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). “It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.’” Id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765). Simpson has satisfied Brecht. We have, at minimum, “grave doubt about whether” the trial court’s erroneous admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement “had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict’”—insofar as that verdict pronounced Simpson guilty of aggravated murder, murder, and attempted murder. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197– 98 (quoting O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436). Examining the elements of those three crimes in light of the admissible evidence that Simpson’s jury received makes this plain. Simpson’s trial judge instructed Simpson’s jury that in order to convict Simpson of aggravated murder, murder, or attempted murder, they would have to determine that Simpson purposefully killed (or attempted to kill) the occupants of 151 South Wheatland Avenue. R. 7913 (Trial Tr. (5/31/01) at 82:24–83:4, 89:4–8, 90:5–7, 91:7–14, 95:12–15, 96:14–19) (Page ID #3802–03, 3809, 3810, 3811, 3815, 3816). Here is how the judge defined “purpose”: Reply Br. at 6–9. The Warden is incorrect. Simpson made this argument in his two briefs to the district court on remand. R. 80 (Pet’r’s Supp. Br at 15–23) (Page ID #4138–46); R. 84 (Pet’r’s Supp. Reply Br. at 3–15) (Page ID #4202–14). Simpson did not waive this argument—he preserved it. 29 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result. . . . Purpose is further defined as a decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious objective of producing a specific result. To do an act purposely is to do it intentionally and not accidentally. Purpose and intent mean the same thing. The purpose with which a person does an act is known only to himself, unless he expresses it to others or indicates it by his conduct. Moreover, the purpose with which a person does an act may be determined from the manner in which it is done, the means used and all of the other facts and circumstances in evidence. Id. at 83:7–24 (Page ID #3803); see id. at 91:17–92:13 (Page ID #3811–12). Under that definition of purpose, Simpson’s jury could not convict Simpson of aggravated murder, murder, or attempted murder unless it found—beyond a reasonable doubt—that Simpson specifically intended to murder the six people inside 151 South Wheatland. Assuming that Simpson’s April 24 and April 27 statements were constitutionally obtained, just five pieces of admissible evidence tied Simpson to the arson: 1. Simpson’s April 24 statement, in which he laid blame for the arson on Smith and Kelly; 2. Simpson’s April 27 statement, in which he reiterated the account he gave Kallay and Ozbolt on April 24; 3. Simpson’s June 16 statement, in which Simpson (a) admitted to Kallay and Ozbolt that he drove Kelly close to the scene of the crime and that Kelly assembled a Molotov cocktail during the ride, but (b) maintained that he had no idea that Kelly planned to burn down 151 South Wheatland; 4. A statement that a sheriff’s deputy overheard Simpson make in jail: “[W]hy didn’t they charge the bitch too. It was her idea to start the fire.”; and 5. A statement Simpson allegedly made to a fellow inmate that he was one of three people involved in the arson, and that the arson involved Molotov cocktails. 30 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. That is thin evidence of Simpson’s specific intent to kill anyone inside 151 South Wheatland Avenue. No physical evidence inculpated Simpson. No eyewitnesses testified against him. The only evidence the state introduced against Simpson were his own statements. And one of those statements—June 20—was the centerpiece of the prosecution’s theory of the case: that Simpson purposefully helped start the fire at 151 South Wheatland. R. 79-13 (Trial Tr. at 14:3–11, 62:9– 63:22 (Page ID #3733, 3782–83). We think it clear why Simpson’s June 20 statement was so critical to the state’s case. It was not until June 20 that Simpson admitted that he knew—a week in advance—that Smith and Kelly planned to start the fire. That is powerful evidence that Simpson had the specific intent to kill the occupants of 151 South Wheatland when he drove Kelly, who assembled a Molotov cocktail during the ride, to the scene of the crime. Put simply, we are confident that the trial court’s decision to admit Simpson’s June 20 statement “had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436). On remand, the magistrate judge rejected Simpson’s argument that the trial court’s admission of his June 20 statement, alone, merits habeas relief. R. 86 (11/10/14 R. & R. at 18– 19) (Page ID #4296–97). The magistrate judge reasoned that the 2010 panel’s decision “explicitly rejects” that claim. Id. at 19 (Page ID #4297). We disagree. The 2010 panel concluded that the April 24, April 27, and June 20 statements were not harmless because (1) Simpson’s June 20 statement established that he was involved directly with the arson, and 31 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. (2) his April 24 and April 27 statements undermined his credibility, which the prosecution used “in support of its theory that Simpson shared Kelly’s intent and purpose.” Simpson, 615 F.3d at 444. The 2010 panel wrote: [E]ven in the June 20th statement, Simpson still maintained that he had not been involved in the planning of the arson or in making the Molotov cocktails, and had no intent to kill anyone. Thus, to prove that Simpson acted with the purpose of causing the death of another, the State needed something more than Simpson’s own admissions. Creatively, the State turned to Simpson’s April denials to prove this element. Id. at 442. That reasoning does not foreclose Simpson’s argument about the stand-alone prejudice of his June 20 statement. The 2010 panel concluded that three of Simpson’s statements were admitted in error; it is logical that the panel would consider their cumulative prejudicial effect on Simpson’s trial. The GVR order, however, does not require this panel to adhere to that reasoning. Indeed, adopting wholesale the 2010 panel’s harmless-error analysis would be impossible, given that Howes fundamentally changes the merits of Simpson’s Miranda arguments by confirming that his April 24 and April 27 statements were not admitted erroneously. In any event, we are satisfied that the trial court’s admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement, standing alone, was not harmless. The Ohio Court of Appeals put this issue well: “Without question, the most incriminating evidence presented against [Simpson] at trial were his own statements.” R. 78-1 (7/23/02 Ohio Ct. App. Op. ¶ 19) (Page ID #816). And one statement stands above the rest: Simpson’s June 20 statement, in which Simpson admitted that he knew that Smith and Kelly were planning to commit arson well before he drove Kelly to the scene of the crime. Removing 32 No. 15-3260 Simpson v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst. that statement from the trial record leaves virtually no evidence tending to show that Simpson acted with murderous intent when he drove Kelly to 151 South Wheatland Avenue. That gives us “grave doubt” about the prejudicial effect of the trial court’s erroneous admission of Simpson’s June 20 statement. We thus affirm the district court’s judgment vacating Simpson’s three specific-intent convictions: aggravated murder, murder, and attempted murder.