Opinion ID: 1929368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Judgment As a Matter of Law On Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim

Text: The trial justice, in granting the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Flanagans' negligence claim, stated: As to the count alleging medical negligence, the Court has already ruled that the testimony of the proffered expert, Dr. Brand, is to be excluded for reasons that I elaborated upon this morning. Based upon that exclusion, the count for bad medicine must fall, and the motion is granted relative to that count. The trial justice's reference to her earlier exclusion of the proffered deposition testimony of Dr. Brand was based upon the absence in the deposition of any testimony by the doctor that he was familiar with the standard of care applicable to pediatric surgeons practicing in Rhode Island. At the time of the trial justice's ruling it is understandable that she of course could not have been aware of our recent holding in Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital, 710 A.2d 161 (R.I.1998), decided after the Flanagans' trial. In Sheeley, we joined the growing number of jurisdictions that have done away with the same or similar community standard of care test and have adopted instead the rule requiring a medical doctor to use the same degree of care and skill expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which he or she belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances. Id., at 167. Even though the trial justice's ruling predated our holding in Sheeley, we conclude that the trial justice nonetheless erred in excluding the entire deposition testimony of Dr. Brand. In his deposition Dr. Brand had testified in part that if a surgeon, any surgeon were to perform a cervical lymph node biopsy without paying attention to the presence of the nerve and thus injured it, if one wasif a surgeon was not paying attention to the presence of the nerve and thus injured it, whether by lack of knowledge of its presence or inattention to the safe conduct of the procedure, that would be a deviation from the standard of care. (Emphasis added.) The competency or expert qualifications of Dr. Brand were never questioned by the trial justice. Accordingly, rather than have relied exclusively upon our earlier case holdings in Richardson v. Fuchs, 523 A.2d 445 (R.I. 1987); Young v. Park, 417 A.2d 889 (R.I. 1980); and Schenck v. Roger Williams General Hospital, 119 R.I. 510, 382 A.2d 514 (1977), the trial justice should have considered the admissibility of Dr. Brand's testimony in light of G.L.1956 § 9-19-41 and Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 702, that became effective October 1, 1987, provides: Testimony by experts.If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion. By virtue of § 9-19-42, Rule 702 took precedence over any statutory or case law in effect at the time of its adoption that was inconsistent with the Rhode Island [Mules of [E]vidence. Rule 702 effectively has served to trump Richardson, Young, and Schenck, all relied upon by the trial justice for her exclusion of Dr. Brand's deposition testimony. We believe that Dr. Brand's deposition testimony would certainly have been of assistance to the jury on both the Flanagans' claim for negligence as well as with regard their failure to inform claim. His board certifications and his extensive knowledge, skill, and experience in pediatric surgery should have presumptively permitted his deposition testimony in the form of both fact and opinion to be admitted at trial. Marshall v. Medical Associates of Rhode Island, Inc., 677 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I.1996); R.I. R.Evid. 702; § 9-19-41, 42; Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L.Rev. 414 (1952). We conclude that the trial justice erred in excluding Dr. Brand's deposition testimony [1] and that this error resulted directly in the improper granting of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the Flanagans' claim of negligence.