Opinion ID: 71897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 17 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) provides criminal defendants with ten days to appeal following entry of the relevant judgment or order in the district court. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(b). If Rule 4(b) applies to this case, Brown's appeal was filed twelve days too late. 18 Brown contends that Rule 4(b) does not govern this case. Instead, he argues that his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis should be construed as a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. So construed, his appeal was timely filed, because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides inmates with sixty days to appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a). 19 We agree that Brown's coram nobis petition must be construed as a § 2255 motion. The writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary writ, limited to cases in which no statutory remedy is available or adequate. Lowery v. United States, 956 F.2d 227, 228-29 (11th Cir.1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As we have previously held, an available statutory habeas remedy precludes coram nobis relief. Id. If Brown was in custody within the meaning of § 2255 when he filed his appeal, then the statutory remedies of that provision were available to him, and coram nobis relief was unavailable as a matter of law. 20 When Brown filed his appeal, he was still serving the supervised release portion of his sentence. Although Brown was not physically in prison when his appeal was filed, he was still subject to the restrictions on liberty that accompany a term of supervised release. Supervised release carries with it the possibility of revocation and additional jail time. Therefore, we conclude that, as a person serving a term of supervised release, Brown was in custody within the meaning of § 2255 when he filed his petition in the district court. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240-43, 83 S.Ct. 373, 376-77, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (holding that paroled prisoner is in custody when the terms of his release impose significant restraints on petitioner's liberty because of his conviction and sentence, which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon the public generally); United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 970 n. 3 (3d Cir.1993) (holding expressly that supervised release satisfies the in custody requirement of § 2255); see also Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 886 n. 2 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that a habeas appeal does not become moot merely because a prisoner is released from physical confinement to serve a term of supervised release, because supervised release is part of the sentence and carries liberty restrictions with it); Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 193 (7th Cir.1995) (same). 3 21 Because Brown was in custody within the meaning of § 2255 when he filed his petition in the district court, coram nobis relief was unavailable to him, and § 2255 was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, the question simplifies to whether Brown's petition should be treated as a § 2255 motion, despite the label that he attached to it. We readily conclude that it should be. Under well-settled principles in this circuit, pro se applications for post-conviction relief are to be liberally construed. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 834 (11th Cir.1991); Allen v. United States, 634 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan.1981). We have already held that pleadings erroneously styled as coram nobis petitions should be treated as § 2255 motions, and vice versa. See Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1536 (11th Cir.1985) (construing coram nobis petition as § 2255 motion); Scarborough v. United States, 683 F.2d 1323, 1324 (11th Cir.1982) (same); Granville v. United States, 613 F.2d 125, 126 n. 1 (5th Cir.1980) (construing § 2255 motion as coram nobis petition); Carbo v. United States, 581 F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1978) (same). 4 22 Accordingly, we construe Brown's coram nobis petition to be a § 2255 motion. As such, his appeal from the denial of relief was timely filed. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a). We do have jurisdiction to decide this appeal and turn now to the merits.