Opinion ID: 2548767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the post-conviction court erred by sua sponte granting summary judgment on two of kell's claims, but the error is harmless

Text: ¶ 45 In the State's motion for dismissal and summary judgment, the State moved to dismiss Kell's Amended Petition. In support of its motion, the State filed a memorandum in support that spanned more than 100 pages and addressed each of Kell's claims individually. However, in an apparent oversight, the State failed to specifically address two of Kell's claims: claim 17(b) and claim 18(b). [15] The post-conviction court recognized the omissions, but concluded that it was perhaps ... an oversight by the State and entered summary judgment in favor of the State on these two claims. ¶ 46 It is error for a trial court to sua sponte grant summary judgment on an issue when neither party has sought summary judgment on that issue. However, on appeal, such sua sponte grants of summary judgment will not constitute grounds for reversal unless the losing party demonstrates that it was prejudiced by the grant of summary judgment. ¶ 47 Under rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, either party may move for summary judgment in its favor upon all or any part of a claim. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1180-81 (Utah 1993); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a), (b). The scope of a summary judgment motion is determined by the moving party, who may move for judgment upon all or less than all of the issues raised by the complaint and answer. Timm, 851 P.2d at 1181. Once the moving party has determined the scope of the motion for summary judgment, rule 56 contemplates that a written motion shall be served on the opposite party setting forth with clarity the relief sought by the motion so that the opposite party may prepare to defend against it if he or she chooses to do so. Id. The court shall then grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). ¶ 48 Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, we generally require strict compliance with the rules governing summary judgment. Timm, 851 P.2d at 1181. However, a grant of summary judgment without strict compliance may be allowed when the error is shown to be harmless. Id. An error is considered harmless when it is `sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.' Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)). ¶ 49 Under the rules for summary judgment, only parties to the case may define the scope of a summary judgment motion. In this case, since neither party moved for summary judgment on claims 17(b) and 18(b) in accordance with rule 56, the court was not strictly complying with the procedural rules for summary judgment. The court therefore erred when it sua sponte entered summary judgment in favor of the State on the two claims. The proper course of action for the court would have been to notify the State of the apparent oversight. The State could have then filed an amended or additional motion to cover all of Kell's claims, and Kell would have had a chance to respond. Because we find that the court erred, we must now consider whether the court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment was harmless. ¶ 50 Kell addressed claim 18(b) in his memorandum in opposition to the State's motion, apparently unaware that the State had not requested judgment on this claim. Because Kell addressed this claim in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, Kell was able to properly defend his position on this claim in the same manner as if the State had requested summary judgment. Thus, there was no reasonable likelihood that, absent the post-conviction court's error, the outcome would have been different. Accordingly, we conclude that the post-conviction court's sua sponte entry of summary judgment was harmless error with respect to this claim. ¶ 51 Kell did not, however, address claim 17(b) in his memorandum in opposition. On appeal, Kell noted the court's error in granting summary judgment to the State on this claim, but he failed to argue that the error was prejudicial. Kell had a chance on appeal to show that claim 17(b) would have withstood summary judgment, i.e., that trial counsel's actions were deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial, but Kell failed to do so. Additionally, upon our review of the record and applicable case law, we conclude that Kell could not have withstood summary judgment on this claim in any event. See State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1154 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (holding that counsel's decision to forego an opening statement did not constitute ineffective assistance and that [e]ven if ... trial counsel forgot to deliver an opening statement, we would still conclude that such failure did not prejudice [the defendant]). We therefore conclude that it was harmless error for the post-conviction court to grant summary judgment on claim 17(b). ¶ 52 Because we find that the post-conviction court's error in granting summary judgment to the State on claims 17(b) and 18(b) was harmless, we affirm the court's grant of summary judgment on these two claims.