Opinion ID: 5046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: aggravating circumstances claims

Text: Under Mississippi law, the jury may impose a death sentence on a person convicted of capital murder if it finds one or more statutorily defined aggravating circumstances, and then determines that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19101 (Supp. 1991). Mississippi is, therefore, what has been termed a weighing state. Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136. At Wiley's sentencing, the trial judge instructed the jury, over Wiley's objection, that it could consider four aggravating circumstances. These were (1) whether the capital offense was 4 committed during the commission of an attempt to commit the crime of robbery; (2) whether the capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain; (3) whether the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; and (4) whether the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Wiley II, 484 So. 2d at 350. In a written verdict, the jury stated that it found the first three aggravating circumstances. The jury further stated that the mitigating evidence did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and accordingly sentenced Wiley to death. Wiley II, 484 So. 2d at 342. Wiley objects that his death sentence is invalid under the Eighth Amendment for two reasons: the especially heinous aggravating circumstances was too vague and imprecise to channel the sentencer's discretion, and the robbery and pecuniary gain circumstances were duplicative. A. Especially Heinous Aggravating Circumstance Nearly two years after Wiley's death sentence became final, the Supreme Court invalidated a death sentence in which the jury had considered the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance without being given a limiting instruction. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). The Court found, first, that the language of the aggravating circumstance was so vague and imprecise as to risk imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. at 364. Second, the Court found that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had failed to apply a limiting construction to the vague 5 aggravating circumstance when reviewing the defendant's death sentence. The Oklahoma court's mere conclusion that the evidence supported the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance was, in the view of the Supreme Court, insufficient to cure the constitutional infirmity of the aggravating circumstance. Id. Maynard was based in large part on Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), in which the Court had identified similar flaws in Georgia's use of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Id. at 422. As in Maynard, the jury in Godfrey had been instructed only in the bare words of the statute and the state supreme court failed to apply a limiting construction to the aggravating circumstance when reviewing the death sentence. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29. Shortly after Maynard was decided, the Court was confronted with the question whether, in a weighing state, infection of the capital sentencing determination with a vague aggravating factor required invalidation of the death sentence. In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Court answered this question in the negative but required that an appellate court reviewing the sentence focus carefully on the role the invalid factor played in the process. As in Maynard and the instant case, the Clemons jury had not received a limiting instruction further defining the concept of an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel killing. Implicit in the opinion was the assumption 6 that this amounted to constitutional error. See Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1139; Clemons, 494 U.S. at 756 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The questions in Clemons were whether the Sixth and Eighth Amendments barred the state appellate court from upholding the death sentence despite the jury's use of a vague aggravating factor and whether, if an appellate court could do so, the Mississippi Supreme Court had conducted the proper analysis of Clemons's sentence. The Court first concluded in Clemons that nothing in the Sixth or Eighth Amendments prevents an appellate court that has invalidated an aggravating factor from reweighing the remaining valid aggravating factors and the mitigating evidence. With respect to the argument that this would infringe on a defendant's jury trial right, the Court pointed out that it had never required that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence. Id. at 745.3 In response to the argument that this would violate the Eighth Amendment, the Court pointed out the numerous ways in which appellate courts become involved in reviewing death 3 This conclusion rested in large part on Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), in which the Court had held that an appellate court can make the findings of intent to kill required under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), for the imposition of a death sentence. The Court also rejected the subsidiary argument that, because Mississippi law permits only a jury to impose a death sentence, allowing the appellate court to do so would transgress a liberty interest in having a jury make all determinations relevant to the sentence. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746-47. 7 sentences4 and concluded that appellate courts were capable of giving defendants the individualized and reliable sentencing determination demanded by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 748-49. Having determined that an appellate court could salvage a death sentence by reweighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Court turned its attention to whether the Mississippi Supreme Court actually had done so. At this point, the Court recognized two methods by which the state court could have reweighed, but was not certain which course the state court had taken. The state court might have been reweighing by (1) including in the balance the especially heinous factor as limited by prior decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court or (2) eliminating the especially heinous factor altogether and reweighing the remaining valid aggravating circumstance against the mitigating evidence. Id. at 751. As for the latter, the Court observed that the Mississippi Supreme Court may not have reweighed at all, but simply applied a rule of automatic affirmance when at least one valid aggravating factor remains. Such a rule was not, in the Court's view, a proper method of reweighing, as it would not involve an actual reconsideration of the mix of aggravating and mitigating circumstances necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's requirement of individualized sentencing. Id. at 752. With respect to the former, the Court did not elaborate, but it seems to have been referring to its 4 Making Enmund findings is a prime example of appellate courts' involvement in the review of capital sentences. 8 approval of appellate courts' application of a proper limiting construction to an aggravating circumstance that has been vaguely defined by statute. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 25556 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (approving Florida death penalty statute in part because state supreme court adopted limiting construction of especially heinous factor). The Court in Clemons also approved of an alternative route to affirmance -- harmless error analysis. Again, however, it was not clear whether the Mississippi Supreme Court had done so in its opinion affirming Clemons's death sentence. The Court indicated its approval of two methods of harmless error analysis: the state court could ask whether beyond a reasonable doubt the sentence would have been the same had the vague aggravating circumstance not been injected into the mix, or the court could ask whether beyond a reasonable doubt the sentence would have been the same had the circumstance been properly defined in the jury instructions. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 753-54; see also Sochor v. Florida, --- U.S. ---, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2123 (1992). In remanding, the Court emphasized that state appellate courts are not required to reweigh or employ harmless error analysis, but that these are constitutionally permissible methods of salvaging a death sentence based upon an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 754. Maynard and Clemons clearly dictate the conclusion that there was constitutional error in instructing the jury in the bare words of the statute. Thus, our first task is to determine 9 whether the Mississippi Supreme Court articulated any constitutionally permissible basis for upholding the death sentence.5 We agree with Wiley that the Mississippi Supreme Court neither eliminated the especially heinous factor from the mix and reweighed the remaining aggravating circumstances against the mitigating evidence, nor engaged in any of the forms of harmless error analysis sanctioned in Clemons. Rather, the court, after reciting the limiting construction it had previously adopted for the especially heinous factor, merely held that the evidence supported the factor as narrowed. Wiley II, 484 So. 2d at 353-54. That it did not reweigh or perform harmless error analysis is not surprising. Its decision was rendered in 1986, two years before Maynard, and at that time the Mississippi Supreme Court did not find any constitutional infirmity in submitting the especially heinous factor to the jury without a limiting instruction. Thus, the court had no need to eliminate an improperly defined factor and reweigh or perform harmless error analysis. Compare Clemons v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354 (Miss. 1988) (post-Maynard decision in which court recognized difficulty with especially heinous factor), vacated and remanded, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). Wiley thus argues that, as in Clemons, the case must go back to the Mississippi Supreme Court. 5 To the extent the district court held that the death sentence could automatically be affirmed so long as valid aggravating factors remained, this conclusion was erroneous in light of Clemons. 10 We cannot agree with the State's contention that the Mississippi Supreme Court cured the sentencing error when it applied its narrowing construction to the especially heinous circumstance and found that the evidence supported the finding of the circumstance as narrowed. Without a doubt, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the use of a vague aggravating circumstance poses no Eighth Amendment problem so long as the state appellate courts apply a proper narrowing construction. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976) (joint opinion) (Georgia's outrageously vile circumstance not vague so long as state supreme court applies limiting construction); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (Florida's especially heinous circumstance upheld because state supreme court had already adopted limiting construction); Walton v. Arizona, --- U.S. ---, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990) (death sentence upheld where state supreme court applied proper narrowing construction to especially heinous, cruel or depraved factor); Lewis v. Jeffers, --- U.S. ---, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1990) (same). Cf. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33 (striking down death sentence where outrageously vile circumstance was used because Georgia Supreme Court failed to apply limiting construction); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64 (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' failure to apply a limiting construction to Oklahoma's especially heinous factor rendered death sentence infirm). But after Clemons and Stringer, it is clear that an appellate court must do more than simply find that the aggravating circumstance as limited is supported by the 11 evidence. Rather, once it makes this finding, the appellate court must either perform the weighing function by incorporating in the mix the aggravating circumstance as limited, or it must perform harmless error analysis by asking whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the death sentence would have been imposed had the aggravating circumstance been properly defined in the jury instructions.6 Here, all the Mississippi Supreme Court did was set forth its limiting construction of the especially heinous factor and then conclude that there was enough evidence in the record to support the factor as limited. It did not perform anything resembling the kind of reweighing or harmless error analysis described above. Clemons and Stringer together dictate this result. Clemons indicates that it would have viewed the state supreme court as having reweighed if that court had reweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances and both aggravating factors by applying the proper definition to the 'especially heinous' factor. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 751. Later, in describing its conception of reweighing, the Court pointed out that Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), require the sentencer to consider all mitigating evidence in imposing a death 6 Of course, the appellate court may reweigh by eliminating the aggravating factor altogether, and it also may perform harmless error analysis by asking whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the death sentence would have been imposed had the vague aggravating factor never been submitted to the jury. The options discussed in the text describe the courses an appellate court may follow if it decides to incorporate the aggravating factor as limited. 12 sentence; a failure to reevaluate the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances, Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752, means that the appellate court's review does not qualify as reweighing. Moreover, in speaking of harmless error analysis, the Court in Clemons is clear that an appellate court does not simply apply the limiting construction, but must inquire into whether beyond a reasonable doubt the result would have been the same had the especially heinous aggravating circumstance been properly defined in the jury instructions. Id. at 754 (emphasis added). This imposes a burden which obviously is more exacting than the burden of finding that the evidence supports the narrowed aggravating factor. Stringer makes these points even more clearly by emphasizing the infirmity of a vague aggravating circumstance in a weighing state. Stringer initially points out the critical importance in a weighing state of defin[ing] [aggravating circumstances] with some degree of precision. Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136. This is due to the fact that aggravating factors in a weighing state do not simply narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, as in Georgia, but rather lie at the very heart of the sentencer's ultimate decision to impose a death sentence. Consequently, [a]lthough we ... held in Clemons v. Mississippi that [when the sentencing process is infected with an invalid aggravating factor] a state appellate court could reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or undertake harmless-error analysis, we have not suggested that the Eighth Amendment permits the state appellate court in a weighing State to affirm a death sentence without a thorough 13 analysis of the role an invalid aggravating factor played in the sentencing process. Id. The Court emphasized this point one paragraph later: In order for a state appellate court to affirm a death sentence after the sentencer was instructed to consider an invalid factor, the court must determine what the sentencer would have done absent the factor. Otherwise, the defendant is deprived of the precision that individualized consideration demands under the Godfrey and Maynard line of cases. Id. at 1136-37. The key to the requirement of such close appellate scrutiny lies in the nature of weighing. In a system such as Georgia's, the jury uses aggravating circumstances to determine whether the defendant is eligible for death; if it finds at least one, it then considers all the evidence adduced at the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases in determining whether death is the appropriate penalty. Id. at 1136; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983). Thus, the jury's use of an invalid aggravating circumstance in determining death-eligibility does not infect the ultimate decision to impose a death sentence and the sentence may be upheld so long as the appellate court determines that the invalid factor made no difference. See Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1137. In a weighing state, in contrast, the process of determining that death is the appropriate penalty -- that is, the weighing process -- is skewed when the sentencing body is told that it may include an invalid factor in its decision. A vague aggravating factor used in the weighing process is in a sense worse [than in the Georgia system], for it creates the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be by 14 relying upon the existence of an illusory circumstance. Id. at 1139. Thus, a court reviewing a death sentence in which the weighing process has been skewed may not simply apply a limiting construction to the factor that has skewed the weighing, but must also reconsider the entire mix of aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented to the jury.7 In addition, we cannot agree with the State that the Mississippi Supreme Court actually performed a harmless error analysis. The words harmless error are not used in connection with the invalid aggravating factor, and there is no indication that the court gave the kind of close appellate scrutiny of the 7 Our conclusion that a state appellate court may not simply apply a limiting construction to a vague aggravating circumstance is not inconsistent with Walton v. Arizona, --- U.S. ---, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990), or Lewis v. Jeffers, --- U.S. ---, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990). Both cases involved the Arizona capital sentencing scheme, which, as described by the Supreme Court, appears to be a weighing system. And, in both cases, the Court upheld death sentences in which the sentencer (a trial judge) used Arizona's especially heinous, cruel or depraved aggravating circumstance. Even if the trial judge did not apply the limiting construction (as he is presumed to do, Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3057; Sochor v. Florida, --- U.S. ---, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2121 (1992)), the sentences were not constitutionally infirm because the Arizona Supreme Court applied an acceptable narrowing construction on direct review. However, the Arizona Supreme Court in both cases did not simply find that the evidence supported the aggravating circumstances as limited; rather, it also reconsidered the mitigating evidence and concluded that there was insufficient mitigating evidence to call for leniency. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3053; Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at 3097. Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court's review constitutes the kind of reweighing required by Clemons and Stringer. In the case before us, by contrast, the Mississippi Supreme Court never reconsidered the mitigating evidence against the especially heinous circumstance as narrowly construed. This runs afoul of the need to give defendants the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752 (citation omitted). 15 import and effect of invalid aggravating factors, Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136, that must accompany the modes of harmless error analysis described in Clemons. See Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at 2123 (a plain statement that a death sentence which incorporates an invalid aggravating factor survives harmless error enquiry is preferable to simply citing cases); id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Clemons requires more than a bald statement that error was harmless).8 Because only the Mississippi courts can determine the proper approach to Wiley's sentencing, we must vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as it holds that the basing of Wiley's sentence on the especially heinous aggravating circumstance did not offend the Eighth Amendment. The district court is, therefore, directed to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the State of Mississippi initiates appropriate proceedings in state court within a reasonable time after the issuance of our mandate. Because a new sentencing hearing before a jury is not constitutionally required, the State of Mississippi may initiate whatever state court proceedings it finds appropriate, including seeking a life sentence. Cf. Bullock v. Cabana, 784 F.2d 187, 187 (5th Cir. 1986) (on remand from Supreme Court) (leaving State 8 In a final attempt to avoid further proceedings in state court, the State asserts that this court can perform harmless error analysis itself. Clemons and Stringer are quite clear, however, that any such analysis must be performed by the state courts. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 752; Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (state appellate courts could apply harmless error analysis when reviewing death sentence imposed by judge who relied in part on invalid aggravating factor). 16 with choice of obtaining a determination from its own courts of factual question which could be decided by either jury or appellate court); Reddix v. Thigpen, 805 F.2d 506, 517 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).9 Wiley argues that placing this case back in the Mississippi courts will necessarily result in a new sentencing hearing, thus mooting the other claims he raises in this appeal. He contends that the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in the Clemons remand, Clemons v. State, 593 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 1992), establishes that that court will not perform either the reweighing or harmless error analysis sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court, but instead will automatically remand to the state trial court for resentencing. Our analysis of the opinion in the Clemons remand, however, indicates that a new sentencing hearing is not absolutely required under state law. Therefore, because Wiley may again receive a death sentence based on the 1984 sentencing trial, we will, in the interest of judicial economy, consider Wiley's claims arising out of that proceeding. 9 We note that, although the district court in this habeas proceeding cannot remand directly to the Mississippi Supreme Court as did the U.S. Supreme Court in the direct appeal in Clemons, Mississippi procedures permit the State to place a case directly before the Mississippi Supreme Court when a federal district court has granted a writ of habeas corpus and left to the State the task of initiating appropriate proceedings. In Reddix and Bullock, two habeas cases in which the federal court vacated the petitioners' death sentences in order to enable the state courts to make factual findings necessary for imposition of the death penalty, but in which the relevant findings could be made at either the trial or appellate level, the State made a motion to reinstate the death sentence directly in the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Reddix v. State, 547 So. 2d 792, 794 (Miss. 1989); Bullock v. State, 525 So. 2d 764, 765 (Miss. 1987). 17 Wiley is correct only about the Mississippi Supreme Court's view on the propriety under state law of reweighing. In its recent decision in Clemons v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that state law precludes it from reweighing aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty is warranted. Analyzing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101, which provides that the jury imposes the death penalty, and Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105, which sets forth criteria for review of death sentences by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court held: From these statutory provisions, two things are clear: only the jury, by unanimous decision, can impose the death penalty; as to aggravating circumstances, this Court only has the authority to determine whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance. There is no authority for this Court to reweigh remaining aggravating circumstances when it finds one or more to be invalid or improperly defined, nor is there authority for this Court to find evidence to support a proper definition of an aggravating circumstance in order to uphold a death sentence by reweighing. Finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weighing them, and ultimately imposing a death sentence are, by statute, left to a properly instructed jury. 593 So. 2d at 1006; see also Shell v. State, 595 So. 2d 1323 (Miss. 1992) (vacated and remanded in light of Clemons; court held state law precluded reweighing); Jones v. State, No. 03-DP601, 1992 WL 124774 (Miss. June 10, 1992) (same); Pinkney v. State, No. 03-DP-761, 1992 WL 146776 (Miss. July 1, 1992) (same). The court in the Clemons remand and the above cited cases did not, however, find that state law precluded it from performing harmless error analysis. In Clemons, the court essentially concurred in the view of the U.S. Supreme Court that use of the invalid aggravating factor was not likely to be 18 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in Clemons' sentencing, where only two aggravating circumstances were argued to the jury and the State's argument at sentencing was devoted almost entirely to the especially heinous circumstance. Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was not convinced that the jury would have found the especially heinous factor had it been properly defined in the jury instructions. Id. at 1007.10 Nothing in the opinion, however, suggests that a harmless error analysis is not permitted under state law. The Mississippi Supreme Court actually asked whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but found that it was not. Thus, although it remanded to the state trial court for resentencing in Clemons and three subsequent cases, there is no guarantee that it would do so in this case. Accordingly, returning this case to the Mississippi courts will not necessarily moot Wiley's other federal claims. We proceed now to consider those claims. B. Robbery and Pecuniary Gain Aggravating Circumstances Wiley levels a second challenge to the use of aggravating circumstances. He contends that, in considering the robbery and pecuniary gain circumstances, the jury was encouraged to double the aggravating weight of evidence already fully considered in the context of another statutory aggravating circumstance. He contends that the use of two aggravating 10 The Mississippi Supreme Court reached similar conclusions in the Shell, Jones and Pinkney remands. 19 circumstances that described the same conduct11 failed to channel and limit the jury's discretion to impose the death sentence, and therefore resulted in an arbitrary death sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. A number of state courts have expressed disapproval of the use of both the robbery and pecuniary gain aggravating factors when both would apply to the same conduct, including (as of 1991) Mississippi.12 These courts have not found this result dictated by the Eighth Amendment, but instead have relied on state law. If Wiley were relying purely on state law in raising this claim, we would agree with the State that our consideration of the claim is barred. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). But Wiley has raised federal constitutional objections, so our powers as a federal habeas court are properly invoked. Having said that, there is an independent bar to our consideration of this claim: Wiley asks us to create a new rule within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), 11 Murder for pecuniary gain could refer to conduct different than murder committed in the course of a robbery, as the former may encompass murder-for-hire. In this case, there were no instructions differentiating among the two, and under the facts of the case both could only refer to the same conduct. 12 Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 1256 (Ala. 1978); People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 1006 (1984); Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977); Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 680-81 (Miss. 1991); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867, 873-74 cert. denied, 434 U.S. 912 (1977); State v. Glidewell, 663 P.2d 738, 743 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). 20 and apply it retroactively to him, and he does not come within either of the exceptions to the Teague doctrine.13 Under Teague, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure will not be announced on federal habeas review unless one of two narrow exceptions applies. 489 U.S. at 311-13; Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). In the now-familiar parlance, 'a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.' Or, '[t]o put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.' Penry, 492 U.S. at 314 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 301) (brackets in Penry; emphasis in Teague); see also Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990); Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1135. These principles primarily serve federalism concerns: they validate state courts' reasonable, good faith reliance on precedents existing at the time they rendered their decisions, Butler, 494 U.S. at 414, and reduce the tendency of federal habeas review to undermine the finality of state criminal convictions. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-09. Although Wiley spends very little time arguing this claim in his brief14 and cites no cases in support of the rule he seeks, 13 The retroactivity issue was not raised by the State, but, as did the Court in Teague, 489 U.S. at 300, we may consider it sua sponte. Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 981 n.12 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded on other grounds, --- U.S. ---, 112 S. Ct. 1463 (1992). 14 It was not raised at oral argument. 21 we perceive his claim to be based on the well-established principle that, when the proposed penalty is death, the sentencer's discretion must be channelled and limited so to as to avoid imposition of the penalty in a wanton or freakish manner. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Stephens, 462 U.S. at 874; Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3061 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (listing the many ways the Court has described this basic principle). Saying that his claim is based on this principle, however, is not the same as saying his claim is dictated by precedent. A deathsentenced petitioner could raise any number of objections to the use of aggravating circumstances and contend that all flow from the basic Eighth Amendment narrowing requirement. Were a habeas petitioner able to spark creation of a new rule simply by invoking Gregg and its progeny, the practical limits the Court has placed on retroactive application of new rules would be all but eviscerated in the Eighth Amendment capital sentencing context. In order for Wiley's sought-after rule not to be considered new, we think it must be dictated by precedent more specific than Gregg and the cases repeating its essential principle. In the only Supreme Court case holding that a rule which ultimately derived from the Gregg principle was not a new rule, the Court did not base its decision on Gregg or the generalized requirement that state capital sentencing statutes narrow the class of 22 persons eligible for the death penalty, but instead on a more particularized application of the Gregg principle. The case to which we refer, of course, is Stringer, and it found the invalidation in Maynard v. Cartwright and Clemons v. Mississippi of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance dictated by Godfrey v. Georgia. Godfrey was a specific application of the narrowing requirement in which the Court held that the Georgia system's threshold criterion for imposing a death sentence must be defined with precision either in the jury instructions or by the state appellate court reviewing the sentence. Thus, Stringer does not suggest to us that the relevant precedent is the broadbased Gregg principle, but rather some precedent that would speak to the constitutionality of giving the jury in a weighing state multiple, identical aggravating circumstances. Cf. Penry, 492 U.S. at 315-19 (requested rule that Texas juries be given special instruction on ability to consider mitigating evidence is not new, because the Texas capital sentencing scheme had been upheld in 1976 on the specific understanding that the statute would not preclude presentation of mitigating evidence); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 491-92 (Penry was an application of the specific precedent of Jurek). We can find no precedent that will assist Wiley. The Court's only specific extension of the Gregg principle has come in the Godfrey-Maynard-Clemons line of decisions, a group of cases which speak to the importance of precision in defining aggravating circumstances in both weighing and non-weighing 23 states and to the consequences for appellate review of imprecisely defined circumstances. Godfrey, Maynard and Clemons (all of which are available to Wiley) provide no basis for the sought-after rule here, for Wiley is not claiming that the robbery and pecuniary gain aggravating circumstances were invalid, improperly defined, or imprecise. Rather, he simply raises a broad-based claim that stacking of identical, valid aggravating circumstances will impermissibly influence the jury in a weighing state toward returning a death sentence. Were we to grant Wiley the relief he seeks we would necessarily break new ground, so the rule must be classified as new. Cf. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 490 (rule which would preclude sentencing jury from being told to avoid any influence of sympathy relates to how sentencer must consider mitigating evidence, not what evidence it may consider, and so is not dictated by the Lockett-Eddings principle). Neither of the two exceptions to the new rule doctrine helps Wiley. The first exception applies when a new rule places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe'[.] Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). It requires no extended discussion to show why the rule Wiley seeks would not put any individual conduct beyond the authority of government to proscribe. The second exception applies to procedural rules which are critical 24 to an accurate determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 312. This exception, too, is obviously inapplicable. Accordingly, because Wiley asks us to apply a new rule to him on habeas, we cannot reach the merits of the claim.