Opinion ID: 165463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of G rand Jury M aterial

Text: -36- Having determined that the disclosures sought by Appellants are, with perhaps a few modest exceptions, governed by Rule 6(e), we remand to the district court to determine in the first instance whether any of the relief sought by Appellants is warranted. The court initially must determine whether Rule 6(e) authorizes disclosures for Appellants’ purposes, and, if so, whether they have met “the standard for determining when the traditional secrecy of the grand jury may be broken.” Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222. Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed. Id. If Appellants seek relief beyond what, if any, is granted by the court under Rule 6(e), the court must then determine whether relief outside of Rule 6(e) is appropriate. This would be a two-part inquiry. First, as previously noted, some matters that Appellants seek to disclose, such as legal arguments in their pleadings, may not be protected by Rule 6(e) and can be disclosed, perhaps in redacted form. Second, some relief may be proper under the court’s inherent authority. The government contends that there is no such inherent authority. The Appellants contend the contrary. There is substantial support for A ppellants’ position. Several courts have held that “a court’s power to order disclosure of grand jury -37- records is not strictly confined to instances spelled out in [Rule 6(e)].” In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury M aterials, 735 F.2d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Craig v. United States (In re Petition of Craig), 131 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Although . . . Rule 6(e) governs almost all requests for the release of grand jury records, this court has recognized that there are certain ‘special circumstances’ in which release of grand jury records is appropriate even outside the boundaries of the rule.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (Rule 6(e) permits “rare exceptions premised on inherent judicial power” to restrict disclosure beyond the requirements of the rule); see generally, Beale, et al., supra, § 5.19 (“The courts . . . have recognized an ‘inherent authority’ to disclose grand jury materials, although they have confined that authority to exceptional cases.”). The Supreme Court, however, has not explicitly recognized such authority. To be sure, it has recognized that disclosure of grand jury materials is “committed to the discretion of the trial judge,” Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959); but it does not necessarily follow that Rule 6(e) sets no boundaries on that discretion. Although the Court has said that “Rule 6(e) is but declaratory [of the proposition that disclosure is committed to the trial judge’s discretion],” id., it also said in the same opinion that “any disclosure of grand jury minutes is covered by Fed. Rules Crim. P. 6(e) promulgated by this Court,” id. at 398 (emphasis added). And the Advisory Committee notes state that -38- “Rule 6(e) continues to spell out the general rule of secrecy of grand-jury proceedings and the exceptions to that general rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e), advisory committee notes, 2002 Amendments (emphasis added); see also 1 W right & M iller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 106 (“[R]eliance on the inherent powers doctrine is suspect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In our view, it would be unwise for us to resolve this delicate issue on the present record. The cases that have recognized this inherent authority “have confined [it] to exceptional cases.” Beale et al., supra, § 5.6. The district court should therefore first determine w hether such circumstances are present before deciding whether it has inherent power to permit or order disclosure. W e REVERSE and REM AND for further consideration in accordance with this opinion. -39-