Opinion ID: 71709
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Final Decision with Respect to an Arbitration

Text: The FAA additionally provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from . . . a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). The term “final decision” has a “well-developed and longstanding 5 Case: 09-10424 Document: 00511039061 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 No. 09-10424 meaning. It is a decision that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). “Because the FAA does not define ‘a final decision with respect to an arbitration’ or otherwise suggest that the ordinary meaning of ‘final decision’ should not apply,” the Supreme Court accords the term its well-established meaning. Id. (citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1992)). This court has not previously addressed a “final decision” determination in the § 16(a)(3) context, but Green Tree’s reliance on its well-established meaning suggests that discussions of what constitutes a final decision for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 are instructive. See id. Under § 1291, however, this court’s determination of its jurisdiction over a dismissal or denial without prejudice to refile varies depending on the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Turner Indus. Group, LLC, 339 F. App’x 441, 443 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (exerting appellate jurisdiction over Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without prejudice of a declaratory action); Telles v. City of El Paso, 164 F. App’x 492, 495 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (no appellate jurisdiction over denial of a motion without prejudice to refile, where district court did not reach the merits of the motion or dispose of any substantive issues). Each case requires an examination of the finality of the underlying order. Ameser asserts that the district court’s denial was a final judgment because any “refiling” would be futile as barred by the statute of limitations, correctly noting that it is uncertain whether a refiled Motion to Vacate would comply with Rule 15 or would be time-barred. Although Ameser cites cases for the premise that courts have been unforgiving of any failure to timely make a Motion to Vacate, none deal with an Amended Motion to Vacate where the initial 6 Case: 09-10424 Document: 00511039061 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 No. 09-10424 Motion to Vacate was timely filed. See Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, 477 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007) (failure to file within three months waived judicial review, and loss of evidence did not toll deadline); Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1986) (due diligence and tolling arguments were “questionable,” and party could not extend the deadline by filing a late motion to vacate in response to a motion to confirm arbitration award); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1984) (no common law exceptions to deadline, and motion to confirm did not extend deadline). At least one court has held that an amended motion to vacate an arbitration may in some instances relate back under Rule 15, but we decline to decide the Rule 15 question at this time. See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1988) (resolving that “an amended motion to vacate an arbitration award, filed outside of the three month period and raising additional grounds for vacation, is deemed timely if the original motion to vacate was timely”). The speculative nature of Ameser’s arguments underscore that the district court has not yet had the opportunity to rule on this issue. Remand is therefore appropriate, so that Ameser may file an Amended Motion to Vacate and the district court will have an opportunity to rule on whether the amended motion relates back under Rule 15. The district court’s April 6 order gives us very little help in evaluating its finality, and we appreciate that in an abundance of caution Ameser appealed the order to preserve error.3 We conclude, however, that the order did not constitute a final decision, and this court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. The district court’s order, denying Ameser’s claims without prejudice to refile, did not conclusively adjudicate the substance of Ameser’s claims and did not preclude further litigation of those issues in district court. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 3 In the usual case, denying all motions pending prior to removal would not finally determine the case on its merits, thus it is unlikely that the judge intended to do so. 7 Case: 09-10424 Document: 00511039061 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/02/2010 No. 09-10424 Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (stating that “as long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive,” the appellate court is without the power of review). Thus, the order is not a final judgment because all relief was not denied.