Opinion ID: 203979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Law Governing Statute of Limitations

Text: We review de novo the district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim based on statute of limitations grounds. López-González v. Municipality of Comerío, 404 F.3d 548, 551 (1st Cir.2005). Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), provided that the facts establishing the defense [are] clear `on the face of the plaintiff's pleadings.' Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Blackstone Realty LLC, 244 F.3d at 197). Where the dates included in the complaint show that the limitations period has been exceeded and the complaint fails to `sketch a factual predicate' that would warrant the application of either a different statute of limitations period or equitable estoppel, dismissal is appropriate. Id. Plaintiffs' complaint brought claims under § 1983, which borrows the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Wilson v. García, 471 U.S. 261, 277-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). The parties agree that Puerto Rico's one-year prescriptive period governing tort actions is the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs' claims. See id. (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2)). While we look to Puerto Rico law to determine the applicable prescriptive period, federal law determines the date on which the claim accrued. Id. at 96. The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff `knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for his claim.' Id. at 96-97 (quoting Rodríguez Narváez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41 n. 5 (1st Cir.1990)). The limitations period of actions is a substantive, not a procedural, matter in Puerto Rico. Rodríguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 570 F.3d 402, 406 (1st Cir.2009) (citing García Pérez v. Corporación de Servicios para la Mujer y la Familia, etc., 2008 TSPR 114, 2008 WL 2717833, at  (P.R. June 30, 2008)). Thus, we apply Puerto Rico's tolling rules. Puerto Rico's tolling rules provide three ways that a plaintiff can interrupt the statute of limitations, which, as relevant here, include the sending of an extrajudicial letter. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5303. [A] letter sent by a tort plaintiff to the tortfeasor, complaining of the tortious conduct and demanding compensation, is an extrajudicial claim that, if timely, interrupts the prescription of the cause of action in tort. Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Pérez y Cía. De P.R., Inc., 142 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st. Cir.1998). We note, however, that an extrajudicial letter will not toll the limitations period `for all claims arising out of the same facts.' Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d at 97 (quoting Fernández v. Chardón, 681 F.2d 42, 49 (1st Cir.1982)). The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has limited the tolling effect of an extrajudicial letter to situations where the letter is identical to a subsequently filed complaint. Id. (citing Cintrón v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 27 P.R. Offic. Trans. 582, 1990 WL 658719 (1990)). This identicality requirement has three components. First, the extrajudicial letter and subsequent complaint must seek the same form of relief. Id. at 98. Second, [t]he causes of action asserted [in the complaint] must be based on the same substantive claims as asserted in the extrajudicial letter. Id. Lastly, provided that other Puerto Rico tolling statutes do not rescue the claims on other grounds, they must be asserted against the same defendants in the same capacities; new defendants should not be added. Id. Before we proceed to our analysis as to whether the identicality requirement is met here, we note some tension in the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's approach to identicality and its tolling provisions. On the one hand, it has stated, and we have often repeated, that the tolling provisions [are] interpreted restrictively against the party invoking their protection. Nieves-Vega v. Ortiz-Quiñones, 443 F.3d 134, 137 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Rodríguez Narváez, 895 F.2d at 43); see also Díaz de Diana v. A.J.A.S., 10 P.R. Offic. Trans. 602, 608 n. 1, 1980 WL 138494 (1980). On the other hand, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has also stated that extrajudicial claims should be analyzed in [their] totality and in a liberal fashion, Pitts v. United States, 109 F.3d 832, 835 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Zambrana Maldonado v. Commonwealth, 129 D.P.R. 740, 1992 WL 755000 (P.R. Jan. 30, 1992)). Also, consistent with a more liberal approach to tolling, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has remarked that it favors conservation of rights as the norm. See Kery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 931 F.Supp. 947, 952 (D.P.R.1995); Galib Frangie v. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 138 D.P.R. 560, 1995 WL 905884 (P.R. June 6, 1995) (The prescription of the right is the exception, being its exercise or conservation the norm, because of which the law propitiates the exercise and conservation of rights through the use of prescription's interruptive mechanisms.). Despite this potentially contradictory guidance, however, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not departed from the principle that an extrajudicial letter in order to toll the statute of limitations with respect to subsequent claims must give fair notice of the claims that are subsequently raised. It has explained the term extrajudicial claim as follows: Our Civil Code has not given to the word claim any precise or technical meaning. But this does not exempt us from trying to find it. In principle, a claim stands for demand or notice. That is: it is an act for which the holder of a subjective right, addresses the passive subject of said right, demanding that he adopt the required conduct. The claim is, then, a pretension in a technical sense. Cintrón, 27 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 592, 1990 WL 658719. Likewise, we have recognized this important principle in our case law, stating that [t]he identicality requirement prevents plaintiffs from circumventing the notice function of the statutes of limitations by asserting different claims in belated federal court complaints. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d at 97.
We first consider whether plaintiffs' extrajudicial claim letter is sufficiently identical to their subsequent complaint. As to the first identicality requirement, namely whether the same relief was sought, there is little question and, in fact, defendants concede, [4] that plaintiffs sought the same form of relief  money damages  both in the letter and in the subsequent complaint. That the letter requested a different amount in damages ($1,500,000) than the complaint (over $4,000,000) is not a problem here because the letter put Toledo on notice of a potential lawsuit for damages. See id. (Although the amount of damages differs in the two complaints, the allegation of damages in her state complaint gave the defendants the requisite `fair notice that [they] might be called upon to defend a damages suit ....') (quoting Hernández del Valle v. Santa Aponte, 575 F.2d 321, 324 (1st Cir.1978) (alteration in original)). Plaintiffs, however, do not fare as well with respect to the second identicality requirement, namely whether the causes of action in the extrajudicial claim and subsequent complaint are based on the same substantive claims. As we have previously stated, Puerto Rico law requires sufficient detail to put defendant on notice of the general nature of their claims. Id. at 100. Here, we conclude that the extrajudicial letter did not assert a claim of supervisory liability in sufficient detail to meet the second prong of the identicality requirement. We explain. Plaintiffs' complaint asserted that the subordinate officers had a propensity of violence, that their supervisors knew of this propensity, and they did not act to correct it through retraining, psychological evaluation, or remedial action. As part of the allegation of the subordinate officers' propensity for violence, the complaint referred to incidents of unwarranted physical violence against citizens. [5] Although the extrajudicial letter was addressed to Superintendent Toledo and mentioned § 1983 in its penultimate sentence [6]  the letter failed to assert, even remotely, the factual allegations supporting supervisory liability that ultimately were raised in the complaint. Instead, the letter recounted plaintiffs' version of the events of June 8 and 9, alleging that the actions and/or omissions of the officers who perpetrated the violence against him caused damages and losses. Further, plaintiffs claimed that the arrest and filing of charges against Santana tarnished his reputation and violated his dignity because they were published in the newspapers and broadcast on the radio. Even if we took a liberal approach in assessing this second prong, analyzing the letter in its totality, we cannot conclude that Toledo, or any of the other defendant supervisors, would have been on sufficient notice to defend a supervisory liability claim. Thus, we conclude that because plaintiffs' extrajudicial letter fails to satisfy the second identicality requirement, the supervisory liability claim as to all defendant supervisors is time-barred. [7]
As to plaintiffs' claims against the on-scene officers, the extrajudicial letter states with precis[ion] and specific[ity], see Fernández, 681 F.2d at 53, the allegations of Santana's arrest, beating, and incarceration without proper medical treatment. However, the letter was addressed only to Toledo and plaintiffs do not allege that the on-scene officers accused of perpetrating the attack knew about the letter or its contents. This is fatal to plaintiffs' claim. Puerto Rico law is clear that the extrajudicial letter must be addressed to the ... passive subject of the right, not to third party. See Velilla v. Pueblo Supermarket, 11 Offic. Trans. 732, 734-35 (1981); see also Pitts, 109 F.3d at 835 (citing same principle); Rodríguez-Narváez, 895 F.2d at 44 (same). Plaintiffs have not pointed to any case, nor are we aware of one, where subordinate officers are held to be on constructive notice of claims made against them in an extrajudicial letter to a supervising officer. [8]