Opinion ID: 2540012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Detective Hickman's Testimony Connecting the Social Security Number with Appellant

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Hickman to testify that the Social Security number the robber gave to the bank teller was Appellant's. Appellant claims that this constituted hearsay, as Hickman lacked personal knowledge of this fact (Hickman acquired this knowledge from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and other sources). Moreover, no business records were introduced to support the testimony, thus nullifying the public records hearsay exception. KRE 803(8). The Commonwealth responds by pointing out the trial court sustained Appellant's hearsay objection to Hickman's reference to the NCIC as one of his sources, yet overruled a later objection relating to improper foundation for Hickman's conclusion based on unnamed other sources. Accordingly, the Commonwealth asserts that if Appellant is contending that Hickman disregarded the court's order and gave hearsay testimony, it was incumbent upon Appellant to request a mistrial or admonition, and thus Appellant waived the error. We disagree. We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. King, 950 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Ky.1997) (It is a well-settled principle of Kentucky law that a trial court ruling with respect to the admission of evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.). An abuse of discretion arises when the court's decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994). Here, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Hickman's testimony regarding the Social Security number, as it was hearsay. The hearsay was the assertion by unnamed sources consulted by Hickman that the Social Security number belonged to Appellant. Furthermore, the statement was introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., the Social Security number belonged to Appellant. As a result we find that Hickman's testimony concerning information he received from these unnamed sources was hearsay. The assertion that the information was gleaned from other sources, assumedly online databases, does not exclude it from being a statement for the purposes of the hearsay rule. [9] KRE 801(a). It is axiomatic that hearsay is inadmissible unless it fits within an exception. KRE 802. Consequently, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Hickman to testify that unnamed sources provided him with the information needed to associate the Social Security number used during the U.S. Bank robbery with Appellant. Finally, we must evaluate whether erroneously admitted testimony was harmless error. As previously noted, evidentiary errors are evaluated under the non-constitutional substantial influence standard, wherein we determine whether the error had substantial influence upon Appellant's trial such that it substantially swayed his conviction. Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 688-689; See also RCr 9.24. In this case, the victim could not make a positive identification, thus the Social Security number was the only linchpin evidence linking Appellant to the robbery. Consequently, we have no difficulty finding that the erroneous admission of Hickman's testimony substantially influenced Appellant's trial in a manner that substantially swayed his conviction. As such, we reverse Appellant's second-degree robbery conviction, vacate that portion of his sentence, and remand for a new trial on this charge.