Opinion ID: 2514412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Complaint as to Bear Lake County?

Text: Even though Deputy Athay and Sheriff Stacey were properly dismissed as defendants in this action, that dismissal was not on the merits. Therefore, Bear Lake County could still be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 889, 522 P.2d 1102, 1110 (1974) (The failure of the jury to return a verdict as to the servant while rendering one against the master based on respondeat superior does not relieve the master of liability). The district court held that neither the conduct of Deputy Athay nor that of Sheriff Stacey rose to the level of reckless disregard. 1. Did the district court err in concluding Deputy Athay's conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard? In Athay I, we held that under Idaho Code § 49-623, the driver of an authorized police vehicle engaged in a high-speed chase can be held liable only if the driver's conduct amounts to reckless disregard for the safety of others. The district court held that Deputy Athay's conduct did not rise to that level. After stating that Deputy Athay was not aware of the deer-vehicle collision before Ervin crashed into the Plaintiff's vehicle, the court concluded, On these facts, Captain Athay had no actual knowledge of any conditions that would have told him to immediately cease or lessen the pursuit any differently than he did. (Emphasis in original.) The district court erred in its analysis. To constitute reckless disregard, the actor's conduct must not only create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17, 27, 375 P.2d 184, 190 (1962), but, as we held in Athay I, the actor must actually perceive the high degree of probability that harm will result and continue in his course of conduct. 142 Idaho at 365, 128 P.3d at 902. Actual knowledge of the high degree of probability that harm will result does not require knowledge of the actual person or persons at risk, or the exact manner in which they would be harmed. It only requires knowledge of the high degree of probability of the kind of harm that the injured party suffered. See Harris v. State, 123 Idaho 295, 299, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1992). Plaintiff had pulled out onto the highway after stopping to assist at the scene of the deer-vehicle accident. It does not matter why he had pulled off the highway and stopped. He could have pulled onto the highway for a variety of reasons. What is significant is the foreseeability that there would be vehicles on the highway, such as Plaintiff's; that the Defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the occupants of those vehicles; and that the Defendant perceived there was a high degree of probability that harm would result and continued his course of conduct. For example, in Smith v. Sharp , we held that the following course of conduct by a driver constituted reckless disregard: that he deliberately turned off his lights and proceeded in the darkness on the wrong side of the roadway toward the lighted intersection; was driving at a speed which was excessive for town driving; he was warned by one of the passengers that danger lurked ahead; he hit the depressions causing the occupants to be thrown violently forward; he continued on down an unfamiliar street for a distance of 173 feet without applying his brakes, although he could have stopped safely within the 173 feet; that he drove down a 45 degree embankment at such speed as to cause the automobile to flip over onto its top into the river just as the brakes were applied, all of which when taken together shows a deliberate course of conduct in reckless disregard of the rights of others and constituted the proximate cause of Marilee Smith's death. 85 Idaho at 33, 375 P.2d at 194. We did not require that the driver know that his passenger would be killed by his conduct. Likewise, we did not require that he know that his manner of driving could cause his car to flip onto its top into the river, or that he even know the river was there as he drove in darkness at excessive speed down an unfamiliar street with his headlights off. Likewise, in State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358, 363, 362 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1961), we held that a driver acted in reckless disregard by intentionally running a stop sign where obstructions to his view prevented him from seeing whether any vehicles were approaching on the crossing, through highway. We did not require proof that he had knowledge of the approaching car, or of the mother and daughter in that car who were killed in the collision. Where an order of a lower court is correct, but based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984); accord, Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 571, 917 P.2d 403, 405 (1996). This Court can decide on appeal whether a defendant's conduct is sufficiently egregious to create a jury issue of whether it rises to the level of reckless disregard of the safety of others. Cafferty v. State, Dept. of Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicle Services, 144 Idaho 324, 332, 160 P.3d 763, 771 (2007); Harris v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 299, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1992). Even though the district court applied the wrong standard for reckless disregard, we affirm the dismissal as to Deputy Athay because the evidence does not create a jury issue as to whether his conduct constituted reckless disregard in this case. Sheriff Stacey pursued a Mustang automobile being driven by Ervin from Utah, through part of Wyoming, into Idaho. When the Mustang was headed into Idaho, Sheriff Stacey radioed Deputy Athay and asked him to attempt to stop the Mustang with spike strips. After obtaining the approval of the Bear Lake County Sheriff, Deputy Athay dispatched Deputy Ludwig to attempt to spike the tires of the Mustang. Deputy Athay did not know that the Mustang had Idaho plates, nor did he know that it was registered in Caribou County. He did know that the driver of the Mustang was suspected of being intoxicated. Deputy Ludwig stopped at milepost 442 at 10:50 p.m. to prepare to spike the tires. At 10:56 p.m., he radioed that the Mustang had run over the spikes and was still going. Deputy Athay had stopped at milepost 440. When the Mustang passed him, he could smell burning rubber. Sheriff Stacey was approximately one mile behind the Mustang, and Deputy Athay joined in the pursuit after Sheriff Stacey went by. Deputy Athay remained behind Sheriff Stacey the entire time. The Mustang initially slowed after running over the spike strips, but then sped back up to around 95 mph. Deputy Athay knew that a tire had been spiked because he could smell burning rubber when the Mustang passed his location. He believed that the Mustang would stop because of the flat tire before getting to Montpelier, which was about five miles away. The traffic on the highway that night was very light, the highway was dry and the weather was clear, and the area from where he was to Montpelier was sparsely populated with few intersecting roads. At about milepost 439, Deputy Ludwig caught up with Deputy Athay. Deputy Ludwig had a faster vehicle, and he asked Deputy Athay if he could pass him and try to catch the Mustang. Deputy Athay had heard Sheriff Stacey state over the radio that the Mustang had slowed when entering Cokeville, Wyoming, and so he denied Deputy Ludwig's request and told him they would see if the Mustang slowed down when entering Montpelier. The highway through Montpelier had four traffic lanes and a center turn lane. All of the cross streets intersecting the highway through Montpelier were guarded by stop signs. The highway through town was well lit, and Deputy Athay called ahead to the police and requested their assistance to control any traffic on side streets that intersected the highway. After the Mustang passed through Montpelier, Deputy Athay saw it fishtail as it was leaving town near the location of the bowling alley at milepost 434. Deputy Athay thought it was speeding up, and so he told everyone to back off and told dispatch to notify Caribou County to request it have an officer in that jurisdiction again spike the vehicle. Deputy Athay slowed down. The Mustang continued on for about three miles, allegedly with its lights off, before colliding with the Plaintiff's vehicle. From the point he joined in the pursuit until he told the officers to back off about six miles later, Deputy Athay did not engage in conduct that met the standard of reckless disregard. Although its reasoning was flawed, the district court arrived at the correct result in dismissing this action as to Deputy Athay. 2. Is there evidence from which a jury could conclude that Bear Lake County could be liable for the conduct of Sheriff Stacey? In Athay I we held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sheriff Stacey's conduct constituted reckless disregard. We also held that there was a genuine issue as to the liability of Deputy Athay and Bear Lake County based upon the district court's statement in its order granting summary judgment that the parties had admitted that Sheriff Stacey was an agent or servant of Deputy Athay. On remand, Bear Lake County pointed out that it was not a party to that admission and that there was no factual basis for holding that Sheriff Stacey was an agent of Bear Lake County during the pursuit. The district court agreed that Bear Lake County was not bound by the stipulation, and the Plaintiff did not appeal that ruling. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Bear Lake County argued that Sheriff Stacey was not an employee of the County as that term is defined in Idaho Code § 6-902(4). The district court held, however, that there was an issue of fact regarding whether Sheriff Stacey was acting as Bear Lake County's agent or servant. When doing so, the district court did not address whether there were any facts supporting the contention that Sheriff Stacey was an employee as that term is defined in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The court granted summary judgment to Bear Lake County on the ground that even if Sheriff Stacey was its agent, his conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard. On appeal, Bear Lake County and Deputy Athay argue that Sheriff Stacey was not an employee of the County as defined in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. That Act provides that a governmental entity can be liable for the negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions ... of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties. I.C. § 6-903(a). For a governmental entity to be held liable the actor must fit the description of an employee within the terms of the statute. Blankenship v. Kootenai County, 125 Idaho 101, 103, 867 P.2d 975, 977 (1994). Under the Act, an employee includes persons acting on behalf of the governmental entity in any official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the governmental entity, whether with or without compensation. I.C. § 6-902(4). In construing this statute in Blankenship, we stated, An employee is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the service is subject to the other's control. 125 Idaho at 103, 867 P.2d at 977. For someone to be employed to perform services in the affairs of another, the alleged employer must expressly or impliedly agree to the creation of that employment relationship. Because of the vicarious liability that a governmental entity can have for the acts of its employees, a person cannot become the employee of a governmental entity without its agreement. The only person who could arguably have agreed to make Sheriff Stacey an employee of Bear Lake County is Deputy Athay. The parties have not addressed whether Deputy Athay had the authority to employ someone to perform services for the County. For the purposes of this decision, we will assume that he did. Assuming that he had the authority, there is no evidence that he did anything that reasonably could be construed as expressly or impliedly employing Sheriff Stacey to perform any services on behalf of Bear Lake County. Because Sheriff Stacey entered Idaho in fresh pursuit of the Mustang's driver and had reasonable ground to believe he had committed the felony offense of eluding in Utah, Sheriff Stacey had the same authority to arrest the driver as a peace officer of this state. I.C. § 19-701. He did not need permission from Bear Lake County authorities to pursue and arrest Ervin. He asked Deputy Athay to assist in trying to stop the Mustang with spike strips. Upon the approval of the Bear Lake County Sheriff, Deputy Athay directed Deputy Ludwig to do so. Deputy Athay did not ask Sheriff Stacey to chase the Mustang into Bear Lake County, nor is there evidence that he asked Sheriff Stacey to do anything. After the Mustang drove over the spike strips, there were no conversations between Sheriff Stacey and Deputy Athay until Deputy Athay told everyone to back off. Telling Sheriff Stacey to back off is not an offer of employment, and his obedience to that request is not the acceptance of employment. In trying to establish an employment relationship, the Plaintiff relies upon the deposition of Sheriff Stacey during which he testified that it was his understanding that Deputy Athay was in control of the pursuit once it entered Bear Lake County. The testimony relied upon by the Plaintiff is as follows: Q. From the time you entered into Idaho did you consider yourself as in charge of the pursuit or did you consider Bear Lake County officers as those who had ultimate responsibility for the decision making relating to the pursuit? A. The Bear Lake County officers. Q. And who was that who was, to your knowledge, the officer in charge of the pursuit at that time? A. Gregg Athay. .... Q. Had you ever been involved in any pursuits with Deputy Athay before then? A. No. Q. I understand from your report that you had called ahead and requested that they get spike strips out on the road; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Did they comply with that request? A. Yes, they did. .... Q. Did you have any conversations with Deputy Athay between the time of the vehicle being spiked and the time that you entered into Montpelier? A. I don't know. Q. Did you discuss with Deputy Athay at any time on the radio traffic the situation regarding how the suspect had slowed down in Cokeville and how that might affect the decision making process? A. I believe I did, yes. Q. Do you recall, can you tell me what you recall of that conversation? A. What I recall of it, I believe I mentioned to him that the suspect had slowed in Cokeville and that perhaps he would do that in Montpelier also. Q. Do you recall what Deputy Athay's response was to that? A. I don't. Q. Do you have any recollection of Deputy Athay giving the command to keep right on the suspect's tail and force him off the road or any of those types ofwell, do you recall him ever telling everybody to step on it and keep right on his tail? A. No. .... Q. Did you ever have any radio communications with Deputy Ludwig? A. No. [6] Q. You talked about the fact that as you were leaving Montpelier, and you weren't sure of the exact sequence, but at some point Deputy Athay gave the order to back off. A. Yes, he did. Q. Did he explain why he gave that order? A. Yes. Q. And why was that? A. Something along the lines of let's give him some room and see if he will slow down and also I believe he mentioned that he had called Caribou County and that they were sending some officers that direction, also. Q. When he gave you that order, did you then back off? A. Yes, I did. Although Sheriff Stacey testified that it was his understanding that Deputy Athay was in charge, that is insufficient to establish an agreement by Bear Lake County to employ Sheriff Stacey. A person's subjective understanding is insufficient to establish an express or implied agreement. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 (2003). Nowhere in his testimony did Sheriff Stacey state that Deputy Athay ever asked him to do anything in an attempt to catch the fleeing Mustang. Nowhere is there any evidence of any agreement between Bear Lake County and Rich County that when an officer from one of the counties pursues someone into the other, the pursuing officer becomes an employee of that county. There is no course of conduct from which one could infer an agreement to employ Sheriff Stacey. Sheriff Stacey did not testify that Deputy Athay ever stated he was in charge. The Plaintiff relies heavily upon the fact that Sheriff Stacey complied when Deputy Athay said to back off. Compliance with that request is insufficient to show that Sheriff Stacey was an employee of Bear Lake County prior to the request. Deputy Athay's deposition would not support a finding that he employed Sheriff Stacey on behalf of Bear Lake County. Deputy Athay testified that he was in charge of only himself and Deputy Ludwig, that Sheriff Stacey was in charge of himself, that he and Deputy Ludwig were assisting Sheriff Stacey, and that he had no control over Sheriff Stacey. His testimony was as follows: Q. Then it [Deputy Athay's affidavit] says, Because the car was then leaving Montpelier, I ordered that everybody back off even more. Were you in charge at this point in time? A. I was in charge of me and Deputy Ludwig. Q. And do you know, did you consider yourself as being in charge of Sheriff Stacey? A. No. Q. Had he requested your assistance? A. Yes. Q. And you were assisting him? A. That's correct. .... Q. Does that mean he was in charge? A. That means he's in charge of Dale. He doesn't give me direction. I don't have any control over him either. There is simply no evidence supporting the contention that Sheriff Stacey was an employee of Bear Lake County during the pursuit. Therefore, there is no basis for holding Bear Lake County liable for his conduct under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Relying upon Idaho Code § 6-803(5), [7] the Plaintiff also argues that Deputy Athay could be jointly and severally liable for any damages awarded against Sheriff Stacey because they were acting in concert during the pursuit in that they were pursuing a common plan which resulted in the commission of a reckless tortious act. The action against Bear Lake County is based upon the Idaho Tort Claims Act. That act provides, [T]he governmental entity is subject to liability only for the pro rata share of the total damages awarded in favor of a claimant which is attributable to the negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions of the governmental entity or its employees. I.C. § 6-903(a). Bear Lake County can be liable only for the conduct of its employee Deputy Athay. It cannot be liable for the conduct of Sheriff Stacey. Therefore, joint and several liability does not apply. Where two statutes appear to apply to the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control over the more general statute. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (2002). Idaho Code § 6-803 is a general statute, while Idaho Code § 6-903(a) is a specific statute limiting the liability of governmental entities. The district court did not err in dismissing this action as to Bear Lake County.