Opinion ID: 802787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amended Complaint and Discovery Motions

Text: Pedicini also challenges the denial of his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and the denial of his motion for additional discovery. We review the district court’s decision in both regards for an abuse of discretion. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nat’l Football League, 491 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir. 2007); Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 569 (6th Cir. 2003). Pedicini argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing leave to amend the complaint in light of LICOA’s failure to disclose that the Kentucky Department of Insurance found that LICOA’s change in the interpretation of “actual charges” discriminated against policyholders and violated KRS 304.12-080. See R. 68-6 (Rate Filing Approval Order at 2). Pedicini requests that the complaint be amended to reflect an additional cause of action for discrimination under Kentucky law as well as additional evidence obtained during discovery in support of the bad-faith claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Pedicini’s request to add the discrimination claim was untimely and should have been made prior to the resolution of the breach-of-contract claim. Counsel’s questioning during the Casey deposition gave clear indication that counsel was aware of possible claims of discrimination in relation 4 Although in a distinct factual context, this Court also recently reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant on a bad-faith claim under Kentucky law. See Phelps v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 1889396,  (6th Cir. May 25, 2012). Nos. 10-6270/6301 Pedicini v. Life Ins. Co. of Ala. Page 12 to LICOA’s new charging policy, and counsel did not need the Kentucky Department of Insurance’s finding to plead this claim. See R. 32 (Casey Dep. at 140:4-141:1). However, in light of our reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of LICOA on the bad-faith claims, we remand for further consideration by the district court as to whether leave to amend the complaint in support of the bad-faith claims is proper. Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of LICOA on the bad-faith claims, Pedicini’s objections to a decision on summary judgment prior to additional discovery are moot. In light of the remand, however, the district judge may consider whether any further discovery is necessary or appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s rulings on both motions.