Opinion ID: 173398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII and Disparate Impact

Text: Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, it is unlawful for an employer to “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 2 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in ruling on the summary judgment motion when it did because the District Court had informed the parties that the July 21 hearing would be limited to questions relating to class certification. Because we will reverse the District Courts’s order granting summary judgment on other grounds, we need not decide this issue. 3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(4). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 6 color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). This prohibition against disparate impact is distinct from disparate treatment by an employer, which requires a showing of discriminatory intent. Under Section 2000e-2(a)(2), an otherwise facially neutral business practice that disproportionately affects or impacts a protected group may be unlawful. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see also Lanning v. SEPTA, 181 F.3d 478, 485 (3d Cir. 1999). “Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by rooting out artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary employer-created barriers to professional development that have a discriminatory impact upon individuals.” Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has noted that “[i]n considering claims of disparate impact . . . this Court has consistently focused on employment and promotion requirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportunities. This Court has never . . . requir[ed] the focus to be placed . . . on the overall number of minority or female applicants actually hired or promoted.” Id. at 450. A prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination has two components. First, a plaintiff must identify “the specific employment practice that is challenged.” Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). Second, the plaintiff must show that the employment practice “causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). To show causation, the plaintiff must present “statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the 7 practice in question has caused exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.” Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; see also EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1980). If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the employment practice at issue is job related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.4 Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(k)(1) (clarifying that to maintain a claim, plaintiff must make out a prima facie case and the employer must then “fail[] to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”).5