Opinion ID: 517318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: bailey

Text: 29 Defendant Paul Bailey (Bailey) argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Bailey contends that, although he purchased cocaine from time to time in small amounts, he never sold cocaine to anyone, and knew of no waitresses who sold cocaine out of his bar. He admits to using cocaine constantly in 1984, spending most of his money on cocaine for himself and his wife. 30 However, at trial, the government presented several witnesses who testified that they either sold cocaine to Bailey on a regular basis in quantities of one-half ounce to two ounces, or that Bailey either gave or sold them cocaine which they then sold to others. The primary witness against Bailey was the manager at his bar, Nancy Smith. Smith testified that Bailey gave her packets of cocaine which were given to the waitresses and dancers to sell to the customers. Smith stated that the women received 10% commission while the remaining 90% was turned over to Bailey. For helping him with the packaging and processing of the cocaine at the paint factory, Smith received small quantities of cocaine. 31 Bailey contends that the jury could not properly convict him of conspiracy to distribute cocaine based on these facts; but he admitted giving cocaine to his wife and sons, thus conceding that he was guilty of distribution. To prove conspiracy in drug cases the government must establish that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir.1986). Participation in the conspiracy's common purpose and plan may be inferred from the defendant's actions and reactions to circumstances. Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir.1981)). The connection of the defendant to the conspiracy need only be slight, if there is sufficient evidence to establish that connection beyond a reasonable doubt. Christian, 786 F.2d at 211 (quoting United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038 (1980)). 32 On appeal, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence this court must determine whether: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Christian, 786 F.2d at 211 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis supplied)). In this case, several witnesses, including Bailey testified that Bailey purchased cocaine from Mark Johnson and other distributors in Flint, and gave or sold cocaine to others. Bailey also volunteered to supply drug paraphenelia (washing solvents manufactured at his paint factory) to the Columbian suppliers. Accordingly, it is clear that Bailey participated in the conspiracy motivating this case. Bailey's conviction is therefore supported by sufficient evidence. 33 Bailey also argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the government to introduce evidence that he threatened government witnesses. Several witnesses testified that they had been threatened by Bailey or others on his behalf, to discourage them from testifying against him in this case. At trial, this evidence was objected to on the grounds that it was irrelevant; however, on appeal, defense counsel argues that although relevant the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. FED.R.EVID. 403. We may only consider this claim under the plain error standard since Bailey's counsel did not raise a Rule 403 objection at trial. We find that it was not plain error to admit this evidence. 34 In his appeal, Bailey requests reversal of the conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel; however, he fails to show how his attorney's deficient conduct prejudiced him as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail in an argument challenging the assistance of counsel, a defendant must: 35 First, ... show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 36 Id. at 687. A careful review of the trial transcript reveals that Bailey's counsel was not deficient, and, even if he erred there is no proof that his performance prejudiced the defense. Moreover, Bailey testified at trial, thus giving the jury an opportunity to evaluate his credibility for themselves. 37 Bailey's final argument challenges the court's decision to admit the testimony of an experienced DEA agent. Called as an expert witness, DEA Agent Krentler's testimony undermined Bailey's defense that he purchased cocaine for his personal use and not for distribution. Bailey contends that even an experienced DEA agent may not testify as to how much cocaine can be ingested through the nose if that information is not part of his personal knowledge. However, this court has previously held that general experience may qualify a witness as an expert. See United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6th Cir.1977). In United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535 (6th Cir.1985), we agreed with the trial court's decision to permit police officers to define certain words used in the transportation, receipt and disposal of stolen property. Id. at 542. Similarly, the trial court in this case did not err by permitting DEA Agent Krentler, to testify about the actual usage of cocaine as reported to him by the habitual users he had come in contact with during his sixteen years of experience as a drug enforcement officer. 38 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgments of conviction are AFFIRMED.