Opinion ID: 619293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coconspirator Statement

Text: For an out-of-court statement to be admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), the offering party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and that the coconspirator's statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 920 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir.1994). These findings, often referred to as Enright findings, must be made by the district court. See United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986-87 (6th Cir.1978). If the statement is admitted conditionally but the government fails to carry its burden by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court should grant a mistrial unless convinced that a cautionary instruction would shield the defendant from prejudice. See United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir.1979). The government elicited through Wood an out-of-court statement by Coon indicating that Coon intended to trade a handgun to defendant in partial payment for heroin. Over defense counsel's objection and despite an attempt to impeach Wood with his prior grand jury testimony, the district court found that the statement was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and denied defendant's motion for a mistrial. This court reviews the district court's conclusions of law de novo, and its factual determinations for clear error. See United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir.2006). Defense counsel's hearsay objection was initially sustained, but the government's proffer satisfied the district court that the necessary showing could be made under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). By way of foundation, Wood testified that on one occasion when he and Coon drove to Columbus to obtain heroin from defendant, Coon had a silver and black .380 caliber handgun with him. When they got there, Coon got out of the car with money and the handgun and returned to the car with the heroin and without the handgun. Then, over defense counsel's continuing objection, Wood testified as follows: Q: At any point in time, sir, did Mr. Coon explain to you why he brought that.380 with him? A: Yes he did. Q: What did he tell you? A: He was short on his money, his part of the money, and he had asked Ron [Kelsor] if he would take the gun in exchange for the rest of the money that he owed for the heroin. On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Wood with his statement before the grand jury that he found out about it later. Wood clarified on redirect examination, however, that Coon told him about trading the handgun to the defendant on the way to Columbus, and that what Wood did not find out about until later was that Coon had told the defendant that Wood was planning to rob him (apparently in an effort to persuade the defendant to take the handgun). As the prosecutor emphasized during the redirect examination, Wood testified before the grand jury that Coon discussed it on the phone with Ron [Kelsor] before he picked me up. Then told me he was selling the gun, but never told me why. I found it out later. To clarify, Wood was asked before the grand jury: So you didn't know that Paul [Coon] had told Ron Kelsor that you were going to rob him until afterwards? You found that out afterwards? Wood answered, Correct. Defense counsel renewed the objection, moving to strike the testimony and for a mistrial. The district court heard arguments, reviewed the relevant grand jury testimony, and commented that the jury might have to resolve the question of whether Wood's testimony was inconsistent about when Coon made the statement. Seizing on that comment, defendant argues that the district court erred by giving weight to the jury's obligation to assess credibility in deciding the threshold question of admissibility. On the contrary, the district court's ruling on the motion the following morning explicitly recognized that the question of admissibility was a matter for the court to determine and that the jury was not to be instructed on the issue. [4] In deciding the motion, the district court articulated the proper standards, made explicit findings with respect to each of the Enright findings, concluded that the statement was properly admitted, and denied the motion for a mistrial. Defendant does not contest the district court's findings that a conspiracy existed; that defendant, Wood, and Coon were all members of that conspiracy; or that defendant knew that Wood and Coon were obtaining heroin from him for further distribution. Rather, relying on the alleged inconsistency about when Coon made the statement, defendant argues that it was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. A statement is made in furtherance of a conspiracy if it was intended to promote conspiratorial objectives; it need not actually further the conspiracy. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 449 (6th Cir.2001). Statements in furtherance of a conspiracy take many forms, including statements that keep a coconspirator apprised of another's activities, induce continued participation, or allay his fears. Id. at 450. Defendant has not shown that it was clear error to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Coon made the statement in the car on the way to meet the defendant, or that what Wood found out later, and probably not from Coon, was that Coon had told the defendant that Wood was planning to rob him. A preponderance of the evidence established that the statement was made in the course and furtherance of the conspiracy. Specifically, there was evidence that, as was their practice, Wood and Coon pooled their money to conduct a single transaction with the defendant. But, short on his portion of the money on this occasion, Coon explained to Wood that he had asked the defendant to accept the handgun in partial payment of their joint purchase. The district court did not err in finding that the statement was intended to promote conspiratorial objectives. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement or denying the motion for mistrial. [5]