Opinion ID: 183143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: restitution and disgorgement

Text: Plaintiffs argue that § 14704(a)(1)'s provision authorizing the court to provide injunctive relief permits them to seek restitution and disgorgement for Swift's past violation of Truth-in-Leasing regulations. They contend the district court erred in finding that the statute confined the court's equitable powers to injunctive relief only. The district court notes that this is not a settled issue in the Ninth Circuit. OOIDA v. Swift Transp. Co ., No. CV-02-1059-PHX-PGR, 2009 WL 2983206, at  (D.Ariz. Sept. 15, 2009). However, the district court's approach is supported by both the statutory text, 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1) (A person may bring a civil action for injunctive relief....), and out-of-circuit case law on this issue. See Landstar II, 622 F.3d at 1324 (Injunctive relief constitutes a distinct type of equitable relief; it is not an umbrella term that encompasses restitution or disgorgement.) (citing OOIDA v. New Prime, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 537, 545 (W.D.Mo.2002)); C.R. England, 508 F.Supp.2d at 983-84 (concluding that § 14704 only authorized injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees). Plaintiffs argue that courts always retain their full equitable powers unless a statute expressly removes them. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946). However, Porter and its progeny contain the caveat that unless otherwise provided by statute, the court retains its full equitable powers. See id. at 398-99, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (construing a statute giving the district court power, upon a proper showing, to grant `a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order' ) (emphasis added); see also CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir.1982) (construing a statute with open-ended language conferring powers on the court); CFTC v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 531 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir.2008) (same). In this case, by contrast, the statute has done precisely that; it has provided a different scheme of enforcement, listing only injunctive relief to the exclusion of other equitable remedies. Indeed, it `is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.' Landstar II, 622 F.3d at 1323-24 (quoting Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 488, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996)). Therefore, the district court's reading of the statute is the most sensible in light of longstanding case law and principles of statutory interpretation. Plaintiffs also attempt to argue that Swift I, the Ninth Circuit's earlier opinion in this case, supports their position with regard to the availability of equitable remedies. 367 F.3d 1108, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 2004). However, Swift I's discussion of traditional equitable discretion relates solely to the test courts should use in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction. It is thus inapposite to the question presented here as it concerns the court's discretion to determine the appropriateness of injunctive relief, not its discretion to award other forms of equitable relief in the face of a statute providing only for injunctive relief. Id. at 1112. We affirm the district court's determination that restitution and disgorgement are not permitted under § 14704(a)(1).