Opinion ID: 183028
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The public employee balancing test applies

Text: Before addressing whether Clairmont has demonstrated that Wilson violated his constitutional rights, we must first determine whether Clairmont should be considered a public employee or a private citizen. [T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. This is because the government, as an employer, has an interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Id. As a result, a governmental employer may impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraints that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (per curiam). When a plaintiff is a public employee, we apply a test that balances the government's legitimate administrative interests as an employer against the employee's interests in free speech, to determine whether the government has violated the employee's First Amendment right to speak freely. See id. Accordingly, in evaluating whether a plaintiff should be considered a public employee, we consider whether the relationship between the parties is analogous to that between an employer and employee and whether the rationale for balancing the government's interests in efficient performance of public services against public employees' speech rights applies. Care-Partners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 881 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 932-34 (5th Cir.1995)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2382, 173 L.Ed.2d 1294 (2009). An independent contractor who provides services to the government is generally treated like a public employee for purposes of determining whether the contractor has alleged a violation of his First Amendment rights. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673-74, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996). In Umbehr, the Court noted the similarities between an independent contractor and a public employee, recognizing both an independent contractor's interests in financially valuable government contract work and the government's need to be free to terminate an independent contractor (1) to respond to poor performance; (2) to improve efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness; and (3) to prevent the appearance of corruption. Id. at 674, 116 S.Ct. 2342. Recognizing that independent contractors are protected by the First Amendment from retaliatory government action, the Court held that the Pickering test, determines the extent of their protection. Id. at 673, 116 S.Ct. 2342. Thus, [w]hen a business vendor operates under a contract with a public agency, we analyze its First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 using the same basic approach that we would use if the claim had been raised by an employee of the agency. Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.2004). Clairmont was not employed by the Municipal Court; he worked for SMH, a private company. Therefore, it is not immediately obvious whether he should be treated as a public employee, an independent contractor, or as a private citizen. Clairmont argues that, because he was not employed by the Municipal Court, he should be treated as a private citizen. As Clairmont notes, although the Probation Unit relies on the information it receives from Treatment providers, it provides no direct funding to these organizations, nor does it have control over the certification, programming, hiring, or firing by the various Treatment providers. There is also no evidence in the record that there was any obligation or even authorization for Wilson to threaten SMH that the Probation Unit would stop making referrals if management did not make the changes that she wanted, such as removing Clairmont from his position. [5] As Clairmont points out, under the applicable regulation, the authority to investigate complaints against Treatment providers and to impose sanctions rests with the Department of Social and Health Services, not the Probation Unit. Wash. Admin. Code § XXX-XX-XXXX. Thus, under this regulation, if Wilson had concerns about SMH's Treatment program, she could have contacted the Department of Social and Health Services officials and asked them to conduct an investigation. Clairmont argues that SMH, like other Treatment providers, is simply a licensee that is regulated by the state. This argument might have some force were it not for the unique relationship between the Municipal Court and SMH. Although SMH was licensed by the state as a Treatment provider, and listed as a provider of such services, it offered its services at the courthouse and maintained a close relationship with representatives from the Probation Unit. Under the terms of its contract with the Municipal Court, SMH provide[d] screening and referral case management and consultation to the Probation Unit. SMH was also required to provide staff coverage in the court Resource Center 40 hours per week. Further, [a]ll SMH staff [had to] submit a monthly report ... to document the number of participant's [sic] served, direct services rendered, number of service hours, and linkages to other court and community based services. The contract further provided that SMH's work shall, at all times, be subject to the City's [through the Municipal Court] general review and approval. Finally, as noted above, the contract characterized the relationship between SMH and the Municipal Court as that of an independent contractor. Clairmont was not a signatory to the contract, but SMH could not provide Treatment services without certified individual providers like Clairmont. Although Clairmont was not a Municipal Court employee, given the nature of the relationship between the court and SMH, the nature of the services provided by SMH, and Clairmont's role in the provision of such services, we conclude that his relationship to the Municipal Court was analogous to that of an employer and employee. Further, given the Probation Unit's need to ensure that SMH's services were properly provided to court-ordered Treatment participants, the balance tips in favor of treating Clairmont as a public employee for purposes of determining whether he has alleged a viable First Amendment retaliation claim. We therefore review Clairmont's First Amendment retaliation claim using the Pickering balancing test set forth below.