Opinion ID: 2778728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allocution Advice

Text: Israel and the Government disagree on the question of whether the district court correctly determined that trial counsel had no duty to give advice about the purpose of allocution. The right of allocution in federal courts is a statutory one, not a constitutional one, and it is provided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii): “Before imposing sentence, the court must: . . . address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence . . . .” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii); see United States v. De La Paz, 698 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining the nature of the allocution right). The parties have not cited and we have not located any federal circuit decisions squarely addressing the question of constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel as it relates to advice about allocution. We conclude that it is unnecessary to decide this question because even if we assume for the sake of argument that trial counsel had such a duty and failed to give such advice, the district court did not err in determining that Israel was not prejudiced. Pursuant to Strickland’s prejudice prong, Israel bears the burden of demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 4 Thus, we do not and need not decide whether to adopt the reasoning of United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010), because, even assuming a duty to give advice regarding the presentence interview, we conclude that the district court did not err in its determination that trial counsel’s advice was strategic. 8 Case: 13-50348 Document: 00512933528 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 No. 13-50348 694. “This is a heavy burden which requires a ‘substantial,’ and not just a ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787, 792 (2011)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011); Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 1997) (“To prevail on the prejudice prong of Strickland, there must be more than the mere possibility of a different outcome.”). Israel does not clearly articulate the precise advice that he should have received, but assuming, without deciding, that his trial counsel should have told him the purpose of allocution is “to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii), nothing in the evidence he presented shows what difference such advice might have made. Instead, it is perfectly logical that minimizing one’s role in an offense, admitting one’s mistake, and showing regret—as Israel did during allocution—would be “information to mitigate a sentence.” Israel’s current evidence, which consists solely of his own affidavit and the sentencing transcript, does not address how he might have reacted to such advice. Instead, he asserts that if he “had understood that the point of addressing the judge was to show why I pleaded guilty . . . I would have told the judge the facts like what I had confessed and admitted in the factual basis.” Thus, Israel has not produced evidence showing that, given proper advice from counsel, he would have stated anything differently that would be substantially likely to produce a different result. See Wines, 691 F.3d at 604. In addition, even assuming a duty to give advice about allocution, Israel does not and cannot suggest that trial counsel must give the defendant a script. Nor is allocution specifically a time to talk about “why I pleaded guilty.” A defendant is free to talk about that, of course, but that is not its specific purpose. 9 Case: 13-50348 Document: 00512933528 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 No. 13-50348 Even so, assuming arguendo that his affidavit shows that he would have “told the judge the facts like what [he] confessed and admitted in the factual basis,” it is not these facts that are the problem. In his factual basis, Israel says nothing about the Cardenas transactions or any transactions other than the September 2003 conduct. It is these points that Israel did not address at any time prior to sentencing, denied at sentencing, and, to this day, has not admitted. Reviewing this evidence, the district judge concluded that there was nothing to “reconsider” about his original sentence. Brito, No. 2:07-CR-132AM, order at 13 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2013), ECF No. 165. We review the district judge’s factual findings for clear error, and we conclude none has been shown here. See United States v. Missio, 597 F.2d 60, 61–62 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Foster v. Wolfenbarger, 687 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We give due deference to the conclusions of the trial judge on the effectiveness of counsel, because ‘[t]he judge, having observed the earlier trial, should have an advantageous perspective for determining the effectiveness of counsel’s conduct and whether any deficiencies were prejudicial.’” (quoting Massaro, 538 U.S. at 506)). In Missio, the petitioner filed a § 2255 petition arguing that six convictions included in his presentence report were unconstitutionally obtained and should not have been considered by the district judge at sentencing. 597 F.2d at 60. We determined that it was not clear from the transcript of the sentencing hearing whether the district judge had relied on the six convictions in imposing sentence. Id. at 61–62 & n.1. As in Missio, it is unclear from the transcript of the sentencing hearing what the district judge meant when she said that she was considering a below-guidelines sentence but “was waiting to hear something from Mr. Brito.” Since the same judge presided over sentencing and the § 2255 proceeding, she is “in the best position to know” what she meant by this statement. 597 F.2d at 61. Her statements in the 10 Case: 13-50348 Document: 00512933528 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/11/2015 No. 13-50348 order denying the § 2255 petition that Israel still has not accepted responsibility for relevant conduct and “has provided nothing to the Court that would warrant any reconsideration of his sentence,” indicates that, at sentencing, she was “waiting to hear” something Israel has yet to say despite all the time that has passed and the filing of Israel’s affidavit in the § 2255 proceeding. 5 The district judge’s determination that Israel still has not stated what she was “waiting to hear” at the sentencing hearing is a factual finding that is not clearly erroneous. This finding supports the conclusion that Israel failed to meet his burden of showing “a ‘substantial,’ and not just a ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Wines, 691 F.3d at 604 (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787, 792). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying relief on this issue. AFFIRMED. 5See Brito, No. 2:07-CR-132-AM, order at 12–13 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2013), ECF No. 165 (“Most importantly, there is absolutely no indication in his § 2255 motion that he has now fully accepted responsibility. Although he has submitted an affidavit admitting his guilt, it amounts to nothing more than admitting to conduct discussed in the factual basis of the plea agreement . . . . Brito still has not admitted to his post-2003 connection with Cesar Brito and Adriana Cardenas.” (citations omitted)). 11