Opinion ID: 1711324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: limiting defense counsel's questioning on voir dire

Text: Roberts contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objections to certain of defense counsel's questions on voir dire. He also contends that the trial court allowed the state greater opportunities to conduct voir dire than the defense, in that the state was sometimes allowed to ask additional questions after the defense had finished. Control of voir dire, including the nature and extent of the questioning, is within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 852 (Mo.1996); State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Mo. 1995). Only abuse of discretion and likely injustice justify reversal. Storey at 892. Roberts contends he was prejudiced because, as a result of the trial court's rulings, he was unable to obtain necessary information to support possible peremptory strikes. The trial court sustained the state's objection when defense counsel asked a small group of venirepersons whether anyone felt that death was preferable to life in prison without parole. Roberts claims this question was necessary to determine bias. However, defense counsel stated at voir dire that he felt he pretty much [had] everybody's view on whether they could consider a sentence of life without parole or would instead automatically vote for the death penalty. Defense counsel had ample opportunity to voir dire the panel. Disallowing that single question would not and did not result in likely prejudice to Roberts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the state's objection. Roberts raises other questions that he believes he should have been allowed to ask. However, the prospective jurors of whom he wished to ask these questions did not serve on the jury. Thus, Roberts cannot show actual prejudice arising from the fact that he could not question those jurors further. Finally, Roberts observes that the state had more opportunities to voir dire prospective jurors than the defense. On three occasions, the trial court allowed the state to ask additional questions of particular jurors after the defense had finished death qualification of the small group of the venire panel. In the first instance, the trial court had cut off the state's initial voir dire so as to allow the defense to proceed, but promised the state that it could ask its remaining questions when the defense concluded. In the other two instances, the state was allowed to further question one juror regarding equivocal answers. Roberts has made no showing how he was prejudiced by this act of the trial court. None of the venirepersons subjected to additional questioning actually sat on Roberts's jury. Roberts made no contention that at any time he had additional questions to ask and was denied the opportunity to do so. Of the six jurors who were further questioned during death qualification, only two were stricken for cause at that point, and as to one of these, the defense agreed. In short, there is nothing to suggest that Roberts was unable sufficiently to voir dire the panel, that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the state's objections, or that Roberts suffered any prejudice because of the trial court's rulings. The point is denied.