Opinion ID: 16329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fourth Amendment and Assertion of Rights

Text: Barnes argues that prior to the videotaping of his fourth statement, he invoked his right to remain silent. Therefore, any statements made after this point could not have been admitted at trial without violating his constitutional rights. The transcript of Sergeant Belk’s exchange with Barnes, however, makes it clear that at no point did Barnes unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent. Therefore, Belk did not violate Barnes’s Fifth Amendment rights by continuing the videotaped 14 statement and the trial court did not err in admitting it. The alleged invocation was recorded on videotape. The transcript of that incident is as follows: Q: I’m Sergeant J.W. Belk. A: I’m Willis Jay Barnes. Q: Okay, Willis. That’s B-A-R-N-E-S. A: B-A-R-N-E-S. Q: Okay. I’m going to read you your warnings, and if at any point you don’t understand, stop me and we will go through it. A: Okay. Q: You have the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that statement you make may be used against you and probably will be used against you at trial. Do you understand that right? A: I understand it. Q: Do you waive this right? A: No. Q: Okay, do you understand what “waive” means? A: It mean, uh, do I waive rights for you to do it, right? Q: Well, it’s explained . . . . you have the right to remain silent . . . . A: Right. Q: And you can remain silent and not say anything at all, or you can waive that right . . . . A: Right, that’s what I’m saying. I waive what I’m saying, it’s okay, what I’m saying is I’m giving you the right to put me that . . . to ask me these questions. All right? Q: Okay, and so you’re waiving your right to remain silent and you are talking. A: I am talking. Q: Okay, so you understand that right . . . A: I understand that right. Q: And you are waiving that right? A: Right. Q: Okay. After this exchange, Belk continued videotaping and Barnes gave his fourth statement, which was consistent with his third written statement. The question raised by this dialogue is whether Belk should have immediately ceased interrogation after Barnes replied “No.” 15 Barnes argues that by continuing beyond this apparent invocation, Belk denied Barnes his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Supreme Court has held that if a suspect “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474-75, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). In this case, it was not clear that the suspect wished to remain silent. Indeed, considering Barnes’s previous statements and the fact that Barnes himself had initiated this particular discussion, Belk had every reason to believe that Barnes wished to talk. The Supreme Court’s most recent exposition on ambiguous invocations was in the context of whether a suspect invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the Court held that the determination of whether a suspect invoked his right to counsel is an objective one. The question is whether the suspect “articulate[d] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id. Other circuits have held that this “objective inquiry” into ambiguity is applicable to invocations of the right to remain silent.2 2 See e.g. Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1100 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2505 (1996) (applying Davis’s objective inquiry to determine whether suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent was ambiguous or equivocal); United States 16 This circuit has not yet determined whether the Davis analysis is applicable to invocations of the right to remain silent. However, because Section 2254 is specifically focused on federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, we need not decide that issue here. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). We only need to decide whether the state court’s decision to admit the fourth statement was contrary to clear Supreme Court law. In light of the language and logic of the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, we cannot say that it was. The majority opinion in Davis held that when faced with an ambiguous invocation of a right, an interrogator was not required to ask clarifying questions. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. Nevertheless, the Court noted that it will “often be good police practice for the interviewing officers” to ask clarifying questions. Id. Thus, in the present case, Belk went beyond what the Supreme Court required and followed what the Court described as “good police practice.” He was presented with an ambiguous and surprising apparent invocation. He asked a few v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1197 (7th Cir.) (same), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 478 (1996); c.f. United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 140 (1996) (assuming, arguendo, that Davis applies to invocations of the right to remain silent, but not holding that it definitely does); see also United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Davis while determining whether right to remain silent had been invoked). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has also applied the Davis analysis to invocations of the right to remain silent. Dowthitt v. Texas, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Davis and holding that statement, “I can’t say more than that. I need to rest.” was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent). 17 explanatory, noncoercive questions that revealed that Barnes did not wish to invoke his right to remain silent. In light of Davis and this clear record--in which an ambiguous statement was made and noncoercive clarifying questions revealed no intent to invoke the right to remain silent--the trial court’s admission of the fourth, videotaped statement is not contrary to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . . .” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).3