Opinion ID: 2338745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Counterclaim against National

Text: On September 19, 1988, Corto sought permission from the trial court under Rule 13(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure to file a permissive counterclaim against National alleging that National engaged in abuse of process when it attached property having a value of more than $18,500, the amount National claimed it was owed. On January 20, 1991, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that if Corto were permitted to then file the counterclaim, her claim for abuse of process would be barred by the three-year statute of limitations, and granted summary judgment to National on Corto's counterclaim. [11] Corto contends that the trial court erred because her filing of the motion to submit the counterclaim two days before the limitations period expired tolled the statute of limitations. We do not reach the merits of Corto's argument because we conclude that Corto's counterclaim that the value of the property attached exceeded National's claim would necessarily fail in light of the trial court's finding that the value of the box office receipts and production property held by the Kennedy Center did not exceed $18,500. [12] Therefore, even assuming the counterclaim was timely, because the factual foundation for the counterclaimthat the property attached was worth more than $18,500is incorrect, National was entitled to summary judgment. Corto also argues that her counterclaim against National should have been permitted because it would have been available in recoupment notwithstanding the running of the statute of limitations, citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Goudie, 290 A.2d 826 (D.C. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049, 93 S.Ct. 523, 34 L.Ed.2d 501 (1972). Sears does not provide the support Corto seeks. The only way recoupment can be had is by a legal or equitable right resulting from a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction. Baylor v. Bortolussi, 194 A.2d 653, 656 (D.C.1963) (quoting Howard Johnson, Inc. of Florida v. Tucker, 157 F.2d 959, 961 (5th Cir.1946)). Corto's counterclaim against National does not arise from the same contract giving rise to National's claim against Corto to recover payment due for services performed. Therefore, Corto is precluded from bringing a claim in recoupment against National. See McGuire v. Gerstley, 26 App. D.C. 193, 204 (1905), aff'd on other grounds, 204 U.S. 489, 27 S.Ct. 332, 51 L.Ed. 581 (1907).