Opinion ID: 788706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The absence of delay.

Text: 48 The bankruptcy court began by commenting that Debtor had moved for rejection of the leases immediately upon filing its bankruptcy petition and had scheduled a hearing virtually as soon as possible: 49 It wasn't perfect. It wasn't done absolutely as soon as possible, but it was done without any delay. There was a holiday in here.... There was neither any deliberate use of a long notice period to keep their options open nor in fact as I can see it any indifference to the timing concerns of the landlord. This is virtually as soon as possible in this particular case. 50 Pacific Shores takes issue with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Debtor set its motion for hearing virtually as soon as possible. 51 The bankruptcy court itself noted that Debtor should have asked Pacific Shores to stipulate to an immediate rejection of the leases upon filing for bankruptcy. It is, of course, speculative whether Pacific Shores would have agreed, knowing that, by doing so, it would lose $1 million in administrative rent. But even if that option had been available, we cannot say that the bankruptcy court's finding that Debtor moved swiftly to reject the leases is clearly erroneous. The minimal delay in bringing the motion to a hearing was due in part to factors outside Debtor's control, including a court holiday and the fact that a creditors' committee had yet to form by the time of the first day emergency motions. 52 Pacific Shores nonetheless argues that, in granting Debtor's motion, the bankruptcy court improperly shifted the burden of justifying delay to the landlord. As we noted in Pacific-Atlantic Trading, [b]y requiring the trustee to timely pay the debtor's rent, Congress clearly placed the burden on the trustee to promptly and properly reject the lease if it has no intention of assuming it. 27 F.3d at 405. Several other courts also have interpreted the amended § 365(d)(3) as a mechanism to shift to the debtor the costs of delay. See, e.g., Paul Harris Stores, 148 B.R. at 310; Federated Dep't Stores, 131 B.R. at 815. 53 This argument misunderstands the import of the bankruptcy court's finding. The bankruptcy court did not require Pacific Shores to bear the costs associated with a delay. Rather, the court concluded that there was no appreciable delay in the first place. That conclusion is consistent with the approach taken by other bankruptcy courts in similar situations. In Paul Harris Stores, for example, the court held that the effective date of rejection was the date on which the court approved the motion to reject, in part because [t]he gap i[n] this case — four months, due in part to extensions of time — could hardly be considered small. 148 B.R. at 311. 4 By contrast, the court in In re Amber's Stores granted the motion to reject as of the motion filing date, where the debtor served a motion to reject the lease as soon as possible.  193 B.R. at 827 (emphasis added). 54 The bankruptcy court found that Debtor brought its motion before the court at the earliest practicable date. See Thinking Machines, 67 F.3d at 1028 (explaining that retroactive relief in § 365 cases encourages resolution of a motion to reject at the earliest practicable date). That finding is not clearly erroneous, nor was the court's reliance on it an abuse of discretion. 55