Opinion ID: 2101921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Law Enforcement Immunity

Text: Following the decision in Campbell, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733, the legislature passed the Indiana Tort Claims Act which regulated these common law rights with the creation of notice requirements, limitations on recovery, and immunity provisions. The so-called law enforcement immunity at issue here was one of the immunity provisions included in the Act. Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-3(7). Inasmuch as the allegations in Seymour involved the breach of a police officer's private duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle upon a public highway, see Ind. Code § 9-13-2-6 and Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8, this Court's task in Seymour should have been to determine to what extent, if any, the legislature intended Section 3(7) to alter the common law right of citizens to seek recovery for the breach of this private duty. [5] Instead, the Seymour majority held that the meaning of the term enforcement of a law was clear, and that all acts of enforcement save false arrest and imprisonment now render the State immune. 422 N.E.2d at 1226. This statement resulted in an immunity co-extensive with the statutory obligations placed on governmental entities and their employees; that is, whenever a governmental employee acted pursuant to some statutory authority, that governmental employee and his employer would be immune from liability. In the various decisions following, the Court of Appeals relied on Seymour to extend law enforcement immunity to encompass many acts within the scope of a law enforcement officer's employment. See, e.g., City of Valparaiso v. Edgecomb (1991), Ind. App., 569 N.E.2d 746, vacated, (1992) Ind., 587 N.E.2d 96 (collision while officer led funeral procession); Tittle v. Mahan (1991), Ind. App., 566 N.E.2d 1064, vacated, (1991) Ind., 582 N.E.2d 796 (care of prisoner awaiting trial); City of Wakarusa v. Holdeman (1990), Ind. App., 560 N.E.2d 109, vacated, (1991) Ind., 582 N.E.2d 802 (rear-end collision while officer looked in rear-view mirror for possible license plate violations); Bevis v. City of Indianapolis (1991), Ind. App., 565 N.E.2d 772 (rear-end collision on route to assist burglary investigation); Carver v. Crawford (1990), Ind. App., 564 N.E.2d 330 (squad car crossed center line on route to investigate suicide); McFarlin v. State (1988), Ind. App., 524 N.E.2d 807 (providing flares at the scene of an accident); City of Gary v. Cox (1987), Ind. App., 512 N.E.2d 452 (bystander shot as prisoner escaped); Weber v. City of Fort Wayne (1987), Ind. App., 511 N.E.2d 1074 (rear-end collision on route to investigate traffic accident); Crews v. Brockman (1987), Ind. App., 510 N.E.2d 707 (collision when squad car entered intersection against red light); Indiana State Police Dept. v. Swaggerty (1987), Ind. App., 507 N.E.2d 649 (collision when officer ran red light on way to assist in a chase); Indiana State Police v. May (1984), Ind. App., 469 N.E.2d 1183 (canisters of tear gas fired into citizen's home to apprehend fleeing suspect). In their dissents to Seymour, Justices DeBruler and Hunter opined that the meaning of Section 3(7) was ambiguous, and urged that Section 3(7) be construed in a manner to avoid unjust or harsh results to those injured by acts of governmental employees. 422 N.E.2d at 1227. As Justice DeBruler wrote: Here, the immunity statute is in derogation of the common law and at odds with the statutory command that emergency vehicles be operated with due care. [ Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8] At common law this state police officer would be required to respond in damages for injuries resulting from his negligent operation of the patrol car. To grant an immunity which would shield negligent and reckless conduct obviously leaves injured victims to suffer without any remedy. Were we to construe the vague immunity provision as being applicable only in circumstances in which the public employee's conduct involved a public duty only, impediment of the common law would be lessened, unjust consequences would be reduced in number, and the two statutes would be left viable and in harmony. This is the legal course charted by Judge Robertson, and I am convinced it is the correct one. 422 N.E.2d at 1227. In writing the Seymour opinion for the Court of Appeals, Judge Robertson described the public-private duty test of Campbell, and concluded that the obligation of a police officer to use reasonable care in the operation of a squad car was a private duty. 384 N.E.2d at 1187. Pursuant to that conclusion, at common law, a officer would not be immune for the breach of that duty. Judge Robertson also addressed whether Section 3(7) changed the common law. In doing so, he concluded that the term enforcement of the law rendered Section 3(7) ambiguous and ultimately concluded that the legislature intended enforcement to mean at least that the decision to enforce and the end result thereof upon the object of the enforcement (within the bounds of law) is protected activity and will not give rise to a civil action for damages. Id. at 1186. In other words, he reasoned that the decision of whether or not to investigate a crime, whether to arrest a particular individual for committing a crime, and the arrest itself were protected activities so long as the acts are otherwise conducted legally. He concluded that these activities were in the nature of the public duty owed by law enforcement officials to the community as a whole. Id. We believe this analysis comports with the legislature's intent when it drafted Section 3(7). This analysis also gives meaning to the exception in Section 3(7) that immunity does not apply if an officer's conduct results in false arrest or false imprisonment. To conclude that Section 3(7) confers immunity to all law enforcement activity conducted within the course and scope of employment, as did the Seymour majority, results in a statute in derogation of common law because prior to the Act, liability was imposed in connection with certain law enforcement activity. A statute in derogation of the common law is strictly construed against limitations on a claimant's common law right to bring suit. Collier v. Prater (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 497, 498. The Court presumes that the legislature does not intend to make any change in the common law beyond what a statute declares either in express terms or by unmistakable implication. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Structo Div., King Seeley Thermos Co. (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 597, 598. Granting immunity to law enforcement officers who fail to exercise reasonable care while driving would sanction negligent and reckless conduct, and result in hardship to the individual injured by the enforcement. Moreover, as Justice DeBruler noted in his dissent to Seymour, interpreting Section 3(7) to confer immunity in situations involving the operation of police vehicles on public streets conflicts with other statutes which regulate the operation of such vehicles. Specifically, Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8 provides that persons who drive an authorized emergency vehicle, such as a police car, are not relieved from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, even though such drivers may disobey certain rules of the road. [6] Where two statutes are in apparent conflict they should be construed, if it can be reasonably done, in a manner so as to bring them into harmony. Wright v. Gettinger (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 1212, 1219. Judge Robertson and Justices DeBruler and Hunter reasoned that Section 3(7) did not confer immunity to law enforcement activity outside the public duty owed to the community as a whole. Instead, governmental entities and their employees would be subject to liability for the breach of private duties as at common law. For example, having decided to respond to the report of a law being broken, the responding officer owes a duty of driving with reasonable care to other travelers on the highway. We are persuaded that this reasoning was correct. Accordingly, we hold that Section 3(7) was intended to codify the common law as it existed at the time the Act was passed. The state of the common law was such that governments and their employees were subject to liability for the breach of private duties owed to individuals, but were immune from liability for the breach of public duties owed to the public at large.