Opinion ID: 2994818
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Value of the security.

Text: Davuluri claims that Dr. Raju’s check was worthless because of the absence of Dr. Raju’s wife’s signature. He cites United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1978) and United States v. Teresa, 420 F.2d 13, 17-18 (4th Cir. 1969) which hold that facially invalid securities cannot be the basis for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314. He also argues that the value of stolen items is measured by the price a willing buyer would pay and that the only relevant buyer here, Merrill Lynch, was not willing to pay anything for Dr. Raju’s check. The government counters with cases from the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Urciuoli, 575 F.2d 768, 769 (9th Cir. 1978), which hold that an actually invalid instrument is still a security for purposes of 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314 as long as it appears to be valid, or could be made to appear valid with minor additions. The government claims that with the minor addition of Dr. Raju’s wife’s signature, the check would have appeared to be valid and thus is a security sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314. We need not decide into which line of cases Dr. Raju’s check would fall because the evidence produced at the trial permits a different approach. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2311 defines the word value as used in 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314 and provides that value means the face, par, or market value, whichever is the greatest. Dr. Raju testified that Fidelity had previously honored checks with only his signature and that others had accepted these checks as payment. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the market value of the check was the amount for which it was written, since similar checks had been given that value by market participants. Davuluri’s argument that the check was worthless because Merrill Lynch refused to accept it fails because this circuit’s case law establishes that the market value of fraudulently taken or stolen goods is the price a willing buyer will pay, United States v. Brookins, 52 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added), not what any particular idiosyncratic buyer will pay. For example, some businesses will not accept any checks but demand to be paid only in cash, but this hardly means that a check presented to and rejected by such a business becomes worthless. Likewise, the fact that Merrill Lynch’s particular policies were apparently more stringent than most other market participants Dr. Raju dealt with does not mean that his check becomes valueless because Merrill Lynch rejected it.