Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant's Confession to Unadjudicated Offenses

Text: On March 5, 1975, as part of the investigation into the incident involving Deborah T., Imperial Beach Police Officer Charles Hamilton informed defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and upon obtaining defendant's waiver, proceeded to ask defendant certain questions involving the matter. Defendant denied having been near the victim's window. After the interview concluded, Hamilton learned that a fingerprint expert had matched defendant's fingerprints to those found on Deborah T.'s window. The following morning, Hamilton visited defendant at Ream Field, the naval facility where defendant was stationed, and reread defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant said that he understood those rights, and asked: I have the right to an attorney? Hamilton responded affirmatively. When defendant asked, What if I can't afford one?, Hamilton replied, Then the court will appoint you one. Defendant thereafter asked whether the legal officer of the naval base could serve as his attorney. A naval investigator informed defendant that such an officer could not represent defendant in a civilian court of law. Defendant asked Hamilton whether he was going to be arrested. Hamilton responded affirmatively, informing defendant that approximately four hours would be required to obtain an arrest warrant. Defendant responded: Okay, I'll talk to you, what do you want to talk about? He thereafter described his involvement in other attacks upon women. At trial, defendant objected to the introduction of evidence pertaining to his confession to the unadjudicated offenses, on the ground that the foregoing colloquy evidenced defendant's invocation of his right not to speak with Hamilton. The trial court denied the challenge. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of defendant's confession, because Hamilton improperly refused to honor defendant's purported request for an attorney. Defendant's contention is unpersuasive. His inquiries of Officer Hamilton were insufficient to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to consult with counsel. ( People v. Maynarich (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 476, 481, 147 Cal.Rptr. 823.) Moreover, after considering Hamilton's responses to his questions, defendant said, Okay, I'll talk to you, thereby waiving his right to speak with an attorney. ( People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 949 P.2d 18.) The record is devoid of evidence that coercion or deception played any role in the interrogation. On these facts, the trial court properly found that defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.