Opinion ID: 836008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: former jeopardy under article i, section 12

Text: As noted, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendants waived any former jeopardy claim that they otherwise might have had under the Oregon Constitution by failing to appear in the underlying forfeiture proceeding. Selness/Miller, 154 Or.App. at 584-87, 962 P.2d 739. Defendants acknowledge that similar reasoning has led courts in other jurisdictions to refuse to entertain any former jeopardy claim that is based on civil forfeiture proceedings in which the claimant did not appear. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert den 513 U.S. 1059, 115 S.Ct. 669, 130 L.Ed.2d 603 (1994) (owner who does not file claim in forfeiture proceeding cannot base double jeopardy claim on that proceeding); United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307 (9th Cir.), cert den 518 U.S. 1007, 116 S.Ct. 2528, 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996) (same). They argue, however, that those decisions are unpersuasive and should not be followed. Defendants also argue that those decisions are inconsistent with the Oregon former jeopardy provision because they are based on a legal fiction that is not accepted in this state, viz., the theory that in rem forfeiture proceedings do not affect personal rights. We note, first, that, in holding that defendants had waived their right to assert a jeopardy defense, the Court of Appeals never aligned itself expressly with any of the cases from other jurisdictions that it discussed in its opinion. Rather, that court set out its own theory of implied waiverthat a homeowner who fails to take advantage of the mitigation procedure provided by the forfeiture statute cannot later complain that the forfeiture that the homeowner suffered was so excessive as to amount to criminal punishment. Selness/Miller, 154 Or.App. at 586-87, 962 P.2d 739. We agree with the Court of Appeals' waiver analysis, as far as it goes: In our view, defendants have waived their right to argue that, as applied to them, the forfeiture scheme at issue is punitive and counts as jeopardy for purposes of Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. However, that conclusion does not speak to defendants' principal argument, viz., that the overall forfeiture scheme in Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, and not just its particular effect in defendants' case, is criminal in nature and effect. The question remains whether defendants' failure to appear waived that argument as well as their as-applied challenge. To answer that question, we turn to the other theories of waiver mentioned, but not expressly approved, in the Court of Appeals' opinion: (1) that, if no one makes a claim to property in a civil forfeiture proceeding, then that property is ownerless and its forfeiture punishes no one; (2) that an owner who chooses not to become a party to a forfeiture proceeding cannot argue that he or she has been subjected to the hazards of trial and a determination of guilt that are the earmarks of jeopardy; and (3) that the proper time for making a claim of ownership is in the forfeiture proceeding, and the court will not hear a person who has failed to make a claim of ownership at that time to make that claim in a later criminal proceeding for the purpose of asserting former jeopardy. See Selness/Miller, 154 Or.App. at 584-86, 962 P.2d 739 (summarizing theories). All three theories appear to proceed on the premise that a property owner can overcome the civil, in rem label that attaches to forfeiture proceedings, but only if the property owner takes the formal step of appearing and contesting the forfeiture. We agree with defendants that all those theories place undue importance on a property owner's decision to appear formally in a forfeiture proceeding. To the extent that they rely on a presumption that nonappearing property owners actually have abandoned their property and, therefore, are not affected by the proceeding or the forfeiture, they are not persuasive. Property owners may have many reasons, other than lack of interest, for failing to file a claim in a forfeiture proceeding, including a realistic appraisal of their chances of obtaining a successful outcome and a legitimate desire to avoid self-incrimination. If, on the other hand, the state's waiver theories rely only on the legal fiction that no ownership interest exists in the absence of a claim, then they are equally unpersuasive. This court never has treated property in in rem proceedings in a manner that ignored the existence or interests of property owners. See, e.g., State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car et al., 120 Or. 254, 269, 251 P. 701 (1927) (automobiles may become subject to in rem forfeiture if used for unlawful purpose, but proceeding must be one in which party who is to be deprived of property is accorded all his constitutional rights). Realistically, a property owner's decision to file a claim in a forfeiture proceeding under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, has no effect on the essential character of that proceeding. Although it is true that a property owner who files a claim may seek mitigation after a forfeiture is authorized, Or Laws 1993, ch 699, § 13, the proceeding will be the same, whether or not the property owner appears. Because the proceeding is whatever it iscivil or criminalthe notion that the validity of an assertion of former jeopardy should depend on the filing of a claim would be an unjustified elevation of form over substance. We agree with defendants, therefore, insofar as they argue that a property owner's failure to appear in a forfeiture proceeding is irrelevant to the property owner's right to assert a claim that the proceeding on its face constitutes former jeopardy under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. If a forfeiture proceeding under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, puts the affected property owner in jeopardy in the constitutional sense (and that is a question that we have yet to decide), then the owner may assert a later former jeopardy claim, regardless of the owner's formal participation in the proceeding. [9]
We turn to the substantive issue: Does a forfeiture proceeding under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, always put an affected property owner in jeopardy within the meaning of Article I, section 12, so that the fact that the proceeding occurred precludes any later attempt to prosecute the property owner criminally for the prohibited conduct alleged in the forfeiture proceeding? Defendants argue that it does, because jeopardy arises out of any proceeding that is criminal in nature and because the forfeiture proceeding provided by Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, is, in their view, such a proceeding. The state acknowledges that jeopardy arises when a person might be punished in a criminal proceeding, but argues that forfeiture, as a proceeding and a sanction, is civil and has been since before the adoption of Article I, section 12. In evaluating those arguments, our task is to ascertain the intent of the individuals who drafted and adopted Article I, section 12. We consider the provision on three levels: its specific wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation. See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65 (1992) (describing that method for analyzing original constitutional provisions). The meaning of the term jeopardy in Article I, section 12, does not advance the inquiry much. In common parlance, jeopardy means danger or risk. By itself, the term jeopardy conveys little about what sort of dangers or risks to which the constitutional provision speaks. The question remains: In jeopardy of what? The text of Article I, section 12, speaks of jeopardy    for the same offen[s]e. Although the term offense can pertain to a broad range of actions, including moral and religious breaches and private, civil transgressions, those are not matters that usually are a concern of the law and, even less, of constitutions. Respecting the law and constitutions, the term most often is used to refer to criminal violations. Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines offense as: A felony or misdemeanor; a breach of the criminal laws; violation of law for which penalty is prescribed. The word `offense,' while sometimes used in various senses, generally implies a felony or a misdemeanor infringing public as distinguished from mere private rights, and punishable under the criminal laws, though it may also include the violation of a criminal statute for which the remedy is merely a civil suit to recover the penalty. Black's Law Dictionary, 1081 (6th ed 1990). Thus, it is most likely that the term offense in Article I, section 12, is about criminal law and criminal proceedings. Historically, Article I, section 12, was borrowed from a similar provision in the Indiana Constitution of 1851, and that the Oregon Constitutional Convention adopted it without any recorded discussion. Charles Henry Carey, The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857, 468 (1926). There are relatively few Indiana cases that pertain to Indiana's 1851 former jeopardy provision that antedate Oregon's adoption of Article I, section 12. Although those cases generally are consistent with the notion that former jeopardy pertains only to criminal law and proceedings, none of them directly addresses the point. See, e.g., Wright v. The State, 5 Ind. 527 (1854) (retrial of criminal homicide case after jury found defendant guilty of assault and battery); Miller v. State, 8 Ind. 325 (1856) (state could not retry criminal grand larceny case when discharge of first jury was not necessary). In one pre-1857 Indiana case, Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854), the Indiana Supreme Court used the principle embodied in Indiana's former jeopardy clause to find that punitive damage awards are not permissible in civil tort actions when the underlying offense also subjects the offender to criminal prosecution. The court acknowledged, however, that the Indiana former jeopardy provision itself was not directly applicable to remedies secured by civil proceedings. Id. at 325. Within a few years of Taber (albeit after Oregon's adoption of Indiana's former jeopardy wording), the Indiana court indicated, even more decisively, that its former jeopardy provision would not apply to a proceeding that was not a prosecution for a crime or offense committed. S tate v. Vankirk, 27 Ind. 121, 122 (1866). Beyond its Indiana roots, the historical circumstances in which Article I, section 12, was adopted also suggest, in a general way, that the former jeopardy concept pertains to criminal proceedings. Of course, at the relevant time ( i.e., before 1857), most of the commentary focused on the common-law notion of double jeopardy or on the federal double jeopardy clause. However, it is clear that such commentary assumes that jeopardy arises in the context of a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law, 452 (1847 ed) (discussing double jeopardy principle as presenting an insurmountable barrier to a second prosecution). Similarly, virtually all the United States Supreme Court's double jeopardy cases prior to 1857 involved a second criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) (no double jeopardy violation if criminal defendant is retried after jury fails to agree on verdict); United States v. Randenbush, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 288, 8 L.Ed. 948 (1834) (no double jeopardy problem when defendant criminally indicted for different offense after acquittal). Finally, we consider the case law surrounding Article I, section 12. In general, this court's case law confirms what the wording and history of Article I, section 12, indicate, viz., that jeopardy arises only in the context of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Welch, 264 Or. 388, 505 P.2d 910 (1973) (involving criminal prosecution on two separate counts of publishing false checks); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972) (involving separate criminal prosecutions for misdemeanor of carrying a concealed weapon and being convict in possession of a firearm, a felony); City of Portland v. Erickson, 39 Or. 1, 6-7, 62 P. 753 (1900) (stating that jeopardy provision in Article I, section 12, applies to proceedings carried out in same manner as criminal cases are prosecuted). However, a few of this court's cases add an additional wrinkle to the former jeopardy analysis: They suggest that any inquiry under Article I, section 12, looks behind a proceeding's civil label and considers the substance of the proceeding. The earliest, and most significant, of those cases is Erickson. In Erickson, this court considered whether it would violate Article I, section 12, if a defendant's acquittal of a city ordinance violation were reversed and the defendant were required to face a retrial. Nominally, the violation was a civil matter, and the city argued that the former jeopardy concept was inapplicable. 39 Or. at 2-5, 62 P. 753. The Erickson court disagreed. In analyzing the problem, the court began with the assumption that jeopardy refers to only criminal prosecutions. It then announced that the constitutional notion of jeopardy may apply to proceedings that, although civil in name or form, are criminal in nature: [W]here, under the statute and ordinances, enforcement is sought by resort to proceedings authorized and carried on in all respects as criminal cases are prosecuted by complaint and warrantand where the court is empowered to inflict upon the accused not only a fine, which may be followed by imprisonment for its nonpayment, but also imprisonment aside from any pecuniary penalty or forfeiture, such proceeding becomes so far criminal in its nature, and the violation of the ordinance such an offense, that a person acquitted thereof can not be again put in jeopardy for the same offense. 39 Or. at 7, 62 P. 753. Thus, Erickson instructs us that, even if a proceeding bears a civil label, it may place a person in jeopardy for purposes of Article I, section 12, if it is criminal in its nature. What determines whether a proceeding is, in fact, criminal in its nature, so that the former jeopardy prohibition in Article I, section 12, is triggered? Erickson is instructive. First, it is notable that, in deciding that case, the Erickson court did not set aside the civil designation as irrelevant. Rather, it found that, because certain aspects of the ordinance were incompatible with that designation, the proceeding became  so far criminal in its nature that it amounted to jeopardy. 39 Or. at 7, 62 P. 753 (emphasis added). Erickson suggests, in other words, that a civil designation ( i.e., a clear indication that the legislating body intends to create a civil proceeding) is relevant, but may be overcome if application of substantive constitutional standards demonstrate that that designation is incorrect ( i.e., the proceeding is in substance [too] far criminal in its nature to be deemed civil for former jeopardy purposes). Erickson informs our present inquiry in another way. The Erickson court concluded that the proceeding that it was examining was criminal in its nature because it included certain pretrial procedures (information and warrant) and a potential penalty (incarceration) that were associated exclusively with criminal proceedings. Erickson thus suggests that the use of traditional criminal pretrial procedures, coupled with the potential for incarceration, may mark an otherwise civil proceeding as criminal in nature, at least for purposes of Article I, section 12. Another Article I, section 12, case, State v. Morrow, 158 Or. 412, 75 P.2d 737 (1938), confirms that the potential penalty associated with a proceeding is of paramount importance in determining whether the proceeding is criminal in its nature. In that case, the court held that jeopardy within the meaning of Article I, section 12, cannot arise out of a filiation proceeding because such proceedings do not involve any potential penalty: Jeopardy has application to proceedings which subject the guilty to the imposition of a penalty. Some courts include within the category of penal proceedings only criminal actions wherein a fine may be imposed or the defendant may be sentenced to confinement in a penal institution, while other courts include within the category civil proceedings in which punitive damages are sought.    A filiation proceeding, being civil in nature and authorizing the imposition of no penalty, cannot place a defendant in jeopardy of life or liberty. Id. at 416-17, 75 P.2d 737 (citations omitted). Morrow is unspecific about the kinds of penalties that mark a civil proceeding as criminal in nature, but leaves open the possibility that penalties other than imprisonment might qualify. Thus, Erickson and Morrow, both decided under Article I, section 12, suggest that, for purposes of determining whether a proceeding qualifies as jeopardy, criminal proceedings can be identified as such by the fact that they expose persons who are subject to them to procedures and penalties that are peculiarly associated with the criminal law. At this point, we briefly summarize our examination of the wording, history, and case law surrounding the former jeopardy clause of Article I, section 12. First, we have determined that, for purposes of Article I, section 12, jeopardy arises only in criminal proceedings. Second, we have determined that, although a proceeding may be designated as civil by the legislature, that designation may be overcome by a showing that the proceeding is so far criminal in its nature that it amounts to a criminal proceeding. Finally, we have observed that a nominally civil proceeding may be shown to be criminal in its nature by the fact that it employs certain procedures ( e.g., complaint and warrant) and may result in certain penalties, including imprisonment. Defendant recommends another case, Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977), as setting out the proper methodology for determining whether a proceeding is criminal in its nature (and, thus, jeopardy, for purposes of Article I, section 12). Because that case was not decided under Article I, section 12, and does not purport to construe that provision, it is not strictly within the scope of the analysis set out in Priest v. Pearce . We are persuaded, however, that the general discussion in Brown is relevant to our present analysis and that Brown should be examined at this juncture. Still, in considering Brown, we remain mindful that certain parts of the discussion might not translate perfectly into the former jeopardy context. Brown came to this court as a challenge to a first-time conviction on a charge of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). On review, the defendant argued that the trial court had committed reversible error by denying his motion for an order granting him court-appointed counsel, a jury trial, and prosecution under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proofall rights that traditionally are guaranteed in criminal, but not civil, proceedings. The defendant acknowledged that the legislature had purported to recategorize first-offense DUII from a criminal to a civil offense. He argued, however, that the first-time DUII offense retained sufficient characteristics of a criminal charge to require compliance with the constitutional guarantees applicable in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 97, 570 P.2d 52. In considering that challenge, the court in Brown began by identifying the sources of the rights at issue, finding that twothe right to counsel and to a jury trialwere guaranteed by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, while the otherthe right to be prosecuted under the criminal beyond a reasonable doubt standard-derived from the federal due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. After declaring that those rights apply to all proceedings that have the character of criminal prosecutions, id. at 98-99, 570 P.2d 52, the court identified five indicia as relevant in assessing whether an ostensibly civil proceeding in fact is a criminal prosecution for constitutional purposes: (1) the type of offense and, specifically, whether the offense historically has been viewed as a crime or involves traditional common-law elements of crime, e.g., mens rea; (2) the severity and significance of the penalty; (3) the significance of any collateral consequences that attach to the proceeding; (4) the punitive or stigmatizing significance of the judgment or penalty; and (5) the fact that traditional criminal pretrial procedures, such as arrest and detention, are used with respect to the offense. Id. at 102-08, 570 P.2d 52. After considering those indicia, the Brown court concluded that the offense at issuefirst-offense DUIIretained too many penal characteristics not to be a criminal prosecution for purposes of Article I, section 11, and that, consequently, the defendant was entitled to the order that he sought. Id. at 109-11, 570 P.2d 52. Brown 's discussion of the indicia of a criminal proceeding is relevant in the present Article I, section 12 context, because it is immediately apparent, from an examination of the indicia identified in Brown, that several of those factors closely parallel factors that Erickson and other Article I, section 12, cases have identified as significant. For example, Brown asserts that the use of arrest and detention and similar practices associated with the enforcement of criminal laws (including the use of physical restraints, search of the person, booking, fingerprinting, etc.) are strongly indicative of a criminal proceeding. That assertion echos Erickson's focus on enforcement by proceedings authorized and carried on in all respects as criminal cases are prosecuted. See Erickson, 39 Or. at 7, 62 P. 753 (referring to enforcement of city ordinance by complaint and warrant). Brown 's identification of the penalty as a relevant indicator also is consistent with this court's Article I, section 12, cases. Brown describes the prescribed penalty as the single most important criterion for distinguishing criminal from civil proceedings, particularly when a potential penalty is imprisonment. 280 Or. at 103, 570 P.2d 52. Erickson and Morrow also hold that the penalty is a crucial consideration. Brown, however, is more expansive about the significance of the prescribed penalty than either Erickson or Morrow. Brown suggests that penalties must be assessed in terms of severity and of whether the penalty is infamous. 280 Or. at 103, 570 P.2d 52. In addition, Brown indicates that some penaltiesfines, for examplemight be either civil or criminal, depending on the circumstances. It suggests that the correct categorization of a monetary penalty may vary depending on whether it is excessive in relation to the civil purpose that it purports to serve. [10] Brown also offers, as a separate indicium of a criminal proceeding, what it terms the punitive significance of the judgment. Id. at 105, 570 P.2d 52. While that factor could be interpreted as another allusion to the infamous nature of certain penalties, e.g., imprisonment, the Brown court was referring to a broader concern, i.e., whether a judgment carries stigmatizing or condemnatory significance. Id. at 106, 570 P.2d 52. Although the court acknowledged the difficulties inherent in weighing that consideration, it nevertheless included the consideration in its test, and ultimately relied heavily on that factor to conclude that first-time DUII under ORS 484.365 (1975) was a criminal offense for constitutional purposes. Insofar as Brown holds that the severity and the infamous nature of the prescribed penalty is an important consideration in distinguishing criminal from civil proceedings, we think that it is a reasonable extension of this court's Article I, section 12, jurisprudence. We agree with the Brown court that heavy fines, for example, must be justified in terms of their supposed civil purpose and that, if they are not, they may be deemed to be criminal punishment. Neither do we reject the possibility that, on some occasions, the stigma associated with a penalty or judgment might mark a proceeding as criminal for purposes of Article I, section 12. We emphasize, however, that that factor requires a showing of a stigma on the individual and not just a showing of some vague public disapproval of the behavior in question. This court recently addressed an analogous problem in State v. MacNab, 334 Or. 469, 51 P.3d 1249 (2002). In that criminal case, the defendant, a convicted sex offender, argued that requiring him to register as a sex offender under a sexual offender registration act was a further punishment for his original offense and, as such, was forbidden by the ex post facto prohibitions of the Oregon and federal constitutions. [11] The act had been passed after the defendant was convicted of the underlying crime. As in the present case, the defendant in MacNab relied, in part, on the Brown decision. In MacNab, this court considered the same reference in Brown to the punitive significance of a statutory procedure. The court there recognized, as we do again today, that the purpose of the criminal law as stated in Brown, viz., to provide `retribution and deterrence,'    meaning deterrence both of the individual defendant and of persons in his situation generally, 280 Or. at 105, 570 P.2d 52, did not much advance the discussion. Instead, the court inquired more deeply into the meaning of the concept of punishment as it related to the purposes for which Oregon's ex post facto provision was established. The court concluded that, for purposes of ex post facto analysis, the question was whether those punitive attributes (detriment, restraint, or deprivation intended to deter the offender and others) are present to such a degree that the application to the defendant violates Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. MacNab, 334 Or. at 479, 51 P.3d 1249. In that case, the court concluded that requiring defendant to register as a sex offender does not impose any significant detriment, restraint, or deprivation on defendant and, therefore, is not a form of increased `punishment' prohibited by Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 481, 51 P.3d 1249. The analysis under Article I, section 21, in MacNab was, in our view, consistent with the test that we here announce under Article I, section 12. So long as a particular forfeiture is justifiable in terms of its civil purpose, the incidental detriment, restraint, or deprivation that it may impose will not rise to the level of a criminal punishment. Brown also states that the type of offense is an indicator of the true nature of a proceeding. That is, the factor focuses on the nature of the alleged illegal act itself. That factor most directly relates to the distinction between Article I, section 11, and Article I, section 12. Article I, section 11, focuses directly on the rights of persons [i]n all criminal prosecutions, i.e., their rights in a proceeding to impose a criminal punishment. The focus under Article I, section 12, has been somewhat different, centering on the practical effect of the outcome of a proceeding on the persons who are subjected to it, i.e., on the consequences such persons might be forced to endure. See, e.g., Erickson, 39 Or. at 7, 62 P. 753 (focusing on statute's provision for imprisonment and on use of complaint and warrant). We think that it follows that the Brown type of offense does not add anything to the standard already enunciated in Erickson. We therefore do not include that Brown factor in our analysis under Article I, Section 12. Brown identifies one more factorcollateral consequencesas an indicator that a proceeding is criminal in nature. By the term collateral consequences, Brown appears to refer to additional burdens and losses that flow automatically from a judgment in a proceeding and that amount to another form of punishment. 280 Or. at 105, 570 P.2d 52. Although collateral consequences are not mentioned in this court's Article I, section 12, jurisprudence, we think it obvious that, if a law operates to impose burdens or penalties as additional consequences of a judgment in a proceeding, those burdens may be relevant to determining whether the proceeding is criminal in nature. Thus, the Brown collateral consequences factor also is compatible with this court's Article I, section 12, jurisprudence. Having examined the five factors identified in Brown as they relate to this court's own Article I, section 12, jurisprudence, we conclude that four are useful in the Article I, section 12, context: (1) the use of pretrial procedures that are associated with the criminal law, such as indictment, arrest, and detention; (2) the potential for imposition of a penalty that is historically criminal or infamous, or that cannot be justified fully in terms of the civil purposes that the penalty supposedly serves; and (3) the potential for a judgment or penalty that carries public stigma; (4) the potential for collateral consequences that, either taken by themselves or added to the direct consequences of the underlying forbidden acts, amount to criminal penalties. For the reasons set out above, the remaining Brown factorthe type of offenseadds nothing new in the former jeopardy context. We conclude that the proper test for determining whether an ostensibly civil proceeding is criminal in nature and amounts to jeopardy is as follows. First, we determine whether the legislature intended to create a civil proceeding. If we conclude that the legislature did so intend, then we apply the factors that we have identified as possible indicators of a criminal proceeding and, in particular, the four Brown factors that we have emphasized.
Applying that test to the case before us, we begin by examining the label attached to forfeiture under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791. There is no question that the legislature intended to, and did, categorize that proceeding as civil. The statute repeatedly refers to civil forfeiture. The findings clearly express a civil intent. See Or Laws 1989, ch 791, § 1(5) ([t]he application of any remedy under this Act is intended to be remedial and not punitive). Other findings and provisions suggest, and are consistent with, remedial purposes: (1) to render the sale and manufacture of illegal drugs unprofitable by confiscating the proceeds of those activities; (2) to make those activities more difficult by confiscating the tools and property that have made those activities possible; and (3) to reimburse governments for their costs in enforcing drug laws. See Or Laws 1989, ch 791, § 1(a) and (c) (setting out findings that prohibited conduct is profitable and that conduct is facilitating acquisition and possession of property subject to forfeiture under chapter); Or Laws 1989, ch 791, § 3 (setting out types of property subject to forfeiture, i.e., controlled substances themselves, raw materials, containers, conveyances, money and things of value that are proceeds of prohibited conduct, and real property used to commit or facilitate prohibited conduct). Still other provisions suggest an intent to avoid punitive effects. See Or Laws 1993, ch 699, §§ 13-15 (providing for mitigation to prevent excessive forfeiture and providing that court shall consider, in determining if forfeiture is excessive, degree of relationship between forfeited property and prohibited conduct, whether forfeited property constitutes claimant's lawful livelihood or residence, etc.). Having established that the legislature intended to create a civil proceeding and remedy when it enacted the statutes at issue, we next examine the proceeding in light of the four factors that we have identified as relevant.
Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, does not provide for the arrest and detention of property owners, or for any other procedure with similar criminal consequences for the property owners.
The state argues that, historically, the law has viewed in rem forfeiture as a civil, rather than a criminal, action. We agree that there is strong support for that view, although the evidence is not entirely one way. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681-90, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2090-95, 40 L.Ed.2d 452, 466-71 (1974) (tracing federal view that in rem forfeitures, as opposed to deodand forfeitures, only pertain to property and treat guilt or innocence of the property owner as irrelevant); but compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 533-35, 29 L.Ed. 746, 752 (1886) (holding that proceeding to forfeit of fraudulently imported goods was quasicriminal and therefore sufficient to implicate prohibition on compulsory self-incrimination). Even if the evidence regarding the historical view of in rem forfeiture is not entirely unequivocal, it is clear that forfeiture is not an infamous penalty, the potential for which, like imprisonment, automatically marks a proceeding as criminal in nature. Neither does it appear that there are any grounds for claiming that forfeiture under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, is inconsistent with, or excessive in relation to, the statute's civil purpose. We already have noted that the forfeiture statute announces several remedial purposes, e.g., to render drug manufacture and trafficking activities unprofitable by confiscating the proceeds, to render those activities more difficult by confiscating tools and other property that facilitate the activities, and to provide resources to governments that enforce drug trafficking laws. Defendants do not deny that those purposes exist, but argue that the forfeiture scheme is unrelated to those purposes. They contend that the forfeiture of their home was personally staggering and that it is impossible to justify their $60,000 loss as necessary to cover the state's investigative and prosecutorial costs or in terms of some other nonpunitive purpose. That is the point at which defendants' procedural choices during the forfeiture proceeding become relevant. As we have shown, the statutory scheme on its face expresses a legislative intent to keep its sanctions within constitutional bounds and provides a mitigation mechanism that purports to serve that intent. To the extent that defendants' argument focuses on any alleged excessiveness of their own $60,000 loss, it is an as applied argument and foreclosed by their failure to intervene in the forfeiture proceeding and seek mitigation. We cannot presume that, if defendants had made the kind of showing in mitigation that they statutorily were entitled to make, the final outcome would have been disproportionate. To the extent that defendants are suggesting that the entire statutory scheme is excessiveand that is their burdenwe are not persuaded. Depending on the circumstances, forfeiture of an entire house or any other property that is a subject of Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, may be justified fully in terms of the remedial purposes of removing the tools of a drug manufacturer's or trafficker's trade and of confiscating profits. Moreover, the clear purpose and effect of the mitigation procedure set out at Oregon Laws 1993, chapter 699, section 13, is to ensure that forfeitures are not excessive in relation to those purposes. Although defendants in this case did not avail themselves of that procedure, its availability precludes any claim that the statute on its face provides for sanctions that cannot be justified in terms of civil purposes.
Defendants also argue that the stigma associated with forfeiture under Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, marks the proceeding as criminal. Defendants argue that persons who lose their home in a drug-related forfeiture bear as much public condemnation, if not more, as persons convicted of such crimes as DUII, reckless endangering or felony driving while suspended. Defendants' comparison to DUII and reckless endangerment is not persuasive. We are searching here for a level of stigma of the individual that marks a forfeiture proceeding as criminal in nature in the constitutional sense. There may be some vague public condemnation associated with the forfeiture of a home, but that same vague condemnation also occurs when homes are lost in the context of proceedings that are indisputably civil, e.g., foreclosures or proceedings to abate a nuisance.
Defendants suggest that they have had to endure collateral consequences that flowed from the forfeiture hereforced relocation and economic devastationand that those consequences demonstrate the punitive nature of the forfeiture proceeding. But those are consequences peculiar to these defendants and, for all that we can determine on this record, are the specific results of their tactical choices. The consequences are not the result of a legislative choice to impose those particular burdens, along with forfeiture, in all cases. Indeed, assuming full participation in a mitigation hearing, it may be that no offender would have to suffer the collateral consequences that defendants have experienced.
Having examined the forfeiture scheme provided at Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 791, in light of the foregoing elements, we conclude that nothing in the scheme negates the legislature's intent to provide a civil procedure and sanction. For purposes of Article I, section 12, a forfeiture proceeding under that statute is not so far criminal on its face as to constitute jeopardy.