Opinion ID: 2403835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Medical Malpractice Trial

Text: On January 16, 1994, two days before the medical malpractice trial was to begin, Mrs. McCool contacted Dr. Dein. She apparently pleaded with him to reconsider his decision not to testify. According to Dr. Dein, he felt guilty and, in an act of conscience, agreed to appear on Mrs. McCool's behalf as an expert witness. The McCools' attorney had no time to meet with Dr. Dein and prepare him as a witness for trial. The medical malpractice trial commenced on January 18, 1994 and lasted several days. The testimony at trial regarding the standard of care was conflicting. Dr. Dein and a second Pennsylvania-licensed physician, Dr. Marshall Klavan, testified as expert witnesses on the McCools' behalf. Both testified that Dr. Gehret had violated the standard of care in a number of respects but most significantly by not responding earlier to Mrs. McCool at the hospital and in removing her uterus and right ovary. Dr. Gehret testified on his own behalf. His testimony was supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Moses Hochman, a Delaware-licensed physician. According to Dr. Hochman, Dr. Gehret's treatment of Mrs. McCool met the standard of care required of physicians in Delaware. On January 25, 1994, just before trial resumed after a break, the McCools had a brief conversation with a female New Castle County police officer. The officer stated that she had been delivered by Dr. Gehret and was there to observe the trial. The officer said she had heard about the trial from an acquaintance who was a member of the jury. The juror had apparently also told the officer he could not discuss the trial with her. The McCools' attorney presented the foregoing information to the trial judge but did not make an application for any action to be taken at that time. The medical malpractice trial continued. At the trial's conclusion, the jury returned a verdict in Dr. Gehret's favor. Due to the length of the trial, the Superior Court dismissed the jurors, thus preventing that jury from hearing the McCools' second claim of tortious interference. In lieu of presenting much of the same evidence before a new jury, the McCools waived their right to a jury trial on the basis that their tortious interference claim would be a bench trial before the Superior Court judge who had presided over the medical malpractice trial. The McCools also moved for a new trial of their medical malpractice claim on three grounds. First, the McCools alleged that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence; second, that the mid-trial contact with the police officer evidenced juror misconduct; and, third, that the Superior Court erred in severing the trial of the tortious interference claim from the trial of the medical malpractice claim.