Opinion ID: 406148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lembric Moore's Fifth Amendment Claim

Text: 15 In the instant case, the trial judge found that, because Lembric might be subject to state or other federal prosecution for his role in the mail theft, he had a valid fifth amendment claim against self-incrimination. The trial judge, however, allowed Lembric to assert a blanket refusal to answer any question. Pierce, 561 F.2d at 741. 2 Nothing in the record indicates that Lembric could have claimed privilege to essentially all relevant questions, nor does the record indicate any special knowledge by the trial judge in this case that would have allowed him to make such a determination. The instant case is unlike Tsui, where (t)he District Court knew from the Government's case-in-chief that (the potential defense witness) was up to his neck in criminal investigations and that further passing-of-the-blame questioning would only lead to answers which would, in all probability, furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute (the witness) or lead to evidence having a tendency to incriminate him, Tsui, 646 F.2d at 367-68. Here, when Lembric asserted his fifth amendment refusal to testify at Nathaniel's trial, the district judge had done no more than accept a Rule 11 statement from Lembric admitting guilt to one count of a two-count indictment. Lembric's Rule 11 statement gave the district judge no special knowledge of either Lembric's susceptibility to further criminal prosecution 3 or the nature of Lembric's unprivileged testimony favorable to Nathaniel. Accordingly, the district court erred when it accepted Lembric's blanket refusal to testify. 16 It is, however, axiomatic that not every trial error, even one of constitutional dimension, requires reversal of a criminal conviction. Where, as here, the challenged district court action involves error of constitutional magnitude, we affirm only if we can say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Hall, 650 F.2d 994, 998 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1977). Two police officers testified that Nathaniel Moore was one of the two individuals seen burning mail at the time of the arrests. Moreover, the officers testified that Nathaniel was arrested in the kitchen along with his co-defendants and not in a bedroom as appellant claims. Appellants' trial counsel made no offer of proof regarding the substance of Lembric's unprivileged exculpatory testimony. On these facts, where there is such clear evidence of guilt, we find the trial judge's erroneous failure to probe with specific questions Lembric's assertion of a fifth amendment privilege, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 17 We hold, therefore, that although the trial judge committed error in accepting Lembric's blanket assertion of his fifth amendment privilege without further inquiry in keeping with Pierce, the error does not warrant reversal of appellant's conviction. The conviction is, therefore, AFFIRMED.