Opinion ID: 4238479
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Horne v. Flores

Text: In Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 439 (2009), the Supreme Court was again tasked with determining whether the lower courts applied the correct standard in denying a Rule 60(b)(5) motion. There, a class of English Language-Learner (ELL) students and their parents in Arizona sued the state for violating the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), which requires a state “to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs.” Id. at 438–39. After a trial, the district court concluded that “defendants were violating the EEOA because the amount of funding the State allocated for the special needs of ELL students (ELL incremental 32 funding) was arbitrary and not related to the actual funding needed to cover the costs of ELL instruction.” Id. at 441. Over the next several years, the district court entered various additional orders and injunctions aimed at improving the state’s ELL incremental funding. Id. For instance, the court ordered the state to “prepare a cost study to establish the proper appropriation to effectively implement ELL programs.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And it later required the state to, within ninety days of the order’s issuance, “appropriately and constitutionally fund the state’s ELL programs taking into account the [court’s] previous orders.” Id. After the state failed to comply with these orders, the district court held the state in contempt and imposed a fine for every day until the state came into compliance. Id. at 442. After accruing over $20 million in fines, the state legislature passed HB 2064, a bill that was designed “to implement a permanent funding solution to the problems identified” by the district court. Id. The Governor allowed HB 2064 to become law without her signature, and the state presented it to the district court for approval. Id. at 443. Because the Governor did not approve of HB 2064’s funding provisions, two members of the state legislature intervened to support the bill. Id. Intervenors then moved to “purge” the district court’s contempt order in light of HB 2064 and, in the alternative, for relief under Rule 60(b)(5) based on changed circumstances. Id. The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(5) motion because HB 2064 “did not establish a funding system that rationally relates funding available to the actual costs of all elements of ELL instruction.” Id. at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 33 Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that “relief would be appropriate only if petitioners had shown either that there are no longer incremental costs associated with ELL programs in Arizona or that Arizona had altered its funding model.” Id. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court reversed. The Court first reiterated that a party may move to modify or vacate an order under Rule 60(b)(5) if “‘a significant change either in factual conditions or in law’ renders continued enforcement ‘detrimental to the public interest.’” Id. at 447 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384). “[O]nce a party carries this burden, a court abuses its discretion when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of such changes.” Id. at 447–49 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then stressed that Rule 60(b)(5) serves an important function in institutional reform litigation for three reasons. Id. First, injunctions and consent decrees in such cases often remain in place for many years, “and the passage of time frequently brings about changed circumstances” (e.g., “changes in the nature of the underlying problem” and “new policy insights”) “that warrant reexamination of the original judgment.” Id. at 448. Second, injunctions and decrees in reform cases tend to “raise sensitive federalism concerns” because such cases often “involve[] areas of core state responsibility.” Id. And those federalism concerns “are heightened when . . . a federal court decree has the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities.” Id. 34 Recognizing that states have limited resources, the Court expressed sensitivity toward the fact that “[w]hen a federal court orders that money be appropriated for one program, the effect is often to take funds away from other important programs.” Id. Third, seemingly endless injunctions and decrees in these types of cases commonly “bind state and local officials to the policy preferences of their predecessors and may thereby ‘improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.’” Id. at 449 (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 441). Successor officials may bring new insights and solutions to ongoing “problems of allocating revenues and resources,” but overbroad or outdated decrees may inhibit their ability to respond to those problems and fulfill their duties as democraticallyelected officials. Id. In sum, a long-lasting and unmodified consent decree not only raises serious federalism concerns but it may also restrain the opportunities for the class protected by the decree because an overbroad and unyielding decree limits financial resources available to governments for the implementation of new innovations and policies that may serve the needs of the protected class better than the requirements embodied in the decree. For the foregoing reasons, courts must take a flexible approach to motions under Rule 60(b)(5) where the moving party seeks relief from a long-lasting decree. Id. at 450. This flexible approach “seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon as a violation of federal law has been remedied.” Id. at 451. To that end, courts must be wary “that ‘federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate federal law or does not flow 35 from such a violation.’” Id. at 450 (quoting Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282). “‘If a federal consent decree is not limited to reasonable and necessary implementations of federal law,’ it may ‘improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.’” Id. (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 441). Accordingly, “a critical question in [the] Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is whether the objective of the [challenged decree] has been achieved.” Id. (citing Frew, 540 U.S. at 442). “If a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.” Id. (citing Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282). Applying these standards, the Court in Horne concluded that the Ninth Circuit erred in two ways. First, instead of applying a flexible approach, the Ninth Circuit “used a heightened standard that paid insufficient attention to federalism concerns.” Id. at 451. Based on the federalism concerns, application of a flexible approach was “critical.” Id. at 452. The Court instructed that application of the flexible approach requires that “‘[w]hen the objects of the decree have been attained’—namely, when [compliance with federal law] has been achieved—‘responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations must be returned to the State and its officials.’” Id. (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 442). Second, the Court held that instead of “inquiring broadly into whether changed conditions in [the schools] provided evidence of an ELL program that complied with the EEOA,” id. at 451, the Ninth Circuit performed an inquiry that was “too narrow,” “focus[ing] almost exclusively on the sufficiency of incremental funding,” id. at 452. But the narrow inquiry—focusing on whether a prior judgment has been satisfied— 36 addresses only one of the bases for relief under Rule 60(b)(5) and fails to consider whether relief is warranted because “applying [a judgment] prospectively is no longer equitable.” Id. at 454. For purposes of the equity basis for modification, the Ninth Circuit’s narrow inquiry also overlooked the possibility that specific items in an initial decree may, with the passage of time and changing circumstances, no longer be the only way, or even the best way, to attain the objects of the decree and assure compliance with federal law. See id. at 447–48, 451–54. To determine whether relief was proper under the equity basis for modification, the Ninth Circuit “needed to ascertain whether ongoing enforcement of the original order was supported by an ongoing violation of federal law.” Id. at 454 (citing Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282); see also id. at 468 (repeating that a proper Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry should ask whether the school district “is now providing equal educational opportunities to ELL students”). The Court explained that while the Ninth Circuit focused on ELL incremental funding, “funding is simply a means [of complying with the EEOA], not the end (here, the EEOA).” Id. at 454–55. By requiring the state “to demonstrate ‘appropriate action’ [mandated by the EEOA] through a particular funding mechanism, the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its own educational and budgetary policy judgments for those of the state and local officials to whom such decisions are properly entrusted.” Id. at 455. Stated otherwise, the Ninth Circuit should have “consider[ed] the broader question whether, as a result of important changes during 37 the intervening years, the State was fulfilling its obligation under the EEOA by other means.” Id. at 439. The Court then remanded for the district court to make “up-to-date” findings and to consider whether four changed circumstances advanced by the defendants warranted releasing the state from the earlier judgment. See id. at 469–70. d. Applicability of Horne & Tension between Horne and Rufo As opposed to the present case that features a Rule 60(b)(5) motion seeking a modification of a consent decree, Horne involved a Rule 60(b)(5) motion seeking a modification of a court-issued injunction, as well as additional orders crafted by the district court. See id. at 441. Lower courts have reached different conclusions regarding the force of Horne in the context of a Rule 60(b)(5) motion seeking modification of a consent decree. See Burt v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 2014 WL 253010, at –19 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014) (discussing opposing conclusions by district courts that have analyzed extent of Horne’s applicability to consent decrees); see also Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126, 165–67, 170–71 (D.D.C. 2010) (questioning applicability of Horne to modification of consent decree and relying primarily on inquiry established in Rufo and Frew when evaluating propriety of enforcement beyond minimum requirements of federal law). The Sixth Circuit, however, did not express any hesitation regarding applying Horne to a Rule 60(b)(5) motion seeking modification of a consent decree. See John B., 710 F.3d at 411–14. In fact, the Sixth Circuit, in John B., concluded that where a defendant subject to a consent decree in institutional reform litigation has implemented a durable remedy to cure the federal 38 violation underlying the decree, Horne’s admonition that continued enforcement of the decree is “improper” controls and requires vacatur of the consent decree. Id. at 411–13. Three considerations compel us to join the Sixth Circuit’s apparent conclusion that Horne fully applies to a Rule 60(b)(5) motion seeking modification of a consent decree. First, while the parties may form the essential terms of a consent decree, as we noted earlier when discussing our jurisdiction over this appeal, a district court’s order approving the consent decree is tantamount to a final judgment on the merits. See supra 22 (citing Johnson, 393 F.3d 1096, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004)). Second, when discussing the proper inquiries for evaluating a Rule 60(b)(5) motion in institutional reform litigation, Horne uses “consent decree” or “decree” interchangeably with injunction and court order even though Horne involved requested modifications to an injunction and several court orders but did not involve a consent decree. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 448–50. From this, we glean that the Court considers a consent decree and an injunctive order equivalent for purposes of evaluating a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for modification. And had the Court intended to limit Horne to institutional reform litigation involving only injunctions and court crafted orders, it could have easily done so explicitly. The Court, however, did not so limit its holding, and the plain language of Horne supports the conclusion that the decision applies with equal force to all institutional reform cases, including those cases featuring consent decrees. 39 Third, the same federalism concerns at the heart of Horne are present in institutional reform cases featuring consent decrees. Admittedly, the acquiescence of state or local governmental officials to the terms of a consent decree might diminish federalism concerns at the inception of the decree. But where, as here, a consent decree remains in effect for decades, enforcement of the decree necessarily interjects a federal court into local affairs and binds local governmental officials who were not parties to the consent decree. The federal court, thereby, effectively limits the democratic process by restricting the array of resources available to the governmental officials for the enactment of other policies. Applying Horne to Rule 60(b)(5) motions for modifications to consent decrees does not come without complication. Notably, an apparent tension exists between Horne and Rufo with respect to the appropriate course of action where a party seeking modification has brought itself into compliance with federal law but has not substantially complied with the specific terms of the consent decree or court order. Compare Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (“If a durable remedy [addressing the federal law violation] has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.”), with Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391 (“A proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor.”). To the extent Rufo and Horne differ as to the appropriate course of action when a party seeks a Rule 60(b)(5) modification to an order in an institutional reform case, two considerations cause us to follow the course outlined in Horne when the 40 significant change advanced as the basis for Rule 60(b)(5) modification is the defendant’s alleged ongoing compliance with federal law. First, Rufo involved a proposed modification to a plan that, if faithfully implemented over time, would eventually cure the federal law violation. See id. at 376 (describing requested modification at issue as allowing for some double bunking in new facility yet to be completed or opened). As such, unlike in Horne where the defendants alleged that they had remedied the federal law violation, the defendants in Rufo had not yet remedied the issues with overcrowding and neglect in maintaining the jail that gave rise to the litigation. And, where the Rufo defendants had not remedied the issues giving rise to the litigation, it naturally follows that the Rufo defendants, unlike the Horne defendants, were not in a position to establish the implementation of a durable remedy. Further, nothing in Rufo suggests that the proposed modification would equate with, or for that matter exceed, the constitutional floor. Thus, while Rufo is undoubtedly informative on many issues surrounding the Rule 60(b)(5) standard for modifying a consent decree, its statement about not striving to modify a consent decree to the constitutional floor is not germane to its decision. Second, Horne represents the Court’s most recent proclamation regarding the standard for obtaining a modification to an order in institutional reform litigation. And, as noted by scholars, Horne is the latest ruling in a trend of decisions that lower the threshold for defendants to obtain a modification to, or the dissolution of, orders in long-lasting institutional reform cases. Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions & the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 167, 193–94 & n.136 41 (2017) (citing Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1435, 1466 (2013), and Mark Kelley, Note, Saving 60(b)(5): The Future of Institutional Reform Litigation, 125 Yale L.J. 272, 307 (2015)). As we read Horne, if a party seeking modification to a consent decree demonstrates a significant change in circumstances, the district court must take a flexible approach and consider whether the moving party has implemented a durable remedy to cure the federal law violation underlying the institutional reform litigation. See John B., 710 F.3d at 412 (“In applying this flexible approach, we must answer two questions: first whether the state has achieved compliance with the federal-law provisions whose violation the decree sought to remedy; and second, whether the State would continue that compliance in the absence of continued judicial supervision.”); see also Petties ex rel. Martin v. District of Columbia, 662 F.3d 564, 569, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying Horne’s statement that district court “ought to have ‘applied a flexible standard that seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon as a violation of federal law has been remedied’” to context of requested modification to preliminary injunction (quoting Horne, 557 U.S. at 450– 51)). The district court, by way of its role in overseeing the institutional reform litigation for many years, is in the best position to evaluate both whether a party has complied with federal law and, if so, whether the party is committed to ongoing compliance with federal law in the absence of oversight by the federal court. See Petties, 662 F.3d at 571 (recognizing that district court’s management of litigation 42 “for many years” places district court in position to assess likelihood of compliance with federal law absent oversight). Likewise, the district court is also in the best position to assess whether the litigation has taken on a life of its own and now advances a purpose removed from remedying the initial violation(s) or whether continued oversight remains necessary to ensure compliance with federal law. Finally, we note that when applying the flexible approach and evaluating whether a moving party implemented a durable remedy, a district court must consider the totality of the moving party’s efforts to demonstrate sustained compliance with federal law. In this respect, there is not a single path, such as the adoption of new legislation, by which a party can demonstrate the implementation of a durable remedy. See id., 662 F.3d at 569–71 (remanding for determination of whether adoption of new internal policies, coupled with improved record of compliance with federal law, satisfied durable remedy requirement). Several of the desegregation cases, although arguably not directly on point, highlight the broad inquiry a district court must undertake when determining a party’s commitment to abiding by federal law. Specifically, factors that a district court may consider include the party’s commitment to compliance, the duration of the party’s compliance with federal law, and whether or not the effects of the violation of federal law persist. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (holding that the district court may relinquish desegregation control in incremental stages, and stating that: “one of the prerequisites to relinquishment of control in whole or in part is that a school district has demonstrated its commitment to a course of action that gives full respect to the equal 43 protection guarantees of the Constitution”); id. at 491 (listing relevant factors in determining whether partial withdrawal of federal desegregation oversight is appropriate as including whether the school district has demonstrated “its good-faith commitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate for the judicial intervention in the first instance”); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v, Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991) (stating that “[t]he district court should address itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable” while also considering the lengthy period of time during which the Board complied with the federal court’s oversight). e. Summary From the foregoing discussion of Rufo, Horne, and other institutional reform litigation cases, several principles emerge that are critical to our analysis of whether Defendants are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(5). First, a motion for relief from a consent decree based on an assertion that “applying it prospectively is no longer equitable” demands a different focus than a motion based on an assertion that “the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); Horne, 557 U.S. at 454. With respect to the latter ground for relief, it is appropriate for a court to focus on whether the movant has satisfied each obligation set forth in the consent decree. But where, as here, the movant contends that changed circumstances have rendered further enforcement of 44 the consent decree no longer equitable, the inquiry is whether the movant has shown (a) that a significant change in factual circumstances or in law warrants revision of the decree, and (b) that the requested modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383–84, 391. A movant may establish that changed factual circumstances warrant modification when (i) the changed circumstances “make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous,” (ii) a “decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,” or (iii) “enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest.” Id. at 384. It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a motion for modification where the moving party meets this burden. Horne, 557 U.S. at 447. Second, a flexible approach to evaluating the equities of such a motion is crucial where, as in this case, institutional reform is sought. Horne, 557 U.S. at 450; Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380–81. Consent decrees in reform cases often remain in effect for extended periods, thereby increasing the prospect that a significant change in factual circumstances will occur. Horne, 557 U.S. at 447–48; Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380. Consent decrees also tend to restrict state and local officials’ ability to implement new ideas to old problems. Horne, 557 U.S. at 449; Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381. And they raise sensitive federalism concerns that are heightened when a decree effectively dictates state or local budget priorities. Horne, 557 U.S. at 448. Third, when a party seeks termination or vacatur of a consent decree based on the inequity of continued oversight, a court must determine not only whether changed circumstances exist, but also whether the “objective” of the decree—that is, whether 45 compliance with federal law—has been attained. See id. at 450 (noting that “a critical question in [the] Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is whether the objective of the District Court’s [initial] order—i.e., satisfaction of the EEOA’s ‘appropriate action’ standard—has been achieved” (emphasis added) (citing Frew, 540 U.S. at 442)); id. at 454 (concluding that the Ninth Circuit “needed to ascertain whether ongoing enforcement of the original order was supported by an ongoing violation of federal law” (emphasis added) (citing Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282)); id. at 468 (reiterating that the Ninth Circuit should have asked whether the school district was meeting the EEOA’s “appropriate action” requirement); see also Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282 (explaining that a decree must be “tailored to cure the condition that offends” federal law and seek to restore victims of unlawful conduct to the position they would have occupied absent the unlawful conduct (internal quotation marks omitted)); John B., 710 F.3d at 411 (stating that a court considering a Rule 60(b)(5) motion “must determine whether ‘ongoing enforcement of the original order [is] supported by an ongoing violation of federal law’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Horne, 557 U.S. at 454)); Washington, 573 F.3d at 710 (interpreting Horne and Rufo as requiring a court to “consider whether the purpose of the decree” has been achieved). So where the basis of the Rule 60(b)(5) motion is that continued enforcement of the decree is no longer equitable, instead of inquiring narrowly whether the specific obligations of a consent decree have been attained, the court must broadly inquire whether the party obligated by the decree is at that time in compliance with federal law. Horne, 557 U.S. at 451–52; see also id. at 439 (stating that the lower courts needed to ask the 46 broader question whether the state “was fulfilling its obligation under the EEOA by other means”). And once compliance with federal law has been attained, a court must return control over the program to the state and its officials, provided a durable remedy is in place. See id. at 452 (“‘When the objects of the decree have been attained’—namely, when EEOA compliance has been achieved—‘responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations [must be] returned promptly to the State and its officials.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 442)); see also Frew, 540 U.S. at 442 (“The federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.” (emphasis added)); Washington, 573 F.3d at 709 (“The Constitution does not establish the district courts as permanent administrative agencies.”). Last, the existence of a durable remedy may warrant disengagement of judicial oversight. The Horne Court’s single reference to a durable remedy states: [A] critical question in this Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is whether the objective of the District Court’s [initial] order—i.e., satisfaction of the EEOA’s “appropriate action” standard—has been achieved. See [Frew,] 540 U.S. at 442. If a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper. See Milliken, [433 U.S.] at 282. Horne, 557 U.S. at 450. From the latter sentence, it is fair to conclude that if a durable remedy is in place, then the movant has attained the more-general objects of the decree—i.e., compliance with federal law. We interpret the Court’s reference to a “durable remedy” as recognition that fleeting federal compliance is insufficient to 47 warrant relief. Thus, a district court, in assessing whether further oversight is equitable, may and should consider the totality of defendants’ efforts to comply with federal law and defendants’ commitment to remaining in compliance with federal law. Such is the approach adopted by two of our sister circuits subsequent to Horne. See supra 41-43 (discussing application of Horne’s durable remedy language in John B., 710 F.3d 391 and Petties, 662 F.3d 564). And like our sister circuits, we do not read the language in Horne too restrictively with respect to what may constitute a durable remedy. The Court has admonished against taking language from its opinions out of context and giving it “talismanic quality.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380. Recall that, in Rufo, the district court denied modification of the consent decree because the state defendants had failed to meet the “clear showing of grievous wrong” evoked by the Court in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). Rufo, 502 U.S. at 377. The Court acknowledged that the “grievous wrong” language used in Swift, if “[r]ead out of context,” “suggests a ‘hardening’ of the traditional flexible standard for modification of consent decrees.” Id. at 379. It explained, however, that such a reading would be inconsistent with Rule 60(b)(5): “That Rule, in providing that, on such terms as are just, a party may be relieved from a final judgment or decree where it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application, permits a less stringent, more flexible standard.” Id. at 380. A similarly cautious reading of the “durable remedy” language in Horne is appropriate here. 48 When a Rule 60(b)(5) movant has established both the absence of an ongoing violation of federal law and a future commitment to remain in compliance with federal law, federalism concerns should inform a court’s flexible determination as to how a consent decree will be modified. Rule 60(b)(5) dictates as much. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380. Accordingly, there is no one way for a movant to show that its federal compliance is more than fleeting. For example, a movant may establish its commitment to future compliance through the adoption of a durable remedy—such as a statute designed to cure the specific federal violation. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 450. A movant may also establish its commitment to future compliance through a record of sustained good-faith efforts to remedy federal violations and, to the extent possible, eliminate the vestiges of the federal violation. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490, 498; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248–49. Ultimately, the district court’s wealth of experience overseeing the litigation should inform its assessment of whether the Defendants are now in compliance with federal law, and whether they are committed to remaining in compliance.6 In summation, if Defendants here can show they are no longer violating the class members’ federal rights, and the district court has reason to believe Defendants’ compliance with federal law is durable, then “continued enforcement of the District Court’s original order[s] is inequitable within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5), and relief is warranted.” Horne, 557 U.S. at 470; see also John B., 710 F.3d at 413; 6 Here, the district court has been involved with this case for three decades. It has personal knowledge of the efforts by the Defendants to meet their obligations and the complexity involved in setting compliance measures. 49 Petties, 662 F.3d at 570-71. To require more under those circumstances would raise serious federalism concerns. It also would conflict with the Supreme Court’s admonition that a federal consent decree should do no more than remedy a condition that violates federal law. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282. Once the offending condition has been cured, the Court has instructed that responsibility over the state program must be returned promptly to the state and its officials. Frew, 540 U.S. at 442; see also Horne, 557 U.S. at 450–51 (stating the flexible standard under Rule 60(b)(5) “seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon as a violation of federal law has been remedied”). And in weighing the equities, the district court should avoid imposing an inflexible standard that risks depriving future officials of their legislative and executive powers. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 449. After all, such inflexibility is unnecessary to protect the federal interests at the heart of the institutional reform litigation. If the state again violates federal law, victims may file a new lawsuit to bring the state back into compliance. Elected officials may also be held accountable to the citizenry through the political process. For all of these reasons, we conclude that Defendants may satisfy the durability required by Horne in a number of ways, including: by taking specific, long-term actions aimed at curing the federal violations, by making good faith efforts to obtain compliance, or by operating in conformity with federal law for a reasonable period of time.