Opinion ID: 2974266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Major Life Activity of Work

Text: -9- No. 05-3751 Gentry v. Summit Second, the evidence Gentry offers fails as a matter of law to show that he is unable to work in a broad class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. See Baptist Mem’l, 398 F.3d at 481. He must present some evidence that Summit regarded him as unable to perform a broad range or class of jobs, meaning that it perceived him as unable to perform the same general type of work in the same geographic area. See Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 652, 653 n. 5, 654 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting in ADA “regarded as” case that it would be plaintiff's burden at trial to prove that she was perceived as “substantially impaired” in her ability to perform other employment suitable to her age, education and experience and available in her geographic area). We find no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gentry’s supervisors regarded him as disabled as to performing manual tasks or performing the activity of work. As such, he fails to establish a prima facie case, so we need not address his claims of hostile work environment.5 2. Retaliation Under Title VII Gentry also argues that Summit retaliated against him by constructively discharging him. He asserts that he lost wages and suffered from post traumatic stress disorder due to the actions of Summit employees. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee has opposed an employment practice made unlawful by the subchapter or “because the employee has made a charge, 5 Gentry’s claim fails because he does not present a genuine issue of fact as to “‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits . . . the major life activities of such individual,’ or as ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ by the employer.” Todd v. City of Cincinnati, 436 F.3d 635, 636 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, the inquiry stops here. - 10 - No. 05-3751 Gentry v. Summit testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under that subchapter. He asserts that he engaged in protected activity when he supported co-worker Higginbotham in filing her EEOC charge; filed his own EEOC charge in 2001; and accompanied witnesses Nancy Jewell and Sandy Hockmeyer when they were interviewed by the OCRC in 2002. Because of this he claims he was harassed to the point that he had to go on long-term disability leave thereby being constructively discharged. Gentry must satisfy the following four elements to make out a prima facie case of retaliation for exercising rights protected by Title VII: (1) he engaged in legally protected activity; (2) Summit knew about Gentry’s exercise of this right; (3) Summit took a materially adverse action against Gentry; and (4) the protected activity and the adverse action are causally connected. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2414-15 (2006); Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001). We also apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to claims of retaliation. See Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 1987). Gentry must meet the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. See Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000). The burden then shifts to Summit to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its conduct. Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 349 F.3d 269, 27374 (6th Cir. 2003). Finally, Gentry must show that the proffered explanation by Summit, if any, was a pretext for its retaliatory action. Id. - 11 - No. 05-3751 Gentry v. Summit Gentry fails to demonstrate the causal relationship between a protected activity and the adverse action. The district court found that Gentry failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation. The dispositive factor the court found lacking was a connection between the adverse action and the protected activity. A plaintiff is required to establish a causal connection and produce sufficient evidence to create an inference that the “adverse action would not have been taken had the plaintiff not filed a discriminatory action.” Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563. Causation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, id., but to withstand summary judgment, causation must be shown by evidence “sufficient to raise the inference that protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action,” Zanders v. Nat’l R.R. Passengers Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotes omitted). We affirm the decision of the district court because Gentry has not shown a connection between his protected activity and the alleged retaliation. We agree with the district court’s finding that several of the adverse acts occurred prior to the protected activity. Gentry does not attempt to address causation in his briefs. Instead he focused on whether there was sufficient evidence to find that he suffered an adverse action and whether the harassment amounted to a constructive discharge. Because he fails to demonstrate a connection between the protected activity and any allegedly retaliatory conduct, we affirm summary judgment. 3. Family Medical Leave Act As mentioned previously, we have no jurisdiction over these self-care FMLA claims. Therefore, we will not discuss that issue. With regard to Gentry’s claim that he was entitled to - 12 - No. 05-3751 Gentry v. Summit FMLA leave to care for his mother, his amended complaint provided no notice that he believed he was entitled to leave on the basis of his mother’s arthritis. Indeed, the only person in the complaint alleged to have experienced a serious health condition is Gentry. “The sole basis for entitlement to FMLA leave pled in [Plaintiff’s] interference claim was his alleged serious health condition.” Hubert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys. Inc.., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)). Thus, the subsequent assertion of an additional, separate statutory basis for entitlement to leave (caring for a parent’s serious health condition) effects a fundamental change in the nature of Gentry’s interference claim. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Having proceeded through discovery without amending (or seeking to amend) his complaint to reflect that fundamental change, Gentry is not permitted to raise it in the midst of summary judgment. Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1296-97. Moreover, the FMLA authorizes leave “[i]n order to care for the . . . parent, of the employee, if such . . . parent has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Gentry has not shown either that he was “needed to care for” his mother on the disputed day or that his activities in caring for her because of her arthritis constituted FMLA-qualifying care. See Overley v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 2006 WL 1133292, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2006). We REMAND the self-care FMLA claim and the Title I ADA claim to the district court for dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and AFFIRM summary judgment on all other claims. - 13 - No. 05-3751 Gentry v. Summit