Opinion ID: 770973
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Same Conduct, Transaction, or Occurrence

Text: 17 Rule 15(c)(2) states that: An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when... the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). As this court recently explained, whether a statute of limitations will be permitted to bar an amended claim turns on whether the amended claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as that set forth in the original complaint: 19 The rule is based on the notion that once litigation involving particular conduct or a given transaction or occurrence has been instituted, the parties are not entitled to the protection of the statute of limitations against the later assertion by amendment of defenses or claims that arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as set forth in the original pleading. 20 Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1999). 21 This court has stated that the thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principle that cases 'should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.' Moore, 790 F.2d at 559 (quoting Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982)). Thus, a court will permit a party to add even a new legal theory in an amended pleading as long as it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. See Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1973) (where the parties are the same, . . . an amendment which adds another claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence does relate back to the date of the original complaint.); Koon v. Lakeshore Contractors, 128 F.R.D. 650, 653 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (an added theory of liability for the same occurrence may relate back. (citing Hageman)), aff'd without opinion, 889 F.2d 1087 (Table), 1989 WL 137151 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 1989); see also 6A Wright et al., federal practice and procedure § 1497, at 94-95, 98-99 (1990 & Supp. 2000) (an amendment that states an entirely new claim for relief will relate back as long as it satisfies the test embodied in . . . Rule 15(c).). Likewise, [a]n amendment that alleges added events leading up to the same injury may relate back. Koon, 128 F.R.D. at 653 (citing Tiller v. AtlanticCoast Line R. Co., 323 U.S. 574, 581 (1945)). 22 Miller argues that the amended claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). Miller asserts that, under the amended complaints, Shippers are liable for the same conduct -- negligently exposing the deceased seamen to toxins and failing to maintain the seaworthiness of their vessels -- as he alleged in his original complaints. He further claims that the amended complaints simply named the hazardous substance other than asbestos with more specificity than did the original complaints, and that the two sets of complaints concerned the same time period and the same injuries. 23 Under the Rules described above, we find this argument to be persuasive. Miller brought his original complaints under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § App. 688, and general admiralty and maritime law. The original complaints included theories of negligence, unseaworthiness, wrongful death, and loss of society and companionship. The amended complaints also arise under the Jones Act and general admiralty and maritime law, and include theories of negligence, unseaworthiness, wrongful death, and loss of society and companionship. More important, each original complaint alleged that, [w]hile serving as a mariner on said vessels, Plaintiff's decedent was exposed to hazardous substances other than asbestos, and that [a]s a direct and proximate consequence of his exposure to hazardous substances other than asbestos, Plaintiff's decedent has sustained injuries. The amended complaints are very similar, with the added specificity that the hazardous substances originally pleaded included benzene and that the injuries originally claimed came in the form of leukemia. Each amended complaint states that Plaintiff's Decedent was required by his employers to perform duties which included the constant exposure to chemical carcinogens including benzene, and that that exposure caused the decedent to suffer from leukemia. The amended complaints then state the particular benzene-containing substances to which each decedent was allegedly exposed, and on which ship the exposure occurred. Thus, the amended complaints simply plead with more specificity that which appeared in the original complaints: Shippers' liability for exposing decedents to a hazardous substance. See Tiller, 323 U.S. at 581 (The cause of action now, as it was in the beginning, is the same -- it is a suit to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of the deceased.); see also 3 James Wm. Moore et al., moore's federal practice §15.19[2], at 15-82 (3d ed. 1999) (Amendments that amplify or restate the original pleading or set forth facts with greater specificity should relate back.). 24 Shippers argue strenuously that the amended complaints do not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original complaints, because they contain new operative facts. 6 It is true that a claim with entirely different operative facts will not relate back. See Koon, 128 F.R.D. at 653 (finding that new claim of lower back injury sustained while jumping to the ground from a fence does not relate back to original complaint of neck injury sustained while lifting heavy object on board a barge). But Miller alleged the very same general set of facts in the amended complaints as he did in the original ones: that decedents worked for many years on Shippers' vessels, that they were exposed to hazardous substances duringthat time due to Shippers' negligence, and that they sustained injuries in the form of lethal diseases due to their exposure to hazardous substances. Shippers' arguments that injuries arising from exposure to asbestos are materially different from injuries arising from exposure to benzene -- an argument which is derived from a few definitions in a medical dictionary, see Dorland's Illustrated medical dictionary 145-46, 191 (28th ed. 1994), and upon which the district court relied -- is unconvincing. To focus on the particular pathologies of a given carcinogen is far too formalistic and specific for the general, non-technical requirements of Rule 15. This is especially the case with diseases such as cancer and leukemia, which may be idiopathic and which may arise from sources that are impossible to identify before extensive discovery (if at all). Accordingly, the benzene exposure claims Miller details in the amended complaints fit comfortably within the claims of exposure to hazardous substances that he alleged in the original pleading 7 .