Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restriction on redirect examination of defense expert psychiatric witness

Text: After the prosecutor, in cross-examination of forensic psychiatrist Dr. Vicary, elicited the witness's opinion that the evidence in defendant's case did not support any psychiatric defenses, including a defense of insanity (see pt. II.B.1., ante ), defense counsel in redirect examination sought to explore Dr. Vicary's understanding of the legal standard for insanity. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the line of questioning. Defendant contends the trial court violated state evidentiary law (by allowing the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence during the prosecutor's cross-examination), as well as defendant's federal constitutional rights (by inconsistently and arbitrarily restricting his counsel's redirect examination of Dr. Vicary when it had just permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine him on the same subject). The Attorney General contends the cross-examination was relevant and that, by failing to object on constitutional grounds to the court's ruling concerning the scope of redirect examination, defendant has forfeited any constitutional claim for purposes of this appeal. Citing People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pages 117-118, 132-133, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166, defendant contends that by calling the trial court's attention to the irrelevancy of the prosecutor's line of questioning, he preserved the constitutional claim he now makes. Assuming for argument's sake defendant preserved the issue, we conclude the trial court did not err under state or federal law. The issue arose in the following context: During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Vicary whether the report he had prepared for defendant's trial counsel addressed issues other than those relevant to the guilt phase. Eventually the prosecutor elicited the fact Dr. Vicary had considered and rejected a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. At sidebar, defense counsel asserted that whether Dr. Vicary thought defendant was insane was irrelevant and inadmissible, and asked what parameters the court would set on such questioning. The court stated the prosecutor had already covered insanity and inquired whether he intended to do more than that. The prosecutor responded he did not. Cross-examination of Dr. Vicary resumed. Defendant complains that despite the colloquy between court and counsel, the prosecutor continued to question Dr. Vicary about the defense of insanity, again eliciting that this case involved no insanity plea. Defendant contends the prosecutor's questioning was irrelevant because he never entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the issue of a defendant's legal insanity is bifurcated and tried separately from that of guilt in any event. But as the Attorney General reasons, the prosecutor engaged in the line of questioning that defendant now challenges not in order to demonstrate that Dr. Vicary did not believe defendant was legally insane, but to impeach Dr. Vicary's testimony on cross-examination that defense counsel would be incompetent if he did not present a psychiatric defense in the guilt phase, even though Dr. Vicary believed the facts did not support a psychiatric defense to the charges, and to put in perspective the fact Dr. Vicary similarly felt the facts did not support a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. In other words, the prosecutor explored the inconsistency between the defense's presentation of a psychiatric defense and its nonpresentation of an insanity defense, despite Dr. Vicary's disavowal of the validity of both defenses on the facts of this case. The trial court acted within its discretion in precluding defense counsel from questioning Dr. Vicary on redirect examination concerning his understanding of the legal definition of insanity, due to the risk of undue consumption of time and confusion of the issues. (Evid.Code, § 352.) Nevertheless, we note the court permitted defense counsel to suggest to the jury a possible distinction between the psychiatric defense actually presented and the insanity defense not presented, by eliciting Dr. Vicary's acknowledgment, on redirect examination, that when a defendant proffers an insanity defense, he bears the burden of persuading the jury he is insane. Defense counsel also elicited from Dr. Vicary testimony reinforcing the principle that the determination whether defendant had the mental state required for the charged offenses was to be made by the jury, not the forensic psychiatrist. We see no possibility that the decision not to allow defense counsel to explore Dr. Vicary's understanding of the legal definition of insanity, coupled with the admission of Dr. Vicary's opinion regarding the viability of an insanity defense, would have misled the jury to conclude Dr. Vicary was asserting defendant suffered from no mental disease or disorder, or otherwise prejudiced defendant. We conclude the trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by imposing asymmetrical evidentiary standards on the parties.