Opinion ID: 1488007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Because of

Text: The insurers also contend that, even if the MDL cases seek damages, those damages are not because of bodily injury. The complaint allegations are varied, but each includes at least one theory under which tort damages may be recovered. Every complaint alleges product liability, breach of implied warranty, and fraudulent concealment claims. Two of the four ( Gimpelson and Pinney ) assert negligence and civil conspiracy counts, and three ( Pinney, Farina, and Gilliam ) allege violations of the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York consumer protection acts, respectively. The amended complaints add battery claims. [W]e have said that the label attached to the cause of action  whether it be tort, contract, or warranty  does not determine the duty to defend. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2007); Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.1997); see also 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 200:19 (It is the factual allegations instead of the legal theories alleged which determine the existence of a duty to defend.). Thus, in a case in which a plaintiff sought recovery on negligence theories, we held there was no duty to defend because, despite the negligence labels attached to the claims, the plaintiff had alleged facts indicating that the origin of his damages was intentional behavior and made no factual contention that could constitute negligent behavior by [the defendant]. Farmers, 955 S.W.2d at 83. But the factual allegations here support a duty. The pleadings allege both intentional conduct (Nokia knew of RFR's harmful effects and nonetheless intentionally sold its products to consumers) and negligence (Nokia should have known of RFR's harmful effects). The insurers argue that the intentional tort allegations defeat the duty to defend. Standing in isolation, they might. Lamar Homes, 242 S.W.3d at 8 (We have further said that an intentional tort is not an accident and thus not an occurrence regardless of whether the effect was unintended or unexpected.). But see King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 189, 193 (Tex.2002) (noting that assault and battery exclusions would be unnecessary if such acts were not occurrences); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Tex. 1999). We cannot, however, ignore the plaintiffs' other allegations when determining that duty. See 22 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 136.2(D) (noting that, when there are covered and non-covered claims in the same lawsuit, the insurer is obligated to provide a defense to the entire suit, at least until it can limit the suit to those claims outside of the policy coverage). The putative class members include two or three groups (depending on which complaint is involved), one of which consists of future purchasers, [12] and the insurers contend that this negates the duty to defend, as it is impossible for future purchasers to have suffered damages due to bodily injury. This misconstrues the nature of the duty, however. The duty to defend is not negated by the inclusion of claims that are not covered; rather, it is triggered by the inclusion of claims that might be covered. Id. § 136.4(B) (noting that [t]o excuse the duty to defend, the complaint must unambiguously exclude coverage under the policy) (emphasis added). Because past purchasers are alleged to have suffered bodily injury and because they seek damages for those injuries already incurred, the suits fall within the policy language  even if the case also involves claims by those who have not yet purchased wireless telephones. Over-inclusive allegations do not negate the duty to defend; the duty applies if there is a possibility that any of the claims might be covered.