Opinion ID: 158618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Unconstitutional Competency Standard

Text: 73 Mr. Smallwood's next ground for relief is that the trial court violated his due process rights by finding him competent to stand trial under an unconstitutional standard of proof. Prior to trial, petitioner's counsel filed an application for determination of competency. 10 The trial court held a hearing, ordered petitioner evaluated by a mental health professional, and, based on the psychologist's evaluation, found the petitioner incompetent to stand trial because of concerns over his ability to adequately assist his counsel. The court committed petitioner to Eastern State Hospital, where he received evaluation and treatment. After two months, a hospital doctor determined petitioner was competent to stand trial. At a hearing, petitioner and his counsel both agreed with this assessment, and the trial court adjudged Mr. Smallwood competent. Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his constitutional rights during his resumption of competency hearing by requiring him to demonstrate his incompetency by a clear and convincing standard of proof, a standard later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996) (finding Oklahoma's clear and convincing standard governing post-examination competency hearings incompatible with the dictates of due process). 11 74 This court has, on several occasions, characterized similar Cooper claims as challenging procedural, rather than substantive, due process rights. See Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 1999); Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Attorney Gen. for the State of Okla., 167 F.3d 1339, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1999). Unlike a substantive competency claim, one based upon procedural due process is subject to procedural bar. Barnett, 174 F.3d at 1134. Therefore, before addressing the merits of petitioner's Cooper claim, we turn to respondent's contention that it is procedurally barred. 75 As with many of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Smallwood failed to raise his Cooper claim in state proceedings, either on direct appeal or in his first application for post-conviction relief. Consequently, he has failed to exhaust this claim. Like the ineffective assistance of counsel claims analyzed in Part III above, though, we excuse petitioner's failure to exhaust because state courts would deny the Cooper claim on procedural grounds were petitioner required to return to the state courts to raise the issue in a second application for post-conviction relief. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1089(D)(2), (8). Similarly, for the same reasons discussed above, we find Mr. Smallwood's Cooper claim procedurally defaulted because petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claim in his first application for state post-conviction relief, nor can he show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from our refusal to address the merits of this claim. 12 76 Even if we were to treat Mr. Smallwood's claim as properly raised before us, it has no merit. To obtain habeas relief on a procedural competency claim, petitioner must show that the state trial court ignored evidence that, viewed objectively, raised a bona fide doubt as to the petitioner's competency to stand trial. Walker, 167 F.3d at 1345. In conducting this inquiry, we consider 'evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.' Id. at 1346 (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975)). The trial court initially adjudged petitioner incompetent based on the report of Dr. Edith King, who examined petitioner and determined he was able to appreciate the nature of the charges against him but was unable to consult with his attorney or rationally assist in the preparation of his defense. Dr. King had serious doubts about [petitioner's] ability to organize and control his thinking in a realistic manner. R., Vol. II at 263. She also reported that petitioner might be able to achieve competency with further evaluation and treatment. After two months at Eastern State Hospital, Dr. Warren Smith evaluated Mr. Smallwood and concluded he was competent to stand trial, able to trust his attorney, and prepared to return to court to face the charges against him. 77 While a prior adjudication of incompetence gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetence . . . . [the presumption] may be overcome by competent evidence. Sena v. New Mexico State Prison, 109 F.3d 652, 655 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). At petitioner's resumption of competency hearing, Dr. Smith's report rebutted the presumption of incompetence created by Dr. King's initial assessment. Additionally, neither petitioner nor his counsel challenged Dr. Smith's opinion as to his competency or ever again raised the issue of competency at trial. In fact, petitioner voluntarily waived a jury trial on the issue of competency and testified that he was competent to stand trial, understood the proceeding against him, and was not on any medications. Petitioner's counsel, who had requested the initial competency evaluation, reinforced these conclusions by also testifying as to petitioner's competency. After considering this evidence and carefully reviewing petitioner's lengthy trial testimony, we find nothing that raises a bona fide doubt regarding whether, at the time of his trial, Mr. Smallwood was able to understand the proceedings against him or was able to assist his counsel in preparing a defense. See Rogers, 173 F.3d at 1290-91 (finding no evidence of petitioner's incompetency); Walker, 167 F.3d at 1345-46 (finding no bona fide doubt regarding competence when expert testimony determined petitioner to be competent and petitioner provided no evidence to the contrary). Therefore, we find that Mr. Smallwood is not entitled to habeas relief on his Cooper claim. 13