Opinion ID: 1297862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the remonstrance theory issue

Text: Abboud alleges that the Ralston City Council was prohibited from confirming the sale to Lakeview because his petition in remonstrance was properly filed pursuant to § 16-202. Section 16-202 provides that if a remonstrance against such sale signed by legal electors thereof equal in number to thirty percent of the electors of such city voting at the last regular municipal election held therein, be filed with the governing body of such city within thirty days of the passage and publication of such ordinance, said property shall not then, nor within one year thereafter, be sold. Abboud filed remonstrance petitions with the Ralston City Council, and the election commissioner verified 836 petition signatures, 16 more than the 820 needed to comprise 30 percent of the electors of the City, as required by § 16-202. The city attorney then reviewed the petitions and recommended invalidating 55 signatures. Based on the city attorney's findings, the city council then rejected the petitions and confirmed the sale of the lakebed property to Lakeview. Abboud requests that this court review the actions of the election commissioner, the city attorney, and the Ralston City Council de novo based on this court's decision in Chan v. City of South Omaha, 85 Neb. 434, 123 N.W. 464 (1909). He claims that the remonstrance petitions contained the requisite number of signatures because § 16-202 requires only that signers of the petitions be legal electors rather than registered voters, and therefore the decision of the city council to reject the petitions was wrong. Pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1985), a judgment rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1903 (Reissue 1989) provides that the proceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation, or modification must be made by petition entitled petition in error filed in a court having the power to reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, and must set forth the assigned errors charged to the lower tribunal. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1905 (Reissue 1989) requires that the plaintiff in error must file with the petition in error a transcript of the proceedings containing the final judgment or order sought to be reversed, vacated, or modified. A city council is a tribunal whose decision can be reversed, vacated, or modified by a court of proper jurisdiction. Roberts v. City of Mitchell, 131 Neb. 672, 269 N.W. 515 (1936). A city council exercises judicial functions in determining questions of fact, and if error proceedings are not filed to review the decision, it becomes final. Hiddleson v. City of Grand Island, 115 Neb. 287, 212 N.W. 619 (1927). If no statutory right to appeal from a decision of a city council exists, then proceedings in error are the only remedy afforded the plaintiff. Fisher v. Housing Auth. of City of Omaha, 214 Neb. 499, 334 N.W.2d 636 (1983). Since Nebraska does not provide a statutory right of appeal from the decision of a city council, Abboud's only remedy was to file a petition in error in the district court pursuant to § 25-1903. The purpose of a petition in error proceeding is to determine whether the decision of the lower tribunal is in accordance with the law. Dlouhy v. City of Fremont, 175 Neb. 115, 120 N.W.2d 590 (1963). In Brunken v. City of Omaha, 225 Neb. 410, 417, 405 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1987), we stated: `The general rule is that if it appears in such cases that such agency or body has acted within its jurisdiction and that all of the jurisdictional facts essential to uphold its findings and orders are sustained by some competent evidence, such findings and orders will be upheld in error proceedings to the district court and on appeal to this court.' In Andrews v. City of Fremont, 213 Neb. 148, 151, 328 N.W.2d 194, 196 (1982), we stated: A petition in error is designed to review the decision of the inferior tribunal. It is not to act as a super legislative or administrative agency to come to an independent conclusion. In order to have obtained review of the lower tribunal's decision, the petitioner must have filed in the reviewing court a transcript containing the lower tribunal's order within 1 calendar month of issuance of the final order. See, Meier v. State, 227 Neb. 376, 417 N.W.2d 771 (1988); Fisher v. Housing Auth. of City of Omaha, supra . We held in Andrews, supra, that the transcript filed in the reviewing court must contain the ordinances relied upon by the city council, as well as sufficient evidence for the reviewing court to determine whether the council's decision was correct. Our decision in Chan v. City of South Omaha, supra , is distinguishable and therefore inapplicable to this case. In Chan, the city council did not overrule but, rather, ignored a remonstrance petition filed by certain property owners. The city council made no decision as to whether the petition contained the amount of frontage foot owners required by the statute, nor did the petitioners have a hearing on the matter. Therefore, there was no decision by the council upon which the district court could find error. In that case we decided that whenever the sufficiency of a remonstrance petition is questioned in court, the fact should be determined without reference to the actions of the city council. The multitude of Nebraska cases following Chan that concern review of decisions of lower tribunals clearly establish that the review must be conducted upon filing of a petition in error unless another right of appeal is given through statute. This could not be accomplished in Chan because there was no decision issued by the lower tribunal to review. In this case it is clear that the Ralston City Council, in a public council meeting and against the objections of Abboud, decided to reject the remonstrance petitions filed by Abboud. This decision was final, judicial in nature, and may be reviewed only upon the filing of a petition in error in the district court. Abboud has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for review of a decision of a tribunal such as the Ralston City Council. He is incorrect in asserting that this court's as well as the district court's standard of review of the actions of the Ralston City Council is de novo. Abboud's only remedy was to file a petition in error requesting the district court to reverse or modify the decision of the Ralston City Council. This court could then review the district court's determination on appeal. He has failed to file a petition in error, and therefore the district court and this court are without jurisdiction to hear his claim. The district court assumed that Abboud's amended petition was a petition in error for the purpose of concluding that the word elector in § 16-202 required that signers of the petitions be registered voters. This does not mean that the amended petition was a petition in error. Abboud's petition did not contain a record of the Ralston City Council hearing at which the remonstrance petitions were rejected. It did not contain a copy of the final order of the city council, as required by Meier, supra, and Andrews, supra, although Abboud does make reference to the language in ordinance No. 765. Abboud did not specify what errors of law were committed by the Ralston City Council in reaching its decision. This is not sufficient to constitute a petition in error. Abboud has not properly presented his claims before either the district court or this court. Therefore, we are without jurisdiction to consider his claim.