Opinion ID: 17018
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Stigma” Due Process Claim

Text: The remaining due process question is whether the alleged false allegations of cheating, in an of themselves, can amount to a due process violation. Wheeler did not specifically allege such a “stigma” due process claim; in any event summary judgment was appropriate on such a claim. At the outset, Paul found that “the weight of our decisions establishes no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”29 It held that a plaintiff’s “charge that [defendants’] defamation of him, standing alone and apart from any other action with respect to him,” did not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.30 As explained above, a rational trier of fact could not find that TWU took any action jeopardizing his status as a student as a result of the alleged cheating allegations. Absent “an infringement of some other interest,”31 defamation by itself is not actionable. Defamation by the government might be actionable even where the government itself does not take action adverse against the plaintiff by altering the plaintiff’s status as an employee or student. We have stated, in this context, that “excluding a person from an occupation by making false defamatory statements is actionable.”32 However, in cases where the plaintiff claims that the government’s defamation has impaired his ability to pursue an occupation, the plaintiff must show 29 Paul, 424 U.S. at 702 (footnote omitted). 30 Id. at 695. 31 San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991). 32 Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1222 (5th Cir. 1983). 16 that the defamatory statement was publicly disclosed.33 The only evidence of a publication outside the university community is the April 2, 1996 letter, discussed above. The letter states that Wheeler “has not met all of his program requirements to be considered as an intern during the 1996-97 school year.” To support a stigma claim the state actor must make “concrete, false assertions of wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff,” and the charge of wrongdoing “must be worse than merely adverse; it must be such as would give rise to a badge of infamy, public scorn, or the like.”34 As a matter of law, the statements made in the April 2 letter are not sufficiently stigmatizing to support a stigma due process claim.35 Further, to establish a stigma due process claim, the plaintiff must prove, among other elements, that the defamatory charges made against him were false.36 “[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by concrete and particular facts will not prevent an award of summary judgment.”37 Wheeler failed to offer sworn summary judgment evidence of concrete and particular facts, showing the falsity of the alleged defamatory statements made by the faculty. For example, McCullough attested that her graduate assistant had seen Wheeler take a test that he was supposed to administer again to a test subject, and return fifteen minutes later with 33 Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 936 n.10 (5th Cir. 1995); Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 1993). 34 Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 936 (internal quotations omitted). 35 Id.; see also Connelly v. Comptroller of Currency, 876 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that letter by defendant stating that “we are of the opinion that [plaintiff] does not possess the qualifications for the position” was insufficient to support stigma due process claim). 36 Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1993). 37 Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995). 17 corrections. According to McCullough, the assistant expressed concern that an unusually high number of responses supposedly gathered from the test subject were word for word from the sample answers in the back of the testing manual. McCullough also attested that, in violation of the rules of her course and ethical standards, Wheeler had twice used a family member as a test subject. The record offers no sworn summary judgment proof that these events did not occur. Similarly, Wheeler offered evidence that Miller had told him that “apparently, there was an accusation . . . brought against you that you were going out creating your own protocols, not seeing children, just making up protocols and apparently you were caught doing that and you had a big confrontation with Dr. Jackson about that.” The record is devoid of sworn, concrete summary judgment evidence that this accusation by Dr. Jackson was false.