Opinion ID: 2974873
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Appellate Review

Text: The petitioner contends that in affirming both the three-judge panel’s imposition and its reimposition of the death penalty, the Ohio appellate courts ran afoul of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980), that a defendant’s right to due process is violated when state courts “arbitrarily disregard” provisions of state criminal statutes. Specifically, Davis argues that the then-applicable provisions of Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.06 forbade a trial court from reimposing the death penalty upon resentencing after concluding4 that a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance has been improperly considered by the sentencer. 4 Pursuant to the version of Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.06 in effect at the time of Davis’s resentencing: If the sentence of death that is imposed upon any offender is vacated upon appeal because the court of appeals or the supreme court, in cases in which the supreme court reviews the sentence upon appeal, could not affirm the sentence of death under the standards imposed by section 2929.05 of the Revised Code, is vacated No. 02-3227 Davis v. Coyle Page 12 We note that the petitioner’s Hicks claim was not raised in the district court, was not included in the certificate of appealability and, therefore, is not properly before us. In anticipation of a similar argument being raised on remand, however, we note that the state courts of Ohio have construed the state statute at issue to apply only when a jury, not a three-judge panel, recommends a sentence of death. See Davis II, 528 N.E.2d at 936. Such an interpretation does not “arbitrarily disregard” state criminal statutes; indeed, that conclusion flows from the determination of the Ohio Supreme Court in Penix that, pursuant to Ohio statutory mandates, “when an accused is tried by jury, . . . a death sentence may be imposed by the trial judge only upon recommendation of the same jury that tried the guilt phase of the proceedings. . . .” 513 N.E.2d at 748 (emphasis added). Because Davis was tried initially by a three-judge panel, not by a jury, the restrictive resentencing provisions of Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.06 are not applicable in this matter. It thus follows that the sentencing process in this case did not violate due process under Hicks, that the sentencing court was not precluded from re-imposing the death penalty, and that there is no constitutional impediment to consideration of the death penalty upon remand for resentencing.