Opinion ID: 463198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Quotient Verdict.

Text: 9 Scogin first argues that he should have been granted a new trial because the jury rendered an impermissible quotient verdict. Scogin relies on an affidavit from a court bystander, Charles A. McDaris, to support his argument. McDaris states in his affidavit that immediately following the trial Roger Burke, the jury foreperson, told him that the percentage figures attributing fault to each of the parties had been determined by a quotient method, that is by adding up percentage figures given by each juror and then striking an average for the fault attributable to Scogin and to Century's employee, West. 10 It is well established that a juror may not impeach his or her verdict, with the exception that a juror may testify about extraneous prejudicial information or improper influence in the jury room. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269, 35 S.Ct. 783, 785, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915); United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1169-70 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110, 97 S.Ct. 1146, 51 L.Ed.2d 563 (1977); Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). 5 In McDonald, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to allow a juror to testify regarding the jury's alleged use of a quotient verdict procedure. Justice Lamar, writing for the Court, explained: 11 But let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation--to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference. 12 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. at 267-68, 35 S.Ct. at 784. The Eighth Circuit has applied the rule enunciated in McDonald to hold that the affidavits of jurors may not be used to show a quotient verdict. Barry v. Legler, 39 F.2d 297, 302 (8th Cir.1930); Manhattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F.2d 840, 847 (8th Cir.1934). 13 The rule against a juror impeaching his or her verdict is now stated in Fed.R.Evid. 606(b), which reads: 14 Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). 6 15 The present case does not concern extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence being brought to bear upon any juror. Therefore, neither statements or affidavits from jurors themselves, nor McDaris' affidavit may be used to impeach the jury verdict. Because the record is devoid of competent proof that the jury reached its verdict by a quotient method, the district court did not err in denying Scogin's motion for a new trial on that ground. 16