Opinion ID: 195633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rivera's Sentencing Challenges

Text: 52 Rivera was convicted of four drug related charges. At sentencing, the court accepted the Presentence Report's (PSR) analysis that because Rivera was convicted of conspiracy to import approximately 800 kilograms of cocaine, and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute approximately 800 kilograms of cocaine, the appropriate sentencing guideline was Sec. 2D1.1. 6 The base offense level (BOL) is determined by Sec. 2D1.1(c)(2), which is based on the total amount of controlled substances involved. Because the offenses involved 800 kilograms of cocaine, the BOL was determined to be 40. 7 53 The court then enhanced the BOL by applying several upward adjustments, over Rivera's objections. The court applied a two level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1), because the court found that Rivera possessed firearms during the commission of the offense. Pursuant to Sec. 3B1.1(b), the court increased the BOL by three because it found that Rivera was a supervisor in a criminal activity involving five or more participants. The court also made an upward adjustment of two, under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, based on its finding that Rivera obstructed justice by perjuring himself, and attempting to coax a co-defendant into providing false information to a probation officer. The court determined that the total offense level was 47, and because Rivera's Criminal History Category was I, he therefore faced a guideline sentencing range of life imprisonment. The court then sentenced Rivera to serve concurrent terms of life imprisonment as to the four counts. 54
55 The district court determined Rivera's BOL on the basis of his and his co-conspirators' conduct, and the total amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy, approximately 800 kilograms of cocaine. The court rejected Rivera's contention that it should decrease the relevant quantity of cocaine to 372 kilograms because Rivera was acquitted on the substantive charges of importing and possessing 418 kilograms of the 800 kilograms of cocaine involved in the case. 8 The court stated: 56 [I]n any event, on the preponderance of the evidence the Court finds that this defendant had jointly undertaken this criminal activity and is held accountable of the conduct of others. And that he was found guilty by the jury on eight hundred kilos [in] the Count charged. 57 And so that the Court finds that--rules that it's not going to lessen by two points the three hundred and seventy-two kilo amount under the relevant conduct issue. 58 When a defendant has been convicted of a drug related offense, a key factor in constructing the defendant's sentence is the quantity of narcotics attributable to him, a factor which is determined by looking at the sum of the charged conduct of which the defendant was convicted, plus his relevant conduct. See United States v. Garcia, 954 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1992) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 409, 126 L.Ed.2d 356 (1993); U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1. The court determines the drug quantity by looking at all acts that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2); Garcia, 954 F.2d at 15; United States v. Mak, 926 F.2d 112, 113 (1st Cir.1991). In the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, such as a conspiracy, a defendant is accountable for all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, [or] in preparation for that offense.... U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 488. A court's determination regarding the amount of drugs involved in an offense will only be set aside on appeal if it is clearly erroneous. See Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 489. 59 The jury convicted Rivera of Counts One and Two, which charged Rivera with conspiracy to import, and to possess, 800 kilograms of cocaine. At sentencing, the court seemingly looked to U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and found that Rivera, and his cohorts, had jointly undertaken this criminal activity, and Rivera was accountable for the other's conduct in attempting to import and possess all 800 kilograms of cocaine. The court's finding was supported by evidence introduced at trial. Both Linder and Monteagudo testified that they met with Rivera, Ovalle, and another co-defendant on November 27, 1991, and that at this meeting they planned to import into Puerto Rico, 22 bales of cocaine (800 kilograms) which were to be airdropped off the coast of the Dominican Republic. Testimony by Monteagudo showed that the original scheme to import the cocaine did not proceed precisely according to plan, because of boat problems and a pursuit by unknown individuals who unexpectedly chased the conspirators in their boat on December 11, forcing them to dump some of the cocaine overboard. Testimony by Linder and Monteagudo indicated that Rivera and Ovalle then helped to salvage the original plan and adapt it--by calling Linder into service and helping him obtain a boat, so that Linder and Monteagudo could go to the Dominican Republic, and pick up and import the rest of the cocaine. Thus, the court did not err by implicitly concluding that Rivera helped plan the logistics of the scheme to import the entire 800 kilograms, and therefore the subsequent acts by his co-conspirators to execute this scheme were in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the jointly undertaken felonious plan. 60 Rivera contends that the verdicts regarding the substantive drug charges should guide the court in determining the correct quantity of cocaine instead of the conspiracy charges. The operative indictment grouped all of the cocaine involved in the December 11, 1991 and the December 15, 1991 shipments of cocaine together (800 kilograms) in Count One and Two, the conspiracy charges. The indictment then broke down the substantive charges into the two distinct shipments of cocaine that the defendants had allegedly attempted to import and possess. The jury only convicted Rivera of the substantive charges related to the December 15 shipment, involving 372 kilograms of cocaine (Counts Five and Six), and acquitted Rivera, and all of his co-defendants, with respect to the December 11, 1991 shipment, involving 418 kilograms of cocaine (Counts Three and Four). Therefore, Rivera contends that it was improper for the court to include the amount of cocaine involved in the charges of which he was acquitted, in determining his BOL. 61 The fact that Rivera was acquitted of the substantive charges involving the 418 kilograms of cocaine does not mean, however, that the court could not consider that conduct as relevant conduct. When determining relevant conduct, a sentencing court may consider acts which were not charged, as well as the facts underlying a prior acquittal when these facts appear reliable. Garcia, 954 F.2d at 15; United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.1989) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 218 (1st Cir.1992) (stating in dicta that an acquittal is not always conclusive on an issue for sentencing purposes due to differing standards of proof). As we have previously noted, testimony by both Linder and Monteagudo indicated that Rivera planned to import 800 kilograms of cocaine, including the 418 kilograms of cocaine which was the basis for Counts Three and Four. There was no clear error in the court's decision to credit the testimony of Linder and Monteagudo at sentencing, and then consider Rivera's conduct with respect to the 800 kilograms of cocaine, when the court determined Rivera's BOL. See, e.g., Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 489; Garcia, 954 F.2d at 16; United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir.1990).
62 Rivera makes a similar challenge to the court's decision to enhance his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1, because the court found that a firearm was possessed during the commission of the drug offenses. Rivera argues that the testimonial evidence linking him and his co-defendants to a firearm was extremely weak, especially in light of the fact that no firearm was ever found. Additionally, because the jury acquitted Rivera and his co-defendants of Count Seven, which charged them with aiding and abetting the carrying of a firearm in relation to the commission of the offense, Rivera contends that there was no basis for the court to enhance his sentence. 63 U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to enhance a defendant's BOL if a dangerous weapon, including a firearm, was possessed. The commentary to Sec. 2D1.1 states that the sentencing court should impose the enhancement if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1 comment (n. 3); United States v. Castillo, 979 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1992); Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d at 727. The First Circuit has followed this clearly improbable standard. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d at 726; United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 507 (1st Cir.1990). We have found that: 64 when the weapon's location makes it readily available to protect either the participants themselves during the commission of the illegal activity or the drugs and cash involved in the drug business, there will be sufficient evidence to connect the weapons to the offense conduct.... 65 Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d at 727; see also Castillo, 979 F.2d at 10. The defendant then has the burden to come forward with evidence demonstrating the existence of special circumstances that would render it clearly improbable that the weapon's presence has a connection to the narcotics trafficking. Castillo, 979 F.2d at 10; Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d at 727-28. 66 As we have previously discussed, the court is entitled to consider relevant conduct at sentencing, and this may include conduct which was the basis for charges that the defendant was acquitted of, as long as the evidence which establishes that conduct was reliable. Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 16-17. The court considered such relevant conduct here when it decided to apply the U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1 enhancement. The court found: 67 There's no question in my mind that there was a gun there. Willie, the Confidential Informant, talked about it. Talked about taking the bullets out. Try to make it inoperable. And then we have Monteagudo who said that he received two guns, as a matter of fact, from this defendant. And there is a gun. 68 The court then acknowledged that Rivera had been acquitted of the firearms charge, but stated that because the court had found that guns were possessed in connection with the narcotics transactions, and Rivera did not convince the court that it was clearly improbable that the gun would have been used in connection with these narcotic transactions, it was going to apply the enhancement. 69 The court's finding was supported by evidence in the record and was not clearly erroneous. Monteagudo testified that on December 7, at a meeting with Rivera, Ovalle, and others, to finalize the plans for the smuggling operation, Rivera gave Monteagudo two firearms, a .38 caliber revolver and a .22 caliber pistol. It was certainly reasonable for the court to conclude that Rivera had given the two firearms to Monteagudo, who was about to leave on his foray to pick up 800 kilograms of cocaine, to facilitate this smuggling plan. With the guns, Monteagudo could protect himself, and his co-conspirators, as well as the large quantity of cocaine they were to pick up. Additionally, Linder testified that Monteagudo had in fact brought a .22 caliber pistol with them on December 15, when he and Monteagudo went to the Dominican Republic to pick up the remaining ten bales of cocaine and bring the cocaine to Puerto Rico. Thus, absent circumstances showing that it was clearly improbable that the firearms were connected to the drug offense, there was sufficient evidence to support the enhancement. Rivera has not claimed that any such special circumstances existed. The court therefore properly applied the U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1 enhancement. 70
71 Rivera challenges the three-level enhancement for playing a supervisory role which the court imposed pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(b), claiming that the evidence demonstrated he was an underling, who merely followed orders in this organization. The court found that the defendant's role is of a manager/supervisor and it has been adequately supported by this record. We review this role-in-the-offense ruling for clear error. United States v. Jadusingh, 12 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir.1994) (citation omitted); United States v. Rodriguez Alvarado, 985 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1993) (citations omitted). 72 A three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(b) is appropriate if the government shows that the defendant 1) was a manager or supervisor of the criminal activity (but not a leader or organizer); and 2) the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Rodriguez Alvarado, 985 F.2d at 20. The terms manager and supervisor are not defined in the guidelines. A court can find that a defendant is a manager or supervisor where he exercised some degree of control over others involved in the commission of the crime or he [was] responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying out the crime. See Rodriguez Alvarado, 985 F.2d at 20 (quoting United States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir.1990)). 73 The court did not err in finding that Rivera played a managerial or supervisory role in the drug smuggling operation. The record supports the conclusion that Rivera played a predominant role in planning and organizing the logistics of this criminal operation: 1) Rivera was present at the November 27 planning meeting; 2) Rivera gave Ovalle and Linder instructions with respect to making sure Linder's boat was available to import the cocaine; 3) Rivera initially became suspicious of Linder, and then held a meeting where it was decided that Linder would be cut out of the initial attempt to import the cocaine; 4) Rivera procured another boat to be used by his cohorts in the initial attempt to import the 800 kilograms of cocaine; 5) Rivera provided Monteagudo with two firearms to be used during the drug smuggling operations; and 6) Rivera, along with Ovalle, met with Linder with respect to the logistics of importing the remaining cocaine which had been left behind in the Dominican Republic. There is also no dispute that more than five individuals were involved in the drug smuggling plan. The court properly applied the U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(b) enhancement.
74 The government requested that the court enhance Rivera's sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, based on Rivera's obstruction of justice. The government based this request on two factors: 1) that Rivera had provided a false statement to the probation officer at a presentence interview to the effect that he was not involved in the November 27 planning meeting, when evidence presented at trial showed that Rivera was in fact present and actively participated in this meeting; and 2) after being found guilty, Rivera sent a letter to co-defendant Chala instructing him to provide false information to the probation officer to the effect that Monteagudo had misled Chala, that Chala was unaware of the plan to pick up the cocaine that was to be airdropped off the coast of the Dominican Republic, and that none of the defendants had anything to do with this smuggling operation. At sentencing, the court found that: 75 Well, I read the letter and the--and unfortunately there are parts of it that I read and said well this could be an individual writing to another individual saying to him that, you know, they're not guilty. And remember--and just reminding him of the fact that they're not guilty and that they have nothing to do with it. Unfortunately, the letter goes beyond that. There's instructions. Actual instructions as to what to tell people and just to--... 76 And besides that there is another matter of the perjury. 77 The court then applied the two level enhancement for obstruction of justice. 78 United States Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 3C1.1 provides that if the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. The enhancement applies where a defendant provides materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, commentary n. 3(h); See United States v. Olea, 987 F.2d 874, 877 (1st Cir.1993). The enhancement also applies where a defendant commits, suborns or attempts to suborn perjury. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, commentary n. 3(b); See United States v. Gonzales, 12 F.3d 298, 299 (1st Cir.1993) (finding that the obstruction of justice enhancement was warranted where the defendant attempted to coax an acquaintance into bearing false witness about a matter material to the case). The test for materiality of an alleged perjured matter is not a stringent one, and the term is defined to include any fact, statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, commentary n. 5; United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 705 (1st Cir.1992). 79 We review a court's factual findings with respect to an obstruction of justice enhancement for clear error. See Gonzales, 12 F.3d at 299; Weston, 960 F.2d at 220. The court found that Rivera had perjured himself during the presentence interview with the probation officer. The court would have been justified in applying the enhancement based on this finding alone, because Rivera's prevarication regarding his role in the smuggling plan was material, in that it could have influenced the probation officer's investigation, and ultimately affected his determination of Rivera's offense level. 80 Additionally, the court heard testimony and argument regarding the letter Rivera sent to Chala, and implicitly found that the letter was authentic, that Chala had received it, and that Rivera's letter specifically instructed Chala to lie to the probation officer. Statements Chala would make to the probation officer regarding what occurred during the drug smuggling operation, and statements attempting to portray Monteagudo as the sole wrongdoer, were material in that they could have influenced or affected various sentencing issues related to the determination of offense levels, such as relevant conduct and various defendants' roles in the offense. See, e.g., Olea, 987 F.2d at 877 (defendant's statements that he was an unwitting dupe and that he had nothing to do with two drug sales were material for purposes of U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 because they would tend to influence or affect the calculation of his base offense level). This finding therefore also supports the application of the enhancement. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 705 (stating that presentence reports are an important ingredient of the sentencing process, and providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence report is culpable and can constitute obstruction of justice even absent a showing of actual prejudice). Rivera contends that the evidence regarding the authenticity of the letter is so dubious that it cannot support the application of the enhancement. That determination, however, was for the sentencing court, and we do not believe that the court's finding that the letter sent by Rivera to Chala, in an attempt to get Chala to lie, was genuine, was clearly erroneous. The court's two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice must stand.