Opinion ID: 2709519
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breach of Fiduciary Duty Element

Text: Because Kotter has “burst the bubble” and overcome the presumption of fraud, the Administrators must point to an issue of material fact in order to survive Kotter’s motion for summary judgment. See Cloe, 712 F.3d at 1176; Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs., 902 N.E.2d at 1134. We are not convinced they have done that. The Administrators’ claim requires them to prove at trial that Kotter breached a fiduciary duty owed to Hedstrom. See 1515 N. Wells, L.P. v. 1513 N. Wells, L.L.C., 913 N.E.2d 1, 11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2009). Kotter could only breach a fiduciary duty owed if she did not treat Hedstrom with “the utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith.” See Benson, 941 N.E.2d at 397. In other words, if Kotter helped procure the outcome of the real estate transactions that Hedstrom wanted, then there was no breach. See Clark v. Clark, 76 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ill. 1947) (“Contracts and transactions between parties to a fiduciary relation, if open, fair and honest 42 No. 12-1969 when deliberately made are as valid as contracts between other parties.”). The Administrators’ conclusory statement that Kotter breached her duty because the Units were not titled in accordance with Hedstrom’s wishes lacks any real support. The only direct support the Administrators can point to is the July 26 letters in which Geldes wrote, “At closing, title for Unit shall be conveyed by warranty deed to Mr. Donald Hedstrom.” The problem for the Administrators is all the documents and admissible testimony after that point demonstrate that Hedstrom did not want title to the properties to be solely in his name. As we have explained, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Hedstrom received complete and adequate information regarding the Units’ titling and that he knew exactly what he was doing during the transactions, regardless of the future tax implications on his estate. Accordingly, the Administrators are unable to demonstrate that a reasonable juror could find in their favor on the issue of breach, an essential requirement of their claim. And when a party cannot prove an essential element of a claim at trial, summary judgment against that party is appropriate. See Majors v. GE Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 53233 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party with bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” (quoting Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 2011))). We No. 12-1969 43 believe the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Kotter and against the Administrators.