Opinion ID: 1779107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Challenge to Commission of a Felony Aggravator; CCP Instruction; and Shifting the Burden of Proof During the Penalty Phase

Text: Dufour asserts that Florida's capital felony sentencing statute is unconstitutional because every person who is convicted of first-degree felony murder automatically qualifies for the aggravating circumstance of commission during the course of an enumerated felony. This Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator is an unconstitutional automatic aggravator. See Reed v. State, 875 So.2d at 437-38; Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687, 704 (Fla.2003); Johnson v. Moore, 837 So.2d 343, 348 (Fla.2002); Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.1997). In Blanco, this Court stated: Eligibility for this aggravating circumstance is not automatic: The list of enumerated felonies in the provision defining felony murder is larger than the list of enumerated felonies in the provision defining the aggravating circumstance of commission during the course of an enumerated felony. A person can commit felony murder via trafficking, carjacking, aggravated stalking, or unlawful distribution, and yet be ineligible for this particular aggravating circumstance. This scheme thus narrows the class of death-eligible defendants. 706 So.2d at 11 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, Dufour's claim is meritless. Dufour next asserts that the CCP jury instruction failed to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death sentence. However, this Court has held that, absent an objection at trial, this claim is procedurally barred. See Walton v. State, 847 So.2d 438, 445 (Fla.2003); see also Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1258 (Fla.1995) (holding that appellant's claim that the CCP aggravator was unconstitutionally vague was procedurally barred because no objection was made at trial to the instruction); James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993) (Claims that the [jury] instruction ... is unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless a specific objection on that ground is made at trial and pursued on appeal.). The record reveals that no objection was made at trial and that this claim was not presented on appeal. Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred. Dufour claims that the penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted the burden to Dufour to prove that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. This claim could and should have been presented on appeal and is thus procedurally barred. See Harvey, 656 So.2d at 1255-56 (holding that appellant's claim that the penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted the burden to Harvey to prove that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors was procedurally barred from postconviction review because it could have been presented on direct appeal).