Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to instruct on unconsciousness

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request for instructions on unconsciousness as a complete defense to all charges. [12] Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge. (§ 26, subd. Four; People v. Coogler (1969) 71 Cal.2d 153, 170, 77 Cal.Rptr. 790, 454 P.2d 686; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 376, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394; see also § 20 [to constitute a crime there must exist a joint operation of act and intent].) To constitute' a defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting. ( Newton, at p. 376, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394.) If the defense presents substantial evidence of unconsciousness, the trial court errs in refusing to instruct on its effect as a complete defense. ( Id. at p. 377, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394, citing People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749, 764, 59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820.) In support of his contention that the evidence warranted the giving of instructions on unconsciousness, defendant relies on Dr. Vicary's testimony that, at the time of the offenses, defendant suffered from bipolar disorder, with symptoms including psychosis and agitation, exacerbated by intoxication, as well as his own testimony that immediately before the shootings he experienced strange sensations, which he asserts were suggestive of an altered state of consciousness. Defendant also points to his testimony that he did not consciously or intentionally pull the trigger in shooting Alcala, as well as to certain inaccuracies and internal contradictions in his testimony and gaps in his knowledge of events. Specifically, defendant cites his testimony professing unawareness as to why he drove from the Alcala scene to the Hammett Vacuum Services location, why he shot Ferguson and Perez, what route he took from the Hammett location to Eugene Layton's house, and his lack of memory of what Ferguson and Perez said to him before he shot them. Defendant also relies on certain contradictions between his own testimony and that of Alcala and Layton, contradictions that he now asserts did not serve his legal interests. Defendant argues his testimony raised the question of whether he actually recalled the shootings or whether he instead had filled gaps in his memory with information gleaned from other sources, and that the jury may have concluded [defendant] was truthful with Dr. Vicary prior to trial when he told the doctor that he had no recollection of the homicides, and that his testimony to the contrary was a confabulation. The trial court properly refused the requested instructions. Defendant's own testimony makes clear that he did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offenses. The complicated and purposive nature of his conduct in driving from place to place, aiming at his victims, and shooting them in vital areas of the body suggests the same. That he did not, by the time of trial, accurately recall certain details of the shootings does not support an inference he was unconscious when he committed them. The cases on which defendant relies are distinguishable: In People v. Wilson, supra, 66 Cal.2d at page 762, 59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820, the defendant testified he did not recall shooting the victims, which was consistent with his statement to police at the time of his arrest. In People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406, 410, 303 P.2d 1018, likewise, the defendant testified his recollection of speaking with the victim just before the shooting was very hazy, he had a very vague memory of the victim springing from the couch, and the next thing he remembered was pulling the trigger of his gun on empty cartridges; he characterized his action as distorted by a haze of mental void. He had made similar statements to the police when he was arrested. ( Ibid. ) Thus, in both Wilson and Bridgehouse, the defendants testified to a mental state consistent with unconsciousness and with prior statements to police. In contrast, defendant in this case testified in sharp detail regarding the shootings. That he earlier had told Dr. Vicary he did not remember them does not, without more, suggest his testimony about the crimes was mere confabulation. In sum, because defendant presented no substantial evidence he was unconscious when he committed the offenses, the trial court did not err in refusing the instructions on unconsciousness as a complete defense. (See People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 551, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182 [trial court need not give instructions absent substantial evidence to support them].) Even if the trial court acted properly in denying his request for an instruction that unconsciousness is a complete defense, defendant further argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter based on unconsciousness. (CALJIC No. 8.47; see § 22; People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 155, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317, 78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153.) Such an instruction is required when there is evidence deserving of consideration that the defendant was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication. Defendant rehearses at length the evidence that around the time of the offenses, he daily and habitually drank to excess with resultant memory losses, and that on the day of the shootings he spent the afternoon drinking at the Anchor Inn bar, producing a blood-alcohol level that measured .154 percent at the time of his arrest some two hours after the shootings (and might, according to the testimony of Dr. Lykissa, have approached .20 percent at the time of the shootings). As discussed above, the record is lacking in substantial evidence that defendant was not conscious of his criminal actions within the meaning of section 26, subdivision Four. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter on a theory of unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication.