Opinion ID: 803420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mother's Exclusion From Courtroom

Text: Before delving into the merits of Quiles's next argument, we pause to review those facts relevant to his allegation that his 8 Of the three government witnesses who worked at the court, one was involved in the court's equipment and supply office, another worked in the in-take office at the Clerk's Office as a cashier, and the third was a U.S. Marshal. The record shows no other relation amongst the witnesses and the judge, aside from their common place of employment. -17- Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by virtue of his mother's alleged exclusion from the courtroom during jury selection. Quiles's case was called for trial on May 18, 2010. On May 20, 2010, the court swore in a jury and asked whether the parties objected to its providing initial jury instructions. The government responded in the negative. Quiles had a different response, evidenced in the following dialogue between the court and Quiles's counsel: MR. GONZALEZ: No, Your Honor. His mother is outside. Can she walk in[?] THE COURT: She could have walked in here a long time ago. MR. GONZALEZ: She was instructed while they were selecting the jury she couldn't be here. Thank you. THE COURT: Please bring that to my attention because under my rules anybody from the family can be here throughout the proceeding even if I have to put a chair there in the middle of the hallway. Okay. All right? MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you, sir. Quiles asserts that the district court's failure to sua sponte investigate his mother's exclusion from the courtroom during the jury selection process constituted a structural error requiring vacatur of his conviction and remand for a new trial. The government retorts that Quiles's perfunctorily raised Sixth Amendment argument, never raised below and with no objection noted in the record, should be deemed waived. -18- Here, the most detail we have in the sparse record as to this claim is the colloquy between Quiles's counsel and the court (referenced above), simply stating that Quiles's mother wished to enter the courtroom but had been instructed not to do so; the court's reply that she always had been free to so enter and that any such issues should be brought to the court's immediate attention; and defense counsel's thanking of the judge. No more, no less. We agree with the government that the brief colloquy between the court and Quiles's counsel suggests an affirmative waiver of any exclusion claim that might have been asserted. See e.g., Cortés-Rivera v. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab. of P.R., 626 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010). Quiles may, of course, attempt to pursue such claims as may be available to him under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See, e.g., Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2011).