Opinion ID: 2465631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Patton

Text: The State does not dispute that conclusion but argues Brown was undercut by the subsequent decision in State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 195 P.3d 753 (2008), which it argues changes the analysis. Essentially, the Patton decision clarified the parameters of the Ortiz exceptions and defined the process for analyzing whether Ortiz mandates an out-of-time appeal in direct appeals from a criminal judgment. The court emphasized that [w]e set out three narrowly defined, truly exceptional circumstances, when that remedy takes the form of permission for a late direct appeal. Patton, 287 Kan. at 217, 195 P.3d 753. This limitation to direct appeals means that the decision cannot be read to expressly overrule any decisions relating to postconviction proceedings, including Guillory or Brown. Nevertheless, the State argues that the decision undercuts the application of Ortiz to statutory proceduressuch as this 60-1507 action because the Patton court found that each Ortiz exception was rooted in the constitution. The Patton court explained: It is evident to us today that what have come to be known in Kansas as the three ` Ortiz exceptions' are grounded not only in fundamental fairness ... but in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The first of the exceptionsapplicable when a defendant was not informed of the right to appealgoes to procedural due process alone. The second and third exceptions applicable when a defendant was not furnished an attorney to perfect an appeal or was furnished an attorney for that purpose who failed to perfect and complete an appealgo to the right of counsel and effectiveness of counsel. Patton, 287 Kan. at 218-19, 195 P.3d 753. As for the first Ortiz exception (failure to be informed of the right to appeal), based on procedural due process, Patton clarified that a criminal defendant may qualify to take a late appeal if he or she has been denied basic procedural due process, i.e., timely and reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Patton, 287 Kan. at 219, 195 P.3d 753. The Patton court went on to describe three Kansas statutes providing specific procedural safeguards of the right to appeal by certain criminal defendants. See K.S.A. 22-3210(a)(2) (district court accepting felony guilty or nolo contendere plea must inform criminal defendant of his or her waiver of right to appeal any resulting conviction); K.S.A. 22-3424(f) (at sentencing, district court must inform criminal defendant of his or her right to appeal the conviction and right to appeal in forma pauperis if unable to pay costs of an appeal); K.S.A. 22-4505 (district court must inform indigent criminal defendant of right to appeal the conviction and right to have appointed counsel and transcript of trial record for purposes of appeal). Patton indicated that due process is denied by the district court's failure to abide by these statutes as they have been interpreted by earlier Kansas case law. None of these statutes pertain to postconviction appeals of 60-1507 decisions. Therefore, with regard to the first Ortiz exception, Patton does not overrule Guillory or change Guillory 's conclusion that there is no statutory requirement that the district court advise a K.S.A. 60-1507 petitioner of the right to appeal the decision on his or her petition. Guillory, 285 Kan. at 228, 170 P.3d 403. If anything, the Patton analysis reaffirms that the first Ortiz exception is unavailable to a 60-1507 movant. Regarding the second Ortiz exception (defendant not furnished with counsel to perfect an appeal), the Patton court clarified the exception is based on the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applies only to defendants who were indigent when they desired to take a timely appeal. Patton, 287 Kan. at 223, 195 P.3d 753. The court recognized that a criminal defendant who had appointed counsel at the district court level is entitled to have appellate counsel appointed. The court explained that a criminal defendant who had retained counsel through sentencing proceedings but can no longer afford to retain counsel for his or her direct appeal must make a timely motion for appointment of appellate counsel. Nothing in Patton 's discussion of the second Ortiz exception changed Kansas precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to a 60-1507 motion. See Robertson v. State, 288 Kan. 217, 228, 201 P.3d 691 (2009) (no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a 60-1507 action); Brown v. State, 278 Kan. 481, 483, 101 P.3d 1201 (2004) (same); Taylor v. State, 251 Kan. 272, 279-80, 834 P.2d 1325 (1992) (no constitutional right to counsel in 60-1507 proceeding), disapproved on other grounds State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 932 P.2d 981 (1997). Nor does Patton change the fact that under certain circumstances, postconviction petitioners are statutorily entitled to have counsel appointed to represent them. See K.S.A. 22-4506(b); Supreme Court Rule 183(m) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 255). As for the third Ortiz exception (counsel failed to perfect and complete an appeal), based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, Patton reiterated that a late appeal is allowed if a defendant was furnished counsel for the purpose of an appeal or has retained counsel but counsel failed to perform. See Wilkins v. State, 286 Kan. 971, 981, 190 P.3d 957 (2008) (Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel). The third exception does not focus on whether counsel has been assigned to a case through any particular mechanism but on whether that lawyer performs up to a minimum constitutional standard once that assignment is made. (Emphasis added.) Patton, 287 Kan. at 223-24, 195 P.3d 753. If counsel has failed to file or perfect a criminal defendant's direct appeal, prejudice is presumed, but the defendant must still demonstrate that he or she would have taken a timely appeal. Patton, 287 Kan. at 225, 195 P.3d 753. As the State argues in this case, the cited authorities and references to a constitutional dimension indicate the Sixth Amendment is the source of the third Ortiz exception, and the Sixth Amendment does not apply in a civil proceeding. Hence, the State makes a valid point that Brown 's reliance on Ortiz is called into question by Patton. In response, Albright argues that the Patton court did not intend to limit the application of the third Ortiz exception to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Any legal representation of a litigant, under either constitutional authority or statutory authority, must be effective, he argues. Therefore, if appointed counsel in 60-1507 proceedings fails to appeal the district court's denial of the 60-1507 motion, an untimely appeal should be permitted under the third Ortiz exception. We agree with Albright that 60-1507 movants who have counsel are entitled to the effective assistance of that counsel, and if counsel's performance was deficient for failure to file a timely appeal, as a remedy a 60-1507 movant should be allowed to file an out-of-time appeal. We do not agree, however, that it is the third Ortiz exception that allows an appellate court to accept jurisdiction. We reach these conclusions through several steps of analysis. First, Patton does not discuss Brown much less overrule it. Even after Patton, this court has upheld the declaration in Brown that effective assistance of counsel is required where a postconviction petitioner is represented by appointed counsel. Robertson v. State, 288 Kan. at 229, 201 P.3d 691 (citing Brown for support in holding that counsel representing defendant on motion for postconviction relief was not authorized to act as an objective assistant to the court or to argue against his client's position). In fact, we once again emphasized that [a]ppointment of counsel in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding should not be a useless formality. Robertson, 288 Kan. at 228, 201 P.3d 691. Indeed, today, we reaffirm this conclusion. Second, even though the doctrinal basis for the third Ortiz exception is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that does not attach in Albright's civil case, the rationale in Brown accounted for this doctrinal distinction but concluded that, regardless of the source of the right, a right to counsel, to be meaningful, necessarily includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. Hence, Patton 's implicit conclusion that Ortiz was not available to someone in Brown's (or Albright's) situation does not mean the right to effective assistance of 60-1507 counsel has been eviscerated. Third, albeit before the decision in Patton, we extended the Brown rationale by applying it to other statutory procedures, specifically, to the petition for review process. See, e.g., Kargus v. State, 284 Kan. 908, Syl. ¶ 1, 169 P.3d 307 (2007) (A defendant who has been convicted of a felony and has appealed directly from that conviction has a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel when filing a petition for review in the direct appeal.); Swenson v. State, 284 Kan. 931, Syl. ¶ 1, 169 P.3d 298 (2007) (Appellate counsel's filing of a petition for review 31 days after a Court of Appeals' decision falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and effectively denies a defendant a statutory right to counsel. As a remedy, appellate counsel is allowed to file a petition for review out of time.). Patton discussed Kargus, noting the Kargus decision exposed the possibility of analytical tension and confusing overlap among Ortiz  and decisions regarding the test for determining whether counsel had been ineffective. Patton, 287 Kan. at 216, 195 P.3d 753. Then, in discussing the third Ortiz exception, the Patton court adopted the view we had taken in Kargus regarding the test to be employed to determine whether a court would apply an exception to the rule that an appeal (or, in Kargus' circumstance, a petition for review) must be timely filed.