Opinion ID: 1769367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Despite the fact that all of the parties present arguments directed to whether (absent the unique procedural history involved in this case) the Commission does or does not have jurisdiction over some aspect of a contractual controversy such as theirs, that issue is not before the Court at this time. What is before the Court is the question of whether the Commission's 1995 determination of its own subject matter jurisdiction over the present controversy is a bar to the Commission's subsequent determination of jurisdiction over the same claim. To resolve that issue, the Court must decide whether the jurisdictional issue posed by the 1998 petitions was either actually raised and determined, or could have been raised and determined, in the 1994-95 proceedings. In reviewing the PSC's determination of its own subject matter jurisdiction, this Court has applied the standard established in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission, 427 So.2d 716 (Fla.1983). See Panda, 701 So.2d at 325 (applying Pan American standard of review to, inter alia, PSC's determination of its jurisdiction to construe terms of standard offer contract). Pursuant to that review standard, the Court presumes orders of the Commission to be correct, and ... only determine[s] whether the Commission's action comports with the essential requirements of law and is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id. at 325-26 (citing Pan American, 427 So.2d at 717). Applying this standard, under the circumstances of this case, the PSC's prior, unappealed ruling regarding its jurisdiction to entertain the controversy addressed in FPC's petitions-even if erroneous [7] operates as a bar to a subsequent determination of that jurisdiction over the same claim. Cf. State Dep't of Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So.2d 1384, 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (acknowledging that even an erroneous determination on the question of subject matter jurisdiction may become res judicata on that issue if the jurisdictional question was actually litigated and decided, or if a party had an opportunity to contest subject matter jurisdiction and failed to do so, although finding it inapplicable under the facts of the case) (citing 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2862, (Supp.1992) (reflecting cases in which an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction was not challenged by appeal)); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1411-13 (8th Cir.1983) (holding that dismissal of a suit for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction precludes relitigation of the same issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in a second federal suit on the same claim). This result is unchanged even if there has been a subsequent change in case law potentially affecting the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction over the controversy-particularly where (as here) such subsequent case law is not directly on point [8] and irrefutably controlling. Cf. Plymouth Citrus Products Co-op. v. Williamson, 71 So.2d 162 (Fla.1954) (involving workers' compensation claim barred by prior determination that claimant had not suffered an accident based upon case law prevailing at the time of the first determination, even though statute of limitations period had not expired, and controlling case law developed in interim would have provided a basis for the claim); Sugarmill Woods Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Southern States Utilities, 687 So.2d 1346, 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that intervening PSC order reflecting that PSC had jurisdiction over certain facilities should not be retroactively applied because [a] subsequent order by the body which rendered the order under review is not the kind of `change in the law' which the appellate court is bound to apply to pending cases); Hillhaven Corp. v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 625 So.2d 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that a Supreme Court decision which invalidated a statute related to certain rules, and which was rendered after adoption of the rules but before commencement of the proceeding challenging them, applied to invalidate the rules at issue), review denied, 634 So.2d 623 (Fla.1994). In Plymouth Citrus Products, this Court considered whether res judicata applied to bar a workers' compensation claim where the Deputy Commissioner had previously made a determination (on the merits) based upon the then-prevailing case law, the claimant had not sought appellate review, and, thereafter, the controlling precedent changed, so that the claimant would have been entitled to recover from the employer under the changed case law. The statute of limitations had not expired when the case law changed, and the claimant again filed his claim, in the form of a petition for modification. The full Commission accepted this petition as the filing of a new claim by the claimant, determining, based upon the current case law, that the claimant suffered a compensable accident for which claim had been filed within the proper time limit and that the previous adjudication between the parties is not res judicata to this present claim. 71 So.2d at 163. In reversing this order, this Court disagreed with the Commission's analysis: There must be an end to litigation sometime. As to the facts in this particular case, the doctrine of res adjudicata applies. The case of Wagner v. Baron, Fla., 64 So.2d 267, was strongly relied upon by petitioner in this case but it is not applicable. In that case we were dealing with a statute which imposed certain additional liabilities upon the father of a bastard child in the nature of support for the said child during a certain period of time and for the determination of the question of fatherhood. There was no question involved in that case of an intervening decision which changed the rule of law or the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of the father of the bastard child. The change in that case was effected by a statute. After a judgment, order or decree has become final and the time for appeal has expired, an intervening decision which may change the liability or the rule of law applicable to a case is not sufficient ground to open the case up for the filing of a new claim under the same facts. It appears that the Full Commission did not proceed in accordance with the essential requirements of the law in this matter. The writ of certiorari should be granted and the order of the Full Commission, affirming the Deputy Commissioner, should be quashed and set aside and a proper order entered by the Full Commission, reversing and setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner. Plymouth Citrus Products, 71 So.2d at 163 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). Applying these principles to the present case, the Commission's determination of its jurisdiction to entertain the 1998 petition for declaratory statement regarding the parties' negotiated contract was governed by the doctrine of administrative finality. Further, even if the jurisdictional issue raised by appellant in its 1998 petition was not actually determined by the PSC's prior decision regarding jurisdiction over the 1994 petition, it appears that it could have been resolved by the PSC at that time. In reviewing the two petitions, there is no question that they are substantively the same, despite the semantical difference. [9] That semantical difference is what the contract terms mean (1994) ( i.e., an interpretation of the contract itself) versus what the contract terms meant to the PSC when it approved the contract ) (1998) ( i.e., an interpretation of the Commission's contract approval order). Although the wording of the 1994 and 1998 jurisdictional issues is not identical, because FPC could have challenged the Commission's jurisdictional analysis in an appeal from the denial of its 1994 petition (but did not), the doctrine of decisional finality still applies. Cf. Albrecht v. State, 444 So.2d 8, 11-12 (Fla.1984) (reflecting that, for the counterpart of administrative finalityres judicatato apply, several conditions must occur simultaneously, one of which is an identity of the cause of action, and that the determining factor in deciding whether the cause of action is the same is whether the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the suit are the same in both actions) (citations omitted); accord, Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla.1956) (observing that the test of the identity of the causes of action, for the purpose of determining the question of res adjudicata, is the identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions) (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 160 Fla. 838, 36 So.2d 774, 777 (1948) (quoting Bagwell v. Bagwell, 153 Fla. 471, 14 So.2d 841, 843 (1943)). The doctrine of decisional finality provides that there must be a terminal point in every proceeding both administrative and judicial, at which the parties and the public may rely on a decision as being final and dispositive of the rights and issues involved therein. Austin Tupler Trucking, Inc. v. Hawkins, 377 So.2d 679, 681 (Fla.1979). Here, because there is an identity of essential facts common to FPC's 1994 and 1998 petitions, along with an identity of the substance of the issue presented, the same issue of subject matter jurisdiction implicated by the 1998 petition, even if not actually raised in 1994, could have been raised at that time. A decision, once final, may only be modified if there is a significant change in circumstances or if modification is required in the public interest. See Austin Tupler Trucking, 377 So.2d at 681. Although the Court will avoid too doctrinaire an application of the rule, see Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. Mason, 187 So.2d 335, 339 (Fla.1966), the circumstances here do not compel a different result. Even assuming arguendo (as appellant urges) that a change in law could qualify as changed circumstances for purposes of this analysis, the theory does not apply. At the time FPC filed its first petition, there was already an out-of-state ruling reflecting that it was properly within the ambit of a public service commission's authority to interpret the scope of its contract approval. See Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 164 A.D.2d 618, 564 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1991). Indeed, this was the opinion cited by the New York Public Service Commission in Orange & Rockland Utilities when it stated that its jurisdiction to interpret the scope of its original contract approvals has been upheld by the courts. In Indeck-Yerkes, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in approving the public service commission's declaratory statement interpreting the scope of its original approval of a cogeneration contract, carefully framed the issue which had been addressed by the commission: The issue in this proceeding is not one of pure interpretation of the language of the agreement between petitioner and NiMo by application of common-law principles of contract. Rather, it is whether there was a rational basis to the PSC's determination of the scope of its prior approval of the parties' agreement, particularly the price structure contained therein, as not covering other than insignificant deviations from the contract's stated initial output of approximately 49 MW. 564 N.Y.S.2d at 843. [10] The distinction stated by the Indeck-Yerkes court in framing the issue before it (involving an interpretation of the scope of the commission's order approving the subject agreement, rather than a pure interpretation of the agreement itself) is the same basis upon which FPC relies to differentiate its 1998 petition from its 1994 petition. Thus, it is clear that FPC could have pursued this theory of jurisdiction throughout the proceedings involving its 1994 petition. Given its failure to do so, including its failure to appeal from dismissal of the 1994 petition, under the unique circumstances presented here, decisional finality applies. [11] The PSC's decision is affirmed. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.