Opinion ID: 2266029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sentencing Proceedings.

Text: In advance of sentencing, Veney's counsel presented to the court evaluations of her client by two psychologists and one psychiatrist. It is apparent from these evaluations that Veney is at least moderately retarded [2] and that he suffers from various mental and emotional disorders. He was abused by both parents, and he was apparently present when his mother shot his father. He has, on occasion, attempted suicide. There can be no doubt that he is a limited young man and that he grew up in most unfortunate circumstances. The materials submitted by the defense also reveal, however, that Veney is an extremely dangerous individual. Since his teens, he has been engaged in numerous unlawful activities, including setting fires, cruelty to animals, stealing cars, destruction of property, fighting, and carrying a knife. He was committed to Saint Elizabeths Hospital and to the Receiving Home, and he spent two years at The Pines Treatment Center in Portsmouth, Virginia. He was released in June 1991. Then, according to the defense psychiatrist, Neil Blumberg, M.D., Veney returned to the District of Columbia and began associating with a delinquent crowd. He did not work, began drinking and abusing drugs, and eventually became involved in selling drugs, which became his primary means of support. Veney's chosen lifestyle is especially dangerous, both for him and for others. In the words of defense psychologist Lanning E. Moldauer, Ph.D., Mr. Veney is particularly poorly equipped for the role of drug dealer or street hustler where the action is likely to turn violent and the demands for making quick, accurate distinctions in life-and-death situations are all too great. In written submissions to the sentencing judge and at the sentencing hearing, the parties presented arguments for and against DCYRA sentencing. Veney's counsel asserted that his client was an appropriate candidate for rehabilitation, and that [t]he court's greatest assurance for rehabilitating is to sentence him under the Youth Rehabilitation Act and commit him to the Lorton Youth Center. The prosecutor countered that [t]here has been a lot of discussion about what would help Mr. Veney. I think the time has come to put the needs of the community ahead of those of Mr. Veney. The prosecutor also stated that she had discussed with J. William Erhardt, Esq. of the Superior Court Criminal Division's Legal Assistance Branch the availability of psychiatric counselling both at the Youth Center and at the adult facility, and that although [i]n theory the treatment's better [at the Youth Center], it wasn't clear to Mr. Erhardt that this was so in practice. The judge declined to sentence Veney pursuant to the DCYRA, and ordered that he be incarcerated for a period of fifteen years to life. He stated in some detail his reasons for rejecting the DCYRA option: Mr. Veney, this is a difficult case. It's difficult because of your situation, it's difficult because of the victim. I can't overlook the fact that you have been carrying around a gun for a while and I cannot assure myself that you only had that gun for Mr. Locust, because of something that he had done to you, as opposed to having that gun for its general use whenever you felt it happened to be needed. If you had gone to trial, you stood a chance of being convicted of offenses that when you add up the possible sentences would add up to 26 years to life, of which 25 years would have been a mandatory minimum, if you'd been convicted of all these three offenses. The plea that you entered subjects you to a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years if you're sentenced as an adult. And if you're sentenced as an adult, you will receive good time credits with respect to years over the [five-year] mandatory minimum. With that I compare [the] Youth Act treatment where I have absolutely no control over the ultimate decision those folks would make when to release you. And although I don't think it would be a very wise decision for them to release you earlier than you would be released as an adult[,] [u]ltimately, the [c]ourt doesn't have any control over it. This is a situation where you will receive the benefit of your bargain, but that is about it. A Youth Act sentence is inappropriate. I'm satisfied that your treatment as an adult will be just as good as it would be as a youth. Therefore, your request for sentencing under the Youth Rehabilitation Act is denied. This appeal followed.