Opinion ID: 747628
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Objections

Text: 114 On appeal, defendant raises four challenges to his sentencing. First, defendant argues that the court violated F ED. R.CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) 9 and U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(b) 10 by failing to make required findings of fact regarding disputed factors pertaining to the calculation of total loss suffered by the victims of defendant's offense. Finding no violation of § 6A3.1(b), which requires courts to resolve disputed sentencing factors in accordance with FED. R.CRIM. P. 32(a)(1), we consider whether the district court violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1). 115 Rule 32(c)(1) requires courts, at the sentencing hearing, to make either a factual finding for each contested factor of the PSI, or to make a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. FED. R.CRIM. P. 32(c)(1). This circuit requires 'literal compliance' with this provision, because such factual findings help to ensure that defendants are sentenced on the basis of accurate information and provide[ ] a clear record for appellate courts, prison officials and administrative agencies who may later be involved in the case. United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 613-14 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Fry, 831 F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir.1987)). The law in this circuit clearly prohibits a court faced with a dispute over sentencing factors from adopting the factual findings of the presentence report without making factual determinations of its own. See, e.g., Tackett, 113 F.3d at 613-14; United States v. Edgecomb, 910 F.2d 1309, 1313 (6th Cir.1990) (If a district court fails to make a factual finding, this court must remand for resentencing.); United States v. Mandell, 905 F.2d 970, 974-75 (6th Cir.1990). 11 In Tackett, this court reviewed a sentence imposed by a district court that was completely silent on contested issues, and merely stated that it adopted the factual findings and guideline applications in the presentence report. Id. at 614. In Mandell, we decided that a district court violated Rule 32 when it accepted of a pre-sentence report's recommended sentencing level without making any findings of fact on disputed issues. 905 F.2d at 974. Edgecomb presented a similar situation in which a district court failed to respond at all to objections to a pre-sentence report. 910 F.2d 1309. 116 Although this case does not present such a drastic violation, we find that the District Court did not comply with the requirements of Rule 32(c)(1). When it sentenced defendant, the court made an oral finding regarding the contested calculation of enhancement levels based on the value of loss resulting from defendant's offense. It stated that it was convinced that the defendant is at least the minimum amount [sic], at least responsible for in excess [of] 80 million dollars, so the calculation will be 18. Although the District Court did make this finding of fact, it did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendant's specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the PSI. The District Court also issued no written findings of fact as Rule 32 requires. See Edgecomb, 910 F.2d 1309, 1313 (Rule 32(c)(3)(D) provides that if there is any allegation of a factual inaccuracy, the court must make a written factual finding or a determination that such a finding is not necessary.). The only written comments regarding contested issues are the statements in the Judgment that [t]he court adopts the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report except ... [t]he Court grants 18 points instead of 22 for Specific Offense Characteristic. The Court grants four points instead of two for the Adjustment for Role in the Offense. These statements, however, are written applications of the guidelines, not written findings of fact. 117 In light of this Circuit's holding that Rule 32 should be strictly enforced, we vacate the eighteen level enhancement of defendant's sentence and remand for re-sentencing, at which time the District Court should issue written findings of fact that respond to defendant's objections to the PSI. Although this may or may not change the defendant's sentence, as we stated in Tackett, literal compliance with Rule 32 helps to ensure that defendants are sentenced on the basis of accurate information and provides a clear record for appellate courts, prison officials, and administrative agencies who may later be involved in the case. 113 F.3d at 614-15. Because the District Court did not disclose the specifics of its calculation or respond to defendant's specific objections to the PSI's loss valuation methods, we can only infer that it had accepted the government's argument that the trial evidence and victim statements established losses that surpassed the Guidelines' eighty million dollar threshold for an enhancement of eighteen levels. Although the court need not establish the value of the loss with precision, see United States v. Kohlbach, 38 F.3d 832, 835 (6th Cir.1994) (citing § 2F1.1, comment. (n.8)), Rule 32 requires it to publish the resolution of contested factual matters that formed the basis of its calculation. 118 Defendant's second argument concerning sentencing is that the District Court erroneously added four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(6)(B). That section directs a court to increase the offense level by four levels [i]f the offense ... affected a financial institution and the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense. Id. He asserts that the District Court improperly grouped the counts affecting financial institutions with the counts representing offenses from which defendant derived over one million dollars in receipts. Defendant argues that this enhancement does not apply to his case because he did not derive a million dollars from the offenses that affected the financial institutions. The government argues that for the enhancement to apply, the money need not come directly from a financial institution as long as there is a financial institution affected by the offense and the defendant gains more than one million dollars from the offense. The District Court held that the offense for purposes of sentencing comprised all the counts for which defendant had been convicted. Because this offense affected financial institutions and defendant received over a million dollars, it applied this four level enhancement. 119 The District Court did not misapply the Guidelines in giving this enhancement. The plain language of the Guidelines indicates that the defendant must derive a million dollars from the offense, not from the financial institutions. The commentary of the Guidelines provides that  '[g]ross receipts from the offense' includes all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such offense. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n.16). Thus, it is clear that the this enhancement applies even if the defendant receives the million dollars in an indirect manner. There is no dispute that as a result of his criminal activity, defendant received more than a million dollars. The question is whether the money that defendant received came from the same offense that affected the financial institutions. The Guidelines mandate that [a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group for the purposes of sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The Guidelines explain that counts involve substantially the same harm [w]hen the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss. Id. at § 3D1.2(d). In addition, the Guidelines specifically state that offenses covered by § 2F1.1 are to be grouped under this subsection. Id. The court, therefore, correctly grouped counts two through 106, offenses covered by § 2F1.1. Furthermore, defendant was convicted of a conspiracy that encompassed and united all of the other counts of illegal conduct, except the tax and the obstruction of justice counts. We affirm the District Court's conclusion that defendant received over a million dollars from an offense that affected financial institutions, thereby warranting an enhancement of four levels. 120 Defendant's third argument is that his sentence should be remanded because the District Court misapprehended its power to depart downward from the Guidelines. Defendant relies on the District Court's statement at sentencing that it wishe[d] it had the power not to be bound by the sentencing guidelines. The record shows that this statement was one of a number of statements the judge made reflecting his displeasure with the sentencing guidelines. These statements, taken in sum, however, do not indicate that the judge misapprehended his power to depart downward. On remand the District Court will have the opportunity to resolve any ambiguity surrounding this issue. 121 Defendant's final objection to the sentencing, the imposition of a fine of one million dollars, is without merit. Defendant argues that this fine was an abuse of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b), which states as follows: 122 If, as a result of a conviction, the defendant has the obligation to make restitution to a victim of the offense other than the United States, the court shall impose a fine or other monetary penalty only to the extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution. 123 § 3572(b). This section does not apply to this case, because, as even the defendant admits, the court did not require defendant to make restitution as part of his sentence. We find that the fine was not an abuse of discretion.