Opinion ID: 2550843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Bar Guest's Custody Petition?

Text: Smith's second claim is that the Family Court erred in holding that res judicata did not bar Guest's July 6, 2009 custody petition. The Family Court concluded that because Smith I was decided on standing grounds and not on the merits, res judicata would not apply. [77] That conclusion was erroneous, Smith urges, because Smith I, properly read, determined that Guest was not a legal parent of ANS. Therefore, res judicata precludes Guest from bringing her renewed custody petition, because this Court has previously (and finally) determined that she is not a legal parent. We review de novo a trial court's formulation and application of legal principles. [78] For Smith I to bar Guest's renewed custody petition, Smith I must constitute either collateral estoppel or res judicata. Section 6 of SB 84 expressly provides, however, that [n]o Court decision based upon a finding that Delaware does not recognize de facto parent status shall have collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. [79] As earlier discussed, the General Assembly may limit the application of judicial common law through legislation, which is what occurred here. [80] Therefore, Smith I does not bar Guest's renewed custody petition under either preclusion doctrine. But even if the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were otherwise available, they still would not bar Guest's renewed custody petition. The bar of res judicata arises where there has been a final judgment on the merits in a first suit involving the same parties, followed by a second suit based on the same cause of action. [81] In those circumstances, res judicata bars the second suit. In contrast to res judicata (which precludes a subsequent lawsuit involving same parties based on same cause of action), collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating a fact issue that has previously been litigated and decided in a prior action involving that party. [82] A claim will be collaterally estopped only if the same [factual] issue was presented in both cases, the issue was litigated and decided in the first suit, and the determination was essential to the prior judgment. [83] Collateral estoppel does not apply because Smith I never addressed or decided the factual issue presented here whether Guest is a de facto parent of ANS. In Smith I, all we held was that the statutory definition of legal parentas defined by a prior version of 13 Del. C. § 8-201did not include a de facto parent. [84] Since by definition Guest was not a legal parent, it did not matter, nor was the Court required to decide, whether Guest was a de facto parent of ANS. Thereafter, in SB 84 the General Assembly amended the statutory definition of legal parent to encompass de facto parenthood. That amendment made relevant for the first time the merits question of whether Guest is (as she claims to be, and as the Family Court found) a de facto parent of ANS. Because that merits issue was never raised or decided in Smith I, collateral estoppel could not preclude its assertion in this action. Res judicata is also inapplicable. First, Smith I was not a final judgment on the merits that operates to bar Guest's 2009 custody petition. Guest's initial 2004 custody petition was brought under the prior statutory definition of legal parent. Smith I held only that Guest did not have standing to bring her 2004 custody petition under that provision. [85] As we have explained, [s]tanding is the requisite interest that must exist in the outcome of the litigation at the time the action is commenced. [86] It is concerned only with the question of who is entitled to mount a legal challenge and not with the merits of the subject matter of the controversy. [87] Because Smith I did not reach the merits of Guest's 2004 custody petition, Smith I is not a final judgment on the merits that bars Guest's renewed custody petition under the doctrine of res judicata. [88] Second, it is well-recognized that the relitigation of an issue of law between the same parties is not precluded where a new determination is warranted to take into account an intervening change in the applicable law. [89] [S]tatutory changes that occur after the previous litigation has concluded may justify a new action. [90] By changing the definition of legal parent, the General Assembly conferred standing upon all persons who would qualify as de facto parents to petition for custody of a minor child. That statutory change was enacted specifically in response to this Court's invitation in Smith I. The rationale underlying res judicata, namely the conclusive resolution of disputes, [91] is not implicated here, because by enacting SB 84, the legislature expressly intended to enable persons such as Guest to petition for custody. [92] Before SB 84, Guest had no legal ability to do so.