Opinion ID: 856802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Biggs (Seller)

Text: The district court granted summary judgment to Biggs on seven claims. R. 141 (Op. & Order at 8–12) (Page ID #2069–73). The Milners apparently contest three claims on appeal: fraud, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy.4 First, they claim that Biggs fraudulently misrepresented the condition of her home. Appellants’ Br. at 22. Second, because Jason Milner could observe the structural damage to the house, they claim this is evidence that Roberts never inspected the crawl space. Id. Third, they argue that the district court erred in finding that there was no evidence of malice sufficient to satisfy a conspiracy claim. Id. at 23. The district court, for its part, found that Biggs made no representations with respect to mold in the house, and was under no duty to disclose a latent defect when selling her house “as is.” R. 141 (Op. & Order at 8–9) (Page ID #2069–70). It further found that, with respect to the crawl space, there was no evidence offered beyond speculation by Natasha Milner that Biggs fraudulently represented her awareness of the defect on the Residential Property Disclosure Form. Id. at 11 (Page ID #2072). Finally, because it found that Biggs lacked knowledge of the defects, the district court held that she could not have acted with malice in selling the house, nor had the Milners made any showing with respect to an 4 Biggs appears to be proceeding pro se on appeal and has not filed a response brief. 10 No. 12-3526 Milner, et al. v. Biggs, et al. agreement between the parties necessary to maintain the other elements of a civil-conspiracy claim. Id. at 12 (Page ID #2073). Ohio law establishes the following elements for torts of fraud: The elements of fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation [or fraudulent concealment] are (1) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact, (2) which is material to the transaction at hand, (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred, (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it, (5) followed by justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment by the other party, and (6) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance. Funk v. Durant, 799 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); see also Groob v. KeyBank, 843 N.E.2d 1170, 1178 (Ohio 2006).5 The use of an as-is contract “relieve[s] a seller of any duty to disclose,” though it “does not provide a defense to fraudulent misrepresentations.” Funk, 799 N.E.2d at 224. With respect to misrepresentations about mold, the only evidence identified is that Biggs stated on the Residential Property Disclosure Form that she had not performed a mold inspection. R. 1-4 (Property Disclosure Form at 2) (Page ID #29). That same form—signed by both 5 The Milners’ complaint alleges negligent misrepresentation, which the district court addressed. Their appeal, however, addresses fraudulent misrepresentation. The elements of negligent misrepresentation are as follows: One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. Delman v. City of Cleveland Heights, 534 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Because the Milners could intend for their arguments about fraudulent misrepresentation to concern negligent misrepresentation, rather than fraud, we analyze their arguments under both fraud and negligence standards. 11 No. 12-3526 Milner, et al. v. Biggs, et al. parties—stated that “every home contains mold,” and that it was the Milners’ responsibility to have a mold inspection performed. Id. Later, the Milners signed a Mold Addendum that stated, among other things, that they “ha[d] not in any way[] relied upon any representations of seller . . . concerning the past or present existence of mold in or around the property.” R. 111-3 (Mold Addendum) (Page ID #1646). Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that the Milners did not justifiably rely on a misrepresentation about the presence of mold in Biggs’s home. Biggs stated that she was unaware of water damage in the crawl space. R. 1-4 (Property Disclosure Form at 2) (Page ID #29). Natasha Milner averred that Biggs would have learned of the water damage when performing home repairs, although Natasha stated that “I’m speculating” in this conclusion. R. 70-1 (Natasha Milner Dep. at 148) (Page ID #625). “Speculation, unsupported by facts in the record, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and falls short of what is required to survive summary judgment.” Am. Rd. Serv. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 348 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2003). The Milners argue on appeal that the damage in the crawl space was so obvious to Jason Milner upon inspection that Roberts could not have conducted an investigation without seeing it. This argument does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to Biggs’s knowledge for two reasons. First, Roberts and Jason Milner inspected the crawl space at different times: Roberts when the crawl space was obstructed by fallen ducts, and Jason Milner after the ducts were raised. Second, even assuming the damage was visible to Roberts, at issue is Biggs’s knowledge. The Milners have offered no evidence that Biggs knew of the moisture damage, or that she failed to exercise reasonable care by taking the word of a certified home inspector. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute as 12 No. 12-3526 Milner, et al. v. Biggs, et al. to whether Biggs knew or should have known that her representation about the water damage was inaccurate.6 To maintain a claim of civil conspiracy, there must be “‘a malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another in person or property, in a way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages.’” Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 (Ohio 1998) (quoting Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio 1995)). “Moreover, ‘[a]n underlying unlawful act is required before a civil conspiracy claim can succeed.’” Chesher v. Neyer, 477 F.3d 784, 805 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 868). Insofar as the district court was correct to find that there was no genuine dispute that no underlying fraudulent conduct occurred, there is no basis to support a charge of civil conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment to Biggs.