Opinion ID: 1801800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to the Constitutional Validity of Defendant's Prior Murder Conviction

Text: (1) Defendant contends that the prior-murder special-circumstance finding should be reversed because the constitutional validity of the underlying plea, which was the basis of the special circumstance allegation, was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In this connection, he contends that our earlier opinion in this case, Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292], in which we held that a defendant does not have a right to a jury trial on the constitutional validity of a prior conviction and bears the burden of proving such invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence, was superseded by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348]. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 490.) Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], the Supreme Court held that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment because it allowed the sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 609.) The court, citing language from Apprendi, stated The dispositive question, we said, `is one not of form, but of effect.' [Citation.] If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact  no matter how the State labels it  must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 602.) Concluding that Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' [citation] the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. ( Id. at p. 609.) As we shall explain, however, the question of the constitutional validity of a prior conviction does not fall within the framework set forth in Apprendi and Ring for those issues of fact as to which the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim. In 1977, defendant pled guilty to second degree murder and that conviction became the basis of the sole special circumstance allegation in the instant case. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2) [The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree.].) By pretrial motion defendant sought to strike the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation on grounds that he was under the influence of drugs at the time he pled guilty to the 1977 murder of an inmate at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, and that he was not properly advised of his Boykin-Tahl rights ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]) at the time he entered his guilty plea. ( Curl v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1296.) Following a lengthy evidentiary hearing occasioned by the absence of a reporter's transcript of the 1977 plea, the trial court denied the motion. ( Id. at pp. 1296-1299.) Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate that ultimately resulted in an opinion from this court, the aforecited Curl v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1292. In Curl, we concluded (1) defendant's statutory right to a jury trial on the truth of the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation (§ 190.4, subd. (a)) did not encompass a jury trial on the constitutional validity of the underlying plea, and (2) defendant had the burden of proof in establishing the constitutional invalidity of the plea by a preponderance of the evidence. (51 Cal.3d at pp. 1300-1302, 1306-1307.) Following our decision, defendant renewed his attack on the validity of his plea, claiming that the first hearing had been conducted without the benefit of our decision. Another evidentiary hearing was held, at the conclusion of which the motion was again denied. (2) Defendant now asserts that, contrary to our conclusions in Curl, Apprendi and Ring require that the constitutional validity of his 1977 plea be relitigated before a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Not so. As noted, the right to a jury trial discussed in Apprendi and Ring applies only to an issue of fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum ( Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490), whatever its designation. Patently, the question of the constitutional validity of a prior conviction does not present such an issue of fact. As the Attorney General points out: Finding that Curl was eligible for the death penalty was not contingent upon the finding that his prior murder conviction was constitutionally valid pursuant to Boykin-Tahl. Neither section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) nor section 190.4 suggest such a requirement nor do these sections state that the constitutional validity of a prior murder conviction must be proved as an element of the offense prior to imposing the death penalty. A finding that the prior conviction is constitutionally valid does not in and of itself expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's verdict. ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. omitted.) The prosecution must still prove the special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact. (§ 190.4.) Moreover, the constitutional validity of a prior conviction is an inquiry that our prior decisions, even those predating Curl, allocated to the trial court and not the jury. ( People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 217 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15] [first step of procedure to strike prior conviction is for the trial court to hold a [pretrial] hearing outside the presence of the jury in order to determine the constitutional validity of the charged prior or priors].) This is because the determination of the constitutional validity of a prior conviction is of a very different nature from the determination of whether the defendant suffered the prior conviction. A prior conviction carries a `strong presumption of constitutional regularity,' and the defendant must establish a violation of his or her rights that `so departed from constitutional requirements' as to justify striking the prior conviction. ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1136 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478], italics omitted.) Given the presumptive constitutional validity of the prior conviction, a motion to strike presents legal questions of a far different nature than the factual determination of the existence of the prior conviction ( Curl v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1303). (3) Accordingly, we conclude that neither Apprendi nor Ring superseded or implicitly overruled our decision in Curl. Therefore, contrary to defendant's argument, Apprendi did not represent an intervening change in the law that would bar applying the doctrine of the law of the case. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 787 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481].) Thus, our conclusions in Curl, that where a defendant challenges the constitutional validity of a plea the defendant must prove such invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence, remains the law of the case. Here, the trial court conducted a second hearing following our decision in Curl and denied the motion to strike. Because defendant does not challenge that proceeding, we assume the trial court correctly applied Curl and affirm its ruling.