Opinion ID: 866160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hoggard

Text: The court concluded that Hoggard was responsible for 3.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. In reaching this figure, the court first determined that Sherman purchased 1.4 kilograms from Marte, and attributed this amount to Hoggard as “relevant 8 conduct” under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The court then added to this sum 2.1 kilograms that it determined Hoggard purchased from Marte. Hoggard challenges both components of this quantity finding. The District Court properly attributed to Hoggard its estimate of the quantity of drugs Sherman purchased, because the evidence was sufficient to conclude that Sherman and Hoggard were co-conspirators, and that Hoggard “could reasonably have foreseen the quantity” of Sherman’s purchases. United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 72 (2d Cir. 2006). As described above, phone calls between Hoggard and Sherman showed that the two communicated about their drug venture and made at least one resupply trip together. In a phone call made after Sherman’s arrest, Hoggard told another co-conspirator that Sherman had “two seventy two . . . on him” at the time of his arrest. Gov’t App. 1662. This statement is consistent with the 272 grams of cocaine police seized from Sherman. From this evidence, the District Court could conclude that Hoggard was well aware of the quantities of drugs that Sherman purchased and sold. We find unavailing Hoggard’s contention that the District Court improperly failed to make particularized findings about the scope of the conspiracy. See United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1995). Had the District Court done so, Hoggard argues, it would not have attributed Sherman’s purchases to Hoggard. But Hoggard’s counsel did not ask the court to make a Studley finding at the time of sentencing. Perhaps more significantly, his counsel did not challenge the District Court’s decision to attribute Sherman’s purchases to Hoggard. Although Hoggard’s counsel suggested at the sentencing hearing that a quantity of 3.4 kilograms (which 9 would have reduced Hoggard’s base offense by two levels) might be more appropriate, this position was based on a challenge to the start dates the District Court ascribed to Hoggard’s and Sherman’s purchases — not on an argument that Sherman’s purchases should be excluded entirely from the quantity of cocaine attributable to Hoggard. Hoggard therefore cannot show plain error. We also find no clear error in the District Court’s calculation of the quantity of drugs Hoggard purchased from Marte. The court determined that Hoggard purchased on average 100 grams of crack cocaine each week, beginning on or about July 15, 2007, until his arrest in December of that year. Although the District Court acknowledged that the length of Hoggard’s relationship with Marte and the frequency and magnitude of his purchases were estimates, its conclusions find adequate support in the record. A sample of the wiretaps showed that between November 18 and December 4, 2007 — a period of approximately two-and-a-half weeks — Hoggard made at least three trips to the Bronx to purchase drugs from Marte, and on two of these occasions he purchased at least 150 grams of cocaine. To determine the date that Hoggard began purchasing cocaine from Marte, the District Court used as a starting point the dates that Glover and Sherman admitted to having begun purchasing cocaine from Marte, and inferred that Hoggard began dealing with Marte no later than several weeks after Glover and Sherman did. We think this inference was reasonable, because the record showed that Hoggard was in close contact with Glover and Sherman, and often acted in concert with them. Glover testified that between 2003 and 2007, he frequently spoke to Hoggard about various 10 topics related to the sale of cocaine, including where to obtain cocaine, the price of powder cocaine, and how to convert powder cocaine into crack cocaine. Sherman, meanwhile, had offered to help Hoggard sell defective cocaine, and traveled with Hoggard to the Bronx to purchase drugs from Marte. Sherman told law enforcement that he began purchasing wholesale quantities of cocaine from Marte in the spring of 2007, and Glover told authorities that he began using Marte as a source in the middle of 2007. The court’s conclusion that Hoggard began purchasing from Marte on about July 15, 2007, was consistent with this evidence.1 Finally, we note that although the District Court found that both Marte and Hoggard either dealt in crack cocaine or reasonably could have foreseen that the cocaine they bought and sold would be converted to crack cocaine, the court decided to use the quantity thresholds associated with powder cocaine, not crack cocaine. Had the District Court not employed a one-to-one ratio for crack and powder cocaine, Marte’s and Hoggard’s Guidelines range would have increased significantly. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). 4. Leadership Enhancement Finally, both Marte and Hoggard challenge the District Court’s decision to enhance their Guideline offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which provides a four-level increase if “the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” The application 1 This conclusion finds further support in the testimony of Kenneth Thames, who stated that he began purchasing re-sale quantities of cocaine from Hoggard in September 2007. The District Court also found that telephone calls between Hoggard and Marte in late September reflected “an ongoing, well-established relationship.” Hoggard App. 221. 11 notes to this Guideline state that, to be subject to this enhancement, the defendant must have led or supervised “one or more other participants.” Id. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The notes define a “participant” as “a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” Id. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. Thus, before it could apply the enhancement, the District Court needed to find that Hoggard and Marte organized or led at least one other participant in a criminal activity involving five or more participants. See United States v. Si Lu Tian, 339 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir. 2003). Marte argues that he did not “lead” any other participant, but we conclude that the record supported the District Court’s finding to the contrary. For instance, when Hoggard returned defective cocaine that he had purchased from Marte, Hoggard argued with an unidentified individual associated with Marte over the amount of new cocaine he would receive from Marte. The individual stated that he had spoken with “G,” and that “G” gave instructions regarding how to proceed with the exchange. Unsatisfied with the amount he would be receiving, Hoggard immediately called Marte, who advised that the other individual had “fixed” the defective cocaine. Gov’t App. 1623. That the individual referred to by Marte was never identified has no bearing on the application of the enhancement. Hoggard, meanwhile, asserts that the criminal activity in which he participated did not involve five or more participants, and that he was not a “leader” or “organizer.” But the evidence showed that at least five others were involved in a drug conspiracy with Hoggard: Kenneth Thames, who purchased crack cocaine from Hoggard and re-sold it; Torrence McCown and Keisha Savain, who ran 12 errands for and otherwise assisted Hoggard; Robert Rawls, another co-defendant frequently recorded discussing drug transactions with Hoggard; and Christopher Sherman, among others. The District Court also noted that two other individuals, Kenneth White and Terrance Jowers, were involved in the conspiracy. The record also permitted the District Court to conclude that Hoggard led at least one other participant. A wiretapped call showed that on November 21, 2007, Thames called Hoggard to purchase drugs. Hoggard replied that he was in a barbershop, but would make sure Thames received the drugs. Only seconds after ending his call with Thames, Hoggard called McCown, and instructed McCown to bring drugs to the barbershop. On another occasion, Thames ordered drugs from Hoggard. Several minutes later, officers saw Keisha Savain drive to Thames’s home, meet with him briefly, and drive away. This evidence was sufficient to permit the District Court to infer that Hoggard instructed McCown and Savain in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. Finally, we reject Hoggard’s argument that he was not given notice that the District Court would rely on information adduced at proceedings involving other defendants. Hoggard’s Presentence Report and the government’s sentencing memorandum apprised him of all pertinent information from other proceedings, and he had the opportunity to rebut the evidence. Because Hoggard “was on notice of all relevant information that could be used in determining his sentence and had an opportunity to make appropriate objections,” United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 1987), we find no error. 13 Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s application of the leadership enhancement to Hoggard. 5. Conclusion We have considered all of appellants’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the District Court are AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe Clerk of Court 14