Opinion ID: 790329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smith's Brief

Text: 62 Smith first challenges the district court's denial of his request to appoint Dr. John Hagedorn under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), which authorizes trial courts to appoint experts for indigent defendants if the services are necessary for adequate representation. Smith argues that Dr. Hagedorn's testimony, which would have explained gang life and drug trafficking to the jury, was necessary because it would have independently corroborated his coercion defense and undermined the government's theory that Smith was dealing drugs for the money. The district court refused to appoint Dr. Hagedorn in a pre-trial ruling, opining that his testimony was neither helpful nor admissible. When Smith renewed his request to appoint Dr. Hagedorn at trial, the district court reaffirmed its ruling, reasoning that Dr. Hagedorn's testimony is just not necessary under the 700 series of the rules of evidence, was not necessary for this jury's consideration [and] there's been plenty of testimony about what gangs do and what they don't do in Chicago on the South Side. We review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.1995). 63 Dr. Hagedorn, a criminal justice professor at the University of Illinois-Chicago who has focused his scholarship on innercity youth gangs, would have testified that the Black Disciples operate within a highly structured hierarchy where failure to follow gang rules often results in swift and violent penalties, including death. Leaving the gang can be a hazardous undertaking, involving beatings and fines. A gang member that cooperates with law enforcement puts himself and his family at risk of death or serious injury. Furthermore, gangs are driven by profits from drugs sales, and debts are taken seriously and seldom forgiven. 64 Smith sought to introduce the above-recited testimony to bolster his own testimony that he was kidnapped, beaten, and threatened by the Black Disciples in early 1998 over a debt he incurred by leaving the gang in 1993, effectively coercing him to return to dealing drugs. Smith asserts that Dr. Hagedorn's testimony also would have explained why Smith did not go to the police after the Black Disciples kidnapped and threatened him. In addition, Smith maintains that gang life and drug trafficking are beyond the ken of the average juror. In response, the government argues that Dr. Hagedorn's testimony was unnecessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) because the jury already had heard similar testimony from a number of witnesses. We agree with the government. 65 First, we doubt that the substance of Dr. Hagedorn's testimony was beyond the ken of the average juror. Most jurors are aware that gang members deal drugs, commit violent acts, and react unfavorably when their misdeeds are reported to authorities. Second, Dr. Hagedorn's description of gang life in Chicago would have been a needless rehashing of ground covered by prior witnesses. For example, FBI Agent Yun, the first witness called by the government, testified that Black Disciple gang leaders may punish a member's violation of a gang rule by ordering that member to be beaten, or even murdered. Allen acknowledged his past membership and role in the Black Disciples, testified about the violent nature of drug trafficking, and stated that there were consequences if people owed him money. Samuel Redding admitted that he was affiliated with the Black Disciples and that the gang pressured him to participate in illegal activity. Palmore acknowledged participation in the beatings of other Black Disciple members on multiple occasions and said that a Black Disciple gang member could not go to the police because it could cost him his life. Smith himself testified extensively about the modus operandi of the Black Disciples. In light of the testimony of Agent Yun, Allen, Redding, Palmore, and Smith about the violent and coercive nature of the Black Disciples, Dr. Hagedorn's testimony was cumulative and unnecessary. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith's requests to appoint Dr. Hagedorn.
66 Smith next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This evidence consists of: (1) a statement by Larone Brim that Allen asked Brim to touch up Smith for failure to pay a debt; (2) a statement from Black Disciple Will Carthan that Allen and his associates conducted surveillance of Smith to ensure that he sold narcotics; (3) grand jury testimony from a Black Disciple member in a related investigation that a Chicago police officer received protection money from the gang; and (4) a statement by Charles Jackson that he heard from Antwayne Palmore, who had heard from a third-party, that Smith had been beaten with a baseball bat for failing to pay a debt. 67 Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a district court may vacate any judgement and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. To carry his burden of showing that the interest of justice requires a new trial, a defendant must establish that the evidence: (1) came to his knowledge only after trial; (2) could not have been discovered sooner had due diligence been exercised; (3) is material and not merely impeaching or cumulative; and (4) would probably lead to an acquittal in the event of a retrial. United States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347, 352 (7th Cir.2000). [W]e approach such motions with great caution and are wary of second-guessing the determinations of both judge and jury. United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1216 (7th Cir.1993). Accordingly, we will reverse the denial of a motion for a new trial only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. United States v. Reed, 986 F.2d 191, 193 (7th Cir.1993). 68 Every piece of evidence offered by Smith fails at least one prong of the above-recited test. With respect to Larone Brim's statement that Allen asked him to touch up Smith for failure to pay a debt and Will Carthan's statement about the Black Disciples' surveillance of Smith's house, Smith fails to address why this evidence could not have been discovered before trial. The grand jury testimony about Black Disciple members paying protection money to the police would have corroborated a largely unchallenged and unsurprising portion of Smith's testimony—that gang members seek to mitigate the risks associated with their unlawful behavior by bribing unscrupulous police officers. It is not the sort of evidence that warrants a new trial. Finally, we doubt that Jackson's statement that Smith was beaten with a bat would lead to an acquittal in the event of a retrial. Even though the evidence would corroborate a portion of Smith's testimony, a jury would probably still reject his coercion defense because of his admittedly extensive involvement with Allen's drug group and because of his failure to permanently flee the area or seek the assistance of authorities. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith's motion for a new trial.
69 Smith also challenges the trial court's ruling allowing the government to play the recording of a phone call that Smith made to his employer while he was in federal custody at the MCC. Smith telephoned his supervisor at the Illinois Department of Transportation to explain his sudden absence from work and told him that a relative from out of state had been murdered and that Smith had to retrieve the children and deal with DCFS because they were taking guardianship of the children. Smith also called his wife from the MCC and joked about the elaborate lie he told his boss. Consistent with MCC policy, the phone calls were recorded. The prosecution played the tape of Smith's call to his supervisor at the beginning of his cross-examination after the following colloquy: BY THE PROSECUTOR: 70 Q. Mr. Smith, you tell stories. You make things up on occasion. Correct? 71 A. As I'm sure everyone does. People make things up on occasion. Yes. 72 Q. Is that a yes, Mr. Smith? 73 A. Yes. 74 Q. And you do that, [sic] in many times, to get out of a jam, to get out of a bind. Correct? 75 A. No. 76 Q. You don't do it to get out of a jam? 77 A. No. Now, you said many times, sir. I'm saying no to many times. 78 Q. Mr. Smith, we'll start here. Have you ever made up stories to get out of a jam? 79 A. Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: 80 Judge, I'm going to object for lack of foundation. THE COURT: 81 Okay. The objection—the objection is overruled. BY THE PROSECUTOR: 82 Q. Have you, in fact, made up stories regarding your situation in this case to get out a jam, Mr. Smith? 83 A. No. 84 Q. Have you ever made up a story regarding your situation in this case to get out of a jam, Mr. Smith? 85 A. No. 86 Q. Now, Mr. Smith, after you were arrested in December of 1999, you placed several phone calls from the Metropolitan Correctional Center, didn't you? 87 A. Yes, I did. 88 Q. And you knew those calls were being recorded, didn't you? 89 A. No. I did not. 90 Q. You saw that big sign over the phone that told you that those calls were being recorded, didn't you, Mr. Smith? 91 A. The phone was in the middle of a desk, sir, and there was no sign there at all. 92 Q. Mr. Smith, one of the people you called was your wife. Correct? 93 A. Yes. 94 Q. And one of the stories you told was to your employer, isn't that correct, Mr. Smith? DEFENSE COUNSEL: 95 Objection. Foundation. THE COURT: 96 Overruled. BY THE WITNESS: 97 A. I'm not sure what you're talking about. BY THE PROSECUTOR: 98 Q. You're not sure what I'm talking about. Well, let me refresh your recollection. DEFENSE COUNSEL: 99 Judge, I've never received this. I've never heard it. May we take a break for me to hear it? 100 THE COURT: No. You can proceed. 101 Smith later moved unsuccessfully for a mistrial based on the playing of the tape and then objected unsuccessfully during the government's closing when the prosecutor argued that Smith's coercion defense was just another story he'd made up to get out of a jam. During rebuttal, the prosecutor likened Smith's defense to a made-for-TV-movie, and argued that his coercion story was strikingly similar to the same lie he told his boss. 102 Citing Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Smith asserts that the MCC tape was inadmissible extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of conduct bearing on his character for truthfulness. Smith argues that playing the tape devastated his credibility, and that the only remedy was a mistrial because Smith's defense rested on his credibility. In response, the government maintains that the tape was admissible extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement under Fed.R.Evid. 613. The government also notes that even if the tape was inadmissible extrinsic evidence, Rule 608(b) does not bar questioning about the conduct, and Smith eventually admitted that he told this story to his employer. 103 We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 969 (7th Cir.2003). If we identify an error that amounts to an abuse of discretion and a timely objection to the error was raised at trial, we must determine if the error was harmless under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). If no timely objection was raised at trial, we review the error under the Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)'s plain error standard. Id. In the instant case, the government argues that the playing of the MCC tape should be reviewed for plain error because Smith's counsel failed to note the specific ground for her objection. In the context of this case, we disagree with the government's position. Smith's counsel objected twice for lack of foundation and then objected to the prosecutor's suggestion to refresh the witness' recollection with the tape by saying, Judge, I've never received this. I've never heard it. May we take a break for me to hear it? If the government actually wanted to use the tape to refresh Smith's recollection, the proper course would have been to play the tape for Smith outside the presence of the jury, and Smith's request to excuse the jury before playing the tape would have been appropriate. United States v. Meza-Urtado, 351 F.3d 301, 303-04 (7th Cir.2003). But the record shows that the government used the tape to impugn Smith's credibility rather than refresh his recollection, which makes the prosecutor's refresh the recollection comment puzzling. Considering that Smith was in the dark about the contents of the tape and that he was led astray by the prosecutor's refresh the recollection foundation, we conclude that Smith's objection was sufficient and that any error is subject to harmless error review. Rule 608(b) provides, in relevant part: 104 (b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness .... 105 Although Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct bearing on a witness' character for truthfulness, the extrinsic evidence may still be admissible for another reason, such as impeachment for bias, contradiction, or prior inconsistent statement. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). The government argues that the tape was admissible because it was extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. Under Rule 613(b), extrinsic evidence of a witness' prior inconsistent statement is admissible as long as the witness is given an opportunity to explain the statement and opposing counsel is afforded an opportunity to question the witness about it. 106 In some instances, it is difficult to distinguish between Rule 608(b) evidence and Rule 613(b) evidence. In this case, however, the government's attempt to characterize the MCC tape as Rule 613(b) evidence is unconvincing and would amount to an end-run around Rule 608(b)'s bar on extrinsic evidence. The First Circuit's discussion in United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548 (1st Cir.1999) helps clarify the distinction between these rules and illustrates why the government's position is without merit: 107 In our view, Rule 613(b) applies when two statements, one made at trial and one made previously, are irreconcilably at odds. In such an event, the cross-examiner is permitted to show the discrepancy by extrinsic evidence if necessary —not to demonstrate which of the two is true but, rather, to show that the two do not jibe (thus calling the declarant's credibility into question). In short, comparison and contradiction are the hallmarks of Rule 613(b).... In contrast, Rule 608(b) addresses situations in which a witness' prior activity, whether exemplified by conduct or by a statement, in and of itself casts significant doubt upon his veracity.... So viewed, Rule 608(b) applies to a statement, as long as the statement in and of itself stands as an independent means of impeachment without any need to compare it to contradictory trial testimony. 108 Id. at 558 (citations omitted). The force of the MCC phone call recording was not due to a comparison of Smith's statements on the tape and his equivocations at trial. Rather, Smith's elaborate lie to his supervisor, in and of itself, cast significant doubt on Smith's character for truthfulness. For this reason, the MCC tape falls squarely within the ambit of Rule 608(b), and it was error for the district court to allow the government to play the tape. 109 Nevertheless, we decline to reverse Smith's conviction because the error was harmless. United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 529 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that courts do not reverse convictions for evidentiary error unless the error had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict). Smith, who was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and the use of a telephone to facilitate the conspiracy, took the stand in his own defense, admitted that the government properly identified his voice on the phone call recordings and acknowledged that he dealt cocaine and crack with Allen from February 1998 until July 1998 (Allen was arrested in August 1998), but maintained that he was coerced into dealing drugs in February 1998 to pay off a debt to the Black Disciples. Even if the government had not played the MCC tape and the jury credited Smith's testimony that the Black Disciples pushed him back into drug dealing in February 1998 to pay off a debt, we think that his coercion defense is deficient as a matter of law. The government intercepted and recorded dozens of phone calls between Smith and Allen discussing drug transactions. Based on our review of the record, there is neither a hint of coercion on the tapes nor any discussion of payment of a debt to the Black Disciples (though Allen and Smith often discuss payment for drugs that Allen had fronted Smith). Instead, in the tapes played to the jury and interpreted by Allen, Smith arranges to purchase large quantities of cocaine and crack, Tr. 1035, bickers with Allen about the prices of the drugs, Tr. 1033-35, 1096, complains about the quality of the drugs, Tr. 1084-85, complains that he is losing business and profits because Allen cannot always deliver the cocaine when the customers want it, Tr. 1099-1100, 1106, and informs Allen that he was renting a house to open up shop there. Tr. 1080. On one occasion, Smith tells Allen that some of his customers claim that they were robbed and that he is holding the customers at gunpoint until they pay him. Tr. 1056-62. Although we do not foreclose the possibility of a viable coercion defense to federal narcotics charges, we are dubious of the defense in circumstances where the defendant engaged in numerous drug transactions over an extended period of time, accepted the proceeds from the drug sales, and made no effort to contact authorities or permanently flee the area. Even if Smith's initial step into the drug conspiracy in 1998 was not voluntary, the only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence is that Smith persisted in the illegal activity after any immediate danger had passed and failed to permanently flee or seek protection despite having the opportunity to do so, and this dooms his coercion theory. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (Under any definition of these defenses [coercion/duress and necessity] one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, `a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,' the defenses will fail.). Consequently, we reject Smith's invitation to reverse his conviction on the basis of a Rule 608(b) error.
110 Smith next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutors engaged in a pattern of misconduct that compromised the fairness of his trial. Though he provides us with a long list of instances of prosecutorial misconduct, he only develops arguments with regard to two of them: (1) the government's failure to disclose the MCC tape prior to trial; and (2) an FBI agent's use of sealed recordings of two intercepted phone calls in an interview with Smith's neighbors. 2 Smith moved for a mistrial based on the government's failure to disclose the MCC tape and moved to suppress all of the wiretap evidence based on the FBI agent's use of the two sealed recordings, and the district court denied both motions. We will defer to the district court's judgment on these rulings unless either decision amounted to an abuse of discretion. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir.1995). When assessing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we must first decide whether the government's conduct was proper. United States v. White, 222 F.3d 363, 369-70 (7th Cir.2000). If we conclude that the conduct was improper, we must consider the conduct in light of the entire record to determine if Smith was so prejudiced by the improprieties that he was deprived of a fair trial. Id. We agree with Smith that the government's failure to disclose the MCC tape was improper. Smith filed a pre-trial motion to require the government to disclose its intention to use any Rule 404(b) or Rule 608(b) evidence at trial, and the district court granted the motion. As explained above, the MCC tape was Rule 608(b) evidence. Consequently, the government should have disclosed its intention to use the tape prior to trial. The FBI agent's use of sealed wiretap evidence was also ill-advised. During an interview with the agent, Smith's neighbors expressed doubt about the charges against Smith because he seemed too nice. The agent cleared up their doubts by playing two phone call recordings that left no question as to Smith's involvement in the drug trade. The district court had previously issued an order pursuant to Title III that sealed the recordings and permitted the recordings to be disclosed by court order or to other law enforcement agencies. The government's justification for the disclosure— that the agent played the tapes in order to develop witnesses that could identify Smith's voice on the recordings—strikes us as an unpersuasive, post hoc rationalization for the disclosure. 111 However, we do not punish prosecutors for government misconduct by reversing convictions. Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241. The appropriate focus is on whether the improprieties impacted the outcome of the trial, and we will reverse only if there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the improprieties, the defendant would have been acquitted. Id. More precisely, we will reverse only if the district court's answer to the question posed above was an abuse of discretion. Id. In the instant case, the improprieties identified by Smith do not require a new trial. While the pre-trial disclosure of the tape recordings may have hurt Smith's reputation with his neighbors, we fail to see how the disclosure had any effect at all on the outcome of Smith's case, considering that the neighbors did not testify at trial or provide the government with incriminating evidence about Smith after the disclosure. Smith does not provide the missing prejudice link in his brief. The failure to disclose the MCC tape, on the other hand, had some potential for prejudice. Had the government disclosed the tape before trial, Smith would have had the opportunity to file a motion in limine to exclude the tape and, with the benefit of a briefed motion, the district court may have excluded the tape. As it turned out, the government did not disclose its intention to use the tape, Smith objected at trial based on limited information, and the court allowed the government to play the tape. Nevertheless, the evidence against Smith was overwhelming and his coercion defense was flawed. There is no reasonable probability that pre-trial disclosure of the tape would have led to an acquittal. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Smith's motion to suppress the wiretap evidence or when it denied Smith's motion for a mistrial based on the government's failure to disclose the MCC tape.