Opinion ID: 774603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: 36 Styron complains that the transfer of the cause from the 75th District Court of Liberty County, the district court from which the grand jury handed down the indictment, to the 253rd District Court of Liberty County, at the request of the State, without notice to or in the presence of either Styron or his attorney and without a hearing, violated Styron's rights to due process of law and to counsel. 37 Petitioner's motion to quash the indictment on these grounds was denied by the 253rd District Court after a hearing on May 2, 1994. At that hearing testimony showed that between 1977 and 1991 indictments were assigned randomly by the district clerk to either the 75th or the 253rd District Court. The testimony further showed that in 1992 the district clerk began to assign indictments to the court in which the prosecutor handling the case was assigned, and that the District Attorney's practice was to randomly assign cases to prosecutors. However, in this case, Prosecutor Anne Streit was assigned to Styron's case, and she was assigned to the 253rd District Court. The evidence suggests that when the District Attorney's office informed the clerk that Streit was prosecuting the case, the clerk's office informed the judge in the 75th District Court, who then transferred the case to the 253rd District Court without a hearing and without notice to either Styron or his attorney. 38 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the transfer was effected pursuant to prosecutorial discretion and that Styron failed to produce exceptionally clear proof that the discretion had been abused. 39 The district court found no due process violation given that Styron failed to demonstrate that he was in any way prejudiced by the lack of hearing and notice of the transfer, and because the trial court hearing on the motion and the appellate and state writ process afforded Styron a full and fair hearing on this matter. The district court also found no violation of the right to counsel since an administrative act transferring the case was not a criminal proceeding in which the rights of Styron might be affected because the act of transfer was not a critical stage in the prosecution. 40
41 The right to counsel attaches at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984). This right extends to critical pretrial proceedings as the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). The court must analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. Id. at 227. In Gouveia, the Supreme Court characterized the situations where the right extends as instances where the results of the confrontation 'might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.' 467 U.S. at 189 (internal citations omitted). As such, the Court has found a violation of the right to counsel where counsel was not notified or allowed to confer with his client prior to a pretrial psychiatric interview later used at the sentencing phase. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); see alsoMempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967) (holding that counsel must be appointed at a proceeding where certain legal rights like appeal may be lost). 42 The transfer of Styron's case was an administrative matter and not a critical proceeding. Counsel's absence did not derogate from a fair trial; indeed, Styron does not even argue that he was denied a fair trial or that the effect of the transfer pervaded the entire proceeding. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257 (1988)(distinguishing cases in which the deprivation of the right to counsel affected--and contaminated--the entire criminal proceeding and applying harmless error standard). He merely makes an amorphous argument that he required aid in knowing whether to oppose a transfer. Styron has failed to show prejudice or that the presence of counsel would have eliminated any prejudice. There is no indication of misconduct, animus, or discrimination by the prosecution. 43 This court has refused to find a violation of the right to counsel at a pretrial confrontation during which a defendant was photographed outside the presence of counsel because the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings is not absolute. Smith v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1990). Likewise, here the right is not absolute. The transfer did not affect any substantial rights, see Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134, because Styron was still afforded a fair trial. See Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997). The mere absence of counsel at an administrative process is not sufficient to show a deprivation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, no COA will issue because Styron has failed to make the requisite substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 44
45 The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985). However, the Supreme Court has limited this right by holding that there is a due process right to be present 'whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge . . . [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. Id. (citingSnyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 108 (1934)). Having recognized this limit, the Court in Gagnon held that the presence of four defendants and their attorneys during an in camera discussion between a judge, juror, and another attorney was not required to ensure fundamental fairness or a 'reasonably substantial . . . opportunity to defend against the charge.' Id.at 527 (internal citations omitted). In Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987), the Court determined that a defendant's due process right is the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. In Stincer, there was no violation of due process for a defendant to have been excluded from a competency hearing concerning two witnesses because the defendant gave no indication that his presence would have been useful in ensuring a more reliable determination as to whether the witnesses were competent to testify. 482 U.S. at 747. 46 Styron has failed to show deprivation of a constitutional right. Although he argues that he was not given notice or an opportunity to object to the transfer, he nevertheless fails to demonstrate that his presence at the [transfer] would have contributed to the fairness of the proceeding. He thus fails to establish, as an initial matter, the presence of a constitutional deprivation. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747 n.21. As the district court acknowledged, the transfer was a purely administrative matter, and Styron's presence would not have had a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend against the charge. See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526. 47 This court has faced a similar issue in United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1991). There, the court addressed the propriety of a transfer requested by the government to a judge who had previously presided over the trial of codefendants. Id. at 1398. First recognizing that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to trial within a particular division of a judicial district, and, a fortiori, before a particular judge, the court emphasized that a court may not transfer a case if a defendant makes a strong showing of prejudice. Id. at 1399. The court held the transfer to be valid, even though the government specifically chose the transferee judge. Id. at 1400. Although the transfer of a case to a different judge upon request of the government is not something we would endorse as routine practice, we cannot in this case, given the existence of a valid reason supporting transfer and no showing of prejudice by the defendant, say that the district court abused its discretion. Id. In this case, the transfer was an administrative matter, and unlike Osum, the transferee court's only connection to the matter was the fact that the prosecutor to whom the case was randomly allotted was assigned to that court. Styron makes no showing of prejudice based on the transfer or his lack of presence thereat. See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1294 (9th Cir. 1980) (They have no basis, however, to advance as error any alleged violation of the Northern District of California's Random Assignment Plan unless they can show actual prejudice.). 48 Therefore, applying the proper standard under the AEDPA, we conclude that Styron has failed to make the requisite substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, no COA will issue on Styron's claims related to the transfer.