Opinion ID: 2517832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Kansas' Construction of Leon

Text: In at least three cases, this court has taken a different approach and applied the test of whether there was a substantial basis for the determination of probable cause to both the determination of the warrant's validity and the determination of whether the good faith exception applied. Kansas first applied Leon in State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 495, 769 P.2d 666 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), where the defendant was arrested by the police in his automobile under suspicion that he was carrying drugs and driving while intoxicated. Police observed a partially burned marijuana cigarette on the console of defendant's car as it was parked in the lot of a club; when officers saw defendant leave, they followed and initiated a stop. After determining Doile did not have a valid license and was driving under the influence, he was arrested. In a search incident to arrest, the police found a mirror, a partially burned hand-rolled marijuana cigarette, and a bag containing a substance that was believed to be marijuana. After arriving at jail, the defendant's personal effects were searched and traces of cocaine were found in his billfold and on a straw he removed from the billfold and chewed during the book-in process. Based on an affidavit setting forth these facts and a disclosure of a prior conviction, the officers obtained a search warrant for his residence. In ruling the evidence should have been suppressed, this court held the warrant was invalid because no probable cause existed for its issuance. The court found there was no nexus between the information in the affidavit and the residence. Doile, 244 Kan. at 501-03, 769 P.2d 666. The Doile court also held that the search could not be saved by the Leon good faith exception. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted: [A] strong theme running throughout Leon is that evidence seized under a search warrant subsequently held to be invalid is not to be suppressed absent some chicanery or wrongdoing by the police. Leon refers to this as the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. . . . As Leon states: `We . . . conclude that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.' [Citation omitted.] 244 Kan. at 501-02, 769 P.2d 666. Acknowledging that none of the four exceptions to Leon were applicable under the facts of the case, the Doile court stated: The affidavit contained no false or misleading statements. No pertinent information was withheld from the affidavit. There is no evidence the issuing judge `wholly abandoned his . . . neutral and detached role.' The warrant was not lacking in specificity. There are no circumstances where it was unreasonable for the officer executing the warrant not to override the determination of probable cause found by the issuing district judge and refuse to execute the warrant. There simply is no bad faith or wrongdoing shown in the issuance or execution of the warrant. 244 Kan. at 502, 769 P.2d 666. Nevertheless, the Doile court declined to apply the good faith exception to permit admission of the evidence seized at Doile's home, quoting a passage from Leon that reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not `provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.' [Citation omitted.] Doile, 244 Kan. at 502, 769 P.2d 666 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405). This passage from Leon is found in the Leon Court's discussion of the validity of the search warrant. The passage did not relate to the applicability of the good faith exception. In other words, the Doile court applied the statement in the wrong context. By reading the passage out of context, the Doile court, which had already determined the standard was not met and the warrant was not valid, found that the good faith exception did not apply. In State v. Probst, 247 Kan. 196, 795 P.2d 393 (1990), this court again addressed the good faith exception after determining that the contested affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for issuing a search warrant for defendant's home. In that case, however, the court refused to apply the good faith exception because the issuing judge had abandoned his judicial role, Leon's second limitation on the good faith exception. 247 Kan. at 205-06, 795 P.2d 393. The district judge who heard the motion to suppress the evidence was the same judge who approved the issuance of the warrant in the first place. When faced with the motion to suppress at trial, he acknowledged his error in issuing the warrant and granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. The Probst court upheld his determination and did not reach the questions of the officers' subjective good faith or objectively reasonable reliance. 247 Kan. at 207, 795 P.2d 393. The third occasion for applying Leon was State v. Ratzlaff, 255 Kan. 738, 877 P.2d 397 (1994). In Ratzlaff, a detective's affidavit indicated that a confidential informant had stated defendant was a drug dealer who, along with others, would receive delivery of drugs from a supplier on a particular date. The affidavit also related the outcome of police surveillance establishing that a supplier was in town that day and had met with other drug dealers named by the confidential informant, who, according to the informant, had ties to defendant. After holding an evidentiary hearing on an eventual motion to suppress, however, the district court found that the affidavit: (1) omitted the fact that the defendant was out of town at the time the drug trafficking was ongoing and (2) deliberately implied that the drugs were delivered to this defendant when the information and investigation indicated otherwise. The district court concluded that these omissions, if included in the affidavit, `would have nullified any finding of probable cause that this defendant or his residence was involved in the drug transaction'; that neither information from the informant nor the investigation by law enforcement the week preceding and up to the execution of the search warrant created reason to believe this defendant possessed drugs; that notwithstanding the investigation and surveillance by numerous law enforcement officers, `the single base accusation by the confidential informant that this defendant was involved in the large-scale drug traffic scheme remained uncorroborated.' 255 Kan. at 740-41, 877 P.2d 397. The district court thus suppressed the evidence, holding that, based on the information available to the affiant, `no reasonable well-trained officer should have relied upon the warrant' and that the detective `did not manifest objective good faith by relying on the warrant for this defendant's residence based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probative [ sic ] cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.' [Citation omitted.] 255 Kan. at 741, 877 P.2d 397. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed that the warrant was invalid, but reversed; it concluded that the good faith exception applied because it was reasonable, based on the evidence in the affidavit, to conclude there was probable cause to issue a search warrant. Hence, a reasonable, well-trained officer might have relied on the warrant. See 255 Kan. at 742, 877 P.2d 397. This court subsequently affirmed the district court's conclusion that the affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause to believe drugs would be found at the defendant's residence. It also adopted the district court's finding that the detective intentionally omitted material information from the affidavit. 255 Kan. at 754-55, 877 P.2d 397. Additionally, the court noted that, although the district court could have declined to apply the good faith exception based on the deliberately misleading aspects of the affidavit ( Leon's first limitation to the good faith exception), the district court instead stated: `This Court believes [the detective] did not approach the issuing magistrate with ill-intent and total deception. The lack of good faith is found only in [the detective's] desire to unreasonably extend the facts to this defendant's residence and to draw this defendant within the realm of probable cause by inference and innuendo when the facts and information dictated the contrary.' (Emphasis added.) 255 Kan. at 755, 877 P.2d 397. The district court had based its ultimate conclusion that the good faith exception did not apply on the finding that there was so little indicia of probable cause contained in the warrant [affidavit] that it was entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe the warrant valid [ Leon's fourth limitation.] 255 Kan. at 755, 877 P.2d 397. The Ratzlaff court stated that [t]he question here [was] whether [the affiant-detective], as a well-trained police officer, reasonably should have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause. 255 Kan. at 754, 877 P.2d 397. However, the court did not answer this question explicitly; rather, the Ratzlaff opinion summarily concluded that the search of defendant's residence [did] not fall within the good faith exception as expressed in Leon, and thus the evidence obtained as a result of the search must be suppressed. 255 Kan. at 755, 877 P.2d 397. The opinion did not include the questionable language from Doile; however, it did not properly frame the question here. Under Leon, the question is not whether the officer reasonably should have known that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected imposing that burden. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Rather, the issue is whether there is so little indicia of probable cause in the affidavit that reliance on it was objectively unreasonable. This court had another opportunity to construe and apply Leon in State v. Longbine, 257 Kan. 713, 896 P.2d 367 (1995), the case relied on by the Court of Appeals in this case. The Longbine court perpetuated Doile's imprecision when it quoted the same statement from Leon's discussion of when a warrant will be determined to be invalid and attributed it to Leon's holding concerning when the good faith exception will not apply. 257 Kan. at 721-22, 896 P.2d 367. Longbine involved a police affidavit in support of a warrant application to search the defendant's residence. The affidavit described the interception of a number of phone calls between a suspected drug dealer and the defendant discussing drug deals and also stated that the suspected drug dealer was believed to store marijuana at the residences of his associates. Longbine was not named as one of these associates. Based on the affidavit, the magistrate issued a search warrant for 13 residences, one of which was Longbine's. In executing the warrant for his residence, officers seized drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Longbine filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence, arguing that the affidavit for the search warrant failed to establish probable cause that contraband would be found in his residence. The district court granted the motion, finding that a reasonable officer would not have believed that the affidavit stated sufficient information to support probable cause for the issuance of the warrant to search the defendant's home. Upon consideration of the State's interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and, apparently wanting to cover all bases, ruled that (1) there was a substantial basis stated in the affidavit to conclude that probable cause existed and (2) the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. In reviewing the validity of the search warrant on petition for review, this court held that the telephone calls merely gave the appearance that the defendant was part of the drug dealer's network and, without more information, the affidavit failed to state facts supporting probable cause to believe that drugs would be found at the defendant's residence. 257 Kan. at 719-20, 896 P.2d 367. On the question regarding the application of the Leon good faith exception, the court considered the defendant's argument that because the affidavit failed to establish sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant for his residence, the good faith exception should not apply and the evidence should be suppressed. The Longbine court recognized that Leon laid out the four circumstances where the exclusionary rule still applies. Then, this court explained its understanding of the Supreme Court's reasoning in adopting the good faith exception in Leon: The Leon Court then stated that reviewing courts will not apply the `good faith exception' to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not `provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.' [Citations omitted.] It concluded that `sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.' 468 U.S. at 915 [104 S.Ct. 3405]. Longbine, 257 Kan. at 721, 896 P.2d 367. Based on this construction of Leon, the Longbine court determined that the good faith exception does not apply to a warrant that fails to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed that drugs would be found in defendant's residence. 257 Kan. at 721-22, 896 P.2d 367. It is at this point that the analysis is flawed in the same manner as the Doile analysis. As previously noted, when the Court in Leon stated sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause, the Court was addressing the initial determination of whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. The Court was not addressing the good faith exception. By requiring the use of a substantial basis test to review probable cause in both contextsdetermining the validity of the search warrant and determining the applicability of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rulethe answer in the first context necessarily predetermines the answer in the second context. Simply put, Doile and Longbine, in applying the substantial basis test as a prerequisite for application of the good faith exception, predetermine the denial of the good faith exception despite the officers' lack of bad faith or misconduct. As the State argues, this renders the Leon good faith exception unattainable in Kansas. The State is not alone in its criticism of Longbine's construction of the Leon good faith exception. In State v. Jackson, 30 Kan. App.2d 288, 41 P.3d 871 (2002), the Court of Appeals recognized the four circumstances requiring exclusion as provided in Leon. But none of the four circumstances applied in Jackson. The Court of Appeals observed that the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained no false or misleading statements. No pertinent information was withheld from the affidavit, nor was the warrant lacking in specificity. The panel further noted that there was no evidence that the issuing judge wholly abandoned his neutral and detached role and no circumstances where it was unreasonable for the officer executing the warrant not to override the determination of probable cause found by the issuing judge and refuse to execute the warrant. 30 Kan.App.2d at 297, 41 P.3d 871. In sum, there simply was no bad faith or wrongdoing shown in the issuance or execution of the warrant. The Jackson panel stated: This determination would normally end the inquiry and the evidence would be admissible under the good faith exception. 30 Kan.App.2d at 297, 41 P.3d 871 (citing Doile, 244 Kan. at 502, 769 P.2d 666). Because of the holdings in Doile and Longbine, however, requiring minimum probable cause in order to apply the good faith exception, the Court of Appeals was compelled to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent. The panel stated: Although Leon may not have established a minimum probable cause requirement, it is clear that our Supreme Court has established such a requirement. 30 Kan.App.2d at 299, 41 P.3d 871; see also, e.g., State v. Malm, 37 Kan.App.2d 532, 548, 154 P.3d 1154 (2007) (The court's reasoning in Doile is somewhat curious because the Leon good faith exception is only triggered in cases where a court subsequently determines that the search warrant affidavit fails to establish a substantial basis for probable cause. This is why we have the Leon good faith exception in the first place.); State v. Hemme, 15 Kan. App.2d 198, 204, 806 P.2d 472, rev. denied 248 Kan. 998, cert. denied 502 U.S. 865, 112 S.Ct. 191, 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991) (noting that the Doile court added a probable cause requirement to Leon's good faith exception by quoting some preliminary probable cause language from earlier in the Leon opinion). For a general overview, see Comment, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Kansas Law, 41 Kan. L.Rev. 95 (Crim.Proc. ed. 1993) (Kansas Supreme Court has incorrectly added an additional minimum probable cause requirement not found in Leon, creating confusion and making the scope of the exclusionary rule unclear).