Opinion ID: 747234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Double Jeopardy-Conspiracy Counts.

Text: 10 Several defendants argue that their convictions on both Counts I and II violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. We consider the argument even though it was not preserved in district court, because it is purely legal and, if correct, the argument would relate to a miscarriage of justice. See Jovanovich v. United States, 813 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.1987). 11 Count I charges that defendants conspired and agreed ... to aid and abet the distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count II charges that the defendants conspired and agreed ... to conduct financial transactions, knowing that the property involved in the financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and knowing that the transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The indictment sets out factual details of the defendants' activities in great detail in the means of the conspiracy and overt acts portions of Count I, and then incorporates by reference the same averments for the means and overt acts portions of Count II. 12 The elements of the crimes as set out in the statutes differ, so there was no double jeopardy. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1429 (9th Cir.1988). Blockburger does not direct us to compare the evidence necessary to convict the defendants of both offenses; rather, it directs us to engage in statutory construction of the two provisions under which the defendants are convicted. [W]e focus upon the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence presented at trial. United States v. Wolfswinkel, 44 F.3d 782 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980)). [T]wo offenses are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes if 'each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.'  Id. (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182). [S]ubstantial overlap in the proof does not establish double jeopardy. United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1429 (9th Cir.1988). 13 In this case, the same act constitutes two crimes, and punishing it as such does not violate double jeopardy. One needs to agree to a plan to conceal proceeds of an unlawful activity to be guilty of conspiracy to launder money, but one need not agree to a plan to conceal proceeds to be guilty of conspiracy to aid and abet the distribution of drugs. Likewise, one needs to agree to a plan to aid the distribution of drugs to be guilty of conspiracy to aid and abet the distribution of drugs, but one need not agree to a plan to aid the distribution of drugs to be guilty of conspiracy to launder money. Here, it just happens that the proceeds laundered are drug proceeds and not the proceeds of some other unlawful activity. 14 Conspiracy to launder money, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), is not a lesser included offense of conspiracy to aid and abet the distribution of controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. See United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1429 (9th Cir.1988) (no double jeopardy violation for conviction of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and conviction of conspiracy to not report currency transactions, 18 U.S.C. § 371, despite fact that same act, removing money from United States, constituted actus reus of both crimes). 15