Opinion ID: 856283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: loss amount (issue 11)

Text: Both Jose and Marchante challenge their sentences, asserting that the district court erred in finding the loss amount exceeded $120,000. The district court calculated Jose’s and Marchante’s total loss amount based on (1) actual purchases that Jose and Marchante made at Target, (2) the credit cards Toledo skimmed at Flanigan’s, and (3) account numbers found on the thumb drive. Specifically, both Jose and Marchante challenge the inclusion of $74,500 in intended loss from the credit card numbers found on the thumb drive because the evidence was insufficient to link them to the thumb drive and the Government failed to establish its ownership. 4 We review the district court’s calculation of loss under the Guidelines for clear error. United States v. Machado, 333 F.3d 1225, 1227 (11th Cir. 2003). 4 Marchante also challenges the inclusion of the account numbers skimmed at Flanigan’s in the total loss amount. This argument is meritless. The evidence at trial was sufficient to establish by a preponderance that Marchante was responsible for the cards that Toledo had skimmed. See United States v. Smith, 480 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining a district court’s fact findings for sentencing may be based on evidence heard during trial or evidence presented during the sentencing hearing). 11 Case: 11-11906 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 12 of 13 The district court’s fact findings for sentencing purposes may be based on, among other things, evidence heard during trial or evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. United States v. Smith, 480 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). In calculating the appropriate level of loss, a district court should take into account not only the charged conduct, but also all relevant conduct. United States v. Hoffman-Vaile, 568 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009). When the loss attributable to relevant conduct is at issue, “the Government bears the burden of proving loss with reliable and specific evidence.” United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). In conspiracies, a defendant’s relevant conduct includes “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The district court did not clearly err in including the credit card numbers found on the thumb drive in its estimate of losses. The thumb drive was found at Jose’s and Marchante’s home, in a nightstand they shared. Additionally, the thumb drive was found next to proceeds of the charged conspiracy—Disney tickets and debit cards re-encoded with Marchante’s name. Jose offered Disney tickets to Toledo as a form of compensation for her skimming efforts. Additionally, the thumb drive contained a reference to software for a credit card skimming machine, which corroborated Toledo’s account that she had used a skimming machine at Flanigan’s at Marchante’s request. 12 Case: 11-11906 Date Filed: 03/26/2013 Page: 13 of 13 Further, Agent Thompson explained the Mini600 skimmer software found on the thumb drive matched the model of skimming machine that Toledo identified at trial as the type she used. Evidence was presented that a significant number of the credit card numbers on the thumb drive had come from a McDonald’s—the same location Jose had informed Toledo that he had other people skimming credit cards for him. Multiple credit card numbers found on the thumb drive were found to be valid and to have been fraudulently used. In light of the evidence tying the thumb drive to the offense, the district court did not clearly err in attributing the intended loss from the credit card numbers found on the thumb drive to Jose and Marchante. 5 AFFIRMED. 5 Alternatively, even if the evidence found on the thumb drive were subject to being suppressed insofar as the trial is concerned, it would still have been admissible at sentencing. Generally, the exclusionary rule does not apply to sentencing proceedings, provided the evidence being considered is reliable and was not seized “solely to enhance the defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1234-37 & n.15 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus, the district court did not err in considering the thumb drive at sentencing. 13