Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cumulative Impact of Asserted Penalty Phase Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: Finally, defendant summarizes the various claims of guilt and penalty phase misconduct discussed above, arguing pervasive misconduct occurred that cumulatively denied him his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to a fair and reliable penalty determination. He also argues this misconduct excuses his numerous failures below to object to the alleged instances of misconduct he has raised on appeal (see Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 821, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673), and that, beyond this, we should abolish the longstanding requirement that defendant object and request an admonition if doing so would not be futile. As with his guilt phase claims, we decline defendant's invitation to eliminate the requirement that defendants afford trial courts an opportunity to remedy in the first instance any prosecutorial misconduct that may have occurred during trial. Furthermore, we have not found any misconduct in this case. Even in the few instances discussed above in which we have assumed that misconduct may have occurred, we have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that any misconduct would have been harmless. We therefore conclude there was no pervasive prosecutorial misconduct that excused defendant's failure to object and to request an admonition, or that denied defendant his constitutional right to a reliable and fair penalty proceeding.
Defendant reiterates various constitutional challenges to California's death penalty law, all of which we repeatedly have rejected. Defendant does not provide any persuasive reason for us to reexamine our prior decisions. Section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the jury to consider in determining the penalty the circumstances of the crime, is neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad, and does not result, in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination. ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545 ( Harris); Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 439, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Because capital defendants are not situated similarly to noncapital defendants, California's death penalty law does not deny equal protection of the laws by depriving capital defendants of certain procedural rights accorded noncapital defendants. ( Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1242-1243, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1287, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115.) Accordingly, the jury may consider unadjudicated offenses under section 190.3, factor (b) as aggravating factors without violating a defendant's rights to a fair trial, confrontation, an impartial and unanimous jury, due process, and a reliable penalty determination. ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 316, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433 ( Sapp ); People v. Bolalen (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) The use of terms such as extreme, reasonably believed, and at the time of the offense in the list of potential mitigating factors does not impermissibly restrict the jury's consideration of evidence in mitigation or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination. ( Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 365, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 316, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) The statute is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) The decisions in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 do not affect California's death penalty law. ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Moreover, `[b]ecause the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative [citation], and therefore different in kind from the determination of guilt,' the federal Constitution does not require the prosecution to bear the burden of proof or burden of persuasion at the penalty phase. [Citations.] ( Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 317, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) Except as to other crimes evidence under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), the court need not instruct regarding any burden of proof, or instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase. ( Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 417-18, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; see also Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th 310, 360, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1216, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) The court need not omit from the instructions factors that apparently are inapplicable. ( Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 919, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) The claim that section 190.3, factor (g), which concerns extreme duress, has no relevance in this case and should not have been mentioned to the jury is of no consequence, because defendant acted alone in perpetrating the murders. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 895-896, 48 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135.) There is no reasonable possibility that in light of the instructions as a whole and the arguments of counsel, the jury could have been misled by the inclusion of factor (g) to conclude that mitigating evidence could not be considered unless it constituted a legal excuse for defendant's crimes. The statute is not invalid for failing to create a presumption in favor of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, nor is the trial court or this court required to engage in intercase proportionality review when examining a death verdict. ( Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 317, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) The existence of prosecutorial discretion in deciding in which cases the death penalty should be sought does not render that punishment unconstitutional. ( Ibid. )
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the asserted errors requires reversal of his conviction and death sentence even if none of the errors is prejudicial individually. We disagree. In the few instances in which we have found error or assumed the existence of error, we have concluded that any error was harmless. These errors combined do not compel the conclusion that defendant was denied a fair trial.