Opinion ID: 2217203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was the obligation assumed by west personal or one running with the land?

Text: This is perhaps the most important single issue. It runs all through the case. Our resolution of this question against West goes far toward deciding the ultimate result which we reach. Both parties cite extensively from Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 362-63, 113 N.W. 941, 943 (1907) on this issue. Sexauer sets out the conditions to be met in determining when a covenant runs with the land. We quote from that case: In determining whether a covenant will run with the land, the material inquiries always are (1) whether the parties meant to charge the land; and (2) whether the burden is one that can be imposed consistently with policy and principle. . . . Covenants intended to charge the land may be shown by the employment of the word assigns, and also may be quite as strongly indicated by other language contained in the deed, and generally the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the tenor of the instrument, the nature of the thing to be done, its relation to the property, the period of its continuance, and the like. . . . We think the real question must be, the covenant being one which may be annexed to the estate and run with the land, whether such was the intention of the parties, as expressed in the deed. In Sexauer the grantee agreed to perpetually maintain a tight fence sufficient to stop hogs and all other livestock. Later the grantee disposed of his interest in the land and refused to perform the condition of maintaining the fence. We held his obligation to do so ceased when he divested himself of all interest in the real estate because that was the intention of the parties. We quote further from Sexauer: [I]t will be observed that Wilson as grantee of plaintiff agreed (1) to maintain a division fence of a particular character; and (2) to do so perpetually. The thing to be done and continued inhered in the land was such as might be annexed to the freehold as a covenant running with the land; and from the promise that the maintenance should be perpetual, to continue longer than either party could have anticipated Wilson or his representative would survive, the intention of the parties that it run with the land is fairly to be inferred. Having so intended, the covenant should be construed accordingly. 136 Iowa at 363-64, 113 N.W. at 944. The rule is stated in Restatement of Property, § 531 (1944): The successors in title to land respecting the use of which the owner has made a promise are not bound as promisors upon the promise unless it was intended by the parties to the promise that they should be so bound. See also Restatement of Property, § 538. The present case is distinguishable from Sexauer. The installation of the spurs and the paving of the streets required a one-time performance only. The paving was to be done immediately, strongly suggesting the duty was personal to the promisor. Both the paving and the railroad spurs were vital to the consideration for the sale of the lots. As West testified at trial, the sale to AGI was to be a great attraction in bringing in other buyers and was thought to be important to the success of the venture. As part of the inducement to secure AGI's agreement to purchase, West agreed to perform these conditions. We are convinced his promise was personal and bound him individually to perform the covenants which he undertook. The agreement is subject to no other reasonable interpretation. The fact that the agreement did not work out advantageously does not excuse West from performing. His various defenses are without merit. Some are even frivolous in nature. He argues, for instance, lack of consideration; but there was valuable consideration passing between the parties when the promise was made. West got his major purchaser. AGI got construction-or at least the promise of construction-of streets and railroad spurs. West also argues he was released because, after transfer of title, he had no right to go on the land to do the necessary construction work. He must mean after the foreclosure action, but the agreement was breached even before that happened. West's first issue is without merit.