Opinion ID: 1855634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Wiley's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to oppose the complete elimination of mercy and sympathy from the jury's consideration?

Text: ¶ 30. Wiley further argues that [t]rial counsel's failure to prevent the trial court's excision of all references to mercy and sympathy was unreasonable and fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation in a capital case. The record reflects that, during the discussion of proposed C-3, the following transpired: MR. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY] JONES: Your Honor, one last objection to this instruction is that we feel to be totally correct it needs to go forward and say that, Even if you find the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you can impose a life sentence. THE COURT: You're tendering a mercy instruction, aren't you? MR. JONES: Yes, sir. But that language would help us with this instruction because I think it leaves the jury with theit just leaves them with the feeling that it's a weighing process, if one outweighs the other, you've got to go with the one that wins, and that's not the law. MR. [PROSECUTOR] WILLIAMS: Your Honor, this is the approved instruction that has been dealt with requesting mercy. The matter was then discussed at length, and, ultimately, the instruction was not revised to include mercy. ¶ 31. The record also indicates that one sentence in proposed instruction D-7 read: A mitigating circumstance is any aspect of the offense or the offender that, in justice and in mercy, should be considered in favor of a sentence less than death. Upon the State's motion, and without objection from the defense, the phrase and in mercy was deleted from that instruction. The amended instruction was given. ¶ 32. In addition, the State objected to the words sympathy and mercy in proposed instruction D-20, which read: Mitigating factors are facts that, while they do not justify or excuse the crime, nevertheless in fairness, sympathy, and mercy to William Wiley, must be considered by you as extenuating or reducing the degree of his blame or punishment. You may not, however, be swayed by prejudice or public opinion. In light of the trial court's previous denial of a sympathy instruction, defense counsel asked the trial court to perhaps strike sympathy and mercy and grant the rest of the instruction. The instruction was granted, as revised. ¶ 33. Wiley argues that his counsel was unfamiliar with the law on this subject, and allowed the trial judge to strike all references to mercy and sympathy from the instructions. To the contrary, however, the record reflects that defense counsel argued for mercy instructions, albeit unsuccessfully. ¶ 34. Wiley argues that, by striking the references to mercy and sympathy from the jury instructions, the trial judge, in effect, instructed the jury to disregard mercy and sympathy. This is a huge analytical leap. Clearly, denying a proposed mercy instruction can be distinguished from instructing the jury to disregard mercy altogether. ¶ 35. It is true that the jury can not be instructed to totally disregard sympathy or mercy. See Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 691 (Miss.1997). However, [w]e have held that mercy instructions are not required and further, that their issuance is within the discretion of the circuit court. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1301 (Miss.1994); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171, 1181 (Miss.1992); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 150 (Miss. 1991). In Jenkins, where no reversible error was found in the lower court's refusal to grant a mercy instruction, it was explained that: The recent decisions of this Court and of the United States Supreme Court enumerate that a mercy instruction is not required at trial. In Ladner [ v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 761 (Miss.1991)], we held that a defendant has no right to a mercy instruction. Ladner, 584 So.2d at 761. In Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-93, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1262-63, 108 L.Ed.2d 415, 427-28 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the giving of a mercy instruction results in a decision based upon whim and caprice. Thus, the lower court was within its discretion when it denied the mercy instruction below. Jenkins, 607 So.2d at 1181. See Foster, 639 So.2d at 1299-1300 (instruction directing jury that it need not find any mitigating circumstances to return a life sentence found to be a mercy instruction). Jackson, 684 So.2d at 1213, 1239 (Miss. 1996). See also Doss v. State, 709 So.2d 369, 394 (Miss.1997); Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 613 (Miss.1996). ¶ 36. In fact, this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have held that a jury can properly be cautioned against being swayed by sympathy, as long as the jury is not instructed to totally disregard sympathy. See Evans, 725 So.2d at 691 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43, 107 S.Ct. 837, 839-40, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987)); Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1264 (Miss.1995). The basis of these holdings is the understanding that [t]he State must not cut off full and fair consideration of mitigating evidence; but it need not grant the jury the choice to make the sentencing decision according to its own whims or caprice. Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 352 (Miss.1997) ¶ 37. Moreover, the jury received the catch-all instruction on mitigating circumstances. That is, the jury was instructed to consider, as a mitigating factor, any other matter, any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other circumstance of the offense brought before them during the trial, which the jury, deemed to be mitigating on behalf of the defendant. This Court long has accepted the use of a `catch-all' to encompass any mitigating circumstances not specifically enumerated under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6). Jackson, 684 So.2d at 1238. ¶ 38. Thus, even if defense counsel's handling of the proposed mercy instructions could be considered deficient, Wiley has not been prejudiced in this case. That is, Wiley was not entitled to such an instruction anyway. Furthermore, the instructions did not preclude the jury from considering mercy or sympathy. Therefore, Wiley's argument on this point is without merit.