Opinion ID: 2520725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: in absentia sentencing

Text: ¶ 11 The State contests the requirements imposed by the court of appeals on the prosecution in criminal cases to prove the voluntariness of the defendant's absence. We thus focus on what constitutes a reasonable inquiry at the time a defendant is sentenced in absentia. ¶ 12 The court of appeals outlined a procedure whereby it concluded that sentencing in absentia could be accomplished without a violation of defendant's constitutional rights. The court properly noted that defendants have the right to be present at all stages of the criminal proceedings against them and that it is the burden of the prosecution to show that an absent defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived that right before sentencing in absentia can proceed. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at ¶¶ 10, 21, 31 P.3d 615 (citing State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-11 (Utah 1996)); State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). Therefore, the court of appeals determined that, absent any direct evidence at a sentencing hearing of the reason for a defendant's absence, the hearing should ordinarily be continued to permit both the prosecution and defense counsel to seek additional information. It then identified a half dozen potential avenues for establishing voluntariness, including inquiries of law enforcement, hospitals, employers, and others with supervisory or security interests in the defendant's appearance, such as bail bond companies or pretrial services personnel. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at ¶ 23, 31 P.3d 615. Given that the burden of proof regarding waiver remains with the prosecution, the court of appeals suggested that it might make these inquiries, but obviously contemplated that defense counsel would do the same. The court then concluded that [o]nce inquiry appropriate to the case has been made, and a compelling reason for the defendant's absence remains unknown, voluntariness, while not guaranteed, may then be properly inferred. Id., at ¶ 23. The State argues that the foregoing process places too heavy a burden of production on the prosecution and that, having established the knowing element of waiver by proving notice, the State is entitled to a presumption of the voluntary element based solely on the defendant's non-appearance. This approach would properly, according to the State, shift the burden to absent defendants to produce evidence of non-voluntariness. ¶ 13 We do not believe that our precedent permits an automatic presumption in favor of waiver of a constitutional right rather, we find that the reasonable inquiry process identified by the court of appeals is a salutary one. In State v. Houtz this court observed: A defendant charged with a crime is entitled to be present at all stages of trial. The right to appear and defend in person is a constitutional one, but may be waived under certain circumstances if the defendant voluntarily absents himself from the trial. However, that voluntariness may not be presumed by the trial court.... The trial court made inadequate inquiry into defendant's ability to appear ... before deciding that he had waived his right to be present at trial. 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). ¶ 14 In Wagstaff, the court of appeals stated that [v]oluntariness is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, 772 P.2d at 990, a standard that clearly contemplates some form of inquiry appropriate to the facts of the case, as required by the court of appeals in this case. The defendant in Wagstaff was known by the trial judge to have intentionally left the state and failed to stay in touch with his counsel and his parole officer, thus rendering his non-appearance at trial entirely the result of his own misconduct. He was not, as was the defendant here, automatically presumed to be absent voluntarily based solely on his non-appearance at a hearing. More recently, in Anderson, this court considered the case of a defendant who had severed contact with his own attorney and with the prosecution. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Citing several cases involving wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of absent defendants, the court reasoned that in some circumstances, a defendant's absence from the jurisdiction can occasion the loss of a criminal appeal right and the `defendant must bear the consequences of his illegal acts.' Id. at 1111 (quoting State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1996)). ¶ 15 The foregoing review of our precedent persuades us that the State is incorrect in arguing that an automatic presumption of voluntariness may be applied based on nothing more than non-appearance at a hearing of which a defendant had notice. Instead, the question of voluntariness is highly fact-dependent, is tied to the totality of circumstances in particular cases, and, where there is virtually no explanation for an absence, requires some form of inquiry by the trial court. The prosecution, which must bear the burden of proof regarding waiver, would be well served to assist the court in its inquiry by providing at least some minimal evidence that the defendant is not incarcerated. Contact with hospitals, however, another avenue mentioned by the court of appeals, would seem unwarranted unless there was some reason specific to the case (e.g., a defendant with a chronic illness or a history of severe disability). Trial courts are well-positioned to assess what questions need to be asked and answered before voluntariness can be properly inferred, and we think the State's concern about unduly burdensome inquiries is misplaced. In the average case, the trial court may simply instruct defense counsel to attempt to contact the defendant or persons familiar with the defendant to see if an explanation for the non-appearance emerges, and the prosecutor to ascertain if the defendant is incarcerated. Should those inquiries disclose no evidence of involuntary absence, we agree with the court of appeals that [o]nce inquiry appropriate to the case has been made, and a compelling reason for the defendant's absence remains unknown, voluntariness ... may then be properly inferred. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at ¶ 23, 31 P.3d 615. It is true that continuances in hearings will occasionally be required, but they need not be of long duration, and we think fairness and constitutional procedure require them. Alternatively, at least in sentencing hearings, a trial court might apply a conditional presumption without a voluntariness inquiry, but indicate on the record that the sentence will be automatically set aside and a new hearing conducted if the defendant appears and rebuts the presumption.