Opinion ID: 1412435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the other vetoed provisions

Text: We hold that the district court properly dismissed the appellants' challenge to the other seven portions of the Long Bill which were vetoed by the Governor. We will discuss each of these provisions in order, together with our reasons for affirming the district court's decision. (1) The Governor vetoed two portions of the Department of Social Services appropriation dealing with funds for County Administration. The first vetoed part is an allocation of funds based upon the number of full-time employees (FTEs) which the legislature believed each county should have. [4] The second vetoed portion of this appropriation is footnote 79, which makes certain specifications as to the number of full-time employees that can be assigned to specific job categories. [5] For example, 953 of the total FTEs are to be social workers, 454.6 FTEs are to be clerical staff, and 18.5 new FTEs are to be social workers in the area of child abuse. An FTE is not an allocation of a certain individual, but rather is defined in the Long Bill as the bugetary equivalent of one position continuously filled full-time for the entire fiscal year and may be comprised of any combination of part-time positions or full-time positions. In his vetoes of these two provisions, the Governor stated: I am vetoing the eleven lines containing county FTE limitations because the executive needs the flexibility to determine the proper allocation of manpower. This item not only infringes upon the Executive's authority, but on the counties' authority as well. We agree that these conditions on the number of full-time employees in each county interfere with the executive authority to allocate staff and resources in administering the funds. Footnote 79 especially is invalid for attempting to allocate the number of full-time employees to be hired in certain job categories. In sum, these provisions are clearly in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. (2) A condition upon an appropriation for Special Residential Child Care Facilities provides that no facilities whose reimbursement rate the previous year exceeded $620 per month can be given a rate increase above six percent without the approval of the Joint Budget Committee. [6] The Department of Social Services is required to present a thorough financial analysis on each facility to the Joint Budget Committee in order to receive a rate increase. The Governor's veto message reads: This item requires approval by the Joint Budget Committee for rate increases. This is a discretionary decision to be made by the Executive under the separation of powers principle. We hold that the requirement for Joint Budget Committee approval unconstitutionally infringes upon the executive's power to administer appropriated funds. Normally, the executive branch exercises its authority to make contracts and enters into agreements with various facilities as to the reimbursement rate. By imposing this condition, the legislature is not merely limiting the overall funds available for the program, but rather is attempting to undertake an executive function in deciding whether a rate increase is appropriate. In our view, this is a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine. (3) Footnote 29 to the Department of Health appropriation for Departmental Data Processing makes the appropriation contingent upon the presentation of a cost-benefit report and a five-year plan to the Joint Budget Committee by January 1, 1978. [7] The Governor's veto message on this provision reads: This footnote requires the approval by the Joint Budget Committee for an appropriation request. The separation of powers problem is obvious. This condition to the Departmental Data Processing appropriation for the Department of Health is also violative of the separation of powers. This particular requirement of a cost-benefit report and a five-year plan in effect gives the Joint Budget Committee a close supervisory role over the administration of the appropriated funds. As such, the requirement impermissibly infringes upon the executive's administrative authority. (4) In the State Compensation Insurance Division portion of the Department of Labor and Employment appropriation, footnote 70a provides that ten additional full-time employees are to be funded if the Division reaches its projected case load by specified dates. [8] In addition the Division is required to submit monthly statistical reports to the Joint Budget Committee. The Governor vetoed this provision on the following basis: This footnote allocates staffing contingent upon caseload. Staffing is an administrative decision. Separation of powers violation is evident once again. This provision is invalid for two reasons. First, the contingent funding of ten full-time employees is a clear interference with the executive authority to allocate staff and resources in administering appropriation. Second, the requirement of monthly reports to the Joint Budget Committee appears to be an attempt to include substantive legislation in the Long Bill. For these reasons, footnote 70a is invalid for contravening both the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the prohibition against including substantive provisions in the general appropriation bill. (5) In the Medical Programs Division portion of the Department of Social Services appropriation, footnote 84 contains an appropriation for an MMIS Study. [9] Footnote 84 also transfers the appropriation for the study from the Medical Programs Division to the Legislative Audit Committee, and provides that the study report is to be made to the Joint Budget Committee. The Governor vetoed footnote 84 for the following reason: Again, approval for a substantive program is made contingent on Joint Budget Committee review rather than executive approval. The Governor's stated reason for this veto mistakenly assumed that the appropriation is contingent on Joint Budget Committee approval. In fact, this provision merely requires submission of the final study to the Joint Budget Committee. Nonetheless footnote 84 is invalid for attempting to include substantive legislation in the Long Bill in violation of Colo.Const. Art. V, Sec. 32. The directive that the funds are to be transferred from the Medical Programs Division to the Legislative Audit Committee for the purpose of having the latter contract for a study of the MMIS program is substantive legislation that should be separately authorized in another bill. (6) Footnote 45a states that appropriations for the Division of Community Colleges cannot be used directly or indirectly, for implementing collective bargaining procedures, prior to legislative approval. [10] The Governor vetoed this provision for the following reason: This footnote prohibits the use of funds for implementing collective bargaining procedures and couches substantive rule making in language purporting to relate to the allocation of funds. The long bill cannot offer substantive laws, it can only say how much money shall be spent. Because this footnote is substantive in nature, it must be vetoed. We agree that footnote 45a is invalid for enacting substantive legislation in the Long Bill. Additionally, it interferes with the executive's administrative authority. In attempting to legislate the subject matter upon which the Community Colleges can spend the appropriated funds, the general assembly is in fact enacting affirmative legislation which should not be contained in the Long Bill. Moreover, the requirement of prior legislative approval is an attempt by the legislature to make a decision which is executive in nature. Thus, footnote 45a violates both Colo.Const. Art. III and Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 32.