Opinion ID: 2541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Brady/Giglio and Use of Perjury

Text: We review a district court's decision to deny a Rule 33 motion seeking a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wong, 78 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1996). The government does not dispute that Gioia breached his plea agreement by withholding information, or that his breaches and related impeachment material were not disclosed to Spinelli for use at trial. The government nonetheless disputes Spinelli's entitlement to a new trial.
Under Brady and Giglio, the government's failure to disclose favorable information will result in an order of retrial if the undisclosed information is material, within the exacting standard of materiality established by the governing case law. While prosecutors have a constitutional duty under Brady and Giglio to disclose to the defense for use at trial helpful information, including information which impeaches government witnesses, see Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, such undisclosed information is deemed material so as to justify a retrial only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). A reasonable probability of a different result is shown when the government's failure to disclose undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Spinelli contends he was entitled to receive not only the information described above about the involvement of Gioia's former fianceé's relatives in various crimes, but also about Gioia's agreement (until permission was denied by the Luchese family) to help Frank Smith, the brother of Gioia's ex-fianceé, to kill Joe Izzo, who Smith believed had murdered Smith's father. At the trial, when asked whether he and Smith committed crimes together, Gioia answered, I never knew Frank Smith on the street, no. The materiality of undisclosed information which could have served to impeach a government witness is affected by the importance of the witness's testimony, as well as the importance of the disclosed information to the impeachment of the witness. Impeaching information is more likely to be deemed material if the witness whose testimony is attacked supplied the only evidence linking the defendant[] to the crime. Wong, 78 F.3d at 79 (internal quotations omitted). Impeaching information is less likely to be considered material when it merely furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable. United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1210 (2d Cir.1995). That is, if the information withheld is merely cumulative of equally impeaching evidence introduced at trial, so that it would not have materially increased the jury's likelihood of discrediting the witness, it is not material. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998). Under this stringent materiality standard, Spinelli is not entitled to a new trial. The defense attacked Gioia on cross-examination, effectively revealing to the jury his extensive criminal history and effectively undermining his credibility. The defense highlighted his participation in murder, attempted murder, drug trafficking, gun trafficking, and extortion. Spinelli's counsel also elicited that Gioia lied to federal agents even after he entered into the cooperation agreement. Gioia admitted that during the course of his cooperation he lied to an FBI agent about an incident in which he assaulted another inmate. Only after he became aware that his lie could have serious negative consequences with respect to his cooperation agreement did he reveal the lie. Additional impeachment by showing additional lies would have made little or no difference. Further, Gioia's testimony, although damaging to Spinelli, was merely confirmatory of Basciano's eyewitness, co-conspirator account, which was the main evidence linking Spinelli to the crime. As the admitted gunman, Basciano detailed Spinelli's involvement in the crime and explained the motivation for the attempted murder of Capozzalo. Gioia's testimony was merely secondary corroboration of what Basciano told the jury. Finally, the information of which the defense was deprived in no way contradicted Gioia's testimony about Spinelli's role in the murder attempt. We conclude that, against the very convincing background of the impeachment of Gioia that was revealed to the jury at trial, the additional potential for impeachment from the information that was not revealed would have added no meaningful likelihood of discrediting Gioia's testimony in the jury's eyes, much less of leading the jury to doubt Basciano's testimony. In sum, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the government disclosed the information. The government's failure to disclose this information does not warrant ordering a new trial.
Spinelli argues that even if he cannot satisfy the Brady and Giglio materiality standard, his case satisfies the lower standard that applies in cases where a conviction is obtained by the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony. Spinelli claims that the prosecutors knew about Gioia's breach of his cooperation agreement and either instructed Gioia not to reveal the breach at trial or in any event knew he was lying when he testified. In deciding whether a new trial is required due to the prosecutor's knowing introduction of perjured testimony, the appropriate inquiry depends on the materiality of the perjury to the jury's verdict and the extent to which the prosecution was aware of the perjury. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.1991). This standard of materiality, as Spinelli correctly argues, is less exacting than in the case of a prosecutor's failure to perform Brady or Giglio obligations. If the prosecution knew of the perjury, then the conviction must be vacated if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id.; see also Wong, 78 F.3d at 81-82. The district court denied Spinelli's motion based on its conclusion that the government prosecutors did not know of Gioia's perjury. This finding, however, rested on the prosecutors' sworn affidavits, which were never tested by cross examination because the district court denied Spinelli's motion without an evidentiary hearing. Because the defendant had no opportunity to challenge the prosecutors' statements, we cannot affirm on the basis of that finding. Cf. United States v. Hamilton, 538 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir.2008) (holding, in the context of a suppression motion, that if asserted facts are contested, the court must hold a hearing to determine the contested issues). Even if we were to assume, despite the prosecutors' contrary affidavits, that they did know Gioia was testifying perjuriously, the reduced materiality standard described in Wallach was not met. As described above, Gioia was shown to be a professional criminal, a member of a vicious organized crime family who engaged in murder, extortion, and trafficking in contraband, not to mention lying. The additional potential for impeachment of Gioia would in the circumstances have raised no reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury's verdict. See Wong 78 F.3d at 82 (where the court assumed that the government knowingly used perjured testimony, materiality standard was not met because ample other evidence supported the conviction and the evidence of perjury would have been cumulative of other significant impeachment of the witness.)