Opinion ID: 1855634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Wiley's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's improper send a message argument during closing argument?

Text: ¶ 39. Wiley argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the following comments, made during the prosecutor's closing arguments: Now, I think it's high time that we have a citizen reaction. It should be made clear to William [Wiley] and to anyone else for that matter that the laws of this county are going to be severely enforced with the most severe penalty when our innocent victims, our blameless victims are slaughtered, are blinded, whose lives are wrecked without any fault of their own. We ought to make it crystal clear. I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that the verdict in this case is a verdict that truth dictates and justice demands.    Ladies and gentlemen, folks who do these things are accountable for their actions. They should be held responsible for their actions. My God, we're not barbarians. We've got laws on our books that are there to protect the innocent people who make up the citizens of this county. That's what they're there for. They protect you. They protect your family. They protect your friends. They protect your loved ones. They even protect the folks you don't like. And they need to be enforced. Folks need to understand that when you commit crime like this, you're going to be held accountable. It's just that simple. ¶ 40. This Court has cautioned prosecutors to refrain from using this type of argument. Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 513 (Miss.1997) (citing Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 637 (Miss.1996); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988)). However, in recent cases, this Court has acknowledged that the warning expressed in previous cases is inapplicable to closing arguments during the sentencing phase of capital murder cases: ... [T]he danger inherent in the send a message argument is that jurors will neglect their duty to determine whether the evidence showed the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged. This danger does not exist at the sentencing phase, where the defendant has already been found guilty of capital murder. The sole determination to be made at this point is whether the death penalty should be imposed. We choose not to fault the prosecution for arguing that the message conveyed by a death penalty verdict would be different than that urged by the defense. To do so would be disingenuous given the inescapable reality that deterrence is, in fact, an established goal of imposing the death penalty, which goal necessarily entails, to some extent, sending a message. The trial court did not err in permitting this argument by the prosecution. Wells v. State, 698 So.2d at 513-14 (Miss. 1997) (citations omitted); Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 985 (Miss.1998). ¶ 41. Given this authority, Wiley's argument is without merit. That is, even if defense counsel's performance could be considered deficient (for failing to object to the prosecutor's comments), there was no resulting prejudice. See Hodgin, 702 So.2d at 116-17 (Miss.1997) (reiterating that burden is on petitioner to prove both prongs of the Strickland test).
¶ 42. Wiley also claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal. The standard of acceptable performance by an attorney is the same for appellate performance as it is for trial performance. Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1138 (Miss.1996). One who claims ineffective assistance of counsel must show both professional error and resulting prejudice. It is clear that there is no constitutional entitlement to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988).... If a post-conviction claim fails on either of the Strickland prongs, the inquiry ends. Foster, 687 So.2d at 1130 (citing Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987)). Williams v. State, 722 So.2d 447, 450-51 (Miss.1998); Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1138 (Miss.1996).
¶ 43. Wiley contends that his appellate counsel should have challenged the jury's finding that the capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest. The record reflects that this was one of two aggravating factors found by the jury. [3] The record also indicates that defense counsel unsuccessfully objected to the inclusion of the avoiding arrest aggravator in the sentencing instructions. ¶ 44. The adverse ruling on this objection was not raised for consideration in Wiley's direct appeal to this Court. Wiley lists three arguments to support his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue this issue:
¶ 45. First, Wiley claims that the evidence was insufficient to support this aggravating circumstance. In support of his argument, Wiley cites the fact that one of the victims of the crime was not killed. Wiley also claims that there are no other facts to demonstrate that he attempted to avoid arrest. Wiley contends that this was a botched robbery, which resulted in a murder, but not a murder committed to avoid arrest. ¶ 46. The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an `avoiding lawful arrest' instruction is. well-settled[.] Woodward v. State, 726 So.2d 524, 541 (Miss.1997). Each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts. If there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to `cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 858 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 153 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 47. `Thus, it is this Court's role to inquire into whether there is any credible evidence upon which the jury could find the aggravating circumstance in question.' Woodward, 726 So.2d at 541 (quoting Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 854 (Miss. 1995)). In the case sub judice, Wiley fired three shots, which killed one of the two witnesses to the robbery, and seriously injured the other witness. The decedent, a storeowner, knew Wiley, a patron of the store. Wiley left the murder weapon and a box (which had contained a money bag) in a nearby, thickly wooded area that had dense undergrowth. The area was described as gullies, briars, it was just one big thicket, it was just almost impenetrable. In addition, Wiley left the money bag laying in some weeds, in a field near a dirt road. ¶ 48. The victims in this case knew Wiley. Furthermore, Wiley's efforts to dispose of and/or conceal the evidence of his crime are sufficient to support the avoiding arrest instruction. That is, there is evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the murder was to conceal Wiley's identity, or cover his tracks, so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest. Therefore, the granting of the instruction on this aggravator was proper. See generally Woodward, 726 So.2d at 541 (the fact that the defendant threw the murder weapon in a creek could reasonably indicate that he did not want to be arrested).
¶ 49. Wiley also argues that, if the avoiding arrest aggravator is applicable to this case, then it is unconstitutionally overbroad. He contends that, if all that is required to support an instruction on the avoiding arrest aggravator is the killing of a victim, then all felony murders would, by definition, be committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest. That is, Wiley asserts that the avoiding arrest aggravator does not genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Wiley places great emphasis on the fact that the second gunshot victim (the decedent's daughter) was not killed. That is, one of the witnesses to the crime was left alive. [4] ¶ 50. A similar argument was considered and rejected in Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 611 (Miss.1995): Walker argues that because every murder necessarily eliminates a witness to that crime, the avoiding arrest aggravator must be given with a limiting instruction channeling the jury's focus to those situations where there is specific evidence demonstrating that one of the purposes behind the killing was the killer's desire to avoid detection and apprehension for an underlying crime. See State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437, 455 (1981). However, Walker compares our law to that of surrounding jurisdictions and concedes, Mississippi, like our sister States, does not equate the killing of the victim with the elimination of a witness in every case. Walker's contention that this aggravator must be accompanied by a limiting instruction has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. In Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 152 (Miss.1991). The Court stated: It is argued some sort of limiting instruction need be given to narrow this aggravator. In Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 651 (Miss.1983), we rebuffed this contention, stating, if there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to `cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Id. at 152-53. Walker, 671 So.2d at 611. In Gray v. Lucas, the Fifth Circuit rejected almost identical contentions to those made here. 677 F.2d [1086] at 1109-1110 [(5th Cir.1982)]. It noted that the Mississippi courts had limited the application of the circumstances to refer to purposefully killing the victim of an underlying felony to avoid or prevent arrest for that felony. So construed, the court observed that this factor was directed to a legitimate state interest and was not so broad that it comprehends an impermissibly large group of murders. Id. at 1110. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 858 (Miss. 1994). Therefore, this aggravating factor, as construed, is not overly broad. ¶ 51. Furthermore, Wiley's assertion is based on the premise that, other than the murder, there is no evidence of avoiding lawful arrest. As discussed earlier, there is evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that Wiley committed the murder to avoid lawful arrest. Therefore, this argument is based on a false premise and is without merit.
¶ 52. Wiley further argues that, if the avoiding arrest aggravator is applicable to this case, then the aggravator impermissibly duplicates the other aggravating circumstance found by the jury (ie: that the capital offense was committed while Wiley was engaged in the commission of a robbery). ¶ 53. These arguments are basically a reiteration of those raised in the preceding subsection. As discussed above, more evidence is required to support the avoiding arrest instruction than evidence of a robbery and a murder. Therefore, Wiley's contentions on this point are without merit. ¶ 54. Thus, Wiley's ineffectiveness of counsel claim on this point is without merit. That is, even if appellate counsel's performance could be considered deficient for failing to raise the issue of the avoiding arrest instruction, Wiley has not proven the requisite prejudice to support an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Therefore, Wiley's arguments on this point fail. See Hodgin, 702 So.2d at 116-17 (Miss. 1997) (reiterating that burden is on petitioner to prove both prongs of the Strickland test).
¶ 55. As stated earlier, Wiley contends that defense counsel referred to the possibility of parole during cross-examination of defense witnesses and during closing arguments. On direct appeal, however, Wiley's counsel only assigned error to the mention of parole during voir dire. As previously noted, this Court affirmed, and distinguished the comments made during voir dire in this case from other cases, which had been reversed for similar reasons. Wiley now argues thatif the other alleged instances of the mention of parole had been brought to this Court's attention then this case could not be distinguished from the cases which have condemned the mention of parole. ¶ 56. However, as stated earlier, the possibility of parole was not mentioned in any of the portions of the record cited by Wiley. Therefore, this argument is not supported by the record. Moreover, even if the performance of Wiley's counsel could be considered deficient on this point, Wiley has not proven any resulting prejudice. Thus, this argument is without merit. See Hodgin, 702 So.2d at 116-17 (Miss.1997) (reiterating that burden is on petitioner to prove both prongs of the Strickland test).
¶ 57. Wiley next argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial, and cites several assignments of error. Each of these arguments is procedurally barred, because they were capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal. See Miss Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) (1994). Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1135 (Miss.1996) ([P]ost-conviction relief is very limited and deals with only those issues undetectable at trial or the appellate level.). ¶ 58. Furthermore, sub-issues 5, 6, and 7 were considered and rejected on direct appeal, and are, therefore, barred by the doctrine of res adjudicata. See Miss.Code Ann. 99-39-21(3) (1994) (The doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal, decided at trial and on direct appeal.). Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss.1992). (Rephrasing direct appeal issues for post-conviction relief purposes will not defeat the procedural bar of res judicata. ) Furthermore, Wiley has failed to prove actual prejudice, as is required by the PCR statutes. For all these reasons, the following issues are without merit.
¶ 59. Wiley argues that the State repeatedly and improperly suggested that Wiley could kill again, if he were paroled. The only comment Wiley cites specifically is the one-time thing comment, made during the prosecutor's closing remarks. On direct appeal, Wiley also argued that this comment was improper, and cited a different reason. Therefore, consideration of this issue is procedurally barred under Miss.Code Ann. Section 99-39-21(2) (1994), which provides that: The litigation of a factual issue at trial and on direct appeal of a specific state or federal legal theory or theories shall constitute a waiver of all other state or federal legal theories which could have been raised under said factual issue; and any relief sought under this chapter upon said facts but upon different state or federal legal theories shall be procedurally barred absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. In addition, consideration of this issue is procedurally barred under Miss.Code Ann. Section 99-39-21(1) (1994), because it was capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal. See Miss Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) (1994). ¶ 60. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the merits of this issue, Wiley's argument would fail. The comment cited by Wiley did not mention parole. This Court ruled that the comment was made in rebuttal to defense counsel's remarks, and was not reversible error. Wiley VI, 691 So.2d at 964-65. See also Faraga, 514 So.2d at 303-04 (affirming where comment does not refer to parole and is proper rebuttal) (citing Evans, 422 So.2d 737). Thus, even on the merits, this argument fails.
¶ 61. In addition, Wiley argues that the trial judge erred by striking from the jury instructions all references to mercy and sympathy. He contends that, in effect, the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider sympathy and mercy. The issue of whether the instructions granted or rejected were error by the trial judge should have been raised on the direct appeal. Procedural bars of waiver, different theories, and res judicata and exception thereto as defined in post-conviction relief statute are applicable in death penalty postconviction relief application. Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 888 (Miss.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S.Ct. 681, 126 L.Ed.2d 649 (1994). Postconviction relief is not granted upon facts and issues which could or should have been litigated at trial and on appeal. The doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal, decided at trial and on direct appeal. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Supp.1994). Thus, this Court will not engage in a full blown argument about whether the instructions were erroneously excluded or whether those admitted were sufficient, as those issues are res judicata. Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1138 (Miss. 1996). ¶ 62. Even if Wiley's argument were not procedurally barred, it would fail. As stated earlier, a capital murder defendant is not entitled to a sympathy instruction or a mercy instruction, although the trial judge has discretion to grant such an instruction. See Jenkins, 607 So.2d at 1181. The jury cannot be instructed to disregard sympathy altogether. See Evans, 725 So.2d at 691. However, they may be cautioned against being swayed by such considerations. See id. ¶ 63. Wiley argues that, by refusing to grant mercy instructions, the trial judge, in effect, instructed the jury not to consider mercy. This is not true. The trial judge was within his discretion in refusing the mercy instructionsand, in fact, could have gone further, and instructed the jury not to be swayed by such considerations. The record reflects that the jury was not instructed to disregard mercy altogether. Wiley's argument to the contrary is a misstatement of the facts and the law.
¶ 64. As stated previously, this issue is procedurally barred under Miss Code Ann. Section 99-39-21(1) (1994). See Foster v. State, 687 So.2d at 1135. However, even if consideration of this issue were not barred, Wiley's argument would fail. That is, the danger inherent in the `send a message' argument ... does not exist at the sentencing phase .... Wells, 698 So.2d at 513-14; Holly, 716 So.2d at 985. Therefore, Wiley's argument is without merit.
¶ 65. Wiley next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. ... [T]his claim was not raised on appeal. Therefore, without making the necessary showing of cause and actual prejudice, this claim is barred from belated consideration on post-conviction review. Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1140 (Miss.1997). ¶ 66. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the avoiding arrest aggravator. Therefore, even if this issue were not procedurally barred, Wiley's argument would fail.
¶ 67. Wiley next argues that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial, following the conversation about the possibility of parole, which occurred during voir dire. As discussed earlier, this issue was considered and rejected on direct appeal. See Wiley VI, 691 So.2d at 964. The issue is, therefore, res adjudicata and without merit. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (1994). See also Lockett, 614 So.2d at 902.
¶ 68. Wiley also argues that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on diminished capacity. This argument is without merit, and was expressly rejected on direct appeal, when this Court held that the evidence did not support a diminished capacity instruction. Wiley VI, 691 So.2d at 965-66. The issue is, therefore, res adjudicata and without merit. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (1994). See Lockett, 614 So.2d at 902.
¶ 69. Wiley further argues that the death sentence is not proportionate in this case. This Court considered the proportionality of Wiley's death sentence on direct appeal, and found thatconsidering the crime and the defendantthe imposition of the death penalty in this case was proportionate. Wiley VI, 691 So.2d at 967. The issue is, therefore, res adjudicata and without merit. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (1994). See Lockett, 614 So.2d at 902.
¶ 70. Wiley's final argument is that the cumulative error in this case requires reversal. This Court has held that the cumulative effect of errors in the trial court may warrant reversal even when the instances taken separately do not. Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1273 (Miss. 1995). See, e.g., Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 667 (Miss.1996); Russell v. State, 607 So.2d 1107, 1117 (Miss.1992); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 142 (Miss.1991). ¶ 71. The question under the cumulative error rule, is whether the defendant has been denied his substantial right to a fair trial. See Hansen, 592 So.2d at 142. There never has been a perfect trial. As long as humans conduct and participate in trial of lawsuits, there will not be such a trial. This Court has said many times that a defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, only to a fair trial. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 629-30 (Miss.1995). ¶ 72. Moreover, the issues raised in Wiley's PCR motion are without merit. Where there is no reversible error in any part, ... there is no reversible error to the whole. McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 136 (Miss.1986).