Opinion ID: 2638116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Judicial Misconduct: Disparaging Remarks About Defense Counsel

Text: Defendant contends the trial court overstepped the bounds of impartiality by disparaging defense counsel in front of the jury, thereby depriving defendant of his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial judge, due process, and a reliable determination of penalty. We disagree; in the context of the entire trial, the remarks complained of could not reasonably have been understood as reflecting bias against the defense. Defendant's contention rests on four remarks by the trial court in the course of the two-month-long jury trial: 1. During the prosecution guilt phase case-in-chief, the court called a slightly early end to a day's testimony because no other witnesses were available. Court and counsel then discussed the next day's start time before excusing the jury: The Court: Okay. Well, we should not punish the attorneys for being efficient, so we'll just all stop for the day. It's only 15 minutes earlier than we would stop normally. Counsel, I think that we can just start at nine o'clock tomorrow. We have nothing we need to discuss before we proceed tomorrow? Mr. Sickels [the prosecutor]: Don't believe so. Mrs. Leonard [defense counsel]: Possibly. The Court: That means Ms. Leonard is going to go back to her office tonight and dream something up. Mrs. Leonard: Oh, that's not quite what I mean, your honor. There may be something Mr. Liss [defense counsel]: Our objections are based on facts, not dreams. The Court: My question is, do you think we should bring the jury in at 9:15? Mrs. Leonard: I think that's a good idea, your honor, 9:15. The Court: Do you think we'll be more than 15 minutes? Mrs. Leonard: I hope not. 2. During the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense guilt phase expert, defense counsel objected to the form of a question: Mr. Liss: Your honor, I am going to object at this point as being not only hearsay, but improper questioning, and that it appears at this point just [to] be wholesale reading of a report, and I would like to be heard at side-bar. The Court: Do you want to be heard at side-bar? Mr. Liss: Yes, your honor. The Court: Well, I think the objection will be overruled. I mean, we heard this objection just the other way yesterday and I ruled in your favor. This is all admissible, and you argued it was admissible yesterday and I agreed with you. Mr. Liss: Perhaps I am looking for questions, but I will leave it at that. The Court: Overruled. 3. During the same cross-examination, the prosecutor moved to strike a response as nonresponsive. The following discussion ensued: The Court: What was yourwhy don't you restate your question? Mr. Liss: Your honor, I'd ask that his question be reread. And this is responsive to it. The Court: I don't think you make friends with the court reporter when you do that It's very hard for her to dig that out. Do you remember your question, or do I need toif you don't, I'll have it reread. 4. At the end of penalty phase instructions, court and counsel discussed a number of issues during a recess. When the jury was brought back in, the court apologized for the delay, saying: The attorneys managed to find a half dozen things to fight about during the recess. A trial court commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The court's comments here did not create that impression. [7] Regarding the court's first challenged comment, whether it was intended humorously (as the Attorney General argues) or would have been so understood by the jury is not entirely clear from the transcript. The trial record reflects a generally cordial relationship between the court and all counsel and includes a number of occasions on which the court and counsel made jokes or kidded one another. Defendant observes that such joking was mainly reserved for proceedings outside the jury's presence, as is of course appropriate, but we note the court later made an ironic comment very similar to the first remark complained of, but referring to the attorneys generally, in the jury's presence: The Court: ... Mr. [K.], did you have a question? Juror [K.]: Your honor said nine o'clock? The Court: Are you saying that with a bit of skepticism because we never really start at nine? Juror [K]: Wasn't sure. I am sorry, your honor. The Court: I suggest nine o'clock. It wouldn't surprise me, but what the attorneys will think up something to talk about between now and Monday, maybe I can get them to come in here Friday and talk about it if that's necessary. Hopefully we'll start just soon after nine o'clock. (Italics added.) This suggests the earlier remark, too, was meant, and would reasonably have been taken, not as a serious attack on defense counsel's integrity but simply as an ironic way of conveying to the jury the court's uncertainty about the trial schedule. Both remarks suggest an attempt to cajole the jurors into patience with the proceedings partly by sardonically casting responsibility for delays on the attorneys. By the same token, the court made clear to the jurors that it was not seriously criticizing the lawyers; indeed, immediately before making the just quoted remark, the court expressly praised the attorneys' efficiency: The Court: ... We should actually be quite grateful that the attorneys, all of them, have gotten right to the point and haven't wasted a lot of time in their questioning. I've certainly seen the opposite of that during my years as a judge, so I suspect that we are better off with attorneys like these attorneys who get right to the point. In this context, we consider it unlikely that the first remark complained of was either intended or understood as a serious attack on the integrity of Defense Counsel Leonard. The second remark complained of, unlike the first, was clearly meant seriously, and it could, as defendant argues, have been understood by jurors as a suggestion that defense counsel were arguing out of both sides of their mouths, an implied criticism that would better be made out of the jurors' presence. In the setting of a protracted trial, however, the court's momentary and isolated expression of irritation with defense counsel did not indicate bias or suggest to the jury that the court was allying itself with the prosecution. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The trial court also occasionally expressed annoyance at the prosecutor, including one occasion on which the prosecutor's request to approach the bench led to an extended sidebar discussion, after which the court called a recess and told the jury the court was really not happy with these things coming up at the spur of the moment while the jury is sitting here that the court has not been advised of in advance. The third remark complained of was not critical of defense counsel; the court merely stated its reason for preferring that the question be re-asked rather than read from the reporter's notes. The fourth comment, that [t]he attorneys managed to find a half dozen things to fight about during the recess, did not expressly or impliedly criticize the defense. Even if meant or understood seriously, the comment was aimed at the attorneys generally. Neither of these remarks suggests bias or gives the impression of a judicial alignment with the prosecution. We conclude the court's comments did not infringe on defendant's rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 1, sections 15 to 17 of the California Constitution.