Opinion ID: 167914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: T im eliness

Text: The district court denied Plaintiffs’ Second Renewed M otion by order entered on September 8, 2004. Plaintiffs assert that their application filed on September 22, 2004, was tim ely because it was filed within 10 days of the district court’s disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (com putation of time); Beck v. Boeing Co., 320 F.3d 1021, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2003) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) governs the tim eliness of applications under Rule 23(f)). The validity of that assertion depends on whether the district court’s denial was “an order . . . granting or denying class action certification.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Boeing contends that the district court’s order was sim ply a refusal to reconsider its prior rulings 1 W e are among several circuits that have treated the timeliness requirement as jurisdictional. See, e.g., Delta Airlines v. Butler, 383 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam ) (“Because the petition was not filed within the mandated time period, we dism issed for lack of jurisdiction.”); M cNamara v. Felderhof, 410 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Unless som e exception applies, we lack appellate jurisdiction to entertain the [untim ely] petition.”). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Eberhart v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406 (2005), however, casts doubt on the notion that the timeliness of notices of appeal generally is jurisdictional, see In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1166 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006), and could have similar implications for Rule 23(f), see Coco v. Incorporated Village of Belle Terre, 448 F.3d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Even if it is not jurisdictional, however, it is unquestionably “mandatory” if properly raised by the opposing party, as was the case here. Because we must dismiss the appeal in either event, we need not analyze Eberhart’s impact on Rule 23(f). -11- denying certification to the Salaried Subclass and not itself an order appealable under Rule 23(f). W e agree with Boeing. In a sense, an order denying a m otion to reconsider a decision on class certification is an “order . . . granting or denying class action certification.” But that cannot be the sense in which the term is used in Rule 23(f), because that construction of the term would underm ine the 10-day tim e lim it for filing an application for review . One who failed to file an application in time could sim ply file a m otion to reconsider; and when that is denied, the 10-day period would restart. See Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Accepting an appeal from such a decision [leaving the class definition in place] would abandon the tim e lim it for all practical purposes. That step would be both unauthorized and imprudent.”); cf. M cNamara, 410 F.3d at 281 (“[T]o hold that— no m atter how styled— a motion under Rule 23(c) [to alter or amend a class-certification decision] is always distinct from a m otion to reconsider w ould allow a party to subvert the ten-day tim e lim it prescribed in Rule 23(f).”). One might argue, as Plaintiffs do, that this reasoning does not apply when the m otion for reconsideration raises new argum ents, based on new developm ents in the case. But the need to avoid causing delay and disruption to the district court proceedings cautions against an appellate court’s engaging in detailed inspection and analysis of the record to determ ine how new an argum ent is and whether the underlying evidence was reasonably available when certification was -12- originally litigated. M oreover, there can be little doubt that review of an order denying a motion for reconsideration would have to be lim ited to the new elements in the motion— the original order regarding certification m ust be presum ed correct, or there would be a clear end run around the 10-day lim it. Yet given the multifactor analysis that courts m ust apply in deciding the propriety of class certification, such a lim ited review would often require contorted thinking that exceeds the capacities of even appellate courts. How can an appellate court say that one particular new factor would require a different result regardless of how the district court weighed the factors presented originally? In stating that the new factor required a different result, the appellate court m ust engage in weighing the factors weighed by the district court in its original ruling but cannot know precisely how much weight the district court granted to each. In particular, what if the district court clearly erred in giving dispositive weight to one factor? How is the appellate court to ignore such error (in keeping with the presum ption that the original decision was correct) even when it addresses a motion for reconsideration that raises only a rather inconsequential new factor? To be sure, we do review m otions to reconsider in certain circumstances, such as denials of m otions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). But the predicate for that review— for exam ple, fraud or newly discovered evidence— is largely collateral to the m erits of the decision. W e are not inclined to adopt a construction of Rule 23(f) that would regularly require m ental gym nastics just for the purpose of giving litigants -13- a second bite at the interlocutory-appellate-review apple. W e note that the very absence of a prom pt appeal by the party aggrieved by the decision on certification suggests that the concerns justifying Rule 23(f) are, at the least, less significant in the particular case. If the decision whether or not to certify the class w as truly outcome determ inative, one would not expect the losing party to continue the litigation for m onths before launching a new challenge to the ruling. Any value in perm itting a belated interlocutory appeal is overridden by the desirability of the district court’s proceeding expeditiously. W e recognize that Rule 23(c)(1)(C) perm its the district court to alter or amend a certification decision. And parties m ay suggest such changes as the factual record and legal theories develop. All we are saying is that there can be no Rule 23(f) appeal from the denial of such a suggestion. An order that leaves class-action status unchanged from what was determ ined by a prior order is not an order “granting or denying class action certification.” Of course, when the district court accepts a suggestion and the certification decision is changed, the new order, to the extent it m odifies the prior order, is indeed such an order and an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f) is perm itted. See G ary, 188 F.3d at 893 (“[I]f in response to a belated m otion for reconsideration the judge m aterially alters the decision, then the party aggrieved by the alteration m ay appeal within the normal time.”). -14- In addition, we note the special case of m otions to reconsider filed within 10 days of the district court’s certification decision. The Supreme Court has long recognized that m otions to reconsider toll the tim e for appeal when they are filed within the tim e for filing a notice of appeal. See United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 & n.3 (1976) (“[T]he consistent practice in civil and crim inal cases alike has been to treat tim ely petitions for rehearing as rendering the original judgm ent nonfinal for purposes of appeal for as long as the petition is pending.”). This recognition stems from the clear advantage of providing the district court an opportunity to correct its own error, as long as doing so does not underm ine the time limit for pursuing an appeal. W e assum e, without having to decide in this case, that such m otions to reconsider w ould also toll the tim e lim it in Rule 23(f). See, e.g., M cNam ara, 410 F.3d at 281 (recognizing the tolling effect of a timely m otion to reconsider in the R ule 23(f) context). The district court first denied certification of the Salaried Subclass’s disparate-treatm ent claim on April 25, 2003. Plaintiffs did not exercise their right to file a Rule 23(f) petition within 10 days of that order. The district court’s determ ination as to that claim has not changed in all the subsequent proceedings, so there has not been any other order “granting or denying class action certification” that would trigger another period for seeking interlocutory appeal. As for class certification of the Salaried Subclass’s disparate-im pact claim , the district court initially certified the class in its April 25, 2003, order, which Boeing -15- did not appeal. On February 24, 2004, however, it granted Boeing’s m otion to decertify. At that juncture Plaintiffs could have sought our review under Rule 23(f), but they did not do so. Despite two attem pts to have the district court recertify that claim , in both Plaintiffs’ First Renewed M otion and their Second Renewed M otion, the district court’s ruling on certification has not changed again. Therefore, neither of the orders denying those motions was an order granting or denying certification and neither triggered a new period for filing a Rule 23(f) application. Plaintiffs’ Rule 23(f) application on September 22, 2004, m ust be dism issed as an untim ely attempt to have us review the court’s orders of April 25, 2003, and February 24, 2004. Any appeal of those certification decisions m ust await final judgm ent. See G ary, 188 F.3d at 892.