Opinion ID: 1478029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Testimony Relating to Battered Woman's Syndrome[9]

Text: Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in permitting the government's expert witness, Dr. Lorraine Chase, to testify about patterns in behavior in domestic violence. The court denied appellant's pre-trial motion to exclude Dr. Chase's testimony about battered woman's syndrome, concluding that the testimony was admissible to explain why Ms. Hawkins continued to have contact with appellant even after he assaulted her on July 9, 2003. [10] At the beginning of Dr. Chase's testimony, the trial judge explained to the jury that Dr. Chase would testify as an expert concerning domestic violence and the dynamics of abusive relationships, but that she would not offer an opinion, nor [would] she [be] permitted under the rules of evidence, to offer an opinion on whether Barbara Hawkins is a victim of domestic violence[,] nor [would] she offer an opinion as to whether Mr. Reginald Earl has engaged in any acts of domestic violence. Dr. Chase testified in general terms to common tactics used by abusive partners to exercise power and control, and how those tactics create a cycle in which the victims do not leave the abusers because they believe that they are somehow responsible for the abuse they receive. She did not make any specific reference to the complainant or appellant, or to their relationship. [T]he evaluation and weighing of evidence for relevance and potential prejudice is quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and we owe a great degree of deference to its decision. Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1095 (D.C.1996) (en banc). Particularly where expert testimony is concerned, reversals on this ground do not abound. ( Gregory ) Nixon, 728 A.2d at 594. This court and courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the relevance of expert testimony relating to battered woman's syndrome in certain contexts, for example, to bolster the credibility of the complainant where she has been impeached by her recantation of her allegation of abuse, see, e.g., id. at 587, 590-92, or to establish the reasonableness of a complainant's fear in a case where the complainant claims self-defense to a charge of violence against her abuser, see, e.g., State v. Wyatt, 198 W.Va. 530, 482 S.E.2d 147, 158 (1996). Appellant argues that Dr. Chase's testimony about patterns in abusive relationships and the domestic violence that can occur in those relationships combined with the evidence of the tumultuous relationship between appellant and Ms. Hawkins created the impression that she suffered from the syndrome because she had been battered by appellant. As a result, according to appellant, the jury was likely to have viewed Dr. Chase's testimony as akin to character evidence establishing appellant's predisposition to domestic violence and used the testimony to establish that appellant did, in fact, assault Ms. Hawkins on the two days in question. See, e.g., Kenyon v. State, 96 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo.2004) (When battered-woman-syndrome testimony is raised by the State in its case-in-chief and relates to a defendant, . . . the testimony draws close to commenting directly on what likely happened and looks like character evidence after all. Evidence concerning a defendant's involvement demands close scrutiny under the character evidence rules. This is so even if reference to the defendant may only be inferred from the testimony.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We conclude that it was within the trial judge's discretion to admit Dr. Chase's testimony. With respect to the July 9 assault, Ms. Hawkins lied to the police, saying that her assailant was Jermaine Wilson. She also equivocated as to whether she had jumped (albeit out of fear of being killed) or been pushed. Dr. Chase testified that battered women are generally not inclined to report their abusers to the authorities because of the shame and embarrassment of reporting, the fact that they still care for their abusers, and fear of reprisal. Ms. Hawkins testified that she both loved and feared appellant. The expert testimony, therefore, assisted the jury in understanding why Ms. Hawkins did not immediately identify appellant as her assailant. See People v. Morgan, 58 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 772, 775 (Cal.Ct.App. 1997) (noting that expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome could help explain [the victim's] delay in reporting the abuse and her last-minute recantation of the charges) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It also aided the jury in assessing Ms. Hawkins's credibility, given her misrepresentations to the police. People v. Brown, 33 Cal.4th 892, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574, 583 (2004) (When the trial testimony of an alleged victim of domestic violence is inconsistent with what the victim had earlier told the police, the jurors may well assume that the victim is an untruthful or unreliable witness.). Moreover, we have also stated that where the judge instructs the jury that the expert testimony concerning battered woman's syndrome is not evidence that the defendant is predisposed to violence or evidence that the defendant committed any particular act of violence, the instruction dispel[s] any fear of unfair prejudice. ( Gregory ) Nixon, 728 A.2d at 595 (quoting People v. Christel, 449 Mich. 578, 537 N.W.2d 194, 201 n. 24 (1995)). Here, the limiting instruction made clear that Dr. Chase's testimony was not evidence that appellant had, in fact, committed either one of the assaults for which he was tried, or that he was predisposed to domestic violence. And at the end of trial, the judge instructed that the expert's testimony was presented to provide [the jury] with information about the ranges of behavior exhibited by victims of domestic violence and, therefore, to help [the jurors] in explaining certain kinds of conduct by victims of domestic violence. There being nothing in the record to suggest otherwise, we presume that the jury followed those instructions. See Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1224 (D.C.1992) (en banc). Accordingly, we reject appellant's argument that the expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome was an end-run around the prohibition against evidence of a propensity for violence.