Opinion ID: 4518276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Traditional Equity Jurisprudence

Text: Equity exists to address specific circumstances and not to create blanket, prospective rules or applications. See McQuiddy, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 19 (“There is no artificial rule on such a subject, but each case as it arises must be determined by its own particular circumstances.”). As put in Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, because “[i]t is impossible that any code, however minute and particular, should embrace or provide for the infinite variety of human affairs, or should furnish rules applicable to all of them,” equity exists in “every rational system of jurisprudence” to address the cases in “which the antecedent rules cannot be applied without injustice, or to which they cannot be applied at all.” 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 6–7 (13th ed. 1886); see also The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he great and primary use of a court of equity is to give 14 SMITH V. DAVIS relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.”). Because equity requires a court to deal with the case before it, complete with its unique circumstances and characteristics, courts must take a flexible approach in applying equitable principles. The Supreme Court has been clear in this requirement, stating “exercise of a court’s equity powers . . . . must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964). And when applying equitable tolling to the AEDPA statute of limitations in Holland, the Supreme Court stated “[t]he ‘flexibility’ inherent in ‘equitable procedure’ enables courts ‘to meet new situations [that] demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct . . . particular injustices.’” 560 U.S. at 650 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944)). But despite the flexibility that equity requires, “courts of equity must be governed by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (citation omitted). As it applies to equitable tolling, the Supreme Court has been clear that one such rule that limits a court’s equitable powers is that “a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2016) (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 649). The first element, requiring diligence on the part of the litigant, flows from the traditional notion that “[c]ourts of [e]quity do not sit for the purpose of relieving parties, under ordinary circumstances, who refuse to exercise a reasonable diligence or discretion.” 1 Joseph SMITH V. DAVIS 15 Story, supra, at 226. Put differently, “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” 1 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in The United States of America 393 (1881); see also Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (“Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights.” (quoting McQuiddy, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 19)). The second element comes from the factspecific inquiry equity demands and the flexible remedies that it provides. For if an extraordinary circumstance is not the cause of a litigant’s untimely filing, then there is nothing for equity to address. C. Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Precedent The stop-clock method of equitable tolling Smith seeks runs counter to the traditional notion that “[c]ourts take a flexible, fact-specific approach to equitable tolling.” Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 885. But he makes two arguments in favor of the stop-clock approach. First, he claims that applying the stopclock approach is consistent with the expressed intent of Congress. And second, he claims that the Supreme Court has already decided that the stop-clock approach applies. We disagree with both points and address them in turn.
In asking us to grant him an additional 66 days to file his habeas petition, the core of Smith’s argument is that because Congress established a one-year statute of limitations in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Congress intended for him to have 365 days, free of any impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance, to draft and file his petition after his conviction was final. Our dissenting colleagues also advance this as their principal disagreement with the result we reach today. Smith urges that the stop-clock remedy he 16 SMITH V. DAVIS seeks is merely a fulfillment of obvious congressional intent. But statutes of limitations are not that simple, and such congressional intent is not so obvious. As the Supreme Court stated in a case relied on heavily by the dissent, “[s]tatutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants.” Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). The Supreme Court has also more recently described statutes of limitations in general as serving the “basic policies of . . . repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). And more specifically, the Supreme Court has found “[t]he AEDPA statute of limitation promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time.” Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006) (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000)). At their core, “[s]tatutes of limitations require plaintiffs to pursue diligent prosecution of known claims,” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims,” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008). Requiring a petitioner who files after the deadline imposed by a statute of limitations has expired to show he has been diligently pursuing his rights up until the time he did file his petition does not ignore congressional intent—it furthers it. The dissent’s contention that the purpose of AEDPA’s statute of limitations is solely (or primarily) to protect the time available for the petitioner to file is not one SMITH V. DAVIS 17 of the purposes for the statute of limitations the Supreme Court recognized in Day, see 547 U.S. at 205–06, and ignores the fact that “AEDPA seeks to eliminate delays in the federal habeas review process,” Holland, 560 U.S. at 648. As the Supreme Court has held, AEDPA’s goal of elimination of delays does not preclude the operation of equitable tolling, but it does refute the notion that the purpose of the limitations period is to protect petitioners alone. In fact, though we can speculate that Congress considered the needs of habeas petitioners as a part of its calculation before enacting a one-year statute of limitations, all we may say for certain is that Congress intended for states to have an affirmative defense against habeas petitions filed more than one year after a conviction became final. See Day, 547 U.S. at 205. The dissent would ignore Supreme Court cases describing statutes of limitations as primarily protecting defendants—and in the habeas context as ensuring judicial efficiency and achieving finality for state judgments within a reasonable time—and elevate an ancillary aim of the statute of limitations to be its only one. On the other hand, requiring reasonable diligence through to the moment of filing protects the rights of all parties without unnecessarily sacrificing one to the other. Petitioners are able to file habeas petitions after the limitations period has expired and still have their claims evaluated on the merits—provided they were reasonably diligent in using their available time and showed that an extraordinary circumstance prevented them from filing within the one-year limitations period. At the same time, states receive a measure of finality and are not required to defend against petitions filed after the deadline by petitioners who have failed to pursue reasonably diligent prosecution of their claims. 18 SMITH V. DAVIS Though we think our rule best serves the animating purposes of statutes of limitations, we also dispute the notion that equitable tolling, practiced consistent with governing precedent, could undermine the intent of a statute. This is because as the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress legislates against the backdrop of the equitable powers of courts and knows of the rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling for statutes of limitations. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). In statutes like AEDPA, where Congress has not acted to preclude equitable tolling, it intended for equitable tolling to apply and to be employed consistent with standard equitable concepts and governing precedent. That is what we do today. Insofar as Smith believes Congress’s inclusion of conditions which reset the start of the one-year limitations period, or the statutory tolling provision in AEDPA, which both work to the petitioner’s benefit, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D), (d)(2), evinces an intent by Congress to alter the traditional way equitable tolling applies in AEDPA and to make its application more favorable to him, he is mistaken. Equitable tolling operates apart from any statutory provision. The authority by which courts equitably toll statutes of limitations comes not from any statute but instead from our exercise of “[t]he judicial Power . . . extend[ing] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. When courts apply equitable tolling to a statute of limitations, they are exercising that independent judicial power, consistent with governing law and precedent. This is distinct from any efforts to interpret a statute or to effect congressional intent behind statutory language. SMITH V. DAVIS 19
Smith’s second argument, also favored by the dissent, that the stop-clock approach to equitable tolling is required by Supreme Court precedent, fares no better. We find the proper application of precedent to favor the flexible, circumstance-specific approach we adopt today. In Pace, the Supreme Court addressed equitable tolling for the first time as it related to the AEDPA statute of limitations. See 544 U.S. at 418 n.8. At issue was whether the statute of limitations was tolled while the petitioner’s untimely, and ultimately procedurally barred, petition for post-conviction relief was pending in state court. Id. at 410. Though the case dealt primarily with whether AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), applied in these circumstances, after it was determined the petitioner was ineligible for statutory tolling, his claim for equitable tolling was also addressed. See id. at 418. In addressing the merits of the equitable tolling claim, the Court stated that to be eligible for equitable tolling the petitioner was required to show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Id. The Court held that even if it assumed the pendency of the untimely state court petition “satisfied the extraordinary circumstance test,” equitable tolling was nevertheless unavailable because the petitioner had not shown “the requisite diligence.” Id. To determine whether the petitioner “has been pursuing his rights diligently,” the Supreme Court evaluated the petitioner’s diligence both before and after the 20 SMITH V. DAVIS existence of the “extraordinary circumstance” and found it wanting. 3 See id. at 418–19. Pace arose in unique circumstances because the state court conviction became final nearly four years before AEDPA’s statute of limitations was enacted. However, after the time period of AEDPA’s statute of limitations had begun to run in 1996, the petitioner waited nearly seven months before filing his state court post-conviction relief application (the pendency of which was assumed to be an “extraordinary circumstance”), and once that was denied, waited an additional five months to file for habeas relief in federal court. Id. at 419. In rejecting Pace’s arguments that he was entitled to equitable tolling, the Supreme Court emphasized Pace’s lack of diligence in all time frames, right up to Pace filing his federal habeas petition. Id. (“Had petitioner advanced his claims within a reasonable time of their availability, he would not now be facing any time problem, state or federal. And not only did petitioner sit on his rights for years before he filed his [state post-conviction relief] petition, but he also sat on them for five more months after 3 The Supreme Court’s phrasing of the first element required for equitable tolling is telling. The Court required Pace to demonstrate that he “has been pursuing his rights diligently”—not that he “pursued,” “had pursued,” or “has pursued” his rights diligently. This specific phrasing indicates a need for a petitioner to show his diligence continued up through the point of filing his habeas petition in federal court. See The Chicago Manual of Style ¶¶ 5.132, 5.135 (17th ed. 2017). Compare this to the second element, which is phrased in the simple past tense—“some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way”—and it is clear the Supreme Court’s wording is intentional. Coupled with the Court’s application of the rule for equitable tolling, which evaluated the petitioner’s diligence before and after the extraordinary circumstance, and through the date he filed his federal habeas petition, there is no doubt that diligence is required through the period up to the actual filing of the petition to merit equitable tolling. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 419. SMITH V. DAVIS 21 his [state] proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal court.”) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In addition to laying the foundation for future AEDPA equitable tolling decisions, a key aspect of Pace is that the Supreme Court actually had an opportunity to adopt the stopclock rule Smith now seeks but refused to do so. Had the Supreme Court applied the stop-clock approach, the outcome in Pace would have been reversed, and the federal petition would have been timely filed, as it was indeed filed on the 363rd “untolled” day of the limitations period, under the stop-clock approach. 4 But the Supreme Court did not apply the stop-clock approach and evaluate only Pace’s diligence in remedying his extraordinary circumstance. The Court evaluated Pace’s diligence in all time periods, including those when he was free from impediments to preparing and filing his habeas petition that had been caused by any extraordinary circumstance. The Court found his “lack of diligence precludes equity’s operation.” Id. Bound 4 Pace pleaded guilty to second degree murder in Pennsylvania state court in February 1986, and in September 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his appeal. AEDPA was passed on April 24, 1996, and the newly imposed statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 1996. Pace filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Pennsylvania courts on November 27, 1996, which was pending for 974 days, and was finally denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on July 29, 1999. Pace then filed a habeas petition in federal district court on December 24, 1999, which was 1337 days after the statute of limitations began to run. Subtracting the 974 days the state petition for post-conviction relief was pending from the time it took Pace to file a federal habeas petition after AEDPA was enacted left potentially 363 “untolled” days had the Supreme Court chosen to adopt the stop-clock approach and excuse Pace’s lack of diligence. See 544 U.S. at 410–11. As noted, the Court did not adopt the stop-clock approach; it noted Pace’s lack of diligence in filing and affirmed the denial of habeas as untimely. 22 SMITH V. DAVIS as we are by the decisions of the Supreme Court, we follow this same approach today. The dissent argues that we misunderstand Pace and that despite the Supreme Court’s explicit evaluation of Pace’s lack of diligence in preparing and filing his federal habeas petition both before and after his state petition was denied, such evaluation of his diligence was unnecessary to the decision, if it was even considered at all. The dissent believes that the Supreme Court put little or no weight on Pace’s lack of diligence while the limitations period was expiring, including the seven months before he filed his state petition for post-conviction relief and the five months following the rejection of the state petition. See Dissent at 54 (“Essentially, the Court held that laches already barred Pace’s claim when AEDPA was enacted, so he was entitled to no additional consideration after he was accorded an additional year.”). This is a strange way to read a passage in a Supreme Court opinion that highlighted this exact lack of diligence. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (“[Pace] also sat on [his rights] for five more months after his [state] proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal court.”) (emphasis in original). Further, the dissent’s supposition that laches would have barred Pace’s habeas petition (in the preAEDPA regime) simply because it was filed four years after his conviction was final finds no support in caselaw. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (“[T]here is no statute of limitations governing federal habeas, and the only laches recognized is that which affects the State's ability to defend against the claims raised on habeas.”) (emphasis added); see also Day, 547 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We repeatedly asserted [before AEDPA] that the passage of time alone could not extinguish the habeas corpus rights of a person subject to unconstitutional incarceration.”). Simply put, the dissent’s reading of Pace is too narrow, and SMITH V. DAVIS 23 we do not adopt such a limited view of the only Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court conclusively determined a habeas petitioner’s eligibility for equitable tolling. It is clear to us that the Court did factor Pace’s lack of diligence after the statute of limitations was enacted, including his failure to pursue his rights diligently after the extraordinary circumstance abated, into its decision to deny him equitable tolling—a holding as to which no justice dissented. What relative importance this held when combined with Pace’s years-long pre-AEDPA delay, and his additional seven month delay after the statute was enacted, we cannot say with certainty, but we know it was important enough for the Court to mention and consider in its opinion. But whatever relative weight Pace’s various periods of nondiligence carried, we know for sure that the Supreme Court did not limit its diligence analysis, as the dissent would have us do, to the question in Socop-Gonzalez, whether Pace had been diligent in bringing about the end of his extraordinary circumstance. See 272 F.3d at 1196. If it had, its decision would have reversed, rather than affirmed, the judgment which denied the writ. The Supreme Court next considered equitable tolling for habeas petitions in Holland, where it took an additional step that weighs against the application of the stop-clock approach here. In Holland, the Court added an explicit causation requirement to the rule for equitable tolling previously stated in Pace. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (“[A] ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” (emphasis added) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418)). As we have previously 24 SMITH V. DAVIS described it, whether an impediment caused by extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing is a “causation question” that requires courts to evaluate a petitioner’s diligence in all time periods—before, during, and after the existence of an “extraordinary circumstance”—to determine whether the extraordinary circumstance actually did prevent timely filing. See Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 892. Though the causation requirement announced in Holland modified the extraordinary circumstance prong of the test, it nevertheless speaks to the diligence required by a petitioner seeking equitable tolling. This is because the Supreme Court held that equitable tolling is not available whenever there is an extraordinary circumstance that impaired the litigant for some portion of the limitations period. It may apply only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner from filing before the deadline expired. The only way for a court to evaluate whether an extraordinary circumstance caused the untimely filing is to examine and assess the facts of the case to determine whether a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence could have filed his claim, despite the extraordinary circumstance, before the limitations period expired. This stands in direct contrast to the position we adopted in Socop-Gonzalez. See 272 F.3d at 1194. 5 The strongest argument Smith can make against the weight of this precedent is based on the earlier case of Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Company, 380 U.S. 424 (1965), which we cited in Socop-Gonzalez when 5 We also note that, in Holland, as it had before in Pace, the Supreme Court evaluated the petitioner’s diligence after the extraordinary circumstance was dispelled and did not apply a rigid stop-clock rule, though admittedly, this did not impact the outcome of the case. See 560 U.S. at 653. SMITH V. DAVIS 25 adopting a stop-clock approach to equitable tolling, see 272 F.3d at 1195–96. In Burnett a plaintiff timely filed a Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) personal injury claim against his employer in state court, seeking compensation under the federal law. The federal claim was subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Ultimately, the state court dismissed the claim for improper venue under state law, and the plaintiff refiled in federal court eight days later but after the statute of limitations had expired. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 424– 25. Addressing the situation, the Supreme Court equitably tolled the statute of limitations and allowed the plaintiff’s suit to proceed in federal court. Id. at 434–35. The Supreme Court commented on the plaintiff’s diligence in bringing the claim in state court and treated that diligence as a prerequisite for equitable tolling. See id. at 429 (“Petitioner here did not sleep on his rights . . . .”). The Court also noted the plaintiff’s diligence in refiling his claim in federal court eight days after his state court suit was dismissed, but this diligence notwithstanding, the Court was clear that it was tolling the limitations period for the entire period the state court claim had been pending and not merely for a “reasonable time.” Id. at 435–36. This holding allowed the plaintiff to use whatever time remained of the limitations period when he filed in state court to refile in federal court, regardless of his diligence in refiling the claim. The concurrence by Justices Douglas and Black was explicit that the decision in Burnett to extend the limitations period automatically, rather than evaluate the plaintiff’s diligence in refiling in federal court, ran counter to “long-established” and “familiar” equitable principles. See id. at 437 (Douglas, J., concurring). We acknowledge that Burnett, absent 26 SMITH V. DAVIS subsequent development by the Supreme Court, would seem to direct a stop-clock approach that allows a plaintiff who qualifies for equitable tolling through diligence to extend the limitations period automatically by the full period of time that the extraordinary circumstance existed, but Pace and Holland were such developments. Whatever the Court’s reason in Burnett for veering from “long-established” and “familiar” applications of equity, modern Supreme Court cases citing Burnett have emphasized the diligence of the petitioner in Burnett, not the stop-clock application of equitable tolling. See, e.g., Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 & n.3 (characterizing Burnett as a case “where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies”); Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 238 (1976) (quoting Burnett’s statement that “[p]etitioner here did not sleep on his rights”); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974) (describing Burnett as involving a “suit in a state court within the three-year time limitation” and being refiled in federal court “[i]mmediately after the dismissal” in state court for improper venue). And none of these cases permitted equitable tolling where a litigant had not been persistent in pursuing his rights diligently. But most tellingly, when the Supreme Court explicitly established the two required elements of equitable tolling in Pace and Holland—diligence and causation—the Court did not apply the stop-clock approach, and citations to Burnett were nowhere to be found. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 634; Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. And since Pace was decided, the only citation to Burnett by a Supreme Court majority 6 was in 6 Burnett was recently cited in a solo dissent in Rotiske v. Klemm, but the citation served to distinguish equitable tolling from the “fraudSMITH V. DAVIS 27 Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, where the Court cited Burnett, not for its stop-clock rule, but for the notion that statutes of limitations are “designed to protect defendants,” an argument counter to the one Smith and the dissent advance here. 572 U.S. 1, 14 (2014) (quoting Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428). All of this is to say that any attempt by Smith to claim Burnett dictates the outcome of this case and excuses his lack of diligence after he received his files from his attorney is unavailing. Smith’s argument ignores the fact that, even in Burnett, the plaintiff exercised diligence consistent with the rule we announce today, and more importantly, it ignores recent Supreme Court cases that have rejected the stop-clock approach and instead meticulously examined petitioner diligence when determining whether equitable tolling was warranted. Smith’s citation to the recent case of Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018), likewise does not support the outcome he seeks. For there, the Supreme Court was asked to decide the scope of the statutory tolling provision contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, and accordingly, was not asked to decide how to apply equitable tolling or determine whether the plaintiff had exercised any measure of diligence. See Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 600–01 (describing the case as “resolv[ing] the division of opinion among State Supreme Courts on the proper construction of § 1367(d)”). Artis addressed a narrow question, whether section 1367(d)—not the doctrine of equitable tolling— based discovery rule” and does not provide support to Smith’s arguments here. See 140 S. Ct. 355, 363–64 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 28 SMITH V. DAVIS functioned to suspend state periods of limitations for the entire time state claims were pending in federal court, plus thirty days, or whether the law provided merely a thirty-day grace period for a litigant to refile in state court after a federal court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim. Id. The answer to this question has nothing to do with the issue we address today. The Supreme Court’s decision that the proper way to read section 1367(d) is to suspend the running of the statute of limitations, and not merely to grant litigants a 30-day grace period, was based on a plain text reading of section 1367(d), not principles of equity. See id. at 603–04. However, in rendering its decision, the Court noted that it commonly uses the “terms ‘toll’ and ‘suspend’ interchangeably,” id. at 601–02, and that prior decisions of the Court had described equitable tolling as “paus[ing] the running of” a statute of limitations, id. at 602 (quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014)). It is based on these statements that Smith and the dissent argue Artis supports the position that Smith is entitled to equitable tolling even if he did not use the time available to him diligently after he received his appellate record from his attorney. Smith asks us to read the statement in Artis that equitable tolling may serve to pause the period of a statute of limitations as excusing him from the requirements for equitable tolling explicitly described in Pace and Holland. Artis does not support such an argument. Artis had almost nothing to say about equitable tolling, and what it did say did not alter the rule that “a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). The cases Artis cited for the idea that equitable tolling SMITH V. DAVIS 29 pauses, or suspends, a statute of limitations do not suggest otherwise and do not support an application of equitable tolling in a circumstance where a litigant has not diligently pursued his rights before, during, and after the existence of an extraordinary circumstance. 7 7 Artis characterized CTS Corp. as “describing equitable tolling as ‘a doctrine that pauses the running of, or ‘tolls’ a statute of limitations.’” Artis, 138 S. Ct. 602 (quoting CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 9). This is true, but CTS Corp. is explicit that equitable tolling applies only “when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” 573 U.S. at 9 (quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014)). Artis also quotes United States v. Ibarra, which predates Pace and Holland, but states, “[p]rinciples of equitable tolling usually dictate that when a time bar has been suspended and then begins to run again upon a later event, the time remaining on the clock is calculated by subtracting from the full limitations period whatever time ran before the clock was stopped.” 502 U.S. 1, 4, n.2 (1991) (per curiam). Ibarra addressed when the government’s 30-day window to appeal district court orders in criminal cases began and did not involve an application of equitable tolling. It thus provides little guidance on how to determine eligibility for equitable tolling, but the opinion cited a Seventh Circuit opinion by Judge Posner, Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation, 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990), as standing for the “principles of equitable tolling.” Ibarra, 502 U.S. at 4, n.2. Cada is explicit that equitable tolling is available only when the plaintiff exercises “all due diligence,” including the diligence required to “bring suit within a reasonable time after” an extraordinary circumstance ends and that the period of limitations is not tolled automatically. 920 F.2d at 451, 453; id. at 452 (“We do not think equitable tolling should bring about an automatic extension of the statute of limitations by the length of the tolling period or any other definite term. It is, after all, an equitable doctrine. It gives the plaintiff extra time if he needs it. If he doesn’t need it there is no basis for depriving the defendant of the protection of the statute of limitations.” (citation omitted)); see also Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1194 (citing Cada as rejecting a stop-clock approach that ignored a lack of diligence after the removal of the extraordinary circumstance that impeded filing). 30 SMITH V. DAVIS Artis did not involve a determination of whether a litigant was eligible for tolling (equitable or otherwise) and addressed no more than the mechanical calculation of the new litigant-specific limitations deadline, after a court makes the determination that the litigant qualifies for tolling. See Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 598–99. The case sheds no light on the underlying question of which litigants are eligible for such extended limitations deadlines. In cases involving equitable tolling, Pace and Holland still govern that inquiry. At most, the effect of Artis’s observation that equitable tolling may serve to “pause[] the running of . . . a statute of limitations,” id. at 602, was to confirm that the maximum additional time, beyond the period of limitations, available to a litigant otherwise eligible for equitable tolling, is equal to the amount of time that the extraordinary circumstance that impeded timely filing existed. As far as we know, this was not in dispute. D. The Proper Rule of Equitable Tolling of Statutes of Limitations In view of the historic practice of courts of equity and modern Supreme Court precedent governing equitable tolling, we make two related holdings. First, for a litigant to demonstrate “he has been pursuing his rights diligently,” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649, and thus satisfies the first element required for equitable tolling, he must show that he has been reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights not only while an impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance existed, but before and after as well, up to the time of filing his claim in federal court. This rule is in accord with the traditional concept that equity requires diligence and is also consistent with recent Supreme Court practice. Though we today reject the stop-clock approach we took in Socop-Gonzalez for evaluating when a petitioner must be SMITH V. DAVIS 31 diligent, 8 this does not alter what it means for a petitioner to exercise diligence. On that issue the rule remains that “[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is ‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (citations omitted). In determining whether reasonable diligence was exercised courts shall “consider the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution in light of his or her particular circumstances,” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011), and be “guided by ‘decisions made in other similar cases . . . with awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case.’” Fue, 842 F.3d at 654 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 650). What we make clear is that it is not enough for a petitioner seeking an exercise of equitable tolling to attempt diligently to remedy his extraordinary circumstances; when 8 As mentioned previously, Socop-Gonzalez rested its decision to apply equitable tolling in a manner that ignored a litigant’s diligence after remedying an extraordinary circumstance on three factors: (1) congressional intent; (2) Supreme Court precedent; and (3) ease of administration. 272 F.3d at 1195. Today we explicitly reject the first two rationales and hold that diligence only up to the point of the removal of the impediment caused by the extraordinary circumstances is not enough to merit equitable tolling. In 2001, we did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pace and Holland, which undermine the continued validity of the first two reasons we gave for adopting the stopclock approach. This leaves just the third rationale: ease of administration. Standing alone, whether the stop-clock approach is easier to administer than the rule we announce today is debatable but ultimately of no consequence. Pace and Holland illustrate that in application of the extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling, individual, and perhaps painstaking, analysis of the specific case overcomes considerations of convenience. If ease of administration is indeed a better policy, it is one for Congress, not the courts, to adopt. But we have no doubt that district courts will be able to apply equitable tolling consistent with the traditional concepts of equity, Supreme Court precedent, and the rule we announce today. 32 SMITH V. DAVIS free from the extraordinary circumstance, he must also be diligent in actively pursuing his rights. 9 9 Contrary to the belief of the dissent we make no holding “that 364 days is always too long a period within which to prepare a federal habeas petition.” Dissent at 65. Nor do we announce a rule that any time long stretches of time pass without a petitioner acting on a habeas petition is it necessarily a situation where a petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence. See Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a petitioner’s wait of 21 months before seeking an update on his petition from a state court was an exercise of reasonable diligence). The dissent’s characterization of our court’s application of equitable tolling as based on such arbitrary considerations as “the length of each chancellor’s foot,” Dissent at 41, not only disserves our judiciary, it ignores our safeguard against such arbitrariness: our standard of review in habeas cases is de novo. See ante at 8–9. Such characterization is particularly inept here where the magistrate judge carefully weighed the evidence and fully explained her decision. We also find the dissent’s criticism that today’s decision provides no guidance for future district courts or three-judge panels to decide cases involving requests for equitable tolling misplaced. As an initial matter, our precedents, Socop-Gonzalez notwithstanding, already require courts to go through the general diligence analysis we outline today. See Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 892. And as discussed previously, one of the benefits of equitable doctrines is that they allow courts to fashion remedies tailored to the circumstances of the case, within the bounds of governing precedent. Further, the evaluation of diligence is hardly new territory for trial courts. For example, in evaluating motions for new criminal trials or relief from civil judgments, courts must regularly evaluate whether newly discovered evidence could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2); United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 2005). And finally, both our approach and the one favored by the dissent, require courts to evaluate whether a petitioner, who is imprisoned and usually filing pro se, exercised the required diligence. The difference between our rule and the dissent’s, as it relates to a court’s evaluation of a petitioner’s diligence, SMITH V. DAVIS 33 Second, and relatedly, it is only when an extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from making a timely filing that equitable tolling may be the proper remedy. This rule aligns with the flexible and fact-specific nature of equity and is directed by Supreme Court precedent. To be clear, this rule does not impose a rigid “impossibility” standard on litigants, and especially not on “pro se prisoner litigants—who have already faced an unusual obstacle beyond their control during the AEDPA limitation period.” Fue, 842 F.3d at 657 (quoting Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1236 (9th Cir. 2013)). In evaluating whether an “extraordinary circumstance stood in [a petitioner’s] way and prevented timely filing,” a court is not bound by “mechanical rules” and must decide the issue based on all the circumstances of the case before it. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649–50 (internal quotation marks omitted). E. Equitable Tolling Applied to Smith’s Petition Accepting Smith’s allegations as true, and assuming that his attorney’s failure to contact him for five months after his state appeal was denied 10 was sufficiently egregious so that it could qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance” that created an impediment to filing under the second required element for equitable tolling, we nevertheless conclude Smith has not exercised the necessary diligence to satisfy the is that one requires an evaluation of a petitioner’s diligence across the whole time involved, and the other conducts the same inquiry but for just part of the time. 10 This includes three months after the California Supreme Court denied Smith’s appeal but before the decision was finalized, and an additional 66 days after the decision was final and the time period of the statute of limitations began to run. 34 SMITH V. DAVIS first element and may not have the statute of limitations tolled to excuse his late filing. Smith’s appeal was denied by the California Supreme Court on March 12, 2014 and became final on June 10, 2014. According to Smith, he learned from his family that his appeal had been denied on May 10, 2014, and he received his appellate record from his attorney on August 15, 2014. Smith’s habeas petition was filed in the district court on August 14, 2014, 364 days after Smith received his appellate record and 65 days after the limitations period expired. Smith’s habeas petition was a 48-page document consisting of 20 pages of facts and background and 28 pages of legal analysis and argument. The petition consisted almost exclusively of items written previously by Smith’s courtappointed attorney and submitted in briefs to the California appellate courts. The facts and background were copied with only minor alterations from Smith’s brief to the California Court of Appeal. 11 And the legal argument section was taken nearly verbatim from the legal arguments previously submitted by Smith to the California Supreme Court, though Smith omitted from his federal habeas petition a challenge to jury instructions he had raised to the state supreme court. In the district court, after California moved to dismiss Smith’s petition as untimely, Smith filed an opposition brief and supporting declaration. In his opposition papers Smith argued that he was diligent in attempting to maintain contact with his attorney and in seeking the return of his case file after he learned his California Supreme Court appeal had 11 Smith’s brief to the California Supreme Court is part of the record before us, but his brief to the California Court of Appeal is not. However, we may take judicial notice of this document and do so. See Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011). SMITH V. DAVIS 35 been denied. Citing Gibbs, Smith acknowledged that our cases have evaluated “[d]iligence after an extraordinary circumstance is lifted” 12 in making determinations about equitable tolling. But Smith alleged no facts, argued no circumstances, and made no claim that he had been diligent in preparing his habeas petition after he had received his file from his attorney. The only diligence with which Smith claimed to have acted was in contacting his attorney to remedy the extraordinary circumstance that he lacked his case file. As we have now held, this was not enough. The problem with Smith’s request for equitable tolling is not simply that he took 364 days after receiving his case file to file his habeas petition. We have no trouble imaging a circumstance where a petitioner is impeded by extraordinary circumstances from working on a habeas petition for two months, but after those circumstances are dispelled, uses the next 364 days diligently, files his petition, and has the entire two months during which the extraordinary circumstances existed equitably tolled. What reasonable diligence would look like in those circumstances varies based on the specifics of the case, but in every instance reasonable diligence seemingly requires the petitioner to work on his petition with some regularity—as permitted by his circumstances—until he files it in the district court. The problem with Smith’s 12 Smith also noted that in Gibbs we stated a lack of diligence after an extraordinary circumstance ended was “not alone determinative” in deciding eligibility for equitable tolling. See 767 F.3d at 892. But despite this statement in Gibbs, Smith was on notice by other statements in Gibbs that we would consider his diligence after the extraordinary circumstance ended as part of our overall assessment to determine whether he was entitled to equitable tolling. See id. When responding to the State’s motion to dismiss, Smith had the necessary notice and incentives to claim he had diligently pursued his rights after he received his case file from his attorney, but he did not do so. 36 SMITH V. DAVIS request for equitable tolling is that when given the opportunity to explain how he had used his time diligently after receiving his file from his attorney and thus merited equitable tolling, Smith made no allegation or claim in his opposition to the motion to dismiss or his supporting declaration that he had acted diligently but had not been able to file earlier. Nor is the only trouble with Smith’s request for equitable tolling the fact that his habeas petition consisted almost exclusively of materials that had been prepared and filed in state courts years earlier. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that when a petitioner acts diligently to prepare a habeas petition, it matters not if he recycles arguments previously made by counsel to state courts. See Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 674, 688 (7th Cir. 2014). But again, the petitioner must act with diligence in preparing his petition to warrant equitable tolling; Smith has not alleged that he was diligent in this manner. In the absence of any claim by Smith that he was diligent in preparing his habeas petition after he received his case file, we fail to see how Smith exercised reasonable diligence and why, if he had, Smith would have been unable to file a habeas petition in the district court before the time period of the statute of limitations expired on June 10, 2015. The district court correctly held Smith had not met the criteria for equitable tolling and denied Smith’s habeas petition as untimely. AFFIRMED. SMITH V. DAVIS 37 BERZON, Circuit Judge, joined by THOMAS, Chief Judge, and MURGUIA, WATFORD, and HURWITZ, Circuit