Opinion ID: 222485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Defendants' action injured Plaintiffs in a way likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from further participation in constitutionally protected activity

Text: The second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim requires an adverse action by the defendant that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the kinds of protected conduct in which [the plaintiff] was engaging. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Adverse actions that may deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising protected conduct may include harassment or publicizing facts damaging to a person's reputation. Id. at 724 (citing Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396). Although much of our First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence addresses claims by public employees and prisoners, the same legal framework applies where, as here, private parties challenge governmental action. Id. at 725. As applied to this case, the operative question is whether Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that Defendants' actions would be sufficient to deter a citizen of ordinary firmness from participating in meetings or otherwise criticizing federal officials about matters relevant to Plaintiffs' political views. Id. On appeal, Plaintiffs group their allegations of Defendants' alleged unconstitutional actions, taken pursuant to the RWE Policy, into three categories: first, officially designating political opponents as dangerous `rightwing extremists,' (Pls.' Br. at 32); second, conducting intrusive and coercive investigations and surveillance to dissuade political opposition, ( id. ); and third, sharing official files and records with political opponents. ( Id. at 36.) Consistent with Iqbal, [w]e begin our analysis by identifying the [relevant] allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. In this case, those allegations are numerous. Most significantly, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege the existence of the claimed RWE policy pursuant to which they allege constitutional violations. Indeed, it is altogether unclear what constitutes the RWE Policy in light of Plaintiffs' vague and conclusory allegations and arguments on appeal. As best we can tell, the policy is alleged to be an Orwellian monster that consists of some amorphous combination of a policy, practice, procedure, and/or custom of Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1; see also Pls.' Br. at 38 (arguing that the RWE Policy takes us a step closer to 1984).) The Amended Complaint identifies no document, policy directive, or anything else that would constitute the RWE Policy. [2] As explored below, even if we assume arguendo the existence of the RWE Policy, Plaintiffs have failed to show that any actions taken pursuant to the RWE Policy would entitle them to relief. The Amended Complaint alleges that [a]ccording to the RWE Policy, Plaintiffs are `rightwing extremists.' (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Without any plausible statements as to when, where, in what, or by whom such a designation was made, this allegation amounts to a naked assertion[] devoid of further factual enhancement that is not entitled to a presumption of truth. [3] Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). Cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (considering a First Amendment challenge to the federal government's official labeling of a movie as political propaganda pursuant to a statute authorizing such a designation). Next, the Amended Complaint makes numerous conclusory and bare allegations about law enforcement activities, including surveillance, that have been directed towards Plaintiffs. ( See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 31 (covert surveillance); id. (collect data); id. ¶ 32 (targeting anti-abortion organizations as potential domestic terrorists); id. ¶ 33 (emerging patter [sic] of abuse); id. ¶ 35 (conducting surveillance); id. (taking law enforcement actions); id. ¶ 36 (conducting surveillance on public events, such as the national TEA parties[ [4] ] and anti-abortion protests and demonstrations); id. ¶ 37 (target of federal and local law enforcement actions); id. ¶¶ 46-48 (increasing government surveillance and scrutiny); id. ¶ 51 (encourag[ing] the reporting of information concerning `suspicious' or `criminal' activity of `rightwing extremists'); id. ¶ 69 (collecting personal information); id. ¶ 76 (greater target for law enforcement action as a result of the Obama Awareness Campaign); id. ¶ 81 (target of surveillance and enforcement actions); id. ¶ 85 (increased government scrutiny, investigation, surveillance, and intimidation); id. ¶ 95 (law enforcement slow to investigate threats to CBR); id. ¶¶ 99, 106 (government scrutiny, investigation, surveillance, and intimidation); id. ¶ 105 (DHS-sanctioned. . . harass[ment]).) None of these bare allegations provide the factual context that would render them plausible and thus entitle them to a presumption of truth at this stage in the litigation. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950; Nagim v. Napolitano, No. 10-CV-00329, 2011 WL 841285, at -2 (D.Colo. Mar. 8, 2011) (dismissing similar challenge to claimed rightwing extremist policy). Unlike Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, where the plaintiff alleged three specific retaliatory phone calls to her employer, Plaintiffs in this case rely on vague and undated assertions of law enforcement activities directed at them. See Fritz, 592 F.3d at 723. The Amended Complaint is silent about the location, manner, duration, extent or timing of the alleged government harassment, surveillance, and scrutiny. Cf. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir.2010) (finding allegations sufficient, where complaint stated prison officials confiscated and destroyed prisoner's outgoing mail on two specific dates); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 477 F.3d at 821 (prior litigation by CBR, alleging specific unlawful actions on a specific date and time). With regard to information sharing, the Amended Complaint similarly offers conclusory and bare allegations, which are consequently not well-pleaded, and disentitle[d]. . . to the presumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. ( See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 50 (share information); id. ¶ 52 (information is gathered, and then it is shared with certain private organizations that are political adversaries of Plaintiffs); id. ¶ 57 (no safeguards for the use or distribution of the information collected pursuant to the policy); id. ¶ 69 (information is shared with private organizations. . . such as SPLC, NAF, and ADL); id. ¶ 70 (sharing of information); id. ¶ 109 (improper sharing of private information and data).) Plaintiffs do not describe the type of information that is shared, who shared this information, or why any claimed sharing would operate to chill their First Amendment rights. The allegations in the Amended Complaint amount to nothing more than the type of unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations that Iqbal deemed insufficient. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Plaintiffs do not even explain how the alleged information sharing has resulted in any concrete harm. See Gordon v. Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir.1983) (holding that the plaintiffs' subjective fear about misuse of information collected pursuant to a law enforcement operation is insufficient to establish a First Amendment claim). Finally, the Amended Complaint makes numerous conclusory and bare allegations that Defendants' actions have had the effect of chilling Plaintiffs' speech. ( See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88-89, 108 (negatively affected CBR's reputation, thereby making it difficult to recruit volunteers, to raise money, and to obtain permission to engage in speech activity at public locations, such as college and university campuses); id. ¶¶ 91, 108 (negatively affected CBR's ability to raise money through donations to support its anti-abortion speech activities); id. ¶ 92 (negatively affected CBR's present effort to forge working relationships with mega-churches, which do not want to be associated with `extremist' groups of any sort); id. ¶¶ 100-04 (Plaintiff Murray is deterred from attending, participating in, or associating with those who participate in TEA parties . . . [and] those who engage in anti-abortion protests and activities . . . for fear that he would be denied employment in the federal government on account of his expressive activities); id. ¶ 105 (deterrent effect on political speech and expressive association); id. ¶ 106 (deterrent effect on . . . activities and . . . rights to freedom of speech and expressive association).) These allegations are not well-pleaded, and their conclusory nature disentitles them to the presumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. Having set aside the conclusory and unadorned allegations that are not entitled to a presumption of truth as well-pleaded allegations, we consider the [remaining] factual allegations . . . to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. To be sure, the Amended Complaint does contain certain allegations that are relatively more specific, but none of them give the Amended Complaint the ring of plausibility as to the second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim. We consider the remaining allegations in turn. First, in Paragraphs 28 and 29, the Amended Complaint alleges: ¶ 28. Pursuant to the RWE Policy, on or about March 23, 2009, a confidential directive was issued by FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. to each of its 56 field offices, instructing the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) to verify the date, time, and location of each TEA party within his or her region and to supply that information to FBI headquarters. The directive instructed the field office to obtain and confirm the identity of the individual(s) involved in the actual planning and coordination of the event in its region. The directive was tightly controlled. ¶ 29. Pursuant to the RWE Policy, a second directive was issued by FBI headquarters on or about April 6, 2009. This directive instructed each SAC to coordinate and conduct, either at the field office level and/or with the appropriate resident agency, covert video surveillance and data collection of the participants of the TEA parties. This information was to be submitted to Washington, D.C. These allegations describe Defendants' actions on certain datesMarch 23, 2009 and April 6, 2009but fail to adequately plead that the actions of Defendants were likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from further participation in expressive activities. The allegations refer to confidential directives that were tightly controlled, making it implausible that Plaintiffs, or others, were aware of these directives, in the absence of any allegation that the directives were publicly disclosed. The mere presence of an intelligence data-gathering activity does not give rise to constitutional liability. Gordon, 706 F.2d at 781. Without additional allegations with regard to these directives, their mere existence is insufficient to state a claim. Second, perhaps related to the above-allegations, the Amended Complaint alleges in Paragraphs 22 and 24: ¶¶ 22, 24. The DHS Assessment was leaked to the public approximately one week prior to the TEA (Taxed Enough Already) parties that were scheduled to be held across the country on April 15, 2009. . . . The public release of the DHS Assessment had the intended and calculated effect of deterring people, such as Plaintiffs and those who associate with them, from participating in events such as the national TEA parties and anti-abortion protests and demonstrations. Although perhaps more than a bare conclusion, this allegation is insufficient to plead that Defendants' action injured Plaintiffs in a way likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from further participation in constitutionally protected activity. Plaintiffs allege only that the DHS Assessment was leaked, but make no allegation as to who or what leaked the document, or whether that person or entity was affiliated with Defendants, or how and to what degree the information was disseminated. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to explain why the release of the DHS Assessment would deter them from attending TEA parties, or any specific TEA party event that they, or anyone else, would have otherwise attended. Third, regarding President Obama's commencement speech at the University of Notre Dame in 2009, the Amended Complaint alleges in Paragraphs 77, 79, and 80: ¶ 77. According to sources within FEMA . . . a number of violent right-wing, anti-abortion individuals and groups arrived in South Bend, Indiana in May 2009 to protest President Obama's participation in the commencement ceremony at the University of Notre Dame. ¶¶ 79-80. CBR was one of the right-wing groups that arrived in South Bend, and it deployed its Obama Awareness Campaign to protest the [P]resident and his policies on abortion. Although there were no reported acts of violence committed during the ceremony, the anti-abortion groups that participated in the protest, such as CBR, were publicly described by federal officials as right-wing and violent. But the Amended Complaint does not allege any action by Defendantsit merely refers to federal officials, who might work for myriad federal agencies unconnected to Defendants. Moreover, the Amended Complaint refers only to one action of these federal officials, namely publicly describ[ing] anti-abortion groups protesting at the commencement as right-wing and violent. The Amended Complaint does not state when, or by what means, such a public pronouncement was made, nor does the Amended Complaint allege the identity or activities of the other anti-abortion groups that participated in the protest, rendering it impossible to evaluate the plausibility of the allegation that any public pronouncement had or was likely to have had an adverse effect on protected speech. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612-15 (6th Cir. 2011) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim, where prisoner alleged that prisoner officials improperly withheld court documents sent to him, but failed to plead facts about the nature of the withheld documents). Fourth, the Amended Complaint alleges in Paragraph 81: ¶ 81. CBR and its employees and volunteers have been detained by agents from the FBI, who described CBR as a domestic terrorist organization on account of CBR's opposition to abortion. The Department of Justice defended the actions of the FBI, claiming that the FBI agents reasonably believed that CBR was involved in domestic terrorism. This allegation is likewise deficient. The Amended Complaint does not identity, for example, who the FBI has detained, when or for how long the FBI did so, whether any charges were filed, and what the circumstances were surrounding the detentions, including whether a proper law enforcement purpose was served. The Amended Complaint also does not allege that any of the individual detentions were connected to CBR or the individual Plaintiffs in this case. In fact, the Amended Complaint appears to allege that CBR, a corporate entity, was somehow itself detained by the FBI, but provides no further elaboration. The Amended Complaint makes no allegation, aside from conclusory statements made throughout, that these arrests had the effect of chilling their speech, or would reasonably be expected to do so. Fifth, with regard to Plaintiff Murray, the Amended Complaint alleges in Paragraph 103: ¶ 103 . . . . To date, Plaintiff has been denied employment with the U.S. Border Patrol and with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. But the Amended Complaint makes no allegation that these agencies denied federal employment to Plaintiff Murray on account of his expressive associations or activities, or pursuant to any alleged unconstitutional policy, or that Plaintiff Murray was otherwise qualified for these positions that he claims to have sought. In fact, the Amended Complaint contains no allegation that Plaintiff Murray is in any way connected to CBR. Accordingly, based on a review of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead that any of Defendants' actions injured Plaintiffs in any way that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from further participation in constitutionally protected activity.