Opinion ID: 2659007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Serra's Right to Rescind

Text: Serra also seeks the post-foreclosure-sale rescission of his mortgage and, in the alternative, damages for the disregard of his initial rescission request, which predated the sale of his property. This claim for rescission is predicated on an alleged violation of MCCCDA § 10(i)(2), which holds that the underreporting of a finance charge by more than $35.00 may amount to a statutory violation. That is, while Serra paid $244.48 for a credit report, he alleges that the reasonable market rate was never more than $50.00. This $194.48 difference, he claims, was -9- improperly excluded from the calculation of his finance charge, resulting in the understatement of the amount financed and annual percentage rate. The district court granted summary judgment on this claim,4 finding that the right to rescind is unequivocally cut off by a subsequent foreclosure sale and that, although Serra sought rescission prior to sale, this unilateral act was insufficient to effectuate such rescission, meaning the right was unexercised when it terminated at the time of sale. Damages, the district court held, could be available for the failure of a mortgage holder to duly undertake consideration of a rescission request. Nonetheless, concluding that Serra's purported basis for rescission was without merit, the district court refused to award such damages here. We need not retread each step along the district court's detailed analytical path, for its eventual conclusion neatly highlights the fatal flaw in Serra's claim. That is, having failed 4 Serra appears to suggest that the district court's conclusion wrongly relied on precedent interpreting the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). In fact, MCCCDA was intentionally constructed to align with TILA, see Lynch v. Signal Fin. Co. of Quincy, 367 Mass. 503, 505, 327 N.E.2d 732, 734 (1975), and [w]here the Massachusetts Legislature in enacting a statute follows a Federal statute, the Massachusetts courts follow the adjudged construction of the Federal statute by the Federal courts, In re Fuller, 642 F.3d 240, 243 (1st Cir. 2011) (alterations omitted)). Thus, in dispatching its duty to faithfully forecast what a Massachusetts court would do if presented with this case, see Blinzler, 81 F.3d at 1151, the district court correctly turned to our own TILA precedent for guidance, Mayo v. Key Fin. Servs., Inc., 424 Mass. 862, 864, 678 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (1997). -10- to sufficiently plead any valid basis to rescind his mortgage loan at any time, Serra has presented no genuine issue of material fact sufficient to require this court to delve into the remainder of his claims regarding the precise scope and duration of his rescission rights. Although it may be, arguendo, that a spurious $194.48 charge would -- on a different record -- suffice to establish an MCCCDA violation for which rescission might lie, Serra has failed to provide any evidentiary support for the claim that $50.00 was the appropriate market rate. In fact, having reviewed the full record, the sole reference to $50.00 as the accepted rate is found in Serra's pleadings. This, without more, is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Transurface Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 738 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding no genuine issue of material fact where a party offered no more than argument, unsupported by affidavits, deposition, or other appropriate materials raising a question of fact (internal citation omitted)). If factual, Serra must necessarily have derived this $50.00 figure from some verifiable source, but -- for reasons unknown -- he decided to leave the record bereft of any and all supporting proof. In contrast, Wells Fargo and Quantum offer an affidavit from the credit reporting agency, with accompanying invoice, attesting that the full $224.48 was a true and reasonable fee for services. We offer no comment on the actual validity of -11- that amount, but on the record before us we see no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Having chosen to rest on the laurels of bald allegation, Serra leaves us no choice but to affirm the grant of summary judgment. Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullán, 485 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir. 2007) (Allegations made in a plaintiff's complaint, standing alone, are not enough to oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment.).