Opinion ID: 2461173
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determining whether land is public trust land

Text: With regard to Clark County's argument that adopting the public trust doctrine unwisely assigns to courts the difficult task of determining if, at any point, a given parcel of land was beneath a navigable body of water in order to determine its trust character, we disagree.
As an initial matter, the public trust doctrine is rooted in our constitutional and statutory law and inherent limitations on the state's power and, thus, cannot be relaxed simply because it may present courts with difficult factual questions. And in any event, Clark County overstates the complexity of determining the character of land for public trust doctrine purposes. Determining whether land is held in trust for the public by the state begins by reference to whether the land was submerged beneath navigable water when Nevada joined the United States on October 31, 1864, as Nevada joined the United States on equal footing with other states in every respect, State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 628, 503 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1972), and, consequently, obtained title to all land below the high-water mark of Nevada's navigable waters on the date of its admission to the Union. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10, 91 S.Ct. 1775, 29 L.Ed.2d 279 (1971); Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 434, 13 S.Ct. 110; Bunkowski, 88 Nev. at 628, 503 P.2d at 1234. Thus, determining whether land is subject to the public trust does not require consideration as to whether land was at any time underwater, as Clark County claims. Rather, it requires consideration of whether the land was beneath navigable waters on October 31, 1864. See Bunkowski, 88 Nev. at 628, 503 P.2d at 1234 (explaining that, for purposes of determining state ownership, the factual question of whether the Carson River is navigable is determined by reference to its condition October 31, 1864). Further, determining the navigability of a segment of a body or channel of water, which under federal law refers to the ordinary and natural condition of the watercourse, may be accomplished through expert testimony, historical surveys, and news clippings from the relevant time, as the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized in Arizona Center for Law v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 837 P.2d 158, 164-65 (App.1991); see also State Engineer v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 86 Nev. 872, 874, 478 P.2d 159, 160 (1970) (A body of water is navigable if it is used or is usable in its ordinary condition as a highway of commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. (citing Brewer Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86, 43 S.Ct. 60, 67 L.Ed. 140 (1922))).
If land was beneath navigable waters when Nevada joined the United States, but is now exposed, whether that land remains subject to the public trust doctrine generally depends on the manner in which it became drywhether by reliction [2] or avulsion. [3] See Cowles, 86 Nev. at 875, 478 P.2d at 161. When the exposure is caused by reliction, the gradual and imperceptible exposure of the land, title to the dry water bed is passed to the adjoining shoreland owners. Id. The event causing the exposure of the water bed may be considered reliction even when the gradual changes to the water bed come about by artificial means: When the exposure is due wholly or in part to artificial causes and those causes are not the act of the party owning the shoreland the rules that prevail as to the ownership of the accreted or relicted land are the same as in the case of accretion or reliction solely by natural causes. Id. In contrast, when changes to the water bed occur by avulsion, that is, by sudden changes in the course of a stream, title is not taken away or bestowed. Peterson v. Morton, 465 F.Supp. 986, 997 (D.Nev.1979) (applying Nevada state law), vacated in part on other grounds by Peterson v. Watt, 666 F.2d 361, 364 (9th Cir.1982). Thus, because artificial actions, such as draining, damming, or channeling a waterway, may result in rapid exposure of the water bed, those events are often appropriately considered avulsions. See id. at 1003 (determining that where the strip of land in question became dry as a result of a sudden deliberate and obvious engineering relocation of the waters within the artificial banks of the permanently channelized river, such an event was considered an avulsion under Nevada law and therefore the state retained title to the land); see also New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 770-71, 784, 118 S.Ct. 1726, 140 L.Ed.2d 993 (1998) (holding that the federal government's filling of a portion of the Hudson River was an avulsion, and, as a consequence, ownership of the new dry land remained unchanged); Garrett v. State, 118 N.J.Super. 594, 289 A.2d 542, 546, 548 (N.J.Super.Ct. Ch. Div.1972) (the filling and rerouting of a tidal stream constituted an avulsion, and accordingly, the state retained title to the streambed). In Cowles, we applied the doctrine of reliction in determining that the state had lost its title to once-submerged land that had gradually and imperceptibly become dry. 86 Nev. at 874-75, 478 P.2d at 161. In the same way, the avulsion doctrine is useful for determining whether the state retains its title to land held in trust for the public after it has become dry. Applying these doctrines balances land gain and loss opportunities in a fair manner and operates as a disincentive to artificially diverting water from public trust lands in an effort to increase personal landholdings near navigable waters. See id. at 876-77, 478 P.2d at 162. Here, whether the disputed land became dry through reliction or avulsion is critical. If it was through reliction, the public trust doctrine does not apply to that land. But if the portion of the Colorado River covering the land was navigable at the time of Nevada's statehood, and the land thereafter became dry through avulsion, the public trust doctrine applies. And if the public trust doctrine applies, whether the disputed land is transferable turns on whether the transfer serves the public's interest in the land and comports with the state's trustee obligations, as discussed next.