Opinion ID: 2582200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court's Failure To Schedule a Third Hearing

Text: Byers's second argument is that the court erred in failing to sua sponte schedule a third evidentiary hearing following the parties' submission of supplemental authorities. He claims that the lack of a third hearing resulted in a determination based on uncorroborated written statements, a violation of this court's holding that Civil Rule 90.3 does not authorize child support trials by affidavit. [19] In the present case, the superior court did not hold a trial[ ] by affidavit. [20] It actively and repeatedly sought information about Byers's 2003 income, continuing discovery to obtain a current copy of Byers's tax return, scheduling a second hearing, again ordering Byers to submit a complete copy of his 2003 tax return, and even offering to hold a third hearing. Byers responded by submitting four incomplete versions of his 2003 tax return, which reported gross income ranging from $14,369 to $22,316 and were replete with errors and omissions. As of the June 15, 2004 master's report, none of these returns appear to have been submitted to the IRS. Because of Byers's repeated failure to submit a complete and final 2003 tax return, the superior court imputed income to him based on his estimated expenditures. As the master's report recognizes, a trial court has broad discretion to impute income based on the most complete evidence before it [21] if the record is incomplete. This discretion is particularly broad where the reason for the incomplete record is the parent's own unresponsiveness. [22] Imputing income to Byers based on his estimated expenses was therefore well within the trial court's discretion. Byers also emphasizes that he was proceeding pro se, suggesting that his waiver of a third hearing might not have been a knowing one. The trial court has an obligation to inform a pro se litigant of the option of holding an evidentiary hearing, and to make it clear that the litigant must actively request the hearing. [23] Had the superior court failed to do this, Byers's waiver would be highly suspect. But the court expressly informed Byers of the option of holding a third hearing, told him that he would have to request the hearing by a certain date, and repeatedly confirmed that he understood. Byers was well aware that a third hearing was available if he asked for one, but he made no such request. For this reason, we hold that Byers knowingly waived such a hearing.