Opinion ID: 1248466
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fundamental Change in Country Conditions

Text: The government contends in the alternative that [a]pplication of the presumption . . . raise[s] new fact questions about changed circumstances, because, in Matter of C-C-, [55] the BIA determined that there has been a fundamental change in country conditions and that forced, coercive abortions and sterilizations are no longer part of China's population control. [56] This argument also fails, as the government overstates the holding of Matter of C-C- : There, the BIA did not in any way comment on whether forced abortions continue to occur as a result of China's population control policies. [57] Matter of C- C- involved a claim that the petitioner and her husband would be forcibly sterilized if they returned to China with their second child, who was born in the United States. [58] The BIA's discussion of China's population control policies was therefore limited to whether there was a realistic chance that the petitioner or her husband would be forcibly sterilized if they returned to China with two children, one of whom was born outside of China. [59] It did not address the extent to which conditions have changed with respect to abortions, sterilizations, and other coercive measures for unplanned pregnancies occurring in China. In fact, the only reference in that case to forced abortions is its observation that the 2005 State Department Country Reports observed that central government policy `formally prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization.' The Country Reports also noted, however, that some reports of physical coercion to meet birth targets continued, although the respondent's province was not mentioned among those which impose stringent measures to deal with out-of-plan pregnancies. [60] Finally, the government advances that we would exceed our authority if we were to find that Zhu is entitled to withholding of removal. For support, the government cites INS v. Ventura 's instruction that courts of appeal not decide questions that have not been decided by the agency in the first instance. [61] The government argues that, because a determination of past persecution in the form of forced abortion raises the regulatory presumption of future fear of forced abortion, new legal and factual issues that the BIA did not address are raised, requiring remand. We disagree. Even though the government had the burden of proving that the regulatory presumption should not apply, it never offered evidence to rebut the presumption before the IJ or before the BIA. Rather, the first time that the government argued that conditions have changed was in its May 9, 2007, letter to this court, eight years after Zhu filed her application for asylum and withholding of removal. Moreover, unlike in Ventura, where the BIA had not had the opportunity to decide whether conditions in the country of nationality had changed, we are satisfied that the BIA has rejected any contention that conditions in China have changed with respect to the treatment of women who become pregnant in violation of China's family planning policies (as distinguished from the treatment of Chinese citizens returning to China with children conceived and born abroad), as the BIA has granted relief to those who suffered persecution as a result of China's coercive planning provisions. [62] In sum, the BIA has now had two opportunities to address the legal and factual issues that are again before this court; we need not give it a third bite at this apple. As there is no need or justification for further factual or legal development, we reverse the decision of the BIA, which was decided on the basis of an erroneous application of the law, [63] and hold that Zhu is entitled to withholding of removal as a matter of law.