Opinion ID: 2069647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: is compliance with industry, association and government standards conclusive?

Text: The next question is whether the trial court committed error when it instructed the jury that defendants were not liable if they complied with industry, association, and governmental standards. Zacher complains that the trial court gave Instructions 20, 21 and 33 over his objections, and that collectively these instructions amounted to a directed verdict for Budd, if Budd complied with the standards of their own industry, voluntary association, or governmental bodies. Zacher points out that the instruction was contrary to South Dakota law, universal law, and argued that no industry or voluntary association may, in fact, adopt its own standards as conclusive. That is, industry standards are merely a minimal standard that may be considered, and Instruction # 20 states that it is a conclusive standard. We agree. See: Turner v. American Motors General Corp., 392 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C. Ct.App.1978) (Compliance with a legislative enactment or administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precaution.); Potter v. Battle Creek Gas Co., 29 Mich.App. 71, 185 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1970) ([H]ad the defendant violated one, or more, of the standards of the commission that fact might be deemed to be proof of negligence or evidence of negligence, it does not follow that coming within the standards ... insulates defendant from a finding of negligence.). See also: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A (1965) (In determining whether conduct is negligent, the customs of a community, or of others under like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling where a reasonable man would not follow them.). [14] Therefore, the trial court's instructions, that compliance with standards exonerated the defendants from liability, were clearly prejudicial and reversible error. Additionally, plaintiffs proposed Instruction # 2 instead of the instructions mentioned above: In determining whether the defendants were guilty of negligence for failure to use reasonable care in connection with the performance by them of the duties which they owed to the plaintiffs as elsewhere defined in these instructions, you may consider whether the defendants followed or complied with the standards and customs of their own industry or trade. However, compliance with such legislative enactments, rules or regulations and/or compliance with the standards and customs of their own industry or trade are not controlling and does not prevent you from finding them negligent if a reasonable man in the position of the defendants would or reasonably should have taken additional precautions. Whenever under particular circumstances and in view of the risk involved a reasonable person would depart from the customs and standards of a particular industry or trade or take precautions additional to those required by a legislative enactment, rule or regulation, such a defendant may be found negligent if it fails to so depart or take such additional precautions. (emphasis in original). In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, proposed Instruction # 2 was an accurate statement of the applicable law and should have been given by the trial court instead of the erroneous instructions mentioned above. The last paragraph of Instruction # 33 properly instructed the jury that compliance with [governmental] regulations could be considered as evidence of the exercise of reasonable care by Yellowstone and Dixon but was not conclusive on the issue of negligence. However, this instruction did not correct the error in respect to the conclusiveness of standards of industry and voluntary associations. Therefore, this error relates not only to the negligence claims against Budd but also against the defendants Yellowstone and Dixon.