Opinion ID: 494717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Self Incrimination

Text: 17 Petitioner argues that police interrogators violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in the course of obtaining incriminating statements during custodial interrogation. The record reflects that on February 3, 1981, Investigator LaTorre advised petitioner of his Miranda rights and questioned him after petitioner responded that he understood these rights and had nothing to hide. At some point during the interview, petitioner asked whether he had to continue with the interrogation. LaTorre asked petitioner what he meant by that question and whether he wanted to take a break. At that point, and apparently without elaboration or indication that petitioner desired a respite, 6 petitioner continued the conversation and admitted that he owned the .25 caliber pistol and necklace found in his possession. Later, after petitioner stated that he wished to say nothing further, the questioning was terminated. 18 In Miranda, the Supreme Court established procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. In order to combat the evils associated with the inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, accused individuals must be informed that statements made may be used as evidence against them, that they have a right to the presence of counsel, and that they have a right to remain silent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. An individual may effectively waive these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Id. 19 Once informed of Miranda rights, an accused has the burden of indicating in some manner his wish to remain silent. United States v. Alegria, 721 F.2d 758, 761 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1182 n. 13 (11th Cir.1982); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. Petitioner contends that he unequivocally indicated his desire to assert his privilege against self-incrimination by asking whether he had to continue with the questioning. This contention was raised in a motion to suppress. 20 The state circuit court conducted a hearing on April 14, 1981 and considered the testimony of Officer LaTorre and petitioner. In addition, the court reviewed a twenty minute videotape of the interrogation in question. 7 After reviewing the testimony, the arguments of counsel and the pertinent law, the circuit court ruled that the statements made by petitioner were freely and voluntarily made after an explanation and waiver of Miranda rights. 21 On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court concurred with the circuit court's determination of voluntariness. Lightbourne, 438 So.2d at 389. The supreme court concluded that petitioner's mid-interview inquiry after the government officials complied with the Miranda requirements did not rise to the level of a reassertion of his Miranda rights requiring a second waiver of those rights. Lightbourne, 438 So.2d at 389. In the alternative, the court ruled that even if petitioner's question constituted an attempt to invoke the right to remain silent, petitioner's subsequent actions evidenced a second knowing waiver after such attempt. Id. 22 In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), the district court made an independent determination of voluntariness in petitioner's federal habeas corpus proceeding. The district court, emphasizing the facts that petitioner's inquiry was equivocal, that the government responded by attempting to clarify the question, and that petitioner clearly demonstrated the ability to discontinue the statements in question, concluded that petitioner did not reassert his right to remain silent after waiving it. After a de novo review of the record and plenary consideration of the voluntariness issue, we affirm. 23 As this court has acknowledged, [i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 923 (11th Cir.1985) modified on other grounds, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 307, 93 L.Ed.2d 281 (1986) (emphasis in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627). Nevertheless, when a purported invocation of a Fifth Amendment privilege is ambiguous, the police may question the accused for the narrow purpose of clarifying [the] equivocal request. Martin, 770 F.2d at 924 (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir.1979). Once it is clear that an accused wishes to remain silent, the desire to discontinue the interrogation must be scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); see United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 1369 (5th Cir.1978). 8 24 In federal habeas court, a statutory presumption of correctness applies to subsidiary factual questions resolved in state court proceedings. Agee v. White, 809 F.2d 1487, 1493 (11th Cir.1987); see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). Thus, the state court finding that petitioner merely asked whether he had to continue before making the incriminating statements will be presumed correct. See Lightbourne, 438 So.2d at 389. Although the Florida Supreme Court's determination that the statements made after this question was asked were voluntarily given is not binding on this court, see Miller, 106 S.Ct. at 451-53, the federal habeas court, should ... give great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state judiciary. Miller, 106 S.Ct. at 451. After making an independent determination of whether petitioner's statements unambiguously evinced an intent to reassert the privilege against self-incrimination, we find that the district court properly concluded that petitioner did not positively and adequately assert his right to discontinue the questioning and therefore volunteered the statements after the police attempted to clarify an equivocal request. As this court has observed, [v]oluntary comments unresponsive to governmental questioning are admissible even after Miranda rights are asserted. United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir.1985). The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda is based, is governmental coercion. United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355, 1362 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). Here, the record reflects that after the police attempted to clarify petitioner's question, petitioner spontaneously resumed discussions concerning the gun and the necklace without inducement. Under these facts, we fail to discern any governmental coercion. 25