Opinion ID: 844212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Threats to Ripple and Her Family and Evidence of Defendant's Gang Affiliation; Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: Defendant contends he suffered irremediable prejudice, requiring reversal of the judgment, because Lorraine Ripple was allowed to testify that he was affiliated with a gang and to suggest he had threatened her and her sons to prevent her from testifying. The first mention of what defendant now claims was inadmissible evidence occurred in response to questions by defense counsel. The prosecutor had elicited from Ripple testimony that defendant had told her he killed someone in Tustin who had a little ministore that cashed checks for wetbacks. She also stated defendant had given her the gun he used, which she had later traded for drugs. During cross-examination, defense counsel explored several areas with Ripple and then asked if police investigators had offered her some kind of benefit in exchange for her agreement to testify. She replied that an investigating officer had offered to put in a good word to have her transferred to the California Institution for Women (CIW) for the trial and that she had responded, yeah, that's some deal. Before counsel asked another question, Ripple added: And it's like right now, I've got my son, all my friends, I have got two letters in the past week, one from Arizona prison, one from Leavenworth that are flat out: don't take the stand, don't say a word. And I'myou know, I've got a lot of problems even with my sons over this. Defendant did not move to strike the comments or ask the court to admonish the jury. On redirect, the prosecutor referred to Ripple's outburst, saying: I think you indicated something about having sons in Arizona, things of that nature, that caused you some concern as you sit here today. Could you please explain what you were talking about to the jury? Ripple replied, Okay. My son is also affiliated with a gang that [defendant] was once a member of The prosecutor interrupted, Before we talk about that, I just Ripple stated, Is that what you wanted? The prosecutor said, I just want to ask do you have any concerns over your own son's safety? There was no further mention of gang affiliation. In response to the prosecutor's further questions, Ripple testified she had one son in state prison and another in federal prison. She stated she had received letters directing her not to take the witness stand and she believed her decision to testify placed her and her sons at risk. Ripple also said Deborah Lankford did not want her to testify and had written to other inmates in Ripple's unit. Ripple said she had been attacked by six inmates in the prison yard. Defense counsel interrupted, objecting that the prosecutor was seeking hearsay evidence. The court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then asked why Ripple had agreed to testify against defendant. Ripple's only response was that she had developed respect for Mike Proctor, one of the officers who had investigated Ripple in connection with her own crimes, who had asked her to contact him if she ever decided to talk about anything. Ripple reported she had since provided information to Proctor on several occasions. Later, after questioning Ripple on other topics, defense counsel returned to the officer's offer to have Ripple moved to CIW, reading from a letter Ripple had written to the officer, in which she wrote: `Let's face another fact. You're offering me one year at C.I.W. and the rest of my life in the hole.' Ripple, agreeing the officer had made the offer, then said: And while we're putting all this in the record, let's go one better. [Defendant has] had Debbie [Lankford] sending all this paperwork to every god damn prison in the fuckin' state laying on my sons to keep me off the stand. Now, put that in your record if one of my kids gets hurt. Defendant did not at that time move to strike or seek an admonition to the jury. But after Ripple's testimony concluded and the jury was excused for the day, defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecution had elicited improper character evidence about gang connections and letters threatening the witness. The court denied the motion. On the following day, after further discussion, the court adopted the prosecutor's suggestion to treat defendant's motion for a mistrial as a timely objection to the evidence. It then admonished the jurors: During redirect examination, the defense objected to a portion of witness Lorraine Ripple's testimony regarding possible retaliation against herself or family members. Upon further reflection, the court believes... the objection to be a proper one. You are therefore instructed that the answer of the witness dealing with that limited portion of her testimony is stricken. You are hereby instructed not to consider or discuss that portion of her testimony in any fashion in deciding this case. (7) A defendant who fails to make a timely objection or motion to strike evidence may not later claim that the admission of the evidence was error ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1]; People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1261 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645]) or that the prosecutor committed misconduct by adducing it ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40]). Further, [w]hen an objection is made to proposed evidence, the specific ground of the objection must be stated. The appellate court's review of the trial court's admission of evidence is then limited to the stated ground for the objection. (Evid. Code, § 353.) ( People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 612 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472].) What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling. If the court overrules the objection, the objecting party may argue on appeal that the evidence should have been excluded for the reason asserted at trial, but it may not argue on appeal that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason different from the one stated at trial. A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct. ( People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765].) The present case illustrates the reason for the foregoing rule. During Ripple's testimony on redirect examination by the prosecutor, wherein she referred to threats of retaliation against herself and her sons, defendant's only objection was that the testimony was hearsay, but he now complains that the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. A timely objection on those grounds, if sustained, would have prevented any further testimony on the subject of threats and would have allowed the court to make an admonition to reduce any prejudice from the testimony already heard by the jury. (8) Nonetheless, in light of the trial court's decision to treat the matter as if defendant had made a timely objection, we will review the merits of his argument. As defendant observes, this court has held that evidence of a third party's attempt to intimidate a witness is inadmissible against a defendant unless there is reason to believe the defendant was involved in the intimidation. (E.g., People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 200-201 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710]; People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 599 [138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203].) But we were responding to the use of the evidence to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt; we were not concerned with whether it was relevant to some other issue, such as the witness's credibility. ( Hannon, at p. 599; People v. Weiss (1958) 50 Cal.2d 535, 554 [327 P.2d 527].) Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact or consequence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness. (Evid. Code, § 210; People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 615.) Thus, `[e]vidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible. [Citations.] An explanation of the basis for the witness's fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is well within the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.]' ( People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1084 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 808, 263 P.3d 1].) Moreover, evidence of a `third party' threat may bear on the credibility of the witness, whether or not the threat is directly linked to the defendant. ( Ibid. ) Ripple's credibility was a significant issue in this case. The evidence therefore had substantial probative value, justifying its admission. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. (9) Defendant's related argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting evidence of defendant's gang affiliation and possible threats to Ripple also fails. A prosecutor commits misconduct by intentionally eliciting inadmissible testimony. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171].) That was not the situation here. As we have said, evidence of real or perceived threats to Ripple or her sons was relevant to the issue of Ripple's credibility. Whether evidence of defendant's gang affiliation was relevant to Ripple's credibility is debatable, but even assuming the evidence should not have been admitted, the record fails to support defendant's claim of misconduct. Defendant asserts the prosecutor cleverly calculated the introduction of inadmissible evidence to prejudice defendant ... [by specifically] asking Ripple to talk about her concerns for her sons, knowing it would undoubtedly lead to a disclosure about [defendant's] gang affiliations. Ripple, however, first mentioned her sons in response to defense counsel's questions. When the prosecutor on redirect asked her to explain, and Ripple for the first time mentioned gang affiliation, the prosecutor interrupted and quickly changed the subject to focus on the sons' imprisonment. Defendant finds support for his argument in Ripple's further statement, after the prosecutor's interruption, Is that what you wanted? In context, however, it appears the prosecutor wanted Ripple to talk about the threats she or her sons had received, was surprised by her mention of gangs, and changed the subject to prevent prejudice to defendant. This interpretation is consistent with the prosecutor's later request for a jury admonition and his emphasis during closing argument that the jury should not consider evidence of defendant's criminal past except for the limited purpose of defendant's credibility. In any event, the gang reference was brief and indicated only that defendant had once been a member of a gang. It could not have prejudiced defendant in the eyes of the jurors, who were fully aware defendant was a dangerous man who had committed numerous violent crimes and had spent a substantial portion of his life in prison. Finally, any possible prejudice was dispelled by the court's admonition to the jury to disregard that portion of Ripple's testimony. ( People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 870 [any error in admitting evidence is harmless where the court has instructed the jury to disregard the evidence].) (10) Defendant also complains that even if evidence of threats against Ripple or her family members was admissible, the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by asserting during closing argument that Ripple was testifying at great risk to herself and great risk to her family, because the court had admonished the jury that it should not consider evidence of retaliation against Ripple or her family. The court's admonition, however, was not a blanket instruction to disregard all evidence of threats against Ripple; it was directed toward Ripple's responses to the prosecutor's questions during redirect examination. Other evidence also tended to show Ripple had reason to fear retaliation, such as her responses to defense counsel's questions, Deborah Lankford's testimony about telling friends in the prison system that Ripple was informing on defendant, and Lankford's concession that a prisoner risked his or her life by informing on someone. The prosecutor was entitled to draw an inference from this evidence that Ripple knew her testimony was putting her and her family at risk. `Prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial. [Citation.] Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.' ( People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 179 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62].) We conclude, for the reasons we have stated, that defendant has shown neither that the trial court erred nor that the prosecutor committed misconduct.