Opinion ID: 4529502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abandonment of Mercedes

Text: Ordinarily, an individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal property that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). However, a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy to complain of a search or seizure of property he has voluntarily abandoned. United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1022 (11th Cir. 1994). Although the defendant bears the initial burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched, the government bears the burden 10 Case: 19-10200 Date Filed: 04/28/2020 Page: 11 of 24 of proving the defendant’s abandonment of that property. Id. at 1023. 4 In deciding whether the defendant abandoned his personal property, we look to the defendant’s intent, which we discern from acts, statements, and other facts. United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982). We consider the surrounding facts and circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment, see id., as well as post-abandonment events that evidence “the defendant’s intent to abandon the property at the previous time,” United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 604 (11th Cir. 1990). The “critical inquiry” is whether Johnson “voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in [his car] so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.” Ramos, 12 F.3d at 1022 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). In applying the abandonment doctrine in the automobile context, this Court has held that a defendant who abandons his car to flee from law enforcement officers has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the car and thereby forfeits his right to Fourth Amendment protection in it. See United States 4 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this Court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal rulings de novo. United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 612 (11th Cir. 2012). We construe the facts in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below, here, the government. Id. We will conclude that the district court clearly erred in making its factual findings only if “our review of the record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). 11 Case: 19-10200 Date Filed: 04/28/2020 Page: 12 of 24 v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 751-53 (5th Cir. 1971).5 In Edwards, the defendant abandoned his car when, after leading police on a high-speed chase, he stopped, “jumped from the car,” and left the car “to the police, on a public highway, with the engine running, keys in the ignition, lights on, and fled on foot.” Id. at 750-51; see also United States v. Williams, 569 F.2d 823, 824-26 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding a defendant abandoned his unlocked trailer and its contents when he unhooked the trailer from his truck, left it in a parking area, and drove away while being pursued by federal agents). Historically, cars have received lesser Fourth Amendment protection because there is a “diminished expectation of privacy” in them. See United States v. Holland, 740 F.2d 878, 880 (11th Cir. 1984). Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Johnson “opened the driver’s side door and took off running, abandoning the vehicle and leaving the door open.” Johnson does not contest this finding. Moreover, the record shows that, once Johnson realized that officers in marked patrol cars were pursuing him, he put the Mercedes in reverse in an unsuccessful attempt to escape while still inside the car, then got out of the Mercedes while it was still in reverse, left the car on and the car door open, and fled on foot from the officers for several blocks. Under the circumstances, Johnson’s actions showed that he “relinquished his 5 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 12 Case: 19-10200 Date Filed: 04/28/2020 Page: 13 of 24 interest in [the Mercedes] so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.” See Ramos, 12 F.3d at 1022 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted); Pirolli, 673 F.2d at 1204. Just like the drivers in Edwards and Williams, Johnson abandoned the Mercedes and its contents and thereby forfeited his right to Fourth Amendment protection in them. See Williams, 569 F.2d at 824-26; Edwards, 441 F.2d at 751-53. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Johnson’s motion to suppress the contraband discovered in the Mercedes. See United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (“We can . . . affirm a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record.”).6