Opinion ID: 3011088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Means Report

Text: Finally, plaintiffs allege that the Means Report, which concluded that the FSU alternative was the preferred choice, was excessively concerned with the economic benefits that Mill Street businesses would reap under the FSU alternative. They imply that this focus on economics prevented an unbiased analysis of the historic harm that the FSU alternative would inflict on the Factory Street area. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs point to language in the Means Report stating that from a longterm economic vitality perspective, [the FSU Alternative] is the better of the two PennDoT configurations under active consideration. The plaintiffs contrast that conclusion with an acknowledgment in the Means Report that if the Factory Street cut-and-cover alternative is built, not only does it do irreparable damage to the traditional skeleton of this remarkably intact 19th century town, it is highly probable that it will foreclose any hope of a bypass. From these two sentences, the plaintiffs argue that the Means Report acknowledged the serious damage the FSU alternative would have on the Historic District but 22 permitted the favorable economics of the FSU alternative to trump those historic concerns.10 While these points weigh in the balance, what is dispositive is that the Means Report concluded that the Factory Street cut-and-cover will have the lesser negative impact on the town's economic vitality and the overall community character of the Historic District. (emphasis added). The Means Report, which we find to be thorough and sensitive, by no means ignored the impact of each alternative on the historic properties. 6. Affirmative Reasons for Selecting the FSU Alternative In addition to considering the FSU alternative's drawbacks, the defendants laid out in the administrative record a number of affirmative reasons why the FSU alternative will inflict less harm on the Historic District. First, the defendants concluded that the FSU alternative will physically and visually separate traffic from the Historic _________________________________________________________________ 10. While we need not decide whether the economic perspective is permissible, the notion that economic vitality will keep the historic character of Mill Street intact (whereas ignoring the economic health of the district might lead to further disintegration of Mill Street) might well be a relevant factor under the NHPA in a situation like this, where the economic and historic health of Mill Street are so tightly linked. Indeed, revitalizing the economic health of Mill Street was one of the stated purposes of the project. Mill Street merchants and professionals, who are dedicated to restoring the historic architecture on Mill Street, see supra at Part I, have formed the Danville Revitalization Corporation (DRC), which is committed to making capital investments in the physical appearance of Mill Street buildings and facades. Between 1993 and 1996, the DRC contributed financially to twenty projects involving storefront, signage, and facade improvements. The merchants formed the DRC partly because the future success of the Mill Street business district turns on the district's ability to present a pleasant, small town, main street environment in an historic architectural setting. They believe that the best way for Danville to achieve that kind of setting is by reducing traffic on Mill Street. It thus may be true that it is in both the historic and economic interests of Danville to reduce traffic on Mill Street and to protect the historic architecture that lines the street. However, as noted above, we need not decide the appropriateness of the economic perspective in this case. 23 District, especially on Factory and West Market Streets. This traffic currently runs the length of the Historic District on Mill Street. Under the No-Build and MS alternatives, cars would continue to use West Market and Factory Streets as a way to avoid the heavy traffic on Mill Street. Therefore, even under the MS alternative, Factory Street would not be free from traffic. The FSU alternative would thus better manage traffic by limiting the number of cars using Market Street and taking traffic underground for a fair part of its trip through Danville. Second, the defendants emphasize that the FSU Alternative will greatly reduce the crippling traffic on Mill Street, an area that is as much a part of Danville's Historic District as Factory Street is. The Means Report discusses the impact of Mill Street traffic as contributing to buildings' physical decay, and threaten[ing] the long-term life of the historic commercial structures that line Mill Street. Ninety people currently live on Mill Street, and one of the goals of the project is to restore the residential component of the Mill Street neighborhood. In balancing the harms and benefits of the various alternatives, the defendants justifiably concluded that the FSU alternative would do much good for Mill Street on an historic level. 7. Conclusion For all of the foregoing reasons, the administrative record supports the FHWA's finding that the FSU alternative will minimize harm to the Danville Historic District. Even if we were to conclude that the MS and FSU alternatives would impose a comparable amount of harm to Danville's Historic District, we would be bound to uphold the Secretary's decision. These decisions are vested by law not in unelected judges but in the accountable Secretary. See Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 716 (The Secretary is free to choose among alternatives which cause substantially equal damage to parks or historic sites.). The defendants performed a large number of studies on the various ways in which the alternatives would impact the Historic District and adequately weighed the results of the studies in selecting the preferred alternative. They also considered the more intangible benefits and harms to Mill and Factory Streets 24 under the competing alternatives. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, they considered and responded to the comments of the ACHP. Therefore, they did not violate Section 106. And as that discussion also demonstrates, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the FHWA to select the FSU alternative under Section 4(f)(2). D. The MS&B Alternative The plaintiffs' final argument under Section 4(f)(2) is that the defendants violated the statute in designating the MS&B alternative imprudent and thus arbitrarily failing to consider the MS&B alternative in detail in the FEIS as a possible 4(f)(2) least harm alternative. Courts have held that an alternative that minimizes harm under Section 4(f)(2) can still be rejected if that alternative is infeasible or imprudent. See Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner, 893 F.2d 58, 62 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hickory I) (acknowledging that Section 4(f)(2) contains an implied feasible and prudent test); Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 716; Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 86 (5th Cir. 1976) (same). While the Supreme Court has articulated what infeasible or imprudent means in the 4(f)(1) context, it has not spoken to what those terms mean in the 4(f)(2) context. Under Section 4(f)(1), an alternative is not a prudent alternative if there are truly unusual factors present, if the cost or community disruption resulting from the alternative reaches extraordinary magnitudes, or if the alternative presents unique problems. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413. We believe that we should apply a similar feasible and prudent determination to the world of alternatives that must be considered under 4(f)(2). See Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, 537 F.2d at 86 (Although there is no express feasible and prudent exception to subsection (2), the act clearly implies that one is present.). We note in this regard that 4(f)(1) sets a very high standard for excluding alternatives that do not use historically significant property, since Congress has determined that the use of such property should be avoided wherever possible. The standard under 4(f)(2) for eliminating alternatives need not be quite so high, since by 25 the time 4(f)(2) is reached, some historically significant property will necessarily be used, as is the case here. We therefore hold that the Secretary must consider every feasible and prudent alternative that uses historically significant land when deciding which alternative will minimize harm, but that the Secretary has slightly greater leeway--compared to a 4(f)(1) inquiry--in using its expertise as a federal agency to decide what the world of feasible and prudent alternatives should be under 4(f)(2). We also look for guidance to caselaw examining what infeasible or imprudent means in the 4(f)(1) context. The plaintiffs argue that the MS&B alternative, which would require defendants to build another bridge upstream to siphon off through traffic that now passes through Danville on its way to a remote location, would minimize the harm to the Historic District by leaving Factory Street intact while reducing Mill Street congestion. They also point out that the Means Report concluded, Ideally, and most leaders we discussed it with agree, a bypass is the answer. The defendants rejected the MS&B option without performing an in-depth analysis of it because they concluded the option was imprudent and thus undeserving of inclusion in the balancing-of-harms test mandated by Druid Hills. In the FEIS, the defendants offered four reasons why they had not evaluated MS&B thoroughly and why they had deemed the MS&B alternative imprudent and infeasible. First, the defendants performed a study that asked drivers who used the Danville-Riverside Bridge whether they would use an upstream bypass. The 50% response rate resulted in 3,500 completed surveys, which the defendants felt was a sufficient sample size. Only 25% of the respondents indicated that they would use a bypass. The plaintiffs rejoin that most of the responses came from local traffic, so that the results were skewed downwards, though it is not clear in the record that most of the respondents were traveling locally. A 809 (charting purpose of respondent's trip but not destination).11 A determination _________________________________________________________________ 11. The plaintiffs are concerned that the proportion of tractor-trailer responses (which comprised 2% of the total responses) is not 26 that 75% of traffic would continue to use the DanvilleRiverside Bridge calls into serious question the usefulness of the bypass alternative in drawing traffic away from Danville. See, e.g., Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hickory II) (Secretary may reject as imprudent alternatives that will not solve or reduce existing traffic problems). Second, the defendants cited the cost of the project as high enough to render the MS&B alternative imprudent. The defendants believed that, for financial reasons, only one structure could be built, and that building a bypass upstream would foreclose the most important part of the project, which was to replace the Danville-Riverside Bridge. They stated, There is not, at this time, funding allocated and programming scheduled to allow the study and construction of a bypass bridge. While no cost studies were performed on the MS&B alternative, it is reasonable to assume that the costs required to build not only another bridge but also to lay over a mile of roadway and to cover condemnation, litigation, planning, engineering, and building costs for that roadway might total many times what would be required to rebuild the Danville-Riverside Bridge. Overton Park held that an agency may not exclude an alternative as imprudent under 4(f)(1) based on cost unless the costs would be of extraordinary magnitudes. 401 U.S. at 413. Here, it appears that the costs of an additional bridge would meet the definition of extraordinary. Third, the defendants highlighted the impact of the additional construction that would be necessary to build the MS&B alternative. The MS&B alternative would require that two bridges be built instead of one, and that an _________________________________________________________________ representative of the makeup of current bridge traffic. Plaintiffs calculate that trucks actually account for 12.5% of all bridge traffic. Nevertheless, even if we assume that there were additional responses by truck drivers such that the proportion of trucks in the survey was 12.5%, and that each of the additional responses stated that the truck driver would use the bypass, the survey would have demonstrated that only 33% of current bridge users would choose the bypass. We believe that a 33% predicted use rate still calls into question the usefulness of the bypass alternative. 27 additional 5,500 feet of road be laid, forcing construction that would impact the environment and communities near the second bridge site. Fourth, the defendants argued that there was no need for a bypass, as the FSU or MS alternative could fill the project needs on its own. Even if the cost increases would not be extraordinary, the problematic results of the use survey and the community and environmental disruption that would result from the additional construction combine to suggest that the MS&B alternative was neither prudent nor feasible. In the 4(f)(1) context, courts have held that an accumulation of smaller problems that, standing alone, would not individually constitute unique problems may together comprise sufficient reason for rejecting an alternative as imprudent. See Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Department of Transp., 4 F.3d 1543, 1550 (10th Cir. 1993) (Although none of these factors alone is clearly sufficient justification to reject the alternatives in this case, their cumulative weight is sufficient to support the Secretary's decision.); Hickory II, 910 F.2d at 163 (holding that a cumulation of problems may be sufficient reason to reject an alternative as imprudent); Eagle Found., Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1987) (same). In sum, we cannot conclude that it was arbitrary to reject this alternative in view of the low predicted use rate, the impact of the added construction, and the enormously increased costs, all of which, taken together, make the MS&B alternative imprudent for minimizing harm under 4(f)(2). We therefore hold that the defendants did not violate the requirements of Section 4(f) by failing to consider the MS&B alternative in greater detail. E. NEPA While 4(f)(2) ensures that the Secretary puts his thumb on the scales in favor of protecting historic properties, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. S 4321 et seq., governs the procedures surrounding the requisite balancing. Under NEPA, Congress directed all agencies of the federal government to include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal 28 actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-- (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Id. S 4332(2)(C). The agency must also study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources .. . . Id. S 4332(2)(E). The detailed statement, known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), is the device that promotes the fulfillment of NEPA's goal, which is to control the more destructive effects of man's technology on his environment. Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). The way in which NEPA achieves that goal is a procedural one. NEPA ensures that an agency has before it detailed information on significant environmental impacts when it makes its decisions and guarantees that this information is available to a larger audience. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1996). NEPA exists to ensure a process, not to ensure any result. Id. ; see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 29 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (NEPA requires an agency to take a hard look at the potential environmental consequences of proposed projects before taking action); Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1994) (NEPA does not mandate particular substantive results, but instead imposes only procedural requirements). Under NEPA, an agency decision to go forward with a major federal action after the agency has prepared and considered an Environmental Impact Statement, requires the court to determine whether all necessary procedures were followed, to consider de novo all relevant questions of law, and to examine the facts to determine whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. See Concord Township v. United States, 625 F.2d 1068, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1989) (stating that courts are to review factual disputes that implicate substantial agency expertise under the arbitrary and capricious standard). We make a pragmatic judgment whether the [EIS's] form, content and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed public participation, and [o]nce satisfied that a proposing agency has taken a `hard look' at a decision's environmental consequences, [our] review is at an end. City of Carmel-bythe-Sea v. United States Dep't of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The plaintiffs contend that the EIS was inadequate because it failed to consider the MS&B alternative, and that the FHWA therefore violated NEPA. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the FHWA only considered the Bypass alternative as a stand-alone alternative--rather than considering it in conjunction with the MS alternative--and therefore rejected the bypass as not meeting the primary purpose of the bridge replacement project. As discussed above, the plaintiffs believe that the combined MS&B alternative would most successfully achieve the goals of the project: to replace the bridge and to limit the traffic volume on Mill Street. To the extent that FHWA did consider the MS&B alternative, the plaintiffs argue, FHWA rejected it on the ground that funding was not available for both a new bridge and a bypass, and the plaintiffs allege that lack of 30 present funding is an improper reason to reject a viable alternative. The defendants respond that they considered the MS&B alternative in the DEIS and FEIS and rejected it as an unreasonable alternative for the four reasons it rejected the alternative under Section 4(f)(2): the origin and destination study indicated that the great majority of traffic would continue to use the Danville-Riverside Bridge rather than the bypass; it would vastly increase the scope and construction costs of the project; the FSU alternative alone would satisfy the needs of the project; and it would cause greater social and environmental impacts than the MS or FSU alternative would on its own. NEPA requires the defendants to consider only reasonable alternatives in the EIS. See Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that agency must look at every reasonable alternative but set forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choice); Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 713 (stating that the EIS should go beyond mere assertions and should devote substantial treatment to all reasonable alternatives). A number of courts recently have addressed the extent to which federal agencies must consider alternatives under NEPA. These courts have concluded that where the agency has examined a breadth of alternatives but has excluded from consideration alternatives that would not meet the goals of the project, the agency has satisfied NEPA. See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Administration, 161 F.3d 569, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding the defendants' consideration of alternatives under NEPA as sufficient to permit a reasoned choice); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1129 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding agency's decision where the FEIS had considered ten alternative plans of action based on visitor levels and effects of visitor use, eliminated two alternatives that were deemed impractical for failing to meet the goals of the project, and adequately explained why increased visitor use was not a viable goal). In the instant case, the defendants sufficiently explained why the MS&B alternative was not feasible and why it did 31 not warrant a highly detailed examination. The plaintiffs' argument that the MS&B alternative possibly could help achieve the two project goals of replacing the bridge and reducing Mill Street congestion encounters the same responses that the FHWA offered under Section 4(f): low use rate and excessive construction and environmental costs. In addition, in arguing for the MS&B alternative, the plaintiffs have not offered a specific, detailed counterproposal that had a chance of success. See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1986); Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that EIS did not have to consider alternative sites where plaintiffs failed to allege specific evidentiary facts showing that the alternative sites were reasonable and viable). In Druid Hills, the court concluded, Although the EIS does not contain what some may feel is a detailed and careful analysis of the relative environmental merits and demerits of the proposed action and possible alternatives, we find no sufficient basis in the record to disturb the district court's conclusion that appellees adequately analyzed the alternatives. Id. at 713; see also City of Carmel, 123 F.3d at 1151 (upholding a reasonably thorough FEIS). There is necessarily a limit to the thoroughness with which an agency can analyze every option, see Morongo Band, 161 F.3d at 575 (noting that, without parameters and criteria, an agency could generate countless alternatives), and our standard of review is quite deferential, see Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 166 F.3d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We conclude that the defendants adequately considered the MS&B alternative and its attendant flaws before rejecting it as infeasible. We therefore will affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the NEPA issue as well. The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 32