Opinion ID: 2326251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pastor Lusk's Speech To The Congregation

Text: The question of whether the comments contained in the pastor's speech to the congregationin which he mentioned the lawsuit, its impact on the congregation, its finances, etc.has come into play on appeal because Linklater relied on the speech to bring her claim within the applicable period of limitations under the continuing violation doctrine, in response to the Church's defense that her claim was barred by limitations. The majority holds that the speech to the congregation is protected speech in its entirety, and therefore inadmissible, but that Linklater's claim is not barred by limitations (on its face) because she alleges other retaliatory actions that occurred with the two-year limitations period. I agree with the majority that Respondent's claims are not barred by limitations, but do not agree that the entire speech is protected under the First Amendment. The majority holds that the ministerial exception applies to speech in which a pastor (1) informs the congregation of a pending lawsuit that could affect the church, and (2) proclaims that he or she is innocent of misconduct. Maj. Op. at 695-96, 28 A.3d at 1188-89. I submit that this demarcation of the protective wing of the ministerial exception is overly inclusive, and that in these statements, the pastor spoke and acted outside the range of the exception. [8] Indeed, the majority does not cite, and I have not found, any cases suggesting that the discussion of such matters is protected. The majority's rule is especially perilous because it suggests that simply by adding cursory religious content to a statement, a minister gains unlimited freedom to speak with impunity on almost any subject, protected from Title VII and corresponding state claims, as well as from defamation or other tort claims. This rule could allow an unscrupulous minister to use the pulpit to wage a campaign of continued harassment and defamation, cloaked in but unrelated to doctrine or theology. Lusk was addressing his congregation during the church's annual meeting. Lusk's remarks on Linklater took up approximately half of his entire address to the congregation, and they had a very personal tone. He protested to the entire congregation about Linklater's claim, singling her out by name. Lusk gave assurances that Linklater's allegations had no credence. He described his own personal and familial stress and called the lawsuit a crisis, a quagmire, and a personal trial. The content and tone of his speech could reasonably be interpreted as trying to sway congregational opinion against Linklater. Lusk encouraged the congregation to obtain a public-record copy of the Complaint that Linklater filed. He singled out another church member by name for representing Linklater and for demanding a $2.5 million settlement, calling the settlement negotiation disturbing. He even insinuated that Linklater's claim itself was retaliatory, in that she did not make her allegations until after the church council expressed displeasure with her performance. Lusk made it very clear that his motivation for speaking about Linklater was not spiritual in nature. He specifically said that he was not speaking in worship or teaching. His statement had little to do with church governance or an employment decision. Instead, his remarks could reasonably be perceived as an effort to turn congregational sentiment in his own favor and against Linklater. All of these factors operate to remove his remarks from the shelter of the ministerial exception. For these reasons, I would reach the same result as the majority on Counts I and III, holding that limitations is no bar to Petitioner's claims. But, I would rely on this speech, in addition to the photograph stabbing conduct relied on by the majority, to do so. Chief Judge BELL and Judge BATTAGLIA authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed in this opinion.