Opinion ID: 184717
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legislative Intent To Punish

Text: 73 Finally, we briefly address the final prong of the punishment test: whether the legislative record indicates a legislative intent to punish. As we noted in BellSouth I, BellSouth must show  'unmistakable evidence of punitive intent.'  144 F.3d at 67 (quoting Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 3348). [S]everal isolated statements are not sufficient to evince punitive intent. See Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 3348. 74 BellSouth again cites here, as it did in BellSouth I, the remarks of members of Congress that refer to the history of the BOCs and the breakup of AT&T. See Brief for Appellants at 28-29; Reply Brief for Appellants at 13-14 n.7. But, as we said in BellSouth I, the few scattered remarks referring to anticompetitive abuses allegedly committed by the BOCs in the past do not provide the kind of  'smoking gun' evidence of congressional vindictiveness. 144 F.3d at 67. Furthermore, as we explained above, Congress was justified in considering the MFJ when drafting the 1996 Act. Thus, we find that BellSouth has failed to show the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent that is required under Selective Service. 75 In sum, we find that § 271's restrictions do not fall within the historical meaning of legislative punishment, that they further nonpunitive purposes, and that there is no unmistakable evidence of legislative intent to punish. Thus, we find that § 271 does not constitute punishment according to the test articulated in Selective Service.