Opinion ID: 2325777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Brooks' Statement to the Police

Text: On May 3, 1978, the day he was arrested, appellant Brooks was interviewed by two detectives. He was read his Miranda rights [12] and indicated that he understood them, but did not sign the rights card because (the detective testified) his arm was in a cast. Brooks indicated that he was willing to answer questions without having an attorney present, and proceeded to give the detectives a statement, which was transcribed. He initially stated that, on the night of the shooting, he had gone to Smith's apartment about 5:00 or 6:00 p. m. and borrowed a bucket from Smith. When he went to return the bucket at 7:00 or so, Smith was not at home, but he was admitted by a man he had never seen before; three men were in the apartment, although he was not sure whether Turner was among them; and while he was in a back room he heard a shot, ran from the house, and went home and fell asleep. At this point, the detectives told Brooks they did not believe him, and (falsely) that Turner had already given a statement inculpating him. Brooks then asked for permission to telephone his mother. After a brief conversation with her, Brooks told the detectives that he did not want to protect the guilty any longer. He said that when he returned the bucket at 7:00 p. m., Turner was in fact present, and that, after some conversation, as Brooks prepared to leave, Turner pulled a gun and told him to relieve the other two men of their valuables. When Brooks protested that he did not want to be a part of this, Turner told him that he was going to help him take the niggers upstairs. Brooks claimed that he immediately bolted through the door, got in his car, and drove away, without hearing a shot or seeing Turner or the stolen money thereafter. Although he stated that he could read and write and had a ninth grade education, Brooks refused to sign this statement after reading it, stating that I just don't want to sign it. I just want to tell the truth. Despite the trial judge's ruling at the suppression hearing that Brooks' full statement was admissible, the statement itself was never moved into evidence at trial. On direct examination, the prosecution asked the detective who had questioned Brooks only a single question relative to Brooks' statement: Q. At that time, sir, [did] Mr. Brooks indicate[] to you whether or not he was present in 1414 Swann Street when that robbery occurred? A. Yes. He stated that he was.[ [13] ] Appellant Brooks argues on appeal that it was error for the trial court to have permitted the detective to testify concerning Brooks' statement, on the ground that the statement was involuntarily given and thus illegally obtained. Brooks also points to the detectives' trickery in falsely suggesting to Brooks that Turner had inculpated him as the most compelling consideration with respect to involuntariness, and the government has locked horns on this issue. But the text of Brooks' statement, as detailed at the suppression hearing, unequivocally demonstrates that Brooks told the detectives before being shown the false statement of Turner that he had been present during (although did not participate in) the robbery and shooting. While both consistent and inconsistent versions of this sequence were extracted from the detective at trial perhaps attributable to the fact that he did not have a copy of Brooks' statement before him when he recounted its contentsthis only gave Brooks the advantage of being able to argue to the jury that he had said nothing to the police until tricked into it, when he in fact had said at least that he was present in the apartment at the time of the crimes. We do not, however, regard the detectives' ploy here as relevant to the question of the admissibility of the particular portion of Brooks' statement recounted by the detective at trial. We thus do not reach the question of whether the trick employed here would have affected the admissibility of any portion of Brooks' statement subsequent thereto. See In re D.A.S., D.C.App., 391 A.2d 255, 256 (1978) (holding that the use of artifice does not by itself invalidate an otherwise voluntary confession). We confine inquiry to appellant's argument that the length and intensity of his interrogation, coupled with his failure to sign both his Miranda waiver card and his written statement, amount to a showing that his statement was involuntary. We find no merit in this argument. Whether an accused has voluntarily waived his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning must be determined by analyzing the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the purported waiver. Rosser v. United States, D.C.App., 313 A.2d 876, 878 (1974). See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-58, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Conversely, the trial court may, in deciding this question, properly consider the absence of circumstances tending to militate against a valid waiver. Walden v. United States, D.C.App., 351 A.2d 515, 517 (1976), quoting United States v. McNeil, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 3, 6, 433 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1969). In any event, the government bears the burden of proving a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487-89, 92 S.Ct. 619, 625-27, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). The government showed that only about one and a quarter hours elapsed from the time Brooks was first read his Miranda warnings to the time the detectives finished typing Brooks' three-page statement. Only ten minutes had passed, however, when Brooks indicated that he wished to make a statement. He was at this time readvised of his rights, and again orally acknowledged that he understood them but wished to speak without benefit of counsel. Appellant does not allege nor does the record suggest that he was in fact not advised of his rights, or threatened, mistreated, or promised special treatment. While counsel for Brooks faulted the detectives' failure to affirmatively test whether Brooks could read, counsel failed to proffer any evidence that Brooks was not telling the truth when he said in his statement that he could read and had finished the ninth grade. Moreover, Brooks was no stranger to custodial interrogation, having been previously arrested on a charge of armed robbery. While we ordinarily subject a written inculpatory statement to close scrutiny where the accused has not signed either his waiver card or the statement itself, we are satisfied that the failures here were not significant. Although we have held that even an unexplained failure to sign a waiver card does not preclude a finding of a valid waiver, Walden, supra at 517, the detective testified that Brooks did not sign his waiver card because of an injured arm, an explanation corroborated by Brooks' bail release form and not controverted at trial. Moreover, Brooks' apparent refusal to sign the detective's typed transcript of his statement does not, on the facts of this case, affect the admissibility of the detective's testimony that Brooks had admitted being present during the robbery. Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 73, 419 F.2d 651, 655 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058, 90 S.Ct. 1383, 25 L.Ed.2d 676 (1979). [14] Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Brooks' statement was voluntarily made, and thus, admissible.