Opinion ID: 1531299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to sequester the jury

Text: After the jury had been selected, the prosecutor announced in open court that the State was not demanding the death penalty. The trial judge thereupon suggested it might not be necessary to sequester the jury under those circumstances and asked the defendant's view. Counsel for the defendant at the trial, among other things, said, so long as the State was not seeking the death penalty, I see no reason why the jury should be sequestered, and justice could be done without it. The court then queried the prosecutor on his view and he insisted the jury be sequestered. The court implied it would accede to the prosecutor's suggestion. Counsel for the defendant then again called the court's attention to the fact that this may be a long and protracted trial and the sequestration of the jury would be expensive    and he urged the court to exercise its discretion against sequestration. The court refused to do so in face of the expression by the prosecutor to the contrary. In his formal opening to the jury, the prosecutor again stated: The State is not demanding the death penalty in this case. At the close of the testimony on the first day, the trial judge announced he had consulted with the attorneys on both sides and they have both indicated that they have no objection if I was to permit you ladies and gentlemen to go home rather than be sequestered every day and every night.    So that you ladies and gentlemen can retire to your homes each night and come back here in the morning. He also warned them against discussing the case with anyone and gave other protective instructions which are not in issue. The defendant, on appeal being represented by another attorney, submits that the court erred in failing to have the jury sequestered. In substance, she asserts this was a capital case and the defendant had a fundamental right to have the jury sequestered. State v. Cucuel, 31 N.J.L. 249 ( Sup. Ct. 1865); State v. O'Leary, 110 N.J.L. 36 ( E. & A. 1933). Although the procedure followed was not objected to by the defendant but, indeed, was the result of defendant's solicitation and request over the prosecutor's initial objections, it is insisted we should take notice of it as plain error under R.R. 1:5-1( a ). The first inquiry is whether or not this remained a capital case in face of the fact that the prosecution announced in open court it was not seeking the death penalty. Relying upon the O'Leary case, supra, the defendant says the waiver of the death penalty by the prosecution was not binding upon the jury, that the indictment alone controls in determining whether it is a capital case. The defendant contends: While the prosecution waived the death penalty in its opening and summation, the jury could have ignored the waiver, as it could have ignored the court's charge forbidding the death penalty. In this respect the court charged: So that if you did not make the recommendation of life imprisonment, it would carry the death penalty, but in this case you cannot render such a verdict. If you find a verdict of murder in the first degree, it must be with a recommendation of life imprisonment. We think there was error in the court's so charging. The case, by our adjudications, remained a capital one. State v. King, 106 N.J.L. 338 ( E. & A. 1930). Although the prosecutor had a right to waive the death penalty and so inform the jury, the jury nevertheless had the prerogative, if it decided to exercise it, under the statute, to return a verdict carrying with it the extreme penalty. The likelihood of its ever doing so, although remote, did not give the court the right to charge as it did. The court could properly have charged the jury that under these present circumstances it would assume, as did the prosecutor, that the death penalty would not be returned as it was not asked for, but the jury could not be stripped of its right to do so given by the Legislature. The question of sequestration of the jury has of recent date assumed increasing importance and attention. Accentuated by the protracted length of criminal trials, plus the high cost of the housing and living facilities required by the jury, the trend of modern decisions seems to be constantly tapering off from the ancient idea that the confinement of the jury in a criminal case is a prerequisite to insure an uninfluenced verdict. The rigidity of the former procedure is no longer accepted by the courts as a whole. Judicial discretion and proper supervisory powers are meeting with constantly added support, and the basis of determination seems to be whether or not the record indicates any actual or possible prejudice by reason of the departures indulged in. A full and interesting treatise on the subject, presenting all phases of the many conflicting decisions, is found in State of Washington v. Amundsen, 37 Wash. 2 d 356, 223 P. 2 d 1067, 21 A.L.R. 2 d 1088. The latitude allowed or the adherence to the rule varies according to the jurisdiction. A few states still maintain the dispersal of the jury is forbidden even where the defendant consents. In others, in increasing numbers, it is permitted in the discretion of the court but only where there is the consent of the defendant. In others, dispersal is permitted in the discretion of the court excepting where the defendant objects, while in still others dispersal is permitted in the discretion of the court even when the defendant objects. The states adopting the last rule are in predominance by a large majority. The question appears to have been clarified and settled in the federal jurisdiction, where jury separation even in a capital case is discretionary with the trial judge. Wheeler v. United States, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 363, 165 F. 2 d 225 ( Ct. App. D.C. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 829, 68 S.Ct. 448, 92 L.Ed. 1115 (1948). The defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. His complaint, amongst other things, was that the jury was allowed to separate during the course of the trial. The court said (165 F. 2 d, at page 229): Whether to keep the jury together in the trial of a capital case is discretionary in this jurisdiction. The court's action in that respect will not be reviewed unless it appears affirmatively that prejudice resulted to the defendant. The inquiry here is whether or not the rule of sequestration, as existing in our jurisdiction, should be dogmatically followed where the prosecutor waived the death penalty and the defendant not only consented but importuned and proposed the suspension of the sequestration rule. In State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426 (1949), the trial judge, in response to a request by the jury and with the consent of the defendant's counsel but in the absence of the defendant himself, transmitted to the jury a paper on which he had written the possible verdicts it could return, and it was contended this was error. Justice Oliphant for our court determined there was no interference with the defendant's right to maintain his defense on the merits and no prejudicial error by reason of his absence, saying (at p. 431): Unfortunate, inexcusable and irregular incidents amounting to bad procedural practice occurred during the course of the trial of the case. Neither the Judge, the Prosecutor of the Pleas or counsel for the defendant should have allowed these situations to have arisen. And again, noting particularly that no objection to the procedure was made by counsel nor was any request made that the defendant be present, the court said: The defendant has further failed to take into consideration Rule 1:2-19 ( b ) which provides `No judgment given upon any indictment shall be reversed   . For [ sic ] any error except such as shall have prejudiced the defendant in maintaining his defense upon the merits.' Conceding the procedure here to be irregular both as to the privy communication of the judge with the jury and the absence of the defendant at some stages of the trial, which we are compelled to do, the sole test is whether such irregularities prejudice the defendant in maintaining his defense on the merits. In State v. Roscus, 16 N.J. 415 (1954), like the Auld case, supra, a trial resulting in the death penalty, error was claimed because of the interruption of sequestration of the jury. But the court found the defendant consented to what had occurred, and we unanimously held (at page 428): There was clearly no error, and, even if one had existed, the defendant waived it by failing to enter timely objection thereto. The defendant here attempts to show prejudice by reason of an article appearing in a certain newspaper publication, but there is no proof that the jury was influenced or even read the article in question. Our rules provide that no judgment shall be reversed for any error except such as shall have prejudiced the defendant in maintaining his defense on the merits. R.R. 1:5-1( b ). The record in the instant case shows no such factual basis. The defendant cannot beseech and request the trial court to take a certain course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure he sought and urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial. We have found no such adjudication on our books, nor are we prone to extend or enlarge the ruling in other factual situations to apply to the case sub judice. In a murder case, where the death penalty is waived by the prosecution and the defendant asks for or consents to the dispersal of the jury, the defendant will not then be heard to claim error or prejudice after the verdict is rendered, unless he can prove he was prejudiced.