Opinion ID: 1667375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Relating to the Guilt Phase

Text: Anderson makes five claims relating to the guilt phase, which are now addressed.
Anderson claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on the grounds of section 552.020.14, RSMo 2000, [3] when the State called Dr. Byron English as a rebuttal witness in the guilt phase and he testified as to statements Anderson made during his section 552.020 competency examination. Dr. English, a Department of Mental Health psychologist and forensic examiner, was designated to evaluate Anderson pursuant to section 552.020 to determine if he was competent to proceed to trial. The State called Dr. English during the guilt phase to rebut the evidence presented by the defense's two expert witnesses, Drs. Pincus and Lewis, who opined that Anderson suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crimes. Before the rebuttal phase of the trial began, defense counsel twice objected to the State calling Dr. English as a rebuttal witness because he had stated in his deposition that he was unable to render an opinion as to Anderson's mental state at the time of the crimes. The trial court overruled the objections, stating that it could not determine if Dr. English had relevant information until he testified. The trial court advised defense counsel to make clear on cross-examination Dr. English's inability to testify about Anderson's mental state at the time of the crimes, if his testimony raised that issue. Dr. English was the state's only rebuttal witness. His testimony discussed the various types of tests he had Anderson perform and the results of some of those tests. He testified that he tested Anderson for somewhere between two to two and a half hours in 1999. [4] When asked if his evaluation indicated that Anderson suffered a mental disease or defect, Dr. English responded, No. On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr. English stated that his evaluation did not go into Anderson's mental status when the crime took place. Defense counsel elicited that Dr. English could not rule out that Anderson had a mental disease or defect that would manifest itself when he was under severe stress. During redirect examination, however, the prosecutor asked: Doctor . . . the defendant denied any symptoms indicating depression, brain damage or any other mental disease or defect, didn't he? Dr. English responded: Yes, he did. The prosecutor highlighted this testimony during closing arguments, stating: [Anderson] told Dr. English he didn't have any of the symptoms of any of those psychiatric disorders that the experts from the East Coast says he has. Anderson argues that section 552.020.14 prohibited Dr. English's testimony and a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances would have objected on that ground. Section 552.020.14 provides: No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination or treatment pursuant to this section and no information received by any examiner or other person in the course thereof, whether such examination or treatment was made with or without the consent of the accused or upon his motion or upon that of others, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding then or thereafter pending in any court, state or federal. A finding by the court that the accused is mentally fit to proceed shall in no way prejudice the accused in a defense to the crime charged on the ground that at the time thereof he was afflicted with a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, nor shall such finding by the court be introduced in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury. 552.020.14 (emphasis added). This section prevents testimony about statements made by the accused or information received during a section 552.020 examination being used as evidence on the issue of guilt. [5] Contrary to the State's assertions, portions of Dr. English's testimony were inappropriate under the prohibitions of section 552.020.14, particularly his testimony regarding Anderson's denial during the evaluation that he suffered a mental disease or defect. Dr. English's testimony was presented by the State as proof of Anderson's guiltto show he was capable of deliberation. A reasonably competent defense counsel in similar circumstances would have objected to those portions of his testimony that violated section 552.020.14. The first prong of Strickland is met. [6] Although Anderson satisfied the first prong of Strickland on this issue, he is unable to satisfy the second prong in that he cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to Dr. English's testimony on the basis of section 552.020.14. Defense counsel ensured that Dr. English made clear that his evaluation of Anderson did not relate to Anderson's mental state at the time of the crimes. Dr. English testified that he could not rule out that Anderson suffered a mental disease or defect that would manifest itself under severe stress. While there was little relevance in Dr. English's testimony, and indeed portions of it were prohibited under section 552.020.14, Anderson has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error, the result of his trial would have been different.
Anderson further claims that his direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. English to offer rebuttal testimony. He argues that a reasonably competent appellate counsel would have asserted that the trial court erred in overruling the objections trial counsel made to Dr. English testifying, an issue preserved at trial and through inclusion in the motion for new trial. Further, he asserts that competent appellate counsel would have raised the issue that the trial court plainly erred in allowing Dr. English's testimony given the prohibitions of section 552.020.14. Anderson was entitled to effective assistance of his appellate counsel. Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 148 (Mo. banc 2005). In reviewing whether his appellate counsel was effective, the Strickland standard is applied. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Anderson must show that his appellate counsel failed to raise a claim of error that a competent and effective lawyer would have recognized and asserted. Tisius v. State, 183 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Mo. banc 2006). He must also have shown that the claimed error [was] sufficiently serious to create a reasonable probability that, if it was raised, the outcome of the appeal would have been different. Id. (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000)). Where an alleged error that was not raised was not preserved, the right to relief due to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel tracks the plain error rule and requires that the error not raised be so substantial as to amount to a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Middleton v. State, 80 S.W.3d 799, 808 (Mo. banc 2002). Anderson cannot prevail on his claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue of plain error relating to Dr. English's testimony under section 552.020.14. Anderson has not demonstrated that the outcome of his appeal would have been different had this issue been raised in that he cannot show that he would have prevailed under plain error review of this issue. No manifest injustice resulted from Dr. English's testimony. The testimony was not prejudicial to Anderson in that Dr. English made clear that his evaluation did not relate to Anderson's mental state at the time of the crime and he could not rule out that Anderson suffered a mental disease or defect that would manifest itself under severe stress. Anderson also cannot show that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the preserved issue that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's objections to Dr. English's testimony. The trial court, properly exercising its discretion, determined that it would not prevent his testimony because it did not yet know what he would say on the stand. The trial court advised defense counsel to make clear the limitations of Dr. English's testimony during questioning. Anderson cannot show that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his appeal would have been different even if his appellate counsel had raised the issue of the trial court permitting Dr. English to testify in rebuttal. Anderson's claims relating to Dr. English's testimony do not warrant post-conviction relief.
Anderson also alleges that the motion court erred in denying him post-conviction relief because the State failed to satisfy its Brady obligations when the prosecutor advised the victims' daughter, Abbey Rainwater, not to authorize release of her psychiatric records. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), due process is violated where the prosecutor suppresses evidence favorable to the defendant that is material to either guilt or punishment. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Shafer, 969 S.W.2d 719, 741 (Mo. banc 1998). The prosecution cannot evade its duty under Brady by simply avoiding possession of evidence that Brady would require it to disclose. State v. Robinson, 835 S.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Mo. banc 1992). In determining if there is a Brady violation, this Court examines whether the prosecutor's failings prejudiced the defense, as [t]he requirements of Brady are designed to guarantee a fair trial and to prevent wrongful convictions. State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-88, 83 S.Ct. 1194). Anderson argues that the prosecutor's actions caused a Brady violation by preventing the defense from obtaining mental health records that documented that Anderson was a source of conflict between Abbey and her parents. Anderson argues that these records would have illuminated how he was impacted by Abbey's overall mental health and would have supported the defense theory that he snapped because he was paranoid that the Rainwaters were trying to take his child from him. These arguments are unpersuasive. Anderson fails to demonstrate that Abbey's mental health records were material evidence to the issues of his guilt and punishment, and he cannot show that failure to obtain the records prejudiced him. This claim does not merit post-conviction relief.
Anderson further asserts that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his counsel was ineffective for failing to retain and call Dr. Donald Cross, who would have testified that Anderson suffered post-traumatic stress disorder due to past abuse. Anderson argues that Dr. Cross's testimony would have increased the probability that the jury would have accepted his diminished capacity defense. `Generally, the selection of witnesses and the introduction of evidence are questions of trial strategy and virtually unchallengeable.' Taylor v. State, 126 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Mo. banc 2004) (quoting State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Mo. banc 1997)). `[D]efense counsel is not required to shop for an expert witness who might provide more favorable testimony.' Id. (quoting Kenley, 952 S.W.2d at 268). Anderson's defense counsel used the testimony of two expert witnesses, Drs. Lewis and Pincus, to support a diminished capacity defense. Defense counsel was not required to offer Dr. Cross's testimony to support or supplement the theories of Drs. Lewis and Pincus. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Dr. Cross to make Anderson's defense even more compelling. Anderson is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this claim.
Anderson argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to and preserve for appellate review the prosecutor's arguments during the guilt phase that (1) but for quick police response, the body count would have been higher and (2) to find Anderson not guilty of first-degree murder required the jury to believe the hired mercenaries, defense experts Drs. Lewis and Pincus. Anderson asserts that his conviction and sentences would have been reversed on direct appeal if these comments had been objected to and properly preserved and not subject to plain error review. Anderson previously complained on direct appeal about these comments. This Court noted that they could only be reviewed for plain error and opined: With respect to [the] claims of error . . . for which no objection was offered . . . we find no error of law. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d at 439. The motion court cited the direct appeal decision in rejecting this Rule 29.15 argument, stating that because this Court had determined that no error of law occurred, counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection. Anderson, however, argues that the finding on direct appeal was that there was no plain error. He cites Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 428-29 (Mo. banc 2002), for the proposition that a finding on direct appeal that there was no plain error does not preclude review of the issue in a Rule 29.15 case, because a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a level of prejudice below that required for plain error. The State asserts that this issue is meritless because the holding on direct appeal that there was no error of law differs from a finding that there was no plain error and, therefore, precludes Rule 29.15 review. In support of this argument, the State cites Cole v. State, wherein this Court rejected an argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to four statements made by the prosecutor that this Court had determined on direct appeal to be no error of law. 152 S.W.3d 267, 268-69 (Mo. banc 2004) (citing State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 169-70 (Mo. banc 2002)). The State also cites Ringo v. State, in which this Court rejected a Rule 29.15 claim where on direct appeal this Court had declared the claim was no[t] error, plain or otherwise. 120 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Mo. banc 2003) (citing State v. Ringo, 30 S.W.3d 811, 818 (Mo. banc 2000)). Unlike the underlying direct appeal decisions in Cole and Ringo , however, the decision in Anderson's direct appeal details the plain error standard before concluding that there was no error of law. Under these circumstances, it is less clear that the pronouncement that there was no error of law was not equivalent to a statement that there was no plain error. As such, consideration is given to Anderson's claim regarding his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments. To prevail on this claim, Anderson must show that his counsel's objections would have been upheld if made and that the failure to object resulted in a substantial deprivation of his right to a fair trial. State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 228 (Mo. banc 1997). Anderson has failed to meet this burden. So long as the prosecutor stays within the record and its reasonable inferences, the argument is proper. State v. Jones, 384 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Mo.1964). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make non-meritorious objections. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 228. Further, counsel's failure to object during closing argument is generally not error, but is a function of trial strategy. Id. Finally, Anderson has not demonstrated that Strickland prejudice resulted from these two comments, nor is he persuasive that he would have prevailed in his direct appeal had his counsel properly objected to and preserved these arguments for review. Anderson is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this claim.