Opinion ID: 2165690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Liability of the Racetrack

Text: In his charge to the jury, the trial justice ruled that Wickman, Tempest and Shannon were agents of the bureau. None of the parties before us disputes this conclusion. The racetrack, however, disclaims liability for the detectives' actions arguing that as related to it, the detectives were only agents of an independent contractor. We cannot agree. It has long been the general rule in this state that vicarious liability does not flow from the act of an independent contractor. This rule is not without exception. See Blount v. Fong, 48 R.I. 453, 138 A. 52. There we noted that where a duty to the public is imposed by ordinance, the contractee cannot escape liability by the simple expedient of delegating the work to an independent contractor. We approved the rule that the employer remains liable despite his delegation of a responsibility imposed by law. The record before us shows that the racetrack operates by a license granted to it by the state commission on horse racing and athletics. G.L. 1956, § 41-3-9, authorizes the race commission to promulgate rules for the operation of the track and stables. Rule 593 is one such promulgation: 593. It is also the duty of the Track Superintendent to preserve order, enforce decorum, and prevent petty games of chance on the grounds of the Association at such times as a Meeting is not in progress. When a Meeting is in progress, those duties shall fall upon the Association Police Force.  (italics ours) In 1960 the general assembly enacted chap. 148, § 1, now cited as G.L. 1956, § 41-3-17, as amended, entitled Ejection of undesirable persons  Rights of licensee: Any licensee hereunder shall have the right to refuse admission to and to eject from the enclosure of any race track where a race meeting licensed under the provisions of this chapter, is being held, any person or persons whose presence within said enclosure is, in the sole judgment of said licensee, its agents or servants, undesirable, and whose presence is inconsistent with the orderly and proper conduct of such race meeting. It is readily apparent to us from a reading of the racing commission's rules and the statute vesting the racetrack with broad powers of ejection that the protection of the race-going public from the presence of bookmakers, touts, pickpockets and other undesirables is a duty which is imposed by law upon the racetrack. While nothing prevents a licensee from permitting a third party to carry out this activity, defendant racetrack cannot expect to avoid liability by so doing. We have examined many cases involving facts similar to those we find before us, especially those cases found in Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 15, at 61. We believe that our holding that the racetrack's responsibility for the protection of the public and the preservation of order upon its premises is nondelegable is consistent with the better rule in these cases. See Szymanski v. Great A & P Tea Co., 79 Ohio App. 407, 74 N.E.2d 205, 35 Ohio Op. 177; Adams v. F.W. Woolworth Co., (N.Y.), 144 Misc. 27, 257 N.Y.S. 776. We feel that a holding to the contrary would immunize the racetrack from responsibility imposed by law thereby permitting it to subject its patrons to the hazards of an irresponsible detective agency while escaping all danger of legal ramifications adverse to itself.