Opinion ID: 3159684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delaware’s Approach Applied to this Case

Text: With these principles of Delaware law in mind, we find that Espinoza has not met his burden to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss. JPMorgan’s investigation into the entire London Whale incident was exhaustive. The board created a Review Committee composed of three outside board members, who retained independent counsel and an expert advisor to assist in the investigation. The Review Committee also oversaw a management Task Force, also assisted by 8 separate independent counsel. Their efforts resulted in the publication of two extensive written reports, a 129‐page report prepared by the Task Force and a shorter report compiled by the Review Committee, and led to many of the changes demanded by Espinoza, including clawbacks, reductions in compensation, and reformed internal guidelines and controls. This case is therefore distinguishable from those in which a board, faced with similar demands, conducted only a half‐hearted investigation, peremptorily stopped the investigation, or did nothing with the results. See, e.g., Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l, Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 973, 979 (Del. Ch. 2013) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss where the special committee investigating the plaintiff’s demand held no meetings, released no reports, and eventually was left with no members); Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 611 A.2d 5, 8–11 (Del. Ch. 1991) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss where the members of the special litigation committee resigned after producing a report, the corporation never showed the contents of the report to stockholders, and the directors never formally responded to the plaintiff’s demand letter). 9 Moreover, under Delaware law, the board was not required to send Espinoza a detailed letter explaining its refusal with a point‐by‐point response to each of the five claims he raised in his demand letter. See, e.g., Baron v. Siff, No. 15152, 1997 WL 666973, at  (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 1997) (“The refusal letter’s failure to state that the Board held a meeting and failure to contain a point‐by‐point response to all allegations in the demand letter does not stand for the proposition that the Board did not consider the demand before refusing it. . . . The Board’s detailed responses to several of plaintiff’s allegations reveal its familiarity with the issues plaintiff raised.”). The minimal requirements for boards contemplating stockholder demands are consistent with “a central tenet of Delaware corporate law, that there is ‘no single blueprint a board must follow to fulfill its duties,’ including with respect to stockholder demands.” Ironworkers Dist. Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity Ret. & Pension Plan v. Andreotti, No. 9714‐VCG, 2015 WL 2270673, at  n.254 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2015) (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)). For example, in Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 214 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d 244 at 253, the Court of Chancery found that the “only reasonable inference to be drawn” from the 10 board’s five‐line reply letter advising the stockholder that it had “review[ed] . . . the matters” set forth in the stockholder’s demand letter was that the board “did act in an informed manner in addressing Levine’s demand.” In this case, by describing the nature of its investigation and the remedial steps taken as a result, JPMorgan’s four‐page refusal letter thus far exceeded the minimum required. As the Delaware Supreme Court observed in its response, “No doubt it is conceivable that an investigative committee that was charged with investigating two materially important and materially distinct subjects could be deemed grossly negligent if it did an indisputably careful job investigating one, and did no job at all of investigating the other,” but the critical question is the “contextual importance of that [allegedly uninvestigated] issue in the overall scope of what the committee was charged with investigating.” Delaware Response at . In other words, whether JPMorgan’s board discharged its duty to investigate Espinoza’s demand depends on whether the “supposedly distinct category [he] allege[s] went uninvestigated . . . was . . . distinct from the category that was indisputably investigated, and whether it was material, when viewed in the overall context of the debacle.” Id. at . 11 Reviewing the record in light of the Delaware Supreme Court’s response, we note that investigating the allegedly “materially false/misleading statements and omissions” made by JPMorgan executives was just one of five claims raised in Espinoza’s demand letter, and bringing legal action against the alleged wrongdoers was but one of the many remedies that Espinoza demanded. J.A. 69– 70. It is also clear from the Task Force report, cited in JPMorgan’s response to Espinoza, that the board was well aware of the executives’ statements referenced in Espinoza’s letter, see J.A. 340–41, and that the board investigated the extent of the executives’ knowledge at the time the statements were made as part of its overall inquiry, see J.A. 334; 339; 361. After conducting “[a]n evaluation of the claims against potential defendants and the likelihood of a recovery of damages,” the board determined that “litigation would not be in the best interests of” JPMorgan. J.A. 85. JPMorgan’s response, together with the Task Force report, thus directly contradicts Espinoza’s contention that the board was recklessly indifferent to the claims he raised or unreasonable in refusing his demand. Accordingly, we find that Espinoza has not met his burden to rebut the strong presumption of the business judgment rule, as defined by Delaware law. 12 In addition to recognizing that Delaware law rejects judicial second‐ guessing when a board has made a decision on a matter of internal corporate affairs, we also note two practical considerations. First, as we observed in our previous opinion, to require boards to detail a response to every issue raised in a demand letter could risk incentivizing plaintiffs to include a laundry list of potential claims, each of which boards would have to respond to, no matter how meritless. See Espinoza, 797 F.3d at 240; cf. Levine, 591 A.2d at 214 (“While a board of directors has a duty to act on an informed basis in responding to a demand . . . , there is obviously no prescribed procedure that a board must follow.”). Second, providing additional detail in a refusal letter could expose the corporation to regulatory or other legal risks, and the board is entitled to—and typically, required to—mitigate that risk in deciding how to respond to a stockholder’s demand. Indeed, the board cited the risk of adverse legal action against JPMorgan as one of its reasons not to pursue litigation. See J.A. 85 (listing “[t]he effect of litigation brought by the Company on the Company’s position in third‐party litigation, regulatory investigations, and potential enforcement 13 proceedings” as a factor in deciding “that litigation would not be in the best interests” of JPMorgan). As the Court of Chancery has observed: A board may in good faith refuse a shareholder demand to begin litigation even if there is substantial basis to conclude that the lawsuit would eventually be successful on the merits. It is within the bounds of business judgment to conclude that a lawsuit, even if legitimate, would be excessively costly to the corporation or harm its long‐term strategic interests. In re infoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 2007). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Espinoza has not sufficiently rebutted the presumption that JPMorgan’s board acted in good faith in responding to his demand letter, and we accordingly AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. 14