Opinion ID: 1189525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expenses Incurred by Defendants Relative to Continuance of Trial on Plaintiffs' Application

Text: It is finally urged that the district court committed prejudicial error because it taxed to plaintiffs one-half of the costs and expenses of a continuance of the trial of the case incurred by the defendants. The situation presented appears to be as follows: The above entitled cause by a formal order of the District Court of Niobrara County was on February 24, 1953, set for trial on March 11, 1953, at 9:30 A.M. None of the parties hereto appears to have objected to this order nor was any effort made by any one after the entry thereof to obtain a change or modification of the same. On March 11, 1953, the defendants appeared with their attorneys and witnesses in the district court aforesaid and announced that they were ready and prepared for the trial of the cause. However, neither the plaintiffs, their attorneys, nor their witnesses appeared in said court on the 11th day of March aforesaid. They did nothing to advise the defendants prior to the date last mentioned that the plaintiffs and their attorneys would not be present to proceed with the trial on the 11th day of March, 1953, pursuant to the court order setting its trial on that date. However, plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter (marked, mailed at Wheatland, Wyoming, at 2:00 P.M. on March 10, 1953) to the defendants' counsel at Casper, stating that plaintiffs did not intend to be present in the Niobrara District Court at Lusk. This letter did not reach the office of counsel for the defendants until after the time the cause was set for trial, as above-recited. No notice was given defendants or their counsel that plaintiffs would not be in Lusk ready to proceed with the trial as set by the court order aforesaid, and no excuse seems to have been offered why that was not done. So far as appears herein, the telegraphic wires and long distance telephone wires were at all times between the 24th of February, 1953, and the 11th day of March, 1953, available to counsel for plaintiffs. If these facilities had been used, defendants' counsel could have been notified in time to prevent their attendance on the date set and obviated the expenses incurred. One of the defendants has its principal office in Oklahoma and the other in Denver, Colorado. On March 13, 1953, the defendants' counsel verified their petition for payment of costs wherein they requested that the court order payment to them for the actual expenses in the sum of $538.17 incurred in bringing counsel and witnesses to Lusk on the date set for trial as above-recited. This petition, with plaintiffs' answer thereto, was presented to the court on April 27, 1953. It seems that on March 11, 1953, the plaintiffs had requested the judge of said court over the long distance telephone to postpone and continue the trial of the cause to a later date. This was apparently done for the case was not tried until September 2, 1953. On April 27, 1953, the court entered the following order: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff shall pay the defendants the sum of $269.08, and that until such payment is made all proceedings herein shall be and hereby are stayed and that plaintiffs shall not be permitted to proceed further with this cause or to try the same until such payment is made. Subsequently, the plaintiffs paid the amount thus ordered, which, it will be noted was one-half of the amount actually expended by the defendants in obeying the court's order of February 24, 1953, and being in Lusk ready for trial on the day set by the court order heretofore mentioned. Our statutes relative to the matter are: Any court, for good cause shown, other than the absence of evidence, may continue any action at any stage of the proceedings, at the cost of the applicant, to be paid as the court shall direct. (W.C.S., 1945, § 3-2002) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the costs of motions, continuances, amendments, and the like, shall be taxed and paid as the court may direct. (W.C.S., 1945, § 3-3726) We note that 17 C.J.S. Continuance § 5 says that it is a general rule that the granting or refusing of a motion for continuance is wholly or largely within the sound discretion of the trial court. The same text also states at page 271: Where a party accepts the conditions on which a continuance is granted, which he may do by accepting the continuance, or by failing to waive it promptly, he cannot afterward complain that the court exceeded its power. In Richardson v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company, 256 Mich. 444, 240 N.W. 65, 66, the court said: Defendant's right to costs, if continuance were granted, was clear. Plaintiff had the option of refusing continuance on the terms ordered or of accepting it. If he was not content with the conditions, he should have made his showing in opposition, refused to accept the continuance, and put his refusal and reasons upon the record for the purpose of review. The record does not indicate that he objected to the terms on any ground or that he refused the continuance. By accepting the continuance, he accepted its terms, and thereby lost his right to attack them as an abuse of discretion. 13 C.J. p. 194; Barney v. Love, 101 Mich. 543, 60 N.W. 58. Under the circumstances appearing before us in the record, we must decline to interfere with the judgment of the district court dismissing the case, believing as we do that a correct result was reached. Accordingly, we think we should order an affirmance of that judgment. Affirmed. BLUME, J., AND HARNSBERGER, J., concur.