Opinion ID: 3131405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Serenyi Evidence

Text: Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â RTD first contends that the court of appeals erred in affirming the commissionâs unilateral deviation from Judge Frickâs ruling in limine regarding the Serenyi Evidence. We agree. Although a trial judge who is overseeing a commission hearing need not affirmatively grant or deny a motion in limine to exclude evidence, if the judge does issue an explicit ruling, then the commission is bound by that ruling and may not deviate from it. Here, Judge Frick explicitly denied, on relevance grounds, amongÂ others, Landownerâs motion to exclude Serenyiâs expert witness testimony regarding the alternate average-value and income-based approaches to industrial property valuation. The commission nevertheless sustained Landownerâs relevance objection at the hearing and deemed the evidence inadmissible without requesting that the judge revisit her previous ruling. In doing so, the commission exceeded its implied authority by contravening the supervising judgeâs explicit ruling on the motion in limine. Therefore, the commissionâs deviation from the judgeâs decision was erroneous. Furthermore, that the ruling was in limine and subject to alteration is of no moment; it certainly could have been altered on the basis of new information, but only by the supervising judge herself. Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Importantly, we do not imply that a judge must rule conclusively on motions in limine regarding the admissibility of evidence. To the contrary, a judge retains broad discretion to decline to rule on an evidentiary motion, thus allowing the commission to rule on the evidence once it becomes apparent during the hearing how that evidence is to be used. See, e.g., City of Englewood v. Denver Waste Transfer, L.L.C., 55 P.3d 191, 195 (Colo. App. 2002) (describing a supervising judgeâs reservation of a motion in limine to exclude testimony, where the judge stated that âit is up to the Commission, basically, to determine how that evidence is to be received and treated, and what weight, if any, is to be accordedâ). But that was not the case hereârather, Judge Frick unequivocally ruled that â[t]he remaining aspects of Respondent-Landownerâs Motion, including its request to preclude Mr. Serenyi from testifying as to âaverage valueâ and the income approach, is DENIED.â In such situations, a commission may not disregardÂ the judicial ruling. If the commission feels that the evidence as presented was inadmissible, then it may request that the judge reevaluate her previous ruling, but the judge need not do so, and the commission remains bound by any judicial rulings. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because we hold that the commission in this case erred by unilaterally excluding the evidence, we reverse that portion of the court of appeals decision approving of the commissionâs deviation from the judgeâs previous evidentiary ruling. We next address the Willow Street Evidence.