Opinion ID: 1388651
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appointment of an Attorney

Text: Respondent sought from the Committee the appointment of counsel to represent him in the disciplinary proceedings. On the day of the Committee hearing, respondent filed with the Board of Governors several requests for relief, a motion for a judicial determination, and orders to appoint counsel and vacate all prior proceedings regarding appointed counsel. Respondent then filed with the Commission a motion for a new order of stay in which he argued that his motion for appointment of counsel was still pending before the Board of Governors and requested a stay of one year from the date of any ruling on that motion. The Board of Governors denied respondent's request for counsel. Respondent then filed with the Committee a Motion for New Stay and to Enforce Existing Stay, a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and a Motion to Vacate Hearing, all of which the Committee denied. The Commission entered its formal order denying respondent's Motion for New Order of Stay. After these rulings, respondent reurged his request for appointment of counsel in almost every pleading or motion he made. Although rule 53(c)(2), Ariz.Sup.Ct. Rules, provides that a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to be represented by a lawyer ..., we do not believe that this entitlement extends to the appointment of counsel at State Bar expense. The Bar's citation of California authority ( Marquette v. State Bar of California, 44 Cal.3d 253, 242 Cal. Rptr. 886, 746 P.2d 1289 (1988); Palomo v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal.3d 785, 205 Cal. Rptr. 834, 685 P.2d 1185 (1984); Yokozeki v. State Bar of California, 11 Cal.3d 436, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602, 521 P.2d 858, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900, 95 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed.2d 145 (1974)) is inapposite because, unlike Arizona, the California state bar has a specific statutory procedure for the appointment of counsel in disciplinary matters. [3] Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 6085 (West 1990); see also Slaten v. State Bar of California, 46 Cal.3d 48, 249 Cal. Rptr. 289, 757 P.2d 1 (1988). Moreover, representation, let alone appointment, of counsel is not an absolute right in California disciplinary matters. See, e.g., Hyland v. State Bar of California, 59 Cal.2d 765, 773-74, 31 Cal. Rptr. 329, 334, 382 P.2d 369, 374 (1963) (attorney who represented himself because he could not afford counsel could not, after an adverse result, assert for the first time that counsel should have been appointed for him); Slaten, 46 Cal.3d 48, 58-59, 249 Cal. Rptr. 289, 296, 757 P.2d 1, 8 (attorney was not denied statutory right to reasonable opportunity to be represented by counsel when record indicated that attorney's alleged mental illness was not so severe that he was unable to assist in his own defense, attorney had ample opportunity to establish right to have counsel appointed, and received notice of procedure for obtaining appointment of counsel, but failed to file completed application form). Respondent has filed continuances, stays, motions for summary judgments, and other pleadings, and has otherwise acted competently, if unprofessionally, throughout these proceedings. His primary basis for requesting appointed counsel is his claim of indigency. We, however, share bar counsel's doubt about respondent's indigency in this case. It is also odd that an individual, who up until recently, had law partners, and who claims in the bankruptcy proceedings to have assets of $4,635,344 and debts of $1,016,620 cannot obtain legal assistance through reasonable efforts. Respondent has stated in the bankruptcy court that his primary asset  160 acres of real property  is worth no less than $1,400,000 and possibly as much as $4,320,000. He has further admitted that, the value of property or funds available after the [pending civil] appeal whether win, lose or draw is substantial ... In appearances before the Disciplinary Commission, respondent has stated that his net take-home pay during the past nine months was less than $3,000 per month. He has also disclosed that he has a positive net worth. For all these reasons, it is difficult to accept respondent's current (and selective) claim of indigency. As noted above, respondent is generally entitled to be represented by counsel in a disciplinary proceeding. Rule 53(c)(2), Ariz.Sup.Ct.Rules. However, because disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, an indigent respondent's request for appointed counsel is properly refused. Ohio State Bar Assoc. v. Illman, 45 Ohio St.2d 159, 342 N.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824, 97 S.Ct. 77, 50 L.Ed.2d 86 (1976). See also State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assoc. v. Nielsen, 179 Neb. 55, 136 N.W.2d 355 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 105, 86 S.Ct. 718, 15 L.Ed.2d 618 (1966), and cert. denied, 386 U.S. 266, 87 S.Ct. 1047, 18 L.Ed.2d 52 (1967), and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 154, 88 S.Ct. 342, 19 L.Ed.2d 355 (1967).