Opinion ID: 177345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Giving Full AEDPA Deference, Is Factfinding Regarding Traditional Sentencing Factors Free of Apprendi Restraints?

Text: Reference has been made throughout these proceedings to the fact that the second step and its factfinding involve the consideration of traditional sentencing factors and is not unlike the requirements of Section 3553(a). [20] I agree but find the point irrelevant. Blakely/Cunningham radically altered the use of traditional sentencing factors where findings of fact and conclusions regarding traditional factors alter maximum sentences. Indeed, each of those cases involved sentencing enhancements altering maximum sentences based on generalized findings well within the range of traditional factorssubstantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence, Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531, and circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime, Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 277, 127 S.Ct. 856but were still held unconstitutional. As for Section 3553(a), that provision is certainly an expression of traditional factors, but it cannot be used to alter maximum sentences. That is in fact what Booker was about. [21]