Opinion ID: 173724
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mere Presence Jury Instruction

Text: Fernández faults the district court for delivering its own jury instruction explaining the concept of mere presence rather than the instruction that Fernández proposed. [3] This type of claim can succeed only in the relatively rare case where the requested instruction was (1) substantively correct; (2) not substantially covered elsewhere in the charge; and (3) concerned a sufficiently important point that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present his or her defense. United States v. Gonzalez, 570 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Prigmore, 243 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.2001)). We review the instruction given not in isolation but in the context of the entire charge in determining whether the district judge clearly conveyed the relevant legal principles, and remain mindful that the district court has considerable discretion in how it formulates, structures, and words its jury instructions. Id. The district court's own mere presence instruction was an entirely accurate recitation of First Circuit case law that more than adequately explained the concept to the jury, particularly when viewed within the context of the entire jury charge. Fernández alleges that the district court's instruction diminished the importance of his willful participation in the conspiracy. Willful participation, however, was addressed in great detail elsewhere in the jury charge; in fact, the court instructed the jury as to the government's burden of proving that Fernández willfully joined the conspiracy immediately after it explained the concept of mere presence. Thus, the court did not err in refusing to give Fernández's mere presence instruction because the court's own instruction adequately covered the issues that Fernández sought to cover with his instruction.