Opinion ID: 760873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appropriateness of Reweighing After Invalidating the

Text: 41 Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravator 42 Mr. Ross contends that, upon invalidating the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance, the Oklahoma courts' refusal to set aside the death penalty after reweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances was unconstitutional. Mr. Ross also argues not only that it was improper to reweigh the remaining aggravating circumstances, but also that the harmless error analysis conducted in this case does not meet federal constitutional standards. 43 In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's constitutional rights are not infringed where an appellate court invalidates one of two or more aggravating circumstances found by the jury, but affirms the death sentence after itself finding that the one or more valid remaining aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating evidence. Thus, in light of Clemons, the Oklahoma district and appellate courts did not violate Mr. Ross' constitutional rights by deciding to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 44 Mr. Ross contends that the reweighing conducted by the Oklahoma district court and Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was inadequate because it failed to adequately discuss the reasons for upholding the death penalty given the invalid aggravating circumstance. He claims that the reweighing by the state district court was extremely brief and conclusory, failing entirely to list and discuss the evidence in mitigation, the emphasis placed by the prosecutor on the infirm aggravating circumstance, or any other considerations crucial to a reweighing process and that the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed without conducting any analysis. Pet. Brief at 34. Mr. Ross relies on Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992), and Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992), to support his argument. 45 We disagree with Mr. Ross' interpretations of Stringer and Richmond. In Stringer the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of close appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating factors. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 230, 112 S.Ct. 1130. Stringer only requires that the state appellate court either conduct a harmless error analysis or independently reweigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence--it does not require the court to discuss the effect the invalid aggravating factor had on the jury's original sentencing decision. Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1115 (10th Cir.1998) (discussing Stringer ). In Richmond, the Court stressed the need to determine whether the state court actually reweighed the remaining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Richmond, 506 U.S. at 48, 113 S.Ct. 528. The Court did not, as Mr. Ross suggests, hold that the state court unconstitutionally reweighed the remaining factors by not mentioning mitigating evidence. The reweighing in Richmond was unconstitutional because the state court failed to conduct any reweighing analysis whatsoever. See id. at 49, 113 S.Ct. 528 (finding state Supreme court justices utilized an automatic affirmance rule rather than actually reweighing the factors). 46 We review de novo the Oklahoma courts' decision to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether Mr. Ross was afforded an individualized and reliable sentencing determination based on [his] circumstances, his background, and the crime. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749, 110 S.Ct. 1441; see Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1569 (10th Cir.1994). We review the court's factual findings regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors under the rational factfinder standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990); see Stafford, 34 F.3d at 1569. 47 [T]he United States Supreme Court 'has never specified the degree of clarity with which a state appellate court must reweigh in order to cure an otherwise invalid death sentence.'  Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 119 S.Ct. 450, 465, 142 L.Ed.2d 404 (1998) (quoting Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir.1994)). The Court has not translated its call for close appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating factors, Stringer, 503 U.S. at 230, 112 S.Ct. 1130, into a clear set of requirements for a constitutional reweighing analysis. Thus, we must only determine that the Oklahoma courts actually reweighed so that the aggravating circumstance provided principled guidance, Richmond, 506 U.S. at 46, 113 S.Ct. 528, and not necessarily a conclusive justification for the death penalty. Id. at 49, 113 S.Ct. 528. 48 Applying this standard, we find that the reweighing was consistent with Clemons and its progeny and that the Oklahoma courts' factual findings as to the four remaining aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances meet the rational factfinder standard. Therefore, the reweighing conducted by the Oklahoma district court and affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is sustained. 49 Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987). Having given careful consideration to Mr. Ross' claims, we find no constitutional error and affirm the denial of Mr. Ross' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 50