Opinion ID: 783949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The application of the conscious avoidance doctrine in the conspiracy context

Text: 17 Relying on dictum in one of our opinions, United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir.2002), Robles contends that the doctrine of conscious avoidance cannot be used at all in the context of a two-person conspiracy. Appellant's Brief at 21. We disagree. The Reyes decision does not mean what Robles reads into it. Even if it did, it would not support his argument. 18 In Reyes, we upheld the defendant's conviction by the jury, overturning the district court's grant of a directed verdict. The defendant was in the business of selling auto parts. The jury found him guilty of engaging in the transportation and sale of stolen airbags and conspiracy to do the same. There was evidence that the defendant, when being interviewed by an FBI agent, said he was aware that the bags were stolen, making an analogy to ... when you see a friend using drugs, you see what's happening, but you turn the other way. Reyes, 302 F.3d at 52. In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, we found that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant knew the airbags were stolen, or in any event thought the airbags were stolen, but deliberately avoided confirming that fact. Reyes, 302 F.3d at 56. We further found that evidence supported the defendant's intentional participation in the conspiracy. 19 Prior to analyzing the evidence, our opinion discoursed on the nature of the conscious avoidance doctrine and observed, [We] do not permit the doctrine to be used to prove intent to participate in a conspiracy. Id. at 54. This observation played no role in the decision. 20 Robles relies on this sentence for his argument. His argument is essentially that conspiracy by definition requires the participation of two or more conspirators, both of whom must intend to participate. If intent to participate may not be proved by reliance on conscious avoidance, then in a case of only two conspirators where the prosecution must rely on the doctrine of conscious avoidance to prove intent to participate on the part of one, the necessary proof of intent to participate by at least two conspirators will be lacking. 21 This argument fails for three reasons. First, the statement in Reyes on which Robles relies was pure dictum. As noted, it played no role whatever in the decision, which was to uphold the defendant's conviction upon the jury's guilty verdict. 7 Reyes stands for the proposition that the conscious avoidance doctrine may be invoked to satisfy the requirement that a defendant know of the unlawful aims of the conspiracy. See Reyes, 302 F.3d at 55 (the jury may use the conscious avoidance doctrine to establish the defendant's knowledge of the aims of the conspiracy). 22 Second, the district court's instruction did not conflict with the Reyes dictum. The court instructed the jury, as quoted above, only to the effect that, [i]n determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may consider whether the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. A. 106 (emphasis added). In giving the instruction, the court made no reference to the defendant's intent to participate. 23 Finally, we doubt that the dictum in Reyes intended what the defendant reads into it. The broad assertion that conscious avoidance may not be used to prove intent to participate has a capacity to cause confusion, and Robles' argument draws on that confusion. Properly understood, intent to participate is a shorthand phrase used to encompass both aspects of the joinder element of conspiracy, i.e., a defendant's knowledge or awareness of the illegal nature of the charged activity and his intent to advance the illegal objective. 8 24 Thus, when Reyes states that conscious avoidance cannot prove intent to participate, we do not understand it to mean that conscious avoidance cannot be used to prove any aspect of intent to participate; it simply means that just as actual knowledge of the illegal purpose of a conspiracy is insufficient to prove a defendant's joinder in a conspiracy, so conscious avoidance of such knowledge is also insufficient. There must be further proof that the defendant joined in the illegal agreement with the intent of helping it succeed in its criminal purpose. 25 In sum, we can see no reason why the factfinder may not rely on conscious avoidance to satisfy at least the knowledge component of intent to participate in a conspiracy. Moreover, we firmly reject Robles' contention that a conscious avoidance charge may not be used in a two-person conspiracy. Whether the conspiracy is among two members or more, a defendant's conscious avoidance of knowledge of its illegal purpose may substitute for knowledge of the illegal purpose. 9 26 In making this argument, Robles contends that a two-person conspiracy requires proof that each alleged co-conspirator possessed actual knowledge of the unlawful objectives of the charged scheme — otherwise, he argues, there can be no illicit agreement. This argument presupposes that a finding of conscious avoidance stands on a lesser legal footing than a finding of actual knowledge. Our precedents, however, establish that knowledge consciously avoided is the legal equivalent of knowledge actually possessed. See, e.g., United States v. Finkelstein, 229 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2000) (one who deliberately avoided knowing the wrongful nature of his conduct is as culpable as one who knew). The defendant's conscious avoidance of knowledge of the unlawful aims of the conspiracy thus may be invoked as the equivalent of knowledge of those unlawful aims. In the context of a two-person conspiracy, intent to participate may be shown by a finding that the defendant either knew, or consciously avoided knowing, the unlawful aims of the charged scheme and intended to advance those unlawful ends. 27