Opinion ID: 787760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Landscape

Text: 145 Turning to the next element, a court must examine the legal landscape on October 16, 1989, to see if the rule it is asked to adopt was then so clearly established that a reasonable jurist would have thought that it was dictated by [Supreme Court] precedents. Caspari, 510 U.S. at 393, 114 S.Ct. at 955. That is, could it be said that  no other interpretation was reasonable, 10 so that when Idaho chose not to overturn Leavitt's conviction on account of the innocence instruction, it erred. In that respect, I remain mindful of the fact that a result is not compelled or dictated by Supreme Court precedent simply because it is within the `logical compass' of an earlier decision. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 203 (9th Cir.1995). 146 When I survey the landscape through those binoculars, it is drear indeed as far as Leavitt's hopes are concerned. As of that date, the Supreme Court had not said that an instruction like the one at hand violates the United States Constitution. What it had said was that no presumption of innocence instruction need be given. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 2090, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979) (per curiam); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978). At that time, the circuits were actually split on the issue of whether the instruction was even improper at all. Compare Moffitt v. United States, 154 F.2d 402, 404-05 (1946) with Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1944). The split is not too surprising. The instruction itself can be said to be a harsh or confusing one which suggests that if a person is really guilty, it is not intended that he have the benefit of the presumption. That seems like a somewhat strange suggestion, since guilt, itself, can only be found if the person has been shown to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, the instruction can also be seen as a benign attempt to turn away any thought that there is no reason to place a special burden upon the state in order to protect criminals — a thought that is often popularly expressed — by assuring the jury that the presumption is actually intended to protect the innocent from being improperly convicted, which necessitates that it be applied to everyone. 11 Be that as it may, the division between the circuits still existed some years later. See United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 536-37 (2d Cir.1997). 12 The very fact of the intercircuit split militates in favor of a determination that we would be establishing a new rule were we to decide that the instruction in this case violated Leavitt's constitutional rights. See Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir.1995), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir.1999). So, likewise, does the existence of a significant split among state courts. 13 147 In so stating, I hasten to add that I am well aware of the fact that by 1989 this circuit had already declared itself to be on the side of those who reject the instruction. See Reynolds v. United States, 238 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.1956). But we did not state that the instruction violated the United States Constitution. In fact, what we did say was: Since it is right to instruct on the presumption of innocence, it is wrong to add this self-defeating qualification. Id. As we saw it, when the qualification is added to the presumption of innocence instruction, the result is to leave matters about where they would have been had no instruction on the presumption been given. Id. Of course, as already noted, as far as the Constitution is concerned, if the situation became the same as if no instruction at all had been given, that would be fine. Moreover, Reynolds was a direct appeal case, and a rule announced by us for direct appeal purposes does not translate itself into directives of the Supreme Court for Teague purposes. 14 148 Also, I am aware of the fact that the presumption of innocence instruction in this case alluded to the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of persuasion. But, in context, that does not make the instruction more or less ambiguous, and does not change the legal landscape as of 1989 in any significant way. In a sense, the two are different sides of the same coin, and courts have not placed weight upon that difference. Rather, they have treated the instruction as one about the presumption of innocence itself. See, e.g., Doyle, 130 F.3d at 533-34 (and cases cited therein); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 350-51 (2d Cir.1983); Moffitt, 154 F.2d at 404-05. I will do the same because, again, I am satisfied that to determine that the offending language violates the Constitution of the United States would create a new rule. That determination is, therefore, barred by Teague. See DelValle, 306 F.3d at 1200.