Opinion ID: 1756872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Point Six: Strike for Cause

Text: In the sixth point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in striking Juror Tompkins for cause. The State struck juror Tompkins for cause due to her position on the death penalty. During voir dire the following exchange occurred: MR. McCULLOCH [State]: Ms. Tompkins, let me ask you the questions. Do you think the death penalty is the appropriate punishment in some cases? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I really could not see any case where it would be appropriate. I do feel I am somewhat impartial. I can be convinced otherwise, but I really do not see any case where the death penalty is appropriate. MR. McCULLOCH: And other than what you may have read or heard about this case and setting that aside, you haven't heard any of the facts, you haven't heard any evidence in this case, correct? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Right, I mean, I don't even think with Jeffrey Dahmer, you know, things like that. You know, I'm  MR. McCULLOCH: From what you know through the media about the facts in that case  let me ask you the question directly. I'm not going to ask you what they are, but can you imagine a set of circumstances where you would think death is the appropriate punishment? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I've been sitting here as you asked and I'm trying to think, and I mean, maybe genocide or something like that. MR. McCULLOCH: Involving mass murder? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Yeah. MR. McCULLOCH: Okay. Let me ask you, in this case you have heard a couple of times already, if the jury finds Kevin Johnson guilty of Murder in the First Degree, we go into that second phase, the jury makes the decision that at least one aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt, and then the jury weighs the mitigating evidence against the aggravating evidence. If you as a juror on a jury decide that the evidence in aggravation outweighs the evidence in mitigation, would you automatically at that point  the only decision left is which punishment is appropriate, which one do we impose. Would you exclude the death penalty as a possible punishment? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Unless something, you know, tremendously  you know, something within the evidence that is given can convince me otherwise, I really don't think that  I think there would be only one option unless something real extraordinary happened that I saw. MR. McCULLOCH: As you have been sitting here for the last half hour or so, you haven't been able to think of something that would be that extraordinary, have you? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: No. MR. McCULLOCH: Okay. And believe me, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but it sounds like other than in the case of mass murder  genocide. Not even mass murder. Genocide, you don't think death would be a possibility for you? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I mean, not that I can think of unless something is presented that I never thought about, you know, somewhat possible. . . . . MS. KRAFT [Defense]: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Tompkins, with regard to the issue on the death penalty versus life without parole, is it possible that you could hear some evidence as you sat in this courtroom that would convince you that the death penalty was the appropriate punishment? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Anything is possible. MS. KRAFT: Okay. So you haven't ruled out the possibility in your own mind that that could happen? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: No. I mean, even when she spoke of, you know, someone being psychopathic, I thought I would  in that situation, if I was would told to consider it, I might be open. Most of me says it's not a possibility, but I'm open. MS. KRAFT: Okay. So you're not entirely closed off to the idea that you could hear something that would make you think that death would be an appropriate punishment? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Right. MS. KRAFT: Even in this case? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Uhhuh. MS. KRAFT: Is that yes? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Yeah. MS. KRAFT: Okay. And you wouldn't automatically reject any kind of mitigating evidence that you might hear, evidence presented on Kevin's behalf, his background, upbringing, that kind of thing? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I wouldn't reject any evidence. MS. KRAFT: Okay. You wouldn't reject any that the State presented either? VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: No. (Emphasis added). The following exchange occurred when the State struck Tompkins: MR. McCULLOCH [State]: I move to strike for cause Juror No. 32, Ms. Tompkins. Ms. Tompkins made it initially very clear she didn't think death was ever appropriate. She modified it somewhat to genocide cases, perhaps to something a little more nebulous, a psychopath would be better off executed. It's real clear she will reject that automatically as a  death automatically as a possible punishment in the case. THE COURT: Response? MS. KRAFT [Defense]: Yes, because Ms. Tompkins did say it was possible that something could be presented in this courtroom that would convince her that death would be an appropriate punishment in this case. THE COURT: Any objection? MR. McCULLOCH: I think like the previous panel, Judge, a credibility issue there. Yes, this is a different situation, but she said, yeah, I got an opinion, but I can. I think credibility is the appropriate word, but certainly she talked about maybe genocide, a psychopath is better off executed. It think it's very clear that she is not going to consider death as a possible punishment in this case, noting for the record there will be no evidence of genocide. THE COURT: Based upon the answer that she gave and the Court's view of her body language and assessing her credibility, she could not consider the death penalty. The motion to strike for cause will be sustained. (Emphasis added). Appellant raised this issue in the motion for new trial. A strike for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tisius I, 92 S.W.3d at 763. The standard to remove a juror for cause because of his or her position on the death penalty is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). While a juror's qualification is determined from the entire voir dire and not from a single response, the trial court may give more weight to a single response when presented with conflicting testimony regarding a prospective juror's ability to consider the death penalty. Id. In determining a juror's qualifications, the trial court is granted broad discretion given its position to observe the juror. State v. Ringo, 30 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Mo. banc 2000). This case is similar to Tisius I, where this Court found no abuse of discretion in striking a juror for cause when the juror unequivocally opposed the death penalty and later supported it only for terrible crimes. 92 S.W.3d at 762-63. The trial court acted within its discretion. The point is denied.