Opinion ID: 774363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construing Crime of Violence

Text: 23 We construed 18 U.S.C. §§ 16 in United States v. CeronSanchez, 223 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000), where we held that an Arizona conviction for aggravated assault qualified as a crime of violence. In so holding, we stressed that the force necessary to constitute a crime of violence [ ] must actually be violent in nature. Id. at 1172. We rejected an argument by the appellant that since one could be convicted of aggravated assault in Arizona with a recklessness mens rea, the crime was not a crime of violence, holding that reckless conduct satisfies the §§ 16 definitions. Id. at 1173. The government urges us to extend this holding to cover negligent conduct as well. Because we believe that the definition ofcrime of violence found at §§ 16 contains a volitional requirement absent from negligence, the government's argument must be rejected. 24 18 U.S.C. §§ 16 defines crime of violence  as: 25 (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or 26 (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 27 As explained above, Baron-Medina and Corona-Sanchez teach that because crime of violence is not a traditional common law crime, we look to the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the language in this definition. 28 Both of §§ 16's definitions involve the use of physical force. Section 16(a) requires actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property. Section 16(b) requires a substantial risk that force may be used against a person or property in committing the offense. In ordinary, contemporary, and common parlance, the use of something requires a volitional act. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines use thus: To make use of, to convert to one's service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action by means of; to put into action or service, especially to attain an end. Id. at 1541. All of these alternative definitions -converting, employing, availing oneself of, carrying out a purpose or action, and putting into action or service to attain an end -contain a volitional requirement. 2 Under ordinary, contemporary, and common understanding, one cannot do any of these things negligently; that is, without some volition to perform the act. 29 Of particular note, 18 U.S.C.§§ 16 defines a crime of violence as one in which physical force is not onlyuse[d] (or threatened to be used, or at risk of being used), but in which the physical force is use[d] . . . against the person or property of another. (Emphasis added). That means that there must be a volitional feature with regard to the impact or collision, and not simply with regard to the use of the physical force itself. While it might make sense -we reserve judgment on this question -to say that a person driving a car is volitionally using physical force just by doing so, it does not make sense to say that person is volitionally using physical force against someone or something when he neither intended to hit the person or thing nor consciously disregarded the risk that he might do so. 30 Thus, we hold that the presence of the volitional use . . . against requirement in both prongs of 18 U.S.C. §§ 16 means that a defendant cannot commit a crime of violence if he negligently -rather than intentionally or recklessly --hits someone or something with a physical object. 31 This definition of use is not in conflict with our holding in Ceron-Sanchez that recklessness satisfies§§ 16. In defining recklessness, we have turned to the Model Penal Code, which the Supreme Court has relied upon as a`source of guidance . . . to illuminate' the meaning of and distinctions between intent requirements. United States v. Gracidas, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978)). 32 The Model Penal Code defines recklessness thus: 33 A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation. 34 §§ 2.02(2)(c) (1985) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has, moreover, explained that the criminal law generally permits a finding of recklessness only when persons disregard a risk of harm of which they are aware. United States v. Albers, 226 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994)). 35 Thus, recklessness requires conscious disregard of a risk of a harm that the defendant is aware of -a volitional requirement absent in negligence. A volitional definition of use . . . against encompasses conscious disregard of a potential physical impact on someone or something -it does not encompass non-volitional negligence as to that impact. 36 Nor does our holding conflict with the recent decision in Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001). Park acknowledged, as do we, that recklessness is a sufficient mens rea for a crime of violence. 252 F.3d at 1024. Park's assertion that an intentional use of physical force is not required, 252 F.3d at 1025 fn.9 (emphasis in original), is perfectly compatible with our analysis -the crime of violence  definitions do not require an intentional use of force, but they do require a volitional act. To use the language of mens rea, the crime need not be committed purposefully or knowingly, but it must be committed at least recklessly. 37 Our holding is also consistent with the holdings of all other circuits who have substantively considered the issue of an intent requirement. See United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 925-27 (5th Cir. 2001) ([A] crime of violence as defined in 16(b) requires recklessness as regards the substantial likelihood that the offender will intentionally employ force against the person or property of another in order to effectuate the commission of the offense.); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 371-74 (7th Cir. 1995) (use of force under U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.2(1)(i), with language identical to §§ 16(a), requires an intentional act); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992) (Use of physical force is an intentional act, and therefore [§§ 16(a) ] requires specific intent to use force.). While we do not go as far as Rutherford and Parson in requiring specific intent, but rather merely a volitional act equivalent to recklessness, our analyses share the conclusion that, at a minimum, a volitional act is required. 38 We also acknowledge that two circuits have held that crimes committed with a negligence mens rea can becrimes of violence under §§ 16. Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); Le v. United States Attorney General, 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). However, neither of these opinions contains any analysis of whether the use . . . against language requires a volitional act. Every circuit that has engaged in such an analysis has concluded, as we do, that it does.