Opinion ID: 6351652
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements of Personal Belief

Text: ¶36 During the prosecutor’s opening statement, he told the jury, “I think you’ll agree with me at the end of testimony, that the defendant is guilty of the charges,” and then later said, “I think you’ll agree with me that it was, in fact, the defendant who ran.” Id. at ¶ 57, 490 P.3d at 658. And during closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that he did not need to prove why Vialpando made a false report—“or what we believe is a false report”—regarding her reported robbery. Id. at ¶ 58, 490 P.3d at 658. The majority reasoned that in each of these three statements, the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal belief that Vialpando was guilty. Id. at ¶¶ 57–58, 490 P.3d at 658. 3. Questions About the Veracity of Another Witness ¶37 During his cross-examination of Vialpando, the prosecutor asked four different times whether another witness, a police officer, was “mistaken.” Id. at ¶ 59, 490 P.3d at 658. The majority reasoned that the prosecutor repeatedly asked 17 Vialpando to opine on the veracity of another witness, which is categorically improper under Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 732–35 (Colo. 2006). Vialpando, ¶ 59, 490 P.3d at 658. 4. Mischaracterization of the Evidence ¶38 During closing, the prosecutor asked the jury, “why didn’t [Vialpando] go out and get a new ID?” even though Vialpando’s unrebutted testimony was that she did get a new ID. Id. at ¶ 60, 490 P.3d at 658–59. The majority concluded that this statement mischaracterized the evidence. Id. 5. Testimony Identifying Vialpando as the “Primary Suspect” ¶39 During his testimony, the lead investigating officer stated that Vialpando was the “primary suspect.” Id. at ¶ 63, 490 P.3d at 659. The majority reasoned that this was improper because a witness may not opine on a defendant’s guilt and, here, that was the only inference that could be drawn from this testimony. Id. at ¶¶ 62, 66, 490 P.3d at 659. The majority rejected the arguments that the officer’s testimony was a proper explanation of the steps the police took in the course of their investigation and that the testimony dispelled any implication that the investigation was cursory. Id. at ¶¶ 63–65, 490 P.3d at 659. C. Whether These Errors Cumulatively Warrant Reversal ¶40 We now consider whether the cumulative effect of these five errors deprived Vialpando of a fair trial. 18 ¶41 Turning first to the prosecutor’s illustrations of reasonable doubt, we ask whether they prejudiced the defendant. The majority stated that the prosecutor’s references to the American flag and the gameshow trivialized reasonable doubt and lowered the burden of proof by making it seem easy to ascertain. We recognize that analogies like these are perilous and unhelpful. See Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1, ¶ 25, 501 P.3d 792, 797. Nevertheless, the trial court instructed the jury multiple times that they must follow only the instructions given by the court and not comments by the attorneys, and we presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions.2 See Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶¶ 14, 16, 436 P.3d 529, 533. Moreover, as Judge Fox’s dissent points out, the prosecutor’s analogies were brief and isolated, and he did not raise them again in closing. See Vialpando, ¶ 114, 490 P.3d at 666 (Fox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Taking these considerations together, on these facts, the prosecutor’s illustrations of reasonable doubt did not lower the burden of proof and were not prejudicial. 2 We do not decide today whether the trial court’s use of reasonable doubt analogies during voir dire is a separate ground for reversal. That question is not before us. See Vialpando, ¶ 87, 490 P.3d at 661–62 (“Because we reverse Vialpando’s conviction without regard to the problematic analogies used by the trial court, we do not decide whether the use of those analogies is a separate ground for reversal, on the basis of structural error or otherwise.”). 19 ¶42 Next, we address the prosecutor’s statements of personal belief as to Vialpando’s guilt. A prosecutor may not offer a personal opinion about the defendant’s guilt. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049. Moreover, we recognize that the prosecutor is a government official, and as such, his opinion might carry more weight with the jury, enflaming the overall impropriety. See Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 418–19 (Colo. 1987). Nevertheless, assuming these are improper personal opinions, as Judge Fox’s dissent points out, the prosecutor’s statements were a small part of his argument, which was otherwise a generally fair summary. See Vialpando, ¶ 117, 490 P.3d at 666 (Fox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, the prosecutor’s comments were brief and inconspicuous, and they were largely tied to his arguments about the evidence. Last, the trial court gave proper instructions on credibility and the presumption of innocence, which helped to ameliorate any prejudice associated with the prosecutor’s comments. See People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Colo. App. 2010). Overall, the prosecutor’s statements demonstrating his personal belief as to Vialpando’s guilt were minimally prejudicial. ¶43 Of all the errors, the most significant occurred during the prosecutor’s crossexamination of Vialpando, when he asked four different times whether another witness, a police officer, was “mistaken.” See Liggett, 135 P.3d at 732 (“[A]sking a witness to opine on the veracity of another witness is prejudicial, argumentative, 20 and ultimately invades the province of the fact-finder.”). These types of questions are categorically improper because they distort the trial process. Id. at 730–32. Here, the prosecutor asked, and Vialpando answered, these categorically improper questions, which invaded the province of the jury. As a result, the prosecutor’s comments about whether the police officer was mistaken were inherently prejudicial. ¶44 The next error that the majority identified concerned the prosecutor misstating the evidence by asking the jury, “why didn’t [Vialpando] go out and get a new ID?” even though Vialpando’s unrebutted testimony was that she did get a new ID. Undeniably, prosecutors may not misstate the evidence. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1048–49. But even assuming that the prosecutor misstated the evidence, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that closing arguments were not evidence, which makes it less likely that the jury was improperly influenced. Additionally, this fact was not significant, and the jury was capable of remembering that Vialpando testified to the contrary. Taking these factors together, the prosecutor’s comments during closing about Vialpando getting a new ID were not unduly prejudicial. ¶45 Finally, we turn to the officer’s testimony identifying Vialpando as the primary suspect. The majority identified this as error because a witness may not opine on a defendant’s guilt, and here, that was the only inference that could be 21 drawn. See People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 31, 379 P.3d 298, 305. But as the dissent points out, the prosecutor did not dwell on the officer’s statement, nor did either party revisit it during closing. See Vialpando, ¶ 147, 490 P.3d at 671 (Fox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Additionally, Vialpando’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the officer to clarify his testimony. Thus, we find the officer’s testimony to be mildly prejudicial. ¶46 Overall, we hold that the cumulative effect of these errors on Vialpando’s trial was slight, especially considering the other evidence against Vialpando that was available to the jury: Vialpando’s belongings were found in the stolen vehicle, an eyewitness identified her, and a reasonable juror could find that Vialpando’s robbery defense was not credible. True, these errors took place over a short, threeday trial; however, when viewed in the aggregate and against the backdrop of other evidence, they did not deprive Vialpando of a fair trial. Accordingly, we conclude that there was not cumulative error.