Opinion ID: 520583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jencks Act Ruling.

Text: 18 FBI agents interviewed Federici many times during the course of their investigation of defendant and prepared reports of the interviews. Such reports are commonly referred to as 302s. Prior to cross-examination of Federici, defense counsel requested the interview reports on the basis that he was entitled to them under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500 which provides, in pertinent part: 19 (b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use. 20 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500(b). The definition of statement on which defendant relies is found in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500(e)(2): a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement. 21 Defendant claims that the 302s were substantially verbatim recitals of oral statements made by Federici and recorded contemporaneously by an FBI agent. This claim is based on the following testimony by Federici. 22 Q: Now, on the occasions when [FBI Agent Lavin] took notes did he ask you questions about what happened and write down your answer--write down what you told him? 23 A: Yes, sir. 24 Q: All right. And did he ever ask you questions as to whether he had got it right--what he was writing down--and ask you to elaborate on what you had said? 25 A: I would find Mr. Lavin a very punctilious note-taker. At times he would, when I was going too fast, he would ask me to slow up, and he would repeat back to me to make sure that he had, in fact, written down what I had said in the middle of a sentence--just to make sure he got it right. Then we'd go on and he would continue to make notes. 26 Q: So it was almost as if he was almost verbatim trying to get what you said as accurate[ly] as possible? 27 A: I would, again, consider Special Agent Lavin a very punctilious note-taker. 28 Defendant argues that this testimony establishes that the 302s fell within the quoted language of Sec. 3500(e)(2). 29 In Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959), the court focused on subsection (e)(2). It held: We find the legislative history persuasive that the statute was meant to encompass more than automatic reproduction of oral statements. Id. at 352, 79 S.Ct. at 1224. It amplified this: 30 It is clear that Congress was concerned that only those statements which could properly be called the witness' own words should be made available to the defense for purposes of impeachment. It was important that the statement could fairly be deemed to reflect fully and without distortion what had been said to the government agent. 31 Id. (footnote omitted). The Court went on to stress that final decision rested within the good sense and experience of the district judge, guided by the standards we have outlined.... Id. at 353, 79 S.Ct. at 1225. It also advised that in doubtful cases, we approve the practice of having the Government submit the statement to the trial judge for an in camera determination. Id. at 354, 79 S.Ct. at 1225. This was done in the instant case. The Court then went on to state: It is also the function of the trial judge to decide, in light of the circumstances of each case, what, if any, evidence extrinsic to the evidence itself may or must be offered to prove the nature of the statement. Id. at 354-55, 79 S.Ct. at 1226. Outside of the quoted testimony, no extrinsic evidence was taken in the case before us. 32 In Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 108, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 1347, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976), the Court reiterated the procedure to be followed: We have recognized that a Government objection to production may require that the trial court inspect documents or hold a hearing to gather extrinsic evidence bearing on the extent to which the documents are statements producible under Sec. 3500. (Footnote omitted). As we stated in United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 14-15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 1237, 59 L.Ed.2d 468 (1979), if the district court had relied on assurances by the prosecution that the 302s were not statements under the Jencks Act and had failed to either review the 302s in camera or hold a hearing, we would be required to remand for additional fact finding. The district court here did, however, examine the material sought in camera and concluded that it did not fall within Sec. 3500(e)(2) of the Jencks Act. Obviously, if an inspection of the documents suffices, there is no need to take extrinsic evidence. In most cases the answer will be plain from the statement itself. Palermo, 360 U.S. at 355, 79 S.Ct. at 1226. We have reviewed the 302s and do not find that the district court's ruling was clearly erroneous. It is plain that the 302s are not substantially verbatim recitals of oral statements made by Federici and recorded contemporaneously with the making of the statements. 33