Opinion ID: 1651275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: certification of the class as defined was an abuse of discretion

Text: Weber claims on appeal that class certification was an abuse of discretion for the following three reasons: (1) common issues do not predominate over individual issues as required by Rule 52.08(b)(3); (2) the class definition was defective because the plaintiffs did not provide a sufficient basis to draw the class boundary at two miles; and (3) the plaintiffs failed to show that individual lawsuits will result in a risk of inconsistent adjudications as required by Rule 52.08(b)(1). The Court addresses each contention.
Although the class certification decision is independent of the ultimate merits of the lawsuit, the applicable substantive law is relevant to a meaningful determination of the certification issues. See Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. banc 2007) (a court must understand the . . . applicable substantive law to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues). In this case, nuisance provides the applicable substantive law. Nuisance is the unreasonable, unusual, or unnatural use of one's property so that it substantially impairs the right of another to peacefully enjoy his property. Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Mgt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. banc 1985). The law of nuisance recognizes two conflicting rights: property owners have a right to control their land and use it to benefit their best interests; the public and neighboring land owners have a right to prevent unreasonable use that substantially impairs the peaceful use and enjoyment of other land. Id. Weber claims that common issues cannot predominate where, as here, plaintiffs sue for a private nuisance, because the proof necessary to present each plaintiff's claim will necessarily vary in light of the elements that must be proved to submit a private nuisance claim to the jury. The verdict directing instruction for private nuisance claims, MAI 22.06, provides that the jury must find for plaintiff if it believes: First, plaintiff used his property as a residence, and Second, (here describe nuisance such as `defendant operated a slaughter house in close proximity to plaintiff's residence') and Third, (here describe the injury such as `ill-smelling odors escaped from defendant's premises onto plaintiff's property and this substantially impaired plaintiff's use of his property,') and Fourth, such use by defendant of his property was unreasonable. Weber asserts that this instruction will require individual proof that each plaintiff used its property as a residence and that the effects of the blasting were felt on and substantially impaired the use of each plaintiff's property to the extent that it made the blasting unreasonable as to that specific plaintiff. Here, the trial court found two issues common to all members of the class that predominate over other issues: (1) whether Weber's use of his land for blasting was unreasonable and (2) whether the blasting activity substantially impaired plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property. This Court agrees that upon a proper showing and class definition, such issues could be found to predominate in a claim based on nuisance. The jury can make a determination as to whether and when defendant began the blasting or level of blasting that is alleged to be a nuisance and whether that blasting was unreasonable as to persons within the class. It may determine that it was reasonable or unreasonable as to all members of the plaintiff class; it may determine that the use of the property was reasonable as to those who felt vibrations of a certain magnitude, but was unreasonable as to those who felt vibrations of a greater magnitude. The common question of the reasonableness of the blasting would pervade every class member's claim. [7] Although a single common issue that predominates over other individual issues can satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 52.08(b)(3), see State ex rel. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 106 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo. banc 2003), the trial court identified a second issue here that also predominates over individual issues: whether the blasting substantially impaired the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property. While the nature and extent of impairment of an individual plaintiffs' property would not be a common question, [8] in a private nuisance action plaintiffs are entitled to recover nominal damages if they prove the existence of the nuisance. See Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517, 522 (1848) (if a private nuisance be alleged and proved, the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages at least); Wallace v. Grasso, 119 S.W.3d 567, 579 (Mo.App. E.D.2003) (a plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages if he proves nuisance but fails to, or cannot, prove actual damage). As to persons within the class, then, the issue of whether this blasting substantially impairs the use and enjoyment of their property in a manner sufficient to entitle them to nominal damages is at least potentially amenable to determination at a common level, and the availability of nominal damages would be common to all members of the class. For these reasons, this Court agrees with the trial court that there are common issues that could predominate in this private nuisance action. [9]
Weber's second objection to the trial court's certification order is that the record below does not support the class definition. Specifically, Weber contends that the evidence adduced before the trial court does not support setting the class boundary at two miles in every direction from the quarry. This Court agrees with Weber that the minimal record below does not support this placement of the class boundary, so the class definition fails. As this Court recently noted in State ex rel. The Coca-Cola Company v. Nixon, 249 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Mo. banc 2008), a properly defined class is necessary to realize both the protections and benefits for which the class action device was created. The primary concern underlying class definition is to avoid certification of vague, amorphous, or indeterminate classes. Id., 249 S.W.3d at 861. A properly defined class facilitates the identification of individuals affected by the litigation from the outset of the case to provide notice and an opportunity to opt out of the class. Dale v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 204 S.W.3d 151, 178 (Mo.App. W.D. 2006). In addition, where a putative class representative seeks to certify a class within certain geographic boundaries, the establishment of those boundaries must bear a reasonable relationship to the evidence of record to date. Doyle v. Fluor Corp., 199 S.W.3d 784, 791 (Mo.App. E.D. 2006). Applying these principles here, it is evident that the record does not support the class definition adopted by the trial court. Although it certified a class of all those residential homeowners within a two-mile radius of the quarry, the only evidence before the court was that the named plaintiffs, who each lived within one-quarter to one-third mile to the south of  and across Interstate 70 from  the quarry, experienced vibrations and shaking from the blasting. The only evidence that the plaintiffs presented to the trial court regarding whether the vibrations could be felt two miles from the quarry was a statement from Ms. Green that she received phone calls from as far as two miles away. [10] Upon further inquiry from defense counsel, she clearly testified that she has no personal knowledge whether the blasts could even be felt at a distance of two miles from the quarry. Here is her pertinent testimony: Q: [Have you ever been] two miles north at the time of the blast? A: Can't say I have. Q: Have you ever stood two miles to the south at the time of the blast? A: No, sir, I did not. Q: Or to the east or the west? A: No, sir, I did not. Q: So you don't have any personal information as to how a blast would feel at that distance? A: No sir, I do not. Ms. Green also testified that, although she believes her new home may be within the two-mile radius from Weber's blasting operations, she does not feel any vibrations at her current residence. When asked further about the two mile distance, she stated that Fizey Road is two miles away, and it can be inferred from her testimony that she received telephone calls from residents somewhere near Fizey Road. In the face of this testimony, it was an abuse of discretion to define the class as including all those residential homeowners within two miles of Weber's quarry. The trial court plainly lacked an evidentiary basis on which to set the class boundary at two miles in all directions from the quarry. Compare Doyle v. Fluor Corp., 199 S.W.3d 784, 791 (Mo.App. E.D.2006) (affirming geographically defined class where experts testified at a class certification hearing that all of the properties in the class definition had been contaminated by defendants). Clearly, the record relied on by the court below did not support the certification of a class that encompassed more than those living in the direction and at approximately the distance from the quarry that plaintiffs lived. The dearth of evidence to support the geographic boundaries of the class certified is particularly troublesome where private nuisance is alleged because of the presumption in favor of nominal damages upon proof of a nuisance. See Smiths, 11 Mo. at 522; Wallace, 119 S.W.3d at 579. Under most theories, where nominal damages are not presumed, there would be little risk that a class member who suffered no damages would recover, as actual damages would have to be proved. Because private nuisance permits recovery of nominal damages in all cases regardless of proof of actual damages, the absence of evidence to support the class' geographic boundaries presents real risks that Weber could have to pay damages to a homeowner in the class who was completely unaffected by its blasting. Absent some evidence that the defendant's blasting could be felt at a distance of two miles in each direction, it was an abuse of discretion to define the class to include all homeowners within a two-mile radius. [11]
Weber's final argument is that the trial court erred to the extent that its order can be read to certify a class under Rule 52.08(b)(1). Although the plaintiffs contend that such certification would have been proper, they concede that the trial court did not certify a class under Rule 52.08(b)(1). This Court agrees that the trial court did not certify this case as a class action under Rule 52.08(b)(1), and it also concludes that the record adduced before the trial court would not support such a certification. Rule 52.08(b)(1) is concerned with the risk of inconsistent or varying determinations that could either establish incompatible standards for the party opposing the class or be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Rule 52.08(b)(1)(A) and (B). As plaintiffs only seek money damages in this suit, and not injunctive relief, there is little risk that separate suits could establish incompatible standards for the party opposing the class, and Rule 52.08(b)(1)(A) does not apply. Similarly, Rule 52.08(b)(1)(B) does not apply here because a loss by one plaintiff in an individual nuisance suit would not impede the ability of a second plaintiff to pursue a separate action. Missouri follows the narrow use of offensive collateral estoppel laid down in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-37, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). James v. Paul, 49 S.W.3d 678, 685 n. 5 (Mo. banc 2001). Under that rule, no party can be bound by a judgment unless she was in privity with the parties to that judgment. See Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 327 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 645 (It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard). Therefore, the individual homeowners will not be bound by judgments reached in individual cases, so Rule 52.08(b)(1)(B) does not apply. [12] No evidence or argument having been offered to show compliance with the provisions of Rule 52.08(b)(1), they simply are not applicable to the request for class certification.