Opinion ID: 1305836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Alleged Errors During Cruse's Testimony

Text: Williams contends that the trial court erred in three rulings during Cruse's testimony. We find no merit in any of these contentions. First, Williams contends that by allowing Cruse to testify on direct examination that he had no plea agreement with the Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony, the court improperly permitted the Commonwealth to bolster Cruse's testimony on direct examination. Williams correctly points out that ordinarily evidence of a witness's credibility is not admissible until the witness's credibility is attacked. See Jordan v. Taylor, 209 Va. 43, 48-49, 161 S.E.2d 790, 794 (1968) (improper to elicit testimony from witness tending to bolster that witness's credibility). However, the order of proof in a trial is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse a ruling varying the order of proof in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 142, 295 S.E.2d 643, 650 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029, 103 S.Ct. 1280, 75 L.Ed.2d 501 (1983) (sustaining admission of evidence in rebuttal phase of case more appropriately admissible in case-in-chief); Hargraves v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 604, 608, 248 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1978) (permitting Commonwealth to reopen case after it rested and court heard defendant's motion to strike Commonwealth's evidence). Since Williams advised the court that he planned to attack Cruse's credibility, we find no abuse of that discretion in this case. Next, Williams argues that the court erred in admitting part of Cruse's testimony. Cruse had testified on direct examination that he was being prosecuted for capital murder arising from the Keller incidents. On cross-examination, Cruse was asked whether he was testifying to help [him]self in making [his] case. Cruse responded, I'm getting it off my chest. Cruse was then asked whether he was also getting the death penalty off [his] back. Cruse simply responded, Not really. Over Williams's objection, Cruse testified on redirect examination that he was unable to look at the pictures of the murder scene because he lost it. In our opinion, evidence that Cruse was upset by the pictures was appropriate corroboration of his testimony that he wanted to get it off [his] chest, and, therefore, proper rebuttal to the suggestion that he was getting the death penalty off [his] back. Williams's final contention regarding Cruse's testimony is that the court erred in refusing to permit Williams to show Cruse's conviction of an assault and battery. Williams recognizes that because misdemeanor assaults and batteries are not crimes of moral turpitude, evidence of convictions of those crimes is not admissible to attack a witness's credibility. Clark v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 787, 790, 120 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1961). However, because he claims that Cruse's credibility and proclivity for assaultive behavior was a crucial factor for the jury to decide, Williams contends that this evidence should have been admitted. However, he cites no supporting authority. Clark states the applicable rule: The rule is well settled in Virginia that a witness cannot be asked on cross-examination questions as to collateral independent facts irrelevant to the issue being tried, though bearing on the question of veracity, for the purpose of testing his credibility. Id. at 789, 120 S.E.2d at 272. We see no reason to create the suggested exception to this rule. Cruse admits he fired the first shot at Mrs. Keller, thereby virtually eliminating any doubt of his proclivity for assaultive behavior. Accordingly, the trial court correctly excluded this testimony as an inadmissible attack upon Cruse's credibility.