Opinion ID: 2150185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: sentencing guidelines are substantive law

Text: The Council's comments to the guidelines state that sentences within the matrix are `voluntary. It is true that the guidelines' enforcement mechanisms support an argument that the guidelines are voluntary: a sentence could not be reversed on appeal solely because of a judge's departure from a recommended range. Nevertheless, the guidelines set forth the preferred sentencing policy and, in fact, discourage departure. Section 47-630(2) provides: The guidelines shall specify appropriate sentences for the designated offenders in consideration of factors set forth by rule. The Supreme Court may provide that a sentence in accordance with the guidelines constitutes a rebuttable presumption. We interpret § 47-630(2) to mean that the Legislature intended this court's adoption of the guidelines to represent the presumptively appropriate sentences. Further, while the guidelines are not binding, § 47-630(1) compels a judge to consider them: The guidelines shall provide that courts are to consider community correctional programs and facilities in sentencing designated offenders, with the goal of reducing dependence on incarceration as a sentencing option for nonviolent offenders. (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, the guidelines would require judges to explain in a written report their reasons for departing from the recommended sentencing guidelines range. In rejecting a similar legislative mandate to adopt sentencing guidelines, the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed: The very requirement of explaining departure from the guidelines creates a presumption that a sentence within the range set forth in the matrix for the particular offense/ offender categories is appropriate, for it places the burden of showing the appropriateness of a sentence outside the matrix range on the sentencing judge. This, we believe, amounts to our prescribing appropriate types and lengths of sentences and constitutes unwarranted intrusion in the sentencing discretion and authority of the trial judge. [36] We agree. Despite its voluntary label, requiring judges to explain their departures gives the guidelines a presumptive status. We do not believe we should promulgate rules that would effectively curb and conflict with the sentencing discretion a court currently has under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204 (Cum. Supp. 2006). The Council, of course, views the matter differently. It points to the state court rules regarding sentencing guidelines in Delaware and Kansas. We note, however, that while the Kansas courts may have participated in developing Kansas' sentencing guidelines, the Kansas Legislature has statutorily enacted the guidelines and their presumptive status. [37] It is true that the Delaware Supreme Court, through an administrative directive, has adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines as recommended by the state's sentencing commission. [38] The Delaware sentencing guidelines are found neither in the court's rules nor in the state's statutes or administrative code. Instead, they are produced by the state's sentencing commission in a publication called the Benchbook. [39] Our research, however, has failed to find any decision by the Delaware Supreme Court upholding its adoption of presumptive sentencing ranges against a separation of powers challenge. Because of our constitution's structure, we decline to follow Delaware's model. More on point, we note that in 1983, the Florida Supreme Court also promulgated sentencing guidelines by court rule in response to a legislative mandate. But, in 1989, the court determined that its rules violated the state constitution's separation of powers clause. [40] Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court had promulgated presumptive sentencing guidelines by administrative order beginning in 1984. But, [t]he Michigan Supreme Court's guidelines and legislative system of disciplinary credits [were] criticized for several reasons, such as excessive leniency, inadequate punishment, and undue harshness. As a result, a systematic statutory sentencing structure was developed and enacted into law to replace the judicially-imposed sentencing guidelines [in] 1999 .... [41] This criticism of judicially imposed sentencing guidelines emphasizes the difficult position in which a court places itself when it specifically prescribes sentencing policy outside a pending case. We would compromise our neutrality, in perception if not in fact, if we promulgated the very law that could be challenged. The attraction of delegating potentially controversial legislation to the judiciary is perhaps understandable. But by complying with the Legislature's mandate, we would undermine the separation of powers doctrine: The purpose of the doctrine ... is to preserve the independence of each of the three branches of government in their own thus tending to prevent the despotism of an oligarchy of the Legislature or judges, or the dictatorship of the executive, or any cooperative combination of the foregoing. In the words of Justice Brandeis, [The purpose was] not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. [42] In addressing a separation of powers issue regarding pretrial diversion, we specifically held that the power to design formal pretrial diversion programs is a legislative power. [43] We reasoned that the adoption of formal pretrial diversion programs represents a shift in focus from deterrence and retribution to rehabilitation. [44] That same reasoning applies to sentencing schemes that result in many offenders avoiding incarceration. Even more to the point, the Legislature may not implement sentencing policy through delegation that is contrary to its current policy under § 29-2204. Section 29-2204 broadly sets forth a policy of indeterminative sentencing with no presumptive sentencing ranges. We commend the Legislature's efforts to enact safe and effective means of treating substance abuse in the community and to address the rising costs of state correctional facilities. To the extent that substance abuse offenders have increased the prison population, we have cooperated with the Legislature's statutory mandate that we promulgate procedural rules for drug courts after the Legislature created these courts. [45] But the Legislature has not asked this court to promulgate procedural rules to govern court administration of a program enacted by the Legislature. Instead, it has asked us to promulgate substantive rules regarding sentencing that would carry out a sea change in sentencing policy. Unquestionably, imposing sentencing guidelines presents challenging issues of public policy. We have repeatedly held that the Legislature cannot statutorily confer upon the courts the duties of other branches. [46] These public policy decisions should be debated in the proper forumthe Legislature. We reject the Council's petition because the Legislature may not delegate its lawmaking function to the executive or judicial branches. [47] PETITION DENIED.