Opinion ID: 4707865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: The compensation court erred when it issued a decision that did not comply with rule 11, and we vacate the order and remand the cause with directions to enter an order in compliance with rule 11 as described in our opinion above. In so doing, we express no opinion on an employer’s potential liability, if any, to construct or purchase adaptive housing under § 48-120(1)(a), and we find it unnecessary to consider Lewis’ cross-appeal. Vacated and remanded with directions. Stacy, J., concurring. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the order of the Workers’ Compensation Court is too ambiguous for meaningful appellate review and therefore must be vacated. I write separately to suggest that any expansion of our holding in Miller v. E.M.C. Ins. Cos. 1 presents issues of public policy for the Legislature. In Miller, the injured worker used a wheelchair and we affirmed an order of the Workers’ Compensation Court directing the employer’s insurer to pay for the modifications needed to make the worker’s home wheelchair accessible. We found that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120(1) (Reissue 1993) provided the necessary authority for such an order, reasoning: [M]odifications to an injured employee’s home [can] be considered medical expenses under the appliances or supplies categories if the modifications are “required by the nature of the injury,” and if the modifications “relieve pain or promote and hasten the employees’ restoration to health and employment.” 2 Miller found the first requirement was satisfied by evidence that doctors had recommended certain modifications to the employee’s home to allow him to access and use the home 1 Miller v. E.M.C. Ins. Cos., 259 Neb. 433, 610 N.W.2d 398 (2000). 2 Id. at 451, 610 N.W.2d at 412. - 736 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LEWIS v. MBC CONSTR. CO. Cite as 309 Neb. 726 from his wheelchair. And the second requirement was satisfied by evidence that the employee’s “pain [was] caused by the loss of independence to function and to enter and move about his own home.” 3 The Nebraska Court of Appeals used similar reasoning in Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet 4 to affirm a Workers’ Compensation Court order directing the insurer to pay $18,376 in construction costs to modify the home of an injured worker who used a wheelchair. In the 20-plus years since this court’s decision in Miller, the relevant provisions of § 48-120(1) on which that holding was based have not been amended by the Legislature. And although the Legislature has defined some of the terms appearing in § 48-120, 5 it has not defined either “appliances” or “supplies” for purposes of that statute. Generally, when a statute has been judicially construed and that construction has not evoked an amendment, it is presumed the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s determination of the Legislature’s intent. 6 But the primary question raised by the parties in this appeal is not whether the employer or its insurer can be ordered to pay for modifications to Lewis’ residence to make it accessible after his work-related injury. The parties agree that question was answered in the affirmative by Miller. Rather, the question here appears to be the extent of the employer’s responsibility for modifications under Miller and Koterzina when the injured worker does not have housing that can be modified. We do not reach that question in this appeal, because we are not able to discern what the trial court has ordered in that regard. Has the court ordered the employer or its insurer to purchase or custom build an entire home that is accessible? 3 Id. at 452, 610 N.W.2d at 412. 4 Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet, 1 Neb. App. 1000, 510 N.W.2d 467 (1993). 5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120.01 (Reissue 2010) (defining terms “plastic surgery” and “reconstructive surgery” for purposes of § 48-120). 6 Rodriguez v. Lasting Hope Recovery Ctr., 308 Neb. 538, 955 N.W.2d 707 (2021). - 737 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LEWIS v. MBC CONSTR. CO. Cite as 309 Neb. 726 If so, how are the associated costs to be allocated between the employer and the employee to ensure the employer pays for the necessary modifications under Miller and Koterzina, but not for the ordinary features of the home? It is a familiar proposition of law that the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court, as a statutorily created court, has only such authority as has been conferred upon it by statute, and its power cannot extend beyond that expressed in the statute. 7 I see nothing in the plain text of § 48-120, or in our current case law, that would support expanding the definition of medical “appliances” or “supplies” to include an entire home. Nor, in my opinion, are the courts the proper place to debate the ­various public policy concerns implicated by such an expansion. So while I agree with the majority that the order of the workers’ compensation court is too ambiguous and confusing for meaningful appellate review, I respectfully suggest that any expansion of the rule announced in Miller and Koterzina implicates important public policy questions about the compensability of accessible housing for injured workers and is something properly left to the Legislature. Funke, J., joins in this concurrence. 7 Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).