Opinion ID: 2544598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breach of duty and legal causation

Text: Whether there was a breach of duty or not, i.e., whether there was a failure on the defendant's part to exercise reasonable care, is a question for the trier of fact. For `under the prevailing rule[,] duty ... is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger,' and `reasonable foreseeability of harm is the very prototype of the question a [trier of fact] must pass upon in particularizing the standard of conduct in the case before it.' Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 385, 742 P.2d 377, 383 (1987) (citations omitted) (some brackets added and some omitted) (ellipsis points in original). Similarly, [t]he presence of a reasonably close connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, i.e. [,] `whether the breach of duty was more likely than not a substantial factor in causing the harm complained of[,] is normally a question for the [trier of fact] too.' Id. (citations omitted) (some brackets added and some omitted). Accordingly, absent uncontroverted evidence from which only one inference can reasonably be drawn, the questions of breach of duty and legal causation constitute questions of fact, reviewable on appeal only for clear error. See, e.g., Taylor-Rice v. State, 91 Hawai`i 60, 69-70, 979 P.2d 1086, 1095-96 (1999); Knodle, 69 Haw. at 387-89, 742 P.2d at 384-85. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Jane Doe, 95 Hawai`i at 190, 20 P.3d at 623 (citation omitted). `Substantial evidence' ... is credible evidence [that] is of sufficient quality and probative value [as] to enable a person of reasonable caution to draw a conclusion. Id. (citation and some quotation signals omitted) (ellipsis points in original).