Opinion ID: 690283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: 20 This case involves the scope of liability under the ADEA, a federal anti-discrimination statute that renders it unlawful for an employer: 21 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; 22 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age. 23 29 U.S.C. Sec. 623(a). 5 With these provisions, [t]he ADEA 'broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age.'  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 98 S.Ct. 866, 868, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978)). 6 In a privilege of employment case such as this one, it is irrelevant that SmithKline had no obligation to provide the particular benefit to its employees, for once an employer decides to grant an opportunity to some, it may not deny this opportunity to others because of their age. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121, 105 S.Ct. at 621. As the Supreme Court has explained,  '[a] benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free ... not to provide the benefit at all.'  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2233-34, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). 24 SmithKline argues in the first instance that Congress, in enacting the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (OWBPA), explicitly considered and rejected a provision entitling older workers to extra consideration for release of ADEA claims. 7 The OWBPA set forth, among other things, specific standards governing whether an employee's waiver of ADEA claims is valid. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(f). SmithKline points out that early drafts of the OWBPA provided that a waiver of ADEA claims is valid only when: 25 the rights or claims are waived in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value-- 26 (ii) that has been offered to a group or class of individuals under an early retirement incentive or other employment termination program. 27 See 135 Cong.Rec. Sec. 289-01, Sec. 356-57 (introduction of bill in Senate); 135 Cong.Rec. H 696-03, H 697 (introduction of bill in House of Representatives). SmithKline is correct in noting that Congress did not include the provision in the OWBPA. This history supporting SmithKline's position is significant and is entitled to some weight. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264-65 (3d Cir.1992). However, we do not rely primarily on legislative history in resolving this case because, as the following discussion shows, it is evident that even if we disregard the history we must conclude that SmithKline's policy did not violate the substantive provisions of the ADEA. 28 With this said, we now assess whether SmithKline's policy of providing enhanced benefits only to terminated employees signing the release violated the ADEA. A policy can be discriminatory because of its treatment of or impact on employees. In a disparate treatment case  '[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion [or other protected characteristics].'  Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1705, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (first alteration added) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1855 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). On the other hand, disparate impact liability  'involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.'  Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 1855 n. 15). 29 DiBiase contends--and the district court found--that older workers who signed SmithKline's release gave up more claims than younger workers who signed the release, since older workers, unlike younger workers, are protected by the ADEA. Because the argument is framed to contend that SmithKline treated older persons less favorably than younger persons, this articulation of the claim falls under the rubric of disparate treatment.