Opinion ID: 2339470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: KTCA Immunity

Text: Although we have determined that plaintiffs should have survived defendants' summary judgment motion on the questions of the existence of a duty, trigger of the duty, and breach, defendants argue that they were nevertheless entitled to summary judgment because they were immune from liability under the KTCA. See Adams v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 577, 585, 214 P.3d 1173 (2009). This lawsuit is subject to the KTCA because the defendants are employees of a governmental body and the governmental body itself. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6102(c) (defining governmental entity to include municipalities); K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6102(b) (defining municipality to include counties); K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6102(d) (defining employee to include persons acting on behalf or in service of a governmental entity in any official capacity). The KTCA provides: Subject to the limitations of this act, each governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6103(a). Under the KTCA, liability is the rule and immunity from liability is the exception. See, e.g., Soto, 291 Kan. at 78, 238 P.3d 278 (citing Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., 249 Kan. 348, 364, 819 P.2d 587 [1991]). The KTCA's analytical matrix requires us to ask, first, whether a private person could be liable under the circumstances. See Adams, 289 Kan. at 585, 214 P.3d 1173. There is no dispute here that a private person can be liable for negligence. Given that, we then are required to examine whether a statutory exception to liability applies. See Adams, 289 Kan. at 585, 214 P.3d 1173. Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating entitlement to immunity under an exception. Soto, 291 Kan. at 78, 238 P.3d 278. In this case, defendants originally claimed they were immune under two different KTCA exceptions, the personnel policy exception of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6104(d) and the discretionary function exception of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6104(e). They have now abandoned their argument for application of the personnel policy exception. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 866, 235 P.3d 1203 (argument not raised or supported by pertinent authority abandoned). We therefore turn to their claim of immunity under the discretionary function exception. This statutory exception provides: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment shall not be liable for damages resulting from: . . . . (e) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the level of discretion involved. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6104(e). The statute does not define discretionary function or duty. Soto, 291 Kan. at 79, 238 P.3d 278. The district judge's analysis of the applicability of this exception was abbreviated and less than clear. He cited Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001), and noted that [a] governmental agency cannot claim that its actions are protected by the [discretionary function] exception where those actions violate a legal duty. He then ruled that Gillespie's adoption of the Suicide Prevention policy fulfilled any duty to protect the health and safety of inmates, and any questions arising from the implementation of her policy can be classified as discretionary, and thus protected under K.S.A. 75-6104(e). This passage in the district judge's memorandum decision appears to have conflated the concepts of breach and statutory immunity. The Court of Appeals' discussion of the discretionary function exception also was remarkably limited. It too cited Barrett, 272 Kan. at 263, 32 P.3d 1156. It did so for the proposition that the discretionary function exception did not apply because defendants owed a duty of care to Stapleton under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A, and this duty was independent of any written policy. Thomas, 40 Kan.App.2d at 965-66, 198 P.3d 182 (also citing Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 [1993]; Cansler, 234 Kan. at 570, 675 P.2d 57). We acknowledge some ambiguity in the language of certain earlier cases on this point, see Nero, 253 Kan. at 585, 861 P.2d 768; Cansler, 234 Kan. at 570, 675 P.2d 57; Estate of Sisk, 262 F.Supp.2d at 1186, but the existence of an independent legal duty is an explicit consideration for the KTCA personnel policy exception, not its discretionary duty exception. Compare K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6104(d) and (e). In order to determine whether a function or duty is discretionary for purposes of the KTCA, Kansas courts look foremost to the nature and quality of the discretion exercised. Soto, 291 Kan. at 79, 238 P.3d 278 (citing Bolyard v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 259 Kan. 447, 452, 912 P.2d 729 [1996]; Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 361-62, 644 P.2d 458 [1996]). Further, [t]he mere application of any judgment is not the hallmark of the exception. Soto, 291 Kan. at 79, 238 P.3d 278 (citing Allen v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 240 Kan. 620, 623, 731 P.2d 314 [1987]). But [t]he more a judgment involves the making of policy[,] the more it is of a `nature and quality' to be recognized as inappropriate for judicial review. Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co., 249 Kan. at 365, 819 P.2d 587. The necessity that the actor employ expertise, whether educational or experiential, also is relevant to determining whether an action is discretionary or ministerial. See Allen, 240 Kan. at 623, 731 P.2d 314 (employee's action not discretionary when decision on how to clean vomit from floor did not invol[ve] any particular skill or training). Negligent performance of a ministerial act is not within the protective orbit of the discretionary function exception. See Nero, 253 Kan. at 587, 861 P.2d 768 (quoting Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 243 Kan. 315, 315, 757 P.2d 272 [1988]). As Professor William E. Westerbeke has observed, several principles guide application of the discretionary function exception by Kansas courts: (1) [T]he discretionary function primarily involves policy-oriented decisions and decisions of such a nature that the legislature intended them to be beyond judicial review, (2) the immunity does not depend upon the status of the individual exercising discretion and thus may apply to discretionary decisions made at the operational level as well as at the planning level, and (3) the discretionary function does not encompass conduct that is deemed `ministerial,' i.e., conduct that involves no discretion. Westerbeke, The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Claims Act: The First Twenty-Five Years, 52 Kan. L.Rev. 939, 960 (2004). This court also has repeatedly put emphasis on the mandatory versus permissive character of direction given to the defendant actor. [W]here there is a `clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.' (Emphasis added.) Soto, 291 Kan. at 80, 238 P.3d 278 (quoting Nero, 253 Kan. at 585, 861 P.2d 768; and citing Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. at 263, 32 P.3d 1156; Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co., 249 Kan. at 365, 819 P.2d 587). For purposes of the exception, [a] mandatory guideline can arise from agency directives, case law, or statutes. (Emphasis added.) Soto, 291 Kan. at 80, 238 P.3d 278 (citing Barrett, 272 Kan. at 263, 32 P.3d 1156; Bolyard, 259 Kan. at 452-54, 912 P.2d 729). Such a guideline leaves little to no room for individual decision making, exercise of judgment, or use of skill, and qualifies a defendant's actions as ministerial rather than discretionary. See Nero, 253 Kan. at 593-94, 861 P.2d 768 (citing Dougan, 243 Kan. at 322-23, 757 P.2d 272) (ministerial act performance of some duty involving no discretion where discretion defined as capacity to distinguish between what is right and wrong, lawful and unlawful, or wise or foolish sufficiently to render one amenable and responsible for his acts). Finally, we recognize that it is sometimes difficult, as defendants and amicus Kansas Association of Counties have pointed out in this case, to differentiate the duty that must exist as a component of a negligence action from the mandatory duty or guideline that eliminates the possibility of immunity under the KTCA's discretionary function exception. As this court described this difficulty in 1998: Although governmental entities do not have discretion to violate a legal duty, we have not held that the existence of any duty deprives the State of immunity under the discretionary function exception. If such were the case, K.S.A. 75-6104(e) could never apply in a negligence action, for in order to recover for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty. Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., 265 Kan. 372, 392, 961 P.2d 677, cert. denied 525 U.S. 964, 119 S.Ct. 409, 142 L.Ed.2d 332 (1998) (citing Jarboe v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 262 Kan. 615, 631, 938 P.2d 1293 [1997]). See Soto, 291 Kan. at 80, 238 P.3d 278; Barrett, 272 Kan. at 264, 32 P.3d 1156. Regardless of the difficulty, this differentiation must be made to avoid nullification of the KTCA's discretionary function exception in all negligence cases. See McAlister v. City of Fairway, 289 Kan. 391, 402, 212 P.3d 184 (2009) (A statute should not be interpreted in such a manner as to make it meaningless.). The simplest way of ringfencing the differentiation is to say that the function or duty at issue under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6104(e), when compared to a general legal duty of care, is likely to demand more specific acts or forbearance by potential defendants and likely to affect a narrower band of potential plaintiffs. To illustrate, the existence of a general legal duty of care may be acknowledged by both sides, as it is here, but the parties remain free to argue whether defendant jailers were permitted to exercise discretion in exactly how to discharge that general duty to an inmate such as Stapleton. Plaintiffs argue that Detention Center rules, and the Suicide Prevention policy in particular, imposed mandatory limits upon or forbade entirely the exercise of defendants' discretion in discharging their duty of care. Defendants, on the other hand, believe they still had room to maneuver in how they handled Stapleton's evaluation and protection. This is a dispute about the applicability of the KTCA discretionary function exception, not about the existence of a general legal duty of care. How do we settle that dispute here? First, we note that Tipton and Biltoft had different positions at the Detention Center. Tipton was a guard and Biltoft, a shift supervisor. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants have acknowledged this difference, perhaps heeding Westerbeke's admonition that discretionary function immunity does not depend upon the status of the actor. 52 Kan. L.Rev. at 960. For our part, we recognize that the Suicide Prevention policy assigned different roles to Tipton and Biltoft in certain respects, but neither was designated a policymaker. Rather, each was to function under the mandatory language of the policy at an operational level, albeit one at a level higher than the other's. On Tipton, we conclude easily that the discretionary function exception does not apply. Under the Suicide Prevention policy and according to Gillespie's testimony, Tipton had no discretion to choose or reject several of the methods to be employed to protect Stapleton and others like him from themselves. Tipton had no autonomy to choose not to do 15-minute checks, to choose not to conduct cell shakedowns, or to allow inmates to cover their cell door windows. See, e.g., Soto, 291 Kan. at 80, 238 P.3d 278 (recognizing that a clearly defined guideline can render the discretionary function exception inapplicable). He was not trusted to exercise his judgment on whether he should consistently monitor Stapleton for suicide risk factors rather than watch television. Cf. Allen, 240 Kan. at 622-23, 731 P.2d 314 (completion of task requiring no particular skill ministerial not discretionary). He had no option, if he saw risk factors surfaceand certainly not if he heard an inmate express a suicidal intention or saw an inmate knot a sheet over his cell doorto choose not to report the same to Biltoft. See Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co., 249 Kan. at 366-68, 819 P.2d 587 (failure to follow established school bus incident reporting policy nondiscretionary). The nature and quality of any latitude granted to Tipton in dealing with Stapleton was strictly, and mandatorily, circumscribed. There is no hint that the legislature intended to shield his negligence from judicial review. On the disputed evidence now before us, we reach the same conclusion as to Biltoft. Again, there is nothing to indicate that he was acting in the role of a policymaker rather than a policy executor. Although Section V.D. of the Suicide Prevention policy may have granted him, as shift supervisor, the discretion to determine whether any insubordination by Stapleton was serious enough to warrant transfer to a protrusion-free cell for Suicide Watch, there is conflicting evidence on whether insubordination was the only or even one of the reasons that Jones and Tipton brought Stapleton's behavior to Biltoft's attention. If one or both of them, instead, reported Stapleton's behavior to Biltoft because they were required to do so under Section I.C. of the policy[s]taff who observe any of the risk factors . . . shall immediately report the behavior(s) verbally and in writing to the shift supervisorthen Biltoft had no discretion under Section II.B. of the policy to do anything other than assign a line supervisor to complete a screening form on Stapleton as soon as possible. Biltoft, and other staff, for that matter would also have been required under Section II.B.1 to see that Stapleton was monitored carefully while the screening was being completed. All of this also would have been true if Biltoft recognized for himself that Stapleton's almost crying was a suicide factor under Section I.B. Biltoft could not simply have conversed with Stapleton and determined on his own that there was no suicide danger. The Suicide Prevention policy did not grant him that power. At this juncture in this case, on the evidence assembled so far, the KTCA discretionary function exception did not apply to provide immunity to Biltoft.