Opinion ID: 1953592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Opinions Denying the Department of Corrections' Motion to Disqualify

Text: In determining the issue before us, we review the factual findings made by Chief Judge Houk for an abuse of discretion. Judge Houk accepted the version of events as related by Judge Giddings. Consequently, we defer to the factual findings and conclusions of both Chief Judge Houk's and Judge Giddings' opinions. [38] In their arguments to this Court, the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors have, for the most part, relied on the analysis presented in these opinions. Therefore, the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors' arguments will be addressed within this section. As previously discussed, Judge Giddings' perception of what took place on September 12, 1994, at the in-chambers meeting is much different from that of Messrs. Govorchin and Soros. Judge Giddings correctly stated that MCR 2.003 requires a showing of actual bias or prejudice. [39] However, Mr. Govorchin admitted that Judge Giddings has not prejudged the case, nor has he shown actual bias or prejudice. [40] Accordingly, because of the lack of any actual bias, the opinion states that the court rule has not been satisfied. Judge Giddings rejected the department's arguments made under Clemens. [41] In response to the department's statement that Judge Giddings had become sufficiently irritated with and has personalized his judicial response to the public statements of Governor John Engler, Judge Giddings stated: That is utterly false. A dispassionate examination of this Court's statements makes clear that this Court's concern has been directed to one thing and one thing only. That one thing is the accurate reporting of court proceedings. That is reflected in repeated statements made on and off the record by this Court.
This record is barren of any indication of irritation or some personalized response to the Governor's or any public criticism. Additionally, Judge Giddings responded to the department's argument that it was inappropriate for him to make comments about the plaintiff's show cause petition. Judge Giddings stated, [n]ot only does this Court have the right to examine into the sufficiency of allegations in support of a petition for show cause, the Court has a duty to do so. No matter how Defendant chooses to characterize the matter, the upshot of those discussions was that this Court refused to issue the requested Order to Show Cause [why Governor Engler and John Truscott should not be held in contempt] for several reasons. First, the petition was somewhat unclear and imprecise. Moreover, it included allegations against Mr. Truscott which the Court felt would accomplish little but to confuse the process.... What Defendant really objects to is the Court's suggestion that Plaintiff might want to focus on Engler's letter of August, 1994 to Attorney General Kelley. This, it is said by counsel for Defendant, demonstrates the appearance of bias or prejudice against Governor Engler. Assuming that to be true, it is of no consequence here. To the extent Engler may become involved in these proceedings in the future, this judge would not be presiding at such proceedings. At this point, Governor Engler is not a party to these proceedings. Nor is he personally affected by them. Judge Giddings clearly stated that he does not consider the Governor to be a party to the Cain case. Even under the Clemens (i.e., Crampton ) standard for disqualification, the bias or prejudice must involve a party. Therefore, Judge Giddings concluded that both of the Clemens situations 2 and 3 are inapplicable. In response to the Governor's August 12 letter to Attorney General Kelley, Judge Giddings set forth reasons for the delay in this case. [T]he most recent trial adjournment occurred because the Department is in default. This is the second time the Department has been defaulted. The trial was also adjourned because discovery had been delayed by the Department's failure to comply with the court rules regarding discovery. Moreover, numerous contempt proceedings have been brought against the [Department of Corrections] and the Department has been held in contempt on six different occasions. Accordingly, it appears that the department is in part responsible for the delay in this case. Lastly, Judge Giddings characterized his actions at the September 12 conference as follows: The Court did suggest that Plaintiffs clarify their petition and be more specific. This Court also tried to discourage Plaintiffs from proceeding against Press Secretary Truscott. True, this Court did suggest (not demand or even request) a contempt proceeding against the Governor based on the August 12th letter. The suggestion, however, is appropriate light of M.C.L.A. § 600.1701(10); M.S.A. § 27A.1701(10) [42] and in light of the Canons of Ethics [43] and Michigan case law.... [Emphasis added.] Judge Giddings' decision denying the disqualification motion was affirmed by Chief Judge Houk in his opinion dated October 7, 1994. In his opinion, Judge Houk supported the analysis and conclusion reached by Judge Giddings. [44]