Opinion ID: 3009775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d at 136 (quoting Zant, 461 U.S. at 891).

Text: 14 In his federal habeas corpus petition, Flamer renewed his argument that the jury's finding of one invalid statutory aggravating circumstance required the reversal of his death sentence, but the district court agreed with the analysis of the Supreme Court of Delaware. Flamer v. Chaffinch, 827 F. Supp. 1079, 1094-97 (D. Del. 1993). This appeal followed. B. Bailey committed the two murders for which he was sentenced to death while assigned to the Plummer House, a work release facility in Wilmington, Delaware. Bailey v. Snyder, 855 F. Supp. 1392, 1396-97 (D. Del. 1993). After escaping from the Plummer House, Bailey appeared at the home of his foster sister, Sue Ann Coker, in Cheswold, Delaware. Id. at 1397. Bailey told his foster sister that he was upset and was not going back to the Plummer House. Id. A short time later, Bailey and Charles Coker, his foster sister's husband, left in Coker's truck to run an errand. Id. On the way, Bailey asked Coker to stop at a package store. Id. Bailey then entered the store and robbed the clerk at gunpoint. Id. Emerging from the store with a pistol in one hand and a bottle in the other, Bailey told Coker that the police would soon be arriving, and he asked to be dropped at Lambertson's Corner, about one and one-half miles away. Id. Coker complied and then drove back to the scene of the robbery, where he inquired about the clerk and telephoned the Delaware State Police. Id. In the meantime, Bailey had entered the farmhouse of Gilbert Lambertson, age 80, and his wife, Clara Lambertson, age 15 73. Id. Bailey shot Gilbert Lambertson twice in the chest with a pistol and once in the head with the Lambertsons' shotgun. Id. at 1392. He shot Clara Lambertson once in the shoulder with the pistol and once in the abdomen and once in the neck with the shotgun. Id. Both Lambertsons died. Id. Bailey fled from the scene but was spotted by a Delaware State Police helicopter unit as he ran across the Lambertsons' field. Id. He attempted to shoot the helicopter co-pilot with the pistol, but he was apprehended. Id. Bailey was charged with first-degree murder and other offenses, and he was tried at approximately the same time as Flamer, but before a different judge. After the jury found Bailey guilty, the state sought the death penalty. Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d 158, 172 (Del. 1983). The state argued that it had established the existence of the following four statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murders were committed by one who had escaped from a place of confinement,0 (2) that the murders were committed while the defendant was engaged in flight after committing a robbery,0 (3) that the defendant's course of conduct resulted in the deaths of two people where the deaths were a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct,0 and (4) that the murders were outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman.0 Id. The judge gave the jury instructions that were virtually identical to those given in Flamer's case. Id. at 0 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)a. 0 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)j. 0 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)k. 0 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)n. 16 173. The jury then returned a verdict recommending the imposition of a death sentence. On an interrogatory form that is also virtually the same as that used in Flamer's case, the jury indicated that it had found that all four of the alleged statutory factors had been proven. See Bailey v. Snyder, 855 F. Supp. at 1409. The jury further indicated that, in recommending a death sentence, it had relied on two of those circumstances -- that the defendant's conduct had resulted in the deaths of two persons where the deaths were a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct and that the murders were outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman. Id. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered whether Bailey's death sentences had to be vacated because the jury had found the existence of one invalid statutory aggravating circumstances (i.e., that the murders were outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or unhuman). Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d at 172-74. The Delaware Supreme Court handed down its decisions regarding the death sentences in Flamer's and Bailey's cases on the same day. In Bailey's case, the State Supreme Court relied on its analysis in its Flamer opinion and affirmed Bailey's death sentence. Id. at 173-74. Bailey subsequently filed the federal habeas petition that is now before us and argued, among other things, that the jury's finding of a single invalid statutory aggravating circumstance required the reversal of his death sentence. Bailey v. Snyder, 855 F. Supp. at 1408. Bailey's petition was assigned to a different district court judge from Flamer's, but the judge 17 in Bailey's case reached the same conclusion as the judge in Flamer's. Agreeing with the Supreme Court of Delaware that Delaware is a non-weighing state and that Zant is the governing precedent, the district court held that the Bailey jury's finding of a single invalid statutory aggravating circumstance did not require the reversal of Bailey's death sentence. Id. at 1408-11. Bailey then took this appeal.