Opinion ID: 2197269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Devices on the Train

Text: Next, we address whether there is an issue of material fact regarding the operation of the train's warning devices at the time of the collision. Specifically at issue in this case is the operation of the train's headlight and whistle. E J & E argues that the train employed all of its warning devices prior to the collision and thereby performed its duty to warn of its approach. (See Sheahan, 212 Ill.App.3d at 735, 156 Ill.Dec. 816, 571 N.E.2d 796.) EJ & E contends that the train's headlight was illuminated and that the whistle was blowing. The evidence, however, is conflicting as to whether the headlight and whistle were operating. Kolofa stated in his deposition that, on the evening of the accident and before the train set out from its yard, he checked the lights, bell, and whistle, all of which were working. According to Kolofa, the headlight was on and the whistle was blowing prior to the train's approach to the 22nd Street crossing. Dipert and Syler agreed that the headlight was on and the whistle was blowing as the train approached the crossing. Anderson, on the other hand, testified in his deposition that he stopped 5 to 10 feet from the crossing, looked both ways, but did not see the headlight on the train. He also indicated that he heard no whistle. Since two prior vehicles had stopped and gone through the crossing, Anderson believed the crossing lights were messed up. Anderson therefore proceeded to go slowly onto the tracks and did not hear the train's whistle until seconds before impact. Anderson stated that as a result he never saw the train until immediately prior to impact. EJ & E responds that the law does not tolerate the absurdity of permitting a motorist to say he looked and did not see the approaching train, when, had he looked, he would have seen it. EJ & E relies on National Bank v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1978), 73 Ill.2d 160, 169, 23 Ill.Dec. 48, 383 N.E.2d 919, and Tucker v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. (1957), 12 Ill.2d 532, 535, 147 N.E.2d 376, for this proposition. Both cases, however, are distinguishable since they rely on the assumption that the light and whistle were operational, whereas here, the parties dispute whether either were operating at the time of the accident. Accordingly, there are disputes of material fact as to the operation of the headlight and whistle prior to the collision. If E J & E failed to employ these warning devices, a jury could find that it breached its duty to warn of an approaching train. This failure to warn may have been one of the proximate causes of the plaintiffs' injuries.