Opinion ID: 146276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession of a Firearm Enhancement

Text: Kimbrough also argues that he should not have received a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 because it is “clearly improbable” that the weapon was connected to the offense. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) states that “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G § 2D1.1(b)(1). Application Note 3 states that the enhancement “should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.3. The Government bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) the defendant actually or constructively ‘possessed’ the weapon, and (2) such possession was during the commission of the offense.” United States v. Catalan, 499 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that it was “clearly improbable” that the firearm was connected to the offense. Id. If the defendant fails to meet his burden, “the district court should apply the enhancement.” Id. at 606-07. “A defendant constructively possesses a gun if he has ownership, or dominion or control over the firearm itself, or dominion over the premises where the firearm is located.” United States v. Galvan, 453 F.3d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). The -6- enhancement applies if the firearm is possessed during “relevant conduct,” and not merely if a weapon is possessed during the commission of the offense. United States v. Faison, 339 F.3d 518, 520-21 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that 1991 amendments to Sentencing Guidelines expanded scope of weapons enhancement); United States v. Armour, 38 F.3d 1217 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1994) (per curiam) (table decision) (noting that effective November 1, 1991, guideline was amended to require only that firearm be “possessed,” not that it be “possessed during the commission of the offense”; citing U.S.S.G. App. C, p. 224 (1992)). Kimbrough argues that the enhancement was improper because he was not in possession of the weapon when he was arrested and found to be in possession of cocaine. He further claims that he was in custody the entire time the officers searched his house and therefore clearly had no control over the weapon during the commission of the offense. In determining whether a firearm was related to a particular drug offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) we consider the proximity of the weapon to the drugs, the type of firearm involved, whether it was loaded, and any alternative purpose for the gun’s presence. United States v. Moses, 289 F.3d 847, 850 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1486 (6th Cir. 1996)). In this case, each of these factors weighs in favor of the enhancement. First, Kimbrough’s loaded shotgun is “of a type associated with drug trafficking.” United States v. Calhoun, 49 F.3d 231, 237 (6th Cir. 1995). Cf. United States v. Garner, 940 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant showed that it was clearly improbable that a single shot antique Derringer, described as a collector’s piece, kept unloaded in a locked safe was connected to his drug trafficking offense). Second, its location in the basement rafters was “a place indicating purposeful concealment rather than a place indicating possession for a legal purpose.” United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1217 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding enhancement warranted even though the gun was unloaded and traces of drugs were -7- on different floors of the apartment, because the gun, a Mac-10 semi-automatic weapon, was “clearly a gun of the type that is normally associated with drug activity”); United States v. Fuller, 72 F. App’x 399, 400-01 (6th Cir. 2003) (order) (upholding enhancement for unloaded weapon that was stored in a cardboard box in close proximity to the crack cocaine; citing Chalkias); United States v. Howard, 36 F. App’x 758, 762 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that enhancement was proper for an unloaded weapon because a 9-mm pistol foun in a room with $720 cash attributed to drug sales; citing Chalkias). Third, the shotgun was loaded. See Moses, 289 F.3d at 850. Finally, Kimbrough never offered an alternative explanation for the firearm, and thus failed to meet his burden of establishing that any connection between the weapon and narcotics was clearly improbable. Kimbrough’s reliance on United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001), is misplaced. In Mackey, the question of possession “in furtherance” of the crime was an element of the offense under 21 U.S.C. § 924(c). Here, the issue involves a sentencing factor, rather than an element of the crime. See United States v. Hurley, 278 F. App’x 574, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the defendant’s reliance on Mackey in his challenge to an enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1)). In sum, because Kimbrough constructively possessed the weapon during the commission of the drug offense, the district court did not err in applying the firearm enhancement.