Opinion ID: 2241961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Trial Court's Consideration of Matters Dehors the Record

Text: The next argument for our consideration centers around certain comments made by the trial judge during the hearing on the motion to suppress. The record in this case reveals that, after reviewing photographs of defendant's head, the trial judge remarked that defendant's wound did not appear consistent with his claim of being struck by a flashlight. Specifically, the trial judge stated that a flashlight would normally leave a bruise, not a scratch. The court also referred to the fact that defendant's wound was heavily laden with scab formation showing an old wound, thereby giving credence to the State's theory that defendant's wound was inflicted prior to his incarceration. Defendant believes that the trial court, in making those comments, impermissibly relied on matters outside the record. See People v. White, 183 Ill.App.3d 838, 841, 132 Ill.Dec. 146, 539 N.E.2d 456 (1989) (holding that the ability to examine a cut and determine the instrument that made it is beyond the province of common knowledge). [3] Defendant further concludes that his appellate counsel erred in not raising this argument on appeal. Again, we disagree. The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel does not mandate that appellate counsel `raise every conceivable argument which might be made, and counsel's assessment of what to raise and argue will not be questioned unless it can be said that his judgment in this regard was patently erroneous.' Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 523, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919, quoting People v. Collins, 153 Ill.2d 130, 140, 180 Ill.Dec. 60, 606 N.E.2d 1137 (1992). In this case, appellate counsel's decision not to raise an argument with respect to the trial judge's speculation about defendant's wound was not patently erroneous. As we have pointed out elsewhere in this opinion, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing strongly supported the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. Throughout this post-conviction proceeding, defendant has repeatedly focused solely on his own self-serving testimony of what transpired during the police interrogation. Defendant, however, overlooks the fact that his credibility was severely assailed by the State during cross-examination. For example, after claiming that he had received a head wound at the hands of the police, defendant acknowledged being hit in the head with a bottle a few days earlier. In addition, defendant originally told the court that the wound caused by the bottle was so inconsequential that he never sought any medical attention. Under the pressure of cross-examination, however, defendant changed his story, admitting that he had in fact gone to a local hospital. Needless to say, [i]nconsistencies in defendant's testimony reflect adversely upon his credibility. People v. West, 137 Ill.2d 558, 583, 148 Ill. Dec. 196, 560 N.E.2d 594 (1990). [4] It is, of course, the function of the trial judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses at a suppression hearing and to resolve any conflicts in their testimony. People v. Garcia, 165 Ill.2d 409, 422, 209 Ill.Dec. 172, 651 N.E.2d 100 (1995). We simply will not usurp the trial judge's role in this case and ignore his express finding that defendant presented no believable or credible evidence in support of his motion to suppress. Because we do not believe that the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been different had the trial judge not speculated upon the age or origin of defendant's head wound, we reject defendant's claims of ineffective appellate representation. In two related arguments, defendant accuses the trial court of engaging in improper speculation when it (i) determined that the blemishes on the decedent's body shown in the autopsy photographs were caused by decedent being run over by a tire and (ii) determined in the absence of expert testimony that [defendant] could not have consumed the amount of alcohol and drugs he testified to having consumed on the date of the incident and to have engaged in a high speed chase with the police, jumped over a fence, and hid under a car. This latter argument was rejected on direct appeal ( Madej, 106 Ill.2d at 216-17, 88 Ill.Dec. 77, 478 N.E.2d 392); further argument, therefore, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata ( People v. Silagy, 116 Ill.2d 357, 365, 107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987)). As for the autopsy photographs, we agree with the State that the trial court never stated that it believed that defendant had run over Barbara's body. Rather, the trial court merely asked counsel if he could explain why there were gray and black and blue markings on the victim's legs. We find no error in the trial court's asking this question.