Opinion ID: 549840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acting Within the Scope of Employment

Text: 30 As noted above, the Restatement provides that an agent is liable for any tort committed by an employee while acting in the scope of ... [his or her] employment. Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec. 219(1) (1958). However, in Hicks, this court noted that Sec. 219(1) of the Restatement of Agency provides scant assistance in assessing employer liability under Title VII. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1418. The court explained that section 219(1) was largely inapposite in sexual harassment cases because  '[s]exual harassment simply is not within the job description of any supervisor or any other worker in any reputable business.'  Id. at 1417-18 (quoting Holtzman & Trelz, Recent Development in the Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims after Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 St. Louis U.L.J. 239, 276 (1987)). This court further stated that  '[c]onfining liability ... to situations in which a supervisor acted within the scope of his authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result that employers would become accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously allow their supervisors to molest women employees.'  Id. at 1418 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C.Cir.1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). 31 The district court in this case held that Captain Galvan was an agent of the Department, but that the Department was not liable under section 219(1) because he was not acting within the scope of his employment in his actions toward plaintiff. Dist.Ct.Op. at 18. The record firmly supports the district court's conclusion. Therefore, we find no error in the district court's holding that defendants are not liable for Galvan's actions under section 219(1).