Opinion ID: 2559108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the standing doctrine in the district of columbia

Text: A. Introduction to the Standing Question Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party's claims. Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet. [17] This is a longstanding principle emphasized in federal case law since Warth, supra , where the Court unequivocally stated that Article III standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal. [18] Thus, the basic function of the standing inquiry is to serve as a threshold a plaintiff must surmount before a court will decide the merits question about the existence of a claimed legal right. If a plaintiff's factual allegations are sufficient to require a court to consider whether the plaintiff has a statutory (or otherwise legally protected right), then the Article III standing requirement has served its purpose; and the correctness of the plaintiff's legal theoryhis understanding of the statute on which he reliesis a question that goes to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, not the plaintiff's standing to present it. Thus, during this threshold inquiry, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue. United States v. Bearden. [19] Federal Circuits routinely have approached standing as a question to be resolved prior to consideration of the merits of the case. [20] Yet, a court may be tempted to avoid the fundamental standing principle because of a conviction that a plaintiff cannot prevail on the merits of his complaint. The Ninth Circuit does not always follow the principle that standing must be considered independent of the merits, but it nevertheless has acknowledged this general principle: Quite frequently, and perhaps usually, the determination of the truth of the allegation of an injury in fact does not require an examination of the merits of the claim asserted. Under circumstances frequently existing, the issue of standing can be regarded as independent of the merits. American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Commc'ns Comm'n, 523 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir.1975). In American Civil Liberties Union, a case involving rules promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, the court concluded that it was confronted with circumstances in which the truth of the allegations of injury in fact can only be determined by examining the merits of the asserted claim. Id. Both the Tenth and the District of Columbia Circuits have grappled with this principle which recognizes overlap between the standing and merits inquiries. Both of these circuits have noted the inconsistency of its application, see State of Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1207 n. 20 (10th Cir.1988) (in cases when the standing inquiry overlaps with the merits of the plaintiff's claim, courts have been inconsistent in their willingness to resolve legal questions in determining standing) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 328 U.S.App.D.C. 52, 66, 132 F.3d 753, 767 (1997) (The appropriate treatment of cases in which the standing inquiry overlaps with the merits so precisely is not entirely clear.). And, both of these circuits have endeavored to identify the type of case in which it is appropriate to apply this principle. In State of Utah v. Babbitt, supra , plaintiffs in essence sought to participate in an inventory of public lands by the Department of the Interior. The court concluded that it had to determine whether the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) granted them a right to participate in the inventory before it could determine whether plaintiffs had standing to sue. It determined that the FLPMA did not grant them a right to participate in the inventory; therefore they had no standing. Id. at 1210. However, the court in Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th Cir.2004), limited application of the overlap principle to situations in which plaintiffs lacked a legally protected interest and in which plaintiffs' claims had no foundation in law, and proceeded to determine that plaintiffs have asserted protected legal interests necessary to establish standing. Id. at 1237. The District of Columbia Circuit stated and apparently applied the overlap principle ([I]f the plaintiff's claim has no foundation in law, he has no legally protected interest and thus no standing to sue) [21] in a 1997 case; the court concluded that plaintiff had no standing to bring her action under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Claybrook v. Slater, 324 U.S.App. D.C.145, 148, 111 F.3d 904, 907 (1997). But, significantly, in a later case, the D.C. Circuit did not read Claybrook to stand for the proposition, contra Warth, that we must evaluate the existence vel non of appellants' Second Amendment claim as a standing question. Parker v. District of Columbia, 375 U.S.App.D.C. 140, 148, 478 F.3d 370, 378 (2007). Furthermore, the court labeled the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the overlap principle as doctrinally quite unsound. [22] We believe that the D.C. Circuit's Parker opinion states the better view because it is faithful to the standing principle enunciated in Warth. It also is consistent with another Supreme Court case, Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice. [23] There, plaintiffs sued to require the disclosure of information relating to an ABA committee's evaluations of prospective judicial nominees for the Department of Justice. They claimed that the disclosures were mandated by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), a law that requires governmental advisory committees (as defined) to make certain information public. The Court ultimately concluded that FACA was inapplicable to the ABA committee and therefore upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit on the merits because the plaintiffs had no statutory right to the information they sought. Nevertheless, as a threshold matter, the Court held that plaintiffs had standing to bring their lawsuit. Thus, at the point of the standing inquiry, the court did not look to whether the statutory right actually existed, but only whether plaintiffs alleged that they were denied information potentially covered by FACA. [24] We mention one other general principle applicable to the standing inquiry. Standing analysis is different at the successive stages of litigation. [25] Thus, the examination of standing in a case that comes to us on a motion to dismiss is not the same as in a case involving a summary judgment motion; the burden of proof is less demanding when the standing question is raised in a motion to dismiss. [26] Some federal circuits have determined that a district court cannot decide disputed factual questions or make findings of credibility essential to the question of standing on the paper record alone but must hold an evidentiary hearing (emphasis in original). [27] This practice is consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Warth: For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. E.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-422 [89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404] (1969). At the same time, it is within the trial court's power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing. If, after this opportunity, the plaintiff's standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed. [28] B. Arguments of the Parties and Amici Regarding the District's Standing Doctrine The parties and amici present diverse arguments regarding the standing doctrine in the District of Columbia. Mr. Grayson and Mr. Breakman contend that the constitutional and prudential standing principles imposed by Article III are not mandatory with respect to the District's courts. But appellees argue that before this court decides the merits of a case the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy and the prudential prerequisites of standing must be satisfied. The Legal Aid Society notes the different ways in which this court has articulated its justiciability principles (such as standing, mootness, and ripeness) and urges the court to recognize explicitly that the D.C. courts are not subject to the same justiciability principles that constrain the judicial power of Article III courts. The District asserts that the conclusion, articulated in some of our cases, that we are not governed by Article III limitations[,] is well-supported by Supreme Court holdings that Congress has vested the District's courts with the same type of jurisdiction that state courts exercise, and that we should not read D.C.Code § 11-705, which refers to cases and controversies, to incorporate all of the jurisprudence relating to those words in Article III of the Constitution. [29] To address these contentions, we first provide historical insight into the evolution of the standing doctrine in the District of Columbia. We then discuss the incorporation into our jurisprudence of standing concepts from federal case law. C. Historical Background Historically, we began to articulate our standing principles as the District government transitioned from the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (FAPA) to the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA). Relying on the legislative history of the DCAPA, we adopted the identical three-part test for standing followed in the federal courts under the FAPA. [30] As we confronted the standing issue in non-APA cases, after Congress enacted the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (Court Reform Act), [31] we took into consideration the fact that we are an Article I court under the Constitution, rather than an Article III court; and in one of our early cases following the adoption of the Court Reform Act, we said: The requirement that a party have standing to invoke the judicial power of the United States is designed to enforce the mandate of Article III of the Constitution that federal courts have jurisdiction only in cases and controversies,. . . although Article III is not the exclusive source of the requirement . . . . In Palmore v. United States , the Supreme Court recently affirmed the view that the courts of local jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, established by Congress pursuant to Article I, are not bound by the requirements of Article III. Our jurisdiction thus extends as far as Congress has granted it. Without, however, examining the limits of this grant, this court has followed the principles of standing, justiciability and mootness to promote sound judicial economy and has recognized that an adversary system can best adjudicate real, not abstract, conflicts. Basiliko [, supra ], 283 A.2d [at] 818; Atkins v. United States, 283 A.2d 204, 205 (D.C.1971). District of Columbia v. Walters. [32] D. Incorporation of Standing Principles from Federal Court Cases Even though we are an Article I court, we have followed Supreme Court developments in constitutional standing jurisprudence with respect to whether the plaintiff has made out a case or controversy between him[/her] and the defendant within the meaning of Article III, and we generally have applied prudential limitations on the exercise of our jurisdiction. [33] We also have recognized that when Congress intends to extend standing to the full limit of Article III, the sole requirement for standing . . . [is a] minima of injury in fact, [and under this circumstance,] courts lack the authority to create prudential barriers to standing. [34] We often cite Warth, supra . Warth articulated the minimum constitutional mandate [35] as follows: In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a case or controversy between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III. This is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit. As an aspect of justiciability, the standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 [82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663] (1962). The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others collaterally. A federal court's jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action. . . . Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 [93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536] (1973). See Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-154 [90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184] (1970). [36] One manifestation of injury in fact is the violation of legal rights created by statute. As Warth declared: The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing. . . . See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., supra, at 617 n. 3 [93 S.Ct. 1146]; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 [92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636] (1972). . . . . Moreover, Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III's requirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants. E.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 [93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254] (1973). But so long as this requirement is satisfied, persons to whom Congress has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, supra, at 737 [92 S.Ct. 1361]; FCC v. Sanders [Bros.] Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 [60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869] (1940). [37] Through the years our cases consistently have followed the constitutional minimum of standing as articulated in Warth and Lujan. [38] And in Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc., supra , we recognized that a plaintiff may be required to meet only the minimum constitutional requirement to gain standing to bring his action. After mentioning the decisions in Allen v. Wright, supra , and Warth, supra , we said: Constitutional standing under Article III requires the plaintiff to allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751 [104 S.Ct. 3315]. Out of prudential concerns, standing doctrine embraces several judicially selfimposed limits on the exercise . . . of jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights . . . and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Id. However, when Congress intends to extend standing to the full limit of Article III, the sole requirement for standing . . . [is a] minima of injury in fact. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). Thus, when standing is permissible to the limit of Article III, courts lack the authority to create prudential barriers to standing. Id. [39] The next question we confront is whether in enacting the 2000 amendments to the CPPA, the Council intended to disturb or override the constitutional doctrine of standing which we have applied for decades.