Opinion ID: 28990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the final decision and whether the Com-

Text: A claimant bears the burden of proving that evaluate the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. he suffers from a disability, which the Social § 405(g); Newton, 209 F.3d at 452; Brown v. Security Act defines as a medically determ- Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999). We inable physical or mental impairment lasting at affirm the Commissioner’s findings whenever least twelve months that prevents the claimant supported by substantial evidence. Martinez v. from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173. Substantial evi42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Newton, 209 F.3d dence “is more than a mere scintilla and less at 452.2 The Commissioner follows a five-step than a preponderance.” Newton, 209 F.3d at sequence to evaluate claims of disability: 452 (citations omitted). We will not re-weigh whether (1) the claimant is currently engaged the evidence, try the questions de novo, or in substantial gainful activity, (2) he has a substitute our judgment for the Comsevere impairment, (3) the impairment meets missioner’s, even if we believe the evidence or equals the severity of a listed impairment in weighs against the Commissioner’s decision. Appendix 1 of the regulations, (4) the Id. at 452. In short, “[c]onflicts in the eviimpairment prevents the claimant from dence are for the Commissioner and not the performing past relevant work, and (5) the im- courts to resolve.” Id. (citations and internal pairment prevents him from doing any other alterations omitted). work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2000). C. Masterson challenges the ALJ’s three main If the claimant satisfies the first four steps factual findings. According to Masterson, subwith sufficient proof, the burden of proof shifts stantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s to the Commissioner to show that the claimant findings that Masterson does not suffer from can perform other substantial work in the PTSD, that he is not otherwise disabled, and national economy. Newton, 209 F.3d at 453; that he had the residual functional capacity to Chapparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 perform sedentary and light work not (5th Cir. 1987). The burden of proof then involving exposure to stressful situations or returns to the claimant to rebut the Com- dealing with the public. We disagree; submissioner’s showing. Chapparro, 815 F.2d at stantial evidence supports all three findings. 1010. A finding that the claimant is not dis- abled at any step is conclusive and ends the The ALJ received conflicting evidence on inquiry. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, whether Masterson suffered from PTSD. The VA originally diagnosed Masterson with PTSD in October 1992, nearly a year after he 2 “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity first obtained treatment from the VA. Nemir, involving significant physical or mental abilities for who performed the consultative psychological pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)-(b). 5 exam for the Texas Rehabilitation Commission the ALJ’s finding that Masterson was not enin January 1995, diagnosed Masterson only tirely credible, substantial evidence supports with an unspecified personality disorder. the ALJ’s conclusion that Masterson was not Moreover, he commented on the VA’s diag- otherwise disabled. nosis of PTSD by remarking that if Masterson had PTSD, it was certainly an “atypical” ver- Finally, the ALJ concluded that Masterson sion. Likewise, Berry testified that Masterson had the residual functional capacity to perform did not suffer from PTSD. Berry admitted sedentary and light work not involving exthat Masterson might suffer from PTSD, but posure to stressful situations or dealing with only if one took Masterson’s testimony as the public. The ALJ expressly and rightly retrue. lied on the testimony of Marion, the vocational expert, in reaching this conclusion. Vaughn v. The ALJ, though, found Masterson’s testi- Shalala, 58 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1995) (the mony less than fully credible. The ALJ care- ALJ may rely on vocational expert’s fully considered this and other evidence and testimony). Masterson offered no contrary concluded that Masterson did not suffer from evidence and thus did not satisfy his burden to PTSD. See Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, prove that he could not perform the kinds of 905 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that ALJ has the jobs identified by Marion. responsibility to resolve conflicting medical opinions); Chapparro, 815 F.2d at 1011 Masterson objects that the ALJ asked (stating that ALJ has the responsibility to re- Marion improper hypothetical questions about solve questions of credibility). Given Nemir’s Masterson’s abilities, but the record clearly refindings and Berry’s testimony, substantial evi- flects that the ALJ scrupulously incorporated dence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that into the hypothetical questions all of Masterson did not suffer from PTSD. Masterson’s disabilities supported by evidence and recognized by the ALJ.3 See The ALJ also concluded that Masterson is not otherwise disabled, despite finding that he suffered from a sleep apnea and a personality 3 Masterson relies in part on McFarley’s report disorder. The ALJ found, however, that Mas- to attack the ALJ’s hypothetical question. Yet, terson’s sleep apnea is well controlled with Masterson did not submit the report to the ALJ at medication. Masterson does not challenge this all; rather, he obtained the report after the ALJ’s finding on appeal. Berry testified that decision and submitted it to the Appeals Council to Masterson’s unspecified personality disorder support his request for a review of the ALJ’s was not sufficiently severe to qualify for dis- decision on the merits. The Appeals Council conability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Sub- sidered the report, as it must under 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), but concluded that the report did not