Opinion ID: 2318327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Furda's Intent

Text: Furda contends that he did not have the subjective intent necessary to support a perjury conviction, explaining that he did not knowingly and willfully lie on the application because he truly believed that the Denial Order was wrong. Although the perjury and false information statutes employ two different termswillfully and knowinglyto describe the requisite state of mind of the defendant, this Court has stated that the two words are of similar import and are the same in substance and effect. Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 244, 155 A.2d 894, 899 (1959). To be willful, the false oath must be deliberate and not the result of surprise, confusion or bona fide mistake[.] Myers v. State, 303 Md. 639, 640 n. 1, 496 A.2d 312, 312 n. 1 (1985). In conducting our inquiry, we are mindful that the trial judge here did not find Furda to be a credible witness: The Court also finds that Mr. Furda did not testify candidly when he testified during his trial. He told me then, he told me now, he was not aware of [the Denial Order]. To be blunt, I do not believe him[.] We give great deference to a hearing judge's ... credibility determinations because credibility determinations are to be made by trial courts, not appellate courts. Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 520, 924 A.2d 1129, 1149 (2007). A review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion. Before walking into Gilbert's Guns, Furda had been made aware of the Denial Order through his counsel. As Furda's lawyer explained to him, that order described Furda as a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(4) because he had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution[.] (emphasis added). We reiterate, this language tracks exactly the language of Question 8, leading any reasonable person to conclude that the term committed had the same meaning in both the Denial Order and the firearm application. In addition, Furda signed his name under the certification I am not prohibited by law from purchasing or possessing a regulated firearm[,] even though he knew there was a judicial finding to the contrary still in effect. [15] Perhaps the most damning evidence of Furda's intent was that, after conferring with his attorney and the owner of Gilbert's Guns on the issue of whether the Denial Order prevented him from purchasing a firearm, he failed to attach or otherwise make reference to his motion for reconsideration in his application. We agree with the logic of the Sixth Circuit that the federal regulatory scheme prohibiting false statements are designed to compel full and honest disclosure[,] see Cassity v. United States, 521 F.2d 1320, 1323 (6th Cir.1975), and conclude that this reasoning is equally applicable to Maryland's scheme. Clearly, Furda's disclosure did not measure up to that standard. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that, by answering No to Question 8, Furda knowingly [gave] false information ... in a firearm application and willfully and falsely [made] an oath or affirmation as to a material fact[.] Accordingly, we affirm his convictions for false information and perjury. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.