Opinion ID: 1443930
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Errors arising prior to the plea: appointment of co-counsel and ex parte communication

Text: The errors alleged by Kirksey regarding the motion for appointment of co-counsel and Judge Lehman's ex parte communication with Dr. Masters occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea. The State contends that by pleading guilty, Kirksey waived all errors arising prior to the plea. Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 1865, 85 L.Ed.2d 159 (1985); Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975). As we have explained: [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Webb, 91 Nev. at 470, 538 P.2d at 165 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)). Where the defendant has pleaded guilty, the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself and the effectiveness of counsel. NRS 34.810(1); Lyons, 100 Nev. at 432, 683 P.2d at 505. Because the denial of the motion for appointment of co-counsel and the ex parte communication occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea, appellate counsel could not have raised these claims on direct appeal. Therefore, appellate counsel's failure to raise these issues could not be considered ineffective assistance. [11] Although the waiver of these issues is dispositive, we also note that a review of the merits of these two contentions further demonstrates that even if appellate counsel could have asserted these claims, there was no reasonable probability of success on appeal. Appointment of co-counsel under NRS 260.060 is discretionary, even in a capital case, and the denial of co-counsel is appropriate when the amount of preparation and investigation required is not unduly burdensome. See, e.g., DePasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 846, 803 P.2d 218, 220 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829, 112 S.Ct. 99, 116 L.Ed.2d 70 (1991); Sechrest v. State, 101 Nev. 360, 367-68, 705 P.2d 626, 631-32 (1985). Since Kirksey's motion for co-counsel came approximately five months prior to the scheduled trial, there was sufficient time for his attorney to investigate and prepare for trial. Although Judge Lehman's ex parte communication with Dr. Masters [12] was inappropriate, there is no evidence that the communication resulted in bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. [13] Additionally, there is no evidence that Dr. Masters was somehow coerced to change his opinion. We therefore conclude that this contention lacks merit and would have had no reasonable probability of success on appeal.