Opinion ID: 2584054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Evaluated and Placed Sufficient Emphasis on Factors Weighing in Favor of the Grandparents.

Text: Constance and Clark essentially argue that instead of stressing Bernard's long-term and successful care by Ruth and John, the trial court should have been persuaded by several factors that they contend weigh in their favor. We hold that the special master made no clearly erroneous factual findings against Constance and Clark, and did not abuse his discretion in declining to give certain factors more weight.
Constance and Clark contend that the special master clearly erred in rejecting evidence that Ruth and John had allowed Bernard to suffer bruising, lacerations, cuts, bite marks, toenail problems, and improperly fitted shoes while in their care. Constance testified at trial, with the aid of photographs and a videotape, that she had alerted DFYS to such problems when visiting Bernard, but that no action had been taken. The special master found that [n]one of the marks appears to a medically untrained eye to be a significant injury or anything beyond ailments and minor injuries which would be ordinary in an active toddler. Having reviewed the photographic evidence, we agree with the special master that these injuries do not appear to be significant. We hold that the special master's findings on this point are not clearly erroneous.
Constance and Clark argue that the special master gave insufficient consideration to their ability to provide Bernard with access to his other biological relatives. They argue that in living with them, Bernard would reside with his brother, and that he would have access to relatives on both his mother's and father's sides. Ruth and John point out in reply that in their household Bernard has already lived with S.G., his half-sister, for two years. They argue that they too arrange for Bernard to spend time with his relatives, and that these are simply different relatives from the ones Constance and Clark know. The record supports the contention that Constance and Clark can provide Bernard with access to more of his extended family, especially relatives from his deceased father's side. Nonetheless, Ruth and John can provide adequate exposure to the extended family, and we agree with the superior court that Bernard's daily care is even more important than his contacts with his extended family. Constance and Clark also submit that because the extended family placement preference of the ICWA [25] is meant to reverse a pattern of breaking up Indian families and to promote the stability of Indian families, [26] this factor should be given no inconsiderable weight. Ruth and John argue that they themselves are part of Bernard's extended family and that placement with them does not break up an Indian family any more than has already occurred. In the previous case between these parties, we held that Ruth provides a sufficiently close family relationship to meet the purpose of the ICWA extended family placement preference, [27] and that Constance and Clark had not shown that they have any greater claim under Yup'ik tradition to the ICWA extended family placement preference by virtue of being more closely related by blood. [28] They produced no new evidence on Yup'ik tradition in the current trial. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this point.
Constance and Clark also contend that the trial court attached insufficient weight to the placement preference of the biological parents. They argue that parental preference is an ICWA factor that has previously been given effect by this court in Adoption of N.P.S. [29] and In re Adoption of F.H., [30] but that in those cases the parental preference resulted in the placement of Indian children with non-Indian parents, which they argue cannot be consistent with the purposes of the ICWA. Ruth and John contend that the ICWA states that parental preference is to be considered [w]here appropriate [31] and that Linda's preference was properly given less weight because Linda was a demonstrably incompetent parent with little history of genuine concern for her children's care. A DFYS investigator had testified that Linda had really put [her older] children into emotional turmoil when she told them that she would regain their custody and take them away from their foster parents. This allegedly occurred when Constance and Clark allowed Linda to have unauthorized contact with the children. Constance and Clark reply that we have previously held that the fact of the preference is more significant than the reasoning behind it under the ICWA, [32] and that it is factually unfounded to say that they will give Linda improper access to the children in the future. We agree with the special master that in this case, parental preference does not shed light on what the best living situation for Bernard is and should not overcome the importance of continuity of care. Moreover, Constance and Clark's argument about a policy of ratifying the parental preference only for non-Indian placements is irrelevant to this case, because both parties include a partner who shares Bernard's tribal affiliation. We find no abuse of discretion on this point.
Constance and Clark also make a number of arguments addressing the stability of the two households, which is a best-interest factor under McDanold v. McDanold. [33] They first contend that their household is more stable because both of them are retired, [34] whereas John travels frequently on business. [35] Constance and Clark also contend that they have no alcohol problems, [36] whereas in the past John has admitted to alcohol dependency. Constance and Clark also argue that they have never given up prior children for adoption, whereas both Ruth and John have. Ruth and John contend that these allegations center on problems that are decades old and completely overcome. The special master found that the adoptions of Ruth's and John's respective children were organized responsibly and do not reflect negatively on their judgment, in distinction to Constance and Clark's return of J.G. to DFYS. We agree that the placements for adoption occurred years ago and are therefore of little value as evidence of the present stability of the household under McDanold. Likewise, both couplesConstance and Clark, Ruth and Johnhave been certified as foster parents and therefore have been cleared of present-day substance abuse problems. The special master did not err in finding that Ruth and John provide a stable household. To the limited extent that Constance and Clark have been able to prove any of the above four factors (alleged inability to supervise the child safely, the grandparents' better access to the child's extended family, parental preference, and relative stability), these factors do not outweigh the superior court's finding that Bernard's emotional health would be best served by continuing his placement with Ruth and John. We hold that there was no abuse of discretion and no clear error.