Opinion ID: 555084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Religious Beliefs.

Text: 11 Over Munn's objection, the district court allowed Algee's counsel to question him about many aspects of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith, including, inter alia, the following beliefs and practices: (1) Christ's physical return to earth in 1914; (2) the eternal damnation of all those not adhering to the faith; (3) the non-existence of hell; (4) the non-existence of souls; (5) refusal to do service to their country; and (6) refusal to salute the flag. Algee's counsel further questioned Munn about his and his wife's adherence vel non to the faith's prohibition on premarital cohabitation. 12 The admission of this evidence raises two questions: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting Munn's testimony, see Jon-T Chems., Inc. v. Freeport Chem. Co., 704 F.2d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir.1983); and (2) assuming the court abused its discretion, whether this error affected any substantial right of Munn's, see Fed.R.Evid. 103(a); LeBoeuf v. K-Mart Corp., 888 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir.1989). 2 A. Admissibility. 13 Evidence is relevant (and thus potentially admissible) if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. For Munn's testimony to be relevant, it is essential to identify a fact of consequence whose existence is made more or less probable thereby. Because we are unable to discern a fact of consequence of which this testimony is probative, we hold that the court erred in allowing the questions and that the error constitutes an abuse of discretion. 14 Algee asserts that the fact of consequence of which this testimony is probative is the sincerity of the Munns' adherence to their faith. 3 One might plausibly argue that sincerity is a fact of consequence in that a decision sincerely motivated by a religious belief is more reasonable 4 than an otherwise inexplicable action. However, only the discussion of the Munns' adherence to the prohibition on premarital cohabitation reflects upon their sincerity. Simply inquiring otherwise into whether the Jehovah's Witnesses faith incorporates certain beliefs does not reveal anything about whether the Munns sincerely adhered to them. 15 Nor were these questions directly probative of the reasonableness of Mrs. Munn's decision to refuse blood. Algee fails to demonstrate how Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs unrelated to blood transfusions reveal the reasonableness of her adherence to one particular article of the faith. 5 16 Algee further asserts that, in any event, she was entitled to counter Munn's direct testimony about his wife's religious beliefs. However, Fed.R.Evid. 611(b) limits the scope of cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. 17 The bulk of Munn's testimony on cross-examination did not concern the sincerity of his and his wife's beliefs. As noted above, simply listing Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs says nothing about the sincerity of the Munns' adherence thereto. Accordingly, this testimony was not within the subject matter of the direct examination. Moreover, Munn's direct testimony did not cover any beliefs other than the prohibition on blood transfusions. Accordingly, because Munn's testimony did not tend to prove or disprove any (permissible) material fact and thus was irrelevant, its admission was error amounting to an abuse of discretion. 6 B. Reversible or Harmless Error. 18 However, simply because the court abused its discretion in admitting his testimony does not entitle Munn to relief. Rule 103(a) indicates that courts of appeals should not reverse on the basis of erroneous evidentiary rulings unless a party's substantial right is affected. 19 This question is not susceptible to mechanical analysis. Rule 103 is silent as to what factors a court must consider in determining whether substantial rights have been affected, indicating that the court must proceed on a case to case basis rather than apply a mechanical rule. 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 103 at 103-6 (1990). However, we have stated repeatedly that  '[a]n error is harmless if the court is sure, after reviewing the entire record, that the error did not influence the jury or had but a very slight effect on its verdict.'  Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 762 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Underwood, 588 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir.1979)). 20 After reviewing the record, we conclude--although it is a close question--that the admission of Munn's testimony did not adversely influence the jury. Munn failed to articulate any substantial right affected by this evidence's admission, 7 and no prejudice is reflected in the jury's verdict. 21 First, Munn cannot plausibly argue that the amount of damages for pain and suffering awarded to Elaine Munn's estate demonstrates prejudice. For approximately eight hours of pain and suffering, the jury awarded $10,000.00, an amount not so small as to arouse suspicion as to the jury's motives. 22 Second, the jury's failure to award Munn any damages for his own pain and suffering most likely reflects the relatively minor nature of his injuries. See Pregeant, 762 F.2d at 1249 (fact that verdict was otherwise supported demonstrates harmless nature of erroneous admission of evidence). He incurred only $241.44 in medical expenses and by his own admission suffered only bruises and contusions. 23 The jury's failure to award any wrongful death damages is the most plausible expression of any prejudice caused by the erroneous admission of this evidence. However, the jury most likely refused to compensate the wrongful death beneficiaries because it believed that Mrs. Munn would have lived had she taken blood transfusions. A number of doctors testified as to whether blood transfusions would have saved Mrs. Munn's life, 8 and although their testimony was conflicting, the evidence was such that in deciding the cause of Mrs. Munn's death, there is no indication that the jury was using her refusal to take blood as a pretext for expressing its possible distaste for Jehovah's Witnesses. See id. 24 Thus we hold that the erroneous admission of Munn's testimony did not affect any substantial right. In this regard we affirm the denial of the motion for new trial. 25