Opinion ID: 836190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the cca's protections

Text: Custody cases involving natural parents inherently implicate the parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. [23] Thus, they implicate the constitutional protections identified in the United States Supreme Court cases previously discussed. The threshold question this Court must address is whether the relevant provisions of the CCA adequately protect a fit parent's fundamental rights under existing United States Supreme Court precedent.
Troxel established a floor or minimum protection against state intrusion into the parenting decisions of fit parents. It invalidated the state of Washington's third-party visitation statute as a violation of a natural parent's fundamental rights. It reasoned that the Washington statute was flawed because it afforded no deference to a fit parent's decision about his or her children's best interests. [24] Rather, the statute allowed any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court review. [25] Troxel also forbade courts from overturning decisions by a fit custodial parent based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interests. [26] Rather, it held that courts must give some special weight to the parents' determination of their children's best interests. [27] The constitutional protection in Troxel centers on the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. [28] The Washington statute's lack of deference to a fit parent's decision was inconsistent with the presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Hence, it was constitutionally infirm. Using that reasoning, Troxel established that a natural parent's fitness to parent is the touchstone for invoking the constitutional protections of fundamental parental rights. The application of the statutory presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must therefore be considered specifically in the context of a fit parent to determine whether it satisfies constitutional scrutiny under Troxel. In Heltzel, our Court of Appeals recognized Troxel's mandate: In order to protect a fit natural parent's fundamental constitutional rights, the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) must control over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c). We agree. Several considerations compel this conclusion. First, Troxel explicitly requires courts to give some deference to a parent's decision to pursue custody because it is inherently central to the parent's control over his or her child. By contrast, unlike the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1), no constitutional protections for third persons underlie the established custodial environment presumption in MCL 722.27(1)(c). This Court has held that no constitutional or statutory basis exists for third parties to have standing to seek child custody solely because they have an established custodial relationship with the child. [29] Finally, we note that the vast majority of Michigan cases interpreting the CCA support the conclusion that these presumptions were not meant to be given equal weight. [30] This conclusion is also in accord with Michigan's longstanding history of affording great respect to parental authority while consistently recognizing that the best interests of the child control the analysis. [31] For these reasons, we conclude that, when these presumptions conflict, the presumption in MCL 722.27(1)(c) must yield to the presumption in MCL 722.25(1). [32] A remaining constitutional question involves the amount of deference due under Troxel to fit parents. We conclude that the statute provides sufficient deference to a fit natural parent's fundamental rights to the care, custody, and management of their child.... [33] We so hold because the statute requires, in order to rebut the parental presumption, clear and convincing evidence that custody by the natural parent is not in a child's best interests. The clear and convincing evidence standard is the most demanding standard applied in civil cases.... [34] This showing must `produce[] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.' [35] We agree with the Court of Appeals in Heltzel that, given the unique constitutional considerations in custody disputes involving natural parents, it is not sufficient that the third person may have established by clear and convincing evidence that a marginal, though distinct, benefit would be gained if the children were maintained with him. [36] A third party seeking custody must meet a higher threshold. He or she must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it is not in the child's best interests under the factors specified in MCL 722.23 for the parent to have custody. This is entirely consistent with Troxel's holding. Although a fit parent is presumed to act in his or her child's best interests, a court need give the parent's decision only a presumption of validity or some weight. That is precisely what MCL 722.25(1) does when it requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. Given our determination that (1) the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) prevails over the presumption in favor of an established custodial environment in MCL 722.27(1)(c) and that (2) the parental presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that custody with the natural parent is not in the best interests of the child, we conclude that MCL 722.25(1) satisfies constitutional scrutiny under Troxel. [37]
Defendant and some of the amici curiae argue that this Court must read into the statute an implicit requirement for a fitness determination in order to protect parents' fundamental rights. Even if the presumption in MCL 722.25(1) supersedes the presumption in MCL 722.27(1)(c), defendant argues that the court must make a preliminary determination whether a natural parent is a fit parent. Thus, defendant insists, Troxel prevents courts from allowing a third party to rebut the presumption using a best interests analysis because it would insufficiently protect the parent's rights. Defendant relies on In re JK in support of her argument. In that case, this Court stated that [a] due-process violation occurs when a state-required breakup of a natural family is founded solely on a `best interests' analysis that is not supported by the requisite proof of parental unfitness. [38] Defendant urged us to examine the Probate Code, the Juvenile Code, and other sections of Michigan law to adopt a test for evaluating parental fitness. She claims that, to satisfy constitutional scrutiny, such a test must be based on objective factors similar or identical to those listed in those statutes. We reject defendant's arguments as beyond the scope of the holdings of Troxel and In re JK. As noted previously, Troxel carefully limited the constitutional scope of the parental presumption to the extent that a court need give decisions by fit custodial parents only a presumption of validity. [39] Since MCL 722.25(1) applies a substantial presumption of the validity of decisions by all parents, including fit custodial parents, the constitutional underpinnings of Troxel are satisfied. [40] In re JK is distinguishable from the case before us. It was a case involving termination of parental rights. Termination cases introduce a significantly heightened intrusion upon a parent's fundamental right to parent because they involve an all-or-nothing proposition: whether a parent's right to be a parent and make decisions regarding his or her child's upbringing is permanently severed. It follows logically that under circumstances where the parental interest is most in jeopardy, due process concerns are most heightened. A custody award to a third party, by contrast, represents a lesser intrusion into the family sphere. It does not result in an irrevocable severance of parental rights or `a unique kind of deprivation' that forces parents to confront the state. [41] The Legislature has addressed these concerns by requiring the state to prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence in termination cases. It has listed specific statutory factors that it has determined make a parent per se unfit and warrant terminating his or her rights to a child. [42] The quoted language from In re JK is inapplicable in custody cases such as this because it does not involve the state-required breakup of a family. In termination cases, the natural parent and the state are the parties to the action. To protect the parental interest from improper state intrusion, the Legislature requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground for termination exists. Hence, the state must show that the natural parent is unfit. In custody cases, by contrast, the state does not initiate the proceedings in which the natural parent's rights are at stake. Rather, custody determinations in cases such as this merely give recognition to a family unit already in existence.... [43] Under such circumstances, [w]hatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that [its decision was] in the `best interests of the child.' [44] Finally, we note that a natural parent's fitness is an intrinsic component of a trial court's evaluation of the best interest factors in MCL 722.23. [45] Therefore, although we hold that due process does not require a fitness determination where the statute does not mandate it, we observe that fitness is an inextricable component of the court's inquiry. For example, MCL 722.23(f) to (g) require the trial court to compare the moral fitness and the mental and physical health of the parties. These factors reflect the legislative determination that concerns about parental fitness are of paramount importance in custody determinations. Therefore, MCL 722.25(1) uses the clear and convincing evidence standard to safeguard the constitutionally protected fundamental rights of fit custodial parents, as identified in Troxel. MCL 722.23, on the other hand, simultaneously fulfills the legislative purpose of maintaining the focus of the inquiry on the best interests of the child.
We again note, as a preliminary observation, that MCL 722.25(1) does not refer to fitness of the natural parent as a prerequisite for applying the statutory presumption in the parent's favor. MCL 722.25(1) applies to all natural parents who are parties in custody disputes with third persons, not merely fit natural parents. Nothing in the statute explicitly or implicitly suggests that the presumption applies only in cases involving a parent adjudged to be a fit parent. Rather, we believe that, in enacting the CCA, the Legislature set forth clear best interest factors in MCL 722.23 that constitute a de facto evaluation of each individual's fitness to raise a child. [46] In doing so, the Legislature rejected the amorphous fitness/neglect/abandonment standard outlined in Mason by not including any reference to that standard. [47] Mason erred by holding that the statutory presumption in the natural parent's favor applies only to fit parents. This was an improper interpretation of Heltzel, Troxel, and the CCA generally. The statutory presumption in MCL 722.25(1) is `a presumption of the strongest order[,]' [48] and one that does not turn solely on the question of fitness. [49] Numerous cases decided since the CCA was enacted have agreed: the parental presumption controls unless the third party shows by clear and convincing evidence that custody with the natural parent is not in the best interests of the child. [50] As discussed earlier in this opinion, the parental presumption has some constitutional provenance, whereas the custodial environment presumption has none. This persuades us that the parental presumption should properly control over the established custodial environment presumption. Mason held that the parental presumption controls with regard to fit parents only because they alone are constitutionally protected. Mason further held that unfit parents have the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change in the established custodial environment with the guardian was in the child's best interests. [51] However, Mason and its predecessors created this new standard out of thin air. [52] In the case before us, the Legislature has provided us with two standards that irreconcilably conflict. Rather than resolve the conflict by divining a new standard, as Mason did, we believe that the better course is to decide which of the two presumptions controls. We are convinced that the parental presumption must control. We are persuaded of this (1) by the fact that, whereas the parental presumption has some constitutional provenance, the established custodial environment presumption does not, (2) by caselaw interpreting the tension between MCL 722.25(1) and MCL 722.27(1)(c) and (3) by the lack of reference to fitness in the CCA. The Court is unwilling to restrict the parental presumption absent clear evidence from the Legislature that a restriction was intended. Moreover, the CCA's notable silence regarding fitness, abandonment, or neglect of children suggests these words should not be read into the statute. The statutory presumption favoring natural parents is not contravened merely because the statute provides greater protection for parental rights than Troxel mandated as a constitutional matter. Mason's contrary holding is contradictory to the weight traditionally afforded to the parental presumption. [53] Because the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) satisfies the constitutional standards mandated for fit parents, no justification existed for Mason to restrict that presumption only to fit parents. Nothing in Troxel can be interpreted as precluding states from offering greater protection to the fundamental parenting rights of natural parents, regardless of whether the natural parents are fit. This rule applies here. Defendant also argues that Mason's arbitrary and subjective fitness standard, and the trial court's equally subjective application of that standard in this case, violated her Fourteenth Amendment [54] due process rights. She claims that, because the Mason standard does not utilize objective criteria for evaluating parental fitness, it lacks procedural protections sufficient to protect her due process rights. Given our holding that Mason improperly limited the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1), we find it unnecessary to reach defendant's constitutional argument. We conclude that Mason erred by reading a fitness requirement into the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1). The statute is entirely silent on the issue of a parent's fitness. [55] Nothing in the statute or the CCA generally [56] suggests that parental fitness is a prerequisite to entitlement to the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1). Because Mason's holding was neither constitutionally mandated nor consistent with the statute, Mason is hereby overruled.
Justice Corrigan's concurrence raises a number of issues that we believe deserve a response regarding the scope of this opinion. We offer the following observations to more explicitly address what this opinion does not do: (1) This case deals with custody actions initiated under the CCA involving both the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) and the established custodial environment presumption in MCL 722.27(1)(c). This opinion should not be read to extend beyond CCA cases that involve conflicting presumptions or to cases that involve parental rights generally but are outside the scope of the CCA. (2) This opinion does not create any new rights for parents. The United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutional rights of parents previously discussed in this opinion provide guidance that informs our analysis. This opinion does not magically grant parents additional rights or a constitutional presumption in their favor. It does not grant unfit parents constitutional rights to their children other than due process rights. (3) Parents may not bring actions under the CCA and invoke the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) as an end run around previous custody determinations. We agree with Justice Corrigan's conclusion that [p]rinciples of collateral estoppel generally prevent a party from relitigating an issue already established in the first proceeding. [57] This Court has long recognized the applicability of these principles to probate court orders such as the guardianship orders in this case. [58] Subsequently, we reiterated that orders of probate courts have the force and effect of judgments and are res judicata of the matters involved and cannot be attacked collaterally. [59] Therefore, a parent whose rights have been terminated or suspended cannot initiate an action for custody under the CCA because it would amount to a collateral attack on the earlier proceedings. A termination order, by its nature, finds that custody with the natural parent is not in the child's best interests. A parent's only recourse in such cases is to appeal the order. A guardianship order, similarly, suspends a parent's parental rights and grants those rights in the child, including a right to physical and legal custody, to the guardian under MCL 700.5215. Thus, defendant in this case would have been collaterally estopped from initiating a custody action under the CCA. A parent's recourse under these circumstances is to file a motion to terminate the guardianship. [60] In sum, collateral estoppel principles provide a sufficient basis to preclude parents from initiating an action for custody under the CCA in order to circumvent valid court orders affecting custody. [61]