Opinion ID: 1610450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex parte Brooks

Text: The divorced parents in In re Stephenson, 513 So.2d 612 (Ala.Civ.App.1986), jointly filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father as to David, their two and one-half year old only child. Therein, the father affirmatively stated his desire to surrender any and all of his parental rights and stated that he believed that such action would be in the best interests of the minor child. A report to the Department of Pensions and Security was a portion of the evidence in this case. This report concluded that it was in David's best interests that the father's parental rights be terminated. There was nothing adverse in the report as to the mother. . . . David appeared to be well adjusted and happy living with his mother. . . . . The parties were divorced at a time when the mother was about three months pregnant with David. The divorce was largely precipitated when the father attempted to persuade the mother to have an abortion and she refused to do so. The judgment of divorce made no custody award. When David was born the father did not visit him in the hospital. As a matter of fact, both parents explicitly testified that the father has never attempted to see David, that he has never visited with David, that he has never even seen David, that he has never paid any child support or provided any money for the child's benefit since his birth, and that, while the mother has requested support from the father on many occasions, he has consistently refused to support David. The father did provide $100 towards the mother's hospital stay. The father is twenty-eight years of age. He has been a deputy sheriff for three years. His salary is $741 every two weeks. He owns no real estate but has an equity in his vehicle and has a moderate bank account. The mother stated that she wants to terminate the father's parental rights because he has no interest in David, is not stable, is not child oriented, is short of patience, and has a bad temper. The parents disagree over the child's religious upbringing as a Jew. The mother is very concerned over bickering about custody and visitation and the effect it might have upon David, who is presently well adjusted. The father testified that he desires that his rights as to the child be terminated since the parents disagree upon a number of areas, such as religion, and that it would not be right to emotionally harm David over the father. In that regard, the father swore that it was better for the mother to raise the child and that he has no desire to visit with or to know David. When asked if he would try to visit David in the future, his reply was, `Who knows what is in the future?' In denying the petition to terminate parental rights, the trial court found that it was not in David's best interests to terminate his father's parental rights, there being no evidence of any harm to the child by the father. The trial court further found that David's future rights to support, inheritance, and paternal affiliation would not be protected by a termination in this matter. The mother appealed. The guardian ad litem who was appointed to represent David's interests supports the final judgment of the trial court. 513 So.2d at 612-13 (emphasis added). On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals noted that the CPA created a rebuttable presumption that the father had abandoned David, and the court concluded that the presumption was not rebutted by an iota of testimony. Even without the benefit of that presumption, the undisputed evidence was that the father has never acted or attempted to act as David's father in any respect. Two and one-half years of the father's failure to act, neglect, and behavior as if David did not exist certainly constitutes ample time and clear reasons to terminate his parental rights as to this young child. In short, we are clearly convinced after a very thorough study of the undisputed evidence that it is in David's best interests that the father's parental rights as to David be terminated. The learned trial court abused its judicial discretion in not doing so. 513 So.2d at 614 (emphasis added). On appeal to this Court, the guardian ad litem argued, in part, that termination of the father's parental rights in this case is: (1) contrary to the intent of the Alabama Child Protection Act when no adoption is contemplated; (2) contrary to public policy; [and] (3) impermissible when a less drastic remedy would better serve the child's interests. . . . Ex parte Brooks, 513 So.2d at 616. In addressing these argument, this Court stated: The purpose of the 1984 Child Protection Act is stated in § 26-18-2, which provides, in part: `It is the purpose of this chapter to provide meaningful guidelines to be used by the juvenile court in cases involving the termination of parental rights in such a manner as to protect the welfare of children by providing stability and continuity in their lives, and at the same time to protect the rights of their parents.' The trial court concluded that termination of [the father's] parental rights would not serve David's best interest. We agree. [The mother] asks for termination of her former husband's parental rights in order to avoid the possibility of future disagreements or a custody conflict with him concerning David. [The father] has shown absolutely no interest in his son and would escape any obligation to support David if his parental rights were terminated. As appellant has ably argued, the 1984 Child Protection Act was not intended as a means for a parent to avoid his obligation to support his child. Were we to concur with the Court of Civil Appeals in this instance, we would satisfy the objectives of the parents at the child's expense. ... Termination of the father's parental rights in this case would seem to us to be an unnecessarily drastic action not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Although we agree that [the father's] conduct toward his son may satisfy the criteria set forth in Ala.Code (1975), §§ 26-18-3 and 26-18-7(c), as constituting `abandonment,' termination of his parental rights appears to be overwhelmingly for the convenience of the parents. By mutual consent, [the parents] seek to waive David's right to receive support from his father although the child would receive nothing in return. . . . . Even if [the father] chooses not to establish contact with his son, David's right to receive support from his father remains. The Child Protection Act of 1984, as we have noted, was not intended as a means for allowing a parent to abandon his child and thereby to avoid his obligation to support the child through the termination of parental rights. The courts of this State will not be used in the furtherance of such a purpose. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that termination of [the father's] parental rights is the appropriate remedy, we cannot agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the trial court erred in denying the [parents'] petition. We hold that the judgment of the District Court of Jefferson County was correct in concluding that David Carlton Stephenson's best interests particularly his right to receive support from his fatherwould not be protected by termination of the father's parental rights. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and a judgment is rendered denying the termination of parental rights. 513 So.2d at 616-17 (emphasis added). [13] According to the main opinion, the stated basis for our holding in Ex parte Brooks , including our holding that the judgment of the District Court of Jefferson County was correct in concluding that David Carlton Stephenson's best interestsparticularly his right to receive support from his fatherwould not be protected by termination of the father's parental rights, was dicta. Given the arguments made to this Court in Ex parte Brooks , this Court's response to those arguments, and this Court's articulation of what we hold, I disagree. The statement concerning the potential termination of support from the father was central to the issue presented and to this Court's disposition of that issue. Further, even if the above-described language from Ex parte Brooks were dicta, I could not agree that it should be lightly disregarded (1) because the matter at issue was raised on appeal and addressed by this Court, see Stark v. Watson, 359 P.2d 191, 196 (Okla.1961) (`Obiter dictum is an expression of opinion by the court or judge on a collateral question not directly involved, or mere argument or illustration originating with him, while judicial dictum is an expression of opinion on a question directly involved, argued by counsel, and deliberately passed on by the court, though not necessary to a decision. While neither is binding as a decision, judicial dictum is entitled to much greater weight than the other, and should not be lightly disregarded.' (quoting Crescent Ring Co. v. Travelers' Indem. Co., 102 N.J.L. 85, 132 A. 106, 107 (1926))), and (2) because I am convinced that the rationale of Ex parte Brooks reflects a proper understanding of the CPA. In addition, assuming the above-described language from Ex parte Brooks is dicta, I do not believe this Court could reasonably have expected the legislature to make the fine distinction between what is dicta and what is not when it enacted the CPA and thereafter amended the CPA three times, particularly since Alabama courts, including this Court, and the bar itself often struggle with what is and what is not dicta in a given case. Certainly the decisions that have relied on Ex parte Brooks over the last 20 years do not lend themselves easily to the conclusion that such decisions are dicta or easily discernible as such. For example, in Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.2d 950 (Ala.1990), this Court overruled that portion of Ex parte Brooks that had required a showing of dependency in the context of a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding involving only the parents as contestants. We also, however, appear to have endorsed the holding from Ex parte Brooks at issue in the present case by stating that [t]he merits of the mother's petition must be tested against the public policy that requires clear and convincing evidence `that termination of [a father's] parental rights [was] the appropriate remedy.' Brooks, 513 So.2d at 617. 564 So.2d at 955. Certainly that appears to be what the Court of Civil Appeals concluded because on remand that court stated: The guardian contends that the trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights in the child in that there were less drastic alternatives than termination available. We agree. `Our courts are entrusted with the responsibility of determining the best interest of children who come before them. When a child's welfare is threatened by continuation of parental rights, the law provides a means for terminating those rights.' Ex parte Brooks, 513 So.2d 614, 617 (Ala.1987). However, the 1984 Child Protection Act was not intended as a means for a parent to avoid his obligation of support. See Brooks, supra . `Convenience of the parents is not a sufficient basis for terminating parental rights.' Brooks, supra, at 617. Here, there was no evidence produced at trial and no argument has been made that Byron (father) has physically harmed or has in any way interfered with the mother's custody of the child. Rather, the evidence simply shows a father whose visits with his child have been sporadic. Even if the father chooses not to establish contact with his son, the child's right to receive support from his father remains. See, Brooks . Clearly, the child's future right to support, including a possible college education (see Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986 (Ala.1989)), and the child's rights of inheritance would not be protected if the father's parental rights were terminated. Therefore, termination of the father's parental rights in this case would seem to us to be an unnecessarily drastic action not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Beasley, 564 So.2d 959, 960 (Ala.Civ. App.1990).