Opinion ID: 2333130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Chancellor's Attitude

Text: It is commonplace to say that before a judge takes up the hearing of a cause he should, to the extent that it is humanly possible, put aside all preconceived notions on the merits of the controversy. The record here suggests that the Chancellor, instead of removing any coat of fixed impressions, donned several more as the trial progressed. His task was to ascertain whether the Agreement really required the defendants to arbitrate the differences between them and the plaintiffs. The Chancellor, however, assumed from the beginning that arbitration was imperative. Thus: THE COURT: If the people involved were negotiating and they selected their arbitrator, Father Comey, as the contract requires, the case would not be here. MR. FREEDMAN: I object to your Honor's statement `as the contract requires.' Your Honor has not even examined the contract. THE COURT: Well, the contract has just been read to me that where there is a dispute, they have to present it to some grievance committee and when they cannot agree, they have to submit the matter in dispute to Father Comey. Isn't that the situation? Also: THE COURT: Go ahead. These people should be down there working and earning a living. MR. FREEDMAN: And I take exception to your Honor's remarks and I again ask that you disqualify yourself from hearing this case because that is further evidence that you have already prejudged the case. THE COURT: Not at all. You have an agreement there that Father Comey is your arbitrator and you just ignore it. MR. FREEDMAN: I again object to that and ask that you disqualify yourself, again because it indicates that you are prejudging the case. THE COURT: Not at all. The Chancellor's treatment of defendants' counsel was as unfortunate as it was uncalled-for. For instance, he charged the defendants' lawyer with misleading the defendants. This is a serious imputation and cannot be supported by the record. There is nothing in the testimony to even remotely suggest that Mr. Freedman was doing other than properly protecting the interests of those he was ably representing. I see no justification for the Court's animadversions reflected in the following: THE COURT: I think these people are being very badly misled. MR. FREEDMAN: And I again ask your Honor to disqualify yourself. THE COURT: No, no. MR. FREEDMAN: And I object to your Honor's statement. THE COURT: You can object to it all you want. That is as plain as the nose on anybody's face. MR. FREEDMAN: Your Honor knows, and you asked me the question before  THE COURT: You would serve your clients better if you would tell them to abide by their agreement and go to Father Comey  MR. FREEDMAN: Your Honor knows  THE COURT: Let me finish. Go to Father Comey and submit their argument to him  and he may decide in their favor  instead of making a court case out of it. MR. FREEDMAN: I object to your Honor telling me what to do. I have a right to use my own judgment and I ask your Honor to limit your consideration to this case. THE COURT: I am not telling you what to do. MR. FREEDMAN: You just did. THE COURT: I am telling you that these litigants would be better off if they would abide by their agreement. With equal disregard for the respect due all members of the Bar, the Chancellor charged counsel with trying to find ways and means and loopholes to avoid an obligation: THE COURT: Look here, you have better sense than that. What is the purpose of putting in the agreement the provision about submitting all matters in dispute to Father Comey? The very purpose is to try to keep disputes out of the courts. MR. FREEDMAN: Well, your Honor knows  THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let me finish. It seems to me that you are trying to find ways and means and loopholes to get out of it. MR. FREEDMAN: I object to your Honor's statement  THE COURT: You can object to it, but that is my opinion. MR. FREEDMAN: It again indicates your Honor's frame of mind. THE COURT: Not at all. I remember the last litigation and that is exactly what you are trying to do. Although it is difficult to believe that the Chancellor would deliberately close his ears to legitimate argument in a case, yet the record here shows that the Chancellor declared he would refuse to listen: BY MR. FREEDMAN: Q. Did not the Philadelphia Marine Trade Association from time to time during the past year refuse to give employment to the longshoremen members of Local 1291, this union, and all other members of the International Longshoremen's Association? MR. RHOADS: I object to that. It is the same question. THE COURT: The objection is sustained. There was a right to go to Father Comey and get redress, if necessary. MR. FREEDMAN: I take exception to your Honor's remarks. THE COURT: Well, your question certainly is not pertinent here. MR. FREEDMAN: If your Honor will listen to me, perhaps you will change your mind. THE COURT: I will not listen. You put your questions to him. It appears to me, as the above illustrations would indicate, that the defendants failed to receive the impartial hearing to which they were entitled under our Constitution, the laws of the land and all traditions of fairness and undeviating impartiality which govern proceedings in our courts. Every lawyer has the right to be treated with courtesy, listened to with attention and replied to with deliberation. As I read the record, the Trial Judge here failed to observe these tenets and, for that reason, added to what I have further observed on the various questions involved, I would reverse.