Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Questions and Comments

Text: Defendant contends that in cross-examining defense witnesses Gloria Carl and James Park, the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct that violated not only state law but also the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We disagree. Defense witness Gloria Carl was a cook who had befriended defendant at the juvenile hall where he was housed at various times throughout his early teenage years. In Carl's view, defendant got into trouble as a teenager because he wanted attention and because his home life lacked structure. On cross-examination, the prosecutor, without objection,. established that defendant's juvenile offenses included safecracking, entering a bank, and joyriding. The trial court sustained defense objections to several questions intended to establish that Carl knew that as time passed, defendant's crimes got more severe. The trial court also sustained a defense objection to the prosecutor's question whether in the years that defendant was in and out of juvenile hall, Carl considered him to be a sociopath. Defense witness James Park had been the assistant warden at San Quentin prison, and in various other capacities had been employed in the California prison system for 40 years. Based on a short discussion with defendant, defendant's prior record, and defendant's age, Park expressed the view that defendant would make a good adjustment within the confines of [a maximum security] prison. In response to defense counsel's question whether Park thought defendant would pose a danger to prison guards or other prisoners, Park answered: I cannot see that he would be a danger under any condition in the high security prison. On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired whether Park made his evaluation of defendant's future dangerousness based on a smattering of information. The prosecutor also asked, If you are wrong and another victim results from it, do you suffer any loss ... do you get less money for your [consulting] work? The trial court sustained defense objections to both questions as argumentative. A prosecutor does not commit misconduct by challenging the credibility of a defense witness or the basis for the witness's good opinion of a defendant. `If the defense chooses to raise [a] subject, it cannot expect immunity from cross-examination on it' ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 219, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1211, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301.) Furthermore, a prosecutor can properly explore on cross-examination the basis for an expert's prediction that a capital defendant will pose no future danger if sentenced to life without parole. ( People v. Morris, supra, at p. 219, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949.) Although here some of the prosecutor's questions were argumentative, we are satisfied that, under any standard of prejudice, the questioning did not affect the outcome of the penalty phase.
The prosecutor began his penalty phase argument to the jury by pointing out that the case dealt with the destruction of human life. He continued: [W]e have come through literally thousands of years of evolution, social evolution as society has developed, and the only hope basically to preserve any kind of civilized society is to set boundary lines beyond which no person is allowed to go and throughout these thousands of years of social evolution we have done that, [Â] And particularly in California, since that's where we are today, we have evolved to a point where we said that there are enumerated crimes that if you commit these crimes you forfeit your right not only to exist in society but to exist in human society unless, unless there are factors in mitigation which justify your continued existence.  (Italics added.) Defense counsel objected to the argument as misstating the law. The trial court overruled the objection, immediately telling the jury that if there is anything that counsel states ... that conflicts with my instructions on the law, you will ignore counsel and ... accept my instructions. Defendant contends the ruling was in error. According to defendant, the prosecutor's comment that we italicized above was a deliberate misstatement of law that misled the jury into believing that it must sentence defendant to death unless he presented evidence in mitigation. Defendant points to decisions of this court holding that the California capital scheme does not create a presumption or bias in favor of the death penalty merely by directing the jury deciding penalty to consider as factors in aggravation the circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances. (See People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1195, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1065, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756.) Viewed in isolation, the prosecutor's comment at issue might seem to convey, contrary to statements in our previous decisions, that once a defendant is convicted of a crime carrying the death penalty, he or she necessarily forfeits the right to exist unless there are factors in mitigation. But when the comment is considered in light of the prosecutor's entire argument, it is apparent that the prosecutor did not, deliberately or otherwise, mislead the jury into believing that defendant entered the penalty phase of his capital trial under a presumption of death. In his very next sentence, the prosecutor stated that a conviction of certain enumerated crimes merely exposes a person to the death penalty. And throughout his argument, the prosecutor stressed that for the jury to return a death sentence the factors in aggravation have to substantially outweigh any factors in mitigation. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 8.88 that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. The court also told the jury to ignore any statements of counsel that conflicted with the Court's instructions on the law. It is therefore not reasonably possible that the jury would have believed it had to impose a sentence of death unless defendant presented mitigating evidence. [11]