Opinion ID: 1935444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Has Gerhard waived his right to review by failing to appeal from an earlier order?

Text: [1, 2] Both of the issues raised on this appeal, i.e., the jurisdiction of the probate court to entertain the objection to the inventory and the admissibility of the compromise offer, were properly preserved in the probate court. Nonetheless, Manfred claims that Gerhard has waived his right to a review of these issues by his failure to appeal at some earlier stage in the proceedings. On appeal from a final order this court lacks the power to review a prior final order in the cause. Pick Industries, Inc. v. Gebhard-Berghammer, Inc., 262 Wis. 498, 501, 56 N.W.2d 97 (1952). [1] However, a nonappealable intermediate order may be reviewed upon an appeal from a final order in a special proceeding. United States v. Burczyk, 54 Wis.2d 67, 74, 194 N.W.2d 608 (1972); Adoption of Brown, 5 Wis.2d 428, 435, 92 N.W.2d 749 (1958). Our review of the probate court's order of February 17, 1976, compelling payment by Gerhard of approximately ten thousand dollars to the personal representative also entails a review of the basis for the December 4, 1974, order to amend the inventory. For this reason Manfred argues that Gerhard should have appealed from the December 4 order and that Estate of Dammann, 230 Wis. 160, 283 N.W. 363 (1939) controls. In Dammann this court refused to permit review of a prior final order denying a motion to surcharge an executor from an appeal from a later final order allowing the executor's final account. However, Dammann is inapplicable where a prior order is not a final order and is not appealable in its own right. [3, 4] An appealable order must finally dispose of a substantial right and preclude further steps therein. Estate of Stoeber, 36 Wis.2d 448, 452, 153 N.W.2d 599 (1967). The order of December 4 merely authorized the filing of an amended inventory and did not finally dispose of title to that property. In fact, further steps were taken by Manfred by means of the orders to show cause to compel Gerhard to pay over cash to the personal representative. The appeal from the first order to show cause was dismissed by stipulation of the parties only to make way for the entry of an order that was more clearly a final order. Those steps resulted in the order which gave rise to this appeal, and we have previously held it to be a final order. Thus even if the review of the February 17, 1976, order requires a review of the probate court's prior intermediate order, such review is proper.