Opinion ID: 2600470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Challenge for Cause to Juror Robert D.

Text: The prospective jurors were sequestered and individually questioned concerning their views on the death penalty as then required by our decision in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301. [10] In response to questioning by the court, Prospective Juror Robert D. stated that he would not automatically vote to impose the death penalty and, instead, would consider all of the evidence before making a decision. In response to questioning by defense counsel, the prospective juror agreed that he was a strong supporter of the death penalty, rating his support as eight on a scale of 10. He stated that death was a just punishment for certain crimes. When asked what crimes he had in mind, he answered: Mostly murder, I would think. He added that if the defendant were convicted of first degree murder and found to be eligible for the death penalty, he would vote to impose the death penalty unless he were convinced otherwise. Upon examination by the People, the prospective juror acknowledged that he would weigh and consider the evidence presented and base his decision on that evidence and would not vote automatically for anything. He denied that he would always vote to impose the death penalty for first degree murder no matter what the circumstances that led to that conviction. He stated that he would not necessarily be committed from the outset to the imposition of the death penalty. The trial judge then engaged the prospective juror in the following colloquy: The Court: .... If ... you as [a] juror found a defendant guilty of first degree murder and you also found a special circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, would that put you in a position where in every case would you always vote for the death penalty? Prospective Juror Robert D[.]: I don't think I could say in every case. I will have to judge each case by its own merits. Defendant challenged Prospective Juror Robert D. for cause, because he indicated he would vote for the death penalty unless he were convinced otherwise. The trial court denied the challenge. After the jury had been selected and sworn, Prospective Juror Robert D. was examined for selection as an alternate juror. Defendant subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror Robert D. and eventually exhausted his peremptory challenges to the alternate jurors. Defendant argues that Prospective Juror Robert D. should have been excused for cause because he made it clear ... that he favored the death penalty as the appropriate punishment and would place a burden on a defendant to prove that death was not the appropriate punishment. To preserve a claim of trial court error in failing to remove a juror for bias in favor of the death penalty, a defendant must either exhaust all peremptory challenges and express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected or justify the failure to do so. [Citations.] ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) Defendant in the present case exhausted his peremptory challenges to the alternate jurors, but did not express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. In response to the People's observation that defendant did not request additional peremptory challenges during the selection of the alternate jurors, defendant asserts that such a request would have been futile, because the trial court had denied his earlier request for additional peremptory challenges during the selection of the seated jurors. This does not explain, however, defendant's failure to express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. As we explained in People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659, defendant is entitled to relief only if he can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected because he was deprived of a peremptory challenge which he would have used to excuse a juror who sat on his case. Unless, in addition to exhausting his peremptory challenges, the defendant expresses dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected, we cannot know whether the earlier denial of the challenge for cause deprived the defendant of a peremptory challenge that he or she would have used to excuse a juror who sat on his case. Accordingly, defendant has not preserved this claim for review. In any event, the trial court did not err in refusing to excuse for cause Prospective Juror Robert D. A prospective juror must be excused if his views on the death penalty `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 558, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) We will uphold the trial court's ruling on this question if it is supported by substantial evidence. ( Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 558, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) The trial court's finding are `generally binding if the prospective juror's responses are equivocal ... or conflicting ...' [Citations.] [ Id. at pp. 558-559, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.] Although the prospective juror in the present case described himself as a strong supporter of the death penalty, he assured the court multiple times that he would not automatically vote for the death penalty and would, instead, reach a decision based upon all of the evidence. Defendant places great emphasis on the prospective juror's statement that he would vote to impose the death penalty unless he was convinced otherwise, but this comment must be considered in light of the prospective juror's explanation that he would not necessarily be committed from the outset to the imposition of the death penalty. The trial court's implied finding that the prospective juror's views on the death penalty would not substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror is supported by substantial evidence.