Opinion ID: 4239421
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brady v. Maryland Claims

Text: Snow’s habeas corpus petition also alleges that the state failed to disclose material evidence helpful to the defense. The failure to disclose such evidence is a violation of the accused’s due process rights. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). There is no difference between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for these purposes. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The state’s obligation under Brady turns on the cumulative effect of all evidence wrongly suppressed by the government. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421, 437–38 (1995). To be entitled to habeas corpus relief on this basis, Snow must demonstrate that the Illinois court’s decision is contrary to or involves an unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny. He has not. 1. Brady claims raised in Snow’s first postconviction petition Snow claims the state should have disclosed deals made with several witnesses who, he claims, received leniency in their own criminal trials in exchange for their testimony. Snow’s initial postconviction petition and first petition for leave to appeal addressed whether the state has a duty to disclose deals made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony regardless of whether such information is publicly available. 14 No. 17-1113 The Illinois appellate concluded that no Brady violation occurred. Thus, these claims are not defaulted. For those witnesses who actually received a downward sentencing departure, all court documents regarding the witnesses’ sentences were publically available. It was reasonable for the state court to determine that no Brady violation occurred. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 747 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that documents were publicly available and concluding that the documents were not suppressed under Brady); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1170 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he government will not be found to have suppressed material information if that information also was available to a defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”). Snow also claims the state should have disclosed evidence that it coached or coerced the testimony of Steven Scheel. This claim was also included in the initial petitions and not defaulted. At trial, Scheel testified that he had known Snow since childhood and that Snow told him that he had robbed the gas station and killed the attendant. An affidavit submitted by an investigator for Snow’s defense states that Scheel told investigators that he was threatened or coerced into testifying against Snow and that detectives tried to coach him on what to say. But, Scheel himself refused to sign an affidavit stating that the state had coerced his testimony, and many other witnesses testified that Snow made similar inculpatory statements. The Illinois appellate court reasonably applied Brady and other federal precedent and concluded that the evidence was not material. No. 17-1113 15 2. Brady claims raised in Snow’s successive postconviction petition Snow’s remaining Brady claims were raised for the first time in his successive postconviction petition. The Illinois court denied Snow leave to file this petition. The appellate court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal. Therefore, Snow subjected these claims to a full round of review in state court before seeking federal review. The state court’s decision, however, was based on Illinois state law. Generally, this court will not review a claim resolved by the state court on independent and adequate state law grounds. Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2009). Because Snow was denied leave to file his successive petition based on the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, both parties assert that the claims were procedurally defaulted. The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act limits a petitioner to one petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). Leave to file a successive petition is required and “may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure.” Id. The Illinois court found that Snow had demonstrated cause, but not prejudice. It is difficult to conclude that the state court’s decision was based entirely on independent and adequate state grounds. “[W]hen resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court’s holding is not independent of federal law and [the federal court’s] jurisdiction is not precluded.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The Illinois court had to con16 No. 17-1113 sider the merits of Snow’s Brady claims raised in the successive petition when determining whether Snow demonstrated prejudice. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (“‘[C]ause and prejudice … parallel two of the three components of the alleged Brady violation itself.’” (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999)). In concluding that Snow failed to demonstrate prejudice, the court noted that the claims failed the Brady materiality standard. Regardless of whether the claims are considered defaulted or are reviewed on their merits, Snow is not entitled to relief. Though he can show cause, he cannot demonstrate prejudice to avoid default, or materiality to succeed on the merits. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 691 (“[P]rejudice within the compass of the “cause and prejudice” requirement exists when the suppressed evidence is “material” for Brady purposes.”); see also People v. Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d 609, 621 (Ill. 2002) (explaining that the cause-and-prejudice test for filing successive postconviction petitions in Illinois mirrors the cause-and-prejudice test used by federal courts reviewing procedurally defaulted claims in habeas corpus proceedings). Snow’s successive petition included an affidavit from Ed Palumbo, one of the witnesses who testified that Snow made a statement indicating he committed the murder. In the affidavit, Palumbo claimed that he thought Snow was “bullshitting” when he made the inculpatory statement, that the prosecutor indicated that he did not think that Snow was guilty, and that he had been trying to get a “deal” in his own criminal proceedings. Because Palumbo failed to provide this testimony earlier, Snow had cause to include the evidence for the first time in his successive petition. The Illinois court specifically found Palumbo’s assertion regarding the prosecutor’s No. 17-1113 17 statement not credible. The only other information in the affidavit potentially in the custody of the state at the time of trial, and thus the only evidence that could have been suppressed by the state, was the fact that Palumbo was seeking a deal. And the impeachment value of this evidence was limited. Palumbo stated only that he sought a deal, not that he had received one. This evidence on its own would not have likely changed the outcome of the proceeding. The wife of another witness, Bruce Roland, also provided an affidavit stating that Roland was pressured by law enforcement to testify and that his testimony was false. Again, Snow did not have access to this testimony earlier and thus had cause to raise it for the first time in his successive petition. Roland’s incentive to testify, however, was explored at trial. He conceded that he did not report Snow’s inculpatory statement until he was charged with a DUI. So it is unlikely this evidence would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Finally, Snow argues that prosecutors should have disclosed unredacted reports from polygraph tests of Martinez and Scheel. Polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible under Illinois law. People v. Jefferson, 705 N.E.2d 56, 62 (Ill. 1998). The federal circuits are split on whether a Brady claim can be based on inadmissible evidence. See United States v. Morales, 746 F.3d 310, 314 (2014) (noting that the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have held that suppressed evidence must be admissible to trigger a Brady analysis, whereas the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held the opposite). Under either standard, however, Snow’s claim fails. The newly discovered notes from Martinez’s test were vague and, if anything, repetitive of the fact that Martinez did not initially identify Snow. The notes from Scheel’s test indicate that he 18 No. 17-1113 was not being truthful when he said Snow confessed to the murder. Even if Scheel could have been impeached with this evidence, it is unlikely that this evidence on its own would have changed the outcome of the case. But our analysis does not end with the conclusion that no singular piece of suppressed evidence is material on its own. The evidence must be considered cumulatively. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436–37. When all of the evidence is considered cumulatively, Snow has not proven a Brady violation. The jury heard testimony from many witnesses in this case. Two of those witnesses testified regarding the person they saw exit the Clark gas station around the time the silent alarm was triggered. The jury also heard from Officer Pelo, who arrived first at the scene. Defense counsel highlighted the discrepancies in the testimony of Pelo and the witnesses, and the state explained how it thought the accounts corroborated each other. Twelve witnesses testified that Snow at some time made an inculpatory statement to them or in their presence. Snow denied making any of these statements, and his counsel presented evidence that many of these witnesses had criminal histories and selfish reasons for testifying. It was for the jury to determine which of these witnesses were credible. The only alibi witnesses presented by the defense were Snow and his wife, Tammy. Both testified that they were home together the entire night of the murder. Tammy testified to the grand jury, however, that it was possible Snow left at some point that evening. The trial jury was informed of her grand jury testimony. No. 17-1113 19 Furthermore, the state introduced the testimony of law enforcement officers who recounted how Snow hid in the insulation in his sister’s attic for five hours when police came to arrest him. Officers also testified that Snow repeatedly asked about the Little homicide investigation and inquired whether he could receive any leniency in exchange for information he had about the murder. Other officers testified that Snow presented false identification and then fled when they tried to arrest him in Ohio in 1999. Taking all of this together, there is no reasonable likelihood that the disclosure of the contested evidence would have changed the outcome of the case.