Opinion ID: 209534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction and Rothe’s Tucker Act Claim

Text: Before turning to the merits of Rothe’s appeal, we briefly explain why appellate jurisdiction lies exclusively in this Court rather than in the Fifth Circuit. With certain 2008-1017 16 exceptions not relevant here, we possess appellate jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on [28 U.S.C. § 1346, known as the Tucker Act.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2). In Rothe III, we possessed jurisdiction because Rothe’s FAC contained a claim for recovery of Rothe’s bid preparation costs under the Tucker Act. See Rothe III, 262 F.3d at 1316 (“As a suit to recover its bid preparation costs, Rothe’s complaint invoked the Tucker Act. Thus, this court has exclusive jurisdiction over all issues Rothe raises in this appeal.”). Rothe’s claim under the Tucker Act is no longer at issue; it has been satisfied by DOD’s tender, and Rothe’s acceptance, of $10,000. We retain appellate jurisdiction, however, because under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2), as under § 1295(a)(1) (regarding patent law), “[t]he path of appeal is determined by the basis of jurisdiction in the district court, and is not controlled by . . . the substance of the issues that are appealed.” Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Of course, the basis of a district court’s jurisdiction—and thus the path of appeal—may change over time in a case, for example, if certain claims are dismissed without prejudice to later refiling. See, e.g., Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 785 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987). But that is not what happened here. Rather, Rothe’s claim under the Tucker Act was satisfied, and thus may not be refiled later. Cf. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Dismissals divest this court of jurisdiction only if ‘[t]he parties were left in the same legal position with respect to [all] patent claims as if they had never been filed.’” (quoting Nilssen., 203 F.3d at 285)). 2008-1017 17 Further, although the district court explicitly declined to render a judgment on the merits of Rothe’s Tucker Act claim, Rothe VI, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 817, the district court ordered DOD to deposit $10,000 with the court in satisfaction of that claim, and thus the court changed the positions of the parties with respect to that claim. Cf. Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1190 (“[W]henever the complaint included a patent claim and the trial court’s rulings altered the legal status of the parties with respect to that patent claim, we retain appellate jurisdiction over all pendent claims in the complaint.”). Therefore, jurisdiction is proper in this Court.