Opinion ID: 798459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Applicable clearly established federal law

Text: Thacker contends that two Supreme Court decisions supply the clearly established federal law applicable to Proposition One. With respect to his assertion that Judge Goodpaster considered prejudicial extraneous information in making his sentencing decision, Thacker points to Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). And, with respect to his contention that Judge Goodpaster failed to meaningfully consider evidence of Thacker's bipolar disorder, Thacker points to Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). In Gardner, the petitioner was convicted by a Florida jury of the first-degree murder of his wife. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the jury expressly found that the mitigating circumstances alleged by the petitioner (his consumption of a vast quantity of alcohol preceding the crime) outweighed the aggravating circumstances (that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel) and advised the trial court to impose a life sentence. At the sentencing hearing, however, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to death. In doing so, the trial court expressly stated that it had relied, in part, on a presentence investigation report (PSR). And it was uncontroverted that the PSR contained a confidential portion which was not disclosed to defense counsel. 430 U.S. at 353, 97 S.Ct. 1197. The petitioner appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court had erred in considering the confidential portion of the PSR in making its sentencing decision. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, stating it had carefully reviewed the record. The record on appeal, however, did not include the confidential portion of the PSR. Id. at 353-54, 97 S.Ct. 1197. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari ... to consider the constitutionality of the trial judge's use of a confidential PSR. Id. at 354, 97 S.Ct. 1197. In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court noted at the outset that a majority of the members of the Court had expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country, id. at 357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, and that, consequently, [i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion, id. at 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197. The Supreme Court then addressed and rejected each of the justifications offered by the State for a capital-sentencing procedure which permits a trial judge to impose the death sentence on the basis of confidential information which is not disclosed to the defendant or his counsel. Id. In particular, the Supreme Court rejected the State's argument that trial judges can be trusted to exercise their discretion in a responsible manner, even though they may base their decisions on secret information. Id. at 360, 97 S.Ct. 1197. This argument, the Supreme Court held, rests on the erroneous premise that the participation of counsel is superfluous to the process of evaluating the relevance and significance of aggravating and mitigating facts. Id. Our belief that debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function of trials, the Supreme Court held, requires us also to recognize the importance of giving counsel an opportunity to comment on facts which may influence the sentencing decision in capital cases. Id. The Supreme Court also held that, [e]ven if it were permissible to withhold a portion of the report from a defendant, and even from defense counsel, pursuant to an express finding of good cause for nondisclosure, it would nevertheless be necessary to make the full report a part of the record to be reviewed on appeal. Id. at 360-61, 97 S.Ct. 1197. The Supreme Court explained that, [s]ince the State must administer its capital-sentencing procedures with an even hand, it is important that the record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which motivated the death sentence in every case in which it is imposed. Id. at 361, 97 S.Ct. 1197. Ultimately, the Supreme Court conclude[d] that [the] petitioner was denied due process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain. Id. at 362, 97 S.Ct. 1197. In Eddings, the petitioner, at the age of 16, shot and killed an Oklahoma Highway Patrol officer. Petitioner was charged with murder in the first degree and was certified to stand trial as an adult. The state trial judge found petitioner guilty upon a plea of nolo contendere. A sentencing hearing was subsequently held before the state trial judge. The state alleged the existence of three aggravating circumstances and presented evidence in support of those alleged circumstances. Petitioner, in turn, presented mitigating evidence regarding his troubled youth. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the state trial judge found that the State had proved each of the three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the petitioner's youth was a mitigating factor of great weight. 455 U.S. at 108, 102 S.Ct. 869. But the state trial judge would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of [the petitioner's] unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance. Id. at 109, 102 S.Ct. 869. Finding that the only mitigating circumstance was [petitioner's] youth and finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the aggravating circumstances present, the [state trial judge] sentenced [petitioner] to death. Id. On direct appeal, the OCCA agreed with the [state] trial [judge] that only the fact of [petitioner's] youth was properly considered as a mitigating circumstance, and it consequently affirmed the sentence of death. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the judgment ... to the extent that it sustain[ed] the imposition of the death penalty, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 117, 102 S.Ct. 869. In doing so, the Supreme Court stated that it was applying the rule first announced in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), i.e., `that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' Id. at 110, 102 S.Ct. 869 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954) (emphasis in original). And the Supreme Court explained that it was clear from the statements at sentencing that the state trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact; rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence. Id. at 113, 102 S.Ct. 869 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court further noted that the OCCA took the same approach, finding that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal responsibility. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the limitations placed by these courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in Lockett.  Id. Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, the Supreme Court held, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869 (emphasis in original). In sum, the Supreme Court held, [t]he sentencer, and the [OCCA] on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration. Id. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869.