Opinion ID: 6983255
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agreement resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade.

Text: Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is thereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). In order to have a § 1 violation, there must be an agreement, as § 1 does not encompass unilateral conduct, no matter how anticompetitive. See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 611 (6th Cir.1990). Section 1 does not prohibit every restraint on trade, but only those agreements which unreasonably restrain trade. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289, 105 S.Ct. 2613, 86 L.Ed.2d 202 (1985). Plaintiff urges two violations of § 1. First, it argues that the ABPS and the APMA engaged in anticompetitive behavior in the form of a group boycott and conspiracy to exclude plaintiff from the health care market. Second, plaintiff argues that the ABPS conspired with its member diplomates to get hospitals and insurance companies to require or prefer ABPS certification over the certification of other boards such as plaintiff. The district court ruled that there was no triable issue of material fact concerning the existence of an agreement between either the ABPS and the APMA or the ABPS and its member diplomates. 5
Despite the over-4,000 pages in the parties’ Joint Appendix, plaintiff points to virtually no evidence of collusion between the APMA and the ABPS. The plaintiff in a § 1 case must present evidence excluding the possibility that the defendants acted independently of one another; it is not enough to show actions consistent with either independent or conspiratorial action. Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474, 484-85 (6th Cir.1990). Here, both the APMA and the ABPS benefit when the ABPS’s credibility within the medical community is strengthened. Thus, it is natural that each organization independently would take steps to promote the ABPS. Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of presenting evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action. Plaintiff points to evidence in the record tending to establish the following: (1) the APMA. determined that it should issue statements warning the public about unrecognized certifying boards; (2) the CPME and the ABPS were on friendly terms; (3) the APMA reviewed some of the ABPS’s literature before it was sent out and did not criticize the literature; (4) in a June, 1993, meeting, the APMA agreed to coordinate the text of one of its mass mailings with the ABPS; and (5) in an October, 1993, mailing, the APMA referred negatively to boards not recognized by the APMA. None of this evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of whether the ABPS and the APMA colluded. These facts indicate that the ABPS and APMA had similar goals concerning non-ABPS boards, but the actions of both entities are as consistent with independent action as with collusive action. Even if it is assumed that the October mailing is the result of the June agreement, plaintiff does not indicate in what way the mailing was anticompetitive. 6 We affirm the district court’s ruling that plaintiff presented no triable issue of fact concerning an agreement between the ABPS and the APMA.
Plaintiff also alleges that the ABPS conspired with its member diplomates to suppress competition. However, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine prevents the ABPS from conspiring with its members as a matter of law, because the diplomates and the ABPS are not independent legal entities for purposes of this antitrust claim. In Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 614 (6th Cir.1990), this court wrote, “Section 1 of the Sherman Act is concerned only with concerted action among competitors and not the coordinated activities that occur within a single firm.” Nurse Midwifery dealt with whether members of a hospital’s medical staff could conspire with the hospital itself when making employment decisions regarding persons in competition with members of the medical staff. We held that because the staff members were not competitors of the hospital, they could not conspire with the hospital for antitrust purposes. Id. Here, the ABPS does not compete with its member diplomates, therefore antitrust concerns are not raised. 7 While the ABPS members may conspire amongst themselves a possibility not alleged by plaintiff — the diplomates cannot conspire with the ABPS. 8 The district court ruled that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to a conspiracy between the ABPS and its members. Plaintiff claims that many ABPS diplomates saw plaintiffs mailings and complained about them to John Bennett. In 1992, the ABPS distributed information packets which urged its members to inform the appropriate persons about various aspects of the ABPS. Evidence suggested that the ABPS’s goal in distributing these materials was to encourage hospitals to require ABPS certification in their by-laws. All this may be true, but it presents insufficient evidence of conspiracy between the ABPS and any of its members. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), the Supreme Court considered a resale price maintenance case. In resale price maintenance, a distributor and merchants selling the distributor’s product agree that the merchants will not sell the product below a certain price. At issue in Monsanto was whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of conspiracy between the distributor and the merchants. The Court wrote that where there was only evidence of complaints by merchants to a distributor concerning low-pricing by a maverick merchant, and then a subsequent refusal by the distributor to do business with the maverick, the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding of agreement between the distributor and the complaining merchants. 465 U.S. at 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464. If the rule were otherwise, distributors would be prevented from legally refusing to do business with a particular merchant whenever other merchants had complained about the low-pricing practices of that merchant. Id. Here, plaintiff can demonstrate only complaints by ABPS members and action arguably in conformity with those complaints. As in Monsanto, the action taken by the ABPS is as much in its interest as it is in the interest of its members individually, and plaintiff has not introduced evidence tending to exclude the possibility that the ABPS acted independently and not in concert with its members. See id. at 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464 (requiring proof tending to exclude the possibility of independent action). Thus, even if the ABPS could conspire with its members, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the section 1 claims must be affirmed because plaintiff has not generated a genuine issue of material fact regarding conspiracy between the ABPS and its member diplomates. In sum, we hold that plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ABPS conspired with either the APMA or its member diplo-mates. Also, we hold that the ABPS cannot, as a matter of law, conspire with its member diplomates.