Opinion ID: 216576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Propriety of the Administrative Closure and Refusal To Reopen

Text: A district court ... necessarily abuse[s] its discretion if it base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), or if `its decision though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual findingcannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,' Slupinski v. First Unum Life Insurance Co., 554 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2001)). As a general matter of federal law, an individual proceeding in federal court has the right to present his case pro se: In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally. 28 U.S.C. § 1654. See generally Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308-10 (2d Cir. 1991) (§ 1654 grants the right of self-representation to natural persons, not to corporations or other artificial entities). If an adult individual wishes to conduct his case pro se, an order requiring him instead to retain counsel to represent him violates § 1654. An order dismissing the action of such a pro se plaintiff for failure to retain counsel is a legal error and cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. Accordingly, in the present case, the district court's July 2 Order refusing to reopen the case solely because Leftridge had not obtained counsel, thereby precluding him from pursuing his case pro se, constituted an abuse of discretion. Defendants argue that the July 2 Order was essentially a dismissal of Leftridge's case `[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with the[ Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or any order of court.' (Defendants' brief on appeal at 5 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (2006)).) They urge that the July 2 Order be affirmed and [that] this case remain closed (Defendants' brief on appeal at 8), stating principally that Leftridge did not begin discovery during the court-ordered time for discovery from July 2008 to March 2009 ( id. at 6; see id. at 6-7) and that the court simply complied with plaintiff's request that he not be required to litigate this case without legal representation ( id. at 7). We are unpersuaded by these arguments and characterizations. The record does not indicate that defendants ever moved pursuant to Rule 41(b) for an order of dismissal for failure to prosecute, or that the district court conducted the analysis that would have been required had defendants made such a motion, see generally Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 180 (2d Cir.2001). Nor is it at all clear that, upon such an analysis, the record would have warranted dismissal. It does not appear that there was a failure to prosecute; indeed, defendants complain in their brief on appeal that they were required to respond to motion practice by Leftridge that was voluminous (Defendants' brief on appeal at 7). Nor do the district court docket entries support defendants' suggestion that Leftridge was derelict for failing to make any attempt to conduct discovery during the period July 2008 to March 2009. Those entries indicate, inter alia, that during the early part of that period Leftridge was attempting to have defendants produce videotapes of his traffic arrestproduction that the district court had ordered but that was delayed by several defense motions for extensions of time that Leftridge opposedand that in December 2008 Leftridge moved for permission to take the deposition of Trooper 1283. And, of course, the February 13 Order administratively closed the case nearly a month before the discovery period was scheduled to end. Finally, we are not persuaded by defendants' argument that the court simply granted Leftridge's own wish to proceed only with the assistance of counsel. His repeated requests for appointment of counsel did not necessarily mean that Leftridge would choose not to proceed pro se if that choice would result in dismissal, He had in fact proceeded pro se for some 18 months despite the denial of counsel and his complaints that he was not well equipped to proceed on his own. That said, we note that we are not inclined to view the district court's February 13 Order itself, which conditionally closed the case without prejudice to its reopening if Leftridge obtained counsel by June 29, as an abuse of discretion. That order was entered, without objection by Leftridge, only after Leftridge submitted the letter from his psychologist indicating that Leftridge's serving as his own attorney was detrimental to his health. Clearly the court did not abuse its discretion by giving Leftridge time to retain counsel, although it would have been preferable for the court to have said that the action was stayed, rather than closed; and the court should have specified that if Leftridge did not retain counsel (by such deadline as the court imposed) he nonetheless had the option of proceeding pro se. And once Leftridge was unable to retain counsel before the June 29 deadline and asked that the case be reopened in order to allow him to proceed pro se, he should have been allowed to proceed pro se. The inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel is not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.