Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lack of Objections to Prosecutor's Summation

Text: Defendant complains of trial counsels' failure to object to aspects of the State's penalty summation that defendant claims were inflammatory and provided an argument in support of non-statutory aggravating factors. Defendant also claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
The prosecutor's comments to which defense counsel should have objected, according to Harris, are as follows:  he said Harris intended to get that bitch;  he stated that Huggins was a virgin before he raped her;  he described Harris's sodomy of Huggins as an act of power. An act of cruelty. An act of contempt for Kristin Huggins. It was an act of dominion and control;  he argued that Harris, with cruel deliberation,. . . planned the killing of Kristin;  he asked the jury to imagine Kristin in the trunk of the car: You have all seen the trunk of that car. When you think about why murder in the course of a kidnapping is a powerful aggravating factor in this case, imagine what it must have been like for Kristin Huggins to have been driven around stuffed into that dark, cramped, airless trunk, worrying about what was going to happen to her next. According to defendant, none of those statements were probative of any aggravating factor and all constituted an attempt to inflame the jury. The State counters that neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel were ineffective because the prosecutor's summation was proper. The prosecutor was entitled to talk about the terror Huggins experienced because that went to the weight of the (4)(g) aggravating factor (murder while engaged in robbery sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, or burglary). The prosecutor tried to show how Harris chose and controlled the events on that fateful day to balance the mitigating effect of the `childhood' mitigating factor. Finally, as to prejudice, the State argues that even if defense counsel lodged an objection during the summation, it would have been unavailing.
We note at the outset that, on direct appeal, we rejected defendant's claims that the prosecutor's summation was improper and impermissibly ranged beyond the scope of the evidence. See Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 192-95, 716 A. 2d 458. That said, we do not regard defendant's arguments as procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-5 because the alleged grounds of prosecutorial misconduct underlying defendant's IAC claim are different from the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct he put forth on direct appeal. Defendant's IAC claim springs from the assertion that the prosecutor's comments were improper because they aimed to inflame the passions or emotions of the jurors. Appeals to emotion are not disallowed per se, but [i]t is constitutionally required that juries in capital trials reach a verdict and impose a penalty without inordinate exposure to unduly prejudicial, inflammatory commentary, and thus those excesses will not be permitted. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 453-54, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988). We forbid attempts to inflame the jury to impose the death penalty based on factors that the law deems to be irrelevant. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 570, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Brunson, supra, 132 N.J. at 392, 625 A. 2d 1085. The inquiry then turns on the proper scope and subject matter of prosecutorial comments. Prosecutors are expected to make a vigorous and forceful closing argument to the jury ... and are afforded considerable leeway in that endeavor. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 460, 803 A. 2d 1 (citations omitted). They are, though, generally limited to commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences from the proofs presented. Id. at 472, 803 A. 2d 1; see also State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 176, 195 A. 2d 449 (1963) (stating that comments must remain within the four corners of the evidence) (citation omitted). Prosecutors may characterize the evidence, unless, of course, they cross into the inflammatory or pejorative. See Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 576-77, 575 A. 2d 816 (holding that prosecutor's references to defendant as coward, liar, and jackal in capital case were inappropriate and could not be considered a characterization of the evidence). In a penalty-phase summation, the prosecutor's commentary on the evidence should be confined to the aggravating and mitigating factors that the legislature has specified. State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 231, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990) (citing State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 521, 548 A. 2d 1058). And, in addition to arguing that the evidence establishes the aggravating factors, [t]he prosecutor is entitled to argue the weight to be accorded an aggravating factor. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 474, 803 A. 2d 1. Thus, it is proper in a penalty-phase summation for the prosecutor, in characterizing and commenting on the evidence, to argue the weight of an aggravating factor even if such comments arouse jurors' emotions. That amount of latitude is justified, given the kind of moral decision that jurors are asked to make based on the weighing of factors. As the Eleventh Circuit aptly noted, [t]he gravity of the crime is a crucial factor in the jury's decision, and arguments about the gravity of a murder will always be emotional. Tucker v. Zant, 724 F. 2d 882, 888 (11th Cir.1984); see also id. at 886-89 (noting also that appeals to emotion are generally prohibited but are permissible when directed at circumstances of [the] particular offense for purposes of assessing penalty) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 179, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (agreeing that capital punishment is, in part, an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct) (quoting Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at 183-84, 96 S.Ct. at 2929, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 880 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Thus, we turn to the specific comments made by the prosecutor. `To justify reversal, the prosecutor's conduct must have been `clearly and unmistakably improper,' and must have substantially prejudiced [the] defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his [or her] defense.' Papasavvas, supra, 163 N.J. at 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (quoting State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 625, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999) (citation omitted)).
This claim is readily resolved. Examination of the statement in context reveals that the prosecutor was repeating a statement that Dunn attributed to Harris during her testimony: Finally, in the vicinity of the Trenton Club, Kristin Huggins and her little red car had the tragic misfortune to be spotted. Question: What happened when you saw the little red car? Answer: As the car was pulling in the driveway, it was this girl in there in the car. It stopped for other cars to go by. And it was pulling in. And we saw the little car coming in. And he said, there's a car, there. I'm going to get that bitch. And she was coming in the driveway. She went down and we both seen her come in. He said to wait, wait, wait, I'll be right back. And he drove down there on his bike after the car. He didn't have to do that. Even then he could have called it off, left Kristin to paint her mural, start her career, get on with her life. But instead, he chose to get that bitch. He controlled the gun. He controlled the situation. He controlled Kristin's life. Not only did the prosecutor, in fact, not step outside the four corners of the evidence, he specifically referenced Dunn's testimony, which he had just read. In addition, Dunn testified that Harris directly called Huggins a bitch and referred to her as a bitch several times. Defense counsel did not have a duty to object to the prosecutor's reference when the prosecutor plainly was staying within the bounds of the evidence, and legitimately could strive to show, as the State argues, the coldness, the total unconcern for the plight of Kristin Huggins exhibited by defendant.
Defendant claims that counsel should have objected when the prosecutor referred to Huggins's virginity. We note at the outset that the prosecutor never commented on Dunn's testimony that Huggins made pleas to Harris based on her virginity. He simply read Dunn's testimony: Question: What happened? ... He told her to take her clothes off. He told me to stand in front of the car. I was turned around, watching Kristin. She didn't take her clothes off right then. She was nervous, was shaking. She was talking, she saying what are you going to do. He just said, shut up, bitch, and take your clothes off. She said I'm a virgin. Question: What happened when she said that? He didn't care. He justhe grabbed her. He grabbed her and she start pulling on her clothes, trying to take them off, nervous and shaking, and he was unfastening his pants. ... And I heard her crying, and I turned around and she was telling him she was a virgin and stuff. And she said, no. I seen him having sex with her. [(Emphasis added).] There was no legal basis for defense counsel to object to the prosecutor's reading this admissible testimony to the jury, and thus there was no ineffective assistance due to a failure to make a baseless objection.
The prosecutor, during summation, read back Dunn's testimony regarding Harris's actions leading up to the rape. He then commented on that testimony. The prosecutor stated, Why did he sexually assault Kristin Huggins? Surely nobody believes that standing under the Southard Street Bridge on that rainy, foggy day, Ambrose Harris was suddenly overcome with sexual passion. No, the sodomy here was an act of power. An act of cruelty. An act of contempt for Kristin Huggins. It was an act of dominion and control.... And then with cruel deliberation, he planned the killing of Kristin. Defendant now complains that his counsel should have objected to those comments. In our assessment, the prosecutor's comments were a fair characterization of the State's evidence and were relevant to the appropriate weight of the (4)(g) aggravating factor (murder in the course of a sexual assault or other specified crime) in the circumstances. The State's evidence depicted a lengthy terrorization by defendant, Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 322, 757 A. 2d 221, of which the sexual assault was a part. The prosecutor's words are not so distinct from our own characterization of the crime: The cold-bloodedness and brutality of defendant are evidenced by the fact that defendant specifically asked Dunn to watch him kill Huggins.... Huggins did not provoke defendant to a sudden intemperate act. Nor did he kill her in the midst of violent sexual frenzy. To the contrary, for two hours she was a helpless victim of a cool and deliberate carjacker.... Defendant was aware of how helpless Huggins felt. [ Ibid. ] Whether described as cold-blooded and brutal, or as an act of cruelty and power, the words are apt to the evidence and pertinent to the aggravating factor under consideration by the jury. The prosecutor's comments were proper. Because they were relevant to defendant's blameworthiness, the weight of the (4)(g) aggravator, and were a characterization of the evidence, defense counsel did not have grounds to object.
After reciting Dunn's testimony about Harris forcing Huggins into the car's trunk, the prosecutor asked the jurors to imagine what Huggins's experience was like: You have seen the trunk of that car. When you think about why murder in the course of a kidnapping is a powerful aggravating factor in this case, imagine what it must have been like for Kristin Huggins to have been driven around stuffed into that dark, cramped, airless trunk, worrying about what was going to happen to her next. Defendant claims that defense counsels' performance was deficient because they did not object to these remarks. Again, although these comments were aimed at invoking some emotion from the jury, they do not exceed proper comment. The prosecutor did not go beyond the parameters of the evidence, and he was entitled to argue the weight to be accorded an aggravating factor. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 474, 803 A. 2d 1. Kidnappings can be conducted in different ways, some more terrorizing than others. Here, the prosecutor was describing in graphic terms the terrible reality of a cold and sadistic kidnapping. The comments may have invoked emotion, but they were relevant to the determination of the weight of the aggravator and thus within the considerable leeway prosecutors are permitted. Id. at 472, 803 A. 2d 1. See Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 570, 575 A. 2d 816. For completeness, we add that there is no merit to defendant's claim that appellate counsel rendered IAC by failing to raise on direct appeal trial counsel's failure to object to the State's summation. Appellate counsel would not have been successful had they raised the issue because the prosecutor's remarks were not `clearly improper.' Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 588, 737 A. 2d 55 (quoting Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 452, 550 A. 2d 1172).