Opinion ID: 2611026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the testimony about prior acts of touching.

Text: Smith asserts that in the second trial the trial court should not have allowed the testimony of Smith's daughter concerning prior acts of improper touching, because the testimony violated (1) the trial court's own order reaffirming the evidentiary rulings in the first trial and (2) our rules of evidence concerning the admissibility of evidence of other criminal acts. We disagree. Smith's attorney did not object in the second trial to the first questions asked of Smith's daughter concerning the prior acts of touching. The question to which an objection was made asked: How many other times has your dad touched you in places that you didn't think he should touch you? After the objection was overruled, Smith's daughter answered: A lot. Smith premises his first attack on the admission of this evidence on the order of the trial court before the beginning of the second trial in which the trial court reaffirmed its evidentiary rulings in the first trial. However, Smith incorrectly contends that the trial court excluded the testimony of Smith's daughter concerning these prior acts in the first trial. The trial court ruled in the first trial that the prosecutor could ask Smith's daughter about these prior acts, because the defense attorney had opened up the subject by his attempts to impeach the daughter through the use of the preliminary hearing transcript. There was no ruling in the first trial restricting the testimony of Smith's daughter as to these prior acts. The trial court only restricted others from testifying about prior acts of Smith. The troubling part about the admission in the second trial of the testimony of Smith's daughter concerning these prior acts is that the testimony came during the direct examination of the daughter, before any attempt had been made to impeach her credibility as the defense attorney had attempted at the first trial. However, during cross-examination of the daughter, the defense attorney again attempted to impeach her, this time through the use of not only the preliminary hearing transcript, but also the transcript of the first trial. Although it might be argued that the trial court prematurely allowed the prosecutor to ask the daughter about how may times her father had touched her improperly on prior occasions, it would have been entirely consistent with the trial court's ruling in the first trial to have allowed the same questions during redirect examination after the attempted impeachment. In ruling on the objection to the prosecutor's question concerning prior acts in the first trial, the trial court said: I feel that so far as [the daughter's] concerned, that it's been sufficiently opened up, with referring to the preliminary transcript, that it seems to me the prosecutor should be allowed to go into her explanations that were elicited as to why she was nervous and also the explanation that it happened at other times. If the defense attorney had not attempted to impeach Smith's daughter in the second trial by using the preliminary hearing transcript and the transcript of the first trial, we might find it necessary to make a different decision here. However, since he again attempted to impeach her in this manner, we hold that the trial court did not violate its own order reaffirming the evidentiary rulings in the first trial. Smith premises his second attack on the admission of his daughter's testimony concerning the prior acts on I.R.E. 404(b) and 403. These rules provide: Rule 404. ... (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Specifically, Smith contends that (1) the ruling of the trial court in the first trial that the admissibility of prior acts of misconduct was prejudicial to Smith was binding as to the admissibility of the testimony of Smith's daughter at the second trial, and (2) the state failed to lay a proper foundation establishing the prior acts were not too remote in time. As to the first of these contentions, we again point out that the ruling of the trial court that restricted evidence concerning other acts in the first trial did not include the testimony of Smith's daughter. The trial court ruled in the first trial that her testimony concerning prior acts was admissible to rebut the attempts to impeach her because of inconsistencies between her testimony at the preliminary hearing and at trial. As to her testimony concerning the prior acts, in the first trial the trial court exercised its discretion under I.R.E. 404(b) and 403 and in admitting her testimony inherently concluded that (1) the testimony was not offered to prove Smith's character, but rather to show how his daughter might have confused the circumstances of one incident with another and (2) that the relevance of the evidence on this point was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by other considerations. Therefore, in admitting the testimony of Smith's daughter as to the prior acts in the second trial, the trial court did not contradict any binding ruling it had made at the first trial. In support of his contention that the state failed to lay a proper foundation establishing the prior acts were not too remote in time Smith cites State v. Clay, 112 Idaho 261, 731 P.2d 804 (Ct.App. 1987) (review denied), which relied in part on State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct.App. 1982) (review denied). In Boothe our Court of Appeals held that if testimony of prior acts is to be admissible in sex crime cases, the prior acts must not be too remote in time... . 103 Idaho at 190, 646 P.2d at 432. There, the Court of Appeals upheld the admission of evidence of prior acts that had transpired over a five-year period ending approximately one year prior to the incident for which the defendant was being prosecuted. Here, Smith's ten-year-old daughter testified that she had lived with her father from approximately April of 1986 until before Christmas of that year. All of the prior acts took place during this period. The second trial took place in July of 1987. These facts established the foundation that the prior acts were not too remote in time.