Opinion ID: 2063677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: State's Motion For Continuance

Text: Defendant alleges reversible error arising from the trial court's grant of the State's motion for continuance two days before the scheduled trial. Defendant filed a motion for speedy trial on May 8, 1984. The court subsequently scheduled the trial for July 13, 1984. On July 11, the prosecutor filed a motion for continuance due to the unavailability of two state witnesses. The first witness, Capt. Frans Hollander, was the chief investigating officer in the case. In the motion for continuance, the prosecutor failed to state the facts to which Hollander was expected to testify. The second witness, Lt. Clark Mercer, was a handwriting analyst who was unavailable because of a lecturing commitment in Illinois. He was expected to testify that the handwriting on the forged instruments was that of the defendant. Defendant filed a written objection to the State's motion, contending the State failed to comply with the statutory requirements of Ind. Code § 35-36-7-2, which provides: (a) A prosecuting attorney may move to postpone the trial of a criminal cause because of the absence of a witness whose name is endorsed on the indictment or information, if he makes an official statement: (1) Containing the requirements of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of section 1 [XX-XX-X-X] of this chapter; (2) Showing that the absence of the witness has not been procured by the act of the prosecuting attorney; (3) Stating the facts to which he believes the witness will testify, and include a statement that he believes these facts to be true; and (4) Stating that the prosecuting attorney is unable to prove the facts specified in accordance with subdivision (3) through the use of any other witness whose testimony can be as readily procured. Upon request of the defendant the court shall order that the prosecuting attorney's motion and official statement be made in writing. (b) The trial may not be postponed if: (1) After a motion by the prosecuting attorney because of the absence of a witness, the defendant admits that the absent witness would testify to the facts as alleged by the prosecuting attorney in his official statement in accordance with subsection (a)(3); or (2) After a motion by the prosecuting attorney to postpone because of the absence of written or documentary evidence, the defendant admits that the written or documentary evidence exists. Defendant contended the State's motion was deficient with respect to Hollander because it neither stated the facts to which the prosecutor believed the witness would testify, nor did it state the prosecutor was unable to prove the same facts through the use of another witness. Defendant also contended the prosecutor's motion was void with respect to Mercer because Mercer's name was not listed on the information as required by subsection (a) of the above statute. [2] Although we agree the State failed to comply with Ind. Code § 35-36-7-2(a)(3) and (4) with respect to Hollander, we note the granting of a continuance due to the absence of a witness not listed on the original information, as was Mercer in this case, is permitted under Trial Rule 53.5. Drake v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 686. The State did comply with Trial Rule 53.5 in seeking the continuance due to the unavailability of Lt. Mercer. Both Ind. Code § 35-36-7-2 and Trial Rule 53.5 provide a means whereby the non-moving party to the proceeding may avoid a continuance in this situation by admitting the absent witness would testify to the facts as alleged by the prosecutor. Because the prosecutor failed to state the facts to which Hollander was to testify, defendant was unable to admit the absent witness would have testified to anything. To have allowed the continuance on the ground Hollander was absent would have been improper because of the State's failure to comply with the statutory requirement. On the other hand, defendant made no attempt to avoid the continuance by admitting Lt. Mercer would testify that the handwriting on the forged instruments was that of the defendant. Thus, he may not complain the trial court should not have granted the continuance. The decision became one vested in the trial court's discretion, and we find no abuse of that discretion. Defendant also contends the motion for continuance misrepresented that Lt. Mercer would testify that the handwriting on the forged instruments was that of the defendant because Lt. Mercer later disclosed he had not yet examined the forged checks at the time the motion was filed. Trial Rule 53.5 provides the motion for a continuance due to an absent witness must contain a statement of what facts about which the prosecutor believes the witness will testify. Lt. Mercer had examined checks allegedly forged by the defendant in a related case pending in Morgan County. The prosecutor explained she was not aware at the time the motion was filed that Lt. Mercer had not completed the evaluation of the instruments in the instant case. We do not sense any bad faith or intentional misrepresentation by the prosecutor. We further reject defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge based on the alleged violation of the speedy trial rule. Criminal Rule 4(D) provides: If when application is made for discharge of a defendant under this rule, the court be satisfied that there is evidence for the state, which cannot then be had, that reasonable effort has been made to procure the same and there is just ground to believe that such evidence can be had within ninety (90) days, the cause may be continued, and the prisoner remanded or admitted to bail; and if he be not brought to trial by the state within such additional ninety (90) days, he shall then be discharged. The absence of a key witness through no fault of the State is good cause for extending the time period requirements for an early trial. Woodson v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 432.