Opinion ID: 1621920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Destruction of blood evidence

Text: Lee's second point on appeal is that the capital murder charge should have been dismissed due to the destruction of possibly exculpatory evidence. When Lee was arrested and taken into custody on the day of the murder, among the items police seized from him was a pair of Converse tennis shoes he was wearing. Kermitt Channell, a serologist with the State Crime Lab, examined the shoes and observed what he believed to be a small spot of blood on the sole of the left shoe, and another spot on the tongue of the right shoe. Channell performed what he termed a Takayama test on the shoes, which confirmed the presence of blood, but consumed the entire sample, thus removing the opportunity for independent analysis by the defense. Lee presented the testimony of Robert Reis, a professor of biochemistry and molecular biology, who testified that, while Channell had done his job quite thoroughly, the State Crime Lab's guidelines needed reevaluation since the advent of more sensitive methods of DNA analysis. According to Reis, other tests could have been performed on the shoes without destroying the sample. Lee claims that his counsel should have been notified that the blood evidence on the shoes was about to be destroyed. He further asserts that the State breached its duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. According to Lee, the State's failure to preserve enough of the sample on the shoes so that he could conduct his own tests deprived him of due process guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. We addressed a similar claim in Wenzel v. State, 306 Ark. 527, 815 S.W.2d 938 (1991). In Wenzel , a rape case, the defendant argued that his due process rights were violated when FBI technicians consumed all of the semen samples found on the victims' vaginal swabs. We emphasized that the State's duty to preserve evidence is limited to that which might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense, and that the evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Wenzel, 306 Ark. at 532-3, 815 S.W.2d 938, quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-9, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2533-34, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). We further explained that, unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Wenzel, 306 Ark. at 533, 815 S.W.2d 938, quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337-38, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). In this case, Lee makes the broad-brushed assertion in his brief that the potential value of the evidence to the defense was so obvious that the decision to allow it destroyed suggests bad faith. This bare contention, without supporting facts, does not demonstrate that the State acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence. To the contrary, Channell testified that he performed the test in accordance with established laboratory guidelines, and that he did not contact the prosecutor or defense counsel to inform them that the sample on the shoes could be consumed, as it was not standard operating procedure to do so. While Lee was free to argue to the jury that alternative testing might have preserved the sample, the police do not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59, 109 S.Ct. at 338. Because Lee has made no showing that the blood evidence on the shoes possessed any exculpatory value before it was destroyed, or that the State in bad faith failed to preserve the sample, Lee's due process claim was properly rejected by the trial court. Alternatively, Lee argues that he was entitled to an order suppressing the use of the shoes as evidence for the State. However, he neither cites authority nor makes a convincing argument for suppression. We have been careful not to consider arguments where an appellant offers no citation of authority or convincing argument and where it is not apparent without further research that the argument is well-taken. Matthews v. State, 327 Ark. 70, 938 S.W.2d 545 (1997).