Opinion ID: 743614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rosa

Text: 196 Rosa argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. 197
198 Rosa contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted to possess with intent to distribute fifteen kilograms of cocaine from February 3 to February 5, 1994. He argues that the government presented no evidence to demonstrate that he took steps toward obtaining possession of the cocaine. 199 To prove that a defendant attempted to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, the government must establish that the defendant acted with the specific intent to commit the underlying offense, and further that he took a substantial step toward its completion. United States v. Cea, 914 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir.1990). Rosa claims only that the government failed to prove that he took a substantial step toward obtaining the cocaine. He does not contest the intent element. 200 The recorded phone conversations that took place from February 3 to February 5, 1994, between Rosa, Toma and Valencia, establish that Rosa took a substantial step toward obtaining 15 kilograms of cocaine. On February 3, Rosa called Toma and told him that he wanted 15. Later that afternoon, Toma called Valencia and asked him for 15. On February 4, Rosa called Toma to check on whether he had gotten the 15. Toma then called Valencia and asked, Did you get that for me? Valencia responded, Yeah, but not the kind you want. Valencia also told Toma that he would give him 3 to try. Toma responded that Valencia should [t]ry to get 15. Toma then called Rosa back and told him that he had 3 tickets. Later that evening, Toma told Valencia that he had shown them the 3 and that they wanted 12 more tomorrow. 201 On February 5, Valencia told Toma that if you got the money ... they can give it to us. Toma told Valencia to bring 12 but Valencia responded that he could only get 8. Valencia and Toma agreed to meet in Toma's garage. However, Rosa called Toma before the meeting and told him that he had gotten a lower price, so the deal was on hold. On February 6, Toma and Youmaran went to Rosa's house in Toma's load car. Toma explained to Youmaran that the purpose of the trip was to provide Rosa with another one, because Rosa had sold those three I [Toma] gave him. (Tr. 740.) Youmaran testified that he accompanied Toma to Rosa's house, where Toma delivered another kilo of cocaine to Rosa. 202 Viewing the evidence of the phone conversations and the visit by Toma and Youmaran to Rosa's house on February 6 in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable and properly instructed jury could conclude that Rosa took a substantial step toward acquiring the fifteen kilograms of cocaine. 16 Rosa called Toma and ordered fifteen kilos of cocaine. While Toma was not able to deliver all of the cocaine, Toma and Rosa did more than merely agree on the delivery of fifteen kilos of cocaine; Toma delivered a portion of the fifteen kilos and was in the process of attempting to find twelve more, but Rosa put the deal on hold. This distinguishes the present case from Cea, the case on which Rosa relies. In Cea, the sole evidence of a substantial step consisted of the defendant leaving his home following a phone call in which he had agreed to pick up drugs, which the government argued meant that he was very likely in the process of picking up the drugs he had discussed on the phone. 914 F.2d at 888. In rejecting this argument, we stated that while the government does not have to wait until the transaction is complete ... it needs more evidence than what it produced at trial. Id. Here, by contrast, the tape of Toma's conversation with Youmaran, and Youmaran's testimony, which explained that Toma had delivered three of the fifteen kilos sought by Rosa and was in the process of negotiating for the delivery of the other twelve, illustrate that the attempted possession by Rosa of fifteen kilograms of cocaine had gone far beyond the attempt in Cea; indeed, Rosa had already acquired part of what he sought. In United States v. Wilks, 46 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.1995), we stated [w]hether [the defendant] took a substantial step toward completing that transaction was a question of fact for the jury to decide. It found that he did, and we agree. As in Wilks, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish a substantial step by Rosa toward the possession of fifteen kilos of cocaine. 203
204 Rosa next claims that the government's evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed with intent to distribute ten kilograms of cocaine on February 3, 1994. He argues that the government failed to prove that he possessed the drugs because there was no eyewitness testimony, no videotape evidence, and no other physical evidence supporting the charges. Rosa further contends that the only evidence presented by the government, consisting of taped phone conversations between himself and Toma, was thus insufficient as a matter of law to establish that he possessed cocaine. 205 To establish that a defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute, the prosecution must prove that the defendant: (1) knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; (2) possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it; and (3) knew the cocaine was a controlled substance. United States v. Jackson, 51 F.3d 646, 655 (7th Cir.1995). Rosa's contention is that he never possessed the cocaine. He does not challenge the intent to distribute or the knowledge requirements. 206 [I]n order to demonstrate possession of cocaine, it is sufficient that the government show a level of control that meets the standards of 'constructive possession.'  United States v. Martinez, 937 F.2d 299, 305 (7th Cir.1991); see also Jackson, 51 F.3d at 653. To establish constructive possession, the government must set forth evidence demonstrating ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband. United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 669, 685 (7th Cir.1994); see United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1266-67 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2511, 135 L.Ed.2d 200 (1996). Although mere association with another who possesses drugs is insufficient to sustain a possession conviction,  'a person can be convicted for possessing cocaine [even] though he does not possess it in a literal sense.'  Johnson, 26 F.3d at 684-85 (quoting United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 756 (7th Cir.1988)); see Jackson, 51 F.3d at 653. 207 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the taped conversations between Toma and Rosa reflect that on February 3, 1994, Rosa told Toma that Rosa had given this guy the 10,000 grams and that he wanted 10 more kilograms. Toma responded that he would get back to Rosa in a few hours to let him know if he could do it and told Rosa that he would have to pay $20.50, which meant $20,500 per kilo. As detailed supra part 1, Toma engaged in conversations with Valencia in an attempt to supply the fifteen kilos, but the deal was put on hold by Rosa when he found another supplier who could deliver the cocaine at $20, or $20,000 per kilo. A rational jury may very well have chosen to believe Rosa's assertions set forth in his phone call to Toma on February 3 that he had delivered ten kilograms of cocaine and, by implication, that Rosa possessed those ten kilograms. That taped telephone conversation also demonstrated that Rosa had ownership, dominion, or control over the cocaine because Rosa himself stated that he gave the cocaine to another person and had knowledge and conveyed that knowledge to Toma that he wanted ten more. 208
209 Finally, Rosa argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. He contends that, while the evidence may be sufficient to show that Rosa purchased cocaine from Toma, nothing shows that Rosa ever agreed to join a conspiracy. 210 We recently reiterated what burden the government bears and how we review the evidence when considering a defendant's participation in a conspiracy in United States v. Edwards, 77 F.3d 968 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded for resentencing on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2543, 135 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1996): 211 To prove that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the Government must demonstrate a participatory link between the conspiracy and the defendant. To establish that participatory link, the Government must offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and that he intended to join and associate himself with its criminal design and purpose. When reviewing conspiracy convictions, we must be certain that the Government presented substantial evidence that the defendant was a conspirator. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 212 77 F.3d at 974 (citing United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 206 (7th Cir.1995)). In United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850 (7th Cir.1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 664, 133 L.Ed.2d 515 (1995), we noted that whether the defendant's acts rendered support to the coconspirators, whether the defendant was entrusted with some task that furthered the criminal design, or whether he entered into a mutually cooperative relationship with coconspirators that assisted them in bringing about the object of the conspiracy were all relevant to determine whether a defendant participated in the conspiracy. 40 F.3d at 866. 213 In the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence demonstrates a continuing and intertwined relationship, lasting several months, between Rosa and the other co-conspirators, particularly Toma. Rosa performed a number of tasks to aid in the efficient operation of the distribution network. For example, Rosa allowed Toma to use his house as a place to break up cocaine into smaller packages, he supplied Toma with cocaine when Toma's usual suppliers ran low, and he purchased cocaine from Toma to distribute to his own clients. Toma frequently fronted cocaine to Rosa, and Rosa answered Toma's telephone calls, took messages for Toma from those callers, and communicated with Toma's other customers from time to time. On February 6, Toma and Youmaran went to Rosa's house, where the three men counted out $60,000 in proceeds from narcotics sales. As these acts demonstrate, Rosa was a trusted member of, and participant in, Toma's cocaine operation, thus showing his agreement to participate in the conspiracy.