Opinion ID: 2387732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the section 51 problem

Text: The controversy before us in these cases arises from the misreading or the misapplication of our precedent concerning whether KRS 311.377 prevents discovery of peer review documents and records in medical malpractice suits. The confusion stems from our decision in Sweasy v. King's Daughters Memorial Hospital, Ky., 771 S.W.2d 812 (1989). However, to fully explain the origin of this confusion, we begin with the earlier case of McGuffey v. Hall, Ky., 557 S.W.2d 401 (1977). In 1976, the General Assembly amended KRS 311.377 in Section 9 of a bill entitled, AN ACT relating to health care malpractice insurance claims. 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 163. These amendments contained a privilege for peer review material and created the statute in substantially its present form. In two combined declaratory judgment actions, the Franklin Circuit Court declared the 1976 Act unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed in McGuffey, supra . The McGuffey Court found, inter alia, that the subject-matter of Section 9 was not sufficiently related to the title of the Act, and, thus, violated Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution. [1] McGuffey, 557 S.W.2d at 407. In its analysis of the Section 51 issue, the McGuffey Court first determined that the title of the Act limited the subject matter of the Act to those subjects which had some reasonable relationship to medical malpractice claims or insurance. Id. at 406. It then construed the statute: Although conduct that results in a malpractice claim may also eventuate in a peer review proceeding, the relationship between the two is purely coincidental. A peer review is not designed to serve any purpose of a malpractice claim, and to the extent that the confidentiality conferred upon it serves to protect those who participate in the proceedings, it is a protection against suits for defamation, not malpractice. Id. at 407. Thus, the McGuffey Court's construction of the statute was that the peer review privilege did not apply to medical malpractice suits. It then found that the statute was unconstitutional on its face because the statute had no reasonable relationship to medical malpractice claims or malpractice insurance. Id. Presumably in response to the McGuffey decision, in 1980, the General Assembly reenacted KRS 311.377 in Section 33 of a new act entitled, AN ACT relating to the establishment of certificate of need, licensing and regulation of health facilities and health services. 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 135. There were no changes made to the text of the statute. We addressed the issue of whether the peer review privilege of the 1980 version of the statute prevented discovery of peer review material in a medical malpractice suit in Sweasy, supra . Unlike McGuffey , in which the constitutionality of the 1976 version of the statute was the only issue at bar, at issue in Sweasy were both the constitutionality and the application of the 1980 version of the statute. Sweasy, 771 S.W.2d at 816. It is important to note that the Sweasy Court did not construe the statute as applying to medical malpractice suits. Rather, the Sweasy Court only made the assumption that the statute applied to medical malpractice suits in order to analyze the constitutional issue. Id. at 813. (With the possible exception of Section 33 ( if interpreted to include a patient's malpractice action ), all thirty-five sections of the 1980 Act relate exclusively to the procedures described in the title.) (Emphasis added). This point is important to understanding the correct interpretation of Sweasy `s holding: The trial court correctly stated that the language of McGuffey v. Hall must mean either that the confidentiality privilege expressed in Section 2 of KRS 311.377 is limited to suits against peer review entities as referred to and protected against in Section 1 of the statute, or it violates Kentucky Const. Section 51. In either case, the trial court has correctly applied the mandate of our Court in McGuffey v. Hall , and the Court of Appeals ignored that mandate in an Order giving no reasons. Id. at 816. Thus, the Sweasy Court's construction of KRS 311.377(2) is consistent with the McGuffey Court's construction of the statute. But unlike the McGuffey Court, the Sweasy Court did not find that the 1980 version of the statute was unconstitutional on its face; rather, it found that the statute would violate Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution if it was applied to medical malpractice suits. In response to the Sweasy decision, the General Assembly reenacted KRS 311.377 in 1990 under a new title without changing any of the text of the statute. [2] Apparently, the General Assembly mistakenly interpreted Sweasy as holding that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. We can find no other explanation to the Preamble of the 1990 Act, which begins, WHEREAS, the protection afforded to peer review participants for review functions . . . has been eliminated by the Supreme Court's decision in Sweasy v. King's Daughters Memorial Hospital, Ky., 771 S.W.2d 812 (1989) . . . . 1990 Ky. Acts, ch. 271. Sweasy clearly did not eliminate the peer review privilege of KRS 311.377(2). At most, Sweasy limited the scope of the privilege. Appellants give Sweasy the same mistaken interpretation. At the heart of Appellants' argument is that McGuffey and Sweasy both held that KRS 311.377 was unconstitutional, and, thus, the 1990 reenactment of KRS 311.377 gives us the opportunity to interpret the statute de novo. However, as shown, Sweasy did not hold that the statute was unconstitutional. Rather, the Sweasy Court relied on the McGuffey Court's construction of the statute to reach the holding that the privilege of Subsection 2 of the statute was limited to suits against peer review entities described in Subsection 1 of the statute. Thus, in order to reverse the Court of Appeals, we would have to overrule Sweasy and its construction of the statute. While we disagree with Appellants that McGuffey and Sweasy have no application to the construction of the 1990 version of the statute, we do agree that those cases have no application to the constitutionality of the 1990 version of the statute. Because our decision rests entirely on statutory construction, we have no cause to reach the constitutional question. Rice v. Walls, 213 F.2d 693, 697 (6th Cir.1954).