Opinion ID: 196929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Perez Appeal

Text: 5 Perez claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the hearing on his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. The government responds that Perez (1) did not ask the court to appoint new counsel, and (2) has not shown that appointed counsel, Jose R. Aguayo, Esquire, labored under an actual conflict of interest within the meaning of United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480 (1st Cir.1994).
6 The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel inheres at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding unless competently waived. United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 47 (1st Cir.1991). A plea withdrawal hearing is a critical stage in the criminal proceeding. United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1069 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 2209, 48 L.Ed.2d 820 (1976). The right to counsel is not contingent upon a request by the defendant; rather, we presume that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 & n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1409 & n. 6, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). In all events, Perez requested counsel at the outset, and the district court appointed Jose R. Aguayo, Esquire. 7 Thus, contrary to the government's suggestion, nothing in the record remotely indicates that Perez knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea withdrawal hearing. Compare United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 771-72 (1st Cir.1995) (defendant repeatedly waived representation by conflict-free counsel), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1322, 134 L.Ed.2d 474 (1996); see also United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 92 (1st Cir.) (discussing waiver elements), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 959, 112 S.Ct. 421, 116 L.Ed.2d 441 (1991). Finding no waiver, we next consider whether Perez has demonstrated that court-appointed counsel failed to afford effective assistance at the plea withdrawal hearing.
8 The government contends that Perez must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] his lawyer's performance. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 486 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). Thus, the government says, Perez was required to show that court-appointed counsel could have pursued a plausible alternative tactic or strategy were it not for an inherent conflict of interest or other loyalties that caused him not to do so. Id.; Guaraldi v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1987). 9 We noted in Soldevila-Lopez that [c]ourts have recognized actual conflicts of interest between an attorney and his client when pursuit of a client's interests would lead to evidence of an attorney's malpractice. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 486 (citing United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1106-08 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 893, 93 L.Ed.2d 845 (1987), and Mathis v. Hood, 937 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir.1991)). The absence of any malpractice or ethics complaint in Soldevila-Lopez nonetheless led us to conclude that a conflict-of-interest finding should not be based solely on an inference that the client might have benefited had defense counsel raised the client's mental incompetency claim prior to trial. Id. at 486-87. 10 The government's contention that Perez' Sixth Amendment claim is indistinguishable from that in Soldevila-Lopez is untenable, since Perez plainly alleged facts amounting to malpractice, if found to be true. That is, the Perez motion to withdraw his guilty plea alleged that Aguayo had pressured him into pleading guilty at the earlier Rule 11 change-of-plea hearing in order to hide [Aguayo's] lack of preparation for trial. Perez further alleged that Aguayo had not made even minimum efforts to act as his counsel or defender and was only interested in a fee, but see infra note 1, thus leaving no doubt that Perez wanted replacement counsel. 11 In United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 893, 93 L.Ed.2d 845 (1987), the district court was presented with a virtually identical situation in which the defendant had filed a pro se motion to withdraw a guilty plea, alleging that court-appointed counsel had persuaded him to forgo trial (despite Ellison's assertions of innocence) because counsel did not want to make waves with the federal prosecutors with whom he would be working in the future. Id. at 1106. The district court neither appointed new counsel nor obtained a competent waiver, but instead rejected the plea-withdrawal motion because defense counsel denied Ellison's accusations at the plea-withdrawal hearing. 12 The Seventh Circuit held that defense counsel's representation at the plea-withdrawal hearing did not meet the Sixth Amendment minima: 13 First, counsel was not able to pursue his client's best interests free from the influence of his concern about possible self-incrimination.... [I]f the allegations in defendant's motion were true, his actions would be tantamount to malpractice. Any contention by counsel that defendant's allegations were not true would (and did) contradict his client. In testifying against his client, counsel acted as both counselor and witness for the prosecution. These roles are inherently inconsistent. 14 Id. at 1107 (citation omitted); see also Lopez v. Scully, 58 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that a pro se motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on alleged attorney coercion created an actual conflict of interest). The identical logic fully warrants the conclusion that Aguayo may have been laboring under an actual conflict of interest at the hearing on the pro se plea-withdrawal motion, which alleged that Aguayo had coerced Perez' guilty plea in order to conceal his unpreparedness for trial. Nevertheless, we think the appropriate course in this case is to remand for further factfinding on the merits of the Perez allegations against Aguayo. 15 As we recognized in Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 486, a claim that counsel was disabled by an actual conflict of interest at a critical stage in the criminal proceeding amounts to an ineffective assistance claim not normally appropriate for consideration on direct appeal. See United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 986, 117 L.Ed.2d 148 (1992). Moreover, the district court record is not sufficiently developed to allow reasoned consideration of the merits of the pro se plea-withdrawal motion itself, Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 486 (quoting Natanel, 938 F.2d at 309), since its underlying conflict-of-interest allegations against Aguayo were never subjected to factfinding in the district court. 16 The district court failed to determine, in the first instance, whether Perez had made an intelligent and competent waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel before the court proceeded to hear the plea-withdrawal motion with Perez acting pro se. See Mateo, 950 F.2d at 47. Instead, it opened the plea-withdrawal hearing with questions to Aguayo about the pro se plea-withdrawal motion. Whereupon Aguayo extolled the benefits of the plea agreement, stated that there were no errors in the earlier Rule 11 plea colloquy conducted by the district court, nor bases in law for Perez' pro se plea-withdrawal motion, and, in all events, that Perez was better off with the plea bargain, given the unlikelihood that he could prevail at trial. Summing up, Aguayo stated: I really don't understand why [Perez] wants to withdraw [the plea agreement]. Compare United States v. Daniel, 962 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir.1992) (attorney argued vigorously and successfully for client after raising potential conflict). Whatever their independent merit, 1 the views expressed by Aguayo at the plea-withdrawal hearing directly contradicted the position advocated by Perez in the pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, the Rule 32(e) hearing record leaves no doubt that Perez was left to fend for himself, without representation by counsel. But see Crowley, 529 F.2d at 1069 (plea withdrawal hearing is critical stage in criminal proceeding). Consequently, Perez was denied effective assistance at the plea-withdrawal hearing. See Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 486; Ellison, 798 F.2d at 1106-08. 17 In many instances a trial court may have no reason to question whether counsel's personal or professional interests might preclude effective assistance to the defendant. In such circumstances, fair and efficient criminal justice may depend in significant part upon the ethical obligation of defense counsel to inform the court whenever a conflict of interest arises in the course of the proceedings. Guaraldi, 819 F.2d at 18. 2 On the other hand, when the trial court learns or has reason to know that there is a colorable conflict, it should initiate an appropriate inquiry to safeguard the accused's Sixth Amendment rights. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 487; United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir.) (Where the accused voices objection to appointed counsel, the trial court should inquire into the reasons for the dissatisfaction.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846, 107 S.Ct. 164, 93 L.Ed.2d 103 (1986); see generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.4(b), at pp. 36-37 (1984) (replacement of appointed counsel); cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) (mandating inquiry into joint representation). 18 Given the clarity and specificity of the malpractice allegations in the pro se plea-withdrawal motion filed by Perez, and Aguayo's sua sponte attempt to terminate his representation at the outset of the plea-withdrawal hearing, the appropriate course for the district court was to resolve the factual dispute in keeping with the adversarial nature of the plea-withdrawal request. Moreover, absent a proper waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and a knowing and voluntary election to proceed pro se on the Rule 32(e) motion, see Ellison, 798 F.2d at 1108-09; United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1510-11 (9th Cir.1987), appointment of replacement counsel was the only appropriate course. As the hearing transcript plainly demonstrates, the failure to conduct the required factual inquiry resulted in an unconstitutional breakdown in the adversarial process, which compels a remand for further proceedings. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19 (rejecting harmless error analysis). 19 On remand, the district court shall appoint replacement counsel for Perez at a plea-withdrawal hearing reconvened for factfinding purposes to determine the merits of Perez' allegations against Aguayo, so as to enable its ultimate determination whether the guilty plea itself was rendered involuntary by a violation of Perez' Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceeding. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (ineffective assistance during bargaining may render plea involuntary). 20