Opinion ID: 4582075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legally Impossible Verdicts Like Terry’s

Text: Are Anathema to Our Justice System ¶21 Having established that Terry‘s jury rendered a legally impossible verdict, we now explain why the verdict cannot stand. Two reasons lead us to this conclusion. First, a legally impossible verdict in which a defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but 66, 69, 74, but other than repeat our commitment to this rule, it does little to address the concerns we raise against a blind reliance in this case. 9 PLEASANT GROVE v. TERRY Opinion of the Court convicted on the compound offense doesn‘t just undermine our confidence in the trial‘s outcome, it eviscerates it. Second, upholding such legally impossible verdicts casts a cold shadow on the criminal justice system, and this shadow is far more worrisome than the inability to retry the defendant due to constitutional constrains. We then reject the argument that invalidating legally impossible verdicts of this kind somehow disrupts the jury verdict‘s finality or invades the jury process. ¶22 Legally impossible verdicts—in which a defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but convicted on the compound offense—cannot stand for two reasons. First, they undermine ―our confidence in the outcome of the trial,‖ Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815, because for a defendant to ―be convicted for a crime on which the jury has actually found that the defendant did not commit an essential element, whether it be one element or all[,] . . . is not merely inconsistent with justice, but is repugnant to it,‖ Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619. The legally impossible verdict means that the jury necessarily overstepped its ―historic role‖ as ―fact-finder,‖ McNeal, 44 A.3d at 986, and has ―taken the law into its own hands,‖ Md. Stewart, 211 A.3d at 376 (Opinion by McDonald, J.), by presumably ―engag[ing] in some . . . process that is inconsistent with the notion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,‖ Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815. The requirement that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is part and parcel of constitutional due process. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 167, 299 P.3d 892 (―In the criminal justice system, a defendant is presumed innocent and the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‖); State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (―Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution require that the burden of proving all elements of a crime is on the prosecution.‖ (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). Such a constitutional insult cannot stand. ¶23 Second, we are deeply concerned about the perceptions of a criminal justice system that upholds such legally impossible verdicts. When liberty is at stake, we do not think a shrug of the judicial shoulders is a sufficient response to an irrational conclusion. We are not playing legal horseshoes where close enough is sufficient. It is difficult to understand why we have a detailed trial procedure, where the forum is elaborate and carefully regulated, and then simply give up when the jury confounds us. 10 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815. ―[T]he possibility of a wrongful conviction in such cases outweighs the rationale for allowing verdicts to stand.‖ State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996). Terry‘s case may only present misdemeanors, but affirming such a legally impossible verdict extends beyond it, and applies equally to grave offenses, such as felony murder. See, e.g., Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 1979). If we affirm the ability of a jury to render such a legally impossible verdict, we sanction the lengthy (perhaps lifelong) incarceration of a defendant for a murder although the jury acquitted him from the underlying felony that allowed the felony murder charge. We cannot stand by legally impossible verdicts and call our system a justice system.6 ¶24 We acknowledge the implications of our decision on the future prosecution of defendants who receive legally impossible verdicts in which the defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but convicted on the compound offense. ―The double jeopardy provisions in both the United States and Utah Constitutions generally prohibit the State from making repeated attempts to convict an individual for the same offense after jeopardy has attached, which in jury trials occurs after a jury has been selected and sworn.‖ State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 22, 104 P.3d 1250 (footnotes omitted). And so, with legally impossible verdicts like the one here, the double jeopardy provisions may effectively preclude a retrial of the acquittal on the predicate offense. The same might be true for retrying the compound offense, the argument being that a defendant with a legally impossible verdict cannot be retried on the compound offense if ―there was insufficient evidence to support [that] conviction[].‖ _____________________________________________________________ 6 The dissent says that ―neither the United States Constitution, [nor] the Utah Constitution, . . . have been read to require‖ the invalidation of legally impossible verdicts. See infra ¶ 59. As for the U.S. Constitution, it is true that the U.S. Supreme Court remarked in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) that ―nothing in the Constitution would require such a protection,‖ but no such statement was conclusively made as to the Utah Constitution. We also stress that the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to adjudicate the issue ―under [its] supervisory powers over the federal criminal process,‖ id., allows for independent treatment by state courts, also in accordance to their constitutions, where appropriate. Therefore, as for the Utah Constitution, the fact that no such reading has been offered in the past should not signal that it is not possible. 11 PLEASANT GROVE v. TERRY Opinion of the Court Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 364 (2016). Under this assumption, it seems that the prosecution would be estopped from a retrial on the compound offense.7 ¶25 But the inability to retry a defendant is far preferable to defendants being convicted of and punished for crimes that— according to the jury‘s acquittal on the predicate offense—they never could have committed. After all, Blackstone‘s ratio—the basis for our presumption of innocence and the core principle of our criminal justice system—tells us that ―[i]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer.‖ 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ; see also State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 305 (―Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the measure of certainty required to convict in a civilized society . . . .‖). If we succumb to the opposite rationale, we would be ―presum[ing] unlawful acquittal‖ ―rather than guard[ing] against unlawful conviction.‖8 Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 213 (1989). ¶26 For these reasons, we hold that legally impossible verdicts— in which a defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but convicted on the compound offense—cannot stand. In doing so, we do not ignore our usual deep reluctance to disturb the finality of a jury verdict, as the dissent suggests, or inquire into the jury‘s intent. See infra ¶ 71. These principles are simply not at play here. We confront other legal errors made at trial, and legally impossible verdicts should not fare differently. And legally impossible verdicts do not require inquiry into the jury‘s intent. _____________________________________________________________ 7 We note that the City has not indicated that it intends to prosecute Terry again, and the parties have not briefed this issue. Recognizing that it is a question of first impression, we leave the ultimate disposition of this question for an appropriate future case. 8 The dissent claims ―that is not so.‖ Infra ¶ 69. In its view, our approach leads courts to ―discard[]‖ jury verdicts that determined ―guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Infra ¶ 69. This claim crystalizes our different approaches to this question. To us, no such verdict has been discarded, because there is no logical way for a jury to acquit a person on a predicate offense and then finding them guilty on the compound offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court ¶27 We routinely overturn trial courts‘ decisions for legal errors. We should do the same when a jury makes a legal error. In fact, we must, because adjudicating matters of law is our duty as an appellate court. We review questions of law for correctness, and even under one of our more deferential standards of review—abuse of discretion—we have long held that a ―legal error is an abuse of discretion that undercuts the deference we would otherwise afford‖ a trial court. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 2020 UT 47, ¶ 78, 469 P.3d 1003. In fact, other courts have refused to accept legally inconsistent verdicts rendered by a judge. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1960); State v. Williams, 916 A.2d 294, 305 (Md. 2007); Akers v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 13, 17 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). We see no reason why a legal error made by one fact finder—a jury—should be treated differently than one made by another—a judge. Any reluctance we might have to disturb the jury‘s verdict is a byproduct of judicial restraint—not an inexorable mandate. For example, we overturn a jury verdict—even a verdict that isn‘t impossible on its face—when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury, ―is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable [so] that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.‖ State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 30, 326 P.3d 645. (citation omitted). Importantly, our restraint is connected to the jury‘s ―historical role‖ as ―the sole fact-finder in criminal jury trials.‖ McNeal, 44 A.3d at 986. But the jury does not act as a fact-finder when it misapplies the law—taking it ―into its own hands,‖ Md. Stewart, 211 A.3d at 376 (Opinion by McDonald, J.), and ignoring its ―duty . . . to decide a criminal case according to established rules of law,‖ Price, 949 A.2d at 627 (citation omitted)—as it does when it reaches a legally impossible verdict.9 _____________________________________________________________ 9 The dissent worries that we have created a ―mandate[e] that such [legally impossible] jury verdicts be overturned‖ and suggests that our decision ―weakens our longstanding and deep reluctance to disturb the finality of a jury verdict,‖ infra ¶ 71, because ―verdicts can be legally inconsistent in various ways and to different degrees.‖