Opinion ID: 2109253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: termination of k.m.'s parental rights

Text: In her fourth assignment of error, K.M. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support termination of parental rights. The basis for the juvenile court's judgment terminating the parental rights of K.M. is twofold: abandonment and failure to comply with a court-ordered rehabilitative program designed to eliminate or correct the conditions which led to the adjudication that J.M.'s children were juveniles within the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The Nebraska Juvenile Code provides that parental rights may be terminated when the best interests of a child require the termination of parental rights. See § 43-292. A juvenile's best interests are the primary considerations in determining whether parental rights should be terminated as authorized by the Nebraska Juvenile Code. In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 267, 417 N.W.2d 147, 158 (1987). In the absence of any reasonable alternative and as the last resort to dispose of an action brought pursuant to the Nebraska Juvenile Code ... termination of parental rights is permissible when the basis for such termination is proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re Interest of T.C., 226 Neb. 116, 117, 409 N.W.2d 607, 609 (1987). Among the bases for termination of parental rights, § 43-292 includes: (1) The parents have abandoned the juvenile for six months or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition; [and] (6) Following a determination that the juvenile is one as described in subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determination. Abandonment, for the purpose of § 43-292(1), is a parent's intentionally withholding from a child, without just cause or excuse, the parent's presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and the opportunity for the display of parental affection for the child. See In re Interest of A.G.G., 230 Neb. 707, 433 N.W.2d 185 (1988). Further, we have stated that if a parent voluntarily, but unreasonably or unjustifiably, departs from the state of residence of the parent's child or children, such departure may constitute parental abandonment of the child or children and cannot be used as an excuse for noncompliance with a court-ordered plan for parental rehabilitation. See In re Interest of A.G.G., supra ; In re Interest of R.A., 226 Neb. 160, 410 N.W.2d 110 (1987). In In re Interest of L.H., 227 Neb. 857, 863, 420 N.W.2d 318, 321 (1988), we stated: A juvenile court has the discretionary power to prescribe a reasonable plan for parental rehabilitation to correct the conditions underlying the adjudication that a child is a juvenile within the Nebraska Juvenile Code. In re Interest of T.C., 226 Neb. 116, 409 N.W.2d 607 (1987). See, also, § 43-292 (termination of parental rights; failure to correct conditions leading to adjudication). When a parent fails to make reasonable efforts to comply with the court-ordered rehabilitative plan, the parent's failure presents an independent reason justifying termination of parental rights. [Citations omitted.] When parents cannot rehabilitate themselves within a reasonable time, the best interests of a child require that a final disposition be made without delay. In re Interest of W., 217 Neb. 325, 330, 348 N.W.2d 861, 865 (1984). Regarding parental failure to comply with a court-ordered rehabilitative program, we expressed in In re Interest of L.O. and B.O., 229 Neb. 889, 895, 429 N.W.2d 388, 392 (1988): A parent's failure to make reasonable efforts to comply with a court-ordered plan of rehabilitation presents an independent reason justifying termination of parental rights. In re Interest of L.H., supra ; In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987). See, also, § 43-292(6) (termination of parental rights; failure to correct conditions leading to adjudication). Regarding termination of parental rights under § 43-292(6): [I]f a circumstance designated in subsections (1) to (6) is evidentially established, there must be the additional showing that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the primary consideration in any question concerning termination of parental rights. The standard of proof for each of the two preceding requirements prescribed by § 43-292 is evidence which is `clear and convincing.' Therefore, regarding parental noncompliance with a court-ordered rehabilitative plan, under § 43-292(6) as a ground for termination of parental rights, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent has willfully failed to comply, in whole or in part, with a reasonable provision material to the rehabilitative objective of the plan and (2) in addition to the parent's noncompliance with the rehabilitative plan, termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., supra at 267, 417 N.W.2d at 158. K.M. devoted a substantial part of her brief to the assertion that the evidence fails to satisfy the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt standard for termination of parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) and § 43-1505(6). As noted, however, termination of parental rights under the Nebraska Juvenile Code requires evidence which is clear and convincing. In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987); In re Interest of T.C., 226 Neb. 116, 409 N.W.2d 607 (1987). Since we have concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act is inapplicable, the appropriate evidential standard to terminate parental rights under the Nebraska Juvenile Code is evidence which is clear and convincing. It is unnecessary to reiterate each salient item of evidence produced in the juvenile court. Suffice it to say that, from our de novo review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is clear and convincing that K.M. abandoned her children for a period of 6 months before the State filed its petition or motion for termination of K.M.'s parental rights, and the evidence is clear and convincing that K.M. failed to comply with the court-ordered rehabilitative program for K.M. The State has evidentially established that the best interests of K.M.'s children require termination of K.M.'s parental rights in her children. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of K.M.