Opinion ID: 2339363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Identified Ambiguity

Text: I further dissent because I do not think the record reveals ambiguity as to the district court's understanding of the scope of its sentencing discretion. As the sentencing transcript cited by the majority reveals, the district court frequentlyand correctlystated that the Sentencing Guidelines put Preacely in Category VI because he qualified as a career offender. See Majority Op., ante at [80] (quoting Sentencing Tr. at 11-12). The majority expresses concern that such repeated emphasis on Preacely's status as a Category VI career offender signals that the sentencing judge may not have understood that he could make a so-called `horizontal departure' from the Career Offender Guideline and adopt a lower criminal history category. Id. at [80]. It questions whether the district court understood that the Career Offender Guideline was not mandatory. Id. at [81]. I do not share these concerns. The district court manifested an understanding of its complete discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines when it stated I'm empowered to go to nothing, i.e., to impose even a non-incarceratory sentence. Sentencing Tr. at 12. The majority construes this statement to show only that the judge understood his authority to depart from the statutory minimum pursuant to the government's 5K1.1 motion. Majority Op., ante at [81]. In support, it notes that the judgment of conviction references only § 5K1.1 as the basis for departure. See id. I am not convinced. Well before Booker, it was understood that a government motion for departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 and, in the case of a mandatory minimum, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), restored full sentencing discretion to the district court, freeing it from both the Sentencing Guidelines and any statutory minimum. In a case where such a motion is made, it thus makes sense for a district court to reference one or both of these sections in the judgment as the basis for imposing a non-Guidelines sentence, without citing other grounds that may also have afforded a measure of departure discretion. More to the point of this dissent, however, only a few sentences after referencing its discretion to impose a non-incarceratory sentence, the district court conclusively demonstrated awareness that it was not bound to adhere to the Career Offender Guideline by stating that it had cut the guideline range from a Category VI. Sentencing Tr. at 12. I am hard pressed to locate any ambiguity in the district court's understanding of the scope of its sentencing discretion when the court thus states that it has granted a departure from the Criminal History Category dictated by the Career Offender Guideline and knows that its departure discretion is so complete that it could impose even a non-incarceratory sentence. [3] Viewed in this context, district court statements cited by the majority, such as I may not ignore his prior record. I may not ignore the guidelines, Majority Op., ante at [81] (quoting Sentencing Tr. at 13); and I am dealing with a Category VI career offender, regardless of all of what you said, id. at [82] (quoting Sentencing Tr. at 12), are not reasonably construed to my mindto suggest that the district court misapprehended the scope of its departure discretion. As the majority itself acknowledges, district courts are not ... free to ignore the Career Offender Guideline, id. at [79], a conclusion that derives from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A). Indeed, precisely because the Guidelines are a § 3553(a) factor, district courts not only begin their [sentencing] analysis with the Guidelines, they appropriately remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 50 n. 6, 128 S.Ct. 586. Thus, I think the cited references to Category VI are reasonably understood simply as the district court's explanation, by reference to a § 3553(a) factor, for why it chose not to afford Preacely the greater sentencing departure that he requested, i.e., a sentence of time served (equivalent to approximately two years' imprisonment) with a period of supervised release that included six months' confinement in a halfway house. Where, as here, a district court acknowledges its discretion to impose even a non-incarceratory sentence, a reviewing court will generally not identify substantive, much less procedural, error in the district court decision to accord more weight to a particular Guideline than a defendant urges. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (holding that appellate court does not review weight assigned § 3553(a) factor except to determine if factor can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of the circumstances); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 59-60, 128 S.Ct. 586 (On abuse-of-discretion review, the Court of Appeals should have given due deference to the District Court's reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence.). It appears that the majority, nevertheless, identifies ambiguity as to the district court's understanding of its departure discretion from the court's failure to indicate what departure it was making from the Career Offender Criminal History Category of VI before proceeding to give defendant consideration for cooperation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Whatever the merits of such a sequential approach to Guidelines departures, I do not think it is a procedural prerequisite to a reasonable sentence. Gall v. United States instructs that district courts should ordinarily begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range, 552 U.S. at 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, but it does not require district courts to address Guidelines departures in any particular order, or even separately, much less to recalculate the Guidelines after each departure. [4] Indeed, after Booker, district courts are liberated from one of the more unfortunate aspects of Guidelines sentencing: the bazaar-like atmosphere of parties bargaining over the temporal value to assign discrete aggravating and mitigating factors, a process in which it is sometimes possible to lose sight of the larger question of what sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to address the statutory factors critical to just federal sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). To the extent Judge Lynch expresses concern that the district court may not have satisfied its § 3553(a) obligations based on apparent failure to consider ... evidence of Preacely's reform, Concurring Op., ante at [86], I respectfully disagree. As the particulars of Preacely's reform were highlighted by defense counsel in thoughtful and detailed written and oral presentations, I do not think we have any basis for thinking that the district court inadvertently overlooked such evidence. See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) ([W]e do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made.); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 30 ([W]e will not conclude that a district judge shirked her obligation to consider the § 3553(a) factors simply because she did not discuss each one individually or did not expressly parse or address every argument relating to those factors that the defendant advanced.). Nor is there any reason to think that the district court, which specifically stated that it had considered all § 3553(a) factors, thought about this sentence a lot, Sentencing Tr. at 15, and cut the guideline range from a Category VI, id. at 12, deliberately ignored the reformation evidence that provided the strongest support for such a cut. In fact, the district court's consideration of Preacely's evidence of reform is demonstrated by its very first statement after the parties' sentencing presentations, when it observed, Well, there is no question that he has done a lot to improve his situation. Id. at 11; see generally United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that no specific verbal formulations should be prescribed to demonstrate the adequate discharge of the duty to `consider' matters relevant to sentencing). This reinforces my view that the record does not indicate the district court's failure to consider reformation evidence or possible misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion, but only its assignment of less weight to mitigating evidence than the defendant, and possibly my colleagues in the majority, might wish. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 59-60, 128 S.Ct. 586; United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189; accord United States v. Mazza-Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 214 (2d Cir.2010) (Because the district court has a particular advantage in assessing the evidence and the defendant, we accord it considerable deference in assigning weight to relevant sentencing factors.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 583,178 L.Ed.2d 425 (2010). In this respect, it is worth noting that a departure from Criminal History Category VI to Category V would have yielded a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months, well above the 94-month sentence imposed. [5] The majority elides this point by hypothesizing that if the district court had properly understood its discretion to depart from the Career Offender Guideline, it might have used a Criminal History Category of V, an offense level of 23, and a resulting Guidelines range of 84 to 105 monthsPreacely's Guidelines range without the career offender enhancementas the starting point for awarding § 5K1.1 consideration. See Majority Op., ante at [82]. The hypothesis raises several concerns in my mind. First, it implies that the district court may have misapprehended its authority to depart from the Career Offender Guideline with respect to offense level as well as criminal history. The possibility of such a procedural error confronts a significant hurdle: the district court undoubtedly departed from the career offender offense level of 31 because, even at Criminal History Category I, offense level 31 provides for a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months, which is higher than the 94-month sentence Preacely received. Thus, I can only assume that, here too, the majority questions the district court's awareness that it could depart from the career offender offense level before it afforded Preacely § 5K1.1 consideration for cooperation. I have already explained why I do not think the district court was required to consider departures in a particular order, especially where, as in this case, the district court acknowledged departure authority broad enough to permit it to impose a non-incarceratory sentence. But I identify a further concern with the majority's hypothesis: it too quickly assumes that a departure from the Career Offender Guideline would necessarily have reduced both Preacely's criminal history and offense level to their original calculations. That is not apparent to me. Some grounds for departuresuch as reformationmight support consideration along the criminal history axis without necessarily supporting a reduction in the enhanced offense level. Other factorssuch as cooperationmight support departure from the offense level without necessarily supporting a departure from the enhanced criminal history. On the record before us, I identify no basis to think that, had the district court only understood the full scope of its sentencing discretion, it might well have reduced Preacely's offense level to 23 even before assessing his cooperation. Indeed, the majority does not incorporate this hypothesis into its conclusion. It directs the district court on remand to consider only whether Category VI over-represents defendant's criminal history and risk of recidivism, without any direction to reconsider Preacely's career offender offense level before affording § 5K1.1 consideration. See Majority Op., ante at [82]. [6] Like my colleagues, I recognize that Preacely received a severe sentence despite his significant cooperation and efforts at reformation. I also recognize that other judges might have accorded these factors greater weight in mitigating the seriousness of Preacely's crime and his risk of recidivism. What I do not recognize is any basis in the record for thinking that the balance struck by the district court is infected by procedural error, specifically, by possible misapprehension as to the court's authority to depart from the Career Offender Guideline. Thus, while I see no reason to remand even for clarification, I specifically dissent from the majority's decision to vacate and to order resentencing.