Opinion ID: 184033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the requirement for consultation

Text: In reviewing DOE's actions, we are guided by the standard of review established by Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and its progeny. The Court's seminal statement is: When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (footnotes omitted). The Court, however, also noted that [t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent, and that [i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect. Id. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Both prongs of the Chevron standard are in play in this case. On the one hand, Congress clearly directed DOE to engage in consultation with affected States. On the other hand, it did not explicitly define consultation. DOE urges that accordingly, Congress's intent is not clear and that the highly deferential standard of review for agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act applies. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. [6] We have recognized that this standard is highly deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid and that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2007). We therefore will affirm[] the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision. Id. Our task is simply to ensure that the agency considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Congress could hardly have been more explicit in directing DOE to consult with affected States. Section 824p(a)(1) specifically directs DOE to conduct a study of electric transmission congestion in consultation with affected States. Furthermore, § 824p(a)(2) directs DOE to issue a report which may designate National Interest corridors, [a]fter considering alternatives and recommendations from interested parties (including an opportunity for comment from affected States). Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning. ... Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). This is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. See also United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984) (We do not, however, construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.). Here, § 824's direction to the DOE to undertake the Consultation Study in consultation with affected States in context clearly means that DOE should have greater interaction with the States in preparing the Congestion Study than it need have when preparing a NIETC report, when it need only provide an opportunity for comment from affected States. Indeed, DOE does not really deny that it was required to consult with affected States. See 72 Fed.Reg. at 25,838 (stating that FPA section 216(a)(1) requires the Secretary to consult with `affected States'); 72 Fed.Reg. at 56,993 (stating that FPA section 216(a)(1) states that the Department shall conduct the congestion study in consultation with affected States). Accordingly, the issue is whether DOE, while undertaking the Congestion Study, consulted with the affected States as mandated by Congress. This inquiry requires that we review DOE's efforts to involve the affected States in the preparation of the Congestion Study and then evaluate whether those efforts amount, as DOE contends, to consultation. Finally, if we determine that DOE's actions did not amount to consultation, we must determine whether any such shortcoming constitutes harmless error.