Opinion ID: 2209082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: The defendant is a worthwhile individual and can be rehabilitated

Text: These factors are discussed together as they are fundamentally related. 1. The Court does not discount that the defendant is worthwhile as a human being. At his age there are prospects for rehabilitation. 2. However, it is difficult to assess a defendant's attitude and his likelihood of repeating his violent acting out, when a defendant persists in denying crime when the evidence shows that he committed the crime. 3. In psychological terms, he is an antisocial, impulsive type personality. Experience has shown the Court that this type of personality is difficult to change and to guide. 4. His pattern in the killing; his pattern in this case is strongly indicative that he will do what is necessary to avoid a difficult situation, whatever the costs to others. His comment to the probation officer, I don't like these charges. I think it was an unfair jury. I'm going to do whatever I can to get out of it, is perhaps indicative of his approach to a difficult situation. As in this case wherein he acted disproportionately to the risk and possible inconvenience to himself to avoid submission to the law, the indication is he will do what is necessary when threatened. 5. He personally has given the Court little. His demonstration of remorse or contriteness or straightforwardness to dispel a feeling that if a similar situation such as that in this case arose, he would necessarily act out in a different manner has been limited. 6. He has avoided in the sentencing phase a detailed account of his version of the incident so that the Court might have a basis to test his version against what otherwise is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Even if he persisted in his position that the co-defendant did it, the defendant could have recounted his version in some detail. The fact that he avoided doing so further supports a conclusion that his position is not supportable and would not stand up if effort were made to present it in detail. 7. The unwillingness of the defendant to be as open as possible with the Court, in light of a senseless killing, limits the Court's ability to indulge in a presumption that one so young would not repeat. And it certainly deprives the Court of a humane and feeling response to form a basis for a more merciful determination in light of such a tragic result in the total context of the case. If there was ever a need to open up, to be honest, and let everything out, this was it. And it did not happen.
Under the law, Snyder could not have received the death penalty in all probability, being the non-trigger man, so to speak, nor would the evidence indicate that he encouraged or induced the killing. Without going into greater detail, in all probability the facts as disclosed by the evidence would well have led to Snyder's conviction of that which he pled to and certainly there is sufficient probability to have allowed room for the Prosecutor to have made the judgment that the Prosecutor made with regard to Snyder. Because of this, the fact that the co-defendant received different treatment is not a mitigating factor. J. Finally, the Court finds that other possible mitigating factors specifically mentioned in the applicable statute ( I.C. XX-XX-X-X ) although not contended by the defendant to be present in this case, are not established by the evidence:

4. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was not substantially impaired as a result of mental disease, or defect, or intoxication.
The Court finds: A. The aggravating factor  the of the murder of a law enforcement officer, is deserving of special weight in the context here not only because of the vulnerability of law enforcement officers who are, without question, the front line of defense in the community in protecting against crime and violence; and also because an attack on such an officer, as a representative of the community, is a more direct attack on members of the community than other killings, and because, too, the law enforcement officer is a symbol of authority and order. 1. One who is able to attack such an officer  a representative of the authority of the community  represents a different level of violent acting out than do many others. Even one ordinarily bent on combatingness in other confrontations will ordinarily submit to the authority of the community and the law. B. The aggravating factor is especially aggravated, too, in the particular factual situation in this case. Perhaps it is the incident which would appear least threatening to an officer which increases an officer's vulnerability. This case is an example. The officer may have recognized the defendant (Hi there, I'm Billy Spranger, you know me) or the appearance of vandalism, serious but not very serious on a comparative basis, or the combination in all probability caused the Marshal to lower his guard, turn his back, and his death followed. C. The senselessness of the killing already eluded [sic] to makes the aggravating factor here especially aggravating. D. In addition, the whole pattern of conduct of the defendant on the night in question indicated an attitude of total disrespect and lack of caring for property (the Mustang incident, not only items stolen from the Mustang but actually apparently an intent to destroy it so that no one could get any benefit from it, for no reason other than to be destructive) and, of course, a total disrespect for the person of the victim in this cause. The possible mitigating factors which have been discussed in detail when, in context, are weighed against the aggravating factor, in context, causes the Court to find and conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor outweighs the possible mitigating factors. (The use of beyond a reasonable doubt is to indicate an expression of certainty, although the Court does not believe in this weighing and judgmental process that this is an appropriate test).

1. The United States Supreme Court appears to have created by decisions in the last several years a framework in which the states are permitted to establish their own standards as to employment of the death penalty provided the aggravating circumstances required at a minimum are reasonably prescribed and sufficiently proscribed; and provided that a state is consistent in similar factual situations in employing or not employing the death penalty; and further provided legal procedures are adopted to assure a studied approach wherein all possible mitigating factors are considered rather than an arbitrary, capricious and emotional approach to the imposition of the death penalty. In recent cases, the Indiana Supreme Court had decided that age, as young or younger than this defendant, of lack of prior record will not deter the death penalty if otherwise the act and the particular circumstances of the case are serious enough. 2. In part the proportionate-disproportionate determination rests upon the judgment of whether the deliberate and senseless killing of a law enforcement officer in the line of duty under the circumstances of this case is of sufficient degree to put it on a par with other killings perhaps more heinous in the manner in which the act of killing itself is carried out  multiple stabbings for example as in a recent case in which the death penalty was imposed and upheld. This Court places the act in the context of this case on that plane and finds it to be sufficient to support the death penalty. The Indiana Supreme Court will, of course, make the ultimate decision in this regard; and is in a better position actually to survey all that has passed before it than is the trial court. 3. The determination to be made here focuses, as do all death penalty cases, but perhaps this one more than many, upon the conflict which necessarily exists in this area: (a) On one hand is the importance we place on individual life and particularly young life and our recognition of the frailty of homan [sic] nature  there is absolutely no question we are all more deficient than we care to admit and the difference between the best and worst of us, however measured in human terms, is miniscule when measured on any absolute scale. Recognition, too, must be given that however impoverished is our human character, each of us can change, if by no other means, than at least by religious conversion. Rehabilitation can never be totally discounted. (b) But, on the other hand, in this area is the importance of the protection of society by deterrance of acts of violence not only directly on the basis that if death comes to some through the system others will be convinced not to commit similar acts (and the debate goes on as to the full extent of the deterrent effect); but also less directly, but perhaps more effectively, as a means of expression of the repulsion of the community at large by acts of violence, and a part of the tightening of the fabric of society and a reflection of the increasing demand that senseless violence must cease. And, too, from a societal protection standpoint, if outrage and utter exasperation exists with regard to senseless violence  which it does  is the increased importance of a system which is responsive, both actually and by appearance, to calm fear and to reveal a viable and generally accepted alternative to self help. 4. I do not believe anyone is fully capable of making this kind of life-death; individual-societal choice presented in a case of this nature. For one thing, the choice is never black and white. For example, no matter what might be said about society's protection by use of the death penalty, it is important to society that neither the community nor the system be so rigid, so hard, so inflexible that appropriate compassion and attention to the human condition is eliminated. If it is, the quality of life in the society is depreciated and the community ultimately suffers. 5. In making the final determination here, the Court has looked at all we have commented on and has looked carefully, as the Court told the jury in this case it would; at the jury's recommendation. The Court receives this case in a slightly different posture than did the jury. The applicable statute requires that the Court among all other factors consider the jury's recommendation. A. In evaluating the jury's recommendation, the Court first looked at the membership and the make up of the jury. The process of jury selection was slow, painstaking, and careful. This was not a death-oriented jury. In fact, in the opinion of the Court, this jury was disinclined generally toward death.
C. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that juries can be a reliable index of contemporary values as they relate to the employment of the death penalty generally and the Court believes a proper jury in a particular case can be a reliable index of those values in a given factual situation. The jury in this case has determined that this senseless killing of a law enforcement officer under all the facts and circumstances of this case warrants the death penalty. 6. In final analysis, with all other considerations mentioned, the Court is persuaded by the jury's recommendation and accepts it. It is the Court's recommendation as well. Therefore, based on all the foregoing, it has been adjudged that the defendant suffer the death penalty in the manner provided by law.