Opinion ID: 1189073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Even If the Right to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Statutes Apply, Did the Trial Court Miscalculate the Judgment?

Text: Lastly, the appellants argue that even if the Right to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors statutes apply, the court has misinterpreted its meaning in calculating its judgment. Essentially, it is appellant's contention that the court should have employed a pro-rata share of fault calculation to reduce the verdict in consideration of the settlements instead of reducing the verdict by the dollars paid by each settler. The proper way to reduce a plaintiff's verdict in consideration of a settling tortfeasor's payment is directed by § 1-1-113(a)(i). A release    reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater   . The question, then, is whether the parties to the settlements in the case at bar contemplated that the consideration for the release was the dollar amount recited in the settling instruments  or was it something else. The appellant argues that the court reduced the verdict by the dollar amount (i.e., the consideration) stipulated by the releases when it should have reduced the verdict by the total percentage of all except Kirby's and Centric's combined fault, since this would be the amount that is greater. Section § 1-1-113(a)(i). The quick and definitive answer to this assertion is that § 1-1-113(a)(i) does not provide for a percentage-of-fault reduction. In fact, the very interpretation of the present statute which Kirby urges was formerly the statutory law of Wyoming, but these statutes have been amended in order to eliminate the pro-rata concept. The original Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors statutes, § 1-7.3 to 1-7.6, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., provided in pertinent part: § 1-7.5. Same; effect of release of one tort-feasor; discharge.  A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if such amount or proportion is greater than the consideration paid. § 1-7.6. Same; release of one tort-feasor; contribution.  (a) A release of one tort-feasor by the injured person relieves that tort-feasor from liability to make contribution to a joint tort-feasor only if: (i) That release is given before the right of the other tort-feasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued; and (ii) The release provides for a reduction to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tort-feasor of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other tort-feasors; and (iii) The issue of proportionate fault is litigated between joint tort-feasors in the same action. Thus, the old statutes contemplated (1) that a release given to a settling tortfeasor reduces the claim against other tortfeasors in either the amount or proportion by which the release provides or the amount or proportion of the consideration paid; (2) that the right of contribution is extinguished in favor of the settling tortfeasor only if the release provided for a reduction of the injured person's damages recoverable against all other tortfeasors to the extent of the pro-rata share of the released tortfeasor. In the Comment, Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, supra, authored in 1974, this prior statute is criticized as follows: The effect of the pro rata reduction clause on the plaintiff's willingness to settle may thus be a profound one. It is quite understandable that a plaintiff would be hesitant to execute a settlement with a pro rata reduction clause if he knows that the reduction of his damages will depend not on his estimation of the settling tortfeasor's negligence, but rather on a later determination of his relative degree of fault by a jury. If he underestimates the fault of the settling tortfeasor, he may well recover less by having settled than if he had permitted the case against both defendants to proceed to trial. It is not likely either that a plaintiff will persuade a settling tortfeasor to execute a release without a pro rata reduction clause, because without it, the settling tortfeasor is liable for future contribution claims from tortfeasors brought to judgment to the same extent as if he had never made the settlement. The inevitable but unfortunate result under these two provisions of the new contribution statute will be fewer settlements in multiple defendant cases. The likelihood that neither party will settle the claim involved under the pro rata reduction clause and relative degree of fault provision was a major factor in the decision of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to withdraw the 1939 act for complete revision. A reconsideration of the pro rata reduction clause led the draftsmen of the 1955 act to conclude that it had accomplished nothing in preventing collusion, which was its original purpose, and they proceeded to abolish it, on the assumption that `[i]t seems more important not to discourage settlements than to make an attempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimination by plaintiffs, or collusion in the suit.' Accordingly, the 1955 act went the whole length, and now provides that a good faith release discharges the tortfeasor outright from all liability for contribution. In 1973, the legislature repealed the pro-rata reduction feature when it enacted § 1-1-113. Thus, the appellant Kirby argues for a statutory interpretation of what the statute used to be  not what it is or was when this cause of action arose or when this case was tried. We agree with appellee that Kirby's contention that the covenant not to sue executed by Union and Drake contemplated a pro-rata consideration is spurious. The covenant not to sue is controlled by § 1-1-113, and it reduces the claim against the others [tortfeasors] to the extent of $250,000, the amount stipulated by the release or the covenant. Section 1-1-113(a)(i). The record contains no evidence that a greater amount of consideration was paid by Drake than the $250,000, nor does the record indicate that the other settling tortfeasors paid or intended to expend any other than the dollar-figure consideration indicated by their settling documents. Lastly, the settling instruments of all settling tortfeasors clearly reveal that it was the dollar amount that the settlers paid for their releases under § 1-1-113, and these sums were, therefore, properly subtracted from the verdict in calculating the judgment. We find that other contentions of Kirby are peripheral to those heretofore considered, and  except as discussed above  warrant no further consideration. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.