Opinion ID: 215369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miller's Liberty Interest in Early Eligibility for a Parole Hearing

Text: We first address whether Miller has a liberty interest in becoming parole-eligible early, that is, before the expiration of the minimum term of his sentence. The Constitution does not, itself, guarantee a liberty interest in parole, but a state's substantive parole scheme may create one that is enforceable under the Due Process Clause. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12, 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (Due Process Clause applies to discretionary parole-release determinations made by the Nebraska Board of Parole); Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 370-71, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (Montana parole scheme created a federally protected liberty interest in parole). Our en banc court recently reiterated this principle in Hayward: If there is any right to release on parole, or to release in the absence of some evidence of future dangerousness, it has to arise from substantive state law creating a right to release. 603 F.3d at 555. A state parole statute establishes a protected liberty interest in parole when it uses language that creates a presumption that the prisoner will be paroled if certain conditions are satisfied. The Nebraska parole statute in Greenholtz provided: Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because [one of four enumerated factors exists]. 442 U.S. at 11, 99 S.Ct. 2100. The Supreme Court reasoned that this language created an expectancy of release that was entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. Id. at 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100. Allen involved a Montana parole statute similar to Nebraska's: [T]he board shall release on parole ... any person confined in the Montana state prison or the women's correction center ... when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community[.] 482 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. 2415. The Court held that this statute gave rise to a protected liberty interest in parole release because, like the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz, it uses mandatory language (`shall') to `creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted' when the designated findings are made. Id. at 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415 (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100). In addition, the Court reject[ed] the argument that a statute that mandates release `unless' certain findings are made is different from a statute that mandates relief `if,' `when,' or `subject to' such findings being made. Any such statute creates a presumption that parole release will be granted. Id. at 378, 107 S.Ct. 2415 (quotations omitted). In McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.2002), we had to decide whether California's parole scheme created a liberty interest in parole, and we drew heavily on Greenholtz and Allen. The parole statute at issue read: The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed.... Cal.Penal Code § 3041(b). We determined that this statute paralleled the Nebraska and Montana parole statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen, respectively. We explained that the California statute created a presumption that parole would be granted unless statutorily defined determinations are made, and we held it therefore gave rise to a liberty interest in parole that is federally protected by the Due Process Clause. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901. See also Pearson v. Muntz, 639 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir.2011) (observing that the Supreme Court did not disturb our precedent that `California law creates a liberty interest in parole.' (quoting Cooke, 131 S.Ct. at 861)). Here, Oregon argues that the language of its murder review statute distinguishes it from the statutes in Greenholtz, Allen, and McQuillion and does not create a liberty interest in early parole eligibility. Those statutes mandate that parole boards shall parole a prisoner unless they have reasons not to ( Greenholtz and McQuillion ) or, in the affirmative, when they believe the prisoner can be trusted to be law-abiding ( Allen ). By contrast, Oregon's statute places the burden on the prisoner to show that he or she is capable of rehabilitation. If the prisoner does not meet this burden, the statute explains, the board shall deny the relief sought in the petition. Or.Rev.Stat. § 163.105(4) (1981). In the State's view, placing the burden of proof on the prisoneralong with the explicit command to deny the relief if the burden is not metremoves any presumption that a prisoner will be granted early eligibility for a parole hearing and therefore negates any liberty interest in obtaining that eligibility. We disagree. Whatever differences exist between requiring a parole board to provide reasons for not granting parole and requiring the prisoner to provide reasons why he or she should be paroled, we do not believe they control whether the statute confers a liberty interest. The parole statutes in Greenholtz, Allen, and McQuillion each provided that a prisoner should be paroled if certain evidentiary conditions were satisfied; similarly, the Oregon murder review statute provides for early eligibility for a parole hearing if a prisoner shows a likelihood of being rehabilitated within a reasonable amount of time. We do not read Greenholtz, Allen, and McQuillion to require that the evidentiary burden must be on the state to show that a prisoner is not entitled to parole rather than on the prisoner to show that he or she is in order for a liberty interest in early parole eligibility to arise. We therefore conclude that the language of Oregon's murder review statute creates a presumption in favor of early eligibility for a parole hearing when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901 (internal quotation marks omitted).