Opinion ID: 2276112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: EED as an element of first-degree manslaughter.

Text: Appellant asserts error in the trial court's failure to include the presence of EED as an element of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. We note at the outset that the murder instructions properly included the absence of EED as an element of that offense. KRS 507.020(1)(a) provides, inter alia: (1) A person is guilty of murder when: (a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance .... (Emphasis added.) Appellant premises his argument on the following language in KRS 507.030(1): (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: ... (b) With the intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in subsection (1)(a) of KRS 507.020. (Emphasis added.) Appellant's reliance on Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 243 (1996), is misplaced. Haight only held that giving an instruction that included the presence of EED as an element of manslaughter in the first degree was harmless at worst, because the jurors found the absence of EED beyond a reasonable doubt when they convicted the defendant of murder. Id. at 248. In Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817 (1997), we held that it was error to require the Commonwealth to prove the presence of extreme emotional disturbance as an element of the offense of manslaughter in the first degree. The inclusion of this additional element required the Commonwealth to prove the absence of extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction of murder ... and to prove the presence of extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction of first-degree manslaughter. Theoretically, the jury could have found by a preponderance of evidence, but not beyond a reasonable doubt, that Baze was or was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. If so, the jury would have been required to acquit Baze of both charges. Id. at 823 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court's instructions on manslaughter in the first degree correctly stated the law.