Opinion ID: 1655639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the circuit court erred in entering judgments against aussenberg and craig for corporate funds paid to them as attorney's fees.

Text: ¶ 74. I concur with the majority that the circuit court erred and Wittjen is precluded from recovering these corporate funds from Aussenberg and Craig. I concur with the majority's reasoning as to this preclusion on the basis that Wittjen should have filed suit against Aussenberg and Craig on behalf of QPI or sought to have included them as parties to this action. However, Wittjen did not comply with the above actions. For these reasons as well as the provisions stated in the bankruptcy dismissal, I concur with the majority as to the above reasoning on this issue. The trial court did err by the judgments against Aussenberg and Craig. ¶ 75. The majority correctly states in its footnote one that, technically the claim for corporate funds unlawfully expended would belong to QPI. However, all remaining claims of QPI were assigned to Wittjen by the bankruptcy court. The majority fails to point out, when it cites to this bankruptcy dismissal document in the record, that Wittjen dismissed all his claims against QPI. Since Wittjen has dismissed his claims against QPI, he cannot now assert his claims for a return of the corporate funds paid to Aussenberg and Craig. ¶ 76. In addition, in its order dated July 7, 1998, the circuit court stated that upon review of the bankruptcy dismissal, only two claims remained in the case. One of these claims was the counterclaim of Jackson Wittjen against Bill Wyssbrod to recover corporate funds expended by Bill Wyssbrod for his personal use. Wittjen did not specifically request attorney's fees in the counter complaint he filed to the Third Amended Complaint prior to the bankruptcy dismissal. This counter complaint is dated July 25, 1996, and there are no subsequent counter complaints filed by Wittjen in the record. Although Wittjen asked for the dissolution of QPI in this counter complaint, he did not specifically request reimbursement of corporate funds used to pay attorney's fees. Therefore, Wittjen is now barred from raising this claim. ¶ 77. In Fulgham v. Snell, 548 So.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Miss.1989), the appellant was found to have forfeited his claims because the claims were considered compulsory, and they had not been raised in the appellant's counterclaim. In deciding whether a case arose from the same transaction or occurrence on which a previous action was based, and therefore, whether the claim should have been pled in a counter complaint, the court used a combination of four factors, which are: (1) Whether the same evidence or witnesses are relevant to both claims; (2) Whether the issues of law and fact in the counterclaim are largely the same as those in the plaintiff's claim; (3) Whether, if the counterclaim were asserted in a later lawsuit, it would be barred by res judicata; (4) Whether or not both claims are based on a common nucleus of operative facts. ¶ 78. In this case, Wittjen's claims for attorney's fees should have been included in the counter complaint he filed. Since Wyssbrod was the only other remaining stockholder of QPI, it is not so unforeseeable that Wyssbrod would use corporate funds to pay for attorney's fees, especially since he filed suit in his individual name, but also in the name of the corporation, QPI. If Wittjen wanted to recover these fees, he should have requested them in his counter complaint. For the above reasons, I concur as to the issue of corporate funds and would reverse the ruling of the circuit court. As to the issues of contempt sanctions and sanctions for attorney's fees against Aussenberg, I dissent from the majority opinion. I would also reverse the circuit court on these two issues, finding Aussenberg free from sanctions in this case. PITTMAN, C.J., joins this opinion.