Opinion ID: 1399686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the district court committed reversible error in admitting certain hearsay statements.

Text: Two Elk next asserts that the district court deprived him of a fair trial by admitting four hearsay statements. Specifically, he objects to Agent Mackey's testimony alluding to a statement Francine made regarding the time period when the twins went unattended, FBI Special Agent Oscar Ramirez's reiteration at trial of a statement made by Ben Sr., and statements made by Agent Kenser and Agent Mackey regarding Two Elk's confession. The government retorts that each is not hearsay at all, citing Eighth Circuit cases holding that statements offered to elucidate the reasons for a police investigation are not hearsay. Alternatively, the government asserts that the substance of each of the purported hearsay statements was cumulative and, thus, any error was harmless. We discern no reversible error in this regard.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, giving due deference to the district judge who saw and heard the evidence. United States v. Davidson, 449 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Love, 521 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.2008) (reviewing district court's decision on hearsay matter for abuse of discretion). A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). This court reviews for plain error an admission of evidence to which the defendant did not object below. United States v. Sharpfish, 408 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2005). This court is not bound by the grounds on which the district court admitted the evidence because it may affirm a district court's judgment on any basis supported by the record. Bercier, 506 F.3d at 629-30 (quotation omitted). In addition, [a] non-constitutional error admitting hearsay testimony `that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.' Id. at 632 (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)). Under Rule 52's harmless-error standard, the reviewing court must consider the entire record to ensure that the error did not influence or had only a very slight influence on the verdict. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 140 (8th Cir.1991)). If the trial court properly admitted other evidence covering the same ground as the erroneously admitted evidence, this court has often held the error harmless because the evidence is cumulative. See id.
Rule 801 defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible absent a Federal Rule of Evidence exception or other exception established by the Supreme Court. Fed.R.Evid. 802.
First, Two Elk objects to the court's ruling during the following colloquy: Q [Prosecutor]: Well, did Francine Murphy advise you as toin the interview when the children were not with her? MS. MINER [Defense Counsel]: Objection. Hearsay. THE COURT: Overruled. Calls for a yes or no answer. A [Agent Mackey]: Yes. Q [Prosecutor]: And she testified to that earlier today in this courtroom? A [Agent Mackey]: Yes. In his briefs, Two Elk never specifies which of the answers listed above he regards as hearsay. Instead, he complains that FBI Agent Mackey repeated a statement by [A.R.'s] caretaker, Francine, that between Saturday, October 15, 2005, and Wednesday, October 19, 2005, [A.R.] was out of Francine's sight only once early on Sunday morning, October 16. Had Agent Mackey actually repeated such a statement, there would be a potential hearsay problem. But, the court did not admit any hearsay in the colloquy quoted above. Neither of the prosecutor's questions called for a response that would include hearsay. The first simply elicited Agent Mackey's recollection of whether Francine had told him something (without straying onto hearsay grounds by asking what exactly she told him). The second elicited Agent Mackey's direct recollection of what Francine had said in her testimony that very day. Neither included a statement by an out-of-court declarant and neither offered such a statement for its truth. The district court did not err in admitting this testimony.
Second, Two Elk argues that the court improperly admitted Agent Ramirez's reiteration of Ben Sr.'s assertion that he had not assaulted A.R. More particularly, the prosecutor asked Agent Ramirez, And what was [Ben Sr.'s] response when you asked him about his involvement with the A.R. matter? After the defense counsel objected and the judge overruled the objection, Agent Ramirez answered, He denied doing it and mentioned that he was in jail during the time that it could have happened. The government argues (1) that the statement is not hearsay under United States v. Malik, 345 F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir.2003), and (2) that, regardless, any error was harmless because the testimony was cumulative. The Malik court held that a statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted if it elucidates the reasons for or propriety of a police investigation. 345 F.3d at 1001; see also Suggs v. Stanley, 324 F.3d 672, 681-82 (8th Cir.2003) (upholding admission of officer's statement about what dispatcher told him because it was offered to show why officer went to a specific house); United States v. King, 36 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 1994). In this regard, the government ventures that the FBI investigators decided not to investigate Ben Sr. thoroughly because he denied assaulting A.R. Thus, the government claims it offered the statement to explain why the government turned its investigatory eye elsewhere, not for the truth of the matter asserted. The government's argument stretches Malik too far. First, Agent Ramirez was not involved in the A.R. assault investigation. Rather, he was tasked with investigating the alleged inappropriate touching of an 11-year-old female at the school at which Ben Sr. worked. Second, it seems implausible that the FBI investigators would simply accept a suspect's denial of liability and turn their attention elsewhere. In this regard, the statement is a fairly flimsy rationale for the FBI's investigative steps and it is exceedingly unlikely that it was offered for this purpose. Moreover, in Malik, the court noted that the trial court had instructed the jury to consider the evidence only as an elucidation of the officers' reasons for stopping the defendant, after the defendant introduced evidence suggesting that the officers planted a gun on the defendant. See Malik, 345 F.3d at 1002. Here, there was no such limiting instruction, nor was any defense tendered in this case dependent upon the motives of the officers in investigating Two Elk. Cf. King, 36 F.3d at 732 (noting court's concern[] that the jury's use of [the non-hearsay testimony] was not appropriately limited by an instruction from the court ...). With no other plausible justification for admitting the statement, the court erred as a matter of law and thereby abused its discretion. Thus, we must address the prejudicial effect of the hearsay. Two Elk's theory at trial was that A.R.'s injuries occurred after he moved out and that Ben Sr. was a prime potential suspect whom the FBI all but ignored. As such, Ben Sr.'s denial of culpability arguably could have had an effect on the jury, especially when repeated by an FBI Agent. Yet Ben Sr.'s denial was intertwined with his statement that he was in jail at the time the assault occurred. And the jury heard that Ben Sr. was incarcerated until Sunday at 6 p.m. or so on multiple occasions prior to Agent Ramirez's testimony. Indeed, Two Elk's defense clamored throughout the trial that A.R.'s injuries might well have occurred after Ben Sr. returned home. No juror would have been surprised to learn that a potential suspect denied the conduct in question, no juror would have been likely to accept such a denial without skepticism, and no juror would have been shocked to learn that Ben Sr. was in jail until Sunday evening. Additionally, as detailed above, the prosecution's strong case against Two Elk, stood on the shoulders of Two Elk's own recorded confession. Thus, we do not believe the court's erroneous evidentiary ruling influenced the verdict.