Opinion ID: 525636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Trial Detainees and Clearly Established Law

Text: 16 Pre-trial detainees are those individuals who the government has probable cause to believe have committed crimes. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). They are confined pending trial, either because there is cause to believe that they are dangerous or because they cannot afford to make bail. Unlike convicted prisoners, the state has no right to punish them. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1871-72, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Their confinement conditions are analyzed under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment standard which is used for convicted prisoners. Id. The injuries detainees suffer must be necessarily incident to administrative interests in safety, security and efficiency. Constitutionally infirm practices are those that are punitive in intent, those that are not rationally related to a legitimate purpose or those that are rationally related but are excessive in light of their purpose. Id. at 538, n. 20, 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74, n. 20. The length of a detainee's confinement must also be considered in assessing the institution's practices. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 555, n. 35, 99 S.Ct. at 1882, n. 35; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1035, 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir.1980). 17 This formulation of the law, however, can be too general when the issue is whether individual defendants should have known that their conduct was prohibited. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 638-641, 107 S.Ct. at 3038-39, 97 L.Ed.2d at 530-31. An examination of past cases regarding the same or similar practices is sometimes required. Boswell v. Sherburne County, 849 F.2d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir.1988) (some but not precise factual correspondence required), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 796, 102 L.Ed.2d 787 (1989); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988); Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883, 887 (7th Cir.1986); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1104 (3rd Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 3276, 97 L.Ed.2d 779 (1987). Prison condition litigation has become quite common in the last thirty years. The questions presented are usually similar, and frequently do not involve academic or otherwise inaccessible analysis. For this reason, we are less inclined to feel that the applicable law in this area is a mystery, even to laymen. Whether the law is clearly established depends on what would be apparent in each situation. Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate   . Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (emphasis added). 18 We therefore reject the per se rule advocated by the individual defendants. They argue that for the law to be clearly established, the specific acts of these officials must be particularly proscribed by decisions rendered by this Circuit or another court with direct jurisdiction over the institution. This rule would enable a jail official to claim immunity where several other circuit, district or state courts had condemned similar practices on the basis of the federal Constitution, so long as a Missouri court, or the district court for the Eastern District of Missouri or the Eighth Circuit had not yet done so. While the identity of a court and its geographical proximity may be relevant in determining whether a reasonable official would be aware of the law (as might the dissemination of information within the pertinent profession and the frequency of similar litigation), we do not think that the defendants' per se rule adequately captures what the Supreme Court has meant by its objective test for what is clearly established. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 535 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. at 2820 n. 12. 2 Because the defendants' reasoning does have some force, in deciding this appeal we have nevertheless been attentive to cases from within this circuit.