Opinion ID: 164183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effectively Unreviewable On Appeal From A Final Order

Text: 22 Finally, we must consider whether such disqualification orders are effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454. An order is effectively unreviewable on appeal where the order at issue involves `an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.' Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978)). 23 Applying this standard in most criminal litigation leads to the conclusion that the government cannot effectively vindicate its rights on appeal after a final judgment. If it loses at trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause will likely prohibit review. See, e.g., Montoya v. New Mexico, 55 F.3d 1496, 1498 (10th Cir.1995). If the government prevails at trial, it will generally lack standing as a prevailing party to appeal the decision. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Serv. Co., 985 F.2d 1419, 1424 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that it is the general rule that a party cannot appeal from a judgment in his favor). The government asks us to find that the same holds true in this case. 24 The government's argument, however, overlooks the fact that the current dispute does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. That clause provides three separate protections for criminal defendants: against prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, against prosecution for the same offense after a conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense. Montoya, 55 F.3d at 1498. Because the current action is not a true criminal proceeding, but merely a dispute over whether the government has honored its obligations under the plea agreement, this matter does not implicate any of the protections provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, the government's argument on this matter is unpersuasive. 25 Nevertheless, we find that an appeal following an adverse ruling on the merits would not effectively vindicate the alleged harm. On this point, the government argues that the true harm from disqualification is grounded in separation of powers. It points out that Congress has mandated that the United States Attorney for each district represent the government in all cases occurring within that district. See 28 U.S.C. § 547. Further, although not noted by the government, the Constitution grants the Executive the power to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Although caselaw is admittedly vague on the exact scope of this power, it is clear that this constitutional provision vests the Executive with substantial discretion in choosing when and how to prosecute cases. See, e.g., United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that the Constitution vests prosecutors with significant discretion in choosing when and how to prosecute); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.1965) (en banc) (It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.); Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena of Rochon, 873 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir.1989) (As a threshold matter, a court may not exercise any supervisory power [over the Executive] absent a clear basis in fact and law for doing so.... A federal court that imposes sanctions on executive conduct that is otherwise permitted by the Constitution, a federal statute or a rule will most likely be invading the executive sphere....) (internal quotations omitted). 26 Because the alleged injury is grounded in separation of powers, we find that appellate vindication would not effectively remedy the alleged harm. In doing so, we have fully considered the teachings of Flanagan, but find them inapposite. In Flanagan, the Supreme Court rejected interlocutory appellate review, in part, because it found that the defendant could obtain effective post-trial relief from the improper disqualification of his counsel because post-trial reinstatement of his counsel would remedy any injury he suffered. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 267-68, 104 S.Ct. 1051. 27 In this case, however, no posttrial relief exists that could remedy the alleged separation of powers injury that would be incurred through wrongful disqualification of the entire USA's office. The separation of powers doctrine, which acts as a safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), confers on each branch the ability ... to be vigorous in asserting its proper authority[,] Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J. concurring). The interests protected by the doctrine simply will not abate during the possibly lengthy resolution of this matter, and appellate vindication cannot undo such an invasion of Executive authority. Therefore, mindful of the fact that [l]iberty is always at stake when one or more branches seek to transgress the separation of powers[,] id., we conclude the USA's office may immediately appeal the disqualification order. 2