Opinion ID: 48260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecution's References to Salinas's Post-Arrest Silence

Text: 11 Salinas claims that the prosecution improperly made reference to his post-arrest silence at three points during its case-in-chief. First, during the prosecution's opening argument, the prosecutor stated, At no time, at no time, the evidence is going to show, that the defendant denied ownership of the money or guns. Defense counsel immediately objected to that remark. The court sustained the objection and reminded the jury that it was to render its verdict only on the basis of the evidence presented, not on the arguments of counsel. 12 Second, during the government's examination of Officer Fulcher, who arrested Salinas and who was with Salinas at the Carrollton police station when the firearms were discovered in the Yukon, the prosecutor asked Officer Fulcher how, if at all Salinas reacted when he heard that firearms had been found in the Yukon. Defense counsel objected before the witness could answer, and the court sustained the objection. 13 Third, later in its direct examination of Officer Fulcher, the prosecution asked Officer Fulcher whether Salinas made any statements after his arrest. Officer Fulcher answered, No, sir. Defense counsel again objected, and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel also requested that the jury be instructed to disregard the statement. The trial judge stated that he would not then instruct the jury, but would consider an instruction at a later time. Defense counsel apparently never reiterated his request for an instruction. In its charge to the jury, however, the court instructed the jury that the statements and arguments of the lawyers could not be considered as evidence and that the jury was to disregard any question to which the court had sustained an objection. 14 Salinas asserts that each of those statements was an improper comment on his post-arrest silence, in violation of his constitutional rights. The government maintains that the comments and questions were permissible. The government points out that Salinas did not receive the Miranda 1 warnings at the time of his arrest, 2 and it argues that the prosecution can permissibly refer to a defendant's pre- Miranda warning silence at trial. 15 Because Salinas did not properly preserve his claim of error regarding the prosecutor's comments on his post-arrest silence in the district court, we review this claim only for plain error. Although Salinas's counsel timely objected to each of the prosecutor's references to Salinas's post-arrest silence, the trial court sustained all of those objections, and the trial court's instructions to the jury made it clear that the jury was not to consider any of the challenged remarks. 3 Salinas's counsel never took exception to the district court's handling of his objections, and, significantly, Salinas never requested that the district court declare a mistrial. Thus, Salinas effectively received all of the relief that he requested from the district court. When a defendant asks this court to reverse a conviction under these circumstances, the defendant essentially asks us `to go against the implicit judgment of both the trial court and the defendant's trial counsel that the trial court's corrective action was adequate and appropriate.' United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 431 (5th Cir.1984)). In such cases, we consider the challenged comments under the plain error standard. See id. at 1466 (applying plain error standard where trial court sustained defendant's objections and defendant did not request mistrial; stating that logically there is little difference between a case that comes to us where no objection has been made to the alleged impropriety and one where no further objection has been made to the trial judge's handling of an impropriety); see also Canales, 744 F.2d at 431. 16 To establish plain error, the defendant must show that (1) there is an error, (2) the error is clear or obvious, and (3) the error affects his substantial rights. United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.2006); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) (A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.). An error is considered plain, or obvious, only if the error is clear under existing law. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (stating that a court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law). If those three conditions are satisfied, this court may grant relief if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d 596, 606 (5th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir.2005)); United States v. Garcia-Flores, 246 F.3d 451, 457 (5th Cir.2001) (`Plain error occurs when the error is so obvious and substantial that failure to notice and correct it would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and would result in manifest injustice.') (quoting United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 297 (5th Cir.1996)). 17 A prosecutor's invocation of the defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent can potentially implicate two, distinct constitutional rights—due process, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We consider each in turn.
18 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has established that due process prevents the prosecution from commenting at trial on a criminal defendant's silence in response to the Miranda warnings, but that due process does not prohibit the prosecution from impeaching a defendant's trial testimony by referring to the defendant's pre-arrest, or post-arrest, but pre- Miranda, silence. 19 In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause ordinarily prohibits the use of a defendant's post- Miranda silence to impeach his trial testimony. 4 The enduring rationale of Doyle is that, because the Miranda warnings carry with them an implicit assurance by the government that it will not use the defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent against him, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240. 5 Consistent with Doyle 's emphasis on fairness, the Supreme Court held in two later cases that it does not violate due process for the prosecution to impeach a defendant's testimony by reference to the defendant's pre-arrest, or post-arrest, but pre- Miranda, silence. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 604-07, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-40, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (pre-arrest silence). In Jenkins, the Court explained that the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle  does not exist with respect to the use of pre-arrest silence on cross-examination because no governmental action induce[s] [a defendant] to remain silent before arrest. 447 U.S. at 240, 100 S.Ct. 2124. The Fletcher court subsequently rejected the argument that the fact of arrest was sufficient to trigger Doyle 's fundamental fairness concern: In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand. 455 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309; see also United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 930-31 (5th Cir.1995) (permitting use of pre- Miranda silence to cross-examine defendant). 20 Although Fletcher clearly permits the use of a defendant's pre- Miranda silence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony, the Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether the prosecution violates Doyle by commenting on the defendant's pre- Miranda silence when the defendant does not testify in his own defense. Given Fletcher 's emphasis on the affirmative assurances of the Miranda warnings, however, it is clear that, irrespective of whether the defendant testifies at trial, the rationale of Doyle applies only to post- Miranda silence. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (noting that fundamental unfairness referred to in Doyle and its progeny derives from the implicit assurances of the Miranda warnings); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 280 (6th Cir.2000) ([T]he Doyle line of cases clearly rests on the theory that Miranda warnings themselves carry an implicit assurance that silence will not be penalized; actual receipt of the warnings is key. Therefore, the comment on Combs's pre- Miranda silence did not violate due process.). Accordingly, because Salinas was not read the Miranda warnings after he was arrested in this case, the prosecutor's comments did not violate Doyle.
21 Salinas also argues that the prosecution's references to his post-arrest silence violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 6 No published decision of this court has addressed whether the prosecution can, at trial, introduce substantive evidence that the defendant remained silent after he was arrested and taken into custody, but before he was given the Miranda warnings. This court has previously held that a prosecutor's reference to a non-testifying defendant's pre-arrest silence does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination if the defendant's silence is not induced by, or a response to, the actions of a government agent. See United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir.1996). 7 Moreover, one unpublished decision of this court has interpreted Zanabria to permit the substantive use of post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence. See United States v. Garcia-Gil, 133 Fed. Appx. 102, 108 (5th Cir.2005) (stating that Zanabria prevents Garcia-Gil from drawing a distinction based on whether the silence was used as impeachment evidence or as substantive evidence of guilt). 8 22 In addition, there is a split among the other federal circuits as to whether a prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have all squarely held that it does. See United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1028-30 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 637-39 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 384-90 (D.C.Cir. 1997); United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322-23 (7th Cir.1991). 9 The First and Sixth Circuits have gone further and have held that the substantive use of even pre-arrest silence can violate the privilege against self-incrimination. See Combs, 205 F.3d at 280-83; Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (1st Cir. 1989). The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have, on the other hand, found the substantive use of post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence during the prosecution's case-in-chief permissible. See United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1109-11 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1567-68 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.1985). 23 We need not decide this constitutional question today. Because this circuit's law remains unsettled and the other federal circuits have reached divergent conclusions on this issue, even assuming that the prosecutor's comments were improper, Salinas cannot satisfy the second prong of the plain error test—that the error be clear under existing law. See United States v. Bennett, 469 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir.2006) (In light of conflicting case law, any error that might have been committed by the district court was not `obvious,' and therefore not plain error.); United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.1996) (Because of the circuit split, the lack of controlling authority, and the fact that there is at least some room for doubt about the outcome of this issue, we cannot brand the court's failure to exclude the evidence `plain error.') (internal footnote omitted). Accordingly, Salinas cannot establish plain error, and he is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.