Opinion ID: 1673698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge to Juror

Text: For his third point for reversal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike juror Richard Bryson for cause. Appellant's motion below was based on the fact that Bryson had been employed as a Woodruff County deputy sheriff while Appellant was in jail, and that he had some conversations with Appellant at the time. After the trial court denied his motion to strike the juror for cause, Appellant used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Later on, after Appellant had used all his peremptory challenges, he attempted to strike juror Lisa Miller. Because he had used all his peremptory challenges, Miller was seated on the jury. At no time during the proceedings below, or even on appeal, did Appellant argue that Miller should have been removed from the jury for cause. Indeed, the record reflects that defense counsel told the trial court that he was just trying to use all of his peremptory challenges. Appellant now argues that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion to strike Bryson for cause. He contends that because the trial court denied his motion to strike Bryson for cause, he was forced to accept Miller, whom he asserted that he would have used a peremptory challenge to strike. This court has recently held that the loss of peremptory challenges cannot be reviewed on appeal, and that the focus on appeal should be on the persons actually seated on the appellant's jury. See Bangs v. State, 338 Ark. 515, 998 S.W.2d 738 (1999); Willis v. State, 334 Ark. 412, 977 S.W.2d 890 (1998). To challenge a juror's presence on appeal, an appellant must demonstrate that he exhausted his peremptory challenges and that he was forced to accept a juror who should have been excused for cause. Id. In other words, for us to review this issue, Appellant must have asked the trial court to remove Juror Miller for cause, and the trial court must have improperly denied the request. Id. Because Appellant failed to challenge Juror Miller for cause, we do not consider this claim. We are not persuaded by Appellant's reliance on the holding in Hobbs v. State, 277 Ark. 271, 641 S.W.2d 9 (1982), wherein this court observed: The appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to excuse for cause venireman Clarence Davis. The appellant excused Davis peremptorily. Although he later exhausted his peremptory challenges, the record does not reflect that any juror was seated, or forced upon him, whom he would have excused if he had been entitled to another peremptory challenge. Consequently, this issue may not be raised on appeal. Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982); and Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980). Id. at 275, 641 S.W.2d at 12. Appellant contends that this holding is in conflict with the later holdings in Bangs and Willis . We disagree. The foregoing language does nothing more than point out that the appellant failed to make an assertion that he would have used a peremptory challenge to strike the juror. Hobbs stops short of holding that such an assertion is all the appellant would have to make. In this respect, the holdings in Bangs and Willis merely expand upon the holding in Hobbs . We thus affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.