Opinion ID: 1385913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Causation: Connection Between Conduct of Mortuary and Crematory Defendants and Injury.

Text: Our conclusion that plaintiffs have standing as direct victims of defendants' misconduct does not resolve that part of defendants' claim that plaintiffs lack standing, in which they observe that plaintiffs allege only emotional distress caused by media reports of defendants' misconduct. We consider this aspect of defendants' argument as one asserting that the complaint fails to state a cause of action because it does not allege facts sufficient to establish that plaintiffs' injury was caused by the breach of the duty owed to plaintiffs. (11) A plaintiff seeking to recover damages from a negligent defendant must allege a causal connection between the negligence and the plaintiff's injury. ( Dunn v. Dufficy (1924) 194 Cal. 383, 386 [228 P. 1029].) A plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the negligence ... and the injury he suffered. Ordinarily that is accomplished by implication from the juxtaposition of the allegations of wrongful conduct and harm. (See 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure [(3d ed. 1985)] Pleading, งง 561-566, pp. 600-606.) However, where the pleaded facts of negligence and injury do not naturally give rise to an inference of causation the plaintiff must plead specific facts affording an inference the one caused the others. ( Blain v. Doctor's Co. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 1048, 1066 [272 Cal. Rptr. 250].) Although introduced into these proceedings by the trial court as a standing question, the trial court did so on a theory that plaintiffs' standing to recover from defendants for the emotional injuries they have suffered turns on whether all of the individual plaintiffs and the class members have alleged or may be able to state a cause of action against defendants. To do so they must allege facts to establish that causal connection. As did the Court of Appeal, therefore, we consider the issue as if it had been raised by a demurrer to the complaint. (12) We agree with the defendants that media or other secondhand reports about psychologically devastating events are not a sufficient basis for imposition of liability for emotional distress suffered by persons who are upset thereby. Damages may be recovered only for an injury resulting from defendant's breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff. The duty here was to provide respectful and dignified treatment of the remains of the plaintiffs' particular decedents. Media reports of a general pattern of misconduct are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to establish that defendants' misconduct included mishandling of the remains of each plaintiff's decedent. Thus, an allegation that a plaintiff suffered emotional distress on learning of that pattern of misconduct does not allege injury caused by a breach of a duty owed to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege, however, that they learned from the media reports that the remains of their decedents had been improperly treated. The ability of each plaintiff to prove either that at the time the plaintiff learned of the misconduct he or she knew or had substantial reason to believe that the decedent was a victim of defendants' misconduct, [27] or that the alleged continuing emotional distress each plaintiff suffers is based on knowledge that the decedent's remains have been mishandled, is a question that is not relevant at this stage of the proceedings. The question is only whether the complaint alleges a sufficiently direct causation between defendants' conduct and the emotional distress suffered by plaintiffs. We conclude that it does. We are not persuaded by defendants' argument that permitting recovery in this case will create tort liability for the emotional impact of reports of disturbing events carried on the evening news, and for conduct which occurred many years in the past. If plaintiffs are unable to establish a direct causal connection between defendants' misconduct and the emotional distress suffered by plaintiffs, then they may not recover. A plaintiff who is unable to establish that he or she suffered severe emotional distress, and that the emotional distress was caused by a well-founded substantial certainty that his or her decedent's remains were among those reportedly mistreated, may not recover damages. A generalized concern that the remains of a relative may have been involved, arising out of a media report of a pattern of misconduct, is insufficient to satisfy the requirement that there be a direct connection between a defendant's conduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. It does not supply a necessary element โ that the injury, here emotional distress, be caused by a breach of the defendant's duty to the particular plaintiff. (See Khan v. Shiley (1990) 217 Cal. App.3d 848 [266 Cal. Rptr. 106]; Stahl v. William Necker, Inc. (1918) 184 A.D. 85, 92 [171 N.Y.S. 728, 733].) On the other hand, were we to accept the suggestions of Justice Kennard that these plaintiffs be permitted to recover unless defendants prove that their decedents' remains were not among those mistreated, a plaintiff could recover damages for emotional distress based on nothing more than a media report of misconduct that may have involved the plaintiff's loved one. The source of a plaintiff's knowledge of misconduct which cannot be readily observed, and the time at which the knowledge was acquired, do not otherwise affect the plaintiff's standing to seek relief except insofar as the statute of limitations may bar the action. These factors instead go to the reasonableness of a plaintiff's claim to have suffered severe emotional distress and thus present issues for the trier of fact. We cannot say as a matter of law, as defendants would have us do, that belated discovery of mistreatment of the remains of a close relative cannot cause severe emotional distress. That suits may be filed by some persons as to whom the degree of suffering claimed is unreasonable is not a basis for denying relief to all. ( Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728, 736-739.)