Opinion ID: 799452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of EEOC's Hostile Work-Environment Claims

Text: The EEOC also appeals several of the district court's dispositive rulings concerning the merits of its hostile work-environment claims against CRST. Title VII ... makes it `an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex.' Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Importantly, this language is not limited to `economic' or `tangible' discrimination. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). Rather, as the Supreme Court has observed, [t]he phrase `terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted); accord Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir.1999). Thus, [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). As we have explained, [h]ostile work environments created by supervisors or coworkers have the following elements in common: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus exists between the harassment and the plaintiff's protected group status; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Al-Zubaidy v. TEK Indus., Inc., 406 F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir.2005). In addition, for claims of harassment by non-supervisory personnel, [the plaintiff] must show that [her] employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper action. Gordon v. Shafer Contracting Co., 469 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 (8th Cir.2006). Critically, [CRST] cannot be vicariously liable for sexual harassment [perpetrated] by non-supervisory coworkers. Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 419 (8th Cir.2010). On the other hand, if the harassment was committed by an employee who supervised [the plaintiff], [CRST] as her employer is vicariously liable for the harassment unless it can establish the affirmative defense defined in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) [ (hereinafter, the  Ellerth-Faragher Defense) ]. Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir.2004). Under the Ellerth-Faragher Defense, CRST may avoid vicarious liability for a supervisory employee's harassment if it satisfies `two necessary elements: (a) that [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior[ ] and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.' Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 718 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting Williams v. Mo. Dep't of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir.2005)). Thus, we must determine, as a threshold matter, whether CRST's Lead Drivers served as supervisors for CRST's trainees or were merely the trainees' coworkers. See Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 419. The district court determined that Lead Drivers did not serve as the trainees' supervisors. In contrast, the EEOC maintained before the district court, as it does here on appeal, that a CRST Lead Driver is a supervisor in every practical sense of the word. Specifically, the EEOC avers that CRST gives [Lead Drivers] virtually unchecked authority and control over all aspects of a trainee's daily activities, as well as authority to recommend whether a trainee is ready for full-driver status, and their recommendations are virtually always followed. CRST counters that the functions and powers that [the] EEOC attributes to [L]ead [D]rivers are no greater than those of the team leaders and foreman that this court has held are not supervisors. Applying our precedent, we agree with the district court that CRST's Lead Driver is not a supervisory employee. Therefore, CRST is not vicariously liable for any harassment that its Lead Drivers allegedly perpetrated against female trainees. [T]o be considered a supervisor, `the alleged harasser must have had the power (not necessarily exercised) to take tangible employment action against the victim, such as the authority to hire, fire, promote, or reassign to significantly different duties.' Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Joens, 354 F.3d at 940). It is undisputed that none of CRST's Lead Drivers wielded any such power. On the contrary, the record reflects that, at best, CRST's Lead Drivers could only (1) dictate minor aspects of the trainees' work experience, such as scheduling rest stops during the team drive and (2) issuing a non-binding recommendation to superiors at the training program's conclusion concerning whether CRST should upgrade the trainee to full-driver status. Under our case law, neither of these prerogatives makes a Lead Driver the trainee's supervisor. First, our circuit has held that [t]he fact that an alleged harasser may have been a `team leader' with the authority to assign employees to particular tasks will not be enough to make that person a supervisor. Merritt v. Albemarle Corp., 496 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir.2007) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, in Weyers, we declined to designate a team leader a supervisor because, [a]lthough [the alleged harasser] had the authority as team leader to assign employees to particular tasks, he could not reassign them to significantly different duties. Weyers, 359 F.3d at 1057. Similarly, in Merritt, we refused to recognize the allegedly harassing reliability technician, 496 F.3d at 881, as a supervisor because [h]is authority was restricted to assigning [the plaintiff] to work on various tasks that were part of her work duties, id. at 884. The same holds true here. The EEOC has adduced no evidence suggesting that a CRST Lead Driver possessed the power to do anything more than assign a trainee to specific tasks already within that trainee's normal, day-to-day duties. Second, CRST's reliance, in part, on a Lead Driver's evaluation of a trainee's performance to decide whether to promote that trainee to full-driver status is insufficient to render a Lead Driver a supervisor. Although the Supreme Court declined, in Ellerth and Faragher, to answer the question, `who is a supervisor?,' Joens, 354 F.3d at 940, it did observe that a tangible employment decision ... may be subject to review by higher level supervisors, Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Indeed, the EEOC relies on this very observation in Ellerth to support its own assertion that [i]t is immaterial that CRST may, on occasion, not follow a trainer's recommendation. However, the EEOC's argument in this regard fails for two reasons. First, aside from its bare assertion, the EEOC offers no evidence that CRST simply rubber stamped its Lead Drivers' recommendations. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1194, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011) (holding that if a non-decisionmaker performs an act motivated by a discriminatory bias that is intended to cause, and that does proximately cause, an adverse employment action, then the employer has cat's paw liability). Second, we have concluded, under almost identical circumstances, that a coworker's authority to make mere recommendations or evaluations to a superior about tangible employment decisions pertaining to a fellow employee does not constructively promote that coworker to a supervisor for purposes of vicarious Title VII liability. See, e.g., Cheshewalla v. Rand & Son Constr. Co., 415 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that a harassing foreman was merely his victim's coworker, and not the victim's supervisor, because the foreman's own supervisor possessed the authority to hire, fire, and promote the laborers, and although [the foreman's supervisor] may have consulted with [the harassing foreman] on such matters, the record [was] clear that [the harassing foreman] lacked any such authority); Weyers, 359 F.3d at 1057 (While it is true that [the alleged harasser] signed at least three of [the plaintiff's] initial performance evaluations and that [the supervisor] acknowledged that he had based his decision to terminate [the plaintiff] at least in part on [the plaintiff's] job[-]evaluation scores, [the alleged harasser] himself did not have the authority to take tangible employment action against [the plaintiff].). Finally, we reject the EEOC's suggestion that, [a]t a minimum, the authority CRST vests in its trainers creates a basis for liability under the apparent authority doctrine. This court has consistently affirmed that a harassing coworker's apparent authority would be an insufficient basis to support a finding of supervisor status. Weyers, 359 F.3d at 1057 n. 7; accord Cheshewalla, 415 F.3d at 851 (reaffirming that [an employee's] belief that [her harassing coworker] possessed the authority of a supervisor does not alter our conclusion that the harasser is a coworker nonetheless (citing Weyers, 359 F.3d at 1057 n. 7)). Thus, we concur with the district court that CRST's Lead Drivers were their trainees' coworkers, not their supervisors. Consequently, CRST cannot be vicariously liable for any sexual harassment in which its Lead Drivers engaged, and the Ellerth-Faragher Defense is inapplicable to the instant case. See Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 419. In order to withstand summary judgment on its hostile work-environment claims against CRST, the EEOC must create genuine issues of material fact as to the following elements regarding each allegedly aggrieved female trucker: (1) [that she belongs to] a protected group; (2) [that she suffered] unwelcome harassment; (3) [that there was] a causal nexus between the harassment and her membership in the protected group; (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of [her] employment; and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. Sheriff v. Midwest Health Partners, P.C., 619 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir.2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Carter, 173 F.3d at 700). Given these elements, we next address the district court's summary-judgment rulings against the EEOC on its hostile work environment claims.
The district court granted CRST summary judgment on the EEOC's hostile work-environment claims on behalf of three women, [17] concluding that, as a matter of law, each alleged harassment that was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive to support a hostile work-environment claim. The district granted CRST summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on behalf of 11 additional women, [18] again citing, inter alia, [19] insufficient severity or pervasiveness as a matter of law. The EEOC appeals these rulings, maintaining that the summary-judgment record contains enough evidence to create a fact question regarding the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment that each woman suffered. A district court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mayer v. Countrywide Home Loans, 647 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir.2011). On each female trucker's behalf, the EEOC must create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of [her] employment. Carter, 173 F.3d at 700. Such discrimination extends beyond terms and conditions in the `narrow contractual sense' and includes discriminatory harassment so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile working environment. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399). There can be no doubt federal harassment standards are demanding.... Indeed, the Supreme Court has `made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.' Al- Zubaidy, 406 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275) (internal citation omitted). Only [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment [is] Title VII violated. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Conversely, [c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environmentan environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusiveis beyond Title VII's purview. Id. A number of factors are relevant in assessing the magnitude of harassment, including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or only an offensive utterance, [and] whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance.... Carter, 173 F.3d at 702. We also consider a harassment victim's physical proximity to the harasser[] and the presence or absence of other people. Id. (internal citations omitted). Proximity and the absence of others are relevant here given the confined quarters and remote setting in which CRST's trainees worked with their Lead Drivers. Once there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury. Sheriff, 619 F.3d at 931. Applying these standards we conclude that, except as to two womenSherry O'Donnell and Tillie Jonesthe district court did not err in granting CRST summary judgment after determining that the women complained of harassment that was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive. The record reveals complaints about their Lead Drivers' poor personal hygiene, [20] boasting about past sexual exploits, sporadic remarks of sexual vulgarity, and highly offensive but isolated instances of propositioning for sex. None of the relevant factors listed above, including the women's physical proximity to [their] harasser[s] and the presence or absence of other people, Carter, 173 F.3d at 702, meet the applicable standard that the alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive that it alter[ed] the conditions of the [women's] employment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Regarding the Lead Drivers' poor hygienic practices, we have noted that Title VII ... is not a general civility code for the American workplace. Wilkie v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 638 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2011) (quotations and citation omitted); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Although a Lead Driver's poor hygiene undoubtedly made for an unpleasant work environment, this [m]erely rude or unpleasant conduct is insufficient to support a claim for hostile work environment. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). As for the boasting about past sexual exploits and sporadic, sexually vulgar remarks, a de novo review reveals that they mostly constituted mere offensive utterance[s], Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir.2000) (quotations and citation omitted), and we have cautioned that [s]poradic or casual comments are unlikely to support a hostile environment claim, Carter, 173 F.3d at 702. With respect to the isolated propositioning, this court and the Supreme Court have stated that `[m]ore than a few isolated incidents are required' to support a hostile work-environment claim. Clearwater, 231 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399). Consequently, the district court did not err in concluding, as a matter of law, that 12 women did not suffer sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment to survive summary judgment. The EEOC did, however, establish material issues of fact regarding the harassment that O'Donnell and Jones allegedly suffered. We hold that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the harassment they suffered was insufficiently severe or pervasive. O'Donnell testified in her deposition that, among others, co-driver Anthony Sears subjected her to persistent sexual harassment during the seven days that she spent with him over the road. Specifically, O'Donnell testified that, over the course of that seven-day trip, Sears (1) asked her, on three to five occasions, to drive naked; (2) refused O'Donnell's repeated requests to exit at a truck stop so she could go to the bathroom, ordering her to urinate in a parking lot instead; and (3) in a culminating incident, grabbed O'Donnell's face while she was driving and began screaming that all he wanted was a girlfriend. Regarding this third incident, O'Donnell testified that Sears grabbed her face so vigorously that it caused one of her teeth to lacerate her lip. Viewing all facts and drawing all inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the EEOC, as we must, Mayer, 647 F.3d at 791, this testimony creates a genuine fact issue as to the severity of the harassment that O'Donnell allegedly suffered. Given that Sears allegedly perpetrated all of these acts in a week's time, the conduct was frequent. See Carter, 173 F.3d at 702. Sears's directive that O'Donnell publicly urinate in a parking lot is a patent attempt at humiliation. See id. (citation omitted). Moreover, Sears's act of grabbing O'Donnell's face, was, by its very nature, physically threatening. Id. Finally, upon assessing these characteristics of Sears's alleged conduct in light of O'Donnell's physical proximity to Sears and the absence of other people, we must conclude that the EEOC has produced enough evidence of severity of O'Donnell's alleged harassment to make it a question for the jury. See Sheriff, 619 F.3d at 931 (Once there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury.). [21] The district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Tillie Jones suffered harassment that was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive. Jones testified that, on three or four occasions over the course of a two-week training trip, her Lead Driver, James Simmons, entered the cab wearing only his underwear and rubbed the back of her head, despite repeated requests by Jones that he stop. Jones also testified that, everyday, Simmons entered the cab in his underwear while she was driving. Additionally, according to Jones, Simmons called her his bitch five or six times, including on one occasion when, in response to Jones's complaints about his slovenly habits, he ordered Jones to clean up the truck, declaring that's what you're on the truck for, you're my bitch. I ain't your bitch. Shut up and clean it up. Finally, Jones testified that, like many of CRST's Lead Drivers, Simmons routinely urinated in plastic bottles and ziplock bags while in transit. However, Jones testified that Simmons would leave his urine receptacles about the truck's cab and that when Jones implored Simmons to gather them, Simmons ordered her to shut up and clean it up. No overt physical threat or contact was present, but the evidence suffices to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment which the EEOC alleges that Jones suffered. In sum, we affirm the district court's summary judgment, in CRST's favor, on the EEOC's hostile work-environment claims on behalf of 12 women, [22] concurring in the district court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, the alleged harassment was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive. However, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the EEOC's claims on behalf of Tillie Jones. We conclude that the EEOC created a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment that Jones allegedly suffered. Finally, although we also conclude that the EEOC has created a genuine fact issue as to the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment that Sherry O'Donnell allegedly suffered, for the reasons stated in Part II.C.3. infra, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on her behalf.
The EEOC also appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on its claims as to 34 women [23] who, according to the district court, either (1) allege harassment that CRST neither knew nor should have known about or (2) allege harassment that CRST, upon being notified of, promptly and effectively remedied. Specifically, the district court granted summary judgment on the EEOC's claims concerning 11 women, see supra n. 5, and some days later granted summary judgment as to 22 more. Additionally, in its order granting CRST summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on behalf of January Jackson for insufficient severity or pervasiveness, the district court alternatively concluded that CRST neither knew nor should have known about her harassment. We have already affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment affecting nine [24] of these 34 women based on its alternative conclusion that their alleged harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. See supra Part II.C.2. Therefore, we need not address whether CRST knew or should have known about the harassment that those nine women suffered. See Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 419 (When an employee complains about inappropriate conduct that does not rise to the level of a violation of law, ... there is no liability for a failure to respond.). As to the remaining 25 women, [25] we conducted a de novo review of all record evidence. Based on that review we hold that the EEOC failed, as a matter of law, to investigate and/or conciliate its claims on behalf of four of themBonnie Batyik, Bethany Broeker, Verona McIver, and Diana Vance. Specifically, each woman complains of harassment that CRST allegedly perpetrated after the filing of the instant lawsuit on September 27, 2007. [26] We reserve the right to affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment on any ground that the summary-judgment record supports. W3i Mobile, LLC v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 432, 436 (8th Cir.2011). Accordingly, as to these four women, we will affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the alternative ground that the EEOC failed to discharge its pre-suit duties under Title VII to investigate and conciliate these claims, as they did not even accrue until after the EEOC had instituted the action. See supra Part II.A.2. Regarding the remaining 21 women, because the women's Lead Drivers and codrivers were their coworkers rather than their supervisors, see supra Part II.C.1., the EEOC must, as part of its burden on summary judgment, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CRST [ (1) ] knew or should have known of the harassment and [ (2) ] failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. Carter, 173 F.3d at 693 (emphasis added). Stated another way, [CRST] may be directly liable for its employees' actions that violate Title VII if the company knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate action and appropriate corrective action. Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 419 (emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted). Regarding the 25 women in question, our de novo review of the EEOC's claims concerning each woman confirms the district court's conclusion that no fact issue remained because (1) CRST neither knew nor should have known about the alleged harassment to remedy it because the woman failed to report it soon enough, or at all; or (2) the woman timely reported the harassment, and CRST promptly and effectively remedied it. With respect to CRST's knowledge, we have stated that either an employer's actual or constructive notice of ongoing coworker-on-coworker harassment may subject the employer to direct liability for that harassment unless the employer takes prompt corrective action. Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir.2009). An employer has actual notice of harassment when sufficient information either comes to the attention of someone who has the power to terminate the harassment, or it comes to someone who can reasonably be expected to report or refer a complaint to someone who can put an end to it. Id. at 802 (citation omitted). Simply put, [i]n the context of sexual harassment claims, `[a]ctual notice is established by proof that management knew of the harassment.' Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir.2003)). Constructive notice is established in the following circumstances: [ (1) ] where an employee provides management level personnel with enough information to raise a probability of sexual harassment in the mind of a reasonable employer, or [ (2) ] where the harassment is so pervasive and open that a reasonable employer would have had to be aware of it. Id. (quoting Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir.1999)). Of the remaining 21 women, we conclude, as a matter of law, that CRST lacked actual notice as to ten of them. [27] Specifically, each of these ten women either never reported the alleged sexual harassment to CRST or reported it too late to afford CRST a reasonable opportunity to promptly and effectively address it. We note that, [i]n some cases, ... an employee may be excused for a delay in reporting harassment, if the employee can demonstrate a truly credible threat of retaliation. Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 422 (quotations and citation omitted). However, a thorough review of each woman's deposition testimony confirms that the EEOC has failed to demonstrate that any of these ten women faced such a credible threat. [28] Thus, CRST lacked actual notice because the EEOC has produced no evidence that management knew of the harassment. Sandoval, 578 F.3d at 802 (quotations and citation omitted). Furthermore, on the present record, we must also conclude, as a matter of law, that CRST lacked constructive knowledge of any harassment that the ten women allegedly suffered. The EEOC's argument to the contrary is linked to its separate contention that the district court abused its discretion in excluding documentary evidence pertaining to the 99 women for whom the district court precluded the EEOC from seeking relief. Specifically, as a discovery sanction for the EEOC's failure to present these 99 women to CRST for deposition, the district courtas it had forewarned in a prior orderprecluded each woman from testifying at trial and barred the EEOC from seeking relief on her behalf in the instant case. However, in opposing CRST's motion for summary judgment concerning the company's constructive notice of harassment, the EEOC included records of these 99 women's harassment complaints to CRST, their Qualcomm messages, and other documentary evidence. CRST moved to strike this evidence from the summary-judgment record, citing the district court's discovery sanction. The district court subsequently granted the motion, concurring with CRST that permitting the EEOC to introduce evidence of the 99 women's complaints would amount to an end-run around its discovery sanction precluding the EEOC's relief on their behalf. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 2524402, at . On appeal, the EEOC maintains that (1) the district court abused its discretion by excluding this evidence pursuant to its prior discovery sanction, and (2) should we reverse the district court and order the inclusion of the evidence in the summary-judgment record, that we also reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in light of the new evidenceevidence that the EEOC avers is relevant to whether CRST possessed constructive knowledge of allegedly rampant harassment in its training program. See Sandoval, 578 F.3d at 802-03 (concluding that, in light of plaintiffs' allegations that the employer was aware of nearly one hundred similar [sexual-harassment] complaints made during the time plaintiffs were employed, the district court erred in disregarding, on summary judgment, the evidence of widespread sexual harassment, as such evidence is highly relevant to prove the sexual harassment was severe and pervasive and that [the employer] had constructive notice). Although we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, Mayer, 647 F.3d at 791, [w]e review the district court's imposition of discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion, Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 559 F.3d 888, 898 (8th Cir.2009) (quotations and citation omitted). The undisputed record reflects that, after protracted discovery, the district court ordered the EEOC, by a certain date, to present for deposition all allegedly aggrieved women. Moreover, the district court directed that [i]f the EEOC fails to make a woman available, as a discovery sanction the court will not permit her to testify at trial and will bar the EEOC from seeking relief on her behalf in this case. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 513, 519 (N.D.Iowa 2008) (emphasis added). The EEOC concedes that it failed to present for deposition the 99 women. In response to a party's failure to obey such a discovery order, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plainly authorizes a district court to prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Notably, the EEOC does not appeal the propriety of the discovery sanction itself, but only the district court's enforcement of it. Citing our decision in Sandoval, 578 F.3d at 802-03, the EEOC emphasizes the excluded evidence's purported relevance to the question of whether CRST was on constructive notice of the alleged harassment. However, the EEOC offers no direct support for its contention that, by enforcing its own discovery sanctionwhose propriety the EEOC does not appealthe district court abused its discretion. Likewise, on this record, we find no evidence that the district court abused its discretion by enforcing its own valid discovery sanction. Consequently, in granting summary judgment based on its conclusion that, as a matter of law, CRST lacked constructive notice as to the ten women presently at issue, the district court did not premise its ruling on an incomplete summary-judgment record. Moreover, our de novo review of this record reveals no fact issue as to CRST's constructive notice. Specifically, the EEOC has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a fact issue as to whether the harassment was so broad in scope, and so permeated the workplace, that it must have come to the attention of someone authorized to do something about it. Id. at 802 (quotations and citation omitted). With respect to the remaining 11 women, [29] we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment based on its conclusion that, as a matter of law, CRST promptly and effectively remedied the sexual harassment once it became aware of it. If an employer responds to harassment with prompt remedial action calculated to end it, then the employer is not liable for the harassment. Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 421. In assessing the reasonableness of an employer's remedial action, the factors to be considered include the amount of time that elapsed between the notice and remedial action, the options available to the employer, ... and whether or not the measures ended the harassment. Id. (alteration in original, quotations and citation omitted). After reviewing the record pertaining to these 11 women in the light most favorable to the EEOC, we hold that CRST effectively and promptly remedied the harassment once the women reported it. The record reflects that CRST addressed reported harassment by (1) removing the woman from the truck as soon as practicable, arranging overnight lodging at a motel and subsequent transportation to a CRST terminal at the company's expense; (2) requesting a written statement from the woman; (3) relieving the woman from future assignments with the alleged harasser; and (4) reprimanding the alleged harasser and barring him from team-driving with women indefinitely. These actions, not necessarily in combination, constitute the type of prompt and effective remedial action that our precedents prescribe. When considering the [remedial] options available to the employer, we have included employee training sessions, transferring the harassers, written warnings, reprimands in personnel files, or termination, as acceptable options, depending on the particulars of the case. Carter, 173 F.3d at 702 (emphasis added). In each of the 11 women's cases, CRST removed the woman from the alleged harasser's truck within 24 hours of the harassment being reported, and often much sooner. See Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 421 (Employees often must tolerate some delay ... so that an employer can gauge the credibility of the complainant and the seriousness of the situation.) (quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, each woman confirmed that they did not suffer any harassment subsequent to their removal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's summary judgment as to the remaining 11 women, concurring in its conclusion that, as a matter of law, CRST promptly and effectively remedied any alleged harassment that the women reported.