Opinion ID: 2982007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chambers’s ADA claim

Text: To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Chambers had to show that 1) he or she is disabled; 2) otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; 3) suffered an adverse employment decision; 4) the employer knew or had reason to know of plaintiff’s disability; and 5) the position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced. Timm v. Wright State Univ., 375 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 2004). Saturn does not dispute that Chambers has physical impairments with regard to his neck, shoulders, arms, and hands that make it more difficult for him to engage in a number of activities. “Nevertheless, the existence of a physical impairment alone is insufficient to support a finding of a disability for the purpose of the ADA.” Anderson v. Inland Paperboard & Packaging, 11 F. App’x 432, 436 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th -9- No. 07-5280 Chambers v. Saturn Corp. Cir. 1997) (“[N]ot every impairment qualifies as a disability protected by the ADA.”)). “An individual is considered disabled under the ADA,” as relevant to the present case, if he or she “has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.” Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Before the ADA Amendments Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defined “major life activities” to include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007). Being “substantially limited” in such activities meant that an individual was “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform” or was “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . . . [an] average person in the general population.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1); see also Williams, 534 U.S. at 198 (holding that the proper disability determination is whether the individual “ha[s] an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”). During Chambers’s 1998 deposition, at which time he was represented by counsel, Chambers testified that his injuries have caused neck pains that occasionally limit his ability to drive, lift certain weights, look up and down, reach up and get objects off a shelf, and walk in a mall. He admitted, however, that on most days he is able to dress himself, shave, walk, stand, climb stairs, and drive. During Chambers’s second deposition in 2006, he testified that he is able to walk, shop for groceries, do laundry, prepare meals, and go to the movies. In a 2005 medical evaluation, Chambers’s -10- No. 07-5280 Chambers v. Saturn Corp. physician Dr. Frederick Wade opined that Chambers “may continue/return to light duty permanent. No lifting more than 20 pounds. No work at or above shoulder level. No repetitive work motion. No power tools, torque guns, or lift with arms outreached.” Dr. Wade did not comment on Chambers’s ability to care for himself or engage in routine daily activities. Chambers states in the affidavit attached to his January 30 Motion that he “cannot bathe without assistance,” “cannot manually scrub, clean, or otherwise use moderate force,” “ha[s] serious difficulty using cooking utensils and handling pots and pans and washing dishes,” and “cannot run, lift weights, do aerobic exercises, swim, do sit ups, chin ups or push ups.” He also alleges that his injuries limit his ability to “do a wide range of daily life activities including[] driving, parking, sleeping, flossing teeth, grocery shopping, and tying my shoes.” Chambers has not explained why this post-judgment affidavit was not submitted in a timely fashion. Moreover, Chambers raised for the first time in the affidavit his difficulty bathing, which he never mentioned during his two depositions. Other statements in the affidavit are also in tension with his deposition testimony, in which he stated that he was able to attend to his bodily functions, walk, drive, shop for groceries, and prepare meals. Finally, his assertion that he is not able to bathe without assistance, use cooking utensils, or clean is uncorroborated by any medical evidence in the record. “A party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment has been made, which contradicts [his] earlier deposition testimony.” Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986). Because Chambers has not explained why we -11- No. 07-5280 Chambers v. Saturn Corp. should consider the information set forth in his post-judgment affidavits, we decline to do so to the extent that these new facts contradict Chambers’s earlier deposition testimony. We now turn to whether Chambers’s impairments constitute a disability under the caselaw interpreting the prior version of the ADA. “The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)). Although such an inquiry is necessarily highly fact-intensive and case-specific, we find instructive a number of cases previously decided by both the Supreme Court and by this court. The most relevant Supreme Court decision is Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). In Williams, the employee could not perform “repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time.” Id. at 192. Her carpal tunnel syndrome also caused her to “avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to occasionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with her children, gardens, and drives long distances.” Id. at 202. The Court noted that Williams could, however, “brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the house.” Id. After holding that the appellate court should focus its inquiry on those activities as “activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives,” id., the Court reversed the appellate court’s decision that Williams was disabled as a matter of law. Decisions from this circuit have likewise held that plaintiffs with similar (though not identical) physical impairments to Chambers were not disabled under the ADA. This court has held, -12- No. 07-5280 Chambers v. Saturn Corp. for example, that restrictions on the amount of weight that one is able to lift is not, in and of itself, a disability. Gayer v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 21 F. App’x 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[F]ederal case law supports that a maximum weight restriction is not a disability as defined by the ADA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have also held that foot, leg, and shoulder injuries that prevent the plaintiff from running, jumping, bending, and working more than eight hours a day do not “rise to the level of a disability under the ADA.” Anderson v. Inland Paperboard & Packaging, 11 F. App’x 432, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a person who was unable to “resume normal work activities such as lifting, reaching, stooping and twisting” was determined not to be disabled. Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 703, 706 (6th Cir. 2001). Finally, we have held that an employee who was restricted from lifting weights of less than ten pounds, pushing or pulling, using vibrating tools, and making repetitive motions with her right hand was not disabled under the ADA. McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A., 110 F.3d 369, 370-71, 374 (6th Cir. 1997). This court noted in McKay that the “plaintiff was not limited in the ‘major life activity’ of caring for herself because ‘the only household function McKay claims to be substantially limited in is mopping.’” Id. at 371-72. We find ample evidence in the record to show that Chambers is able to care for himself. Chambers’s injuries do not significantly prevent him from walking, standing, climbing stairs, driving, dressing himself, doing laundry, and shaving. Chambers admitted during his two depositions that although his neck and shoulder pains have changed the manner and frequency with which he performs certain activities, he is able to engage in all of them. Although he claims in his January 30, 2007 affidavit that he cannot bathe without assistance, cook, or clean, he alleged these facts only after the district court granted summary judgment. -13- No. 07-5280 Chambers v. Saturn Corp. Chambers’s remaining argument, which he does not develop on appeal, is that he is substantially limited in his ability to work. Both 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007) and the Supreme Court have acknowledged that “working” may be considered a major life activity. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. But this court’s pre-ADA Amendments Act caselaw repeatedly held that the major life activity of working is not substantially limited simply because an employee’s physical or psychological impairment prevents him from performing a particular job. See Black v. Roadway Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff’s knee injury did not prevent him from performing a broad class of truck-driving jobs); Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s back problems did not substantially limit his ability to work in a broad class of jobs); McKay, 110 F.3d at 373 (holding that the plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome, which prevented her from performing only a narrow range of assembly-line jobs, was not an impairment that substantially limited her general ability to work); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in the life activity of working where the plaintiff’s eye impairment, although a permanent one that prevented him from performing the functions of a postal distribution clerk, did not interfere with his ability to work other jobs). “To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. The claimants must, at a minimum, allege that they are unable “to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.” Id. at 491. -14- No. 07-5280 Chambers v. Saturn Corp. Chambers has not demonstrated that he is unable to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Moreover, Saturn proffered unrebutted evidence from an vocational expert that, during the period when Chambers was on leave from Saturn, there was an average of 336,388 available jobs in the Middle Tennessee area that Chambers was qualified to perform with his restrictions. Indeed, at the time that the briefs were submitted in this matter, Chambers was employed with Saturn as a quality technician, and he performed temporary jobs at Saturn before he was put on medical leave. Chambers has therefore failed to show that he is substantially limited from working. We conclude that Chambers has not carried his burden of proving that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA as it existed before the ADA Amendments Act. Accordingly, we have no need to consider the other factors required to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.