Opinion ID: 1898472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantive Educational Opportunity: The Administration of the Act by the Commissioner and the Board

Text: In Robinson I the record was primarily limited to the funding scheme, its impact, and demographic data; it lacked significant evidence of substantive educational content. We ruled that without such evidence, our constitutional determination must necessarily be based solely on the disparity of expenditures per pupil. Repeating the quotation from Robinson I: The trial court found the constitutional demand had not been met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input per pupil. We agree. We deal with the problem in those terms because dollar input is plainly relevant and because we have been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate. [62 N.J. at 515-16, 303 A. 2d 273 (emphasis supplied).] The State claims there is now such a viable criterion for measuring thorough and efficient; indeed, that is the heart of the State's case when it so strenuously opposes the significance of plaintiffs' disparity measurements. It claims simply that a thorough and efficient education in fact exists regardless of the disparity of expenditures. The proof of substantive educational content has several sources: the Act itself, the rules and regulations of the Board and the Commissioner, the Commissioner's implementing actions, and the evidence of the education that actually takes place in the district  through curriculum plans, course offerings, studies, reports, evaluations, and observations. These proofs differentiate this case from Robinson I. The Act and the rules of the Board together constitute a thoughtful, well-integrated definition of thorough and efficient, described both abstractly and in concrete terms. The standards and goals, when considered in conjunction with the mandated procedures, constitute a potentially practical, workable mechanism for achieving a thorough and efficient education throughout the state. The Act defines thorough and efficient education on a statewide basis as including: (a) establishment of educational goals at both the state and local levels; (b) encouragement of public involvement in goal-setting; (c) instruction intended to produce the attainment of reasonable levels of proficiency in the basic communications and computational skills; (d) a breadth of program offerings designed to develop the individual talents and abilities of pupils; (e) programs and supportive services for all pupils especially those who are educationally disadvantaged or who have special educational needs; (f) adequately equipped, sanitary, and secure physical facilities and adequate materials and supplies; (g) qualified instructional and other personnel; (h) efficient administrative procedures; (i) an adequate State program of research and development; and (j) evaluation and monitoring programs at both the state and local levels. N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-5. Local agencies have the responsibility to establish goals and objectives consistent with legislative guidelines, and to define standards of performance necessary to indicate achievement of the goals and objectives. N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-2b(3)(a)-(b). While necessarily general, the Act has fairly established the standard against which an educational opportunity can be measured to see if it conforms to the constitutional command. We found the standard constitutional in Robinson V, and reaffirm that conclusion now. The plaintiffs do not attack the statutory definition and its formulation of goals and standards, or the statutory provisions for its implementation. Their complaint, rather, is that without adequate funding, it simply cannot be achieved; that the administration of the Act in any event does not assure that it will be achieved; that in fact it has not been achieved. The Act, having defined the elements, goals, and standards of thorough and efficient statewide, and the concomitant structure of goal setting and planning at the local level, then goes on to provide a mechanism for its effectuation. The Commissioner and the Board are charged with the responsibility for achieving the constitutional mandate. Both the Board and Commissioner have done their work with energy and dedication, and have achieved considerable success in view of the limited time they have had to work under the Act, and the limited resources available to them. Pursuant to statute and regulations the Commissioner requires each district to file an annual report covering budgets, curriculum, and other matters concerning the district's operation and education offerings. N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-11; N.J.A.C. 6:8-3.2. Those reports are reviewed  by county superintendents for facial compliance with budget requirements, and, once every five years in the case of certified districts, by special teams that visit the district. This oversight represents a radical change from a system in which districts were almost totally independent of any State involvement, except for a few courses mandated by statute. The transformation of the system to one with an increasingly significant State role has not been easy. Since 1983-84, the DOE has based this monitoring on ten elements [23] of a thorough and efficient education and a number of indicators, originally fifty-one, now forty-three, of acceptable performance in these elements. [24] N.J.A.C. 6:8-4.3. Certification of a district is based on an acceptable rating of all forty-three indicators. N.J.A.C. 6:8-4.5. If the county superintendent finds that the district has met this standard, a recommendation for certification and a summary report of the findings is submitted to the Commissioner, who then recommends that the Board certify the district as providing a thorough and efficient education. [25] N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-14; N.J.A.C. 6:8-4.5. Among the forty-three prescribed indicators is the requirement that 75% of the ninth grade students of each school pass all three sections of the HSPT. Moreover, the failure of a certified school district to meet the State HSPT standard is cause for rescinding its certification. N.J.A.C. 6:8-4.6. If the Board does not certify a district, it becomes subject first to a Level II review process ( N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-14(a), (b); N.J.A.C. 6:8-5.1), and failing that, to Level III corrective action by the State. [26] N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-14(b), (c), (d); N.J.A.C. 6:8-5.2. Under Level II review, a district is required to develop a self-improvement plan, which is submitted to the district board of education and the county superintendent of schools. When the superintendent, after reviewing the plan with the assistant commissioner, Division of County and Regional Services, approves it, progress is monitored and interim reviews are conducted at least once every three months. The reviews may consist of reviewing the chief school administrator's reports, of on-site visits, or both. N.J.A.C. 6:8-5.1(3)(b)(e). If a district fails to achieve certification as a result of its improvement plan activities, the county superintendent initiates Level III corrective action. N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-14(c); N.J.A.C. 6:8-5.2. An external review team is appointed from qualified staff of other districts supplemented by the DOE's compliance unit. The team assesses the reasons for the district's failure and recommends implementation of a corrective action plan or, if conditions warrant, of a comprehensive compliance investigation. If the former is undertaken, the district has a year to implement the new plan, or at least demonstrate reasonable progress toward correcting its deficiencies, with the county superintendent monitoring progress on a monthly basis. N.J.A.C. 6:8-5.2(d)(e). Pursuant to such corrective action, the Commissioner may reallocate funds within the district's budget, or order a budget increase. N.J.S.A. 18A:17-14(d), -15; see also Robinson V, supra, 69 N.J. at 461-63, 355 A. 2d 129 (discussing this power). If the district fails to demonstrate adequate progress or the external review team's report indicates that conditions preclude successful implementation of a corrective plan, the Commissioner must order a comprehensive compliance investigation ( N.J. S.A. 18A:7A-14(d)), including full examination by a team from the DOE's compliance unit and a comprehensive audit by a private firm hired for that purpose. N.J.A.C. 6:8-5.3. After a plenary hearing before an ALJ, the Commissioner may issue an administrative order requiring compliance with a departmental correction plan. N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-14(e). If even these steps fail, he must recommend to the Board that it create a State-operated school district. N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-15. The Commissioner has exercised those powers on occasion  in Trenton, for instance, the Commissioner, pursuant to an administrative order, appointed a monitor with the power to direct the district's personnel to take all steps necessary to operate a thorough and efficient program, to review all personnel staffing recommendations, and to oversee all budgetary matters. In re Trenton Bd. of Educ., 176 N.J. Super. 553, 559-60, 424 A. 2d 435 (App.Div. 1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 327, 431 A. 2d 808 (1981). In Jersey City, the Board initiated a full take-over, appointing a state district superintendent to supplant the local district board of education and direct all operations of the district. Notwithstanding the apparent forcefulness of these interventions, the ALJ concluded that their administration by the Board and Commissioner was seriously deficient. Most importantly, he concluded that, apart from the HSPT and similar standardized tests, [27] the Level I and Level II process amounted to little more than a comparison of the district's goals and plans with the district's own statement of its accomplishments in achieving those goals and plans  all without any independent assessment by the Commissioner of the adequacy of the goals or the quality of the education provided. Neither the Commissioner nor his agents compared the education offered by the district with that offered by others. There was neither an absolute standard nor a standard implied through comparisons. We conclude that although the monitoring function may have been designed to measure and achieve a thorough and efficient education, in practice it has not accomplished that goal. In part because resource issues were avoided, it operated largely as a self-improvement system. Beyond a few statemandated courses, the local board could approve any curriculum it chose or, presumably, could afford. The Commissioner evaluated neither its adequacy to the children's needs, nor its relationship to a thorough and efficient education. Nor did he evaluate the quality of any offering. When monitors visited classes, they did so to verify that the teacher was using a local board-approved lesson plan. We cannot accept the Commissioner's and the Board's contention that certification is prima facie proof of a thorough and efficient education. It is not that we ascribe no importance to it, it is simply not enough. However, we need not decide whether any significance attaches to the lack of certification because regardless of certification or its lack, we find the constitutional mandate has not been satisfied in poorer urban districts. [28] Indeed, the Board itself has acknowledged that the design of this scheme is deficient, and in this very litigation has proposed and adopted regulations to strengthen its monitoring and assessment functions. State Board of Education, Docket No. 12-89, at 54-55 (March 23, 1989). It has also requested that the Legislature shift its aid formula to reflect current, rather than prior, year funding; appropriate more money for school facilities; and ensure that minimum aid to richer districts is redistributed if there is a shortfall in appropriations. Id. at 55-57. For the overwhelming number of districts, all we know about the substantive education is that the Act commands it, reports are produced, monitoring takes place, and the Commissioner has certified most districts as providing a thorough and efficient education; we have no evidence that they are not. While we know of expenditure disparity, we have no reason to believe the actual funding level in most districts is below that needed to achieve a thorough and efficient education. On this record plaintiffs have not shown that a thorough and efficient education does not indeed exist right now in the overwhelming number of districts in this state. Under those circumstances our State Constitution does not require that this entire system be scrapped and replaced by another at enormous expense based solely on expenditure disparities. We do not imply anything about the importance of such disparities when considered as a matter of policy. As noted at the outset of this opinion, our decision does not deal with optimum educational policy, but with constitutional compliance. We are unable to conclude that most districts are failing to deliver the educational opportunity required by our State Constitution. There are various elements to that conclusion. In a narrow procedural sense, it reflects our belief that the burden is on the plaintiffs to show that a thorough and efficient education is not being delivered; it represents our conclusion that when the State, through the Legislature and its administrative agency, has conscientiously attempted to achieve a level of education and the State's agency says it has been achieved, some deference must be accorded to that determination. It further embodies our conclusion that all of these factors are sufficient evidence to preclude a finding of constitutional deprivation based solely on expenditure disparity. Most of all it reflects our firmly held belief that before this Court concludes that there is a constitutional failure despite the legally-authorized certification of the Commissioner to the contrary, the Board's conclusion to the contrary, and the Legislature's efforts to achieve it, the proofs must be compelling. Before this Court voids the statute, overrules the Board and the Commissioner, and orders the Legislature to provide a new system, the constitutional failure must be clear. As to most districts of the state, it is not. But as to some  the poorer urban districts  it is glaringly clear.
Municipal overburden is the excessive tax levy some municipalities must impose to meet governmental needs other than education. It is a common characteristic in poorer urban districts, a product of their relatively low property values against which the local tax is assessed and their high level of governmental need. The governmental need includes the entire range of goods and services made available to citizens: police and fire protection, road maintenance, social services, water, sewer, garbage disposal, and similar services. Although the condition is not precisely defined, it is usually thought of as a tax rate well above the average. The underlying causes of municipal overburden are many and complex. Its consequences in this case, however, are clear and simple. The poorer urban school districts, sharing the same tax base with the municipality, suffer from severe municipal overburden; they are extremely reluctant to increase taxes for school purposes. Not only is their local tax levy well above average, so is their school tax rate. The oppressiveness of the tax burden on their citizens by itself would be sufficient to give them pause before raising taxes. Additionally, the rates in some cases are so high that further taxation may actually decrease tax revenues by diminishing total property values, either directly because of the tax-value relationship, or indirectly by causing business and industry to relocate to another municipality. Plaintiffs argue that municipal overburden restricts these poorer urban districts' ability to raise more money through increased school taxes to achieve a thorough and efficient education. That contention is urged in support of their claim that the present system, relying on local levies, must be converted to one where state revenues predominate and local taxing ability is relatively unimportant. It is an argument of constitutional dimension: it responds to the State's claim that a thorough and efficient education can be achieved under the Act through the unlimited power of school districts to increase education revenues by raising taxes, and it supports plaintiffs' preferred constitutional remedy. The Commissioner's position is that municipal overburden is irrelevant to the constitutional issue. He maintains that the school board is obliged as a matter of statutory and constitutional duty to raise as much money as is needed for a thorough and efficient education no matter what the tax consequences, no matter how much the tax increase, no matter how high the present tax, and no matter how high the present local municipal tax. If tax inequity exists, that may be a concern for the Legislature but it must not be for the school district. The Commissioner's views are set forth strongly and unambiguously. He portrays school boards, in even the poorest urban districts, that refuse to substantially increase taxes that already border on the confiscatory, as shirking their clear duty and, in some districts, as yielding to political pressure. His position rests on his conception of the Act as one with funding provisions that make it certain that enough money for a thorough and efficient education will be raised. That conclusion, he says, is irresistible given the districts' unlimited power to tax, their duty to do so, and the power of the Board and the Commissioner to force them to if needed. We respectfully disagree. The social and economic pressures on municipalities, school districts, public officials, and citizens of these disaster areas  many poorer urban districts  are so severe that tax increases in any substantial amount are almost unthinkable. To pejoratively label that uniform resistance to increased taxes as political fails to recognize the desperate situation that some school boards may face. The record is clear on this issue. The former Commissioner recognized that the refusal of such districts to raise taxes was strongly based on legitimate concerns. Similarly, the present Commissioner has (with one possible exception) never compelled a tax increase during the period of his eight year tenure. We do not pass on the legal contentions of the Commissioner in this respect. Our conclusion concerning municipal overburden is that it effectively prevents districts from raising substantially more money for education. It is a factual conclusion. It is based on the record history of the failure of any effort, whether through the actions of a school district or the Board or Commissioner, legal or otherwise, through the more than ten year period that the Act has been in effect, to achieve substantially increased local funding through school tax increases. That factual finding is one of the bases for our conclusion that the funding mechanism of the Act will never achieve a thorough and efficient education because it relies so heavily on a local property base already over-taxed to exhaustion.