Opinion ID: 1766558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: HearsayGerjuan's Payphone Conversation

Text: In point one, Taylor argues the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Gerjuan's testimony that Rowe told her she was calling from a pay telephone on November 28th. Taylor argues that the testimony was admissible as Rowe's present sense impression or under the due process clause. In addition, he argues that the testimony was admissible pursuant to the curative admissibility doctrine to refute the inference that Rowe and Gerjuan did not speak to each other on that date from the absence of a call to Gerjuan in Rowe's home telephone records.
Gerjuan Rowe was served with a subpoena to testify at trial. Gerjuan did not appear and the court issued a writ of attachment. At the end of the State's case, Taylor's counsel informed the court that the writ had not been served, and that the defense intended to call Gerjuan as a witness in the case. As a result, the court granted Taylor permission to read portions of Gerjuan's deposition into evidence. The court, however, excluded the following portion as hearsay: A. [Gerjuan] We was out walking around, and she did call me from a pay phone on Jennings Station Road and West Florissant at the Amoco. Q. [Defense] Okay. A. And I was supposed to have been on my way that way, but by my car not being legal and by Jennings police being ass holes, I didn't just go over there. Q. But you knew she was at a pay phone then on the A. Yes. Q. on the early morning hours A. Yes. Q. of the 28th? A. Yes. MR. KEY: How did you know she was on a pay phone? A. Because I asked her, I asked her, where are you? And she said she was on the pay phone. And I saidI was supposed to have been on my way to get her. I was supposed to have been on my way to get her, that's what I was supposed to be doing. That's how I knew she was at the Amoco on Jennings Station Road and West Florissant. Q. (By Ms. Beimdiek) Were you ever able to actually hook up with her then? A. No. (Emphasis added). The existence of the telephone call on November 28th was admissible, and testimony regarding such a call was admitted into evidence; however, evidence that Rowe was calling from a pay telephone was hearsay and inadmissible.
Gerjuan's testimony that Rowe told her that she was calling from a pay telephone on November 28th was hearsay. The statement was offered for the truth of the matter asserted: that Rowe called Gerjuan from a pay telephone on November 28th. This hearsay statement is not admissible as a present sense impression. The statement was about Rowe's location at a specific time in response to a question from Gerjuan. The statement did not concern an event or describe or explain an event that Rowe perceived. Further, the statement lacks indicia of trustworthiness. Taylor did not offer any evidence corroborating the statement that Rowe made the call from a pay telephone on November 28th. Although Gerjuan's cell phone records show an outgoing call to the pay telephone at 4:36 a.m. on November 28th, the statement was offered to prove that the Rowe placed the call from the pay telephone. There is no record of an incoming call from the pay telephone to Gerjuan's cell phone or any telephone, and there is no evidence of outgoing calls from the pay telephone. Lastly, neither Rowe nor Gerjuan was subject to cross-examination to resolve the confusion. The statement is also not admissible pursuant to the constitutionally based hearsay exception in the due process clause because it lacks circumstances of reliability. The statement was not against Rowe's interest or spontaneously made, and most importantly, as discussed above, this statement is not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence in the case. In addition to the lack of evidence in the phone records, Gerjuan's testimony regarding the dates of events prior to the murders, such as when she last saw Rowe, was conflicting, [5] and the circumstances of this telephone call were also unclear. [6] Finally, the curative admissibility doctrine does not apply. The State presented evidence of Rowe's home phone records and Gerjuan's cell phone records. This evidence was admissible, and as a result, Gerjuan's inadmissible testimony about the pay phone cannot be admitted pursuant to this doctrine. Gerjuan's proposed testimony regarding Rowe's statement is hearsay and inadmissible. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.