Opinion ID: 1566486
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Heading: The Sufficiency of the Warrant

Text: The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants issue only upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. Article I, Section 7 of Tennessee's Constitution speaks in terms of evidence of the fact committed. Section 40-504, T.C.A., requires that search warrants be supported by affidavit. Rule 41(c), Tenn.R.Crim.P., requires a sworn affidavit or affidavits to establish probable cause. Central to all these requirements is the notion that probable cause must be supported by evidence submitted to the issuing magistrate and that evidence must be sufficient to support an independent and neutral judgment that probable cause exists. In Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378, 181 S.W.2d 351 (1944), Mr. Justice Chambliss, writing for the Court, adopted Bouvier's definition of probable cause: [a] reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 181 Tenn. at 381, 181 S.W.2d at 352. In the issuance of a search warrant the magistrate must be informed of the underlying circumstances, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. Little, 560 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. 1978); the warrant may not be issued on the basis of mere conclusions of the affiant, Aguilar, supra , Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507 (1966); nor may it be supported by mere suspicion, Spinelli, supra . The record in this case does not reveal, nor is it contended, that any other evidence except the affidavit was brought to the attention of the magistrate. The reviewing court may consider only the information presented to the magistrate, Aguilar, supra , Spinelli, supra . The magistrate's determination will be sustained if it rests on any substantial basis and substantial deference will be paid to the magistrate; however, the Court will not rubber stamp his action. Aguilar, supra , Spinelli, supra . Thus we test the validity of this warrant by the affidavit pursuant to which it was issued. The full affidavit appears as an appendix to this opinion. In summary, it contains these representations: 1. That the TBI agent received information from a special agent of Exxon Corporation that a credit card, issued to Raymond Kenneth Berry, deceased father of the defendant, was used to purchase gasoline on February 9, 1978, by an individual operating a vehicle titled in defendant's name. 2. That the original charge receipts were mailed on March 15, 1978, to the defendant's father at defendant's address. 3. This credit card and the original charge receipt are material evidence in investigations of murder, robbery and felonious assault ... on the 9th day of February 1978 in Greene County, Tennessee as suspect Russell Keith Berry has given alibi defense to affiant that he did not leave the Nashville, Tennessee area on date of said offense. The affidavit does not set forth the fact that the gasoline purchase was made in Knoxville, Tennessee, on the date of the murder. The magistrate was not given this critical underlying fact. As a maximum, the affidavit suggests the fraudulent use of a gasoline credit card and contains a bald assertion that the named items are material. Beyond the fraudulent use of the credit card, the activities are innocuous, innocent and probative of nothing. The allegation of materiality is, of course, a mere conclusion. In Aguilar v. Texas, supra , the Court said: Although the reviewing court will pay substantial deference to judicial determinations of probable cause, the Court must still insist that the magistrate perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. 378 U.S. at 111, 84 S.Ct. at 1512, 12 L.Ed.2d 727. Further: The Commissioner must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause. He should not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion   . (Emphasis supplied). 378 U.S. at 112, 84 S.Ct. at 1513, 12 L.Ed.2d 727. The Supreme Court of the United States took Spinelli v. United States, supra , [b]elieving it desirable that the principles of Aguilar should be further explicated. 393 U.S. at 412, 89 S.Ct. at 587, 21 L.Ed.2d at 641. Spinelli was convicted of traveling in interstate commerce with the intention of conducting illegal gambling activities. The convicting evidence was obtained by means of a search warrant supported by an affidavit which alleged in substance: 1. On various days Spinelli had been seen crossing the bridge leading from Illinois into St. Louis, Missouri and had been seen parking his car at a St. Louis Apartment house. On one occasion he had been followed to a particular apartment. 2. The records of the Telephone Company revealed that the apartment contained two telephones with different numbers and listed in the name of a person other than the defendant. 3. Spinelli was known to affiant and law enforcement officials as a bookmaker and gambler. 4. A reliable person had informed that Spinelli was conducting a gambling operation by means of these two phones. The Court summarily disposed of the first two items, stating that they reflect only innocent seeming activity and data. 393 U.S. at 414, 89 S.Ct. at 588, 21 L.Ed.2d at 642. With respect to the third item, that Spinelli was known as a gambler and associate of gamblers, the Court bluntly characterized this as being but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision. 393 U.S. at 414, 89 S.Ct. at 588, 21 L.Ed.2d at 643. The Court discredited the fourth item for want of proof of reliability and lack of a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances. The informant in the case at bar was named but the information he supplied, as set fourth in the warrant, was indicative of innocent seeming activity and data. Agent Baird conceded at the suppression hearing that the mere fact of the use of the credit card does not operate to refute defendant's alibi. Yet he says that this use and the fact the credit card was fraudulently obtained and invalid was all he relied upon to support his material evidence charge. The statement that the credit card and charge slip are material evidence is but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight. Clearly, the affidavit in the instant case is not as strong as the judicially condemned affidavit in Spinelli, which the Court could not sustain without diluting important safeguards that assure that the judgment of a disinterested judicial official will interpose itself between the police and the citizenry. 393 U.S. at 419, 89 S.Ct. at 591, 21 L.Ed.2d at 645-46. Our own case of Earls v. State, 496 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tenn. 1973), reminds us that in analyzing the validity of a search warrant, [m]ere affirmance of belief of suspicion is not enough. The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police  which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment  is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in `the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra . The demands of due process take on a broadened significance in death penalty cases, for death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed. 393, 401 (1977). Looking at this record in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was no need for the documents listed in the warrant; viewed from the other end of the spectrum the warrant was a ploy, a subterfuge and a pretext to intrude into the privacy of defendant's home. It is unnecessary to decide which and such a decision is of no consequence because the end result is the same. In either event the search warrant was defective. It was further defective because the affidavit did not give sufficient underlying information, with the result that it basically details innocent seeming activity, with its guilty cast resting upon unsupported conclusions and suspicion. For these reasons I would hold that this search warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee. In my opinion all fruits of the search were inadmissible and the Trial Judge erred in failing to sustain the motion to suppress.