Opinion ID: 2639400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Department of Water Resources Correctly Apply the Doctrine of Resumption of Use?

Text: Idaho Code § 42-222(2) (1990) provides: All rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated and when any right to the use of water shall be lost through nonuse or forfeiture such rights to such water shall revert to the state and be again subject to appropriation under this chapter. Idaho law has contained a similar provision since 1903. [1] This Court has held, however, that abandonments and forfeitures are not favored. Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937). Therefore, although statutory abandonment did actually occur, the forfeiture is not effective if, after the five-year period, the original owner or appropriator resumed the use of the water prior to the claim of right by a third party. Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 531-32, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944). Sagewillow contends that it resumed use of its water rights during the period from 1989 to 1993. The parties disagree as to whether the resumption-of-use doctrine still applies, and, if so, how it should be applied in this case. The Department contends that resumption of use only applies if there are no junior appropriators in the same or an interconnected water source. If there are junior appropriators, then the resumption of use will not apply. According to the Department, as a matter of law the resumption-of-use doctrine only applies to the most junior appropriator. Thus, in this case the Department's conclusion of law regarding resumption of use was as follows: 17. Other users are not required to assert a specific claim to the water rights or water represented by rights held by the user attempting to resume his use. The existence or establishment of a junior water right is sufficient claim to the water. The resumption doctrine cannot restore portions of water rights forfeited by Sage Willow's [sic] predecessor in interest to the detriment of other water right holders. In making its argument, the Department relies upon the following language in Jenkins v. State, Dept. of Water Resources, 103 Idaho 384, 387-88, 647 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (1982) (citations omitted): If a water right has indeed been lost through abandonment or forfeiture, the right to use that water reverts to the state and is subject to further appropriation. Other parties may then perfect a water right in those waters. Hence a person making a subsequent appropriation will be injured by resumption of the abandoned or forfeited water right. If a senior right has been abandoned or forfeited, the priority of the original appropriator is lost, and the junior appropriators move up the ladder of priority. If a senior right which had been forfeited or abandoned were allowed to be reinstated through a transfer proceeding, clearly injury would result to otherwise junior appropriators. Priority in time is an essential part of western water law and to diminish one's priority works an undeniable injury to that water right holder. The Department particularly emphasizes the statement, If a senior right has been abandoned or forfeited, the priority of the original appropriator is lost, and the junior appropriators move up the ladder of priority. The Department construes this statement as holding that if there are junior appropriators, a senior appropriator cannot avoid a forfeiture by resuming use after a five-year period of nonuse. Jenkins did not so hold, however. In Jenkins, the water user did not raise the issue of resumption of use. Thus, this Court did not address the issue of whether resumption of use is applicable to prevent a forfeiture when there were junior water rights on the water source. Rather, the above-quoted statement merely holds that once a water user's rights have been forfeited by nonuse, allowing the water right to be reinstated through a transfer proceeding would harm junior appropriators because once there was a forfeiture the junior appropriators moved up the ladder in priority. As this Court stated in Jenkins, Priority in time is an essential part of western water law and to diminish one's priority works an undeniable injury to that water right holder. 103 Idaho at 388, 647 P.2d at 1260. In Jenkins there was an express finding that the watercourse was overappropriated. There is, however, a connection between harm to junior appropriators as discussed in Jenkins and junior appropriators making a claim to water sufficient to defeat the defense of resumption of use. The junior appropriators would be harmed if there would not be sufficient water to fill their water rights due to the senior appropriator being permitted to resume his use. That would typically occur when the watercourse was overappropriated, as in Jenkins. Conversely, if the watercourse was overappropriated and, after the senior appropriator's five-year period of nonuse, the junior appropriators were using water to the extent it was availablewater that would not have been available had the senior appropriator been filling his water rightthen the junior appropriators would have made a claim to the water not used by the senior appropriator. The mere existence of a junior appropriator, however, is not sufficient to show that the junior appropriator has made a claim of right to the water not used by the senior appropriator. The junior appropriator must also have used the water for a beneficial purpose. For example, in Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Company, 40 Idaho 49, 231 P. 418 (1924), the plaintiffs brought an action to have a portion of a senior appropriator's water right declared forfeited. Both the plaintiffs' and the defendant's water rights had been adjudicated under a prior decree, but the plaintiffs contended that the defendant had for over five years not used its entire decreed right because its canal lacked the capacity to carry that quantity of water. The trial court ruled on behalf of the defendant, but this Court reversed that judgment on appeal. When doing so, this Court stated: [I]t is clear that it [the canal] has never had the capacity to carry the maximum amount of water claimed by respondent and decreed to it in 1909, and from the whole record it is clear that this excess has not been diverted and applied to a beneficial use by respondent, it is subject to the rights of subsequent appropriators under the Frost decree upon their showing that they have so applied this excess. 40 Idaho at 56-57, 231 P. at 420 (emphasis added). The requirement that junior appropriators have used the water is consistent with this Court's statement of the resumption-of-use doctrine that the prior use must be resumed prior to a claim of right by a third party. Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 532, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944). Under the Department's argument, if the three most junior appropriators did not use their water rights for five years, the second and third most junior appropriators would forfeit their water rights, but the most junior appropriator would not. The most junior appropriator, by his mere existence, would be held to have made a claim of right to the water of the second and third most junior appropriators even though none of them used any water. In the instant case, the Department did not make any finding that after the statutory period of nonuse and before resumption of use by Sagewillow and/or its predecessors, any junior appropriator used water that was available because of continued nonuse by Sagewillow and/or its predecessors. [2] The Department likewise did not make any finding that during such period any third party applied for and obtained a water right in the same or an interconnected watercourse. For example, the Department did not find that the two watercourses involved in this case were overappropriated and that because of continued nonuse by Sagewillow and/or its predecessors, junior appropriators received water that they would otherwise not have received. The Department's lack of findings on this issue is further complicated by the fact that because of their priority dates, Sagewillow's surface water rights at issue could be filled only during periods of high water flow. The Department did not find that after the statutory period of nonuse, there was water available that could have been used to fill some or all of Sagewillow's water rights. If no water was available, a third party obviously could not have made a claim to it by applying it to a beneficial purpose. Mays argues that the legislature has abolished the resumption-of-use doctrine by the portion of Idaho Code § 42-222 that provides as follows: Upon proper showing before the director of the department of water resources of good and sufficient reason for nonapplication to beneficial use of such water for such term of five (5) years, the director of the department of water resources is hereby authorized to grant an extension of time extending the time for forfeiture of title for nonuse thereof, to such waters for a period of not to exceed five (5) additional years. This provision was first added to Idaho law in 1933. Ch. 193, 1933 Idaho Sess. Laws 382, 385. It does not by its terms expressly abrogate the resumption-of-use doctrine. Mays contends it did so by implication. Although this Court has not previously addressed Mays' argument, in 1982 this Court stated that the statutory extension of the five-year period provided by Idaho Code § 42-222(2) and the doctrine of resumption of use were both viable defenses to forfeiture. Statutory forfeiture is based upon the legislative declaration in I.C. § 42-222(2) that water rights may be lost if they are not applied to a beneficial use for a period of five continuous years. Certain defenses to forfeiture have been recognized. Extension of the five year period may be made upon a showing of good cause, providing the application for extension is made within the first five-year period. I.C. § 42-222(2). Also wrongful interference with a water right or failure to use the water because of circumstances over which the water right holder has no control have been recognized as defenses. Further, if use of the water right is resumed after the five year period, but before any third parties make a claim in the water, then the courts will decline to declare a forfeiture. Jenkins v. State, Department of Water Resources, 103 Idaho 384, 389, 647 P.2d 1256, 1261 (1982). The two defenses are not mutually exclusive. Both the statutory extension and the resumption-of-use doctrine can operate independently of each other. This Court first acknowledged the resumption-of-use doctrine in 1937, Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937), four years after the enactment of the statutory provision for an extension of the period of nonuse. The statutory extension was obviously not enacted in order to eliminate the doctrine of resumption of use because that doctrine had not yet been announced in Idaho. After the enactment in 1933 of the statutory provision for extension of the five-year forfeiture period, this Court in several cases applied to resumption-of-use doctrine. Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937); Wagoner v. Jeffery, 66 Idaho 455, 162 P.2d 400 (1945); In re Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 248 P.2d 540 (1952). In 1969, the legislature substantially amended the statute providing for the extension of the five-year forfeiture period by adding comprehensive procedures for processing and giving notice of applications for such extensions. Ch. 303, § 2, 1969 Idaho Sess. Laws 905, 908-09. When doing so, the legislature did not amend the statute to eliminate the resumption-of-use doctrine. There is simply no indication that the legislature intended to abolish the resumption-of-use doctrine by enacting the statutory provision for an extension of the five-year period of nonuse in order to avoid a forfeiture. Relying upon language in Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 531-32, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944), Mays also contends that for the resumption-of-use doctrine to apply, it must be the original appropriator who resumes use of the water and not a successor in interest to the original appropriator. The first case in which this Court applied the resumption-of-use doctrine was Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937). In that case, this Court held that resumption of use of water before its appropriation by another prevented the statutory forfeiture of the water right. The resumption of use in that case was not by the original appropriator. Although it is unclear from the facts whether the owner of the water right at the time was the original appropriator, it is clear that the owner of the water right was not the one who resumed use of it. Use of the water right was resumed by persons using the water with permission of the owner of the right and the owner's lessee. This Court has not held that application of the resumption-of-use doctrine is limited to resumption of use by the original appropriator, and we decline to do so. Sagewillow argues that a claim of right by a third party must be the commencement of a judicial or administrative forfeiture action, or a new appropriation of the water, or conduct amounting to adverse possession that would provide notice that the third party is claiming the water. It contends that no such claim of right was shown in this case. This Court has not previously expressly addressed what constitutes a claim of right by a third party. There are three cases, however, in which this Court has applied the doctrine of resumption of use. This Court first applied the resumption-of-use doctrine in Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937). The plaintiffs claimed a total water right of 500 miner's inches from Grimes Creek in Boise County with priority dates of 1933 for 270 inches and 1934 for 230 inches. The defendants claimed a water right of 1000 miner's inches with a priority date of 1905. The defendants' point of diversion was upstream from that of the plaintiffs. Neither the defendants nor their predecessors in interest had used water from Grimes Creek from 1905 to 1932. In 1934 the defendants diverted almost all of the water from Grimes Creek for their claimed 1000-inch water right, thereby shutting off the plaintiffs' supply of water. The plaintiffs immediately filed a lawsuit to enjoin the defendants' use of the water. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed. The defendants' water right was called the Noble right because it was originally appropriated for use on the Noble placer claims. After stating the facts, this Court then declared the resumption-of-use doctrine as follows: It will be noticed that it is the nonuse for five years which works an abandonment. Abandonments and forfeitures are not favored. And even though forfeited and abandoned for five-year periods prior to the time respondents [plaintiffs] initiated their appropriation, if subsequent to such five-year periods, and prior to respondents' appropriation, appellants [defendants] or their predecessors in interest under claim of right and continuity of interest of diversion and application of the Noble water, as such, for mining purposes to the amount applied, rediverted and applied water, there would be no abandonment which could inure to the benefit of respondents. 57 Idaho at 713, 68 P.2d 50. Thus, to avoid forfeiture of their water rights, the defendants would have had to resume use of the water right before the plaintiffs' appropriation. At that time, the plaintiffs could appropriate the water either by diverting it and applying it to a beneficial use or by obtaining a permit from the State Reclamation Department. Silkey v. Tiegs, 51 Idaho 344, 5 P.2d 1049 (1931); Nielson v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. 488 (1911). The plaintiffs in Zezi acquired their 1933 water right for 270 inches by diversion and appropriation to a beneficial use, and they acquired their 1934 water right for 230 inches by obtaining a permit. A third party named Whittle & Company had the right to divert 500 miner's inches of water from a point upstream from both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' points of diversion. This water right was called the Howard right. The defendants had given Whittle & Company permission to use the Noble water right in 1932. During that year, Whittle & Company diverted 700 to 800 inches of water from Grimes Creek. Thus, the issue was whether the water diverted by Whittle & Company in 1932 consisted of 500 inches of the Howard right and 200 to 300 inches of the Noble right, or 700 to 800 inches of the Noble right and none of the Howard right, or some other combination. This Court resolved that issue by stating that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that Whittle & Company did not use the Noble right. Respondents' [plaintiffs'] suit to quiet title as against appellants [defendants] on the theory that there had been an abandonment of the Noble water right placed the burden of proof upon respondents to show that the 700 or 800 inches used by Whittle & Co. in 1932 consisted of the full Howard right for 500 inches, in other words, if the 700 or 800 inches was in fact Noble water, there was no abandonment. 57 Idaho at 714, 68 P.2d at 53. This Court then held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the water used by Whittle & Company was not entirely Noble water, and therefore the trial court should have held that the defendants retained a valid right to 700 miner's inches of water. The uncontradicted evidence shows that Whittle & Co. used between 700 and 800 inches and there is not sufficient evidence showing this was not Noble water to sustain the burden cast upon respondents [plaintiffs]. Whittle & Co. had the right to use both Noble and Howard water. Appellants [defendants] ask no affirmative relief, merely resisted respondents' contention that the Noble water right had been abandoned, and the court should have found that appellants even though they had abandoned all in excess of 700 inches of their original claimed appropriation of 1,000 inches, still retained by Whittle & Co.'s use in 1932 of Noble water, a valid right for 700 inches, as such, which would prevent the barring application of the abandonment statute. 57 Idaho at 714-15, 68 P.2d at 53. This Court next applied the resumption-of-use doctrine in Wagoner v. Jeffery, 66 Idaho 455, 162 P.2d 400 (1945). In 1927 the plaintiff drilled six wells on a forty-acre parcel of unappropriated public land and filed with the federal government an application for a right-of-way to construct a canal across the land to convey water from the wells to his real property. In 1930 he constructed the canal and used it to convey water from the wells to his property, but he did not attempt to use the wells again until 1943. In 1932 the defendants took possession of the land upon which the wells were located. In 1934 the federal government issued plaintiff a right-of-way for the wells and the canal. In 1938 the federal government granted defendants a patent to the land upon which the wells and canal were located, subject to existing water and ditch rights. In December 1943, the plaintiff began cleaning out the canal and enlarging the wells in order to resume use of the water for irrigation. The defendants ordered plaintiff and his employees off the property, and the plaintiff filed suit to enforce his right to the wells and canal. The defendants did not contend that they had ever used any water from the wells for irrigation or any other beneficial purpose. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed. This Court held that under the resumption-of-use doctrine plaintiff did not forfeit his water right by nonuse. In doing so, this Court stated: Abandonments and forfeitures are not favored, and even though forfeited and abandoned for five year periods, if subsequent to such five year periods, respondent again took possession of the right of way and wells in question, as found by the trial court, under a claim of right and continuity of interest, prior to the initiation of any right therein or claim thereto by appellants, there would be no abandonment which could inure to the benefit of appellants. 66 Idaho at 459-60, 162 P.2d at 402. This Court also stated: In the instant case, at the time respondent again took possession of the right of way and the wells in question, Congress had not (and has not) declared a forfeiture, nor had appellants commenced a suit against respondent for the purpose of obtaining a decree of forfeiture. 66 Idaho at 460, 162 P.2d at 402. When summarizing its holding, this Court also stated that in December 1943 the plaintiff had retaken possession of the canal and wells before any intervening right had attached. 66 Idaho at 461, 162 P.2d at 403. The final case is In re Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 248 P.2d 540 (1952). In 1946 Boyer applied to change the point of diversion and the place of use of his water right, both of which had previously been within the geographical confines of the Big Lost River Irrigation District. Boyer's property within the Irrigation District was called his Section 10 lands, and he also owned land outside the District called his Arco lands. When Boyer filed his application, no water had been used on his Section 10 lands for thirty to forty years. The Irrigation District objected to the transfer on the grounds that it would be harmed by the change and that Boyer had forfeited his water rights by nonuse for a period of five years. There was evidence that Boyer had been using the water on his Arco lands. Boyer prevailed before the State Reclamation Department, and the Irrigation District appealed to the district court, where there was a trial de novo. The district court found no forfeiture, and the Irrigation District appealed to this Court. This Court resolved the forfeiture issue as follows: The correct rule was thus, in essence, announced in Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 147 P.2d 1009: `Although statutory abandonment of a water right has occurred, forfeiture is not effective if, after five-year period original owner or appropriator resumes the use of the water prior to claim of right by a third party. (I.C.A., sec.41-216.)' now Section 42-222, I.C. and similarly in Wagoner v. Jeffery, 66 Idaho 455, 162 P.2d 400. No one claims this particular decreed water by adverse possession and clearly, so far as this proceeding is concerned, it was in part at least used by respondent on some of his Arco lands before it was claimed it had been forfeited. The trial court was justified in holding that water had been so used by respondent that he had not abandoned or forfeited his water rights, correctly applying the principles announced in the Carrington and Wagoner cases, supra. 73 Idaho at 160, 248 P.2d at 544. In summary, in the Zezi v. Lightfoot case, this Court stated that the water user had resumed use of its water right prior to the time that others initiated their appropriation. In the Wagoner v. Jeffery case, this Court stated that the water user had retaken possession of his wells and canal prior to the initiation of any right therein by others, before the adverse parties had commenced suit against [him] for the purpose of obtaining a decree of forfeiture, and before any intervening right had attached. In the In re Boyer case, this Court stated that no one claimed the water by adverse possession and the water user had used the water on other lands before it was claimed it had been forfeited. Finally, although not involving the resumption-of-use doctrine, but also relevant, is this Court's statement in Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Company that where a senior appropriator failed to use all of its decreed water right for over five years, the unused excess was subject to the rights of subsequent appropriators under the Frost decree upon their showing that they have so applied this excess. 40 Idaho at 56-57, 231 P. at 420. Under the resumption-of-use doctrine, statutory forfeiture is not effective if, after the five-year period of nonuse, use of the water is resumed prior to the claim of right by a third party. Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 531-32, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944); Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937). A third party has made a claim of right to the water if the third party has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, Wagoner v. Jeffery, 66 Idaho 455, 162 P.2d 400 (1945), or has obtained a valid water right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date prior to the resumption of use, Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937), or has used the water pursuant to an existing water right, Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Company, 40 Idaho 49, 231 P. 418 (1924). [3] Because there can be a partial forfeiture of water rights by nonuse for five years, State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400 (1997), a resumption of use of only a portion of a water right prior to a claim of right by a third party will only prevent the forfeiture of that portion of the water right, Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937) (where use of only 700 miner's inches of water was resumed before a claim of right by a third party, appropriator only retained a right to 700 inches of the original 1000-inch appropriation). The resumption of use must also be upon land to which the water right is appurtenant. McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 20 P.3d 693 (2001). Because the Department based its order upon an erroneous statement of the resumption-of-use doctrine, we must vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.