Opinion ID: 626218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Protection Class-of-One

Text: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified to help protect the equality that had been won in the Civil War, is most familiar as a guard against state and local government discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and other class-based distinctions. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (heightened scrutiny for legal classification based on sex). The Equal Protection Clause has also come to be understood to protect individuals against purely arbitrary government classifications, even when a classification consists of singling out just one person for different treatment for arbitrary and irrational purposes. To state a so-called class-of-one equal protection claim, Geinosky must allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008), citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). We have held that class-of-one claims can be brought based on allegations of the irrational or malicious application of law enforcement powers. E.g., Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that Engquist exemption for public employment decisions does not extend to law enforcement decisions). Although the police are necessarily afforded wide discretion in performing their duties, that discretion does not extend to discriminating against or harassing people. The district court correctly found that nothing bars a properly pled class-of-one equal protection claim in this context, but it erred when it found that Geinosky's pleadings were insufficient to state such a claim. Courts have understood that if class-of-one claims are not defined appropriately, they might turn many ordinary and inevitable mistakes by government officials into constitutional violations and federal lawsuits. One element of a proper class-of-one claim is a wrongful act that necessarily involves treatment departing from some norm or common practice. McDonald, 371 F.3d at 1009. But the purpose of entertaining a `class of one' equal protection claim is not to constitutionalize all tort law nor to transform every claim for improper provision of municipal services or for improper conduct of an investigation in connection with them into a federal case. Id. The appropriate limiting principle must be tailored to the type of government action at issue. For example, because the government traditionally is given even more discretion in its role as employer than in its role as enforcer of the law, public employees simply do not have recourse to class-of-one claims if they are singled out for firing. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 607, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (we are guided, as in the past, by the `common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter'). To bring an equal protection claim, public employees aggrieved by their firing must be able to allege and later prove discrimination against a protected class. Under Engquist, the prohibition on class-of-one claims in the public employment context is categorical. In contrast, in the context of complicated government investigations or prosecutions, we have relied on careful application of the similarly-situated requirement to distinguish between unfortunate mistakes and actionable, deliberate discrimination. E.g., McDonald, 371 F.3d at 1009. When the parties raise a serious question whether differences in treatment stem from a discriminatory purpose or from a relevant factual difference, the key evidence is often what was done in the investigation or prosecution of others in similar circumstances. The Supreme Court also relied on the similarly-situated prong in Olech, in the context of providing municipal services. 528 U.S. at 565, 120 S.Ct. 1073. [2] The district court here invoked the similarly-situated requirement and faulted Geinosky for failing to identify and describe any such individuals. But in this case, requiring Geinosky to name a similarly situated person who did not receive twenty-four bogus parking tickets in 2007 and 2008 would not help distinguish between ordinary wrongful acts and deliberately discriminatory denials of equal protection. Such a requirement would be so simple to satisfy here that there is no purpose in punishing its omission with dismissal. Here, the pattern and nature of defendants' alleged conduct do the work of demonstrating the officers' improper discriminatory purpose. Geinosky's general allegation that defendants intentionally treated plaintiff differently than others similarly situated is sufficient here, where the alleged facts so clearly suggest harassment by public officials that has no conceivable legitimate purpose. To require more would elevate form over substance. Geinosky's complaint states a class-of-one claim in light of the pattern of unjustified harassment he has alleged. [3] Geinosky does not know for certain why he was targeted. He suspects a connection between his estranged wife and officers of Unit 253, but his case would be just as strong if the officers picked him to harass for no reason at all. The complaint clearly tells a story in which Geinosky was targeted. Reason and common sense provide no answer to why he was targeted that could be considered a legitimate exercise of police discretion. Somewhere between the first several and the twentyfourth bogus tickets from officers of the same police unit, Geinosky's grievance rose to the level of an actionable class-of-one discrimination claim. We do not credit the city's assertion that allowing this suit will open the floodgates to a wave of ordinary malicious prosecution (or other tort) cases brought as constitutional class-of-one claims. The extraordinary pattern of baseless tickets that Geinosky received will remain rare, we trust, particularly now that the Police Board and the courts are involved. The litigation floodgates should not open for the additional reason that truly random law enforcement, as when an officer picks one of many speeding cars to stop and ticket, provides a rational basis for the selection even if the ticketed driver feels she was unfairly singled out. Officers have discretion for powerful reasons, not the least of which is the impossibility of ticketing all traffic or parking violations and the ineffectiveness of ticketing none. Because officers must choose among violators, random selection is certainly rational. We are not inviting every driver with a couple of parking tickets (even invalid ones) to sue in federal court. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 604, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (But allowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged action.). But the pattern of conduct alleged here, as the district court correctly wrote, is not a legitimate exercise of discretion. No one has suggested, let alone demonstrated as a matter of law, a rational and proper purpose for the ticketing. On these unusual factsmany baseless tickets that were highly unlikely to have been a product of random mistakesGeinosky's general assertion that other persons were not similarly abused does not require names or descriptions in support. We reverse the dismissal of plaintiff's equal protection claim.