Opinion ID: 1863557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Livestock Neglect.

Text: Iowa Code section 717.2 makes it a crime to neglect livestock. It defines the crime as failing to provide proper care or depriving necessary sustenance to confined livestock. Iowa Code § 717.2(1)(a), (b). [1] The crime is classified as a simple misdemeanor. Id. § 717.2(2). However, if an individual intentionally commits the offense and the livestock suffers serious injury or dies as a result of the neglect, the individual is guilty of a serious misdemeanor. Id. Additionally, this section further defines the units of prosecution available under the statute. It provides that an individual shall not be guilty of more than one offense of livestock neglect punishable as a serious misdemeanor, when care or sustenance is not provided to multiple head of livestock during any period of uninterrupted neglect. Id. (emphasis added). It is this portion of the statute which serves as the basis for the principal issue presented. We must decide if the statute limits the prosecution under the facts of this case to one count of serious misdemeanor livestock neglect.
The State first claims that the motion to dismiss filed by Wells was not the proper mechanism to challenge duplicative counts in the trial information. It claims that the grounds to support a motion to dismiss are specified by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(6)(a) and (c), and do not include duplicative counts of a trial information. We agree with the State that, at the time the trial information was filed in this case, a motion to dismiss was not a proper vehicle to challenge duplicative counts in a trial information without first challenging the sufficiency of the evidence by filing a request for a bill of particulars. [2] State v. Graham, 291 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Iowa 1980). A bill of particulars is a prerequisite to a motion to dismiss an information under rule 10(6)(a). Id. Clearly, Wells did not first request the State to produce evidence to support a multiple count information based upon interrupted or separate incidences of neglect. Nevertheless, the State did not resist the motion to dismiss on the grounds that separate counts were supported by interrupted neglect, but claimed section 717.2 permitted multiple counts even with uninterrupted neglect. The parties acknowledge the issue did not rest on the sufficiency of evidence, but involved an interpretation of the statute. The challenge raised by Wells was presented to the district court on that basis. Under these circumstances, a bill of particulars was unnecessary and the issue was properly raised by the motion to dismiss.
Our legislature has both the power and responsibility to describe crimes and fix punishment. State v. Schmidt, 588 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Iowa 1998); State v. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Iowa 1978); State v. Nelson, 178 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Iowa 1970). Thus, the elements of each offense are derived from the statute. State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980). Similarly, the question of how many convictions are lawful under a statute rests with the legislative intent. State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997); see United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir.1991); Castaldi v. United States, 783 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1986). Any doubt as to the legislative intent of the appropriate units of prosecution must be resolved in favor of the accused. Freisinger, 937 F.2d at 388 (statute which prohibited carrying a firearm during the commission of a drug offense permits multiple counts for carrying multiple firearms); Castaldi, 783 F.2d at 121 (statute prohibiting counterfeiting of any postage stamp permitted multiple counts for each denomination of postage stamps); Kidd, 562 N.W.2d at 766 (statute prohibiting possession of weapon permits multiple counts for multiple weapons). The language of section 717.2 expressly prohibits multiple convictions for a serious misdemeanor offense of livestock neglect when care or sustenance is not provided to multiple head of livestock during any period of uninterrupted neglect. Iowa Code § 717.2(2). The State argues this language means only one conviction can result for serious misdemeanor livestock neglect when the same neglect occurs to a herd of livestock. Yet, the State claims the two horses in this case did not constitute a herd, and were not part of a larger group of horses. We begin by considering our well-established principle of statutory construction that when a statute is plain and its meaning is clear, [we] should not reach beyond the express terms of the statute. Garwick v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 611 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Iowa 2000); see Schmidt, 588 N.W.2d at 419-20; Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Iowa 1986); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01, at 113 (6th ed.2000). We consider legislative intent only when the statutory terms are ambiguous. Garwick, 611 N.W.2d at 289. The terms of the statute are ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ ... as to the meaning of the statute. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996). Moreover, we have held that undefined statutory terms should be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. of Iowa v. Terry, 541 N.W.2d 882, 887-88 (Iowa 1995). We believe section 717.2 is clear and unambiguous. The State's argument substitutes the phrase herd of livestock for head of livestock. In the context of livestock, the word head is commonly defined as one of a number. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 522 (1981); see State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 760 (Iowa 1998) (we consider the context in which the term is used). Thus, multiple head of livestock under the statute plainly refers to more than one. The object of the offense is livestock neglect. The statute seeks to prohibit a person who confines livestock from neglecting the animals. When neglect is uninterrupted or continuous, results in serious injury or death, and involves multiple livestock, the statute makes it clear that only one conviction can result. Multiple convictions are not based on the number of livestock, but on the separate incidents of neglect. [3] See State v. Vandewater, 203 Iowa 94, 100, 212 N.W. 339, 342 (1927) (separate incident of larceny is committed only when different items were taken in separate and distinct transactions). The State further argues that the statute merely defines an affirmative defense which Wells did not raise. It points out that the statute does not prohibit the prosecution of multiple counts, but only provides a person shall not be guilty of multiple offenses. Iowa Code § 717.2(2). We reject the notion that the statute defines an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense places the burden on the defendant to submit evidence to support the defense. See State v. Lawler, 571 N.W.2d 486, 489 (Iowa 1997); State v. Delay, 320 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Iowa 1982). If section 717.2 defined an affirmative defense, the defendant would be required to prove the period of neglect was uninterrupted. We do not interpret the statute to impose such an absurd result. See State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999) (we do not construe a statute in a manner which creates an absurd result). We conclude the statute prohibits prosecution of multiple counts of livestock neglect as a serious misdemeanor based on uninterrupted neglect to multiple head of livestock. When multiple counts are brought in a case involving neglect resulting in serious injury or death of a multiple number of livestock, the period of neglect becomes an element of the crime and each count must be supported by a separate period of uninterrupted neglect. See State v. Butler, 415 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa 1987) (two offenses can be prosecuted out of the same incident if each offense requires proof of a separate element not required in the other offense). Under the evidence as well as the stated theory of the case, Wells was only subject to prosecution for one count of livestock neglect.