Opinion ID: 43822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request for Specific Performance

Text: We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to grant specific performance of a plea agreement. See United States v. Tobon-Hernandez, 845 F.2d 277, 281 (11th Cir. 1988). Following the government’s breach of a plea agreement,1 the district court has two options: (1) order specific performance, which entitles the defendant to resentencing before a different judge in accordance 1 On appeal, the government does not contend that it did not breach the plea agreement. Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the remedies for breach of a plea agreement. 6 with the terms of the plea agreement; or (2) allow the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty and proceed to trial. See id. at 280 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971)). “While the choice of a remedy is within the discretion of the court rather than the defendant, the remedy of withdrawal of the guilty plea has not been favored in this circuit.” United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1527 (11th Cir. 1990). This preference for specific performance recognizes the necessity for the government to honor plea agreements and for courts to ensure that defendants receive the benefit of the bargain they negotiated in exchange for their surrender of certain constitutional rights to trial. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S. Ct. at 499. Where practical considerations would make specific performance problematic, however, withdrawal of the guilty plea is a sufficient remedy for the government’s breach. See United States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368, 372 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that withdrawal was the appropriate remedy because the government’s breaching statements were part of the record that likely would have been examined by a different sentencing judge had specific performance been ordered). Based on the foregoing, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shannahan’s request for specific performance of the plea agreement. As the district court noted, the probation officer’s presentencing investigation report 7 (“PSR”) recommended a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Shannahan’s fax of a document to the ATF regarding the destruction of the Zastava. Accordingly, had the district court granted the specific performance sought by Shannahan, the newly appointed sentencing judge likely would have been confronted with a PSR containing the same recommendation. Consequently, the record containing Shannahan’s responses to questions relating to the fax and the government’s arguments for enhancement in breach of the agreement would have been relevant to, and the subject of, subsequent sentencing proceedings. Thus, based on Taylor, withdrawal was the proper remedy because the grant of specific performance would not have effectively remedied the breach. See id. Moreover, the district court found, and our review of the record confirms, that Shannahan was not consistent in the statements he made under oath during various sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., R6 at 33-34; R10 at 85. Thus, while our preference is to grant specific performance where a defendant has adhered to the terms of the agreement, see United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985, 989 (11th Cir. 1992), the district court found, and we agree, that Shannahan’s conduct did not merit giving him the benefit of the bargain he made. Because the district court “is in a better position to decide whether the circumstances of [a] case require” specific performance or withdrawal, we have adopted a deferential standard of 8 review for district court orders that remedy breaches of plea agreements. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S. Ct. at 499. Based on that standard, and on the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to order specific performance and by allowing Shannahan to withdraw his plea.