Opinion ID: 529826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Informant Identity

Text: 10 We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision denying the motion for disclosure of the informant's identity. United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1299 (9th Cir.1987). The government has a limited privilege to withhold the identity of confidential informants. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. Id. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 627-28. However, the Supreme Court believes no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. Id. at 59, 77 S.Ct. at 627. The Court identified the problem as one that 11 calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. 12 Id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-29. In practice these factors have focused on 1) whether the testimony would be relevant and helpful to the defendants' case, especially in terms of the relationship between the asserted defenses and the likely testimony of the informant, see United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.1979), which in turn will often depend on the degree of involvement by the informant in the charged crime, see United States v. Tenorio-Angel, 56 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir.1985), and 2) the government's interest in protecting the safety of an informant, see United States v. Hernandez-Berceda, 572 F.2d 680, 683 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 949, 98 S.Ct. 2856, 56 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978). 13 The burden of proof is on the defendants to show need for the disclosure. United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1299 (9th Cir.1987). The mere suspicion that information will prove helpful is insufficient to require disclosure. Id. In the present case, the trial court found a minimal threshold showing with regard to at least one defense, to justify the in camera interview, but insufficient information to justify disclosure. 14 Defendants assert that knowing the identity of the informant would have better enabled them to establish outrageous government conduct, entrapment, and lack of knowledge. We have reviewed the district court's in camera interview of the informant and in camera memorandum. The record supports the district court's conclusion that danger to the informant and the government's need to protect his identity and maintain the flow of information through him outweighs the need for his testimony by the defense. There is no indication that the informant could have provided any testimony that would have helped the defense establish outrageous government conduct, entrapment, or lack of knowledge. 15 In Roviaro, the defendant was charged with possession and sale of heroin. The defendant entered the informant's car, which had an officer in the trunk and other officers following it. After driving for a while and trying to lose a suspected tail, they stopped at the curb where the defendant got out of the car and walked to a tree. He reached behind the tree and returned with a pouch. He left it with the informant and then got into another car, which was waiting for him, before the police could stop him. When the officers reached the informant's car they found a pouch containing an opiate-derivative. This pouch and the conversation overheard by the officer in the trunk were admitted as evidence. The informant was not called. 16 In reversing the trial court's denial of disclosure, the Supreme Court emphasized that the informant was the only person with material information of the key evidence admitted against the defendant. And although the defense may not have actually called the informant to testify, that was for the defendant to decide. 17 In the case presently before us, there is no evidence to suggest that the informant was the only percipient witness to any critical event, United States v. Long, 533 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829, 97 S.Ct. 88, 50 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976), as in Roviaro. The informant's testimony would either have been cumulative or insignificant. Furthermore, the government largely avoided reference to the informant's activities throughout its case, relying instead on evidence relating to the defendants' activities at the Kuala Lumpur airport and in Los Angeles and New York, where the DEA had agents engaged in surveillance of the defendants. 18 Assuming, for argument, that the defendants made the required threshold showing as to the proffered defenses to justify consideration of disclosure, we conclude that the informant's testimony would not have been relevant and helpful, Rovario, 353 U.S. at 60, 77 S.Ct. at 627, to the defense. With respect to the defense of lack of knowledge, the informant's interview indicates that, to the extent the informant's testimony would not have been cumulative of other evidence, any assistance provided to the defense would not have been significant, and at any rate the vast bulk of the testimony would have been unfavorable to the defense. In fact, the defendants were able to introduce significant evidence to support several of the claims for which they claim they needed the informant's testimony. 19 The informant's testimony would have been even less helpful to the proffered defense of entrapment. Absolutely nothing in the informant's interview indicates that his testimony would tend to establish that government agents induced the defendants to participate in the importation of heroin. There is no suggestion that any governmental agent was responsible for ... conduct which implants a criminal disposition. United States v. Goodacre, 793 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993, 107 S.Ct. 595, 93 L.Ed.2d 595 (1986). Furthermore, nothing in the informant's testimony would indicate that the defendants were not predisposed to commit the offenses charged in this case. Id. (no entrapment defense if defendants were predisposed to commit the crime). 20 Similarly, there is nothing in the informant's interview that suggests outrageous government conduct. There is no indication that government agents manufactured the crime or that the crime was generated merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges against the defendant[s]. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir.1983). 21 Comparing the government's strong interest in protecting the valuable resources of the informant in drug investigations with the limited benefit that would accrue to the defendants' defense satisfies us that the trial court's denial of disclosure was not an abuse of discretion.