Opinion ID: 2411071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: state officeholders

Text: We next examine the constitutionality of Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment 73 relating to term limits on State executive and legislative officeholders. The circuit court, though it invalidated the entire amendment for lack of an Enacting Clause, ruled that Sections 1 and 2 do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. We concur with this ruling. Individual states have limited the terms of their officeholders for decades, albeit more in the context of their governors than their legislators. See Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F.Supp. 816, 821 (S.D.Ohio 1993). In the case before us, the policy and interest of the State of Arkansas was expressed in the Preamble to Amendment 73: The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the terms of elected officials. In counterpoint to the State's interest, as expressed by the adoption of Amendment 73, are the interests of current State officeholders and their supporters such as appellee Hill. We have already referred in this opinion to those legitimate interests in the political process which are protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the right to candidacy is not a fundamental right requiring close scrutiny. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); see also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (plurality decision). A second question, though, is whether the right of a person such as appellee Hill to participate in a person's political campaign or to vote for a candidate is fundamental in nature so as to warrant a compelling state interest to offset it. Separating the rights of the candidate from those of the supporter may be difficult. The Court observed in 1992 that the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation. Burdick v. Takushi, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2065-2066, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992), quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), the Court weighed the speech and association interests of voters for and supporters of John Anderson, an independent candidate for president of the United States, against the State of Ohio's asserted interest in protecting political stability by setting an early filing deadline. The Court held that the supporters' interests unquestionably outweighed the State's regulatory interests. The proper standard for resolving the assessment of the State's interest and the burden on supporters has since been described as a more flexible standard dependent on the severity of the burden. Burdick v. Takushi, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). However, not every burden on the right to vote is subject to strict scrutiny or requires a compelling state interest to justify it. Id. The California Supreme Court, in the wake of the Anderson case, considered the effect of a constitutional amendment fixing term limits on elected state officials. Legislature of the State of California v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1292, 117 L.Ed.2d 516 (1992). That Court weighed the interests of the voters and supporters of certain candidates against the will of the electorate limiting incumbent terms and held that the amendment would prevail irrespective of whether a rational basis standard or a compelling state interest standard was employed. The Court stated: In sum, it would be anomalous to hold that a statewide initiative measure aimed at restor[ing] a free and democratic system of fair elections, and encourag[ing] qualified candidates to seek public office (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5), is invalid as an unwarranted infringement of the rights to vote and to seek public office. We conclude the legitimate and compelling interests set forth in the measure outweigh the narrower interests of petitioner legislators and the constituents who wish to perpetuate their incumbency. 286 Cal.Rptr. at 303, 816 P.2d at 1329. It is not the function of this court to agree or disagree with the purpose and rationale behind Amendment 73. It is our function to determine whether the Amendment expresses such a legitimate and sufficient state interest that the rights of the supporters and the incumbents must yield. We hold that the state interest, as expressed in the Preamble to Amendment 73, is sufficiently rational and even compelling when weighed against the residual burden placed on the rights and privileges of elected officeholders and those desiring to support them.