Opinion ID: 348609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the purposes of title vii

Text: 38 We find, therefore, that both the plain language of the statute itself and the case law in which that language has been applied support the District Court's decision. In addition, we are compelled to note that adoption of the position urged by appellant would seriously impinge on effective implementation of Title VII's established purposes. 24 39 In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, the Supreme Court construed Title II's attorney fee provision which, as already discussed, is slightly narrower but otherwise identical to that of Title VII. In ruling that the congressional policy of encouraging private enforcement of civil rights legislation required a construction favoring wide availability of attorneys' fees, the Court stated: 40 When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law.    41 390 U.S. at 401, 88 S.Ct. at 966 (footnote omitted). Relatedly, the Court also noted that Congress    enacted the provision for counsel fees not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II. Id. at 402, 88 S.Ct. at 966. 25 Similarly, the attorney fee provision of Title VII has the broad purpose of abetting enforcement of that Title by encouraging individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek the relief made available thereunder relief for which administrative proceedings are essential. 42 Specifically, Piggie Park held that, notwithstanding the statutory language that the District Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party fees and costs, the purpose of encouraging private enforcement dictated that one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. 390 U.S. at 402, 88 S.Ct. at 966. Piggie Park was explicitly cited with approval in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), the leading decision as to when attorneys' fees may be awarded. 43 Courts construing the fees and costs provisions of Title VII have adopted the Piggie Park rationale that statutes authorizing award of attorneys' fees as part of private enforcement schemes in the Civil Rights Act should be broadly interpreted. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1974), the court said with respect to Section 706(k): This Court, as part of its obligation 'to make sure that Title VII works,' has liberally applied the attorney's fee provision of Title VII, recognizing the importance of private enforcement of civil rights legislation. (Footnote omitted.) This court adopted the liberal construction of Section 706(k), as enunciated in Johnson, in Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, supra, 503 F.2d at 187-189. Furthermore, failure to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in a Title VII action has been held an abuse of the District Court's discretion. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., supra, 438 F.2d at 88. 44 The policy favoring private enforcement of Title VII is arguably even more compelling when a federal agency or official is the defendant. Unlike private sector employees, federal employee complainants are not merely private attorneys general; they are the only attorneys general under the enforcement scheme adopted in Section 717, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975). Suits in behalf of federal employees by the Attorney General or EEOC are not authorized against federal agencies. Indeed, the Attorney General is frequently counsel for the other side. 26 Also unlike private sector employees, federal employees must first bring their employment discrimination grievances, not to an independent state or local administrative body 27 or to EEOC, but to the very agency about whose practices they are complaining. Id. 28 Partly for these reasons, no doubt, courts consistently have awarded attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases in which a federal agency is the defendant. E. g., McMullen v. Warner, supra; Johnson v. United States, supra; Smith v. Kleindienst, 8 F.E.P. 752 (D.D.C.), aff'd, sub nom. Smith v. Levi, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 527 F.2d 853 (1975) (decision without opinion); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F.Supp. 145 (N.D.Tex.1974). 45 Appellant insists, however, that in awarding attorneys' fees a distinction should be made between administrative and judicial enforcement of Title VII. Appellant's entire argument clashes sharply with the clearly perceived structure and aims of the Title. From the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Title VII enforcement scheme has included both administrative proceedings and judicial actions. In a passage already quoted 29 from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, 415 U.S. at 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, the Supreme Court emphasized the interrelatedness of Title VII's administrative and judicial enforcement scheme in the private sector. And in numerous passages quoted 30 from Brown v. GSA, supra, the Court stressed that Title VII's administrative and judicial enforcement scheme for federal employees was at least as interrelated. 46 Essentially, appellant's position on whether attorneys' fees for representation at the administrative level are necessary to effectuate Title VII policy is an internally inconsistent attempt to have it both ways. On the one hand, appellant argues that payment of attorneys' fees relates only to a fringe benefit, not to a substantive or procedural defect of the administrative factfinding process that would prevent equitable resolution of an employee grievance. Moreover, appellant asserts, administrative proceedings in a federal sector Title VII case are non-adversarial. On the other hand, appellant also contends that while the governing regulations give an employee the right to be accompanied, represented, and counseled by a representative of his own choosing at every stage of the proceedings, see 5 C.F.R. § 713.214(b) (1977), paid counsel is unnecessary at this time since employees often have available the services of an attorney without charge. 31 47 Appellant thus seems uncertain whether he wants to argue that for services at the administrative level (1) attorneys' fees are unnecessary because attorneys are unnecessary, or (2) attorneys' fees are unnecessary because, although attorneys are necessary, compensation is not. In any event, we can accept neither argument. 48 To support his contention that an employee in federal sector Title VII administrative proceedings does not need a lawyer, appellant cites the Discrimination Complaints Examiners Handbook (1973), published by the Office of Federal Equal Employment Opportunity. In fact, however, the contents of the Handbook could more accurately be cited for just the opposite proposition. The Handbook offers the self-description that it sets forth the basic ground rules which will enable the Examiner to conduct a fair and impartial hearing and render a just decision in discrimination complaint cases. Id., Foreword. In outlining the nature of such a hearing the Handbook sketches a process in which, though not indispensable, lawyers would clearly be of assistance to a lay person. For example, the Handbook makes provision for continuances and describes the grounds for granting or denying them (id. at 20-21), provides for receipt of stipulations (id. at 38), speaks to relevancy, materiality, and repetitiousness as matters of concern when ruling on admissibility (id. at 47-48), and entitles the parties to participate in drafting written interrogatories (id. at 29). The Handbook, and federal regulations, make clear that in a Title VII administrative hearing the employee is expected to put evidence into the record, offer proof, argue against exclusion of evidence, agree on stipulations, and examine and cross- examine witnesses. See 5 C.F.R. Part 713 (1977). Settlement of the charge is possible at any stage of the proceedings and agreements may, accordingly, have to be negotiated and rights may be waived. 49 Furthermore, the agency's representative is likely to be a lawyer, which can only serve to exacerbate a non-lawyer plaintiff's disadvantage. Any realistic assessment of Title VII administrative proceedings requires the conclusion that despite the fact they are not strictly adversarial an employee would often be ill-advised to embark thereon without legal assistance. Indeed, the services a lawyer may be called upon to perform at the administrative level are well illustrated by the instant litigation. Appellee's counsel has attested that in the course of the administrative proceedings she drafted two administrative complaints and a lengthy affidavit, compiled exhibits, interviewed witnesses, responded to inquiries from the agency investigator, conducted legal research at the request of the agency equal employment opportunity officer, and negotiated a settlement of all charges. Affidavit of Linda P. Singer, JA 20-21. 50 Turning to appellant's contention that free legal services are available to federal employees in Title VII administrative complaints we note initially that the factual accuracy of the point is disputed. Appellee has submitted an affidavit by the Program Director of the District of Columbia Bar Association Employment Discrimination Complaint Service which asserts that there is a shortage of both private and government attorneys who are able to provide the time-consuming representation that is necessary for these government EEO cases, within the financial means of the complainants. Appellee's br., Attachment A, P 11. We do not propose to resolve on appeal this factual dispute. We do observe, however, that appellant, in arguing that free legal services are available, relies in part on the availability of attorneys from the employee's own agency. Appellant's br. at 28. Without questioning in any way the competence or integrity of such attorneys, we find this an unsatisfactory alternative to allowing a plaintiff to choose his own counsel from outside his particular agency. A plaintiff who is asked to rely on an attorney from within the very agency about whose practices he is complaining may lack faith in the objectivity of the proceeding. We fear that the absence of independent counsel could only compound the conflict of interest that might be perceived to exist when the agency accused of discrimination must process and rule on the claim. 32 51 In addition to being inconsistent with the recognized policies of Title VII, the distinction between attorneys' fees for services at the administrative and judicial levels is inconsistent with the realities of legal practice. For a conscientious lawyer representing a federal employee in a Title VII claim, work done at the administrative level is an integral part of the work necessary at the judicial level. Most obviously an attorney can investigate the facts of his case at a time when investigation will be most productive. The attorney may thus gain the familiarity with the facts of the case that is so important in the fact-intensive area of employment discrimination. Perhaps even more important, the administrative proceedings allow the attorney to help make a record that can be introduced at any subsequent District Court trial. 33 Especially in an instance where development of a thorough administrative record results in an abbreviated but successful trial, refusing to award attorneys' fees for work at the administrative level would penalize the lawyer for his pre-trial effectiveness and his resultant conservation of judicial time. Simply to describe the operation of appellant's suggested distinction between attorneys' fees at the administrative and judicial levels is to emphasize its irrationality.