Opinion ID: 614604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 1 Statutory Framework of the ECPA

Text: As noted, Suzlon filed a petition for production of documents to assist in the Australian Proceedings. Suzlon sought this relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which states in part: The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. . . . The Ninth Circuit has previously held that the ECPA limits § 1782 by making it illegal for an entity that provides an electronic communication service to the public to produce the contents of its stored communications. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071-72, 1077 (9th Cir.2004) (finding that a civil subpoena to plaintiff's internet service provider violated the ECPA). The relevant provision of the ECPA states that a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). The ECPA defines electronic communication service as any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). The ECPA defines a user as  any person or entity who(A) uses an electronic communication service; and (B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(13) (emphasis added). The question now presented is whether the protections of the ECPA extend to the contents of communications of foreign citizens. In other words, does the mere fact that Sridhar happens to lack U.S. citizenship mean that Microsoft has to produce his emails under a § 1782 order? The answer depends on the proper interpretation of any person in § 2510(13). To resolve this dispute, the Court turns to the plain text of the statute.