Opinion ID: 2197150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dual Nature of Comparative Sentencing Analysis

Text: An unstated but underlying theme in the majority opinion is that comparative sentencing analysis is something that could help only defendants. The majority does not acknowledge that the State could use comparative sentencing analysis in support of its position, but clearly the State could do so. The State could argue in the trial court that a defendant deserved a very harsh sentence because other defendants who committed similar crimes also received lengthy sentences. In the appellate court, the State could argue that a defendant's sentence was justified based upon other sentences received by similarly situated defendants. The dual nature of comparative sentencing analysis can best be seen in this court's decision in People v. Smith, 177 Ill.2d 53, 226 Ill.Dec. 425, 685 N.E.2d 880 (1997). Smith was issued two years ago, before this court decided to find comparative sentencing analysis objectionable. This court vacated the defendant's death sentence based on a review of other cases in which the death penalty was found excessive. Smith, 177 Ill.2d at 98-101, 226 Ill.Dec. 425, 685 N.E.2d 880. The discussion on this issue began, An analysis of previous cases where this court has found a death sentence to be excessive is useful. Smith, 177 Ill.2d at 98, 226 Ill.Dec. 425, 685 N.E.2d 880. What this court found useful two years ago, it now forbids other courts from considering. Three justices dissented in Smith and used comparative sentencing analysis to support their position. The dissenting justices reviewed cases in which defendants had relatively clean criminal records, yet still received the death penalty. See Smith, 177 Ill.2d at 114-15, 226 Ill.Dec. 425, 685 N.E.2d 880 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Bilandic and Heiple, JJ.). Thus, comparative sentencing arguments could be made by both the State and defendants, and the majority's apparent fear of the one-sided nature of this type of analysis is unfounded. An additional problem with the majority's fear of defendants making comparative sentencing arguments is that, under the majority's rule, defendants will now look for any evidence that the sentencing judge used a comparative sentencing approach instead of carefully crafting a sentence based on the individual's circumstances. Any statement by the trial judge or State's Attorney that the defendant should receive the typical or usual sentence for a person in the defendant's position could amount to reversible error. Under a discretionary system, that would not be the case. The majority's approach will severely hamper judges in sentencing defendants for frequently occurring minor offenses.