Opinion ID: 200079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reasonableness of the State Court Decision.

Text: 76 We are left with the question of whether the state court's balancing of the four Barker factors was reasonable. In answering this question, the AEDPA requires that we cede substantial deference to the state court's legal and factual conclusions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2), (e)(1). This deference is heightened in a Barker -type case, because constructing a balance among the four factors is more judicial art than science. Look, 725 F.2d at 8. 77 As the district court observed, the opinion of the Massachusetts Appeals Court is not very comprehensive. We find it disconcerting that the opinion did not discuss explicitly the consideration most favorable to the petitioner — the Commonwealth's negligence in not bringing him to trial during his stint in a Texas jail. It is not our function, however, to grade a state court opinion as if it were a law school examination. Rather, we review the state court's ultimate findings and conclusions to ascertain whether they constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Ouber, 293 F.3d at 34; Bui, 170 F.3d at 243. 78 In this instance, the state court supportably determined that a sizable portion of the delay was caused by the defendant, that his conduct after he was indicted reflected inaction and avoidance on his part (rather than an intent to press his speedy trial claim), and that he had failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice. Under the applicable Supreme Court precedents, these determinations suffice to ground a denial of the petitioner's speedy trial claim. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (explaining that a defendant who cannot show that he wanted a speedy trial must carry a heavy burden on the other factors).