Opinion ID: 361114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction over Paragraphs B-D of Count I of Indictment

Text: 9 Defendants next contend that apart from the alleged mail fraud violation (under 18 U.S.C. § 1341) described in paragraph A of Count I, the other objects of the conspiracy, Viz., the alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f), 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 7 U.S.C. § 270, do not constitute offenses against the United States over which the district court had jurisdiction under the facts shown in the rest of the indictment. 10 (a) Bribery Charge 11 Paragraph B of Count I describing bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) as one of the objects of the conspiracy is based on defendants' promising money to Kinley E. Gunder and Gary L. Byrd, both grain inspectors licensed by the United States Department of Agriculture under 7 U.S.C. § 252 and regulations thereunder (7 C.F.R. § 102.61 Et seq.). Defendants contend that those grain inspectors were not public officials within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) which proscribes bribing any public official for past or future official acts. It is true that the inspectors were employed by Central Soya rather than by the Government. However, Congress provided for such grain inspectors to act on behalf of the Department of Agriculture in an official capacity. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 252, 256. That is sufficient to make them public officials because the bribery statute defines a public official as a person acting for or on behalf of    any department (of the United States)    in any official function, under or by authority of any such department     (18 U.S.C. § 201(a)). 3 12 Privately employed licensed grain inspectors under the United States Grain Standards Act 4 (7 U.S.C. §§ 71, 74, 79, 84-87h) and regulations thereunder have been considered public officials under 18 U.S.C. § 201(g). United States v. Fleetwood, 528 F.2d 528, 529 (5th Cir. 1976). 5 Similarly, Gunder and Byrd, licensed under the United States Warehouse Act, meet the definition of public official in 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) since they were acting on behalf of the Department of Agriculture by issuing the certificates required by the Warehouse Act and its implementing regulations. Therefore bribing them constitutes an offense against the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 201(f). In reaching this conclusion, we reject the defendants' principal contention, which in different guises underlies each of their objections to the jurisdiction of the district court under this indictment. The defendants insist that the Warehouse Act confers jurisdiction on the Department of Agriculture only over bailments of grain and not, as is the case here, over purchases of grain which is then stored by the purchaser in its own licensed warehouse. The argument turns on whether the term stored as used in the Act is the equivalent of bailed or is to be understood more colloquially as held for future use. 13 The Warehouse Act empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to provide for the licensing of inspectors of any agricultural product or products, stored or to be stored in a licensed warehouse (7 U.S.C. § 252). These provisions of the statute are implemented by 7 C.F.R. § 102.19, which requires all storage and non-storage grain received into a licensed warehouse to be inspected, graded and weighed by a licensed inspector. Non-storage grain is defined in 7 C.F.R. § 102.2(k) as 14 Grain received temporarily into a warehouse for conditioning, transferring, assembling for shipment, or lots of grain moving through a warehouse for current merchandising or milling use, against which no receipts are issued and no storage charges assessed   . 15 The regulations thus explicitly adopt a broad, nontechnical interpretation of stored grain to include all grain kept in a licensed warehouse, not merely grain which is held as a bailment and for which warehouse receipts have been issued. Although the defendants correctly note that non-storage grain is not defined in the statute, they do not directly attack the regulations. Judge Steckler expressly adopted a broad interpretation of stored which is consistent with the regulations (Tr. 383-384, 472-474). We think this is the correct reading of the statutory language. 16 Defendants insist that the purpose of the Act was to foster confidence in warehouse receipts for grain stored as a bailment in order to facilitate financing. While this clearly was an important purpose of the Act, the legislative history suggests that broader goals of protecting the agricultural commodities themselves and establishing consistent standards also motivated the Act's passage. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235 n. 13, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447. In any event, the statutory language does not support the narrow reading advocated by defendants. 6 17 We conclude that it is immaterial that the grain delivered by defendants to Central Soya Company was sold to it rather than merely stored with it, since Central Soya's storage of the purchased grain in its own warehouse brings the Act into play. The term warehouse as used in the Warehouse Act includes every building    in which any agricultural product is or may be stored (7 U.S.C. § 242). Since the Act provides for the licensing of inspectors of any agricultural product or products, stored or to be stored in a licensed warehouse (7 U.S.C. § 252), such inspectors, including the defendants here, are public officials for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 201. 18 (b) False Statements Charge 19 Paragraph C of Count I describing false statements in violation of18 U.S.C. § 1001 as another object of the conspiracy charges that defendants caused false and incorrect United States Warehouse Act inspection and weight certificates to be executed and issued under the Warehouse Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 241 Et seq.). Counsel for defendants again argues that paragraph C does not allege an offense against the United States because the false statements were made to Central Soya, a private purchaser of grain. However, as explained above, 7 U.S.C. § 252 places the regulation of the storage of agricultural products in all licensed warehouses within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture. Because this object of the conspiracy was to have Gunder and Byrd in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department    of the United States make any knowingly false, fictitious or fraudulent statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), the false statement statute has been satisfied. Ebeling v. United States, 248 F.2d 429, 434 (8th Cir. 1957), certiorari denied, 355 U.S. 907, 78 S.Ct. 334, 2 L.Ed.2d 261; see also Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70-71, 90 S.Ct. 355, 24 L.Ed.2d 264; United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1974). 20 (c) Issuance of False Weight and Inspection Certificates 21 Paragraph D of Count I, describing the issuance of false and fraudulent weight certificates in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 270 7 as the fourth object of the conspiracy, is based on defendants' causing Gunder and Byrd to issue such documents. Defendants again reiterate their view that paragraph D does not charge an offense against the United States because it covers the purchase and sale of grain rather than storage. However, as already pointed out, the United States Warehouse Act does cover the Central Soya warehouse and the certification of grain stored in it. The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to prescribe rules and regulations with respect to such certification (7 U.S.C. § 252) and defendants admit that these inspection and weight certificates were approved by the Department of Agriculture (Br. 13). The regulations provide that after the weighing and inspection of the grain, the inspector is to issue an inspection and weight certificate (7 C.F.R. §§ 102.65, 102.67, 102.68). Copies of such certificates must be kept by the inspector for one year, with another copy being filed with the warehouse (7 C.F.R. § 102.69). The regulations require the inspection of all grain coming into a licensed warehouse (7 C.F.R. §§ 102.19, 102.44). Since these regulations are authorized by the Warehouse Act (7 U.S.C. § 268), defendants' argument that paragraph D does not charge facts constituting an offense against the United States must fail. 22 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court correctly refused to dismiss Count I of the indictment and to deny the motions for acquittal insofar as they related to this subject matter.