Opinion ID: 504371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: remaining issues on usx's cross-appeal

Text: 81 Finally, we address the remaining issues raised by USX in its cross-appeal. We find that each of the contentions raised is without merit, and therefore we will affirm the district court's judgment as to those claims.
82 USX argues that the district court erred by certifying the class because the claims raised were not sufficiently typical as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). 18 USX asserts that, because its personnel who were charged with hiring responsibility based their decisions upon varied subjective criteria, each instance of alleged discrimination was necessarily distinct and, therefore, that the certification of the class was improper. 83 This contention rests in part upon the same rationale that USX asserts with regard to the applicability of disparate impact analysis to this case--that where subjective criteria are employed, it is necessary to evaluate each instance of discrimination independently. As we noted above, we find nothing in Title VII that requires that result. The argument is similarly unpersuasive in this context. It completely misperceives the typicality requirement of Rule 23. That rule requires that class representatives present sufficiently common issues of law and fact upon which the class action is based, to assure that the interests of the absent class members will be adequately represented. As we noted in Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Weinstein v. Eisenberg, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S.Ct. 342, 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), however,  '[t]ypical' is not identical. Our review under this first requirement of Rule 23 is to assure that the claims presented by the class representatives are consistent with those presented by the entire class. [T]ypicality entails an inquiry whether 'the named plaintiff's individual circumstances are markedly different or ... the legal theory upon which the claims are based differs from that upon which the claims of other class members will perforce be based.'  Id. (quoting Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 809 n. 36 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060, 105 S.Ct. 1777, 84 L.Ed.2d 836 (1985)). We are satisfied that the district court correctly applied this test in its certification of the class, and therefore we will not disturb its judgment. 84 Similarly, we find that the district court was correct in its decision not to decertify the class. In essence, USX argues that the specific claim presented by the named plaintiff Danley became moot when the class as a whole dropped from its claim allegations of discrimination regarding the particular year in which Danley had made his application to USX. For that reason, USX contends that the district court should have decertified the plaintiff class. This assertion is also incorrect. 85 The Supreme Court has instructed, in a similar case in which the named representative could not maintain a viable individual claim, that the class can maintain its claims so long as  'a live controversy [remains] at the time'  the case is reviewed. Franks, 424 U.S. at 755, 96 S.Ct. at 1260 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, 95 S.Ct. 553, 559, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975)) (brackets in original). The Court held in Franks that, [a]lthough the named representative no longer had a personal stake in the outcome, ... '[w]hen the District Court certified the propriety of the class action, the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named representative],' ... and, accordingly the 'cases or controversies' requirement of Art. III of the Constitution was satisfied. Id. at 753, 96 S.Ct. at 1259 (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402, 95 S.Ct. at 559). These same circumstances are present in this case. Despite the fact that Danley's individual claim was no longer viable, the class retained claims that clearly presented the district court and this Court  'with a case or controversy in every sense contemplated by Art. III of the Constitution.'  Id. at 755, 96 S.Ct. at 1260 (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 398, 95 S.Ct. at 557). 86 In Goodman, we noted that a broad view of Rule 23 in Title VII claims was proper. Thus we found that, although racial bias in the discharges during employee probationary periods was a class claim, and that none of the named representatives were dismissed during their probationary periods, the claims of discharge in employment overall were nonetheless sufficiently common to justify class certification. See 777 F.2d at 123. We noted, however, that an expansive view of Rule 23 does not obviate the necessity that each requirement of that rule be met. Accordingly, we found with regard to another aspect of the class's claims, racial discrimination in the initial assignment of new employees, that the named plaintiffs were not sufficiently representative of the class. That finding, however, is distinct from the issue presented in the present case. In Goodman, we had determined that the named representatives' claims regarding discrimination in initial assignments fell outside the applicable limitations period. Thus, the question of the sufficiency of the named parties of the class was jurisdictional because their claims were no longer actionable. In this case, the named representative, Danley, did not prevail on his claim because the evidence supporting discrimination during the year in which he was hired was insufficient. That conclusion, however, did not affect the commonality of Danley's claims with the remainder of the class. For this reason, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the motion for decertification of the class. 19
87 Finally, we review USX's contention that the district court erred by its award of damages to applicants for summer employment. USX argues that [n]owhere in the District Court's liability decision ... did the Court find as a matter of fact or law that USX unlawfully discriminated against black applicants for summer employment in 1972 and/or 1973. Brief For Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 42. This argument, however, misstates the findings of the district court. We conclude that the district court's opinion clearly included applicants for summer employment in the class to which USX was liable. 88 In its order dated August 26, 1980 certifying the class, the district court stated that the plaintiff class was comprised of [a]ll black persons who unsuccessfully sought employment at the Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania Plant of [USX] between July (11) (sic), 1972, and the [date of this order]. Green, 570 F.Supp. at 256. That order was never amended to exclude summer applicants from the plaintiff class, and there is no indication that the district court contemplated that this sub-class was to be severed from the overall class. To the contrary, in several instances in its opinion, the district court made particular reference to the summer applicants. See id. at 257 (Findings of Fact p 16) ([a]pproximately 15% of new P & M hires during the class period were hired for summer jobs); id. at 271 (Findings of Fact p 128) (questioning the statistical evidence presented by USX's expert, and noting that part of the reason for the doubt was that the expert's data did not include applications submitted by persons seeking summer jobs, although they are members of the class ) (emphases supplied). We are convinced by these references, and by our review of the record, that the district court made findings of fact regarding the summer hires that justified inclusion of this sub-class in the damage award. In this light, USX's challenge regarding the summer applicants is more appropriately characterized as an assertion that the record does not support the liability determination that the district court made. On this question, our standard of review is whether the court's findings were clearly erroneous, see Pullman, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, and our conclusion is that they were not. 89 In our review of the propriety of the factual findings of the district court, we need only determine whether the decision that it reached was reasonable--not whether a different conclusion would also have been reasonable. Before we may properly intrude upon any factual finding that the district court made, we must be left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). In this case, we are not in this way convinced of any error by the district court. 90 Although much of the data regarding summer hires for the years in question was unavailable, we note that the reason for that unavailability was USX's destruction of all of the applications for employment prior to 1975. See Green, 570 F.Supp. at 261 (Findings of Fact p 49). Notwithstanding this fact, the class's statistical expert, Dr. Litwin, was able to present findings to the district court that [USX's] hiring had a statistically significant negative and disparate impact upon blacks during the overall class period [,] ... [and this conclusion was] the same whether summer hires were included or excluded. Id. at 265 (Findings of Fact p 83) (emphasis supplied). 91 In our view, the inferences that the district court drew from these facts were reasonable. We are not left with the certain impression that the district court's findings that the summer hires should be included in the overall class for the purpose of determining liability were clearly erroneous. Therefore, we will affirm this aspect of the district court's judgment.