Opinion ID: 209435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Employee and Labor Relations Manual

Text: Although section 6323 does not apply to the Postal Service, agency employees are entitled to military leave under the provisions of the ELM. Under current regulations, the agency does not charge non-workdays falling within a period of military service against an employee's military leave. See ELM § 517 (effective Sept. 8, 2001). But in 1999, the year in which Welshans' disputed leave was charged, the ELM provided that: Nonworkdays falling within a period of absence for active duty are charged against the paid military leave allowed for full-time employees during the fiscal year, but nonworkdays falling at the beginning and end of an active duty period are not charged. ELM § 517.53. Thus, during the relevant time period, the ELM unambiguously required that the Postal Service charge non-workdays falling within a period of absence for military duty against military leave. Notwithstanding the fact that the plain language of the ELM in effect in 1999 required the agency to charge non-workdays against military leave, Welshans contends that the Postal Service intended to provide its employees with rights analogous to those provided to other federal employees by section 6323. In support, he argues that [t]he [Postal Service] originally implemented a policy that mirrored the [f]ederal law [in 5 U.S.C. § 6323] and then routinely amended that policy to reflect changes in the prevailing federal law despite the fact that it was under no statutory obligation to do so. In essence, Welshans argues that the Postal Service intended to impliedly integrate all section 6323 rights into the ELM. Welshans acknowledges, however, that he did not raise this argumenteither before the administrative judge or the board. We decline, therefore, to consider it on appeal. See Rockwell v. Dep't of Transp., 789 F.2d 908, 913 (Fed.Cir.1986) (Our precedent clearly establishes the impropriety of seeking a reversal of the board's decision on the basis of assertions never presented to the presiding official or to the board.). Although there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), no such circumstances are present here. It would be manifestly unfair for this court to resolve the question of whether the Postal Service intended to impliedly integrate section 6323 rights into the ELM without giving the government an opportunity to present evidence on the issue. [] See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941) (An appellate court's refusal to consider new arguments on appeal is essential in order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues ... [and] in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.).