Opinion ID: 2582415
Heading Depth: 2
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Heading: Evolution of Colorado's Conflict of Laws Jurisprudence

Text: Colorado's conflict of laws jurisprudence has evolved significantly over the last several decades, in keeping with changes to the majority rule applied by most states. During the late nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth century, the majority conflicts of law principle was that Lex loci delecti ÔÇö the law of the place of the wrong ÔÇö governed the tort action. See Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 570-71 (2d ed.1992); Restatement of the Conflict of Laws  7 (1934). This rule was consistent with Colorado law at that time. See First Nat'l Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 440-41, 514 P.2d 314, 316 (1973) (citing Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821 (1877)); Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Warring, 37 Colo. 122, 86 P. 305 (1906)). Under this rule, courts often held that the law governing a cause of action in tort also governed damages because the measure of damages is inseparably connected to the cause of action. Scoles & Hay, supra, at 576 (citing Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal.App.2d 518, 329 P.2d 728, 732 (1958)). Initially, commentators praised the Lex loci rule based on its certainty and ease of application. Id. at 577. This rule made sense at a time when interstate travel was infrequent and travelers were presumed . . . [to] be aware of the different duties and obligations they were incurring when they made the interstate journey. Rostek, 182 Colo. at 442, 514 P.2d at 316. Over time, however, the increasing mobility of the population began to undermine the legitimacy of the Lex loci rule. As this Court explained in Rostek: [W]ith the industrial revolution and the passage of time, the interstate mobility of the citizenry increased in speed and availability to such an extent that persons no longer regarded an interstate journey as a rare occurrence entailing a significant change in surroundings. As these attitudes and conditions changed, it became clear that the mechanical application of Lex loci delecti to every multistate tort controversy often yielded harsh, unjust results, unrelated to the contemporary interests of the states involved or the realistic expectations of the parties. Id., 514 P.2d at 317. In order to avoid harsh outcomes sometimes imposed by this rule, courts began to characterize particular issues as procedural rather than substantive in order to apply the law of the forum. Id. at 442-43, 514 P.2d at 317; Scoles & Hay, supra, at 580-83. Thus, the advantages of predictability and ease of application began to fade. In response, commentators and courts began to explore other possible rules that would be workable in a conflict of laws situation. In 1973, when we issued our opinion in Rostek, Colorado joined the majority of jurisdictions in following the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties test, expressed in the Second Restatement, for multistate tort controversies. See Rostek, 182 Colo. at 448, 514 P.2d at 320. We determined that the conflicts analysis provided in the Second Restatement was the more flexible and rational choice of law approach and better suited the changing policies of Colorado. [1] Id. at 444, 514 P.2d at 318. In doing so, we broadly announced that Colorado will adopt the general rule of applying the law of the state with the most `significant relationship' with the occurrence and the parties, as presented and defined in the Restatement, (Second) Conflict of Laws, Vol. 1, Sec. 145 (1969). Id. at 448, 514 P.2d at 320. This case represented a fundamental shift in Colorado choice of law jurisprudence. Following Rostek, we have never rejected the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties test set forth in the Second Restatement in any of its applications. Although before today we have not considered whether to apply this test to prejudgment interest on a damages award, we have consistently applied the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties test in a variety of circumstances when we have had the occasion to do so. For example, in the context of covenants not to sue, we adopted the rule of section 170 of the Second Restatement. Like section 171, section 170 refers back to the law selected to govern a controversy in accordance with the most significant relationship test set forth in section 145. Dworak v. Olson Constr. Co., 191 Colo. 161, 163, 551 P.2d 198, 200 (1976); see also Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 198 Colo. 444, 601 P.2d 1369 (1979) (adopting the most significant relationship test for contract actions).