Opinion ID: 199138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Whallon has Rights of Custody under the Convention

Text: 18 The Hague Convention states that rights of custody shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence . . . . Hague Convention, art. 5(a), 19 I.L.M. at 1501. The Convention then contrasts rights of custody with the far more limited rights of access, which include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence. Id. art. 5(b), 19 I.L.M. at 1501. It reserves the remedy of return solely for violations of rights of custody. 3 19 While the Hague Convention itself provides no further definition of the term rights of custody, and deliberately so, 4 courts have commonly looked to the background report of the Convention for further guidance. See, e.g., Walsh, 221 F.3d at 217. That report states that the law of the child's habitual residence is invoked in the widest possible sense, and that the sources from which custody rights derive are all those upon which a claim can be based within the context of the legal system concerned. Explanatory Report, 67, at 446. 5 The Report also states that the Convention favors a flexible interpretation of the terms used, which allows the greatest possible number of cases to be brought into consideration. Id. 20 Two important and closely related principles underlying the Hague Convention also inform our approach here. First, a court deciding a petition for return of a child plainly has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a wrongful removal claim, but it may not decide the merits of the underlying custody dispute. See Hague Convention, art. 19, 19 I.L.M. at 1503 (A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.); 42 U.S.C. 11601(b)(4). Second, the Convention is generally intended to restore the pre-removal status quo and discourage a parent from crossing international borders in search of a more sympathetic forum. See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 218-19; Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999); Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1064. As the Explanatory Report instructs: 21 [F]rom the Convention's standpoint, the removal of a child by one of the joint holders without the consent of the other, is . . . wrongful, and this wrongfulness derives in this particular case, not from some action in breach of a particular law, but from the fact that such action has disregarded the rights of the other parent which are also protected by law, and has interfered with their normal exercise. The Convention's true nature is revealed most clearly in these situations: it is not concerned with establishing the person to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the future, nor with the situations in which it may prove necessary to modify a decision awarding joint custody on the basis of facts which have subsequently changed. It seeks, more simply, to prevent a later decision on the matter being influenced by a change of circumstances brought about through unilateral action by one of the parties. 22 Explanatory Report 71, at 447-48. 23 Thus, to assess whether Whallon possesses rights of custody under Article 5 of the Convention, the court must not simply look to the relevant provisions of Mexican law but also must interpret those provisions in light of the Convention's basic principle that a child's country of habitual residence is best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access, unless an exception applies. Id. 34, at 434-35. 24 The law of the State of Baja California Sur, the place of Micheli's habitual residence, is the relevant source of law here. See Hague Convention, art. 3, 19 I.L.M. at 1501. 6 That poses its own difficulties for a court of the United States, a court which comes from a different legal tradition. Care must be taken to avoid imposing American legal concepts onto another legal culture. Differently from many laws in this country, Mexican law appears to embody two concepts of importance here. The first is a preference in divorce cases toward placing what is called custody of a child under age seven with the mother. That preference is negated in exceptional cases such as those involving serious and contagious illness, vice, mistreatment or desertion. Codigo Civil del Estado de Baja California Sur (Civil Code), art. 322. The preference is embodied in the Civil Code, and while it applies specifically to divorces (and there has been no divorce here since there was never a marriage), the Mexican court looked to this provision in informing its decision about whether to terminate Lynn's custodial rights. And so we find that maternal preference, as well as the Code's use of the term custody, relevant to our determination of whether Whallon has rights of custody under the Convention. 25 The second concept is embodied in the doctrine of patria potestas, 7 and represents a more generalized concept of parental authority. Although historically the doctrine protected the father's rights as to the child, originally absolute rights under Roman law, the Baja California Sur Civil Code refers to it as encompassing the rights of both parents. Article 474 provides generally that patria potestas, or parental authority, is understood to mean the relationship of rights and obligations that are held reciprocally, on the one hand, by the father and the mother or in some cases the grandparents and, on the other hand, the minor children who are not emancipated. Civil Code, art. 474. The concept of patria potestas is defined broadly: 26 Paternal authority is exercised over the person and the property of the children subject to it. The purpose of its exercise is the comprehensive physical, mental, moral and social protection of the minor child, and it includes the obligation for [the child's] guardianship and education. 27 Id. art. 479. Additionally, those exercising patria potestas have the obligation to comport themselves in a manner that sets a good example for the children and shall teach them appropriate standards of social interaction. Id. art. 486. 28 The Civil Code explicitly discusses patria potestas rights in situations where, as here, the parents of a child born outside of wedlock separate. It provides that in such situations, both [parents] shall continue to exercise paternal authority. See id. art. 478 (emphasis added). The Code then distinguishes patria potestas from custody, which may be decided by agreement or, failing such agreement, by a judge. Id. Indeed, the existence of divisible custody rights under Mexican law -- i.e., of physical custody and patria potestas - is entirely consistent with the Hague Convention's statement that custody may be held jointly or alone. Hague Convention, art. 3, 19 I.L.M. at 1501; Explanatory Report 71, at 447-48 (characterizing joint custody as dividing the responsibilities inherent in custody rights between both parents); see also Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (rights of custody under Convention references a bundle of rights exercised by one or more persons having custody). 8 29 Lynn says that Whallon's patria potestas rights are closer to what the Convention means by rights of access than to what it means by rights of custody. We disagree. Article 329 of the Civil Code states that [i]ndependently of who exercises patria potestas or custody, the relatives obliged by law to provide support have the right to visit their descendants or collateral relatives, and to have an adequate communication with them. Civil Code, art. 329. Thus, patria potestas, like physical custody, plainly means something independent from mere visitation rights. Importantly, the Code describes these visitation rights in terms of adequate communication, id., but describes patria potestas rights through the stronger language of adequate connection, id. art. 323, which implies a meaningful, decisionmaking role in the life and care of the child, and not the mere access to the child associated with visitation rights. 9 30 Additionally, Whallon submitted into evidence the affidavit of Mexican attorney Omar Quijano Martinez further corroborating that both parents exercise patria potestas rights over a child under Mexican law and stating that both parents must consent to the removal of such child under Mexican law. Such affidavits are an acceptable form of proof in determining issues of foreign law, see Rule 44.1, Fed. R. Civ. P., and are likewise permitted under the Hague Convention, see Explanatory Report 101, at 456-57 (proof of the substantive law of the State of the child's habitual residence may be established by either certificates or affidavits). 31 Lynn also relies heavily on the decision of the Mexican court rejecting Whallon's petition to terminate her parental rights. That decision, however, has limited relevance to this action. At issue in the Mexican court action was whether Whallon had demonstrated the necessary exceptional circumstances to terminate Lynn's custodial rights. Although the Mexican court concluded that Whallon had not met his heavy burden, it never stated or even suggested that Whallon lacked custody rights or otherwise determined what those custody rights were. Whether or not a Mexican court ultimately decides the matter of custody differently following Micheli's return to Mexico, Whallon did possess rights of custody under the law of Micheli's habitual residence at the time of her removal. 10 32 Finally, Lynn contends that the district court, though acknowledging at trial that Whallon had the burden of proof to establish a wrongful removal, failed to acknowledge that burden in its written opinion and failed to impose that burden on Whallon in its analysis. This argument fails. The district court approached the issue of wrongful removal by first considering Whallon's arguments regarding patria potestas rights under Mexican law. After closely analyzing the relevant provision of Baja California Sur's Civil Code and Lynn's counter-arguments, the court concluded that there had been a wrongful removal. It acknowledged that Whallon had the burden of proof on this issue, weighed the burden in light of the law and evidence presented, and found that the burden had been satisfied. 33 In sum, the evidence of patria potestas rights under Mexican law leads us to conclude that Whallon's rights were rights of custody under the Convention. While Lynn had actual custody of Micheli, both parents exercised patria potestas rights over Micheli. Indeed, to date no Mexican court has given Lynn exclusive custody or denied Whallon patria potestas rights over Micheli. The pending Massachusetts custody proceedings commenced by Lynn after her removal of Micheli are inapplicable to this action because the Convention refers specifically to (Whallon's) rights of custody at the time of removal. Hague Convention, art. 3(b), 19 I.L.M. at 1501; see also Beaumont & McEleavy, Hague Convention, at 53 (subsequently rendered custody orders inapplicable to return proceedings). 34