Opinion ID: 212983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Steps (c), (f) – Selecting an Area

Text: The district court construed step (c), “selecting a first area having boundaries . . .” to mean a user “choosing a geographic area of interest by causing a boundary to be superimposed over the displayed map using the first area selection cursor.” J.A. 16. According to the district court, to practice the claimed invention, the user manipulates the resizable first area selection cursor to enclose the area to be selected. For example, the ’989 patent at FIG. 3A, col.1 ll.49-68, and col.9 ll.37-56 describes the user moving and resizing a resizable rectangular “window box” or “rubberband” on the map to define an area before zooming 7 MOVE INC v. REAL ESTATE ALLIANCE in on that selected area. The district court similarly construed step (f), “selecting a second area having boundaries . . . ,” to mean “choosing a search area by causing a boundary to be superimposed over the displayed map using the second area selection cursor.” J.A. 16. An example may be seen at FIG. 3B, illustrating a user positioning a rubberband circle to define the second area. ’989 patent, col.9 ll.57-65. Thus, the district court’s construction limits these selecting steps to a user defining and selecting an area using a resizable selection tool. The district court stated that its construction was “in keeping with the meaning [it] gave these terms” when construing the parent ’576 patent. J.A. 6, 8. The terms construed for the ’576 patent, however, included “selecting a landmark” and “first area selection cursor,” which are not recited in this claim. 1. Selecting an Area Does Not Require Defining the Area REAL argues that the district court’s construction read limitations into the claims which are not present in these claims – incorrectly requiring the user to define the area using an area selection cursor or rubberband. Move argues that the district court properly construed these steps, but concedes, as it must, that the area selection cursor limitation is not present in this claim. Move’s position is that “selecting” encompasses causing a boundary to be superimposed over the map (with an unspecified tool) because the “‘claims cannot be of broader scope than the invention that is set forth in the specification.’” Appellee’s Br. 32 (quoting On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). REAL argues that the boundaries of the selected area do not have to be created in any specific manner, i.e., they are not limited to a user superimposing visual boundaries MOVE INC v. REAL ESTATE ALLIANCE 8 over a displayed map. REAL further asserts that the district court improperly imported these limitations from the ’576 claims, which recite using the selection cursors to define the selected areas, into the claim at issue which does not have any such limitations. We agree. In our view, defining an area is different than choosing a particular area once it has been defined. The plain language of the claim requires only the choosing of a particular area having boundaries. The claim language, “selecting a first area having boundaries,” does not require that the user create the boundaries. The claim only requires that the user select an area with boundaries. And it certainly does not require that the user utilize any particular tool (such as a selection cursor or rubberband) to create boundaries. Claim 1 of the ’989 patent does not contain the same “first area selection cursor” limitation as the claims of the ’576 patent and it was incorrect for the district court to import it into this claim. There is nothing in the specification that clearly disavows selecting an existing area with boundaries. In the absence of such a disavowal, we will not narrow the claims. Move argues that the prosecution history supports a narrower construction of selecting because the inventor characterized the prior art as lacking the selection of preexisting geographic “bounded areas” such as a city or county. Contrary to Move’s characterization, we do not read the prosecution history to limit the claimed invention in this manner. The inventor characterized the prior art as discussing selection of pre-existing subregions, but not disclosing the selection of first and second bounded areas where the second is within the first. J.A. 1007-08. Move also argues that the inventor did not dispute the examiner’s characterization of the invention as allowing the operator to designate an area by drawing a border around it on a display. This characterization, however, 9 MOVE INC v. REAL ESTATE ALLIANCE does not amount to a clear disavowal of selecting an existing area as Move argues. The characterization was not made by REAL, nor did it acquiesce in the examiner’s characterization. J.A. 998-99, 1007-09. Finally, Move’s arguments relating to the prosecution of the ’576 patent do not amount to a clear disavowal of claim scope for claim 1 of the ’989 patent. While statements made during prosecution of a parent can certainly limit a later application, we conclude that the statements cited by Move in the ’576 prosecution pertained to very different patent claims with different limitations. Claim 1 of the ’989 patent does not contain the first area selection cursor limitation of the ’576 and the ’576 claims do not recite selecting an area. We conclude that the prosecution history cited by Move does not clearly disavow selecting an existing area. Accordingly, we conclude that selecting an area having boundaries does not require defining the boundaries. 2. A User or a Computer May Select an Area The district court held that the “selecting” step must be performed by a human user, not a computer. The district court based its construction of the selecting steps at issue on appeal on its construction of a “selecting a landmark” step from a ’576 patent claim. REAL argues that the selecting steps on appeal may be performed by a computer. REAL asserts that because the preamble recites “[a] method using a computer for locating available real estate properties,” the claimed steps are performed by the computer. REAL also notes that nowhere in the claim is a human user mentioned. Move responds that a human user is implicit in a claim reciting a method using a computer. The plain meaning of selecting does not foreclose automated selection, as both users and computers may select or choose. We see nothing in the selecting step that MOVE INC v. REAL ESTATE ALLIANCE 10 requires the selecting be done exclusively by human users or computers. While the preamble may well limit the claim, in that it requires use of a computer to locate available real estate properties, this preamble limitation does not require that every claim step be performed exclusively by a computer. Further, the specification does not clearly disavow automated selection. To the extent that REAL argues that the selection of an area takes place when the computer sets the world coordinates equal to the boundaries of a selection cursor or rubberband window box, we do not agree. Selection takes place when the user or a computer chooses an area having boundaries, not when the computer updates certain display variables to reflect the selected area.