Opinion ID: 2817272
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Majority opinion

Text: The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the state trial court’s decision not to suppress the statements. Id. at 606. It reviewed de novo the trial court’s legal conclusion that the statements were voluntary, considering under the totality of circumstances whether Ms. Sharp’s free will was overborne and her capacity for self-determination was critically impaired. Id. at 597. It explained the totality of circumstances test required the court to consider Ms. Sharp’s mental state; the manner and duration of her interrogation; her ability to communicate with the outside world; her age, intellect, and background; 6 Ms. Sharp also argued the trial court erroneously limited the cross-examination of Mr. Cornell, erroneously admitted hearsay evidence, and committed cumulative error. Sharp, 210 P.3d at 594-95, 605. Ms. Sharp did not reassert these arguments in her § 2254 petition, so we do not discuss them here. -9- whether the interrogating officers conducted their interview with her in a fair manner; and her fluency in the English language. Id. at 598. Ms. Sharp conceded that her argument mainly challenged the trial court’s factual findings that she was not operating under any promises. Id. at 598. By limiting her voluntariness argument to the trial court’s factual findings, she effectively reduced the supreme court’s voluntariness analysis to deciding whether the factual record supported the findings. 1) Ms. Sharp’s challenge to factual findings The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings under the substantial competent evidence standard. Id. at 597. It explained “[s]ubstantial competent evidence is that which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis in fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved.” Sharp, 210 P.3d at 602. The court noted this standard is consistent with the clearly erroneous standard the United States Supreme Court applies to factual findings underlying voluntariness determinations. See id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991)). Ms. Sharp challenged the trial court’s factual findings that she was not operating under any promises. She argued her will was overborne because (a) Detective Wheeles promised her leniency, (b) he promised to help find a place for her and her children to live, and (c) she was in a vulnerable position due to her recent divorce and homelessness (with two children). Id. at 597, 606. The court concluded substantial competent evidence supported the trial court’s findings that Ms. Sharp was not operating under any promises - 10 - during the interviews and re-enactment; she did not appear to be under duress or coercion; and she was relaxed, candid, and cooperative. Id. at 602-06. a) Promise of leniency Ms. Sharp argued Detective Wheeles promised her leniency in exchange for her confession when he said she would not go to jail. Id. at 599. The court rejected Ms. Sharp’s contention and found substantial competent evidence showed no such promise was made. Id. at 603-05. Alternatively, the court said Detective Wheeles conditioned any such promise, and Ms. Sharp did not satisfy the condition. Id. at 604. First, in its discussion of leniency, the court highlighted Detective Wheeles’s testimony from the suppression hearing, where he denied making any threats or promises and instead claimed he had exhorted Ms. Sharp to be truthful. Id. at 603. It said the interview transcript supported Detective Wheeles’s characterization of his comments and that the transcript does not contain the words “promise” or “threat.” Id.7 The court considered the context of the statements and agreed with Detective Wheeles that he caught Ms. Sharp in two lies during the interview, and that he admonished her to tell the truth. Id. It concluded Detective Wheeles did not promise her leniency. Id. Second, the court determined that substantial competent evidence supported an alternative factual finding that Detective Wheeles conditioned any promise of leniency on Ms. Sharp not “do[ing] something dumb and jam[ming] [her]self.” Id. at 603-04. The 7 The court’s analysis on this point is confusing because it later acknowledged that Detective Wheeles did use the word “promise” in reference to Ms. Sharp’s children. See id. at 605. It appears the court limited its comment about the transcript to the portion dealing with leniency. - 11 - court understood the comment to mean Detective Wheeles would be lenient as long as Ms. Sharp did not inculpate herself in the crime. Id. at 604. Based on the details of the crime and Ms. Sharp’s admission to participating, the court concluded she did not satisfy her end of the deal and therefore was not “operating under” the conditional promise. Id. It identified two incriminating statements Ms. Sharp made while re-enacting the crime at the camp site. Id. She said she told Mr. Hollingsworth, “Don’t kill him here,” which the court interpreted to mean she did not mind if Mr. Hollingsworth killed Mr. Owen elsewhere. Id. And she admitted it was her idea to burn Mr. Owen’s belongings. Id. The court therefore decided Ms. Sharp failed to satisfy the terms of Detective Wheeles’s conditional promise. Id. at 605. b) Promise to help Ms. Sharp and her children The court also concluded substantial competent evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Ms. Sharp was not operating under a promise relating to her children when she confessed. Id. at 605-06. First, the court said substantial competent evidence showed Ms. Sharp did not confess in exchange for the police’s helping her and her children. Id. at 605. Second, the court determined Detective Wheeles was trying to protect the children by removing them from a homeless camp where they were alone with a convicted sex offender. Id. Third, the court recognized an alternative basis to affirm—the purported promise to help Ms. Sharp’s children was a “collateral benefit,” which it described as a promise “with no assurance of benefit to [the] accused with respect to the crime.” Id. (quotations - 12 - and emphasis omitted). The court explained such promises generally cannot render a confession involuntary under Kansas law. Id. at 605-06. c) Ms. Sharp’s vulnerable position The court rejected Ms. Sharp’s assertion that her vulnerable position during the interview and re-enactment made her statements involuntary. Id. at 606. It referenced the video recordings of her interview and re-enactment and concluded substantial competent evidence supported the trial court’s factual finding that Ms. Sharp seemed relaxed and provided clear answers, and did not appear to be under duress or coercion. Id. 2) Voluntariness under the totality of circumstances Having rejected Ms. Sharp’s challenges to the trial court’s factual findings, the court considered facts Ms. Sharp had not challenged on appeal but were relevant to voluntariness: “[Ms.] Sharp was Mirandized; she voluntarily gave up her Miranda rights; she did not appear to be under the influence of anything; the detention length was not unusual; she was given things to drink; and she was cooperative.” Id. Based on the trial court’s factual findings the state supreme court concluded, under the totality of the circumstances, that Ms. Sharp’s statements were voluntary. Id. at 606.