Opinion ID: 2607677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Exclusionary clause is unambiguous.

Text: The relevant portions of the policy, supra, clearly indicate that medical coverage is for the vehicle described in the policy only and, therefore, unambiguously rejects stacking. Faced with this clear and unambiguous language, any contrary reading by Sanchez clearly was not reasonable, and he could not have reasonably understood the policy to provide for stacking under these circumstances. The policies state that State Farm will pay medical expenses to certain enumerated parties while they operate a vehicle covered under the liability section. The liability section obligates the insurer to pay for loss resulting from the use of your car, which is defined as the one car owned by Sanchez that the policy covers. The policy further excludes injury sustained while occupying any vehicle owned by Sanchez that is not insured by the coverage of the policy. We find that this language clearly and unambiguously excludes stacking of medical coverage. The four other policies on vehicles owned by appellant's father specifically exclude medical coverage for injury incurred through the use of any vehicle owned by Sanchez but not listed on the policy. Compare Lopez, 98 N.M. at 168, 646 P.2d at 1232 (rejecting insurer's contention of unambiguity because the policy did not consider multiple premiums). Sanchez contends, nevertheless, that the exclusionary clause is subject to an alternative interpretation. He maintains that the term coverage in the clause, [t]here is no coverage: ... [f]or medical expenses for bodily injury (a) sustained while occupying ... a vehicle ... which is not insured under this coverage  (emphasis added) can be interpreted not to refer to the single policy, but to all policies purchased from State Farm. Thus, the exclusion refers to vehicles owned by Sanchez but insured by an alternative carrier; the clause can be read as an attempt by State Farm to capture all of the family's insurance business. Sanchez cites Schmick as authority that coverage is susceptible to plural as well as singular meaning. See 103 N.M. at 219, 704 P.2d at 1095. We reject this attempt to demonstrate an ambiguity. To hold otherwise would require an unreasonable construction that would import different meanings to the two uses of the term coverage in the same sentence. Thus, we hold that the insurance policy unambiguously reflects the agreement of the parties to exclude stacking of medical coverage. Because we are not faced with any countervailing legislative policy mandating a different interpretation, we abide by the canons of contract construction and find that the unambiguous terms should be enforced. State Farm is entitled to preclude stacking. We hold the medical payments from the Sanchez' five policies may not be stacked. Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the trial court's rulings. We remand to the district court for further proceedings in accord with the first part of this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. SOSA, C.J., and RANSOM, J., concur.