Opinion ID: 2792510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction over thompson’s murder charges

Text: Here, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to try Thompson for the three murders. 4 In the § 2255 proceeding, the district court found, based on the parties’ agreement, that the murders occurred within 200 yards of Florida’s shore, and neither party challenges that finding on appeal. Importantly, the trial record supports this factual finding and shows that, when Lubin and Charles drowned in August 2006, the boat was at least 50 to 100 yards from the Florida shore, and 4 Although Thompson did not raise this jurisdictional issue in his direct criminal appeal, see United States v. Thompson, 363 F. App’x 737 (11th Cir. 2010), it is not subject to waiver or procedural default. See Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir. 2004). 5 Case: 14-10361 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 6 of 7 when Warren drowned in December 2006, the boat was approximately one length of the courtroom away from the Florida shore, both times in water that was over the victims’ heads. Given that the murders occurred between 50 and 200 yards of Florida’s coastline, the murders occurred on the “high seas” and within the “territorial sea” of the United States, as those terms are defined by federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(1); 33 C.F.R. §§ 2.22(a)(1)(ii), 2.32(a); Murray, 61 F.2d at 484-85. Thus, the murders occurred within the United States’s special maritime and territorial jurisdiction and were federal criminal offenses over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(1) & 1111(b), 3231.5 Thompson argues that because he committed his crimes within three miles of shore, Florida has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute him. Specifically, he contends that 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) bars his federal prosecution because it limits the jurisdiction of the United States to only those waters that are “out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.” See id. § 7(1). This argument is foreclosed by Murray, which concluded that this particular phrase refers only to “any other waters,” and does not apply to the “high seas.” See Murray, 61 F.2d at 485; see also Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we are bound by a prior panel’s holding unless that holding is overruled or 5 We need not, and do not, address whether the State of Florida had concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute Thompson for violations of its own laws. 6 Case: 14-10361 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 7 of 7 undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc). Although Murray interpreted an earlier version of 18 U.S.C. § 7 (then codified as 18 U.S.C. § 451), the relevant language of the provision has not materially changed, see Murray, 61 F.3d at 484-85, and Murray’s interpretation of the phrase “high seas” is consistent with the current federal regulation defining that term, see 33 C.F.R. § 2.32(a). Thompson argues that the Submerged Lands Act conferred exclusive criminal jurisdiction on Florida. Nothing in the language of the Submerged Lands Act suggests that, notwithstanding 18 U.S.C. § 7, exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all waters within the states’ boundaries is conferred on the states. Indeed, the Submerged Lands Act does not refer to either criminal jurisdiction or criminal prosecutions at all. Further, Thompson cites no authority indicating that the Submerged Lands Act was intended to transfer to the states exclusive criminal jurisdiction over waters falling within 18 U.S.C. § 7(1)’s definition of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In sum, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to try Thompson on the second degree murders counts under 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 and 1111(b). Accordingly, the district court properly denied Thompson’s § 2255 motion with respect to these convictions. AFFIRMED. 7