Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Persuasive Federal Precedent

Text: When interpreting our state constitution, it is appropriate to consider relevant federal precedent. We employ this precedent for guidance and analogy [in construing our own constitution, however, only] when the federal authorities are `logically persuasive and well-reasoned.' W. Brennan, `State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,' 90 Harv. L.Rev. 489, 502 (1977) (`state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, [but] only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees'). State v. Joyce, 229 Conn. 10, 20, 639 A.2d 1007 (1994). As the defendants correctly assert, the vast majority of federal circuit courts that have considered the issue have concluded that sexual orientation is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, and, consequently, legislation that classifies on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to rational basis review. [63] These courts, however, relied primarily on the holding of Bowers v. Hardwick, supra, 478 U.S. at 196, 106 S.Ct. 2841, in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that criminalized consensual homosexual sodomy. [64] Bowers held that gay persons have no fundamental right to engage in such conduct; id., at 190-92, 106 S.Ct. 2841; that rational basis review of the antisodomy statute therefore was appropriate; see id., at 196, 106 S.Ct. 2841; and that the Georgia legislature's moral disapproval of that conduct constituted sufficient justification for the law. See id. Although Bowers was a due process case; see id., at 190, 106 S.Ct. 2841; the various federal circuit courts faced with equal protection challenges to statutory classifications based on sexual orientation have reasoned that because, under Bowers, it is constitutionally permissible to criminalize intimate homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by that conduct cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. E.g., Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266 (6th Cir.1995) ([s]ince Bowers, every circuit court which has addressed the issue has decreed that homosexuals are entitled to no special constitutional protection, as either a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, because the conduct which places them in that class is not constitutionally protected), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001, 116 S.Ct. 2519, 135 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1994) (if the government can criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by reference to that conduct cannot constitute a suspect class [internal quotation marks omitted]); High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.1990) ([o]ther circuits are in accord and have held that although the court in [ Bowers ] analyzed the constitutionality of the [antisodomy] statute on a due process rather than equal protection basis, by the [ Bowers ] majority holding that the [c]onstitution confers no fundamental right [on] homosexuals to engage in sodomy, and because homosexual conduct can thus be criminalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis review for equal protection purposes); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) ([a]fter [ Bowers ] it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990). Thus, the impact of Bowers . . . on the equal protection claims of [gay persons was] enormous. E. Gerstmann, supra, c. 4, at p. 69.  Bowers . . . prevent[ed] courts from finding [gay persons] to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class even if [gay persons were] able to demonstrate a history of discrimination and substantial current discrimination against them. Id. Because Bowers was so widely viewed as disqualifying gay persons from recognition as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, in the wake of Bowers, courts gave only cursory consideration to claims by gay persons that statutes that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny. Thus, as one court has noted, given [ Bowers' ] sanction of such a severe curtailment of the liberty of [gay persons, it is not surprising that] the issue of whether states should or must permit marriage between same-sex partners has only recently come into public debate. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr.3d 675, 703 (App.2006), rev'd on other grounds, 43 Cal.4th 757, 183 P.3d 384, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 (2008). Five years ago, however, in Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472, the United States Supreme Court overruled Bowers, thus removing the precedential underpinnings of the federal case law supporting the defendants' claim that gay persons are not a quasi-suspect class. The court in Lawrence acknowledged that, in framing the issue in Bowers as it did, that is, whether the [f]ederal [c]onstitution confers a fundamental right [on] homosexuals to engage in sodomy; Bowers v. Hardwick, supra, 478 U.S. at 190, 106 S.Ct. 2841; the court had fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said [that] marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472. The court identified the real issue, both in Bowers and in Lawrence, as whether the right to liberty that gay persons share with all of our citizenry under the due process clause of the United States constitution includes the right to engage in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle without government intervention. Id., at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472. The court in Lawrence also explained that [t]he foundations of Bowers have sustained serious erosion from . . . [two] decisions that were decided after Bowers, namely, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996). Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 576, 123 S.Ct. 2472. The court in Lawrence further explained: In [ Casey ], the [c]ourt reaffirmed the substantive force of the liberty protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause. The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . In explaining the respect the [c]onstitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, [the court] stated as follows: `These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the [s]tate.'. . . Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right. (Citations omitted.) Id., at 573-74, 123 S.Ct. 2472. The court continued: The second post- Bowers case of principal relevance is Romer . . . . There the [c]ourt struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals as a violation of the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause. Romer invalidated an amendment to Colorado's [c]onstitution which named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either by `orientation, conduct, practices or relationships' . . . and deprived them of protection under state antidiscrimination laws. We concluded that the provision was `born of animosity toward the class of persons affected' and further that it had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. (Citations omitted.) Id., at 574, 123 S.Ct. 2472. Lawrence thereafter expressly endorsed the following portion of Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent in Bowers: `Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a [s]tate has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.' Id., at 577-78, 123 S.Ct. 2472, quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, supra, 478 U.S. at 216, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, as the court stated, [w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the [c]onstitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472. Bowers' contrary conclusion, the court observed, demeans the lives of homosexual persons; id., at 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472; by depriving them of the respect for their private lives; id., at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472; that the constitution guarantees. Lawrence represents a sea change in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the rights of gay persons. To a very substantial degree, Lawrence undermines the validity of the federal circuit court cases that have held that gay persons are not entitled to heightened judicial protection because, as we have explained, the courts in those cases relied heavilyand in some cases exclusivelyon Bowers to support their conclusions. See Witt v. Dept. of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 828 (9th Cir.2008) (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ([b]ecause Lawrence unequivocally overruled Bowers, it undercut the theory [and] reasoning underlying [the cases that have relied on Bowers to deny gay persons heightened protection under the federal equal protection clause] in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable [internal quotation marks omitted]). In stark contrast to Bowers, Lawrence recognizes that gay persons, no less than heterosexuals, are constitutionally entitled to freedom from state interference in matters of sexual intimacy. In acknowledging this liberty interest, Lawrence rejected the notion that moral disapproval of gay persons can justify discriminatory state action that infringes on their right of personal autonomy. See Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (state antisodomy statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual). Thus, whereas Bowers erected a profound impediment to gay persons seeking protected status, Lawrence removed that barrier. Gay persons, therefore, cannot be deprived of suspect or quasi-suspect class status merely because others may find their intimate sexual conduct objectionable, repugnant or immoral. In fact, after Lawrence, the social and moral disapprobation that gay persons historically have faced supports their claim that they are entitled to heightened protection under the state constitution. [65] See part V A of this opinion. Finally, we reject the defendants' contention that, in Romer v. Evans, supra, 517 U.S. at 631-32, 116 S.Ct. 1620, the United States Supreme Court implicitly concluded that gay persons do not comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the federal constitution because the court applied rational basis review, rather than heightened scrutiny, in sustaining an equal protection challenge to a Colorado state constitutional amendment that prohibited all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect . . . [gay] persons. . . . [66] Id., at 624, 116 S.Ct. 1620. Because the court indicated that the Colorado constitutional amendment could not withstand even rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, the court had no reason to decide whether heightened review was appropriate. See id., at 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620. In the absence of any contrary indication in Romer, we must presume that the court followed its own well established principle never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). Indeed, in accordance with this general rule of judicial restraint, the United States Supreme Court previously has declined to decide whether heightened scrutiny is applicable when a statutory classification fails rational basis review. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618, 105 S.Ct. 2862, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985) (declining to determine whether to apply heightened scrutiny when classification did not meet rational basis test because if the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimum rationality test, [the court's] inquiry ends); cf. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) (declining to decide whether to apply strict scrutiny when classification could not survive intermediate scrutiny). Romer, therefore, lends no support to the defendants' claim that statutory classifications based on sexual orientation are subject only to rational basis review. In sum, although federal case law is nearly unanimous in concluding that gay persons are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, those cases ultimately are not persuasive because they rely so heavily on Bowers v. Hardwick, supra, 478 U.S. at 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, which has been overruled. Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472 ( Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers . . . should be and now is overruled.). In addition, the federal circuit courts that have determined that gay persons are not entitled to heightened protection have failed altogether to reconcile their analyses with the one that the United States Supreme Court used in concluding that women comprise a quasi-suspect class. See part V D of this opinion. Indeed, in our view, the individual federal circuit and district courts and judges that have analyzed the issue most carefully and applied the standard for determining a group's status as a suspect or quasi-suspect class most consistently with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence have concluded that statutes discriminating against gay persons are, in fact, subject to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, supra, 909 F.2d at 376-82 (Canby, J., dissenting); Watkins v. United States Army, supra, 875 F.2d at 724-28 (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); Able v. United States, supra, 968 F.Supp. at 862-64; Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, supra, 860 F.Supp. at 434-40; Jantz v. Muci, supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1547-51. Thus, although the weight of federal precedent favors the defendants, the weight of persuasive federal precedent favors the plaintiffs. D