Opinion ID: 2820096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Milam's Subjective Complaints

Text: Where objective evidence does not fully support the degree of severity in a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must consider all evidence relevant to those complaints. Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984)). This includes evidence pertaining to the claimant's daily activities; the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and functional restrictions. Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322. Of course, [t]he ALJ need not explicitly discuss each Polaski factor. It is sufficient if he acknowledges and considers those factors before discounting a claimant's subjective complaints. Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). The ALJ may discount complaints of pain if they are inconsistent with the evidence as a whole. If the ALJ discredits a claimant's credibility and gives a good reason for doing so, we will defer to its judgment even -10- if every factor is not discussed in depth. Perkins, 648 F.3d at 900 (quotations and citations omitted). The ALJ identified multiple valid reasons for discrediting Milam's subjective complaints of pain, including Milam's application for and receipt of unemployment benefits after she allegedly became disabled. In seeking and obtaining such unemployment benefits, Milam evinced a willingness and ability to work, which contradicts her claim of disabling pain. Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1991) (A claimant may admit an ability to work by applying for unemployment compensation benefits because such an applicant must hold [her]self out as available, willing and able to work. (citation omitted)). Milam's search for a new job after her layoff further evinces both a willingness and ability to work after she allegedly became disabled. The ALJ also noted Milam's relatively conservative treatment history, which relied on a conservative course of treatment, including exercises, . . . and medication. Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Moreover, Milam did not seek medical treatment for her alleged pain for long periods of time. In the nearly four years between September 2007 and June 2011, for instance, Milam did not seek any medical treatment from Dr. Sprinkle for her back pain—notwithstanding her assertion that she actually became disabled in August 2009. See Gwathney v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a claimant's failure to seek medical assistance for her alleged . . . impairments contradicts her subjective complaints of disabling conditions and supports the ALJ's decision to deny benefits (citations omitted)). Milam's regular physical activities, as discussed above, further undermine her assertion that she is unable to perform even sedentary work. Of course, the ability to do activities such as light housework and visiting with friends alone are insufficient reason to discredit Milam's subjective complaints. Baumgarten v. Chater, -11- 75 F.3d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1996) (quotation and citations omitted). But the extent of Milam's regular physical activities, particularly when considered in conjunction with the medical record in this case, further supports the ALJ's decision. See, e.g., Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the claimant's ability to shop, drive short distances, attend church, and visit relatives was inconsistent with her assertion of disabling pain); Lawrence v. Chater, 107 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the claimant's ability to dress and bathe herself, and do some housework, cooking, and shopping contradicted her testimony regarding the severity of her pain and disability). The ALJ also considered, among other things, Milam's work history. Milam is correct that her lengthy work history supports her subjective complaints of disabling pain. Black, 143 F.3d at 387. [O]ffsetting this work history[, however,] is the fact that [Milam] was laid off from her position, rather than forced out due to her condition. Id. (citation omitted). In light of the foregoing considerations and the record as a whole in this case, we find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's adverse credibility determination.