Opinion ID: 2086811
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Errors at Sentencing Phase

Text: As noted, our standard of review of the sentencing proceeding is set forth by statute which instructs: The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that: (i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; (ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d); or (iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3). The Commonwealth presented evidence of two aggravating circumstances at the sentencing proceeding. The Commonwealth first offered, by stipulation, information regarding appellant's criminal history, which informed the jury that appellant had been previously convicted of aggravated assault, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, and possessing an instrument of crime-generally. N.T. Sentencing Hearing, February 6, 1985 at 54-55. These convictions stemmed from an incident at the Swan Bar in Philadelphia on December 11, 1981 wherein appellant shot a young lady in the left chest area and shot a man in his elbow. The Commonwealth offered these convictions as proof of appellant's significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(9). The Commonwealth also presented medical and forensic evidence to demonstrate that in committing the murder of Davis Kelly, appellant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(7). This evidence demonstrated that one of the bullets fired at the victim had richocheted off a solid surface and that another had passed through the victim and was, in fact, never recovered. There were several people on the porch in very close proximity to the murder victim and the shooting who could have been struck by a richochet, a pass through bullet, or a missed shot. The jury found both of these aggravating circumstances. We are constrained to find that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to establish a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person. The Commonwealth demonstrated only one such felony conviction, the conviction for aggravated assault. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). The remaining convictions arising from the incident at the Swan Bar, recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, and possessing an instrument of crime-generally, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907, certainly involved violence, but the convictions constituted misdemeanors only. Accordingly, by the opinions of a majority of the members of this Court, appellant's single conviction for one felony involving violence or its threat, the single aggravated assault conviction, does not establish a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence. Commonwealth v. Goins, 508 Pa. 270, 495 A.2d 527 (1985) (Larsen and Papadakos, JJ., dissenting; McDermott, J., did not participate) (single prior conviction for murder of the third degree cannot constitute significant history of felony convictions involving violence); Commonwealth v. Frederick, 508 Pa. 527, 498 A.2d 1322 (1985) (Larsen, McDermott, and Papadakos, JJ., dissenting) (single prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter does not constitute significant history of felony convictions involving violence). [9] The evidence does, however, support the jury's finding that in the shooting of the victim, the appellant knowingly created a grave risk of death to other persons, namely to Betty Harris and the others present on the porch who were in very close proximity to the victim, and who were in danger of being struck by an errant, richochet or pass through bullet. The jury was entitled to find that appellant created a grave risk of death to the other innocent persons on the porch near the shooting. See Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 504 Pa. 455, 468, 475 A.2d 714 (1984) (the wounding of another person who was in the car with the murder victim established that the defendant knowingly created the grave risk of death of another person) and Commonwealth v. Griffin, 511 Pa. 553, 515 A.2d 865 (1986) (defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to others when he shot victim once in the head at close range at a party; no one else was injured). Appellant argues, however, without citation of authority, that the aggravating circumstance set forth in subsection (d)(7) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define the term grave risk of death. Point 28. This Court has not addressed this specific vagueness challenge to subsection (d)(7), grave risk of death. The United States Supreme Court has, however, upheld similar statutes establishing aggravating circumstances for knowingly creating great risks of death against vagueness and over-breadth challenges. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2939, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 256, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2968, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). This Court has addressed and rejected vagueness challenges to various other aggravating circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Fahy, 512 Pa. 298, 516 A.2d 689 (1986), we rejected the claim that the term significant history was vague and overbroad, stating: In Commonwealth v. Beasley, 504 Pa. 485, 475 A.2d 730 (1984), this Court reviewed an identical claim and stated: Appellant further contends that certain language employed in the statute's enumeration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to be weighed by the jury in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed, are (sic) so vague as to invite arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. The challenged language includes, inter alia, the phrases significant history of prior criminal convictions (42 Pa.C. S.A. § 9711(e)(1)), extreme mental or emotional disturbance (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(2)), age of defendant (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(4)), participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(7)), capacity of the defendant . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of law . . . (42 Pa.C. S.A. § 9711(e)(3)). In reviewing an identical claim of vagueness asserted against the corresponding portion of the death penalty statute of the State of Florida, which employed virtually identical language, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the vagueness claim, noting that a jury's evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as enumerated, requires no more line drawing than is commonly required of a fact-finder in any lawsuit. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 257, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 925-926 (1976). See also, Commonwealth v. Goins, 508 Pa. 270, 495 A.2d 527 (1985). We find no basis, and Appellant has not raised any novel reasons, to ignore the holdings of Proffitt, Beasley, and Goins. Therefore, Appellant's contention that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d) is vague and overbroad is dismissed as being meritless. 512 Pa. at 315-16, 516 A.2d at 698. So too in the instant case, we find no basis to ignore the holdings of Proffitt and Gregg. The jury is quite capable of understanding the meaning of grave risk and of applying its common sense and experience to the facts to determine whether a grave risk had indeed been created, as it did in this case. Accordingly, we reject appellant's vagueness challenge. In mitigation, appellant introduced testimony of a prison counselor who had counseled appellant (the jury did not learn that this counselor knew and worked with appellant in prison) and of a psychological services associate who had evaluated appellant. These witnesses testified that appellant was of defective intelligence, was highly unskilled, and that he had an I.Q. of 76. Counsel argued to the jury that there were three mitigating circumstances shown: that appellant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; the diminished capacity of [appellant] to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law; and that the character and record of the [appellant] and the circumstances of his offense were such that the death penalty was unwarranted. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(2), (3) and (8), respectively. The jury, however, found no mitigating circumstances. The jury therefore returned the sentence of death based upon its finding of one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). Since the jury found the presence of one aggravating circumstance and found no mitigating circumstances, the sentence of death is upheld even though another aggravating circumstance is held invalid. Commonwealth v. Christy, 511 Pa. 490, 510, 515 A.2d 832 (1986), citing Commonwealth v. Beasley, supra at 504 Pa. 500, 475 A.2d 738. Appellant raises several issues pertaining to his proffered mitigating circumstances regarding his low level intelligence. First he argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that his low I.Q. alone is sufficient to return a sentence of life prisonment. Point 32. He offers no authority to support this proposition and we know of none. Under our statutory sentencing procedures in capital cases, it would have been erroneous to so instruct the jury, since the legislature has not designated low intelligence specifically as a mitigating circumstance, and since it is the jury that has been assigned the solemn task of finding which aggravating and mitigating circumstances exist and weighing such circumstances to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate. Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 521 A.2d 1, 20 (1987). Appellant also asserts that the court erred in failing to admit the report of a psychologist who examined [appellant] in 1971, which showed [his] I.Q. 76, and in failing to admit into evidence the report of a mental health professional named Willis, who examined petitioner at Farview [sic] State Hospital in 1971.... Points 30 and 31, Brief for appellant at 26-27. Appellant asserts that these reports qualified as exceptions to the hearsay rule under the business records exception. These arguments are without merit. Such reports containing opinions, diagnoses and conclusions are not admissible under the business records exception. Commonwealth v. Harris, 492 Pa. 389, 394, 424 A.2d 1245, 1248 (1981). The reports which appellant sought to introduce were also remote in time, and their authors were unknown  the author of the first report was identified only as H.E.S. and the author of the second as Willis. Under these circumstances, the court properly excluded these reports. Moreover, the evidence of appellant's low I.Q. and defective intelligence was placed before the jury and was uncontradicted. Finally, appellant argues that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proving mitigating circumstances on the defendant. We have considered and rejected this contention on several occasions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, supra at 500 Pa. 64-66, 454 A.2d at 962-63. We have reviewed the record and we find sufficient evidence to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance, § 9711(d)(7). We also find that the sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3)(ii) and (i). Additionally, we have reviewed the data and information pertaining to similar cases that has been compiled by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts pursuant to this Court's directive. See Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700, 707-08 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984). Our review of that data discloses that the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to that imposed in similar cases involving this aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 504 Pa. 455, 475, 475 A.2d 714, 724 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 361, 83 L.Ed.2d 297 (1984).