Opinion ID: 1426020
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Core Judicial Function Challenge

Text: ¶13 The trial court anchored its holding that section 77-27-11(3) was unconstitutional on the conclusion that the Board's power to issue a retaking warrant was a core judicial function, and thus could be performed only by a judicial officer who was appointed pursuant to article VIII of the Utah Constitution. As authority for this conclusion, the trial court relied largely on State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). In that case, we held that the power of a court of record to issue a search warrant was a core judicial function that could not be exercised by court commissioners because they are not judicial officers appointed pursuant to article VIII of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 302. ¶14 Thomas was based largely on a previous case, Salt Lake City v. Ohms, in which we first used the nomenclature core judicial function. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1994). In Ohms, we held that court commissioners in courts of record did not have the power to enter final judgments and to impose sentences on defendants in criminal misdemeanor cases. Id. at 851. We characterized that power as a core judicial function and held that, in courts of record, only judicial officers appointed pursuant to article VIII could exercise it. Id. ¶15 The trial court in this case reasoned that the Board is analogous to the court commissioners in Ohms and Thomas because neither enjoy status as an article VIII judicial power. The trial court also found similarity between the power of a retaking warrant to arrest a suspected parole violator, and the power of a search warrant to search a citizen's dwelling, and concluded that a retaking warrant, like a search warrant, is a core judicial function. We depart from both elements of the trial court's analysis. ¶16 The trial court overextended the reach of Ohms and Thomas. It is true that the members of the Board, like court commissioners, do not acquire or maintain their positions pursuant to the judicial selection and retention process set out in article VIII. However, Board members, unlike commissioners, do not serve in courts of record, a characteristic that defined the realm of both Ohms and Thomas. ¶17 The statutory grant of authority to court commissioners exceeds constitutional limits `to the extent that it purports to vest ultimate judicial power in courts of record in persons who have not been duly appointed as article VIII judges.' Thomas, 961 P.2d at 302 (quoting Ohms, 881 P.2d at 855). Thus, because the Board is not a court of record, Ohms and Thomas do not apply to warrants which it issues. [1] ¶18 The trial court also overstated the similarity between a retaking warrant and a search warrant. When we held that the issuance of a search warrant was a core judicial function, we noted that search warrants implicate a right preeminent among those protected by our constitution. Id. at 303. We need not retreat from our recognition of the importance of the right to be free from unreasonable searches, or our commitment to defend it, to conclude that retaking warrants, issued to apprehend absconding parolees, are not entitled to equal dignity. ¶19 When Mr. Jones was sentenced to serve a prison commitment, he was placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections. [2] See Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-7 (2003). The Department's custodial responsibilities extend to offenders who, like Mr. Jones, are paroled. Id. Although parolees are entitled to a greater range of constitutional protections than prison inmates, they do not enjoy the full complement of constitutional freedoms. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). `Revocation [of parole] deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.' Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480). ¶20 We have previously stated that `the parole function is a complex, multidimensional proceeding.' Padilla v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997) (quoting Labrum v. Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993)). Within the dimensions of the parole function is the need to impose and enforce conditions of parole. The ability to issue retaking warrants, and thus engage the aid of law enforcement in apprehending offenders who violate the conditions of parole, is integral to the effective use of parole as an alternative to incarceration. We therefore conclude that the constitutional interest at stake in the issuance of retaking warrants does not merit including them in the category of a core judicial function.