Opinion ID: 744871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Entitlement to a New Trial.

Text: 25 In the alternative, the Company contends that the jury's verdict on the age discrimination claim is against the great weight of the evidence and it is entitled to a new trial. It argues that the verdict was based on improperly admitted evidence, most notably a videotaped deposition of Carter's former supervisor, Singletary. It charges that the jury heard extremely prejudicial and highly inflammatory testimony concerning Spencer's attitudes about women, which was relevant only to Carter's sex discrimination cause of action which was to be decided by the court. 26 Carter denies that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. She maintains that the district court's evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion. The pretrial order made it clear that Singletary's testimony would be presented by videotaped deposition and be considered as evidence in both the Title VII and ADEA causes of action. Moreover, the judge clearly instructed the jury at least twice that it was to decide only the ADEA claim, and that he would determine the sex discrimination issues. She also notes that it was important for the jury to hear the evidence of sex discrimination in order to be able to assess the strength of the evidence of age discrimination. She says that the defendant cannot now complain that the trial was not bifurcated because it never requested that the district court conduct separate trials and specifically agreed in the pretrial order that bifurcation of the claims was not necessary. 27 A motion for new trial may only be granted when the jury's verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. See Simon v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 895 F.2d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir.1990). We review a district court's denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Group, 916 F.2d 637, 643 (11th Cir.1990). 28 As we have noted, there was clearly sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and, therefore, its verdict cannot be said to be against the great weight of the evidence. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting Singletary's testimony. The Company now believes that the rather strong evidence of sex discrimination contained in that testimony tainted the jury's consideration of the age discrimination evidence. Yet, it failed to seek a bifurcated trial of the two claims and cannot now be heard to complain that the issues were tried together. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1325 (5th Cir.1976). Moreover, since the jury heard the evidence on both causes, it was actually in a better position to judge the strength of the evidence supporting the age discrimination claim. If the jury had concluded, as the district court properly instructed, that the defendant discriminated against Carter on the basis of her sex alone, it would have had to return a verdict in the Company's favor on the ADEA cause of action. 29 The Company also contends that the district court erred in admitting testimony from Carter, Ferguson and Singletary that they believed the defendant discriminated against Carter because of her gender or age. It claims that none of these witnesses was qualified as an expert able to give an opinion about the ultimate issue in the case. As Carter correctly observes, however, the Company waived the objection as to her testimony and that of Ferguson because it failed to object to their statements. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1); Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir.1985). 30 Further, Fed.R.Evid. 701 specifically permits lay opinion testimony if those opinions are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony. Finally, Fed.R.Evid. 704(a) has abolished the prohibition on opinion testimony concerning the ultimate issue in a case. Such opinions are properly admitted if they are based on the personal observations of the witness. See, e.g., Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir.1988). Each of these witness' opinions came at the conclusion of their testimony and was based on their perceptions of the reasons for the Company's treatment of Carter. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error, in admitting this testimony. 31 The Company also challenges the jury's verdict as erroneous because it was tainted by improper instructions combined with an inadequate general verdict form. It excepts to the district court's causation instruction because it permitted the jury to return a verdict for Carter if it found that age discrimination was only a determinative factor in her termination. It also attacks the instructions as defective in that the district court 1) did not charge that, to establish pretext, Carter had to prove that its proffered reason for discharging her was false and that the real reason for her discharge was age discrimination; 2) encouraged the jury to consider whether Carter's discharge was caused by her gender; 3) misled the jury by giving a disparate impact instruction, charging the jury that the discrimination need not be direct or intentional; and 4) repeatedly told the jury that defendant was required to prove that Carter was discharged for good cause. Finally, according to the defendant, the general verdict form did not require the jury to specify which claim they were deciding and which claim would support an award of liquidated damages. 32 We apply a deferential standard of review to a district court's jury instructions. Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543 (11th Cir.1996). The trial judge is given wide discretion as to the style and wording employed in the instructions so long as they accurately reflect the law. Id. Under this standard, we examine whether the jury charges, considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so that the jurors understood the issues and were not misled. Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1560, 1569 (11th Cir.1991). We will reverse the district court because of an erroneous instruction only if we are left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations. Johnson v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir.1982). 33 The Company's criticisms of the district court's jury instructions are simply misleading. It focuses on phrases taken out of context. Taken as a whole, the district court's instructions accurately stated the law and properly guided the jurors in their consideration of the case. The jury was repeatedly instructed that, to return a verdict in her favor, it must find that age was a determinative factor in the Company's treatment and ultimate termination of Carter. This is clearly a correct statement of the law. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993-94 (5th Cir.1996)(en banc). The district court also clearly instructed the jury that it was deciding only the age discrimination claim and that if they concluded that Carter was terminated for some other reason, it must return a verdict in favor of the Company. Thus, the court instructed the jury that if you should believe ... that her termination was caused by gender discrimination, that is, they discriminated against her because of her sex, then you have to return a verdict for [defendant] because age would not be the cause. The jury instructions, taken as a whole, accurately stated the law and the respective burdens of proof. Finally, the general verdict form was clearly proper because the jury had to decide only a single issue, whether the Company discriminated against Carter in violation of the ADEA. The district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for new trial. 34