Opinion ID: 2307555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attorney's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Denied Defendant His Right to Testify and Right of Allocution

Text: Defendant did not testify in 1990 at the retrial of the penalty phase. He argues that Aifer deprived him of his right to testify by unilaterally deciding that he should not do so. According to the State defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to testify on their own behalf. State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 626-28, 577 A. 2d 455 (1990). The decision whether to testify rests with the defendant. Id. at 631, 577 A. 2d 455. Defense counsel must inform defendants of their right to testify. Counsel may not merely rely on their own trial strategy. As we have written: [I]t is the responsibility of a defendant's counsel, not the trial court, to advise defendant on whether to testify and to explain the tactical advantages or disadvantages of doing so or not doing so. Counsel's responsibility includes advising a defendant of the benefits inherent in exercising that right and the consequences inherent in waiving it.... Indeed, counsel's failure to do so will give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. [Id. at 630-31, 577 A. 2d 455 (internal citation omitted) ]. At the PCR hearing, Smith, defendant's appellate attorney, stated that Aifer admitted that she, rather than defendant, unilaterally decided that defendant should not testify. Aifer, however, testified that on several occasions she had discussed the issue with defendant, but that he was reluctant to testify. According to Aifer, she explained to defendant the risk of testifying, particularly the danger of subjecting himself to cross-examination. The dangers were real. At the Peniston trial in 1984, the prosecutor effectively cross-examined defendant. Consequently, Aifer advised defendant that it would be more convincing to present the facts about which he sought to testify through expert witnesses. Defendant's recollection differs from Aifer's. At the PCR hearing, defendant stated that he had told Aifer that he wanted to testify at the penalty-phase hearing. According to defendant, Aifer told him that he should not testify. Instead, she suggested that defendant undergo a videotaped hypnosis as a means of presenting his testimony without subjecting himself to cross-examination. Although defendant believed that he could not be hypnotized, he agreed. The attempt at hypnosis failed. Defendant and Aifer disagreed whether defendant should testify. Although Aifer promised Bey to discuss the issue with him on a later date, they never did. As a result, defendant claims that he was unaware of his right to testify. The PCR court concluded that Aifer had not usurped defendant's right to testify. The court determined that defendant was aware of that right as a result of his original murder trials in 1983 and 1984. According to the court, defendant chose not to exercise this right in 1990. Instead, he concurred with counsel's decision to shield him from cross-examination. From the foregoing, we conclude that Aifer did not inform defendant properly that the decision whether to testify was his. Nor did she sufficiently consult with defendant. Instead, Aifer decided on her own that defendant should not testify at the penalty-phase retrial. The next question is whether counsel's deficiency prejudiced defendant. Defendant argues that we should forego this analysis because of the fundamental nature of the right to testify. He posits that the impact of a defendant's own words on a jury is too speculative to support a finding of harmless error. Consequently, defendant urges the adoption of a per se rule that the denial of the right to testify is presumptively prejudicial. Alternatively, defendant requests that we require the State to prove that the denial of the right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705 (1967) (holding that, in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless, court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Previously, we have evaluated claims involving the denial of a defendant's right to testify under the Strickland/Fritz test. Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 631, 577 A. 2d 455. Notwithstanding the unique nature of a defendant's testimony, we continue to believe that the Strickland/Fritz test, see supra at 251-52, 736 A. 2d at 478-79, applies to the issue before us. Several federal courts likewise have required defendants to prove that they have been prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to inform them of the right to testify. See, e.g., United States v. Tavares, 100 F. 3d 995 (D.C.Cir.1996) (rejecting rule under which defense counsel's performance resulting in denial of defendant's right to testify constitutes prejudice per se ); Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F. 2d 258, 262 (7th Cir.1988) (applying harmless-error analysis to denial of right to testify); Campos v. United States, 930 F.Supp. 787 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that analyzing denial of right to testify as claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is soundest approach). Counsel's failure to inform defendant of his right to testify is not so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating [its] effect in a particular case is unjustified. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 667. Even if Aifer had informed Bey that the ultimate decision to testify was his to make, his testimony would not have affected substantially the penalty-phase deliberations. In brief, defendant has not satisfied the showing of prejudice required by the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. Defendant was aware of his right to testify from his experience in his two previous murder trials. During the original Alston trial in 1983, defendant's attorney, William Gearty, informed the court that he had advised defendant of his right to choose whether to testify: Your honor, in this matter, I have discussed with the defendant his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Fifth Amendment. I have advised him at this proceeding on the issue of guilt at his option, he may chose not to testify in his own defense. I've explained that to him. I'm convinced that he understands it. I am convinced also that after our discussion of the matter he has knowingly and intelligently waived that right to testify on his own behalf and has indeed elected not to testify in this, the guilt phase of the trial. After a colloquy with defendant, the court concluded that it was convinced defendant understands the nature of what he is doing. One year later, in the 1984 Peniston trial, defendant asserted his right to choose whether to testify. Defendant asked the court to remove Gearty as his counsel for advising him to testify. The effect, according to defendant, would have been the relinquishment of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Your Honor, I wish to ask this Court to have my present counsel, Attorney Gearty, removed from this position of representing me in this penalty phase of my trial.... I state that rather than defending me, Attorney Gearty jeopardized my defense and my life by his lack of argument against the prosecution's presentations against me and I further state that his advice to me leading me at his direction to place myself where unrealizing and in evidence, gave up my right to refrain from self-incrimination and upon his direction in capsule, testified against myself in that direction and that direction and advice from counsel to self-incriminate is the opposite of any defense attorney's duty. Defendant's request that the court remove Gearty as his attorney demonstrates his understanding that he had the right to decide whether to testify. Defendant, however, argues that his statement illustrates his failure to understand that the right to make the decision was his. According to defendant, the statement highlights defendant's belief that he was compelled to follow counsel's advice, even if defendant disagreed. Finally, defendant states that his remarks indicate his familiarity only with the right to remain silent, but not with the corresponding right to testify. We disagree. First, defendant's statement in 1984 confirms that his attorney, Gearty, merely advised, rather than compelled, defendant to testify. If defendant had not known that he could override Gearty's advice, he would not have requested the court to remove Gearty as his counsel. Second, defendant's statement, although it reflects his intention to remain silent, supports the finding that defendant, in accordance with his attorney's advice, had made the original decision to testify. Thus, as far back as 1984, defendant knew both of his right to testify and of the correlative right to remain silent. Defendant's assertion of his right to remain silent in 1984 confirms the conclusion that defendant did not want to testify at the 1990 penalty-phase retrial. In 1984, defendant realized that his testimony, particularly that part elicited on cross-examination, had damaged his case. In the present matter, defense counsel so advised defendant after reaching the same conclusion. Thus, at the 1990 penalty-phase hearing, Aifer told defendant that testifying would be a very risky thing to do. Aifer's co-counsel, McCauley, agreed that defendant would not be an effective witness because of halting speech and his inability to withstand cross-examination. Defendant's disastrous testimony in the Peniston trial six years earlier and his aversion to testifying in the present matter undermine the unsubstantiated assertion on appeal that defendant wanted to testify at the penalty-phase hearing in 1990. Defendant, however, asserts that after already experiencing a sharp cross-examination in 1984, he would have been better prepared to withstand cross-examination in 1990. He contends that because his guilt had been established, and the first penalty trial had resulted in a verdict of death ... something had to be done to avert the same outcome. These assertions are unpersuasive. If defendant had taken the stand, his testimony would have focused on his claim that on the night of murder he was intoxicatedthe precise subject of defendant's cross-examination at the 1984 trial. The State, moreover, could have cross-examined defendant on the basis of his testimony at that trial. After hearing defendant's testimony in 1984, the jury had convicted defendant and sentenced him to death. To avert the same outcome, trial counsel understandably would have considered a strategy that did not involve subjecting defendant to withering cross-examination. Lastly, defendant's request in 1984 for the removal of Gearty as his attorney demonstrates his willingness to disagree with counsel in open court. In the present proceeding, defendant had the opportunity to communicate his desire to testify during a colloquy among the court, defense counsel, and defendant: Court: Might I inquire of you now, to as to whether or not the Defendant wants towants me to instruct the Jury about his constitutional right to remain silent? Aifer: No. Court: Does not? Aifer: No. Court: Discussed it with him? Aifer: I will. Court: Okay. Then you advise me as to whether he wants the charge. Okay? Aifer: The charge I assume is likened to the charge in cases [where] the Defendant doesn't testify? Court: Yes. Aifer: The charge is given that he has the right to remain silent? He is indicating that he does not want it. Court: You discussed it with him and do you understand the charge? Defendant: Yes. Court: Okay. And you don't want that charge given to the jury? Defendant: No. No. In the 1984 proceeding, when he requested the discharge of his attorney, defendant registered his objection to having testified. His failure to object in 1990 suggests his acquiescence to Aifer's statement that he would not testify. We conclude that defendant was aware of his right to testify and decided not to exercise this right at the penalty-phase trial. In sum, defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. Therefore, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.
Defendant did not read a statement of allocution to the penalty-phase jury. He now claims that the trial court and his attorney deprived him of the right of allocution. A capital defendant has a common-law right to present a statement of allocution to the penalty-phase jury. Ibid. State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 429-30, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988) (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1474, 28 L.Ed. 2d 711, 733 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed. 2d 765 (1972)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1989). The right of allocution is designed to ensure that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury 'which never heard the sound of his voice.'. During allocution, a defendant is permitted to make a brief statement in order to allow the jury to ascertain that he or she is an individual capable of feeling and expressing remorse and of demonstrating some measure of hope for the future. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 361, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996) ( Loftin I ). A defendant, however, may not use allocution to rebut facts in evidence or to deny his guilt. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 430, 548 A. 2d 1022. If the defendant makes an impermissible statement, the court may strike the offending portions, allow the State to respond, or permit limited cross-examination of the defendant. Ibid. The trial court must engage defendant in a colloquy to apprise defendant of his right of allocution. Bench Manual for Capital Causes Appendix Q. Here, however, defendant did not assert his right of allocution at trial or on direct appeal. For the first time, he now argues that the trial court erred by failing to inform of his right of allocution. A challenge to the trial court's failure to afford defendant an opportunity to make a statement of allocution must be raised on direct appeal. State v. Cerce, 46 N.J. 387, 396, 217 A. 2d 319 (1966). Furthermore, defendant's claim is barred by Rule 3:22-4, which provides: Any ground for relief not raised in a prior proceeding ... is barred from assertion in a proceeding ... unless the court ... finds (a) that the ground for relief not previously asserted could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding; or (b) that enforcement of the bar would result in fundamental injustice; or (c) that denial of relief would be contrary to the Constitution of the United States or the State of New Jersey. None of the three exceptions applies in this case. Defendant did not raise his right of allocution on direct appeal. For the following reasons, that failure bars his challenge on post-conviction relief. First, the denial of the right of allocution was apparent from the record. Defendant, therefore, reasonably could have raised this objection on direct appeal. Second, the denial of the right of allocution does not result in fundamental injustice. Although our civilization commends permitting a defendant to express his remorse and make a plea for mercy, Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 429, 548 A. 2d 1022, such an expression is not essential to provide [ ] the defendant with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome, State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 587, 601 A. 2d 198 (1992). Even in the absence of a statement made in allocution, the jury must reach a rational fact-based conclusion on whether he shall live or die. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 430, 548 A. 2d 1022. Third, the denial of the right of allocution, which is grounded in the common law, does not contravene the federal or state constitutions. Defendant next alleges that Aifer's assistance was ineffective because she did not inform him of his right of allocution. Instead, Aifer unilaterally decided not to use an allocutory statement that defendant had drafted. Contrary to the dissent, we do not review the denial of the right of allocution in a vacuum. The claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase can fairly be assessed only in the context of the entire trial record and of the grave offenses of which defendant was convicted. Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 252, 690 A. 2d 1. The PCR court concluded that the decision whether a defendant should make a statement of allocution is a matter of trial strategy best left to counsel. At the PCR hearing, Aifer testified that she had not used defendant's proposed statement because portions of it were inadmissible and would subject defendant to cross-examination. In the statement, defendant denied that he had committed purposeful or knowing murder and attempted to rebut the testimony of the mental health experts. Aifer concluded that the jury might find the statement insincere. On summation, moreover, the prosecutor could have attacked the sincerity of any such statement. Consequently, the PCR court held that Aifer had made a reasonable strategic decision for defendant not to make a statement in allocution. Fundamentally, the right of allocution, like the right to testify, is a personal right that defendants themselves decide whether to exercise. Accordingly, the trial court should address the defendant, rather than counsel, concerning the right of allocution. Defense counsel should not make an independent strategic decision whether defendant should exercise that right. Instead, as with the right to testify, defense counsel should consult with their clients so the clients can make their own informed decisions. It follows that defense counsel should inform the defendant of the right of allocution or ensure that the trial court apprises the defendant of this right. Moreover, as with the right to testify, counsel must advise the defendant on the issue whether to submit a statement of allocution to the jury and to explain the tactical advantages or disadvantages of doing so or not doing so. Counsel's responsibility includes advising a defendant of the benefits inherent in exercising that right and the consequences inherent in waiving it.... Indeed, counsel's failure to do so will give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. [ Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 630-31, 577 A. 2d 455 (discussing right to testify).] Here, Aifer should have requested the trial court to engage defendant in a sufficient colloquy concerning the right of allocution. Instead, after consulting with defendant, she simply asked him on the penultimate day of the trial to write out if I could say something to the jury, what would I say. Although Aifer informed defendant of the purpose of this statement, she did not explain the limits of such a statement or that it would not necessarily subject him to cross-examination. Once defendant completed his statement, Aifer glanced at and rejected it. Rather than discussing the advantages and disadvantages of allocution, she decided unilaterally not to use his statement. On these facts, we conclude that counsel's performance was deficient. We therefore turn to the question whether counsel's deficiency prejudiced defendant. Once again, we resist defendant's suggestion that we presume prejudice. The evaluation of a claim that defense counsel did not fulfill the duty to inform a defendant of the right of allocution is like the evaluation of other ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, including those involving the right to testify. See supra at 252-56, 736 A. 2d at 479-81. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that a statement of remorse by defendant would not have substantially affected the jury's deliberations. Two days before the end of the trial, defendant drafted the following statement at the request of his attorney: Morning Ladies and Gentleman of the Jury I know that you may want to hear from me on why my Life should be spared by you. As you know from the Various Doctors that testified in this proceeding I'm not good at explaining myself vocally. So instead I am writing this letter to you and speak to you on this matter. I do not know if Judge Arnone will allow you to read this or let this be read to you but I'm trusting that he will. The crime's that have me before you in this matter there is no excuse that I can give and what I write is not to be taken as one, this is only to let you know some of my feeling's. At the time of this crime, I was 18 yr's old and am now 25 yr's old, and I will live with this pain for the rest of my LIFE knowing this. I cannot tell you why someone was murdered that night nor can anyone else in this court room. I say this because I have not been able to answer this question to myself. But over these 7 yr's I have thought about why a murder took place that night and even tho I have not still understood it, I do know that I could not and would not ever intentionally take someone's life away for any reason. That I know for sure. People say that I don't show any emotion's but that is not true. When I think about what happened I do cry and ask forgiveness from the Alston and Peniston Families when I am in my cell at night or think about what happened. But how can I ask them for forgiveness or let them know that when I cry at night I cry for them also. I have told them that I am sorry and meant it, when I say these thing's to them tho, someone say's that I don't mean it or when I don't say anything they say that I don't have any remorse but the people who make these statement have not sat down with me to see what I am feeling. Before this crime took place, I had not cried for a long time, but now in these 7 yr's I have cried a lot, and within myself I know that my sorrow is knowing that what happened was wrong and for the Peniston Family, and to say to them again that I am sorry. Ladies and Gentleman Thank You for this chance to speak to You. The statement is problematic. Specifically, in the third paragraph, defendant disputes that he had committed a knowing or purposeful murder of Peniston. That assertion contradicts the jury's finding in the guilt phase. Even if defense counsel had advised defendant to eliminate that denial and to plead for mercy, the record demonstrates that the plea would not have had a substantial propensity to affect the jury's deliberations. In his original trial in 1984, defendant testified similarly about the remorse he felt as a result of the murder. While under oath, defendant told the 1984 jury that: I apologize to the family. I apologize to anybody sitting over there for putting you all into this predicament. And I have been taken drugs since I was thirteen, fourteen years old. And it came to the point where the drugs was my way of life. It was a necessity. A need. And maybe if I never would have taken the drugs it never would have happened. But it did. And it came around to the situation where I needed drugs to forget. You know. Personal problems and things like that. And from when I was thirteen or fourteen I have taken just about every kind of drugs there was. Heroin and acid. And I started depending on the drugs from all different types of reasons. And it got out of hand and to the point where I couldn't control it no more. And like I told the Peniston family, I never would have got involved in drugs. I know for certainthat that would never happen. I would never have been in the predicament where this would have happened. Unfortunately, it did happen. And I'm reallyyou know. I can't really express to you how sorry I am. I'm trying. And since the Peniston family has been in the courtroom from day one, when I told them a few minutes ago I was sorry, that was the first time I could actually look at them, tell him I'm sorry. And right now I can only try to explain to you how sorry I am. And I don't want to be put to death. And I'm sorry for putting my mother and my brothers and my aunt, my whole family through this predicament, the Peniston family and everybody else on the jury. Despite this plea, the jury sentenced defendant to death. The jury, albeit after receiving erroneous instructions on the need for unanimity concerning the mitigating factors, found no such factors. As Aifer testified, defendant's counsel in 1984 believed that the jury was not persuaded by defendant's expression of remorse. Nothing indicates that a statement of remorse would have substantially affected the jury's deliberations in 1990. Aifer also represented defendant in the Alston murder trial. As defendant's counsel, she was best positioned to determine how defendant's allocution would affect the jury. At the PCR hearing, Aifer testified that she believed that the allocution would not have swayed the jury: [R]emember that it's not just evaluating the statement in the abstract. It's evaluating its impact on the jury, on the jury that I'd been watching during the trial, on a jury that had heard evidence presented to them over the course of several days. And I had to evaluate the persuasiveness of this statement in light of all that. And it [the decision not to use the statement] was ultimately the conclusion that I came to. Additionally, Aifer expressed reluctance to use any of defendant's statements of remorse because any such statement would have allowed the State to ridicule the expression of remorse as being something that was done to avoid being punished for his crime: I felt, quite honestly, that as much as I wanted to present Mr. Bey to the jury in as sincere and basically humanand humanized light as possible, I didn't think that his standing and reading a prepared statement to them was going to accomplish that and may possibly have angered or offended some of the jurors, not intentionally, not because I thought he would say anything improper, but because they just might not accept the sincerity of it. At the PCR hearing, Aifer's co-counsel, McCauley, testified that defendant's statement expressed remorse, deep sympathy for the families of the victims and a living hell he has to endure with these thoughts. He admitted that at the time of the trial, however, he dismissed the effectiveness of an allocution, even without having read the statement. I recall at the time not thinking that it would be effective, that I thought the hearing was going well, and just having the question posed to me, what do you think of him getting up and saying I'm sorry, it didn't strike me as being effective before the jury. Aifer's trial strategy was to introduce evidence of defendant's remorse without subjecting defendant to criticism by the prosecutor. Although Aifer did not utilize defendant's own statement, she introduced evidence of defendant's remorse through two mental health experts. Dr. Young testified at the 1990 penalty-phase trial about his meeting with defendant: I saw him crying while he told me what it was like to read the paper about what happened to Ms. Peniston. And he stopped, he lowered his eyes and his hands and he paused for some length before he could go on and explain and as he explained, that it was in the reading of the paper that the reality really hit him. He reached up and was rubbing his eyes and I could see when he wiped his hands they were wet. That he was moved by this recollection. I was not talking with him about potential of death penalty or things of that sort, I was talking with him about what happened a few days or short time after this crime and trying to get his own spontaneous emotional reaction and that was what came out of that. Dr. Pincus also described his contact with defendant at the penalty-phase hearing: I asked him questions designed to determine if a person is depressed. And one of the things I asked, Do you feel guilty? Very often people who are depressed feel guilty. He took that question literally and said, well, yes and no. And he said he felt, yes, because there are two people who are dead. And he becamehis eyes welled with tears when he said that. And he said, on the other hand, he said, I don't see how I could have done such a thing. It doesn't sound like me. He said if anybody he went on to say, If anybody were to give me my freedom and lots of money in return for killing somebody, I wouldn't be able to do it. He said it so sincerely that I believed him. Theoretically, a defendant's personal statement may have a stronger impact on a juror. Here, however, the statement of defendant's remorse, as related by the expert witnesses, may have been more effective. In addition to the expert testimony, Aifer told the jury in her penalty-phase summation that of course [defendant] feels guilty about [the murder]. He is guilty of it. We know that. That's not I know an issue and he's responsible for it. She stated that defendant is frustrated that he can't recall the events and does not know why it happened. This is not someone who as I may have said on my opening gloried in his killing or enjoyed the shedding of blood or is proud of his work or feels that he was justified or anything like that. Lastly, whether defendant would have delivered the allocution, even if properly advised, is pure speculation. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that defendant would not have submitted the statement. In defendant's presence, the trial court asked defense counsel whether defendant chose to make a statement to the jury: Court: Ms. Aifer, based on the case of State v. Zola and reaffirmed in State v. Clausell [, 121 N.J. 298, 580 A. 2d 221 (1990)], I neglected to inquire of you and your client if he chose to make a statement, unsworn statement to the Jury? Aifer: No, sir. Although defendant heard his attorney's refusal, he did not object. Defendant's silence contrasts with his actions in 1984, when he expressed to his defense counsel a request to apologize personally and to plead for mercy. In 1990, defendant did not repeat this request to Aifer, even after she told him she did not intend to use his proposed statement. The dissent proceeds on the assumption that defendant would have read a statement in allocution to the jury if Aifer had informed him of his right to do so. See post at 304, 736 A. 2d at. The record, however, suggests the likelihood that defendant had no desire to read such a statement. Before us, defendant contends that the statement itself, which indicates defendant's desire to make a statement in allocution, reflects that defendant trusted that the court would allow the jury to read the statement. In his PCR testimony, however, defendant testified that he wasn't hoping anything in particular would happen with the statement. In concluding that defendant demonstrated that Aifer's ineffective assistance substantially affected the jury's deliberation, the dissent relies on its own characterization of defendant's statement as a powerful expression of defendant's feelings of remorse. Post at 305, 736 A. 2d at 509. The statement was similar to one rejected by a previous jury in 1984. None of defendant's attorneys believe the statement had a reasonable probability of affecting substantially the deliberations of the penalty-phase jury. We likewise conclude that the record fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the statement would have affected substantially those deliberations.