Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: Discharge of Juror Stephen W.

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in discharging juror Stephen W. during the penalty phase deliberations. On the morning of the fourth day of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court indicating that one of the jurors had discussed the case with a family member. The court convened a hearing at which the juror, Stephen W., admitted that he had violated the instructions of the court by discussing the case with his wife. He stated that he needed to straighten things out in [his] head, and in the process of trying to sort the facts out he had recounted the story of the case to his wife. He explained that his wife told him that he had a difficult decision to make and gave some opinion [sic] which left me with the same decision that I had before. The juror testified that this discussion allowed him to think more clearly. Over defense objection, the trial court excused Stephen W. and seated an alternate juror. The court stated that Stephen W. deliberately and consciously had violated the court's order not to discuss the case outside of jury deliberations. The juror had a doubt about his opinion and voiced that doubt to someone outside the jury's deliberations, and his doubt was removed by that discussion. The court may discharge a juror and substitute an alternate if it finds a juror is unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089.) A trial court's decision to discharge a juror for misconduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and is upheld if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 447, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209; People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 474, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.) The juror's inability to perform must `appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.' ( Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 843, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.) Stephen W. admitted that he had discussed the case with his wife in violation of the court's admonitionan act that constitutes deliberate misconduct. (See § 1122, subd. (a).) [A] juror's serious and willful misconduct is good cause to believe that the juror will not be able to perform his or her duty. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d 815, 864, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) In Daniels, this court upheld the removal of a juror who had discussed the case with others and who had expressed an opinion on the issue of guilt, stating that a judge may reasonably conclude that a juror who has violated instructions to refrain from discussing the case . . . cannot be counted on to follow instructions in the future. ( Id. at p. 865, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) The trial court's conclusion that Stephen W.'s misconduct rendered him unable to perform his duty as a juror is supported by substantial evidence. Defendant further asserts that the trial court erred in refusing defendant's request to discharge the entire penalty phase jury after it discharged juror Stephen W., the defense having claimed that the remaining jurors would be incapable of starting penalty deliberations anew. The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 694, 131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742, that the parties have a right to a verdict reached only after full participation by all twelve jurors, and that they must disregard their past deliberations and begin deliberations anew. As we stated in Collins, We are confident that juries made aware of the rights involved will faithfully follow such instructions. ( Ibid. ) Defendant provides no reason for us to doubt that the jury in this case was able to follow the court's instructions.