Opinion ID: 69109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Wall’s Sentences

Text: We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion using a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). We look first at whether the district court committed any significant procedural error and then at whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable in light of the record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006).8 We ordinarily 8 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 11 expect that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range will be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Wall argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Procedurally, Wall contends that the district court failed to give sufficient reasons for a mid-range sentence, as required by § 3553(c)(1), failed to consider mitigating circumstances, and failed to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Substantively, Wall claims that the district court’s procedural errors resulted in a sentence that was substantively unreasonable. Here, Wall has not met his burden to show that his 144-month sentence is procedurally unreasonable. Wall does not dispute that his advisory guidelines range was properly calculated. In selecting a sentence, the district court expressly acknowledged that it had considered the parties’ statements and all of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court explained that it determined that a midrange sentence was necessary to deter future criminal conduct, provide sufficient punishment, and promote respect for the law. Thus, the district court did not fail to comply with § 3553(c)(1). Contrary to Wall’s assertions, § 3553(c)(1) did not require the district court to articulate its consideration of each of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006). 12 We also reject Wall’s argument that his 144-month sentence, in the middle of the advisory guidelines range of 121 to 151 months, is substantively unreasonable. The difference between Wall’s sentence and Allan’s sentence reflects that Allan pled guilty and received reductions arising from his acceptance of responsibility and the safety-valve provision. Plus, Allan cooperated with the government in prosecuting Wall. The district court was within its discretion to conclude that the mitigating factors Wall points out–his personal history, characteristics and role in the offense–were outweighed by the need to provide just punishment for such a serious offense, to deter him from future criminal conduct and to promote respect for the law. See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”) (quotation marks omitted). Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence in the middle of the advisory guidelines range. AFFIRMED. 13