Opinion ID: 2232175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The General Order

Text: The general order (156 Ill.2d at 137, 189 Ill.Dec. at 44, 619 N.E.2d at 745) does not save this search. This provision is very similar to the Florida Highway Patrol policy at issue in Wells. As with the general order, the Florida Highway Patrol policy did not specifically refer to closed containers, but rather required a general inventory of articles in the vehicle. ( State v. Wells (Fla.1989), 539 So.2d 464, 469, aff'd (1990), 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1.) As with the Florida Highway Patrol policy, the general order does not limit an officer's discretion regarding the scope of an inventory search, particularly with respect to the treatment of closed containers. ( Salmon, 944 F.2d at 1120.) The Florida Highway Patrol policy did not justify the opening of a closed container during the automobile inventory search in Wells. Likewise, the general order should not justify such conduct here. Accord Salmon, 944 F.2d at 1121 (Based on the lack of evidence of any criteria or established routine regarding the scope of an inventory search, we conclude that the searching officers had impermissible discretion regarding the scope of the inventory, particularly as to the treatment of closed containers). I note that in United States v. Wilson (7th Cir.1991), 938 F.2d 785, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that the general order sufficiently limits the discretion of police officers to satisfy the fourth amendment. The court reasoned that requiring the examination and inventory of the contents of an inventoried vehicle establishes the policy that closed containers must be opened. Wilson, 938 F.2d at 789-90. I believe that the Federal appeals court's interpretation of the general order was erroneous for at least two reasons. First, the Wilson court concluded that the general order was distinguishable from the Florida Highway Patrol policy because the Florida State Police admittedly had no standard policy governing inventory searches while the State of Illinois did. ( Wilson, 938 F.2d at 790.) However, the policy in Wells and the general order are essentially the same. Thus, the result in Wells should obtain here. Second, the Wilson court's reasoning, that a general examination requirement necessarily requires the opening of closed containers, is flawed. The Oregon Court of Appeals explained as follows: What [this reasoning] fails to recognize is that the `general nature' of the procedure is precisely what makes it defective. To approve a policy because it is so general that an officer must look everywhere he can think of flies in the face of the requirement that the inventory be `conducted according to standardized criteria,' [citation], or `established routine.' ( State v. Willhite (1992), 110 Or. App. 567, 574, 824 P.2d 419, 422.) Further, Professor LaFave specifically notes that the reasoning of the Wilson court is open to question. (3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.4, at 28-29 (2d ed. Supp.1993).) Of course, the Wilson decision is not binding on Illinois courts. See People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 293, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202.