Opinion ID: 2401009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instructions Regarding First Degree Murder

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding first degree murder. This contention is based primarily upon the following two suppositions: (i) the trial judge erred in giving the jury an instruction that was inconsistent with our recent holding in Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 613 A.2d 956 (1992); and (ii) the instruction given allowed the jury to improperly rely upon the intensity and effect of the victim's wound in order to determine whether premeditation and the intent to kill existed at the time of the shooting.
Relying upon Maryland Rule 4-325(e), Appellant urges this Court to take cognizance of any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the defendant, id., despite his failure to lodge any objection to the instructions given at trial. [10] See Johnson v. State, 310 Md. 681, 686, 531 A.2d 675, 677 (1987) (Although the trial court's failure to give a requested instruction may constitute error, ... such error is ordinarily not preserved for appellate review unless the requesting party objects after the trial court instructs the jury. (Emphasis added)). Because we find that the trial judge committed no error, there is no need to determine whether there exists a plain error so egregious as to warrant reversal absent preservation of Baker's right to appeal the issue under Rule 4-325(e). On occasion, in a capital case, we have reviewed questions concerning jury instructions before determining whether the issue has been adequately preserved for appeal. See Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 611, 616 A.2d 392, 400-01 (1992). We shall, therefore, discuss Appellant's argument. Baker argues that the jury instructions failed to emphasize the differences between first and second degree murder sufficiently enough so the jury could draw a clear distinction between the two degrees. In respect to this argument, Appellant stated the following: Assuming without conceding that Mr. Baker was the perpetrator, he fired a single shot at a stranger in the course of an offense the primary purpose of which was clearly not, as in Willey, to terminate the life of the victim. The jury if properly instructed could well have concluded that there was an absence of any conscious weighing of the reasons for and against the shooting, but instead only a spur-of-the-moment decision based upon a moment's panic-induced thought. The propounding of an instruction consonant with this Court's concerns as expressed in the Willey opinion was therefore particularly necessary and appropriate. Appellant fails to acknowledge, however, that at trial he not only acquiesced in these instructions but, in fact, specifically requested essentially identical instructions. Prior to trial, Defense counsel requested the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions found in Chapter 4:17, which are as follows: