Opinion ID: 1186189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: United States Supreme Court Decisions Before Casey

Text: ¶ 18 In 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, [20] holding that a woman had a constitutional right to have an abortion and that a compelling state interest was necessary to advance state regulation. [21] The Roe court recognized a state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life of the unborn child, [22] in safeguarding pregnant women's health, and appropriate medical standards. [23] The Court addressed the interest of a state based on trimesters of the woman's pregnancy. ¶ 19 Under Roe, these state interests became more compelling as the pregnancy progressed, [24] and a state's interest in the health of pregnant women became compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester. [25] After the end of the first trimester, permissible state regulation included the facility in which the procedure [was] to be performed, that is, whether it [had to] be a hospital or [might] be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status. [26] ¶ 20 A state's interest in protecting potential human life became compelling at viability. [27] At the point of viability, a state could not only regulate abortion but also prohibit abortion. [28] ¶ 21 The United States Supreme Court decided Doe v. Bolton, [29] on the same day as Roe. Doe addressed Georgia's abortion restrictions including the requirement that abortions be performed in a hospital licensed by the Board and accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. [30] Under Georgia's law, the definition of hospital was not sufficiently broad to include facilities, other than hospitals, which were adequately equipped to handle abortions. ¶ 22 In striking down Georgia's hospital-related requirements, the Court noted that the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals accreditation requirement was not reasonably related to the purposes of the Act. [31] The Court held that the hospital requirement of the Georgia law, because it fails to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy,. . . is also invalid. [32] ¶ 23 Then in 1983, the United Supreme Court once again faced issues relating to abortion regulations in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., [33] Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, [34] and Simopoulos v. Virginia [35] . Continuing the Roe reasoning that a woman has a fundamental right to abortion, the Court in Akron recognized that a state could regulate abortion during the first trimester so long as the regulation did not significant[ly] impact on the woman's exercise of her right and the regulation was justified by important state health objectives. [36] From the beginning of the second trimester until viability, a state could adopt regulations reasonably relate[d] to the preservation and protection of maternal health, [37] and legitimately related to the objective the State [sought] to accomplish. [38] ¶ 24 The Akron Court struck down as unconstitutional an ordinance requiring all abortions after the end of the first trimester to be performed only in acute-care, full-service hospitals. [39] The Court relied heavily on evidence that the cost of an abortion performed in a general hospital was more than twice as much as those performed in a clinic, second-trimester abortions were rarely performed in Akron hospitals, and medical commentary supported that at least during the early weeks of the second trimester . . . abortions [could] be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full service hospital. [40] The Court also struck down a requirement that counseling for the purposes of obtaining informed consent had to be done by the physician and could not be delegated to an assistant. [41] ¶ 25 Ashcroft dealt with several Missouri abortion statutes, one of which restricted abortions after the twelfth week of pregnancy to hospitals. [42] The Court adopted the definition of hospital as a general acute-care facility. [43] Relying on Akron, the Court summarily found the Missouri statute to be unconstitutional. ¶ 26 In Simopoulos v. Virginia, [44] a doctor was convicted for performing a second-trimester abortion outside a hospital. Under Virginia law, a hospital included outpatient hospitals. [45] Virginia's regulations defined outpatient hospitals to include facilities which primarily provide facilities for the performance of surgical procedures on out-patients. [46] The regulations permitted second trimester abortions in such clinics. [47] With only a few exceptions, the regulations licensing the outpatient hospitals in which abortions were performed applied to all outpatient hospitals. [48] The Court upheld the regulations because of Virginia's interest in protecting its citizens, in regulating second-trimester abortions, in setting standards for medical facilities, and in having its regulations consistent with accepted medical practice. [49]