Opinion ID: 159870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objections to the PSR

Text: The PSR, prepared on September 18, 1998, recommended that Aguilar’s sentence be enhanced two levels pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). Aguilar filed objections to the PSR on October 15, 1998 challenging, in part, the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. In response to Aguilar’s objections, an addendum was prepared and attached to the PSR. The response provided justifications for the imposition of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, and stated, in part, “The defendant was observed bending over the front seat of the vehicle prior to the arrest.” At the -8- sentencing hearing, Aguilar challenged the statement noting that, “[a]ll of the reports . . . show that Mr. Sicairos . . . was bending over the seat and apparently trying to hide a gun. . . . they are trying now to show that it was [Aguilar who] was doing that, which is contrary to all of the reports that have ever been written.” On appeal, Aguilar argues the district court failed to make adequate findings on his objections to the PSR as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). 3 Rule 32(c)(1) provides, in part, that when a party objects to a matter contained in the presentence report, “the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing.” Rule 32(c)(1) also provides that “a written record of these findings and determinations must be appended to any copy of the presentence report made available to the bureau of prisons.” Aguilar’s argument that the district court failed to make adequate findings lacks merit. It is clear from the record that the district court considered Aguilar’s contention that the response to his written objection contained a factual inaccuracy. The undercover officer testified at the sentencing hearing and confirmed Aguilar’s position that the statement in the PSR was factually 3 In his opening brief, Aguilar relies on Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) to support his argument. Aguilar acknowledges in his reply brief that Rule 32(c)(3)(D) has been superceded by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). -9- erroneous. Prior to overruling Aguilar’s objection to the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, the district court stated, “even though it was not Mr. Aguilar who was observed making the furtive motion of what appeared to be stuffing the gun under the seat, he was right there in the front seat, the gun was within reach . . . .” It is clear from the court’s statement that it accepted Aguilar’s contention that the PSR erroneously stated that Aguilar was seen bending over the front seat of the vehicle. This statement makes it equally clear that the district court considered Aguilar’s objections to the PSR but nevertheless concluded that Aguilar’s actual knowledge of the possession of the gun could be inferred from the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, thus, overruling Aguilar’s written objections to the § 2D.1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Aguilar’s argument that the district court erred by failing to made adequate findings as required by Rule 32(c)(1) thus fails. Aguilar, however, correctly asserts that the district court was obligated under Rule 32(c)(1) to reduce its factual findings to writing and append them to the PSR. The government concedes that the district court has failed to append these findings to the PSR. Thus, we remand to the district court with instructions to reduce its findings to writing and attach them to the PSR.