Opinion ID: 1291031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA)

Text: ¶ 35. Wisconsin's zoning laws, including the statutes governing county boards of adjustment, date to 1927. In that year, the legislature enacted, almost verbatim, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) that had been promulgated by the United States Department of Commerce under Herbert Hoover earlier. See ch. 408, Laws of 1927. The similarity between the revised SSZEA (1926) and Wisconsin's law (1927) is unmistakable. The 1926 SSZEA provided: The board of adjustment shall have the following powers: 1. To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this act or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto. . . . . In exercising the above-mentioned powers such board may, in conformity with the provisions of this act, reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify the order, requirement, decision, or determination appealed from and may make such order, requirement, decision, or determination as ought to be made, and to that end shall have all the powers of the officer from whom the appeal is taken. A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 10-11 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1926). ¶ 36. The original Wisconsin statute corresponding to the quoted language is textually identical except that section 59.97 was substituted for the first instance of this act. Wis. Stat. § 59.99(7)(a), (8) (1927). To remove any possible doubt, a copy of the SSZEA, annotated with the aforementioned change, appears in the statute's drafting file. See Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for Assembly Bill 603, ch. 408, Laws of 1927. That our statute was based on the SSZEA is therefore beyond dispute. See also Klinger v. Oneida County, 149 Wis. 2d 838, 842 n.3, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989) (noting that Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10) is modeled on the SSZEA). ¶ 37. When a Wisconsin statute adopts a model law, it is appropriate to reference the case law of other jurisdictions that have also enacted the same law. See, e.g., Knight v. Milwaukee County, 2002 WI 27, ¶ 28, 251 Wis. 2d 10, 640 N.W.2d 773; National Operating, L.P. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2001 WI 87, ¶ 30, 244 Wis. 2d 839, 630 N.W.2d 116. ¶ 38. Because the statutory language at issue is taken from a model act that has been adopted in most jurisdictions, [10] there is no paucity of case law deciding the issue now before this court. Courts in other jurisdictions, construing statutes effectively identical to Wisconsin's, have repeatedly concluded that a board of adjustment has broad power to conduct a de novo review and may take additional evidence. [11] See also 4 Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 2205, at 14-15 (4th ed. 1997) (board has power to conduct a de novo review); 3 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 57:9, at 57-27 (Ziegler rev. 2002) (board has power to reverse or affirm, wholly or partly . . . and make such order, requirement, decision, or determination as, in its opinion, ought to be made in the case.) (emphasis added). In exercising this power, the Board necessarily canindeed, must  make factual determinations. See 3 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 57:11, at 57-31 (Ziegler rev. 2002).