Opinion ID: 853762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fair Cross-Section of the Jury Pool

Text: Dye argues that his jury was not selected from a venire that represented a fair cross-section of the community. Before trial 150 prospective jurors completed questionnaires that included a question about race. After reviewing the questionnaires, Dye discovered that only eighteen of the 150 potential jurors identified themselves as African-American. [14] He filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings or Dismiss the Information Based upon Racial Discrimination in the Jury Venire which sought either time to allow investigation of the racial disparity, supplementation of the venire pursuant to Indiana Code § 33-4-5-2(d) & (e), or dismissal of the information. The trial court denied the motion. In order to make a prima facie showing of a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must establish (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). Dye acknowledges that he bears the burden of establishing a Duren violation, see, e.g., Bond v. State, 533 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 1989), and concedes that he cannot meet the third prong of Duren based on the record before us. He nevertheless asserts error based on the trial court's denial of his motion to stay the proceedings or supplement the venire pursuant to Indiana Code § 33-4-5-2(d) & (e). That statute provides that [t]he jury commissioners may supplement voter registration lists and tax schedules ... with names from lists of persons residing in the county that the jury commissioners may designate as necessary to obtain a cross section of the population of each county commissioner's district.... IND.CODE § 33-4-5-2(d) (1998). The supplemental sources may consist of such lists as those of utility customers, persons filing income tax returns, motor vehicle registrations, city directories, telephone directories, and driver's licenses.... Id. § 33-4-8-2(e). As noted above, Dye made no showing that supplementation was necessary to comply with Duren, and we see no basis for requiring trial courts under such circumstances to utilize this discretionary statutory provision for supplementation. The use of voter registration lists complied with statute. See IND.CODE § 33-4-5-2 (1998). [15] In addition, the trial court also had a duty to comply the constitutional requirements set forth in Duren, which it did. It was not required to supplement the voter's registration lists. See Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 103-04 (Ind.1995) (Absent constitutional infirmity, however, we decline to construe [Indiana Code § 33-4-5-2(d)] so as to convert an option into a mandate.). Nor was the trial court required to grant Dye a stay for further investigation of systematic exclusion. Dye did not raise the issue until days before trial when a lengthy continuance would have been required to conduct the study Dye requested. [16] We review a trial court's denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind.1994). Under these circumstances, the denial of Dye's motion for a stay was not an abuse of discretion.