Opinion ID: 146903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DISCUSSION (A) Proffer Agreement

Text: Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions. However, because Rule 410 constitutes an exception to the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible, its limitations are not to be read broadly, United States v. Griffith, 385 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir.2004), and its protections are waivable, United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2004). Oluwanisola's proffer agreement contained a partial waiver of his rights under Rule 410, allowing the government to use statements made during the proffer sessions only as substantive evidence to rebut, directly or indirectly, any evidence offered or elicited, or factual assertions made, by or on behalf of [Oluwanisola].... Oluwanisola argues that the district court took an overly expansive view of the waiver provision, causing his counsel to refrain from making key arguments at trial in order to avoid introduction of the proffer statements, and effectively denying him effective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, Oluwanisola argues that the district court erred (1) by not allowing his counsel to make any argument with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence during his opening statement; and (2) by not allowing his counsel to elicit testimony during cross examination of the government's witnesses to demonstrate the insufficiency of the government's proof as to key issues. In United States v. Barrow , we looked at a proffer agreement with almost identical waiver language to that here and addressed the question of what factual assertions would trigger the waiver provision. 400 F.3d 109, 116-121 (2d Cir.2005). [3] We concluded that the clause any evidence offered or elicited, or factual assertions made, by or on behalf of [the defendant] applied to all factual assertions, including those made directly during opening argument or indirectly through cross-examination. Id. at 118. However, we stated that [t]he mere fact that a defendant pleads not guilty and stands trial is not a factual assertion that triggers the proffer agreement waiver. Id. Moreover, a defense argument that simply challenged the sufficiency of government proof on elements such as knowledge, intent, identity, etc., would not trigger the waiver here at issue. Id. at 119. In this case, the district court made a distinction between generally tell[ing] the jury about the burden of proof and the necessity of the government proving all elements of the crime and arguing that specific elements of the crime [have] not be[en] met, ruling that while the former would not trigger the waiver provision, the latter would. Barrow did not make such a distinction and we can think of no rationale that would compel such a result. Under the district court's interpretation of Barrow, even if the government failed to introduce any evidence on a certain element, defense counsel would not be permitted to draw the jury's attention to the lack of evidence in his opening statement without triggering the waiver provision in the proffer agreement. Interpreting the waiver provision to permit such a result would leave the defendant, for all practical purposes, defenseless. As the record makes clear, Mr. Nobel was compelled by the court's ruling to limit his opening statement to generalized statements concerning the government's burden of proof and the jury's responsibilities. Under Barrow, however, Mr. Nobel should have been permitted during his opening statement to reference certain elements of the crime and argue that the government would be unable to sustain its burden of proof as to those elements. Whether the court erred in its rulings on cross examination is a more complex question. In Barrow, we noted that when confronted with a government argument that a defense opening or cross-examination implicitly satisfies the factual assertion requirement for waiver, a district court may well have to consider carefully what fact, if any, has actually been implied to the jury.... 400 F.3d at 119. Defense counsel's question challenging the testimony of the postal worker, Dennis Coleman, presents precisely the type of cross examination question that requires careful consideration by the district court. Coleman testified that he had seen Oluwanisola picking up mail at one of the suspect addresses and had reported the suspicious behavior to his supervisor. Defense counsel asked whether there was a written report, which he explained to the court was relevant because it would establish the date of Coleman's observation of Oluwanisola. This date was relevant to whether the government could tie over one kilogram of heroin to deliveries picked up by Oluwanisola because the government's argument was based, in part, on the fact that Oluwanisola had been observed picking up deliveries for several months. The government argued that any challenge to Coleman's credibility would trigger the waiver provision because Oluwanisola admitted to picking up mail at that address during that time period at his proffer session. However, we do not believe that defense counsel's question can be construed as an implicit factual assertion that Oluwanisola did not pick up mail at that address. Under the government's construction of the waiver provision, defense counsel would be prohibited from asking a witness any question during cross examination about his testimony on directeven if the testimony was misleading, weak, or contradictorybecause the only plausible reason to do so would be to call into question the witness's credibility. We do not read the language in the waiver provision to prohibit Oluwanisola from placing the government's evidence in context, even if that context is that a government witness is not credible. It is true that in Barrow we stated that some cross examination questions, such as a question accusing a witness of fabricating an event, 400 F.3d at 119, could make an implicit factual assertion that would trigger the waiver provision. However, in Barrow we were faced with a situation in which defense counsel had affirmatively argued during his opening statement that the defendant had been mistaken for someone else and then asked a government witness during cross examination, `You made up about meeting the [confidential informant] there that day, didn't you?' Id. at 114. In that situation one can easily infer that defense counsel was making the implicit factual assertion that no meeting took place because his theory of mistaken identity depended on that fact. But when the defendant has not directly or indirectly contradicted the facts he admitted in his proffer, the same inference does not apply. The defendant's admission in his proffer statement of the facts the witness testifies to having observed is not an admission that the witness observed those facts. There is no inconsistency or contradiction between a defendant's admission that he robbed the bank and his challenge to a witness's testimony that the witness saw the defendant rob the bank and recognizes the defendant. Indeed, there is no principled way of distinguishing between a cross examination question that challenges a witness's perception of an event and a question that accuses the witness of fabricating an event. In both cases it is entirely possible that the event nevertheless occurred despite the inaccurate testimony. Moreover, both blatant accusations of fabrication and gentle inquiries into the witness's memory serve only one purposeto question the credibility of the witness's testimony. A cross examination question that goes to the credibility of the government's witness, without a factual assertion contradicting the facts admitted in the proffer statement, is not sufficient to trigger the waiver provision here. Thus, defense counsel should have been permitted to question Coleman about the date of his observation without triggering the waiver provision. The district court also erred in its other ruling on the proffer statements during cross examination, but for a different reason. After defense counsel asked Agent Goodwin a question about the role of couriers in drug conspiracies, the government incorrectly represented to the court that Oluwanisola made statements about his role in the conspiracy during his proffer sessions. In fact, Oluwanisola made those statements at the time of his arrest, which the government introduced as part of its case. Assuming without deciding that defense counsel's question represented a factual assertion, the government was still required to show that the proffer statements fairly rebut[ted] that assertion. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 117-19. The district court erroneously ruled that the government had made such a showing here, denying Oluwanisola the opportunity to pursue that particular avenue of cross examination. In sum, the district court's rulings on the scope of the waiver provision, both with respect to defense counsel's opening statement and during cross examination, violated Oluwinasola's Sixth Amendment rights. However, [a] constitutional error does not always require reversal of a criminal conviction. United States v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir.2005). While structural defects, which affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, are subject to automatic reversal, trial errors of the type here, which are relatively limited in scope, are subject to harmless error review. Id.; see also United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 193 n. 3 (2d Cir.2004) (reviewing district court's decision that proffer agreement waiver was enforceable for harmless error); cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680-84, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (applying harmless error review to restriction on a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness in violation of the Sixth Amendment). Under harmless error review, we ask whether we can conclude with fair assurance that the errors did not substantially influence the jury. United States v. Ivezaj, 568 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). In conducting this inquiry, we consider factors including: (1) the importance of the unrebutted assertions to the government's case; (2) whether the excluded material was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the government's case on the factual questions at issue; (4) the extent to which the defendant was otherwise permitted to advance the defense; and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Cf. Brinson v. Walker, 547 F.3d 387, 395 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431). The government argues that any error was harmless because defense counsel was permitted to make sufficiency arguments during summation, based on the court's slightly altered view, expressed after the close of evidence, that the government ha[s] a somewhat more aggressive view of [ Barrow ] than I do. Moreover, the government argues that any error during cross examination was harmless because the evidence supporting a guilty verdict was overwhelming. We agree with the government that there was sufficient evidence to convict Oluwanisola, see infra, but are not convinced that the court's error in interpreting the waiver provision was harmless. Because of the court's ruling, defense counsel was unable to pursue avenues of cross examination going to both the quantity of drug involved and Oluwanisola's role in the drug conspiracy, which related to whether Oluwanisola knew that the envelopes contained heroin. Moreover, the effect of the court's ruling went far beyond the several questions that the government chose to challenge. The government's extreme interpretation of Barrow, coupled with the court's preliminary ruling that adopted the government's position, had the effect of severely limiting Oluwanisola's ability to mount an effective defense. In a situation such as this one, where defense counsel risked letting the horse out of the barn if he did not closely adhere to the court's ruling, this limitation was substantial. The fact that defense counsel was able to make sufficiency arguments during closing arguments does not cure this defect. Having been unable to put the government's evidence in perspective during cross examination, defense counsel was reduced to making sufficiency arguments that bore no relation to the evidence actually presented or elicited. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude with fair assurance that the errors did not substantially influence the jury. Ivezaj, 568 F.3d at 98. We therefore vacate the judgment of conviction.