Opinion ID: 2642623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: T. L. Wallace

Text: ¶16. T. L. Wallace argues that it owed no duty to Patterson and that Patterson failed to show that T. L. Wallace had created the hazardous condition. Conversely, Patterson argues that T. L. Wallace’s negligence may be inferred through circumstantial evidence, that the evidence shows T. L. Wallace created the hazardous condition, and that T. L. Wallace breached its duty to clean the debris and warn motorists of the condition. ¶17. The Court of Appeals’ majority admitted that neither Patterson nor Sorrels could testify regarding the source of the debris. Then, it stated “there was no evidence that anyone else could be responsible for the debris in the roadway,” and “[n]either of the Appellees could testify as to an alternate source of the accumulation in the roadway that led to Patterson’s wreck and injuries.” Patterson v. T. L. Wallace Constr., Inc., _ So. 3d _, 2012 WL 1592154 (Miss. Ct. App. May 8, 2012). The majority improperly shifted the burden to T. L. Wallace to prove someone else had created the hazardous condition. ¶18. In order to prevail on a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance 9 of the evidence each element of negligence: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages. Huynh, 95 So. 3d at 1262 (¶9). Duty and breach of duty are essential elements of negligence and should be demonstrated first. Id. at 1262-63 (¶10). Patterson had to provide sufficient proof that T. L. Wallace was responsible for the debris on the Parkway, failed to clean it, and failed to warn motorists of the hazardous condition. He did not do so. ¶19. Patterson stated that, because T. L. Wallace had performed construction in the area, T. L. Wallace must be responsible for the debris on the Parkway and must be liable for his injuries. Patterson’s argument is similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. But, in pertinent part, this doctrine requires “the instrumentality causing the damage must be under the exclusive control of the defendant.” Brown v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. DeSoto, Inc., 806 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (¶17) (Miss. 2002). The doctrine does not apply here, because the Parkway is a public road owned by the City of Hattiesburg; it is not under T. L. Wallace’s exclusive control. ¶20. So, to survive summary judgment, Patterson had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that T. L. Wallace owed it a duty of care. A defendant who creates a hazardous condition has a duty to make safe or warn of that condition; ownership is immaterial. See Spann v. Shuqualak Lumber Co., 990 So. 2d 186 (Miss. 2008) (holding the defendant had a duty to refrain from creating an unreasonably dangerous condition – smoke – which could impede a motorist’s vision). But the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that the defendant created the hazardous condition. ¶21. The parties do not dispute that T. L. Wallace was retained by Turtle Creek to perform work on a retention pond located west of the Parkway. To facilitate its work, T. L. Wallace 10 had repaired a haul road which stopped 200 feet away from the Parkway. T. L. Wallace’s work entailed smoothing out wet dirt, and it moved equipment onto the property to complete the work. When deposed, neither Patterson nor Sorrels could provide answers regarding who was responsible for the debris and how long the debris was on the Parkway. Patterson showed that T. L. Wallace had worked near the site of his accident several days prior to his accident and a few days after his accident. But evidence that T. L. Wallace had worked in the area several days prior to Patterson’s accident is insufficient to show that it created the hazardous condition. See Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Tisdale, 185 So. 2d 916, 917 (Miss. 1966)) (holding mere proof of occurrence of an accident is insufficient to establish negligence). ¶22. Based on circumstantial evidence, the Court of Appeals’ majority found the case should have survived summary judgment. In some cases, circumstantial evidence can be used to survive summary judgment. But the Court has stated that: In order to establish an allegation of negligence based upon circumstances, inferences and acts of a defendant in the nature of admissions, the proof of circumstances must be such that they will take the case out of the realm of conjecture and place it within the field of a legitimate inference of liability. Huynh, 95 So. 3d at 1263. ¶23. Patterson relies on mere allegations and speculation to support his claims against T. L. Wallace. As previously mentioned, neither Patterson nor Sorrels knew who had deposited the debris on the Parkway or how long it had been there. As stated by the circuit court: [Patterson] insists that “the debris was in the road either as a result of Defendant’s work at the project or because it fell off of Defendant’s equipment.” This insistence is mere speculation, and it is likely that other contractors, members of the general public, or employees of the City of 11 Hattiesburg created the hazardous condition that caused this accident. We agree. ¶24. “[A] plaintiff may not rely solely upon the unsworn allegations in the pleadings or ‘arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda.’” Whiting, 62 So. 3d at 914 (¶9). At most, Patterson showed that T. L. Wallace performed construction in the area several days prior to his accident. No circumstantial evidence suggests T. L. Wallace caused the debris to accumulate on the Parkway. Without such evidence, Patterson’s claims are insufficient to survive summary judgment. T. L. Wallace proved that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, showed no genuine issue as to any material fact, and it was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we find the circuit court did not err by granting T. L. Wallace’s motion for summary judgment.