Opinion ID: 2779090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Meirhofer Is Entitled to Relief

Text: An SVP may challenge confinement through a personal restraint petition when changes occur that fall outside the statute. It is a question of fact whether a change in the diagnoses leads to the conclusion that the SVP is no longer mentally ill and dangerous. I would hold that if a detainee presents a sufficiently significant change, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a trier of fact could find the person is no longer suffering from a mental abnormality that renders him or her dangerous, then the detainee is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing to determine if he or she continues to meet the constitutional criteria for confinement. Meirhofer meets the test: it is reasonably possible that his change in diagnoses could lead a reasonable trier of fact to believe that he is no longer suffering from a mental abnormality that renders him dangerous. In considering Meirhofer's case, we 11 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) examine the evidence that would be presented to the jury to make the case that Meirhofer is no longer mentally ill and dangerous. The jury would consider if Meirhofer continues to be mentally ill. The jury would be told that Meirhofer was diagnosed with paraphilia, NOS, nonconsent, and paraphilia, NOS, hebephilia. They would learn that neither diagnosis is found in the pages of the DSM. They would hear of the controversial nature of these two diagnoses and the rejection of both by the national and international psychiatric communities. The jury would then consider Meirhofer's third diagnosis, antisocial disorder, and would hear that the DSM assigns antisocial personality disorder to individuals who habitually violate the rights of others without remorse. The definition includes four diagnostic criteria and seven subfeatures, including failure to obey the laws. The jury would be told that under this assessment, Meirhofer will likely never lose the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, regardless of his participation in treatment. They would probably be told that the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the assertion that a person with previous criminal history plus a diagnosis of antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct ... may be held indefinitely. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82. Notably, the jury would not hear that Meirhofer is a pedophile, a label widely recognized and associated with egregious criminal behavior. The jury would also consider whether Meirhofer is still dangerous. They would hear that he was convicted in 1988 and served a 9-year prison sentence, after which he was confined at the Special Commitment Center on McNeil Island for 14 years. 12 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) They would be shown actuarial instruments6 that predict his likelihood of reoffending. They would be told that the State's expert predicted a likelihood of reoffending between 20 percent and 30 percent, down from 92 percent during his commitment trial. Meirhofer's own expert would confirm this score. The jury would be told that the State's psychologist, despite his actuarial assessment, believes that Meirhofer is still dangerous because of his criminal actions nearly 27 years prior. They would be told that his risk assessment will never drop to zero because of his previous criminal behaviors. Given all the evidence, the jury would weigh and consider if Meirhofer continues to have a mental abnormality that renders him dangerous, beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof, meaning that the jury must decide that there is no doubt that Meirhofer continues to be mentally ill and dangerous. A jury might find that the State has carried this heavy burden of proof, but there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would hold to the contrary and that Meirhofer would be released. Regardless, due process requires a hearing to determine whether the significant change in Meirhofer's diagnoses means that he is no longer an SVP. 6 An actuarial instrument is an empirical tool that estimates recidivism rates of sex offenders by weighing a number of risk factors. The offender receives a score of one or zero based on the presence or absence of the risk factor, the total is then added up, and the total score represents the offender's risk of future offense. The weightiest risk factor is the number of prior sex offenses. See generally DENNIS M. DOREN, USING RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTATION, IN EVALUATING SEX OFFENDERS: A MANUAL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENTS AND BEYOND 103 (2002); In re Oet. of Thorell, 149 Wn.2d 724,753,72 P.3d 708 (2003). 13 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) Meirhofer's case might be unusual. Not all changes in diagnosis will require relief under a personal restraint petition. For example, I agree with the majority that the detainee in Klein would not be afforded a new proceeding under the test we propose here. State v. Klein, 156 Wn.2d 103, 124 P.3d 644 (2005). Klein, an insanity acquittee, was originally diagnosed with psychoactive substance induced organic mental disorder, a mental disorder induced by using one drug. Her diagnosis was later changed to polysubstance dependence, a dependence on many drugs. /d. at 120. The court concluded that Klein's diagnoses are based on the very same symptoms[ and] differ only in the name attached to it. Klein, 156 Wn.2d at 120-21. The change from dependence on one drug to many drugs does not give rise to a reasonable possibility that a reasonable trier of fact would determine that Klein no longer suffered from a mental illness that made her dangerous. Unlike Klein's circumstances, Meirhofer's diagnostic change removed one of his original diagnoses (not-A) and added a nebulous new diagnosis (D). In contrast, Klein's diagnosis could be represented as a change in diagnosis from (A) to (A+). Therefore, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine if Meirhofer continues to meet the criteria for confinement. We cannot live in the land of makebelieve, where fictitious roads for relief exist and we pretend that a change in diagnosis makes no difference. The cornerstone of our system is due process-we must continue to believe in the power of the jury to make a determination for the community. A jury should determine if, beyond a reasonable doubt, Meirhofer continues to meet the criteria for commitment. 14 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) Given the reasonable possibility that a trier of fact could determine Meirhofer's restraint is unlawful, the evidentiary hearing should be granted. This test would not empty the Special Commitment Center at McNeil Island of its detainees, but it would provide an evidentiary trial for a subset of detainees whose situations fall outside of the SVP statute.