Opinion ID: 1521791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: shaw's contentions

Text: Appellant Shaw contends the trial court abused its discretion in ruling, after an in camera inspection, that certain portions of prior statements of three government witnesses did not need to be disclosed under the Jencks Act, see Super.Ct.Crim.R. 26.2 (implementing Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), in the District of Columbia). The subject of the testimony of all three witnesses was a conversation that each had had with Shaw at the time of the assault, in which Shaw stated that he had injured Wilson in the course of an arrest. We have examined the undisclosed documents and find that none of them relate[s] to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness[es] under 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the government was not required to produce these statements. See Reed v. United States, 403 A.2d 725, 732 n. 9 (D.C.1979). Shaw also asserts the trial court erred by instructing the jury that a testifying defendant has an interest in the outcome of the trial. That claimed error is groundless. See United States v. Hill, 152 U.S.App. D.C. 213, 217, 470 F.2d 361, 365 (1972) (cited in Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 440 (D.C.1982)). Finally, we find ample evidence to support Shaw's conviction as an accessory after the fact to simple assault. An accessory after the fact is one who assists a principal to avoid apprehension or punishment. D.C.Code § 22-106 (1981). The government's evidence showed that Shaw affirmatively attempted to mislead the police into thinking that Shaw had been forced to inflict the injuries upon Wilson in the course of an arrest. Six police officers testified that in six separate conversations Shaw had told them that he had inflicted the injuries. That Shaw's statements were designed to aid the true culprit to avoid apprehension is made even clearer by the testimony that Shaw told Ruffin not to talk to the police and to wipe the blood from his shoes and in addition by Shaw's statement that he would tell the authorities that he had injured Wilson while attempting to apprehend him. Accordingly, we affirm Ruffin's conviction of second-degree murder and vacate his conviction of mayhem, and we affirm Shaw's convictions. Affirmed. MACK, Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Today the majority of this division takes a giant step towards trampling the constitutional protections guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It treads on dangerous ground in holding, contrary to the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in numerous cases, that the admission into evidence at trial of a written confession obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment can be harmless error. The majority goes on to find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, in spite of a record that is unequivocally to the contrary. Finally, it reaches the startling conclusion, on facts indistinguishable from those present in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), that the government has been relieved of its heavy burden of proving that a suspect voluntarily waived a Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal seizure, merely because a trial court has questioned the credibility of that suspect. I find these holdings to go beyond the outer limits of constitutional reason, case-law, or common sense. I therefore do not agree that appellant Ruffin's second-degree murder conviction can be affirmed. [1]