Opinion ID: 2569804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: KRPC 1.1 (Competence)

Text: Respondent first takes issue with the panel's findings of fact in relation to the KRPC 1.1 violation. Specifically, respondent argues that paragraph 4 of the panel's report, stating that the respondent indicated she would file a paternity action on Mr. Froggatte's behalf, is in error. Respondent's argument is not persuasive. Froggatte did not know the nature of what respondent intended to file. However, it is undisputed that respondent collected a filing fee of $42 from Froggatte after they discussed filing a paternity action. This is borne out by respondent's own words: [W]e talked about, I believe, both a paternity case in terms of establishing [his] parental rights as well as subsequently determining custody of that child. Based on this discussion and respondent's collection of a $42 filing fee, the panel could reasonably conclude that respondent said she would file a paternity action. In addition, while crossexamining Froggatte, respondent said, I spoke with you about your need to file a sworn affidavit to back up the petition with regard to paternity. Respondent's request for this sworn affidavit suggests she intended to file a paternity action. Respondent also questions the finding that the necessary pleadings were to be filed by May 4, 1998. The panel's findings in paragraph 4 are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent also argues that the evidence supporting the panel's finding in paragraph 9 that she did not contact Froggatte on May 4, 1998, is not clear and convincing. We disagree. In the context of the findings, the panel is referring to the respondent's failure to contact Froggatte as promised to meet with and advise him of how to proceed with his case. Froggatte expected respondent to meet with him personally, fill out paperwork, and file the case Monday, May 4. When Froggatte did not receive a phone call from respondent by the close of business on May 4, he telephoned respondent and left a message for her. Respondent returned Froggatte's call that day or the next day. Respondent agreed that she promised to meet with Froggatte and that the meeting did not take place. Clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's finding of fact in paragraph 9. Respondent next argues that the panel's conclusion of law that she violated KRPC 1.1 (competence) (1999 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 284) is erroneous. The panel found that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 because she advised Froggatte that: (1) a paternity action could be filed before the birth of a child, and (2) there were legal means of restraining a pregnant woman from leaving the State before giving birth. The Disciplinary Administrator argues the panel found this violation because respondent did not adequately explain to Froggatte that these possibilities did not exist under the current state of the law. It is respondent's contention that she informed Froggatte that bringing such an action would break new legal ground. Respondent argues she should be given leeway to be a zealous advocate and argue for the expansion or modification of existing law. A review of the transcript lends only marginal support to respondent's position. Froggatte admitted during cross-examination by Respondent: What I was informed was that Judge Saschse may not require her to stay in Kansas.... So, to keep her in Franklin County, you did not guarantee me that, but you told me that we would get jurisdiction in Franklin County and that we would try to keep her in Kansas throughI don't know what we were going to fileand that if weat least she would have to come back to Franklin County for further proceedings. It is not clear, as respondent contends, that she advised Froggatte the case would break new legal ground. It is also not clear that respondent competently advised Froggatte of the state of the law. Respondent promised to file a paternity action and seek a restraining order without conducting research on the issue. She advised Froggatte before she was aware whether there was a good faith basis to argue for the expansion of existing law. The panel obviously concluded that respondent did not inform her client as she contends. In matters of credibility or conflicting testimony we may defer to the panel's findings. See In re Carson, 252 Kan. 399, 406, 845 P.2d 47 (1993); State v. Zeigler, 217 Kan. 748, 755, 538 P.2d 643 (1975). There is clear and convincing evidence to support the panel's finding that respondent exhibited a lack of competence in her dealings with Froggatte.