Opinion ID: 2627487
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The superior court's evidentiary rulings were within its discretion.

Text: Having concluded that it was not error for Judge Michalski to reverse the previous ruling in this case, we turn now to whether the subsequent rulings admitting evidence were erroneous. Byler specifically contests the court's admission of evidence of the assault, the Coast Guard letter of concern, a conviction for failing to comply with reporting requirements, and the insinuation that Byler was a drug dealer. The admission of this evidence, Byler contends, deprived Byler of a fair trial and improperly influenced the jury. To place this dispute in context, it must be remembered that Byler's suit listed three statements and one failure to deny that he claimed were defamatory: (1) Owen's statement I can't say anything good about Darren Byler; (2) Owen's statement to Abeyta that Byler abandoned hunters to be rescued by the Coast Guard; (3) Owen's statement to Abeyta that Byler was known to run out of fuel; and (4) Owen's failure to deny or refute Shaker's statements about Byler to Kenner. In defense of Byler's claims, Owen offered evidence that his statements were true. Alaska, like the majority of jurisdictions, follows the Restatement of Torts which considers truth to be a defense to defamation. [26] In response, Byler argued principally that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. As to relevancy, evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less likely. [27] In general, all relevant evidence is admissible. The Alaska Rules of Evidence set out several exceptions to that rule. Byler contends that the admission of the contested evidence violated two exceptions in particular: (1) character evidence is generally inadmissible and never admissible to prove specific conduct (Rule 404), and (2) the evidence at issue here is more prejudicial than probative (Rule 403). We consider each of these claims in turn. In Alaska the admission of character evidence is governed by Evidence Rule 404. Rule 404 provides generally that [e]vidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, but it then lists several exceptions. Judge Michalski justified his ruling allowing some character evidence the two pieces of evidence concerning Byler's conviction for violating reporting requirements and the Coast Guard letter of concernby finding that the evidence was relevant, noting that it was an integral part of this case. The character evidence that Owen introduced was not introduced to show that Byler acted in a certain way, but rather that Owen may have had reason to believe Byler was an unsafe fisherman and therefore Owen may have had a defense to defamation. Reasonable minds could disagree as to whether the evidence that Owen presented to support his defense of truth was more prejudicial than probative (and therefore excludable on Rule 403 grounds). In order for the evidence to be relevant, and thus probative, to this action, it must go to the question of whether Owen had reason to believe that Byler was an unsafe boat operator. We examine each of Owen's four pieces of evidence (or allegations) concerning Byler with this question in mind. The suggestion that Byler was a drug dealer bears little direct relevance on the question of whether he was an unsafe sailor. At the same time, it does have the potential to improperly bias the jury against him. This insinuation is clearly more prejudicial than probative. But there was no error here: The court did not admit this evidence. Byler argues that the court erred in its decision to allow reference to the allegation. Judge Michalski did not, however, allow reference to the allegation; as soon as the allegation was raised, the court sustained Byler's objection to the comment and offered a curative instruction. Byler next contests the court's admission of evidence regarding Byler's allegedly assaultive behavior. During the cross-examination of Kenner, Owen's attorney asked if Kenner would be wary to charter a boat with someone convicted of assault for running his skiff up against other folks. Byler objected and asked Owen to produce proof of convictions for any assaults. When Owen was unable to produce proof of a conviction, the court sustained Byler's objection and struck all references to assaults. Like the insinuation that Byler was a drug dealer, the question of the admissibility of evidence of assaultive behavior is misplaced because the court struck all references to such behavior. Byler next takes issue with Judge Michalski's admission of the Coast Guard letter of concern into evidence. The court ruled that the letter of concernwhich the Coast Guard issued after fuel problems aboard Byler's boat were not reportedwas admissible for the purpose of cross-examining Byler's witnesses. After the court allowed hypothetical questions based on the letter, Owen then questioned another witness about the letter, characterizing the situation by noting that 25% of Byler's trips had been referred to the Coast Guard. A letter from the Coast Guard that details Byler's boating misdeeds, unlike the comments about drugs and assault, relates directly to the question of whether Owen had reason to believe that Byler was an unsafe charter operator. In fact, this letter was issued in response to the incident involving the allegedly abandoned hunters, the very incident about which Owen had warned Abeyta. There was no error in admitting the evidence. Finally, Byler contests Judge Michalski's admission of Byler's conviction for violation of reporting requirements. Byler contends that the conviction is stale, thereby making it more prejudicial than probative for its impeachment value. Judge Michalski allowed evidence of the conviction, reasoning that the evidence was admissible as a basis for the knowledge that led Shaker to his beliefs about Byler's reputation. The admission went to the issue of Byler's reputation, not to impeach Byler as Byler's appeal suggests. Judge Michalski supported his ruling by reasoning that this conviction bears on the question of whether one would do business with him and the basis for [Shaker] having thought this of [Byler]. Although this appears to us to be a close question since the conviction for false reporting occurred twenty years earlier, it is arguable that it had some continuing effect on Byler's reputation. Accordingly, we are not convinced the court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Further leading to our decision to uphold Judge Michalski's evidentiary rulings is our conclusion that, even if error, the rulings were harmless to Byler. Byler argues that Owen engaged in character assassination and that the admission of these pieces of evidence biased the jury against him. But the jury concluded that Owen's statements suggesting that Byler was an unsafe operator were false. And the jury's finding that Owen did not know the statements to be false, the only question that the jury found against Byler, is sufficiently supported by other evidence introduced at trial: Owen believed Shaker's statements to be true because Shaker himself believed they were true. We accordingly find that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that was relevant to Owen's defense.