Opinion ID: 3189206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The SLA

Text: F.E.B. contends that, although the QTA’s limitations period may have been triggered in 1951, the period did not expire, because the intervening passage of the SLA countervailed the United States’ 1951 assertion of ownership. Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315, in 1953 in reaction to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. California (California I), 332 U.S. 19 (1947), which held that the United States—not the states—had “paramount sovereign rights” to submerged lands seaward of the states’ coasts. See United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1997). The SLA counteracted that holding, and instead “grant[ed] States submerged lands beneath a 3-mile belt of the territorial sea.” Id. at 35; see 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (b)(1) (“confirm[ing]” and “establish[ing]” states’ “title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within [their] boundaries” and “releas[ing] and 4 That F.E.B.’s cause of action both arose and expired before the QTA was enacted in 1972 is of no legal moment: “The legislative history is clear that Congress intended to foreclose totally any suit on claims that accrued more than twelve years prior to the effective date of the QTA.” Block, 461 U.S. at 286 n.23; see also Knapp, 636 F.2d at 282 (rejecting “the argument that an action under section 2409a cannot accrue before Congress created the right in 1972 to bring such actions”); Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1977) (same). 9 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 10 of 25 relinquish[ing] . . . all right, title, and interest of the United States . . . in and to all said lands”), § 1312 (defining states’ boundaries as reaching three miles seaward from their coastlines); § 1301(a)(3) (defining “lands beneath navigable waters” to include “all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath navigable water”). 5 Not all submerged (or formerly submerged) lands within that boundary, however, fall within the SLA. The SLA contains numerous exceptions, including, for example, lands actually occupied by the United States under claim of right, lands acquired by eminent domain, and, of particular relevance here, “all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own use.” 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (emphasis added). 6 5 Even though Wisteria Island had been built up above sea level by the time the SLA was enacted, the parties agree that, unless an exception applies, the island falls within the SLA’s definition of submerged lands. See 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (defining submerged lands to include “all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath navigable waters”). 6 In full, the exceptions include: (a) [A]ll tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions thereto, resources therein, or improvements thereon, title to which has been lawfully and expressly acquired by the United States from any State or from any person in whom title had vested under the law of the State or of the United States, and all lands which the United States lawfully holds under the law of the State; all lands expressly retained by or ceded to the United States when the State entered the Union (otherwise than by a general retention or cession of lands underlying the marginal sea); all lands acquired by the United States by eminent domain proceedings, purchase, cession, gift, or otherwise in a proprietary capacity; all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own use; and any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually occupied by the United States under claim of right; 10 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 11 of 25 F.E.B. argues that the generic language in the SLA abandoned the federal government’s previously-expressed claim to the (formerly submerged) Wisteria Island, which in turn effectively reset the QTA’s statute of limitations period for that island. A few of our sister circuits, in other contexts not involving the SLA, have accepted the possibility that the government’s express abandonment of a claim can prevent a previously-triggered QTA’s limitations period from expiring (although no case that has come to our attention has found that abandonment in fact occurred). See Spirit Lake Tribe, 262 F.3d at 739; Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1199-1201; Cheyenne Arapaho, 558 F.3d at 597; cf. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathus amarus) v. Bureau of Reclam., 599 F.3d 1165, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (assuming, “without definitively deciding,” that abandonment could reset the limitations period). The bar for showing such abandonment, however, is high. It is well-established that “the federal government cannot abandon property absent an affirmative act authorized by Congress.” Int’l Aircraft Recovery, LLC v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. (b) such lands beneath navigable waters held, or any interest in which is held by the United States for the benefit of any tribe, band, or group of Indians or for individual Indians; and (c) all structures and improvements constructed by the United States in the exercise of its navigational servitude. 43 U.S.C. § 1313 (emphasis added). 11 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 12 of 25 2000). Moreover, “officers who have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.” California I, 332 U.S. at 40. Accordingly, our sister circuits have consistently held that, for purposes of the QTA statute of limitations, the United States will be deemed to have abandoned a claim of ownership only if (1) “it clearly and unequivocally abandons its interest,” as evidenced by (2) sufficiently formal “documentation from a government official with authority to make such decisions on behalf of the United States.” Kingman, 541 F.3d at 1201 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1186 (same); Spirit Lake, 262 F.3d at 739 (same); Cheyenne Arapaho, 558 F.3d at 597 (same). We have no difficulty concluding that the SLA does not rise to the level of the “clear and unequivocal” abandonment of the government’s interest in Wisteria Island necessary to reset the QTA statute of limitations. 7 The SLA only “release[d] and relinquishe[d]” the United States’ interest in submerged lands “except as otherwise reserved [t]herein.” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b). One such reservation excepts from the SLA “all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own use.” Id. § 1313(a) (emphasis added). 7 Of course, because the SLA was passed by Congress, the second prong is met. See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954) (per curiam) (holding that the SLA was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to dispose of the United States’ property). 12 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 13 of 25 Wisteria Island’s origin is undisputed: It was built up by Navy contractors, who used the land for the government’s purpose and benefit of storing fill accumulated from nearby dredging operations. 8 Thus, the plain language of the SLA refutes F.E.B.’s argument that the SLA clearly and unequivocally conveyed title in Wisteria Island to the neighboring state of Florida. Consequently, the statute of limitations period to challenge the federal government’s ownership of Wisteria Island continued running in the wake of the SLA, and expired long before F.E.B filed this action.