Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mistrial Motion After Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: (48a) Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial made after the prosecutor, when cross-examining defense psychologist Margaret Bennett, referred to certain facts not in evidence  namely, that a probation report mentioned a confrontation defendant may have had with a probation officer respecting defendant's possession of a knife while in jail. We review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 839 [55 Cal. Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].) Specifically, the prosecutor asked Dr. Bennett: Given the fact that when he [i.e., defendant] was confronted by a probation officer at the time that  after he pled guilty to the possession of the knife in the county jail . At that point, the court interrupted the prosecutor, stating, [c]ounsel, that's not in evidence. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, correctly noting the court previously had admonished the district attorney not to question Dr. Bennett about any matters other than what ha[d] been proved at trial. Trial counsel complained that the impression now before the jury is that there's another charge pending that has not been put in evidence.... The trial court denied the mistrial motion, but admonished the prosecutor, thus: I will tell you this, Mr. [prosecutor], that I specifically stopped you from referring to that probation report in any manner . The court went further: I think it is misconduct and contemptuous. When the prosecutor protested, the court added: I'm not going to let you refer to this probation report in any way. It is hearsay and improper and you know it. Cross-examination of Dr. Bennett then resumed, focusing on other topics. Defendant contends the trial court erred in not granting his mistrial motion because the prosecutor, in deliberately referring to the probation report in contravention of the trial court's ruling, committed egregious misconduct. The People take the position there was no misconduct, arguing the trial court should have permitted the prosecutor to ask psychologist Bennett whether she considered the probation report in formulating her opinion and whether her opinion would be different in light of defendant's denial to the probation officer that he possessed a knife in county jail. Because the prosecutor should have been permitted to ask these questions, the People appear to reason, he cannot have committed misconduct in asking them. The People's argument is flawed. To begin with, the trial court did not prevent the prosecutor from asking Bennett whether she had considered the probation report. In fact, the prosecutor asked Bennett what sources of background information she had used in preparing her report on defendant; Bennett responded she had relied primarily on interviews with and testing of defendant. She did not mention the probation report. Moreover, the prosecutor was permitted to cross-examine defendant, himself, as to whether he told a probation officer that he had not possessed a knife in jail. The only limitation the court placed on cross-examination of Dr. Bennett  that it be restricted to matters that have been introduced into evidence in this case  was clearly appropriate. (49a) A party attacking the credibility of the expert may bring to the jury's attention material that is relevant to the issue of which the expert was unaware [citation], but that party may not by its questions testify regarding the content of that material. ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 81.) (48b) The prosecution's cross-examination of Dr. Bennett was improper, therefore, insofar as it revealed to defendant's penalty jury contents of the probation report previously ruled inadmissible. If the prosecutor had merely been trying to show that Dr. Bennett had not read all relevant background materials, he could easily have asked about the probation report without revealing its contents. (Cf. People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) Too, as defendant correctly notes, the fact Dr. Bennett was not permitted to answer the prosecutor's question does not automatically mitigate the impropriety of its having been asked. (49b) The question itself may place inadmissible hearsay before the jury. ( People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 619 [119 Cal. Rptr. 457, 532 P.2d 105].) (48c) Pointing to the trial court's harsh rebuke of the prosecutor, defendant avers the prosecutor must have known his reference to the confrontation noted in the probation report was improper, and that he intentionally violated the court's prior ruling on the topic. Examining the record, it is difficult to disagree. Nevertheless, despite the prosecutor's apparent misbehavior, we cannot conclude there was reversible misconduct. (50) What is crucial to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not the good faith vel non of the prosecutor, but the potential injury to the defendant. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 793 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].) When [a prosecutorial misconduct] claim focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, a court must determine at the threshold how the remarks would, or could, have been understood by a reasonable juror. [Citations.] If the remarks would have been taken by a juror to state or imply nothing harmful, they obviously cannot be deemed objectionable. ( Ibid., citing People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 [247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218].) (48d) We conclude the prosecutor's remark about a confrontation defendant had with a probation officer could not reasonably have been understood by the jury as conveying significantly damaging information about defendant. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor's question did not contain an unequivocal statement that defendant had another, unrevealed, charge against him. The jury was already aware of defendant's knife possession and his guilty plea respecting it. Nor can we agree with defendant that the question invited the jury to speculate about the existence of other violent behavior by defendant, for the simple reason that the fact defendant was confronted does not imply he behaved violently. Finally, based upon a plain reading of the transcript, we disagree with defendant that the prosecutor's mention of a confrontation between defendant and a probation officer put ... possible uncharged crimes before the jury. In short, we do not think there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood the prosecutor's question as the defendant claims. Accordingly, as the remarks would have been taken by a juror to state or imply nothing harmful, they obviously cannot be deemed objectionable ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 793) so as to support a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. We conclude the trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial.