Opinion ID: 4586473
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parratt Doctrine

Text: Appellants assert that a pre-deprivation hearing was impossible or impracticable and that “Plaintiff had two meaningful postdeprivation procedures available: the hearing and appeal provided by the City, and a state-law tort action for her damaged toilets.” Appellants’ Br. at 1011, 19. Appellants argue that we must therefore reverse under Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981) and its progeny. Id. We disagree. No. 19-1208 Johnson v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 10 “A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” United Pet Supply, 768 F.3d at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). “When the situation necessitates ‘quick action’ by the state or makes efforts to provide a meaningful predeprivation process impracticable, the persons acting under state authority may proceed without violating the property owner’s rights so long as the state provides an adequate postdeprivation procedure.” Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539). Under the Parratt doctrine, “[i]f an official’s conduct would otherwise deprive an individual of procedural due process but is ‘random and unauthorized,’ the Parratt doctrine allows the state to avoid liability by providing adequate remedies after the deprivation occurs.” Daily Servs., 756 F.3d at 901. Thus, we “may dismiss a procedural due process claim if the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy and ‘(1) the deprivation was unpredictable or “random”; (2) predeprivation process was impossible or impracticable; and (3) the state actor was not authorized to take the action that deprived the plaintiff of property or liberty.’” Id. at 907 (quoting Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995)). Here, the record does not support the conclusion that the deprivation was random or unpredictable.4 Stemple estimated that he has shut off water service to a dozen businesses in response to similar situations and that no notices or hearings were provided. Stemple testified that the “[p]ractice and policy has been consistent throughout” the water suspensions. R. 74-4, PID 1348-49. Stemple further testified that if the same events occurred at a place next door to the Café, he would suspend water service there as well. Similarly, Gough testified that no notices are provided prior to water-service suspensions. Thus, it appears that Johnson’s water 4 Appellants also argue that “the onus rests with the Plaintiff to prove that there was no adequate state-law remedy available to adequately compensate her for the alleged harm” and that Johnson failed to do so. Appellants’ Br. at 11. However, “[t]he rule requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to show the inadequacy of a state’s post-deprivation corrective proceedings . . . applies only where . . . the state cannot feasibly provide a predeprivation hearing.” Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2006). This was not a random, unauthorized deprivation, nor was this a situation where the state could not “feasibly provide a predeprivation hearing.” Thus, Johnson need not show that the state’s post-deprivation corrective procedures were inadequate in order to adequately allege a deprivation of her due process rights. Id. at 316. No. 19-1208 Johnson v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 11 service was ordered suspended in accordance with an established practice. See Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2006). In most cases, “[w]hen a deprivation occurs through an established state procedure, ‘then it is both practicable and feasible for the state to provide pre-deprivation process, and the state must do so regardless of the adequacy of any post-deprivation remedy.’” Id. (quoting Walsh v. Cuyahoga County, 424 F.3d 510, 513 (6th Cir. 2005)). But in some exceptional circumstances— when the “necessity of quick action” renders pre-deprivation process “impossible or impracticable”—pre-deprivation process may be excused even when an action is neither random nor unauthorized. See Harris, 20 F.3d at 1402-05 (holding that Parratt doctrine excused predeprivation process for emergency demolition of decaying home even though the demolition process was “authorized” and performed under “established procedures”). This is not one of those exceptional cases. As we observed in the context of Johnson’s business-license suspension, “[g]iven that the City held a hearing within three days of the shooting (after suspending Johnson’s license), it does not appear as though it would have been impractical for the City to have held a hearing before suspending her license.” Johnson v. Morales, 946 F.3d 911, 923 (6th Cir. 2020). The record reveals no reason why the same is not true of the water suspension. Further, the district court found that “there was nothing preventing the City from exercising other lawful options to address the emergency,” R. 84, PID 1815, and we lack jurisdiction on interlocutory review to disturb that factual inference, DiLuzio, 796 F.3d at 609.5 “The Parratt doctrine prevents liability in order to allow the state to avoid responsibility for denying process it cannot reasonably be expected to provide.” Daily Servs., 756 F.3d at 901. 5 The dissent’s position relies on a factual disagreement with the district court. It argues that predeprivation process was “impracticable and dangerous,” and therefore the City could comply with due process by providing an adequate post-deprivation remedy. But the district court found that the City failed to show that predeprivation process was impracticable. The dissent’s argument can only succeed if we reject the district court’s finding. We lack jurisdiction to do so. See DiLuzio, 796 F.3d at 609 (“[A] defendant may not challenge the inferences the district court draws from [the] facts, as that too is a prohibited fact-based appeal.”). The same point applies to the dissent’s effort to align this case with several prior decisions where the need for quick action rendered pre-deprivation process impossible or impracticable—a comparison that only holds water if we discard the district court’s determination that the City had other options here. See Dissent at 23 (citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 247 (1947); Harris, 20 F.3d at 1403-05 (6th Cir. 1994)); Dissent at 25 (arguing that these cases show that “prevailing law . . . support[s] Saginaw, not Johnson,” because in those cases, “[t]he Supreme Court and this court have both authorized more dramatic and final government gestures without process”). No. 19-1208 Johnson v. City of Saginaw, et al. Page 12 Here, the circumstances support that Appellants could be reasonably expected to provide predeprivation process. Lastly, the suspension of Johnson’s water service was not the type of “unauthorized” conduct contemplated by Parratt. In Zinermon v. Burch, the Supreme Court limited the applicability of the Parratt doctrine. 494 U.S. 113 (1990). The Court considered Burch’s claim that staff at Florida State Hospital “deprived him of his liberty, without due process of law, by admitting him to FSH as a ‘voluntary’ mental patient when he was incompetent to give informed consent.” Id. at 115. The Court held that Parratt was inapplicable, in part because the employees’ conduct was not “‘unauthorized’ in the sense the term is used in Parratt.” Id. at 138. The Court reasoned that “[t]he State delegated to them the power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of here” and that the deprivation was “‘unauthorized’ only in the sense that it was not an act sanctioned by state law, but, instead, was a ‘depriv[ation] of constitutional rights . . . by an official’s abuse of his position.’” Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)). Similarly, here, Appellants cannot now claim that their actions, which they initially argued were reasonable and in accordance with the City’s policies, were random and unauthorized in order to defeat Johnson’s procedural due process claim. Schulkers, 955 F.3d at 548. The deprivation was not random, unpredictable, or unauthorized in the Parratt sense and pre-deprivation process was not impossible or impracticable. Therefore, the Parratt doctrine is inapplicable.