Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claimed Brown error.

Text: (39) In People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 540 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], reversed on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], we held that the jury must be free to reject death if it decides on the basis of any constitutionally relevant evidence or observation that it is not the appropriate penalty. [Fn. omitted.] We said further, the jurors cannot be required to render a death verdict on the basis of some arithmetical formula, or ... to impose death on any basis other than their judgment that such a verdict was appropriate under all the facts and circumstances of the individual case. [Fn. omitted.] (40 Cal.3d at p. 540; see also Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 329 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 239-240, 105 S.Ct. 2633]; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869].) Defendant argues the prosecutor misled the jury regarding its function in weighing the factors under section 190.3. Defendant points to the analogy the prosecutor drew between the jury's function and that of an umpire in a baseball game who must follow the rules of the game, and claims the prosecutor thereby encouraged the jury to make its decision mechanically by counting up factors. He also complains the prosecutor referred to a chart upon which the statutory factors were written, reducing the jury's weighing function to a mere outline. Again, there was no objection to the argument on this basis, nor do we see any indication the jury was misled by the prosecutor's argument. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1228-1231.) The prosecutor told the jury that like an umpire, it had to follow the rules already established in making its determination, but explicitly acknowledged that the jury's function was not that automatic, and not that mechanical. The prosecutor also clearly acknowledged that the jury's function was a normative one and that it was free to reject his view of the weight to be accorded the various factors. In addition, the court specifically instructed the jury that the weighing process was not mechanical. Defendant also argues the prosecutor misled the jury by arguing that the only possible verdict was for death, that any other sentence was illogical and unreasonable. Defendant claims the reference to logic and rules in the prosecutor's argument misinformed the jury regarding its inherently subjective decision whether to impose the death penalty, and indicated the existence of a mechanical formula requiring the imposition of a death sentence. Again, there was no objection and the point was waived. On the merits, we do not think it improper to refer to logic in connection with an argument that the only proper verdict was one for death. (See People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 166 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561] [proper to urge jury to follow the law as long as appropriateness of penalty is paramount].) The prosecutor clearly indicated the jury's decision was not automatic but personal and subjective and that the jury could impose a life without parole sentence even if it found nothing but circumstances in aggravation. We see no indication the jury was misled. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1228-1231.)