Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Proof of Intent

Text: The trial court instructed the jury, inter alia, that a defendant is presumed innocent and that the People have the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then defined the offenses of murder, manslaughter, burglary, and robbery; the special circumstances of multiple murder, intentional murder for financial gain, felony-murder-burglary and felony-murder-robbery; and the act and mental state, including specific intent, requisite to each. Further, the court instructed on the defenses of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication, and on their availability if a reasonable doubt exists as to the presence of certain required mental states. The court also explained how intent is shown, in accordance with the standard instruction (which was subsequently withdrawn) set out in former CALJIC No. 3.34 (4th ed. 1979 (1979 rev.)): The intent with which an act is done is shown as follows: By a statement of his intent made by a defendant. By the circumstances attending the act, the manner in which it is done, the means used, and the soundness of mind and discretion of the person committing the act. For the purposes of the case on trial, you must assume that the defendant was of sound mind at the time of his alleged conduct which, it is charged, constituted the crime described in the information. (Brackets and paragraphing omitted.) (30a) Defendant contends that the instruction on proof of intent  specifically, its presumption of mental soundness  was erroneous. He argues in substance as follows: the language under challenge created a mandatory conclusive presumption that reduced the People's burden of proof as to the mental elements of the applicable offenses and special circumstances by undermining the defenses of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication; and such a reduction in burden is impermissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When a determination of error depends on the meaning communicated by an instruction, we must ascertain how a hypothetical reasonable juror would have, or at least could have, understood the words in question. (See Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. ___, ___ [112 L.Ed.2d 339, 341-342, 111 S.Ct. 328, 329] ( per curiam ) [could have]; Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 316 [85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354, 105 S.Ct. 1965] [same]; People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 487 [would [have]]; cf. Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 378, 380 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 328, 329, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1197, 1198] [holding that [t]he legal standard for reviewing jury instructions claimed to restrict impermissibly a jury's consideration of relevant evidence under the Eighth Amendment is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of such evidence].) To do so, we must obviously consider the language both in itself and in the charge as a whole. We find no error. On this record, a reasonable juror would have understood the presumption of mental soundness for what it was, i.e., a presumption of sanity. Sanity, of course, was not at issue. Such a presumption could not have reduced the People's burden of proof as to the mental elements of the applicable offenses and special circumstances. Through the instructions as a whole, the jury was directed to take into account all the evidence introduced by both the parties bearing on the presence or absence of the mental elements, and to decide the question on that basis. Certainly, the presumption could not have undermined the defenses of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication. It must be recalled that defendant relied on voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity as a result of voluntary intoxication. Defendant's mental soundness  as a reasonable juror could have understood the phrase  was simply not at issue. Defense counsel conceded as much in his summation: There is no evidence here of mental illness or mental defect.... The presumption, therefore, could not have had any appreciable effect on the defenses actually presented. It is true that whether defendant was intoxicated was indeed in dispute. (31)(See fn. 8.), (30b) But  contrary to what appears to be defendant's argument  a reasonable juror could not have discerned in the presumption of mental soundness a presumption of sobriety. [8]