Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Violation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights by Requiring Defendant to Submit to Competency Examinations

Text: Prior to trial, defense counsel questioned defendant's competence to stand trial. The trial court, in accordance with section 1368, suspended criminal proceedings and appointed Dr. Alfred Fricke, a psychologist, and Dr. Jeffrey Weiner, a psychiatrist  Fricke to assess defendant's competence and Weiner to assess the effects on defendant of the psychotropic medications he was taking. [3] Over defendant's objections, the trial court also ordered him to submit to a competency examination by Dr. James Missett, who was retained by the prosecution. A total of four experts testified at defendant's competency trial. The defense expert, Dr. Kormos, testified that defendant was suffering from schizophrenia and, as a result, was so impaired he was unable to assist rationally in his own defense. Kormos opined that defendant was not malingering. The two court-appointed experts, Drs. Fricke and Weiner, each testified that while they initially had believed that defendant was not competent to stand trial based on their first examinations of him, subsequent examinations changed their assessment. Dr. Fricke testified that, after his second examination of defendant, he concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial and that without a doubt defendant was malingering. Dr. Weiner testified that, after his subsequent examination of defendant, there was insufficient data as to whether defendant was competent. Weiner testified further that he had observed evidence that made him strongly suspicious that defendant was malingering. Finally, the prosecution's expert, Dr. Missett, testified that defendant was competent to stand trial and was malingering. The jury found defendant competent. Defendant contends that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel by requiring him to submit to competency examinations by the two court-appointed evaluators and by an evaluator designated by the prosecution. Alternatively, he contends that these rights were violated by requiring him to submit to examination by the prosecution's evaluator alone. In general, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to competency examinations. ( Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359.) In California, the protection ... afforded by application of the Fifth Amendment is in fact provided by a judicially declared rule of immunity applicable to all persons whose competency to stand trial is determined at a section 1368 hearing. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 496, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673.) This rule of immunity was first declared in Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61. In that case, the Court of Appeal concluded that a psychiatrist appointed to examine a defendant for competency could not testify later on the question of defendant's sanity. The court reasoned that, because a defendant may not invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination in a competency examination, neither the statements of [the defendant] to the psychiatrists appointed under section 1369 nor the fruits of such statements may be used in trial of the issue of [the defendant's] guilt, under either the plea of not guilty or that of not guilty by reason of insanity. ( Id. at p. 470, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61.) We adopted the judicially declared rule of immunity in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 522, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338 (see People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 959-960, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 [noting the rule in Arcega ]). Defendant argues that the immunity granted in Arcega inadequately protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment interest against self-incrimination because it does not prevent nonevidentiary derivative uses of statements obtained from a defendant during the competency examination. Such derivative uses, he postulates, might include gain[ing] insight into the relationship between the defendant and his attorneys, or insight into tactical decisions or considerations by the defense, or a myriad of other articulable and inarticulable matters that ... could be helpful to the opponent in dictating his choice of actions or tactics. We reject defendant's argument for two reasons. First, the premise of defendant's claim  that the immunity conferred in Arcega is not coextensive with Fifth Amendment protections  is wrong. From its inception, this immunity has applied to a defendant's statements to the competency evaluator and to any fruits of the mental competency examination. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 959-960, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 518, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338 [There is a rule of immunity for all statements and fruits of a mental competency examination which prevents their use at the guilt trial]; Tarantino v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 470, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61.) The judicially declared rule supplants the Fifth Amendment, because the scope of that rule is coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 501, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673.) Thus, the immunity granted in Arcega fully protects a defendant against any nonevidentiary uses of statements obtained from the defendant during the competency hearing to the same extent he or she is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Second, defendant fails to demonstrate that, in this case, the immunity described in Arcega failed to fully protect his Fifth Amendment interests. His assertion that the prosecution may have gained some nonevidentiary insight into defense tactics via the competency examinations conducted by the court-appointed experts or the prosecution's expert is unsupported by citation to the record and exists only in the realm of speculation. Indeed, none of the experts who testified at the competency trial testified at any other phase of the trial, nor does it appear that their reports or observations were used by the prosecution at trial. [4] Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim is equally unpersuasive. Preliminarily, we agree that [t]he right to counsel clearly applies to the type of competency proceedings with which we are here concerned. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 503, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673.) However, in this case, the record reveals that defendant was fully represented by counsel during the competency proceedings from the time that defense counsel first raised the issue of defendant's competency through the jury trial at which defendant was ultimately found to be competent. Indeed, as defendant's appellate counsel acknowledged during argument, defense counsel was even given the opportunity to be present at the examination of defendant by Dr. Missett, the prosecution's expert, but counsel declined. Moreover, although defendant adverts to a right to refuse to submit to a competency evaluation as part of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, there is no indication on the record that he did so, even with respect to Dr. Missett. On this record, therefore, we reject defendant's argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to the extent that his claim is based on an assertion that he was denied counsel. Thus, this case is easily distinguishable from those decisions cited by defendant in which the reviewing court found a Sixth Amendment violation where, in essence, the defendants were allowed to represent themselves despite doubts regarding their competency. ( United States v. Klat (D.C.Cir.1998) 156 F.3d 1258; Appel v. Horn (3d Cir.2001) 250 F.3d 203.) Defendant fares no better to the extent that his Sixth Amendment claim is based on the same ground as his Fifth Amendment claim  that the immunity described in Arcega was inadequate to protect against nonevidentiary uses of the competency evaluation by the prosecution. Defendant asserts that the possibility the prosecution may have gained some nonevidentiary advantage from its examination of defendant constituted an improper intrusion into the attorney-client relationship in violation of the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 1012, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704 [A defendant's right to the assistance of counsel free from unreasonable government interference is protected by the Sixth Amendment].) The predicates of this argument are that the immunity described in Arcega fails to protect a defendant against nonevidentiary uses of statements obtained during the competency evaluation, and that in this case the prosecution gained such advantage and exploited it. As we have already concluded, in rejecting defendant's Fifth Amendment argument, both predicates are false. For these reasons, then, we also reject defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. Finally, defendant contends that, even if his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by compelled competency evaluations by the court-appointed experts, Drs. Fricke and Weiner, then, at minimum, these constitutional protections prohibited the competency evaluation by the prosecution's expert, Dr. Missett. We disagree. The constitutional interests are the same, whether the competency evaluation is undertaken by court-appointed experts or an expert retained by the prosecution and those interests are adequately protected in either case by the immunity granted by Arcega. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 502-503, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673; but see Bishop v. Caudill (Ky.2003) 118 S.W.3d 159, 163-164.) Here, moreover, Dr. Missett did not testify at either phase of defendant's trial nor does defendant demonstrate that the prosecution made any use of Dr. Missett's testimony, report, or observations outside of the competency proceedings.