Opinion ID: 1972350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Justification for Closure of a Trial. [4]

Text: So far we have only concluded that the various constitutional rights do apply to a preliminary hearing and that, therefore, those rights may have been violated by the way the instant preliminary hearing was conducted. However, closure can sometimes be justified. It remains for us to determine whether the instant closure was justifiable. Our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have considered situations in which it was held that considerations warranted a partial or temporary closure order during an otherwise open public trial. In Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa. 57, 364 A.2d 902 (1976), our Supreme Court stated that: the right to a public trial is not absolute; rather, it must be considered in relationship to other important interests. ..... In considering such other interests, a court must assess all of the circumstances to determine if they present a situation in which an exclusion order is necessary. If the court determines a necessity exists, it may then issue an exclusion order, but the exclusion order must be fashioned to effectuate protection of the important interest without unduly infringing upon the accused's right to a public trial either through its scope or duration. Knight, supra, 469 Pa. at 66, 364 A.2d at 906 (emphasis added). In Contakos, supra, our Supreme Court held that an imminent death threat to the Commonwealth's principal witness did not sufficiently justify even a partial closure, ordered only during the testimony of that witness and only for the exclusion of spectators who were not parties, from the press, or the defendant's family. A new trial was ordered due to the constitutional infirmity. The United States Supreme Court announced guidelines for the closure of a criminal trial, as follows: The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). Accord, Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. at 45-46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215. Only a compelling government interest justifies closure and then only by a means narrowly tailored to serve that interest. [5] Contakos, supra, 499 Pa. at 354 n. 2, 453 A.2d at 585 n. 2, citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982). In this case, the trial court failed to offer any reasons for closure in its opinion, and the transcript reveals only the vague security interest recited above. We find this unexplicated word an insufficient justification for closure. If we presume that the security interest refers to the possibility that the defendants might attempt to escape, the justification is still clearly insufficient. Courts commonly must provide security for the trial of prison inmates. If the perceived danger was from members of the public, either sympathetic or hostile to the defendants, then other appropriate measures could have been taken. In any event, the remainder of the trial was held without any special security measures noted in the record. Closure of a portion of a criminal trial is within the discretion of the trial court, but only within the narrow guidelines which serve to protect the defendants' right to a fair trial. Knight, supra, 469 Pa. at 65, 364 A.2d at 906. Unamplified, as it is presented for appellate review here, security is an insufficient reason to order closure of a preliminary hearing. If it were sufficient, closure could be ordered any time the accused was a prison inmate. Thus, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion in ordering closure.