Opinion ID: 2366436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Can a public agency ratify or cure a violation of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act?

Text: [¶ 12] We construe statutes according to the following standards: The paramount consideration is to determine the legislature's intent, which must be ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. We look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous. A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute. Morris v. CMS Oil and Gas Co., 2010 WY 37, ¶ 26, 227 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo.2010) (citation omitted). [¶ 13] The Wyoming Public Meetings Act requires most governmental actions to be taken in public meetings. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-401 (LexisNexis 2009) specifies that [t]he agencies of Wyoming exist to conduct public business. Certain deliberations and actions shall be taken openly as provided in this act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) (LexisNexis 2009) provides: All meetings of the governing body of an agency are public meetings, open to the public at all times, except as otherwise provided. No action of a governing body of an agency shall be taken except during a public meeting. . . . Action taken at a meeting not in conformity with [the public meetings] act is null and void and not merely voidable. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009) defines action as follows: (i) Action means the transaction of official business of an agency including a collective decision of a governing body, a collective commitment or promise by a governing body to make a positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a governing body upon a motion, proposal, resolution, regulation, rule, order or ordinance. [¶ 14] TCHA agrees that it violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) when it voted to buy the Mantey property at an executive session which was closed to the public, on March 1, 2007. [1] It later took steps to remedy that error by properly publishing notice and conducting a public meeting. The issue here is whether a decision made in violation of the Public Meetings Act can ever be remedied, and if so, how. We have not previously addressed this issue directly. [¶ 15] Our previous cases applying the Act have only arisen when an agency met in private, in violation of the Act, yet did not take action on the deliberated matter until a public meeting occurred. Under those circumstances, we have found the Act was not violated, and the action taken is not null and void, notwithstanding the private deliberations. See Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Building Code Board of Appeals of the City of Cheyenne, 2010 WY 2, 222 P.3d 158 (Wyo. 2010); Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 16] The Public Meetings Act does not address whether an agency which improperly attempts an action in a closed meeting may later correct that error by properly taking action in a public meeting. Appellants contend that because the initial decision to purchase the Mantey property was made in violation of the Public Meetings Act, the transaction is null and void. They assert that TCHA must first undo the transaction, and then start over, if it wants to own the Mantey property. [¶ 17] The district court resolved this issue via summary judgment, determining that TCHA had effectively cured any violation of the Public Meetings Act by later re-voting on the Mantey purchase in a properly-noticed public meeting, first on September 20, 2007, and again on November 15, 2007. The facts before the district court for the purpose of summary judgment on this matter were undisputed. They showed that TCHA in fact independently reconsidered the transaction twice, and both times voted to ratify the purchase of the Mantey property. [¶ 18] When TCHA reconsidered the Mantey property purchase on September 20, 2007, its attorney opened the issue by stating: So tonight I ask you to consider whether you want to ratify the agreement to purchase the Mantey property or not to ratify it. And the law requires that you do so with an open mind and you have to keep in mind that not ratifying this agreement is just as much an option as ratifying the agreement. So I ask you to, you know, go back in time and try to recollect back in March 1, on March 1, what the reasons were at that time for going forward with the agreement and for making the offer, and I do recall that at the meetings we had, excuse me, after the Jackson State Bank decided they were not going to finance the property I think there was even some discussion at some of those special meetings about whether this, whether this was something the Board still wanted to go through, and you had discussion at that time about the merits of going forward with the agreement, so I'm asking the Board to, to with a very open mind, decide tonight whether to ratify this agreement weighing all the pros and cons that you considered when you discussed alternative financing and any pros and cons that you might be, that you might consider tonight. And then when you do, at some point I would ask the chair to ask for public comment. Are there any questions at this point? [¶ 19] TCHA's counsel then engaged in a conversation with one of the board members, in which counsel stated that one of the board's options was to rescind the agreement to purchase the Mantey property. The Chairman then asked for public comment. There was none. The board then voted to ratify the purchase. [¶ 20] When a question arose about public notice for the September 20, 2007, meeting, TCHA held a second hearing on November 15, 2007. TCHA's counsel again made a statement to the board asking it to approach the issue with an open mind, cautioning that rescission is just as much an option as ratification so I would ask you to once again consider whether you do in fact want to ratify or not ratify your purchase of the Mantey property, which occurred in July [2007]. After discussion among the board members, the board again voted to ratify the purchase. [¶ 21] These facts were undisputed. TCHA independently and substantially reconsidered the Mantey purchase, and properly voted to ratify that purchase in a public meeting. Although we have not previously considered whether void action under the Public Meetings Act can later be ratified or cured, as was done here, other states with similar statutes have. We find discussions from Alaska and Tennessee particularly helpful. [¶ 22] In Alaska Community Colleges' Federation of Teachers, Local No. 2404 v. University of Alaska, 677 P.2d 886, 891-892 (Alaska 1984), the university board of regents voted in executive session to merge separate colleges into a state university system. The applicable section of Alaska's public meeting law then provided [a]ction taken contrary to this section is void. Id. at 890. The Court recognized, however, that the Alaska Act was silent as to how a void action could be remedied. Examining the Act's purpose and the consequences of curing a void action, the court stated: [Alaska's Open Meeting Act] exists primarily to advance the interests of the people of this state. When the sunshine law is breached it is the people's right to remain informed which sustains injury. There is no inherent damage stemming from the substantive action which is taken; it is the manner of action which offends. Of course, [the Open Meeting Act], by ensuring that issues are decided publicly, does attempt to insure that better substantive decisions are made through public scrutiny and adequate information. The commentators who have reported upon the sunshine laws in other jurisdictions present a picture of the intent behind these statutes consistent with our reading of [the Alaska Open Meeting Act]. Open decision-making is regarded as an essential aspect of the democratic process. It is believed that public exposure deters official misconduct, makes government more responsive to its constituency, allows for greater public provision of information to the decision-maker, creates greater public acceptance of government action, and promotes accurate reporting of governmental processes. . . . Note that none of the above rationales focus upon the substance of the decision made. Id. at 891. [¶ 23] Using this rationale, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the policy behind open meeting laws does not prohibit ratification of a void action. The void act itself is not offensive to the law, but the closed process is offensive. Public ratification cures that problem. [¶ 24] In Neese v. Paris Special School District, 813 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990), the Tennessee Court of Appeals also considered whether a void decision could be ratified. It stated: [Tennessee's open meeting act] provides that [a]ny action taken at a meeting in violation of this part shall be void and of no effect. . . . We do not believe that the legislative intent of this statute was forever to bar a governing body from properly ratifying its decision made in a prior violative manner. However, neither was it the legislative intent to allow such a body to ratify a decision in a subsequent meeting by a perfunctory crystallization of its earlier action. We hold that the purpose of the act is satisfied if the ultimate decision is made in accordance with the Public Meetings Act, and if it is a new and substantial reconsideration of the issues involved, in which the public is afforded ample opportunity to know the facts and to be heard with reference to the matters at issue. See Alaska Comm. Coll. Fed. of Teachers v. University of Alaska, 677 P.2d 886, 891 (Alaska 1984). Id. at 436. [¶ 25] The purpose of Wyoming's Public Meetings Act is to require open decision making, not to permanently condemn a decision or vote in violation of the Act. The focus of the Act is on the process of governmental decision making, and not on the ultimate decisions. It follows that the Act would permit ratification of a prior void action, if the ratification is done in compliance with the Act. We hold that an agency may cure a void action made in violation of the Public Meetings Act by conducting a new and substantial reconsideration of the action in a manner which complies with the Act. Because the undisputed facts show that TCHA did conduct a new and substantial reconsideration of its decision to purchase the Mantey property, the district court properly granted summary judgment on this issue.