Opinion ID: 2318701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Modification of Alimony Awards

Text: The statutory framework for alimony is silent concerning retroactive modification, stating only: (a) Where available. The court may award alimony: (1) on a bill of complaint for alimony; or (2) as part of a decree that grants: (i) an annulment; (ii) a limited divorce; or (iii) an absolute divorce. (b) Award to either party. The court may award alimony to either party. (c) Effect of agreement. If a final disposition as to alimony has been made in an agreement between the parties, the court is bound by that agreement as the agreement relates to alimony. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 11-101 of the Family Law Article. Subsection (c) mandates that the court is bound by the terms of a separation agreement entered into by the parties, which allows parties to customize their separation agreements to suit best their personal needs and circumstances. In addition to the basic framework for alimony awards contained in Section 11-101, the Maryland Code sets forth two other statutory provisions regarding modification of alimony awards. Section 11-107(b) of the Family Law Article states that, [s]ubject to § 8-103 of this article and on the petition of either party, the court may modify the amount of alimony awarded as circumstances and justice require. Section 8-103(c) limits such modifications as follows: The court may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement with respect to alimony or spousal support executed on or after April 13, 1976, regardless of how the provision is stated, unless there is: (1) an express waiver of alimony or spousal support; or (2) a provision that specifically states that the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to any court modification. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-103(c) of the Family Law Article (emphasis added). Section 8-103 provides an additional restriction upon the general rule that allows a court to modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement which has been incorporated, whether or not merged, into a divorce decree.... Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-105 of the Family Law Article. The legislative roots of Sections 11-107(b) and 8-103(c) run deep within Maryland's statutory history. See 1980 Md. Laws ch. 575, § 5; 1931 Md. Laws ch. 220 § 1. Throughout this history of legislation concerning alimony awards, the General Assembly never delineated explicitly a provision governing retroactive modification of alimony awards. The legislature, however, repeatedly has vested the courts with broad discretionary power when dealing with alimony awards. For example, Article 16, Section 14 of the Maryland Code (1888) stated: The courts of equity of this State, shall and may hear and determine all causes for alimony, in as full and ample manner as such causes could be heard and determined by the laws of England in the ecclesiastical courts there. Md.Code, Art. 16, § 14 (1888)(citing Keerl v. Keerl, 34 Md. 21 (1871); J.G. v. H.G., 33 Md. 401 (1870); Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 294 (1858); Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537 (1855); Jamison v. Jamison, 4 Md. Ch. 289 (1847); Wiles v. Wiles, 3 Md. 1 (1852); Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 429 (1852); Dunnock v. Dunnock, 3 Md. Ch. 140 (1852); Tayman v. Tayman, 2 Md. Ch. 393 (1851); Coles v. Coles, 2 Md. Ch. 341 (1851); Daiger v. Daiger, 2 Md. Ch. 335 (1850); Ricketts v. Ricketts, 4 Gill 105 (1846); Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544 (1830); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 1 Bland 101 (1826); Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463 (1829); Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485 (1825); Galwith v. Galwith, 4 H. & McH. 477 (1689)); see Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 618-19, 451 A.2d 1215, 1222 (1982).
The point of departure for this analysis of alimony is the parties' Separation Agreement, because the court is bound by that agreement as the agreement relates to alimony. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 11-101(c) of the Family Law Article. If the Langstons' Separation Agreement specifically precludes any court modification, then the court is bound by those terms. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-103(c) of the Family Law Article. The Langstons' Separation Agreement explicitly states that, [t]he alimony provisions of this paragraph are subject to the further order of the court, and may be modified AS TO AMOUNT ONLY based proportionally on any increase or decrease in the Husbands [sic] gross income.... Section V(c) of the Separation Agreement (italicized emphasis added; other emphasis in original). The Separation Agreement establishing the amount and schedule of respondent's alimony payments to petitioner was incorporated, but not merged, into the trial court's order granting the parties an absolute divorce. The terms of a separation agreement which has been incorporated, but not merged, into a divorce decree are enforceable either through contempt proceedings or as an independent contract. See Md.Code, § 8-105(a) of the Family Law Article. [6] Because respondent urges us to consider the Separation Agreement as an independent contract, he argues that its terms should be strictly construed as not prohibiting retroactive modification of his alimony obligation to petitioner. [7] As such, we will apply the basic rules and principles of contract interpretation to the Langstons' Separation Agreement. See Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 212, 428 A.2d 469, 474 (1981). The in banc panel and the Court of Special Appeals disagreed with respondent and found that the language of the Agreement does not provide for modification of alimony retroactive to the date when [Dr. Langston] first sustained a decrease in income. Langston, 136 Md.App. at 227, 764 A.2d at 391. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals noted that the Settlement Agreement was in fact silent on the issue of retroactive modification, rather than prohibitive in its language. See id. The interpretation by the lower courts of the Settlement Agreement is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review. See Auction & Estate Representatives, Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 341, 731 A.2d 441, 445 (1999); JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 625, 697 A.2d 898, 911 (1997). Contract interpretation, like statutory interpretation, begins with the principle of the plain meaning of the contractual terms. See Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 209, 783 A.2d 194, 199 (2001). The terms of a contract must be given their ordinary and usual meaning as utilized within the context of the contract. See Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 766, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1989); Kasten Construction Co. v. Rod Enters., Inc., 268 Md. 318, 329, 301 A.2d 12, 18 (1973). Maryland follows the objective law of contract interpretation. See Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 178, 776 A.2d 645, 653 (2001). The objective law of contract interpretation holds that a written contract will be considered ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one interpretation when examined by a reasonably prudent person, see Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 436, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999); however, [i]f a written contract is susceptible of a clear, unambiguous and definite understanding ... its construction is for the court to determine. Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 251, 768 A.2d 620, 630 (2001)(quoting Rothman v. Silver, 245 Md. 292, 296, 226 A.2d 308, 310 (1967))(internal quotations omitted). Under the objective law of contract interpretation, the court will give force and effect to the words of the contract without regard to what the parties to the contract thought it meant or what they intended for it to mean. See Auction & Estate Reps., Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. at 340-41, 731 A.2d at 445(quoting Calomiris, 353 Md. at 436, 727 A.2d at 363). It is evident from the plain meaning of the words of Section V(c) of the Separation Agreement that the parties anticipated that there may come a point in time where the alimony might be increased or decreased based upon changes in respondent's income. The Agreement specifically states that [t]he alimony provisions of this paragraph are subject to the further order of the court, and may be modified AS TO AMOUNT ONLY.... Section V(c) of the Separation Agreement (emphasis in original). With regard to retroactivity of any modification, the Agreement does not expressly permit retroactive modification, nor does it expressly prohibit either party from seeking retroactive modification through the statutory provisions of Section 11-107(b). The terms of the Settlement Agreement are not dispositive of the issue of whether a trial court has discretion retroactively to modify alimony payments. Langston, 136 Md.App. at 228, 764 A.2d at 391. We now turn to the statutory provisions.
Whether retroactive modification is permissible within the statutory framework is determined by interpretation of Sections 8-103(c) and 11-107(b) of the Family Law Article. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is the ascertainment of legislative intent. See Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 757 (1993). Our investigation of legislative intent begins with the words of the statute. See Torboli v. Torboli, 365 Md. 52, 63, 775 A.2d 1207, 1214 (2001)(quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). In examining the language of the statute, we ascribe to those words their ordinary and commonly understood meaning. See Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001). Where the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, it must be construed without forced interpretations designed to limit its application. In re: Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 557, 640 A.2d at 1095. Thus, if the legislative intent is apparent from the text of the statute itself, we end our inquiry and allow the plain meaning of the statute to govern our interpretation. See Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399, 726 A.2d 728, 733 (1999). The express statutory allowance for modification of alimony awards, as set forth in Section 11-107(b) of the Family Law Article, does not use any language which prohibits an order of retroactive modification, or conversely, authorizes only prospective modification. Under Section 11-107(b), the only words of limitation and guidance to the trial court in exercising its discretion to modify an alimony award is the phrase as circumstances and justice require. Md.Code, § 11-107(b) of the Family Law Article. [8] The predecessor to Section 11-107(b) contained similar language, which also encompassed the language of Section 8-103(c): ... Furthermore, any provision in the deed or agreement in respect to alimony, support and maintenance of the husband or wife is subject to modification by the court to the extent the court deems just and proper regardless of the manner in which the provisions with respect to the alimony, support and maintenance are expressed or stated unless there is an express waiver of alimony, support and maintenance by the husband or wife or unless the provisions of the deed, agreement, or settlement specifically state that the provisions with respect to the alimony, support and maintenance of the husband or wife are not subject to any court modification. Md.Code, Art. 16, § 28 (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol.). See also, Md.Code, Art. 16, § 37 (1951); Md.Code, Art. 16, § 42 (1939). We have taken the position that alimony awards may be modified from time to time depending on the needs and financial circumstances of the parties. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 70, 646 A.2d 413, 423 (1994); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. at 209, 428 A.2d at 473; Stevens v. Stevens, 233 Md. 279, 282, 196 A.2d 447, 449 (1964); Sugarman v. Sugarman, 197 Md. 182, 188, 78 A.2d 456, 459 (1951); Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 344-45, 125 A. 695, 697 (1924). In Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 15 A.2d 914 (1940), we explained that, [t]he doctrine is founded in an equality of right and obligation, and its enforcement is indifferent to whether the change is in the relief of one spouse, so long as the rights of the other are not denied. It is patent that of its nature alimony is in amount subject to variations from time to time as the circumstances, needs, and pecuniary condition of the parties change. Id. at 499, 15 A.2d at 918-19. Thus, we noted that, the time when such modification may become effective was in the discretion of the chancellor. Id. at 496, 15 A.2d at 917. In its discourse with counsel for Gary Langston, the in banc panel emphasized that the parties' Separation Agreement did not contain language specifically permitting retroactive modification of the alimony award: Court: Where is the language which says it is retroactive prior to the date of filing of the petition to modify the alimony? Where does it say that? Counsel for respondent: It doesn't say that, Your Honor. Court: I know. Counsel for respondent: Butbut the plain meaning of the wordsyou are saying that the parties had to have intended that there be an affirmative requirement to do that, andand it doesn't say it, so there is no requirement that either party come to Court. It saysit really Court: But it is just like any other case, if they want to modify it Counsel for respondent: Right. Court:by consent they can, but in the event one party has to come to Court, which is what happened in this case, how do you make that leap that it is retroactive prior to the filing of the petition? Counsel for respondent: Because there is a provision, there is a built in reduction that says it may be modified, and then it tells everybodyit tells the parties how you do it. Court: What the formula is.