Opinion ID: 752382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Request Requirement

Text: Section 1831j(a)(2) provides: 13 No Federal banking agency ... may discharge ... any employee ... because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to the request of the employee ) provided information to any such agency ... or to the Attorney General regarding any possible violation of any law or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 14 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(a)(2) (emphasis added). The statute includes the FDIC and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision in its definition of Federal banking agency. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(e). The parties agree (1) that Haley did not directly provide the memo to the FDIC, and (2) that Haley did not expressly request that Plowman give the memo to the FDIC. The district court found, however, that Haley told Plowman to use the memo to save MCM from perceived abuse by the OTS, that the FDIC was one of several possible destinations for the memo that Haley had considered, and furthermore, that Plowman and Haley had discussed Plowman's intention to contact Congress or the FDIC about the problem. 2 The court concluded that Haley's actions were within the scope of protected behavior under the statute. This is a mixed finding of law and fact, which we review de novo. See Loehrer v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 98 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir.1996). The issue before us is whether Haley's conduct was sufficient to constitute a request and thus to trigger the protection of section 1831j(a)(2). This court is unaware of any case law addressing this question, and we therefore view it as one of first impression. 3 15 The first step in statutory interpretation is to look at the text of the statute itself. See United States v. Talley, 16 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir.1994). If the plain meaning of the language clearly expresses the meaning Congress intended, the judicial inquiry ends there. See United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 54258 (U.S. March 9, 1998) (No. 97-7733). If, however, the language of the statute is ambiguous, we are obliged to consider  'the purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led to its enactment.'  Id. (quoting Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir.1945)). When the meaning of a statute is questionable, it should be given a sensible construction and construed to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law. S.A., 129 F.3d at 998. 16 In this case, the statute purports to cover situations in which the employee (or any person acting pursuant to the request of the employee) provided information. Haley prepared the memo in question; he provided it to Plowman; he directed Plowman to provide it to someone with the authority to stop the OTS. Plowman then turned the memo over to the FDIC. In this scenario, was Plowman acting pursuant to the request of Haley when he provided information to the FDIC? On the one hand, Haley did not ask that Plowman give the memo to the FDIC. If the statute requires a request that specifically mentions the intended recipient of the information, then Plowman was not acting pursuant to the request of Haley and the statute does not cover the behavior. On the other hand, the word request does not necessarily dictate any level of detail. A request is the act of asking for something to be given or done. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1636 (2d ed.1987). Haley initially considered direct action, such as writing a letter to Congress or sending the memo directly to the Chairman of the FDIC, but he rejected the idea because he feared retaliation by the OTS. Instead, he prepared the memo and gave it to Plowman. He knew Plowman was already considering notifying Congress or the FDIC about the situation, and that Plowman was in contact with others outside the OTS who might be able to intervene. When he gave the memo to Plowman and asked Plowman to provide it to authorities who could help save MCM, that knowledge was implicit. We therefore find that Haley's behavior was sufficient to constitute a request. When Plowman provided the information to the FDIC, he was doing as Haley had suggested, and thus, was acting pursuant to the request of Haley. 17 Even if the text is ambiguous with respect to the meaning of request, the policy and purposes behind the statute lead us to the same conclusion. Laws protecting whistleblowers are meant to encourage employees to report illegal practices without fear of reprisal by their employers. These statutes generally use broad language and cover a variety of whistleblowing activities. Accordingly, when the meaning of the statute is unclear from its text, courts tend to construe it broadly, in favor of protecting the whistleblower. This is often the best way to avoid a nonsensical result and to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law. S.A., 129 F.3d at 998. 18 For example, the plaintiff in Neal v. Honeywell, Inc. 4 claimed that she was entitled to whistleblower protection under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), which applies to any employee who suffers retaliation because of lawful acts done by the employee ... in furtherance of ... an action filed or to be filed under the False Claims Act. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 861 (7th Cir.1994). She reported her co-workers' fraud, but the United States eventually settled with the employer and no action under the False Claims Act was ever filed. The plaintiff was subsequently discharged and sought the protection of the whistleblower statute. In its defense, the employer claimed that the statute applied only to situations in which an action under the False Claims Act was or would be filed. The Seventh Circuit construed the statute to cover the plaintiff's actions. Id. at 864. To read it otherwise, the court determined, would yield the absurd result that employees would be protected in doubtful cases (the kind that breed litigation), but not when the fraud is so clear that the employer capitulates, averting litigation. Id. 19 The Eleventh Circuit took a similarly broad view of another federal whistleblower statute in Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926 (11th Cir.1995). The statute in question provided protection for any employee who commenced, caused to be commenced, testif[ied] in, or assist[ed] or participat[ed] in any manner in a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under ... the Atomic Energy Act. Id. at 931 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)). The court held that informal complaints made by an employee were covered by the statute. 5 Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 932-33. In its analysis, the court stated that this interpretation promotes the remedial purposes of the statute and avoids the unwitting consequence of preemptive retaliation, which would allow the whistleblowers to be fired or otherwise discriminated against with impunity for internal complaints before they have a chance to bring them before an appropriate agency. Id. 20 We agree with the district court that section 1831j(a)(2) covers Haley's actions in this case. This interpretation protects those who provide information about violations of the law to the appropriate authorities, but who try to safeguard themselves by blowing the whistle discreetly--i.e., by requesting with a mere suggestion or an implicit understanding. Particularly when the employee's failure to make a direct request is driven by fear of the very conduct the statute proscribes (namely, retaliation), it would be unreasonable to deny the statute's protection once the employee has completed the task the statute seeks to encourage (namely, alerting authorities to possible illegal activity). Our reading of the statute best effectuates the policy Congress sought to achieve in passing it. 21