Opinion ID: 1039268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: time limits on trial presentations

Text: [¶26] Father’s third issue is a challenge to the time limits imposed by the district court at trial. We traditionally afford district courts considerable discretion in conducting trials. For that reason, we review Father’s third issue using an abuse of discretion standard. Benjamin v. State, 2011 WY 147, ¶ 32, 264 P.3d 1, 10 (Wyo. 2011). In this context, “the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” Id. [¶27] On April 11, 2012, Mother filed a request for a one-day trial setting. On May 31, 2012, the district court issued an order setting a one-day trial on October 9, 2012. It also 7 issued an accompanying “Time Management Order” specifying that the parties would divide the allotted time equally, with each trial presentation limited to 160 minutes in total. On appeal, Father describes the time limits as arbitrary and a denial of a fair trial and due process, and therefore an abuse of discretion. [¶28] Notice and the opportunity to be heard are touchstones of due process. Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 942 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1997). The opportunity for hearing must be “‘appropriate to the nature of the case,’” and must be “‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Moore v. Board of Educ. of Fulton Public School No. 58, 836 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. 1992)). See DH v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003). In certain circumstances, time limits on trial presentations might deprive a party of a meaningful hearing. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goellner, 770 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Colo. App. 1989) (“[B]ecause the mother was allotted only one-half hour to present her case-in-chief, we conclude that she was denied due process.”). [¶29] The case before us does not present such circumstances. Father complains that the time limits were imposed before the trial court knew anything about the details of this case, or the issues that were in dispute. His argument overlooks the fact that the time limits were imposed as a result of Mother’s request for a one-day trial setting. Father did not object. It was not arbitrary for the district court to set a one-day trial as requested, or for it to give each party half of the trial time. [¶30] It may be that unexpected or difficult issues developed after the time management order was entered. If so, Father did not bring those developments to the attention of the district court. He filed no motion to increase the time allotted for trial. He did not request a pretrial conference. He raised no pretrial objection of any sort. Father has presented no authority suggesting that it was the district court’s obligation to monitor the progress of the case and make sua sponte adjustments to the trial setting. [¶31] Father claims he did not seek an increase in his allotted time because the district court’s order “was worded in such a way to lead [Father’s] counsel to believe that the time limit imposed therein was absolute: the trial judge had already ruled on the length of time he was willing to allow for this trial and that it was not subject to further debate.” The text of the time management order is as follows: This matter having [come] before the court for review and the court having considered the pleadings and the time allotted for the proceedings set in this matter finds that a Time Management Order should issue. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 8
Tuesday, October 9, 2012, from 9:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. The parties should anticipate that the court will strictly adhere to this schedule. 2. The trial time will be divided equally, with each of the respondents getting 160 (one hundred sixty) minutes of total time for opening statements, presentation of evidence, cross-examination, and argument. Delays occasioned by a party will be deducted from that party’s allocated time. 3. Absent compelling circumstances, the parties should anticipate that the court will not continue the proceedings to another date for additional evidence or argument. The language of the time management order does not support Father’s claim. [¶32] Father first objected to the time limits during the trial, after using 151 of his 160 allotted minutes. He asserted that the time limits put him at a disadvantage because, as petitioner, Father had to present his case first and provide certain background information. He also asserted that the hearing on Father’s motion to exclude one of the witnesses should not have been included in his time limit, as he had earlier requested that the hearing be held prior to trial. He asserted that “it’s a denial of due process to count that time against me when we have eight years of information to cover over the custody of a young child.” [¶33] The district court provided this response: Well, let me just say this – and I’ve said it I don’t know how many times in the past, about three years – the parties have unlimited time in these [trials]. The only thing I ask is that when you make a request for the time, that is the time that is allocated. There are a number of reasons for that. One, so that I can plan my schedule. Two, I do not like having these held in different parts. Two consecutive days is fine. Three consecutive days is fine. But doing one day and then coming back several months later is not fair to me and it’s not fair to the parties, especially the party that has to be first, because I have impressions that I have to attempt to re-create. So when it’s set for a day and there is no objection, I assume that both parties believe that they have adequate time to present their 9 case. And since I didn’t hear an objection in this case, we went ahead with the day. The district court also noted that the hearing on the motion to strike the witness “was actually about ten minutes or maybe less.” Although the district court continued to enforce the time limits in general, it did give each party extra minutes for closing arguments. [¶34] The district court has a legitimate interest in planning its schedule. Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] court’s resources are finite and a court must dispose of much litigation.”). We also evaluate the district court’s explanation in light of our decision in Jackson Hole Traders, Inc. v. Joseph, 931 P.2d 244, 248 (Wyo. 1977): Appellants do not point us to any authority which prohibits trial courts from limiting parties to the amounts of time that they specified they would need to fully present their cases. The trial court in this case did not arbitrarily limit the substance of the evidence which Appellants wanted to present; it merely limited the time in which they were allowed to present it to the amount of time which they had indicated that they thought would be sufficient. In the case before us now, the district court limited the parties to the amount of time requested by Mother, without objection from Father. The district court did not control the substance of the evidence or arguments, only the total time of the trial presentations. Father has pointed to no unexpected developments during trial that rendered the time limits impractical. See Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1103 (Colo. App. 2010). Given this analysis, the time limits imposed by the district court did not deny Father his rights to due process. They were not unreasonable under the circumstances, and the district court’s decision to enforce them was not an abuse of discretion.