Opinion ID: 2831207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The GTLA and the TPPA

Text: The common law tort of retaliatory discharge was recognized by this Court in Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556-57 (Tenn. 1988). See also Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 534-35 (Tenn. 2002) (tracing origins of common law tort of retaliatory discharge). In 1990, a mere two years after Chism, the Legislature enacted the TPPA, which differs from the common law tort of retaliatory discharge by only providing protection for employees terminated “solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities.” Act of March 29, 1990, ch. 771, 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 256 (emphasis added) (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(a) (Supp. 1990)); see also Haynes v. Formac Stables, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tenn. 2015) (“The primary difference in the statutory version of the cause of action [for retaliatory discharge] is that it requires an employee to show that his or her refusal to remain silent was the sole reason for the discharge, whereas a common law claimant must show only that his or her refusal to remain silent was a substantial factor motivating the discharge.”). 5 Tennessee Code Annotated section 21-1-103 provides the following right to trial by jury in chancery court: “Either party to a suit in chancery is entitled, upon application, to a jury to try and determine any material fact in dispute, save in cases involving complicated accounting, as to such accounting and those elsewhere excepted by law or by this code, and all the issues of fact in any proper cases, shall be submitted to one (1) jury.” -7- Early decisions addressing both common law and TPPA claims against governmental entities held that the GTLA had not removed governmental immunity for such claims. See, e.g., Ketron v. Chattanooga—Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 919 F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (finding governmental immunity for pre-1997 TPPA claim); Baines v. Wilson Cnty., 86 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the GTLA did not remove sovereign immunity for common law retaliatory discharge claim); Seals v. Jefferson City, No. 03A01-9808-CV-00269, 1999 WL 349690, at ,  (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1999) (holding that the governmental entity was immune in a pre-1997 TPPA action); Williams v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 890 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the governmental entity was immune to a common law retaliatory discharge claim); Montgomery v. Mayor of Covington, 778 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (same). However, in 1997, the Legislature amended the definition of “employer” in the TPPA to include “the state, or any municipality, county, department, board, commission, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision or any other entity of the state,” and the definition of “employee” to include “an employee of the state, or any municipality, county, department, board, commission, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision or any other entity thereof.” Act of May 29, 1997, ch. 511, 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 931 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(g)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1997)). Judicial decisions predating these amendments do not provide the answer for the issue in this appeal. We turn instead to the text of the TPPA.
The TPPA provides that “[n]o employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(b). It goes on to state that “[a]ny employee terminated in violation of subsection (b) shall have a cause of action against the employer for retaliatory discharge and any other damages to which the employee may be entitled.” Id. § 50-1-304(d)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the TPPA sets out certain prohibited conduct in section 50-1-304(b), creates in section -304(d)(1) a cause of action for those who have been subjected to this prohibited conduct, and finally defines, in section -304(a), the “[e]mployee[s]” who may bring this cause of action and the “[e]mployer[s]” against whom it may be brought. The TPPA also provides for recovery of attorney‟s fees6 and includes a safeguard against frivolous claims.7 All together, these provisions form an 6 See Id. § 50-1-304(d)(2) (“Any employee terminated in violation of subsection (b) solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities who prevails in a cause of action against an employer for retaliatory discharge for the actions shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.”). 7 See Id. § 50-1-304(f)(2) (“If any employee files a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause needless increase in costs to the employer, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the employee an appropriate sanction, which -8- independent and comprehensive statutory scheme which removes governmental immunity independent of the GTLA. Moreover, the Legislature‟s 1997 amendment to the TPPA, made subsequent to early court decisions barring TPPA claims against governmental entities, further supports our conclusion that the TPPA is not subject to the procedural requirements of the GTLA. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction that this Court must presume that the Legislature knows the law and makes new laws accordingly. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010); Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2000). When presented with judicial decisions interpreting the GTLA as barring TPPA claims against governmental entities, the Legislature chose to amend the TPPA instead of the GTLA. By making this choice, the Legislature established the TPPA as an “„independent bod[y] of law‟” outside the purview of the GTLA. Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 25 (quoting Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496). The GTLA, originally enacted seventeen years before the TPPA and amended numerous times since its enactment, contains a number of exceptions to the general grant of immunity found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-201(a). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-202 through -205. Had the Legislature intended to subject TPPA claims to the procedural requirements of the GTLA, it easily could have amended the GTLA to remove immunity for TPPA claims, instead of amending the TPPA to specifically allow suit against governmental entities. Consequently, similar to the THRA, the Legislature‟s treatment of TPPA claims evinces an intent that such claims are not “brought under” the GTLA. Rather, they are brought under the TPPA, an independent statute which establishes its own rights and remedies apart from the procedures that apply under the GTLA.