Opinion ID: 4570401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment

Text: A district court may dismiss an indictment obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or, pursuant to its supervisory power, when there is “an abuse of the grand jury process such as perjury or government 6 Case: 19-11812 Date Filed: 09/28/2020 Page: 7 of 11 misconduct.” See United States v. Pabian, 704 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. DiBernardo, 775 F.2d 1470, 1475 (11th Cir. 1985). In either case, the defendant must show prejudice. See Pabian, 704 F.2d at 1540; Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988). When a motion to dismiss an indictment is based on government misconduct that occurred during a grand jury proceeding, the motion will be granted only when the misconduct “‘substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict’ or when there is ‘grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.’” United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1219 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256). A constitutional violation occurs when law enforcement’s technique is “so outrageous that it is fundamentally unfair and ‘shocking to the universal sense of justice mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)). Such conduct is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Butler’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. See Cavallo, 790 F.3d at 1219 (providing the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but issues of law are reviewed de novo). Butler moved to dismiss the superseding indictment on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, arguing the grand jury was 7 Case: 19-11812 Date Filed: 09/28/2020 Page: 8 of 11 not informed that the CI’s wife was not searched for weapons or contraband prior to her meetings with Butler and could have been the actual source of narcotics. This alleged misconduct fails to show prejudice, as no drugs were exchanged on the two occasions referenced in the motion involving the CI’s wife, and the record does not indicate the CI’s wife was present for any of the drug transactions listed in the superseding indictment or presented at trial. In addition, the Government submitted evidence the CI was searched before any controlled purchases and was consistently recorded and surveilled. Butler also argued the investigation lacked oversight, and law enforcement officers knew the CI was a drug user who wanted to entrap Butler into possessing a firearm so he could be charged with another offense. Under the totality of the circumstances, however, this conduct falls short of being so outrageous as to be “fundamentally unfair and shocking to the universal sense of justice mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1516 (quotation marks omitted). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Butler’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment.