Opinion ID: 773871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 16 We generally have jurisdiction to review final decisions of FERC under 16 U.S.C. §§ 825l(b), which provides: 17 Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. 18 Id. Because Petitioners have their principal place of business in Washington, we would ordinarily have jurisdiction to hear a petition for review. However, §§ 825l(b) also provides that [n]o objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure to do so. Id. 19 Petitioners argue for the first time on appeal that the second sentence of §§ 7(a) either provides an example of activities that are not precluded by the first sentence, or creates an exception to the general rules set forth in the first sentence. 3 FERC, on the other hand, interprets the second sentence as a third, independent standard that applies specifically to proposed developments outside of wild and scenic river areas. See 85 FERC ¶¶ 61,093. 20 Petitioners did not raise this statutory construction argument in the administrative proceedings or in the request for rehearing. In those proceedings, Petitioners argued that: (1) only FERC, and not the Secretary of Agriculture, is authorized under the second sentence of §§ 7(a) to make a determination; (2) the Commission's adoption of the Forest Service's interpretation violated several statutory provisions; and (3) the Forest Service's 1998 determination is barred by principles of res judicata. Petitioners did not object to FERC's statutory construction of §§7(a) in their original administrative proceedings before FERC or in their request for rehearing. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review Petitioners' first argument. See Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ([U]nder the FPA's judicial review provision, 16 U.S.C. §§ 825l(b), [p]arties seeking review of FERC orders must petition for rehearing of those orders and must themselves raise in that petition all of the objections urged on appeal. Neither FERC nor this court has authority to waive these statutory requirements. (internal quotations and citations omitted)); State of Cal., ex rel. State Water Res. Bd. v. FERC, 877 F.2d 743, 745 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that under §§ 825l (b), [o]ur jurisdiction is limited to objections raised in the petitioner's application for rehearing before the Commission). 21 Petitioners assert that they implicitly raised their statutory construction argument in their request for rehearing. Petitioners cite isolated language in their brief in support which reads: [i]t is not clear that the second sentence of 1278(a) has any substantive content at all, and [t]he second sentence grants no additional authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, and indeed does nothing other than to clarify the point that the Secretary may prohibit power development only in the case of a direct and adverse effect. Although this language taken out of context may suggest that the second sentence of§§ 7(a) is not substantive in content, the entire gist of Petitioners' argument before FERC was that the Secretary of Agriculture lacked authority under the second sentence of §§ 7(a) to make a determination, precluding adoption by FERC of the Agriculture Secretary's determination; whereas, here, Petitioners advance the substantive argument that their proposed plants are permitted by the second sentence of §§ 7(a). These are not the same arguments simply because they both require interpretation of the same sentence. Put another way, our answer to one would not resolve the other. 22 Furthermore, we require much more specificity in the statement of objection in the administrative petition for rehearing to trigger our appellate review. Am. Rivers v. FERC, 201 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that[b]ecause the petitioners renew on this appeal the specific objections proffered in their administrative petitions for rehearing, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §§ 825l(b) (emphasis added)); Pac. Power & Light Co. v. FPC , 141 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction unless objecting party raised the specific grounds of objection before the Commission). There is good reason for this requirement. As the D.C. Circuit explained in R. I. Consumers' Council v. FPC, 504 F.2d 203, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1974): 23 The purpose of [the provision requiring the parties to raise all objections to FERC before appealing them to this court] is to insure that the Commission has an opportunity to deal with any difficulties presented by its action before the reviewing court intervenes. FPC v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492 (1955). This exhaustion requirement comports with the general function of judicial review to insure that an agency has `taken a `hard look' at the salient`problems.' Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC , 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The agency cannot reasonably be expected to take a hard look unless the parties participate in the task of identifying the hard problems, and of bringing to light pertinent information and analysis bearing on their resolution. The agency's obligation presupposes a burden on the part of interested parties to draw attention to the consequences of proposed action that adversely affects their interests. 24 By not presenting the issue squarely to FERC, Petitioners have deprived FERC of the opportunity to first address the interaction of the first and second sentences of§§ 7(a) before we intervene. Thus, Petitioners' argument fails. 25 Our analysis does not end here, however. Under§§ 825l(b), we can consider an objection not raised before FERC . . . if the party offers reasonable grounds for failing to object. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. FERC, 993 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993). This exception has been limited to three situations: (1) where the objection was based upon changed circumstances; (2) where the Commission subsequently clarified its position; or (3) where the objection upon rehearing appeared futile. See Scott Jennings, Requirements that Objection be Urged on Rehearing Before Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as Prerequisite for Judicial Review under§§ 19 of Natural Gas Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 717(r)), §§ 506(a) of the Natural Gas Policy Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 3416(a)) and §§ 313 of Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 825l), 93 A.L.R. Fed. 186 (1989). 26 Petitioners do not base their jurisdictional argument on the changed circumstances exception. Nor could they. There is no indication that since the order denying Petitioners' request for rehearing §§ 7(a) has been amended or cases have interpreted it differently or that the factual circumstances underlying FERC's decision have changed in any way. Second, FERC has not since clarified its position or reinterpreted §§ 7(a). In fact, FERC interpreted §§ 7(a) as setting forth three separate standards in its opinion in the original licensing hearing, see 85 FERC at ¶¶ 61,093, thereby providing Petitioners with the opportunity to object to FERC's statutory construction of §§ 7(a). Finally, there is no suggestion that Petitioners' statutory objection upon rehearing would have been futile and there is nothing in the record to suggest that it might have been. Therefore, because the facts indicate that Petitioners do not fall within any of the exceptions to §§ 825 l(b), we lack jurisdiction to review Petitioners' first claim. 27