Opinion ID: 1130366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Government Code

Text: In 1975, the Legislature repealed the Winton Act (Stats. 1965, ch. 2041, § 2, p. 4660, repealed by Stats. 1975, ch. 961, § 1, p. 2247, formerly codified at § 13080 et seq.), which had granted school district employees the right to organized representation on employment relations, and replaced it with the Education Employment Relations Act (also known as the Rodda Act) (Gov. Code, § 3540 et seq.) (the EERA). The EERA defines a more restrictive scope of bargaining, but provides for stronger bargaining powers than its predecessor. ( San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 860 [191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 663 P.2d 523] ( San Mateo ).) The purpose of the EERA is to promote the improvement of personnel management and employer-employee relations within the public school systems in the State of California by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public school employees to join organizations of their own choice, to be represented by the organizations in their professional and employment relationships with public school employers, to select one employee organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit, and to afford certificated employees a voice in the formulation of educational policy. (Gov. Code, § 3540.) Pursuant to the EERA, employers shall meet and negotiate with and only with representatives of employee organizations selected as exclusive representatives of appropriate units upon request with regard to matters within the scope of representation. (Gov. Code, § 3543.3.) The scope of this duty is limited to matters relating to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. (Gov. Code, § 3543.2, subd. (a).) The statute defines the phrase terms and conditions of employment to mean health and welfare benefits ..., leave, transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions of employment, class size, procedures to be used for the evaluation of employees, ... procedures for processing grievances pursuant to specific Government Code sections relating to an agreement to submit to binding arbitration, and the layoff of probationary certificated school district employees, pursuant to Section 44959.5 of the Education Code. ... (Gov. Code, § 3543.2 subd. (a), italics added.) As discussed, ante, at page 279, section 44959.5 governs the layoff of probationary teachers exclusively, and in contrast to a district's decision not to reelect probationary teachers, requires the laid-off employee to be given notice, a hearing, and the right to reappointment to the work force is reinstated. Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (a) also expressly provides that all matters not specifically enumerated in the EERA are reserved to the public school employer and may not be a subject of meeting and negotiation. In addition, Government Code section 3540 further mandates that the provisions of the Government Code relating to collective bargaining agreements shall not supersede the Education Code. Causes and procedures for dismissal are not subject to negotiation. (Gov. Code, § 3543.2, subd. (b).) Against this background, we address the merits of the case.
Two Court of Appeal decisions explain the effect of the notice provision in section 44929.21(b) and, contrary to the present Court of Appeal, conclude that school districts have the absolute right to decide not to reelect probationary teachers without providing cause or other procedural protections to the terminated employees, and without regard to contrary provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. ( Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d 1517; Bellflower Education Assn. v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 805 [279 Cal. Rptr. 179] ( Bellflower ).) As we explain, we agree with the result in these cases. In Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d 1517, a probationary teacher received a notice of the district's decision not to reelect her for the following year pursuant to former section 44882, subdivision (b) (now section 44929.21(b)). She filed a grievance alleging that the school district had violated the collective bargaining agreement, which required just cause for employee discipline, and provided for the filing of grievances for any covered employee who had been `adversely affected by an alleged violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of [the agreement].' ( Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d at p. 1519.) On appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the teachers association conceded that under Grimsley, supra, 189 Cal. App.3d at page 1450, the Education Code allowed the district to decline to reelect probationary teachers without cause. ( Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d at p. 1524.) Nonetheless, the association asserted that the collective bargaining agreement gave probationary teachers a right not addressed by the Grimsley court: the right not to be disciplined without just cause or progressive discipline  and that in certain factual situations a notice of [a district's decision against reelection] can be a disciplinary act. ( Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d at p. 1524.) Thus, the association argued that an arbitrator should determine whether a given notice of [the decision against reelection] is really a disciplinary act, and if the arbitrator determines [the decision not to reelect is] really discipline, then the arbitrator should be allowed to fashion some relief for the dismissed teacher.... ( Ibid. ) The Fontana School District asserted that the agreement could not cover its reelection decision because those issues were preempted by the Education Code. The Fontana Court of Appeal agreed with the district that its reelection decision was not arbitrable. The court equated the decision against reelection of probationary teachers with dismissal, relying primarily on Government Code section 3543.2. As discussed ante, at pages 279 through 280, that section delineates the topics that may be negotiated and memorialized in a collective bargaining agreement. Subdivision (b) of Government Code section 3543.2 provides in part: Notwithstanding Section 44944 of the Education Code [which governs dismissal or suspension of permanent employees for cause], the public school employer and the exclusive representative shall, upon request of either party, meet and negotiate regarding causes and procedures for disciplinary action, other than dismissal, including a suspension of pay for up to 15 days, affecting certificated employees. (Italics added.) The Fontana court concluded that because subdivision (b) of Government Code section 3543.2 applies to all certificated employees, including probationary teachers, and is not confined to permanent employees, the statute specifically excludes the topic of probationary employee reelection from inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, that topic cannot be made subject to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, even though the language of the subdivision indicates a legislative recognition that dismissal may be a form of disciplinary action. ( Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d at p. 1525.) [1] (4) The Court of Appeal below opined that the Fontana court based its holding on the faulty premise that a district's decision against reelection was synonymous with dismissal of the employee. Although the Court of Appeal acknowledged that in Fontana, the parties agreed a decision against reelection and a dismissal amounted to termination of the employee, it concluded that fact should not mislead a court into accepting the Fontana court's conclusion that Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (b), excludes the entire topic of dismissal (including a district's decision against reelection) from the scope of collective bargaining. [2] In addition, Association asserts that the Education Code distinguishes between the decision not to reelect a probationary employee at the end of the school year, and the decision to dismiss, and urges that such a distinction between the acts must be maintained. (Compare § 44929.21(b) [reelection of probationary teachers at end of school year] with § 44948.3 [midyear dismissal of probationary teachers] and §§ 44932-44947 [dismissal of permanent employees].) Although we agree with the result in Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d at page 1525, we disagree with its analysis to the extent it held the case was directly governed by Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (b), because the decision against reelection is tantamount to dismissal. The notion that the term dismissal historically encompasses procedures for a decision against reelection is not supported by recent statutory changes. The post-1983 modifications to the Education Code specifically distinguish between a dismissal for cause (see, e.g., §§ 44932 et seq., 44941 et seq., 44948) and a decision against reelection pursuant to section 44929.21(b). In addition, the primary purpose of Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (b), is to provide that a collective bargaining agreement may, in certain limited respects, supersede the provisions of section 44944. Those provisions govern the conduct of a hearing initiated after the filing of written charges that may be the basis for dismissal or suspension, and do not directly govern the reelection of probationary employees. (3b) Nonetheless, even though we do not believe Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (b), allows us to equate dismissal and nonreelection, and we disapprove Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d 1517, to the extent it concluded the two terms were interchangeable, we do find Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (a), evidences a general intent to exclude the procedures governing the reelection of probationary teachers as a proper subject of collective bargaining. As observed ante, at page 274, Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (a), specifies that labor and management may supplement or depart from the Education Code in limited matters relating to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. Matters outside the scope of subdivision (a) are reserved to the public school employer, may not be the subject of collective bargaining, and may not supersede other provisions of the Education Code. (Gov. Code, §§ 3543.2, subd. (a), 3540.) Association argues that because Government Code section 3543.2 does not specifically exclude reelection procedures as a proper subject of collective bargaining, it remains a permissive subject on which valid and enforceable agreements may be reached voluntarily. (See, e.g., Labor Board v. Borg-Warner Corp. (1958) 356 U.S. 342 [2 L.Ed.2d 823, 78 S.Ct. 718].) Although this argument may be persuasive in allowing for bargaining of subject matter not specifically enumerated in Government Code section 3543.2 in other contexts, such is not the case here. When we construe section 44929.21(b) in light of both the nonsupercession clause of Government Code section 3540 and its own predecessor statute, such preclusion must be inferred. In sum, when viewed in the context of the pre-1983 Education Code provisions that provided due process protections for probationary teachers, it is clear the Legislature intended, by its post-1983 amendments, to establish a reelection procedure in which notice, a hearing, and a statement of reasons were not required. Because the contract clause in this case was directly contrary to the procedures established by section 44929.21(b), it violated the nonsupercession clause of Government Code section 3540. We find further support for our conclusion when we examine the statutory scheme of the Education Code. In contrast to permanent teachers entitled to procedural due process before termination (see e.g., §§ 44934, 44944), dismissal of probationary teachers may occur at the end of their second year with a simple notice of the district's decision. Undoubtedly, if the district entered into a collective bargaining agreement which stated, in effect, Probationary employees will be entitled to the same due process rights as permanent employees, that agreement would be in direct conflict with the two-tiered system of the Education Code and would violate that nonsupercession clause of Government Code section 3540. If the district instead agreed to give probationary teachers only some of the due process rights given permanent teachers, as in this case, one effect would be to create a quasi-permanent employee status, in between permanent and probationary, that would conflict with the Education Code's statutory scheme. Finally, the Court of Appeal in Bellflower, supra, 228 Cal. App.3d 805, agreed with the result in Fontana, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d 1517, and concluded that the Legislature vested exclusive discretion in the school district to determine the reelection procedures for probationary teachers under section 44929.21(b). In concluding that section 44929.21(b) allowed the district not to reelect a probationary teacher at the end of the school year without cause, the Bellflower court observed that the Government and Education Codes would preempt any terms of a collective bargaining agreement relating to a district's reelection procedures. ( Bellflower, supra, 228 Cal. App.3d at p. 811.) Thus, in section 44929.21(b), the Legislature has determined that the due process protection enjoyed by permanent certified employees should not apply to probationary employees, and that the state's interest in discharging unsuitable teachers in the first two years of employment outweighs any due process rights sought by these teachers. The collective bargaining provisions in this case contravene this legislative scheme, and therefore violate Government Code section 3540's injunction that collective bargaining agreements in public schools not supersede provisions of the Education Code. In rejecting the preemption analysis of both Fontana and Bellflower, the Court of Appeal below concluded that those cases were inconsistent with this court's decision in San Mateo, supra, 33 Cal.3d 850. There, we held that the scope of collective bargaining is not confined to the matters specifically enumerated in Government Code section 3543.2, because that section permits collective bargaining on matters relating to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. ( San Mateo, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 864-866.) At the same time, the San Mateo court noted that Government Code section 3540 mandates that its provisions shall not supersede other provisions in the Education Code. Thus, the San Mateo court concluded that the Education Code preempts collective bargaining agreements if the provisions of the code would be `replaced, set aside or annulled' by the agreement. ( San Mateo, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 864-866.) Relying on the San Mateo court's discussion of the flexibility of the Government Code's collective bargaining provisions, the Court of Appeal below reasoned that because the Education Code does not expressly prohibit a negotiated agreement that gives greater protections to probationary employees than provided by statute, there is no direct conflict between article 19, section B(1) of the collective bargaining agreement and the Education Code. The Court of Appeal observed that the Education Code's only mandate in this regard is that a school district must give notice to the teacher by March 15 of its decision not to reelect. This statutory mandate, the Court of Appeal asserted, does not prohibit 30 days' advance notice as provided by the agreement. Thus, the Court of Appeal reasoned, there is nothing to prohibit the school district from agreeing to provide a statement of reasons for the decision against reelection insofar as the reason relates to incompetency to teach or misconduct. It concluded that by harmonizing the applicable provisions of the Education and Government Codes, a collectively negotiated contract may supplement the reelection procedure contained in section 44929.21(b), as did the provisions of article 19, section B(1) of the collective bargaining agreement. In considering the context of the statutory framework as a whole ( Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659 [147 Cal. Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155]), we conclude the statutes at issue here cannot be harmonized in the manner advocated by Association or attempted by the Court of Appeal. Section 44929.21(b) is explicit in its terms of notice for a decision against reelection of probationary teachers after the second year of employment. Government Code section 3540 specifically states its provisions governing collective bargaining shall not supersede other provisions of the Education Code. Thus, harmony is provided by the fact that the statutes are consistent on their face. Moreover, in contrast to assertions made by Association and the Court of Appeal below, San Mateo, supra, 33 Cal.3d 850, observed that the intent of the Government Code is to preclude contractual agreements that would alter the meaning of other statutory provisions. As District observes, if we were to validate the requirements of article 19, section B(1) of the agreement with Association, we would severely undermine section 44929.21(b). Indeed, under San Mateo, supra, enforcement of article 19, section B(1), would result in replacing or setting aside a nonnegotiable and mandatory provision of the Education Code, a result the Fontana court explained Government Code section 3540 et seq. sought to avoid. The Court of Appeal also attempted to distinguish United Steelworkers of America v. Board of Education (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 823, 832 [209 Cal. Rptr. 16] ( United Steelworkers ). There, a school bus driver had been dismissed from his duties by the governing board of a school district. The teachers association sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The United Steelworkers court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the motion to compel arbitration after concluding that the provisions of the agreement delegating disciplinary decisions to an arbitrator conflicted with the mandatory provisions of section 45113 (making conclusive the determination of sufficiency of cause for disciplinary action by the school board against permanent classified employees). The conflict, the Court of Appeal reasoned, precluded arbitration. The present Court of Appeal asserts that the reasoning of United Steelworkers does not apply to the present case, because there is nothing in the Education Code making a district's reelection decisions conclusive. Nor, the Court of Appeal reasons, is there any language in the Education Code explicitly prohibiting a negotiated agreement that gives greater protection to probationary employees than provided by statute. The court analogizes this case to Taylor v. Crane (1979) 24 Cal.3d 442 [155 Cal. Rptr. 695, 595 P.2d 129] (hereafter Taylor ), in which this court determined that because a city charter did not expressly prohibit an agreement to arbitrate the discipline or discharge of city employees, the exclusive power given to the city manager to discharge employees amounted to initial discretion in the city manager; the charter did not limit his authority to agree to subject his decisions to arbitration. ( Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 450-453.) In sum, the Court of Appeal believed that, because there is no specific provision in section 44929.21(b) that the notice statute is conclusive, and because section 44929.21(b) is less explicit than the charter provision in Taylor, there is no direct conflict between article 19, section B(1) and section 44929.21(b). Under this logic, the procedure for reelection of probationary teachers is therefore a proper subject of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeal's analysis is misplaced. United Steelworkers, supra, 162 Cal. App.3d 823, relies on section 45113, a provision which makes conclusive the school board's determination of sufficiency of cause for disciplinary action against permanent classified employees. Section 45113 implies that a school board's disciplinary action is not appealable and does not address the sole discretion vested in the school board with respect to the decision to reelect a probationary teacher. As we have previously observed ( ante, at pp. 283-284), it is clear that the intent of section 44929.21(b) was to vest exclusive discretion in the school district to decide whether or not to reelect probationary teachers, and the procedures set forth in article 19, section B(1), effectively supersede that discretion. The present case is also factually distinguished from Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d 442. There, the court was interpreting a city charter provision. Here, by contrast, we review specific legislative acts which establish statewide procedures for the employment of public school teachers. As we have discussed, the Courts of Appeal in both Fontana and Bellflower explain the effect of this exclusive discretion and reach the correct result under the statutory scheme.