Opinion ID: 2785104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interplay Between the Railway Labor Act and the

Text: Norris-LaGuardia Act The relationship between the RLA—with its goal of keeping the trains and planes running—and the NLGA—with its goal of keeping federal courts out of the labor injunction business—has always been somewhat unclear. See 75 Cong. Rec. 5504 (1932) (statement of Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia) (inquiring about an apparent “tie-up” between the provisions of the RLA and the NLGA). Although Section 4 of the NLGA is phrased in absolute language, the Supreme Court AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. 11 consistently has held that the “competing demands of the RLA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act” must be “accommodate[d].” Burlington N. R.R., 481 U.S. at 445; see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 772–73 (1961); Graham v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 239–40 (1949); Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937). In practice, this means that the RLA has been read as creating an exception to the NLGA. Yet the boundaries of this exception are narrow. Although the “specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,” Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 490, 513 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[t]his exception is necessarily a limited one,” Burlington N. R.R., 481 U.S. at 446. In fact, “[e]ven when a violation of a specific mandate of the RLA is shown,” courts should “hesitate” to grant an injunction “unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff’s right.” Id. (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 367 U.S. at 773) (internal quotation mark omitted). The district court concluded that the RLA applied to this dispute, and that this meant that no provision of the NLGA could apply—thus allowing the district court to issue the preliminary injunction without considering whether Section 8 of the NLGA was satisfied. This blanket conclusion, however, elided the distinction between Sections 4 and 8 of the NLGA. Although the Supreme Court has “held that the NLGA § 4 general limitation on district courts’ power to issue injunctions in labor disputes must be accommodated to the more specific provisions of the RLA,” Pittsburgh & Lake 12 AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. Erie R.R., 491 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added),1 neither this court nor the Supreme Court has held that the same is true with respect to Section 8. The vast majority of courts to consider this question have applied Section 8 to disputes that the RLA governs.2 Indeed, 1 This is not to suggest that the RLA applies to this dispute, in which ASIG’s employees are non-unionized, or that Section 4 of the NLGA does not apply. We do not reach those intertwined questions. The dissent’s reliance on the fuelers’ obligations under Section 2, First of the RLA is thus misplaced. We assume, for the purposes of this opinion only, that this provision binds the fuelers—and that this obligation supersedes Section 4 of the NLGA. 2 See Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div., 497 F.3d 568, 571–73 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring that a carrier must satisfy Section 8 before obtaining an injunction under the RLA); Nw. Airlines Corp. v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants–CWA (In re Nw. Airlines Corp.), 483 F.3d 160, 166–67, 177 (2d Cir. 2007) (“While [the NLGA] generally admits of only limited exception, the Supreme Court has held that the NLGA does not preclude courts from enforcing the mandates of the RLA. Even so, however, a party seeking an injunction under the NLGA must have clean hands.” (citation omitted)); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. United Air Lines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886, 900–02 (7th Cir. 1986) (“In making its ruling, the district court correctly noted that any party seeking injunctive relief under the RLA must comply with section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” (citation omitted)); Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 416 F.2d 633, 638–39 (4th Cir. 1969); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 613–14 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“That principle of accommodation means that actions to enjoin violations of the Railway Labor Act may be maintained without regard to Section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, and yet be subject to Section 8 of that Act.”); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 735 F. Supp. 1265, 1268–70 (E.D. Pa. 1990); E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 710 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1989). But see Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 290 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1961). AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. 13 over the years our court has treated Sections 4 and 8 as independent limitations on a district court’s power to issue an injunction, even when the RLA applied. See, e.g., Trans Int’l Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 957–58, 961–67 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J.) (considering whether the “clean hands” requirement had been satisfied independently of analysis of whether the RLA trumped Section 4); Switchmen’s Union of N. Am. v. S. Pac. Co., 398 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1968) (considering whether Section 8 had been satisfied after determining that the RLA trumped Section 4); Order of Ry. Conductors & Brakemen v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Ry. Co., 366 F.2d 99, 104–05 (9th Cir. 1966) (noting that, even if the RLA trumped Section 4, the Supreme Court’s Toledo decision “foreclose[d] the railroad, which positively rejected mediation, from claiming an injunction”); Butte, Anaconda & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 268 F.2d 54, 60 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1959) (noting that Section 8 would have barred injunctive relief even if the RLA had trumped Section 4); see also Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 307 F.2d 21, 39–40 (2d Cir. 1962) (relying in part on Butte At least two other circuits have issued seemingly conflicting decisions with respect to this question. Compare Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, 437 F.2d 388, 393–94 (5th Cir. 1971), and Itasca Lodge 2029 v. Ry. Express Agency Inc., 391 F.2d 657, 667–69 (8th Cir. 1968), with Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 439 F.2d 73, 79–80 (5th Cir. 1971), and Bhd. of R.R. Carmen of Am., Local No. 429 v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 354 F.2d 786, 794–96 (8th Cir. 1965). 14 AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. for the proposition that, even if the RLA trumps Section 4, a party must comply with Section 8 to obtain injunctive relief).3 This approach to the relationship between the RLA and Section 8 is consistent with the Supreme Court’s past efforts to “accommodate” the RLA and Section 4 of the NLGA. As noted above, the RLA creates only a “limited” exception to Section 4—one restricted to situations in which an injunction is the only remedy that can safeguard a right that the RLA grants. Burlington N. R.R., 481 U.S. at 446; see also Graham, 338 U.S. at 239–40 (rejecting a construction of Section 4 that would leave federal courts “powerless to enforce” rights granted by the RLA); Fed. Express Corp. v. Teamster Union, Local No. 85, 617 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[W]hile federal courts may issue injunctions in labor disputes to compel the parties to fulfill their obligations under the RLA, when no such duties exist, the Norris-LaGuardia Act controls.”). For example, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad, a union chose to strike rather than submit to the dispute resolution procedures of the RLA. 353 U.S. at 32–33. If the Supreme Court had chosen to strictly enforce Section 4 in those circumstances, the railroad would have effectively been left with a right under the RLA without a remedy. Accordingly, the Court instead permitted the injunction to stand despite Section 4 to prevent the specific provisions of the RLA from being rendered “nugatory.” See id. at 40–42 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co., 300 U.S. at 563). Only in such a case of “irreconcilable conflict between” the RLA and the NLGA is 3 We also have recognized that Section 4 of the NLGA is conceptually distinct from Section 8 in other contexts. See Camping Constr. Co. v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers, 915 F.2d 1333, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990). AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. 15 it necessary to choose between the RLA and the NLGA. See Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 582 n.18. Section 8, however, does not conflict with any provision of the RLA. On the contrary, as the D.C. Circuit recognized years ago, strict enforcement of Section 8 does “not trammel, but . . . rather further[s] the effectuation of that Railway Labor Act, for it ensures compliance by complainant carrier or union which cannot seek an injunction until and unless it has discharged the obligations imposed by the Railway Labor Act.” Akron & Barberton Belt R.R., 385 F.2d at 614; see also Local 553, Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 695 F.2d 668,679 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, does not conflict with the RLA. . . . Since section 8 is congruent with the RLA, Local 553 should be held to section 8’s requirements . . . .”); Local 553, Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1315, 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[Section] 8 does not conflict with the mandatory status quo provisions of the RLA. Rather, [Section] 8 is in harmony with the purposes of the RLA.”), modified on other grounds, 695 F.2d 668. In applying Section 8 in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge, No. 27 v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R.—a case that involved the RLA—the Supreme Court said the same: “The policy of the Railway Labor Act was to encourage use of the nonjudicial processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration for the adjustment of labor disputes. The over-all policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the same. . . . It is dominant and explicit in Section 8.” 321 U.S. at 58–59 (citations omitted); see also In re Dist. No. 1—Pac. Coast Dist., Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n (AFL-CIO), 723 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that Toledo held that Section 8 had not been satisfied “without even mentioning [Section] 16 AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. 4”). There is thus no need to read another exception into the NLGA to accommodate the RLA.4 4 The dissent relies on two Supreme Court cases interpreting Section 4 for the proposition that the “jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act do not apply to disputes, such as this one, where the parties have not first engaged in any of the procedures of the Railway Labor Act.” Dissent at 44. Again, neither of these cases speak to the proper accommodation between Section 8 and the RLA. The Court in Chicago River did not discuss the applicability of Section 8 to the case before it. And in Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, the Court considered only the “question [of] whether § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibit[ed] the use of a strike injunction.” 402 U.S. 570, 581 (1971) (footnote omitted); see also Brief for the Petitioner at 8 n.6, Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. 570 (No. 70-189), 1970 WL 136733 (noting that the “lower courts never reached the question [of whether Section 8 barred the injunction at issue], and it is not pertinent to the issue presented here”). We address a question left unanswered by those cases. The dissent also fails to engage with any of the cases cited above that give Section 8 a much wider scope, instead claiming that our position “creates a circuit split.” Dissent at 35. Yet three of the cases cited by the dissent never mention Section 8. This could perhaps mean that these courts assumed without comment that the RLA trumped Section 8—but it could just as easily mean that, like the Fifth Circuit, these courts did not consider whether “[Section] 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act” applied because it “was not advanced as a basis for denying an injunction against the strike,” Nat’l Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 416 F.2d 998, 1003 n.4 (5th Cir. 1969) (citing Butte’s discussion of Section 8 but recognizing that “[w]e take the case as we find it”). Moreover, the lone case in this purported “split” that does discuss Section 8 actually cuts against the dissent’s position. In United Airlines— immediately following the sentence quoted by the dissent—the court reaffirmed the Seventh Circuit’s longstanding position that the RLA does not categorically supersede Section 8, noting that things would have been different if the union had a “stronger case for barring the injunction under [Section] 8 of the NLGA.” 243 F.3d at 365 & n.11. But even if we were to read these four cases as the dissent suggests, they merely add to the circuit split, and possible intra-circuit splits, noted above. AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. 17 Consistent with our own precedent and that of many other courts, we reaffirm that a party seeking an injunction under the RLA is not relieved of its obligation to comply with the provisions of Section 8 of the NLGA.5