Opinion ID: 1386085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Duty to Instruct Sua Sponte

Text: (6a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury should consider his voluntary intoxication in determining whether he had premeditated and deliberated the murder. As previously mentioned, the instructions given (CALJIC No. 4.21) related voluntary intoxication only to the question of whether defendant had the specific intent to kill. The Court of Appeal held that the abolition of the defense of diminished capacity had eliminated the need for a sua sponte instruction relating mental illness or voluntary intoxication to the required mental states. It relied on the analysis set forth by Justice Sims in his concurring opinion in People v. Whitler, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d at pages 342-343: These cases represent variations of the familiar rule that a trial court has a sua sponte duty to give instructions relating a recognized defense to elements of a charged offense. ( People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716.) ... [T]he defense of diminished capacity has been abolished. A defendant may still defend against a charge of homicide by presenting evidence of mental disease or defect sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that he or she in fact had the requisite mental state at the time of the offense. [Citation.] However, when a defendant presents evidence to attempt to negate or rebut the prosecution's proof of an element of the offense, a defendant is not presenting a special defense invoking sua sponte instructional duties. While a court may well have a duty to give a `pinpoint' instruction relating such evidence to the elements of the offense and to the jury's duty to acquit if the evidence produces a reasonable doubt, such `pinpoint' instructions are not required to be given sua sponte and must be given only upon request. [Citations.] In contesting the Court of Appeal's determination on this issue, defendant relies primarily on People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170 [264 Cal. Rptr. 852, 783 P.2d 211] and People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]. In Jackson, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder despite evidence that he did not recall the event and was a chronic user of phencyclidine (PCP). Defendant relies on our discussion in Jackson of the defendant's claim that the court erred in instructing on involuntary manslaughter. We noted that both the defense and prosecution had requested the instruction and that the defendant's testimony constituted evidence warranting it. We further stated: Mitigation of the requisite mental state due to drug intoxication was the primary theory of defense and, even if the defense had not requested the instruction, the court clearly had a sua sponte duty to instruct as it did on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1196.) We did not, however, address the question presented here  whether there is a sua sponte duty to instruct on the relationship between voluntary intoxication and premeditation and deliberation. The court in this case did instruct on all aspects of homicide  first and second degree murder, voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. In People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1158, the trial court refused to give a requested instruction under former CALJIC No. 8.41, relating diminished capacity caused by intoxication to voluntary manslaughter. We found the refusal proper in light of the abolition of the diminished capacity defense, but we noted that no one had raised the potential applicability of CALJIC No. 4.21, which deals with the effect of intoxication on the defendant's actual state of mind. Although we held that there was insufficient evidence of intoxication to warrant a sua sponte instruction, we also stated that a number of decisions have specifically held that in an appropriate case a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the principles embodied in CALJIC No. 4.21. (See, e.g., People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550, 576 [268 P.2d 705]; People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 527-528 [219 P.2d 9]; People v. Robinson (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 43, 48 [84 Cal. Rptr. 796]; People v. Arriola (1958) 164 Cal. App.2d 430, 435.) ... Thus, when the evidence warrants and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case (see People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913]), the principle embodied in CALJIC No. 4.21 is one of `the general principles of law' (see People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 [83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]) on which the trial court must instruct the jury even in the absence of a request. ( People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 1179-1180.) The discussion in Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1158, did not consider the points now raised and, in any event, was dictum. The Ramirez discussion appears to assume that intoxication is in the nature of a defense. Technically, however, it was never a defense (see § 22). When voluntary intoxication became subsumed by diminished capacity, it was treated as a part of the defense of diminished capacity. (See, e.g., People v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 727; People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310.) (7) The withdrawal of diminished capacity as a defense removes intoxication from the realm of defenses to crimes. Intoxication is now relevant only to the extent that it bears on the question of whether the defendant actually had the requisite specific mental state. (8) Thus it is now more like the pinpoint instructions discussed in People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847], and People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247, 92 A.L.R.3d 845], to which a defendant is entitled upon request. Such instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or pinpoint the crux of a defendant's case, such as mistaken identification or alibi. (See People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 885.) They are required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte. All of the cases relied upon and cited by Ramirez were decided after our embarkation on the development of the diminished capacity theory in 1949 in People v. Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2d 330. Moreover, they provide only minimal support for the proposition for which they were cited. In People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 527-528 [219 P.2d 9], there was evidence that the defendant had been drinking heavily, but the trial court refused to give the defendant's requested instruction regarding intoxication on the ground that the proffered instruction was incorrect. This court held that the trial court should have given its own instruction if the defendant's version was incorrect. In People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal.2d 550 [268 P.2d 705], the trial court gave misleading instructions by reciting only the first part of section 22 to the effect that voluntary intoxication does not excuse criminal conduct without informing that jury that it could nevertheless consider voluntary intoxication in determining whether the requisite intent had been shown. We stated: Although we might hesitate before holding that the absence of any instruction on voluntary intoxication in a situation such as that presented in this case is prejudicial error, when a partial instruction has been given we cannot but hold that the failure to give complete instructions was prejudicial error. (42 Cal.2d at pp. 575-576.) People v. Arriola (1958) 164 Cal. App.2d 430 [330 P.2d 683] also involved the giving of only the first part of the intoxication instruction. Without the second part of the instruction it was misleading and erroneous. Finally, People v. Robinson (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 43 [84 Cal. Rptr. 796] rejected a claim that the court should have instructed on intoxication on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to justify such an instruction. In passing, however, the court stated: While a trial court on its own motion must instruct the jury with respect to the effect of intoxication on a crime requiring specific intent where evidence of intoxication raises a factual issue ( People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 572-573, 576; People v. Arriola, 164 Cal. App.2d 430, 434-435), here the evidence of intoxication was minimal and such instruction was unnecessary. ( Id., at p. 48.) Thus, the authority supportive of the asserted sua sponte duty appears to consist entirely of dicta. (See also People v. Crawford (1968) 259 Cal. App.2d 874, 877-878 [66 Cal. Rptr. 527]; People v. Watts (1976) 59 Cal. App.3d 80, 84-85 [130 Cal. Rptr. 601].) The only case involving a direct holding that it was error to fail to instruct sua sponte on voluntary intoxication was itself based on the previously mentioned dicta. ( People v. Fanning (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 729, 733 [71 Cal. Rptr. 641].) (6b) Thus, even if there were a duty on the trial court to instruct sua sponte on voluntary intoxication when the defense of diminished capacity existed, we do not believe that it is reasonable for such a duty to continue after abolition of the diminished capacity defense. In our view, under the law relating to mental capacity as it exists today, it makes more sense to place on the defendant the duty to request an instruction which relates the evidence of his intoxication to an element of a crime, such as premeditation and deliberation. This is so because the defendant's evidence of intoxication can no longer be proffered as a defense to a crime but rather is proffered in an attempt to raise a doubt on an element of a crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In such a case the defendant is attempting to relate his evidence of intoxication to an element of the crime. Accordingly, he may seek a pinpoint instruction that must be requested by him (See 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2925, pp. 3586-3587), but such a pinpoint instruction does not involve a general principle of law as that term is used in the cases that have imposed a sua sponte duty of instruction on the trial court. The court did not err, therefore, in failing to instruct sua sponte.