Opinion ID: 3047130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Issues Regarding Woods’s Statements

Text: We also reject Woods’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Woods’s statements at trial without first requiring the government to introduce evidence that Woods provided the statements voluntarily.9 As noted above, the magistrate judge held a pretrial hearing on Woods’s motion to suppress by civilian authorities. Rather, in this case we address only the Fifth Amendment and Miranda’s rule designed to preserve Woods’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 9 Woods’s brief does not clarify whether this claim refers to his written statement, his oral statements at the May 12, 2009 and July 16, 2009 interviews, or both. We presume Woods appeals the admission of both his written and oral statements. 18 his statements at the May 12, 2009 and July 16, 2009 interviews. In the thorough Report, the magistrate judge found that Woods knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The district court adopted that Report and denied Woods’s motion to suppress. Woods cites no authority holding that the government was required again to prove the voluntariness of Woods’s statements before the district court admitted Woods’s statements in evidence. The jury is not required to make an independent finding on whether a defendant’s confession was voluntary. See United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 756–57 (11th Cir. 1990). In any event, the government provided ample evidence at trial that Woods made these statements voluntarily in the form of witness testimony describing the circumstances of the May 12, 2009 and July 16, 2009 interviews, the contents of the waiver forms Woods signed, and Woods’s participation in the drafting of his statement after the July 16 interview. C. Vagueness and Overbreadth of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (a)(5)(B) Woods next claims that the child pornography statutes here are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.10 A statute is void for vagueness if it 10 This Court reviews de novo a district court’s determination that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568 (11th Cir. 1995). 19 “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008); accord United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2010). A statute is facially overbroad if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech “relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 292, 128 S. Ct. at 1838. We begin with the text of the two relevant statutes. As to receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) makes it a crime for any person to: knowingly receive[] or distribute[]– (A) any child pornography that has been mailed, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; or (B) any material that contains child pornography that has been mailed, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer . . . . As to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) makes it a crime for any person to: knowingly possess[]11 any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, 11 In October 2008, Congress added “or knowingly access[] with intent to view” to the statute. Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 203(b), 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) (emphasis added). The indictment 20 computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce . . . including by computer . . . . Woods argues that these receipt and possession statutes are unconstitutionally vague because the statutory language is unclear whether a person who merely views child pornographic images on his computer—versus a person who actually downloads copies of those images to a hard-drive—has “knowingly receive[d]” or “knowingly possesse[d]” those images. Our recent decision in United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 113 (2011), about the receipt statute, sheds light on this issue. In Pruitt, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction for receipt of child pornography under § 2252A(a)(2)(A) because the evidence showed he had viewed child pornography on his work computer but had not downloaded the offending images to the computer’s hard drive. Pruitt, 638 F.3d at 765–66. We affirmed the defendant’s receipt conviction because a person “knowingly receives” something when he “knowingly accept[s]” or “take[s] possession or delivery of” that thing or “take[s] in [that thing] through the mind or senses.” Id. at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Pruitt held here did not charge Woods with this new, alternative prong of the statute. 21 that “[u]nder [§ 2252A(a)(2)’s] ‘knowingly receives’ element, an intentional viewer of child-pornography images sent to his computer may be convicted whether or not, for example, he acts to save the images to a hard drive . . . .” Id. Pruitt was not a vagueness case. But Pruitt’s construction of § 2252A(a)(2) shows why that receipt statute is not vague on the basis argued by Woods.12 Pruitt’s holding flowed from the “ordinary meaning” of the words “knowingly” and “receive.” Id. As Pruitt pointed out, those words clearly convey that a person who “intentionally views, acquires, or accepts child pornography on a computer from an outside source” violates § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Id. The clarity of the statute’s plain language thus shows why the receipt statute provides “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited” and does not authorize or encourage “seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 304, 128 S. Ct. at 1845. Similar reasoning applies to the possession statute, § 2252A(a)(5)(B). First, we explain why the possession statute, like the receipt statute, applies to a person who knowingly views child pornography on his computer, but does not download 12 As Woods notes, Pruitt was decided after Woods engaged in the conduct that led to his conviction. Accordingly, Pruitt itself could not have put Woods on notice that merely viewing child pornography on a computer, versus downloading and saving child pornography to the hard drive, was conduct prohibited by § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Nonetheless, Pruitt’s construction of the ordinary terms used in § 2252A(a)(2)(A) shows why the statute is not vague. 22 or save that material to a hard drive. To do so, we discuss United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1373 (11th Cir. 2009), in which this Court already concluded that “receipt” necessarily proves “possession,” and that therefore the possession crime in § 2252A(a)(5)(B) is a lesser included offense of the receipt crime in § 2252A(a)(2)(B).13 In Bobb, the defendant was convicted of receiving child pornography, in violation of § 2252A(a)(2)(B), and possessing child pornography, in violation of § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1369–70. The defendant claimed that his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the receipt and possession statutes criminalized the same conduct. Id. at 1370–71. This Court agreed that “these provisions, indeed, proscribe the same conduct” because “by proving that a person ‘knowingly receives’ child pornography, the Government 13 We note that in Bobb, the defendant was convicted of receipt of child pornography under § 2252A(a)(2)(B), while this case involves receipt under the adjacent subsection, § 2252A(a)(2)(A). However, these statutes proscribe virtually the same conduct. Section 2252A(a)(2) makes it a crime to: knowingly receive[] or distribute[]— (A) any child pornography . . . ; or (B) any material that contains child pornography . . . . Bobb’s reasoning, which relied on the relationship between the words “receive” and “possess,” is applicable to receipt under both subsections (A) and (B). Indeed, the defendant in Bobb argued that the possession statute was a lesser included offense of both subsections (A) and (B). See Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1373 (explaining that defendant argued “that the offenses described in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (prohibiting receipt) comprise a subset of offenses described in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (prohibiting possession)” (emphasis added)). 23 necessarily proves that the person ‘knowingly possesses’ child pornography.” Id. at 1373. We nonetheless affirmed the defendant’s receipt and possession convictions in Bobb because there the defendant’s “convictions and sentences were based on two distinct offenses, occurring on two different dates, and proscribed by two different statutes.” Id. at 1375. Reading our precedents together, we see that (1) Pruitt held that a person who “knowingly” views child pornography on a computer, but does not download it, “receives” child pornography; and (2) Bobb held that “receipt” necessarily entails “possession.” Thus, these precedents, taken together, show that a person who intentionally views, but does not download, child pornography necessarily “possesses” child pornography within the meaning of § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The issue thus becomes whether § 2252A(a)(5)(B) provides “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice” that it prohibits such conduct. Williams, 553 U.S. at 304, 128 S. Ct. at 1845. As with the receipt statute, the ordinary meaning of the terms in the possession statute show why it is not unconstitutionally vague. “‘Possession’ is ‘the act or condition of having in or taking into one’s control or holding at one’s disposal.’” United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 24 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1770 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1981)). One who “knowingly” views images of child pornography on a computer, even without downloading or saving those images to the computer’s hard drive, takes those images into his control and has those images at his disposal. He may save those images to a different location on the computer, transmit the images over the Internet, or show those images to others. Like the receipt statute, the terms of the possession statute thus provide “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited” and do not authorize or encourage “seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 304, 128 S. Ct. at 1845. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague for failing to describe explicitly the range of ways in which the statute can be violated. See United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Congress may use a term that conveys the type of conduct regulated rather than enumerate all the specific instances within the legislation.”). Woods’s vagueness argument also fails because Woods himself knowingly saved child pornography to the hard drives of his two computers, and “one to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it . . . for vagueness.” Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 112 F.3d 1542, 1547 (11th 25 Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1271 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that party whose own conduct is clearly proscribed by statute cannot successfully challenge statute for vagueness either facially or as applied); United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1326 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that when a vagueness challenge does not involve the First Amendment, the analysis must be based on the facts of the case), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 360 (2011), and 132 S. Ct. 1002, 1582 (2012). Woods admitted that he downloaded child pornography to both his H-P computer and his home desktop computer. Forensic analysis confirmed that child pornography files were saved to the H-P computer and later transferred and saved to Woods’s home computer. Woods’s ex-wife also testified that she discovered sexually explicit images of children on the H-P computer she shared with Woods. Woods makes no claim that he merely viewed child pornographic images without downloading them. Nor does Woods claim that his downloading and viewing of child pornography are constitutionally protected conduct. Because the language of § 2252A(a)(2) and (a)(5)(B) is not vague as applied to Woods’s conduct, Woods’s facial and asapplied vagueness challenges fail. See Catron, 658 F.3d at 1271. We also conclude that the child pornography receipt and possession statutes 26 are not overbroad. As noted above, a statute is overly broad only if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to the statute’s legitimate sweep. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292, 128 S. Ct. at 1838. The statutes Woods challenges prohibit only the knowing receipt or possession of “child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B). Child pornography is not speech protected by the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 765, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3355, 3359 (1982); United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d 978, 980 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the two statutes’ very terms restrict their application to speech unprotected by the First Amendment. In criminalizing this unprotected conduct or speech, the statutes prohibit little, if any, protected speech or conduct. The statutes criminalize only “knowing” possession or receipt of child pornography, which eliminates the possibility that an unwitting downloader of child pornography will trigger liability under the statutes. Though Woods identifies some problematic hypothetical applications of these statutes, Woods has not demonstrated that these applications are substantial in relation to the statutes’ legitimate sweep. These statutes do not offend the First Amendment in the vast majority of applications, and “[t]he mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not 27 sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Id. at 303, 128 S. Ct. at 1844 (internal quotation marks omitted). D. Multiplicitous Indictment Woods next claims that his indictment is multiplicitous. “An indictment is multiplicitous if it charges a single offense in more than one count.” United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A multiplicitous indictment “violates double jeopardy principles by giving the jury more than one opportunity to convict the defendant for the same offense.” Id. A multiplicitous-indictment challenge is subject to the same standard as a double jeopardy challenge. Id. Accordingly, charges in an indictment are not multiplicitous if the charges differ by even a single element or alleged fact.14 United States v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 1991). Woods’s argument relies on our decision in United States v. Bobb, discussed above, holding the possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), is a lesser included offense of the receipt statute, § 2252A(a)(2). 577 F.3d at 1373–75. Woods argues that under Bobb, where an indictment charges both possession and receipt of child pornography, “there must be allegations and proof of separate, 14 We review de novo a claim that an indictment is multiplicitous. Jones, 601 F.3d at 1258. 28 distinct downloadings of pornography.” Woods’s claim wholly lacks merit, because, as in Bobb, each count of the indictment alleges that Woods engaged in the charged conduct during a different time period. Count 1 charges that Woods received or attempted to receive child pornography between November 2006 and May 12, 2009, which corresponds to the time between when Woods and his ex-wife moved to Georgia and when Woods surrendered his home desktop computer to federal agents. Count 2 charges that Woods possessed child pornography between June 24, 2007 and May 12, 2009, which corresponds to the time between when Woods copied the files from the H-P computer to his home computer and when Woods surrendered his home computer to federal agents. Count 3 charges that Woods possessed child pornography between June 2005 and December 2007, which corresponds to the time before Woods’s ex-wife moved out and took the H-P computer. See Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375 (holding that indictment charged two separate offenses in part because charged offenses occurred on two different dates). Though these date ranges partially overlap, each range in each count has a span of dates not covered by the time period in the other counts. And indeed, two counts involve different computers. Nothing in the indictment indicated that the 29 same images underlying the receipt count underlie the possession counts. In any event, the government’s bill of particulars confirmed there is no multiplicity of the charges here. The bill of particulars, which the government provided Woods in February 2010, described each of the images or videos the government would rely on to prove each count of the indictment, and no single downloaded image or video constituted the basis for multiple charges.15 See United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1260 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a bill of particulars may cure notice problems caused by a vague term in an indictment); United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that a bill of particulars can cure an indictment’s omission of details needed to help defendant prepare defense). Accordingly, each of the three counts in the indictment rested on at least one fact or element different from the others, and the indictment itself was not multiplicitous. See Costa, 947 F.2d at 926.16 E. Admission of Testimony Mentioning Images in NCMEC Database Woods also raises evidentiary issues which first require some background about what happened at trial. 15 Indeed, the government points out that Woods does not claim that the bill of particulars included the same image as evidence of more than one count. 16 We also reject Woods’s claim that the trial evidence constructively amended and unconstitutionally varied from Woods’s indictment. 30 In his opening argument, Woods’s counsel argued that Woods was the victim of a “sloppy” police investigation. Specifically, Woods’s counsel argued to the jury that (1) the government “made a conscious decision to try to prejudice you against [Woods] over here by the selections [of images] that they made”; (2) the government “decided to make [the images] just as bad as they could hoping that would fire y’all up to just convict him because they’re just such nasty pictures”; and (3) “[t]here are manipulations of the images as to the image descriptions, the number and type.” Later, during its case in chief, the government asked Agent Eversman and DCFL forensic examiner James Morris to describe how they recovered data from Woods’s computers and how they decided which of the hundreds of images recovered to submit for in-depth analysis. Agent Eversman and Morris testified that they verified which of the files on Woods’s computers matched images and videos in the NCMEC database and selected several of those matching files for indepth analysis. Morris testified that agents selected for in-depth analysis images that matched NCMEC database images because the government did not have the time or resources to perform an in-depth analysis on all of the images recovered from Woods’s computers. Morris stated that DCFL lab policy is to perform in- 31 depth analysis on no more than 25 images without additional authorization. Woods’s counsel objected multiple times to Agent Eversman’s and Morris’s testimony on grounds that their suggesting Woods’s files matched those in the NCMEC database (1) was unauthenticated evidence; (2) was inadmissible hearsay; (3) denied Woods’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses regarding this evidence; and (4) was unfairly prejudicial. The district court overruled Woods’s objections. On appeal, Woods raises each of these challenges. We review them in turn.17 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a), an “item” of evidence is not admissible at trial unless and until it is properly authenticated by evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Here, Woods’s counsel did not object to the introduction of any “item” of evidence. Rather, Woods’s counsel objected only to testimony that the government’s ordinary forensic process showed that some of the images and videos discovered on Woods’s computer matched those in the NCMEC database. Accordingly, the authentication requirement, which applies only to “an item of 17 This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2012). “If, however, the objection raises the right to confront witnesses, we review it de novo.” United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1121 (2012). 32 evidence,” is inapplicable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Woods’s objections on these grounds. Id. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Woods’s hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections. Relevant evidence may be excluded if it is inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). In explaining how the DCFL and NCIS recovered data from Woods’s computers and decided which images to subject to in-depth analysis, Agent Eversman and Morris testified that images found on Woods’s computers matched images in the NCMEC database. Assuming without deciding that these matches were out-of-court “statements” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a),18 this testimony was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the images found on Woods’s computer matched images of known child pornography. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). Rather, the testimony explained how the government selected which images recovered from Woods’s 18 The Federal Rules of Evidence define a “statement” as “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(a). 33 computers to subject to in-depth analysis. This purpose was particularly evident given Woods’s counsel’s attack on the integrity of the government’s forensic techniques, especially Woods’s counsel’s claims to the jury that the government selected images to use against Woods on the basis of those images’ inflammatory effects. By eliciting testimony about the NCMEC matches, the government showed that it selected images for in-depth analysis based on the likelihood that in-depth analysis would reveal useful information about the images, rather than pursuant to an illicit or improper motive.19 See United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1208 n.17 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Statements by out of court witnesses to law enforcement officials may be admitted as non-hearsay if they are relevant to explain the course of the officials’ subsequent investigative actions . . . .”). Accordingly, testimony about the NCMEC database matches was not hearsay under Federal Rule of 19 The government’s closing argument confirms that Agent Eversman’s and Morris’s testimony was not offered to prove the images in fact matched images in the NCMEC database, but merely to explain the selection process for in-depth analysis. The government told the jury: I will note that there has been evidence in the case about references to NCMEC and its known database. The purpose of that was just to explain the forensic process. It’s really up to you to determine whether or not there are real children in these pictures, whether or not they were minors at the time that the images were taken, and whether or not they are sexually explicit in nature. 34 Evidence 801(c).20 Last, we reject Woods’s argument that this testimony was unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded. Under Rule 403, the district court may exclude otherwise-admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by the danger, inter alia, of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Fed. R. Evid. 403. The courts must employ Rule 403 “only sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence.” United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). There is no question that testimony that files on Woods’s computer matched those in the NCMEC database was relevant and probative of the government’s forensic techniques and helped to show, contrary to Woods’s counsel’s assertions, that the government did not select evidence pursuant to an improper motive. This testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, especially given the volume and nature of the evidence at trial showing that Woods had downloaded child pornography. This evidence included (1) Woods’s own written confession that he had downloaded hundreds of images of child 20 Because the admitted testimony was not hearsay, Woods’s Confrontation Clause challenge also fails. See United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009) (“There can be no doubt that the Confrontation clause prohibits only statements that constitute impermissible hearsay.”). 35 pornography; and (2) the testimony of both Woods’s ex-wife and forensic expert Morris, who each testified that, based on their personal observations, the images on Woods’s computers were child pornography; (3) Agent Ozden’s testimony that the images he viewed on Woods’s home computer were child pornography; (4) Woods’s statement to Agent Ozden that he thought Ozden had discovered child pornography on Woods’s computer; (5) the nature of the images on Woods’s computers, which depicted pre-pubescent minors that could not reasonably be confused with adults; (6) the names of Woods’s computer files containing child pornography, which included obvious references to the fact that the images depicted children.21 Further, at the close of the trial, the district court instructed the jury that the jury was to decide whether the individuals depicted in the images were minors. The district court’s jury instructions stated: As part of the Government’s case, evidence has been admitted, including images which the Government asserts depict actual minors. It is for you to determine, based upon all the evidence before you, whether actual minors are depicted in the images. This instruction further emphasized that the jury itself was to determine whether Woods’s images were child pornography. See United States v. Fortenberry, 971 21 See supra n. 4. 36 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that limiting instructions minimize the prejudicial effect of evidence).22 In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Agent Eversman’s and Morris’s testimony over Woods’s counsel’s objections. F. Admission of Other Acts Evidence At trial, Woods objected to the admission into evidence of the portion of his typed statement describing his molestation of his niece, which the district court admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 414. Woods also moved for a mistrial. Woods now argues that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial.23 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 414(a): In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another 22 We further note that Woods’s defense at trial was that the government could not show that Woods, as opposed to Woods’s ex-wife or his roommates, received and possessed the images and videos found on the two computers, not that the images and videos did not depict actual minors. 23 We construe Woods’s presentation of this issue on appeal as an argument that the relevant portion of Woods’s written statement should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. To the extent Woods argues in his opening brief that Rule 414 is unconstitutional, Woods has abandoned this issue by failing to develop any argument on it in his opening brief. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (deeming an issue abandoned when a defendant merely makes a passing reference to an alleged error in his brief). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings and denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. McGarity, 669 F.3d at 1232. 37 offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.24 Rule 414 defines “offense of child molestation” as, among other things, a crime involving “any conduct proscribed by chapter 110 of title 18, United States Code.” Fed. R. Evid. 414(d)(2). Woods was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (receipt of child pornography) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (possession of child pornography), both of which fall under chapter 110 of title 18. Accordingly, admission of Woods’s statement about molesting his niece was proper under Rule 414 so long as this evidence satisfied the other Rules of Evidence, including Rule 403. See United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012). As discussed above, under Rule 403, the district court may exclude otherwise-admissible evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Fed. R. Evid. 403. In McGarity, we considered a nearly identical Rule 403 challenge to the admission of the defendant’s written statement detailing “his prior fondling, touching, and molestation of his two-year-old daughter some nine years earlier.” 669 F.3d at 24 Rule 414 was amended in December 2011. However, even if that amendment were retroactive, the amendment was stylistic only and does not change the outcome of our inquiry. See Fed. R. Evid. 414 advisory committee’s note (“These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”). All quotations of Rule 414 reflect the pre-amendment language. 38 1243. In that case, we rejected defendant McGarity’s claim that the probative value of this statement was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, in part because McGarity’s statement showed that he was the person who had trafficked in the child pornography admitted in evidence. Id. at 1244–45 (“The nature of McGarity’s crime was intended to avoid detection.”). Similarly, Woods argued at trial that the government could not prove that Woods—as opposed to Woods’s ex-wife or Woods’s roommates—had received and possessed the child pornography found on the two computers. Like McGarity’s statement, Woods’s statement describing his molestation of his niece was probative of Woods’s interest in child pornography and therefore made it more likely that Woods, and not his ex-wife or roommates, was responsible for the child pornography found on the two computers. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence under Rules 414 and 403 and by denying Woods’s motion for a mistrial. G. Prosecutor’s Closing Argument Woods next claims that the prosecutor’s closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct and denied Woods a fair trial.25 “Reversal on the basis 25 This Court reviews de novo a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006). 39 of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the misconduct be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1099 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). “For a claim of prosecutorial misconduct relating to the closing argument to be successful, the argument must be improper and prejudicial to a substantial right of the defendant.” United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997). A defendant’s substantial rights are prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that, but for the improper remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different. United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996). Woods does not identify any particular improper statement the prosecutor made during the closing argument. Rather, Woods claims only that the prosecutor “fanned and inflamed the jury against him concerning such information about which he was not charged.” Our review of the record shows no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. In her closing argument, the prosecutor merely restated the elements of the offenses with which Woods was charged, outlined the evidence against Woods, and connected the evidence to each element of the offense. The prosecutor used no inflammatory language whatsoever and 40 referenced no unadmitted evidence. Accordingly, Woods’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct fails.26