Opinion ID: 1189045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Undue Influence and Use of a Computer Sentence Enhancements

Text: Patterson also objects to the district court's enhancement of his sentence for Undue Influence and Use of a Computer. When reviewing a district court's application of sentencing enhancements, we review the district court's legal interpretations de novo, United States v. Katalinic, 510 F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir.2007), and its factual findings for clear error, United States v. Bryant, 557 F.3d 489, 500-01 (7th Cir.2009). The clear error standard is significantly deferential and an appellate court may only reverse a factual finding under this standard when it is left with a `definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' United States v. Gerstein, 104 F.3d 973, 980 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)) (other citations omitted).
Sentencing Guideline § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) requires a two level enhancement where a participant unduly influenced the victim to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. The commentary to the Guideline instructs courts to closely consider the particular facts of the case to determine whether a participant's influence over the victim compromised the voluntariness of the victim's behavior. U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2, cmt. n. 3. This court has stated that the defining characteristic of undue influence is that it involves a situation where the `influencer' has succeeded in altering the behavior of the target. U.S. v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir.2003). Here, the district court applied the enhancement because the defendant was the one or was one of the people who helped involve the victim with prostitution. This finding was supported by the record. The defendant was a forty-two year old man and the victim was a fourteen year old girl at the time of the crime. The victim testified to the grand jury that she had never worked in prostitution before the defendant encouraged her to try it. Moreover, the victim was destitute and penniless when Patterson began urging her to travel to Chicago with him to engage in internet-based prostitution, making her more vulnerable to his influence. Because the record supports the district court's application of the enhancement, and because there is no basis for a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, we affirm the district court's application of the undue influence enhancement.
Patterson arguesand the government concedesthat the district court erred when it applied the U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3) enhancement for use of a computer. Under this provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's offense level is increased two levels: [i]f the offense involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to ... entice encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor.... U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3). The commentary, however, further provides that [s]ubsection (b)(3) is intended to apply only to the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to communicate directly with a minor or with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor. Id. § 2G1.3 cmt. n. 4. In this case, no computers were used to communicate directly with the victim or the victim's custodian, so the enhancement does not apply. We therefore reverse and remand with regard to this enhancement in order to ensure that it played no part in Patterson's sentence.