Opinion ID: 795902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absolute Immunity From Yarris's Constitutional Claims

Text: 19 Although § 1983 purports to subject [e]very person acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, the Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 was not meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). To that end, the Court has identified two kinds of immunities under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity. 3 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). However, for public officials who perform special functions, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), the Court has determined that absolute immunity is appropriate because it is better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (quotation marks and citation omitted). [T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). 20 In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that state prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-judicial role. See 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984. This immunity extends to acts that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, such as initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State's case. Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984. The Supreme Court has noted numerous public policy considerations underlying its extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors: 21 [S]uits against prosecutors for initiating and conducting prosecutions could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate; lawsuits would divert prosecutors' attention and energy away from their important duty of enforcing the criminal law; prosecutors would have more difficulty than other officials in meeting the standards for qualified immunity; and potential liability would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. . . . [T]here are other checks on prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law and professional discipline. 22 Burns, 500 U.S. at 485-86, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425, 427-28, 429, 96 S.Ct. 984). 23 Since extending absolute immunity to state prosecutors in Imbler, the Supreme Court has clarified that absolute immunity does not extend to [a] prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 494-96, 111 S.Ct. 1934. At the same time, the Court has reaffirmed that acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. 24 Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state's advocate while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation. See id. at 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606. As the Supreme Court explained in Kalina v. Fletcher, in determining immunity, we examine the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. 522 U.S. 118, 127, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted). 25 Turning to the instant case, Yarris's Amended Complaint alleges that the ADAs engaged in conduct that violated Yarris's rights under the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 4 In support of these claims, the Amended Complaint alleges that the ADAs deliberately destroyed exculpatory evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence, fabricated a false confession, and obtained a false statement from a jailhouse informant. 5 We analyze whether the ADAs are entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on this alleged conduct below. 26
27 The Amended Complaint alleges that the ADAs violated Yarris's Fourteenth Amendment rights when they deliberately destroyed . . . highly exculpatory information. 6 (Am.Compl.¶ 92.) Although we have not directly addressed whether prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims based on the destruction of exculpatory evidence, we have denied absolute immunity where a plaintiff alleged that a prosecutor knowingly failed to preserve exculpatory evidence. See Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1120 (3d Cir.1980) ( per curiam ). We have also observed that courts have been unwilling to extend absolute immunity to a prosecutor's alleged perjury or destruction of evidence when not closely connected to an ongoing criminal prosecution. Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 630 n. 28 (3d Cir.1993); but see Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1978) (prosecutor absolutely immune from suit claiming that he destroyed and falsified evidence). 28 We believe that destroying exculpatory evidence is not related to a prosecutor's prosecutorial function. Unlike decisions on whether to withhold evidence from the defense, decisions to destroy evidence are not related to a prosecutor's prosecutorial function. As our late colleague Judge Becker aptly observed in Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F.Supp. 1072, 1083 (E.D.Pa.1980): 29 [O]nce the decision is made not to furnish evidence to the defense, no additional protectible prosecutorial discretion is involved in deciding to dispose of it, and . . ., while deciding not to furnish the prosecution's evidence to the defense may be an act of advocacy, throwing the evidence away is not such an act. 30 Accordingly, the ADAs are not entitled to absolute immunity from suit for constitutional violations caused by their alleged deliberate destruction of exculpatory evidence. 31
32 The Amended Complaint next alleges that the ADAs violated Yarris's constitutional rights when they: withheld highly exculpatory information; fail[ed] to disclose investigatory materials and exculpatory evidence; fail[ed] to release physical evidence for DNA testing in a prompt manner; and failed to release exculpatory physical, investigatory, and DNA evidence. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 92, 93, 96). 33 It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, so long as they did so while functioning in their prosecutorial capacity. As the Supreme Court explained in Imbler, the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information is included within the legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 424 U.S. at 431-32 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 984; see also Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 199 n. 18 (3d Cir.2000). Furthermore, courts have held that prosecutors are entitled to immunity even when they withhold evidence after trial while the criminal conviction is on appeal. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Cozzolino, 238 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that absolute immunity covers prosecutors' actions after the date of conviction while a direct appeal is pending). Here, even accepting the allegations concerning the ADAs as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Yarris's favor, we find that the ADAs are absolutely immune from claims based on allegations that they intentionally concealed exculpatory evidence prior to trial. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 4, 5.) See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431-32 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 984. 34 Less clear is whether the ADAs are absolutely immune from claims based on allegations that they withheld exculpatory evidence, in the form of DNA samples, after Yarris was convicted and sentenced to death. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 93, 96.) We agree with other courts that [a]bsolute immunity applies to the adversarial acts of prosecutors during post-conviction proceedings . . . where the prosecutor is personally involved . . . and continues his role as an advocate, but that where the role as advocate has not yet begun . . . or where it has concluded, absolute immunity does not apply. Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 799 (6th Cir.2003). Compare Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 366 (7th Cir.1992) (no absolute immunity where prosecutors were not personally prosecuting the appeal in post-conviction proceedings) with Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir.1994) (absolute immunity where prosecutor was handling the postconviction motions and the initial direct appeal . . . [and thus] still functioning as an advocate for the State). After a conviction is obtained, the challenged action must be shown by the prosecutor to be part of the prosecutor's continuing personal involvement as the state's advocate in adversarial post-conviction proceedings to be encompassed within that prosecutor's absolute immunity from suit. 35 Based on the facts on the record as it now stands, the prosecutors have not satisfied their burden of showing that they are entitled to the immunity they seek. Yarris's direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was argued in April and decided in October of 1988. See Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988). Yarris's numerous requests for DNA testing of physical evidence began in March 1988—presumably in an attempt to uncover new evidence that might entitle him to extraordinary relief in case the legal avenues he was pursuing did not succeed. The prosecutors have not shown that their response to Yarris's DNA test requests was part of their advocacy for the state in post-conviction proceedings in which they were personally involved. 36 Without such a showing, a prosecutor acting merely as a custodian of evidence after conviction serves the same non-adversarial function as police officers, medical examiners, and other clerical state employees and—just as with certain police investigative work—it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, [absolute] immunity should protect the one and not the other[s]. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. The handling of requests to conduct scientific tests on evidence made after conviction—not related to grounds claimed in an ongoing adversarial proceeding—can be best described as part of the prosecutor's administrative duties . . . that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings and are not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. Because the ADAs have not yet shown how the handling of DNA evidence related to ongoing adversarial proceedings in which they were personally involved, we conclude that the prosecutors may have been function[ing] as . . . administrator[s] rather than as . . . officer[s] of the court and, thus, may be entitled only to qualified immunity. Id. 37
38 The Amended Complaint next alleges that the ADAs violated Yarris's constitutional rights when they concoct[ed] a false and fabricated confession. (Am. Compl.¶ 93.) There is no elaboration in the Amended Complaint regarding the circumstances under which the ADAs fabricated a confession by Yarris. In fact, the only reference to a confession is found in paragraph 40 of the Amended Complaint, which discusses a conversation Yarris had on February 1, 1982, with a prison guard who subsequently gave a statement and later testified that Yarris said that he had raped Craig, but that another man named Mark had actually murdered her, a statement known to be absolutely false in light of DNA evidence conclusively showing that Yarris was not the rapist. (Am. Compl.¶ 40.) 39 Accepting Yarris's allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, we must conclude that absolute immunity from this claim is not appropriate at the motion-to dismiss stage. As already noted, the key question is whether the ADAs were functioning as the state's advocates when they engaged in the conduct that gave rise to the evidence-fabrication allegations. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606. In Buckley, the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity to prosecutors who had allegedly fabricated evidence that was used to obtain a criminal conviction after it determined that the prosecutors' conduct occurred well before they could properly claim to be acting as advocates. Id. at 275, 113 S.Ct. 2606; see also Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1467 (stating that prosecutor who fabricated confession would be absolutely immune if he did so while prosecuting the case). In contrast, the allegations here do not indicate whether the fabrication of Yarris's confession occurred during the preliminary investigation of an unsolved crime, as in Buckley, or after the ADAs had decided to indict Yarris and had begun working as the state's advocates in the prosecution of Yarris. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the ADAs cannot establish that they are entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly fabricating Yarris's confession. 40
41 The Amended Complaint also alleges that the ADAs violated Yarris's constitutional rights when they obtain[ed] a false statement from a jailhouse informant. (Am.Compl.¶ 93.) According to the Amended Complaint, after Yarris was charged with murder, rape, kidnaping, and robbery, he was returned to his prison cell, which was located next to a cell occupied by Charles Catalino, who had been convicted of burglarizing ADA Ryan's home and was awaiting sentencing. (Am. Compl.¶ 42.) Yarris alleges that the following ensued: 42 43. Charles Catalino subsequently falsely reported, and, perjuring himself, testified at trial, that Yarris expressed concern that his blood would be discovered at the scene of the murder and that he had committed the rape and murder, a statement now known to be absolutely false in light of DNA evidence conclusively showing that Yarris was not the rapist or murderer. 43 44. Yarris believes and therefore avers that Catalino received a reduced sentence on the burglary charge to run concurrent with an existing sentence, was allowed conjugal visits with his spouse, and was released later in 1982. 44 (Am.Compl.¶¶ 43-44.) Yarris thus claims that the ADAs used a `stick and carrot' treatment to elicit [Catalino's] false testimony. (Am.Compl.¶ 54.) 45 Based on these allegations, the ADAs are entitled to absolute immunity from Yarris's claim that they obtained a false statement from a jailhouse informant. As a general matter, we note that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for using false testimony in connection with [a] prosecution. Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1465; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984. With respect to the solicitation of false statements alleged here, the ADAs are entitled to absolute immunity to the extent that their conduct occurred while they were acting as advocates rather than investigators. As the Amended Complaint makes clear, Yarris had already been charged with the Craig crimes before Catalino made any statements about what Yarris told him while they were held in adjacent prison cells. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 41-43.) Thus, although the Amended Complaint does not describe in detail when or how the ADAs obtain[ed] a false statement from a jailhouse informant (Am. Compl.¶ 93), the allegations relating to Catalino's false statements indicate that the ADAs' involvement with Catalino's statements occurred after Yarris's prosecution for those crimes had begun. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 344-45 (3d Cir.1989) (granting absolute immunity where complaint alleged that prosecutors solicited perjured testimony for use in grand jury proceedings); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 832-34 (3d Cir.1976) (granting absolute immunity where complaint alleged that federal prosecutor and witness conspired to use perjured testimony to secure plaintiffs' convictions). Accordingly, the ADAs are entitled to absolute immunity from this claim. 46