Opinion ID: 4123854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amount of the Bank-Fraud Loss

Text: Pielsticker challenges the district court’s finding that the Bank suffered $11,464,560.08 in bank-fraud loss, arguing that this amount lacks evidentiary support. Based on the Bank’s May 1, 2015 victim-impact statement, the PSR calculated $11,464,560.08 in loss. In response, Pielsticker objected to the Bank’s “bare conclusion of its loss, without any supporting back-up.” Appellant App. vol. 4 at 672. He also objected to the PSR, mentioning that the Bank had asserted different loss amounts over time and questioning whether the Bank had reduced its claim by legitimate invoice amounts and collections after the fraud. In its revised PSR, the probation office rejected Pielsticker’s objection, explaining in an addendum that the Bank’s loss calculations had decreased after “accounting for recourses and payment of legitimate invoices.” Appellant App. vol. 5 at 919. The probation office acknowledged that the Bank’s loss calculation had fluctuated, but noted that the calculated losses averaged $12,284,523. Had the record ended here, we might sympathize more with Pielsticker’s position. But instead the record shows that four days before Pielsticker’s October 8, 2015 sentencing, Pielsticker’s counsel entered into a “Stipulation Regarding Testimony of [the Bank] Representatives” to enable the court to accept the stipulation’s contents as the Bank’s testimony in lieu of having a representative 11 testify.5 Appellant App. vol. 3 at 621. Included within this testimony was the following: During the course of the scheme, Arrow submitted false invoices to [the Bank] totaling at least $20,900,000. As a result, [the Bank] suffered a loss of at least $11,400,000. This is a conservative calculation of [the Bank’s] losses resulting directly from the Accounts Receivable . . . . This loss takes into account all collection activity, including collateral obtained after Arrow closed. Appellant App. vol. 3 at 622. This testimony supports the district court’s bank-fraud loss finding by bolstering the Bank’s victim-impact statement with testimony. Using a “conservative calculation,” the Bank’s written testimony estimates the Bank’s losses near the Bank’s slightly higher6 figure in its victim-impact statement from four months earlier. Appellant App. vol. 3 at 623. And, because Pielsticker stipulated to the written statement as the Bank’s testimony, the district court was entitled to rely on it as evidence. United States v. Spann, 515 F.2d 579, 580-83 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating 5 At oral argument, Pielsticker’s counsel cryptically justified the decision to stipulate but later maintain his present position as being for tactical reasons. Oral Argument at 4:30-4:32. Whatever tactical reason Pielsticker had for stipulating—to require a remand for a more precise calculation?—his stipulation certainly means that he chose not to cross-examine the Bank’s witnesses about the bases for their loss figure. His stipulating led to his present complaint—and hurt the district court’s ability to hear more precise information on loss. 6 For some reason, the Bank, in the written testimony stipulated for admission to the district court, rounded its losses to $11.4 million, rather than use the more precise $11,464,560.08 given in its victim-impact statement and used in the PSR. The Bank’s written testimony described its rounded number as a “conservative estimate.” Appellant App. vol. 3 at 623. 12 that a jury may rely on testimony admitted into evidence by the parties’ stipulation in reaching its decision). Now Pielsticker attacks the Bank’s written testimony as unreliable for stating an unsupported conclusion. He argues that to calculate the bank-fraud losses properly, the district court would need to analyze each of the “hundreds, if not thousands, of inflated invoices” for fraud, for recourse payments, and for any other collections. Appellant Opening Br. at 46. In other words, Pielsticker challenges the worth of the very evidence he stipulated be admitted at sentencing. By stipulating and forfeiting any cross-examination of live testimony from Bank witnesses, Pielsticker deprived the district court, and us, of the Bank’s proof in response. In this circumstance, with the Bank’s written testimony properly before it, the district court had a sufficient basis to establish guideline loss. See United States v. Abbo, 515 F. App’x 764, 770 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (stating that a stipulation to admit into evidence a witness’s testimony in lieu of live testimony “waive[s] any right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence on foundational grounds”) (citing United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2004)). Because the district court properly received the Bank’s written testimony, the district court could rely on it in making its bank-fraud loss calculation.