Opinion ID: 760827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court's Trial Decisions

Text: 11 Frito-Lay makes three arguments about the charge given to the jury at the end of the trial. First, the Company complains that the district court used a general verdict form 2 rather than either a special verdict under FED.R.CIV.P. 49(a) or a general verdict with interrogatories under Rule 49(b). The language of both prongs of the rule is explicitly permissive, which leaves the decision within the sound discretion of the trial court. There is some disagreement in this circuit as to our standard of review. Compare Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir.1995) (reviewing the decision for abuse of discretion) (citing Portage II v. Bryant Petroleum Corp., 899 F.2d 1514, 1520 (6th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865, 116 S.Ct. 179, 133 L.Ed.2d 118 (1995), with Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013, 1020-21 (6th Cir.1990) ([T]he form of jury verdict is within the discretion of the trial judge, and is not ordinarily reviewable.) (citing Lummus Industries, Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 273 (Fed.Cir.1988)). 3 Generally matters that are committed to the sound discretion of the district court are reviewed by the court of appeals for abuse of discretion. We need not resolve the issue here, however, because even applying the less deferential standard to review the decision, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in choosing to submit a general verdict form to the jury. We note, however, that the complicated nature of ADA claims makes special interrogatories worth consideration by district courts: in this case, they might well have shed light on how the jury reached its verdict as it made its way through ADA law (for instance, which prong of disability applied) and thereby could have aided the district court, as well as this court, in reviewing the verdict. Moreover, Rule 49 seems to have been implemented with these purposes in mind. 4 12 Frito-Lay next argues that the district court erroneously charged the jury on issues that had been resolved by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district court prior to trial: specifically, whether a continuous presence on the production line is an essential function of Workman's job, and whether she could perform this job without an accommodation. At the defendant's objection, the district judge explained that he adopted only the conclusions of the magistrate judge's report and not its findings of fact. J.A. at 414 (Tr. Trial at 234). The district court used these words in its order of adoption: The Court has independently reviewed the Magistrate Judge's findings and conclusions, as well as the objections and the entire record. The objections are overruled. The conclusions of the Magistrate Judge in the Report and Recommendation are adopted and approved. R: 44 (Order). Typically, a district court will adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 5 in a magistrate judge's report; significantly, the district judge adopted the conclusions alone. The magistrate judge's report recommended granting summary judgment to the defendant on the state law claim and sending the ADA claim to trial, and it is these conclusions that the court adopted. The federal and state statutes use different language, and the ADA utilizes several particular terms of art, including essential functions and reasonable accommodation, which are properly before a jury deciding an ADA claim. In contrast to the THRA, an employer may still violate the ADA if the employee can perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Such a determination required the type of instructions given by the district judge; in any case, he did not abuse his discretion by providing them. 13 Frito-Lay also complains that the district court neglected to offer an instruction to the jury on its defense of good faith. In fact, the jury instructions include a charge on the affirmative defense of good faith, J.A. at 94, 100 (Jury Charge at 13, 19), and in a later brief, the defendant recharacterizes its objection to the instruction as failing to mention the effect that such a finding by the jury would have on the relief available to Plaintiff. Third Br. of Defendant-Appellant at 8 (emphasis in original). That is, the defendant contends that a finding of good faith bars an award of compensatory damages. The fact that the jury found Frito-Lay liable necessarily precludes the possibility that they adopted the Company's good faith defense, however, because it is a defense to liability. In addition, the jury did not award compensatory damages, making the error, if any, harmless and the effect about which defendant was concerned a non-issue. This court need only determine whether the [jury] charge, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately submits the issues and applicable law to the jury on this issue, see Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d at 606 (internal quotation omitted), and after reviewing the charge as a whole, we conclude that it does. 14 Workman for her part complains about two district court decisions to exclude documents from trial. First, the district court decided to exclude as untimely documents referencing certain benefits to which Workman is allegedly entitled, because the documents were not turned over in discovery but instead produced the day before trial. J.A. at 455. We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to admit them at that late date. 6 The second set of documents were offered in support of Workman's claims for retaliation and punitive damages. Because the opinion of the court resolves these claims adversely to Workman (see post ), there will be no trial on them and it is unnecessary to reach the issue here.