Opinion ID: 187095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Text: Instead of suing the foreign state of Israel, something prohibited by the FSIA in the absence of allegation of any of the statutory exceptions, Plaintiffs sued a retired Israeli general with at most a tangential relationship to the events at issue who made a convenient visit to the District of Columbia. But the FSIA is not written so narrowly as to exclude all but foreign states in name. It applies to foreign states, their political subdivisions, and their agencies and instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C. § § 1603-04. Furthermore, [a]n individual can qualify as an `agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.' El-Fadl, 75 F.3d at 671 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990)). An individual qualifies for this immunity when he acts in his official capacity for the state. See Jungguist, 115 F.3d at 1027. The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs have only alleged acts done in General Ya'alon's official capacity and have in no instance alleged acts that were either personal or private in nature. See id. at 1028 (finding that the district court reasonably concluded that defendant's actions were personal and private rather than official in nature based in part on a statement by the defendant's superior that if he had done the alleged acts he would take him for a walk in the desert  meaning kill him). According to the complaint, at the time of the shelling in Qana, General Ya'alon was Head of Army Intelligence for the IDF and was acting under the actual or apparent authority and/or color of law of the State of Israel. Compl. ¶ 98. Appellants further alleged that he had command responsibility for the attack. Id. ¶ 2. Nothing in the complaint indicates that General Ya'alon took part in any events related to the shelling of Qana that were outside his official authority and role as the head of intelligence for the IDF. In cases involving foreign sovereign immunity, it is also appropriate to look to statements of the foreign state that either authorize or ratify the acts at issue to determine whether the defendant committed the alleged acts in an official capacity. See, e.g., Jungguist, 115 F.3d at 1025 (noting affidavits submitted to the district court to help determine whether the defendant was entitled to foreign sovereign immunity); see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir.1994) (citing a letter from the Philippine government urging the court to exercise jurisdiction over its former leader and holding that Marcos' acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly acts outside of his authority as President); Doe I v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1285-87 (N.D.Cal.2004) (looking to both public proclamations and documents produced by the People's Republic of China (PRC)). In fact, it is incumbent upon the court to engage in sufficient pretrial factual and legal determinations to satisfy itself of its authority to hear the case when a party claims it is entitled to foreign sovereign immunity. Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1027-28 (internal quotations omitted). Here, the Israeli ambassador to the United States transmitted a letter stating that General Ya'alon's alleged acts were done in the course of [his] official duties, and in furtherance of the official policies of the State of Israel. To allow a suit against [this] former official[] is to allow a suit against Israel itself. This is a case  anticipated by those who enacted the TVPA  in which the state admit[s] some knowledge or authorization of relevant acts. 138 Cong. Rec. S2667-04, S2668 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992) (statement of Sen. Specter on passage of the, TVPA). In light of the absence of any indication in the complaint that General Ya'alon acted outside his scope of authority and the Israeli ambassador's statement that his actions were within the authority given to him by the State of Israel, General Ya'alon qualifies for the immunity provided by the FSIA. Upon review of their complaint it appears that appellants pleaded themselves out of court. The complaint identifies nothing that General Ya'alon is alleged to have done in an individual capacity, or other than as an agent or instrumentality of the state of Israel. Indeed, the complaint alleges nothing that General Ya'alon did at all. The factual allegations of tortious conduct all concern acts allegedly done by the military of the state of Israel in the conduct of hostile operations. The personal liability of General Ya'alon seems to be entirely based on the proposition that the defendant, acting singly and in concert with others, conducted a military operation which was rather plainly on behalf of the state of Israel. The complaint alleges nothing that appellee allegedly did himself. Indeed, the critical portions of the complaint alleging specific wrongful acts. by Ya'alon which allegedly caused the harm to the plaintiffs all consist of claims that at a time when Ya'alon knew or should have known that Lebanese civilians sought shelter in the United Nations compound, he did nothing to prevent it. Since there is nothing in an individual capacity that Ya'alon or any other individual not acting as an agent of the Israeli government could have done to stop the military actions of the IDF, on the face of plaintiffs' complaint it is apparent that any argument that he acted in an individual capacity rendering him unprotected by the FSIA is meritless. We have no difficulty in holding that the district court properly ruled that the FSIA does not extend jurisdiction over this action against an officer for actions committed by the state in whose army he served.