Opinion ID: 1771560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: STATE v. OWEN

Text: This Court in Long v. State, 517 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla.1987), held that if in the course of custodial interrogation a suspect makes an utterance that may be an attempt to invoke his or her rights, police may continue questioning for the sole purpose of clarifying the equivocal request. Subsequent to Long, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), held that if a suspect initially waives his or her rights, the suspect thereafter must clearly invoke those rights during the ensuing interview. That Court based its ruling on the following rationale: [T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. [F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process. [ Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).] A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460-61, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). This Court was then faced in State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 574, 139 L.Ed.2d 413 (1997), with the issue of whether to adopt the Davis rationale in Florida. The defendant in Owen had initially waived his Miranda [6] rights and during the ensuing interrogation session made two equivocal statements. First, when one of the detectives asked whether he had deliberately targeted the victim's house, Owen responded, I'd rather not talk about it. Later, when the officer asked him where he had put a bicycle, Owen said, I don't want to talk about it. In both statements it was unclear whether Owen was referring to the immediate topic of discussion, i.e., the house and the bicycle, or to the underlying right to cut off questioning. Officers did not stop to clarify either statement. The district court affirmed the trial court's order suppressing the confession but certified to this Court a question asking whether Davis was applicable in Florida. This Court answered in the affirmative and held as follows: Thus, we hold that police in Florida need not ask clarifying questions if a defendant who has received proper Miranda warnings makes only an equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate an interrogation after having validly waived his or her Miranda rights. Owen, 696 So.2d at 719. We quashed the district court decision. The impetus underlying our decision in Owen was that the equivocal request standard announced in Long had proven unworkableit placed too great an impediment upon society's interest in thwarting crime. Owen, 696 So.2d at 719. Custodial utterances are extraordinarily rich in diversity and include not only statements affirmatively invoking a suspect's rights but also statements prefatory to the invoking of a right. Police under Long were required to stop an interview and clarify each such statement that was equivocal in any way. This rule resulted in otherwise admissible confessions being suppressed based on the most tenuous statements. In Owen, we were confronted with an utterance of the first type, i.e., a statement allegedly invoking a right, and our ruling was simple: In such a case, the suspect must invoke the right clearly. [7] That issue is not presented in the instant case. Here, we are confronted with a custodial utterance that was prefatory toand possibly determinative ofthe invoking of a right. In analyzing the present utterance, we first must ascertain whether Almeida was in fact referring to his right to counsel. As noted above, Detective Mink asked Almeida, Do you wish to speak to me now without an attorney present? and Almeida replied, Well, what good is an attorney going to do? Almeida's utterance was made under the following conditions: (1) at the very beginning of the taped interrogation session; (2) in the midst of a general discussion concerning his rights; and (3) in direct response to a police question concerning the right to counsel. In light of these circumstances, it is indisputable that the defendant was referring to his right to counsel. [8] We next must determine whether the utterance was a bona fide question whichunder normal circumstances would call for an answer. The audio taped version of the encounter sheds further light on the exchange. On the tape, Almeida had answered each of the preceding questions without hesitation and without equivocation, and then, when asked the above question, he came to an abrupt halt, paused for many seconds (about 5 seconds on the tape), and made a pensive, probing response: Well ... [pause] ... what ... [another pause] ... good is an attorney going to do? It was a genuine question. It was not a rumination or a rhetorical question. [9] Almeida was seeking a frank answer. The officers, however, ignored the question and never attempted to give an answer. This scenario is not embraced within our holding in Owen. The type of utterance at issue in Owen was an equivocal statement whichpursuant to Davis required no clarification and could not trump the clear waiver of rights Owen had made earlier. The type of utterance at issue here, on the other hand, was an un equivocal question that was prefatory toand possibly determinative ofthe invoking of a right and which cast doubt on the knowing and intelligent nature of the prior waiver. Detective Mink plainly asked Almeida if he wanted to proceed without a lawyer, and Almeida just as plainly asked the officer what good a lawyer would do. There was nothing equivocal about this exchange and certainly nothing unclear about Almeida's questionit was a simple, direct question, susceptible of but a single interpretation. Almeida very clearly was asking the officer for fundamental information concerning his right to counsel.