Opinion ID: 1281413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Instructions on Sympathy and General Character/Background Evidence

Text: (53) Defendant argues that the jury was misinstructed on the proper role of sympathy and general character/background evidence in the penalty phase. In reviewing such claim, we examine the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether the jury was adequately informed of the proper scope of mitigating evidence. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538, 546 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943] (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.); see Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-115 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537, 544, fn. 17; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, & fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) We have undertaken such a review, and conclude that the jury was not misled regarding its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. First, the jury was not instructed at the penalty phase with the nosympathy language embodied in CALJIC No. 1.00. (Compare People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537, vacated sub nom. California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538 [wherein the high court held that the giving of the California standard antisympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) at the penalty phase is not unconstitutional per se].) Next, defendant argues that the giving of CALJIC No. 1.00 at the guilt phase  with its standard no-sympathy admonition  may have had a prejudicial carryover effect at the penalty phase. We have rejected this identical argument in previous cases. (See People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1209; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 102.) There is no indication in this record that the jury was misled into applying the antisympathy guilt phase instruction at the penalty phase. ( Miranda, supra, at p. 102; cf. People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 784-786.) Nor was there Easley error in this case. In Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, we found section 190.3, factor (k) (reproduced in former CALJIC No. 8.84.1) constitutionally infirm in that it spoke only of a circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime. We therefore imposed the prospective requirement that trial courts  in instructing on the factor embodied in section 190.3, [factor] (k)  should inform the jury that it may consider as a mitigating factor `any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime' and any other `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( Id., at p. 878, fn. 10.) Here the trial court modified the factor (k) language in former CALJIC No. 8.84.1 to read: Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, including but not limited to the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition, and physical condition. (Italics added.) The instruction, as modified, adequately addressed our concerns set forth in Easley. Moreover, in response to the jury's question during penalty phase deliberations asking for further definitions of the terms aggravating and mitigating, the court informed the jury that mitigation includes circumstances that do not amount to a justification or excuse of the offense or act in question, but may properly be considered in mitigation or reduction of the punishment [13] Lastly, we have scrutinized the prosecutor's penalty phase arguments and find nothing therein which nullified the effect of the proper instructions. The prosecutor argued there was a proper place for compassion in the penalty deliberations. He reread the modified catchall factor (k) instruction and suggested to the jury [i]t is a pretty broad section.... And he discussed the testimony of the defense witnesses who sought to present mitigating evidence of defendant's general character and background.