Opinion ID: 187172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factual posture

Text: When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If we determine there is a genuine dispute concerning a material fact, which makes the case unsuitable for summary judgment, then we remand the case to the district court to resolve the factual issue. Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 339 (D.C.Cir.2006). In this case, unlike the district court, we do not merely assume the truth of Venetian's allegations: Their truth has been established. Although the details of the Commission's disclosure policy are still unclear, the record leaves no doubt the Commission has a policy of disclosing confidential information without notice to the submitter. Venetian so asserted in its statement of undisputed facts before the district court and, although the Commission made several ambiguous statements, it never denied Venetian's description of the agency's policy. Here are the Commission's assertions, in chronological order:  Inzeo asserted in his Declaration, and the Commission in its brief confirms, Neither version of section 83 of the Compliance Manual applies to ADEA or [Equal Pay Act] charge files. We find this statement incredible inasmuch as § 83.1(a) of both the 1987 and the 1992 Manuals explicitly applies to ADEA files, and those are the very provisions Venetian challenges as unlawful.  Inzeo also asserted in his Declaration that the Commission does not violate the Trade Secrets Act. This is a legal conclusion and is not responsive to Venetian's claim that the Commission will disclose without notice information Venetian has labeled confidential.  In its statement of undisputed facts before the district court, the Commission asserted, The provisions of Section 83 speak for themselves. This is, to say the least, surprising in light of this court's having previously found it unclear what the disputed provision in the revised Manual means. Venetian II, 409 F.3d at 367. In any event, § 83 permits disclosure as authorized by the Commission's regulations implementing the Privacy Act, which in turn permits disclosure without notice as may be appropriate or necessary to perform the Commission's functions under the [ADEA]. Such an openended statement of policy casts no doubt upon Venetian's allegation. When directly questioned about the disclosure policy at oral argument, counsel for the Commission conceded employees of the Commission might disclose confidential information without notice: Counsel: If the agency thought that the information had any chance of actually being [a trade secret] then they would tee up some sort of notice provision or something to ... create a decision as to whether the information was confidential commercial information. The Court: What if you think it's not? ... Counsel: Then they would take their chances as to whether they're complying with the Trade Secrets Act. (Oral Arg., 21:26-21:56). Counsel later reaffirmed this policy as follows: The Court: If a submitter marks a document as confidential ... what happens? ... Counsel: [T]he agency would need to decide whether it was going to refrain on the basis that ... it might actually be... trade secret information. The agency could say the claim is obviously preposterous and proceed ... or the agency could send out notice to the submitter. (Oral Arg., 26:25-27:18). In sum, the Commission has never denied Venetian's allegations, even when styled as statements of undisputed fact, and counsel for the Commission conceded their essential truth at oral argument. On this record it is clear the Commission has a policy of disclosing confidential information without notice; we proceed to the question whether that policy is lawful.