Opinion ID: 1275885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gunwall Analysis of Disturbance of Private Affairs Under Article I, Section 7

Text: In State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986), we adopted six criteria to employ in determining whether WASH. CONST. art I, § 7 provides greater protection to Washington citizens than the Fourth Amendment: (1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of state or local concern. As we noted in State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173, 179-80, 867 P.2d 593 (1994), examination of the first, second, third, and fifth criteria all lead to the conclusion that article I, section 7 provides greater protection of privacy than the Fourth Amendment. Thus, it is not necessary to reexamine those criteria here. State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 576, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). Likewise, because state law enforcement measures are a matter of local concern, Young, 123 Wash.2d at 180, 867 P.2d 593, it is not necessary to analyze the sixth criterion. Only the fourth criterion, preexisting state law, warrants examination in this case. No Washington case has discussed whether Hodari D. comports with Washington law. The Court of Appeals in this case simply adopted Hodari D. without substantial discussion. [7] Previous Washington cases adopted the Mendenhall test of a seizure to analyze a disturbance of a person's private affairs under article I, section 7: A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.... There is a seizure when, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. State v. Stroud, 30 Wash.App. 392, 394-95, 634 P.2d 316 (1981) (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)), review denied, 96 Wash.2d 1025 (1982); accord State v. Thorn, 129 Wash.2d 347, 351-52, 917 P.2d 108 (1996). Washington search and seizure law stemming from Terry and proceeding through Mendenhall is well-established. Were we to adopt Hodari D. and its new definition of seizure for a disturbance of private affairs under article I, section 7, we would be departing from our precedents and the greater protection of privacy afforded Washington citizens under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Given the erosion of privacy the Hodari D. decision entails, we adhere to our established jurisprudence and reject application of the test for a seizure articulated in Hodari D. to a disturbance of private affairs under article I, section 7. D. Article I, Section 7 in this Case Like those asserting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, State v. Thorn, 129 Wash.2d 347, 354, 917 P.2d 108 (1996), Young has the burden of proving a disturbance of his private affairs under article I, section 7. Young maintains being illuminated with the police car spotlight constituted a seizure. Further, because the seizure was without probable cause, the subsequent recovery of the imitation controlled substance was unlawful, and the evidence of it should be suppressed. Because the police did not apply physical force to Young, the seizure question becomes, was the illumination by the spotlight such a show of authority that a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to leave. That Young actually did leave makes no difference; the test is objective. Young asserts he had a privacy interest in being free to move about in a public place without being accosted by the police. Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 6. As noted above, however, the police are permitted to engage persons in conversation and ask for identification even in the absence of an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. The amicus brief the Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and American Civil Liberties Union jointly filed goes too far in asserting, This Court, under Article I § 7, cannot allow police this unfettered discretion to direct their power towards a person who is doing nothing more than exercising his right to walk down the street unhindered by government authority. Amicus Br. at 12. Article I, section 7 does not forbid social contacts between police and citizens: [A] police officer's conduct in engaging a defendant in conversation in a public place and asking for identification does not, alone, raise the encounter to an investigative detention. State v. Armenta, 134 Wash.2d 1, 11, 948 P.2d 1280 (1997). This view comports with the Supreme Court's statement in Mendenhall that not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is an intrusion requiring an objective justification. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. at 1876. The Mendenhall Court also said, Moreover, characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a `seizure,' while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. Id. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. Thus, it is well-established that [e]ffective law enforcement techniques not only require passive police observation, but also necessitate their interaction with citizens on the streets. Tucker, 642 A.2d at 406 (police are more than mere spectators) (quoting People v. Mamon, 435 Mich. 1, 457 N.W.2d 623, 628 (1990)). In Thorn, for example, a law enforcement officer, armed and in full uniform, who asked the defendant in a parked car at night Where's the pipe? did not seize the defendant. The question Young raises is whether illumination with a police car spotlight transcends a permissible interaction between the police and a citizen and rises to the level of a seizure. Young cites no cases to support his position. He simply argues the shining of the spotlight was an intrusion into his protected privacy interests. Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 6-9. The State cites Mendenhall for a list of examples of a show of authority: Examples of circumstance that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.... In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55, 100 S.Ct. at 1877 (citations omitted). When Carpenter completed his social contact with Young, he had no knowledge of Young's criminal history. He drove down the street and determined from a criminal history records check, that Young had a substantial history of police contacts for drug-related incidents. This new information raised his concern about Young. Carpenter then noticed Young peering down the street in an apparent attempt to see where the deputy was, behavior suggesting Young was checking to see if the coast was clear. These two new facts motivated Carpenter to turn his vehicle around and proceed back toward Young. These events occurred in an area known for high drug-related activity. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy acted reasonably in seeking to renew his contact with Young. The shining of the spotlight in this case does not rise to the level of intrusiveness discussed in Mendenhall. Carpenter did not have his siren or emergency lights on. No weapon was drawn. The police car did not come screeching to a halt near Young. Young was on a public street in public view. The shining of the light on him revealed only what was already in plain view, Young's person, and not anything he wished to keep private. The deputy did not see the contraband until Young disposed of it. In Young, this court explained that `what is voluntarily exposed to the general public' is not considered part of a person's private affairs. State v. Goucher, 124 Wash.2d 778, 784, 881 P.2d 210 (1994) (quoting Young, 123 Wash.2d at 182, 867 P.2d 593). [8] The illumination by the spotlight did not amount to such a show of authority a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to leave, not free simply to keep on walking or continue with whatever activity he or she was then engaged in, until some positive command from Carpenter issued. To rule as Young requests that the shining of a spotlight was, in effect, a per se violation of article I, section 7 would call into question legitimate police patrol functions at night where the spotlight is a necessary tool to illuminate a scene. Mere illumination alone, without additional indicia of authority, does not violate the Washington Constitution. There was no disturbance of private affairs under article I, section 7 here.