Opinion ID: 792181
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Standard Applied by the District Court

Text: 21 Valdez argues that the district court's refusal to depart downward rested on its use of the improper standard, namely the standard for an insanity defense. To support this argument, Valdez points to the court's numerous discussions as to whether the defendant knew right from wrong. While we agree that knowledge of right from wrong would have been an incorrect standard, we think Valdez mischaracterizes the standard the court, in fact, applied. The record indicates that the court considered Valdez's knowledge of right from wrong in order to inform its ultimate finding that Valdez was not suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity [that] . . . contributed substantially to the commission of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. Consequently, we understand the district court to have applied the proper standard. 22 Immediately prior to its ruling on the departure, Valdez's counsel informed the district court that Valdez's ability to differentiate between right and wrong did not prohibit the court from exercising its discretion to downwardly depart. In response, the district court judge said that he could not find Valdez's impairment was severe in light of the psychiatrist's testimony, Valdez's extensive involvement in the fraud, and defendant's ability to process complex information. Specifically, the district court relied on the fact that Valdez manipulated others by posing as another person, committed the offense for which he was charged over 1,000 times, and in order to do that kept track of hundreds of calling card numbers. The district court also reasoned that despite Valdez's diagnosis of agoraphobia, he chose to work and did so successfully in crowded bus terminals, and that he exhibited no symptoms of bipolar disorder. 23 A defendant's understanding of reprehensibility falls along a continuum and his comprehension need not land in the abyss to justify a departure. But in asking whether defendant knew right from wrong, the district court elicited responses that allowed it to assess at which point along the continuum Valdez's understanding fell. Valdez's psychiatrist's response to this question was that Valdez knew right from wrong, yet the psychiatrist also elaborated that Valdez did not fully understand the degree of wrongfulness or the consequences of his actions. Moreover, in its final statements on the issue the district court gave additional reasons why defendant's mental condition did not severely impair his ability to understand wrongfulness, indicating that its ruling did not hinge upon whether Valdez knew right from wrong. 24 A case where we expressed doubt about whether the district court understood its authority to depart downward stands in contrast to the circumstances here. See Zedner, 401 F.3d at 52-53. There we vacated the district court sentence for having conflated the standard for diminished mental capacity with the standard for failure to form criminal intent. We ruled instead that the Guidelines leave open the possibility that a defendant could have acted with criminal intent so as to be guilty of the crime, while at the same time suffering from a diminished mental capacity that would justify departure. Id. 25 Here the district court never implied that a complete inability to understand the difference between right and wrong would satisfy the requirements for a departure. To the contrary, it recognized the defendant would have an insanity defense under 18 U.S.C. § 17(a), which requires that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts, if such was the case. This comment indicates that the district court understood the difference in degree of impairment between the standard required for a downward departure on a diminished mental capacity ground and that required for an insanity defense.