Opinion ID: 202855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Request for Entrapment Instruction and Preclusion from Arguing Entrapment at Closing

Text: Teleguz's primary argument is that he was entitled to an entrapment instruction because the evidence shows that Ortiz was an insistent buyer who was doggedly persistent, and this amounted to improper inducement of Teleguz. Teleguz also argues that the district court erred in precluding him from arguing entrapment to the jury at closing. Teleguz preserved his objections at trial; we review the denial of the entrapment instruction de novo, United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76 (1st Cir.2005), and review the limitations placed on defendant's closing argument for abuse of discretion, United States v. Wood, 982 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1992). The entrapment defense is not a doctrine of constitutional dimension or one expressly created by statute. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432-33, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); see also United States v. Luisi, 482 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir.2007). Rather, it is a judicially created doctrine which recognizes that Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). The question is whether a reasonable jury could view the evidence as establishing that defendant was entrapped. See United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir.1988). If so, Teleguz was entitled to an entrapment instruction; if not, there was no error in the district court's denial of defendant's request. The entrapment defense consists of two prongs. Luisi, 482 F.3d at 52. The first prong requires a showing of improper government inducement. United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1998). The second prong requires that the defendant have had a lack of predisposition to commit the offense. Id. Because entrapment is a judicially created doctrine, courts have been careful not to contravene congressional intent to punish those who commit the offense; that, in turn, requires that the doctrine take into account the practical problems faced by federal law enforcement. See Luisi, 482 F.3d at 52-53. Our case law stating that a defendant has a low entry-level burden for obtaining an entrapment instruction, Gamache, 156 F.3d at 9, should not be misunderstood (as defendant here misunderstands). In assessing whether the entry-level burden for an instruction has been met, we look at the evidence most charitably to the defendant and determine whether it is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was entrapment. See Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 813. In this case, no reasonable jury could conclude that there was any improper government inducement. Defendant's argument is based on an erroneous understanding of (1) what it takes to show improper inducement, (2) the personal nature of the entrapment defense, and (3) the scope of the record to be considered. Acceptance of Teleguz's arguments would so water down the concept of improper inducement as to delete the requirement of impropriety from the equation. Admittedly, sometimes a judgment on what is sufficient to make a plausible claim of improper inducement can be a close call. Nonetheless, merely giving a defendant an opportunity to commit a crime when the government puts forth an enthusiastic and persistent buyer of illicit goods cannot be improper inducement. Decisions which discuss the improper inducement requirement often use the phrase that there must be opportunity plus, and then turn to the nature of the plus. See, e.g., United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 243 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Vega, 102 F.3d 1301, 1305 (1st Cir.1996). Plucking phrases from the case law, Teleguz argues that the plus factor is necessarily satisfied by evidence of government manipulation or by forceful solicitation and dogged insistence. He cites United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir.1994), for support. Gendron, however, is clear that sting operations ordinarily do not involve improper inducement. See id. at 961; see also Gamache, 156 F.3d at 9 (A `sting' operation is not improper inducement if it merely provides an opportunity to commit a crime. . . .). Indeed, sting operations by their nature often involve government manipulation, solicitation, and, at times, deceit. See, e.g., Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d at 71-72, 76-77. Teleguz's argument that the evidence supported an entrapment instruction rests on evidence to the following effect. Teleguz argues that it was the government agent [1] Ortiz who first approached Teleguz and the co-defendants about purchasing firearms. Teleguz also maintains that Ortiz was not simply a buyer; he pretended to befriend several of the defendants. Ortiz pressed hard to get a number of weapons from co-defendants, and to get them quickly. Further, defendant says Ortiz made up stories about why he needed the weapons and why he needed them so quickly. These facts, however, whether standing alone or collectively, are insufficient to show improper inducement. Most of the evidence on which Teleguz relies to show undue pressure was directed toward co-defendants, and was not designed to induce the co-defendants to put pressure on Teleguz. Entrapment is a personal defense; it is not additive to cover co-defendants not targeted by the government agent. See Luisi, 482 F.3d at 54-55; United States v. Bradley, 820 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.1987). The justification for the entrapment doctrine simply does not extend to pressure placed on co-defendants intended to affect only those co-defendants' actions. [2] In the larger context of this case, the basis for an entrapment instruction is even weaker. Before Ortiz and Teleguz met for the first time on June 24, 2002 at Teleguz's home, Ortiz had already bought two rifles from co-defendants Buynovskiy and Zhernov, one of which had been previously owned by defendant. In total, Ortiz completed eight firearms transactions with Teleguz and his co-defendants. Over the course of these transactions, Ortiz and Teleguz had three face-to-face meetings. As the district court noted, when Ortiz visited defendant's house in Pennsylvania, Teleguz stated almost immediately that he was ready to do business. Within approximately one hour, Teleguz had sold Ortiz four firearms. Two months later, on August 25, 2002, the defendant traveled to Massachusetts and personally sold Ortiz eight firearms. Five days later, he sold Ortiz another two firearms, also in Massachusetts. There is no showing of any resistance on Teleguz's part to selling weapons, much less any resistance which was overcome by improper government pressure. Defendant was an eager vendor of deadly weapons. Having considered the broader record, we agree that Teleguz did not make the requisite entry-level showing for an entrapment instruction. Cf. United States v. Joost, 92 F.3d 7, 12-14 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that defendant was entitled to entrapment instruction where jury could have found, inter alia, that defendant resisted agents' requests, defendant employed a general strategy of deflecting agents' requests, agents deliberately created a financial dependency, and agents threatened defendant's continued income). The district court properly denied defendant's request for an instruction on entrapment. As to the district court's decision to preclude Teleguz from arguing entrapment at closing, we find no abuse of discretion. See Wood, 982 F.2d at 4. The trial court has broad discretion over the scope of summations. United States v. Grabiec, 96 F.3d 549, 552 (1st Cir.1996). After the close of evidence, having already correctly determined that Teleguz was not entitled to an entrapment instruction, the district court informed defense counsel that he would be precluded from arguing entrapment in his closing argument. Defense counsel initially believed that the district court had prohibited him from arguing neutral facts that had been developed in relation to the desired entrapment defense. The court clarified, however, that it was only prohibiting defense counsel from arguing a theory of entrapment; there was no limitation on arguing facts. The district court's decision was well within its discretion. B. Denial of Motion To Dismiss, on Interstate Commerce Grounds, Charges of Possession of a Firearm with an Obliterated Serial Number The district court denied Teleguz's pretrial motion to dismiss the charges brought against him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). Teleguz argues that dismissal of the charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) was required both because § 922(k) involves an impermissible exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers, and because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under the statute. Our review of legal questions is de novo, and we review the entire record on Teleguz's sufficiency claim. See United States v. Garcia-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Rodriguez, 457 F.3d 109, 113 (1st Cir.2006). Section 922(k) prohibits possession of firearms with obliterated or altered serial numbers. [3] The statutory text requires proof that the firearm has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. [4] We have already held that § 922(k) is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. See Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d at 953. Teleguz argues, however, that in light of the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Jones, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902, and Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658, we should revisit Diaz-Martinez and hold that evidence that a firearm was manufactured in one state and possessed by defendant in another state is insufficient to justify a conviction under § 922(k). Teleguz mixes the question of Congress's power to regulate with the different question of sufficiency of the evidence. Our opinion in Diaz-Martinez, which was decided after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), [5] remains good law. Other circuits, post- Lopez, have upheld § 922(k) against similar attacks. See United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 563 (10th Cir.2000); United States v. Mack, 164 F.3d 467, 473 (9th Cir.1999). Indeed, our sister circuits have held that virtually identical interstate commerce elements in other federal criminal statutes survive challenges under Jones and Morrison. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 359 F.3d 470, 480 (7th Cir.) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 844, 125 S.Ct. 285, 160 L.Ed.2d 71 (2004); United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir.) (reaffirming constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(1)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1013, 122 S.Ct. 503, 151 L.Ed.2d 413 (2001); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 584-86 (10th Cir.2000) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 986, 121 S.Ct. 1635, 149 L.Ed.2d 495 (2001); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 400-02 (6th Cir.2000) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)). The reasoning for upholding § 922(k) in the aftermath of Jones and Morrison is the same as that provided in the cases cited above. Congress has not exceeded the scope of its Commerce Clause powers in enacting § 922(k) because the statute prohibits the possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers only if such firearms have been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. So restricted by its own text, § 922(k) does not present a constitutional problem  Congress may permissibly regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624; United States v. Morales-De Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir.2004). From the constitutional analysis, it follows that the evidence was sufficient. The prosecution offered expert testimony that twenty-two of the twenty-five firearms at issue necessarily had crossed state or foreign lines because they were originally manufactured in other states or countries. The interstate commerce argument is especially misplaced here, where Teleguz traveled from his home in Pennsylvania, across a number of state lines, to sell firearms to Ortiz in Massachusetts. C. Denial of Motions To Suppress Post-Arrest Statement After defendant had signed a voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights, ATF agent Bernie Tuerler asked Teleguz how many illegal guns he had and how many illegal guns he had sold. Defendant did not respond. Teleguz was then asked who removed the serial numbers and reblued [6] the guns which he sold. Teleguz answered, Well, Alex is the one who reblued the guns and removed the serial numbers. Only then did defendant say, I think I'm going to get a lawyer. [7] The district court denied defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress the statement that Alex was the one who reblued the guns and removed the serial numbers. [8] The court similarly denied defendant's preadmission and post-admission suppression motions at trial. The court noted that the agent's questions were put to Teleguz in fairly quick succession and concluded that defendant's mere hesitation or non-response to previous questions did not justify suppression. Our appellate review of the denials of defendant's motions is bifurcated. We review findings of fact for clear error; we review conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir.2006). Teleguz argues that there was a Miranda violation and relies on the facts that (1) just before he made the challenged statement he had not answered Tuerler's questions about how many illegal guns he had and how many illegal guns he had sold, and (2) just after the statement he said, I think I'm going to get a lawyer. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Teleguz argues that his silence in response to questions about the number of illegal guns was tantamount to the invocation of his right to remain silent, and that his subsequent invocation of his right to an attorney confirms that his earlier state of mind in not answering questions was to exercise his Miranda rights, his prior written waiver notwithstanding. Miranda addresses two different rights: the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. See id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999). The record is clear that Teleguz did not request counsel until after he made the statement, so his right to counsel is not at issue. That leaves the question of whether he had invoked his right to remain silent. He had not. A defendant's choice, after signing a Miranda waiver, to selectively answer questions, is not in itself an unequivocal assertion of his right to remain silent. There is no other evidence to support the argument that Teleguz asserted his right to remain silent. See Bui, 170 F.3d at 239; cf. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.). The district court correctly held that Teleguz's statement was admissible. D. Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal At the close of the evidence, the district court denied Teleguz's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the three counts of possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers. The court rejected the argument that defendant did not know at the time of possession that serial numbers had been removed from many of the guns he sold to Ortiz. We review the matter de novo, see United States v. O'Shea, 426 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir.2005), and affirm. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), requires the defendant to have knowingly possessed firearms with obliterated serial numbers. See United States v. Hooker, 997 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir.1993). Defendant argues that his statement that Alex is the one who reblued the guns and removed the serial numbers is not a statement that Teleguz had this knowledge at the time he possessed the firearms. That is true, but it is hardly dispositive. The government's case did not rest merely on Teleguz's statement, so we do not face the abstract question of whether inferences from defendant's statement would suffice to meet the government's burden of proof. On August 25, 2002, Teleguz personally sold six firearms with obliterated serial numbers to Ortiz in Massachusetts. The same was true of the two firearms defendant sold to Ortiz on August 30, 2002. Further, on October 3, 2002, Teleguz arranged for Zhernov to deliver to Ortiz another firearm with an obliterated serial number, for which Teleguz received $850. It is easy to infer that Teleguz was familiar with the guns he was selling and knew quite well that the serial numbers had been obliterated. This conclusion that Teleguz had the requisite knowledge is further supported by Quickel's testimony that he had purchased firearms with intact serial numbers for Teleguz, and by Agent Burns's testimony explaining the similarities between Quickel's purchases for Teleguz and numerous firearms with obliterated serial numbers that defendant sold to Ortiz. The evidence was sufficient. The conviction is affirmed.