Opinion ID: 784273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Arbitration Clause

Text: 33 Wellmont argues that we should affirm the denial of the motion to compel arbitration because the arbitration provision in the 2001 Contract is repugnant and should be disregarded. Wellmont points to that portion of paragraph 1 of the 2001 Contract stating that all other terms and provisions of the 1997 Contract continue in full force and effect. It argues that because the 1997 Contract did not contain an arbitration clause, while the 2001 Contract did, there is a conflict over dispute resolution mechanisms, and under Tennessee law, the first method, i.e., no alternative dispute resolution, should prevail. See Bartlett v. Philip-Carey Mfg. Co., 216 Tenn. 323, 392 S.W.2d 325, 327 (1965) (if two clauses of a contract are so repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together, the first shall be received and the latter rejected). 34 The fatal flaw in Wellmont's reasoning is that the 1997 Contract did not remain in full force and effect with respect to hospital services. Paragraph 1 of the 2001 Contract states in pertinent part: 35 This Agreement supersedes the contracts, HNHPHO 98/12 KPMP98 961, and HNH POA/PHO 12/96 COPYRIGHT 1996 KPMP96 446, to the extent these contracts apply to inpatient and outpatient hospital services. All other terms and conditions of those contracts and any amendments remain in full force and effect. 36 Contract KPMP96 446 is the 1997 Contract. The rehabilitation services are hospital services. They are provided in the skilled nursing units of the Wellmont hospitals. Thus, the 2001 Contract, including the section requiring arbitration, completely supercedes the 1997 Contract for those services. There can, therefore, be no repugnancy and the arbitration clause is part of the contract applying to hospital services. 4