Opinion ID: 2514191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirements for Reinstatement of a Disbarred Attorney

Text: The bar association argues that this court should recognize a presumption against reinstatement after disbarment. According to the American Bar Association (ABA), because the purpose of lawyer discipline is not punishment, disbarred attorneys may be readmitted [10] to practice. Nevertheless, the ABA believes that the presumption should be against readmission. [11] Other jurisdictions considering reinstatement matters have followed the ABA, explicitly recognizing the existence of a presumption against readmission. [12] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has even gone so far as to say that disbarred attorneys have no basis for an expectation ... of the right to resume practice at some future point in time. [13] The purpose behind the presumption is protection of the public. This reflects the purpose of the disciplinary process: to protect the public, not to punish the lawyer. [14] According to the South Dakota Supreme Court, a court must endeavor to make certain that it does not again put into the hands of an unworthy petitioner that almost unlimited opportunity to inflict wrongs upon society possessed by a practicing lawyer. [15] Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court has stated that [a]ny significant doubt about whether an applicant for reinstatement has sustained [his] burden must be resolved in favor of protecting the public interest by denying reinstatement. [16] Courts have long held that [a] court should be slow to disbar, but it should be even slower to reinstate. [17] We agree with and adopt this approach. Given that both the ABA and a large number of jurisdictions have acknowledged the existence of a presumption against reinstatement, it was proper for the board to assume such a presumption existed. Accordingly, we recognize the presumption against reinstatement of a disbarred attorney and take this into account in evaluating Wiederholt's case.
The bar association argues on appeal that in order to prove that a petitioner has the proper qualifications to be reinstated to the practice of law, he or she must present `overwhelming' proof of reform coupled with `exemplary' conduct. The ABA states that [i]n no event should a lawyer even be considered for readmission until at least five years after the effective date of disbarment. [18] After that time, the ABA recommends that a lawyer seeking readmission show by clear and convincing evidence the following: rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders or rules, and fitness to practice law. [19] This high level of scrutiny is not unusual; most jurisdictions impose very high standards on those petitioning for reinstatement. The major consideration in reinstatement proceedings is whether the disbarred attorney has shown that those weaknesses that produced the earlier misconduct have been corrected. [20] Therefore, courts often consider remorse, rehabilitation, and moral fitness to practice law to be key elements in the inquiry. [21] Because a petitioner for reinstatement must demonstrate moral fitness and good character sufficient to be trusted again, the petitioner must make a showing of these characteristics that overcome[s] the court's former adverse judgment on the petitioner's character. [22] Accordingly, other jurisdictions have stated that petitioners for reinstatement should be held to an even higher standard of conduct than first-time applicants because they have already demonstrated that they are at risk for unethical conduct. [23] The majority position among courts is that the more culpable the conduct, the greater the burden for proving one is entitled to reinstatement. [24]
Most jurisdictions, including Alaska, have standards for reinstatement that are similar to the ABA guidelines. [25] Many jurisdictions have further developed fact-intensive, multi-part tests for determining whether a petitioner meets these standards. [26] The factors most commonly taken into account include (1) the petitioner's present moral fitness; (2) the petitioner's acceptance of wrongdoing with sincerity and honesty; (3) the extent of the petitioner's rehabilitation; (4) the nature and seriousness of the original misconduct; (5) the petitioner's conduct following the discipline; (6) the time elapsed since the original discipline; (7) the petitioner's character, maturity, and experience at the time of discipline and at present; (8) the petitioner's current competency and qualifications to practice law; (9) restitution; and (10) the proof that the petitioner's return to the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest. [27]

Alaska Bar Rule 29 sets out the standard a disbarred attorney seeking reinstatement must satisfy: [T]he Petitioner will have the burden of demonstrating that (s)he has the moral qualifications, competency, and knowledge of law required for admission to the practice of law in this State and that his or her resumption of the practice of law in ... the State will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest .... [28] Thus, an individual seeking reinstatement has the burden of demonstrating two things: (1) that he or she has the knowledge of law, competency, and moral qualifications requisite to the practice of law in this state; and (2) that his or her reinstatement will not be detrimental to the Alaska Bar, the administration of justice, or the public interest. Alaska has no other bar rules addressing the question of reinstatement by a disbarred attorney. There are also no Alaska cases that interpret this language. We conclude that the ten factors distilled in Pier and listed previously [29] provide useful guidance in a reinstatement inquiry.
In making their determinations regarding Wiederholt, the Area Hearing Committee and the Disciplinary Board stated that an individual seeking reinstatement must prove that he or she meets the requirements set out in Rule 29(c)(1) by clear and convincing evidence. A review of the ABA standards and cases from other jurisdictions suggests that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the proper standard of proof in reinstatement cases. In its Standards, the ABA states that a lawyer seeking reinstatement or readmission must demonstrate rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable rules and discipline orders, and fitness to practice law by clear and convincing evidence. [30] Other jurisdictions have concurred, establishing clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof that petitioners seeking reinstatement must satisfy. [31] The reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court is persuasive: The purposes underlying both attorney disciplinary and reinstatement proceedings are to safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and to protect the administration of justice from reproach. Consistent with those purposes is the principle that when a disbarred attorney petitions for reinstatement that person has the burden of introducing clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation. [32] We agree with this conclusion and adopt the clear and convincing evidence standard for proving the Rule 29(c)(1) requirements.
In the present case, the board considered the factors explicitly listed in Rule 29: competency, knowledge, moral fitness, and whether Wiederholt's resumption of the practice of law in the state will be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest. The board determined that Wiederholt had satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he met the competency and knowledge elements of the Rule 29(c) inquiry. [33] However, the board ruled that Wiederholt had not met his Rule 29 burden of demonstrating (1) that he was morally fit and (2) that his resumption of practice would not be detrimental to the bar, justice, or the public interest. While Rule 29 establishes moral fitness and lack of detrimental impact as the requirements for reinstatement, it does not explicitly state what factors the board may take into account in determining whether a petitioner has satisfied these requirements. In making its determination in Wiederholt's case on both moral fitness and the potential detrimental impact of Wiederholt's return to practice, the board specifically considered, among other things, Wiederholt's past conduct, his level of remorse and acknowledgment of past wrongdoing, and the amount of time that has passed since his disbarment. Wiederholt argues that the board's consideration of these three factors fails to show present unfitness. We disagree. Wiederholt's past conduct, his level of remorse and acknowledgment of past wrongdoing, and the amount of time that has passed since his disbarment are all highly relevant. Moreover, a survey of reinstatement cases in other jurisdictions with reinstatement rules similar to Rule 29 indicates that the board acted properly in its inquiry by considering Wiederholt's past conduct, his level of remorse, and the length of time that has passed since his disbarment. Each of these issues is discussed in greater detail below.
Wiederholt argues that a petitioner has satisfied his Rule 29 standard of proof if he or she can demonstrate that he or she has the moral qualifications, competency, and appropriate knowledge of law at the time he or she is petitioning for reinstatement. Therefore, Wiederholt contends that it is inappropriate for the Disciplinary Board to consider the petitioner's past moral unfitness, incompetency, or lack of knowledge when making a reinstatement decision. The bar association disagrees, believing that a petitioner's past conduct has a great deal of bearing upon his or her present fitness to practice law. [34] A petitioner must demonstrate that he or she has the requisite moral qualifications, competency, and knowledge to practice law in Alaska. [35] Wiederholt points to the use of the present tense of the verb and suggests that the board should be determining whether a petitioner has the requisite qualifications as of the present time (when the petition is being reviewed) rather than looking back to and considering the petitioner's earlier conduct. Wiederholt's argument is unpersuasive. It makes little sense to consider a disbarred attorney's petition for reinstatement entirely in a vacuum, ignoring the conduct and attitude that led to disbarment. Rather, the bar association's argument that [d]isbarment conclusively proves lack of moral fitness at the time of disbarment and remains as evidence of lack of moral fitness later is supported by the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions that have explicitly acknowledged that the conduct that led to the petitioner's disbarment is an important factor to consider when determining whether the petitioner should be reinstated. [36] Courts addressing this issue cover a broad spectrum. At one extreme, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania goes so far as to begin its reinstatement inquiry by examining past conduct and, if it is sufficiently egregious, barring reinstatement altogether without looking at subsequent events. [37] At the other end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court of Mississippi apparently looks only to the petitioner's present firm resolve to live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation sufficient to convince a reasonable mind clearly that the person has reformed. [38] But most courts take an intermediate approach. When most courts examine prior conduct, they tend to balance the evidence of the petitioner's current good character with the seriousness of the prior misconduct, inquiring whether the former is of sufficient weight to overcome the latter. [39] For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has devised a five-part test a petitioner must satisfy in order to be reinstated. This comprehensive test takes into account the petitioner's past and present conduct, qualifications, and attitude. It looks at the following factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined; (2) whether the attorney recognizes the seriousness of the misconduct; (3) the attorney's conduct since discipline was imposed, including the steps taken to remedy past wrongs and prevent new ones; (4) the attorney's present character; and (5) the attorney's present qualifications and competence to practice law. [40] We agree with the intermediate approach taken by the majority of courts, and we conclude that a petitioner's past conduct plays an important role in determining whether the petitioner has been rehabilitated. We therefore hold that it is appropriate to consider a petitioner's past conduct in a reinstatement proceeding.
One of the reasons the bar association gives for the board's refusal to reinstate Wiederholt is his failure to acknowledge his wrongdoing or show remorse. Courts in numerous jurisdictions with reinstatement rules similar to Alaska's have found a petitioner's remorse and consciousness of prior wrongdoing to be persuasive factors in determining whether a petitioner currently has the level of moral and ethical character required for reinstatement. [41] As discussed above, a primary concern of the reinstatement process is whether the petitioner has been rehabilitated and whether he has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that those weaknesses that produced the earlier misconduct have been corrected. [42] Because the petitioner's remorse and acknowledgment of prior wrongdoing are vital to this determination, we hold that this factor is appropriate to consider in a reinstatement decision.
In making its determination in Wiederholt's case, the board explicitly took into account the relatively short amount of time that had passed since his disbarment. It noted that Wiederholt had petitioned for reinstatement at the earliest possible moment of eligibility and had filed his petition for reinstatement several weeks before the mandatory term of his disbarment expired. It was not error to consider this factor. Other jurisdictions have considered the length of time an attorney has been disbarred in conjunction with his or her past acts when determining whether reinstatement should occur. [43] The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that [w]hen an attorney has engaged in repeated acts or a calculated series of acts designed to corrupt the administration of justice, the showing of present fitness may require a lengthier period of rehabilitation. [44] We agree with that assessment and conclude that this factor is applicable in this case and was properly considered.