Opinion ID: 465035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relevant Teachings of DelCostello

Text: 21 The very fact that two other circuits have read DelCostello as commanding the importing of the NLRA six month statute of limitations into free standing LMRDA cases makes indispensable our closest possible analysis of this case. 22 We begin by noting that in one of the two cases embraced in DelCostello, the limitations period for claims against both union and employer fixed by the lower court was 30 days and that in the other claims had to be asserted against the employer within 90 days, and against the union within 3 years. The Court both began and ended its opinion with homage to the norm of borrowing limitations periods from state law. It began by noting, We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law. 462 U.S. at 158, 103 S.Ct. at 2287. See generally, id. at 158-61, 103 S.Ct. at 2287-89. 4 23 Then the Court noted that it had borrowed a six year period from state law to apply to a union suit against an employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). Even though labor-management relations were the subject--ordinarily an issue calling for uniform treatment, the Court observed: [N]ational uniformity is of less importance when the case does not involve 'those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote--the formation of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it,' 383 U.S., at 702 [86 S.Ct., at 1111]. We also relied heavily on the obvious and close analogy between this variety of Sec. 301 suit and an ordinary breach-of-contract case. 462 U.S. at 162-63, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. 24 The Court then proceeded to articulate its concern in the case before it over periods as short as the 90 days that state laws required for suits to vacate arbitration awards, id. at 165-68, 103 S.Ct at 2291-92. But it also manifested its concern over a limitations period as long as three years. It quoted its language in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 64, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1564, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981):  'This system [collective bargaining], with its heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the law of the shop, could easily become unworkable if a decision which has given meaning and content to the terms of an agreement, ... could suddenly be called into question as much as [three] years later.'  Id. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. 25 Significantly, the Court acknowledged that, even with these objections, resort to state law might have to be tolerated if there were no federal statute of limitations designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here--a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the suggested state-law parallels. Id. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. It then noted the very substantial overlap and family resemblance between unfair labor practices, union breaches of fair representation, and employer breaches of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 170, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. It also stressed as at least equally important to this similarity of rights the similarity of the underlying considerations-- 'stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements' . Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. It thus meticulously justified by both negative and positive reflections its choice of NLRA section 10(b)'s six month period. 26 Having undergone such an intricate analysis, the Court returned to its theme at the outset and cautioned that it was not departing from its preference of borrowing state limitations periods, even saying that there is not always an obvious state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state law remains the norm.... Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. Even under this elaborate reasoning, carving out a narrow exception from the general borrowing norm, Justices Stevens and O'Connor would have followed the usual rule. 27 We draw the clear conclusion that DelCostello is not the kind of precedent that lends itself as a springboard for easy application to other rights, statutes, and policies. Rather, it is a closely reasoned exception to a general rule which illumines a rather narrow path.