Opinion ID: 2533856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crawford's Retroactivity

Text: ¶ 10 Historically, we have attempted to maintain congruence in our retroactivity analysis with the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. [1] See In re Pers. Restraint of Sauve, 103 Wash.2d 322, 328, 692 P.2d 818 (1985) (holding that the balancing test established by the United States Supreme Court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision); In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321, 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (1992) (stating that we have attempted from the outset to stay in step with the federal retroactivity analysis, and discussing a recent change in the federal retroactivity analysis); In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wash.2d 868, 940, 952 P.2d 116 (1998) (citing the federal analysis discussed by this court in St. Pierre as the current retroactivity analysis in Washington State). Cf. State v. Hanson, 151 Wash.2d 783, 789, 91 P.3d 888 (2004) (stating that St. Pierre sets out the current prospective application analysis in Washington, which is derived from the two United States Supreme Court retroactivity analysis cases cited in St. Pierre ). ¶ 11 The current incarnation of our retroactivity analysis was first summarized in St. Pierre as follows: 1. A new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break from the past. 2. A new rule will not be given retroactive application to cases on collateral review except where either: (a) the new rule places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe, or (b) the rule requires the observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 118 Wash.2d at 326, 823 P.2d 492 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)). In this case, part one of the analysis is inapplicable because the Markels long ago exhausted direct review and their cases are now final. Part two, subsection (a), is also inapplicable because Crawford did not announce a new rule of substantive law but, rather, articulated a change in the procedures required under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. Thus, the question presented is whether Crawford is a new rule of procedure implicit in the concept of ordered liberty under the so-called Teague analysis. ¶ 12 The United States Supreme Court has recently described the Teague analysis as giv[ing] retroactive effect to only a small set of `watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.' Schriro v. Summerlin, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060)). Further, the rule must be one `without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.' Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 109 S.Ct. 1060). Finally, the Court has noted that [t]his class of rules is extremely narrow, and `it is unlikely that any. . . ha[s] yet to emerge.' [2] Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990))). It is with these principles in mind that we evaluate the possible retroactive application of Crawford. ¶ 13 Amicus curiae Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) first raises the possibility that the Teague analysis does not apply because Crawford is not a new rule. This argument is unavailing. A new rule is one that breaks new ground or was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060. The testimony the Markels now argue was erroneous under Crawford was held admissible under Ohio v. Roberts on multiple occasions. [3] The State concedes, without specifying, that some of that testimony would now be inadmissible under Crawford. Thus, while the reasoning in Crawford relied upon the historical underpinnings of the confrontation clause, the rule itself is a departure from previous United States Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, as WACDL states elsewhere in its amicus brief, the Crawford Court explicitly overturn[ed] its own prior decision of 24 years before in Ohio v. Roberts  and Crawford is an upheaval[ ] in confrontation clause law. WACDL Br. at 11. As defined in the Teague analysis, Crawford articulated a new rule of criminal procedure. ¶ 14 Although the question of whether Crawford applies retroactively has yet to be addressed in our appellate courts, several federal courts and appellate courts in other states have done so under the Teague analysis discussed above. With only two apparent exceptions, all of these courts have concluded that Crawford does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 334-36 (2d Cir.2004); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir.2005); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786 (7th Cir.); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444 (8th Cir.2004); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir.2004); Haymon v. New York, 332 F.Supp.2d 550, 557 (W.D.N.Y. 2004); People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118 (Colo.Ct.App.2004). But see Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1021-24 (9th Cir.2005) (stating that Crawford is a watershed rule of criminal procedure with concurrence agreeing in principle, but arguing that Crawford is not a new rule of criminal procedure); Richardson v. Newland, 342 F.Supp.2d 900, 923-25 (E.D.Cal.2004) (opining that Crawford is not a new rule of criminal procedure for purposes of the Teague retroactivity analysis, but concluding that the defendant's habeas corpus petition should be granted because his confrontation clause rights were violated even under Ohio v. Roberts ). [4] ¶ 15 Without addressing the validity or existence of the cases holding that Crawford is not to be applied retroactively under Teague, the Markels and WACDL argue that Crawford is a watershed rule of criminal procedure. In doing so, they eschew discussion of the retroactive application of Crawford itself and, instead, rely on three cases where a change in the confrontation clause analysis was applied retroactively. Two of the cases, Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1968), and Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 89 S.Ct. 540, 21 L.Ed.2d 508 (1969), are per curiam decisions decided by the United States Supreme Court under a retroactivity doctrine later superseded by Teague. In deciding the outcome of a habeas corpus petition, the Roberts Court applied the rule that the admission of a defendant's extrajudicial confession implicating a codefendant violates the right to cross-examination under the confrontation clause retroactively. 392 U.S. at 294, 88 S.Ct. 1921. In contrast, Berger was not a case before the Court on collateral review and would not, therefore, be subject to the Teague analysis if decided today. 393 U.S. 314, 89 S.Ct. 540. The Berger Court held that a new rule, stating that the absence of a witness from the jurisdiction would not justify the use at trial of preliminary hearing testimony unless the state made a good faith effort to secure the witness' presence, applied retroactively. Id. at 314-15, 89 S.Ct. 540. ¶ 16 Both Roberts and Berger applied the retroactivity doctrine established in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) (stating that rules of criminal procedure fashioned to correct serious flaws in the fact-finding process at trial are applied retroactively), which was discussed and superseded by the analysis established in Teague. See St. Pierre, 118 Wash.2d at 324-26, 823 P.2d 492 (describing the evolution of the federal retroactivity doctrine from Linkletter to Teague ). Because Roberts and Berger were not subject to the strict limitations on retroactivity that apply to cases on collateral review after Teague, they provide little or no persuasive analogy to Crawford. ¶ 17 WACDL's third source of authority for its argument that Crawford is a watershed rule of criminal procedure is Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1039, 112 S.Ct. 890, 116 L.Ed.2d 793 (1992). In Graham, the Second Circuit evaluated the retroactivity of a confrontation clause case decided by the United States Supreme Court, which held that a defendant's confession may not be admissible against a codefendant in a joint trial even if the codefendant has separately confessed. 946 F.2d at 993. Graham applied the rule retroactively to a case on collateral review as a watershed rule of criminal procedure under Teague. Id. Despite the retroactive application of the rule, the Graham court went on to ultimately dismiss the habeas corpus petition on harmless error grounds. Id. at 997. In essence, we are asked to ignore the multitude of state and federal courts that have explicitly held that Crawford does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague, and instead hold that Crawford does apply retroactively because it has some similarity to the Second Circuit's decision in Graham, relating to the use of out of court confessions by codefendants. We decline the invitation to disregard several cases directly on point in favor of a tenuously analogous case that was decided well before the Teague analysis was fully developed. [5] ¶ 18 In sum, we agree with the overwhelming majority of courts holding that Crawford did not announce a watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure . . . `without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished' under the Teague analysis. Schriro, 124 S.Ct. at 2523 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313, 109 S.Ct. 1060). Instead, Crawford is plainly seen as a new definition of the confrontation clause requirements, intended to more accurately reflect the constitutional framers' intent. Where before, under Ohio v. Roberts , the confrontation clause required only adequate indicia of reliability for the admission of all hearsay evidence, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, a defendant's right of confrontation now requires the unavailability of the witness and a prior opportunity for cross-examination if testimonial hearsay evidence is at issue. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. Criminal defendants who were denied Crawford's procedural requirements by reason of timing were not dispossessed of all meaningful opportunity to challenge the admission of the testimony. The Markels themselves, for example, challenged the child hearsay testimony under the Ohio v. Roberts standard at trial, in their first personal restraint petition, and in a federal habeas corpus petition.