Opinion ID: 2099175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Review of the Sentence of Life Imprisonment without the Possibility of Parole

Text: 1. Applicable Statutes and the Trial Court's Sentence In spite of our conclusion that Mr. Sifuentes has waived his right to a review of the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to § 12-19.2-5, we have nonetheless chosen to undertake a review of his sentence. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the harshest sentence that can be imposed in this state. [10] Taking into account the severity of such a sentence and being mindful that we have no legal obligation to do so, we shall, in this case, disregard petitioner's waiver of his right to a § 12-19.2-5 review in either of his two previous appeals to this Court or in his recent application for postconviction relief. [11] At the same time, however, we decline to grant Mr. Sifuentes' request that this case be remanded to the Superior Court in order to develop the record by obtaining a fresh presentence report and the institutional record. We further decline to grant his request that he be given an opportunity to testify verbally or in writing as to his sense of remorse. Rather, we shall review the record as it existed before the trial justice, the only review to which Mr. Sifuentes was originally entitled. When, acting pursuant to § 12-19.2-5, we review a trial justice's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, we do so in a de novo manner. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 288 (R.I. 2006); see also State v. Quinlan, 921 A.2d 96, 112 (R.I.2007). Under the provisions of G.L.1956 § 11-23-2, the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may be imposed in a first-degree murder case when one of seven enumerated grounds is present. Motyka, 893 A.2d at 288; see also State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 982 (R.I.2001) (The penalties for murder listed in § 11-23-2 are enumerated in the alternative, thereby requiring that the jury find only one of seven conditions in order to trigger consideration of the `not eligible for parole' provision.). [12] In the instant case, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Sifuentes guilty of first-degree murder. After returning the verdict of guilty, the jury was called upon to determine whether the murder was committed in a manner which involved either torture or aggravated battery. See § 11-23-2(4). Upon further deliberation, the jury found that the murder was committed [i]n a manner involving both torture and aggravated battery to Kevin Greenhalgh. (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, the trial justice conducted a sentencing hearing, at which Mr. Greenhalgh's sister and his girlfriend addressed the court. His sister described Mr. Greenhalgh as a son, a brother and a friend to many people. She further stated that those people who loved Mr. Greenhalgh have also become [Mr. Sifuentes'] victims. The trial justice was also read a letter from Mr. Sifuentes' mother, and his sister addressed the court. Mr. Sifuentes' mother and sister informed the court that Mr. Sifuentes had a family that loves him and that [h]e also has a good heart, no matter what anyone says about him. They further contended that Mr. Sifuentes was trying to be rehabilitated, and they asked the court to allow Mr. Sifuentes to one day live his life. In addition, the trial justice heard arguments from the prosecutor and from counsel for Mr. Sifuentes. When Mr. Sifuentes was asked by the trial justice whether he wished to address the court prior to the pronouncement of sentence, the entirety of Mr. Sifuentes' response was: I don't know what to say. No, I guess not. In imposing the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in this case, the trial justice acknowledged the decedent's assistance to law enforcement and set forth his view that Mr. Greenhalgh had committed what the trial justice sardonically described as a capital crime by having cooperated with law enforcement and by having informed on fellow prisoners. The trial justice went on to state that, for this capital crime Mr. Greenhalgh received a punishment where death apparently was not enough. The trial justice stated that the torture and aggravated assault, as demonstrated by the wounds on [Mr. Greenhalgh's] body and against his throat, speak of the barbarity of that hedonistic ascription. The trial justice further expressed his view that the manner in which Mr. Greenhalgh was killed was intended by Mr. Sifuentes and Mr. Brown to be a signal to other potential informants that they will not only be killed should they choose to inform, but also that they will die in the torment that Kevin Greenhalgh did die. The trial justice expressly found that, after having reviewed the presentence report and after having considered the statements of Mr. Sifuentes' mother and sister, there is no mitigation in any event. He went on to state that, having reviewed all the evidence, he found that Rudy Sifuentes participated gladly, even eagerly, in the tortured death of Kevin Greenhalgh. For the foregoing reasons, the trial justice sentenced Mr. Sifuentes to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 2. This Court's Review of the Sentence In State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848 (R.I.2008), this Court described as follows the factors which the members of this Court are to consider when, acting pursuant to § 12-19.2-5, we conduct our independent review of the appropriateness ( vel non ) of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole: [W]e look to the record, the jury's findings, the trial justice's conclusions, and the character and propensities of the defendant, including any aggravating circumstances as well as any mitigating factors. Graham, 941 A.2d at 866. [13] After having conducted such an independent review of the transcript of the proceedings below and relevant portions of the record, it is our conclusion that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate, and we ratify the sentence. In the case at bar, the jury found that Mr. Sifuentes committed first-degree murder [i]n a manner involving both torture and aggravated battery to Kevin Greenhalgh. After having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence in this case overwhelmingly supports the jury's finding that the murder was committed in a manner involving both torture and aggravated battery. The testimony with respect to the severity and barbarity of the injuries sustained by the victim in this case is as disturbing as it is explicit. The medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Mr. Greenhalgh testified at trial that she found numerous bruises and abrasions at various places on his head. She also found cuts to the ear, stab wounds below the ear, and another cut over the cheek and jaw; she described the cut over his cheek and jaw as having been caused by the tip of the knife dragging along the surface of the skin. The medical examiner described the front part of Mr. Greenhalgh's neck as having a gaping    wide, open inside wound    which measured twelve inches from side to side, ripped across both sides of the neck and front of the neck. The muscles of the neck were exposed in a manner which the medical examiner described as being in a very ragged fashion, as if a saw had been cut across the front muscles of the neck. The medical examiner also testified that both the larynx and trachea had been cut and that the jugular veins had also been partially cutwhile the spine remained intact. The medical examiner stated that, in her opinion, the wounds to the neck were the result of several motions of the knife. She also found stab wounds, of varying degrees of severity, on the victim's chest, abdomen, legs, thighs, back, and buttocks. The medical examiner further described the injuries to Mr. Greenhalgh's head as being indicative of blunt force trauma consistent with him having been struck with a fist or foot while he was alive. She further testified that, based on certain injuries to the neck area, it was likely that the victim had been subjected to some sort of neck hold. The medical examiner additionally testified that she would describe various wounds on the victim as teaser wounds, which she defined as being wounds which would not be expected to inflict lethal injury    [but were] to inflict psychological injury. She stated that the victim's wounds were also consistent with his having been bound during the course of the assault because there were very few defensive injuries. The medical examiner ultimately concluded that Mr. Greenhalgh's death was caused by a loss of blood, mainly [from] the jugular veins that were cut from the neck wound. She further estimated that, based on the time it takes for fatal blood loss to occur, the victim lived for at least ten minutes after receiving the wound to the neck; she added that this was further indicated by the fact that both blood and dirt were found in the victim's lungs. Given this evidence, it is entirely clear to us that the aggravating circumstances of torture and aggravated battery were present in this case. Additionally, our review of Mr. Sifuentes' character, record, and propensity for criminal activity has further led us to conclude that it is unlikely that he will be rehabilitated. See Graham, 941 A.2d at 867. In view of that conclusion, we are of the opinion that Mr. Sifuentes presents a continuing danger to the community. The presentence report which was conducted with respect to Mr. Sifuentes reveals that, prior to his being charged with the murder of Mr. Greenhalgh, Mr. Sifuentes had pled nolo contendre to no fewer than ten criminal chargesfor which he was twice incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions and for which he has served periods of probation (during which periods he twice has been found to have been a probation violator). We note once more, as we did in our 1995 decision with respect to his appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, that at the time of sentencing Mr. Sifuentes had failed to accept responsibility and to express remorse for [the] crime. Sifuentes II, 667 A.2d at 792. [14] We are in agreement with the trial justice that the evidence presented by petitioner at the time of sentencing did not serve to mitigate the true heinousness of the crime that he committed. The brutality and cold-heartedness that must be present for one to carry out a murder in such a cruel manner are almost unfathomable. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was entirely appropriate.