Opinion ID: 1474986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Authority to Enter Judgment Stipulation

Text: Does the record support a finding that Cristine, as attorney for McBurney, had authority to enter into the stipulation dated March 23, 1999? On this question, McBurney first argues that Cristine's testimony on remand was not credible, and that the trial justice disregarded crucial evidence in his assessment of the witness. In the alternative, McBurney argues that the hearing justice's conclusion that Cristine possessed the authority to settle his claim was incorrect as a matter of law. We disagree with both contentions and will address each separately. First, we see no indication that the trial justice misconceived or erred in his evaluation of the evidence presented to the court. This Court long has recognized the principle that assigning credibility to witnesses presented at trial is the function of the trial justice, who has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify in court. Baxter v. Lincoln Mills Co., 70 R.I. 16, 24, 36 A.2d 106, 109 (1944); Rahikka v. Gronstrom, 61 R.I. 270, 274, 200 A. 973, 975 (1938). Also, it is within the province of the trial justice, as part of the fact-finding process, to draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses, and those inferences, if reasonable, are entitled on review to the same weight as his factual determinations. Veach v. Veach, 463 A.2d 508, 510 (R.I.1983). Our review of the record in this case reveals that Cristine testified that she was specifically and expressly authorized to settle McBurney's claim and enter into a judgment stipulation. In addition, Walsh testified that he was, at all times pertinent to this issue, under the impression that Cristine was representing McBurney and had the authority to negotiate on his behalf. Even McBurney's own testimony indicated that he specifically instructed his attorney to settle his lawsuit against Roszkowski. Considering our deferential standard of review, and in light of this testimony, we see no indication that the trial justice's conclusion that Cristine was authorized to enter into the judgment stipulation reflects a misconception or oversight of the material evidence presented to him. Indeed, the trial justice's factual conclusion is wholly supported by the testimony presented on remand. Likewise, we hold that McBurney has failed to show that the trial justice committed an error of law when he concluded that Cristine had the authority to enter into the specific settlement stipulation at issue in this case. We have recognized that [t]he relationship [between an attorney and client] is essentially one of principal and agent. State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297, 309, 405 A.2d 1192, 1199 (1979). For that reason, the determination of whether an attorney possesses the authority to bind his client requires an application of the principles governing agency law. Normally, an agent is considered to be vested with authority to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to him. Restatement (Second) Agency, § 7 (1958). An agent is authorized to do, and to do only, what it is reasonable for him to infer that the principal desires him to do in the light of the principal's manifestations and the facts as he knows or should know them at the time he acts. Id. at § 33. Unless otherwise agreed, authority to conduct a transaction includes authority to do acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are reasonably necessary to accomplish it. Id. at § 35. Specifically addressing the authority of an attorney to settle a claim or lawsuit on behalf of his or her client, however, this Court has recognized that the power to settle lawsuits rests not with the attorneys but with the clients who are parties to the suit[.] Parrillo v. Chalk, 681 A.2d 916, 919 (R.I.1996). Thus, we adhere to the rule that an attorney has no authority to settle a case on behalf of a client unless the client has authorized the attorney to do so.  Id. (Emphasis added.) [7] In those specific circumstances when a client expressly authorizes his or her attorney to settle a case, however, it is implied that the attorney is further authorized to take such steps in representing his client as he may deem legal, proper and necessary, and his acts in that respect, in the absence of fraud, must be regarded as the acts of his client. Cohen v. Goldman, 85 R.I. 434, 438, 132 A.2d 414, 416 (1957). [8] Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is apparent to this Court that the trial justice did not err in his assessment of the law when he found that Cristine was authorized to sign the settlement stipulation providing Judgment for Defendant. The testimony elicited on remand established that Cristine was expressly authorized to settle the lawsuit against Roszkowski. It is clear that in the absence of any evidence that McBurney specifically advised his attorney not to enter into the stipulation providing Judgment for Defendant, Cristine had, at a minimum, the implied authority to enter into the judgment stipulation necessary to carry into effect the main authority conferred, viz., to settle the case. Accordingly, we see no error in the trial justice's conclusion that Cristine was vested with the authority to enter into the judgment stipulation.