Opinion ID: 2102723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: improper cross-examination of dr. page

Text: Defendant finally contends the State improperly cross-examined Dr. Page. Defendant told the doctor that he entered a house and had sex with a woman. Dr. Page, who was called as a defense witness at the second trial, was asked on direct examination about defendant's propensity for violent acts. Specifically, defense counsel asked Dr. Page whether he would be afraid to have defendant in the same home with Dr. Page's mother, grandmother, or wife; to which Dr. Page replied in the negative. In response to defense counsel's question whether defendant had showed any tendency that he would be a rapist, Dr. Page testified that, I haven't seen any sexual problems or violent problems with Dennis. Defense counsel then summarized the facts surrounding the alleged offensethat the victim was a seventy-six year old woman who was wearing a cast on her leg and was struck on her head by her attacker and then thrown to the bed and rapedand then asked, Doctor, would it be a fair statement to say that that particular act would be really foreign to Dennis? Dr. Page replied, That would be fair to say. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court permitted the State to ask Dr. Page whether defendant had said anything regarding his involvement in the alleged rape. Dr. Page then replied, I remember Dennis making the statement that made conflicting statements. [sic] He made a statement that he couldn't remember, that he was drunk, he made a statement that he had entered a house, had sex with a woman. Dr. Page also stated that defendant had told him that he had entered the house through the front door and pushed in the screen. Defendant contends his right against self-incrimination and his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by the admission of the above-quoted answers given by Dr. Page during cross-examination. In support of this contention, defendant cites Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 456, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1869, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). We find that decision to be inapposite. In that case the State offered a psychiatrist's testimony regarding the defendant's propensity towards future dangerousness. Here, in stark contrast, it was defense counsel who called the psychiatrist as a witness and then sought his opinion on defendant's lack of propensity towards violence and of the unlikelihood that defendant would have committed the offense charged. In effect, defense counsel attempted to voice defendant's denial of guilt through the mouth of the psychiatrist. Defendant could not advocate this position through a surrogate, the psychiatrist, and then expect it to be exempt from cross-examination. By offering this testimony, defendant waived whatever privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel he may otherwise have had. Having waived those rights, he cannot now complain of unconstitutional denial. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. MORGAN and HENDERSON, JJ., concur.