Opinion ID: 2979459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Circumstances Surrounding Plea

Text: The record does support defendant’s contention that he was reluctant to enter the guilty plea. The district judge recognized this reluctance at the time of the change-of-plea hearing; that’s why he was “very thorough” and “wanted to make sure [defendant] understood exactly what was going on, . . . bend[ing] over backwards” to make sure defendant was satisfied. R. 70, Hearing tr. pp. 4344. As he exercised this special caution, the district judge made the following observations: Now, I didn’t find anything in your comments during the colloquy to give me a concern. You didn’t seem unsure. You didn’t seem upset. You didn’t seem like you were being forced, and I was putting those questions to you, and I never found you to be shy to the extent that you would lie or misrepresent on the questions and answers that you were going to be giving, the answers you were going to be giving to my questions. Id. at 45. -5- No. 09-3855 United States v. Ernest Evans Nonetheless, defendant contends he was “coerced” into pleading guilty, that he was pressured by his attorney and his mother and his wife into not risking his life. Defendant’s counsel at the time, Rufus Sims, did not prepare, sign or file defendant’s motion to withdraw, but filed a sworn declaration in response to it. In it, he denied that he pressured defendant to plead guilty. Sims permitted defendant to use his cell phone in the courtroom on the day of the change-of-plea hearing to confer with his wife and mother, but denied hearing or seeing any indication that defendant was pressured by his family to plead guilty. Based on his review of the evidence in the case and his twenty-one years’ experience, Sims believed the plea agreement, including the government’s commitment to recommend a sentence of 120 months (the statutory mandatory minimum, well below the applicable advisory Guidelines range) was in defendant’s best interest—considering that, if he went to trial, he faced the possibility of a career offender enhancement and mandatory life imprisonment without parole. Sims conceded that he and defendant “had lively, intelligent, forthright discussions . . . and disagreements” about what the evidence would show at trial, but ultimately, “the decision was made by Mr. Evans to sign the plea agreement.” R. 70, Hearing tr. p.32. The contents of the plea agreement were subject to negotiation and were changed in several respects at defendant’s request before he signed it. In fact, defendant was even permitted to delete a portion of the factual basis for the plea wherein he would have implicated a third person. Yet, the paragraphs detailing his own participation in the conspiracy defendant agreed to without change. When the agreement was finalized and the plea entered, defendant “did not exhibit any showing of indecision and never hesitated in answering any questions.” R. 37, Declaration ¶ 17. In Sims’s opinion, the plea was “free and voluntary.” Id. Indeed, during the plea colloquy, defendant -6- No. 09-3855 United States v. Ernest Evans responded that he was fully satisfied with Mr. Sims’s representation and advice, said he understood the plea agreement, and stated that no one attempted in any way to force him to plead guilty. At the conclusion of the change-of-plea hearing, defendant personally thanked the district judge and the Assistant U.S. Attorneys for being patient with him. Faced with the possibility of life imprisonment if convicted, defendant doubtless experienced considerable stress and anxiety, but this is not the sort of “coercion” that undermines the voluntariness or integrity of his plea. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51 (1970) (recognizing that government may not produce plea by actual or threatened physical harm or mental coercion, but rejecting claim that defendant’s desire to accept certainty of lesser penalty is product of improper compulsion); Mader, 251 F.3d at 1105-06 (rejecting argument that government’s threat to enhance sentence was cognizable reason to withdraw plea). We therefore find no error in the district court’s evaluation of the circumstances surrounding entry of defendant’s guilty plea. D. Defendant’s Background and Prior Experience with Criminal Justice System In considering defendant’s nature and background, the district court noted that defendant, fifty-two years of age, completed high school and had “some college.” Observing that defendant was not a man of “limited intelligence,” the court found there was no question that defendant understood what was going on when he entered the guilty plea. The court also observed that defendant had a number of prior convictions and was no stranger to the criminal justice system, negating the possibility that defendant was confused about the nature and significance of the change-of-plea proceeding. Defendant does not dispute these findings by the court, and impliedly concedes that these considerations weigh against him. -7- No. 09-3855 United States v. Ernest Evans E. Potential Prejudice to Government The district court noted the government had not made a compelling showing that it would suffer substantial prejudice if defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea. The court did not, however, place much weight on this factor. Indeed, as the government points out, it was not required to show prejudice “unless and until defendant advances and establishes a fair and just reason for allowing the withdrawal.” United States v. Ellis, 470 F.3d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 2006). Because consideration of the foregoing factors shows that defendant did not demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea, the requirement to show potential prejudice was not triggered. F. Conclusion In sum, only one of the above factors weighs in favor of granting defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant did not delay, but relatively quickly advised the court of his change of heart. Nonetheless, evaluation of the other factors reveals that defendant lacked what the law recognizes to be a “fair and just reason” to withdraw his plea. Rule 11's fair-and-just-reason requirement is not met where a defendant makes a tactical decision to enter a plea and then seeks to withdraw it when he comes to believe he made a bad choice. United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991). This is so because the entry of a guilty plea is no mere gesture, no mere formality, no mere trifle, but a “grave and solemn act.” Hyde, 520 U.S. at 677. After a defendant has sworn in open court that he actually committed the crime and that he is pleading guilty because he is guilty; and after the court has found a factual basis for the plea and has accepted the plea, the defendant cannot be allowed to withdraw it simply on a lark or a whim. Id. at 676-77. To allow a defendant to withdraw his plea for other than a “fair and just reason” would “degrade the otherwise -8- No. 09-3855 United States v. Ernest Evans serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a move in a game of chess.” Id. at 677. Because we concur in the district court’s assessment that defendant Evans did not establish a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant’s motion.