Opinion ID: 169352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delaware Valley

Text: 47 The relevant Supreme Court decision is Delaware Valley. The Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley) had filed suit under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410, to compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to enact a vehicle-emissions regulation program. See 478 U.S. at 549, 106 S.Ct. 3088. The parties entered into a consent decree, under the terms of which Pennsylvania agreed to enact an emissions program for several counties in the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia areas by August 1, 1980. In addition, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) would seek legislation to establish private emission-inspection franchises to implement the new emissions requirements. If the legislature did not approve the franchise system, PennDOT was to promulgate regulations certifying private garages to perform the emissions tests. 48 The plaintiffs' counsel was quite active after entry of the consent decree and sought attorney fees for those efforts. Although the specific issue before the Supreme Court was whether attorney efforts before administrative agencies could be compensable, the Court's opinion plainly signals approval of compensation for all the described efforts by counsel, so it is instructive to include a rather full description. 49 The Court divided the activities following entry of the consent decree into nine phases. In Phase I Delaware Valley moved to hold Pennsylvania in contempt because the Pennsylvania legislature had refused to authorize the franchise system and PennDOT had failed to promulgate the required regulations. But before the district court could rule on the motion, PennDOT published the regulations. See id. at 549-50, 106 S.Ct. 3088. The district court therefore did not hold the Commonwealth in contempt but ordered the parties to establish a revised schedule for implementation of the regulations. Phase II consisted of Delaware Valley's efforts to monitor Pennsylvania's performance and its submission of comments on the proposed regulations. In Phase III Delaware Valley reviewed and approved Pennsylvania's request for a ten-month extension of the August 1, 1980, deadline, which the district court granted. Phase IV concerned further efforts regarding extensions. By month six of the extension, Pennsylvania requested an additional two years. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement, Pennsylvania asked the district court to approve its request. Delaware Valley responded by seeking an order finding Pennsylvania in contempt and modifying the terms of the consent decree. The district court held Pennsylvania in contempt, refused to modify the decree, and denied Pennsylvania's requested extension, although a few months later it approved a one-year extension. Pennsylvania appealed both the district court's finding of contempt and its one-year extension, and lost both appeals. See id. at 550-51, 106 S.Ct. 3088. 50 Phase V involved a battle of wills between the federal judiciary and the Pennsylvania legislature. The legislature enacted a law prohibiting the expenditure of state funds for implementation of the emissions program. See id. at 551, 106 S.Ct. 3088. PennDOT therefore ceased all emissions-program activities after publishing final regulations for garage owners to conduct emissions inspections. Pennsylvania then sought to stay implementation of the decree, and Delaware Valley sought a finding of contempt and sanctions. The district court held Pennsylvania in contempt, denied a stay, and limited the Commonwealth's access to federal funds by ordering the United States Secretary of Transportation to cease approval of highway projects and grants in the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia areas unless they met certain criteria. The Commonwealth's appeal of this order was denied. 51 In Phase VI the City of Pittsburgh and several legislators attempted to intervene in the litigation. See id. at 552, 106 S.Ct. 3088. Delaware Valley successfully resisted these attempts. In Phase VII the district court reviewed seven projects that the United States Secretary of Transportation had funded and found that only two were allowable under the court's prior order. In Phase VIII the Pennsylvania legislature finally passed the legislation required to implement the emissions program and negotiated with Delaware Valley for a new implementation schedule, which the court approved. In Phase IX Delaware Valley successfully opposed Pennsylvania's efforts before the Environmental Protection Agency to reduce the size of the area in which the emissions plan was to be implemented. 52 Delaware Valley then sought attorney fees it had incurred since the consent decree had been entered. Much of the work for which it sought compensation involved post-degree litigation, but it also involved work in Phases II and IX before state and federal administrative agencies. The district court awarded fees for that work, and the Third Circuit affirmed. 53 Pennsylvania argued before the Supreme Court that the language of the attorney-fee provision of the Clean Air Act allowed recovery only for costs of litigation, and that therefore Delaware Valley's administrative work in Phases II and IX was not compensable. See id. at 557-58, 106 S.Ct. 3088. The Court disagreed, explaining that counsel's work in those phases, although not traditional legal work, 54 was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief for their client as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom which secured Delaware Valley's initial success in obtaining the consent decree. This case did not involve a single tortious act by the Commonwealth that resulted in a discrete injury to Delaware Valley, nor was the harm alleged the kind that could be remedied by a mere award of damages or the entry of declaratory relief. Instead, Delaware Valley filed suit to force the Commonwealth to comply with its obligations under the Clean Air Act to develop and implement an emissions inspection and maintenance program covering 10 counties surrounding two major metropolitan areas. To this end, the consent decree provided detailed instructions as to how the program was to be developed and the specific dates by which these tasks were to be accomplished. 55 Protection of the full scope of relief afforded by the consent decree was thus crucial to safeguard the interests asserted by Delaware Valley; and enforcement of the decree, whether in the courtroom before a judge, or in front of a regulatory agency with power to modify the substance of the program ordered by the court, involved the type of work which is properly compensable as a cost of litigation under § 304. In a case of this kind, measures necessary to enforce the remedy ordered by the District Court cannot be divorced from the matters upon which Delaware Valley prevailed in securing the consent decree. 56 Id. at 558-59, 106 S.Ct. 3088 (emphasis added). The Court therefore held that the post-degree monitoring work in each phase was compensable. 57 Although the case arose under the Clean Air Act, the Court stated that the Act's fee provision was intended to serve the same purpose as the fee provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 — to encourage private citizens to enforce rights created under federal law. The Court cited with approval several § 1988 cases that had awarded attorney fees for postjudgment monitoring of consent decrees, and stated that the fee provisions of the two statutes should be interpreted in the same manner. See id. at 559-60, 106 S.Ct. 3088.