Opinion ID: 1449368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: does the finding of two additional aggravating circumstances on resentencing violate double jeopardy?

Text: After conviction for first degree murder, defendant originally was sentenced to death upon a finding of two statutory aggravating circumstances, based upon his nine earlier convictions for first degree murder, and no substantial mitigating circumstances. The two aggravating circumstances specifically found were former A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(1), presently § 13-703(F)(1), prior convictions for crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death, and former A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(2), presently § 13-703(F)(2), prior convictions for felonies involving the use or threat of violence. On resentencing, defendant again was sentenced to death. This time, however, in addition to the two aggravating circumstances cited above, the court found two additional aggravating circumstances. The court found that Gretzler committed the offense in expectation of receiving something of pecuniary value. See former A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(5), presently § 13-703(F)(5). Also, it found that Gretzler murdered the Sandbergs in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. See former A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(6), presently § 13-703(F)(6). As noted above, the court additionally found as a mitigating factor that Gretzler's mental capabilities were partially impaired, see former A.R.S. § 13-454(F)(1), presently § 13-703(G)(1), but that this impairment was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. See former A.R.S. § 13-454(D), presently § 13-703(E). Defendant challenges the propriety of finding the two additional aggravating circumstances on resentencing. He first argues that these additional findings violate the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment, relying on Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981). The argument that Bullington controls cases like defendant's has been presented to, and rejected by, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253 (1982), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 473, 74 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982). Bullington held that once a defendant is acquitted of the death penalty in a formal jury sentencing procedure resembling trial, receiving instead life imprisonment, he may not be given the death penalty in a later proceeding if his underlying conviction is reversed and he is retried. The Ninth Circuit Court in Knapp stated that, The present case is clearly distinguishable from Bullington. Id. at 1265. It pointed out that the defendants in Knapp, including Gretzler, received the death penalty at their original sentencing, not life imprisonment. Thus, There exists no implied `acquittal' in the case. The sentence that can be imposed on resentencing here cannot be more severe than that previously assessed. Id. at 1265 (citation omitted). In the instant case, the state was justified in its attempt to establish two additional aggravating factors on resentencing, as the law on both of these factors had been substantially clarified since the time of the original sentencing. In 1980 in State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 616 P.2d 888, cert. denied 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980), this court interpreted the pecuniary gain circumstance of A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(5), expressly holding for the first time that this factor was not limited to the hired gun situation. 126 Ariz. at 436, 616 P.2d at 896. In 1980 in Steelman II, supra, we also substantially clarified the meaning of the words especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner used in A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(6), and specifically held that the Steelman/Gretzler slaying of the Sandbergs met this statutory wording. 126 Ariz. at 26, 612 P.2d at 482. These clarifications of law were not available to the judge at the initial sentencing, but were properly brought to the court's attention upon resentencing. The purpose of the sentencing procedure is to obtain the appropriate punishment for the particular crime and the particular offender, and the trial court upon remand may take into account new interpretations of the death penalty statute occurring between the first and second sentencing. See State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 286, 645 P.2d 784, 801 (1982). The resentencing court did not err in considering the two aggravating factors not found at the initial sentencing. However, even if we were to set aside the two additional findings of aggravating circumstances, we would hold that, considering the two aggravating circumstances previously found by the trial court and found again at the resentencing, as well as the newly found mitigating circumstance, the death penalty was properly imposed.