Opinion ID: 885035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Existence of plea bargain

Text: ¶ 25 Lastly, we consider the third factor, whether the plea was the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dismissal of another charge. Although one charge was dismissed pursuant to the agreement, Sanders notes that the plea agreement also required the prosecution to recommend a three-year suspended sentence in exchange for his guilty plea. Sanders contends that the prosecution breached this agreement when it recommended a five-year prison sentence and then called the pre-sentence investigator as a witness in support of this recommendation. He argues that although the prosecution later agreed to recommend the three-year suspended sentence provided for in the plea agreement to avoid any potential loopholes, the recommendation was only halfhearted and more importantly the damage had already been done. ¶ 26 The State responds that once the prosecution realized its mistake and that Sanders had not committed a crime since he had signed the agreement, the State withdrew his request for a five-year sentence and recommended the sentence provided for in the plea agreement. It argues that the prosecutor had made an honest mistake in believing that the defendant had violated the terms of the agreement, and that this Court should not hold prosecutors to such an impossible standard. Additionally, the States cites State v. Yother (1992), 253 Mont. 128, 137, 831 P.2d 1347, 1352 and Bowley, 282 Mont. at 311-12, 938 P.2d at 600, and contends that this Court has stated that a probation officer is free to recommend a sentence different than that agreed to by the State. Under this line of reasoning, the fact that the probation officer recommended a five-year prison sentence does not constitute a breach of the plea agreement. ¶ 27 This Court has repeatedly stated that fundamental fairness dictates that the prosecutors meticulously abide by the terms of a plea agreement. Specifically, this Court has instructed: Prosecutors who engage in plea bargaining must meet strict and meticulous standards of both promise and performance as a plea of guilty resting in any significant degree on an unfulfilled plea bargain is involuntary and subject to vacation. Prosecutorial violations, even if made inadvertently or in good faith to obtain a just and mutually desired end, are unacceptable. State v. Allen (1981), 197 Mont. 64, 69, 645 P.2d 380, 382 (citations omitted). ¶ 28 The State correctly notes that this Court has stated that when a probation officer recommends a sentence different from that contained in a plea agreement, this does not constitute breach of the plea agreement by the prosecutor because the probation officer's recommendation is not equivalent to the prosecutor's recommendation. Bowley, 282 Mont. at 311-12, 938 P.2d at 600 (citing Yother, 253 Mont. at 137, 831 P.2d at 1352). The author of this opinion rejected this statement of law in Bowley and joined the specially concurring opinion, which concluded that: when guilty pleas are induced by promises from one agent of the State to recommend a suspended sentence, and that recommendation is then rendered meaningless because another agent of the State makes a contrary recommendation, the State has not met strict and meticulous standards of both promise and performance. . . . . What sense does it make to pay lip service to the principle that an accused person has a right to rely on material representations made to him or her as an inducement to enter into a plea agreement, but then allow the practical effect of that inducement to be circumvented by permitting another agent of the same government to do just the opposite of what was promised to the defendant? Is there any question whose recommendation the district judge will take more seriously? Bowley, 282 Mont. at 313, 938 P.2d at 601 (Trieweiler, J., concurring). ¶ 29 In any event, even applying the standard set forth in the majority opinion in Bowley, as we must, we conclude that the prosecution breached the plea agreement in this case, not because the probation officer recommended a different sentence, but because the prosecutor himself failed to meet strict and meticulous standards of both promise and performance. Allen, 197 Mont. at 69, 645 P.2d at 382 (citations omitted). The prosecutor himself recommended the five-year sentence in violation of the plea agreement, and then called the pre-sentence investigator as a witness to support its view that Sanders' offense warranted a stiffer sentence than that provided for in the plea agreement. ¶ 30 Sanders contends that the prosecutor's retraction of the five-year sentence recommendation simply to avoid potential loopholes was only halfhearted. While, based on the cold record, this Court cannot evaluate the sincerity of the prosecutor's retraction or the enthusiasm with which he then recommended the three-year suspended sentence, this Court agrees with Sanders that the damage had already been done. The prosecutor had already represented to the court that it believed Sanders deserved a stiffer sentence, and it supported this recommendation with testimony from the pre-sentence investigator. ¶ 31 We reject the State's argument that such a holding will somehow impose new and impossibly high standards on prosecutors. This Court has always repeatedly stated that prosecutors must meet strict and meticulous standards when performing the duties required by plea agreements. Allen, 197 Mont. at 69, 645 P.2d at 382. Violations of the agreement, even if made inadvertently or in good faith . . . are unacceptable. Allen, 197 Mont. at 69, 645 P.2d at 382 (citation omitted). The prosecutor in this case failed to meet the strict and meticulous standard. It was not impossible as the State suggests for the prosecutor to accurately assess whether Sanders had committed a crime after entering the plea agreement. The prosecutor had only to carefully read the information in the presentence investigation or question the investigator himself, as Sanders' attorney did on cross-examination. Additionally, he could have alerted Sanders' attorney to the fact that he intended to request a stiffer sentence before the sentencing hearing, rather than surprising him at the hearing, and thereby allow Sanders the opportunity to clarify the issue before the damage had been done. Although we have no doubt but that the prosecutor's failure was an honest mistake, we equally have no doubt but that his performance of the plea agreement was neither strict nor meticulous. Based on all the foregoing, we conclude that this third factor also weighs in favor of Sanders. ¶ 32 In sum, all three factors discussed above indicate that good cause existed to permit Sanders to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion by denying Sanders' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. ¶ 33 We do not mean to suggest by this decision, however, that all three factors in every case must necessarily weigh in a defendant's favor before this Court will hold that the district court abused its discretion. We consider the errors that occurred in this case to be egregious, and any one of them alone may be sufficient in a similar case to justify allowing a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. ¶ 34 Sanders requests that, on remand, the District Court should either allow him to withdraw his guilty plea or, alternatively, sentence him in accordance with the plea agreement. We agree. Due to both the inadequacy of the District Court's interrogation and the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement, we remand this case to the District Court with the following instructions. Should Sanders desire to do so, the District Court should allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. Alternatively, if Sanders elects to be sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement, the District Court should do so. ¶ 35 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. TERRY N. TRIEWEILER, JIM REGNIER, and W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, JJ., concur.