Opinion ID: 2994586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: At oral argument, Choate requested leave to submit a supplemental brief, arguing that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. We granted Choate’s request because, although both parties in their briefs submitted that we had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291, [i]t is never too late, of course, to raise a jurisdictional challenge . . . . Karazanos v. Madison Two Assoc., 147 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore, before proceeding on the merits, we address this jurisdictional challenge. On June 11, 1999, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Choate. Webb filed a post-judgment motion in the district court on June 23. On July 7, Webb filed a notice of appeal from the grant of summary judgment, docketed as case No. 99-2725. We issued an order on July 20th to Webb stating: A preliminary review of the short record indicates that the order appealed from may not be a final appealable judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291. A notice of appeal filed before the district court issues its ruling on a timely Rule 59 motion is ineffective until the order disposing of the motion is entered on the district court’s civil docket. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). In the present case, plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend on June 23, 1999. This may be a timely Rule 59 motion. See Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1986). As such, this appeal may be premature, because it appears that the district court has not disposed of the motion and entered its order on the district court’s civil docket. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff-appellant shall file, on or before August 3, 1999, a brief memorandum stating why this appeal should not be STAYED pending the entry of the order disposing of the [post-judgment] motion. A motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) will satisfy this requirement. . . . The following day, July 21st, the district court denied Webb’s post-judgment motion. On July 26, Webb filed in this Court a document entitled Judicial Memorandum-- Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Pending a Final Order, requesting dismissal of the appeal, No. 99-2725, pending the district court’s final order. The motion stated that Webb filed his appeal within the 30 day required period after the entry of judgment to assure his time for appeal would be protected, aware that a Rule 59 Motion would likely stay the appeal. However, it went on to state that Webb hereby moves this Court to dismiss his appeal, pending a final Order . . . . We responded in an order, dated August 30th, which stated: the motion for voluntary dismissal is GRANTED and appeal no. 99-2725 is DISMISSED pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 42(b). Prior to this grant, on August 24, Webb filed a notice of appeal from the post-judgment order, which was docketed as case No. 99-3189 on August 25th. On September 1, we issued the following order: a notice of appeal in a civil case [must] be filed in the district court within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed. In this case, the order denying plaintiff’s post-judgment motion was entered on July 22, 1999, and the notice of appeal was filed on August 24, 1999, one day late. . . . [Appellant is ordered to] file a brief memorandum stating why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) will satisfy this requirement. . . . If appellant wishes to request an extension of time in which to file the notice of appeal, he should file an appropriate motion in the district court, not this court, as soon as possible. Appellant’s jurisdictional memorandum should include a discussion of the status of any such motion. In response to this order, on September 9, Webb filed a document entitled Status Report On Extension of Time Within Which to File Notice of Appeal of Post-Judgment Order. In the document Webb stated that he was withdraw[ing] his Notice of Appeal of his Post-Judgment Motions and requested that a briefing schedule be set on the district court’s denial of summary judgment. On September 14, the district court denied Webb’s request for a time extension. On September 22, we issued another order, which explained that we construed the status report as a motion to dismiss this appeal, and ordered the appeal dismissed. We denied a briefing schedule since we deduced that Webb had voluntarily dismissed his appeal . . . . On September 30, Webb filed a document named Motion to Reconsider Order of Court Dismissing Appeal and to Recall Mandate of Dismissal and Motion for Leave to Withdraw Dismissal of Appeal in Case No. 99-2725. On November 12, we granted Webb’s motion, stating that the mandate in 99- 2725 is RECALLED and this appeal is REINSTATED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal filed on August 25, 1999 [No. 99-3189] is WITHDRAWN. Upon reinstatement, a briefing schedule was set and oral arguments were arranged. As mentioned, Choate challenged our jurisdiction at oral argument. Choate argues that we lack jurisdiction because once Webb’s appeal had been voluntarily dismissed, it could not have been reinstated by the September 30th motion because it was filed outside the time limit for filing the original notice of appeal. See Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the court cannot resurrect a notice of appeal after the time provided by Fed.R. App.P. 4 for commencing an appeal; rather, it must be treated as if notice [was] never filed). Choate further contends that since Webb’s motion to reinstate was too late, we lack the power to reinstate the appeal. Webb counters that we have the inherent power to recall our mandate, and properly did so in this case. While we believe Choate correctly states the law in Barrow, the facts of this case do not fit squarely within that case. Rather, we view this case as similar to Patterson v. Crabb, 904 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1990). In Barrow, after we issued an order worded exactly as the July 20th order in this case, the appellants voluntarily dismissed the appeal rather than explain why we had jurisdiction. See 977 F.2d at 1102. The appellants later argued that the appeal should be reinstated because of judicial error. See id. We viewed this as a strategic choice of the attorney, albeit a poor one. See id. In Patterson, we dismissed the appeal because we found no final order in the record. See 904 F.2d at 1179. However, the final order had been entered, but was overlooked. See id. As in Patterson, the jurisdictional facts of this case present a series of misunderstandings between Webb and this Court. We now turn to untangling them. The first gaffe occurred when Webb’s counsel misinterpreted our July 20th order and merged the options of submitting a memoranda to explain why the appeal ought to be stayed, or move for voluntary dismissal./1 This misinterpretation is demonstrated in the title--Judicial Memorandum-- Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Pending a Final Order. Webb believed our order meant that the appeal would be temporarily dismissed but once the order of the district court on the post- judgment motion was received, the appeal of the summary judgment would be reinstated. We interpreted Webb’s motion to be a full dismissal, and not a memorandum explaining why the appeal should be stayed. Webb, in turn, interpreted our dismissal as a stay, probably because counsel had wrongly labeled the motion a voluntary dismissal. Webb failed to call our attention to the fact that on July 21st, a day after our order was entered, the district court had ruled on the post-judgment motion. See 904 F.2d at 1179-80. We, of course, wish that this matter had been resolved earlier, but we believe this mix-up is similar to that in Patterson. The fault lies with a misinterpretation of this Court’s orders and the mislabeling of the motion. There was also judicial error in misreading the motion before the appeal was dismissed. The motion asked for both the appeal to be stayed and for it to be dismissed. We ought to have caught the discrepancy and sought a resolution. We have noted that we will only reinstate an appeal in extraordinary circumstances. See United States v. Holland, 1 F.3d 454, 455-56 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Patterson, 904 F.2d at 1180). This power will be used sparingly. Therefore, we must emphasize that this is not a case in which only counsel misunderstood the law. A misunderstanding of the law or fact by counsel alone would not compel us to reinstate an appeal. Rather, this is a case of misinterpretations by both the Court and counsel. However, as in Patterson, our decision might be different if Choate had been prejudiced by these events. See 904 F.2d at 1180. We see no prejudice here. Both parties have been laboring on this case since June of 1999, and the issues were briefed and ready for oral argument before this Court. As to our power to reinstate the appeal, we again rely on Patterson, which reasoned that [t]he assertion of this power fills a gap in the appellate rules and is well within the traditional authority of the courts, properly described as inherent, to regulate procedures in them in the absence of legislatively prescribed rules. Id.; see Holland, 1 F.3d at 455. Therefore, we hold that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We now address Webb’s ADA claim.