Opinion ID: 2079430
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Accused's Absence from Hearing

Text: Appellant was not present in court on August 19, 1982, when the trial court granted the State's request to continue the trial. Appellant asserts granting the continuance was a critical part of the criminal process and that his absence violates due process. We begin by turning to the words of Justice Cardozo. So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 333, 78 L.Ed. 674, 679 (1933). However, a trial court's failure to arrange for a defendant's presence does not implicate fairness where the accused's presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow. 291 U.S. at 106-107, 54 S.Ct. at 332. Appellant admitted his absence caused no prejudice to his defense. Appellate counsel has not identified any prejudice beyond the ambiguous assertion that Arnold and King gained an advantage over his client. This case is unlike State v. Harden (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 35, in which the accused was absent when a taped exhibit of a co-conspirator's statement was played to the jury during deliberations and he could show some prejudice. Appellant's absence from the proceeding where the trial court granted the continuance was not a violation of due process. United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir.1981). The trial court is affirmed. DeBRULER, GIVAN, PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur.