Opinion ID: 2306140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Natural and Probable Consequences

Text: In Wilson-Bey, supra, we held that a natural and probable consequences' instruction erroneously `dispenses with any requirement that the accomplice be shown to have the requisite mental state for conviction of first-degree murder, including premeditation and intent to kill.' Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 835. In Coleman, supra, we applied Wilson-Bey's holding so as to invalidate the same instruction in a second-degree murder prosecution. Coleman, 948 A.2d at 552-53; Fortson v. United States, 979 A.2d 643, 658-59 (D.C.2009). Hence, it was error for the court to give the instruction in this casean error to which appellants properly objected at trial. Nevertheless, reversal is not required if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt boils down to whether an impartial juror could reasonably conclude that [appellants] did not kill (or help to kill) the decedent with [malice]. Wilson-Bey, supra, 903 A.2d at 846; Fortson, supra, at 658. Here, appellants do not dispute that they kicked Wellman while he was on the ground; the only dispute is as to how many times their kicks landed on Wellman's head, if at all. [1] Alisha Glover, Wendall Wray, and Adrianne Glover all testified that both appellants kicked the decedent multiple times. Thus there was strong evidencethe mutually corroborating testimony of three eye witnesses from which to infer that appellants had the requisite mens rea for second-degree murder while armed with a shod foot because they intended to kill Wellman, or intended to seriously injure him, or acted in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to him when they were kicking him. See Herbin v. United States, 683 A.2d 437, 443 (D.C. 1996) (setting out the elements of seconddegree murder). In these circumstances, we are persuaded that there is no reasonable possibility, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), that a juror relied on the crutch of the erroneous instruction to find malice on appellants' part. Moreover, unlike Wilson-Bey, supra, the instructions here at least specified that an accomplice must know that another participant had the intent necessary for second-degree murder, see Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 832-33, 833 n. 28, andagain unlike in that casethe prosecutor did not argue in summation that the jury did not have to find malice as to each participant to convict of second-degree murder. Thus, the error in instructing on natural and probable consequences was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.