Opinion ID: 4748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constructive Discharge

Text: In order to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he was discharged 5 from his position. Even if the plaintiff resigned from the position, he can satisfy the discharge element of an age discrimination claim by proving that he was constructively discharged. Junior v. Texaco, 688 F.2d 377, 378 (5th Cir. 1982). This circuit has held that a constructive discharge occurs when the . . . working conditions are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would feel compelled to resign. Bourque v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)). The jury found that Stephens was constructively discharged. CIT argues that the evidence does not support a finding of constructive discharge and that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. on the issue of constructive discharge. In reviewing the district court's denial of CIT's motion for judgment n.o.v., we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable and with all reasonable inferences to Stephens. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1986) modified on other grounds, 109 S.Ct. 2702 (1989). Factual findings in employment discrimination cases are reviewed on the same standard as in other cases. Consequently, the Court will not overturn the jury verdict unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 803 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc)). 6 CIT asserts that Stephens did not face working conditions that would compel a reasonable employee to quit. Upon a careful review of the evidence under the proper standard, however, we think otherwise. A reasonable juror could find that the cumulative effect of CIT's actions made the working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying CIT's motion for judgment n.o.v.. The evidence shows that Stephens was demoted from Division Head to DSM, a sales position, and was asked to help train his young successor, Roy Keller. (Tr. at 45-46). As a DSM he had no supervisory duties, and in fact had to report to Keller. (Tr. at 49). He was asked to explain his demotion and introduce Keller as the new boss to the division's biggest client, Holt Machinery. (Tr. at 62-63). He was first told that he alone would handle the Holt Machinery account, but was later informed that ultimately, [Keller] is Division Manager and will make the decisions on how the account will be handled. (Pl.'s Ex. 4). Stephens, who had formerly supervised the entire San Antonio Division, was also informed that he was permitted to assist the Credit Department as needed but that whenever possible, [he] must have a member of the credit department along as designated by Division Management. (Pl.'s Ex. 4). On top of all this, his salary was reduced from $53,500 to $43,200 after he had been told that there would be no reduction in his salary. Finally, each time CIT imposed a new restraint on Stephens or cut his salary or responsibility, Keller 7 asked him whether he was going to quit his job. (Tr. at 56, 71). The combination of the demotion, the continuing limitations on his salary and responsibility, and Keller's repeatedly asking him whether he was going to quit his job, could make working conditions intolerable for a reasonable person in Stephens's position. CIT correctly argues that this circuit has held that a slight decrease in pay coupled with some loss of supervisory responsibilities is insufficient to constitute a constructive discharge. See Jett, 798 F.2d 748 (loss of coaching responsibilities was not so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign); Jurgens v. E.E.O.C., 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990). In both Jett and Jurgens, in which the employees claimed to have received discriminatory demotions and constructive discharges, this court found insufficient evidence of constructive discharge, stating that the employer had not harassed the employees after the demotion and the demotions were not a harbinger of [the employee's] dismissal. Jurgens, 903 F.2d at 392. On the other hand, in Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 803 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1986), this court held that Guthrie, who believed that termination was inevitable, had been constructively discharged. Guthrie, 803 F.2d at 207. Although the evidence is less overwhelming in this case than in the Guthrie case, Stephens reasonably could have believed that his demotion was a harbinger of dismissal. CIT's actions after demoting Stephens could make a reasonable employee believe that he risked termination if he remained on the job. Even if CIT did not plan to terminate Stephens, it certainly had no 8 intentions of promoting him, and the permanence of [a] demotion is a factor to consider under the constructive discharge analysis . . . . Jurgens, 903 F.2d at 392. We find that when viewed in the light most favorable to Stephens, sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict.