Opinion ID: 1060750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Race-Based Testimony

Text: We next turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify about the alleged harmful effects of an interracial relationship on a minor child. Teri Parker argues that the issue of race was injected into the proceeding and improperly considered by the court in making its custody decision. The appellee Richard Parker maintains that the trial court expressly denied using race as a factor and applied the appropriate factors governing child custody. The appropriate factors governing child custody are set out below and exclude race. In a child custody case, the needs of the children are paramount. Lentz v. Lentz, 717 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tenn.1986). Every effort must be made to promote the child's interest by placing the child in an environment that will best serve his or her physical and emotional needs. See Luke v. Luke, 651 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn.1983). Among the relevant factors for consideration include: the age, habits, mental and emotional make-up of the child and those parties competing for custody; the education and experience of those seeking to raise the child; their character and propensities as evidenced by their past conduct; the financial and physical circumstances available in the home of each party seeking custody and the special requirements of the child; the availability and extent of third party support; the associations and influences to which the child is most likely to be exposed in the alternatives afforded, both positive and negative; and where is the greater likelihood of an environment for the child of love, warmth, stability, support, consistency, care and concern, and physical and spiritual nurture. Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn.App.1996) (quoting Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn.App.1983)); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (1996 & Supp.1998). In considering all of these factors, the court must undertake a comparative fitness analysis by which it determines which of the available custodians is comparatively more fit than the other. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d at 630; In re Parsons, 914 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Tenn.App.1995). In considering all relevant circumstances, however, a court may not consider the effects or alleged effects of racial prejudice. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984), the father sought a change of custody because the mother, who was Caucasian, was living with an African-American man, whom she later married. The trial court made the following findings: It is of some significance ... that the mother did see fit to bring a man into her home and carry on a sexual relationship with him without being married to him. Such action tended to place gratification of her own desires ahead of her concern for the child's future welfare. This Court feels that despite the strides that have been made in bettering relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that [the child] will, if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains school age and thus more vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come. 466 U.S. at 431, 104 S.Ct. at 1881 (emphasis omitted). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court observed that the trial court had made no other findings regarding the mother's fitness and that, therefore, the sole determining factor applied by the trial court was race. The Court began its analysis by observing that [i]t would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist and that there is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may by subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin. 466 U.S. at 433, 104 S.Ct. at 1882. The Court concluded, however: The question ... is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. Id. (footnote omitted). The Court therefore held that [t]he effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody. 466 U.S. at 434, 104 S.Ct. at 1882-83. This Court is troubled by the interjection of race based testimony in these proceedings, which is so clearly prohibited in Palmore . The trial court allowed a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert regarding the alleged harmful effects upon a child from an interracial relationship. When counsel for Richard Parker made inquiries as to the racial issue in his cross-examination of Gail Scism, the trial judge remarked that he and Ms. Scism were from the same school and that the views of society are different today. Although the trial judge later explained that his comments were aimed at unmarried people shacking up or living together, there is no evidence in this record to show that Teri Parker and Dr. Sidberry lived together. Finally, we observe that as part of the final divorce judgment, the trial court ordered that the child was to have no contact with Dr. Sidberrya condition that was not discussed or requested by any party to the case. [1] In applying the Palmore decision to the present case, however, it is apparent that there are differences. First, in Palmore , custody was granted to the natural mother and the father later filed for a change in custody. Second, the trial court's ruling in Palmore was solely based on race. In contrast, this case involves an initial custody hearing and a comparison of the fitness of the two parents where evidence of a racial factor was admitted. At the post-trial hearing on the statement of evidence, the trial court denied that he considered race while excluding comments alleged to reflect racial bias. He indicated that his concern was the presence of an extramarital affair that interfered with the well-being of the child. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, 831 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tenn.App.1991) (sexual indiscretion does not, by itself, disqualify a parent from being awarded custody, but it may be a relevant factor if it involves the neglect of the child). As an appellate court, we recognize that the trial court must exercise broad discretion in child custody matters. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d at 631. We accept the trial court's statement that race did not play a part in its decision-making in awarding custody to the father. Moreover, it appears that the trial court properly weighed the relevant factors in performing the comparative fitness analysis. Although nothing before this Court indicates that either parent is unfit, the evidence in the limited record does not preponderate against the judgment awarding custody to Richard Parker. The judgment is therefore affirmed.