Opinion ID: 1475144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Interpreter Act Issue

Text: We first dispose of Mr. Mesa's argument that because the Office of Interpreter Services, authorized in D.C.Code § 2-1911 (2001), [6] has not been established, no qualified interpreter could be provided, and hence, his motion to suppress his statements should have been granted. D.C.Code § 2-1901(5) defines Qualified interpreter as a person who is listed by the Office of Interpreter Services as being skilled in the language or form of communication needed to communicate accurately with a communication-impaired person and who is able to translate information to and from the communication-impaired person. While it is true, as we recognized in Ko, supra, that the statutory central and government-wide Office of Interpreter Services does not exist, there is a functionally equivalent D.C. Courts' Office of Court Interpreting Services (OCIS) with respect to the work of the D.C. Courts. Under statutory interpretation principles, a court may refuse to adhere strictly to the plain wording of a statute in order `to effectuate the legislative purpose,' as determined by a reading of the legislative history or by an examination of the statute as a whole. Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 A.2d 466, 471 (D.C. 2002). The legislative history shows that the statutory Office of Interpreter Services was envisioned as the central location in the District government for coordinating interpreter services. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT ON BILL 7-108, INTERPRETERS FOR HEARING IMPAIRED AND NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING PERSONS ACT OF 1987, June 11, 1987 (Council Report), at 4. But, to achieve the pivotal purpose of providing competent interpreter services, the Council also recognized that the D.C. Courts might need a supplementary interpreter service program, [7] or, as it specified in D.C.Code § 2-1911(c)(1), it might be impractical [] to request the assistance of the Office in locating a qualified interpreter. [8] Indeed, in approving the Act, the Council's overriding purpose was to provide for qualified interpreters to assist hearing impaired and non-English speaking persons as they participate in proceedings of the D.C. Court System, the Council of the District of Columbia, and the District's administrative agencies. Council Report, at 1. Here, the record reveals that resort to the D.C. Courts' OCIS was unnecessary because the police and Gallaudet collaborated to ensure competent sign language interpreter services for Mr. Mesa before he was arrested. Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the existence or non-existence of the statutory Office of Interpreter Services is irrelevant to the ultimate statutory issue in this case. Mr. Mesa's major challenge is to his alleged waiver of rights under the Act. Essentially he claims that his waiver was not valid because it was not approved by an appointing authority, within the meaning of the Interpreter Act. Our resolution of this challenge requires us to reconcile related parts of the Act, Gonzalez, supra, 498 A.2d at 1174, and to read the words of the various parts of the Act in the light of the statute as a whole, Gallagher, supra, 734 A.2d at 1091. Here, we must read § 2-1902(e) together with pertinent parts of §§ 2-1902(a), (b), (c), and (d), and with § 2-1906, all in light of the statute as a whole. Section 2-1902(e) provides: Whenever a communication-impaired person is arrested and taken into custody for an alleged violation of a criminal law, the arresting officer shall procure a qualified interpreter for any custodial interrogation, warning, notification of rights, or taking of a statement. No person who has been arrested but who is otherwise eligible for release shall be held in custody pending arrival of an interpreter. No answer, statement, or admission, written or oral, made by a communication-impaired person in reply to a question of a law-enforcement officer in any criminal or delinquency proceeding may be used against that communication-impaired person unless either the answer, statement, or admission was made or elicited through a qualified interpreter and was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently or, in the case of a waiver, unless the court makes a special finding upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the answer, statement, or admission made by the communication-impaired person was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. D.C.Code § 2-1906(a) specifies: (a) A communication-impaired person entitled to the services of an interpreter under this chapter may waive the services of a qualified interpreter in whole or in part. The waiver must be made in writing, or orally on the record, by the communication-impaired person following consultation with that person's attorney. If the person does not have an attorney, the waiver must be made in writing by the communication-impaired person in that person's written language and the waiver must be approved in writing, by the appointing authority. The first sentence of § 2-1902(e) reveals that this section applies to a communication-impaired person who has been arrested and taken into custody for an alleged violation of a criminal law. Under those circumstances, the section imposes on the arresting officer the responsibility for obtaining a qualified interpreter for any custodial interrogation, warning, notification of rights, or taking of a statement. § 2-1902(e). In contrast, § 2-1902(a) applies to a communication-impaired person who is a party or witness or to a juvenile whose parent or parents are communication-impaired, and to a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, that is, a court proceeding[]. D.C.Code § 2-1902(a); [9] Council Report, at 7. In that instance, it is the appointing authority who has the responsibility for appointing a qualified interpreter. § 2-1902(a). Similarly, under section (c), [10] when a communication-impaired person is a party or a witness in an administrative proceeding before a department, board, commission, agency, or licensing authority of the District of Columbia, the responsibility for appointing a qualified interpreter falls on the person conducting the proceeding. § 2-1902(c). And, if a person is a witness before any legislative committee, the appointing authority is the person conducting the proceeding. D.C.Code § 2-1902(d). [11] Unlike subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d), subsection (e) includes waiver language and assigns responsibility to the court for determining whether an answer, statement or admission made by the communication-impaired person was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. [12] The last part of subsection (e) focuses on the use in any criminal or delinquency proceeding of an answer, statement, or admission or any attempt to assert a communication-impaired person's waiver of the right to a qualified interpreter. Thus, the reference to the court in that setting is significant and understandable in relation to D.C.Code § 2-1906(a). Under § 2-1906(a), a communication-impaired person may waive his or her right to a qualified interpreter. If the communication-impaired person does not have an attorney at the time the waiver is made, as in the case before us, the waiver must be in writing, and the waiver must be approved in writing, by the appointing authority. Id. [13] Properly interpreted, the reference to the appointing authority in § 2-1906(a) parallels the reference to the court in § 2-1902(e), that is, it refers to the judge who handles the judicial proceeding. [14] After reviewing the pertinent provisions of the Interpreter Act and the record, we are satisfied that the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the Act, and in concluding that Mr. Mesa waived his right to a qualified interpreter. In Barrera v. United States, 599 A.2d 1119 (D.C.1991), we emphasized that [t]he goal of the Act is to create an independent right to an interpreter `in th[e] situation of custodial interrogation [when] Miranda [] rights and the right to due process come into effect.' Id. at 1131. To achieve this goal, [t]he statute grants to any person who does not speak English [or who is deaf] and is taken into custody and questioned by the police the unrestricted right to a qualified interpreter. Id. at 1130. Mr. Mesa was not in a situation of custodial interrogation on February 12, 2001, and he made no incriminating statement. Nevertheless, as we said in Barrera, the Act allowed Mr. Mesa to waive any right to a qualified interpreter that he may have had on February 12, 2001, without a lawyer, so long as the waiver is in writing. [15] 599 A.2d at 1131. In that respect, even assuming that Mr. Mesa had a right to a qualified interpreter on February 12, 2001, he duly waived that right. Before the detectives spoke with Mr. Mesa on February 12, 2001, Detective Reed gave him a waiver form pertaining to his right to a qualified interpreter. He read the form, and expressed no difficulty in understanding it. Two full-time skilled and competent interpreters employed by Gallaudet University were present. Mr. Mesa knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily signed the waiver form. Detective Reed tested Mr. Mesa's knowledge of English through a questionnaire she devised which called for certain personal information. [16] Mr. Mesa makes no claim that he is unable to read. He knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily signed two other waiver forms on February 12, 2001  one giving the police permission to take a DNA sample, and the other to take his fingerprints. He signed the last two forms after Detective Reed read the forms to him and also explained the forms to him orally through American Sign Language interpreters. After reviewing the record of proceedings on February 12, 2001, we agree with the trial court that Mr. Mesa knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to a qualified interpreter under the Interpreter Act. On February 13, 2001, Mr. Mesa voluntarily approached the police on two different occasions  once to inquire about when he could return to his room. He made no incriminating statement at that time. His second voluntary contact with the police on February 13, 2001, resulted from his desire to tell the police something. No questions had been posed to Mr. Mesa when he blurted out to the interpreters who were present, to be honest with you I did it. He continued to speak voluntarily until Detective Reed cut him off to ask whether he was willing to go to the police station, together with the two interpreters from Gallaudet University, so that his statement could be videotaped. He agreed and was taken to police headquarters without restraint. There, he was given a fresh waiver of qualified interpreter form. The two highly experienced and trained interpreters, Ms. Ressler and Ms. Beldon-Feldman (both were also trained in signing Miranda rights), who had been full-time Gallaudet employees for several years, provided interpretation services as the detectives explained the form to him. [17] Mr. Mesa signed the form. We agree with the trial court that on February 13, 2001, Mr. Mesa not only waived his right to a qualified interpreter, that is, one appointed by the court, but significantly, he had competent and highly skilled interpreters to assist him on that date. [T]he determination of the competence of an interpreter is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been abused. Gonzalez v. United States, 697 A.2d 819, 825 (D.C.1997) (citations omitted). On this record we see no abuse of discretion and no indication of translator incompetence, id., despite the testimony of defense witness Coulston whom the trial court discredited, and defense witness Colonomos whose testimony was not deemed to raise material problems. Consequently, Mr. Mesa cannot prevail on his argument that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the trial court violated the Interpreter Act.