Opinion ID: 2460345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence in General

Text: In her second issue, Ward reasserts the arguments she made before the Court of Appeals, i.e., that there was no direct evidence that Ward was involved in the 17 crimes for which she was convicted and that Stinnett's testimony lacked credibility. Our standard of review is well known and was properly cited by the Court of Appeals: When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Northcutt, 290 Kan. 224, 231, 224 P.3d 564 (2010); State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 83, 201 P.3d 673 (2009). We agree with the Court of Appeals that there is strong evidence of Ward's involvement, including direct evidence, and the issue of credibility was resolved by the jury and will not be reweighed on appeal. In the light most favorable to the prosecution, Stinnett's testimony established that the four controlled drug buys took place. Certainly, Stinnett's credibility was in question during the trial, but the defense was given ample opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine her. Additionally, the jury was made aware that Stinnett was cooperating with law enforcement in exchange for the dismissal of charges against her, some of which were drug related, and the trial court gave a cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of a confidential informant. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, the credibility of Stinnett was solely within the province of the jury and not within that of an appellate court, which does not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. Gant, 288 Kan. at 80, 201 P.3d 673. Ward also asserts her convictions should be reversed because there is only circumstantial evidence to support them. The legal premise of this argument is ill-founded because the law clearly allows a conviction of even the gravest offense to be based on circumstantial evidence. State v. Becker, 290 Kan. 842, 852, 235 P.3d 424 (2010) (stating general principle and noting that specific intent need not be shown by direct proof but may be shown by acts, circumstances, and reasonable inferences deducible therefrom); State v. Tyler, 286 Kan. 1087, 1095, 191 P.3d 306 (2008) (circumstantial evidence is evidence of events or circumstances from which reasonable factfinder may infer existence of material fact in issue). Certainly, Ward was free to argue to the jury that the circumstantial nature of much of the evidence created reasonable doubt, but on appeal we accept the circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the State when assessing sufficiency. Further, the factual premise of Ward's argument is also ill-founded because there was direct evidenceobservationsof the transactions by officers and Stinnett. In this regard, in Ward's petition for review and supplemental arguments, she focuses on the fact that Detective Wagenseller admitted during his testimony that he did not actually see Ward and Stinnett exchange money or cocaine during any of the four controlled drug buys, that he never recovered any marked purchase money from Ward, and that no law enforcement officers actually saw Stinnett dial Ward's phone number. And even though there was a videotape of some of the controlled buys, Deputy Troy Briggs testified Ward could not actually be seen in any of the recordings. Briggs indicated that he saw Stinnett enter and exit Ward's house on January 25 and January 31, 2007, but he admitted that he could not observe what happened inside. Yet, the officers observed many aspects of the transactions, saw Ward in the blue Suburban, overheard conversations, and verified many aspects of Stinnett's testimony. For example, Officer Roy Williams testified that prior to this case he had known Ward for about 5 years and had numerous conversations with Ward in his capacity as a narcotics officer. Williams confirmed that Stinnett dialed Ward's phone number in each of the controlled drug buys. He also testified that he recognized Ward's voice on the audiotapes of the transactions and that he knew Ward owned a blue Suburban. Other officers explained the steps taken to control the buys and to maintain audio and video surveillance that allowed them to witness the general nature of the events. In light of this evidence, we conclude that, even though the officers who monitored the drug transactions did not witness the actual exchange of money and cocaine between Ward and Stinnett, their observations and testimony, when considered along with Stinnett's testimony, provide more than sufficient evidence that Ward sold Stinnett crack cocaine on the four separate occasions identified in the charges. Affirmed. PAUL E. MILLER, District Judge, assigned. [1] ROSEN, J., dissenting: I agree with the majority's well-reasoned opinion up to the point where it finds the error in the trial court's failure to grant the defendant's motion for mistrial harmless. As the majority concludes, a trial court almost always abuses its discretion to take control of the courtroom when it allows witnesses or nonwitnesses to be brought before a jury in jail clothing without articulated justification. Much thought and planning has been given to the creation of the courtroom setting in which the pursuit of justice is to be carried out. We strive for an ambience of dignity, consideration, respect, and, most of all, impartiality, in which each witness' testimony is given its due evidentiary weight. When inmates in their inescapably identifiable bright orange prison attire are purposely paraded into the courtroom as part of the staging of the prosecution of an accused, it cannot help but prejudice the jury's perception of the lifestyle and associations of the defendant, thereby compromising the heart of the impartial proceedings we so fervently strive to achieve. In this case, the State's procuring of the involuntary appearance of West and Jackson in the courtroom gallery and their forced participation in Ward's trial while wearing and being identified specifically by their prison attire clearly set them apart from that group of peers and citizens that are typically observers of a public trial. Repeatedly calling the jury's attention to the orange jumpsuits that these individuals were wearing was blatantly prejudicial in that it directly called the jury's attention to the relationship between the defendant and the spectators in oranges, which served to declare the defendant guilty by sartorial association. All that was missing was a theater orchestra playing a bar show/vaudeville parody of Stephen Sondheim's melody entitled Send in the Cons. I regard this tactic as an impermissible manipulation by the prosecution that created immeasurable prejudice to the defendant, which could not be overcome by the weight of the remaining evidence against her. I would find the trial court's error in failing to grant Ward's motion for mistrial not harmless and would reverse and remand for a fair trial. JOHNSON, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.