Opinion ID: 4462528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kimbrew’s Bribery Conviction Was Supported by

Text: Sufficient Evidence Kimbrew argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his bribery conviction. Specifically, he contends 8 UNITED STATES V. KIMBREW that the government failed to prove that he could “make good” on his promises, and therefore he did not commit an “official act” within the meaning of the bribery statute. Kimbrew’s argument is both factually and legally incorrect. A public official commits bribery if he “corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value . . . in return for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official act.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A). An official act is “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). The bribe recipient need not be the final decisionmaker. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2370 (2016). “A public official may also make a decision or take an action on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ by using his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act.’” Id. So too, a public official may be liable under § 201 if he “uses his official position to provide advice to another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another official.” Id. Moreover, the bribe recipient “is not required to actually make a decision or take an action on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’; it is enough that the official agree to do so.” Id. at 2370–71. It is immaterial whether the bribe recipient ever intended to follow through with his end of the bargain, so long as he agreed to perform the official act. Id. Kimbrew contends that the government lacked evidence that he actually had any influence over the City Attorney or the Congresswoman. On the contrary, the evidence UNITED STATES V. KIMBREW 9 presented at trial satisfies the relatively low burden applicable on sufficiency of the evidence review. See Nevils, 598 F.3d. at 1161, 1164. It is immaterial that the evidence was disputed, because we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume that the jury resolved all conflicts in the record against the defendant. See id. The evidence shows that Kimbrew and the City Attorney knew each other, and that both worked out of Compton City Hall. Kimbrew acted as the Congresswoman’s liaison in certain local affairs and attended city council meetings as her representative. Although the City Attorney denied that Kimbrew had any influence over him, the jury also heard recorded conversations in which Kimbrew attested that he did in fact have such influence. This factual dispute was a matter to be resolved by the jury, which could have reasonably believed Kimbrew’s representations over the City Attorney’s denial. The jury could have doubted that the City Attorney would implicate Kimbrew, particularly when doing so might cast a shadow on his own reputation as well. So too, the jury may have reasonably believed that planned testimony was less likely to be sincere than a surreptitiously recorded conversation. On this record, a rational jury could have reasonably concluded that Kimbrew in fact had the ability to exert the promised influence. Similarly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Kimbrew had a means of influencing the Congresswoman’s actions. Kimbrew served on the Congresswoman’s staff, and he represented her within the Compton area. Green Legendz was operating unlawfully within her district, and Kimbrew’s job responsibilities included “bring[ing] information back that the [C]ongresswoman . . . should be aware of.” Based on this showing, a rational factfinder could 10 UNITED STATES V. KIMBREW have found that Kimbrew wielded the influence he said he did, i.e., that he could have brought the dispensary’s illicit operation to the Congresswoman’s attention, characterized it as a substantial problem within her district, and persuaded her to help get it shut down. Finally, Kimbrew contends that it would have been impossible for him to help secure an operating permit for Green Legendz, because marijuana dispensaries were categorically unlawful in the City of Compton. Thus, his argument goes, there was no “official act,” because permitting a dispensary “fell outside any official’s purview[:] . . . it was not a matter either pending, or which by law could be brought, before any public official, anywhere.” Kimbrew concedes that he represented to the UC that plans were underway to permit a limited number of marijuana dispensaries to operate in the City, but he argues that these representations were false. However, Kimbrew does not point to any evidence—let alone irrefutable evidence—to support his position. The jury reasonably could have taken Kimbrew’s recorded statements at facevalue, and accepted as true that the City had pending plans to permit a small number of marijuana dispensaries to operate. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Kimbrew could have exerted influence to help obtain the promised permit at a later date— after the City’s plans had come to fruition. The statutory definition of “official act” contains broad temporal language that indicates the question or matter at issue need not currently be pending or capable of being brought before a public official. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (referring to questions or matters “which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public UNITED STATES V. KIMBREW 11 official”) (emphases added). This language encompasses scenarios in which a briber might anticipatorily seek to induce official action relevant to a circumstance yet-tocome. For example, on the eve of anticipated marijuana legalization—but while its sale was still illegal—an entrepreneur might bribe an official to “reserve” his services to help obtain a future dispensary permit. A quid pro quo of that nature remains a private inducement attached to the provision of a “formal exercise of government power,” see McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2369–70, albeit a contingent one. But a bribe tied to a contingency is no less a bribe. Kimbrew’s permit-related promise fits that mold. Kimbrew represented that, in the near future, the City of Compton would permit a small number of dispensaries to operate. In response, the UC sought to make “arrangements” for Green Legendz to be one of those dispensaries. Against that backdrop, the absence of a permitting architecture at the moment of agreement is not dispositive. It is true that the contingency never came to be, and Green Legendz got shut down, but § 201 liability does not depend on an outcome; the offense is complete at the moment of agreement, and that agreement need not even be accompanied by the bribe recipient’s genuine intentions to follow through. Regardless, the prosecution was not required to prove that Kimbrew could achieve the outcome he promised. The relevant inquiry, instead, is whether Kimbrew agreed to “us[e] his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act,’ or to advise another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another official.” McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372; see also United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that “a person may be convicted of bribery [under § 201(b)(2)] even 12 UNITED STATES V. KIMBREW though the action requested is not within the official’s power to perform”). Nowhere in the statute or in the governing case law is there a requirement that the bribe recipient be able to succeed in exerting that pressure or persuading through his advice to realize the desired result. A contrary reading would run afoul of the process- oriented, rather than results-oriented, nature of the offense. As noted, the offense of bribery is complete upon the agreement between the briber and the public official. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370–71. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the official need not follow through to be found guilty. Id. The official can be convicted even if he never intended to perform the official act for which he was bribed. Id. at 2371. In short, execution is immaterial. It logically follows, then, that § 201 is not limited by the odds of success of the quo at issue. The reach of § 201 is not unlimited. For example, the “official act” core of § 201 carries with it a requirement that there be a nexus between the public official’s position and the quo he promises. But this only takes Kimbrew so far. His official responsibilities included engaging with the local Compton government, serving as a representative in that community, and informing the Congresswoman of any local activity of which she should be aware. Accordingly, the quos at issue bore a nexus to Kimbrew’s official role.