Opinion ID: 770890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Divestiture of District Court's Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Local Civil Actions

Text: 14 Parrott's effort to obtain collateral relief before the Territorial Court under the local habeas statute requires us once again to clarify the scope of the jurisdictional changes brought about by Congress's 1984 amendments to the Revised Organic Act. See 48 U.S.C. SS 1611-1616 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000). 3 15 With the 1984 amendments, Congress established the framework for a dual system of local and federal judicial review in the Virgin Islands. By virtue of these amendments, the District Court now possesses the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States. 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a). 4 After the 1984 amendments, the District Court continued to possess its statutorily granted local jurisdiction. The Virgin Islands Legislature was now able, however, to divest the District Court of original jurisdiction for local matters by vesting that jurisdiction in territorial courts established by local law for all causes for which any court established by the Constitution and laws of the United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction. 48 U.S.C. S 1611(b). 16 To the extent that that divestiture power is exercised by the legislature, the District Court loses jurisdiction to the Territorial Court over local matters. 5 See 48 U.S.C. S 1612(b); see also Estate Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Ct. of Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that, following the enactment of S 1612, divestiture is not self-executing). Section 1612(b) provided the mechanism to eliminate the overlap between the District Court and the Territorial Court on local matters: 17 The purpose of section 22(b) [48 U.S.C. S 1612(b)] is to eliminate the present situation of both the district court and the local court having jurisdiction over strictly local causes. Upon the effective date, the district court will not [sic] longer have jurisdiction over any cause over which local law has vested jurisdiction in the local courts. The decision as to whether jurisdiction over strictly local causes should be vested in the district courts or the local courts will be made by local law. At any time,... by vesting jurisdiction in the local courts, the local law will have the effect of divesting the district court of jurisdiction. 18 103 Cong. Rec. S10527 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (statement by Sen. Weicker) (emphasis added). 19 This divestiture is reinforced by S 1613 of the Revised Organic Act, which formalizes the separate institutional relationship between the District Court and the Territorial Court for, among other questions, habeas petitions: 20 The relations between the courts established by the Constitution or laws of the United States and the courts established by local law with respect to... the issuance of writs of habeas corpus... shall be governed by the laws of the United States pertaining to the relations between the courts of the United States, including the Supreme Court of the United States, and the courts of the several States in such matters and proceedings. 21 48 U.S.C. S 1613. This section ensures that the relations between the local courts of the Virgin Islands and the federal courts... shall be the same as the relation between the state courts and the federal courts.... 130 Cong. Rec. S10527 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (statement by Sen. Weicker). 22 The Territorial Legislature took the first steps toward eliminating concurrent jurisdiction in 1991 when it divested the District Court of original jurisdiction over purely local civil matters. See 4 V.I. Code Ann. S 76(a) (1997). 6 As we reasoned in Brow, S 1613 of the Revised Organic Act acts in combination with S 76(a) of the V.I. Code to effectively repeal any grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the District Court over local actions once the Virgin Islands Legislature has vested jurisdiction over local civil actions in the Territorial Court. See Brow, 994 F.2d at 1035-36 (recognizing implicit repeal in 4 V.I. Code Ann. S 32). 23 Because habeas proceedings are generally considered civil in nature, see Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987), the term civil action includes habeas petitions. 7 Thus, S 76(a)'s implied repeal of the District Court's jurisdiction for local civil actions governs our interpretation of the grant of jurisdiction in S 1303. 24 The situation here is complicated, however, by the fact that, despite S 76(a)'s grant of jurisdiction in local actions to the Territorial Court, the Virgin Islands code continues to provide that [t]he writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the district court, upon petition by or on behalf of any person restrained of his liberty. 5 V.I. Code Ann. S 1303 (emphasis added). We must, therefore, determine whether the 1984 amendments affected the jurisdictional provisions inherent in the language of S 1303 in that that section's specific reference to writs of habeas corpus being granted by the district court has never been amended. However, when interpreting other Virgin Islands statutes in which the grant of jurisdiction over civil actions had been made expressly to the district court, as it was in the habeas provision, we have reached the conclusion that the reference to the district court had been impliedly repealed. See Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 1995) (construing implied repeal for 5 V.I. Code Ann. S 1421); Tamarind Resort Assoc. v. Government of Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 1998) (construing same for 21 V.I. Code Ann. S 913(d)). We conclude that there is ample precedent in our interpretation of other Virgin Islands statutes to conclude that the reference to the district court in S 1303 has been impliedly repealed by S 76(a). Cf. Walker v. Government of Virgin Islands (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2000) (holding that District Court properly determined it was without jurisdiction to grant habeas relief under S 1303 to prisoner convicted in Territorial Court). 25 We note that when the District Court tried Parrott's case, it did so as a local court acting under its then general jurisdiction, which authorized it to serve the dual functions of local territorial and federal court. The District Court no longer fulfills these twin roles. Nevertheless, this former duality of function does not prevent us from finding that the elimination of the District Court's territorial function impliedly repealed its territorial habeas function. 26 In sum, because S 76(a) operates to divest the District Court of jurisdiction for all civil actions, including habeas proceedings, we hold that the correct forum for Parrott's habeas petition under 5 V.I. Code Ann. S 1303 is not the District Court but the Territorial Court. Nor are we dissuaded from reaching this result because the District Court now has the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States. As explained in the next section, while that newly bestowed status circumscribes the District Court's original jurisdiction, it does not create a constitutional obstacle to the Territorial Court's review of its earlier decisions. 27