Opinion ID: 845996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the high court's precedent regarding the statutory maximum

Text: The United States Supreme Court grappled over a long period with the judicial modification of sentences using facts found by a judge after a jury's verdict. These facts are known as sentencing factors. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, [8] the Court addressed the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's mandatory minimum sentencing act, 42 Pa Cons Stat 9712 (1982). That act provided for a mandatory minimum sentence for certain felonies if the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant `visibly possessed a firearm' during the commission of the offense. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). The Court found that the visible-possession requirement was a mere sentencing factor that did not change the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 86-88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. And it made another important point: there are constitutional limitations on the degree to which a state may whittle away the factual support needed to prove a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It also paid special attention to the fact that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9712 did not increase the maximum penalty faced by the defendant: Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm. [ McMillan, supra at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. 2411.] The Supreme Court returned to the discussion of sentencing factors in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). In that case, the Court addressed whether the federal carjacking statute [9] constituted three separate crimes or one crime with sentencing factors that increased the maximum penalty. Id. at 229, 119 S.Ct. 1215. The Court concluded that a fair reading of the statute required it to find three separate offenses. But it went on to discuss alternative reasons under constitutional law for requiring that all the elements be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court's focus quickly centered on McMillan's discussion of an increase in the maximum penalty: The terms of the carjacking statute illustrate very well what is at stake. If serious bodily injury were merely a sentencing factor under § 2119(2) (increasing the authorized penalty by two thirds, to 25 years), then death would presumably be nothing more than a sentencing factor under subsection (3) (increasing the penalty range to life). If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life on a nonjury determination, the jury's role would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping: in some cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sentence would merely open the door to a judicial finding sufficient for life imprisonment. [ Id. at 243-244, 119 S.Ct. 1215.] The Supreme Court found the diminution of the jury's role of great concern. It indicated that removal from the jury of control over the facts necessary for determining a statutory sentencing range would raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue. Id. at 248, 119 S.Ct. 1215. The Court stated that any doubt on this issue of statutory construction must be resolved in favor of avoiding such Sixth Amendment questions. Id. at 251, 119 S.Ct. 1215. The next step in the Supreme Court's discussion of sentencing factors came in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Apprendi centered on a New Jersey hate-crime law. The statute allowed for an increase in the defendant's maximum sentence from ten to 20 years if the trial court found that the defendant `acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.' Id. at 468-469, 120 S.Ct. 2348 quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:44-3(e). The sentencing judge could make the finding based on a preponderance of the evidence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In its analysis, the Supreme Court specifically built on its holding in Jones. It concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution commanded the same answer for state statutes. Id. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Apprendi Court found that a legislature could not change the elements of a crime simply by labeling some of them sentencing factors. It found that such attempts run afoul of due process and violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment protections. Instead, the Court stated, a sentencing court could exercise its judicial discretion on sentencing factors only as long as the sentence imposed fell within the appropriate statutory limits. Id. at 481-482, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Court expressed concern that a defendant not be deprived of his or her liberty or otherwise stigmatized by a conviction and sentence. To that end, procedural practices must adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirement that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to constitute the statutory offense. Id. at 483-484, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Court reasoned that increasing punishment beyond the statutory maximum violated those principles: If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should notat the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstancesbe deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached. [ Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 2348.] The Supreme Court went on to make a concise reiteration of its holding. In doing so, it used the phrase statutory maximum: In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in that case: [I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [ Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-253, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (Stevens, J., concurring).] The Supreme Court continued its discussion of the statutory maximum in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). That case dealt with the Sixth Amendment implications of Arizona's first-degree murder statute. The statute stated that first-degree murder was punishable by death or life in prison. It then referred to another statute that directed the trial judge to conduct a separate sentencing hearing. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the existence of specific circumstances (sentencing factors) in order to decide whether a death sentence was appropriate. Id. at 592-593, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Supreme Court, relying on its previous decisions in Jones and Apprendi, found that Arizona's system violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The Court reiterated: The dispositive question, we said, is one not of form, but of effect. If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant may not be expose[d] ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. [ Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428 quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-483, 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (citations omitted; emphasis in Apprendi ).] Notwithstanding that the statute allowed for either life in prison or death, the Supreme Court found that the statutory maximum was life imprisonment. This is because the death sentence could be imposed only after additional factual findings by a judge. The Supreme Court found nothing to distinguish this case from Apprendi. Ring, 536 U.S. at 604-606, 122 S.Ct. 2428. It reached this conclusion because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors were the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment required that a jury find these factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. It was in Blakely that the Supreme Court fully explained the meaning of the phrase statutory maximum. In that case, the defendant had pleaded guilty in the state of Washington of second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and the use of a firearm. The standard sentencing range for the offense was 49 to 53 months in prison. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298-299, 124 S.Ct. 2531. But, under Washington's sentencing guidelines, a court could impose a sentence above the standard range if it found substantial and compelling reasons to justify an exceptional sentence. Id. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Aside from the elements of the crime, the defendant in Blakely admitted to no other relevant facts. Id. However, after hearing the complainant's version of the kidnapping, the judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months. [10] He based this departure on his finding that there had been deliberate cruelty, a statutorily enumerated ground for departure in domestic violence cases. Id. at 300, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Washington argued that its system did not present a Sixth Amendment problem because the highest possible sentence was a maximum of ten years' imprisonment. Therefore, in no instance could an exceptional sentence exceed ten years. Id. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Instead, it defined the statutory maximum as the maximum sentence that can be imposed without judicial fact-finding: Our precedents make clear, however, that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper authority. [ Id. at 303-304, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).] Therefore, for Sixth Amendment purposes, the maximum sentence was not ten years. Instead, it was 53 months, the maximum sentence that could have been imposed solely on the basis of facts defendant admitted when pleading guilty. Id. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Supreme Court concluded that this determination alone properly effectuated the people's control of the judiciary that the Founding Fathers intended: Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice. One can certainly argue that both these values would be better served by leaving justice entirely in the hands of professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those following civil-law traditions, take just that course. There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers' paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury. As Apprendi held, every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment. [ Id. at 313, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis in original).] The final phase in the Supreme Court's discussion of judicial modification of statutory maximum sentences through sentencing factors came in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). In that case, the Court addressed the applicability of Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines. Booker [11] was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. The statute for this crime provided a maximum possible sentence of life in prison. But on the basis of Booker's criminal history and the quantity of cocaine base that the jury found was involved, the guidelines required a maximum sentence of 262 months' imprisonment. Instead of imposing that sentence on Booker, the trial court held a hearing during which it made additional findings of fact. It found that Booker had possessed an additional 566 grams of cocaine base and that he had obstructed justice. Accordingly, using a preponderance of the evidence test, the court increased the maximum sentence to 30 years in prison. Id. at 227, 125 S.Ct. 738. After a discussion of Jones, Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, the Supreme Court found the federal guidelines statutes indistinguishable from the Washington guidelines statutes at issue in Blakely. Booker's actual sentence, however, was 360 months, almost 10 years longer than the Guidelines range supported by the jury verdict alone. To reach this sentence, the judge found facts beyond those found by the jury: namely, that Booker possessed 566 grams of crack in addition to the 92.5 grams in his duffel bag. The jury never heard any evidence of the additional drug quantity, and the judge found it true by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, just as in Blakely, the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon finding some additional fact. There is no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentences imposed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in these cases. [ Id. at 235, 125 S.Ct. 738 quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citation omitted).] It again found irrelevant the fact that there existed an absolute maximum sentence set by statute. The maximum sentence could not be applied in every case. Instead, in cases like Booker's, the jury's verdict supports nothing other than a lower maximum sentence. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-235, 125 S.Ct. 738. In conclusion, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding from Apprendi: Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [ Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738.] On this basis, the Supreme Court invalidated the statutory provisions that make the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory. Id. at 226-227, 125 S.Ct. 738.