Opinion ID: 214654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jury’s Apportionment of Liability

Text: The jury held AmeriCor responsible for 35 percent of plaintiffs’ damages, apportioning 65 percent of the liability to Suffolk County and its employees. AmeriCor contends that the jury’s apportionment was against the weight of the evidence, and that “a new trial must be ordered with respect to this issue.” “[L]iability is apportioned by assessing the damage inflicted by each [joint tortfeasor],” and apportionment is therefore “an issue of fact for the jury.” Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiffs presented substantial evidence of AmeriCor’s blameworthiness, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s allocation of liability. See Kreppein v. Celotex Corp., 969 F.2d 1424, 1427 (2d Cir. 1992). The jury heard evidence that AmeriCor contracted with the County to provide medical care to detainees; that its employees worked in the jail 24 hours per day, every day; that AmeriCor employees played an integral role in jail operations, including in the detaineeintake process, the review of intake forms, and the monitoring and referral of detainees for 5 mental-health services; that AmeriCor knew of New York’s minimum standards for supervision of pretrial detainees; and that an AmeriCor nurse was aware that Sinkov had presented as a suicide risk and failed to order protective measures. The jury’s assignment of a relatively modest share of liability to AmeriCor was entirely reasonable. III. Expert Witness Testimony on Loss of Earning Capacity AmeriCor argues that expert testimony about Spencer Sinkov’s loss of earning capacity was impermissibly speculative, and was in any event irrelevant since neither Sinkov’s estate nor his parents were “entitled to recover lost earnings as there was no survivor who relied on [him] for financial support.” We find no reason to disturb the district court’s admission of the evidence. Trial courts have “great latitude in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony.” United States v. Onumonu, 967 F.2d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1992). Their decisions “[are] to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous.” Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702. “Whether a witness called to testify to any matter of opinion has such qualifications and knowledge as to make his testimony admissible is a preliminary question for the judge presiding at the trial, and his decision of it is conclusive, unless clearly shown to be erroneous as a matter of law.” Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, 130 U.S. 520, 527 (1889). We have held that “[w]here lost future earnings are at issue, an expert’s testimony should be excluded as speculative if it is based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the plaintiff’s future employment prospects.” Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 6 21 (2d Cir. 1996). However, “other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Estimates of a deceased person’s future earning capacity are inherently speculative to some degree. Cf. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1189 (2d Cir. 1992). However, it is within the district court’s discretion to determine “whether the expert acted reasonably in making assumptions of fact upon which he would base his testimony.” Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 1984), citing Fed. R. Evid. 703. Here, we agree with the district court that Dr. Crakes’s testimony was not based on unrealistic assumptions regarding Sinkov’s future employment prospects. Dr. Crakes provided the jury with three alternative calculations of Sinkov’s loss of earning potential, based on the earning capacities of (1) a secondary school teacher working until age 65; (2) a typical man who holds an associate’s degree, from age 22 to age 65; and (3) a typical man who holds a bachelor’s degree, from age 25 to age 65. Particularly in light of the educational credits Sinkov had already earned towards his associate’s degree before his death, as well as Sinkov’s stated intention to become a teacher, Dr. Crakes’s appraisals of loss of earning potential were rooted in the evidence. AmeriCor had every opportunity to argue to the jury that Sinkov’s use of drugs undercut the likelihood that he would accomplish these ambitions. And its argument apparently carried weight, as the jury dramatically discounted the expert’s projections, awarding plaintiffs $450,000 in damages on the deliberate indifference claim, 28 percent of Dr. Crake’s lowest earnings projection. The possibility that Sinkov would straighten himself out, complete his education, and 7 become a productive member of society was hardly so unlikely as to preclude the jury from considering it.1 Accordingly, AmeriCor’s speculativeness argument is one for the jury, as it “go[es] to the weight, not the admissibility,” of Dr. Crakes’s testimony. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1188. It was for the jury to consider how long Sinkov might have worked, in what jobs, and at what salary. The trial court was well within its discretion in concluding that Dr. Crakes’s testimony could assist the jury in performing its factfinding role. AmeriCor also argues that Dr. Crake’s testimony was irrelevant, contending that Sinkov’s estate was legally barred from recovering damages for loss of earning capacity. The argument ignores the significant distinction between state and federal law. AmeriCor correctly points out that under New York law, post-death lost-earnings damages are not recoverable in wrongful death cases where a decedent leaves behind no dependents and no persons who reasonably expect to receive future support from him. See Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2002); Zelizo v. Ullah, 769 N.Y.S.2d 255, 273 (1st Dep’t 2003). Had the district court admitted Dr. Crakes’s earnings testimony as bearing on plaintiffs’ state law claims, we would agree that his testimony was irrelevant and should have been excluded. But that is not what the district court did. The record makes clear that Dr. Crakes’s testimony regarding loss of earning 1 Indeed, it is not even clear that the jury intended to award any damages specifically for loss of earning capacity: the court instructed that the jury could award damages under § 1983 not only for pecuniary losses, but also for “intangible damages such as mental anguish, pain, suffering and the loss of Spencer’s enjoyment of life.” 8 capacity was introduced only for, and was explicitly limited to, the estate’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The New York authority on which AmeriCor relies does not address the extent of damages permitted in an action for violation of constitutional rights. We have long recognized that when state law damages limitations conflict with the purposes of § 1983, we need not defer to those limitations. We have concluded in the past, for example, that New York’s survival statute was inconsistent with § 1983 because (at the time) the New York statute “prevent[ed] the survival of claims for punitive damages after the death of the plaintiff’s decedent.” McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983). In McFadden, we stated that we have no doubt that limitations in a state survival statute have no application to a [§] 1983 suit brought to redress a denial of right that caused the decedent’s death. To whatever extent [§] 1988 makes state law applicable to [§] 1983 actions, it does not require deference to a survival statute that would bar or limit the remedies available under [§] 1983 for unconstitutional conduct that causes death. Id. (internal citation omitted). Several federal courts that have addressed the issue have applied similar logic to allow damages for loss of earning capacity in actions for constitutional violations.2 This Court, however, has not had occasion to address the issue. We decline to do so here. AmeriCor has not directly addressed, beyond a few 2 See, e.g., Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 2001); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1507 (10th Cir. 1990); Sparks v. Susquehanna Cnty., No. 3:05 Civ. 2274, 2009 WL 1598125, at  (M.D. Pa. 2009). 9 conclusory assertions, the appropriate standard for damages under § 1983, focusing instead on the undisputed point that New York law does not allow for such damages – an argument that is at best oblique to the federal question. “Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998). We decline to address a substantial and potentially farreaching issue without adequate briefing.