Opinion ID: 2455559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court erred in relying on collateral estoppel to dismiss the jensens' state law claims on summary judgment

Text: ¶ 39 The district court erred in applying collateral estoppel in this case because the legal standards for state and federal constitutional violations are different. Because the Jensens' state law claims involve important issues of Utah law, the federal district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims and instead remanded them to state court. P.J. ex rel. Jensen v. Utah, No. 2:05-CV-739 TS, 2008 WL 4372933, at , 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72334, at  (D.Utah Sept.22, 2008). The federal district court made no findings with regard to any of the Jensens' state law claims but dismissed, on the merits, all of their federal claims. Id. ¶ 40 In deciding the remanded claims, the state district court concluded that the Utah Constitution does not provide greater protections for parental rights than the Federal Constitution. The court ruled that the same set of undisputed facts that were material to the federal claims was also material to the state constitutional claims. And because the federal court determined that those material and undisputed facts were not sufficient to establish a violation of the Jensens' federal constitutional rights, the Jensens were precluded from arguing that their state constitutional rights were violated. The state district court erred in applying collateral estoppel in this way. ¶ 41 Collateral estoppel, otherwise known as issue preclusion, `prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit.' Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, ¶ 31, 194 P.3d 956 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ¶ 35, 73 P.3d 325). Issue preclusion applies only when the following four elements are satisfied: (i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted [was] a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication [was] identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action [was] completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit. . . resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Id. ¶ 29 (quoting Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, ¶ 12, 52 P.3d 1267). ¶ 42 To satisfy the second element of this test, the issue to be litigated must be identical in both cases. The defendants rely on Oman in support of their argument that the issue the state court faced here is identical to the one decided by the federal court. In Oman, we held that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from litigating his breach of contract claim in state court because a federal court had already determined that the employment contract had not been breached. Id. ¶ 32. The issue precluded from re-litigation in that case was whether the employment contract had been breached. Id. Generally, state law governs the interpretation of contracts. See, e.g., Summit Contractors, Inc. v. Legacy Corner, L.L.C., 147 Fed.Appx. 798, 800 (10th Cir. 2005). The federal court in Oman did not indicate a deviation from this norm. Therefore, because the breach of contract issue had been decided by the federal court using the same standard that would be applied in state court, the plaintiff was precluded from relitigating that issue in state court. See Oman, 2008 UT 70, ¶ 32, 194 P.3d 956. ¶ 43 But Oman is distinguishable from the situation presented here. This case is more analogous to a Maryland case, Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md.App. 268, 762 A.2d 172 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2000). There, the state court rejected the application of collateral estoppel after a federal district court dismissed a plaintiff's federal § 1983 claims based on federal qualified immunity standards. Id. at 182-83. When faced with the plaintiff's state constitutional claims based on the same series of events considered by the federal court, the state court refused to apply collateral estoppel because Maryland law governing qualified immunity from state law claims is not `identical' to federal law governing qualified immunity from section 1983 claims. Id. at 183. ¶ 44 The instant case presents a nearly identical scenario to that considered by the Maryland court in Thacker. Here, as in Thacker, the federal district court applied federal constitutional law and federal immunity standards to dismiss the Jensens' § 1983 claims on summary judgment. P.J. ex rel. Jensen, 2008 WL 4372933, at -31, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72334, at -99, aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., P.J. ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1194-1201 (10th Cir.2010). And the state district court granted summary judgment to the defendants because it determined it was bound by the dispositive issue in federal courtthat, as a matter of law, the material and undisputed facts did not give rise to a federal constitutional violation. But the state district court was not considering a federal constitutional violation. Rather, it was considering whether the facts gave rise to cognizable claims of state constitutional violations under state law. The determinations made by the federal judge, under federal law, regarding the materiality of the facts or the inferences that could be drawn from those facts were not dispositive as to questions arising under state law. Thus, unlike the situation in Oman, where the legal standard for analyzing a breach of contract claim was the same in both state and federal court, the standards for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to damages for a state constitutional violation differ from the standards for assessing claims under the federal constitution. ¶ 45 At the most fundamental level, the standards for state and federal constitutional claims are different because they are based on different constitutional language and different interpretive case law. See, e.g., State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 34, 162 P.3d 1106 (noting that Utah's search and seizure provisions (which are identical to those in the federal constitution) provide a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court (internal quotation marks omitted)); compare, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (federal due process clause), with Utah Const. art. I, § 7 (state due process clause), and id. art. I, § 1 (inherent and inalienable rights clause). ¶ 46 While some of the language of our state and federal constitutions is substantially the same, similarity of language does not indicate that this court moves in `lockstep' with the United States Supreme Court's [constitutional] analysis or foreclose our ability to decide in the future that our state constitutional provisions afford more rights than the federal Constitution. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 11 n. 2, 52 P.3d 1158; see also Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 33, 162 P.3d 1106; West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 1994); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n. 8 (Utah 1988). This idea underlies our reasoning in those cases where we have adopted the primacy approach, which dictates an analysis of state constitutional law before addressing any federal constitutional claims. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 33, 162 P.3d 1106; see also West, 872 P.2d at 1006. When utilizing this approach, we have stated, [t]his court, not the United States Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to interpret Utah's constitutional guarantees . . . and we owe federal law no more deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical state language. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 33, 162 P.3d 1106. Indeed, when a court is confronted with a state constitutional claim, the starting point is the language of the state constitution. Id. ¶ 47 In addition to the differences in constitutional language and interpretive case law, the framework for making out a claim for damages for a violation of one's constitutional rights is different under state and federal law. To recover for a violation of the United States Constitution under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's actions violated a [federal] constitutional or statutory right . . . [and] that this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (noting that courts are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first). The answers to these questions must be based on the language of the Federal Constitution. ¶ 48 In contrast, to recover monetary damages for a violation of the Utah Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the provision violated by the defendant is self-executing and then must establish three elements: (1) the plaintiff suffered a flagrant violation of his or her constitutional rights; (2) existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries; and (3) equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff's rights or redress his or her injuries. Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ., 2000 UT 87, ¶¶ 18, 23-25, 16 P.3d 533. The answers to these questions must be based on the language of the Utah Constitution. ¶ 49 Without an analysis of the independent protections afforded by our state constitution, the state district court dismissed the Jensens' state law claims because a federal court found that the undisputed material facts did not give rise to a federal constitutional violation. This was error. Because the state and federal standards for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to damages for a constitutional violation are different, a federal court determination that the material undisputed facts do not give rise to a federal constitutional violation does not preclude a state court from deciding whether those same facts will give rise to a state constitutional violation. [5] Therefore, the state district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants solely on the basis of collateral estoppel was in error.