Opinion ID: 2611911
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of Section 25123, Subdivision (e)

Text: (3a) The County contends that section 25123, subdivision (e), precludes the present ordinance from being subject to referendum. The subdivision provides that county ordinances which specifically relate to the adoption or implementation of a memorandum of understanding with an employee organization shall go into effect immediately, excepting them from the general rule that ordinances are to go into effect 30 days after the date of final passage. ( Ibid. ) We agree with the County's position. The right of voters of cities and counties to referendum derives from article II, section 11. That section provides in part that [i]nitiative and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city or county under procedures that the Legislature shall provide. ( Ibid. ) (4) `[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power whenever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it.' ( Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 [135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038].) (3b) Thus, we will presume, absent a clear showing of the Legislature's intent to the contrary, that legislative decisions of a city council or board of supervisors  including local employee compensation decisions (see Collins v. City & County of S.F. (1952) 112 Cal. App.2d 719, 730 [247 P.2d 362])  are subject to initiative and referendum. In this case, the legislative intent to bar the referendum power over the ordinance in question is unmistakable. To understand why this is so, a brief review of the statutes governing the conduct of a county referendum is appropriate. The legislative procedures authorized by article II, section 11 for county referenda are set forth in Elections Code section 3750 et seq. Elections Code section 3751, subdivision (b) provides that all county ordinances, with certain enumerated exceptions, shall become effective 30 days from and after the date of final passage by the board of supervisors. Elections Code section 3753 provides that between the date of the adoption of the ordinance and the date the ordinance becomes finally effective 30 days later, a petition by voters of the county equal in number to at least 10 percent of the entire vote cast within the county for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election, will suspend the ordinance and compel the board of supervisors to reconsider it. Elections Code section 3754 provides that if the board of supervisors fails to entirely repeal the ordinance, it shall be submitted to a countywide referendum. Elections Code section 3751 excepts certain types of county ordinances from the 30-day effective date rule, providing instead that these ordinances go into effect immediately. Of greatest relevance to the present case is Elections Code section 3751, subdivision (a)(2), which excepts from the 30-day rule ordinances specifically required by law to take immediate effect. Thus, Elections Code section 3751, read in conjunction with Elections Code sections 3753 and 3754, makes clear that when the Legislature desired to denominate certain types of ordinances that were not subject to county referendum procedures, it did so not by specifically declaring these ordinances ineligible for referendum, but rather by providing that they go into effect immediately. (See Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 773-774 [269 Cal. Rptr. 796].) Government Code section 25123 in turn parallels Elections Code section 3751 et seq. in that it provides all county ordinances shall become effective 30 days from final passage, except for certain classes of ordinances which are to go into effect immediately. Subdivision (e) of section 25123, quoted above, is one such class. Thus, ordinances specifically related to the adoption or implementation of memoranda of understanding with employee organizations are one class of ordinances specifically required by law to take effect immediately under Elections Code section 3751, subdivision (a)(2), and are therefore exempt from the referendum procedures provided in Elections Code sections 3753 and 3754. VFRR does not attempt to challenge this construction of section 25123, subdivision (e), nor does it dispute for the most part [2] that the subdivision applies to the ordinance in question. Rather VFRR insists, as the Court of Appeal below held, that section 25123, subdivision (e), in effect, unconstitutionally deprives county voters of the right to repeal such ordinances by referendum. It is to this contention that we now turn.