Opinion ID: 4426339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adjudicatory Phase

Text: Here, the trial court determined that two grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights: willful failure to pay child support pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) and willful abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). “If either of the [two] grounds aforesaid is supported by findings of fact based on clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the order[s] appealed from should be affirmed.” In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 404, 293 S.E.2d at 133; see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) (2017) (“The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more [grounds for termination.]”). We first address the trial court’s ruling that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights based upon willful abandonment. Termination pursuant to this ground requires proof that “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition.” N.C.G.S § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2017). We have held that “[a]bandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986)); see also Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 502, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962) (“Abandonment requires a wilful intent to escape parental -7- IN RE: E.H.P. AND K.L.P. Opinion of the Court responsibility and conduct in effectuation of such intent.”). “It has been held that if a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.” Id. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608. In its 14 January 2019 orders, the trial court took judicial notice of the Temporary Custody Judgment. Both 14 January adjudication orders also contained the following pertinent findings of fact: 4. That within the [Temporary Custody] Order, the Court ordered that the Respondent was to have no contact with the minor children until allowed such by further Order of the Court. That the Respondent never filed a Motion asking for contact with the minor children. 5. Respondent Father states that he tried to provide some gifts for the minor children for 3 years after the separation, but the Petitioner did not accept the gifts so Respondent stopped trying. 6. That Respondent ha[d] no substance abuse issue for the past year, but has struggled throughout the minor children’s life with substance abuse. .... 9. . . . That the Respondent has not made a regular child support payment for more than year [sic] or preceding the filing of this petition. .... 11. That Respondent acknowledged that he was not at a good point in his life as to why he has not tried to -8- IN RE: E.H.P. AND K.L.P. Opinion of the Court contact the children or filed anything with the Court. Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that sufficient grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights to both children pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Respondent concedes that he had no contact with the children from 25 December 2017 to 25 June 2018—the relevant six-month period for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). See In re Young, 346 N.C. at 251, 485 S.E.2d at 617 (“[S]ince the petition for terminating respondent’s parental rights was filed on 6 May 1994, respondent’s behavior between 6 November 1993 and 6 May 1994 is determinative” for purposes of an abandonment determination.). He contends, nevertheless, that the trial court erred by determining he willfully abandoned the children because he was forbidden to contact them under the provisions of the Temporary Custody Judgment. We are satisfied that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s determination that respondent willfully abandoned his children pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). By his own admission, respondent had no contact with his children during the statutorily prescribed time period. In addition, he made no effort to have any form of involvement with the children for several consecutive years following the entry of the Temporary Custody Judgment. While respondent ascribes this inaction to the no-contact provision contained in the Temporary Custody Judgment, this argument is unavailing. A temporary custody order is by definition provisional, and the order at issue here expressly contemplated the possibility that the no-contact -9- IN RE: E.H.P. AND K.L.P. Opinion of the Court provision would be modified in a future order. No attempt was made by respondent, however, to alter the terms of the Temporary Custody Judgment so as to allow contact between him and the children. Similarly, the fact that respondent was incarcerated for almost the entirety of the six-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition does not preclude a finding of willful abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). See In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 153, 804 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2017) (“Our precedents are quite clear—and remain in full force—that ‘[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 10, 618 S.E.2d 241, 247 (2005), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006)). Indeed, the record reveals that respondent was aware during his incarceration of his ability to seek relief from the trial court’s orders. Respondent testified that he filed a motion while he was incarcerated asking the trial court to suspend his child support obligations. When asked by petitioner’s counsel why he never filed a similar motion seeking a custody modification or visitation rights with his children, he stated that he “wasn’t in a place in [his] life to -- to really be a father or a parent.” Thus, we conclude that respondent’s conduct meets the statutory standard for willful abandonment and affirm the trial court’s adjudication pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). As previously noted, an adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient to support a termination of parental rights. See In re Moore, -10- IN RE: E.H.P. AND K.L.P. Opinion of the Court 306 N.C. at 404, 293 S.E.2d at 133; see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Therefore, we need not address respondent’s contention that the trial court erred in determining that grounds likewise existed to support termination based on willful failure to pay child support. See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. at 8, 618 S.E.2d at 246 (“[W]here the trial court finds multiple grounds on which to base a termination of parental rights, and ‘an appellate court determines there is at least one ground to support a conclusion that parental rights should be terminated, it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds.’ ” (quoting In re Clark, 159 N.C. App. 75, 78 n.3, 582 S.E.2d 657, 659 n.3 (2003))).