Opinion ID: 857574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Examine Peynetsa

Text: Berg next claims that the district court should have directly questioned Peynetsa to determine whether he 12 No. 12-2118 would testify for Berg’s defense. To understand this claim, some further background is in order. After his arrest, Peynetsa confessed to police and implicated Berg in dealing cocaine. Later, Peynetsa submitted an affidavit claiming that Berg had nothing to do with cocaine trafficking and that Berg only met with Peynetsa to talk about buying marijuana for Berg’s personal use. Berg placed Peynetsa on his witness list, and the government announced its intention to impeach Peynetsa with his prior confession if Peynetsa testified. During the trial, however, Berg’s counsel stated that “we have elected not to call Mr. Peynetsa in the defense case in chief.” (Trial. Tr. Vol. II at 425.) He then explained as follows: [Defense counsel]: I think we had a meeting this morning in chambers where we discussed the fact that Attorney Raj Sing had had contact with Mr. Peynetsa and had been—I do not know if we need to make this—we will just make it part of the record based on our comments here I think is fine. That Mr. Sing did indicate that he had had an opportunity to speak with client and that he was advising Mr. Peynetsa to invoke his fifth amendment rights if called to the stand.2 In my opinion that basically rendered him likely to be unavailable and if that is the case, then we also 2 By the time Berg’s trial began, Peynetsa had already been convicted on a state law cocaine distribution charge but was still awaiting sentencing. No. 12-2118 13 understand the government cannot use any of his written statements as co-conspirator state- ments because he would not be subject to cross-examination. So given the fact that Mr. Peynetsa was basically useless to both sides at that point, we have now elected simply not to call him. THE COURT: I understand he had given post-arrest interviews where he implicated your client and— [Defense counsel]: Yes. THE COURT:—those are also not admissible. [Defense counsel]: Correct. THE COURT: All right. [Defense counsel]: The government has not offered any of them. THE COURT: No, and without him testifying there would be no basis. [Prosecutor], do you have anything to add? [Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: This is one of those decisions that sounds strategic but I take it you have discussed it with your client since you have been having— [Defense counsel]: Yes. THE COURT:—it seems multiple discussions with your client. He is an active client— [Defense counsel]: Yes. 14 No. 12-2118 THE COURT:—it appears from the court’s vantage point. [Defense counsel]: Sure. THE COURT: All right. Good. (Id. at 425-27) (footnote added). In proceedings on Berg’s post-trial motion, Berg argued that his attorney was ineffective for failing to call Peynetsa into court to state whether he actually wanted to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.3 Berg also requested a post-trial evidentiary hearing to allow Peynetsa to testify about his intentions. The district court held that Berg’s attorney made a reasonable strategic decision not to call Peynetsa and denied Berg’s post-trial motion. Berg does not renew his ineffective assistance claim here. Because Peynetsa’s testimony is not in the record, Berg argues that there is not enough evidence to tell whether his attorney was ineffective. Instead, Berg argues that the district judge violated Berg’s Sixth Amend- ment right to compulsory process by failing—both during trial and during post-conviction proceedings—to determine independently whether Peynetsa wanted to testify. Questioning Peynetsa during trial, Berg argues, would have allowed the district judge to determine whether Peynetsa actually would have invoked his 3 Because Peynetsa was represented by counsel, Berg’s attorney, as a general matter, could not have spoken to him outside of the courtroom, at least not ethically. See E.D. Wis. Gen. L.R. 83(d)(1); Wis. R. Prof. Conduct 4.2. No. 12-2118 15 Fifth Amendment rights. And questioning Peynetsa after trial, Berg continues, would have allowed Berg to support his ineffective assistance claim. We disagree. Berg waived his right to call Peynetsa at trial, and, as we will explain, that waiver extinguished any Sixth Amendment claim Berg might have had. Berg cannot overcome that waiver, and, in any event, his underlying ineffective assistance claim is meritless. Accordingly, the trial court’s failures to question Peynetsa— either during or after trial—do not entitle Berg to reversal of his conviction.
We will start with Berg’s argument that the district judge should have independently questioned Peynetsa during trial. As we have already discussed, see supra at n.1, the Supreme Court has distinguished between “forfeiture” and “waiver”; “forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,” while “waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Tichenor, 683 F.3d at 363. A forfeited error may still be reviewed on appeal, albeit under the more deferential “plain error” standard. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. “When an issue is waived,” however, “we cannot review it at all because a valid waiver leaves no error for us to correct on appeal.” Tichenor, 683 F.3d at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Berg, acting through counsel, clearly abandoned his right to call Peynetsa at trial. Accordingly, Berg waived any Sixth 16 No. 12-2118 Amendment claim on this basis, and we cannot consider it on appeal. Berg also suggests, without citation, that the district judge had an independent duty to determine whether Berg agreed with his lawyer’s decision not to call Peynetsa. (See Appellant’s Br. at 29.) At the outset, Berg forfeited this argument by failing to make it in the district court. See United States v. Taylor, 471 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2006). But in any event, the argument has no merit. “The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client approval.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988). Thus, “[p]utting to one side the exceptional cases in which counsel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer’s decision . . . to decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand.” Id.; accord Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249-50 (2008). That brings us to the core issue: whether Berg’s attorney was ineffective for declining to call Peynetsa at trial. While Berg raised this argument in post-trial proceedings, he now argues that there is not enough information in the record to determine his attorney’s effectiveness. (Appellant’s Br. at 30.) If Berg is correct, that suggests we should leave the question for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which would allow for additional fact-finding. The government, on the other hand, argues that there is already enough evidence in the record to conclude, as a matter of law, that Berg’s trial counsel was not unconstitutionally ineffective. We usually leave ineffective assistance of counsel claims for collateral review. See United States v. Best, 426 No. 12-2118 17 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). That said, we will address such claims on direct review if they do not involve extrinsic evidence and “can be fully evaluated only on the record below.” Id. And, because Berg cannot possibly show that his lawyer’s performance was deficient on this record, we think this is one such case. As discussed, proving ineffective assistance of counsel requires Berg to show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient; and, (2) that deficiency resulted in prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate that his lawyer’s performance was deficient, Berg must show that his lawyer’s work “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. “It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Id. at 689. As a result, review of counsel’s actions is “highly deferential,” and we must “indulge a strong presump- tion that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. Berg’s attorney reasonably declined to call Peynetsa here. “The Constitution does not oblige counsel to present each and every witness that is suggested to him.” Best, 426 F.3d at 945. Instead, it simply obliges counsel to investigate the various lines of defense available in a given case. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-23 (2003). “If counsel has investigated witnesses and consciously decided not to call them, the 18 No. 12-2118 decision is probably strategic.” Best, 426 F.3d at 945. As a result, counsel’s decision “to call or not to call a witness” is “generally not subject to review.” Id. There can be no doubt that Berg’s counsel made a strategic decision not to call Peynetsa—the trial judge specifically observed that this was “one of those decisions that sounds strategic,” and Berg’s trial counsel agreed. (Trial Tr. Vol. II at 427.) Moreover, that strategic decision was reasonable. As both defense counsel and the trial judge noted, calling Peynetsa would have allowed the government to introduce post-arrest interviews in which Peynetsa implicated Berg. (Id. at 426-27.) A reasonable attorney could easily conclude that the harm caused by these interviews would outweigh any benefit from Peynetsa’s testimony. Accordingly, Berg cannot show that his attorney performed deficiently. Nor can he show prejudice. As we have already dis- cussed at length, the evidence here weighed heavily in favor of the government. Moreover, there is little reason to think that Peynetsa’s testimony would have tipped the scales back in Berg’s favor. Given Peynetsa’s apparent intent to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, he might not have even testified if called. And even if Peynetsa did testify, he was unlikely to be a strong witness; the government could have impeached him with his prior statements implicating Berg. In light of these observations, we do not think that Berg can satisfy either prong of Strickland. No. 12-2118 19 2. Failure to question Peynetsa during post-trial proceedings That brings us to our final issue. Berg, in his reply brief in support of his motion for a new trial, asked for an “evidentiary hearing relative to the issues of whether Mr. Peynetsa would have testified.” 4 (R. 92 at 7.) Berg never received one, and he argues that this, too, violated his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in his defense. The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to present witnesses in his defense. But that right “is not unlimited” and must “accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). We think that one such legitimate interest is the need for litigants to present their evidence at the proper time and in the proper way. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence” in exercising his or her Sixth Amendment rights); Horton v. Litscher, 427 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 4 While Berg asked for an evidentiary hearing in his reply brief in support of his motion, (R. 92 at 7), he did not ask for an evidentiary hearing in his initial motion for a new trial, (see R. 89 at 7) (requesting “a new trial . . . [to] determine whether Mr. Peynetsa would testify”). Arguably then, Berg forfeited his right to an evidentiary hearing. See Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The right to an evidentiary hearing can be forfeited if the litigant fails to timely raise the issue[.]”). But the government does not argue forfeiture, so we will address the issue on the merits. 20 No. 12-2118 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)) (reasonable restrictions on the presentation of evidence “do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve’ ”). Berg could have tried to call Peynetsa at trial. And, had the district court barred him from doing so, Berg could have objected and preserved the issue for appeal. But he did not. Instead, he affirmatively (and, as discussed, reasonably) waived his right to call Peynetsa. In other words, Berg was not denied the opportunity to call Peynetsa. Berg had the opportunity to call Peynetsa; he just did not try to use it until well after the time to do so had passed. We do not think that the Sixth Amendment gives defendants a right to affirmatively abandon an issue at trial and then revive the issue after things have not gone their way. That said, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides that a district court “may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Thus, a district court has the discretion to reexamine issues not presented at trial, even if the Sixth Amendment does not require it to do so. Accordingly, the district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing in this case is reviewable for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Smith, 674 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We review the denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 for an abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Cornelius, 623 F.3d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We review the district court’s decision not to grant an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.”). No. 12-2118 21 We do not think the district court abused its discretion here. As discussed, Berg’s ineffective assistance claim cannot succeed because his attorney made a strategic choice not to call Peynetsa. As a result, an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary to resolve the claim, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold one.