Opinion ID: 1388566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hector Leonel Marquez-Ramos

Text: Hector Marquez-Ramos was convicted of the most serious charge of the three defendants, conspiracy to murder in a foreign country. See 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1). He was charged in connection with the murder of Maria Eliza Liuzza in Juarez, Mexico. He was also convicted of four drug counts: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(vii); conspiracy to import 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), and 960(b)(1)(G); possessing with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(vii); and distributing 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana with the intent that it be imported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959. He raises several issues regarding his conviction and his sentence, which we now examine.
Marquez-Ramos first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the count regarding conspiracy to murder. This is the relevant statutory language: Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, conspires with one or more other persons, regardless of where such other person or persons are located, to commit at any place outside the United States an act that would constitute the offense of murder . . . shall, if any of the conspirators commits an act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy, be punished as provided in subsection (a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1). The offense can be divided into four elements relevant to the facts of this case: (1) Marquez-Ramos and at least one other person agreed to murder Maria Elida Liuzza; (2) he knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement and joined it willingly; (3) one of the conspirators committed at least one overt act in the United States furthering the conspiracy; and (4) at least one of the conspirators was within the jurisdiction of the United States when that person conspired. See United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 537-38 (5th Cir.2003). Marquez-Ramos argues that the government failed to meet three of these four elements. First, he argues there was no showing that any of the conspirators were within the jurisdiction of the United States when the agreement was made; second, that there was insufficient evidence that any agreement to kill Liuzza had been made at all; and third, that no overt act had occurred. He also argues that no showing was made that Liuzza was killed by choking or beating, as alleged in the indictment. We first explain in some detail the government's evidence of the murder conspiracy. Hector Marquez-Ramos is the brother of Mario Marquez, the latter being the head of a major drug enterprise that imported large quantities of drugs, especially marijuana, from Mexico into the United States. In early 2005, the Organization was in turmoil, after increasingly frequent drug seizures, difficulties in transmitting drugs and money, and infiltration by the authorities. Marquez-Ramos, who had served as an enforcer for the Organization in the past, was dispatched, with another member of the group, to Detroit, the residence of Ricardo Sepulveda, the Organization's main agent in the Midwest. [1] The Organization had grown increasingly frustrated with Sepulveda over the preceding months, as he had refused orders to carry out a murder for hire and to pick up a large truckload of marijuana for distribution. He owed around a million dollars to the Organization. While in Detroit, Marquez-Ramos had Sepulveda show him where some lower level members of the Organization who were suspected of stealing from the group lived. Marquez-Ramos told Sepulveda that he planned to have them killed. While Marquez-Ramos was in Michigan, Sepulveda told him he wanted to quit the Organization. After Marquez-Ramos left the Midwest, Sepulveda received a call from Mario Marquez asking him to go to Juarez, Mexico to touch base and smuggle cash back into Mexico. Sepulveda took his mother with him. They arrived in El Paso on February 13, 2005. When at a Marquez-controlled house in El Paso, Marquez-Ramos and another Organization member, Esaul Guerrero, packed bundles of cash into the door panels and console of Sepulveda's truck. Sepulveda and his mother that evening then crossed into Mexico. On arrival at an Organization house in Juarez, Mexico known as the yellow and green house, Sepulveda asked to be paid for the cash smuggling. Mario Marquez said he would have to wait for another Organization member to arrive. The next day, Sepulveda was once again told to wait another day. That night there was a cookout at the yellow and green house. Mario Marquez told Sepulveda that he was concerned that a member of the Organization in the Midwest, whom Sepulveda had brought into the Organization, had threatened to go to the authorities. They also talked about Marquez-Ramos's trip to the Midwest. Sepulveda then told Mario, as he had earlier told Marquez-Ramos, that he wanted to pull out of the Organization. The next morning, Sepulveda and his mother wanted to leave and return to the United States. Mario Marquez asked them to stay and have breakfast. Marquez-Ramos took them to a restaurant. When they returned to the yellow and green house, Sepulveda saw a man with a wooden handle outside. Later, when he, his mother, Marquez-Ramos, and others were inside the living room, yet another Organization member arrived and said he had been in a car accident. Sepulveda and Marquez-Ramos went outside to see what had happened, passing the putative accident victim and others on their way in. Marquez-Ramos then rushed back inside, and Sepulveda realized there was nothing wrong with the car. When he reentered the house, Sepulveda found his mother, Maria Elida Liuzza, laying on the floor. One man was on top of her with an object in his hand, while another Organization member washed his hands in the kitchen. His mother was moaning, in pain, and out of breath. Sepulveda immediately ran out of the house, pursued by some of the men. He apparently was helped by a motorist to reenter the United States. Once there, he went to the authorities. They taped a series of calls he made to Mario and Diana Marquez; both Marquezes repeatedly asked him where he was. Another witness testified that Mario Marquez subsequently told him that Sepulveda's mother was murdered, and that Sepulveda had escaped. The government's view of the evidence is that the jury could have found that Marquez-Ramos was part of a conspiracy, hatched in the United States, that had as its object the murder of Maria Elida Liuzza in Mexico. The conspiracy was a late addition to a preexisting conspiracy to murder Sepulveda in Mexico. There was evidence that Marquez-Ramos worked closely with Mario Marquez, and that Marquez-Ramos had past enforcement duties that included committing acts of violence against suspected traitors to the Organization. The motive for Mario Marquez and Marquez-Ramos to kill Sepulveda would be the disarray in the Organization, Sepulveda's owing money to Mario Marquez, Sepulveda's having declined to undertake two jobs, and Sepulveda's telling Marquez-Ramos he planned to quit. The motive to kill his mother arose when he arrived in El Paso with her. That placed her naturally within the ambit of the plan to kill, because she could not safely be left alive. Thus, the government's theory was that Mario Marquez's invitation for Sepulveda to go to Juarez was a ruse for the planned murder. An overt act occurred when Marquez-Ramos met Sepulveda in El Paso and loaded the bundles of cash into his truck for smuggling into Mexico. Another question is whether one of the conspirators was within the United States when he conspired. The government offers two possible ways to answer the question favorably. One is that jurors could have inferred that Marquez-Ramos and Esaul Guerrero, tacit[ly] or otherwise, hatched the conspiracy to kill Liuzza when both men were present in El Paso. They would have realized it would be necessary to do so as part of the existing conspiracy to kill Sepulveda. The other possibility is that Mario Marquez, at that time in Mexico, would have been informed . . . immediately of Liuzza's arrival with Sepulveda. An understanding about the need for murder would have been reached with the El Paso conspirators during an international phone call. There is no evidence in the record of such a telephone call, though that one was likely made is logical. We need not decide if such speculation suffices, as the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction without the phone-call theory. Substantial, if circumstantial, evidence exists that if there was a plan to murder Sepulveda, his arrival in El Paso with his mother would have required consideration immediately to be given as to her fate. One of the two alleged conspirators who was in El Paso, Esaul Guerrero, while not indicted for the murder in the final version of the indictment, was Mario Marquez's stepson and was indicted for drug activity with the Organization. Co-conspirators need not be identified in the indictment. United States v. Thomas, 348 F.3d 78, 82-84 (5th Cir.2003). Jurors could have found that, while in El Paso, Marquez-Ramos did agree with Guerrero to kill Liuzza in Mexico, satisfying the element of the offense that the conspiracy be formed with someone in this country. The closely related question is whether the jury could have found a conspiracy to kill Liuzza at all. Given the evidence that Sepulveda owed Mario Maruqez a large sum of money, the evidence regarding Marquez-Ramos's and the Organization's tendency towards violence and murder as management tools, and the eventual fate of Liuzza (and near-fate of Sepulveda), a reasonable jury could find that the invitation to Juarez was a ruse to kill Sepulveda. Then, the jury could have inferred that plan would have needed to include someone Sepulveda brought with him. There was evidence that Sepulveda had brought his mother on such trips in the past, so her arrival may not have been entirely unanticipated. At least it was reasonable for jurors to conclude that the specific plan to kill Liuzza was not finalized, because it could not have been, until she arrived in El Paso. Next, if Marquez-Ramos and Guerrero commenced their conspiracy to kill Liuzza when they saw her arrive with Sepulveda, the packing of the cash into Sepulveda's vehicle in El Paso was an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Any encouragement to Sepulveda and his mother to continue on to Juarez, any maintaining of the ruse by act or word, would also have been overt acts. Finally, Marquez-Ramos's argument that the government failed to prove the choking and beating portion of the indictment is unpersuasive. What this argument involves is a dispute about the manner and means by which the murder was shown to have occurred. The government may even allege that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means. Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1). Because stating the manner and means is not necessary indictment language, what is alleged on that point is not essential. A constructive amendment of an indictment occurs when the jury is permitted to convict the defendant upon a factual basis that effectively modifies an essential element of the offense charged. United States v. Adams, 778 F.2d 1117, 1123 (5th Cir.1985). Marquez-Ramos does not explain how the asserted difference between the indictment and the proof offered at trial modified an element of the offense, so what happened here was at most a variance, not a constructive amendment. Id.; United States v. Dentler, 492 F.3d 306, 313 (5th Cir. 2007). In any event, we discern no error. A reasonable jury could have concluded that Liuzza was beaten based on Sepulveda's testimony that he saw one of the assailants entering the house with a wooden handle, that another man was on top of Liuzza with an object in his hand, and, perhaps most significantly, that an axe handle and stained piece of carpet were recovered from the house by Mexican authorities, and tested positive for Liuzza's DNA. We affirm Marquez-Ramos's conviction for conspiracy to kill Maria Elida Liuzza in a foreign country.
Marquez-Ramos argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on three of the four drug countsthe two conspiracy counts and the substantive possession with intent to distribute count. We also address a slightly different challenge Marquez-Ramos raises with respect to his Section 959 conviction. With respect to the conspiracy counts, there was testimony that Marquez-Ramos was a high-ranking officer who was in charge of the money for the Organization. One witness had seen the Organization import a little under a ton of marijuana on at least ten separate occasions. There were multiple seizures of marijuana at the border of 150-180 pounds. Almost four tons of marijuana was being moved through a Mexican house and drug depot known as The Castle at any given time. In El Paso, between 1000 and 1500 pounds of marijuana were shipped out on a daily basis for distribution within the United States. Marquez-Ramos told Sepulveda that, while Mario Marquez was in jail, he imported and exported drugs for the Organization. On another occasion, he said he controlled a lot of import and exports of the drugs coming in from Mexico to the United States. Mario Marquez told cash smugglers that they could deliver to Marquez-Ramos rather than to him when he was not home. Marquez-Ramos once gave Sepulveda $300,000 in cash to take back to Mexico, and once helped carry at least $1.3 million to a Mexican bank for deposit. The testimony about Marquez-Ramos's violent enforcer role on behalf of the Organization would have been evidence the jury could have taken into account concerning his involvement in the conspiracies. Finally, the government introduced evidence that a drug ledger at The Castle contained multiple entries in Marquez-Ramos's handwriting. A reasonable jury could have found Marquez-Ramos guilty of the two conspiracy counts. The possession with intent to distribute count arose when a police officer observed Marquez-Ramos and others buying what he thought were likely to be drug packaging materials at a store in El Paso. The officer followed the group on a circuitous route back to a house. Later, when Marquez-Ramos left in a white van, the police stopped him. Apparently unaware of the surveillance, Marquez-Ramos lied about where he had been. At the house, officers detected the odor of unburnt marijuana and discovered just under 1,000 pounds of marijuana. A subsequent investigation revealed Marquez-Ramos's fingerprint on an electric scale at the house. Marquez-Ramos claims that the only real evidence against him was the fingerprint, and invokes what he calls the fingerprint only doctrine as requiring a finding that the evidence was insufficient. See United States v. Lonsdale, 577 F.2d 923, 926 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353, 1354-55 (5th Cir. 1973). If any such doctrine ever existed, it no longer does, since both cases cited by Marquez-Ramos were decided under a former rule applying a now-abandoned standard of review for convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence. The two cases are no longer good law for that reason. Gibson v. Collins, 947 F.2d 780, 782 (5th Cir.1991). Regardless, here there was considerably more evidence than Marquez-Ramos's fingerprint alone, as our recounting of the circumstances leading the police to the house indicates. A reasonable jury could have found him guilty on this count. We now examine the evidence on Marquez-Ramos's distributing marijuana in Mexico knowing it would be unlawfully imported into the United States. See 21 U.S.C. § 959. Marquez-Ramos argues that venue in the Western District of Texas was improper, because the government failed to prove that Marquez reentered the United States at the same place as the marijuana entered the country. The statute, however, states only that a defendant is to be tried where he or she enters the United States; it says nothing about the entry point of the controlled substance. Id. § 959(c). Marquez-Ramos does not dispute that he entered the United States at El Paso, which is in the Western District of Texas. Accordingly, this argument lacks merit.
Marquez-Ramos argues that evidence seized in Mexico from the yellow and green house and The Castle should be suppressed, and that he was entitled to a mistrial since some of it had already been presented to the jury before he could have known it was illegally obtained. This evidence included, from The Castle, large quantities of marijuana, a drug ledger with Marquez-Ramos's name in it, and firearms. Recovered from the yellow and green house was evidence involving Liuzza's murder, including her driver's license, a blood-stained axe handle and carpet that tested positive for her DNA, and identification belonging to Marquez-Ramos. At one point Marquez-Ramos made both Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments for suppression. At oral argument before this court, his counsel explicitly disclaimed reliance on the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we review only for a Fifth Amendment due process violation. In considering the denial of a suppression motion, we review factual findings for clear error and constitutional conclusions de novo. United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir.2008). The government argues that Marquez-Ramos waited too long before objecting to the introduction of the evidence, thus subjecting his claim to plain error review. We need not decide the question, as the outcome is clear under either standard. The factual basis for this claim is Sepulveda's trial testimony, which Marquez-Ramos claims shows American law enforcement agents sat idly by while Mexican agents encouraged Sepulveda to lie and exaggerate his story in order to obtain Mexican search warrants. Marquez-Ramos's due process argument relies primarily on a precedent from this court. We found that due process was violated when an IRS agent committed a deliberate deception by giving a literally true but misleading answer to a question designed to discover whether an investigation was being undertaken for criminal purposes. United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir.1977). Notably, Tweel relied on a case which stated that an `affirmative misrepresentation' by an agent must be shown, by a clear and convincing standard of proof, in order to demonstrate that the government acted impermissibly. Id. (quoting United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1033 (5th Cir. 1970)). Here, Marquez-Ramos does not allege that agents of this country made any representations whatsoever, much less a misrepresentation. At best, his evidence is that they sat by while Mexican authorities induced a witness to make false statements for use within the Mexican judicial system. Substantive due process may forbid obtaining a conviction based on law enforcement conduct that shocks the conscience, when the conduct is brutal and offensive to human dignity and is among the most egregious official conduct. Stokes v. Gann, 498 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Even taking as true Marquez-Ramos's allegation that American law enforcement agents were aware that their Mexican counterparts were inducing a witness to lie in order to obtain a Mexican search warrant, that conduct does not sink to the required depths. We find no error in the denial of the motion to suppress.
Marquez-Ramos took the stand to testify in his own defense. The district court granted his motion to provide testimony, and thus be cross-examined, only on the conspiracy to kill charge. The district court then told the jury that they should draw no inference whatsoever from Marquez-Ramos's election not to testify as to the other counts. Before entering into the precise fray between the parties on this issue, we find that the district judge's order was not a proper limit on the examination even of a defendant. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. Fed.R.Evid. 611(b). A criminal defendant who testifies waives the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of relevant cross-examination. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 195, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704 (1943). In that dated but still authoritative opinion, the Supreme Court quoted Professor Wigmore: a defendant's voluntary offer of testimony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other relevant facts, because of the necessary connection between all. Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276(2) (3d ed.1940)). Once a defendant testified voluntarily, he waived his fifth amendment right and became obligated, as any other witness, to answer all relevant questions. United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242, 1246 (5th Cir.1977)). The place at which the district judge drew his line for cross-examination, namely, between counts of the indictment, was invalid. The proper line is between what on cross-examination is relevant and irrelevant to the scope of the direct examination. The government does not here challenge the limitation of its examination. It is this defendant who alleges that another aspect of the district court's actions was prejudicial. Marquez-Ramos claims that the district court's instructions to jurors not to draw any inferences was error and entitled him to a mistrial. The argument is that the comment improperly drew attention to his decision not to testify on the other counts. When the defendant raises an issue such as this at trial, the standard of appellate review for the denial of a mistrial is one of an abuse of discretion. United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir.2005). We find no error, as the kind of comment made by the district court has been endorsed by the Supreme Court. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 338-39, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 55 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). While it is impermissible to comment adversely on a defendant's silence, a cautionary instruction informing jurors not to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to testify is permissible. Id. The unusual events in this trial that underlay the comment do not change the validity of it. There was no abuse of discretion in failing to grant a new trial.
Marquez-Ramos next disputes a sentencing enhancement. The district court found Marquez-Ramos to be an organizer or a leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants. See U.S.S.G § 3B1.1(a). This increased his Guidelines range by four levels. Marquez-Ramos argues that he had no decision-making authority and recruited no accomplices. He also alleges that the government did not have evidence of the size of his share of the Organization. There was evidence, though, that Marquez-Ramos had major responsibilities on the financial side of the Organization, overseeing the disposition of hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash at a time. There was testimony that he largely ran the Organization while Mario Marquez was in prison during much of the 1990s. Marquez-Ramos was in charge of the group arrested after leaving the El Paso stash house during the incident that led to the possession with intent to distribute conviction. Finally, there was testimony pointing to his role as an enforcer for the Organization. Given this testimony, and the emphasis in the Guideline application note on the exercise of decision making authority, nature of participation, degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, nature and scope of the illegal activity, and degree of authority exercised over others, it was not clear error for the district court to have found that Marquez-Ramos met the criteria for the leadership enhancement. We affirm Marquez-Ramos's sentence.