Opinion ID: 2752607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting Summary Judgment to Turner Was

Text: Error At the outset, we reject the government’s argument that El-Shaddai waived his right to appeal the magistrate’s findings on exhaustion because El-Shaddai did not specifically object to them.3 “[P]arties who do not object to a magistrate’s report waive their right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings but retain their right to appeal the magistrate’s conclusions of law.” Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, El-Shaddai does not challenge the magistrate’s factual findings on whether he filed the grievance or its contents. Rather, he challenges the legal conclusion as to whether the grievance gave adequate notice with regard to Turner, which we review de novo. See Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006); cf. Vinieratos v. U.S., Dep’t of Air Force Through Aldridge, 939 F.2d 762, 768 (9th Cir. 1991). The question of whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Turner is properly before us. As to the merits of the issue, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires inmates to both substantively and 3 On April 9, 2008, nearly two months after the magistrate judge issued his proposed Findings and Recommendations, and nine days after the district court adopted them in full, El-Shaddai filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendations stating only that “Plaintiff make[s] this objection in order to preserve his right to appeal.” 10 WILKERSON V. WHEELER procedurally exhaust all claims through administrative avenues before filing a suit in court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006). The scope of this requirement depends on the scope of administrative remedies that the state provides. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). In California, inmate grievances must “describe the problem and the action requested.” Cal. Code Reg., tit. 15 § 3084.2. We have said that “when a prison’s grievance procedures do not specify the requisite level of detail” needed to exhaust a claim, the standard enunciated in the Seventh Circuit applies. Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). That standard provides: [w]hen the administrative rulebook is silent, a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought. As in a notice-pleading system, the grievant need not lay out the facts, articulate legal theories, or demand particular relief. All the grievance need do is object intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming. Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002). In recent decisions, we have applied the Strong standard to California prisoner claims. Sapp v. Kimbrell held that a prisoner who alleged that eye problems and denials of his requests for surgery or medical appointments exhausted his claim against a prison doctor, even though the prisoner never specifically identified the doctor in his grievance. 623 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2010). We reasoned that “Sapp was not WILKERSON V. WHEELER 11 required to identify [the doctor] by name to exhaust the grievance against him. Neither the PLRA itself nor the California regulations require an inmate to identify responsible parties or otherwise to signal who ultimately may be sued.” Id. at 824. Here, El-Shaddai’s grievance gave greater notice than Sapp’s grievances. El-Shaddai described not only the nature of the wrong but also identified Turner by name. ElShaddai’s grievance states that he suffered injuries “[a]s a result of the assault on my person by C/O Wheeler and C/O Albonico and responding officers.” It names Turner as a responding officer and says that Turner applied pressure to his ankle despite his screams of pain and that Turner acted deliberately to inflict pain. Because El-Shaddai’s grievance describes the use of force against El-Shaddai by Wheeler, Albonico, and “responding officers,” identifies Turner as one of those responding officers and specifically describes Turner’s use of force, it “alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824. We conclude that El-Shaddai exhausted his administrative remedies against Turner.