Opinion ID: 109928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The general principles governing this case are well established.

Text: A State may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal. The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though `the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.' . . . If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the constitutional protection also embraces the defendant's `valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.' . . . Consequently, as a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand trial. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497, 503-505 (1978) (footnotes omitted). In the application of these general principles, the narrow question here [12] is whether the State in filing exceptions to a master's proposals, pursuant to Rule 911, [13] thereby require[s] an accused to stand trial a second time. We hold that it does not. Maryland has created a system with Rule 911 in which an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding which begins with a master's hearing and culminates with an adjudication by a judge. Importantly, a Rule 911 proceeding does not impinge on the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. A central purpose of the prohibition against successive trials is to bar the prosecution [from] another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 11 (1978). A Rule 911 proceeding does not provide the prosecution that forbidden second crack. The State presents its evidence once before the master. The record is then closed, and additional evidence can be received by the Juvenile Court judge only with the consent of the minor. The Double Jeopardy Clause also precludes the prosecutor from enhanc[ing] the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted. Arizona v. Washington, supra, at 504, by taking the question of guilt to a series of persons or groups empowered to make binding determinations. Appellees contend that in its operation Rule 911 gives the State the chance to persuade two such factfinders: first the master, then the Juvenile Court judge. In support of this contention they point to evidence that juveniles and their parents sometimes consider the master the judge and his recommendations the verdict. Within the limits of jury trial rights, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971), and other constitutional constraints, it is for the State, not the parties, to designate and empower the factfinder and adjudicator. And here Maryland has conferred those roles only on the Juvenile Court judge. Thus, regardless of which party is initially favored by the master's proposals, and regardless of the presence or absence of exceptions, the judge is empowered to accept, modify, or reject those proposals. [14] Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the procedure authorized under Rule 911 unfairly subjects the defendant to the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of a second trial proscribed in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957). Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that the juvenile is even brought before the judge while he conducts the hearing on the record, or that the juvenile's attorney appears at the hearing and presents oral argument or written briefs. But even if there were such participation or appearance, the burdens are more akin to those resulting from a judge's permissible request for post-trial briefing or argument following a bench trial than to the expense of a full-blown second trial contemplated by the Court in Green. In their effort to characterize a Rule 911 proceeding as two trials for double jeopardy purposes, appellees rely on two decisions of this Court, Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975), and United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975). [15] In Breed, we held that a juvenile was placed twice in jeopardy when, after an adjudicatory hearing in Juvenile Court on a charge of delinquent conduct, he was transferred to adult criminal court, tried, and convicted for the same conduct. All parties conceded that jeopardy attached at the second proceeding in criminal court. The State contended, however, that jeopardy did not attach in the Juvenile Court proceeding, although that proceeding could have culminated in a deprivation of the juvenile's liberty. We rejected this contention and also the contention that somehow jeopardy continued from the first to the second trial. Breed is therefore inapplicable to the Maryland scheme, where juveniles are subjected to only one proceeding, or trial. Appellees also stress this language from Jenkins: [I]t is enough for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . that further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have been required upon reversal and remand. Even if the District Court were to receive no additional evidence, it would still be necessary for it to make supplemental findings . . . . [To do so] would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 420 U. S., at 370 (emphasis added). Although we doubt that the Court's decision in a case can be correctly identified by reference to three isolated sentences, any language in Jenkins must now be read in light of our subsequent decision in United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978). In Scott we held that it is not all proceedings requiring the making of supplemental findings that are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, but only those that follow a previous trial ending in an acquittal; in a conviction either not reversed on appeal or reversed because of insufficient evidence, see Burks v. United States, supra ; or in a mistrial ruling not prompted by manifest necessity, see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497 (1978). A Juvenile Court judge's decision terminating a Rule 911 proceeding follows none of those occurrences. Furthermore, Jenkins involved appellate review of the final judgment of a trial court fully empowered to enter that judgment. Nothing comparable occurs in a Rule 911 proceeding. See n. 15, supra. To the extent the Juvenile Court judge makes supplemental findings in a manner permitted by Rule 911either sua sponte, in response to the State's exceptions, or in response to the juvenile's exceptions, and either on the record or on a record supplemented by evidence to which the parties raise no objectionhe does so without violating the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.