Opinion ID: 4544632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title VII Harassment Claim

Text: In order to establish a viable claim of harassment (also referred to as hostile work environment), a plaintiff must show, in relevant part, that the conduct of her coworkers was “severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000).9 The plaintiff must demonstrate that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Banerjee’s allegations fall short of this standard. Most of the incidents which she cited below as supporting her harassment claim are simply not—even in the light of every favorable inference accorded to the party opposing summary judgment—instances of racial- or national-origin-based comments.10 Many are bizarre,11 nonsensical,12 or petty examples of alleged slights in the groves of academe.13 On appeal, Banerjee zeroes in on what she considers to be her best examples: She was told by her influential colleague Dr. Cable and her husband, a retired faculty member, that she should focus her energies on library work or on India, her country of origin, since she was incapable of the depth of understanding of the United States necessary for field work. (Banerjee Depo., RE 78-1, Page ID ## 599- 9 This is the objective portion of a two-part inquiry that also asks if the “victim . . . subjectively regard[ed] that environment as abusive.” Ibid. There seems no serious doubt that Banerjee subjectively felt ill-used. 10 For instance, Banerjee claims that Dr. Jones and Dr. Cable referred to her as a “shirker.” 11 “Dr. Presser referring to Plaintiff’s daughter as a ‘ghost baby’ because Dr. Presser had not seen the baby.” 12 “On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff emailed Dr. Shefner about funding to travel to India for a conference at which she was presenting a paper.” Shefner replied, “[w]e can certainly help pay for your December travel,” and added “as far as I am concerned, you continue to be a full member of faculty until your departure . . . . I am more than willing to talk about any other issues or resources that make your transition easier.” (This email was written after the faculty committee had voted for dismissal.) Banerjee called Shefner unprofessional, and the exchange became heated. As the district court put it, “Plaintiff apparently believes Dr. Shefner assumed she was moving to India,” while “[i]n the context of the email, it is clear Dr. Shefner referred only to her transition out of the University.” 13 Examples abound. One of the shorter examples: “At a department party at Dr. Shefner’s house, Plaintiff testified Dr. Shefner introduced everyone standing around her to others, but did not introduce her.” 16 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn. 600.) Dr. Cable and another professor frequently mocked the accents of foreign faculty within Dr. Banerjee’s hearing. (Id. at 606-09.) Another professor let it be known how easy it was for Indian and Chinese people to get degrees in their home countries, with the clear subtext that Dr. Banerjee’s credentials were less significant than they appeared. (Id. at 609.) These three comments are neither sufficiently severe nor sufficiently common to come close to the Title VII harassment standard. Because this is summary judgment, we infer that all three comments were meant as insulting Banerjee on the grounds of race and/or national origin and were perceived that way. But even taken together, no reasonable juror could find that these incidents sufficed to show that Banerjee’s workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (cleaned up). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). The comments about library work and about Indian degrees are certainly “isolated incidents.” And while making fun of accents is juvenile and unbecoming, it does not, absent further allegations that would allow us to infer particularly aggravating circumstances, rise above “simple teasing.” Cf. Calderon v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 300 F. App’x 362, 369–70 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where the evidence showed “a pattern of ridicule and treatment,” including coworkers mocking the plaintiff’s accent “every time she spoke”). 17 19-6009, Banerjee v. Univ. of Tenn. In sum, Banerjee has fallen short of the standard required to make out a Title VII hostile work environment claim. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (The “standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code.”) (cleaned up).