Opinion ID: 1801890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: General Privacy Principles

Text: Defendants (joined by their amici curiae) argue here, as below, that they did nothing wrong in attempting to videotape a nighttime intruder using the computer in plaintiffs' office, because no private information about plaintiffs was obtained. Defendants insist that plaintiffs, not being the intended targets of the surveillance plan, were never viewed or recorded, and thereby suffered no serious or actionable intrusion into their private domain. Plaintiffs disagree and urge us to adopt the Court of Appeal's approach in the present case. They insist that defendants were able to view and record plaintiffs at will, without their knowledge or consent, and unjustifiably deprived them of the privacy they reasonably expected to have while working behind closed doors in their shared office. The foregoing arguments have been framed throughout this action in terms of both the common law and the state Constitution. These two sources of privacy protection are not unrelated under California law. ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 227; accord, Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 27; but see Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 313, fn. 13 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 482, 58 P.3d 339] [suggesting it is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision, which is otherwise self-executing and serves as the basis for injunctive relief, can also provide direct and sole support for a damages claim].) Such privacy principles provide the framework for our analysis, as follows. (1) A privacy violation based on the common law tort of intrusion has two elements. First, the defendant must intentionally intrude into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Second, the intrusion must occur in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, approving and following Rest.2d Torts, § 652B; Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1482 [232 Cal.Rptr. 668] ( Miller ); accord, Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 724-725, 731 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 151 P.3d 1185] ( Taus ).) These limitations on the right to privacy are not insignificant. ( Miller, supra, at p. 1482.) Nonetheless, the cause of action recognizes a measure of personal control over the individual's autonomy, dignity, and serenity. ( Shulman, supra, at p. 231.) The gravamen is the mental anguish sustained when both conditions of liability exist. ( Miller, supra, at pp. 1484-1485.) As to the first element of the common law tort, the defendant must have penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy ... or obtained unwanted access to data by electronic or other covert means, in violation of the law or social norms. ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 232; see id. at pp. 230-231.) In either instance, the expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable. ( Id. at p. 232.) In Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies (1999) 20 Cal.4th 907 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67] ( Sanders ), a leading case on workplace privacy that we discuss further below, this court linked the reasonableness of privacy expectations to such factors as (1) the identity of the intruder, (2) the extent to which other persons had access to the subject place, and could see or hear the plaintiff, and (3) the means by which the intrusion occurred. ( Id. at p. 923; see Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 233-235.) The second common law element essentially involves a policy determination as to whether the alleged intrusion is highly offensive under the particular circumstances. ( Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th 683, 737.) Relevant factors include the degree and setting of the intrusion, and the intruder's motives and objectives. ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 236; Miller, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1483-1484.) Even in cases involving the use of photographic and electronic recording devices, which can raise difficult questions about covert surveillance, California tort law provides no bright line on [`offensiveness']; each case must be taken on its facts. ( Shulman, supra, at p. 237.) (2) The right to privacy in the California Constitution sets standards similar to the common law tort of intrusion. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 27.) [6] Under this provision, which creates at least a limited right of action against both private and government entities (7 Cal.4th at p. 20), the plaintiff must meet several requirements. First, he must possess a legally protected privacy interest. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) These interests include conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference ( ibid. ), as determined by established social norms derived from such sources as the common law and statutory enactment ( id. at p. 36). Second, the plaintiff's expectations of privacy must be reasonable. This element rests on an examination of customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities ( ibid. ), as well as the opportunity to be notified in advance and consent to the intrusion. ( Id. at pp. 36-37.) Third, the plaintiff must show that the intrusion is so serious in nature, scope, and actual or potential impact [as] to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms. ( Id. at p. 37; accord, Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, 201 P.3d 472] ( Sheehan ); Pioneer Electronics ( USA ), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370-371 [53 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 150 P.3d 198] ( Pioneer ).) (3) Hill and its progeny further provide that no constitutional violation occurs, i.e., a defense exists, if the intrusion on privacy is justified by one or more competing interests. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 38.) For purposes of this balancing functionand except in the rare case in which a fundamental right of personal autonomy is involvedthe defendant need not present a `compelling' countervailing interest; only general balancing tests are employed. ( Id. at p. 34.) To the extent the plaintiff raises the issue in response to a claim or defense of competing interests, the defendant may show that less intrusive alternative means were not reasonably available. ( Id. at p. 38.) A relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the intrusion was limited, such that no confidential information was gathered or disclosed. ( Ibid.; accord, Sheehan, supra, 45 Cal.4th 992, 998-999; Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal.4th 360, 371.) In light of the foregoing, we will assess the parties' claims and the undisputed evidence under the rubric of both the common law and constitutional tests for establishing a privacy violation. Borrowing certain shorthand language from Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, which distilled the largely parallel elements of these two causes of action, we consider (1) the nature of any intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy, and (2) the offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any justification and other relevant interests. ( Id. at pp. 27, 34.)