Opinion ID: 3008274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inverse Condemnation Jurisprudence

Text: Private property ownership is a fundamental right in the United States. See Severance v. Patterson, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2012) (quoting Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977)). “The right of property is the right to use and enjoy, or dispose of the same, in a lawful manner and for a lawful purpose.” City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 100 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex. 1936) (citation omitted). Hearts Bluff brought an inverse condemnation claim against the State. Inverse condemnation is “a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.” United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); City of Abilene v. Burk Royalty Co., 470 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. 1971) (“The essence of an inverse condemnation proceeding is that property has been taken and the property owner is attempting to recover compensation therefor.”). This dispute raises the question of when the State’s actions affecting the regulation of property become a taking, compelling us once again to venture into the “sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog.” Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 671 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted); see also JOHN MILTON , PARADISE LOST 42, bk. II, ll. 592–94 (Gordon Teskey ed., Norton & Co. 2005) (1674) (describing the land beyond Lethe as “[a] gulf profound as that Serbonian bog / Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old / Where armies whole have sunk.”). Our case law on takings under the Texas Constitution is consistent with federal jurisprudence. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Travis Cnty. Landfill Co., 73 S.W.3d 234, 238–39 (Tex. -9- 2002); Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 933–34. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST . amend. V.19 Similarly, Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made.” TEX . CONST . art. I, § 17. We consider the federal and state takings claims together, as the analysis for both is complementary. See, e.g., Travis Cnty. Landfill Co., 73 S.W.3d at 238–39; Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 933–38. Although determining whether a taking has occurred is a question of law, see Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 933; City of Coll. Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984), courts generally eschew any “set formula” in determining how far is too far when performing a regulatory takings analysis, preferring to “‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). The Supreme Court has frequently noted that whether a particular property restriction is a taking depends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citing United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)); see also United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952). Notwithstanding the fact specific nature of takings cases, the Supreme Court has established a general framework against which courts apply the individualized facts of alleged regulatory takings. Penn Central, Sheffield, and Mayhew govern regulatory takings challenges and they set out three guiding factors. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104 (regulation of development of historic 19 This constitutional protection has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the individual states. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 175 n.1 (1985) (citing to Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). - 10 - landmarks); Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d 660 (moratorium on development and rezoning of property); Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d 922 (denial of development application). First is the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.20 The second factor under Penn Central is the character of the governmental action. Id. The third consideration is the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the economic expectations of the property owner. Id. In Sheffield, we began our analysis with another consideration for regulatory takings – the Agins “substantial advancement” test. 140 S.W.3d at 673. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.” 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). “[A] use restriction . . . may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127; see also Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 673; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). Although since Sheffield the Supreme Court has changed its view of the Agins “substantially advances” test,21 Hearts Bluff rightfully acknowledges that water management and conservation is a legitimate public use. Therefore, we need not discuss this consideration. 20 Courts distinguish between physical invasions of private property and regulatory actions affecting the owner’s property interest. “A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, see, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. Also, land-use exaction cases– in which the government exacts dedication of a property interest, imposes a fee, or imposes conditions as a prerequisite of approval of development on an ad hoc basis–a are somewhat distinct types of regulatory takings matters. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546–48 (2005); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385–86 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); see also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship 135 S.W .3d 620, 631 (Tex. 2004); Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W .2d at 804–05. 21 In its first opportunity to consider the validity of the Agins “substantially advances” test, the Supreme Court held that the test prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process test, not a takings test, and has no proper place in federal takings jurisprudence. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548; cf. Sheffield, 140 S.W .3d at 673–74. - 11 - We now turn to clarify the basis of Hearts Bluff’s claim and then consider the factors in a regulatory takings analysis.