Opinion ID: 196675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim of Exemptions

Text: 9 Although Petit renews on appeal most of the arguments made below, we do not reach them, see Juniper Dev. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp. ), 993 F.2d 915, 935 (1st Cir.) (court of appeals may affirm on any ground established by the record, whether or not raised or addressed in the bankruptcy court), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 303, 126 L.Ed.2d 251 (1993), since she has not met the first indispensable precondition to a valid claim of exemptions: a timely claim of exemptions. See Fed.R.App.P. 11(a); Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1029 n. 4 (1st Cir.1995) (appellant must include in appellate record all materials essential to appellate claim). 10 A debtor must list the property claimed as exempt under Bankruptcy Code § 522 within the applicable time limit prescribed in Bankruptcy Rule 1007. See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(a). An alleged debtor in an involuntary case must file schedules, including any Schedule C--Property Claimed as Exempt, within 15 days after the entry of the order of relief. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 1007(c). Schedules duly filed in a chapter 7 case are deemed filed in a superseding case unless the court directs otherwise. Id. Any extension of the filing deadlines prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) may be granted only on motion for cause shown and on notice to the United States trustee and to any committee elected pursuant to § 705 or appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code, trustee, examiner, or other party as the court may direct. Id.; see also Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(1) (imposing a heightened showing of excusable neglect where the motion to extend the time for filing is made after the expiration of the original 15-day filing period). 11 Petit filed no schedules until February 25, 1994, despite the fact that the order for relief under chapter 7 had been entered on December 10, 1993, which meant that her schedules were due not later than December 26, 1993, absent a timely motion to extend the filing period for cause shown or excusable neglect. Nonetheless, no request to extend the filing time was ever made pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c). See, e.g., Bryant v. Smith, 165 B.R. 176, 181-82 (W.D.Va.1994) (The court finds that untimely filed schedules waive a debtor's exemption unless the untimely filing is permitted by the bankruptcy judge in his discretion for cause shown or excusable neglect.). 12 During the 15-day window allowed under Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c), Petit did file a motion to convert the chapter 7 case to chapter 11, but this motion neither excused the failure to comply with Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c), nor tolled the 15-day filing period. Finally, the automatic deeming provision in Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c), see supra p. 8, can afford no refuge since no chapter 7 schedules were ever filed. Nor did the chapter 11 schedules eventually filed by Petit cure her procedural default. 13 First, although an order of conversion constitutes an order for relief under the chapter to which the case is converted, see 11 U.S.C. § 348(a), it does not effect a change in the date of ... the order for relief. That is to say, [s]ection 348(a) provides that 'those provisions of the Code which are keyed to the date of entry of the order for relief for their operation are unaffected ... by conversion.'  F & M Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Richards, 780 F.2d 24, 25 (8th Cir.1985) (quoting 2 Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcy § 348.02 (15th ed. 1979)); see Schwartz v. Jetronic Indus., Inc. (In re Harry Levin, Inc.), 175 B.R. 560, 570 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1994); LaRossa v. Leydet (In re Leydet ), 150 B.R. 641, 642 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1993). Since the time limits prescribed in Bankruptcy Rules 1007(c) and 4003(a) are keyed to the date of the order for relief, which had already been entered on December 10, 1993, the order of conversion could not effect an automatic extension of the 15-day deadline (December 26, 1993) for filing schedules. 14 Second, Petit inexplicably made matters more problematic by disregarding a ready opportunity, and her clear responsibility, to cure the procedural default by complying with an explicit bankruptcy court order directing her to file chapter 11 schedules not later than February 23, 1994. See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b), (c). Instead, Petit failed to file the required chapter 11 schedules until February 25, two days beyond the deadline. Thus, Petit's chapter 11 schedules were time-barred even viewed in the most favorable light, without regard to her failure to notify the United States Trustee of her intention to request an extension under Rule 4003(a) or to allege or demonstrate either excusable neglect or good cause. See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 1007(c), 9006(b)(1). 15 The Taylor Court recognized that a debtor should not be indefinitely or unreasonably delayed in reacquiring property while the trustee or creditors ponder whether or not to lodge objections to a claim of exemptions. See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 638, 112 S.Ct. at 1644; In re Young, 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir.1987); Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(b), 9006(b)(3) (trustee must move for filing extension before end of 30-day period). Unless and until a debtor files a timely claim of exemptions, however, as required by the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, there is no list of property claimed exempt for the trustee or creditors to oppose. See, e.g., Redfield v. Peat, Marwick and Co. (In re Robertson ), 105 B.R. 440, 450 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989) (The Debtor and other Defendants here who seek the normal benefit that flows from a timely claim of exemption not timely objected to, rest their contention on a late-filed claim that the Court never allowed to be filed.... In this case, the exemption claim late-filed without notice, motion, or leave of Court, is not entitled to the automatic allowance that Bankr.R. 4003(a) gives to a timely filed exemption claim if it is not timely objected to. He who seeks to benefit by the Bankruptcy Rules must abide by them.). In these circumstances, the principle of repose relied upon in Taylor supports the rulings below. Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644, 112 S.Ct. at 1648 ([Rule 4003(b) ] deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and produce finality.). 3 16 The district court judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to appellees.