Opinion ID: 819853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Controlling precedent

Text: In answering this question, we do not write on a blank slate (even though we ultimately have to wipe away some of what is written on it). In United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 879–81 (6th Cir. 1995), we held that a court may properly consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs in revocation sentencing.2 Jackson reasoned that while § 3582(a) bars a court from imposing an initial sentence to promote rehabilitation, the court may consider rehabilitative goals in determining the sentence’s length. Id. at 879–80. Transposing this distinction—between the decision to imprison and the length of imprisonment—from the context of an initial sentence under § 3582(a) to a revocation sentence under § 3583, Jackson concluded that a court imposing the latter may similarly “consider[] the defendant’s rehabilitative needs in arriving at the length of his sentence.” Id. at 880–81. Query, though, whether this specific holding may survive after Tapia. We think it cannot. 2 Although Jackson interpreted the statutory provision dealing with mandatory revocation of supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), and the clauses at issue here relate to permissive revocation, see id. § 3583(e), this does not affect our analysis for a simple reason. The permissive revocation provisions explicitly instruct the sentencing court to consider rehabilitative goals, but the mandatory revocation provisions do not. If, as Jackson concluded, a court may consider rehabilitation in the face of the mandatory revocation statute’s silence on this point, it must follow that a court can do so when the Act specifically instructs that it must. See Jackson, 70 F.3d at 880. No. 11-2271 United States v. Deen Page 7 As noted, Tapia held that § 3582(a) “precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.” 131 S. Ct. at 2391 (emphasis added). The Court’s analysis traversed the Act’s text, context, and delegation of authority to different actors in the sentencing scheme. First, Tapia observed, § 3582(a)’s language—which states that a court “shall consider” the § 3553(a) factors, including rehabilitation, but may only do so “to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation”—expressly bars consideration of rehabilitation in initial sentencing. Id. at 2388 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)). And the prohibition applies “when determining both whether to imprison an offender and what length of term to give him,” since the court considers the relevant § 3553(a) factors at both turns. Id. at 2389. Tapia also highlighted another provision in the Act that “restates § 3582(a)’s message, but to a different audience.” 131 S. Ct. at 2390. That provision, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k), tells the Sentencing Commission to ensure that the guidelines it authors reflect that rehabilitation is an inappropriate end to seek “when imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment.” This, too, dispelled doubts as to the clarity of § 3582(a)’s prohibition. Finally, the Court found support in the underlying practical problem—“the absence of any provision granting courts the power to ensure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation programs.” Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390. If Congress wanted “courts to base prison terms on offenders’ rehabilitative needs, it would have given courts the capacity to ensure” their participation. Id. But Congress didn’t. Instead, it gave the BOP “plenary control” over where a defendant serves his time and the treatment programs in which he participates. Id. While a court can make recommendations, “decisionmaking authority rests with the BOP.” Id. at 2390–91. By contrast, Congress empowered sentencing courts to order a defendant to participate in certain treatment programs and facilities when imposing probation or supervised release. Id. at 2390. Tapia found this allocation of authority to be an “[e]qually illuminating” indicator of Congress’s intent to prohibit imposing or lengthening a prison sentence for rehabilitative purposes. Id. Taken together, these No. 11-2271 United States v. Deen Page 8 indicia all “point to the same bottom line,” id. at 2391: “when sentencing an offender to prison, the court shall consider all the purposes of punishment except rehabilitation—because imprisonment is not an appropriate means of pursuing that goal,” id. at 2389. D. Supervised-release revocation sentences and Tapia Though Congress explicitly required courts to consider rehabilitation when acting pursuant to § 3583(e), it appears inescapable that Tapia applies to revocation sentencing under § 3583(e)(3), just as it does to initial sentencing after conviction under § 3582(a). First, Tapia teaches that the word “imprisonment,” as it is used in § 3582(a), “most naturally means ‘[t]he state of being confined’ or ‘a period of confinement.’” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 825 (9th ed. 2009)). We see no difference in the quality of a defendant’s confinement when he “serve[s] in prison all or part of” his revoked supervised release term and his initial “imprisonment” after conviction. The prohibitory language of § 3582(a) interpreted in Tapia naturally encompasses a court order that requires a defendant to serve time in prison for violating a condition of supervised release. There are, no doubt, textual contrasts between § 3582(a) and § 3583(e)(3). For example, Congress didn’t use the phrase “term of imprisonment” in § 3583(e)(3), as it did in § 3582(a), but spoke only in terms of requiring the defendant to “serve in prison all or part of the term” after his supervised release sentence was revoked. This objection—that the prohibition Tapia clarified only bears on a sentence that leads to a “term of imprisonment”—has little to recommend it. Congress did not meaningfully distinguish the imposition of a “term of imprisonment” from the act of sending a defendant to “serve in prison.” And the Act makes this clear enough. Elsewhere in § 3583, Congress used the phrase “term of imprisonment” to describe a prison sentence imposed on revocation of supervised release.3 “Term of imprisonment” has no 3 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (stating in the mandatory revocation provision that “the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment”); id. § 3583(h) (empowering the court to impose a subsequent term of supervised release after an earlier “term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment”); id. No. 11-2271 United States v. Deen Page 9 talismanic effect. Time spent in prison after one’s supervised release is revoked is plainly and unavoidably a “term of imprisonment.” The more salient textual contrast—that § 3582(a) explicitly disallows consideration of rehabilitative goals, while § 3583(e)(3) states no equivalent limitation—is a better counterargument, but one that cannot carry the day. Our interpretation of § 3583(e)(3) works no harm on § 3583(e)’s more general requirement that a court consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors, including rehabilitation. Even though a court may not revoke supervised release and sentence a defendant as a means to rehabilitate him under § 3583(e)(3), the court may consider rehabilitation when deciding to end a supervised release term under § 3583(e)(1), or extend it or modify its conditions under § 3583(e)(2). Mindful that we must avoid statutory interpretations that render provisions superfluous, see Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, 689 F.3d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2012), our conclusion executes the statute’s command and explains its language in light of the narrow prohibition of Tapia. We also find support for our holding in Tapia’s logic. Recall that Tapia found one feature of the Act—its refusal to give a sentencing court authority to order prisoners to participate in rehabilitation programs—to be an “illuminating” indicator of Congress’s intent to prohibit sentencing for rehabilitative purposes. This same rationale applies in the context of revocation sentencing. A district court has no more power to order participation in prison-based rehabilitation programs when sending a defendant to prison after revoking his supervised release than it does when initially imprisoning him after conviction. (Note, though, that this rationale only constrains § 3583(e)(3)—where rehabilitation may not be effectuated because the BOP has authority—and has no impact on the other provisions of § 3583—where the court retains discretionary authority and may effectuate a plan for rehabilitation.) Thus, the statute’s parallel limitation on the § 3583(i) (granting the court power “to revoke a term of supervised release . . . and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment” beyond the term’s expiration in certain cases); id. § 3583(k) (requiring the court to “revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment” with respect to specified offenses committed by certain sex offenders). No. 11-2271 United States v. Deen Page 10 sentencing court’s authority strongly suggests that Tapia’s prohibition applies with equal force to revocation sentencing. Finally, our view comports with the conclusion reached by nearly every circuit that has considered this question. At the time briefing in this appeal was completed, two circuits had held as we do today. See United States v. Molingnaro, 649 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2011) (Souter, J. (ret.), sitting by designation); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 281 (9th Cir. 2011). Since then, three others have weighed in and agreed with the conclusion we now reach. See United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 1005, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mendiola, 696 F.3d 1033, 1040–42 (10th Cir. 2012). Only one has taken a contrary view, see United States v. Breland, 647 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2011), but its position is in question as the Supreme Court summarily vacated and remanded that decision for reconsideration in light of the government’s position that Tapia applies to supervised-release sentences. See United States v. Breland, 463 F. App’x 376, 376–77 (5th Cir. 2012) (remanding to the district court for resentencing in light of Supreme Court’s order); see also United States v. Garcia, 472 F. App’x 316, 316–17 (5th Cir. 2012) (same). In sum, the weight of circuit authority supports Tapia’s application to prison sentences upon revocation of supervised release. Returning to Jackson, we can only conclude that the permission it gave courts to consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imprisoning him subsequent to revoking his supervised release cannot stand after Tapia. The intervening rule of Tapia—that courts may not “impos[e] or lengthen[] a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation,” 131 S. Ct. at 2391 (emphasis added)—collapses the analytical distinction between the decision to imprison and the length of imprisonment that Jackson rested on, 70 F.3d at 880–81. This distinction can no longer be maintained. Although a panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of another panel, we are to revise our law when “an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the [earlier] decision.” Phillip v. United States, 229 F.3d 550, 552 (6th Cir. 2000). We must do so here. No. 11-2271 United States v. Deen Page 11 E. Application With the legal framework clarified, all that remains is to apply it to Deen’s sentence. The district court departed from the Guidelines’ policy statement’s recommendation to send Deen to prison for four to ten months, and sentenced him instead to two years’ imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. The court determined that “the goal of rehabilitation . . . can be best achieved through incarceration” and ordered a sentence that would “give the Bureau of Prisons another chance to do some in-depth rehabilitation with Mr. Deen.” This is plainly inconsistent with Tapia’s instruction that a sentencing court “shall consider all the purposes of punishment except rehabilitation—because imprisonment is not an appropriate means of pursuing that goal.” 131 S. Ct. at 2389. And it leads to the ineluctable result that the district court abused its discretion when it expressly rested Deen’s revocation sentence on his rehabilitative needs. We recognize that some may assume Tapia will thwart the more hopeful instincts of courts that seek to direct defendants to rehabilitative opportunities that can improve their lives. It should not. Our conclusion applies only to prison sentences imposed on revocation of supervised release under § 3583(e)(3). It leaves untouched a district court’s considerable authority to impose conditions specifically geared towards a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when the court initially orders supervised release under § 3583(a) or modifies its terms under § 3583(e)(2).4 Moreover, “[a] court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” Id. at 2392. Nor will it run afoul of Tapia by “urg[ing] the BOP to place an offender in a prison treatment program.” Id. And, for that matter, a court may always “make a recommendation concerning the type of prison facility appropriate for the defendant,” 4 For example, a court may order as a condition of supervised release “any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b) and any other condition it considers to be appropriate.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). This may include directing the defendant to pursue a course of study or vocational training, id. § 3563(b)(4), refrain from excessive use of alcohol or specified drugs, id. § 3563(b)(7), undergo medical and mental health treatment, id. § 3563(b)(9), and participate in community service, id. § 3563(b)(12). No. 11-2271 United States v. Deen Page 12 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), considering his needs for “educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). All of these options remain on the table when a court determines how best to encourage the rehabilitation of a defendant before it. Trouble only comes when a court imposes or lengthens a sentence “to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation” inside a prison’s walls. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2393. Although a court may “wisely believe” a prison sentence will have rehabilitative benefits, “those benefits cannot be the reason for imposing it.” Grant, 664 F.3d at 282. A court would do well, then, to articulate the reasons for a prison sentence imposed upon revocation of a defendant’s supervised release in terms of other legitimate criteria.