Opinion ID: 2524356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: allegations of abuse of process

Text: ¶ 29 The facts as gleaned from the record before this Court, this Court's own records, [23] and the Court of Appeals' opinion are as follows. Respondent filed three lawsuits against the town of Seiling, the Seiling Board of Trustees (Board) members, and Matt Sander. The first was filed on March 17, 2005 (CV-2005-14); the second was filed on September 2, 2005 (CV-2005-46); and the third was filed on October 11, 2005 (CV-2005-52). The three lawsuits stem from actions taken by the Board and the Seiling Planning/Zoning Commission (Commission) in rezoning property owned by Sander. [24] ¶ 30 Sander moved a manufactured home onto a residentially-zoned lot in Seiling in November of 2004. The home's location did not comply with the zoning requirements in that it was too close to another structure. Then, Sander applied for a zoning variance and paid the $100 fee. The Seiling Town Administrator recommended that Sander apply to have the property rezoned to commercial. The Commission approved the rezoning request on February 28, 2005. The Board approved the rezoning application on March 14, 2005. The Commission and Board also approved Sander's building permit application. On March 17, 2005, Respondent filed suit in the Dewey County District Court against Seiling, Sander, and Board members in case number CV 2005-14. Respondent alleged that the Board had not followed the law in rezoning the property and that the property did not qualify as commercial property. On January 3, 2006, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of some of the defendants and, on April 11, 2006, denied Respondent's motion to vacate. On August 3, 2006, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sander. On September 6, 2006, Respondent filed his appeal of the summary judgment in CV-2005-14 with this Court (appellate number 103,737). ¶ 31 Before judgment was entered in CV-2005-14 and because of discrepancies in the first rezoning process, the Administrator, at the Board's direction, initiated a second rezoning process on July 18, 2005. On August 8, 2005, the Commission and the Board both approved the second rezoning. On September 2, 2005, Respondent filed a petition in CV-2005-46 asking the district court for a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition ordering the Board to rescind its actions taken on August 8, 2005, in regard to the rezoning. ¶ 32 On September 12, 2005, the Board confirmed the second rezoning, declared an emergency so that the rezoning ordinance was immediately effective. On October 11, 2005, Respondent filed a petition in CV-2005-52 asking for a writ ordering the Board to rescind the actions taken on September 12, 2005, concerning the rezoning. ¶ 33 On April 11, 2006, the district court entered judgment against Respondent in both CV-2005-46 and in CV-2005-52. On May 11, 2006, Respondent filed appeals in CV-2005-46 (appellate number 103,337), and in CV-2005-52 (appellate number 103,338). This Court consolidated these two appeals with a surviving number of 103,337. Then on November 7, 2006, the Court of Civil Appeals issued an opinion affirming the trial court's judgment on the merits and finding a writ was unavailable to Respondent because he had an adequate remedy at law and finding he had failed to show that he had standing to litigate the issue. On January 4, 2007, the Court of Civil Appeals issued an order in 103,337 (consolidated with 103,338) awarding attorney fees and costs against Respondent and remanding the case for a Burk  hearing. [25] ¶ 34 In the mean time on October 5, 2006, this Court ordered appeal number 103,737 be made a companion with the other two appeals. On April 11, 2007, the Court of Civil Appeals issued its opinion in appeal number 103,737. In this opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment and found Respondent lacked standing to bring the rezoning issue before the court. ¶ 35 Seiling and the Board filed motions seeking attorney fees in the district court in CV-2005-46 and in CV-2005-52. On January 4, 2007, in separate orders, the district court found that the claims asserted by Respondent in the two cases were frivolous as defined by title 12 section 2011.1 [26] The district court entered judgment against Respondent in CV-2005-46 in the amount of $4,325.72 and in CV-2005-52 in the amount of $2,725.72. Then on January 30, 2007, the district court found that Sander was an unnecessary party in all three cases and entered judgment against the defendant in the amount of $1,520.00 in CV-2005-14. The district court order does not state any statutory authority for awarding attorney fees in CV-2005-14. Respondent appealed the three orders awarding attorney fees, and the three appeals from the order of sanctions and/or attorney fees were given appellant numbers 104,277 (CV-2005-46); 104,278 (CV-2005-52); and 104,367 (CV-2005-14). ¶ 36 This Court ordered these three appeals from the attorney fee awards to be made companion cases. Respondent's briefs in chief were due on July 13, 2007. As discussed later in this opinion, about this time Respondent became seriously ill and was hospitalized. In September of 2007, these three appeals were dismissed for failure to timely file the briefs in chief. These three appeals were never before the Court of Civil Appeals; and, contrary to the OBA's allegations and the stipulations, the Court of Civil Appeals did not affirm the lower court's order of sanctions. [27]
¶ 37 The facts gleaned from the record and a Court of Criminal Appeals' order are as follows. [28] On May 5, 2006, Respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Dewey County District Court, case number CV-2006-28. The district court filed an order dismissing the case as to one defendants on October 4, 2006, and granted attorney fees against Respondent in that defendant's favor. On December 27, 2006, the district court filed an order dismissing the case as to the remaining defendants. On November 3, 2006, Respondent filed an application to assume original jurisdiction and for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Criminal Appeals, case number MA-2006-1174. On December 15, 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeals filed an order denying the petition for writ of mandamus, finding that Respondent had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. On January 9, 2007, Respondent re-filed the December 27, 2006 order and, on January 25, 2007, filed a notice of intent to appeal with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, appellate case number M-2007-71. On May 8, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal as filed out of time. The order dismissing the appeal noted that Respondent could not revive the time limitation for filing his appeal simply by having a copy of the District Court's order re-filed at a later point.
¶ 38 The OBA contends that Respondent has violated Rule 1.1 the ORPC. Rule 1.1 of the 2001 ORPC deals with a lawyer's duty to the client. It provides: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Throughout the ORPC, the term client is treated as a person separate from the lawyer. For example Rule 1.2 requires that a lawyer abide by the client's decisions and refrain from counseling a client to engage, or assist a client in criminal conduct, and Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed. It is inane to construe the term client to include oneself. While as the adage goes a lawyer representing himself has a fool for a client, we do not agree that Rule 1.1 imposes a duty to provide competent representation to oneself when acting as a pro se litigant.
¶ 39 The OBA also alleges that Respondent violated Rule 3.1 of the ORPC. From the amended complaint, the OBA appears to advocate a per se rule that a finding under title 12, section 2011.1 requires a finding of a violation of Rule 3.1 of the ORPC. Section 2011.1 allows a court, upon the finding that an action not arising out of contract was frivolous, to enter an order for reasonable costs, including attorney fees, against the nonprevailing party. [29] Rule 3.1 of the 2001 ORPC provides: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. ¶ 40 The dissimilarities of section 2011.1 and Rule 3.1 purposes, the nature of the proceeding, the repercussions, and the burden of proof require us to examine whether an attorney has violated Rule 3.1 even if a lower court has imposed sanctions under title 12, section 2011.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section 2011.1 is a means by which a court can shift the attorney fees in litigation to an opposing party; Rule 3.1 is a rule enacted for the protection of the public and the reputation of the legal profession. Section 2011.1 is a civil proceeding; whereas, a bar disciplinary proceeding for a violation of Rule 3.1 is quasi-criminal. The repercussions for frivolous filings under section 2011.1 are monetary, but, under Rule 3.1, range from a loss of a professional reputation up to loss of a professional license. The burden of proof under section 2011.1 is a preponderance of the evidence; the burden of proof under Rule 3.1 is clearing and convincing evidence. See Shephard v. CompSource Okla., 2009 OK 25, ¶ 6, 209 P.3d 288, 291-291; Besly, 2006 OK 18 at ¶¶ 20-25, n. 9, 136 P.3d at 598; Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists, 1996 OK 41, ¶¶ 17-26, 913 P.2d 1339, 1345-1348 (discussing the burdens of proof in different types of proceedings). Thus, this Court will examine the facts de novo to determine whether the a lawyer has violated Rule 3.1. ¶ 41 Respondent filed CV-2005-14 against Seiling and others for failing to follow proper procedures and the law when it approved the ordinance rezoning the property on which Sander had moved his manufactured home. Apparently as a result of the first case being filed, Seiling enacted a second ordinance rezoning the same property and then reaffirmed this second ordinance. Respondent filed cases number CV-2005-46 and CV-2005-52 before a final ruling in the first case (CV-2005-14). Had Respondent failed to file the last two cases, he would have risk losing the right to litigate the rezoning. Given that the Court of Civil Appeals decision in appellate number 107,277 and 107,278 (district court cases CV-2005-46 and CV-2005-52 respectively) were rendered in one opinion and before its decision in appellate number 107,737 (CV-2005-14), we cannot agree that Respondent violated Rule 3.1 of the ORPC in regards to CV-2005-46 and CV-2005-52. Further, the district court in awarding attorney fees in CV-2005-14 found only that Sander was not a necessary party, and there is nothing in the facts presented by the OBA which would lead to a finding that Respondent violated Rule 3.1 of the ORPC by actions taken in CV-2005-14. ¶ 42 As to case number CV-2006-28, Respondent may have pushed the limits of zealous advocacy when he re-filed the district court's order. See ORPC, R. 1.3 cmt. Standing alone, re-filing a judgment does not violate the ORPC. Further, we do not find Respondent's action in filing an appeal in CV-2006-28 out of time was frivolous for purposes of Rule 3.1 of the ORPC.