Opinion ID: 1433865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admissibility of Evidence of Marty Roddy's Treatment for Marijuana Dependency

Text: At trial, the Holdens sought to impeach Marty Roddy with evidence that he had been treated for marijuana dependency in 1992. Roddy's treatment record indicated both that his heavy marijuana use had caused him short-term memory loss and that he had not been truthful about the extent of his use. The Holdens argued that this evidence should be admitted to impeach Roddy's character for truthfulness and his memory. The district court ruled that the defense could only introduce evidence of drug use as it related to Roddy's ability to perceive the events that were the subject of his testimony and testify about them at trial. It thus excluded evidence of Roddy's treatment because it occurred nine years prior to the charged conduct. In doing so, the court explained that the treatment was too remote in time to be probative and lack[ed] a causal relationship with Roddy's testimony at trial. The Holdens contend that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Roddy's prior treatment into evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) or Fed.R.Evid. 612, and that in doing so it violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We review a district court's evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir.2005). It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to commit legal error or find clearly erroneous facts. Id.
FRE 608(b)(1) provides that a witness's credibility may be attacked on cross-examination through questioning on specific instances of conduct relevant to credibility. As a general matter, prior drug use is not relevant to a witness's character for truthfulness. United States v. March, 114 Fed.Appx. 671, 674 (6th Cir.2004) (A witness's use of drugs may not be used to attack his or her general credibility, but only his or her ability to perceive the underlying events and testify lucidly at trial.) (quoting Jarrett v. United States, 822 F.2d 1438, 1446 (7th Cir.1987)); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 602 (11th Cir.1990). Consistent with this, the district court held that the defense could ask questions about Roddy's ability to perceive the events that were the subject of his testimonythe nature of testing performed at the plant from 2001 to 2004. This was not an abuse of discretion. The evidence of drug treatment in 1992 was offered only to impeach Roddy's general credibility, and it occurred nine years prior to the start of the charged period. That Roddy may have misrepresented his drug use or experienced memory loss at that time has little if any relevance to his ability to testify truthfully about an unrelated subject more than a decade later. Contrary to the Holdens' suggestion, this evidence does not establish either a pattern of dishonesty or permanently impaired memory. Rather it is isolated evidence that is remote in time and laden with potential unfair prejudice. Thus, it was reasonable for the district court to exclude it.
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 allows a witness to refresh his recollection as to the contents of a document if he is unable to recall them while on the stand. Larry Holden argues that Roddy's record of treatment should have been admitted under this provision. This is incorrect. Rule 612 is not an independent source of admissibility, but rather a means to refresh a witness's memory on an admissible subject of testimony: Rule 612 does not apply where a witness refers to documents for purposes other than refreshing recollection. In such a case, Rule 612 is inapplicable and the question becomes whether the writing is admissible under laws regulating the admissibility of documentary evidence. 28 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6183. Here, the district court ruled that the document was not relevant to Roddy's testimony about the running of the plant between 2001 and 2004, so questions about it could not be asked in the first place and Larry Holden could not attempt to refresh Roddy's memory of the subject while on the stand.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an opportunity to impeach the credibility of a witness against him because impeachment is fundamental to effective cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). As the Supreme Court explained in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), however, this does not mean that the defendant is free to impeach a witness in whatever way, [or] to whatever extent the defense might wish. Id. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431; see also Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 736-37 (6th Cir.2000). Rather, trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. The key issue is whether the jury had enough information to assess the defense's theory of the case despite the limits placed on cross-examination. Boggs, 226 F.3d at 739. Here, the proposed impeachment related to Roddy's prior treatment for marijuana dependency. The court permitted the defense to impeach Roddy extensively, including through the introduction of evidence that Roddy used drugs during the time period that was the subject of his testimony at trial. The district court's refusal to allow evidence of drug treatment nearly a decade beforehand for general impeachment purposes was reasonable in light of the evidence's marginal evidentiary value and danger of unfair prejudice. This narrow limitation did not restrict the jury's ability to assess the defense's theory of the case to a degree sufficient to raise Confrontation Clause concerns.