Opinion ID: 772248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aviation Safety and the Forest Service

Text: 4 As part of its broad mandate from Congress, the Forest Service, through delegation from the Secretary of Agriculture, is charged with administering and protecting the nation's forests, consisting of approximately 187 million acres in 42 states. See 16 U.S.C. S 551 (1994); 36 C.F.R. S 200.3 (2000). In carrying out this responsibility, the Forest Service operates a firefighting program that relies significantly on aircraft. At the time of the accident, the Forest Service's aviation program consisted of 44 owned-and-operated aircraft, approximately 310 aircraft owned by the Forest Service and leased to the states, and approximately 1,050 aircraft under contract. The Forest Service contracted for approximately 30 airtankers. 5 The Forest Service issues regulatory guidance, policies, and directives, including the Forest Service Manual. Critical directives relating to aviation management are in section 5700 of that manual. Section 5700 requires [i]mplement[ation] and administ[ration] [of] a national aviation safety program including but not limited to service-wide standards for pilot and aircraft approval, training and accident prevention. 6 In addition to the manual, the Forest Service issues other policies and guidance through a variety of other documents. Relevant to air safety, the USDA Forest Service Aviation Management Strategy 1991 (the Management Strategy) gave guidance for developing local aviation management plans, including the national aviation safety program. Witnesses testified at trial that the Management Strategy was Forest Service policy and that management was required to follow it. 7 The Management Strategy included the Aviation Accident Prevention Program (the Accident Plan), which provides, in relevant part: 8 It is management's responsibility to monitor contract and employee pilot performance and provide every opportunity for pilots to expand their knowledge and cultivate their skills. While proficiency training is regarded by management as a productive means to accomplish this, a concentrated effort must be placed on the human factor aspect of pilot performance. Human factor information allows the pilots to better interface with the machinery and environment in which they operate. Therefore, human factor training must be identified as a significant aspect of the accident prevention plan. 9 (Emphasis added.) These two highlighted phrases are at the heart of the controversy here. The Accident Plan also states that [m]ethods and/or requirements used by the [Fire Service] to achieve this standard of safety are contained in published manuals, handbooks, guides, contracts, and operations plans. Those documents do not, however, contain any requirement that contract pilots receive any human factor training, nor do any Forest Service documents mandate any specific type of human factor training. 10 A discussion of the various technical terms is in order. Human factors and crew resource management (CRM) are related concepts but are neither co-extensive nor synonymous. Human factors is a generic term for a multidisciplinary field devoted to optimizing human performance and reducing human error. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular 120-51A at 3. As one expert put it, human factors focuses on interaction and interfacing of the man, machine and media. The FAA notes that CRM is one way of addressing the challenge of optimizing the human/machine interface. FAA Advisory Circular 120-51Aat 4. 2 11 Trial witnesses testified that CRM training was developed to address the human tendency for the division of duties to break down when an unexpected situation arises, often with the result that even the most experienced crew members become preoccupied with fixing the problem rather than flying the plane. CRM training seeks to improve crew coordination and use, by all crew members, of all human and mechanical resources available during an emergency. 12 As part of its biannual Airtanker Elite Plane Remedial Conference, a workshop for airtanker pilots and others involved in aerial firefighting, the Forest Service sponsored a one-half day introduction to CRM, in lecture format. Otherwise, the Forest Service did not provide or require CRM training for its contract pilots. Although the contract between the Forest Service and Neptune required contract pilots to have certain flight experience, certifications, and training, it did not require CRM training, nor did the Forest Service ask Neptune to provide such training. 13 According to the Forest Service, its evaluations of airtanker pilots during annual flight safety check rides included human factors concepts. Forest Service witnesses testified that both Kelly and Lynn consistently demonstrated proficiency in crew coordination. Both pilots had received some CRM training. 14 Kelly attended the Forest Service's one-half day seminar, as well as a three-day course, six months before the accident, which included human factors training (this training was independent of any action by the Forest Service). Although the record is not clear, at least one witness testified that Neptune provided Lynn with CRM training.