Opinion ID: 1698910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: McCAIN v. FLORIDA POWER

Text: In contrast to the rather narrow focus of the so-called agrarian rule, this Court in McCain attempted to restate the general principles of negligence law and clarify the role that foreseeability plays in evaluating the duty and proximate cause elements of a common law negligence claim. In this context, we noted that although foreseeability relates to both duty and proximate cause, it does so in different ways: The duty element of negligence focuses on whether the defendant's conduct foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that poses a general threat of harm to others. The proximate causation element, on the other hand, is concerned with whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred. In other words, the former is a minimal threshold legal requirement for opening the courthouse doors, whereas the latter is part of the much more specific factual requirement that must be proved to win the case once the courthouse doors are open. As is obvious, a defendant might be under a legal duty of care to a specific plaintiff, but still not be liable for negligence because proximate causation cannot be proven. McCain, 593 So.2d at 502-03 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). On the question of duty, we explained: Foreseeability clearly is crucial in defining the scope of the general duty placed on every person to avoid negligent acts or omissions. Florida, like other jurisdictions, recognizes that a legal duty will arise whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized and foreseeable risk of harming others. As we have stated: Where a defendant's conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk, the law generally will recognize a duty placed upon defendant either to lessen the risk or see that sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses. Id. at 503 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 735 (Fla.1989)) (alteration in original). The Court also noted that every risk need not be set out in a statute or by case law in order to give rise to a duty of care: [E]ach defendant who creates a risk is required to exercise prudent foresight whenever others may be injured as a result. This requirement of reasonable, general foresight is the core of the duty element. For these same reasons, duty exists as a matter of law and is not a factual question for the jury to decide: Duty is the standard of conduct given to the jury for gauging the defendant's factual conduct. As a corollary, the trial and appellate courts cannot find a lack of duty if a foreseeable zone of risk more likely than not was created by the defendant. Id. Finally, as to the element of proximate cause, we explained: [F]oreseeability is concerned with the specific, narrow factual details of the case, not with the broader zone of risk the defendant created. . . . . Unlike in the duty context, the question of foreseeability as it relates to proximate causation generally must be left to the fact-finder to resolve. Thus, where reasonable persons could differ as to whether the facts establish proximate causationi.e., whether the specific injury was genuinely foreseeable or merely an improbable freakthen the resolution of the issue must be left to the fact-finder. Id. at 503-04. We have subsequently applied our analysis in McCain to a variety of factual contexts. See, e.g., Springtree Properties, Inc. v. Hammond, 692 So.2d 164 (Fla.1997) (holding trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of restaurant owner in suit arising out of automobile accident in front of restaurant and issue of foreseeability should have been left to jury). Importantly, subsequent decisions in accident cases resulting from visual obstructions to motorists have recognized and applied McCain 's foreseeability analysis to determine whether the landowner owed a duty of care and whether that duty was breached in a particular instance. See Napoli v. Buchbinder, 685 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that plaintiff's wrongful death action alleging that design of parking lot and placement of stop sign which contributed to accident created a material question of fact as to whether defendant's alleged negligence placed plaintiff in a foreseeable zone of risk); Dykes v. City of Apalachicola, 645 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding that the test to determine whether city was liable for trees and bushes which allegedly contributed to an accident was whether defendant's conduct created a foreseeable zone of risk). Hence, it appears that McCain has been applied in most instances as we intended, as a restatement of the law of negligence.