Opinion ID: 2252960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Harmless ErrorGuilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Text: The State attempted to attack Dugan's Nicarico statements by showing either that they were unreliable and untrue, or that Dugan participated in the crime along with defendant. To accomplish these dual ends, the State presented the bloodhound evidence to demonstrate inconsistencies in Dugan's Nicarico statements and his version of the crime, and to show that there were multiple offenders, perhaps Dugan ( e.g., shoeprint on front door as consistent with his account). The State presented as well the Rodriguez impeachment testimony to establish a Dugan-Cruz connection. While the State was afforded the opportunity to present such inadmissible evidence, the defendant was not allowed to rebut it with admissible evidence. The State maintains that any error with respect to Rodriquez's impeachment and the admission of bloodhound evidence must be considered harmless. We do not agree. As we have stated previously, with the admission of Dugan's Nicarico statements, the State's case became significantly dependent on the theory that defendant and Dugan were joint participants. Without Rodriguez's impeachment evidence, only the self-interested testimony of Turner, a convicted murderer and sex offender, supported the theory that Dugan participated with defendant. Further, the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming. ( People v. Cruz (1988), 121 Ill.2d 321, 335, 117 Ill.Dec. 907, 521 N.E.2d 18 (harmless error not found as [t]he evidence against defendant was not overwhelming).) Turner's testimony offered the primary distinction between the State's case at defendant's first trial and this trial. Certainly, Turner's testimony did not significantly add to the weight of the evidence against defendant at this trial. Because the evidence of defendant's guilt is not overwhelming, errors which occurred assumed have greater significance than would otherwise have been the case. And because we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that these errors did not affect the verdict ( People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill.2d 151, 57 Ill.Dec. 628, 429 N.E.2d 526), reversal is required. A review of the admissible evidence reveals, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (See People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill.2d 289, 309-10, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 391 N.E.2d 366.) We are not in disagreement with the dissenters on this score. Accordingly, defendant faces no risk of double jeopardy and may be retried. We next address two issues likely to recur at trial.