Opinion ID: 1442370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs-Appellants' First Amendment Claim

Text: Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims lead us to wrestle with a most difficult question: how to balance some students' rights to free speech with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), taking into account the authority of school officials to maintain the discipline and learning environment necessary to accomplish the school's educational mission. The district court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs-Appellants' First Amendment and Equal Protection claims because the Confederate flag did not need to have caused a disruption in the past in order for school officials to ban it when (1) there were racially motivated incidents at the school that caused tension among the student body and (2) such a ban was not implemented in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. J.A. at 35 (Tr. at 92:17-23); J.A. at 38 (Tr. at 95:6-9); J.A. at 41 (Tr. at 98:3-14). We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board. The Supreme Court has made clear that students do not `shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' Morse v. Frederick, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2622, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733). [T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), and courts must apply the rights of students in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733). In Tinker, the Court considered whether a public school district violated high-school and junior-high-school students' First Amendment rights when the district suspended students who had worn black armbands to school as an expression of their opposition to the Vietnam War. The school had implemented a ban on the wearing of armbands after learning of some students' plans to protest the war by wearing black armbands during the holiday season in December 1965. The Court determined that because the wearing of armbands. . . was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it, the wearing of the armbands was closely akin to `pure speech.' Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court also determined that there existed no evidence that the suspended students' protest interfered with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone and, accordingly, that the case did not concern speech or action that intrude[d] upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students. Id. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court concluded that the school's ban on armbands was motivated by an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the expression. Id. at 510, 89 S.Ct. 733. Because of the absence of evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students, the Court reversed the en banc court of appeals decision below affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs-students' complaint. Id. at 509, 514, 89 S.Ct. 733. In two subsequent cases, the Court qualified when the Tinker standard should be applied and clarified that schools did not in every situation need to justify regulation of student speech on the basis that the speech would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733 (quotation omitted). In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser , the Court considered whether a public high school infringed upon a student's free-speech rights when the school suspended the student for violating a school policy that prohibited the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. 478 U.S. at 678, 106 S.Ct. 3159. The suspended student had given a speech at a school-sponsored assembly, in support of another student's candidacy for elective office, which employed an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Id. at 677-78, 106 S.Ct. 3159. The Court noted [t]he marked distinction between the political `message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of the respondent's speech in [ Fraser ], id. at 680, and observed that prior Court decisions had allowed limitations on speech in the interest of protecting children, especially those in captive audiences, from sexually explicit, vulgar, and offensive spoken language. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 3159. Accordingly, the Court held that schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as . . . Fraser's. . . plainly offensive [speech.] Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. 3159. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier involved a suit brought by former staff members of a high-school newspaper who argued that the school principal violated their First Amendment rights when he deleted two pages of the newspaper containing articles discussing students' experiences of pregnancy and the effect of divorce on students. The Court concluded that because the school lent its name and resources to the newspaper, the Tinker standard did not apply to the case. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73, 108 S.Ct. 562. The Court held that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562. The above trilogy of cases yields three principles: (1) under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit vulgar, lewd, indecent, or plainly offensive student speech, [5] Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-85, 106 S.Ct. 3159; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 562; (2) under Hazelwood, a school has limited authority to censor school-sponsored student speech in a manner consistent with pedagogical concerns, 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562; and (3) the Tinker standard applies to all other student speech and allows regulation only when the school reasonably believes that the speech will substantially and materially interfere with schoolwork or discipline, 393 U.S. at 513, 89 S.Ct. 733. Guiles, 461 F.3d at 325; Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1484, 167 L.Ed.2d 225 (2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir.2001); see also Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2001). Tinker governs the instant case because by wearing clothing depicting images of the Confederate flag students engage in pure speech not sponsored by the school. Castorina, 246 F.3d at 539-40. Hazelwood does not apply to the instant case because no one would reasonably believe that [Plaintiffs-Appellants' clothing] bore the school's imprimatur. Morse, 127 S.Ct. at 2627. Therefore, our inquiry in this case is whether the ban on clothing depicting the Confederate flag is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court's most recent student-speech case, Morse v. Frederick , does not modify our application of the Tinker standard to the instant case. Morse affirmed that schools may regulate some speech even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school and that the rule stated in Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech. 127 S.Ct. at 2627 (internal quotation omitted). The Morse decision, however, resulted in a narrow holding: a public school may prohibit student speech at school or at a school-sponsored event during school hours that the school reasonably view[s] as promoting illegal drug use. Id. at 2629. Justice Alito's concurrence states that he joins the majority opinion on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito also makes clear that he joins the majority only insofar as the opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions beyond those articulated in Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood. Id. at 2637.
As an initial matter, we must consider Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that much of the evidence presented by the Board, and relied upon by the district court, was hearsay. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 33-37; Reply Br. at 17-21. As the Board notes, however, Plaintiffs-Appellants do not specify in their brief which evidence they consider to be hearsay; rather, Plaintiffs-Appellants refer us to documents filed at the district court level. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 33 n. 6. Well-established law in this Circuit holds that a party is not allowed to incorporate by reference into its appellate brief the documents and pleadings filed in the district court. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 459 F.3d 705, 710 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir.2003)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ 127 S.Ct. 985, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007). Therefore, we are left with only Plaintiffs-Appellants' allegation that [m]ost of the defendants' evidence in the case at bar consists of hearsay statements that were [inappropriately] considered `for its[ ] effect upon the listener.' Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 34. Because Plaintiffs-Appellants do not specify to which pieces of evidence they are referring, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it found that in the record before the Court many of the declarants do, in fact, testify as to occurrences and incidents of which they have personal knowledge as that term would be defined and understood pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence. J.A. 39 (5/24/07 Hr'g Tr. at 96:19-22). See United States v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358, 363 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that all evidentiary rulings of the district court, including its determination of whether testimony is inadmissible hearsay, are reviewed for abuse of discretion). Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that there is no evidence that the Confederate flag ever caused any disruption at the school, even when worn by students during the ban. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 28. Plaintiffs-Appellants' contention that the Confederate flag itself had to cause disruption in the past for the school to justify the ban, however, misapplies the Tinker standard. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir.2007).  Tinker does not require disruption to have actually occurred. Id. at 593. Rather than evaluating competing claims about whether disruption occurred in the past, we must evaluate the circumstances to determine if [the school's] forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable. Id. The rationale for this standard lies in the fact that requiring evidence of disruption caused by the banned speech would place school officials. . . between the proverbial rock and hard place: either they allow disruption to occur, or they are guilty of a constitutional violation. Id. at 596. Recognizing that the Tinker decision does not require that the banned form of expression itself actually have been the source of past disruptions, subsequent appellate court decisions considering school bans on expression have focused on whether the banned conduct would likely trigger disturbances such as those experienced in the past. Brogdon, 217 Fed.Appx. at 525 (citing Castorina, 246 F.3d at 542; Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 1926, 36 L.Ed.2d 414 (1973)). Our inquiry, then, is whether the school reasonably forecast that the Confederate flag would cause material and substantial disruption to schoolwork and school discipline. Plaintiffs-Appellants further challenge the alleged high level of racial tension at the school, no matter the cause. In particular, Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that [t]he racial graffiti referred to by the defendants as proof of `racial tension' actually caused absolutely no disruptions, implying that racial tension is not as high as claimed. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 29. Were Plaintiffs-Appellants correct and the record showed minimal evidence of prior disruption related to racial tension, then we would likely conclude that the school had little basis for anticipating disruption caused by images of the Confederate flag. But the evidence on the record belies Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument. In deposing Hord, the attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants tried to show that racist graffiti had not specifically caused disruption. When asked if he knew if any classes had been disrupted as a result of the graffiti, Hord stated that [t]he only disruption I think it does have is that just by the fact that a Principal and teachers if they have those kids they are pulling kids out questioning them there, they are trying to get to the bottom of it. So in that sense it is a disruption, but I don't know specifically here is the class, here is the kids, that kind of thing. J.A. at 114 (Hord Dep. at 31:15-21). Hord stated that he did not know whether any fights resulted from the graffiti or hit lists. J.A. at 114 (Hord Dep. at 31:3-12). We are wary of concluding, however, that the racist graffiti had to cause violent disruption to the school for the school reasonably to forecast that images of the Confederate flag would cause disruption within the meaning of Tinker. There is no requirement that disruption under Tinker be violent. Hord presents uncontested testimony that investigation of the graffiti disrupted classes. Furthermore, the racist graffiti was violent in character: the graffiti contained examples of the most demeaning racial slurs, accompanied by threats against the lives of African-Americans generally, an image of a noose next to that of a Confederate flag, and hit lists containing specific students' names. One might plausibly argue that such racist graffiti containing violent threats is inherently disruptive to a school environment. We do not need to reach such a conclusion today, however, because Hord presented evidence that the racist graffiti including the hit lists produced secondary disruptions. There was a lot of school disruption because of the hit lists, parents coming to school, parents calling me, calling the administrator, calling people in the Central office and it was time consuming. J.A. at 114 (Hord Dep. at 30:24-31:2). Hord also gave unrefuted deposition testimony that fear of racial violence caused an increase in absenteeism among African-American students, the epitome of disruption in the educational process. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the racial tension that existed at the school immediately prior to the clothing ban comes from Plaintiffs-Appellants' own deposition testimony. Barr stated that he felt friction and racially related tension in the school in the spring of 2005. J.A. at 240 (Barr Dep. at 13:11, 13). He said he could feel the intensity as people walk[ed] by. J.A. at 240 (13:8-9). Craig White, another student bringing this suit, conceded in his deposition that his Confederate flag clothing could create disruptive behavior at school if others found his clothing offensive. J.A. at 261 (R. Craig White Dep. at 8:11-14). The instant case can be distinguished from Tinker. In Tinker there were no facts in the record that would reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred as a result of students wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. 393 U.S. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733. The facts in this case, however, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs-Appellants, indicate that school officials could reasonably forecast that permitting students to wear clothing depicting the Confederate flag would cause disruptions to the school environment. In contrast to the dearth of evidence on the record in Tinker, the record in the instant case contains evidence of racial violence, threats, and tensions: a fight between an African-American and a white student on February 22; [6] a complaint filed with OCR alleging that following a racially motivated altercation, the school punished an African-American student more harshly than a white student in the district was punished; racist graffiti containing racial slurs and generalized threats against the lives of African-Americans; hit lists containing student names; unspecified race-related physical fights during the 2004-2005 school year; a fear-motivated increase in absenteeism among African-American students; and a school lockdown in April 2005 that the school implemented because of a breakdown in student discipline and the threat of race-related violence. Notably, a particularly egregious example of racist graffiti depicted the Confederate flag next to a drawing of a noose, just below a general threat to the lives of African-Americans that contained a racial slur. J.A. at 406-09 (Waters Aff. Ex. 2). That graffiti exemplifies how school officials reasonably concluded that the connection between the symbolism of the Confederate flag and racial tensions at the school meant that the Confederate flag would likely have a disruptive effect on the school. Under Tinker, we hold that the school reasonably forecast that clothing bearing images of the Confederate flag would disrupt schoolwork and school discipline. We do not find persuasive Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that the Board has repeatedly admitted that prevention of disruption is not [its] only motive. Appellant Br. at 27. Hord acknowledges that the disruption he anticipates arising from displays of the Confederate flag directly correlates with the offense the flag poses to some students. Hord stated at deposition: I think when that offense becomes something that you have to deal with day-in and day-out [then] it is disruptive to what our normal process is, yes. J.A. at 115 (Hord Dep. at 34: 6-8). That Hord determined the Confederate flag to be offensive to African-American and other students, however, does not negate his reasonable belief that the flag was also disruptive and would cause substantial and material interference with schoolwork and school discipline. This is not a case in which the school acted upon undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. The school did not merely find the Confederate flag offensive to some students but rather found that in a context of high racial tensions, race-related altercations, and threats of violence, the flag would disrupt the school's educational process. That there exists a relationship between the offensiveness of the Confederate flag, in the eyes of some students, and its disruptive potential does not change our holding. We note that our decision evinces greater sensitivity to the effect of the regulated speech on its student audience than that ordinarily accorded to the targets of speech in our general First Amendment jurisprudence. First Amendment standards applicable to student speech in public schools, however, are unique, and courts accord more weight in the school setting to the educational authority of the school in attending to all students' psychological and developmental needs. Unlike in Tinker, Plaintiffs-Appellants' free-speech rights colli[de] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. The fact of this collision would almost certainly not be enough to justify government regulation of the speech, if the parties in this case were adults in a public forum. If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (holding that prosecution of defendant for burning an American flag during a protest rally violated the defendant's right to free expression under the First Amendment). We caution, however, that our decision today does not establish a precedent justifying a school's ban on student speech merely because other students find that speech offensive: we simply hold that the school's dress code as applied to ban the Confederate flag is constitutional because of the disruptive potential of the flag in a school where racial tension is high and serious racially motivated incidents, such as physical altercations or threats of violence, have occurred. Our holding that the school in the circumstances of this case reasonably forecast the disruptive effect of the Confederate flag accords with precedent in our circuit as well as our sister circuits. In Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 1926, 36 L.Ed.2d 414 (1973), we held that the suspension of a student for violating a high-school code of conduct banning displays of the Confederate flag and the Confederate soldier, as well as the song Dixie, did not violate the student's rights under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Evidence on the record showed that during the 1969-1970 academic year, the school that implemented the ban had become racially polarized as a result of continuing controversy over the use of the Confederate flag and the song Dixie at various school functions. Id. at 1333. Racial tension in the school disrupted classes and led school authorities to call for police assistance amid several confrontations and also to close the school for the purpose of restoring order and calming tensions. Id. The evidence in Melton supporting the school's rationale for the ban is, in two respects, stronger than that in the instant case: past disruptive conflict in the school had centered on the Confederate flag and disruption had led authorities not only to lockdown the school but to actually close it. Nevertheless, as we noted above,  Tinker does not require school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591-92. In another sense, despite the fact that the displays of the Confederate flag did not themselves apparently instigate racial conflict, the evidence supporting the ban in the instant case is stronger than in Melton because racial tension had produced physical confrontations and threats against students' lives. In sum, the holding in Melton supports our decision that a school may reasonably forecast that the Confederate flag would cause substantial and material disruption of a school when the school had recently experienced intense racial conflict. Furthermore, the record in the instant case closely parallels that in West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir.2000). In West, a middle-school assistant principal had suspended a student who had drawn a Confederate flag on a sheet of paper during a class, in violation of a school's racial-harassment policy that prohibited students from possessing written material that is racially divisive or creates ill will or hatred. Id. at 1361. The policy listed the Confederate flag as an example of the banned material. Id. In the three years prior to the incident, the school at issue had experienced verbal confrontations . . . between black and white students; white students wearing clothing depicting the Confederate flag and black students wearing clothing invoking the ideology of Malcolm X; the circulation of racist materials among students by non-student members of the Aryan Nation and Ku Klux Klan; graffiti stating such things as `KKK' (Ku Klux Klan), `KKKK' (Ku Klux Klan Killer), and `Die Nigger'; reports of racial incidents on school buses and at football games; and [a]t least one fight . . . as a result of a student wearing a Confederate flag headband. Id. at 1362. The Tenth Circuit concluded that [t]he evidence . . . reveals that based upon recent events, [the school district] officials had reason to believe that a student's display of the Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the rights of other students to be secure and let alone. Id. at 1366. Just as in West, in the instant case the school based its clothing ban on the existence of racial tension, threatening graffiti, reports of racially motivated confrontations, and at least one fight. The only potentially significant difference between the records in the two cases is that the February 22, 2005 fight in the instant case did not involve an image of the Confederate flag. Given binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit interpreting Tinker, however, we do not think any difference between the record in the instant case and that in West is significant enough to distinguish West. Indeed, we find West consistent with our decision in Melton and, therefore, consider West to constitute persuasive precedent. [7]
Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the ban on clothing depicting racially divisive symbols, and specifically the ban on the Confederate flag, discriminates on the basis of viewpoint and unconstitutionally suppresses particular ideas. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 19-26. In Tinker, the Supreme Court rested its holding striking down the defendant school's ban on armbands on the finding that the action of the school authorities appear[ed] to have been based upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the expression rather than from reasonable anticipat[ion] that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students. Id. at 509-10, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court proceeded to observe in dicta, however, that its decision also reflected the Court's concern that the school authorities did not purport to prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or controversial significance. Id. at 510, 89 S.Ct. 733. There existed evidence that some students at the school wore buttons related to political campaigns as well as the Iron Cross, a Nazi symbol, and that the school did not ban these symbols. Id. at 510-11, 89 S.Ct. 733. Significantly, the Court in Tinker did not hold that a viewpoint-discriminatory rule in the schools would necessarily be unconstitutional; such a rule would still be constitutional if it met the disruption standard outlined in the opinion. Specifically, the Court concluded its paragraph discussing the viewpoint-discriminatory character of the ban on armbands with the following statement: Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible. Id. at 511, 89 S.Ct. 733 (emphasis added). Our precedent interpreting the status of viewpoint-discriminatory school rules under Tinker is complicated. The code of conduct at issue in Melton explicitly prohibited images of the Confederate flag, the Confederate soldier, and the song Dixie. 465 F.2d at 1333-34. The code did not prohibit symbols that might have been similarly controversial at a newly integrated public high school during the time-period in question: the late 1960s and early 1970s. Id. Thus, one could characterize the ban at issue in Melton as viewpoint discriminatory because it prohibited symbols that some people might perceive as celebrating Southern heritage, or even white supremacy, but did not prohibit symbols perceived as celebrating the North's defeat of the South in the Civil War, racial equality, or black power. We upheld the ban, however, regardless of any viewpoint discrimination because it met the disruption standard set forth in Tinker. Melton, 465 F.2d at 1335. Indeed, the Melton opinion does not address any argument by the plaintiffs in that case regarding viewpoint discrimination. A subsequent Sixth Circuit decision, Castorina v. Madison County School Board, took the view that even if there has been racial violence that necessitates a ban on racially divisive symbols, the school does not have the authority to enforce a viewpoint-specific ban on [some] racially sensitive symbols and not others. 246 F.3d at 544. Castorina reversed and remanded a district court's grant of summary judgment to a defendant school board because the plaintiff students had created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the school banned clothing with images of the Confederate flag but did not ban the wearing of clothing with images of or allusions to Malcolm X and the Black Muslim movement. Id. at 541. The statement in Castorina that a viewpoint-discriminatory clothing ban would be unconstitutional is in tension with our decision in Melton upholding the constitutionality of such a ban under Tinker's substantial-and-material-disruption standard. Although one panel of this circuit cannot overrule a prior panel, Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985); 6TH CIR. R. 206(c), an intervening Supreme Court decision gave the Castorina panel authority to modify the holding in Melton. The Castorina panel based its holding regarding the unconstitutionality of viewpoint-discriminatory clothing bans on Tinker and two other Supreme Court decisions: Police Department of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), decided two months before our decision in Melton, and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828-29, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995), decided over a decade after Melton. Castorina, 246 F.3d at 542. To the extent that Castorina rested its holding on Rosenberger, decided after Melton, the Castorina panel had the authority to modify the Melton panel's interpretation of Tinker. In Rosenberger, the Court considered a university's denial of student-activity funds to a student newspaper that would otherwise be eligible for funds but for the fact that the newspaper promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. 515 U.S. at 825-27, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Court held that because the University had opened the student-activity funds as a limited public forum (in a conceptual rather than spatial sense), the University could not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Id. at 828-30, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Therefore, once the University allowed the disbursement of funds to groups discussing religion as a subject matter, the university could not deny funds to those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. Id. at 831, 837, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Castorina applied the principles set forth in Rosenberger to the high-school setting, holding that schools' regulation of student speech must be consistent with both the Tinker standard and Rosenberger 's prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. Accordingly, we cannot affirm the grant of summary judgment to the school if Plaintiffs-Appellants have created a genuine issue of material fact that the school implemented the clothing ban in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the school engages in viewpoint discrimination by banning racially divisive symbols but not racially inclusive symbols. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 19-22. The Board argues that it enforces a facially neutral ban on racially divisive symbols in a nondiscriminatory manner. Defendant-Appellee Br. at 34. In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court illuminated the often imprecise distinction between content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech. The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. Id. The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not `reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,' . . . nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the Court observe[s] a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations. Id. at 829-30, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The two sides in this litigation have presented competing paradigms for what we should view as constituting content-based and viewpoint-based regulations on speech, in the circumstances of this case. Plaintiffs-Appellants suggest that the school may restrict student speech regarding race as a general topic, but may not ban racially divisive speech while allowing racially inclusive speech. By contrast, the school suggests that the restriction on racially divisive clothing is a permissible content-based restriction and that our inquiry should be whether the clothing ban is enforced in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. We agree with the school. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs-Appellants' suggested definition of content in this case is so abstract as to approach absurdity. Considering the salience of race to our nation's history and contemporary political and social debates, any public school would seriously hamper its ability to foster thoughtful and responsible citizens by prohibiting all student speech and expression about any topic dealing with race. Moreover, we find Plaintiffs-Appellants' effort to redefine content and viewpoint to be a red herring. In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), the Supreme Court explained that a blanket ban on the use of odious racial epithets by proponents of all views constitutes mere content-based regulation, while a ban on the use of racial slurs by one group of speakers but not those speakers' opponents constitutes viewpoint-discrimination. Id. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538. Applying this distinction to the instant case, it is clear that the school's ban on disruptive speech does not engage in viewpoint discrimination. The school bans all symbols which cause[ ] disruption to the educational process, regardless of whether the disruption arises because of a student's racial animus, or for another reason entirely. J.A. at 156 (Hord Aff. Ex. 1 at ¶ 4(f)). Indeed, based on the record in this case, there is no evidence that the ban on disruptive symbols would not have been applied equally to a student displaying a Confederate flag in solidarity with hate groups, and another who displayed a Confederate flag in a circle with a line drawn through it. Thus, there is no indication that the school permits one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392, 112 S.Ct. 2538. Both proponents of racial tolerance and proponents of racial hatred are forbidden to display the Confederate flag. Furthermore, although the restriction on racially intolerant but not racially tolerant messages may be unconstitutional as applied to adults acting in a public forum, R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-94, 112 S.Ct. 2538, the same is not true in the public schools. Public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic.. . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). Given the extensive Supreme Court precedent affirming the unique mission of public education and holding that the free-speech rights of public-school students are not coextensive with those of adults, we believe that the exclusion of racially divisive symbols in a school that has experienced intense racial tensions is a permissible content-based restriction. The critical question, therefore, is whether the school has enforced its facially neutral, written dress code banning racially divisive symbols in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. Plaintiff-Appellant Barr stated that it was not until after the hit list incidents that the school began enforcing a ban on clothing depicting the Confederate flag, and prior to that time Barr had worn such clothing. J.A. at 243 (Barr Dep. at 16:11-19). Hord confirmed this understanding of the dress code's enforcement. J.A. at 110 (Hord Dep. at 13:6-21) (noting that the policy was not really enforced until the hit lists appeared on the restroom walls and the racial graffiti, threats, complaints from parents, [and] a lot of racial tension.). [8] That the school only began rigorously to enforce the dress code following the hit lists, however, does not mean it did so in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. Lafon attests that he has complied with Hord's direction to apply the provisions of the dress code evenly without viewpoint discrimination. J.A. at 51 (Lafon Aff. at ¶ 4). The school specifically identified the Confederate flag as subject to enforcement as a violation of the dress code, but also intended the ban to apply to other racially divisive symbols that could reasonably be expected to cause disruption in the school. Hord attests: In banning racially divisive symbols, I specifically included the Confederate [f]lag because it had been disruptive; however, the Principal of William Blount High School was instructed to ban any racially divisive symbols or flags that caused disruption or was likely to cause disruption. J.A. at 153 (Hord Aff. 4/3/07 at ¶ 8); see also J.A. at 110 (Hord Dep. at 15:12-18); J.A. at 98 (Lafon Dep. at 9: 11-17). While the school has specifically and explicitly banned the Confederate flag as a result of racial tension in the schools, J.A. at 110 (Hord Dep. at 14: 15-19), the school has not yet done so with respect to other political symbols because of an alleged absence of necessity. In other words, the school alleges that because other symbols have not yet caused a disruption, they have not been explicitly banned. J.A. at 110 (Hord Dep. at 14:24-15:4). Thus, Hord attests that he expects Lafon to enforce a ban on any other flag  [i]f it became disruptive and it proved to be. J.A. at 110 (Hord Dep. at 15:8) (emphasis added). Hord reiterated at deposition that under the policy, Lafon would enforce a ban against any flag that became disruptive and offensive to a group to the point [at which] it was disruptive. J.A. at 122 (Hord Dep. at 62:13-15). Thus, for example, while the school does not currently ban the Canadian flag, [i]f it became disruptive, if there is someone there that had a deep conceded problem with the Canadian flag and [would] fight you over it, it would become something that we [would] need to deal with. J.A. at 122 (Hord Dep. at 63:12-15). Plaintiffs-Appellants have produced no evidence suggesting that the school did not have a policy of applying the ban to all disruptive, racially divisive symbols and not just the Confederate flag. On the one hand, the evidence on the record that the school has explicitly and prospectively banned the Confederate flag but has not done the same with respect to other symbols supports Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that the enforcement of the dress code is viewpoint discriminatory. The evidence is uncontested that at the opening assembly of the 2005-2006 school year, Lafon announced only that the dress code's prohibition applied to the Confederate flag and did not specifically cite any other flags or symbols as similarly prohibited. In Castorina, we held that the First Amendment prohibited not only the kind of formally targeted ban present in Tinker but also a facially neutral policy that is enforced . . . in a content-specific manner. Castorina, 246 F.3d at 542. One could argue that the school's announcement that the Confederate flag fell within the dress code's prohibition chilled the expression of students who desired to wear emblems of the Confederate flag, whereas students desiring to wear racially divisive symbols other than the Confederate flag were free to test the boundaries of the dress code. Those students' speech would be censored only after they wore a divisive symbol and not prospectively. Ultimately, however, we decline to hold that the fact of Lafon's announcement regarding the Confederate flag alone demonstrates that the school enforces the ban on racially divisive symbols in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. The school required all students to take home a planner containing a copy of the school rules, including the dress code's ban on racially divisive symbols, and to have their parents sign a page of the planner attesting that the students had read it. J.A. at 102 (Lafon Dep at 27:3-7). Lafon's announcement that the Confederate flag lay within the scope of the ban did not narrow its breadth but rather clarified that the ban covered at least one symbol that students had previously worn on their clothing. We cannot require that, every time a school official explains a policy restricting students' speech, the official must offer a comprehensive list of the applications of the policy so as to avoid a finding that the official enforced the policy in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. Were there evidence that the school in practice enforced the dress code against the Confederate flag but not against other racially divisive symbols, we would need to reverse the grant of summary judgment for the school. But Plaintiffs-Appellants have produced no more than a scintilla of evidence that the school fails to enforce the dress code against racially divisive symbols other than the Confederate flag. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Both parties construe Malcolm X iconography as the ideological counterpoint to the Confederate flag, and thus we would have to reverse the grant of summary judgment were there evidence on the record that the school failed to enforce the dress code to prohibit clothing with Malcolm X iconography. In contrast to Castorina, 246 F.3d at 541-42, in which there existed a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the school refused to ban apparel celebrating Malcolm X, there is no similar issue of fact in the instant case. Lafon attests that other flags and symbols would fall under the ban if they are disruptive . . . . a Malcolm X shirt or some national flag, Mexican flag might possibly be, different things from that standpoint that whatever would cause a disruption. J.A. at 101 (Lafon Dep. at 22: 20, 22-25). Lafon attests, however, that [t]here have been no reported incidents of students wearing clothing emblazoned with Malcolm X words or caricatures, or international flags. J.A. at 51 (Lafon Aff. at ¶ 4). Plaintiffs-Appellants have not produced evidence disputing Lafon's testimony that would create a genuine issue of material fact regarding discriminatory enforcement of the dress code. Barr declares in his affidavit that he has seen other students wear clothing depicting Malcolm X and national flags during the 2005-2006 school year. J.A. at 27 (Barr Aff. at ¶ 9). Barr's declaration in the joint appendix is not signed. Furthermore, Barr stated at deposition that when he saw students, [o]nce or twice, wearing clothing like a Malcolm X shirt, he told teachers and it came to a stop. [9] J.A. at 247 (Barr Dep. at 40:4-14). Barr affirmed that, as far as he knew, the same penalties for wearing Confederate flag clothing applied to wearing the other types of potentially disruptive clothing and he never saw it enforced any differently. J.A. at 248 (Barr Dep. at 41:8-12). [10] Chris White's declaration states that [o]n several occasions during the 2005-2006 school year [she] ha[d] seen other students . . . wear clothing that depicted foreign national flags, Malcolm X symbols, and political slogans. J.A. at 25 (C.W. Decl. at ¶ 9). Chris White testified at deposition, however, that she was not aware of students wearing Malcolm X clothing, and was not really sure whether she had seen students wearing national flags on their clothing but thought she had seen Canadian flags and Mexican flags. J.A. at 255-56 (Chris White Dep. at 9:20-10:1). Chris White's declaration in the joint appendix is neither dated nor signed, and thus we cannot consider the declaration to create a factual issue when it contradicts her own deposition testimony. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir.1986). Lastly, Craig White also testified at deposition that he wasn't aware of students wearing Malcolm X clothing or foreign national flags. J.A. at 260 (R. Craig White Dep. at 7:7-15). Thus, Plaintiffs-Appellants have not created a genuine issue of material fact that the school enforced the dress code's prohibitions against the Confederate flag but not against clothing with Malcolm X iconography. Accordingly, under Tinker and its progeny in the Sixth Circuit Melton and Castorina we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the school with respect to Plaintiffs-Appellants' First Amendment claim.