Opinion ID: 148669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The USERRA Claim

Text: We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). Whether Wysocki could waive his USERRA claim through the Release is a matter of statutory interpretation, and depends on the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 4302. In matters of statutory interpretation, we look first to the text and, if the meaning of the language is plain, then the sole function of the courtsat least where the disposition required by the text is not absurdis to enforce it according to its terms. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P., 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir.2009). USERRA has a specific provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4302, dealing with its relation to other laws, plans, and agreements. [2] Section 4302 establishes that: (a) Nothing in this chapter shall supersede, nullify or diminish any Federal or State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that establishes a right or benefit that is more beneficial to, or is in addition to, a right or benefit provided for such person in this chapter. (b) This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such benefit. 38 U.S.C. § 4302. Wysocki argues that the Release is a contract or agreement that eliminates his rights and benefits under USERRA and, therefore, that it is automatically superseded by the language of § 4302(b).
Initially, we note that the rights and benefits protected in § 4302 are defined in 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2): (2) The term benefit, benefit of employment, or rights and benefits means any advantage, profit, privilege, gain, status, account, or interest (other than wages or salary for work performed) that accrues by reason of an employment contract or agreement or an employer policy, plan, or practice and includes rights and benefits under a pension plan, a health plan, an employee stock ownership plan, insurance coverage and awards, bonuses, severance pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, vacations, and the opportunity to select work hours or location of employment. The rights and benefits listed in § 4303(2) are all substantive rights. They do not deal with the procedure or process for enforcing those rights and benefits. Arguably, applying the definition in § 4303(2) to § 4302, the only rights and benefits protected in § 4302 are substantive, not procedural, rights; therefore, § 4302(b) does not prevent veterans from waiving their procedural rights because it does not apply to a waiver of a veteran's procedural rights. Under this reading, since the Release waived all of Wysocki's procedural and substantive rights, and since the waiver of all of Wysocki's procedural rights, which is not affected by § 4302, would prevent this suit, summary judgment for IBM would be appropriate. The district court followed this reasoning, and IBM urges it upon us. Moreover, this conclusion is supported to some degree by prior case law in this circuit, which recognized, along with other circuits, the distinction between procedural and substantive rights for the purposes of § 4302. In particular, in Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC , we enforced a contract providing for the arbitration of a veteran's USERRA claim. 537 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2008). Landis based its reasoning on Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir.2006), which discussed the definition of rights and benefits provided in § 4303(2), as it applies to § 4302(b), and recognized the distinction between procedural and substantive rights. Landis, 537 F.3d at 562 (discussing Garrett, 449 F.3d 672, 674-80). Wysocki distinguished this case in part from Landis by noting that this case involves a wholesale contractual elimination of all methods to enforce USERRA's rights and benefits. (Appellant Reply Br. 8). We agree. We enforced the arbitration provision at issue in Landis because arbitration still presents a fair opportunity for a claimant to present and prevail on a claim of a USERRA violation. 537 F.3d at 563. This is so because [b]y agreeing to arbitration, a party does not forego the substantive rights provided by the statute, but rather it submits its claims to an arbitral forum instead of a judicial forum. Id. at 562. Here, however, the Release purports to preclude Wysocki from advancing a USERRA claim in any forum, ever. An agreement that eliminates all of a veteran's procedural rights also eliminates, for all practical purposes, all of the veteran's substantive rights. Thus, enforcing the Release would provide Wysocki with no opportunity to present and prevail on a USERRA claim, much less the fair opportunity required by Landis. The agreements at issue in Garrett and Landis were found not to implicate § 4302 because they did not extend to substantive rights and still allowed for a fair opportunity to advance those rights. Here, however, the Release squarely implicates § 4302.
However, the fact that § 4302 applies to the Release, does not mean that the Release is automatically superceded by § 4302. While § 4302(b) supercedes any law, plan or agreement that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter, its application is limited by § 4302(a), which exempts any law, plan or agreement that is more beneficial to, or is in addition to, a right or benefit provided for such person in this chapter from the operation of § 4302(b). Therefore, the critical inquiry is whether the Release is exempted from the operation of § 4302(b) by § 4302(a), because the rights it provided to Wysocki were more beneficial then the rights that he waived. In determining whether the rights Wysocki received in exchange for signing the Release were more beneficial than the rights he gave up, we are cognizant of the fact that other courts have recognized that USERRA's provisions are to be liberally construed in favor of veterans. See Gordon v. Wawa, Inc., 388 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir.2004) ([W]e construe USERRA's provisions liberally, in favor of the service member.); McGuire v. United Parcel Serv., 152 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir.1998) (USERRA is to be liberally construed in favor of those who served their country.); see also Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196, 100 S.Ct. 2100, 65 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980) (stating that USERRA's predecessor is to be liberally construed for the benefit of the returning veteran). We also note that the legislative history clearly envisioned that veterans would be able to waive their individual USERRA rights by clear and unambiguous action. See H.R.Rep. No. 103-65, at 20 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2453 (The Committee wishes to stress that rights under chapter 43 belong to the claimant, and he or she may waive those rights, either explicitly or impliedly, through conduct.); S. Rep. 103-158, at 41, available at 1993 WL 432576 (Oct. 18 1993) (The rights under chapter 43 belong to the employee and, as such, can only be waived through unambiguous and voluntary action by the employee.); see also WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 73:7 (4th ed.) ([B]ecause releases are in the nature of settlements, the strong public policy in favor of encouraging the resolution of disputes is also implicated, and courts will interpret releases to further that policy.), 66 AM.JUR.2D Release § 2. Clearly, the ability to waive their USERRA rights without unnecessary court interference, if they believe that the consideration they will receive for waiving those rights is more beneficial than pursuing their rights through the courts, is both valuable and beneficial to veterans. In this case, the Release used clear and unambiguous language and involved a valuable amount of consideration. The Release stated that it covered claims based on veteran status. This clear and unambiguous language informed Wysocki that he was waiving his USERRA rights and, in exchange for signing the Release, Wysocki received over $6,000. Under these circumstances, it appears from the record that Wysocki understood that the Release eliminated his USERRA rights, that he signed the Release because he believed that the rights provided in the Release were more beneficial than his USERRA rights and, therefore, that the Release is exempted from the operation of § 4302(b) by § 4302(a). Wysocki has not presented any argument or evidence to the contrary, nor do we find any such evidence in the record. Furthermore, there is no evidence of mistake, incapacity, fraud, misrepresentation, unconscionability, or duress. We also note that Wysocki was encouraged to see a lawyer and had ample time to consider the Release before he signed it. [3] In short, we hold that § 4302 does not invalidate the Release.