Opinion ID: 1194140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fairbrook I.

Text: In the declaratory judgment action, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Mesaba's motion and granted partial summary judgment in favor of Fairbrook, concluding that, even though the Term Sheet was a preliminary agreement, it was an enforceable contract because its length, detail, formality, and completeness lend[] support to the finding that this document defines the parties' obligations, and is not a mere invitation for them to continue to negotiate. Fairbrook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 295 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1069-70 (D.Minn.2003). Alternatively, the court held that the parties to the Term Sheet bound themselves at a minimum to a framework within which to negotiate open terms in good faith, and Mesaba breached this duty by seeking concessions that contradicted the Term Sheet's framework. Id. at 1073. The court concluded that Fairbrook could enforce the Term Sheet subleases up to ninety-six months but denied Fairbrook summary judgment on its claim that it was entitled to unilaterally extend the Term Sheet subleases an additional four years. Id. at 1076. In June 2004, the parties entered into a Stipulation reciting that the Order of December 8, 2003 is the extent of the declarations sought by [Fairbrook] at this time and dismissing without prejudice Fairbrook's claims for four-year sublease extensions. Accordingly, the Stipulation recited, final judgment may be entered on the Court's December 8, 2003 Order to allow [Mesaba] to appeal that order at this time. The court entered an Order that the remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice and directed that final judgment be entered. [4] The Clerk entered a separate Judgment the next day containing no substantive terms. Although Fairbrook filed the action seeking a declaratory judgment and referred to declarations in the Stipulation that manufactured a final order for appeal, the final Order of December 8, 2003, contained no declaratory judgment. Cf. Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1297 (7th Cir.1986). It was in substance an interlocutory order granting partial summary judgment. As the district court's decision was based on alternative grounds, the preclusive effect of the summary judgment we affirmed in Fairbrook I must be determined by examining our opinion, not the district court's Order. Fairbrook interprets Fairbrook I as holding that the Term Sheet was a Type I, fully enforceable long-term contract entitling Fairbrook to the benefit of its bargain, namely, damages equal to $44,000 per month per aircraft for the fully extended twelve-year subleases. Mesaba construes Fairbrook I as concluding that the Term Sheet was a binding commitment only to negotiate the remaining open terms in good faith. To frame this dispute, it is necessary to examine New York contract law before we review the district court's decision to adopt Mesaba's interpretation of Fairbrook I. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment and its interpretation of state law de novo. 408 F.3d at 464.