Opinion ID: 741147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The INS's Interpretation

Text: 23 The BIA's most recent decision in Matter of Li followed two prior cases which also addressed the impact of adoption on the sibling relationship. 24 In Matter of Fujii, 12 I. & N. Dec. 495 (Dist.Dir.1967), the INS District Director 3 held that a U.S. citizen could petition for visa preference on behalf of her natural brother, who had been given up for adoption as a child. Recognizing that the Act did not define the terms brother or sister, the Director noted that the normal definition is a person having the same parent or parents as another. Id. at 496. The petitioner established that the beneficiary was the legitimate child of her natural parents and was therefore her brother under this definition. 4 The Director reasoned: 25 To conclude without judicial or precedent administrative determination to the contrary (and we find none) that the relationship of brother and sister created by the legitimate birth of the petitioner and beneficiary to the same parents was destroyed by the subsequent adoption of the latter would be to place upon the statute a harsher construction than that intended by Congress. 26 Id. The Director also observed that, although section 101(b)(1)(E) of the INA prevented the natural parent of an adopted child from obtaining an immigration right, privilege, or status via that child, there was no similar proscription regarding the natural siblings of an adopted child. Id. at 497. 27 In Matter of Kong, 17 I. & N. Dec. 151 (BIA 1979), the petitioner had been adopted as a child by the natural parents of the beneficiary. However, that adoption was terminated after the petitioner's natural mother immigrated to the United States so that the natural mother could seek a familial visa preference on the petitioner's behalf. The petitioner subsequently immigrated to the United States and became a U.S. citizen. The petitioner then applied for preferential visa status pursuant to section 203(a)(4) on behalf of the natural son of her adoptive parents (and thus her adoptive brother). 28 The BIA held that a sibling relationship created by an adoption does not survive the termination of that adoption for immigration purposes. Clarifying a prior BIA statement suggesting that the status of parent, once established, cannot be terminated, the BIA explained that to qualify as siblings under section 203(a)(5) of the INA, a petitioner must establish: (1) that both she and the beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent, and (2) that the parent is still a parent of each of them. Id. at 153. Although the petitioner and the beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent, they no longer shared a common parent because the petitioner's adoption had been terminated. Her adoptive parents were no longer her parents for immigration purposes. Id. 29 Finally, in Matter of Li, the BIA considered whether a petitioner, who qualifies as an adopted child within the provisions of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, can successfully petition for a natural sibling on the basis of their relationship to a common natural parent? 20 I. & N. Dec. 700, at  2. Relying on its decision in Matter of Kong, the Board stated that to qualify as siblings under section 203(a)(5) of the Act, a petitioner must establish both that he and the beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent and that the parental relationship has not been severed. Id. at  3. 30 Focusing on the section 101(b)(1)(E) proviso which provides that, upon an adoption that meets the requirements of the section, no natural parent can thereafter be accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Act, the Board held that such an adoption (which meets the statutory requirements) severs the relationship between natural parent and adopted child. Because the natural parent no longer has the status of parent under the Act, the legal relationship between adopted child and natural sibling also ceases. They no longer have a common parent for immigration purposes. 31 The Board rejected the District Director's analysis in Matter of Fujii, which depended on the absence of a prohibition of benefits for natural siblings similar to that of the section 101(b)(1)(E) proviso. Recognizing that section 101(b) of the Act defined only the parent-child relationship, the Board concluded that [a]ll other familial relationships are dependent on these [parent-child] definitions. Id. at  5. Because [a] sibling relationship can only be recognized through the fact of having a common parent within the definition of the Act, no sibling relationship can be recognized through a natural parent who loses his or her status as a parent under the Act as a result of the proviso to section 101(b)(1)(E). Id. To the extent that a relationship between the petitioner and his natural parents was terminated by virtue of his adoption, he cannot now establish that he and the beneficiary are children of a common parent as is required by the Act for the purpose of establishing a sibling relationship. Id. at  6. With this understanding of the statutory provisions and the INS's construction, we proceed with our Chevron analysis.