Opinion ID: 8414984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jones Act Claims

Text: The district court dismissed Volk’s Jones Act claims because it concluded that Volk did not qualify as a “seaman” within the meaning of the Jones Act. We agree.
Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920 to provide “heightened legal protections to seamen because of their exposure to the perils of the sea.” O’Hara, 294 F.3d at 61 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). It “gives seamen an express right of action in tort because of their status as ‘wards of the admiralty’ who ‘are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour.’” Id. at 61-62 (quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354-55, 115 S.Ct. 2172). “[T]o qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act, a maritime employee must have a substantial employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation,” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 373, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (emphasis omitted), or “to an identifiable group of such vessels,” id. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172. To have an “employment-related connection” to a vessel, “the worker’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.” O’Hara, 294 F.3d at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is liberal: “[t]he putative seaman need not aid in the navigation or contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must be doing the ship’s work.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997) (noting this prong focuses on whether the worker “contributed to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission”). Moreover, “the worker’s connection to the vessel must be ‘substantial in both its duration and its nature.’ ” O’Hara, 294 F.3d at 63 (quoting Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 82 F.3d 30, 32 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996)). This inquiry “focuses on whether the [worker] derives his livelihood from sea-based activities.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Land-based maritime workers do not become seamen because they happen to be working on board a vessel when they are injured, and seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when the course of their service to a vessel takes them ashore.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 361, 115 S.Ct. 2172. Nevertheless, the “recognized [ ] distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers” does not mean “that a maritime employee must work only on board a vessel to qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.” Id. at 363, 115 S.Ct. 2172. Rather, “the ultimate inquiry” is whether, in light of 'the totality of the' circumstances, “the worker in question is a member of the vessel’s crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.” Id. at 370, 115 S.Ct. 2172; see also Harbor Tug & Barge Co., 520 U.S. at 555, 117 S.Ct. 1535 (“For the substantial connection requirement to serve its purpose, the inquiry into the nature of the employee’s connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether the employee’s duties take him to sea.”). “Whether [a worker] qualifies as a seaman ‘is a mixed'question of law and fact.’ ” O’Hara, 294 F.3d at 63-64 (quoting Harbor Tug & Barge Co., 520 U.S. at 554, 117 S.Ct. 1535). The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is important “to focus upon the essence of what it means to be a seaman and to eschew the temptation to create detailed tests to effectuate the congressional purpose.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 369, 115 S.Ct. 2172. “The Jones Act remedy is reserved for sea-based maritime employees whose work regularly exposes them to ‘the special hazards and disadvantages to which they who go down to sea in ships are subjected.’ ” Id. at 370, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)). The key is whether the individual “ ‘had a sufficient-relation to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon.’ ” Id. (quoting Wallace v. Oceaneering Int’l, 727 F.2d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 1984)).
In weighing “the total circumstances” of Volk’s employment, we -conclude as a matter of law that Volk does not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. See id. As a reasonable. factfinder could only conclude, his work on the barges did not regularly expose him to the special hazards and disadvantages of the sea. See id. at 369-70, 115 S.Ct. 2172. Volk did not “derive[] his livelihood from sea-based activities.” O’Hara, 294 F.3d at 64 (internal quotation-marks omitted). Volk never, operated a barge and only-worked aboard the barges when they were secured to the dock. See Harbor Tug & Barge Co., 520 U.S. at 555, 117 S.Ct. 1535 (“For the substantial connection requirement to serve its purpose, the inquiry into the nature of the employee’s connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether the employee’s duties take him to sea.”). The barges Volk worked on were moved to the loading dock by Tilcon workboats and Tilcon employees, and transported down the Hudson River by Buchanan tugboats. 8 Volk was not a crew member of and did not serve on the Buchanan tugboats. 9 Indeed, Volk reported to the dock foreman, not a ship’s officer,.-and it was the dock foreman who brought him to the medical clinic after his accident. Volk belonged to a union that represents equipment operators. He did not belong to a maritime union and did not hold a maritime license or other “seaman’s papers.” O’Hara, 294 F.3d at 64. Finally, Volk never spent the night aboard a barge; he worked an hourly shift and went home every night after his shift ended. In contrast, a traditional Jones Act seaman normally serves for voyages or tours of duty. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 731-32, 63 S.Ct. 930, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943) (voyages); Sellers v. Dixilyn Corp., 433 F.2d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 1970) (tours of duty). In O’Hara, we concluded that a dockworker who was injured while repairing the Staten Island pier aboard a barge was not a “seaman” as a matter of law because he had, at most, “a transitory or sporadic connection” to the barges “in their capacity as vessels in navigation,” 294 F.3d at 64 (emphasis omitted). Key to our holding was that the dock worker (1) belonged to a dock workers union rather than a maritime union, (2) lacked a maritime license, (3) never spent the night aboard a barge, and (4) never operated a barge or assisted in its navigation and only worked aboard the barges when they were fully secured to the pier that the dock worker was employed to repair. Id. We emphasized that, although the worker “spent more ' than half his working hours ... aboard the barges, ... he spent all of that time performing tasks related to the repair of the Staten Island pier while the barges were secured to the pier.” Id. This case is not substantially different from O’Hara. ' Volk seeks to rely on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC, 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1397, 191 L.Ed.2d 359 (2015). There,' a shipyard worker “spent approximately 70 percent of his total' time working aboard” so-called “lift-boats” that “were moored, jacked up or docked iii [the] shipyard canal.” Id. at 930. His duties included “inspecting [the lift-boats] for repairs, cleaning them, painting them, replacing defective or damaged parts, performing engine repairs, going on test runs, securing equipment, and operating the vessels’ marine cranes and jack-up legs.” Id. The worker was occasionally “dispatched ... to repair a vessel or fill in as a vessel crane operator while the vessel was operating in open water.” Id. at 931. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the, jury verdict in favor of the shipyard worker awarding Jones Act damages, finding that the shipyard worker was exposed to the perils of a maritime work- environment such that he was a seaman. Id. at 935. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is not controlling on us, and it is in any event distinguishable. The- shipyard worker there clearly had a more substantial connection to seafaring vessels than Volk does. For example, the shipyard worker operated “the vessels’ marine cranes and jack-up legs” and worked aboard the vessels in open water, even if only “occasionally.” Id. at 930. Volk did none of these things; Volk worked ■ on barges that were moored, directly or indirectly, to the Tilcon dock and did not operate the Tilcon workboats or Buchanan tugboats that transported the barges. See Schultz v. Louisiana Dock Co., 94 F.Supp.2d 746, 750 (E.D. La. 2000) (“Plaintiffs duties were limited to inspecting and repairing barges moored at the facility. He did not go to sea or face the perils of the sea in the manner associated with seaman status. Plaintiff ate meals ashore and went home every night. He admitted that with respect to the vessels used to transport him around the facility he did not serve as a deckhand.”). In sum, none of Volk’s work was of a seagoing nature. Volk’s duties were limited to inspecting and repairing barges that were secured to the dock at the Clinton Point facility. Volk did not go to sea and he was not exposed to the “perils of the sea” in the manner associated with seaman status. See Denson v. Ingram Barge Co., 5:07-cv-00084-R, 2009 WL 1033817, at  (W.D. Ky. Apr. 16, 2009) (“The hazards Denson states he faced do not rise to the level of the special hazards and disadvantages faced by seamen; they are hazards that longshoremen commonly encounter. Therefore, Denson was an intended beneficiary of the LHWCA.”). Accordingly, considering the total circumstances of Volk’s employment, we conclude as a matter of law that Volk does not qualify as a “seaman” within the meaning of the Jones Act, and we affirm the dismissal of his Jones Act claims.