Opinion ID: 396175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the governing law

Text: 31 Looking to the body of old Fifth Circuit law adopted as precedent, we conclude that the case before us is controlled by Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1981), decided by the former Fifth Circuit July 13, 1981. 8 Mitchum is indistinguishable on its facts and on its reasoning. It concerned a state prisoner who filed a civil rights suit complaining of his treatment in another jail in the same county as Prichard. As in the instant case, counsel had been appointed for the prisoner, and there was no indication that counsel would be incapable of prosecuting the action. The case was referred to the same United States magistrate who made the same recommendation as made in the present case and for the same reasons. The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the case. Mitchum appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the grounds for dismissal were inadequate. 32 Our adoption of the body of Fifth Circuit law as precedent, and of the decision in Mitchum v. Purvis as part of that adopted law, is not the end of the matter. Because the court considers this case en banc it can overrule its prior precedent; thus we could overrule Mitchum as a precedent, albeit an adopted one, for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellees join with the appellant in urging that we adopt Fifth Circuit precedent as our precedent, but urge that the court en banc overrule Mitchum as an Eleventh Circuit precedent. This we decline to do. We believe that Mitchum is sound. 33 Prisoners have a constitutional right to adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979). This right is well established both in habeas corpus actions, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), and in civil rights cases, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-80, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2985-86, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Andrade v. Hauck, 452 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir. 1971) (fourteenth amendment right to access extends to § 1983 suit concerning conditions of incarceration). It is inconsistent with the due process rights of prisoners to dismiss civil rights cases filed by prisoners for the limited reasons advanced by the magistrate in this case and in Mitchum. A litigant capable of prosecuting an action cannot be denied access to the federal district court forum merely because of his status as a prisoner. 9 The appellees suggest there has been no denial of access because Bonner secured access to the court when he filed his complaint and the court thereafter and for appropriate reasons dismissed his complaint. They consider that denial of access is limited to the preparation and presentation to the court of complaints and petitions, such as the right to legal assistance and to legal materials in preparing documents for filing, and is unrelated to disposition by the court of a matter that the prisoner has filed. Thus, appellees say Mitchum is wrong because it relies on Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, a right of access case, for its holding that a prisoner is entitled to his day in court. Ordinarily matters presented to and decided by the district court are reviewed under principles other than right of access. But the line is not drawn as precisely at the courthouse door as appellees would have it. Inmate access to the courts must be adequate, effective and meaningful. Bounds v. Smith, supra. It is none of these if it embraces no more than being permitted to file a paper that, without determination of whether it states a claim legally sufficient and within the court's jurisdiction, is subject to dismissal on grounds of convenience to court and litigants. In discussing right of access Bounds refers to the rights of an indigent to a transcript in order that he have adequate and effective appellate review, and the right to counsel in order that he have a meaningful appeal. Id. Both of these are rights that reach beyond filing suit. 34 The appellees also urge that the dismissal is really a benefit to Bonner rather than a detriment because it permits him to pursue his cause of action at a time when he will no longer be at the disadvantage of prosecuting his case from behind bars. Appellees point out that Bonner can preserve the testimony of witnesses by depositions. The assessment of these benefits is more properly made by Bonner and his lawyer than by the appellees. Bonner and his counsel wish to proceed now. In the record before us there are not present substantial reasons that support refusing to permit Bonner to proceed. 35 The magistrate conducted no hearing with respect to his recommendation and the supporting notations. There is no evidence to support the notation relating to the security risk posed if Bonner or his witnesses were allowed to be present at trial. We only know that the witnesses are prisoners, that Bonner is under a ten year sentence for robbery and that, when a hearing was conducted on the issue of class certification, Bonner was transported for that hearing, and that, so far as the record shows, this was without incident. 36 There is no evidence that the testimony of Bonner or his witnesses will be unavailable. The presence of a state or federal prisoner as party or witness in federal court can be secured under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, which the federal court has discretionary authority to issue. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(5) (West 1971). 10 See Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1977). The court in Mitchum indicated that the district court should not address concerns about the need to transport prisoners to court on a sua sponte motion to dismiss early in the litigation but only upon the filing of a petition for the writ. 650 F.2d at 648. In this case there was no petition for a writ before the magistrate. No hearing was held on the issue of securing the presence of prisoners, nor was Bonner given other opportunity to produce evidence. 37 The district court had no evidence before it that Bonner was incapable of effectively pursuing his suit. No hearing was held and no evidence presented on this issue. The record shows that Bonner had counsel who may be able to try the case even if Bonner cannot be present at trial because of his incarceration. If petitions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are denied to Bonner or other imprisoned witnesses, counsel may seek leave of court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a) to depose them, and these depositions can be used as a substitute for live testimony at trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3). Ball v. Woods, 402 F.Supp. 803, 811 (N.D.Ala.1975) aff'd without opinion sub nom. Ball v. Shamblin, 529 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940, 96 S.Ct. 2660, 49 L.Ed.2d 393 (1976). 38 The magistrate is correct that Bonner is no longer in the Prichard jail and is, therefore, not subject to repetition of the wrongs he alleges. This is not sufficient basis to deny judicial inquiry into the incidents that he asserts have already taken place. 11 39 The court appreciates the cooperation and assistance of counsel for appellant, appellees, and for the amicus. 40 This opinion shall be released forthwith and in photocopy form. 41 AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.