Opinion ID: 1885183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Peculiar Nature of this Case

Text: On February 2, 2001, Governor Don Siegelman prorated state funds at 6.2%. In order to stop proration from affecting the order in the Equity Funding Case, the Alabama Coalition for Equity (ACE), the original plaintiff in the Equity Funding Case, sought a declaratory judgment in the Montgomery Circuit Court. The circuit court granted ACE injunctive relief on February 22, 2001. On appeal to this Court, the intervenors, as well as ACE, raised the issue of the constitutionality of the proration order, based on the orders that had been entered in the Equity Funding Case. It was clear that the finality of the March 31, 1993, order in the Equity Funding Case was critical to any resolution of that issue. We ordered the parties to address the question of the finality of that order, and during the study of that question, discovered that the trial court may well have lacked jurisdiction to rule in the Equity Funding Case. That discovery led to our order to the parties to brief the issues of the jurisdiction of the trial court to rule and the constitutionality of that March 31, 1993, order and all other orders associated with the Equity Funding Case. This Court has never had to deal with a case as unusual as this one, and it is unusual in several ways. The trial court violated the limits of its own jurisdiction with respect to the other two branches of the civil government of this State, to which the Constitution delegates the power to establish a public-education system. As I explain below, the very name of the case Equity Funding [26] describes the jurisdictional violation committed by the trial court. While this case was pending in the trial court, the then governor was convicted of a felony; that, in turn, produced the unusual occurrence that several of the plaintiffs realigned themselves as defendants, so that there appeared to be adverse parties and a case and controversy during the 42-day period within which an appeal could be taken. In reality there was no case or controversy and there were no adverse parties. Lacking a case or controversy, the case should have been dismissed. Lacking any disagreement between the parties, there was no case or controversy before the March 31, 1993, order was certified as final on June 9, or during the 42-day appeal period following that date. Nor did the trial court allow any other interested parties to intervene in the case. [27] While the case was pending before the trial court, the trial judge campaigned for a position on the Alabama Supreme Court as The Judge for Education Reform. In his campaign literature he stated that he was a tough judge because he had ruled Alabama's education system unconstitutional, order[ed] the Legislature back to work, and told a governor and the Legislature to fix the problem. Those public statements ultimately forced his removal from the case while it remained pending. However, before his removal, the trial judge declared his orders final and then continued to order hearings and different forms of relief, in contradiction to the supposed finality of his own order. Using racism as a basis, the trial court declared all of the education portion of Amendment 111, Ala. Const.1901, unconstitutional, but preserved a portion of the original Art. XIV, § 256, Ala. Const.1901. He divided the case into two partsa Liability Phase and a Remedy Phasea faulty distinction. Then, using one word found in § 256liberalthe trial judge renovated and reformed the entire education system to the tune of an estimated $1 billion and instituted a scheme of continuing supervision by his court of every aspect and agency of the entire Alabama education system, including the Alabama Legislature, the Governor, and the State Board of Education. The orders issued to promulgate this plan would necessarily require an increase in taxation, amounting to taxation without representation, and would create a right to public education which was expressly prohibited by Amendment 111. The trial judge proceeded to set up this program even though the Legislature was not properly a party to the action. He went to great lengths to micromanage the State's school system, to the point of requiring that adequate toilet paper be provided for each student. [28] A trial court in a proper case may hold an act of the Alabama Legislature unconstitutional, but to enter an order that would require the Legislature to pass legislation and spend money on an education project of the trial judge's own making is unprecedented in the history of this State. [29] By its wholesale striking of Amendment 111, the trial court appears to have attempted to create a new right to public education, disregarding the expressed wishes of the people as set forth in Amendment 111 to the Alabama Constitution. [30] Even if the trial court had had jurisdictionand I conclude that it did notwe should not ignore an abuse of power by the judicial branch that represents an attempt to change our constitution. It is not surprising that there has been a lack of clarity on several matters in this litigation. The trial court made legislative and executive, instead of judicial, decisions. While some states have been willing to allow their courts to make extensive and endless forays into supervising education in the name of necessity, particularly in this type of litigation, see Chief Justice Hooper's dissent in Ex parte James, 713 So.2d 869, 906-08 (Ala.1997), Alabama must not make such a fundamental error. Any change to our constitution must be effected only by the lawfully established amendment process. Under our constitution, the power over public education belongs to the Legislature, not the courts. An attempt to usurp that power by the judicial branch is a fundamental breach of the separation-of-powers doctrine and an improper subject of the court's jurisdiction. Courts issue opinions that are binding on the parties to a particular case and controversy; those opinions have precedential value only so far as they correctly interpret and faithfully apply the law.