Opinion ID: 613385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion in Limine and Testimony Regarding Jimmy Swain

Text: The government contends that trial counsel could not have been deficient for failing to move in limine to preclude Karlos Harper from testifying. The government asserts that a district court has no authority to preclude a witness from testifying because of her history of untruthfulness in prior proceedings before the court. We need not decide this question  though we note appellate courts have held that a witness's prior perjury does not preclude that witness from testifying. See United States v. Oros, 578 F.3d 703, 710-11 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating a witness's testimony is not per se incredible simply because he once committed perjury); United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1347 (7th Cir.1997) (even the most dastardly scoundrels, cheats, and liars are generally competent to testify); United States v. Margolis, 138 F.2d 1002, 1004 (3d Cir.1943) (holding perjury does not preclude a witness from testifying but is rather a credibility issue for the jury). In the government's first appeal, this court concluded that aside from Mr. Harper's contested testimony, there was overwhelming evidence of Bass's participation in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Bass, 478 F.3d at 952. Accordingly here, had trial counsel successfully moved in limine, there is not a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Bass simply did not suffer prejudice from the lack of a motion in limine to prevent Karlos Harper from testifying. Likewise, Bass did not suffer prejudice from counsel's failure to object to the testimony regarding Jimmy Swain. That testimony was, at best, a minor part of a week-long trial and any prejudice cannot overcome the fact that [s]ix witnesses testified to participating in crack cocaine transactions with Mr. Bass or observing Mr. Bass's crack-related activities. Id.