Opinion ID: 4519639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crim.R. 16

Text: {¶ 44} Crim.R. 16 governs discovery in criminal cases. Effective July 1, 2010, Crim.R. 16 underwent comprehensive changes in large part to strengthen the protections of a defendant’s constitutional due-process rights to a fair trial. Grove, Criminal Discovery in Ohio: “Civilizing” Criminal Rule 16, 36 U.Dayton L.Rev. 143, 144-145 (2011). The new Crim.R. 16 promoted “more open discovery,” id. at 144, leveling the playing field by strengthening the defendant’s right to know the evidence the state will present against him at trial. {¶ 45} Crim.R. 16 begins by providing that the purpose of the rule is: [T]o provide all parties in a criminal case with the information necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the facts, to protect the integrity of the justice system and the rights of defendants, and to protect the well-being of witnesses, victims, and society at large. 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Crim.R. 16(A). {¶ 46} As part of the rule’s changes in 2010, Crim.R. 16(K) was adopted, requiring that expert witnesses generate written reports and that those reports be disclosed to the opposing party no later than 21 days before trial. See State v. Walls, 2018-Ohio-329, 104 N.E.3d 280, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.). Crim.R. 16(K) states: An expert witness for either side shall prepare a written report summarizing the expert witness’s testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a summary of the expert’s qualifications. The written report and summary of qualifications shall be subject to disclosure under this rule no later than twenty-one days prior to trial, which period may be modified by the court for good cause shown, which does not prejudice any other party. Failure to disclose the written report to opposing counsel shall preclude the expert’s testimony at trial. {¶ 47} Here, to be clear, an autopsy report was provided to the defense well in advance of 21 days before trial, so this is not a case involving the admission of expert testimony in the complete absence of an expert report. But that report did not contain all the opinions that the state ultimately sought to elicit from the deputy coroner at trial. The question, then, is whether Crim.R. 16(K) required the exclusion of Dr. Scala-Barnett’s testimony that went beyond the scope of her written autopsy report. {¶ 48} Consistent with the overall purpose of Crim.R. 16, lower courts have found that “ ‘[t]he purpose of Crim.R. 16(K) is to avoid unfair surprise by providing notice to the defense and allowing the defense an opportunity to challenge the expert’s findings, analysis, or qualifications, possibly with the support of an adverse expert who could discredit the opinion after carefully reviewing the written 14 January Term, 2020 report.’ ” State v. Fetty, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0091, 2012-Ohio-6127, ¶ 36, quoting State v. Perry, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-125, 2012-Ohio-4888, ¶ 55; see also State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-273, 81 N.E.3d 895, ¶ 33 (9th Dist.). {¶ 49} Here, the state provided Dr. Scala-Barnett’s autopsy report to defense counsel over one year before trial. Of no less importance, defense counsel met with Dr. Scala-Barnett 19 days before trial and learned her conclusions regarding Brandi’s stomach contents and time of death and the glove-buckle comparison. To the extent that Crim.R. 16(K) gives a trial court discretion to adjust the date for the production of a report, the production of a supplemental report could have cured any noncompliance with the rule without prejudicing Boaston’s right to a fair trial. {¶ 50} Moreover, there is no suggestion that Dr. Scala-Barnett’s unwritten opinions affected Boaston’s defense strategy. No continuance was requested. In fact, defense counsel engaged in a rigorous cross-examination of Dr. Scala-Barnett as to her time-of-death and glove-buckle-analysis opinions. See State v. Mobley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26858, 2016-Ohio-4579, ¶ 36 (defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice when he made no showing of surprise or a need for additional information or that he would have obtained his own expert if he had known the expert’s opinion earlier); see also State v. Groesser, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00182, 2018-Ohio-2713, ¶ 30 (defendant was aware before trial of the substance of testimony to be offered by witnesses, and he failed to elucidate with any specificity how, even assuming the witnesses had testified as experts, the lack of a report prevented him from retaining his own expert witness). Insofar as the purpose of Crim.R. 16 is to avoid unfair surprise, no such unfair surprise occurred here. But that does not end our analysis. {¶ 51} Appellate courts have split on the issue whether trial courts must exclude expert testimony in all cases of noncompliance with Crim.R. 16(K). Some courts have held that exclusion is not always required, reasoning that a trial court 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO retains discretion in regard to evidentiary matters. See State v. Proby, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-1067, 2015-Ohio-3364, ¶ 32-33; State v. Opp, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-33, 2014-Ohio-1138, ¶ 16; State v. Retana, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-12-225, 2012-Ohio-5608, ¶ 53-54. {¶ 52} Other courts have found that Crim.R. 16(K) removes the trial court’s discretion and mandates the exclusion of expert testimony when a written report has not been disclosed in accordance with the rule. Walls, 2018-Ohio-329, 104 N.E.3d 280, at ¶ 31; State v. Hall, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170699 and C-170700, 2019-Ohio-2985, ¶ 20; State v. McGhee, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0106, 2017-Ohio-5773, ¶ 21. {¶ 53} Many of the cases that rely on a court’s broad discretion in regulating the admission of evidence, see, e.g., Proby at ¶ 33, cite to another section of the rule, namely Crim.R. 16(L)(1), which states: The trial court may make orders regulating discovery not inconsistent with this rule. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may make such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. {¶ 54} Here, the Sixth District appeared to follow this reasoning.3 2017Ohio-8770, 100 N.E.3d 1002, at ¶ 44, 52-53. However, we cannot subscribe to this 3. The appellate court also concluded that Boaston waived the issue by not raising it at trial pursuant to Crim.R. 12(C)(4). 2017-Ohio-8770, 100 N.E.3d 1002, at ¶ 50, 53. This is a misreading of Crim.R. 12(C)(4). Crim.R. 12(C)(4) does not require a party to object to every Crim.R. 16 discovery violation before trial. The rule simply requires that a party must raise objections regarding requests 16 January Term, 2020 analysis for the simple fact that the plain language of Crim.R. 16(K) limits the trial court’s discretion and provides its own specific remedy for a violation of the rule. See State ex rel. Law Office of Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. Rosencrans, 111 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006-Ohio-5793, 856 N.E.3d 250, ¶ 23 (“To interpret court rules, this court applies general principles of statutory construction”). Thus, if a court rule is unambiguous, it is to be applied as written. Erwin v. Bryan, 125 Ohio St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-2202, 929 N.E.2d 1019, ¶ 22. {¶ 55} The plain language of Crim.R. 16(K) expressly provides the consequence for failing to disclose an expert’s report as required: “Failure to disclose the written report to opposing counsel shall preclude the expert’s testimony at trial.” (Emphasis added.) Crim.R. 16(L)(1) implicitly acknowledges this remedy: “The trial court may make orders regulating discovery not inconsistent with this rule.” (Emphasis added.) And while Crim.R. 16(K) confers some measure of discretion on trial judges, it is limited to modifying the 21-day requirement “for good cause shown, which does not prejudice any other party.”