Opinion ID: 1119018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pre- and Post-Miranda Statements

Text: Miranda established requirements to assure protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under inherently coercive circumstances. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612-13. Pursuant to Miranda, a suspect may not be subjected to an interrogation in official custody unless that person has previously been advised of, and has knowingly and intelligently waived the following: the right to silence, the right to the presence of an attorney, and the right to appointed counsel if that person is indigent. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Custody means a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); accord Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). The district court determined that Alward was not in custody. We will not disturb the district court's determination of whether the defendant was in custody where that determination is supported by substantial evidence. Rowbottom v. State, 105 Nev. 472, 480, 779 P.2d 934, 939 (1989). In the instant case, however, we conclude that there is not substantial evidence to support the district court's determination that Alward was not in custody. Since Alward was not formally arrested at the scene, the pertinent inquiry, as with Fourth Amendment claims, is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-52, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). We consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether or not Alward was in custody; no single factor is dispositive. E.g. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520. Important considerations include the following: (1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation has focused on the subject, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present, and (4) the length and form of questioning. People v. Celaya, 191 Cal.App.3d 665, 236 Cal.Rptr. 489, 492 (1987). Admittedly, Alward summoned police to the scene and kept telling [Trooper Jorgensen] over and over not to leave him. However, shortly thereafter, Alward's hands were bagged to preserve incriminating evidence, and Sergeant Bogdanowicz took Alward to the Sheriff's department. Once Alward's hands were bagged, he was incapable of leaving the area by hitchhiking or by driving, and he was incapable of dialing a telephone to request a ride from another or to call his family. The investigation focused on Alward at the point that police bagged his hands, since in so doing they attempted to preserve evidence with which to incriminate him. The bagging of Alward's hands occurred immediately after Bogdanowicz returned from the tent where he saw that the victim had her finger behind the trigger, not in front of it, making it unlikely that a suicide occurred. The interrogation at the Sheriff's department took place in a room used for interviews and equipped with a special mirror. Apart from the mental health counselor visit, only Alward and the investigators were present in the interview room. From this, we hold that a reasonable person in Alward's position would have concluded that he was under arrest. Any interrogation which took place after Alward's hands were bagged and before Miranda warnings were administered was therefore custodial, and Miranda safeguards applied. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291-92, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). The district court therefore erred in failing to suppress that part of the videotape which contains statements Alward made before the Miranda warnings were administered. Appellant further contends that statements he made after receiving the Miranda warnings were the product of coercive interrogation tactics, and therefore, should have been suppressed. In Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 214, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (1987), this court listed several factors which are relevant in determining whether a defendant's statement was voluntary: [t]he youth of the accused; his lack of education or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice of constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Only the length of detention is a factor here  Alward was questioned for several hours. However, during that time, there is no indication in the record that any other factors were present which would detract from voluntariness. Alward had been read the Miranda warnings and voluntarily waived his rights. The investigators did not employ coercive interrogation techniques such as depriving Alward of food or sleep. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Alward made the inculpatory statements voluntarily. Therefore, we hold that the district court properly admitted the statements which Alward made to police after receiving Miranda warnings and waiving his Fifth Amendment rights. Alward further contends that statements he made at the Sheriff's department should have been suppressed because they were taken following an arrest which was unlawful because the police lacked probable cause at the time they arrested him, and because his detention violated NRS 171.123. The State casts Alward's detention as limited to the time that police conducted an investigation into suspected criminal conduct. We have held that a warrantless felony arrest may be made if the arresting officer knows of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that a felony was committed by the arrestee. Lyons v. State, 106 Nev. 438, 446, 796 P.2d 210, 215 (1990) (citing Block v. State, 95 Nev. 933, 935, 604 P.2d 338, 339 (1979)). We conclude that probable cause existed to justify an arrest since Alward's claim that Baxter committed suicide was inconsistent with the scene in the tent, which Sergeant Bogdanowicz had already investigated at the time Alward's hands were bagged. Upon unzipping the tent, Sergeant Bogdanowicz noticed that Baxter's finger was behind the trigger, which was inconsistent with Alward's story of suicide. Therefore, Alward's arrest was not unlawful, and Alward's statements were properly not suppressed for this reason. Finally, Alward contends that the statements he made after officers informed him of their discovery of items not in plain view at the scene should have been suppressed as the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation. [E]vidence will not be excluded as `fruit' unless the illegality is at least the `but for' cause of the discovery of the evidence. Suppression is not justified unless `the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity.' Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3390-91, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1249-50, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980)). Alward fails to specify exactly what the investigators referred to when they told Alward that evidence was discovered at the scene which indicated that he was lying when he stated that he was not inside the tent when the gun was fired. According to our careful review of the record, the investigators never mentioned any illegal fruit during the interrogation. Thus, there is no indication in the instant case that the fruits of the illegal search resulted in the production of Alward's incriminating statements. Here, as in Segura, the illegal search of the tent did not contribute in any way to Alward making inculpatory statements.