Opinion ID: 29578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Union Majority Status

Text: 20 Raven argues in the alternative that its unilateral elimination of job classifications was proper because it acted in the good faith belief that the Union no longer enjoyed the support of the majority of its members. When an employer has such a good faith belief it may withdraw recognition from a union and refuse to bargain with it. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 359, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998). To determine whether an employer in fact holds such a belief, we apply a two part test in which the employer bears the burden of proof. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787, 110 S.Ct. 1542, 108 L.Ed.2d 801 (1990). First, we ask whether at the time of its refusal to recognize a union, the employer had a reasonable uncertainty about whether the union enjoyed the continuing support of its members. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 367, 371, 118 S.Ct. 818. These doubts must be supported by objective evidence external to the employer's subjective impressions. Id. at 368 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 818. Second, we consider whether the employer's uncertainty is held in good faith (i.e., is it genuine?). Id. at 371, 118 S.Ct. 818. To be held in good faith the doubt must arise in a context free of unfair employer labor practices that could have reasonably tended to contribute to employee dissatisfaction with its union. United Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 549, 554 n.6 (5th Cir.1989). 21 The ALJ concluded that Raven had not met the first prong of this test, concluding it had failed to point to sufficient evidence on which it could have based a good faith doubt of the Union's majority status on October 1, 1996. The ALJ also held that the Raven had failed to demonstrate that its doubts were held in good faith, as they were reached in the context of wide ranging unfair labor practices that undermined Union support among employees. We review these determinations under the substantial evidence standard. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 366, 118 S.Ct. 818. Put another way, we must consider whether a reasonable fact-finder could have found that Raven lacked a genuine, reasonable uncertainty about the Union's majority status. Id. at 367, 118 S.Ct. 818. We conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could make such a determination. 22 First, we agree with the ALJ that Raven has failed to point to sufficient evidence on which it could have based a good faith belief that the Union lacked majority status in October 1996. In its brief Raven cites five pieces of evidence that it relied upon to question the Union's majority. It noted: (1) lack of real efforts by the Union to obtain an agreement; (2) the Union's inability or refusal to formulate proposals to break the impasse; (3) Union inactivity from January to September 1996, including the failure of the Union to provide Raven with a list of stewards; (4) substantial workforce turnover from the certification of the Union in December 1992 to October 1996; and (5) a rumor that a decertification petition was circulated by an employee in January or February 1996. 23 Raven's actions were principally the reason for the Union's inability to formulate proposals that resulted in an agreement. By refusing to give the Union the materials it requested in its September 20 letter, Raven denied the Union the information it needed to formulate new proposals. As for the remaining evidence, after considering it as a whole we believe that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Raven did not have reasonable uncertainty as to the Union's status. Contrary to Raven's claims, there was at least some activity by the Union of which petitioner was aware in 1996, including the election of Kenneth Forge as Union steward. The workforce turnover that Raven notes was insufficient to establish good faith doubt of majority status, unless there was some reason to believe that the new workers were less likely to support the Union. NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 525 F.2d 870, 871-72 (5th Cir.1976). Raven offers no evidence to support such a conclusion. And Raven's information concerning the decertification petition was a scant rumor at best. Raven made no attempt to substantiate the hearsay information until September 1997, nearly a year after the October 1, 1996 unilateral changes. Unsubstantiated rumors of a decertification petition, even combined with workforce turnover and limited activity by the Union over a 9 month span, do not constitute sufficient grounds for reasonable uncertainty over the Union's majority status. Cf. Allied Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 881-82 (D.C.Cir.1973) (noting that naked information regarding the filing of a decertification petition without information regarding the number of signatories is insufficient to create good faith doubt of union majority status, even with additional evidence present). 24 Even assuming arguendo that Raven had reasonable uncertainty about the Union's majority status, we agree with the NLRB's conclusion that this belief was not held in good faith. Raven did not inform the Union that it doubted its majority status until July 1997, nine months after it made the October 1, 1996 changes unilaterally. Given this time lag, Raven's claim that it genuinely doubted the Union's majority status in October 1996 appears more as a post hoc rationalization for unilateral action, than a real reflection of its beliefs. Moreover, the doubts Raven claimed to have had on October 1, 1996 were rendered suspect by its refusal of the Union's September 20, 1996 request for information necessary or useful to the formulation of bargaining proposals. Raven's unlawful refusal of information itself threatened to undermine support for the Union among workers by rendering futile the Union's attempts to formulate a new bargaining proposal. It is exactly this kind of coercive anti-union employer practice that we have previously held prevents an employer from establishing good faith doubt as to a union's majority status. United Supermarkets, 862 F.2d at 553 n.6. 25 Thus, the NLRB's determination that Raven lacked good faith doubt as to the Union's majority status entitling it to act unilaterally in making the October changes is supported by substantial evidence on the record. We therefore conclude the NLRB did not err in finding that Raven's unilateral October 1, 1996 changes constituted an unfair labor practice.