Opinion ID: 3011785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Challenge to the Prohibition on

Text: Unsupervised Contact with Minors Conditions of supervised release must be r easonably related to the goals of deterrence, pr otection of the public, and rehabilitation of the defendant. 18 U.S.C.S 3583(d)(1). They must also involve[ ] no gr eater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to meet these goals, 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d)(2), and, as stated above, supervised release conditions that affect constitutional rights will likely be valid if narrowly tailored and . . . directly related to deterring [the offender] and protecting the public. United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 138 (1999); see also United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986) ([C]onditions that restrict a probationer's freedom must be especiallyfine-tuned.). Loy claims that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the condition barring him from having _________________________________________________________________ (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual depiction is advertised, pr omoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct[.] 18 U.S.C. S 2256(8). 26 any unsupervised contact with minors. He further contends that the condition is not `reasonably r elated' to the statutory goals because no evidence was presented that [he] ever molested a child. Finally, Loy argues that the condition, coupled with the requirement that the supervision come from someone other than his wife, functionally prevents him from bearing and raising children of his own, in violation of his fundamental rights to procreate and to maintain the integrity of his family. The District Court's findings in support of the condition that Loy have no unsupervised contact with minors r ead as follows: The Court finds it appropriate to pr ohibit defendant from all unsupervised contact with minors while on supervised release. Although defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography and not of the production of such pornography, the evidence presented to this Court prior to sentencing demonstrates that the defendant has not only a significant knowledge of and interest in child pornographic materials, but also that the defendant himself has been involved in making videos of young girls. Specifically, defendant described to Special Agent Guzy how he had produced videos by hiding a camcorder in a bag and filming up the skirts of girls high school age and younger as they rode escalators at a mall, as well as how he has hidden camera videotapes that he made by videotaping through windows. Regardless of whether or not these videos constitute pornography, it is clear to this Court that the defendant, given his interest in child por nography and his efforts to make sexually explicit materials involving children, poses a danger to childr en if left alone with them. Accordingly, the Court finds it appr opriate to prohibit defendant from having unsupervised contact with minors. The Court does not mean by imposition of this condition to require that defendant's pr obation officer or another law enforcement official be pr esent whenever defendant is around minors. However , defendant is not to be alone with minors, nor is he to 27 be alone with his wife and any minors. In other wor ds, an adult other than defendant's wife must be pr esent when defendant is in the presence of a minor . This condition of supervised release serves to: (1) protect minors who may come in contact with defendant in that defendant is not likely to attempt to make sexually explicit depictions of them if another adult is pr esent; and (2) deter defendant from engaging in criminal conduct, also because defendant is not likely to attempt to make sexually explicit depictions of children if another adult is present. In a footnote, the court explained that [e]vidence presented to this Court prior to defendant's sentencing indicated that defendant's wife also has an interest in child pornography. Loy argues that the District Court's findings with respect to this condition are not supported by the r ecord. We disagree. As the court noted, Loy twice admitted to an undercover agent that he secretly filmed up young girls' dresses on escalators at the local mall by placing a bag containing a hidden video camera at their feet. It may also be true that, at the subsequent hearing on his motion to suppress, Loy claimed to have fabricated the story. But it is not true, as Loy argues, that because the evidence on this point is contradictory, the record does not support the District Court's finding. The contradiction is of Loy's own creation. The District Court was free to conclude that the self-serving statements Loy made before the court were less cr edible than statements he made to third parties who he believed shared his interests in child pornography. Ther efore, the record contained sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Loy had personally made videotapes exploiting minors. Loy next argues that even if there is sufficient evidence that he had secretly filmed up young girls' dresses on mall escalators, that conduct would not be addr essed by the condition, because the conduct would not have taken place when Mr. Loy was alone with minors. The argument is wholly without merit. The fact that Loy was willing to exploit minors in public places fully supports a condition barring him from being alone with them in private. 28 Loy further contends that the condition is vague in that it might conceivably apply to casual or unavoidable contact with minors in public places. This argument is one that has a long and familiar history in the courts; associational conditions placed upon parolees and probationers are commonplace and have frequently been challenged as overly broad or vague because they potentially extend to casual encounters. See 1 Neil P. Cohen, The Law of Probation and Parole S 9.11, at 9-19 (2d ed. 1999). At this point, it is well established that associational conditions do not extend to casual or chance meetings. See, e.g., Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 4 (1971) (per curiam) (interpreting an associational condition to exclude certain casual encounters); Birzon v. King, 469 F .2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); Cohen, supra,S 9.11, at 9-19 (observing that associational conditions are fr equently challenged, but that courts routinely uphold them and interpret them not to apply to chance meetings). We also so interpret them. Certainly accidental or unavoidable contact with minors in public places is not forbidden by the condition; however, should Loy deliberately seek out such contacts, they would cease to be casual orunavoidable and would fall within the condition's scope. Thus, in accordance with the long line of similar cases, we believe that the condition restricting Loy's contact with minors is not unconstitutionally vague. Loy also submits that the record does not support the District Court's finding that his wife is also interested in child pornography. Consequently, he ar gues, the court erroneously structured the condition to pr ohibit him from having otherwise unsupervised contact with minor children even if his wife is present. The court explained its order that Loy must be chaperoned by someone other than his wife when in the presence of minors as justified by the fact that [e]vidence presented to this Court prior to defendant's sentencing indicated that defendant's wife also has an interest in child pornography. This led the court to require that an adult other than defendant's wife must be present when defendant is in the presence of a minor . Although the evidence on which the court based its decision is fairly tenuous for such a severe restriction, especially considering its impact on a third party who has not been charged with 29 any crime, given our deference to the District Court in factual matters, it is sufficient.9 Loy's final challenge to the condition is that, although he does not currently have children, the condition could potentially extend to any children he and his wife may subsequently have once he is released fr om prison. If so, the condition might deter him from exer cising his constitutional right to procreation, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and, should he have children to whom the condition applies, it would interfere with his fundamental right to familial integrity, see Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir . 2000). It is well established that, although parents have a fundamental right to raise their children, this right can be overridden by the state's compelling inter est in ensuring children's safety. See Croft v. W estmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, convicted pedophiles may, quite legitimately, lose custody of their children or have restrictions placed on their parental rights. However, where there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that children are potentially in danger from their parents, the state's inter est cannot be said to be compelling, and thus interference in the family relationship is unconstitutional. See id. at 1126. Loy, after approximately nine years of marriage, is childless; his term of supervised release will last only three years. At most, any children he might have upon his release would be two years old by the time the term ended. There is certainly a legitimate question as to whether the _________________________________________________________________ 9. The only evidence that Loy's wife is inter ested in child pornography is that, in his reply to the fake advertisement run by the police, Loy responded as Ray and Maria and used the word we to describe the interest in child pornography. However , the transcription of his telephone call with the government agent suggests that Ray did not let his wife know about his proclivities: Umm, you know she really don't know too much about the very young stuff I got. I mean you know she kinda likes the, the couples and solo girls and stuf f. . . . But, like I said, I kinda keep the actual really young stuf f from her because I don't know how she'd handle that. I don't know if she'd fr eak out or not. . . . I keep that definitely hidden. 30 record would support a finding that Loy represents a threat to an infant child of his own. But it is unnecessary to decide this question, because we believe it unlikely that the District Court intended its condition to extend so far. Given the severe intrusion on Loy's family life that would otherwise result, we believe that, absent a clearer sign from the District Court, the condition should be construed to apply only to other people's children, and not to Loy's own. If, at some later date, the District Court should come to believe that it is necessary for the protection of the public or for Loy's rehabilitation to extend the condition to Loy's own children, it may consider modifications to the condition in accordance with 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e); the constitutionality of the restriction can likewise be reviewed at that time. We therefore r eject the government's suggestion that the condition receive a br oad construction now, placing the burden on Loy to petition for a modification should he and his wife have childr en before the term of supervised release ends.