Opinion ID: 2512369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Motion to Strike Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16

Text: Before considering the merits of the property dispute, we must decide a preliminary procedural question. Subdivision (b)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16) provides: A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. Defendants filed a special motion to strike under this sectiona so-called anti-SLAPP motion. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735].) The trial court found that section 425.16 governs the action the Los Angeles Diocese filed and, further finding plaintiffs had not shown a probability they would prevail, granted the special motion to strike. The Court of Appeal concluded that the action was not a SLAPP suit. We agree with the Court of Appeal. (2) [S]ection 425.16 requires that a court engage in a two-step process when determining whether a defendant's anti-SLAPP motion should be granted. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one `arising from' protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. ( City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695].) Defendants argue that this action arose from their protected activity in first expressing disagreement with the higher church authorities regarding church governance and then disaffiliating from the general church. The Los Angeles Diocese's complaint did allege facts concerning the reasons defendants decided to disaffiliate from the greater church. Nevertheless, we conclude the action did not arise from protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16. As the Court of Appeal aptly stated, The flaw in this thinking is that it confuses the motivation for the disaffiliation with the claims made by the general church about the use of church property. [¶] ... [I]t makes no difference why defendants are disaffiliating; the point is they are being sued for asserting control over the local parish property to the exclusion of a right to control asserted by plaintiffs.  [T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been `triggered' by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from such. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity. ( Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703].) In filing this action, the Los Angeles Diocese sought to resolve a property dispute. The property dispute is based on the fact that both sides claim ownership of the same property. This dispute, and not any protected activity, is the gravamen or principal thrust of the action. ( Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 193 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494].) The additional fact that protected activity may lurk in the backgroundand may explain why the rift between the parties arose in the first placedoes not transform a property dispute into a SLAPP suit. Accordingly, the trial court erred in treating this as a SLAPP suit subject to section 425.16's special motion to dismiss.