Opinion ID: 1746805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Stephenson's claim of insufficient evidence is essentially a question of statutory construction. Our review is therefore for errors at law. State v. Eickelberg, 574 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1997). Because this case will be retried, we address the issues of statutory construction that arose. Iowa Code section 708.7 provides in pertinent part: 1. a. A person commits harassment when, with intent to intimidate, annoy, or alarm another person, the person does any of the following: (1) Communicates with another by telephone, telegraph, or writing without legitimate purpose and in a manner likely to cause the other person annoyance or harm. (2) Places a simulated explosive or simulated incendiary device in or near a building, vehicle, airplane, railroad engine or railroad car, or boat occupied by another person. (3) Orders merchandise or services in the name of another, or to be delivered to another, without the other person's knowledge or consent. (4) Reports or causes to be reported false information to a law enforcement authority implicating another in some criminal activity, knowing that the information is false, or reports the alleged occurrence of a criminal act, knowing the act did not occur. b. A person commits harassment when the person, purposefully and without legitimate purpose, has personal contact with another person, with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm that other person. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires,  personal contact  means an encounter in which two or more people are in visual or physical proximity to each other.  Personal contact  does not require a physical touching or oral communication, although it may include these types of contacts. 2. A person commits harassment in the first degree when the person commits harassment involving a threat to commit a forcible felony, or commits harassment and has previously been convicted of harassment three or more times under this section or any similar statute during the preceding ten years. Harassment in the first degree is an aggravated misdemeanor. Stephenson suggests a violation of section 708.7(1)(a)(1) requires proof the accused initiated a harassing telephone conversation. He notes that sections 708.7(1)(a)(2)-(4) all proscribe behavior that is instigated by the harasser, and that section 708.7(1)(b) prohibits purposeful, as opposed to accidental contact. This, he believes, evinces a pattern of legislative intent through which the crime of harassment should be construed as a proscription against annoyance inflicted through uninvited, unwelcome contact, rather than an interdiction against nuisance or vulgarity over the phone. Since Stephenson did not place the calls upon which his conviction stands, he reasons the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime. We are unpersuaded. A well recognized rule of statutory construction holds that when a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms. State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). We find the statute unambiguous. Section 708.7(1)(a)(1) neither expressly or impliedly supports Stephenson's theory. That sections 708.7(1)(a)(2)-(4) specify affirmative conduct on behalf of an offender, only serves to buttress the notion that the legislature specifically intended section 708.7(1)(a)(1) to forbid all harassing telephonic communications, regardless of who initiated contact. Had the legislature intended otherwise, it would have employed language of limitation; i.e., providing that only those who make calls, or telephone another, commit the crime of harassment. We also note that the predecessor statute to section 708.7(1)(a)(2) used language on the unlawful use of a telephone that more narrowly applies to an offender. Iowa Code section 714.37 (1975) states: It shall be unlawful for any person, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to telephone another and use any obscene, lewd or profane language or suggest any lewd or lascivious act, or threaten to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person. (Emphasis added.) This statute was amended to provide that the act of harassment is committed by a person who communicates with another, rather than providing it is unlawful for a person with intent to harass to telephone another. The present statute was thus broadened to include those instances whereby someone other than the offender initiates the call. We hold that Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(1) applies to a defendant who commits harassment by communication regardless of who initiates the contact between the victim and an accused. The defendant may thereby be prosecuted under Iowa Code section 708.7(2).