Opinion ID: 72743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: De Varon’s testimony

Text: The district court’s first reason for denying the request for an adjustment hinged on the fact that De Varon offered only her own, uncorroborated testimony to prove that other participants in the crime were more culpable than she was. De Varon offered to testify that she was in desperate need of money for her son’s operation and that she was approached by a woman named “Nancy” at De Varon’s workplace who solicited her to become an internal carrier of drugs. De Varon also proposed to testify that she was to be met by an unknown person at the Miami airport who would take the heroin. The district court declined to hear this testimony. Instead the court ruled that because the 8 defendant bears the burden of proof in establishing role, De Varon’s uncorroborated testimony was either unbelievable or facially insufficient to establish her as a minor participant.4 To the extent that the court found her testimony unbelievable, this finding was inconsistent with its earlier decision, concerning the “safety valve” provision, that De Varon had been completely truthful with the court. By finding De Varon eligible for the “safety valve” protection of USSG § 5C1.2, the court had to find that De Varon had “not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, . . . truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence . . . [that she had] concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” USSG § 5C1.2(5). The “safety valve” provision of the guidelines allows a court to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum and to grant a two-level decrease where it finds that the defendant does not have a criminal history, did not use violence or cause injury, was not an organizer or leader, and has been completely truthful with the court. USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(4) & 5C1.2. The government did not oppose De Varon’s application for the safety valve, and the district court found that she met all requirements 4 The court’s comments do not clearly indicate whether it found De Varon’s testimony unbelievable or whether the uncorroborated testimony of a courier is never sufficient to establish role. 9 for the protection of this provision. Therefore, the court must have found that she had truthfully provided all information that she had concerning the crime. To discredit De Varon’s testimony later in the sentencing hearing is an inconsistent finding. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)(generally a district court’s findings on whether testimony is true cannot be deemed clear error unless internally inconsistent); Colvin v. U. S., 549 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1977) (“These two findings are inconsistent and one must fall as clearly erroneous.”). Because the court specifically found De Varon truthful, it is bound to consider her testimony for the purpose of determining role. The district court also indicated that the uncorroborated testimony of a courier alone is insufficient to establish role. We do not limit the district court’s power to find, based on all the evidence in the record, that a defendant’s testimony describing her participation in a scheme is not credible. However, we do hold that status as a courier is not by itself a sufficient ground to support a credibility finding. Other grounds may support a credibility decision, but status alone does not. Whether other considerations exist that detract from a particular defendant’s believability is for a district court to decide. In this case the defendant’s truthfulness was predetermined by the court, and credibility should not have been 10 an issue. The district court did not properly support its decision to disregard De Varon’s testimony on her role in the scheme. When a court finds that a defendant has truthfully provided all information that she has regarding the crime then the court must consider that information in determining the defendant’s role. Furthermore, status as a courier alone is not enough to sustain a credibilty finding. Because the district court’s decision to disbelieve De Varon was inconsistent with its earlier finding that she had truthfully disclosed all information that she knew about the crime, we must look to the court’s other proffered reasons for its denial of De Varon’s request for a downward adjustment based on role.