Opinion ID: 417966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure To Prove an Essential Element of Count 31

Text: 9 It is axiomatic that in a criminal prosecution, the government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487, 16 S.Ct. 353, 358, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895) (burden of proof is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial and applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Where the government has failed to present proof of an essential element of the crime, a judgment of conviction must be reversed and the indictment dismissed. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); United States v. Tavoularis, 515 F.2d 1070, 1077 (2d Cir.1975). 10 In the context of the present case, if there was no evidence that GX 31 was found in Berisha's possession, there was no proof as to its transfer to a person known to reside outside of California--an essential element of the offense charged under Sec. 922(a)(5), see note 2 supra --and the defendants were entitled to acquittals on count 31. The government makes a number of arguments in its effort to have the convictions on count 31 sustained. We find none of them meritorious. 11 First, the government suggests that perhaps GX 31 was in fact identified by Agent Amaker as one of the guns seized from Berisha's apartment and that the transcript's reflection that Amaker identified only Exhibits 23 through 30, and not 31, was stenographic error. (E.g., United States' brief on appeal at 9.) At the same time, however, the government concedes that the absence of any reference to GX 31 may have resulted from the Assistant United States Attorney's oversight or mispeaking. (Id. n. .) The government apparently did not move in the trial court for a correction of the record, and we are provided no creditable ground for concluding that GX 31 was identified as having been found in Berisha's possession. 4 We can hardly sustain a conviction on the basis of the government's speculation--equivocal, at that--that essential facts may have been placed in evidence. 12 The government's principal contention is that, if GX 31 was not identified as having been seized from Berisha's apartment, the defendants have waived the defect. The government argues that because the defendants' motions for acquittal did not explicitly refer to count 31 and did not pinpoint the deficiency in the government's proof, defendants are not entitled to raise the issue on appeal. We disagree. Both defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) for judgments of acquittal at the close of the evidence, and the very nature of such motions is to question the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. See United States v. Jones, 174 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir.1949) (motion for acquittal is a challenge to the Government in the presence of the court that the Government has failed in its proof); 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 466, at 654 (1982). Further, the defendant need not specify the ground of the motion in order to preserve a sufficiency claim for appeal. United States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir.1951); United States v. Cox, 593 F.2d 46, 48 (6th Cir.1979); United States v. Jones, supra, 174 F.2d at 748; 8A Moore's Federal Practice p 29.03, at 29-7 (2d ed. 1982) ([T]he grounds for the motion need not be stated with specificity, at least not unless the government demands such a statement. (footnote omitted)); 2 C. Wright, supra, Sec. 466, at 653. 5 Thus, when a defendant moves for acquittal, even without specificity as to the grounds, it is incumbent upon the government to review its proof as to the facts required to establish each element of each offense alleged. Its neglect to do so is not a charge upon the defendant. 6 13 Further, we note that in the present case the defendants' Rule 29(a) motions were not without direction. Dushaj's attorney argued that the government has a significant gap in the proof and that is in the area of the transportation from California to New York. (Tr. 299.) Gjurashaj's attorney argued similarly that although clearly the evidence shows my client participated in purchases of guns in California, and some of these guns were found here in New York, there is no showing that he had anything to do with the guns moving from California to New York. (Id.) The government could hardly fail to recognize that its proof of the interstate transfer or transport of any particular gun was entirely circumstantial. Having failed, in the face of the defendants' motions, to be sure that it had introduced evidence of seizure in New York of each gun that was the subject of a specific count, the government is not entitled to complain now that it was disadvantaged because the defendants did not cite chapter and verse of the weakness of the case against them: 14 Surely, the defendant does not have to lead the Government through the various steps of the trial to insure a proper record for the Government to stand upon. The Government cannot be heard to say it does not know the significance of a motion for acquittal. 15 United States v. Jones, supra, 174 F.2d at 748. 16 Accordingly, since the record does not reveal that there was any evidence of the interstate transfer or transport of GX 31, we reverse the defendants' convictions on count 31.