Opinion ID: 182637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion in Limine: Preliminary Injunction Evidence

Text: WWFS argues the district court abused its discretion in allowing WWP to introduce evidence of the district court's pre-trial decision to enter a preliminary injunction shutting down the woundedwarriors.org website. WWFS opines that, by allowing the jury to speculate as to the reasons why the district court enjoined WWFS, the district court improperly influence[d] [the] jury's impartiality from the outset of trial and effectively eviscerate[d] [WWFS's] constitutional right to a jury trial. WWP responds we should only review for plain error, because the first mention of the preliminary injunction and WWFS's actions post-injunction came without objection from Folsom's own testimony. We disagree with WWP's characterization of the sequence of events in the district court and will review WWFS's argument under the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard. WWFS filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any mention of the preliminary injunction, which the district court denied on the condition that it would issue a cautionary instruction to the jury. During its case-in-chief, absent an objection from WWFS, WWP introduced into evidence a videotaped deposition of Folsom, in which WWP's attorney asked Folsom if WWFS had ceased use of woundedwarriors.org web site pursuant to the [district court's] order in this case. Folsom answered, Yes. In filing its motion in limine and receiving a definitive answer, WWFS preserved its objection to the mention of the preliminary injunction at trial and was not required to reassert an objection to the introduction of the deposition. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a); Shelton, 622 F.3d at 958-59 & n. 14. With respect to the merits of WWFS's argument, WWP rejoins the district court's granting of the preliminary injunction was admissible and relevant evidence and, in any event, WWFS suffered no unfair prejudice because Kirchner's conservative theory of damages required a comparison of the amount of donations WWFS received before and after the district court shut down the woundedwarriors.org website. We agree with WWFS that it would have been preferable had the district court excluded express evidence of the preliminary injunction. For example, the district court could have accepted a stipulation from the parties that, in 2008, WWFS shut down the woundedwarriors.org website. Such a stipulation would have allowed WWP to present one of its theories of damages (comparing the amount of donations WWFS received immediately before and after WWFS shut down its website) yet minimized any prejudice WWFS might suffer when the jury learned the court had entered an injunction against WWFS in WWP's favor shutting down the WWFS website. Cf. Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 39-40 (1st Cir.2002) (discussing a stipulation and the prejudice a party suffers when the jury learns of a preliminary injunction). WWFS did not suggest this alternative treatment or any other similar option. That said, we believe WWFS's allegations of prejudice are too speculative to warrant reversal. The references at trial to the district court's granting of the preliminary injunction were isolated. Critically, the district court issued a cautionary instruction immediately prior to the submission of the case to the jury. The district court ordered: You have heard evidence that the Court granted a preliminary injunction on July 14, 2008, and ordered the defendant to discontinue use of the www. woundedwarriors.org Website. The fact that the Court granted a preliminary injunction should not affect your decision as to who should prevail on the issues presented to you in this case. Elsewhere in the final jury instructions, the district court stated: In the trial of this case and in this charge, I have in no way attempted to express my opinion as to who should prevail upon the issues submitted to you. You must not construe any statement, action, or ruling on my part in the trial of this case as an indication of any opinion on my part respecting the proper course of your verdict. A jury is presumed to follow its instructions, and because we do not detect `an overwhelming probability' that [the jury] was unable to follow the district court's cautionary instruction, we will affirm. United States v. Uphoff, 232 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)).