Opinion ID: 335117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Order is Interlocutory.

Text: 25 Since this appeal is the first case involving a review of a denial of a Rule 782 motion, the question of whether such an order is interlocutory for the purpose of § 24a appellate jurisdiction has not yet arisen. 26 The principle generally utilized to distinguish a final order from an interlocutory order is given in Merle's, supra, 481 F.2d at 1018: 27 A final order has been defined as follows: 'A decision which finally determines the rights of parties to secure in that suit the relief they seek is a final decision.' (citation omitted) An interlocutory order or decree is one which does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and which requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the merits. (citations omitted) 28 Applying this principle to the case at bar, we conclude that the order is interlocutory. All that has been decided is that the breach of contract trial will commence in the Southern District of California and not in the District of Maryland. The merit of the dispute whether a breach of contract occurred has not been reached. 29 An additional reason for our conclusion is that in other areas of the law where an order denying or permitting a transfer of a case has been appealed, such an order has been held to be interlocutory. We consider two instances: § 32 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 55) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). We cite these examples only for the purpose of defining an interlocutory order. 30 Section 32 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 55, hereinafter s 32), as revised by Rule 116 of the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules, provides for the transfer of an entire bankruptcy proceeding to any other district, in such cases where the petition was filed in the wrong district or where the interest of justice and the convenience of the parties merit the transfer. 3 31 An order denying or permitting such a transfer has been held to be interlocutory. In re Flexton Corp., 208 F.2d 869, 870 (2 Cir. 1953). See 2 Collier, P 24.38(2) at 794-95, text accompanying note 39. We recognize that appellate jurisdiction in Flexton was proper even though the order appealed from was interlocutory, because the case involved a proceeding and not a controversy. See infra, distinguishing proceeding from controversy. 32 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice any civil action to any other district where the action might have been brought. 4 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) permits a dismissal or a similar transfer if an action is brought laying venue in the wrong district or division. 5 33 As to these two sections, 9 Moore's, P 110.13(6), at 173 states the general rule: 34 An order dismissing an action for improper venue or under the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a final order and is appealable. But an order transferring or refusing to transfer an action to another district or division is an interlocutory order and is non-appealable except by certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). (footnotes omitted) 35 Accord, Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777, 778-79 (9 Cir. 1950). The Ninth Circuit, along with other circuits, has continued to hold that orders respecting venue entered under § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) are interlocutory in nature. Pac. Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 951 (9 Cir. 1968). See also cases cited in Pac. Car, id., n.4 and n.5; and cases cited in 9 Moore's, id., n.3. 36 We hold that an order denying a transfer under Rule 782 similarly should be held to be interlocutory. 6 37