Opinion ID: 1563959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Cross-Examination of Dr. Merikangas

Text: Prior to trial, Appellant's counsel consulted with forensic psychiatrist, Robert Wettstein, M.D., who on several occasions had interviewed Appellant after his crime spree. Appellant ultimately decided not to call Dr. Wettstein to testify, but instead relied principally upon the expert testimony of another psychiatric expert, James R. Merikangas, M.D., in support of his insanity defense. Dr. Merikangas had not consulted with Dr. Wettstein in arriving at his conclusions. At a pre-trial hearing, the trial court ruled that Dr. Wettstein's notes could not be examined or used by the Commonwealth because they consisted of attorney-client and attorney work-product protected documents. Indeed, it appears that the Commonwealth never obtained Dr. Wettstein's notes, records, or report. However, at trial and over Appellant's objection, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to cross-examine Dr. Merikangas concerning his failure to consult with Dr. Wettstein. Appellant specifically identifies the following testimony as prejudicial: Q. [Commonwealth]: He [Dr. Wettstein] interviewed [Appellant], didn't he? A. [Dr. Merikangas]: If you say so. Q. Well, what if [Appellant] on that date would have said that he wasn't hearing voices, I just hate blacks, wouldn't that be important for you to know? A. If that were the case. I don't know what happened. Q. Well, that's right, you don't know because you didn't talk to Wettstein, isn't that right? Notes of Testimony (N.T.) Trial, 5/4/01, at 1500. It is important to note that Appellant does not argue that by this questioning, the Commonwealth divulged the contents of Dr. Wettstein's report or notes. Rather, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's questions suggested that, like the prosecution's expert, Dr. Welner, Dr. Wettstein believed that [Appellant] was a malingerer and a racist. Appellant's Brief at 48. In overruling Appellant's objection to the Commonwealth's questions pertaining to Dr. Wettstein, the trial court determined that such questioning did not violate the court's pre-trial ruling prohibiting the Commonwealth's acquisition and use of Dr. Wettstein's report or invade the area of confidential exchanges between Appellant and Dr. Wettstein. Rather, the court determined that the questioning was relevant both to the issue of Dr. Merikangas's possible bias and the foundation for his opinion. The issue of potential bias related to previously disclosed evidence that Appellant had stated to a cellmate that he had two psychiatric experts, and that he had chosen the one that was more favorable to his case while rejecting the other. The issue of the foundation for Dr. Merikangas's opinions pertained to the degree to which this witness had explored records and psychiatric evaluations of other psychiatric professionals in order to obtain a more complete picture of Appellant's mental state. The court determined that the Commonwealth could explore these issues without delving into the substance of Dr. Wettstein's reports and records. N.T. Trial, 5/4/01, at 1496. Appellant now argues that the information the Commonwealth was attempting to elicit from Dr. Merikangas concerned confidential communications that took place between Appellant and Dr. Wettstein, and for this reason is protected by (1) work-product and (2) attorney-client privileges, and (3) the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. We shall examine Appellant's theories and apply them to the facts seriatim. (1) The work-product doctrine was adopted by this Court and placed into practical effect in Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(G), which reads as follows: [Pre-trial d]isclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the attorney for the Commonwealth or the attorney for the defense, or members of their legal staffs. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 583 Pa. 208, 876 A.2d 939, 946 (2005) (explaining that the general work-product doctrine as recognized by United States Supreme Court case law was adopted by this Court in the context of pre-trial discovery in criminal matters and delineated in Pa. R.Crim.P. 573(G)). Further, the rules of criminal procedure pertaining to pre-trial discovery generally protect the work-product of agents hired by defense attorneys. Id. at 946-47. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(C)(1)(a) (providing that upon the Commonwealth's filing of a motion for pre-trial discovery, the trial court may order the defendant, subject to his or her right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination, to divulge reports or test results that the defendant intends to introduce into evidence or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call to testify at trial). [12] Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(C) does not require the defendant to disclose reports prepared by a witness whom he or she does not intend to produce at trial. In Kennedy, supra, we extended the principles of the work-product doctrine from the realm of pre-trial discovery to the course of the trial itself, specifically holding that a practical application of the work-product doctrine to trial in criminal proceedings prevents the Commonwealth from calling as a witness an agent who[m] the defense hired in preparation for trial but decided not to call as a witness at trial[,] or to use the materials prepared by the agent as evidence at trial, unless the Commonwealth can show a substantial need for such testimony and an inability to obtain the substantial equivalent of such testimony without undue hardship. Consequently, absent these showings, a trial court may not compel such testimony. Id. at 948-49 (footnote omitted). In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth never obtained any reports or notes of Dr. Wettstein, nor did the Commonwealth call Dr. Wettstein to testify. Therefore, the work-product protections that this Court has extended to defendants by rule of criminal procedure or case law were not violated. The mere questioning of one expert witness as to whether his failure to consult with another witness who was not called afforded a full view upon which to base an expert opinion does not implicate the work-product doctrine as defined and applied by this Court. (2) Appellant's arguments concerning alleged violations of attorney-client privileges and his right to effective assistance of counsel appear to be two sides of the same coin. A criminal defendant is protected by the benefits of an attorney-client privilege; also, he or she is constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478, 738 A.2d 406, 422-23 (1999). Our Superior Court, based on federal case law, has determined that the attorney-client privilege in criminal matters extends to communications made between the defendant and an agent hired by the defendant's attorney to provide legal assistance. Commonwealth v. Noll, 443 Pa.Super. 602, 662 A.2d 1123, 1126 (1995). The court stated, This privilege protects those disclosures that are necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege. This privilege only applies where the [defendant's] ultimate goal is legal advice. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Matter, 147 F.R.D. 82, 84 (E.D.Pa.1992); emphasis in original). Notably, Appellant does not suggest or argue how the Commonwealth obtained and then divulged to the jury any legal advice given by Dr. Wettstein as an agent for Appellant's attorney. Again, the Commonwealth never obtained any reports or notes of Dr. Wettstein, nor did the Commonwealth call Dr. Wettstein to testify, nor did the Commonwealth introduce evidence of Dr. Wettstein's advice to Appellant, if he gave any, through any other witness. There is no basis for the claim that Appellant's attorney-client protections were violated by the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Dr. Merikangas. (3) With regard to a criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel within the context of the issue Appellant raises herein, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: The issue here is whether a defense counsel in a case involving a potential defense of insanity must run the risk that a psychiatric expert whom he hires to advise him with respect to the defendant's mental condition may be forced to be an involuntary government witness. The effect of such a rule would, we think, have the inevitable effect of depriving defendants of the effective assistance of counsel in such cases. A psychiatrist will of necessity make inquiry about the facts surrounding the alleged crime, just as the attorney will. Disclosures made to the attorney cannot be used to furnish proof in the government's case. Disclosures made to the attorney's expert should be equally unavailable, at least until he is placed on the witness stand. The attorney must be free to make an informed judgment with respect to the best course for the defense without the inhibition of creating a potential government witness. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (3d Cir.1975). The Alvarez court also couched its concern over such disclosures in terms that related to violation of the attorney-client privilege. Indeed, Alvarez has been interpreted as reading a broad attorney-client privilege into the Sixth Amendment requirement of effective counsel. See Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1413 (6th Cir.1983); see also State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 587, 392 A.2d 590, 595-96 (1978) (finding a similarity between the attorney-client privilege and the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and holding that reliance upon the confidentiality of an expert's advice is a critical aspect of a defense attorney's ability to consult with and advise his or her client). [13] Hence, Appellant's arguments concerning alleged violations of attorney-client privileges and his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel are essentially the same. As with our determination that the Commonwealth's cross-examination of Dr. Merikangas did not offend Appellant's right to attorney-client privileges, for the same reasons, Appellant's argument invoking the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel would not have any merit even if we were to decide the question of when such right is implicated, which we decline to do at this time. The record is clear that the Commonwealth did not have access to Dr. Wettstein's notes or reports, did not introduce them into evidence, and did not call Dr. Wettstein to testify. Thus, nothing of record indicates any interference with Appellant's counsel's right or ability to rely upon the confidential communications of an expert retained but not called to testify. Accordingly, Appellant's Sixth Amendment argument lacks the factual predicate the case law he cites in support of his argument would require for establishing relief. Therefore, we determine that none of the theories Appellant has advanced in support of this issue has merit.