Opinion ID: 1938973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial as to guilt.

Text: The guilt phase of the trial lasted twelve days, and included six night sessions. Over thirty witnesses took the stand, and over one hundred exhibits were introduced into evidence. As to the jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and endangering safety by conduct regardless of life, the defendant makes the following significant claims of error. Submission of lesser offenses. Defendant claims it was prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to submit to the jury alternatives of second-degree murder, homicide by reckless conduct, and reckless use of a weapon. Multiple verdicts are to be submitted to the jury when there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for a conviction of either the greater or the lesser offense. The rationale of the rule has been stated by this court as follows: ... if the evidence, in one reasonable view, would suffice to prove guilt of the higher degree beyond a reasonable doubt, and if, under a different, but reasonable view, the evidence would suffice to prove guilt of the lower degree beyond a reasonable doubt, but leave a reasonable doubt as to some element included in the higher degree but not in the lower, the court should, if requested, submit the lower degree as well as the higher.... [1] The key word in the rule is reasonable. The rule does not suggest some near automatic inclusion of all lesser but included offenses as additional options to a jury. Only if under a different, but reasonable view, the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt of the lower degree and also leave a reasonable doubt as to some particular element included in the higher degree but not the lower, should the lesser crime also be submitted to the jury. However, there is not to be read into the rule the requirement that there are not reasonable grounds on the evidence to convict of the greater offense. [2] That goes too far. Where the defendant is able to demonstrate that there is no reasonable view of the evidence that warrants conviction on the greater offense, and the trial court agrees, there remains no issue on such charge to go to the jury. The purpose of multiple verdicts is to cover situations where under different, but reasonable, views of the evidence there are grounds either for conviction of the greater or of the lesser offense. The lesser degree verdict is not to be submitted to the jury unless there exists reasonable grounds for conviction of the lesser offense and acquittal on the greater. On the challenge to the form of the verdict, the dispute here revolves around the requirement that for first-degree murder the state must prove that the defendant had ... the mental purpose to take the life of another human being. [3] The defendant argues that there is evidence in the record to give credence to the theory that a struggle took place between defendant and Russell Wirth, the victim, before the fatal shooting. Powder burns on a couch, the path of the bullet and statements of the defendant make up such evidentiary support for the theory of a struggle. However, a review of the evidence on the issue of intent leads us to conclude, as did the trial court, that there is no reasonable basis for finding that the defendant lacked the intent to murder Russell Wirth. The defendant had purchased a gun three weeks earlier; the defendant had told a family friend that he was going to kill Russell Wirth; the victim's wife saw the defendant holding the gun to Russell Wirth's chest, and heard the defendant state, You are not going to live; the defendant admitted holding the gun at Russell Wirth's chest; the defendant admitting saying to Russell Wirth, I am going to have to shoot you; the defendant admitted shooting Russell Wirth. The defendant's testimony indicates that any struggle which took place occurred after the first shot was fired. The defendant confessed to the murder a number of times; he told a priest in San Diego he would kill Russell Wirth again; he told San Diego police the grievances which he held against Russell Wirth and stated that they were the reasons for shooting him. The trial court concluded: There was in the court's opinion no evidence presented which would provide reasonable grounds for conviction of a lesser degree and thus have justified the submission of a lesser degree of homicide.... We reach the same conclusion. Impeachment of widow. The defendant argues that the trial court unduly restricted the impeachment of Mary Wirth, the widow of the victim and the person wounded by the defendant. The widow had testified that she did not know if she had refused to speak to police officers concerning the shootings until she had spoken to her attorney. The trial court barred an attempt, on cross-examination, to impeach this testimony. However, Police Officer Wroblewski did testify that Mary Wirth had declined to answer questions until she had spoken with her attorney. For what it was worth, this fact was presented to the jury. The defendant also argues that the trial court ruled immaterial a defense question concerning Mary Wirth's feelings toward the defendant. Admittedly it is proper cross-examination to show bias on the part of a witness to a party in a lawsuit. [4] This is true in both civil [5] and criminal cases. [6] The extent of such inquiry into bias is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. [7] Here it was not in dispute that the witness was the widow of the man that defendant had shot and killed, and that she had been shot by the defendant. As one court said in a somewhat similar situation, The answer to the question was obvious.... [8] To establish that the witness had less than kindly feelings toward the man who had killed her husband and shot her would have been to tell the jury what it already knew. If she had attained the saintlike compassion with which Mahatma Gandhi forgave his assassin, the effect of such rare deviation from the usual attitude would have been to strengthen, not weaken, the impact of her testimony upon the jury. If error there was, and we do not so find, it was harmless. Counsel for kin. Objection is made to the trial court's rulings in regard to questioning concerning the retaining of counsel by children of the victim. On cross-examination Mary Wirth testified that she did not hire an attorney to assist in the case; that her children did contact a Milwaukee attorney to find out what their rights were; that her sons had spoken about retaining an attorney, and that she had stated that she would work within the system. Questions concerning what occurred between the attorney consulted and her sons were objected to, and the objections properly sustained. A subpoena was served upon the attorney consulted, Attorney James Shellow. On his motion, the trial court quashed the subpoena, and properly so, on the ground that any questions asked would have concerned privileged communications. We find no improper restrictions placed on the defense by the trial court. Statement and confession. A Goodchild -type hearing was held on the issue of the admissibility of statements made by defendant to a taxicab driver who drove him from Los Angeles to San Diego, a priest in San Diego and San Diego police officers. The clergyman was asked his impressions of the defendant's condition at the time of the statement. Objection to such question was sustained. The issue at the Goodchild hearing before the court was the voluntariness of the statements made. The hearing deals solely with the issue of the voluntariness of the confession, and the jury is to decide the weight and credibility to be given to the confession. [9] It is clear that the statements made to the priest were volunteered. The defendant was not in custody. The question which the defense counsel asked goes to the trustworthiness of the statements made, not to their voluntariness, and, as this court has said: The question of voluntariness is, of course, not directed to the trustworthiness of the statement and whether the statement is true and credible, but rather whether it was obtained under such circumstances that it represents the uncoerced, free will of the declarant.... [10] Whether the defendant was drunk, or not in full possession of his faculties, relates more to the weight or trustworthiness of the statements made by the defendant to the clergyman, not to the voluntariness which was the sole issue at the hearing on admissibility. [11] Defendant also argues that the in-custody confession given by defendant to the San Diego police did not meet the Miranda standards. [12] Following the Goodchild hearing, the trial court found that the defendant was properly informed of his rights. Such finding is not to be set aside unless contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. [13] Here the testimony of the police officers was that the defendant was informed of his rights. The defendant testified that he could not remember being so informed. The finding of the trial court as to admissibility is clearly supported by the evidence. Participation of court. Complaint is made that the trial court unduly participated in the examination of witnesses. We find no foundation for such complaint. Of the incidents cited in defendant's brief, three occurred outside the presence of the jury, two during the Goodchild hearing. The only incident in the presence of the jury appears to involve certain questions put by the court to a defense witness concerning an exhibit. This court has stated: ... a trial court may question a witness called by the parties in order to clarify received testimony, providing the court does not overtly express his view of the matters in issue. While the court cannot function as a partisan, it may take necessary steps to aid in the discovery of truth.... [14] Given the length of this trial, the participation complained of was less than might be expected and no more than was reasonably required under the circumstances. Witnesses not called. The defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to give the so-called absent witness instruction, arguing that the failure of the state to call a number of police officers raises the inference that their testimony would have been adverse to the prosecution. In the first place, the policemen not called by the state were called as witnesses by the defense. In the second place, much of their testimony was cumulative, explaining why they had not been called by the prosecution as witnesses. Cover on the couch. Powder burns on the cover of the couch on which the defendant and the murder victim were seated figured in the trial. During the second week of the trial, the defense made a motion, pursuant to sec. 165.04, Stats., to have the couch cover examined by the state crime laboratory. The motion was denied as untimely. Untimely it was, since the defense had known of the powder burn on the couch cover during the preliminary examination. A similar mid-trial motion was made to have a defense expert remove the couch cover from evidence for analysis. Denial was based on untimeliness and avoiding undue delay. The witness did examine the couch cover while on the stand and did testify that the smudges on it were powder burns and were the result of a gun being fired in close proximity, probably from a distance of three to five inches. The expert was able to testify, based on his courtroom examination of the couch cover, as to the nature of the smudges and the position of the gun when fired. We find no error and no prejudice to the defendant in these trial court rulings. Conduct of the prosecutor. The defendant registers dissatisfaction with the manner in which the district attorney conducted the prosecution. Under the adversary system, and given the outcome of this trial, this is understandable. In this regard it is not easy to separate wheat from chaff. A specific complaint relates to the closing argument of the prosecutor. Considerable latitude is to be allowed counsel in closing arguments, subject only to the rules of propriety and the discretion of the trial court. [15] As to the role of the district attorney in prosecuting criminal cases, it has been well said that: He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. [16] References to the heinous nature of the crime charged and the weakness of certain defense arguments fall well within the outer limits of the leeway given counsel in this area. It is true that the district attorney expressed his opinion as to the guilt of the defendant in his closing argument. Such expression of personal opinion is proper only if it is made clear that it was the evidence in the case which convinced him, not sources of information outside of the record. [17] Here the prosecutor's statement came at a point in his closing argument where he was reviewing the evidence. Additionally, objection was made, sustained, and the court stated that the opinion of counsel in the case was not relevant. The district attorney himself thereupon informed the jury to disregard his opinion. If error there was, it was cured. No motion for mistrial was then and there made, and, if it had been, it would or should have been denied.