Opinion ID: 785832
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Prejudice

Text: 39 In order to successfully merit relief from a due process violation, an asylum applicant must show not only the violation itself, but that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation. Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 971. This is not a but for or harmless error standard; in proper circumstances, the petitioner need not explain exactly what evidence he would have presented in support of his application, and we may infer prejudice in the absence of any specific allegation as to what evidence [petitioner] would have presented ... had he been provided the opportunity to present that evidence. Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir.2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original). 40 The absence of a lawyer at Tawadrus' hearing and the mere two hours he was given to prepare resulted in prejudice to his case in several respects, causing the IJ to deny his asylum application on three specific points: (1) serious reservations concerning credibility in light of the inconsistencies between the written application and the oral testimony; (2) failure to demonstrate persecution on a protected ground; and (3) failure to demonstrate that the persecution was by a group that the government is unwilling or unable to provide protection [from] or that he could not relocate to a different location in Egypt to seek such protection. 41 The framework of a deportation hearing differs substantially from an Article III trial, and also from other administrative proceedings. Nonetheless, federal immigration regulations provide that: 42 Whenever an examination is provided for in this chapter, the person involved shall have the right to be represented by an attorney or representative who shall be permitted to [1] examine or cross examine such person and witnesses, [2] to introduce evidence, [3] to make objections which shall be stated succinctly and entered on the record, and [4] to submit briefs. 43 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b). Indeed, these are the tasks that immigration lawyers become very familiar with. The pro se applicant, however, starts from a baseline of little knowledge of the intricacies of immigration law. See, e.g., Castro-O'Ryan, 847 F.2d at 1312 (With only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed `second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.' A lawyer is often the only person who could thread the labyrinth.) (internal citation omitted). 44 Tawadrus was prejudiced by the absence of a lawyer and his lack of legal knowledge in three out of four of these procedural areas: (1) he did not have the opportunity, at many points in the testimony, to present reasonable explanations for perceived inconsistencies leading to the IJ's adverse credibility determination; (2) he was denied the opportunity to reasonably present his case with the aid of an advocate familiar with his legal and evidentiary burdens and was not given the time or instruction to have his translated documents properly certified under 8 C.F.R. § 3.33 or to make any objection to the admission of certain documents; 7 and (3) he was never questioned about the government agencies and officials listed in his asylum application and therefore was never able to draw the connection to the government or a group the government was unwilling or unable to control — the heart of his persecution claim. Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir.1996). 45 Most significantly, Tawadrus was clearly unable to present a succinct and internally consistent account of his claim of persecution without the guidance of an advocate. At the hearing, he seemed to abandon the potentially viable claims of economic sanctions by specific and denominated government agencies laid out in his original application in favor of accounts of being beaten by Islamic fundamentalists. 8 Whether or not this indicates a lack of credibility, at the very least, an attorney would have been able to bring these inconsistencies to Tawadrus' attention for some explanation. How Tawadrus could parlay these allegations into a case for well-founded fear is irrelevant — such an explanation is not required for a showing of due process prejudice. 9 Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 972. 46 In similar circumstances, we have found the absence of counsel prejudicial: 47 [Petitioner], a carpenter with some education in engineering and a very imperfect command of spoken English, was unable to articulate the basis of his fears of persecution under oral examination by Judge Nail and counsel for the INS.... Lacking the counsel he asked for, Castro lacked what [] has [been] said to be indispensable and missing in totalitarian countries — a clear-minded ally who knows the law. No one was there to help him tell his story. His case was seriously prejudiced by the lack of legal assistance that Congress has mandated. 48 Castro-O'Ryan, 847 F.2d at 1313-14 (internal citations omitted). It is likewise clear that the lack of representation potentially affected the outcome of [Tawadrus'] proceedings, Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 972 (quoting Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999)) (alteration omitted), and therefore the IJ's actions not only constituted an abuse of discretion requiring remand, Castro-O'Ryan, 847 F.2d at 1312, they also violated Tawadrus' right to due process.