Opinion ID: 1369044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The meaning of the statutory language.

Text: The majority assert that the 1978 death penalty law is realistically susceptible of only one meaning: that intent to kill is required for accomplices to a felony murder, but not for the actual killer. Anyone familiar with principles of statutory construction will recognize that something is wrong with this assertion  the word realistically does not belong. It has long been established (see Ex parte Rosenheim (1890) 83 Cal. 388, 391 [23 P. 372]) that if a penal statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the courts should give it that interpretation which favors the defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Garfield (1985) 40 Cal.3d 192, 200 [219 Cal. Rptr. 196, 707 P.2d 258]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal. Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186]; People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 23 [148 Cal. Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000]; Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 488 [134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 556 P.2d 1081].) This rule derives from the fundamental precept that a defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute. ( In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250, 257 [339 P.2d 553]; People v. Davis, supra, 29 Cal.3d 814, 828; People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 560 [224 Cal. Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 585].) But all of these cases refer to reasonable interpretation and reasonable doubt. The majority inexplicably substitute the word realistic for reasonable and, as if to stress that the change is deliberate, italicize the words. [11] But they do not tell us how a realistic interpretation differs from a reasonable one, or a realistic doubt from a reasonable doubt. Pending an explanation, I will assume the majority intend no change in the rules of statutory construction, and will speak of reasonable doubt and reasonable interpretations of a statute. [12] I turn then to the question whether Penal Code section 190.2 is reasonably susceptible of only a single interpretation, one which requires intent to kill for accomplices to felony murder but not for killers. Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) (hereinafter paragraph (17)) is the felony-murder special circumstance. [13] It provides for a special circumstance if the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit nine listed felonies  robbery, kidnapping, rape, sodomy, lewd and lascivious conduct, oral copulation, burglary, arson, and train wrecking. It is silent as to intent to kill. As we acknowledged in Carlos, one could infer from this silence the absence of an intent requirement. As Carlos pointed out, however, a construction of paragraph (17) without an intent requirement would have anomalous results. Because section 189, the felony-murder provision, lists five of the felonies listed in paragraph (17)  robbery, rape, lewd conduct, burglary, and arson  a defendant convicted of one of those offenses could be executed without proof of intent to kill. One convicted of one of the other felonies listed in paragraph (17)  kidnapping, forcible sodomy, forcible oral copulation, or train wrecking  could not be convicted of first degree murder, and thus could not be executed, without proof of intent. Rather than blaming this anomaly on careless draftmanship, the majority unwisely attempt to defend it. They suggest that the voters may have believed kidnapping less inherently dangerous than arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or child molesting. Paragraph (17) expressly includes kidnapping in violation of section 209  that is, kidnapping for ransom or robbery  and it seems quite unlikely that the voters thought this crime less dangerous than burglary. The majority also suggest that forcible sodomy and oral copulation occur less frequently than rape and therefore stand less in need of deterrence. Are these crimes less frequent? Is there any reason to think the drafters thought they were? That the voters thought they were? Frequency is in any case irrelevant, since the objective, I assume, is to impose the death penalty for the most atrocious murders, not the most common murders. Isn't it more reasonable to assume that the voters believed that all felonies listed in paragraph (17) would be treated alike? [14] In any event, the majority agree with Carlos that section 190.2 requires proof of intent to kill for accomplices such as Carlos; they maintain only that it does not extend this requirement to the actual killer. They cannot derive this distinction from paragraph (17), which expressly applies to both actual killers and accomplices and says nothing about intent for either. Instead, for that, the majority turn to section 190.2, subdivision (b), which states that [e]very person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of intentionally aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, soliciting, requesting, or assisting any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.... The majority acknowledge that in the abstract the introductory phrase of section 190.2 [, subdivision] (b)  `[e]very person whether or not the actual killer'  encompasses both the actual killer and his [accomplice]. (Maj. opn. at p. 1142.) I would go further, and maintain that such is the single plain meaning of those words. In an attempt to avoid the plain meaning of those words, the majority note that the statute goes on to speak of persons found guilty of aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, soliciting, requesting assisting in the commission of a murder. They do not, however, adhere to the straightforward, literal meaning of the subdivision, and apply it to require intent to kill for every person, including actual killers, who also assist other murderers. That would be an unreasonable interpretation, for there is no conceivable reason to require proof of intent to kill for the actual killer who acts with a confederate, but not for one who acts alone. The majority, however, assert that the only reasonable meaning of subdivision (b) is one which imports an intent requirement for accomplices but not the actual killer. They do not go through the language of the section, word by word and phrase by phrase, to show how such is the clear and necessary import of the words and phrases employed. If they did, it would become apparent that the only way to arrive at the majority's interpretation is to turn the subdivision's opening phrase upside down. Every person whether or not the actual killer must be transformed into Every person except the actual killer. I recognize that when a court deals with a statute as poorly drafted as this one, it will often be necessary to depart from the literal language of the statute; it may even be necessary to construe some phrase to mean the opposite of its apparent meaning. But if the court concludes that it must construe a phrase to mean the opposite of what it apparently means, it cannot justify this by the single plain-meaning rule. Indeed, the basic problem with the majority opinion is that it simply adopts one reasonable interpretation of subdivision (b), justifying that interpretation by arguments which would be unnecessary and inappropriate if the language had a single clear meaning. It invokes, for example, a comparison of the language of the 1978 and 1977 law, the presumption that the deletion of former language is intended to change the law, and the ordinary judicial construction of words describing accomplices. It ignores, however, similar canons of construction, such as the one which requires the court to give meaning and effect to all words and phrases. (See, e.g., Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233 [273 P.2d 5]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672]; Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 326, 334 [136 Cal. Rptr. 421].) Having in this manner arrived at one reasonable interpretation of subdivision (b), the majority then announce that this is the plain meaning of the statute and the only reasonable construction. I think it is clear that subdivision (b) has no single clear meaning on its face. The majority have advanced one reasonable interpretation of that subdivision. But theirs is not the only reasonable interpretation. As five justices of this court, including the author of the present majority opinion, recognized in 1983, one can also reasonably argue that a subdivision which purports to apply to every person whether or not the actual killer does in fact apply to every person whether or not the actual killer. Thus the issue in this case, as Carlos, supra 35 Cal.3d 131, is one of choosing between alternative reasonable interpretations. One interpretation, however, is now fortified by precedent. The interpretation of subdivision (b) to require proof of intent to kill for all persons including the actual killer, has been reaffirmed many times by this court (see cases cited, fn. 2, ante ). Nothing has changed which warrants yet another reconsideration of that matter.