Opinion ID: 811330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to plead for relief as a ‘mortgagor’

Text: For the first time on appeal, the Portises assert that because Deutsche Bank failed to specifically plead that it was entitled to a right of redemption based upon its status as a “mortgagor” prior to submission of its trial brief—instead asserting in its complaint only a general entitlement to redemption—Deutsche Bank waived any statutory redemption claim that it might have had. Although not stated in so many words, the Portises effectively argue that the judgment of the district court should be reversed because Deutsche Bank failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This court has not squarely decided whether the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is waived by the appellant’s failure to raise it in the trial court. See Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1060 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1981).6 6 In Bonner v. City of Prichard we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 13 Case: 11-15790 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 14 of 17 But even if we assume without deciding that such a claim can be raised for the first time on appeal, this argument also fails for the reasons that follow. To state a claim for relief, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading contain (i) “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”; (ii) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”; and (iii) “a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Id. at 8(e). However, “[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations, we are bound to apply the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).” Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012). “As a result, the plaintiff must plead a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).7 In its first complaint against Citibank, filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama in February 2009, Deutsche Bank asserted that it 7 By comparison, Alabama courts maintain a permissive approach to what may suffice for a well-plead complaint. Peacock v. Clay, 831 So. 2d at 36. This standard was not changed by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. See McKelvin v. Smith, 85 So.3d 386, 391 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). 14 Case: 11-15790 Date Filed: 11/06/2012 Page: 15 of 17 held legal and equitable title to the Property. The complaint laid out specific grounds for why Deutsche Bank was entitled to relief. Deutsche Bank’s amended complaint, filed in April 2010, included, in the alternative, its request to redeem the Property. The Federal and Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure each expressly provide for claims of relief made in the alternative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3); Ala. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Deutsche Bank’s claim to statutory redemption was supported by the same facts as its claim to title in the Property. Here again, insofar as Deutsche Bank’s amended complaint seeking redemptive relief related back to its original complaint, under either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Alabama’s more liberal pleading standards, Deutsche Bank’s complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. In other words, Deutsche Bank did not waive its right to redemptive relief simply because it failed to specify that it was entitled to redemptive relief based upon its status as a mortgagor. Thus, the Portises’ Rule 12(b)(6) argument fails.