Opinion ID: 844269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Findings of Sexual Abuse

Text: The referee stated she had no reason to doubt the veracity of the mitigating evidence that petitioner presented at the reference hearing, and she “accept[ed] the evidence as valid.” As relevant here, that evidence included defense expert Dr. Morris‟s opinion that petitioner had been sexually abused by his mother. In challenging the referee‟s findings, the Attorney General argues that five rulings by the referee were erroneous and that those rulings may have affected the referee‟s findings. We discuss those rulings below. 1. Denial of Attorney General’s motion for psychodiagnostic evaluation The Attorney General argues that the referee erred in denying the motion to have an Attorney General mental health expert conduct a psychodiagnostic evaluation of petitioner. We agree. When, as here, a habeas corpus petitioner places in issue his mental condition at the penalty phase of his capital trial and in support presents the testimony of a mental health expert, the prosecution is entitled to have the petitioner examined by its mental health expert. (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1190; see § 1054.3; People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 572.) 2. Denial of Attorney General’s motion to call petitioner as a witness The Attorney General faults the referee for denying the Attorney General‟s request to call petitioner as a witness at the reference hearing. We agree. A petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding involving a challenge to a judgment based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to investigate and present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial has 23 no right not to be called as a witness. (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 791, 815.) Nor, contrary to the referee‟s explanation and petitioner‟s argument here, would petitioner‟s testimony have been irrelevant at the reference hearing. A habeas corpus petitioner must prove sufficient grounds for relief. (In re Bolden (2009) 46 Cal.4th 216, 224.) Here, petitioner had the burden of proving his allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase. Questioning of petitioner by the Attorney General at the reference hearing would have been highly probative of petitioner‟s credibility on the key issue of whether as a child he was sexually abused by his mother and why, during the 17 years from August 5, 1985 (when petitioner was charged) to February 26, 2002 (when in connection with the reference hearing petitioner was interviewed by his expert witness, psychologist Dr. Morris), petitioner made no mention of childhood sexual abuse by his mother. Questioning of petitioner by the Attorney General would have been helpful in determining whether such sexual abuse could have been discovered by trial counsel and, if so, whether the failure to present such evidence at the penalty phase prejudiced petitioner. 3. Limiting Attorney General’s cross-examination of petitioner’s witness Emily Vander Pauwert The Attorney General contends that the referee inappropriately limited the Attorney General‟s cross-examination of Emily Vander Pauwert. We agree. Emily Vander Pauwert, petitioner‟s former girlfriend and a defense witness at petitioner‟s capital trial when she was known as Emily Bates, later testified on petitioner‟s behalf at the reference hearing. On direct examination, Vander Pauwert testified to petitioner‟s drinking habits, his irregular sleep patterns, his relationships with his mother and father, his relationships with other women, and her own contacts with trial counsel. On cross-examination by the Attorney General, Vander Pauwert said that she visited petitioner while he was in jail, and 24 that she wanted to find out whether he had killed Nancy, his wife. The Attorney General then asked Vander Pauwert: “And isn‟t it true that he gave you two different versions of how his wife died?” When petitioner‟s counsel objected to this question as being beyond the scope of the reference hearing, the referee asked the Attorney General for a response. The Attorney General replied that the question was relevant to petitioner‟s character, his moral culpability, and his credibility, noting that Dr. Morris‟s opinion of childhood sexual abuse by petitioner‟s mother was based in part on Dr. Morris‟s assessment of petitioner‟s veracity. The referee sustained petitioner‟s objection and rejected the Attorney General‟s request to make an offer of proof. We agree with the Attorney General that the referee should have allowed the Attorney General to ask the question at issue, as it was relevant to petitioner‟s credibility and moral culpability, both of which were at issue at the reference hearing. 4. Referee’s refusal to allow certain questions during Attorney General’s direct examination of prosecution psychologist Dr. Martell The Attorney General contends the referee erred in denying the Attorney General an opportunity, during direct examination of prosecution psychologist Dr. Martell, to question Dr. Martell on the lack of a causal connection between petitioner‟s childhood sexual abuse by his mother and his commission of the murder. We disagree. During the Attorney General‟s direct examination of Dr. Martell, the Attorney General asked: “[W]e‟ll assume that [petitioner] was sexually assaulted as he alleges by his mother. Based on the peer-reviewed and validated professional literature that was available to members of your profession in 1989, can you cite the court to any authority that a male who had been sexually abused 25 as petitioner alleges was at a statistically significant higher risk than someone who had not been so sexually assaulted to commit a premeditated and deliberate murder?” Petitioner‟s counsel objected on the ground that the question asked for irrelevant evidence, adding: “There has been no evidence offered by petitioner regarding the assertion that the abuse evidence that has been presented is connected to the commission of the offense.” After briefly conferring with counsel for both parties, the referee sustained the objection to the Attorney General‟s question to Dr. Martell. The Attorney General argues the evidentiary ruling was an abuse of the referee‟s discretion. The Attorney General asserts the question was proper rebuttal evidence to correct any misimpression created by petitioner‟s presentation at the reference hearing of mitigating evidence that, according to petitioner, his trial counsel should have presented at the penalty phase. The admission of rebuttal evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trier of fact, here the referee, whose decision will not be disturbed in the absence of “ „palpable abuse.‟ ” (People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 965; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 912.) At the reference hearing, petitioner had conceded the very point that the Attorney General sought to elicit through the question posed to prosecution expert Dr. Martell — that no causal relationship existed between petitioner‟s childhood sexual abuse by his mother and his later murder of Nancy, his wife. Here, the referee‟s stated ground for sustaining the objection of petitioner‟s counsel reflects her full understanding of petitioner‟s concession. Because the evidentiary ruling does not constitute palpable abuse, the referee did not abuse her discretion in sustaining the objection to the Attorney General‟s question at issue. 26 5. Referee’s refusal to allow certain questions on cross-examination by Attorney General of petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. Morris The Attorney General argues the referee erred in sustaining petitioner‟s objections during the Attorney General‟s cross-examination of petitioner‟s expert witness, Dr. Morris, concerning petitioner‟s motivation for killing Nancy, his wife. We disagree. While cross-examining Dr. Morris, the Attorney General asked whether petitioner‟s murder of his wife was motivated by greed, and also whether the murder was partially motivated by “the thrill of the kill.” The referee sustained petitioner‟s objections to each question. The Attorney General asserts that the questions were appropriate rebuttal questions. As noted above, an evidentiary ruling on rebuttal evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed unless the abuse is palpable. No abuse of discretion occurred here. Dr. Morris‟s testimony was not directed to and did not address petitioner‟s motivation for the murder. The Attorney General‟s questions at issue were directed at most to a peripheral aspect of Dr. Morris‟s testimony and opinion. B. Referee’s Finding That Petitioner Did Not Hinder or Prevent Trial Counsel’s Penalty Phase Investigation The referee found: “It is undisputed that petitioner did not tell his trial counsel that he was the victim of sexual molestation or abuse.” The referee further found: “No evidence was presented that petitioner . . . hindered the investigation in any manner or asked that any particular mitigating evidence not be presented.” The Attorney General challenges the latter finding, arguing the evidence indicates that petitioner did hinder trial counsel‟s investigation by failing to disclose to his trial counsel the alleged childhood sexual abuse by his mother and by telling counsel that until the time of his parents‟ divorce, his childhood had been normal. We agree with the Attorney General. 27 “The reasonableness of counsel‟s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant‟s own statements or actions. Counsel‟s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691.) Thus, a defendant can hinder counsel‟s investigation not only through affirmative statements, but also by remaining silent or failing to disclose pertinent information to counsel. (In re Andrews (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234, 1255.) Whether a defendant‟s statements or nondisclosures have hindered trial counsel‟s investigation depends upon the circumstances of each case. (See In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 729.) Here, lead trial counsel O‟Sullivan, who talked to petitioner daily, asked petitioner about his background, asked petitioner whether there were any problems that O‟Sullivan should know about, and explained to petitioner the scope of mitigating evidence by reading to him the applicable Penal Code statutes. According to O‟Sullivan, petitioner did not tell him of “anything amiss or awry.” Second counsel Morehead, who was in charge of the trial‟s penalty phase, explained to petitioner the purpose of the penalty phase and the types of evidence that could be presented. When Morehead asked petitioner about his childhood, petitioner responded that he “had a good life until the time that the mother and the father got divorced, and from then on it spiraled downward.” Petitioner never mentioned to either attorney that his mother had sexually abused him as a child, obviously critical information, which did not surface until petitioner‟s expert Dr. Morris interviewed him for the reference hearing, 17 years after petitioner was charged with his wife‟s murder and 15 years after his mother‟s death. Nothing in petitioner‟s statements to his trial counsel would have led a reasonable attorney to suspect that petitioner had been the victim of childhood 28 sexual abuse by his mother. Also, in an interview with Dr. Phillips, a psychiatrist retained by the defense, petitioner said he “grew up in a normal home under normal circumstances.” Accordingly, we agree with the Attorney General that the referee erred in finding that petitioner had not hindered his trial counsel‟s investigation.