Opinion ID: 2012326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is residential zoning of plaintiffs' property invalid as confiscatory?

Text: Plaintiffs allege that the zoning ordinance is invalid as applied to their property because, under the circumstances, requiring it to be used for residential purposes amounts to confiscation. The land, they argue, supra, can be used as a practical matter only for a mobile-home park. No other use would be profitable. The mobile-home park use will not only be profitable, but the community needs mobile-home parks. It does not need more single and multiple-family residences. Additionally, plaintiffs say, a mobile-home park on that site is good planning. Defendants contend, supra, that there is no confiscation because the land can be used successfully as zoned. This raises the second principle in Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139; 215 NW2d 179 (1974). [21] We stated the standards by which allegations of confiscation are determined. This principle is that plaintiff has the burden of proving that an ordinance may be unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use in the area in question, 391 Mich 139, 158, and that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions on his property preclude its use for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted. 391 Mich 139, 162-163. And of course, as in all equity cases, considerable weight is given to the findings of the trial judge. 391 Mich 139, 163, quoting Christine Building Co v City of Troy, 367 Mich 508, 518; 116 NW2d 816 (1962). If plaintiff thus sustains an attack [22] on the validity of the ordinance, he is entitled to the land use he is petitioning for under normal and regular conditions unless such use would be a nuisance. To do otherwise would leave petitioner with property no one can use. In the instant case, the trial court found no confiscation. We hold that the trial court used an inappropriate standard to determine whether the ordinance was indeed confiscatory as to plaintiffs' property when it found that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated by a preponderance of the proofs that the continual zoning of the premises as RB is detrimental to the health, safety and welfare in the township. Further, it was error to hold that the zoning ordinance was itself evidence of the general plan of development. The trial court held that the property in question can be used as agricultural property, profitably, and that it can be developed as a site for single or multiple dwellings. The Court of Appeals, however, reviewing the evidence de novo, although giving considerable weight to the trial judge's finding of facts, reversed that holding: The record discloses persuasive evidence that the high cost of removing obstacles on the property, alleviating drainage problems, and employing a sewage lift pump precluded the use of plaintiffs' property for agricultural purposes. Likewise, the construction difficulties created by the surrounding uses for the development of either single or multiple residences and nonexistent market for the construction of multiple units indicates that the subject parcel was unsuitable for either of the remaining uses permitted by the defendant's ordinance. Upon these facts the property is so devoid of feasibility for use as zoned that the ordinance is deemed confiscatory. 46 Mich App 344, 350. [23] This is not a situation where plaintiffs argue that the difference in value alone, between land used as the existing ordinance requires, and land used as they would like to, is of such substantial disparity as to render that ordinance confiscatory as applied to their land. The problem in the instant case is that while the land will have some value if used as zoned, it would require such extensive changes at tremendous cost as to virtually transform the nature of the property. In Fenner v Muskegon, 331 Mich 732; 50 NW2d 210 (1951), we found application of a zoning ordinance restricting land to residential use in practical effect, confiscatory of plaintiffs' property. 331 Mich 732, 736. The subject property, low marshy land, was not suitable for the erection of residences or homes, or buildings of any kind without expending substantial sums for footings, excepting a strip along the northerly line of the property including an area where plaintiffs have removed sand. 331 Mich 732, 734. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals in the instant case was consistent with this approach, finding, as in Spanich v Livonia, 355 Mich 252; 94 NW2d 62 (1959), where we adopted the trial court's holding, that it would be financially unsound to develop [the property] for residences. 355 Mich 252, 264. We therefore affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that the ordinance amounted to confiscation as applied to plaintiffs' property.