Opinion ID: 6345773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applications of Evans

Text: Ms. Davis contends the district court legally erred by applying Evans in ruling on her fee application. She contends Evans applies only when the harmless error question involves an evolving legal principle, and the issue here did not. Her argument misinterprets Evans. We recognized in Evans that “[t]he government is more likely to meet [the substantial justification] standard when the legal principle on which it relied is unclear or in flux.” 640 F. App’x at 733 (quotations omitted). But we did not suggest that an unsuccessful harmless error argument based on settled legal principles cannot be substantially justified for EAJA purposes. Indeed, Evans held that such an argument is not unreasonable when there are decisions with conflicting outcomes and the “issue turns on the individual facts of the case.” Id. at 737. Applying that principle here, the district court pointed to Tenth Circuit decisions finding no reversible error in an ALJ’s failure to discuss third-party statements. It also cited conflicting district court outcomes in cases involving similar issues. And based on that authority, the court determined that the Commissioner’s position under the facts of this case was substantially justified. See Best-Willie v. Colvin, 514 F. App’x 728, 736 (10th Cir. 2013) (ALJ’s failure to discuss lay witness statement was harmless error where the same evidence the ALJ cited in discounting the claimant’s allegations also discredited the lay witness statement); Brescia v. 7 Appellate Case: 21-3148 Document: 010110691354 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 8 Astrue, 287 F. App’x 626, 630 (10th Cir. 2008) (“While the ALJ did not explicitly discuss the statements of [claimant’s] sister and friend, we do not believe this omission is grounds for a remand given the nature of their evidence, which was largely cumulative.”). We conclude the district court did not err.