Opinion ID: 180499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Practicing Prior to Admission to Court’s Bar

Text: This Court’s docket reflects that Gell began filing documents in this Court at least as early as March 2005. See Singh v. Gonzales, 05-1054-ag, acknowledgment letter filed Mar. 29, 2005; Singh v. Gonzales, 05-1606-ag, acknowledgment letter filed Apr. 14, 2005; Mostafa v. Gonzales, 05-2211-ag, acknowledgment letter filed May 25, 2005, motion filed July 11, 2005; Afzal v. Gonzales, 053336-ag, petition for review filed June 23, 2005; Amin v. Gonzales, 5 05-2751-ag, motion filed July 29, 2005. Her initial application to join the bar of this Court was thereafter filed in August or September of 2005 (although the application later had to be resubmitted, due to the absence of a sponsorship letter). Dec. 3, 2008 Transcript at 230-31. At a later date – probably in early 2006 – Gell was informed by an associate in her firm (“the Gell associate”) that a Court employee had told her that an attorney did not need to be admitted to file a petition or brief, but only if the attorney intended to orally argue the case.1 Dec. 3, 2008 Transcript at 219-22 (Gell associate’s testimony concerning conversation with Court employee); Oct. 23, 2008 Transcript at 100 (Gell testimony); Dec. 11, 2008 Transcript at 5-6 (same).2 1 The Court employee’s advice may have been limited to Gell’s ability to sign briefs after her admission application was submitted, but before her actual admission. Nov. 3, 2008 Transcript at 66-67, 69 (Gell’s testimony); Dec. 3, 2008 Transcript at 230 (Gell associate’s testimony). In light of other evidence discussed in the text, we assume the advice was not limited in that fashion (an assumption that favors Gell). 2 The Gell associate first testified that her conversation with the Court employee likely had occurred in 2004 or 2005, Dec. 3, 2008 Transcript at 220-21, but later recalled that it had occurred in 2006, id. at 224, 227. Gell testified that she thought that the conversation had occurred in 2006, although she left open the possibility that it had occurred in 2005. Dec. 11, 2008 Transcript at 5-6. Early 2006 appears likely as (a) the Gell associate testified that her inquiry had been motivated by the scheduling of oral argument in Paul v. Ashcroft, 03-4807-ag, (b) the scheduling notice for that argument was mailed on February 1, 2006, see Paul, 03-4807-ag, notice filed Feb. 1, 2006, and (c) a February 27, 2006 letter notifying the Clerk that Gell would appear for oral argument in that case stated that Gell had submitted an application for admission to the Court’s bar but had not yet received a decision on that application, see id., 6 Finally, as of the October 23, 2008 hearing, an attorney who often worked for Gell was still under the belief that an attorney need not be admitted to this Court’s bar in order to file a petition for review. Oct. 23, 2008 Transcript at 55. Prior to January 1, 2010, this Court’s rule concerning admission to the Court’s bar stated the following: Counsel of record for all parties must be admitted to practice before this court. Oral argument may be presented only by attorneys admitted to practice before this court. Former Second Cir. Local Rule 46(d). We are informed that, during the time period relevant to the present proceeding, some employees of this Court had interpreted this rule to mean that an attorney litigating before this Court need not be admitted to the bar of this Court unless he or she intended to orally argue the case. This interpretation is consistent with both the Gell associate’s testimony about receiving such advice from a Court employee in 2006 and an affidavit prepared by a legal assistant to Gell’s counsel, asserting that a Court employee had informed the legal assistant in October 2008 “that an attorney d[id] not have to be admitted to the Second Circuit to sign a brief but the attorney must be admitted for oral argument.” Record, vol. 6, exh. M. We agree with the Committee that, prior to filing any document in this Court, Gell should have read this Court’s local rule letter filed Feb. 28, 2006. However, we need not determine the precise date for purposes of this decision. 7 governing practice before this Court, Former Local Rule 46(d), and that she violated that rule by filing documents without first being admitted to this Court’s bar or having an application pending. However, there are several mitigating factors. First, although Gell should not have relied exclusively on the advice of other attorneys, the existence of that advice offers at least partial mitigation. This is particularly true as to the advice the Gell associate obtained from a Court employee. Although some may argue that the proffered advice was not the best interpretation of the rule, we find that a reasonable attorney could have accepted, and acted upon, such advice from the Court. However, that mitigating factor does not apply to the time period preceding the Gell associate’s conversation with the Court employee. Second, no evidence was adduced suggesting that Gell had intentionally violated this Court’s admission rule or that any client or the public was prejudiced by Gell’s failure to seek admission. Third, while the Court was prejudiced by having its admission rules circumvented, and not receiving the applicable admission fee in 2005, the Court’s operations were not otherwise affected and Gell later became a member of the Court’s bar. Thus, while we agree that Gell erred in not seeking admission prior to filing documents in this Court, we conclude that her error did not constitute 8 substantial misconduct.3