Opinion ID: 78312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: SORNA's Applicability to Ambert

Text: First, Ambert argues that § 2250 of Title 18 of the United States Code which made it a crime for anyone who travels in interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly fail to register or update a registration as required by SORNAdoes not apply to him because his relevant travel occurred before the Attorney General determined on February 28, 2007 that the statute's registration requirements apply to all offenders convicted before July 27, 2006. But, as the district court clearly recognized, the indictment was based in part on Ambert's travel from Florida to California and back on July 9-11, 2007, well after the effective date of the statute. See United States v. Ambert, 2007 WL 2949476, at  (N.D.Fla. Oct. 10, 2007) (unpublished) (Part of the date that Defendant is accused of violat[ing] SORNA is `on or about July 11, 2007.'). We agree with the trial court that § 2250 unambiguously applies to Amberthe had an obligation to register beginning on February 28, 2007 and traveled in interstate commerce after this date on July 9-11, 2007. However, even if we were to assume arguendo that Ambert's relevant travel occurred before February 28, 2007, our recent decision in United States v. Dumont, 555 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir.2009), would be dispositive of Ambert's argument. In Dumont, a sex offender convicted of a qualifying offense before July 27, 2006, and who had traveled in interstate travel prior to February 28, 2007, was successfully prosecuted for failure to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 after February 28, 2007. On appeal, he challenged his conviction on the ground that his interstate travel occurred prior to the Attorney General's retroactivity determination. Id. at 1289-91, 2009 WL 161864 -. A panel of this Court squarely rejected this challenge. We concluded that 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 imposed upon all sex offenders convicted prior to July 27, 2006 an obligation to register under § 16913 beginning on February 28, 2007, the date of the Attorney General's retroactivity determination. Id. at 1291, 2009 WL 161864,  ( citing Madera, 528 F.3d at 857). We observed that § 2250 criminalizes a sex offender's failure to register [under SORNA] after traveling in interstate or foreign commerce, and the `travels' language provides a jurisdictional basis. Id. at 1292, 2009 WL 161864,  (emphasis added). We held that the fact that Dumont's travel to Florida occurred prior to the retroactivity determination does not preclude his prosecution [under § 2250 of SORNA], id., and concluded that Dumont violated § 2250 on March 5, 2007 when he: (a) had an obligation to register under SORNA's general registration requirements; (b) had previously traveled in interstate travel; and (c) had not registered within three business days once he had an obligation to register and had traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 1291-92, 2009 WL 161864, -. Under the case law, Ambert had an obligation to register under SORNA beginning on February 28, 2007 and his failure to do so formed a proper foundation for a charge levelled under 18 U.S.C. § 2250.