Opinion ID: 1616952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Buyer's Request for a New Trial.

Text: In its final assignment of error the buyer contends that it should be granted a new trial because counsel for the sellers, at the trial court's direction, drafted the final rulings on post-trial motions. The record shows that the trial court first decided this jury-waived law case by filing a relatively brief one-page decision on July 24, 1981 finding the contract price to be $425,015.00. The buyer then filed post-trial motions which asserted very specific grounds for relief. Its motion for a new trial alleged that the court had erred in referring to an escrow agreement rather than the parties' written contract and in finding that the price was $1000 greater than requested in the prayer of the sellers' petition. Its motion filed pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) asked the court to enlarge or amend its findings to rule specifically on whether the general taxes on the motel had in fact been prepaid. More than twenty-two months after the motions were filed, the trial court orally requested that the sellers' attorney prepare orders denying the motions. The attorney did so and mailed the orders to the court, sending to the buyer's attorney a copy of his cover letter but not copies of the proposed orders. The trial court then signed and filed those orders. The one-page nunc pro tunc order eliminated the erroneous reference to the parties' escrow agreement, reduced by $1000 the purchase price fixed in the decree, and thereby corrected the two factual mistakes on which the buyer had based its motion for a new trial. The six-page order ruling on the buyer's post-trial motions included detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to buttress the trial court's amended declaratory judgment which found the purchase price to be $424,015.00 as the sellers had alleged. To support its claim that under these circumstances we should reverse and remand for a new trial, the buyer contends in its brief: The practical result is that the trial court indicated how [it] wanted to rule and the plaintiff's counsel attempted to make the ruling Supreme Court Proof. By finding as a matter of fact and law those matters which the plaintiff had alleged through the trial, and were not found or considered by the court in the original ruling, the defendant has an almost insurmountable burden in trying to overcome said judgment. The only practical method of resolving this situation is to set a new trial before the court for a determination of those matters. The sellers respond that the buyer has presented no legal or logical basis for reversal of this case as a result of this common practice. We first address the questions of whether and under what circumstances a trial court may properly request the assistance of counsel in drafting rulings, orders, judgments and decrees, then the question of whether in this case the buyer is entitled to a new trial because the court adopted orders proposed by the sellers' counsel. Many courts have recognized as a common practice the post-trial submission by counsel of proposed findings, conclusions, orders and decrees. See, e.g., Louis Dreyfus & Cie. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir.1962); Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 193, 560 P.2d 861, 864 (1977). See generally 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2578 (1971); Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 868 (1973) (Propriety and Effect of Trial Court's Adoption of Findings Prepared by Prevailing Party). Trial counsel's thorough preparation and articulation of suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law, accompanied by references to particular testimony and exhibits, can be of great assistance to the trial court, especially in highly technical or complicated cases. See In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1008 (1st Cir.1970) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1067, 92 S.Ct. 1502, 31 L.Ed.2d 797 (1972); Crown Machine & Tool Co. v. D & S Industries, Inc., 270 F.Supp. 271, 280 (D.Ariz.1967), aff'd 409 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 824, 90 S.Ct. 66, 24 L.Ed.2d 75 (1969); Delevan-Delta Corp. v. Roberts, 611 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn.1981). Many courts have sharply criticized the practice, however, suggesting that if the trial court adopts verbatim the findings prepared by winning counsel it may appear that the court has abdicated its role of fact-finder as well as decision-maker. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S.Ct. 268, 66 L.Ed.2d 129 (1980); Chicopee Manufacturing Corp. v. Kendall Co., 288 F.2d 719, 724-25 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825, 82 S.Ct. 44, 7 L.Ed.2d 29 (1961) (counsel's preparation of opinion, without notice to opposing party, may amount to denial of due process). The United States Supreme Court itself criticized findings of fact which had been submitted by counsel and adopted verbatim by the trial court. The Court held that the findings were formally the court's and would stand if supported by evidence, but it clearly stated its preference for those drawn with the insight of a disinterested mind which thereby reveal the discerning line for decision of the basic issue in the case. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-57, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 1047, 12 L.Ed.2d 12, 17 (1964) (dictum). All courts agree that finding the facts is an important part of the judicial function and that the judge cannot surrender this function to counsel. 9 Wright & Miller, § 2578, at 705. Detailed written decisions are often required by court rule, particularly when a judge tries an issue of fact without a jury. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Iowa R.Civ.P. 179(a); Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The purpose of such rules is threefold: (1) the quality of the judge's decision-making process is enhanced by requiring simultaneous articulation of the judge's underlying reasoning; (2) the parties receive assurance that their contentions have been fully and fairly considered; and (3) appellate courts can readily ascertain the specific factual and legal bases for the court's decision. See Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751-52 (3d Cir.1965); Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 236, 408 N.E.2d 860, 862-63 (1980). These purposes may not adequately be served to the extent that the trial court delegates to counsel its own responsibility to scrutinize the record, select apt principles of law, and fully articulate the bases for a sound, fair decision. We believe the better practice is that spelled out in Bradley v. Maryland Casualty Co.: We venture to suggest that if, because of prevailing custom, or pressure of work, or a case's technical nature, or for other reasons, counsel must be asked to assist in the preparation of findings and conclusions, it is better practice to make this request at or soon after the submission of the case and prior to decision and to make it of both sides. 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed. 1966), par. 52.06[3], p. 2665. Then the court may pick and choose and temper and select those portions which better fit its own concept of the case. 382 F.2d 415, 423-24 (8th Cir.1967) (Blackmun, J.) (dictum). We further emphasize that in fairness all parties should be given the same opportunity to submit proposed findings and to comment on findings proposed by others. The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct provides in relevant part: A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. Canon 3 A(4), Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. Turning to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the buyer has failed to establish that its substantial rights were adversely affected by the trial court's reliance on counsel in drafting the orders which overruled the buyer's post-trial motions. Our affirmance of the trial court on the specific issues here raised by the buyer has not turned on the substantive content of the findings of fact or reasons given for the rulings proposed by the sellers' counsel and adopted as its own by the trial court. As explained in division II above the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence in ascertaining the parties' intent and then accounting for property taxes as a part of the final purchase price. The buyer made no request that the trial court reform the contract documents, so neither the trial court nor this court could properly consider the issue of mutual mistake. Moreover, the specific grounds on which the buyer requested a new trialmistakes of fact in the trial court's initial decisionwere corrected by order nunc pro tunc, and the buyer does not here challenge the entry of that order. The buyer does not in this appeal contend that any particular finding of fact or conclusion of law proposed by sellers' counsel and adopted by the court was unsupported by the evidence or incorrect except to the extent already considered and affirmed. Consequently, even though we disapprove the trial court's ex parte request for proposed rulings, we find that the buyer has not been harmed by being deprived of its right to submit its own proposed rulings and comment on those suggested by the sellers' counsel. Because the buyer has made no showing that the trial court's actions materially and adversely affected its substantial rights, we conclude that the buyer is not entitled to a new trial on any of the grounds it has asserted in this appeal. Iowa R.Civ.P. 244; Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(3), (4). We do here note our disapproval of the inordinate length of time which elapsed between the one-day trial on May 19, 1980 and the filing of the trial court's rulings on post-trial motions on June 17, 1983. Our trial judges labor under heavy caseloads, but delays of that magnitude are inexcusable and intolerable. AFFIRMED.