Opinion ID: 772937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Regarded as Disabled Due to Required Medical Examination

Text: 27 Tice further contends that, whether or not he is actually disabled, CATA regarded him as disabled, and thus he can seek the ADA's protection through the regarded as definition of disability. As proof of such regard, Tice points only to the fact that he was required to take an IME when no other employee was forced to do so, even though CATA had the opportunity to consult directly with his doctor. We will address the question whether CATA's IME comported with ADA requirements in Part III.B, infra; in this section, we deal with the distinct (though related) issue of whether the request for an IME demonstrates that CATA regarded Tice as disabled. 28 For an individual to be disabled under the regarded as portion of the ADA's definition of disability, the individual must demonstrate either that: (1) despite having no impairment at all, the employer erroneously believes that the plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits major life activities; or (2) the plaintiff has a nonlimiting impairment that the employer mistakenly believes limits major life activities. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). In either case, the definition of substantially limits remains the same as it does in other parts of the statute -- i.e., if the individual is attempting to establish that the employer believed the individual to be limited in the life activity of working, then working must encompass a broad class of jobs. See id. at 489-93; see also Wright v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 204 F.3d 727, 731-33 (7th Cir. 2000); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 647 (2d Cir. 1998). 6 29 The ADA also has specific provisions, which we have rescribed in the margin, regarding the propriety of employer-mandated medical examinations. 7 These provisions, which are not a model of legislative clarity, see Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1996), may leave an odd gap in setting out the scope of permissible examinations and inquiries. The Act expressly allows examinations or inquiries as to whether an employee has a disability or as to the severity of a disability, if such examinations/inquiries are job-related and consistent with business necessity. See 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4)(A). The Act also explicitly permits inquiries (but not examinations) as to an employee's ability to perform job-related functions. 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4)(B). However, the Act is unclear as to whether examinations (rather than inquiries) are permissible if intended to evaluate the employee's ability to perform job-related functions, even if such examinations are not intended to discover whether an employee is disabled within the meaning of the Act, as permitted in S 12112(d)(4)(A). 30 The EEOC regulations clarify the statute by explaining that [a] covered entity may require a medical examination (and/or inquiry) of an employee that is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 29 C.F .R. S 1630.14(c). 8 Under these standards, a request for an IME that complies with the statutory restrictions will never, in the absence of other evidence, be sufficient to demonstrate that an employer regarded the employee as substantially limited in a major life activity, simply because an examination that is job-related and consistent with business necessity must, at minimum, be limited to an evaluation of the employee's condition only to the extent necessary under the circumstances to establish the employee's fitness for the work at issue. Cf. Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1999). A request for such an appropriately-tailored examination only establishes that the employer harbors doubts (not certainties) with respect to an employee's ability to perform a particular job. Doubts alone do not demonstrate that the employee was held in any particular regard, see Colwell, 158 F.3d at 647, and, as we have explained, inability to perform a particular job is not a disability within the meaning of the Act, see Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 811. Accord Wright, 204 F.3d at 732-33 (request for an examination does not establish that an employer regarded an employee as disabled where all the evidence suggested that the employer merely had doubts about the employee's abilities solely with respect to the physical demands of a single job); Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1998) (request for a mental examination of an employee who had exhibited strange behaviors does not establish that the employer regarded the employee as disabled because [e]mployers need to be able to use reasonable means to ascertain the cause of troubling behavior without exposing themselves to ADA claims). 31 Indeed, even an improper IME request, without more, might not be sufficient to demonstrate that an employee was regarded as disabled. This is because an inquiry into how an employee was regarded is necessarily quite fact-specific, and all of the surrounding circumstances may be relevant in reaching a conclusion. So, for instance, if the IME is improper only for the reasons Tice has alleged --i.e., because the employer already had sufficient information from other sources to gauge the employee's fitness for work -- such facts, standing alone, would not necessarily be determinative of how the employee was regarded. 32 At all events, this is not to say that a request for an IME, proper or improper, may not, taken in conjunction with other evidence or circumstances surrounding the request, establish that the employer regarded the employee as disabled. The important point is that the request and surrounding circumstances must establish that the employee was regarded as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-93. So, for example, if it turned out that the employer's examination was not limited to an assessment of those potential impairments that had occasioned the examination in the first place, but instead became a wide-ranging assessment of mental or physical debilitation, Sullivan, 197 F .3d at 812, such evidence might be highly probative as to the nature of the employer's perception. Further, a request for an examination, taken in conjunction with evidence suggesting that the employer had no reasonable basis for harboring doubts about the employee's ability to do his or her job in the first place, might also be probative as to the nature of the employer's regard. Thus, for Tice to use CATA's request for an IME to establish that CATA regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, he must raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether CATA's request evinced a belief that Tice was unable to work in a broad class of jobs. 33 Tice has not even attempted to make such a showing. On the contrary, he has explicitly argued in his briefing only that CATA believed Tice's impairment precluded him from working as a bus driver. Further, it is undisputed that CATA's inquiries of Tice's doctor, and the IME itself, all focused solely on the physical requirements of bus driving. 9 34 Therefore, even if CATA believed Tice to be unable to drive a bus, such a regard would still not establish that CATA regarded him as disabled. Because there has been no other evidence besides the request for an IME submitted to establish the nature of CATA's regard for Tice, we hold that Tice has not put forth sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to his entitlement to ADA protection. Thus, Tice has failed to make out the first element of a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, i.e., that of disability, and his claim that CATA deliberately misclassified his injuries in order to effect a discriminatory discharge fails. 35