Opinion ID: 1945481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Appellants' Named Insured Status

Text: Named insureds are those persons defined or described by the language of the insurance contract. See Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co., 190 So.2d 819, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (In interpreting insurance policies, the courts have uniformly held that the term `named insured' has a restricted meaning and does not apply to any persons other than those named in the policy.). The contract at issue in the instant matter defines named insured as FORD MOTOR COMPANY, ITS U.S. SUBSIDIARIES AND ANY PERSON TO WHOM AN AUTOMOBILE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED, LEASED OR LOANED. In the context of UM/UIM coverage, an analysis of who is a named insured is always the first step in any analysis with regard to the statutory requirements and protections, because named insureds are the only persons authorized under the UM/UIM statute to reject UM/UIM coverage or to accept UM/UIM coverage at lower limits. See, e.g., Kimbrell v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 420 So.2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 1982) ([S]ection 627.727(1) . . . requires insurers to provide uninsured motorist coverage to policy holders in an amount equal to their bodily injury liability coverage, unless the uninsured motorist coverage is rejected by the named insured.  (emphasis supplied)). This is particularly true when any issue touching upon UM/ UIM coverage by operation of the statute arises because, as indicated above, if the statutorily mandated offer and rejection or acceptance does not take place, UM/UIM coverage is provided by operation of the UM/UIM statute. See id. In concluding that summary judgment in favor of the appellants on the issue of coverage was proper, the district court in the instant matter specifically determined, based on the analysis of the Third District in Perez v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co., 723 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), that the appellants were named insureds under the plain language of the insurance policy prior to reformation, i.e., person[s] to whom an automobile has been . . . leased or loaned. In Perez, the Third District determined that the plaintiff, a retail lessee, was a named insured under the same insurance contract at issue in the present case. See Perez, 723 So.2d at 850-51. The Third District reasoned that under Item 1 listed on the declarations page, describing the Named Insured as Ford Motor Company, its U.S. subsidiaries, and any person to whom an automobile has been assigned, leased or loaned, the plaintiff, as an individual to whom an automobile had been leased, came within the definition of a named insured under the plain language of the policy. See id. at 850. The Third District concluded that the insurance policy's language was unambiguous and, therefore, did not require construction, and must be given effect as written. Id. at 851. Adopting this reasoning, the district court below determined that appellants were likewise named insureds under the policy. As such, they would be entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the policy by operation of section 627.727 of the Florida Statutes because neither the appellants nor any other named insured under the policy were offered and either accepted or properly rejected the coverage. See § 627.727, Fla. Stat. (2004). Michigan Mutual looks to the policy definition of covered auto to amend the separate policy provision of named insured, arguing that a different definition of vehicles in a separate covered autos provision in Endorsement [PP] FO RD 04 changes named insureds under the policy at issue. We have held that insurance contracts must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161, 165 (Fla.2003). The definition of named insured on the declarations page of the policy at issue here clearly states and includes any person to whom an automobile has been . . . leased. An interpretation of the plain meaning of that definition would, absent any modification of the definition of named insured elsewhere in the policy or by endorsement, include appellants retail lessees as named insureds. See Kohly, 190 So.2d at 821 (named insured status is only given to those named in the policy). Michigan Mutual attempts to change the definition of named insured on the declarations page of the policy, by reference to the description of a covered auto with the tag designations listed in Endorsement PP FO RD 04 under the definition of covered auto, not named insured, and conclude that the retail lessees are not named insureds under the policy at issue. If we adopted this reasoning, we would stretch the concept of interpretation entirely beyond that permitted by Florida law by mixing distinct insurance provisions, one policy provision and concept  named insuredbeing defined by reference to a definition of an entirely different independent policy provision, definition, and concept  covered auto. Who is a named insured under a policy is not altered by the description of a covered auto found in a separate, different provision, definition, and concept contained in an endorsement to that policy. Therefore, the tag designations listed in endorsement PP FO RD 04, which are used to describe the term covered auto and not named insured, cannot be used to totally alter the separate definition of named insured found on the declarations page in a different policy provision. There is no endorsement which modifies the definition of named insured in this contract. The plain and unambiguous language in the distinct contract provision on the declarations page which defines who qualifies as a named insured must control and dictate who is in that category without resorting to a distinct and different policy provision and definition to change the unambiguous policy language. Reference to a covered auto may modify or impact the vehicle or where coverage may apply, but it does not alter the definition of named insured as a policy term. Even if the definition of the distinct and separate contract description of covered auto in Endorsement PP FO RD 04 could be construed as creating ambiguity as to the separate definition and provision of the term named insured, principles of insurance contract construction would still require that the plaintiff retail lessees be considered named insureds. We have held that where policy language is subject to differing interpretations, the term should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So.2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1998) (citing Container Corp. of Am. v. Md. Cas. Co., 707 So.2d 733, 736 (Fla. 1998)). Under this reasoning, an interpretation of person to whom an automobile has been . . . leased, which clearly includes a retail lessee, should be favored over one that includes only Ford employee lessees, because the former interpretation would adhere to the rule of construing policy language subject to differing interpretations liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So.2d at 1076. Based on the foregoing, I would conclude that the appellants were within the definition of named insured and were entitled to the statutory protection related thereto under the policy at issue in its prereformation state. Therefore, the district court's reformation of the policy was the proper process to analyze this case if appellants as retail lessees were to be excluded from the definition of named insured under the policy. Since the majority correctly determines that reformation was appropriate in the instant matter and supported by competent substantial evidence, I concur.