Opinion ID: 1567830
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Redirect Examination of Deputy Sheriff Reeves.

Text: ¶ 33. Christmas also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to limit the State's redirect examination of Reeves. During redirect, Reeves testified to various statements made by Christmas that were not brought out on direct or cross-examination. Reeves testified that Christmas described the victim as an old white lady, that he knew about a black Avalanche, that he accurately described the stolen purse as white, and that he described the gun as a thirty-two or thirty-eight caliber revolver. Eventually, the defense lawyer objected to this line of questioning: Prosecutor: And did you ask [Christmas] if  he admitted he ran  he ran out  Defense Attorney: I'm going to object. It is improper redirect. Court: Why? Defense Attorney: Well, for one, he's not clarifying anything that I went into on cross. Court: In Mississippi, you're not limited on what's called into cross.... Defense Attorney: My argument is that he is going into new ground here, and that he's not going into ground that was to clarify anything that may have been  come up as a result of my cross-examination.... Court: Okay. Alright. That is not the rule in Mississippi. It's overruled. ¶ 34. After this exchange, the prosecutor abandoned the question but elicited additional testimony that Christmas accurately described the victim's house and her car. Later in the redirect examination, Reeves was asked by counsel for the State, [a]nd the defendant didn't deny running out of his shoes to get away from the police? Deputy Sheriff Reeves responded, No, he did not. ¶ 35. While a trial judge enjoys broad discretion in allowing or excluding testimony on redirect examination, we find that in this instance the trial court erred in ruling that redirect examination is not limited to matters first brought out in cross-examination. The applicable rule for redirect examination in Mississippi is quite clear: The scope of redirect examination, while largely within the discretion of the trial court, is limited to matters brought out during cross-examination. Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 786 (Miss.2001) (quoting Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1212 (Miss.1996)). See also West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048, 1055 (Miss.1985) (The general rule is that redirect is limited to matters brought out on cross-examination.) (citing Cole v. Tullos, 228 Miss. 815, 90 So.2d 32 (1956)). ¶ 36. However, Christmas's attorney did not object to the examination until most of the improper testimony had been presented. This Court has held that [t]o preserve an issue for appeal, a contemporaneous objection must be made. Walker v. State, 913 So.2d 198, 238 (Miss.2005). Therefore, although the trial judge erred in allowing unfettered redirect, we cannot find that this constitutes reversible error.