Opinion ID: 880411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony Exclusion

Text: Our standard of review for this issue is identical to the previous issue: an abuse of discretion must be shown before a District Court's ruling on evidentiary questions will be overturned. Defendant argues that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony of witness C. Rude. Defense counsel made an offer of proof in chambers asserting that Rude would testify to his eavesdropping on a conversation which occurred in Missoula during early December 1986. The conversation related by two men, now in trouble with the Washington state authorities, was regarding a man they had rolled in downtown Missoula, taking a small amount of money from the victim. The District Court analyzed the proposed testimony in relation to the crime with which Rudolph was charged. The judge found the proposed testimony was too vague regarding the time of the occurrence and the actual crime committed (rolled was the best recollection Rude could give and he did not recall the day of the crime). Thus, after finding the proposed testimony too tenuous and remote from Rudolph's case, the judge excluded the evidence for failing the relevancy requirements. We agree. Relevancy is defined in Rule 401, M.R. Evid., as follows: ... evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rude's testimony sought to exculpate Rudolph by incriminating two other unknown individuals upon whom he had been eavesdropping. The similarities between the crime overheard by Rude and the one attributed to Rudolph are few: two men perpetrated the offenses (one dark haired and one blonde), in downtown Missoula, in December of 1986, for a small amount of money. The unknown factors of the evidence include what crime was committed, upon whom, when and by whom. These far outweigh the similarities of the two occurrences. Thus, defense counsel is unable to prove that the proposed testimony is so close in time, place and similar in style so as to be relevant to the question of Rudolph's innocence or guilt. Absent a closer connection between the two occurrences, or at the very least, a definition of the crime committed by the other unknown assailants, we find no abuse of discretion in refusing this testimony. In summary, we conclude that the show up pretrial identification of Rudolph was constitutionally sound and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the evidentiary rulings contested at trial. Judgment affirmed. HARRISON, GULBRANDSON, SHEEHY and HUNT, JJ., concur.