Opinion ID: 3001313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal Franklin first argues that our decision in Miller “eviscerates Booker and reestablishes the status quo by merely inserting the word advisory before the words sentencing guidelines, creating a judicial fiction that the Constitution is respected, that the Supreme Court’s holding in Booker is respected, and that constitutional guarantees under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are respected.” This argument is frivolous. In Miller we explained that, after calculating the relevant advisory guidelines range, a district judge has discretion to impose a sentence outside of the range, depending on the specific facts of the case. But we emphasized that district courts are not at liberty to disregard legislative choices and that differing sentences that are caused by legal rules, such as the existence of fast-track programs in some districts, cannot be said to create unwarranted disparities. See id. at 275-76. Franklin asserts that Miller holds “that all sentences within the guideline range are reasonable,” but he simply misunderstands the opinion. Franklin, citing the “‘bright-line rule announced in Apprendi,’” next argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because it was enhanced by “aggravating factors” that were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt or found by a jury. This contention is equally frivolous. To the extent that Franklin alludes to his prior convictions, the holding of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), has never applied to prior convictions. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 496-97 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Glover, 479 F.3d 511, 522 (7th Cir. 2007). As for the guidelines, they are advisory only, and so judicial factfinding at sentencing does not raise constitutional concerns. See United States v. Wilson, 502 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. White, 443 F.3d 582, 592 (7th Cir. 2006). No. 07-1918 Page 4 Franklin also argues that the district court rejected his invocation of the “parsimony provision” of § 3553(a), which states that “[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to comply with the goals of sentencing. We review sentences imposed by the district court for reasonableness. See United States v. Dale, 498 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jung, 473 F.3d 837, 844-45 (7th Cir. 2007). A sentence that is reasonable is entirely consistent with the parsimony provision. See United States v. Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2006). Here the district court focused primarily on the seriousness of this offense, the need to incapacitate Franklin, and its desire to protect the community from him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C). Franklin claims that his sentence is unreasonable because “it was not imposed as a result of the district court’s assessment of the relevant factors and determination of the minimally adequate sentence,” but the record belies this argument. Franklin’s final argument is that the presumption of reasonableness given to a within-guidelines sentence conflicts with both the Sixth Amendment and § 3553(a). The Supreme Court’s decision in Rita forecloses this claim. Franklin filed his opening brief roughly two weeks before Rita was decided, but in his reply brief he did not acknowledge Rita. This was an error. AFFIRMED.