Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Questions Concerning Relevant Aggravating Factors

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error during the death-qualification phase of voir dire by failing, sua sponte, to question potential jurors about the aggravating factors the State would seek to establish during the penalty phase. Although the jurors were questioned about their views on the death penalty in general, the trial court did not ascertain whether the jurors could weigh evidence in mitigation if it was established that defendant was guilty of a murder committed during a kidnapping or for the purpose of escaping detection. Thus, defendant argues that he was denied the opportunity to intelligently challenge jurors who, with the knowledge of those aggravating factors, would automatically impose a death sentence. Potential jurors were aware of the nature of the allegations against defendant as well as the existence and purpose of statutory aggravating factors. After completing a lengthy questionnaire, the court read the indictment to all of the prospective jurors. Thus, the potential jurors knew that the State would seek to prove that defendant had kidnapped Flax and then had murdered him in the course of that kidnapping. The potential jurors, however, did not know from the indictment that the State also alleged that the murder had been committed to escape detection. Additionally, the trial court explained to the potential jurors the structure of the New Jersey Capital Punishment Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, and the bifurcated jury determinations regarding guilt and sentencing. The court also delineated the aggravating and mitigating factors, and explained the purpose of both such factors. During individual voir dire, the court alluded to examples of aggravating factors enumerated in the death-penalty statute: By way of example of an aggravating factor; one, that the murder was outrageously or wantonly cruel or, two, that the defendant committed the murder for the purpose of escaping detection. Those are only two examples. The court did not inform the potential jurors, however, which aggravating factors the State was seeking to prove against defendant. Moreover, following the initial questioning by the court, defense counsel was afforded an unrestricted opportunity to pose questions to the venirepersons. Indeed, defense counsel used that opportunity to explore the kidnapping aggravating factor with some of the potential jurors, although not all. He did not discuss the escaping detection factor except for a brief mention with one prospective juror. In capital proceedings, The court in conducting the voir dire should be particularly responsive to the requests of counsel regarding the examination of prospective jurors as to potential bias. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 68, 459 A. 2d 641 (1983) ( Williams I) (footnote omitted). Although the fact is not dispositive, defendant made no request for voir dire questions concerning the kidnapping or escaping detection aggravating factors. In both State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988) ( Williams II), and State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 594 A. 2d 172 (1991) ( Biegenwald IV), the trial court denied defense-counsel requests to query potential jurors on the effect of the relevant aggravating factors. We recognize that a demonstrated reticence to pursue questions concerning the alleged aggravating factors can be demonstrative of a well-considered strategic attempt to limit juror exposure to questions concerning capital punishment on the part of defense counsel. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 93, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991) ( Marshall I). Counsel may very well neither [seek] nor believe[] in an exhaustive voir dire process, seeming to wish that the court not overemphasize the qualification process. State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 247, 593 A. 2d 266 (1991). To the extent that defense counsel makes strategic decisions to avoid particular aggravating aspects of the case during voir dire, the trial court should not interfere by conducting extensive examinations regarding those facts. Because defense counsel here did pursue the kidnapping aspect of this case with some jurors, we do not find that he evidenced a strategic decision to avoid that aggravating factor. The purpose of voir dire is to ensure an impartial jury and a fair trial, a right that is heightened when a defendant faces the death penalty. State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 155, 590 A. 2d 624 (1991); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 363, 558 A. 2d 1259 (1989); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 324 n. 84, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). The voir dire in a capital cause should probe the minds of the prospective jurors to ascertain whether they hold biases that would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 129, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991). Accordingly, any juror whose position on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath is disqualified from serving on a penalty-phase jury. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255-56, 524 A. 2d 188. Because the sentencing authority `has a constitutional obligation to evaluate the unique circumstances of the individual defendant,' State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 48, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987) ( Biegenwald II) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3161, 82 L.Ed. 2d 340, 351 (1984)), prospective jurors should, in certain circumstances, be questioned about the effect that relevant aggravating factors will have on their penalty-phase deliberations. In Williams II, supra, we found that the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied defense counsel's request to ask prospective jurors whether they automatically would impose the death penalty on defendants who had committed murder during a rape. 113 N.J. at 417, 550 A. 2d 1172. We concluded that the failure to inquire into whether any juror could consider the mitigation evidence if it was established that defendant was guilty of rape and murder denied counsel and the trial court the tools with which to insure that the jury panel could fairly undertake its role   . Ibid. The trial court's refusal to question jurors was a serious error and a significant component of the deficiencies, which resulted in reversal of that defendant's sentence and conviction. Ibid. However, because of the poor quality of the overall voir dire we did not decide whether the error with respect to the alleged aggravating factors, standing alone, warranted reversal. Ibid. Likewise, in Biegenwald IV, we determined that a trial court that refused to allow defense counsel to question potential jurors during voir dire about their ability to consider mitigating evidence should the State establish aggravating factor c(4)(a), that the defendant had two prior murder convictions, had committed serious error. As in Williams II, we did not hold that such an error standing alone automatically warranted reversal. Nor did we establish a per se rule that prospective jurors had to be questioned about the potential effect of each alleged aggravating factor on their penalty-phase deliberations. As we explained: In Williams II, we recognized that the brutality of a rape and murder could blind venirepersons in the performance of their duties as jurors. Similarly, we are convinced that knowing a defendant had killed before could cause an otherwise fair-minded person to disregard evidence offered in support of mitigating factors. [ Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 31, 594 A. 2d 172.] Therefore, we concluded that voir dire should include questioning about evidence of aggravating factors that will be presented [and that] may with reasonable likelihood have the effect of rendering that juror substantially impaired in his or her ability to deliberate fairly during the penalty phase. Id. at 32, 594 A. 2d 172. We conclude that such a likelihood exists with respect to murders committed during the course of a kidnapping. A kidnap/murder is often a sensational crime, partly because of its infrequency. Unlike the situation with other murders, the FBI is often involved, especially when, as in the present case, the kidnapping was conducted for ransom. More importantly, the victimization in a kidnap/murder can endure for an extended period of time and, by design, involves terrorization of the victim's family. Thus, the kidnap/murder aggravating factor can cause excessive, and deserved, sympathy for the victim, and should be delved into during voir dire. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 93, 594 A. 2d 172 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Thus, the pool of prospective jurors should have been questioned on the effect that the kidnapping aggravating factor would have on their deliberations. The same cannot be said of murders committed to escape detection. Although such circumstances undoubtedly aggravate the criminal conduct, see State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 577 A. 2d 99 (1990), that statutory factor simply does not have the capacity to enflame otherwise reasonable jurors. Although it may be better practice for trial courts to question jurors about all the aggravating factors at issue, subject to possible defense-counsel strategic objections, the trial court's failure to question the jurors about the escaping detection factor did not constitute error. Nonetheless, even assuming that the trial court should have questioned the potential jurors about both factors, such error    is not irremediable. [A] defendant's sentence may be upheld if the voir dire was otherwise so thorough and probing as to ensure that the jurors empaneled had the `capacity to credit the evidence in mitigation.' Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 34, 594 A. 2d 172 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 154, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II)). After reviewing the jury-selection process as a whole, we conclude that it was not constitutionally flawed. The voir dire of defendant's potential jurors was sufficiently probing to uncover potential biases and overcome any error associated with the failure to question prospective jurors about both of the aggravating factors. Defendant also alleges that defense counsel's failure to question the potential jurors about the aggravating factors constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's claim is discussed with his other allegations concerning his counsel's alleged ineffective assistance, infra at 322-323, 619 A. 2d at 1284-1285.