Opinion ID: 1764940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, the parties do not dispute that Vokal's office and its contents were property under his official care and control, as defined by the NPADA, or that Vokal was campaigning for or against the nomination or election of a candidate when he filmed 7 seconds of his campaign advertisement in his office. The question is whether sitting at his desk touching the keyboard inside that office was use of these resources under § 49-14,101.02 and, thus, a violation of the NPADA. In answering that question, we are guided by several familiar principles of statutory construction. In discerning the meaning of a statute, we must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, it being our duty to discover, if possible, the Legislature's intent from the language of the statute itself. [5] Under principles of statutory construction, the components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter may be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature so that different provisions of an act are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [6] Moreover, because § 49-14,101.02 is penal in nature, [7] it must be strictly construed. [8] Penal statutes are considered in the context of the object sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought to be served. [9] A penal statute will not be applied to situations or parties not fairly or clearly within its provisions. [10] So, with those principles in mind, we turn to the specific provisions of the NPADA. The NPADA was promulgated in 1976 to set up disclosure and accountability procedures concerning campaign finance. [11] Specifically, it was designed to establish requirements for the financing, disclosure, and reporting of political campaigns and lobbying activities and provide conflict of interest provisions for ensuring the independence and impartiality of public officials. [12] Section 49-1402 states in full: The Legislature finds: (1) That the public interest in the manner in which election campaigns are conducted has increased greatly in recent years, creating a need for additional disclosure and accountability; (2) That there is a compelling state interest in ensuring that the state and local elections are free of corruption and the appearance of corruption and that this can only be achieved if (a) the sources of funding of campaigns are fully disclosed and (b) the use of money in campaigns is fully disclosed; (3) That it is essential to the proper operation of democratic government that public officials and employees be independent and impartial, that governmental decisions and policy be made in the proper channels of governmental structure, and that public office or employment not be used for private gain other than the compensation provided by law; and (4) That the attainment of one or more of these ends is impaired when there exists, or appears to exist, a substantial conflict between the private interests of a public official and his or her duties as such official; and that although the vast majority of public officials and employees are dedicated and serve with high integrity, the public interest requires that the law provide greater accountability, disclosure, and guidance with respect to the conduct of public officials and employees. Section 49-14,101.02, enacted in 2001, falls under the conflicts of interest section of the act. The broad term use, found in § 49-14,101.02, is not specifically defined in the NPADA. The Concise Oxford American Dictionary defines use as to take, hold, or deploy (something) and to take or consume. [13] The Commission acknowledged at oral argument that the office, desk, and computer in this case were only props for the video. There is no allegation that Vokal created or distributed campaign material using his office or the computer in that office. There is likewise no evidence that he used the office telephone to solicit votes or contributions. We question, even under the strict dictionary definition of use, whether the mere fact that items under official control that are present in the background as props in an advertisement can be considered as a deployment or consumption of these items. But, regardless, we do not view the term use in a vacuum. Instead, we must understand it in the context of the statute where it is found. And we consider the express goal of the NPADA's conflict of interest provisions, which is the independence and impartiality of public officials. We find the case of Saefke v. Vande Walle [14] illustrative of the meaning of use in this context. In Saefke, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a judge running for reelection did not violate a corrupt practices act forbidding the use of state property for political purposes when he was filmed for a campaign advertisement wearing his judicial robe while seated at the bench in the courtroom. Although the act specified that state property included buildings, the court found the broad construction asserted by the contestant elector was simply unreasonable. The court noted that because the statute was penal in nature, it must be strictly construed and given a reasonable construction. The court then explained that the primary intent of the legislature in passing the corrupt practices act was to prevent the misuse of public funds or a financial misuse of public property for political purposes. The court found no evidence of such misuse. Instead, by being filmed wearing his robe while seated at the bench in the courtroom, the court found that the judge was simply trying to express to voters that he already occupied the office to which he sought reelection. The court observed that it was common practice for state officials to be shown sitting at their desks in campaign literature. And it reasoned that given such common practice, surely if the legislature intended such `use' of state property to be a violation ..., it would have so provided in specific and clear terms. [15] We find the North Dakota court's reasoning to be persuasive. We simply find nothing in the statute indicating that we should stretch the meaning of use to its broadest possible applicationto a case where nothing was consumed and the actions do not create any impression of a conflict of interest. A commonsense approach to the term, in the context in which it is presented, does not warrant such a broad understanding. In fact, the Commission has been unable to persuasively explain how Vokal's actions represented any of the problems the NPADA sought to address. The Commission admits that a much clearer violation would be present had Vokal, for instance, actually used a photocopier or other equipment to produce campaign flyers. While the Commission suggests that Vokal was utilizing an unfair advantage of his incumbency, as in Saefke, we find that Vokal was merely conveying something that most of the public already knew and that Vokal had a right to convey to those who did not. As the Commission concedes, Vokal would not have been sanctioned had he simply rebroadcast news footage showing him working in his office. We see no meaningful distinction between such a scenario and what happened in this case. We agree with the district court that Vokal's actions did not violate § 49-14,101.02. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision reversing the Commission's judgment. We do not explicitly reach Vokal's contention that the district court erred in failing to find § 49-14,101.02 unconstitutional. Not only would it be unnecessary to our disposition of this appeal, but Vokal also failed to properly set forth any assignment of error in his cross-appeal. A party filing a cross-appeal must set forth a separate division of the brief prepared in the same manner and under the same rules as the brief of appellant. [16] Thus, the cross-appeal section must set forth a separate title page, a table of contents, a statement of the case, assigned errors, propositions of law, and a statement of facts. [17] In this case, Vokal's separate section entitled Brief on Cross-Appeal contains nothing more than an argument section. We have repeatedly said that errors argued but not assigned will not be considered on appeal. [18] Parties wishing to secure appellate review of their claims for relief must be aware of, and abide by, the rules of this court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals in presenting such claims. [19]