Opinion ID: 2827103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fourth Amendment applies

Text: Officer Emmi argues that the district court mistakenly applied the Fourth Amendment’s objective use of force standard to this case rather than the Fourteenth Amendment’s subjective use of force standard. Following the parties’ briefing on appeal, the Supreme Court rendered this issue purely academic in Kingsley v. Hendrickson by holding that a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is subject to the same objective standard as an excessive force claim brought under the Fourth Amendment. 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). In light of Kingsley, under either amendment, the court would employ the same objective test for excessive force. Id. at 2472-73. The district court’s application of the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, moreover, is warranted based on the facts in this record. The Fourth Amendment applies to the seizure of individuals due to mental health concerns, Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777, 783-84 (6th Cir. 2008), and to excessive force claims alleged within the context of that seizure, Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1104 (6th Cir. 1997). As with pretrial detainees, once a plaintiff finds himself in ongoing state custody after an initial mental health seizure, his excessive force claims generally1 fall under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment. Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 2008). Here, there is no indication that Clay was seized before he refused to put on the dressing gown because he voluntarily rode to the hospital to “talk to somebody” and was not restrained. Citing our decision in Lanman, 529 F.3d at 683, Officer Emmi argues that even though Clay went to the hospital voluntarily, the Fourteenth Amendment must apply because this court has applied it to both voluntary and involuntary committal cases. But the Lanman plaintiff was 1 Lanman contemplates exceptions that are not applicable here. 529 F.3d at 681. No. 14-2351 Clay v. Emmi, et al. Page 7 forcibly restrained after voluntarily committing himself by filling out the hospital’s Adult Formal Voluntary Admission Application, which—as the opinion noted—enabled the hospital to keep him in custody for three days after he gave notice of his desire to leave. Id. at 677, 683. This three-day period was central to the court’s holding. Id. at 683. Clay never signed such form, so the three-day holding provision was not in effect here. Officer Emmi also argues that he took Clay into custody under a Michigan Mental Health Code provision that permits peace officers to place individuals who reasonably appear to require mental health treatment in protective custody and transfer them to a hospital for screening by a medical professional. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.1427. But the record does not show that Officer Emmi had actually taken Clay into custody before the incident at the hospital, given that the statute requires a peace officer who exercises this authority to inform the person being seized that he is being held in protective custody and is not under arrest. Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.1427a. Nothing in the record suggests that Emmi made any such statement to Clay. Clay simply agreed to accompany the paramedics to the hospital. Officer Emmi’s police report indicates that he eventually filled out the application for an involuntary commitment of Clay, but it appears this was done after Emmi deployed the Taser on Clay. Here, the facts support the district court’s conclusion that the seizure occurred in the hospital after Clay refused to change clothes, and it is therefore the Fourth Amendment that applies. C. Officer Emmi’s failure to concede genuine issues of material fact Under the Fourth Amendment—and since Kingsley, also the Fourteenth Amendment— the test for whether officers’ use of force violated the Constitution is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Among the factors to be considered are whether the person being seized “poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others” and “whether he is actively resisting.” Id. at 396. No. 14-2351 Clay v. Emmi, et al. Page 8 Clay’s level of resistance and whether he was handcuffed before being tasered—the facts Officer Emmi refuses to concede—are central to this inquiry. Emmi acknowledges that Clay “suggests” he stopped resisting before being tasered, but argues that Clay’s testimony should not be credited due to his mental illness and drug use, and the contrary testimony of others on the scene. In doing so, Officer Emmi misconstrues Scott. There, based on a police videotape depicting the events at issue, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment (due to a genuine dispute of material fact) because the plaintiff’s “version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.” 550 U.S. at 380. Here, however, Officer Emmi’s arguments transgress the well-recognized standard of Rule 56, that “at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Decisions on the credibility of a witness or the proper weight to be given to evidence are reserved to the trier of fact. The district court correctly determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the level of force the officers used and the level of resistance offered by Clay. Though Clay indicated that he has some memory problems, both Clay and other witnesses recall that Clay called Easter Seals, was on the floor of the van when Officer Emmi arrived, voluntarily rode to the hospital, refused to put on gown that was given to him, and was eventually physically restrained. Clay’s steadfast recollection that he was handcuffed before being tasered is not “so utterly discredited by the record” as to be rendered a “visible fiction,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81, simply because other witnesses testified to the contrary. Rather, the existence of these differing accounts of material facts supports the district court’s conclusion: Officer Emmi was not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage because these factual disputes must be resolved by a jury. We lack jurisdiction to resolve them and refuse to usurp the place of the jury by weighing the witnesses’ relative credibility here.