Opinion ID: 2524514
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were Shaw's injuries caused by accident?

Text: At the outset Shaw argues that her injuries were caused by accident, noting that an intentional event may nonetheless be an accident within the policy language if it is both unexpected and unintended by the injured party: [I]n analyzing whether a particular incident is an accident for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, the courts should view the incident from the injured party's perspective. Thus if the event causing the injury is unintended and unexpected from the injured party's viewpoint, the injury is deemed to have occurred as a result of an accident. [5] State Farm does not take issue with this principle, or even mention it on appeal. In the superior court State Farm adverted to this principle, but explicitly declined to contest it. We agree with Shaw on this point. What counts as an accident is not defined by Shaw's insurance policy. When the language of a policy provides no guidance in the definition of its terms, we may determine the policy's meaning by examining case law interpreting similar provisions. [6] We have previously defined the term `accident' as `anything that begins to be, that happens, or that is a result which is not anticipated and is unforeseen and unexpected.'  [7] Further, we have held that whether an occurrence is unanticipated, unforeseen, and unexpected is to be determined from the perspective of the insured. [8] Shaw, of course, was the insured under her State Farm policy. State Farm has not contested Shaw's assertion that [t]he shooting was completely unexpected, and that until she saw the gun in Murphy's hand she had [no] indication of any kind that [he] would shoot [her]. Accordingly, Shaw's injuries were caused by accident. We would need to say no more were it not for an apparent conflict between our holding here and one of our statements in a recently decided case, Kim v. National Indemnity Co. [9] In Kim, we briefly addressed the question of whether a minor who had been sexually assaulted by a cab driver was entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of the cab driver's insurance policy. [10] We first held that the cab driver was not covered by his general insurance agreement, which restricted coverage to injuries caused by accidentbecause the driver's abuse of the minor was intentional, not accidental. [11] We further held that the uninsured motorist provision does not cover [the minor] L.W.'s injury for the same reasons that the general insuring agreement does not: L.W.'s injury did not result from an `accident.'  [12] Under the general insurance agreement, however, it was the cab driver who was the insured; under the uninsured motorist provision, by contrast, it was the minor passenger who was the insured. Because the intentional assault was not expected by the victim, what was not an accident from the perspective of the insured cab driver could still have been an accident from the perspective of the insured minor. To the extent that our statement in Kim suggests otherwise, it is overruled. The result in Kim was correct based on the briefing in that case. In arguing that the minor's injuries should be covered under the uninsured motorist provision, the appellant in Kim argued that if liability coverage would have been provided under the general insurance agreement but for the presence of a separate abuse and molestation exclusion, then coverage should still be provided under the uninsured motorist provision because the abuse and molestation exclusion did not apply to that provision and public policy would not bar such a result for the molester would not benefit. Our holding that liability coverage would not be provided under the general insurance agreement (regardless of the abuse and molestation exclusion), [13] however, defeated the appellant's conditional argument for coverage under the uninsured motorist provision. Because the appellant in Kim did not argue that the abuse could have been an accident from the minor's perspective even though it was not an accident from the tortfeasor's perspective, he abandoned that point on appeal. [14]