Opinion ID: 1334245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whistleblower suit

Text: Circuit Court granted summary judgment in the Whistleblower action, finding that (1) Belton was terminated on March 2, 1988, prior to the effective date of the Whistleblower Act, (2) that Belton's conduct was not within the scope of the Act and (3) that the State Employee Grievance Committee's Order was res judicata as to Belton's termination. We disagree. The Whistleblower Act became effective March 14, 1988. Circuit Court found that Belton's termination occurred on March 2, 1988, precluding application of the Act. However, we find a genuine issue of material fact as to the effective date of Belton's termination. In her grievance to the State Employee Grievance Committee, Belton asserted that she did not receive notice of Authority's final decision until April 1, 1988. Indeed, a memorandum from Authority indicates April 13, 1988, as the date of its concurrence in Belton's dismissal. Moreover, assuming that Belton was terminated prior to the effective date of the Act, she claims, and the record reveals, various instances of retaliation occurring subsequent to her reinstatement. Clearly, there is evidence from which a jury could find Belton was disciplined subsequent to the effective date of the Act. [4] Prior to its amendment, the Whistleblower Statute, § 8-27-20 (Supp.1992) provided: No public body may discharge, otherwise terminate, or suspend from employment, demote, decrease the compensation of, discipline, otherwise punish, or threaten any employee of a public body whenever the employee reports a violation of any state or federal law or regulation which involves a public body or any employee or official of a public body or whenever the employee exposes governmental criminality, corruption, waste, fraud, gross negligence, or mismanagement or testifies as a witness in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding involving any of the matters described in this section.... (Emphasis supplied). [5] Belton claims that she was terminated for reporting a violation of federal wage and hour laws to DHRM and that she was retaliated against for having testified at a hearing before the Grievance Committee. Clearly, these allegations are sufficient to bring her within the scope of the Act prior to its amendment. Finally, we hold that the Grievance Committee's findings are not res judicata to Belton's Whistleblower claim. [6] Here, Belton prevailed in her action before the Grievance Committee, at which the issue of retaliation was not addressed. Accordingly, we find that Belton is entitled to litigate the issue, and may offer the findings of the Grievance Committee in support of her claim. Cf. Bennett v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 305 S.C. 310, 408 S.E.2d 230 (1991).