Opinion ID: 3014846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: UTPCPL Claims

Text: The District Court and Met Life also contend that appellants’ UTPCPL claims are barred by the statute of limitations, for much the same reason. The District Court reasoned that the appellants failed to exercise reasonable diligence in reviewing their policies and therefore could not be considered to have reasonably relied on Met Life’s representations about the nature of the policy. In Tran we dealt with similar UTPCPL claims to those in the instant cases and we find its reasoning controlling. There, we held that a policyholder’s reliance on agent representations about the nature of the policy, even where the plain language of the policy is contradictory, creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether the reliance was justified. Tran, 408 F.3d at 130. Moreover, in Tran we concluded that an insured’s failure to read the policy does not, as a matter of law, preclude a fraud claim because 5. We note that at the time of the District Court’s opinion, we had not decided either Tran or Dilworth. 8 Pennsylvania does not impose a duty to read insurance policies where fraud is alleged. Id. at 139 n.11.6 Acting without the benefit of our decision in Tran, the District Court here held that the policyholders’ failure to read the policy constituted, as a matter of law, grounds for dismissal of the UTPCPL fraud claim because the plain language contradicted the alleged misrepresentations and the appellants failed to read their policies.7 In Tran, we recognized that this presumption would allow insurers to defeat the reasonable expectations of policyholders by representing one thing and then doing another. We therefore held that it is not, as a matter of law, unreasonable for policyholders to rely on representations made by insurance agents rather than on the actual provisions of the policy. In the instant cases, the policyholders all relied on alleged misrepresentations made by a Met Life agent concerning a vanishing premium life insurance policy. The District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Met Life is premised on the appellants’ failure to read the actual policy. It therefore failed to consider that the alleged misrepresentations by a Met Life agent about the nature of the 6. It is important to note that even if Pennsylvania were to impose such a duty, the language contained in this type of vanishing premium policy would not suffice, as a matter of law, to defeat appellants’ claims that they reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations. 7. As we have indicated above, the District Court’s conclusion that the plain language of these policies contradicts the alleged representations, in light of Dilworth, is erroneous. 9 insurance policy creates a genuine issue of fact concerning the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s expectations of the nature of the policy. Thus, at least with respect to vanishing premium policies, where a policyholder alleges reliance on representations made by an insurer or insurer’s agent, summary judgment is an inappropriate mechanism if it is based on the policyholder’s failure to read the actual policy. As we stated in Dilworth, we recognize that at trial a policyholder may be unable to prove that his reasonable expectations differed from the provisions of the policy, but, at minimum, that policyholder is entitled to try. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 10