Opinion ID: 2830587
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whoever travels in interstate or foreign

Text: commerce or uses the mail or any facility in in‐ terstate or foreign commerce, with intent to—
lawful activity; or
ther any unlawful activity; or
lish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to per‐ form— (A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under this ti‐ tle, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or (B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this title, im‐ 18 See United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 317 n.29 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting “that it is appropriate to interpret § 1958 in light of § 1952 given that the two sections employ similar language, and that § 1958 was intended to supplement § 1952”); S. Rep. No. 98‐225, at 306 (1984), as re‐ printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3485 (noting that § 1958 “follows the format” of the Travel Act). No. 14‐2799 15 prisoned for not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 1952. A Travel Act violation consists of three basic elements: (1) traveling in, or using a facility of, inter‐ state or foreign commerce, (2) with the intent to commit a specified unlawful act, and (3) thereafter performing or at‐ tempting to perform that act. See United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 715 (7th Cir. 1982). Notably, unlike the Travel Act, § 1958 contains no re‐ quirement that a defendant carry out or otherwise attempt to accomplish his criminal intent. That is, it contains no explicit requirement that a defendant actually enter into a murder‐ for‐hire agreement. Because § 1958 was modeled on the Travel Act, this omission is significant. “It is generally pre‐ sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully when it includes particular language in one section of a stat‐ ute but omits it in another.” City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, this omission suggests that Congress intended for § 1958 to require only that a defendant travel in, or use a facility of, interstate commerce with the requisite criminal intent. This understanding of the statute accords with its legislative history, which indicates that “[t]he gist of the offense is the travel in interstate commerce or the use of the facilities of interstate commerce or of the mails with the requisite intent … .” S. Rep. No. 98‐225, at 306 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3485. Despite the clear import of the statute’s text and history, Mr. Dvorkin nonetheless contends that our previous cases 16 No. 14‐2799 require a different result. He points to our decisions in Riche‐ son and United States v. Gibson, 530 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2008), which, he asserts, interpret the word “consideration” in § 1958 as requiring proof that “the solicitor and the murder‐ er” reached “a promise or agreement.”19 Those decisions, however, do not require proof of a separate agreement ele‐ ment (i.e., that an offer was made or accepted), but rather merely clarify the meaning of “consideration” within the context of § 1958’s intent element. See Gibson, 530 F.3d at 609 (“The issues Gibson raises involve the meaning of ‘consider‐ ation for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value.’”); Richeson, 338 F.3d at 657, 659 (addressing the defendant’s “argu[ment] that the government never established his intent to pay for the murders” and concluding that the “evidence plainly re‐ veal[ed his] intent to compensate his coconspirators”). In neither case did we squarely face, or decide, whether § 1958 requires as an element that the defendant actually enter into a murder‐for‐hire agreement. Similarly, although we stated in United States v. Mandel, 647 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011), that § 1958 requires proof that “something of pecuniary value was promised or agreed to be paid in consideration of the murder,” that statement clearly was dictum and was not central to our holding, which merely addressed whether the defendant “was entrapped into using a facility of interstate commerce in furtherance of [a murder‐for‐hire] plot.”20 Id. at 19 Appellant’s Br. 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Indeed, Mandel’s citation to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Preacher makes clear that we intended no disagreement with that court’s holding that § 1958 requires only the use of an interstate commerce facility with (continued…) No. 14‐2799 17 717, 719. In sum, a close reading of our previous cases makes clear that we never have had the occasion to address square‐ ly this precise issue.21 (…continued) the necessary intent. See 647 F.3d at 717 (citing United States v. Preacher, 631 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2011)); see also id. at 716 (noting, in dicta, that “what section 1958 prohibits is the use of a facility of interstate commerce … with the intent to commit a murder for hire”). 21 We note that the Second Circuit previously has made statements which could be construed as inconsistent with the position we take here today. See United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The federal murder‐for‐hire statute proscribes a very limited category of be‐ havior; only those instances in which one party agrees to commit a mur‐ der in exchange for another party’s provision (or future promise) of payment are punishable under § 1958.” (quoting United States v. Framp‐ ton, 382 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004))). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit’s stance on this issue is not entirely clear. Although both Hardwick and Frampton seem to indicate that § 1958 requires proof of an actual murder‐ for‐hire agreement, neither case squarely addresses that issue. Rather, the disputed question in both cases was whether a given item or service qualified as something of “pecuniary value” under § 1958. See Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 101 (addressing whether the defendant “intended the gun he provided Trujillo to serve as consideration … for Trujillo’s promise to murder the intended victim”); Frampton, 382 F.3d at 217–19 (addressing whether an “unspecified future ‘favor’” could qualify as something of “pecuniary value”). Further, both cases at times appear to recognize that the statute’s reference to consideration merely modifies the type of intent which a defendant must possess (i.e., the intent that a murder for hire be committed). See Hardwick, 523 F.3d at 99 (reviewing whether the defend‐ ant “intended the gun he provided [a hitman] to serve as considera‐ tion”); Frampton, 382 F.3d at 218 (noting that “the relevant inquiry [was] whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that [the defendants] intended that [a] murder … take place in exchange for the provision of, or a promise to pay, anything of pecuniary value” (emphasis added)). Un‐ (continued…) 18 No. 14‐2799 Given the text and history of the statute, we now hold squarely that § 1958 does not require proof of an actual murder‐for‐hire agreement, but rather only that the defend‐ ant act with the intent that a murder for hire be committed. Because the Government was not required to prove the ex‐ istence of such an agreement, Mr. Dvorkin’s sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.