Opinion ID: 2074738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Prior Statements

Text: There are three instances in which the trial court ruled testimony by witnesses relating to prior statements by appellant inadmissible because of their self-serving nature. [17] The statements were made by appellant between the time of the assault by the deceased on appellant's wife and the shooting incident. Appellant argues that the statements were admissible to show his state of mind at that time. The question objected to was as follows: Q: [Mr. Kleinbart] Now when we discussed this incident, ma'am [Johnsie Sturdivant], what did I say to you? Although the objection was sustained, later the following testimony was advanced: Q: What if anything occurred then?       The Witness: The conversation we had, you said you wanted to see him [Bennett]. You didn't want no trouble. You wanted to find out why he smacked your wife. Apparently this was the state of mind which appellant desired to bring before the jury. Thus, he would have argued that he was not looking for trouble and was therefore not the aggressor in the situation. The other possibility, which is more likely, is that appellant sought to introduce evidence that his state of mind toward the deceased, prior to the shooting, was one of fear and therefore it was unlikely that he was the aggressor. There are problems with either argument. It is undisputed by appellant that he fired the first shot at the deceased, although he claims that he purposely aimed over the victim's head. He argues, however, that he shot the victim in self-defense, intending to hit him with the second shot he fired. The pertinent inquiry, then, is appellant's state of mind immediately prior to the actual killing, or the time period between the two shots which were fired. Even if we accept appellant's proposition that he was not the aggressor, the question which was before the jury was whether appellant acted reasonably in his killing Bennett in so-called self-defense. The standard to be applied is an objective one, and appellant's state of mind several days prior to the actual confrontation is irrelevant. We therefore find that the self-serving hearsay statements were properly excluded on the basis of irrelevance. Appellant has misperceived the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, which permits admission of extrajudicial statements that reflect the declarant's state of mind when such is an issue in the case. The initial inquiry is one of relative relevance, requiring a balancing of the need for such evidence against the danger of prejudice. Rink v. United States, D.C.App., 388 A.2d 52, 57 (1978); United States v. Brown, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 190, 194, 490 F.2d 758, 762 (1973) (as amended in 1974); See Campbell v. United States, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 283, 287 (1978). We need not go so far in this case as to balance, since we find there was no manifest need for evidence that was unrelated to a material issue in the case.