Opinion ID: 2325510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claps Matter

Text: This matter arose out of a matrimonial proceeding, Grazioso v. Grazioso. In that proceeding, Claps represented Mr. Grazioso and respondent represented Mrs. Grazioso. The proceeding was contested throughout, and a trial was held in November 1977. At the conclusion of the trial, both attorneys sought counsel fees and affidavits were submitted to the Court. Judge Ashbey, the trial judge, would not accept respondent's affidavit due to improper form and gave respondent an opportunity to submit a second affidavit in proper form. Judge Ashbey rendered her decision on or about November 7, 1977 but reserved judgment on the issue of counsel fees due to the problem with respondent's affidavit. In late December 1977, respondent did submit his revised affidavit, which was received by Judge Ashbey's office on December 22, 1977. On December 22, 1977, prior to receipt of said affidavit, Mr. Claps wrote to respondent and again requested the Judgment of Divorce. The letters crossed in the mail, and on December 23, 1977, Mr. Claps did receive a proposed form of judgment. He made certain revisions to the form, affixed his consent, and returned the document to respondent on December 27, 1977. The document, at that time, did not have any provision for counsel fees. Mr. Claps heard nothing further from either Judge Ashbey or respondent. Finally, on February 8, 1978, he wrote to respondent inquiring as to the status of the matter. On February 15, 1978, he received a copy of the signed judgment from respondent. Its form had been revised and a clause had been added awarding $750 to respondent for counsel fees. Mr. Claps was never notified of this addition, objected to it, and strongly objected to the revision of a document to which he had previously consented. Respondent admitted that he added the clause and Judge Ashbey's secretary testified that Judge Ashbey had written in the sum of $750. In his pleadings, and in his initial testimony, respondent asserted that he forwarded the form of judgment to Judge Ashbey, was told to add the clause pertaining to counsel fees, received the form back in the mail, revised it, and then returned it to Judge Ashbey. However, no correspondence was presented to support this chain of events and the judge's secretary testified that it could not have occurred. If a clause was to be added to a document submitted to Judge Ashbey, she would add it and would not return it to the attorney for revision. Thereafter, respondent revised his testimony. He acknowledged that he may have added the clause initially and then forwarded the form to Judge Ashbey. In either event, he said he sent the form of judgment on January 26, 1978 and stated in his covering letter that he was including a paragraph relating to the award of counsel fees. This letter of January 26 does show a carbon copy to Mr. Claps, but Mr. Claps denied that he ever received same. The Committee believed that Mr. Claps did not receive a copy of the January 26 letter. His letter of February 8 would have been unnecessary if he had. On the other hand, the Committee could not determine whether a carbon copy of the January 26 letter was actually mailed by respondent's office to Mr. Claps. Respondent was given the benefit of the doubt in this regard by the Committee. The Committee found that the events, as detailed above, constituted improper conduct by respondent. He admitted altering a document that had been previously consented to by another attorney, that he never contacted that attorney regarding the revision, that he certainly never asked the attorney for his consent to this revision, and that he may not have even notified him of it prior to presentation of the document to the Court. Moreover, the document as presented to Judge Ashbey indicated that Mr. Claps did consent to some counsel fee for respondent, a misrepresentation at best. The Committee concluded that respondent did not act in the best interests of the legal profession and his conduct reflects adversely on the practice of law and violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (4), (5) and (6). We agree. DR 1-102(A)(4) makes clear that misrepresentation is unprofessional conduct. Under these circumstances, whether due to clerical mishap or not, a fact was misrepresented to the court that was unwarranted. Upon an independent review of the record, the Court is satisfied that the conclusions of the Committee in finding unethical conduct in the five matters are fully supported by clear and convincing proof. We do not agree with the Board, however, that respondent's behavior warrants his disbarment. Aside from the Muller matter, respondent's breaches of professional standards were not undertaken for the purpose of self-enrichment. Comparable instances of professional misconduct have resulted in sanctions less severe than disbarment: In re Gallop, supra, 85 N.J. 317; In re Mocco, supra, 75 N.J. 313; In re Conti, supra, 75 N.J. 114; In re Surgent, supra, 79 N.J. 529; In re Dworkin, supra, 16 N.J. 455. Taken together, respondent's conduct reflects an insensitivity to the degree of professionalism expected of every member of the bar. His written presentation to the Court, attributing his problems to the animus of the District Committee, demonstrates a lack of recognition of the high standards of responsibility required of every member of the profession. In mitigation, it should be noted that respondent has been under stress due to the breakup of his marriage and has left his practice to reside in Connecticut. He is currently under medical treatment. Under all the circumstances, we conclude that the appropriate discipline is to suspend respondent for three years and until he submits medical proof that he is capable of practicing law. We further direct that respondent reimburse the Administrative Office for costs. For suspension  Justices PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK and O'HERN  6. Opposed  None.