Opinion ID: 1864367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court should have granted kitchens' motion for ummary judgment on the excess judgment or its pre-emptory instruction.

Text: This Court assumes that the peremptory instruction to which this assignment refers is the one denied by the trial court after the close of Kitchens Inc.'s case in chief. The trial court should not have granted a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff when all it had before it is the plaintiff's case in chief. The peremptory instruction was correctly denied regardless of the nature of the evidence. The appellant next argues for summary judgment. Summary judgments may be granted pursuant to Miss.R.Civ.P. 56. The applicable standard of review of a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is as follows: The trial court must review carefully all of the evidentiary matters before it  admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If in this view the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise the motion should be denied. Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says just the opposite. Issues of fact, as a matter of proper construction of Rule 56, also exist where there is more than one reasonable interpretation that may be given undisputed testimony, where materially differing but nevertheless reasonable inferences may be drawn from the uncontradicted facts, or where the purported establishment of the facts has been sufficiently incomplete or inadequate that the trial judge cannot say with reasonable confidence that the full facts of the matter have been disclosed. Dennis v. Searle, 457 So.2d 941, 944 (Miss. 1984) (citations omitted). In an ordinary bad faith case, the trial court must determine first, as a matter of law, whether the issue of punitive damages on account of alleged bad faith should be submitted to a jury. Cossitt v. Federated Guaranty Mutual Insurance Co., 541 So.2d 436, 443 (Miss. 1989). [I]f an insurance company has a legitimate or arguable reason for denying a claim, then such will utterly preclude the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Pioneer Life Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Moss, 513 So.2d 927, 930 (Miss. 1987). The lack of a legitimate reason does not mean that the issue of punitive damages will automatically go to the jury. In the absence of an arguable reason for denying a claim, there is a jury issue as to the insurer's having committed a willful or malicious wrong, or acted with gross or reckless disregard for the insured's rights. If not, the question of punitive damages should not go to the jury. Pioneer Life, 513 So.2d at 930. In this case, the trial court found that MIGA could not be liable for punitive damages in any case. In reaching this decision the trial relied on Isaacson v. California Insurance Guaranty Association, 193 Cal. App.3d 93, 215 Cal. Rptr. 652 (2 Dist. 1985). Although this decision has been superseded by Isaacson v. California Insurance Guaranty Association, 44 Cal.3d 775, 244 Cal. Rptr. 655, 750 P.2d 297 (Cal. 1988), the latter decision affirmed the denial of punitive damages without mentioning them or providing any rationale for doing so. In the original decision, the court gave the following reasons for its decision: [W]e accept respondent's argument that CIGA's nature as a legislative creation designed to protect the public from the insolvency of insurers, with definite limitations on the payments of covered claims, negates the rationale for imposition of punitive damages on CIGA. As this division recently stated in Magallanes v. Superior Court (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 878, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547, denying punitive damages in a case based on the market share theory of liability, `The concept of punitive damages embodies a rule for individualized punishment of a wrongdoer whose conduct toward the plaintiff is particularly outrageous.' (Emphasis in original.) Aside from the difficulty of assessing CIGA's net worth, upon which the recovery of punitive damages is usually based, we are confronted with the nature of CIGA as an association of certain insurers (Ins.Code, § 1063), funded by premium payments from its member insurers (Ins.Code, § 1063.5), which ultimately receive their funding from the insured public. Imposing punitive damages on an individual insurer makes sense; presumably, its premiums will rise and its customers will seek coverage from insurers with lower premiums. The impact on the insured public in such a case is not counter to the punitive and deterrent purposes sought to be achieved by the imposition of punitive damages. However, if punitive damages are imposed on CIGA, the increased premiums would be spread among all insurers, and ultimately to all insureds, regardless of the culpability of the individual insurer. There might indeed be a deterrent effect on CIGA; but compensatory damages will achieve that effect, without the possible devastating effect on the public. Appellants are not entitled to recover punitive damages against CIGA. Isaacson, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 666-667. This rationale is applicable in this case, in that the portion of the summary judgment ruling denying punitive damages is correct. We find that as a matter of law, MIGA cannot be liable for punitive damages. As to whether MIGA acted in bad faith as a matter of law, the trial court was correct in its finding. In this case there was contradictory testimony, and undisputed facts and testimony from which multiple interpretations could be drawn. Also, at the time the summary judgment motion was ruled on, there had not been an opportunity for full development of the facts. This Court recently stated that [w]here evidence is produced either of bad faith or negligence, ordinarily the issue becomes one for the jury. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So.2d 255 (Miss. 1988). This matter contained multiple genuine issues of material fact, and the trial court's denial of summary judgment was correct.