Opinion ID: 1221649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: false imprisonment issues

Text: Appellant argues that summary judgment in favor of the Springhaven appellees on her claim of false imprisonment was inappropriate. Her contentions can be summarized in four points: (1) That her detention for two hours while the involuntary commitment petition was being processed is not justifiable restraint and is actionable; (2) that the probable cause hearing, being unlawful, provides appellees no protection and is not res judicata as to her mental condition at the time; (3) that once Doctor Robertson reversed his judgment and prepared his progress note, the remaining appellees are liable for her continued detention and transfer to BAR-H under physical restraints; and (4) that the mental hygiene commissioner did not order her further detention at the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, and the Springhaven appellees had no authority to cause her further detention, physical restraint, transportation, and admission to BAR-H. The Springhaven appellees respond that their initial detention of appellant was clearly justified by the statutory plan for involuntary commitments and judicial process, that appellant's initial detention was justified to enable the judicial process to commence, that the probable cause determination justified appellant's continued detention in good faith compliance with judicial orders, and that the Springhaven appellees enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for their efforts to give effect to the decision of the mental hygiene commissioner. The Springhaven appellees contend that their initial detention of appellant was justified by her upset condition and that the finding in the probable cause hearingthat by reason of mental illness appellant was a danger to herself or othersforecloses further inquiry into the propriety of her detention after that time. We turn first to a review of authorities on false imprisonment. This Court has said that the gist of the action for false imprisonment is illegal detention of a person without lawful process or by an unlawful execution of such process. Vorholt v. Vorholt, 111 W.Va. 196, 160 S.E. 916 (1931); Finney v. Zingale, 82 W.Va. 422, 95 S.E. 1046 (1918). In Vorholt, a lunacy proceeding was brought in Kanawha County. Under the procedure then in place, the defendant procured a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff for the purpose of having the lunacy commission inquire into the sanity of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was arrested, and a hearing was held. The plaintiff was released when he was determined sane by the commission. Thereafter, he brought an action alleging both false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the latter count alleging that the defendant had a malicious purpose in procuring the warrant and arrest of the plaintiff. This Court affirmed the dismissal below of the false imprisonment count, because the arrest and detention occurred pursuant to lawful process, but reversed the dismissal of a malicious prosecution count otherwise properly pleaded, since it averred that the procuring of the warrant and arrest was achieved for a malicious purpose. In its opinion, the Court adopted the following definition of the distinction between the two actions: An action for false imprisonment may be maintained where the imprisonment is without legal authority. But, where there is a valid or apparently valid power to arrest, the remedy is by an action for malicious prosecution. The want of lawful authority is an essential element in an action for false imprisonment. Malice and want of probable cause are the essentials in an action for malicious prosecution. Vorholt v. Vorholt, 111 W.Va. at 199, 160 S.E. at 918 (citing Roberts v. Thomas, 135 Ky. 63, 121 S.W. 961, 962 (1909)). However, not every order or warrant for arrest, even though apparently valid on its face, will insulate those who instigate the issuance of the warrant from an action for false imprisonment resulting from the execution of the warrant. In Ogg v. Murdock, 25 W.Va. 139 (1884), a defendant's lawyer procured a warrant for the arrest of a debtor. The warrant was regular on its face and was issued under the authority of a statute authorizing the arrest of a debtor under certain circumstances. The defendant was held liable for false imprisonment when it was shown that, although the statute authorized the issuance of the warrant, there was no suit pending against the debtor at the time the warrant was issued, and, in the absence of a pending suit, the statute did not operate to authorize the issuance of the warrant. Also, in Williamson v. Glen Alum Coal Co., 72 W.Va. 288, 78 S.E. 94 (1913), a coal company which arrested and procured the trial of a man for a misdemeanor, for conduct which did not constitute any crime, was held liable for false imprisonment resulting from the arrest and the trial, even though the judicial officer, a justice of the peace, who conducted the trial, was a duly constituted public officer entitled to arrest and try accused persons for a misdemeanor without a warrant. More recently, in Winters v. Campbell, 148 W.Va. 710, 137 S.E.2d 188 (1964), a party who instigated an arrest under a Mary Doe warrant issued by a justice of the peace that did not contain a legally sufficient description of the alleged defendant was held liable for false imprisonment. With the principles enunciated in these cases in mind, we look first to the claim of the Springhaven appellees that their early detention of appellant, from the time of her arrival at the BMU, was justified. The evidence available in the record suggests that, upon arrival at the BMU, appellant was extremely upset and that appellees feared for her safety and were even concerned that she might do harm to others in the psychiatric unit. We note that there is no material dispute of the facts regarding appellant's apparent state of mind and general condition when she arrived at the BMU, and we regard the few divergences in the testimony before us as inconsequential. In those circumstances, the doctrine of justification is applicable. The common law has long provided justification for the temporary and reasonable restraints of insane persons, even without legal proceedings, when they are dangerous to themselves or others. 32 Am.Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 72 (1995). Accordingly, the early detention of appellant, to protect her from harm and prevent harm to others and to prepare, properly document, and file a petition for involuntary commitment, can be seen as acts taken in good faith and for good reason, all fully justified in law. Difficulty arises at the point where the Springhaven appellees Armstrong and Nolley proceeded to inform Doctor Robertson of the situation and take from him a certificate representing that Doctor Robertson had examined appellant. The Springhaven appellees contend that since everything they did from that time to the time of appellant's release from BAR-H under a writ of habeas corpus was done in aid of the involuntary commitment procedure set forth by statute, they are immune from damages as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. They rely on the filing of the initial petition for involuntary commitment, the issuance by the circuit court of its order directing the Sheriff of Mercer County to take appellant into custody, the probable cause hearing, and the finding by the mental hygiene commissioner of probable cause to believe that appellant was likely to harm herself or others by reason of mental illness. To address the issues thus raised, we must consider the law of quasi-judicial immunity or privilege in relation to involuntary commitment proceedings. Our discussion will necessarily touch on the potential liability of Doctor Robertson to the charge of negligence under another count in appellant's complaint below. We will discuss that count more fully later in this opinion, noting here only that appellant did not charge Doctor Robertson under the false imprisonment count. The defense of quasi-judicial immunity has been described as follows: An exemption similar to that of judges from personal liability for their judicial acts is extended to officers in the other departments of government whenever they are entrusted with the exercise of discretionary power and their determinations or decisions are, by their nature judicial.... This immunity exists only where the officer has jurisdiction of the particular case and is authorized to determine it; if the officer transcends the limits of authority the officer ceases, in the particular case, to act as judge, and is responsible for all the consequences.... 32 Am.Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 109 (1995) (footnotes omitted). There is a view, suggested by the cases collected by R.F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for False Imprisonment Predicated Upon Institution of, or Conduct in Connection with, Insanity Proceedings, 30 A.L.R 3d 523, 536 (1970 & Supp.), that [e]xamining physicians who testify or otherwise give evidence in proceedings to determine sanity [are] ... immune from liability for false imprisonment... and applying that principle even where the physician failed to follow statutory directions or made false statements. The cases supporting that view appear to rest on the theory that, as necessary participants in the commitment procedure, the physicians are judicial officers and are therefore immune. In a few cases cited and others decided more recently, that view has been applied in cases involving a failure to follow statutory directions. Without exhaustively reviewing those cases, we touch on three. In Hurley v. Towne, 155 Me. 433, 156 A.2d 377 (1959), the physician, as in this case, falsely certified without in fact examining the plaintiff. The court upheld immunity for the physician, although it is noted that the actual incarceration occurred on an order entered by the hearing tribunal. In Niven v. Boland, 177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E. 282 (1900), the court reached the same result, emphasizing the quasi-judicial nature of the physician's certificate, even though it was false. In Carter v. Landy, 163 Ga.App. 509, 295 S.E.2d 177 (1982), the statute required a physician's examination, but the physician merely observed the person. On the facts of that case, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the doctor in a false imprisonment case, saying that the issue presented was to be determined on medical standards, not legal ones. In Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga.App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986), the Georgia court overruled the medical standards test, saying: [T]o the extent that Carter v. Landy, supra, could be construed as establishing a medical negligence standard for determining the unlawfulness of an involuntary detention pursuant to OCGA § 37-3-40 et seq., it must be overruled. We hold the following to be the applicable legal principles: Where one is taken into custody pursuant to a procedurally valid certificate of a physician authorizing involuntary mental treatment, the resulting detention is not unlawful. Although such detention may give rise to other claims, a cause of action for false imprisonment is not among them. Where one is held in custody pursuant to a void or defective physician's certificate, there is a viable claim for false imprisonment, but only if the certificate was not issued in good faith. Where ... the detention is not evidenced by some form of objective compliance by the physician with all applicable procedural process requirements, there is a viable claim for false imprisonment. Id. at 716, 348 S.E.2d at 54 (emphasis in original). Williams v. Smith , with its reliance on good faith, appears to be in accord with the more modern view expressed in 32 Am. Jur.2d, False Imprisonment § 115 (1995), where a distinction is drawn between cases in which a physician has falsely certified that an examination has been conducted and cases where the examination is faulty or inadequate. The emerging general rule seems to suggest that all such cases turn on their respective merits and that recovery can be had on a false certificate but will usually be denied on the basis of immunity or privilege grounds where the examination is simply faulty or inadequate. In McLean v. Sale, 38 N.C.App. 520, 248 S.E.2d 372 (1978), a summary judgment in favor of the physician was reversed and the cause remanded for trial in a false imprisonment case. The court said a material issue of fact existed as to whether the doctor intentionally or negligently violated his duty to make an examination before signing a certificate of commitment and that any such violation is not covered by immunity. In Sukeforth v. Thegen, 256 A.2d 162 (Me.1969), the court held squarely that a certification that a physician has made an examination in a mental hygiene proceeding, when none has been made, is false imprisonment. However, the court recited that observation in lieu of examination would meet the statutory requirement, where the condition and actions of the ill person prevented a full fledged examination. A similar result obtained in Delatte v. Genovese, 228 So.2d 252 (La.App.1969). Fair Oaks Hospital v. Pocrass, 266 N.J.Super. 140, 628 A.2d 829 (1993), confronts the issue of immunity for physician misconduct in a case where the commitment statute was not followed but no false certificate was employed to restrain the allegedly ill person. In Fair Oaks, a physician transported the allegedly mentally ill person to a mental health facility. Under a recently enacted applicable statute, such a person had either to be first taken to a screening service or two physicians' certificates had to be presented and a court order obtained. The patient was not taken to the screening service but was admitted to a mental health facility on the say so of this doctor, who furnished one certificate, but the second certificate and the order were not obtained until after admission was achieved. It appears that under the prior statute the procedure employed would have been appropriate. The court said that the failure to follow the statutory procedure presented an issue of negligence for the jury. The court reasoned that, while the doctor was charged with knowledge of the new procedure, the jury might not find negligence because the doctor was familiar with the old statute. However, the court also ruled that the physician was liable to the patient for false imprisonment because motive was not an issue, the elements in false imprisonment being the intent to imprison and the absence of lawful process. Although we find no West Virginia cases dealing specifically with the employment of false medical certificates that fail to comport with statutory requirements for involuntary commitments, we believe that the cases reviewed which permit a finding of liability where the certificate is false are directly consistent with the principles enunciated in the West Virginia false imprisonment cases we reviewed in this opinion. As the Court stated in Williamson v. Glen Alum Coal Co., supra , the elements of false imprisonment are (1) the detention of the person, and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention and restraint. And, as suggested in Vorholt, supra, an action may be sustained on the unlawful execution of otherwise lawful process, and neither malice nor want of probable cause are elements the plaintiff must prove to prevail in the action. See Johnson v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 82 W.Va. 692, 97 S.E. 189 (1918). Moreover, the detention and restraint may be shown to be unlawful, as in Ogg v. Murdock and Winters v. Campbell , even though the detention is carried out under facially valid authority or, as in Williamson v. Glen Alum Coal Co ., with the assistance of validly constituted authority, acting beyond this authority. We, therefore, conclude that the defense of quasi-judicial immunity or privilege is generally available to one participating in the involuntary commitment process in good faith. However, the defense of quasi-judicial immunity or privilege does not apply where it is shown: (1) that a materially false medical certificate was employed to effect or continue the detention of the plaintiff, (2) that such false medical certificate was necessary to the continued detention of the plaintiff, and (3) that the person made and employed the false medical certificate, or (4) employed such certificate knowing or having reason to know that it was materially false. In the case before us, the Springhaven appellees, as well as Doctor Robertson, knew or clearly should have known that the medical certificate originally signed by Doctor Robertson contained the representation that he had examined the appellant and knew or should have known that that representation was false. That representation appears to be not only material, but crucial, to executing the temporary involuntary commitment procedure employed against appellant. Under the evidence thus far developed, it may be concluded that the employment of that certificate at various stages in the events giving rise to this action, in the particular circumstances of this case, resulted in the detention of appellant from the time of the making of the certificate to the time appellant was released from BAR-H. The evidence, it appears, will also support the conclusion that the Springhaven appellees caused or participated in causing that detention and that the false medical certificate was crucial to the continued detention of appellant at several distinct stages in the detention process. We will proceed to review particular circumstances that bear, to a greater or lesser extent, on the matter at issue. Appellees are not in fact officers of the government but would enjoy limited immunity or privilege because of the delicate nature of involuntary commitment and mental health problems, in which their faithful participation is critical and welcome. Nevertheless, the right to detain another must be exercised with due regard to the provisions of law permitting it and faithful compliance with legal requirements. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we, like the court below, must examine the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine if there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. In doing so, we view the evidence available in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If there is a genuine issue for trial, the judgment sought will not be rendered. See Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). We now review the circumstances appearing in this case under those standards, leaving for a jury the actual determination of the facts. Preparing and filing the involuntary commitment petition. Appellant's evidence would support a finding that appellees Robertson, Armstrong, and Nolley, and by derivation appellee Springhaven, fully participated in obtaining Doctor Robertson's original medical certificate and that the certificate was known from the beginning to be false and misleading. As discussed above, that set off a chain of events resulting in appellant's continued detention. Detention after the court order, pending the probable cause hearing. The circuit court's order in the involuntary commitment proceeding, issued after appellee Nolley completed her petition and caused it to be presented to the court, authorized appellant's detention by the Sheriff of Mercer County. The evidence suggested by the record before us is that, after the issuance of the circuit court order, the Springhaven appellees, rather than the Sheriff, detained appellant at the BMU while arrangements were being made for a probable cause hearing. Further, in an apparent effort to provide for medical certification and full compliance with the requirements for temporary involuntary commitment, the order of the circuit court required that appellant be examined at Southern Highlands Community Mental Health Center or a facility designated by it. Alternatively, the statute upon which appellees rely authorized the use of an examination done elsewhere, if the examination was approved by Southern Highlands. The record does not indicate that the BMU was designated by Southern Highlands to conduct the examination and does not indicate that any other examination of appellant approved by Southern was ever conducted. In short, it may be concluded, relying on the false medical certificate alone, that appellees made no effort to obtain a valid, approved medical examination conforming to the requirements of the circuit court order. Finally, it is noted that the circuit court order further provided for a probable cause hearing ifand only ifthe appellant was medically certified. The evidence would support a conclusion that the Springhaven appellees, having made no effort to comply with the precise terms of the circuit court order or to provide the substitute approved examination allowed by statute, next caused the probable cause hearing to be convened, with the prosecuting attorney, appellant's appointed counsel and the mental hygiene commissioner coming to the BMU for that purpose. All that time, it may be concluded, appellant remained unlawfully detained at the BMU, in the custody of Springhaven, not the Sheriff. The probable cause hearing. Appellees contend that, in any event, the finding of the commissioner in the probable cause hearing justified the continued detention of appellant. They suggest that the commissioner's finding absolves them of liability because appellant was indeed found to be mentally ill and likely to harm herself or others. It is noted that the commissioner made that finding based on his own observation and not on Doctor Robertson's original certificate or subsequent progress note. However, it appears that the probable cause hearing was not authorized in law, there apparently being no valid examination and medical certificate as required by the circuit court order and the applicable statute. Moreover, the commissioner's order, standing alone, makes no reference to continued detention of the appellant and provides no authority to hold and restrain her. In a properly conducted mental hygiene proceeding, appellees would necessarily have had before them a physician's or psychologist's certificate which they reasonably believed constituted an examination meeting the statutory requirements. Here, a fair, reasonable inference can be drawn that the Springhaven appellees knew or should have known otherwise. The existence of a finding of probable cause validly made by the mental hygiene commissioner can be seen in these circumstances to be more or less irrelevant. The finding of probable cause serves one office, the physician's certificate serves another, and the employment by the Springhaven appellees of a false physician's certificate perpetuated the appellant's confinement. An inference may also be drawn that the Springhaven appellees disregarded the changed opinion of Doctor Robertson, and, in cooperation with the attorneys and mental hygiene commissioner, facilitated an unlawful probable cause hearing. We believe that a jury could properly conclude that appellant's detention throughout the probable cause hearing occurred because of the Springhaven appellees' employment of the false medical certificate and their failure to comply or, in some instances, even attempt to comply with statutory requirements. Appellant's transportation and admission to BAR-H. Doubt may be raised as to the authority of the Springhaven authorities to arrange for the transportation of appellant to BAR-H. To be sure, there is a mimeographed form, signed by appellee Nolley, requesting that the Sheriff transport appellant to BAR-H. We assume that the form was one frequently used in commitment cases. It may be concluded that the use of the form simply evidences the continued detention of appellant under appellee's asserted authority, rather than the authority of law. As noted before, we do not find in the record that the Sheriff of Mercer County ever had custody of appellant under the order of the circuit court directing the Sheriff to take appellant into custody. It is reasonable to infer that the Sheriff, in transporting appellant to BAR-H, did not act under the authority of the circuit court order. One may conclude that the Sheriff took custody of appellant only after the probable cause hearing under the purported authority conferred by the request for transportation executed by appellee Nolley, supported by the finding of probable cause by the mental hygiene commissioner and the original certificate signed by Doctor Robertson. Again, the Springhaven appellees are implicated by such inferences. The admission of appellant to BAR-H can also be seen to flow from the employment of the false certificate. The evidence is that Springhaven sent along to BAR-H Doctor Robertson's original certificate, facially sufficient to gain appellant's admission to BAR-H, and a handwritten note explaining the absence of medical records for appellant. The record discloses that Springhaven appellees claim that at that time, Doctor Robertson's later progress report had been misplaced or lost, though effort was made to locate it and send it along to BAR-H with appellant. We note, however, that it appears that no specific mention of Doctor Robertson's progress note, or that it had been misplaced or lost, was contained in the handwritten note to BAR-H explaining the absence of medical records. Moreover, appellee Nolley called BAR-H to be certain a bed was available but apparently did not advise BAR-H that the progress note had been misplaced or lost or that it negated in large measure the findings appearing on the face of Doctor Robertson's original certificate. Lastly, we note, for what bearing it might have, that the record does not disclose that BAR-H is a mental health facility authorized by statute to receive a person involuntarily committed if all the legal requirements are met. We believe that adverse inferences, contrary to the assertions of appellees, may properly be drawn from these factors. We note again that the lawful temporary commitment of an allegedly mentally ill person to a mental health facility under the provisions of W.Va.Code § 27-5-1, et seq., may only occur when two steps have been accomplished: (1) a facially valid certificate of an examining physician or psychologist exists expressing the judgment that such person is mentally ill and likely to harm himself or herself or others, and (2) a facially valid finding of probable cause has been made to the same effect. In short, the medical or psychological discipline and the legal discipline must concur in the judgment. In our procedure, there is no confirming court order made expressly committing the allegedly mentally ill person to the mental health facility. It may be concluded that appellant's admission to and incarceration at BAR-H flowed directly from the employment by the Springhaven appellees of the original medical certificate, knowing or having reason to know it to be false. Summary. We conclude that a jury, on proper instruction of the elements of false imprisonment, could conclude that Springhaven possessed no legal authority to detain appellant, at least from the time the Sheriff was first ordered to apprehend appellant. The jury may also conclude that Springhaven, through its employees, intentionally falsely imprisoned appellant at any time from and after the original Robertson certificate was solicited until she was released from BAR-H. In the light most favorable to appellant, the evidence thus far developed supports the conclusion that appellant simply was not a candidate for a probable cause hearing or for admission to a mental health facility and that the legal procedure which the Springhaven employees attempted to employ to gain her admission there, seen in that light, was simply not applicable to her circumstances. Under such an analysis, the Springhaven appellees are liable to appellant for such damages as the evidence may show and a jury may find. As regards the claim of immunity or privilege, we are persuaded by that line of cases which grants immunity or privilege to those necessary participants in the temporary commitment process, even in the event of simple error, but denies immunity or privilege with respect to the natural consequences of the making and employment of a materially false certificate that an allegedly mentally ill person has been examined, when in fact no such examination occurred, because a facially valid certificate of that type is a critical requirement for commitment. Appellant is entitled to prove her case, to show to what extent the Springhaven appellees employed such a certificate to restrain her freedom, knowing or having reason to know it was false, and to have such recovery therefor as the law and the evidence permit in cases of false imprisonment.