Opinion ID: 2317266
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: opinion on death sentence

Text: The guilt phase of this case having been decided by this Court's Opinion dated February 7, 1983, we now turn to the defendant's assertions of error in his penalty hearing, held pursuant to 11 Del.C.  4209. Before considering the particular allegations of reversible error which defendant contends occurred during the penalty phase of his trial, however, we find it necessary and helpful for later reference herein to set forth at the outset the historical background of the statutory provisions relating to imposition of the death penalty in Delaware and to examine pertinent parts of defendant's penalty hearing. In so doing, we draw liberally from this Court's discussion of the present death penalty statute in State v. White, Del.Supr., 395 A.2d 1082, 1084-87 (1978). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the United States Supreme Court invalidated the capital punishment statute of Georgia because it gave sentencing juries virtually untrammeled discretion to impose the death penalty arbitrarily and capriciously without clear and objective standards and guidelines. The Furman decision effectively struck down most, if not all, of the state capital punishment statutes then existing. The Delaware Legislature responded to Furman in 1974 by re-defining the crime of First Degree Murder and requiring the imposition of the death penalty for that crime. This Court upheld the constitutionality of Delaware's 1974 mandatory death penalty statute based upon its understanding of Furman in State v. Sheppard, Del.Supr., 331 A.2d 142 (1974). Two years later, however, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of several revised state capital punishment statutes in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed. 974 (1976). The mandatory death penalty statutes in Woodson and Roberts were declared unconstitutional, while the discretionary death penalty laws in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek were upheld because they suitably directed and limited [the discretion of the sentencing jury] so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, 96 S.Ct. at 2932. The statutes which passed muster in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek contained three common hallmarks: a) a bifurcated trial for separate determination of guilt and punishment; b) a required finding of certain aggravating circumstances and consideration of existing mitigating circumstances as a pre-requisite to imposition of the death penalty; and c) expedited appellate review of all death sentences. The holdings in Woodson and Roberts compelled this Court in State v. Spence, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 983 (1976) to declare Delaware's 1974 mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional. Reacting almost immediately to this flurry of judicial activity, the Delaware General Assembly enacted 11 Del.C.  4209, this State's current death penalty statute (Statute) [1] , patterning it after the Georgia statute deemed constitutional in Gregg. The Delaware General Assembly in  4209 prescribed a bifurcated trial procedure for First Degree Murder cases. Id.  4209(b). In the first phase, the judge or jury must decide whether a defendant is guilty or innocent of First Degree Murder in violation of 11 Del.C.  636. [2] Id.  4209(b)(1). If the defendant is found guilty, a separate hearing is conducted before the same judge or jury that convicted the defendant to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without benefit of probation or parole or other reduction in sentence. Id. Procedure at such punishment hearing is governed by  4209(c). At the hearing, the parties may present evidence as to any matter that the Court deems relevant and admissible to the penalty to be imposed. Id.  4209(c)(1). The evidence must include matters relating to any mitigating circumstance and to any aggravating circumstance, including, but not limited to, those aggravating circumstances enumerated in 4209(e). Id. Written notice of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances to be relied upon at the penalty hearing must be given to the other party prior to the punishment hearing unless the Court deems such advance notice impracticable. Id. The record or absence of any prior criminal convictions, guilty pleas or pleas of nolo contendere are admissible. Id. At the hearing, both parties are permitted to argue as to the punishment to be meted out. Id.  4209(c)(2). After evidence is presented and oral arguments made, the judge must direct the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances and any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in  4209(e). Id.  4209(c)(4). The jury shall be instructed to weigh any mitigating factors against the aggravating factors. Id. The death penalty may not be imposed unless the judge or jury finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously recommends the death penalty after considering the circumstances and details of the crime and the character and propensities of the offender, and after weighing pertinent aggravating and mitigating factors. Id.  4209(d)(1) a. & b. A finding by the jury of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and a consequent recommendation of death, supported by the evidence, shall be binding on the Court. Id.  4209(d)(1)b. If the sentencing body cannot unanimously find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and cannot unanimously recommend the death penalty, then the Court must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of parole or probation. Id.  4209(d)(3). Subsection (e) of the Statute contains a list of nineteen aggravating circumstances, at least one of which must be found unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or judge in order for the death penalty to be imposed. Id.  4209(e)(1). [3] If the defendant is convicted of First Degree Murder in violation of  636(a)(2)-(7) [4] , supra, such conviction conclusively establishes the existence of a statutory aggravating factor and the jury must be so instructed; but the jury is not precluded from considering and finding any of the other statutory aggravating circumstances and any other non-statutory aggravating circumstances supported by the evidence. Id.  4209(e)(2). In accordance with the practice sanctioned in the Gregg line of cases, the Statute mandates automatic review of any death penalty by this Court. Id.  4209(g)(1). This Court must answer two questions in its review: a. Whether, considering the totality of evidence in aggravation and mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, the death penalty was either arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or disproportionate to the penalty recommended or imposed in similar cases arising under this section; [and] b. Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section and, where applicable,  636(a)(2)-(7) of this title. Id.  4209(g)(2) a & b. Review of the death penalty is based upon the transcript of the punishment hearing, which is transmitted to this Court by the Clerk of the Superior Court, and the briefs submitted by the parties. Id.  4209(g)(1) & (3). Review under  4209(g) is in addition to that conducted under ordinary appellate procedures. Id.  4209(h). Responding to an accused's delineation of several constitutional deficiencies in  4209, this Court in White, supra, supplemented the Statute with several additional procedural requirements. Those requirements were: a) A complete transcript of the trial must accompany transmittal of the transcript of the punishment hearing ...; b) An essential part of the record and of the report by the Trial Judge shall be a specific identification of the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances `found' by the trier of fact; c) A report by the Trial Judge, containing specified information about the defendant, the offense, the trial, the victim, defendant's counsel, and the chronology of the case; [5] and d) Counsel for the State and Court-designated amicus curiae are to furnish this Court with such assistance as the Court may request to aid it in conducting its review. White, 395 A.2d at 1096.