Opinion ID: 506169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miscellaneous Restrictions on Cross-Examination

Text: 101 Black raises two other issues regarding the court's restrictions on cross-examination that do not merit extended discussion. First, Black claims that the defense was precluded from examining Strickland regarding an alleged agreement with some co-conspirators to frame the defendants. Contrary to Black's claim, however, the court never made such a ruling. Rather, the court prohibited defense counsel from questioning Strickland as to why certain alleged co-conspirators, including Sonny Croughn, had not been indicted. Tr. 1300, 1306, 1309, 1311, 1312, 1317-19. The limit was natural enough, given that Strickland had neither authority to ask the grand jury to indict co-conspirators nor personal knowledge of the reasons for the prosecutor's actions. This was not, therefore, an abuse of discretion. 102 Second, Black contends that the trial court forbade cross-examination of Kohn as to whether Strickland had counseled him to lie about the conspiracy. Again, Black mischaracterizes the court's ruling. The government conceded to the trial court that the defense is entitled to show that Mr. Strickland tried to interfere with the grand jury process by counseling Mr. Kohn. Tr. 3337. See also Tr. 3338 (government has no objection to [the defense] asking Mr. Kohn about the counseling he received from Mr. Strickland). The court thus did not restrict the defense from inquiring into an alleged plan between Kohn and Strickland to lie to the grand jury. Tr. 3340. The court merely ruled that the defense could not examine Kohn regarding Strickland's invocation of the Fifth Amendment before a grand jury. Tr. 3339-41. This was entirely proper.