Opinion ID: 1702151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: bunkley-klayman decisions

Text: While Bunkley and Klayman involved two different statutes, the issues in these cases were the same  whether the constructions of the statutes at the time Bunkley and Klayman's convictions became final [19] were made nonfinal by this Court's subsequently acquiring jurisdiction over the cases and construing the statutes upon which their convictions were based contrary to the earlier constructions applied in their cases. This Court acquired jurisdiction in both of these cases via certified questions by the district courts of appeal, inquiring whether this Court's decisions that construed the statutes contrary to the district court precedent after their convictions were final should be retroactively applied. See Bunkley v. State, 768 So.2d 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), approved, 833 So.2d 739 (Fla.2002), vacated, 538 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 2020, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2003); Klayman v. State, 765 So.2d 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), approved, 835 So.2d 248 (Fla.2002). As indicated at the outset of this opinion, the decisions of this Court in Bunkley and Klayman were released within a week of each other. Klayman was released on November 14, 2002, and Bunkley was released on November 21, 2002. Regrettably, neither of the majority opinions in Klayman and Bunkley mentions or explains this Court's precedent on the precise issue framed by the United States Supreme Court in Fiore. The majority simply does not acknowledge Bass, Hall , or McCuiston. [20] The majority opinion in Bunkley similarly does not acknowledge Klayman, which was released after Bunkley. [21] This was error because, as seen in the portions of Bass, Hall , and McCuiston that I have extensively quoted, the issue of what the law was at a time when a Florida district court had ruled one way, but which was subsequently ruled in a contrary way by the Florida Supreme Court was clearly answered by this Court in Bass, Hall , and McCuiston. [22] Rather than squarely confront this issue or this precedent, the majority opinions in both cases resorted to defining the word clarification. Neither the analysis nor the definition of clarification created by the majority opinions had any basis in our precedent. By use of this definition, the majority in Klayman held that Fiore required relief from a final district court of appeal decision, whereas the majority in Bunkley held that Fiore did not apply and that there was no relief from a final district court of appeal decision. This definition of clarification led to the flawed conflict in decisions. The key comparative passages which resulted in the majority opinions not confronting the fundamental issues are as follows. In Klayman, this Court stated: In an effort to determine whether Hayes should be applied retroactively, we must ask, is Hayes a clarification or change in the law? A clarification is a decision of this Court that says what the law has been since the time of enactment. To determine whether a decision clarifies a statute, we first look to the decision itself to discern its intent. If the decision is silent or ambiguous on this point, we then look to the underlying statute to discern its intent. Where the Legislature cedes no discretion to the courts either directly[n.1] or indirectly[n.2] but instead employs definitive language that ordinarily requires no judicial construction, the Legislature intends that the statute be applied as enacted. A decision by this Court confirming the original intent is a clarification of extant law. [n.1] For example, the Legislature directly ceded to the courts the authority to formulate grounds for departing from the sentencing guidelines. See § 921.001(6), Fla. Stat. (2001) (A court may impose a departure sentence outside the sentencing guidelines based upon circumstances or factors which reasonably justify which reasonably justify the aggravation or mitigation of the sentence....). [n.2] The Legislature may indirectly cede discretion to the courts by employing language that commonly requires judicial construction. Examples of such language include careful and prudent, reasonable, and probable cause. See, e.g., § 316.1925, Fla. Stat. (2001) (Any person operating a vehicle upon the streets or highways within the state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner....) (emphasis added); § 856.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2001) (No adult having control of any residence shall allow an open house party to take place at said residence if any alcoholic beverage or drug is possessed or consumed ... by a minor ... and where the adult fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage or drug.) (emphasis added); § 933.04, Fla. Stat. (2001) ([N]o search warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause....) (emphasis added). Hayes is such a clarification, because the Legislature, in formulating the trafficking statute, ceded no discretion to the courts either directly or indirectly with regard to the types and quantities of substances proscribed by the statute. Klayman, 835 So.2d at 253. In Bunkley, this Court stated: As a rule, a change in the statutory law is presumed to operate prospectively absent a clear showing of contrary intent. A change in the decisional law in a nonfinal case, on the other hand, is presumed to operate in all other nonfinal cases. A change in either the statutory or decisional law may operate retroactively when retroactive application is expressly provided, but regardless of intent, the issue of retroactivity is ultimately controlled by overarching constitutional principles. The Court in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980), was confronted with the following question: must a change in the law that is announced in a nonfinal case be applied in final cases? The Court held that only jurisprudential upheavals will be applied in final cases and that evolutionary refinements in the law will not be applied in final cases.... In brief, changes in the decisional law are divided into two subgroups for retroactivity purposes. A jurisprudential upheaval is a major constitutional change of law, announced by either this Court or the United States Supreme Court, that addresses a basic unfairness in the system. The unfairness must be so fundamental that it undermines confidence in the validity of final cases and outweighs the doctrine of finality. An evolutionary refinement, on the other hand, is a conventional change that affords new or different guidelines for Florida courts in exercising their authority in applying the law. Jurisprudential upheavals are applied retroactively. We add that, as opposed to changes in the law, an entirely separate body of precedent, i.e., clarification in the law, has no application under Florida law in the context of retroactivity. V. THE PRESENT CASE In analyzing the retroactivity of L.B. under Witt, we are called upon to determine whether L.B. was a jurisprudential upheaval or an evolutionary refinement in the law. As noted above, a jurisprudential upheaval is a  major constitutional change of law. Examples include Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335[, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799] (1963), and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584[, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982] (1977). L.B. clearly was not a decision of that order, for L.B. was a routine statutory construction case wherein this Court construed the phrase common pocketknife. Rather L.B. was an evolutionary refinement in the law, i.e., it was a conventional change that affords new or different guidelines for the courts in applying the law. To determine whether a decision refines a statute, we first look to the decision itself to discern its intent. If the decision is silent or ambiguous on this point, we then look to the statute to discern its intent. Where the Legislature cedes a measure of discretion to the courts either directly or by employing language that commonly requires judicial construction, the Legislature intends for the courts to effectuate the purpose of the statute by refining the decisional law in the face of evolving circumstances. The Legislature, at the turn of the century, ceded discretion to the courts by employing the phrases dangerous weapon and common pocketknife in the burglary and weapon statutes, and these phrases clearly required judicial construction in order to provide a meaningful basis for imposing sanctions. This Court's decision in L.B., which was issued in 1997, was the culmination of a century-long evolutionary process. Although some courts during that period may have interpreted common pocketknife contrary to the holding in L.B., each court nevertheless sought to comply with legislative intent and to rule in harmony with the law as it was interpreted at that point in time. A key consideration is that none of the courts attempted to impose criminal sanctions without statutory authority  i.e., none ruled in contravention of legislative intent. Thus, none of the convictions imposed pursuant to section 790.001(13) violated the Due Process Clause in this regard. Bunkley, 833 So.2d at 743-46 (footnotes omitted). The analysis in the above passages from the majority opinions which ties clarification or evolutionary refinement to the Legislature ceding or not ceding discretion to the courts to construe the criminal statutes involved is analysis which has no basis in our law, which resulted in our decisions in Bunkley and Klayman being in conflict, and which resulted in our decisions not directly answering the question which the United States Supreme Court has remanded to us to answer in Bunkley. The question now before us is what Florida law was at the time Bunkley's convictions became final. The answer to this question has nothing to do with what power the Legislature ceded to this Court to construe criminal statutes. The question must instead be answered based upon the Florida Constitution and our precedent.