Opinion ID: 1140899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attorney-Work-Product Privilege

Text: The defendants contend that the trial court's order compelling them to produce the subset of documents the defendants selected for copying from Arvin's records violates their attorney-work-product privilege. That argument is based on Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., which, in pertinent part, provides as follows with respect to materials developed in the course of preparing for trial: (3) Trial Preparation: Materials. . . . [A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.  (Emphasis added.) Counsel for the defendants argue that, when they selected a subset of the Arvin documents for copying, that selection process was completed using their mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories concerning the litigation (hereinafter opinion work product). Accordingly, the defendants argue, disclosure to the plaintiffs of the copies of the records the defendants' obtained from Arvin would violate the opinion-work-product privilege encompassed in Rule 26(b)(3). The parties do not cite, nor have we found, any prior Alabama decision that has considered whether documents selected by counsel are protected from discovery as opinion work product. Counsel for the parties, however, have cited several cases in which federal courts have considered the selection-and-compilation doctrine. The defendants rely particularly on two decisions  Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312(3d Cir.1985), [4] and Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.1986) [5]  in support of their position that Alabama should recognize the selection-and-compilation doctrine. Relying extensively on In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir.1988), the plaintiffs argue that identification by counsel of nonprivileged records produced by a third party cannot justifiably have been expected by the defendants' counsel to remain private and to constitute opinion work product. [6] Here, we do not determine whether the selection of a subset of records subpoenaed from a nonparty constitutes protected work product because we find that production of the records so selected is mandated by the clear, unambiguous language of Rule 45(a)(3)(D), Ala. R. Civ. P. Arvin produced records in response to a subpoena issued by the defendants pursuant to Rule 45, Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 45(a)(3)(D) states that [i]f the party serving the subpoena obtains copies of documents or things, that party shall make available a duplicate of such copies at the request of any other party upon payment of the reasonable cost of making such copies. Rule 45(a)(3)(D) was adopted in 1995. The Committee Comments to the October 1, 1995 Amendment to Rule 45 state that the subject of Rule 45(a)(3)(D) was formerly covered by Rule 34 and that the 1995 amendment was intended to maintain the obligation of the party obtaining the discovery [from a nonparty] to make copies available to other parties at a reasonable cost. The defendants make three arguments in their efforts to avoid the clear language of Rule 45(a)(3)(D). First, according to the defendants, the goal of Rule 45 is to ensure that all parties have access to those documents furnished by a nonparty in response to a subpoena. The defendants argue that Rule 45(a)(3)(D) was not intended to cover a situation such as this one, where the plaintiffs had access to the same records Arvin provided to the defendants. Second, the defendants argue that Rule 45(a)(3)(D) should be read in concert with Rule 26(b)(3) and should not defeat their alleged opinion-work-product privilege. They argue that nowhere does Rule 45 grant the plaintiffs the right to attend a document production like that in Michigan and then to later obtain the defendants' alleged opinion work product. Finally, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs waived the benefit of Rule 45(a)(3)(D) by participating in the document-review process at which all parties designated a subset of records for copying. The defendants' arguments are without merit. We agree with the trial court and the plaintiffs that, as written, the plain language of Rule 45(a)(3)(D) applies and requires the defendants to provide the plaintiffs a duplicate of such copies that the defendants obtained from Arvin. The exception to 45(a)(3)(D) urged by defendants  that the rule is inapplicable because the subset of disputed records was made available to the plaintiffs in the documents produced by Arvin  is simply not contained or suggested in the language of the rule. Such an exception could perhaps be incorporated in an amendment to Rule 45. The role of this Court, however, is to interpret the rule according to its plain meaning. [7] Further, Rule 45(a)(3)(D) does not provide that the procedure in that rule is limited by the protection of opinion work product. Instead, Rule 45(a)(3)(D) states that the party obtaining copies of documents and things from a nonparty pursuant to Rule 45  shall make available a duplicate of such copies at the request of any other party. . . . (emphasis added). [8] Because opinion work product potentially is involved whenever a party selects a portion of subpoenaed records for copying, the position argued by the defendants could severely limit the application of Rule 45(a)(3)(D). Finally, the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs waived the benefit of Rule 45(a)(3)(D) is also without merit. The plaintiffs did participate in the document production in Michigan where all parties separately reviewed the Arvin records and selected a portion of those records for copying. The mechanics of that process were confirmed in the September 7, 2005, letter from IRMCO's counsel to an Arvin representative. However, plaintiffs' counsel was not a signatory or recipient of that letter. Under these circumstances, there is no credible evidence in the record indicating that the plaintiffs waived the benefit of Rule 45(a)(3)(D).