Opinion ID: 1747707
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The January 18, 1988 continuance

Text: The state argues that this continuance was for good cause and should toll the speedy trial clock. Given the fact that the state requested this continuance solely for its prosecutorial tactical advantage, its argument cannot be supported in this speedy trial analysis. Ross alleges that the state delayed his Tippah County case solely so it could first try the strong, Union County case. [4] The court acknowledged this fact. While this case does not represent prosecutorial sabotage, it represents intentional, tactical delay after the defendant had already asserted his speedy trial right. By way of comparison, the Barker Court found no speedy trial violation after five years of a similar tactical delay; in that case however, the defendant did not assert his speedy trial right until after the prosecution's twelfth continuance. Here, Ross demonstrated his willingness to go to trial, and the continuance delayed his doing so. Given the policy goal of speedy trial, simply, that defendants should not wait for trial longer than they have to, this delay should be charged to the state. This conclusion does not signify that the state's action was improper in terms of the state's authority. It simply means that, if the state made any tactical choice not motivated by a compelling need to advance the cause of justice in the instant case, and the defendant had already requested speedy trial, and the delay helped push the defendant past a reasonably available trial date, the state should bear the burden. Barring any evidence of bad-faith attempts to undermine the defense's resources, however, this factor should not weigh heavily against the state.