Opinion ID: 4516132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deliberate-Distortion Test

Text: ¶ 38. Even if prosecutorial misconduct that deliberately distorts the factfinding process could warrant forcing the State to elect between immunization of an important defense witness or dismissal, defendant has not demonstrated the necessary causal link in this case. ¶ 39. Defendant claims that the State improperly threatened to charge Edwards with a crime and dissuaded Edwards from testifying. Defendant asserts that the State’s threat of charging Edwards with escape was based on a false understanding of the law because Edwards could not have been charged with felony escape where he was out of place for only a few hours. See 13 V.S.A. § 1501 (delineating terms of escape from custody). ¶ 40. Prosecutorial misconduct can include intimidation or threats designed to dissuade a witness from testifying or selectively immunizing prosecution witnesses to gain a tactical advantage. See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that due process may require government to grant immunity “when prosecutorial misconduct caused the defendant’s principal witness to withhold out of fear of self-incrimination testimony which would otherwise allegedly have been available to the defendant”). The defendant must, however, show a 14 “causal nexus” between the government’s actions and the witness’s decision not to testify to establish a due process violation. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1193 (1st Cir. 1990); see People v. Stewart, 93 P.3d 271, 304 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that to demonstrate interference with right to compulsory process, defendant must show “causal link” between prosecution intimidation and witness’s refusal to testify (quotation omitted)). ¶ 41. The evidence fails to demonstrate that the State’s action threatened or intimidated Edwards into not testifying.3 Although the State indicated, in the presence of Edwards’s lawyer, that it would charge Edwards on the basis of his proffered testimony, the record does not support that this interchange led Edwards to invoke his right against self-incrimination. At the time of the prosecutor’s remarks, Edwards’s counsel had already informed the court that Edwards would invoke his right against self-incrimination if he testified. Before Edwards’s lawyer said he would invoke the privilege, the prosecutor had said only, “It is our belief that either Mr. Edwards is going to admit to an escape, or Mr. Edwards is going to be perjuring himself. And if that’s what we expect him to say, I think the Court should provide him with legal counsel prior to testifying.” Neither Edwards nor the lawyer who was subsequently appointed to represent him were present for that remark, and moreover, the prosecutor’s remark was appropriate; it seemed calculated to ensure only that Edwards had counsel to help him weigh his choice to testify, not to prevent him from testifying. 3 Moreover, we reject defendant’s inference that Edwards did not have a basis to claim a privilege against self-incrimination because his actions did not amount to a crime. The privilege is “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). It is not necessary for the prospective witness to demonstrate that a prosecution will follow or that answers to questions will