Opinion ID: 789385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Standard for Title VII Retaliation Claims

Text: 2 The parties agree that this case was litigated and tried as a pretext (rather than mixed-motive) retaliation case. 7 Under the pretext framework, after the employee demonstrates a prima facie case of retaliation and the employer carries its burden by stating a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the employment action, the burden falls to the employee to establish that the employer's permissible reason is actually a pretext for retaliation. 8 3 Here, the parties disagree as to the proper standard of proof for the final portion of the above framework. The University seeks plain error review of the district court's use of the phrase motivating factor instead of the but-for causation standard in submitting Septimus's retaliation claims to the jury. Conversely, Septimus contends that the motivating factor language employed by the district court was legally proper, and therefore the jury's verdict on these claims should not be disturbed. 4 Septimus relies primarily on Fabela v. Socorro Indep. School Dist. 9 to support her argument that the district court's motivating factor language was appropriate for a retaliation claim. In that case the discharged employee presented direct evidence of retaliation and proceeded upon a mixed-motive theory as was then provided for under the framework set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 10 This court noted in Fabela that it is unusual to have direct evidence of retaliatory intent, and that in cases based on circumstantial evidence it has long recognized the well-trod path by which a plaintiff may demonstrate retaliatory intent through the use of circumstantial evidence and the famed McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 11 Because this is a circumstantial evidence pretext case, the standard of proof applied in Fabela and other mixed-motive cases is not controlling here. 5 The McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework applies to Title VII retaliation claims brought under a pretext theory. 12 Under that framework, the employee's ultimate burden is to prove that the employer's stated reason for the adverse action was merely a pretext for the real, retaliatory purpose. 13 The proper standard of proof on the causation element of a Title VII retaliation claim is that the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff would not have occurred but for her protected conduct. 14 This court has consistently held that in retaliation cases where the defendant has proffered a nondiscriminatory purpose for the adverse employment action the plaintiff has the burden of proving that `but for' the discriminatory purpose he would not have been terminated. 15 Moreover, we have recently stated that the motivating factor test is less stringent, implying that standard would require a lesser burden of proof. 16 We hold that the district court erred when it used the term motivating factor to instruct the jury in this case. 6 Because the University did not timely raise this issue at trial, the court must determine whether this error requires reversal under the plain error standard. This court has consistently required a but for standard for proving causation on a Title VII retaliation claim brought under the pretext framework. 17 Thus, the disputed jury instruction amounts to plain error that should have been clear or obvious. Even when the jury instructions are viewed in their entirety, the substitution of the phrase motivating factor for but for causation causes us to doubt substantially whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations. Septimus was held to a lower standard in proving the causation element of her retaliation claims — the ultimate question in this case — and therefore substantial rights of the University were prejudiced. Because the jury was improperly instructed, the outcome of this case may have been affected. Therefore, failing to correct this fundamental error could impact the fairness of the judicial process in this case and could result in a miscarriage of justice.