Opinion ID: 320666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legislative History and Judicial Construction

Text: 51 Our view of the Mine Safety Act is supported by the legislative history. Senator Kennedy, in introducing his amendment which became section 110(b) of the Safety Act, noted the broad purpose of the provision: 52 the rationale for this amendment is clear. For safety's sake, we want to encourage the reporting of suspected violations of health and safety regulations . . .. 53 But miners will not speak up if they fear retaliation. This amendment should deter such retaliation, and, therefore, encourage miners to bring dangers and suspected violations to public attention. 33 Senator Kennedy also remarked that 54 it is especially important that miners not feel inhibited to point out health and safety violations because there is such a high degree of danger in the mines. 34 55 Given this wide scope of protection intended, a liberal construction of the language of the Act is justified. 35 56 The House Committee on Education and Labor in reporting on the Act also suggested a liberal construction: 57 Subsection (b) prohibits discrimination against miners for having exercised their rights under this Act or for having participated, in any way, in the enforcement of the Act. The subsection provides procedures for obtaining reinstatement and back pay for miners discharged by operators and other remedies for miners discriminated against. 36 58 Furthermore, we note that the Third Circuit in considering a previous Mine Safety Act stressed a broad reading: 59 In construing safety or remedial legislation narrow or limited construction is to be eschewed. Rather, in this field liberal construction in light of the prime purpose of the legislation is to be employed. This statute is remedial, with a humane purpose in view and is therefore entitled to a liberal construction. 37 60 The parallels between the Mine Safety Act and other protective labor acts are significant. The Safety Act provision which we here construe was introduced with the announced intention of giving to miners 'the same protection against retaliation which we give employees under other Federal labor laws.' 38 Specifically, the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Landrum-Griffin Act were all noted as protecting employees against discrimination because of exercise of rights under the Acts. 61 The Supreme Court has construed the corresponding NLRA provision broadly: in NLRB v. Scrivener, dba AA Electric Company, 39 the Court held violative of the NLRA the discharge of an employee for his giving a sworn written statement to a NLRB field examiner who was investigating an unfair labor practice charge. Justice Blackmun, writing for the unanimous Court, was concerned that the employee should be protected in the investigative stages as well as after filing of formal charges or in giving formal testimony. Such protection is necessary to prevent the Board's channels of information from being dried up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and witnesses. 40 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stated that 62 the presence of the preceding words 'to discharge or otherwise discriminate' reveals, we think, particularly by the word 'otherwise,' an intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather than narrow protection to the employee. 41 63 In the Mine Safety Act the words 'in any other way discriminate' may be similarly construed. 64 We believe our view of the scope of section 110(b)(1) of the Mine Safety Act is the only practical one to ensure the health and safety of miners, which is the central purpose of the Act. Holding that miners are not protected until they initiate formal procedure for review, of which they may be unaware, would violate the goal of protecting the miners' health and would thus violate the Congressional intent. 42 The result we reach in this case best comports with the remedial purpose of the legislation. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals and reinstate the decision and order of the Administrative Law Judge. 65 So ordered.