Opinion ID: 1945963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct in Summation

Text: Defendant argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by suggesting to the jury in its guilt-phase summation that there could have been a third homicide victim. The State responds that there was no misconduct and that, even if this Court determines that the disputed remarks were prejudicial, they were harmless. During the State's summation, the prosecutor described the telephone calls that defendant and Vreeland placed to various pizza restaurants on the night of the killings. The prosecutor noted that one restaurant considered making the delivery but ultimately declined to do so. Specifically, the prosecutor stated: Thankfully for [the restaurant's delivery person] his boss decided not to make that delivery. [The delivery person] may have been killed that night, as well. The trial court overruled defendant's objection to the prosecutor's remark, explaining: Insofar as the reference [that the delivery person] ... could have been killed, as well, if he had shown up on the scene. I think, again, that's athat's an arguably fair comment that could be made based upon the evidence which was presented in this case. In considering whether to reverse a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct, we must examine the severity of the alleged misconduct and its prejudicial effect on [a] defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999). Prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal unless the misconduct was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83, 727 A. 2d 1 (1999). To reverse a conviction on that basis, the Court must find that the misconduct was `clearly and unmistakably improper,' and ... substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 575, 737 A. 2d 55 (citation omitted). We have repeatedly recognized that the prosecutor's primary duty is not to obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 320, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). Prosecutors must be particularly careful to fulfill that duty in capital cases in which death is a potential penalty. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 448, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988). That we expect prosecutors to make powerful arguments in summations to the jury is, however, equally clear. State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 84, 695 A. 2d 1301 (1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052, 120 S.Ct. 593, 145 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1999). Within certain boundaries, prosecutors are thus afforded considerable leeway in making closing arguments. Ibid. Applying those tenets, we conclude that the prosecutor's statement about a possible third victim did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant correctly points out that the prosecutor erred in referring to an additional, as opposed to an alternative, victim. However, defendant's ability to find one isolated and fleeting reference to a third victim is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. Nor did that one reference deprive defendant of a fair trial. The prosecutor implied that had another pizza restaurant decided to make the delivery, the delivery person from that restaurant would have been the victim, instead of Giordano or Gallara. We do not believe that the jury, after hearing all of the evidence presented in this case, would have thought realistically that the prosecutor suggested that defendant intended to kill Gallara, Giordano, and a third victim.