Opinion ID: 2337351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: complicity instructions.

Text: The complicity instructions given by the trial court were as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 3 You will find the Defendant guilty of Complicity to Murder under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about January 11, 1997 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, Kenneth Tharp killed Elaina Curtis by beating her with his fists; B. That the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, failed to make a proper effort to prevent Kenneth Tharp from beating Elaina Curtis with his fists; AND C. That in so doing, the Defendant wantonly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and the Defendant's conduct thereby caused the death of Elaina Curtis under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. INSTRUCTION NO. 4 If you do not find the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, guilty under Instruction No. 3, you will find the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, guilty of Complicity to Second-Degree Manslaughter under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about January 11, 1997 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, Kenneth Tharp killed Elaina Curtis by beating her with his fists; B. That the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, failed to make a proper effort to prevent Kenneth Tharp from beating Elaina Curtis with his fists; AND C. That in so doing, the Defendant was acting wantonly as that term is defined in Instruction No. 2. INSTRUCTION NO. 5 If you do not find the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, guilty under Instruction No. 3 or Instruction No. 4, you will find the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, guilty of Complicity to Reckless Homicide under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about January 11, 1997, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, Kenneth Tharp killed Elaina Curtis by beating her with his fists; B. That the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, failed to make a proper effort to prevent Kenneth Tharp from beating Elaina Curtis with his fists; AND C. That in so doing, the Defendant was acting recklessly as that term is defined in Instruction No. 2. Instruction No. 2 included the statutory definitions of wantonly, KRS 501.020(3), and recklessly, KRS 501.020(4), and defined complicity to mean that a person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, having a legal duty to prevent the conduct causing the result[,] fails to make a proper effort to do so. Appellant first asserts that the trial judge's definition of complicity was improper because KRS 502.020(2) does not specifically say that a defendant is guilty of an offense committed by another person if the defendant fails in his duty to make a proper effort to prevent the other person's conduct. In fact, inclusion of any definition of complicity in the instructions was surplusage, since the substantive instructions embodied the essentials of the definition. Nevertheless, we note that the title of KRS 502.020 is Liability for conduct of anotherComplicity; that subsection (2)(c) provides that a person  is guilty of that offense when he ... [h]aving a legal duty to prevent the conduct causing the result, fails to make a proper effort to do so (emphasis added); and that the 1974 Official Commentary to KRS 502.020 provides that [t]he purpose of subsection (2) is to make special provisions for complicity in an offense which has a prohibited result as an essential element. (Emphasis added.) Second, Appellant argues that the instructions erroneously failed to require the jury to determine the mental state of Kenneth Tharp at the time he killed Elaina Curtis, which Appellant asserts is an essential element of her guilt by complicity. The gravamen of this argument is that a condition precedent to a conviction of an offense by complicity is a finding by the jury that the principal actor is equally guilty of the same offense. Not so. The principal actor's mental state with respect to his own conduct, or the degree of his criminal liability, is largely immaterial to the criminal liability of an accomplice or the degree thereof. As noted in Springer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 439, 453 (1999), the common law generally held that an aider or abettor could not be convicted if the principal was acquitted. E.g., Rutland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 590 S.W.2d 682 (1979). However, even in the pre-penal code era, the degree of an accomplice's liability was determined by his or her own mens rea and not that of the principal. If one commits a crime and another is actually present aiding, abetting, assisting, or encouraging its commission, the latter thereby becomes a participant, a principal in the second degree, and his culpability is determined by his motives.... Fuson v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 804, 251 S.W. 995, 997 (1923). That proposition was codified in KRS 502.030(1): In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to KRS 502.010 and 502.020, it is no defense that: (1) Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based on the conduct in question, or has previously been acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a different offense.... Although there was no common law equivalent to KRS 502.020(2)(c), it is obvious that KRS 502.030(1) applies as well to one whose guilt by complicity is premised upon a failure to perform a legal duty to prevent conduct as to one whose guilt is premised upon active participation in that conduct. And if an accomplice can be convicted despite the acquittal of the principal, it follows that the degree of the offense of which an accomplice is convicted does not depend upon the degree of which the principal is convicted. KRS 502.020(2) is modeled after what became Section 2.06(4) of the Model Penal Code. [9] The Official Comment to that section includes the following: Subsection (4) makes it clear that complicity in conduct causing a particular criminal result entails accountability for that result so long as the accomplice is personally culpable with respect to the result to the extent demanded by the definition of the crime. Thus, if the accomplice recklessly endangers life by rendering assistance to another, he can be convicted of manslaughter if a death results, even though the principal actor's liability is at a different level. In effect, therefore, the homicidal act is attributed to both participants, with the liability of each measured by his own degree of culpability toward the result. Model Penal Code Pt. I § 2.06 Comment, at 321 (1985) (footnote omitted). It has been asserted that the purpose of Section 2.06(4) is to ameliorate the harshest aspects of the so-called natural and probable consequence doctrine, under which an accomplice is held criminally liable for a crime which he/she did not intend to aid or assist so long as the resultant crime was a natural and probable consequence of the crime he/she did intend to aid or assist. [10] A. Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes; Remaining within the Constraints of Intent, 31 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 1351, 1360, 1362 (1998). This view of the purpose of Section 2.06(4) is supported by the following statement in the Official Comment to Section 2.06: One who solicits an end, or aids or agrees to aid in its achievement, is an accomplice in whatever means may be employed, insofar as they constitute or commit an offense fairly envisaged in the purposes of the association. But when a wholly different crime has been committed, thus involving conduct not within the conscious objectives of the accomplice, he is not liable for it unless the case falls within the specific terms of Subsection (4). Model Penal Code Pt. I § 2.06 Comment, at 311 (1985). Thus, it is immaterial to Appellant's criminal liability or the degree thereof whether Kenneth Tharp is ever convicted of criminal homicide for causing the death of Elaina Curtis, or, if so, of which degree of homicide he is convicted. To convict Appellant of wanton murder, the jury was only required to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Kenneth Tharp's conduct resulted in Elaina Curtis's death; (2) Appellant failed to make a proper effort to prevent that conduct; and (3) in so doing, Appellant, under circumstances amounting to aggravated wantonness, disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such conduct would result in Elaina Curtis's death. The instructions accurately described the elements of the offense of which Appellant was convicted. Finally, Appellant complains that the instructions were deficient in failing to require a finding that Appellant was physically capable of performing her duty to prevent the conduct causing her child's death. KRS 501.030(1) provides: A person is not guilty of a criminal offense unless: (1) He has engaged in conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform a duty which the law imposes upon him and which he is physically capable of performing.... It is unclear whether Appellant's argument in this regard is a claim that she was physically unable to prevent Kenneth Tharp from killing Elaina Curtis (a proposition which she did not assert at trial). If so, the concurring opinion in Lane v. Commonwealth, supra , points out that KRS 502.020(2)(c) does not anticipate courage or heroism, but requires only a proper (read reasonable) effort to protect the child from harm. Lane, supra, at 881 (Cooper, J., concurring). This requirement of a proper effort gives the jury leeway to consider any physical infirmities which might mitigate a parent's failure to protect his/her child from harm. Regardless, the 1974 Official Commentary to KRS 501.030(1) explains that the purpose of that statute is to remove from the field of criminal liability all social harms resulting from involuntary acts as well as those resulting from failures to perform moral, yet non-legal, duties. Professors Lawson and Fortune tell us that [t]he essence of subsection (1) is that there can be no crime without an act, though it is clear that failure to act under a legal duty satisfies the requirement. Lawson and Fortune, supra, § 2-1 (a), at 39. The instructions did not predicate Appellant's guilt in this case upon an involuntary act or upon the failure to perform a non-legal duty, but upon her failure to act while under a legal duty to do so. KRS 501.030(1) has no application to this case. We note that the trial instructions did not include as an element of the offense [t]hat the Defendant, Myrna Tharp, was the parent and custodian of Elaina Curtis, an essential element of complicity liability under KRS 502.020(2)(c). That issue was raised neither at trial nor in the briefs, presumably because Appellant did not deny being Elaina's mother and legal custodian. Although it was error to omit this element from the complicity instructions, the omission does not rise to the level of palpable error. RCr 10.26.