Opinion ID: 879736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: easement by way of necessity

Text: In like manner, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Pamela A. Houle for an easement by way of necessity. Again, we reverse. In Graham v. Mack, supra, this Court, speaking of easements by way of necessity, said: There are two basic elements (1) unity of ownership; and, (2) strict necessity. The necessity must exist at the time the unified tracts are severed. (Citing authority.) The way granted must be over the grantor's land and never over the land of a third party or stranger to the title (citing authority) and finally there must be strict unity of ownership. 699 P.2d at 596. None of the requirements for a way of necessity are met here. The evidence in this case is that the way of necessity does not give access to Pamela A. Houle from her land to a public road. Rather, the encroachment on Lot 11 goes from one part of Lot 12 to another part of Lot 12, passing over Lot 11. In that situation, no way of necessity can be created. Baumhoff v. Lochhaas (Mo. 1923), 253 S.W. 762. Indeed in this case, it appears that the road, after leaving the property of the parties must traverse another mile and a half to get to a public road, over the properties of third parties. Under Graham v. Mack, supra, a way of necessity may not exist in that situation. 699 P.2d at 597. Finally, a way of necessity is incompatible with a prescriptive right for the same easement. A prescriptive right never accrues in a way of necessity as long as the necessity continues. Hanna v. Means (Fla. App. 1975), 319 So.2d 61, 64. Again, summary judgment on this issue in favor of Pamela A. Houle is reversed and Ace M. Woods is entitled to summary judgment on his cross-motion under Rule 56.