Opinion ID: 2260682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Misconduct in this Case Requires a Stronger Sanction Than Public Censure As Urged by Respondent

Text: Respondent's position is that the appropriate sanction, if any, should be no more than public censure, which is at the opposite end of the spectrum from disbarment as urged by Bar Counsel. However, just as the cases cited by Bar Counsel are inapposite, the Board is unanimous in its view that the public censure cases relied upon by Respondent are distinguishable. Both Gilchrist and Artis, supra, are illustrative precedents involving commingling where the sanction was public censure. Since the misconduct in Gilchrist and Artis, as here, extended beyond a simple commingling offense, it is essential to compare the nature and depth of the other offenses on a relative scale of ethical considerations. In this case, Respondent's other offense (in addition to simple commingling), consists of inadvertent misappropriation, but nothing more. In both Gilchrist and Artis, the other offense was the failure to maintain complete records of a client's funds as required by DR 9-103(B)(3). In weighing these other offenses, the Board concludes that the balance tilts toward a stronger sanction against Respondent in this case than public censure, which was the sanction in Gilchrist and Artis. This conclusion rests on the premise that, on a relative scale of unethical misconduct, any type of misappropriation of client's funds is a more reprehensible offense than the failure to maintain complete records of the client's funds. The latter type of offense is analogous to neglect, or inadequate preparation, where mild sanctions are generally imposed for first-time offenders. For example, for an attorney with no prior disciplinary violations, a violation consisting of simple neglect often results in only an informal admonition by Bar Counsel or public reprimand by the Board. In re Confidential, Bar Dkt. 150-85 (B.P.R. Rep. April 21, 1987). If the neglect is accompanied by a prior disciplinary record, then public censure by the court might be appropriate. Compare In re Williams, M-111-82 (D.C.C.A. May 22, 1987). Respondent also relies on In re Branham, No. 26-75 (D.C.App. Feb. 3, 1978), a case in which the Court imposed public censure as recommended by the Board. However, the misconduct in Branham is distinguishable because the attorney there did not misappropriate or use the client's funds to defray the attorney's personal or office expense. Rather, Branham was a case where the attorney made an improper or unauthorized investment on behalf of the client. Respondent's reliance on the public censure precedents is misplaced.