Opinion ID: 450428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admissibility of the Phone Call

Text: 59 Defendant Gironda argues that the district court erred in permitting Ruiz to testify that Nichols told him that Nichols had received a threatening phone call from Gironda. Specifically, Ruiz testified that Gironda told Nichols that if Ruiz and Velazquez did not follow through with what they said they were going to do, they would end up dead in the trunk of a car. Defendant Gironda contends that, for three reasons, the district court should not have allowed Ruiz to testify about this phone call. First, defendant maintains, the Government did not establish a proper foundation for the admissibility of the phone call. Second, defendant claims that Ruiz' testimony constituted inadmissible double hearsay. Third, defendant argues that, because Nichols did not testify, the admissibility of the phone conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. 60 Because Ruiz' testimony consisted of two separate statements, this court must analyze each statement to determine whether the Government laid adequate foundation for its admissibility and whether the statement itself presents hearsay problems. In essence, Ruiz testified both to what Nichols told him and to what Gironda told Nichols. This court will analyze each statement in turn. 61 With respect to Ruiz' testimony regarding Nichols' conversation with him, the Government adequately laid the foundation for its admissibility. Before testifying to the substance of Nichols' statement to him, Ruiz testified as to where and when the conversation occurred and as to who was present when it occurred. Although the portion of Ruiz' testimony dealing with Nichols' statement presents no foundational problems, it does create potential hearsay problems. Undoubtedly, the Government offered Nichols' statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. More particularly, the Government offered Nichols' statement to demonstrate that Gironda had made threatening statements to Nichols. In admitting this testimony, the district court reasoned that the statement was admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a coconspirator's statement made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 62 Prior to admitting a statement under rule 801(d)(2)(E), the court must determine that the Government has satisfied three requirements. The Government must prove, by evidence independent of the challenged statement, that a conspiracy existed. Also, it must prove that both the hearsay declarant and the defendant against whom the statement is offered are members of the conspiracy. Finally, the Government must establish that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir.1983). See also United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 696 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir.1978). In this case, the Government filed a Santiago memorandum seeking to demonstrate the satisfaction of these elements, and the district court found that the Government had met its burden of proof with respect to these prerequisites for admissibility of a statement under rule 801(d)(2)(E). 63 On appeal, defendant Gironda challenges only two elements of the district court's Santiago ruling. First, defendant argues that the Government failed to prove that Nichols was a member of the conspiracy. Second, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Nichols made the statement to Ruiz in furtherance of the conspiracy. 64 Once the Government proves the existence of a conspiracy, the Government need only offer slight evidence to prove that an individual was a member of the conspiracy. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 685 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124, 102 S.Ct. 2944, 73 L.Ed.2d 1340; United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994, 100 S.Ct. 530, 62 L.Ed.2d 425. This court finds that, on the basis of the evidence offered at trial, the district court did not err in determining that Nichols was a member of the conspiracy. 65 Similarly, this court finds that the district court's determination that Nichols relayed Gironda's threat to Ruiz to further the conspiracy was not clearly erroneous. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 609 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1354, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985). Defendant argues that Nichols informed Ruiz about Gironda's threatening phone call to cause him to move out of Nichols' residence. The Government, on the other hand, argues that Nichols told Ruiz about the call to inform Ruiz that the conspiracy had stalled and to pressure him into moving more quickly with the scheme. In light of the facts that defendants were becoming frustrated by the failure of the conspiracy and that Nichols was a member of the conspiracy, this court does not find clearly erroneous the district court's determination that Nichols intended to further the conspiracy by conveying Gironda's threat to Ruiz. 66 The second portion of Ruiz' testimony concerned defendant Gironda's threat that, if Ruiz and Velazquez did not follow through with the conspiracy, they would end up dead in the trunk of a car. Ruiz testified that Nichols received the threatening phone call. Nichols did not testify at trial, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Because Nichols refused to testify, defendant Gironda argues, the Government failed to lay the proper foundation for the admissibility of Gironda's threatening statements. 67 Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs the authentication requirement, provides that voice identification may be made by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(5). To satisfy the requirements of rule 901, the proponent may establish the identification by direct or circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 1338, 63 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980); United States v. Zweig, 467 F.2d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1111, 93 S.Ct. 921, 34 L.Ed.2d 692 (1973). 68 In this case, the Government authenticated Gironda's statement by offering direct evidence to show that Nichols was familiar with Gironda's voice and could have recognized it over the phone. According to the trial testimony, Nichols had met Gironda on at least three occasions prior to the telephone call. Additionally, Ruiz testified that during at least one of these meetings Nichols engaged in extended conversation with Gironda. Ruiz' testimony that Nichols stated that he had received a phone call from Chubby, the nickname that Ruiz and Nichols used to identify Gironda, further demonstrated that Nichols recognized Gironda's voice. Since the district court's finding that Nichols was familiar with Gironda's voice was not clearly erroneous, see United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 811, 814 (4th Cir.1983); United States v. Thomas, 586 F.2d 123, 133 (9th Cir.1978), this court will not disturb the district court's conclusion that the Government laid a proper foundation for Gironda's statement. See United States v. Vitale, 549 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir.1977) (rule 901(b)(5) satisfied through evidence that proponent had spoken with defendant on three occasions subsequent to phone call); cert. denied, 431 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 1704, 52 L.Ed.2d 393. 69 Ruiz' testimony concerning the substance of Gironda's threats toward Nichols presents no hearsay problems. Clearly, the Government did not offer Gironda's statement to prove that Ruiz and Velazquez would in fact end up dead if they did not cooperate. Rather, the Government intended to show that threats were a part of the conspiracy and that Gironda was involved in the conspiracy. See United States v. Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Pate, 543 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir.1976). 70 Defendant Gironda's final objection to the admissibility of Ruiz' testimony concerning the phone call is that the Government violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by failing to put Nichols on the stand. Although the standards for evaluating a confrontation clause challenge to testimony admitted under rule 801(c)(2)(E) vary from circuit to circuit, this court has stated in numerous cases that the admissibility of a statement under rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not offend the confrontation clause. United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 987 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682; United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 (7th Cir.1977). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in deciding that the confrontation clause did not bar the admissibility of statements under rule 801(d)(2)(E).