Opinion ID: 1153076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the court should have found for appellants on their claim for breach of contract to make a will

Text: Alvarez argues that Dixie contracted with Vernard to make a testamentary gift to benefit the Church in the amount of 50% of their estate, and that Vernard contracted with Dixie to make a testamentary gift benefitting her great grandchildren in the amount of 50% of their estate. Dixie performed her part of the contract, and the contract became irrevocable at her death; therefore, Vernard was under a legal obligation to comply with the bargain. Alvarez asserts a third-party claim on this contract theory. Coleman argues that there is no evidence of a contract between the Drokes. A contract to devise or bequeath property by will is valid. Williams v. Mason, 556 So.2d 1045, 1048 (Miss. 1990); Trotter v. Trotter, 490 So.2d 827, 830 (Miss. 1986); Estate of McKellar v. Brown, 404 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1981); Monroe v. Holleman, 185 So.2d at 443; Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574 (1860). In Monroe, supra, we discussed the construction of joint wills: the will of two or more persons executed pursuant to an oral agreement or understanding, may, within itself, when considered and construed together, constitute a contract. The construction of joint and mutual wills and the contract under which they are made is governed by the rules relating to the construction of wills and contracts generally, including the rule that the situation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are to be taken into consideration so as to determine the intent of the testators. Monroe, 185 So.2d at 448. Vernard's and Dixie's wills were clearly executed, together with the trust instrument, pursuant to an agreement or understanding. Considered and construed together, as directed by Monroe, the instruments constitute a contract. We held in Monroe that the surviving wife impermissibly repudiated the contract she and her husband had made concerning the disposition of their property: Construing the will here involved in the light of the contract which is a part of the will, we are convinced that the surviving testator could not legally give away a great part of the corpus of the estate and thereby defeat the agreement therein contained that whatever of the estate remains after the death of both of us shall pass to our respective families, one-half to each family    We are of the opinion that the testimony in this case shows clearly that Maggie Lou Holleman attempted to disregard her agreement by placing a great part of the estate in joint accounts and joint bonds in an effort to transfer the residue of the estate to her own family in preference to an equal division of the residue between their respective families. Moreover, the persons preferred are persons the testators agreed in their contract in the will should only receive one-half interest in the residue of the estate.       After having carefully considered the evidence in this case and the terms of the will here involved, we are convinced that the instrument is a mutual and reciprocal will and is contractual in nature. We hold, therefore, that Maggie Lou Holleman was estopped to repudiate the agreement contained in the will, and that she could not defeat the clear intention of the will by giving a large part of the estate to her family in preference to that of her husband's family. Monroe, 185 So.2d at 448-449. Vernard, the surviving testator, was similarly bound by the contract contained in the November 18, 1981, wills and trust instrument, and similarly estopped from repudiating that contract. Dixie's half-interest in the marital estate became vested upon her death; Vernard could not thereafter revoke the mutual wills and trust agreement. In Trotter v. Trotter , we considered the breach of a contract not to revoke a will. We stated that the breach of such contract was not grounds for contesting the will itself, but that the promisor's heirs might have a remedy on the contract or perhaps upon a constructive trust theory. 490 So.2d at 832. In the case at bar, there was a contract to place all assets in a trust, to give the surviving spouse unlimited use and control over the assets, and to divide the residue of the estate (contained in the trust) at the survivor's death between Vernard's designee, the Church, and Dixie's designee, her great grandchildren. Vernard breached this contract by attempting to transfer the residue of the estate to his designee exclusively. Dixie's great grandchildren may maintain a third party claim on this contract theory.