Opinion ID: 2593107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: conclusion

Text: ¶ 40 The majority inappropriately broadens the conceptual transfer of intent codified in RCW 9A.36.011 to create a dangerously limitless principle of law: as long as the defendant has the requisite mens rea with regard to any one person, she or he bears the risk of multiple convictions ... regardless of whether the defendant knows of their presence. Majority at 444. Under this reasoning, the act of firing a single bullet at a single intended victim can support criminal liability limited only by the number of people who apprehend harm from the shot. The legislature has provided other statutory options for charging a defendant who causes no injury but creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person[(s)]. RCW 9A.36.050. With these statutes and the conceptual difficulties that arise when intent is transferred to uninjured victims, I find it unlikely that the legislature intended the first degree assault statute as a vehicle to impose nearly limitless criminal liability. I cannot uphold Elmi's convictions of first degree assault for unintended, unknown victims. WE CONCUR: MARY E. FAIRHURST and RICHARD B. SANDERS, JJ.