Opinion ID: 1810222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of our dismissal.

Text: We turn briefly to plaintiffs' claim our prior mootness dismissal validated their 1975 summary judgment. At the outset, it is plain that dismissal did not purport to determine the question of lease duration. Because three years had expired, we said our attempt to resolve this appeal would amount to an interdicted advisory opinion because any rights asserted by lessees, if granted, would have terminated March 1, 1977, a time now passed. The matter then before us, on its face, was a forcible entry and detainer case in which the sole question was possession, not a claim for damages for holding over. See State ex rel. Turner v. Buechele, 236 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1975) (The test [of mootness] is whether an opinion would be of force and effect as to the underlying controversy. ) (emphasis in original). Although in retrospect it was unfortunate that we did not dismiss the appeal because there was no valid judgment from which to appeal, we now hold our above decision did not resolve the issue of lease term, nor validate a judgment entered where no action was pending, despite any language in the procedendo which subsequently issued. See Lanahan v. City of Los Angeles, 14 Cal.2d 128, 133-34, 92 P.2d 1014, 1016-17 (1939); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1384, at 503 (1958) (On dismissal, the whole case is out of court, and it cannot in any manner pass on the merits of the action or determine questions raised in the briefs concerning the merits . . ..). A void judgment remains subject to collateral attack. Peterson v. Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1970); see Lewis v. Shaw, 77 Cal.App. 99, 101, 246 P. 86, 86-87 (1926); Schmehl v. Mellinger, 325 Pa. 487, 489-90, 191 A. 62, 63 (1937); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1384, at 505 & n.60 (1958) (The dismissal of an appeal from a void order or judgment on a ground which does not involve its validity [ e. g., mootness] does not impart to the order or judgment any validity which it would not have had if there had been no appeal.). Thus our mootness dismissal of defendants' prior appeal did not affirm the question of trial court's jurisdiction to enter a judgment where no action was pending. But once brought to our attention, the question of subject matter jurisdiction must be disposed of, no matter in what manner of form or stage presented. Walles v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 252 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Iowa), cert. denied sub nom. Walles v. Bechtel Corp., 434 U.S. 856, 98 S.Ct. 175, 54 L.Ed.2d 127 (1977); see Qualley v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 261 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1978). Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is vacated. This matter is remanded to district court with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice to plaintiffs. Costs are to be assessed to plaintiffs. This disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by these parties in this appeal. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS. All Justices concur except McCORMICK, J., who concurs specially, and HARRIS, J., who takes no part.