Opinion ID: 324541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Contempt Element

Text: 39 The prosecutor admittedly had been advised by Ms. Norton's personal counsel that she would decline to answer questions going beyond the scope of her grand jury testimony. Anderson asserts that after that declaration the calling of Ms. Norton as a witness was improper and prejudicial, and that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a mistrial on that account. We do not agree. 40 The present situation is quite unlike that in cases, cited by Anderson, wherein the prosecutor called a witness in full awareness that the witness would invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. 92 Here the prosecutor had brought to the trial judge's attention Ms. Norton's unwillingness to testify voluntarily, and had sought and obtained for her a grant of immunity from prosecution. Thereafter, the prosecutor had every right to demand and to expect her testimony, under compulsion by the court if necessary, despite her preference to the contrary. 93 41 We perceive no impropriety in the handling of the problem by either the prosecutor or the judge, and no ground for overturning the ruling on Anderson's ensuing motion. Declaration of a mistrial in a criminal case is a step to be avoided whenever possible, 94 and one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor. 95 Relunctance of a prosecution witness is not such an occasion; 96 rather, the court's duty is to secure the witness' testimony if compellable, and to give appropriate curative instructions to the jury, if necessary, to restore order in the trial. 97 42 In the case at bar, the trial judge, out of the jury's presence, warned Ms. Norton of the consequences of the course she was taking, and adjudged her in contempt when she persisted. The judge also instructed the jury not to draw any inference of any kind from Ms. Norton's recalcitrance, or speculate as to what Ms. Norton's additional testimony would have been. Those steps fulfilled the judge's responsibility during the period Ms. Norton remained adamant. When Ms. Norton later recanted and returned to the witness stand for questioning by all counsel, any threat to Anderson's Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-examination--on account of her pre-contempt testimony--was eliminated from the trial. We do not find Anderson any the worse off because of this experience, and there is no occasion for us to determine what disposition would have been called for had Ms. Norton remained steadfast in her decision to say no more.