Opinion ID: 2014176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant maintains that the State's case consisted of weak, circumstantial evidence, i.e., that no physical evidence established that he was at the crime scene; that the gun used to murder Beasley was found in the possession of another man, who was not charged with a crime; that the forensic hair evidence did not establish that the victims were in the van used by defendant; that the evidence of motive was conflicting; and that there was evidence that someone other than defendant could have committed the murders. When considering a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of this court to retry the defendant. People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill.2d 24, 43, 227 Ill.Dec. 779, 688 N.E.2d 116 (1997). Rather, the relevant question on appeal is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); People v. Young, 128 Ill.2d 1, 49, 131 Ill.Dec. 86, 538 N.E.2d 461 (1989). Only where the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt will a conviction be set aside. People v. Brown, 185 Ill.2d 229, 247, 235 Ill.Dec. 626, 705 N.E.2d 809 (1998); McDonald, 168 Ill.2d at 444, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, provided that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged. McDonald, 168 Ill.2d at 444, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832; People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d 484, 515, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996). The trier of fact need not, however, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. It is sufficient if all of the evidence taken together satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Jones, 105 Ill.2d 342, 350, 86 Ill.Dec. 453, 475 N.E.2d 832 (1985). Based on our examination of the evidence in light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Masters and Beasley beyond a reasonable doubt. There was credible evidence that the 9-millimeter handgun, which delivered the fatal shot to Beasley, was purchased by defendant's wife and delivered to defendant in St. Louis shortly before the murders. Although defendant testified that he sold the gun prior to the murders, the jury was free to disregard such testimony as not credible. Further, the fact that Monaco McNeil, from whom the gun was eventually recovered, was not charged with a crime does not diminish the fact that one of the murder weapons was traced directly to defendant. In addition, Sherry Harris unequivocally testified that on the evening of October 3, 1994, defendant, upon seeing the Merkur in the parking lot of the Colony North Apartments, took a shotgun from the van in which they were riding, pointed it at the light-skinned driver of the Merkur, and angrily ordered the two women out of the vehicle. These events occurred within two hours of the murders. Significantly, Harris is a neutral third party. She met defendant once and has no relationship with the other witnesses or the victims. Harris' testimony is also consistent with the other prosecution witnesses who testified that they had seen a shotgun in defendant's possession during the months immediately prior to the murders. Furthermore, there exists credible evidence that defendant made inculpatory statements shortly after the murders. At the car rental agency, defendant explained that he was wiping down the rental van because of evidence, fingerprints. Defendant also told Michelle Smith that Masters was dead, and that he needed to move because the motel room was registered in Masters' name. Defendant argues that the evidence of motive was conflicting. The State presented evidence that defendant was a controlling person, that he regarded Masters as merely someone he needed to help him rent cars and hotel rooms, and that the Merkur became the object of a tug-of-war between defendant and Masters. To the extent there exists a conflict in the evidence as to defendant's reaction to Masters' use of the Merkur, such a conflict is for the trier of fact to resolve. See Digirolamo, 179 Ill.2d at 46, 227 Ill.Dec. 779, 688 N.E.2d 116; McDonald, 168 Ill.2d at 448-49, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832. Defendant also challenges the State's forensic hair evidence, arguing that such evidence does not establish that the victims were ever in the rental van. Defendant cites to testimony from the State's forensic scientist that the hairs recovered from the van could have been innocently transferred, and that no DNA testing was performed on the Caucasian hair, although certain DNA testing was available in 1994. Defendant also argues that no witness was able to testify conclusively that the hairs recovered from the van matched the hair samples taken from Masters and Beasley. Any infirmities in the testimony of the State's expert witness merely go to the weight of the evidence and the expert's credibility as a witness. These determinations were for the jury, as the finder of fact, to make. See McDonald, 168 Ill.2d at 448-49, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832; Young, 128 Ill.2d at 51, 131 Ill.Dec. 86, 538 N.E.2d 461. Defendant further argues that there was evidence that someone other than defendant could have committed the murders. Defendant relies upon testimony that a burgundy vehicle with three black males was observed in the parking lot of the Colony North Apartments, just a few spaces away from where the Merkur was parked, and that Masters was seen with a large amount of cash. Defendant's theory is that after he confronted Masters and Beasley in the parking lot, the three men in the burgundy car accosted the women, and then abducted and murdered the women, perhaps for the money, coincidentally using the very handgun which defendant's wife purchased for defendant and sent to him in St. Louis. Where circumstantial evidence relied upon to support the defense that someone other than the defendant committed the crime is unsatisfactory, based upon mere surmise or possibility, a hypothesis of innocence may be rejected by the trier of fact. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 533, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995). We conclude that such is the case here, and that the jury could properly reject defendant's theory of innocence. Moreover, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence and to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt. McDonald, 168 Ill.2d at 447, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832. Finally, defendant argues that reversal of defendant's conviction is warranted under People v. Smith, 185 Ill.2d 532, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365 (1999). We disagree. In Smith, the victim was shot and killed outside a bar by a gunman wearing dark clothing. This court reversed the defendant's murder conviction where the testimony of the State's key witness, the only witness who identified the defendant as the gunman, was repeatedly impeached and contained serious inconsistencies with the testimony of other witnesses. The record in Smith also indicated that the State's key witness had a motive to falsely implicate the defendant. Further, the only circumstantial evidence of the defendant's involvement in the crime was his presence in the bar and the dark clothing that he wore. We concluded that the evidence merely narrowed the class of individuals who may have killed the victim, but that it did not point specifically to the defendant, as there were two other men with the defendant on the night of the shooting, both of whom also wore dark clothing. In contrast to the Smith case, the testimony of the State's key witness in this case, Sherry Harris, stands unimpeached and is consistent with the testimony of other witnesses as to defendant's possession of a shotgun. There is nothing in the record suggesting a reason for Harris to implicate defendant falsely. As noted earlier, Harris has no relationship with defendant, with the victims, or with the other witnesses. Further, unlike the Smith case, the circumstantial evidence in this case, i.e., defendant's angry confrontation with the victims, his possession of one of the murder weapons, and his inculpatory statements, points specifically to defendant. We conclude that the evidence is not so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.