Opinion ID: 2637623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Erroneous Felony-murder Special-circumstance Instructions

Text: With respect to the felony-murder special-circumstance allegations, the trial court gave a separate instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.81.17 for each allegation. Each instruction was virtually identical and stated in relevant part that: To find ... the special circumstance ... to be true, it must be proved: [¶] 1. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of [the specified felony]; or [¶] 2. The murder was committed during the immediate flight after the commission or attempted commission of [the specified felony] by the defendant; or [¶] 3. The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of [the specified felony] or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. Defendant contends the instruction's use of the disjunctive or (italicized above) rather than the conjunctive and was erroneous and is reversible per se. In the alternative, defendant contends the error was not harmless because the jury could have found the special circumstances to be true without finding that defendant committed the murder in furtherance of the robberies, kidnapping, or rapes. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, overruled on other grounds by People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99 and People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 236-237, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512 [to find true a felonymurder special circumstance, the jury must find that the defendant committed the murder in order to advance an independent felonious purpose].) Although we agree that the instruction was defective, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As an initial matter, we reject defendant's contention that the error is reversible per se, even though a recent United States Supreme Court decision has partially undermined People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 247 Cal.Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184. In Odle, we held that there is no right under the Sixth or Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution to have a jury determine the existence of all of the elements of a special circumstance. ( Id. at p. 411, 247 Cal.Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184.) This holding is now erroneous after Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 609 [122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d 556], which held that a juryand not a judge must find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Ring did not, however, undermine the core holding of Odle that an erroneous instruction that omits an element of a special circumstance is subject to harmless error analysis pursuant to Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824. Because the omission of an element [of a substantive offense] is an error that is subject to harmless-error analysis under Chapman ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35), by analogy, the erroneous omission of an element of a special circumstance is still subject to that same analysis, notwithstanding Ring. We therefore review this instructional error under a harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. In this case, there was no evidence that reasonably or rationally suggests that defendant committed the robberies, kidnappings, or rapes in order to carry out or advance the murder. ( People v. Williams (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1763, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 128.) Defendant and his cohorts were in the midst of robbing Rangel when the three women drove up. After seeing the women, they let Rangel go and robbed the women. They then kidnapped the women and took them away in one of the victim's cars. No evidence suggests that defendant or his cohorts intended to murder Woodruff at the time they formed the intent to rob and kidnap the women or that the robberies and kidnappings were incidental to the murder. Rather, the evidence strongly suggests that defendant committed the murder in order to advance the robberies and kidnappings or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. Indeed, Sorian's promise during the kidnappings that they would not hurt the women arguably suggests that defendant and his cohorts did not have the intent to commit murder before they had the intent to commit robbery and kidnapping. Later, defendant and his cohorts took the women to an empty field where they raped them. Defendant then shot and killed Woodruff. At best, this evidence suggests that defendant developed the intent to kill Woodruff and the intent to rape her at the same time. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 182, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150 [concurrent intent to kill and commit a felony supports a felony-murder specialcircumstance finding].) Thus, the evidence shows that defendant committed the murder to advance the rape or to facilitate his escape or to avoid detectionand did not commit the rape to further the murder. Accordingly, the failure to give CALJIC No. 8.81.17 in the conjunctive was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Williams, at p. 1764, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 128.)