Opinion ID: 1708994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in failing to give grayco's requested jury instructions?

Text: Plaintiff Grayco asserts that the trial court erred in not giving its requested charges number 8 through number 29. Rule 51, Ala.R.Civ.P., provides that refusal of a requested written instruction shall not be cause for reversal on appeal if it appears that the same rule of law was substantially and fairly given ... in the court's oral charge. In reviewing instructions to determine if they correctly set forth the applicable law, we must read and consider the charge as a whole. Allen v. Mobile Interstate Piledrivers, 475 So.2d 530, 536 (Ala.1985), Alabama Power Co. v. Tatum, 293 Ala. 500, 504, 306 So.2d 251, 254 (1975), First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, Walter E. Heller & Co. v. First Virginia Bankshares, 435 U.S. 952, 98 S.Ct. 1580, 55 L.Ed.2d 802 (1978). Upon review of the oral charge, we find the trial judge charged the jury on the elements of breach of contract and common law fraud (including willful misrepresentation, reckless misrepresentation, mistaken misrepresentation, and suppression of truth), spelling out the elements required for a finding of liability in each. The second portion of the trial judge's charge involved securities fraud. It is this section to which Grayco objects. There is no need to list every error Plaintiff alleges on the part of the trial court. The following are a few. Plaintiff submits that the trial judge: 1) failed to orally charge the jury regarding both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), Code 1975, § 8-6-19 (Plaintiffs' requested charge 8), [1] 2) failed to properly charge the jury regarding subsection (1) of Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C.A. § 771 (1)] (Plaintiffs' requested charge 9), [2] 3) failed to properly charge the jury regarding the essential elements of a legal action for the sale of an unregistered security under 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(1) (Plaintiffs' requested charges 10 and 12), [3] 4) failed to orally charge the jury that scienter is not required to prove a case for the sale of an unregistered security (Plaintiffs' requested charge 11). [4] The above serve to illustrate the kind of objections raised by Plaintiff. Except as noted below, Plaintiff's objections are well founded. The trial judge did not charge on § 8-6-19(a)(1), Code 1975, [5] as requested. Neither did the trial court instruct the jury as to the first provision of Section 12, Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C.A. § 77 l (1)]. [6] Plaintiffs' requested charges numbers 13 [7] and 14, [8] specified what plaintiff must show in order to recover under § 12(2) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 77 l (2)) and under what conditions liability is established under the statute. In considering the oral charge as a whole, as required by Rule 51, we find that these two charges (charges 13 and 14) were given in that they were part of the general charge on 15 U.S.C.S. § 77 l (2). Although the trial judge indicates otherwise on the list of charges found in the record, the substance of the remaining charges at issue here (charges 10-12 and 15-29) was not covered by his oral instructions. Grayco points out that these charges relate to the Alabama securities statute as well, because § 8-6-19 is modeled on the federal Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1) and (2). Additionally, Plaintiff suggests that a mere reading of the securities statute alone would be insufficient, because there is a marked difference between a legal action based on common law fraud, on the one hand, and a claimed securities violation under § 12(1) and (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Ala.Code 1975, § 8-6-19, on the other hand. We agree with Plaintiff. While [i]n itself there is nothing improper with charging a jury in the language of a statute, when one of the issues in the case is whether the statute was breached, Merchant's Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. Lane, 259 F.2d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935, 79 S.Ct. 651, 3 L.Ed.2d 636 (1959), [t]o repeat statutory language is not sufficient unless its meaning and application to the facts are clear without explanation. Structural Rubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707 (Fed.Cir.1984), quoting 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2556 at 658 (1971). We agree with Circuit Judge Freeman's concurrence in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., when he said that [a]n academic recitation of the language of a statute without any direction as to how it may be applied to the disputed facts before the jury is too general to furnish guidance to them. 350 F.2d 479, 487 (3rd Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987, 86 S.Ct. 549, 15 L.Ed.2d 475 (1966), modified on other grounds, 370 F.2d 93, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009, 87 S.Ct. 1350, 18 L.Ed.2d 436 (1967). In regard to a trial judge's duty to charge on the law, we agree with the court in Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.1964), when it stated that, even though there were imperfections in the requested charges in that case, [t]he Judge has an obligation to charge on the essential elements of the case and instruct the jury as to the law on matters which developments of the trial have made significant and important. 334 F.2d at 137. Here, Plaintiff submitted charges which would have better educated the jurors on how they could apply the state and federal securities statutes to the facts of the case. We have repeatedly held that each party is entitled to have proper instructions given the jury regarding the issues presented in the case. Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 356 So.2d 646 (Ala.1978), State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Dodd, 276 Ala. 410, 162 So.2d 621 (1964), Jones v. Blackman, 284 Ala. 684, 228 So.2d 1 (1969), Calvert v. Bynum, 255 Ala. 172, 50 So.2d 731 (1951). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to give certain of Plaintiffs' requested jury charges as noted. The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.