Opinion ID: 2981262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michigan’s Aiding and Abetting Jurisprudence

Text: Parham submits that the jury instructions violated his constitutional due-process right that “the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979). This is because, according to Parham, the aiding-and-abetting jury instruction allowed Parham to be convicted on a lower mens rea standard than would be required for the principal offense. Specifically, he argues that the aiding-and-abetting instruction permitted conviction based on mere knowledge of the principal’s intent, whereas the underlying offense of first-degree premeditated murder requires the defendant himself to have an intent to kill with premeditation and deliberation. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(a). The Michigan statute providing liability for aiding and abetting states simply: Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its -6- No. 09-2510 Parham v. Warren commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense. Mich. Comp. Laws § 767.39. The Michigan Supreme Court has explained that “[u]nlike conspiracy and felony murder, which also allow the state to punish a person for the acts of another, aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense. Rather, ‘being an aider and abettor is simply a theory of prosecution’ that permits the imposition of vicarious liability for accomplices.” People v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Mich. 2006) (internal citation omitted). The statute does not supply any particular mens rea standard for aiders and abettors but instead provides that they should be “tried” as if they were principals. In the absence of a statutory definition for “aiding and abetting,” the Michigan Supreme Court established a three-part test: (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the defendant] gave aid and encouragement. Moore, 679 N.W.2d at 49 (quoting People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 141 (Mich. 1999)) (emphasis added). This test was designed to follow the common law, under which “[p]rincipals in the second degree had to intend to commit the crime charged or else be aware of the intent of the principal in the first degree to commit that crime.”5 Robinson, 715 N.W.2d at 48 (emphasis added). 5 Of course, satisfaction of this mental state must be coupled with a requisite act before a person may be subject to liability. People v. Norris, 600 N.W.2d 658, 663 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“Mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed or is being committed, is insufficient to establish that a defendant aided or assisted in the commission of the -7- No. 09-2510 Parham v. Warren Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court has established a mens rea standard for aiding and abetting that includes the very “knowledge” requirement included in Parham’s jury instructions: “knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the defendant] gave aid and encouragement.”6 Id. (quoting Moore, 679 N.W.2d at 49). The state post-conviction court was thus correct in observing that the aiding-and-abetting jury instruction was consistent with Michigan case law. See id. (“[K]nowledge of the accomplice’s intent constitutes sufficient mens rea to convict under [Michigan’s] aiding and abetting statute.”). Parham suggests that Michigan courts have not, in fact, held that a mens rea of “knowing” is sufficient to convict for first-degree premeditated murder and that the cases cited by the State only address crimes in which the underlying offence does not require specific intent. Further, he notes that the Michigan Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he ‘requisite intent’ for conviction of a crime as an aider and abettor ‘is that necessary to be convicted of the crime as a principal.’” People v. Mass, 628 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Mich. 2001) (quoting People v. Kelly, 378 N.W.2d 365, 378 (Mich. 1985)). Nonetheless, although Michigan aiding-and-abetting case law has developed by considering primarily non-specific-intent offenses, some recent cases have applied the same rules to first-degree premeditated murder, without considering the possible conflict. See People v. Al-Jamailawi, No. 292774, 2011 WL 2022952, at  (Mich. Ct. App. May 24, 2011); People v. Harris, No. 287724, crime.”). 6 To satisfy the knowledge element, a defendant must have had “no substantial doubt” that the principal intended to kill. James v. Lafler, 452 F. App’x 673, 676 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Echelon Homes, L.L.C. v. Carter Lumber Co., 694 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Mich. 2005)). -8- No. 09-2510 Parham v. Warren 2010 WL 2925380, at  (Mich. Ct. App. July 27, 2010); People v. Bennett, 802 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).7 The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation determined that Michigan’s aiding-and- abetting instruction was unconstitutional when applied to specific-intent crimes because an instruction allowing the jury to convict Parham upon finding intent or knowledge “is incompatible with the mental state needed to prove first degree premeditated murder,” which is only intent. This instruction, the magistrate judge observed, “allowed conviction of [Parham] in violation of the ‘elementary principle of due process that every element of the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Caldwell v. Bell, 288 F.3d 838, 841 (6th Cir. 2002)); See Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 302-03 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Flowers v. Blackburn, 779 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1986)) (finding that a similar jury instruction unconstitutionally “relieved the state of the burden of proving [defendant’s] specific intent to kill”). Despite the troubling nature of this issue to some of us, we need not resolve it in this case because, as discussed below, the surrounding portions of Parham’s jury instructions provided sufficient explanation of the proper “intent” mens rea. Moreover, the evidence against Parham and the circumstances of the crime would make any error harmless. 7 The Bennett dissent concluded that there was no evidence the defendant intended for the victim to be killed and that she had essentially been convicted for “gross negligence.” Id. at 643 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). The jury instructions given in that case would allow the conviction of someone who, “whether because of stupidity, fear, self-delusion, or some other reason, . . . provides the assistance with the genuine subjective belief that it will not aid in a crime.” Id. However, Judge Shapiro’s solution was not to require a specific intent but rather to alter the jury instructions to require a subjective, rather than a “reasonable person,” inquiry as to the defendant’s knowledge. Id. -9- No. 09-2510 Parham v. Warren