Opinion ID: 510038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pain and Suffering Award

Text: 16 We next discuss plaintiff's damages claims. Damages in FTCA actions are determined by the law of the state in which the tort occurred. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 592, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir.1964). Generally, under New York law a plaintiff may recover his loss of earnings, medical expenses, and mental and physical pain and suffering. See 36 N.Y.Jur.2d Damages Sec. 57, at 102-03 (1984). 17 As noted earlier, the district court initially awarded Ulrich $500,000 for past and future pain and suffering related to his paraplegia, but reduced that award to $125,000 in its final judgment and order. The reason for the $375,000 reduction, the district judge explained, was the court's [t]aking into account the additional Veterans Administration Benefits plaintiff has received and will receive as a direct result of his accident. The district court also stated--we think inconsistently--that Ulrich's pain and suffering award was not subject to set-off by his increased VA benefits. 18 Regardless of the terminology it used when fixing the pain and suffering award, when the trial court took into account plaintiff's increased VA benefits it effectively setoff those benefits against the original $500,000 pain and suffering award. The $375,000 reduction was roughly equivalent to the value of Ulrich's increased Sec. 314(o ) benefits. Yet, the only statutory authority that arguably supports a set-off of increased VA benefits against a pain and suffering award is not applicable here. Congress has provided that an increase in government disability benefits accruing to a plaintiff as a result of his injuries should be set off against any damages awarded him when those benefits are awarded under 38 U.S.C. Sec. 351 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 1 Although throughout much of the trial the court assumed that Sec. 351 applied, the government unequivocably informed the court before the final determination of damages that Sec. 351 did not apply because Ulrich's increased disability benefits were awarded pursuant to 38 U.S.C. Sec. 314(o ), (r)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Congress does not provide for benefits awarded under Sec. 314 to be setoff against any other sums awarded to a plaintiff. Thus, unlike Sec. 351 benefits, there is no statutory authority for setting off Sec. 314 benefits against plaintiff's pain and suffering award. 19 Moreover, plaintiff's increased Sec. 314 benefits are not the equivalent of pain and suffering damages, a circumstance which might justify a set-off. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53-54, 69 S.Ct. 918, 920-21, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949) (indicating that set-off might be appropriate where tort damages are the equivalent of elements taken into account in providing disability payments); Pike v. United States, 652 F.2d 31, 34 (9th Cir.1981) (set-off appropriate only where benefits are intended to compensate for same element of damages as FTCA award); Mosley v. United States, 538 F.2d 555, 561 (4th Cir.1976) (same); Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355, 360-61 (6th Cir.1969) (same); Powers v. United States, 589 F.Supp. 1084, 1107 (D.Conn.1984) (same); see also Christopher v. United States, 237 F.Supp. 787, 799 (E.D.Pa.1965) (Certainly pain and suffering has no bearing on what disability rating a veteran will receive and could not be construed to be a duplication of benefits.). It is clear from the statutory scheme that increased Sec. 314 benefits are intended to compensate a veteran for his loss of earning capacity, not for pain and suffering. For example, impairment ratings used for calculating the amount of Sec. 314 benefits due a disabled veteran are based, as far as practicable, upon the average impairments of earning capacity. 38 U.S.C. Sec. 355 (Supp. IV 1986). A VA claims examiner also testified at trial that Ulrich's increased Sec. 314 benefits were intended only to compensate for his loss in earning capacity. 20 From this it is evident that the district court's set-off of the Sec. 314 benefits against Ulrich's pain and suffering award took from him a benefit to which he was rightfully entitled. Thus, it was error. Accordingly, the $125,000 award for past and future pain and suffering must be reversed and the district court's original $500,000 award for these damages reinstated. 21 Further, plaintiff is not entitled to an additional award for loss of enjoyment of life, since the trial judge permissibly took into account Ulrich's loss of enjoyment of life in assessing his damages for pain and suffering. See McDougald v. Garber, 135 A.D.2d 80, 88-94, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dept. 1988) ([L]oss of enjoyment of life may be measured in damages in New York as an element of pain and suffering.). Yet, the award of $500,000 for pain and suffering must be remanded solely for the purpose of allowing the district court to discount that award to present value in accordance with our opinion in Metz v. United Technologies Corp., 754 F.2d 63, 66-68 (2d Cir.1985). See Oliveri v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 849 F.2d 742, 745-52 (2d Cir.1988); Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 40 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971, 101 S.Ct. 2049, 68 L.Ed.2d 351 (1981).