Opinion ID: 2209974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory requirement for exhaustion.

Text: We turn to the second condition of the exhaustion doctrine. The county argues the administrator of the waiver program failed to recognize any review process for the county. It also argues no statute exists which explicitly requires it to exhaust the DHS remedy before court intervention. In determining whether administrative remedies must be exhausted before court intervention, we look to the intent of our legislature. Aschan, 446 N.W.2d at 793. We consider the objectives the legislature sought to accomplish and construe the statute to best affect legislative intent. Id. Where no explicit statutory direction exists, we consider whether the exhaustion requirement would be consistent with the statutory scheme, so that any implied exhaustion requirement is tailored to fit the role the legislature assigned to the agency. 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 506, at 492-93 (1994). Although there is no explicit statutory authority requiring a county to exhaust administrative remedies following a waiver-eligibility decision, we find exhaustion is implied. The DHS is responsible for determining eligibility for medical assistance under Title XIX programs. See generally Iowa Code ch. 249A; Iowa Admin. Code r. 44183.61 (1999). This includes eligibility for the HCBSMR waiver program. Thus, the legislature has placed the decisionmaking responsibility in the hands of the DHS. Although the DHS has transferred the initial determination to the expertise of IFMC, a review process is provided within the DHS. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 4417.5. (Any person or group of persons may file an appeal with the department concerning any issue.). Moreover, section 249A.4(14) specifically provides that judicial review of decisions of the department of human services may be sought in accordance with chapter 17A. Iowa Code section 17A.19 permits any person aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action to seek judicial review of that action. We think the clear implication of the statutory scheme requires the county to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking review by the courts. Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the underlying rationale of the exhaustion doctrine.