Opinion ID: 1965767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Life Without Parole Proceedings and Sentence

Text: A. Murder for Hire After the jury found defendant guilty of murder, the state pursued its previous recommendation of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, under § 11-23-2(3). Section 11-23-2 says in relevant part: Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be imprisoned for life. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree:    (3) committed at the direction of another person in return for money or any other thing of monetary value from that person    shall be imprisoned for life and if ordered by the court pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12 that person shall not be eligible for parole from imprisonment. Over defendant's objection, and in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 12-19.2-1, [16] the trial justice asked the jurors to determine whether they believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant killed Sanjeev Patel at the direction of T.J. Patel in exchange for money. The jury answered in the affirmative, making defendant eligible for a life sentence without parole. On appeal, defendant argues that the jury should not even have been able to consider murder for hire because of the alternate theories of liability presented to the jury and because of a paucity of evidence that defendant was paid in advance for the murder. The state counters that its only theory during trial was that defendant, not T.J. Patel, was the shooter and that there was sufficient evidence that defendant agreed to kill the victim in return for money. We hold that it was completely appropriate for the trial justice to ask the jury to determine whether this killing was a murder for hire. To convict a defendant of murder for hire, the state must prove that (1) the defendant committed a murder, (2) at the direction of another, (3) in return for money. See § 11-23-2(3). Despite defendant's assertion to the contrary, we believe ample evidence was presented at trial that defendant killed the victim at T.J. Patel's request in exchange for money. First, there was substantial evidence that defendant was the one who shot and killed the victim. Both Prena and Jay Patel, who were extremely familiar with T.J. Patel and undoubtedly would have recognized him, instead identified defendant as the victim's shooter. Additionally, Dwayne Daniels and Dale Hardy both testified that defendant admitted to them that he had shot and killed the victim. Second, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial that the murder was committed at the direction of T.J. Patel. The defendant testified that he came to Portsmouth on T.J.'s request and reconnoitered the Founder's Brook Motel lobby immediately before the murder at the direction of T.J. From such testimony, especially combined with the eyewitnesses' accounts, a jury reasonably could have believed that T.J. also directed defendant to kill the victim. Furthermore, evidence was adduced at trial that suggested that only T.J. had a motive to kill the victim. Various witnesses testified about T.J.'s intense anger toward Sanjeev Patel, who he blamed for breaking up his family, while defendant testified that he never had met, nor even heard of, the victim before January 1, 2002. Based on this evidence, a jury reasonably could have decided that defendant killed Sanjeev per T.J.'s request. Finally, evidence was presented at trial that the murder was committed in exchange for money. The testimony of Det. Arrighi revealed that defendant did not have any significant sum of money in his possession when he searched him at the North Attleboro gas station one day before the murder; the detective did not find a wallet or any wad of bills after searching defendant's knapsack and pockets. However, when defendant arrived at the gas station in Warwick the following evening, after the shooting of Sanjeev Patel, he was seen carrying a large wad of cash and subsequently paid cab driver Edward Genier $375 in cash to drive him to Brooklyn. Also, the defendant argues that § 11-23-2(3) must be read to require sufficient evidence that the money changed hands before the killing for a homicide to qualify as a murder for hire. We do not agree. No provision of § 11-23-2(3) makes such a prior payment a necessity, and we refuse to read such a requirement into the statute. See State v. Lough, 899 A.2d 468, 472-73 (R.I.2006). Rather, we agree with various other jurisdictions that have held that murder for hire requires an agreement to exchange money, rather than an actual exchange of money. See State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 882 A.2d 604, 651-52 n. 26 (2005) (holding that the state's murder-for-hire statute required that there be  an agreement between the defendant and the person hired    to cause the death of [the victim] and to pay the person hired monetary compensation) (emphasis added); see also People v. Patel, 366 Ill.App.3d 255, 303 Ill.Dec. 560, 851 N.E.2d 747, 762 (2006) (holding that solicitation of murder for hire did not require that money change hands but only that there was some type of agreement or request for money or anything of value). In light of all the evidence suggesting that defendant agreed to kill his helpless victim, at the direction of T.J. Patel and in exchange for money, we believe that the trial justice was correct when he asked the jurors whether they believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this was a murder for hire. B. The Sentence Imposed At defendant's presentencing hearing, the sentencing justice considered the arguments made by counsel as well as the testimony of Jay and Prena Patel regarding the impact of the murder on them. After considering both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, pursuant to § 12-19.2-4, [17] he sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He was persuaded by defendant's previous criminal record, his lying to the police during the criminal investigation, the testimony of defendant's cellmate about the potential murder of the child witness, and his lack of remorse for his actions. The sentencing justice also was persuaded that this maximum sentence would deter others from murdering for hire and would provide some comfort to the victim's family. The defendant has appealed his sentence to this Court, in accordance with § 12-19.2-5. [18] He maintains that the sentence was not warranted because of his lack of a violent criminal past and the nature of the homicide. The state counters that this Court should not disturb the trial justice's decision that appropriately was based on defendant's record, the circumstances of the crime, and the unlikelihood of defendant's rehabilitation. Because this case involves the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, it is incumbent upon this Court to exercise its own independent judgment and discretion in determining the appropriateness of the sentence. State v. Tassone, 749 A.2d 1112, 1119 (R.I. 2000) (citing State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 320 (R.I.1990)). In our independent review of such a sentence, we look to the record, the jury's findings, the trial justice's conclusions, and the character and propensities of the defendant, including any aggravating circumstances as well as any mitigating factors. Section 12-19.2-4; see Tassone, 749 A.2d at 1119. After subjecting this record to our independent review, we hold that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate because the crime here belongs to the narrow class of the most heinous crimes, for which we have reserved that sentence. State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 86 (R.I.2006). Our legislature undeniably has singled out those who commit murder for hire as deserving of the harshest penalties, Here, the jury unanimously found that defendant murdered Sanjeev Patel, an innocent man whom defendant never before had met, in exchange for money. The defendant shot and killed the victim in front of his eight-year-old son, forever changing the lives of the young boy and the victim's other family members. The defendant's actions reflect a complete disregard for human life, and, thus, warrant the harshest penalty. We reject defendant's assertion that this crime does not warrant a sentence of life without parole because of the nature of the crime, namely that it was a shooting, and not a stabbing or other type of homicide indicating savagery or intense brutality. The defendant was eligible for a sentence of life without parole because the killing was a murder for hire, see § 11-23-2(3), not because it was a torture or aggravated battery, see § 11-23-2(4). Moreover, defendant's troubling character, record, and propensity for criminal activity persuade us that it is unlikely that he could be rehabilitated. The defendant has been engaged in a life of crime, including selling bootleg tapes and compact discs, installing bootleg cable, selling weapons, and selling drugs. Finally, after reviewing the record, we are unable to find any indication that defendant has, to this day, shown any real remorse for what he has done. See State v. Bertoldi, 495 A.2d 247, 253 (R.I.1985) (stating that defendant's remorse is an appropriate consideration in the imposition of a criminal penalty). For these reasons, we believe the trial justice's imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole was warranted. The cold-blooded and shocking nature of this act reveals a heart of stone and a character unconcerned with the standards of a decent and law-abiding society. We cannot in good conscience say that the citizenry ever would be safe if again exposed to this callous criminal. Therefore, we affirm the sentence of life without parole imposed by the trial justice.