Opinion ID: 2507697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for a Directed Verdict of Acquittal

Text: Dickey contends the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial judge properly refused to direct a verdict of acquittal based on self-defense. In conjunction with his self-defense arguments, Dickey claims the Court of Appeals erred in failing to address whether a glass bottle should be considered a deadly weapon under South Carolina law as Dickey believed Boot was armed with a large glass bottle that could have been used to inflict serious bodily harm or death. A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged. State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006). If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury. Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648. When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate. Id. at 292, 625 S.E.2d at 648. Once raised by the defense, the State must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Burkhart, 350 S.C. 252, 261, 565 S.E.2d 298, 303 (2002). There are four elements required by law to establish a case of self-defense. State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984). The four elements are: First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty. Second, the defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based upon his belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or losing his own life. Fourth, the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular instance. If, however, the defendant was on his own premises he had no duty to retreat before acting in self-defense. Id. ; State v. Hendrix, 270 S.C. 653, 657-58, 244 S.E.2d 503, 505-06 (1978). Under the Castle Doctrine, [o]ne attacked, without fault on his part, on his own premises, has the right, in establishing his plea of self-defense, to claim immunity from the law of retreat, which ordinarily is an essential element of that defense. State v. Gordon, 128 S.C. 422, 425, 122 S.E. 501, 502 (1924). Our appellate courts have recognized that the rule also applies to a person's place of business. Id. ; State v. Brooks, 252 S.C. 504, 167 S.E.2d 307 (1969). The absence of a duty to retreat also extends to the curtilage of one's home or place of business. State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 548 n. 15, 500 S.E.2d 489, 494 n. 15 (1998). Curtilage includes outbuildings, the yard around a dwelling, a garden of the dwelling, or the parking lot of a business. Id. Applying the foregoing to the facts of the instant case, I find that all four elements of self-defense were not established as a matter of law to warrant a directed verdict. As to the first element of self-defense, a question of fact was created as to whether Dickey was without fault in bringing on the conflict. The State presented undisputed evidence that Dickey followed Boot and Stroud after they left the apartment building. Because Dickey could have remained inside behind the safety of the locked doors to wait for the police, there is evidence that Dickey could have avoided the fatal confrontation. I disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals' finding that Dickey's actions were reasonably calculated to provoke a new altercation with Boot, and that Dickey intended to engage in mutual combat. Dickey, 380 S.C. at 394, 669 S.E.2d at 923. First, this ground was neither raised to the trial judge nor submitted to the jury. Secondly, the Court of Appeals appears to have found that mutual combat was established as a matter of law, which would have precluded Dickey's reliance on self-defense. See State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 232, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003) (Whether or not mutual combat exists is significant because the plea of self-defense is not available to one who kills another in mutual combat. (citation omitted)); State v. Graham, 260 S.C. 449, 450, 196 S.E.2d 495, 495 (1973) (To constitute mutual combat there must exist a mutual intent and willingness to fight and this intent may be manifested by the acts and conduct of the parties and the circumstances attending and leading up to the combat. (citation omitted)). In contrast to the Court of Appeals, I find there was a question of fact as to the requisite intent for the doctrine of mutual combat; thus, mutual combat could have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, I believe the Court of Appeals' reference to this doctrine was harmless as it did not negate the court's correct finding regarding the first element of self-defense. In terms of the second and third elements, i.e., Dickey's belief that he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, the State presented evidence to create a question of fact as to the reasonableness of Dickey's belief that he needed to shoot Boot. First, the evidence was disputed as to whether Boot was in possession of a deadly weapon and whether he was reaching for one prior to the shooting. Although there is case law to support Dickey's assertion that the glass bottle constituted a deadly weapon, I note that this issue was neither raised to nor ruled upon by the trial judge. Thus, it was not properly preserved for appellate review. See State v. Moore, 357 S.C. 458, 464, 593 S.E.2d 608, 612 (2004) (holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for review). Even assuming the issue was preserved and the Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule on it, it is inconsequential whether the bottle constituted a deadly weapon as a matter of law. Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed that a deadly weapon is any article, instrument or substance that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Furthermore, the State presented evidence that Dickey did not consider himself in imminent danger as Dickey readily exited the locked building and continued the confrontation outside of the apartment building. As to the fourth element, the duty to retreat, I find the State presented evidence that Dickey was not immune as a matter of law under the Castle Doctrine as Dickey was not within the curtilage of the apartment building at the time of the shooting. At the time of the shooting, Dickey was on the doormat outside the front door of Cornell Arms. According to the testimony, the doormat was placed near the front of the building on a public sidewalk. As recognized by the Court of Appeals, it is a novel issue in this state as to whether a public sidewalk in front of an apartment building is considered curtilage. Dickey, 380 S.C. at 395, 669 S.E.2d at 924. In ruling that the public sidewalk did not constitute curtilage, the Court of Appeals relied on our state's jurisprudence establishing that curtilage does not extend to a public street. The Court of Appeals also cited cases from other jurisdictions where appellate courts refused to hold there is no duty to retreat from a sidewalk in front of a business or residence. Id. at 396-97, 669 S.E.2d at 924. For several reasons, I agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. Initially, I would note that the court properly relied on this state's case law discussing curtilage with respect to public streets. The underlying theory in these cases is that a defendant is not immune from the duty to retreat on property where he did not have the right to eject his adversary. A public sidewalk falls within this category as it constitutes public land from which a person could not eject another person. Furthermore, the out-of-state cases cited by the Court of Appeals as well as other secondary authority support this proposition. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat as Condition of Self-Defense When One is Attacked at His Office, or Place of Business or Employment, 41 A.L.R.3d 584 (1972 & Supp.2011) (analyzing the doctrine of retreat within the general rules of self-defense and discussing state cases where courts have considered where a person attacked at his office or place of business is precluded from relying on his right to self-defense by a duty of retreat). Moreover, regardless of the position of the Cornell Arms doormat, [7] Dickey was on the public sidewalk at the time he shot Boot. Once Dickey left the building and walked onto the public sidewalk, he was under a duty to retreat as the sidewalk was not part of the curtilage of his residence or business. Furthermore, there is undisputed, quantifiable evidence that Dickey could have easily retreated without incident. The circumstances just prior to the shooting establish that Dickey was aware of the potential threat and had sufficient time to retreat. Dickey testified that he watched Boot and Stroud walk to the corner of Pendleton and Sumter Street before they turned around. At that point, according to crime scene investigators, Boot and Stroud would have been approximately 68 feet from the Cornell Arms doormat on which Dickey stood. Dickey testified that as Boot and Stroud came back in his direction they continued their profane rant and threatened to whip [his] a. Once Dickey realized that Boot and Stroud were heading back in his direction in a menacing manner, it would have been reasonable for Dickey to retreat. Thus, without question, Dickey had a duty to retreat; however, the question is whether Dickey could do so safely. This question was one for the jury to resolve. Additionally, I find disingenuous the majority's reliance on Dickey's claimed disability as support for its holding regarding self-defense. Although Dickey testified he could not run as a result of this disability, there is evidence to the contrary in that he was able to descend several flights of stairs to the lobby in the same time it took Boot and Stroud to ride the elevator. In view of the foregoing, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Dickey was not entitled to a directed verdict based on his claim of self-defense.