Opinion ID: 4562740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Commit Murder for Hire

Text: There was sufficient evidence to convict Cordero and Velasquez on the charge of conspiracy to commit murder for hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (stating scope of review). A defendant is guilty of murder for hire when he by himself or in conspiracy with others “use[s] the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce[] with intent that a murder be committed . . . as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay[] anything of pecuniary value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). Defendants do not contest that they used a facility of interstate commerce but do contest that (1) they acted with intent to murder (2) in exchange for payment, and (3) that they entered into a conspiracy. The Government presented sufficient evidence that each defendant acted with the requisite intent to murder. First, the jailhouse informant, Marc King, testified that he was asked by Cordero to find Tyra Goines’ address because Velasquez and a fellow drug dealer wanted to Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 10 kill Goines. When King expressed disbelief, Cordero called Velasquez, who confirmed that he would “tie her up and get rid of the bitch.” Cordero also stated to King during a secretly recorded conversation that Velasquez would receive a significant payout for murdering Goines. When asked by King exactly how much Velasquez would be paid, Cordero responded, “[d]epend on what he’s gonna do, he’s gonna bury the bitch in his backyard, I don’t know.” In addition, shortly after learning that Velasquez was travelling to scope out Goines’ residence, Cordero is heard on tape saying, “[h]e see that bitch he might throw her in the trunk right now.” If this evidence were not enough, Cordero proceeded to describe graphically how he would commit the murder were he not in prison: Cordero: I would have done it correctly, King: You don’t think he [Velasquez] gonna do it correctly? Cordero: Not like how I would have done it. King: So how would you do it then? Cordero: Nah, he’s not gonna get caught, he’s gonna do it right, I just take it to another level, like I bring you verification that this is her, you know what I’m saying, what you want, her eyes? Her teeth? She got a tattoo you want me to cut out and bring to you? While Cordero writes off these comments as “mere speculation and grandiose statements,” the jury could have reasonably thought otherwise. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate murderous intent on the part of Velasquez and Cordero. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Velasquez contends that Cordero’s statements about murdering Goines do not establish murderous intent on the part of Velasquez. This argument ignores King’s testimony that he heard Velasquez state on the phone, “I’m going to tie her up and get rid of the bitch.” Moreover, Cordero’s statements shed light on Velasquez’s intent because the two men were close confidants and spoke with each other frequently. Velasquez also attempts to impugn King’s credibility, arguing that “[t]he claim of conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, advanced by ‘the Fraudster’ informant is incredible and conjecture.” A trial witness’s credibility, however, is not relevant on review of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2009). It was the jury’s prerogative to believe what King had to say. Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 11 Both defendants contend that certain statements by Cordero create reasonable doubt about what exactly Velasquez planned to do beyond verifying Goines’ address. At one point, Cordero is recorded as saying, “I don’t know what they gonna do, to be honest . . . .” At another point, Cordero tells King, “let them do what they do, we don’t need to know what they gonna do.” Read in the light most favorable to the Government, however, these statements indicate Cordero’s uncertainty regarding the method by which Velasquez will murder Goines and dispose of her body. In any event, other evidence in the record leaves no doubt that Cordero and Velasquez understood that Goines would be murdered. When determining if a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, “[a]ll conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of the government, and every reasonable inference is drawn in its favor.” United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2009). This case is very different from United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1999), relied upon by defendants. There, the Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder for hire. Id. at 147. The evidence in Barnett demonstrated that the defendant assisted his friends who he knew had been hired to perpetrate “some unlawful act” against the victim. Id. at 146. The evidence did not show, however, that the defendant “knew that the unlawful act was murder.” Id. That the defendant “was aware that some crime was afoot,” the Fifth Circuit said, was not sufficient to demonstrate he knowingly joined a conspiracy to murder. Id. at 147. In contrast to the facts in Barnett, Velasquez and Cordero repeatedly alluded to Goines’ murder and never suggested that she would suffer nonfatal injury. There was also sufficient evidence presented at trial to meet the “pecuniary value” requirement of the murder-for-hire statute. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Velasquez had an agreement—or intended to form an agreement—with Victor to kill Goines for money. The jury heard testimony that Velasquez told Cordero on the phone that he would kill Goines. Velasquez does not argue—nor was there evidence indicating—that he had any personal stake in Goines’ murder. It was therefore logical for the jury to infer that Velasquez intended to perform the murder in exchange for money, particularly when there was already someone, i.e., “Victor,” who was willing to pay for information on Goines’ whereabouts. This inference was further supported by Cordero’s recorded statements that Velasquez would be compensated for Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 12 Goines’ murder. In one such statement, Cordero surmised that Velasquez would receive “probably more” than $20,000, with the exact amount depending on the method in which Goines was killed. In another instance, Cordero remarked that Velasquez “ain’t going to do it for peanuts.” Finally, the facts that Velasquez travelled to Goines’ residence and purchased tracking and surveillance equipment were further indications that he had an agreement in place to commit the murder or intended to enter one. Defendants repeatedly assert that, although Victor may have agreed to pay Cordero—and perhaps Velasquez—for locating Goines, he did not agree to pay Velasquez to complete the murder. Sure enough, the record supports the possibility that the murder-for-hire plot was to take place in two stages—the first involving locating Goines’ address and the second involving Goines’ murder. Cordero told King, for instance, that Velasquez would sell “Victor” the information about where Goines lived and then negotiate separately regarding her murder: Cordero: He’s gonna, he’s gonna, basically, once he got her: “I got her, what you wanna do?” King: But… Cordero: I got her address, I got everything, you want that, you want to pay for that, or you want to pay for the full service, basically . . . King: (Laughing) Now, the full service would be . . . it is what it is Cordero: Whatever they gonna, whatever he decides he wants It is also true that while King heard firsthand from Victor regarding payment for Goines’ address, there was no similar direct evidence presented of an agreement between Velasquez and Victor regarding payment for Goines’ murder. But even so, the absence of an agreement—or even an offer—to commit murder for hire does not foreclose a conviction under § 1958, provided there is a showing of intent on the part of the defendant. See United States v. Ransbottom, 914 F.2d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dvorkin, 799 F.3d 867, 875-76 (7th Cir. 2015). Furthermore, Velasquez’s intent to commit the contract murder is sufficient for a conviction even if Victor himself had no intention of entering into such an agreement. In United States v. Dais, we noted that our earlier decision in Ransbottom “rejected the argument that § 1958(a) requires ‘participation by at least two Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 13 persons.’” 559 F. App’x 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ransbottom, 914 F.2d at 745). Accordingly, even assuming the scope of Velasquez’s agreement with Victor included only locating Goines’ address, the jury could still have reasonably concluded that Victor intended to, in Cordero’s words, perform the “full service” afterwards and, moreover, that Cordero was aware of Velasquez’s intention. This conclusion is even easier to reach when considering the remaining circumstantial evidence, including Velasquez’s stated intent to murder Goines; his negotiations with Victor to locate Goines’ address for money; his purchase of advanced surveillance equipment; and Cordero’s statements about payment in exchange for murdering Goines.2 Because the intent-to-murder and pecuniary-value elements are met, the conspiracy element is also met in this case. To prove conspiracy to violate § 1958, the government must show that (1) the defendant conspired to use an interstate facility with the intent to murder in consideration for money to be paid to the killer; (2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy; and (3) a member of the conspiracy performed an overt act. United States v. Burdette, 86 F. App’x 121, 126 (6th Cir. 2004). As discussed, there is evidence showing at the very least that Velasquez intended to receive payment from Victor to kill Goines and that Velasquez used a facility of interstate commerce—a cell phone—to work with Cordero to further this intent. Cordero’s recorded statements about Velasquez’s murdering Goines for payment further support the conclusion that a murder-for-hire conspiracy existed, and that Cordero was aware of it. Cordero voluntarily joined the conspiracy by providing information that would assist in locating Goines in exchange for payment of $1,500. Finally, Velasquez performed an overt act by travelling to Goines’ residence to confirm her address, as demonstrated by his taking a picture of Goines’ house and car. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have found Cordero and Velasquez guilty of conspiring to violate § 1958. 2Cases cited by the defendants are not to the contrary. The murder-for-hire conviction in United States v. Ritter, 989 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1993), was overturned because the defendant did not have knowledge that the murder scheme he had participated in had a contract element. Here, by contrast, all indications are that Velasquez intended to enter into a scheme in which he would be paid to commit murder. United States v. Wicklund, 114 F.3d 151, 153-54 (10th Cir. 1997), is similarly unhelpful to defendants, as that case turned on the absence of a quid pro quo. Velasquez’s intention to commit murder in exchange for payment from Victor satisfies the quid pro quo requirement. See United States v. Acierno, 579 F.3d 694, 701 (6th Cir. 2009). Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 14