Opinion ID: 770161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Alleged Suppression of Impeachment Evidence

Text: 25 Defendant Trevino next challenges the failure of the government to turn over impeachment evidence concerning Daniel Chavez. Chavez was an informant who testified during the government's case-in- chief regarding defendant Trevino's involvement in drug trafficking activities. Although Chavez admitted on cross-examination that he had been paid money by the government for his services as an informant, the records of these payments were never tendered to the defense. Defendant Trevino contends that these government payments to Chavez constitute impeachment evidence of an important government witness demonstrating bias and that, because of the nature of that evidence, the government had an obligation to inform the defense of the payments and to turn over any records regarding those payments to defendant Trevino. 26 The government has an obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant upon request when such evidence is material to the defendant's guilt or innocence, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and that obligation extends to both impeachment and exculpatory evidence, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). In this case, the government argues that it was not required to give defendant Trevino information about the payments made to Chavez because those payments were not relevant to the instant case. More specifically, the government contends that the district court judge previously assigned to this case determined that the payments made to Chavez were unconnected to the government's investigation of these particular defendants and that this ruling affirmatively relieved it of its obligation to turn the disputed evidence over to the defense. In order to evaluate this argument, we must consider the somewhat unusual events surrounding the determination that the payments made to Chavez were not relevant to this case. 27 The evidence regarding the government's payments to Chavez was first presented by DEA agents in an in camera hearing to Judge Baker, the district judge previously assigned to this case. This hearing took place outside the presence of defense counsel and there is no indication in the record as to what was discussed during this meeting or as to what information was provided to Judge Baker. The record does reflect that following this meeting, Judge Baker issued an order stating that evidence of the government's payments to Chavez was inadmissible at the defendants' trial based on the court's conclusion that the payments made to Chavez were related to a wholly separate DEA investigation. The district court accepted Judge Baker's determination that the disputed evidence was irrelevant, and the government now argues that Judge Baker's ruling as to this potentially impeaching evidence relieved it of its obligation under Brady to turn the requested impeachment evidence over to the defense. 28 We agree with the government that no Brady violation occurred here. The information regarding evidence of the government's payments to Chavez was provided to Judge Baker and it was determined to be irrelevant. Because the government is only required to turn over requested information if it is material to an issue at trial, see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 786 (7th Cir. 1998), the district court's determination that the requested evidence was irrelevant necessarily relieved the government of its obligation to turn over information concerning Chavez's dealings with the government because irrelevant evidence cannot be material. Put another way, the central Brady inquiry on appeal is whether there is a reasonable probability that the disputed evidence would have affected the result at trial, see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1018 (7th Cir. 1993), and we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that evidence properly found to be irrelevant would have affected the jury's conclusions. The question then is not whether the government violated its Brady obligation when it refused to turn over the information regarding its payments to Chavez that had been deemed irrelevant by Judge Baker, but rather whether the district court erred in making its initial materiality determination as to the disputed evidence. We review the district court's determination that the disputed evidence was not material under Brady for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 818 (7th Cir. 1994). 29 In circumstances where the defense seeks access to confidential information during discovery, we rely particularly heavily on the sound discretion of the trial judge to protect the rights of the accused as well as [those of] the government. United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1988) (Generally, the decisions whether to conduct an in camera review of government files in appropriate cases, whether to require discovery of materials contained therein, and in what form such materials should be produced are committed to the sound discretion of the district judge.). While we recognize this broad grant of authority to district judges, 1 it is impossible for us to determine on the record as it now stands whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in refusing defense requests to turn over information regarding the payments to Chavez. There is no information in the record as to the substance of the meeting between Judge Baker and the DEA agents, nor is there any information supporting Judge Baker's determination that the disputed evidence was irrelevant. Judge Baker's docket order deeming the evidence irrelevant, coupled with the district court's decision to rely on that previous finding, do not provide a sufficient basis for evaluating the district court's decision to deny defendant Trevino discovery of the disputed information. 30 Despite our conclusion that the district court did not provide a sufficient explanation of its decision to exclude records of the government payments to Chavez, defendant Trevino has not convinced us that the disputed evidence was material. See United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 510 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976)) ([A] Brady violation does not arise due to nothing more than a possibility that the undisclosed item might have helped the defense . . . .). In order to demonstrate materiality, defendant Trevino must show both an abuse of discretion and prejudice. See United States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730, 743 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1993)) (stating that discovery violations warrant a new trial only when both an abuse of discretion and prejudice are shown); see also United States v. Miller, 199 F.3d 416, 421 n.3 (7th Cir. 1999). In this context, prejudice means a showing that because of the absence of the sought-after evidence, defendant Trevino did not receive[ ] a fair trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)); see Pickens v. Runyon, 128 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997). Prejudice exists when the defendant is unduly surprised and lacks an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense, or when the violation substantially influences the jury. United States v. De La Rosa, 196 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1999). 31 During cross-examination, the district court allowed the defendants to inquire into Chavez's work as a government informant, and Chavez admitted that he had been paid for his services. Although defendant Trevino admits that he was able to question Chavez about the fact of government payments, he contends that he was not able to explore sufficiently the nature, and specifically the amounts, of the payments made to Chavez without access to the records of those payments. Under these circumstances, however, defendant Trevino has not shown that the district court's refusal to allow additional inquiry into the government payments received by Chavez resulted in an unfair trial, or that the evidence he sought to obtain discovery of was anything more than cumulative impeachment evidence. See United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 819) (stating that in order to justify a new trial, impeachment evidence must be more than mere cumulative impeachment); United States v. Dweck, 913 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 1990). Because defendant Trevino has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the government's failure to turn over records regarding the government payments to Chavez, we will not disturb the ruling of the district court below.