Opinion ID: 2347610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of the Polygraph Test

Text: At trial, the defendant attempted to impeach Mr. Coyne's identification of him through the introduction of the witness's prior inconsistent statements to the police that he was no longer certain of the robber's identity. The defendant's cross examination attempted to emphasize that it was not until after the polygraphic examination that the witness reaffirmed his original certainty of the robber's identity. The apparent intended thrust of this testimony was to permit the jury to infer that the witness' certainty at the time of trial was spurious, induced in part by subtle police coercion through the form of the questions to which he was subjected during the polygraph examination. On redirect, the State then made a brief reference to the polygraph test in the nature of rehabilitation of its witness. [2] On redirect, the witness further stated that he had always been certain that John McDonough was the robber and had expressed doubt only to avoid exposing himself to the danger of retaliation from the defendant or his brothers. The defendant now seeks a reversal, claiming that the admission of the witness's polygraphic examination, and especially testimony by a police officer that the examination had been ordered by a Superior Court justice, were highly prejudicial because they conveyed to the jury the impression that the test results confirmed the veracity of the story the witness related to the jury while on the stand. Because the defendant did not object to this evidence at trial (and was in fact the moving force behind its admission), we must now consider this matter under the manifest error rule stated above. In State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840, 841 (1974), this Court excluded as having a bearing on the question of the consciousness of guilt evidence of both the results of polygraph tests and the willingness or refusal of a witness to submit to such a test. That decision was based upon our belief that the polygraph was not a sufficiently reliable or accurate means for producing competent evidence. While we have by no means deviated from the position stated in that case, we do not think that the introduction into evidence in the instant case of the witness's polygraphic examination was manifestly prejudicial to the defendant. Here, the evidence was introduced by the defendant for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of Martin Coyne, the State's principal witness. Every defendant is entitled to submit to the jury all proper evidence bearing upon the credibility of the State's witnesses. The witness's submission to polygraphic examination was not introduced by the defendant for the purpose of proving or disproving the truthfulness of the answers elicited thereunder, but rather to suggest that the administration of the test had been instrumental in procuring the witness's present testimony, a fact which, if true, would render that testimony suspect. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is significantly outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury. State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489, 493 (1974). In evaluating the impact of evidence upon the jury, the trial Justice is allowed wide discretion. State v. Gagne, Me., 343 A.2d 186 (1975). We wish to emphasize that before evidence as potentially prejudicial as a polygraphic examination is admitted into evidence for any reason, it should be carefully scrutinized by the presiding Justice, preferably in an offer of proof beyond the hearing of the jury. See State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225 (1962). We nevertheless believe that the admission of this evidence in this case did not manifestly prejudice the rights of the defendant. The State's attempts to rehabilitate its witness may incidentally have tended to mingle the witness's testimony and the results of his polygraph test in an undifferentiated union, at least in the minds of the jury. If such occurred, the danger of admitting evidence of polygraphic tests is thereby underscored. The defendant, however, may not complain. Whatever prejudice, and we do not think it was great, may have resulted to the defendant occurred as a direct response of evidence presented by him. The response evoked may have been highly damaging, but one who would pry open a box may expect to have the lid slammed on his fingers. United States v. Kubitsky, 469 F.2d 1253, 1255 (1st Cir. 1972). The presiding Justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence to which the defendant now objects. State v. Gagne, supra, 343 A.2d at 196.