Opinion ID: 1888050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Family Court's Finding of Most Equitable Construction

Text: Marvin argues that the Family Court overlooked the specific provisions of the scheme fashioned by the parties when it found that an exemption of the properties in 7.B.1(b) from listing for sale would allow Marvin to avoid his obligation to pay Sharie the equitable distribution of $500,000. He maintains that his obligations to Sharie are highly leveraged and the consequences of his failure to do so are quite serious. Consequently, Marvin argues that a requirement for the listing for sale of all of the property actually affords Sharie greater leverage than was negotiated between the parties. Sharie argues that the trial justice did not misconceive the evidence or abuse his discretion when he found that Marvin's interpretation of the ambiguous provision was not the most equitable. She asserts that the trial justice's conclusion is supported by his finding that some of the properties already had been foreclosed upon and it would appear that it is very iffy even with the remaining properties that the plaintiff will receive the total amount of the funds due her. Sharie contends that not requiring Marvin to immediately list the properties for sale would risk additional foreclosures before she is able to enforce her rights with respect to the remaining properties herself in March 2012. [5] Thus, potentially, she would have no means to recover the $500,000 that Marvin had agreed to pay to her. Finally, Sharie argues that eliminating Marvin's obligation to sell these three properties gives him an unconscionable advantage and flies in the face of the intent of the agreement    to sell the property so as to satisfy [Marvin's] $500,000 obligation to [her]. A property settlement agreement that is not merged into a divorce judgment retains the characteristics of a contract. Riffenburg v. Riffenburg, 585 A.2d 627, 630 (R.I.1991); see Ritter v. Mantissa Investment Corp., 864 A.2d 601, 607 (R.I.2005) (holding property settlement agreement that was not merged into the divorce judgment retains contract characteristics) (quoting Riffenburg, 585 A.2d at 630). Therefore, a property settlement agreement such as the agreement here that has been incorporated by reference in, but not merged with, a divorce judgment can be modified only if the parties consent or if a ground for reformation under contract law, such as ambiguity, exists. Gorman, 883 A.2d at 740-41 (citing Riffenburg, 585 A.2d at 630). As we have discussed, this agreement is ambiguous; thus, the Family Court had the authority to construe the ambiguous contract provision and modify the agreement accordingly. Id. at 746. When he does so, the trial justice should adopt that construction which is most equitable and which will not give to one party an unconscionable advantage over the other. Donelan v. Donelan, 741 A.2d 268, 270 (R.I.1999) (quoting Flynn, 615 A.2d at 122). Additionally, this Court has held that it is necessary to examine both the circumstances surrounding the development of the ambiguous terms and the intentions of the parties. Flynn, 615 A.2d at 121. Indeed, one of the cardinal rules of construction of agreements is that the meaning should be gathered from the entire context and the language should be interpreted so as to subserve, and not subvert, the general intention of the parties   . Massasoit Housing Corp. v. Town of North Kingstown, 75 R.I. 211, 217, 65 A.2d 38, 40 (1949) (citing 12 Am. Jur. Contracts § 241 (1938)). This Court affords great deference to the trial justice's findings of fact that support his conclusion that Sharie's interpretation of the ambiguous paragraph was the most equitable in light of the parties' intentions under the agreement. See Horton, 891 A.2d at 888 (citing Koutroumanos, 865 A.2d at 1097). Thus, we will overturn these findings only if he overlooked or misconceived the relevant evidence or otherwise was clearly wrong. Id. It is our opinion that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive the relevant evidence when he found that Marvin's construction of the ambiguous provision, which would exempt several of the properties from listing for sale, was not the most equitable because such a construction is ineffective to achieve the agreement's overarching goal, which is to provide Sharie with $500,000, produced by the sale of the enumerated properties. We hold that the findings of the trial justice are supported by the record, and we decline to disturb them on review. He found that the agreement directed certain properties that were marital assets to be sold and Sharie should receive the net proceeds    until she receives the sum of $500,000. This finding is supported by the agreement's provision that directs Marvin to pay to Sharie the amount of the equitable distribution and then sets forth in detail the mechanism through which this distribution will be realized, specifically, the sale of any parcel of real estate identified in [the] Agreement. The trial justice based his conclusion on the fact that several of the properties already had been foreclosed upon, thus making it likely that the remaining properties could not generate the amount that Marvin had agreed to pay Sharie unless they were listed for sale immediately. It is our opinion that this is a logical conclusion supported by the record, and thus is not clearly wrong. Further, the trial justice was not clearly wrong when he found that Marvin's interpretation of the ambiguous provision would give him an unconscionable advantage over Sharie by affording Marvin an inordinate amount of control with respect to disposition of the property and, consequently, over his obligation to pay her $500,000. See Donelan, 741 A.2d at 270. Similarly, he also was not clearly wrong when he found that Marvin's interpretation would subvert the intention of the parties, which is clearly embodied in the agreement, that the sale of the enumerated properties is the primary mechanism through which to generate the funds to satisfy the equitable distribution due to Sharie. See Massasoit Housing Corporation, 75 R.I. at 217, 65 A.2d at 40-41. For these reasons, we hold that the trial justice did not err when he ruled that Shade's interpretation was the most equitable construction of the ambiguous provision and when he ordered the three properties in question to be listed for sale forthwith.