Opinion ID: 1556296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court misapplied the law in admitting Barnes' statements made during custodial interrogation, thus depriving Barnes of her constitutional Right to Counsel.

Text: ¶ 7. Barnes asserts that the trial court should have suppressed her statements because they were taken in violation of her constitutional Right to Counsel. Barnes asserts that she attempted to invoke her Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel during her interview with authorities on May 23, 2006. Barnes further asserts that her statement to police was taken in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Section 26 of Article 3 of the Mississippi Constitution. ¶ 8. This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress only if the ruling is manifest error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Ruffin v. State, 992 So.2d 1165, 1169 (Miss.2008) (citations omitted). Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), custodial interrogation must be preceded by advising the defendant of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney. Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Upon invocation of the right to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Id. If the defendant invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Id. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Id. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Once a defendant asks for counsel, he cannot be interrogated further until counsel has been made available, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). ¶ 9. However, the applicability of the `rigid prophylactic rule' of Edwards requires courts to first `determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.' Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (citations omitted). Determining whether a defendant actually invoked his right to counsel is an objective inquiry. Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. A defendant must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis reiterated that there is no requirement that police clarify whether or not a defendant actually wants an attorney when the defendant makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court said that, although clarifying questions are good police practice, we decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. Id. at 461-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350. To recapitulate: We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide for such assistance. We held in Edwards that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease questioning him until an attorney is present. But we are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue. Davis, 512 U.S. at 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350. See also Delashmit v. State, 991 So.2d 1215, 1221 (Miss.2008); and Chamberlin v. State, 989 So.2d 320, 333 (Miss.2008). ¶ 10. During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Lewis testified that Barnes was not a suspect when he called her and asked her to come to his office for a noncustodial interview. Barnes' interview was videotaped and later transcribed. However, Lewis testified that during the course of the interview, Barnes made some contradictory statements, which are discussed further herein, that made her a person of interest. At that point, Lewis said Barnes was given her Miranda rights and a waiver. Lewis further testified that Barnes still was not a suspect at that point, but that he was aware that she had made contradictory statements. Lewis also testified that Barnes never asserted her right to have an attorney present, but that she was offered an attorney. ¶ 11. In the motion to suppress her statement, Barnes argued that she had asserted her right to counsel multiple times. The trial court denied Barnes' motion, finding that Barnes understood her right to get an attorney, that Barnes never asked for an attorney, and that her statements were free and voluntary. The trial court also noted that Barnes never made any inculpatory statements. ¶ 12. Barnes argues on appeal that the first assertion after she was given the Miranda warning was when she made the statement, So, I don't need legal, okay. ... However, this is not an assertion of her right to counsel, but rather an attempt to clarify whether she must have an attorney present. Barnes testified during the hearing on the motion to suppress that she made the statement [t]o see did I need to have a lawyer there, did I need some legal representation. ... Further, after Barnes made this statement, Lewis explained to her that he had to advise her of her rights and make sure she understood before he asked her any more questions. Barnes indicated that she understood. ¶ 13. Barnes next claims that she again asserted her right to counsel when she said, But I don't have an attorney here. However, again, this statement read in the context in which it was made does not indicate an explicit request for an attorney. Barnes continued talking. Lewis interrupted her on two separate occasions and advised her to hold on just a second until he had the information written on the waiver so she could read over it. Lewis then reviewed the waiver with Barnes. Barnes indicated that she understood. Further, Barnes again testified during the hearing on the motion to suppress that this statement was merely a question as to whether she needed to have an attorney present. ¶ 14. Barnes claims that the clearest example that she had asserted her right to counsel was when she said, Now if I do need to get a lawyer ... I will get one. However, Lewis asked whether that was what she wanted to do and she replied, It don't matter to me. Lewis again asked whether she wanted to, and she replied, Whatever I've got to do, but I'm not fixing to get railroad [sic] up in this mess because Joyce is the one that gets ... getting all ... getting her and her husband since she bought him from Iraq, she's the one that's talking about she's been broke since she got `Farkad' [Joyce's husband] over here. Barnes testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that this statement meant exactly what it says, [m]eaning if I needed to get a lawyer, that I would get one, whatever I have to do. ¶ 15. We find that the record supports a finding that Barnes received the Miranda warning, that she knowingly and intelligently waived the rights, and that she freely and voluntarily made the statements. Pursuant to Davis, Barnes failed to make an unambiguous, unequivocal request for an attorney, and Lewis had no obligation to stop questioning her. Id. at 461-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350. See also Chamberlin, 989 So.2d at 333. Therefore, this issue is without merit.