Opinion ID: 408075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: McCruiston's Motion for a Comprehensive Jury Selection Plan

Text: 34 On the day of the trial, McCruiston presented to the court a motion for a jury selection plan which included the following: (1) access to the qualification questionnaire on each potential juror; (2) additional peremptory challenges for the defendants as provided for in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b); (3) the right of the attorneys to conduct the voir dire or to ask the follow-up questions to the court's voir dire; (4) the opportunity to voir dire each individual juror out of the presence of the other jurors; and (5) a request for the court to utilize the questions included in the motion if the court alone conducted the voir dire. The motion was predicated in part on assumptions of prejudice resulting from the nature of the offense, pre-trial publicity, and the race of the defendants. The court denied the motion and conducted voir dire on its own. 35 The manner in which a trial court conducts the voir dire examination will not constitute grounds for reversal unless there has been a clear abuse of the court's discretion. United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1295 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934, 97 S.Ct. 1558, 51 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977). The trial court, when asked to submit follow-up questions to the panel as a whole, ordinarily did so. 2 Refusal to interrogate the jurors individually may be within the court's discretion, even when the issue of pre-trial publicity is raised. United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 2923, 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980). The trial judge, in his discretion, may assume responsibility for questioning the jurors. United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 1966); vacated on other grounds, 387 U.S. 231, 87 S.Ct. 1583, 18 L.Ed.2d 738 (1967). The trial court is also allowed considerable discretion in determining whether to submit additional questions, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973), and refusal to submit questions is not reversible error when in substance the defense received the information specifically requested and review of the voir dire reveals that the court made sufficient inquiry as to the background and attitudes of the jurors to enable the litigants, not only to challenge for cause, but to exercise their peremptory challenges. United States v. Esquer, 459 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1006, 94 S.Ct. 366, 38 L.Ed.2d 243 (1973) (quoting Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 920, 79 S.Ct. 1439, 3 L.Ed.2d 1535 (1959)). 36 We are not unmindful that the literature on effective trial practice currently is placing emphasis on the scientific selection of juries. Methods of predicting with any great degree of accuracy how twelve human beings, often with diverse backgrounds and from different walks of life, will react to a specific set of facts might seem to have aspects of significant uncertainty, barring such predictions having been made following an individualized session with each juror by a skilled psychologist. In any event, if the voir dire is to take the place which the dissent would seem to want it to have in the process, we would be returning to a trial within a trial, with the attorneys asking, or having the judge ask, unlimited questions, and with the underlying purpose often that of indoctrinating the prospective jurors with the questioner's theory of the case, without the necessity of putting on sworn witnesses. 37 This former procedure has been abandoned by the district courts in this circuit, and properly so. The dissent has chosen as an example of the claimed incompleteness of the voir dire the refusal to ask a woman with teenage daughters whether she had drug-related problems in her family. The judge had asked all of the prospective jurors concerning possible drug problems in their families. If he then had singled out a woman who had not indicated any problems in her family generally by emphasizing her particular family situation, it seems to us it would have been suggestive that perhaps she had not truthfully responded to the general questions. Jurors should not be excused from answering questions that might reflect upon their ability to serve, but we think the judge properly refrained from asking the suggested follow-up, highly embarrassing, question when no basis had been shown for doing so. 38 Our review of the voir dire convinces us that the judge did ask the key questions not only to ascertain to his satisfaction that the jurors would fairly try the case, but also to enable the defendant intelligently to exercise his challenges. In sum, in the absence in this record of any indication from the responses to the questions asked of a need for further follow-up questions, we find no abuse of discretion in the manner in which the voir dire was conducted. 39 As to the issues of pre-trial publicity and racial prejudice specifically, we note that the judge inquired of the panel as a whole their attitudes toward the race of the defendants. When asked subsequently by defense counsel for a question as to racial prejudice, the court responded that it had already asked such a question and asked again if any of the jurors would be prejudiced against the defendants due to their race. 40 The dissent erroneously states that the judge posed only one question to the jurors on racial bias. When asked to pose a follow-up question on racial bias, the judge directed the following questions to the jurors: 41 Ladies and gentlemen, as is apparent, the defendants in this case are both black. I would ask that you raise your hand if this question applies to you: Would the fact that the defendants are both black in any way prejudice any of you against either one of these defendants, or would you be willing to try this case strictly on the basis of the evidence introduced in the courtroom, or any exhibits that are introduced? 42 Let me ask you, would all of you be willing to set aside any prejudice you might have and decide this case strictly on the basis of the evidence? I take it from the way you are nodding your heads that you would. You are saying to me that none of you have any prejudice because of race, is that correct? If it isn't raise you (sic) hand, please. Very well. 43 The court also asked whether any of the jurors had heard of the case, read about it in the newspapers, or heard of it on the radio. No further questions on pre-trial publicity were submitted by defense counsel. 44 Pre-trial publicity was not as extensive or racially inflammatory as was the case in United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1974), upon which the defendant primarily relies. In Bear Runner, an American Indian convicted of larceny challenged on appeal the sufficiency of the trial court's voir dire on two issues-pre-trial publicity and racial prejudice. In the months preceding the trial, several disruptive incidents involving American Indians, including the well publicized occupation of Wounded Knee, had occurred in the district in which the defendant was tried. These incidents had received not only extensive local but national publicity. The Eighth Circuit noted that the trial court had asked a single question on both the issue of pre-trial publicity and racial prejudice to the prospective veniremen as a group. Id. at 910 & 912. The court found that any objection to the adequacy of the voir dire on the issue of pre-trial publicity had not been adequately preserved for appeal because the defendant had not submitted any further questions on the issue or sought leave to interrogate the jurors on the matter of pre-trial publicity. In finding the voir dire inadequate only on the issue of racial bias, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that the defendant's trial had taken place in October of 1973, the events of Wounded Knee had taken place that spring in the same general locality, and the intense feelings of the local citizenry about the incidents had necessitated that the criminal charges against those American Indians involved in the Wounded Knee incident be moved out of the locale. Id. at 912. These unusual circumstances created an atmosphere of racial bias that necessitated further inquiry into the issue in the voir dire beyond the single question asked by the court. 45 The pre-trial publicity and resultant racial bias, if any, in the case before us certainly cannot be said in any sense to approach the intensity of that involved in Bear Runner. Here, the pre-trial publicity was of a routine nature with no indication it was other than the type of media coverage customary for nearly any local criminal proceedings, particularly in the area of prosecution of drug-related crimes. The focus of the events and publicity found in Bear Runner to engender racial bias was the racial conflict between the American Indians and local citizenry. To suggest, as the dissent appears to do, that any publicized narcotics crime involving blacks creates an atmosphere of racial bias akin to that in Bear Runner is an unwarranted expansion of that decision. Moreover, the trial court in this case did ask a follow-up question on the issue of race when requested to do so by defense counsel. The dissent acknowledges that the Eighth Circuit's decision on the issue of race had been tendered by the trial court in Bear Runner. 46 Further, we note that in the extensive quote in the dissent from Bear Runner, the court focused on the sensitive case. Bear Runner was such a case on the issue of racial prejudice. The case before us was not and we discern nothing in the overall circumstances and surroundings suggesting the possibility of racial bias, unless we assume that this exists in every case in which a black person is a party. We are unwilling to make such an assumption. Although the questions were formulated to necessitate an affirmative response from jurors who thought themselves to be prejudiced, that in itself does not render the voir dire inadequate. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 1979). On these facts, we conclude the issues of racial prejudice and pre-trial publicity were sufficiently explored so that reversal is inappropriate. 47 McCruiston also contends that the denial of additional peremptory challenges to the defendants was error due to the antagonism of the defendants' positions. Specifically McCruiston claims that he wanted to remove a juror after he had exercised his five peremptory challenges, but that Banks' counsel refused to remove the juror. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) provides that, with multiple defendants, the government is entitled to six peremptory challenges and the defendants jointly to ten. The court is given discretion to grant the defendants additional peremptory challenges and to permit them to be exercised either separately or jointly. 48 We have previously concluded that the defenses of Banks and McCruiston were not in fact antagonistic. Close examination of the record also reveals that McCruiston was not precluded from exercising the final peremptory challenge as to the juror in question. The court initially told the defendants they had ten challenges cumulatively. When told they might not be able to agree on exercise of the challenges, the court said that each defendant would have five. At the time the juror in issue was being questioned, the following exchange took place: 49 Mr. Thomas: Your Honor, I would like to state for the record, of course I don't have any more peremptories, I do not like Mr. Anderson but Mrs. Balanoff likes him. 50 The Court: You have ten collectively, you can take him off. 51 Mr. Thomas: But I would be acting against the interest of co-counsel-involuntary co-counsel, but co-counsel nevertheless. 52 The Court: That is between you and counsel. 53 Mr. Thomas: For that reason I am not exercising a peremptory. 54 Mrs. Balanoff: I am not exercising it. 55 The Court: As long as we understand that you have one more, if you care to exercise it. 56 Thus, it appears that counsel for McCruiston did have a remaining peremptory challenge which could have been exercised had McCruiston chosen to do so. Under these circumstances, there was no error in the award of peremptory challenges or resultant prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Mastrian v. Wood, 433 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 2985, 53 L.Ed.2d 1099 (1977); Van Duyse v. Israel, 486 F.Supp. 1382, 1388 (E.D.Wis.1980). 57