Opinion ID: 2833026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pleading of Retaliation Claims

Text: We consider the applicable pleading standards for a retaliation claim, and then we apply the pleading standards to the retaliation claims in this case. 1. Applicable Pleading Standards for Retaliation Claims
Title VII provides that ʺ[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated ‐ 37 ‐ in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.ʺ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a). Thus, for a retaliation claim to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) defendants discriminated ‐‐ or took an adverse employment action ‐‐ against him, (2) ʺbecauseʺ he has opposed any unlawful employment practice. Id. The Supreme Court has held that in the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, an adverse employment action is any action that ʺcould well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.ʺ Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). This definition covers a broader range of conduct than does the adverse‐action standard for claims of discrimination under Title VII: ʺ[T]he antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive [discrimination] provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.ʺ Id. at 64. As the Court cautioned: Context matters. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. A schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to many workers, but may ‐ 38 ‐ matter enormously to a young mother with school‐age children. A supervisorʹs refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight. But to retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employeeʹs professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination. Id. at 69 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kessler v. Westchester Cty. Depʹt of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 207‐09 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting White, 548 U.S. at 62‐71). As for causation, a plaintiff must plausibly plead a connection between the act and his engagement in protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐ 3(a). A retaliatory purpose can be shown indirectly by timing: protected activity followed closely in time by adverse employment action. See Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (ʺThe causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action.ʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (ʺThough this Court has not drawn a bright line defining, for the purposes of a prima facie case, the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish causation, we have previously held that five months is not too long to find the causal relationship.ʺ). ‐ 39 ‐ Unlike Title VII discrimination claims, however, for an adverse retaliatory action to be ʺbecauseʺ a plaintiff made a charge, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the retaliation was a ʺbut‐forʺ cause of the employerʹs adverse action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). It is not enough that retaliation was a ʺsubstantialʺ or ʺmotivatingʺ factor in the employerʹs decision. See id. ʺʹ[B]ut‐forʹ causation does not[, however,] require proof that retaliation was the only cause of the employerʹs action, but only that the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.ʺ Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013). Further, ʺthe but‐for causation standard does not alter the plaintiffʹs ability to demonstrate causation . . . through temporal proximity.ʺ Id. at 845.
As in discrimination claims, the elements of a retaliation claim based on an equal protection violation under § 1983 mirror those under Title VII. Accordingly, we hold that for a retaliation claim under § 1983 to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) defendants acted under the color of state law, (2) ‐ 40 ‐ defendants took adverse employment action against him, (3) because he complained of or otherwise opposed discrimination. 2. Application We conclude that Vega has adequately pleaded retaliation claims under Title VII based on his assignment of notoriously absent students, his temporary paycheck reduction, and the Districtʹs failure to notify him of a curriculum change, and under Title VII and § 1983 based on his negative performance review. As a threshold matter, we note that the district court erred in concluding that, for a retaliation claim, a plaintiff needs to demonstrate a connection between the alleged retaliatory acts and his ethnicity. See Vega, 2014 WL 2157536, at  (ʺMoreover, plaintiffʹs retaliation claims suffer from the same deficiencies as his Title VII claims, i.e., the lack of a connection between the alleged retaliatory acts and his ethnicity.ʺ). Retaliation occurs when an employer takes action against an employee not because of his ethnicity, but because he engaged in protected activity ‐‐ complaining about or otherwise opposing discrimination. ‐ 41 ‐ Here, Vega alleges that after he engaged in protected activity by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in August 2011, he was assigned more students with excessive absenteeism records (jumping from 20% to 75%), his salary was temporarily reduced, he was not notified that the curriculum for one of his classes was changed, and he received a negative performance evaluation. Each of these allegations plausibly states a claim of retaliation. First, each of these actions ʺcould well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.ʺ White, 548 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). The assignment of a substantially higher number of chronically absent students could very well have adversely impacted Vega, both by making his teaching assignments more difficult and by making it more difficult for him to achieve good results. Likewise, the wrongful deduction of $738.92 from his paycheck for sick leave, the failure of the District to correct the error in full, and the failure of the District to correct the error even in part for six months surely could have had an adverse impact on Vega. See id. Similarly, failing to notify Vega of a curriculum change could have adversely affected him by, for example, making him appear unprepared or ineffective both to his ‐ 42 ‐ students and for his up‐coming teacher evaluation, as he would have been preparing for and teaching the wrong curriculum. Viewed in the context of his other allegations, it was plausible that the Districtʹs failure to notify Vega of the curriculum change was part of their pattern of discrimination and retaliation designed to make Vega look bad. Finally, of course, a poor performance evaluation could very well deter a reasonable worker from complaining. See, e.g., Krinsky v. Abrams, No. 01‐CV‐ 5052 (SLT)(LB), 2007 WL 1541369, at  (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2007) (ʺ[A] negative evaluation, or the threat of a negative evaluation, while not an adverse employment action that affects terms and conditions of employment, might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.ʺ (alteration omitted) (quoting White, 548 U.S. at 68) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, each of these actions closely followed protected activity by Vega. His assignment of classes ʺfor the 2011/2012 school year,ʺ App. at 16, must have been made shortly before the start of the school year ‐‐ shortly after he filed his initial charge with the EEOC on August 8, 2011. Similarly, the District changed the curriculum for his class in November of 2011, within three months ‐ 43 ‐ of his initial filing with the EEOC. The District made the erroneous sick leave deduction from Vegaʹs pay check on March 2, 2012, just two months after Vega filed an addendum to his EEOC complaint on January 4, 2012, providing greater detail about his previous claims and adding new allegations of discrimination and retaliation. Vega received his poor teacher evaluation (from Artiles)11 in February 2013, approximately two months after he filed his pro se complaint in the action below, on December 12, 2012. According to Vega, this was his first negative evaluation in sixteen years of teaching at the High School. Hence, the Complaint plausibly alleges a temporal proximity for each of these actions. Some of these actions, considered individually, might not amount to much. Taken together, however, they plausibly paint a mosaic of retaliation and an intent to punish Vega for complaining of discrimination.