Opinion ID: 476852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appealability and Standing

Text: 6 The government has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that appellants lack standing. Our disposition of almost all of the issues raised by the motion and on the merits of the appeal is controlled by this court's decision last year in In re Grand Jury Matter (District Council 33), 770 F.2d 36 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 574, 88 L.Ed.2d 558 (1985), involving three of the four appellants before us here. In that case, which arose from a grand jury subpoena issued August 21, 1984 directed to District Council 33 (the 1984 subpoena), the district court denied a motion to quash the subpoena, the movants appealed, we dismissed the appeal of several appellants on the ground that they had no standing, and, on the merits, we affirmed the district court's refusal to quash. 7 We turn first to the status of appellant JFK Hospital, to whom the subpoena was directed. As we stated in our prior opinion, the denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is not a final order for the purposes of an appeal unless and until the party to whom the subpoena is directed disobeys its commands and is subsequently cited for contempt. Id. at 38 (citing United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686 (1906)). 8 As the Supreme Court has made clear, this rule is not merely one of convenience. [E]ncouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law.... It is no less important to safeguard against undue interruption the inquiry instituted by a grand jury than to protect from delay the progress of the trial after an indictment has been found. Opportunity for obstructing the 'orderly progress' of investigation should no more be encouraged in one case than in the other. Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325, 327, 60 S.Ct. at 541, 542. It follows that because JFK Hospital has not followed the established route for review, insofar as it has not chosen to disobey the subpoena and incur a citation for contempt, the denial of the hospital's motion to quash the subpoena is not a final order as to it and its appeal will be dismissed. 9 We see no reason why the same ruling should not apply to District Council 33 even though the subpoena was not directed to it. Third parties have sometimes been permitted to intervene and appeal the refusal to quash a subpoena because they do not have the option of resisting compliance and standing in contempt. See In re Grand Jury (Schmidt), 619 F.2d 1022, 1024-27 (3d Cir.1980). The court's order denying a motion to quash is effectively a final order to those who have no further steps they can follow. As we pointed out in Schmidt, it is unlikely that a third party, even an employee, would risk a contempt citation in order to provide [the employer] with immediate review. Id. at 1024-25. Similar considerations have led this court to hold final and appealable by a client orders refusing to quash subpoenas to an attorney that would have required production of documents in which the client claimed a privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 800-01 (3d Cir.1979); In Re Grand Jury (Freedman), 541 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir.1976). 10 Although we have found no cases considering the finality of an order refusing to quash a subpoena as to the parent of the subpoenaed party, it appears to us that District Council 33, as the owner of JFK Hospital, is in a position to control the hospital's decision whether to produce the records or stand in contempt. Thus review of District Council 33's claim on the merits is not now or never, Schmidt, 619 F.2d at 1025, and its appeal will also be dismissed for want of a final order. 11 We turn next to the status of appellant Stout, who here, as in the earlier case, is acting as an intervenor. The district court's order is final as to Stout because, notwithstanding his position as Chairman of the hospital's Board of Directors, we cannot assume that he could personally control its decision whether to produce the records or risk contempt. Nonetheless, because the subpoena is not directed to Stout, we must still consider whether he has standing to appeal the court's order. We stated in District Council 33 that Stout has failed to assert any personal property right or privilege at stake and, in fact, has claimed no legitimate interest whatsoever in the [1984] subpoenaed materials. Id. at 38. Stout has made no greater showing of interest in the materials sought in the 1985 subpoena. Accordingly, we hold that he has no standing to pursue this appeal. 12 Finally, we turn to the status of appellant Health and Welfare Fund. It is in the same position as Stout with respect to finality. The standing considerations are different. In our prior opinion we stated that the Fund may possess a proprietary interest in at least some of the records which District Council 33 was directed to produce, District Council 33, 770 F.2d at 39, and assumed without deciding that the Fund had standing to appeal. We cannot make a meaningful distinction between the considerations that led us to consider the merits of the Fund's challenge to the 1984 subpoena and those that would apply to the appeal before us. For that reason, we feel bound to consider the merits of the Fund's challenge to the 1985 subpoena. 2