Opinion ID: 1699092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Habeas Corpus Collateral Crime Evidence

Text: In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Hodges argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit evidence revealing that the victim had accused Hodges of indecent exposure, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. To assess whether Hodges is entitled to relief on this issue, this Court must determine whether appellate counsel's failure to raise it on appeal is of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result. Floyd, 808 So.2d at 183 (quoting Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla.1986)). Evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by the accused is generally admissible if relevant to a material fact in issue, except where such evidence is solely relevant to demonstrate the bad character of the accused, or propensity of the accused to engage in criminal conduct. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 663 (Fla.1959). The admissibility of collateral crime evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling shall not be disturbed upon review absent an abuse of that discretion. See LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.2001). Under that standard, Hodges cannot sustain a claim for relief on this issue. The record shows that upon defense counsel's objection to the introduction of testimony revealing the nature of the victim's charge against Hodges, the trial court received argument underscoring the relevance of the evidence to show that prosecution of the charge angered Hodges, who maintained that the incident was an accident. The trial court thus reasonably concluded that revealing the nature of the charge would illuminate a material fact at issue  namely Hodges' attempt to characterize the incident as an accident and why continued prosecution may have motivated him to commit murder. There is no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in deeming the evidence relevant. Regardless of relevancy of collateral crime evidence, however, admissibility is improper where the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. See Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988). Based on the facts of the case, Hodges cannot establish that the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its probative value. Hodges stipulated to the fact that the woman he stood accused of murdering had filed charges against him and was adamant about prosecution. With that fact already in the minds of the jury, it defies logic to conclude that the scale balancing probative value versus prejudicial impact would have been tipped by revealing the nature of the pending charges. With almost no probability of overcoming the abuse of discretion standard, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise the claim on appeal. See Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So.2d 138, 142 (Fla.1998).