Opinion ID: 2169046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ex Post Facto Application of KRS 532.110(1)(d)

Text: We now turn to Appellant's argument with respect to his plea of guilty to one count of rape against J.A. As stated above, in exchange for his guilty plea, Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. He reserved the right to appeal the sentence. Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it applied KRS 532.110(1)(d) to his two sentences for rape in the first degree. He argues that the statute's application to his case is in violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. KRS 532.110(1)(d) provides: The sentences of a defendant convicted of two (2) or more felony sex crimes, as defined in KRS 17.500, involving two (2) or more victims shall run consecutively. Subsection (1)(d) became effective July 12, 2006. Between 2001 and 2004, when the rapes of M.W. and J.A. occurred, no such provision existed and the trial court enjoyed the discretion to run applicable sentences concurrently or consecutively. Indeed, though ultimately concluding KRS 532.110(1)(d) had retroactive application, the trial court stated it would have otherwise ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Both the Kentucky Constitution and the United States Constitution prohibit ex post facto laws. See Ky. Const. § 19 and U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. An ex post facto law is one that alters the definition of a crime or one that inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. Lozier v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 511, 513 n. 1 (Ky.App.2000). In determining whether application of a law violates the ex post facto prohibition, our case law requires that we first determine whether it is retrospective. Purvis v. Commonwealth, 14 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Ky.2000). In this case, we next determine whether the law inflicts a greater punishment than the law existing at the time of the offense. Id. The first hurdle has been surmounted in this case. KRS 532.110(1)(d) became effective July 12, 2006. The crimes against J.A., M.W., and M.J.W. occurred between 2001 and 2004. Accordingly, the law was applied retroactively in Appellant's case. We thus turn to the question of whether KRS 532.110(1)(d) increased Appellant's punishment. The Commonwealth urges that the application of KRS 532.110(1)(d) to Appellant does not increase the punishment because the possibility of consecutive sentences existed prior to the enactment of that subsection. The Commonwealth also points out that the allowable term of the underlying sentences remains unchanged. Conversely, Appellant argues that subsection (1)(d) does, in fact, inflict a greater punishment because it removes the possibility of concurrent sentences by essentially rendering what was previously a maximum sentence, a required sentence. The United States Supreme Court has explained that a law violates the ex post facto prohibition when it stiffen[s] the standard of punishment applicable to crimes that have already been committed. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). In Lindsey v. Washington, the Court held for the first time that the ex post facto clause looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by a statute, rather than to the sentence actually imposed. 301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937). In Lindsey, the sentencing scheme at the time of the petitioners' crimes permitted the trial court to impose an indeterminate sentence up to fifteen years. Prior to sentencing, however, a new statute required the trial court to impose the maximum sentence of fifteen years. Despite the fact that a fifteen-year sentence was possible under both the old and new statute, the Court concluded that application of the new scheme violated the ex post facto clause because the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier. Id. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) and Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), both applied the Lindsey principle that the ex post facto clause prohibits the state from later enhancing the measure of punishment to an existing crime. In Weaver , the Court held unconstitutional the application of a statute that reduced the amount of automatic gain time credits available to prisoners, effectively eliminating the lower end of the possible range of prison term. In Miller , the statutorily mandated presumptive sentence range was amended after the petitioner's crime but before his sentencing, increasing the maximum allowable sentence from five and a half years to seven years. The Court determined that application of the later statute was prohibited by the ex post facto clause because it made more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before [the statute's] enactment. 482 U.S. at 435, 107 S.Ct. 2446. The Court of Appeals followed the reasoning in Lindsey in Wethington v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 530 (Ky.App.1977). There, the defendant committed his crimes prior to the enactment of KRS 533.060(2), which makes a person ineligible for concurrent sentencing on a subsequent offense when that offense is committed during a period of parole, probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge. The defendant was sentenced, however, after the effective date of KRS 533.060(2), and the trial court ordered consecutive sentences, concluding that such was required by the new statute. Following Lindsey, the Court of Appeals concluded that application of the statute violated the ex post facto clause because the new standard of punishment adopted by KRS 533.060 is more onerous than the old statute. 549 S.W.2d at 532. While the old statute left to the discretion of the trial judge eligibility for probation and running of sentences, the new statute completely denies eligibility for probation and commands that the period of confinement may not run concurrently with any other sentence. Id. We find Wethington and Lindsey to be analogous to the present case. As in Wethington , the amended version of KRS 532.110(10(d)) denies the trial court the opportunity to consider concurrent sentences for crimes committed before the effective date of the subsection. The Commonwealth, however, argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively overruled Lindsey, which was heavily relied upon in Wethington , and asks this Court to overrule Wethington . We disagree. As this Court explained in Martin v. Chandler, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed confusion surrounding the second prong of the ex post facto inquiry; that is, whether the change in law increases the punishment for a crime. 122 S.W.3d 540 (Ky.2003). In reliance upon dicta found in Weaver v. Graham , this inquiry has, at times, been articulated in terms of whether an offender has been somehow `disadvantaged' by a change in the law after the crime was consummated. 122 S.W.3d at 547. The disadvantaged language, first appearing in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883), was relied upon in Lindsey, Weaver , and Miller , and has been cited by Kentucky courts. See Purvis v. Commonwealth, 14 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Ky. 2000). In Collins v. Youngblood, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Kring and expressly rejected the disadvantaged language, explaining that the case should not be read to mean that the Constitution prohibits retrospective laws ... which alter the situation of a party to his disadvantage. 497 U.S. 37, 49-50, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). While it is true that Collins expressly overruled Kring , the Commonwealth is incorrect in its assertion that Collins undermines the validity of the holdings in Lindsey, Weaver , and Miller . The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Morales : Our opinions in Lindsey, Weaver , and Miller suggested that enhancements to the measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto prohibition because they operate to the disadvantage of covered offenders. But that language was unnecessary to the results in those cases and is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins v. Youngblood. After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of disadvantage, nor, as the dissent seems to suggest, on whether an amendment affects a prisoner's opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. (Internal citations omitted.) 514 U.S. 499 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). Because it ultimately focuses on the increased punishment, the Court of Appeals' holding in Wethington is equally valid, though also citing the disadvantaged language of Lindsey and Kring . See Martin, 122 S.W.3d at 548 (reaffirming the holding in Purvis despite its use of the disadvantaged language). Thus, we reject the Commonwealth's request to overrule Wethington . Accordingly, we conclude that application of KRS 532.110(1)(d) to Appellant's sentencing is prohibited by the ex post facto clause. By removing the possibility of concurrent sentences, subsection (1)(d) creates a new standard of punishment that is more onerous than the old statute. As in Lindsey and in Wethington , the new statute makes mandatory what was previously the maximum sentence. The trial court erred in applying the statute to Appellant's sentencing. We, therefore, remand this case for a new sentencing hearing to be conducted in accordance with this opinion. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court as to the counts involving the rape of M.W. (06-CR-002483-001) and the intimidation of a participant in the legal process (06-CR-002483-003) is affirmed. Appellant's judgment as to the count involving the rape of J.A. (06-CR-002483-002) is remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for a new sentencing hearing. MINTON, C.J.; ABRAMSON, NOBLE and SCOTT, JJ., concur. SCHRODER, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion, in which NOBLE, J., joins. SCHRODER, J., concurring in result only. I believe that Mason's testimony improperly vouched for M.W.'s credibility. As in Bell , although Mason did not explicitly state that M.W. was truthful, implicit in her testimony was that M.W.'s demeanor indicated that she was telling the truth. However, in light of the eyewitness testimony of M.J.W., I believe the error was harmless. NOBLE, J., joins.