Opinion ID: 1350571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was langlotz' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief ripe for judicial determination?

Text: Lamoreux argues that Langlotz' claim was not ripe because the covenants gave Lamoreux two years in which to complete the exterior of his dwelling. Langlotz contends that, had he not acted immediately, his claim might well have been barred by the defense of laches. [3] Ordinarily, a cause of action accrues when all the essential elements forming the basis for the claim have occurred. See Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 375 (Alaska 1987); Hanebuth v. Helicopter International, 694 P.2d 143, 146 (Alaska 1984). If a suit is commenced before the claim is ripe, the suit is premature and must be dismissed. See Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173-74 (Alaska 1983) (complaint alleged actual present damage and therefore stated valid claim for relief). Courts sometimes take a different approach when the claimant seeks to enjoin violations of restrictive covenants. For example, when one neighbor sued to enjoin a setback violation four months after the violator laid his foundation and began construction, the court ruled that the plaintiff neighbor was guilty of laches. Smith v. Spencer, 81 N.J. Eq. 389, 87 A. 158, 159 (1913). Although plaintiff had immediately informed the violator of the suspected violation and had corresponded extensively with him, the court concluded that plaintiff had a duty to file legal proceedings immediately, before there was a substantial expenditure of money. Id. Similarly, in McRae v. Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic, 40 Ariz. 496, 14 P.2d 478, 481-82 (1932), the court ruled that plaintiff was guilty of laches when it filed suit to enforce a residential-use-only restriction ten days after defendant began excavation for the foundation. Plaintiff failed to request a temporary restraining order, and defendant completed construction a month before trial. Id. Since injunctive relief was not feasible plaintiff was limited to recovery of damages. Id. More recent decisions reflect a willingness to allow the complaining neighbor some time to pursue extra-judicial avenues of redress. For example, in Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980), the court enforced a single-family dwelling only restriction against a homeowner who built an apartment in her basement. The court ruled that the homeowner proceeded at her own risk when she continued building after her neighbors complained. Id. at 1264. The neighbors having informed the homeowner of the existence of the controversy, the court ruled that equity did not require them to file suit immediately. Id. Similarly, in Dickstein v. Williams, 93 Nev. 605, 571 P.2d 1169 (1977), the court enforced a building height restriction. The complaining neighbor learned of the violation in January and filed suit a month later. Id., 571 P.2d at 1170. The court ruled that the complaining neighbor acted diligently and the violating homeowner acted at his own risk after he knew of his neighbor's complaint. Id. at 1171. Thus, the homeowner was required to remove the offending addition, even though it was completed three months before final judgment was entered. Id.; accord Smith v. Nelson, 149 Colo. 200, 368 P.2d 566 (1962). We have never addressed this precise issue. However, in City and Borough of Juneau v. Breck, 706 P.2d 313 (Alaska 1985), we ruled that Breck, a citizen plaintiff, was not entitled to an order enjoining the city from completing a design-build construction project. The contract was signed and construction began in May. Id. at 314. Breck was aware of possible city charter violations as early as March, and appeared before the borough assembly at least nine times. Id. By the time Breck filed suit in August, construction was 50% complete. Id. at 315. We ruled that Breck had unreasonably delayed in filing suit, because she waited until long after it was no longer reasonable to assume that the assembly would comply with the charter. Id. Once the city was committed to an irrevocable course of conduct, a reasonable person would have been galvanized into legal action. Id. at 316. We believe that Langlotz' claim was ripe for review. Once Lamoreux began to build in apparent violation of the covenants, and refused to discuss the problem, a reasonable person would have been galvanized into action. Although a claim for damages might have been premature, we conclude that Langlotz was entitled to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief. [4]