Opinion ID: 1378366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: constitutional mandates

Text: The impasse facing the state as a result of the qualification of the referenda challenging the Legislature's reapportionment statutes leaves this court no choice but to resolve the pressing problem of what districts should be used in the upcoming primary and general elections. The only alternatives available are either the new plan approved by the Legislature and the Governor or the old districts used in the last decade. From a practical point of view, which of these plans is available to this court for congressional reapportionment? California is now entitled to 45 representatives instead of 43. Real parties argue that this court should use the 43 old districts and fill the 2 new seats by statewide elections. Every member of this court agrees that this is not a viable alternative. As this court pointed out in Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 603, federal law forbids the use of statewide elections to fill congressional seats. Section 2c of title 2 of the United States Code provides that, In each State entitled ... to more than one Representative under an apportionment made [by the President of the total number of Representatives among the several States], there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established.... (7) Real parties assert that Reinecke I was wrong in holding that section 2c commands the election of congressional representatives from single-member districts. They contend that section 2a(c), of title 2 commands at-large elections. The flaw in their argument is that the legislative history of section 2c reveals, as does its plain language, that Congress intended 2c to supersede the provisions of section 2a(c). [17] During the Senate debate on section 2c, proposed by Senator Howard Baker, the following colloquy occurred. After observing that by its terms section 2c would require that each state establish by law single-member districts for the election of its representatives, Senator Birch Bayh posed this question to Senator Baker:  I would interpret `by law' to mean if the reapportionment is done either by the State legislatures or by the court. I should like to know whether the Senator from Tennessee [ Senator Baker ] agrees with that interpretation.  (Debate before the Senate, 113 Cong. Rec. 31719 (1967), italics added.) Senator Baker responded that it was, of course, in the first instance the province of the legislatures to establish congressional districts and that a court should only intervene if the legislature failed to do so. ( Ibid. ) Senator Bayh, stating that perhaps the Senator had misunderstood his question, went on to observe: [I]f it is bad government for the legislature to say that Congressmen should run at large, then it is bad government for the court to have an entire group of Congressmen running at large in a State. ( Ibid. ) Senator Baker responded: ... I agree.... ( Ibid. ) Senator Bayh then returned to his original question. When we say `... there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative,' we are talking about either of two situations  whether the legislature reapportions or whether the court reapportions. ( Id., at p. 31720.) Senator Baker replied, The Senator is correct. ( Ibid. ) During the floor debate, Senator Bayh again asked: This will make it mandatory for all Congressmen to be elected by single-Member districts, whether the reapportionment is done by State legislatures or by a Federal court. Senator Baker responded: That is my understanding. Thereafter, section 2c was adopted by the Senate by voice vote. ( Ibid. ) The bill then went to the House for its consideration. An amendment was proposed to allow those states which had been conducting congressional elections at large (i.e., Hawaii and New Mexico) to do so for the 91st or next congressional election as well. (See Debate before the House, 113 Cong. Rec. 34032 (1967).) Most of the debate focused on the desirability of this proposed amendment. Little was said about the merits of the provision itself. However, one remark is instructive. The language ... will prohibit any State from running [its representatives] at large in any future elections. (Remarks of Representative Smith, id., at p. 34035.) The measure passed the House, as amended, and was returned to the Senate. (See Debate before the Senate, 113 Cong. Rec. 34364 (1967).) There, the debate focused on whether the House amendment allowing Hawaii and New Mexico to elect their representatives at large in 1968 should be accepted. (See id., at pp. 34364-34370.) In the course of that debate, it was observed that, Beginning with the 1970 elections, and for every congressional election thereafter, every state of the Union, with no exception, must elect its Congressman [ sic ] from single-member districts. (Remarks of Sen. Fong, id., at p. 34364, italics added.) At the close of debate, the Senate passed the bill as amended by the House. ( Id., at pp. 34369-34370.) Given the legislative history of section 2c and this court's observations in Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 603, it is clear that the use of the 43 old districts and an at-large election of the 2 new representatives would contravene the congressional mandate set forth in section 2c. This interpretation is consistent with the decisions of other state and federal courts. [18] As this court stated in Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 603, the mandate of Congress to elect all representatives from single-member districts is one with which this court fully agrees. [T]o conduct statewide elections to fill [the new] congressional seats in a state of California's geographical size and large population would not only tremendously increase the burdens and expenses of effective campaigning but, by increasing the choices confronting the electorate ..., would seriously impede the casting of informed ballots. ( Ibid. ) Further, an at-large election would allow the voters of California to select three representatives instead of the one that they are entitled to under law. [19] The only practical and constitutional alternative available for use as a temporary court plan for this election year is the 1981 congressional reapportionment law. (Stats. 1981, ch. 535.) If this court must adopt the 1981 congressional reapportionment plan so that the 1982 House elections can go forward, is there any reason this court should not also adopt the 1981 Assembly and Senate plans? Although few definitive rules guide the choice of an interim election plan, decisions of the United States Supreme Court do provide standards. (8) The primary federal concern is equal protection  here, the principle of one-person, one-vote. Further, equitable considerations such as the potential disruption of the state's election process must also be considered. ( Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 585 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 541].) Thus, this court must adopt the plan that best ensures equal protection of the law while minimizing any disruptive impact on the election process. In addition, any decision by this court should recognize the basic rule that reapportionment is primarily a legislative task, undertaken by this court only when circumstances permit no alternative. ( Id., at p. 586 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 541].) (9a) A weighing of the diverse and at times conflicting factors involved in this case leads to the conclusion that the election plans developed by the Legislature in 1981 must be used, as a temporary measure, in the 1982 legislative elections. (10) The equal protection clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) mandate that this court adopt the reapportionment plan that most nearly meets the constitutional ideal, absent extraordinary circumstances. ( Cosner v. Dalton (E.D.Va. 1981) 522 F. Supp. 350, 363-364; Cummings v. Meskill (D.Conn. 1972) 347 F. Supp. 1176, 1177; Klahr v. Williams (D.Ariz. 1970) 313 F. Supp. 148, 153; Jones v. Falcey (1966) 48 N.J. 25 [222 A.2d 101, 109-110]; see also Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 585 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 541].) [20] (9b) Given the imminence of the 1982 primary election, only two options are available. This court must choose between the two districting plans currently available, selecting that plan which more nearly comports with the requirements of the federal and state equal protection clauses and is least disruptive of the electoral process. The old districts contain enormous population variances. The population of the largest old Assembly district is more than 200 percent that of the smallest. The populations of the new districts appear to be within 4 to 7 percent of equality. [21] Clearly, the new districts are far closer to the constitutional goal than the old. [22] According to figures supplied by real parties, the current population of the old 76th Assembly District (530,643) is 236 percent of the population of the old 16th Assembly District (224,488). The vote of a resident of the former 16th District would, therefore, be worth more than twice that of a resident of the former 76th District. Compared to the current ideal district size, the old 76th District is 79.4 percent greater than the ideal, while the old 16th District is 24.1 percent less than the ideal. The total deviation between the two districts is 103.5 percent. Overall, 2 of the old Assembly districts vary by more than 50 percent from the ideal population size of 295,857; 2 vary by 30 to 50 percent from the ideal size; and 48 of the 80 districts vary by 10 to 30 percent from the ideal. Only 28 of the districts are within 10 percent of the ideal district size. In the Senate, old Senate District 5 now contains 458,587 people, 22.5 percent less than the ideal number, while old Senate District 38 contains 904,725 people, 52.9 percent more than the ideal. Thus, the vote of a resident of former District 5 would be worth almost twice that of a resident of former District 38. The total deviation between the two districts is 75.4 percent. Real parties' figures show that the population of one old Senate district is more than 50 percent greater than the ideal; another is 41 percent greater than the ideal; 19 vary by 10 to 30 percent from the ideal; and 19 are within 10 percent of the ideal population size. The Supreme Court has not established a rigid numerical limit for legislative districts. However, the high court has developed guidelines for permissible deviations. As summarized by one federal district court, a maximum deviation of less than 10 percent between the largest and smallest districts is permissible and need not be justified by the state. However, a maximum deviation of 10 to 16.4 percent is permissible only if the state can demonstrate that the deviation is the result of a rational state policy. A maximum deviation greater than 16.4 percent is intolerable under the equal protection clause. ( Sims v. Amos (M.D.Ala. 1973) 365 F. Supp. 215, 222, affd. sub nom. Wallace v. Sims (1974) 415 U.S. 902 [39 L.Ed.2d 460, 94 S.Ct. 1394]; Cosner v. Dalton, supra, 522 F. Supp. at pp. 357-358; see also White v. Regester (1973) 412 U.S. 755 [37 L.Ed.2d 314, 93 S.Ct. 2332]; Mahan v. Howell (1973) 410 U.S. 315 [35 L.Ed.2d 320, 93 S.Ct. 979]; see 1 Dorsen et al., Political and Civil Rights in the United States (4th ed. 1976) pp. 1107-1108.) Under this standard, the old districting plan  with maximum deviations of 103.5 percent (Assembly) and 75.4 percent (Senate)  is a per se violation of the United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at page 585 [12 L.Ed.2d at page 541], once a State's legislative apportionment scheme has been found to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan. (Italics added.) Further, the high court has held that a court-ordered plan, such as that which established California's old districts, must be held to higher standards than a state legislature's plan. ( Chapman v. Meier (1975) 420 U.S. 1, 26 [42 L.Ed.2d 766, 784, 95 S.Ct. 1988].) California's Constitution provides a further reason to prefer adoption of the Legislature's 1981 reapportionment plans rather than to perpetuate the out-dated, malapportioned districts followed in the past decade. Article XXI of the state Constitution, adopted in 1980, requires the Legislature to reapportion the state in the year following the federal census. This constitutional provision expresses a clear mandate that properly apportioned districts be in effect by the time of the first election following the decennial census. Use of the Legislature's 1981 plans will also minimize the potential disruption of the electoral and political processes of the state. At the primary, the new reapportionment plans will be either affirmed or rejected. The court cannot and should not attempt to predict the outcome of the referenda. The will of the people, except as already expressed through their chosen representatives, is as yet unspoken. The referenda may be voted up or down. Both possibilities must be considered in fashioning a temporary remedy that will do least violence to the orderly conduct of the 1982 elections, regardless of the ultimate result of the referenda. California faces a unique situation in which the plan by which the elections should be conducted is the subject of a vote at those same elections. Use of the Legislature's 1981 plan for the 1982 elections minimizes any disruption of the electoral process. If the reapportionment statutes are ratified by the voters at the primary, use of them now will cause no disruption at all. The 1982 elections will proceed according to the new plan  a statute approved by the Legislature, the Governor, and the people of the state. Real parties argue that use of the old legislative districts would cause less disruption. That conclusion, however, rests on an implicit and impermissible assumption  that the referenda will result in the rejection of the Legislature's reapportionment statutes. That is an assumption this court cannot legally make. To do so would thrust the court into the political realm, prejudging an issue which is exclusively for the voters of the state to decide. If the court orders the use of the old districts in 1982 and the reapportionment statutes then are affirmed, the state will be faced with the anomalous situation of an election run under seriously malapportioned, unconstitutional districts, despite the fact that the Legislature, the Governor and the people of the state all have concurred in adopting a new reapportionment statute. The legislators elected in those malapportioned, unconstitutional districts would serve terms of two and four years before the districts chosen by the people and their elected representatives could be given effect. If the reapportionment statutes are rejected at the primary election, some disruption of the election process will occur no matter which plan is adopted now. The Legislature will be faced with the task of formulating new districts in time for the 1984 elections. That new plan will be subject to possible challenge in the courts and by referendum. At least, however, if the new plans are adopted temporarily in June and November, the 1982 elections will be run under a districting plan that is far closer to federal and state constitutional mandates than the out-dated plan of the last decade. In sum, then, giving equal weight to the possibilities that the referenda may succeed or fail, use of the 1981 reapportionment statutes minimizes the potential disruption of the electoral process. It eliminates the danger of the worst possible scenario  use of the old, unconstitutional plans in June and November despite approval of the new plans at the primary election. Further, the use of the 1981 reapportionment plans maximizes the likelihood that there will be no disruption at all. Adoption of the Legislature's reapportionment plans for temporary use in 1982 also furthers the related goals of judicial restraint and deference to the Legislature. This court passes no judgment on the wisdom of the Legislature's 1981 plans or on the likelihood that the people will affirm or reject those statutes at the primary election. However, in choosing whether to use an out-of-date plan that no longer conforms to equal protection requirements or a new statute passed by the Legislature, the court cannot be blind to the fact that the Legislature and the Governor have given their assent to the latter plan. Although stayed by the referenda, these statutes were the product of the political give and take of the legislative branch of government, the branch delegated responsibility for reapportionment both by federal precedent and by California's Constitution. [23] Use of the old plan would also perpetrate a potentially grave injustice on the majority of the people of this state. The effect of reverting to the old plan would be to allow 5 percent of the voters, by signing referendum petitions, to delay implementation of a constitutionally required reapportionment plan for two to four years. [24] Not until 1986 would the voters in some Senate districts electing representatives this year have the opportunity to vote in properly apportioned districts. Although the Constitution of our state grants the power to initiate a referendum to 5 percent of the voters, it does not require that the effect of that referendum be articulated in a manner that does such serious injury to conflicting and equally compelling constitutional mandates. (See discussion, ante, at pp. 660-661.) Any decision by this court requires a balancing of competing constitutional considerations. In light of the strong factors weighing in favor of the use of a revised, up-to-date reapportionment plan, it is simply untenable to argue that the constitutional provision on stays must be followed blindly, no matter what the cost to the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions and article XXI of the state Constitution. Maintaining the old election districts for the upcoming election would raise troubling questions about the future of reapportionment in our state. It would create a serious risk that every reapportionment plan would be delayed at least two years before it could be implemented. Each decade, the losers in the reapportionment battle could obtain a two-year grace period on the strength of the signatures of 5 percent of the voters, thereby delaying implementation of the new plan until years after the referendum election. Cognizant of the seemingly interminable reapportionment lawsuits of the last two decades, this court should take care to avoid creating a system whereby delay becomes the rule and constitutionally required reapportionment may never be achieved within constitutionally imposed deadlines. The decision to implement the 1981 reapportionment statutes for the 1982 elections will not circumvent the people's right to vote on those plans at the primary. The outcome of that vote will determine the future of reapportionment for the rest of the decade. This court's decision affects only the districts to be used temporarily for the 1982 elections. It is an unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of the timing of the referenda that the results of those referenda must necessarily be one step behind the reality of the 1982 elections. For this one year only, the elections must be conducted in ignorance of the preference of a majority of the voters. This is the unhappy result of the unique situation now confronting the state. Further, use of the unconstitutional, out-dated plan would increase the likelihood that the will of the people, as expressed in the primary vote, might be thwarted. It is important to remember that the Legislature's plans have not been rejected by the voters. The statutes have been placed on the ballot, based on the signatures of 5 percent or more of the actual number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election. The ultimate disposition of the plans, although put to a vote by the referendum petitions, is as yet undecided. Thus, this case is substantially different from Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 595. There this court held that it would not order use of the results of a truncated legislative process absent the most compelling considerations. ( Id., at p. 602.) The reapportionment bill in Reinecke I had been vetoed by the Governor. By way of contrast, the statutes here have never been rejected by any governmental entity. They were signed by the Governor and will be put to a vote of the people. To use the adjective truncated to describe both of these situations would seriously stretch the descriptive power and distort the definition of the word. The legislative process in Reinecke I was truncated by a sharp, final veto by the Governor. The legislative process here has been lengthened but not terminated. A small percentage of the voters has exercised its right to put the question to a vote of the whole. Pending that vote, the legislative process here has been stalled but not derailed, slowed but not truncated. The situation facing this court today is distinguishable from Reinecke I in another crucial respect: the applicable law has changed in the intervening 10 years. First, the voters of the state amended the state Constitution in 1980 to provide, In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts.... (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 1, italics added.) This provision replaced former provisions that had been declared unconstitutional on other grounds in 1965. ( Silver v. Jordan (S.D.Cal. 1964) 241 F. Supp. 576, affd. per curiam, Jordan v. Silver (1965) 381 U.S. 415 [14 L.Ed.2d 689, 85 S.Ct. 1572].) The voters of the state have thus recently reaffirmed their commitment to the constitutional requirement that the Legislature adopt new apportionment lines immediately after the new census figures are available. Since Reinecke I, this court has also held that our state's equal protection clause (see art. I, § 7), adopted in 1974, has independent vitality which at times may require greater protection than that afforded by the federal Constitution ( Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 764 [135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929]). Finally, the years since Reinecke I have taught us that the courts cannot tolerate endless delays in the implementation of a constitutional reapportionment plan. Reinecke itself required four opinions before this court imposed a court-designed reapportionment plan on the state. (See Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595; Legislature v. Reinecke (1972) 7 Cal.3d 92 [101 Cal. Rptr. 552, 496 P.2d 464]; Legislature v. Reinecke (1973) 9 Cal.3d 166 [107 Cal. Rptr. 18, 507 P.2d 626]; Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 396.) Court battles over reapportionment have frequently stretched far into the decade that the reapportionment plans were intended to serve. The courts must now seek remedies that will encourage prompt resolution of reapportionment disputes. The calculus confronting this court as it determines the proper remedy for the 1982 elections is thus substantially different from that which faced the court 10 years ago in Reinecke I. The new plan carries with it the assent of both the Legislature and the Governor. Although it faces the possibility of rejection by the people, that is as yet only a possibility. On the other hand, the factors militating against use of the old districting plans are far stronger than they were in 1972. The equal protection clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions are less open to delay and stricter in their requirement of one-person, one-vote. [25] Further, an amendment to the California Constitution has specifically reaffirmed the requirement of legislative reapportionment in the year following the federal census. The Reinecke I solution  use of the old districts for legislative elections and the new districts for Congressional elections  is not helpful here. The suggestion that it be used today leads ineluctably to a logical conflict. If the court has the power to order use of the new plans for congressional races, a fact agreed to by every member of this court, it must be able to do the same for the state legislative districts. In 1982 the allure of the Reinecke I solution lies more in its value as a compromise than its theoretical neatness. And compromise between competing political parties is a political solution, one that is inappropriate for a body whose members are sworn to uphold the constitutional right of the citizens of this state to vote in districts which respect the requirement that each person's vote has equal value.