Opinion ID: 3166086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arizona’s Test

Text: The trial judge sentenced McKinney to death in 1993. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Kinney’s conviction and sentence in 1996. As briefly described above, Arizona capital sentencing law included a statutorily specified nonexhaustive list of five mitigating factors. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G) (1993). Among the statutory mitigating factors was a modified form of diminished capacity, contained in § 13703(G)(1): “The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.” Arizona capital sentencing law also included nonstatutory mitigating factors, such as family background or mental conditions that did not rise to the level of impairment MCKINNEY V. RYAN 27 specified in § 13-703(G)(1). Beginning in the late 1980s, Arizona Supreme Court developed a “causal nexus” test for nonstatutory mitigation. Under this test, as we noted above, evidence of a difficult family background or a mental condition was not in and of itself relevant mitigating evidence. As a matter of Arizona law, such evidence was relevant for mitigation purposes only if it had some causal effect contributing to the defendant’s behavior in the commission of the crime at issue. Thus, while the defendant could submit evidence of his difficult family background or mental condition, the sentencing court was prohibited from treating it as legally relevant mitigation evidence unless the defendant proved a causal connection between his background or disorder and the crime. In capital cases from the late 1980s to the mid-2000s, the Arizona Supreme Court repeatedly articulated this causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. The test was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” in Eddings. In the immediate aftermath of Eddings, the Arizona Supreme Court had not yet developed its causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. One year after Eddings, the Arizona Supreme Court understood and applied Eddings and Lockett correctly. In State v. McMurtrey, a capital case, the Court wrote: [T]he sentencer may not refuse to consider, as a matter of law, relevant evidence presented in mitigation. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). . . . . . . If after considering the offered evidence, the court concludes that with 28 MCKINNEY V. RYAN respect to the defendant’s mental condition, it merely establishes a character or personality disorder then the court may under [State v.] Richmond, [560 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1976),] conclude that the mitigating circumstance in [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.] § 13-703(G)(1) does not exist. In order to remain faithful to Lockett and [State v.] Watson, [586 P.2d 1253 (Ariz. 1978),] however, the court’s inquiry may not end there. The court must consider the offered evidence further to determine whether it in some other way suggests that the defendant should be treated with leniency. 664 P.2d 637, 646 (Ariz. 1983); see also State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1, 14 (Ariz. 1983). By the late 1980s, however, the Arizona Supreme Court had begun to articulate and apply its causal nexus test to nonstatutory mitigation. In Wallace, decided three years before the trial judge sentenced McKinney, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote in a capital case: A difficult family background, in and of itself, is not a mitigating circumstance. If it were, nearly every defendant could point to some circumstance in his or her background that would call for mitigation. A difficult family background is a relevant mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that something in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the defendant’s control. . . . [Appellant’s] entire family background was before the court in the MCKINNEY V. RYAN 29 pre-sentence report. Appellant, however, made no claim that his family background had anything to do with the murders he committed. Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986 (1989) (emphasis added). The Court could not have been clearer that, as a matter of law, nonstatutory mitigation evidence not satisfying the causal nexus test was irrelevant. This test was in direct contravention of Eddings and Lockett. In Ross, decided two years after the trial judge sentenced McKinney, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote in another capital case, with a pin citation to the precise page in Wallace: A difficult family background is not a relevant mitigating circumstance unless “a defendant can show that something in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the defendant’s control.” State v. Wallace, 773 P.2d 983, 986 (Ariz. 1989). 886 P.2d at 1363 (1994) (citation shortened) (emphasis added). Again, the Court could not have been clearer that, as a matter of law, nonstatutory mitigation evidence not satisfying the causal nexus test was irrelevant. In affirming McKinney’s death sentence in 1996, the Arizona Supreme Court cited Ross, with a pin citation to this precise page. McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234. Two years after affirming McKinney’s death sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court mentioned Eddings by name, in a passage manifesting its continued misreading of Eddings and 30 MCKINNEY V. RYAN Lockett. In State v. Djerf, 959 P.2d 1274, 1289 (Ariz. 1998), the Arizona Supreme Court explained that it read Eddings and Lockett to require a sentencer to “consider” evidence offered in mitigation. In the usage of the Arizona Court, however, “considering” such evidence did not mean weighing it to determine how much mitigating effect to give it. Rather, it meant “considering” such evidence to determine whether it satisfied the causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. If it satisfied the test, the sentencer was required to determine how much weight, if any, to give it. If did not satisfy the test, the sentencer was required, as a matter of law, to treat it as irrelevant and to give it no weight. As the Court wrote in Djerf: This court has held that Lockett and Eddings require only that the sentencer consider evidence proffered for mitigation. The sentencer, however, is entitled to give it the weight it deserves. Arizona law states that a difficult family background is not relevant unless the defendant can establish that his family experience is linked to his criminal behavior. Ross, 886 P.2d at 1362. The trial court considered the evidence but found it irrelevant and declined to give it weight because proof was lacking that his family background had any effect on the crimes. Id. (emphasis added and some citations omitted). Two years later, in State v. Hoskins, the Arizona Supreme Court reiterated what it had written in Djerf and explained the Arizona causal nexus test and its two-step process for MCKINNEY V. RYAN 31 “consideration” of mitigating evidence. The Court wrote at length: The trial court found that defendant had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from antisocial or borderline personality disorder. But proof that such disorder exists does not of itself establish mitigation. For our purposes on review, it is essential not only that a personality disorder be shown to exist but that it be causally linked to the crime at the time the crime is committed. ... A dysfunctional family background or difficult childhood can be mitigating only if the defendant can establish that early experiences, however negative, affected later criminal behavior in ways that were beyond his control. Thus, family dysfunction, as with mental impairment under the (G)(1) statute, can be mitigating only when actual causation is demonstrated between early abuses suffered and the defendant’s subsequent acts. We reaffirm that doctrine here. . . . . . . If the defendant fails to prove causation, the circumstance will not be considered mitigating. However, if the defendant proves the causal link, the court will then determine what, if any, weight to accord the circumstance in mitigation. 32 MCKINNEY V. RYAN .... The dissenting opinion expresses an impassioned description of the defendant’s “horrific” childhood. We are aware of the circumstances of defendant’s upbringing and have reviewed all aspects in minute detail. . . . Yet, it is clear that credible evidence in this record does not establish actual nexus with the crime, and our jurisprudence requires the nexus be proven. Wallace (II), 773 P.2d at 985–86. Importantly, were we to hold otherwise, the family dysfunction factor and the impairment factor would become meaningless because virtually every homicide defendant can point to background dysfunction, abuse, or neglect as a basis for mitigation and leniency. 14 P.3d 997, 1021–22 (Ariz. 2000) (emphasis added and some citations omitted). The decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court make clear that family background or a mental condition could be given weight as a nonstatutory mitigating factor, but only if defendant established a causal connection between the background or condition and his criminal behavior. For a little over fifteen years, the Arizona Supreme Court routinely articulated and insisted on its unconstitutional causal nexus test, as seen in Wallace (1989), Ross (1994), Djerf (1998), and Hoskins (2000), as just described, and in many other cases. See, e.g., State v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 881 (Ariz. 1991) (“‘A difficult family background, in and of itself, is not a mitigating circumstance.’” (quoting Wallace, 773 P.2d at MCKINNEY V. RYAN 33 986)); State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 802 (Ariz. 1992) (“The evidence of defendant’s troubled background establishes only that a personality disorder exists. It does not prove that, at the time of the crime, the disorder controlled defendant’s conduct or impaired his mental capacity to such a degree that leniency is required.”); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1209 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s family history was not mitigating in part because “Defendant made no showing that any difficult family history had anything to do with the murder” (citing Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986)); State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830, 854 (Ariz. 1995) (“A difficult family background, however, is not always a mitigating circumstance. If it were, many homicide defendants could point to some circumstance in their background that would call for mitigation. A difficult family background is a mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that something in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond his control.” (citing Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986)); State v. Stokley, 898 P.2d 454, 473 (Ariz. 1995) (“A difficult family background alone is not a mitigating circumstance.” (citing Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986)); State v. Jones, 917 P.2d 200, 219–20 (Ariz. 1996) (defendant’s “chaotic and abusive childhood [was] not a mitigating circumstance” because there was no causal nexus to the crime); State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 311 (Ariz. 1996) (“We have held that a difficult family background is not always entitled to great weight as a mitigating circumstance. State v. Wallace, [773 P.2d at 985–86] (‘A difficult family background is a relevant mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that something in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the defendant’s control.’)”); State v. Rienhardt, 951 P.2d 454, 467 (Ariz. 1997) (“[T]his court has rejected past drug and alcohol use as a mitigating circumstance calling for leniency 34 MCKINNEY V. RYAN when there is no evidence of a causal connection between the substance abuse and the crime.”); State v. Greene, 967 P.2d 106, 117 (Ariz. 1998) (“Greene’s mother may have introduced him to drugs, but Greene failed to show how this influenced his behavior on the night of the murder. Thus, we do not find Greene’s dysfunctional family history to be a mitigating circumstance.” (internal citation omitted)); State v. Sharp, 973 P.2d 1171, 1182 (Ariz. 1999) (“[W]e require a causal connection to justify considering evidence of a defendant’s background as a mitigating circumstance.”); State v. Kayer, 984 P.2d 31, 46 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that the defendant’s mental impairment “was not established as a nonstatutory mitigating factor” in part because “defendant offered no evidence to show the requisite causal nexus that mental impairment affected his judgment or his actions at the time of the murder”); State v. Martinez, 999 P.2d 795, 809 (Ariz. 2000) (“There is simply no nexus between Martinez’ family history and his actions on the Beeline Highway. His family history, though regrettable, is not entitled to weight as a non-statutory mitigating factor.”); State v. Canez, 42 P.3d 564, 594 (Ariz. 2002) (“[A] causal nexus between the intoxication and the offense is required to establish nonstatutory impairment mitigation.”); id. at 595 (“A defendant’s difficult childhood is mitigating only where causally connected to his offense.”). The Arizona Supreme Court articulated the causal nexus test in various ways but always to the same effect: As a matter of law, a difficult family background or mental condition did not qualify as a nonstatutory mitigating factor unless it had a causal effect on the defendant’s behavior in committing the crime at issue. The Arizona Court frequently stated categorically that, absent a causal nexus, would-be nonstatutory mitigation was simply “not a mitigating MCKINNEY V. RYAN 35 circumstance.” Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986. Sometimes, the court stated that evidence offered as nonstatutory mitigation that did not have a causal connection to the crime should be given no “weight.” For example, as it wrote in Djerf: Arizona law states that a difficult family background is not relevant unless the defendant can establish that his family experience is linked to his criminal behavior. The trial court considered the evidence but found it irrelevant and declined to give it weight because proof was lacking that his family background had any effect on the crimes. Djerf, 959 P.2d at 1289 (citation omitted). Similarly, the court wrote in Martinez, “There is simply no nexus between Martinez’ family history and his actions on the Beeline Highway. His family history, though regrettable, is not entitled to weight as a non-statutory mitigating factor.” Martinez, 999 P.2d at 809. Sometimes, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that evidence of a difficult family background or mental illness was “not necessarily” or not “usually” mitigating, and then (often in the same paragraph) held as a matter of law that the evidence in the specific case before the Court was not mitigating because it had no causal connection to the crime. For example, the Court wrote in Jones, A difficult family background is not necessarily a mitigating circumstance unless defendant can show that something in his background had an effect on his behavior that 36 MCKINNEY V. RYAN was beyond his control. . . . [H]owever, the trial court did not find any connection between defendant’s family background and his conduct on the night of the murders, and our review of the record does not reveal any such connection. Thus, we find that defendant’s chaotic and abusive childhood is not a mitigating circumstance. Jones, 917 P.2d at 219–20 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court wrote in Hoskins, quoting an earlier case, “‘An abusive family background is usually given significant weight as a mitigating factor only when the abuse affected the defendant’s behavior at the time of the crime.’” Hoskins, 14 P.3d at 1021 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784, 795 (Ariz. 1997)). The court in Hoskins then went to state and apply the unconstitutional causal nexus test as a matter of law to the evidence in the case before it, writing, [I]t is essential not only that a personality disorder be shown to exist but that it be causally linked to the crime at the time the crime is committed. . . . . . . Because defendant has not connected his anti-social or personality disorder to the car-jacking and murder, it cannot be co nsidered a relevant m i t i gat i ng circumstance. . . . .... MCKINNEY V. RYAN 37 . . . If the defendant fails to prove causation, the circumstance will not be considered mitigating. However, if the defendant proves the causal link, the court then will determine what, if any, weight to accord the circumstance in mitigation. Id. at 1021–22 (emphasis added). In the mid-2000s, after the United States Supreme Court emphatically reiterated the Eddings rule in Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), the Arizona Supreme Court finally abandoned its unconstitutional causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. In its first post-Tennard case addressing Eddings, the Arizona Supreme Court properly stated the rule in a jury sentencing case: While Eddings and various other Supreme Court decisions dictate a liberal rule of admissibility for mitigating evidence, they still leave it to the sentencer to “determine the weight to be given to relevant mitigating evidence.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114–15, 102 S.Ct. 869. Once the jury has heard all the defendant’s mitigation evidence, there is no constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that the evidence is not particularly relevant or that it is entitled to little weight. State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369, 392 (Ariz. 2005). A year later, in a judge-sentencing case, the Arizona Supreme Court, relying on Anderson, again properly stated the rule: 38 MCKINNEY V. RYAN We do not require that a nexus between the mitigating factors and the crime be established before we consider the mitigation evidence. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004). But the failure to establish such a causal connection may be considered in assessing the quality and strength of the mitigation evidence. State v. Newell, 132 P.3d 833, 849 (Ariz. 2006).