Opinion ID: 1675672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rights of Privacy and Free Exercise of Religion

Text: We begin our analysis with the overarching principle that article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution guarantees that a competent person has the constitutional right to choose or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all relevant decisions concerning one's health. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1990); see also In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1989). In cases like this one, the privacy right overlaps with the right to freely exercise one's religion to protect the right of a person to refuse a blood transfusion because of religious convictions. Art. I, §§ 3, 23, Fla. Const.; Wons. [5] In cases where these rights are litigated, a party generally seeks to invoke the power of the State, through the exercise of the court's judicial power, either to enforce the patient's rights or to prevent the patient from exercising those rights. We have set forth the following guiding principles: The state has a duty to assure that a person's wishes regarding medical treatment are respected. That obligation serves to protect the rights of the individual from intrusion by the state unless the state has a compelling interest great enough to override this constitutional right. The means to carry out any such compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the individual. Browning, 568 So.2d at 13-14 (footnote omitted); see also Wons, 541 So.2d at 96; In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1192-93. Among the factors we have identified that could be considered in determining whether to give force to a patient's right to refrain from medical treatment is the protection of innocent third parties, see, e.g., Browning, 568 So.2d at 14, often discussed in terms of abandonment. See, e.g., Wons, 541 So.2d at 97 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially). [6] The arguments made in this Court present two basic issues. First, we must determine whether it is appropriate for a hospital to assert the state interests in an attempt to defeat a patient's decision to forgo emergency medical treatment. Second, assuming the state interests were properly presented in this case, we must decide whether Patricia's rejection of a blood transfusion constituted, as the district court found, abandonment of the couple's minor children and amounted to a state interest that was compelling enough to override her constitutional rights of privacy and religious freedom, by the least intrusive means available.