Opinion ID: 170577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Guidelines Enhancements

Text: The government challenges the district court's refusal to apply the manager or supervisor enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) and the use of a minor enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4. Both enhancements were recommended by the PSR, which recited the evidence supporting them. The defendant lodged timely objections to both enhancements. These objections triggered the judge's fact-finding and explanatory duties. Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B), the district court is required for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter  [to] rule on the dispute.... Id. Though [a] ruling on a disputed issue need not be exhaustively detailed ... it must be definite and clear. United States v. Williams, 374 F.3d 941, 947 n. 9 (10th Cir.2004). At the very least, the district court must find and articulate sufficient facts and reasons to allow us to review the appropriateness of the enhancement; without such findings, we would have to engage in conjecture to divine the basis for the district court's ruling. Failure to provide proper explanation for the chosen sentence is reversible procedural error. See Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
A defendant receives a three-point increase in criminal offense level if he was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). According to the Guidelines commentary, [t]o qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. Id., cmt. 2. This means that the enhancement applies only when the defendant had decision-making authority or control over a subordinate. United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 524 (10th Cir.1993). The question of whether a defendant is a manager or a supervisor is a mixed question of law and fact. See United States v. Cruz Camacho, 137 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (10th Cir.1998). We held, in Cruz Camacho, that because the ultimate conclusion of whether the defendant qualifies for this enhancement is so firmly rooted in sophisticated factual determinations based on the sentencing court's assessment of the broad context of the crime, ... the sentencing court's determination that the defendant was an organizer ... is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. at 1223. Because the context of the crime is so important to the ultimate conclusion, the district court must conduct a thorough review of all subsidiary facts that might be relevant to the ultimate manager-supervisor determination. At sentencing, there were two competing versions of the nature of Mr. Peña-Hermosillo's relationship to other drug dealers identified in the PSR. The PSR and the government's proffer indicated that the drug distribution enterprise in which Mr. Peña-Hermosillo engaged involved well more than five participants, including Kelly, Becerill-Garcia, Hogan, Anthony Losoya, Kylie Lemmon-Cantrell, and persons identified as Wetto (or Guero) and Sancho. R. 40-43. Evidence indicated that Kelly transported drugs on the defendant's behalf, that Becerill-Garcia stored drugs for the defendant and was forced to accompany the defendant to Colorado for a drug pick-up, that Hogan stored drugs for the defendant at his body shop, that Losoya packed a gun while he accompanied Mr. Peña, that Wetto accompanied the defendant on a drug run, that Sancho made many deliveries and trips down to Utah on Mr. Peña's behalf, and that Lemmon-Cantrell, who was also the mother of his second child, removed guns and drugs from the defendant's residence at his request when the police were on the way. Id. This evidence included Ms. Kelly's prior statements to police that she ran drugs for Peña and that he had paid her expenses on drug runs to Utah. Though not disputing many of the primary facts as stated in the PSR and the government's proffer, defense counsel argued against application of the manager-supervisor enhancement on the ground that by virtue of his age, it was unrealistic to believe that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo was directing the adults in the operation. R. 33. With respect to Ms. Kelly, he stated that she was present and she would tell you that [Mr. Peña-Hermosillo] didn't supervise her and he didn't manage her and she has a drug problem ... and that her conduct was [not] related to anything but her own choices and not any pressure or any management or any supervision of Mr. Peña. R. 34. Ms. Kelly's unsworn statement to the court provided some support for this argument. She told the court that [i]t's not like he told people what to do. I have a mind of my own. Id. at 62. The district court and defense counsel also engaged in the following colloquy: THE COURT: Would you say [the defendant] was not the manager of the whole operation, but he did take the lead in some aspects of it? MR. SERELSON: I think that's probably a fair characterization, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's what it seemed to me, after I read it. MR. SERELSON: I believe that's a fair characterization. I would not dispute that. Id. at 34-35. Despite this concession, the seemingly pertinent evidence in the government's proffer, and the inconsistencies between defense counsel's proffer regarding Ms. Kelly's testimony and her prior statements to police, the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and provided almost no explanation for the denial of the enhancement. The sole reasoning given was as follows: ... I believe that there is good grounds to doubt the question of whether or not the defendant first was a minor [sic] or a supervisor. I think that he sold drugs, that he associated with those who did, that Miss Kelly was really not a subordinate. She was his common law wife, with whom he had a child and they were involved in drug trafficking when she met him and I don't think he really supervised them, so I'm going to grant the objection to the three-level increase for manager or supervisor. Id. at 47. Later, when imposing sentence, the court stated: I don't feel that you were a manager. Id. at 66. This explanation falls short of the required ruling under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B). Here, the basis for the court's feeling that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo was not a manager was anything but clear. Even assuming the court accepted Ms. Kelly's in-court statement and concluded from it that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo did not supervise, manage, or direct her drug trips and sales, the court failed to explain why the government's proffered evidence fell short of establishing Mr. Peña-Hermosillo's supervisory role over at least one of the other participants. The district court acknowledged that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo took the lead in some aspects of the operation, R. 34-35, but it did not state why this did not make him a manager-supervisor. Perhaps the district court found that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo's age made it improbable for him to exert such a significant supervisory role, as defense counsel argued, or maybe the court found the evidence proffered by the government and summarized in the PSR unbelievable. But the court did not say so. If the government's proffered evidence was credible, it certainly was sufficient to support a manager-supervisor enhancement. Without a more thorough explanation, we are left wondering how the district court interpreted the evidence and why he found that it did not support the offense level increase. Because the district court's reasoning was not definite and clear, we reverse and remand for further fact-finding and explanation. Williams, 374 F.3d at 947.
A defendant's offense level must be increased by two points if he used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4. According to the application note, using includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting. Id. at cmt. n. 1. Proof that the defendant and the minor participant were mere co-conspirators or confederates is not sufficient to establish this enhancement. See United States v. Suitor, 253 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir.2001). See also United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d 243, 247 (3d Cir.2005); United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir.2001). We review legal determinations, such as whether or not a certain action constitutes use, de novo, United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir.2003), and factual determinations, such as whether that action occurred, for clear error, United States v. Tran, 285 F.3d 934, 937 (10th Cir.2002). The government proffered evidence that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo used Janae Kelly, his teenage girlfriend, to assist in his drug dealing. The proffered evidence included summaries of two interviews Ms. Kelly gave to police officers. According to the PSR and the government's proffer, Ms. Kelly sold cocaine and methamphetamine for Mr. Peña-Hermosillo over the course of more than two years, and also made approximately 30-40 trips to Utah to pick up methamphetamine for Peña. R. 96. She began making trips to Utah on his behalf to deliver money or obtain drugs when she was only thirteen years old. Ms. Kelly would drive rental vehicles obtained on Mr. Peña-Hermosillo's sister's credit card, although she was too young to have a license. Although both had their own customers, Ms. Kelly transported and sold drugs for Mr. Peña-Hermosillo (as shown by the fact that he paid for her expenses), while there is no evidence that he transported or sold drugs for her. See id. at 97 (reporting Ms. Kelly's statement to investigators that she sold a lot of the drugs for Peña). Ms. Kelly undertook at least one of these trips while eight months pregnant with Mr. Peña-Hermosillo's child. Ms. Kelly also made trips to Colorado in 2005 on Mr. Peña-Hermosillo's behalf. Mr. Peña-Hermosillo was three and a half years older than Ms. Kelly. Although at the beginning of these activities the defendant was also a minor, Ms. Kelly's transportation and sale of drugs for Mr. Peña-Hermosillo continued for more than a year and a half after his eighteenth birthday. The defendant contested the nature of the relationship. In his argument to the court, defense counsel emphasized that their criminal activity started when both parties were minors. Ms. Kelly herself claimed that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo did not tell her what to do, and that she had a mind of [her] own. R. 62. She also told the court that she had been involved with and surrounded by drugs since she was born. This evidence was presented to suggest that Mr. Peña-Hermosillo and Ms. Kelly were co-equals in a partnership. The district judge declined to apply the enhancement. The district judge explained: The spirit of the enhancement is to punish adults who exploit minors, and I don't feel that Mr. Peña fits this mold, because his girlfriend was very close to him in age and he wasn't really exploiting her so much as he was misleading his wife. And I doubt very much she was really misled a lot by him, so I'm going to grant ... the two-level reduction [for use of a minor].... Id. at 48. Earlier in the hearing, the judge stated: Here you've got one minor living with another minor and he asks her to go down to Salt Lake and pick up some drugs for him, ... and it wasn't anything that she hasn't been doing. Id. at 45-46. He also observed that Ms. Kelly was involved in drug trafficking when she met Mr. Peña-Hermosillo. Id. at 47. As with the manager-supervisor issue, the district court's explanation falls short of the required ruling under Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B). In particular, it is not clear whether the district judge concluded that, as a matter of law, the enhancement did not apply under the government's proffered facts or, if the ruling was based on a factual finding, why he resolved the factual dispute against the prosecution without hearing the government's proposed testimony. The defendant's principal argument at sentencing regarding the use of a minor enhancement was that the two parties began their relations when both were minors and that the the purpose of the statute, is to protect minors from older, unscrupulous adults who try to take advantage and influence, enlist their experience and age. R. 36. This appears to be an argument that, as a matter of law, the enhancement cannot apply when the defendant's relationship with the used person began when the defendant was a minor. The district court expressed agreement with this argument during the hearing, and it provides the most plausible explanation for why the court might have determined that the enhancement is inapplicable. The plain language of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 contains no limitation based on the defendant's age, the proximity in ages between the defendant and the used person, or the nature of their relationship, other than to say that the person must be under eighteen and the defendant must engage in directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, recruiting, or soliciting him or her. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 & cmt. n. 1. There is, however, some support in the legislative history for the defendant's argument. Congress originally directed the Commission to promulgate an enhancement for use of a minor by defendants over twenty-one. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d at 1158 (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-322 § 140008, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994)). Congress also instructed the Commission to consider the possible relevance of the proximity in age between the offender and the minor(s) involved in the offense, suggesting that if the two were close in age, the coercive force might be mitigated. United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir.2001); 108 Stat. 1796. When drafting the guideline, however, the Sentencing Commission included neither an age limitation nor any limitation based on proximity in ages, and Congress took no step to override this decision. In affirming application of the enhancement to defendants above the age of seventeen, some courts, including this one, have used language that implies that it would not apply to younger defendants. See Kravchuk, 335 F.3d at 1158 ([W]e follow the reasoning of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in holding that U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 is valid as applied to defendants aged eighteen to twenty.); United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir.2004). We need not resolve whether this legislative history prevails over the plain language of the Guideline because for more than a year and a half, including most of the conduct on which the government relies, Mr. Peña-Hermosillo was eighteen or older. Moreover, the three and a half year difference in their ages is surely large enough to satisfy the nonproximity requirement, if there is one. As the prosecutor pointed out at the hearing, the defendant was a junior in high school when Ms. Kelly was still in seventh or eighth grade. That is a large enough difference in ages to enable him to take advantage of her. If this was the basis for the district court's ruling, it would be an error of law. Alternatively, the district court may have concluded as a factual matter, based on defense counsel's proffer regarding Ms. Kelly's testimony and her unsworn in-court statement, that Ms. Kelly and Mr. Peña-Hermosillo were mere confederates, with neither in a supervisory role. See R. 48 ([H]e wasn't really exploiting her so much as he was misleading his wife. And I doubt very much she was really misled a lot by him, so I'm going to grant ... the two-level reduction [for use of a minor]). The question then would be why the court declined to allow the prosecution to put on testimony addressing this issue, or which aspects of the government's proffer it accepted and which it disbelieved. The Rules of Criminal Procedure state that the district court must allow the parties to comment on the probation officer's determinations and other matters relating to an appropriate sentence, and that the court may permit the parties to introduce evidence on the objections. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(1)(C), 32(i)(2). The Sentencing Guidelines provide that [w]hen any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3. This does not give any party the right to introduce live testimony, but they must be given an adequate opportunity to present relevant information to the court. United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 978 (10th Cir.1992). See Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (stressing the thorough adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure). After the parties' presentation of information, the sentencing court must  for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter  rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B). Here, in response to the defendant's objections to the enhancements, the government and the defendant sought to introduce live testimony. Although the district court did not allow formal testimony from either side, it did allow Ms. Kelly to state that the defendant did not tell [her] what to do, which was the only basis in the record for the court's conclusion that the use of a minor enhancement was inapplicable as a matter of fact. Ms. Kelly's statement was also relevant to the manager or supervisor enhancement. The court refused to allow the government to present contradictory testimony, including testimony that Ms. Kelly herself had told police she transported drugs for Peña and that he had paid the expenses of her trips. It would be an abuse of discretion for the district court to decide a disputed question of fact against a party without giving that party an opportunity to present relevant and admissible evidence. United States v. Sienkowski, 359 F.3d 463, 467 n. 1 (7th Cir.2004) ([A]n evidentiary hearing may sometimes be the only reliable way to resolve disputed issues.) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 cmt.); United States v. Jimenez Martinez, 83 F.3d 488, 494-95 (1st Cir. 1996). The district court provided no explanation for its refusal to permit the parties to introduce testimony on this disputed issue. We therefore do not know why it denied the enhancement on this record. Failure to explain a Guidelines sentence adequately is a form of procedural unreasonableness, and we reverse and remand on that ground. See Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. On remand, the district court should hold an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts, or explain on the record why any such evidence would be immaterial.