Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: muhammad's contentions

Text: Muhammad contends that his waiver of rights was coerced because he was deprived of food for ten hours and was unable to walk around for nearly nine hours. The flaw in this argument is that there was no evidence that Muhammad waived his rights as a result of any coercion. After Muhammad was arrested at approximately 7:30 a.m., he was taken to the police station and placed in an interview room. Shortly after 9:00 a.m. two detectives entered the room, read Muhammad his rights, and gave him a waiver of rights form to fill out. Muhammad waived his rights and gave a statement denying knowledge of the events associated with the charges. He was then left alone in the interview room for several hours. During this lengthy break in Muhammad's interrogation, the police periodically checked on him. Muhammad never said he was hungry or in any kind of distress; he was also escorted to the bathroom at least once. We are satisfied that this delay in Muhammad's interrogation did not, in itself, give rise to a coercive atmosphere. In the first place, Muhammad waived his rights at the outset. See United States v. Bell, 740 A.2d 958, 964-966 (D.C.1999); Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598-599 (D.C. 1992). There was no evidence that the police threatened Muhammad or used physical force on him; in fact, Muhammad confirmed that no such abuse occurred. Muhammad knew how to read and write, had attended school through the tenth grade, and stated that he understood his rights. In addition, he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at any time during the interrogation. Overall, Muhammad never gave any indication that he was unhappy with the way he was treated following his arrest. Nor was there any evidence to suggest that, after the interrogation resumed later in the day, Muhammad's confessions were coerced. Detective Irwin entered the interview room at 3:00 p.m. to resume his earlier conversation with Muhammad. The detective told him that other persons had admitted their involvement in the murders and had given up their weapons; he simply asked Muhammad if he would do the same. Muhammad agreed, and on the way to his mother's house to retrieve the weapon, he reaffirmed that he knew his rights and that he had waived them. After the gun was recovered, Detective Irwin took Muhammad to a fast-food restaurant at 4:30 p.m. to get something to eat. Upon their return to the police station, Muhammad gave videotaped and written confessions. Before making these confessions, he was again read his rights, and again he confirmed that he understood and waived them. The evidence shows that Muhammad was not subjected to any coercion that might render his statements inadmissible. His interrogation cannot be characterized as coercive simply because it extended  intermittently  over a period of several hours. See, e.g., Everetts v. United States, 627 A.2d 981, 986 (D.C.1993) (sixteen-year-old defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his rights, though he was detained for a lengthy period of time prior to questioning). Taking all of the circumstances into account, we hold that the trial court properly determined that Muhammad's confessions were not coerced. See Byrd, 618 A.2d at 599.
Muhammad argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his case from those of Marks and Riley and that the supposedly conflicting defenses of the defendants and the disparity of proof as to his guilt, compared with the proof against Marks and Riley, resulted in manifest injustice. For three reasons, we hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Muhammad's request for severance. First, the murders were jointly committed by all three co-defendants; second, the evidence was substantial against each defendant; and third, the record reveals no manifest prejudice to Muhammad (or either of the other defendants, for that matter) resulting from their joinder in a single trial. We review the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion. E.g., Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 996 (D.C.1991). When multiple defendants are charged with jointly committing a criminal offense, there is a strong presumption that they will be tried together. Id.; see Super. Ct.Crim. R. 8(b). Properly joined defendants may request a severance at any time under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 14 if trying the defendants together prejudices any party. Ray v. United States 472 A.2d 854, 856 (D.C.1984); accord, Ingram, 592 A.2d at 996. Severance is not called for, however, when co-defendants simply blame each other and are mutually hostile to one another. Rather, severance is required only when a defendant shows that (1) a clear and substantial contradiction between the respective defenses' causes inherent irreconcilability between them and (2) that the irreconcilability creates a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. Id. (emphasis added; citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A court should grant a severance only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial could compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). Muhammad's argument is essentially that he was prejudiced because his co-defendants attempted to shift responsibility for the crimes to him. We find no merit in this argument. Unfair prejudice does not arise merely because defendants are mutually hostile and attempt to blame each other. Ingram, 592 A.2d at 996. We find nothing in the record that would support Muhammad's claim that his co-defendants asserted defenses that were irreconcilable with his. Furthermore, none of the three appellants testified at trial. All of the evidence heard by the jury came from witnesses whose testimony would be admissible in separate trials. The court also limited the effectiveness of the blame-shifting theory of Muhammad's co-defendants by giving jury instructions to limit the impact of any suggestion by Riley's and Marks' counsel that Muhammad was the leader of the assault on the two Littles brothers. We are fully satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, or otherwise err, in denying the motion for severance. [25]
Muhammad contends that the trial court improperly prevented his counsel from asking a series of questions during his cross-examination of Wayne Brown about whether Brown knew if anyone had been prosecuted for shooting two members of the Rushtown Crew. This claim was not raised in the trial court, however, and we find no plain error in the court's handling of the matter. [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 857 (D.C. 1978). If the trial court has permitted enough cross-examination on an appropriate issue to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, any limitation on further cross-examination will be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 151 (D.C.1986). In exercising that discretion, the court must balance the importance of the subject matter and the credibility of the witness against the degree of cross-examination permitted. Id. In this case, Muhammad's counsel sought to demonstrate through cross-examining Brown that members of the Rushtown Crew shot at the Littles brothers to avenge the wounding of Russell Tyler and the murder of Lawrence Lynch. The trial court prohibited this line of questioning because it was irrelevant and did not suggest a justifiable motive for the killing. The court noted that the only inference to be drawn from such questions would be that the murder of the Littles brothers was some sort of justice, which of course could not excuse or justify a double homicide. On appeal, Muhammad argues that if the Rushtown Members knew that the attackers of their friends were being prosecuted, the government's evidence of motive would be greatly discredited. Because this argument was not raised below, Muhammad must demonstrate plain error in order to win reversal. Under the plain error standard of review, the appellant bears the burden of first establishing error, a deviation from the legal rule, and second, demonstrating that the error was so plain that the judge was derelict in countenancing it. McCullough v. United States, 827 A.2d 48, 55 (D.C.2003); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). We find no plain error  indeed, we find no error at all  because there was substantial evidence of Muhammad's guilt, including most obviously his own statement in which he confessed to the murders.
In his supplemental memorandum, Muhammad argues that the redaction of Riley's and Marks' confessions was inadequate. It is utter fantasy, he asserts, to suggest that the jury in this case, having heard directly from witnesses . . . that the co-defendants were present together and acted together . . . failed to detect the fictional revision of each defendant's confession turning each `we' to `I.' This is essentially the same argument made by Riley, which we have already held to be deficient. Improper inferences from a confession are those which a jury can immediately draw even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial. Gray, 523 U.S. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Inferences of guilt that arise when the statement is linked with other evidence presented at trial, however, are not the type of inferences with which Bruton and its progeny are concerned. See Plater, 745 A.2d at 960. In this case the record makes clear that the statements of Riley and Marks were properly redacted and, standing alone, did not implicate Muhammad; thus those statements as admitted did not violate Muhammad's Sixth Amendment rights. [26]