Opinion ID: 3010068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: We address each contention in turn.

Text: Count XI of the indictment charged that, on or about October 7, 1993, Stansfield did assault and attempt to kill one Dwight E. Hoffman with the intent to prevent Hoffman's communication of information relating to STANSFIELD'S commission of federal offenses . . . to a law enforcement officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). App. at 35. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) provides, in pertinent part: Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense shall be imprisoned for up to twenty years. The term law enforcement officer is defined as an officer or employee of the Federal Government, or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant authorized under law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of an offense. Id. § 1515(a)(4). However, the government need not prove that Stansfield knew or intended that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government. Id. § 1512(f). As we stated in United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 341 (1994), we must sustain the verdict of a jury if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to uphold the jury's decision. In determining whether evidence is sufficient, we will not weigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Appellate reversal on the grounds of insufficient evidence should be confined to cases where the failure of the prosecution is clear. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt, so long as it establishes a case from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence proved that Stansfield held a shotgun at Dwight Hoffman's throat and asked him a number of questions, including why Hoffman had told law enforcement officials about the fire at Stansfield's house. This evidence is sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Stansfield intended to prevent Hoffman's future communications with law enforcement officials, not merely that he intended to retaliate against Hoffman for past communications with law enforcement officials. The jury in its opinion could reasonably conclude that inherent in the action of pointing a loaded firearm at another's throat and asking, in effect, Why did you do it? is the implicit message, Don't ever do it again. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Stansfield intended to foreclose future communications by Hoffman with law enforcement officials.
We also find the evidence sufficed to satisfy the federal officer element of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(C) and 1515(a)(4). The parties dispute what the government has to prove in order to satisfy this requirement. Stansfield urges that the government must prove an intent to prevent the communication of information to some particular law enforcement officer, or at least to any agent involved in a particular, actual federal investigation, as long as that officer is federal. Appellant's Brief at 16. The government argues that it need only prove that the offense about which the defendant wishes to prevent communications is actually a federal offense. The case law from our sister circuits does not support Stansfield's view. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1449 (1996) wrote: There need not be an ongoing investigation or even any intent to investigate. Rather, the killing of an individual with the intent to frustrate the individual's possible cooperation with federal authorities is implicated by the statute (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994), held that what is essential is that the defendant believed that a person might furnish information to federal officials and that he killed or attempted to kill that person in order to prevent such disclosure (second emphasis added). Accord United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 1991) ([T]he statute focuses on the defendant's intent: whether she thought she might be preventing [the witness'] future communication of information.) (emphasis added); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 324 (1988) ([I]t is only necessary for a defendant to have believed that a witness might give information to federal officials, and to have prevented this communication, to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1510.). This is not to say that the position of the government is without problems. Were we to require only that the government prove that the underlying offense is federal and that the defendant intended to prevent the witness from communicating with law enforcement officials in general, without also proving the defendant's knowledge of or belief in the possibility that the witness would communicate with federal authorities, we would essentially vitiate an important facet of the intent requirement of the statute. Accordingly, we hold that, in order to obtain a conviction pursuant to § 1512(a)(1)(C), the government must prove: (1) the defendant killed or attempted to kill a person; (2) the defendant was motivated by a desire to prevent the communication between any person and law enforcement authorities concerning the commission or possible commission of an offense; (3) that offense was actually a federal offense; and (4) the defendant believed that the person in (2) above might communicate with the federal authorities. This last element may be inferred by the jury from the fact that the offense was federal in nature, plus additional appropriate evidence. For example, it is sufficient (but not necessary) that the government prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the federal nature of the offense in order for the jury to infer the last element. This framework is an appropriate reconciliation between the constraint that the government must prove the defendant's specific intent to hinder a federal investigation and the fact that, by virtue of § 1512(f), it need not prove that the defendant knew the federal status of any particular law enforcement officer involved in an investigation. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1054 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014, 112 S.Ct. 660 (1991); United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1984). In this matter, the underlying offense clearly was a federal offense. The evidence reflected that Hoffman had already cooperated several times with state authorities and with Erie. Stansfield had knowledge of Hoffman's past cooperation and was aware that some investigation, though not necessarily a federal one, was underway. Moreover, though it is unclear whether Stansfield was aware of it, the evidence also showed that federal authorities had begun an investigation approximately one month prior to the conduct in question. Given that Stansfield violated several federal laws and based on the actions he took thereafter, a jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that the attack was motivated, at least in part, by Stansfield's belief that Hoffman might cooperate with federal authorities. See Gonzalez, 922 F.2d at 1054. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).

Although Stansfield was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), the district court, without objection from counsel, instructed the jury on a different but related offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). After reading count XI of the indictment verbatim, the district court instructed the jury: Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense shall be guilty of a crime. App. at 104 (emphasis added). This reflects the language of § 1512(b)(3), which provides, in relevant part: Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force [or] threatens . . . another person, or attempts to do so, . . . with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense is guilty of a crime. The district court proceeded to set forth and explain the elements of a violation of § 1512(b)(3), not § 1512(a)(1)(C). Because there was no objection to the charge, Fed. R. Crim. P.52(b) is implicated. The Rule provides: Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. The concept of plain error comprises four elements: (1) there must be an error, seeUnited States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 177778 (1993); (2) the error must be plain, meaning clear or obvious, id.; (3) the plain error must be one affecting substantial rights, i.e., it must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings, id.; and (4) because Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory, the court should correct plain error affecting substantial rights only where the error (a) causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant, or (b) `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. at 735-36, 113 S.Ct. at 1778-79 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392 (1936)) (alteration added). For our purposes the difference between § 1512(a)(1)(C) and § 1512(b)(3) is that the former includes an attempt to kill element while the latter includes only a uses intimidation or physical force element. The question we face, then, is whether the omission of the attempt to kill element constituted plain error and requires us to reverse Stansfield's conviction on Count XI. We hold it does. This Court has declined to adopt a per se rule that the omission of an essential element of an offense from jury instructions constitutes plain error. See United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir. 1993). However, we have also stated that such an omission `ordinarily constitutes plain error.' Id.(quoting Government of Virgin Islands v. Brown, 685 F.2d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in Xavier). See also United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1176 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818, 819 (3d Cir. 1972). This general rule . . . is consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction that due process requires `proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged.' Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1287 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970)) (alteration added). The omission of an essential element of an offense from the jury instructions usually will be obvious error, and therefore ordinarily satisfies the first and second requirements of Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. We have little trouble in concluding that the omission of the attempt to kill element in this case satisfies those first two requirements. See generally Retos, 25 F.3d at 1229-30. We therefore turn to the cases that have discussed the third and fourth steps of Olano. In Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286, the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury was never instructed that knowledge of the status of the primary wrongdoer (defendant's brother) as a felon was an essential element of the crime. Concluding that the omission constituted plain error, the court wrote that there can be no question that the failure to instruct had an impact on the jury's deliberations, because the jury could not have been expected to make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt as to [defendant's] knowledge of his brother's status as a felon in the absence of an instruction to do so. Id. at 1287. Thus, the third Olano step was satisfied. The consequent effect on defendant's due process rights were such that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, which satisfied Olano's fourth and final step. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Retos, 25 F.3d at 1229-30, the district court failed to instruct the jury that, to convict the defendant for currency structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5324(3), it was required to find that he actually knew that such structuring was unlawful, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, ___, 114 S.Ct. 655, 663 (1994). With respect to the third Olano step, we wrote that, because the evidence presented by the government on [the defendant's] structuring count, while sufficient, was not conclusive . . . we cannot be certain that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Retos knew his actions were unlawful, absent a specific instruction from the district court judge. Id. at 1232. We then concluded that, inasmuch as the defendant suffered severe prejudice, which is a hallmark of manifest injustice, the omission in the jury charge `seriously affect[ed] the fairness' of the trial and satisfied the fourth Olano step. Id. at 1232 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S at 736, 113 S.Ct. at 1779) (alteration in Retos). By contrast, in Anderson, 859 F.2d at 1176, the district court had failed to instruct the jury that to find the defendant guilty of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), it was required to unanimously agree that he committed three violations of the federal drug laws. However, the jury convicted the defendant of three counts of heroin distribution and one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, as well as the CCE count. See id.. Thus, the jury necessarily made the determination of guilt that was a predicate to conviction on the CCE count even though it was not properly instructed. We refused to find plain error because it was not possible that the jury did not find the omitted element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Such is not the case here. As in Xavier and Retos, the omission of the attempt to kill instruction satisfies both the third and fourth steps of the Olano analysis and constitutes plain error. As for the third step, while there was overwhelming evidence that Stansfield use[d] intimidation or physical force against Dwight Hoffman, the evidence that he attempted to kill Hoffman, while perhaps sufficient to support a conviction by a properly instructed jury, was more sketchy and circumstantial in nature. It is quite likely that the outcome on Count XI would have been different given a proper charge. Even if we conclude that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Stansfield violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), that is a less serious offense, with a statutory maximum sentence of ten years, as opposed to the twenty year maximum provided for by § 1512(a)(1)(C). We conclude that the error was not harmless. We also conclude that the fourth Olano step, that the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, is satisfied by the failure to instruct a jury that in order to convict a defendant of attempting to kill another to achieve a desired result, the jury must find he actually attempted to kill that person. Instructing a jury essentially that this element may be satisfied by showing the defendant merely intimidated or used physical force, and then adjudging him guilty of the more serious crime, is the type of error that would impugn the judicial system and bring it into disrepute. The government contends that the error was harmless and did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. It argues that Stansfield never disputed he attempted to kill Dwight Hoffman and the evidence was overwhelming that he did. This argument is not persuasive. First, the evidence was far from overwhelming or conclusive that Stansfield attempted to kill Hoffman. Second, the government cites only Stansfield's closing argument, in which his attorney conceded that Stansfield may well have intended to kill the Hoffmans, Supp. App. at 29, for the proposition that he did not dispute that element of the offense. Even if this language were truly a stipulation, which it is not, it concedes only that Stansfield intended to kill Dwight Hoffman, not that he attempted to kill Dwight Hoffman. Moreover, arguments of counsel are not evidence but are merely comments on evidence. Stansfield's closing argument did not relieve the government of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Stansfield attempted to kill Dwight Hoffman. We conclude that the omission of the intent to kill element from the instructions given the jury constituted plain error. Accordingly, Stansfield's conviction on Count XI for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Stansfield also argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the law enforcement officer referred to in § 1512 be an existing federal officer actually investigating the federal offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4). Stansfield did not contemporaneously object to the instructions. The instruction given the jury was not in accord with what we have held regarding this element of the offense. Seesupra at 22. On remand, the jury should be instructed that in order to find Stansfield guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), it must find in addition to the other elements of the offense both that he was motivated by a belief that the victim might communicate with federal authorities concerning the commission or possible commission of an offense, and that the offense in question is in fact a federal offense. Given appropriate evidence, if the jury finds the latter fact to exist, it may find the former to exist as well.