Opinion ID: 6309857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: oral argument to disciplinary hearing panel

Text: On June 21, 1978, Messrs. Anderson, Henry and Reath, serving as chairman, heard oral argument. Respondent’s counsel’s argument was that the discipline imposed was entirely too harsh, considering respondent’s prior record and the circumstances involved. During oral argument the hearing panel gave respondent an opportunity to state orally her position, in light of the fact that disciplinary counsel had argued in its brief: (1) that no restitution had been made; and (2) that respondent showed no evidence of contrition or any recognition that she had done anything wrong. At this point, respondent reasserted what her counsel had argued, that she felt that she had been shabbily treated by the bank in that they, without authority, had blocked all of her accounts and had used that improper action as leverage to force her to agree to the escrow provision of her personal passbook. She persisted in her view that the affidavit which she signed was not false, but stated that if it was determined that it was false, then, but only then, was she sorry for what she had done. The hearing board was not a little disappointed by the fact that, either because of immaturity or stubbornness, she was unwilling to admit that she had done anything wrong or that her actions in withdrawing the money in the blocked account were in part motivated, however improperly at the time, by anger at the way in which the bank had treated her. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, we feel any form of suspension would be inappropriate. Not only would this be harsh and damaging to respondent in her efforts to get started in her practice — but the offense that she had committed was not in connection with any representation of a client that would cause harm to the general public. After the hearing was concluded, the board received a letter from the two members of the hearing committee who participated in this matter, indicating that, in their view, the original recommendation for a three-month suspension was too severe for two reasons: (1) because the committee’s report was filed late; and (2) because such a suspension would harm respondent’s law practice. Thereafter, assistant disciplinary counsel, in a letter to the hearing committee under date of June 29, 1978, reported that in light of respondent’s agreement to satisfy her indebtedness to the bank, and in light of the revised recommendations of the hearing committee as contained in their letter of June 22, 1978, disciplinary counsel was now influenced to modify its recommendation from three months to “one month or less in duration and without the necessity of notifying clients of such suspension as normally required by Rule 217 of Pa.R.D.E.” It seems clear to us that respondent knowingly signed a false affidavit and thereby succeeded in removing funds from the bank which she knew she had no right to. In this regard, we adopt and approve that portion of disciplinary counsel’s brief at page 13 quoted in the footnote below. 1 We might have had more compassion on her problem — had she been more candid in admitting her wrongful act. We reject, out of hand, her continued protestation that her affidavit was not false. The board is also concerned regarding the large amount of litigation to which, considering her short time at the bar, she has been a party — and the number of judgments outstanding against her.