Opinion ID: 1972106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: submission of questions to witnesses by jurors [17]

Text: In United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (1979), Judge Charles Clark wrote for a unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit: There is nothing improper about the practice of allowing occasional questions from jurors to be asked of witnesses. If a juror is unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good common sense to allow a question to be asked about it. If nothing else, the question should alert trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more extensive development. Trials exist to develop truth. It may sometimes be that counsel are so familiar with a case that they fail to see problems that would naturally bother a juror who is presented with the facts for the first time. The view expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Callahan reflects the position taken by most state and all federal courts which have addressed the issue that whether jurors should be permitted to submit questions to witnesses rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, in the absence of a statute or rule of court. [18] The rare cases resulting in reversals as a result of juror questioning all have involved the posing of oral questions in open court, and, with one apparent exception in the single state which prohibits the practice, have been marked by highly improper juror or judicial conduct. [19] There are sound reasons to permit the questioning of witnesses by jurors if the procedure is undertaken with careful judicial control. As the court in Callahan observed, it makes good common sense to permit a juror to ask a question about a matter which, in the juror's mind, needs clarification. United States v. Callahan, supra . [20] Moreover, counsel and the court both may be alerted to particular factual issues that need exploration or more extensive development. Id.; Harms, supra, note 18, 27 Am.U.L.R. at 131. Questions by jurors also may bring to the court's and counsel's attention improper concerns which can be promptly addressed with cautionary instructions, admonishing the juror who asked the question that the matter is not relevant to the case and should not be brought to the attention of other jurors or play any part in the inquiring juror's consideration of the case. [21] Additionally, as the Callahan court also noted, consistent with repeated appellate averments in the District of Columbia, [t]rials exist to develop truth, Id.; [22] and it seems indisputable that the increased effectiveness of communication with jurors that will result if they are permitted to pose questions to witnesses will aid in finding the truth. As one of the most recent and thorough commentaries on the questioning of witnesses by jurors observed: [23] Only when evidence and issues are communicated successfully to jurors can they begin to fulfill their duty to seek truth and deliver a just verdict. But, because the jury is relegated to a passive role, communication in a trial is basically a one-way system  a system notably lacking in ability to insure a reliable communication of evidence or issues to the jury. Allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses would promote better and more reliable communication, because a two-way system provides for constant clarification of messages being sent. Understanding testimony more clearly, jurors thus would be able to fulfill their basic function of finding the facts in dispute. Harms, supra, note 18, 27 Am. U.L.R. at 160. Finally, there is reason to believe that permitting receivers of information, e.g., jurors, to ask questions enhances not only their ability to understand what is being communicated, but results in their putting forth more effort to listen and to understand because they know they may ask questions. [24] A concomitant benefit predictable from these effects might well be a reduced likelihood that the court will be required to intervene to question witnesses or elucidate issues that are clarified by juror questions. [25] Notwithstanding the prospect that permitting jurors to submit questions to witnesses is likely to enhance both the search for truth in a trial and the knowledge, motivation and understanding with which jurors pursue that search, it is beyond dispute that the questioning of jurors by witnesses also may present potential dangers unless the trial judge exercises careful control over the process from the outset of trial. First, it is essential that jurors not be permitted to question witnesses orally. Oral questioning by jurors not only effectively eliminates the judge's ability to confine potentially prejudicial concerns of a single juror to that juror, but, as defendants assert, may place counsel who wishes to object to a juror question in an embarrassing and difficult position. See Raynor v. State, supra, note 18, 447 S.W.2d at 393. Directing that jurors reduce to writing their questions effectively addresses these concerns. [26] See State v. Barrett, supra, note 18, 297 S.E.2d at 795; Cheeks v. State, supra, note 18, 361 N.E.2d at 910; A Handbook for Petit Jurors (hereafter,  Handbook ), p. 28 (Circuit Administrative Judges of Maryland, 1979, revised 1981). [27] Second, questions submitted by jurors should be discussed with counsel at the bench out of the presence of the jury, and counsel afforded an opportunity to interpose objections prior to the questions being posed to witnesses. See State v. Barrett, supra, note 18, 297 S.E.2d at 795-96; Cheeks v. State, supra, note 18, 361 N.E.2d at 910; State v. LeMaster, supra, note 18, 669 P.2d at 597. In this fashion objections to questions irrelevant or clearly improper and prejudicial to the rights of either party may be sustained by the court without embarrassment to counsel. State v. LeMaster, supra ; note 26, supra. Third, jurors should be permitted to submit questions only at the close of the examination of a witness so as to avoid interrupting or distracting counsel or other jurors, and to maximize the possibility that issues of concern to jurors will be addressed by counsel's examination and therefore will not prompt unnecessary inquiries by jurors. See State v. Barrett, supra, note 18, 297 S.E.2d at 795; Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, vol. 1, p. 267 (3rd ed. 1977). [28] Fourth, in the event the court decides to pose one or more questions submitted by jurors, counsel should be afforded an opportunity to ask additional questions in any areas that might be opened by the jurors' question(s) or the witness's answer(s) to the question(s). See State v. LeMaster, supra, note 18, 669 P.2d at 597. [29] Fifth, it would seem wise to avoid, where possible, the disclosure to the jury of the juror who posed a particular question. This might alleviate embarrassment of a juror whose question was not asked. Finally, it is of critical importance that the jury be instructed carefully both at the outset of trial regarding the proper procedure for submitting questions to witnesses, and during trial in the event the trial judge declines, for whatever reason, to pose a juror's question to a witness. The preliminary instruction should apprise the jury that: (1) generally only the lawyers and the judge ask witnesses questions, and that if jurors are patient, matters of concern to them will probably be covered by counsel's questions; [30] (2) jurors are not encouraged to pose questions to witnesses; [31] (3) in the event a juror has a question, the question may be written out and submitted to the judge after counsel have finished examining a witness; [32] (4) the judge will decide if the question is a legally proper one after consulting with the lawyers, and will put the question to the witness if it is proper; [33] (5) if the judge does not ask the question, the juror who asked it should not guess or speculate why the question was not asked, and should neither consider the question nor discuss it with the other jurors during deliberations; [34] (6) oral questions never may be asked of witnesses during the trial; [35] (7) questions may be asked of witnesses only to clarify evidence or elicit information, not to discredit or argue with a witness, because jurors are impartial judges of the facts, not advocates for either side; [36] and (8) just as jurors may not discuss the case among themselves or with anyone else prior to deliberations, so they may not discuss or devise among themselves, either in the courtroom or during recesses, questions to be posed to witnesses. [37] Where the court declines to ask a juror-posed question during trial, the jury should be instructed that: (1) the court has considered the question and does not know what the answer would be, [38] but will not ask it because it is legally improper, and (2) the juror who submitted the question should strike it from his or her mind and not consider it or discuss it with other jurors during deliberations. [39] In this court's view, a careful admonition to jurors that they are permitted but not encouraged to submit questions to be posed to witnesses, in accord with the procedures described above, is likely to enhance the prospect that juries will perform their responsibilities knowledgeably, intelligently, efficiently, and reliably. While defendants apparently would have it otherwise, [40] it is important to the administration of justice that jurors find out, consistent with preserving the constitutional rights of litigants, what really happened in a case. Defendants' arguments in opposition to the court's procedures, articulated with some distortion, [41] much indignation and exaggeration, [42] and rooted primarily in speculation, [43] find virtually no support in the Constitution, statutory law, or numerous court opinions that have considered juror questioning of witnesses. To the contrary, no federal or state court has found cause to question the constitutionality of the procedure, and almost all courts have found election of the procedure to be firmly committed to the discretion of the trial judge. [44] Commentators who have thoughtfully discussed juror questioning of witnesses commend it for many of the reasons that have prompted this court to permit it, [45] and respected compilations of federal jury instructions, [46] as well as juror handbooks in adjoining jurisdictions, [47] acknowledge acceptance of the practice. While there well may be cases where, notwithstanding the sound reasons [48] that prompt this court to allow juror questions, it nevertheless would be wise for a trial judge, in the exercise of discretion, to dispense with the practice because of unique circumstances posing unusual dangers of prejudice to a party, none of defendants' cases present such dangers. [49] Consequently, defendants' requests that this court not instruct jurors as to the circumstances under which they are permitted to submit questions to witnesses will be denied, and the court will give the following modified instruction to jurors, consistent with the preceding discussion. [50] GENERALLY ONLY THE LAWYERS AND I ASK WITNESSES QUESTIONS. IF YOU ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WHETHER A WITNESS WILL TESTIFY ABOUT A MATTER THAT SEEMS IMPORTANT TO YOU, USUALLY, IF YOU ARE PATIENT, THE MATTER WILL BE COVERED BY FURTHER QUESTIONS ASKED BY ME OR THE LAWYERS. OCCASIONALLY, HOWEVER, A JUROR FEELS THAT AN IMPORTANT QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN ASKED. NOW I AM NOT ENCOURAGING ANY OF YOU TO POSE QUESTIONS TO THE WITNESSES IN THIS CASE. HOWEVER, IF IT HAPPENS DURING TRIAL THAT YOU FEEL AN IMPORTANT QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN ASKED, YOU MAY WRITE OUT THE QUESTION ON A BLANK PIECE OF PAPER FROM YOUR NOTEBOOK, RAISE YOUR HAND WHEN THE LAWYERS ARE FINISHED WITH THEIR EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS, AND HAVE THE QUESTION HANDED TO ME. I THEN WILL DECIDE IF THE QUESTION IS A PROPER ONE AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE LAWYERS. IF IT IS, AND IF IT RELATES TO A FACTUAL MATTER ABOUT WHICH THE WITNESS CAN TESTIFY, I WILL ASK THE WITNESS THE QUESTION. IF I DO NOT ASK THE QUESTION, THAT MEANS I HAVE DECIDED THAT IT IS NOT LEGALLY PROPER FOR SOME REASON, JUST LIKE I MIGHT SUSTAIN AN OBJECTION TO A QUESTION ASKED BY A LAWYER FOR THE SAME REASON. IF I DO NOT ASK THE QUESTION, THE JUROR POSING IT SHOULD NOT GUESS OR SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT THE ANSWER MIGHT HAVE BEEN, AND MAY NOT CONSIDER THE QUESTION OR DISCUSS IT WITH OTHER JURORS DURING DELIBERATIONS. IF I DECIDE THAT THE QUESTION DEALS WITH A LEGAL ISSUE, I MAY DECIDE TO WAIT UNTIL MY FINAL INSTRUCTIONS AND ANSWER IT THEN IF IT IS RELEVANT TO YOUR CONSIDERATION OF THE CASE. NO JUROR EVER MAY POSE QUESTIONS ORALLY TO A WITNESS AT ANY TIME DURING THE TRIAL. MOREOVER, YOU MAY POSE A QUESTION TO A WITNESS ONLY TO HELP YOU UNDERSTAND THE TESTIMONY, TO CLARIFY THE EVIDENCE OR TO SEEK INFORMATION, NOT TO DISCREDIT OR ARGUE WITH A WITNESS. THIS IS BECAUSE YOU, AS JURORS, ARE IMPARTIAL JUDGES OF THE FACTS, NOT ADVOCATES FOR EITHER SIDE IN THIS TRIAL. FINALLY, REMEMBER THAT JUST BECAUSE YOU MAY SUBMIT QUESTIONS TO WITNESSES DOES NOT MEAN THAT YOU MAY DISCUSS THIS CASE WITH A FELLOW JUROR OR ANYONE ELSE BEFORE YOU BEGIN YOUR DELIBERATIONS. YOU MAY NOT DO SO, AS I ALREADY HAVE TOLD YOU, AND WILL REMIND YOU THROUGHOUT THIS TRIAL. THIS MEANS THAT YOU MAY NOT DISCUSS WITH A FELLOW JUROR OR ANYONE ELSE, EITHER HERE IN THE COURTROOM OR OUTSIDE, ANY QUESTION YOU MIGHT BE THINKING OF POSING TO A WITNESS. If a question is submitted by a juror during one of defendants' trials and is not posed by the court because the question is determined to be legally improper, the court will instruct the jury as follows: [51] LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I HAVE DECIDED NOT TO ASK THIS WITNESS A QUESTION WRITTEN OUT BY ONE OF THE JURORS BECAUSE THE QUESTION IS NOT LEGALLY PROPER. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WOULD HAVE BEEN, AND I MUST DIRECT THE JUROR WHO SUBMITTED THE QUESTION NOT TO GUESS OR SPECULATE ABOUT THE ANSWER BECAUSE IT IS NOT RELEVANT TO YOUR CONSIDERATION OF THIS CASE. THAT JUROR MUST PUT THE QUESTION OUT OF HIS OR HER MIND AND MAY NOT CONSIDER IT OR DISCUSS IT WITH OTHER JURORS DURING DELIBERATIONS. For the foregoing reasons, it is this 12th day of March, 1985, hereby ORDERED that defendants' motions that the court not permit jurors to take notes or submit questions to witnesses during their trials, and that the court not instruct the jury before closing argument as to the purpose of argument and the impropriety of the expression of personal beliefs or opinions by counsel, be, and they hereby are, denied. /s/ Henry F. Greene HENRY F. GREENE Judge