Opinion ID: 3179278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Pretestimony Lineup and Questioning

Text: Masters contends that rulings by the magistrate at the preliminary hearing and by the trial court erroneously prevented him from testing the accuracy of Willis‘s identification of him. In this claim, as in most of his claims on appeal, Masters contends that the asserted error or misconduct he raises infringed his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair and reliable trial. What we stated in People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, footnote 17, applies in the present case: ―In most instances, insofar as defendant raised the issue at all in the trial court, he failed explicitly to make some or all of the constitutional arguments he now advances. In each instance, unless otherwise indicated, it appears that either (1) the appellate claim is of a kind (e.g., failure to instruct sua sponte; erroneous instruction affecting defendant‘s substantial rights) that required no trial court action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court‘s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the Constitution. To that extent, defendant‘s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. [Citations.] [¶] In the latter instance, of course, rejection, on the merits, of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue 22 actually before that court necessarily leads to rejection of the newly applied constitutional ‗gloss‘ as well. No separate constitutional discussion is required in such cases, and we therefore provide none.‖ (Italics in original.) In order to test Willis‘s ability to identify Masters, Johnson, and Woodard, the magistrate granted their request that they not initially be in the courtroom while he testified at the preliminary hearing. Outside their presence, Willis testified he had known each of them for a few months before Sergeant Burchfield was murdered. Willis testified that he had seen Masters as he walked past Willis‘s cell and that they had met several times on the exercise yard. Masters‘s counsel then asked Willis a series of questions about Masters‘s appearance: ―Q. Mr. Masters is about maybe five seven in height, right? ―A. Somewhere — yes, maybe. ―Q. And he‘s probably about, what, maybe 195, 200 pounds? ―A. I don‘t think he‘s that heavy. ―Q. About 190? ―A. I don‘t think he‘s that heavy. ―Q. 140, what? ―A. Somewhere up in there. Between 140, 160 pounds. ―Q. He‘s very — very light skinned; isn‘t he? ―A. No, he‘s not. ―Q. Very dark skinned? ―A. Dark skinned. ―Q. He didn‘t have any scars or other marks on his face; did he? ―A. I don‘t remember. ―Q. He didn‘t have any tattoos on his body anywhere? ―A. I don‘t remember. 23 ―Q. Didn‘t have any tattoos on his face; did he? ―A. I don‘t remember. ―Q. He wore glasses; is that right? ―A. That is correct. ―Q. He had a big afro; is that right? ―A. That is wrong. ―Q. He had a small afro? ―A. Yes, he kept his hair about as short as mine. ―Q. He didn‘t have any facial hair [between January and June 1985], did he? ―A. I don‘t remember. [¶] . . . [¶] ―Q. Okay. He‘s a fellow probably in his early 30s when you saw him? ―A. He looked to be. ―Q. Early — early 30s? ―A. He looked to be in his 30s, I don‘t know whether it was early or late, I‘m just saying he looked to be in his 30s. He looked rather old to me. ―Q. He looked like mid to latter part of his 30s maybe, maybe that old? ―A. I don‘t know, it just looked like maybe he was in his 30s. Maybe early 30s — ―Q. Okay. ―A. Or late 20s. [¶] . . . [¶] ―Q. He had an earring in his left ear, right — was it left — left ear; didn‘t he? [¶] . . . [¶] ―A. I ain‘t never seen him with an earring. ―Q. Okay. His tone of voice is very loud, deep voice, right? ―A. Squeaky voice. ―Q. Squeaky voice. He‘s built rather stocky, rather heavy? ―A. Slim. [¶] . . . [¶] 24 ―Q. You don‘t really remember very much about what he looks like; do you? ―A. Yes, I remember what he looks like. But he was — he was bald headed at that time, kind of chubby, he seemed to be kind of chubby. ―Q. Okay. He was bald on the top of his head? ―A. No, he kept his hair bald, all his hair, he kept his hair shaved off. ―Q. And he was kind of fat, you said?‖ ―A. Kind of husky. You‘re talking about Masters, right? ―Q. Masters, correct. ―A. That‘s correct. He was kind of heavy like, husky — ―Q. When you say — ―A. — chubby. ―Q. — chubby or husky, do you mean muscular or just fat? ―A. Well, he had a little stomach on him, weighed about maybe 175, 180. ―Q. Okay. What else do you remember about him, about his physical appearance? ―A. At that time he wasn‘t toned, by that I mean no definition in his muscular — you know, that‘s about it.‖ Outside of Willis‘s presence, Masters‘s counsel informed the magistrate that Masters‘s physical characteristics did not match Willis‘s description. According to Masters‘s counsel, at the time of Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder Masters was 22 years old, six feet tall, neither heavy nor fat; had a tattoo on his left cheek; had a mustache; and did not wear his hair as Willis described it. Masters‘s counsel also noted Willis‘s descriptions of Andre Johnson and Lawrence Woodard were ―relatively accurate.‖ Masters‘s counsel requested a lineup at which Willis could attempt to identify Masters. Based on Willis‘s testimony ―as to the number of times that [he met Masters] on the yard,‖ the magistrate denied the request. Masters, Johnson, 25 and Woodard were brought into the courtroom but were not seated next to their respective attorneys. Willis returned to the courtroom and correctly identified each of them. Much later during the preliminary hearing, the magistrate disclosed the existence of a prison memorandum in which inmate Harold Richardson, another BGF member, had purportedly confessed his role in the planning of Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder. At the time of the preliminary hearing, Richardson was 31 years old, 5 feet 7 inches tall, bald, and not wearing glasses. He weighed about 185 pounds and would not characterize his own skin as ―dark.‖ Masters believed Richardson matched Willis‘s description of Masters and asked to recall Willis as a witness. The magistrate denied his request. After the preliminary hearing ended, Masters moved in the superior court to set aside and dismiss the information based in part on the magistrate‘s refusal to order a lineup and to recall Willis to permit him to be further questioned about his identification of Masters. The court denied the motion. Masters contends the court‘s rulings denied him a fair trial. ―In Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, we held that when eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification, due process may require ‗that an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate.‘ [Citation.] . . . A trial court ruling on a request for a pretrial lineup considers the benefits to be derived from it, the reasonableness of the request, and the resulting burden on the prosecution, the police, the court, and the witnesses. [Citation.] Further, ‗[t]he broad discretion vested in a trial judge or magistrate includes the right and responsibility on fairness considerations to deny a motion for a lineup when that motion is not made timely. Such motion should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable. We note that 26 motions which are not made until shortly before trial should, unless good cause is clearly demonstrated, be denied in most instances by reason of such delay.‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 911–912.) On appeal following conviction, the defendant must demonstrate the prejudice suffered at trial caused by the magistrate‘s asserted error during the preliminary hearing. (See People v. Mena (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 156 (Mena) [citing People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529].) In response to Masters‘s claim that the trial court erred in denying his request for a lineup, the Attorney General contends the request was untimely. We need not decide whether the request was timely because Masters fails to establish there is a reasonable likelihood that Willis would not have been able to properly identify him at the preliminary hearing. The magistrate ruled, and we agree, there was no reasonable likelihood of misidentification that a lineup could have resolved because Masters and Willis knew each other and had spent time together. Masters does not dispute that he and Willis were confined in the same section in San Quentin for the months preceding Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder and that Willis had several opportunities to see him. Willis‘s initial responses during the preliminary hearing to leading questions that described Masters‘s physical characteristics do not necessarily cast doubt on his ability to identify the participants of the conspiracy. Even if we were to assume that the magistrate erred by denying Masters the opportunity to confront Willis with the similarities between his description of Masters and Richardson‘s physical characteristics, Masters fails to demonstrate that it is reasonably probable that he would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); Mena, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 161, 164 [applying Watson standard to denial of pretrial lineup because there is no federal constitutional right to a lineup].) 27 Generally speaking, it ― ‗has long been recognized that ―[i]n the case of in-court identifications not preceded by a lineup . . . , the weaknesses, if any, are directly apparent at the trial itself and can be argued to the court and jury . . . .‖ ‘ ‖ (Mena, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 162.) At trial, Masters stood before the jury, and his counsel cross-examined Willis: ―Q. Mr. Masters, you‘d say, is about six feet tall?‖ ―A. Yes. Six foot, six-one. ―Q. Got hair on his head? ―A. Yes. ―Q. Mustache? ―A. Really can‘t see. It‘s kind of blurry. ―Q. But he‘s got hair on his face? Mustache, goatee? ―A. Yeah. Looks kind of dark. ―Q. Slender, slim? ―A. Looks husky around top. ―Q. He‘s got a rather distinctive tattoo on his left cheek, doesn‘t he?‖ ―A. I [saw] it the last time at the preliminary hearing. [¶] . . . [¶] ―Q. Have you ever seen Mr. Masters wear glasses? ―A. I don‘t recall. [¶] . . . [¶] ―Q. Now this person that you claim was Mr. Masters on the yard, Mr. Willis, he wasn‘t six foot or six feet one, was he? ―A. Didn‘t appear to be. ―Q. In fact, he was about five feet seven. ―A. Like I say, I recall describing him to that effect in the preliminary hearing, but I know Mr. Masters. I‘ve had so many meetings with Mr. Masters it‘s pathetic.‖ 28 Masters had the opportunity at trial, and availed himself of the opportunity, to challenge in front of the jury Willis‘s identification of him. Moreover, he had the opportunity to argue to the jury the weaknesses in Willis‘s identification, including the lack of a lineup and the possible suggestiveness of the procedure employed at the preliminary hearing. Even if the magistrate had permitted Masters to examine Willis about Richardson once his existence had been disclosed, there is no reasonable probability that the magistrate would have disbelieved Willis‘s identification of Masters as the person he met with several times on the exercise yard. Willis knew Richardson and Masters, and Willis also knew who participated in the conspiracy. In addition, Willis identified Masters at trial as one of the conspirators, and the jury heard evidence about the weaknesses in Willis‘s prior identification. Moreover, a note written in Masters‘s handwriting also implicated him in the conspiracy. Thus, even if we were to assume that Willis had met with Richardson and not Masters in the exercise yard to discuss the attack, Masters‘s guilt was independently established by this and other notes. Masters‘s statements to Evans also confirmed his role in the conspiracy. Further, even if we were to assume that the magistrate erred by denying his requests for a pretrial lineup and a further opportunity to examine Willis, Masters fails to demonstrate prejudicial error because the magistrate‘s rulings did not deny Masters a reasonable opportunity to challenge Willis‘s identification of him or otherwise deprive him of a fair trial. Masters‘s related claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss necessarily fails for the same reasons.