Opinion ID: 2194575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Uncharged Misconduct to Establish Common Scheme or Plan

Text: We first address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly consolidated the Burger King and Empire Pizza cases for trial because it improperly concluded that the evidence in each case was admissible in the trial of the other to establish a common scheme or plan. As previously explained, if evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct is cross admissible to establish a common scheme or plan, then separate trials ordinarily would afford the defendant no significant benefit and the trial court's joinder of the offenses for a single trial will not result in substantial prejudice. See, e.g., State v. McKenzie-Adams, supra, 281 Conn. at 527, 915 A.2d 822 (trial court properly consolidated cases because if the cases . . . had been tried separately, evidence of the defendant's sexual misconduct with each victim would have been admissible to establish a common scheme or plan in the case of the other); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 464, 551 A.2d 1231 (1988) ([t]he trial court properly joined the two cases for trial because, in the event of separate trials, evidence relating to each of the cases would have been admissible in the other); State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 68, 71-72, 530 A.2d 155 (1987) (trial court properly consolidated cases because evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct would have been admissible to prove identity). Before addressing the merits of the defendant's claim, we review our jurisprudence regarding the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct. Such evidence generally is inadmissible, unless it falls within a well established evidentiary exception. See Conn.Code Evid.  4-5(b) [3] ([e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible . . . to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony). As a general rule, evidence of prior misconduct is inadmissible to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . . Such evidence cannot be used to suggest that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity for criminal behavior. . . . On the other hand, evidence of crimes so connected with the principal crime by circumstance, motive, design, or innate peculiarity, that the commission of the collateral crime tends directly to prove the commission of the principal crime, is admissible. The rules of policy have no application whatever to evidence of any crime which directly tends to prove that the accused is guilty of the specific offense for which he is on trial. . . . We have developed a two part test to determine the admissibility of such evidence. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. . . . Second, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McKenzie-Adams, supra, 281 Conn. at 521-22, 915 A.2d 822; accord Conn.Code Evid.  4-5. Because of the difficulties inherent in this balancing process, the trial court's decision will be reversed only whe[n] abuse of discretion is manifest or whe[n] an injustice appears to have been done. . . . On review by this court, therefore, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court's ruling. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 661, 835 A.2d 895 (2003). The standard by which the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct is measured generally will depend on two factors: the purpose for which the evidence is offered, and the type of crime with which the defendant has been charged. For example, when a defendant is charged with a sex crime and evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct is offered to establish that the defendant had a common scheme or plan to engage in sex crimes, the admissibility of the proffered evidence is evaluated pursuant to a liberal standard. See State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331, 332 n. 1, 904 A.2d 101 (2006) (our holdings in sexual assault cases that prior sexual misconduct is viewed more liberally than other types of prior misconduct should not be disturbed). In cases that do not involve sex crimes, such as the present case, however, we apply a more stringent standard to determine whether evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible to establish a common scheme or plan. An examination of our case law reveals that, although this court recently and repeatedly has addressed the liberal standard of admissibility applicable to sex crime cases; see State v. McKenzie-Adams, supra, 281 Conn. at 519-27, 915 A.2d 822; State v. Aaron L., 272 Conn. 798, 819-28, 865 A.2d 1135 (2005); State v. Ellis, supra, 270 Conn. at 352-68, 852 A.2d 676; State v. James G., 268 Conn. 382, 388-402, 844 A.2d 810 (2004); State v. Merriam, supra, 264 Conn. at 656-65, 835 A.2d 895; State v. George B., 258 Conn. 779, 789-94, 785 A.2d 573 (2001); State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 59-63, 644 A.2d 887 (1994); we have not had the opportunity to address the more stringent standard applicable to nonsex crime cases since State v. King, 235 Conn. 402, 405, 665 A.2d 897 (1995) (per curiam) (affirming judgment of Appellate Court on basis of that court's thoughtful resolution of [the] issues), and State v. Greene, supra, 209 Conn. at 464-66, 551 A.2d 1231, which was decided in 1988. A review of our case law further reveals that, although we have been consistent in our application of this stringent standard, we have been inconsistent in our articulation and explanation of the principles that guide our analysis. See State v. Murrell, 7 Conn.App. 75, 83, 507 A.2d 1033 (1986) (there is some discrepancy in the cases as to the factors governing the admissibility determination when evidence of prior misconduct is offered to prove a common scheme). Accordingly, we take this opportunity to analyze carefully our jurisprudence concerning the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct offered to establish the existence of a common scheme or plan in nonsex crime cases, and to clarify the principles that govern our review. We turn first to the general purpose and scope of the common scheme or plan exception. Evidence of uncharged misconduct, although inadmissible to prove a defendant's bad character or propensity to engage in criminal behavior, is admissible [t]o prove the existence of a larger plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the crime on trial is a part. 1 C. McCormick, Evidence (6th Ed. 2006)  190, pp. 754-55. To prove the existence of a common scheme or plan, each crime must be an integral part of an overarching plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant or his confederates. Id., p. 755; see also C. Tait, Connecticut Evidence (3d Ed. 2001)  4.19.9, p. 237 (The exception for common plan or scheme admits evidence of conduct that forms part of an overall plan. This exception requires that the misconduct be connected to a `common' plan or scheme and not be isolated or unconnected conduct of a similar nature.). Evidence of such a plan is relevant to the charged crime because it bears on the defendant's motive, and hence the doing of the criminal act, the identity of the actor, and his intention, where any of these is in dispute. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Shindell, 195 Conn. 128, 133-34, 486 A.2d 637 (1985), quoting C. McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed. 1972)  190, pp. 448-49; see also 1 E. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence (Rev. Ed. 1999)  3:21, p. 114 ([p]roof that the defendant entertained a plan, including the commission of the charged crime, is logically relevant to show the defendant's identity as the criminal); E. Imwinkelried, supra, p. at 115 (proof that defendant entertained plan logically relevant to demonstrate that [t]he charged and uncharged crimes both are effects of the same cause, the plan). In addition to these general principles, our analysis reveals the existence of two separate and distinct categories of cases in which we have applied the common scheme or plan exception. In the first category, which consists of what most accurately may be described as true common scheme or plan cases, the nature of the charged and uncharged crimes combined with connecting evidence, if any, gives rise to a permissive inference that an overall scheme or plan existed in the defendant's mind, and that the crimes were executed in furtherance of that plan. In the second category of cases, which consists of what most accurately may be described as signature cases, the charged and uncharged crimes appear to be separate and discrete criminal acts, but the method of commission exhibits the existence of a modus operandi, logo, or signature, which, when considered in combination with other factors, such as the proximity of time and place of commission, gives rise to a permissive inference that the crimes were executed in furtherance of an overall common scheme or plan. In the first category, which is composed of true common scheme or plan cases, the nature of the uncharged misconduct and the charged crime, or the existence of connecting evidence, reveal a genuine connection between the crimes in the defendant's mind. [4] 1 E. Imwinkelried, supra,  3:23, p. at 124. As Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried explains in his treatise entitled Uncharged Misconduct Evidence: The [uncharged] act can be probative of a true plan even when it is dissimilar to the charged crime. There need not be exact correspondence between all the crimes involved in the plan. The defendant's burglary of a pawn shop can be used to show the defendant's plan to obtain the weapons for a robbery. The defendant's theft of a car can be employed to show the defendant's plan to use the car as a getaway vehicle in a kidnapping or robbery. The defendant's theft of a uniform is evidence of the defendant's plan to masquerade as a guard in order to rob an armored car. The dissimilarity between the charged and uncharged crimes does not negate the value of the uncharged crime as evidence of the existence of the plan including the charged crime. Id.,  3:22, p. 118. State v. Shindell, supra, 195 Conn. at 128, 486 A.2d 637, exemplifies the first category of cases. In Shindell, the defendant was charged with two counts of arson in the second degree and two counts of conspiracy to commit arson in the second degree. Id., at 129, 486 A.2d 637. The four counts related to two fires, one on November 23, 1974, and the other on November 29, 1974, both of which occurred at 36-38 Ann Street in New Haven. Id. At the defendant's trial, the trial court admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct pertaining to the defendant's participation in other arsons, attempted arson, vandalism and filing of false insurance claims. Id., at 133, 486 A.2d 637. Specifically, the trial court admitted evidence that the defendant had sold the Ann Street property, as well as five additional properties located in New Haven, in a single transaction to Peter Cappola, his coconspirator in the crimes charged. Id., at 129-30, 486 A.2d 637. The defendant and Cappola entered into a sales agreement that contained a `windfalls profit clause' that required them to share equally the insurance proceeds from the destruction of any of the buildings situated on the five properties. Id., at 130, 486 A.2d 637. Upon realizing the extent to which the buildings were insured against vandalism, theft, fire and loss, the defendant and Cappola decided to destroy the buildings and recoup the insurance proceeds. From June through November, 1974, the defendant and Coppola, either personally or through their agents, intentionally vandalized and set fire to various properties, including 36-38 Ann Street, filed false insurance claims concerning those properties, and split the proceeds equally pursuant to the terms of the windfalls profit clause. Id., at 130-33, 486 A.2d 637. Additionally, with respect to the remaining properties, the defendant and Cappola filed false insurance claims for vandalism, theft and loss of rents. Id., at 132, 486 A.2d 637. The trial court admitted the evidence of uncharged misconduct because it concluded that the evidence was relevant to the defendant's motive, intent and involvement in a common plan or scheme. Id., at 134, 486 A.2d 637. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the trial court's admission of uncharged misconduct evidence amounted to an impermissible attack on his character in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. Id., at 133, 486 A.2d 637. We disagreed, concluding that the trial court properly had admitted the evidence because it was relevant and material to show a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the present crime[s] on trial [were] a part. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 136, 486 A.2d 637. In arriving at this conclusion, we noted that, [a]ll the various properties involved were part of a single sales transaction, a package deal executed under a common sales agreement and subject to nearly identical mortgage terms. Insurance proceeds collected on losses to any of the buildings were divided pursuant to the same windfall profits arrangement. Each of the key participants in the various offenses played a role that remained constant throughout: the defendant advised Cappola, dealt directly with the appraiser, and filed and pressed the insurance claims; Cappola hired and instructed the actual perpetrators of the arsons and vandalism, set the scenes for the fires by strategically placing the gasoline in the buildings and signed the claims and letters prepared by the defendant. In addition, all the offenses occurred within less than a year, most within . . . six months. Id., at 135-36, 486 A.2d 637. The defendant claimed, however, that the evidence was inadmissible because it lacked the requisite grade of similarity to the charged crimes. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 134, 486 A.2d 637. We rejected this claim, noting that the defendant misconstrues the specific basis upon which the trial court admitted this evidence. The degree of similarity between the crime charged and the other crime is only at issue when the latter is an unrelated incident which, because of certain particularly distinguishing features that it shares in common with the charged offense, is probative to show that the same individual committed both. In such a case, the evidence is offered [t]o prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused. . . . [M]uch more is demanded [in cases involving unrelated incidents] than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated burglaries or thefts. The device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.  (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 134-35, 486 A.2d 637. Because the evidence of uncharged misconduct at issue in Shindell, did not consist of unrelated incidents that could only be connected to the charged crimes by showing a high degree of similarity in the modus operandi of their commission; id., at 135, 486 A.2d 637; but, rather, exhibited a substantial number of . . . [connecting] factors indicating the existence of a common scheme or plan to commit insurance fraud, we concluded that the admissibility of the evidence did not depend on the degree of similarity shared by the charged and uncharged crimes. In the second category, which consists of signature cases, this court concluded that evidence of uncharged misconduct was admissible to establish the existence of a common scheme or plan because the factual characteristics shared by the charged and uncharged crimes were sufficiently distinctive and unique as to be like a signature and, therefore, it logically could be inferred that if the defendant is guilty of one [crime] he must be guilty of the other. [5] (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 205 Conn. 638, 661, 534 A.2d 1199 (1987) (evidence of prior burglary and robbery admissible in defendant's felony murder trial to establish common scheme or plan because crimes were proximate in place and time, same perpetrators were involved, all victims were highly vulnerable, and excessive violence was used). State v. Mandrell, 199 Conn. 146, 506 A.2d 100 (1986), is illustrative of the second category of cases. In Mandrell, the defendant was charged in relevant part with robbery in the first degree and assault of a victim sixty years or older in the second degree. Id., at 147, 506 A.2d 100. The charges arose out of an incident in which the defendant and an accomplice had robbed a liquor store located at 350 Asylum Avenue in Hartford. Id., at 148, 506 A.2d 100. In the commission of the robbery, the defendant's accomplice threatened the clerk of the store with what the clerk believed to be a gun, forced the clerk to lay down on the floor in the back room, and bound and gagged him. Id. Thereafter, the defendant, who had attempted to open the cash register unsuccessfully, ordered his accomplice to unbind the clerk and return him to the front of the store. The defendant, gesticulating wildly and using profanity, forced the clerk to open the cash register. The clerk subsequently was escorted to the back room, where he was bound and struck in the head twice with a bottle. Id., at 148-49, 506 A.2d 100. At the defendant's trial, the state sought to introduce testimony concerning a robbery that the defendant had committed five years prior to the crimes charged. The evidence established that the defendant and an unidentified accomplice previously had robbed a liquor store located at 280 Asylum Avenue in Hartford. Id., at 150, 506 A.2d 100. During that robbery, the defendant had grabbed a customer by the neck, put a gun to the customer's head and assaulted the customer physically, while the defendant's accomplice forced the clerk to open the cash register. The defendant, while using profanity, then forced the customer and the clerk to lie down on the floor of the back room, where the defendant struck the clerk in the head twice with a bottle. Id., at 150-51, 506 A.2d 100. The trial court admitted the evidence of uncharged misconduct to prove, inter alia, the existence of a common scheme or plan. Id., at 151, 506 A.2d 100. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had admitted the evidence concerning the defendant's uncharged misconduct. Id., at 150, 506 A.2d 100. In addressing this claim, we noted that, [e]vidence of other crimes is relevant to identity, a common scheme, or an element of the crime presently charged, if the methods used are sufficiently unique to warrant a reasonable inference that the person who performed one misdeed also did the other. Much more is required than the fact that the offenses fall into the same class. The device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature. State v. Ibraimov, [187 Conn. 348, 354, 446 A.2d 382 (1982)]. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mandrell, supra, 199 Conn. at 151-52, 506 A.2d 100. With this standard in mind, we examined the factual similarities shared by the charged and uncharged crimes: both robberies took place in liquor stores located close to each other on Asylum Street in Hartford and were committed by two black males. In each robbery the defendant was identified as using profanity and exhibiting aggressive, violent behavior, the store clerk was forced to lie down on the floor in the store's back room and the clerk was twice struck on the head with a liquor bottle. Id., at 152, 506 A.2d 100. We also noted the dissimilarities between the charged and uncharged crimes: a gun was displayed openly in the uncharged robbery only; the two robberies were committed at different times of day and five years apart (although the defendant was incarcerated during much of this time period); bottles of different sizes were used to strike each clerk in the head. Id. Despite these dissimilarities, we concluded that the trial court properly had admitted the evidence of uncharged misconduct to establish the existence of a common scheme or plan because the methods used in the two crimes were sufficiently similar and unique to warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant committed both crimes. Id. We never previously have articulated why we employ the signature test, which is probative of the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged, to ascertain the existence of a common scheme or plan. [6] See State v. Ibraimov, supra, 187 Conn. at 354, 446 A.2d 382 (Evidence of other crimes or misconduct of an accused is admissible on the issue of identity where the methods used are sufficiently unique to warrant a reasonable inference that the person who performed one misdeed also did the other. Much more is required than the fact that the offenses fall into the same class. The device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.  [Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Accordingly, we take this opportunity to do so. The signature test ordinarily is used to determine whether evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible under an evidentiary exception separate and distinct from the common scheme or plan exception, namely, the identity exception. See Conn. Code Evid.  4-5(b). Specifically, the test is used to discern whether evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 219 Conn. 93, 100, 591 A.2d 1246 (1991); State v. Sierra, 213 Conn. 422, 430, 568 A.2d 448 (1990). The signature test is pertinent to the common scheme or plan inquiry, however, when the state seeks to establish the existence of an overall plan in the defendant's mind based solely on the similarities shared by the charged and uncharged crimes. This is because, when evidence of uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crime so as to rise to the level of a signature, modus operandi, or logo, it also is likely to exhibit such a concurrence of common features . . . [as] naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which [the charged and uncharged crimes] are the individual manifestations. (Emphasis omitted.) 2 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev. Ed. 1979)  304, p. 249; see also State v. Murrell, supra, 7 Conn.App. at 88, 507 A.2d 1033 ([w]here evidence of prior misconduct is sufficiently similar to the facts and circumstances of the charged offense to be admissible for the purpose of proving that the same individual committed both crimes, i.e., to be admissible under the identity exception, then there is some likelihood that the evidence is also relevant and admissible for the purpose of proving a common scheme or system of criminal activity). Stated another way, when the charged and uncharged crimes exhibit the same modus operandi, it is likely that both crimes had been committed in furtherance of an overall plan or scheme in the defendant's mind. It is the existence of this permissive inference that an overall plan existed that explains our use of the signature test in the second category of cases. State v. Barnes, 132 Conn. 370, 44 A.2d 708 (1945), is a paradigmatic example. In Barnes, four defendants were charged with conspiracy to steal fur coats from furriers located in Stamford and Norwalk. The evidence adduced at trial revealed that, on the night of October 11, 1944, the four defendants had entered two small fur stores and had stolen fur coats in a similar manner: one defendant distracted the proprietor of the store by requesting his assistance while two defendants blocked the proprietor's view and the fourth defendant concealed a fur coat on her person. Id., at 371, 44 A.2d 708. At the defendants' trial, the trial court admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct relating to the defendants' subsequent attempt to steal a fur coat. The evidence revealed that, two hours after they had visited the Stamford and Norwalk stores, the defendants had visited a New Haven furrier, where the proprietor observed one of the defendants attempting to conceal a fur coat beneath her skirt. Id. The proprietor contacted the police, and the defendants subsequently were arrested. A search revealed that each of the defendants had three or four large pins generally known as horse blanket pins; id., at 372, 44 A.2d 708; that presumably had been used to pin the fur coats beneath the defendants' skirts. On appeal, the defendants conceded that the evidence of uncharged misconduct was admissible to prove identity, but maintained that it was inadmissible for any other purpose. Id. We rejected this claim, noting that evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible to establish a common scheme embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We concluded that, because the charged and uncharged crimes might almost be described as identical . . . [e]very requirement of the exception to the rule [had been] fully met. Id., at 373, 44 A.2d 708. We therefore concluded that the trial court properly had admitted the evidence of uncharged misconduct to establish a common scheme or plan. In Barnes, the marked similarity of the modus operandi of the charged and uncharged crimes, coupled with proximity of time and place of commission, supported the inference that the defendants had an overall scheme or plan to steal fur coats, and that both the charged and uncharged crimes had been executed in furtherance of this plan. Although this permissive inference may arise in some, if not many cases, we caution that it will not arise in all cases. As the Washington Court of Appeals aptly observed, [s]omething more than the doing of similar acts is required in evidencing design, as the object is not merely to negative an innocent intent, but to prove the existence of a definite project directed toward completion of the crime in question. (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harris, 36 Wash.App. 746, 751, 677 P.2d 202 (1984); see also People v. Hansen, 313 Ill.App.3d 491, 505, 246 Ill.Dec. 283, 729 N.E.2d 934 (2000) (In determining whether multiple crimes have been committed as part of a common design, scheme, or plan, we find it far more sensible to focus on the defendant's state of mind or purpose in committing the offenses than on the factual similarities of the offenses. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by the fact that similarities between crimes is the focus for determining the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to establish the existence of modus operandi. In fact, we suspect that confusion between the concepts of common design, scheme, or plan, and modus operandi . . . has led to the line of cases on which the [s]tate relies. [Citation omitted.]); see also 29 Am.Jur.2d 514-15, Evidence  448 (1994) (Some courts consider the defendant's modus operandi as part of, or closely related to a scheme or plan. But more generally, the term modus operandi suggests that since the defendant acted in a similar and unusual or distinctive manner previously, it is more likely that he, rather than someone else, did the act on the occasion of the charged crime, so that the inference is from modus operandi to the identity of [the] defendant as the culprit. [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). Thus, when seeking to admit evidence pursuant to the common scheme or plan exception, it is not enough to show mere similarity between the [charged and uncharged] crimes; 1 E. Imwinkelried, supra,  3:23, p. at 124; because [s]tanding alone, a series of similar acts does not establish the existence of a true plan. A series of similar robberies could be the result of separate decisions to rob. Id., pp. 124-25. Accordingly, to establish the existence of a true plan in the defendant's mind based solely on the marked similarities shared by the charged and uncharged crimes, the state must produce sufficient evidence to: (1) establish the existence of a signature, modus operandi, or logo; and (2) support a permissive inference that both crimes were related to an overall goal in the defendant's mind. Id., p. 125. We need not provide a laundry list of factors that support such a permissive inference. A review of our jurisprudence reveals, however, that one of the most decisive factors is the proximity of time and place of commission of the charged and uncharged crimes. Accordingly, when both the charged and uncharged crimes exhibit the existence of a signature, and were committed within the same limited geographic area and time period, a permissive inference ordinarily arises that the charged and uncharged crimes were the individual manifestations of a true plan in the defendant's mind. See State v. Greene, supra, 209 Conn. at 464-65, 551 A.2d 1231 (crimes tried jointly committed in same vicinity of city, at similar time of day and within three days of each other); State v. Jones, supra, 205 Conn. at 661, 534 A.2d 1199 (charged and uncharged crimes committed in the same general neighborhood and six days apart); State v. Mandrell, supra, 199 Conn. at 152, 506 A.2d 100 (charged and uncharged crimes committed on same street in Hartford and five years apart, but defendant was incarcerated during much of intervening period); State v. Braman, 191 Conn. 670, 680, 469 A.2d 760 (1983) (charged and uncharged crimes committed in adjoining towns and . . . within three weeks of each other); State v. Barnes, supra, 132 Conn. at 371-72, 44 A.2d 708 (charged and uncharged crimes occurred in nearby towns within hours of each other). In sum, we conclude that evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible in nonsex crime cases to establish the existence of a common scheme or plan only if it supports a permissive inference that both crimes were related to an overall goal in the defendant's mind. 1 E. Imwinkelried, supra,  3.23, p. 125. Two distinct avenues exist by which the proponent of the uncharged misconduct evidence may seek to establish the existence of this permissive inference. First, the nature of the charged and uncharged crimes, combined with connecting evidence, if any, may give rise to an inference that a common scheme or plan existed. See, e.g., State v. Shindell, supra, 195 Conn. at 134-35, 486 A.2d 637. In this category of cases, the admissibility of the evidence does not depend on the degree of similarity shared by the charged and uncharged crimes, but, rather, on the extent to which it is probative of the existence of an overall plan in the defendant's mind. Id. Second, when the charged and uncharged crimes appear to be separate and discrete criminal acts, but the proponent of the evidence claims that a common scheme or plan may be inferred from the modus operandi of the crimes, the crimes must share sufficient marked similarities so as to rise to the level of a signature and must support a permissive inference that they were committed in furtherance of an overall scheme or plan. See State v. Mandrell, supra, 199 Conn. at 152, 506 A.2d 100; State v. Barnes, supra, 132 Conn. at 373, 44 A.2d 708. In nonsex crime cases, regardless of the avenue by which the evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted, once admitted, it is relevant to establish the defendant's motive, intent and identity. See State v. Shindell, supra, at 133-34, 486 A.2d 637. This is because the evidence necessarily gives rise to the inference that the defendant had an overall plan that encompassed the commission of the charged and uncharged crimes and, therefore that the defendant, rather than someone else, committed the crime charged. [7] With these principles in mind, we turn now to the merits of the defendant's claim. In the present case, the state did not adduce evidence revealing a direct connection between the Burger King and Empire Pizza robberies. Compare id., at 135, 486 A.2d 637. Likewise, the nature of the crimes, namely, armed robbery and felony murder, do not give rise to an inference that the charged and uncharged crimes necessarily were executed in furtherance of an overall scheme or plan. Compare State v. Johnson, 190 Conn. 541, 549, 461 A.2d 981(1983) (defendant charged with larceny by false promise, an element of which is to scheme to defraud and, therefore, common scheme or plan evidence was admissible). Rather, it is the modus operandi of the Burger King and Empire Pizza robberies that, the state claims, indicates the existence of a plan in the defendant's mind. Accordingly, we must evaluate the similarities shared by the two crimes to determine whether they are sufficiently distinctive and unique as to rise to the level of a signature. If, and only if this standard is met, do we proceed to consider whether the similarities shared by the crimes also give rise to an inference that an overall common scheme or plan existed. In evaluating the similarities shared by the Burger King and Empire Pizza robberies, we note that the inference that the defendant committed both crimes does not arise . . . from the mere fact that the charged and uncharged offenses share certain marks of similarity, for it may be that the marks in question are of such common occurrence that they are shared not only by the charged crime and [the] defendant's prior offenses, but also by numerous other crimes committed by persons other than [the] defendant. On the other hand, the inference need not depend upon one or more unique or nearly unique features common to the charged and uncharged offenses, for features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness, although insufficient to raise the inference if considered separately, may yield a distinctive combination if considered together. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 172, 471 A.2d 949 (1984). Our review of the record in the present case reveals that the Burger King and Empire Pizza robberies were executed in a dissimilar manner: the Burger King robbery occurred at 6:30 p.m. during the dinner rush hour when the restaurant was full of customers, whereas the Empire Pizza robbery occurred nearly three months later, at 9:30 p.m., when the restaurant was devoid of customers; the Burger King robbery was committed by two gunmen, whereas the Empire Pizza robbery was committed by a lone gunman; no one was injured during the course of the Burger King robbery, indeed, the primary gunman repeatedly apologized and said to the employees, I wish I didn't have to do this to you, whereas the gunman in the Empire Pizza robbery violently shot and killed one of the employees; and the gunmen in the Burger King robbery fled the scene by automobile, whereas the gunman in the Empire Pizza robbery fled the scene by foot. Cf. State v. Jones, supra, 205 Conn. at 661-63, 534 A.2d 1199 (trial court properly admitted evidence to establish common scheme or plan because all three incidences involved same perpetrators who exhibited excessive and unnecessary violence toward highly vulnerable victims); State v. Banks, 59 Conn.App. 112, 125, 755 A.2d 951 (factual similarities of each robbery weigh in favor of admissibility to show a common scheme . . . [because] [b]oth were committed within two weeks of one another and in close physical proximity; both stores were Bedding Barns; both were robbed by a black male near closing time; the suspect described by the witnesses from each store was carrying a bag from which he pulled a silver handgun; the suspect in each case asked for the bank bag after asking for money from the cash register; the suspect in each case locked the victims in a room and fled), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000); State v. McClendon, 45 Conn.App. 658, 675, 697 A.2d 1143 (1997) (trial court properly admitted evidence under common scheme or plan exception because [1] all four robbery locations are in close proximity; [2] all four crimes occurred within a six day period; [3] each robbery was a weekday, daylight robbery of a small business office at either the beginning or end of the day; [4] in each robbery, there was a lone perpetrator using a gun; [5] in each robbery, the gunman placed his weapon close to the victim and announced that it was a `stickup'; [6] in each robbery, there was an insistent search for money and wallets; [7] in three of the four robberies, the defendant fled on foot; and [8] the same gun was used in [three of the robberies]), aff'd, 248 Conn. 572, 730 A.2d 1107 (1999). We recognize that the perpetrators of both robberies wore dark clothing and masks to shield their identities, and displayed firearms to obtain money from the cash registers forcibly, but we conclude that these similarities are of such common occurrence that they are shared not only [by the two cases], but also by numerous other crimes committed by persons other than [the] defendant. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Esposito, supra, 192 Conn. at 172, 471 A.2d 949; accord State v. Sierra, supra, 213 Conn. at 431-32, 568 A.2d 448 (There is nothing distinctive about the use of a knife to commit an armed robbery. . . . There is also nothing particularly distinctive about the use of threats during the commission of an armed robbery. . . . Nor is there any marked significance in the items taken from the two victims: money, jewelry, clothing, and automobiles. [Citations omitted.]). Because the Burger King and Empire Pizza robberies do not share any distinctive marks of similarity from which it logically may be inferred that the same person committed both crimes, the trial court improperly concluded that the evidence in each case was admissible in the other case to establish the existence of a common scheme or plan. The state nonetheless claims that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of uncharged misconduct because the defendant's postcriminal conduct in each case was unique and distinctive in that the defendant engaged in a pattern of self-defeating behavior whereby he implicated himself in each crime. In support of this claim, the state relies on the following additional facts that the jury reasonably could have found: (1) the defendant admitted to Evelyn Reyes, the owner of the Short Stop Grocery, which is located adjacent to Empire Pizza, that he had committed the Burger King robbery; (2) sometime after the Burger King robbery, the defendant tried to sell Reyes a black handgun; (3) sometime after the Empire Pizza robbery, the defendant purchased merchandise at the Short Stop Grocery with a $50 bill, which was highly unusual; (4) the defendant informed Michael Bogan, his cell mate in April, 2002, that, although he was not involved in the Empire Pizza robbery, the victim shouldn't [have] tried to stop it and that it wasn't his money anyway, and that . . . the killing was probably an accident, was most likely an accident; (5) the defendant informed Brian Foley, a detective with the Hartford police department, that he might or might not know information relevant to the Empire Pizza robbery; (6) when Foley, in an attempt to play a cat and mouse game with the defendant informed him that the perpetrator of the Empire Pizza robbery had not worn a mask, the defendant responded: Are you crazy? Do you think I would actually rob a place without wearing a mask? The state claims that [a]ll of the differences in the commission of the two robberies . . . lack legal significance in connection to the singular aspects of his modus operandi that involved continuously acting in a way that was self-defeating and ensured his apprehension as the perpetrator of the two robberies. We are not persuaded. We acknowledge that there may be unique circumstances in which a defendant's post criminal conduct gives rise to an inference that both the charged and uncharged crimes had been executed in furtherance of a common scheme or plan, but the facts of this case do not support such an inference. Although the evidence on which the state relies indicates that the defendant carelessly and recklessly implicated himself in the commission of the Burger King and Empire Pizza robberies, it does not indicate that the defendant had an overall scheme or plan that encompassed the commission of both the Burger King and Empire Pizza robberies. Simply stated, under the circumstances of the present case, the defendant's inculpatory postcriminal conduct simply is too slim an evidentiary reed upon which to admit evidence of uncharged misconduct under the common scheme or plan exception.