Opinion ID: 434780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Fraudulent Conduct

Text: 75 The motion for a new trial or to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b) alleged fraudulent conduct. On review of a denial of a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b), the standard, like that on review of a denial of a motion for new trial, is whether an abuse of discretion occurred. See e.g., CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 727 F.2d 1550 at 1555 (Fed.Cir.1984). None did. 76 The allegation of fraudulent conduct rests on a statement made after trial in this action by counsel for a defendant (Canon) in a separate case filed by Perkin-Elmer. At a combined hearing in connection with this action and that case, counsel for Canon said that before trial in this action Perkin-Elmer changed its Micralign printer from the concentric non-2:1 system of the '015 patent claims to the nonconcentric 2:1 system of the CA-3000 printer to get an improved result. Computervision says Perkin-Elmer witnesses fraudulently testified that the printer claimed in the '015 patent and the CA-3000 printer achieve substantially the same result and thereby rendered the patents in suit unenforceable. We disagree. 77 Assuming that a statement of counsel for a defendant in another case can be viewed as testimony or as evidence, exact identity of results is not required in establishing equivalency. Though Graver Tank, supra, alternatively speaks of the same and substantially the same result, 339 U.S. at 608, 70 S.Ct. at 856, the doctrine is clearly based on substantial, not exact, identity: 78 Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect. 79 Id. at 609, 70 S.Ct. at 856. Similarly, though the doctrine was initially articulated in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361, 219 USPQ 473, 480 (Fed.Cir.1983) as appearing to involve the same result, when the court applied the doctrine it referred to substantially the same result. 717 F.2d at 1366, 219 USPQ at 484. Moreover, our predecessor court has recognized that the results achieved may be substantially the same. See e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 79, 193 USPQ 449, 461, 213 Ct.Cl. 395, 414 (1977); Pratt & Whitney Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 838, 841, 145 USPQ 429, 431, 170 Ct.Cl. 829, 833 (1965). 9 80 Thus, if Perkin-Elmer changed its commercial device to get an improved result by making it the same as the CA-3000, it would not be inconsistent--much less fraudulent--for Perkin-Elmer witnesses to testify that the claimed and accused devices are nevertheless equivalent. A patentee need produce no commercial device. Infringement is determined by comparison with the patentee's claimed invention, not with its marketed product. CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 527 F.2d 95, 100, 188 USPQ 419, 423 (7th Cir.1975), cert. den. 424 U.S. 978, 96 S.Ct. 1485, 47 L.Ed.2d 748 (1976). 81 Presumably, as above indicated, the Ninth Circuit so determined equivalence, and, though it did not in its opinion employ the words of Graver Tank, supra, its words do indicate that it found substantially the same result. Perkin-Elmer's witnesses testified that the results are substantially the same, not identical. The instructions to the jury defined equivalency in terms of substantially the same result. Computervision's own expert testified that the CA-3000 optical system performs the same work in substantially the same way as the '015 patent system, and accomplished a similar result. For all of those reasons, Computervision's assertion of fraudulent conduct is unpersuasive. 82 The district court committed no abuse of discretion in denying Computervision's alternative motions for new trial or to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b).