Opinion ID: 779532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hearing Delay1

Text: 9 It is apparent, as David argues, that the City set a hearing for a number of weeks after his car was towed on August 13, 1998, despite David's insistent and immediate demand that he be given a hearing forthwith. That appears to be in violation of state law; more importantly, it is a violation of the United States Constitution. 10 We faced this issue twenty-five years ago in a case where the City of San Francisco towed and stored the plaintiffs' automobiles, and they objected to the lack of an expeditious procedure to attack those actions. See Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (9th Cir.1977). The city had attempted to deflect that attack by providing that certain people, those who could not afford towage fees, could get a hearing within five days after notifying the city of that fact. Id. at 1341. We were not impressed with that limited concession. 2 We did take note of its limited applicability, see id. at 1344 n. 21, but declared: 11 Seizure of property without prior hearing has been sustained only where the owner is afforded prompt post-seizure hearing at which the person seizing the property must at least make a showing of probable cause.... 12 An early hearing, on the other hand, would provide vehicle owners the opportunity to test the factual basis of the tow and thus protect them against erroneous deprivation of the use of their vehicles.... We conclude, therefore, that [the state statute ] does not comply with due process requirements. 13 Nor is the statute saved by the San Francisco ordinance. A five-day delay in justifying detention of a private vehicle is too long. Days, even hours, of unnecessary delay may impose onerous burdens upon a person deprived of his vehicle. 14 Id. at 1344 (footnotes omitted). In Stypmann, we were most concerned with the fact that the automobile itself would be held unless and until the fees were paid, but did not declare that the payment of those fees would elide the requirement of a prompt hearing. Rather, we spoke more generally. 15 California thereafter adopted a statute that responded to our concerns. It provides that once a vehicle is ordered stored by an authorized member of a public agency, the agency shall provide the owner with the opportunity for a post-storage hearing. Cal. Veh.Code § 22852(a). The agency must give the owner notice within 48 hours, Cal. Veh.Code § 22852(b), and the owner may request a hearing. Cal. Veh.Code § 22852(b)(4). The post-storage hearing shall be conducted within 48 hours of the request, excluding weekends and holidays. The public agency may authorize its own officer or employee to conduct the hearing if the hearing officer is not the same person who directed the storage of the vehicle. Cal. Veh.Code § 22852(c). It should be noted that this statute also speaks generally, and does not limit its protections to those who have not put up the fees necessary to release their vehicles from storage. 16 We returned to the fray in 1982, when another irate citizen, whose automobile had been impounded by the City of Los Angeles, sued. See Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). Goichman's car had been towed and stored at the direction of an officer. Goichman went to the storage facility to demand its return, but was told that he had to pay towing and storage fees. He paid them, his car was released, and he brought a civil rights action. Id. 17 We did not reject Goichman's claim out of hand on the basis that he had paid the fees and obtained release of the vehicle. Rather, we saw the question before us as whether the post-seizure hearing provided by section 22852 of the California Vehicle Code and the Los Angeles ordinance is sufficiently prompt to satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 1324. We answered that question in the affirmative and opined: Balancing the governmental and private interests at stake, we hold that provision for a post-seizure hearing within forty-eight hours satisfies the requirements of due process. Id. at 1325. While this does amount to a ruling that the state statute is constitutional, it does not help the City, which did not follow the statute. 18 Nevertheless, the City takes the position that it need not adhere to the statute, or to our opinions about due process. It comforts itself with the reflection that Goichman refused to pay the towing fees, and brushes the case aside on that basis. It adds, [t]he court there held that the challenge to the towing must be conditioned upon the payment of the impound fees. That is the veriest nonsense. As we said, Rheuban conditioned return of the automobile on payment of $32.00 in towing charges and $4.50 in storage charges. Goichman paid the charges, and Rheuban released the vehicle. Id. at 1322. Moreover, as to payment of fees, what we said was that due process did not require return-on-demand. Id. at 1324. We then approved of conducting a hearing as long as forty-eight hours after the seizure. 19 What is clear is that the City cannot point to the slightest possibility that it has met the five day limit we set out in Stypmann, much less the 48 hours standard of state law. In other words, the long delay amounts to a violation of due process. We, therefore, reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in this respect. If anyone were entitled to summary judgment on this issue and this record, it would be David.