Opinion ID: 506169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: disclosure of witness statements

Text: 136 Appellants Burns and Tarantino allege that notes and other material regarding the testimony of several government witnesses were improperly withheld from the defense. Tarantino was especially concerned with statements by government witnesses (so-called Jencks Act material) relating to conversations these witnesses had with Strickland or relating to details of the particular drug transactions about which Strickland testified. Tarantino argues that the government should have been required to turn these statements over to the defense prior to Strickland's cross-examination because access to these statements would have enhanced defense counsels' ability to cross-examine Strickland--the key government witness. 137 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(2) prohibits discovery of statements by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses except as provided in the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500 (1982). The Jencks Act directs that in a criminal prosecution, statements made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses are not open to discovery or inspection by the defense until said witnesses have testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. See United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir.1979); Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 77 n. 111. In balancing a criminal defendant's need for such statements against legitimate state interests, Congress provided for discovery of statements only after the witness has testified, out of concern for witness intimidation, subornation of perjury, and other threats to the integrity of the trial process. United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.1987) (en banc); United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902, 102 S.Ct. 409, 70 L.Ed.2d 221 (1981); United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 773 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1588, 55 L.Ed.2d 807 (1978); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.1974). This congressional determination is not to be disregarded by the courts. The Act supplies the only avenue to the materials it encompasses, and 'statements of a government witness made to an agent of the Government which cannot be produced under the terms of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500 ... cannot be produced at all.'  Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 77 n. 111 (quoting Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 351, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 1224, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959)). So, under the Jencks Act, defendants had no right to the statements given by other witnesses prior to Strickland's cross-examination. 11 Only after those witnesses themselves testified does the Jencks Act give the defendants access to their statements. 12
138 In addition to his arguments based on the Jencks Act, appellant Tarantino contends that the failure of the government to turn over certain material constituted an improper denial of cross-examination, thus violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Tarantino argues, in particular, that notes made by government agents while interviewing Kohn, which were later used to refresh Kohn's recollection during his grand jury testimony and which the trial court therefore found had been adopted by Kohn for purposes of the Jencks Act, should have been turned over to the defense prior to Strickland's cross-examination. Tarantino asserts these notes would have aided the cross-examination of Strickland, because Kohn described some of the same transactions described by Strickland, but Kohn's versions were different in various details. 13 139 Appellant's attempt to use the Sixth Amendment as a constitutional rule of discovery, over and above the discovery provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Jencks Act, is barred by the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). In Ritchie, the defendant, who was charged with sexual offenses against his minor daughter, argued that his right to cross-examine the witness against him (his daughter) was impaired when a state protective service agency responsible for investigating cases of child abuse refused to turn over its records to him. Unlike this case, the records sought in Ritchie were alleged to contain statements made by the witness herself to agency counselors. Nevertheless, the plurality refused to hold the failure to produce these records violated defendant's right to cross-examine. The Court said that 140 the right of confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination.... The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses. 141 Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. at 999 (citations and footnote omitted). Similarly, in this case, the government's refusal to produce statements made by other potential witnesses prior to Strickland's cross-examination did not breach appellant's right to cross-examine Strickland--the refusal to turn over potentially useful or even exculpatory material is not equivalent to a restriction on cross-examination under Ritchie. See also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986).
142 Tarantino also argues that the failure to disclose the statements by witnesses that contradicted Strickland's version of events violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as interpreted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 14 Under Brady the government may not suppress evidence favorable to the accused when it is material to either guilt or punishment, and under Giglio and Bagley such evidence includes impeachment material. One element of a successful Brady claim is that the government did, in fact, suppress the evidence. United States v. Driver, 798 F.2d 248, 250 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 637 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2162, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980); United States v. Bernard, 607 F.2d 1257, 1263 (9th Cir.1979). No suppression occurred here--Kohn's statements to the government agent were undisputedly delivered to the defense in accordance with the requirements of the Jencks Act. Tarantino, however, claims the production was too late to be useful in Strickland's cross-examination. This argument strikes us as an attempt to convert Brady into a broad rule of discovery in criminal cases. Appellants' argument necessarily suggests that all relevant material held by the government must be produced prior to trial, for relevant material will always be at least marginally useful at every stage of the trial. As a matter of policy such broad discovery might or might not be wise, but certainly it is not required by present law. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-09, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398-2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The Supreme Court has stated that [t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; ... 'the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded.'  Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)); see United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1440-41 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed.2d 889 (1986); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 975 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976). 143 Once defendants obtained Kohn's statements, they were perfectly able to impeach his trial testimony if inconsistent. And during Kohn's cross-examination or during final argument, defendant's counsel could call the jury's attention to any inconsistencies between Kohn's version of the events (whether the account presented at trial or the one given to the government agents, if the two were at odds) and Strickland's rendition. Tarantino argues, nevertheless, that because the material was unavailable for Strickland's cross-examination, the force of the discrepancies was likely to have been lost on the jury. This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, witnesses are not impeached by prior inconsistent statements of other witnesses, but by their own prior inconsistent statements. See FED.R.EVID. 613, 801. And even if it had been permissible to confront Strickland with a statement by Kohn that the details of a particular transaction were not as Strickland had said, the effectiveness of this is not self-evident, as Strickland could not confirm or deny that Kohn had made the statement or explain Kohn's statement. 144 Second, Brady provides the sole theory on which Kohn's statements were discoverable prior to Kohn's direct examination. But under Brady, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3380 (footnotes omitted); see Pollack, 534 F.2d at 975. Thus, Brady directs only that material information be disclosed, and in Bagley the Supreme Court held information is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; see United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 135-36 and n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1986). 145 Since the evidence at issue here was disclosed, Tarantino must establish that had the statements been disclosed earlier, there is a probability sufficient to undermine our confidence in the actual outcome that the jury would have acquitted. Because we doubt whether earlier discovery of the statements would have appreciably increased the effectiveness of Strickland's cross-examination, and because the defense was not foreclosed from arguing any inconsistencies to the jury at a later point in the trial, we think that nothing approaching a Brady violation occurred here. See United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 765-66 (9th Cir.1987) (Brady not violated where impeachment material was disclosed after several witnesses had testified, but in time to be used to impeach key witnesses); United States v. Twomey, 806 F.2d 1136, 1141 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Brimberry, 803 F.2d 908, 911-915 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1977, 95 L.Ed.2d 817 (1987); United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1008-10 (1st Cir.1984); United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 675-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 195, 34 L.Ed.2d 145 (1972) (Brady does not override Jencks Act where one witness' statement is inconsistent with another's and where defense could bring out discrepancy at trial).
146 Finally, appellant Tarantino argues that the trial court erred in not ordering the government to turn over any Jencks material relating to Nancy Strickland. During the trial, Tarantino's counsel requested discovery of Nancy Strickland's Jencks material so he could use it to aid his decision whether to ask for Lonnie Strickland's recall for re-cross examination or to call Nancy Strickland as a witness for the defense. Tr. 4119. This motion was made after it became apparent that the government was not going to call Nancy Strickland as a government witness. However, just as the Jencks Act does not provide for the discovery of statements by government witnesses prior to their actual testimony, it also does not require production of statements by potential witnesses who in fact do not ultimately testify. United States v. Mills, 810 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir.) (Judge, now Justice, Kennedy), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 107, 98 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987); United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1469 (9th Cir.1984) (abuse of discretion to order production of statements of witnesses the government did not intend to call); United States v. Disston, 612 F.2d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir.1980). 147 Tarantino asserts, nevertheless, that he was entitled to discovery of Nancy Strickland's statements because she was a co-conspirator. Nancy Strickland, an unindicted co-conspirator, was listed as a prospective witness and before trial had made statements to government agents regarding the conspiracy. She was not called by the government to testify, and while it is true that the government did not hinder the defense from interviewing her, the defendants felt, perhaps reasonably, that any attempt to do so would have proved futile. Moreover, although Nancy Strickland was available as a witness for the defense, the defense was understandably reluctant to call her without either a prior interview or knowledge of statements she may have made to the government. Nancy's statements were presented to the district court for review in camera; the court concluded the statements did not contain Brady material and refused to order disclosure. 148 Tarantino's argument in favor of discovery requires a close reading of FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) in conjunction with FED.R.CRIM.P. 16(a)(1)(A). Under 801(d)(2)(E), a co-conspirator's statement is attributed on an agency rationale to each of the co-conspirators, and so it is classified as non-hearsay and may be admitted against each co-conspirator as if it were his own statement. And under 16(a)(1)(A), a defendant is entitled to pre-trial discovery of any of his own statements in the government's possession. Thus, because the co-conspirator's statements may be treated as the defendant's own for purposes of hearsay analysis, Tarantino argues they should be discoverable in the same manner as the defendant's own statements. Once it was apparent that Nancy Strickland would not testify for the government and consequently her statements would not be discoverable in accordance with the Jencks Act, Tarantino contends the trial court should have ordered disclosure. 149 Even though the Jencks Act explicitly provides that statements of witnesses or prospective witnesses, including co-conspirators, are not discoverable until after the witness testifies, some courts have ordered disclosure of co-conspirator statements where the prosecution does not propose to put the co-conspirator on the stand. See United States v. Konefal, 566 F.Supp. 698, 705-07 (N.D.N.Y.1983) (citing cases in accord); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Sec. 253 at 50 (2d ed. 1982) (citing cases). 150 We believe, however, that we are without authority to order such discovery. Nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence or in the Jencks Act requires such disclosure--we think it clear that as used in Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A) the phrase statements made by the defendant does not include statements made by co-conspirators of the defendant, even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay. Once appellant's imaginative reading of 16(a)(1)(A) is rejected, no other authority is suggested for this type of discovery order. Under our law, the adversary system is the primary means by which truth is uncovered. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. We decline to extend the defendant's right to discovery beyond that required by statute or the Constitution. We note this result is in agreement with every other circuit that has examined the question. See United States v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.1987) (en banc); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.1974); see also 8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE p 16.04 at 16-54, 55 (2d ed. Nov. 1986 Rev.).