Opinion ID: 1250117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: parishioners' discovery quest

Text: Initially parishioners sought discovery by interrogatories and requests for production of writings, Church records and reports pertaining to their expulsion. They moved to compel defendants to produce these documents and to answer interrogatories. The district court agreed with the Church that the information sought was absolutely privileged by the First Amendment. Discovery quest was denied. Parishioners then unsuccessfully sought, by mandamus brought in this court, to compel the trial judge to grant discovery. [54] On January 9, 1989, four days before the Church filed its motion for summary judgment, parishioners filed a motion to compel the defendants (Shaw, Joiner, and Warden), their spouses and two expert witnesses to answer certain questions that had been asked during depositions taken in September of 1988. The trial court failed to rule on the parishioners' January 9 motion. At the summary judgment proceeding parishioners' counsel argued that they had not been allowed to question these persons as to what they have said to other church members or other ecclesiastical leaders concerning the excommunication ... In their briefs here parishioners argue that the trial court's failure to rule affirmatively on their motion denied them the opportunity to conduct meaningful discovery and hence constitutes an abuse of discretion. The record does not show whether the district court correctly applied the teachings in this opinion on the First Amendment limitation on discovery. Church judicature exercised within proper bounds of cognizance is not discoverable. Conversely, any activity outside of valid church judicature is not absolutely privileged and may be discoverable. We cannot say that this is always so, but only that the absolute privilege afforded by the First Amendment does not reach beyond the outer bounds of proper ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Parishioners' first unsuccessful discovery efforts occurred before Guinn's promulgation. Shortly after Guinn was handed down, they attempted to incorporate its governing norms in a supplemental brief in support of their January 9 motion to compel discovery. Their request was never ruled on. Because of the intervening promulgation of Guinn, fairness requires that a limited window of opportunity be kept open today for parishioners' discovery of actionable post-expulsion facts or conduct [55] that would lie outside the ecclesiastical privilege surrounding religious judicature and its implementation. On this record, we are unable to ascertain whether parishioners did seek discovery of post-expulsion communications or conduct that lie dehors the outer bounds of valid ecclesiastical judicature. If so, then the trial court, after hearing arguments on remand, must reconsider the motion. We hence remand today solely to allow for testing of undiscovered post-expulsion conduct's action ability. If parishioners can show good cause for discovery of post-expulsion communications or conduct unrelated to the Church's efforts at effectuating its valid judicature, they should be allowed to proceed further. The trial court's summary judgment, treated here as its partial summary adjudication (holding that evidentiary materials of record disclose no pre-expulsion or expulsion-related conduct to be actionable) is affirmed; the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this pronouncement. [56] LAVENDER, DOOLIN, HARGRAVE and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. HODGES, V.C.J., concurs in Parts I through VI and dissents from Parts VII and VIII. SIMMS, J., concurs in Parts I through VI, concurs by reason of stare decisis in Part VII and dissents from Part VIII. ALMA WILSON, J., dissents. KAUGER, J., concurs in result.