Opinion ID: 3064607
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the number of officers; (2) whether weapons

Text: were displayed; (3) whether the encounter occurred 4424 UNITED STATES v. BROWN in a public or non-public setting; (4) whether the officer’s officious or authoritative manner would imply that compliance would be compelled; and (5) whether the officers advised the detainee of his right to terminate the encounter. Id. (citing Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 494-96 (9th Cir. 1994)). [3] Taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding her encounter with Agent Watson, we conclude that Rishel was not in custody. Although Brown and Rishel were admittedly approached by five or six officers with guns drawn —and were both ordered to the ground, handcuffed, and patted down for weapons—all these events occurred in a public setting and there is no evidence that police continued to display their weapons after Brown and Rishel were safely secured. Moreover, subsequent events would have communicated to a reasonable person that she was free to terminate the encounter. Paramount among these is that the officers treated Brown and Rishel very differently. Brown was arrested, placed in a squad car, and driven to the Spokane County Jail. By contrast, before Rishel consented to search of the East Augusta Residence, Agent Watson had released her from handcuffs and informed her that she was not under arrest.1 He retrieved the key to the East Augusta Residence from Brown’s front pocket and gave it to Rishel, who returned to 1 The district court found that Rishel was released from handcuffs and informed that she was not under arrest before Agent Watson informed her that Brown was in possession of firearms. Rishel admitted on crossexamination that upon removing the handcuffs, Agent Watson informed her that she “was free to go.” Moreover, she also admitted on cross that after telling her she was free to leave, Agent Watson then “proceeded to tell [her] . . . that Mr. Brown . . . had a couple of firearms.” Because Agent Watson shared his information on Brown before Rishel consented to the search, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Rishel was not handcuffed and had been informed that she was not under arrest when she gave consent. UNITED STATES v. BROWN 4425 the apartment alone. According to Agent Watson, at Rishel’s request, police removed their insignia before joining her at the apartment to conduct the search. Once inside the East Augusta Residence, Agent Watson specifically sought Rishel’s consent to search the room where Brown had slept as well as the bedroom occupied by Rishel and Tensley. This police conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that she was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about her business. [4] The remaining voluntariness factors do not tip the scales in Brown’s favor. While officers first approached both Brown and Rishel with guns drawn, Brown does not contend that those weapons were still displayed after he and Rishel had been handcuffed. Rishel was not in custody, so “Miranda warnings were inapposite.” Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d at 504. Although Agent Watson admittedly did not notify Rishel that she had a right not to consent to search, this factor is not an absolute requirement for a finding of voluntariness, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, and also seems inapposite given that Rishel volunteered consent without any prompting whatsoever.2 Finally, although the district court made no express finding with respect to whether either Agent Watson or another officer informed Rishel that they could obtain a warrant, the evidence does not support this contention. During cross-examination, Agent Watson denied that any officer threatened to obtain a warrant. He also admitted telling Tensley after the search that he had probable cause to obtain a warrant, but implied that he did so because Rishel feared her boyfriend’s reaction should he discover that she voluntarily consented to the search. Rishel’s testimony expressly supports this motivation. [5] Given these circumstances, the district court did not 2 As Rishel specifically admitted during cross- examination that she spontaneously invited Agent Watson to search the East Augusta Residence, the district court did not clearly err in so finding. 4426 UNITED STATES v. BROWN clearly err in finding that Rishel voluntarily consented to search of the East Augusta Residence.