Opinion ID: 159185
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consideration of Similarly Situated Lands

Text: Next, HCCA argues that the Forest Service erred in failing to consider “contemporaneous uses made of similarly situated lands in the area.” 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(a). In particular, HCCA criticizes the Forest Service’s failure to consider lands in which access was allowed by over the snow methods. It also notes that several of the specific properties that the Forest Service did consider (i.e., properties on which access by snowplowing was allowed) are not comparable to the Paulys’ inholding. For example, HCCA observes, snowplowing of the road to one of these properties was only allowed until Thanksgiving. In other instances, snowplowing of Forest Service roads also allowed access to winter recreation trailheads. See Aplt’s Reply Br. at 11-12. We are not persuaded. The regulation on which HCCA relies does not define what constitutes “similarly situated” property, and it thus vests the Forest Service with 1 In light of that conclusion, we need not address the significance of the timing of the recording of the resolution. We note in passing that Mr. Storch himself reached no ultimate conclusions about the need for recording of the resolution. He merely observed what both parties here concede: that the resolution was not recorded when the Paulys purchased the inholding. 19 considerable discretion in determining the particular properties that should be taken into account in deciding whether to issue special use permits. Moreover, Mr. Storch’s decisional memorandum provided an explanation for not considering properties for which snowplowing had not been requested: there are over 100,000 acres of private land within the Gunnison National Forest, decisions whether to allow snowplowing on Forest Service Roads are made on a case by case basis, and, “[a]bsent an application to plow snow, it is not reasonable to examine each such inholding on the Forest in detail.” Aplt’s App. at 171. Accordingly, we conclude that the Forest Service did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to the law in considering “similarly situated” properties in assessing the Paulys’ application for a special use permit.