Opinion ID: 441811
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Heading: issues

Text: 11 Monforton initially argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the conspiracy count because there was no evidence of his participation in the conspiracy. We do not agree. 12 When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction, an appellate court must determine, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Becker, 720 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir.1983). United States v. Ospina, 739 F.2d 448 at 450-451 (9th Cir.1984). In viewing the evidence in favor of the government, the court must draw all reasonable inferences favorable to the government. United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932, 103 S.Ct. 2096, 77 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). 13 Not only did the evidence show that Monforton was a principal in each of the three corporations involved in the sale of the oil and gas leases, but an MMI corporate resolution empowered Monforton to act on behalf of MMI. Evidence also showed that Monforton made two trips to Laramie, Wyoming to meet with Schroefel in conjunction with the sale of the oil and gas leases. The agreement contained Monforton's signature, waiving a drilling requirement contained therein. Additionally, Smith testified that Monforton made the first trip to Laramie for the purpose of delivering the oil and gas agreement to Schroefel. Finally, both Smith and Schroefel testified that Monforton represented that the oil and gas lease rights were absolutely vested in Hill or W.D. Hill Farms, Inc. This evidence was more than sufficient to support a finding that Monforton was a member of the conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
14 Monforton argues that the government committed violations of the pretrial order by failing to disclose in a timely fashion two documents: the Focher statement and Schroefel's copy of the oil and gas lease options agreement. Monforton argues that the tardy disclosure of the September 1, 1982 Focher statement on October 15, 1982 violated the dictates of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), because the fact that Monforton's name had been forged on various documents was crucial to his defense that he was not a major figure in MMI. Monforton contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying, following an evidentiary hearing, his motions to dismiss the indictment and to sever the prosecution based on the government's failure to timely disclose the Focher statement. We do not agree. 15 Assuming that this material is exculpatory and material to either guilt or punishment, see United States v. Van Brandy, 726 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir.1984), we nevertheless do not find that the tardy disclosure is a reversible Brady violation. Monforton was made aware of the Focher statement three weeks prior to trial. Monforton's counsel made reference to the statement at trial in questioning Monforton and in developing the defense that Monforton was merely a pawn in the fraudulent transactions. In such circumstances, even though the government should have disclosed the Focher statement more promptly and the government's delay is not to be condoned, Monforton has not established such prejudice as would warrant reversal. United States v. McClintock, 734 F.2d 438, 446 (9th Cir.1984). 16 Monforton also argues that the production and admission of Government Exhibit Number 4, Schroefel's copy of the oil and gas lease option agreement, which contained a valid signature by Monforton, violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 because Monforton and his counsel had not been made aware of its existence prior to trial. Because the record contains no suggestion that the government either was aware of the document or had possession or control of it until trial, when Schroefel produced it, the government's failure to produce it prior to trial was not a violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16. United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.1982). Moreover, even if we were to hold that the government had violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 by not producing this document prior to trial, its admission by the trial court would not constitute an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gee, 695 F.2d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir.1983).
17 Hill and MMI argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw from representation of MMI made by counsel for Hill and MMI due to an allegedly clear possibility of a conflict of interests. Hill and MMI also contend that the trial court erred when it treated the motion, in part, as one for continuance. We disagree. 18 Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, requires a trial court either to accept counsel's representations concerning the existence of a conflict of interests or to take adequate steps of its own to insure that there is no conflict. United States v. Morando, 628 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir.1980). See generally Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). In the present case, the trial court inquired on two occasions as to the basis for counsel's assertion that a conflict existed. Counsel merely stated that he had recently learned of a possible conflict. On neither occasion did counsel make an adequate showing of the existence of an actual conflict of interest to have warranted the trial court's granting the motion for withdrawal. See United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 481 & 482, 78 L.Ed.2d 679 (1983). 2 Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion by counsel to withdraw from representation of MMI.
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20 All of the defendants argue that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of the Fuller-Banks Energy transaction. The defendants contend that the evidence was offered as evidence of other crimes admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) only upon a trial court's determination under Fed.R.Evid. 403 that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Defendants assert that the trial court failed to make this determination. 21 In United States v. Bailleaux, supra, this court enunciated the following principles for admission of evidence of other criminal acts: 22 Before evidence of [other] criminal conduct may be admitted for these other purposes, the following prerequisites must be met: (1) proof that the defendant committed the other crime must be clear and convincing; (2) the prior criminal conduct must not be too remote in time from the commission of the crime charged; (3) the prior criminal conduct must, in some cases, be similar to the offense charged; and (4) the prior criminal conduct must be introduced to prove an element of the charged offense that is a material issue in the case. See United States v. Herrera-Medina, 609 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 934, 100 S.Ct. 281, 62 L.Ed.2d 193 (1979). Once these prerequisites have been satisfied, the evidence is admissible for those purposes permitted by Rule 404(b) if the court determines that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. This balancing is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir.1981). 23 685 F.2d at 1109-10 (footnote omitted). The evidence of the Fuller-Banks Energy transaction was properly admitted as proof of the existence of the conspiracy charged, United States v. Bonanno, 467 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 964, 35 L.Ed.2d 271 (1973), and of a common plan or intent, United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir.1977). Each of the four prerequisites stated in Bailleaux, supra, were met. The probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 1000 (9th Cir.1983). 24 Hill and MMI argue, however, that the trial court, sua sponte, should have given a limiting instruction, even though, as they concede, they did not request one. This argument is meritless. It is well-settled that where no limiting instruction is requested concerning evidence of other criminal acts, the failure of the trial court to give such an instruction sua sponte is not reversible error. United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 709 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3543, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392 (1983); United States v. Aims Back, 588 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.1979). 25 Monforton argues that the admission of the evidence without a cautionary or limiting instruction in his case was reversible error because he not only requested such an instruction but proposed one. 3 Again, we do not agree. We approve the giving of a proper limiting instruction in circumstances such as these, in which the evidence may be considered by the jury only as it relates to the existence of the conspiracy or the intent or common plan of the defendants. Cf. United States v. Miller, 725 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir.1984). We decline to hold, however, that the trial court's refusal to give an instruction, such as the one proposed, which is manifestly intended to present the defendant's construction of the evidence as opposed to the government's, is an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hall, 552 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir.1977).
26 At the beginning of the government's rebuttal argument to the jury, the prosecutor made a statement that the government conceded at oral argument to have been improper. 4 Counsel for Hill and MMI immediately objected and the trial court directed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks. In response to a request from counsel for Monforton, the trial court gave a further cautionary instruction concerning the grand jury. 27 All defendants contend that the statement was improper and warrants reversal of their convictions, arguing that improper prosecutorial references to the grand jury warrant reversal and a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Cummings, 468 F.2d 274, 278 (9th Cir.1972). Although we do not condone the comments of the prosecutor, the admonition and the instruction of the trial court was sufficient to remove any prejudicial impact. See United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 889-90 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 820 (1975); United States v. Sutton, 446 F.2d 916, 922 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025, 92 S.Ct. 699, 30 L.Ed.2d 675 (1972). Accordingly, we hold that the comments of the prosecutor do not warrant reversal.