Opinion ID: 1690567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Severance of the Theft Count from the Remaining Counts.

Text: In Geier's second asserted error, he argues that the district court erred in failing to sever the two theft counts from the remaining charges, all of which related to the assault on T.M. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(1) is the relevant court rule: MULTIPLE OFFENSES. Two or more public offenses which arose from the same transaction or occurrence or from two or more transactions or occurrences constituting parts of a common scheme or plan may be alleged and prosecuted as separate counts in a single complaint, information or indictment, unless, for good cause shown, the trial court in its discretion determines otherwise. Geier's complaint arises out of his pretrial motion for severance alleging that joinder of the charges against him would produce substantial prejudice and deny him a fair trial before a single jury. The district court ruled that it would be burdensome upon the judiciary to sever the five charges in this matter all arising as a charge against one defendant and apparently arising out of one event and therefore denied the motion to sever. Before presentation of evidence, Geier waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to trial before the bench. We review this issue on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Bair, 362 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Iowa 1985). Geier's argument is one of negative implication: since rule 6(1) permits the joinder of counts where they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or are part of a common scheme or plan, the rule prohibits joinder where the offenses are neither part of a common scheme nor part of the same transaction or occurrence. As an initial matter, we note that the counts involving the assault on T.M. and the counts involving the theft of the boat motors did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as those terms are used in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(1). Bair, 362 N.W.2d at 512 (same transaction or occurrence necessitates unity of time, place, and circumstances resulting in situation wherein the facts of each charge can be explained adequately only by drawing upon the facts of the other charge). Similarly, the theft counts and the assault counts cannot be said to constitute part of a common scheme or plan. State v. Wright, 191 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 1971) (noting that a common scheme or plan requires some connection between the crimes aside from the fact they are similar and committed by the same person). As a general rule, when the counts neither arise out of the same transaction or occurrence nor are part of a common scheme or plan, separate trials would be called for under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(1). However, in a benchtrial case, as here, there is less likelihood that a failure to sever has prejudiced the defendant than in a trial to a jury. By virtue of training and experience, the court is better able to compartmentalize the evidence regarding the various charges and guard against the prejudice a severance seeks to prevent. Consistent with the concerns of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(1), a trial of multiple charges must strike the proper balance between the antipodal themes of ensuring defendant a fair trial and preserving judicial efficiency. Cf. State v. Brown, 397 N.W.2d 689, 695-96 (Iowa 1986) (accused challenging denial of motion to sever defendants must show that jury could not compartmentalize evidence). Geier first argues that he was deterred from testifying on the assault charge because the charge of theft involved a crime of truth and veracity. He claims that combining the charges substantially diminished his credibility and prejudiced his defense to the assault charge to the point that he dared not testify. We find this unsupported contention to be wholly without merit. We accept the State's suggestion as more plausible: that Geier wished to avoid being impeached by the introduction of his voluminous prior theft convictions. Geier's assertion of prejudice is without support. In a similar argument, Geier maintains that he was prejudiced in his defense against the theft charges by the joinder of evidence relating to the assault on T.M. His claim here is that the election not to testify regarding the assault prevented him from explaining why he was in possession of the motors he was charged with stealing. Cf. State v. Knapp, 426 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Iowa App.1988) (knowledge of stolen character of property may be inferred from defendant's unexplained possession of recently stolen items). This linkage of charges thus prevented his defense to the theft charge and denied him a fair trial. We believe that the prejudice, if any, that defendant claims as a result of his not testifying came from his decision, which was made for reasons of his own, independent of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(1) on multiple offenses. Geier elected not to testify, as was his right. Had he testified, the State would have been entitled to impeach his testimony with his numerous prior convictions involving truth or veracity. Iowa R.Evid. 609(a). We conclude that Geier made this choice because of his prior convictions rather than as a consequence of any purported prejudice from trying the various counts jointly. Cf. State v. Davis, 328 N.W.2d 301, 304-07 (Iowa 1982) (defendant, who did not actually testify, may not raise claim of prejudice arising from a decision not to testify purportedly based on fear that State would then use inadmissible testimony to impeach); Knapp, 426 N.W.2d at 173-74. Geier's further complaint on this point is that the mere fact of including the evidence of assault prejudiced his defense to the theft charge because of its indication of bad character. However, there is nothing here but a bare suggestion of prejudice that might occur from a court's failure to compartmentalize the various counts. We find no proof to support this allegation and deem it meritless. Having found no substantiation for Geier's claims of prejudice, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to sever the theft counts from the remaining counts. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.