Opinion ID: 1909892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: brady [5] claim

Text: In his first issue, Duest asserts that the testimony in the new penalty phase by medical examiner Dr. Ronald Wright as to the manner of the victim's death constitutes material, exculpatory evidence unlawfully withheld by the State. In his 1983 testimony at deposition and trial in this case, Dr. Wright testified that the victim was initially attacked both on his bed and in the bathroom, and died soon after a final blow in the bathroom, and that death would have occurred from ten to fifteen seconds to no more than five minutes after the stab wound to the right side of the heart. After reviewing the evidence, including crime-scene photographs, Dr. Wright testified in the 1998 penalty phase that the evidence showed that the stab wounds were inflicted only in the bedroom and that the victim then made his way to the bathroom, where he collapsed and died. Dr. Wright also testified in the new penalty phase that the victim was alive and conscious for fifteen minutes or longer after the attack and might not have died from his injuries had he promptly telephoned for emergency medical help. Duest claims that this change in testimony shows that the assailant left the victim alive and therefore calls into question the intent to kill, requiring a new trial on his guilt of first-degree murder. We conclude that Duest's challenge to the murder conviction, which became final in 1985, is not properly before this Court in an appeal from the reimposition of a death sentence after the previous death sentence was vacated. Duest did not object to the testimony below, instead impeaching Dr. Wright on his change in testimony from 1983 to 1998. Nor has Duest filed a motion for postconviction relief asserting that the change in testimony constitutes either undisclosed exculpatory evidence or newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial. [6] The absence of a pending motion for postconviction relief distinguishes this case from Way v. State, 630 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993), in which this Court reversed the summary denial of a motion for postconviction relief raising a Brady claim and withheld ruling on the direct appeal from resentencing pending disposition of the postconviction motion. Id. at 179. In recognition of Duest's efforts to raise this issue during the direct appeal, our affirmance is without prejudice to Duest raising the issue in the trial court via Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 after this appeal.