Opinion ID: 5438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law Before the 1984 Act

Text: The well-established general principle is that a jury has no concern with the consequences of its verdict. As the Supreme Court stated succinctly in Rogers v. United States, the jury [has] no sentencing function and should reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed. 422 U.S. 35, 40, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2095, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). This Circuit has long recognized that punishment and sentencing are matters entrusted exclusively to the trial judge. We have held specifically that juries should not only by reason of insanity, it is required that the Court commit the defendant, or (2) [Y]ou should know that it is required that the Court commit defendant to a suitable hospital facility until such time as the defendant does not pose a substantial risk of bodily injury to another or serious danger to the property of another. The trial judge rejected both versions. 5 ordinarily be informed about the consequences of an NGI verdict. See United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 423 (5th Cir. 1974)(Except where a special provision mandates a jury role in assessment or determination of penalty, the punishment provided by law for offenses charged is a matter exclusively for the court and should not be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict as to guilt or innocence.). McCracken, a pre-IDRA case, posed an issue similar to the one we face today. We reversed the defendant's murder conviction because the trial court instructed the jury that if it returned an NGI verdict, the defendant would be freed. The jury charge embodied a then-accurate statement of the law; no federal statutory scheme yet provided for the disposition of defendants acquitted due to insanity. We recognized, however, that the court's instruction possibly served to coerce or induce a guilty verdict since jurors at that time were assumed to be fearful of those with mental illness and might convict insane defendants based upon a perceived need to protect society rather than face the risks resulting from their immediate release onto the streets. We lamented that the absence of federal commitment procedures led to heavy reliance upon state authorities to institute commitment proceedings against those acquitted by reason of insanity. We labelled such dependence one of the the harsh effects of the federal statutory silence. 6 In the McCracken opinion, we noted the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957)(en banc), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct. 997, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1958). In Lyles, a divided court held that a jury should be informed that such an NGI verdict would result in defendant's involuntary commitment. But a key feature distinguished Lyles. The case arose under the D.C. Code, which Congress had amended to provide for mandatory commitment of a defendant who asserted a successful insanity defense.4 Despite our apparent appreciation for such a statute, we noted that the absence of comparable federal legislation made the D.C. Circuit's approach inapposite for other circuits. McCracken, 488 F.2d at 422. We therefore concluded in McCracken that, absent an explicit statutory directive mandating an enhanced jury role, it was inappropriate for jurors to consider possible post-trial punishments. Id. at 423. McCracken was a natural descendant of our earlier decision in Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941, 85 S.Ct. 1776, 14 L.Ed.2d 704 (1965). In Pope, we affirmed the trial court's refusal to inform the jury about what would occur if they found Pope not guilty only by reason of insanity. There too, we expressly rejected the Lyles approach, holding that [d]ifferent rules and different statutes apply to the Courts of the District of Columbia. Id. at 509. Emphasizing our 4 The Code provision did not by its own terms mandate the giving of such an instruction. See Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728-29. 7 long-standing focus on the unique duties of judges and juries, we said: Unless otherwise provided by statute, it is the duty of the court to impose sentence, or make such other disposition of the case as required by law, after the facts have been decided by the jury. To inform the jury that the court may impose minimum or maximum sentence, will or will not grant probation, when a defendant will be eligible for a parole, or other matters relating to disposition of the defendant, tend to draw the attention of the jury away from their chief function as sole judges of the facts, open the door to compromise verdicts and to confuse the issue or issues to be decided. In a case of this nature what they were to decide was whether the defendant was guilty or not. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).