Opinion ID: 2215876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Weapons Penalty Enhancer

Text: Finally, Avila asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court erred in instructing the jury on sec. 939.63(1)(a), Stats., which establishes an enhanced penalty for a person who commits a crime while possessing a dangerous weapon. That statute provides: If a person commits a crime while possessing, using or threatening to use a dangerous weapon, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased ... [the statute proceeds to set increased penalties which vary according to the penalty for the predicate offense]. Specifically, Avila contends that under this court's recent decision in Peete, 185 Wis.2d at 9, the court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the State must prove the existence of a nexus between the crime and the weapon. That is, that the State must prove that the defendant possessed the weapon to facilitate commission of the predicate offense. Id. We agree; Peete is directly on point with this case. In Peete, a defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver while armed under secs. 161.16(2)(b)1, 161.41(1m)(c)2, and 939.63(1)(a)3, Stats. Id. This court addressed two issues on review: (1) whether sec. 939.63 penalized both actual possession and constructive possession; and (2) whether the language in sec. 939.63, while possessing required the State to prove the existence of a nexus between the crime and the weapon. Id. As to the first issue, we concluded that the language in sec. 939.63, Stats., while possessing included both actual possession and constructive possession. We reasoned that such an interpretation was consistent with prior interpretations of the term possession in Wisconsin criminal statutes. Id. As to the second issue, we concluded that the language in sec. 939.63, Stats., required the State to prove a nexus between the crime and the offense. Id. at 18. We stated that the enhanced penalty could not be imposed unless the State proved the existence of the nexus beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, we added: A circuit court must instruct the jury on the definition of possession; on the nexus requirement, that the defendant possessed the weapon to facilitate the predicate crime; and on the definition of dangerous weapon. The enhanced penalty can only be imposed when the state proves the existence of each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 21. Because the circuit court in Peete had not instructed the jury properly, and thus, the State did not prove the elements of the weapons enhancer beyond a reasonable doubt, we reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the cause to the circuit court with directions to enter a judgment of conviction against Peete solely on possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. We further directed the circuit court to conduct a new trial on the issue of whether the defendant was guilty of committing the predicate offense while possessing a dangerous weapon. Finally, we directed the circuit court to vacate defendant's sentence and resentence him after a new trial. Id. at 23. [13] This case mirrors Peete. Avila was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver while possessing a dangerous weapon. The circuit court did not instruct the jury on the nexus requirement nor on the other elements set forth in Peete, and the State did not prove the elements of the weapons penalty enhancer beyond a reasonable doubt. Consistent with Peete, we reverse Avila's judgment of conviction on possession with intent to deliver while possessing a dangerous weapon, and direct the court to enter a judgment of conviction solely on possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Further, Avila is entitled to a new trial on the issue of whether he was guilty of possession with intent to deliver while possessing a dangerous weapon. Finally, Avila's sentence with respect to the possession of cocaine with intent to deliver while armed should be vacated and Avila should be resentenced solely on the charge of possession with intent to deliver. In the event that he is retried, the court should vacate the sentence and resentence him after the new trial. As we stated in Peete, [sec]. 939.63 provides an enhancement to the penalty for the predicate offense and thus a circuit court sets one sentence for a defendant convicted of committing a predicate offense while possessing a dangerous weapon. The circuit court cannot sentence [defendant] on his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver until a jury makes the additional determination of whether [defendant] is guilty of the conduct prohibited by sec. 939.63. Id. at 23-24. [Footnotes omitted.] [14,15] The State argues that neither a new trial nor resentencing are necessary here. It contends that because the circuit court did not sentence Avila beyond the maximum for the predicate offense, the weapons penalty enhancer was not utilized. Therefore, the court's error in instructing the jury on the enhancer was harmless. The State directs us to State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 617, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984), and State v. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 660, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984). The court in Harris and Farr, in the context of the repeater penalty enhancement statute, sec. 939.62, Stats., determined that the repeater statute does not apply until and unless the maximum sentence is imposed for the crime which the defendant was convicted. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 617; Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 660. The court in Harris stated that being a repeater is not a crimeit is a status.... Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 618. It went on in Farr to add: [t]he only consequence of the state proving the defendant to be a repeater is that the defendant is subjected to the possibility of a sentence longer than the maximum one provided by law for the offense for which the defendant is convicted. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 661. The State's reliance on Harris and Farr is misplaced. Peete makes clear that the weapons penalty enhancer is an element of the predicate offense, and as such, the State must prove the elements of the enhancer beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of the length of the sentence imposed. Id. at 24 n.11. When a jury does not make a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on an element of the crime, a court cannot conclude that a deficient jury instruction with regard to that element is harmless error. There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993). Accordingly, the State's argument is without merit. By the Court. The order of the circuit court is affirmed and the judgment of conviction is reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The following memorandum was filed July 31, 1995.