Opinion ID: 793019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Last Arrival in the United States

Text: 22 As we have noted, section 208(a)(2)(B) of the INA requires asylum applications to be filed within 1 year after the date of the alien's arrival in the United States, and 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii) provides that [t]he 1-year period shall be calculated from the date of the alien's last arrival in the United States or April 1, 1997, whichever is later. Porras's asylum application was undisputedly filed within one year of his return from his parole to Costa Rica on January 27, 2000, so the timeliness issue turns on whether that date should be considered Porras's last arrival in the United States for purposes of section 208(a)(2)(B). 23 Porras contends that the IJ's decision contradicts the plain language of the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii), to which we must give effect when, as here, it is not `arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778). As we have discussed, the IJ stated, notwithstanding the regulation's provision that [t]he 1-year period shall be calculated from the date of the alien's last arrival in the United States, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii), that Porras's eligibility for Asylum should be determined not from the date of his last arrival to the United States on January 27, 2000. Oral Decision at 6 (emphasis added). In light of the fact that the IJ, even in the course of denying Porras's application as untimely, apparently assumed that January 27, 2000, was the date of Porras's last arrival in the United States, Porras's plain-language argument seems plausible. 24 Upon analysis, however, we conclude that the term last arrival in the United States should not be read to include an alien's return to the United States after a brief trip abroad pursuant to a parole explicitly permitted by United States immigration authorities. Although the use of the word last seems to imply that there can be more than one arrival, it is anything but self-evident that the phrase arrival in the United States refers to any and all border crossings into the country. Indeed, while counsel has not referred us to a case interpreting the term in the context of the regulation at issue here, and we have discovered no such authority ourselves, in other contexts last arrival [in] the United States has been taken to exclude returns from temporary departures from the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4)(iii) (under the Act of November 2, 1966 providing for the adjustment of status of certain Cuban nationals, [i]f an applicant . . . departs from the United States temporarily with no intention of abandoning his or her residence, and is readmitted or paroled upon return, the temporary absence shall be disregarded for purposes of the applicant's `last arrival' into the United States.); Matter of Baez-Ayala, 13 I. & N. Dec. 79, 82-83, Interim Decision No.1925, (BIA 1968) ([A] subsequent arrival after a temporary absence from the United States with no intention to abandon residence in the United States does not constitute the `last arrival' within the contemplation of section 1 of the Act [of November 2, 1966].); cf. Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 986 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004) (The Notice to Appear gives the date of Lagandaon's last arrival in the United States as July 31, 1988. The parties agree, however, and the Board of Immigration Appeals found, that Lagandaon was absent from the United States in 1988 for only twenty days. An absence of that length does not interrupt a period of presence for purposes of cancellation of removal eligibility.). 3 Conversely, we are aware of no authority supporting the notion that a return from a short absence abroad constitutes an arrival in the United States for these or similar purposes. Thus, read in the context of other immigration statutes and decisions, the IJ's conclusion when applying the statute was reasonable, despite the fact that he seemed to disregard the words of the applicable regulation. 25 Moreover, the IJ's conclusion best accords with the purpose of the statute as a whole. The one-year deadline was added to the INA as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, which, among other things, restricted the circumstances in which asylum could be granted. As is manifest in the IIRIRA and its legislative history, Congress was concerned that [t]he asylum system has been abused by those who seek to use it as a means of `backdoor' immigration. H.R.Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 107 (1996); see also S.Rep. No. 104-249, at 3 (1996) (stating that a purpose of the bill was to address the abuse of humanitarian provisions such as asylum). Congress intended the one-year deadline to prevent persons who had resided in the United States for an extended period of time from applying for asylum as an afterthought, after overstaying their visas or failing to obtain citizenship through another means. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 116 (expressing concerns about asylum applications from visa overstayers, many of whom, in the House Committee's view, filed for asylum as a means of remaining in the United States indefinitely); id. at 139 (noting with disapproval that, prior to the Act, aliens were able to file an asylum application regardless of how long they have resided in the United States) (emphasis added). Permitting applicants to reset the asylum clock by taking a short excursion abroad would undermine the one-year deadline's clear purpose of focusing the asylum process on those who have recently fled persecution in their home countries.