Opinion ID: 1057699
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: The defendants, Norfolk and Mr. Worley, moved for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Mrs. Martin was at least fifty percent at fault as a matter of law. The defendants’ motion includes several factual assertions. First, the defendants assert that Mrs. Martin had ample visibility from her initial stopped position and would have seen the train had she merely looked. To support this claim, the defendants submitted photographs that show the visibility from various locations at the crossing. Second, the defendants contend that Mrs. Martin’s vehicle moved from its initial position and stopped a second time near the storage track. The defendants refer to the testimony of Conductor Martin to support this assertion. Third, the defendants assert that from the position of her second stop, Mrs. Martin had a better opportunity to see the train and had more than enough time to safely maneuver her vehicle once the train became visible. In support of these assertions, the defendants offered the deposition testimony of their expert witness, Charles Manning. Mr. Manning testified that within fifteen to twenty feet of the mainline track a motorist would have 900 to 1000 feet of visibility. Mr. Manning further testified that under these circumstances nine to ten seconds would be sufficient for a person to see a train, react, and bring a vehicle to a stop in time to avoid a collision. Conductor Martin also testified that a motorist could see a substantial distance from the storage track. Finally, the defendants claim that Mr. Worley repeatedly blew the train’s whistle as the train approached the crossing and that Mrs. Martin had an opportunity to hear the train had she merely listened for it. In support of this assertion, the defendants offered the deposition testimony of Mr. Worley and the affidavits of two witnesses who stated that they heard a train whistle around the time of the collision. In light of these alleged facts, the defendants argue that no reasonable jury could conclude that Mrs. Martin acted reasonably or that she was any less than fifty percent at fault for the collision. 2. The Plaintiffs’ Response to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment In the plaintiffs’ response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs set forth their own factual assertions. First, the plaintiffs assert that Mrs. Martin initially stopped her vehicle 12.93 feet from the near rail of the storage track and 27 feet from the near rail of the mainline track. In support of this assertion, the plaintiffs submit the testimony and affidavit of their expert, Kenneth Heathington. Mr. Heathington based his calculation of Mrs. Martin’s stopping position on Conductor Martin’s testimony that he could see the front bumper and hood of Mrs. Martin’s truck when the train was approximately 400 feet from the crossing. Second, the plaintiffs assert that from this stopped position, vegetation would have limited Mrs. Martin’s ability to see more than 300 feet in the direction from which the train was approaching. This assertion is also based on the testimony and affidavit of Kenneth Heathington. -3- Third, the plaintiffs assert that when Mrs. Martin began to move forward from her stopped position she could not see the train because it was still over 300 feet away. This assertion is consistent with Conductor Martin’s testimony that the train was 400 feet away from the crossing when he first became aware of Mrs. Martin’s vehicle. Fourth, the plaintiffs assert that Mrs. Martin did not stop a second time but rather moved slowly and continuously across the crossing. In support of this assertion, the plaintiffs provide the deposition testimony of an eyewitness, Cecil Smith. According to Mr. Smith, Mrs. Martin’s vehicle was “creeping” across the railroad crossing prior to the collision. The plaintiffs also rely on Conductor Martin’s initial written statement in which he checked a box indicating that Mrs. Martin had “Stopped, then Proceeded” rather than checking a box designated “Other” and describing Mrs. Martin’s second stop. Fifth, the plaintiffs claim that once Mrs. Martin began to move forward from her initial stopped position she had insufficient time to perceive the train and bring her vehicle to a stop short of the mainline tracks. These allegations are also supported by the testimony and affidavit of Kenneth Heathington. Finally, the plaintiffs claim that Mr. Worley did not sound the train’s whistle as the train approached the crossing. In support of this assertion, the plaintiffs submit Mr. Smith’s testimony that he was in a position to hear a whistle but did not hear it. The plaintiffs argue that these factual assertions demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact and therefore the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been denied. 3. The Rulings of the Trial Court and Court of Appeals In its ruling, the trial court emphasized that Mrs. Martin could see at least 300 feet from her stopped position and that she was familiar with the crossing. Specifically, the trial court stated, “Had she remained stopped, had she looked and listened, there’s no question in my mind, and in my opinion no question in any reasonable mind that she could have seen the train.” The trial court determined that no reasonable jury could conclude that Mrs. Martin was less than fifty percent at fault for the collision. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In a divided decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The majority concluded that the dispute concerning whether Mr. Worley sounded the train’s whistle was immaterial because the trial court’s judgment was based on the determination that Mrs. Martin failed to look for the train. Furthermore, the majority concluded that “the undisputed facts establish that the train was plainly visible and in hazardous proximity to the crossing when decedent proceeded to cross the railroad track” and that Mrs. Martin “could have easily seen the train had she looked.” In his dissenting opinion, Judge Susano argued that there were several genuine issues of material fact and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. We granted review to provide further guidance regarding the application of summary judgment in this State. -4-