Opinion ID: 1343594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Role of Foster Parents at Termination Proceeding

Text: The Stems argue that they were denied the right to meaningful participation at the termination hearing. Their counsel was permitted to be present, but was not permitted to present or cross-examine witnesses. [21] This Court recognized in syllabus point one of Bowens that [i]f a party has lawful physical custody of a child, she has the right to service of process and to be heard in any proceeding that concerns the child. 174 W.Va. at 184-85, 324 S.E.2d at 145. We further held that [i]f a party having lawful physical custody of a child is not served with process of a proceeding concerning that child she has the right to intervene in that proceeding. Id. In that case, we determined that an individual who had been granted physical custody of the children by written agreement of the natural mother prior to the initiation of abuse and neglect proceedings was entitled to notice of the proceedings pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-6-2(c) and was wrongly denied the right to intervene in the abuse proceedings. In deciding Bowens, the Court first looked to the definition of custodian found in West Virginia Code § 49-1-5(5) (1981) [22] which provides that `[c]ustodian' means a person who has or shares actual physical possession or care and custody of a child, regardless of whether such person has been granted custody of the child by any contract, agreement or legal proceedings[.] This Court then examined the language of West Virginia Code § 49-6-2(c) (1984), [23] which stated that [i]n any proceeding under this article, the party or parties having custody of the child shall be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, including the opportunity to testify and to present and cross-examine witnesses. In denying the Stems' motion for relief, the circuit court reasoned that the involvement of DHHR, as Jonathan G.'s custodian, precluded the applicability of the Bowens ruling. While DHHR was clearly the legal custodian of Jonathan G.; however, it was not his physical custodian. Thus, the circuit court's attempt to distinguish Bowens from the present case on that basis does not survive scrutiny under the statutory definition of custodian. See W. Va.Code § 49-1-5(5). Bowens, however, was decided in the factual context of an individual who was a lawful custodian prior to the initiation of abuse and neglect proceedings, which clearly is the type of custodian contemplated by the provisions of West Virginia Code § 49-6-2(c). The more difficult issue that we face here is whether foster parents enjoy the statutory rights of notice and participation extended by West Virginia Code § 49-6-2(c) when their status as a child's custodian results from the filing of abuse and neglect charges and exists subject to and under the auspices of the DHHR's role as the child's legal custodian. An examination of the law of other jurisdictions is helpful. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota determined in In re Welfare of C.J., 481 N.W.2d 861 (Minn.App.1992), that because the statutory definition of custodian [24] included foster parents, the foster parents involved in that case were permitted to intervene under Minnesota's statutory language which parallels that of West Virginia Code § 49-6-2(c). [25] 481 N.W.2d at 862-63. The Minnesota court expressly rejected the argument that the foster parents are merely agents for the county and therefore cannot intervene as of right. The court held: The intervention statute, however, does not require a party have legal custody; instead the party must only be a lawful custodian. Here the foster parents fall under the definition of custodian and therefore they have the right to participate in the termination proceedings. Id. at 863. Like the Minnesota court, we conclude that the absence of a statutory provision requiring that only legal custodians have a right to participate in termination proceedings negates the argument that DHHR's involvement, as the child's legal custodian, is all that is authorized by West Virginia Code § 49-6-2(c). Numerous tribunals have permitted foster parents to intervene and participate in at least part of the termination proceedings, depending on applicable statutory provisions. See Custody of a Minor, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 290, 432 N.E.2d 546, 554 (1982) (finding no error in trial court's decision to permit foster parent involvement in termination proceedings despite lack of constitutional right to such participation); In re Kimberly J., 191 A.D.2d 984, 595 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1993) (holding that foster parents had no statutory right to intervene in factfinding stage of termination proceedings, but did have right to intervene in dispositional phase of proceeding given custody nature of proceeding); In re Baby Boy Scearce, 81 N.C.App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, 410 (1986) (discussing statutory right of foster parents to participate in review proceedings concerning child's placement after termination of parental rights and noting [a]t the very least, foster parents have the right for an opportunity to be heard, a right which derives from the child's right to have his or her best interests protected); see also Berhow v. Crow, 423 So.2d 371 (Fla.Dist.Ct. 1982) (finding that foster parents had liberty interest arising from relationship with child that entitled them to notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard in adoption proceedings). Many of those courts that permit foster parents to participate in termination proceedings recognize a need to limit the scope of their involvement in such proceedings. In In re D-L-C., 834 S.W.2d 760 (Mo.Ct.App. 1992), the appellate court held that the foster parents' participation in everything but name in a parental rights termination proceeding was reversible error. [26] Id. at 768. Rather than relying on language within a termination statute as grounds for participation, however, the foster parents in D-L-C. looked to the provisions of a foster parent statute which permitted them to present evidence for the consideration of the court. [27] 834 S.W.2d at 767 (quoting 1985 Mo. Laws § 211.464). In castigating the full-blown participation of the foster parents in the termination proceeding, the Missouri appellate court cited the United States Supreme Court's observation in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), that: `However substantial the foster parents' interests may be, they are not implicated directly in the factfinding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding against the natural parents.' 834 S.W.2d at 767 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761, 102 S.Ct. at 1399 and citation omitted). In the instant case, it is difficult not to be sympathetic to the Stems' effort to participate, not only because they had Jonathan G. with them for so long, providing him with love, constancy, and care in his earliest years; but also because the significant issues relating to a child's life and fate must not be decided in some artificial procedural vacuum, and the Stems, after the passage of so much time, probably were more knowledgeable than anyone as to this child's needs. What makes balancing their right to participate, and the extent of such participation, against the natural rights of the biological parents, as well as the statutory objective of reunifying Jonathan G. with them, so difficult is that both sets of parents, foster and biological, obviously loved and wanted this child. As a result of this love, and their strong commitment to this child, the two sets of parents became adversaries during these proceedings. As an aside, we must comment that scenarios such as the one before us would discourage most people from ever embarking on the noble work of foster care. Since the Stems were a constant in Jonathan G.'s life for such a long period of time and during his formative years, it would seem to go against not only all principles of fairness and equity, but also against all values of human relationship and compassion to deny them the right to be heard as to Jonathan G.'s best interests during these proceedings. While we recognize that the statutory language of West Virginia Code § 49-6-2(c), when viewed in conjunction with the Bowens case, certainly appears to afford foster parents a right to participate in abuse and neglect proceedings, we believe sound public policy and the overall purposes of both statutory and case law regarding abuse and neglect proceedings dictate that such participation have its limits. Perhaps the healthiest balance we can achieve is to hold that the foster parents' involvement in abuse and neglect proceedings should be separate and distinct from the fact-finding portion of the termination proceeding and should be structured for the purpose of providing the circuit court with all pertinent information regarding the child. The level and type of participation in such cases is left to the sound discretion of the circuit court with due consideration of the length of time the child has been cared for by the foster parents and the relationship that has developed. To the extent that this holding is inconsistent with Bowens v. Maynard, 174 W.Va. 184, 324 S.E.2d 145 (1984), that decision is hereby modified. When foster parents are involved in these proceedings, however, the circuit court must assure that the proceeding does not evolve into a comparison of the relative fitness of the foster parents versus the biological parents. [28] See In re Trapp, 593 S.W.2d 193, 205-06 (Mo.1980), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 967, 102 S.Ct. 2226, 72 L.Ed.2d 840 (1982) (overruling trial court's granting of foster parents' motion to intervene in neglect proceedings, noting that foster parents' presence would interject the false issue of the fitness of the foster parents to have custody of the children and observing that children cannot be removed from their parents on grounds that they would be better off in another home). We do not reverse the circuit court on this issue of denial of meaningful participation, but direct that on remand the Stems should be given a full opportunity to be heard concerning Jonathan G.'s interests and their desire to have a continued relationship with him.