Opinion ID: 2575790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 3: Did the district court err in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification testimony?

Text: Kirtdoll asserts that the district court erred in giving a jury instruction on eyewitness identification testimony based upon PIK Crim. 3d 52.20. The State again responds with a multitude of reasons why his position has no merit. We again need only address a few of them. The district court gave the following cautionary instruction: The law places the burden upon the State to identify the defendant. The law does not require the defendant to prove he has been wrongly identified. In weighing the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony, you first should determine whether any of the following factors existed, and, if so, the extent to which they would affect accuracy of identification by an eyewitness. Factors you may consider are: 1. The opportunity the witness had to observe. This includes any physical condition which could affect the ability of the witness to observe, the length of the time of observation, and any limitations on observation like an obstruction or poor lighting; 2. The emotional state of the witness at the time including that which might be caused by the use of a weapon or a threat of violence; 3. Whether the witness had observed the defendant on earlier occasions; 4. Whether a significant amount of time elapsed between the crime charged and any later identification; 5. Whether the witness ever failed to identify the defendant or made any inconsistent identification; 6. The degree of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of any identification of the accused; and 7. Whether there are any other circumstances that may have affected the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Kirtdoll did not object to the instruction at trial. Accordingly, our standard of review under such circumstances typically is to determine if the instruction was clearly erroneous. See K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 22-3414(3); State v. Boone, 277 Kan. 208, 220, 83 P.3d 195 (2004). Here, however, Kirtdoll not only failed to object, but he also championed the use of the instruction over the State's objection as demonstrated by the following colloquy: [The Court] Next, the law places the burden upon the State to identify the defendant; number 8. MR. MCELHINNEY [The State]: Can we make objections at this point? THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. MCELHINNEY: I would object to the giving of this instruction. I think I made this objection before that at least in PIK and I believe in case law that the guidance is if the Court has some serious concerns about the identification of the eyewitnesses that we presented, pointed the finger at Mr. Kirtdoll have all indicated that they have known him. I think the shortest time period was seven years being Lakisha Brooks. Krystal Barber indicated that she used to date him, and we know that she has known him for some period of time. And Demetria Rucker indicated that she has known him since middle school. I don't believe that this instruction is warranted under the guidelines given by both the PIK committee and the Kansas Court of Appeals. MR. HUERTER [Defense counsel]: Judge, I think that if the only element of the factors and there are seven listed in the instruction, if the only one was number 3 that the witness had observed the defendant on earlier occasions that might have been an argument that holds water. But when you take a look at things about physical conditions, the length and time of the observation, the poor lighting, emotional state caused by use of weapons, significant amount of time between the crime and the later identification where we have a crime in February and one of his eyewitnesses gives an I.D. on Monday of this week eleven months later, this is clearly a warranted instruction. THE COURT: The Court would agree with that. The Court will keep instruction number 8. This instruction it will be labeled as number 8. (Emphasis added.) A litigant may not invite and lead a trial court into error and then complain of the trial court's action on appeal. State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 78, 82 P.3d 470 (2004). Based on defense counsel's argument  in response to the State's objection  that the instruction was warranted, Kirtdoll is barred from claiming the error on appeal. Moreover, as the State suggested at the instruction conference, no eyewitness cautionary instruction was warranted in this case because the eyewitnesses, Brooks, Rucker, and Barber, all had known Kirtdoll before the night of shooting. As we stated in State v. Calvin, 279 Kan. 193, 206, 105 P.3d 710 (2005): Where the witness personally knows the individual being identified, the cautionary eyewitness identification instruction is not necessary and the accuracy of the identification can be sufficiently challenged through cross-examination. See also State v. Franklin, 280 Kan. 337, 344-45, 121 P.3d 447 (2005); State v. Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 677-79, 56 P.3d 212 (2002). Although an eyewitness instruction is not necessary if the eyewitness personally knows the defendant, this court has not concluded that giving such an instruction in that situation is error. See Franklin, 280 Kan. at 345 (no error found where an instruction was given although not warranted by the facts).