Opinion ID: 1450420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issues presented on appellant's appeal

Text: A. The appellant's first contention is that the district court erred in relying upon the preliminary hearing transcript at the sentencing hearing as opposed to requiring the state to present the testimony of witnesses in open court. The record below discloses that the court at the aggravation-mitigation hearing initially offered the appellant an opportunity to change his plea of guilty, which was declined. The court then stated: The Court has set this time as a mitigation/aggravation hearing. I'm going to ask you, Mr. Blake [counsel for appellant], to go forward particularly with any statements, first, as to the presentence investigation, and then I'll hear any witnesses or statements you have in mitigation. The court in effect gave appellant the first opportunity to present any material facts or information he wished at that time in whatever form he wished. After argument by Mr. Blake, wherein no witnesses were called, the court proceeded to hear the state's presentation. Mr. Pincock stated for the prosecution: I have chosen, Your Honor, because I think we do have a  a good record of what transpired in the preliminary hearing, instead of calling witnesses today, to rely on the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, Your Honor. I think that there are a number of matters which the Court might address itself to in considering the sentencing, as far as aggravating circumstances are concerned. Mr. Pincock proceeded to quote at length from various parts of the preliminary hearing record and made arguments thereon. Mr. Blake then undertook on behalf of appellant to discuss the facts as presented by the preliminary hearing record and the presentence investigation report. The court allowed appellant to give a statement, and when the court inquired if there was anything further to be added, Mr. Blake gave a final statement. At no time did either the state or the defendant object to proceeding in this manner or present any witnesses for examination. Since appellant did not object to the use of the preliminary hearing record at the time, and in fact acquiesced in its use, we must initially determine whether the general rule that precludes our review of matters not objected to below [3] prohibits our consideration of this issue. We conclude that it does not. This general rule applicable to appellate review of error is not necessarily controlling where we are statutorily required to undertake appellate review irrespective of the defendant's contentions, if any. Death is clearly a different kind of punishment from any other that may may be imposed, and I.C. § 19-2827 mandates that we examine not only the sentence but the procedure followed in imposing that sentence regardless of whether an appeal is even taken. This indicates to us that we may not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the gravity of a sentence of death and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweighs any rationale that might be proposed to justify refusal to consider errors not objected to below. Other jurisdictions similarly do not allow technical appellate rules to preclude a comprehensive review of those cases where a sentence of death has been imposed. See e.g., State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174, 179-80 (1978); State v. Ceja, 115 Ariz. 413, 565 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1977); cert. den., 434 U.S. 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977); State v. Martin, 243 Iowa 1323, 55 N.W.2d 258, 260-261 (1952); Tuggle v. State, 73 Okl.Cr. 208, 119 P.2d 857, 859 (1941). We have previously recognized as much in this state by holding that fundamental error, even absent objection at trial will be reviewed on appeal. State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 714, 551 P.2d 1344, 1350 (1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 842, 97 S.Ct. 118, 50 L.Ed.2d 111 (1976); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). However, while it is the conclusion of this court that we may consider the issue, we hold that the use of the preliminary hearing transcript at the sentencing/aggravation mitigation hearing in this case was not in error. Facially, I.C. § 19-2516 provides: Inquiry into circumstances  Examination of Witnesses.  The circumstances must be presented by the testimony of witnesses examined in open court, except that when a witness is so sick or infirm as to be unable to attend, his deposition may be taken by a magistrate of the county, out of court, upon such notice to the adverse party as the court may direct. No affidavit or testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, can be offered to or received by the court, or a judge thereof, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, except as provided in this and the preceding section.  (Emphasis added) While this provision would seem to imply an absolute requirement of live testimony, pursuant to the last sentence therein, it must be read in light of the preceding section, I.C. § 19-2515. Subsection (c) thereof states: (c) In all cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, the court shall, after conviction, order a presentence investigation to be conducted according to such procedures as are prescribed by law and shall thereafter convene a sentencing hearing for the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense. At such hearing, the state and the defendant shall be entitled to present all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation. Should any party present aggravating or mitigating evidence which has not previously been disclosed to the opposing party or parties, the court shall, upon request, adjourn the hearing until the party desiring to do so has had a reasonable opportunity to respond to such evidence. Evidence admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing. Evidence offered at trial but not admitted may be repeated or amplified if necessary to complete the record. (Emphasis added) The section speaks of the entitlement of the parties to present whatever evidence they desire at the aggravation-mitigation hearing. The ultimate decision regarding the use to be made of that opportunity clearly rests with each party. But the precise question raised by appellant is whether the live testimony mandate of I.C. § 19-2516 displaces or excludes the discretion granted to the state on how to proceed at the hearing, i.e., whether the statute absolutely requires live testimony in open court at the aggravation-mitigation hearing. We decide that it does not. The last sentence of I.C. § 19-2516 makes it clear that we are to treat both sections as together setting forth the procedure to be followed in such hearings. The statute provides that evidence previously presented at trial need not be repeated and indeed may be amplified if desired. The parties are entitled to present all [other] relevant evidence they desire. The manifest intent is to place as much possible relevant information as can be provided before the sentencing court. This also serves to provide this court with as much information and as complete a record as possible for appellate review. While, admittedly, the section speaks of evidence from the prior trial, in light of the purpose of the statute, we see no need to read into the statute a requirement that other previously considered, relevant information from the preliminary hearing is to be excluded unless presented once again by live testimony. This is certainly true where the appellant also relied upon the information contained in the record of the preliminary hearing, as occurred here. [4] This court was presented in State v. Coutts, 101 Idaho 110, 609 P.2d 642 (1980), with a similar argument that the provisions of I.C. § 19-2516 were absolute. In that case, the defendant claimed that certain remarks of the prosecutor during the sentencing hearing were the equivalent of unsworn evidence in violation of the provisions of the statute. After noting a split in authority among jurisdictions as to the formality required at such hearings, this court stated: In order to maintain a viable system of sentencing hearings, under ordinary circumstances, such hearings normally need not be encumbered with all the procedural requirements which attend a resolution of the issue of guilt or innocence. The court therefore holds that in the absence of an explicit request for the formal hearing contemplated by I.C. § 19-2516, the court may reach its sentencing decision by receiving the unsworn formal statements presented by both sides, together with the presentence report and arguments of the respective counsel. In this proceeding appellant did not present any request to the trial court for a formal hearing as required by I.C. § 19-2516 but participated without objection in the more informal type of hearing conducted by the sentencing judge. After the complained of statements were made by the prosecutor, appellant's counsel responded responded to these statements advising the court that the appellant would deny them, and continued by arguing that the court should consider appellant's age. (Emphasis in original) 609 P.2d at 645. While the question there, the unsworn statements or argument of counsel, and that here, the use of preliminary hearing testimony, are not identical, we find the analogy persuasive. Where the defendant expressly or impliedly agrees to dispense with the formality possible under the statute, i.e., the presentation of all statements orally and under oath, and instead allows presentation of facts through prior evidence, presentence reports, argument of counsel, and the like, we find no prima facie error due to such use. We recognize that cases where the death penalty may be imposed are not under ordinary circumstances. Indeed, our strong belief is that the procedural requirements provided for by the legislature should be followed with care, especially since doing so assures this court of an opportunity to make a meaningful appellate review. Yet we here are faced with a situation where unreasoning adherence to the formal requirements would not materially add to the achievement of statutory objectives. We find no error in the court's consideration of the preliminary hearing record along with the other information before it. B. Next, we consider appellant's argument that he was denied due process since the state did not formally notify him that it was seeking the death penalty or forewarn him as to which aggravating circumstances it would seek to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing hearing. While it is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977), the due process/notice requirements at sentencing are not necessarily the same as those at trial. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-252, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084-1085, 93 L.Ed. 1337, 1343-1344 (1949), reh. den. 337 U.S. 961, 69 S.Ct. 1529, 93 L.Ed. 1760 (1949). In the present case, under I.C. §§ 18-4004, 19-2513 and 19-2513A, upon pleading guilty to a charge of first degree murder appellant was informed that he could be sentenced to death, or to a determinate or indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment. Not only does the statute so notify, but the record reflects that the court below made the sentencing possibilities abundantly clear to appellant more than once during the proceedings. Indeed, the possibility of capital punishment was noted at each point in the proceedings where the plea of appellant was discussed. Whether the state would urge the maximum penalty or not was immaterial to the question of adequate notice to appellant that it was possible. We find no error in this regard. In Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980) cert. den. 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 254, 66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980), the court dismissed the defendant's contention that the sentencing procedure was unconstitutional in that no notice was given as to the aggravating circumstances upon which the death penalty was sought. The Utah court held: It is to be noted that U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-202 specifically sets forth eight aggravating circumstances, one or more of which must be alleged, proved, and found by the fact finder. Hence, one charged with a capital felony is put on notice and is made aware of what the State must prove and thus able to prepare his defense. 607 P.2d at 822. However, in State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336 (La. 1979), the court stated: [A] defendant is entitled in a capital sentencing proceeding, no less than in the guilt or innocence trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, LSA-Const. art. 1, § 13 (1974), and to his Fifth Amendment right to `[n]otice... given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and [setting] forth the alleged misconduct with particularly.' In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1446, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 459 [sic] (1967). Thus, the defendant is entitled to know the aggravating circumstances which the prosecution will seek to prove sufficiently in advance of court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded. 379 So.2d at 1356. However, the court in Sonnier then held that the defendant lacked standing to contest the issue because he had not alleged either that he was not so informed or that he had made any attempt to obtain the information. We agree with the position taken by the Utah Supreme Court in Andrews v. Morris, supra . The statute clearly sets forth that one of the listed aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and must outweigh any mitigating circumstances shown, prior to imposition of death. Generally, it is apparent that there will be no surprise under the facts of any given case as to what potential aggravating circumstances are involved. Both defense counsel and prosecution who have participated in the earlier preliminary hearing and trial will ordinarily be well appraised and conversant with the facts and issues involved in the aggravation-mitigation hearing. We additionally note that the statute, in I.C. § 19-2515(c), provides that should any party present evidence not previously disclosed, the court upon request shall adjourn the hearing until the opponent has had a reasonable opportunity to respond. Here, the district court expressly informed counsel to disclose the evidence and arguments to be relied upon at the hearing, and the state did so inform the appellant. Such protections are sufficient and we will not attach thereto a superfluous judicial requirement that the state formally notify a defendant of the particular aggravating circumstance upon which it will rely. C. The next question before us is whether the trial court erred in failing to set forth the mitigating factors it considered. I.C. § 19-2515(d) states: (d) Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments in mitigation and aggravation the court shall make written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found. Further, the court shall set forth in writing any mitigating factors considered and, if the court finds that mitigating circumstances outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstance found so as to make unjust the imposition of the death penalty, the court shall detail in writing its reasons for so finding. (Emphasis added) As noted previously, the district court stated in its memorandum opinion that it had searched all the information before it hoping sincerely to find circumstances in mitigation which would overcome the circumstances of aggravation  however, such mitigating circumstances do not exist. (Emphasis added.) The court also made the finding of fact: The Court further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances which outweigh the gravity of aggravating circumstances and which would make imposition of the death penalty unjust. (Emphasis added) The record on appeal reflects that appellant's counsel raised below a number of arguable mitigating circumstances such as the nature of appellant's prior criminal record, his history of alcohol and polydrug abuse, [5] his personal and familial background, and the varying interpretations possible from the facts surrounding the offense. Not only were these issues raised and argued, they were also present in the presentence investigation and psychiatric reports and thus clearly before the district court. I.C. § 19-2515(d) is mandatory in its terms: the court shall set forth in writing any mitigating factors considered. The reasoning behind a similar statutory requirement for specific written findings was explained by the Florida Supreme Court: The fourth step required by Fla. Stat. § 921.141, F.S.A., is that the trial judge justifies his sentence of death in writing, to provide the opportunity for meaningful review by this Court. Discrimination or capriciousness cannot stand where reason is required, and this is an important element added for the protection of the convicted defendant. Not only is the sentence then open to judicial review and correction, but the trial judge is required to view the issue of life or death within the framework of rules provided by the statute. State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973) cert. den. 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1951, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). We feel the requirement of written and detailed findings serves a dual purpose. Initially it focuses the attention of the sentencing court upon all the information before it and requires a thorough and reasoned analysis of all relevant factors. This helps assure that the imposition of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required. It also serves the purpose, as noted by the Florida Supreme Court, of making the process for imposing death rationally reviewable. On review, if the mandates of I.C. § 19-2515(d) are met, we can determine whether the lower court overlooked or ignored any raised mitigating factors, whether the evidence supports the aggravating factors found, and finally whether the court has properly weighed all factors. If the findings of the lower court are not set forth with reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its review on an inadequate record, and could not fulfill the function of meaningful appellate review demanded by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We hold that the legislative requirement that all mitigating factors considered be set forth must be met. [6] In requiring the court to consider and specify mitigating factors, we pause to give some guidance on the matter. While the Idaho legislature has not provided any suggestions as to what constitute mitigating factors, statutes from other states do delineate possibilities. [7] The Model Penal Code sets forth the following factors among others: (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance... . (g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication... . § 210.6(4) (Tent.Draft 1962). See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2523(2); Utah Code § 76-3-207. The Supreme Court noted in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 197, 96 S.Ct. at 2936, 49 L.Ed.2d at 888 that the sentencing authority in that state is asked to determine whether there are any special facts about the defendant such as age, extent of cooperation with police, or emotional state at the time of the offense, which would mitigate against imposition of capital punishment. We generally note that the concept of mitigation is broad. Mitigating circumstances have been defined as: Such as do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at 903. In previously discussing the court mitigating circumstances concept under our sentencing provisions, this court stated: It may be open to debate as to whether the `circumstances' mentioned in § 19-2515, I.C., refer particularly to circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and tending to aggravate or mitigate the character of the conduct involved, or whether such circumstances include also the convict, himself, as an individual, which would include his background, his age, upbringing and environment or any other matter appropriate to a determination of the degree of culpability. We think that the statute should be given the broader interpretation, particularly in a capital case. State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 403, 253 P.2d 203, 207-208 (1953), overruled on other grounds, State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82 (1971). Such is still our feeling. Thus, we conclude that there was error in the court's failure to specify in writing the mitigating factors it considered. Consequently, we remand for resentencing. D. Appellant next argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it fails to specify mitigating factors. This argument was disposed of in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2981, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), wherein the Supreme Court held it was unconstitutional for the legislature to limit the sentencing body's consideration of mitigating factors to those enumerated in a statute. See also State v. Mata, 125 Ariz. 233, 609 P.2d 48, 56-7 (1980) cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 338, 66 L.Ed.2d 161 (1980). E. Appellant next assigns as error the court's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which would probably constitute a continuing threat to society. The district court observed in response to this argument upon appellant's motion for correction or reduction of sentence: Sec. 19-2515 requires that aggravating circumstances must be found beyond a reasonable doubt and since the Court made such finding by preponderance rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, it is obvious that the Court did not consider such finding as an aggravating circumstance upon which it relied in making its ultimate sentencing. Perhaps such finding, since it was by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, should not have been inserted as a finding. However, as above stated, the Court was cautious to note that the finding was made by a preponderance and was not considered by the Court as a statutory aggravating circumstance because it was not found beyond a reasonable doubt. I.C. § 19-2515(f) states that at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before the sentence of death may be imposed. A finding of an aggravating circumstance by preponderance of the evidence, we feel, should not enter into the statutorily required evaluative process in the absence of express legislative authorization. Yet the inclusion of such a finding here must be viewed in light of the court's statements that this finding was not relied upon as a statutory aggravating circumstance. While generally the inclusion of such a finding would be ill-advised due to its possible impact on the process of balancing the aggravating circumstances found beyond a reasonable doubt and the mitigating circumstances raised, here, due to the express exclusion of the finding by the sentencing court, we find no error. F. Appellant next argues that due process is denied under the statutory scheme since the death penalty may be arrived at unless the court finds the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstance found. Appellant contends that this constitutes an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant and cites the cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), and Woodson v. North Carolina, supra , in support of this proposition. In Mullaney, the Supreme Court was faced with a state statutory scheme which placed the burden upon a defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion in order to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. The Supreme Court held this to be unconstitutional since the due process clause required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion or sudden provocation when that issue was properly presented. 421 U.S. at 701-4, 95 S.Ct. at 1891-92, 44 L.Ed.2d at 520-22. What the court essentially decided was that the state had the burden of proving all elements of the offense, including establishing sufficient criminal intent when a legitimate issue on the question of intent was raised. The Court noted that in some situations the defendant bears the burden of production, i.e., of introducing some evidence to raise an issue, but the prosecution retains the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We find Mullaney unpersuasive authority for appellant's contention. [8] Here we are not concerned with proof of an element of the offense but rather are engaged in an inquiry into all relevant facts and circumstances which might weigh upon the propriety of capital punishment. The weighing process, in our opinion does not involve shifting the burden of persuasion but is concerned instead with the presentation of relevant information to the sentencer in order that a reasoned and considered decision can be reached. The defendant's burden is merely to raise, in the aggravation-mitigation hearing, any factors which might possibly tend to mitigate his culpability for the offense. He has full opportunity to present and argue those factors. The court below then evaluates those factors under the guidelines set forth in the statute. His decision, including his reasoning, is then set forth in detail and this court reviews the entire process. While it is possible to speak of a burden of persuasion on the defendant to establish why he should receive leniency, we feel that, under our sentencing process, the facts speak for themselves once presented. The completeness of the evaluative process below and the mandatory review by this court, we feel, withstands constitutional scrutiny. Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830, 848-50 (1980); State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253, 1258-9 (1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 924, 99 S.Ct. 1254, 59 L.Ed.2d 478 (1979). G. Appellant argues next that the language of the statutory circumstances found beyond a reasonable doubt by the district court [9] is unconstitutionally vague. We conclude that this statutory language withstands constitutional scrutiny. The need for clear standards to guide the discretion of the sentencing body in death penalty cases was initially set forth in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), wherein Justice Stewart noted that a death penalty scheme could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with a result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur. 428 U.S. 195, n. 46, 96 S.Ct. at 2935, 49 L.Ed.2d at 887. In Gregg, the petitioner argued that the language of the Georgia death penalty statute authorizing the imposition of death if the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim was impermissibly vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court, however, held that this language was not unconstitutional on its face: It is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction. 428 U.S. at 201, 96 S.Ct. at 2938, 49 L.Ed.2d at 890. Subsequently, in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), the Supreme Court held that where statutory provisions concerning aggravating circumstances such as these could be applied to any murder, a limiting construction is indispensable if the state is to meet its constitutional obligation to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. 446 U.S. at 428, 100 S.Ct. at 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d at 406. Under Gregg, it is apparent that the language contained in I.C. §§ 19-2515(f)(5) and (6) is facially constitutional. However, inasmuch as a reasonable person could fairly characterize any murder as especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity and as exhibiting an utter disregard for human life, it is equally apparent under Godfrey that this court must place a limiting construction upon these statutory aggravating circumstances so as to avoid the possibility of their application in an unconstitutional manner. Other jurisdictions have had an opportunity to construe statutory language similar to that contained in I.C. § 19-2515(f)(5). In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. den., 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1951, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), the defendant attacked the constitutionality of the statutory aggravating circumstance that [t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The Florida Supreme Court interpreted this language as follows: [W]e feel that the meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that an ordinary man would not have to guess at what was intended. It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies  the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.  Id. at 9. (Emphasis added) Subsequently, in Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2968, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 925 (1976), the United States Supreme Court approved of this construction, observing that [w]e cannot say that the provision, as so construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged with the duty of recommending or imposing sentences in capital cases. In State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881, 891 (1977) cert. den., 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 231, 54 L.Ed.2d 158, reh. den., 434 U.S. 961, 98 S.Ct. 496, 54 L.Ed.2d 322 (1977), the Nebraska Supreme Court considered the statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence, and stated: In interpreting this portion of the statute, the key word is `exceptional.' It might be argued that every murder involves depravity. The use of the word `exceptional,' however, confines it only to those situations where depravity is apparent to such an extent as to obviously offend all standards of morality and intelligence. We agree with the definition of heinous, atrocious and cruel set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in Dixon, and with the definition of exceptional depravity set forth by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Simants. With these constructions, i.e., that the murder must be accompanied by acts setting it apart from the norm of murders and that its commission manifests such depravity as to offend all standards of morality and intelligence, the aggravating circumstance contained in I.C. § 19-2515(f)(5) is sufficiently definite and limited to guide the sentencing court's discretion in imposing the death penalty. A similar limiting construction must be placed upon the aggravating circumstances in I.C. § 19-2515(f)(6), that [b]y the murder, or the circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life. To properly define this circumstance, it is important to note the other aggravating circumstances with which this provision overlaps. The second aggravating circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(2), that the defendant committed another murder at the time this murder was committed, obviously could show an utter disregard for human life, as could the third aggravating circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(3), that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. The same can be said for the fourth aggravating circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(4), that the murder was committed for remuneration. Since we will not presume that the legislative intent was to duplicate any already enumerated circumstance, thus making I.C. § 19-2515(f)(6) mere surplusage ( See, e.g., Norton v. Dept. of Employment, 94 Idaho 924, 500 P.2d 825 (1972)), we hold that the phrase utter disregard must be viewed in reference to acts other than those set forth in I.C. §§ 19-2515(f)(2), (3), and (4). We conclude instead that the phrase is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. With such an interpretation, it is our conclusion that this aggravating circumstance meets the constitutional requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Upon remand, the district court should, in accordance with his opinion and the provisions of I.C.R. 33.1 and 33.2 (enacted subsequent to original sentencing in this case), specifically set forth the facts and reasoning underlying the finding, if any, that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists. H. Finally, the appellant argues that the legislature improperly delegated the power to inflict the death penalty to the Board of Corrections. I.C. § 19-2716 provides: The punishment of death must be inflicted by the intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death until the defendant is dead. The director of the department of corrections shall determine the substance or substances to be used and the procedures to be used in any execution. This argument was disposed of in Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978): [T]he existence of an area for exercise of discretion by an administrative officer under delegation of authority does not render delegation unlawful where standards formulated for guidance and limited discretion, though general, are capable of reasonable application... . ... . It appears that the Legislature has declared a policy and fixed a primary standard and delegated to the said Director power to determine details so as to carry out the legislative purpose which the Legislature cannot practically or efficiently perform itself. The statute is sufficiently complete to accomplish the regulation of the particular matters falling within the Legislature's jurisdiction. 561 S.W.2d at 514-5. We agree with this analysis; we will not assume that the director of the department of corrections will act in other than a reasonable manner.