Opinion ID: 610908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Pinkerton Charge

Text: 48 Harwood contends that he was prejudiced by a Pinkerton charge, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1183, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), which permits a jury to find a defendant guilty on a substantive count without specific evidence that he committed the act charged if it is clear that the offense had been committed, that it had been committed in the furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy, and that the defendant was a member of that conspiracy. United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1208 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842, 96 S.Ct. 75, 46 L.Ed.2d 62 (1975). Harwood argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish the existence of a requisite conspiracy before the jury could consider the substantive offense, and that the Pinkerton charge on the substantive count improperly influenced the jury's verdict on the conspiracy count itself, so tainting it as to require reversal of both convictions. See United States v. Cantone, 426 F.2d 902, 904-05 (2d Cir.) (where evidence was insufficient to establish existence of a conspiracy, the giving of the Pinkerton charge undoubtedly influenced the jury's finding with respect to conspiracy charge), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827, 91 S.Ct. 55, 27 L.Ed.2d 57 (1970); see also United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1341 (2d Cir.1974) (noting that the Pinkerton charge should not be given as a matter of course), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975). 49 In his charge on the substantive counts, the trial judge, over objection, instructed the jury: If, in light of my instructions, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the defendants was a member of the conspiracy charged in Count 1 of the indictment and, thus, guilty on the conspiracy count, then you may also, but you are not required to, find him guilty of the substantive crimes charged in Counts 2 and 3.... The court then meticulously discussed the five elements that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant a finding of guilt under Pinkerton. 50 As discussed in section IV, supra, there was ample evidence independent of the substantive possession crime from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Harwood and McKee conspired together. This is not a case where the evidence is such that the jury is required to resort to the inverse of Pinkerton and infer the existence of a conspiracy from a substantive offense. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1050 (2d Cir.1976); see Sperling, 506 F.2d at 1342. Further, the trial judge properly instructed the jury to consider the substantive count only after it first found that a conspiracy existed between the defendants. See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 19 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082, 100 S.Ct. 1037, 62 L.Ed.2d 767 (1980). Considering the charge as a whole, see United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 240 (2d Cir.) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (citation omitted)) (a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990), we find no reversible error here.