Opinion ID: 4528739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Case Number 19-0754: Dylan Price

Text: In this matter, the DMV contends that the circuit court erred by accepting Mr. Price’s petition for review and granting him a stay of his driver’s license revocation 9 because the court lacked jurisdiction to do so. The DMV explains its position by stating that because the OAH deemed Mr. Price’s request for an administrative hearing to be untimely and, thus, refused to grant him an administrative hearing, the OAH did not render a final decision on Mr. Price’s challenge to the DMV’s revocation order. As a result, the DMV argues that Mr. Price’s petition for review to the circuit court did not involve a “contested case” as required for the circuit court to have jurisdiction pursuant to the provision of the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act (“the Act”), i.e., West Virginia Code section 29A-5-4 (LexisNexis 2018), referenced in the circuit court’s order. Mr. Price disagrees and contends that his request for review was properly considered by the circuit court. 3 Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Price’s request for relief is governed by statutory law, namely various provisions of the Act and West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2, which pertains to the review of an administrative revocation of a driver’s license. See generally W. Va. Bd. of Med. v. Spillers, 187 W. Va. 257, 259, 418 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1992) (“[P]rocedures for appeals of decisions by administrative agencies are governed by the State Administrative Procedures Act.”). In matters involving statutes, we are bound by the rules of statutory construction. We first must determine the Legislature’s intent in enacting the provision. See Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s The DMV also raises additional issues similar to those advanced in Mr. 3 Blankenship’s case. See note 4, infra. 10 Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975) (“The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”). Then, we consider the precise words employed in the enactment. Where such language is plain, we apply the subject statutory language as written without any further interpretation. See Syl. pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968) (“Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.”); Syl. pt. 5, State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959) (“When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.”). To determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider Mr. Price’s review petition, we first look to the statute the circuit court cited in support of its jurisdictional finding. Pursuant to West Virginia Code section 29A-5-4(a), “[a]ny party adversely affected by a final order or decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter[.]” (Emphasis added). We find this language to be plain because we previously have recognized that “this [S]tate’s [A]dministrative [P]rocedures [A]ct . . . generally provides for judicial review of contested administrative cases[.]” Johnson v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 178 W. Va. 675, 677, 363 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1987) (emphasis added). 11 The Act further defines a “contested case,” in pertinent part, as “a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, interests or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.” W. Va. Code § 29A-1-2(b) (LexisNexis 2018). We previously have considered this statutory definition of a “contested case” and held as follows: Our Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va. Code, 29A- 1-2(b), defines a contested case before an agency as a proceeding that involves legal rights, duties, interests, or privileges of specific parties which are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing. Thus, an agency must either be required by some statutory provision or administrative rule to have hearings or the specific right affected by the agency must be constitutionally protected such that a hearing is required. Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Perry, 189 W. Va. 662, 434 S.E.2d 22 (1993). Likewise, we find this language to plainly require, as it pertains to the instant proceeding, an administrative agency to hold a hearing and issue a decision of the matter following the hearing. These requirements are further reflected in the statute granting Mr. Price the ability to challenge the DMV’s decision to revoke his driver’s license for DUI: Written objections to an order of revocation or suspension under the provisions of section one of this article or section seven, article five of this chapter shall be filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings. Upon the receipt of an objection, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall notify the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles, who shall . . . afford the person an opportunity to be heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The written objection must be filed with [the] Office of Administrative Hearings in person, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or by facsimile transmission or electronic mail within thirty calendar days after receipt of a copy of the order of revocation or suspension or no hearing will be granted . . . . The hearing 12 shall be before a hearing examiner employed by the Office of Administrative Hearings who shall rule on evidentiary issues. . . . Upon consideration of the designated record, the hearing examiner shall, based on the determination of the facts of the case and applicable law, render a decision affirming, reversing or modifying the action protested. The decision shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall be provided to all parties by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or with a party’s written consent, by facsimile or electronic mail. W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(a) (LexisNexis 2017). We also find this language to be clear and note that the method for requesting a hearing to challenge the revocation ruling, as well as the time period within which the request must be made, are reiterated in both the revocation notice sent to Mr. Price and the administrative hearing request form he submitted, but which the OAH rejected as untimely filed. Moreover, as the definition of a “contested case” specifically requires, and as the revocation review statute also recognizes, an administrative hearing must not only be requested for a matter to constitute a “contested case.” Rather, the agency also must actually hold the hearing and issue a decision to render a case “contested.” See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. McGraw, No. 12-0380, 2012 WL 3155761, at  (W. Va. May 30, 2012) (memorandum decision) (finding that “the subject license revocation is not a ‘contested case’ within the definition of the [Act]” because the driver failed to appear at the administrative hearing he had requested to challenge his license revocation, and, thus, “because there was no administrative hearing, there was nothing to make this . . . a contested case within the definition of W. Va. Code § 29A-1-2(b)”); Syl. pt. 9, in part, State 13 ex rel. Miller v. Reed, 203 W. Va. 673, 510 S.E.2d 507 (1998) (“Where an administrative hearing is not held in a driver’s license revocation case because the holder of the driver’s license failed to pursue his administrative remedies, a circuit court does not have jurisdiction to grant . . . relief with respect to issues which are capable of resolution under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act, West Virginia Code §§ 29A-1-1 to 29A- 7-4 (1998).”); Cowie v. Roberts, 173 W. Va. 64, 312 S.E.2d 35 (1984) (finding circuit court did not have jurisdiction to grant motorist relief where motorist failed to request administrative hearing to challenge suspension of his driver’s license). This is so because, “[u]nder the Administrative Procedures Act, the task of the circuit court is to determine whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” W. Va. Health Care Cost Review Auth. v. Boone Mem’l Hosp., 196 W. Va. 326, 335, 472 S.E.2d 411, 420 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, where “there [i]s no administrative hearing before the Division by the Commissioner, there [i]s no ‘contested case’ within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 29A-1-2 of the [Act].” Reed, 203 W. Va. at 683, 510 S.E.2d at 517. Here, it is undisputed that the OAH did not hold a hearing regarding the revocation of Mr. Price’s driver’s license because it found his request to be untimely filed. In fact, the failure to hold a hearing is one of the errors Mr. Price assigns in the petition for review he filed in the circuit court. Nevertheless, as the preceding authorities make clear, a circuit court has jurisdiction under the Act to review only “contested cases.” See W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a). Therefore, because the OAH did not hold a hearing to review the 14 propriety of Mr. Price’s license revocation, the instant matter does not meet the definition of a “contested case” so as to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court to consider the petition for review therein filed by Mr. Price. See Syl. pt. 9, in part, Reed, 203 W. Va. 673, 510 S.E.2d 507. See also Syl. pt. 1, Cowie, 173 W. Va. 64, 312 S.E.2d 35 (“‘The general rule is that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute or by rules and regulations having the force and effect of law, relief must be sought from the administrative body, and such remedy must be exhausted before the courts will act.’ Syl. pt. 1, Daurelle v. Traders Federal Savings & Loan Association, 143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958).”). Moreover, where, as here, a circuit court does not have jurisdiction over a matter, the proper course is to dismiss the proceeding from the circuit court’s docket as we recently held in Syllabus point 5 of Holly v. Feagley, 242 W. Va. 240, 834 S.E.2d 536 (2019): “Whenever it is determined that a court has no jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of a civil action, the forum court must take no further action in the case other than to dismiss it from the docket.” Syllabus Point 1, Hinkle v. Bauer Lumber & Home Bldg. Ctr., Inc., 158 W. Va. 492, 211 S.E.2d 705 (1975). Accord McGraw, No. 12-0380, 2012 WL 3155761; Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Dale v. Stucky, 232 W. Va. 299, 752 S.E.2d 330 (2013) (per curiam). See also Syl. pt. 3, Richmond v. Henderson, 48 W. Va. 389, 37 S.E. 653 (1900) (“Where a justice has no jurisdiction of a civil action, neither has a circuit court on appeal, though such circuit court would have original jurisdiction in the case, and therefore such court must dismiss the action for want 15 of jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering its August 16, 2018 order whereby it granted relief to Mr. Price by staying the revocation of his driver’s license and requiring the DMV to produce the underlying administrative record. As such, we grant as moulded the writ of prohibition requested by the DMV 4 and direct the Circuit Court of Boone County to dismiss 5 the matter in which it entered its August 16, 2018 order.