Opinion ID: 536966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Consent to Search

Text: 14 The parties disagree as to whether Mrs. Timberlake gave voluntary consent to Sergeant Poole to allow the officers to search after they had entered the apartment. We hold that, even if Mrs. Timberlake agreed to allow the officers to search her home, her alleged consent was tainted by the preceding illegal entry (i.e., the officers' entry without a warrant, with no exigent circumstances and without permission), because there was no evidence that the illegality of the initial entry, which violated Timberlake's Fourth Amendment right, was attenuated before the police endeavored to obtain Mrs. Timberlake's consent. Thus, the alleged consent to search was no more valid than the entry itself. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 2 Indeed, the Government does not dispute this point; rather, the Government argues only that [n]either the police entry into the premises nor the failure of the police to leave when they learned of the drug seller's apprehension could have tainted Mrs. Timberlake's consent since neither was unlawful. Appellee's Brief at 21. We have rejected the Government's claim that the entry into Mrs. Timberlake's home was lawful; therefore, the Government's argument fails.