Opinion ID: 2422729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Meaning of Lowest Possible Price

Text: In its appeal to the Superior Court from the DBR decision, Heritage argued that the agency issued a decision that, inter alia, is legally erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, and unsupportable by substantial evidence; in violation of statutory provisions; and in excess of statutory authority of the DBR. However, although the trial justice affirmed the DBR ruling as to the import of the LPP phrase within the enabling statute, the court distinguished its reasoning from that of the agency, explaining: The Court disagrees slightly with the DBR's reasoning, but ultimately agrees with its decision to deny Heritage's request. The `lowest possible price' language does not confer any sort of regulatory jurisdiction upon DBR. DBR does have regulatory authority over Beacon's rates; however, that authority simply derives from another portion of Beacon's enabling statute. [10] In its ruling, the Superior Court held that [t]he `lowest possible price' language is merely a statement of policy or purpose, which is common in many statutes, but which does not itself create substantive rights. Responding to Heritage's contention that such an interpretation would render the disputed language superfluous, thereby violating general statutory construction principles, the Superior Court disagreed, noting that such provisions do serve important functions even if they do not create substantive rights. Statements of policy or purpose inform administrators and courts of the purposes of legislation, since they usually have not participated in drafting such legislation. After our de novo review, we are satisfied that the Superior Court justice correctly affirmed the decision of the DBR. [11] We do not perceive the language of P.L. 2003, ch. 410, § 3 to be ambiguous. In our opinion, Heritage endeavors to generate an ambiguity in the statute by selectively excising lowest possible price from the context of its nesting within its particular sentence, subsection, and section. [12] Indeed, adopting the interpretation suggested by Heritage would lead us down a dangerous path in violation of established principles of construction. See In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I.2006) (It is an equally fundamental maxim of statutory construction that statutory language should not be viewed in isolation.); Hargreaves v. Jack, 750 A.2d 430, 435 (R.I. 2000) (It is a well-known maxim of statutory interpretation that this Court `will not construe a statute to reach an absurd [or unintended] result.') (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996)). [13] We agree with the reasoning of the trial justice who wrote in his 2007 decision: [W]hen read in the context of the entire statute creating Beacon, the role of the policy or purpose statement is clear. See, e.g., Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ. v. Newman, 688 A.2d 1300, 1302 (R.I.1997) (finding that a Court must endeavor to ascertain the legislative intent, `examin[ing] the statute in its entirety and then the individual provisions in the context of the whole, not as if each provision were independent of the whole'). In our view, it is clear that the phrase lowest possible price in of the statute is prefatory in nature and does not create any substantive private right. Recently, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i said: The general rule of statutory construction is that policy declarations in statutes, while useful in gleaning the purpose of the statute, are not, of themselves, a substantive part of the law which can limit or expand upon the express terms of the operative statutory provisions. Poe v. Hawai'i Labor Relations Board, 97 Hawai'i 528, 40 P.3d 930, 942 (2002). See also Illinois Independent Telephone Association v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 183 Ill.App.3d 220, 132 Ill.Dec. 154, 539 N.E.2d 717, 726 (1988) (A declaration of policy contained in a statute is, like a preamble, not a part of the substantive portions of the act. Such provisions are available for clarification of ambiguous substantive portions of the act, but may not be used to create ambiguity in other substantive provisions.); Price Development Co., L.P. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237, 1246 (Utah 2000) (holding that policy sections may be used to clarify ambiguities, but they do not create substantive rights that are not found within the statute). We do not agree with Heritage's argument that the disputed language would be rendered superfluous if it is not construed to create a private cause of action. [14] In our opinion, the phrase lowest possible price is clear within its context as a statement of policy. Policy language such as this serves to clarify other substantive provisions of Beacon's enabling act without creating substantive rights.