Opinion ID: 6215723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Law and Standards of Review

Text: ¶15 Both the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to be presumed innocent until a jury finds that the prosecution has proven every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo. 2001); Martinez v. People, 470 P.2d 26, 30 (Colo. 1970). To give this guarantee effect, we require trial courts 1 We granted Garcia’s petition for certiorari review of the following issue: Whether the division erred in upholding the trial court’s supplemental jury instruction defining “seizes and carries,” as that phrase is used in section 18-3-302(1), C.R.S. (2020), as “any movement, however short in distance.” 7 to properly instruct juries on all of the statutory elements of the charged crimes. Griego, 19 P.3d at 7. ¶16 On review, we consider jury instructions de novo to determine if they are correct recitations of the law and “accurately inform[] the jury of the governing law.” Riley v. People, 266 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Colo. 2011). We review not only whether the jury instructions faithfully track the law but also whether the instructions are confusing or may mislead the jury. People v. Janes, 982 P.2d 300, 303–04 (Colo. 1999). In order to evaluate whether jury instructions properly state the law or are misleading, we also must consider the criminal statutes themselves. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. ¶17 “[O]ur primary purpose [when interpreting statutes] is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id. We do so by looking to the statutory language and “giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. Additionally, we read statutes “as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of [their] parts, and we must avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id. at ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389. If the statute is unambiguous, our work is done. Id. If, however, the statute can reasonably be interpreted in multiple ways, we may look to other aids of statutory construction. Id. 8 ¶18 Assuming the jury instructions were correct statements of the law, we review a trial court’s decision to give those instructions for an abuse of discretion. Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011). Otherwise, if we determine that the jury instructions were incorrect or misleading, we will review the trial court’s error under the constitutional harmless error standard as long as the objecting party properly preserved the issue, as Garcia did here.2 Griego, 19 P.3d at 8; see also Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119. If the instructions were incorrect or misleading, we will reverse a conviction unless the prosecution can prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—that is, that the error did not contribute to the conviction. Hagos, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d at 119. If there is even a “reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction,” we must reverse. Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S 18, 24 (1967) (alteration omitted)). ¶19 We now apply these principles to the facts before us. 2 Though the People expressly conceded in their briefing before the division below that Garcia preserved the jury instruction issue, they now argue before this court that he failed to preserve the issue. We expressly and strongly disapproved of this practice just last year in People v. Struckmeyer, 2020 CO 76, ¶ 5, 474 P.3d 57, 58. It is unclear why, in light of this admonition, the People consider it appropriate to try to walk back their concession before the division. A prosecutor’s ultimate goal is justice, which is not always synonymous with victory. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Colo. 2005). 9