Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Inquiry re juror bias or misunderstanding.

Text: Defendant urges that remarks by the court to the jury during its penalty deliberations were fatally coercive. In defendant's view the court, having reason to suspect the jurors were eleven to one for death, told them it expected and desired a quick verdict and improperly implied that the alternative was an investigation of the minority juror. Examined in context, the record shows the court responded correctly to indications of serious juror misunderstanding or misconduct and that its remarks were not coercive. A resume of the facts is required. Penalty deliberations commenced on Thursday, December 9, 1982, and the jury was sequestered on Thursday evening. During deliberations on Friday afternoon, the jury foreman delivered a note to the court which stated: One person doesn't remember that during the jury selection he said we could vote for the death penalty. The court summoned counsel and advised them of its initial intention to investigate the possibility that a juror had misrepresented on voir dire his ability to follow the law. Defense counsel, however, persuaded the court simply to reinstruct the entire jury on its sentencing powers and duties. The jury was then summoned for a supplemental charge. The court prefaced its instructions by remarking that perhaps they will resolve any problem that you have, and perhaps will answer any questions that you have, .... The jurors were first admonished (1) that they should reach a verdict if you can do so; (2) that [w]hile each of you must decide the case for yourself and not merely acquiesce in the conclusions of your fellow jurors, each juror must examine the issues with candor[,] frankness[,] and ... a proper regard for the opinions of your fellow jurors; and (3) that they were obliged, after full consideration of the evidence and the law, to agree upon ... a verdict if you can do so without violating your conscience and your individual judgment.  (Italics added.) At this point, the court also specifically advised as follows: Of course, by pointing out to you the desirability of your reaching a verdict, I am not suggesting to any of you that you surrender your honest convictions as to what the evidence in this case has disclosed and of the weight and effect of the evidence in the case. Finally, the court restated that the jury may impose the death penalty if persuaded that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating, and shall impose life without parole if convinced that mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating. The jury was ordered to resume deliberations, and the court asked to be advised by note if there is any problem or difficulty with its instructions. Later the same afternoon the court, in the presence of both counsel, received a second note from the jury foreman. The note declared: Your Honor, we have a juror who cannot morally vote for the death penalty. The court denied defense counsel's motion for mistrial, made on grounds the note indicated a hung jury. In the court's view, it was now duty bound to investigate whether a juror ... had misled us on the voir dire, .... With defense counsel's full agreement, the court decided to release the jury for the weekend and defer the investigation until Monday in order, in counsel's words, that the jurors can be free from the very intense pressure which exists in the jury room at this moment. Counsel also agreed that the court would explain to the jurors what we're going to do and admonish them to search their conscience[s] over the weekend about their duties to be fair and follow the law. About 4:30 p.m., the jury was recalled to the courtroom. The court announced that, based on the foreman's note, it appears to me that the jury has a problem. I am required to investigate this, said the court, and to question both the foreman and the one or more jurors who may be having difficulty in reaching a verdict.... [¶] I may have to permit the attorneys to question one or more of the jurors. The court declared it had thought the jury would have a verdict by this afternoon. Under the circumstances, however, the court offered the jurors the option of being released for the weekend since I assume ... you've been working hard all day and ... would like, perhaps, to be able to go home and spend the weekend with your families and take care of your own personal business. Over the weekend, each juror should search your conscience ... and recall your oath ... and your duty and responsibility to follow the law and judge the case ... in accordance with your honest convictions as to what you believe is the appropriate penalty in this case. If the jury was released, said the court, on Monday morning, I can question the foreman, question several of the jurors, if there is a problem, and then make a determination ... whether or not one or more of the jurors are refusing to adhere to the law and the evidence, and if that is the situation, then I'll have to make a determination as to how to proceed. At this point, the foreman, Mr. Piazza, attempted to interrupt. The court admonished him not to reveal the jurors' thoughts or what's going on in deliberations. Rather, said the court, I probably, Mr. Piazza, will question you on Monday morning individually with the attorneys present, and then I may have to question each juror individually, .... The foreman responded that a weekend release would be a fine gesture, and that by searching our conscience, ... we should have a verdict come Monday. The court responded, Good. Well, I'm glad to hear you say that. I appreciate that. Next, the court delivered a long commentary, explaining why the jury had been sequestered the previous night despite the substantial imposition, and admonishing the jurors for God's sake not to do anything over the weekend that would in anyway [ sic ] influence you one way or the other. Jurors should return at 9:15 Monday morning, said the court, but should not resume deliberations until advised to do so. Meantime, the court would probably talk to your foreman and may talk to all of you individually, depending on what facts developed. After the jurors had left the courtroom, defense counsel took issue with the court's statement to the effect the Court would be pleased with the jury reaching a verdict on Monday. The court responded that it would try on Monday to correct any such misimpression, because I don't feel that way [at] all. Counsel raised no objection to the court's remarks that it might have to investigate dissident jurors. When the jurors returned on the morning of Monday, December 13, they were diverted to the jury assembly room and admonished again not to discuss the case. After interchange between court and counsel, the jury foreman was brought in for questioning. The court cautioned him not to reveal the details of deliberations, the numerical split, or the prevailing view within the jury. It then asked if any juror had stated he or she would not follow the law; [b]y that I mean has a juror indicated that they [ sic ] would refuse to vote for the death penalty in every case or that they would vote for death and never vote for life imprisonment? The foreman responded, No. Thereupon, the following colloquy occurred: [¶] Q. [By the Court] All right. Based upon what has occurred, is it your opinion that a juror is refusing to follow the law? [¶] A. I can't answer that without a little statement, your Honor. [¶] Q. All right, explain. [¶] A. It was  there was a little confusion of the jurors, and I am talking plural, as to the instructions of the judge the day of  the day we were challenged. And these jurors did not recall hearing that they may have to vote for the death penalty. And the statement I got this morning was, it has been resolved. The weekend that you gave us, your Honor, I believe cleared everybody's minds or whatever. So, that is where we stand now, your Honor. The court denied defendant's renewed motion for mistrial. Defense counsel complained about the foreman's apparent reference to a morning discussion between jurors in violation of the court's admonition. The foreman was returned to the courtroom and again warned not to reveal the details of voting or views within the jury. The following exchange then took place: [¶] Q. [By the Court] But you made that statement that the problem, you thought, was resolved. [¶] Have you talked to any other juror about the case today or discussed the case? [¶] A. No, sir. [¶] Q. Okay. [¶] A. Can I clarify that statement? [¶] Q. Yes. Without telling me  don't identify anybody. [¶] A. No. There was an apology. `I needed the weekend.' And that was it. [¶] Q. That was the extent? [¶] A. That was the extent of the discussion with the jurors, okay, plural, again. [¶] Q. The individual who made that apology just approached you without any question from you? [¶] A. Yes, sir. The court ruled that it need not investigate further and would allow the jury to continue its deliberations. After recalling the jury to the courtroom, the court readministered the previously given instructions on general obligations of a juror. These again stressed that jurors must follow the law, discuss issues frankly, respect and consider the views of other panelists, and reach a verdict if possible without violation of conscience or individual judgment. The court then stated: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, one further comment before you return to the jury room to continue your deliberations. So that there is no misunderstanding in this particular case, the Court has not intended by anything that it may have said or done to intimate or suggest to you what you should find to be the fact on any question submitted to you or which penalty the Court believes is appropriate in this particular case. [¶] If anything I have said or done has seemed to so indicate, you must disregard it and form your own opinion of the evidence. The jury recommenced deliberations. Within an hour, it announced a death verdict. (28a) Defendant claims that, in obviously stressful circumstances, with assertedly only a single juror holding out against the death penalty, the court's expressed preference for a quick verdict, and its threat to investigate the jury's problem, unfairly coerced the minority juror. However, our scrutiny of the court's conduct and remarks discloses no impropriety. (29a) At the outset, we emphasize that when a trial court learns during deliberations of a jury-room problem which, if unattended, might later require the granting of a mistrial or new trial motion, the court may and should intervene promptly to nip the problem in the bud. The law is clear, for example, that the court must investigate reports of juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to replace an offending juror with a substitute. As we recently explained in People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251], [s]ection 1123 gives the trial court the authority to discharge a juror `found to be unable to perform his duty.' [Fn. omitted.] Section 1089 provides for the substitution of an alternate juror in the event one of the original jurors is discharged. [Fn. omitted.][ [24] ].... California cases construing these statutes have established that, once a juror's [inability to perform his duty] is called into question, a hearing to determine the facts is clearly contemplated. [Citations.] Failure to conduct a hearing sufficient to determine whether good cause to discharge the juror exists is an abuse of discretion subject to appellate review. [Citations.] (Pp. 519-520, italics added.) (30) A sitting juror's actual bias, which would have supported a challenge for cause, renders him unable to perform his duty and thus subject to discharge and substitution under sections 1089 and 1123. ( People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 59 [98 Cal. Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537].) A juror may be disqualified for bias, and thus discharged, from a capital case if his views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, 105 S.Ct. 844], quoting Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 [65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589, 100 S.Ct. 2521]; see also Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 521-522 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784-785, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) Grounds for investigation or discharge of a juror may be established by his statements or conduct, including events which occur during jury deliberations and are reported by fellow panelists. (E.g., Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 517 [fellow jurors reported statements and demeanor indicating marijuana intoxication]; Compton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 59 [mid-trial comments to barber indicating actual bias]; see People v. McNeal (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 830, 835-839 [153 Cal. Rptr. 706] [foreman reported juror's statements indicating personal knowledge of controverted facts].) (29b) Since the court has power to investigate and discharge jurors who refuse to adhere to their oaths, it may also take less drastic steps where appropriate to deter any misconduct or misunderstanding it has reason to suspect. Of course, any intervention must be conducted with care so as to minimize pressure on legitimate minority jurors. (28b) The foreman's notes in this case, written in ambiguous style by a layman, could reasonably be construed as stating that one or more jurors either harbored a disqualifying bias, or had misunderstood their obligations as capital penalty jurors. The first note suggested a juror was deviating from assurances made during jury selection about ability to vote for the death penalty. The second note said flatly that a juror  not necessarily the one previously described  cannot morally vote for the death penalty. Neither statement was limited by its terms to the case at hand. Singly and in combination, the notes could mean that a juror or jurors were now expressing absolute refusal to consider the death penalty under any circumstances. [25] The court thus had ample cause to pursue the matter further. It conducted a discreet and properly limited investigation, which proved the inference of misconduct or misunderstanding unfounded. Defendant argues, however, that the court was nonetheless obliged to declare a mistrial because its statements in open court that an investigation might be necessary, and that a prompt verdict was expected and desired, were inherently coercive in light of the obvious jury division. We reject this attempt to place the court in a no-win situation. In the first place, contrary to defendant's suggestion, there was no necessary inference that the court sought to coerce a lone juror, or a minority, who opposed a death verdict. Though each of the foreman's notes suggested that a juror was having difficulty recalling or implementing his oath to consider the death penalty, no implication arose that the same juror was described in each note (see discussion ante ). Moreover, the court was careful to avoid learning the jury's divisions. On two occasions under direct questioning, the foreman himself indicated the problem was with plural jurors. At one point, the court took direct issue with defense counsel's assumption that the jury stood eleven to one for death. [26] Nor did the court's remarks, viewed as a whole, have a coercive connotation. Defendant points to the court's comments on Friday that it had expected a prompt penalty verdict and would appreciate a decision on Monday. A trial judge should refrain from placing specific time pressure on a deliberating jury and should never imply that the case warrants only desultory deliberation. Such comments risk persuading legitimate dissidents, whatever their views, that the court considers their position unreasonable. Here, however, the court was at pains to dispel any such inference. The court neither insisted that a deadlock be resolved, nor urged minority jurors to give special attention to majority views, nor suggested that failure to reach a decision would have any specific consequences. (Cf., e.g., People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 847-852.) On the contrary, it reinstructed on the broad scope of the jury's sentencing discretion, including its power to exercise leniency even if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. Moreover, the court repeatedly cautioned that no juror should surrender his individual judgment and conscience, even if this meant no unanimous decision could be reached. [27] When the jurors returned after a weekend's rest, the court, in an abundance of caution, stated specifically and at length that it had not intended by any earlier remarks to suggest what verdict the court deemed appropriate. The court stressed that jurors must disregard any such inference and form [their] own opinion of the evidence. This admonition was more than sufficient to eliminate any possible misunderstanding. [28] Nor do we find sinister import in the court's statements, before releasing the jurors on Friday, that on Monday it might have to investigate the jury's difficulties. We note first that defense counsel did not protest when the court said, outside the jury's presence, that it intended to explain to the jury what we're going to do. The context of the court's remarks indicates it meant to mention in open court the possibility of an investigation. [29] Moreover, though counsel objected promptly that the court should not have told the jurors it would be pleased with a prompt verdict (see discussion ante ), he never took issue with the court's remarks to the jury about an investigation. Thus, at the least, the potential for coercion argued now was not apparent to one on the spot. [Fn. omitted.] ( Lowenfield, supra, 484 U.S. at p. ___ [98 L.Ed.2d at p. 579].) Indeed, any potential for improper coercion seems minimal even in hindsight. Defendant implies the court's expressed intent to investigate ... whether or not one or more jurors are refusing to adhere to the law and the evidence might persuade an already beleaguered dissident that the court, too, disapproved his or her minority position, even suspected it was illegal. On the other hand, defendant suggests, the court offered a weekend respite to search your conscience and recall your oath. The threat was clear, in defendant's view  conform over the weekend or face a humiliating inquiry by the court. We cannot accept this view of the facts. In the first place, nothing in the court's remarks singled out an individual juror or suggested the court knew the identity of any juror who was having a problem. On the other hand, the person or persons to whom the foreman's notes referred almost certainly knew he had sent them. Since it would be logical for the court to take some action in response to the notes, as was its obligation, judicial declarations to that effect were unlikely to create additional pressure. It is difficult to see how coercion arose from the court's decision to postpone any further action until after a weekend recess. The express purpose of the recess was to relieve the jurors of excessive stress, and defendant's counsel gave wholehearted concurrence on that basis. As counsel must have assumed, the weekend respite offered legitimate minority jurors an opportunity to gather strength and resolve. In the course of its Friday comments, the court had drawn a careful distinction between honest disagreement on the facts, which was proper, and refusal to consider the evidence, which was not. If a juror's minority position was fair under these standards, a post-recess court investigation could be expected to provide vindication and relief from further overbearing pressure by fellow panelists. Finally, the court was within its rights to seek to avoid an investigation by exhorting any jurors who were refusing to deliberate impartially to reconsider their positions and adhere to their oaths. A court does not engage in improper coercion when it reminds jurors of their obligations under the law. No impropriety appears in the court's comments or in its overall conduct of the episode. We find no basis for reversal. [30] (See also fn. 35, post. )