Opinion ID: 1757837
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Heading: Pittway

Text: Pittway argues that Phillip and Kathy Lynn Dillard's injuries were not proximately caused by a defect in the smoke detectors. The purpose of a smoke detector is to provide notice of a fire. Pittway contends that Phillip had notice of the fire when he ran inside the home to help. Therefore, it argues that Phillip's personal injuries did not result from a lack of notice of the fire. In essence, Pittway is arguing that Phillip assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent by attempting the rescue. Pittway argues that Phillip was not the ultimate user or consumer of the smoke detector and that it therefore owed no duty to him; Pittway says the ultimate users or consumers were the occupants of the home. Pittway also argues that it owed no duty to Phillip under the rescue doctrine. Proximate cause is an act or omission that in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent causes, produces an injury or harm and without which the injury or harm would not occur. Thetford v. City of Clanton, 605 So.2d 835 (Ala.1992). Foreseeability is the cornerstone of proximate cause. General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176 (Ala.1985). The first question we must answer is whether it is reasonably foreseeable that a smoke detector's failure to timely sound would result in injuries. `An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered. This connection usually is dealt with by the courts in terms of what is called proximate cause.' Wassman v. Mobile County Commun. Dist., 665 So.2d 941, 945 (Ala.1995), quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, p. 263 (5th ed.1984). As Pittway notes, a smoke detector is a safety device and its purpose is to give early notice of fire. Certainly, it is foreseeable that a person could be hurt if a smoke detector fails to give notice for all to exit the house or if the warning is delayed because of a defect in the detector. It would be wholly inconsistent to allow the manufacturer of a safety device ... to design a defective product and then allow that manufacturer to escape liability when the product is used for an intended use.... Dennis v. American Honda Motor Co., 585 So.2d 1336, 1340 (Ala. 1991). In a similar case involving heat detectors, we held: [A] jury could reasonably conclude that had the heat detector worked as it was intended, and provided an early warning of danger, [the plaintiff's son] could have escaped from the house. In other words, the jury was entitled to find that the natural and probable sequence of events which led to [the death of the plaintiff's son] was proximately caused by the defective condition of the ... heat detector. Interstate Engineering, Inc. v. Burnette, 474 So.2d 624, 628 (Ala.1985). A delay in an emergency situation can give rise to proximate cause. In Wassman, supra, we held that the defendant's 39-minute delay in returning a 911 emergency telephone call was the proximate cause of the victim's death. The victim was a ventilator-dependent quadriplegic child. His mother was changing his ventilator tube when she had trouble inserting the tube. She dialed 911 but received no answer. She then telephoned an ambulance service located near her home. The service's ambulance had mechanical problems, so the service sent an ambulance from another location; the ambulance did not arrive for 30 minutes. By the time it arrived, the victim's tissues were so swollen that a tube could not be inserted. Shortly after the ambulance arrived, the defendant returned the 911 call. The victim died because of a lack of oxygen. In this present case, we conclude that it is foreseeable that a person could be injured by the delay of a smoke detector's warning. Pittway next argues that Phillip Dillard was not the ultimate user or consumer of the smoke detector, because he was not living in the home. We note that the ultimate user or consumer who seeks recovery in an AEMLD action need not have purchased the product, but could be a family member, friend, employee, guest, or donee of the purchaser. Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala.1976). The next question is whether a rescuer can sue under the AEMLD. The Dillards argue that they are entitled to recover for their personal injuries under the rescue doctrine in a product liability case. Pittway correctly asserts that one who is aware of danger and fails to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury cannot recover from the person whose negligence was responsible for the peril. However, under the danger invites rescue doctrine, one who attempts to rescue another who has been placed in peril by the defendant stands, for purposes of determining causation, in the position of the person being rescued. 57A Am.Jur. Negligence § 689 (1990). The rescue doctrine arose as a way to establish causal relation between the action of the defendant and the harm to a rescuer and to prohibit the negligent defendant from using the affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence against the rescuer. Govich v. North American Systems, Inc., 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94 (1991). The rescue doctrine extends, for the benefit of the rescuer, the liability the defendant may have toward the person he placed in peril. Essentially, the rescue doctrine provides that it is always foreseeable that someone may attempt to rescue a person who has been placed in a dangerous position and that the rescuer may incur injuries in doing so. Thus, if the defendant has acted negligently toward the person being rescued, he has acted negligently toward the rescuer. Alabama has adopted the rescue doctrine as a bar to the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. Neither contributory negligence nor assumption of risk is charged to him who comes to the rescue of others in peril without their fault, unless the act of the rescuer is manifestly rash and reckless to a man of ordinary prudence acting in emergency. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Johnson, 217 Ala. 251, 254, 115 So. 168, 170 (1927); cert. dismissed, 278 U.S. 576, 49 S.Ct. 95, 73 L.Ed. 515 (1928). Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Jeffcoat, 214 Ala. 317, 107 So. 456, cert. denied, 271 U.S. 688, 46 S.Ct. 639, 70 L.Ed. 1152 (1926). In other words, unless the rescuer's own conduct in attempting the rescue is wanton, then the rescuer may recover from the negligent defendant. In Seaboard Air Line Ry., the plaintiff was injured when he attempted to stop a train car from striking his fellow employees. This Court held that the defendant could not defend on the doctrine of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. Other jurisdictions have allowed the rescuer to sue the defendant under a product liability theory if the defendant's product had put the person being rescued in danger. See McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 86 Wash.App. 107, 936 P.2d 31, review granted, 133 Wash.2d 1027, 950 P.2d 478 (1997) (motorist on highway who was struck by hit-and-run driver when he stopped to aid passengers in overturned car could sue manufacturer of the overturned car under the rescue doctrine); Williams v. Foster, 281 Ill.App.3d 203, 217 Ill.Dec. 9, 666 N.E.2d 678, appeal denied, 168 Ill.2d 628, 219 Ill.Dec. 578, 671 N.E.2d 745 (1996) (rescuer sued manufacturer of water heater based on injuries suffered while rescuing family from burning home); Welch v. Hesston Corp., 540 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. Ct.App.1976) (injured volunteer fireman sued manufacturer of haystacker machine); Govich v. North American Systems, Inc., 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94 (1991) (plaintiff sued manufacturer of coffee maker and component based on harm suffered while attempting rescue of a dog from a burning house); Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969) (estate of rescuer who died of gas asphyxiation sued manufacturer of gas mask; court held that manufacturer committed culpable act by making and distributing defective oxygen-producing mask); Conaway v. Roberts, 725 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.Ct.App.1987) (rescuer sued manufacturer based on injuries suffered when he came to the aid of a neighbor trapped under a riding lawnmower). The archetype rescue case is Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921). In that case, the rescuer was seriously injured in an attempt to rescue his cousin from a moving tram; the tram was moving as a result of the railway company's negligence. The rescuer lost at trial, and an intermediate appellate court directed a judgment on the verdict for the railway company. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting the railway's primary arguments that the rescuer's attempt was outside the chain of causation and that the rescuer was contributorily negligent. Judge Benjamin Cardozo stated: Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.... The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had. 232 N.Y. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437-38. Rather than penalize the commendable human urge to rescue another in peril, we reaffirm the rescue doctrine. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of Pittway as to the claims of Phillip Dillard and his wife Kathy Lynn Dillard. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, COOK, and LYONS, [] JJ., concur. MADDOX and SEE, JJ., dissent.