Opinion ID: 1910930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Possession

Text: Having discussed the admissibility of the defendant's gun and spent shell casings in connection with the issue of unlawful possession of the two moose, the crime charged against Goyette, we will now take out of order his argument, raised for the first time in this appeal, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Goyette, on November 24, 1977, did unlawfully have in his possession two moose. The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict was not advanced before the trial Court by motion for judgment of acquittal, either at the close of all the evidence, M.R.Crim.P., Rule 29(a), or after jury verdict, M.R.Crim.P., Rule 29(b), nor did the defendant move for a new trial under Rule 33, M.R.Crim.P. In these circumstances, our review of such issue is limited to the manifest error-serious injustice standard, i. e. whether there was error which deprived the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial. State v. Boyer, Me., 392 A.2d 41 (1978); State v. Mimmovich, Me., 377 A.2d 116, 118 (1977); State v. Hanson, Me., 331 A.2d 375, 378 (1975). If the evidence was such that under no circumstances could the defendant be found guilty of having violated 12 M.R.S.A., § 2467, i. e. of possession of moose or any part or parts thereof, then Goyette's conviction of such crime on evidentiary facts which in and of themselves disproved the commission of such crime would rise to the level of an obvious serious prejudicial error depriving him of his fundamental right to a fair trial. In testing the evidence in the context of the manifest error-serious injustice principle, the appellate court must view the record, as in the case of saved error, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, assuming the truth of the evidence adduced in support of the State and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom which favor the State. See State v. Young, Me., 390 A.2d 1056, 1057 (1978); State v. Littlefield, Me., 389 A.2d 16, 19 (1978); State v. Blier, Me., 371 A.2d 1091, 1092 (1977). The sufficiency of the proof in any case must be measured by the totality of the evidence. State v. Matheson, Me., 363 A.2d 716, 722 (1976). Hence, we must decide whether from the facts of the instant case viewed in the light most favorable to the government the defendant did possess the moose within the meaning of 12 M.R.S.A., § 2467. Initially, we may say that the jury could have concluded from the evidence that the defendant had factually shot the two moose, and this beyond a reasonable doubt, disbelieving Goyette's exculpatory statement that he merely came upon the dead animals, dressed them for the sole purpose of preserving the meat and intended to notify the authorities respecting the presence of the dead beasts in the woods. In State v. Gaudin, 152 Me. 13, 16, 120 A.2d 823, 825 (1956), this Court interpreted the statute here in issue and held that Gaudin, who at midnight took into possession, and had in his possession and under his physical control when apprehended, a part of a moose and was carrying it away with intent to use or dispose of it, had possession of moose, or parts thereof within the meaning of the statute which forbade the same. In Gaudin, said the Court, [a]ctual possession exists where the thing is in the physical control, or immediate occupancy of the party;   physical control of a thing is possession of it. In State v. Koehling, Me., 381 A.2d 12, 14 (1978), where the charge was the unlawful possession of deer, this Court stated that [w]here the State alleges a crime of possession of a physical object, it must prove possession by showing that the accused at some time bore one of two relationships to the object: he either had immediate physical control or occupancy of the object or knew where it was and had the intention and ability to gain physical control or occupancy of it. (Emphasis added) We readily observe that in the instant case proof of possession of the moose is not so complete as in Gaudin, where the intent to use or dispose of the moose parts was obvious. Here, however, as in Koehling, we can say that Goyette did at some time bear the necessary relationship to the physical object, the moose, in that he at one time had immediate physical control and occupancy of the moose by shooting them and dressing them. In the ancient case of Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines' Reps. 174, 178 (1805), it was said that actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire right to, or possession of, wild beasts; but that, on the contrary, the mortal wounding of such beasts, by one not abandoning his pursuit, may, with the utmost propriety, be deemed possession of him; since thereby the pursuer manifests an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use, has deprived him of his natural liberty, and brought him within his certain control. Whether Goyette's relationship to the two moose was in violation of section 2467 of chapter 12 would depend upon the meaning which the Legislature intended to attach to the language  no person shall have in his possession any moose or parts thereof  when it enacted the legislation. We recognize the fundamental principle of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be construed strictly. State v. Millett, Me., 392 A.2d 521, 525 (1978); State v. Snow, Me., 383 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1978); State v. Granville, Me., 336 A.2d 861, 863 (1975). But, the cardinal rule to which all other rules are subordinated is that the intent of the Legislature controls. Legislative intent, whether ascertained directly from the statutory language itself or indirectly through the process of judicial analysis, must prevail and be given effect. State v. Bellino, Me., 390 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1978). In the instant case, the statute does not define the term possession, but it must be so interpreted to give it such meaning as shall appear most reasonable and best suited to effectuate the intent, and implement the policy, of the Legislature. State v. Bellino, supra, 390 A.2d at p. 1021; State v. Heald, Me., 382 A.2d 290, 294 (1978). Penal statutes must not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation. State v. S. S. Kresge, Inc., Me., 364 A.2d 868, 871 (1976). The total prohibition against having in possession any moose or parts thereof (except for imported moose possessed under special permit for the purpose of consumption or mounting, but not for sale), as reflected in section 2467 of title 12, was enacted in its present form by the public laws of 1945 and 1953 (See P.L.1945, c. 374, s. 81 and P.L.1953, c. 394, s. 49). Undoubtedly, the Legislature was familiar with the decisions of this Court respecting violations of the Inland Fish and Game laws of the State. Our Court, as early as 1897, in a case in pari materia with the facts of the instant case (fishing for smelts contrary to statute), had stated that [some] acts, however, are sometimes made unlawful absolutely, without reference to any intent or other state of mind of the doer. In such cases no intent need be alleged or proved. The intent to do is sufficient, and that can be inferred from the doing. The acts prohibited by this statute are of this latter class. They are prohibited absolutely. Having intentionally committed them, though innocent of any turpitude, the appellant has violated the statute. State v. Huff, 89 Me. 521, 36 A. 1000 (1897). We hold that, in enacting in 1945 and 1953 the prohibitory provisions of what is now section 2467 of title 12 of our Inland Fish and Game laws, the Legislature intended that the mere intentional doing of acts amounting to possession of moose would give rise to a sufficient culpable mental state required in proof of its violation and that knowledge that the conduct of the actor is prohibited by law (criminal turpitude) would not be an element of the crime. Wild game within a state is not subject to private control, possession or ownership except to the extent that the people through their representatives in the legislature may elect to permit the same; thus, the Legislature may, if it sees fit, absolutely prohibit the hunting, killing or possession of any wild game, if it is deemed necessary for the protection or preservation of the public good. It has full power and authority to regulate the taking of wild animals, and, in so doing, to impose such conditions, restrictions and limitations as it deems needful or proper. See State v. Snowman, 94 Me. 99, 46 A. 815, 80 Am.St. Rep. 380, 50 L.R.A. 544 (1900); Holbrook Island Sanctuary v. Inhabitants of Town of Brookville, 161 Me. 476, at pages 486 and 488, 214 A.2d 660 (1965). The purpose and scope of 12 M.R. S.A., § 2467 is to give moose absolute immunity from man's innate liking for the sport of hunting. The Legislature has deemed this necessary for their preservation and protection, and to prevent their decimation and extinction. (An experimental short hunting season on moose has been enacted by the One Hundred and Ninth Legislature (P.L.1979, c. 56, and c. 543 § 7463)). See James v. Wood, 82 Me. 173, 19 A. 160 (1889); Lacoste v. Dept. of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 549, 44 S.Ct. 186, 187, 68 L.Ed. 437 (1924). [7] Whether Goyette did possess the moose in violation of 12 M.R.S.A., § 2467 was a question of fact for the jury. It was for them to say whether he killed them and had not abandoned his prey, having in mind that he dressed them as he conceded. See State v. Visser, 188 Wash. 179, 61 P.2d 1284 (1936). Possession does not necessarily mean having them on one's person or being apprehended in the act of carrying them as in Gaudin, supra. See Stewart v. People, 83 Colo. 289, 264 P. 720, 721 (1928). Furthermore, when Goyette undertook to dress the moose, the doing of that very act was a violation of the statute. His purpose in so doing, even if believed, was immaterial. Given the overriding design of the Legislature as trustee of wild game to protect them against the onslaught of an avid hunting public, criminal intent in the nature of a specific intention to violate the law was not made an essential element of the crime of possession, and honest intentions or good faith may not be successfully advanced in justification of what the statute prohibits absolutely. State v. Barber, 91 N.M. 764, 581 P.2d 27 (1978); State v. Bates, 76 S.D. 23, 71 N.W.2d 641 (1955); Commonwealth v. Worth, 304 Mass. 313, 23 N.E.2d 891, 125 A.L.R. 1196 (1939); Worington v. Richart, 226 Mo.App. 42, 41 S.W.2d 410 (1931). The Legislature, in banning the possession of moose unconditionally, was also motivated by the fact that such arbitrary prohibition without the element of such criminal intent would serve to effectuate the end results of the legislation more fully by preventing easy evasions of the statute's mandate. Haggerty v. St. Louis Ice Manufacturing & Storage Co., 143 Mo. 238, 44 S.W. 1114, 1116 (1898). The defendant can hardly complain about the sufficiency of the evidence in the instant case, since the issue of possession was submitted to the jury on instructions requested by him which advised the jury that where someone is walking along the woods, hunting or not, but . . . came upon a moose that was dead and he had nothing to do with it and he looked down and he saw the dead moose, and if that person felt, well, the meat is going to spoil and I'd better clean it out, and then go tell the authorities and did that, and that was what happened, I don't think the legislature had any intention of saying that that person was a criminal. And I think we should accept that interpretation of the statute. Such instruction was more favorable to the defendant than what he was entitled to, and effectively indicates that the jury disbelieved Goyette's exculpatory statement to the effect that his possession of the moose was merely for the purpose of dressing the animals to save the meat, but rather, that they concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot the moose, dressed them, and, knowing where they were, had the intention and ability to regain physical control and occupancy of them at the opportune time. We fail to see how the defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous instruction which was downright beneficial to him. See State v. Heald, Me., 307 A.2d 188, 190 (1973). In any view of the evidence, there was sufficient proof of possession beyond a reasonable doubt.