Opinion ID: 220093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FERA Amendments

Text: At this early point in our discussion we consider a recent amendment to the FCA. On May 20, 2009, Congress enacted the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub.L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009), which amended the FCA and re-designated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) as 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) as 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). The pre-FERA version of the FCA, imposed liability on: [A]ny person who (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2). The FCA as FERA has amended it, now imposes liability on: [A]ny person who (A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim[.] 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). The FCA defines material as having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). For purposes of this case both versions of the FCA define a claim in pertinent part as a request or demand. . . for money or property that . . . is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States. . . . 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (pre-FERA); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(i) (post-FERA). FERA contains a retroactivity provision which applies only to section 3729(a)(1)(B), and provides that that clause take[s] effect as if enacted on June 7, 2008, and appl[ies] to all claims under [the FCA] that are pending on or after that date. [12] Pub.L. No. 111-21 § 4(f)(1), 123 Stat. at 1625. Though appellants filed their complaint on July 10, 2008, and their amended complaint on August 5, 2009, they cited to the pre-FERA version of the FCA in both their original and amended complaints. Nevertheless, appellants argued in the District Court that the addition of material to in section 3729(a)(1)(B) made it easier to state a claim under the FCA inasmuch as, under the amended version of the FCA, a relator only need show that compliance with the applicable regulations which the defendant allegedly violated would have a tendency to influence the Government's payment decision. The Court, though assuming that the amendment applied in this case, held that Congress' addition of a materiality requirement did not change the meaning of the FCA. Appellants do not contend that the Court erred in this conclusion but they do argue that the original complaint clearly alleged a time period were [sic] claims would be pending on June 7, 2008. Appellants' br. at 16 n. 17. Appellees argue that the majority of courts considering the applicability of the retroactivity provision have determined that the retroactivity provision does not apply to cases which were pending on June 7, 2008. [13] Appellees' br. at 9 n. 6 (citing Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2009)). [14] We need not decide whether the earlier or amended version of the FCA is applicable because we conclude that appellants' claims based on appellees' alleged violation of the Medicare marketing regulations cannot survive appellees' motion to dismiss under either version of the statute. Moreover, as we explain later, appellants' claims under the AKS fall only under pre-FERA section 3729(a)(1), which was still in force at the time that appellees submitted their claims for payment to the Government and at the time that appellants filed this suit. Therefore, we will decide this case under the pre-FERA version of section 3729(a)(1).