Opinion ID: 2234605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propriety of Recusal

Text: Although our limited remand did not contemplate a supplemental motion, the trial court has authority to hear a recusal challenge on limited remand. We will only reverse the court's decision to recuse itself if there is evidence of an abuse of discretion. Ordinarily, the issue of recusal comes before us because a judge did not recuse himself when asked, rather than from a judge's decision to recuse. When a judge agrees recusal is necessary, it is a matter based largely on judicial discretion. Here, we have very little to aid our review because no concrete reasons were given for the recusal. In a somewhat similar context, when a judge decides to disqualify an attorney, we have said: Because the district court did not mouth the magic wordsactual conflict or serious potential for conflictdoes not mean the court automatically abused its discretion. In our review we can determine whether the facts available to the court support the court's discretionary decision to disqualify . . . counsel. We emphasize, however, that trial judges should explain their discretionary decisions on the record. It would aid our review if they would make detailed findings of fact and state why the facts show an actual conflict of interest or a serious potential for conflict of interest. State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 1997) (emphasis added). Normally, when a judge does not recuse himself, the burden is on the party seeking recusal to prove that he should have. The State's argument here is that the court should not have recused itself in this situation where Taylor was not forced to bear this burden of proof, show actual prejudice, prove actual partiality, allege sufficient facts of extrajudicial bias, etc. See, e.g., State v. Bear, 452 N.W.2d 430, 434-35 (Iowa 1990). The State correctly states some of the questions we ask on review of a decision not to recuse. However, we do not use this same analysis on appeal when the judge does recuse himself. State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Iowa 1984). In Lawrence, the judge agreed with the State's motion that his recusal was necessary. The defendant appealed, arguing he was biased by the original judge not hearing his case. We noted and held: In support of this argument defendant cites a number of authorities which set forth grounds upon which judges shall either consider recusing themselves or actually recuse themselves from cases. These authorities, however, only set the limits of a judge's decision to refuse recusal. They do not delineate grounds for challenging a judge's decision to step aside . . . [W]e [have previously] said: The right to change a judge is not one of absolute right. The judge is entitled to consult his own mind and he, perhaps better than anyone else, knows whether or not he can give a defendant on trial before him a fair and impartial trial in every way. The high appreciation of judicial duties should prompt any judge to refrain from presiding at the trial of one charged with crime when he feels a consciousness that he cannot act in the matter with impartiality and without a feeling of prejudice. The right, if it exists at all, to retain a certain judge to preside over a specific case is even more tenuous. The judge here did not recuse himself because he believed his ability to be impartial was [not] in any way affected by the motion. He simply felt his trial rulings might be questioned in the mistaken belief he was reacting in some way to the fact he had been asked to step aside. We cannot say this was unreasonable. There was no error [in the recusal]. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 605.17 (1981) (repealed 1983); Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1); State v. Smith, 282 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Iowa 1979); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 323-24 (Iowa 1976)) (quoting State v. Gibson, 204 Iowa 1306, 1310, 214 N.W. 743, 745 (1927)). Because this is largely an issue of discretion, we will uphold the recusal if it was reasonable. See Gibson, 204 Iowa at 1310, 214 N.W. at 745; see also State v. Veal, 564 N.W.2d 797, 812-13 (Iowa 1997) (approving judge's recusal from sentencing after meeting with prosecutor at a bar following conviction). Here, the district court judge gave the same reason for his recusal the judge gave in Lawrence . Neither admitted they were biased, but rather, sacrificed their control of the case to temper the appearance of impropriety once their predilections had been challenged. Although we agree with our emphasis in Vanover, i.e., that courts should provide a factual basis on the record for decisions left to their discretion, we have never found that the decision to recuse to avoid the appearance of impropriety is an abuse of discretion. We decline to do so today. As such, we find it was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to recuse himself.