Opinion ID: 2001201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: State v. Barker Analysis

Text: As noted earlier, Judge Moran determined that even if the ex parte meeting between Judge Finn and the Thimm family was not procedurally barred, there was no violation of State v. Barker, 227 Neb. 842, 420 N.W.2d 695 (1988), and that, in any event, Ryan suffered no prejudice as a result of the meeting. Ryan, however, contends that State v. Barker, supra , was violated and that an automatic remand was required once the ex parte meeting was factually determined to have occurred. Further, Ryan contends that the ex parte meeting violated his constitutional due process rights and that he was prejudiced as a result. In State v. Barker, supra , Barker was charged with second degree murder but was convicted of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. On direct appeal, Barker's sole assignment of error was that the sentencing judge failed to recuse himself, as requested by Barker, after the judge had met ex parte with the victim's family prior to sentencing. In response to Barker's motion for recusal, the sentencing judge recounted what had transpired during the ex parte meeting, found that the court was in no way prejudiced by the meeting, and refused to recuse himself. In remanding Barker's case for a new sentencing hearing to be conducted by a different judge, we fashioned a recusal rule based upon the evidentiary concerns regarding judicial testimony. We expressly did not reach the constitutional dimensions of Barker's claim regarding ex parte communications because it was unnecessary to the disposition of Barker's direct appeal. We did not analyze the parameters of Barker's due process rights, although we noted that `the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.' State v. Barker, 227 Neb. at 844, 420 N.W.2d at 697 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977)). Rather, we focused on the ethical and evidentiary concerns that arise when a judge is asked to recuse himself because of an ex parte communication. We therefore announced a recusal rule based on the rationale of Neb. Evid. R. 605, that `[t]he judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness.' State v. Barker, 227 Neb. at 848, 420 N.W.2d at 699. The Barker recusal rule states that a judge, who initiates or invites and receives an ex parte communication concerning a pending or impending proceeding, must recuse himself or herself from the proceedings when a litigant requests such recusal. Id. at 847, 420 N.W.2d at 699. The evidentiary dilemma which State v. Barker, supra , addresses simply does not exist in this postconviction proceeding. In the case before us, Ryan has supplemented his record with Judge Finn's testimony taken in a proceeding over which Judge Finn was not presiding and at which he was, therefore, not incompetent to testify pursuant to Neb. Evid. R. 605. Thus, there is no need to fashion a remedy for an alleged Barker violation when we have the presiding judge's properly obtained testimony before us. The evidentiary concerns that prompted the Barker rule do not exist with regard to Ryan's claims in this proceeding. Further, postconviction relief is a very narrow category of relief, available only to remedy prejudicial constitutional violations. The defendant moving for postconviction relief must allege facts which, if proved, constitute a denial or violation of his or her rights under the state or federal Constitution. State v. Smith, 256 Neb. 705, 592 N.W.2d 143 (1999); State v. Silvers, 255 Neb. 702, 587 N.W.2d 325 (1998). The recusal rule fashioned in State v. Barker, 227 Neb. 842, 420 N.W.2d 695 (1988), is premised on evidentiary principles and judicial ethics. Although these underlying concerns promote due process and efficiency in the legal process, they are separate and distinct from constitutional rights. The Barker rule is not a constitutional right in and of itself. We have never implied or treated State v. Barker, supra , as conferring constitutional protection. In State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), Lotter brought a direct appeal asserting error, in part, because of an ex parte meeting between the prosecutor and the presiding judge. We concluded that Lotter, by failing to make a motion for the judge to recuse himself at the time of the proceedings, had waived the Barker rule. If the Barker rule were a constitutional right, Lotter's failure to motion for recusal would not have been sufficient by itself to waive his right to the judge's recusal. Waiver would only be sufficient if Lotter had been personally apprised of the ex parte communication at issue. State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 889, 891, 587 N.W.2d 673, 674 (1999) (supplemental opinion). In our supplemental opinion to State v. Lotter , we noted: The requirement in Barker that a judge who has participated in an ex parte communication must recuse himself or herself upon request was based upon Nebraska law, and not upon federal constitutional grounds. Thus, Barker and its progeny do not dispose of Lotter's claim that the ex parte communication in this case presented a threat to the impartiality of the trial court and violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.) 255 Neb. at 890, 587 N.W.2d at 674. Simply put, State v. Barker, supra , is not premised on federal or Nebraska constitutional law and in no way expands due process protection in Nebraska. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with our holding in State v. Lotter . Finding Barker itself inapplicable to Ryan's postconviction claims, we turn to the underlying constitutional issue of whether Ryan's due process rights were violated by the May 9, 1986, ex parte meeting.