Opinion ID: 773750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: va's negligence and statute of limitations

Text: 3 Vicarious liability was not the sole basis for Mr. Knudsen's claim against the VA. In his FTCA claim filed on January 12, 1998, Mr. Knudsen also alleged that the VA was itself negligent in failing to supervise Dr. Zitzow and failing to comply with the quality control standards established by Congress and the VA. According to Mr. Knudsen, the VA's negligence caused the lapse in his treatment which in turn caused his permanent impairment. Mr. Knudsen, however, acknowledges that his last counseling with Dr. Zitzow occurred in 1984, as did his Agent Orange exam which was conducted at the VA hospital in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. It was after that exam that VA administrative personnel told him that he could not file a claim for his PTSD or get counseling for it. Mr. Knudsen's next contact with the VA was in 1992 when he admits the VA provided him with the care he needed. 4 Because the FTCA has a two year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. &#167 2401(b), the government argues that Mr. Knudsen's claim based on the VA's primary negligence is barred. Relying on U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120-122 (1979), Mr. Knudsen counters that the statute of limitations was tolled until he knew both the existence of his injury and its cause. 5 An FTCA claim accrues when the injured person knows or reasonably should know both the existence and cause of his injury. U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120-122 (1979); Slaaten v. U. S., 990 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 1993). Accrual occurs at that point even if the injured person does not know that the injury is legally redressable. K.E.S. v. U.S., 38 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 1994). 6 The gravamen of Mr. Knudsen's claim is that the VA did not follow its own standards or the standards mandated by Congress, and as a result Mr. Knudsen did not get referred for additional counseling, and his PTSD progressed until he was permanently and totally disabled. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Knudsen stated: Dr. Zitzow first saw Plaintiff on or about November of 1983. He diagnosed Plaintiff as having Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and recommended that Plaintiff have continued therapy and possible inpatient treatment in an appropriate VA program to prevent this condition for (sic) becoming worse. 17, Amended Complaint, J.A. 34 (emphasis added). In his deposition Mr. Knudsen confirmed that the statement he made in 17 of his Amended Complaint was true. J.A. 189. He also stated: I wouldn't have filled [the Agent Orange form] out there with [Dr. Zitzow] that particular night and had it sent in. I wouldn't have done that if he would not have been suggesting that in order for things not to progress at a rate that he said it's treatable, but it isn't - you know, basically, the old adage of its treatable but not curable and take care of business now and continue. J.A. 178. 7 In response to the government's motion for summary judgment, however, Mr. Knudsen filed an affidavit in which he stated that Dr. Zitzow never told him that his PTSD condition would worsen without treatment. 8 Putting aside for a moment Mr. Knudsen's affidavit that was filed in response to the government's motion for summary judgment, the record is clear that as of 1984, Mr. Knudsen knew that he had PTSD, that it was a progressive disease, and that he needed counseling for it. When he was explicitly denied counseling by the VA in 1984, he knew, or reasonably should have known, both the existence and cause of his injury. He needed counseling to prevent his PTSD from becoming worse, and he was denied treatment. His failure to understand exactly how debilitating his disease would become without treatment does not justify tolling the statute of limitations. K.E.S. v. United States, 38 F.3d 1027, 1029-1030 (8th Cir. 1994). 9 Mr. Knudsen's affidavit stating that he did not know that PTSD would get worse without treatment does not alter the Court's conclusion that the statute of limitations bars his claim. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Knudsen alleged that Dr. Zitzow told him that he had PTSD and recommended continued treatment to prevent his condition from becoming worse. In a deposition, Mr. Knudsen confirmed this fact. Mr. Knudsen's later affidavit contradicting his pleading and his deposition testimony cannot create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment. American Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 F.3d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1997); Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1983). Furthermore, factual statements in a party's pleadings are generally binding on that party unless the pleading is amended. Missouri Housing Development Comm'n v. Brice, 919 F.2d 1306, 1314 (8th Cir. 1990); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 1968). [A] party is bound by what it states in its pleading . . . . [A]lthough the rule smacks of legalism, judicial efficiency demands that a party not be allowed to controvert what it has already unequivocally told a court by the most formal and considered means possible. Soo Line R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997). 10 While Mr. Knudsen's later affidavit states that he did not know his PTSD would get worse without treatment, a fair reading of his Amended Complaint shows that Dr. Zitzow told Mr. Knudsen that he should continue treatment to prevent his PTSD from becoming worse. This fact is further supported by Mr. Knudsen's deposition testimony. 11 Because the statute of limitations bars his claim against the VA for failing to provide him with the care to which he was entitled, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment for the United States. 12 The judgment is affirmed.