Opinion ID: 1476601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: What to Make of the Evidence Adduced Through Bailey?

Text: I agree that the trial judge in Archer's case, Judge Prevas, made unduly heavy-handed comments to Bailey and his lawyer in an effort to induce Bailey to testify at Archer's trial, as Bailey had promised to do in his earlier plea agreement with the State. Petitioner contends, and the Majority accepts, that, but for Judge Prevas's comments during Archer's trial, Bailey would have stood firm on his refusal to testify and, therefore, the jury would not have heard Bailey's live testimony, nor excerpts from his videotaped testimony from the co-defendant's trial on 30 August 1999. I am not convinced, on this record, that Judge Prevas's comments at Archer's trial necessarily were the clear, procuring cause of Bailey's decision to testify. [1] Although inappropriate in context, the judge's threat of life imprisonment for contempt was moderated more than Petitioner would have us believe. [2] More importantly, even after these dire admonitions, Bailey nonetheless refused to testify, choosing instead to take his chances in a contempt trial before Judge Themelis. There is no credible record of what transpired before Judge Themelis. It is a fact, however, that only after appearing before him did Bailey agree to testify in Archer's trial. When asked directly during Archer's trial what occurred in Judge Themelis's courtroom, Bailey testified, The only thing I heard him say was that if I don't testify, it will be 20 years. I don't know if I would get the 20 years but if the jury found me guilty.  (emphasis added). Bailey's ultimate decision to testify, therefore, was not based necessarily on the prospect of a summary conviction for contempt with a punishment of life imprisonment as supposedly theorized by Judge Prevas, but more likely because he perceived a risk of imprisonment of perhaps up to twenty years from Judge Themelis if he were found guilty of contempt by a jury. For all we know on this record, whatever Judge Themelis said to Bailey could have conformed to the ideals urged by the Majority ( see Maj. op. at 226-28). Petitioner further contends that Bailey's testimony also was procured by Judge Prevas effectively granting Bailey a license to commit perjury. I am not convinced that the inappropriate suggestion to Bailey that he may choose to testify more favorably (or at least friendlier) to Archer than in his prior testimony was a determinative factor in Bailey's election to testify. Bailey's stated reason for his reluctance to testify stemmed from a jailhouse assault upon him, which he attributed to retribution for his earlier testimony at the co-defendant's trial and inferentially as a warning regarding further testimony about the crimes. Yet, at Archer's trial, Bailey, supposedly freed by Judge Prevas of any fear of a perjury charge, nonetheless provided substantial and relevant inculpating testimony against Archer, stating that Archer joined in the conspiracy to commit robbery; that he armed himself for that purpose; and, that he participated in the attempted robbery and shooting. These elements of his testimony at Archer's trial were consistent with his earlier testimony at Edmonds's trial. Let us consider for a moment the asserted inconsistencies between Bailey's testimony at the co-defendant's prior trial and that given at Archer's trial. First, at the prior trial, when asked by the State how he and the co-defendants reached the decision to commit robbery, Bailey testified, [Archer] seen some nice chains that he wanted so he told us, we got to go out the way to get some guns to come back down here and get some chains.... But at Archer's trial, when asked whose idea it was to commit the robbery, Bailey testified, It was Keith [Edmonds] out there. When confronted by the State about this inconsistency, Bailey testified, We all said that [we should commit robbery], so that ain't nothing. The second inconsistency was premised on, at the prior trial, Bailey testified that Archer approached Lyons at the start of the robbery. At Archer's trial, however, Bailey testified that he didn't see whom Archer approached: I wasn't paying nobody no mind. I wasn't paying [Archer] no mind. When confronted about the vagueness of this testimony, Bailey said of his prior testimony, I guess that's who we had. I didn't know who had who for real. When pressed further by the State, Bailey testified, It was that [the events were fresher in his mind at the prior trial]. But not really though. Because I forget things. You understand, I was going to ... a slow education school. The final inconsistency in Bailey's testimony was whether he observed, after the robbery-homicide, Edmonds hand his gun to Archer. At the prior trial, Bailey admitted to seeing the transfer; but at Archer's trial, when asked if observed the transfer of the gun, Bailey testified, . . . I ain't see [sic] that. Give the gun? I don't recall. These so-called inconsistencies do not amount to perjurious testimony given under the implied immunity that Petitioner asserts Judge Prevas effectively extended. To the contrary, it is just as likely that Bailey gave testimony to the best of his present recollection, given the lapse of five years since the shooting and the fact that Bailey was a self-described slow learner who lacked the reading skills necessary to refresh fully his recollection with the transcript of his testimony at the prior trial. [3] In Brown v. State, 339 Md. 385, 663 A.2d 583 (1995), a prosecutor's statement was held to be error where, in her closing argument to the jury, she argued that if it found the defendant guilty, it could recommend mercy. Id. at 395-96, 663 A.2d at 588-89. The jury found the defendant guilty, but did not recommend mercy. Id. at 396, 663 A.2d at 589. The majority in Brown could not conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, after considering the prosecutor's remark, had not convicted Brown based on a lesser standard of proof. Id. at 397-98, 663 A.2d at 589. Writing in dissent, Judge Rodowsky, joined by Judges Chasanow and Raker, opined that because the verdict was unqualified, the prosecutor's error was harmless. Id. at 398, 663 A.2d at 590 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). Somewhat similarly, the record in the present case does not compel the conclusion that Bailey relied on the comments of Judge Prevas in Archer's case to reach his decision to testify. As did the Majority in Brown, the Majority here engages in an interesting, but irrelevant, discussion of a problem in the abstract. Id. at 398, 663 A.2d at 590.
Even if Bailey's testimony in Archer's trial was procured solely or was caused proximately by Judge Prevas's comments, the errors committed by Judge Prevas were harmless. When a reviewing court finds trial error, the appellate court must reverse the judgment below unless it concludes the error was harmless. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). In making that determination, the reviewing court conducts an independent review of the record with the end of determining whether it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict. Id. In other words, there must be no reasonable possibility that the decision of the finder of fact would have been different had the tainted evidence been excluded. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 674, 350 A.2d 680, 687 (1976). In the present case, a reasonable fact-finder could have found Archer guilty, absent Bailey's testimony, because there was overwhelming other evidence supporting the convictions. The oft-repeated test for sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 717, 415 A.2d 830, 842 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In the present case, Lyons provided strong and unshaken eyewitness testimony that he got several good looks at Archer's face during the robbery-homicide. Lyons positively identified Archer as the man who shot him on the night of 11 September 1997. In addition to Lyons's testimony, the jury also heard from a second eyewitness, Faulkner. Faulkner testified that he too recognized Archer's face from the robbery-homicide, albeit he saw Archer's face only when running from the scene; thus, his testimony may have commanded somewhat less persuasive force than that of Lyons. In considering the sufficiency of evidence, however, it is not the role of the appellate court to re-weigh evidence or determine the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 465, 682 A.2d 248, 257 (1996) (citing State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 590, 606 A.2d 265, 268 (1992); Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530 at 535, 573 A.2d 831, 833-34 (1990)). Rather, due regard must be given to the jury's findings of fact and its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses. See, e.g., White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855, 861 (2001) (and cases cited therein). Although Faulkner's testimony was not as unequivocal as that of Lyons, his testimony provided a second positive identification of Archer. The record before us shows Lyons's and Faulkner's testimony was uncontradicted, and therefore, under the Jackson analysis, we must assume was believed by the jury. Thus, the jury had before it on which to base its verdict the testimony of two eyewitnesses who saw Archer attempt to rob them at gunpoint and shoot Lyons in the eye. Furthermore, both Lyons and Faulkner independently identified Archer in a live police line-up two years prior to the trial. [4] It is the well-established rule in Maryland that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if believed, is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986); Walters v. State, 242 Md. 235, 237-38, 218 A.2d 678, 680 (1966) (stating, identification by the victim is ample evidence to sustain a conviction.). This Court has held that even when a witness cannot identify the defendant at trial, evidence of the witness's previous identification of the defendant in a line up is sufficient to sustain a verdict. See, e.g., Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 560-61, 629 A.2d 633, 639 (1993); Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 443 A.2d 78 (1982). With the overwhelming evidence provided by Lyons and Faulkner alone, looked at in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found Archer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Prevas's errors, therefore, were harmless. The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals should be affirmed.