Opinion ID: 220543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leedom Financial’s Attorney’s Fee Award

Text: Partners appeals the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Leedom Financial pursuant to Chapter 38,1 which provides that “[a] person may recover 1 “Texas has long followed the ‘American Rule’ prohibiting fee awards unless specifically provided by contract or statute.” MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009). Leedom Financial pleaded its entitlement to attorney’s fees 5 Case: 10-20626 Document: 00511533210 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/07/2011 No. 10-20626 reasonable attorney’s fees from an individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for: . . . (8) an oral or written contract.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2008). Specifically, Partners argues that Leedom Financial failed to plead and prove presentment of its claim to Partners, citing Texas cases. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 2008) (“To recover attorney’s fees under this chapter: (1) the claimant must be represented by an attorney; (2) the claimant must present the claim to the opposing party . . .; and (3) payment for the just amount owed must not have been tendered before the expiration of the 30th day after the claim is presented.”); see also Smith v. United Nat’l Bank-Denton (In re Smith), 966 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Texas case law holding that a party must prove presentment); Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. 1983) (stating that a party must plead and prove presentment and lack of performance under the predecessor statute to Chapter 38); Llanes v. Davila, 133 S.W.3d 635, 640-41 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied).2 The Texas Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the presentment requirement of Chapter 38 “is to enable the debtor to pay the claim within the thirty days and avoid liability for attorney’s fees.” Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Servs. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. 1983); accord Busch v. pursuant to Chapter 38. 2 Partners did not challenge the reasonableness of the amount of the attorney’s fee award in its briefing to this court. We also note that Texas courts have held that to recover attorney’s fees under Chapter 38, a party must: “(1) prevail on a cause of action for which attorney’s fees are recoverable, and (2) recover damages.” See Green Int’l v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Tex. 1997) (holding that because a jury awarded no damages despite finding breach of a subcontract, the prevailing party was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees under Chapter 38). Partners has never argued that Leedom Financial failed to show either that it prevailed or that it recovered damages on its counterclaim. Thus, we do not consider whether Leedom Financial met those two requirements. See LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A]rguments not raised before the district court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 6 Case: 10-20626 Document: 00511533210 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/07/2011 No. 10-20626 Hudson & Keyse, LLC, 312 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). “No particular form of presentment is required.” Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (noting that several forms of presentment have been held sufficient, including oral and written demands and requests for admissions; holding that a letter and telephone conversation sufficed as a matter of law). The presentment also does not have to include an amount owed. Ferch v. Baschnagel, No. 03-04-00605-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1006, at  (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 13, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 911 S.W.2d 463, 474 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds, 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997), and Arch Constr., Inc. v. Tyburec, 730 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Thomas v. Goodman, No. 04-07-00531-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4933, at -12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 2, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., Inc., 101 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)). Turning to the case before us, we first reject Partners’s argument that Leedom Financial cannot recover attorney’s fees because Leedom Financial failed to properly plead presentment and failure to tender performance. Although Leedom Financial did not specifically plead these two elements in its answer and counterclaim, it stated that it was entitled to judgment for reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees pursuant to Chapter 38. The issue of pleading—as distinguished from the substantive requirement of presentment—is a question of federal procedure governed by federal, not Texas, law. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 2008). We have previously found that even though a party failed to cite Chapter 38 in its amended complaint, it may still recover fees under that statute 7 Case: 10-20626 Document: 00511533210 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/07/2011 No. 10-20626 if it clearly presented a claim for attorney’s fees. Enserch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 1485, 1501 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. Cirrus Prod. Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., L.P., No. 92-6357, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11629, at  (10th Cir. May 10, 1993) (unpublished) (concluding “as a matter of substantive Texas law that so long as a claimant prevails on a claim that would support the award of fees under section 38.001 and proves compliance with the requirements of section 38.002, he is entitled to an award of attorney fees, regardless of whether he properly pled compliance with the requirements of section 38.002”). Because Leedom Financial cited Chapter 38 as the basis for its pleaded claim for attorney’s fees, we conclude that this is a sufficient pleading if Leedom Financial in fact proved presentment of the claim and failure to tender performance. Turning to the substantive presentment issue, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that an email sent from in-house counsel for Leedom Financial to Partners met the presentment requirement.3 The email stated that Partners failed to comply with the settlement agreement by continuing to pursue its lawsuit against Leedom Financial in Texas state court. See Aegis Ins. Holding Co., L.P. v. Gaiser, No. 04-05-00938-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2364, at  (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that a party properly presented its claim, as the record showed that the party made numerous oral and written demands for compliance with an agreement). Further, the email stated that if Partners did not stop its pursuit of the lawsuit in Texas, Leedom Financial would be forced to move appropriately. See Standard Constructors, Inc., 101 S.W.3d at 627 (stating that 3 We reject Partners’s argument that the district court erred in considering this email as evidence of presentment. Although the email was not presented to the court until the hearing on Leedom Financial’s motion for attorney’s fees, Partners failed to cite any authority for the proposition that the district court could not consider that evidence because Leedom Financial did not provide it during the underlying summary judgment proceedings. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s consideration of this evidence, and Partners has not established any harm as a result. 8 Case: 10-20626 Document: 00511533210 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/07/2011 No. 10-20626 presentment must include assertion of the debt or claim and a request for compliance); Jim Howe Homes, Inc. v. Rogers, 818 S.W.2d 901, 904 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no pet.) (stating that, at a minimum, presentment must consist of a demand or request for payment). Although the email stated that it was being sent pursuant to Florida procedural rules, the email mentioned Partners’s lawsuit in Texas. We conclude that this email satisfied the purpose of the presentment requirement. Partners does not refute that it failed to tender performance within thirty days of the date of the email. Thus, Leedom Financial was entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees.