Opinion ID: 765383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fair Warning as to the Constitutional Right Violated

Text: 165 The Supreme Court in Lanier pointed out that general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in [some] instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though 'the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful. Id. at 271 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). In my opinion, the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment that [n]o person shall be deprived of life . . . without due process of law, and of the Fourteenth Amendment that nor shall any State deprive any person of life . . . without due process of law, together with 242, made specific every person's right not to be deprived of life without due process of law so as to give adequate advance notice that a person who caused such a deprivation while acting under color of law 'would be visited with punishment . . .[and] not punished for an unknowable something.' Id. at 267 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 105). Moreover, prior court decisions have given fair warning that willful or intentional deprivation of a person's life without due process of law committed under color of law is punishable under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242. 166 In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 797 (1966), the Supreme Court declared that: (1) 241 reaches conspiracies to injure any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution; (2) this language includes rights or privileges protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) this language extends to conspiracies otherwise within the scope of the section participated in by officials alone or in collaboration with private persons. Id. at 798. 167 Moreover, the Price Court concluded that an allegation of official, state participation in murder, accomplished by and through its officers with the participation of others, is an allegation of state actionwhich, beyond dispute, brings the conspiracy within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 799. 168 The Fifth Circuit in Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947), followed the legal principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Screws in affirming the conviction under 18 U.S.C. 52 (now 242) of a town marshal who murdered a black man. The defendant, who had personal animosity toward McFadden (the decedent), was riding in his nephew's automobile when he spotted McFadden, who allegedly was drunk. Crews guided McFadden without resistance to his nephew's car, put him in the rear seat and drove McFadden to a bridge, where Crews forced him to jump into the river, even though McFadden told him that he could not swim. McFadden drowned. Id. at 747-48. 169 This court affirmed Crews's conviction, concluding that Crews acted under color of law in depriving McFadden of the constitutional right to life or liberty or to a fair trial under due processes of law rather than a trial by ordeal. Id. at 749. 170 In a civil case arising under 1983, 1981, 1985(3), and 1986, this court in Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961) (Brown, J.), held that an action against Georgia police officers for the wrongful death of the deceased, allegedly resulting from violations of Federal Civil Rights Statutes, gave rise, by virtue of the Georgia survival statute, of a federally enforceable claim for damages during his lifetime and by his survivors. Before answering the ultimate question of whether such a remedy was available, the court concluded that the Civil Rights Statutes express a clear congressional policy to protect the life of the living from the hazard of death caused by unconstitutional deprivations of civil rights. Id. at 405. According to the court: 171 [I]t defies history to conclude that Congress purposely meant to assure to the living freedom from such unconstitutional deprivations, but that, with like precision, it meant to withdraw the protection of civil rights statutes against the peril of death. The policy of the law and the legislative aim was certainly to protect the security of life and limb as well as property against these actions. Violent injury that would kill was not less prohibited than violence which would cripple. 172 We have fresh evidence of the broad and sweeping aims of Congress with specific regard to 1983. Monroe v. Pape makes an extensive re-examination of the legislative history and summarizes its purpose in this way. The debates are long and extensive. It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claim of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunity guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the State and the state remedy need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. 173 Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added) (internal citations and footnote omitted). 174 Other courts and judges expressly have recognized that 242 criminalizes murder by state officers in the course of official conduct and done with the aid of state power. Screws, 325 U.S. at 129 (Rutledge, J., concurring). See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (There is a constitutional right not to be murdered by a state officer, for the state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when its officer, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of life without due process of law.) (citing Brazier, 293 F.2d at 404-05). Cf. Beard v. O'Neill, 728 F.2d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1984)(The Fifth Amendment guarantees, among other things, that a person will not be deprived of life without due process of law. Jeff Beard had a constitutional right, therefore, not to be murdered by someone acting under color of federal authority. (citing Brazier)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984). See also, discussed in more depth below, United States v. Robinson, 503 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1974), in which the rogue cop who killed Beard (of Beard v. O'Neill, supra), was convicted of violations of 241 and 242 for committing the murder for hire. In Robinson, however, the defendant did not raise and the opinion does not discuss, but apparently assumes, fair warning and color of law requirements were met. 175 These cases, along with others discussed later, make it apparent that the very action in question, i.e., deprivation of a person's life by a state officer in the course of official conduct and done with the aid of state power, is unlawful under the Constitution. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271. 176 Arguably, a person also has a separately defined right protected by the Constitution not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, and this right is also violated by having his or her life taken willfully by a state officer acting under color of law. In United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1104 (1987), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the criminal conviction under 242 of a California Highway Patrol officer who raped and murdered a woman traveling on the highway. According to the indictment, Gwaltney, acting under color of law, willfully assaulted and shot Bishop, thereby causing her death and violating her constitutionally protected right not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law. Id. at 1380-81 (emphasis added). 177 The Gwaltney court held that the following jury instructions were not plainly erroneous: 178 [T]he government was obliged to prove that Gwaltney deprived Bishop of a right secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; that the right not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law is such a right; that the right to liberty includes the principle that no person may be physically assaulted, intimidated, or otherwise abused intentionally and without justification by a person acting under color of state law; and that the right not to be deprived of life without due process of law prohibits a police officer acting under color of law from killing any person without justification. 179 Id. at 1387 (emphasis added). 180 Other courts, including the Fifth Circuit, sometimes have framed the defined right exclusively as the right to liberty without due process. In United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979), this court affirmed the conviction under 242 of a police chief who, along with his son-in-law and two other officers, arrested a suspected burglar, drove him to a deserted area, and shot him to death. The police chief later arranged for his wife, daughter, and sister-in-law to transport the body 400 miles, where they buried the body in a shallow grave in an isolated area. The indictment in Hayes charged the police chief with depriving Richard A. Morales of the right to liberty without due process of law, resulting in the death of Richard A. Morales. Id. at 816 (emphasis added). 181 This court in Hayes declared that the defined right which had been violated was the right to be tried by a court, and not by ordeal, and thus to be free from unlawful assault by state law enforcement officers when lawfully in their custody. Id. at 820 (emphasis added). According to the court, the 1968 amendment to 242, which added life imprisonment where death results, alter[ed] the statute only insofar as requiring the additional elementthat death ensued as a proximate result of the accuseds' willful violation of the victim's defined rights. Id. Significantly, this court declared: 182 The amendment to Section 242 . . . did not proscribe any additional Conduct which was not already punishable under the unamended version of Section 242. Rather, those cases of infringement with defined rights which result in death are a subset of the universe defined as those cases of infringement with defined rights. Activities which fall within the former naturally fall within the latter. Id. at 821. 1 183 Even though the Fifth Circuit held in the earlier case of Crews, and suggested in Brazier, that when a murder is committed under color of state law, the defined rights are life or liberty, Hayes made it apparent that whether the victim of an assault lives or dies, the defined right is liberty, rather than life. Thus, under Hayes, the jury in the present cases was properly instructed. 2 184 Similarly, in United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843, 857 (1987), the First Circuit, in affirming the criminal conviction under 241 and 242 of a police officer who murdered a prosecution witness, found no clear error in the following jury instruction: 185 [O]ne of the liberties secured to the victim involved in this case by the Constitution is the liberty to be free from unlawful attacks upon her person. It has always been the policy of the law to protect the physical integrity of every person from unauthorized violence. Liberty thus includes the principle that no person may ever be physically assaulted, intimidated, or otherwise abused intentionally and without justification by a person acting under the color of law of any state. 186 Id. at 829 (emphasis added). 187 In sum, whether the defined right is one of liberty or of life, or both, the foregoing decisions, together with the express guarantees of due process of law of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, give fair warning that a person's right to life is a protected constitutional right, and that an intentional violation of that right under color of law is proscribed criminal conduct under 241 and 242. 188 E. Fair Warning That Conduct Is Under Color of Law 189 The Supreme Court in Lanier dealt only with the right made specific element of 242. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 264. 3 It is difficult to conceive of any reason, however, that the Due Process fair warning requirement should not apply also to the under color of law element of 242. Assuming that it does, it also follows that the principles and methodology set forth in Lanier for determining whether the requirement was satisfied with respectto a defined right may also be applied to decide whether an accused was given fair warning that the charged conduct amounted to acts under color of law before he engaged in that conduct. 190 Court decisions interpreting the under color of law element of 242 prior to the offenses at issue in these cases gave fair warning to all of the defendants that Len Davis's actions that caused the deprivation of Groves's right to life constituted conduct under color of law. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the under color of provision of 42 U.S.C. 1983 applied to unconstitutional actions taken without state authority as well as unconstitutional action authorized by the state. In that case, the complaint alleged that 13 Chicago police officers: (1) invaded the plaintiffs' home and searched it without a warrant; (2) arrested and detained Mr. Monroe without a warrant and without arraignment; (3) detained him on open charges at the police station for 10 hours, interrogated him about a two-day-old murder, and refused to allow him to call an attorney or his family; and (4) subsequently released him without criminal charges being preferred against him. 191 The Supreme Court in Monroe stated and answered the question presented as whether Congress, in enacting [42 U.S.C. 1983], meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position. . . . We conclude that it did so intend. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172. The Court specifically rejected the argument that 'under color of' enumerated state authority excludes acts of an official or policeman who can show no authority under state law, state custom, or state usage to do what he did. Id. The Court noted that, although one of the aims of the statute was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice[,] id. at 174, the legislation has general and independent application regardless of the substance of state laws or the quality of their enforcement. The Court stated: 192 Although the legislation [42 U.S.C. 1983] was enacted because of the conditions that existed in the South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as applicable to Illinois as it is to the States whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates. It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court. 193 Id. at 183. 194 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Monroe concluded that the meaning given under color of law in the Classic case and in the Screws and Williams Cases was the correct one; and we adhere to it. Id. at 187. The Court recalled that in Classic, it had ruled, 'Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of state law.' Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).  The right involved in the Classic case was the right of voters in a primary to have their votes counted. The laws of Louisiana required the defendants 'to count the ballots, to record the result of the count, and to certify the result of the election.' Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-84 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326). But according to the indictment they did not perform their duty. Id. at 184. The Monroe Court further noted that the Classic case's view of themeaning of the words under color of state law, in 18 U.S.C. 242, was reaffirmed in Screws, 325 U.S. at 108-13; that in Screws, the Court had rejected, as it did in Monroe, the argument that under color of state law included only action taken by officials pursuant to state law; that the Court had adhered to Classic's view in Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70, 99 (1951); that [t]he meaning which the Classic case gave to the phrase 'under color of any law' involved only a construction of the statute. Hence if it states a rule undesirable in its consequences, Congress can change it. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185; that it is beyond doubt that this phrase should be accorded the same construction in both 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 18 U.S.C. 242. Id.; and that since the Screws and Williams decisions, Congress had several pieces of civil rights legislation before it, but on none of those occasions was a word of criticism directed to the prior construction given by the Court to the words under color of law. Id. at 186. 195 The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 797 (1966), contains a short treatise on under color of law that contributes to fair warning that Len Davis's conduct was within the scope of that term, and that private persons, jointly engaged with him in the prohibited action, would be acting under color of law for purposes of the statute. In footnote 7, the Court stated: 196 Under color of law means the same thing in 242 that it does in the civil counterpart of 242, 42 U.S.C. 1983. In cases under 1983, under color of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the state action required under the Fourteenth Amendment. The contrary view in a 242 context was expressed by the dissenters in Screws, and was rejected then, later in Williams II, and finally -- in a 1983 case -- in Monroe v. Pape. Recent decisions of this Court which have given form to the state action doctrine make it clear that the indictments in this case allege conduct on the part of the pr[i]vate defendants which constitutes state action, and hence action under color of law within 242. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, we held that there is state action whenever the State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence (with the otherwise 'private' person whose conduct is said to violate the Fourteenth Amendment)    that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 197 Id. at 794 n.7 (internal citations omitted). 198 Several courts of appeals have dealt with the question of when a state law enforcement officer, whose conduct is usually considered to be state action, becomes a private citizen for state action/under color of law purposes. In United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1991), involving 18 U.S.C. 242, the defendant deputy sheriff was accused of assaulting his wife's former lover under color of law. Affirming his conviction, the Fifth Circuit stated: 199 Tarpley did more than simply use his service weapon and identify himself as a police officer. At several points during his assault of Vestal, he claimed to have special authority for his actions by virtue of his official status. He claimed that he could kill Vestal because he was an officer of the law. Significantly, Tarpley summoned another police officer from the sheriff's station and identified him as a fellow officer and ally. The men then proceeded to run Vestal out of town in their squad car. Thepresence of police and the air of official authority pervaded the entire incident. 200 Id. at 809. 201 Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 910, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 429 U.S. 118 (1976), dealt with an off-duty, out-of-uniform police officer whose involvement in a bar room brawl resulted in his shooting several and killing two persons. The officer did not identify himself as such when he intervened. On the other hand, police department regulations imposed a continuing duty on police officers, even when off duty, to act in connection with any type of police or criminal activity. Also, the officer used mace issued by the department and a gun, similarly issued by the department, which he was required to carry at all times. The Sixth Circuit indicated that the officer was acting under color of law as a matter of law: The fact that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform is not controlling. 'It is the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty, which determines whether the officer has acted under color of law.' Id. at 441. 202 In Revene v. Charles County Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1989), an off-duty deputy sheriff shot and killed plaintiff's decedent. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal on state action grounds. Even though the defendant was off duty, out of uniform, and driving his own vehicle, as a matter of local law he was on duty twenty-four hours a day and was expected to take proper police action when appropriate. Id. at 873. 203 Other cases have drawn helpful distinctions: Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order. . . . [However,][i]f the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.); Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1984) (This case is unlike a situation where a uniformed police officer, who is in a position to prevent violence, observes a murder without intervening in any way. . . . Indeed, the officer's presence and authority might facilitate the murder by providing the symbolic support of the government. In such a case, the officer might be personally liable for the acts of the person who operated the murder weapon.). 204 Accordingly, an act is under color of law when it constitutes a '[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326); Tarpley, 945 F.2d at 809; Lanier, 33 F.3d. at 653. It is clear that under 'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law. Screws, 325 U.S. at 111. Accord Tarpley, 945 F.2d at 809; Lanier, 33 F.3d at 653. Individuals pursuing private aims but not using or misusing state authority are not acting under color of law purely because they are state officers. See Tarpley, 945 F.2d at 809; Lanier, 33 F.3d at 653. However,[a]cts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it. Screws, 325 U.S. at 111. Screws does not mean that if officials act for purely personal reasons, they necessarily fail to act 'under color of law.' Tarpley, 945 F.2d at 809 (citing Brown v. Miller, 631 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1983)). 205 Consequently, Davis, Hardy, and Causey had adequate advance notice that their actions were not merely part of Davis's pursuit of a purely personal goal, but also involved a substantial use or misuse of theauthority and power vested in him by state law: (1) Davis's actions were taken to protect his position as a police officer, to retaliate against Groves for informing the IAD of his alleged previous acts under color of law in misuse of his authority, and to send the IAD a message to leave him alone in his exercise of the powers of his office; (2) While acting under the pretense of performing his official duties, Davis used the police station, police squad car, police radio, and police telephone, as well as his presence as a fully armed and equipped, uniformed policeman, driving a marked police squad car, to plan, direct, and effectuate the murder of Groves; (3) Davis had the power as a police officer to either protect or not protect Hardy and Causey from investigation and arrest for numerous crimes; Davis used this power vested in him by the state to persuade and require Hardy and Causey to murder Groves; (4) Davis used his authority and the power of his office to provide, on his own watch, surveillance, lookout, and cover for the killers under which they began and carried out most of the homicide operation; (5) After setting the murder scheme in motion, Davis continued to misuse his authority and responsibility by deliberately allowing the criminal activity to proceed unimpeded, contrary to his obligation as a police officer, whether on duty or off, to interdict known breaches of the peace; (6) Hardy and Causey joined and executed the murder operation with full knowledge and consent to the foregoing facts. 206 It is true that, unlike the present case, most of the previous decisions upholding convictions under 241 and 242, and civil judgments under 1983, for unconstitutional deprivations of life and liberty by law enforcement officers involved the officer's personal operation of the weapon or other criminal means. There is no reason in law, common sense, or morality, however, for any rational person, whether he is a police officer or a co-participant in an offense with the officer, to believe that the deprivation of a person's constitutional right to life by an officer's use and misuse of his authority through an intermediary would not be equally as unlawful as such a deprivation by the officer's own hand. The Supreme Court has upheld convictions under 241 or 242 despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269 (citing authorities). In sum, as with civil liability under 1983 or Bivens, all that can usefully be said about criminal liability under 242 is that it may be imposed for deprivation of a constitutional right if, but only if, 'in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [under the Constitution] is apparent[.]' Where it is, the constitutional requirement of fair warning is satisfied. Id. at 271-72 (internal citation omitted). 4 207 Applying the fair warning standard, principles, and methodology clarified by the Supreme Court in Lanier, by analogy, I conclude that each of the defendants in the present cases was given fair warning by prior decisions that the conduct he intentionally chose to engage in would amount to acts under color of law and subject him to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. 242. 208