Opinion ID: 78310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of Post-deprivation Remedies

Text: Reams contends that, even if she was not entitled to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing, the process she did receive was constitutionally inadequate because: (1) she had to wait seven months before she was afforded an initial hearing, and (2) the settlement conference in which she participated with GDA officials was not meaningful in a constitutional sense as it did not offer [her] the right to subpoena evidence or witnesses, directly or cross-examine witnesses, or present her case to an unbiased decision-maker. Appellant's Brief at 26. The Humane Care for Equines Act affords equine owners an opportunity for a hearing to contest any impoundment. It provides: Any ... equine owner ... aggrieved or adversely affected by any order or action of the Commissioner to include ... impoundment ... upon petition within 30 days after the issuance of such order or the taking of such action, shall have a right to a hearing before a hearing officer appointed or designated for such purpose by the Commissioner. The decision of the hearing officer shall constitute an initial decision of the Department of Agriculture, and any party to the hearing ... shall have the right to final agency review before the Commissioner. O.C.G.A. § 2-2-9.1(d) (quotation marks omitted). Even assuming, arguendo, that the process Reams received under the Act was inadequate from a timeliness standpoint and not truly meaningful, Appellant's Brief at 24, her § 1983 due process claim is nevertheless incognizable. It is well-settled that a constitutional violation is actionable under § 1983 only when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) ( en banc ); see also Foxy Lady, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 347 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2003) ([E]ven if a procedural deprivation exists ..., such a claim will not be cognizable under § 1983 if the state provides a means by which to remedy the alleged deprivation.); Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1331 (It is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim.). In Cotton, we observed that [t]his rule (that a section 1983 claim is not stated unless inadequate state procedures exist to remedy an alleged procedural deprivation) recognizes that the state must have the opportunity to remedy the procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in the appropriate fora-agencies, review boards, and state courts before being subjected to a claim alleging a procedural due process violation. Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1331 (quotation marks omitted); see Horton v. Bd. of Co. Com'rs of Flagler Co., 202 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir.2000) (no federal procedural due process violation under McKinney if state courts generally would provide an adequate remedy for the procedural deprivation the federal court plaintiff claims to have suffered). The question is thus whether the state provided Reams with the means to present her allegations, demonstrate that the impoundment was wrongful, and receive redress from that deprivation. See Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1527 (11th Cir.1994). We find that it did. In addition to administrative review, an equine owner like Reams who is adversely affected by an order or action of the Commissioner may, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 2-2-9.1(n), seek judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act (APA). That Act provides: Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.... A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a). On review, the superior court may reverse or modify the [agency's] decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ... [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. Id. § 50-13-19(h). Because [i]nherent in [the] power to review is the power to remedy deficiencies and to cure violations of due process, McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1563, the review available in this case more than satisfies [the] requirement that the state provide a remedy that is adequate to correct the alleged procedural due process violation. Narey, 32 F.3d at 1527 (quotation marks and citation omitted); Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1331 ([C]ertiorari [to the state courts] is generally an adequate state remedy.). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that [t]he judicial safety valve provided by the Georgia [APA] foreclose[d] any constitutional challenge to the procedural adequacy of the hearing-and-appeal procedure set forth in the Humane Care for Equines Act. R5-85 at 15. Inasmuch as Reams failed to establish a constitutional violation, appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. See McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557 (due process violation not complete unless and until [a] State fails to provide due process (citation and quotation marks omitted)).