Opinion ID: 1187046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Manville's statement protected by the attorney-client privilege where it was made to an employee of her attorney, rather than the attorney himself?

Text: Again, former Civil Rule 43(h)(2) and Alaska case law do not address this issue. However, the attorney-client privilege set out in the new Evidence Rules provides an affirmative answer. Rule 503(b) sets out the general rule of privilege: A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative ... . (Emphasis added.) Rule 503(a)(4) provides a definition of representative of a lawyer: A representative of the lawyer is one employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services. The Evidence Rules Commentary states: The definition of `representative of the lawyer' recognizes that the lawyer may, in rendering legal services, utilize the services of assistants in addition to those employed in the process of communicating . Evidence Rules Commentary 503(a)(4) (emphasis added). This language clearly indicates that even in the absence of the representative of the lawyer language, the attorney-client privilege would protect confidential client communication to the attorney's employee who is used simply as a conduit for communication. This conforms to the dictates of the traditional common-law privilege. Even the courts which took the strictest view of the common-law privilege held that it extended to laymen who are necessary intermediaries between attorney and client. 8 J. Wigmore, supra, § 2301, at 583 & n. 1; C. McCormick, supra, § 89, at 182, § 91 at 188-89. Accord, United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 920-23 (2d Cir.1961); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d 26, 30-31 (1951). See cases collected in: Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 125, § 32-33, 147-48 (1964 & Supps. 1976 & 1980); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses §§ 179, 191, 217 (1976 & Supp. 1980); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 276c(1), (2) (1957 & Supp. 1980). In the present case, Manville's communication to her attorneys' employee, Ward, would be protected by even the most restrictive interpretation of the common-law privilege. In this case, the investigator was an employee and agent of the attorney who was acting as a conduit for the transmission of information from the client to her attorney.