Opinion ID: 799732
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nacirema Environmental Services, Inc.

Text: Finally, we address Munoz‟s § 1983 claim against Nacirema. We will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of Nacirema. Munoz asserts in his opening brief that Nacirema is liable only for negligent demolition and conversion, both violations of New Jersey state law. Perhaps recognizing that § 1983 liability cannot be premised on violations purely of state law, see Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007), in his reply brief, Munoz asserts for the first time that Nacirema is liable under § 1983 as an instrumentality of Union City. We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204 n.29 (3d Cir. 1990). No reason is present here to deviate from this rule; Munoz has waived the argument that Nacirema is liable under § 1983.6 Even if we were to look past Munoz‟s waiver, the argument fails on the merits. “Although it is possible for a private party to violate an individual‟s § 1983 rights, the individual alleging such a violation is not relieved of the obligation to establish that the private party acted under color of state law.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d 6 This Court‟s finding of waiver is equally supported by Munoz‟s cursory, onesentence argument regarding Nacirema‟s liability, devoid of any legal support. This opaque reference is insufficient to preserve the argument on appeal. Cf. United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (“This one-sentence footnote falls far short of meeting the requirement that an appellant raise an issue in his opening brief or else waive the issue on appeal.”). 13 Cir. 1993).7 This requires the plaintiff to show “a sufficiently close nexus” between the actions of the private party and the State to warrant treating the actions as those of the State. Id. (citation omitted). We have outlined three circumstances in which the requisite nexus exists: (1) the private party performed a function typically performed by the State; (2) the private party acted in concert with the State; or (3) the State has become interdependent with the private party. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We can discern no fact in the record to support a finding that Nacirema was a state actor under any of these circumstances. Munoz baldly alleges that Nacirema, a private contractor, acted as the agent of Union City in performing the demolition and is liable for constitutional violations to the extent Union City is liable. The only supporting fact that Munoz points to is the contract between Union City and Nacirema for the demolition. Simply because Nacirema performed pursuant to a public contract does not suffice to establish state action. Boyle v. Governor’s Veterans Outreach & Assistance Ctr., 925 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1991).8 7 Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently held, a private party acting at the behest of the state can invoke qualified immunity. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1666 (2012) (establishing that a private individual retained by the state can seek qualified immunity under § 1983). 8 The District Court granted summary judgment regarding all federal claims but failed to comment on its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The District Court would have been required to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, absent a countervailing reason, given that the District Court disposed of all federal claims providing it with original jurisdiction. Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Despite the District Court‟s omission, we presume that it declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction because Munoz has pointed to no factor counseling in favor of the District Court 14