Opinion ID: 564390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Dismissed Robbery Counts

Text: 4 Perkins claims that the district court improperly denied his pretrial motion to introduce evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) of the dismissed robbery counts and contends that the district court's ruling precluded him from developing his theory of the case. Perkins argues that the distinct modus operandi of the four crimes shows that the same person committed all of the robberies and that because Perkins was at work during two of them he could not be the robber. Perkins stresses that the government initially proceeded against him on the theory that he committed each of the four charged robberies, and accordingly, he should be able to preserve the same theory of defense even after the government dismissed three of the counts. 5 The district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Brannon, 616 F.2d 413, 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 2993, 64 L.Ed.2d 858 (1980). 6 A defendant is entitled to introduce evidence which tends to prove someone else committed the crime. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir.1980); Brannon, 616 F.2d at 418. One way of proving mistaken identity is by showing that other crimes similar in detail have been committed at or about the same time by a person other than the defendant. Of course, the district court may exclude this evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403, if it is likely to confuse the issues or mislead the jury. 7 The identity exception to Rule 404(b) requires that the characteristics of the other crime or act be sufficiently distinctive to warrant an inference that the person who committed the act also committed the offense at issue. United States v. Andrini, 685 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.1982). [I]f the characteristics of both the prior offense and the charged offense are not in any way distinctive, but are similar to numerous other crimes committed by persons other than the defendant, no inference of identity can arise. United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir.1978). 8 The modus operandi of the dismissed counts is not sufficiently similar to the charged offense to support an inference of identity and warrant admission under Rule 404(b). The robberies all involved a man supposedly wearing various disguises (fake moustache, beard, glasses, etc.), approaching the teller with something to carry away money, handing the teller a note or making a statement requesting money, and warning the teller not to push any buttons. In the district court, Perkins seized on the fact that the robber used a tennis racket cover to carry the money away as a sufficiently distinctive feature of the crimes. However, while unusual, this alleged signature element was present in only two of the four robberies and not in the November 9 robbery for which Perkins was tried and ultimately convicted. While the same person may have committed the two tennis racket cover robberies, the similarity of those crimes says nothing about who committed the instant offense. The robbery at issue did not involve any peculiar, unique, or bizarre conduct so as to constitute a personal signature; rather it was similar to most bank robberies. See United States v. Ezzell, 644 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir.1968)). The points of similarity between the [two] robberies were ones which are so common to most bank robberies as to be entirely unhelpful.... [T]he requirements of Rule 404(b) were not met here. Id. 9 Moreover, even if the evidence was properly admissible under Rule 404(b), it must nevertheless undergo the probative-prejudice balancing required under Rule 403 and may be excluded if the jury is likely to be confused or misled. Andrini, 685 F.2d at 1097; Brannon, 616 F.2d at 418. The district court did not abuse its discretion in focusing the trial on the offense at issue, and not allowing the parties to stray and discuss the details of several extraneous robberies. 10 Perkins cannot transform the exclusion of this evidence into constitutional error by arguing that he was deprived of his right to present a defense. The right to present a defense is clearly fundamental, but [i]n the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 313 (1973). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence as not probative of identity under Rule 404(b) and likely to mislead or confuse the jury under Rule 403. In any event, the district court did not deprive Perkins of the opportunity to present evidence critical to his defense; Perkins was permitted to, and did, present other evidence from which he could argue and the jury could infer that someone else committed the crime. Nor did the district court prevent Perkins from rebutting evidence introduced by the government. 1