Opinion ID: 774362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Giving Meaning to the Whole Statute

Text: 45 Does §§ 1252(e)(5) erect an absolute bar to habeas review of the substance of an expedited removal order? While the statute is clear that judicial review does not extend to actual admissibility, stopping there neglects a further question: how do we reconcile the statutory predicates for expedited removals found at §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) with the judicial review provisions of §§§§ 1252(e)(2)(B) and 1252(e)(5)? 46 Separate provisions of a single statute, such as IIRIRA, should be interpreted harmoniously, in a manner that renders none of the provisions surplusage. Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 198 F.3d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1999). The majority's view of §§ 1252(e)(2)(B) would render the specific requirements for expedited removal found at §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) surplusage. Under that provision, an expedited removal order is only to be issued where the alien is inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) (fraud or willful misrepresentation to gain admission) or §§ 1182(a)(7) (no valid visa). If INS is allowed to remove aliens for any reason whatsoever (or no reason, as in Li's case), then these statutory predicates for an expedited removal have no legal teeth and are mere surplusage. Indeed, INS realizes that §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) presents clear prerequisites for proper issuance of an expedited removal order -that is why Form I-860 contains a blank space in which the agent is supposed to explain the particular fraud or willful misrepresentation that triggers inadmissibility under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C). Judicial foreclosure of any sort of review of the substance of an expedited removal order, rendering the statutory substantive requirements mere surplusage, is unwarranted where, as here, the statute permits another reading.