Opinion ID: 516812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jury bias or misconduct

Text: 17 Kabir and Batin assert that the district court gave an ineffectual admonition prior to the return of the verdict and unduly delayed conducting a voir dire of the jurors after the verdict. The defendants also challenge the procedure used by the district court as deficient, arguing that they were not afforded an adequate opportunity to prove actual bias. Finally, the defendants argue that the evidence in fact demonstrated bias and prejudice and that the district court erred in relying upon the challenged jurors' assurances that their decision was reached without bias or prejudice. 18 Where jury partiality or misconduct is alleged, the remedy is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982)). In light of Phillips, this court in Pennell concluded that the burden of proof rests upon a defendant to demonstrate that unauthorized communications with jurors resulted in actual juror partiality. Prejudice is not to be presumed. 737 F.2d at 532. 3 Phillips indicates that post-verdict interviews are constitutionally sufficient to decide allegations of juror impartiality. United States v. Adams, 799 F.2d 665, 669 (11th Cir.1986) (citing to Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217-18 and Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230 (1954)). See also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985). 19 We perceive no constitutional deficiency in the manner in which Judge Aldrich chose to proceed. The defendants' counsel voiced no objection prior to the time of that procedure. In their subsequent motion for a mistrial, Batin and Kabir requested a voir dire of the jurors to determine their state of mind. Judge Aldrich's decision to defer, in our view, complied with the requirements of Remmer and Phillips. 20 The defendants also complain that defense counsel were not allowed to question the jurors directly regarding the sketching incident, and Kabir also challenges the district court's failure to afford him or his counsel the opportunity to examine jurors Wilson and Luksic regarding the alleged racial slurs. All that is required, however, is a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230. We find no merit in the defendants' contentions. 21 The nature and extent of an investigation or hearing in this respect rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Shackleford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128, 1130 (6th Cir.1973). See also Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.1987). In United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989 (11th Cir.1985), the Eleventh Circuit approved the district court's questioning of the jurors with counsel being given the opportunity to provide input, noting that had counsel taken an active role in the questioning, it would have put the juror and the defendant in an adversarial posture, which could have had an adverse affect on the juror. 776 F.2d at 997. We are not persuaded, therefore, by defendants' contentions in this respect. 22 Defense counsel, in the midst of the voir dire, requested that juror Wilson be questioned about the alleged slur based at that point upon unverified, anonymous information. The district judge stated the proposed question for the record, but refused to pose it to juror Wilson. Again, this handling of the alleged episode rested in the discretion of the trial court. We find no error in this regard. See United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 664 (6th Cir.1987) (no abuse of discretion in refusal to conduct hearing into the question of possible juror misconduct based upon unverified allegations communicated by defense counsel); Caldwell, 776 F.2d at 998 ([t]he more speculative or unsubstantiated the allegation of misconduct, the less the burden to investigate); United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385, 1391 (10th Cir.1986) (trial court justified in requiring defense counsel to produce more specific information before conducting inquiry). 23 The delay in later investigation of this episode is explained by Judge Aldrich in her Memorandum and Order of August 17, 1987 as resulting from the defendants' delay in filing briefs in support of their motions for new trial combined with an accident suffered by Judge Aldrich. We find no due process violation under these circumstances, but we do not approve the district court's use of her law clerk in regard to jury contact. 24 We do not disturb the district court's findings regarding the jurors because she carefully gave her reasons for these findings, as well as for not crediting the two spectators, offered by defendants, who allegedly overheard the racial slur. Denial of a new trial was not erroneous, and we affirm this decision.