Opinion ID: 2814816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for New Trial on Graham’s Counterclaim

Text: Graham asserts the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on his wrongful-termination counterclaim. Graham claims he was entitled to a new trial because the district court refused to give his proposed jury instruction defining the word “dishonest.” Our review of the denial of a proposed jury instruction is for abuse of discretion. Safety Nat. Cas. Corp. v. Austin Resolutions, Inc., 639 F.3d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 2011). “[F]ailure to give a proposed instruction must result in prejudice to the requesting party before a new trial will be ordered.” Cox v. Dubuque Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.3d 492, 497 (8th Cir. 1998). The court abuses its discretion only when the omitted instruction: “(1) correctly state[s] the applicable law; (2) address[es] matters not adequately covered by the charge; and (3) involve[s] a point ‘so important that failure to give the instruction seriously impaired the party’s ability to present an effective case.’” Id. at 496 (quoting Thomlison v. City of Omaha, 63 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1995)). “Our review is limited to determining whether the instructions, when taken as a whole and in light of the particular issues presented, fairly and adequately presented the evidence and the applicable law to a jury.” Am. Family -8- Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hollander, 705 F.3d 339, 355 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted) (interpreting Wisconsin law). A key issue in dispute on Graham’s counterclaim was whether American Family was entitled to terminate Graham’s Agent Agreement without notice because he had engaged in “dishonest” conduct. The parties disputed what “dishonest” meant in the context of the Agent Agreement, and both parties proposed a jury instruction that offered a definition of “dishonest.” In the alternative, Graham requested a contra proferentum instruction,4 which would instruct the jury how to determine what the parties intended by using the word “dishonest.” The district court found that the term “dishonest” was ambiguous and thus should be submitted to the jury, and it instructed the jury on contra proferentum. See Hollander, 705 F.3d at 355. The court further concluded that Wisconsin law does not allow the court to instruct both on contra proferentum and to give an instruction defining the disputed term. The court thus declined to give either of the proposed instructions defining “dishonest.” See id. (citing D’Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Prods. Co., 207 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Wis. 1973)). Graham does not argue the district court erred in giving the contra proferentum instruction. Instead, he argues the district court erred in failing to give his proferred instruction defining “dishonest.” We agree with the district court that it would be error under Wisconsin law to give a contra proferentum instruction—which requires a finding that a word is ambiguous—and to then define the same word in another 4 “Contra proferentum is Latin for ‘against the offeror.’” Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 809 N.W.2d 529, 535 n. 5 (Wis. 2012) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (7th ed.1999)). The instruction given was a model Wisconsin jury instruction. Both parties agree Wisconsin law applies. -9- instruction. The district court properly instructed the jury regarding the term “dishonesty.”5