Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unadjudicated Criminal Activity (Oliver)

Text: Oliver challenges the admission of certain aggravating evidence under section 190.3, factor (b), and presents a related instructional claim. He alleges that such errors violated his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination. The prosecution introduced evidence of  criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.  (§ 190.3, factor (b), italics added.) This section allows proof of violent conduct, other than the capital crime, that itself is criminal. ( People v. Anderson (2000) 25 Cal.4th 543, 584, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Such other violent crimes are admissible regardless of when they were committed or whether they led to criminal charges or convictions, except as to acts for which the defendant was acquitted. ( Ibid. ) The penalty instructions must make clear that an individual juror may consider other violent crimes in aggravation only if he or she is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed them. ( Ibid.; People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, 585, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) Here, the challenged factor (b) evidence involves (1) Oliver's possession of a long plastic knife in San Quentin Prison, (2) his act of throwing a carton of milk and hot coffee at a prison guard in Chino, and (3) his 1981 death threats over the telephone to Lewis's wife, Jeanett Hudson, and to her sister, Nadine Burchett. On appeal, Oliver argues that these acts did not satisfy the crime and/or violence requirements of section 190.3, factor (b), and that they were inadmissible in aggravation at the penalty phase. We reject the claim. As a threshold matter, Oliver failed to object to the admission of the foregoing evidence on any ground at trial. He therefore has forfeited his appellate claims under both statutory ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 588, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142) and constitutional ( Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765) law. The evidence also was properly admitted under section 190.3, factor (b). Contrary to what Oliver suggests, the jury could infer that he knowingly possessed the knife in prison in violation of penal law. (§ 4502, subd. (a).) Indeed, the jury could infer that the weapon was carefully hidden from view in the rear of his one-man cell. Such possession involves an implied threat of violence. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569, 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) The prosecution was not required to show that Oliver intended to use the weapon in a provocative or threatening manner. ( Ibid.; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 383, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) The complaints about admissibility therefore fail. As to the second incident, in which Oliver threw a carton of milk and hot coffee at a prison guard, the jury could infer that he committed an unlawful and physically threatening act, i.e., an assault. (§ 240.) The evidence showed that Oliver threw the items at the guard, who had to dodge the coffee to avoid being hit. (Cf. People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569, 590, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) Such conduct violated penal law and involved the implied threat of violence. It therefore satisfied section 190.3, factor (b). We similarly reject Oliver's challenge to evidence that he made threatening phone calls to Jeanett Hudson and Nadine Burchett in 1981. Both witnesses testified that the calls threatened lethal harm. The jury could infer that such calls and threats were intended to annoy the recipients, and that they violated misdemeanor prohibitions against making annoying and threatening phone calls. (§ 653m, subd. (a).) Contrary to what Oliver claims, the remote nature of these acts does not bar their admission. The penalty jury was entitled to consider and weigh criminal threats of violence committed at any time. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 585, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Hence, the phone calls were properly admitted below. ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th 764, 824, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) We next address Oliver's related claim of instructional error. In general, he argues that the trial court failed to instruct on all the elements of the factor (b) crimes challenged here. He complains that the instruction concerning possession of a deadly weapon in state prison omitted the requisite knowledge element. Oliver also observes that the instructions allowed the jury to consider the battery and assaults on correctional officers, including the Chino assault on Valiente, without defining those crimes. Finally, Oliver observes that the jury never learned the criminal mental state required to make the threatening [and] harassing phone calls generally described in the instructions. However, contrary to what Oliver implies, this is not a case in which the trial court was asked to instruct on the elements of other crimes, and failed to do so accurately. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 72, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224 [trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on elements of factor (b) crimes].) Counsel on both sides specifically declined the court's offer to instruct on the elements of the prior criminal acts. Oliver and Lewis indicated that they considered and rejected such instructions because  in the words of Lewis's counsel  they don't help us. Hence, no instructional error occurred insofar as the court was induced to use the more generic instructions about which Oliver now complains. Any technical lapse also was harmless under any applicable standard. [T]he evidence and argument properly focused the jury's attention on the moral assessment of defendant's actions[.] ... [T]he instructions now suggested were not essential to the jury's consideration of this issue. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 73, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.)