Opinion ID: 4556507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the valuation of parcel 84

Text: ¶40 UDOT challenges the court of appeals’ decision that Coalt’s compensation should include any increase in the value of its land caused by its proximity to the Legacy Parkway. As noted above, the district court found in favor of UDOT on this issue. But the court of appeals reversed the district court because it determined UDOT’s briefing was inadequate on this point. ¶41 Accordingly, we must first address the adequacy of UDOT’s briefing before the court of appeals on the issue of Parcel 84’s valuation. While we agree that UDOT’s briefing was minimal, we ultimately do not decide whether UDOT’s briefing was adequate because it is not determinative. Regardless of the adequacy of UDOT’s briefing, we cannot rule in Coalt’s favor 5 Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution states, “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 58 Opinion of the Court because it has not provided a plausible basis for reversal of the district court. This is because Coalt’s valuation arguments rely on the antecedent presumptions we rejected above. ¶42 The court of appeals concluded that UDOT’s briefing on valuation was inadequate, finding that it had “made no effort to defend the district court’s decision” and “failed to include any response to Coalt’s arguments . . . or any reference to the issue at all.” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Coalt Inc., 2016 UT App 169, ¶ 22, 382 P.3d 602. Relying on Broderick v. Apartment Management Consultants, L.L.C., 2012 UT 17, 279 P.3d 391, the court of appeals reversed the district court and ruled in Coalt’s favor after concluding that Coalt had advanced a plausible argument and “competently called into question” the district court’s reasoning. Coalt, 2016 UT App 169, ¶ 25. The court of appeals did not analyze whether the district court’s decision was “ultimately right or wrong.” Id. ¶43 Rule 24(a)–(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires, among other things, that both appellant and appellee briefs contain “reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record.” And an appellee brief must respond in substance to the issues presented in the appellant’s brief. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 22, 16 P.3d 540. ¶44 There is no “bright-line rule determining when a brief is inadequate.” Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12, 391 P.3d 196. And the “ultimate question” is not “whether there is a technical deficiency in [briefing] meriting a default.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 41, 326 P.3d 645). “While this court will not lightly toss aside partially briefed but still discernable arguments, we are limited by the practical considerations that an unbriefed argument presents.” Heslop v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, ¶ 50, 390 P.3d 314. ¶45 An appellant bears the burden of persuasion on appeal. Broderick, 2012 UT 17, ¶ 19. But a court may rule in favor of an appellant for purposes of that case if the appellee inadequately briefs an argument and the appellant provides a plausible basis for reversal. See id. ¶46 UDOT contests the court of appeals’ characterization of its briefing as inadequate. UDOT points out that Coalt relies on the same premises for both its authority and valuation arguments, 13 UDOT v. COALT Opinion of the Court and it asserts that it directly attacked those premises throughout its briefing in the court of appeals. We agree.6 However, we note that UDOT refuted Coalt’s assertions primarily in the authority context and devoted only one paragraph to valuation. ¶47 UDOT identifies this one paragraph as the point at which it addressed valuation before the court of appeals. While the paragraph does not use the word “valuation,” we agree that it does cite the district court’s findings and conclusions involving the issue. And UDOT does defend the district court’s ruling in its favor, however briefly. But UDOT should have more explicitly addressed valuation, where Coalt raised it as a stand-alone claim. ¶48 Overall, we agree with the court of appeals that UDOT’s briefing of the valuation issue was scant. But while this is a close call, we ultimately conclude that the adequacy of UDOT’s briefing is not dispositive. Because Coalt’s authority and valuation arguments rest on the same assertions, which UDOT has addressed, this is not a situation in which we have insufficient information to make a ruling. Nor must we bear the parties’ burden of research. ¶49 Ultimately, we conclude that Coalt has not presented a plausible basis for reversal. Coalt’s valuation argument relies on the same foundational presumptions that we rejected in the authority context. See supra ¶¶ 25–39. We cannot reject these assertions on one hand but find them plausible on the other. 6 Coalt’s brief states, The thrust of Coalt’s valuation argument [in the court of appeals] was that its property was not part of the Legacy project. Coalt relied upon its arguments concerning UDOT’s statutory and constitutional authority, as well as UDOT’s statements in the settlement documents, to demonstrate that the trial court’s decision that Coalt’s land was “within the scope of the Legacy Parkway Project” was erroneous. . . . Instead, it condemned the property to settle litigation and for mitigation of unspecified future projects unrelated to Legacy Parkway. (Emphases added.) This foundation underlies both Coalt’s authority and valuation arguments. 14 Cite as: 2020 UT 58 Opinion of the Court Accordingly, we conclude that Coalt has not provided a plausible basis for reversal and reverse the court of appeals on this issue.