Opinion ID: 6498085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Spencer's Postconviction Motion

Text: ¶17 Spencer filed a postconviction motion arguing the circuit court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by interviewing the juror ex parte and maintaining trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the meeting with the juror and failing to object to hearsay testimony. Regarding the hearsay testimony, Spencer asserted R.S. told the police that Mr. McKinney had told him that he, Mr. McKinney, had been shooting to protect [R.S.] and that the testimony was used to prove the truth of the matters asserted because it was used to show that Mr. McKinney was shooting to protect [R.S.] Spencer claimed this testimony was key evidence in the State's theory of felony murder. ¶18 The circuit court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. With respect to the judge's interactions with the juror, the court concluded it could not find the juror's health issue which arose in this case prior to closing arguments constituted a critical stage of the proceedings in which the defendant needed assistance with a legal problem and where counsel's presence was essential. The court determined that even if it were error to meet with the juror outside the summon jurors resulted in an unconstitutional racial composition of the jury panel, which in this case consisted of 2 Black citizens on the panel of 35, in violation of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The circuit court denied the motion. 13 No. 2018AP942-CR presence of the parties, it was harmless because the error did not prejudice Spencer's case or contribute to the guilty verdict. With respect to the hearsay testimony, the court concluded, even if trial counsel had objected and the testimony was struck, there is simply not a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted . . . because there was absolute overwhelming evidence of guilt.