Opinion ID: 2777589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality of Foreclosure Judgments

Text: ¶ 19. Defendants first argue that the foreclosure judgments were not final and therefore could be amended pursuant to Rule 54(b). Whether there was a final judgment is a question of law, which we consider de novo. In re Estate of Kurrelmeyer , 2010 VT 20, ¶ 10, 187 Vt. 620, 992 A.2d 316 (mem.) ( stating that pure questions of law are reviewed de novo). A final order is one that “end[s] litigation on the merits or conclusively determine[s] the rights of the parties, leaving nothing further for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Town of Randolph v. Estate of White , 166 Vt. 280, 283, 693 A.2d 694, 695 (1997); see V.R.C.P. 54(a) (defining judgment as “any order from which an appeal lies”). ¶ 20. In evaluating whether the foreclosure judgments arising from the August 2011 stipulated order were final, we bear in mind three considerations particular to foreclosure judgments. First, a foreclosure decree is a final judgment even if a right to redeem exists, and even if further proceedings ancillary to the foreclosure itself are contemplated. Mortg. Lenders Network, USA v. Sensenich , 2004 VT 107A, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 592, 873 A.2d 892 (mem.). Second, a party seeking to appeal a foreclosure judgment must seek permission to appeal within ten days “of the date of the entry of the judgment or order to be appealed from.” V.R.C.P. 80.1(m). Third, as generally reflected by the above authority, we have recognized a strong legislative policy favoring the finality of foreclosure judgments. See Woodbine Condo. Ass’n v. Lowe , 174 Vt. 457, 458, 806 A.2d 1001, 1003 (2002) (mem.) ( explaining that Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent requirement of seeking permission to appeal foreclosure decree because of legislative policy promoting finality of foreclosure judgments). ¶ 21. In light of these considerations, we conclude that the August 2011 foreclosure orders were final, unappealed judgments. Citibank, N.A. v. Groshens , 171 Vt. 639, 640, 768 A.2d 1272, 1273 (2000) (mem.) ( dismissing appeal from court’s denial of motion to reopen foreclosure judgment because of legislative policy promoting finality of foreclosure judgments). ¶ 22. Defendants do not dispute the general rule that foreclosure judgments are final, appealable judgments, but argue that in this case the subsequent October 2011 stipulated order effectively canceled the sales, stayed the actions, and indicated that the foreclosure judgments might be vacated. We reject this argument. The parties filed the October 2011 stipulated order well after the expiration of the time for requesting an appeal of the foreclosure judgments. By that time, the judgments were final and could only be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b). Although the October 2011 stipulated order stayed a public auction, and contemplated a future scenario in which a court might vacate the foreclosure judgments upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, that stipulated order did not itself vacate the foreclosure judgments. In fact, the order expressly contemplated that the foreclosure judgments would remain in place so that the only remaining issue would be defendants’ compliance with the new payment plan, and provided that upon default, the court would lift the stay and the property would go to auction. Accordingly, we cannot construe the October 2011 stipulated order as in any way altering the finality of the August 2011 foreclosure judgments.