Opinion ID: 1315738
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aetna's Motion to Dismiss

Text: Shortly after Guyden filed her complaint, Aetna moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement that Guyden had signed. In support, Aetna filed several documents reflecting Guyden's agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes. For example, Aetna filed Guyden's signed application for employment, which stated that Guyden understood that if she were offered employment [at Aetna], a condition of the offer and [her] acceptance [was] that [she] agree[d] to use Aetna's mandatory/binding arbitration program rather than the courts to resolve employment-related legal disputes. Similarly, the offer letter Aetna issued to Guyden stated that [t]his offer and [Guyden's] acceptance of that offer also are contingent upon [her] agreement to use the Company's mandatory/binding arbitration program rather than the courts to resolve employment-related legal disputes. Guyden later signed other documents that further delineated the mandatory/binding arbitration program applicable to any employment-related disputes. On April 22, 2004, Guyden signed a stock incentive agreement that included a mandatory arbitration agreement (the Agreement). The signature page included a statement that Grantee has accepted the stock option award and agrees to be bound by all its terms and conditions including mandatory binding arbitration of employment related disputes. . . . Guyden does not challenge the existence of the arbitration agreement. The Agreement stated that all employment-related legal disputes between [Guyden and Aetna] will be submitted to and resolved by binding arbitration. . . . The only employment-related disputes not included in this requirement were workers' compensation claims, unemployment compensation claims, and Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) claims. Disputes over whether the Agreement applied in a particular case were to be submitted to the arbitrator. Arbitration was to be administered by the American Arbitration Association and is subject to its National Rules. Three components of the arbitration process established by the Agreement are of particular importance to Guyden's challenge: the allowance for limited discovery, the requirement of confidentiality of the proceedings, and the provision for an abbreviated written decision (the brief summary requirement). With respect to discovery, the Agreement allows each party limited pre-hearing discovery. More specifically, each party may take the deposition of one person and anyone designated by the other as an expert witness. Each party also has the right to submit one set of ten written questions (including subparts) to the other party, which must be answered under oath, and to request and obtain all documents on which the other party relies in support of its answers to the written questions. The Agreement further states that [a]dditional discovery may be permitted by the arbitrator upon a showing that it is necessary for that party to have a fair opportunity to present a claim or defense. Regarding confidentiality, the Agreement provides that [a]ll proceedings, including the arbitration hearing and decision, [would be] private and confidential. . . . Finally, the brief summary provision of the Agreement states that the arbitrator's decision will be in writing with a brief summary of the arbitrator's opinion. Guyden fought Aetna's motion to compel arbitration on two grounds. First, she argued that SOX whistleblower claims are categorically nonarbitrable. Second, she claimed that certain components of this specific arbitration process would prevent her from vindicating her statutory rights. The district court rejected both challenges and dismissed the complaint in favor of arbitration. Guyden v. Aetna Inc. (Guyden I), No. 3:05cv1652 (WWE), 2006 WL 2772695, at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73353, at  (D.Conn. Sept. 25, 2006). It found no inherent conflict between arbitration and the purposes underlying SOX. Id. at -5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73353, at -13. It also found that because confidentiality is a common aspect of arbitration, the confidentiality clause did not render the arbitration process created by the Agreement unfair. Id. at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73353, at . Finally, despite agreeing with Guyden that she might need greater discovery than the Agreement permitted, the district court upheld the Agreement because it found that the arbitrator was free to order additional discovery if it were needed. Id. at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73353, at -19. Guyden appeals.