Opinion ID: 745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Inform Mr. Ferrel of the Drug-Quantity Element

Text: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure `is designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's plea is truly voluntary.' United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)). Under Rule 11, the court must inform the defendant of the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. See Rule 11(b)(1)(G). In most cases, this requires the court to recite the elements of the offense. See Gigot, 147 F.3d at 1198. Mr. Ferrel was charged with and pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). [3] 21 U.S.C. § 846 prohibits conspiring to commit an offense under § 841. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), in turn, makes it unlawful for any person to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir.2000). Subsection (b) sets forth the penalties for violations of § 841(a). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b); Jones, 235 F.3d at 1235. When no specific amount of the controlled substance is charged, § 841(b)(1)(C) provides for a statutory maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. In contrast, subsections (b)(1)(A) and (B) provide for higher maximum sentences depending on the type and quantity of the substance. In Mr. Ferrel's case, for example, possession of fifty grams or more of methamphetamine carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Because the type and quantity of drug are facts that expose a defendant to a higher maximum sentence than the twenty-year maximum set forth in § 841(b)(1)(C), we have held that such findings are essential elements of the substantive offense under § 841(a). United States v. Montgomery, 468 F.3d 715, 719 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Cernobyl, 255 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir.2001); Jones, 235 F.3d at 1236. At Mr. Ferrel's Rule 11 plea colloquy, the district court did not explicitly inform him of any of the elements of the charged offense, including that the purpose of the conspiracy was to possess with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. Instead, the court simply stated that the elements were listed in the plea agreement under the section titled Elements of the Offense of Conviction. Although the plea agreement included a recitation of the offense as charged in the indictment and the factual basis for the plea, both of which clearly set forth the drug amounts alleged by the government, the elements section did not mention the quantity of methamphetamine involved. Instead, that section focused on the elements of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine generally. [4] Thus, the district court did not satisfy its obligation under Rule 11 to inform Mr. Ferrel of the nature of the charges against him. Mr. Ferrel, however, did not object to the court's error, and as such, we review his claim under the exacting plain-error standard. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002); United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir.2003). To notice plain error ... the error must (1) be an actual error that was forfeited; (2) be plain or obvious; and (3) affect substantial rights, in other words, in most cases the error must be prejudicial, i.e., it must have affected the outcome. Edgar, 348 F.3d at 871 (quotations omitted). If all three conditions are met, we may then exercise our discretion to notice the error, but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (quotations omitted). Mr. Ferrel has not shown that the district court's failure to inform him of the drug-quantity element affected his substantial rights. In the context of a plea agreement, an error affects substantial rights if it is prejudicialthat is, if the defendant can show that he would not have pleaded guilty had the court complied with Rule 11. See id. at 872. In this case, nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Ferrel would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead exercised his right to trial had the district court properly informed him of the quantity of drugs with which he was charged. We have suggested that a Rule 11 error is not prejudicial when the defendant was simply deprived of a mandated procedure as opposed to the substantive material information contemplated by the rule. See Gigot, 147 F.3d at 1200. Thus, a defendant who receives the information omitted by the district court from other sources generally cannot demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty had the court also so informed him. Cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) ([W]e have never held that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.). Such is the case here. The fact that Mr. Ferrel's offense involved at least fifty grams of methamphetamine was alleged in the indictment, the same language was repeated in the plea agreement and in Mr. Ferrel's Statement in Advance of Plea of Guilty, and Mr. Ferrel himself acknowledged discussing the elements of the offense with his attorney prior to the Rule 11 hearing. Nonetheless, Mr. Ferrel contends that he did not recognize the fifty-gram quantity as an actual element of the offense but instead viewed the language referencing fifty grams of methamphetamine in the aforementioned documents as simply descriptive or superfluous. Furthermore, he emphasizes that the plea agreement section titled Elements of the Offense did not include quantity as an element. Even so, however, Mr. Ferrel does not demonstrate that his decision to plead guilty would have been different had the court specifically informed him of the quantity element. Indeed, even now on appeal, with full knowledge of his rights under Rule 11, Mr. Ferrel does not unequivocally seek to withdraw his plea so that he may go to trial; rather, he primarily requests resentencing without regard to the statutory minimum and maximum sentences set forth in § 841(b)(1)(A). [5] Additionally, Mr. Ferrel consistently and repeatedly admitted prior to the Rule 11 hearing that his § 841 offense involved at least fifty grams of methamphetamine, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that he wanted a jury to determine that issue. [6] Thus, Mr. Ferrel has not satisfied his burden of showing that the district court's failure to adequately inform him of the quantity element during his Rule 11 colloquy affected his substantial rights. [7]