Opinion ID: 2515997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the district court violate w.r.cr.p. 11 in its advisement of the elements of a conspiracy?

Text: [¶ 7] W.R.Cr.P. 11 sets forth the procedures that must be followed for acceptance of a plea by a criminal defendant. The rule is lengthy and complex. Pertinent to the present discussion are section (b), which describes the advisements that must be given to the defendant, section (d), which requires the court to determine the voluntariness of the plea, section (e)(7), which prohibits waiver of a presentence investigation by plea agreement, section (f), which requires the court to determine the accuracy of the plea by inquiring into the factual basis, and section (h), which allows harmless errors to be disregarded. [¶ 8] The appellant's first contention is that the district court's colloquy with the appellant was insufficient to establish that the pleas were voluntary or that there was a factual basis for the pleas. He relies on McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (quoting F.R.Cr.P. 11, Notes on Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules), for the proposition that the judge must determine `that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.' Specifically, the appellant argues that, conspiracy being a specific intent crime, it was improper for the district court to infer that element from the following exchange between the district court and the appellant: THE COURT: Mr. Reyna, how do you plead to Counts I and II of the Information that's on file in this matter? THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. THE COURT: Were you in Laramie County on or about December 2 of 1999? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And did you have a plan with one or more people to commit forgery? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Was that person Juan Martinez? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Were you also in Natrona [sic] County on December 17 of 1999? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Did you issue checks on an account that did not belong to you? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Did you write checks on an account? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Was that Mr. Luebke's account? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Did you have his permission to do that? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Does the State accept those factual recitations? [PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor. And I believe you did get in the fact that it was in Laramie County, Wyoming. THE COURT: Do you agree with that, Mr. Reyna? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: On both counts? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [¶ 9] We have adopted the following standard of review for cases involving the acceptance of a guilty plea: The procedure utilized to accept a guilty plea is reviewed by this court as a whole. Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 187 (Wyo.1994). Our inquiry determines if the district court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including the possible penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis for the plea. Mehring [v. State ], 860 P.2d [1101] at 1106 [(Wyo.1993)] (emphasis added). These procedural requirements are intended to assure that the individual facing the criminal charges is not misled into an unintentional waiver of substantial rights. Id. McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 (Wyo. 1994). We look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a plea. Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Wyo.1993). [¶ 10] At the change of plea hearing in the instant case, the district court reviewed with the appellant all of the following: 1. The terms of the plea agreement. 2. The appellant was not under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, drug, or medication, he did not suffer from a mental disability or learning disorder, and he had no physical problems or distractions. 3. The appellant had reviewed the Information. 4. The nature of the charges. [2] 5. The potential penalties. 6. The rights waived by a guilty plea. [3] 7. The plea agreement did not restrict sentencing, and the appellant could be sentenced to the maximum penalty allowed by law. 8. The pleas were made of the appellant's own free will. 9. The appellant had discussed the matter fully and completely with his attorney and he was satisfied with that attorney's representation. 10. The appellant had no questions he wished to ask his attorney before pleading. 11. If the appellant pled guilty, he would be required to answer questions concerning the crimes. 12. The amount of restitution. 13. There was a factual basis for the pleas. [¶ 11] This list reveals the immediate circumstances under which the district court accepted the factual basis for the conspiracy plea. The appellant's contention that there was insufficient discussion of the specific intent element of conspiracy could implicate either his understanding of the nature of the charge (# 4) or the factual basis for the charge (# 13). The appellant's appellate brief commingles these arguments. [¶ 12] These immediate circumstances do not, however, tell the whole story. The change of plea hearing did not take place in a vacuum. The appellant is an experienced criminal, with three previous penitentiary sentences for felony convictions, two for forgery and one for theft. See Kaldwell v. State, 908 P.2d 987, 992-93 (Wyo.1995). He was represented by an experienced public defender who reviewed the evidence and plea options with him. See McCarty, 883 P.2d at 374. There was a preliminary hearing. The appellant, himself, raised the idea of waiving the presentence investigation report because he feared the judge would learn that he may be wanted in Nebraska for the same thing not as much money. These circumstances indicate that the appellant made a voluntary plea with a full understanding of the nature of the charges. [¶ 13] The appellant does not contest that a forgery or forgeries occurred or that there was a sufficient factual basis presented for that crime. His contention is that the factual basis for conspiracy was inadequate because his specific intentthe agreement that a crime be committedhas to be inferred from other statements. [4] We disagree. The appellant replied, Yes, when asked, And did you have a plan with one or more people to commit forgery. (Emphasis added.) Certainly it does not require much of an inference to conclude that a plan with one or more people to commit forgery is substantively the same as agrees with one (1) or more persons that they ... will commit [forgery]. [5] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303(a). [C]omplete descriptions of the elements are not mandatory in accepting a plea under [Rule 11]. See W.R.Cr.P. 11(b). The courts of our land do not function with scripts requiring each participant to perform his or her specific part in the same manner on each occasion. We should never mistake the presence of the printed or spoken word for comprehension. A ritualistic expression of verbiage, complete with legal terminology and excess, may provide a comfortable layer of support for technically demanding members of the bar, but would provide little real assurance that the accused actually understands what is about to be accomplished. Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1108-09. See also United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1011 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1067, 115 S.Ct. 1700, 131 L.Ed.2d 562 (1995). [¶ 14] W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually guilty. United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958, 91 S.Ct. 986, 28 L.Ed.2d 242 (1971); McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C.Cir. 1966). The rule's standard is much lower than that: Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. W.R.Cr.P. 11(f). In applying this rule, the judge need not rely solely on the statements of the defendant, but may draw inferences from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 17-19 (Wyo.1993). We cannot say that, in the instant case, there were insufficient facts and circumstances from which the district court could satisfy itself of a factual basis for the conspiracy plea. [¶ 15] Since we conclude that the district court complied with the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 11 in the matters set forth above, we need not consider a harmless error analysis under section (h) of the rule.