Opinion ID: 2828146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Frazee v. Partney Remains Good Law

Text: At the center of both of the plaintiffs’ arguments is this Court’s decision in Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958). In Frazee, a family was involved in a car accident caused by a driver who fell asleep at the wheel. Id. at 917. Two people were killed, but the driver was unaware an accident had occurred because he did not see where the family’s car went off the road. Id. The driver considered whether to go back and investigate but elected to proceed ahead to his destination. Id. The accident occurred in 1954, but the plaintiffs did not learn the driver’s identity until March 1956. Id. They filed a wrongful death suit against the driver in September of 1956. Id. at 916. The defendant pleaded section 537.100, which at that time provided a one-year limitation period for wrongful death claims. Id. This Court considered two questions: (1) when a wrongful death cause of action accrues, and (2) whether the defendant’s allegedly fraudulent concealment of his identity tolled or extended the limitation period in section 537.100. Id. at 917. With respect to delayed accrual, this Court addressed whether a wrongful death claim accrues at death or at the point when the suit “could be validly commenced and 8 maintained against an ‘actual’ defendant,” i.e., when the identity of the defendant became known. Id. at 917. Frazee distinguished between the existence of a defendant and the identity of the defendant and noted that the language of section 537.100 specifically provided that the limitation period began at the accrual of the cause of action – when the plaintiff’s injury was complete and not at the point when a lawsuit could be effectively commenced. Id. at 920-21. Frazee held that, despite the harshness of the outcome, the wrongful death claim accrued at the moment of death, even though the plaintiff argued the identity of the defendant had been fraudulently concealed. Id. at 921. In addressing the driver’s identity, Frazee rejected the argument that such concealment, even if fraudulent, tolled or extended the limitation period and held that section 537.100 “must carry its own exceptions”: This court has uniformly held that where a statute of limitations is a special one, not included in the general chapter on limitations, the running thereof cannot be tolled because of fraud, concealment or any other reason not provided in the statute itself. . . . No other exceptions whatever are engrafted on that statute, and it is not the duty or the right of the courts to write new provisions into the statute. Id. at 919. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that it was bound to consider only the plain language of section 537.100 and the legislative intent that language evidenced. Id. at 921. Frazee further found it significant that the legislature had twice amended section 537.100 since its adoption and added two exceptions yet never saw fit to craft a fraudulent concealment exception like the one codified at section 516.280. Id. at 920. “We are forced to construe the cold, clear words of the statute, and if its scope is to be enlarged we feel that the remedy is legislative, not judicial.” Id. at 921. 9 The plaintiffs question the validity of Frazee in light of two subsequent decisions. First, in O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 906-07 (Mo. banc 1983), this Court considered whether a fetus qualified as a “person” under the wrongful death statute. O’Grady held that the wrongful death statute was not in derogation of the common law and should be construed “with a view to promoting the apparent object of the legislative enactment.” Id. at 908. In holding that the fetus was a “person” for purposes of wrongful death, this Court noted three basic objectives underlying the wrongful death statute: (1) to compensate bereaved plaintiffs for their loss, (2) to ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions, and (3) to deter future harmful conduct that might lead to death. Id. at 909. Second, the plaintiffs cite Howell v. Murphy, 844 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1992), which relied on O’Grady. The plaintiffs argue that Howell abrogated Frazee. In Howell, the plaintiffs filed wrongful death claims against a man who murdered their loved ones and concealed the evidence for more than five years. Id. at 45. The plaintiffs could not file their claims within three years because the victims had not been found and, by statute, were presumed missing and not dead until five years had passed. Id. at 47. The court favorably cited O’Grady as a “major shift” in the interpretation of wrongful death, holding that the statute of limitation “should not be so strictly construed as to avoid the wrongful death statute’s purposes.” Howell, 844 S.W.2d at 46. It held that, due to the defendant’s concealment of the bodies and the statutory presumption of life, section 537.100 was tolled “until the plaintiffs could, by reasonable diligence, ascertain they had 10 an action.” Id. at 47. In its discussion, Howell also stated that “the reasoning of Frazee is superseded by O’Grady.” Id. at 46. Howell is in error. Frazee was never referenced or cited by this Court in O’Grady. Absent a contrary showing, an opinion of this Court is presumed not to be overruled sub silentio. State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Mo. banc 2013). Additionally, Frazee and O’Grady are dissimilar because the statute of limitation was not at issue in O’Grady. As a result, Frazee remains good law. To the extent that Howell stated that Frazee is superseded by O’Grady, it should no longer be followed. 4