Opinion ID: 2516287
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The bad check statute

Text: The primary question before us is whether the term check or draft, as used in NRS 205.130(1), the Nevada criminal statute prohibiting the drawing or passage of bad checks, applies to gaming credit instruments commonly known as markers. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. [4] County of Clark v. Upchurch, 114 Nev. 749, 753, 961 P.2d 754, 757 (1998). The Nevada bad check statute, NRS 205.130(1), prohibits a person from drawing or passing a check or draft to obtain [c]redit extended by any licensed gaming establishment, drawn on a bank when the person has insufficient money, property or credit with the drawee of the instrument to pay it in full upon its presentation . Although NRS 205.130(1) does not explicitly define the term check or draft, we construe this undefined term in accordance with its ordinary and plain meaning. See Attorney General v. Board of Regents, 114 Nev. 388, 392, 956 P.2d 770, 774 (1998) (quoting McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986)). A draft is [a] written order by the first party, called the drawer, instructing a second party, called the drawee (such as a bank), to pay money to a third party, called the payee. Black's Law Dictionary 493 (6th ed.1990). The Uniform Commercial Code (codified in Nevada at NRS 104.1101 et seq. ) defines draft as an order, a written instruction to pay money signed by the person giving the instruction. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(6); U.C.C. § 3-104(e); NRS 104.3103(f); NRS 104.3104(5). A check is an instrument drawn upon a bank and payable on demand, [5] signed by the drawer, containing an instruction to pay a certain amount to another party. See Black's Law Dictionary 493 (6th ed.1990); U.C.C. § 3-104(f)(i); NRS 104.3104(6)(a); see also 12 C.F.R. § 210.2(h) (Federal Reserve Board definition of a check as a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand). An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term. U.C.C. § 3-104(f); NRS 104.3104(6). `Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning clear and unmistakable, ... the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.' Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538-39, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995) (quoting Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990) (quoting State v. Jepsen, 46 Nev. 193, 196, 209 P. 501, 502 (1922))). We believe the language of this statute is abundantly clear and unmistakable. By its terms, NRS 205.130 applies to instruments that are drawn upon a bank, payable on demand, signed by the payor, and which instruct the bank to pay a certain amount to the payee. Given the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the markers at issue in the instant case fall within the purview of the bad check statute. The markers provided a mechanism for payment of a specific sum of money from the Texas National Bank to the order of these gaming establishments. Nguyen signed the instruments, which stated no time or date of paymentthey were payable on demand, thus subjecting the [drawer] payor to a repayment obligation at the will of the payee. Fleeger, 95 F.Supp.2d at 1131. We therefore hold that these markers were checks within the meaning of NRS 205.130(1). Nguyen contends that the markers are better characterized as credit instruments outside the scope of NRS 205.130. According to Nguyen, the practice of delaying payment of a marker renders the instrument a loan document, whereby the signer agrees to pay the debt before an agreed-upon but unwritten disposition date. We disagree. Whether an obligee chooses to cash a check immediately or at a later date does not alter the character of the instrument. Further, there is no evidence that Nguyen and the casinos understood the marker to effect a contract for a loan. See Hillyer v. The Overman Silver Mining Co., 6 Nev. 51 (1870) (holding that parties to a contract must mutually assent to its terms). [6] We turn now to Nguyen's contention that his conduct did not evidence sufficient criminal intent. The statute provides that, in order to be convicted for passing bad checks, a person must act with an intent to defraud. NRS 205.130(1). Also, [i]n a criminal action for issuing a check or draft against insufficient or no funds with intent to defraud, that intent and the knowledge that the drawer has insufficient money, property or credit with the drawee [bank] is presumed to exist if ... [p]ayment of the instrument is refused by the drawee when it is presented in the usual course of business, unless within [five] days after receiving notice of this fact from the drawee or the holder, the drawer pays the holder of the instrument the full amount due plus any handling charges. NRS 205.132. We conclude that Nguyen's intent to defraud was circumstantially demonstrated by his failure to pay the full amount due within the statutory period, and by the return of the instruments from his bank with the notation Account Closed. Thus, evidence such as that present in this case is sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of guilt or innocence under NRS 205.130. Nguyen alternatively contends that he had no intent to defraud because the markers were post-dated instruments (meaning that the instruments bore dates later than the date they were issued). He argues that, as a matter of law, postdating a check is prima facie evidence that there is no intent to defraud. See State v. Stooksberry, 872 S.W.2d 906 (Tenn.1994); State v. Papillon, 223 Neb. 325, 389 N.W.2d 553 (1986); see also U.C.C. § 3-113(a); NRS 104.3113(1) (an instrument payable on demand is not payable before the date of the instrument.) We disagree. Assuming Nguyen's argument is based upon a correct statement of Nevada law (we have never addressed the issue), the markers in this case were not post-dated. Rather, they bore the date upon which they were executed. Nguyen also argues that the agreement by the gaming establishments to hold the markers for a period of time rendered them the equivalent of post-dated checks. However, just as there is no evidence here that the parties intended the markers to represent a loan instrument, there is no evidence that the parties mutually understood that the markers were post-dated checks. The face of the documents demonstrates that they were payable on demand, at the time of issuance. Nguyen further argues that, under State v. Jarman, 84 Nev. 187, 438 P.2d 250 (1968), he cannot be prosecuted under NRS 205.130(1). In Jarman, we held that this provision does not apply to checks issued to pay preexisting debts. The gravamen of the offense, we noted, is the intent to defraud. Id. at 190, 438 P.2d at 252-53. Payment of a preexisting debt with an instrument backed with insufficient funds does not, in and of itself, confer any benefit on the maker because the debt remains unaffected. Id. Nguyen asserts that the agreements to delay collection transformed the markers into instruments memorializing preexisting debts. Such transactions, he contends, fall outside the scope of NRS 205.130. This assertion lacks merit. The markers issued in these instances did not compensate these establishments for preexisting debts. Rather, Nguyen executed the markers to purchase gaming tokens, which he could exchange for currency. In this manner, Nguyen deprived the casinos of property. Jarman is inapposite, and we reject Nguyen's contention to the contrary. Accordingly, we hold that Nguyen was properly convicted under NRS 205.130.