Opinion ID: 2001310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reconcilable South Dakota Case Law

Text: South Dakota case law, albeit muddied at times, attempts to hold a delicate balance between the common-law tradition of open courts and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Reviewing this authority, this court has tried to refine state employee exposure to liability by establishing categories of functions for which liability falls. Those functions are labelled either as ministerial or discretionary, and seemingly existed before the Ruth decision. [9] See Sioux Falls Const. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 297 N.W.2d 454 (S.D.1980). In National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D.1982), this court explained the distinction between the two classifications in conjunction to liability. This court stated, [immunity] extends to a governmental employee who, while acting within the scope of his employment, exercises a discretionary function. Id. at 848 (citations omitted). State employees are cloaked in sovereign immunity when performing discretionary acts because such discretionary acts participate in the state's sovereign policy-making power. Ritter v. Johnson, 465 N.W.2d 196, 198 (S.D.1991). Factors to be considered in determining a discretionary function are: (1) The nature and importance of the function the officer is performing; (2) The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of discretion by the officer will amount necessarily to passing judgment by the court on the conduct of a coordinate branch of government; (3) The extent to which the imposition of liability would impair the free exercise of his discretion by the officer; (4) The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on the officer; (5) The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if the action is taken; (6) The nature and seriousness of the type of harm that may be produced; (7) The availability to the injured party of other remedies and other forms of relief. Leir, 325 N.W.2d at 848 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, comment f (1979)). Furthermore, this court has consistently held sovereign immunity barred a cause of action against the state where the state was the real party in interest. High Grade Oil, 295 N.W.2d 736; Wisc. Granite Co. v. State, 54 S.D. 482, 223 N.W. 600 (1929). Nevertheless, Leir reaffirmed the co-existence of case precedent holding employees responsible for their negligence in performing ministerial tasks. It stated, a state employee who `fails to perform a merely ministerial duty, is liable for the proximate results of his failure to any person to whom he owes performance of such duty.' Leir, 325 N.W.2d at 848 (citing Conway v. Humbert, 82 S.D. 317, 145 N.W.2d 524 (1966); Walters v. City of Carthage, 36 S.D. 11, 153 N.W. 881 (1915); Ruth, 9 S.D. at 90, 68 N.W. at 190). The court ultimately held employees liable for the consequences of their negligent acts. Leir, 325 N.W.2d at 848-49. This court, in defining ministerial acts in Ritter, explained that a ministerial act is the simple carrying out of a policy already established... so that permitting state employees to be held liable for negligence in the performance of merely ministerial duties within the scope of their authority does not compromise the sovereignty of the state. Ritter, 465 N.W.2d at 198 (citations omitted). In Kruger v. Wilson, 325 N.W.2d 851 (S.D.1982) this court held a state employee liable for negligently driving a car within the course of employment. The facts of Kruger are similar to the cases at bar. The employee defendant was driving a state vehicle when she struck the plaintiff's car. Id. at 852. The plaintiff sued the employee individually, and the state was not a party. Although the statutes at issue here were not enacted at the time of Kruger, the employee defendant still claimed protection from suit under sovereign immunity. Id. The Kruger court recognized the plaintiff's right to sue, and held that immunity does not extend to personal negligence in operating a motor vehicle. Id. at 853. In its decision, the court again considered the factors in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D to establish that driving a motor vehicle was a ministerial function. As this court expressed in Bego, the common law recognizes that merely being an agent or employee does not alter the duties one owes to third parties. 407 N.W.2d at 805 (citations omitted). `Everyone, whether he is principal or agent, is responsible directly to persons injured by his own negligence in fulfilling obligations resting upon him in his individual character and which the law imposes upon him, independent of contract. No man increases or diminishes his obligations to strangers by becoming an agent. If, in the course of his agency, he comes in contact with the person or property of a stranger, he is liable for any injury he may do to either, by his negligence, in respect to duties imposed by law upon him in common with all other[s].' Id. (quoting Kelly v. State, 265 Ark. 337, 578 S.W.2d 566, 567 (1979)). Considering common-law principals in light of constitutional guarantees, the court in Bego held that sovereign immunity did not extend to a state employee absent the state being the real party in interest, or the employee being engaged in a discretionary function. Id. at 806. It is inconceivable that driving a motor vehicle is anything other than a ministerial function. Regardless of state employment, Employees still owed the same duty of care to drive safely as any other driver not so employed. Employees' claimed immunization from suit does not extend to negligent individuals in any other sector of employment. The legislature cannot extend it to negligent individuals who work for the state. Although we agree that state employees performing discretionary, policy making functions should be covered by immunity for the consequences resulting from their decisions, that is simply not the case here. Instead, what exists is injury resulting from the alleged negligent operation of a motor vehicle. It has been stated: Negligence law must have some degree of flexibility. However, it is an entirely different and unacceptable proposition to assume that the flexibility of our negligence law may act in degradation of the fundamental foundation of our state constitution. Our constitution ... is solid core upon which all our state laws must be premised. Clearly and unequivocably, our constitution directs that the courts of this state shall be open to the injured and oppressed. We are unable to view this constitutional mandate as a faint echo to be skirted or ignored. Daugaard, 349 N.W.2d at 425 (citations omitted). The common law of negligence existed well before the South Dakota Constitution, as did employees' personal liability for their wrongful conduct. The legislature does not have the authority to wholly abrogate such common-law actions guaranteed by the constitution. Baatz. 426 N.W.2d at 302. It therefore can impose only reasonable restrictions that do not infringe on these protected rights. Id. at 304. Considering the history of sovereign immunity, the common law of negligence and the South Dakota Constitution, we agree that SDCL 21-32-17 and 21-32A-2 are unconstitutional so far as they extend sovereign immunity to state employees performing ministerial functions. We affirm. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS and KONENKAMP, JJ., concur. WUEST, Retired J., participated in the oral argument of this case but not in the final decision. GILBERTSON, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this case was considered, did not participate.