Opinion ID: 2211566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Burden

Text: The majority announces that the prosecution has the burden of establishing a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Op. at 158. Although I am willing to proceed under the assumption that the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence because the prosecution failed to prove its case even by a preponderance, I do not believe that the applicable burden is as clearly established as the majority implies. The preponderance test employed by the majority springs from Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), a United States Supreme Court case discussing the voluntary waiver of constitutional rights protected by Miranda, Traditionally, constitutional waiver cases place a heavy burden on the prosecution. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see, also, Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 581, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 531, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). Our Supreme Court has also recognized that, `courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights, and that we `do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' Johnson at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019. To date, the United States Supreme Court has never expressly declared that a preponderance standard should be applied in knowing and intelligent waiver cases. In Connelly itself, Justice Brennan's dissent reiterated the fact that Connelly was a voluntariness case, Connelly at 187-188, 107 S.Ct. 515, and explained why the imposition of a preponderance standard was undesirable: In holding that the government need only prove the voluntariness of the waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court ignores the explicit command of Miranda: If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. ... In recognition of the importance of the Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment, we always have characterized the State's burden of proof on a Miranda waiver as great and heavy. [ Id. at 184-185, 107 S.Ct. 515.] Although Connelly's imposition of the preponderance standard arguably extends to knowing and intelligent waiver cases, the proposition is certainly open to debate. In announcing the preponderance standard in Connelly, the Supreme Court examined cases involving the exclusion of evidence, and built upon other cases examining voluntary waiver. Connelly at 167-169, 107 S.Ct. 515. The United States Supreme Court's recent recognition that Miranda was a constitutional decision, [2] lends some support that Connelly's rationale should not be extended to knowing and intelligent cases. The majority is correct that the Supreme Court stated that [w]henever the [s]tate bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the [s]tate need prove waiver only by preponderance of the evidence. Connelly at 168, 107 S.Ct. 515. The entirety of the Supreme Court's statement was as follows, however, We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence. Connelly at 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, referring to Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). In Lego, the inquiry focused solely on voluntariness. There, the Supreme Court held: the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. Of course, the States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake. Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 619.