Opinion ID: 3037600
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Articulation of an Acceptable Level of Risk

Text: Plaintiffs argue that the Final Rule violates the APA because the agency “simply declar[ed] that the measures it has adopted will ‘prevent the introduction’ of Medfly without explaining what criterion it applied to make that determination or why.” According to plaintiffs, APHIS was obligated to identify the level of risk it considers to be unacceptable, and the agency’s failure to do so requires that the Final Rule be set aside. In support of their argument, plaintiffs cite Harlan Land Company v. USDA, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (E.D. Cal. 2001), as well as decisions relied on in Harlan Land, including Ober v. Whitman, 243 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001). 6382 CACTUS CORNER v. USDA The court in Harlan Land overturned a similar rule because APHIS “did not establish a level above which the risk [of pest introduction] would no longer be negligible.” Id. at 1080. Harlan Land thus suggests that APHIS was required to “provide a negligible risk threshold” before issuing the Final Rule. Id. at 1087. [1] Plaintiffs’ argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. USDA, 415 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). In Ranchers Cattlemen, we considered this issue in the context of the Animal Health Protection Act, which is substantively identical to the Plant Protection Act.2 The district court in that case had relied on Harlan Land to enjoin a USDA rule permitting the importation of Canadian beef and cattle. The district court specifically held “that USDA failed adequately to quantify the risk of Canadian cattle to humans.” Id. at 1091. The agency appealed, and we reversed. [2] On appeal, we squarely rejected the premise of plaintiffs’ argument, holding that the Animal Health Protection Act “does not require the Secretary to quantify a permissible level of risk or to conduct a risk assessment.” Id. at 1097. We also emphasized the USDA’s “wide discretion in dealing with the importation of plant and animal products,” and we noted that 2 The relevant language in the two statutes is nearly identical. Under the Animal Health Protection Act, the Secretary of Agriculture may prohibit or restrict . . . the importation . . . of any animal . . . if the Secretary determines that the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into . . . the United States of any pest. 7 U.S.C. § 8303(a)(1). Under the Plant Protection Act, the Secretary may prohibit or restrict the importation . . . of any plant . . . if the Secretary determines that the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into the United States . . . of a plant pest. 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a). CACTUS CORNER v. USDA 6383 “the statute’s use of the word ‘may’ suggests that [USDA] is given discretion over such decisions as whether to close the borders.” Id. at 1094. In this case, where APHIS has issued a rule under a substantively identical statute, we follow our holding in Ranchers Cattleman and reject this point of appeal.