Opinion ID: 1938925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presumption of revocation.

Text: The initial issue determined by the trial court was that testatrix was presumed to have destroyed the 1965 will:  Eighth: That the deceased did have in her possession, the last will dated February 17, 1959, the last will dated April 30, 1960 and the last will dated June 17, 1965; that the deceased knew the contents of the various last wills and was faced with a dwindling estate, and therefore, is presumed to have destroyed the last will dated June 17, 1965 and the last will dated April 30, 1960. As to the 1965 will, the trial court found that the presumption of revocation had not been overcome; that the will was not destroyed by accident; and that there was no evidence to support a finding that the instrument should be allowed as a lost will and thereupon denied the admission of the will to probate as a lost will. We consider this case to present a question of whether the trial court was in error in holding that the 1965 will was presumed to have been destroyed. The trial court also made the same finding as to the will of April 30,  1960. Since the material facts are not in dispute, the issue is one on which this court can rule as a matter of law. Will of Donigian (1953), 265 Wis. 147, 60 N. W. 2d 732. In Will of Donigian, supra, pages 151, 152, this court reviewed three cases in which the presumption of destruction had been considered: In Estate of Lambert (1948), 252 Wis. 117, 31 N. W. (2d) 163, the testator made a will on March 16, 1946, and it was last seen in his possession. He died two weeks later and the will was never found. In the interval he told several people how he had disposed of his property. We held that the presumption of revocation which arises from nonproduction of a will is not so strong in this state as to require the proponent to prove that the testator had no opportunity to destroy the will, and we said (p. 126): `The evidence of the proponent, having established that the deceased made a will and persisted in statements of satisfaction with its contents up to the day of his death, is sufficient to sustain the finding of the trial court that the presumption of destruction was overcome.' In Wendt v. Ziegenhagen (1912), 148 Wis. 382, 134 N. W. 905, the testator made his will in 1900. He died in 1909. He had possession of the will but it was not found after his death. His son who would profit by an intestacy and his widow, who sided with the son, had access to his papers. The court did not consider the question of the possible destruction of the will by interested parties but rested its decision upon the frequent statements of the testator to the effect that he was satisfied with his will and the absence of any change in conditions which would make it likely that he would revoke the will in order to give greater benefits than the son had already received. Such evidence was held to be sufficient to overcome the presumption and to support a finding that the testator did not destroy his will with intent to revoke it. In Will of Lauburg (1920), 170 Wis. 502, 175 N. W. 925, the testatrix up to the time of her death made declarations tending to show the existence of her will and that she had no intention of revoking it. We held that this evidence was strong enough to rebut the presumption  and support a finding that the will had not been destroyed by the testatrix with intention of revoking it. In Will of Donigian, supra, page 154, the presumption of revocation was rebutted: We conclude that undisputed testimony here is sufficient to support a finding that the August 7th will was not revoked by the testator by destruction or otherwise. There is no testimony whatever that he did so revoke it,nothing but a presumption that he did so arising from the nonproduction of the will,and that presumption went out of the case when evidence came in that during Donigian's final days he referred to his will with satisfaction, that no change of intent was ever manifested, or cause for such change arose, and that his papers and effects were so situated that others than himself had access to them. In this case, testatrix entered a convalescent home in September, 1967, and did not again live in the residence she owned prior to that time. The residence was sold in December, 1967, and the furniture, papers, files and other personal belongings were moved to the home of the testatrix's sister, Ann Cotter. Mrs. Cotter testified that at the time her sister's home was vacated, she found negotiable bonds under some newspapers and also found some stock certificates. These were put into the testatrix's safety-deposit box by Mrs. Cotter. Mrs. Cotter also testified that she made a search among all the papers, files and insurance policies of the testatrix which were in her possession but she had been unable to find a will; and that she didn't know of anyone other than herself, her son, Charles M. Cotter (respondent-petitioner), or attorney Francis Murphy who would have any papers or personal effects of her sister. Mrs. Cotter also testified that the testatrix had informed her that her son, Charles M. Cotter, was the executor of a will, and that the testatrix told her this at the death of the testatrix's husband in 1964 and again about four or five months before her death.  Charles M. Cotter testified that he did not make any search for the lost will. Attorney Francis Murphy, a witness and scrivenor of the 1965 will, and Wallace Krueger, the other witness, both testified that the original will was executed back near the vault in the Montello State Bank. Their testimony reflects the will was properly executed. Mr. Murphy conformed the copy of the will in the bank after the original was signed. At that time testatrix removed her original will of April 30, 1960, from the box in the bank which Mr. Murphy advised her to destroy since she had now signed another will. That was the last time Attorney Murphy discussed the will of June 17, 1965, with her, or saw the original 1960 or the original 1965 wills, and he had no idea as to what had ever been done with them. Wallace Krueger, the other witness, did not know anything about the whereabouts of the original will subsequent to its signing on June 17, 1965. A comparison of the three wills shows little substantive difference between them, except as to Lyle McGwinn (a nephew of testatrix's husband), and certain comparatively small specific beneficiaries. The 1959 will left the testatrix's estate to her husband and in the event he predeceased her it provided for certain specific bequests of $500 and her personal belongings, and bequeathed the remainder to Charles M. Cotter, Betty Hanson and Lyle McGwinn. The 1960 will contained substantially the same provisions as the 1959 will, added some specific bequests totaling $450 and left the remainder of her estate to Charles M. Cotter and Betty Hanson to share equally. The 1965 will made no substantive changes in any of its provisions as compared with the 1960 will, except that the provision for her husband, who died in 1964, was not included. There was, therefore, little reason for the testatrix to revoke the 1965 will in the belief she could revive an earlier will. Most of the personal goods of the testatrix were not in her possession for almost two years before her death.  She did not have her bonds and stock certificates with her, and the fact that negotiable bonds were found under newspapers leaves an inference that the testatrix did not make suitable provision for the safekeeping of her important papers. In addition, testatrix made reference to her will four or five months before her death and this fact, coupled with the complete absence of any evidence of intent to revoke or dissatisfaction with the 1965 will, or evidence of destruction, also goes to rebutting the presumption that the lost 1965 will was destroyed with the intention of revoking it. Finally, no provision was made for the testatrix's sister, Ann Cotter, in any of the three wills. Mrs. Cotter did not contest the admission of any of the wills, nor is there any evidence that she did not make a diligent search for the 1965 will. Nevertheless, her interests would be furthered if no will were found and this is another factor which lessens the impact of the presumption of revocation in this case. We consider, further, that the very existence of the presumption we have been discussing depends on the tacit assumption that a diligent search was made for the will by persons trying to find it. We are far from charging that the contestant and his associates did not search in good faith and there is no evidence but what they did; but whatever virtue the presumption created by a failure to find may start with, that virtue is seriously diminished when it must depend on a search made by those whose interests will be impaired by production of the will. As we said in Gavitt v. Moulton (1903), 119 Wis. 35, 49, 96 N. W. 395: `True, the mere fact that the contestant had an opportunity to destroy the will would not of itself overcome the presumption that it was destroyed by the testator with the intent to revoke it; still it is a circumstance to be considered with other proof.' Will of Donigian, supra, pages 153, 154. Therefore, (1) the absence of any testimony that testatrix was dissatisfied with the will, destroyed it, or that she intended to revoke; (2) evidence that she did not  have control of her personal papers and files for nearly two years prior to her death; (3) reference by testatrix to her will four or five months before her death; and (4) the manner in which testatrix kept her other important papers such as stocks and bonds, is sufficient to rebut the presumption and support the conclusion that the June 17, 1965 will was not revoked by the testatrix by destruction or otherwise. Sec. 310.10, Stats., requires that the petition for probate of a lost will set forth the provisions of the will, which was done in this case by appending a copy of the June 17, 1965 will to the petition. In their brief, appellants state: It is established that Catherine Markofske properly executed the will of June 17, 1965 as a valid will, and the same was last known to be in her possession. Therefore, the statutory requirements for execution of a will having been met and the presumption overcome, we are of the opinion that the 1965 will should be admitted to probate.