Opinion ID: 2596737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards for Resolving the Case

Text: I turn now to the second Baker factor, namely whether there are any judicially manageable standards by which to resolve the issue presented. This factor is closely tied to the first, as the Supreme Court has observed that, the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). Such standards and rules are conspicuously absent in this case. Furthermore, our holding in Lujan offers no standards or rules that would be of assistance here because our holding in Lujan only applied to an equal protection claim. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1011, 1024-25. Even though the Lujan plaintiffs made two distinct claims â one a classic equal protection challenge and the other under the thorough and uniform clause â the Lujan court spent the majority of its opinion reasoning that education was not a fundamental right nor was wealth a suspect classification, both of which are equal protection analyses. See id. at 1014-22. Those two determinations led the court to conclude that a rational basis standard should apply, resulting in a holding that the school funding system at the time was rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of controlling the public debt. Id. at 1024. Because that holding and the use of the rational basis standard responded only to a traditional equal protection argument, it has no controlling effect on today's issue. The Lujan court then turned to the purely Colorado constitutional claim that unequal per pupil spending violated the thorough and uniform clause. Id. at 1024-25. Lujan, however, only defined what the constitution does not require, specifically uniform and equalized spending per pupil. In support of its ruling that only uniform educational opportunities  must be available, the Lujan court merely cited instances where this court had interpreted aspects of the education clause in response to discrete issues demanding yes or no, constitutional or unconstitutional answers. Id. at 1025 (emphasis added). [5] Thus, this court issued no prospective rule, only basic reasoning through analogy, leaving nothing to guide or bind future courts. The majority refers to  Lujan's explicit pronouncement that the court's `function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's system' of public education, but the majority fails to recognize the context surrounding that uncontested principle. Maj. op. at 372 (citing Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025). In its entirety, the quoted sentence reads: Thus, whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's system. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025. Plaintiffs today ask the court to decide not on a constitutional question but, almost verbatim, on whether a better financing system could be devised. [6] Id. Lujan neither controls this case nor sanctions review of all claims brought under the education clause. It actually states the opposite, maintaining that financing decisions are instead the proper function of the General Assembly. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025. Moreover, the majority states that in Lujan the court affirmed . . . that [it] has the responsibility to review whether the actions of the legislature are consistent with its obligation to provide a thorough and uniform public school system. Maj. op. at 372. Again, this is a misreading of the Lujan opinion, and it is instructive only as evidence of the majority's conflation of Lujan's separate equal protection and thorough and uniform holdings. The majority writes that [t]he Lujan court engaged in rational basis review of whether the state's system . . . violated the `thorough and uniform' mandate. Maj. op. at 374. This is simply untrue-the Lujan court never references any test for thorough and uniform, uses the words rational basis, or posits any standard of review. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1024-25. Indeed, the majority offers no support for its statement that rational basis review applies here. [7] Stated succinctly, the Lujan holding on the education clause rested solely on prior decisions, all of which involved discrete yes or no answers considerably different from the abstract one presented in this case. On the other hand, the plaintiffs today ask this court to define an adequate or thorough education in this state, but this intangible concept is ill-fitted for a judicial rule. Plaintiffs ask: [T]hat this Court enter judgment declaring that the education clause guarantees to each school age resident of the state the right to a public education sufficient to permit him or her to participate meaningfully in the civic, political, economic, social, and other activities of our society and the world, and to exercise the basic civil and other rights of a citizen of the State of Colorado and the United States of America. This is the constitutionally adequate, quality education that must be established and maintained â and must be funded in order to be more than an empty promise. Pet'r Reply Br. 14. Plaintiffs attempt to constrain this request by directing the courts to defer all specific decisions to the General Assembly, but, as other state courts have found, such a partitioning of responsibilities is not workable in reality. Pet'r Br. at 80; See, e.g., infra n.10 (describing the New Jersey courts' attempts to manage education from the bench). The central feature of a judicially manageable standard is a logical framework that can guide future courts. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule ) (emphases in original). It is impossible to create a judicial standard or rule that can define, accommodate, and limit the enormity of preparing students for meaningful civic, political, economic, social engagement in the world. The majority's attempts to affix a rational basis standard to a nebulous concept like this do not present a manageable framework, and the standard fails to inform or channel judicial discretion. Such an unbound standard of review simply substitutes the trial court for the General Assembly, essentially giving the trial court veto power over any legislative policy determination in education. I believe such a breach of the separation of powers is unacceptable. The majority's rational basis concept does not represent the requisite judicially manageable standard. Finally, I believe that this court is not in a position to devise a judicially manageable standard on which to evaluate the adequacy or thoroughness of an education. There is no precedent to guide our hand in fashioning a standard, creating the unacceptable appearance of an arbitrary judicial decree. In Lujan, we recognized that: We have never been called upon to interpret article IX, section 2 [the thorough and uniform clause] in any context which would prove helpful to this case although the provision is discussed in many cases. Also, we are unable to find any historical background to glean guidance regarding the intention of the framers. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1024-25 (citations omitted). The lack of any constitutional or judicial history to guide our interpretation distinguishes this case from other state cases that have created educational standards from the bench. As the court of appeals correctly observed, the contours of a `quality' public education cannot be ascertained by judicially discoverable or manageable standards because the education clause `provides no principled basis for a judicial definition.' Lobato, 216 P.3d at 39 (quoting Comm. For Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill.2d 1, 220 Ill.Dec. 166, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill.1996)). [8] In addition, we have already held that the education clause itself mandates the General Assembly to provide to each school age child the opportunity to receive a free education, and to establish guidelines for a thorough and uniform system of public schools. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018-19 (emphasis added). Thus, we have already assigned to the General Assembly the responsibility to create and impose broad education policy determinations. It would be a marked transgression for this court to now usurp the role it has already designated to the legislature in Lujan by attempting to devise new standards for education.