Opinion ID: 1214619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral Estoppel and Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention

Text: Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of a previously determined issue where the first action is brought in a federal court and a second action is brought in state court. Campion v. State, Dep't of Community and Regional Affairs, 876 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Alaska 1994). The federal court rendered its decision before Sopcak's state court lawsuit concluded. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states that, in such cases `the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, or federal statutes or rules of decision, may require that preclusive effect be given to the first decision.' Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. e (1982)). These considerations are even weightier when, as here, the matter in question is one of federal law. See Ricotta v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana, 482 F. Supp. 497, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (The scope of the [Warsaw] Convention is a matter of federal law and federal treaty interpretation.), aff'd, 633 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.1980). We have applied collateral estoppel to jurisdictional issues. E.g., Campion, 876 P.2d at 1101 (applying collateral estoppel to find absence of personal jurisdiction in Alaska). Collateral estoppel requires the following: 1. The plea of collateral estoppel must be asserted against a party or one in privity with a party to the first action; 2. The issue to be precluded from relitigation by operation of the doctrine must be identical to that decided in the first action; 3. The issue in the first action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the merits. Id. at 1098-99 (citation omitted). There is no dispute that the parties in this case are identical to those in the previously decided prior federal lawsuit.
Sopcak argues that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court is different from that in the state superior court and that collateral estoppel therefore cannot be applied. We disagree. The Warsaw Convention is a multilateral treaty, ratified by the U.S. Congress in 1934, intended to make uniform and establish limits upon the potential liability of international air carriers. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster on Sept. 1, 1983, 814 F. Supp. 592, 596 (E.D.Mich. 1993); see generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allen I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497, 498-99 (1967). The Convention constitutes the supreme law of the land in the matters upon which it touches. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. at 596. As both parties recognize, the flight giving rise to this litigation falls under the Convention. See Warsaw Convention art. 1(1)-(2). Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention specifies four locations where a suit can be brought. Article 28's restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. See Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir.1983) (Because Article 28 speaks to subject matter jurisdiction, it operates as an absolute bar to federal jurisdiction in cases falling outside its terms. (citations omitted)). An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination. Warsaw Convention art. 28(1). Unless the United States is the domicile or principal place of business of the carrier, the site of contracting, or the place of destination, U.S. courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir.) (discussing jurisdictional requirements of Article 28), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816, 86 S.Ct. 38, 15 L.Ed.2d 64 (1965). Both federal and state jurisdiction are limited by Article 28. As a federal treaty, the Warsaw Convention has the force of federal law and preempts inconsistent state law. See In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541, 1548-49 (N.D.Cal. 1990) (holding that the Warsaw Convention preempts conflicting local law); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1480 (11th Cir.1989) (Any state law in conflict with a treaty of the United States is invalid. Therefore the Warsaw Convention preempts any state law which is inconsistent with it. (citations omitted)), rev'd on other grounds 499 U.S. 530, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991); Ricotta, 482 F. Supp. at 499 (holding that the Warsaw Convention's statute of limitations being a treaty provision takes precedence over anything inconsistent in the state statute of limitations. (citations omitted)). Therefore, while Sopcak correctly points out that state courts may have broader jurisdiction than their federal counterparts, in this case Article 28 applies to divest both state and federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction where the United States is not one of the four specified fora. See Adesina v. Swissair, 143 Misc.2d 406, 544 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (App.Term. 1988) (giving preclusive effect to federal determination of no subject matter jurisdiction in Adesina v. Swissair, 648 F. Supp. 997, 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)). Alaska can only assert jurisdiction if Article 28 can be satisfied. This issue has been decided. Sopcak, 52 F.3d at 819. The federal courts determined that the place of destination was Vancouver, British Columbia, not Wrangell, Alaska, and that Article 28(1) prevented jurisdiction from lying in the United States. 859 F. Supp. at 1272, 52 F.3d at 819. Given this fact, Alaska lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The issue being precluded is identical to that resolved in the previous decision.
Sopcak additionally argues that the federal decision was not a final judgment on the merits. Sopcak argues that this is so because the Ninth Circuit's reasoning differed from that of the district court. According to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. d (1982), however, [w]hen an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated within the meaning of this Section.... A determination may be based on a failure of pleading or of proof as well as on the sustaining of the burden of proof. The Ninth Circuit based its decision on Sopcak's failure of proof. Sopcak, 52 F.3d at 819. As such, its ruling constitutes a final decision on the merits for the purposes of collateral estoppel. See Nichols & Co. v. United States, 66 C.C.P.A. 28, 586 F.2d 826, 829 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (applying collateral estoppel where in prior decision appellate court affirmed decision below on alternative grounds, based upon a failure of proof). As reflected in the Ninth Circuit's decision, Sopcak raised the issue of whether the United States was the final destination and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue. [2] 52 F.3d at 819. While the Ninth Circuit may have applied a standard different from that employed by the federal district court, it followed long-established federal precedent. See, e.g., Petrire v. Spantax, 756 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985); Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir.1992); Lee v. China Airlines Ltd., 669 F. Supp. 979, 981 (C.D.Cal. 1987); Kapar v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd in part on other grounds, 845 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir.1988). Sopcak could therefore reasonably be expected to have anticipated the necessity of discovery of the contracts of carriage in opposing Northern Mountain's federal motion to dismiss, even before the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue. [3] While we have stated that in an extreme case the lack of an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate an issue might preclude the application of collateral estoppel, Rapoport, 794 P.2d at 952 (citing Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1153-56 (Alaska 1987)), we find no reason to refuse to apply collateral estoppel here. Nor has there been an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise requiring a new determination. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982) (discussing exceptions to issue preclusion). See also State v. Baker, 393 P.2d 893, 900-01 & n. 35 (Alaska 1964) (discussing analogous exception stated in Restatement of Judgments § 70 (1942)). The federal litigation ended in entry of judgment on the merits. The decision of the Ninth Circuit is entitled to full faith and credit in our courts. We hold that Alaska lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Sopcak's claims. We consequently do not reach the issues raised in Northern Mountain's cross-appeal. [4]