Opinion ID: 4565229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crim. P. 7(e)

Text: ¶14 An information is a charging document that advises a defendant of the charges against him. Washam, ¶ 14, 413 P.3d at 1264. An information serves two interests “of a constitutional dimension: (1) it provides the defendant with notice of the offense charged, as well as the factual circumstances surrounding the offense so that the defendant can adequately defend him or herself; and (2) it protects the defendant from further prosecution for the same offense.” People v. Williams, 984 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1999). When an information is defective, it may be cured by timely amendment. Washam, ¶ 15, 413 P.3d at 1264. ¶15 Crim. P. 7(e) governs how and when such an amendment may take place. In its entirety, that rule provides: The court may permit an information to be amended as to form or substance at any time prior to trial; the court may permit it to be amended as to form at any time before the verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. (Emphases added.) Unpacking Crim. P. 7(e), the prosecution may amend the information as to form or substance “at any time prior to trial.” However, in instances where the prosecution seeks to amend the information after trial has begun—as was the case here—Crim. P. 7(e) dictates that it may do so only if the amendment “(1) was one of form, (2) did not charge an additional or different 9 offense, and (3) did not prejudice [the defendant’s] substantial rights.” Washam, ¶ 16, 413 P.3d at 1264. All three conditions must be satisfied. ¶16 In this case, we focus our analysis on the third condition: whether the mid-trial amendment prejudiced Fisher’s substantial rights. If it did, then we need not decide whether the amendment was one of form or substance, nor whether it charged an additional or different offense, and we will thus limit out analysis accordingly.2 ¶17 When conducting this analysis, it is important to recognize that, as Judge Berger pointed out in his dissent, Crim. P. 7(e) does not ask how much the defendant has been prejudiced. Rather, the rule asks whether a defendant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced at all. Recognizing the difference between those two questions is critical. Asking how much the defendant has been prejudiced assumes that some prejudice to the defendant’s substantial rights is acceptable under Crim. P. 7(e), whereas asking if the defendant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced recognizes that any prejudice to the defendant’s substantial rights forecloses an amendment to the information during trial. Crim. P. 7(e)’s 2 The court of appeals concluded that the amendment was one of form, not substance, partly because the exact date of the offense was not an essential element of the charges. Fisher, ¶¶ 28, 35. Because we focus on whether the amendment affected Fisher’s substantial rights, we express no opinion on this issue. 10 focus on whether prejudice to the defendant’s substantial rights occurred at all makes sense given that it is difficult, if not impossible, to know how much a mid-trial amendment to the information under certain facts—like those presented here—ultimately prejudiced the defendant. Accordingly, the amount to which the right was prejudiced is not relevant to the determination under Crim. P. 7(e). ¶18 Determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced necessarily involves a case-by-case examination, and courts must look at the totality of the circumstances. See Washam, ¶¶ 30–32, 413 P.3d at 1266–67 (looking at several non-exhaustive factors to conclude that an amendment narrowing the date range in the information did not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights). Factors relevant to the inquiry include but are not limited to: (1) the theory of the defense, id. at ¶ 30, 413 P.3d at 1266 (looking, in part, at the defendant’s defense strategy and whether his ability to prepare or present that defense was impaired); (2) the timing of the amendment, Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783, 788 (Colo. 1986) (citing the fact that neither side had yet presented evidence as one factor supporting the decision to allow the amendment); and (3) whether the amendment requires a different defense strategy, see People v. Metcalf, 926 P.2d 133, 140 (Colo. App. 1996) (explaining that “the amendment did not . . . require a different defense strategy from the one the defendant had chosen under the initial information”). No single factor is dispositive, and courts should “look to the 11 surrounding circumstances” in the case to determine whether prejudice has resulted. Williams, 984 P.2d at 64. ¶19 With this framework in mind, we now turn to the question of whether the amendment in this case was permissible. C. The Amendment Prejudiced Fisher’s Substantial Rights ¶20 A defendant’s right to prepare and present a defense to a criminal charge qualifies as a “substantial right” under Crim. P. 7(e). See People v. Garcia, 940 P.2d 357, 362 (Colo. 1997) (noting that the information must “give [the defendant] a fair and adequate opportunity to prepare his defense, and . . . ensure that [the defendant] is not taken by surprise because of evidence offered at the time of trial”); see also Metcalf, 926 P.2d at 139 (explaining that the “purposes served by a criminal information are” in part “to enable the defendant to prepare a defense”). No one here disputes that. Therefore, we need to examine whether the amendment here prejudiced Fisher’s right to prepare and present a defense. Fisher argues that it did. He contends that the amendment to the information prejudiced his substantial rights because expanding the date range on the third day of trial adversely affected his ability to prepare and present his alibi defense. Conversely, the People contend that the amendment was permissible, reasoning that Fisher was still able to present his partial alibi, the amendment did not totally destroy the defense, and Fisher’s alibi defense was only mildly viable anyway. In 12 so doing, the People, like the majority in the division, focus on the extent of the prejudice and argue that the amendment was permissible under Crim. P. 7(e) because it did not substantially prejudice Fisher. ¶21 To determine if the expansion of the dates prejudiced Fisher’s substantial right to prepare and present a defense, we begin by recognizing that expanding a date range alone does not automatically prejudice a defendant’s ability to prepare or present a defense. But we also recognize that the type of defense asserted is a factor that must be considered to make that determination. Here, Fisher asserted that he had an alibi for part of the date range in the original information. Therefore, the dates of the alleged assaults were a significant issue in this case. Furthermore, prior to the amendment, Fisher’s alibi placed him out of the state for the first alleged assault, making the start of the date range even more important to his defense. Recall that the date range was November 16, 2014, to March 29, 2015, and the prosecution’s theory was that the first assault occurred after November 16 but before Thanksgiving (November 27). Based on this information, Fisher came to trial prepared with an alibi defense for part of the specified date range—namely, that he could not have committed the first alleged assault because he was out of the state from late October until Thanksgiving Day. As Judge Berger noted, had the trial court denied the amendment and the jury accepted Fisher’s alibi, the result “would have warranted an acquittal on count one.” Fisher, ¶ 65 (Berger, J., 13 dissenting). Ultimately, we cannot know what the jury would have decided had the amendment not occurred. What we do know, however, is that the amendment changed the date range from one where the first alleged assault fell squarely within Fisher’s alibi timeline (November 16 through November 27) to one where it fell partly outside that timeline (October 1 through November 27). Therefore, the amendment plainly diminished the viability of Fisher’s alibi defense for the first count. Had Fisher been timely advised of the expanded date range, he surely would have investigated whether he had additional alibis or another viable defense for those dates.3 Thus, the amendment impaired his ability to prepare his defense. ¶22 The timing of the amendment—our second factor—is also significant. It occurred on the third day of trial, near the close of the prosecution’s case; the 3 The People argue, in part, that expanding the timeline was permissible here because Fisher had access to all of the relevant material through discovery, such that he would have known that the victim had stated in her forensic interview that the first incident might have occurred before the date specified in the information. We are not persuaded. To accept this argument, would—in effect—mean that the dates charged in the information are irrelevant as long as the defendant has access to all of the information in discovery. The People elected the dates in the information and Fisher was entitled to rely on that decision. Accordingly, we reject the People’s suggestion that an erroneous mid-trial amendment to the information under these facts is rectified by the fact that the defendant had access to all of the relevant material in discovery. 14 prosecution only had one more witness to call before it rested. Not only did expanding the timeline this late in the trial prevent Fisher from finding witnesses or marshaling evidence to dispute the expanded timeframe of the charges, it also prevented him from adequately cross-examining the prosecution’s witnesses as he understandably limited his examination to the date range in the original complaint. Indeed, integral to Fisher’s defense was that Z.F. lacked credibility. Arguably, if the jury had determined that the first alleged assault did not occur— i.e., that Z.F.’s testimony was not credible—then that conclusion had the potential to influence the verdict on the remaining counts. However, the prosecution moved to amend the dates after Z.F. testified and after Fisher had cross-examined her about the first alleged assault. Hence, expanding the timeline, in effect, not only diminished the viability of Fisher’s alibi defense but the timing of the amendment also weakened his ability to call into question Z.F.’s credibility overall. As a result, he did not have the opportunity, or frankly even the need, to try to cast doubt on the expanded date range during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. ¶23 Of course, the mere fact that an amendment occurs during trial does not necessarily mean that it prejudices the defendant’s right to prepare and present his defense. Indeed, we recently held in Washam that, under the particular facts of that case, a mid-trial amendment was not reversible error. ¶ 32, 413 P.3d at 1267. In Washam, after the jury was sworn but before the presentation of any evidence, 15 the prosecution moved to amend the information to narrow the date range for the charged offenses. Id. at ¶ 7, 413 P.3d at 1263. In holding that the amendment had not prejudiced Washam’s substantial rights, we noted that he “was always notified of the time frame in the case against him” and that narrowing the date range did not impede his ability to prepare or present his defense. Id. at ¶ 30, 413 P.3d at 1266. ¶24 The opposite is true here. In this case, the prosecution moved to expand the date range for the charged offenses. Hence, unlike in Washam, Fisher was not “always notified of the time frame in the case against him,” which is particularly significant given that Fisher’s defense was that he had an alibi for the earliest dates in the original information. Accordingly, the timing of the amendment, coupled with the fact that it negatively affected Fisher’s alibi defense, prejudiced Fisher’s substantial right to present and prepare his defense.4 ¶25 In sum, Crim P. 7(e) does not ask the court to consider how much prejudice Fisher suffered, but rather asks whether the substantial rights of Fisher were prejudiced. Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the mid-trial 4 We reject the People’s suggestion that the fact that Fisher did not request a continuance after the trial court permitted the amendment somehow changes the inquiry under Crim. P. 7(e). 16 amendment that expanded the date range adversely affected Fisher’s substantial right to prepare and present his alibi defense. That adverse effect constitutes prejudice to Fisher’s substantial rights under Crim. P. 7(e). The trial court, therefore, abused its discretion in permitting this mid-trial amendment. And because this error “affected the fairness of the trial proceedings” and “impairs the reliability of [the] conviction,” this abuse of discretion constitutes reversible error. People v. Jefferson, 2017 CO 35, ¶ 26, 393 P.3d 494, 499; see also DeBella v. People, 233 P.3d 664, 667 (Colo. 2010).