Opinion ID: 405327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactivity of the Bargaining Order

Text: 47 The Board concluded that the Company violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act by withholding recognition from the Union on September 16, 1977, and ordered the Company to bargain retroactively from that date. John Cuneo, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. at 1027. Since its decision in Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 298 (1975), the Board has consistently made Gissel bargaining orders retroactive, rather than effective only from the date of the Board Decision and Order. 17 The Board adopted this policy upon recognition that prospective bargaining orders 48 (i)n some instances ... left unremedied an employer's unilateral changes in working conditions made after a union had established its majority status.... This led to the unwanted result that an employer, by committing serious unfair labor practices, could delay the holding of an election indefinitely (since a fair one could no longer be held), and insure himself a substantial period of time until the Board issued a remedial bargaining order, during which period he would not have to deal with a union. Since the events which triggered the bargaining duty occurred much earlier, i.e., at the time of the unfair labor practices, and since the employees had earlier expressed their desire for union representation, the Board's prospective bargaining order fell short of reinstating the situation as it would have been had Respondent obeyed the law and allowed a fair election to proceed. 49 Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. at 301. Cf. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB (Tiidee Products, Inc.), 426 F.2d 1243, 1248-49 (D.C.Cir.) (prospective bargaining order inadequate remedy for brazen refusal to bargain after union election victory), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 239, 27 L.Ed.2d 256 (1970). 50 Three circuits have explicitly considered and enforced retroactive, as opposed to prospective only, bargaining orders. See Alumbaugh Coal Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1380, 1386 (8th Cir. 1980); Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 318-19 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1699, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981); Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 739, 744 (10th Cir. 1976). We also approve the issuance of retroactive bargaining orders where, as here, the union had majority support within the bargaining unit, the employer refused to bargain with the union, and the employer engaged in serious and pervasive unfair labor practices sufficient to justify a bargaining order under Gissel. In this case, therefore, the Board was justified in making its bargaining order retroactive to September 16, 1977, the date on which the Union, having attained majority support, demanded recognition and on which the Company rejected the demand and embarked on its course of unlawful conduct. 18 C. Reinstatement of the Striking Employees Under Drug Package 51 In Drug Package Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 108 (1977), the employer rejected a demand for recognition by a union that had a valid card majority. Beginning before the union demanded recognition, and continuing after it, the employer engaged in serious unfair labor practices that undermined the union majority. Two weeks after the union demand, the employees struck for recognition. Relying on its Trading Port decision, the Board issued a bargaining order retroactive to the date that the union evidenced majority support and demanded recognition. The Board further held that the employees who struck for recognition were unfair labor practice strikers and therefore entitled to reinstatement upon their unconditional offer to return to work. Those strikers who had not been promptly reinstated were awarded backpay plus interest. 19 See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278, 76 S.Ct. 349, 355, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956). 52 The Board relied on its Drug Package decision to characterize the striking employees in the present case as unfair labor practice strikers. On this point, the Board opinion stated:  '(W)hen employees strike for recognition which should have been granted at the time they went on strike and where the employer engaged in contemporaneous widespread illegal conduct designed to frustrate the statutory scheme, and bargaining in particular, the striking employees are unfair labor practice strikers.'  John Cuneo, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. at 1026 (quoting Drug Package Co., 228 N.L.R.B. at 112). The factual circumstances of Drug Package and of the present case are indistinguishable-in both cases the employer rejected a demand for recognition by a majority union and committed unfair labor practices justifying a Gissel bargaining order; following the employer's rejection, the employees struck for recognition. The propriety of the Board's reinstatement order in this case therefore depends upon the validity of the so-called Drug Package doctrine. 53 In one sense, the treatment of striking employees as unfair labor practice strikers under the circumstances of Drug Package and of this case follows by simple logic from the imposition of a retroactive bargaining order. Concomitant with the imposition of the retroactive bargaining order is a conclusion that the employer's refusal to recognize and bargain with the majority union was a violation of section 8(a)(5). See John Cuneo, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. at 1027; Drug Package Co., 228 N.L.R.B. at 111 & n.21. Since the employer committed an unfair labor practice in its refusal to recognize the union, and since the employees then struck for recognition, the employees' absence from the workplace (was) prompted by employer conduct that (was) found to constitute an unfair labor practice, Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 394 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 119, 70 L.Ed.2d 102, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 141, 70 L.Ed.2d 117 (1981). Hence, the employees were unfair labor practice strikers. 54 The logical application of established remedial principles is not the sole justification for the Board's Drug Package doctrine. The Drug Package doctrine is also warranted by well-recognized policies of the Act, which provide both a union and an employer certain limited, lawful options prior to a Board election or a voluntary recognition of a majority union. 55 Under the Act, an employer has no automatic duty to bargain with a union that claims to have signed authorization cards from a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. The employer may, regardless of motive, refuse a demand for recognition based on a card majority and compel the union to petition for a secret-ballot election to demonstrate its majority status. Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 95 S.Ct. 429, 42 L.Ed.2d 465 (1974). An employer who rejects a demand for recognition may not, however, use the time preceding the election to commit unfair labor practices in an attempt to destroy the union's majority. Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB, 419 U.S. at 310, 95 S.Ct. at 434; NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 600, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1933, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). If the employer engages in unlawful conduct that impedes the electoral process, the employer forfeits (its) right to demand an election, NLRB v. Prineville Stud Co., 578 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1978), and may be ordered to bargain with the union, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 614-15, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 527 F.2d 803, 806 n.4 (D.C.Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 2229, 48 L.Ed.2d 832 (1976); Drug Package Co., 228 N.L.R.B. at 111. 56 If the employer refuses to bargain on the basis of the union's card majority, the union may strike for recognition, subject to the restrictions of section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). 20 The union may hope that a visible display of majority support on the picket line and economic pressure on the employer will shorten the route to recognition and bargaining. Still, as long as the employer does not unlawfully attempt to undermine the union's support, it is not required to recognize the union and may insist on an election. See Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB, 419 U.S. at 306, 95 S.Ct. at 432. In addition, the employer may permanently or temporarily replace employees engaged in an economic strike. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra. 57 If the employer exceeds its legal rights and embarks on an unlawful campaign to undermine the union's support, it may injure the employees' protected interests in at least two distinct ways. First, the employer's unfair labor practices may prevent the employees from freely expressing their union preferences in a Board conducted election. An impairment of employee free choice, assured by section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), may justify the imposition of a Gissel bargaining order. As the Board stated in Drug Package : The legal basis for so bypassing the election procedure is simply that the employer's own misconduct has created conditions which now preclude the conducting of a fair election. 228 N.L.R.B. at 111. 58 Second, the employer's illegal conduct may cause excessive economic harm to employees who have participated in a lawful strike for recognition. As noted above, when a union demands recognition, the employer has two lawful options. The employer may recognize and bargain with the union, in which case no strike for recognition will follow. Alternatively, the employer may refuse to recognize the union and await the outcome of a Board election. If the employer does not impede the electoral process, the recognitional strike should last no longer than the date of the election. 21 If, however, the employer rejects these lawful alternatives and undermines or prevents an election, the strike likely will be prolonged as a consequence of activity that is clearly forbidden by the Act. In other words, the employees' continued strike, and continued loss of earnings, would result directly from their employer's illegal conduct. 59 Just as a Gissel bargaining order may be an appropriate remedy for the impairment of employee free choice caused by an employer's unfair labor practices, the treatment of striking employees as unfair labor practice strikers under Drug Package may be an appropriate remedy for the harm that follows from an employer's illegal conduct. Furthermore, the possibility that striking employees might attain the status of unfair labor practice strikers under Drug Package may deter an employer from embarking on a course of illegal conduct designed to destroy a union's majority. See Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 50 (D.C.Cir.1980) (deterrence is a legitimate remedial purpose of bargaining orders). Thus, the Board's characterization of these striking employees as unfair labor practice strikers bear(s) appropriate relation to the policies of the Act. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348, 73 S.Ct. 287, 289, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953). 60 Finally, the Board's Drug Package doctrine is appropriately remedial and not improperly punitive. 22 If an employer engages in serious and pervasive unfair labor practices that prevent a fair election, the employer may extend a lawful recognitional strike beyond the date on which, by operation of the lawful election process, it would have terminated. Thus, the Board may properly conclude that the employees would not be made whole for their employer's unfair labor practices if they were not entitled to prompt reinstatement after their unconditional offers to return to work. See International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 604 F.2d 689, 697 (D.C.Cir.1979). Similarly, the Board may properly conclude that the employer has forfeited its right to hire permanent replacements for its striking employees when their absence from work stems from the employer's unlawful impairment of the electoral process. See, e.g., M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 1940). The Drug Package doctrine therefore lies within the broad remedial discretion that Congress gave to the Board, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), and which the courts have recognized, e.g., Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540, 63 S.Ct. 1214, 1218, 87 L.Ed. 1568 (1943); United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 629-30 (D.C.Cir.1981), and we affirm it. 23 61 As we noted earlier, the facts of this case are indistinguishable from those of Drug Package. The Union demanded recognition based on a valid card majority. The Company refused and embarked on an unlawful course of conduct designed to destroy the Union's majority. The Union then unsuccessfully struck for recognition. After considering the employer's conduct, the Board concluded that a retroactive bargaining order should issue. We therefore uphold the Board's decision, based on Drug Package, to view the striking employees as unfair labor practice strikers, whom the Company therefore had an obligation to reinstate upon their unconditional offers to return to work on November 14, 1977.