Opinion ID: 399387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Joinder Requirement in Copyright Actions

Text: 13 The district court's dismissal of defendant-intervenors' counterclaims appears to have been dictated by the court's determination that the counterclaims hinged upon an interpretation of a licensing agreement between the Episcopal Conferences and Talbot Press as to the terms under which the accused books could be published and distributed. 9 But the district court apparently failed to recognize that breach of the licensing agreement might also constitute copyright infringement if the breach were material or if it resulted in a failure to satisfy a condition to the license. 10 Therefore, the district court should not have dismissed the counterclaims for failure to join an indispensable party before deciding if valid copyright infringement claims were, in fact, asserted, for it is well established that a suit for infringement is analogous to other tort actions and infringers are jointly and severally liable; hence plaintiff need sue only such participants as it sees fit. 11 This rule was recently endorsed by this court in Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein, et al. v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., et al., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C.Cir.1981) (hereinafter German Wine ). There Judge Ginsburg observed: 14 Courts have long held in patent, trademark, literary property, and copyright infringement cases, any member of the distribution chain can be sued as an alleged joint tort-feasor. See, e.g., Wells v. Universal Pictures Co., 166 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1948); Grocers Baking Co. v. Sigler, 132 F.2d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 1942). Since joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, the victim of trademark infringement may sue as many or as few of the alleged wrongdoers as he chooses; those left out of the lawsuit, commentary underscores, are not indispensable parties. 12 15 This court's decision in German Wine overturned a decision of the district court that dismissed a trademark infringement claim against an Australian wine producer and its American distributors. The district court had decided that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Australian defendants and for that reason held that the action could not proceed against the American defendants. In reversing, we held that the District of Columbia long-arm statute authorized adjudication of the claims against the Australian wine companies. Although not necessary to the decision, this court felt compelled to note that even if jurisdiction were lacking over the Australian defendants, the claims against the American defendants should not have been dismissed because any member of the distribution chain could be sued as an alleged joint tortfeasor. Under the same reasoning, in the instant case, the Episcopal Conferences can counterclaim copyright infringement against Costello without being required to join Talbot Press. The remedy requested-destruction of the accused books-is one that would be carried out only against Costello. J.A. 46. 16 Costello seeks to distinguish German Wine by arguing that there (t)he parties defending the action did not claim that the foreign companies had obtained a right to use the trademark from the parties claiming infringement. In contrast to the situation in (German Wine ), the defendant distributor in this case, appellant Costello, has asserted that the copying activities that form the basis of the claim of copyright infringement were undertaken in compliance with the terms of a copyright license issued by the copyright holder to a foreign publisher. Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 5. Nevertheless, if Talbot Press failed to satisfy a condition to its license or materially breached the licensing agreement, it had no rights under which Costello can take cover and therefore both Talbot Press and Costello acted without authority and thereby infringed defendant-intervenors' copyright. See pp. 1045-1046 infra. Costello's good faith use of the material would not insulate Costello, for intent is not an element of infringement, 13 and the copyright holder may proceed against any member of the chain of distribution. See p. 1043 supra. 17 Costello maintains that Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), is inapposite for similar reasons. That case was brought by a group of British writers and performers known as Monty Python, who wrote and performed television programs broadcasted by the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), against the American Broadcasting Company (ABC). The BBC had a license for the programs, but the Monty Python group retained all rights in the script. The BBC could sublicense transmission of recordings of the program and did so to Time-Life, who broadcasted them through ABC. When the Monty Python group learned that ABC had edited portions of programs, it requested ABC not to edit further broadcasts. ABC refused to honor the request and the Monty Python group sought a preliminary injunction for infringement of copyright and unfair trade practices against ABC only. The district court denied relief, inter alia, because the Monty Python group failed to join the BBC and Time-Life as indispensable parties. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that those at the end of the chain of distribution can acquire no greater rights than the licensee. Id. at 21. Costello seeks to distinguish Gilliam because there it was the act of ABC ... in editing the work that formed the basis of Monty Python's copyright infringement claim.... In the case at hand, Costello Publishing Company has done nothing to edit or change Morning and Evening Prayer. However, if Talbot Press failed to satisfy a condition to the license, then the copyright holder can proceed against Costello for infringement of copyright even though Costello did not intend to participate in Talbot Press' alleged wrongdoing. See pp. 1042-1044 supra. 18 Costello also argues that the allegations concerning breach of the terms of the copyright license cannot be resolved without the participation of Talbot Press because that contract was formed by the Episcopal Conferences and Talbot Press. Costello argues further that it would be inequitable to force Costello to defend what is essentially a contract action when it was not a party to the contract. Stripped of the assumption that the counterclaims are merely contract actions, Costello is left only with the argument that Talbot Press is indispensable because Costello needs evidence from Talbot Press for a defense. But the question of whether or not an entity or individual should be a party to an action is something quite different from the questions and problems associated with obtaining evidence from such an entity or individual. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14 does not list the need to obtain evidence from an entity or individual as a factor bearing upon whether or not a party is necessary or indispensable to a just adjudication. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the counterclaims for failure to join Talbot Press as an indispensable party before deciding whether a copyright infringement had taken place.