Opinion ID: 204040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rejection of Tax Evasion Instruction

Text: García, Román, Ramos, Vázquez, and Roldán all argue that the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury during the jury charge that this is not a tax evasion case. They claim, given the use of tax related evidence during the government's case in chief and closing, that declining their request to repeat the instruction prejudiced them. During the government's case-in-chief, however, and at the Defendants' request, the district court did instruct the jury that this was not a tax evasion case. The district court instructed as to the following: Members of the jury, this evidence that you are going to receive now regarding the income tax returns, I should tell you that ... the case that is before us ... has nothing to do with tax evasion. Tax evasion is exclusively under the jurisdiction of the state courts, not the federal courts. And the evidence is being allowed because the Government needs to present evidence as part of their effort to prove a number of elements in the federal offenses which they think have something to do with this. That is, of course, for you to decide at the end of the case, on the basis of the instructions that I will give you. And that is the only purpose. So this is not a tax evasion case. This is a healthcare programs fraud case. That is what it is. None of the above Defendants objected to the district court's decision not to provide the same instruction during the jury charge, only Caraballo did, who does not join this argument on appeal. Thus, we review for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30(a) (Any party may request in writing that the court instruct the jury on the law as specified in the request. The request must be made at the close of the evidence or at any earlier time that the court reasonably sets.); see also United States v. Harris, 104 F.3d 1465, 1471 (5th Cir.1997) ([T]he greater weight of authority counsels that a party can rely upon the objection of his codefendant only if he joins in the objection, citing cases). The above Defendants claim prejudice, but it is difficult to see how, when the mid-trial instruction was correct, and case law presumes that jurors ... follow the trial judge's instructions. United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir.1998); see also United States v. Rivera-Gómez, 67 F.3d 993, 999 (1st Cir.1995) ([J]urors are not children.) overruled on other grounds by Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). Moreover, García specifically argues that prejudice may have resulted from the government's closing, but the government reminded the jurors in closing that [t]his is not a tax evasion case. We thus see no error.