Opinion ID: 2630721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: freakish and wanton application and gary ridgway

Text: ś 83 Since Cross's trial, the Green River Killer, Gary Ridgway, was caught, prosecuted, and sentenced to life in prison. We cannot begin to calculate the harm his abhorrent murders caused. The fact he will live out his life in prison instead of facing the death penalty has caused many in our community to seriously question whether the death penalty can, in fairness, be proportional when applied to any other defendant. ś 84 We do not minimize the importance of this moral question. But it is a question best left to the people and to their elected representatives in the legislature. Under the United States Constitution (the only constitution plead here), Washington's death penalty is constitutional and nothing about Gary Ridgway changes that. ś 85 It may be that there will always be aberrations like Ridgway. We do not believe that these horrific aberrations make a statute unconstitutional. We look at the entirety of first degree aggravated murder prosecutions, not just at whether any particular case is within an order of magnitude of the worst we have known. RCW 10.95.120. ś 86 We do not agree with those who say that no rational explanation exists for Gary Ridgway escaping a death sentence and Dayva Cross not. See generally Matthew R. Wilmot, Note, Sparing Gary Ridgway: The Demise of the Death Penalty in Washington State? 41 WILLAMETTE L.REV. 435 (2005). Ridgway was spared because a highly respected, honorable, and thoughtful prosecutor made the decision to stay the hand of the executioner in return for information that would otherwise have died some midnight within the walls of the state penitentiary. The information received in return for a life sentence allowed so many families to, at long last, know what happened to their loved ones. While many may disagree with that prosecutor's decision, no one should deny that it was highly rational. ś 87 Under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and its progeny, the death penalty is constitutional only if it is properly constrained to avoid freakish and wanton application. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, 173, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). To be constitutionally valid, where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909. We have repeatedly held that our statutes meet this standard. They properly constrain prosecutorial discretion in seeking the death penalty; they properly direct the jury to consider appropriate factors; and they provide for meaningful mandatory appellate review in every case. See Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 210-11, 892 P.2d 29; State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 697-701, 683 P.2d 571 (1984) ( Rupe I); cf. In re Pers. Restraint of Brown, 143 Wash.2d 431, 460, 21 P.3d 687 (2001). ś 88 Our proportionality review is only one way Washington State law prevents arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty. Other statutory protections may be just as effective. ś 89 First, the death penalty may only be sought in the most egregious of killings. RCW 10.95.020. This limitation does much to constrain the possibility of arbitrary and capricious application. Second, the prosecutor is instructed to seek the death penalty only when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. RCW 10.95.040(1). That requires the prosecutor to consider seriously whether, in any particular case, it would be inappropriate to seek the sentence at all. Third, the State bears the heavy burden of convincing all 12 jurors that the death penalty is appropriate. RCW 10.95.060(4). Unanimity sets a high threshold. Fourth, Washington juries are informed that if they do not recommend a death sentence, the defendant will automatically be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. RCW 10.95.030(1), .080(2). This assures the jurors that if they exercise mercy, a brutal killer will not someday be set free. Fifth, the jurors are asked whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. RCW 10.95.060(4). This gives the defense considerable opportunity to plead for mercy on any theory they can conceive or that the facts support. Sixth, jurors are specifically instructed to consider eight separate, but nonexclusive, criteria in deciding whether mercy is warranted. RCW 10.95.070. This ensures that jurors' will have their attention drawn to specific reasons to exercise mercy. Seventh, we collect data on all death-eligible convictions. RCW 10.95.120. This allows us and other interested parties to analyze the actual patterns and practices of capital sentencing. Finally, the legislature has directed this court to review all death sentences, whether or not the defendant would otherwise appeal, to independently review the evidence supporting a death sentence and to determine whether the sentence is disproportionate. RCW 10.95.100, .130. Should a death penalty be the result of arbitrary and capricious conduct, the defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to get relief from the highest court in the state. ś 90 Ridgway's abhorrent killings, standing alone, do not render the death penalty unconstitutional or disproportionate. Our law is not so fragile. But his killings are not irrelevant to our analysis, and will be considered as part of our statutorily mandated review of every future death penalty case.