Opinion ID: 697705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mens Rea Instructions

Text: 25 Boyles initially contends on appeal that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the requisite mens rea. Boyles alleges on appeal, for the first time in these proceedings, that the trial court committed the following errors, none of which were called to the attention of the trial judge either during the trial nor at the jury instruction conference. He argues that the court failed to instruct the jury: (1) that voluntary intoxication could negate the specific intent required for conviction of aggravated sexual assault; (2) that the defense of good faith reasonable mistake as to consent may have been applicable because he was so intoxicated that he may not have realized that Tomow did not consent to have sexual intercourse with him; and (3) that Tomow's intoxication may have impaired her ability to effectively communicate her nonconsent to Boyles. Boyles also contends that the jury should have received expert testimony 8 concerning the effect of alcohol and drugs on both Boyles and Tomow before it was able to reach a proper conclusion that Boyles had the requisite mens rea to commit aggravated sexual assault. 26 Jury instructions are viewed as a whole and not in isolation and will not be disturbed on appeal provided they treat the issues fairly and adequately. United States v. Durades, 929 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted). At trial, Boyles's attorney proposed the same mens rea instruction as the prosecution, and when it was given, he did not request the district judge to supplement the mens rea instructions. It is well settled that a party may not raise an error or omission in a jury instruction unless the party timely objected and state[d] [specifically] the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of that objection. United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203, 1207 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, quotation omitted, alteration in original). A timely and proper objection apprises the court of the precise nature of the alleged error so the court has an opportunity to rectify any shortcoming. United States v. South, 28 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir.1994) (quotation omitted). Because Boyles did not give the district court the opportunity to address, much less correct, these alleged errors, he forfeited his right to appeal on these issues, id., and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) authorizes us to review for plain error only. United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-77, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) ( 'No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,' or a right of any other sort, 'may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it' ). 27 Plain errors are classified as those that affect substantial rights, id., and seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1776 (quotations omitted). Boyles bears a heavy burden because [i]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). 9 [T]here is no miscarriage of justice if the defendant's guilt is so clear that he would certainly have been convicted even if the error had never been committed[.] United States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir.1992). 28 Boyles's first contention is that the judge should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, that Boyles's voluntary intoxication could 10 negate the requisite mens rea for the offense of aggravated sexual assault because he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent to knowingly engage in sexual intercourse, by force, with Tomow. Voluntary intoxication is a negative defense to specific intent crimes and a high degree of intoxication can conceivably, under limited circumstances, render the defendant incapable of attaining the required state of mind to commit the crime. United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 641 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982, 110 S.Ct. 517, 107 L.Ed.2d 518 (1989); see also United States v. Brownlee, 937 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir.1991). Wisconsin law 11 also provides that intoxication is a negative defense if such condition [n]egatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime. Wisc.Stat. Sec. 939.42(2). In Wisconsin, voluntary intoxication can serve to negate specific intent when it is an element of the crime charged. State v. Strege, 116 Wis.2d 477, 343 N.W.2d 100, 103 (1984). If a defendant wants the jury to be instructed on voluntary intoxication, counsel is required to request such an instruction after producing that quantum of evidence sufficient to convince the jury that his mental faculties were so overcome by intoxicants that he was incapable of forming the intent requisite to the commission of the crime, id. 343 N.W.2d at 105 (quotation omitted), or that the intoxication was so extreme as to suspend entirely the power of reason. Id. 343 N.W.2d at 106 (quotation omitted). 12 29 A bald statement that the defendant had been drinking or was drunk is insufficient--insufficient not because it falls short of the quantum of evidence necessary, but because it is not evidence of the right thing. In order to merit an intoxication instruction ... the defendant must point to some evidence of mental impairment due to the consumption of intoxicants sufficient to negate the existence of the [specific] intent[.] 30 Id. 343 N.W.2d at 105. 31 Although we have no reason to doubt that Boyles was inebriated at the time of the assault, he never testified that his ingestion of alcohol was to that great a degree that it impaired his judgment. He has failed to present us with evidence to convince us of the merits of his argument that he was intoxicated to that degree of inebriation that he had no power of reason or that he was utterly incapable or knowing that he was forcing Tomow to engage in intercourse with him. The defendant's mere post-trial statement that he was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the required intent to forcibly sexually assault Tomow is insufficient to require that the jury be instructed on voluntary intoxication. Id. His entire defense was based on the theory that both parties willingly and knowingly engaged in consensual intercourse, a defense which is a stark contradiction to his appellate argument that he was too intoxicated to realize that he was forcing Tomow to engage in intercourse. Additionally, it is interesting to note that the defendant presented a very clear and detailed recollection of the events on the night in question thus bringing into question how his memory and reasoning process were impaired. Such a detailed recitation of facts serves to raise grave suspicion in contradiction of the very heart and soul of his voluntary intoxication defense. Id. 343 N.W.2d at 107. 32 Boyles's next contention, also not raised at trial, is that the jury should have been instructed about the defense of reasonable mistake as to consent because the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he knowingly forced Tomow to engage in intercourse. A defendant seeking to overturn a jury's verdict based on the sufficiency of the evidence must overcome a very high hurdle. United States v. Billops, 43 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1389, 131 L.Ed.2d 241 (1995). We must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We will reverse only when the record is devoid of any evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Garcia, 35 F.3d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir.1994) (citation omitted).  '[T]he credibility of witnesses is peculiarly within the province of the jury and our review of credibility is prohibited absent extraordinary circumstances.'  United States v. Rose, 12 F.3d 1414, 1421 (7th Cir.1994) (quotation omitted). 33 Because of the absence of case law from the Seventh Circuit interpreting the federal aggravated sexual assault statute, we turn to law from the Eighth Circuit, which states that the purpose of the aggravated sexual assault statute is to criminalize sexual acts engaged in with a person whose will is not actually engaged but is overcome by violence. It will therefore be a rare case indeed where the defense of reasonable mistake will be available, since the need to employ force will necessarily indicate, as a general matter, a lack of consent so obvious as to render a mistake impossible. United States v. Norquay, 987 F.2d 475, 478 (8th Cir.1993). The evidence before us is not one of those rare cases nor has Boyles produced a scintilla of evidence to even suggest that he made a reasonable mistake. 34 Tomow's physical examination at the hospital revealed bruises, scratches, and contusions on her arms, legs, back and neck, all of which the doctor who examined her said were consistent with being forcibly sexually assaulted in the manner she described, on the ground as well as being forcibly pushed against the hood of a car while being assaulted from behind. Boyles also denied having had sexual relations with Tomow on the ground, but during the examination, it was noted that grass, sand, and dirt were found in and about her body in a manner consistent with her statement as to the series of assaults on the ground. 35 At trial, Boyles never offered evidence as to a reasonable mistake as to consent, nor did he argue such a theory to the jury but claimed that Tomow did, in fact, consent to the acts of intercourse and that they discussed the subject both before and after the acts of intercourse. The detail with which Boyles related this conversation and the other events of the night in question raises serious doubt about his claimed inability to know that Tomow did not consent to engage in intercourse with him for if he was as inebriated as he now claims to be, his mental recall would most likely have been impaired. Boyles never testified that Tomow was anything other than eager and willing to engage in sex. Both Tomow and Boyles testified at trial, and each of them acknowledged their respective intoxication. 36 The determination of such an issue is best resolved through giving the judge or jury the opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitude, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements, rather than looking at the cold pages of [an appellate record.] 37 Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1125 (7th Cir.1992). 38 On appeal, Boyles alleges that there are extraordinary circumstances in this case that should compel us to review the credibility determination of the jury because the jury was not presented with expert testimony concerning the effects that drugs and alcohol may have had on both himself and Tomow, although Boyles never tried to offer any expert testimony, nor did he make any objection to the lack thereof during trial. Had the court allowed expert testimony concerning Boyles's degree of intoxication and how it affected his ability to know if he was forcing Tomow to engage in intercourse with him, it would have run afoul of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) 13 because the issue of whether Boyles engaged in intercourse with Tomow knowing that he did it forcibly was an element of his crime and a question solely within the province of the jury. United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 331-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S.Ct. 1981, 95 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987). 39 This is not a case of reasonable mistake, but rather, about whether or not Tomow consented to sexual intercourse. Essentially, Boyles challenges the jury's determination that Tomow was the more credible witness, but we will not disturb their determination. We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Boyles knowingly forced Tomow to engage in sexual intercourse in light of the injuries she received and the jury's determination of credibility. Furthermore, we hold that the district judge did not commit plain error when he failed to, sua sponte, instruct the jury on the defenses of voluntary intoxication or good faith reasonable mistake as to consent, nor did he err by failing to instruct the jury that Tomow's intoxication may have impaired her ability to communicate her lack of consent because there was insufficient evidence in the record to do so.