Opinion ID: 1963122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: declaration of emergency judicial review

Text: A question involved, advanced by the city and the Authority, is whether a municipal declaration of an emergency is subject to judicial review. It is axiomatic that municipal bodies in this State have no powers other than those delegated by the Legislature, and must perform their prescribed activities within the statutory ambit. Equally well settled is the jurisdiction of the former Supreme Court to inquire into the validity of municipal activities through the medium of the prerogative writ of certiorari (now constitutionally vested in the Superior Court, subject to rules promulgated by this court). Half a century ago the former Court of Errors and Appeals reiterated the even then long-established law of this State that this jurisdiction could not be impaired by adverse legislation. Green v. Heritage, 64 N.J.L. 567, 572 ( E. & A. 1900). These principles resulted in a very positive declaration by the former Supreme Court in Lyons v. Bayonne, 101 N.J.L. 455, 457 ( Sup.Ct. 1925), that the court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of a municipal declaration of emergency ( i.e., to adjudge whether an emergency in fact existed at the time of the municipal declaration thereof), even where the Legislature (as it had in the Lyons case, supra ) by the statute in question (there, L. 1919, c. 178) had declared that where the municipal resolution was adopted by a three-fourths vote it was conclusive as to the character and existence of an emergency within the act. The Lyons case, supra, was expressly followed in this respect as to another statute, R.S. 40:2-31 (1), in Murphy v. West New York, 130 N.J.L. 341, 342 ( Sup.Ct. 1943). In the Murphy case, supra, the former Supreme Court held ( p. 342): Whether or not an emergency in fact exists, within the contemplation of this statute, is a question for the court, and the determination of the municipality on that fact is not conclusive. This decision was fortified as an authority by the approval thereof implicit in Murphy v. West New York, 130 N.J.L. 569 ( Sup.Ct. 1943), a decision rendered by three justices of the former Supreme Court other than those who heard and decided the earlier phase of the matter. Cf. Murphy v. West New York, 132 N.J.L. 595 ( Sup.Ct. 1945). While no express declaration on this question involved appears to have been enunciated by a court of last resort in this State, the determination of emergency by a public body has been judicially reviewed in the courts of last resort. E.g., Frank v. Bd. of Education of Jersey City, 90 N.J.L. 273, 274-278 ( E. & A. 1917). Upon the consideration of these and other decisions and the philosophy hereinabove expressed, we are of the opinion that the Superior Court, Law Division, had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the municipal declarations of emergency involved in this case. That such a conclusion is not an uncommon one appears from the comparable decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in Hunt v. Norton, 68 Ariz. 1, 198 P. 2 d 124, 5 A.L.R. 2 d 668 ( Sup.Ct. 1948); Annotations, 5 A.L.R. 2 d 675 et seq. However, there appears to be some difference of opinion in judicial decisions of jurisdictions elsewhere. See for example the discussion of conflicting views on the subject contained in Prescott v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 299 Mass. 191, 12 N.E. 2 d 462, 467-468 ( Mass.Sup.Jud.Ct. 1938).