Opinion ID: 1669788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Regarded as having an impairment

Text: The Department argues even though Tervo may not meet the portion of the disability test requiring an impairment which substantially limits major life activities, he does meet the third prong of the test which extends coverage to those individuals who are simply regarded as having a physical or mental impairment. Congress expanded the definition in 1974 to include such individuals in order [t]o combat the effects of erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions about the handicapped   . Arline, 480 U.S. at 279, 107 S.Ct. at 1126. Regulations promulgated after the act interpret the phrase is regarded as having such an impairment to mean: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by an employer as constituting such a limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitude of an employer toward such impairment; (3) or has none of the impairments defined    but is treated by an employer as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702 (1988). Congressional legislative history also sheds light on the meaning of this phrase: This subsection includes within the protection of sections 503 and 504 those persons who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as having, as well as those persons whose mental or physical condition does not substantially limit their life activities and who thus are not technically within [the first prong] in the new definition. Members of both of these groups may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their being regarded as handicapped. S.Rep. No. 93-1297, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. and Ad. News 6373 at 6389-90. These interpretive regulations suggest the substantial limitations requirement may be met not only by past hardships suffered by a plaintiff, but also by the possibility of future discrimination based on the plaintiff's perceived handicap. As the Supreme Court stated in Arline: Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283, 107 S.Ct. at 1128-29. In Arline, the Court provided examples of individuals who would fit under this portion of the definition: (1) a cerebral palsied child and (2) a woman crippled by arthritis. Id. These individuals possess physical characteristics which an employer may perceive as limiting even though the applicant is qualified to perform the job. Hennepin County did not make such a false perception in regard to Tervo. The Department argues Hennepin County perceived Tervo as possessing a disabling condition which substantially limited his ability to see. In reality, however, Hennepin County simply stated that Tervo failed to meet its uncorrected vision standard of 20/100. Hennepin County was aware that with glasses Tervo's vision could be corrected to 20/15. Therefore, it did not perceive him as being substantially limited in his ability to see. This case differs significantly from one involving a blind person or other individual whose visual problems are uncorrectable. Hennepin County's decision not to hire Tervo was not based on its perception of him as disabled, but rather on his failure to meet a job qualification necessary to protect the safety of employees and prisoners. Allowing Tervo to qualify under the third prong of the disability definition would result in an expansion of disability protection beyond the logical scope of the Act. As the Tudyman court pointed out, under such an expansive reading any individual rejected for a single job based on a physical impairment would be considered disabled under the law: For the same reason that the failure to qualify for a single job does not constitute a limitation on a major life activity, refusal to hire someone for a single job does not in and of itself constitute perceiving the plaintiff as a handicapped individual. If this were the case, then anyone who failed to obtain a job because of a single requirement which may not be essential to the job would become a handicapped individual because the employer would thus be viewing the applicant's failure as a handicap. This court refuses to make the term handicapped a meaningless phrase. Tudyman, 608 F.Supp. at 746. Hennepin County did not perceive Tervo as being substantially limited in a major life activity of seeing or working; he was simply rejected on the basis of his failure to meet a qualification of the job. As such he fails to meet the definition of a disabled person under the Human Rights Act.