Opinion ID: 2062624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Bona Fide Claim of Right

Text: The state cites Carpenter v. Coles, 75 Minn. 9, 77 N.W. 424 (1898) for the proposition that the phrase claim of right in Minn.Stat. § 609.605(5) (1980) is a term of art and means a claim of title or ownership. This court, in an adverse possession case, stated that the terms claim of right, claim of title, and claim of ownership    mean nothing more than the intention of the disseisor to appropriate and use the land as his own to the exclusion of all others    [and that] the presence or absence of good faith of the [adverse] possessor, or whether the possession originated in a naked trespass, or was taken under color or claim of title, is wholly immaterial. 75 Minn. at 11, 77 N.W. at 424. The state recognizes that an adverse possessor need not act in good faith but argues that the quoted language makes clear that a claim of right, whether or not it is held in good faith, means a claim of ownership and that since defendant did not assert a claim of ownership or title to St. Mary's, her claim of right that she was acting in good faith is meaningless and no defense to the trespass charge. A claim of right under section 609.605(5) is not limited to a claim of title or ownership. Express or implied consent  a license  to a person from one who has the authority to give such consent is a defense to a charge of criminal trespass. In Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943), the court reversed convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses charged with criminal trespass on complaint of an apartment building owner. The court there determined the defendants were at least licensees of the respective tenants who afforded them the opportunity to enter and state their mission, 313 Mass. at 640, 48 N.E.2d at 683, and concluded: In the instant case the defendants were lawfully in the vestibule, where the means for communicating with the respective tenants had been installed that the tenants might at will release to lock and give access to those seeking to see them. Of course, they could decline to do so if they saw fit. The releasing of the lock, we think, must be held to have at least conferred upon the defendants a license or permission to enter the inner halls, to approach the apartments in question, and, if permitted by the tenant, to state the object of their call. This was a license for the tenants to grant or withhold, one embraced within the easement conferred upon them by the letting, one which subsisted until revoked by the tenants, and one which the tenants could exercise notwithstanding objections of the landlord, who could not revoke the license any more than he could an invitation extended by the tenant to one calling upon any legitimate business. Id. This court considered the defense of license to be upon premises and the principle of Richardson, in distinguishing the facts giving rise to the license in Richardson from the facts precluding a finding of implied consent and a license in the case before it, State v. Quinnell, 277 Minn. 63, 151 N.W.2d 598 (1967), a criminal trespass action also brought under Minn.Stat. § 609.605(5) (1980), and there concluded: Defendant seems also to argue that, because a large part of the stockyards were leased to independent commission firms, the demonstrators were implied licensees of those commission firms, and Stockyards was therefore without power to revoke the license, citing Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.(2d) 678, 146 A.L.R. 648, in support of their (sic) contention. To state the facts, however, is to distinguish the cases at once. The Richardson trespass complaints arose out of the demand of an apartment-building landlord that Jehovah's Witnesses refrain from entering upon the premises for the purpose of making peaceful communication with his apartment tenants. It is undisputed, in contrast, that neither the hog chutes nor the East Chute Road giving access thereto was owned or possessed by the commission firms but by Stockyards only, so that no rights of tenants were here involved. Even were this not so, the physical obstructing of the stockyards, for the apparent purpose of compelling a change in its marketing methods, would seem to be equally hostile to the commission firms and would equally negative any notion of implied consent.    277 Minn. at 69-70, 151 N.W.2d at 603 (emphasis added). One in possession of premises by permission of a tenant who is entitled to possession is not a trespasser but a licensee. Keithley v. Hettinger, 133 Minn. 36, 157 N.W. 897 (1916). A license is a mere power, authority, or personal privilege. It does not create an estate or interest in land, and it may be created by parol. A licensee is one who has mere permission to use land, dominion over it remaining in the owner, and no interest in or exclusive possession of it is given to the occupant. 11A M. Dunnell, Dunnell Minnesota Digest 2d Licenses in Real Property § 1.00 (3d ed. 1978) (footnotes omitted). In Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. v. City of Winthrop, 257 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Minn. 1977), this court succinctly stated: Because a license is generally revocable, it is not an encumbrance upon land. It is actually a justification for acts done under the license, a sort of immunity from trespass. (Emphasis added). A person visiting a nursing home resident with express or implied consent of the resident or of the guardian of the resident is no less a licensee entitled to use the means of ingress and egress to make such visitation possible than is a person visiting an apartment building tenant. If the guardians had never given express consent or had withdrawn express consent, or if they had acted in such manner as to give rise to implied consent which had been withdrawn, defendant would have no license to enter St. Mary's to visit Ms. Siebert and would have no claim of right defense. If express or implied consent of the guardians existed on the date of the alleged trespass, or if defendant had not been informed of the withdrawal of previously existing express or implied consent, she had a claim of right defense to the trespass charge. Quinnell referred to a claim or right in this manner: The Advisory Committee Comment on the new Criminal Code, 40 M.S.A. p. 570, commenting on the statutory reference to trespass without claim of right, observes that those words simply cover bona fide claims of right and that [a] false claim would not be a claim at all, language obviously relating to protection of an innocent trespasser from criminal prosecution. 277 Minn. at 70-71, 151 N.W.2d at 604. The claim of right is a defense only if it is bona fide. The reason for allowing a defendant in a criminal trespass case the defense of a bona fide belief of claim of right is that the law generally does not punish persons who commit an offense without criminal intent. A bona fide belief, i. e., a good faith claim of right, negatives the criminal intent required by Minn.Stat. § 609.605(5) (1980). 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass § 87 (1974) states the point this way: Criminal intent is an essential element of the statutory offense of trespass, even though the statute is silent as to intent, and if the act prohibited is committed in good faith under claim of right or color of title, although the accused is mistaken as to his right, unless it is committed with force or violence of a breach of the peace, no conviction will lie, since it will not be presumed that the legislature intended to punish criminal acts committed in ignorance, by accident or under claim of right, and in the bona fide belief that the land is the property of the trespasser, unless the terms of the statute forbid any other construction. Id. (footnote omitted). In Hayes v. State, 13 Ga.App. 647, 79 S.E. 761 (1913) cited, and quoted from, by the state, a criminal trespass action for title to property was in dispute. The court discussed the trespass statute and quoted from a prior case which held that criminal trespass was not designed to try disputed land titles, but to punish those who wilfully, and without claim of right, commit acts of trespass on the lands of others. 13 Ga.App. at 649, 79 S.E. at 762. The court then continued to discuss trespass and the defense of good faith in this language: An act which, as related to the true owner of land, might appear to be trespass is not in fact a trespass, if the act is committed in good faith by one who actually and sincerely believes that he is authorized (either because authorized by the true owner, or because he believes himself to be the true owner) to do the act in question. In fact the burden rests upon the state of proving the absence of good faith on the part of one accused of trespass, because the act must generally be shown to be willfully done, and, under the particular paragraph upon which the charge against the defendant in the present case was based, it was essential for the state to show that the presence of the accused upon the premises in question was with no bona fide claim or color of title, and without the consent of the owner. If, therefore, the defendant had any evidence which tended to show that he did have a bona fide claim dependent upon the consent of one who bona fide claimed to be the owner, it would be error to withhold such evidence from the jury, and thus deprive them of giving to the claim of the defendant equal consideration with that accorded to the claim of the prosecutor. In trespass it is altogether a question of bona fides, and not a question of real title. Id. at 649-650, 79 S.E. at 762 (emphasis added). The issue before the court is whether defendant, in her offer of proof, presented a sufficient prima facie case of claim of right to create a fact issue; that is, she believed she had a license to enter St. Mary's and there were reasonable grounds for her belief. [5] Defendant testified at the hearing that: she had visited Sharon Siebert almost daily for some 22 months; the guardians were aware of her visits and her actions with Ms. Siebert; the guardians had never told her not to visit; and the guardians and their minister encouraged defendant's involvement and advocacy on behalf of Ms. Siebert. Moreover, there was no showing that defendant was at any time informed, until subsequent to her arrest, that the guardians had consented to, or acquiesced in, the decision of Mr. Brenny to bar her from the facility. Excerpts of the testimony by guardian Earl Bigalke offered as a part of the defendant's offer of proof are material here: Q But it was his idea that she be barred, was it not? A I don't know. Q Was it your idea, sir? A No. Q I am sorry, I didn't hear you. A No, no sir. At a later portion of the record: Q And again just so the record is clear, it was not your idea to bar Jane from the facility, was it? A No, sir. The questions continued and the transcript reveals the further exchange: Q Mr. Bigalke, you knew that Jane was working with Sharon and has been for the last two years? A Yes, sir. Q You know, for example, in the guardianship trial that she was attempting to teach her to speak and open her mouth and do other things of that sort, didn't you? A I don't know at that particular time, but she worked with her, I realize that. Q During the process of the guardianship matter you indicated to your attorney that you didn't object to her continuing that, didn't you? A I don't recall. Q That's possible, though, isn't it, sir? A Probably. Q You probably said that? A Probably. Q And you have never specifically told Miss Hoyt not to continue working with Sharon yourself, have you? A I don't believe so. Q You certainly never told Miss Hoyt not to visit Sharon? A I don't believe so. The foregoing testimony is reinforced by testimony of defendant in answer to a question by her counsel: Q Have either Mr. or Mrs. Bigalke ever advised you to stop your activities or not see Sharon? A Never. We hold that the defendant through her offer of proof made out a sufficient prima facie defense of bona fide claim of right to require the case to be submitted to a finder of fact where the burden is on the state to establish the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the view expressed by the dissent, the nursing home is not without power to exclude disruptive persons from its premises. If a visitor on the nursing home premises is engaged in disruptive conduct, the nursing home has at the very least the right to seek a complaint for disorderly conduct pursuant to Minn.Stat. 609.72 (1980). See also footnote 4. The order of the district court appellate panel affirming the judgment of conviction in the Hennepin County Municipal Court is reversed.