Opinion ID: 2227782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: provided by law

Text: The phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute. Peile v. Skelgas, Inc., 242 Ill.App.3d 500, 610 N.E.2d 813, 182 Ill.Dec. 944 (1993), reversed on other grounds 163 Ill.2d 323, 645 N.E.2d 184, 206 Ill.Dec. 179 (1994); Manchin v. Browning, 170 W.Va. 779, 296 S.E.2d 909 (1982). See Holzendorf v. Bell, 606 So.2d 645 (Fla.App.1992). Accordingly, the PSC's statutory authority over any particular common or contract carrier must be derived from some statute other than § 75-109. To hold otherwise would be to render the phrase provided by law superfluous, since § 75-109 would provide general authority in and of itself. See SID No. 1 v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 253 Neb. 917, 922, 573 N.W.2d 460, 465 (1998) (in construing statute, a court must attempt to give effect to all of its parts, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless; it is not within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute). Thus, the PSC may regulate and exercise general control over common and, by definition, contract carriers, only when such authority is provided for by some statute other than § 75-109. Accordingly, we must determine whether the Legislature has enacted statutes to regulate telecommunications contract carriers. If so, the PSC would administer such statutes and, thus, exercise regulatory and general control over such carriers, by virtue of § 75-109. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 75-604 to 75-616 (Reissue 1996) and 86-801 to 86-811 (Reissue 1994) generally govern telecommunications providers in this state. These sections, by their plain language, purport to apply to all telecommunications carriers without distinction. Nonetheless, we can only conclude that the Legislature's failure to distinguish between various types of telecommunications carriers indicates that the Legislature intended these statutes to apply only to common carriers. Indeed, if we were to interpret these sections as providing the PSC with jurisdiction over telecommunications contract carriers, they would be of doubtful constitutional validity. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CONTRACT CARRIER REGULATION Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, under one of which the statute is valid while under the other it is unconstitutional or of doubtful validity, that construction which gives it validity should be adopted. Nebraska P.P. Dist. v. City of York, 212 Neb. 747, 326 N.W.2d 22 (1982), citing Union Stock Yards Co. v. Nebraska State Railway Commission, 103 Neb. 224, 170 N.W. 908, modified on other grounds 103 Neb. 224, 172 N.W. 528 (1919). Both this court's and the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents indicate that to interpret Nebraska's telecommunications statutes as providing the PSC with the authority to regulate contract carriers as strictly as common carriers would render the statutes unconstitutional. Thus, the statutes' ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the NPPD. See, Michigan Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 45 S.Ct. 191, 69 L.Ed. 445 (1925); Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Com., 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264 (1931); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288 (1932); City of Bayard v. North Central Gas Co., 164 Neb. 819, 83 N.W.2d 861 (1957); Rodgers v. Nebraska State Railway Commission, 134 Neb. 832, 279 N.W. 800 (1938). Michigan Commission v. Duke, supra ; Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Com., supra ; and Smith v. Cahoon, supra , all stand for the proposition that a contract carrier cannot be constitutionally required to meet the same standards as a common carrier. The state statute in each of these cases essentially required both private contract and common motor carriers to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity. In each case, the Supreme Court struck down the statute. As stated by the Court in Michigan Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. at 577-78, 45 S.Ct. 191: [I]t is beyond the power of the State by legislative fiat to convert property used exclusively in the business of a private carrier into a public utility, or to make the owner a public carrier, for that would be taking private property for public use without just compensation, which no State can do consistently with the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, as we stated in City of Bayard v. North Central Gas Co., 164 Neb. at 832, 83 N.W.2d at 868: It is well established that the state cannot, consistent with constitutional guaranties against infringement upon private property rights, by legislative fiat or edict or by the orders of an administrative commission, arbitrarily impose the character or status of a common carrier upon a mere private carrier or other person who has not devoted his property to such a public use. If we were to read Nebraska's statutes governing telecommunications as requiring all telecommunications providers, whether private, contract, or common, to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity, then those statues would likewise be unconstitutional. Accordingly, we conclude that Nebraska's telecommunications statutes apply only to common carriers.