Opinion ID: 788340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge to instructions on the interstate nexus elements of Counts One and Two

Text: 165 Fernandez argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could find the required nexus with interstate commerce for the RICO counts if it found that the enterprise had a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. 35 Under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), Fernandez asserts, the government was required to show that the regulated conduct had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Because Fernandez did not raise this claim at the district court, we review for plain error. Jones, 527 U.S. at 388, 119 S.Ct. 2090. 166 Fernandez's challenge to the jury instructions is foreclosed by our recent decision in Shryock. In that case, we described and rejected the same argument Fernandez raises in this appeal: 167 Appellants argue that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that [the interstate nexus element of the RICO counts] could be satisfied if the the activities of the enterprise affect interstate commerce in some minimal way. According to Appellants, the correct standard requires the jury to find that the enterprise had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.... In United States v. Juvenile Male, we held that all that is required to establish federal jurisdiction in a RICO prosecution is a showing that the individual predicate racketeering acts have a de minimis impact on interstate commerce. 118 F.3d 1344, 1347-49 (9th Cir.1997). The district court, therefore, correctly instructed the jury that a de minimis [e]ffect on interstate commerce was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under RICO. 168 342 F.3d at 984; see also United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir.1981) (The effect on commerce is an essential element of a RICO violation, but the required nexus need not be great. A minimal effect on interstate commerce satisfies this jurisdictional element.). 169 The district court therefore properly instructed the jury on the interstate nexus requirement for counts one and two. 170 D. Failure to instruct the jury that Counts Three and Four required a nexus with interstate commerce 171 Appellants argue that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must find a nexus with interstate commerce in order to convict on counts three and four, the drug conspiracy counts under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Because Appellants did not raise this objection before the district court, we review for plain error. Jones, 527 U.S. at 388, 119 S.Ct. 2090. 172 As we explained earlier, an effect on interstate commerce is not an element of a drug conspiracy offense under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Cf. United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir.1990) (stating that no proof of an interstate nexus is required in order to establish jurisdiction of the subject matter in prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)) (quoting United States v. Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir.1977)). The district court therefore did not plainly err in failing to instruct on an interstate nexus. Appellants' argument that the jury instructions relieved the government of its burden of proving one of the elements of the offense fails for the same reasons. 173 E. Failure to instruct the jury that Counts Fourteen, Fifteen and Twenty-One required a nexus to interstate commerce as to the underlying act 174 Appellants argue that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the specific violent acts charged in VICAR counts fourteen, fifteen and twenty-one must have had an effect on interstate commerce. Because the appellants did not raise this objection to the jury instructions before the district court, we review the claim for plain error. Jones, 527 U.S. at 388, 119 S.Ct. 2090. 175 Appellants concede that § 1959 does not itself require a nexus between interstate commerce and the specific act of violence charged. The statute does require that the enterprise in relation to which the violent acts are committed be one that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). Appellants argue, however, that the acts that allegedly violate that statute must themselves have a nexus to interstate commerce. Their claim relies on the holding of one district court. See United States v. Garcia, 68 F.Supp.2d 802, 811 (E.D.Mich.1999). Even though the appellants deny they are making a facial attack on the statute, their challenge to the jury instructions is essentially a claim that the statute as written goes beyond the regulatory power of Congress. Such a claim has already been rejected by at least three circuits. See United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 987 (8th Cir.2004); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 538 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 717 (2d Cir.1997). Moreover, in the context of the substantive RICO statute, we have explained that the government need not show a nexus to interstate commerce for each predicate act underlying a RICO conviction. See Bagnariol, 665 F.2d at 892 ([T]he [RICO] statute requires that the activity of the enterprise, not each predicate act, [affect] interstate commerce.). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court's failure to instruct the jury that each violent act charged in the VICAR counts must have an effect on interstate commerce constituted clear or obvious error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (At a minimum, [a] court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law.). We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury that a nexus to interstate commerce must be found as to each violent act charged in the VICAR counts. 176 F. Challenge to the instructions regarding the quid pro quo theory of motive for Counts Fourteen, Fifteen and Twenty-One 177 Appellants argue that the district court's instruction on the motive element of the VICAR counts was misleading and an incorrect statement of the law. Because Appellants did not object to the instruction at the district court, we review for plain error. Jones, 527 U.S. at 388, 119 S.Ct. 2090. 178 As we explained earlier, the VICAR statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, contemplates two different motive theories for commission of a VICAR offense: a quid pro quo crime theory and a status crime theory. Although it is clear that the government has prosecuted all of the VICAR counts in this case under the status crime theory of the statute, the district court, in addition to instructing on the status crime theory, did instruct the jury on the alternative quid pro quo crime motive theory. Appellants have not, however, met their burden of showing that any error in the quid pro quo crime instruction violated their substantial rights as is required under plain error review. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770. We find it extremely unlikely that the jury relied on a theory of the case upon which the government expressly did not rely, and which had no support in the record. We therefore conclude that the district court's instruction on the quid pro quo theory of the VICAR counts did not constitute plain error. 179