Opinion ID: 3037902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: genericness and descriptiveness

Text: On appeal, McCord essentially concedes that Reno Air has an exclusive right to its “unique composite mark”—i.e. the registered “pylon logo.” McCord even goes beyond this con- 8 We do not need to reach McCord’s remaining arguments challenging the district court’s contempt finding and imposition of sanctions. RENO AIR RACING ASS’N v. MCCORD 7537 cession to suggest that Reno Air has an exclusive right to the distinctive “Eiffel-tower”-like pylon depiction in its registered mark. The pylon trademark contains not only a stylized checkered pylon, but an artistic rendition of two airplane silhouettes that encircle it and lines representing the airplanes’ respective paths around the pylon. In effect, in the face of these concessions, what McCord really asks from us is a prophylactic declaration that pylons in general are generic and that he can use some form of a pylon with impunity. Although we are not unsympathetic to his effort to cabin a safe harbor regarding future use, we are not in the business of providing such advisory opinions, and to the extent that McCord’s future depictions are challenged by Reno Air, it is for the district court to determine in the first instance whether trademark infringement has occurred. [12] To be sure, even an incontestible mark is subject to challenge as generic. “Generic marks are not capable of receiving protection because they identify the product, rather than the product’s source,” KP Permanent, 408 F.3d at 602, and “a registered mark may be canceled at any time on the grounds that it has become generic.” Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194. However, registered marks are endowed with a strong presumption of validity, and a defendant has the burden of showing genericness by a preponderance of the evidence. Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2005). [13] Even construing McCord’s pleadings liberally as asserting the argument that the genericness inquiry should focus on the checkered pylon as the “most salient feature” of the pylon logo, KP Permanent, 408 F.3d at 604, no single feature of the incontestable logo mark—e.g., the checkered pylon or the two airplane silhouettes circling around it with lines representing their trails—merits such an exclusive focus. Thus, the district court correctly focused its validity inquiry on the trademark as a whole and appropriately concluded that McCord failed to meet his burden of showing that the regis7538 RENO AIR RACING ASS’N v. MCCORD tered pylon logo had become generic. See California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he validity of a trademark is to be determined by viewing the trademark as a whole. . . . [T]he composite may become a distinguishing mark even though its components individually cannot”). McCord’s position that the “pylon logo” is an invalid descriptive mark that has not acquired secondary meaning is foreclosed by hornbook trademark law. “[A] defendant in a trademark infringement action cannot assert that an incontestable mark is invalid because it is descriptive and lacks secondary meaning.” KP Permanent, 408 F.3d at 606; see Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 196 (holding that unlike genericness, “[m]ere descriptiveness is not recognized . . . as a basis for challenging an incontestable mark”).