Opinion ID: 702601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Collective Bargaining and Contract Interpretation

Text: 9 The Board in the past has attempted, without ultimate success, to read and apply section 8(b)(1)(B) very broadly. At one time it extended the protection of the section to virtually all supervisory employees, on the theory that they were potential collective bargaining representatives of the employer. IBEW, Local 340 (Royal Electric), 271 N.L.R.B. 995, 997, 1984 WL 36751 (1984), enforcement denied, 780 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.1986), aff'd, 481 U.S. 573, 107 S.Ct. 2002, 95 L.Ed.2d 557 (1987); Teamsters Local 296 (Northwest Publications), 263 N.L.R.B. 778, 779 n. 6, 1982 WL 23899 (1982); Toledo Lithographers Locals 15-P and 272 (The Toledo Blade Co.), 175 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1969), enforced, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.1971). As discussed by the Supreme Court in Local 340, the Board's rationale was that all 10 supervisors constitute a reservoir of workers available for selection at some future date as collective bargaining agents or grievance adjusters.... [I]f a union is permitted to discipline a supervisor-member, even one without Sec. 8(b)(1)(B) duties, the union discipline might affect the supervisor's loyalty to his or her employer, the effect of that discipline might linger, a smaller pool of loyal supervisors might be available, and the employer might therefore be restricted in its future choice of representatives for Sec. 8(b)(1)(B) purposes. 11 481 U.S. at 586, 107 S.Ct. at 2010 (discussing and dismissing the doctrine). 12 In Local 340, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the reservoir approach. In so doing, the Court cited Florida Power & Light v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790, 94 S.Ct. 2737, 41 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974), for the proposition that the collective bargaining activities protected by section 8(b)(1)(B) are to be narrowly viewed. Both the language and the legislative history of Sec. 8(b)(1)(B) reflect a clearly focused congressional concern with the protection of employers in the selection of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activities, namely collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances. Florida Power, 417 U.S. at 803, 94 S.Ct. at 2744 (emphasis added). Thus both Local 340 and Florida Power demonstrate that section 8(b)(1)(B)'s protection extends only to a subset of those persons identified as supervisors, who perform specifically identified duties of collective bargaining or grievance adjustment. 13 Again today, in Henry's case, the Board asserts a theory of section 8(b)(1)(B) that is almost as expansive as its discredited reservoir theory. There is no dispute that Henry was not authorized to engage in collective bargaining with the Union on behalf of his employer. The Board, however, contends that Henry qualifies as a collective bargaining representative because he interprets the collective bargaining agreement on behalf of Simpson. Applied to the undisputed facts of this case, such an interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B) expands that section's boundaries far beyond the narrow scope specified by the Supreme Court in Local 340 and Florida Power. 14 Henry's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, according to the Board, consisted in assigning his air conditioning specialists to commercial work and calculating the correct travel mileage. The Board focuses particularly on Henry's role in correcting a travel payment for one Mr. Sabbatino. But there was no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement to be done in that or the cases in which Henry made certain that workers received their proper travel pay. There was no dispute between the Union and the employer, or even with the employee, as to when travel pay was required under the contract. Henry simply measured the distance a worker had to travel to the job site, consulted the agreement for the appropriate travel pay rate, and compared it with the employee's pay check. These actions are not contract interpretation for purposes of section 8(b)(1)(B). To hold otherwise would be to convert every instance in which a supervisor merely followed or applied the contract into one of contract interpretation. That result is contrary to the usual meaning of the term contract interpretation, and in no way furthers Congress's objective of protecting employers against restraint or coercion in selecting its representatives for collective bargaining or grievance adjustment, as set forth in section 8(b)(1)(B). 1 15 The Board seizes on a statement of the Supreme Court in Local 340 limiting section 8(b)(1)(B) activities to collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, or some other closely related activity (e.g., contract interpretation, as in Oakland Mailers). Local 340, 481 U.S. at 586, 107 S.Ct. at 2010. But this statement was part of a restrictive definition of activities protected by section 8(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court acknowledged in Local 340 that the Board's decision in San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No. 18 (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968) (Oakland Mailers), which precluded Union discipline aimed at forcing supervisors to take pro-union positions in interpreting collective bargaining agreements, was at best 'within the outer limits'  of section 8(b)(1)(B). Local 340, 481 U.S. at 581, 107 S.Ct. at 2008 (quoting Florida Power, 417 U.S. at 805, 94 S.Ct. at 2745). The Court also favorably cited commentators who stated that the Court, while not specifically overruling Oakland Mailers, seemed to be restricting its expansive interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B). Id., 481 U.S. at 582 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. at 2008 n. 5. We cannot read Local 340 as endorsing in any manner the Board's view that Henry's daily supervisory activities, carried out in conformity with and by reference to the collective bargaining agreement, constituted interpretation that would somehow bring Henry within the protection of section 8(b)(1)(B). 2 Under such reasoning, every supervisor would fall within the protection of section 8(b)(1)(B) by reason of his or her routine acts. 3 16 It may be that the Board's expansive view of section 8(b)(1)(B) comes, as it did in the case of the reservoir doctrine, from a distaste for the conflict of loyalties engendered when supervisors are subject to union discipline. But the Supreme Court, in rejecting the Board's reservoir doctrine and adopting its narrow interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(B), acted with a full realization that it was leaving most such conflicting loyalties in place. Id. at 583, 107 S.Ct. at 2009. Section 8(b) was not intended to address the problems of loyalty conflicts in general. See id. Those problems, the Court reasoned, were the natural result of an employer allowing its supervisors to retain their union memberships, and were outside the scope of the section. 17 We return to the test of Florida Power: a union's discipline of one of its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(B) only when that discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of the employer. Florida Power, 417 U.S. at 804-05, 94 S.Ct. at 2744-45. Applying that test to the case at hand, we conclude that Henry's actions are not protected by section 8(b)(1)(B) as collective bargaining activities. Nor are Henry's activities that the Board identifies as contract interpretation so closely related to collective bargaining that the Union's discipline will have the requisite adverse effect on present or future collective bargaining activities. See Local 340, 481 U.S. at 586, 107 S.Ct. at 2010-11. The Union disciplined Henry for ordering its members to work under inapplicable contract rules. The only foreseeable result of this discipline will be to deter him from violating the existing and future contract rules about work assignment. The discipline in no way adversely affects Simpson Sheet Metal's representation in either the collective bargaining or grievance adjustment processes. In short, any harm caused by the Union's discipline here is not the sort that section 8(b)(1)(B) was intended to prevent. We therefore conclude that section 8(b)(1)(B) does not extend to protect Henry as an interpreter of the collective bargaining agreement. 18