Opinion ID: 2815883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Lopez’s dying declarations

Text: Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting Lopez‟s statements under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule on the ground their admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the evidence against him, his due process right to reliability and fundamental fairness, and his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict. More specifically, he claims that Lopez‟s statements went beyond identifying defendant as the shooter, concerned her perception of his actions and motives, and that he had no opportunity to confront them and show their unreliability. We conclude that the court properly admitted Lopez‟s statements. After Lopez was shot and taken to the hospital but before she went into surgery, she gave a statement to Officer Patrick Olson in which she described the argument between defendant and Jose Alvarez. Lopez told the officer that defendant was holding a shotgun and pointed it at Alvarez during the argument. Lopez said she thought defendant was going to shoot Alvarez, so she immediately stepped between them to stop defendant from shooting. She then said that she was shot once. In addition to the statement given 27 to Officer Olson at the hospital, Lopez spoke to two officers at the crime scene, identifying defendant as the person who shot her. All three officers testified as to Lopez‟s statements. Two other witnesses at the crime scene, a neighbor and Lopez‟s brother, also testified that Lopez had identified defendant as the person who shot her. Just before the prosecution commenced its case-in-chief, defense counsel objected to the admission of Lopez‟s statements on hearsay grounds, as well as on constitutional grounds under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court made a “preliminary finding” that it “would probably” allow admission of the statements. Defense counsel also requested that the objection be deemed a continuing objection because he “hate[s] to object in front of the jury.” The trial court granted the defense‟s request that there be a continuing objection. During the penalty phase, defense counsel reminded the trial court that he previously had objected, on various statutory and constitutional grounds, including the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to any statements that Lopez made that went beyond naming defendant as the shooter. Counsel stated, “I just want to reiterate all those same objections I made, and I suspect the court‟s ruling would be the same.” The trial court agreed, “I think it would. The dying declarations will definitely come in. I‟ll overrule you on that.”8 The Attorney General argues that defendant has forfeited this claim on appeal because he failed to renew his objection during the testimony of the witnesses who recounted Lopez‟s statements. But defendant‟s objection to Lopez‟s statements was 8 The trial court admitted Lopez‟s hearsay statements as a dying declaration under Evidence Code section 1242, which states: “Evidence of a statement made by a dying person respecting the cause and circumstances of his death is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement was made upon his personal knowledge and under a sense of immediately impending death.” 28 properly preserved for appeal. In order to avoid disruption at trial, the trial court granted defense counsel‟s motion for a continuing objection to all such testimony introduced at trial, which indicates that the court understood that the defense opposed the introduction of this evidence. (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1165 [it was not incumbent upon defense counsel to disrupt the trial by continuing to object to each subsequent question in order to preserve the objection].) Defense counsel again raised the issue at the penalty phase, and the court affirmed its prior decision. Consequently, defendant did not forfeit this claim. On its merits, however, defendant‟s claim fails. We have previously rejected confrontation clause challenges to the admission of dying declarations in two cases, People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743 (Monterroso) and People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257 (D’Arcy). In Monterroso, we reviewed the legal principles established in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 56, footnote 6 (Crawford), in which the Supreme Court held that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”9 (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59.) In Crawford, the high court recognized that, historically, the “one deviation” from this rule involves dying declarations, but the court specifically refused to decide “whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations.” (Id. at 9 We assume, for sake of argument, that Lopez‟s statements to the three investigating officers were “testimonial” within the meaning of Crawford. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51 [discussing, as testimonial, statements that a declarant would reasonably expect to be used in a prosecution]; cf. Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344, ___ [131 S.Ct. 1143, 1167] [concluding that statements taken from a dying victim by police at crime scene were not testimonial but were taken for the primary purpose of handling an ongoing emergency].) 29 p. 56, fn. 6.) While the court had no occasion to specifically consider dying declarations in Crawford, it did note that the “existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed.” (Ibid.) It further noted, “Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are.” (Ibid.) In Monterroso, we found that historical common law had permitted the admission of dying declarations, in spite of the right of confrontation. We concluded, therefore, “that the common law pedigree of the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment.” (Monterroso, supra, at p. 765.) Defendant urges this court to reconsider our decision in Monterroso. He contends that recent scholarly criticism analyzing the common law basis of the dying declaration exception establishes that it was not a historically unique hearsay exception, and, therefore, the lack of its uniqueness subjects such statements to the demands of the confrontation clause. But our decision in Monterroso did not purport to rely on any asserted historical uniqueness concerning the dying declaration exception to the right of confrontation; rather, we simply recognized that the admissibility of dying declarations was one of “ „those exceptions established at the time of the founding.‟ ” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 765, quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 54.) Accordingly, even assuming that the dying declaration exception was not a unique hearsay exception at the time the founders drafted the Sixth Amendment, that circumstance does not affect our holding in Monterroso. Defendant further contends that the historical notion of the inherent reliability of dying declarations no longer holds true today because a modern declarant may harbor and articulate self-serving motives under pain of death. We rejected similar arguments in D’Arcy, where this court affirmed its holding in Monterroso and again applied the exception regarding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay as a dying declaration. (D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 292.) 30 In the alternative, defendant argues that even assuming the admission of Lopez‟s statements are not rendered inadmissible by the confrontation clause, this court should find they are inherently unreliable and inadmissible under state and federal guarantees of due process and his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict. Defendant‟s argument is without merit. Defendant contends that the belief that a declarant, at the point of death, has no self-serving motives is an unwarranted generalization that is not universally applicable. Defendant cites a federal district court case, contending that it rejected the dying declaration exception as unreliable. It did not. Instead, that court merely expressed its doubt concerning “the inherent reliability of such statements,” but concluded that the challenged statements were admissible under an alternative ground and did not make any ruling concerning the application of the dying declaration exception. (U.S. v. Mayhew (S.D. Ohio 2005) 380 F.Supp.2d 961, 965, fn. 5.) In any event, although of course we are not bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431), defendant fails to cite a single case concluding that dying declarations are inherently unreliable so as to violate guarantees of due process and a reliable verdict. Furthermore, specific indicia of reliability are built into Evidence Code section 1242, which codified the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. The statute requires that a dying declaration is admissible only if the statement was made upon “personal knowledge and under a sense of immediately impending death.” (Evid. Code, § 1242, italics added.) Each of these elements is satisfied in defendant‟s case. It was uncontroverted that Lopez‟s statements about the shooting were from her personal knowledge and concerned the circumstances of her death. The evidence also established that Lopez made her statements under a sense of immediately impending death. Lopez‟s statements were properly admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1242. We have explained that when evidence is properly admitted under the Evidence Code, there is no violation of due process. (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 67.) 31 Defendant‟s argument that the general admission of dying declarations violates constitutional and state guarantees of due process and a reliable verdict is without merit. B. Motion for mistrial based on witness’s comment and the admissibility of a statement made by an investigating officer Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial after a witness unexpectedly referred to codefendant Todd Brightmon as defendant‟s “henchman.” He claims the ruling violated his right to due process and a reliable verdict. In a related claim, defendant also contends the court erred by refusing to redact a portion of codefendant Brightmon‟s police interview in which the investigating officer stated that he has to get defendant “off the streets.” Defendant argues that the officer‟s statement was irrelevant and inflammatory under Evidence Code section 352 and that its admission in both the guilt and penalty phases violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court did not err in either ruling.
The prosecution called Alan Ford, who lived in the neighborhood of the Lopez shooting, had seen defendant and Brightmon arrive together, and later heard the gunshot. Ford had been familiar with both defendants and, when asked about the relationship between Brightmon and defendant, Ford replied that Brightmon was defendant‟s “henchman.” Defendants objected, and the trial court granted codefendant Brightmon‟s motion to strike the answer. Defendants did not ask for a specific instruction informing the jury to disregard the answer, but instead later moved for a mistrial. Defendant contended that the “henchman” comment portrayed him as a criminal leader, but the court denied the motion noting that “everybody was caught off guard.” “We review a ruling denying a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 283.) “ „Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with 32 considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.‟ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 211, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854.) Defendant argues that the jury could have used the “henchman” comment to infer that defendant had ordered codefendant Brightmon to confess to the Campos murder and testify falsely about the shooting of Lopez. First, the jury had been repeatedly instructed to disregard any evidence that the court ruled inadmissible. The trial court at the beginning of the case, told the jury to disregard an answer if the answer is given before the court rules on an objection and urged the jury to “rise above being basic humans” and “do your best to disregard certain things.” Also, before deliberations began, the court instructed the jury to disregard any evidence stricken by the court and to “treat it as though you had never heard of it.” We presume the jury followed these admonitions. Further, any inference that defendant influenced Brightmon to testify falsely in defendant‟s favor was already strongly supported by other evidence. Brightmon initially told police that he did not shoot Campos. Early on, he was reluctant to confirm defendant‟s involvement and, instead, blamed the shooting on a man named “Timbuktu.” Later, however, Brightmon admitted that defendant was involved. He explained that defendant had put him “under the gun” and that if he did not cooperate with defendant then he “would have been a dead man inside of the trunk” along with Campos. Following their arrest, defendant and Brightmon were housed on the same jail floor and could meet and communicate with each other during the day. Eventually, Brightmon sent a letter to defendant‟s counsel offering to take responsibility for shooting Campos. Given these circumstances, even without the “henchman” comment, there was a strong inference that defendant had significant influence over Brightmon so as to cause him to testify in defendant‟s favor. Accordingly, defendant fails to show that the fleeting reference to “henchman” caused him incurable prejudice. 33 2. Admission of the investigating officer’s statement about the need to apprehend defendant As a defense witness, Brightmon testified that he had inadvertently shot Campos during a struggle, and that Oscar Ross demanded that he dispose of Campos or Ross would shoot him. Brightmon testified that he was afraid of Ross. The prosecution impeached Brightmon with the audio recording of his police interview in which he expressed his fear of defendant, not of Ross, while participating in the ambush of Campos. During that interview, the investigating officer made statements about the need to arrest defendant, and the defense unsuccessfully moved to “redact” these statements. As previously explained, early in the police interview Brightmon refused to acknowledge that defendant was involved in the shooting of Campos, instead identifying a man named “Timbuktu” as the shooter. Later, when the investigating officer accused Brightmon of trying to protect defendant, Brightmon admitted that he felt defendant had put him “under the gun.” When the officer clarified that it appeared that Brightmon had participated in ambushing Campos not of his own free will and questioned whether Brightmon felt he could have backed out of participating, Brightmon replied, “Then I would have been a dead man inside of the trunk” along with Campos. In response, the investigating officer repeatedly stated that he had to get defendant “off the streets.” Brightmon then asked who else the officer had to get, and the officer again referred to defendant, explaining to Brightmon, “You just said yourself man, you‟d be the one in the trunk” if you didn‟t cooperate and that “obviously” indicates that you had received “some kind of direction, or you have some fear, right?” Brightmon did not express any disagreement with the officer‟s statements. This portion of the interview was played both at the guilt phase and again during the penalty phase retrial. Defendant objected to the officer‟s statements about needing to apprehend defendant, contending that they should be excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial. The prosecutor argued that the officer‟s statements gave context to the part of the interview 34 where Brightmon expressed fear of defendant, as opposed to Oscar Ross. The trial court weighed the matter under Evidence Code section 35210 and decided that the statements‟ probative value as impeachment evidence outweighed any prejudice because it seemed unremarkable that the officer would want to arrest defendant in the belief that he had killed two people. Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove any disputed fact or consequence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness. (Evid. Code, § 210; People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 615.) A witness‟s fear is relevant to his or her credibility, especially when it provides an explanation for conflicting statements by the same witness. (People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 869.) A trial court‟s decision to admit or exclude impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 705.) Brightmon‟s fear of defendant tended to show that his trial testimony accepting responsibility for the shooting was false and influenced by that fear. Brightmon‟s statement to the officer that he could not back out of participating in the ambush of Campos or else he would have found himself in the trunk was, by itself, ambiguous in that Brightmon did not precisely identify who would have harmed him if he had backed out — Ross, “Timbuktu,” or defendant. But the officer‟s responses about needing to arrest defendant and that defendant would have harmed Brightmon if he had refused to participate clarified that Brightmon was expressing his fear of defendant. Although the officer‟s belief that defendant should be arrested and removed from the streets was not 10 Evidence Code section 352 states: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” 35 highly probative, the trial court properly recognized that any prejudice stemming from the officer‟s belief was minimal because it was unremarkable that a suspect who killed two persons, and might also have killed Brightmon, should be apprehended. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to edit Brightmon‟s police interview in the manner defendant requested. C. Admission of photographs Defendant claims the court erroneously admitted, in both the guilt and penalty phases, autopsy photographs of the victims, a photograph of Campos‟s body on the side of the road, and a photograph of defendant standing in a lineup. He argues that the photographs were irrelevant, cumulative, and unduly prejudicial in violation of Evidence Code section 352 and of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable capital trial. The trial court properly admitted all of the challenged photographs. Before trial, defendant made objections to the autopsy photographs of Lopez and Campos, arguing that their causes of death were not in dispute, that the coroner could testify about the injuries using sketches and diagrams, that the photographs were inflammatory, and that some of them were cumulative. Regarding two photographs showing Campos‟s body on the side of the road, defendant complained that they were gruesome and irrelevant. The trial court carefully exercised its discretion by choosing not to admit one autopsy photograph of Campos as duplicative of another photograph; it also refused to admit a photograph of Campos‟s body turned face up on the side of the road because it was “a little bit on the gruesome side.” Instead, the court admitted a photograph of the body found facedown on the embankment. In all, the trial court admitted five photographs of Lopez and seven photographs of Campos over defendant‟s objections. 36 There was no error. The admission of photographs lies within the trial court‟s discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1271-1272.) Even if defendant was willing to stipulate to the victims‟ causes of death, their injuries, or their identities, “[t]he prosecution was not obligated to „accept antiseptic stipulations in lieu of photographic evidence.‟ ” (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 705, quoting People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243.) More important, the photographs were relevant to show the conditions of the bodies and the directions of the bullets as indicated by the coroner in the photographs. The photographs depict cleaned wounds showing little blood. The photographs of Campos showing injuries to his face, wrist, and back were relevant to establish that he had been beaten and dragged for purposes of the robbery and kidnapping special circumstances. Last, the picture of Campos‟s body facedown on an embankment on the side of the road “simply showed what had been done to the victim; the revulsion [it] induce[s] is attributable to the acts done, not to the photograph[].” (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1054.) The admission of these photographs of the deceased fell well within the trial court‟s broad discretion. Defendant also claims the admission of these photographs was prejudicial at the penalty phase. However, “the penalty phase is an especially appropriate time to introduce photographs showing exactly what the defendant did.” (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 852.) “The photographs demonstrated the real life consequences of defendant‟s crimes and pointedly made clear the circumstances of the offenses . . . .” (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 35.) As for the photograph of defendant standing in a lineup with five other persons, all of whom were wearing handcuffs and orange jumpsuits, the trial court also did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence over defendant‟s objection. Ronald Moore, whose vehicle defendant had commandeered at gunpoint following the Campos shooting, had been shown this photograph to identify defendant as the person who had entered his 37 vehicle. Defendant objected to this photograph as irrelevant and prejudicial because it depicted him wearing an orange prison jumpsuit and handcuffs, but the prosecutor explained that he wanted to use the photograph in his examination of Moore. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the lineup photograph. It was relevant to show that all six persons were roughly the same height and build and dressed in the same manner so as to indicate that there was nothing suggestive that resulted in Moore tentatively picking out defendant as the person who was at the scene of the Campos shooting. To the extent the jury could have inferred that defendant had been in custody and was dangerous because of the use of handcuffs, it seems unlikely for the jury not to believe that he was, at some point, in custody and under arrest for his uncontroverted role in the shooting of Lopez while being further investigated for his role in the killing of Campos. There was no error. D. Dismissal of the Lopez first degree murder charge Defendant contends the trial court erred by granting over his objection the prosecutor‟s request during jury deliberations to dismiss the first degree murder charge in the Lopez case, in the furtherance of justice. The prosecution made the request after the jury sought clarification about the meaning of transferred intent as it applied to first or second degree murder. Defendant argues that the dismissal was improper because it did not follow the proper procedure. He also argues that the court‟s instruction informing the jury that first degree murder was no longer an option regarding the Lopez killing but was still an option concerning the Campos killing had a coercive effect on jury deliberations. Defendant claims the asserted errors violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process, and reliable jury verdicts. Although we agree with defendant that the trial court erred in dismissing the first degree murder allegation by not stating the reasons for the dismissal in a minute order, we conclude that neither this error nor the 38 court‟s additional instruction had any prejudicial or coercive effect on the jury‟s deliberations. 1. Defendant was not prejudiced by dismissal of the first degree murder charge Section 1385 provides that a judge or magistrate may order an action dismissed “in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a).) In dismissing an action, the court must set forth the reasons for doing so in a minute order. (Ibid.) Stating the reasons for dismissal is mandatory, and an order dismissing charges is generally not valid unless it complies with this requirement. (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 944-945.) Here, after granting the prosecutor‟s request to dismiss the first degree murder charge for the Lopez killing, the trial court failed to set forth the reasons for dismissal in a minute order. This was error. Nevertheless, setting forth the reasons for dismissal “is designed to protect the public interest against improper or corrupt dismissals and is not related to protection of the rights of defendants.” (People v. Silva (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 453, 455, italics added.) “Despite the defective procedure, no harm is done because the prosecutor,” who moved for the dismissal, “obviously would not appeal from the order of dismissal.” (People v. Curtiss (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 123, 127.) Defendant suffered no prejudice because of this procedural violation. 2. The trial court’s instruction had no prejudicial or coercive effect Defendant further claims that the trial court‟s instructions regarding the dismissal of the first degree charge concerning Lopez‟s killing (count 2) had a coercive effect on the Campos verdict (count 1). Defendant alleges that the dismissal and additional instructions “highlighted the fact that the court considered the Campos charge to be stronger.” The claim is without merit. Coercion exists where, given the totality of the circumstances, the court‟s instructions or remarks displaces the independent judgment of the jury “ „in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency.‟ ” (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 39 281, 319, quoting People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 817.) Such displacement may occur when the court exerts pressure to reach a verdict, rather than no verdict at all. (People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 817.) Following the dismissal, the trial court informed the jury, first orally and then in written instructions: “As to Count 2 (Camerina Lopez) only, you are no longer to consider first degree murder. . . . First degree murder on Count 2 (Camerina Lopez) is no longer an issue before you.” (Underscoring in original written instruction.) The court further clarified that the previous instructions would continue to apply to count 1, the Campos matter. The jury also received the instruction that “[e]ach count charges a distinct crime. You must decide each Count separately. The defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of either or both of the crimes charged. Your findings as to each Count must be stated in a separate verdict.” We presume the jurors understood and followed the instructions. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) Defendant fails to point to any part of the record suggesting that the jury did not follow the instructions. The trial court never indicated a preference for a particular verdict, it did not exert pressure on any juror, nor did it express any exasperation about the jury‟s deliberations. (People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 819-820.) An argument similar to defendant‟s was raised and rejected in People v. Bordeaux (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 573, 582. The defendant there claimed that dismissal of a first degree murder charge under Penal Code section 1385, with instructions to consider second degree murder, coerced the jury to return a verdict of second degree murder. (People v. Bordeaux, supra, at p. 582.) The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal was not coercive and noted that “dismissal of first degree murder under the circumstances here benefits both defendant and the criminal justice system.” (Id. at p. 582.) Similarly, in the present case, dismissal of the first degree murder charge aided defendant by relieving him of possible capital murder liability for the killing of Lopez. 40 E. Instructions on kidnapping Defendant argues that the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding must be set aside because the trial court‟s instruction provided a definition of simple kidnapping that was incorrect because it was not in effect at the time he committed his crimes. Despite acknowledging that the jury was correctly instructed on an alternate theory of aggravated kidnapping, he contends that it is not possible to determine whether the jury‟s verdict rested on the correct legal theory of kidnapping. (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593.) He contends the error violated his federal and state due process rights, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict. We conclude that the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding must be set aside. In addition to alleging the robbery-murder special circumstance in connection with the killing of Martin Campos, the People charged a second special circumstance, alleging that defendant had committed that murder during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of kidnapping and kidnapping for purposes of robbery. The jury was told it could find this kidnapping-murder special circumstance true if it believed defendant had committed a simple kidnapping or an aggravated kidnapping based on the intent to rob the victim. The jury found this special circumstance true, but the verdict form did not specify whether the jury found the special circumstance true based on simple kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping based on the intent to rob the victim. The parties agree that the jury received a correct definition of aggravating kidnapping but an incorrect definition of simple kidnapping. In 1995, when the crimes took place against Campos, the law defining simple kidnapping contained an asportation element that focused exclusively on the actual distance the victim was moved. According to People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 572, 574, (Caudillo), “ „the determining factor in the crime of [simple] kidnaping is the actual distance of the victim‟s movements‟ ” and “[n]either the incidental nature of the 41 movement, the defendant‟s motivation to escape detection, nor the possible enhancement of danger to the victim resulting from the movement is a factor to be considered in the determination of substantiality of movement for the offense of [simple] kidnaping.” Under the Caudillo standard, a jury would have to find only that “the movement of the other person was for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial.” (CALJIC No. 9.50 (6th ed. 1996).) The jury in the present case, however, was given the 1999 revised instruction reflecting this court‟s overruling of Caudillo and replacing the definition of simple kidnapping with a much broader standard. In People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 (Martinez) we overruled Caudillo with regard to future cases, and explained it would “be proper for the court to instruct that, in determining whether the movement is „ “substantial in character” ‟ [citation], the jury should consider the totality of the circumstances.” (Martinez, supra, at p. 237.) Thus, “the jury might properly consider not only the actual distance the victim is moved, but also such factors as whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both the danger inherent in a victim‟s foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker‟s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.” (Ibid.) The resulting 1999 revised jury instruction, which was given to the jury here, required movement “that is substantial in character,” and it further defined that phrase by including the three factors we listed in Martinez.11 11 The relevant part of the instruction read: “A movement that is only for a slight or trivial distance is not substantial in character. In determining whether a distance that is more than slight or trivial is substantial in character, you should consider the totality of the circumstances attending the movement, including, but not limited to, the actual distance moved, or whether the movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the movement, or decreased the likelihood of detection, or increased both the danger inherent in a victim‟s foreseeable attempt to escape and the Footnote continued on next page 42 Consequently, the trial court gave the jury an erroneous instruction by supplying a 1999 revised definition of simple kidnapping that was not in effect at the time of defendant‟s crimes and was significantly broader than the previous version of the instruction, which had focused only on how far the victim had been moved. Further compounding this error, the prosecutor‟s closing argument did not focus on the distance of the movement, but instead focused on whether defendant‟s movement of Campos increased the risk of harm. Distance, however, should have been the determinative issue concerning whether a simple kidnapping had occurred because pre1999 case law established that a movement of 45 feet or less was legally insufficient for purposes of simple kidnapping. (People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 612-613.) But in this case, there was scant evidence concerning how far defendant had moved Campos except that he had been moved into the back of a U-Haul truck and then into the trunk of Jose Garcia‟s vehicle after being shot.12 The Attorney General contends that the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding need not be set aside because the jury found true the robbery-murder special circumstance. According to the Attorney General, the jury‟s true finding on the robberymurder special circumstance indicates that they found the kidnap-murder special circumstance true on the aggravated-kidnapping intent to rob the victim ground and not on the simple kidnap ground. She argues no rational juror, having concluded that the Footnote continued from previous page attacker‟s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. If an associated crime is involved, the movement also must be more than that which is incidental to the commission of the other crime.” (CALJIC No. 9.50 (1999 rev.).) 12 The evidence showed that Brightmon dragged Campos back to the U-Haul truck, moving him somewhere between 19 and 40 feet. 43 murder was carried out during the commission of a robbery, would have found that the murder was also carried out in the commission of a simple kidnapping. Rather, a rational juror would have found an aggravated kidnapping based on the kidnapping for robbery. Because there was no error concerning the instructions for aggravated kidnapping for purposes of robbery, the Attorney General reasons, the jury‟s verdict rested on at least one correct legal theory. (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128.) We disagree. The trial court instructed the jury that, in order to find true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, it had to find that defendant committed the murder to facilitate the crime of robbery. The court further instructed that robbery is the taking of “personal property in the possession of another, against the will and from the person or immediate presence of that person, accomplished by means of force or fear and with the specific intent permanently to deprive that person of the property.” Concerning aggravated kidnapping for purposes of robbery, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that, in order to find the kidnapping-murder special circumstance to be true, the jury had to determine that a robbery had occurred and that the victim had been moved “for a substantial distance where such movement is not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and where the movement substantially increases the risk of harm to the person moved, over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself.” Thus, the instruction established that an aggravated kidnapping occurs during a robbery if two criteria are met: (1) the defendant moved the victim for a substantial distance; and (2) that movement substantially increased the risk of harm for the victim, over and beyond that required for the crime of robbery itself. These two criteria are not part of the definition for robbery murder. Because the allegation of aggravated kidnapping based on kidnapping to commit robbery has additional elements that are not necessary for robbery-murder, the jury‟s true finding concerning the robbery-murder special circumstance does not shed light on 44 whether the jury also agreed that the additional elements required for aggravated kidnapping had taken place. In order to make the latter finding, the jury would have to conclude further that defendant moved the victim in a manner that “substantially increased the risk of harm to the person moved, over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself.” (CALJIC No. 9.54 (1998 rev.).) Accordingly, the jury‟s true finding for the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation does not also establish the truth of the aggravated kidnapping allegation for purposes of the kidnapping-murder special circumstance. Nor does the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding foreclose the possibility that the jury concluded that only a simple kidnapping had occurred based on the erroneously given instruction defining simple kidnapping under Martinez. Under that erroneously given definition, a simple kidnapping may occur not only when the movement increases the risk of harm, but also when the movement “decreased the likelihood of detection” or “increased both the danger inherent in a victim‟s foreseeable attempt to escape and the attacker‟s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.” Jose Garcia testified that once they were inside the U-Haul truck, he and Campos were out of sight of anyone else and hidden from view of the street by a large container filled with trash. Thus, the jury could have found that, by ordering Campos into the back of the U-Haul truck, the movement was substantial because it decreased the likelihood of detection by shielding from view the fact that Campos and Garcia were being held at gunpoint. The movement also made it more difficult for them to escape and easier for defendant to assault them. Under the instructions given, therefore, the jury could have found that a simple kidnapping had occurred under the Martinez standard, and it did not necessarily also decide whether the movement substantially increased the risk of harm to Campos or Garcia over and above that required for robbery. Accordingly, although there was a legally correct theory that could have supported the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding, the finding must be set aside 45 because we cannot determine on which theory the jury rested its verdict. (See People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 613 [setting aside kidnap-murder special-circumstance finding because the jury was erroneously instructed under Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th 225, instead of Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d 562].)13 F. Miscellaneous claims Defendant raises a number of claims that we have previously rejected in other cases. We decline defendant‟s request to revisit the wisdom of our prior rulings. To that effect: CALJIC No. 2.52, which instructs the jury that a defendant‟s flight from the scene of the crime can be used to infer consciousness of guilt, is not unnecessary, argumentative, nor did it permit the jury to draw impermissible inferences about defendant‟s guilt or state of mind. (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 706.) The instruction also does not lessen the prosecution‟s burden of proof even if the identity of the perpetrator is at issue. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 710.) The trial court did not lack jurisdiction to try defendant for first degree murder because the information charged him with malice murder under section 187 rather than deliberate and premeditated or felony murder under section 189. Defendant received adequate notice that he faced first degree murder charges and special circumstance allegations of burglary, kidnap, and kidnap for robbery because of the evidence presented 13 Given that we set aside the kidnap-murder special circumstance, we need not decide defendant‟s additional contentions that (1) the trial court prejudicially failed to provide a unanimity instruction to compel the jury to unanimously agree whether a simple kidnap or aggravated kidnapping had occurred and as to which victim, Campos or Garcia; (2) the pre-1999 definition of simple kidnapping was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) there was insufficient evidence of asportation for either simple kidnapping or kidnap for robbery . 46 at the preliminary hearing. (People v. Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 616-617.) Moreover, the information did not violate his constitutional rights to notice, due process, and trial by jury under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466. (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 54.) The trial court was not required to instruct the jury to agree unanimously whether defendant had committed a premeditated murder or a first degree felony murder. (People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 54.) Instructions informing the jury that the court could not accept a guilty verdict on second degree murder unless the jury first unanimously found defendant not guilty of first degree murder, and similarly could not accept a manslaughter verdict without an initial unanimous finding that he was not guilty of first or second degree murder, did not restrain the jury from full consideration of all the evidence and are not unconstitutional. (People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309-311.)