Opinion ID: 147535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts I-VI

Text: Counts I, III and V all allege the discriminatory denial of promotion to distinct GS-15 positions, while Counts II, IV and VI allege retaliatory denial of promotion to the same three positions. Because USAID offered a legitimate reason for denying each promotion, the central inquiry for the court is whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis. Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (D.C.Cir.2008). The district court concluded there was insufficient evidence to infer the asserted reasons were pretextual and accordingly concluded that summary judgment was appropriate. On de novo review, we reach the same conclusion as to Counts I-IV but not as to Counts V and VI. Counts I and II allege that in August 2000, shortly after filing the complaint in Porter I, Porter applied for the position of GS-15 Supervisory Labor Relations Specialist but was denied the promotion because of his race and in retaliation for his prior protected activity. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 29-33, Porter II (Oct. 12, 2005). The district court found unrebutted USAID's legitimate reasons for passing over Porter for another candidate who `had practiced law for approximately ten years prior to his selection for the [position],' held a law degree from a prestigious law school, and had experience performing the legally related functions required of the position, pointing out that Porter did not have a legal degree, had drafted only one appeal, never prepared a final agency decision during his career or wrote an agency-level Foreign Service decision, and had never represented the Agency before the Foreign Service Grievance Board, all tasks which he would be required to do if he had been selected for the position. Porter II Mem. Op., 601 F.3d at 220-21 (quoting Mem. of Points and Authorities in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Porter II ) (internal record citations omitted; alteration in original). Porter argues, as he did below, that the proffered legitimate reasons are rebutted by the facts that (1) he was better qualified than the candidate selected and (2) the selecting officer for the position, Marilyn Marton, who had been found to have retaliated against Porter in Porter I, overhauled the position's crediting plan which set out the criteria for grading applicants. Appellant's Br. at 27. Neither assertion, however, precludes summary judgment on Counts I and II. First, the record indicates that Porter was not substantially more qualified to perform the duties listed in the vacancy announcement than the successful candidate, H. David Kotz, a lawyer with 10 years' experience in labor and employee relations. [4] See Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C.Cir.2003). Porter plainly lacked the stark superiority of credentials over Kotz that can give rise to an inference of pretext. Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 429 (D.C.Cir.2003); see also Adeyemi, 525 F.3d at 1227 (The qualifications gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.) (internal quotation omitted). Second, there is nothing about the alleged overhaul of the crediting plan that is, by itself, particularly indicative of discrimination or pretextit affected all applicants equally and nothing in its text or about its circumstances ties it to discrimination or retaliation against Porter specifically. Cf. Adeyemi, 525 F.3d at 1228-29 (re-advertising of position to seek level 12 applicants to fill two remaining level 11 openingsafter hiring five level 11snot indicative of discrimination because all level 11 non-incumbents were similarly disadvantaged). And Porter has not shown that changing the job criteria was so irregular or inconsistent with [USAID's] established policies as to make its hiring explanation unworthy of belief. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir.1999). Nor can a finding of pretext rest on the bare fact of Marton's history with Porter. See id. (alleged past retaliatory act by two job interviewers was relevant but not enough to impute sinister motivations to them during the . . . selection process). We also uphold the grant of summary judgment on Counts III and IV, which allege that in May 2001 USAID decided not to advertise a vacancy for a GS-15 Administrative Officer in the Global Bureau and instead laterally transferred a white male to the position in order to prevent Porter from securing it, discriminating against him on account of his race and retaliating for his agency complaints and his successful litigation of Porter I. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-20, 34-38. The district court again found unrebutted USAID's legitimate reason for choosing the selectee (and for electing not to open the position to competition)namely, the selectee's absolutely outstanding credentials, including a long and distinguished career in the personnel field, his publications, and college-level teaching experience. Porter II Mem. Op., 601 F.Supp.2d at 222 (internal record quotations omitted). Porter does not challenge the selectee's qualifications but instead asserts as evidence of pretext that Linda Lion, who, like Marton, had been involved in the retaliation found by the Porter I jury and had testified at the Porter I trial, made the non-competitive lateral transfer decision while knowing Porter was the most competitive candidate for the position within the department and that he would apply for the position. Appellant's Br. at 31. From all of this, Porter claims, a jury could infer that Lion made the decision for the purpose of discriminating and retaliating against him. Such speculations and allegations . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding [an employer's] articulated reasons for [its decisions] and avoid summary judgment. Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 458-59 (D.C.Cir.1999) (internal quotation omitted). Lion's involvement in both Porter I and Porter II is, like Marton's, insufficient by itself to establish pretext. Further, Lion was authorized under USAID procedures to fill the vacancy through a lateral transfer without a competitive procedure, see Porter II Mem. Op., 601 F.Supp.2d at 223 & n. 11so that the lateral transfer was neither irregular nor inconsistent with [USAID's] established policies, Simms, 165 F.3d at 1330. On this record, there was no basis for the district court (nor is there for us) to reject USAID's legitimate reason for the lateral transfer. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate. [5] By contrast, summary judgment was not appropriate on Counts V and VI, which charged USAID with gender discrimination and retaliation in not promoting Porter in November 2001 to the open position of Deputy Chief in the Personnel Operations Division. The district court again accepted USAID's proffered reason for not selecting Porter, namely, that the female selectee had over 34 years of experience in human resource management, had been serving in a similar position to that of Deputy Chief and had far more supervisory experience than that of the plaintiff, even having supervised the plaintiff for some time. Porter II Mem. Op., 601 F.Supp.2d at 224. The record, however, casts doubt on USAID's asserted reason for rejecting Porter. The job description of the Deputy Chief position stated that a B.A./B.S. in personnel management, business administration or international business management is required[,] [and a] M.A./M.S. is desired. 601 F.Supp.2d at 225 (quoting Def.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Dispute, ex. 32 at 6, Porter I (filed July 21, 2006)). In lieu of the required bachelor's degree in business, Porter, whose bachelor's degree is in political science, holds a second master's degree in business (he has a master of science in business and a master's degree in business administration); the selectee, by contrast, was a high school graduate with no college degree at all. Given that the two candidates' qualifications were otherwise close, as the district court acknowledged, 601 F.Supp.2d at 225, the substantial educational discrepancy could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Porter was markedly more qualified than was the selectee, thus throwing into doubt the reason given for his rejection. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc). Accordingly, USAID was not entitled to summary judgment on Counts V and VI.