Opinion ID: 836625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION TO DOYLE v. OHIO

Text: The Doyle Court noted a single exception to its general rule: [P]ost-arrest silence [can] be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest. [426 U.S. at 619 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2240.] This exception can aptly be described as the impeachment exception. This exception did not apply in Doyle because the defendants in that case never claimed to have told the authorities their exculpatory story before trial. The exception only applies when a defendant falsely testifies that he already told his exculpatory story to the authorities. At that point, the exception allows the prosecutor to impeach that averment with proof that the defendant actually remained silent before trial. The impeachment exception only applies to allow use of a defendant's silence that would otherwise be prohibited by Doyle's general rule. [7] Intuitively, in order for the impeachment exception to apply to allow use of otherwise Doyle -prohibited silence, the door must be opened by a defendant's testimony regarding his post-arrest, post- Miranda conduct. Thus, a prosecutor may not use a defendant's testimony regarding his actions before Doyle applied as a means to open the door to impeach the defendant with his post- Doyle silence. Doyle's general rule and its impeachment exception apply to silence occurring after a defendant has been arrested and given Miranda warnings. Accordingly, if the prosecution wants to use the impeachment exception, its use must be based on defendant's testimony regarding his post-arrest, post- Miranda actions. In this case, the prosecutor argues that the exception applies because defendant opened the door to impeachment in the following portion of his direct-examination testimony: Q. [Defense counsel] When you came out of the building with the two officers did anyone make any comments or gestures toward you? A. [ Defendant ] Yes, sir. Q. And who was that? A. Caroline Kessler [the victim]. Q. Okay. A. She made a comment that Ishe said that's the man, that's the man that robbed me. Q. Did anyone else speak that you remember? A. The officer asked me where the purse was and where the gun was. I didn't have any idea what he was talking about. I tried to describe the shooting to him and he put me in the back seat of the police car. We conclude that the exception was not triggered by this exchange because defendant never testified that he made post- Miranda attempts to explain his story. Defendant's only testimony regarding an attempt to explain his story was related to his pre- Miranda conduct (when he was being escorted to the police car). If the prosecutor had wanted to impeach defendant regarding this pre- Miranda silence, Doyle would have presented no prohibition. But, for whatever reason, the prosecutor chose not to so impeach defendant. Instead, the prosecutor repeatedly asked defendant why he did not explain his side of the story after being taken to the precinct and after being given Miranda warnings. The prosecutor also repeatedly made defendant admit that he remained silent during that time. Finally, the prosecutor used this silence in his closing argument to bolster the contention that defendant's exculpatory story was not credible. None of these uses of defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence is supported by defendant's testimony regarding his post-arrest, post- Miranda actions. In sum, the defendant did not open the door to the impeachment exception with his fleeting reference to his failed attempt to tell his story before Doyle was even applicable. To counter this conclusion, the prosecution relies on People v. Allen, 201 Mich. App. 98, 505 N.W.2d 869 (1993). In Allen, the Court stated: [D]efendant did not claim to have told the police the same version of his exculpatory story upon arrest. Rather, his claim on redirect examination was that the trial was his first opportunity to tell his version of the events. We believe that this case falls within the exception permitting impeachment of a defendant's version of his postarrest behavior. Although defendant's testimony would not have permitted the prosecutor to argue that his postarrest silence was inconsistent with his claim of innocence, it did permit the prosecutor to attempt to discredit defendant's testimony by showing that defendant did have an opportunity before the trial to tell his side of the story. Having raised the issue of his opportunity to explain his version of the events, he opened the door to a full and not just a selective development of that subject. [ Id. at 103, 505 N.W.2d 869 (citations and quotation marks omitted).] Thus, Allen extended Doyle's impeachment exception to include not only instances when a defendant is allegedly lying about his post-arrest behavior, but when a defendant is falsely asserting that the trial presented his first opportunity to tell his side of the case. We do not reach the merits of this extension because the prosecution would not benefit from it in this case. Defendant was arrested in the abandoned building and immediately escorted to a police car. At trial, during direct examination, defendant testified that he unsuccessfully tried to tell his side of the story as he was being escorted to the police car. It was not until he reached the police station that he was given Miranda warnings and was interrogated. At that point he invoked his right to silence and, after obtaining counsel, decided to remain silent until trial. Even under Allen's extension of the exception, the prosecution would be incorrect in arguing that defendant opened the door to the impeachment exception by claiming to have tried to tell his story to the arresting officers because there was no door to open at that point Doyle was not even applicable at that time. Indeed, defendant had only been arrested; he had not been given Miranda warnings. Under United States Supreme Court precedent, the prosecutor was free to impeach defendant on his silence before Doyle applied, and could have asked why defendant did not tell his side of the story after being put into the police car. See footnote 7 of this opinion. But all the prosecutor's impeachment tactics here related to defendant's silence after he was brought to the precinct and given Miranda warnings. Accordingly, we hold that the impeachment exception did not apply in this case, and, as noted, the general rule in Doyle was violated by the prosecution's use of defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence.