Opinion ID: 1159635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Plain language of initiative

Text: We begin (and I would prefer to end) our analysis with the plain language of the enactment: In interpreting [an initiative] we must look to the voters' intent and the language of the [i]nitiative as the average informed lay voter would read it. In re Estate of Hitchman, 100 Wash.2d 464, 467, 670 P.2d 655 (1983). Subsection 680(3) of this statute plainly prohibits withholding, absent consent, of any portion of wages or salary for contributions or for use as political contributions. The employers' argument is the strongest when it comes to the for contributions language as that could be construed to connote a directness or immediacy associated with the payee, i.e., the deduction is not made for contributions but for union dues. However the for use as language would pertain to how the money is used once it goes wherever it is going. As the statute does not define use in this context, we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the word as found in a dictionary. State v. Bolar, 129 Wash.2d 361, 366, 917 P.2d 125 (1996). As even small school children know, to use something is to put it to a particular service or end. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2523 (1981). The dictionary tells us further use involves a sense of a useful or valuable end, result, or purpose. Id. Therefore to determine how the withheld money is used in this context we must be mindful of its end, result, or purpose, which means we must follow it to its destination. Further support for this proposition is found in our recent decision in State v. Batten, 140 Wash.2d 362, 997 P.2d 350 (2000). There we considered what it means to have used a motor vehicle in the commission of a felony, and decided the plain and ordinary meaning of used gleaned from Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3d ed.1966) is `employed in accomplishing something.' State v. Batten, 140 Wash.2d at 365, 997 P.2d at 352 (quoting State v. Batten, 95 Wash.App. 127, 129, 974 P.2d 879 (1999)). Defining used in this way we held the defendant used his car in the commission of a felony (possession of narcotics and a firearm) when he employed his vehicle not to drive, but to store and conceal his felonious accoutrements. Employing this definition, that use means employed to accomplish something, we can safely say that to determine how withheld dues are used we must look to the something in furtherance of which they are employed, i.e., political contributions. Moreover, since criminal statutes are strictly and narrowly construed, the same term when used in this civil statute must mean at least as much as it means in the criminal context. Although there is some claim in this record that the WEA did not actually use the particular money obtained from mandatory dues, but rather preexisting reserves, for political purposes, there is also evidence in this record which would support the opposite view. However under the summary judgment rule, CR 56, all facts must be construed most favorably to the nonmoving party. Such approach should therefore control our disposition here in favor of the appellants. Notably the trial court did not base its dismissal on a contrary view of the facts. Rather the trial court endorsed the districts' snapshot analysis which absolves the employer of any responsibility for what his payee does with the money as a matter of law. But based on the plain language of this statute, I disagree. What is truly inexplicable about the majority opinion is that it also disagrees with this out-of-my-department approach. Indeed the majority cautions that an employer is absolved from liability only if the employer is not made aware of the specific intended use of the funds.... Majority at 613. The majority thus rejects the core of the employers' argument that how these funds are ultimately used is irrelevant, and thus equally rejects the basis of the trial court's summary dismissal. But it affirms that dismissal nonetheless! I submit the majority cannot sustain its affirmance, even under its own theory, unless it finds neither fact nor inference in this record that the employer knew or reasonably should have known that at least a portion of these mandatory deductions would end up in political campaign coffers. [2] But I think it is fairly obvious they would, for the following reasons. First, these employers do not even deny knowledge about the ultimate political destination of these funds. Rather they have litigated this case on the theory that they have no responsibility beyond the immediate payee. Br. of Resp't School Districts at 10-11. That is the same position taken by the WEA. Br. of Resp't Educational Ass'n at 24-25. Second, the WEA makes no bones about its continued and historical involvement in political campaigns. The WEA tells us such involvement is necessary and appropriate to facilitate the interest of its members. No apologies made. Third, public records demonstrate that the WEA in fact donates to political candidates and campaigns. For example, a simple glance at the Public Disclosure Commission's list of Major Contributors to Ballot Issues (dated Jan. 13, 1997), which is a public record available to any school district, discloses substantial general budget amounts devoted to political purposes. Said document alone shows a total of $713,841 was contributed in 1996 by the WEA to defeat Initiatives 173 and 177 allowing for school vouchers and charter schools. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 168. Fourth, by law, mandatory payroll deductions for agency shop fees (for employed nonunion members) payable to the union may not include money to be contributed by the union for political purposes; whereas there is no such per se restriction on dues from union members. RCW 42.17.760. [3] (The WEA even argues in its brief that teachers who do not approve of WEA political expenditures could avoid their proportional contribution by resigning from the union and thereby subjecting themselves to reduced withholding of agency fees which could not be used for political purposes. Response Br. of Resp't Educational Ass'n at 6.) Therefore, by logical inference, the employer is on notice that the difference between agency fees and union dues is probably attributable to political use. Fifth, employers may have received actual notice of how these mandatory deductions would be used for political purposes from affected employees and others. (To comply with the majority opinion this is all a potential future plaintiff need do.) For example, the school districts' payroll officers received a memorandum from the WEA in the summer of 1994 alerting them that to compensate for the loss of mandatory WEA-PAC dues the new deduction would be called Political Education. CP at 151. This none-too-subtle new moniker put school districts on notice as to what use such funds were destined. It is a reasonable inference from the combination of these facts that the school districts had actual, or at least constructive, knowledge of the political use of the payroll deductions. Granted, knowledge may be a question of fact; however, it is a material one that would preclude summary judgment and require reversal. Notwithstanding, I can find no requirement for actual knowledge in the plain language of this statute and would not invent one from the bench. Under the plain language of this statute the buck stops with the employer who must take responsibility for the ultimate misappropriation of any portion of wage deductions contrary to law. Perhaps the employers would be well advised to make some reasonable inquiry, or take some reasonable precautions by contract or other device with its payees; however, that is up to them, not this court.