Opinion ID: 2625922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Daubert and its Progeny

Text: ¶ 4 Plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by airborne chemicals that they inhaled while attending a circus in the State Fair Arena. Defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony, opinions, and exhibits of Plaintiffs' expert on the issue of the causation of Plaintiffs' injuries. The trial court granted the motion, stating that plaintiffs' expert is not competent to give a medical opinion on the cause of injury based upon the test set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Patrick Carmichael et al., 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) and their progeny. First, we must determine if Daubert and its progeny apply, and then if so, whether Daubert was applied correctly. ¶ 5 In Oklahoma the testimony of an expert is controlled by the applicable statutes found in the Oklahoma Evidence Code, 12 O.S.2001 § 2702 (Testimony by Experts); [5] § 2703 (Bases of Opinion Testimony by Expert); [6] § 2704 (Opinion on Ultimate Issue); [7] and § 2705 (Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion). [8] The Oklahoma Evidence Code was adopted in 1978 by our Legislature and was modeled, in most parts, after the then current Federal Rules of Evidence. 1 L. Whinery, Oklahoma Evidence, The Guide to the Oklahoma Evidence Code, Preface, (1985); 1978 Okla.Sess.Laws c. 285 (eff.Oct.1, 1978). ¶ 6 Professor Whinery has explained that § 2702 is identical in substance to Federal Rule 702, §§ 2703 and 2704 are identical to Rules 703 and 704, and § 2705 has slightly different language than that in Rule 705 but [t]here is no indication that the Legislature intended a substantive change by the modification. 1 L. Whinery, Evidence, at 238, 243, 247, 255. We have said that federal court decisions may be examined for persuasive value when they construe federal evidence rules with language substantially similar to that in our evidence statutes. Willoughby v. Oklahoma City, 1985 OK 64, 706 P.2d 883, 887. We thus turn to the discussion of Daubert. ¶ 7 In Daubert the Court observed that the previously used general-acceptance test in Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013 (1923), for the admissibility of scientific evidence had been displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court explained that Federal Rules imposed certain limits on the admissibility of such evidence. The Court also explained the trial judge's role in applying these limits. First, the trial judge examines the relevance and reliability of the evidence: under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but must be `scientific' and reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court said that [t]he primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify. Id. The Court noted that In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity. Daubert, 509 U.S. at n. 9, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, (emphasis in original). ¶ 8 Daubert provided a list of factors for the trial judge to consider when determining the admissibility of evidence. They include: 1. Can the theory or technique be, or has it been, tested; 2. Has the theory or technique been subjected to peer review and publication; 3. Is there a known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and 4. Is there widespread acceptance of the theory or technique within the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. [9] The inquiry is a flexible one, and focuses on the evidentiary relevance and reliability underlying the proposed submission, and not on the conclusions they generate. Id. 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786. ¶ 9 The evidence must also assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This requirement goes primarily to relevance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Rule 702 thus requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court then explained the trial judge's role: Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-593, 113 S.Ct. 2786, notes omitted. Daubert explained that preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness and the admissibility of evidence is determined by the court. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, n. 10, 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786, citing, Federal Rule 104. We have a similar requirement in our Evidence Code at 12 O.S.Supp.2002 § 2105. § 2105. Preliminary questions A. Preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subsections B and C of this section. B. A person claiming a privilege must prove that the conditions prerequisite to the existence of the privilege are more probably true than not. A person claiming an exception to a privilege must prove that the conditions prerequisite to the applicability of the exception are more probably true than not. If there is a factual basis to support a good faith belief that a review of the allegedly privileged material is necessary, the court, in making its determination, may review the material outside the presence of any other person. C. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. D. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall be conducted in all cases out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall also be conducted out of the hearing of the jury when the interests of justice require or when requested by an accused who is a witness. E. The accused does not subject himself to crossexamination on other issues in the case by testifying upon a preliminary matter. F. This section does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 12 O.S.Supp.2002 § 2105. Thus a trial judge's decision to prevent improper testimony from an expert witness is not new to our jurisprudence. [10] Our Evidence Code currently recognizes the gatekeeping capacity of a trial judge, and Daubert is but a refinement of this role. ¶ 10 The High Court thereafter decided Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The Court explained that in Rule 702 scientific was merely one type of expert testimony, and that technical or other specialized knowledge were also types of expert testimony in Rule 702, and were thus governed by the Daubert opinion. This language [in the Rule] makes no relevant distinction between scientific knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, (explanatory phrase added). Our Evidence Code (§ 2702), like its federal counterpart, does not appear to make a distinction between scientific knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge. ¶ 11 The High Court has stated that a trial court must make a determination of the reliability of an expert's evidence when it is sufficiently challenged. And where such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question,... the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 149, 119 S.Ct. 1167, quoting, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In Daubert the Court indicated that this reliability determination is not limited to novel or unconventional evidence. Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on novel scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, n. 11, 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), (emphasis added). Our Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that Daubert shall apply to novel scientific evidence in criminal proceedings. Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, 889 P.2d 319, 328. See Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, ¶¶ 62-64, 8 P.3d 883, 907, (noted adoption in Taylor and then applied Daubert ). After Kumho the court held that Daubert should be applied to all novel expert testimony. Harris v. State, 2000 OK CR 20, ¶¶ 8-9, 13 P.3d 489, 492-493, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1025, 121 S.Ct. 1971, 149 L.Ed.2d 764 (2001). Then in Kumho the U.S. Supreme Court stated that when the evidence is not novel a trial court may make that determination and avoid a prolonged Daubert inquiry. The Court stated that a federal trial judge possesses the authority needed both to avoid unnecessary `reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael et al., 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, emphasis added. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that a Daubert inquiry will be limited to circumstances where the reliability of an expert's method cannot be taken for granted. [11] Thus, a Daubert challenge includes an initial determination of whether the expert's method is one where reliability may be taken for granted. ¶ 12 Plaintiffs assert by brief in this Court that Daubert applies to only novel evidence. We have no record before us showing argument in the trial court by Plaintiffs that the methods of their expert showed a facial reliability for the type of conclusion the expert made. On the other hand, Defendants' argument presupposes the absence of such reliability and that a Daubert proceeding is necessary. We decline to address further this argument, except as it pertains to the issue of causation discussed later in this opinion. This issue we leave to the parties to address in the trial court upon conclusion of this extraordinary proceeding. ¶ 13 In Kumho Tire Co., supra, the Court explained that a trial court has some latitude in applying the Daubert factors of reliability: Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Thus, the Daubert factors are not a rigid standard applicable in every case. The Daubert factors may bear on a judge's gatekeeping determinations, however. The four Daubert factors `may or may not be pertinent'; it will all depend on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.' Determining which factors are indicative of reliability in a particular case cannot be accomplished solely by a categorical a priori characterizations about the particular field in question. The Court explained: Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations, the reliability of which will be at issue in some cases.... In other cases, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience. In all cases, a court must exercise its gatekeeping obligation so that the expert, whether relying on professional studies or personal experience, will, when testifying, employ the same level of intellectual rigor that the expert would use outside the courtroom when working in the relevant discipline. Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 19 (2d ed.2000), quoting, Kumho, supra . A trial court must thus make a determination of the appropriate factors of reliability for the particular controversy before it based upon the nature of that controversy. ¶ 14 Nothing in Daubert or Kumho conflicts with our Evidence Code. Our Court of Criminal Appeals has already adopted Daubert for criminal proceedings in Oklahoma Courts. Today we likewise adopt Daubert and Kumho as appropriate standards for Oklahoma trial courts in deciding the admissibility of expert testimony in civil matters.