Opinion ID: 40470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Strike New Evidence

Text: Ordinarily, this court examines a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis to support a motion to reopen under Matter of Lozada, 19 I & N Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988). In Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2001), we stated that a petitioner, who is seeking to reopen or reconsider his removal proceedings to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, must provide: 1) an affidavit by the alien setting forth the relevant facts, including the agreement with counsel regarding the 4 The BIA cannot grant a motion to reopen proceedings unless it finds the additional evidence presented “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). -5- alien’s representation; 2) evidence that counsel was informed of the allegations and allowed to respond, including any response; and 3) an indication that, assuming that a violation of “ethical or legal responsibilities” was claimed, a complaint has been lodged with the relevant disciplinary authorities, or an adequate explanation for the failure to file such a complaint. Id. The parties do not dispute, and the record demonstrates, that Berzosa’s motion to reopen met the first and second prongs of the Lozada inquiry. With respect to the third prong, however, the BIA determined that the record did not contain evidence that a complaint had been lodged with the relevant disciplinary authorities, and Berzosa failed to provide a sufficient explanation for his failure to do so. Indeed, our review of the record confirms that Berzosa’s first effort to meet the third prong of Lozada did not occur until he filed the instant appeal and attached a letter of complaint to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) dated June 24, 2002 stating his grievance about Moreno’s representation. On May 20, 2005, the Attorney General filed a motion to strike the new evidence submitted with Berzosa’s brief to this court.5 More specifically, Berzosa’s brief attached two additional pieces of evidence not found within the administrative record: (1) the letter of complaint dated June 24, 2004 from 5 On May 31, 2005, this court ordered that the motion be carried with the instant appeal. Berzosa-Flores v. Gonzales, No. No. 04-61168 (5th Cir. May 31, 2005) (unpublished order). Berzosa did not file a response to this motion or provide any justification for including the new evidence in his brief. -6- Berzosa to the EOIR concerning Moreno’s allegedly deficient representation in his case; and (2) school records of Joanna and Jacqueline discussing their special education needs. The Attorney General correctly noted that additional evidence outside of the administrative record cannot be considered in this appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (providing that on review of orders of removal “the court of appeals shall decide the petition only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based”) (emphasis added); Goonsuwan, 252 F.3d at 390 n.15 (“It is a bedrock principle of judicial review that a court reviewing an agency decision should not go outside of the administrative record.”). Accordingly, we grant the motion and confine our review to the administrative record. B. Jurisdiction Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Berzosa’s motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title.”6 Because Berzosa attempted to reopen his 6 Aside from a brief jurisdictional statement at the beginning of his brief, Berzosa does not address the initial question of this court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Before reaching the merits of his claim that he was deprived of due process as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must first determine whether jurisdiction lies in this case. See -7- removal proceedings to challenge the IJ’s determination that he was not eligible for the discretionary relief under § 1229b(b)(1), the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies. See Rueda v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 381, 381 (5th Cir. 2004) (dismissing petition for review of hardship determination under § 1229(b)(1)(D) for lack of jurisdiction). Even though Berzosa raises his challenge through a motion to reopen his proceedings rather than a direct challenge to the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s merits determination, this circuit has held that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(2) apply with equal force in this context. Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[J]ust as our power to review a final order is circumscribed by § 1252(a)(2)’s various jurisdiction-stripping provisions, our ‘jurisdiction to entertain an attack on that order mounted through filing of a motion to reopen’ is equally curtailed.”) (quoting Patel v. United States, 334 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, we agree with the Attorney General that Berzosa cannot “manufacture jurisdiction simply by petitioning this court to review the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen.” Id. at 475. Although the holding in Rueda clearly precludes review of a discretionary hardship determination under § 1229b(b)(1)(D), Nguyen v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 400 F.3d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that “the question of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be properly raised at any stage in litigation, including for the first time on appeal”). -8- Berzosa also challenges the IJ’s finding that he failed to meet the physical presence requirement under § 1229b(b)(1)(A). This circuit has not extended the reach of § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s jurisdictional bar to the determination of whether a petitioner has been continually present for a period of not less than ten years. See Garcia-Melendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing the continuous physical presence requirement as “a factual determination which is subject to appellate review”); Gonzalez-Torres v. I.N.S, 213 F.3d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 2000). We review the IJ’s factual conclusion on the issue of whether Berzosa established ten years of continuous presence for substantial evidence. Garcia-Melendez, 351 F.3d at 661. Because all four requirements of § 1229b(b)(1) must be satisfied for cancellation of removal, however, our lack of jurisdiction to review the IJ’s determination on hardship is fatal to Berzosa’s claim. Therefore, it would be a hollow act for us to separately consider the IJ’s finding on continuous presence.7 7 Although we need not reach the issue, we note that the IJ’s determinations with respect to Berzosa’s claims of continuous presence and “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” were supported by substantial evidence. The record amply demonstrates the gaps in documentary proof and questionable credibility of Berzosa’s statements during the hearing. We afford “great deference to an immigration judge’s decisions concerning an alien’s credibility.” Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Chun v. I.N.S., 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994)). Despite several opportunities to explain the discrepancies in his testimony, Berzosa failed to meet his burden of establishing continuous presence. This court has been -9- C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Although this court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s holding with respect to discretionary relief under § 1229b(b)(1), we retain jurisdiction over “any substantial constitutional claims.” See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 274, 278 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001). As such, before we can dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we must consider whether Berzosa’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rises to the level of a “substantial constitutional violation.” This court has previously found that ineffective assistance of counsel “may implicate the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee if the ‘representation afforded [the alien] . . . was so deficient as to impinge upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing.’” Assaad, 378 F.3d at 475 (quoting Paul v. I.N.S., 521 F.2d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1975)); Goonsuwan, 252 F.3d at 385 n.2 (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel offends due process when “as a result, the alien suffered substantial prejudice”). Berzosa contends that Moreno’s representation was deficient in two respects, both of which are directly related to his application for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1). First, Berzosa claims that Moreno failed to adequately prepare and present his case to the IJ, especially with respect to her “emphatically clear” that it “‘will not review decisions turning purely on the immigration judge’s assessment of the alien petitioner’s credibility.’” Chun, 40 F.3d at 78 (citing Mantell v. I.N.S., 798 F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1986)). -10- purported inability to establish Berzosa’s physical presence requirement under § 1229b(b)(1)(A). Second, Berzosa claims that the ineffective assistance of Moreno impaired his ability to establish the “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship to his citizen daughters that would be necessary to secure discretionary relief under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Because Berzosa’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be disentangled from his effort to secure discretionary relief, we find no deprivation of a protected liberty interest that would give rise to a due process violation. Assaad, 378 F.3d at 475 (finding that a “motion to reopen does not allege a violation of [the petitioner’s] Fifth Amendment right to due process because ‘the failure to receive relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest’”) (quoting Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1146 (11th Cir. 1999)). Without question, the discretionary cancellation of removal under § 1229b is expressly subject to the § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) jurisdictional bar. See Garcia-Melendez, 351 F.3d at 661. Therefore, Berzosa’s effort to circumvent the jurisdictional defect in his petition for review through a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel is ultimately unavailing.