Opinion ID: 2638704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Restoring Harrell

Text: Just as the establishment of Procunier's strict standard led to the abolition of the Harrell standard, the abandonment of Procunier led to Harrell's restoration. In Turner, supra, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64, the United States Supreme Court formally determined the question reserved in Procunier by concluding that case protected the First Amendment rights of only the civilians with whom the inmates were corresponding. The rights of prisoners enjoyed less stringent protection; when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. ( Turner, at p. 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254.) The state Legislature adopted this standard in its 1994 amendment to section 2600, which now reads, A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may ... be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The amendment reflected the Legislature's desire to repeal the expansive protections afforded California inmates and replace them with the more limited protections available under federal law as described in Turner, supra, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64. In Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 130, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 46, 18 P.3d 1198, we observed the 1994 amendment abrogated the standard we had followed in In re Arias (1986) 42 Cal.3d 667, 230 Cal.Rptr. 505, 725 P.2d 664. Thompson recognized prison restrictions on inmate liberties that might have been invalid prior to 1994 could now be valid. (Thompson, at pp. 129-130, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 46, 18 P.3d 1198 [restriction on practice of religion that might have been invalid under pre 1994 standard was valid under new law].) We hold the monitoring of inmates' conversations with visitors to be another such regulation that has become valid after the 1994 amendment. Construing the legitimate penal objectives in Harrell, supra, 2 Cal.3d at page 702, 87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470 P.2d 640, and legitimate penological interests in the current section 2600 and finding them comparable phrases, we conclude the current standard is less restrictive than the Harrell test. Our former standard permitted restrictions on inmates' activities only in accordance ( Harrell, at p. 702, 87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470 P.2d 640) with the proper goals, whereas the current standard permits such restrictions whenever they are reasonably related to the goals ( Turner, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 89,107 S.Ct. 2254). We therefore conclude the Legislature, in restoring the legitimate penological objectives/interests standard of Harrell, intended to restore the former law regarding inmates' rights. Any restrictions on inmates' rights that were lawful prior to De Lancie, a fortiori, will be lawful under the current test. [14] Because the current standard was operative during the surveillance challenged below, and such surveillance was lawful prior to De Lancie, we find it was lawful in this case, and therefore not misconduct. [15] Although we base our decision on our own precedent, our conclusion draws support from other jurisdictions. We note other jurisdictions permit the monitoring and recording of custodial conversations, without expressly requiring a noninvestigative purpose. (See, e.g., Angel v. Williams (8th Cir.1993) 12 F.3d 786, 790; U.S. v. Willoughby (2d Cir.1988) 860 F.2d 15, 22; United States v. Harrelson (5th Cir.1985) 754 F.2d 1153, 1168-1171; Allen v. State (Fla.1994) 636 So.2d 494, 496-497; State v. Wilkins (1994) 125 Idaho 215, 868 P.2d 1231, 1237-1238; State v. Strohl (1999) 255 Neb. 918, 587 N.W.2d 675, 682; Belmer v. Commonwealth (2001) 36 Va. App. 448, 553 S.E.2d 123, 129.) The result is the same even where the express purpose is to gather evidence to support the prosecution. (Nelson, supra, 457 F.2d at p. 377; State v. Ryan (1976) 145 N.J.Super. 330, 367 A.2d 920, 922.) [16]