Opinion ID: 1451781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental Defect Defenses

Text: Forsyth argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate because he failed to reasonably investigate and present the insanity and the diminished responsibility defenses. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that trial counsel's investigative conclusions were consistent with the relevant expert opinions available at the time counsel made this strategic decision [to not pursue the insanity and the diminished responsibility defenses]. Forsyth v. Iowa, No. 03-1378, 2004 WL 1161614, at . Trial counsel's strategic decisions are virtually unchallengeable unless they are based on deficient investigation, in which case the `presumption of sound trial strategy. . . founders on the rocks of ignorance.' Link v. Luebbers, 469 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting White v. Roper, 416 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir.2005)) (omission in original). One of trial counsel's strategic decisions is that of reasonably deciding when to cut off further investigation. Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1034 (8th Cir.2006). Trial counsel had several reasons for choosing to pursue a defense of factual innocence and not an insanity defense. First, he believed that there was sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt regarding Forsyth's guilt. The exculpatory evidence included a blood stain that did not match any victim or Forsyth, a medical examiner's testimony that the physical evidence suggested that one person could not have committed all the murders, a tape-recorded conversation in which Mrs. Forsyth's boyfriend (and the father of the two non-Forsyth children who were murdered) told his ex-wife that he had killed their children, and an initial claim by Mrs. Forsyth's brother, who discovered the bodies, that he had shot Forsyth and had been shot in the leg in return. Trial counsel testified that Forsyth was adamant that he could not have killed his family and that Forsyth did not want to utilize a defense based upon an admission that he had committed the murders but had been insane at the time. Additionally, none of the mental health professionals who had interviewed Forsyth expressed an opinion that Forsyth was legally insane at the time of the murders. See Marcrum, 509 F.3d at 511 (The very fact that [the psychologist's] interpretation of the record was consistent with [the state psychiatrist's] would have given [trial counsel] every reason to believe that both experts were making a correct analysis of the medical records.). Trial counsel spoke with persons who knew Forsyth well, none of whom believed Forsyth had suffered from a mental disease or defect prior to the murders. Further, the MMPI II test completed shortly before the murders did not indicate that Forsyth suffered from any major psychological disorders. Finally, trial counsel had had many years of experience in the area of criminal defense and was aware that insanity defenses are rarely successful in the best of circumstances, and that such a defense in Forsyth's case would not be, given the existing expert opinion on the issue. Trial counsel noted that pursuing alternative defenses claiming that, I did not do it, but if I did I was insane, can have the disadvantage of appearing to concede the factual innocence claim. Forsyth argues that trial counsel's failure to investigate the insanity and the diminished responsibility defenses rendered his choice not to raise these defenses uninformed and perforce unreasonable. We have held, however, that [w]here counsel has obtained the assistance of a qualified expert on the issue of the defendant's sanity and nothing has happened that should have alerted counsel to any reason why the expert's advice was inadequate, counsel has no obligation to shop for a better opinion. Marcrum, 509 F.3d at 511. Forsyth asserts that the experts who examined him lacked the requisite training to assist him because they were clinical, not forensic, mental health experts. Forsyth presents neither a factual basis for differentiating categorically between clinical and forensic psychiatrists or psychologists nor any legal authority for this proposition. The defense of diminished responsibility permits the defendant to offer proof that he lacked the mental capacity to form the specific intent to commit the crime charged. See Iowa v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285, 287-90 (Iowa 1964). Trial counsel was not ineffective in investigating this defense, because even Dr. Logan, Forsyth's expert on appeal, stated that Forsyth did not lack that capacity. In light of the experts' opinions and the results of the May 2003, MMPI II test, there is no basis to hold that trial counsel's investigation of possible mental illness defenses was constitutionally inadequate. Accordingly, trial counsel was not objectively unreasonable in not pursuing further inquiry into possible mental defect defenses. Forsyth has not overcome the presumption of adequacy and reasonableness applied to trial counsel's strategic decisions, and the district court thus did not err in finding that the state court's decision was not unreasonable regarding either the facts or the federal law. Because Forsyth has alleged no grounds in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel beyond those alleged against his trial counsel, that claim likewise fails. The judgment is affirmed.