Opinion ID: 1210171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Penal Code Sections 3024, 12022, and 12022.5

Text: The People concede that the judgment in this case should be modified to provide that Penal Code sections 3024 and 12022 are not applicable, but that defendant was armed with a .22 caliber revolver for purposes of Penal Code section 1203, pertaining to probation. This result is compelled by recent cases of this court holding that the provisions of sections 3024 and 12022 (which provide for a minimum term of sentence and for additional punishment in certain cases where defendant was armed in a specified manner; see fn. 1, ante ), are inapplicable where the defendant was found guilty of first degree robbery on the basis of the fact that he was armed ( People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894, 910-911 [88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008]; People v. Floyd, 71 Cal.2d 879 [80 Cal. Rptr. 22, 457 P.2d 862]). On appeal, the People originally contended that the judgment should not be modified to exclude the minimum additional punishment provided by Penal Code section 12022.5 for robbery and certain other crimes if the defendant used a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of the offense. At oral argument, however, the People stipulated that section 12022.5 was inapplicable and that the judgment herein should be so modified. In view of the fact that the lower courts have had some difficulty determining under what circumstances section 12022.5 properly may be applied, we choose to reach the issue in this case in spite of the People's stipulation. Section 12022.5 by its express terms applies even in those cases where the use of a weapon is an element of the offense. Thus, in a proper case, a defendant convicted of robbery in the first degree (by reason of being armed with a deadly weapon, Pen. Code, § 211a) may also be subject to the additional punishment provided in section 12022.5 for using a firearm, despite the holding of such cases as People v. Floyd, supra, 71 Cal.2d 879. ( People v. Chambers, 7 Cal.3d 666, 671-672 [102 Cal. Rptr. 776, 498 P.2d 1024]; People v. McDaniels, 25 Cal. App.3d 708, 713-716 [102 Cal. Rptr. 444]; People v. Henry, 14 Cal. App.3d 89, 92-93 [91 Cal. Rptr. 841].) (1)(See fn. 4.) The question before us in the instant case is whether or not, by reason of the People's failure to request jury instructions covering that section, the People should be deemed to have waived the application of that section. [4] The People took no steps whatever at trial to secure a verdict or judgment stating the applicability of section 12022.5. The People did request and receive an instruction directing the jury to determine whether or not defendant was armed with a deadly weapon (as defined in another instruction) at the time of the offense. However, the People failed to request an instruction under section 12022.5 directing the jury to find whether or not defendant used a firearm during the offense, as that term is defined in cases cited above. Before we determine, however, whether the People have waived their right to have the question tried, we first must decide whether the question should have been tried by the jury, rather than by the trial judge. It could be argued that the finding required to make section 12022.5 applicable is to be made by the trial judge rather than the jury, since there is no statute (such as Pen. Code, §§ 969c and 1158a, with respect to the applicability of §§ 3024 and 12022) which commits these determinations to the jury. (See People v. Harrison, 5 Cal. App.3d 602, 609 [85 Cal. Rptr. 302].) (2) We think, however, that the better rule is set forth in People v. Spencer, 22 Cal. App.3d 786, 801 [99 Cal. Rptr. 681], quoting with approval the following language taken from the People's brief in that case: Section 969c of the Penal Code provides for the right to a jury trial of allegations that a defendant was armed with a deadly weapon so as to bring him within the operation of Penal Code sections 3024 and 12022. The addition of Penal Code section 12022.5 in 1969 was not accompanied by an amendment of section 969c to include section 12022.5. However, in view of the California Constitution's guarantee of the right of jury trial (art. I, § 7), it would seem that this omission does not manifest a legislative intent to exclude allegations under section 12022.5 from the class of cases in which there is a right to a jury trial. The court in Spencer concluded that the People's concession is legally compelled. We agree. Issues of fact shall be tried in the manner provided in Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of this State [i.e., by a jury]. (Pen Code, § 1042; see People v. Loomis 27 Cal. App.2d 236, 239 [80 P.2d 1012].) Section 12022.5 therefore requires a jury determination of the factual question whether or not defendant used [5] a firearm in the commission of the underlying offense, unless defendant has waived a jury trial or has pleaded guilty. As defendant in the instant case did not waive a jury trial nor plead guilty, he was entitled to a jury determination of the matter, preceded by proper jury instructions regarding the meaning of section 12022.5. As explained above, the jury's finding that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the offense was insufficient to establish his use of a firearm. An identical situation occurred in People v. Spencer, supra, 22 Cal. App.3d 786, wherein the information charged defendant with robbery and with being armed with a deadly weapon, both at the time of the offense and at the time of his arrest for that offense. The People failed to request jury instructions on the question of use of a firearm under section 12022.5, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of robbery in the first degree, and a finding that defendant was armed when the offense occurred (though not when arrested). On appeal, the court rejected defendant's various claims of error, but also denied the People's request that the cause `be remanded to permit the People the opportunity to try to a jury the allegation that appellant used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5.' The court reasoned that such a procedure would constitute a piecemeal trial requiring the impanelment of a new and different jury and a trial in which the admissible evidence bearing upon the limited issue would be practically coextensive with that received at the plenary trial.... [Par.] It is our conclusion that the practical realities of the situation, combined with the valid arguments of appellant in opposition to an unprecedented bifurcation of a jury trial for the purpose of determining the limited issue of penalty, dictate the rejection of that procedure in the circumstances of this case. It seems not unreasonable to hold that the failure of the prosecution to request either the necessary jury instruction or the submission of the requisite special verdict should be taken as an indication that section 12022.5 has not been invoked. (Italics added; 22 Cal. App.3d at p. 802.) Prior to the stipulation referred to above, the People had urged us to disapprove Spencer and remand the cause to the trial court for a further jury trial on the applicability of section 12022.5. The People rely upon People v. Washington, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d 470, 474-475, and People v. Henderson, 25 Cal. App.3d 371 [101 Cal. Rptr. 129], wherein the Court of Appeal ordered remands to determine the issue of use of a firearm under that section. Both cases are, however, distinguishable. In Washington, the trial was by the court, defendant having waived a jury trial. The court's judgment found defendant guilty of robbery in the first degree, and also found that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon when the robbery was committed. The Court of Appeal deemed the judgment ambiguous in that it could not be determined from its face whether defendant had been found to have violated [6] section 12022 or the more specific provisions of section 12022.5. The court concluded that In view of the severity of the additional punishment compelled by section 12022.5 we think defendant is entitled to a specific finding in the judgment as to whether his conduct amounted to a violation of that section. (P. 477.) Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court to make a specific finding of fact on the application of section 12022.5 to the conduct of this defendant and then enter judgment in accordance with its finding. [7] As noted in People v. Spencer, supra, 22 Cal. App.3d 786, the Washington case is distinguishable because in that case the defendant waved a jury trial. In that situation the trial court could make the required specific finding on the record made at the trial  a relatively simple procedural process. (22 Cal. App.3d at p. 802.) Spencer's rationale, which we adopt, is that fundamental fairness forbids piecemeal jury litigation of the sort originally sought by the People herein; defendant should not have to undergo a second trial on the issue of penalty, especially since the People could have obviated such a procedure by timely measures during the first trial. That rationale also furnishes a basis for distinguishing People v. Henderson, supra, 25 Cal. App.3d 371, involving a jury retrial of the section 12022.5 issue. In Henderson, as in the instant case and Spencer, the People failed to request a jury instruction regarding section 12022.5. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on counts of kidnaping and robbery, and also found that defendant was armed at the time of the robbery within the meaning of Penal Code 12022.5 as contained in Count I of the Information.... [8] The court recognized that, by reason of Spencer and Washington, section 12022.5 could not be made applicable to the existing verdict. Nevertheless, since the court had reversed and remanded the kidnaping count, the court deemed it proper to remand for a further finding regarding section 12022.5, evidently on the theory that since the case was to be retried in any event, such a remand would not involve the piecemeal litigation condemned in Spencer. Whether or not the court in Henderson was justified in remanding for a further jury proceeding on the issue of the applicability of section 12022.5 is a question we need not decide, for it is apparent that the decision furnishes no authority for a remand under the circumstances in this case. (3) We conclude that the People waived the application of section 12022.5 by failing to have the matter resolved at trial.