Opinion ID: 2633459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Arceo: Separate and Distinct Culpable Acts

Text: In Arceo, evidence of multiple acts of sexual contact and sexual penetration was introduced to support each of two counts of sexual assault. 84 Hawai`i at 3, 928 P.2d at 845. This court held that, when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count charging a sexual assault-any one of which could support a conviction thereunder-and the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless either the prosecution elects the specific conduct upon which it intends to rely to establish the conduct element of the offense or the trial court gives the jury a specific unanimity instruction. Id. at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75. The prosecution argues that the unanimity requirement articulated in Arceo does not apply to the instant case because the various grounds upon which the jury could have found a lack of consent, i.e., the absence of consent or one of the four grounds for finding ineffective consent, did not amount to separate and distinct culpable acts that could support separate counts of an indictment or complaint. We agree with the prosecution. As this court recognized in Valentine, [t]he Arceo decision dealt with a situation in which the prosecution had adduced evidence regarding independent incidents, during each of which the defendant engaged in conduct that could constitute the offense charged, and each of which could have been, but were not, charged as separate offenses. Inasmuch as these independent instances of culpable conduct were submitted to the jury in a single count that charged but one offense, we held that a specific unanimity instruction was necessary to ensure that each juror convicted the defendant on the basis of the same incident of culpable conduct. Thus, two conditions must converge before an Arceo unanimity instruction, absent an election by the prosecution, is necessary: (1) at trial, the prosecution adduces proof of two or more separate and distinct culpable acts; and (2) the prosecution seeks to submit to the jury that only one offense was committed. Moreover, it bears repeating that the purpose of an Arceo unanimity instruction is to eliminate any ambiguity that might infect the jury's deliberations respecting the particular conduct in which the defendant is accused of engaging and that allegedly constitutes the charged offense. 93 Hawai`i at 208, 998 P.2d at 488 (emphases added) (citations omitted). In the instant case, although the prosecution adduced proof of two or more separate and distinct culpable acts or independent incidents, the prosecution correctly charged Defendant with separate counts of sexual assault with respect to each distinct culpable act or incident. [12] Thus, the danger present in Arceo that the jury did not agree upon which independent incident constituted the charged offense was not presented by the consent instruction in this case. See Valentine, 93 Hawai`i at 208, 998 P.2d at 488 ([T]here was no danger that the jury would be confused regarding the conduct of which [Defendant] was accused and that constituted the charged offense.). Rather, the problem presented by the consent instruction in this case, discussed infra, was that the jury was presented with alternative means of establishing a single element of each of the charged offenses, specifically, the lack of legal consent, where there was insufficient evidence to support one of those alternative means. Other state courts have made a distinction between alternative means cases and multiple acts cases. The distinction has been explained as follows: In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in more than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means. [13] In reviewing an alternative means case, the court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In multiple acts cases, on the other hand, several acts are alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged. In these cases, the jury must be unanimous as to which act or incident constitutes the crime. To ensure jury unanimity in multiple acts cases, we require that either the State elect the particular criminal act upon which it will rely for conviction, or that the trial court instruct the jury that all of them must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 875 P.2d 242, 246 (1994) (quoting State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403, 756 P.2d 105, 109 (1988)) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The foregoing distinction is consistent with Arceo, which relied heavily on federal law, as well as cases from Washington, Alaska, Colorado, and Tennessee, in holding that unanimity is required, absent an election by the prosecution, as to each separate and distinct culpable act. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 32, 928 P.2d at 874 (In our view, the logic of [ State v.] Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, [683 P.2d 173, 177 (Wash. 1984), modified by Kitchen, 756 P.2d at 109-10], Covington [v. State], [703 P.2d 436, 440, aff'd in part on reh 'g, State v. Covington, 711 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Alaska Ct.App.1985) (holding that, although trial court erred by failing to give unanimity instruction, error was not raised at trial and did not constitute plain error requiring reversal of conviction)], [ People v.] Aldrich, [849 P.2d 821 (Colo.Ct.App. 1992),] [ State v.] Brown, [762 S.W.2d 135, reh'g denied, 762 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn.1988)], and the line of federal decisions arising out of [ United States v. ]Echeverry [, 719 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.1983) ] is cogent, compelling, and ineluctable.). Some of the cases relied upon by the court in Arceo, like Timley, make the distinction between alternative means cases and multiple acts cases. See Petrich, 683 P.2d at 177 (distinguishing case involving several criminal acts from alternative means cases); Covington, 703 P.2d at 439-40 (distinguishing case involving separate criminal acts from a case involving different means of committing the same offense). Indeed, each of the jurisdictions relied upon in Arceo employs some form of alternative means analysis. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555, reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S.Ct. 28, 115 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1991) (adopting rational and fair approach to alternative means analysis); Kitchen, 756 P.2d at 109 (making distinction between alternative means cases and multiple act cases, identifying Petrich as a multiple acts case); State v. James, 698 P.2d 1161, 1165-67 (Alaska 1985) (holding that juries need not unanimously agree upon particular statutory theory of crime charged if there is sufficient evidence in record to support either theory, where jury is instructed disjunctively or on alternative methods by which defendant may commit single offense; jury need only be unanimous in its conclusion that defendant committed single offense described in statute) (cited in and distinguished by Covington, 703 P.2d at 439-40); James v. People, 727 P.2d 850, 854-55 (Colo.1986) (recognizing the general principle that a defendant is not deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict in circumstances where the court instructs the jury that the crime can be committed in alternative ways and the jury returns a general verdict of guilty and holding that there must be sufficient evidence of each alternative to uphold the general verdict); State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 169-71 (Tenn.1999) (holding that unanimity was not required as to alternative theories of establishing DUI offense and distinguishing case from multiple criminal acts cases such as Brown ). We agree with the foregoing distinction and emphasize that separate and distinct culpable acts, or independent incidents, each of which could support a separate count of an indictment or complaint, may not be treated as alternative means of proving the conduct element of an offense. [14] Each separate and distinct culpable act or independent incident that may be charged as a separate count includes the conduct, attendant circumstances, and result of conduct that may be present. To illustrate the conceptual difference between separate and distinct culpable acts or independent incidents and the conduct element, consider the following example. A defendant is charged with committing the offense of simple trespass upon two different properties on the same day. HRS § 708-815 (1993) provides that [a] person commits the offense of simple trespass if the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises. Evidence is adduced that Defendant trespassed upon premises A (Incident A) and upon premises B (Incident B). If the prosecution has charged the defendant in a single count, then the analysis in Arceo applies and either the prosecution must elect which incident it is relying upon in the single count or a unanimity instruction is required. The prosecution may not treat the acts of entering premises A and B as alternative means of proving the conduct element of one count because they represent independent incidents. However, if the prosecution charges the defendant with separate counts as to each independent incident, then the requirements of Arceo are met. With respect to each individual count, the statutory alternatives of enters or remains may be treated as alternative means of proving the conduct element of the offense, as long as it is rational and fair to do so under the test set forth in Klinge. See discussion infra. Alternative means is a specific legal concept that addresses whether statutory alternatives, not multiple acts or incidents, may be treated as a single element of the crime. See Klinge, 92 Hawai`i at 586-89, 994 P.2d at 518-21. In an abstract sense, there may be a danger that separate and distinct culpable acts could be viewed as alternative ways of establishing the conduct element of the crime. However, this is precisely why we distinguish multiple act cases from alternative means cases. This distinction affirms the principles underlying both Arceo and Klinge and avoids the absurd result of requiring unanimity every time a criminal statute uses the word or. Cf. Klinge, 92 Hawai`i at 606 n. 12, 994 P.2d at 538 n. 12 (Ramil, J. dissenting) (It is elementary that the mere presence of the word `or' in a statute would not, in and of itself, implicate a defendant's right to a unanimous verdict.). [15] Because the prosecution correctly charged Defendant with separate counts of sexual assault with respect to each distinct culpable act or incident, the danger present in Arceo that the jury did not agree upon which independent incident constituted the charged offensewas not presented by the consent instruction in this case. Having determined that Arceo does not apply to the facts of this case, we now examine this court's recent decision in Klinge, which recognized that unanimity may not be required where the jury is presented with alternative means of establishing a single element of the offense charged. 92 Hawai`i at 589, 994 P.2d at 521.