Opinion ID: 2995523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness of Grounds for

Text: Departure The Sentencing Guidelines direct district courts to apply Guideline sec. 2X5.1 when sentencing defendants for criminal contempt. See U.S.S.G. sec. 2J1.1. In turn, Guideline sec. 2X5.1 directs courts to apply the most analogous guideline, U.S.S.G. sec. 2X5.1, because misconduct constituting contempt varies significantly. U.S.S.G. sec. 2J1.1. In this case, the district court chose to sentence Jones under Guideline sec. 2J1.5 (Failure to Appear by Material Witness) because Jones’ criminal contempt consisted of failing to testify before Scott’s grand jury and at Scott’s trials, as he was required to do under the Agreement. We conclude that the district court correctly chose the most analogous Guideline. See Simmons, 215 F.3d at 742 (stating that Guideline sec. 2J1.5 defines the most closely analogous [behavior] to [a] refusal to comply with an order to testify). The district court then noted that the applicable sentencing range under Guideline sec. 2J1.5 was 4 to 10 months imprisonment. After choosing the applicable sentencing range, the district court could apply an upward departure if it found that Jones’ behavior was outside of the heartland of conduct embodied by Guideline sec. 2J1.5. See Simmons, 215 F.3d at 742. In other words, if Jones’ behavior was more egregious than the behavior normally punished under Guideline sec. 2J1.5, then the district court was permitted to apply an upward departure. See id. Here, the district court applied an upward departure because Jones’ refusals to tes tify amounted to a breach of the Agreement. Further, the benefit of the Agreement had already been conferred to Jones in the form of a downward departure applied to his drug sentence. We addressed the application of an upward departure based on this exact type of behavior in Simmons, 215 F.3d at 742- 43. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to bank robbery pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, which required the defendant to testify at the trial of Dwayne Reed. See id. at 739. After the defendant testified at Reed’s first trial, which ended in a mistrial, the government moved for the application of a downward departure for the defendant’s bank robbery sentence, and the district court granted the motion. See id. At Reed’s second trial, however, the defendant refused to testify, and the district court found him guilty of criminal contempt. See id. at 739-40. In sentencing the defendant for criminal contempt, the district court applied an upward departure, justifying its decision by stating that the defendant had received a benefit from the plea agreement in the form of a reduced bank robbery sentence. See id. at 740. Further, because the defendant had breached that plea agreement by refusing to testify at Reed’s second trial, the upward departure would take away the benefit conferred upon the defendant with respect to his bank robbery sentence. See id. at 742-43. On appeal, this court upheld the application of the upward departure on these grounds because the defendant’s outright refusal to testify, coupled with his change of heart as to his decision to testify, served to distinguish [defendant’s] behavior from other behavior within the heartland of sec. 2J1.5. Id. at 742. The facts in the present case are strikingly similar, if not more egregious. After his drug convictions, Jones entered into an Agreement with the government, under which he was obliged to provide complete and truthful testimony to any grand jury, trial jury, judge, or magistrate in any proceeding in which he may be called to testify by the government. (italicized emphasis added). Jones testified in front of a grand jury that was investigating Scott, and accord ingly, the district court applied a downward departure to Jones’ drug sentence. Thereafter, Jones refused to provide grand jury testimony three times and refused to testify at both of Scott’s trials. Because of these five refusals to testify, Jones was convicted of criminal contempt. The district court then applied an upward departure to Jones’ criminal contempt sentence, justifying its decision by stating that it found Jones’ refusal to testify [to be] outside of the heartland of conduct contemplated by the Sentencing Commission. As in Simmons, [Jones] initially agreed to cooperate, testified, received a benefit for his cooperation, and then, refused to testify. Further, the district court stated that it wanted to strip [Jones] of the benefit of his sec. 5K1.1 reduction in his [drug] sentence. Therefore, as in Simmons, 215 F.3d at 743, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying an upward departure based on Jones’ refusals to testify. Jones’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, Jones’ reliance on Guideline sec. 5K1.2, which states that a defendant’s refusal to assist authorities in the investigation of other persons may not be considered as an aggravating sentencing factor, is misguided. U.S.S.G. sec. 5K1.2. Jones has cited no authority that suggests that Guideline sec. 5K1.2 applies to a situation where the defendant received a benefit for agreeing to assist the government and thereafter refused to comply with that agreement. In fact, there is precedent holding that this exact kind of behavior does warrant an upward departure. See Simmons, 215 F.3d at 742-43. Next, Jones contends that because generalized dissatisfaction with the Guidelines . . . is not a reasonable basis for applying an upward departure, his sentence should be reversed. United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 964 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This principle is not applicable to the case at hand because the district court specifically stated that it was applying the upward departure because [Jones] initially agreed to cooperate, testified, received a benefit for his cooperation, and then, refused to testify. We reject the contention that the district court applied the upward departure because of any dissatisfaction with the applicable Guideline. Finally, Jones contends for the first time in his reply brief that he did not breach the terms of the Agreement. Jones bases this claim on the fact that on January 7, 1999, when the government sought Jones’ grand jury testimony, it stated that it was not calling [Jones] before the Grand Jury in any way connected with [the Agreement]. Jones did not mention this argument in his opening brief and did not adequately develop it in his reply brief because he discussed no legal authority addressing how the government’s statement affected the continuing validity of the Agreement. See 330 West Hubbard Rest. Corp. v. United States, 203 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that argument inadequately developed when not bolstered by legal authority). Therefore, without passing judgment on the merits of this contention, we hold that Jones has forfeited this argument on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Guy, 174 F.3d 859, 862 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999).