Opinion ID: 3011843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Courts

Text: Federal courts have followed both lines of reasoning when interpreting compacts containing concurred in language. Courts in the Second Circuit have uniformly adopted the express intent standard, finding the New York viewmore in line with the language of the compacts before them. Baron v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 968 F. Supp. 924, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to unilaterally impose New York’s human rights laws on the New York and New Jersey Port Authority where there was no evidence that either state intended its anti-discrimination laws to apply). See also Dezaio v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 205 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Rose v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 12 F. Supp. 2d 516, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that the same or similar public policy of two states is not sufficient to impose law of either state on the agency unless legislation expressly mentions the bi-state entity); Settecase v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 13 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ([I]f New York and New Jersey intend their own . . . laws to apply to the Port Authority, they have the means to do so clearly and expressly, as they have done for other laws.). Within our circuit, however, the district courts have espoused both views. The District Court for the District of New Jersey has applied the New Jersey complementary or 8 parallel standard. Moore v. Del. River Port Auth., 80 F. Supp. 2d 264, 268 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 68 v. Del. River & Bay Auth. , 688 A.2d 569 (N.J. 1997)). In Moore, the court refused to apply New Jersey common law regarding wrongful discharge and breach of contract to the Delaware River Port Authority, a bi-state entity whose compact includes concurred in language. Id. at 271. In arriving at that result, however, the court analyzed whether the common law of New Jersey was substantially similar to the common law of Pennsylvania, bypassing any discussion as to what was required in order for a law of one state to be concurred in by the other. In contrast, in Delaware River Port Authority v. Fraternal Order of Police, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30, 135 F.Supp.2d 596, 609 (E.D.Pa. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, Delaware River Port Authority v. Fraternal Order of Police, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30, 290 F.3d 567 (3d Cir. 2002), Judge Robreno in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently noted that as a general rule of statutory interpretation, surrenders of sovereignty are to be strictly construed in terms of their scope, Id. at 603, concluding that the ambiguous term ‘concurred in’ of[the Delaware River Port Authority compact should] be interpreted to require the express consent of both legislatures before additional duties are imposed upon the bi-state entity. Id. at 604. The court further noted that the weight of authority supported the express intent standard, and that the New Jersey complementary or parallel standard was based on a misreading of the law of compacts. Id. at 604-05. The court went on to hold that because neither New Jersey nor Pennsylvania had expressly stated that they intended to impose their collective bargaining laws on the Delaware River Port Authority, they had not concurred in the application of those laws. Id. at 609. On appeal, we did not reach the merits of Judge Robreno’s ruling, or of either the New York express intent or the New Jersey complementary or parallel views, but reversed on different grounds, concluding that the parties’ litigation involved an attack on a New Jersey judgment entitled to preclusive effect. Lodge 30, 290 F.3d at 572 (discussing Fraternal Order of Police, Penn-Jersey Lodge 30 9 v. Del. River Port Auth., 733 A.2d 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999)). The parties to the Lodge 30 litigation were in privity with the parties in a case resolved in the New Jersey courts; we were therefore required to give preclusive effect to the New Jersey court’s ruling regarding the complementary or parallel test.4Id. at 577. In dicta, however, we noted, Were we sitting on the New Jersey courts, we might have interpreted the respective statutes and the DRPA’s obligations to its patrol officers differently. But we may not reconsider the New Jersey judgment.5 Id.