Opinion ID: 1345549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ADA and RA Claims

Text: In Count One of the complaint, the Chambers allege violations of § 504 of the RA and § 202 of the ADA on both their own and Ferren's behalf. The District Court determined that the Chambers lacked standing to pursue their RA and ADA claims on their own behalf for much the same reason it found they lacked standing to pursue their IDEA claim under Collinsgru. [15] Notwithstanding the District Court's misplaced reliance on Collinsgru, we need not address the viability of the Chambers' RA and ADA claims, at least to the extent the Chambers assert those claims on their own behalf. Our review of the record convinces us that the Chambers failed both to press those claims in the District Court and to revive them in their opening brief on appeal. As a consequence, those claims are waived. [16] See F.D.I. C. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169-70 (3d Cir.2000); Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir.1994). With respect to the Chambers' ADA and RA claims asserted on Ferren's behalf, the District Court concluded that those statutes were merely the predicates for what it perceived to be a § 1983 claim. Relying on our decision in Jersey City, in which we held that § 1983 does not offer a plaintiff a remedy for violations of the IDEA or the RA, the District Court found that summary judgment was warranted. The Chambers do not question that finding on appeal. To the extent the Chambers asserted claims directly under the RA and the ADA on Ferren's behalf, the District Court concluded in a footnote that the Chambers had waived those claims: It appears from the Amended Complaint as though Plaintiffs assert their Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims separately as well as through the vehicle of § 1983; however, in the Response to Defendant's Motion, counsel seems to pursue the claims only under § 1983. (Resp. at 16.) During oral argument Plaintiffs' counsel confirmed that Plaintiffs are pursuing claims under § 1983, not the individual statutes. Tr. March 13, 2007 at 8. Chambers, 2007 WL 4225584, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88003, at  n. 8. We cannot agree with the District Court's conclusion that the Chambers waived their right to proceed directly under the RA and the ADA. The District Court's reference to a statement made by the Chambers' attorney on page 13 of the hearing transcript is in all likelihood a result of inadvertent error. [17] At that stage of the hearing, the District Court was engaged in a colloquy with the School District's attorney, not the Chambers' attorney. Moreover, later in the hearing the Chambers' attorney clarified that the Chambers fully intended to keep all of their options on the table: THE COURT: But it's unclear to me whether you believe you can sustain these dual actions from start to finish, and then you have both an IDEA claim for the parents, and a 1983 case predicated on the IDEA. Just using that as an example. [PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL]: Yes, I think you can proceed with both, and I think Matula says that you're permitted to  that you can recover directly under the IDEA and Section 504 for a violation, but you can also proceed through a 1983 action and  . . . . [A]nd that's why I want to obviously leave myself open. I don't want to foreclose, because I think the courts have suggested there might be slightly different remedies available the way you proceed, and that's what I would suggest. (App.251.) This colloquy between the District Court and the Chambers' attorney persuades us that the Chambers did not intend to waive their right to pursue their RA and ADA claims on Ferren's behalf. [18] Because the same standards govern both the Chambers' RA and ADA claims, we may address both claims in the same breath. McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995) (Whether suit is filed under the Rehabilitation Act or under the Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for determining liability are the same. (citation omitted)). To prevail on a violation of either of those statutes, [19] the Chambers had to demonstrate that Ferren (1) has a disability; (2) was otherwise qualified to participate in a school program; and (3) was denied the benefits of the program or was otherwise subject to discrimination because of her disability. [20] See Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir.1991) (citing Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir.1983)). The parties do not dispute that the first two elements are satisfied. The parties disagree only on the third element: whether Ferren was denied a benefit of an education program because of her disability. In an effort to meet its summary judgment burden, the School District argued before the District Court that Ferren was not denied any educational benefits. According to the School District, it actively tried to provide an appropriate education setting for Ferren[.] (App.88.) To buttress its position, the School District pointed to the various educational programs in which Ferren was enrolled over the course of several years, the numerous medical and psychological evaluations she underwent to test her progress, and the several types of special therapies and services she received. These facts are supported by reference to the School District's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, which in turn is tethered to different parts of the record. In the School District's view, [t]hese facts show that Ferren was actively participating in school programs and was not discriminated against. (App.89.) Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the Chambers, as we must in this posture, we do not believe that the School District met its initial summary judgment burden based on its proffer to the District Court. We have previously said that the failure to provide a free appropriate public education violates IDEA and therefore could violate [the RA]. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Matula, 67 F.3d at 492-93.) We think that the record contains enough of a genuine factual dispute about whether the School District in fact provided Ferren with a FAPE, not to mention whether the School District otherwise committed RA and ADA violations. We must therefore refrain from wading into this dispute. In light of the District Court's erroneous dismissal of the Chambers' RA and ADA claims based on its misperception of the Chambers' position, and because we do not find summary judgment to be appropriate based on the record in its current incarnation, we will vacate the grant of summary judgment on those claims.