Opinion ID: 2361099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Factual Basis For the First Two Issues

Text: During direct questioning of Price, his counsel asked, Why is it that you didn't appear, Mr. Price? He replied initially, I just  I just didn't appear. I really can't answer that. I just didn't appear. When asked to explain why he didn't appear, he responded: Well, . . . I was going to court several times, and I kept getting a continuance on my case . . . I was supposed to get my case thrown out, but unfortunately they couldn't remember who I was to throw my case out. . . . The response was struck on the ground of pure speculation. Defense counsel asked Price to explain how the repeated continuances of his case affected him; he answered: Well, . . . after I was arrested, and I had came back around the area, I was assaulted by Porky and three guys and  well, first he asked me what happened and what did I say, what did I tell the police when I got arrested, and I told him that they said that I was the one that sold drugs, and they didn't believe me, so I got jumped . The prosecutor objected on the basis of hearsay and speculation. After bench conferences with counsel, the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard what statements were made to Mr. Price, and what Mr. Price said is hearsay. Defense counsel requested another bench conference during which she maintained that Price's objected to testimony was not hearsay. It was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show his state of mind as to why he didn't appear. In response to the trial judge's request for a proffer as to the relevance of the objected to testimony, defense counsel responded, in part: [I]t was the fear of Porky and these other individuals involved in the drug sales on this particular block. In addition to that, I guess Mr. Price wants to express that it had been continued several times, and based on a feeling that he had nothing to do with it  The trial judge interrupted, warning [h]e can be probed as to the basis of his understanding as to why he thought the case was to be dismissed and was set for further proceeding. The door is now open with respect to that type of cross examination. With respect to the other area of inquiry that you are before me on, it is not a valid defense, and no evidence can come in with respect to that. Defense counsel responded, That is fine, your Honor. After additional bench conferences, the trial court modified its instruction for the fourth time saying, [d]isregard what I just stated because it was stated too broadly with respect to what you can and cannot consider. What you cannot consider in your deliberations is Mr. Price's testimony with respect to his statements alleging any encounter with Porky after his arrest in the case of the distribution of cocaine. Defense counsel posed no further questions to Price. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked questions concerning Price's failure to appear for the January 28, 1992, status conference. In response to the prosecutor's questions as to whether he thought the case had gone away and why, Price said, Well, I had reasons to believe that it would be dismissed. When defense counsel asked to approach the bench after the prosecutor asked, What were those reasons, the trial judge stated, Overruled and the prosecutor continued with his questions. Price remarked, you  don't want me to talk about it, so I cannot tell you. The prosecutor responded: You can tell me anything that responds to the question I just asked you. I want to know what the reasons are you thought this case was going to be dismissed. You can tell me who told you and why you thought it. Price named an assistant United States attorney, and the prosecutor asked, Why would he tell you that this case could get dismissed; do you know, and later inquired: Now isn't it true that the real reason you thought this case was going to be dismissed was because on December 10, 1991, you told the Court . . . that you were thinking about a disposition of the case, isn't that right? When Price said, Excuse me, the prosecutor asked: You told [the Court] that you were thinking about entering a plea before [the Court] in the case? Defense counsel requested a bench conference during which the trial judge indicated that Price can be cross examined with respect to all the colloquy that goes on, all of which is on the record, about discussing possible plea options and what he could do. . . . Defense counsel asserted, I think it is highly prejudicial at this point that the Government be allowed to question him simply about a plea. I would ask for a mistrial at this point. The trial judge remarked, Doesn't it go directly to his consciousness of guilt for fleeing, to which defense counsel replied, Certainly not. [3] The trial judge recognized that there is prejudice. Nonetheless she decided to allow [the prosecutor] limited room because it is very relevant to the issue of flight. . . . At the conclusion of the bench trial, the prosecutor continued to pose questions to Price regarding his failure to appear for the status hearing. He asked: The purpose of each of those status dates was for you to make a decision whether you were going to accept the plea offer that had been given you and enter a guilty plea, or were you going to exercise your right to go to trial; isn't that right? Price responded, No. The prosecutor also asked: Isn't it true that the reason you were supposed to come to court on January 28, 1992, was to determine whether you were going to accept a plea offer and enter a guilty plea . . . or tell [the Court] you wanted to exercise your right to have a trial, isn't that true? At this point, before Price replied, the trial judge asked both counsel to approach for a bench conference. She stated: The only thing that occurred to me  I think it is still appropriate for bias. You have to be careful with respect to  isn't there a rule with respect to settlement discussions and plea negotiations not coming out? The prosecutor indicated that he would strike the last question and move on. The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the last question. On redirect examination, Price maintained that he never intended to enter a guilty plea to the drug charge. During consideration of the final instructions to be given to the jury, defense counsel again asked for a mistrial because of the government's cross-examination questions regarding the plea bargain discussions. She labeled the questions extremely prejudicial to Price. She stated: [B]ecause the jury may not be as sophisticated as we are, that information is before them, and the seed is planted in their mind that Mr. Price may have been thinking about pleading guilty earlier, and that regardless of what is said now and way down the line and years later, it taints his testimony as he gave it today. The trial court responded that Price had opened the door by saying he thought his case was being dismissed by the government, and also suggested that Price's failure to appear served as a basis for arguing flight due to consciousness of guilt. As the trial court put it, in terms of motivation to plea, he fled right at a point of critical juncture in the court proceedings, and that is very relevant to his state of mind as to his reason for not appearing at that critical juncture. . . . [4]