Opinion ID: 1713530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Doe's Complaint

Text: ¶ 33. Before we consider the parties' competing arguments regarding BBB Doe, Pritzlaff, and Clauder, we must test the legal sufficiency of Doe's complaint. ¶ 34. We must decide whether Doe has alleged facts sufficient to support the three causes of action stated in his complaint: negligence, fiduciary fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. ¶ 35. In 1975 this court adopted new rules of Wisconsin civil procedure. 67 Wis. 2d 585 (1975). One of the keystones of the new procedural system was Wis. Stat. § 802.02 (1977-78), which signaled Wisconsin's adoption of notice pleading. Wilson v. Cont'l Ins. Cos., 87 Wis. 2d 310, 316, 274 N.W.2d 679 (1979); Clausen, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure at 37. Under § 802.02(1)(a), a complaint must simply contain [a] short and plain statement of the claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences out of which the claim arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. These claims are to be liberally construed [so] as to do substantial justice. Wis. Stat. § 802.02(6); Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 229. ¶ 36. However, a complaint cannot be completely devoid of factual allegations. The notice pleading rule, while intended to eliminate many technical requirements of pleading, nevertheless requires the plaintiff to set forth a statement of circumstances, occurrences and events in support of the claim presented. Clausen, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure at 38-39. For example, a claim in negligence must state general facts setting forth that the [defendant] had knowledge or should have had knowledge of a potential and unreasonable risk.... Wilson, 87 Wis. 2d at 318. [A] bare conclusion [does] not fulfill[] a plaintiff's duty of stating the elements of a claim in general terms. Id. at 319. In short, we will dismiss a complaint if, [u]nder the guise of notice pleading, the complaint before us requires the court to indulge in too much speculation leaving too much to the imagination of the court. Id. at 326-27. It is not enough for the plaintiff to contend that the requisite facts will be supplied by the discovery process. Id. at 327. ¶ 37. Accordingly, the first step in our analysis is an examination of the allegations in Doe's complaint to determine whether the alleged facts are sufficient or whether they leave too much to the imagination of the court. One of the grounds for the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss was that the complaint did not allege that the Archdiocese had knowledge about Nuedling as of 1960. ¶ 38. Reviewing Doe's pleadings, we find the following allegations relating to the date of the Archdiocese's knowledge: 9. On information and belief, Defendants knew or should have known of Nuedling's problems with alcohol abuse as well as his tendency and history of sexually abusing children. Despite this Defendants Diocese and Church continued to allow Nuedling to have unsupervised contact with children. 10. On information and belief, in approximately 1980 an agent of Defendant Diocese witnessed Nuedling sexually abusing a boy in the sacristy of St. John the Evangelist Church. 11. On information and belief, in November of 1986 a man reported to Defendant Diocese that he was abused when he was a boy by Nuedling. 12. On information and belief, in approximately 1987 Nuedling admitted abusing a boy at St. Rita. Despite the report to Defendant Diocese and Nuedling's own admission of sexual abuse, Defendant Diocese allowed Nuedling to continue serving as a priest. 13. On information and belief, in March of 1993 another man reported to Defendant Diocese that he was abused by Nuedling when he was a boy. 14. On information and belief, Defendant Diocese received additional reports of abuse by three different men in July of 2001, March of 2002 and May of 2002. 15. Despite these numerous reports of abuse Defendants Diocese and Church failed to disclose information regarding Nuedling's abusive propensities until recently. . . . . 23. Defendants Diocese and Church knew or should reasonabl[y] have known of Nuedling's dangerous and exploitative propensities as a child sexual exploiter and/or as an unfit agent and despite such knowledge, Defendants Diocese and Church negligently retained and failed to provide reasonable supervision of Nuedling. .... 30. On information and belief, Defendants Diocese and Church had actual or constructive knowledge of Nuedling's inappropriate behavior, as discussed above. 31. Defendants Diocese and Church misrepresented, concealed and/or failed to disclose information relating to sexual misconduct, and other inappropriate behavior of Nuedling. ¶ 39. None of these paragraphs alleges that the Archdiocese knew of Doe's proclivities as of 1960-62. Paragraph 9 alleges that the Archdiocese knew or should have known without giving a date. The vague and general allegations in paragraph 9 are grounded in the facts set forth in subsequent paragraphs describing incidents that occurred between 1980 and 2002. Paragraphs 23, 30, and 31 similarly contain no allegation relating the date of the Archdiocese's knowledge. ¶ 40. At oral argument before this court, Doe's counsel reiterated the allegation that the Archdiocese had knowledge as of 1980. Counsel acknowledged that Doe had not specifically pleaded an allegation that the Archdiocese knew as of 1960, and asked us to assume prior knowledge based on the Archdiocese's recent revelations. In effect, counsel argued that the nonspecific allegations of paragraph 9, knew or should have known, are enough to sustain Doe's claim. ¶ 41. These arguments echo the allegations Doe's counsel made before the circuit court regarding the date of the Archdiocese's knowledge of Nuedling's proclivities. See supra ¶¶ 13-14 (The Archdiocese, he said, had known about Nuedling for twenty or more years and had failed to disclose this information.). Doe has never specifically alleged, in his complaint before the circuit court, in his argument before the circuit court, in his brief to this court, or in his oral argument before this court, that the Archdiocese knew about Nuedling's misconduct in 1960-62, or had a basis for such knowledge before 1980. ¶ 42. With this understanding, we examine the elements of each of the causes of action Doe alleged, to determine whether any of them may proceed despite Doe's failure to allege that the Archdiocese had knowledge at the time of the events in question.