Opinion ID: 546143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of the Term Dignified

Text: 7 The district court found the Minnesota legislature's use of the term dignified in the introductory subsection colored all later references to the acceptable disposal methods in the statute. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989), decided one week after the district court's opinion here, the Supreme Court found that a preamble to a Missouri abortion statute which stated the life of each human being begins at conception was not intended to be controlling or regulatory, but instead simply expressed a value judgment. Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3050. The Court added it will be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way. Id. 8 Although the term dignified, standing alone, is no more definitive than humane, stricken in Akron, it nonetheless does not ultimately control Minnesota's fetal disposal law. Introductory provisions of a statute must give way to the specific language in the operative sections of the statute. See In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn.1980). Under governing principles of statutory construction it is generally accepted that the preamble    contributes to a general understanding of the statute, but it is not an operative part of the statute   . Where the enacting or operative parts of a statute are unambiguous, the meaning of the statute cannot be controlled by language in the preamble. Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, Va., 745 F.2d 868, 885 (4th Cir.1984) (quoting Association of Am. Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C.Cir.1977)); cf. United States Trustee v. Prines (In re Prines), 867 F.2d 478, 483-84 (8th Cir.1989) (declining to give dispositive weight to preamble language where doing so disregards language of operative section). 9 The Minnesota legislature expressly articulated the disposal methods that are acceptable: cremation, interment by burial, or in a manner directed by the commissioner of health. Any ambiguity created by the preamble is obviated by these common terms with accepted meanings. 4 The Minnesota statute differs significantly from fetal disposal statutes using humane, dignified, or sanitary without limitation. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 451, 103 S.Ct. at 2503; Leigh, 497 F.Supp. at 1351. We therefore find that the Minnesota legislature's use of the term dignified in the preamble of the fetal disposal statute does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. 10 The district court found, however, that uncertainty remained as to the authorized methods of disposal. For example, the district court could not determine whether group disposal was dignified, and therefore found the statute vague. 5 We believe the district court's conclusion misapplies the standards for judging the facial vagueness of a statute. In this context, the court must determine whether the statute can ever be applied in a valid manner. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100. Whether or not group disposal is authorized by the statute, the district court could have upheld the statute based on valid application in the case of individual cremation or interment. The terms used in the statute are, however, ambiguous in the sense that the permissibility of group disposal is not clear. Although we need not address the group disposal issue to resolve the constitutional issue, we do so in order to resolve this ambiguity. 11 We note that the statute does not expressly prohibit group disposal. The intent of the statute was to preclude methods of disposal that were not associated with the notion of burial, such as disposal through the sewer system or the indifferent dumping of remains in landfills; however, this intent does not rule out group disposal. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Health & Human Services Committee on S.F. No. 389, 74th Minn.Leg., Apr. 1, 1989 (statement of Sen. Chiemelewski, App. at 124). The legislature acknowledged that several hospitals already disposed of fetal remains by group disposal. See Senate Floor Debate on S.F. No. 389, 74th Minn.Leg., May 13, 1987 (Statement of Sen. Chiemelewski) (hospitals store aborted or miscarried fetal remains for disposal on a monthly basis) (App. at 94-95). We therefore believe the statute should be construed to allow group disposal. 12 This interpretation requires consideration of administrative rules that Planned Parenthood argues prohibit group disposal methods, and create additional vagueness problems. The pertinent rule states: When cremation is selected as a method of disposition, cremation must be accomplished 72 hours from the time of death on all unembalmed bodies.    Commingling of cremains shall not be permitted without written permission from next of kin. Minn.R. 4610.2000 (1989). 6 13 If group disposal is authorized under the statute, and we have found that it is, Planned Parenthood urges that a conflict exists between this rule and subdivision 6 of the statute, which states that disposition can occur without consultation with the woman. The district court found the ambiguity regarding group disposal compounded by the potential application of this rule. The statute defines remains of a human fetus as the remains of the dead offspring of a human being which reflects a stage of development of cartilaginous structures, fetal or skeletal parts. Minn.Stat. Sec. 146.1621, subd. 2. Thus, even though the statute strains to equate a human body with the remains of a dead fetus, the two provisions, under common understanding, convey for purposes of the rules involved totally different meanings. The administrative rule on cremation was not adopted to govern the disposal of human fetuses. The state concedes this. We agree with the state that the administrative rule on cremation does not apply to the fetal disposition law. 14 Even if the rule requiring permission for group disposal was intended to apply to fetal disposition, and the state concedes it does not, it is fundamental that the rule cannot take precedence over the explicit language of the statute that no discussion with the woman about the method of disposal is necessary. If the statute allows for group cremation, the permission requirement of the rule cannot be read into the statute where doing so would nullify the express language of the statute. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 852, 865 (8th Cir.1983) (agency's interpretation of its regulations cannot emasculate the plain meaning of the governing statute); see also Spears v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 766 F.2d 520, 523 (Fed.Cir.1985) (agency's regulations must be consistent with statute). 7 15 We therefore find the methods of disposal authorized by Minnesota's fetal disposal statute sufficiently clear to avoid vagueness concerns. Further, we find the statute as construed authorizes group disposal methods, but that the state's regulations on group cremation do not govern disposal undertaken in compliance with this statute.