Opinion ID: 423695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right Infringed

Text: 28 When the classification employed by the state burdens the exercise of fundamental rights, strict judicial scrutiny is required. Plaintiffs maintain that because they are destitute and unable to find work, the right at issue in this case is the right to subsist. The right to basic subsistence is arguably the most fundamental of all human rights. For a person who is starving and without shelter, all other rights appear to pale in comparison. As employed by the Supreme Court, however, the term fundamental rights does not mean rights of particular human or societal significance. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1298, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Rather it means those rights which have their source, explicitly or implicitly, in the Constitution. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 217 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. at 2395 n. 15. 29 Nowhere does the Constitution explicitly guarantee the right to receive welfare. Were this a matter of first impression, we might conclude that subsistence is impliedly protected by the Constitution, because it is of basic human importance and fundamental to the meaningful exercise of all other rights. This is not, however, a matter of first impression. The Supreme Court has considered the issue on numerous occasions and consistently rejected any attempt to require the state to justify its economic and social policies by showing some compelling state interest, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33, 93 S.Ct. at 1296, even when the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings are at stake. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). 30 This Court did suggest in dictum in Medora v. Colautti, 602 F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (3d Cir.1979), that courts might apply heightened scrutiny if the categories used by the state totally denied, as opposed to reduced, benefits to a class of persons similar in all relevant respects to the favored group. 4 Medora involved a very different situation from the one in this case. First, in Medora, plaintiffs challenged a regulation that was in conflict with the statute under which it had been promulgated, rather than as here the statute itself. Second, the regulation in Medora required blind, aged, or disabled persons to apply for federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits before applying for Pennsylvania general assistance benefits. Persons deemed not blind, aged, or disabled, and thus ineligible to receive SSI benefits were permitted to apply for general assistance. However, those found to be blind, aged, or disabled, but still not eligible for SSI for some other reason, were barred from applying for general assistance, even if they would have qualified under the applicable general assistance criteria. This Court concluded that under the lowest standard of scrutiny the regulation violated the equal protection clause, because it was not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interests. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 245, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1088, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). Despite its broad language, Medora does not compel heightened scrutiny in welfare cases, Jackson v. O'Bannon, 633 F.2d 329, 339 (3d Cir.1980), and in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dandridge, we are precluded from applying such scrutiny here.