Opinion ID: 1962224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the fifth amendment claim: miranda

Text: The defendant's graphic and detailed confession to the murders was admitted at trial. The defendant asserted before the trial court, and claims before this court, that the confession was obtained in violation of his right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself under the fifth amendment to the constitution, as interpreted in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, reh. denied, 452 U.S. 973, 101 S. Ct. 3128, 69 L. Ed. 2d 984 (1981), and Miranda v. Arizona, supra. After his encounter with Shay on Route 69 in Prospect at approximately 2 p.m., Acquin was brought to the Prospect command post. He was again read the Miranda rights and then questioned at length by Hamila regarding his activities of the preceding two days. At approximately 5:45 p.m. Acquin interrupted himself in midsentence and stated that he wanted a lawyer. [6] Hamila reported Acquin's request for counsel to Captain Thomas McDonnell of the Connecticut state police, who had assumed overall command of the investigation. McDonnell told Hamila to get something to eat. McDonnell then went into the room with Acquin and talked with him for over half an hour in an attempt to discover who Acquin wanted to represent him. McDonnell suggested Acquin's previous attorney and the public defender. Acquin rejected both, as he did the suggestion that his brother be called to get him an attorney. After some time, Acquin indicated that it wasn't really an attorney that he wanted, it was just somebody he could trust, and that he wanted Joel Albert, a psychiatrist working with prisoners in the New Haven jail. Acquin also indicated that as soon as Albert got there that he would tell us the truth about what happened the night before. [7] McDonnell broke off the conversation at that point, and ordered Shay to find and to summon Albert. He then returned to the interrogation room, and he and Acquin decided to get something to eat. Hamila returned shortly thereafter, and McDonnell, Hamila and Acquin drove to a restaurant nearby, where they ate hamburgers in the police cruiser. Acquin was not handcuffed or physically restrained during this trip. At Acquin's request he was taken to Bethany rather than back to Prospect, where a crowd of reporters had gathered. In Bethany, Acquin was left alone in a room to wait for Albert. He curled up in an armchair and slept or rested for about two and one-half hours, when Albert finally arrived at approximately 11:40 p.m. on July 22. McDonnell woke Acquin up, and asked whether he still wanted to see Albert and to tell his story. Acquin said he did, and the two of them joined Albert in another room. McDonnell told Acquin that Albert was not an attorney and reminded him that any statement made could be used against him in court; [8] and at Albert's request, McDonnell then left the room. Albert determined that Acquin did want him there, and called McDonnell back in. Neither Acquin nor Albert mentioned an attorney. [9] On direct examination, McDonnell described the conversation which followed: A. They [sic] then asked Lorne Acquin: do you want to tell us what happened last night. And, he said: no, I don't want to tell you. Q. And, what did you say? A. I said: well, I thought you said when Dr. Albert got here that you would tell us the truth about what happened last night. And, he said: well, what I mean is, it'sI don't want to tell you, I want you to ask me questions, I can't go through it all again. So, I asked him questions. Q. Did you ask him questions? A. Yes. Q. What did you ask him first? A. First question I asked him was: how did you really get those cuts. Previously he told us he got the cuts during an assault, he was assaulted by some people up in the Waterbury area. And, his reply to my question was that he didn't get the cuts from those guys the way he told me. Q. And A. And, then I asked him: did you kill all those people. And, he said: yes, he did. And, then without any further questions for quite some time, he went into a narrative about what happened the night before. The defendant claims that the facts before us establish as a matter of law that his confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. We disagree. Any inquiry into the admissibility of a confession obtained while a defendant is in custody must of course begin with Miranda v. Arizona, supra. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires that a suspect in police custody be informed specifically of his or her right to remain silent and to have an attorney present before being questioned. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 444, 479. The court further held that [i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; id., 473-74; and [i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Id., 474. Furthermore, [i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Id., 475. The standard for waiver is that announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938): A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.... [which] must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Accord, North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979); State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280, 439 A.2d 330 (1981). The Supreme Court recently reconfirmed the principles stated above in Edwards v. Arizona, supra, where the court held: [W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id., 484-85. The defendant contends that Edwards v. Arizona, supra, establishes a per se rule that once an accused has asked for counsel, any further questioning of any kind by the police violates his fifth amendment rights. We do not, however, construe the Edwards opinion so broadly. To do so would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S. Ct. 321, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1975). We believe that the Edwards opinion is a restatement of existing principles of constitutional law, and is not intended to overrule decided cases. Edwards does not prohibit communication between police and a suspect who has requested an attorney. Rather it prohibits the use of confessions obtained when police initiate renewed custodial interrogation after such a request. The Supreme Court has stated quite clearly that the Miranda safeguards are relevant only when an in-custody accused is subjected to interrogation. `Interrogation' means any words or actions ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980); see State v. Falby, 187 Conn. 6, 15, 444 A.2d 213 (1982); State v. Graham, 186 Conn. 437, 443, 441 A.2d 857 (1982). The per se rule suggested by the defendant would negate the holding in Innis by forbidding any conversation initiated by police after a request for counsel whether or not likely to elicit an incriminating response. But the majority in Edwards was careful to disavow any intention to overrule the interrogation requirement of Miranda and Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, stating: The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation [absent which] ... there would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked.... Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 485-86. The relevant inquiry when a defendant has clearly invoked his right to counsel is to ask, first, was there in fact interrogation and, second, did the police initiate it. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 490 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). [10] It is unquestioned that Acquin was read the Miranda rights before any statement was taken, and it appears clear from the record that he understood those rights. It is also undisputed that he specifically requested an attorney at 5:45 p.m. (I think I'm in trouble. I think I better get a lawyer.), and that he confessed several hours after that request. Edwards and Miranda require, therefore, that we examine two incidents which occurred after the defendant's request: (1) McDonnell's inquiries about whom the defendant wanted as an attorney; and (2) the events immediately following the arrival of Albert in Bethany, which immediately preceded the confession. 1