Opinion ID: 1601918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by doctors doherty, patel, harrison, hashimoto, and kregor.[4]

Text: ¶ 18. Davis argues that the above-listed physician defendants were not state employees at the time of his treatment at UMMC. He also argues that there was no evidence to support summary judgment. ¶ 19. The MTCA provides that no state employee shall be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee's duties. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2). The MTCA defines employee as any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision of the state, but specifically excludes from that definition an individual acting in the capacity of an independent contractor. Id. § 11-46-1(f). There is a rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee within the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment. Id. §§ 11-46-5(3) & -7(7). ¶ 20. To determine whether a faculty physician at UMMC is an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of immunity under the MTCA, we consider the factors adopted in Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 302, 310 (Miss.2000):(1) the nature of the function performed by the employee; (2) the extent of the state's interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the employee; (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion; and (5) whether the physician received compensation, either directly or indirectly, from the patient for professional services rendered. A judge must have discovery responses and produced discovery in applying these factors to the facts presented: Contested status issues invariably require discovery. The party seeking summary judgment on the grounds that he was not responsible for another's actions typically will be the party in possession of the information necessary to determining whether he is indeed responsible. While summary judgment may be appropriate where the status issue has been fully fleshed out and there are no material issues of fact, ... it cannot be said that the status issue in this case has been fully fleshed out. Owens v. Thomae, 759 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss.1999). ¶ 21. Summary judgment for a defendant physician was recently affirmed because we were able to make a finding from the record that he was a state employee entitled to immunity under the MTCA. Corey v. Skelton, 834 So.2d 681 (Miss. 2003). The record contained the physician's employment contract and responses to interrogatories. ¶ 22. Similarly, in Clayton v. Harkey, 826 So.2d 1283 (Miss.2002), we upheld summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician, finding that the physician was a state employee entitled to immunity under the MTCA. Having examined the physician's employment contract, we found that the record reveals that Dr. Harkey was a full-time faculty member who received a fixed contractual salary, all of which was paid from funds controlled by UMMC. Dr. Harkey was not permitted to earn any income from the practice of medicine outside of his contract. Id. at 1287. ¶ 23. In a third case, we upheld summary judgment for the defendant physician, finding that he was at all pertinent times employed by UMMC and acted according to the terms of his contract. Watts v. Tsang, 828 So.2d 785, 799 (Miss. 2002). We stated, If the record is not sufficiently developed to determine the employment status of the faculty physician, this Court will reverse and remand so the trial court can apply the Miller test, unrestricted by the limited record before us on appeal. Id. at 798. ¶ 24. Finally, in Mozingo v. Scharf, 828 So.2d 1246 (Miss.2002), we upheld summary judgment, finding that the defendant physician was a state employee entitled to immunity under the MTCA when there were sufficient facts in the record to properly apply the Miller factors and determine that summary judgment was appropriate. We were able to examine the physician's employment contract to determine the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the physician and whether the physician received compensation directly or indirectly from the patient. Id. at 1252-53. ¶ 25. Under this precedent, the circuit judge erred in granting summary judgment to Doctors Doherty, Patel, Harrison, Hashimoto, and Kregor. A full and meaningful application of the Miller factors was not possible on the record before the circuit court. The only evidence presented in support of these doctors' motion for summary judgment was two affidavits stating that the doctors were either residents, interns, or attending physicians. To compound the error, the circuit court never allowed the parties to conduct discovery, essentially barring Davis from presenting any evidence to rebut the motion. ¶ 26. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to Doctors Doherty, Patel, Harrison, Hashimoto, and Kregor and remand to the circuit court with instructions to enter a scheduling order which allows for a period of discovery. The circuit court should not rule on these doctors' motion for summary judgment until discovery is complete.