Opinion ID: 4037404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count Three: TVPA

Text: We first note that the Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s dismissal of Count Three only as it relates to Defendants Garry Drummond and James Michael Tracy. Because the Plaintiffs have waived any challenge to the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Count Three as to the three corporate defendants, we affirm that aspect of the district court’s order without further discussion. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004); cf. also Doe, 782 F.3d at 602 n.36 (“The TVPA does not authorize liability against corporate entities.”). We now proceed to discuss the Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims against Garry Drummond and Tracy. Baloco II held that claims preclusion and issue preclusion barred the plaintiffs’ TVPA claims. 767 F.3d at 1248, 1251. The Baloco plaintiffs had a substantive legal relationship with the Romero plaintiffs, and the issues and claims were identical in the two actions. See generally id. This action, while similar, involves distinct plaintiffs and distinct claims. Neither before the district court nor on appeal do the Defendants argue that this case is barred by res judicata. 12 Case: 16-10921 Date Filed: 09/27/2016 Page: 13 of 17 Therefore, Baloco II does not appear to be the basis upon which the district court dismissed with prejudice Count Three. Doe held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact supporting their theories that the individual defendants were indirectly liable for the AUC’s alleged extrajudicial killings. 782 F.3d at 604. Specifically, this Court found no genuine dispute of fact regarding (1) the individual defendants’ knowledge of Drummond’s payments to the AUC; (2) the individual defendants’ knowledge that the AUC was murdering noncombatants along rail lines; or (3) the individual defendants de facto or de jure authority or control over the actors who committed extrajudicial killings. Id. at 604–05, 610 n.48. The absence of evidence supporting (1) and (2) precluded an aiding and abetting theory of liability, and the absence of evidence supporting (3) precluded a command responsibility theory of liability. See id. at 608, 610. When the district court dismissed this case, discovery had not commenced, and there was no pending motion for summary judgment. Before the stay, the district court had before it the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, which the district court administratively terminated without prejudice in light of the stay. In the district court’s post-stay show-cause order, the district court did not notify the parties that it intended to consider matters outside the pleadings other than this Court’s published decisions in Baloco II and Doe. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (If a 13 Case: 16-10921 Date Filed: 09/27/2016 Page: 14 of 17 district court intends to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (“After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may: (1) grant summary judgment for a nonmovant; (2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or (3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.”). Therefore, the district court could not have based its dismissal of Count Three on the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Because the district court could not have based its dismissal of Count Three on the holdings of Baloco II and Doe, we are left rudderless on appeal. The Defendants argued both before the district court and on appeal that, given Doe’s extensive discussion of the standard for aiding and abetting liability and command responsibility doctrine liability under the TVPA, Doe supports dismissal of Count Three for failure to state a claim. While this may be so, the district court failed to discuss this issue at all. We have the discretion to affirm an order of the district court on any grounds supported by the record but may “decline to do so when appellate review would benefit from reasoned deliberation by the district court.” Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1306 n.15 (11th Cir. 2010) 14 Case: 16-10921 Date Filed: 09/27/2016 Page: 15 of 17 (citations omitted). Here, where the 112-page, 210-paragraph operative complaint alleges wrongful conduct by five defendants (and numerous non-parties) resulting in the extrajudicial killing of 34 people, we decline to consider in the first instance whether the complaint states a claim for two defendants’ indirect liability. The initial resolution of that issue is better left to the district court, which has grown intimately familiar with the allegations in this case. 2 We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of Count Three (except as to the corporate defendants) and remand with instructions for the district court to either permit the Plaintiffs to proceed against the individual Defendants on Count Three or to reinstate the dismissal along with an articulation of the basis and reasoning for the dismissal.