Opinion ID: 2630788
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The record supports the trial court's decision.

Text: The court suggests that the trial court promised at the May 2001 trial setting conference to be flexible in its scheduling decisions, [15] and implicitly concludes that it was not flexible after Kay belatedly tried to change the ground rules for the lawsuit. [16] I do not read the trial court's statements as amounting to an enforceable promise of flexibility. [17] Although the trial court stated that it would usually grant motions to extend or file late for good cause shown, it also repeatedly emphasized that it did not want pre-trial deadlines crowding too close to the trial date and potentially delaying the trial. The trial court's decision not to allow Kay to withdraw from Rule 26(g) is consistent with its previous statements expressing concern about late filings and delay of trial. The court's trial setting comments could not have misled Kay, and reliance on them to justify the late withdrawal and eve-of-trial continuance efforts would have been unreasonable. Kay had to understand that such efforts are addressed to the trial court's discretion.