Opinion ID: 588111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Particularized Findings Required on Remand

Text: 40 As the previous discussion of Nix and other inevitable discovery cases indicates, inevitable discovery analysis logically must begin with the progress of the investigation at the time of the government misconduct. This point of departure is fixed by the requirement that an inevitable discovery inquiry focus on demonstrated historical facts so as to keep speculation to an absolute minimum, see Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. at 2509 n. 5, although by its nature inevitable discovery analysis inevitably involves some degree of speculation. The exception requires the district court to determine, viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred. 41 Our initial concern is the possibility that the government's tax evasion investigation was not sufficiently active or developed prior to the search of Eng's safe to support the government's broad claim of inevitable discovery. Only a few months passed from the beginning of Interdonato's investigation until the search of Eng's safe. Many important sources of evidence were not sought out until after the search of Eng's safe, and Interdonato's information prior to the search of the safe was not very detailed or comprehensive in relation to what later was admitted against Eng. The search of the safe provided a great deal of specific financial information about Eng, and only thereafter was the indictment amended to include tax evasion. 42 We have suggested that investigations trigger[ed] or catalyzed by information unlawfully gained become tainted. See United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir.1973); United States v. Cole, 463 F.2d 163, 173-74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942, 93 S.Ct. 238, 34 L.Ed.2d 193 (1972). Similarly, in Pimentel, we took specific note that the audit of the contractor's files was active and ongoing at the time of the government misconduct in that case, and declined to adopt a flexible test allowing the government to meet its burden of proof without showing that an alternate line of investigation [was] being actively sought or pursued at the time of the government misconduct. Pimentel, 810 F.2d at 369. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's observation that: 43 [T]he alternate means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized. If the inevitable discovery exception can be applied only on the basis of the [government's] mere intention to use legal means subsequently, the focus of the inquiry would hardly be on historical fact. 44 United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 n. 10 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056, 107 S.Ct. 932, 93 L.Ed.2d 983 (1987). 45 The government claims that pursuit of most sources deliberately was delayed until after Eng's arrest so as not to alert Eng, and that pre-search subpoenas were issued only when the government was certain that the subpoena recipient would maintain the matter in confidence. However, there is no obvious reason why Bowery Bank, subpoenaed prior to the unlawful search for Eng's personal account records, would have been more likely to maintain confidence than the other commercial banks subpoenaed after Eng's arrest for the same type of records. Moreover, it is not apparent why National Westminster Bank, which was subpoenaed prior to the search for Chinese Moon records but after the search for Eng's personal account records, would have been better able to keep the first subpoena in confidence than the second. It also appears that some weeks passed between the search of the safe and the issuance of some of the subpoenas. Delays of this kind are not fully consistent with the suggestion that the government was informed and ready to move as soon as Eng was arrested and the risk of flight removed. 46 If the evidence demonstrates that an active and ongoing investigation of Eng of the kind we have required was in progress at the time of unlawful search, the district court's next task must be to consider each piece of evidence challenged by Eng and claimed by the government to be admissible under the inevitable discovery exception. The district court must, for each particular piece of evidence, specifically analyze and explain how, if at all, discovery of that piece of evidence would have been more likely than not inevitable absent the search of Eng's safe, see Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509. This task requires the district court to determine what would have happened had the government misconduct never occurred, in light of what the government knew and was pursuing at the moment before the unlawful search, and other relevant facts and circumstances. 47 That a piece of evidence in fact was found after the search of Eng's safe does not necessarily indicate that its discovery was inevitable at the time of the search. Cf. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484, 83 S.Ct. at 415 (rejecting proposition that a search unlawful at its inception may be validated by what it turns up) (citations omitted). Similarly, Interdonato's testimony as to what he would have done or how he would have behaved, while deserving of careful consideration as part of the analysis, is not necessarily conclusive on the question of whether a particular piece of evidence inevitably would have been found through lawful means had Eng's safe never been searched, or even on subsidiary questions such as whether a subpoena would have been issued and what evidence the subpoena would have produced. An objective analysis is required. 48 As we indicated, we are unable fully to consider the issues presented in this case because the specific reasoning behind the district court's belief that every item of challenged evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine is unknown. In this connection, we set forth some of our concerns as they relate to specific assets:
49 Prior to the search of Eng's safe, Interdonato had only the names of the banks at which Eng had personal accounts. The search of the safe provided the account numbers presumably used in Interdonato's post-search subpoenas. An important question is to what extent possession of an account number makes more likely a satisfactory response to a bank subpoena, a point on which Interdonato's testimony appears to be contradictory. We note that Bowery Bank, the only bank subpoenaed for personal account records prior to the search of Eng's safe, returned its subpoena without producing any information.
50 With respect to the customer records of the money orders used by Eng to pay Long Island Savings Bank, the mortgagee of the 134 Gauldy Avenue property, the government's chain of inevitable discovery appears to be as follows: Eng's bank account records showed that Eng was not paying the mortgage from his checking accounts; Interdonato had confidential information prior to the unlawful search that Eng was using money orders to pay many expenses; and therefore discovery of the money orders was inevitable because the government's next step in light of this information would have been to obtain the Long Island Savings Bank's deposit items, presumably by subpoena, which would have turned up the money orders. However, this chain of reasoning presumes that lawful discovery of the bank account records themselves was inevitable, a point which is not all that clear. Additionally, Interdonato's testimony is conflicting as to whether he had information prior to the search of the safe that Eng was using money orders to pay for expenses. 51 Interdonato seems to indicate in his testimony that in order to discover money orders such as those used by Eng to pay Long Island Savings Bank, one must know where and on what date the money orders were deposited after receipt by the payee. The record is unclear as to whether Interdonato possessed, or specifically how he would have acquired, any of this information (if indeed it is important) with respect to the money orders used by Eng to pay Long Island Savings Bank. Indeed, similar questions seem to exist with respect to discovery of all the various money orders admitted against Eng.
52 Interdonato's only pre-search knowledge of the 141 Division Street condo came from a confidential source. It is not clear whether Interdonato would have taken action solely on the basis of his pre-search information, for it appears that this information was not even written down by Interdonato. Only the bank records and the condominium unit number found in the safe confirmed that Eng owned the property in the first instance. Further, if a unit number is required in a title search, then it will be more difficult for the government to establish inevitable discovery of the condominium evidence. Interdonato testified he would have gone to the building and asked which unit belonged to Eng, but it is uncertain whether this method of discovery rests on demonstrated facts capable of ready verification. 53
54 While significant information about the 26 Bowery building was known prior to the unlawful search--Eng's interest in the building (through Bowery Mansion), the selling corporation (26 Bowery Corp.), the name of the seller's attorney (Ronald De Petris) and the names of Eng's attorneys--it was the search of the safe that revealed the names of the owners of 26 Bowery Corp., Sol Leitner and Frieda Grant. The important evidence admitted at trial concerned closing information on the price paid and amount borrowed by Eng to purchase the 26 Bowery building. At least some of the closing information admitted at trial may have been provided only by Leitner and Grant. To the extent that Leitner and Grant were the source of the closing information, inevitable discovery of the evidence in their possession becomes more difficult to prove because their identities were discovered in the search of the safe, and alternate routes to discovery of these parties may be attenuated. 55 Interdonato knew prior to the unlawful search that a series of cashier's checks issued by Hang Seng Bank had been deposited into Chinese Moon's National Westminster Bank account. After the arrest of Eng, Interdonato subpoenaed Hang Seng Bank, and discovered a variety of records admitted at trial showing that these cashier's checks originated from parties in Hong Kong. Subject to the district court's fact finding, this seems to us a convincing showing of inevitable discovery of the records in question. Interdonato had detailed knowledge of fund transfers, rooted in pre-search events, and the only step that remained to discovery was issuance of a subpoena for the types of records Hang Seng Bank probably would produce. 56 It appears that Interdonato first learned of the existence of World Express from the National Westminster Bank checkbook discovered in Eng's safe. After the search, National Westminster Bank was subpoenaed, and a series of cashier's checks and wire transfer deposits into the World Express account discovered. The banks from which the funds originated--Wing Lung Bank, Kwantung Bank, and BCCI--then were subpoenaed, leading to the discovery of additional evidence admitted against Eng. It is possible that discovery of the mere existence of World Express was inevitable. Wang F. Luk, the accountant, and Frank Lam, the attorney, both of whom apparently had some information on World Express, were known to the government prior to the search. However, a case for inevitable discovery of the information produced by Wing Lung Bank, Kwantung Bank, and BCCI would appear to involve a far more attenuated chain of events.
57 The only connection between Interdonato and the Florida properties evident in the record is that provided by the documents found in the safe. Those documents identified the address of the house and Eng's ownership of the boat, apparently facilitating a title search and further subpoenas, all of which led to discovery of the evidence admitted at trial. If our understanding of the record is confirmed by the district court on remand, then it will be difficult for the government to meet its burden of proving inevitable discovery of the Florida properties. The government urges that Interdonato inevitably would have found the boat regardless of the search of the safe, because the Florida house had a marina. This argument is inadequate if the search of the safe revealed to the government for the first time that Eng had a house in Florida, and no other convincing connection to the house can be established.