Opinion ID: 171417
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Although no challenge has been raised, “we have an independent duty to examine our own jurisdiction.” Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Lang v. Lang (In re Lang), 414 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] court’s threshold determination of its jurisdiction is a prerequisite to any judicial action . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). The district court did not determine whether DeWilliams’ motion was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Rule 35(a), as it concluded relief was not warranted in either case. We do not read DeWilliams’ motion as requesting relief under Rule 35(a) because he does not assert the sentencing court made an “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” in calculating his sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Moreover, where a federal prisoner seeks to test the validity of a judgment and sentence, the exclusive remedy is that provided for in § 2255, -3- unless that remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). 2 DeWilliams clearly seeks to test the validity of his judgment and sentence—he requests “after a hearing on the merit(s) an Order be issued amending, or modifying the Judgment and Commitment Order . . . and upon that Mr. DeWilliams be discharged from further custody . . . .” (R. Vol. I, Doc. 41 at 5.) Thus, his motion can be properly characterized as a § 2255 motion. 3 Because this is his second § 2255 motion, DeWilliams had to follow the procedure for the filing of a second or successive habeas petition. Section 2255 provides: A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Section 2244(b)(3)(A), in turn, mandates: “Before a second or successive application . . . is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the 2 The § 2255 remedy is not inadequate or ineffective simply because the prisoner is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion. Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999). 3 A court is not required to give notice before recharacterizing a pleading as a § 2255 motion when it is not the first § 2255 motion. See United States v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2002). -4- appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” DeWilliams did not obtain the required authorization. Without the authorization, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion. See United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A] second or successive § 2255 motion cannot be filed in district court without approval by a panel of this court. As a result, if the prisoner’s pleading must be treated as a second or successive § 2255 motion, the district court does not even have jurisdiction to deny the relief sought in the pleading.”) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has instructed: “When the lower federal court lacks jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.” Bender, 475 U.S. at 541 (quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936)). That is the extent of our jurisdiction here. We DENY DeWilliams’ request for current and past transcripts and his renewed motion to obtain a copy of his 1988 sentencing transcript, which we construe as motions to supplement the record.