Opinion ID: 677469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Prosecutor's Statements Made In Brown I

Text: 17 In Brown I, Darrell Brown, the co-defendant in this case, and a different co-defendant, John Reventas, had been charged with conspiring to make false statements and with making false statements to a federally insured financial institution. As in this case, the charges stemmed from the sale of units at the Seawinds complex, but involved a different scheme. See Brown, 983 F.2d at 205 (discussing differences between scheme in this case and in Brown I ). Brown's defense was based upon his reliance on counsel, DeLoach. Both Brown and Reventas were acquitted in Brown I. 18 Relying on cases from the Second Circuit, United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811-12 (2d Cir.1991), rev'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2503, 120 L.Ed.2d 255 (1992), and United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 27-34 (2d Cir.1984), DeLoach argues that the district court erred when it refused to admit portions of the prosecutor's closing argument in Brown I as admissions by a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7 DeLoach claims that the prosecutor's statements in Brown I contained assertions of fact which were inconsistent with the allegations made by the Government in this case. 19 Only the Second Circuit has squarely addressed this issue. In McKeon, the court said that opening statements of a defendant's attorney in a criminal case are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) where they are: 1) assertions of fact that are the equivalent of a testimonial statement by the [client]; and 2) inconsistent with similar assertions in a subsequent trial. McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33; see Salerno, 937 F.2d at 811 (citing McKeon in dicta, indicating that statements meeting these requirements made by prosecutor during summation in prior, related case are admissible). The McKeon court also said that, [s]peculations of counsel, advocacy as to the credibility of witnesses, arguments as to the weaknesses in the prosecution's case or invitations to a jury to draw certain inferences should not be admitted. McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33 (emphasis added). Thus, in the Second Circuit an attorney's arguments may be admissible, but admissibility is tightly circumscribed. 20 The Government contends that a review of the prosecutor's comments that DeLoach sought to admit establishes that they failed to meet the requirements set out in McKeon and Salerno because the comments were neither statements of fact nor inconsistent with the Government's position in the present case. We agree. 21 The prosecutor's comments from Brown I at issue in this case are: 1) [A] reasonable inference could be drawn from that particular incident back at Biscayne Federal is DeLoach told them if you tell the bank it is okay; and 2) Mr. Brown himself admitted, Guy DeLoach did not advise him not to tell the bank. We note incidentally that these statements were made by the prosecutor during closing argument, not during opening statements in which lawyers are, in a sense, prohibited from arguing. In addition, the Brown I prosecutor was engaged in advocacy as to the credibility of witnesses and inviting the jury to draw certain inferences, two circumstances under which McKeon expressly stated a lawyer's comments would not be admissible. McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33. Also, the prosecutor's comments in Brown I were not clearly inconsistent with the evidence presented at DeLoach's trial. To say that DeLoach did not affirmatively advise Brown to lie to the savings and loans, does not mean that both DeLoach and Brown did not, in fact, conspire to lie and, later, lie to the savings and loans. 22 The comments of the prosecutor were neither statements of fact equivalent to a testimonial statement by the client nor clearly inconsistent with the Government's position in this case. See Salerno, 937 F.2d at 811; McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33. We conclude that the comments by the prosecutor in Brown I would be inadmissible as admissions of a party opponent even under the cases relied upon by DeLoach. So, we also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the admission of the prosecutor's comments from Brown I.