Opinion ID: 1572689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: secretary's cross-appeal

Text: Section 32-1409(1) reads, in relevant part: The signature and address shall be presumed to be valid only if the election commissioner or county clerk finds the printed name, street and number or voting precinct, and city, village, or post office address to match the registration records and that the registration was received on or before the date on which the petition was required to be filed with the Secretary of State. The finding of the election commissioner or county clerk may be rebutted by any credible evidence which the Secretary of State finds sufficient. Concluding that the foregoing statute hindered rather than facilitated the initiative process, the district court ruled that it violates Neb. Const. art. III, § 4, which provides that [t]he provisions with respect to the initiative ... shall be self-executing, but legislation may be enacted to facilitate their operation. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 32-1412 (Cum.Supp.1996) provides that if the secretary refuses to place on the ballot any measure proposed by an initiative petition, any resident may apply to the district court for Lancaster County for a writ of mandamus. In Duggan v. Beermann, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68 (1996), we explicitly held under a prior codification of § 32-1412, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 32-704(2) (Reissue 1993), that a prayer for injunctive relief based on the legal insufficiency of the initiative petition could be joined with a prayer for declaratory relief based on the unconstitutionality of the ballot measure. See, also, Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788 (1994) (permitted without analysis or comment joining of prayer for injunctive relief based on insufficiency of signatures with prayer for declaration that measure unconstitutional). However, in both of those cases, it was the constitutionality of the ballot measure which was at issue. Thus, there was no inconsistency in questioning the means by which the measure came to be on the ballot and questioning as well the constitutional validity of the measure. Here, it is the constitutionality of § 32-1409(1) which is at issue, the very statute under which the committee sought to rehabilitate the signatures which had been rejected. It is axiomatic that a litigant who invokes the provisions of a statute may not challenge its validity or seek the benefit of such statute and in the same action and at the same time question its constitutionality. State ex rel. Sileven v. Spire, 243 Neb. 451, 500 N.W.2d 179 (1993); In re Dissolution of School Dist. No. 22, 216 Neb. 89, 341 N.W.2d 918 (1983). Accordingly, the relator cannot challenge the constitutionality of § 32-1409(1), as it is the statute invoked in an effort to persuade the secretary to rehabilitate signatures which had been rejected. For that reason, the district court erred in considering the constitutionality of § 32-1409(1), and its pronouncements in that regard are a nullity.