Opinion ID: 424713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: procedural deficiencies

Text: 19 At oral argument the suggestion was made that the proper course for us would be to abstain until the Indiana courts have had an opportunity to construe the procedural aspects of the notification statute. We disagree. 20 In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., the Supreme Court refused to abstain until the state courts had interpreted the challenged ordinance. The Court said that [i]t is reasonable to assume ... that a state court presented with a state statute specifically governing abortion consent procedures for pregnant minors will attempt to construe the statute consistently with constitutional requirements. 103 S.Ct. at 2498 (emphasis added). The Court held that abstention was not appropriate in that case because the ordinance creates no procedures for making the necessary determinations. Id. 4 21 Here we are faced with a statute that is as silent about many of the bypass procedures as the Akron ordinance was. The statute makes no reference to expedited appeals or appeals of any kind, appointment of counsel, or the extent of the protective measures the juvenile court may take after denying a minor's request for waiver. In addition, we are concerned that a substantial period of time will elapse before a state record of interpretations of the statute will be developed, 5 deterring in the meantime many minors from seeking waiver of parental notification. Accordingly, we decline to abstain.
22 In the plurality opinion of Bellotti II, Justice Powell stated that a state must assign the procedure for determining whether a minor is mature to an independent decisionmaker, which could either be a court or a nonjudicial alternative such as an administrative agency or officer. 443 U.S. at 643 & n. 22, 99 S.Ct. at 3048 & n. 22 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). The appellants contend that the statute impermissibly requires a mature minor to go to court to avoid notification because, they say, it would be less burdensome on the abortion right to delegate the maturity determination to the minor's physician. 23 Although such a procedure would be simpler, quicker, and undoubtedly less distressing for a minor than requiring her to go to court, Indiana was not constitutionally required to provide the least burdensome alternative to notification. The plurality in Bellotti II said that a state could choose to employ a nonjudicial decisionmaker, 6 but it was not required to do so. In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, the Court upheld a state statute that provided for a judicial determination of maturity. 103 S.Ct. at 2526 (opinion of Powell, J.). In light of the Court's holding that a judicial determination of maturity is constitutional, we cannot hold that the Indiana statute is unconstitutional for having delegated the maturity determination to a court.
24 The statute provides that [n]otice under this section shall be waived by the juvenile court if the court finds that the minor is mature enough to make the abortion decision independently or that notification would not be in the minor's best interests. The appellants contend that this provision is unconstitutional because it allegedly allows the juvenile court to deny waiver of notice for a concededly mature minor if the court finds that notice would be in the child's best interests. 25 The state disputes this interpretation, contending that the statute provides that a court can waive notification even if the minor is found to be immature if the notification would not be in the minor's best interests. The state says that the juvenile court may not deny waiver for a mature minor on the basis that notification would be in the minor's best interests. 26 We note, first, the requirement that, [w]here fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2526 (opinion of Powell, J.). If the statute did provide what the appellants contend it does, it would be unconstitutional. [T]he State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests. City of Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2498 (emphasis added). 27 We are persuaded that the appellants' interpretation of the statute is simply incorrect. The words or that notification would not be in the minor's best interests are a grant of authority to the juvenile court to waive notification despite the minor's immaturity if it is in the minor's best interests not to notify the parents. The statute does not--and constitutionally cannot--give the juvenile court the authority to refuse to waive notification despite a finding that the minor is mature. For us to interpret the language as the appellants suggest would be to go out of our way to find an unconstitutional construction of the statute.
28 Section 35-1-58.5-2.5(d) provides that the juvenile court must rule on a petition for waiver within forty-eight hours of the filing of the petition. It specifies no procedures for appellate review of an adverse decision. The district court held that the statute's failure to make explicit provision for expedited appeal did not render the statute constitutionally deficient because, it said, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure provide guidelines for appeals. 29 A judicial alternative to parental notice or consent must 'assure' that the resolution of this issue 'will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.'  Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)). Thus a parental notification statute that did not provide for prompt resolution of the waiver petition would be unconstitutional. 7 30 The Supreme Court recently discussed the necessary specificity of procedures a judicial bypass statute must have in order to be constitutionally sufficient. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., the Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling that the challenged ordinance impermissibly failed to specify the procedures for determining whether a minor's abortion decision was informed. The Court noted that the ordinance, which required a minor to obtain a court order permitting an abortion in lieu of parental consent, creates no procedures for making the necessary determinations. 103 S.Ct. at 2498. Nor was it sufficient for the city to assert that the juvenile courts in Ohio might find that they had jurisdiction to make the necessary determinations. Id. at 2498 & n. 31. 31 On the same day, the Court in Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft upheld a Missouri statute requiring parental consent or judicial approval of a minor's decision to have an abortion. Unlike the Akron ordinance, the Missouri statute required an appeal from an adverse decision to be perfected within five days from the filing of the notice of appeal. In addition, the statute directed the state supreme court to promulgate rules to provide expedited appellate review of such cases. Justice Powell concluded that this section provides the framework for a constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.). 32 The Indiana statute is far more analogous to the ordinance in City of Akron than to the statute in Ashcroft. Unlike the Missouri statute, section 35-1-58.5-2.5 does not even mention appeals, much less specifying the time in which they must be perfected or directing the Indiana Supreme Court to promulgate rules governing expedited appellate review. 33 The state contends, however, that expedited consideration is assured because Rule 62(D)(1) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and Rule 6(B) of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure allow the appellate court to issue a stay of the trial court's decision in an emergency. Even assuming such stays are generally available in emergencies, we do not understand in what way a stay of a denial of a waiver petition would ensure expedited consideration of the appeal. The statute requires court approval of waiver, so staying the juvenile court's denial of waiver would still leave the minor unable to have an abortion without parental notification. A stay of the denial would not be equivalent to finding that the minor was mature or that an abortion would be in her best interests. 8 We conclude that the two cited rules are irrelevant to ensuring an expedited appeal of a denial of waiver. 34 The state also contends that other Appellate Rules would allow expedited appeals from the denial of waiver petitions. The appellees state that Rule 4(A)(10) allows an appeal filed with the court of appeals to be transferred to the Indiana Supreme Court if an emergency exists. This is inaccurate. The rule provides that a transfer is possible if the appellant makes a showing, under oath, that the appeal involves a substantial question of law of great public importance and that an emergency exists for a speedy determination (emphasis added). It is doubtful that an appeal from the denial of waiver would be deemed to involve a substantial question of law of great public importance, because the determination of maturity is largely an issue of fact and concerns only the minor, the parents, and the abortion providers. Also, the transfer is discretionary. 35 As the sole other statutory citation to support its contention that the Indiana courts will expedite appeals in these cases, the state cites Appellate Rule 4(F). The state says that the rule allows for expedition of an appeal where it involves matters of general public concern. In fact, however, the rule provides that [matters] of general public concern may ... be advanced by order of the court after they are fully briefed. 36 There are several difficulties with the application of this rule to expedited appeals in abortion cases. First, expedition is discretionary with the court, as shown by the use of the phrase may ... be advanced. Second, it is doubtful that a case involving waiver of notification is a matter of general public concern, because, as noted above, only the minor, the parents, and the abortion provider have an interest in the case. 9 For reasons of confidentiality, the public is not even supposed to know the identity of the minor. Third, the reference to full briefing suggests that the rule is inadequate for appeals by minors. For a minor without counsel, the requirement of full briefing would be an insuperable bar because minors are untrained in the law and would be extremely unlikely to have any idea of how to brief their cases. Even for minors with counsel, the requirement suggests delay in a situation in which a rapid resolution is required. 37 Finally, the state cites the unreported case of In re Infant Doe to show that Indiana courts allow expedited appeals in emergencies. The state says that in that case a child was born on Friday; a judge heard the case on Saturday, issued an order that night, and a written opinion on Monday. On Wednesday, the Indiana Supreme Court heard and decided the case. 38 We are not reassured by the state's citation of this case. In re Infant Doe is unreported and all of the decisions and orders have been sealed. The state does not even inform us as to the subject matter of the case. 10 That the Indiana courts gave expedited consideration to one case does not mean that, as a matter of course, abortion notification waiver appeals will be treated in a similar fashion. 39 For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in holding that the statute was sufficiently specific about expedited appeals. As noted, a waiver statute must assure expeditious consideration of appeals. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644, 99 S.Ct. at 3048 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). If the statute had specified the procedure for appeals or at least directed the Indiana Supreme Court to promulgate rules governing expedited appeals, we would be satisfied. See Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.). As it is, however, the only assurance we have that Indiana courts will expedite appeals is the state's assertion that they will, yet we do not understand how, in the absence of legislation, the state has control over how the courts manage their dockets.
40 The appellants contend that the statute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide for any court-appointed counsel to a minor seeking waiver of parental notification. The statute makes no mention of counsel, but section 31-6-7-2(a) of the Indiana Code provides that the juvenile court may appoint counsel to represent any child at any ... proceeding. The district court held that appointment of counsel was a matter for the sound discretion of the juvenile court and said that it could not be assumed that the court would abuse its discretion. 41 On the one hand, due process generally does not require that a state provide a civil litigant with counsel. The state only must give a litigant the opportunity to retain counsel. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has said that the judicial bypass procedure must provide  'an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained'  by qualified minors. Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added) (quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644, 99 S.Ct. at 3048 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)). In addition, the provisions of a notice or consent statute [must] not unduly burden the right to seek an abortion. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640, 99 S.Ct. at 3046 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). 42 The Court also has stressed the unique nature of the abortion decision, Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642, 99 S.Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.), and noted that there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible, id. As a result of this, the Court has held that a state can impose a consent or notification requirement upon minors only if it allows them an opportunity to try to show that they are emancipated or mature or that, even if immature, consent or notification would not be in their best interests. A state does not extend minors the privilege of going before an independent decisionmaker to determine maturity; rather, minors have a right to try to establish their maturity. 43 The question we must address, then, is whether, considering the uniqueness of the abortion decision, the grave and indelible effect of denying the minor's right to make the decision, the need to preserve the constitutional right, id., and the legal and social status of minors, a minor needs appointed counsel in order to have an effective opportunity to pursue her right to seek a judicial bypass of the notification requirement. 44 We note, first, that as a practical matter the choice for most minors will be between having a court-appointed attorney or no attorney at all. The more under age eighteen a minor is, the less likely it is that the minor will have enough money of her own to be able to hire an attorney to represent her at the waiver hearing. Naturally, a minor seeking to avoid parental notification will not feel free to ask her parents to pay for her attorney. 45 Furthermore, it is a reasonable conclusion that the few minors who do have sufficient independent funds with which to employ an attorney will be without any experience enabling them to hire the representation that they would need in this delicate situation. The minor certainly would not desire to seek the help of the family lawyer. One who was determined enough to walk into the office of an unknown lawyer would have no assurance that she would not be attempting to retain a counsel who had strongly held religious or moral beliefs about the wrongfulness of abortion. Presumably such an attorney would not accept the representation, thus causing further delay, and we would certainly expect an attorney who held such beliefs not to accept a court appointment. Even adults, it must be recognized, who have had no prior need for the services of a lawyer, often display an ineptness in securing a lawyer to represent adequately their particular interests. 46 Second, there is an obvious need for a minor to have some help in determining how to go about presenting her case. If the waiver procedure set forth in section 35-1-58.5-2.5 simply involved speaking to the judge in order to demonstrate maturity, counsel might not seem essential. But no legal proceeding is that simple. A minor, completely untrained in the law, needs legal advice to help her understand how to prepare her case, what papers to file, and how to appeal if necessary. 11 Requiring an indigent minor to handle her case all alone is to risk deterring many minors from pursuing their rights because they are unable to understand how to navigate the complicated court system on their own or because they are too intimidated by the seeming complexity to try. 47 Third, the nature of these cases is such that one cannot assume that attorneys will volunteer to represent minors at the hearings even for clearly meritorious cases. First, an attorney has no financial incentive to take a case on a contingent fee basis because the minor seeks no money damages from anyone. Second, there is no provision in Indiana juvenile law for a prevailing party to be awarded attorney's fees to compensate for the lack of a money judgment in its favor. 48 The state recognizes the validity of these concerns by agreeing that indigent minors need appointed counsel. Indeed, it concedes that [t]here can be no doubt that in a case dealing with the abortion decision, refusal to assign counsel to an indigent minor would be reversible error. 49 Although we are impressed with the state's candor, we do not believe that this concession solves the problem. Our concern is that, because the statute itself makes no reference to appointment of counsel, the state's concession would not be binding on the juvenile courts. Because section 31-6-7-2(a) makes the appointment of counsel discretionary with the juvenile court, a judge could rely on that discretion to deny counsel to a minor regardless of what the state thinks. A minor could appeal from a judge's decision denying counsel in her case, but the delay resulting from resolution of this side issue might well result in the birth of the baby by the time the issue was resolved. Although we do not assume that the juvenile court will abuse its discretion, we cannot be unmindful that the consequences of an abuse of discretion could result in a mature minor's loss of her right both to have counsel and to have an abortion. 50 Accordingly, we hold that the statute impermissibly fails to provide for the appointment of counsel to minors. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1389 & n. 28 (7th Cir.1978) (faulting an Illinois consent statute for failing to provide for the appointment of counsel in waiver proceedings). We believe that this result is necessary to ensure that the waiver hearing becomes an effective opportunity for the minor to obtain an abortion upon the proper showing. We do not believe that the requirement of counsel will be a significant burden on the bar: most cases will be necessarily short, and most work will be routine and will consist of guiding the minor through the necessary steps in making her case and appealing. 51 We note that the juvenile court will necessarily be limited in its determination of whether a minor is indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel. As noted above, few minors will have enough independent money to afford counsel, even if their parents are wealthy. Those minors would qualify as indigent because, as far as their access to money is concerned, they are indigent. It would of course be inappropriate for the court to seek payment from the parents of the minor, because such indirect notice of the child's petition would be unconstitutional. See City of Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2498 n. 31. Indeed, the Indiana Code allows the court to waive parental payment where [j]ustice would not be served by ordering payment in juvenile court proceedings. Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 31-6-4-18(b)(3) (Burns Supp.1982).
52 The statute provides that any records made as a result of the waiver proceedings are subject to the rules of confidentiality provided in section 31-6-8 of the Indiana Code. The appellants object to the application of section 31-6-8-1(d) to waiver petition records. That section provides that [t]he juvenile court may grant any person providing services to the child or his family access to the records on the child and his family. The appellants say that any person includes parents and that therefore the statute inadequately protects confidentiality. 53 It would be unconstitutional for the juvenile court to allow parents to obtain indirect notice of the waiver petition under this subsection. See City of Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2498 n. 31. We agree with the state, however, that any person providing services to the child does not include a parent. Services is used in the technical sense of court-authorized aid to a child in need of services as defined by section 31-6-4-3. Any person providing services thus refers to service providers such as social workers, not parents. 12
54 The appellants challenge the statute on the grounds that it does not define emancipated, actual notice, constructive notice, or immediate threat and grave risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman. We hold that the language is sufficiently well defined. 55 We conclude that emancipation is not impermissibly vague. The term is one of general usage and understanding in Indiana. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Brokaw, 398 N.E.2d 1385, 1388 (Ind.App.1980) (relevant factors include whether the minor lives at home and whether the parents provide his or her food, transportation, college tuition, and medical expenses). Cf. Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 18 (opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that emancipation was not vague as used in Missouri consent statute). 56 Similarly, we believe that actual notice is sufficiently defined under Indiana law. In Wienke v. Lynch, 407 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind.App.1980), the court held that actual notice was notice that has been directly and personally given to the person to be notified, which the court went on to say encompassed all degrees and grades of evidence of notice. This definition would undoubtedly include telephoned notice to parents, rather than requiring any in-person notice, because telephoning is both personal and direct. 57 The statute defines constructive notice as certified mail to the last known address of one of the parents. Contrary to the appellants' contention, the statute is clear that, if no acknowledgement is received from a parent in response to the mailing within forty-eight hours from the time of posting, the abortion may be performed. 58 The reference to immediate threat and grave risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman is not vague. Rather, this allows a physician to use a medical judgment as to the necessity for the abortion, a judgment that would be questioned only if the physician did not believe there was a health danger.H. Criminal Sanctions 59 The statute provides that a physician may perform an abortion without parental notification on an emancipated minor. Court determination of emancipation is unnecessary. The appellants contend that the statute will deter physicians from performing abortions upon minors because it requires physicians to make a difficult legal determination under penalty of being charged with a felony if they make the wrong determination. 60 We are not persuaded that the requirement that the physician determine whether the minor is emancipated is made impermissible by virtue of the criminal penalty. Section 35-1-58.5-4 of the Indiana Code provides that [i]t is a class C felony for a person knowingly or intentionally to perform an abortion not expressly provided for in this chapter. Knowingly is defined as being aware of a high probability that one is engaging in the proscribed conduct. Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 35-41-2-2(b) (Burns 1979). 61 Although a physician cannot be expected to learn the details of a minor's life before performing an abortion, the statute does not require him to do so. If the physician actually believes that the minor is emancipated, or at least is not aware that there is a high probability that she is not, or if he does not discover, prior to performing the abortion, that she is not telling the truth, liability will not attach. 62 Furthermore, a minor's right to avoid notification if she is emancipated is not precluded even if the doctor decides she is not emancipated. The minor can always establish emancipation at the court proceeding. A minor who is emancipated is necessarily mature enough to avoid notifying her parents. Also, a physician can protect himself by requiring that the court determine emancipation. 63 As to the appellants' contention that the criminal penalty is unconstitutional because it provides no protection to a doctor falsely accused by a minor of knowing that she was not emancipated, our response is that this would be an unfortunate occurrence but not an unconstitutional one. The physician would be in the same position as any other person wrongly accused of a crime. If the minor and the doctor did conspire to send notice to the wrong address, for example, then of course the doctor would be liable.