Opinion ID: 864414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether counsel was

Text: CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE. 6 ¶18. The standard for determining if a defendant received effective assistance of counsel is well settled. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468, 477 (Miss. 1984) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id.; Burns v. State, 813 So. 2d 668, 673 (Miss. 2001). We have further held that the failure to present a case in mitigation during the sentencing phase of a capital trial is not, per se, ineffective assistance of counsel. McGilberry v. State, 843 So. 2d 21, 30 (Miss. 2003). Williams v. State, 722 So. 2d 447, 450 (Miss. 1998) (citing Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 1997)). A. Failure to Prosecute a Motion for Change of Venue ¶19. Jones complains that trial counsel filed a motion for change of venue but neither attached any affidavits thereto nor requested a hearing thereon. The motion was based on the inflammatory nature of the case, the small population of the community of Rolling Fork and Sharkey County, Mississippi, and the pre-trial publicity . . . . As a result, the Court was required to rule on the Motion based on responses from the jury pool qualified during the voir dire process at the beginning of the trial. If a separate hearing had been held, numerous witnesses could have been summoned to justify a change of venue. ¶20. The circuit court denied the motion for change of venue after voir dire had taken place. It stated: 7 The Court, after sampling the vernary [sic] that was called was satisfied that there are sufficient jurors who do not know, and if they do or are aware of him, do under oath state to the Court that they could be fair and impartial to both the State and the Defense. Also the Court will note that there are 42 jurors of which 15 of those jurors are White, the remainder being Black. The population of Sharkey County is approximately 66 or 65 percent Black and 35 to 40 percent White and that works out [to] be about 38 percent of the jurors are White which is a good cross section that reflects the racial makeup of the county. The Court is satisfied that the jurors that are here can fairly try this case and the answers given to the court satisfied the Court that they could (1) do not have an intimate relationship with any of the parties concerned being the Defendant or the alleged victim in this case; and (2) that it is a fair cross section of the community in terms of demographics and therefore the Court will deny the Motion for Change of Venue. Jones has not presented any evidence that the circuit court's ruling was erroneous. Therefore, as far as the motion for change of venue pertained to the small population of Sharkey County, Jones's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. ¶21. The circuit court did not address pretrial publicity in its ruling. To determine whether a change in venue should have been granted an appellate court looks to the level of pretrial publicity and prejudicial nature of the coverage. Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 336 (Miss. 1997). See also Hickson v. State, 707 So. 2d 536, 542 (Miss. 1997); Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 215 (Miss. 1985). ¶22. Jones presents no evidence of the alleged pretrial publicity; therefore, his claim must fail. Davis v. State, 743 So. 2d 326, 341 (Miss. 1999). B. Failure to Object to Admission of .22 Revolver ¶23. Because Jones's objection to Sheriff Cartlidge's introduction of the .22 into evidence is without merit, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue is likewise without merit. C. Failure to Object to Improper Closing Argument 8 ¶24. Because Jones's objection to the State's remarks during closing argument is without merit, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue is likewise without merit. D. Failure to Submit Adequate Jury Instructions. ¶25. Jones contends that the instructions offered by defense counsel were inadequate and did not properly instruct the jury on his defense theory of suicide. He cites the proposition that a defendant is entitled to have the jury properly instructed as to the defendant's theory of his defense so long as there is some reasonable credible evidence in the record to support it. Gibson v. State, 731 So. 2d 1087 (Miss. 1998); Underwood v. State, 708 So. 2d 18 (Miss. 1998); Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383 (Miss. 1989). ¶26. The record shows that the jury was properly instructed that the State had the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. The instructions also charged the jury that they were to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and that unless the State met its burden of proof, they were to find Jones not guilty. ¶27. The jury was further instructed that if there is a material fact or a material circumstance in this case susceptible to two interpretations, one favorable and the other unfavorable to David Allen Jones when the jury has considered such fact and circumstance with all the other evidence, if there is a reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation you the jury must resolve such doubt in the favor of David Allen Jones and place upon such material fact or material circumstance the interpretation most favorable to him. ¶28. As stated above, Jones's defense was that he did not shoot Pam, and he argues that the State did not prove that he shot Pam. This theory was adequately before the jury via the burden of proof instruction given, i.e., that the State must prove every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that the State must prove that Jones murdered Pam to the exclusion of every other reasonable 9 hypothesis consistent with innocence, including suicide. The jury, by finding Jones guilty of murder, found that suicide was not a reasonable hypothesis. ¶29. Jones has not shown that the outcome of the trial would have been different if an instruction on his suicide theory had been given to the jury. The evidence allegedly supporting his theory was clearly before the jury, and it rejected that theory. There is no reasonable probability that a jury would have failed to convict Jones if a suicide instruction had been granted. See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 708 So. 2d 884, 887 (Miss. 1998). This claim is without merit.