Opinion ID: 886878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues

Text: ¶32 2. Did the District Court err when it granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that Hinkles' expert did not establish causation? ¶33 Even though a particular injury need not be foreseeable in the duty context, Hinkles still must prove the causation element of their negligence claimi.e., that the claimed injury was caused by Defendants' conduct. Hinkles argue that the District Court erred when it concluded that Hinkles' expert did not establish that Defendants' actions caused Rocky's injuries. In its Order and Memorandum, the District Court indicated it was unable to determine from the pleadings the chain of causation upon which Hinkles relied. We likewise are unable to determine if Hinkles allege that Defendants caused Rocky to develop diabetes, or simply that their conduct accelerated or exacerbated a nascent medical condition, and whether this occurred because of the initial bus incident or because of the series of events which followed the bus incident. A further question is whether Hinkles allege that Rocky's PTSD resulted from the bus incident or the bus incident aftermath, or perhaps came about as a result of the stress he experienced from his traumatic and life-threatening bout of ketoacidosis, or from his having to deal with the stress of managing his diabetes, or some combination thereof. Unfortunately for Hinkles, this difficulty in framing the causation paradigm pervades not only the pleadings in this case, but also the medical evidence. ¶34 In its Order and Memorandum, the District Court concluded that expert testimony would be required for Hinkles to establish a causal connection between the alleged negligence of Defendants and Rocky's injuries. The District Court further concluded that, according to his deposition testimony, Dr. Gunville could not say that it was more likely than not that Rocky's ketoacidosis, Type I diabetes, or PTSD were a result of the actions of Defendants during the bus incident or its aftermath. ¶35 Hinkles' ability to establish causation hinges on the testimony of their expert witness Dr. Gunville. Rule 702, M.R.Evid., provides, If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. We have held that expert testimony is required when the issue presented is sufficiently beyond the common experience of the trier of fact and the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact in determining the issue or understanding the evidence. Dayberry v. City of E. Helena, 2003 MT 321, ¶ 17, 318 Mont. 301, ¶ 17, 80 P.3d 1218, ¶ 17. Here, Hinkles do not dispute that the development of ketoacidosis, Type I diabetes, and PTSD is beyond the common experience and understanding of the trier of fact. ¶36 A medical expert's opinion is admissible if it is based on an opinion that it is more likely than not that the alleged wrongdoing caused the plaintiff's injury. Butler v. Domin, 2000 MT 312, ¶ 13, 302 Mont. 452, ¶ 13, 15 P.3d 1189, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). In Butler, we concluded that the district court correctly excluded the testimony of a medical expert who testified in his deposition that a particular injection could have caused the plaintiff's injury. Butler, ¶ 15. ¶37 Hinkles point to a portion of Dr. Gunville's deposition, in which he testifies, [I]f Rocky suffered emotional distress, I canI would never say that it did not cause harm to him. If he suffered emotional distress, I would have to say, as certain as anyone could state, that it would definitely cause harm. In their brief, Hinkles argue, Dr. Gunville will testify that the stress could have accelerated the onset of, or agitated, Rocky's medical condition and at least caused Rocky harm. (Emphasis added.) ¶38 Hinkles' own argument concedes that Dr. Gunville's testimony would be that the stress could have had something to do with Rocky's medical condition. It could have accelerated or agitated it. As we held in Butler, this does not meet the threshold of establishing that Defendants' actions more likely than not caused the injuries claimed. Hinkles argue that the jury should be given the opportunity to hear expert testimony from both sides and be allowed to weigh the credibility of that testimony and draw its own conclusions. However, in order to survive summary judgment, Hinkles must first present expert testimony that establishes a causal connection between Defendants' actions and Rocky's injuries. Dayberry, ¶ 17. We conclude they simply have not done so in this case. ¶39 Thus, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the grounds that Hinkles cannot prove the element of causation.