Opinion ID: 1922714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Hughes's sentence is unconstitutional because it punished Hughes for exercising his right to trial and was disproportionate to his role in the crime.

Text: ¶ 54. Errors related to improper sentencing are procedurally barred if no objection is made at trial. Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847, 857 (Miss.2006) (citing Cox v. State, 793 So.2d 591, 599 (Miss. 2001)). Because no objection was raised at trial, this issue is procedurally barred on appeal. ¶ 55. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this Court will not ordinarily review a sentence if it is within the statutory limits. [10] Hersick v. State, 904 So.2d 116, 128 (Miss. 2004) (quoting King v. State, 857 So.2d 702, 731 (Miss.2003)); Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 784, 797 (Miss.1995); Reynolds v. State, 585 So.2d 753, 756 (Miss.1991). However, a trial court may not impose a heavier sentence because the defendant exercised his right to a trial by jury than that which the defendant was offered in the plea bargaining process. Johnson, 666 So.2d at 797 (citing Temple v. State, 498 So.2d 379, 381 (Miss.1986)). A sentence must be based only on legitimate factors. Id. (citing Fermo v. State, 370 So.2d 930, 932-33 (Miss.1979)). ¶ 56. Hughes claims that his sentence unconstitutionally punished him for exercising his right to trial. Hughes points to the following comments made by the trial judge during the sentencing phase of the trial: There has been another request for leniency, of mercy in this case. You know, when you are offered leniency and mercy, sometimes you have got to pick it up. And Mr. Hughes was offered a sentence of ten years on aggravated assault, which would have been with the possibility of parole. The most he would have had to serve would have probably been 85 percent of that. That is eight and a half years, and after discussions with his father and everybody, the other people involved in this thing, he decided he didn't want that. He wanted to take his chances and go to trial. And of course, when he did, the jury found that he was just as culpable as Mr. Webster. And by doing that, by taking that gamble, he, unlike Mr. Webster, is now convicted of three charges. Well, not only did he get that offer of leniency, he got one extended one to him that he didn't even ask for. The state and the victims in this case agreed for this matter to not go to the jury on sentencing on the armed robbery and left it up to me. Again, had it gone to that jury, my observation is that he would have been, they would have sentenced him to life without parole. And so he is not going to get that, and so he has received leniency on two occasions, one of which he picked up and one he didn't ask for and got. So it's a bad situation for everybody involved in this. But one of the things people in this country are entitled to, they are entitled to be at their house and be left alone. They are entitled to folks not to come to their house in the middle of the night and shoot them and rob them, and when people do that to other people, then they have to get what they deserve. Mr. Hughes, you weren't the shooter. I'm going to give you some, some slight benefit for that but not much. The jury found that you should get as much as the other, as Mr. Webster. Therefore, on the armed robbery, I sentence you to thirty (30) years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On the two aggravated assault charges, I sentence you to twenty (20) years each and order that those sentences run concurrent with the armed robbery charge. ¶ 57. We find that Hughes was not given a heavier sentence because he exercised his right to trial. The trial judge's comments pertaining to Hughes's plea negotiations are best described as the trial court's disposition of Hughes's post-conviction request for leniency. In sentencing Hughes, the trial judge's concern was the nature of the offense and Hughes's role in the crime. Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the trial judge was made aware of Hughes's former plea negotiations until the sentencing phase of the trial. See Edwards v. State, 800 So.2d 454, 471 (Miss.2001) (no error in imposing a greater sentence than that offered in the plea bargaining process where the trial judge remained aloof or unaware of former plea negotiations until the sentencing phase of the trial). ¶ 58. Furthermore, an aider and abetter is considered to be as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Rubenstein, 941 So.2d at 773 n. 18 (citing King, 857 So.2d at 739). In light of the violent nature of these crimes, we find no support for an inference of gross disproportionality, particularly considering that armed robbery carries a potential life sentence. Mingo v. State, 944 So.2d 18, 34 (Miss.2006) (citing Nichols v. State, 826 So.2d 1288, 1290 (Miss.2002) (This Court employs the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis only when a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of `gross disproportionality.')).