Opinion ID: 173320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to Bender on Willis' Battery/ Informed Consent Claim

Text: The district court granted summary judgment to Bender on the battery claim. It first concluded that claim was more appropriately analyzed under the law of negligence, specifically the informed consent doctrine. The court determined that while Wyoming's informed consent law imposes a duty upon a doctor to disclose the specific risks associated with a medical procedure or treatment, it did not impose a duty on the physician to disclose the details about his own background or experience, even if the patient asks for this information. Therefore, it held an informed consent claim based on a physician lying to a patient in response to direct questions is only actionable where the information allegedly misrepresented would otherwise fall under the scope of required disclosure, i.e., the specific risks associated with a medical treatment or procedure. It reasoned: In insisting that the duty of disclosure be tied to the intended purpose of the informed consent doctrine, this Court does not mean to suggest that lying to patients is without the potential for legal liability. Instead, this decision merely recognizes the limitations of the informed consent doctrine as a catch all cause of action. Because there are more appropriate causes of action for asserting [a] physician's ineptitude or deceit, this Court cannot allow an impermissible expansion of the doctrine of informed consent in order to provide what would often be a redundant cause of action. There is simply no support for doing so under Wyoming law. (R. Appellant's App. Vol. I at 244 (citations omitted).) The court did not, however, suggest a more appropriate cause of action. The court was also concerned that allowing an informed consent claim based on a physician lying to a patient in response to questions concerning his experience and track record, licensure problems and litigation history would have the practical effect of bringing before the jury the type of `prior bad act' evidence that would normally be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): A claim framed in this manner would require mini-malpractice trials within the underlying action for the purposes of proving that the physician's lack of skill (as evidenced by prior meritorious lawsuits, claims, or prior acts [of] surgical negligence) increased the risk to the patient of undergoing the surgery such that it should have been disclosed as part of the process of securing the patient's informed consent. (R. Appellant's App. Vol. I at 244-45.) Even assuming an informed consent claim could be made under these circumstances, the court concluded the claim failed because there was no expert testimony demonstrating proximate cause. While Willis may have provided expert testimony establishing Bender's alleged misrepresentations in response to her direct questions breached the standard of care, she had failed to present expert testimony showing the withheld information increased the risks such that a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would not have consented to the procedure had disclosure been made.