Opinion ID: 1449523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: relevance of prior sexual conduct

Text: According to ER 401, relevant evidence is defined as follows: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Former RCW 9.79.150(2) begins by making evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior inadmissible on the issue of the victim's credibility. That provision goes on to state that such evidence is inadmissible to prove the victim's consent unless the procedures of former RCW 9.79.150(3) are followed. [2] At the very outset, then, credibility is ruled out altogether as the basis for introducing past sexual conduct and consent is made a suspect justification for the introduction of such evidence. At least one law review article has charged that Washington's rape shield law conflicts with common law rules of impeachment and cannot be squared with the accused's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544, 581 n. 179, 582 n. 180 (1980). The above characterization of Washington's rape shield statute is wrong for at least two reasons. First, the prohibition of sexual conduct evidence is directed at the use of such evidence for impeaching the victim's general credibility for truth and veracity. The old common law rule apparently recognized a woman's promiscuity somehow had an effect on her character and ability to relate the truth, whereas no such effect existed as to men: [S]uch evidence is inadmissible in any case for the purpose of impeaching the character of a male witness... It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that of a woman. (Italics ours.) State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 531, 33 S.W. 167 (1895). Former RCW 9.79.150(2) appears to us to be directed at the misuse of prior sexual conduct evidence based on this antiquated and obviously illogical premise. See also State v. Kalamarski, 27 Wn. App. 787, 792 n. 4, 620 P.2d 1017 (1980) (McInturff, J., dissenting). Second, the defendant is permitted, under former RCW 9.79.150(4), to cross-examine and impeach the victim's testimony on her past sexual behavior if the prosecution raises the issue of her past sexual behavior in its case in chief. [3] We shall specifically address the cross examination question in part II of this opinion. The presumption of inadmissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence on the issue of consent is a recent trend, [4] reversing years of the opposite rule, and is based on the observation that such evidence is usually of little or no probative value in predicting the victim's consent to sexual conduct on the occasion in question. As stated in State v. Geer, 13 Wn. App. 71, 73-74, 533 P.2d 389 (1975): Such evidence [specific acts of sexual misconduct by the prosecutrix] has little or no relationship to either the ability of the prosecuting witness to tell the truth under oath or her alleged consent to the intercourse. See also State v. Cecotti, 31 Wn. App. 179, 182, 639 P.2d 243 (1982); State v. Blum, 17 Wn. App. 37, 46, 561 P.2d 226 (1977); Comment, Evidence  Admissibility of the Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washington's Rape Evidence Law  Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.150 (1976), 52 Wash. L. Rev. 1011, 1028-37 (1977). [1] The inquiry as to the relevancy of prior sexual behavior of the complaining witness must be whether, under ER 401, the woman's consent to sexual activity in the past, without more, makes it more probable or less probable that she consented to sexual activity on this occasion. In other words, does the mere fact of prior consensual sexual activity have any value in predicting whether a woman would consent again? We believe that, without more, such evidence does not even meet the bare relevancy test of ER 401. The argument that past consent to sexual conduct is relevant assumes a woman's consent to have sex with one or more men makes her somehow more likely to consent to other men. As pointed out in Abraham P. Ordover's article, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 90, 98 (1977), this reasoning is based on the following faulty syllogism: Major Premise: Women who possess the character trait of unchastity consent more readily than chaste women to sexual intercourse. Minor Premise: The complainant's reputation establishes that she possesses the character trait of unchastity. Conclusion: The complainant's character trait of unchastity makes her consent more likely than if she lacked this trait. (Footnote omitted.) Ordover points out the conclusion is invalid because the major premise is grounded in the moral judgment that women who engage in nonmarital intercourse are immoral, and that such immoral women are more likely to consent to sexual intercourse on any given occasion. Once the woman's immoral character is established, the fact finder could infer consent not from specific behavioral patterns, but rather from the woman's membership in the class of women of unchaste character. Without other factors tending to indicate the past consensual sexual activity is factually similar in some respects to the consensual sex act claimed by defendant, it should not be considered relevant. Factual similarities between prior consensual sex acts and the questioned sex acts claimed by the defendant to be consensual would cause the evidence to meet the minimal relevancy test of ER 401. For instance, if a complaining witness frequently engages in sexual intercourse with men shortly after meeting them in bars, this would have some relevancy if the defendant claims she consented to sexual intercourse with him under similar circumstances. Such a particularized factual showing would demonstrate enough similarity between the past consensual sexual activity and defendant's claim of consent that it would have the necessary predictive value required by ER 401. Nevertheless, this evidence may be so slightly relevant in comparison to its prejudicial effect that it may not be admitted into evidence. Former RCW 9.79.150(3); ER 403. It has been suggested that other factual situations may exist in which past sexual conduct may be relevant, such as: (1) evidence of prior sexual conduct by complainant with defendant; (2) to rebut medical evidence on proof of origin of semen, venereal disease or pregnancy; (3) distinctive sexual patterns so closely resembling defendant's version of the alleged encounter as to tend to prove consent on the questioned occasion; (4) evidence of prior sexual conduct by complainant with others, known to the defendant, tending to prove he believed the complainant was consenting to his sexual advances; (5) evidence of sexual conduct tending to prove complainant's motive to fabricate the charge; (6) evidence tending to rebut proof by the prosecution regarding the complainant's past sexual conduct; and (7) evidence of sexual conduct offered as the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the acts charged. Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 98-99 (1977). Other commentators have made similar suggestions and the rape shield statutes in many states reflect these or other circumstances which may cause past sexual conduct evidence to be relevant and perhaps admissible. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544, 591-602 (1980). Once other circumstances are identified which make the prior consensual sexual activity factually closer to the defendant's version of the story and the evidence is deemed relevant, the probative value must be balanced against the potentially prejudicial effect.