Opinion ID: 2612495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Right of Public Access to Preliminary Hearings

Text: In Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ( Press-Enter. II ), the United States Supreme Court reversed a California Supreme Court decision which held that there is no first amendment right of public or press access to preliminary hearings. In Press-Enter. II, the Supreme Court held in California there is a qualified first amendment right of access to preliminary hearings and that the hearings cannot be closed unless specific findings are made on the record that a substantial probability exists that the publicity will prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial and reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights. The Court held that the public right of access is not necessarily inconsistent with the defendant's right to a fair trial, and observed, [o]ne of the important means of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers. The right to an open public trial is a shared right of the accused and the public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness. Id. at 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2739. The United States Supreme Court has applied and extended the openness rule to other criminal proceedings. In Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), the Supreme Court noted that even in a suppression hearing the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public. Id. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215. It is important to note in our consideration of the issues presented in the instant case that the First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., `trial' or otherwise, particularly where the preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale trial. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2739. In Press-Enter. II two complementary considerations were presented to determine whether preliminary hearings should be open to the public. The first consideration concerned whether the place and process of preliminary hearings have historically been open to the press and general public. The second consideration is whether public access to preliminary hearings as they are conducted plays a particularly significant positive role in the actual functioning of the process. In addressing the first consideration the Supreme Court noted that although grand jury proceedings have typically been closed, preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates have been open to the public, Id. at 10, 106 S.Ct. at 2741, and the near uniform practice of all state and federal courts has been to conduct preliminary hearings in open court. Id. Idaho Code § 19-811 is based upon the New York Field Code of Criminal Procedure which was published in 1850, see Press Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2741-42, and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), and allows for closure of a preliminary hearing at the request of the defendant. In Press-Enter. II, the Supreme Court cited State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P.2d 206 (1957), as one of the several states which have allowed preliminary hearings to be closed on the motion of the accused. 478 U.S. at 11, n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 2742, n. 4. However, the Supreme Court quickly observed, But even in these States the proceedings are presumptively open to the public and are closed only for cause shown. Open preliminary hearings, therefore, have been accorded the favorable judgment of experience. 478 U.S. at 11 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 2742 n. 4. The Supreme Court further pointed out in a footnote to the above quote in Press-Enterprise II, that even though these states have closure statutes based on the Field Code, many have found either a common law or a state constitutional right of the public to attend pretrial proceedings. Although Arizona, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah have closure statutes based on the Field Code, see Gannett, 443 U.S., at 391, 99 S.Ct., at 2911, in each of these States the Supreme Court has found either a commonlaw or state constitutional right of the public to attend pretrial proceedings. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wifvat, supra [328 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1983)]; Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, supra [186 Mont. 433, 608 P.2d 116 (1980)]; Minot Daily News v. Holum, supra, [380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986)]; Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318 (1980); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, supra [685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984)]. Id. The clear presumption in nearly all states that preliminary hearings are generally open to the public absent the request of the defendant has also been the recognized and traditional practice in Idaho. In State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P.2d 206 (1957), the magistrate declined to close a preliminary hearing after the defendant had made the request. Although this Court held that it was not error to refuse the defendant's request, the ruling indicates that the policy and traditional practice in Idaho is to open preliminary hearings to the public. As further indicative of the tradition in Idaho, several Idaho magistrates have recently relied upon Press-Enter. II and have refused to close preliminary hearings. [2] Our tradition is one of presumed openness with preliminary hearings closed only for cause shown and we see no compelling reason to change that tradition. The second consideration raised in Press-Enter. II concerns whether public access plays a significant positive role in the actual functioning of the process. The United States Supreme Court delineated some of the governmental processes that require secrecy and others which require openness. Although many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of governmental operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly. A classic example is that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1672, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979). Other proceedings plainly require public access. In Press-Enterprise I, we summarized the holdings of prior cases, noting that openness in criminal trials, including the selection of jurors, enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system. [citation omitted]. 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. Although there are some differences in I.C. § 19-811 and the California statute scrutinized in Press-Enter. II, the actual preliminary hearing process involved in both states is similar. The Supreme Court observed that California preliminary hearings are sufficiently like a trial to justify public access. In California, to bring a felon to trial, the prosecutor has a choice of securing a grand jury indictment or a finding of probable cause following a preliminary hearing. Even when the accused has been indicted by a grand jury, however, he has an absolute right to an elaborate preliminary hearing before a neutral magistrate. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 584, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437, 586 P.2d 916, 918 (1978). The accused has the right to personally appear at the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 859-866 (West 1985), § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1986). If the magistrate determines that probable cause exists, the accused is bound over for trial; such a finding leads to a guilty plea in the majority of cases. 478 U.S. at 12, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. The process in conducting preliminary hearings in Idaho is likewise sufficiently like a trial to generally justify public access. The United States Supreme Court observed in Press-Enter. II that, Because of its extensive scope, the preliminary hearing is often the final and most important step in the criminal proceeding. [citations omitted]... . [T]he preliminary hearing in many cases provides the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice system. Similarly, the absence of a jury, long recognized as an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor, and against the complaint, biased, or eccentric judge, [citation omitted] makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even more significant. People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. [citation omitted]. Id. 478 U.S. at 12, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. The Supreme Court also determined in Press-Enter. II that there was a certain therapeutic value of openness. When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions [provoked by certain violent crimes]... . . The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend give assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system. Id. at 13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742, (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In Idaho all of the concerns and considerations deemed significant by the Supreme Court in Press-Enter. II are present when a preliminary hearing is held. The present case provides an excellent example of when the preliminary hearing was the final and sole occasion for the public to observe the criminal justice system. When the preliminary hearing was concluded the conspiracy count against Frazier was dismissed. Because the preliminary hearing was closed, the public was denied the opportunity to determine for itself whether the hearing was conducted fairly and justice properly administered. Furthermore, the community therapeutic value of openness may also have been frustrated by not knowing what transpired at the preliminary hearing, particularly on the discussed portion of the complaint. Many criminal cases are dismissed by the magistrate following the preliminary hearing. A criminal complaint that is open to the public has been filed in all of these cases, unlike the absence of public filing when a grand jury convenes. Thus, when a preliminary hearing is closed the public is denied the opportunity to observe the criminal justice system at work and is denied the assurance that justice has been fairly and properly administered. We are of the opinion and hold that public access to preliminary hearings in Idaho plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the criminal justice system. Since preliminary hearings are presumptively open and considering that openness of preliminary hearings plays a significant positive role in our society, we hold that in Idaho a qualified first amendment right of public access attaches to preliminary hearings.