Opinion ID: 3011057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Divergent Authority

Text: Despite the legislative history and interpreting authority which have informed our decision, many courts have held that the field of aviation safety is not federally preempted. We find, however, that the rationales, on which these courts have relied in reaching this conclusion, are unpersuasive. As explained below, either the courts have presumed, without any in-depth analysis, that the FAA does not preempt state or territorial air safety standards, or they have followed precedent involving the ADA, an economic deregulation statute which is inapposite to resolving preemption questions relating to the FAA and air safety. We will deal with these various rationales in turn.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a Latin maxim which means to express one is to exclude the other. As with all easy answers, it should be taken with a grain of salt -- or even better, with a grain of common sense. The maxim has been employed by some courts to justify a decision that air safety standards are not federally preempted. The main rationale for such a finding rests on Section 105(a)(1) of the ADA, which provides that the regulation of rates, routes, and services is expressly preempted.12 Based on the language of this section, some _________________________________________________________________ 12. Section 105(a)(1) of the ADA provides: 16 courts have observed that state tort law claims for personal injuries connected to airline operations are not preempted. See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995); Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 321-22 (E.D. Mich.1993) (holding thatnowhere in the legislative history or in the evolution of the [FAA] is there any suggestion that the preemption provision of the [ADA] was intended to preclude common law negligence actions and collecting cases); see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 231, n.7 (1995) (noting that the United States as Amicus Curiae had conceded that[i]t is ... unlikely that [the ADA] preempts safety-related personal injury claims relating to airplane operations). Such a result may not, of course, be inconsistent with our determination that even with federal preemption of standards of care, state tort remedies are preserved. A number of courts have, however, continued to use the state law standard of care, along with state remedies. They have concluded that the standards of care related to aviation safety by implication must not be preempted because expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 294-95 (11th Cir. 1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1443-44 (10th Cir. 1993). We agree with American that reliance on this maxim to determine whether safety standards are federally preempted is inappropriate. This maxim stands on the faulty premise that all possible alternatives or supplemental provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.D.C.1973). The maxim serves only as an aid in discovering the legislative intent when that is not otherwise manifest. United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 519 (1912). For that reason, it can never override clear and _________________________________________________________________ [N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.... 49 U.S.C. S 41713(b)(1). 17 contrary evidences of Congressional intent. Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); United States v. Castro, 837 F.2d 441, 443 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding legislative history and context indicate maxim cannot apply); National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 648 n.33 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that evidence of legislative intent renders the maxim inapplicable). As the District Court recognized in its comprehensive examination of the exclusio unius maxim, the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892). Thus, whether the maxim should be applied to the standards of care for pilots, flight attendants, and passengers depends on Congress's intent when it enacted the ADA -- Congress's intent not only with respect to the ADA itself, but also regarding the ADA as it affected and interrelated with the earlier provisions of the FAA. The ADA was enacted [t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own ... [by] prohibiting the States from enforcing any law `relating to rates, routes, or services' of any air carrier. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992). Airlines compete against one another by attracting passengers through the rates, routes, and services that they offer. Congress did not want the states to hamper this competition by their own regulation of these areas. Safe operations, however, are a necessity for all airlines. Whether or not to conform to safety standards is not an option for airlines in choosing a mode of competition. For this reason, safety of an airline's operations would not appear to fall within the ambit of the ADA and its procompetition preemption clause. Moreover, as the court noted in Moreno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1958), the maxim ... is pretty weak when applied to acts of Congress enacted at widely separated times. Id. at 71; see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520 (remarking that  `the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier 18 one.' (citation omitted)). The ADA was enacted 20 years after the FAA. Under the circumstances then of Congress's intent in adopting both the FAA and the ADA, we do not find the exclusio unius maxim helpful on the issue of federal preemption of aviation safety standards.
Another rationale for finding that federal law does not preempt state and territorial safety standards rests upon the observation that Congress directed the Administrator to prescribe minimum standards to promote safety. 49 U.S.C. S 44701.13 Because the federal standards are minimum, some courts have determined that a common law duty of safety may be owed beyond the FAA regulations. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 815 (2d Cir. 1994); Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444-45; Sunbird Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 789 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (D. Kan. 1992); Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (D. Haw. 1990). Indeed, as the District Court pointed out in its preemption analysis, some courts have concluded that the application of state standards would raise the level of air safety as a supplement to the federal regulations. See, e.g., Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1445. After findingnothing inconsistent with Congress' goal of maximum safety and common law claims, id. at 1443, the court in Cleveland compared the state common law duties and the federal regulatory framework to determine whether there was an actual conflict. Id. at 1444-45. Finding no conflict between state and federal law, it found that the state common law action was not preempted. Id. at 1445. _________________________________________________________________ 13. 49 U.S.C. S 44701(a)(5) provides: The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing-- ... (5) regulations and minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security. (emphasis added). 19 We have a problem with applying the type of analysis employed in Cleveland to determine that there is no federal preemption of aviation safety. First, as we demonstrate in Part III.A.1, there is no gap in the federal standards to fill with a state common law standard. The S 91.13(a) prohibition of careless or reckless operation of an aircraft occupies the apparent void beyond the specified minimum standards. Therefore, because the Administrator has provided both general and specific standards, there is no need to look to state or territorial law to provide standards beyond those established by the Administrator. Moreover, as the First Circuit noted in French, the lack of a conflict between federal standards and state law is irrelevant. The court in French remarked that the absence of a conflict was beside the point. So long as occupation of an envisioned field was intended, `any state law falling within th[e] field is pre-empted.' . . . The federal interest necessarily predominates, rendering states impotent to act. 869 F.2d at 6 (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248); see also Morales, 504 U.S. at 387 (holding that [t]he pre-emption provision [of the ADA] ... displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with . . . substantive requirements.). In such instances, the state statute must yield to the force of federal law . . . , notwithstanding that it is constructed upon values familiar to many and cherished by most, and notwithstanding that it may fit neatly within or alongside the federal scheme. French, 869 F.2d at 6. As a consequence, in a federally preempted area, the question whether state or territorial law conflicts with federal law is a pointless inquiry. See id. If Congress has preempted a field -- whether it be expressly or by implication -- state laws attempting to regulate within that field will be invalidated no matter how well they comport with substantive federal policies. L. TRIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 6-27 at 497 (2d ed. 1988); see also Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
The FAA's savings clause provides that: A remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by 20 law. 49 U.S.C. S 40120(c). The insurance clause requires that airlines maintain liability insurance for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual ... resulting from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft. 49 U.S.C. S 41112(a). These two sections have been interpreted to mean that state safety standards are not preempted because Congress provided for compensation of injured persons. See, e.g., Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338 & n.7; see also Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1442 (collecting cases in which courts relied on the savings clause to find no preemption of state common law). These two sections do demonstrate that Congress intended to allow for compensation of persons who were injured in aviation mishaps. As we point out in our answer to the second part of the certified question, however, we do not find that state and territorial law remedies are preempted, only the standards of care for the safe operation of aircraft. For that reason, the inclusion of the savings and insurance clauses in the FAA is not inconsistent with our decision. Their inclusion as a part of the FAA is in fact compatible with our determination that state and territorial damage remedies are preserved.
Finally, as the District Court pointed out, some courts have found that federal law does not preempt state law in the field of aviation safety because they believe that states may regulate aviation safety under their traditional police powers. See, e.g., Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1443; Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 496, 505 (Tex. App. 1994). However, whether the states may invoke their police powers depends on whether the field is federally preempted. See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1441 (Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'.) (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citation omitted); accord Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338. As a result, because we have found that the entirefield of aviation safety is federally preempted, we need not consider whether the regulation of aviation safety falls 21 within the traditional police powers of the states and territories.