Opinion ID: 2361142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Garris's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Argument

Text: Garris maintains that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. To prevail on this issue, Garris must show (1) deficient performance by his trial counsel, and (2) prejudice traceable to his trial counsel's deficiencies. The burden is a heavy one because of a strong presumption that defense counsel has rendered reasonable professional assistance. Zanders v. United States, 678 A.2d 556, 569 (D.C.1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2055, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Garris contends that his trial counsel's illegal drug usage during a serious double homicide trial was outside the boundaries of reasonable professional norms and his performance not only was deficient but also prejudicial to him. [T]o prove prejudice he `must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Zanders, supra, 678 A.2d at 569 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). We have never before decided whether an attorney's drug usage by itself constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Both Garris's counsel and the government acknowledge that drug or alcohol usage by an attorney is not per se evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree. Indeed, under Strickland the fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance claim. The critical inquiry is whether, for whatever reason, counsel's performance was deficient and whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir.1985) (emphasis in original). [8] Garris's pro se motion sets forth several conclusory allegations. [9] However, neither those allegations nor the others raised during his D.C.Code § 23-110 (1996 Repl.) hearing, or discussed on appeal, are supported by credible evidence. At the § 23-110 hearing, only two persons testified: Garris's attorney and Kevin Moye, who allegedly saw Garris's counsel, in a pool room, exchange money for packages he presumed to be drugs. Moye offered no testimony regarding Garris's counsel's performance at trial. After listening to the testimony of Garris's counsel and Moye, and hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court concluded in part: First of all, the Court was aware of the problem that [counsel] had and we observed and looked at him throughout the trial and observed all counsel and we were  we never saw any indication of any inattention to the matter and we saw him on every motion exercising the most profound skills that we have ever seen a lawyer exercise. There is no question in the Court's mind but that [counsel] was the most outstanding lawyer in this case. Absolutely none at all. He performed better than the other two lawyers and including, as the [Assistant] U.S. attorney suggests, the [Assistant] U.S. attorney. He just had no equal in it. He did an outstanding job in the defense of this man. ... We had CJA lawyers representing the other defendants. They had complete and unlimited funds to investigate this case so to speak. They investigated it from A to Z and this Court is aware that co[-]counsel in cases have opportunities to cooperate and take benefits from other investigations. . . . . The type of cross examination he did on [witness Terry] was in[-]depth and he got every pound of advantage that could be gotten from such a witness who came across believable and she was able to convince these jurors that these defendants committed the offense. We just find nothing that would indicate that there was any such lack of preparation on the part of [counsel] in this case. The trial court found no deficiency in the performance of Garris's counsel, and no errors so serious as to deprive [Garris] of a fair trial or trial whose results . . . [are] unreliable. Based upon our review of the record and transcripts in this case, we agree that there is no credible evidence of deficient performance by Garris's counsel. Furthermore, we see no error that undermines confidence in the outcome of Garris's trial, or that rises to the level of the prejudice required for Garris to prevail on the second prong of the Strickland standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.