Opinion ID: 1193826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: costs of the action

Text: The determination of costs is left to the discretion of the trial court. Idaho Dep't of Health v. Southfork Lumber Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564, 567 (1993). The burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's discretion, and absent an abuse of discretion the district court's award of costs will be upheld. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996).
Transformer argues that Rule 54(d)(1) is the correct law to apply when awarding costs under I.C. § 44-1704(2). Transformer also argues that the trial court erred in awarding discretionary costs for two reasons: (1) there was no showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional; and (2) upon objection to the costs, the trial court did not make express findings as to why the costs were allowed pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(D). Perkins argues that Rule 54(d)(1) does not apply to I.C. § 44-1704(2) because I.C. § 44-1704(2) mandates an unqualified cost allowance and no statute or rule specifically brings I.C. § 44-1704(2) within Rule 54(d). The language of I.C. § 44-1704(2) states that [t]he court in such action [to recover liability under I.C. § 44-1702] shall, in cases of violation in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow ... costs of the action.  (emphasis added). Although the language of I.C. § 44-1704(2) is broader than the language of Rule 54(d)(1), which specifies costs as either costs as a matter of right or discretionary costs, we hold that Rule 54(d)(1) is the proper measure for costs under I.C. § 44-1704(2). Without specific language to the contrary in the statute, our rules of civil procedure provide the correct basis by which to measure an award of costs in such an action. This case is unlike Idaho Department of Health v. Southfork Lumber Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564, 567 (1993) where we held that I.C. § 39-108, which allows an award of any expense rather than costs, permitted a more expansive recovery than that contemplated by Rule 54 and we stated that the trial court should consider the costs according to I.C. § 39-108(6) rather than Rule 54(d)(1). As with the attorney fees, the record is insufficient for a review of the standard the district court used to determine Perkins' costs. Without a transcript or specific findings by the trial court, it is impossible to evaluate the basis upon which the trial court determined the award of discretionary costs. However, we note that if indeed the district court did apply Rule 54(d)(1), as to discretionary costs, the district court did so incorrectly by not ruling that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. I.C.R.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Additionally, upon Transformer's objection to costs the court did not make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. Id. Because the district judge no made findings by which we can evaluate either the standard used for determining costs or his exercise of discretion, we vacate the award of costs and remand for further consideration by the district court consistent with this opinion.