Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Waiver of Conflict-Free Counsel as a Less Drastic Alternative to a Mistrial

Text: Next, we must determine whether, at the time the court declared a mistrial, there were measures short of mistrial that might have sufficed to mitigate or cure the problems arising from Kane's conflict of interest. Braxton, 395 A.2d at 773; see Coleman, 449 A.2d at 329. In particular, appellant argues that he should have received an opportunity to waive his right to independent counsel and thereby to preserve his double jeopardy interests by continuing the trial with Kane as counsel. The Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. at 1178 n. 5 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)); see Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-74, 101 S.Ct. at 1104-05. Case law in this jurisdiction, as well as in federal and other state jurisdictions, is to the same effect. See, e.g., Lollar v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 201-03, 376 F.2d 243, 244-46 (1967); Annot., 53 A.L.R. Fed. 140, at § 23 (1981); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 4th 360, at §§ 25-27 (1982). Furthermore, the ethical rules of the legal profession, upon which Judge Hannon relied in deciding to terminate the trial, expressly allow an attorney to accept or continue employment even though his or her own interests may impair independent professional judgment, as long as it is with the consent of his [or her] client after full disclosure. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1981); D.C.App.R. X (1978). [18] As with the relinquishment of other important constitutional rights, waivers of conflict-free counsel must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (footnote omitted); see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Hsu v. United States, 392 A.2d 972, 981-87 (D.C.1978). The court must indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of the unimpaired assistance of counsel, Campbell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 144-45, 352 F.2d 359, 360-61 (1965), and ensure that the defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages... so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.' Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) ). Thus, before a waiver is accepted the trial court should conduct, on the record, an inquiry sufficient to establish that the defendant is aware of the right to conflict-free representation; understands the nature of the risks and the potential adverse effects of foregoing that right; and knows that, if convicted, he or she will not be able to complain on appeal that the defense at trial was compromised by the conflict. See Lollar, 126 U.S.App.D.C. at 202-03, 376 F.2d at 245-46; United States v. Curcio (Curcio I), 680 F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir. 1982). [19] Moreover, the informed and voluntary character of the waiver should be manifested by `clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous language.' United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 332, 84 S.Ct. 411, 423, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964)). Because an effective waiver of conflict-free counsel would have barred any subsequent Sixth Amendment claim based on Kane's conflict of interest, as well as eliminated any concern that appellant was forced to accept less than adequate representation, it was a reasonable alternative to a mistrial which the court should have explored once appellant indicated a desire to continue the trial with Kane's assistance. [20] Judge Hannon's comments at the time of mistrial, however, make clear that he never gave serious consideration to the waiver alternative. Without inquiring into appellant's competence to waive effective assistance of counsel, and without exploring the specific nature of the negative effects he believed the conflict might have on Kane's performance during the remainder of trial, Judge Hannon concluded: I have no alternative, sir. I have no options in the matter; and that's all there is to that. Judge Hannon either overlooked the need to consider the waiver alternative or erroneously assumed that such a waiver was impossible as a matter of law and accordingly dismissed this alternative out of hand. Whichever was the case, the inference of a lack of sound discretion is even stronger here than in cases where the trial court is merely silent regarding a possible, less drastic alternative. See supra note 11. The trial court, in this case, admitted its failure to consider any alternative to a mistrial, and yet we can see from the record that at least one possible alternative indeed existed. [21] Under these circumstances, we owe no deference to the trial court in evaluating whether the waiver alternative should have been adopted. See supra pages 133-134. We therefore may permit a retrial only if the record reveals a clear and persuasive reason why rejection of that alternative was appropriate on the particular facts presented.