Opinion ID: 1630596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether BJCCA Is Entitled to Prospective Application Only

Text: We concluded in Part V.A. that the trial court in the JCEA action lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of Act No. 99-669 because it was presented with a nonjusticiable political question. Only if this Court allowed BJCCA to have prospective application could the trial court's judgment in this proceedingholding that the judgment in the JCEA action was void for want of subject-matter jurisdictionbe reversed. The County contends that, assuming the judgment in the JCEA action is void, the ruling in BJCCA should be applied prospectively only. The County says BJCCA represents either a case of first impression establishing a new principle of law or an overruling of clear precedent on which litigants may have relied. In either event, according to the County, judicial discretion can be applied to determine whether BJCCA should be limited in its retroactive effect. In Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So.2d 291 (Ala.2008), the County says, this Court embraced the three factors outlined in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), for determining whether a decision should be applied prospectively: first, the decision must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied,. . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; second, the court must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation; and, third, the court must weigh the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for `[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.' 990 So.2d at 313 (dissenting opinion of Harwood, J., in Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So.2d 755, 761 (Ala.2007), attached as an appendix to and adopted as the opinion of the Court in Griffin ). The County concludes: These three factors overwhelmingly lead to the conclusion that this Court's decision in BJCCA should be applied prospectively. County's brief, at 60-61. The taxpayers cite authority from this Court stating the rule that retrospective application is the norm. See Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So.2d 432, 439 (Ala.2001) (In general, with regard to civil matters, prospective-only decision-making within the realm of constitutional law is disfavored. `Since the Constitution does not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form does not make sense.' (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring))). This Court was not confronted with a matter of constitutional magnitude in Griffin. We there dealt only with the construction to be accorded the term accrued in § 6-2-30(a), Ala.Code 1975. BJCCA dealt with the application of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers as set forth in § 43 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Pursuant to our endorsement in Lyles of Justice Scalia's view that prospective-only application of a constitutional principle does not make sense, we decline to give BJCCA prospective application only. [8]