Opinion ID: 154699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Oklahoma Public Policy Tort Claim

Text: Roberts maintains the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed her claim that the University’s failure to hire her violated Oklahoma public policy. She contends that Oklahoma recognizes a public policy exception to its employment-at-will doctrine to provide plaintiffs with a state tort claim in the refusal-to-hire context. She argues the district court should have allowed her to proceed on this claim in state court, where her lawsuit began prior to removal. This court faced a similar argument in Sanchez v. Philip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff in Sanchez argued that Oklahoma precedent which created an exception to employment-at-will for terminations motivated by race or retaliation applied to create a cause of action for wrongful failure-to-hire claims. Id. at 249. This court rejected the claim, holding that Oklahoma cases were limited and nothing in those cases supported expanding the narrow exceptions. Id. On the basis of Sanchez, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Roberts’ state tort claim rather than remanding it to state court for further proceedings. See Sanchez, 992 F.2d at 249. C. District Court’s Failure to Allow Additional Discovery Roberts contends the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow her to depose Curl, Sokoll, and Grzybowski a second time. Although it is -23- doubtful the record on appeal is sufficient for this court to determine whether the district court abused its discretion, we nevertheless reach the merits and affirm. 7 Roberts alleges that despite a request for all documents related to the screening process, the University failed to inform her that Curl served on the first screening committee until after she had deposed Curl, Sokoll, and Grzybowski. After that disclosure, Roberts filed a motion before the magistrate judge seeking to depose Curl, Sokoll, and Grzybowski a second time. Although the magistrate ordered the University to turn over any additional documents related to the screening process, the magistrate refused to allow the additional depositions. The district court affirmed on appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(B) provides as follows: “A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to the extent consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2), if . . . the person to be examined already has been deposed in the case.” This court reviews the denial of leave to conduct a second deposition under Rule 30(a)(2)(B) for an abuse of discretion. See Building & Constr. Dep’t v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993) (reviewing district court’s refusal to grant a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion for abuse of discretion). 7 Unfortunately, Roberts never included in the record on appeal a copy of the magistrate judge’s oral order denying her leave to redepose several witnesses. Instead, this court is limited to Roberts’ interpretation of why the magistrate judge denied the motion. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the record is sufficient to conclude that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion. -24- This Circuit has defined abuse of discretion as “‘an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.’” United States v. HernandezHerrera, 952 F.2d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir. 1989)) (further quotations omitted). Although Roberts has failed to include a transcript of the magistrate judge’s oral denial of her motion for additional depositions, it is still clear on the record before us that the denial was not unreasonable because Roberts had “ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(ii). The record clearly demonstrates that at the time she first deposed Curl, Sokoll, and Grzybowski, Roberts was fully aware of the existence of the first screening committee; knew that Curl must have selected the members of the first screening committee; had serious reservations about the fairness of the procedures used by the first screening committee; and believed that Curl was the person responsible for the University’s failure to hire her. Furthermore, it is clear that in wide-ranging depositions of Dean Powers, Curl, Sokoll, and Redinger, Roberts’ counsel touched on the subject of the first screening committee. He failed, however, to ask the key question: What was the composition of the first screening committee? In light of Roberts’ theory of the case, it was not unreasonable for the magistrate judge to conclude that Roberts had ample opportunity to question Curl, Sokoll, and Grzybowski about the first screening -25- committee during the original depositions of those individuals. Therefore, the district court’s refusal to allow additional depositions was not an abuse of discretion.