Opinion ID: 2119572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: foreseeability in present case

Text: We apply Restatement (Third) principles to our analysis of this case, to provide the parties and the district court with clearer guidance of how the case should proceed on remand, and to establish Restatement (Third) precedent to guide other cases. We note, however, that our disposition of this appeal would have been the same regardless. As noted above, A.W. argues that LPS had a duty to protect C.B. from the danger of sexual assault, that the sexual assault of C.B. was reasonably foreseeable, and that LPS' response was inadequate to that foreseeable danger. Primarily, A.W. contends that the neighborhood in which Arnold Elementary School is located was sufficiently dangerous to place LPS on notice of a danger that a student could be sexually assaulted and that the LPS employees who saw Siems on the day of the assault should have foreseen the danger that he represented. And, as we also noted above, LPS' relationship with C.B. was such that LPS owed a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arose within the scope of that relationship. There is no argument in this case that there is any countervailing principle or policy warranting a modification of that duty in this class of cases. So, the parties' foreseeability arguments are properly framed as disputing whether, considering the foreseeable likelihood of harm, LPS exercised reasonable care under all the circumstances. [55] If, in light of all the facts relating to LPS' conduct, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the conduct lacked reasonable care, it is the function of the finder of fact to make that determination, and summary judgment was improper. [56] And it bears repeating that in an appeal from a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, A.W. [57] Nonetheless, to begin with, we are not persuaded by A.W.'s evidence of criminal behavior in the area of the school. Evidence of prior criminal activity is a necessary component in the totality of the circumstances which must be considered in determining foreseeability. [58] Several instances of similar criminal activity in a fairly contiguous area during a limited timespan may make other such incidents foreseeable, implicating a responsible party's duty to take reasonable care. But the only evidence A.W. presents in this regard is a call log from the Lincoln Police Department for a three-block area near Arnold Elementary School during 2001 to 2005. There were a great many calls for police assistance made in the year before C.B. was assaulted, including incidents of vandalism, an assault, and a report of a suspicious person at Arnold Elementary School. And other, more sexually related crimes were reported in the neighborhood. But few of those incidents took place during the school day. And there was nothing that should have suggested to LPS that a sexual assault was likely in the school building. The evidence in this case is far different from that presented in other cases, in which we have found a basis for determining that criminal activity was foreseeable. This is not, for instance, a case such as Doe v. Gunny's Ltd. Partnership, [59] in which the plaintiff had been sexually assaulted in a parking garage, and in which there was evidence of crimes reported in the same building or one of the businesses located in the building. This was not a case in which a substantial number of similar incidents had occurred on the premises. [60] Nor is this a case in which the defendant had been on notice of the behavior of a particular assailant. [61] In short, there was not sufficient evidence of prior criminal activity to necessarily make the intrusion of a sexual predator at this particular elementary school foreseeable. In order to make a risk of attack foreseeable, the circumstances to be considered must have a direct relationship to the harm incurred, [62] and that relationship is lacking here. After Siems entered the building, however, reasonable minds could differ as to whether LPS' initial failure to note his presence, and response to his presence, satisfied its duty of reasonable care. The sequence of events presented by the evidence is essentially undisputed. Siems was spotted by a number of LPS employees, more than one of whom observed that Siems seemed out of place. While each of them responded to the threat that they recognized Siems represented, none of them effectively made sure that Siems did not make contact with a student. Specifically, they did not keep track of Siems' location and permitted him to evade them. Nor did they prevent C.B. from entering the restroom, alone, while Siems' whereabouts were unknown. And reasonable minds could differ as to whether Siems' assault of C.B. was a foreseeable result of those failures. These facts, taken in the light most favorable to A.W., [63] establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LPS breached the duty of reasonable care it owed C.B. For that reason, A.W.'s first three assignments of error have merit and A.W. is entitled to a full trial to resolve these respective issues.