Opinion ID: 1335858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: misstatement in jury charge

Text: We next consider Brisbon's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when it instructed the jury that in determining credibility, it should take into account whether the defendant was forthright or hesitant. The following excerpt contains the disputed charge in context: You are also the judges and the sole judges, the only judges of the credibility or the believability of the witnesses who have testified in this case, and in passing upon their credibility you may take into consideration many things such as  these are by way of example  the appearance and manner of the witness on the stand commonly referred to sometimes as the demeanor of the witness. Was the defendant forthright or hesitant? Was the witness's testimony consistent or did it contain discrepancies? Was the ability of the witness to know What was the ability of the witness to know the facts about which he or she testified? Did the witness have a cause or a reason to be biased or prejudiced in favor of the testimony that he or she gave? And was the testimony of the witness corroborated or made stronger by other testimony or was it made weaker by other testimony and evidence? (emphasis added). Brisbon contends that the reference to defendant focused attention on him and his credibility as a witness to the exclusion of the other witnesses. The record is clear that the trial court mistakenly substituted the word defendant for witness. After Brisbon's objection, the court immediately offered a curative instruction, but the defendant refused, arguing that only the granting of a mistrial could correct the error. It is well established that a trial judge must refrain from any comment which tends to indicate his opinion as to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the guilt of an accused, or any fact in controversy. Sosebee v. Leeke, 293 S.C. 531, 362 S.E.2d 22 (1987); State v. Smith, 288 S.C. 329, 342 S.E.2d 600 (1986). Sosebee and Smith, however, are easily distinguishable. In Smith, during the jury instruction, the judge, after describing what the State had to prove in order for evidence of a breathalyzer exam to be admissible, commented, You have heard such evidence. Smith, 288 S.C. at 331, 342 S.E.2d at 601. In Sosebee, after petitioner's counsel objected that certain testimony was only designed to buttress the victim's testimony, the judge declared: No sir, it's not necessarily to buttress it in a situation such as this. You have suggested that her story is patently incredible, but within a few moments after reporting back home she told that story. It isn't something she made up between then and now, as you suggested. Sosebee, 293 S.C. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 23. On appeal, the Court found this statement to be prejudicial. The comment in the present case in no way compares to the prejudicial comments made by the trial courts in the above cases. The statement here was simply a slip of the tongue; it was not an affirmative comment upon the evidence. Moreover, there was arguably no prejudice here, because the jury charge was not stating that the defendant was untruthful. The question, Was the defendant forthright or hesitant, could just as easily be interpreted as emphasizing the defendant's forthrightness, as it does his hesitancy.