Opinion ID: 2517324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Voluntary Intoxication Instructions

Text: The court instructed the jury on the specific intent required for the uncharged crime of threatening a school officer. With the assent of both counsel, the court also gave the jury a version of CALJIC No. 4.21 on voluntary intoxication, as follows: In the uncharged crime of Threatening a School Official a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of the specific intent as set forth elsewhere in these instructions. If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in determining whether defendant had such specific intent. If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant formed such specific intent you must find that he did not have such specific intent. The court followed this instruction with the definition of voluntary intoxication provided by CALJIC No. 4.22: Intoxication of a person is voluntary if it results from the willing use of any intoxicating liquor, drug or other substance, knowing that it is capable of an intoxicating effect or when he willingly assumes the risk of that effect. Voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary ingestion, injecting or taking by any other means of any intoxicating liquor, drug or other substance. Defendant contends these two instructions are irreconcilable and confusing. He claims the jurors were likely to conclude that his willing assumption of the risk of intoxication could not have diminished the criminality of his conduct. To the extent this claim was not forfeited by defendant's failure to object or seek clarification below (see People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 749), it is meritless. The jury was correctly informed that intoxication was relevant to its determination of whether defendant had formed the requisite specific intent, even if he was willing to accept the risk of intoxication. We considered and rejected a claim similar to defendant's in People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224], concluding there was no likelihood that CALJIC Nos. 4.21 and 4.22 misled the jury in its consideration of the intent requirement. ( Cain, at pp. 38-39.) 4. The Escape Instruction The jury was informed that defendant had pled guilty to a charge of escaping from a police officer. The court read to the jury an abbreviated and modified version of CALJIC No. 7.30, as follows: The defendant has been convicted of the crime of escape without force or violence, in violation of section 4532(b) of the Penal Code. Every person arrested and booked and charged with a felony who is under the lawful custody of an officer who escapes or attempts to escape from the lawful custody of such officer is guilty of the crime of escape without force or violence, in violation of Penal Code section 4532(b). The written instructions provided to the jury included the standard terminology from the form instruction referring to [e]very prisoner arrested and booked and charged.... (Italics added.) Defendant contends the failure to change prisoner to person in the written instructions violated his constitutional rights because the jury was likely to have inferred that he had escaped from state prison. Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object below. The inconsistency between the oral and written instructions is trivial and did not even arguably affect his substantial rights. (§ 1259.) The evidence and argument made it plain that the escape was from the custody of a police officer, and both the oral and written instructions so specified. 5. The Clerk Had Been Stabbed Testimony During the questioning of Jerome Van Tress, the salesman who observed defendant attacking a 7-Eleven clerk in 1984, Van Tress began to relate what happened when he drove to a police station to report what he had seen. Defense counsel objected after Van Tress stated the police officer at the desk said. The prosecutor responded that it may not be offered for its truth, we don't know what it is. So it might not be hearsay. The court allowed Van Tress to answer, subject to a motion to strike. Van Tress continued, he said that the clerk had been stabbed. The court sustained defense counsel's objection and directed the jury to disregard the answer. (19) Defendant argues that the court erred by failing to require the prosecutor to establish that Van Tress's testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated under the hearsay statute (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a)), before permitting Van Tress to finish his statement. Defendant relies on cases discussing the necessity of proving the existence of a preliminary fact before proffered evidence is deemed admissible, under Evidence Code section 403. (E.g., People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 514 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420]; People v. Pic'l (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 824, 859-860 [171 Cal.Rptr. 106], disapproved on another point in People v. Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 498.) These cases are inapposite; whether testimony is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is not a preliminary fact, but an intrinsic part of the determination whether a statement is hearsay. In any event, the court's authority to allow a witness to answer on a provisional basis, subject to a motion to strike, is recognized in Evidence Code section 403 itself, as well as in other contexts. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (b); 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Presentation at Trial, § 388, p. 481.) Nevertheless, we note that the better practice would have been to resolve the hearsay question before revealing the witness's statement to the jury. It is not unreasonable to expect advocates to know what evidence they are eliciting and be prepared to defend its admissibility in advance. The prosecutor's excuse that we don't know what it is invited the court to go forward and hope to rectify any problem after the fact. Under the circumstances, however, defendant can show no prejudice. [19] The jury was informed that defendant had admitted intentionally inflicting great bodily injury on the victim, and it heard Van Tress testify that he had seen quite a bit of blood on the floor of the 7-Eleven and on the sidewalk outside. The jury also learned, as we discuss next, that when defendant was arrested the same day, there was a bloody knife next to him. Thus, even assuming the jury would not have been able to follow the court's instruction to disregard Van Tress's hearsay testimony, in light of this other evidence the reference to stabbing was not in itself so prejudicial as to violate any fundamental right. 6. The Bloody Knife Evidence Detective Richard Knapp testified that he and a colleague went to an apartment across the street from the 7-Eleven on the day of the robbery, following a lead. Inside they found defendant lying on the floor, next to a table on which there was a folding knife. The knife was closed. When Knapp examined it, he saw what appeared to be dried blood on the inside and outside of the handle. Defendant contends this testimony was irrelevant to any statutory aggravating factor. The claim is meritless. The fact that defendant was found with a bloody knife not long after the robbery was relevant to prove criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant's arguments disputing the probative value of this evidence go to its weight, rather than its admissibility. 7. General Objections to the Use of Unadjudicated Criminal Activity Defendant raises a number of general objections to the use of unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (b). We have consistently rejected these challenges. Section 190.3, factor (b) is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976-977 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630]; People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 922.) Defendant contends our decisions construing this factor have resulted in procedural protections less rigorous than those provided to noncapital defendants. However, the authority to which he refers fails to support his assertion that penalty phase procedures are constitutionally required to be more stringent than other criminal procedures. (See Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 87 [84 L.Ed.2d 53, 105 S.Ct. 1087] (conc. opn. of Burger, C. J.); Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 117-118 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869] (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.); Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 605-606 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954].) To the contrary, it is settled that defendants in capital cases are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants. Thus, the objection that section 190.3, factor (b) operates differently from noncapital procedures is meritless, as is defendant's equal protection claim. ( People v. Carey, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 136; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 754 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145].) The use of the same jury to determine guilt and to weigh the other-crimes evidence does not deprive defendants of an impartial jury. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 335 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 428 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000].) Defendant argues that his counsel was unable to adequately question prospective jurors during voir dire regarding the unadjudicated crimes, due to the risk of biasing them during the guilt phase, at which the other-crimes evidence was inadmissible. However, he provides no specific argument on this point, and elsewhere he concedes that the unadjudicated offenses involved alleged robbery and threatened assaultive conduct similar to the charged crimes. Because counsel was free to explore the prospective jurors' attitudes in regard to the charged crimes, defendant fails to demonstrate any prejudice, even if he could establish a constitutional violation. Jury unanimity is not required with respect to unadjudicated criminal conduct. ( People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1059 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596]; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 541-542 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032].) Nor does expiration of the statute of limitations bar the use of such conduct as an aggravating factor. ( Barnwell, at p. 1058 [citing cases].) Defendant cites Johnson v. Mississippi (1998) 486 U.S. 578, 585-586 [100 L.Ed.2d 575, 108 S.Ct. 1981], for the proposition that procedures governing consideration of other-crimes evidence at the penalty phase must conform to the constitutional standards governing proof of charged offenses. However, as we have pointed out, Johnson does not say that. ( Barnwell, at p. 1058, fn. 15; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 137-138 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].) Juvenile misconduct may properly be introduced as evidence in aggravation. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 737 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289]; People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 378; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 295 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].)