Opinion ID: 2816279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adverse Effect on Fire District Operations

Text: Anzaldua argues the defendants can satisfy this step only if they present specific evidence of actual disruption. However, “‘[e]vidence of actual disruption . . . is not required in all cases.’” Bailey, 451 F.3d at 521 (alterations in original) (quoting Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1344 (8th Cir. 1993)); see also Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 1995) (“A showing of actual disruption is not always required in the balancing process under Pickering.”). This is because “‘we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.’” Hemminghaus, 756 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152). Thus “‘[w]e have consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large.’” Id. (quoting -15- Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (plurality opinion) (“Few of the examples we have discussed involve tangible, present interference with the agency’s operation. The danger in them is mostly speculative.”)). And “‘we have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public concern.’” Id. (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (plurality opinion)).3 Further, a fire department, as a public safety organization, “has a more significant interest than the typical government employer in regulating the speech activities of its employees in order ‘to promote efficiency, foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain morale, and instill public confidence’ in its ability.” Shands, 993 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1419 (8th Cir. 1983)). “‘When lives may be at stake in a fire, an espirit de corps is essential to the success of the joint endeavor.’” Id. at 1344-45 (quoting Janusaitis v. 3 We recognize some Eighth Circuit cases seem to support Anzaldua’s argument that employers must always present specific evidence of actual disruption. See, e.g., Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 882 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Where, as here, the employer has failed to demonstrate any disruption, there is no balancing to be done and the evidentiary failure is fatal to the claim of qualified immunity.”). To the extent these cases represent a split among panels in our circuit, we note that Anzaldua fails to cite, and we have failed to locate, any case supporting his argument that predates Germann v. City of Kan. City, 776 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1985) (“It is not necessary ‘for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.’” (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 )); see Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[W]hen faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earliest opinion must be followed as it should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the conflict.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, we recently observed that Supreme Court precedent places in question the soundness of the cases that suggest employers must present specific evidence of actual disruption. See Hemminghaus, 756 F.3d at 1112 n.10 (citing Waters, 511 U.S. at 673; and Connick, 461 U.S. at 152). -16- Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 1979)). Thus we give “considerable judicial deference” to the defendants’ determination that Anzaldua’s “speech had caused or would cause dissension and disruption.” Id. at 1345. Moreover, although we do not require actual evidence of disruption in all cases, it exists here. Three firefighters submitted declarations showing the disruption Anzaldua’s email caused. Lieutenant Barbarotto explained she was “shocked both by the contents of the email . . . and that [Anzaldua] would send” it. She stated the email “angered” many firefighters, who worried it would “make [them] a public laughing stock.” Two battalion chiefs similarly reported the email “shocked and irritated many firefighters in the District” and “fostered division between Anzaldua and his co-workers, and between the District firefighters and [Chief] Farwell.” Anzaldua’s email also attacked Chief Farwell personally, accusing him of shutting down pumpers, prioritizing his business over his firefighters’ safety, and violating the Fire District’s vehicle use and cell phone policies. See Bailey, 451 F.3d at 521 (“The letter accused Bailey’s superiors of fraud and legal and ethical violations. Such accusations are sufficient evidence of potential workplace disruption.”). Thus this is not a case where the Fire District had no supporting evidence of disruption or relied on its own “[m]ere allegations of disruption.” Sexton, 210 F.3d at 912; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (giving deference to supervisor’s determination of disruption because “[w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate”). Viewed in light of the considerable deference we owe the Fire District’s determination of actual or potential disruption, we find the defendants satisfy this step.