Opinion ID: 1676916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority to Condemn for the Construction of an Off-Street Public Parking Facility

Text: Whether a municipality has statutory authority to condemn property for off-street public parking facilities is an issue of first impression for this Court. Section 11-47-170, Code 1975, which grants municipalities general condemnatory powers, provides that [w]henever in the judgment of the council or other governing body of a city or town it may be necessary or expedient for the carrying out and full exercise of any power granted by the applicable provisions of this title or any other applicable provision of law, the said town or city shall have full power and authority to acquire by purchase the necessary lands... or, for the purposes for which private property may be acquired by condemnation, may proceed to condemn the same in the manner provided by this article, or by the general laws of this state governing the taking of lands or the acquiring of interests therein for the uses for which private property may be taken .... Section 11-47-241(1), Code 1975, specifically grants to cities having a population of 34,000 or more the authority to plan, establish, develop, acquire, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regulate and protect parking facilities. The term parking facility includes any building for off-street parking of motor vehicles. Code 1975, § 11-47-240(3). Section 11-61-2, Code 1975, enlarged the scope of this provision by granting to any city or town the aforementioned powers. Although we agree with the circuit court's initial premise that the power of eminent domain cannot be exercised until conferred by statute, either in express words or by necessary implication, Dean v. County Bd. of Education, 210 Ala. 256, 97 So. 741 (1923), we do not agree with the circuit court's conclusion that no statutory authority exists for a city to condemn property for an off-street public parking facility. The circuit court thought it significant that Code 1975, § 11-47-241, and § 11-61-2, did not specifically grant cities the power of eminent domain in connection with parking facilities and that Code 1975, § 11-47-170, the general condemnation statute, failed to mention the specific purpose of off-street public parking. In so holding, the circuit court failed to adhere to the rule of statutory construction which requires that all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose be read together to constitute one law. American Life Ins. Co. v. State, 226 Ala. 383, 147 So. 168 (1933); City of Mobile v. Smith, 223 Ala. 480, 136 So. 851 (1931). Yet, when these three statutes are read in pari materia, it is clear that § 11-47-170 allows cities to condemn property to carry out the parking facility powers bestowed by § 11-47-241 and § 11-61-2 if construction of an off-street public parking facility is a purpose for which property may be acquired by condemnation.... Because Code 1975, § 11-47-170, fails to define the phrase for the purposes for which property may be acquired by condemnation..., we must examine prior law, related statutes, and constitutional provisions to determine the legislative intent. State v. AAA Motor Lines, Inc., 275 Ala. 405, 155 So.2d 509 (1963). Our court has determined that property may not be condemned except for a recognized public use. Gralapp v. Mississippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368, 194 So.2d 527 (1967). This public use requirement is also contained within Ala. Const. art. XII, § 235, which mandates that municipalities pay just compensation when exercising the privilege of taking property for public use. Although we have not specifically ruled upon whether use of property for off-street public parking in urban areas is a public use, other jurisdictions clearly recognize this use as being public. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Georgetown, 301 Ky. 241, 191 S.W.2d 403 (1945); Bowman v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 233 S.W.2d 26 (1950). The Alabama legislature, moreover, has implicitly recognized that the use of property for off-street public parking in urban areas constitutes a public use in its declaration that providing off-street parking in urban areas is necessary to the health, safety and general welfare of the public. Act of October 1, 1971, No. 2079, § 1, 1971 Ala.Acts 3335. We therefore hold that the use of property for off-street public parking in urban areas is a public use which constitutes a purpose for which property may be acquired by condemnation ... in accordance with Code 1975, § 11-47-170. The Williamses argue, however, that because the term acquire, found in a 1933 statute, was construed to relate to a transaction by purchase or gift but not to a transaction by condemnation, we should likewise construe the present statutory language to preclude the authority to condemn. J. Blach & Sons, Inc. v. Hawkins, 238 Ala. 172, 189 So. 726 (1939). When the same words are used in different statutes relating to different subjects, the extent of the meaning of the words is not always the same. City of Mobile v. Harker, 204 Ala. 26, 85 So. 425 (1920). The statute in the Blach opinion authorized municipalities to acquire property outside of the municipality for public utility rights-of-way. The policy considerations militating in favor of a strict construction of the Blach statute, which denied condemnatory powers to acquire property outside municipal boundaries, are not present here. In the first place, the Williams property is located within municipal boundaries and hence within the City's ostensible condemnatory powers. More importantly, the limitation of the term acquire to by purchase or gift would render the § 11-47-171 term acquire by purchase redundant and the term acquire by condemnation oxymoronic. Because we cannot presume that the legislature used language without any meaning or application, Robinson v. State, 361 So.2d 1113 (Ala.), on remand, 361 So.2d 1115 (Ala.Crim.App.1978), we cannot adopt the Williamses' strict construction of the statutory term acquire. The City therefore possessed the requisite statutory authority to condemn private property located within its borders for an off-street public parking facility.