Opinion ID: 151405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: eppolito

Text: Eppolito, on this appeal, contends principally that he did not receive constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. He argues that his attorney Bruce Cutler did not communicate with him adequately; failed to investigate, call favorable witnesses, or introduce and marshal evidence; and failed to inform him of his right to testify. We are unpersuaded. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must meet both prongs of the standard set by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), by (1) demonstrating that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and (2) affirmatively prove prejudice arising from counsel's allegedly deficient representation, id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 427 F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir.2005). In applying this standard, a reviewing court must `indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound [legal] strategy.' United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 468 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 990, 125 S.Ct. 1878, 161 L.Ed.2d 751 (2005). And to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that ... `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding below would have been different.' Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In the present case, following the jury's verdicts, both Caracappa and Eppolito moved for a new trial based on claims, inter alia, that their respective attorneys had failed to render constitutionally effective assistance. The district court held a three-day evidentiary hearing into defendants' contentions and rejected their claims in Eppolito I, 436 F.Supp.2d at 561-65. That decision was not at issue in Eppolito II. Insofar as Eppolito contended that Cutler did not adequately communicate with him, the district court rejected that claim without discussion, see Eppolito I, 436 F.Supp.2d at 564; its rejection is supported by the record. Cutler testified that he had an open line of communication with Eppolito (Hearing Transcript, June 26, 2006, at 388) and spoke with him every morning of the trial ( id. ). Edward Hayes, Caracappa's counsel, testified that Cutler met with Eppolito on a regular basis during the trial. ( Id. at 446.) In addition, Bettina Schein, Cutler's co-counsel, testified, inter alia, that Eppolito had been pleased with Cutler's performance and made no complaints until the verdict was returned. ( Id. at 477-78.) The record thus supports the district court's rejection of Eppolito's lack-of-communication claim. Eppolito's other contentions were expressly rejected by the district court following the hearing. With respect to the claim of failure to investigate, to call favorable witnesses, or to introduce and marshal evidence, the court described the pertinent legal principles, in relevant part, as follows: The duty to investigate is essential to the adversarial testing process `because the testing process generally will not function properly unless defense counsel has done some investigation into the prosecution's case and into various defense strategies.' Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 320 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). This duty requires defense counsel either to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 200 (2d Cir.2001). It does not, however, compel counsel to conduct a comprehensive investigation of every possible lead or defense, see, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; Wells, 417 F.3d at 321, or to scour the globe on the off-chance something will turn up. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2463, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). [R]easonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste. Id. Eppolito I, 436 F.Supp.2d at 562. The court found that this standard had not been met: The performance of both attorneys was far from constitutionally ineffective. Counsel were assisted by excellent investigators who, with the help of both defendants and Caracappa's brother, Domenick Caracappa, thoroughly investigated the case, studying vast amounts of discovery material and following up on leads. Multiple witnesses testified that Eppolito's counsel, Bruce Cutler, personally analyzed hundreds of hours of audio recorded by key government witness Steven Corso. Investigator Jack Ryancalled by Eppolito to testify on his behalf at the hearingstated that Cutler was open and approachable regarding investigative leads.... Eppolito maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective because he refused to call witnesses that Eppolito thought could assist him, including Lizzie Hydell, the sister of murder victim James Hydell; Al Guaneri, Eppolito's brother-in-law and fellow retired New York City police detective; and Anthony Casso, the defendants' prevaricating co-conspirator. Cutler's choice not to call these witnesses, however misunderstood by his client, was not only a reasonable strategic decision, but an eminently wise one. As Cutler explained, the value of Guaneri's testimony was debatable and Guaneri indicated that he had mixed feelings about Eppolito and was reluctant to testify. Lizzie Hydell was understandably hostile to Eppolito, casting doubt on the value of any testimony she might have been able to give on his behalf. Calling Casso would have been an unmitigated disaster; up until the final days of the trial, Casso had done nothing but implicate the defendants, even making eleventh-hour attempts to assist the government. Given the strong evidence presented by the government, the primary strategy left to defense counsel was, as Cutler testified, to pulverize the government's witnesses on cross-examination, which Cutler and Hayes both attempted with gusto. Cutler repeatedly and strenuously challenged the credibility of the witnesses, pointing out their motives to lie and the inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimony. That his attempts to shake these witnesses was ultimately unsuccessful is not an indication of any failing on Cutler's part, but rather resulted from the overwhelming strength of the government's case and its witnesses. .... Hayes' co-counsel, Rae Koshetz, argued the statute of limitations issue at length and in detail. Although Koshetz's argument was ostensibly made solely on behalf of Caracappa, it should, for the purposes of determining prejudice, be deemed to have been made for both defendants, since the argument applied equally to both. Thus, even if it was error for Cutler not to have raised the statute of limitations argument in his own summation, Eppolito could not have been prejudiced by this failure on the part of his counsel. The court has considered the additional allegations of error relied upon by the defendants and concludes that none of these contentions supports the conclusion that the defendants were denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. While there may be disagreement as to the value of the sometimes baroque style of these two attorneys, they were clearly skilled, dedicated to their clients, and enormously hardworking. Monday-morning quarterbacking is not a sport encouraged by the laws governing ineffective assistance claims. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (there are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case and even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way). Eppolito I, 436 F.Supp.2d at 563-64. We see no error in this ruling. Finally, with respect to the contention that Cutler failed to advise Eppolito that he had the right to testify at trial, the district court observed that [a] defendant's right to testify in his own defense is personal and may not be waived by his attorney over the defendant's opposition. Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.1997); Campos v. United States, 930 F.Supp. 787, 789 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Trial counsel's duty of effective assistance includes the responsibility to advise the defendant concerning the exercise of this constitutional right. Brown, 124 F.3d at 79. [A]ny claim by [a] defendant that defense counsel has not discharged this responsibilityeither by failing to inform the defendant of the right to testify or by overriding the defendant's desire to testifymust satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington for assessing whether counsel has rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance: objectively unreasonable performance and prejudice. Id. (internal citations omitted). Eppolito I, 436 F.Supp.2d at 562. The district court rejected Eppolito's right-to-testify-based ineffective assistance claim for failure to meet the prejudice prong: At the June 23, 2006 evidentiary hearing, Eppolito testified that his trial counsel, Bruce Cutler, had not informed him that he had a constitutional right to testify and had repeatedly refused his requests to take the stand, telling him that he would never take the stand so long as Cutler was his attorney. Eppolito also asserted that, despite his over twenty years of work in law enforcement, he was unaware of his right to testify. Although both Cutler and his co-counsel, Bettina Schein, conceded that neither of them had specifically informed Eppolito that he had a constitutional right to testify, both refuted Eppolito's claim that he had repeatedly insisted that he should testify. Cutler and Schein testified that they had each discussed the issue of Eppolito testifying with him once before the trial, advising him that his testimony would do little to help and much to hurt him, given the court's exclusion of bad acts evidence the government wanted to introduce. Schein also testified that her discussion with Eppolito led her to believe that Eppolito was well aware of his right to testify if he chose to do so over counsel's advice. Because Eppolito's testimony at the hearing made it clear that he was not a credible witness-he admitted to being an inveterate liar, repeatedly contradicted his own prior recorded statements and written accounts, and gave inconsistent answers to the same questions at different times during his testimony-the court does not credit his assertions regarding his lack of knowledge of his right to testify and Cutler's refusal to allow him to testify. As for Cutler's failure to inform Eppolito of his right, the law is unclear regarding whether he was required to give Eppolito a prophylactic, Miranda-like warning or merely to determine that Eppolito was aware of, and could make an intelligent decision regarding, his right to testify. Compare Brown, 124 F.3d at 79 (counsel must inform the defendant that the ultimate decision whether to take the stand belongs to the defendant) with DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F.Supp. 1330, 1358 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (There is no blanket requirement that counsel must explicitly warn all of their clients that they have the ultimate right to decide whether or not to testify.). Cutler admitted that he did not, in so many words, tell Eppolito that he had an absolute right to testify, but both he and Schein discussed the issue of testifying with Eppolito, and Schein believed Eppolito knew of his right. Regardless of the relevant standard-and regardless of whether Cutler did or did not fulfill it-Eppolito's claim must fail. Even if Cutler was required to explicitly inform Eppolito of his right to testify, Eppolito did not establish that the outcome of the trial could have been different had he testified. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (even if counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different). On the contrary, Eppolito's testimony at the hearing made it overwhelmingly clear that his testimony at the trial would have proven a disaster to himself and his co-defendant. In addition to describing himself, under oath, as a man who would lie in order to get what he wanted, Eppolito gave numerous examples of times when he had lied or embellished in order to further his career or his image. He discussed his own racism at great length, volunteering a long list of racial slurs that he said he often used; admitted to having placed a sawed-off shotgun in the mouth of a man who had insulted his mother, expressing disbelief when the prosecutor asked him whether he knew that such an act was illegal; and confessed to having removed files from the police department without permission. On cross-examination, he repeatedly volunteered more self-damaging information than was necessary to answer the prosecution's questions. As for his testimony regarding the crimes with which he was charged, it appears that, aside from a general denial of involvement, Eppolito had little to say. Although Eppolito claimed that he had told his counsel that he could refute the charges against him, his testimony at the hearing gave no indication that this was the case. His testimony about the critical issue of his association with Burton Kaplannamely, that he knew Kaplan as a merchant of clothingwould not have added anything that had not been brought out on his counsel's cross-examination of Kaplan. Eppolito I, 436 F.Supp.2d at 564-65 (emphasis added). Given the district court's superior ability to make credibility assessments based on its first-hand observation of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, we defer to those assessments, and we see no error in the court's factual findings. We reject Eppolito's claim that he was denied effective assistance because of counsel's failure to advise him of his right to testify substantially for the reasons stated by the district court.