Opinion ID: 873205
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Attorney General may permit an alien

Text: voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection, in lieu of being subject to [removal] proceedings . . . or prior to the completion of such proceedings, if the alien is not deportable” for reason of an aggravated felony or terrorist activity. UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 13 relying on that removal at trial, United States v. Medina, 236 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001), it would not necessarily invalidate the indictment. Generally, an indictment is sufficient so long as it sets forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense. United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 727 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). However, where a defendant is successful in collaterally attacking the only prior removal that supported the government’s case, we have held that dismissal of the indictment is appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Camacho-Lopez, 450 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2006). This is because, under those narrow circumstances, there would be no question that the government lacked the evidence to convict the defendant. See United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 855 n.25 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that a district court may dismiss an indictment where the facts are undisputed); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 842 (1987). The result is different in this case. Here, the indictment tracks § 1326(a)’s elements by alleging that Rojas was an alien who was deported or removed from the United States and was subsequently found in the United States without authorization. The indictment does not rely on a particular removal for the § 1326(a) charge, and at trial the government introduced and relied on evidence of Rojas’s 1997 removal order as well as the April 2010 removal to prove the elements of the § 1326(a) charge. Because the government relied on removals other than the April 2010 removal to support its case, we reject Rojas’s argument that the court erred in not dismissing the § 1326(a) charge in the indictment. 14 UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 2 We must still consider, however, whether the district court erred in not dismissing the § 1326(b) charge in the indictment. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part). In order to subject a defendant to § 1326(b)’s enhanced penalties, the government must allege in the indictment and prove at trial that the defendant was removed after a particular date. United States v. Contreras-Hernandez, 628 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).6 To that end, the indictment alleged that Rojas “was removed from the United States subsequent to December 12, 2008.” Because it is undisputed that the April 2010 removal was the only removal that occurred after this date, the government cannot prove the § 1326(b) charge if Rojas successfully challenges that removal. Accordingly, we turn to Rojas’s collateral challenge to the April 2010 removal, which was based on a reinstatement of the 1998 removal order. In order to make a collateral challenge to a prior removal or deportation order, a defendant must satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires the defendant to demonstrate that “(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued 6 At sentencing, the district court determines, based on the date alleged and proved by the government, whether “the alien’s removal occurred after [a] qualifying conviction” that triggers § 1326(b)’s enhanced penalties. Contreras-Hernandez, 628 F.3d at 1174–75 (internal quotation marks omitted). UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 15 improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” § 1326(d).7 Under our case law, a defendant can meet all these requirements by establishing that the IJ failed to inform the defendant “of his or her apparent eligibility” for relief as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2),8 and that the defendant had plausible grounds for relief. See United States v. VidalMendoza, 705 F.3d 1012, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2013). 7 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) states: Limitation on collateral attack on underlying deportation order In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not challenge the validity of the deportation order described in subsection (a)(1) of this section or subsection (b) of this section unless the alien demonstrates that— (1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 8 Section 1240.11(a)(2) states: The immigration judge shall inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during the hearing . . . . 16 UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA We recently explained why an IJ’s failure to inform an alien regarding “apparent eligibility” for relief fulfills the requirements of §§ 1326(d)(1) and (2), and part of § 1326(d)(3). Id. First, the IJ’s error excuses the alien from the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 1326(d)(1), because “we deem the alien’s waiver of the right to an administrative appeal to have been insufficiently ‘considered and intelligent.’” Id. at 1015 (quoting United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2004)). Second, the same failure to inform an alien regarding “apparent eligibility” for relief also “deprive[s] the alien of the opportunity for judicial review,” § 1326(d)(2), because “an alien who is not made aware that he has a right to seek relief necessarily has no meaningful opportunity to appeal the fact that he was not advised of that right.” United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). Finally, this same error partially satisfies the requirement of § 1326(d)(3), that the entry of the removal order was “fundamentally unfair.” A removal order is “fundamentally unfair,” if “(1) [the alien’s] due process rights were violated by defects in his underlying deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the defects.” Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have concluded that an IJ’s failure to advise an alien of “apparent eligibility” to apply for relief is a due process violation, United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), and thus satisfies the first prong of § 1326(d)(3). For purposes of this analysis, eligibility for relief is “apparent” where “the record, fairly reviewed by an individual who is intimately familiar with the immigration laws[,] . . . raises a reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for relief.” Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 897 UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry “focuse[s] on whether the factual circumstances in the record before the IJ suggest that an alien could be eligible for relief.” Id. at 900. Because “IJs are not expected to be clairvoyant,” we have explained that an IJ need not advise an alien of possible relief when the record lacks such a factual basis. Id As a result, “[u]ntil the alien himself or some other person puts information before the judge that makes such eligibility apparent,” the IJ’s duty to advise the alien “does not come into play.” Id. Where an IJ failed to advise an alien “of his or her apparent eligibility” for relief, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2), the alien must still establish prejudice under the second prong of § 1326(d)(3). This requires the alien to make an additional showing and demonstrate “plausible grounds” for relief. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d at 1054. “Where the relevant form of relief is discretionary, the alien must make a ‘plausible’ showing that the facts presented would cause the Attorney General to exercise discretion in his favor.” United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the alien has made this showing, we apply a two-step process. First, we identify the factors relevant to the IJ’s exercise of discretion for the relief being sought. See id. at 1089–90. Next, we determine whether, “in light of the factors relevant to the form of relief being sought, and based on the unique circumstances of the alien’s own case, it was plausible (not merely conceivable) that the IJ would have exercised his discretion in the alien’s favor.” Id. at 1089 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). In making this determination, we are not concerned with general statistics. Id. Instead, we focus on whether aliens 18 UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA with similar circumstances received relief. See id. at 1091 n.17. We applied this two-step approach in Barajas-Alvarado. There, the defendant argued that the IJ erroneously failed to inform him about the opportunity to withdraw his application for admission. Id. at 1089. Because an immigration officer’s authority to grant this relief is discretionary, we began by identifying the factors relevant to the exercise of such discretion. Id. In this regard, we noted that the field manual applicable to immigration officers set forth six factors, including seriousness of the immigration violation, previous findings of inadmissibility, and intent to violate the law. Id. at 1090. We next considered the specific circumstances of the defendant’s case. There, the defendant had conceded that he deliberately presented false documents, had been removed twice, and had been subject to multiple findings of inadmissibility. Id. at 1090. Applying the relevant factors to the specific circumstances of the defendant’s case, we concluded that it was not plausible that the IJ would have exercised discretion in the defendant’s favor. Id. at 1090–91. In doing so, we rejected the defendant’s argument that it was plausible he would have received discretionary relief “as a matter of statistics,” id. at 1091, and noted that we had previously considered statistical evidence that IJs grant discretionary relief applications “fifty percent of the time” to be insufficient to show plausibility of relief. Id. (quoting United States v. Corrales-Beltran, 192 F.3d 1311, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999)). Finally, we rejected as inapposite the alien’s citations to “two cases in which an alien . . . presented false documents and was granted withdrawal.” Id. at 1091 n.17. “Because [those] cases involve[d] aliens in very different factual circumstances, and the courts in those cases neither addressed nor explained why the alien was granted UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 19 withdrawal relief,” we held that they did not help the defendant “carry his burden of showing it was plausible he would have been granted relief in his unique circumstances.” Id. 3 We now apply § 1326(d)’s requirements to Rojas’s challenge to his 1998 removal order. Pursuant to § 1326(d), we begin by considering whether Rojas adequately established that the IJ failed to inform him of relief for which he claims he was apparently eligible. Here, the record is ambiguous. During the 1998 proceedings, Rojas informed the IJ that, during the 1997 proceeding he had “signed [his] voluntary deportation.” Based on this testimony, “an individual who is intimately familiar with the immigration laws,” Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 896 (internal quotation marks omitted), could reasonably conclude that Rojas was not eligible for pre-conclusion voluntary departure in 1998 because he had previously received voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(c).9 Nevertheless, the record also contained information suggesting that Rojas had not received voluntary departure in 1997. Specifically, the government lawyer noted that Rojas’s file “reflects a removal on June 23, 1997.” 9 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(c) states: The Attorney General shall not permit an alien to depart voluntarily under this section if the alien was previously permitted to so depart after having been found inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(A) of this title [aliens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled]. 20 UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA In light of the ambiguity in the record regarding whether Rojas had apparent eligibility for relief (which would satisfy § 1326(d)(1) and (2) and the first component of § 1326(d)(3)), we instead resolve Rojas’s collateral challenge based on the more straightforward inquiry raised by the second component of § 1326(d)(3): whether Rojas was prejudiced by the IJ’s failure to inform him of the possibility of applying for that relief. Because pre-conclusion voluntary departure is a form of discretionary relief, we apply Barajas-Alvarado’s two-part test in determining prejudice. Under the first step of this test, we identify the factors relevant to a discretionary grant of pre-conclusion voluntary departure. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1089–90. The BIA has long established that “[i]n exercising discretion on a voluntary departure application” an IJ should take into account both favorable and unfavorable factors. See Matter of Gamboa, 14 I. & N. Dec. 244, 248 (BIA 1972) (citing cases). The BIA has consistently maintained this approach. See Matter of Arguelles-Campos, 22 I. & N. Dec. 811, 817 (BIA 1999) (explaining that in deciding whether an alien warrants “a favorable exercise of discretion” with respect to pre-conclusion voluntary departure, an IJ should weigh both favorable and unfavorable equities); see also Matter of Loera, 2011 WL 6962801 (BIA Dec. 8, 2011). Favorable equities include long residence, close family ties to the United States, and humanitarian needs. Arguelles-Campos, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 817; accord Gamboa, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 248; Loera, 2011 WL 6962801. Unfavorable equities include “the nature and underlying circumstances of the deportation ground at issue; additional violations of the immigration laws; the existence, seriousness, and recency of any criminal record; and any UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 21 other evidence of bad character or the undesirability of the applicant as a permanent resident.” Arguellos-Campos, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 817; accord Gamboa, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 248 (noting unfavorable factors “including the alien’s prior immigration history, the nature of his entry or entries . . . his violations of the immigration and other laws, and the like”). Having identified the relevant factors, we now apply them to the unique circumstances of Rojas’s case as of 1998. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1089. Although Rojas came to the United States in 1982, there is no evidence that he continuously resided in this country. To the contrary, Rojas admits that he lived “off and on” in the United States. At the 1998 hearing, he stated that he had no immediate family who were United States citizens or residents. The record as of 1998 also showed that Rojas had a number of negative equities. His immigration history would have reflected two illegal entries, one in 1982 and a second entry in July 1997, just one month after his June 1997 removal. In addition, Rojas had four misdemeanor convictions for driving offenses between 1994 and 1997, including two convictions for driving under the influence. Based on these factors, it is not plausible that an IJ would have exercised discretion in Rojas’s favor at his 1998 hearing. The record showed no positive equities, other than Rojas’s intermittent stays in the United States.10 By contrast, the record showed numerous negative equities, including his illegal entries and convictions. In particular, the BIA has noted that driving under the influence is a serious negative factor. Matter of Romero-Reyes, 2010 WL 3780635 (BIA 10 Rojas does not claim to have had relatives who were United States citizens or legal residents in 1998. 22 UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA Sept. 9, 2010); Matter of Butt, 2010 WL 2846348 (BIA June 25, 2010). Our review of BIA cases supports the conclusion that Rojas lacked a plausible case for relief.11 We note that the BIA has affirmed denials of voluntary departure in a number of cases in which the aliens had equities better than or similar to Rojas’s equities. See, e.g., Matter of Posadas-Posadas, 2012 WL 371659 (BIA Jan. 18, 2012) (affirming a denial of voluntary departure as a matter of discretion where the alien was arrested twice for driving on a suspended license and once for driving under the influence, but had family ties to the United States); Matter of Martinez-Hernandez, 2011 WL 4446883 (BIA Sept. 6, 2011) (affirming a denial of voluntary departure as a matter of discretion where the alien had no criminal history but also no positive equities); Matter of Herrera-Lopez, 2003 WL 23521816 (BIA Oct. 31, 2003) (affirming a denial of voluntary departure as a matter of discretion where the alien had convictions for public nuisance, domestic battery, and possession of an open container in a vehicle, and the alien misrepresented his criminal history to the IJ); Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 580, 586 (BIA 1992) (affirming a denial of voluntary departure as a matter of discretion where the alien had a single conviction for the possession of an altered immigration document, but had been residing in the United States for seven years and intended to marry a United States citizen with whom he had a child); Matter of Lemhammad, 20 I. & N. Dec. 316, 318, 324–26 (BIA 1991) (affirming a denial of 11 The BIA reviews an IJ’s exercise of discretion de novo. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (ii); Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 493, 496–97 (BIA 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Huang v. Attorney Gen., 620 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010). UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 23 voluntary departure as a matter of discretion where the alien had accepted money to take the exams of three college students and had a single assault conviction that resulted in a two day jail sentence, but had a United States citizen brother, desired to complete his education in the United States, and had entered the United States legally). In cases where the BIA reversed a denial of voluntary departure, the aliens’ equities were more favorable to them than Rojas’s. See, e.g., Matter of Hernandez-Mata, 2010 WL 4500914 (BIA Oct. 18, 2010) (reversing a denial of voluntary departure where the alien was arrested for intoxication, but had two United States citizen children and other family in the United States); Matter of Maldonado-Hernandez, 2010 WL 4509754 (BIA Oct. 22, 2010) (reversing a denial of voluntary departure when the alien was 19 years old, had lived in United States for ten years, and had no criminal record); Matter of Hernandez-Garcia, 2012 WL 1705671 (BIA Apr. 11, 2012) (reversing a denial of voluntary departure where the alien impersonated a United States citizen in attempt to procure a passport, but whose spouse and child were United States citizens). Although Rojas points to cases in which aliens with serious criminal histories received voluntary departure, those cases involved aliens with significant family ties and other positive equities that Rojas lacks. For example, in Matter of Gonzales-Figeroa, 2006 WL 729784 (BIA Feb. 10, 2006), an alien with multiple assault convictions was granted voluntary departure. But in addition to a long history in the United States, the alien in Gonzalez-Figeroa also had a sister and two nieces who were United States citizens, a mother who was a permanent resident (whom the alien helped with rent and medical expenses), no other adverse immigration history, 24 UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA and a pending visa application. Id. Similarly, in Matter of Battista, 19 I. & N. Dec. 484 (BIA 1987), an alien convicted of breaking and entering, grand theft, and possession of criminal tools was granted voluntary departure, but he had a United States citizen spouse who was pregnant at the time of the deportation hearing, United States citizen parents, and United States citizen siblings. Indeed, the history of this very case confirms our conclusion that Rojas did not have a plausible claim for voluntary departure in 1998. In June 1997, the IJ declined to grant Rojas voluntary departure even though the IJ was not aware of Rojas’s criminal history and Rojas had only one illegal entry at the time. By the 1998 hearing, Rojas had an additional illegal entry, which occurred in July 1997. Given that the first IJ declined to grant Rojas voluntary departure, it is not plausible that the second IJ, after learning of Rojas’s additional unfavorable equities, would have granted Rojas voluntary departure in 1998. In short, when considered in light of the relevant factors, Rojas’s equities would not have caused an IJ to grant him voluntary departure in 1998. Therefore, we conclude that Rojas failed to carry his burden of establishing plausible grounds for relief. For this reason, Rojas has failed to show he suffered prejudice as a result of the IJ not informing him of the availability of pre-conclusion voluntary departure. Because Rojas was not prejudiced, the 1998 removal order was not “fundamentally unfair,” and he cannot satisfy § 1326(d)(3). See Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048. Accordingly, the district court did not err in rejecting Rojas’s motion to dismiss the § 1326(b) charge in the indictment. UNITED STATES V . ROJAS-PEDROZA 25