Opinion ID: 3055301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: redacted wiretap applications and orders

Text: This Court reviews an issue of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011).
Carson’s next argument on appeal is that the contents of the wiretapped conversations and evidence obtained under the wiretaps should have been excluded because “only parts” of the supporting applications and orders were provided to the defense prior to trial. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9), The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party, not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying 35 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 36 of 53 application, under which the interception was authorized or approved. This ten-day period may be waived by the judge if he finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the above information ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving such information. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (emphasis added). In accordance with the statute, the government furnished the defense with copies of the applications and court orders at least 10 days prior to trial. But the copies contained redactions. Upon Carson’s objection, the government did provide Carson with unredacted copies at the beginning of the second day of trial. In response, the government argues that: (1) Carson waived this argument because he did not move to suppress the evidence on this basis; (2) the government complied with the statute’s requirements and the statute does not explicitly require disclosure of unredacted copies of the application and order; and (3) even if the statute required unredacted copies, the failure to comply with that requirement caused Carson no prejudice and thus the evidence should not be suppressed. Despite Carson’s failure to move to suppress the evidence, Carson did preserve a timely objection on the basis that the government failed to comply with § 2518(9). Thus, we assume Carson did not waive this claim. We also agree with the government that the statute does not explicitly require the government to furnish the defendant with unredacted copies of a wiretap application and/order, although we can certainly imagine a scenario in which an application and/or order 36 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 37 of 53 is so heavily redacted that it frustrates the purpose of the disclosure. But even assuming that Carson did not waive the issue and the statute requires complete copies, we conclude that Carson’s claim here fails. In United States v. Caggiano, a Unit B panel of the Fifth Circuit 11 held that a technical violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b), requiring an issuing judge to seal a wiretap application and order, did not require suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the wiretap, so long as “the procedures actually employed fulfilled the purpose of [the statute] and the technical noncompliance did not prejudice the defendants.” 667 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). The panel observed that “[a] failure to comply with the procedures of . . . § 2518(8)(b) may render an interception unlawful and its fruits inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i),” id. at 1178–79, which provides that an “aggrieved person . . . may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication . . . , or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that . . . the communication was unlawfully intercepted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). However, “[s]uch technical noncompliance necessitates suppression . . . only if the violated procedure is a central or a functional safeguard in the statutory scheme to prevent abuses of the wiretap act and if the purpose of the procedure has been frustrated or the procedure has been deliberately ignored.” Caggiano, 667 F.2d at 1179. 11 Decisions issued by a Unit B panel of the former Fifth Circuit are binding on this Court. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982). 37 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 38 of 53 In applying those principles to Caggiano, the panel first “assume[d] that the sealing requirement is a central or a functional safeguard.” Id. But the defendants failed to show prejudice from this technical violation of § 2518(8)(b): the defendants “have not suggested that the procedure which was in fact employed promoted any breach of confidentiality or that they were in any other way prejudiced by the noncompliance . . . ; nor do they suggest that the government deliberately circumvented the sealing requirement.” Id. Accordingly, the panel held that the contents of the wiretapped conversations were properly admitted into evidence. This Court has not confronted this issue in the specific context of a government’s alleged noncompliance with § 2518(9). However, the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished decision, United States v. Owen, 966 F.2d 1445 (4th Cir. 1992) (table), considered a defendant’s challenge to the admission of any evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap when the government did not provide the applications and orders at least 10 days prior to trial, instead providing them on the first day of trial, in violation of § 2518(9). Id. at . Citing our prior panel’s opinion in Caggiano, the Fourth Circuit observed that “[t]echnical noncompliance with the wire interception statute necessitates suppression ‘only if the violated procedure is a central or a functional safeguard in the statutory scheme to prevent abuses of the wiretap act and if the purpose of the procedure has been frustrated or 38 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 39 of 53 the procedure has been deliberately ignored.’” Id. at  (quoting Caggiano, 667 at 1179). Applying these principles in Owen, the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence should not be suppressed for the government’s technical noncompliance with § 2518(9). Specifically, the defendants in Owen failed to: (1) demonstrate “that the government’s failure to furnish them a copy of the court interception order and its application frustrated the purposes of the act or that the government deliberately ignored its procedures”; and (2) “[m]ore importantly, [defendants had] not established that they suffered any prejudice because they did not receive the information until the day trial commenced.” Id. at . We conclude that even if providing only redacted copies of the wiretap application and orders technically violated § 2518(9), the district court correctly held that the contents of the communications and evidence obtained pursuant to them should not be suppressed. Certainly the fact that the statute does not explicitly require unredacted copies weighs against a determination that disclosure of unredacted, complete copies is a “central or a functional safeguard in the statutory scheme.” But more importantly, Carson does not allege being provided redacted copies prior to trial prejudiced his defense. Indeed, Carson concedes that his only prejudice is the admission of the recordings. Furthermore, the district court informed defense counsel that the trial could be pushed back if necessary so 39 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 40 of 53 that the defense could fully review and use the unredacted copies. The defense apparently did not take up the district court’s offer. Thus, Carson suffered no prejudice from the delay in receiving unredacted copies. Ultimately, Carson does not demonstrate that the failure to furnish him with complete copies prior to trial frustrated the purpose of the statute or that the government deliberately ignored the statute, and Carson concedes that he suffered no prejudice due to any noncompliance with the statute. We affirm the district court’s ruling permitting admission of the wiretap evidence.