Opinion ID: 30585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Currently Applicable Test.

Text: 16 Rush Truck first challenges the district court's characterization of Bouchie's property as a rural homestead based on the district court's sole application of Tex. Prop.Code § 41.002(c). 6 The bankruptcy court did not apply the multiple factors test adopted in United States v. Blakeman. 7 Blakeman 's applicability in light of the 1999 amendments of section 41.002(c) is a question of first impression for this court. 8 17 The bankruptcy court in the instant case applied the approach it had previously developed in In re Perry. 9 In that case, the bankruptcy court concluded that the question whether a homestead is rural or urban is answered by first applying section 41.002(c). 10 Under Perry, if the homestead does not qualify as urban under the statute, it is rural and the inquiry ends. 11 If, however, the homestead meets the statutory definition of urban, then the court continues with its analysis by applying the Blakeman five-factor test. 12 The bankruptcy court in the instant case held that Bouchie's property did not meet the statutory definition of urban and thus classified it as rural, ending its inquiry. 18 To determine whether the Blakeman test is applicable in light of the 1999 amendment to section 41.002(c), it is useful to summarize briefly its origins. Prior to 1989, a homestead was characterized as urban or rural by applying a five-factor test developed by the Texas courts. 13 The factors that the courts considered included (1) the location of the land with respect to the limits of the municipality; (2) the situs of the land in question; (3) the existence of municipal utilities and services; (4) the use of the lot and adjacent property; and (5) the presence of platted streets, blocks and the like. 14 19 In 1989, the Texas legislature enacted section 41.002(c). 15 As enacted, section 41.002(c) stated that [a] homestead is considered to be rural if, at the time the designation is made, the property is not served by municipal utilities and fire and police protection. 16 In Bradley, we held that a homestead that is not served by municipal utilities, fire, and police protection is rural under section 41.002(c) as it was then written. 17 We left the question open, however, whether section 41.002(c) provided the exclusive test for making the rural/urban determination or whether it was but a factor to consider. 18 We indicated, nevertheless, that the legislative history suggested that section 41.002(c) might not displace the traditional common law definition of `homestead' in all cases. 19 20 We answered that question in Blakeman, ruling that the 1989 version of section 41.002(c) is not the exclusive test to determine whether a property's homestead status: it is but one factor a court considers to determine whether a court considers to determine whether the homestead is urban or rural. 20 We thus held that section 41.002(c) did not overturn the common law five-factor test. 21 We then determined on the facts in Blakeman that the property at issue constituted a rural homestead, despite the fact that it was served by municipal utilities or fire and police protection. 22 21 In 1999, the Texas legislature substantially rewrote section 41.002(c) in its current form, as quoted above. Unlike the previous version of the section, the current version provides a detailed framework for determining when a property is urban and substantially incorporates the factors included in the traditional test. Like its predecessor version, however, section 41.002(c) does not explicitly state that it is the exclusive test for whether a homestead is urban or rural. 22 At this point, the canons of statutory construction come to bear. A `statute is presumed to have been enacted by the legislature with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it.' 23 Our holding in Blakeman that section 41.002(c) was not the exclusive test for determining homestead status pre-dated the Texas legislature's amendment of section 41.002(c) by seven years. Thus, at first glance, the fact that the amended version does not state that section 41.002(c) supplies the exclusive test suggests that the legislature did not intend to displace Blakeman. As we explain below, however, the Texas legislature did incorporate part of the Blakeman test into the current version of the statute. Under the well-known canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, this indicates that the legislature intentionally excluded the other factors from the rural/urban determination. This latter inference is more consistent with the other evidence that section 41.002(c) in its current form leaves no room for the Blakeman test. 23 Another fundamental principle of statutory interpretation holds that [w]hen the legislature amends a law, it is presumed that it intends to change the law. 24 This canon of interpretation suggests that the Texas legislature, by substantially amending section 41.002(c), intended to change the test for determining which homesteads are urban and which are rural. 24 In the framework of these interpretive rules, we conclude that the Blakeman approach did not survive the 1999 amendment to section 41.002(c). In amending section 41.002, the legislature created a detailed scheme for determining which homesteads are to be considered urban. If courts continued to graft the common law test on to this statute, they would fundamentally rewrite it and, in effect, would defeat the legislature's ability to change the state of the law by statutory amendment. Further, applying Blakeman to section 41.002(c) as amended in 1999 is inappropriate in light of the legislature's deliberately including some of the Blakeman factors in the amendment and excluding others. The legislature included two of the Blakeman factors in the statute: Location of the property with respect to municipal limits and whether the land is platted. 25 In addition, the statute refers to a third Blakeman factor — the existence of municipal utilities and services — which was part of the predecessor statute. 26 Under the expressio unius maxim, the decision to include three of the Blakeman factors but not the others must be construed to prohibit the extra-statutory consideration of those other factors. 27 25 Finally, in construing any statute, a court's primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. 28 The purpose of the 1999 amendment was to provide more certainty to lenders and to municipal taxing authorities as to the homestead character of land. 29 Continuing to apply the Blakeman factors in addition to the detailed definition provided by the statute would frustrate this purpose. The legislature went as far as to weigh how many services a municipality must provide (assuming other predicate conditions are met) for a homestead to be urban. 30 Courts should not preempt this balancing by reweighing or adding factors. 26 Our interpretation of the statute today is consistent with that of a noted scholar of Texas property law. Professor McKnight states that, unlike the 1989 version of section 41.002 which defined some homesteads as rural without stating that all other homesteads were necessarily urban, the 1999 amendment states expressly which homesteads are urban and which are rural. 31 Under the statutory amendments..., availability of [the enumerated] services within a municipality makes the homestead urban, but lack of amenities allows the rural character of the homestead to be maintained. 32 27 Having concluded that the Blakeman approach can no longer be used to distinguish between rural and urban homesteads, we cannot endorse the Perry approach crafted by the bankruptcy court. Under Perry 's bifurcated approach, a bankruptcy court could determine that a homestead that is urban within the express terms of the amended section 41.002(c) is, nevertheless, not urban based on non-statutory common law factors. 33 This cannot be correct. Perry may have been designed to accommodate Blakeman with the amended statute, but our dispensing with Blakeman removes the need to make such an accommodation. The amended statute is the exclusive vehicle for distinguishing between rural and urban homesteads. 28