Opinion ID: 2294895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Nature of Child Abuse

Text: As we have seen, when the crime was first created by the General Assembly it comprised the malicious beating, striking or otherwise mistreating a child to such degree as to require medical treatment. We pointed out in State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976), that by the terms of the enactment it did not reach acts not constituting, in one form or another, an assault on a child. Id. at 423. Acts 1973, ch. 835 repealed the maliciously beats, strikes or otherwise mistreats test of child abuse and substituted in its place a new and different measure of the offense. The 1973 amendment added a definition subsection to ง 35A. Subsection (b) 7 provided that whenever abuse was used in ง 35A, it shall mean any physical injury or injuries sustained by a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of malicious act or acts.... Acts 1974, ch. 554 designated this meaning as item (A) of ถ 7 and expanded the definition of child abuse by adding item (B) so as to include in the offense any sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are sustained or not. The amendment also added ถ 8 defining sexual abuse to mean any act or acts involving sexual molestation or exploitation, including but not limited to incest, rape, carnal knowledge, sodomy or unnatural or perverted sexual practices on a child.... Acts 1977, ch. 290, substituted or sexual offense in any degree for carnal knowledge in ถ 8. [9] We considered the scope of item A, subsection (b)7 in Fabritz. Applying the rules of statutory construction, 276 Md. at 421-423, we thought it evident that the Legislature plainly intended to broaden the area of proscribed conduct punishable in child abuse cases. Id. at 423-424. We said: Its use in the amended version of ง 35A of the comprehensive phraseology `who causes abuse to' a minor child, coupled with its broad two-pronged definition of the term `abuse,' supports the view that the Legislature, by repealing the narrow measure of criminality in child abuse cases then provided in ง 35A, and redefining the offense, undertook to effect a significant change of substance in the scope of the statute's prohibitions. In making it an offense for a person having custody of a minor child to `cause' the child to suffer a `physical injury,' the Legislature did not require that the injury result from a physical assault upon the child or from any physical force initially applied by the accused individual; it provided instead, in a more encompassing manner, that the offense was committed if physical injury to the child resulted either from a course of conduct constituting `cruel or inhumane treatment' or by `malicious act or acts.' Id. at 424. We found that the failure of the mother to seek or obtain any medical assistance for her child, although the need therefor was obviously compelling and urgent, caused the child to sustain bodily injury additional to and beyond that inflicted upon the child by reason of the original assault by another. The act of omission by the mother constituted a cause of the further progression and worsening of the injuries which led to [the child's] death; and that in these circumstances [the mother's] treatment of [the child] was `cruel or inhumane' within the meaning of the statute and as those terms are commonly understood. Id. at 425-426. We therefore vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which in Fabritz v. State, 24 Md. App. 708, 332 A.2d 324 (1975), had reversed the judgment of the trial court entered upon the conviction of the mother of child abuse. [10]