Opinion ID: 340098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ERRORS ASSERTED BY INCISO A. Admissibility of Hearsay

Text: 85 Testimony Concerning Statements of Larry Adell 86 Appellant Inciso argues that the district court erred in admitting hearsay testimony by two teenaged friends of Larry Adell concerning statements made by Larry on June 1, 1974, the day that he disappeared. Timely objections were made to the questions which elicited the testimony on the ground that the questions called for hearsay. In response, the Government attorney stated that the testimony was offered for the limited purpose of showing the state of mind of Larry. 11 After instructing the jury that it could only consider the testimony for that limited purpose and not for the truth or falsity of what (Larry) said, the district court allowed the witnesses to answer the questions. Francine Gomes, Larry's date on the evening that he disappeared, testified that when Larry picked her up that evening, he told her that he was going to meet Angelo at Sambo's North at 9:30 P.M. to pick up a pound of marijuana which Angelo had promised him for free. R.T. Vol. 5, p. 286. She also testified that she had been with Larry on another occasion when he met a man named Angelo, and she identified the defendant as that man. Miss Gomes stated that it was approximately 9:15 P.M. when Larry went into the parking lot. Doug Sendejas, one of Larry's friends who was with him at Sambo's North just prior to his disappearance, testified that Larry had made similar statements to him in the afternoon and early evening of June 1st regarding a meeting that evening with Angelo. Mr. Sendejas also testified that when Larry left the table at Sambo's North to go into the parking lot, Larry stated that he was going to meet Angelo and he'd be right back. R.T. Vol. 5, p. 338. 87 Inciso's contention that the district court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Larry's friends is premised on the view that the statements could not properly be used by the jury to conclude that Larry did in fact meet Inciso in the parking lot of Sambo's North at approximately 9:30 P.M. on June 1, 1974. The correctness of that assumption is, in our view, the key to the analysis of this contention of error. The Government argues that Larry's statements were relevant to two issues in the case. First the statements are said to be relevant to an issue created by the defense when Inciso's attorney attempted to show that Larry had not been kidnapped but had disappeared voluntarily as part of a simulated kidnapping designed to extort money from his wealthy father from whom he was allegedly estranged. In his brief on appeal, Inciso concedes the relevance and, presumably, the admissibility of the statements to show that Larry did not voluntarily disappear. However, Inciso argues that for this limited purpose, there was no need to name the person with whom Larry intended to meet, and that the district court's limiting instruction was insufficient to overcome the prejudice to which he was exposed by the testimony. 12 Second, the Government argues that the statements are relevant and admissible to show that, as intended, Larry did meet Inciso in the parking lot at Sambo's North on the evening of June 1, 1974. If the Government's second theory of admissibility is successful, Inciso's arguments regarding the excision of his name from the statements admitted under the first theory is obviously mooted. 88 In determining the admissibility of the disputed evidence, we apply the standard of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which governed at the time of the trial below. Under that standard, the District Court was required to decide issues concerning the admissibility of evidence according to the the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 89 The Government's position that Larry Adell's statements can be used to prove that the meeting with Inciso did occur raises a difficult and important question concerning the scope of the so-called Hillmon doctrine, a particular species of the state of mind exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. The doctrine takes its name from the famous Supreme Court decision in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892). That the Hillmon doctrine should create controversy and confusion is not surprising, for it is an extraordinary doctrine. Under the state of mind exception, hearsay evidence is admissible if it bears on the state of mind of the declarant and if that state of mind is an issue in the case. For example, statements by a testator which demonstrate that he had the necessary testamentary intent are admissible to show that intent when it is in issue. The exception embodied in the Hillmon doctrine is fundamentally different, because it does not require that the state of mind of the declarant be an actual issue in the case. Instead, under the Hillmon doctrine the state of mind of the declarant is used inferentially to prove other matters which are in issue. Stated simply, the doctrine provides that when the performance of a particular act by an individual is an issue in a case, his intention (state of mind) to perform that act may be shown. From that intention, the trier of fact may draw the inference that the person carried out his intention and performed the act. Within this conceptual framework, hearsay evidence of statements by the person which tend to show his intention is deemed admissible under the state of mind exception. Inciso's objection to the doctrine concerns its application in situations in which the declarant has stated his intention to do something with another person, and the issue is whether he did so. There can be no doubt that the theory of the Hillmon doctrine is different when the declarant's statement of intention necessarily requires the action of one or more others if it is to be fulfilled. 90 When hearsay evidence concerns the declarant's statement of his intention to do something with another person, the Hillmon doctrine requires that the trier of fact infer from the state of mind of the declarant the probability of a particular act not only by the declarant but also by the other person. Several objections can be raised against a doctrine that would allow such an inference to be made. One such objection is based on the unreliability of the inference 13 but is not, in our view, compelling. 14 A much more significant and troubling objection is based on the inconsistency of such an inference with the state of mind exception. This problem is more easily perceived when one divides what is really a compound statement into its component parts. In the instant case, the statement by Larry Adell, I am going to meet Angelo in the parking lot to get a pound of grass, is really two statements. The first is the obvious statement of Larry's intention. The second is an implicit statement of Angelo's intention. Surely, if the meeting is to take place in a location which Angelo does not habitually frequent, one must assume that Angelo intended to meet Larry there if one is to make the inference that Angelo was in the parking lot and the meeting occurred. The important point is that the second, implicit statement has nothing to do with Larry's state of mind. For example, if Larry's friends had testified that Larry had said, Angelo is going to be in the parking lot of Sambo's North tonight with a pound of grass, no state of mind exception or any other exception to the hearsay rule would be available. Yet, this is in effect at least half of what the testimony did attribute to Larry. 91 Despite the theoretical awkwardness associated with the application of the Hillmon doctrine to facts such as those now before us, the authority in favor of such an application is impressive, beginning with the seminal Hillmon decision itself. Hillmon, supra, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, was a civil case involving a colorful dispute over certain life insurance claims. The factual issue in the case was whether Hillmon, who had purchased a number of life insurance policies naming his wife as beneficiary, had been killed by the accidental discharge of a gun in a campsite near Crooked Creek, Kansas. If he had been so killed, his wife was entitled to the benefits under the insurance policies. The defendant insurance companies contended, however, that Hillmon was not dead but was in hiding, and that the claims were part of a conspiracy to defraud the companies. While it was undisputed that someone had been killed in the campsite at Crooked Creek, there was complete disagreement as to who the victim was. The defendants in Hillmon introduced evidence which tended to show that the body at Crooked Creek was not that of Hillmon, but was that of another man, Frederick Adoph Walters. As part of this attempt to show that it was Walters who was killed at Crooked Creek, the defendants attempted to introduce two letters written by Walters from Wichita, Kansas, shortly before he disappeared, never to be heard from again. In the letters, one written to his sister and the other to his fiancee, 15 Walters stated that he intended to leave Wichita in the near future and to travel with a man named Hillmon. In the letter to his financee, Walters explained that Hillmon was making the expedition to search for a suitable site for a sheep ranch, and that Hillmon had promised him employment at the ranch on very favorable terms. Plaintiff's objection to the introduction of the letters on the ground that they were incompetent, irrelevant, and hearsay was sustained by the trial court. 92 The Supreme Court summarily rejected the argument that the letters were admissible as memoranda made in the ordinary course of business, 145 U.S. at 295, 12 S.Ct. at 912, but then held that they were admissible as evidence of Walters' intention: 93 The letters in question were competent, not as narratives of facts communicated to the writer by others, nor yet as proof that he actually went away from Wichita, but as evidence that, shortly before the time when other evidence tended to show that he went away, he had the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he did go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such intention. In view of the mass of conflicting testimony introduced upon the question of whether it was the body of Walters that was found in Hillmon's camp, this evidence might properly influence the jury in determining that question. 145 U.S. at 295-296, 12 S.Ct. at 912-913 (emphasis added). 16 94 Although Hillmon was a civil case, the Supreme Court cited with approval a number of criminal cases in support of its decision. One of them, Hunter v. State, 11 Vroom (40 N.J.L.) 495, involved facts remarkably similar to those before us here. The Court summarized the facts and the holding of that case as follows: 95 Upon an indictment of one Hunter for the murder of one Armstrong at Camden, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey unanimously held that Armstrong's oral declarations to his son at Philadelphia, on the afternoon before the night of the murder, as well as a letter written by him at the same time and place to his wife, each stating that he was going with Hunter to Camden on business, were rightly admitted in evidence. 145 U.S. at 299, 12 S.Ct. at 914. 96 The Court then quoted a long passage from the opinion of Chief Justice Beasley in Hunter. The primary concern expressed in that passage was whether there was anything unnatural about the victim's statements that might suggest an ulterior purpose and, hence, unreliability. Having found no indicia of unreliability, 17 Chief Justice Beasley brushed aside the suggestion that the specific reference to the defendant should have been omitted. Speaking rhetorically, Chief Justice Beasley asked: 97  'If it is legitimate to show by a man's own declarations that he left his home to be gone a week, or for a certain destination, which seems incontestable, why may it not be proved in the same way that a designated person was to bear him company?'  The Chief Justice then concluded: 98  'If it was in the ordinary train of events for this man to leave word or to state where he was going, it seems to me it was equally so for him to say with whom he was going.' Hunter v. State (11 Vroom), 40 N.J.Law, 495, 534, 536, 538. 145 U.S. at 299, 12 S.Ct. at 914. 99 The Hillmon doctrine has been applied by the California Supreme Court in People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944), a criminal case with facts which closely parallel those in Hunter. In Alcalde the defendant was tried and convicted of first degree murder for the brutal slaying of a woman whom he had been seeing socially. One of the issues before the California Supreme Court was the asserted error by the trial court in allowing the introduction of certain hearsay testimony concerning statements made by the victim on the day of her murder. As in the instant case, the testimony was highly incriminating, because the victim reportedly said that she was going out with Frank, the defendant, on the evening she was murdered. On appeal, a majority of the California Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that Hillmon was the leading case on the admissibility of declarations of intent to do an act as proof that the act thereafter was accomplished. 148 P.2d at 631. Without purporting to define or summarize all the limitations or restrictions upon the admissibility of such evidence, id. at 632, the court did mention several prudential considerations not unlike those mentioned by Chief Justice Beasley in Hunter. Thus, the declarant should be dead or otherwise unavailable, and the testimony concerning his statements should be relevant and possess a high degree of trustworthiness. Id. at 631. The court also noted that there was other evidence from which the defendant's guilt could be inferred. Applying these standards, the court found no error in the trial court's admission of the disputed hearsay testimony. Unquestionably the deceased's statement of her intent and the logical inference to be drawn therefrom, namely, that she was with the defendant that night, were relevant to the issue of the guilt of the defendant. Id. at 632. 100 In addition to the decisions in Hillmon and Alcalde, support for the Government's position can be found in the California Evidence Code and the new Federal Rules of Evidence, although in each instance resort must be made to the comments to the relevant provisions. 101 Section 1250 of the California Evidence Code carves out an exception to the general hearsay rule for statements of a declarant's then existing mental or physical state. The Hillmon doctrine is codified in Section 1250(2) which allows the use of such hearsay evidence when it is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. The comment to Section 1250(2) states that, Thus, a statement of the declarant's intent to do certain acts is admissible to prove that he did those acts. Although neither the language of the statute nor that of the comment specifically addresses the particular issue now before us, the comment does cite the Alcalde decision and, therefore, indirectly rejects the limitation urged by Inciso. 102 Although the new Federal Rules of Evidence were not in force at the time of the trial below, we refer to them for any light that they might shed on the status of the common law at the time of the trial. The codification of the state of mind exception in Rule 803(3) does not provide a direct statement of the Hillmon doctrine. Rule 803(3) provides an exemption from the hearsay rule for the following evidence: 103 Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 104 Although Rule 803(3) is silent regarding the Hillmon doctrine, both the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules and the House Committee on the Judiciary specifically addressed the doctrine. After noting that Rule 803(3) would not allow the admission of statements of memory, the Advisory Committee stated broadly that 105 The rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon (citation omitted) allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left undisturbed. Note to Paragraph (3), 28 U.S.C.A. at 585. 106 Significantly, the Notes of the House Committee on the Judiciary regarding Rule 803(3) are far more specific and revealing: 107 However, the Committee intends that the Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon (citation omitted) so as to render statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of another person. House Report No. 93-650, Note to Paragraph (3), 28 U.S.C.A. at 579 (emphasis added). 108 Although the matter is certainly not free from doubt, we read the note of the Advisory Committee as presuming that the Hillmon doctrine would be incorporated in full force, including necessarily the application in Hillmon itself. The language suggests that the Advisory Committee presumed that such a broad interpretation was the prevailing common law position. The notes of the House Committee on the Judiciary are significantly different. The language used there suggests a legislative intention to cut back on what that body also perceived to be the prevailing common law view, namely, that the Hillmon doctrine could be applied to facts such as those now before us. 109 Although we recognize the force of the objection to the application of the Hillmon doctrine in the instant case, 18 we cannot conclude that the district court erred in allowing the testimony concerning Larry Adell's statements to be introduced. 110 B. Admissibility and Abuse of Hearsay Testimony Concerning Statements of Pheaster 111 Inciso also raises certain issues concerning the testimony of Mrs. Elmyra Mapes, a Government witness. Inciso's first contention is that the district court erred in admitting testimony by Mrs. Mapes concerning statements made to her by Pheaster which tended to implicate Inciso in the kidnapping scheme. The issue here is a limited one of whether the elements of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule were present. Inciso's second contention is that the Government attorney deliberately distorted Mrs. Mapes' testimony in his final argument to the jury. 112 It is well settled that evidence of statements made by one conspirator is in some circumstances admissible against a co-conspirator despite the fact that the evidence might otherwise be inadmissible under the hearsay rule. See, e. g., United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir., 1975); United States v. Ellsworth, 481 F.2d 864, 870-871 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1041, 94 S.Ct. 544, 38 L.Ed.2d 332 (1973); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 735-736 (9 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 1625, 12 L.Ed.2d 498 (1964). Indeed, Inciso does not challenge this basic proposition. Rather, he bases his argument on the alleged failure of the Government to establish all of the necessary foundational requirements of the co-conspirator exception. Focusing exclusively on the foundational requirement that the statements by the hearsay declarant must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy, Inciso argues that Pheaster's statements were not in furtherance of any conspiracy and should not have been admissible against Inciso. 113 A rather extensive body of case law has emerged from this Court's consideration of the co-conspirator exception. The basic framework of analysis was established in our decision in Carbo v. United States, supra, 314 F.2d 718. As stated in Carbo 114 The necessary foundation consists of three distinct prerequisites. First: that the declaration is in furtherance of the conspiracy; second: that it was made during the pendency of the conspiracy; third: that there is independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy and of the connection of the declarant and the defendant with it. Id. at 735 n. 21. Accord, United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir., 1975). 115 The question raised in Carbo was not the definition of these foundational requirements, but rather the allocation of responsibility between judge and jury in determining whether they have been satisfied. The factual issue in Carbo was whether the defendants were co-conspirators, but the analysis is equally applicable to factual findings concerning the other foundational requirements: 116 It is for the judge then, and not the jury, to determine the admissibility of the declarations. In making this determination the test is not whether the defendants' connection had by independent evidence been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether, accepting the independent evidence as credible, the judge is satisfied that a prima facie case (one which would support a finding) has been made. Thereafter it is the jury's function to determine whether the evidence, including the declarations, is credible and convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 737. 117 Under the principles established in Carbo, the question here is whether the Government made a prima facie showing that the statements made by Pheaster to Mapes were in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is a factual determination for which the trial court is uniquely well placed. Inciso argues that the statements were an admission of guilt to a third party which were likely to hinder or destroy the conspiracy. The broader view taken by the Government and by the district court was that Mrs. Mapes' role was considerably more than that of a disinterested third party. Mrs. Mapes testified under a grant of immunity. She had accompanied Pheaster to the first drop-site in Palm Springs and had taken a position where she might have performed the counter-surveillance contemplated by the ransom letters. During the conversation of June 22, 1974, in which the disputed statements were made, Pheaster attempted to recruit Mrs. Mapes to accompany him to the second drop-site in Corona on the following day. Although Mrs. Mapes denied going to Corona, a woman was observed driving Pheaster's car in the vicinity of the Corona drop-site on June 23, 1974. Also, during the meeting on June 22, 1974, Pheaster transferred to Mrs. Mapes the typewriter used to type the ransom letters. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the statements had been made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 118 Inciso also contends that the action of the Government attorney, both in his examination of Mrs. Mapes and in his final argument to the jury deliberately distorted her testimony concerning Inciso's involvement in the kidnapping. The Court has reviewed Mrs. Mapes' testimony in its entirety and has concluded that the conduct of the Government attorney does not constitute reversible error. The questions asked by the Government attorney were not devious or confusing, and the answers given by Mrs. Mapes indicated that the business deal that Pheaster had with Inciso was that of abducting Larry Adell (although Mrs. Mapes did not know the identity of the victim at that time). In his final argument to the jury, the Government attorney may have overstated Mrs. Mapes' testimony, but no objection was raised by the defense although other matters were mentioned at the side bar immediately after the close of the Government's argument. Any prejudice to Inciso from the closing argument was surely cured when, pursuant to a request from the jury, the entire testimony of Mrs. Mapes 119 was reread. C. Admissibility of Evidence Seized During the Search of Inciso's Residence 120 Inciso also challenges the district court's refusal to suppress certain tangible evidence found during a search of his residence on July 14, 1976. The search was made pursuant to a search warrant, the validity of which is not disputed. Rather, the argument is based upon certain alleged procedural irregularities associated with the suppression hearing and upon the alleged seizure of items not covered by the warrant and not within any exceptions to the warrant requirement. 121 Because it was originally contemplated that nothing seized from Inciso's residence would be introduced at trial, no suppression motions were filed before trial. When the Government later decided to introduce evidence seized at that time, the district court exercised its discretion to allow the evidence to be introduced, subject to any suppression motions that Inciso might make. Motions were made, and a hearing was conducted at which the District Court determined that the evidence was admissible. Later the Government attempted to introduce other evidence seized at the same time. When Inciso objected, the court overruled the objection for the reasons previously stated. While the procedure was not ideal, it was, for the most part, dictated by the Government's vacillation concerning the evidence that it would present. The district court exercised its discretion to allow the evidence to be introduced. In doing so, it gave Inciso sufficient opportunity to present his objections and to preserve his position on appeal. 122 We have examined Inciso's Fourth Amendment argument and find it to be without merit. The items seized were either covered by the search warrant or seized under the plain view exception once the agents were lawfully within Inciso's residence. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 78; Quigg v. Estelle, supra, 492 F.2d 343. 123 Finally, Inciso argues that a revolver seized during the search of his residence should have been excluded, because its prejudice to him outweighed its probative value. In support of this argument, Inciso states that (i)f Larry Adell was kidnapped there is absolutely no evidence that any gun was ever used. In a trial for an apparent kidnapping, the circumstances of which are completely unknown because of the victim's continued absence and probable death at the hands of his kidnappers, the district court decision to allow the introduction of the revolver was not error.D. Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Adell 124 Inciso argues that the district court erred in allowing the Government to call Mr. and Mrs. Adell to testify in rebuttal. Decisions concerning the use of rebuttal evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. We do not believe that this discretion was abused in the instant case. 125 E. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Conviction 126 Inciso challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to all twelve counts of the indictment. In considering this challenge, we must determine  'whether the evidence, considered most favorably to the government, was such as to permit a rational conclusion by the (trier of fact) that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Jones, 518 F.2d 64, 65 (9 Cir. 1975), quoting United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1242 (9 Cir. 1969) (brackets in original). The sufficiency of the evidence to show that Larry Adell was transported in interstate commerce is considered infra. We now consider the sufficiency of the evidence to show that Inciso conspired with others to kidnap Larry Adell (Count One) and knowingly participated in communicating ransom demands and extortionate threats to his father (Counts Two-Twelve). 127 The evidence against Pheaster can properly be characterized as overwhelming. It is, therefore, highly significant that Pheaster and Inciso were in frequent communication with each other by telephone until a few days prior to the kidnapping. Larry Adell disappeared from a parking lot where he had gone with the express intention of meeting Inciso. After Larry's disappearance, Pheaster and Inciso stopped communicating with each other over their residence telephones. However, they apparently continued to contact each other by using pay telephones. Pheaster was observed in the vicinity of the pay telephone at a particular service station in Long Beach. A scrap of paper containing the number of that pay telephone was found in the search of Inciso's residence. Telephone company records showed that the dates of the calls made to that number from Palm Springs, where Inciso was working, directly corresponded to major events in the kidnappers' efforts to obtain the ransom from Mr. Adell. Although fictitious numbers were given by the caller to the telephone company on four occasions, accurate numbers were given on two occasions, and the pay telephones with those numbers were located less than a block from the place where Inciso was working. In addition to calls placed over pay telephones, Pheaster and Inciso met several times at out-of-the-way places. Finally, Inciso's involvement in the kidnapping scheme could be inferred from Mrs. Mapes' testimony. Although circumstantial, the evidence against Inciso is sufficient to support the jury verdict.