Opinion ID: 1178027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of the 1972 rape charges.

Text: (1) It is well established that the Committee may initiate an investigation into criminal charges against an applicant to the bar, even if those charges resulted in a favorable termination to the applicant. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to Committee proceedings, because the purpose of the proceedings is to determine moral fitness, rather than to punish a guilty party. Furthermore, the parties to the proceedings, as well as the quantum of proof, are different from those of a criminal trial. ( Wong v. State Bar (1975) 15 Cal.3d 528, 531-532 [125 Cal. Rptr. 482, 542 P.2d 642]; Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 210, 224 [113 Cal. Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991]; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 790-791, fn. 1 [51 Cal. Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521]; Best v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 633, 637 [21 Cal. Rptr. 589, 371 P.2d 325].) In its investigation, however, it is important that the Committee maintain a certain degree of integrity. An applicant must be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges being investigated. When no such opportunity has been given, we must use our supervisory power over the Committee to invalidate the proceedings. (2a) In the case at bar, petitioner was denied such a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself against charges to which he has steadfastly maintained his innocence for over 10 years. Because no trial transcript existed, no reporter's notes were kept, and the evidence introduced had been destroyed, petitioner could not meaningfully defend his position. He could not properly cross-examine the complaining witnesses, because their prior statements made at trial, which may have been inconsistent, were not available. Nor could any other witness have been properly impeached. [3] Several of the petitioner's witnesses had become unavailable  some had died, others had moved out-of-state and thus beyond the reach of our subpoena power. [4] Since petitioner had received a favorable termination 10 years ago, it is more than likely that these witnesses had contributed in a material fashion to that favorable termination. Petitioner could not introduce their former testimony because it had not been preserved. The nonexistence of the records also inhibited his ability to challenge the validity of an allegedly suggestive photographic lineup, or to locate or identify a hostile witness whose testimony in the 1973 trial indicated that a complaining witness had perjured herself. The trial judge is now deceased; we cannot be enlightened by his memory of the trial. Finally, petitioner could not properly refresh his own memory of the incidents; and, after nine years, they could well have become murky, especially if those memories were ones petitioner would rather have forgotten. [5] Thus, petitioner was significantly impaired from presenting a defense at the Committee hearings. We therefore conclude that the retrial conducted by the State Bar Court and the Committee was fundamentally unfair, and any conclusions drawn therefrom must be disregarded. [6] (3) Under normal circumstances, when the Committee's findings rest primarily upon testimonial evidence, we give great weight to those findings. ( Bernstein v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1968) 69 Cal.2d 90, 101-102 [70 Cal. Rptr. 106, 443 P.2d 570].) When there has been a previous civil trial, however, deference is instead given to the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position than the subcommittee or this court to determine the factual issues. ( Id., at p. 102.) Similarly, when there has been a previous criminal trial which resulted in a favorable termination to an applicant to the bar, this court discounts its normal degree of reliance on the Committee's findings, and gives very serious consideration to the favorable termination. ( Siegel v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1973) 10 Cal.3d 156, 173, 178 [110 Cal. Rptr. 15, 514 P.2d 967]; see also Wong v. State Bar, supra, 15 Cal.3d 528, 532.) (2b) Here, however, we cannot compare the testimony or evidence introduced at the criminal trial to that introduced at the State Bar Court and Committee hearings; thus, we cannot examine the differences in each to determine why different conclusions had been reached. In addition, we do not know whether any of the testimony given at the various hearings was reliable, because no trial transcript exists to reveal inconsistent testimony by any witness. Thus, fundamental fairness dictates that we give no consideration to the findings of the State Bar Court and the Committee.