Opinion ID: 60253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Instruction on Wilfulness

Text: Edelkind argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to offer his proposed jury instruction regarding wilfulness. The district court retains substantial latitude in formulating its jury charge, and we will reverse only if the requested instruction is substantially correct; was not substantially covered in the charge as a whole; and if the omission of the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present a given defense. Cain, 440 F.3d at 674 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Any error is subject to harmless error review. United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir.2007). Edelkind argues that the court abused its discretion when it declined to charge the jury that if they f[ou]nd that the defendant had a good faith belief that he is not obligated to pay a portion of his child support, such a belief is a defense to a `finding of wilfulness' even if that belief is unreasonable. Instead, the district court merely stated that wilfully ... means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law .... Moreover, the court said that [i]f you find that it was proven that the defendant had money which he used to pay other expenses beyond living expenses instead of paying his child support, then the wilful element is satisfied. The district court also noted that this element is satisfied if you find that the defendant had the ability to pay part of his child support, even if he did not have the entire amount which he was ordered to pay, or that the defendant['s] lack of funds to pay was the result of his voluntary and intentional acts done without justification. Edelkind does not present a valid argument as to how the omission of the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present a given defense. Cain, 440 F.3d at 674. Edelkind testified that he believed the 1998 Judgment was invalid because, according to his belief, Boudreaux had violated the judgment by mortgaging their previous home. Edelkind now suggests that the failure to give the proposed instruction impaired his ability to contend that he had a good-faith, albeit unreasonable, belief that he did not wilfully violate the child support order because he believed the order was no longer binding. However, this defense, as a matter of law, is not a valid defense. Edelkind's proposed instruction would apply if his defense had involved ignorance of what the law actually required. See United States v. Mathes, 151 F.3d 251, 254-55 (5th Cir.1998). Here, Edelkind's defense does not involve the ignorance of what the law actually required when the law itself was unclear, but an unreasonable self-belief that a known court order was invalid and thereby not binding on him. In Bailey, we explicitly rejected any defense against a section 228 prosecution by challenging the validity of the underlying state court order. 115 F.3d at 1232. We said: A CSRA prosecution turns only on the defendant's violation of a state court order. It does not turn on the fairness of the order, the reasons underlying the state court's issuance of the order, the defendant's relationship with his children or former spouse, or any other matter involving relitigation of a family law issue. Moreover, there is no language in the CSRA allowing the federal court to look beyond the four corners of the state child support order or permitting the defendant to collaterally attack the state court order in federal court. Id.; see also Kerley, 416 F.3d at 178 (Every circuit that has addressed the issue has stated that defendants in DPPA prosecutions cannot collaterally challenge the substantive merits of the underlying support order.). Accordingly, the omission of Edelkind's proposed jury instruction did not seriously impair Edelkind's presentation of the given defense because it was not a valid defense as a matter of law.