Opinion ID: 1975818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: counterclaim to establish equitable parental rights

Text: [¶ 15] The Superior Court allowed Henderson to file a late counterclaim to establish his equitable parental rights, but dismissed it without prejudice because (1) Norma is not a party; (2) Stitham did not request any relief concerning his rights with the child other than the declaration of paternity; and (3) a post-divorce motion, brought by Henderson to enforce visitation, is pending in the District Court. The court concluded that in order to afford [Henderson] a full panoply of remedies in the District Court, it would dismiss the counterclaim without prejudice. [5] We conclude that the Superior Court was correct in dismissing the counterclaim. [¶ 16] Henderson argues that he is entitled to a jury trial on his counterclaim, and the Superior Court is the only forum in which he can have a jury trial. He has failed, however, to cite any authority for an entitlement to a jury trial on a claim of equitable parental rights. To the extent that he has equitable parental rights with regard to K.M.H., the exercise of such rights is totally dependent upon a determination of the best interests of K.M.H. Matters involving the custody or best interests of a child are equitable in nature and are not for determination by a jury. See In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1296-97 (Me.1988) (holding father not entitled to jury trial in termination of parental rights case and discussing the equitable origins of custody determinations). [¶ 17] A post-divorce motion is pending in the District Court concerning Henderson's right of contact with the child. The District Court has jurisdiction to determine the parental rights regarding the children before it in divorce and post-divorce matters. [6] 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1001, 1653(10) (1998). Until the Superior Court's declaration that Henderson is not the biological father, Henderson was the legal father to K.M.H. The parent-child relationship, shown by the undisputed facts and by his affidavit, places him in the position of a de facto parent. Because of his prior legal relationship to the child and his current role as a de facto parent, the District Court has jurisdiction to decide whether it is in the best interests of K.M.H. for Henderson to have a continuing role in her life and what that role should be. [¶ 18] Hopefully, these parties, keeping the best interests of the child uppermost in their minds, either on their own, or with the assistance of an able case management officer and/or mediator, will agree upon the best arrangement for the child. We recognize that Stitham is not a party in the District Court proceeding, but the District Court may find it appropriate to permit Stitham, who has now been declared to be the biological father, to intervene if he so requests. [7] The entry is: Judgment affirmed. SAUFLEY, J., files a concurring opinion joined by ALEXANDER and DANA, JJ. SAUFLEY, J., with whom ALEXANDER, J. and DANA, J., join, concurring. [¶ 19] I concur in the Court's analysis and the result in this matter. I write separately to address the Court's reference to the de facto parenthood of Henderson and the area of law that is emerging from the intersection of traditional social policies and modern biological testing abilities. [¶ 20] For centuries, a child born during a marriage was considered the child of the parties to the marriage, regardless of contrary allegations of paternity. See Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104, 106 (1963). As a matter of public policy, this approach was necessary to prevent bastardization and to preclude unwarranted intrusions into family peace and harmony. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1987). From a practical perspective, evidentiary proof of paternity was also difficult and unreliable. [8] See Denbow v. Harris, 583 A.2d 205, 206 (Me.1990) (noting that prior to blood tests, a baby was exhibited to the jury to show family resemblance). [9] As blood testing and methods of proof progressed, we repudiated the absolute presumption of paternity in 1963, allowing the rebuttal of the presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ventresco, 191 A.2d at 108-09. That presumption was eventually embodied in the Rules of Evidence. See M.R. Evid. 302; Denbow, 583 A.2d at 206. [¶ 21] With the recent advances in bio-technology and human genetics, family law is undergoing further evolution. Because testing is now sufficiently accurate, the presumption of paternity, a hurdle once very difficult to overcome, can now be swept aside by a simple test. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1561 (1998). As a result, there now exists the real possibility, as this case demonstrates, that one man may become the legally acknowledged biological father of a child, while another, through marriage to the mother, has been the legally acknowledged and factually involved father. [¶ 22] The status of the father by marriage, following an adjudication declaring that another man is the biological father, is not addressed consistently throughout the country. Some states have enacted statutes explicitly recognizing that a man married to a child's mother at the time of the child's birth is a legal parent, regardless of the legal recognition of a different biological father. [10] [¶ 23] Maine statutes are silent on the issue. [11] Maine law does, however, create an avenue for biological fathers to assert a claim of paternity, see 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1553 (1998), even when the child has a father who was previously understood to be the father because he was married to the mother at the time of the child's birth. [12] Thus, although the law recognizes the legal rights and responsibilities of the newly established biological father, it does not directly address the consequences of that legal recognition for the person who had previously thought himself to be the father. [¶ 24] Although DNA testing may provide a bright line for determining the biological relationship between a man and a child, it does not and cannot define the human relationship between father and child. When a man has been newly determined to be the biological father of a child, the courts have a responsibility to assure that the child does not, without cause, lose the relationship with the person who has previously been acknowledged to be the father both in the law, through marriage, and in fact, through the development of the parental relationship over time. [13] [¶ 25] In this developing area of law, and in the absence of legislative action, many questions remain unanswered. [14] However, we have today recognized that Henderson's previously existing legal and factual relationship to K.M.H. gives the District Court the authority to recognize Henderson as a de facto parent [15] and to act in the best interests of K.M.H. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, § 2.03(1)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 10, 2000). [16] [¶ 26] Accordingly, one question has been resolved. When a man has been understood at law to have been the father of a child, through marriage to the child's mother, and the courts have determined that a different man is the biological father of the child, the District Court has the authority to determine, in the best interests of the child, whether the father by marriage shall continue as a de facto parent and have a continuing relationship with the child.