Opinion ID: 782472
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Defense

Text: 23 We turn now to the merits of the entrapment defense question. Ortega's brief on appeal makes the following argument: 12 Just prior to his getting involved in the money laundering scheme, his father was threatened by four armed men who visited him at his home and questioned him about Ortega's willingness and ability to launder money. The men then threatened to harm his father and Ortega's wife's relatives. Ortega reported this incident to the head of security at his bank. He did not, however, report it to the police because he believed that the police were corrupt and that the armed men could have been policemen. After this incident, Ortega noticed a strange car parking outside his residence. Soon afterwards, he was contacted by Navarro, who invited him to Los Angeles to meet some potential investors, who turned out to be Mendoza and several undercover agents. Navarro and Mendoza drove him to the alleged business meeting, which was held in the United States at Emerald Empire. Ortega soon discovered that this was no ordinary business meeting. Both in the car and at the meeting, Mendoza made statements that Ortega interpreted as threats to the life and health of himself and his family. For example, in the car, Mendoza reportedly stated that he preferred to do business in Mexico because he had bribed the Mexican army and police, at a rate of two million dollars per month, and therefore could do whatever [he] pleased. At the meeting, Mendoza repeatedly alluded to the Cali cartel and its well-known reputation for violence, and he made statements that Ortega construed as implying that he would be killed if he did not join the criminal conspiracy. 13 Ortega also claimed that after the meeting ended, he asked Mendoza if he had sent the four armed men to his father's door; Mendoza did not answer the question but smiled in a manner that led Ortega to believe that he had done so. Ortega asserts that he was convinced that if he did not cooperate with Mendoza, he would be killed or seriously injured by members of the Cali cartel, who might also kill or injure his father, his wife, or his wife's family. He stated that he had not before been involved in money laundering and that he would not have become involved but for his fear for himself and his family. 24 Inducement can be any government conduct creating a substantial risk that an otherwise law-abiding citizen would commit an offense, including persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship. Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 698 (quoting United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir.1994)). Here, Ortega would have testified that he did not realize at first that the potential investors from the United States were, in fact, money launderers for a major international drug operation; 14 that when he arrived at the appointment, he was informed for the first time that his new business associates were actually operatives of the Cali cartel; 15 that he understood Mendoza's veiled threats to mean that he or members of his family would be murdered if he did not join the criminal conspiracy; and that it was these threats alone that caused him to agree to participate in the money laundering scheme. 16 Although this version of the events is not particularly convincing, a defendant need present only some evidence, which may be of doubtful credibility, to create a factual issue that must be resolved by a jury. United States v. Sotelo-Murillo, 887 F.2d 176, 178-79 (9th Cir.1989)(quotations omitted). A jury could have believed Ortega's sworn testimony; if so, it could have concluded that Mendoza's coercive threats constituted inducement because they created a substantial risk that an otherwise law-abiding person would commit a crime. 25 This view of the evidence is strengthened by the fact that the district court allowed Kissel, a similarly situated defendant, to present an entrapment defense. Kissel's evidence of government inducement appears to be no more convincing on its face than Ortega's. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kissel arrived at the meeting with a detailed plan for structuring the money-laundering transactions to avoid detection, and that she lobbied Mendoza for his business. The videotape of her meeting with Mendoza shows her laughing and joking, apparently eager to participate in the criminal scheme. During her testimony, however, Kissel explained that her behavior at the meeting was just an act, meant to disguise her fear. She testified that she was petrified that she would be killed if she did not agree to join the conspiracy and that she could not contact the Mexican authorities because she believed that they were part of the scheme. She also stated that her money laundering plan was really a business plan she had concocted to help persons who she thought were wealthy investors who wanted to avoid paying Mexican taxes. In sum, although Kissel had no more evidence of government inducement than Ortega, she was allowed to present her defense. She was acquitted, and Ortega might conceivably have been as well, as long as he could show that he lacked a predisposition to commit the crime. 26 We have held that five factors are relevant to examining predisposition: (1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant showed any reluctance; and (5) the nature of the government's inducement. Becerra, 992 F.2d at 964. We have also stated that, although none of these factors alone controls, the most important is the defendant's reluctance to engage in criminal activity. Id. In this case, accepting Ortega's factual assertions as correct, the third factor weighs against Ortega, while the first, second, and fifth factors probably favor him. The fourth factor at first blush appears to weigh against Ortega; however, as Operation Checkmark itself demonstrates, appearances are sometimes deceiving. Like Kissel, Ortega maintains that his apparent lack of reluctance was caused by his fear of Mendoza and the ruthless individuals for whom Ortega believed he worked. Under these circumstances, the fourth factor must be deemed to favor Ortega, or at worst to be neutral. Ortega has offered a plausible explanation as to why he did not manifest the reluctance he claimed he felt. A criminal defendant who acts out of fear does not forfeit his right to present an entrapment defense simply because he agrees, seemingly without reluctance, to commit a crime. The credibility of the defendant's explanations is a matter for the jury to determine. 27 We also note that it is the government's burden to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174. In this case, there is no evidence in the record that Ortega had engaged in money laundering, or indeed in any form of criminal activity, prior to his involvement in this case, and Ortega contends that he joined the conspiracy only after his father was approached and threatened by four armed men and only after he himself was put in fear by a government agent who was pretending to work for the Cali cartel. 17 Ortega averred that he was not predisposed and affirmatively stated that he had never engaged in money laundering, or any other criminal activity, before his meeting with Mendoza. Because there was no evidence of predisposition beyond the fact that Ortega joined the conspiracy, the jury could have believed that he lacked the predisposition to become a money launderer. 28 Ortega's entrapment defense was not strong. However, as we have stated, only slight evidence entitles a defendant to present his defense to the jury. Becerra, 992 F.2d at 963. Ortega presented slight evidence on both elements of the entrapment defense. The weight and credibility of that evidence were matters for the jury to determine. Accordingly, we must reverse Ortega's conviction. On retrial, he shall be permitted to present an entrapment defense.