Opinion ID: 203825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Meaning of Spouse

Text: In determining the meaning of a statute, our analysis begins with the language of the statute. Id. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004)). We construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it. Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Morales, 524 F.3d at 57. In examining the plain language of the statute for purposes of step one of the Chevron analysis, we examine the common, ordinary meaning of the words of the statute at the time of enactment. See Carcieri, 129 S.Ct. at 1064; BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004). As explained above, the issue here is whether Mrs. Taing retained her status as a spouse after her husband died in order for her to qualify as an immediate relative under the INA. The government argues that the definition of spouse in federal law and the common, ordinary meaning of the term spouse compel the conclusion that Mrs. Taing ceased to be a spouse, and hence an immediate relative, when Mr. Taing died. We disagree with both arguments. The federal law to which the government cites is as follows: In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word marriage means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added). By reference to this statute, the government argues that one is a spouse only if one is a husband or wife within a legal marriage. Further, it contends that due to Mr. Taing's death, Mrs. Taing is no longer the wife of her deceased husband, and thus no longer a spouse. The government overreaches here. This definition originated in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Pub.L. No. 104-199, § 7, 110 Stat. 2419-20. DOMA was intended to limit the institution of marriage to heterosexual unions, not to alter the traditional meaning of the word spouse, which, as we discuss immediately below, includes surviving spouse under its common, ordinary meaning. See Lockhart, 561 F.3d at 619 (noting that § 7 of DOMA emphasizes that spouses shall be of the opposite sex, it does not mandate that spouses lose their status as such with the death of either one of them. (quoting Taing, 526 F.Supp.2d at 184)). Indeed, nothing in the legislative history of DOMA contemplates upsetting Congress's intent behind its use of the word spouse in the immigration context. See id. at 619 n. 1; see also Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 484, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Statutory interpretation is not a game of blind man's bluff. Judges are free to consider statutory language in light of a statute's basic purposes.). We conclude that it would be improper for us to give the definition of spouse in DOMA such unintended breadth. Turning to the government's second argument, we do not agree that the plain meaning of the term spouse does not include surviving spouse. Because Congress has chosen not to define [a phrase] in the statute itself, we can look to the dictionary for clarification of the plain meaning of the words selected by Congress. Pérez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 49. [3] Thus, we look to the sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1990, and available at the time Congress amended the INA by adding the second sentence of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). [4] This edition includes surviving spouse within its definition of spouse and defines spouse as follows: Spouse. One's husband or wife, and surviving spouse is one of a married pair who outlive the other. Black's Law Dictionary 1402 (6th ed.1990). This definition of spouse clearly includes Mrs. Taing, who is one of a married pair who outlive[d] the other. [5] See id. The government's contention that we should not consider a surviving spouse like Mrs. Taing a spouse is unpersuasive given that the term surviving spouse is subsumed within the dictionary definition of spouse. [6] Further, the plain language of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) confirms that spouse includes surviving spouse. The second sentence of this section refers to a surviving spouse simply as spouse without using any qualifying terms. See Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039. That sentence states that the alien ... shall be considered, for purposes of this subsection, to remain an immediate relative after the date of the citizen's death but only if the spouse files a petition under section 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) ... within 2 years after such date and only until the date the spouse remarries. 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The fact that within the same subsection, Congress uses the word spouse to refer to a living spouse and a surviving spouse lends support to the argument that it intended for spouse to include surviving spouse. See Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039-41; see also Robinson, 554 F.3d at 369 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (Congress used `spouse' to refer to a continuing marital bond between the deceased petitioner and a surviving husband or wife.). This reading is consistent with one of the principal rules of statutory construction which is to give terms consistent meaning. See Robinson, 554 F.3d at 369 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).