Opinion ID: 1330504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did The Board Fairly Assign Points To Its Experience Criterion?

Text: The Board allocated a total of five points for its experience criterion. The Board chose to use an all or nothing method for awarding experience points. That is, if an applicant had assistant principal experience of any length, the applicant received all five points. If an applicant had no experience as an assistant principal, the applicant received zero points for the experience criterion. In this case, Mr. Keatley and Mr. Disibbio each received five points for the experience criterion. Mr. Keatley argues that the Board's method of allocating experience points was arbitrary, in that it did not distinguish his twelve years of experience from Mr. Disibbio's one year of experience. The experience criterion applied by the Board is set forth in W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a and provides in relevant part: A county board of education shall make decisions affecting the hiring of professional personnel ... on the basis of the applicant with the highest qualifications.... In judging qualifications, consideration shall be given to each of the following: .. amount of experience relevant to the position[.] See full text, supra. The ALJ dismissed Mr. Keatley's argument under this statute by stating that in selection of professional administrative positions, seniority is not one of the listed criteria and is not the equivalent of experience. We believe the ALJ misunderstood the argument made by Mr. Keatley. The issue under consideration calls for this Court to examine the statutory language. We stated recently in syllabus point 4 of McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 200 W.Va. 114, 488 S.E.2d 389 (1997) that ``[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such a case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute. Point 1, syllabus, State ex rel. Fox v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund of the City of Bluefield, et al., 148 W.Va. 369 [135 S.E.2d 262 (1964) ].' Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Board of Trustees v. City of Bluefield, 153 W.Va. 210, 168 S.E.2d 525 (1969). Syl. pt. 3, Central West Virginia Refuse, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of West Virginia, 190 W.Va. 416, 438 S.E.2d 596 (1993).' Syl. Pt. 2, Keen v. Maxey, 193 W.Va. 423, 456 S.E.2d 550 (1995). Moreover, [a] common maxim of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed so as to give meaning to every word in them. Bullman v. D & R Lumber Co., 195 W.Va. 129, 133, 464 S.E.2d 771, 775 (1995). The issue of seniority is not the argument advanced by Mr. Keatley. Mr. Keatley contends that the statute requires the creation of an evaluation method which distinguishes the various levels of professional experience when making the overall hiring determination. [12] The statute clearly requires the Board to consider the amount of experience of each applicant, not merely the existence of experience. The Board's method of awarding points does not comply with the statute's requirement to consider the amount of experience. The Board's all or nothing method only determines the existence of experience. It does not determine the amount of experience. This Court has commented upon the issue of experience, in the context of classroom teachers, in State ex rel. Melchiori v. Board of Educ. of County of Marshall, 188 W.Va. 575, 425 S.E.2d 251 (1992). The issue we confronted in Melchiori involved reduction in force and the transfer of a teacher under W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a. The transfer was based upon a county board of education policy which did not consider classroom teaching experience when reassigning a teacher displaced due to a reduction in force. The affected teacher in Melchiori had thirteen years of experience as a physical education teacher. She was also certified to teach mentally handicapped students, but had not previously done so. Under the reduction in force policy, the teacher was reassigned to teach mentally handicapped students. The teacher contended that, because of her teaching experience in physical education, she should have been reassigned to a position in that area. We ultimately remanded the case to the county board of education with instructions that it reconsider its reduction in force transfer policy. In so doing, we held that a county board of education must give weight to the years of teaching experience a displaced employee has in given subject areas when making a decision to reassign the teacher pursuant to West Virginia Code Sec. 18A-4-7a. Melchiori, 188 W.Va. at 581, 425 S.E.2d at 257. (Emphasis added.) [13] In reading W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a in its entirety, we note that the legislature has made a marked distinction between amount of experience, and the existence of experience. See West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Authority v. Boone Memorial Hosp., 196 W.Va. 326, 338, 472 S.E.2d 411, 423 (1996) (It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but it must be drawn from the context in which it is used.) (citations omitted); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2054, 124 L.Ed.2d 138, 149 (1993) (The meaning of a word that appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation [will] become clear when the word is analyzed in light of the term that surrounds it.); United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 2182, 124 L.Ed.2d 402, 418 (1993) ([statutory interpretation] is a holistic endeavor ... and, at a minimum, must account for a statute's full text, language as well as punctuation, structure and subject matter.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although set out in the context of criteria for classroom teachers, the term amount of experience, and existence of experience are two (2) separate and distinct criteria. The relevant section of W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a states: ... If one or more permanently employed instructional personnel apply for a classroom teaching position and meet the standards set forth in the job posting, the county board of education shall make decisions affecting the filling of such positions on the basis of the following criteria: Appropriate certification and/or licensure; total amount of teaching experience; the existence of teaching experience in the required certification area; degree level in the required certification area; specialized training directly related to the performance of the job as stated in the job description; receiving an overall rating of satisfactory in evaluations over the previous two years; and seniority. (Emphasis added.) The above provision of W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a provides that when determining whether to fill a classroom teaching position with an instructional personnel applicant, county boards of education must look at, among other things, amount of teaching experience and the existence of teaching experience in the subject area. [14] The fact that amount and existence are each independently set forth as a factor in the context of hiring instructional personnel such as classroom teachers, indicates that the legislature intended to convey a different meaning to amount of experience and existence of experience. [15] That is, amount and existence are each intended to modify experience in a meaningfully different way. It has been a traditional rule of statutory construction that the Legislature is presumed to intend that every word used in a statute has a specific purpose and meaning, State ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W.Va. 579, 582, 251 S.E.2d 505, 508 (1979). We cannot ignore this significant statutory language. See State v. Carper, 176 W.Va. 309, 312, 342 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1986); Wooddell v. Dailey, 160 W.Va. 65, 68, 230 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1976). We held succinctly in syllabus point 2 of State v. White, 188 W.Va. 534, 425 S.E.2d 210 (1992) that `[i]n ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part of the statute and to the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the legislation. Syl. Pt. 2, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).' Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Fetters v. Hott, 173 W.Va. 502, 318 S.E.2d 446 (1984). We hold, therefore, that pursuant to W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a county boards of education must utilize a fair method of awarding credit for experience when filling professional personnel positions; such a method must establish a system that will differentiate experience among the applicants. [16] In the matter under consideration we believe the ALJ was clearly wrong in finding the Board's all or nothing allocation of points for experience was not arbitrary. Even so, Mr. Keatley does not prevail for three reasons. First, as the Board asserts, if its maximum five points for experience were assigned to Mr. Keatley based on an experience formula, Mr. Keatley's total score would remain lower than Mr. Disibbio's total score, because a total of six points separated them. Second, another undisclosed person actually ranked higher than Mr. Keatley and presumably would have been given the job had Mr. Disibbio declined the position. Third, and most importantly, the interpretation we have given to the experience criterion of W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a is applicable prospectively only. [17] Therefore, the ALJ's decision to deny Mr. Keatley relief on this issue will not be disturbed.