Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Definition of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances.

Text: (34) Defendant argues the trial court erred in rejecting his proffered instruction relating to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. [30] The first two paragraphs of the instruction define aggravating and mitigating circumstances in terms similar to those approved in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 289. Although giving the instructions may have provided a helpful framework for the jury's consideration of the statutory circumstances in aggravation and mitigation ( People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 82), the court's refusal was not error. Aggravation and mitigation are commonly understood terms. A trial court is not required to instruct on the meaning of terms that are commonly understood. (Cf. People v. Page (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 569, 577 [163 Cal. Rptr. 839] [statutory language is generally sufficient].) We believe the jury, without definition of the terms, is capable of deciding which of the statutory factors increase the guilt or enormity of a crime ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 289) and which extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability ( ibid. ). (Cf. People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777 [determining which factors are applicable].) It is established, of course, that in determining penalty the jury is permitted to consider in aggravation only evidence relevant to the statutorily enumerated aggravating factors, but is required to consider in mitigation any evidence bearing on defendant's character and background that he proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 775; People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, 878.) In the instant case no confusion on this point could have occurred: the court fully instructed the jury as to the circumstances it should consider in reaching its penalty determination; there was no prosecutorial argument or other basis for confusion as to which factors were aggravating and which mitigating (cf. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 288-290; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 789-790); and defense counsel argued defendant's mitigating background and character evidence at length. The final paragraph of the requested instruction directed the jury to weigh the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in reaching its penalty determination and informed it that defendant's guilt of first degree murder was not in itself an aggravating circumstance. The first part was essentially duplicative of the court's modified version of CALJIC No. 8.84.2, pursuant to which the jury was instructed to weigh the applicable factors in making its penalty determination and, moreover, was given the option of not imposing the death penalty even if the aggravating factors did outweigh the mitigating factors ( ante, fn. 16, p. 39). The second part was potentially confusing in that it conflicted somewhat with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, par. (a), which told the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in determining punishment, and also was potentially misleading, in that defendant's prior murder conviction was a special circumstance which the jury could consider. Refusal of these two proffered instructions thus was not error.