Opinion ID: 1367112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Survival of Widow's Right to Claim Community Property Interest Against Inconsistent Provisions in Husband's Will.

Text: (1) Following antecedent Mexican law, the rule in California has always been that a wife is entitled to at least one-half of the community property on her husband's death and the husband's testamentary power over such property is limited to the remaining half. (Prob. Code, § 201; Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 172 Cal. 775, 779 [158 P. 537]; Estate of Buchanan (1857) 8 Cal. 507.) Accordingly, when a husband's will describes the property which it gives to the wife and others in general terms, e.g., all my property, without affirmatively indicating any intention to deal with the wife's community property interest, the operation of the will upon community property is confined to the husband's interest and the surviving wife is entitled to receive both her half of the community property by operation of law and any interest in the deceased husband's share given her by the will. ( Estate of Wolfe (1957) 48 Cal.2d 570, 574-575 [311 P.2d 476]; Estate of Gilmore (1889) 81 Cal. 240 [22 P. 655].) (2) However, if the will expressly requires the widow to elect between the provisions for her benefit and her community property rights ( Estate of Dunphy (1905) 147 Cal. 95, 103-104 [81 P. 315]; Estate of Klingenberg (1949) 94 Cal. App.2d 240, 244 [210 P.2d 514]) or if the testator purports to dispose of the wife's share of the community property and the will shows that to satisfy the wife's community property rights while giving effect to its provisions with respect to remaining property would thwart the testamentary intent ( Estate of Wolfe, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 574; Estate of Orwitz (1964) 229 Cal. App.2d 767, 769 [40 Cal. Rptr. 545]; Estate of Roach (1959) 176 Cal. App.2d 547, 553 [1 Cal. Rptr. 454]) the wife cannot take both her community property interest and the property given her by the will but must elect between them. Identical principles may require such an election by a surviving husband between his community property rights and the provisions for his benefit in the will of his deceased wife, whose testamentary power over community property is likewise applicable to only a one-half interest. (Prob. Code, § 201; Estate of Johnson (1960) 178 Cal. App.2d 826 [3 Cal. Rptr. 408]; Kahn & Gallo, The Widow's Election: A Return to Fundamentals (1972) 24 Stan.L.Rev. 531, 532.) In Estate of Kelley (1953) 122 Cal. App.2d 42 [264 P.2d 210], as in the present case, the wife died during administration of her husband's estate without having made an election to take under his will or to claim her community property interest against the will. The testator directed that all of his property be distributed to a testamentary trust in which the wife would have a lifetime interest. This provision was apparently intended to cover both halves of the community property as the will further provided that if the widow should elect to take under the law and not under the will the provision for the trust would be void and the estate would go to the testator's sister and nieces. The widow's executrix filed an election to take against the will and in a proceeding to determine interests in the estate was awarded one-half of the community property by an order which was affirmed on appeal. The present will differs from the Kelley will in that instead of requiring the widow, Royene, to elect between its disposition of her community property interest and its other provisions for her benefit, it provided that if she elected to take the rights given her by law by claiming her community property interest, she should nevertheless be entitled to benefits which the will gave her in other property. It is clear, however, that if Royene had permitted her half of the community property to become part of the corpus of a testamentary trust as provided in the will she could not also claim the same property outright. The choice between acceptance or refusal of testamentary provisions for the widow's share of the community property where refusal would not require relinquishment of rights or benefits in other property is sometimes referred to as a voluntary widow's election, as distinct from a forced widow's election in cases such as Kelley where such relinquishment is a necessary consequence of claiming community property rights. (Kahn & Gallo, supra, 24 Stan.L.Rev. 531, 533.) Survival of the right of election after the widow's death is not affected by whether the election is forced or voluntary. (3a) Urging rejection of Kelley, the Murphy legatees argue that the will's provisions controlled the disposition of Royene's community property interest unless she affirmatively elected to take against them and that her right to so elect was a personal right which could not be exercised by her representative after her death. This is indeed the usual rule of decision in American jurisdictions in which none of the acquisitions of resident married persons constitutes community property and the surviving spouse is given a right to elect between the testamentary gifts provided by the deceased spouse's will and a statutory share of the deceased spouse's estate. The purpose of the right of election in those jurisdictions is to assure the surviving spouse of personal enjoyment of a minimum share of the property formerly owned by the deceased spouse. ( Payne v. Newton (D.C. Cir.1963) 323 F.2d 621, 623; Estate of Davis (1971) 129 Vt. 162, 166-167 [274 A.2d 491]; Celenza's Estate (1932) 308 Pa. 186, 191-192 [162 A. 456]; Estate of Dalton (1975) 60 Ill.2d 451 [328 N.E.2d 257]; see Annot. 83 A.L.R.2d 1077, 1080.) This personal nature of the surviving spouse's right of election in those jurisdictions results from its being strictly construed as a limited exception to the deceased spouse's general testamentary power to control the disposition of his own property. (Cf. Estate of Bunn (1949) 33 Cal.2d 897, 900 [206 P.2d 635] (former statutory right to set aside charitable bequest strictly construed as personal to eligible relative); Estate of Hughes (1962) 202 Cal. App.2d 12, 18 [20 Cal. Rptr. 475] (same).) [2] In contrast, on the death of a married California resident the surviving spouse's half of the community property belongs to such survivor and is not subject to the decedent's testamentary disposition in the absence of an affirmative election to the contrary. The surviving spouse's interest is not a special exception to a decedent's right to dispose of his own property, provided out of solicitude for the survivor's personal comfort, but reflects a legal recognition of the survivor's right to absolute ownership of a share of the fruits of the marriage unless and until such right is voluntarily relinquished. The circumstances under which the surviving spouse must elect between community property rights and benefits under the deceased spouse's will are essentially the same as those generally giving rise to a necessity for election whenever an instrument purports to dispose of property owned by another and also gives such owner benefits in other property. (See Noe v. Splivalo (1880) 54 Cal. 207 (testator's son's acceptance of devised property estopped him from claiming title to other property devised to third persons); Estate of Waters (1972) 24 Cal. App.3d 81, 85 [100 Cal. Rptr. 775] (surviving joint tenant's election); Tassi v. Tassi (1958) 160 Cal. App.2d 680, 685 [325 P.2d 872].) In all such cases the effectiveness of the will or other instrument to dispose of property normally beyond the maker's power of control depends on conduct of the property owner constituting an election to accept benefits under the instrument. ( Estate of Smith (1895) 108 Cal. 115, 119-122 [40 P. 1037]; Estate of Klingenberg, supra, 94 Cal. App.2d 240, 244.) (4) Thus the effectiveness of a testamentary disposition of the surviving spouse's community property interest to third persons depends upon the survivor's voluntary and affirmative acceptance of the will's provisions and cannot stem from the decedent's testamentary act alone. ( Estate of Carson (1965) 234 Cal. App.2d 516 [44 Cal. Rptr. 360] (construing Inheritance Tax Law).) The survivor's decision to accept or reject the will's provisions in lieu of his or her community property interest may be made as late as the time of the proceeding for distribution of the property. ( Estate of Roberts (1945) 27 Cal.2d 70, 75 [162 P.2d 461]; Estate of Dunphy, supra, 147 Cal. 95, 104.) (3b) The absolute nature of the survivor's community property interest precludes treating the mere fact of the survivor's death as equivalent to an election to accept the will's provisions in lieu of that interest. The continuation after the surviving spouse's death of his or her right to claim half of the community property against conflicting provisions of the deceased spouse's will is consistent with, but not dependent upon, the vested nature of the spouses' community property rights during their married lives. Since 1927 [t]he respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the marriage relation have been present, existing and equal interests. (Civ. Code, § 5105; former Civ. Code, § 161a.) [3] Even before 1927 the wife's community property interest during the marriage, while not vested, was deemed a much more definite and present interest than is that of an ordinary heir. ( Stewart v. Stewart (1926) 199 Cal. 318, 342 [249 P. 197]; accord, Siberell v. Siberell (1932) 214 Cal. 767, 771-772 [7 P.2d 1003].) (5) But the surviving spouse's rightful claim to half of the community property on the other spouse's death stems not from the rights held during the marriage but from the survivor's vested interest existent immediately upon death unless and until voluntarily relinquished, (Prob. Code, §§ 201, 300; Logan v. Serpa (1949) 91 Cal. App.2d 818, 822 [206 P.2d 70].) [4] Language in Estate of Kelley, supra, 122 Cal. App.2d 42, suggesting that survival of the wife's rights to take her community property share against her husband's will depends upon the vested nature of her interest during the marriage is disapproved. Other language in Kelley to the effect that the widow's executrix was duty bound to elect against the will (122 Cal. App.2d at p. 44) and that the widow's death eliminated any problem of election (122 Cal. App.2d at p. 45) constrains us to observe that there may be circumstances, not present here or in Kelley, under which it will be in the best interest of a surviving spouse's estate to elect to accept the provisions of the will. The death of the surviving spouse does not necessarily terminate the right of such spouse's successor to do so. [5] (Cf. Prob. Code, § 202, subds. (b), (c); fn. 4, ante. )