Opinion ID: 1942962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Capital Sentencing Reform

Text: Finally, I write to reiterate this Court's suggestion to the Legislature regarding revision of our capital sentencing statute. In Steele, this Court recommended that the Legislature revisit our capital sentencing statute and consider whether to require some unanimity in the jury's recommendations. 921 So.2d at 548. As noted in the majority opinion authored by Justice Cantero, Florida is now the only state in the country that allows the death penalty to be imposed even though the penalty-phase jury may determine by a mere majority vote both whether aggravators exist and whether to recommend the death penalty. Id. at 550. We suggested in Steele that the Legislature consider requiring unanimous findings of aggravators and a unanimous jury recommendation. Id. [30] As noted in the Steele majority opinion, seven states require at least that the aggravators be determined unanimously. Id. at 548. Florida could do the same while still requiring only a majority of the jurors to recommend death in order for that penalty to be imposed. Further, there appears to be some confusion as to how a requirement of jury unanimity would operate in the penalty phase. Under the current system, the jury is informed that its advisory sentence need not be unanimous, and is not encouraged to deliberate at length before making its recommendation. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.14. If unanimity were required on either the existence of aggravators or the penalty recommendation, jurors could be required to deliberate until they reached agreement or informed the Court that they were deadlocked, as with guilt-phase deliberations. The Legislature could provide that in the rare case in which jurors cannot agree on a death-qualifying aggravating circumstance (or the penalty if a unanimous recommendation is required), a new penalty-phase jury should be impaneled or, in the alternative, a sentence of life imposed. Accordingly, reform bringing Florida closer to the mainstream of capital sentencing states in regard to jury findings could take one of several paths. I again encourage the Legislature to reexamine section 921.141 in light of Ring, Steele, article I, section 22, and this case. CANTERO, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in affirming Coday's conviction, but I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to vacate his death sentence. The majority does so based on his experts' testimony that his capacity to conform to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. The trial judge, who was in a much better position than we are to determine the experts' credibility, rejected their testimony. He did not abuse his discretion in doing so. First, competent, substantial evidence demonstrates that Coday had the capacity to conform to the requirements of law; and specifically, that he carefully planned the encounter with his victim and its aftermath. Second, much of the experts' testimony was based on Coday's own self-reports, and therefore the trial court was within his discretion to reject it. Below, I explain the standard for determining whether a trial court may reject uncontradicted expert testimony. Next, I address the evidence supporting the trial court's decision and then the evidence supporting his rejection of the mental health experts' opinions.
Whether a mitigator has been established, and the weight to ascribe to it, are matters within the trial judge's discretion. Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 420 (Fla. 1990). In fact, we have stated that [a] trial court may reject a claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proven provided that the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the rejection. Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 646 (Fla.2000). When the asserted mitigating circumstance is based solely on expert testimony, the trial judge has even wider discretion because expert testimony is not binding. Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 390 (Fla.1994). A trial court may reject mitigation based on expert testimony, even if that testimony is uncontroverted, where it is difficult to square with the other evidence in the case. Morton v. State, 789 So.2d 324, 330 (Fla.2001). As we stated in Walls, [o]pinion testimony gains its greatest force to the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, and its weight diminishes to the degree such support is lacking. A debatable link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor usually means, at most, that a question exists for judge and jury to resolve. 641 So.2d at 390-91. The majority concludes that the evidence offered by the State to counter this mitigation evidence can be squared with the expert testimonies. Majority op. at 1005. As I demonstrate below, however, the evidence presented at least made that factor debatable. Therefore, the judge was well within his discretion in rejecting it.