Opinion ID: 468570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exclusivity of the lhwca.

Text: 35 Reynolds maintains that even if he is covered under the LHWCA, he may sue Litton for negligence under Sec. 905(b). Reynolds relies upon the first sentence of the statute which provides as follows: 36 In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person ... may bring an action against such vessel.... 37 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b). In addition to the sentence which forms the basis of Reynolds' claim, however, the statute also contains an additional sentence which is largely overlooked by both sides in this appeal. That sentence provided: 9 If such person was employed by the vessel to provide shipbuilding or repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing shipbuilding or repair services to the vessel. 38 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b) (1972). We conclude that while the Ticonderoga was at sea for sea trials, Litton was still engaged in shipbuilding; consequently, Reynolds may not sue under Sec. 905(b). 39 At the time Reynolds was injured, Litton was performing ship building services. Our opinion in Williams makes clear that a shipbuilder takes a ship out for sea trials to determine whether the ship is completed, fit and seaworthy. 452 F.2d at 957. The whole purpose of the sea trial was to ascertain what additional work would be required to make the [Ticonderoga] fully fit. 452 F.2d at 957. Although some two-thirds of the approximately 500 persons aboard the Ticonderoga were Litton employees (with the remainder being Navy personnel), Litton was not operating the ship in commerce; it could not use the ship for its own benefit. Litton was testing the Ticonderoga as required by its construction contract with the Navy. 40 The definition of vessel was added to the LHWCA by the 1972 amendments. The legislative history accompanying the amendment of that section is brief, but the 1972 legislative history pertaining to Sec. 905(b) does explain that if the [injured] employee were employed by the vessel to provide shipbuilding or repair services and his injury were caused by the negligence of other persons providing such services to the vessel, such a[ ] [negligence] action against the vessel would be barred. 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, at 4719. It is therefore clear that even before the 1984 amendments, the type of action Reynolds is seeking to bring against Litton was barred by the 1972 version of the Act. Further, the pertinent legislative history prior to the 1984 amendments explains that the [1972] bill provides in the case of a longshoreman who is employed directly by the vessel there will be no action for damages if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in performing longshoring services. Similar provisions are applicable to ship building or repair employees employed directly by the vessel. 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, at 4705. 41 Reynolds' employer, Litton, was engaged in shipbuilding services. Litton's duties as operator were highly circumscribed, specifically defined, and merely incidental to its contractual obligation to build a ship. Cf. Ducote v. International Operating Co., 678 F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir.1982) (party cleaning and loading a barge not an owner pro hac vice because it did not have the right to use the barge for its own purposes in maritime commerce). 10 Reynolds, moreover, worked for Litton as a shipfitter. His brief voyage on the Ticonderoga was a voluntary sojourn which occurred while Litton was still in the process of building the ship. Reynolds is clearly barred from bringing an action under Sec. 905(b). 42