Opinion ID: 1162670
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuing Wrong Theory Inapplicable.

Text: It is also noted in commentary that some federal courts have considered tolling the running of, or delaying the accrual of, the statute of limitation in section 1983 land use actions under the continuing wrong theory. See 1 S. Steinglass  6.6(d) (citing Ocean Acres Ltd. Partnership v. Dare Cy. Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.1983); Gordon v. Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 391 (6th Cir.1978); De Botton v. Marple Township, 689 F. Supp. 477, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Moore v. Costa Mesa, 678 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Jackson v. City Coun., 659 F. Supp. 470, 474-75 (W.D. Va. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 840 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.1988)). There is a split among jurisdictions as to the function and availability of the continuing wrong theory. [35] However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected this theory in the regulatory taking and land use context. See Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 584 (9th Cir.1991); De Anza Properties X, Ltd. v. County of Santa Cruz, 936 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.1991). Since the Ninth Circuit has not embraced the continuing wrong theory, it is not available in this case. The policy behind statutes of limitation is to ensure essential fairness to defendants and to bar plaintiffs who have slept on [their] rights. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428, 13 L.Ed.2d 941, 85 S.Ct. 1050 (1965). The plaintiffs in this case did not bring state actions prior to raising their federal claims so as to toll the statute of limitation during the pendency of their state court proceedings. The nature of the wrongful conduct alleged in this section 1983 action is the enforcement of respective HPO provisions after trial courts had declared them invalid and issued injunctions against continued enforcement. Insofar as the section 1983 claim is concerned, the federal substantive due process rights of the respective class members, if violated, were violated at the instant this improper enforcement came to bear upon each of them. We are therefore not persuaded that this case presents a continuing wrong vis-a-vis the respective class members. In this case the respective class members' section 1983 causes of action accrued ( i.e., substantive due process was violated by allegedly arbitrary and capricious conduct) when they were assessed fees by the City pursuant to the HPO, as a requirement for obtaining a license, after the applicable provisions of the ordinance had been declared invalid by trial courts and further enforcement had been enjoined. [36] We hold that the moment of imposition of fees pursuant to invalidated HPO provisions by the City against each of the respective class members as a condition of removing low income housing gave each respective class member a basis for asserting a section 1983 substantive due process claim against the City. The 3-year statute of limitation began running on each of these respective claims at the moment of fee imposition, which was the moment the respective causes accrued. We accordingly hold that since the 3-year statute of limitation applies, all section 1983 claims by class members which arose prior to the period of 3 years before May 27, 1988, the date of the filing of the complaint, are time barred.