Opinion ID: 2408514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: For its first argument on appeal, the railroad asserts that the trial court erred when it denied its motion for a directed verdict on Sharp's negligence claim. Our standard of review of the denial of a motion for a directed verdict is whether the jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Ouachita Wilderness Institute, Inc. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997); Balentine v. Sparkman, 327 Ark. 180, 937 S.W.2d 647 (1997). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty; it must force the mind to pass beyond suspicion or conjecture. Esry v. Carden, 328 Ark. 153, 942 S.W.2d 846 (1997). When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the party on whose behalf judgment was entered. Id. In such situations, the weight and value of testimony is a matter within the exclusive province of the jury. Id. To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must show that damages were sustained, that the defendant breached the standard of care, and that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the damages. See Ouachita Wilderness, supra ; Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. v. Allen, 326 Ark. 1023, 934 S.W.2d 527 (1996). The parties do not contest that Sharp suffered damages as a result of the collision. Hence, the relevant inquiry on appeal is whether Sharp presented substantial evidence that the railroad breached the standard of care, and that this breach was the proximate cause of his damages.
At trial, Sharp argued that the railroad was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to properly sound its audible warnings. Because the jury rendered a general verdict of negligence, it is impossible to determine whether the jury found that the railroad was negligent in one or both respects. Hence, we must affirm if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory of negligence. Sharp's first theory of negligence was that the railroad failed to maintain a proper lookout under Ark.Code Ann. § 23-12-907(a)(1) (1987) which states that: It shall be the duty of all persons running trains in this state upon any railroad to keep a constant lookout for all persons, including licensees and trespassers, and property upon the track of any and all railroads. During Sharp's case-in-chief, the train's engineer, T.P. Spoon, testified that he could not see Sharp's van, and that he did not know that the train had struck the van until the brakeman brought it to his attention. We find that from this testimony, a jury could have concluded that the railroad breached the standard of care by failing to keep a proper lookout for vehicles entering the Louisiana Street crossing. Because we find that Sharp presented substantial evidence that the railroad was negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout, it is unnecessary to address whether he presented substantial evidence that the railroad was also negligent in failing to properly sound its audible warnings.
The railroad next argues that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict because there was insubstantial evidence that the railroad's negligence was the proximate cause of Sharp's injuries. We have previously defined proximate cause as that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Ouachita, supra ; Craig v. Traylor, 323 Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996). Proximate causation is usually an issue for the jury to decide, and when there is evidence to establish a causal connection between the negligence of the defendant and the damage, it is proper for the case to go to the jury. Ouachita, supra ; Tyson Foods Inc. v. Adams, 326 Ark. 300, 930 S.W.2d 374 (1996); McGraw v. Weeks, 326 Ark. 285, 930 S.W.2d 365 (1996). In other words, proximate causation becomes a question of law only if reasonable minds could not differ. Ouachita, supra ; Tyson, supra . As mentioned previously, Sharp presented evidence that the railroad might have been negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout. The jury could have concluded that if the railroad had kept a proper lookout, it could have either stopped prior to colliding with Sharp's van or sounded earlier warnings to notify Sharp of the impending danger. The railroad argues that Archie Burnham's testimony unequivocally established that the train could not have stopped when it was first able to see Sharp's vehicle. We, however, have previously explained that the jury is not bound to accept the opinion testimony of experts as conclusive. Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. Winburn Tile Mfg. Co., 324 Ark. 266, 920 S.W.2d 829 (1996); Burns v. State, 323 Ark. 206, 913 S.W.2d 789 (1996); Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1861, 134 L.Ed.2d 960 (1996). Hence, we find that Sharp presented substantial evidence of a causal connection between his damages and the railroad's actions. In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of our prior decisions where we held that it was improper to give the lookout instruction where the evidence established that the train could not have stopped in time to avoid the collision. Northland Ins. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R., 309 Ark. 287, 830 S.W.2d 850 (1992); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Evans, 254 Ark. 762, 497 S.W.2d 692 (1973). These cases, however, are distinguishable from the case at hand in that the appellants in both Northland and Evans contested the court's decision to give a jury instruction on one particular theory of negligence. Northland, supra ; Evans, supra . Although the railroad also objected to the lookout instruction in this case, it has failed to contest this ruling on appeal. Instead, the railroad has merely asked us to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury's general verdict of negligence which, as previously mentioned, could have been based upon the jury's finding that the train was negligent in failing to sound audible warnings, in failing to keep a proper lookout, or both. In other words, we are asked only to determine if there was any showing of proximate cause, and not whether the plaintiff established proximate cause of a particular theory of negligence. For these reasons, we find that Sharp presented substantial evidence that the railroad breached its standard of care, and that this breach was the proximate cause of Sharp's injuries. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury for resolution.