Opinion ID: 891622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the search was constitutional under the fourth amendment, but it violated article ii, section 10

Text: {13} The Court of Appeals relied upon United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), holding that if an individual's expectation of privacy is breached by a private actor, then subsequent investigation by the state is not an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so long as the subsequent investigation does not expand upon the scope of the original breach. Rivera III, 2009-NMCA-049, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 194, 207 P.3d 1171. The Court held that the agent's actions were based upon his belief that the package had already been opened by the Denver station employee. Id. ¶ 14. When he opened the package, he saw what had been described to him, and therefore his actions were within the scope of the privacy violation already perpetrated by the Denver station employee. Id. The Court also held that cutting into one of the bundles did not impermissibly expand upon the private search because [t]he knowledge Agent Perry gained from the Bus Company employee about the package, his experience with drugs and packaging of drugs, and his observations of the package and the bundles within would have supported his actions. Id. {14} The State argues that it was reasonable for Agent Perry to reopen the package because Defendant no longer had an expectation of privacy in the package after it had been opened by a private party who later invited Agent Perry to take control of it. Defendant counters with three arguments. First, the mere allegation of a private search is insufficient to dispense with the warrant requirement. Second, the private search doctrine applies only when the officer is shown the contents of the package by the private party who opened the package. Third, Article II, Section 10, as interpreted by this Court, requires a warrant before an officer can search an opaque container. Because Defendant prevailed at the district court level, her citation to the New Mexico Constitution was adequate to preserve the state constitutional claim. See State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 12, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032. {15} The interstitial approach requires the court to determine whether the right is protected by the Fourth Amendment and, if not, whether the state constitution affords greater protection. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19, 20, 22, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. The state constitution will be interpreted to afford greater protection if we conclude that the federal analysis is flawed, we find structural differences between the state and federal government, or we find distinctive state characteristics. Id. ¶ 19. Therefore, we begin our discussion by reviewing whether the Fourth Amendment protects Defendant from the actions of the government agent in this case.
{16} In the context of searches, the Fourth Amendment protects against the infringement of an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Such protection, however, does not extend to searches conducted by private citizens because the Fourth Amendment only restrains unreasonable actions by the government. Id. at 113-14, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Once the expectation of privacy has been lost due to a private search, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now-nonprivate information. Id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. 1652. The private search doctrine allows government officials to search a container without a warrant if a private individual, without participation by the government, searched the container and reveals its contents to the government agent. Id. at 116, 104 S.Ct. 1652; but see Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983) (discussing that although the expectation of privacy may be lost by a private search, it can be potentially regained where there is a substantial likelihood that the contents have been changed during a gap in surveillance). The rationale for this doctrine is that by conducting a search subsequent to the private search, the agent is not learning anything that he did not already know as a result of what was disclosed by the private search. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119-20, 104 S.Ct. 1652. It follows, however, [t]he additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search. Id. at 115, 104 S.Ct. 1652. {17} In Jacobsen, employees of a private freight carrier opened a damaged package, and beneath eight or nine layers of wrappings discovered clear plastic bags containing a white powdery substance. Id. at 111, 104 S.Ct. 1652. After replacing the contents in the box, employees notified the DEA. A DEA agent then arrived on the scene, re-opened the package, and conducted a field test on the powdery substance. Id. at 111-12, 104 S.Ct. 1652. The United States Supreme Court held that the opening of the package by the employees of the freight carrier, whether accidental or deliberate, and whether reasonable or unreasonable, did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character. Id. at 115, 104 S.Ct. 1652. As for the actions of the agent upon arrival, the Court held that [t]he additional invasions of [defendants'] privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search. Id. Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate information. Id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Therefore, a manual inspection of the tube and its contents would not tell [the agent] anything more than he already had been told.... [And t]he agent's viewing of what a private party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 119-20, 104 S.Ct. 1652. {18} The Court applied the private search doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement, even when the items to be searched are not in plain view. Even if the white powder was not itself in plain view because it was still enclosed in so many containers and covered with papers, there was a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its contents would not tell [the agent] anything more than he already had been told. Id. at 118-19, 104 S.Ct. 1652. The Court held that based on what had been learned from the private individual who had previously searched the package, the act of resealing the package could not create any privacy interest with respect to the package that would not otherwise exist. Id. at 120 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Thus, removal of the clear plastic bags from a tube within the package and a visual inspection of the contents enabled the agent to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search. Id. at 120, 104 S.Ct. 1652. {19} The Jacobsen Court also upheld the constitutionality of a field test of the contents of the clear bags because this expansion of the private search was de minimis and the safeguards of a warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment interests. Id. at 125, 104 S.Ct. 1652. The Court reasoned that the subsequent field test did not further compromise any legitimate interest in privacy because the field test only confirmed for the agent that the substance was cocaine. Id. at 122-23, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Also, the suspicious nature of the material made it virtually certain that the substance tested was in fact contraband. Id. at 125, 104 S.Ct. 1652. [T]hus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably `private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest. Id. at 123, 104 S.Ct. 1652. The Court also reasoned that the likelihood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 124, 104 S.Ct. 1652. {20} In this case, analyzing the Fourth Amendment under Jacobsen, if a private search occurred in Denver, Agent Perry's actions, including cutting into the bundle, would not violate the Fourth Amendment. The private search authorized Agent Perry to re-examine the contents as long as he did not unreasonably exceed the scope of the private search. We are confident that the United States Supreme Court would conclude that by re-opening the package in Albuquerque, Agent Perry learned nothing more than what he had been told by the bus company employees, and therefore did not infringe upon any privacy rights of Defendant. {21} Although cutting into an opaque bundle exceeded the scope of the private search, this would likely still be permissible under Jacobsen since Defendant's privacy interest in the package contents had been compromised by the private search in Denver. Id. Although the bundles were not transparent, as was the case in Jacobsen, we believe the United States Supreme Court would conclude that the additional intrusion of cutting into a bundle was de minimis since Agent Perry believed the bundles contained marijuana. Id. at 121, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Requiring Agent Perry to obtain a warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment interests, id. at 110, 104 S.Ct. 1652, and would be unnecessary under Jacobsen in light of the certainty of the contents and the fact that the previous search had largely compromised Defendant's privacy interest in the package. Id. at 121, 104 S.Ct. 1652. Therefore, Agent Perry did not unreasonably expand the private search under the Fourth Amendment.
{22} Defendant also asserts that the search of the package was unconstitutional under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. We have previously observed that the states have the inherent power as separate sovereigns to provide more liberty than that mandated by the United States Constitution. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (We are not bound to give the same meaning to the New Mexico Constitution as the United States Supreme Court places upon the United States Constitution, even in construing provisions having wording that is identical, or substantially so. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). [T]his Court has demonstrated a willingness to undertake independent analysis of our state constitutional guarantees when federal law begins to encroach on the sanctity of those guarantees. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 440, 863 P.2d 1052, 1061 (1993). Article II, Section 10 expresses the fundamental notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions, and thus [we have] identified a broader protection to individual privacy under the New Mexico Constitution. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 24, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (There is established New Mexico law interpreting Article II, Section 10 more expansively than the Fourth Amendment.); State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 19, 140 N.M. 345, 142 P.3d 933 (Specifically, Article II, Section 10, provides greater protections for privacy.). {23} The protection we apply in this case is New Mexico's strong preference for a warrant under Article II, Section 10. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (In interpreting our search and seizure provision, this Court consistently has expressed a strong preference for warrants.). Accordingly, we decline to interpret Article II, Section 10 consistent with Jacobsen because Jacobsen does not comport with the distinctive New Mexico protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 27, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032. {24} Notwithstanding our preference for a warrant, we have sought to encourage private citizens to assist police in their investigations of crimes by declining to suppress evidence that has been discovered by private citizens and turned over to the police. See State v. Santiago, 2009-NMSC-045, ¶ 5, 147 N.M. 76, 217 P.3d 89 ([T]he Fourth Amendment is not implicated and suppression is unwarranted when a private person voluntarily turns over property belonging to another and the government's direct or indirect participation is nonexistent or minor. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); State v. Johnston, 108 N.M. 778, 780-81, 779 P.2d 556, 558-59 (Ct.App.1989) (constitutional analysis not applicable to blood sample taken from defendant for medical purposes and later turned over to police); State v. Perea, 95 N.M. 777, 779, 626 P.2d 851, 853 (Ct.App.1981) (holding that the defendant's shirt, which had been turned over to the officer by a nurse who removed it, did not need to be suppressed because [a]n officer who is lawfully in a position which exposes evidence to him does not need a warrant to seize it.). {25} In Jacobsen, the United States Supreme Court also seeks to promote private citizen assistance of officers. Where we depart from Jacobsen is on the issue of the reasonableness of the expansion of a private search. We agree with Justice Stevens' analysis in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980): [i]f a properly authorized official search is limited by the particular terms of its authorization, at least the same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of another person's privacy.... [S]urely the Government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search. Id. at 657, 100 S.Ct. 2395. We hold that unless there is an exception to the warrant requirement, the government must get a warrant before exceeding the scope of a private search. See State v. Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, ¶ 61, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807 (Among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are exigent circumstances, consent, searches incident to arrest, plain view, inventory searches, open field, and hot pursuit. (citation omitted)), holding modified on other grounds by State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. We decline to retreat from our precedent which interprets Article II, Section 10 as having a stronger preference for a warrant than the Fourth Amendment. This approach honors the state's interest in encouraging private citizens to assist police officers, yet safeguards the preference for a warrant when the government seeks to search private property. This approach does not impose any greater burdens on law enforcement, since for decades law enforcement officers in New Mexico have sought warrants despite their belief that they had probable cause to believe a package contained contraband. See State v. Mann, 103 N.M. 660, 665, 712 P.2d 6, 11 (Ct.App.1985) (Observations gleaned after a valid consent to enter and inspect premises may also provide a basis for establishing probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.). In Mann, while searching the trunk of a car with the permission of the owner, an officer discovered a brown package sealed with tape, positioned behind the trunk lining. Id. at 662-63, 712 P.2d at 8-9. Before the officer could inspect the package, the owner withdrew his consent to the search. Id. at 663, 712 P.2d at 9. After the defendant was arrested, the officer obtained a warrant to search the package and testified that the wrapping of the package observed by him appeared to be of the type normally used to package marijuana. Id. When government agents rely upon their training and experience, they can bring such information to a neutral and detached magistrate to issue a warrant. See State v. Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 647, 137 P.3d 587 ([W]hile we give deference to a magistrate's decision, and to an officer's observations, experience, and training, their conclusions must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances.), limited on other grounds by State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.3d 376. We next determine whether Agent Perry's actions in opening the opaque bundle without a warrant violated Article II, Section 10.