Opinion ID: 512637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of the Board's Remedial Order

Text: 42 The company argues that the Board's remedial order is improper and should not be enforced because of changed circumstances in the years elapsed since the complaints were filed and because the complaint did not adequately inform the company of the issue to be tried. The Board premised its cease and desist order on its finding that, in light of the company's history of unlawful conduct, the company had demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act and unlawfully frustrate the organizational desires of its employees. The company complains that it lacked fair notice of the issue because the complaint did not expressly charge that the company had a proclivity to violate the Act. 43 The company's complaint pertains to the relief ordered in this case. The administrative law judge had issued a narrow order which the Board had modified to a broad order in its decision, based on the company's proclivity to violate the Act. It is well-settled that, while General Counsel's complaint must give a respondent fair notice of the violations charged, [i]t is unnecessary for the complaint to spell out the details of the relief to be requested if it is found that the Act has been violated. NLRB v. Winchester Elecs., Inc., 295 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir.1961); accord NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 11 n. 9 (1st Cir.1976) (rejecting union's contention that the broad orders were unlawful because the General Counsel did not give [the union] notice that he would seek broad orders), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S.Ct. 736, 50 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977). 44 The company's proclivity to violate the Act to its employees' detriment is demonstrated by the evidence of its violations in this case as well as in the two prior cases: Schwab's Foods, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1972), and Schwab Foods, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 394 (1976), enforced, 549 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.1977). Moreover, the company received express notification that its proclivity to violate the Act was at issue in this case when the General Counsel, in exceptions to the administrative law judge's decision, requested issuance of a broad cease and desist order based on this company's demonstrated proclivity. The company could have challenged this request under the Board's rules. It did not do so. We find that the company waived this due process claim because of its failure to bring a timely objection to the lack of prior notice. The company was aware that proclivity would be an issue before the Board, but it did not object. The due process clause ... is not violated by requiring a party to raise a defense based on lack of proper notice within a reasonable period after he becomes aware of the procedural default. NLRB v. Western Temporary Servs., Inc., 821 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir.1987). This claim comes too late. 45 Similarly, we find that the company has waived its objections to the Board's remedial order based on changed circumstances, specifically, that the union allegedly ceased to exist after a merger in June 1979 and that there has been a substantial employee turnover since the complaints were filed. Although the merger occurred while the Board's decision was pending, the company did not file any motions with the Board asking it to consider this changed circumstance. The Act provides that [n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(e). This raises a jurisdictional bar against review of issues not raised to the Board. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 2082-83, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 (1982). When the Board's order issued, the company did not ask the Board to reconsider its order in light of the changed circumstances. The company does not suggest to us what extraordinary circumstances prevented it from doing so. We therefore find that the company has waived its right to object to the terms of the Board's order at this stage of the proceeding. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 281 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. 972, 975 n. 3, 43 L.Ed.2d 189 (1975) (if not raised earlier, objection must be asserted through motion for reconsideration, rehearing or reopening of the record).