Opinion ID: 1268291
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-October-2004 Circuit Court Cases

Text: In Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir.2007), the Ninth Circuit considered Crater's AEDPA habeas petition, in which Crater claimed that he had been denied a fair trial because of an impermissible appearance of [judicial] bias, which was premised on the presiding judge's pre-trial, in camera statements recommending to Crater, in no uncertain terms, that he accept the government's plea offer. The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by announcing that Supreme Court precedent reveals only three circumstances in which an appearance of bias  as opposed to evidence of actual bias  necessitates recusal: (1) a judge who has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against one of the litigants, id. at 1131 (citing Tumey, Ward, and Aetna ) (editorial marks omitted); (2) a judge who becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy with one of the litigants, id. (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971)) (quotation marks omitted); and (3) a judge who acts as part of the accusatory process, id. (quoting Murchison ) (quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit then determined that [n]one of the three [established] circumstances requiring recusal reflects the case at bar, and concluded that the state court's conclusion that the law did not compel disqualification for presumed judicial bias accords with clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 1132 (citations, quotation marks, and editorial marks omitted). In Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1326 (11th Cir.2007), the Eleventh Circuit considered Davis's AEDPA habeas petition, in which Davis claimed that he had been denied due process because the juvenile-court judge who presided over his preliminary proceedings  including the proceeding to transfer him to the circuit court to be tried as an adult  was the brother to one of the three prosecutors at those proceedings. Davis did not claim that he was unaware of the relationship, id. at 1327 n. 2, did not move to disqualify the judge, id. at 1327, and did not allege any actual bias, id. at 1326. Rather, Davis contends that the relationship between [judge and prosecutor] created an appearance of partiality and violated his federal constitutional due process rights. . . . Id. The Eleventh Circuit framed the issue by first acknowledging that federal recusal statute and federal canons of judicial ethics are inapposite because they do not govern state court judges; that the state court's application of state law is not subject to review on habeas; and that habeas review here narrowly concerns only the Due Process Clause and whether the [state court's] rejection of Davis's federal constitutional due process claim constituted an `unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court's precedent. Id. at 1332-33. Having thus framed the issue, the Eleventh Circuit explained in some detail, and ultimately concluded, that [t]here is simply no Supreme Court holding establishing that the type of appearance problem alleged here violates the Due Process Clause or that Davis lacked an impartial tribunal. Id. at 1336.