Opinion ID: 2319629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Initial Deadline Waived

Text: It is well settled in Delaware that a party may waive contractual requirements or conditions. [25] But, the standards for demonstrating waiverthe voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known rightare quite exacting. [26] [The doctrine] implies knowledge of all material facts and an intent to waive, together with a willingness to refrain from enforcing those [] rights. [27] Furthermore, the facts relied upon to demonstrate waiver must be unequivocal. [28] Applying those principles, we have held that three elements must be demonstrated to invoke the waiver doctrine: (1) that there is a requirement or condition capable of being waived, (2) that the waiving party knows of that requirement or condition, and (3) that the waiving party intends to waive that requirement or condition. [29] The record in this case reflects that all three of those elements were clearly established. The Initial Deadline to submit Election Forms was a condition capable of being waived. The Merger Agreement and Election Form specifically informed the parties of the consequence of failing to satisfy that condition: NYBOT Members ... whose [E]lection [Forms] are not [] received [by the Initial Deadline] will not be entitled to specify their preference as to the form of [M]erger consideration that they may receive.... The Defendants knew of that condition. Throughout the entire suboptimal process, the Defendants debated whether to waive the Initial Deadline and continue to accept Election Forms. Then, the Defendants finally decided to waive the Initial Deadline in an effort to accommodate NYBOT Members who had not submitted an Election Form by the Initial Deadline. The Defendants' intent to do so was unmistakably clear.