Opinion ID: 4556341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Dismiss Allegedly Biased Juror

Text: {¶ 67} In his third proposition of law, Kirkland contends that one of the prospective jurors who ended up seated on the jury, prospective juror No. 36, favored an automatic death penalty in every murder case and therefore should have 16 January Term, 2020 been removed. However, Kirkland never challenged this prospective juror for cause; he has therefore forfeited this claim, absent plain error. {¶ 68} On her questionnaire, prospective juror No. 36 checked boxes indicating that the death penalty is “[a]ppropriate in every case where someone has been murdered” and “should always be used as the punishment for every murder.” {¶ 69} On voir dire, defense counsel asked the panel members as a group whether they understood that the death sentence is not automatic: And just because Mr. Kirkland has been found guilty by a prior jury does not mean that Mr. Kirkland automatically gets the death penalty. Fair? Everybody gets that? Just because a jury has said guilty, that he is guilty of aggravated murder and specifications associated with aggravated murder, the case is not over. Everybody understands that, right? Good. No prospective juror responded to these questions. {¶ 70} Defense counsel also briefly questioned prospective juror No. 36 about the views expressed on her questionnaire: MR. CUTCHER [defense counsel]: I think you listed the death penalty is necessary? [Prospective juror No. 36]: Yes. MR. CUTCHER: Did you mean necessary in some cases, all cases? [Prospective juror No. 36]: Some cases. 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO MR. CUTCHER: Thank you for correcting me so quickly. The death penalty should always be used as a punishment for every murder. You put you agreed with that. [Prospective juror No. 36]: In answering the question, yes, at the time, yes. I answered yes. MR. CUTCHER: So you don’t think it is appropriate in every case? [Prospective juror No. 36]: In listening to—there are so many different cases that was discussed earlier today, I don’t know how to answer that honestly. MR. CUTCHER: That’s all right. I didn’t mean to put you on the spot. (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel asked no further questions of prospective juror No. 36. Neither did the trial court. The defense did not challenge prospective juror No. 36 for cause, and she served on the jury in the resentencing hearing. {¶ 71} By declining to challenge prospective juror No. 36 for cause, Kirkland forfeited this claim. See State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 467, 2014Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 78. For this court to consider this claim, Kirkland must show plain error: that an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). If he makes this showing, we must decide whether we will, in our discretion, correct the error. Id. {¶ 72} A plain error is “an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings.” Id. To qualify as correctible plain error, the defect “must have affected ‘substantial rights,’ ” which “mean[s] that the trial court’s error must have affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. We have held that a defendant must “demonstrate a reasonable 18 January Term, 2020 probability that the error resulted in prejudice.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22. {¶ 73} “Actual bias is ‘bias in fact’—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1997), citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936). Here, the questionnaire contains an expression of partiality on the part of prospective juror No. 36. A juror who will automatically impose a death sentence is biased. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Hence, by stating that capital punishment should be imposed on all murderers, prospective juror No. 36 revealed “a state of mind that leads to an inference that [she would] not act with entire impartiality,” Torres at 43. {¶ 74} But the expression of partiality does not end the analysis. A court will find actual bias when a prospective juror’s unambiguous statement of partiality is “coupled with a lack of juror rehabilitation or juror assurances of impartiality.” Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666, 675 (6th Cir.2004). {¶ 75} Prospective juror No. 36’s questionnaire statement was not coupled with a lack of juror rehabilitation. While she did not say she could set aside the opinion expressed on her questionnaire, she did indicate that she no longer held that opinion. As soon as defense counsel brought up her statement on the questionnaire, she immediately contradicted it. These responses showed that prospective juror No. 36 had reconsidered her original opinion in response to what she heard during voir dire, and they indicated a newfound understanding that a single dogmatic response is not appropriate to every murder conviction. {¶ 76} When a prospective juror gives contradictory answers, it is the trial judge’s function to determine her true state of mind. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d at 339, 744 N.E.2d 1163. The question whether a juror is impartial is “one of historical fact.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (1984); hence, a trial court’s finding is entitled to deference on appellate review. E.g., State v. Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 339, 638 N.E.2d 1023 (1994). {¶ 77} Given the prospective juror’s change of mind during voir dire, we cannot find that the trial court committed an obvious error in failing to dismiss her sua sponte. Accordingly, no plain error exists here. We therefore overrule Kirkland’s third proposition of law.