Opinion ID: 1391736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proportionality Review on Appeal

Text: California's 1977 death penalty legislation has another serious flaw since there are inadequate safeguards for appellate review of a judge or jury's decision to impose death. The United States Supreme Court has struck down death penalty statutes which fail to provide for meaningful appellate review. ( Roberts (Stanislaus), supra, 428 U.S. at p. 335 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 983].) To be adequate, legislation must set up a method by which a full review of the factual basis for the sentencing authority's decision [29] can be made by a court which, because of its statewide jurisdiction, can assure consistency, fairness, and rationality in the evenhanded operation of the state law. [30] The California Legislature failed to provide for such proportionality review in enacting the 1977 legislation. An examination of the background and legislative history of this legislation establishes conclusively that the omission was intentional and that the Legislature intended to exclude proportionality review from this state's capital punishment law. Two developments prior to the Legislature's consideration of the 1977 law are relevant. First, this court had consistently and repeatedly held that it had no power to review the exercise of the jury's or trial court's discretion which fixed the penalty for capital murder. ( People v. Odle (1951) 37 Cal.2d 52, 55 [230 P.2d 345]; see also, In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 623 [73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117] and cases cited therein.) Although this court was importuned on many occasions to exercise such a power[,] [u]niformly, the request [was] rejected. ( People v. Howk (1961) 56 Cal.2d 687, 699 [16 Cal. Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426].) In December of 1976, this state's then-existing mandatory death penalty laws were held unconstitutional because they violated the principles of Gregg et al. ( Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420 [134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101].) [31] Those laws did not have a provision which included proportionality review. In striking down that legislation, this court specifically held that [d]ecisions as to ... what extent a jury determination [imposing a death sentence] is reviewable by... the reviewing court, and the scope of responsibility to be given this court to safeguard against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty are matters of legislative concern. ( Id., at p. 445, italics added.) The court went further and declined to read such requirements into the death penalty statute because that would invade the legislative province.... ( Ibid. ) Soon after Rockwell was filed, several bills were introduced in the Legislature to reinstate the death penalty. One of these bills, Senate Bill No. 155 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.), was eventually enacted into law, creating the death penalty provisions now under consideration. Early in the Legislature's consideration of these bills, a special hearing was called to consider expert testimony on the question of what procedural provisions would be mandated in order to pass a constitutional death penalty law. (See Constitutional Issues Relative to the Death Penalty, Special Hearing, Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice (Jan. 24, 1977).) An outstanding group of experts was called to testify. (See remarks of Hon. Kenneth L. Maddy, id., at p. 1.) The legislators were repeatedly told at the hearing that the absence of Supreme Court proportionality [review] in a statute ... is enough to make it unconstitutional. ( Id., at p. 13.) As originally introduced, Senate Bill No. 155 did not include any statutory provision for proportionality review. Analyses of the bill in both the Senate and the Assembly noted this omission and queried, Wouldn't the risk of unconstitutionality be unduly high in a statute like S.B. 155 without statewide proportionality review? (See Bill Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 155 (as amended Mar. 24, 1977) by Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, at p. 7; see also Bill Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 155 (as amended Feb. 17, 1977) by Sen. Com. on Judiciary, at pp. 6-8.) On May 16, 1977, an amendment was proposed that would have added proportionality review to Senate Bill No. 155. The amendment read: In any appeal taken pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1239, the Supreme Court shall also consider the punishment to determine whether the sentence was imposed for any arbitrary factor and whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering the crime, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the defendant. The Supreme Court is authorized to make any rules regarding the keeping of the records or any other matter necessary to fulfill the responsibility under this subdivision. (2 Assem. J. (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) p. 3352.) The proposed amendment to Senate Bill No. 155 was rejected by a vote of 44 to 30, and the bill was quickly enacted into law with no provision for proportionality review. In light of all of these developments, the conclusion appears unavoidable that the Legislature has not empowered this court to conduct proportionality review. As one well known authority has stated, Generally the rejection of an amendment [to a bill that is subsequently enacted] indicates that the legislature does not intend the bill to include the provisions embodied in the rejected amendment. (2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) § 48.18, p. 224, fn. omitted.) [32] This rule of construction has been followed in California for many years. (See, e.g., Madrid v. Justice Court (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 819, 825 [125 Cal. Rptr. 348]; Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal. App.2d 591, 607 [45 Cal. Rptr. 512]; see also California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 846 [157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) Nevertheless, the three justices who addressed this issue in Frierson decided to `read into' the 1977 law the requisite provisions for proportionality review, since those justices were unable to discern a clear legislative intent to reject such review. ( Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 183 (lead opn. of Richardson, J.).) This conclusion can be reached only by ignoring legislative history and violating long established rules of statutory construction. ( Sutherland, op. cit. supra. ) When the Legislature rejected the amendment to insert proportionality review into Senate Bill No. 155, it knew (1) that this court had for years held it had no power to review a sentencing authority's exercise of discretion which imposed a death sentence; (2) that only five months prior to the vote on the proposed amendment, this court had held that proportionality review was a matter of purely legislative concern and that for this court to read such a provision into a death penalty legislation would be to invade the legislative province ... [33] ; and (3) that constitutional experts and the legislators' own staffs had informed them of the probable need for such a provision in the bill itself for the legislation to be constitutional. In light of these circumstances, it is inconceivable that anyone could conclude that when the Legislature rejected the proportionality review amendment, it was not rejecting the concept of proportionality review. [34] In Rockwell, supra, 18 Cal.3d 420, this court expressed other reasons which militated against our inserting proportionality review into legislation that did not provide for it. The court would not only have to attempt to devise the necessary procedures and criteria but it would be in the position of having to pass objectively on the constitutionality of procedures of [its] own design. ( Id. at p. 445.) The fears underlying these considerations are borne out by the narrow scope of the proportionality review suggested by the lead opinion in Frierson. Even if this court could properly defy the Legislature's wishes concerning proportionality review, the kind of review which the three Frierson justices vowed to undertake is inadequate under federal constitutional standards. Quoting from In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921]  a case predating Gregg et al. and relying solely on the California Constitution  the three justices in Frierson defined proportionality review as an obligation to determine whether the penalty `is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' (25 Cal.3d at p. 183, emphasis added in Frierson. ) This test of proportionality is too narrow. It focuses on the proportionality between the punishment and the crime without attempting to determine whether it is proportional to other sentences imposed for similar crimes. ( Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 203 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 891] (opn. of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.).) [35] This deficiency is compounded by the articulation of a wholly subjective standard for finding a death sentence disproportionate: the sentence must shock the conscience in light of the crime. Such a standard leaves the appellate court without adequate guidance for determining the proportionality of a particular death sentence. Moreover, the standard appears to be virtually unreachable, since former section 190.2 permits a death sentence only for very serious crimes  first degree murders committed under special circumstances. It is difficult to believe that in reviewing death sentences imposed on persons convicted of such crimes, a majority of this court will find the sentence so excessive as to shock their conscience or offend their sense of human dignity. Realistically, the kind of proportionality review described by the lead opinion in Frierson is at best an empty ritual. Clearly, proportionality review was not meant to be an entirely subjective or perfunctory exercise. Rather, it was designed to provide a significant check on the arbitrariness of judges and juries by assuring consistency throughout the state in the infliction of death sentences. Under the view suggested in Frierson, proportionality review does not include this essential comparative function. It also bears noting that this court is not presently equipped to perform meaningful proportionality review. While this court can monitor those cases in which a death sentence is imposed, it cannot account for cases in which a sentencing authority returns a verdict of life imprisonment. Thus, every automatic appeal reviewed for proportionality of sentence can only be compared to other cases wherein death has been imposed. No matter how frequently life sentences may be returned at the trial level for similar crimes and similar offenders, all death sentences will appear to this appellate court to be consistent. Finally, even if this court could properly limit its proportionality review to the record in the individual appeal being decided, the review would be meaningless. The sentencing authority in California is under no obligation to put on the record any of its reasons for imposing the death penalty. Further, it may impose death on the basis of factors not specifically enumerated in former section 190.3. As a result, this court has no way of determining whether any given death sentence was in fact arbitrary or based on caprice. The entire scheme for proportionality review set up by the lead opinion in Frierson is mere illusion. In Frierson, supra, the lead opinion acknowledged this court's constitutionally derived responsibility to assess the proportionality of a particular punishment.... (25 Cal.3d at p. 183.) Today, this court's majority opinion states that we stand fully prepared to afford whatever kind of proportionality review may be held constitutionally mandated by the high court. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 317.) Despite these statements of high resolve, the majority have not undertaken such review as to the present case. Perhaps the reason for this omission is that such a review is impossible under this statute because there is no way of knowing why this jury sentenced this young man to die. There is no way of knowing what aggravating circumstances the jurors actually relied on in their decision to impose death. There is no way of knowing which circumstances the jury believed were aggravating and which they deemed mitigating. There is no way of knowing which of the 10 enumerated factors in former section 190.3 were found to be true. There is no way of knowing whether all the jurors agreed on the existence of the same aggravating circumstance(s) or whether only a few agreed on any particular one. There is no way of knowing whether the jury found each aggravating circumstance relied on to have been established by a scintilla of evidence, a preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And there is no way of knowing whether this jury's decision was consistent with those of other juries under like circumstances. In short, this court knows nothing more about the actual reasons why this jury chose to condemn appellant to death than it would have known under the invalid pre- Furman law. This court, in order to uphold the constitutionality of a defective death penalty statute, has set up an illusory scheme that resembles the work of a prestidigitator more than that of a court of law.
Over the years, much has been written about the death penalty. People differ philosophically as to its efficacy as a deterrent to crime. Indeed, there are few issues that generate so much heat while shedding so little light. Perhaps no issue is so emotionally charged. Unfortunately, the political atmosphere this issue creates is more conducive to sensationalism and exploitation than it is to understanding. Thus, in the past some politicians have not been above attempting to advance their careers by playing on the strong feelings this issue engenders. [36] Against that emotional backdrop, this court must play a very different role. Our job is to carefully and precisely review the record and apply constitutional principles of law so that a fair and just result is reached in each and every case in which a judgment of death has been pronounced. The people of this state placed that responsibility on this court when they enacted the provision presently found in article VI, section 11 of the California Constitution. To properly discharge our responsibility, two difficult tasks must be undertaken. First, this court must rigorously review the record below for error. If substantive error is present, this court must not hesitate to reverse. That is our job, and we are duty-bound to perform it. Second, this court must measure the adequacy of California's statutes by federal constitutional standards regarding the death penalty, as articulated in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Those decisions have set forth rules to ensure that when a state imposes the death penalty, it is done consistently with fair procedure. Regardless of whether they personally favor the death penalty or not, I am certain the citizens of this state would not want this court to uphold the imposition of that penalty if our statute did not meet the essential requirements that the United States Supreme Court has posited. The justices of this court all take an oath of office to follow the law. Although we may disagree on various issues before us, our views are reached conscientiously and consistently with the rigorous demands of our oaths. Nowhere is our exercise of conscientious judgment more critical than in those cases in which the ultimate sanction of death has been imposed. It is precisely for these reasons that I think it imperative that this court strip away the emotional overlay surrounding this issue and objectively and fairly review the record of this trial and the applicable law. Having done so, I am convinced that this conviction cannot stand. The failure of the Legislature to write a death penalty statute that sets forth clear guidelines that assure relative equality of treatment; the failure of the Legislature to give the sentencing authority meaningful standards to follow in exercising its discretion; the failure of the Legislature to provide procedures that ensure that the judge or jury focuses on the important and permissible sentencing considerations; the failure of the Legislature to set out a mechanism that would ensure that a reliable determination has been made that death is the proper sentence in a particular case; and the failure of the Legislature to give this court the means or the power to engage in meaningful review of a sentence of death, make it impossible to uphold the 1977 death penalty statute. These failures of the Legislature are only compounded by the failure of the state-appointed trial attorney to effectively represent his client. Consequently, the judgment entered below should be reversed.