Opinion ID: 1190183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The DANIELS Test

Text: As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to consider the exact nature of the Daniels test. The People assert that it is only if both prongs of that test are met that a conviction of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (§ 209) is invalid under Daniels. Daniels stated (at p. 1139), we hold that the intent of the Legislature in amending Penal Code section 209 in 1951 was to exclude from its reach not only `standstill' robberies (e.g., People v. Knowles, ... 35 Cal.2d 175 [217 P.2d 1]) but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. [Italics added.] (See Note, Room-to-Room Movement: A Risk Rationale for Aggravated Kidnapping ... 11 Stan.L.Rev. 554, 555; Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping ... Colum.L.Rev. 540, 554-557.) [4] Some authorities have indicated that, if the movement is not merely incidental to the robbery, a conviction under section 209 is not invalid under Daniels irrespective of whether there is an increase in danger to the victim under the second prong of the Daniels test. (E.g., People v. Stathos, 17 Cal. App.3d 33, 38-39 [94 Cal. Rptr. 482]; see In re Bryant, 19 Cal. App.3d 933, 937-938 [97 Cal. Rptr. 40] [conc. opn.]; 59 Cal.L.Rev. 180, 189.) [5] (2) On the other hand from language in the majority opinion in People v. Thornton, supra, 11 Cal.3d 738, it may be inferred that movements of a victim can constitute kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (§ 209) only if the movements (1) are not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and (2) substantially increase the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the crime of robbery. [6] The Thornton dissent clearly so indicates. [7] (See also In re Crumpton, 9 Cal.3d 463, 466-467 [106 Cal. Rptr. 770, 507 P.2d 74]; People v. Cleveland, 27 Cal. App.3d 820, 825 [104 Cal. Rptr. 161]; and People v. Lobaugh, 18 Cal. App.3d 75, 83 [95 Cal. Rptr. 547].) That indication is correct. [8] Cases such as People v. Stathos, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d 33, are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with the views expressed herein. Nothing in People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d 588, is inconsistent with the requirement that to convict a defendant of violating section 209 the jury must find both of the foregoing matters. Stanworth held (at p. 596) that the Daniels test is inapplicable to simple kidnaping (§ 207). Stanworth pointed out that both prongs of the Daniels test refer to robbery and that simple kidnaping may occur in the absence of another crime. Stanworth stated (p. 601) that the language of section 207 implies that the determining factor in the crime of kidnaping is the actual distance of the victim's movements; and further, that the minimum movements necessary for the commission of the crime are present where the victim is forcibly taken `into another part of the same county.' (Italics added.) Finally because the victim's movements must be more than slight ... or `trivial' ... they must be substantial in character to constitute kidnaping under section 207. Stanworth involved not only section 207 convictions but also a section 209 conviction, and with respect to the latter Stanworth applied the Daniels test. Stanworth further noted (p. 600) that In Daniels, we observed that section 209 fails to define the term `kidnaps' ... and concluded that the Legislature must have intended the term to have the same meaning as the word `kidnaping' used in section 207. ( Daniels, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1131.) In sum, both Daniels, involving section 209 kidnaping, and Cotton [v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459 (15 Cal. Rptr. 65, 364 P.2d 241)], involving section 207 kidnaping, construe the term `kidnaping' to mean movements which are not merely incidental to associated crimes. [9] ( Stanworth, at p. 600.) However, in view of the fact that, as we stated in Daniels, section 209 prescribes increased punishment when the kidnaping is for the purpose of ransom or robbery ( Daniels, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1131; see also Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1973 Supp.) § 358A, p. 187), [10] violation of section 209 requires not only that the asportation be not merely incidental to the associated crime of robbery (i.e., that there be a kidnaping) but also that it substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. ( Daniels, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139.)