Opinion ID: 2633588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Did statutory restrictions on independent study programs apply to charter schools before Education Code section 51747.3 was amended in 1999?

Text: The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs may not pursue, as part of their CFCA cause of action, allegations that the charter school defendants claimed ADA funding in violation of the independent study requirements of Education Code section 51747.3. The appellate court reasoned that section 51747.3 applied to charter schools only after a 1999 amendment, effective in 2000, and that all the pertinent allegations of the complaint preceded this effective date. We conclude, contrary to the Court of Appeal, that section 51747.3, as in effect before 2000, did include charter schools. Our analysis proceeds against the following backdrop. In 1989, article 5.5 (§ 51745 et seq.), dealing with independent study programs, was added to title 2, part 28, division 4, chapter 5 of the Education Code. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1089, § 5, p. 3775.) [28] Section 51745, subdivision (a), provides that, beginning with the 1990-1991 school year, local school districts may offer independent study programs to meet the educational needs of pupils in accordance with the requirements of this article. Three years later, in 1992, the Legislature enacted the CSA. One section of that law, Education Code section 47610, provided that a charter school must comply with its charter, but was otherwise exempt from the laws governing school districts except as specified in [s]ection 47611 [dealing with participation in the State Teacher's Retirement System]. (Stats.1992, ch. 781, § 1, p. 3760.) Since its inception, the CSA has further stated that, with specified exceptions, [a]dmission to a charter school shall not be determined according to the place of residence of the pupil, or of his or her parent or guardian, within this state. (Ed.Code, § 47605, subd. (d)(1).) In 1993, Education Code section 51747.3 was added to the independent study provisions. (Stats.1993, ch. 66, § 32, p. 923.) As then enacted, section 51747.3 provided that [n]o local education agency may claim state funding for the independent study of a pupil . . . if the agency has provided any funds or other thing of value to the pupil or his or her parent or guardian that the agency does not provide to students who attend regular classes or to their parents or guardians. (Stats.1993, ch. 66, § 32, p. 923 adding Ed.Code, § 51747.3, subd. (a), italics added.) Further, the new statute specified that  [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . independent study average daily attendance shall be claimed by school districts and county superintendents of schools only for pupils who are residents of the county in which the apportionment claim is reported, or . . . of a county immediately adjacent to [such] county. . . . ( Id., adding § 51747.3, subd. (b), italics added.) Finally, the statute stated that [t]he provisions of this section are not subject to waiver by the State Board of Education, by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, or under any provision of Part 26.8 [ of the Education Code ] ( commencing with [s]ection 47600 ) [i.e., the CSA]. ( Id., adding § 51747.3, subd. (d), italics added.) A 1995 Attorney General's opinion concluded that Education Code section 51747.3's restrictions on the provision of special funds or other thing[s] of value to independent study pupils applied to charter schools. The opinion observed that although, in section 47610, the CSA purported to exempt charter schools from all but a few specified school district laws, subdivision (d) of section 51747.3 expressly provided that the provisions of that statute could not be waived under the CSA. As the opinion indicated, [w]hatever may comprise the `laws governing school districts' from which charter schools are exempt, it is clear that for purposes of the state funding of independent study programs, a charter school must comply with the particular requirements of [Education Code] section 51747.3. The last sentence of subdivision (d) of section 51747.3 would otherwise be devoid of meaning, contrary to the rule of statutory construction that every word, phrase, sentence and part of a statute must be accorded significance if reasonably possible. [Citations.] (78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 253, 257-258 (1995).) [29] In 1996, the Legislature amended Education Code section 47610, part of the CSA, to add certain additional statutes to the list of laws from which charter schools, in derogation of the general rule, were not exempt. (Stats.1996, ch. 786, § 5.) Section 51747.3 was not included. In this setting, the Legislature amended Education Code section 51747.3 in 1999. (Stats.1999, ch. 162, § 2.) As amended in 1999, subdivision (a) of section 51747.3 specifies that [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, charter schools are among the local educational agencies barred from claiming state funding for pupils who have received funds or other things of value not provided to regular classroom students. (Stats.1999, ch. 162, § 2.) A new sentence in subdivision (a) further declares that [a] charter school may not claim state funding for the independent study of a pupil . . . if the charter school has provided any funds or other thing of value to the pupil or his or her parent or guardian that a school district could not legally provide to a similarly situated pupil of the school district, or to his or her parent or guardian. In subdivision (b), the amendment added charter schools to school districts and county superintendents of schools as entities ineligible to claim state apportionment funds for independent study pupils who reside outside the county from which the apportionment claim is reported, or an adjacent county. (Stats.1999, ch. 162, § 2.) [30] The Legislative Counsel's Digest for Senate Bill No. 434 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 434), which incorporated the 1999 amendment to Education Code section 51747.3, stated that the amendment (1) would make . . . applicable to charter schools the preexisting statutory restriction on ADA funding for independent study students who have received money or things of value not provided to traditional classroom students, (2) would apply . . . also to charter schools the preexisting ban on ADA funding for independent study students who live outside the county in which funding is sought, or an adjacent county, and (3) would additionally prevent charter schools from receiving ADA funding for independent study pupils to whom they provided money or things of value which a school district could not legally provide to similarly situated students. In concluding that the 1999 amendment extended Education Code section 51747.3 to charter schools for the first time, the Court of Appeal cited (1) the CSA's express exemption of charter schools from all but a few specified provisions governing school districts, (2) the express CSA provision that charter school enrollment cannot be limited by residence, (3) the 1999 amendment's express addition of charter schools to the entities subject to section 51747.3, and (4) the Legislative Counsel's Digest quoted above. The concurring and dissenting opinion applies a similar analysis. But that approach overlooks language section 51747.3 has contained since its adoption in 1993i.e., that its provisions are not subject to waiver under the CSA. As the Attorney General observed in his 1995 opinion, the only possible meaning of this language is that, from and after the effective date of the 1993 enactment, charter schools were, and remain, subject to the statutory restrictions on independent study programs then set forth in that law. Any other conclusion would deprive this phrase of significance, contrary to the principle of statutory construction that interpretations which render any part of a statute superfluous are to be avoided. (E.g., In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 48, 87 P.3d 797; Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1002, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 987 P.2d 705; People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1030, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204.) This construction of Education Code section 51747.3 does not overlook certain provisions of the CSA, noted by the Court of Appeal, and by the concurring and dissenting opinion, which were already in effect in 1993, including sections 47605 (eligibility for enrollment in particular charter school not to be determined by residence) and 47610 (charter school exempt from laws governing school districts except as expressly provided). In harmonizing the disparate, and sometimes discordant, statutory provisions, we are guided by the maxim that, where statutes are otherwise irreconcilable, later and more specific enactments prevail, pro tanto, over earlier and more general ones. (See, e.g., Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 942-943, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 126 P.3d 1040 ( Pacific Lumber ); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 568, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d 1086; Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1524, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 621.) Applying those principles, we conclude that the 1993 version of Education Code section 51747.3, including its provision for nonwaiver under the CSA, is a more recent and specific enactment on the subjects it addresses than the pertinent provisions of sections 47605 and 47610. The latter statutes, enacted in 1992, provided generally that charter schools were exempt from most school district laws and must accept nonresident students. But section 51747.3 later placed restrictions, including residence restrictions, on the circumstances under which charter schools, like other public schools, could obtain ADA funding for independent study programs and pupils in particular. To that extent, section 51747.3 superseded the earlier statutes. Indeed, section 51747.3 has always expressly provided that its residency restrictions apply notwithstanding any other provision of law. ( Id., subd. (b).) [31] We are not persuaded otherwise by the 1996 amendment to Education Code section 47610, which added certain statutes to the list of laws from which charter schools are not exempt, but did not include section 51747.3. Section 51747.3, by its express terms, already applied to charter schools. There was no need to say so again in section 47610. Nor are we dissuaded by the language, the Legislative Counsel's Digest, or the legislative history [32] of the 1999 amendment to Education Code section 51747.3, insofar as they might suggest the 1999 Legislature believed charter schools were being added to the statute for the first time. A later expression of legislative purpose is not binding as to what prior legislation meant when it was adopted. (E.g., Pacific Lumber, supra, 37 Cal.4th 921, 940, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 126 P.3d 1040; Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 492, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 823, 115 P.3d 98.) We therefore conclude that the restrictions on independent study programs set forth in the 1993 version of Education Code section 51747.3 applied to charter schools even prior to the 1999 amendment. [33] Plaintiffs' CFCA cause of action appears properly tailored to the pre-1999 version of the statute. The complaint alleges that the charter school defendants submitted false ADA claims for independent study pupils who (1) received funds or other thing[s] of value not provided to classroom students, and (2) resided outside the counties designated by the statute. The trial court and the Court of Appeal thus erred in holding that plaintiffs' independent study claims were barred because Education Code section 51747.3 did not apply to charter schools until it was amended in 1999. [34]