Opinion ID: 147630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Replevin

Text: Lackawanna argues that genuine issues of fact preclude determining whether a demand for return of No. 952 was made in 1995 or 1996, and therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 580 (stating statute of limitations is a matter of law where the relevant facts are uncontested). The premise of Lackawanna's argument is that an action for replevin accrues only upon a bailor's demand for return of the property and a bailee's subsequent refusal. But this premise does not accurately reflect Missouri law. To be sure, in Empiregas, Inc. of Palmyra v. Zinn, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a replevin claim did not accrue until plaintiff demanded, and the defendant refused, return of a leased heating fuel tank. 833 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Mo.Ct.App.1992). But that case does not stand for the proposition that in every case there must be a demand and refusal before a bailor may bring an action for replevin. Recent Missouri replevin cases include no such requirement. See Vahey, 120 S.W.3d at 292 (stating removal of personal property gave rise to replevin action); Hamdan, 37 S.W.3d at 399 (stating statute of limitations for replevin begins to run when the damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment). Further, longstanding Missouri precedent establishes that a replevin action may accrue absent a demand and refusal. In Bollman Bros. Co. v. Peake, which concerned replevy of a piano, the plaintiff argued that before an action of replevin for personal property can be maintained ... a demand for possession must be made. 96 Mo.App. 253, 69 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1902). The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected this argument stating, [i]t is not the law that the accrual of a cause of action dependant on a demand... can be postponed indefinitely by the failure of a claimant to make a demand. Id. And in Sanderson, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that any act by the bailee inconsistent with the purpose of the bailment and in derogation and defiance of the bailor's rights would constitute a conversion. 259 S.W. at 894. In other words, the wrongful conduct of the bailee terminates the bailment, entitling the bailor to the possession of the property. Id. We read these cases as establishing that in some circumstances a bailor's cause of action for replevin may accrue absent a demand. [4] Thus, although Lackawanna vigorously argues the record contains an issue of fact regarding demand, we need not delve into the fine particulars of that argument because undisputed facts establish that in 1995 and 1996, the Museum took actions inconsistent with the bailment and in derogation and defiance of the bailor's rights. In 1995, Mr. Howes, the president of the Historical Society at that time, attempted to persuade Mr. Schmidt [the director of the Museum] to release the 952, or agree to some kind of temporary loan under which the museum would allow the 952 to be sent to Pennsylvania for display. Mr. Schmidt responded that the Museum is committed to retaining this engine in its collection and is not interested in any swap for other engines. In May 1996, Mr. Schmidt stated in a letter to Mr. Howe that the Museum held No. 952 under a permanent loan and that the Museum did not intend to relinquish this important artifact. Despite the belief of the Historical Society that it had an ownership interest in No. 952, it did not file suit against the Museum to recover No. 952. Nonetheless, these undisputed facts establish that in 1995 and 1996, the Museum took actions inconsistent with the bailment and in defiance of the bailor's rights. See Sanderson, 259 S.W. at 894. At this point, the damage was sustained and capable of ascertainment. See Hamdan, 37 S.W.3d at 399. Accordingly an action for replevin accrued and expired before Lackawanna filed suit in 2002. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.