Opinion ID: 557800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Administrative Probable Cause based on Specific Evidence of Violations

Text: 58 Inasmuch as we have determined that the Secretary could establish probable cause to inspect by specific evidence of violations at International Matex's facility without showing that a neutral administrative plan existed, we turn to the appropriate standard for establishing probable cause for this type of evidence. While the standard for probable cause based on programmed inspections is well established, see Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321, 98 S.Ct. at 1824-25, the quantum and quality of specific evidence to establish probable cause is less clear. We find that standard in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant supported by administrative probable cause for officials to enter to investigate the cause of a fire. In that case the inspection was responsive to individual events and was not programmatic. Id. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 1949. The Court indicated that, although programmed inspections achieved the appropriate balance between the need for the intrusion and the threat of disruption by broad legislative or administrative guidelines specifying the purpose, frequency, scope and manner, 59 [i]n the context of investigatory fire searches, which are not programmatic but are responsive to individual events, a more particularized inquiry may be necessary. The number of prior entries, the scope of the search, the time of day when it is proposed to be made, the lapse of time since the fire, the continued use of the building, and the owner's efforts to secure it against intruders might all be relevant factors. 60 Id. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 1949. 61 Michigan v. Tyler has been interpreted to establish that the relaxed administrative standard for probable cause applies both to warrant applications based on specific evidence and those based on inspections pursuant to a plan and we agree. Horn Seed, 647 F.2d at 99 n. 2.; see also West Point-Pepperell, 689 F.2d at 958. 62 Setting forth the requirements for probable cause, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Horn Seed stated that for warrant applications grounded on specific evidence of violations, 63 there must be some plausible basis for believing that a violation is likely to be found. The facts offered must be sufficient to warrant further investigation or testing. 64 By necessity, such a determination requires the magistrate to consider the reliability of the information tendered in support of the application.... Although a 'substantial basis' is not required to credit the information's reliability, there must be some basis for believing that a complaint was actually made, that the complainant was sincere in his assertion that a violation exists, and he had some plausible basis for entering a complaint.... The warrant application must, of course, inform the magistrate of the substance of the complaint so that he can determine whether the alleged conditions, if true, constitute a violation. 65 Id. at 102-03 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 66 That court continued that, for an application based on an employee complaint, the affidavit should set forth, inter alia, who at OSHA received the complaint, the source of the complaint, the underlying facts surrounding the complaint, the steps taken to verify the complaint, and any personal observations by the affiant of the premises and past violations. Id. at 103. 67 Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit set forth the standard for probable cause based on specific evidence in West Point-Pepperell: 68 the evidence of a specific violation required to establish administrative probable cause, while less than that needed to show a probability of a violation, must at least show that the proposed inspection is based upon a reasonable belief that a violation has been or is being committed and not upon a desire to harass the target of the inspection. This requirement is met by a showing of specific evidence sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation. 69 689 F.2d at 958 (citing Horn Seed, 647 F.2d at 102). 70 Considering the information that OSHA presented to the magistrate here, we conclude that probable cause clearly existed under this relaxed administrative standard. The magistrate had before him the written complaints of the mayor and the union president. 2 The mayor's complaint contained specific allegations of violations at the facility based on anonymous complaints that he had received and these allegations were repeated in the union president's letter. 71 Under Horn Seed, we must determine whether the magistrate had some basis for believing that a complaint was actually made, that the complainant was sincere in his assertion that a violation exists, and he had some plausible basis for entering a complaint. Horn Seed, 647 F.2d at 102-03. Because the complaints were attached to the application, the magistrate clearly had a basis for believing that the complaints were actually made. Although International Matex now contends that these charges were politically motivated or retaliatory, this information was not presented to the magistrate and, therefore, this court cannot consider it in determining whether the magistrate's probable cause determination was correct. See West Point-Pepperell, 689 F.2d at 959 (judicial review strictly limited to information brought to magistrate's attention). 3 72 We, however, need not determine whether these complaints, standing alone, would support a finding of probable cause because the Secretary presented other evidence of violations at International Matex through the affidavits of OSHA employees. Compliance Officer Secor, in her affidavit supporting the application for a warrant, stated [b]etween January 23 and February 2, I have found numerous instances of conditions which may constitute violations of the general industry OSHA standards found at 29 CFR 1910. According to Kulick's affidavit, the compliance officers discovered during the consensual inspection that there appear to be electrical hazards present to a large extent everywhere, which could result in electrocution hazards, or fire/explosion hazards. Additionally, the compliance officers determined that International Matex had failed to implement required safety measures such as a hazard communications program, confined space procedures, and a respirator program, even though employees were required to wear respirators throughout the facility. They also observed that some storage tanks for hazardous materials were inadequate. 73 This information is reliable because it is based on the first hand knowledge of Officer Secor, an experienced inspector who spent several days inspecting the facility. See Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.1979) (employee complaints, compliance officer's observations, and accident records are ample evidence to support finding of probable cause). Her first hand observations corroborate the union president's allegations about widespread electrical hazards and inadequate safety programs for fire safety, vessel entry, and respirator training and, therefore, the affidavit enhances the credibility of his complaint. 74 Additionally, OSHA presented the magistrate with Secor's determination that International Matex's LWDI rate was three and a half times the national rate. Secor based her calculations on employee accident/illness records reviewed during the consensual inspection and, therefore, the result is reliable. Such a wide deviation from the national rate provides a plausible basis for believing that a violation is likely to be found. Horn Seed, 647 F.2d at 102 (emphasis in original). 75 We have no trouble concluding that these materials established probable cause under the relaxed administrative standard for OSHA inspections. The evidence of specific violations, particularly the observations of Compliance Officer Secor that electrical hazards permeated the facility, showed that the proposed inspection was based upon a reasonable belief that a violation has been or is being committed. West Point-Pepperell, 689 F.2d at 958. This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry because we must determine the appropriate scope of a warrant supported by such evidence.