Opinion ID: 134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The JCSC As a Necessary Party

Text: We review a district court’s ruling as to whether a party is a necessary party for an abuse of discretion. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 F.3d 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001). Under an abuse of discretion standard, we must affirm the district court’s Rule 19(a) determination unless it is “left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Byers, 151 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, “whether a party is indispensable for a just adjudication requires a determination regarding whether the absent party is necessary to the litigation; if so, whether the absent party can be joined in the litigation; and if joinder is infeasible, whether the lawsuit can nevertheless proceed ‘in equity and good conscience.’” School Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 264 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). An absent party must be joined if “in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 19(a)(1)(A). Plaintiffs argue that they included the JCSC as a Defendant because it is a necessary and indispensable party for purposes of affording complete relief, given that Plaintiffs seek reinstatement to employment. The JCSC was created by ordinance § 35.01 of the City of Jeffersontown, pursuant no reasonable public official understanding this charge could conclude that [Plaintiffs’] speech did not address such matters,” Chappel, 131 F.3d at 580, it is clear that if Plaintiffs’ speech was protected by the First Amendment, Plaintiffs’ right was clearly established in the context of this case. Furthermore, the large number of factual disputes as to whether Foreman retaliated against Plaintiffs based on their First Amendment activity, as Plaintiffs claim, or was following the protocol that the law requires when investigating complaints directed at personnel of the JPD, as Foreman claims, are precisely the type of subordinate predicate factual questions that must be resolved by a factfinder at trial. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-15, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1995). 14 to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 95.761. According to § 35.06, Plaintiffs are employees who are “classified within and subject to the Civil Service Commission,” and Chapter 35 lays out the manner in which the Commission oversees the hiring and firing of these employees. (Dist. Ct. R.E. 30 Ex. M). Inasmuch as the JCSC has authority over the hiring of police officers and dispatchers, this Court agrees that the Commission is a necessary party for purposes of providing Plaintiffs with the relief of reinstatement. However, the district court did not determine whether the JCSC is a necessary party; rather, the district court held that the JCSC was created pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 95.761 and is not an entity that can be sued without providing any citations in support of this statement. Defendants cite to Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) and Smallwood v. Jefferson County Gov’t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990) in support of their claim that the Commission is not a proper party which may be sued under Plaintiffs’ theory of liability. In Matthews, the plaintiff sued the chief of police of Jefferson County in the chief’s official capacity. This Court first found that “[a] suit against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity,” and then held that “[s]ince the Police Department is not an entity which may be sued, Jefferson County is the proper party to address the allegations of [the plaintiff’s] complaint.” Id. at 1049. For the latter holding, this Court cited to Smallwood, which held that a suit against the equivalent of the mayor and city council of Jefferson County in their official capacities was the same as a suit against Jefferson County itself because if “a suit against a state official in their [sic] official capacity is regarded as a suit against the state, it seems logical to regard a suit against a County official in their [sic] official capacity as a suit against a County.” 743 F. Supp. at 503 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989)). 15 Neither case involved a suit against a civil service commission, and neither case provides support for the assertion that the JCSC is not an entity that can be sued pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 95.761. Furthermore, neither Ky. Rev. Stat. § 95.761 nor Chapter 35 of the Jeffersontown ordinances prohibits suit against the JCSC. Additionally, authority from the Kentucky state courts indicates that a commission such as the JCSC is a different type of entity from a mayor or police department, and one that is properly party to a suit. See Timmons v. City of Louisville, No. 2003-CA-001631-MR, 2004 WL 1857363, at  (Ky. Ct. App. June 8, 2005) (finding that Louisville Civil Service Board is “not merely a nominal party” because “the Board is vested with the authority to carry out specific legislative duties and with the responsibility of administering a fair civil service system”); Vaughn v. City of Paducah, No. 2008-CA-001549-MR, 2010 WL 135107, at -4 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2010) (remanding for joinder of the Civil Service Board of the City of Paducah where the board had sole authority over dismissal of civil service employees); see also Jeffersontown, Ky., Ordinances § 35.10(F) (“No employee shall be reprimanded, removed, suspended, or dismissed except as provided in this section.”). Accordingly, we find that the JCSC is a necessary party and hold that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the JCSC is not an entity that can be sued.