Opinion ID: 6348962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure-to-Adopt-Policies

Text: Supervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for their failure to adopt policies if that failure causally results in a constitutional injury. 27 Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act, with “deliberate indifference,” a “disregard [for] a known or obvious consequence of [their] action[s].” 28 Plaintiffs must introduce evidence that each Defendant had “actual or constructive notice” that their failure to adopt policies would result in constitutional violations. 29 This typically requires showing notice of “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations” due to deficient policies, 26 Id. at 321 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)). 27 Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011). 28 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just., 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A] supervisory official may be liable under § 1983 if that official, by action or inaction, demonstrates a deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights.”). 29 Porter, 659 F.3d at 447. 10 Case: 20-30304 Document: 00516352631 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 No. 20-30304 permitting the inference that Defendants deliberately chose policies causing violations of constitutional rights. 30
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to their right to timely release by failing to adopt policies that would ensure local jails’ timely transmission of pre-classification paperwork to DPSC; that all three officials knew that local jails were failing to timely send paperwork but did nothing, well aware that their policies (or lack thereof) led to overdetentions. They contend that LeBlanc and Stagg, as officials responsible for the content of the Basic Jail Guidelines, should be held liable for failing to require local jails to transmit pre-classification paperwork to DPSC by a stated deadline, and that Stagg and Griffin, as the officials responsible for running DPSC’s Pre-Classification Department, should be held liable for their deliberate indifference to the reality that newly-sentenced DPSC prisoners lacked initial time computations and release dates, meaning that they were being jailed unlawfully. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a “pattern of similar constitutional violations,” such that their inaction amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk. DPSC’s Lean Six Sigma study revealed that 2,252 DPSC prisoners were annually held past their release date. On average, these prisoners were detained 72 days past the expiration of their courtimposed sentence. The study attributed this overdetention to delays in determining prisoners’ release dates, finding that on average, it took 110 days to determine a prisoner’s release date after his conviction. This included 30 Id. 11 Case: 20-30304 Document: 00516352631 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 No. 20-30304 approximately 31 days for documents to be transmitted from the Clerk of Court to the local jail to DPSC’s Pre-Classification Department. 31 LeBlanc, Griffin, and Stagg were each familiar with the Lean Six Sigma study. Secretary LeBlanc was a “champion” of the project and apprised of its findings. Pre-Classification Director Griffin was a member of the Lean Six Sigma team and helped present its findings and recommendations to DPSC staff. And then-Assistant Secretary Stagg testified that, although he joined DPSC after the study was conducted, he was made aware of the deficiencies it uncovered. Defendants concede that, because of the study, they each knew that on average, it took a month for DPSC to receive the paperwork necessary to begin calculating a prisoner’s release date after his conviction. Defendants also knew that some prisoners would be entitled to immediate release upon conviction. Therefore, in cases like Plaintiffs’, where prisoners were entitled to immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction, it was obvious that a failure to address those processing delays would lead to unconstitutional overdetentions. Despite this awareness, years after the Lean Six Sigma project, Defendants have not pointed to a single effort that any of them took to identify immediate releases more quickly during that month-long delay. And this is despite the fact that LeBlanc and Stagg were responsible for the Basic Jail Guidelines, while Stagg and Griffin were responsible for running DPSC’s Pre-Classification Department. They were each in a position to adopt policies that would address this delay. Defendants persist that they are insulated from liability because the Lean Six Sigma study was aimed at investigating DPSC’s internal—not 31 It is not entirely clear from the study what amount of delay is attributable to the Clerk of Court and to the local jail, but it appears that both entities account for some delay. 12 Case: 20-30304 Document: 00516352631 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 No. 20-30304 external—delays in processing prisoner paperwork. Defendants contend because the study focused on internal processes, that it did not reveal a “pattern of similar constitutional violations” to those Plaintiffs complain of here, overdetentions caused by delay from the local jails. 32 But this misses the point; Defendants cannot avoid the evidence that the study exposed unlawful detentions of prisoners. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants’ awareness of this pattern of delays and their conscious decision not to address it rises to the level of deliberate indifference.
So, we turn to whether a reasonable factfinder could find that Defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. This Court has recognized the “clearly established right to timely release from prison.” 33 Of course, “timely release” is not the same as instantaneous release: it is reasonable for jailers to have some administrative delay in processing an inmate’s discharge. 34 While courts have declined to define the amount of delay that is reasonable, 35 it is without question that holding without legal notice a prisoner for a month beyond the expiration of 32 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). 33 Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. 34 See Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 1968) (concluding that a jailer does not commit “an instant tort at the moment” the prisoner is entitled to release; instead, a jailer’s “duty to his prisoner is not breached until the expiration of a reasonable time for the proper ascertainment of the authority upon which his prisoner is detained.”). 35 See Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 771 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Courts have not settled on any concrete number of permissible hours of delay in the context of post-release detentions.”). 13 Case: 20-30304 Document: 00516352631 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 No. 20-30304 his sentence constitutes a denial of due process. 36 Indeed, Defendants knew not just of delay, but that there was, on average, a month-long delay in receiving paperwork from the local jails. Therefore, they had “fair warning” that their failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like Plaintiffs their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction. 37 We conclude that because a reasonable jury may find that Defendants’ inaction was objectively unreasonable in light of this clearly established law, they have failed to show they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. 38