Opinion ID: 201506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constructive discharge jury instruction

Text: 31 The Department also contends that it is entitled to a new trial based on the district court's instructions to the jury on the elements of Baron's First Amendment claim. As the Department concedes, it forfeited this claim by failing to timely object to the instructions as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c). The district court cited this failure as the basis for refusing to consider the Department's challenge when it was raised for the first time in a post-trial motion. The Department now renews its claim before us. 32 A petitioner's failure to object when the court issued the [jury] instruction constitute[s] a forfeiture of her right to object on appeal. Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir.2004). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c)(2)(A), a timely objection to jury instructions must be raised before the instructions are delivered. Our interpretation of Rule 51 is quite strict. Connelly v. Hyundai Motor Co., 351 F.3d 535, 544 (1st Cir.2003). There is a good reason for this strictness. We enforce our object-or-forfeit rule `to compel litigants to afford the trial court an opportunity to cure [a] defective instruction and to prevent the litigants from ensuring a new trial in the event of an adverse verdict by covertly relying on the error.' Flynn, 377 F.3d at 25 (quoting Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1068 (8th Cir.1998)) (alteration in original). Accordingly, we review the Department's forfeited claim only for plain error. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(d)(2); Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 63-64 (1st Cir.2002). 33 The Department assigns error to the district court's references to Baron's constructive discharge in explaining the necessary elements of his First Amendment claim. It contends that these references gave jurors the mistaken impression that the court had already determined that Baron was constructively discharged, when in fact it remained part of Baron's burden of proof to make that showing. A review of the full jury instructions, however, clearly belies this claim. The court explained that: 34 The second element of plaintiff's claim is that he was constructively discharged ... and that this constructive discharge deprived him of his constitutional right of free speech under the First Amendment and his right of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 ... 36 In order to find that the plaintiff has been constructively discharged, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his working conditions were so difficult and so unpleasant that a reasonable person in his shoes would have felt compelled to resign. In order to prevail, Mr. Baron must prove that based on an objective assessment of the conditions under which he was expected to work, it was so difficult as to be intolerable. 37 The court then went on to explain the remaining elements of Baron's First Amendment claim: 38 In order to prove his First Amendment claim against the Department, Mr. Baron must establish two elements of his claim: First, that his acts or speech were protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and second, that those acts of speech were a substantial or motivating factor in his constructive discharge. 39 Coming on the heels of the instruction regarding the requisite findings for a constructive discharge, the use of the term constructive discharge in this and the ensuing instructions in no way suggests that the court had already concluded that Baron had been constructively discharged. The instruction was not plainly erroneous.