Opinion ID: 2630681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of certification statute

Text: William, contends that the juvenile court misapplied the certification statute when it used the discretionary standard under NRS 62B.390(1) to certify him after determining that he had rebutted presumptive certification under NRS 62B.390(2). [3] According to William, allowing discretionary certification after presumptive certification is rebutted would render the exceptions essentially meaningless, as crimes involving forceful sexual assault or the use of firearms would almost always result in discretionary certification. William points to our acknowledgment in Anthony Lee R., A Minor v. State , that it was clearly not the intention of the legislature that certification should automatically result in all deadly weapons cases; otherwise, no exceptions would exist, and all such cases would be subject to mandatory certification. [4] We disagree with William's contention. While we conclude that the certification statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and is therefore ambiguous, it was not the Legislature's intent to limit the juvenile court's discretion in making certification decisions by precluding the court from applying the discretionary certification prong after a minor rebuts presumptive certification. The construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. [5] Generally, the plain meaning of the words in a statute should be respected unless doing so violates the spirit of the act. [6] If more than one reasonable meaning can be understood from the statute's language, it is ambiguous, and the plain meaning rule does not apply. [7] We must then ascertain the Legislature's intent by reviewing the statute's terms and context, along with reason and public policy. [8] Here, both parties present reasonable constructions of the certification statute, and the statute is therefore ambiguous. Under William's interpretation, once a minor rebuts presumptive certification with clear and convincing evidence of substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problems pursuant to NRS 62B.390(3), then the statute commands that the juvenile court shall not certify the minor for criminal proceedings as an adult. William argues that the shall not certify language is clear and leaves no room for subsequent discretionary certification. On the other hand, under the State's interpretation, the shall not certify language only precludes certification under the statute's presumptive certification prong but not under the discretionary certification prong. Specifically, NRS 62B.390(3) provides that if the court finds the minor has rebutted the certification presumption, then the court shall not certify the minor for criminal proceedings as an adult pursuant to subsection 2 (presumptive certification). But the statute does not expressly preclude certification under subsection 1 (discretionary certification). Under this interpretation, the subsections operate independently of one another. As the statute is ambiguous, we must ascertain the Legislature's intent. By enacting the presumptive certification prong, the Legislature did not limit the juvenile court's discretion but simply made it harder to avoid certification when firearms and sexual assaults are at issue. The statute does not otherwise impinge upon the juvenile court's discretion to certify when the minor rebuts the certification presumption. William's reading of the statute would restrict the juvenile court's discretionary certification power. Grafting such a limitation onto the statute would impair the broad discretionary power of the juvenile court that we have consistently adhered to [9] and is contrary to the stated purposes behind juvenile certification, i.e., public safety and social control. [10] Moreover, in Anthony Lee, our most recent opinion analyzing the juvenile certification statute in depth, we specifically stated that even if the minor rebuts presumptive certification, the juvenile court may still certify the minor under discretionary certification: [T]he juvenile court's finding of exceptional circumstances or other mitigating circumstances so that [the] NRS 62.080(2) [now NRS 62B.390(2) and (3)] presumption does not apply does not preclude certification in cases in which the background of the juvenile or the nature of the offense makes it appear clearly and convincingly that the public safety and welfare require transfer. [11] We noted that presumptive certification is a special avenue to be taken in cases involving certain types of crimes and that the presumption does not alter the juvenile court's discretionary power to certify minors. [12] After our decision in Anthony Lee, the Nevada Legislature altered the juvenile certification statute in 2003 by separating into two subsections the certification presumption and the evidence required to rebut that presumption, whereas those provisions previously had been combined in one subsection. [13] But the Legislature did not expressly prohibit discretionary certification after presumptive certification was rebutted, even though it could have. [14] We are unpersuaded by William's argument that allowing discretionary certification after presumptive certification is rebutted would render the factors supporting rebuttal essentially meaningless because the nature and seriousness of the crimes at issue would almost always result in discretionary certification. Not all crimes falling within the realm of presumptive certification are equally serious and heinous in nature. While many crimes involving forceful sexual assault or the use of firearms are so egregious and heinous that discretionary certification is compelled based on the seriousness of the crime alone, other situations could arise in which the nature of the crime is not so heinous and the juvenile's lack of serious criminal history coupled with personal considerations weigh against certification. Accordingly, we conclude in this case that the juvenile court did not misapply the certification statute.