Opinion ID: 718752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of Defendants' Qualified Immunity Claim

Text: 19 Defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity because, even if they mistreated Jemmott in precisely the manner he alleges, it was objectively reasonable for them to think that their actions did not violate his clearly established rights. Their reasoning is as follows: Jemmott bases his § 1983 claim, grounded in the Equal Protection clause, on defendants' supposed creation of a race-based hostile work environment at Mt. McGregor. According to Title VII law, which is utilized by courts considering § 1983 Equal Protection claims, a plaintiff must prove discrimination that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment in order to prevail on a hostile work environment claim. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Gierlinger v. New York State Police, 15 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir.1994). Therefore, before holding any one individual defendant liable, a court would have to find that he personally behaved in such a way as to create an atmosphere of severe and pervasive harassment. According to defendants, no individual's actions, considered in isolation, were sufficiently severe or pervasive to give rise to a hostile environment claim. Thus, each defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on Jemmott's § 1983 claim. 20 It is true that several circuits have held that, when § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy with Title VII in a discrimination suit, as it is here, the elements of the substantive cause of action are the same under both statutes. See Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 483 (6th Cir.1989); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.1988); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 559 n. 3 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc). In addition, to state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, it is well established that a plaintiff must point to conduct severe or pervasive enough to result in an environment that would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, ----, 114 S.Ct. 367, 371, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). Finally, there is clearly no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Gierlinger, 15 F.3d at 34. 21 Nonetheless, we reject defendants' assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Jemmott's § 1983 claim. Each individual defendant's alleged conduct towards Jemmott, if proven, did amount to severe and pervasive harassment, which therefore violated Jemmott's clearly established rights. 22 The Supreme Court has held that whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. Harris, 510 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 371. Relevant circumstances identified by the Court include the severity of the conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Id. (Emphasis added). As alleged by Jemmott, each defendant intentionally jeopardized his ability to perform or even keep his job (planting clothing in order to frame him, tricking him into skipping a day of work, and levelling false charges against him), or put him in danger of physical harm (refusing to send requested back-up assistance, and humiliating him in front of prisoners he is required to control). We hold that the acts of each defendant, if true as alleged, were sufficiently severe to create a hostile or abusive work environment under the factors articulated in Harris. If the alleged acts were caused by discriminatory animus towards Jemmott as a black Correction Officer, they violated clearly established law. We simply cannot accept defendants' contention that an objectively reasonable correction officer would believe in 1991 that attempting to get a co-worker fired because of his African-American origins was not clearly against the law. 23 In addition, at least two defendants, Superintendent Kennedy and Captain Murphy, are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage in the litigation as a result of their supervisory authority over the remaining appellants. 5 Jemmott has alleged that, although he informed both supervisors of the harassment to which he was subjected, they failed to reasonably investigate or address his allegations. If such nonresponsiveness is shown to lead to an environment in which discrimination is an accepted custom or practice of an employer, it violates an employee's clearly established right to work in an environment free of race-based invidious discrimination. Gierlinger, 15 F.3d at 34. 24 Of course, to prevail at trial on his Equal Protection claim, Jemmott must prove that defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2050, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The district court found that Jemmott has articulated sufficient facts at this stage to withstand summary judgment. Given this finding, and the fact that defendants are accused of violating what they reasonably should have known is a clearly established right, we decline to grant qualified immunity to the defendants. 25 The decision of the district court is affirmed.