Opinion ID: 1647489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was appellant denied effective assistance of counsel?

Text: Appellant contends that due to the injection of various irrelevant matters into evidence by the prosecuting attorney, without objection of his own counsel, he was deprived of a fair trial as required by due process. The specific instances complained of include testimony as to the armed robbery of the Flamingo Motel, plans to rob a drug store and package store on the afternoon of the robbery, the use and cost of drugs by George Taylor, and testimony concerning George Taylor's eligibility for parole and good time. The state contends that the evidence which appellant complains of was either admissible under well delineated rules of evidence or was of such a nature that could not have prejudiced appellant. The state further asserts that an examination of the entire record reveals appellant's counsel was effective and that his failure to urge ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial below procedurally bars such from being raised on appeal. This latter proposition, of course, is inappropriate under our recent decision in Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 1983. The offense for which appellant was charged (aggravated assault) and the armed robbery of the Flamingo Motel were so interrelated that it would have been utterly impossible to establish the facts surrounding the alleged aggravated assault without a showing of the commission of the armed robbery. As a general rule, testimony in a criminal trial should be confined to the charge for which an accused is on trial and the prosecution should not be allowed to aid the proof against the accused by showing he committed other offenses. Oates, supra; Eubanks v. State, 419 So.2d 1330 (Miss. 1982); Black v. State, 418 So.2d 819 (Miss. 1982); Tucker v. State, 403 So.2d 1274 (Miss. 1981); Wilborn v. State, 394 So.2d 1355 (Miss. 1981); Massey v. State, 393 So.2d 472 (Miss. 1981); and Gardner v. State, 368 So.2d 245 (Miss. 1979). However, there are exceptions to this rule as stated in Woods v. State, 393 So.2d 1319 (Miss. 1981): In Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342 (Miss. 1977), the Court said: ... It is well settled in this state that proof of a crime distinct from that alleged in an indictment is not admissible against an accused. There are certain recognized exceptions to the rule. Proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so connected as to constitute one transaction, where it is necessary to identify the defendant, where it is material to prove motive and there is an apparent relation or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged, where the accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved to make out the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge. See Smith v. State, 223 So.2d 657 (Miss. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1030, 90 S.Ct. 1274, 25 L.Ed.2d 542 (1970); Cummings v. State, 219 So.2d 673 (Miss. 1969); cert. den. 397 U.S. 942, 90 S.Ct. 954, 25 L.Ed.2d 122 (1970). (393 So.2d at 1325) (emphasis ours). See also Saik v. State, 387 So.2d 751 (Miss. 1980). Where evidence is admissible as a part of the res gestae, it will not be excluded because it may tend to inflame the minds of the jury or would tend to indicate the commission of another crime. Gray v. State, 375 So.2d 994 (Miss. 1979). Perhaps the rule is best stated in Anderson v. State, 171 Miss. 41, 156 So. 645 (1934); wherein this Court stated: The proof of another offense is admissible where the main transaction cannot be brought out without showing such other offenses. Simmons v. State, 165 Miss. 732, 141 So. 288, and Mackie v. State, 138 Miss. 740, 103 So. 379, and the authorities therein cited. (171 Miss. at 47, 156 So. at 646). See also Hosey v. State, 300 So.2d 453 (Miss. 1974); Ellis v. State, 255 So.2d 325 (Miss. 1971); Brooks v. State, 242 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1971); Grinnel v. State, 230 So.2d 555 (Miss. 1970); Strickland v. State, 209 So.2d 840 (Miss. 1968); Whittington v. State, 160 Miss. 705, 135 So. 190 (1931); and Keel v. State, 133 Miss. 160, 97 So. 521 (1923). Because this evidence was admissible, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be predicated thereon. The prosecutor also elicited from Edgar Johnson and George Taylor, without objection, evidence of a plan to rob a drug store and package store on the afternoon of the robbery. These plans were made while Johnson, Taylor, Jackson and appellant drove around in Jackson's automobile a few hours before the robbery of the Flamingo Motel. As previously stated, evidence of other crimes is admissible where the offense charged and that offered are so connected as to constitute one transaction, where it is necessary to identify the defendant, where it is material to prove motive and there is an apparent relation or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged, where the accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved to make out the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge. Woods, supra . The evidence concerning the plans to rob a drug store and package store were likewise admissible evidence to establish motive and identity of the appellant, as well as being so connected to the aggravated assault as to constitute one transaction. Any objection thereto would have been futile. Appellant finally complains that the interjection into the trial of the purchase and use of drugs by George Taylor and Edgar Johnson as well as evidence concerning Taylor's eligibility for parole and good time, was improper evidence which was prejudicial to the appellant. There was no evidence that appellant was involved with drugs or used drugs on the day the offense was committed or on any other occasion. Appellant has failed to demonstrate how either the use of drugs by Taylor and Johnson or Taylor's eligibility for parole and good time release prejudiced him. In the absence of such, we cannot assume that appellant was prejudiced thereby. We have carefully examined the record in toto [1] and are unable to say therefrom that trial counsel was ineffective due to his failure to object to the matters herein previously discussed. We also have no way of knowing whether trial counsel's actions were prompted by trial strategy or for other reasons. We decline, however, to hold here that appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel. Read, supra . Based on the foregoing, appellant's conviction and sentence are hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.