Opinion ID: 852726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vehicle Mobility and Warrantless Vehicle Search

Text: The defendant also urges that because his vehicle was not mobile, the warrantless search of the interior of his vehicle was not justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. He argues that the automobile exception is inapplicable to this case because there was no probable cause and because his vehicle was not readily mobile. As discussed above, we have determined that probable cause did exist. We thus turn our attention to the issue of mobility. The defendant argues there was no ready mobility because the police officer pulled up behind his parked car so that the defendant could not move his vehicle. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches, but there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. Black v. State, 810 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ind.2004). In this case, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence resulting from the warrantless search based on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The automobile exception was first applied in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). This exception was originally based on ready mobility and exigent circumstances. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-60, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2034-35, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 579 (1971). The United States Supreme Court later made clear that separate exigent circumstances are not required for the automobile exception to apply because [t]he mobility of automobiles. . . `creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.' California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2069, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 413 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1004 (1976)); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442, 445 (1999) ([T]he `automobile exception' has no separate exigency requirement .... [I]n cases where there [is] probable cause to search a vehicle `a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained. ') (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2164-65, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 584 (1982)); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031, 1036 (1996) (If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.). Furthermore, the exception is based not only on ready mobility but also on the lesser expectation of privacy with respect to automobiles, so that even where an automobile is not immediately mobile, a warrantless search may still be justified. Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. at 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d at 1036. In Dyson, the United States Supreme Court held that police need not obtain a search warrant before searching a vehicle that they have probable cause to believe contains illegal drugs. The Court emphasized that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement, id., 527 U.S. at 467, 119 S.Ct. at 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d at 445, and that [i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the vehicle without more. Id. (quoting Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. at 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d at 1035-36). Unfortunately, the adjective readily is subject to differing interpretations, and there has been disagreement regarding the meaning of readily mobile. Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are not consistent regarding whether automobiles under police observation or control are readily mobile so as to be subject to warrantless search under the automobile exception. E.g., compare, Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exception), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer inherently mobile), trans. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 433 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven, even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers), trans. denied, and Justice v. State, 765 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), as modified on rehearing, 767 N.E.2d 995, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. not sought (finding warrantless search of an automobile in apartment complex parking area, where driver was handcuffed and being questioned in police car, was justified because of the inherent mobility of automobiles). Some cases from other courts have declined to apply the automobile exception where the automobile is entirely immobile or is not situated for transportation. See, e.g., State v. Kypreos, 115 Wash.App. 207, 216, 61 P.3d 352, 357 (Wash.App.2002) (automobile exception did not apply to a fifth wheel trailer that was not attached to any vehicle so was not readily mobile); Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 475 (10th Cir.1985) (automobile exception did not apply to a car that was towed and searched by the police the day after an arrest and was immobile because its engine was partially dismantled). But several other courts have found that vehicles temporarily in police control or otherwise not at risk of being driven away may still be considered readily mobile, so as to qualify for the automobile exception. These cases base ready mobility not on the immediate capabilities of an automobile but rather its inherent capabilities. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (All that is necessary to satisfy [the readily mobile] element is that the automobile is operational.); United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that the automobile exception applied to a car that had broken down and was to be repaired during the night and operable the next morning because the car had not lost its inherent mobility); United States v. Vasquez, 297 F.Supp.2d 696, 698 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a vehicle was readily mobile even though it was locked and its owner was in police custody because other individuals might also have access to the car); People v. Carter, 250 Mich.App. 510, 515, 655 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Mich.App.2002) ([A]pplication of the well-established automobile exception does not rise or fall depending on the peculiarities of the automobile to be searched. On the contrary, the exception was established because of the mobility of automobiles in general. ). In light of the Supreme Court's recent emphatic statement in Dyson that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement, 527 U.S. at 467, 119 S.Ct. at 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d at 445, we conclude that this exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment does not require any additional consideration of the likelihood, under the circumstances, of a vehicle being driven away. Rather, we understand the ready mobility requirement of the automobile exception to mean that all operational, or potentially operational, motor vehicles are inherently mobile, and thus a vehicle that is temporarily in police control or otherwise confined is generally considered to be readily mobile and subject to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement if probable cause is present. This broad understanding of readily mobile is also consistent with the recognition that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an individual is deemed to have a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile. Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. at 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d at 1036; Carney, 471 U.S. at 393, 105 S.Ct. at 2070, 85 L.Ed.2d at 414. In the present case, the defendant's car was readily mobile and thus eligible for the automobile exception regardless of the fact that it may have been temporarily confined by physical circumstances including the position of Officer Turner's police vehicle blocking it from the rear. Because the positive narcotics dog response provided probable cause to search the readily mobile vehicle, the warrantless search of it was justified under the automobile exception.