Opinion ID: 1406453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Imposition of Multiple Sentences for Crimes Arising Out of the Same Course of Conduct

Text: The trial court sentenced defendant to the state prison on each of three convictions, the terms to run concurrently. Upon objection by defendant's counsel that defendant could not be punished for both the robbery and the burglary convictions, the court purported to merge the sentences for those convictions and, as merged, ordered that the terms therefor run concurrently with the term for the assault conviction. Such form of judgment was deemed to be in accordance with the provisions of section 654. [10] (7a) Section 654 does not preclude multiple convictions but only multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. (See People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625 [105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905].) The proscription against double punishment ... is applicable where there is a course of conduct which violates more than one statute and comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute.... The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one. ( People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 376 [82 Cal. Rptr. 357, 461 P.2d 637, 37 A.L.R.3d 1398].) In People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d 625, we stated that section 654 is applicable to limit punishment for multiple convictions arising out of either an act or omission or a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time in those instances wherein the accused entertained a principal objective to which other objectives, if any, were merely incidental. ( Id., at p. 639, italics added.) (8a) It appears clear under the Beamon test that in the instant case defendant entertained but a single criminal objective  to commit a theft of the contents of the jewelry store  and that those acts which constituted the burglary, the robbery and the assault were performed only as incidental objectives to that principal objective. (7b) Notwithstanding the foregoing determination that defendant entertained but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct, he may nevertheless be punished for multiple convictions if during the course of that conduct he committed crimes of violence against different victims. ( In re Ford (1967) 66 Cal.2d 183 [57 Cal. Rptr. 129, 424 P.2d 681]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [56 Cal. Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998]; People v. Ridley (1965) 63 Cal.2d 671, 678 [47 Cal. Rptr. 796, 408 P.2d 124]; Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 21 [9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].) (9) As the purpose of section 654 is to insure that defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability, when he commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by means likely to cause harm to several persons, his greater culpability precludes application of section 654. ( Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20-21.) (8b) In the instant case the victim of the robbery as alleged, proved and found to be true was John Keating who was accosted and threatened at gunpoint. The robbery of a victim at gunpoint has been held to be an act of violence such as to preclude application of section 654 in the case of multiple convictions involving multiple victims. (See In re Ford, supra, 66 Cal.2d 183; In re Wright, supra, 65 Cal.2d 650, 656.) Although a burglary does not necessarily involve an act of violence against any person, sections 459 and 461 define the instant crime as a burglary in the course of which the defendant intends to and does inflict great bodily injury on an occupant of the premises burglarized. Thus the burglary alleged, proved and found to be true is a crime of violence committed against Burk. Defendant being convicted of a second crime of violence against a second victim, section 654 does not preclude the imposition of punishment for both the robbery and the burglary convictions. [11] Section 654 does, however, preclude the imposition of sentence as to the assault conviction. That crime was committed during the same course of conduct and against the same victim as in the case of the aggravated burglary conviction and defendant cannot be punished for both of those convictions. (10) When a defendant suffers multiple convictions, sentencing for some of which is precluded by operation of section 654, an acceptable procedure is to sentence defendant for each count and stay execution of sentence on certain of the convictions to which section 654 is applicable. Such stay is to be effective pending the successful service of sentence for the more serious conviction, at which time the stay is to become permanent. (See People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d 625, 640; People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal. App.2d 749, 755-756 [39 Cal. Rptr. 11].) (8c) The court in the instant case, however, sought to merge those sentences which together offended section 654. It can be contended that the effect of merging two sentences, or merging the lesser into the greater sentence and requiring the defendant to serve a term the equivalent of the greater of the two sentences, usually accomplishes the same end result as staying execution of a lesser sentence until the greater has been served, at which time the stay becomes permanent. Defendant, however, argues that the merger practice nevertheless constitutes at least a technical violation of section 654. (7c) Section 654 when applicable precludes punishment under more than one criminal provision. It has long been established that the imposition of concurrent sentences is precluded by section 654 (see In re Wright, supra, 65 Cal.2d 654-655; People v. Quinn (1964) 61 Cal.2d 551, 555 [39 Cal. Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705]) because the defendant is deemed to be subjected to the term of both sentences although they are served simultaneously. The term merger means inter alia the absorption ... of a minor offense into a greater. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1948).) A merger thus implies that the item absorbed continues to have existence as a part of the merged product. In People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal. App.3d 532 [88 Cal. Rptr. 235], the court, although dealing with sentences merged by operation of law under section 669, [12] held that such merged sentences constituted a violation of section 654. The People would distinguish Mulqueen on the ground that the sentences were merged by operation of law but that distinction is not relevant to the issue. The question is whether merged sentences, however they became merged, offend section 654. We conclude that the distinction to be drawn between sentences to be served concurrently and those merged for the purpose of service is too fine to justify recognition; in either case the defendant is subjected to punishment under more than one of the sentences. (8d) Although defendant has not urged that he is being further subjected to multiple punishment, it nevertheless appears that he may be subjected to no more than one additional period of imprisonment pursuant to section 12022.5. [13] (See In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [130 Cal. Rptr. 719, 551 P.2d 23].) Here defendant used the firearm on but one occasion although in the almost simultaneous commission of three crimes. He cannot, accordingly, be subjected to more than one term of the added penalty provided by section 12022.5, notwithstanding the jury's findings of use of a firearm as to all three of the convictions. In accordance with the foregoing determinations the judgment entered herein on December 5, 1974, is modified (see People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d 625, 640; People v. Niles, supra, 227 Cal. App.2d 749, 755, 756) as follows: first, by striking therefrom the finding as to count one that defendant in the course of the robbery, with intent to inflict great bodily injury, did inflict great bodily injury upon Charles Burk; second, by striking therefrom the following, On motion of defendant, Count Two is ordered merged with Count One, and Count Three to run concurrently with Counts One and Two as merged, and adding thereto immediately after the language It is Therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the said defendant be punished by imprisonment in the State Prison for the terms prescribed by law, the following: provided, however, that the terms for the robbery conviction (count one) and the burglary conviction (count two) shall run concurrently, and that the execution of sentence for the assault conviction (count three) be stayed pending the finality of this judgment and service of sentence as to count two, such stay to become permanent when service of sentence is completed; provided further that defendant serve only one additional period of imprisonment pursuant to the findings that as to all counts he used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5. As so modified the judgment is affirmed.