Opinion ID: 406141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fact Issues Concerning the Date of Injury to Plaintiff

Text: 29 Plaintiff contends also that summary judgment is precluded because a genuine issue of fact exists as to when the statute of limitations began to run. 30 The statute of limitations invoked by defendants provides that the time for commencement of a medical malpractice action shall be three years after the date of injury. Cal.Civ.Pro.Code § 340.5 (emphasis added). California courts have uniformly interpreted the term injury in section 340.5 to mean the damaging effect of the wrongful act, not the act itself. See Larcher v. Wanless, 18 Cal.3d 646, 656 n.11, 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 80 n.11, 557 P.2d 507, 512 (1976). (U)ntil plaintiff 'suffers appreciable harm' he cannot establish a cause of action, thus a person is 'injured' when (the) damaging effect or pathology first manifests itself regardless of any knowledge on plaintiff's part that it was negligently caused. Bispo v. Burton, 82 Cal.App.3d 824, 831, 147 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445 (1978) (emphasis added) (quoting in part Larcher, 18 Cal.3d at 656, 135 Cal.Rptr. at 80, 557 P.2d at 512). 31 The District Court reasoned that if it applied the statute of limitations rule in Braham the complaint was untimely if plaintiff's appreciable harm first manifested itself well before June 11, 1977. 3 After deciding to apply the Braham rule, the court reviewed all of the submitted evidence and concluded that appreciable harm existed, had manifested itself well before the last problem noted on the problem list (June 8, 1977). IV Reporter's Transcript at 14. 32 A review of the evidence submitted, which consisted entirely of hospital records that were undisputed, supports the court's conclusion. Plaintiff was admitted to the Los Angeles County/USC Medical Center with serious problems on May 27, 1977, and she developed at least eight more medical problems prior to June 8, 1977. Her complaint alleges acts of omission that led to eclampsia; she was admitted to the French Hospital on May 27, 1977 with a diagnosed case of eclampsia. 33 Plaintiff contends that she did not suffer appreciable harm until her overall condition and the true consequences of the Defendants' negligence finally became clear. Opening Brief of Appellant at 17-18. However, in interpreting the three-year limitation period from the date of injury, California courts have held that a plaintiff's knowledge or discovery of the negligent cause of her harm is not relevant. See Bispo, 82 Cal.App.3d at 831, 147 Cal.Rptr. 442. 34 Moreover, plaintiff has not properly raised a factual issue by alleging the discovery of brain damage after July 19, 1977. Plaintiff's assertion of brain damage appears only in her attorney's legal memoranda filed with the District Court. Legal memoranda and oral argument are not evidence and do not create issues of fact capable of defeating an otherwise valid summary judgment. Flaherty v. Warehousemen Local 334, 574 F.2d 484, 486 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, the District Court correctly dismissed this assertion as not supported by probative evidence. 35 Because the District Court determined only that there was no genuine issue that the date of plaintiff's injury was sometime prior to June 11, 1977, we have no occasion to consider whether a genuine issue of fact remains regarding whether the date of injury was prior to April 21, 1977. See note 1 supra. 36 REVERSED.