Opinion ID: 2222745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Duration of Easements.

Text: The last issue concerns the maximum allowable term of easements granted by the commission. The sheriffs' juries in the compensation commission hearings were instructed to compute damages on the basis that the easements were perpetual, and this is presumably what they did. No one claims, at any rate, that he was paid for anything less than that. The commission originally ruled they were to be perpetual, and the objectors say this was beyond its authority. The district court on review did not treat the issue in its original order but, in response to a motion for expanded findings and conclusions, entered an order which modified the commission ruling insofar as it granted a perpetual easement. The court held that the easement could not initially extend beyond the 25-year franchise period, but in the event a franchise is extended . . . the easement therefor would correspondingly be extended. The objectors claim that can be no automatic extension of the easement. Iowa Power, as franchisee, is also concerned about the effect of that part of the ruling which says that the power of condemnation . . . must coincide and be commensurate with the franchise or privilege granted for such purpose not to exceed twenty-five years. . .. The Iowa legislature has not given to the [commission] . . . authority to grant a perpetual easement to the power companies when [the] franchise or privilege for such purpose shall not be longer than a period of twenty-five years. Iowa Power therefore has taken a cross-appeal from this ruling only in the event that Judge Hayden's sentence [just quoted]. . . is construed to mean that the easement is limited to 25 years. Section 478.15 grants eminent domain powers to a party which has been granted a franchise for construction of an electric transmission line, providing in part that any person, company, or corporation having secured a franchise as provided in this chapter, shall thereupon be vested with the right of eminent domain to such extent as the commission may approve, prescribe and find to be necessary for public use . . . . (Emphasis added.) This section appears to give the commission broad latitude as to the terms of the easement, but it is silent on the question of how long such easements may last. It is clear that the franchise may not be granted for more than 25 years. § 478.9, The Code. May the accompanying easements be ordered in perpetuity in review of that limitation? We conclude the easements are neither perpetual nor do they terminate with the franchise. Rather they are effective for so long as the electric transmission line remains in use on the property. We are led to that conclusion by a reading of the statute and consideration of analogous cases decided by this court. The time-limitation and extension provisions of chapter 478 refer to the franchise, not the accompanying easement. See, e. g., § 478.90 (25-year limitation on franchise); § 478.13 (extension of franchise). On the other hand, the chapter provides that the interest in the land itself will revert upon abandonment or nonuse. Part of section 478.15 provides: If an electric transmission line right-of-way, or any part thereof, is wholly abandoned for public utility purposes by the relocation of the transmission lines, is not used or operated for a period of five years, or if its construction has been commenced and work has ceased and has not in good faith been resumed for five years, the right-of-way shall revert to the person or persons who, at the time of the abandonment or reversion, are the owners of the tract from which such right-of-way was taken. [procedure for implementing reversion provisions follows.] An analogous case is Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, 2 Iowa 288, 301 (1855), which involved the measure of damages in an appropriation for railroad purposes. The court said, in dictum, that despite the fifty-year limit on corporate charters, and therefore upon the duration of licenses for railroads, the interest in land would be in perpetuity if the grantees, or assigns continue to occupy the land for the purposes for which it was appropriated. Accord, Heskett v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co., 61 Iowa 467, 469, 16 N.W. 525 (1883). We conclude that the easements obtained pursuant to the franchise procedures of chapter 478 shall remain in effect for so long as the land subject to the easement has not been abandoned and is being used for the purposes for which the franchise was granted. Upon abandonment or nonuse, it is subject to reversion under that part of section 478.15 just quoted. Of course, if a franchise expires and the utility ceases to operate the line, the easement would be lostnot because it was coterminous with the franchise but because it would no longer be used for the intended purpose. This conclusion is in accord with the general law of easements stated at 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 106, at 510-11 (1966): An easement may be terminated by completion of the purpose for which it was granted, since the reason for, and necessity of, the servitude are at an end. Thus, if an easement is granted for a particular purpose only, the right continues while the dominant tenement is used for that purpose, but ceases when the specified purpose ceases. Iowa Power, cross-appellant on this issue, concedes it is not entitled to have perpetual easements, but only easements which are coterminous with the use of the line. The commission agrees that its use of the term perpetual in its order should be so qualified. While the ruling of the district court is not entirely clear, we believe it is in accord with our view that the easements do not terminate with a franchise and will continue to be in force subject to termination for abandonment or nonuse. We conclude, therefore, that no error by the trial court is shown. We have considered all of the remaining issues raised in the many pages of briefs and voluminous record and find no basis for reversal. The case is therefore affirmed. AFFIRMED. All Justices concur except REYNOLDSON, C. J., who takes no part.