Opinion ID: 6324834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Marion I

Text: On appeal, this court clarified that the conspiracy “excep‐ tion” to Illinois Brick is not limited to price‐fixing conspiracies. See Marion I, 952 F.3d at 839. We explained that “it is better to think of the right to sue co‐conspirators not as an exception to Illinois Brick, but instead as a rule inhering in Illinois Brick that allocates the right to collect 100% of the damages to the first non‐conspirator in the supply chain.” Id. (citing Paper Sys., 281 F.3d at 631–32). We also observed: “Apple [v. Pepper] confirms that Illinois Brick is a bright‐line rule allocating the right to sue to direct purchasers alone …. The relationship between the buyer and the seller, rather than the nature of the alleged an‐ ticompetitive conduct, governs whether the buyer may sue under the antitrust laws.” Id. at 840 (citing 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1522 8 No. 21‐1513 (2019)). The court concluded that the Providers could sue the distributors under Illinois Brick because the distributors were allegedly conspirators with BD. Marion I, 952 F.3d at 840–41. Turning to the sufficiency of the complaint, however, the Marion I court held that the Providers had failed to allege a plausible hub‐and‐spokes conspiracy. Id. at 843. We noted: “The role of the distributors is critical to the Providers’ case. … If the distributors were not part of the alleged conspiracy, then [the] Providers’ case falls apart: no conspiracy, no direct purchaser status, no right to recover.” Id. at 841. To plausibly allege an antitrust conspiracy, the Providers needed to show that “the manufacturer and others had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objec‐ tive.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray‐ Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)). The FAC failed to state a claim because the Providers did not allege that the distributors (the “rim”) coordinated with each other at the direction of BD (the “hub”). Marion I, 952 F.3d at 842–43. Instead, the FAC alleged only that the distrib‐ utors enforced the Net Dealer Contracts between BD and the GPOs and charged a fee for the distributors’ services. The Pro‐ viders did not even allege that the distributors knowingly en‐ gaged in parallel conduct, which could have constituted cir‐ cumstantial evidence of an agreement.6 Id. “All the Providers have alleged is that the distributors buy and sell the devices in accordance with the terms of the contracts that the GPOs 6 Independent action does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 760; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007) (citing Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954)). No. 21‐1513 9 have negotiated.” Id. at 843. “They have made no argument that the distributors played any role in setting the anticom‐ petitive pricing or that there was any quid pro quo according to which Becton compensated them for participating in the al‐ leged antitrust conspiracy.” Id. We vacated and remanded so that the Providers could file an amended complaint, “pro‐ vided that they believe they can adequately plead that the dis‐ tributors were part of the putative conspiracy.” Id.