Opinion ID: 874023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The district court erred in quieting Wilfrido's title on summary judgment because Barraza demonstrated factual issues as to whether Wilfrido took title subject to a statutory claim by Barraza.

Text: Turning to Wilfrido's second motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Barraza had failed to establish a legally valid claim against the property and therefore quieted title in Wilfrido's name. According to the court, If a lien is improperly filed as a mechanics lien and the lien is not one otherwise recognized by law, then the lien is a nonconsensual common law lien and is properly subject to a court order removing the lien, Idaho Code § 45-1703. Barraza argues that he established a valid interest in the property and that Wilfrido had notice of his claim so he cannot be a bona fide purchaser. Wilfrido responds that he is the presumptive owner of the property by virtue of the quitclaim deed he received from Juan and that he took title to the property free from any valid claim of Barraza. He asserts that Barraza was unable to show that he held a valid, enforceable interest in the property prior to the recording of the deed. While the parties spar back and forth over issues that are not particularly relevantwhether the district court should have considered evidence of the oral contract between Juan and Wilfrido to purchase the property, whether Barraza's contract with Juan satisfied the statute of frauds, and whether Barraza was entitled to specific performance of that contract [4] the pertinent question is whether Barraza presented competent evidence of a legally recognizable claim against the property so as to withstand summary judgment. The record clearly discloses genuine issues of material fact as to whether Barraza asserted a legally recognized lien against the property and, if so, whether Wilfrido took subject to that lien. Although Barraza does not specifically identify his claim against the property as a vendee's lien, his claim certainly appears to fit the elements of that type of statutory lien. A vendee's lien is described in I.C. § 45-804, as follows: One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of consideration. In his claim of lien, which was recorded twiceMay 6, 2002, and January 31, 2007 before the quitclaim deed from Juan to Wilfrido, Barraza asserted a lien for unpaid refund in the amount of $20,000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title. The lien claim attached and incorporated a valid legal description of the property. We recently held in Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 223, 268 P.3d 1167, 1175 (2012), that it is the payment to the owner of any part of the purchase price of the real property under an agreement of sale that creates the lien. Barraza's claim of lien indicates that the $20,000 payment had been made on or before January 5, 2002, so presumably the statutory lien attached at or prior to that date. It should be noted that the lien is created upon the payment of any part of the purchase price and is not dependent upon the recording of a written document. The claim of lien filed by Barraza in this case does, however, constitute evidence bearing on the question of what notice may have been imparted to subsequent purchasers of the property. Besides asserting that Barraza established no credible claim against the property, Wilfrido asserts that he was a bona fide purchaser. The pertinent statute is I.C. § 45-803, which provides, The liens of vendors and purchasers of real property are valid against every one claiming under the debtor, except a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for value. In Benz we held that good faith, as used in this statute, means without actual or constructive knowledge of the applicable lien. Id. at 228, 268 P.3d at 1180. Barraza asserts in his affidavit that Juan was aware of the $20,000 claim he asserted against the property and that Juan knew it was money that had been paid toward the purchase price of the property. In an affidavit, Wilfrido acknowledged that he was aware Juan had brought a suit against Barraza because of a $20,000 claim of lien that was filed against the property. Certainly, the recording and re-recording of the written claim of lien would have put Wilfrido on notice of Barraza's claim. Wilfrido may have questioned the validity of the claim, but he certainly was aware of it and therefore could not be a good faith purchaser under I.C. § 45-803. This is not to say that Wilfrido may not have defenses against Barraza's claim. We do not opine on that issue, as it has not been presented on appeal. What is apparent is that the district court erred in quieting title in favor of Wilfrido as against Barraza because genuine issues of fact existed as to whether or not Barraza had asserted a legitimate claim against the property. The district court erred in determining that Barraza's claim of lien was not authorized by statute and constitutes a nonconsensual common law lien, and is invalid and unenforceable, citing I.C. § 45-1702. A vendee's lien is authorized by statute and, therefore, does not fit the description of a nonconsensual lien. Barraza presented sufficient evidence of a vendee's lien to survive summary judgment. The judgment, insofar as it quiets title in Wilfrido against Barraza, is vacated and the case is remanded to determine the issue of Barraza's rights, if any, under I.C. § 45-803.