Opinion ID: 163797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timing of the imposition of sentence

Text: 22 Defendant also argues that he was not deported ... after ... a conviction for a felony that is ... a drug-trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months[.] USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). He relies on the fact that the 1- to 15-year sentence for his 1997 drug-trafficking conviction was not imposed until his probation was revoked in June 2000, after his deportation. According to Defendant: 23 The plain language of the guideline refers to a conviction and sentence which was imposed prior to the deportation underlying the re-entry offense, and the imposition of a longer sentence based on a probation violation should not be considered. By explicitly limiting application of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to re-entry following a deportation which takes place after a sentence longer than 13 months, this guideline, by its terms, does not apply when the sentence of over 13 months is only imposed after the re-entry offense has taken place. [Defendant] was not deported after the imposition of the longer sentence, and § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) therefore does not apply to him. 24 Aplt.'s Opening Br. at 7-8. 25 Defendant's argument is based upon a plausible reading of the guideline. But because Defendant did not raise this argument below, we can grant him relief only if the sentencing error was plain—that is, if the error was clear or obvious under current law. Whitney, 229 F.3d at 1308 (internal quotation marks omitted). An error is clear and obvious when it is contrary to well-settled law. Id. at 1309. In general, for an error to be contrary to well-settled law, either the Supreme Court or this court must have addressed the issue. See id. (finding no plain error in interpretation of guideline provision when neither Supreme Court nor Tenth Circuit had directly addressed the issue). The absence of such precedent will not, however, prevent a finding of plain error if the district court's interpretation was clearly erroneous. See United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (the district court's error was plain when guideline clearly and obviously was limited to a single interpretation, despite the absence of circuit precedent). 26 There is no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent addressing enhancements under the present version of § 2L1.2 on facts similar to those presented here— i.e., when an initially suspended sentence is reinstated after deportation and illegal reentry. Nor have we found such precedent in other circuits. But cf. United States v. Guzman-Bera, 216 F.3d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (under prior version of § 2L1.2, aggravated-felony enhancement did not apply when defendant was initially sentenced to probation (without a suspended sentence), because subsequent revocation and imposition of prison term did not occur until after defendant's deportation and illegal reentry); Jimenez, 258 F.3d at 1125-26 (dictum to same effect). 27 In our view, Defendant's reading of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) is not compelled. First, the provision speaks of deportation after... a conviction,  not after imposition of sentence.  Second, it is not immediately obvious that the purpose of the enhancement would be undermined by applying it in the circumstances of this case. The provision derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which increases the penalty for illegal reentry when the alien had been convicted of an aggravated felony prior to deportation. There is some doubt regarding which interpretation of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) would best serve the purposes of § 1326(b)(2). Third, the guideline provides for the enhancement if the defendant was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after... a conviction for a felony.... USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Defendant has presented no argument regarding how to construe the unlawfully remained language or its applicability here. 28 A careful examination of the context and purposes of § 2L1.2 might convince us that Defendant's interpretation is the correct one. What we cannot say, however, is that the district court was clearly wrong. See Whitney, 229 F.3d at 1309 (finding error, if any, not plain, even though Tenth Circuit in dictum, Seventh Circuit, and Black's Law Dictionary indicated that guideline should be construed in a manner contrary to district court's application of guideline). 29 Defendant urges us to adopt his interpretation by applying the rule of lenity, which instructs courts to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes favorably to the accused. See United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir.2001). But the rule of lenity is applied only when all other techniques for statutory construction leave the court in equipoise. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, ... we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. (internal quotation marks omitted; ellipses in the original)). When the choice between two possible meanings of a statute is so open to debate that the rule of lenity comes into play, one can hardly say that either interpretation is plainly wrong. We see no role for the rule of lenity in determining whether there was plain error below. 30 We hold that the district court did not plainly err when it enhanced Defendant's sentence 16 levels under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i).