Opinion ID: 854135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amending the Habitual Offender Information

Text: Sides next asserts that the trial court erred by allowing a late amendment to the habitual offender allegation. He says the State should not have been allowed to amend by changing a prior conviction from auto theft to theft. He also alleges that the trial court acted as an advocate by amending the charging information. Under Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5(c), an amendment to the charging information may occur at any time as long as it does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-34-1-5(c) (West Supp.1997). These substantial rights include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge. Hegg v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ind.1987). As we observed in Martin v. State, 537 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Ind.1989), if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights. Id. Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges. See McCollum v. State, 582 N.E.2d 804, 814 (Ind.1991); Miller v. State, 563 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ind.1990). The record indicates that Sides was neither surprised nor prejudiced by this amendment. On January 23, 1995, the State filed the information charging Sides as a habitual offender. This information alleged that he had been convicted of three prior felonies: auto theft on April 3, 1990, auto theft on March 22, 1991, and possession of cocaine on May 6, 1993. (R. at 34). In May 1995, Sides received copies of the informations for the prior felonies, the judgments of conviction, and their cause numbers. (R. at 71-72). These documents unequivocally demonstrated that Sides was not convicted of auto theft on March 22, 1991, but instead was convicted of theft on that date. (R. at 772, 776). The conviction date for the alleged auto theft is identical to the conviction date for the actual theft. The cause numbers are also identical. More importantly, Sides knew of the State's error. During closing arguments, Sides contended that although felonious theft was committed on that date, he did not commit auto theft. (R. at 800-01). He asserted that even if the mistake was inadvertent, the information had to be perfect under Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5. (R. at 801). Sides' interpretation of Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5(c) is misguided. This section expressly allows for amendments so long as the substantial rights of defendants are not prejudiced. Our courts have held on numerous occasions that defendants are not prejudiced when the amendment is merely one of form and not substance. See McCollum, 582 N.E.2d at 814 (court did not err by amending conviction date on day of trial); Cornett v. State, 536 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ind.1989) (amendment changing location of crime was not prejudicial); Rainey v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (amendment on day of trial which allowed the information to conform to documentary evidence was not prejudicial). Consistent with these cases, we conclude that the deletion of the word auto from the information was one of form. Sides was neither surprised nor substantively affected by the State's amendment, and we find no error in allowing it. Sides also contends that the trial court acted impermissibly by deleting the first auto theft from the information and by adding the words a narcotic drug instead of cocaine in the possession charge. According to Sides, this conduct amounted to advocacy by the trial court. In another section of his brief, however, Sides states that [i]t is unknown how these changes came to be made. (Appellant's Br. at 26 n. 4). Without proof that these changes were made by the trial court, appellant has not presented a cogent argument as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 8.3. Therefore, this claim is waived. Daniels v. State, 683 N.E.2d 557, 558 n. 4 (Ind.1997).