Opinion ID: 4522412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: saa

Text: SAA “govern[s] common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce.” Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 57, 60 (1934). It requires railroad carriers to equip railcars with listed safety features, including designated types of couplers, brakes, running boards, and handholds. 49 U.S.C. § 20302(a). The list of required features set out in § 20302(a) does not include insulation of any kind. Nevertheless, Budd asserts the asbestos insulation at issue in this case relates to railroad worker safety and is, thus, regulated by SAA. That is, Budd asserts, whether by statute or common law cause of action, states cannot regulate any railcar safety device whether the device is listed or not in SAA. Budd’s strikingly broad proposition is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914). In Atlantic Coast Line, the Court addressed a railroad company’s challenge to a Georgia statute mandating headlights on locomotives. The railroad company claimed, inter alia, that with SAA, Congress had occupied the field to “promote the safety of railway operations.” Id. at 293. Atlantic Coast Line decisively rejected this argument, concluding SAA’s preemptive field applied only to those safety devices listed in the Act. Id. at 293-94 (“It does not appear, however, . . . 3 (...continued) it advances on appeal in support of preemption. -14- that Congress . . . has established any regulation so far as headlights are concerned. As to these, the situation has not been altered by any exertion of Federal power, and the case stands as it has always stood; without regulation, unless . . . supplied by local authority.”); see also Little, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 121516 (discussing at length the decision in Atlantic Coast Line). Budd asserts, however, that the Supreme Court broadened the preemptive reach of SAA with its decisions in Southern Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439, 446 (1915), and Gilvary, 292 U.S. at 60-61. This argument is entirely unconvincing. It is certainly true, as recognized by the district court, that the Supreme Court used “more sweeping language” in these cases to describe the scope of SAA preemption. Little, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 1216. That language, however, must be considered in context. In both Southern Railway and Gilvary, the Court was dealing with safety devices specifically listed in SAA. S. Ry., 236 U.S. at 444 (grab irons) 4; Gilvary, 292 U.S. at 52 (automatic coupler). 5 Given that both Southern Railway and Gilvary involve covered safety devices, in which preemption is obvious, and that neither purported to alter or 4 See 49 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(2) (requiring “secure grab irons or handholds” on the ends and sides of a covered “vehicle” “for greater security to individuals in coupling and uncoupling vehicles”). 5 See 49 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(1)(A) (requiring use of “couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles”). -15- overrule Atlantic Coast Line, Atlantic Coast Line remains binding as to the nonpreemptive effect of SAA on devices not specifically listed in the Act. This is especially true given that the Supreme Court has continued to rely on Atlantic Coast Line in noting the limited preemptive impact of SAA. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 475 (1937) (holding that when the claim involved an allegedly negligently placed brace rod, a piece of equipment not listed in SAA, “[t]he law to be applied . . . is the common-law rule of negligence, and not the inflexible rule of the [SAA]”); Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) (“Does the legislation of Congress manifest the intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment? Obviously, it did not do so by the [SAA], since its requirements are specific.”). Alternatively, assuming this court is unconvinced by its argument that the Supreme Court has abandoned its holding in Atlantic Coast Line, Budd asks this court to assume the Supreme Court would do so if presented with the question. In so arguing, Budd notes that in the years after the decision in Atlantic Coast Line, the Supreme Court has adopted a much more robust form of preemption as to matters within the cognizance of LIA. See Kurns, 565 U.S. at 631-34 (describing capacious nature of LIA preemption). In so arguing, Budd is asking this court to undertake an analysis the Supreme Court has indicated is forbidden. That is, even entertaining the dubious assumption that the analysis in Atlantic Coast Line is -16- somehow inconsistent with the analytical approach the Supreme Court later adopted in analyzing LIA, it is the Supreme Court’s prerogative to reconcile the two inconsistent lines of precedent. The Supreme Court has made clear that if one of its precedents “has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quotation and citation omitted). Because Atlantic Coast Line is directly on point and specifically holds that SAA does not preempt state common-law suits involving railcar safety as long as the suit does not relate to one of the listed devices, it resolves this issue. Little’s state-law claims relate to asbestos-wrapped pipes, a matter not regulated by SAA. Those claims, therefore, are not preempted by SAA.