Opinion ID: 1977232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Miranda and the Blood-Alcohol Test

Text: By the time McAvoy was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test, he clearly was in custody. Although that fact changes the analysis, it does not change the result. The breath taken from McAvoy was physical evidence and was not testimonial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. In South Dakota v. Neville , the Supreme Court said, at 459 U.S. 559, 103 S.Ct. 920: In Schmerber v. California ... this Court upheld a state-compelled blood test against a claim that it infringed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. We recognized that a coerced blood test infringed to some degree the inviolability of the human personality and the requirement that the State procure the evidence against an accused `by its own independent labors,' but noted the privilege has never been given the full scope suggested by the values it helps to protect. .. . We therefore held that the privilege bars the State only from compelling communications or testimony. Since a blood test was physical or real evidence rather than testimonial evidence, we found it unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege. (footnote omitted). Additionally, the Neville Court noted, at 459 U.S. 564, n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 923 n. 15, that a police request to take a chemical sobriety test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda: In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), police words or actions normally attendant to arrest and custody do not constitute an interrogation. The police inquiry here is highly regulated by state law, and is presented in virtually the same words to all suspects. It is similar to a police request to submit to fingerprinting or photography. Respondent's choice of refusal thus enjoys no prophylactic Miranda protection outside the basic Fifth Amendment protection. Accordingly, we conclude that Miranda warnings, as such, were not required in connection with the breathalyzer test. This does not end our inquiry, however, because McAvoy has also cast the question of his entitlement to be informed of the right to counsel in another light. Drawing on our holdings in Brosan v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662, 516 A.2d 970 (1986), and Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 481 A.2d 192 (1984), McAvoy argues that because we have recognized a constitutional right to counsel on the part of a person who is put to the decision of taking or refusing a blood-alcohol test, it follows that the results of a test cannot be admitted unless the record shows the defendant had counsel or voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to counsel. Further, he says, an intelligent waiver of counsel is dependent upon prior advice of the existence of that right, and thus Miranda -like advice of the right to counsel is required. The argument, though interesting, is flawed. We recognized in Sites neither a right of counsel in the Fifth nor Sixth Amendment sense, but rather a deprivation of the right of due process by the unnecessary denial of a specific request for counsel. The difference is significant, and dispositive of this question. For reasons we have already discussed, McAvoy did not have a Fifth Amendment right to counsel in connection with the decision he was required to make concerning the blood-alcohol test. Nor did he then enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because a formal charge had not yet been filed against him. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Sites v. State, 300 Md. at 712, 481 A.2d 192; Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 474 A.2d 1305 (1984). The right that McAvoy did enjoy at that point was the right not to be unreasonably refused counsel when requested by him. We hold, therefore, that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, requires that a person under detention for drunk driving must, on request, be permitted a reasonable opportunity to communicate with counsel before submitting to a chemical sobriety test, as long as such attempted communication will not substantially interfere with the timely and efficacious administration of the testing process. Sites, supra, 300 Md. at 717-18, 481 A.2d 192. The right to counsel, when it exists, is of such importance that waiver of that right will not be presumed, but will be permitted only when the record affirmatively shows as intelligent and voluntary relinquishment of the known right. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2394-95, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962). Thus, had McAvoy enjoyed the right to counsel in the traditional Fifth or Sixth Amendment sense at the time the decision was put to him, the record would have had to show advice of the right to counsel, and waiver, before the result of the test would have been admissible. The simple fact, however, is that McAvoy enjoyed no such right. Sites dealt only with due process concepts of essential fairness. We there found it fundamentally unfair to deny a request for counsel where the defendant was faced with an important decision, and where the granting of the request would not substantially interfere with the timely and efficacious administration of the testing process. We expressly held that the uncharged accused did not enjoy the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Sites, supra, 300 Md. at 712, 481 A.2d 192. McAvoy did enjoy the due process rights we recognized in Sites and refined in Brosan. Those rights did not, however, entitle him to advice of his right to counsel, nor to termination of testing activity until the appearance, or waiver, of counsel. The test results were properly admitted into evidence. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.