Opinion ID: 546370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adversary Adjudications

Text: 15 The EAJA expressly provides that a court awarding fees for judicial review proceedings of an adversary adjudication may also award fees for the attorney time expended in the adversary adjudication itself to the extent authorized in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504(a). 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(3); Hudson, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2257; St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 890 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C.Cir.1989). In order for an administrative proceeding to qualify for a fee award under section 2412(d)(3) of the EAJA, the proceeding must constitute an adversary adjudication as defined in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504(b)(1)(C). 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(3); Hudson, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2257; St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co., 890 F.2d at 448. Section 504(b)(1)(C) of Title 5 describes an adversary adjudication as one under section 554 of this title in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504(b)(1)(C); see Hudson, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2257; St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co., 890 F.2d at 448. 16 Here, plaintiffs seek attorney's fees for two separate series of proceedings before the INS. The first administrative proceedings, which ensued after the district court ruled that the failure to provide prompt post-deprivation hearings violated due process, occurred from August 1980 through the beginning of 1982. The second administrative proceedings, from February 1986 to February 1988, took place on remand and under the conditions imposed by the federal courts after the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the INS improperly refused to consider plaintiffs' defense of duress. 17 The first administrative proceedings do not qualify for EAJA fees as adversary adjudications under the plain language of section 2412(d)(3) because the position of the United States was not represented by counsel or otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(3); Hudson, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2257. It is undisputed that the United States was not represented by counsel in these proceedings. Plaintiffs, however, suggest that the position of the United States was otherwise represented because the INS official who conducted the personal appearance interview that initiated the administrative process 4 acted as a criminal investigator. 5 18 The plaintiffs' expansive reading of the term otherwise, to include the immigration officer 6 conducting the interview or hearing, is not supported by a fair reading of the act. The word otherwise is more appropriately read in the context of the entire clause to refer to an individual who represents the position of the United States in a manner similar to that of counsel. The crucial distinction between the role of counsel and that of an adjudicator is that the former advocates a particular position while the latter independently assesses the evidence before it to reach a result that is dictated by its understanding of the law. The INS official who conducted the plaintiffs' personal appearance interview was not an advocate for the United States. Rather, his statutory role was to consider the evidence presented opposing the imposition of the fine and prepare a report summarizing the evidence and containing his findings and recommendation. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 280.13. As the First Circuit has cogently noted, [t]he bare fact that an agency acting in an adjudicatory capacity rules against a private party, unjustifiably, is insufficient, absent the sovereign's adversary participation, to support a fee award under section 504['s definition of adversary adjudication]. In re Perry, 882 F.2d 534, 540 (1st Cir.1989). 19 Until recently, the government's liability for attorney's fees for the second administrative proceedings under the adversary adjudication prong of the EAJA was a far closer question. The government concedes that it was represented by counsel during these proceedings. Nevertheless, the government maintains that the INS fine imposition proceedings were not adversary adjudications within the meaning of the act because they were not adjudications under section 554 of ... title . 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504(b)(1)(C). 7 20 The Courts of Appeals have split on the appropriate construction of the statutory term under section 554. Compare Escobar Ruiz v. I.N.S., 838 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc) (EAJA provides fees for adversary proceedings that have all essential characteristics of proceedings governed by section 554) with Clarke v. I.N.S., 904 F.2d 172, 178 (3rd Cir.1990) (EAJA applies only to adversary proceedings that are actually governed by section 554); St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co., 890 F.2d at 449-51 (same); Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (6th Cir.1988) (same). Recently, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit, over a vigorous dissent, adopted the majority position, limiting EAJA awards in the adversary adjudication context to those proceedings  'governed by' or 'subject to' section 554. Ardestani v. United States Dept. of Justice, I.N.S., 904 F.2d 1505, 1510-13 (11th Cir.1990). This panel is bound by the decisions of prior panels of the Eleventh Circuit unless overruled by the en banc court or the Supreme Court. Garay v. Carnival Cruise Line, 904 F.2d 1527, 1534 n. 10 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Machado, 804 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir.1986). The law is clear that INS adjudicatory proceedings are not governed by section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955); Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1511; Clarke, 904 F.2d at 174; Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1023, 1025. Therefore, such proceedings cannot be considered adversary adjudications for EAJA purposes under the law of this circuit even if the government's position was represented by counsel. Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1512-13.