Opinion ID: 2223913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the requirement of an arrest warrant

Text: While we have found that the police in the instant case had probable cause to arrest the defendant, this conclusion alone does not make the defendant's arrest constitutionally proper. The question becomes, under the Michigan Constitution, whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his motel room which required the officers to have an arrest warrant, absent exigent circumstances, before arresting the defendant in his room. See Payton v New York, 445 US 573; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980); Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967). [6] Recently, the United States Supreme Court has established the rules pertaining to the requirement of an arrest warrant. First, if probable cause exists, the police are not required to obtain a warrant before apprehending a suspected felon in a public place. United States v Watson, 423 US 411, 423-424; 96 S Ct 820; 46 L Ed 2d 598 (1976). Second, before entering a suspect's residence to effect his arrest, the police must possess an arrest warrant absent exigent circumstances. Payton, supra, pp 602-603. Third, an arrest warrant alone is not sufficient authority for entry into the home of a third party to arrest the subject of an arrest warrant. Steagald v United States, 451 US 204; 101 S Ct 1642; 68 L Ed 2d 38 (1981). With these rules in mind, we must focus on whether the Payton constitutional requirement  that police have an arrest warrant before effecting the arrest of a defendant in his home  should be extended to a motel room under the Michigan Constitution. [7] No United States Supreme Court decision has held that a motel room is so different from a home, on a constitutional basis, that a defendant lacks a protected privacy interest in a rented room. [8] Thus, the United States Supreme Court has generally accorded Fourth Amendment protection to hotel rooms which were used by defendants. Therefore, absent exigent circumstances or consent, police officers, as agents of the state, need to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment before searching or seizing things or persons from such a place. E.g., Stoner v California, 376 US 483, 487-488; 84 S Ct 889; 11 L Ed 2d 856 (1964) (hotel clerk had no authority to permit search of defendant's room); United States v Jeffers, 342 US 48, 51-52; 72 S Ct 93; 96 L Ed 59 (1951) (search of a hotel room not exclusively used by a defendant invalid absent exigent circumstances or consent); McDonald v United States, 335 US 451, 454; 69 S Ct 191; 93 L Ed 153 (1948) (no compelling reason to justify the search of a hotel room); Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14-15; 68 S Ct 367; 92 L Ed 436 (1948) (search of a hotel room without a warrant constitutionally invalid). Cf. Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293; 87 S Ct 408; 17 L Ed 2d 374 (1966) (no violation of Fourth Amendment where the defendant voluntarily made statements in a hotel room to a third party who then relayed the information to the government). In addition, a number of other courts have addressed this specific issue, and most have held or indicated that the Payton requirement of an arrest warrant is equally applicable to hotel or motel rooms. [9] In United States v Bulman, 667 F2d 1374, 1383-1384 (CA 11, 1982), that court recognized that the difference between a home and a hotel room for Fourth Amendment purposes, as it related to the applicability of Payton to a hotel room, was a distinction without constitutional significance: A mere recitation of the difference between the places in which an arrest occurred does not, of course, pronounce relevant Fourth Amendment distinctions.    The appropriate approach, rather, is to determine [the defendant's] legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel room.    If we find that expectation identical to that which he would have in his home, then we must hold Payton applicable here. Not in all circumstances would we equate the reasonable expectation of privacy of an individual in a motel room with that of an individual in his own home.    Cases in which the Court has upheld a distinction, however, have depended upon occurrences of searches or seizures in the public areas of a motel.    The motel room was, however temporarily, equivalent to a home. Absent some applicable exception to the warrant requirement of Payton, the warrantless invasion of the motel room by law enforcement officials violated [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights. Likewise, this Court refuses to endorse such a shallow constitutional distinction between a home on the one hand and motel rooms on the other as it relates to the requirement of an arrest warrant. Thus, we hold that the warrantless arrest of the defendant in his motel room violated article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution [10] unless the police were authorized by an exception to the warrant requirement.