Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 37

Heading: the motion to dismiss is further granted as to 7 of the petitioner's claims because the new authority cited is either inapplicable to petitioner's case or clearly distinguishable from it leaving the claims barred by res judicata.

Text: The following claims include new allegations of fact or citation to new authority: A, C, D, O, BB, TT, VV. The claims do not, however, include new allegations or new citations of authority, which affect the validity of the prior determinations of the Montana Supreme Court with respect to those issues. A. As part of this claim petitioner asserts that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had the purpose, in restraining Peggy Lee Harstad, to inflict bodily injury, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) for purposes of establishing a standard of review. That standard of review has been exceeded in this case as evidenced by the jury verdict and this court's Finding No. 1, which reads in pertinent part: In this area Coleman initiated the assault upon the victim by swinging his motorcycle helmet by the chin strap and crashing it against the victim's head. Then the defendant placed the yellow nylon rope around the victim's neck and attempted to strangle her. Then both the defendant and Robert Nank carried the victim down to a slough and, the defendant held her under the water. The victim rose out of the water briefly and then both men went into the water and held her under until she expired. C. Petitioner's claim regarding the court's amendment of the information was considered in Coleman I, 579 P.2d at 745-6. The recently decided case of State v. Cardwell, Mont., 609 P.2d 1230 (1980), is inapposite because (1) the amendment in petitioner's case was found to be one form and not substance; (2) only substantive amendments without leave of court are affected by Cardwell; and (3) the Cardwell ruling is not retroactive. D. Petitioner's claim regarding his arrest was ruled on by the Montana Supreme Court in Coleman I, 579 P.2d at 743. The recently decided case of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), is inapposite because Payton has not been given retroactive effect. This is because the new constitutional doctrine it establishes is not one aimed at overcoming an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truthfinding function thereby raising questions as to the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials. V v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 1952, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972). Moreover, the purpose of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct is not served at the post-appeal stage and application of the exclusionary rule deflects the truthfinding process. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3051, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). O. Petitioner's claim of insufficient corroboration of Nank's testimony was considered in Coleman I, 579 P.2d at 748. Petitioner's citation of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and Pilon v. Bordenkinder, 444 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 7, 62 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), do not establish a standard of review for corroborative evidence and are therefore inapposite. BB. Petitioner's claim with respect to the district court's consideration of his prior criminal history as a mitigating circumstance was considered in Coleman II, 605 P.2d at 1019-20. Jackson, supra, and Pilon, do not affect this claim. TT. Petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim that hanging is a cruel and tortuous method of execution was rejected in Coleman II, 605 P.2d at 1058-9. Establishing a method of execution is properly a function of the legislature. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-5, 25 L.Ed. 345 (1879). Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 168-173, 96 S.Ct. at 2922-2925. VV. Petitioner's claim that his death sentence for the crime of aggravated kidnapping is disproportionate to the offense for which it was imposed is without merit. Coleman II, 605 P.2d at 1057. The death penalty imposed in this case was not the result of kidnapping only, but rather for the offense of aggravated kidnapping resulting in the death of the victim. Section 46-18-303(7), MCA.