Opinion ID: 2034362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Informer's Privilege at Suppression Hearings

Text: The use of confidential informants to establish probable cause presents a difficult issue for the courts. As a general rule, hearsay is admissible at a suppression hearing ( see, CPL 710.60 [4]). A police witness at a suppression hearing may establish probable cause by personal knowledge, as well as by information supplied by fellow officers or private citizens ( see, People v Washington, 87 NY2d 945, 947; People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 346). The People are not required to produce any particular witness, provided they sustain their burden of coming forward with evidence showing that there was probable cause for the arrest ( People v Parris, supra, at 346; see also, People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 337-339 [defendant does not have an absolute right to call the complaining witness to testify at a Wade hearing], cert denied 498 US 833). The People may even rely on hearsay evidence provided by an anonymous tipster, so long as the requirements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test are met ( People v Parris, supra ). As a counterbalancing principle, the defendant has a right to cross-examine the People's witnesses at the suppression hearing ( see, People v Williamson, 79 NY2d 799, 800-801 [trial court committed reversible error by curtailing cross-examination of witness at suppression hearing]). Thus, in the ordinary case where a police officer has obtained evidence from a third person providing probable cause, the defendant has the opportunity to question the officer about the third person's identity, relationship to the crime, basis of knowledge, past relationship to the police and criminal history. The defendant is thus able to raise any appropriate question about the officer's testimony to the suppression court. In the case of a confidential informant, however, the defendant's ability to test the officer's claim of probable cause is circumscribed. Since it is often important to maintain the secrecy of the informant's identity, especially at the early stages of a criminal proceeding, trial courts have the discretion to prohibit a defendant from eliciting the informant's name or any other information that could reveal the informant's identity ( see, People v Castro, 29 NY2d 324, 326 [finding it unnecessary to disclose informant's name at suppression hearing where other evidence established informant's reliability]; People v Coffey, 12 NY2d 443, 450-453 [upholding trial court's decision not to disclose informant's name where informant's existence and statements were verified by sworn testimony from Assistant District Attorney], cert denied 376 US 916; McCray v Illinois, 386 US 300, 311-314 [due process does not require disclosure of an informant's identity at a suppression hearing]). Thus, the defendant would be thwarted in efforts to test the officer's credibility ( see, 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3 [g], at 188 [3d ed]). Responding to these concerns, in 1974 this Court established a procedure to verify the testifying officer's credibility while keeping the informant's identity secret. The Court held that, where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause apart from the testimony of the arresting officer as to communications received from an informer, it would be fair and wise for the People to be required to make the informer available for interrogation before the Judge ( People v Darden, supra, 34 NY2d, at 181). In order to protect the informer's confidentiality, the prosecutor may be present at the hearing, but defendant and defense counsel may not. Defense counsel, however, may submit, in writing, suggested questions for the Judge to ask the informant, and the transcript of the in camera hearing must be placed under seal and made available to appellate courts should the case be appealed. Further, a summary report of the hearing should be made available to defense counsel and the People, regarding the existence of the informer and the communications made by the informer to the police ( id. ). By contrast, at trial, where the defendant's guilt or innocence is at issue, disclosure of the informant's identity should not be resolved in an ex parte proceeding ( People v Liberatore, 79 NY2d 208, 215).