Opinion ID: 2069196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Procedure Accorded Brown and Marlowe

Text: Appellant Brown was returned to the hospital on November 15, 1993, and the Hospital informed the court by letter on November 18, 1993, of Brown's readmission. Although counsel did not receive the letter until November 23, 1993, on the eighth day of Brown's return to inpatient care, this period was not so unreasonably long as to violate due process. The notice to the court explained that the basis for the revocation was the deterioration of Brown's mental health. Although general, the notice was sufficient to put Brown on notice of the particular condition requiring his readmission so that he could investigate, with the assistance of counsel, and demand a hearing. Indeed, Brown filed a motion, and a hearing was scheduled on December 21, 1993, less than a month after his summary return to inpatient care. Finally, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the merits of Brown's recommitment, but he postponed it. Subsequently, Brown consented to a modified conditional release order and resumed outpatient status pursuant to it. On these facts, Brown has not demonstrated that he was denied due process in connection with this rehospitalization. He was afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time under procedures employed by the Hospital and statutory procedures. See Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. at 902. Since the Hospital did not return Marlowe to inpatient status, there can be no valid claim that the Hospital acted outside its authority as Marlowe contends. It was the court which ordered the issuance of an attachment to insure Marlowe's return to the Hospital upon his release from incarceration in New York. Marlowe contends that the Hospital's unsworn letter, without notice to him or his counsel, was an inadequate basis for the court to issue the attachment which resulted in a detainer being lodged with the New York prison officials. He also seems to contend that only upon request of the government pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-301(i) could the court order his return. [8] As Marlowe concedes, the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction over an insanity acquittee until he or she is released unconditionally. Here, by order, Marlowe's release was conditioned upon his continued outpatient treatment at Park Ridge, residence with his mother, and continued mental stability. Once Marlowe was incarcerated, he necessarily was out of compliance with the court-imposed conditions of his release. The court was obligated upon learning of Marlowe's incarceration after a felony conviction to take steps to assure his return to the jurisdiction and to the Hospital for evaluation of his treatment needs. Although the conditional order of release contained no explicit condition requiring Marlowe to comply with the law, like grants of probation, such a condition must be implicit in such orders. See Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839, 840 n. 7 (D.C.1974). The report of a law violation is particularly significant for an insanity acquittee whose mental illness has resulted in criminal activity. We reject Marlowe's claim that the court must await a motion by the government under D.C.Code § 24-301(i) before taking steps to assure the patient's return to the Hospital for assessment. Since the court can delegate to the Hospital the authority to return the conditionally released acquittee to the hospital summarily, it surely can rely upon the Hospital's report as a basis for ordering the patient's return to the District for temporary hospitalization to ascertain his status when the conditions deemed to be essential for his community placement are not being observed.