Opinion ID: 2328266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inherent Danger and Peculiar Risk of Harm.

Text: In Counts IV and V of his complaint, Fry, Jr. alleged that the work to be done was inherently dangerous and exposed him to a peculiar risk of harm. An employer is liable for injuries caused by the negligence of an independent contractor where the work performed by the contractor is inherently dangerous. Levy v. Currier, 587 A.2d 205, 209 (D.C.1991); Lindler, supra, note 7, 164 U.S.App.D.C. at 38, 502 F.2d at 495 (applying this rule in favor of independent contractor's employee). The trial judge, as we have seen, held that scaffolding and painting are not inherently dangerous activities. [10] But the application of the inherent danger rule is not limited to intrinsically hazardous work. District of Columbia v. Howell, 607 A.2d 501, 505 (D.C.1992). On the contrary, the rule applies, inter alia, where the employer has special reason to contemplate such a risk [of harm] under the particular circumstances under which the work is to be done. Levy, supra, 587 A.2d at 209 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427, cmt. b (1965)). In the present case, Barnas testified that he was well aware of the danger posed by the scaffolding and ladder procedure. According to Fry, Sr., Barnas not only tolerated the perilous methodology but actually directed Fry, Sr. to follow it. Whether a particular kind of work is inherently dangerous is essentially a relative determination based upon the facts of the particular case. Taylor v. Tellez, 610 A.2d 252, 255 (D.C.1992) (citations omitted). The existence of [a] danger and knowledge of it by the employer are normally questions of fact for the jury. Howell, supra, 607 A.2d at 505. Given Fry, Sr.'s testimony, there were genuine issues of material fact precluding entry of summary judgment on Fry, Jr.'s claim of inherently dangerous activity. For similar reasons, we conclude that summary judgment was improperly entered on Fry, Jr.'s related claim under the peculiar risk doctrine. See Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 244 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 309, 757 F.2d 1293, 1304 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 413 cmt. b (1965).