Opinion ID: 2172904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of the Writ

Text: The city's final argument which, at least in part, has merit is that the order entered steps beyond the traditional office of the writ of mandamus. In this aspect of the litigation, the city first relies upon cases as Travis v. Teter, 370 Pa. 326, 87 A. 2d 177 (1952) and Waters v. Samuel, 367 Pa. 618, 80 A. 2d 848 (1951). Both cases, emphasizing that a mandamus action is addressed to the equitable discretion of the court, stated that the court may in its discretion refuse to issue the writ where its issuance would injuriously affect the interests of the public or create disorder and confusion in municipal government. These cases do not say, as the city suggests, that the trial court abuses its discretion if it does issue the writ (there is nothing in this record which indicates that issuance of this writ would result in the evils outlined above). [22] Furthermore, the court below did attempt to balance the interests of the city and those of the members of its retirement system by permitting the city to meet its Charter obligations on a gradual basis: It appears, therefore, that the most constructive, and hence the most equitable, way for this Court to proceed at this moment is to declare what defendants' obligations are, and to order that the obligations shall be met. If, upon consideration, defendants find that the City will be financially embarrassed, and that to avoid the embarrassment, present taxpayers will have to be taxed too severely, then defendants may devise, with the help of their actuary, a reasonable program for achieving gradually, and hence without undue burden on present taxpayers, what must be achieved. Defendants may then apply to the Court for permission to comply with the Court's order in accordance with such a graduated program. [23] Under the circumstances, the balance drawn by Judge SPAETH seems proper. The second branch of the city's argument centers about language contained in Dorris v. Lloyd (No. 1), 375 Pa. 474, 100 A. 2d 924 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936, 74 S. Ct. 632 (1954). See also 11 Std. Pa. Practice, ch. 46, § 1, at 227 (1964); Lakeland Joint School District Authority v. Scott Township School District, 414 Pa. 451, 458, 200 A. 2d 748, 752 (1964). We said in Dorris (supra at 478-79, 100 A. 2d at 927): [A] fatal objection to the granting of the relief here sought is the fact that . . .: `The ordinary office of the writ of mandamus is to coerce the performance of single acts of specific and imperative duty, . . .; and ordinarily it is not an appropriate remedy to compel a general course of conduct or a long series of continuous acts, to be performed under varying conditions,. . .' To this there is added . . .: `It is plain that where the court is asked to require the defendant to adopt a course of official action, although it is a course required by statute and imposed upon the official by law, it would be necessary for the court to supervise, generally, his official conduct, and to determine in numerous instances whether he has, to the extent of his power, carried out the mandate of the court. It would in effect render the court a supervising and managerial body as to the operation and conduct of the activity to which the writ pertains, and so keep the case open for an indefinite time to superintend the continuous performance of the duties by the respondent. Accordingly, the writ will not issue to compel the performance of a series of acts by a judicial officer;. . . nor to compel performance of other acts of a continuous nature.' [24] Appellants contend that the tripartite order of the court below violates the teaching of Dorris for it places the court in a position where it must supervise a series of future acts by municipal officers. The first two parts of the order required the city to appropriate for 1967 and 1968 sufficient funds to cover its normal cost and interest on its unfunded accrued liability; the third directed the city to appropriate for each year after 1968 and until all of appellee's retirement benefits have been paid an amount sufficient to cover normal cost plus interest on the unfunded accrued liability. The first two parts of this order are not violative of Dorris; the third is. There is no dispute that the first part of the order, covering 1967, is within the scope of the court's power; nor can there be, the city to the contrary notwithstanding, a dispute as to the 1968 section of the order. Section 2-300 of the Home Rule Charter requires that at least 30 days before the end of the city's fiscal year (in this case, December 31, 1967) city council must adopt the annual operating budget ordinance for the coming fiscal year. This budget must provide for discharge of any deficit. Thus, if the city's budget ordinance for fiscal 1968 did not contain sufficient appropriations (as the court below found) to cover normal cost and interest on unfunded accrued liability, it has already breached its duty and as to 1968 the order of the court below does not compel the performance of a future act. However, for years subsequent to 1968 the city has not yet made its financial decisions; the third section of the order below thus contains a directive for the performance of a future act in violation of the dictates of Dorris. Although we can agree with the court below that, if the city fails to make sufficient appropriations for years subsequent to 1968 and the court's order for subsequent years is vacated, then subsequent and perhaps annual mandamus actions will be necessary to compel performance of the city's duty, we certainly cannot assume that the city, now aware of its obligations, will refuse to act accordingly. [25] Thus, the third section of the order of the court below must be vacated. The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, as modified, is affirmed. Mr. Justice EAGEN concurs in the result. Mr. Chief Justice BELL and Mr. Justice JONES took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.