Opinion ID: 4530509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-conviction counsel was ineffective.

Text: ¶122. This claim is not barred. Under this Court’s decision in Grayson v. State, 118 So. 3d 118, 126 (Miss. 2013), death-penalty petitioners are entitled to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, and claims related to ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel are not subject to the procedural bars. ¶123. In order to show ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, Brown has to meet the well-known Strickland test: The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is well-settled. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must first prove that his counsel was deficient, which requires showing that “counsel made errors so serious that [he or she was] not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Secondly, a defendant must prove that the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” which requires showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of 44 a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. Absent both showings, a defendant may not prevail on his claim that his counsel was ineffective. Id. This Court must “‘strongly presume that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and the challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy. In other words, defense counsel is presumed competent.’” Liddell v. State, 7 So. 3d 217, 219–20 (Miss. 2009). And even where professional error is proven, this Court must determine if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Mohr v. State, 584 So. 2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991). Grayson, 118 So. 3d at 126-27 (quoting Chamberlin, 55 So. 3d at 1050). ¶124. Brown was represented at the initial post-conviction stage by James Craig. Craig is currently the director of the Louisiana office of the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center. He previously worked at the Mississippi Capital Defense Resource Center. At the time the petition was filed, Craig was one of the more experienced and respected capitaldefense attorneys in Mississippi. ¶125. Craig filed a petition on behalf of Brown in March 1998. The petition raised seven issues. Craig’s petition was successful initially. This Court granted the petition, in part, calling for a hearing on the question of ineffectiveness in the failure to secure expert testimony for the mitigation case. Brown II, 749 So. 2d at 93. ¶126. Craig has submitted an affidavit in which he claims that his 1998 petition was “skeletal” and that he did not have sufficient time or resources to fully investigate and prepare a sufficient petition. He claims that he did not begin to work on Brown’s petition until a month before it was due and that he did not have time to sufficiently investigate 45 relevant issues. ¶127. Even if it is assumed that Craig’s investigation and preparation of the first petition was deficient, Brown still has to show prejudice. At this point, this Court must determine whether there is “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Chamberlin, 55 So. 3d at 1050 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mohr, 584 So. 2d at 430). A thorough review of all of the claims raised in the successive petition reveals none that have merit. Thus, even if Craig had raised any or all of these claims, the result would have been the same. Brown’s ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-counsel claim therefore fails to meet the second Strickland prong. XV. Brown should be allowed to file motions for discovery and for expert access in the trial court. ¶128. Brown claims that he has been denied certain files by the State and that he should be allowed discovery into these matters. Brown’s discovery requests have been denied repeatedly by this Court. A similar request was denied in December 2015 because the Court found that “there has been no minimal showing of any need for pre-petition discovery.” Order, Brown v. State, No. 2015-DR-01099-SCT (Miss. Dec. 23, 2015). ¶129. Brown again sought discovery after the remand for a hearing in the first petition for post-conviction relief. The trial judge denied discovery, and this Court affirmed on appeal. Brown III, 88 So. 3d at 731. This Court held, “we cannot say that the trial court abused its 46 discretion in denying Brown’s discovery request.” Id. ¶130. Undeterred, Brown filed another motion for discovery. That motion was likewise denied. Brown IV, 255 So. 3d at 144. This Court held that “Rule 22(c) does not apply to successive petitions for post-conviction relief.” Id. This Court further found that “Brown’s filings before this Court and the State’s response indicate that Brown has been given access to some of this information, while other information simply cannot be located and may not exist.” Id. at 146 (footnote omitted). In its response to the petition, the State maintains that The State has made the district attorney’s files open to Petitioner. The State has made the Natchez Police Department’s files open to Petitioner. The State has made the Adams County Sheriff’s Department’s files open to Petitioner. The State has even taken time to help the Circuit Clerk of Adams County search for files that Petitioner claims are missing from his file. ¶131. We find that Brown’s fourth request for discovery should be denied. This has been answered repeatedly.