Opinion ID: 2604080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Julien's Standing to Sue for Breach of the Contract Between Nielsen and Hoiness:

Text: Hoiness argues that the contract between Nielsen and Hoiness was made only for the benefit of Nielsen, and that Julien was not an intended beneficiary. We do not find Hoiness' argument persuasive, in concurring with the trial-court decision that Julien was an intended third-party beneficiary of the Nielsen-Hoiness payment/performance-bond contract. In Peters Grazing Association v. Legerski, Wyo., 544 P.2d 449, 457 (1975), reh. denied 546 P.2d 189 (1976), we stated:    Where a person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person, such third person may maintain an action thereon even though he is a stranger to the contract and the consideration therefor and had no knowledge of the contract when it was made and was not specifically named therein so long as he is otherwise sufficiently described or designated. Nielsen did obtain a benefit from its contract with Hoiness in its eligibility to enter into and continue the construction subcontract with Julien. It was Julien that required Nielsen to obtain the bonds for the protection of Julien. This is not disputed by Hoiness which by brief, however, argues, The fact that the bonds to be obtained under the contract were intended to benefit Julien Construction does not make Julien Construction an intended beneficiary of the contract.  We refuse to follow the semantic gymnastics urged upon us by Hoiness and contrarily hold that Julien was an intended beneficiary of both the contract and the bond which attaches to Nielsen's agreement with Hoiness to be furnished the bond. Consequently, Julien has standing to maintain a breach-of-contract claim against Hoiness. It is a well settled rule of law that where one person agrees with another, on a sufficient consideration, to do a thing for the benefit of a third person, the third person may enforce the agreement   . Peters Grazing Association v. Legerski, supra, 544 P.2d at 457. See also Kaiser Engineers, Inc. v. Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co., Inc., 173 Cal. App.3d 1050, 219 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1985), following the same rule.