Opinion ID: 153012
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: County Attorney Smith

Text: Mr. Stearns alleges that County Attorney Smith violated his Fourth Amendment rights by ordering his arrest without probable cause. On appeal, Mr. Smith argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he had a reasonable belief that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Stearns for disorderly conduct. [3] Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4101 provides, in relevant part: 21-4101. Disorderly conduct. Disorderly conduct is, with knowledge or probable cause to believe that such acts will alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or other breach of the peace: . . . (c) Using offensive, obscene, or abusive language or engaging in noisy conduct tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others. Since 1980, [however,] this section has been limited to words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace [i.e., `fighting words']. Cook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 966 F.Supp. 1049, 1052 (D.Kan. 1997) (citing State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, 612 P.2d 630, 635 (1980)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). Thus, it is [not] objectively reasonable to arrest someone for . . . criticizing the police, and not every epithet directed at a police officer constitutes `disorderly conduct.' Elbrader v. Blevins, 757 F.Supp. 1174, 1181, 1182 (D.Kan.1991). Mr. Smith contends that he reasonably believed that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Stearns for two separate incidents: (1) the episode at Officer Venable's house and (2) Officer Venable's interaction with Mr. Stearns three hours later. We disagree. First, Mr. Smith maintains that Mr. Stearns's 12:30 a.m. visit to Officer Venable's house provided him with a reasonable belief that probable cause existed. The undisputed facts, however, show that Mr. Smith knew only the following: Mr. Stearns's father had been killed by local law enforcement officers and Mr. Stearns was upset with police, Mr. Stearns knocked on Officer Venable's door just after midnight but left when no one answered the door, and Mrs. Venable claimed she overheard Mr. Stearns say the word later. These facts would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Stearns for disorderly conduct. Second, Mr. Smith maintains that he reasonably believed probable cause existed based on Mr. Stearns's conduct during his interaction with Officer Venable around 3:30 a.m. that same day. Mr. Smith claims that prior to ordering Mr. Stearns's arrest he was told that during the early-morning interaction Mr. Stearns was loud, belligerent, smelled of alcohol, and pointed his finger at Officer Venable while using profanity. At the time Mr. Smith ordered the arrest, however, it was well-settled that profanity, especially toward police officers, does not amount to a violation of the disorderly conduct statute unless it constitutes fighting words. Huffman, 612 P.2d at 635; Elbrader, 757 F.Supp. at 1180. Moreover, none of the additional facts allegedly known by Mr. Smith could have converted Mr. Stearns's statements to Officer Venable into a threat. Thus, it was unreasonable for Mr. Smith to believe that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Stearns. Accordingly, the district court properly denied his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.