Opinion ID: 1294771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the pretrial documents

Text: In an opinion rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a state court's protective order prohibiting dissemination of data acquired in civil discovery proceedings, the Supreme Court explained that pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2207, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are answered in private. Id. at 33 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. at 2207. The Court noted that Rule 26(b)(1) of the state court's discovery rules provided that a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action and that discovery was not confined to information that is competent as evidence at trial so long as the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. at 29-30, 104 S.Ct. at 2205-06. Commenting upon these rules, the Court said: Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has significant potential for abuse. This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery. The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under a State's discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization of protective orders. The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery. The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. Id. at 34-36, 104 S.Ct. at 2208-09. (footnotes omitted). Although the issue in Seattle Times Co. was freedom of the press ( i.e., the right to publish) rather than the public's right of access, the Court's opinion is relevant to the issue before us. Both cases are civil in nature. Both involve protective orders impressed on pretrial documents. And the discovery rules central to the Supreme Court's rationale and our Rules 4:1(b)(1) and (c) are essentially the same. Shenandoah cites no authority, and we find none, respecting either a pre-judgment or a post-judgment right of public access to discovery data at common law, [3] and in Virginia, trial courts are expressly authorized by our discovery rule for good cause shown [to] ... make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Rule 4:1(c). We hold that the reasons assigned by the trial judge in his letter opinion constitute good cause to enter the pre-judgment protective orders sealing the pretrial documents.