Opinion ID: 539912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Errors Claimed to Arise from Joint Trial

Text: 39 During her interrogation by the FBI at the shopping mall, Long stated that Barry had instructed her to go to the mall, pick up a key, move a package from one locker to another, and stay there to watch for suspicious activity. Long argued this statement was important to her defense that she acted merely on the instructions of Barry, her employer, and not knowing she was participating in an illegal scheme. Long herself did not testify, but she sought to have the statement put in evidence through cross-examination of the FBI interrogator. Because this hearsay statement would implicate Barry without allowing him the opportunity to cross-examine Long, the court ordered the FBI agent to substitute the pronoun someone in place of Barry's name. As a result the agent testified Long said someone instructed her to do what she did at the mall. 40 Long argues that the redaction of her statement made a mockery of her defense that she was merely Barry's dupe and pawn. She insists that the district court violated the rule of completeness by not allowing her statement in its entirety. Barry also objects to the redacted testimony. He argues that cross-examination of the agent by Long's counsel made very plain that the someone was in fact Barry. He therefore asserts he was denied his constitutional right to confront Long about the statement she made against him. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (admission of codefendant's post-arrest confession implicating defendant violates defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him). Both defendants urge that the district court erred by not granting them separate trials. 41 Whether to sever trial of multiple defendants is a matter within the discretion of the district court. We will reverse only upon abuse of discretion resulting in clear prejudice. United States v. Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505, 522 (8th Cir.1982).
42 With respect to Long's claim, the rule of completeness holds that when a confession is introduced, the defendant has a right to have all, and not just part of it, put into evidence. Kaminski, 692 F.2d at 522. However, when one defendant's confession is redacted to avoid implicating the other defendant, the rule of completeness is violated, and severance required, only where admission of the statement in its edited form distorts the meaning of the statement or excludes information substantially exculpatory of the declarant. Id. 43 Long has proven no distortion here. Her counsel skillfully cross-examined the FBI agent about her statement in a way that made clear that the someone was Barry. The following excerpts illustrate: 44 [Cross-examination of FBI agent by Long's counsel] Q: So if I understand it right, Miss Long told you that someone instructed her to be out there? 45 A: That's correct. 46 Q: She actually told you a name of the person that told her to be out there and you know that name now? 47 A: Yes, sir, I do. 48       49 Q: [She told you she] saw Arlene Anderson drive up with someone, is that right? 50 A: That's correct. 51 Q: And is this the same someone that gave the instructions? 52 A: Yes. 53 Q: And it's the someone that gave Miss Long the instruction to be there and to watch as Miss Anderson arrived with this other person, is that correct? 54 A: Yes, it is. 55       56 Q: And then pursuant to the instructions from the mystery person, she was watching the lockers, is that right? 57 A: She was to stay in that area and make a note of any unusual observations. 58 Q: And she didn't use the word mystery person, did she? 59 A: In terms of who she got the instructions from? 60 Q: Right. 61 A: No, she didn't. 62 Q: And in fact, she told you that she had been at some meetings with Arlene and this other person recently, right? 63       64 A: She had a conversation with this person and Arlene before, yes, part of that time. 65 Other testimony connected Arlene Anderson with Barry in the meetings mentioned by the FBI agent. This record therefore leaves no doubt that the jury fully understood Long's claim that she acted on Barry's instructions. The rule of completeness is not violated when the meaning of the redacted statement becomes clear despite the redaction. 66 Even assuming the statement lost some exculpatory effect through its redaction, the redaction did not cause sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal. The record is replete with other evidence of Long's presence at, knowledge of, and participation in the fraudulent ticket writing and distribution. 2. Bruton Violation 67 Barry argues that because cross-examination by Long's counsel made clear that Barry was the someone in the redacted hearsay statement, admission of the statement infringed his sixth amendment right to confront the witness against him, as explained in Bruton v. United States. The Supreme Court has held that the Bruton rule is not violated merely because other evidence allows the jury to infer a link between a co-defendant's redacted confession and the defendant. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). Provided the redacted confession itself contains no reference to the defendant, an instruction to the jury to avoid inferring any link between the statement and the defendant should suffice to protect the defendant's sixth amendment rights. Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709. 68 In Richardson, however, the redacted confession contained no neutral pronoun like someone as a replacement for the defendant's name. Rather, the redaction eliminated all reference to the involvement of any other person. The Court expressly reserved judgment on whether a redaction using a pronoun would violate the sixth amendment if other evidence allowed the jury to infer who was the someone. 481 U.S. at 211 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. at 1709 n. 5. 69 We encountered this reserved question in United States v. Garcia, 836 F.2d 385 (8th Cir.1987). We distinguished cases where presentation of the redacted statement draws the jury's attention to the fact that a name was omitted and invites the jury to fill in the blank, and cases where the redacted statement does not invite speculation. 836 F.2d at 390-91 (citing Clark v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1055, 105 S.Ct. 1761, 84 L.Ed.2d 823 (1985), as an example of a case where jury was invited to fill in the blank); see also United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 651-53 (2d Cir.1989) (contrasting case that did not invite jury speculation from one that did), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990); United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1142 (11th Cir.1988) (prosecutor invited speculation). Because the statement in Garcia did not invite speculation, we upheld the district court's admission of the redacted statement. 70 In the present case speculation was invited. As the excerpted portions of the transcript plainly indicate, Long's counsel led the jury straight to the conclusion that someone referred to Barry. Long never took the stand for Barry to cross-examine about her statement. 71 Nevertheless, violations of the Bruton rule are subject to the harmless error standard. Garcia, 836 F.2d at 391. We find that the Bruton error in this case was harmless. The offending statement served to connect Barry with Long and, therefore, with the stolen tickets Long guarded in the shopping center locker. Even without this statement, however, ample evidence connected Barry with those tickets and the scheme to steal and market them. Arlene Anderson testified that Barry took her to view the tickets in the locker before going downtown to collect the money for them. The other evidence showing Barry's involvement in the scheme was overwhelming. Barry suffered no prejudice by the Bruton error. 72 We hold that the convictions of Barry and Long should be affirmed.