Opinion ID: 3036664
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the government’s negligence

Text: “A negligence action requires proof of four elements: (1) existence of a duty; (2) breach of the duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Gentry v. Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc., 962 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Mont. 1998).5 The district court addressed the four elements required for a negligence action. In holding that the government had breached its duty to Musselman, the district court applied a standard of ordinary care under Montana law. As we discuss later in this order, the government disputes the application of that standard, contending that the standard is either gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. Because we leave this issue for determination by the Montana Supreme Court by way of this certification, we defer its resolution pending a response from that Court. However, our order resolves all other issues and leaves only the standard of care as determinative of this appeal.

[6] To establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must first demonstrate the existence of a duty of care. Gaudreau v. Clinton Irrig. Dist., 30 P.3d 1070, 1073 (Mont. 2001). “The existence of a legal duty can be determined as a matter of law.” Lopez v. Great Falls Pre-Release Servs., Inc., 986 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Mont. 1999). The Forest Service owed a duty of care to all persons which it could reasonably foresee would use the 5 The Forest Service does not dispute the trial court’s damage award. 2882 OBERSON v. USDA snowmobile trail. Id.; see Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 134 (Mont. 1996) (“Duty . . . is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails” (quoting Mang v. Elaisson, 458 P.2d 777, 781-82 (1969)). The government argues that Musselman cannot show the existence of a duty because Montana’s snowmobile statute places all legal responsibility for risks “inherent in the sport of snowmobiling” on the snowmobiler. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-654 (1996). It argues that the statute relieved the government of liability for the failure to warn Musselman of the “variation in terrain” on which he was injured. § 23-2-654(1). The government, however, overstates the law. [7] We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of state law. See Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 2003). To determine whether the government had a duty to warn Musselman of the hill’s hazardous nature, we must interpret the meaning of “inherent risk” in the Montana snowmobile statute. Courts considering the meaning of “inherent risk” or similar language in similar statutes have held that language to shield defendants from liability for risks that are integral parts of a sport and, therefore, could not be eliminated by a defendant with ordinary care. See Brewer v. Ski-Lift, Inc., 762 P.2d 226, 231 (Mont. 1988); see also Bouchard v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 81, 84 (N.D. 1996); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 705-06 (Cal. 1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Utah 1991); Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Life, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786, 791-92 (D. Vt. 1951). Here, the risk under consideration is not a variation in terrain but the lack of a warning sign at a hazardous variation in terrain. Given the Service’s comprehensive safety program designed to standardize hazard notification on trails, the negligent failure to post a warning sign is not an integral part of the sport of snowmobiling. The risk from such a failure could be eliminated by the exercise of ordinary care. We conclude that the snowmobile statute’s “inherent risk” provision did not OBERSON v. USDA 2883 shield the Forest Service from liability for failure to provide a warning of a known hazard on the Big Sky Trail.
To determine whether the government breached its duty to Musselman, the district court analyzed the Forest Service’s conduct under the ordinary care standard. The district court arrived at this standard of care only after rejecting two alternative standards prior to trial. To the extent relevant to the questions certified to the Montana Supreme Court, we recite the grounds upon which the district court based its pretrial rulings. [8] First, the district court barred affirmative defenses based upon the 1996 snowmobile statute’s gross negligence standard, MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-653, holding that standard of care to violate the Montana equal protection clause, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. In so doing, the district court relied on Brewer, in which the Montana Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute eliminating legal recourse against ski area operators for skiers suffering injury by virtue of their participation in the sport of skiing “regardless of the cause [of injury] and regardless of the presence of negligence or intentional conduct on the part of the ski area operators.” 762 P.2d at 230. According to the district court, the “special rights” created by the 1996 snowmobile statutes gross negligence standard were the same as those created by the statute considered in Brewer— which removed all liability—and similarly were not rationally related to the statutes purpose. Here, the district court based its analogous treatment of the ski area operator and snowmobile statutes upon its unpublished order in Riska v. USDA, CV-96-63-BU-DWM (D. Mont. Oct. 14, 1997) (holding 1996 snowmobile statute’s gross negligence standard unconstitutional under Brewer). We have found no Montana court decisions resolving the constitutionality of the 1996 snowmobile statute’s gross negligence standard or Brewer’s 2884 OBERSON v. USDA applicability to gross negligence standards of care in other statutes. [9] Second, the district court barred affirmative defenses based upon the recreational use statute’s willful or wanton misconduct standard, MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-302(1). According to the district court, the parties agreed that the Montana legislature “carved snowmobiles out of the general recreational use statute by enacting the specific snowmobile liability statutes.” The government argued the recreational use statute’s willful or wanton misconduct standard still should apply in place of the snowmobile statute’s rejected gross negligence standard. The district court, however, held the recreational use statute to be preempted by the more specific snowmobile liability statute in this instance. Having found the recreational use statute’s standard of care inapplicable, the district court instructed the parties to proceed under the catchall ordinary care standard, MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-701, citing Brewer, 762 P.2d at 230, and Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782, 786-87 (Mont. 1994). We have found no Montana court decisions addressing whether the snowmobile liability statute’s standard of care preempts the recreational use statute’s standard in this context. [10] The Montana Supreme Court’s decision regarding the appropriate standard of care will be dispositive of this appeal. If the Court endorses the application of the ordinary care standard, we find no reason to overturn the district court’s decision. However, if the Court holds the gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct standard applicable, we must remand the case to the district court for a new trial under the appropriate standard of care.
The government contends first that there was no causal relationship between the absence of a warning and Musselman’s injury. We review a district court’s findings of both OBERSON v. USDA 2885 cause-in-fact and proximate cause for clear error. Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing mixed questions of law and fact regarding proximate cause); United States v. Hackett, 311 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing factual findings regarding causation). [11] “[A] party’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of an event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct.” Gentry, 962 P.2d at 1209 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The record established that when approaching the hill at only 35 mph (below the speed limit), a snowmobile would leave the ground and sail over the crest of the hill with the operator losing control and unable to see objects at the foot of the hill, as occurred in the earlier collision of a snowmobile with the snow groomer at the same location. As the district court found, “[p]lacing a sign on the approach to this hill would have changed the riders’ expectancies and informed them that the approaching hill was far steeper than the usual gentle grade.” Oberson v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 2d 917, 959 (D. Mont. 2004). Musselman, having landed off the trail, saw Johnson on the trail and reentered it, as the court found, to assist or warn the other snowmobilers of the danger. He was hit when Kalahar and Leinberger, unwarned, sped over the hill’s crest and lost control of their snowmobiles as a result of the unexpected steep grade. The court found that “but for the hill and the associated problems found in the facts, the accident would not likely have occurred.” Cause-in-fact, therefore, was established on the record which showed that the Service’s conduct, “in a natural and continuous sequence . . . helped produce [Musselman’s] injury and [the injury] would not have occurred without it.” Busta, 916 P.2d at 139. The Forest Service’s principal contention is that Kalahar and Leinberger’s speed and intoxication combined with Musselman’s carelessness in entering the trail were independent intervening causes. Even if its failure to post a warning sign were found to be a cause-in-fact of Musselman’s injuries, the 2886 OBERSON v. USDA Forest Service argues, the riders’ acts were unforeseeable intervening causes, sufficient to prevent a finding that the Forest Service’s failure to warn was a proximate cause of the accident. Where, as here, the existence of independent intervening acts is alleged, causation requires proof of both cause-in-fact and proximate cause. Gentry, 962 P.2d at 1209. “When two or more causes concur to bring about an event, then cause-infact is established by the ‘substantial factor’ test.” Sletteland v. Roberts, 16 P.3d 1062, 1067 (Mont. 2000) (citation omitted). Under that test, a party held to have contributed to an event is not “absolved from that responsibility upon the ground that the identical harm would have occurred without [its involvement].” Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d 621, 628 (Mont. 1985). As the foregoing discussion shows, the Service’s maintaining the hazardous and unwarned condition of the hill contributed to the event in which Musselman was injured. [12] Proximate cause is established when a party could reasonably foresee that its conduct would result in injury. Busta, 916 P.2d at 135. An independent intervening act will not bar liability if it is “one that the defendant might reasonably foresee as probable or one that the defendant might reasonably anticipate under the circumstances.” Estate of Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 672 (Mont. 1996). However, “[t]he particular resulting injury need not have been foreseeable.” Hinkle v. Shepherd Sch. Dist. # 37, 93 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2004). [13] That serious accidents involving snowmobiles could occur at the site of the hill was foreseeable. The district court found that the potential severity of the earlier snow groomer accident, even though no one was injured, placed the Forest Service on notice that serious injury could result from its failure to post a warning. That riders would operate snowmobiles negligently was foreseen by the Service. Its awareness of ridOBERSON v. USDA 2887 ers’ high speeds was a motivation for implementing a trail warranting process. And its awareness of intoxicated persons operating snowmobiles is reflected in the Code of Federal Regulations’ express prohibition of operation of a snowmobile while intoxicated in a National Park or Forest. 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.18, 4.23 (1996). Thus, Kalahar’s and Leinberger’s negligence was foreseeable. [14] The Montana Supreme Court has long recognized the rescue doctrine.6 Under that doctrine, “one who, observing another in peril, voluntarily exposes himself to the same danger in order to protect him . . . may recover for any injury sustained in effecting the rescue against the person through whose negligence the perilous condition has been brought about.” Bracey v. Nw. Improvement Co., 109 P. 706, 707 (Mont. 1910); see also Brown v. Columbia Amusement Co., 6 P.2d 874, 878 (Mont. 1931). Although the cases speak broadly in terms of liability, they recognize that liability is intertwined with causation in the application of the doctrine. Thus, in Kiamas v. Mon-Kota, Inc., 639 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Mont. 1982), the court held that causation had not been established where action was no longer required to avert a threatened harm. In its discussion of “Scope of Liability (Proximate Cause),” the Restatement of Torts (Third) (Proposed Final Draft) states, with respect to rescuers, “The aspect relevant to scope of liability provides that an actor whose tortious conduct puts the actor or another at risk, is subject to liability to a third person who is injured while attempting to come to the aid of the actor or the other imperiled person.” § 32 cmt. b (2005). Musselman’s entry onto the trail, the district court found, was a response to the peril created by the Service to warn or give aid to other snowmobilers. As such, it was a foreseeable consequence of the Service’s negligence. 6 “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable.” Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.). 2888 OBERSON v. USDA