Opinion ID: 2257566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Substantial and Sufficient Basis of an Actual Controversy as to the Merits

Text: Petitioner argues that Respondent failed to provide a detailed statement as to the merits of his defense. Relying on Carter, supra, Petitioner contends that motions that fail to state the legal and factual basis for a defense on the merits, or that state no more than conclusory allegations concerning a defense, are inadequate, because they afford the court no real information upon which to make its finding. We must resolve whether Judge Heard erred when she granted Respondent's motion to vacate the default order even if the stated legal and factual basis was insufficient. We conclude that she did not. We explain, noting that Petitioner relies on our decision in Banegura. In Banegura, after an entry of the order of default was filed, sixty-seven (67) days later and after a jury trial to determine damages, Banegura filed a motion to strike the default order. Banegura, 312 Md. at 614, 541 A.2d at 971. The trial judge denied Banegura's motion. Id. at 620, 541 A.2d at 974. Later, a motion to modify the request to strike was filed, which also was denied because it failed to provide any factual or legal basis for a defense or state that any defense existed. Id. at 620, 541 A.2d at 974. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal as to the judgment by default. We granted certiorari and held that [a] trial judge possesses very broad discretion to modify an interlocutory order where that action is in the interest of justice. Id. at 619, 541 A.2d at 974. Although a motion to vacate an order for default must include a legal and factual basis for the defense claimed, the failure to comply with the mandate of this rule may not deprive the trial judge of the right to grant the motion, but it may furnish justification of the denial of it . . . . We do not suggest that [the judge could not have granted the motion rather, we make clear that it was well within his discretion to deny it even if it had been timely filed. If Banegura cannot succeed in his challenge to the trial judge's exercise of discretion . . . he obviously cannot succeed in his appeal from an action over which the trial judge had very wide discretion. Id. at 620, 541 A.2d at 974-75 (1988) (citations omitted) (alterations added). We do not disagree with Petitioner that Respondent could have done a better job of complying with the first prong of Rule 2-613(d). [15] We also recognize that Judge Heard could have denied the motion to vacate for failure to comply with Rule 2-613(d) and (e) because the rules require that the motion shall state the reasons for the failure to plead and the legal and factual basis for the defense to the claim. We agree that Respondent failed to provide detailed legal and factual sufficiencies of his case, we are mindful, however, that [t]echnicality, while important, should not be elevated to an exalted status. Holly Hall, 147 Md.App. at 266, 807 A.2d at 1210. Respondent's motion contained the legal basis for his argument. Essentially, Respondent demanded proof that he violated the MRPC, and challenged the validity of Bar Counsel's factual allegations. Moreover, Rule 2-613(e) requires that if the court finds that there is a substantial and sufficient basis for an actual controversy as to the merits of the action and that it is equitable to excuse the failure to plead, the court shall vacate the order. Given that there was an adequate reason for Respondent's failure to plead, we cannot say that, in the interest of justice, that the hearing court abused its discretion in requiring the case to proceed on the merits rather than pursuant to a default order.