Opinion ID: 1060523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Denial of Montgomery's Motion for Severance

Text: Montgomery claims that the trial court erred by refusing to sever his case from that of Carruthers under Tenn. R.Crim. P. 14(c)(2). [33] Montgomery asked for a severance, before trial, during trial, and once again in his motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court's failure to grant a severance resulted in prejudicial error mandating a new trial. [34] In this Court, Montgomery claims he was unduly prejudiced by a joint trial because of the admission of certain statements made by Carruthers that would not have been admissible at a separate trial and because of the grossly prejudicial fashion in which Carruthers represented himself at trial. The State responds that the trial court appropriately denied Montgomery's requests for a severance and alternatively contends that any possible error in denying the request was harmless. Whether a severance should be granted is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it results in clear prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Tenn.1994); State v. Coleman, 619 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tenn.1981); Hunter v. State, 222 Tenn. 672, 681, 440 S.W.2d 1, 6 (1969); State v. Burton, 751 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). In Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 538-39, 51 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1932), this Court noted that: The state, as well as the persons accused, is entitled to have its rights protected, and when several persons are charged jointly with a single crime, we think the state is entitled to have the fact of guilt determined and punishment assessed in a single trial, unless to do so would unfairly prejudice the rights of the defendants. (Emphasis added.) Reversal is required only when the record demonstrates that the defendant was clearly prejudiced to the point that the trial court's discretion ended and the granting of [a] severance became a judicial duty. Hunter, 222 Tenn. at 682, 440 S.W.2d at 6; see also Burton, 751 S.W.2d at 447. No Tennessee court has previously considered the effect of one defendant's self-representation on a co-defendant's right to a severance. Several federal courts have held that, while pregnant with the possibility of prejudice, a trial involving a pro se defendant and a represented co-defendant is not prejudicial per se. United States v. Veteto, 701 F.2d 136, 138-39 (11th Cir.1983); see also Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 665 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Oglesby, 764 F.2d 1273, 1275-76 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552, 555-56 (2nd Cir.1977); State v. Canedo-Astorga, 79 Wash.App. 518, 903 P.2d 500, 504 (1995). Rather than automatically granting a severance in such cases, these courts have suggested that certain precautionary measures be employed to minimize the possibility of prejudice, including appointing standby counsel, warning the pro se defendant that he will be held to the rules of law and evidence and that he should refrain from speaking in the first person in his comments on the evidence, and instructing the jury prior to the closing remarks, during summation and in final instructions, that nothing the lawyer said is evidence in this case. [T]he district judge should also make clear to the jury at the outset that anything the pro se defendant says in his `lawyer role' is not evidence and should instruct the pro se defendant beforehand that he should both avoid reference to co-defendants in any opening statement or summation without prior permission of the court and refrain from commenting on matters not in evidence or solely within his personal knowledge or belief. Veteto, 701 F.2d at 138-39; Oglesby, 764 F.2d at 1275; Sacco, 563 F.2d at 556-57; Canedo-Astorga, 903 P.2d at 506. These courts have emphasized that such precautionary measures are suggestions, not requirements, for preventing the possibility of prejudice from ripening into actuality in a trial involving a pro se defendant and a represented co-defendant. Veteto, 701 F.2d at 138. We agree that these precautionary measures should be employed when a pro se defendant and a represented co-defendant are tried jointly. However, in rare cases, such as this one, even these protective measures will not be sufficient to prevent the possibility of prejudice from ripening into actuality. Id. Although the trial court required Carruthers to generally adhere to the rules of evidence and procedure and cautioned him about making statements to the jury, these measures were not enough to prevent his pro se representation from prejudicing Montgomery's right to a fair trial. Indeed, despite the trial court's efforts, the record demonstrates that Montgomery was severely prejudiced by Carruthers' self-representation, specifically, his offensive mannerisms before the jury, [35] his questioning of witnesses that elicited incriminating evidence, [36] and most importantly, his calling Alfredo Shaw to testify as a witness. The prejudice to Montgomery was compounded when the State used and emphasized the incriminating evidence elicited by Carruthers during its closing argument. [37] We do not agree with the State's assertion that any error is harmless because the trial court instructed the jury that if evidence applied to one defendant they should only apply it to the one defendant. As Montgomery points out, despite this general instruction, at no point did the trial court instruct the jury that any particular evidence applied only to one defendant and not the other. Even though Montgomery's name was not mentioned, Alfredo Shaw's testimony clearly indicated that others were involved with Carruthers in committing these crimes, and given the joint trial, the jury likely inferred that Montgomery was one of the others. [38] We recognize that the prejudice resulting to Montgomery from being tried jointly with Carruthers did not become fully apparent until the trial had concluded. Only at the conclusion of the trial was it possible for the trial court to comprehend the full effect of Carruthers' self-representation upon Montgomery's right to a fair trial. We realize that the trial court properly attempted to accommodate the interest of judicial economy, the State's interest in having guilt determined and punishment assessed in a single trial, and the defendants' right to a fair trial. However, by the time this issue was raised in the motion for new trial, we believe that the record demonstrated that Montgomery was clearly prejudiced to the point that the trial court's discretion ended and the granting of [a] severance became a judicial duty. Hunter, 222 Tenn. at 682, 440 S.W.2d at 6; see also Burton, 751 S.W.2d at 447. We therefore hold that Montgomery's right to a fair trial was prejudiced when he was denied a severance and was jointly tried with Carruthers. [39] Accordingly, we reverse Montgomery's convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial. [40]