Opinion ID: 1926398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: moratorium under section 4301(11)

Text: [¶ 11] Because, however, the Growth Management Ordinance does not prevent all development, but rather allows up to forty-eight new housing starts each year, we do not construe its provisions to amount to a moratorium within the meaning of section 4301(11). Home Builders relies on that language in section 4301(11), that defines moratorium as a land use ordinance ... which temporarily defers any authorization or approval necessary for development and contends that, because the ordinance requires applicants over a certain number to wait until the following year at the soonest before being issued a development permit, the ordinance temporarily defers development, and accordingly constitutes a moratorium under the statute. [¶ 12] We read that phrase to address an ordinance that explicitly or effectively withholds all authorizations or approvals necessary for development, and not, as Home builders contends, to mean an ordinance that withholds any single authorization or approval. In section 4301(11), the Legislature intended to address those ordinances commonly understood to halt all development of a particular type. Such ordinances, regularly enacted by municipalities over the last decade, traditionally prohibit all development of the type at issue for a period of time and are intended to allow a municipality to catch its breath or develop regulations for the targeted development. See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4356(1)(A), (B) (1996). In contrast to such an action, the Town of Eliot has not halted development. Rather, it has allowed a significant but finite amount of development and has regulated the speed with which that development may occur in this town of 5787 people. [¶ 13] Our interpretation of the moratorium provisions in this context turns on the meaning of any in the phrase by withholding any authority or approval necessary for development. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4301(11) (1996) (emphasis added). In common American usage, the word any is susceptible of several accepted meanings, each dependent on context. Any may mean any one, but it may also mean all or every. See THE OXFORD AMERICAN DESK DICTIONARY 24 (rev. ed.1998); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 40 (1970); WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 83 (1968). Because both of those meanings of any are acceptable uses, the meaning intended by the Legislature in this case can only be understood in the context of the legislation within which the word is used. [¶ 14] The meaning of a statute must be construed in light of the subject matter, purpose of the statute, and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Church v. McKee, 387 A.2d 754, 756 (Me.1978). An understanding of context must necessarily begin with the Legislature's stated goals and objectives regarding the statutory provision at issue. The restrictions on zoning moratoria are an integral part of the State's Planning and Land Use Regulation Act. See 30-A M.R.S.A. §§ 4301-4457 (1996 & Supp. 1999). Among the express purposes of the Act are the following: A. Establish, in each municipality of the State, local comprehensive planning and land use management; B. Encourage municipalities to identify the tools and resources to effectively plan for and manage future development within their jurisdictions with a maximum of local initiative and flexibility; C. Encourage local land use ordinances, tools and policies based on local comprehensive plans. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4312(2) (1996). The Legislature also announced that it is in the State's best interest to achieve the following goals: A. To encourage orderly growth and development in appropriate areas of each community, while protecting the State's rural character, making efficient use of public services and preventing development sprawl; B. To plan for, finance and develop an efficient system for public facilities and services to accommodate anticipated growth and economic development. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4312(3) (1996). [¶ 15] It is against the backdrop of those goals that we must determine what the Legislature intended when it addressed ordinances that temporarily defer[ ] development by withholding any authorization or approval necessary for development. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4301(11) (1996) (emphasis added). The Town's Growth Management Ordinance certainly does not defer development by withholding all authorizations. Indeed, it allows up to 48 new starts each year and requests for authorizations beyond that cap have had to be deferred only five times in 20 years. Indeed the ordinance would appear to be the very kind of municipal planning tool that the Legislature had in mind when it set forth its goals for the Planning and Land Use Regulation Act. It signifies the Town's attempt to effectively plan for and manage future development, 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4312(2)(B) (1996), and satisfies the State's goal for allowing orderly growth and development, 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4312(3)(A) (1996). The stated goal of allowing municipalities flexibility in establishing comprehensive plans is intended to encompass growth limitation ordinances of this sort. [¶ 16] Nonetheless, Home Builders would have us interpret section 4301(11) to sweep into the limitations of the moratoria provision any ordinance that has as an effect the deferral of any single authorization, thus restricting municipalities from placing a cap on development of any kind unless that cap met the restriction of the moratoria provisions, most notably, a maximum effective duration of 180 days. See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4356(2) (1996). [5] That construction would have an effect on communities across this State that currently use reasonable growth management ordinances to managebut not to haltdevelopment. [¶ 17] While an unreasonable limit on development could, in certain circumstances, constitute a de facto moratorium, that is not the case here. [6] The cap has only been reached five times in 20 years. The Town has amended the ordinance twice, increasing the cap as the Town's growth permitted. The Town's actions have complied with the legislative mandate to encourage orderly growth and development. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4312(3)(A) (1996) (emphasis added). The Town's growth limit ordinance does not constitute a moratorium either as defined by the statute or de facto. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.