Opinion ID: 2257786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amenability of partners to suit.

Text: The trial judge dismissed the complaint against the three Skadden, Arps partners on the ground that, under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-2501 et seq. (1992 & Supp.1998), these defendants are not amenable to suit in their individual capacities. The plaintiff contends that the judge erred in this regard. We agree with the plaintiff. To determine whether Ms. Wallace has a right of action against the partner defendants, we look first to the language of the statute. The Human Rights Act makes it unlawful, inter alia, for an employer to discriminate against an individual on account of race, marital status, or other prohibited ground, with respect to that individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. D.C.Code § 1-2512(a)(1) (Supp.1998). Employer is defined as any person who, for compensation, employs an individual, except for the employer's parent, spouse, children or domestic servants, engaged in work in and about the employer's household; any person acting in the interest of such employer, directly or indirectly; and any professional association. D.C.Code § 1-2502(10) (1992) (emphasis added). The Act also makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, invite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under the provisions of this chapter or to attempt to do so. D.C.Code § 1-2526 (1992). The partner defendants contend that the plaintiff was employed for compensation by Skadden, Arps, and not by the individual partners, and that therefore none of the partners is the plaintiff's employer. This argument has some force with respect to the first part of the statutory definition of employer, but it cannot be reconciled with the phrase which we have italicized in that definition. According the italicized words their normal everyday meaning, see James Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 45-46 (D.C. 1989), we conclude that the partners fall within the ambit of the statute. Where, as here, the employer is a law partnership, the phrase any person acting in the interest of such employer, directly or indirectly, necessarily includes a partner. [30] Indeed, if the quoted language italicized in Section 1-2502(10) does not extend to a partner in a law firm, it is difficult to conceive of any person to whom it would apply. Moreover, if Skadden, Arps unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff as alleged, then the partners who carried out the allegedly discriminatory acts aided and abetted the employer's discrimination, in violation of Section 1-2526. An aider or abettor is one who in some sort associate[s] himself with the venture, ... participate[s] in it as something he wishe[s] to bring about, [and] seek[s] by his action to make it succeed. Roy v. United States, 652 A.2d 1098, 1104 (D.C.1995) (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938) (Learned Hand, J.)). Even if we were to assume that the individual partners are not employers, and thus not principals in the alleged discrimination, the complaint fairly alleges that these defendants participated in the discrimination and sought to make it succeed. In Dici v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542 (3d Cir.1996), the court held that if, as there alleged, the plaintiffs supervisor knew or should have known that the plaintiff was being sexually harassed, and if he repeatedly refused to take prompt action to end the harassment, then [s]uch conduct, if proven, would constitute aiding and abetting, in violation of Pennsylvania's counterpart to Section 1-2526. Id. at 553. In the present case, the individual partners are alleged to have personally engaged in discriminatory conduct, and not simply to have failed to prevent it. The reasoning of Dici therefore applies a fortiori. Moreover, the presence in the Human Rights Act of the proscription against aiding and abetting refutes the partner-defendants' contention that the Act imposes liability only on the employing entity. In urging affirmance of the trial judge's decision, the partner defendants rely principally on federal precedents construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. [31] Under Title VII, the defendants' position would arguably be correct. [T]he clear majority of the courts of appeals that have considered this question have held that individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir.1996) (collecting authorities), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2532, 138 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1997). Moreover, some courts have held that a partner in a law firm is not personally liable under the federal statute. See, e.g., Yaba v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, 896 F.Supp. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citations omitted); Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 882 F.Supp. 1529, 1532 (E.D.Pa.1995). We note, however, that Title VII differs from the Human Rights Act in several critical respects. First, Title VII's definition of employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b), does not contain the phrase any person acting in the interest of such employer, directly or indirectly. [32] Second, there is no provision in Title VII proscribing aiding or abetting. The language of the Human Rights Act on which we have relied in support of our conclusion that the partner defendants are amenable to suit thus finds no analogue in the federal statute. Moreover, Title VII does not apply to employers with fewer than fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b). As one court explained in holding that the managing partner of a law firm cannot be held personally liable under Title VII, Congress would not have exempted employers with up to 25 [later 15] employees from liability, but kept an individual open to personal liability. Caplan, supra, 882 F.Supp. at 1532. The logic that the court found persuasive in Caplan is not available to the partner defendants here, for the Human Rights Act contains no exception for small employers. On the contrary, if an employer who employs only a single individual is subject to the Act, it is unlikely that the Council intended to protect partners in a large law firm from individual liability. Our Human Rights Act was designed to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit.... D.C.Code § 1-2501 (1992). Civil rights statutes are remedial and must be generously construed. Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 398 (D.C.1991) (interpreting Human Rights Act). If we were to adopt the construction of the Act urged on us by the partner-defendants, then a plaintiff could secure no reliefnot even an injunction prohibiting further discrimination in the future [33]  against an individual partner who has personally and willfully denied the plaintiff the equal employment opportunity which is the plaintiff's due under the Act. We do not believe that the Council contemplated such a result, and we therefore hold that the Skadden, Arps partners were properly joined as defendants.