Opinion ID: 782343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The NLRB's Decision and Order is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Text: 38 In its final assignment of error, Fluor Daniel argues that the Decision and Order of the NLRB is not supported by substantial evidence. The Company argues that the Board ignored a significant part of the evidence and drew unreasonable and illogical inferences and conclusions from the evidence it did consider. Specifically, Fluor Daniel makes four arguments relating to errors in the findings of fact and subsequent conclusions of the Board: (1) the Board erroneously credited testimony by Gary Evenson, a witness for the Charging Party Boilermakers; (2) the Board erroneously substituted its judgment for the business judgment of Fluor Daniel; (3) the Board erroneously concluded that Fluor Daniel considers only nonunion employees to be loyal; and (4) the Board erroneously found that Fluor Daniel had large numbers of deviations from its hiring protocols. All of these arguments are without merit, as substantial evidence supports the findings of the NLRB. 39 First, Fluor Daniel asks us to reassess the ALJ's credibility determination concerning Evenson, a key witness from Palo Verde, based on the fact that Evenson was found to have filed frivolous unfair labor practice charges, falsified evidence, and committed perjury in a 1993 organizing event in the case of Irwin Industries, Inc., 1996 NLRB LEXIS 666 (Sept. 18, 1996). However, we may not review credibility determinations unless they have no rational basis. Valley Plaza, Inc., 715 F.2d at 242. The ALJ was under no obligation to consider determinations made by another ALJ in a wholly different case regarding the credibility of a particular witness. During the hearing, the ALJ ruled under Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that any testimony regarding Evenson's involvement in Irwin Industries would add confusion to the current case. Furthermore, in Irwin Industries, 325 NLRB 796, 797 n. 7 (1998), the ALJ was reversed by the NLRB, who explicitly stated that we do not agree with the [ALJ] that the unfair labor practice charges related ... to the three employees [including Evenson] were frivolous and knowingly false. After hearing the testimony and observing Evenson at the hearing in this case, the ALJ concluded that his testimony was credible. There is no evidence presented to refute that conclusion or that should lead this Court to disturb the ALJ's credibility determination. 40 Second, Fluor Daniel argues that the Board erroneously substituted its judgment for Fluor Daniel's business judgment by suggesting what protocol should have been used for staffing the two projects. In particular, the Company argues that it was the APS, and not the Company, that determined staffing requirements for Palo Verde and that the Board penalized Fluor Daniel for not making certain business decisions, such as reviewing the Bechtel workforce for qualified employees. 41 Fluor Daniel's arguments mischaracterize the findings of the NLRB. In its Decision and Order, the NLRB never challenged the lawfulness of Fluor Daniel's systems of hiring preferences, policies, and procedures per se. Instead, the NLRB concluded that Fluor Daniel had applied those preferences, policies and procedures in a discriminatory way, and substantial evidence supports this conclusion. The NLRB noted several instances in which Fluor Daniel made choices that were contrary to the provisions of the Act and we review those factual findings only to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. See W.F. Bolin Co., 70 F.3d at 870. 42 The findings of the NLRB do not represent an attempt by the Board to substitute its judgment for the business judgment of the Company. Instead, the NLRB cited many instances of disparate treatment between the discriminatees and other applicants, noting in each case not that Fluor Daniel should have conducted business differently, but rather how Fluor Daniel treated discriminatees in a manner different from other applicants. For example, the NLRB found that Fluor Daniel discriminated against applicants in Palo Verde by failing to consider the applications of former employees of Bechtel, an obviously qualified and available pool of potential employees, while actively seeking applications from other sources. The NLRB found other instances where Fluor Daniel acted in contravention of the Act in Palo Verde by treating discriminatees differently: Fluor Daniel allowed several discriminatees to apply for nonexistent job classifications, while allowing other applicants to apply for comparable work with different job classifications; Fluor Daniel invited nonunion applicants to check back in the case of no-shows but did not invite the alleged discriminatees to do the same; and Fluor Daniel never referred any of the discriminatees to its Wolf Creek nuclear project, as it did for nonunion applicants. 43 Fluor Daniel's third and fourth arguments relate purely to findings of fact and inferences and do not warrant lengthy discussion, as we review them only to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Id. Fluor Daniel argues that the NLRB erred when it found that Fluor Daniel considered only nonunion employees to be loyal. The Board found substantial evidence that Fluor Daniel harbored anti-union animus, in particular finding that Fluor Daniel did not consider union organizers to be loyal. Fluor Daniel, 2001 NLRB LEXIS, at . In support of this conclusion, the Board found that Fluor Daniel promotes its database of loyal employees to customers. Id. Indeed, in its proposal for Palo Verde, Fluor Daniel stated that it had determined that an open shop labor posture can best meet [Palo Verde's] goals and provide them with `[w]orkers loyal to [Palo Verde] and Fluor Daniel instead of a local union.' Therefore, the conclusions of the NLRB that Fluor Daniel openly expressed the view that union organizers could not be loyal to the Company is supported by substantial evidence. 44 Finally, Fluor Daniel argues that the NLRB erroneously found that it had a large number of deviations from its hiring protocol. In particular, at Exxon the NLRB found 3,000 deviations from Fluor Daniel's hiring protocols with respect to the hire of nonactivists, but strict adherence to several hiring protocols to exclude the discriminatees from consideration. The NLRB found deviations from the protocol with respect to three major areas — hiring of former employees, hiring of applicants with inactive applications, and hiring of applicants with insufficient experience. Id. at . As previously discussed, Fluor Daniel hired former employees (also referred to as preferenced employees) who did not have forty-two months of craft experience, who had been certified in crafts other than the ones that they were hired to perform, who had never submitted applications or whose applications had expired, or who were considered for crafts other than those for which they applied. Second, Fluor Daniel also hired twenty-seven journeymen in breach of the Company's thirty-day active application rule that it implemented for the Exxon project. Id. at . Third, Fluor Daniel hired forty-three former employees without the requisite forty-two months of experience, and 124 applicants without former company experience and with less than forty-two months experience at Exxon. Id. at . 45 The NLRB additionally found that at Exxon, contrary to the requirement that applicants submit only one application and seek consideration for only one position, Fluor Daniel considered two-thirds of all applicants for positions other than those indicated on their applications. Id. at . None of the discriminatees were afforded the same opportunity. The NLRB, after extensively reviewing the enormous amount of Fluor Daniel's employment data, made several other findings, including that: (1) of the applicants hired prior to submitting their applications, two-thirds had inadequate experience and two-fifths were considered for different crafts; (2) of the applicants hired more than thirty days after submitting applications, three-quarters had inadequate experience and four-fifths were considered for different crafts; and (3) of the noncertified former employees with less than forty-two months experience, two-thirds were considered for other crafts. Id. 46 The NLRB found 892 deviations from Fluor Daniel's hiring protocol at Palo Verde, all in favor of nonunion activists. Id. at . Analyzing the Company's own data for nonpreferenced hires through November 1, 1994, the NLRB found: nine journeymen were hired before they applied; two journeymen were hired after their applications had expired; eighty-eight journeymen were hired with less than forty-two months of craft experience; and over 700 applicants were considered for crafts other than those for which they applied. Id. The NLRB also found that significant percentages of applications contained more than one deviation. Id. 47 The deviations found by the NLRB represent its factual findings after review of the evidence presented, including numerous documents and hearing testimony. Fluor Daniel argues that the exhibits [presented] show the silliness of the Board's finding, because many of the deviations in which the craft on the applications differed from the craft hired were the result of spelling errors, the use of abbreviations and a vernacular substitute. Under our standard of review of factual findings made by the NLRB, we find that these factual finding are supported by substantial evidence. See W.F. Bolin Co., 70 F.3d at 870. The conclusions of the NLRB were the result of the examination and statistical analysis of more than 1,000 applications and accompanying Fluor Daniel databases of former employees and hires. Clearly, the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, and Fluor Daniel's argument that some of the nearly 900 findings of deviations were the product of spelling errors or misunderstandings is simply unpersuasive. Given that the NLRB examined over 1,000 applications and found almost 900 deviations, even if some portion of these deviations were the result of misunderstandings, the record nevertheless contains substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRB. 48 Finally, we hold that the standard set forth in FES for refusal-to-consider claims, as applied in this case by the NLRB to the five union members who sought positions as rebar helpers, is in conflict with our caselaw. Therefore, we remand this issue to the NLRB for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 49 On April 19, 1994, five union members submitted applications for rebar helper positions in response to a job posting at the Exxon site. Both the recruiter and supervisor at the site acknowledged that postings were made only if jobs were available and a requisition had been completed. After the applications were submitted, the job posting was removed and the applications were never considered. The ALJ dismissed the failure-to-hire allegations against Fluor Daniel regarding these employees, apparently finding not only that no rebar helpers were hired after the employees submitted their applications, but that there were no jobs available when the union members applied. However, the NLRB concluded that the ALJ did not fully address the failure to-consider claim for these applicants. 50 The NLRB analyzed the failure to consider claim under the standard it set forth in FES. In FES, the NLRB reiterated its long-held position that hiring need not take place in order to find an unlawful refusal to consider union applicants for employment. 2000 WL 627640, at . The Board explained that in order to find a violation in refusal to consider cases: 51 [T]he General Counsel bears the burden of showing ... (1) that the respondent excluded applicants from a hiring process; and (2) that antiunion animus contributed to the decision not to consider the applicants for employment. Once this is established, the burden will shift to the respondent to show that it would not have considered the applicants even in the absence of their union activity or affiliation. 52 Id. at . In adhering to this test in its analysis of the alleged violations of the Act by FES, the Board stated that it was unpersuaded by our position in Fluor Daniel II that there can be no violation of Section 8(a)(3) when no hiring is occurring. Id. 53 In Fluor Daniel II, we specifically held that violations of Section 8(a)(3) can only occur when an employer is hiring for the position(s) at issue. We noted that in order to prove a violation of Section 8(a)(3), the General Counsel needs to show (1) that there is anti-union animus, and (2) the occurrence of a covered activity, for example a particular discharge or a particular failure to hire. Fluor Daniel II, 161 F.3d at 966. Once the General Counsel proves these elements, the employer must show that the employees in question would not have been hired or considered even in the absence of their union affiliation. Id. In dicta we noted that: An employer who has no need for a particular applicant's services has not failed or refused to consider an applicant in violation of the Act. Id. at 967 n. 15. We also stated that, There is no interference with, restraint, or coercion of applicants in the exercise of their protected rights when an employer, even with anti-union animus, rejects applicants who are in fact unqualified or for whose particular services the employer simply has no need. Id. at 967. 54 We do not agree with the Board's use of the test set forth in FES and rejected by this court in Fluor Daniel II. We therefore remand this issue to the NLRB for a determination of whether in fact, as required for a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, there were jobs available for rebar helpers when the union members applied.