Opinion ID: 1974255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority of the Public Utilities Commission

Text: The first issue on the merits is whether the Public Utilities Commission had the authority to promulgate its Rule 18(a). Appellant argues that the statute on carriers, title 35 of the Revised Statutes, does not contain a sufficiently clear grant of authority to the Commission to prescribe an age limitation, enforcible by criminal sanctions, on drivers of carriers within the Commission's jurisdiction. In support of that argument, he contends that 29 M.R.S.A. § 530 (Supp.1979-80) constitutes a specific finding by the Legislature that any holder of a Class 1 operator's license is qualified to drive a tractor trailer and that nothing in the statutes authorizes the Public Utilities Commission to issue a rule that has the effect of contradicting that finding. The extent of the Commission's authority must be determined in the light of the fact that 35 M.R.S.A. § 1563 imposes a criminal penalty for violation of Commission rules and regulations issued pursuant to the authority of chapter 93 or 95 of title 35. It is constitutionally permissible for the legislature to provide a criminal sanction for violation of rules or regulations that it has duly empowered an administrative agency to promulgate. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517-18, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1910); United States v. Piatti, 416 F.Supp. 1202 (1976); State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 423 P.2d 867 (1967); State v. Lambert, 68 Wis.2d 523, 229 N.W.2d 622 (1975). See 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 127 (1962 & Supp.1979); Annot. 79 L.Ed. 474, 491 (1934). The agency must be given clear standards to prevent the exercise of authority beyond the scope intended by the legislature and to assure that the citizen is protected against arbitrary or discriminatory action by public officials. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); State v. Boynton, Me., 379 A.2d 994 (1977). The Commission's rule-making authority for administering chapters 93 and 95 of title 35 is conferred by section 1558, the relevant part of which provides: The commission shall have authority to make such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or advisable to insure proper administration and enforcement of this chapter and chapter 95 and to promote the safety of the operation of common carriers, contract carriers and interstate carriers over the highways. The only particular aspect of safety that section 1558 refers to is the length of duty of drivers, with respect to which the section requires the Commission to conform its rules and regulations to the standards of the Interstate Commerce Commission for vehicles in interstate commerce. The section makes no explicit reference to the age of drivers or to any other particular aspects of safety of operation. The general statement of policy announced in the opening section of chapter 93, namely, 35 M.R.S.A. § 1551 (1978), manifests a clear legislative purpose of improving public safety on the highways by regulating the operation of commercial carriers under the Commission's jurisdiction: The business of operating motor trucks for hire on the highways of this State affects the interests of the public. The rapid increase in the number of trucks so operated, and the fact that they are not effectively regulated, have increased the dangers and hazards on public highways, and make more effective regulation necessary to the end that highways may be rendered safer for the use of the general public . . . and that the various transportation agencies of the State may be adjusted and correlated so that public highways may serve the best interest of the general public. Other provisions manifesting a similar purpose appear in section 1552, relating to common carriers, and section 1555, relating to contract carriers, all of which are embraced within the authority granted by section 1558 to enforce the provisions of chapter 93. The Commission has a clear mandate to administer chapters 93 and 95 in such a way as to promote the safety of operation of commercial carriers subject to its jurisdiction. In carrying out that mandate the Commission may take into consideration another legislative purpose, perhaps less plainly expressed in chapter 93, of promoting efficient performance of service on the part of carriers under the Commission's jurisdiction. The provisions governing certification of common carriers require the Commission, in determining whether to grant a certificate, to consider the ability of the applicant efficiently to perform the service for which authority is requested, 35 M.R.S.A. § 1552 (1978), and the Commission may not grant a permit for operation of a contract carrier unless it appears that the applicant is fit, willing and able properly to perform the service of a contract carrier by motor vehicle, 35 M.R.S.A. § 1555(3) (Supp.1979-80). The legislative mandate to the Commission is thus to administer chapters 93 and 95 so as to promote public safety on the highways while assuring, by means of selective licensure, the efficient transportation of merchandise entrusted to commercial carriers under the Commission's jurisdiction. That mandate sets forth a sufficiently clear standard to determine whether the Commission has remained within the bounds of its authority in issuing Rule 18(a). To fulfill its responsibility under the mandate, the Commission may properly impose a requirement for the operation of such carriers that is reasonably related to the safety of the public and the efficient performance of service. The grant of authority to the Commission in section 1558, considered in the context of the entire statute, clearly supports the Commission's requirement of a minimum age for drivers of common, contract and interstate carriers, as reasonably related to public safety on the highways and efficient performance of service by the carriers. The operator of a commercial carrier may be subject to greater pressures for haste and for driving under hazardous conditions than the ordinary motorist. In the event of a breakdown or other emergency, the quality of the operator's judgment may be crucial to the safety of other motorists and the security of the carrier and its cargo. We cannot say that some minimum age requirement higher than the fifteen years theoretically permissible for the issuance of Class 1 operators' licenses under the motor vehicle law is not a reasonable means of assuring the greater experience and maturity that the Commission finds desirable to promote safe operation and competent management of commercial carriers under its jurisdiction. The particular choice of 21 years as an age minimum is not per se unreasonable, and it draws some support from the fact that the Federal Highway Administration has applied the same minimum to drivers of commercial vehicles operated in interstate commerce, 49 C.F.R. § 391.11, basing its regulation on statistics from private liability insurers. See 35 Fed.Reg. 6458 (April 22, 1970). The Commission has experimented since 1933 with various age minima for operators of commercial carriers under its jurisdiction. In its 1933 rules, it required age 21, with special authorization possible at 19; in 1935, it provided for special authorization of persons under 21 with a chauffeur's license; in its 1937 rules, it set the minimum age limit at 18, where it remained until issuance of the Commission's 1951 rules, which permitted age 18 for operators of common and contract carriers but required 21 for operators of interstate carriers. In the Commission's rules of 1964, the present requirement of age 21 for all types of carriers was prescribed, and it has since remained in effect. Throughout the entire period, despite frequent amendments of section 1558, the Legislature has not restrained the Commission from exercising authority under that section to prescribe a minimum age limit. The history of Rule 18(a) indicates strongly that the Commission has given serious thought through the years to the determination of an appropriate age minimum. After administering the act for many years with a minimum of 18 years, the Commission saw fit to increase that minimum to 21. In view of that history, the Commission's experience in the matter is entitled to considerable weight. We conclude that the Commission has the authority under the statute to set a reasonable minimum age limit and that its choice of age 21 is reasonable. In reaching our conclusions, we do not overlook Dube's argument that the Commission has no authority to set a requirement for operating a motor vehicle exceeding the requirements for a Class 1 operator's license established by the Legislature in sections 530 and 538 of title 29. Section 538 of title 29 provides that no license shall be issued to any person under fifteen years of age. Section 530 defines three classes of licenses to be granted by the Secretary of State. A Class 1 license entitles the holder to operate any motor vehicle or combination of vehicles, including `Class 2 or 3,' except school buses, motor cycles or motor driven cycles. A Class 1 license authorizes operation of vehicles over 28,000 pounds. Dube, at the time of his arrests, held a Class 1 license. On its face, Rule 18(a) is not in conflict with any provision of the motor vehicle law. Rule 18(a) adds to the appropriate requirement of a Class 1 operator's license a special requirement affecting only the operation of vehicles for hire placed under the Commission's jurisdiction by sections 1551 to 1563 of title 35. Nothing in the language or history of sections 530 and 538 of title 29 indicates that the Legislature intended their provisions to be exclusive. On the contrary, subsection 5(B) of section 530 provides that nothing in the section shall prevent an employer from imposing additional qualifications or requirements. The Secretary of State is charged by 29 M.R.S.A. §§ 581-586 with the responsibility of administering examinations and other requirements for candidates for operators' licenses, general requirements designed to protect the safety of the traveling public. The Commission's responsibility is somewhat different: it is charged with promoting efficient and responsible operation of common, contract and interstate carriers on the highways, both to promote safety of the public on the highways and to serve the public interest in the safe transportation of merchandise entrusted to such carriers. That mandate distinguishes the authority of the Commission from that of the Secretary of State, and it authorizes the Commission to impose, for operation of such carriers, requirements that are reasonably related to promoting the safety of the public on the highways and the competent performance of service. The Commission's regulation of the age limit for operators of commercial carriers has not been invalid through all the years since 1933 merely because it imposed a requirement over and above that of the highest class of operator's license.