Opinion ID: 169654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Mr. Wilken's waiver of appeal

Text: We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1322 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc) ([W]e have statutory subject matter jurisdiction under § 1291 over sentencing appeals even when the defendant has waived his right to appeal in an enforceable plea agreement.). We begin by addressing the predicate issue of whether Mr. Wilken waived his right to appeal; if so, we must dismiss his appeal without reaching its merits, see id. at 1328. Our review of an appellate waiver is governed by the three-part inquiry we articulated in Hahn: (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. . . . Id. at 1325. Mr. Wilken's primary argument against enforcement of his waiver implicates both the first and second prongs of the Hahn analysis: he argues that, although the language of his plea agreement contained a clear waiver of his right to appeal, the scope of that waiver became ambiguous after the sentencing court's statements and therefore, at the time he pled guilty and signed the plea agreement, any waiver of his right to appeal an unreasonable sentence was not knowing or voluntary. We agree that the sentencing court's explanation of the waiver differed substantially from that in the written plea agreement: while the written waiver left Mr. Wilken with the right to appeal only a sentence above the maximum penalty provided in the statute of conviction, the court explained to Mr. Wilken that he also had the right to appeal a sentence imposed in violation of the factors listed in the statute, thus significantly narrowing the scope of the waiver. [3] The question here is whether that statement, made during the plea colloquy just prior to Mr. Wilken's signing the plea agreement and entering a plea of guilty, introduced ambiguity so as to preclude our finding that the waiver of his right to appeal an unreasonable sentence was knowing and voluntary. We have previously held that a sentencing court's statements made after the entry of the appeal waiver and the district court's acceptance of the guilty plea cannot overcome the plain language of the appeal waiver to create ambiguity where none exists in the written plea agreement. United States v. Arevalo-Jimenez, 372 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir.2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1328 n. 14); see also United States v. Fisher, 232 F.3d 301, 304 (2d Cir.2000) (Most of the circuits that have considered whether a district judge's post-sentence advice as to appellate rights renders ineffective an otherwise enforceable waiver of such rights have ruled that the waiver remains valid.). Mr. Wilken's argument, however, presents us with a different question, one we have never squarely faced: whether the sentencing court's mischaracterization of an appellate waiver during a plea colloquy, prior to signing of the plea agreement or entry of a guilty plea, can create a material ambiguity as to an otherwise unambiguous waiver in the plea agreement. See United States v. Salazar, 188 Fed. Appx. 787, 790 n. 3 (10th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (noting that the instant issue appears to be an unsettled question), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1017, 166 L.Ed.2d 767 (2007). Our precedent, though not addressing this question directly, provides guidance by directing this court to look primarily to two factors in determining whether an appellate waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily: (1) the language of the plea agreement, and (2) the plea colloquy required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. [4] United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir.2007); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. We have thus clearly contemplated an explanatory role for the plea colloquy, although our prior opinions have addressed this role in the context of clarifying the particulars of a defendant's appellate waiver, rather than obfuscating them. See United States v. Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that the plea colloquy is a way in which the content of a defendant's waiver of appeal rights can be made known to him). Nevertheless, logic indicates that if we may rely on the sentencing court's statements to eliminate ambiguity prior to accepting a waiver of appellate rights, we must also be prepared to recognize the power of such statements to achieve the opposite effect. If it is reasonable to rely upon the court's words for clarification, then we cannot expect a defendant to distinguish and disregard those statements of the court that deviate from the language of a particular provision in a lengthy plea agreement  especially where, as here, neither the government nor defense counsel apparently noticed the error at the time. Assuming that Mr. Wilken understood the court's statements as broadening his right of appeal under the waiver  an understanding the court's language clearly supports  he certainly could not be faulted for relying upon the court's explanation, rather than his own understanding, as the definitive construction of the agreement he would almost immediately sign. This immediacy, without objection or time to consult with counsel, is a further factor supporting our conclusion that the sentencing court's statements created ambiguity in Mr. Wilken's waiver. Had either party's counsel objected to the court's statement or sought clarification, then the court could have amended its statement and resolved any ambiguity. Alternatively, if an adequate interval had occurred after the court's statements but prior to the entry of a guilty plea or signing of the agreement during which Mr. Wilken could have consulted with counsel regarding any confusion over the scope of the appellate waiver, then arguably counsel would have cleared up any ambiguity. But here, neither clarification nor an opportunity therefor was offered between the court's erroneous statements and Mr. Wilken's signing of the plea agreement. [5] We are thus left with ambiguity existing at the time Mr. Wilken signed his plea agreement and pled guilty: the written agreement enumerates a broad waiver of his appellate rights, but the court's statements during the plea colloquy describe a much narrower waiver. Under such uncertain circumstances, we must construe the waiver narrowly, according to . . . what the defendant reasonably understood when he entered his plea. Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d at 1172; see id. at 1173 (Like most waivers, a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal . . . is to be construed narrowly.); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325 (In determining a waiver's scope, we will strictly construe appeal waivers and any ambiguities in these agreements will be read against the Government and in favor of a defendant's appellate rights.). As a result, we cannot conclude that Mr. Wilken's waiver of his right to appeal an allegedly unreasonable sentence was knowing and voluntary, and we therefore hold that Mr. Wilken did not waive his right to bring the instant appeal. [6] See Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d at 1174. We therefore proceed to consider the merits of his appeal.