Opinion ID: 789069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession of Multiple Identifications Enhancement

Text: 26 We review the factual findings of a district court for its imposition of a sentencing enhancement, pursuant to the Guidelines, for clear error, and we review a district court's legal determinations in regard to the applicability of the enhancement, i.e., whether the facts legally support an enhancement, de novo. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Si Lu Tian, 339 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir.2003); see, e.g., United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir.2003). 27 A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d 368, 370 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). 28 Here, section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 6 for Sash's offense. The Enhancement states that the possession of [five] or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification, increase[s] [the offense level] by [two] levels. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(ii). 3 Application note 7(A) of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 discusses the application of § 2B1.1(b)(9), specifying that: `Means of identification' has the meaning given that the term in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(3), except that such means of identification shall be of an actual (i.e., not fictitious) individual, other than the defendant or a person for whose conduct the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.7(A). Section 1028(d)(7)(A), which was formerly codified at section 1028(d)(4), states that a means of identification includes any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any ... official State or government issued ... identification number. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)(A). Application note 7(D) further states: 29 Subsection (b)(9)(C)(ii) applies in any case in which the offense involved the possession of [five] or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced or obtained, regardless of the number of individuals in whose name (or other identifying information) the means of identification were so produced or so obtained. 30 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.7(D). 31 Sash's argument rests solely on the proposition that portions of the background commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 suggest that identity theft, as discussed in the background commentary, must be an element of the crime of conviction if the enhancement provided in section 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(ii) is to be applied. Sash admits to only three actions: (i) making duplicate badges for their original owners; (ii) selling one badge to a confidential informant who pretended he was a collector and requested a specific shield number; and (iii) distributing fake badges for non-criminal purposes (i.e., collecting and film-making). Sash claims that only the second action constitutes identity theft. Accordingly, Sash claims that he should not have been sentenced, pursuant to the Enhancement, for five or more instances of identity theft. 32 The commentary states that [s]ubsection (b)(9)(C) focuses principally on an aggravated form of identity theft known as `affirmative identity theft' or `breeding,' in which a defendant uses another individual's name, social security number, or some other form of identification ... to `breed'... new or additional forms of identification. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. background (emphasis added). The commentary continues: 33 [T]he new or additional forms of identification can include items such as a driver's license, a credit card, or a bank loan.... The minimum offense level accounts for the fact that the means of identification that were bred (i.e., produced or obtained) often are within the defendant's exclusive control, making it difficult for the individual victim to detect that the victim's identity has been stolen. 34 Id. 35 The Guidelines suggest three categories of purposes that commentaries may serve: 36 The Commentary that accompanies the [G]uideline sections may serve a number of purposes. First, it may interpret the [G]uideline or explain how it is to be applied.... Second, the commentary may suggest circumstances which, in the view of the Commission, may warrant departure from the [G]uidelines. Such commentary is to be treated as the legal equivalent of a policy statement. Finally, the commentary may provide background information, including factors considered in promulgating the [G]uideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the [G]uideline. As with a policy statement, such commentary may provide guidance in assessing the reasonableness of any departure from the [G]uidelines. 37 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7 (emphases added). We deem the at-issue commentary here to fall within the third category of purposes that commentaries may serve, as the commentary here provides background information regarding the Enhancement. 38 Sash's argument is unavailing. We need not resort to background commentary interpretations when the language of the Guidelines is plain. In United States v. Mingo, 340 F.3d 112 (2d Cir.2003), we explained that when the language of the Guidelines provision is plain, the plain language controls. 340 F.3d at 114 (citing United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 195 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.1999)); see also United States v. Demerritt, 196 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.1999) ([W]e must give the words used their common meaning, absent a clearly expressed manifestation of contrary intent. (quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 346 (2d Cir.1996) (As with statutory language, the plain and unambiguous language of the Sentencing Guidelines affords the best recourse for their proper interpretation.... (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). When the wording of the Guideline is subject to but one interpretation, it is unnecessary to consult other sources for interpretive guidance. Mingo, 340 F.3d at 115. 39 We distinguish this case from Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993), where the Supreme Court held that commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline. 508 U.S. at 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913. It seems to us that Stinson can be limited to the first category of commentary — i.e., commentary that interpret[s] ... or explain[s] how [the Guideline] is to be applied. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7. The commentary there defined a particular at-issue term (crime or violence), and, thus, the commentary fell within the first category of commentary. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 39, 113 S.Ct. 1913. In addition, in finding that the commentary was binding, the Court characterized it as interpretive and explanatory of the Guideline. Id. at 42, 113 S.Ct. 1913; see also id. at 43, 113 S.Ct. 1913 (referring only to interpretive or explanatory commentary as binding). 40 While Stinson itself seems limited to the first category of commentary, courts — including this one — have used its language without distinguishing between categories of commentary. For example, in United States v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 412 (2d Cir.2003), the Court referred to background commentary on the appropriate non-punitive uses of probation as authoritative. 347 F.3d at 416-17 & 417 n. 3; see also United States v. Jiles, 259 F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir.2001) (reading background commentary as if it had the force ascribed by Stinson to interpretive commentary). We hold that Stinson, insofar as it establishes the binding nature of commentary, applies only to commentary that is interpretive or explanatory in nature. Stinson, therefore, would not render binding the commentary at-issue in this case, which merely provides background information, including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7; see also United States v. Hightower, 25 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that commentary that merely provides background information on a guideline is not binding). 41 A Guideline may apply in situations not contemplated by the background commentary to the Guideline. In United States v. Auguste, 392 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit examined the applicability of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i). There, the defendant added her name to that of an American Express cardholder as a secondary card holder. Id. at 1267. The appellant-defendant received a card in her name, in addition to accessing five other American Express accounts to make purchases. Id. The District Court applied the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i) because the offense involved the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification. Id. at 1267-69 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit noted that none of the examples in the background commentary to § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) contemplate[s] a situation where a defendant adds her own name to a victim's existing line of credit as a purported legitimate secondary cardholder. Moreover, there is no case law that addresses this scenario. Id. at 1268. (citations omitted). In finding that the application of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i) was warranted, the court resorted to the plain language of the enhancement provision, without examining the background commentary that Sash cites. Indeed, the court stated that: 42 [T]he lack of relevant application notes and caselaw is of no moment. What matters is the plain language of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i). Under that subsection, a court must apply a two-level enhancement if an offense involved the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any means of identification. 43 Id. at 1268 (emphasis and footnote omitted). The Eleventh Circuit explained that the defendant-appellant unlawfully obtained transferred credit card numbers, the means of identification, to obtain new credit cards for herself — the other means of identification. We stand with the Eleventh Circuit in its plain-meaning analytical approach to the analogous provision, § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i), and apply that same analysis to § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(ii). 44 Accordingly, we find that the District Court's application of the plain language of the Enhancement was appropriate. An officer's badge-and-shield number unquestionably constitutes a unique, government-issued identification, as it identifies an actual, specific officer of the NYPD, and, thus, is a means of identification. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(4), (7). Hence, the at-issue badges that Sash produced are clearly means of identification for purposes of the Enhancement. Despite the fact that Sash may have received permission from various police officers — but not the police commissioner or department — to produce a duplicate badge at the officer's request, Sash was still unlawfully producing a means of identification from another means of identification under the plain meaning of the Enhancement. See United States v. Melendrez, 389 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that an unlawfully produced duplicate means of identification still subjects a defendant to the § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) enhancement because there is no requirement that the source ID number and the produced ID [number] be different numbers). 45 In sum, Sash's production, or in some cases duplication, of identification documents (i.e., police badges) falls within the purview of the plain meaning of the language of the Enhancement, as Sash never received legal permission from the proper authorities in the NYPD to produce or duplicate NYPD badges. Notably, section 190.27 of the New York State Penal Law prohibits the sale of any part of the [police] uniform which identifies the wearer as a member of a police department, such as the uniform, shield, badge, numbers, or other identifying insignias or emblems. N.Y. Penal L. § 190.27. Moreover, section 14-108 of the New York City Administrative Code prohibits the unlawful production or possession of tools to reproduce official department identification cards and the sale of police uniforms and badges to unauthorized persons. 46 Sash admitted to duplicating badges well in excess of [five] or more times, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(ii), and Sash even admitted that, on various occasions, he produced duplicate police badges without permission. Specifically, Sash admitted that he willfully and knowingly did produce duplicate police badges which are considered false identification documents under this statute, ... knowing that such police badges were produced without lawful authority, and that he produced hundreds of duplicate police badges of a type intended and commonly accepted for the purpose of identifying an individual as an officer of the [NYPD]. Clearly, the record and Sash's own admissions require application of the Enhancement, pursuant to its plain language, which is a sufficient basis for the application. 4 47 Even assuming we were to resort to the background commentary of the Enhancement for guidance in applying the Enhancement, nothing in the commentary requires that identify theft or breeding be found in order to apply the Enhancement, as the commentary merely states that the enhancement was principally — as opposed to solely — aimed at identify theft and breeding. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i), cmt. background. 48 We have considered all of defendant's remaining arguments against the imposition of the Enhancement and find them to be without merit. 49 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment of conviction and upward departure under the Guidelines is affirmed.