Opinion ID: 1352137
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conviction of Prior Felony Involving Violence

Text: To qualify as an aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), a prior conviction must be for a felony that, by statutory definition, involves the use of or threat of violence on another person. State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 228, 782 P.2d 693, 704 (1989); State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985); appeal after remand, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d 655 (1984). If, under the statutory definition of the crime, the defendant could commit or be convicted of the crime without the use or threat of violence, the prior conviction cannot qualify as a statutory aggravating circumstance. State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 114, 786 P.2d 959, 965 (1990); Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704. At trial, the state presented evidence that Fierro had been convicted of three prior felonies involving violence. On July 6, 1978, Fierro was convicted in Texas of aggravated assault on a police officer. On August 23, 1978, he was convicted in Texas of robbery. On April 19, 1982, he was convicted in Arizona of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. In addition to the evidence the state presented regarding these convictions, Fierro himself admitted at the evidentiary hearing that he had been convicted of these crimes. See R.T., Nov. 18, 1986, at 20-22. In State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 579 P.2d 542 (1978), we held that violence, as used in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) (formerly § 13-454(E)(2)), meant the exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse. Id. at 51, 579 P.2d at 555. In determining whether a defendant's prior convictions under § 13-703(F)(2) warrant aggravating a life sentence to death, only those felony convictions in which force was employed or threatened with the intent to injure or abuse will be considered in aggravation. Cf. Lopez, 163 Ariz. at 114, 786 P.2d at 965 (creating substantial risk of physical injury does not necessarily involve the use or threat of violence). Ordinarily, the crimes of robbery and aggravated assault, by definition, involve the use or threat of violence. However, in 1973, the Texas legislature specifically amended the statutes creating these offenses to encompass a broader range of activity. Tex.Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.02 and 29.02 (Vernon 1974). Under the statutory definitions of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits an aggravated assault if he commits an assault and threatens with a deadly weapon or causes bodily injury to a peace officer. Id., § 22.02(a)(2). The Practice Commentary to the 1973 amendment specifically states that violence is not necessary, and there is no requirement of intent to injure. It is sufficient for conviction that bodily injury is recklessly inflicted, that fear is knowingly induced, or that the offensive nature of physical contact ought to be known. Id., Practice Commentary  1973. The 1973 definition of robbery also employs the same language concerning the reckless infliction of bodily injury. Under the Texas Penal Code, a person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 29.02 (emphasis added). Because the Texas legislature has amended its penal code so that violence is no longer required to commit these offenses, the Texas convictions for aggravated assault on an officer and robbery cannot be used to establish the aggravating circumstance enumerated in § 13-703(F)(2). Lopez, 163 Ariz. at 114, 786 P.2d at 965; Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704. Similarly, under the statutory definition of aggravated assault found in A.R.S. § 13-1204, it would be possible to commit aggravated assault without the use or threat of violence. [9] Because the state presented no evidence specifying under which subsection Fierro was charged and convicted, this conviction also fails to establish an aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). Under the circumstances, the state did not prove this aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lopez, 163 Ariz. at 114, 786 P.2d at 965; Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704. We conclude that the aggravating circumstance of the prior convictions for use of violence was not proved.