Opinion ID: 2995663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Race and National Origin

Text: Discrimination Cerros begins by arguing that the district court should not have applied the indirect framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to his case, and instead should have analyzed his claim under a direct method of proof. But this is the wrong perspective for a case that had a full trial. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983). We will review the record instead to see whether there was clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Cerros failed to prove his discrimination claims. Although the district court found that there was evidence that co-employees as well as managers directed racial epithets towards Cerros and perpetuated an if it ain’t white it ain’t right philosophy at the plant, the district court did not find that Cerros’s supervisors or other agents of Steel used this philosophy in connection with an adverse employment action. In fact, the district court found that Cerros was not subject to any adverse employment action at all. If the record supports this conclusion, it is fatal to Cerros’s claim of discrimination. And on this record, we cannot find that the district court clearly erred. Cerros was promoted twice, and he received a pay increase. Markel v. Bd. of Regents of Wisconsin Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2002). Even though these are the opposite of adverse employment actions, Cerros argues that he was nevertheless injured when Steel denied him proper training for the position of slitter operator. His theory was that the promotion was a cynical one, and by failing to train him as well as it trained white employees (in keeping with the if it ain’t white it ain’t right philosophy), Steel made sure that he would fail in the new job. The question is then whether there was evidence of the alleged substandard training, and whether this alone could constitute an adverse employment action. This court has defined an adverse employment action as a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment [that is] more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Stockett v. Muncie Indiana Transit Sys., 221 F.3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2000). Rather than setting forth a finite list of what actions constitute adverse employment actions, we have instead provided a range of examples from economic injuries to other actions that are not as easily quantifiable, but nonetheless are enough to qualify as an adverse change in the terms and conditions of someone’s employment. Markel, 276 F.3d at 911; Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). Yet not every inconvenience or slight on the job is an adverse employment action. Although Cerros argues that Steel’s failure formally to train him was more than a mere inconvenience because it placed his position as slitter operator at risk, the evidence before the district court did not compel this conclusion. The district court found that Cerros failed to prove that he was denied training, nor did he prove that supervisors were setting his machines up incorrectly. After reviewing evidence from both parties, the district court determined that Cerros did not suffer any adverse employment action; we see no warrant for disturbing this finding. That in turn means that the district court’s ultimate finding that Cerros did not suffer discrimination on the basis of his race or national origin cannot be branded clearly erroneous, and the district court’s judgment for Steel on this claim must be affirmed.