Opinion ID: 780097
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Conflict

Text: 37 We note at the outset that Shwayder's waiver of his conflict of interest was not valid. The waiver document stated that there was no conflict of interest, so it can hardly be read as waiving one. Also, the document was signed before the indictment was issued and a few years before trial, so it could not have taken into account the actual scope of the case as it proceeded. 38 Furthermore, [f]or a waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the defendant must have been sufficiently informed of the consequences of his choice. Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (citing United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 976-77 (8th Cir.1982) (holding waiver invalid when the defendant was informed of a possible conflict due to attorney's prior representation of co-defendant and told that a conflict may arise from prior confidential communications but not told that a valid conflict may result from continued loyalty to co-defendant)). Schlie never raised the conflict issue with Shwayder or the court after Swan's guilty plea altered the potential risks posed by Schlie's representation of Shwayder. In fact, Schlie testified that he never felt that there was a conflict issue that he needed to discuss with his client. 39 Because Shwayder was never adequately informed of the significance of the various conflicts that might arise from Schlie's former representation of Swan, Shwayder did not waive his right to conflict-free counsel. We therefore turn to the question whether there was an actual conflict and, if so, it affected Schlie's representation of Shwayder.