Opinion ID: 1476585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Historical Perspective on Mortgages and Deeds of Trust

Text: Because we are undertaking consideration of a relatively recent alleged common-law provision, it is helpful to address the common-law of mortgages generally in order to add proper perspective to the priority issues the Court is resolving. The right to private property predated for centuries the Magna Carta. [11] The right of land owners to pledge their parcels as security for debt also arose relatively early in the history of the recorded law of property. There are early references in England to the practice that concerned statutes and the common-law regulation of lending practices. In Vol. III of Statutes of the Realm, at p. 933, the text refers to a statute passed in the year 1542 to 1543 that addresses an already existing practice in respect to mortgages. That statute, identified as 34 & 35 Hen. VIII ch. 26, provided: That no mortgages of land, tenement, or hereditament, made on and after the saide feaste of Sainte John Baptist, whiche was in the saide XXXiith yere of the reigne of our saide, Soveraigne Lorde, or that hereafter shall be had or made, with in any of the saide Shyres or places, shall be hereafter allowed or admitted, otherwyse thenne after the course of the common Lawes and Statutes of the Realme of Englande: any usage or custome heretofore had to the contrarye thereof not withstanding. See also Richard M. Venable, The Law of Real Property and Leasehold Estates in Maryland 177 (1892). By the early 18th Century, and apparently much earlier, a mortgagee was considered the owner of the pledged property subject to a condition. A debtor who timely paid the debt in full, acquired the right to eject the creditor (mortgagee) if necessary, and re-take complete title to the property. However, if the debt at any time became in default, or the mortgage was otherwise in default, the creditor (mortgagee) was considered the owner of all of the property free of the condition. It did not make any difference whether ninety percent or one percent of the debt was unpaid and in default. Such creditor/debtor arrangements came to be known as strict mortgages for obvious reasons. It appears that in early times redemption rights of the mortgagors were also much more limited than present. Mortgagees, in these early times, apparently utilized ejectment actions as well, even though they were considered to be the owners of all the pledged property, because they had to be able to free it of the condition that might cause a defeasance of their title. In other words, under the lien instruments of the time, even though the mortgagee acquired complete ownership upon default, the mortgage documents (however called) facially created a possibility by way of the condition of a defeasance, reversion or reverter back to the mortgagor. In order to clear title of that condition, mortgagees also used actions at law in ejectment, i.e., ejecting the rights potentially existing by way of the condition. In explaining the origin of the concept of a mortgage, Venable stated: These pledges took the form of estates on condition. The debtor, or borrower, conveyed lands to the creditor on condition that if the money was repaid in a designated time the debtor might reenter or the conveyance was to be void, or the lands were to be reconveyed. This conveyance (or mortgage) transferred to the grantee (or mortgagee) an estate on condition; that is, an estate to be defeated on the performance of a condition subsequent (the payment of the money). Courts of law, of course, recognized this form of conditional estates, as they did other forms; but they held the parties strictly to the very terms and stipulations of the mortgage. If the mortgagor paid the mortgage debt in the time agreed, he thereby acquired a right of entry on the mortgaged premises, and could eject the mortgagee (4 Kent Com. 140). If, however, the debt was not paid in the time stipulated, he forfeited all interest in the property, and the mortgagee became the absolute owner of the estate. Courts of law thus refused to regard the fact that the real nature and intent of the transaction was that the land was to be held as a security for a debt, and, regarding merely the form of the transaction, insisted on enforcing the rules relating to estates on condition in all their strictness.... Id. Venable went on to discuss the mortgagor's equitable right of redemption, [12] fully established by the time of the reign of Charles I and then known as the mortgagor's Equity of Redemption,  where the mortgagor, due to mishap or misfortune, failed to pay timely the last portion of the debt. Over time, courts of equity had begun to intervene in such situations and began to regard the true intent of the mortgage as a security for a debt. Such resulted in compelling the mortgagee, on tender by the mortgagor of the mortgage debt and interest even after default, to reconvey the property to the mortgagor. Id. The courts, however, did not give the mortgagor an indefinite time to repay the debt. The court imposed a time-limit for the mortgagor to repay and under proper circumstances allowed the mortgagee to file a bill to foreclose even after equity proceedings were taken in respect the equity of redemption. This foreclosure of the mortgage then cut off the mortgagor's right of redemption. [13] In an attempt to further regulate the foreclosure process, England passed the Statute of 7 Geo. 2, ch. 20 in 1734 (Alex. Stat. 725). That statute stated, in relevant part: WHEREAS Mortgagees frequently bring Actions of Ejectment for the Recovery of Lands and Estates to them mortgaged, and bring Actions on Bonds given by Mortgagors to pay the Money secured by such Mortgages, and for performing the Covenants therein contained, and likewise commence suits in his Majesty's Courts of Equity, to foreclose their Mortgagors from redeeming their Estates; and the Courts of Law, where such Ejectments are brought, have not Power to compel such Mortgagees to accept the principal Monies and Interests due on such Mortgages, and Costs, or to stay such Mortgagees from proceeding to Judgment and Execution in such Actions; but such Mortgagors must have Recourse to a Court of Equity for that Purpose; in which Case likewise the Courts of Equity do not give Relief until the Hearing of the Cause;' For Remedy thereof, and to obviate all Objections relating to the same; Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Comments, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That from and after the first Day of Easter Term one thousand seven hundred and thirty-four, where any Action shall be brought on any Bond for Payment of the Money secured by such Mortgage, or Performance of the Covenants therein contained, or where any Action of Ejectment shall be brought in any of his Majesty's Courts of Record at Westminister, or in the Court of Great Sessions in Wales, or in any of the superior Courts in the Counties Palatine of Chester, Lancaster, or Durham, by any Mortgagee or Mortgagees, his, her, or their Heirs, Executors, Administrators or Assigns, for the Recovery of the Possession of any mortgaged Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments,[ [14] ] and no Suit shall be then depending in any of his Majesty's Courts of Equity in that Part of Great Britain called England, for or touching the foreclosing or redeeming of such mortgaged Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments; if the Person or Persons having Right to redeem such mortgaged Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, and who shall appear and become Defendant or Defendants in such Action, shall at any Time, pending such Action, pay unto such Mortgagee or Mortgagees, or in case of his, her, or their Refusal, shall bring into Court, where such Action shall be depending, all the Principal Monies and Interest due on such Mortgage, and also such Costs as have been expended in any Suit or Suits at Law or in Equity upon such Mortgage ..., the Monies so paid to such Mortgagee or Mortgagees, or brought into such Court, shall be deemed and taken to be in full Satisfaction and Discharge of such Mortgage, and the Court ... may ... compel such Mortgagee or Mortgagees, at the Costs and Charge of such Mortgagor or Mortgagors, to assign, surrender, or reconvey such mortgaged Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments, and such Estate and Interest, as such Mortgagee or Mortgagees have or hath therein, and deliver up all Deeds, Evidences, and Writings, in his, her, or their Custody, relating to the Title of such mortgaged Lands, ... unto such Mortgagor or Mortgagors, who shall have paid or brought such monies into the Court, ... or to such other Person or Persons, as he, she, or they, shall for that Purpose nominate or appoint. [Footnote added.] Similar provisions further addressed rights of redemption. Carefully read, this statute provides additional protections for the rights of mortgagors. These statutes modified what had been known as strict foreclosure [15] by apparently providing a method for persons, having gone into default, to pay the balance of the entire debt, and retaining and/or recovering their property. Nevertheless problems continued to arise, where, as Venable states in The Law of Real Property, at p. 178, in reference to the early strict mortgages, that complete forfeitures may have still survived: By it the whole mortgaged estate became the property of the mortgagee absolutely, when a portion of it, if sold, might be sufficient to pay the mortgage debt; and, instead of securing to the mortgagee an expeditious payment of the debt, to secure which the mortgage was executed, it might result after delays in transferring to him the property absolutely. [Citation omitted.] We dealt with such a situation in the case of Boteler and Belt v. Brookes, 7 G. & J. 143 (1835), which, although it concerned the rights and obligations of trustees and their amenability to suit, made a full discussion of the Legislature's intent in passing a Maryland statute, 1785 Md. Laws, Chap. 72, that sought to remedy further these perceived problems with the foreclosure process. In that case, a suit was brought to compel the sureties of a trustee to bring into Court, the proceeds of a sale of mortgaged premises, sold in pursuance of a decree of a Court of equity. Boteler, 7 G. & J. at 150. The Court concerned itself with the question of whether it had the power to force the trustee to bring into court the monies received by the sale of the mortgaged property. In answering that question, the Court discussed the implications of the third section of 1785 Md. Laws, Chap. 72, which appears to be an early (the second) Maryland statute authorizing the sale of mortgaged premises, albeit, according to its language it may have been intended only to apply where the lending documents involved the rights of infants and incompetents. The Boteler Court, nonetheless, applied it in a case not involving infants or incompetents. The Court quoted from this statute: III. AND BE IT ENACTED, That in all cases of application to the chancellor to foreclose any mortgage, he shall have full power and authority, in case the party against whom the bill shall be filed does not pay the sum due upon the mortgage by the time limitted in the decree for paying the same, to order and direct that the mortgaged premises, or so much thereof as may be necessary to discharge the money due and costs, be sold for ready money, (unless the plaintiff shall consent to a sale on credit,) by a proper person to be appointed by the chancellor, and to order that the money raised by such sale be brought into court to be paid to the plaintiff; and the person empowered to make such sale shall give bond, with good security, to be approved by the chancellor, for the faithful execution of the trust, and full compliance with the order of the chancellor, and upon failure to execute such trust, the party grieved shall have a right to bring suit on such bond, or a copy thereof, against principal and security or securities, and shall recover the money for which the mortgaged premises shall have sold, and the plea of non est factum [ [16] ] shall not be received, unless verified as aforesaid; and the chancellor may also issue attachment of contempt against the person empowered to sell as aforesaid, and his security or securities, and may thereupon commit both principal and securities until his order shall be fully complied with, and contempts cleared. 1785 Md. Laws, Chap. 72. See Boteler, 7 G. & J. at 153. This statute, in its entirety, imposed upon courts of equity certain requirements protecting the interests of mortgagees in the passing of decrees for the sale of mortgaged property and, subsequent to the statute, when a sale occurred, the proceeds were to apply initially to the costs of the sale, then the principal mortgage debt and then the interest owed the mortgagee. Any surplus, however, apparently went to the mortgagor under this 1785 statute. The process, prior to this statute, had been known as common-law foreclosure (by way of actions in ejectment at law filed by mortgagees or perhaps in equity to clear clouds on title), and even after the modification brought about by this statute affecting the distribution of the proceeds of sale, this type of foreclosure was still known as common-law foreclosure, although by that time it had been statutorily modified. Common-law foreclosures apparently are still viable in Maryland, although, one supposes rare. See infra. Common-law foreclosure, unlike foreclosures conducted under powers of sale and assent to decrees, required the completion of a judicial proceeding, and, prior to 1784, the obtaining of a court order in ejectment or some similar order before title could be affirmed in the mortgagee or reaffirmed in the mortgagor depending upon the evidence presented. It is unclear whether, under the prior common-law foreclosures, the courts had the power to provide that the property be sold and direct the disbursement of proceeds in any particular manner. This was clarified by the 1785 statute (and apparently by a 1784 statute as well). In interpreting the 1785 statute in Boteler, this Court further stated: The Legislature had, no doubt, a two-fold object in view, in authorizing a sale of mortgaged premises. As regarded the mortgagor himself, it was [a remedy] in many cases beneficial to him, as it was calculated to save a portion of his estate from passing to the mortgagee, beyond the power of redemption, while at the same time, full justice was done to the mortgagee; who obtained by a sale the amount loaned, and thus effectually reaped the fruits of his security in the most speedy and expeditious manner. The remedy by foreclosure alone, from its tedious character, was calculated to abridge very much this form of security; and with the view of avoiding difficulties sometimes growing out of foreclosures, the parties themselves had introduced, in many cases, the practice of inserting trusts for sale in mortgages. By simplifying remedies, by furnishing speedy redress, and by rendering these securities available according to the design of the parties, in entering into them, in the shortest time practicable, the Legislature, therefore, no doubt designed to encourage this kind of contract and security. While the law held out to capitalists the greatest possible facilities, to the obtention of full indemnity, through the medium of the Courts, it at the same time, gave to those who might desire to take up money on such securities, much more ample means of accomplishing their object. These too, were designs well deserving the attention of the Legislative body, presiding as it does, over the interests of a commercial community, where every effort to bring into captivity unemployed capital, is necessarily calculated to advance the interests of the State. Such objects are clearly designed by the Act of 1784, [ [17] ] which appears to be the first law authorizing the sale of mortgaged premises, and which furnished encouragement to foreigners to lend their capital to citizens of the State; and the Act of 1785, ch. 72, was but the carrying out of the same great objects among our own citizens, by extending the authority to sell, in all cases of mortgages, where a default had occurred in the payment of the money secured to be paid. Providing thus the means by a sale, and summary process, for the extinguishment of the mortgaged debt, it was evidently that which was solely looked to, and not the interest of the mortgagor, or any person who might, as his assignee, be incidentally interested in any possible surplus; for as has been very justly observed, it was not contemplated that more should be sold than was necessary to extinguish the debt due on the mortgage. And when the remedies by the third section are provided, they look only to such sum as would accomplish that object. If indeed the law could have a practical operation, by limiting the sales in all cases, to the exact amount of the mortgage debt, such a proceeding would reach with precision the object of the Legislature. But it is impossible in anticipation to know, that a given number of acres will produce a specific sum of money, and as a sum of money equivalent to the mortgage debt has to be raised, the trustee, to carry the Act into effect at all, even where the decree limits him to the sale of only so much as may be necessary to satisfy the debt, must necessarily often have a surplus in hand, which must belong to the mortgagor or those, who, in the eye of a Court of Equity may represent him. Boteler, 7 G. & J. at 151-52 (emphasis added) (footnote added). It is clear that the Boteler court interpreted the Legislature's intent in passing this statute, in substantial part, to be to protect the interests of the mortgagor to recover any excess value of his land realized as a surplus at a sale above the amount of the mortgage debt. According to another of our early decisions, this Act and the Court's interpretation of it, did not remove common-law foreclosure, or apparently even altogether eliminate strict foreclosure, but merely added another remedy to address default, a foreclosure by judicial sale and advanced in the statute certain protections for the mortgagors. In Andrews v. Scotton, 2 Bland 629, 666 (1830), although that case did not involve a mortgage foreclosure but a judicial sale arising out of an estate matter, with a subsequent default, the Court compared mortgage foreclosure sales, saying: The Court has been authorized by an Act of Assembly to decree a sale of the mortgaged property; 1785, ch. 72, s. 1, 2 and 3; 1837, ch. 292; but the provisions of that Act have been always considered as having merely introduced an additional remedy, and not as having abrogated any pre-existing mode of relief, to which the mortgagee was entitled, or to have altered the proceedings in this Court on mortgages, in any other respect whatever, and therefore, the mortgagee may now, notwithstanding the provisions of that law, have a decree of foreclosure instead of a decree for a sale. By the time of Venable, the foreclosure by sale had practically supplanted the strict foreclosure in Maryland. See Richard M. Venable, The Law of Real Property 178 (1892). See also Pannell & Smith v. Farmers' Bank of Maryland, 7 H. & J. 202 (1826); 4 Kent Com. 181. A problem continued to exist, however, in that the mortgagee still had to commence to proceed, first by way of a bill of equity in order to foreclose a mortgage. To remedy this problem, mortgagees began the practice of inserting power of sale provisions into their mortgages. As Venable defines it, power of sale provisions expressly stipulated in the mortgage that, on default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee might sell the property in the manner and on the terms specified in the mortgage, without obtaining a prior decree authorizing the sale. Richard M. Venable, The Law of Real Property 179. In discussing power of sale mortgage provisions, Venable said: Courts of equity in England recognized and enforced these powers. The great objection to them was that they committed a power to the mortgagee which was not compatible with his relation to the mortgagor. He was practically a trustee to sell for the benefit of himself and of the mortgagor; but his interests were not identical with those of the mortgagor, and he was subjected to a temptation to abuse the position of trust which he occupied by not exerting himself to sell to the best advantage. In some of the United States the courts of equity refused to recognize these powers, and in others they were viewed with such disfavor that Deeds of Trust to Secure supplanted mortgages with powers to sell (3 Md. 96-7). In these deeds of trust the borrower conveyed the property intended to secure the debt, not to the lender, but to some third person, and empowered him to sell on default (4 Kent Com. 146-7). In Maryland, however, mortgages with power to sell were recognized and the power enforced; but in order to remove all doubt as to the right to exercise such powers (3 Md. 96), and to remove the manifest objections to such mortgages, Acts were passed to regulate the exercise of the power and prevent its abuse (1785, c. 72; 1825, c. 203; 1826, c. 192; 1833, c. 181; 1836, c. 249, 1874, ch. 460; 1878, c. 483; codified in 2 Md. C. Art. 66, ss. 6-20). These Acts clothed the mortgagee with the responsibilities and duties of a trustee, and strictly directed the method of his procedure in exercising his power to sell. And, in order to prevent the mortgagor from hampering the mortgagee by filing bills in equity to enjoin him on frivolous pretexts intended to delay or gain time, the mortgagor's right to enjoin was restricted to certain specified cases (1826, c. 292; 1836, c. 249, codified in 2 Md. C. Art. 66, ss. 16-18). In consequence of these provisions the mortgage with a power to sell is by far the most prevalent form of security in Maryland, although deeds of trust to secure may exist and are of frequent occurrence. Id. (emphasis added). This Court, in Charles v. Clagett, 3 Md. 82 (1852), set out a brief background as to power of sale clauses. Judge Eccleston, speaking for the Court, stated: Mortgages with power of sale, are treated of at marg. p. 124 of 1 Coote, ( 69 Law Lib. ) 170; and this authority was much relied upon by the appellant's counsel, as sustaining his view of the subject. Where the power of sale is given to a mortgagee himself, or to a third person, merely as a naked power to sell, it need not, nor do I presume that it does, at all, impugn or interfere with the ordinary and usual rights of a mortgagee, which exist in a mortgage, similar, in all other respects to such a deed, except in regard to this power. But when the estate is conveyed to a third party in fee, in trust to sell, the deed is but a quasi or equitable mortgage. This power of sale is regulated in New York and some other States by statutes. Our act of 1825, ch. 203, on this subject, particularly the third section, has been insisted upon by the appellant's counsel, as conclusive authority, for holding the present deed to be a mortgage within the meaning of the act of 1846. ... According to my opinion, this provision relates to such mortgages as give special powers of sale to the mortgagees, or to others: the special powers to others meaning merely naked powers, and not conveyances of estates, to third persons in trust, to sell. At one time doubts were entertained as to the validity of sales, under powers contained in mortgages, unless made with the concurrence of the mortgagor, or the sanction of a court of equity. And it would seem that some such consideration induced the legislature to pass the act of 1825.... Id. at 95-96. In Charles the Court, as indicated above, recognized that the Legislature sought to clear up any doubt as to the validity of a power of sale mortgage when it enacted the Act of 1825, ch. 203. That Act, in relevant part, stated: 4. And be it enacted, That all such powers to mortgagees made, or to be made, authorising sales, shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as deeds and conveyances usually are before the conveyances for the sale be executed, and every such sale [under a power of sale contained in a mortgage] shall be at public auction or vendue, and public notice shall be given thereof by advertisements.... 5. And be it enacted, That in every case ... an affidavit ... by the printer... and also an affidavit ... by the person who fixed the [advertisement] upon the [court house] door; and also, an affidavit stating the circumstances respecting the sale ... made by the person who acted as auctioneer at the sale ... shall be received in every court of law or equity in this state, as prima facia evidence of the facts in such affidavit set forth. [Alterations added.] This statute evidences an early statutory authorization, or acceptance, of foreclosure sales under powers of sale contained in mortgages, in that it addressed and resolved problems that had apparently arisen in those types of foreclosures. It did so by enacting requirements for the sales and the reporting of the sales to the courts. Venable next notes that the City of Baltimore sought greater protection of mortgagees' interests than was provided by the Act of 1825. This greater protection, then applicable only in the City of Baltimore, first was provided by the Act of 1833, ch. 181. [18] This Act specifically stated, in relevant part: Sec. 2. And be it enacted, (in order to the facilitating the enforcement of mortgages of real property and estate in the city of Baltimore,) that in all cases of conveyances by way of mortgage of lands or hereditaments or chattels real, situate in the city of Baltimore, and where in the said conveyances the mortgagor shall declare his assent to the passing of a decree as hereinafter mentioned, it shall and may be lawful for the mortgagees or their assigns, at any time after filing the same to be recorded, to submit to the Chancellor, or to Baltimore county court or any Judge thereof, the said conveyances or copies under seal of said county court thereof, and the said Chancellor or court or Judge aforesaid, may thereupon forthwith decree, that the mortgaged premises shall be sold.... [Footnote added.] As the text of the statute reveals, the Act of 1833, ch. 181 permitted a particular type of mortgage commonly referred to in the present day as an assent to decree mortgage or lien instrument. As Venable states, this type of security provides: [T]hat the mortgagor may incorporate in the mortgage an assent on his part to the passage of a decree in equity for the sale of the property on his default. Under this consent the mortgagee may, immediately on taking the mortgage, file an ex parte petition for a decree of sale to be made on default; and, immediately on default, the trustee appointed in the decree may proceed to make sale in conformity with the terms of the decree; or the mortgagee may file his ex parte petition after default and have a decree for the sale. Richard M. Venable, The Law of Real Property 180. Evidently, because the statute originally only provided assent to decree foreclosures in Baltimore City, the particular process became prevalent in that jurisdictionand remains so. It is less frequently utilized in other jurisdictions, even though they are now authorized statewide. See Md.Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 7-105 of the Real Property Article. In the case of Hays v. Dorsey, 5 Md. 99 (1853), this Court affirmed a decree of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, which was sitting as a court of equity, that had directed the sale of mortgaged premises. Hays dealt with a mortgage that was duly executed pursuant to the Acts of 1833 and 1836. We stated that [t]he mortgagor, by executing his conveyance under the act, gives his `assent' to the passage of the decree; and so far as the authority of the court to pass it is involved, it is only necessary to file a petition and the mortgage. Id. at 101. With respect to foreclosures pursuant to an assent to a decree, this Court, in Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 148 A. 816 (1930), said: [T]he mortgagees had at their command two plain remedies which were prescribed by statute, whereby they could at one time and in one proceedings sell the entire lot, by beginning, either in the city or the county, [at the time of the mortgage, the property was intersected by the boundary between Baltimore City and Baltimore County and the mortgage was recorded in both jurisdictions] a bill of complaint for foreclosure in accordance with ancient equity practice [common-law foreclosure] or a sale under the power specifically conferred by the mortgage upon the mortgagees, their personal representatives or assigns, or their attorney named in the mortgage. Supra; Code, art. 16, secs. 90, 92; art. 66, sec. 15; Baltimore City Charter & [Public Local Laws] (1927), art. 4, sec. 730, p. 438; Miller's Equity Proc., secs. 445-447, 452-458, 472. Instead of choosing either of these two methods, the mortgagees availed themselves of the third remedy of a foreclosure under assent to a decree. By this election the mortgagees, and those claiming title as successors in title to the purchaser at the mortgage foreclosure sale, are bound.... The practice of a foreclosure sale under an assent to a decree originated with the Act of 1833, ch. 181, and has continued to the present. It affords a summary remedy for the benefit of mortgagees. Its operation is limited to cases where the mortgagor has in the mortgage deed declared his assent to the passage forthwith of a decree, in conformity with the provisions of the act, providing, before default, for a sale of the mortgage premises. The proceeding is ex parte until after the decree and a sale under the decree. In order to obtain the decree it is only necessary to file the mortgage and a petition for the decree. No summons is necessary, and no notice is required to be given to the mortgagor or any person claiming under him, and neither prior nor subsequent mortgagees or incumbrancers need be made parties. The mortgagee is entitled to the decree at any time after the recording of the mortgage, and without regard to default. If there has been no default, the decree is entered prospectively. If no default occurs, it never becomes effective, but, should there be a default afterward occurring, the decree is enforced. See Miller's Equity Proc., sec. 474 et seq.  Ahrens, 158 Md. at 417-18, 148 A. at 819 (alterations added). Thus, the historical differences between power of sale and assent to decree foreclosures is that the former was created initially by the common-law and later formalized by statute while the latter is purely a creature of statute. Therefore, when necessary to examine the respective foreclosures, common-law history may be important in respect to strict foreclosures, common-law foreclosures and power of sale foreclosures, but relatively unimportant in assent to decree foreclosures. As of 1892, when Venable published his The Law of Real Property, he stated that mortgage law was regulated in the following manner: Mortgages with power to sell, being regulated in Maryland by general law applicable to the whole State, are in the city of Baltimore called County Mortgages, although they may and do exist in the city of Baltimore. Mortgages with an assent to a decree, being regulated by local law, exist only in the city of Baltimore, and are generally called City Mortgages. Mortgages in which there is neither a power to sell nor an assent to a decree are called, by way of distinction, Common Law Mortgages.  Richard M. Venable, The Law of Real Property 180 (footnote omitted). Venable also points out that it was common at that time, in Baltimore City, to have both an assent to a decree and a power of sale provision within a single mortgage. Id. Currently, the Maryland Rules state that `Power of sale' means a provision in a lien instrument [`mortgage, a deed of trust, a land installment contract,' Md. Rule 14-201(b)(5)] authorizing a person to sell the property upon a specified default, Md. Rule 14-201(b)(6), and that `Assent to decree' means a provision in a lien instrument declaring an assent to the entry of an order for the sale of the property subject to the lien upon a specified default, Md. Rule 14-201(b)(1). Both types of mortgage provisions are now governed by the current Maryland Rules, and are, as we have indicated, authorized by Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol.), § 7-105 of the Real Property Article. A short note on the advent of deeds of trust is in order in that the lien instrument in the present case is a deed of trust with a power of sale. As used in the case at bar, and as such lien instruments are often used, they operate much as would a mortgage with a power of sale, except that the trustees would be exercising the power, not the mortgagee or mortgagee's assigns. Deeds of trust apparently came into being in this country as a result of the harshness of strict foreclosure, and as an intellectual reaction to mortgages with powers of sale included. In his 1892 treatise, Venable describes the distinctions between deeds of trust and mortgages: It has already been seen ... that a debtor may pledge his lands as a security by conveying them to a third person in trust for the creditor, as well as by conveying them directly to the creditor as in the case of a mortgage. Conveyances of property, as a security or indemnity to some person other than the person secured, are called deeds of trust to secure, or simply deeds of trust or trust mortgages. They differ from technical mortgages in their form and manner of execution and in the rights of the parties. ... The parties to a mortgage are the mortgagor (debtor), and mortgagee (creditor). The parties to a deed of trust to secure are the grantor (debtor), the grantee (trustee), and the cestui que trust (creditor).... ... ... In Maryland where a debtor wishes to secure a creditor by a pledge of lands the mortgage is the common form of security, although the deed of trust is frequently used in such cases. But where the number of creditors to be secured is great, and the bonds or notes or debts secured are held by different persons, who may assign them with or without endorsement, it is almost a necessity to use the deed of trust.... And so where a number of creditors are to be secured, the deed of trust is practically in universal use. ... ... The grantor's rights are usually stated in the deed.... The rights of the cestui que trust are those of cestuis que trust generally, except as modified by the terms of the deed. The creditors are strictly cestuis que trust and not mortgagees. They have no right, consequently, on default, to take possession of the property and apply the rents and profits to the payment of their claims; nor have they any right of foreclosure such as a mortgagee would have under a technical mortgage (3 Md. 82, 94-5). Their only remedy is to compel the enforcement of the trust according to its terms (45 Md. 396, 408). The rights and duties of the grantee (trustee) also depend on the terms and conditions of the deed. The Law of Real Property at 253-55. Even prior to Venable's The Law of Real Property, Richard H. Coote, in his A Treatise on The Law of Mortgage (1837), discussed power of sales in reference to both regular mortgages and deeds of trust. Coote stated: It is now frequent in practice to give the mortgagee a power of sale.... The modes of accomplishing this are various. In some instances, the estate is limited to the use of the mortgagee for a term of years, with the usual proviso for redemption, and subject thereto to the use of trustees in fee upon trust to sell.... [A]nd, in other instances, it is limited to the mortgagee in fee, with the usual proviso for redemption, attended with a declaration, that if default is made in payment at the given time, it shall be lawful for the mortgagee, his heirs or assigns, after notice in writing requiring payment, to sell, ... Either instance is valid and effectual, but the latter is most to be recommended; for on breach of the proviso, it bestows on the mortgagee an absolute estate; and at the end of a further time gives him a power of sale; and leaves open to him the option, in the mean time, of filing his bill to foreclose. A Treatise on the Law of Mortgage 55 (alteration added). So while the instruments, as most often used, are similar in operation, there are many more uses of deeds of trust than are practical for mortgages. Multiple bond holders, multiple creditors, the need for the identity of the ultimate beneficiaries to remain unknown, etc. are all practical in a deed of trust format and impracticable, or impossible, under a mortgage format. Often, for commercial lenders particularly, deeds of trusts are much more efficient, while for private lenders not in the banking or mortgage business, the use of the mortgage format may be more efficient. Since perhaps as early as pre-Magna Carta times, and certainly no later than the early 18th Century, there have been four types of mortgages (and deeds of trust) and four modes of foreclosure. There have been strict mortgages, common-law mortgagees (and perhaps common-law deeds of trust), mortgages with powers to sell, and mortgages with assent to decrees. Common-law mortgages contain no power to sell or assent to decree provisions. Some mortgages and deeds of trust may contain both a power to sell and an assent to decree. Similarly, there have been strict foreclosures, common-law foreclosures, foreclosures under powers to sell and foreclosures under assents to decree. Strict mortgages and strict foreclosures have not survived the test of time and have been statutorily rendered obsolete. Common-law mortgages and common-law foreclosures have survived, although their use is now rare because almost every mortgage or deed of trust contains either a power to sell or an assent to decree provision. However, if a drafter forgets to include one or the other of the last mentioned provisions, all is not losta common-law foreclosure can still occur, although one supposes that, at least currently, it is a rare practitioner who will come across a common-law mortgage. In other words, if a modern mortgage contains neither a power of sale or an assent to decree, the mortgagee, upon default of the mortgage debt, can still file a Bill of Complaint requesting relief, including a judicial sale of the property.