Opinion ID: 131149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure Provisions

Text: BCRA § 201, which requires disclosure of electioneering communications, including those coordinated with the party but independent of the candidate, does not substantially relate to a valid interest in gathering data about compliance with contribution limits or in deterring corruption. Contra, ante, at 196. As the above analysis of Title I demonstrates, Congress has no valid interest in regulating soft-money contributions that do not pose quid pro quo corruption potential. In the absence of a valid basis for imposing such limits the effort here to ensure compliance with them and to deter their allegedly corrupting effects cannot justify disclosure. The regulation does substantially relate to the other interest the majority details, however. See ibid. This assures its constitutionality. For that reason, I agree with the Court's judgment upholding the disclosure provisions contained in § 201 of Title II, with one exception. Section 201's advance disclosure requirement  the aspect of the provision requiring those who have contracted to speak to disclose their speech in advance  is, in my view, unconstitutional. Advance disclosure imposes real burdens on political speech that post hoc disclosure does not. It forces disclosure of political strategy by revealing where ads are to be run and what their content is likely to be (based on who is running the ad). It also provides an opportunity for the ad buyer's opponents to dissuade broadcasters from running ads. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. in No. 02-1733 et al., pp. 44-46, and nn. 42-43. Against those tangible additional burdens, the Government identifies no additional interest uniquely served by advance disclosure. If Congress intended to ensure that advertisers could not flout these disclosure laws by running an ad before the election, but paying for it afterwards, see ante, at 200, then Congress should simply have required the disclosure upon the running of the ad, Burdening the First Amendment further by requiring advance disclosure is not a constitutionally acceptable alternative. To the extent § 201 requires advance disclosure, it finds no justification in its subordinating interests and imposes greater burdens than the First Amendment permits. Section 212, another disclosure provision, likewise incorporates an advance disclosure requirement. The plaintiffs challenge only this advance disclosure requirement, and not the broader substance of this section. The majority concludes this challenge is not ripe. I disagree. The statute commands advance disclosure. The Federal Election Commission has issued a regulation under § 212 that, by its terms, does not implement this particular requirement. See 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (to be codified at 11 CFR § 109.10(c)(d)). Adoption of a regulation that does not implement the statute to its full extent does not erase the statutory requirement. This is not a case in which a statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation can be relied upon to avoid a statutory obligation that is uncertain or arguable. The failure of the regulation at this point to require advance disclosure is of no moment. Contra, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 251 (per curiam). The validity of § 212 is an issue presented for our determination; it is ripe; and the advance disclosure requirement, for the reasons given when discussing the parallel provision under § 201, is unconstitutional. Contra, ante, at 212 (declining to address the ripeness question in light of the majority's rejection of the challenge to advance notice in § 201).