Opinion ID: 1372176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: There must be a recognizable high degree of risk of harm

Text: If there is one thing that the cases and Restatement make clear, it is that a mere risk of harm is not sufficient to create liability. There must be, prospectively, a recognizable high degree risk of harm from the future misconduct of the third person, before liability ensues. In every case where recovery has been allowed (and in many cases where recovery was not allowed), there was evidence, from the previous record of the escaping criminal, that the criminal in custody was peculiarly likely to inflict harm upon others. For example, in Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545, 550 (1955), the New York Court of Appeals, in rejecting recovery, noted that there was nothing in the criminal's record to give any indication that he was likely to wander from the prison and assault members of the public. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, in allowing recovery in Frank v. Pitre, 341 So.2d 1376, 1379, 1380 (La. 1977), noted that the escaped person was a known criminal with a propensity for violence towards others. [2] The Restatement also sets forth a restrictive rule. Comment d to Section 302B states: Normally the actor has much less reason to anticipate intentional misconduct than he has to anticipate negligence. In the ordinary case he may reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will not interfere in a manner intended to cause harm to anyone. This is true particularly where the intentional conduct is a crime, since under ordinary circumstances it may reasonably be assumed that no one will violate the criminal law. Even where there is a recognizable possibility of the intentional interference, the possibility may be so slight, or there may be so slight a risk of foreseeable harm to another as a result of the interference, that a reasonable man in the position of the actor would disregard it. The editors go on to say (Comment e ), page 90, Section 302B Restatement (Second): There are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal misconduct of others. In general, these situations arise where the actor is under a special responsibility toward the one who suffers the harm, which includes the duty to protect him against such intentional misconduct; or where the actor's own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account.    (Emphasis added.) As an example of a situation where there is a recognizable high degree of risk of harm, the Restatement contains the following (F and H to 302B): F. Where the actor has taken charge or assumed control of a person whom he knows to be peculiarly likely to inflict intentional harm upon others. (Emphasis added.) H. Where the actor acts with knowledge of peculiar conditions which create a high degree of risk of intentional misconduct. (Emphasis added.) There is no doubt that Restatement of Torts (Second), § 449, states that liability can arise from the act of a third person, even though it is intentionally tortious, or criminal. However, stringent limitations are placed upon this rule. See Comment a :    [T]he mere possibility or even likelihood that there may be such misconduct is not in all cases sufficient to characterize the actor's conduct as negligence. It is only where the actor is under a duty to the other, because of some relation between them, to protect him against such misconduct, or where the actor has undertaken the obligation of doing so, or his conduct has created or increased the risk of harm through the misconduct, that he becomes negligent.