Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pre-trial procedural challenges

Text: Juniper contends the trial court erred in failing to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Norfolk, John R. Doyle, III, because of his previous representation of Juniper in a criminal case ten years earlier. In addition, Juniper challenges the trial court's denial of his request to cross-examine Doyle at the hearing on his disqualification motion. In 1994, Doyle represented Juniper on charges of escape without force and trespass. Juniper pled guilty and entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth. Juniper alleges Doyle's former representation in this unrelated matter created a conflict of interest in the case at bar which could be cured only by Doyle's disqualification from prosecuting him. Juniper also argues he should have been allowed to cross-examine Doyle because Juniper carried the burden of proof on the disqualification motion. See Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 138, 590 S.E.2d 537, 556, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 892, 125 S.Ct. 86, 160 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). At the hearing on the disqualification motion, Doyle represented to the trial court that he gained no privileged information from his prior representation of Juniper, harbored no animosity towards him as a result of that representation, and had no personal interest in the prosecution of the case at bar. Juniper made no argument and presented no evidence to the contrary. Neither Doyle nor Juniper had a personal recollection of the prior representation. Furthermore, Doyle represented that the Commonwealth would not use the record of that former conviction as evidence. In response, Juniper agreed that this concession by the Commonwealth benefited him, but then made the argument that allowing Doyle to continue the prosecution did not [do] justice ... to the community represented by the jury which arguably should have that evidence. Juniper does not repeat this argument on appeal, but simply contends Doyle's status as Commonwealth Attorney creates an undefined conflict of interest. All of Juniper's arguments are meritless. The interest to be considered on a motion for disqualification of a prosecutor is the protection of the defendant's former attorney-client relationship and his right to a fair trial in the matter at hand. See Powell, 267 Va. at 139, 590 S.E.2d at 557 (Commonwealth's attorney need not be disqualified if defendant's antagonism had no effect on his professional judgment in seeking fairly and impartially to see justice done); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 394, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (1985) (due process rights of criminal defendant violated when Commonwealth's Attorney who has conflict of interest relevant to defendant's case prosecutes defendant). Juniper has alleged no personal prejudice in the trial of his case as a result of the former attorney-client relationship with Doyle. The trial court argument that Doyle's offer not to use his former conviction does an injustice to the jury and the community at large is irrelevant, if not frivolous. The trial court thus did not err in denying Juniper's motion for disqualification nor in refusing his request to cross-examine Doyle at the hearing on that motion.
Juniper separately assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motions to fund a corrections expert and mitigation expert in addition to those experts already appointed by the court. [12] Citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), Juniper contends that failure to provide funds for his requested experts excluded mitigation evidence in violation of his federal constitutional rights. We disagree. The cases Juniper cites establish the admissibility of specific mitigating evidence, not a constitutional mandate that certain expert assistance be provided an indigent defendant. [13] See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5, 106 S.Ct. 1669 (defendant's behavior during incarceration relevant to determination of future dangerousness); and Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116, 102 S.Ct. 869 (background and mental and emotional development of youthful defendant must be considered a mitigating factor). These cases provide no support for Juniper's argument that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's denial of his motion to fund mitigation and corrections experts. Instead, we note that while the Commonwealth is required to provide adequate expert assistance to indigent defendants in certain circumstances, it is not required to provide them with all assistance that a non-indigent defendant may purchase. Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154, 117 S.Ct. 1092, 137 L.Ed.2d 225 (1997). [A]n indigent defendant seeking the appointment of an expert has the burden of showing a particularized need therefor. The required showing must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and a determination whether an adequate showing has been made is a matter that rests within a trial court's discretion.... A hope or suspicion that favorable evidence may be procured from an expert, however, is not sufficient to require the appointment of an expert. Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 171, 477 S.E.2d 270, 276 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224, 117 S.Ct. 1724, 137 L.Ed.2d 845 (1997) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth maintains that Juniper failed to show a particularized need for either of these experts. We agree. With regard to the corrections expert, Juniper argued that such a person was necessary to examine the defendant's background, behavior in the Norfolk City Jail and previous incarcerations and provide testimony and documents. He proffered no reason why examination of such records could not be adequately conducted by his counsel, investigator or mental health expert. As Juniper failed to show a particularized need for a corrections expert, the trial court properly denied his motion. Juniper contended the mitigation expert could locate essential witnesses and data, examine and evaluate testimony and documents. In denying this motion, the trial court noted that the services of the requested mitigation expert were duplicative of those of the court appointed private investigator, Wayne Kennedy. I can't think of anybody who's better qualified to locate essential witnesses and data, examine and evaluate testimony and documents than [Wayne Kennedy] is. I don't know how much money the court authorized for Mr. Kennedy when he was appointed, but [if there] are other things that you all think he needs to do and you need to come back, do so. Wayne Kennedy is perfectly capable of doing these things, so that motion is denied. Although not receiving the particular expert he requested, Juniper, in fact, received the services he requested. Thus, his motion for a mitigation expert was properly denied. See Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 581, 604 S.E.2d 21, 30-31 (2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 107, 163 L.Ed.2d 120 (2005).
The trial court denied Juniper's discovery request in a Motion to Examine Investigators Under Oath in which he sought to ensure that law enforcement officials have not concealed exculpatory evidence ... and that any and all such evidence will be available prior to trial. Juniper assigns error to this ruling arguing that the trial court abused its discretion. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the motion sought material beyond the scope to which Juniper is entitled under Rule 3A:11 or any other provision of law. There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, even where a capital offense is charged. Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490-91, 404 S.E.2d 227, 233, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944, 112 S.Ct. 386, 116 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991). While a defendant has the right to exculpatory evidence in the Commonwealth's possession upon request, Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 795, 180 S.E.2d 504, 509 (1971), Rule 3A:11 defines the other discovery available to the accused in a felony case. See Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 713, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1980) (decided under previous Rule 3A:14). Under Rule 3A:11, a felony defendant is entitled to his own written or recorded statements made to law enforcement personnel, certain written reports in the possession of the Commonwealth, and tangible objects ... within the possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth which may be material to the preparation of [the] defense. Rule 3A:11(b). The Rule specifically does not authorize discovery of statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or prospective ... witnesses to agents of the Commonwealth ... in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case. Rule 3A:11(b)(2). Citing past instances in other cases when law enforcement failed to provide prosecutors with all exculpatory evidence in their possession, Juniper argues that he should be able to examine the Commonwealth's investigators at a pretrial hearing in order to determine independently if they have provided all Brady material to the Commonwealth's Attorney. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Juniper offers no authority to support this argument. It is the individual prosecutor [who] has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 328, 541 S.E.2d 872, 886, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043, 122 S.Ct. 621, 151 L.Ed.2d 542 (2001) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). Juniper admitted that the Commonwealth's Attorney has apparently disclosed all exculpatory evidence, and he does not assert that any additional discoverable material actually exists or that he has any reason to believe that there is any which has not been disclosed. We agree with the Commonwealth that Juniper's motion is a speculative search for evidence. No statute or rule of court affords a defendant the right to use a pretrial hearing as a discovery vehicle in this manner. Davis v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 816, 821, 213 S.E.2d 785, 788-89 (1975); see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 724, 729, 160 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (1968). Because granting Juniper's motion to examine the Commonwealth's investigators under oath would have allowed Juniper discovery which is not authorized under Rule 3A:11 or otherwise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

In four separate assignments of error, Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Specifically, Juniper argues he should have been allowed to question potential jurors about (1) the age and sex of their children and grandchildren; (2) their educational coursework in psychology, psychiatry, or law; (3) their military experience, including courts martial; and (4) their philosophical beliefs. Although Juniper argues the trial court abused its discretion, he also relies on the statutory right to examine potential jurors on issues of relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice under Code § 8.01-358. The Commonwealth responds there was no abuse of discretion and that parties only have a right to ask potential jurors questions relevant to the [Code § 8.01-358] factors of relationship, interest, opinion or bias. The Commonwealth contends Juniper's proposed questions were not relevant to any of those factors. The purpose of voir dire is to protect an accused's constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. Amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const. Art. I, § 8.Code § 8.01-358 expands upon these principles by providing, in relevant part: [t]he court and counsel for either party shall have the right to examine under oath any person who is called as a juror therein and shall have the right to ask such person or juror directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein.... Even so, parties do not have an unlimited constitutional or statutory right to propound any question to a jury panel. Rather, the questions propounded during voir dire must be relevant to the factors prescribed in Code § 8.01-358. Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 315, 319, 568 S.E.2d 673, 675 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1202, 123 S.Ct. 1300, 154 L.Ed.2d 1043 (2003). Thus, [i]f an answer to the question would necessarily disclose, or clearly lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of relationship, interest, opinion, or prejudice, it must be permitted. Questions which go beyond this standard are entirely within the trial court's discretion. LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984). A party does not have a right to propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum. The court must afford a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospective jurors stand indifferent in the cause, but the trial judge retains the discretion to determine when the parties have had sufficient opportunity to do so. Id.
Juniper contends the trial court abused its discretion in restricting his voir dire of potential jurors by limiting inquiry about the specific age and gender of their children or grandchildren. This limitation, Juniper argues, had the potential for prejudice in contemplating punishment, because of a parent's protective instincts toward his or her own children in view of the young ages of Shearyia and Nykia. The Commonwealth argues that the question requesting the age and gender of a potential juror's children and grandchildren was unnecessarily intrusive. Furthermore, the Commonwealth avers that the actual voir dire of potential jurors ascertained whether they had children or grandchildren under the age of 14, and, if so, whether those jurors could fairly try the case. Although the trial court did not permit an open-ended inquiry, it did permit the panels of potential jurors to be asked: [D]o [any of] you have children or grandchildren under the age of 14? and Would the fact that those of you who have answered this question in the affirmative have children or grandchildren under the age of 14, given the statement of the case that was read to you by the Court ... prevent you from giving both sides in this case a fair trial and ... basing your verdict on the evidence? The trial court had informed the potential venire that I expect that the Commonwealth will present evidence that the defendant shot and killed ... Nykia Stephens who was four years old and Shearyia Stephens who was two years old. Juniper conceded at trial that a juror would not be struck for cause based solely upon the age or sex of that juror's children. He nonetheless contends the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting his requested inquiry. We disagree with Juniper that the trial court abused its discretion. Juniper had the opportunity to ascertain from all potential jurors if they had a child or grandchild under the age of 14. He did not ask two of the ten panels this question at all, and in two panels only asked one or two of the potential jurors. All potential jurors in the remaining six panels were asked these questions. Furthermore, Juniper had the opportunity, in addition to the trial court's examination on bias, [14] to specifically inquire as to bias on the basis of the age of a juror's progeny. All prospective jurors who responded that having young children or grandchildren would affect their ability to be impartial were struck for cause without objection. Juniper thus had full knowledge of those potential jurors who had not indicated bias or prejudice as a result of having young children or grandchildren and could consider this factor in exercising peremptory strikes if he so chose. Nonetheless, he argues, without citation to authority, that he should have been able to gather further information about the age and gender of the potential jurors' children and grandchildren. As we noted in an analogous voir dire context in LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 582, 304 S.E.2d at 653, [s]uch attitudes might well be interesting to counsel, but they have no relationship to the juror's ability to abide by the court's instructions, to find the facts impartially, and to apply the law to the facts conscientiously. Our jurisprudence according deference to the trial court's discretion in consideration of juror voir dire matters is long-standing. Whether to permit a party to ask a question that goes beyond what is permissible under Code § 8.01-358 is a matter entirely within the trial court's discretion. Powell, 267 Va. at 143, 590 S.E.2d at 559; see also Green, 266 Va. at 96-97, 580 S.E.2d at 843 (When, as here, a trial court affords ample opportunity to counsel to ask relevant questions and where the questions actually propounded by the trial court were sufficient to preserve a defendant's right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, we will generally not reverse a trial court's decision to limit or disallow certain questions from defense counsel.); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 458, 470 S.E.2d 114, 125, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887, 117 S.Ct. 222, 136 L.Ed.2d 154 (1996) ([S]ince [the accused] had ample opportunity to ask relevant questions, and since the questions asked were sufficient to preserve [the defendant's] right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask additional questions.); LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653. We see no reason not to accord deference to the trial court's ruling on this issue. In addition to our long-standing recognition of deference to the trial court's discretion on matters of voir dire, we find instructive the decision of the Supreme Court of California, which examined a similar issue in People v. Box, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130, 146-47 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 963, 121 S.Ct. 1497, 149 L.Ed.2d 383 (2001). Box involved a multiple homicide, one of the victims being a three-year-old boy. Id. at 142. Defendant's counsel sought to ascertain in voir dire whether the prospective jurors had young children or grandchildren. Id. at 147. The trial court declined to permit that inquiry, but did make specific examination of the potential venire as to any bias based on one of the murder victims being a young child. Id. Finding that the bias these inquiries sought to uncover was adequately addressed by the trial court's voir dire, the California Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion. Id.; see also United States v. Joe, 831 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072, 108 S.Ct. 1043, 98 L.Ed.2d 1006 (1988). In the case at bar, Juniper's counsel was permitted greater latitude of inquiry than in Box, having the ability to ascertain those potential jurors with children or grandchildren under the age of 14. The trial court, and Juniper, made full inquiry as to any bias or prejudice on the part of such potential jurors. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal of Juniper's requested inquiry.
Juniper also contends he should have been able to inquire as to a juror's educational background in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, or law because those studies could lead to impermissible preconceived notions regarding the testimony of Juniper's expert witnesses or on matters of the law. The Commonwealth responds that the specific questions Juniper proposed did not inquire as to whether the potential jurors had earned particular degrees, but whether they had any education in the particular fields. The Commonwealth further questions the relevance of determining that somebody once took Psych 101 to evaluate a juror's potential bias. Juniper's concerns regarding the potential jurors' educational background in psychology, psychiatry, and law were adequately addressed by inquiring about the potential jurors' occupations and, when necessary, for a description of their work responsibilities. Little, if any, relevant information would have emerged from learning the specific coursework of a potential juror outside their particular career. The trial court did not err in barring Juniper's proposed questions. Juniper also assigns error to his inability to question potential jurors regarding their military experience, particularly as to courts martial. He contends that such an inquiry could reveal whether potential jurors had a background in military law enforcement or the military justice system. The Commonwealth argues that a juror's generic military experience is irrelevant because members of the armed forces generally have no role in the investigation or prosecution of crimes. Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends any relevant concern regarding a background in military law enforcement was adequately covered by the trial court's direct inquiry about law enforcement experience. [15] Juniper's concerns were adequately covered by the trial court's direct question to jurors about law enforcement service. A potential juror's military experience would have had little, if any, probative value, as the trial court confirmed that Juniper was never a member of the armed services. To the extent that requesting the potential jurors' military service would have shed light on their law enforcement experience, the trial court's explanation of law enforcement covered any law enforcement experience while in military service. Lastly, we find no merit in Juniper's assertion that the potential jurors should have been directly asked about their philosophical beliefs, which might affect their judgment as jurors. The trial court asked a series of questions designed to alert jurors to possible bias from their opinions or beliefs that could influence their function as impartial triers of fact. Although religious or moral beliefs were specifically addressed in voir dire, the trial court also inquired as to  any opinion or belief that would influence the potential jurors' consideration of sentences of life or death and  any reason whatsoever that would prevent them from affording Juniper a fair trial. (Emphasis added.) Juniper's request is semantic irrelevance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Juniper to ask potential jurors any of the aforementioned questions.
Juniper assigns error to the trial court's failure to strike four potential jurors: Henry, Colander, Ashby, and Molinaro. Code § 8.01-358 and Rule 3A:14 facilitate an accused's constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury by providing that members of the venire must stand indifferent in the cause. A prospective juror must be able to give [the accused] a fair and impartial trial. Upon this point nothing should be left to inference or doubt. All the tests applied by the courts, all the enquiries made into the state of the juror's mind, are merely to ascertain whether [the juror] comes to the trial free from partiality and prejudice. Wolfe, 265 Va. at 211, 576 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943 (1879)). On appeal, this Court generally gives deference to the trial court's decision whether to strike a potential juror for cause. Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218, 120 S.Ct. 2226, 147 L.Ed.2d 257 (2000). We do so [b]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which we lack, to observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors first hand .... Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 123-24, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1489, 99 L.Ed.2d 716 (1988) (citing Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258-59, 307 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983)). Consequently, unless manifest error appears in the record, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed. Id. In reviewing whether a potential juror should have been removed from the venire, we consider the prospective juror's entire voir dire, not just isolated portions. Jackson, 267 Va. at 191, 590 S.E.2d at 527. Guided by these principles, we review the entire voir dire of the four prospective jurors Juniper argues should have been stricken for cause.
Juniper moved to strike prospective juror Henry for the bias and prejudice shown in his responses to whether he would consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the death penalty. Juniper asserts that prospective juror Henry was not successfully rehabilitated from his statement that he would more likely favor the death penalty. Juniper contends Henry's voir dire demonstrated the type of preconceived opinion that the process of voir dire is designed to ferret out. The Commonwealth submits that the totality of Henry's voir dire indicates an open mind to consideration of a sentence of life imprisonment. In particular, the Commonwealth notes that Henry stated that he did not know whether there were mitigating factors that would affect his decision and agreed that he would consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a decision. The record contains the following exchange: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [You] are able to consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the death penalty in this case? MR. HENRY: Yes sir. It's possible, but I would more likely favor the death penalty. . . . . . THE COURT: You could consider life imprisonment without parole? MR. HENRY: It's within the realm of possibility, but not likely. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Dr. Henry, would you restate what you said a moment ago? DR. HENRY: I said it's within the realm of possibility that I wouldcould see a sentence of life imprisonment, but most likely I would favor the death penalty based on what you've told me so far. I don't know if there are other mitigating factors that could come up, but in general, I would favor the death penalty. . . . . . [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: So, Dr. Henry ... you know at the end when it comes time for a jury to deliberate the Court will give you instructions setting out the law, giving you guidance as to [how to] conduct your deliberations and you could follow the Court's instructions including if the Court instructed the jury to consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a decision? Is that fair to say? [DR. HENRY]: Yes. In denying Juniper's motion to strike Henry, the trial court stated, I gleaned from his answer he said he would be inclined to the death penalty if that is proven and the defendant is guilty of capital murder, but he could consider the other one. ... I think Dr. Henry's voir dire in its entirety [reflects] he'd be open to consider both penalties. Henry's overall responses to voir dire questions relevant to this particular issue reveal that he could stand indifferent in the cause and would consider both the prosecution and defense's evidence when determining the appropriate sentence for Juniper. He unequivocally responded yes when asked if he would conduct deliberations as a juror according to the trial court's instructions, and he mentioned that mitigating factors would play a role in determining Juniper's sentence. As we have previously stated, [t]he standard to be applied by a trial court in deciding whether to exclude or retain a prospective juror is whether the prospective juror's views `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Breard, 248 Va. at 77, 445 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824, 112 S.Ct. 88, 116 L.Ed.2d 60 (1991)); see also Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 139-41, 547 S.E.2d 186, 195-96 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094, 122 S.Ct. 840, 151 L.Ed.2d 719 (2002). Henry satisfied this test by indicating that he could consider sentences both of life or death in accord with the evidence. We also afford deference to the trial court's observation that Henry's responses showed he would be open to consider both penalties. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision refusing to strike this juror for cause.
Juniper claims the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike prospective juror Colander from the venire because she had stated that it would cause hardship to be away from her position as a public school principal for the duration of the trial. The Commonwealth counters Juniper's assertion by observing that difficulty finding a replacement at work is irrelevant to any disqualifier under § 8.01-358. When refusing to strike Colander from the venire, the trial court expressed confidence that the Norfolk public school system could accommodate her absence. Juniper has not cited, nor does the record reflect, any basis for removing Colander for cause. Decisions of the trial court regarding whether to retain or excuse potential jurors are entitled to great deference on appeal. As such, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision rejecting Juniper's motion to strike Colander as a juror.
Juniper contends that prospective juror Ashby should have been struck for cause because her answers indicated that she [could not] sit fairly and impartially as she [had] already formed opinions regarding Juniper and the evidence before the commencement of the trial. Specifically, Juniper cites Ashby's statement that it's hard when kids are involved and her knowledge of the case through media coverage to support this assertion. The Commonwealth responds that Ashby's statements plainly show she had not formed an opinion and would fairly contemplate the evidence and instructions presented at trial. The Commonwealth also relies on the trial court's observation that although [Ashby's] answers at least regarding capital punishment were somewhat inconsistent, her responses did not provide a reason to strike. The following colloquy occurred after Ashby indicated she had heard something about the case from media reports: [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: Has what you heard about it or the seriousness of the allegations made you to [sic] form an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the person who's accused? [MS. ASHBY]: No. It haven't [sic] made me form an opinion or nothing, but it's hard when kids is involved. I'll put it that way. So I can't say. I can't form an opinion until all evidence is heard or what. [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: So you would base your decision on the evidence that you will hear in the courtroom which may include the deaths of children andbut make your decision on what you hear in the courtroom? You're nodding your head yes? [MS. ASHBY]: Yes. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ms. Ashby, based upon what you have heard or read, have you formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Juniper? MS. ASHBY: No. No. The totality of Ashby's voir dire reflects that she would not rely on any information she had read or heard about the case and that she had not formed an opinion regarding Juniper's guilt or innocence. As such, she would be able to stand indifferent in the cause and fairly and impartially perform the duties of a juror. Mere exposure to media coverage does not disqualify a potential juror as long as that individual can still fairly and impartially weigh the evidence presented at trial. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991); see also Wolfe, 265 Va. at 209-12, 576 S.E.2d at 480-82; Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 192-94, 563 S.E.2d 695, 709-10 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123, 123 S.Ct. 860, 154 L.Ed.2d 805 (2003). Consequently, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to strike this potential juror.
Juniper's final challenge is that prospective juror Molinaro should have been struck for cause because she was an acquaintance of the Commonwealth's Attorney. Juniper asserts that when asked if it would affect her ability to sit fairly and impartially[, Molinaro] responded, `[I]'ve been thinking that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so.' This exchange, Juniper contends, reflects Molinaro's clear inability to give an unequivocal answer in light of her familiarity to the prosecutor and illustrated her inability to be a qualified juror for Juniper. The Commonwealth initially notes that Juniper misquotes Molinaro's response to the question regarding her impartiality in such a way that suggests equivocation on Molinaro's part that her actual response does not. The record demonstrates Molinaro's complete response was, I've been thinking about that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so. (Emphasis added.) From Molinaro's actual response, the Commonwealth asserts that far from equivocation, her answers show conscientious introspection with respect to possible bias before reaching the conclusion that she could be fair. In light of this showing of truthfulness and frankness, the Commonwealth contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Molinaro. The record shows the following colloquy during Molinaro's voir dire: THE COURT: [W]hat's the nature of your acquaintance with [the Commonwealth's Attorney]? . . . . . MS. MOLINARO: I know his wife from my work at Sentara. I didam I allowed to say I did put some signs up in yard[s] in the neighborhood when he was running for Commonwealth['s] Attorney. THE COURT: Do you believe your acquaintance with Mr. Doyle would in any way prejudice you in favor of the prosecution or impair your ability to give a fair and impartial trial to MS. MOLINARO: I've been thinking about that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so. . . . . . [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:... I just wanted to be sure we brought that all out. In fact, you may be acquainted with [Defense Counsel] as well. [MS. MOLINARO]: I know of [Defense Counsel] through soccer. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can you be certain [that you would not be inclined or partial to the Commonwealth in this case]? [MS. MOLINARO]: I feel certain that knowing him the little that I do, that I would be an impartial juror just because I have faith in myself, but the reason I have been asking is because I don't do this very often and so I do not know, but I do not think. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You threw me off. [MS. MOLINARO]: Yeah. Okay. Well, you're more experienced with screening jurors, but I think that I am an impartial juror. In rejecting Juniper's motion to strike Molinaro, the trial court stated: I think she said she'd been thinking about it all morning. The impression I got from observing her demeanor was I imagine she made up her mind she can be fair in this case. ... If people who knew the Commonwealth's attorney were disqualified from being on a jury, in most rural areas in this state you'd never have a criminal trial. Our previous decisions have generally held that relationship does not automatically disqualify a potential juror from being fair and impartial. Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 325, 337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112, 106 S.Ct. 1524, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (citing Calhoun, 226 Va. at 263, 307 S.E.2d at 900). The overarching consideration is whether the trial court erred in determining that the prospective juror would fairly and impartially decide the accused's case. See, e.g., Jackson, 255 Va. 625, 640-41, 499 S.E.2d 538, 548 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067, 119 S.Ct. 796, 142 L.Ed.2d 658 (1999) (upholding trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause when the juror's husband was a first cousin of the Commonwealth's attorney); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 343, 468 S.E.2d 98, 109, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951, 117 S.Ct. 365, 136 L.Ed.2d 256 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Morrisette v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 270 Va. 188, 202, 613 S.E.2d 551, 562 (2005) (upholding retention of juror when the Commonwealth's attorney in a capital case formerly represented prospective juror in a matter and the prospective juror still regarded him as his personal attorney); Wise, 230 Va. at 325, 337 S.E.2d at 717 (upholding retention of prospective juror who was the Commonwealth's attorney's golfing buddy and long standing friend). The voir dire of Molinaro demonstrates that after carefully considering her association with the Commonwealth's Attorney, she could be impartial as a juror. We do not find manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that Molinaro would stand indifferent in the cause and act as an impartial and fair juror.
Juniper contends the trial court erred in denying Juniper's Batson challenge to jurors Mix, McClain, Bailey, Boddie and Dawley. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that excluding a potential juror solely on the basis of the juror's race is purposeful discrimination and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Jackson, 266 Va. at 435, 587 S.E.2d at 542. When a defendant makes a Batson challenge to the use of a peremptory strike, he must show that the individual is a member of a cognizable racial group, Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 388, 394, 551 S.E.2d 306, 309 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1060, 122 S.Ct. 1925, 152 L.Ed.2d 832 (2002) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712), and make a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was made on racial grounds. Jackson, 266 Va. at 436, 587 S.E.2d at 542. Mere exclusion of members of a particular race by using peremptory strikes does not itself establish such a prima facie case under Batson. Yarbrough, 262 Va. at 394, 551 S.E.2d at 309. To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must also identify facts and circumstances that raise an inference that potential jurors were excluded based on their race. Id. Once a prima facie case is put before the court, the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce race-neutral explanations for striking the juror. The defendant can then argue that the prosecution's explanations were purely a pretext for unconstitutional discrimination. Jackson, 266 Va. at 436, 587 S.E.2d at 542. Juniper offered no basis for his challenge that the strikes were racially motivated other than observing that the jurors were African-American. [16] Nonetheless, the Commonwealth offered the following raceneutral explanations for exercising its peremptory strikes against the five jurors: (1) India Mix was struck because she had been a client of one of Juniper's attorneys in a prior criminal case. (2) The Commonwealth stated that it was concern[ed] by the fact that Charlotte McClain's brother had been prosecuted in Norfolk by the Commonwealth Attorney's Office the previous year resulting in a conviction. (3) Malia Bailey was struck due to inconsistent answers to questions regarding the possible imposition of the death penalty. The prosecutor observed that at one point in the voir dire, Ms. Bailey was pretty close to crying as a result of the questioning regarding the death sentence and said at one point it makes her sick to think about ... the possible imposition of the death penalty. In addition, the Commonwealth cited Ms. Bailey's on-going medical appointments related to breast cancer treatments. (4) Richard Boddie was struck because of his affirmative [response] that it would be difficult to impose the death penalty. In addition, the Commonwealth noted that Mr. Boddie was the final potential alternate juror who had indicated any difficulty with the death penalty. (5) Michelle Dawley was struck because her brother had been convicted of murder 25 years ago, and the prosecutor believed that the conviction would affect her. The trial court concluded that Juniper failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of a prima facie showing that any of the strikes was racially motivated. In making its decision, the trial court noted, over the seven strikes the Commonwealth made, four were black, ... three were white which is generally in fairly good proportion from the total mix on which they had to strike. [17] Even if a prima facie case had been made, however, the trial court found that the Commonwealth had provided a sufficient race-neutral reason to strike each prospective juror at issue. Our previous decisions recognize the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and credibility of potential jurors during voir dire, and therefore afford the trial court's determination whether the Commonwealth's explanation is race neutral great deference. Jackson, 266 Va. at 437, 587 S.E.2d at 543. We will not reverse the trial court's decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. Even if we assume that Juniper made a prima facie showing, we find nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the trial court's determination was clearly erroneous. Far from being pretextual explanations, as Juniper contends, the Commonwealth's reasons for dismissing each of the potential jurors directly related to valid race-neutral reasons. Furthermore, the record supports the Commonwealth's characterization of the statements made by the potential jurors in question. See Jackson, 266 Va. at 437, 587 S.E.2d at 543. Finding no basis for Juniper's contention that the juror strikes were racially motivated, we will not disturb the trial court's findings that Juniper had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that the Commonwealth's explanations for striking these jurors were race neutral.
The trial court granted Juniper's motion under Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A) for the appointment of a mental health expert, Dr. Thomas A. Pasquale, to assist with his defense. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F), the trial court granted the Commonwealth's request for a similar expert, Dr. David Keenan. The trial court also advised Juniper that his refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert could result in the exclusion of testimony by his expert witness or notice to the jury that Juniper refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert. Juniper acknowledged to the trial court that he understood the requirements and the potential consequences for noncompliance. Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2). On December 29, 2004, the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Keenan, met with Juniper. Ten minutes into the meeting, Juniper stood, turned around, banged on the glass, said a few things, banged on the glass. Juniper became angry, cursed at Dr. Keenan and told a guard that Dr. Keenan was trying to set [him] up. Juniper demanded that the guard remove him from the interview room. The interview was thus terminated, and Dr. Keenan testified that he did not believe [he could] get any useful information from Mr. Juniper should they arrange another meeting. The Commonwealth then filed a motion under the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2) to bar Juniper from presenting expert testimony from Dr. Pasquale at sentencing or to permit the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the defendant's refusal to cooperate. Juniper filed a motion to appoint a substitute expert for Dr. Keenan. At the hearing on this motion, Juniper again acknowledged that refusal to cooperate with Dr. Keenan could result in either tell[ing] the jury that [he] refused to cooperate or ... exclud[ing] Dr. Pasquale. Though Dr. Keenan and Juniper's accounts of the interview questions differ, Juniper did not dispute that he refused to cooperate with Dr. Keenan or that he terminated the interview. Rather than asking that Juniper be prohibited from presenting his own expert testimony, the Commonwealth agreed to allow Juniper to present testimony from Dr. Pasquale as long as the jury was informed of his refusal to cooperate with Dr. Keenan. The trial court found as a matter of fact that Mr. Juniper refused to cooperate with the evaluation requested by the Commonwealth, and ordered the sanction recommended by the Commonwealth. Juniper assigns error to the trial court's finding of failure to cooperate and the denial of his motion to appoint a substitute expert in place of Dr. Keenan. Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2) explicitly provides that the choice of sanction is within the trial court's discretion. Based on the record and Juniper's own admission that he made the decision to end the interview, the trial court's finding that Juniper refused to cooperate with Dr. Keenan was not erroneous. Similarly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Juniper's motion to appoint a substitute expert. See Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 247, 372 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925, 109 S.Ct. 3261, 106 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989) (indigent defendant not entitled to a second psychiatric examination at state expense where the Commonwealth already had paid for his first examination); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 276-77, 351 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220, 96 L.Ed.2d 706 (1987) (defendant has no right to `shop around' at state expense until he finds a doctor who will give him the opinion he wants).