Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Juror Bussey

Text: The prosecutor stated as his basis for excusing juror Bussey: [H]e had a high death rating, but he had a low guilt rating because of his Blood association at Morningside High School. I have him down as a six to seven on guilt rating and seven is the breaking point for me. The prosecutor also stated: I have an eight to nine for a death rating on him. Defendant concedes the prosecutor's proffered explanation for excusing prospective juror Bussey is facially neutral as to race, but argues such an explanation functions, in practice, as a proxy for race. Defendant cites U.S. v. Bishop (9th Cir.1992) 959 F.2d 820, 827-828 as illustrating the principle that a potential juror's place of residence often acts as an ethnic badge and suggests we should find the prosecutor's proffered explanation invalid in light of the fact a person's place of residence often determines the high school he attends. Of course, Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d 820, is not controlling. (4) Decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 989 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704].) (1d) More importantly, Bishop is not apposite. There, a prosecutor peremptorily challenged African-American jurors who lived in a predominantly low-income, black neighborhood and therefore were likely to believe the police `pick on black people.' ( U.S. v. Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d at p. 821, quoting the prosecutor.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated the peremptory challenge as based on stereotypical presumed group bias, but only because there was no nexus between the jurors' characteristic  i.e., that they lived in a poor, predominantly African-American city  and their possible approach to the specific trial. ( U.S. v. Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d at p. 825.) The court elaborated thus: This is not to say that residence never can constitute a legitimate reason for excluding a juror, even after a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination has been made.... What matters is not whether but how residence is used. Where residence is utilized as a link connecting a specific juror to the facts of the case, a prosecutor's explanation based on residence could rebut the prima facie showing. ( U.S. v. Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d at p. 826.) The prosecutor here used residence as a link connecting prospective juror Bussey to the facts of defendant's case. Referring to evidence that defendant is a Blood gang member, the prosecutor stated he suspected Bussey would be sympathetic toward Blood gang members owing to his having attended Morningside High in a Blood gang area. Indeed, on voir dire, Bussey confirmed he had gone to school with gang members, that the Bloods gang was prevalent at Morningside High School and that the whole school would get together and run [the Crips] out if they came to Morningside High. (3b) The law recognizes that a peremptory challenge may be based on a broad spectrum of evidence suggestive of juror partiality. The evidence may range from the obviously serious to the apparently trivial, from the virtually certain to the highly speculative. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275.) (1e) Despite the fact Bussey also stated on voir dire that he did not become involved with gangs at high school and defendant's being a Blood wouldn't mean a thing to him, the prosecutor may have concluded the likelihood Bussey would evince sympathy for defendant owing to his high school familiarity with Bloods gang members was sufficient to warrant use of a peremptory challenge. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's reason; we see no error in its having done so. Thus, we conclude the trial court's denial of defendant's Wheeler motion was not erroneous.