Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grasping the Opportunity Interest

Text: Lehr is significant, therefore, especially for the present case, because the Supreme Court announced for the first time how an unwed father can receive constitutional protection of his interest in a child with whom he has not had a custodial relationship. Lehr makes clear that, in a proceeding to determine child custody, a noncustodial, unwed father who moves quickly and responsibly can achieve constitutionally mandated priority over prospective adoptive parents who have received the child at birth and do not yet have an established family relationship with that child. See Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, at 373. I therefore turn, more specifically, to what it means for a noncustodial father to grasp his opportunity interest in a manner entitling him to constitutional protection. As Lehr illustrates, a natural father who fails promptly to assert his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his child may forever lose that interest. See Eason, 257 Ga. at 295, 358 S.E.2d at 462 (opportunity interest not indestructible). Elizabeth Buchanan notes, moreover, that [c]hildren are not static objects. They grow and develop, and their proper growth and development require more than day-to-day satisfaction of their physical needs. Their growth and development also require day-to-day satisfaction of their emotional needs, and a primary emotional need is for permanence and stability.... That need for early assurance of permanence and stability is an essential factor in the constitutional determination of whether to protect a parent's relationship with his or her child. The basis for constitutional protection is missing if the parent seeking it does not take on the parental responsibilities timely. The opportunity is fleeting. If it is not, or cannot, be grasped in time, it will be lost. Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, at 364 (footnotes omitted). Of course, once the state places an infant with a prospective adoptive family, the natural father is precluded from establishing a parental relationship with his child, and any failure to establish personal, custodial, or financial ties with the child after such placement cannot automatically be characterized as abandonment. On the other hand, at least two courts have found relevant to a finding of abandonment the fact that a natural father knew of the mother's pregnancy but failed to express an interest in a parental role or to assume any responsibility for the pregnancy or the newborn before adoptive parents assumed custody of his child near the time of the child's birth. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1068 (Okla.1985) (unwed father not entitled to substantial constitutional protection where he knew of pregnancy, yet made no attempt to assist mother financially during pregnancy, pay for expenses related to childbirth, or learn when and where child was to be born), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072, 108 S.Ct. 1042, 98 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1988); In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So.2d 741, 749 (Fla.1989) (not unconstitutional to deny substantial due process protection to father who fails to provide prebirth assistance to mother when he is able and assistance is needed). As the Supreme Court of Florida recently stated: Because prenatal care of the pregnant mother and unborn child is critical to the well-being of the child and of society, the biological father, wed or unwed, has a responsibility to provide support during the prebirth period. [A] natural father's argument that he has no parental responsibility prior to birth and that his failure to provide prebirth support is irrelevant to the issue of abandonment is not a norm that society is prepared to recognize. Such an argument is legally, morally, and socially indefensible. Id. at 746. In sum, a court evaluating a father's assertion of his opportunity interest is entitled to focus on the extent of the father's involvement as soon as he learns of the pregnancy. On the other hand, the court must also recognize the limitations state action can impose on a noncustodial father once the child is placed with another family. Given the caselaw to date, I believe the question whether a particular unwed, noncustodial father's opportunity interest will be entitled to substantial protection under the due process clause depends upon application of such factors as (1) the presence or absence of an established relationship between the child and an existing family; (2) whether the father has established a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with his child, or assumed responsibilities during the mother's pregnancy; (3) the impact, if any, of state action on the father's opportunity to establish a relationship with his child; (4) the age of the child when the action to terminate parental rights is initiated; and (5) the natural father's invocation or disregard of statutory safeguards designed to protect his opportunity interest. Considering these factors, I conclude that, when an unwed mother has relinquished her right to custody of a child at birth for adoption by strangers, the unwed father's interest in developing a custodial relationship with his child is entitled to substantial constitutional protection if he has early on, and continually, done all that he could reasonably have been expected to do under the circumstances to pursue that interest. See Eason, 257 Ga. at 295, 358 S.E.2d at 462 (unwed fathers gain from biological connection an opportunity interest to develop relationship with children which is constitutionally protected); In re Adoption of Lathrop, 2 Kan.App.2d 90, 95, 575 P.2d 894, 898 (1978) (due process requires that natural father who asserts desire for custody of infant child have rights paramount to those of non-parents); In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986) (termination of unwed father's parental rights violated due process where father unable to assert his rights under statute because he did not know of birth of child); Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980) (due process violated where parental rights are terminated under statute and father not permitted to show he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with statutory requirements); Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serv. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 578, 385 N.W.2d 448, 451 (1986) (statutory scheme requiring unwed father to file intent to claim paternity within five days of child's birth may well violate due process rights where father did not know of birth) (dicta), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 805, 107 S.Ct. 49, 93 L.Ed.2d 10 (1986).