Opinion ID: 774531
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether procedural default analysis is inapposite.

Text: 55 Finally, Lott argues that the question of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction is never waivable and may be raised at any time. He reasons that an Ohio court has jurisdiction to try a defendant in the absence of a jury only when a defendant waives that right in strict compliance with §2945.05; where a court disregards the mandatory requirements of §2945.05, any resulting proceeding is rendered void ab initio for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and a challenge of that proceeding may be made at any time. Thus, Lott submits, the district court's procedural default analysis was inapposite. 56 The district court rejected Lott's characterization of the jurisdiction at issue in this case as subject-matter jurisdiction, and concluded that §2945.05 concerned jurisdiction of the particular case. Jurisdiction of the particular case, the district court reasoned, does not, like subject-matter jurisdiction, concern the ability of a court to hear a particular class of cases, but rather is more akin to a statute of limitations or other quasi-jurisdictional bar that prevents a court from hearing aparticular case that would, in the absence of that bar, properly be before it. While it is true that a challenge of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, the district court concluded that such was not the case for jurisdiction of the particular case, which may be waived. In support of its conclusion, the district court relied on State v. Swiger, 708 N.E.2d 1033 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998), and Swiger's interpretation of Pless, as evidence that the Ohio Supreme Court was referring to something other than subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1039 (If the 'jurisdiction' to which the [Ohio Supreme Court in Pless] referred were subject matter jurisdiction, by its very nature, it would be open to challenge at any time. By holding that this defect in the trial court's 'jurisdiction' can be waived if not timely raised, the Supreme Court was apparently referring to something other than subject matter jurisdiction.). 57 We are not convinced that the district court's conclusion rests on solid ground. In a post-Swiger case, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly held that the question whether a defendant was properly tried by a three-judge panel was a jurisdictional matter that can never be waived. See State v. Filiaggi, 714 N.E.2d 867, 876 (Ohio 1999) (The state contends that defendant consented to [a bifurcated procedure whereby a three-judge panel decided certain counts and a single judge decided others] and therefore waived any error.... [W]e conclude that this jurisdictional matter cannot be waived.). Thus, Lott may be correct that the district court's procedural default analysis was misplaced. We need not resolve this question, however, because, as discussed supra, at the time that Lott sought to waive his right to a jury trial, it was an open question whether strict adherence to §2945.05 was required to execute a valid waiver and confer jurisdiction on a three-judge panel. We believe that Lott's entry of a signed and written waiver made in open court, although not filed and made part of the record, would meet the less restrictive, pre-Pless substantial compliance standard. Lott, therefore, is foreclosed from obtaining federal habeas relief on this basis.