Opinion ID: 2262473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assemblies' Cross-Appeal

Text: Subsection 2 of Section 8 of the Ordinance provides, in part:  Hearings; Appeals; Notice  Appeals to the Board of Appeals concerning interpretation or administration of this ordinance may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any officer or bureau of the governing body of the county affected by any decision of the zoning inspector. Such appeals shall be taken within a reasonable time of such decision, not to exceed 10 days, by filing with the zoning inspector and with the Board of Appeals a notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The zoning inspector shall forthwith transmit to the Board all papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. The Board of Appeals shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of appeals, give public notice thereto as well as due notice to the parties in interest, and hold the public hearing within forty-five (45) days from the date of the decision of the Zoning Inspector. At least fifteen (15) days notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be published in a paper of general circulation in the County. At the hearing any party may appear in person or by agent or attorney. The Board shall then decide the appeal within fifteen (15) days from the time of hearing. The Zoning Inspector's decision was made on 12 April 1972. An appeal was taken in timely fashion on 20 April. The hearing before the Board was set for 30 May, and then postponed to 27 June because of the absence of Assemblies' attorney, a postponement requested by his secretary. The Board rendered its decision on 25 July. Assemblies moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the case before the Board on the ground that neither the hearing set for 30 May nor that actually held on 27 June was within 45 days from 12 April, the date of the Zoning Inspector's decision, and on appeal to the circuit court, urged as an additional reason for dismissal the failure of the Board to decide the case within 15 days of the 27 June hearing. From an order denying the petition to dismiss, Assemblies took a cross-appeal. Faced with the definition contained in Section 18 of the Ordinance, [t]he word shall is mandatory, the word may is permissive, the lower court (Roney, J.) turned to what we regard as an acceptable, pragmatic solution. The members of the Cecil County Board of Appeals (we were told at argument that they receive no salary) customarily meet on the last Tuesday of each month. The appeal to the Board was taken on 20 April. The Board next met on 25 April, but the case could not be heard on that day, because the Ordinance requires 15 days' notice by publication in advance of the hearing. Consequently, hearing was scheduled for 30 May, the date fixed for the Board's next meeting, which was 48 days after the Zoning Inspector's decision. It was then postponed to 27 June, the meeting next following, because of the absence of Assemblies' counsel. [5] Finally, the Board's opinion was not filed until 25 July, more than 15 days after the hearing. Taking all of these alleged irregularities in inverse order, most of them can be summarily disposed of. Counsel for the parties stipulated that the Board could have an additional 15 days within which to file its opinion, and the opinion was filed within this time. The postponement from 30 May to 27 June was at the request of Assemblies' counsel, a delay about which it can scarcely complain. As regards the scheduling of the original hearing on 30 May which was within 48 days of the Zoning Inspector's decision and not within the 45-day period required by the Ordinance, the lower court noted that if the requirement of 15 days' notice is taken into account along with the manner in which the Board scheduled its meetings, no other result was possible as a practical matter. Assemblies also raises two questions regarding the adequacy of notice. That there was public notice of the hearing before the Board is established by the record, and assuming, arguendo, that Assemblies got no direct notice, [6] there can be no showing of prejudice when Assemblies appeared at and participated in the hearing. Obviously, counsel for Assemblies must have had actual notice in order to seek a postponement. There is ample authority for the proposition that where there has been compliance with the substance of the requirements of statutes or rules by one party and the other party has not been prejudiced, technical irregularities cannot be made the basis for depriving persons of an opportunity to assert their legal rights, compare Border v. Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 106-07, 297 A.2d 81 (1972); Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 61, 225 A.2d 294 (1966) and Board of County Comm'rs v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 125, 210 A.2d 367 (1965) with Rasnake v. Board of County Comm'rs, 268 Md. 295, 303-04, 300 A.2d 651 (1973). While failure of an administrative board to give proper notice is jurisdictional and in some circumstances may be fatal, Cassidy v. Board of Appeals, 218 Md. 418, 421-22, 146 A.2d 896 (1958), the requirement of notification purposed to inform may be satisfied by actual knowledge, Clark v. Wolman, 243 Md. 597, 600, 221 A.2d 687 (1966), especially when it is acted upon. We think that the letter of 23 May rescheduling the hearing met the requirement of due notice contained in the Ordinance, which specifies neither the time within which nor the fashion in which it is to be given. But even if it did not, Assemblies had both constructive notice and actual knowledge, and was in no way prejudiced. Orders of 6 October 1972 and 1 December 1972 affirmed; costs to be paid one-half by appellants and cross-appellees and one-half by appellee and cross-appellant.