Opinion ID: 4543683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: United States v. Brown

Text: Because Denson relies primarily on United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018), we discuss why Brown actually shows that a § 3582(c)(1)(B) proceeding is not a “critical stage” that requires the defendant’s presence at a hearing and why Brown undermines Denson’s due process claim. First, Brown involved a § 2255 proceeding, not a § 3582(c) motion.7 Moreover, although the district court had granted Brown’s § 2255 motion and 7 In Brown, the district court had granted a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and vacated the defendant’s 180-month sentence on the sole count of conviction in its entirety. 879 F.3d at 123334, 1240. After that, the district court imposed a new sentence without a hearing or giving any explanation. Id. at 1234. Although the defendant’s newly calculated advisory guidelines range was 77 to 96 months, the district court varied upward to 120 months. Id. This Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing before resentencing Mr. Brown. Id. at 1241. However, the Brown Court was careful to limit its due process holding to its facts, stating that it addressed only “the question raised by Mr. Brown: did the modification to his sentence require his sentencing court to conduct a resentencing hearing?” Id. at 1236. In other words, even when sentences are vacated in § 2255 cases, Brown does not require a hearing in every § 2255 resentencing. See Thomason, 940 F.3d at 1172-73 (applying Brown and holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a defendant a resentencing hearing after it granted his § 2255 motion based on a Johnson error). 15 Case: 19-11696 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 16 of 18 vacated his sentence in its entirety, Brown still recognized that the established right to be present for initial sentencing “or even for resentencing under certain circumstances” did “not translate into a right to be present whenever judicial action modifying a sentence is taken.” Id. at 1237 (quotation marks omitted). In doing so, Brown actually pointed out that “the correction or reduction of [a] sentence under Rule 35 or 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)” was one of the “types of sentence modifications that do not require a defendant to be present” under Rule 43(b)(4). Id. at 1237 & n.4. Thus, the Brown Court, albeit in dicta, expressly indicated that sentence modifications in § 3582(c) proceedings do not require a defendant’s presence. Second, we recognize that Denson asks us to apply these two fact-intensive inquiries that Brown used to guide its consideration of whether defendant Brown’s § 2255 resentencing was “a critical stage” requiring his presence: (1) “did the errors requiring the grant of habeas relief undermine the sentence as a whole?” and (2) “will the sentencing court exercise significant discretion in modifying the defendant’s sentence, perhaps on questions the court was not called upon to consider at the original sentencing?” Id. at 1239-40. However, as concluded above, Brown’s two-part framework does not apply to sentencing modifications based on § 3582(c) motions. 16 Case: 19-11696 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 17 of 18 Alternatively, and as an independent holding, even assuming arguendo that we should apply Brown’s fact-intensive framework, Denson’s § 3582(c) sentencing modification based on the First Step Act is not a critical stage under Brown’s two-part test. As to Brown’s first inquiry, the district court’s sentence modification under the First Step Act was not concerned with any “errors” at his original sentencing that may or may not “undermine” his sentence in its entirety. Indeed, Denson was sentenced on his drug conviction in accordance with the law as it existed at the time. The Fair Sentencing Act’s changes to the statutory penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) were not to correct a sentencing error or “constitutionally compelled” but rather “represent[ed] a congressional act of lenity.” Cf. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). The First Step Act merely extended that “congressional act of lenity” to federal prisoners who, like Denson, were sentenced before the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act by applying certain changes retroactively. Cf. id. As to Brown’s second inquiry, a sentence reduction based on the First Step Act is a limited remedy, and the district court is not called upon to answer questions it did not consider at the original sentencing. See Brown, 879 F.3d at 1239-40. Rather, in ruling on a defendant’s First Step Act motion, the district court (1) is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence only on a “covered offense” 17 Case: 19-11696 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 18 of 18 and only “as if” sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect when he committed the covered offense, and (2) is not free to change the defendant’s original guidelines calculations that are unaffected by sections 2 and 3, to reduce the defendant’s sentence on the covered offense based on changes in the law beyond those mandated by sections 2 and 3, or to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not “covered offenses.” See First Step Act § 404(b); United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019). In short, the First Step Act does not authorize the district court to conduct a plenary or de novo resentencing. See Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418. Even under Brown’s framework, a sentencing modification under the First Step Act does not qualify as a “critical stage in the proceedings” that requires the defendant’s presence. See Brown, 879 F.3d at 1239-40.