Opinion ID: 1659809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Reserved During Trial)

Text: Defendant moved to suppress written and oral inculpatory statements that he made to Trooper Stuard and to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The trial judge ruled that the inculpatory statements were freely and voluntarily made and denied the motion. At trial, defendant's objection to the admission in evidence of his written confessions were likewise overruled. Defendant reserved these bills to the rulings of the trial judge and adopts the same argument in support of both. On a trial of a motion to suppress evidence, the state has the burden of proving that a purported written confession or written inculpatory statement was made freely and voluntarily and was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(C) (1966). Likewise, before a confession can be introduced in evidence, the state must make the same affirmative showing. La.R.S. 15:451 (1966). On the night of May 4, 1973, while defendant was incarcerated in the parish jail, Agents Litchfield and Howard presented to him a printed form fully advising him of his fifth amendment rights (S-11). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). At the bottom of the form is a paragraph entitled Waiver of Rights, with a space for defendant's signature. Although defendant did not sign this form, it is stated thereon that: Rogers read this form, stating he understood it, but did not desire to sign anything. This statement is corroborated by the testimony of Agents Litchfield and Howard who both testified to the same effect. Thereafter, defendant gave an oral statement to Agents Litchfield and Howard admitting his part in the bank robbery. On May 7, 1973, defendant was again presented with a printed form advising him of his Miranda rights and containing a section providing for waiver of these rights. This time, he signed the form (S-10). He then signed a six-page statement, written by Agent Howard, in which he recounted the events of the robbery and confessed his participation (S-15). Agents Howard and Litchfield were witnesses to his signing of the statement. They both testified that defendant read the statement after it was completed. Agent Howard stated that he also read the statement to him in its entirety and, prior to signing the last page, defendant wrote in his own handwriting: I have read this six-page statement and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. On the following day (May 8), defendant also signed a one-page statement that inculpated an accomplice in the robbery (S-16). Agent Howard and Deputy Sheriff Arnold F. Hess were present at the time. Agent Howard testified that he orally advised him of his Miranda rights on this occasion. Deputy Sheriff Hess corroborated Agent Howard's testimony that the latter gave defendant his Miranda warnings before defendant made the statement. Defendant advances essentially three arguments in support of his contention that the inculpatory statements were not freely and voluntarily made. First, he alleges that he was not informed of his Miranda rights before making the statements because he could not read the Advice of Rights form handed him. This argument is insubstantial. Defendant testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He admitted that he could write but denied that he could read. The trial judge properly gave little weight to this assertion. Defendant had an eighth-grade education. When asked to read the forms advising him of his constitutional rights, he gave all indications that he could do so. It was also established that he wrote letters to relatives while in jail. His testimony that he was illiterate was clearly self-serving and was contradicted by the weight of the evidence. Second, defendant argues that the inculpatory statements were obtained by a promise that state charges would be dropped by the district attorney. Defendant testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Agent Howard told him charges would be dropped under the Louisiana armed robbery statute and would be brought only under the federal bank robbery statute, which imposes a lesser maximum sentence. Although Agent Howard testified that he did inform defendant of the penalty for his offense under both federal and state law, he also testified that such an explanation was standard procedure and was not given in connection with any promise or inducement whatsoever. Defendant's testimony that he was induced to sign the inculpatory statements because he was led to believe that a deal was in the making with state authorities was uncorroborated and was unequivocally contradicted by Agent Howard and all other federal and state officials. Further, defendant offered no evidence that the district attorney was a party to the alleged arrangement. His consent would have been necessary for a dismissal of state charges. La.Code Crim.P. art. 61 (1966). Third, defendant avers that Agent Howard's promise that a federal charge of possession of an illegal weapon against him and his commonlaw wife would be dropped if he confessed to participation in the bank robbery. Agent Howard, testifying at the hearing on the motion to suppress, strongly denied this allegation. Moreover, it was not corroborated by any other witness. Upon reviewing the testimony of the witnesses at the motion to suppress, we believe, as did the trial judge, that the state satisfied its burden of proving that all inculpatory statements were made freely and voluntarily and were not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(C) (1966). Consequently, the trial judge correctly denied the motion to suppress. For similar reasons, the confessions were properly received in evidence at trial. La.R.S. 15:451 (1966). Finally, defendant's oral statements made to Trooper Stuard before he was placed under arrest and given his Miranda warnings were totally unrelated to the charge of armed robbery nor were they obtained at a time when defendant was under custodial interrogation. Rather, the questions were merely asked at a stage of preliminary investigation. See State v. Roach, 322 So.2d 222 (La.1975). Defendant next contends that the inculpatory statements, even if made freely and voluntarily, are inadmissible because they are tainted by an unlawful arrest. It is urged that Trooper Stuard arrested him without probable cause and that these statements are the fruits of that arrest. He relies on the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 42 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Reviewing the sequence of events that led to his arrest, we believe that defendant's contention has no substance. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the United States Supreme Court stated: In Terry this Court recognized that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. (Citation omitted) The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. [citation omitted] A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. [citations omitted] See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Jefferson, 284 So.2d 882 (La.1973). Applying the standards set forth in Adams v. Williams and Terry v. Ohio to the facts of this case, we conclude that Trooper Stuard was justified in stopping defendant's vehicle for investigatory purposes. Trooper Stuard was informed that two black males had just robbed a Livonia bank. He witnessed a speeding vehicle driven by a black male en route from the town soon after he received this information. Trooper Stuard therefore had reasonable cause to make an investigatory stop of the vehicle, even though probable cause might not have existed at that point in time for defendant's arrest. Having made a lawful, investigatory stop, Trooper Stuard witnessed, through the car window, in plain view, loose paper money in defendant's car. The plain view doctrine was therefore applicable. It is settled that objects falling within the plain view of an officer who had a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. [2] Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968). The plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). We believe that his observation of the loose bills lying in the car in suspicious circumstances, together with his knowledge of the armed robbery that had so recently taken place, gave Trooper Stuard probable cause to arrest defendant. Accordingly, his inculpatory statements were not tainted by an unlawful arrest. These bills are therefore without merit.