Opinion ID: 1229173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Exclusion of Lana Poole's Videotaped Testimony

Text: The defendant sets forth three grounds for the admission, in its entirety, of the videotaped statement given by Lana Poole to Sergeant Michael Spradlin of the West Virginia State Police in June 1996. First, the defendant contends that the videotape was admissible under Rule 612 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, [5] in order to refresh Poole's recollection on cross-examination. The defendant avers that the proper basis for admission of the videotape was Poole's testimony on cross-examination that she could not recall critical areas of testimony which appear on the videotape. Therefore, says the defendant, the videotape should have been played during the trial in order to refresh Poole's memory. We disagree. While Rule 612 provides for the use of documents or objects in order to refresh a witness' memory, it does not provide that the document or object be read or shown to the jury. See Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, Vol. 1, § 6-12(E) (3rd ed.1994). Concerning refreshing a witness' recollection, this Court has explained: The witness, in proceeding to testify from a present or existing recollection, may be unable to do so by unaided mental effort, but by resort to some memorandum or writing, his memory may be so stimulated and refreshed as to enable him to recollect the fact, and where this is so, it is not proper to introduce the writing in evidence, or read it in the presence of the jury, because it forms no part of the testimony, being used only for the purpose of aiding the mental effort of the witness to recollect the particular transaction. State v. Legg, 59 W.Va. 315, 322, 53 S.E. 545, 548 (1906). [6] The one recognized exception to the above rule is when an adverse party of the witness seeks to have the writing or object introduced into evidence. [I]t is not the memorandum that is the evidence, but the recollection of the witness,' the party whose witness uses it has no right to have it read or handed to the jury; it is only the opponent who wishes to do this in case he wishes to cast doubt on the reality of the refreshment of memory. Id., (citation omitted). This is in accord with Rule 612(a). Rule 612(c) requires that if a claim is made that the writing or object contains matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony, and the trial court so finds, the unrelated portions of the writing or object shall be excised and only the related portions introduced in evidence. In the instant case, the trial court adhered to the requirements of Rule 612(c). When the State objected to the playing of the videotape in its entirety, the trial court instructed counsel for the defendant to play only those portions of the videotape that were relevant to specific questions he had asked the witness on cross-examination. Because he had not previously edited the videotape nor prepared a written transcript of it, defendant's counsel was unable to do this. That defendant's counsel was prohibited from playing the entire videotape for the jury in order to refresh Poole's recollection is consistent with Rule 612. That he was unable to play selected portions of the videotape is not the fault of the trial court. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Second, the defendant maintains that the entire videotape should have been admitted as substantive evidence because Poole incorporated the videotaped statement into her trial testimony by admitting that her recollection in June 1996, when the statement was given, was better than it was at the July 1997 trial. [7] According to the defendant, [t]hroughout her testimony Poole indicated that she could not remember the content of her video statement; therefore, it became imperative for the jury to see and hear the video tape as substantive evidence. The defendant concludes that [t]he video tape statement by [Poole's] own admission was more accurate and more reliable than testimony she may have given at trial. The defendant cites no authority for the legal theory advanced here. We, likewise, are unaware of any provision in our case law or rules of evidence for the admission of the entire videotaped statement at issue under the specific circumstances of this case. As explained above, Rule 612 of the Rules of Evidence provides for admission of relevant portions of the videotape in order to refresh the witness' recollection. Rule 613(b) provides for the admission of a videotaped statement which is inconsistent with the witness' in-court testimony. [8] Finally, Rule 803(5) [9] provides for the admission of recorded recollections. The defendant never sought the admission of the videotaped statement on Rule 803(5) grounds. The trial court complied with Rules 612 and 613(b) by allowing relevant selected portions of the videotape to be played. Beyond this, there is no ground in law or reason for the admission of the entire videotaped statement. It is undisputed that an out-of-court statement which was not under oath and not subject to cross-examination is less reliable than live testimony. [10] There was certainly no necessity for the admission of the videotape. Lana Poole testified and was questioned thoroughly by both the State and defense counsel. If Poole did make statements at trial which were inconsistent with the videotaped statement, the defendant had the means to impeach her testimony. The videotape was in the possession of defense counsel. He could have excised the inadmissible portions of the videotape or made a transcript of the videotape in anticipation of the necessity of impeachment. Instead, the defendant now asks this Court to find that the he should have been allowed to play an entire videotaped statement, some, if not most, of which is duplicative of in-court testimony. This we must decline to do. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in not allowing the admission of the entire videotaped statement to show prior inconsistent statements of Poole for impeachment purposes. The defendant opines that the admission of the entire videotaped statement was necessary in order to show the jury not only the inconsistent statements made on the videotape but also to show what was not on the videotape but which was testified to at trial. According to the defendant, these inconsistencies in testimony constituted material issues of fact in the trial. The defendant concludes that because Poole was the only witness that placed the defendant with the victim and allegedly saw the defendant inject the victim with morphine, a proper impeachment of her testimony was crucial to the defense. In State v. King, 183 W.Va. 440, 396 S.E.2d 402 (1990), this Court held that it was not error for the trial court to admit an entire videotaped statement under Rule 613(b) to impeach a witness' testimony at trial. There, the daughter of a defendant charged with incest testified in a videotaped statement made to a State Trooper that she and her sisters had sexual intercourse with her father. During the trial, however, she was called as a defense witness during the defendant's case-in-chief and testified on direct examination that she had previously lied about her father having sex with her because, among other things, she was afraid of the State Trooper and claimed that he coerced her into stating that her father had sex with her. The State was allowed to play the entire videotape to the jury to support its contention that the witness was not coerced by the State Trooper and to rebut the witness' testimony that she previously lied, by showing that she was credible at the time she spoke with the State Trooper. In affirming the trial court, this Court stated: A videotaped interview containing a prior inconsistent statement of a witness who claims to have been under duress when making such statement or coerced into making such statement is admissible into evidence if: (1) the contents thereon will assist the jury in deciding the witness' credibility with respect to whether the witness was under duress when making such statement or coerced into making such statement; (2) the trial court instructs the jury that the videotaped interview is to be considered only for purposes of deciding the witness' credibility on the issue of duress or coercion and not as substantive evidence; and (3) the probative value of the videotaped interview is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Syllabus Point 2, Id. See also, State v. Schoolcraft, 183 W.Va. 579, 396 S.E.2d 760 (1990). The circumstances in King are different from those in the case sub judice. In King, the issue of whether the witness was under duress during the initial statement made the playing of the entire videotape necessary so that the jurors could view for themselves the witness' demeanor on the videotape. In the instant case, there are no allegations of duress or coercion during Poole's initial statement. The playing of the entire videotape in this case would be solely for the purpose of impeaching Poole's testimony at trial with previous inconsistent statements. As stated above, defense counsel could have impeached Poole with the discrepancies in her two accounts without playing the entire videotape. In his brief to this Court, the defendant lists two specific instances where Poole's videotaped statement and her in-court testimony diverged. Again, Poole could have been confronted with these inconsistencies at trial in the manner prescribed by the trial court. This Court has stated that, Three requirements must be satisfied before admission at trial of a prior inconsistent statement allegedly made by a witness: (1) The statement actually must be inconsistent, but there is no requirement that the statement be diametrically opposed; (2) if the statement comes in the form of extrinsic evidence as opposed to oral cross-examination of the witness to be impeached, the area of impeachment must pertain to a matter of sufficient relevancy and the explicit requirements of Rule 613(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidencenotice and an opportunity to explain or denymust be met; and, finally, (3) the jury must be instructed that the evidence is admissible only to impeach the witness and not as evidence of a material fact. Syllabus Point 1, State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 478 S.E.2d 550 (1996). It appears from the record that the trial court adhered to these requirements in excluding the playing of the entire videotape. The defendant characterizes Poole's videotaped statement as a significant departure from her in-court testimony. The State, on the other hand, states that the videotape was almost entirely consistent with the in-court testimony. The trial court witnessed both the videotaped statement and the in-court testimony and, therefore, was able to accurately determine whether the entire videotape should be admitted or only select portions under the requirements set forth above. In explaining its ruling to defense counsel, the trial court stated: The proper way to [admit the videotape] is one of three ways. And you say now that you want to do it to refresh her recollection. Earlier this morning, it was to impeach. But in any event, if itthe tape is used, the question has to be asked, and then the tape played. And [Poole] has an opportunity to respond. That wasn't done. That's what I told you this morning. Find out which areas where you're going to seek to impeach. And do it so it can be shown. And then impeach. The other way to do it would've been a transcript. If the Defendant is prejudiced because that wasn't doneI suggested that at the last trial, that's the proper way to do it. If the Defendant is prejudiced, it's because his lawyers failed to pay attention. The other way it could be done, still can be done, would be to call the police officer who took the statement and ask him if she made the statement. [11] The trial court's instructions were in line with the requirements of Rule 613(b). Further, the defendant had ample opportunity to impeach Poole concerning her prior inconsistent statements. Finally, [a] trial court is afforded wide discretion in determining the admissibility of videotapes and motion pictures. Syllabus Point 1, Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc., 176 W.Va. 492, 345 S.E.2d 791 (1986); Syllabus Point 1, State v. King, 183 W.Va. 440, 396 S.E.2d 402 (1990). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the videotaped statement of Lana Poole in its entirety. C.