Opinion ID: 2326693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Moten Case

Text: Respondent challenges most of Judge Souder's findings concerning Respondent's handling of the Moten case. First, he challenges Judge Souder's finding that he did not provide competent representation by failing to subpoena witnesses or otherwise be prepared for trial on February 27, 2009. In that regard, he argues that a default judgment was the proper result of the litigation. Second, Respondent excepts to Judge Souder's finding that he acted without requisite promptness by failing to enter his appearance in the matter until the February 27 scheduled trial date. Third, Respondent argues that Judge Souder erred in finding that he did not communicate sufficiently with Mr. Moten during the course of the representation and thereby prevented Mr. Moten from making decisions about the case. In that regard, Respondent argues that Judge Souder failed to set forth exactly what about the matter that Mr. Moten needed to decide.... Fourth, Respondent attacks Judge Souder's finding excessive the fees Respondent charged Mr. Moten (the $2500 fee for handling the de novo appeal and the subsequent $600 fee for the supposed bankruptcy matter). Fifth, Respondent asserts that, contrary to Judge Souder's finding, he conducted work on Mr. Moten's case prior to withdrawing funds from his attorney trust account. Respondent, representing himself, testified at the hearing before Judge Souder. So too did Mr. Moten, as a witness for the Commission. Judge Souder found that Mr. Moten was a very credible witness. Judge Souder also stated that she did not find [Respondent's] testimony credible in many respects during this proceeding. And, [t]o the extent that his [Respondent's] testimony diverged from the facts testified to by Denver Moten, Judge Souder resolve[d] those issues in favor of Denver Moten[.] Mr. Moten testified that, at the initial meeting with Respondent to discuss the Circuit Court appeal, he provided Respondent with the names of several witnesses who testified on his behalf in the District Court, and he conveyed his desire to have those witnesses called again at the Circuit Court de novo trial. Mr. Moten also testified that he learned of the February 27 trial date a few days beforehand, not from Respondent, but from his, Moten's, independent monitoring of the court's docket. And it was Mr. Moten who informed Respondent of the scheduled trial date, of which Respondent was previously unaware. Mr. Moten further testified that Respondent did not advise him before the trial date that he, Respondent, would be seeking a default judgment on February 27; instead, Respondent advised Mr. Moten that a postponement would be sought because it was such short notice. Finally, Mr. Moten testified that Respondent did not mention to him that the witnesses who had testified on his behalf at the District Court proceeding now wanted to be compensated. We defer absolutely to Judge Souder's credibility determinations; therefore, we accept as fact Mr. Moten's version of events as we consider each of Respondent's exceptions. The relevant records of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City were entered into evidence and show that February 27, 2009 was the date the Moten case was scheduled for trial. Judge Souder had before her that information as well as the information gleaned from Mr. Moten's testimony that: (1) Mr. Moten retained Respondent in December 2008 and, by the end of that month, had paid Respondent all of the agreed-upon $2500 fee; (2) Mr. Moten advised Respondent, early on, of the witnesses he wished to be called at trial; (3) Respondent did not enter his appearance in the case until the trial date, February 27, 2009; (4) Respondent did not learn of the looming trial date until Mr. Moten informed him of it several days in advance of it; and (5) Respondent did not give Mr. Moten accurate information about the status of the case; in particular, Respondent did not tell him that the witnesses he wished to have testify at the trial wanted to be compensated as experts. Based on these facts, we conclude that Judge Souder did not err, much less clearly so, in finding that Respondent did not subpoena witnesses, did not promptly enter his appearance in the case, and did not communicate accurate information to Mr. Moten about the case. Respondent mentions that he had learned from Evan Goldman, evidently the attorney for Bulldog Development, LLC, that one of the defendants in the Moten case had filed a suggestion of bankruptcy and would not be present on the February 27 trial date. [8] Respondent suggests that, armed with this knowledge, he reasonably anticipated obtaining an order of default on the trial date. We have mentioned that Judge Souder did not find Respondent to have been a credible witness; therefore, we cannot assume the truth of Respondent's testimony. [9] Even so, the fact that Respondent was able ultimately to obtain a default judgment (with an award of $0) is irrelevant to whether he violated the rules of professional conduct that mandate competence, diligence, and accurate client communication. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 25, 762 A.2d 950, 963 (2000) (finding no merit in the respondent's exception based on an argument of no harm, no foul, and all is well that ends well); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Davis, 375 Md. 131, 162, 825 A.2d 430, 448 (2003) (same). In our independent review of the record, we conclude, as did Judge Souder, that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1 (competence), [10] 1.3 (diligence), [11] and 1.4(b) (communication), [12] by failing to prepare adequately for trial on February 27, 2009. Judge Souder also concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 1.5(a). That provision states: A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: ... (4) the amount involved and the results obtained.... Judge Souder grounded this rule violation on the quality of representation provided and the lack of any meaningful result obtained. Judge Souder reasoned that Respondent failed to prepare competently for the hearing on February 27th, 2009, so the $2,500 fee [Respondent charged Mr. Moten] did become unreasonable. Respondent excepts to those findings. He argues that he obtained the proper result at the February 27 hearing, and Judge Souder therefore erred in concluding that the outcome of the casea default judgment for $0made the fee unreasonable. We disagree. In light of Judge Souder's findings concerning Respondent's lack of competence and diligence in representing Mr. Moten and the result obtained, it was not unreasonable for Judge Souder also to find that the $2500 fee became excessive. See Guida, 391 Md. at 52-53, 891 A.2d at 1096 (holding that a fee, not unreasonable on its face, became unreasonable under MRPC 1.5(a), because, through lack of effort on behalf of [the clients,] the attorney fail[ed] to perform the services to any meaningful degree). But even if we were to grant Respondent his point as far as the $2500 fee is concerned, Respondent cannot ignore that Judge Souder found also that the separate $600 fee Respondent charged Mr. Moten for the execution of the judgment was unreasonable on its face at the outset, because there was no judgment. Judge Souder added that Respondent performed no meaningful services of any kind with respect to the $600 fee collected from Mr. Moten[.] Those findings are supported by the record. We therefore overrule Respondent's exception and conclude from our independent review of the record that he violated MRPC 1.5(a). In addition to finding that Respondent violated MRPC 1.5(a), Judge Souder found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.5(b), albeit Judge Souder did not label her finding as a violation of subsection (b). MRPC 1.5(b) provides: The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.... [13] Bar Counsel argued to Judge Souder that Respondent violated Rule 1.5(b) because, according to Mr. Moten's testimony, there was no communication properly to the client and, certainly, not in writing, as to the basis or rate of Mr. Patterson's fees and expenses for this matter. Judge Souder found that Respondent never advised Moten that he would be charging an hourly rate. I do not believe that [Respondent] ever had prepared a retainer agreement or communicated to Mr. Moten that he was to sign it or review it. Respondent takes no exception to that finding. We therefore conclude, based on our independent review of the record, that Respondent violated MRPC 1.5(a) by charging Mr. Moten an excessive fee, and he violated 1.5(b) by failing to communicate to Mr. Moten the terms of the fee agreement. Respondent next argues that Judge Souder erred in finding that he violated MRPC 1.15(a) by immediately taking disbursements of funds paid by Mr. Moten despite having done nothing to earn those fees. According to Respondent's Client Escrow Ledger for Mr. Moten's case, on December 2, 2008, Respondent deposited a $1,400 payment from Mr. Moten. On the same day, Respondent withdrew $1,200 for file and transcript review. On January 5, 2009, Respondent deposited a $1,100 payment from Mr. Moten, and on the same day withdrew $1,300 for pleadings prep. In Guida, we instructed: Funds given in anticipation of future legal services qualify as trust money and, accordingly, are to be deposited in trust accounts separate from the attorney's property, to be removed promptly by the attorney as earned. To deposit such trust money into the attorney's personal or operating accounts before the fees are earned constitutes a violation of MRPC 1.15(a). 391 Md. at 53, 891 A.2d at 1097. In his testimony, Respondent asserted that he had done work on Mr. Moten's casepresumably file and transcript reviewbefore he received the first payment of $1,400. Respondent explained that Mr. Moten had been referred to Respondent by an individual Respondent trusted, so Respondent had no reservations about beginning work on the case before receiving payment. Thus, Respondent argues that he had earned the $1,200 he withdrew on the same day he deposited Mr. Moten's $1,400 payment. Judge Souder stated that she did not find [Respondent's] testimony credible in many respects during this proceeding. We surmise that, in finding a MRPC 1.15 violation in connection with the two withdrawals, Judge Souder inferred from the evidence before her that Respondent was not telling the truth when he testified that (1) he had worked on Mr. Moten's case before he was formally retained and received any money from Mr. Moten, and (2) he had done additional work by the time Mr. Moten paid the remainder of the agreed-upon $2500. That said, we cannot overlook that Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence. Md. Rule 16-757(b). We are unable to find evidence in the record demonstrating, to a clear and convincing standard of proof, that Respondent failed to perform the file and transcript review on Mr. Moten's case before withdrawing the $1,200 fee on December 2, 2008. Nor does Bar Counsel direct us to any such evidence. The same holds true for the $1,300 fee Respondent withdrew on January 5, 2009. The record is devoid of any evidence or testimony that Respondent, contrary to his testimony, did not perform pleadings prep prior to that date. Accordingly, we sustain Respondent's exception and conclude that Judge Souder erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(a) by failing to earn the fees of $1,200 and $1,300 prior to withdrawing those amounts from his trust account. Finally, Respondent states in his exceptions relating to the Moten case: The hearing judge found a violation of Rule 1.16(d). She found that Respondent was indeed terminated. Interestingly, her 1.4(b) finding was totally contradictory on this point. We do not understand Respondent's statement to be a formal exception to Judge Souder's finding of a MRPC 1.16(d) violation, which provides: Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. Judge Souder made the following factual findings concerning the MRPC 1.16(d) violation: The Defendant performed no meaningful services of any kind with respect to the $600 fee collected from Mr. Moten for the execution of judgment. There was no judgment on which to execute at any time. So the $600 was unreasonable for the amount of services provided and for the results obtained.    Because Mr. Patterson never provided any meaningful service regarding the $600 fee paid by Mr. Moten, when Mr. Patterson understood that he was terminated, he was clearly obligated to refund the $600 to Mr. Moten. When he failed to do so, he violated Maryland Rule 1.16(d). Upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that Respondent violated MRPC 1.16(d). In sum, we have overruled all but one of Respondent's exceptions as they relate to his handling of the Moten matter, and, based on our review of the record, we conclude that Respondent violated the following rules: Maryland Rules 16-606.1 and 16-609(c), and MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a) and (b), and 1.16, but not 1.15(a). [14]