Opinion ID: 859237
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Altercation with Tiffany; looking for Tiffany

Text: ¶36 In addition to opposing the State’s motion in limine, Hardy objected at trial to the anticipated testimony of Hardy’s friend, Krystal, that Tiffany had left because Hardy slapped her. The court overruled the objection, finding the testimony relevant to Hardy’s state of mind. ¶37 Krystal testified that, a day or two before the murders, Hardy told her that Tiffany had left because “he had hit her,” that he “kept repeating that she was gone and he was 16 upset,” and that he “wanted to find Tif” and would do anything to locate her. The court gave a limiting instruction after the testimony. At the close of the guilt phase, the court further instructed the jurors that they could consider other acts only if they found the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the acts, and that those acts were to be considered only to establish the defendant’s motive or intent. ¶38 Evidence that a defendant was searching for the victim shortly before the crime is admissible to show plan or intent. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of prior argument with or violence toward a victim is likewise admissible to show motive or intent. Id.; see also State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 62, 881 P.2d 1158, 1167 (1994) (evidence of prior physical abuse and threats was admissible to show motive and intent when defense was lack of motive to kill and impulsivity); State v. Sparks, 147 Ariz. 51, 55-56, 708 P.2d 732, 736-37 (1985) (alleged feud with victim was proper to prove retaliation motive); State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 418-19, 661 P.2d 1105, 1119-20 (1983) (prior attack showing malice toward victim was relevant to prove motive and intent and to rebut defense of love and inability to harm victim). ¶39 Hardy argues that the slap revealed marital discord rather than motive or intent and cites United States v. 17 Peterson, 808 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1987), to support his assertion that a single slap is insufficient to prove intent. In Peterson, however, the issue was not that a single prior act was proffered, but that the government failed to provide sufficient background to support a necessary inference. 808 F.2d at 975. In this case, there was no such failure. Krystal’s testimony was relevant to prove motive and intent, and to rebut Hardy’s defense theory. ¶40 Hardy’s argument that the trial court should have excluded Krystal’s testimony as unfairly prejudicial is also unavailing. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Ariz. R. Evid. 403. “Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, . . . such as emotion, sympathy or horror.” State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52, 859 P.2d 156, 162 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court could reasonably find that the evidence of Hardy hitting Tiffany was more probative than prejudicial because Hardy’s motive and intent were significant issues at trial. Further, the court expressly instructed the jury to not consider the evidence to determine the defendant’s character or that he acted in conformity therewith. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Krystal’s testimony about Hardy’s statements. 18