Opinion ID: 2431372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First-Degree Battery

Text: Weaver next contends that there was insufficient evidence supporting her first-degree battery conviction. Our analysis of this point turns on the definition of serious physical injury. A person commits battery in the first degree if [h]e causes serious physical injury to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-13-201(a)(3) (Repl.1993 & Supp.1995). The code defines serious physical injury as physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-102(19) (Repl.1993 & Supp.1995). We look to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which the jury might infer serious physical injury. See Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991); Tarentino v. State, 302 Ark. 55, 786 S.W.2d 584 (1990). In viewing the circumstances surrounding the poisoning and its impact on Theresa Allen, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support a verdict that her injury was serious. It is apparent to us that there was a substantial risk of death. This inference is supported by the convincing fact that the elevated level of arsenic in her system approached the lethal level found in Jeannie Allen. She was also hospitalized for several days to reduce the level of toxicity. Again, the trial court did not err in denying the directed verdict motion on this charge.