Opinion ID: 186604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Cogburn's Motion for Reconsideration

Text: 15 Shortly after the Board issued its decision in September 2001, Cogburn moved to reopen the record. The Company argued that the Board should reconsider its decision to impose a Gissel bargaining order due to changed circumstances that arose during the several years when the ULP case was pending disposition. The Board denied the Company's motion largely on the ground that it was untimely. Cogburn contends that the Board erred in refusing to address its motion and credit its evidence of changed circumstances on this procedural ground. We review the Board's decision not to reopen the record for an abuse of discretion. E. Carolinas Broad. Co. v. FCC, 762 F.2d 95, 103 (D.C.Cir.1985). 16 Citing its regulations, the Board contends that Cogburn neglected to `state [why] the additional evidence sought to be adduced . . . was not presented previously.' Br. for NLRB at 56 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(d)(1)). The Board's finding on this score is simply wrong. In its motion to the Board, the Company stated: 17 Simply put, Cogburn cannot be expected to have presented evidence of substantial employee turnover and management changes which did not exist when this matter initially was presented to the Board, more than three (3) years ago. Indeed, the longer the Board delayed in issuing its decision, the more changes occurred during the day to day operations at Cogburn. As such, Cogburn now should be permitted to introduce evidence of changed circumstances. 18 Cogburn Healthcare Center Inc.'s Request to Reopen the Record and for Reconsideration, Cogburn Healthcare Ctr., Inc. (Nov. 1, 2001) at 8, Joint Appendix (J.A.) 30 (hereinafter Cogburn Motion). It is plain that Cogburn explained that it did not present evidence of changed circumstances when it filed its 1998 exceptions to the Board because those changes took place over the ensuing three years. 19 The Board argues that Cogburn could have alerted the Board to the changed circumstances during the three-year interval between the ALJ's decision and the Board's order. To support this claim, the Board relies on the decision in NLRB v. U.S.A. Polymer Corp., 272 F.3d 289 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit noted in Polymer that [t]he Board's procedural rules permit an employer to submit a motion to reopen the record after the ALJ's decision but before the Board has ruled. Id. at 295. The decision added that [t]he Board is entitled to assume, in the face of the parties' silence, that the facts as initially presented continue to adequately describe the employer's workforce. Id. at 296. But Polymer also makes it clear that there is no clear procedural vehicle for such a motion. Id. at 295. In our view, this last point is the most telling. Nothing in the Board's rules required Cogburn to advise the Board of every changed circumstance in its business operation and workforce between the date of the ALJ's decision and the Board's final disposition of the case. And we will not infer such a requirement. 20 The changed circumstances here were gradual, incremental, and cumulative. There was no single event at Cogburn which, alone, gave clear evidence of changed circumstances. Absent a Board rule requiring it, Cogburn had no reason to think that it was obliged to file a motion on every occasion of employee turnover. Cogburn acted reasonably under the circumstances and the Board abused its discretion in rejecting Cogburn's motion as untimely. 21