Opinion ID: 2995304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hilpipre’s Opinion Testimony

Text: Bogan initially contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Hilpipre’s exclamatory statement that he believed Bogan and Calhoun were trying to kill Officer Degenhardt. The decision of ’whether to admit testimony under Rule 701 is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and a ruling will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court abused its discretion.’ United States v. Stormer, 938 F.2d 759, 761 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Towns, 913 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1990)) (internal citations omitted). A determination made by a trial judge regarding the admissibility of evidence ’is treated with great deference because of the trial judge’s first-hand exposure to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and because of [her] familiarity with the case and ability to gauge the likely impact of the evidence in the context to the entire proceeding.’ United States v. Wash, 231 F.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 329 (7th Cir. 1992)). Rule 701 of the Federal Rule of Evidences provides: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Bogan does not contest the fact that Hilpipre was able to clearly view the altercation in the officer station and also that his opinion was rationally based on his observation of the incident. Similarly, Bogan also does not challenge the court’s ruling that Hilpipre’s exclamation was helpful to the jury. Bogan’s acknowledgments thus satisfy the requirements of Rule 701 as previously stated. Bogan’s claim that the testimony should have been excluded rests upon a novel, though unconvincing, argument. The gist of Bogan’s argument is that Hilpipre’s statement would be too helpful to the jury--that Hilpipre himself concluded that Bogan intended to kill Degenhardt, and thus did not allow the jury to draw that conclusion for itself. According to Bogan’s theory, then, any statement describing a third person’s observations that forms the basis for a conclusion regarding a defendant’s thoughts and motivations would be presumptively inadmissible. Bogan offers no case law in support of his theory that lay opinions regarding mental states are presumptively inadmissible. Indeed, such an argument runs contrary to case law precedent. We have previously held that lay opinion testimony as to the mental state of another is indeed competent under [Rule 701]. United States v. Guzzino, 810 F.2d 687, 699 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729, 731-32 (7th Cir. 1981). Bogan offers another reason in support of his argument that the experienced and competent trial judge abused her discretion in admitting Hilpipre’s statement. Bogan speculates that while Hilpipre was speaking on the phone he realized that his conversation was being recorded, and that, as he observed the attack, Hilpipre consciously decided to proclaim that Bogan was trying to kill Degenhardt in order that it might later help him to strike a bargain with the government to reduce his sentence in exchange for his testimony. Bogan’s speculation borders on the fantastic. To suppose that in the midst of an observation of a violent altercation where two inmates are observed savagely attacking a prison guard, the observing witness would have the presence of mind to think calmly and rationally not about the attack itself, but rather about how he might manipulate the system in an attempt to reduce his sentence simply lacks even a scintilla of substantiation in the record. Ultimately, the decision as to admissibility of Hilpipre’s statement lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Wash, 231 F.3d at 371. We are confident that had Hilpipre truly been attempting to manipulate the system, as Bogan speculates, that the trial judge would have uncovered the ruse because she had the opportunity and ability (gained from years of trial experience) to gauge Hilpipre’s credibility by hearing his answers as well as observing his facial expressions, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements, all of which are not contained in the cold pages of an appellate record. United States v. Woods, 233 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Bogan’s contention is meritless and we hold that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting Hilpipre’s statement.