Opinion ID: 2639471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failing to Instruct on Other Crimes Evidence

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error because it failed to discharge its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury, at the penalty phase, that the jury could not consider other crimes evidence as aggravating circumstances unless it first found those crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (See, e.g., People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279.) Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor, in his case-in-chief at the guilt phase, introduced other crimes evidence of defendant's gun possession and the fact defendant may have also raped the three victims. Thus, the court's failure to give this instruction requires reversal. This contention is without merit. The prosecutor did not take the position or argue that evidence of defendant's supposed gun possession or sexual intercourse with the victims constituted evidence in aggravation; rather, such evidence was admitted at the guilt phase only and was not mentioned during the penalty phase. Indeed, both the prosecutor and defendant argued at the penalty phase as if the only aggravating circumstance at issue was the fact that defendant murdered the three teenage girls seriatim. In People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 443, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1, we stated that in the absence of a request, the trial court is under no duty to give an instruction at the penalty phase regarding evidence received at the guilt phase. [Citations.] Even when section 190.3, factor (b), criminal activity is expressly alleged, which was not the case here, `the rule absolving the court of a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of crimes introduced under [section 190.3,] factor (b) `is based in part on a recognition that, as [a] tactical matter, the defendant may not want the penalty phase instructions ... [to] lead the jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central question of whether he should live or die. [Citations.]'` [Citation.] If a trial court need not instruct a jury sua sponte as to the elements of alleged other crimes, given the possible undue emphasis which the defense may fear the jury will place on them [citation], a trial court is obviously under no sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury on the prosecution's burden of proving other crimes that are not clearly introduced under section 190.3, factor (b). [Citations.] Based on the foregoing authority, the court was not required to instruct the jury on other crimes evidence.