Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: which standard--cuyler or strickland ?

Text: 232 The majority holds that Strickland (rather than Cuyler ) governs the analysis of Beets's claim. The majority contends that Cuyler 's analysis is applicable only to conflicts stemming from multiple representation, and it opines that Strickland offers a superior framework for addressing attorney conflicts outside the multiple or serial client context. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1265. First, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Cuyler and the other Supreme Court cases addressing attorney conflicts support its decision to limit Cuyler to the multiple representation context. 233 Second, drawing on those cases and on some of the cases at the circuit level that apply Cuyler to attorney-client conflicts, I would apply Cuyler to a conflict between the attorney and his client which has a highly particularized and powerfully focused source, of a kind not frequently or normally encountered in the practice of law. It is these exceptional situations, where the divergence between the lawyer's self-interest and his client's interest poses an extraordinary threat to the lawyer's duty of loyalty, that warrant the protection of Cuyler. As this court and other courts have recognized, the conflict stemming from a media rights contract is such a conflict, as are the conflict arising from the kind of contingent fee arrangement at issue in Winkler and the conflict arising from an attorney's involvement in the allegedly criminal conduct of his client. If we reserve Cuyler for extraordinary attorney-client conflicts of that sort, not normally encountered in law practice, and we apply Strickland to alleged deficiencies in an attorney's performance having their sources in the more common incidents of the attorney-client relationship, we avoid having the Cuyler exception swallow the Strickland rule. At the same time we preserve the benefit of the Cuyler inquiry for those exceptional cases that lie at the heart of the principles animating it.
234 To test the majority's hypothesis that Cuyler applies only to multiple representation cases, I look first at what the Supreme Court and other courts have said about attorney conflicts. It is well-settled that [w]here a constitutional right to counsel exists ... there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflict of interest. Wood, 450 U.S. at 271, 101 S.Ct. at 1103; see also Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 335, 100 S.Ct. at 1711; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The Supreme Court revisited Cuyler in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981), and it applied its framework to a conflict created by a third-party's payment of counsel. After examining the record, the Court noted that the defendants' employer had paid for the defendants' legal assistance, for the defendants' bond fees, and for some of the other fines that the defendants incurred, but it had failed to pay the fines which resulted in the defendants' incarceration. Wood, 450 U.S. at 267, 101 S.Ct. at 1101. The Court further observed that: 235 The fact that the employer chose to refuse payment of these fines, even as it paid other fines and paid the sums necessary to keep petitioners free on bond in this case, suggests the possibility that it was seeking--in its own interest--a resolution of the equal protection claim raised [in the case]. 236 Id. (footnote omitted). The Court recognized that because the attorney was being paid by the employer, and was therefore the employer's agent, there was a clear possibility of conflict of interest. Id. In light of this possibility, the Court remanded the case to the state court, instructing the lower court to apply the Cuyler framework and to determine whether the conflict of interest that th[e] record strongly suggests actually existed at the time of the probation revocation or earlier. Id. at 273, 101 S.Ct. at 1104. 237 The Supreme Court next discussed conflicts of interest in Strickland. In that case, the Court was called upon to determine the proper standards for judging a criminal defendant's contention that the Constitution requires a conviction ... to be set aside because counsel's assistance at the trial ... was ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671, 104 S.Ct. at 2056. 238 Notably, when describing the standard for evaluating the prejudicial effect of a counsel's failings, the Court distinguished ineffectiveness claims predicated on conflicts of interest. Specifically, the court noted that these claims warranted a limited presumption of prejudice, stating that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 345-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1716-19). When there is an actual conflict, the Court emphasized that counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Id. Additionally, the Court found that a limited presumption of prejudice was warranted because it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Id. Further, the Court reasoned that [g]iven the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Id. (citation omitted). 239 The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether Cuyler applies to cases involving conflicts stemming from sources other than multiple representation. See Illinois v. Washington, 469 U.S. 1022, 1023, 105 S.Ct. 442, 443, 83 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nevertheless, as the majority concedes, this court, as well as every circuit court facing the issue, has applied the rule of Cuyler to many types of conflicts of interest. 14 In fact, the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the Cuyler framework to conflicts stemming from media rights contracts. See United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201, 205-09 (7th Cir.1985) (employing Cuyler framework to claim predicated on conflict of interest between [the] lawyer's financial interest in proceeds from the movie rights and [defendant's] interest in acquittal), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 1209, 89 L.Ed.2d 321 (1986); Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1987) (noting that [t]he standard developed in Cuyler has been applied to cases in which defendants argue that their lawyers were more interested in publicity than in obtaining an acquittal, and employing the Cuyler analysis); United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1980) (recognizing that the conflict in Cuyler was based on multiple representation, and observing that the case before it was based on private financial interests of the lawyer, but applying Cuyler because [t]hese differences are immaterial.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 2018, 68 L.Ed.2d 325 (1981). 240 Nevertheless, the majority boldly asserts that all of these other courts have misread Cuyler and the Supreme Court's subsequent cases, stating that [o]ne cannot read Cuyler [as] analyz[ing] conflicts of interest in a context broader than that of multiple client representation. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1266. As noted above, however, the Supreme Court did just that in Wood, applying Cuyler to a conflict of interest stemming from the fact that defendants' counsel was being paid by a third party. The majority attempts to distinguish this case by stating that the lawyer was at least in the functional equivalent of a joint representation.... Both the theater and the employees expected him to advance their interests, yet to serve one might require him to fail the others, while doing nothing could harm both. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1267. The majority forces Wood into the multiple representation category by focusing on the common denominator of all conflicts: divided loyalties or divergent interests between two or more entities. 241
242 The majority accurately notes that representation of two or more clients whose interests are best served by divergent litigation tactics presents a situation in which an attorney's loyalties may be pulled in different directions by his various clients. When such a situation arises, an attorney may be forced to choose the interest of one client at the expense of the interest of the other client, or the attorney may choose to do nothing and neglect the interests of both clients. See Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes, 1 The Law of Lawyering Sec. 1.7:101 (2d ed. Supp.1992); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7, 1.9 (specifically addressing conflicts of interest arising from concurrent representation and serial representation). 243 Multiple representation situations, however, are not the only circumstances in which a conflict of interest may test an attorney's duty of loyalty. A lawyer's duty of loyalty may also be compromised when his own interests diverge from his client's interests. See Wolfram, supra, Sec. 7.1.3, at 317 (The principle of loyalty runs throughout conflicts thinking but is most prominent in the areas of simultaneous conflicts and conflicts involving the lawyer's personal interests.). In fact, the general rule against conflicts of interest provides that [a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b); see also Wolfram, supra, Sec. 7.1.2, at 315 (describing how an older version of the rules governing conflicts deal[t] with two central situations--when a lawyer's personal interests clash with those of a client and when a lawyer represents at the same time clients with differing interests). This potential for a conflict rooted in the attorney's self-interest is so severe that the Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8 is devoted almost entirely to prohibitions and restrictions aimed at preventing such conflicts. 15 The reason for these rules is clear. Just as an attorney's loyalty may be pulled in different directions by clients' divergent interests, an attorney's loyalty can be sorely tested when his own self-interest runs counter to the interests of his client. 244 Thus, the majority's attempt to draw the Cuyler line at multiple representation is ill-considered, for there is no logical reason why the distinction could not be used to classify all conflicts (including those involving the attorney's self-interest) as multiple representations. Simply put, there is no intuitive reason why the Cuyler line should be drawn at conflicts where the interests of only third parties cause the divergence facing the attorney, as distinguished from conflicts where the interest of the attorney himself causes the divergence that he confronts. Indeed, there is a powerful intuitive reason why, in some situations, that line should not be (and has not been) drawn there. There are exceptional conflicts involving the attorney's self-interest that, human nature being what it is, are far more likely to impair the lawyer's ability to satisfy his duty of loyalty to his client than are the more ordinary conflicts between clients. 245
246 I recognize that not every conflict of interest pitting a lawyer's self-interest against his client's interests should trigger the analysis outlined in Cuyler. As one commentator notes, [i]n a sense, every representation begins with a lawyer-client conflict. If the representation is for a fee, the lawyer's economic interest will be to maximize the amount of the fee and the client's will be to minimize it. Wolfram, supra, Sec. 7.1.1, at 313. Conversely, if the representation is for a flat fee, the attorney's interest will be to minimize the amount of time spent on the case, and the client's interest will be to maximize it. Similar conflicts inure in any contract for the sale of goods or services; the seller's interest is to maximize the amount the buyer spends and minimize his own costs, and the buyer's interest is to minimize the amount that he spends and maximize the quality of the goods or services. 247 Thus, the Cuyler exception would swallow the Strickland rule if it were applied to every case in which a criminal defendant complains that his lawyer failed to investigate a witness or a defense, neglected to perform an experiment, did not hire a witness, or otherwise failed to take action because the attorney decided that it was not worth the time or the expense. We have recognized that Cuyler is not meant to cover these types of cases. Strickland appropriately governs claims for failure to investigate 16 and the like, and courts have had little difficulty in treating such claims under Strickland's ineffectiveness rubric. See, e.g., Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir.1995) (refusing to apply Cuyler when a defendant alleged that the fact that payment for any investigation or psychiatric services could have come from counsel's pocket forced counsel to choose between [the defendant's] interests and his own); United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 921 (2d Cir.1993) (finding that Strickland, not Cuyler, was applicable to a claim that defense counsel was plagued by a conflict of interest, namely that he was under enormous time constraints in regard to prior trial commitments (internal quotations omitted)); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir.1993) (finding that a failure to hire an expert was not a conflict in the Cuyler sense and applying Strickland to the alleged conflict). 17 248 In addition to conflicts that are more properly treated under Strickland as claims about competence and diligence, there are other attorney-client conflicts frequently or normally encountered in the practice of law that will be better handled under Strickland. For example, the conflict claimed to exist in United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 64-65 (D.C.Cir.1992), involving a lawyer who allegedly failed to request a continuance because he was afraid the judge would take action against him and his law firm if he made such a request, would arise with some frequency, as would the conflict claimed to exist in Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1987), that the lawyer was more concerned with publicity than with his client's fate. Both these charges can be made, with some credibility, in a good number of cases, and where they form the basis for a claim for post-conviction relief, they should be evaluated under Strickland. 249 While the great majority of alleged attorney-client conflicts arising in post-conviction proceedings--those frequently or normally encountered in the practice--will be better handled under Strickland, there are exceptional conflicts between an attorney's self-interest and his client's interest, stemming from highly particularized and powerfully focused sources, of the sort not normally encountered in law practice, that demand the application of Cuyler. A media rights contract is such a source, 18 as are the kind of contingent fee arrangement at issue in Winkler and an attorney's involvement in the allegedly criminal conduct of his client. These circumstances present situations so fraught with the temptation for the lawyer to sacrifice his client's best interest for his own benefit that they constitute particularly serious threats to the duty of loyalty. Not coincidentally, the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the Cuyler presumption to these very types of cases. 19 250 The majority posits that in these cases, unlike in the multiple representation context, the risk of prejudice is not plain, and that [w]hen the duty of loyalty is challenged by an attorney's self-interest, the range of possible breaches ... is virtually limitless. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1271. I disagree. The risk is all too plain. Further, Cuyler has been the law for fifteen years, and it cites precedents at the circuit level (including this circuit's decision in Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.1975)), that are even older. The inescapable fact is that the courts have not had difficulty with the boundary problems described by the majority, as courts have been able to separate ordinary ineffective assistance claims (even those dressed in conflict language) from the exceptional cases that warrant the Cuyler standard. But even if we do encounter problems with cases at the boundaries, that is no reason to change the rule in a case that lies at the heart of the principles animating Cuyler. 251 In short, there is no authority whatsoever for limiting Cuyler to the multiple representation situation, and, as many courts have recognized, it makes no sense to do so in those exceptional cases where an attorney's self-interest poses a serious threat to the duty of loyalty.