Opinion ID: 2196990
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Textron's Public Policy Argument

Text: Finally, Textron, citing Jones v. Continental Casualty Co., 123 N.J. Super. 353, 303 A.2d 91 (1973), claims that the reporting requirement converts Liberty's occurrence-based policies into impermissible hybrid policies in violation of public policy. In light of our discussion of the Jones decision in Gereboff v. The Home Indemnity Co., supra , which involved policies somewhat similar to Liberty's, we find little merit in Textron's argument. We reiterate the sentiments we expressed in Gereboff that we are unaware of any principle that    prevents an insurer from imposing reasonable conditions upon the obligations it assumes in its contract. 119 R.I. at 822, 383 A.2d at 1028. The reporting requirement is such a reasonable restriction, operating to limit Liberty's exposure for certain property-damage claims. Furthermore, we have previously held that in the absence of a statutorily declared policy to the contra, the parties to an insurance agreement are free to contract as they desire. Constant v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 497 A.2d 343, 345 (R.I. 1985); see also Faraj v. Allstate Insurance Co., 486 A.2d 582, 586 (R.I. 1984). No statutes have been brought to our attention that prohibit the issuance of policies such as Liberty's. We also stated in Gereboff that no principle had been brought to our attention that condemns on public policy grounds coverage that combines elements of both `discovery' [claims-made] and `occurrence' policies, but provides less protection than is customarily afforded by either. 119 R.I. at 822, 383 A.2d at 1028. Finally, the reporting requirement in Liberty's policies does not operate either to tie Textron to Liberty after the expiration of its policies or unduly [to] restrict [Textron's] ability to obtain adequate protection elsewhere, id. at 820, 383 A.2d at 1027, which, in fact, it did after 1965. In conclusion, given our discussion of the scope of coverage for property-damage claims, we conclude that even when viewed in the light most favorable to Textron, the pleadings and supporting documentation allege no set of facts that would give rise to coverage for property damage under any of the Liberty policies, more than twenty-one years after the expiration thereof. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in regard to Textron's property-damage claims.