Opinion ID: 6336933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicable Antitrust Framework

Text: Aiyer’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred by consistently failing to evaluate purported evidence that his conduct in the FX market lacked anticompetitive effects, and, in fact, had procompetitive benefits, in order to decide whether the per se rule or rule of reason applies to that conduct. Notably, in relation to this issue, Aiyer does not challenge the district court’s rulings on his motion to dismiss the indictment or his later motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial under Rules 29 and 33, nor does he contend that the district court erred in its legal instructions to the jury. Instead, he makes the more amorphous argument that, at some point during the lengthy proceedings below, the district court should have made a threshold determination as to which analytical framework under the Sherman Act—the per se rule or the rule of reason—should be applied in assessing the alleged offense conduct. We construe this aspect of Aiyer’s appeal as raising a question of law, which we review de novo. See United States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645, 658 (2d Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 313, 321–30 (2d Cir. 2015) (reviewing de novo the question whether the per se rule or rule of reason applied to alleged conduct in a civil antitrust case); California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 23 2011) (“The selection of the proper mode of antitrust analysis is a question of law, which we review de novo.”). As set forth below, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that it was not required to review Aiyer’s proffered evidence of competitive effects of his trading activity in the FX market or to make a threshold determination as to whether, under the Sherman Act, the per se rule or rule of reason applied at his criminal trial.
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Congress declared “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Although the plain language of this provision broadly covers any agreement to restrain trade, it is axiomatic that “Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)); see also Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018) (“[The Supreme] Court has long recognized that, ‘[i]n view of the common law and the law in this country’ when the Sherman Act was passed, the phrase ‘restraint of trade’ is best read to mean ‘undue restraint.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911))). 24 Typically, alleged restraints on trade challenged under the Sherman Act are analyzed under the rule of reason. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 5 (stating that “[the Supreme] Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis” in Sherman Act cases); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (noting that “most antitrust claims are analyzed under a ‘rule of reason[]’”). As its name suggests, the rule of reason requires that “the finder of fact . . . decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” Khan, 522 U.S. at 10; see also Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (“The rule of reason requires courts to conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and market structure . . . to assess the [restraint]’s actual effect on competition. The goal is to distinguis[h] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Gatt Commc’ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., L.L.C., 711 F.3d 68, 75 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) (“When applying the rule of reason, courts weigh all of the circumstances surrounding the challenged acts to determine whether the alleged restraint is unreasonable . . . .”). 25 However, certain restraints are subject to the per se rule—that is, they are categorically unreasonable restraints on trade, given their inherently anticompetitive nature. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (“Some types of restraints . . . have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se.”). As we have stated, the per se rule “‘reflect[s] a longstanding judgment’ that case-by-case analysis is unnecessary for certain practices that, ‘by their nature[,] have a substantial potential’ to unreasonably restrain competition.” Apple, 791 F.3d at 321 (alterations in original) (quoting FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990)). “To justify a per se prohibition a restraint must have manifestly anticompetitive effects, and lack . . . any redeeming virtue.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this rule, there is no “need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work.” Id. Thus, in a criminal antitrust case alleging conduct falling within the per se rule, the government “need prove only that [the offense conduct] occurred in order to win [its] case, there being no other elements to the offense and no 26 allowable defense.” United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). The paradigmatic example of a per se illegal restraint on trade under the Sherman Act is a horizontal conspiracy to fix prices with competitors. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (“Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) ( “A horizontal agreement to fix prices is the archetypal example” of a per se unreasonable practice). 15 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the practice of allocating markets is subject to the per se rule. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990). Moreover, we have ruled that bid rigging—which is simply another “form of horizontal price fixing”—is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See Koppers, 652 F.2d at 294 (“In cases involving behavior such as bid rigging, . . . the Sherman Act will be read as simply saying: An agreement among competitors to rig bids is illegal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 15 “[C]oncerted action [between competitors at the same level of the market] is usually termed a ‘horizontal’ restraint, in contradistinction to combinations of persons at different levels of the market structure, e.g., manufacturers and distributors, which are termed ‘vertical’ restraints.” United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). 27 also United States v. Joyce, 895 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Fenzl, 670 F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 2012) (defining “bid rigging” as “a form of price fixing in which bidders agree to eliminate competition among them, as by taking turns being the low bidder”); accord 15 U.S.C. § 7a note (Findings; Purpose of 2020 Amendment) (“Congress finds [that] . . . [c]onspiracies among competitors to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate markets are categorically and irredeemably anticompetitive and contravene the competition policy of the United States.”). Despite the categorical nature of the per se rule, there are certain exceptions to its application. For example, the “ancillary restraints doctrine,” which “governs the validity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration, such as a business association or joint venture, on nonventure activities,” Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7, “exempt[s]” such agreements “from the per se rule,” such that the rule of reason applies, Aya Healthcare Servs. Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 9 F.4th 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). When this doctrine applies, “courts must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a naked restraint on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes of the business association, and thus valid.” Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7. 28 Apart from the ancillary restraints doctrine, courts have also relieved alleged misconduct from per se treatment in “[limited] situations where the ‘restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.’” Apple, 791 F.3d at 326 (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010)). As we have explained when discussing this second exception to the per se rule, courts “apply the rule of reason [under these circumstances] only when the restraint at issue was imposed in connection with some kind of potentially efficient [formal or informal] joint venture.” Id. (“Put differently, a participant in a price-fixing agreement may invoke only certain, limited kinds of ‘enterprise and productivity’ to receive the rule of reason’s advantages.” (emphasis omitted)).
Aiyer argues that the district court erred in declining to assess his competitive effects evidence and refusing to make a threshold determination as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applied to the conspiracy to restrain trade alleged in the indictment. We disagree. Aiyer’s argument is both procedurally and substantively flawed. As a procedural matter, contrary to Aiyer’s contention, the district court did not “abdicate[] its gate-keeping responsibilities” by “refus[ing] to analyze the 29 charged conduct in light of the proffered economic evidence and decide whether it should be evaluated under the per se rule or the rule of reason,” Aiyer Br. at 36, because it has no such responsibilities in this criminal case. Before trial, a defendant “may raise by . . . motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits,” including a motion alleging “a defect in the indictment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1)(B). On such a motion, “[a]n indictment is sufficient as long as it (1) ‘contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend,’ and (2) ‘enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.’” United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 779 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d 104, 120 (2d Cir. 2021)). Additionally, although a district court can “make factual determinations in matters that do not implicate the general issue of a defendant’s guilt” when assessing a Rule 12 motion, it cannot resolve “a factual dispute that is inextricably intertwined with a defendant’s potential culpability,” as that is a role reserved for the jury. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 2018). Beyond a Rule 12 motion, “[a] defendant has no right to judicial review of a grand jury’s determination of probable cause to think a defendant committed a 30 crime.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 333 (2014). Thus, “[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.” Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 409 (1956) (footnote omitted); accord United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979). Here, in its denial of Aiyer’s motion to dismiss the indictment—which is not challenged on appeal—the district court properly concluded that the indictment adequately alleged a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids in the FX market. As a result, the government was entitled to present its per se case against Aiyer to the jury without any pre-trial determination by the district court as to the sufficiency of the government’s proof of the alleged per se charges. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 409. In reaching this decision, we emphasize that this is a criminal case, and “summary judgment does not exist in federal criminal procedure.” Wedd, 993 F.3d at 121 (quoting Sampson, 898 F.3d at 282). In other words, “although a judge may dismiss a civil complaint pretrial for insufficient evidence [on a motion for summary judgment], a judge generally cannot do the same for a federal criminal indictment.” Sampson, 898 F.3d at 280. Moreover, unlike a civil antitrust case, where the government may proceed in the alternative under a rule of reason 31 theory and the availability of the rule of reason impacts the scope of evidence at trial, see Apple, 791 F.3d at 297, the government’s criminal case here was going to rise or fall solely on its ability to prove the per se categories of restraint alleged in the indictment. In other words, there was no possibility that the government could argue to the jury in the alternative that, if the government’s proof fell short of a per se violation, Aiyer could still be found guilty under the rule of reason. As noted supra, the government does not pursue criminal charges under the rule of reason as a matter of policy and, in any event, the indictment here—charging only a per se case—would have foreclosed any such attempt to switch theories during trial. Simply put, in a criminal antitrust case, a district court has no pretrial obligation to consider a defendant’s evidence of competitive effects in order to determine whether or not the indictment properly charges an actual per se offense. Thus, there was no procedural error in the district court’s failure to assess Aiyer’s proffered evidence and decide which rule under the Sherman Act applied here. 16 16 We are unpersuaded by Aiyer’s suggestion that we have previously required courts to conduct a preliminary, “sophisticated economic inquiry” to determine whether a challenged restraint is properly characterized as per se unlawful. Aiyer Br. at 35 (quoting Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Pro. Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1988)). As a threshold matter, we note that Volvo was a civil case, and thus, as discussed supra, is subject to different procedures for pre-trial determinations regarding sufficiency of the evidence. In any event, the substance of our decision in Volvo does not conflict with our analysis here. In that case, plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that a professional 32 Aiyer’s argument is equally without merit from a substantive standpoint based upon well-settled antitrust jurisprudence. Having correctly determined that the indictment charged price fixing and bid rigging as per se violations of criminal antitrust laws, the district court properly concluded that precedent from both the Supreme Court and this Court has long foreclosed consideration by the district court (whether pre-trial or at some later procedural posture) of the competitive effects—i.e., reasonableness—of that alleged conduct in an attempt by Aiyer to avoid the per se rule. See, e.g., Maricopa Cnty., 457 U.S. at 351 (“The anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some.”); Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218 (“[The Supreme] Court has consistently and without deviation adhered tennis council conspired to fix compensation for certain professional tennis matches. 857 F.2d at 71. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to this claim. See id. at 62. We reversed, but noted in dicta that “[a]ssuming . . . appellants succeed in proving the foregoing allegations, . . . we express no opinion at this time as to whether [defendants’] conduct should be condemned as per se unlawful or, instead, should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason.” Id. at 71. We further explained that it was not immediately clear that the per se rule should apply in the context of that case because “professional sporting events cannot exist unless the producers of such events agree to cooperate with one another to a certain extent, and that the antitrust laws do not condemn such agreements when coordination is essential if the activity is to be carried out at all.” Id. at 71–72. As discussed below, Aiyer does not—and cannot—argue that his conduct was essential to the functioning of the FX market. In any event, we did not suggest in Volvo that a defendant is entitled to a pre-trial determination on these issues in a criminal case. 33 to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.”); Apple, 791 F.3d at 321 (explaining that “case-by-case analysis [of competitive effects] is unnecessary” in per se cases); Koppers, 652 F.2d at 295 n.6 (stating that “the per se rule makes certain conspiracies illegal without regard to their actual effects on trade”). As the Supreme Court explained in 1940, “[w]hatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.” Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59 (emphasis added). Therefore, even assuming arguendo that Aiyer is correct that the charged “conspiracy to ‘fix prices’ or ‘rig bids’ did not actually have a material effect on supply, demand, or consumer price,” Aiyer Br. at 36, that fact has no legal consequence because actual effects on the market are, subject to only a few, narrow exceptions, irrelevant in a case alleging a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 17 Therefore, any inquiry into Aiyer’s proffered 17 Relatedly, this long-standing principle also renders Aiyer’s argument that the government “showed no increased prices or reduced supply,” Aiyer Br. at 45, unavailing. 34 economic evidence below would not only have been unnecessary on the issue of reasonableness with respect to a per se violation, cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (noting that “[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is . . . inadmissible under standard rules of evidence”), but indeed, would have been legal error absent a properly asserted exception to the per se rule, none of which are at issue here. At oral argument, Aiyer relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin for the proposition that “a ‘departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.’” 551 U.S. at 887 (alteration in original) (quoting Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977)). Therefore, he argued, the district court was required to consider economic effects before determining whether the per se rule applied here. However, Aiyer misunderstands the import of that case. In Leegin, the Court considered whether a specific category of restraints on trade— “vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements”—“should continue to be treated as per se unlawful.” Id. at 885. Thus, upon reviewing the relevant We reiterate that, in a per se case, resulting anticompetitive effects need not be proved. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (explaining that agreements subject to the per se rule “are thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm [they have] actually caused”). 35 economic evidence, the Court concluded that the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule, was “the appropriate standard to judge vertical price restraints,” and overruled prior caselaw holding otherwise. Id. at 889–99, 907. Similarly, in GTE Sylvania, the Court was asked to determine whether certain vertical franchise agreements that “limited the number of franchises granted for any given area” were subject to the per se rule or the rule of reason. 433 U.S. at 38, 41–42. There too, the Supreme Court overruled a prior case and determined that the rule of reason applied to the challenged restraints. Id. at 58–59. Here, by contrast, the Supreme Court and this Court have long held that the categories of restraints alleged in the indictment—price fixing and bid rigging— are subject to the per se rule, see, e.g., Catalano, 446 U.S. at 647; Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223; Koppers, 652 F.2d at 293–94, “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue,” Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985). Indeed, in Leegin itself, the Supreme Court reiterated that “[r]estraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices.” 551 U.S. at 886. Thus, there was no need for the district court to consider “demonstrable economic effect[s],” id. at 887 (internal quotation marks omitted), given the well-established 36 principle that the “anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation,” Maricopa Cnty., 457 U.S. at 351. On appeal, Aiyer also asserts that “[e]ven when no formal cooperative venture exists, conduct that technically would fall within the per se category may still warrant rule of reason analysis when it promotes productivity,” Aiyer Br. at 33, but that assertion is overstated and, in any event, has no application to the facts here. As we explained in Apple, a joint venture-related exception to the per se rule arises “only when the restraint at issue was imposed in connection with some kind of potentially efficient joint venture.” 791 F.3d at 326. A court may then consider the alleged misconduct under the rule of reason. Id. Cases applying this exception, however, tend to be “limited to situations where the ‘restraints on competition [at issue] are essential if the product is to be available at all.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203). In addition, in Apple itself we rejected application of this exception where “there was no joint venture or other similar productive relationship between any of the participants in the conspiracy.” Id. 18 Aiyer does not, nor could he, claim that, even if he and the other co-conspirators 18 Although Aiyer complains that the government’s interpretation of this exception incorrectly requires the existence of a formal joint venture, we made clear in Apple that a “similar productive relationship” suffices as well. Id. 37 had the requisite “productive relationship,” their trading activity in the FX market was “essential” for CEEMEA currencies “to be available at all.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 In short, the district court did not err in refusing to assess Aiyer’s competitive effects evidence to decide whether that evidence counseled in favor of applying the rule of reason to this facially valid indictment charging a per se case. To hold otherwise would be to unconstitutionally infringe upon the factfinding function of the jury in a criminal trial, and likewise cause “the per se rule [to] lose all the benefits of being ‘per se.’” Id. Aiyer suggests that “without the trial court’s meaningful, on-the-record analysis of proffered economic evidence to determine whether the per se rule 19 Aiyer’s substantial reliance on civil cases applying the ancillary restraints doctrine or joint venture-related exception to the per se rule is therefore misplaced. For example, in In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation, the Seventh Circuit determined that the rule of reason should apply to alleged misconduct where the defendants—which were affiliate firms—entered a joint venture with another company to supply sulfuric acid in the United States because “the[ir] coordination [was] ancillary to (that is, supportive of) the legitimate business purpose of the venture.” 703 F.3d 1004, 1013 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys., 922 F.3d 713, 719, 725–31 (6th Cir.) (assessing whether the ancillary restraints doctrine applied to alleged coordinated conduct among various hospitals where those hospitals’ functions were governed by a joint operating agreement), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 380 (2019); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–90 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that, under Illinois law (which “refers courts to federal antitrust law as a guide to questions of interpretation”), the rule of reason applied to an “ancillary” restraint stemming from “a new venture—the building of a joint facility—that would expand output”). Simply put, such cases, which we assume arguendo were correctly decided and which do not bind this Court in any event, are distinguishable on their facts and inapplicable here. 38 applies, the [Sherman Act] would be unconstitutional” and “violate basic principles of due process.” Aiyer Br. at 43. This perfunctory assertion is unsupported by the law or the record in this case. In Koppers, we explicitly “decline[d] the invitation” to find that the per se rule could not be applied constitutionally absent a finding that the challenged agreement was factually unreasonable and noted that “[t]his argument asks us in effect to overrule the Supreme Court’s decisions.” 652 F.2d at 293; see also id. at 294 (“Since the Sherman Act does not make ‘unreasonableness’ part of the offense, it cannot be said that the judicially-created per se mechanism relieves the government of its duty of proving each element of a criminal offense under the Act.”). To be sure, the absence of a “reasonableness” element in a per se violation does not alter the government’s burden to prove each of the existing elements of a per se violation to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. However, as set forth below, Aiyer was not precluded from legally and factually challenging each of the elements of the alleged per se charge in full accord with due process. First, if a defendant seeks to challenge the application of the per se rule to his offense conduct by arguing to the jury that such conduct fell within one of the exceptions to the per se rule, he would have had every right to make those 39 arguments and present evidence on such exceptions at trial. Aiyer was given a full opportunity to do so. He could have introduced evidence (or argued) that his coordinated activities in the FX market either fell within the ancillary restraints doctrine, see Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7, or otherwise were in furtherance of some joint venture-like enterprise that yielded significant efficiencies, see Apple, 791 F.3d at 326. Indeed, the district court denied the government’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that Aiyer’s challenged conduct was subject to any joint venture-related exception to the per se rule. Importantly, although Aiyer suggested prior to trial that the ancillary restraints doctrine or other joint venture-related exception could apply to his conduct, he did not make specific arguments regarding, or offer any evidence related to, those exceptions at trial. In fact, Aiyer did not even ask that the jury be instructed regarding any of these potential exceptions to the per se rule. Thus, Aiyer chose not to pursue these exceptions at trial. Second, as discussed further infra, Aiyer was permitted to present some competitive effects evidence on the intent element by cross-examining witnesses regarding the actual effects of the co-conspirators’ trading activity. The district court reasoned, “having gone through all of the evidence that the purpose of [the conspiracy] was not only . . . to agree to set a price to a customer, but, rather, to 40 move the prices up or down in order to be able to make more money and to effect supply and demand, it would . . . be remarkable not to admit evidence [of] whether what they intended to do, in fact, had any effect.” App’x at 821–22. Thus, on several occasions, Aiyer was able to elicit testimony supporting his argument that the co-conspirators’ trading activity did not yield significant price effects. Insofar as Aiyer argues that he should have been permitted to introduce more evidence of competitive effects in relation to intent, as discussed below, we reject that argument because, as we have held—and reemphasize today—under these particular circumstances “nothing more is required than a showing that the defendant intentionally engaged in conduct that is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, which was proven here.” Koppers, 652 F.2d at 298. In addition to arguing to the jury that he lacked the requisite intent, Aiyer argued that there was no agreement among the alleged co-conspirators, and that any agreement that may have existed was not an agreement among competitors or an agreement to not compete on pricing. Therefore, Aiyer was fully able to attack the government’s proof as to each element of a per se case. Third, Aiyer had the opportunity to ensure that the government’s proof met the correct legal standard for a per se violation by challenging the district court’s 41 jury instructions with respect to the elements. Although he asserts that he objected to the court’s instructions on price fixing and bid rigging, Aiyer’s counsel, in fact, objected more narrowly to the district court’s decision not to use certain of his proposed instructions—namely, instructions that interdealer trading and trading in the Russian ruble do not constitute price fixing or bid rigging. 20 Thus, there was no objection to the district court’s specific language in the ultimate instruction that stated that price fixing and bid rigging “unlawfully restrain[] trade regardless of the motives of the conspirators or any economic justification they may . . . offer.” App’x at 1096 (price fixing); see also App’x at 1098–99 (same with respect to bid rigging). Further, had Aiyer presented any evidence going to the ancillary restraints doctrine or joint venture-related exception to the per se rule, he could have requested that the district court instruct the jury on those issues. Tellingly, on appeal, Aiyer does not make any specific challenges to the substance of any of the language in the district court’s jury instructions. 21 20Aiyer’s counsel also contended that “any instruction on bid rigging was not necessary because there was no bid rigging proved.” App’x at 1059. 21 Although Aiyer generally argues on appeal that the district court “could have instructed the jury to consider the reasonableness of [his] conduct,” Aiyer Br. at 42, he is incorrect. As discussed supra, absent an applicable exception, the per se rule “eliminates the need to study the reasonableness” of a challenged restraint on trade. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (emphasis added); accord Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. 42 Finally, with respect to judicial review of the adequacy of the government’s proof in the per se case against him, Aiyer was permitted to—and did—challenge the sufficiency of the government’s evidence in a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Of course, Aiyer carried a heavy burden because, on a Rule 29 motion, “a reviewing court must sustain the jury’s guilty verdict if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ho, 984 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2010)). Under that standard, in its thorough and well-reasoned decision, the district court denied Aiyer’s motion and concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Aiyer “knowingly joined a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids that affected interstate commerce and that existed within the 43 statute of limitations period.” 22 Aiyer II, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 409. Aiyer does not challenge that ruling, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, on appeal. 23 22 As described in detail in the district court’s decision, see Aiyer II, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 392–400, the government’s proof included compelling, direct evidence of a per se violation. Taking just one example, as described above, on January 8, 2012, Aiyer and Cummins realized that they had the same U.S. dollar–South African rand stop-loss order—to sell $25 million if the market price reached a certain low point. Once this situation was made known to Katz on a Bloomberg chat involving him, Aiyer, and Cummins, Katz wrote, “why dont we drive [the price] down there and keep some,” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 464, which Cummins understood to mean, “if you push it through now, it is likely that the market would bounce back and . . . you could make a profit selling higher if the market bounces higher,” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 81. Then, as Cummins testified at trial, the three co-conspirators “[w]ork[ed] together on the stop-loss.” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 122. There was evidence introduced at trial that, through this coordinated effort, Aiyer, Cummins, and Katz lowered the market price for the South African rand, after which Aiyer wrote in the chatroom, “wow tht went.” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 465. Later that day, Aiyer wrote on Bloomberg chat, “salute to first coordinated . . . zar effort,” to which Katz replied, “yep . . . many more to come.” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 450. The evidence of criminal intent was further bolstered by Aiyer’s prior comments on Bloomberg chat, such as telling Katz, “u shud introduce me to the zar mafia,” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 395; writing that he “want[ed] in to the zar mafia,” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 396; and that, “between [him and Katz] . . . we can ryun zar,” Gov’t Supp. App’x at 395; see also App’x at 1133 (Bloomberg chat where, in response to Katz’s comment that “conspiracies are nice,” Aiyer writes, “hahaha . . . prolly shudnt puot this on perma chat”). 23 Aiyer does attempt to relitigate that, in connection with Russian ruble trading, his role was more akin to that of a supplier in a vertical relationship, such that his conduct should be assessed under the rule of reason. See Apple, 791 F.3d at 321 (explaining that “the Supreme Court in recent years has clarified that vertical restraints—including those that restrict prices—should generally be subject to the rule of reason” (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882 and Khan, 522 U.S. at 7)). However, the jury heard arguments that this was not a horizontal price agreement among competitors and implicitly rejected those arguments as a factual matter with its verdict, and, again, Aiyer does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on appeal. 44 In sum, the district court did not commit legal error in declining to review Aiyer’s proffered competitive effects evidence and refusing to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applied in this case. Having had the ability to test the facial validity of the indictment in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, to present arguments and evidence to the jury on exceptions to the per se rule (which he choose not to do), to question some witnesses regarding competitive effects of the trading activity on the issue of intent, to challenge the district court’s jury instructions, and to move for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, Aiyer was given a full opportunity to legally and factually challenge the per se case against him throughout the proceedings below.