Opinion ID: 4536271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tepco

Text: We next address TEPCO’s motion to dismiss. The district court also engaged in a choice-of-law analysis for the claims against TEPCO. After determining that Japanese law should apply, the court dismissed the claims against TEPCO on international-comity grounds. We begin by addressing the choice-of-law analysis. We then consider international comity.
The plaintiffs raise the same challenges to this choice-oflaw analysis as they did to the analysis of the claims against because the sailors were injured on U.S. ships. This argument, presented for the first time in the reply, has been forfeited. See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 We therefore need not reach the alternative arguments in GE’s brief. 30 COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. GE. For the reasons previously stated, the choice-of-law analysis is not premature or inappropriate at this stage. As to the merits of the choice-of-law analysis, the district court correctly found that Japanese law also applies to the plaintiffs’ claims against TEPCO.
There is no disagreement that the laws of Japan and California differ in three ways with regard to the claims against TEPCO. First, under Japanese law, the Compensation Act is the exclusive means of redress, Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 14, 2009, 2066 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI] 54,9 but under California law, there is no such exclusive remedy. Second, the Compensation Act requires a “high probability” of causation, Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 24, 1975, 29 Saikô Saibansho Minji Hanreishû [Minshû] 1417, 1419–20, while California negligence principles require the plaintiffs to show only that their injuries were “more likely than not” caused by radiation exposure. Jones v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 456, 460 (Ct. App. 1985). Finally, Japanese law has a broad definition of compensatory damages, including damages for proprietary and material losses, spiritual or mental suffering (“consolation money”), and income lost over a lifetime, but it does not recognize or allow for punitive damages, Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 11, 1997, 51(6) 9 The cases cited here were explained in a detailed declaration from Yasuhei Taniguchi, a retired professor of law who has taught at several Japanese universities. In addition to an LL.B. from Kyoto University, Professor Taniguchi holds an LL.M. from the University of California at Berkeley and a J.S.D. from Cornell University. His analysis was credited by the district court and is not disputed by the plaintiffs. COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. 31 Saikô Saibansho Minji Hanreishû [Minshû] 2573, while California law does. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294.
The plaintiffs made no argument here or before the district court regarding the interests of either forum. We conclude that the same interests are implicated here as in the analysis of the claims against GE. California has an interest in ensuring compensation for its injured residents, while Japan has an interest in the consistent application of the Compensation Act to protect its nuclear industry. There is therefore a true conflict and we proceed to step three of the governmental-interest test.
Law Was Not Applied The analysis at this step is also much the same as for the claims against GE. As noted supra, California courts have frequently applied foreign laws like the Compensation Act—which serve to limit liability for businesses—in these situations. Japan has an even greater interest in its law applying to the claims against TEPCO than it did with respect to GE. TEPCO is a Japanese corporation operating a nuclear reactor in Japan. It is not only subject to general principles of Japanese law but, as evidenced by the Compensation Act, to a series of special rules regarding its responsibility following a nuclear disaster, just as American nuclear plant operators are subject to special liability rules under the Price-Anderson Act.10 Furthermore, following the disaster and consistent 10 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 63–67 (1978) (background on the Act). 32 COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. with the Compensation Act, the Japanese government has come forward to fund compensation for the victims of the FNPP meltdown. We were advised in TEPCO’s brief and at oral argument that the Japanese government has allocated, to date, more than $76 billion to compensate victims, and that more than 21,000 victims have received some form of compensation. Japan has a strong interest in the uniform application of the Compensation Act. Subjecting TEPCO to California’s negligence rules would seriously undermine the comprehensive scheme in the Compensation Act and impair Japan’s interests. In contrast, California has an interest in seeing the victims of a nuclear disaster compensated, but that interest would be equally served under Japanese law.11 The Compensation Act operates to compensate those injured by nuclear accidents and the plaintiffs offered no showing that they cannot be adequately compensated for their injuries under Japanese law.12 Because Japan’s interests would be more impaired if California’s laws were applied than California’s would if Japanese law were applied, we conclude that Japanese law applies to the claims against TEPCO and affirm the district court’s holding on the choice-of-law issue. We now proceed to the question of whether, given that Japanese law must be applied in any proceedings in the Southern District of 11 Of course, as discussed, the plaintiffs would not be able to recover punitive damages under Japanese law. But punitive damages are not intended to compensate for a plaintiff’s losses, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003), and TEPCO has stated that injured parties will be fully compensated for proven injuries. 12 At oral argument, TEPCO agreed to waive any statute of limitations defense provided the plaintiffs filed their claims in Japan within a reasonable amount of time. COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. 33 California, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case on international-comity grounds.
“International comity ‘is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.’” Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 597 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 1998)) (other citations omitted). It is “a doctrine of prudential abstention, one that ‘counsels voluntary forbearance when a sovereign which has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction concludes that a second sovereign also has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction under principles of international law.’” Id. at 598 (quoting United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997)). International comity embodies the policy of “good neighbourliness, common courtesy and mutual respect between those who labour in adjoining judicial vineyards.” Id. There are two kinds of international comity: prescriptive comity (addressing “the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes”) and adjudicative comity (a “discretionary act of deference by a national court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case properly adjudicated in a foreign state”). Id. at 598–99. This case deals only with adjudicative comity. In deciding whether to apply the doctrine of adjudicative comity, the courts weigh “several factors, including [1] the strength of the United States’ interest in using a foreign 34 COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. forum, [2] the strength of the foreign governments’ interests, and [3] the adequacy of the alternative forum.” Id. at 603 (quoting Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004)) (brackets in original)). In Mujica, we expounded on how to assess the United States’ and the foreign government’s interests in relying on a foreign forum: The (nonexclusive) factors we should consider when assessing [each country’s] interests include (1) the location of the conduct in question, (2) the nationality of the parties, (3) the character of the conduct in question, (4) the foreign policy interests of the [countries], and (5) any public policy interests. Id. at 604; see also id. at 607. These considerations need not be addressed mechanically. We review the district court’s international-comity determination for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if the district court applied an incorrect legal standard or if its “application of the correct legal standard was (1) ‘illogical,’ (2) ‘implausible,’ or (3) without ‘support in the inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’” Id. at 589 (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). The district court here “correctly laid out [the] legal standard,” so “the only question is whether the district court’s decision . . . to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims was illogical, implausible, or unsupported by the record.” Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1205. COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. 35 In our previous opinion, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it decided against dismissing the claims against TEPCO on comity grounds. Id. at 1209. We recognized that this was a “difficult case” and that there were “strong reasons for dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims in favor of a Japanese forum.” Id. We noted that “further developments in the district court may counsel in favor” of dismissal, particularly once the district court determined which jurisdiction’s law would apply. Id. at 1210 n.12. On remand, the district court reconsidered its comity analysis based on new developments, finding that these developments tilted the scales towards dismissal. The location of the conduct in question, nationality of the parties, nature of the conduct, and the public-policy interests remained the same. But after considering the statements from the Japanese and United States governments—which the district court did not have before it when it first ruled on the issue—the district court found that the foreign-policy interests now favored dismissal.13 And because the choiceof-law analysis is relevant to comity decisions, the district court found that its conclusion that Japanese law applied also 13 The district court also left its previous decision on the adequacy-ofthe-alternative-forum factor undisturbed, and the plaintiffs do not challenge this factor on appeal. They make passing reference to “the disparities between the American justice system and Japan’s,” but do so without citation to the record or law that supports the implication that Japan would be an inadequate forum. They claim that the defendants needed to present “clear and incontrovertible evidence” that Japan’s courts would not “deprive Plaintiffs of due process and equal protection of law to which they are entitled,” but our precedent imposes no such requirement. The plaintiffs raised similar unsubstantiated claims of bias in their previous appeal, but we found that there was “no doubt that Japan would provide an adequate alternative forum.” Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1209. The district court did not abuse its discretion by leaving its previous analysis of this factor in place. 36 COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. weighed in favor of dismissal on comity grounds. The plaintiffs contend that this was an abuse of discretion because “nothing has changed except for the court’s willingness to revisit the issue of international comity and decide to punt this case to Japan.” First, the conclusion that Japanese law applies to the case does affect the comity analysis. See Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1210 n.12 (citing Mujica, 771 F.3d at 602; UngaroBenages, 379 F.3d at 1240). It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to take the applicability of Japanese law into consideration. If Japan’s interest in the applicability of its laws to this case was strong enough to overcome California’s interests in the choice-of-law analysis, it was not illogical or implausible for the district court to find that Japan had a similarly strong interest in being the place where the plaintiffs’ claims are litigated. We can take notice of the fact that if the suit proceeds in the Southern District of California, the district court will have to inform itself at every turn of the nuances of Japanese civil law. That would require understanding who bears the burden of proof, principles of causation, and what constitute compensable damages. Not only would the district court have to educate itself on the law, but it would need to understand how the Compensation Act has been administered in the thousands of cases resolved in Japan, lest the “change of courtrooms” mean a change in result. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639. The other “significant change” that the district court found affected its analysis was the amicus briefs filed in our court during the first appeal. Neither government had expressed its views on litigating in U.S. courts before Cooper III. After Japan filed an amicus brief in Cooper III expressing a strong interest in the case being litigated in COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. 37 Japan, we invited the United States Department of State to give its views on whether the litigation should proceed in the United States.14 We considered both amicus briefs and found that they expressed “important, competing policy interests” that required “difficult judgment calls” from the district court. Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1209. On remand, the district court weighed the interests expressed in the governments’ amicus briefs and decided that, in light of the Japanese government’s strong objection to the case being litigated in the United States, the foreign-policy factor now weighed in favor of dismissal. This was a significant change from the first time the district court engaged in the comity analysis, despite the plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary. The first time the district court considered the comity factors, neither Japan nor the United States had expressed an opinion to the district court about the appropriate venue for the litigation. It was not improper for the district court to reconsider its previous holding in light of those statements. 14 In Cooper III, TEPCO and GE (appearing as amicus) argued that dismissal on comity grounds would promote the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (“CSC”). The United States argued that, in denying dismissal on comity grounds, the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1199–1200. The CSC guarantees that its contracting parties will have exclusive jurisdiction over litigation arising out of a nuclear incident within their borders. Because Japan was not a contracting party to the CSC at the time of the FNPP disaster, the United States objected to the courts relying on this argument from TEPCO and GE. Otherwise, the United States argued that it had “no specific foreign policy interest necessitating dismissal in this particular case.” Id. at 1208. 38 COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. The plaintiffs suggest that the district court effectively “overruled the Ninth Circuit,” by weighing the amicus briefs and coming to a different conclusion. But the district court did nothing of the kind. In Cooper III, we fairly invited the district court to revisit the comity analysis if and when circumstances changed. Id. at 1210 & n.12. And the statement from both governments about where the litigation should proceed was a changed circumstance for the district court. The argument that the statements were not new because we had them before us in Cooper III misunderstands the scope of our review in that case. The question before us then was not whether we, with the benefit of the statements, would have dismissed the suit on comity grounds, but whether the district court had abused its discretion with the information that it had. We were careful in stating our standard of review in that case. Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1205, 1209. Once the district court had the positions of the United States and Japanese governments before it, it was entirely proper for the district court to revisit the comity analysis. In its amicus brief, Japan strongly objected to this case being litigated in the United States. Japan has committed a significant sum of money and resources to ensure fair and consistent compensation for accident victims. Japan pointed out that if injured parties could bring their claims anywhere in the world, foreign courts might apply different legal standards, resulting in different outcomes for similarly situated victims. See id. at 1207. This would seriously affect the integrity of the compensation system established by the Japanese government. And because the Japanese government is financing TEPCO’s compensation payments, which are administered through Japanese courts, that risk is particularly troublesome. See id. at 1209 (“Japan has an undeniably strong interest in centralizing jurisdiction over FNPP-related COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. 39 claims.”). If Japan cannot exercise some control over the compensation process, it may be less willing to compensate FNPP victims who seek remedies outside of a Japanese forum. That may complicate the victims’ ability to be compensated. See Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1207 (“Judgments originating in American courts may well be inconsistent with the overall administration of Japan’s compensation fund.”) When the district court revisited the comity factors, it noted TEPCO’s argument that Japan’s interests “have only grown stronger” since its brief was filed. With the benefit of this position, the district court found that the foreign policy factor weighed in favor of dismissal, despite the United States’ “important, competing policy interest.” The plaintiffs contend that it was illogical for the district court not to consider the United States’ amicus brief in its analysis and that the district court owed deference to the State Department’s opinion about whether to exercise jurisdiction. But the district court acknowledged the United States’ statement and its competing foreign-policy concerns in its order. And to the extent that the plaintiffs contend that the State Department’s brief is an affirmative statement from the government that was entitled to special deference, the plaintiffs overstate their case. The plaintiffs point to no principle that requires district courts to defer to statements of interest from the United States. We will give “serious weight to” such statements, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004), but “[a] statement of national interest alone . . . does not take the present litigation outside the competence of the judiciary,” Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1236. Moreover, the United States issued a careful, cautious statement. The United States first “applaud[ed] the 40 COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. Government of Japan’s impressive efforts to provide recovery for damages caused by the nuclear accident at the FukushimaDaiichi power plant, including through the creation of an administrative compensation scheme that has paid over $58 billion in claims.” It did express an interest in Japan not retroactively receiving exclusive jurisdiction over suits under the CSC, which Japan had not signed at the time of the FNPP incident. And, for that reason, the U.S. urged us not to overturn the district court’s decision in Cooper III. See Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1207–09. But outside of that, the United States said only that although “a district court could choose to dismiss a case based on international comity for a claim arising overseas[,] . . . [t]he United States has no specific firm policy interest necessitating dismissal in this particular case.” The United States stopped well short of urging that California was the proper forum to exercise jurisdiction in this case. The United States thus voiced its concerns with the reasons for which the district court would grant dismissal on comity grounds, but expressed no objection that Japan be permitted to adjudicate these claims in its own courts. The United States’ measured response pales in comparison to Japan’s unequivocal objection to the exercise of jurisdiction in U.S. courts. Recognizing Japan’s interests under these circumstances was not illogical or implausible, particularly once the district court determined that Japanese law would apply to the claims. We acknowledge that the case is complicated. It implicates strong, important policy interests in both countries. But comity is a “fluid doctrine” that can “change in the course of the litigation.” Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1210. We invited the district court to reevaluate its decision in COOPER V. TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. 41 appropriate circumstances. The district court did so, and carefully explained its reasons. Having decided that Japanese law applies to the case and considering Japan’s strong interests in the case being litigated in Japan, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the claims against TEPCO on international-comity grounds.15