Opinion ID: 76792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pre-Trial Stipulation and Trial

Text: 13 On October 18, 2002, the parties entered into a pre-trial stipulation. Notably, they stipulated that [f]or the purposes of the forthcoming trial, the parties will try only those issues relating to the strict (vicarious) liability standard as articulated and ordered by [the district court] in [its] Order dated February 26, 2001. Specifically, the parties' stipulation stated that these issues of fact remained to be litigated: 14 A. As to the issue of rape, sexual assault and battery, whether or not the Plaintiff consented to the sexual contact with Aydin. 15 B. As to damages, the precise nature and extent of the damages claimed. 16 C. The Plaintiff has a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The parties disagree whether this cause of action is subsumed within the strict liability count or whether it should be presented separately at trial. 17 No one raised a legal or fact issue about which of the four defendants employed Aydin or about whether Aydin's employer was a common carrier. Instead, as to the strict liability claim, the defendants chose to litigate only whether Doe consented to the sexual intercourse and the amount of damages. 18 The case proceeded to trial, and at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendants filed three separate written motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, defendants' Rule 50(a) motions argued: (1) that as to Doe's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, Doe failed to show an independent tort (other than the alleged rape) rising to the level of outrageousness required under Florida law; (2) that as to the assault and battery claims, Doe failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Aydin intended to batter or assault Doe; and (3) that as to the strict liability claims, notwithstanding [the pre-trial] ruling ... that strict liability applies, the Defendants renew the arguments put forth in their Motion(s) to Dismiss. In other words, the third Rule 50(a) motion renewed their objections to the strict liability standard insofar as it applied to common carriers at all. Again, no defendant ever raised any issue relating to the status of Aydin's employer as a common carrier. The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Doe's emotional distress claims, but denied the other two motions. 19 At the close of all evidence, the defendants orally renewed all of [their] previously denied directed verdict motions. The district court denied the defendants' Rule 50(a) motions again and submitted Doe's sexual assault and sexual battery claims to the jury. 20 As to the sexual battery, the district court instructed the jury that the defendants were strictly liable if Doe proved actual sexual penetration and that that act was done without her consent, as follows: Sexual Battery 21 On Plaintiff's claim for sexual battery, Defendants, CELEBRITY CRUISES, ZENITH SHIPPING CORPORATION, APOLLO SHIP CHANDLERS, INC., and CELEBRITY CATERING SERVICES PARTNERSHIP are strictly liable to Plaintiff for sexual battery if Plaintiff shows, by the greater weight of the evidence, the following: 22 That Baris Aydin, with his sexual organ, penetrated or had union with the vagina of Plaintiff; and 23 That act was done without the consent of Plaintiff. 24 (emphasis added). In contrast, as to the sexual assault, the district court instructed the jury that the defendants were strictly liable if Doe proved Aydin (1) intended to commit a sexual battery and that the attempted act was done without Doe's consent, or (2) intended to cause the plaintiff to fear a sexual battery and that the attempted act was done without her consent, as follows: Sexual Assault 25 On Plaintiff's claim for sexual assault, Defendants ... are strictly liable for sexual assault if Plaintiff shows, by the greater weight of the evidence, either: 26 a) That Baris Aydin intended to commit a sexual battery on the person of Plaintiff; and that the attempted act was done without the consent of Plaintiff; or 27 b) That Baris Aydin intended to cause Plaintiff to fear an immediate sexual battery or rape; and that the attempted act was done without the consent of Plaintiff. 28 (emphasis added). Thus, as charged, a finding of sexual battery required actual penetration without Doe's consent; whereas, a finding of sexual assault required a specific intent to commit a crime and only an attempted act without Doe's consent. 29 On November 22, 2002, the jury returned a verdict for Doe on her sexual battery claim, awarded her $1 million in compensatory damages, and allocated fault equally among the four defendants. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on Doe's sexual assault claim. 30 When the jury announced its verdict, the defendants immediately sought re-submission of the claims and defenses in light of the seemingly inconsistent verdict. After hearing argument and reviewing the memoranda filed by the parties on this point, the district court denied the defendants' request to have the jury revisit its verdict. On November 27, 2002, the district court entered final judgment on the verdict in favor of Doe and against all defendants.