Opinion ID: 2831207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of Retaliatory Discharge

Text: The common law tort of retaliatory discharge was recognized by this Court in Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556-57 (Tenn. 1988). See also Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 534-35 (Tenn. 2002) (tracing origins of common law tort of retaliatory discharge). In 1990, a mere two years after Chism, the Legislature enacted the TPPA, which differs from the common law tort of retaliatory discharge by only providing protection for employees terminated “solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities.” Act of March 29, 1990, ch. 771, 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 256 (emphasis added) (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(a) (Supp. 1990)); see also Haynes v. Formac Stables, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tenn. 2015) (“The primary difference in the statutory version of the cause of action [for retaliatory discharge] is that it requires an employee to show that his or her refusal to remain silent was the sole reason for the discharge, whereas a common law claimant must show only that his or her refusal to remain silent was a substantial factor motivating the discharge.”). 5 Tennessee Code Annotated section 21-1-103 provides the following right to trial by jury in chancery court: “Either party to a suit in chancery is entitled, upon application, to a jury to try and determine any material fact in dispute, save in cases involving complicated accounting, as to such accounting and those elsewhere excepted by law or by this code, and all the issues of fact in any proper cases, shall be submitted to one (1) jury.” -7- Early decisions addressing both common law and TPPA claims against governmental entities held that the GTLA had not removed governmental immunity for such claims. See, e.g., Ketron v. Chattanooga—Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 919 F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (finding governmental immunity for pre-1997 TPPA claim); Baines v. Wilson Cnty., 86 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the GTLA did not remove sovereign immunity for common law retaliatory discharge claim); Seals v. Jefferson City, No. 03A01-9808-CV-00269, 1999 WL 349690, at ,  (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1999) (holding that the governmental entity was immune in a pre-1997 TPPA action); Williams v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 890 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the governmental entity was immune to a common law retaliatory discharge claim); Montgomery v. Mayor of Covington, 778 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (same). However, in 1997, the Legislature amended the definition of “employer” in the TPPA to include “the state, or any municipality, county, department, board, commission, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision or any other entity of the state,” and the definition of “employee” to include “an employee of the state, or any municipality, county, department, board, commission, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision or any other entity thereof.” Act of May 29, 1997, ch. 511, 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 931 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304(g)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1997)). Judicial decisions predating these amendments do not provide the answer for the issue in this appeal. We turn instead to the text of the TPPA.