Opinion ID: 1261143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Land Dedication and Road Construction Requirements

Text: The Board claimed it had the power to require the Cupps, as a condition to approval of their application, to dedicate land to the county and to build a right-turn lane and a service road. It argues that the source of its authority is Code § 15.1-491 which reads in pertinent part as follows: A zoning ordinance may include, among other things, reasonable regulations and provisions as to any or all the following matters: . . . . . (c) For the granting of special exceptions under suitable regulations and safeguards; and notwithstanding any other provisions of this article, the governing body of any city, county or town may reserve unto itself the right to issue such special exception or use permit. We find nothing in this language which empowers the Board to impose the road dedication and construction requirements which it claimed it was empowered to impose. In Virginia, we adhere to Dillon's Rule and a corollary thereto, that the powers of boards of supervisors are fixed by statute and are limited to those conferred expressly or by necessary implication. Hylton v. Prince William County, 220 Va. 435, 440, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1979). The right to grant special exceptions under suitable regulations and safeguards does not imply the power to require a citizen to turn land over to the county and build roads for the benefit of the public. Moreover, even if we assume that the Board had the authority, in a proper case, to impose such a condition, it could not do so in this case because the dedication and construction requirements were unrelated to any problem generated by the use of the subject property. The evidence established that approximately 35,000 vehicles per day used Route 7 but that Wolf Trap Nursery averaged only 25 customers per day. Of Wolf Trap's approximately 150 customers per week, 70% came on weekends and the bulk of the remaining 30% came between 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., that is, during the non-rush-hour periods. Mr. Cupp testified that the modification to the layout of the business would not expand the services offered nor increase the number of customers. He also testified that no accidents had occurred at the entrance to the driveway. Moreover, a witness for the Board admitted that the dedication and construction requirements were not imposed because of any problem generated by the Cupp property, but because of general conditions prevailing along Route 7. The Cupps contend that our decisions in Bd. Sup. James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975), and Hylton v. Prince William County, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979), have resolved the question whether dedication and construction requirements, not generated by the use, can be imposed. We think that Rowe is virtually on all fours with the present problem; therefore, we will rely upon it. Hylton, though related, concerned a subdivision development; therefore, it is factually distinct. In Rowe, the landowner complained of an ordinance that required him, prior to development, to dedicate a 55-foot-wide stretch of land fronting on Route 60 in James City County. We held that requirement to be invalid. We wrote as follows: The precise question before us is whether a local governing body has the power to enact a zoning ordinance that requires individual landowners, as a condition to the right to develop their parcels, to dedicate a portion of their fee for the purpose of providing a road, the need for which is substantially generated by public traffic demands rather than by the proposed development. Our enabling statutes delegate no such power. Moreover, Article I, § 11, of the Constitution of Virginia expressly and unequivocally provides that the General Assembly shall not pass any law ... whereby private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses, without just compensation. The dedication requirement of 8A offends that constitutional guarantee, and we hold that it is invalid. 216 Va. at 138-139, 216 S.E.2d at 208-209 (emphasis added). In addition to the dedication requirement, the ordinance in Rowe required the landowner to construct a service road. The county contended that under its general police power, it could require the construction of the road. We said the police power, while flexible, could not stretch that far because if it did, no property right, indeed, no personal right, could co-exist with it. Id. at 139, 216 S.E.2d at 209. We stated that as a general proposition, when the government takes property from a citizen it should pay for it. We held as follows: The Board cites nothing in the constitution, enabling statutes, or case law of Virginia which empowers the sovereign to require private landowners, as a condition precedent to development, to construct or maintain public facilities on land owned by the sovereign, when the need for such facilities is not substantially generated by the proposed development. The private money necessary to fund the performance of such requirements is property, and we hold that such requirements violate the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... Constitution of Virginia, Art. I, § 11. Id. at 139-140, 216 S.E.2d at 209. On the strength of Rowe, it is plain that the dedication and construction requirements could not be imposed by the Board.