Opinion ID: 2590549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Instruct Regarding Accomplice Liability and Credibility Assessment of Prosecution Witness Springer

Text: Defendant contends that at the Stumpf trial the court had a sua sponte obligation to give accomplice liability instructions regarding the testimony of George Springer in light of evidence it was Springer and not [defendant] who shot Stumpf. As an alternate theory, defendant argues Springer aided and abetted his sale of drugs to Stumpf and was therefore liable for the murder as a natural and probable consequence of that crime. According to defendant, the failure to give this instruction deprived him of his right to due process and other constitutional guarantees. We find no error. As to the first theory  that Springer was the direct perpetrator of Stumpf's murder  defendant's contention is legally unsound. Although section 1111 defines an accomplice as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given, the law further requires a relationship between the defendant and accomplice, either by virtue of a conspiracy or by acts aiding and abetting the crime. (See People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 183, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664.) The record, however, contains no evidence of a conspiracy between Springer and defendant or that Springer somehow aided and abetted defendant in the commission of any crime. As such, the standard instruction on witness credibility (see CALJIC No. 2.20)  including [t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive  was sufficient to apprise the jury on its consideration of Springer's testimony. People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298, relied on by defendant, is distinguishable and does not undermine this conclusion. In that case, the defendant's testimony established a preexisting involvement between him and the prosecution witness he asserted was an accomplice. ( Id. at pp. 465-466, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) The prosecutor also indicated the witness was involved in the crime. ( Id. at p. 467, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) On that basis, this court concluded that the question of whether the witness was an accomplice should have been submitted to the jury along with cautionary instructions on accomplice credibility. ( Id. at pp. 468-469, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) Here, defendant denied being at the scene of the murder, much less having some connection with Springer in its perpetration. The prosecution also never suggested anyone but defendant killed Stumpf. To the extent People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pages 468-469, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298, indicated that a witness could be deemed defendant's accomplice in the charged offense even if the evidence of the witness's possible involvement tends to show the witness committed the crime without the defendant's participation, its reasoning on this point is disapproved. Defendant's second theory of accomplice liability  that murder is a natural and probable consequence of any drug sale  fails for similar reasons. There is no evidence in the record even suggesting that Springer was associated in any way with defendant in the selling of drugs. Indeed, Springer accompanied the unarmed victim who wanted to purchase drugs  and not defendant who was armed while selling drugs. As such, there was no evidence to support an accomplice instruction under a natural and probable consequence theory.