Opinion ID: 1962637
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Form of Government

Text: The Commonwealth Court struck down Act 91 upon the alternative ground that, in its view, the statute improperly vests powers in the mayor of Harrisburg without approval of the Harrisburg voters. As discussed, the court viewed this as inconsistent with the Charter Law, in that the mayor-council plan of government does not grant the mayor authority to appoint a board of control for the school district. Appellees likewise contend that giving the mayor power to appoint such a board violates Article IX, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra note 8, in that it effects a modification in the form of Harrisburg's government after the voters had already made a selection of governmental structure pursuant to the Charter Law. While there is some appeal to the proposition that giving the mayor any duties or responsibilities which are not specifically enumerated in the Charter Law effects a change in the form of government because the voters did not opt for a plan in which the mayor possessed such responsibilities, see Hickok II, 781 A.2d at 234, it should also be recognized that the Charter Law specifically imbues the mayor with general enforcement authority over all general laws applicable thereto. 53 P.S. § 41412; see also 53 P.S. § 41301 (specifying that, once a city chooses its optional plan, the city is thereafter governed by the plan as well as by all applicable provisions of general law). Any city that adopts a mayor-council form of government under the Charter Law thus implicitly endorses the principle that, in addition to local ordinances, the city will be bound by applicable general laws subsequently enacted by the Legislature. As we have already determined that Act 91 is not a special law, it is a general law that is applicable thereto, that is, to Harrisburg and any other city in the class defined by its terms. See Hickok I, 563 Pa. at 397, 761 A.2d at 1136 (observing that legislation for a class is general, not special); Seabolt v. Commissioners of Northumberland County, 187 Pa. 318, 323, 41 A. 22, 23 (1898) (same). The act is therefore consistent in principle with the general grant of mayoral powers contained in the Charter Law. The question, then, distills to whether, as Appellees contend, Act 91 violates Article IX, Section 3 by somehow altering the form of government selected by the voters of Harrisburg or other cities in the relevant class. This is the central inquiry because the constitutional provision at issue pertains specifically to the selection by municipalities of an optional form of government. See PA. CONST. art. IX, § 3. Form is defined variously, and most relevantly, as the organization, placement, or relationship of basic elements, and the structure, organization, or essential character of something, as opposed to its matter. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 515 (2d rev'd & updated Random House ed.2000). In this respect, we agree with Judge Leadbetter that Section 3 of Article IX does not per se preclude a legislative grant of particularized powers and duties to the mayor of a city that has opted for a mayor-council form of government, but refers instead to a wholesale change of municipal government. See Hickok II, 781 A.2d at 239 (Leadbetter, J., dissenting). So long as the addition of such duties is not inconsistent with the basic existence, structure, and powers of the office of mayor or the other branches of city government, it does not alter its form. This reading is also consistent with the provisions of the Charter Law itself. Those applicable to all optional plans tend to focus upon such things as the size of the city council, see 53 P.S. § 41213, and the manner in which city officials are elected, see 53 P.S. § 41241, while the provisions pertaining specifically to the mayor-council plan deal with: identifying the city's elected officials (i.e., the mayor, the city council, the treasurer and the controller), see 53 P.S. § 41402; the length of terms of office, see 53 P.S. § 41403; the size of the city council, see 53 P.S. § 41404; the manner in which vacancies are filled, see 53 P.S. § 41405; the separation of powers between branches of government, see 53 P.S. §§ 41407, 41411; the manner in which local ordinances are enacted, see 53 P.S. § 41413; whether and how a department of administrator is established, see 53 P.S. § 41416; and the preparation of a city budget, see 53 P.S. § 41418. None of these provisions purport to identify an exhaustive list of mayoral duties, and we decline to adopt an interpretation of the Charter Law under which the mayor's responsibilities as enumerated in that statute can never be augmented because they define the governmental structure. Accordingly, as Act 91's grant of authority to the mayor to appoint a board of control for the school district does not interfere with the existence, structure, or powers of the mayor or any other branch or function of city government prescribed by the mayor-council optional form of government under the Charter Law, we hold that it does not change the form of such government in violation of Article IX, Section 3.