Opinion ID: 4527475
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admission of Amanda Kelly’s Testimony

Text: Sumlin appeals the district court’s decision to admit Amanda Kelly’s testimony relating to the scope of her past relationship with him. He argues that the testimony was not intrinsic to the case because it showed no connection to his alleged drug dealings with Carrie Dobbins. Furthermore, Sumlin argues that the testimony should have been evaluated and found inadmissible under a Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) analysis, given that the evidence was not probative of a material issue in the case, but instead, was inadmissible character evidence. Rebutting these claims, the government advances that Kelly’s testimony related to her past use of drugs and her purchases from Sumlin was proper background evidence and inextricably intertwined with the rest of her testimony. In the alternative, the government argues that such evidence would be properly admitted even under Rule 404(b). The government has the better of the argument. We review a district court’s decision to admit testimony and other evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 414 (6th Cir. 2000); see United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 1992). “An abuse of discretion exists where the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2006); see United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir.1991). “An erroneous admission of evidence that does not affect the ‘substantial rights' of a party is considered harmless, and should be disregarded.” United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 775 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 271 F.3d 247, 254 (6th Cir.2001)). Furthermore, “[t]he standard for relevancy is extremely liberal.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). “‘[E]vidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence’ is relevant.” Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 11 Evid. 401). “[E]ven if a district court believes the evidence is insufficient to prove the ultimate point for which it is offered, it may not exclude the evidence if it has the slightest probative worth.” DXS, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 100 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Given these directives, we deem Amanda Kelly’s testimony about her past drug-related and personal relationship with Sumlin, to be relevant. Kelly was Carrie’s sister, Sumlin’s former client, and also his former girlfriend. Kelly testified that she saw her sister with Sumlin at her mother's residence at approximately 8:45 a.m. on March 28, 2015. Kelly also testified that Carrie had abused drugs in the past and continued to do so, and that Sumlin was a drug dealer, who had routinely delivered drugs to her at her mother’s same residence in the past. Prior to the introduction of this testimony, Sumlin’s attorney objected to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds. However, the government offered a strong foundation for the testimony’s relevance, explaining that this evidence was necessary both to contextualize the relationship between Kelly and Sumlin, and to explain how Kelly could identify “TJ” the drug dealer, as Sumlin. The government also explained that the evidence was relevant to Kelly’s motives for testifying. After Sumlin’s attorney eventually conceded that her client was a drug dealer and had had past relationships with both Carrie and Kelly,6 the district court determined that Kelly’s testimony was relevant. Nonetheless, the court also agreed to give the jury a limiting instruction as to how to consider the testimony at the beginning of Kelly’s testimony and during its jury charge. Furthermore, even if Kelly’s testimony alone would have been insufficient to prove Sumlin’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), as discussed above, this court’s “relevance threshold is very low under Rule 401, [a]nd . . . the government is permitted to build an incremental case.” Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 739. And here, simply because Kelly’s 6Prior to the district court concluding that Kelly’s testimony was relevant, the following exchange occurred between the judge and Sumlin’s defense counsel: THE COURT: What’s the defense here, Rhonda? MS. KOTNIK: For that witness or - THE COURT: In general. I mean, listened to the opening statements, but - MS. KOTNIK: The drugs that he provided are not the drugs that killed her. THE COURT: So you’re not disputing the fact that they had a relationship with a drug dealer? MS. KOTNIK: Correct. Correct. (R. 175: Trial Trans., PageID 1114–15). No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 12 testimony may or may not prove Sumlin’s crime, “does not mean, necessarily” that the contextualizing evidence Kelly provides is irrelevant. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Kelly’s testimony.
In light of our above assessment, we disagree with Sumlin’s characterization of Kelly’s testimony as barred by Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) “does not apply to evidence that itself is probative of the crime charged[.]” United States v. Price, 329 F.3d 903, 906 (6th Cir. 2003). Such probative proof includes “intrinsic acts” evidence that relates to those acts that “were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.” United States v. Daulton, 266 F. App’x 381, 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Furthermore, even if the evidence at issue relates to a defendant’s uncharged criminal conduct, the evidence still is admissible if the conduct “arises from the same events as” and “is directly probative of [defendant’s] charged offense[.]” United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 698 (6th Cir. 2012). To demarcate the scope of admissible “intrinsic evidence” from proof that falls under the scope of Rule 404(b)’s exclusion, our circuit uses the following framework: Rule 404(b) does not apply where the challenged evidence is “inextricably intertwined” with evidence of the crime charged in the indictment. When the other crimes or wrongs occurred at different times and under different circumstances from the offense charged, the deeds are termed “extrinsic.” “Intrinsic” acts on the other hand, are those that are part of a single criminal episode. United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Torres, 685 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1982)). Note as well, that evidence relating to the background of the charged offense, known as “res gestae evidence,” is also considered “intrinsic” and admissible, meaning the court would not undertake a Rule 404(b) analysis: Proper background evidence has a causal, temporal or spatial connection with the charged offense. Typically, such evidence is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness's testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense. United States v. Hardy (Marlondo), 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 13 In light of this authority, we find that Amanda Kelly’s testimony, in which she reveals her previous drug use and past drug purchase history from Sumlin, constituted both proper res gestae evidence, as well as evidence that is “inextricably intertwined” with evidence of Sumlin’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). At a foundational level, Kelly’s historic drug dealings with Sumlin help contextualize (1) how she knew Sumlin was “TJ,” (2) how she recognized Sumlin’s car in her mother’s driveway on the morning of her sister’s death, and (3) how she identified Sumlin as the individual in the living room with her sister at 8:45 a.m. on the same morning. Kelly’s previous interactions with Sumlin also help de-code the text messages in which Carrie Dobbins appears to request drugs and Sumlin agrees to drop them off. Without any level of background knowledge of Sumlin’s past drug dealings with Kelly and Carrie, the texts, in isolation, could appear cryptic. There were no explicit references to drugs, or even popular drug code words in the conversation, which would have aided in confirming that the text message exchange was indeed, about a drug deal. Without any background knowledge, the number “35” (Carrie’s response to Sumlin’s question of “how much”) could have been referring to “35” units of any type of commodity. (R. 177: Schmidt Trans., PageID 1404–14 & Exhibit 140, PageID 1655). However, as the government argues, and as we agree, Kelly’s testimony as to her past relationship and dealings with Sumlin is “integral,” in that it completes the story of Sumlin’s charged offense under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)—namely, that those “35” units discussed in the text exchange could reasonably have been interpreted as “35” units of fentanyl or heroin, which was the quantity of drugs that Sumlin, operating under the alias “TJ,” distributed to Carrie and that ultimately led to her death. Moreover, as Kelly explained, because Sumlin had prior dealings with both her and her sister, when he asked Carrie “how much” following her request to “come over,” he did not have to ask where to deliver the drugs. (Id.). Significantly as well, we find the testimony to represent both “intrinsic” and proper background evidence in clarifying Kelly’s motives for testifying, as well as revealing any potential bias she harbored against Sumlin, which could have prejudiced his case. The Supreme Court characterizes bias as “the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, [her] testimony in favor of or against a party.” No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 14 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). “Bias is always relevant in assessing a witness’s credibility.” Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 607 permits a party to proactively introduce potential impeachment evidence during direct examination prior to the defense having the opportunity to present the same evidence during cross-examination. Kelly’s testimony relating to her past drug use and prior sexual relationship with Sumlin was directly relevant to her credibility.7 The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the government to inform the jury of impeachment facts through Kelly’s direct testimony, rather than wait for them to be introduced in her cross-examination. For the aforementioned reasons, we classify Kelly’s evidence as both “intrinsic” and relevant, and therefore, properly admitted by the district court. Given this holding, we need not analyze Sumlin’s alternative argument regarding the testimony’s applicability under a Rule 404(b) analysis.