Opinion ID: 1155865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inadequate preparation

Text: Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for petitioner's trial, especially given the fact that counsel had ample notice this was an LWOP case. We agree. A criminal defense attorney has a duty to perform a reasonable investigation. Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. at 331, 642 S.E.2d at 597. [W]hile the scope of a reasonable investigation depends upon a number of issues, at a minimum, counsel has the duty to interview potential witnesses and to make an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 331-32, 642 S.E.2d at 597 (internal quotes and citation omitted). Petitioner's trial took place on December 4-5, 2001. At the outset, trial counsel Greg Newell informed the court that petitioner's family was supposed to bring several witnesses with them for petitioner. Counsel then requested a continuance because he had found out the names of these people just this morning and therefore had not had a chance to subpoena them. (emphasis added). Newell discussed witnesses for the defense a few other times during trial. After a pretrial hearing, Newell advised the trial court there were two witnesses who would be arriving in the afternoon, but two others who were not available. Newell offered his opinion that the unavailable witnesses would not add much to petitioner's case, although he informed the trial court that the witnesses would be able to connect Garrett with petitioner through drug dealing. Later that afternoon, counsel requested assistance to locate a witness named Elaine Sara Hawkins who was in detention. Hawkins, however, was unable to be located either that day or the following day. Newell told the court that he had spoken to the two other witnesses, but contended they would not add that much to the case. As a result, petitioner was the sole defense witness. According to the State, both petitioner and Newell had been served written notice of the State's intent to seek an LWOP sentence on May 3, 2001. Additionally, Newell was served again with notice on October 18, 2001. Therefore, Newell had several months' notice petitioner was facing a LWOP sentence if convicted. At the PCR hearing, petitioner testified that Newell had not done anything to investigate his case. Significantly, petitioner stated Newell had met with him only once  on the morning of trial. Although Newell had represented petitioner in a probation violation matter in August 2001, petitioner testified Newell never discussed the armed robbery and kidnapping charges at all. Petitioner further explained that on the morning of trial, he gave Newell the names of witnesses who could identify Garrett as someone with whom he had dealt. Petitioner said Newell showed him some discovery that morning, but Newell did not discuss the file; he simply asked petitioner to look it over and if petitioner saw anything, to let him know. Petitioner presented two other witnesses at the PCR hearing. George Lounds, petitioner's brother, testified that Garrett and petitioner bought and used drugs together. George stated that Newell spoke to him before trial, and said he would get back to him, but George never heard back from Newell. According to George, if Newell had called him to the stand, he would have testified about the connection between Garrett and petitioner. Moreover, George stated he was surprised when he learned that petitioner had been charged with robbing and kidnapping Garrett because the two of them were always together hanging out and smoking together at a crack house. Preston Lounds, petitioner's nephew, testified that he had seen Garrett purchase drugs and had also seen petitioner and Garrett together in Garrett's truck. Preston further testified he was at the courthouse during petitioner's trial, but Newell never spoke to him. Newell did not testify at the PCR hearing. The State attempted to subpoena Newell for the PCR hearing, but was unable to successfully serve him. [2] The PCR court found that trial counsel adequately conferred with [petitioner], conducted a proper investigation, and was competent in his representation. The PCR court suggested that because Newell told the trial court the witnesses would not add anything to the defense case, it was a strategic reason to not call the witnesses. Moreover, the PCR court found it unlikely that George and Preston's testimony would have overcome the victim's testimony at trial. We find there is no probative evidence to support the PCR court's findings on this issue. We have recognized that when counsel articulates a valid reason for employing a certain strategy, such conduct generally will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel. Ingle v. State, 348 S.C. 467, 560 S.E.2d 401 (2002); Stokes v. State, 308 S.C. 546, 419 S.E.2d 778 (1992). The validity of counsel's strategy is reviewed under an objective standard of reasonableness. Ingle, 348 S.C. at 470, 560 S.E.2d at 402. In the instant case, however, Newell did not articulate a strategy because he did not testify at the PCR hearing. Although Newell did state to the trial court he believed the witnesses would not add much to petitioner's defense, we find this was not objectively reasonable given the defense theory of the case. The only defense Newell presented to the jury was that petitioner and Garrett knew each other through drug dealing. If witnesses other than petitioner were willing to testify to this fact, certainly that would have added significantly to the credibility of petitioner's case. Thus, we find the PCR court erred in finding that Newell offered an objectively valid strategic reason not to call these witnesses. Furthermore, both the trial transcript and petitioner's PCR testimony inescapably point to the conclusion that Newell simply had not adequately prepared the defense case. Newell himself admitted to the trial court he had only learned of defense witnesses that morning, and therefore they had neither been interviewed nor subpoenaed. Petitioner corroborated this at the PCR hearing when he stated Newell had only spoken to him about the case on the morning of trial. We hold the evidence clearly shows that Newell inadequately prepared for trial. See Ard v. Catoe, supra (at a minimum, counsel has the duty to interview potential witnesses). This was unreasonable in light of the fact that Newell had several months' notice that petitioner was facing LWOP if convicted. Therefore, we find counsel deficient in this regard. As to the prejudice resulting from counsel's deficient performance, we believe petitioner clearly was prejudiced by Newell's failure to subpoena and call witnesses who would have supported petitioner's own testimony at trial. With its not-guilty verdict on the armed robbery charge, the jury necessarily rejected several aspects of Garrett's account, and accepted as true certain parts of petitioner's testimony. Moreover, the jury's questions during deliberations indicate it also struggled with whether petitioner was guilty of kidnapping. Thus, we find that if additional witnesses had confirmed petitioner's testimony, there is a reasonable likelihood the result of the trial would have been different on the kidnapping count. Strickland v. Washington, supra . Accordingly, the PCR court erred in not finding ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue. See Jackson v. State, supra (if no probative evidence supports the PCR court's findings, this Court will not uphold the findings of the PCR court) Pierce v. State, supra (the PCR court's decision will be reversed when it is controlled by an error of law).