Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Combined Effect of Guilt Phase Errors

Text: As the preceding analysis reveals, defendant has conclusively demonstrated only a single instance of actual error by the trial court at the guilt phase  i.e., the unmodified use of CALJIC No. 2.11.5. (See pt. II.J.2., ante. ) As will be recalled, that error did not prejudice defendant. It follows no cumulative error warranting reversal occurred at the guilt phase of defendant's trial.
Defendant raises a number of claims attacking the judgment as to penalty.
(36) After the guilt phase of his trial had concluded, but before the beginning of the penalty phase, defendant moved to reopen voir dire of the jury, pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (c) (section 190.4(c)). That statute provides [i]f the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the truth of any special circumstances which may be alleged, and the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. The trial court denied defendant's motion, observing [t]he only ground that you base your opinion on is that they came in with a verdict within an hour and 45 minutes, and I will submit that is probably a product of the strength of the People's case rather than any jury misconduct. Defendant contends the denial of his motion to reopen voir dire was prejudicial error. He argues that the jury's having deliberated less than two hours after a long trial involving extensive exhibits constitutes reason enough to justify a voir dire of the jury to determine if good cause exists to impanel a new jury for the penalty phase. Defendant's argument lacks merit. Voir dire is not to be reopened on speculation that good cause to impanel a new jury may thereby be discovered; rather, a showing of good cause is a prerequisite to reopening. ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 846 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].) Section 190.4(c) reflects the long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty. ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 845.) Defendant's mere speculation that his jury cut short its deliberations out of prejudice does not establish good cause for a departure from that preference. Good cause is established only by facts which `appear in the record as a demonstrable reality' ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]), and defendant cites to none. Thus, no error appears.
(37) Prior to the beginning of penalty phase testimony, defendant moved for removal of Juror Savolt, who served as jury foreman during both the guilt and penalty phases, on the ground Savolt committed misconduct during the guilt phase. Defense counsel, based on alleged observations of Savolt's body language, contended Savolt had reached a decision in the case before the matter was submitted to him. Specifically, counsel alleged Savolt turned away from watching defense witnesses, and was not paying any attention to defense witnesses. Instead, Savolt was facing away, not looking at ... defense witnesses that were testifying. In response to defendant's motion, the trial court stated that during the course of the trial I make it a habit to observe the jury and I don't recall seeing anything that would make me feel that he was not listening to the evidence. When defense counsel requested that Savolt be asked if he had listened to the defense, the court denied the request, finding no objective evidence that he did such a thing ... other than what you [i.e., defense counsel] say [about] his body language. Ultimately, the court denied defendant's motion to excuse Juror Savolt. Defendant contends it was reversible error for the trial court not to voir dire Juror Savolt as to whether he had listened to the defense. It is true that [a] trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine facts alleged as juror misconduct `whenever the court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist.' ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 547 [41 Cal. Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119], quoting People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 519 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].) On this record, however, we cannot conclude the trial court was put on notice of good cause to discharge Savolt. First, defense counsel made inconsistent factual allegations in support of his request that the court voir dire Juror Savolt, thus undermining his claim of misconduct. In the same breath, trial defense counsel alleged both that Juror Savolt was showing his disgust, his disbelief in any defense witnesses and that he [p]aid absolutely no attention to what the defense was presenting. Second, the trial court was attentive to the possibility of Savolt's misbehavior. Twice confronted by defense counsel with concerns that Juror Savolt was not listening to defense witnesses, the trial judge stated, I've seen nothing improper, but I will observe much more closely. At the end of the court session at issue, as defendant acknowledges, the court further stated: I would like the record to reflect that I have constantly observed juror No. 7 [Savolt]. Through all these witnesses he has been attentive. Third, even if Juror Savolt did turn his face for some periods of time so that he was not directly observing defense witnesses, this fact would not alone establish that he was not listening to the witnesses or that he was not paying proper attention to their testimony. In short, defendant merely speculates there might have been jury misconduct. Before a juror may be dismissed for losing, during trial, the ability to render a fair and unbiased verdict, the juror's inability to perform his functions must appear as a `demonstrable reality.' ( People v. Van Houten (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 280, 288 [170 Cal. Rptr. 189], quoting People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 696 [131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742].) The record here does not establish that the trial court was put on notice of good cause to believe that Juror Savolt had prejudged the issues submitted to him. Accordingly, no duty arose on the part of the trial court to conduct an inquiry, let alone to discharge Juror Savolt. ( People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 547.)
(38) Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to replace Juror Rogers with an alternate. After Juror Rogers indicated to the court clerk that, if the case lasted too much longer, she might not be physically able to continue to serve as a juror, the trial judge asked her to come into the courtroom, with counsel present, but outside the presence of the jury. The court told Rogers that counsel estimated the trial would last about one more week, and asked: Would one more week or soon thereafter cause you any great problems? Rogers responded: I have the faith to keep going, and said that she felt better after lunch. The court then stated: At any time that you feel you would have problems, just let me know. Rogers responded, I appreciate that. After this colloquy, the trial judge asked defense counsel if they had any questions they would like to ask Juror Rogers; each answered, No, your honor. Rogers continued to serve on defendant's jury, which began deliberations 10 days later. Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to inquire further into the problems Juror Rogers was having and in failing to ask her about possible prejudice or bias she might have with respect to the case. We do not agree. [A]n inquiry sufficient to determine the facts is required whenever the court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist. ( People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 519.) If a juror upon good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefore, the court may order him to be discharged and substitute an alternate juror. (§ 1089.) `A good cause determination in this context is one calling for the exercise of the court's discretion [citations], and if there is any substantial evidence supporting the decision, it will be upheld on appeal. [Citation].' ( People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 520, quoting People v. Van Houten, supra, 113 Cal. App.3d at p. 288.) Juror Rogers's statements to the clerk were sufficient to raise the possibility she was physically unable to continue serving as a juror. (Cf. People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 520.) Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to conduct an inquiry sufficient to establish whether good cause for her discharge existed. ( Id. at pp. 520-521.) This the trial judge did. Rogers, in defense counsel's presence, answered questions put to her by the judge. Defense counsel was afforded an express opportunity to ask any additional questions. Rogers indicated she felt able to continue as a juror, and nothing in the record indicates she experienced any further problems, let alone that her ability to function competently as a juror was impaired. Nor was there ever any suggestion that Juror Rogers was subject to bias or prejudice. Bias in a juror may not be presumed ( People v. Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 696), and the trial court here had no basis for further questioning of Rogers on that topic. Before a trial court may excuse a juror for inability to perform the juror's functions, `that inability must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60 [98 Cal. Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to discharge Rogers from the jury.
(39) Defendant contends that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated by admission of evidence respecting his participation in an unadjudicated shooting at a July 19, 1980, church carnival (the Cakewalk). Defendant and another Bloods gang member shot into the crowd attending the Cakewalk, which included members of a Crips gang. Several people were injured and four people (Karry Island, Mary Nixon, Barbara Nixon and Deontray Turner), including a minister of the church (Barbara Nixon), testified they recognized defendant when the red bandanna he was wearing slipped from his face. Initially, charges respecting the Cakewalk incident were filed against defendant, but they were dismissed and never refiled. Defendant contends admission of the evidence was erroneous in several respects. First, defendant argues, presentation of an unadjudicated felony charge as to which the statute of limitations had expired denied him due process and a fair penalty trial and resulted in a death sentence based on unconstitutionally unreliable evidence. As defendant concedes, however, we consistently have rejected the contention that a defendant's statutory or constitutional rights are violated by the consideration, as a factor in aggravation of penalty, of evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity for which prosecution would be time-barred. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1244 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) We have long recognized that, as `[section 190.3, factor] (b) imposes no time limitation on the introduction of violent crimes; the jury presumably may consider criminal violence which has occurred at any time in the defendant's life.' ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 529 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640], quoting People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 202 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], original italics.) Defendant asks us to reconsider our holding that the Eighth Amendment's aim of assuring the reliability of penalty determinations is furthered, not frustrated, by the admission of ... prior violent criminal activity. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1244.) Defendant somewhat opaquely argues that our reasoning in Johnson was circular. Having considered defendant's arguments and reviewed Johnson `s reasoning and rationales, we are not persuaded we should revisit that decision in this case. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention of error in admission of evidence concerning the Cakewalk incident, even though the statute of limitations had, at the time of trial, expired as to crimes with which defendant was originally charged in connection with that incident. (40) Second, defendant argues, his rights under the state and federal Constitutions were violated because he received inadequate notice that the prosecution would introduce evidence respecting the Cakewalk. We have reviewed the record and conclude defendant received adequate notice. As defendant acknowledges, the prosecution sent a letter to defense counsel dated November 21, 1983, which gave notice that evidence respecting the Cakewalk incident was going to be used in aggravation at the penalty phase. The prosecution's letter specifically stated that [t]he evidence includes, but is not limited to, five counts of murder and assault with intent to commit murder, which was the subject of Case No. A449580, dismissed 8-4-80 after witnesses failed to appear.... On December 3, 1983, in response to the prosecution's notice letter, defense counsel requested (and later received) certain discovery, including the arrest report on the Cakewalk incident. Before defendant's trial commenced, on March 10, 1985, the prosecution sent another notice letter to trial defense counsel. The second letter listed the specific Cakewalk-related counts and enhancements the prosecution intended to present in aggravation. Before the commencement of the penalty phase, defense counsel moved to exclude the prosecution's Cakewalk-related evidence on the ground the arrest report of the Cakewalk incident did not establish substantial evidence of defendant's involvement so as to render the Cakewalk-related evidence relevant and admissible against him. The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding the Cakewalk evidence admissible. Finally, the trial court gave defense counsel a continuance in order to conduct any interviews of Cakewalk witnesses to be presented by the prosecution; defense counsel interviewed three witnesses (Karry Island, Mary Nixon, and Michael Hardwick). The prosecution presented testimony of Karry Island, Mary Nixon, Michael Hardwick, Thelma Turner, Barbara Nixon and Deontray Turner. In light of the foregoing, it is apparent defendant received adequate notice the prosecution intended to introduce evidence respecting his participation in the Cakewalk incident as a factor in aggravation of penalty. Defendant correctly observes section 190.3 provides no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. (Italics added.) Defendant argues that, because the notice his counsel received (i.e., the previously described letters and discovery) did not specify which of the individuals mentioned in the Cakewalk police report would be called to testify, what their testimony would be, or what physical evidence would be introduced in conjunction with their testimony, the notice provided was statutorily inadequate. We previously have rejected the identical contention. (See People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 852-854 [248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894].) In Grant, defendant contended the prosecution's notice was insufficient under section 190.3 because, while the notice advised defendant of the particular prior offenses the prosecution planned to prove at the penalty trial ( People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 853), it did not state which specific testimony, writings, material objects, or other things (Evid. Code, § 140) would be offered. We ruled: The point is unpersuasive. A challenge to the sufficiency of a notice of aggravating evidence ... cannot be resolved by a mechanical application of a general definition of the word `evidence.' ( People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 853.) In Grant, the notice given to defendant ... advised him of the date, place, and charge of certain prior charges and the date, place, nature, and victim of certain additional criminal acts that the prosecution intended to prove he had committed. In these circumstances, the notice was adequate to fulfill the statutory purpose.... ( People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 853-854.) Similarly, here there was no error. (41) Third, defendant argues, the trial court denied him due process in refusing to conduct a lineup to test several eyewitnesses' identification of him as a shooter in the Cakewalk incident. Defendant relies on Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617 [114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681] ( Evans ). In Evans, we held that due process requires in an appropriate case that an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate. ( Id. at p. 625.) We explained, however, that the right to a lineup arises only when eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to resolve. ( Ibid. ) Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a lineup because the in-court eyewitness identification testimony actually elicited at the penalty phase of his trial was unreliable. Specifically, defendant complains that: (1) approximately five years had elapsed between the Cakewalk incident and the eyewitness testimony to it at the penalty phase of his trial; (2) the eyewitnesses who testified against him had strong motivation to lie, because they were either rival gang members or family members of rival gang members; and (3) the eyewitnesses each testified that, prior to their testimony, they had known or encountered defendant at times and places other than the Cakewalk incident. There was, here, no reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification such as was discussed in Evans. (See Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 625.) In Evans, [i]t was argued in support of the motion [for a lineup] that because [the defendant] was identified at the scene of the robbery by witnesses ... who saw only a limited view of [the defendant]'s head and shoulders from the rear, the identification was faulty; [and] that because the witnesses had committed themselves as to the identifications [at the preliminary hearing] they would be reluctant to recede from such a position, even if in error, at later proceedings in court.... ( Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 621.) Neither argument was  or could have been  made in support of defendant's motion. The witnesses who identified defendant as a participant in the Cakewalk incident testified to seeing his face. Moreover, as defendant himself emphasizes, their testimony identifying him at trial was the first these witnesses had given respecting the Cakewalk incident. Defense counsel, in addition to having the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution's Cakewalk eyewitnesses, was given, just prior to their testimony, a continuance to interview them. Counsel did not request any further continuance. As we have previously noted, [i]nsofar as defendant contends that an in-court identification not preceded by a lineup is impermissibly suggestive and prejudicial as a matter of law, he is wrong. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1155.) We emphasized in Evans that the resolution [of a lineup request] must be arrived at after consideration not only of the benefits to be derived by the accused and the reasonableness of his request but also after considering the burden to be imposed on the prosecution, the police, the court and the witnesses. ( Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 625.) Before ruling, the judge at defendant's penalty phase heard argument at some length from defense counsel as well as the prosecution on the relative benefits and burdens of conducting a lineup. Even defense counsel conceded a lineup might not accomplish much, your honor, though he did think it would accomplish something. We noted in Evans that [t]he questions whether eyewitness identification is a material issue and whether fundamental fairness requires a lineup in a particular case are inquiries which necessarily rest for determination within the broad discretion of the magistrate or trial judge. ( Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 625.) In light of the attendant circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's having denied defendant's motion for a lineup. Fourth, defendant argues, he was denied due process of law because the allegation that he was involved in the Cakewalk incident was adjudicated by the same jury that had previously convicted him of murder. As defendant acknowledges, we repeatedly have rejected the claim that due process rights are infringed when the same jury that convicted a capital defendant subsequently determines the truth or falsity of previously unadjudicated aggravating charges. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1244; People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 204-205.) Defendant requests we reconsider our original holding in Balderas to that effect, but we quite recently declined to do so. (See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 427 [53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000].) Defendant suggests no basis for our concluding differently in this case. (42) Finally, defendant argues, the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting one Willie Smith's medical records to show that Smith was injured in the Cakewalk shooting. Karry Island testified that Smith was present at the Cakewalk carnival during the shooting. Island also testified that Smith grabbed Michael Hardwick when Hardwick was shot by defendant and, because Hardwick was unable to run from the shooting, dragged him into the back of a nearby truck for safety. Smith was not able to appear because he was in state prison at the time of defendant's trial. The trial court admitted Smith's medical records into evidence. Defendant concedes that evidence defendant shot Smith at the Cakewalk would be relevant as a factor in aggravation of penalty. The record contains evidence that defendant discharged a shotgun several times at this crowded neighborhood carnival. (There was also testimony that another individual discharged a shotgun.) Several people were wounded by shotgun pellets. As discussed, there was evidence that Willie Smith was present at the Cakewalk and that he assisted another shooting victim to safety. Plainly, medical records indicating Smith sustained gunshot wounds on the date of a shooting at which he was present and at which several other individuals also present in the crowd were injured, have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove (Evid. Code, § 210) that Smith sustained his wounds there and then. Even assuming, however, that the inference defendant shot Smith at the Cakewalk was so tenuous that Smith's medical records should have been excluded on relevancy grounds, defendant has not shown prejudice. Record evidence shows that a number of children were in the area into which defendant shot, and that at least one child was hit by a shotgun pellet. There was testimony that Karry Island, Stacey Jones and Michael Hardwick all were wounded. Hardwick sustained injuries in the chest, stomach and arm. Shotgun pellets were still lodged in Hardwick's arm at the time of trial. We agree with the People that, under these circumstances, evidence that Smith also was shot at the Cakewalk can hardly be considered prejudicial, even if it was improperly admitted. In sum, we cannot conclude that admission at the penalty phase of evidence respecting the Cakewalk incident was, in any of the particulars of which defendant complains, prejudicially erroneous.
(43) Defendant argues his death sentence must be reversed because the trial court erroneously allowed evidence of his conviction for possessing a weapon (specifically, a handmade shank) while he was in jail, as well as evidence respecting the circumstances surrounding that conviction, to be presented as a factor in aggravation at the penalty phase. Defendant does not dispute he was convicted of possessing the shank. He argues, rather, that his shank possession was not indicative of violence because, as he testified, he possessed it for defensive purposes, as he was jailed among rival gang members; hence evidence respecting it should not have been admitted under section 190.3, factor (b), as indicating an implied threat to use force or violence. Under section 190.3, factor (b), a penalty phase jury shall take into account ... if relevant the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. We do not believe defendant's self-serving testimony about his motives rendered the shank evidence inadmissible. As we observed in People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965], a case involving a Youth Authority inmate's possession of a knife, defendant was free to present any additional evidence of the circumstances of the incident that would be relevant to the jury's assessment of the incident's probative value with respect to defendant's propensity for violence. ( Id. at p. 1187.) The People correctly observe the jury was not bound to accept defendant's explanation, but could reasonably have concluded he possessed the shank for violent purposes. [T]hat defendant ... did not actually use [a weapon he possessed while incarcerated] in a threatening or violent manner when his possession of the weapon was discovered ... does not mean that he did not engage in criminal conduct involving the implied threat to use force or violence for the purposes of section 190.3, factor (b). (50 Cal.3d at p. 1186.) In Ramirez, we stated that possession of the type of `dirk' or `dagger' involved [in that case] [citation] is prohibited precisely because such an implement is a `classic instrument[] of violence' [citation] that is `normally used only for criminal purposes.' [Citation.] ( Id. at pp. 1186-1187.) Here, too, the shank defendant possessed would appear to have been a classic instrument of violence. Defendant next argues that, under factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3, only the existence of his conviction for possessing a weapon while in jail should have been admitted, and not the circumstances surrounding that conviction. He argues the facts underlying his conviction cannot, consistent with the statute's plain language, be considered in aggravation, because, unlike some other subdivisions of the statute, factors (b) and (c) refer to the presence or absence of the factors they discuss (i.e., criminal activity and any prior felony conviction, respectively), rather than to the circumstances of those factors. (Compare § 190.3, factors (b) and (c) with § 190.3, factors (a), (f) and (k).) Defendant concedes we have previously upheld introduction of similar evidence under section 190.3, factor (b). (See, e.g., People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 449 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] [possession in jail of stolen wirecutters; circumstances of theft admitted].) In fact, we expressly have held that [w]hen dealing with violent conduct it is not the fact of conviction which is probative in the penalty phase, but rather the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the offense. ( People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1203, original italics.) We further noted in Gates that [factor] (b) of section 190.3 ... permits the introduction of all evidence of violent crimes and does not require a conviction. ( Ibid., italics added, citing People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 202-203 [relitigation before penalty phase jury of facts underlying prior violent convictions consistent with due process].) Defendant asks us to reconsider our previous pronouncements regarding section 190.3, on the ground our holdings conflict with various decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning the need for heightened reliability in capital sentencing procedures. Defendant acknowledges, however, that the federal courts have not decided the precise issue he raises. In People v. Balderas we acknowledged [a]t least two other jurisdictions have concluded that due process precludes a `guilt' jury from hearing `other crimes' evidence at the penalty phase. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 204, citing State v. Bartholemew (1982) 98 Wn.2d 173 [654 P.2d 1170, 1184], remanded 463 U.S. 1203 [103 S.Ct. 3530, 77 L.Ed.2d 1383], opn. after remand 101 Wn.2d 631 [683 P.2d 1079]; State v. McCormick (1979) 272 Ind. 272 [397 N.E.2d 276, 279-281].) However, we declared, we find nothing in recent United States Supreme Court decisions to support such a conclusion. The court has often declared that states have the broadest possible range in deciding what negative aspects of the defendant's character and background are relevant to the sentencing determination. (41 Cal.3d at pp. 204-205, citing numerous high court decisions.) In recent years, we have reaffirmed that [e]vidence of the facts of criminal activity, whether or not accompanied by a conviction, is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), but only if the activity involves force or violence. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 776 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].) We have also refused to overrule our decision in People v. Balderas that admission of such evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial is consistent with due process and a reliable death judgment. ( Id. at p. 777; see also People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 427.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason why we should rule differently in his case. Defendant contends, finally, that the trial court's failure to clarify CALJIC No. 8.84.1, tracking the language of section 190.3, improperly allowed the jury to consider his weapon-possession conviction under both factors (b) and (c) of the statute. Defendant more fully develops this contention in his general argument concerning penalty phase instructional errors. Accordingly, we address defendant's contentions regarding CALJIC No. 8.84.1 post, when reviewing that argument.
(44) Defendant argues his state and federal constitutional rights were violated when the jury was permitted to consider evidence of the Green Meadow Park shooting incident. Defendant's argument has several parts. First, defendant contends he was not given adequate notice that his convictions for the attempted murders of Anthony Debose and Carol Freeman (who were injured in the Green Meadow Park shooting incident) would be presented in aggravation at his penalty trial. Defendant's trial counsel conceded the prosecution on several different occasions provided timely oral notice that aggravating evidence relating to defendant's conviction for the murder of Donald Billingsley (who died in the Green Meadow Park shooting incident) would be presented. Defendant also concedes the prosecution provided timely written notice that Arthur Cox would testify about the gang meeting, led by defendant, at which the plan to shoot rival gang members at Green Meadow Park was discussed. Defendant, nonetheless, contends the notice provided was inadequate to apprise his trial counsel that defendant's Green Meadow Park attempted murder convictions also would be presented. Over defense objection, the trial court held that the notice the prosecution provided satisfied section 190.3 as to evidence respecting defendant's criminal activities at Green Meadow Park, including the attempted murders of Debose and Freeman. The trial court did not err. Notice that evidence will be presented regarding a specific prior crime or crimes should alert counsel that evidence of all crimes committed as part of the same course of conduct may be offered, and, therefore, substantially complies with the notice requirement of section 190.3. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 70 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388], citing People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 842 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865].) Defendant concedes he was convicted of the attempted murders of Anthony Debose and Carol Freeman, as well as the murder of Donald Billingsley, in connection with the Green Meadow Park shooting incident. Defendant's attempts to murder Debose and Freeman were `crimes [he] committed during a continuous course of criminal activity which includes force or violence' ( People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 776, quoting People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841) and, as such, are admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). (2 Cal.4th at pp. 776-777.) Defendant points out, however, that his trial in this case was conducted before we decided Cooper, Visciotti, and Livaditis. Defendant was tried during the latter half of 1985 and first month of 1986. Defendant asserts his trial counsel relied on section 190.3 as it had been interpreted at the time of his trial and could not reasonably have anticipated our subsequent interpretation of that statute in Cooper and its progeny. We are not persuaded. Defendant does not point to any previous judicial interpretation of section 190.3  let alone any previous pronouncement by this court  that suggests his trial counsel might reasonably have anticipated the trial court would rule differently than it did on his objection to admission of the attempted murder evidence. Moreover, when we announced our decision in Cooper, it was without any suggestion it should have prospective application only. Indeed, without remark, we applied our holding in Cooper to the defendant in that case. (See People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841.) Similarly, Cooper properly may be applied in this case. We recently reaffirmed our holding in Cooper. (See People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 543 [46 Cal. Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420].) Defendant requests we reconsider that holding, but provides no persuasive reason why we should. There was no error. Nor does defendant demonstrate prejudice. Defendant does not contend the prosecution's failure expressly to provide notice, prior to the guilt phase of this trial, of its intention to present evidence of his attempted murder convictions, was one of the kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 692 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2067], citing United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657]) constituting `constitutional error of the first magnitude [such that] no amount of showing of want of prejudice could cure it.' ( United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2047].) A defendant's failure to request a continuance [to prepare a response to aggravating evidence] generally `precludes any showing of prejudice attributable to [the] delay' [in receiving notice of it]. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 799 [60 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485], citing People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 771 [47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2].) Defendant does not contend he requested a continuance. Rather, defendant simply asserts that deficiencies in the notice provided prevented his trial counsel from making key decisions about his defense. Defendant suggests it was not possible for his counsel to prepare a coherent overall trial strategy, but identifies no portion of the trial record illustrating the effect the prosecution's omissions assertedly had on his counsel's performance. Indeed, defendant does not state how counsel's trial strategy might have differed had the prosecution's notice come sooner. In sum, defendant does not demonstrate either that the trial court violated his statutory rights in finding the prosecution's notice respecting aggravating evidence adequate or that, assuming his rights were violated, he was prejudiced thereby. Sheppard v. Rees (9th Cir.1989) 909 F.2d 1234, cited by defendant for the proposition that the trial court's ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, is not apposite. [7] Sheppard involved a pattern of government conduct [that] affirmatively misled the defendant, denying him an effective opportunity to prepare a defense. ( Sheppard v. Rees, supra, 909 F.2d at pp. 1236-1237.) Under such circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded, `[t]he defendant was ambushed' and his Sixth Amendment right to notice violated. ( Id. at pp. 1236-1237, quoting Gray v. Raines (9th Cir.1981) 662 F.2d 569, 575.) Here, by contrast, defendant does not suggest the prosecution affirmatively misled him about its intent to present evidence respecting convictions for attempted murder. Second, defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting Arthur Cox's testimony that defendant participated in a gang planning meeting prior to the Green Meadow Park shootings. Defendant argues the planning meeting evidence was improperly admitted under section 190.3, factor (b), because the meeting did not involve[] the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. In support, defendant cites Black's Law Dictionary for the proposition that, in order to constitute a threat, an activity must involve some communication to the person or persons who are the object of the threat. We need not decide whether evidence respecting the planning meeting established violence or a threat of violence for the purposes of section 190.3. Arthur Cox's testimony was that he was there when Barry set the meeting to shoot up Green Meadow Park. There were about nine, ten dudes at the meeting. There were a lot of guns, too. Barry would do most of the talking and handed out assignments. Defendant concedes the evidence presented constituted the crime of conspiracy. As previously discussed, all crimes committed during a continuous course of criminal activity which includes force or violence may be considered in aggravation even if some portions thereof, in isolation, may be nonviolent. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841.) Accordingly, evidence respecting defendant's participation in a criminal conspiracy that was part of a continuous course of conduct, including the Billingsley murder, was properly admitted in aggravation of penalty under the statute. There was no error. Third, defendant argues the trial court's permitting the jury to consider his prior conviction for murdering Donald Billingsley both as a factor in aggravation of penalty and for the purpose of establishing the special circumstance making him death eligible constituted inappropriate multiple use of that prior conviction, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant concedes we have rejected similar claims (see, e.g., People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 943 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277]), but asks that we reconsider the issue. Defendant offers neither evidence nor argument compelling such a reexamination. Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the penalty jury to consider, as aggravating evidence, not only his conviction for murdering Donald Billingsley, but the facts underlying that conviction as well. Defendant concedes we have upheld the introduction of similar evidence in previous cases. (See, e.g., People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192].) Moreover, we have specifically rejected defendant's contention that relitigation at the penalty phase of a capital trial of the facts underlying a defendant's prior felony conviction denies him equal protection or conflicts with our observation in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 348-355 [243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150] that in considering sentence enhancement in a noncapital case, the prosecution is effectively barred from relitigating the facts behind the record of a prior offense. In People v. Johnson, we observed that sentence enhancement statutes focus on a defendant's criminal history, while section 190.3 focuses on the defendant's conduct. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1242.) Capital defendants, we concluded, are thus situated differently from defendants subject to sentence enhancements, and no equal protection violation occurs when they are treated differently. ( Id. at pp. 1242-1243.) We agree with the People that defendant has not provided any convincing reason why we should readdress this issue now. There was no error. In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate that either his statutory or constitutional rights were violated when the jury was permitted to consider, as evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase of his trial, testimony respecting the Green Meadow Park shooting incident.
(45) Defendant next contends the trial court prejudicially violated both his state statutory and federal constitutional rights by permitting the jury to consider as a factor in aggravation evidence that he engaged in witness intimidation. Specifically, defendant argues that Kenneth Simmons's guilt phase testimony (about Mark Williams's statements to him respecting the shooting of Patricia Lewis's home) was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that defendant engaged in witness intimidation. Therefore, defendant concludes, the trial court erred in permitting his penalty jury to consider witness intimidation as an aggravating factor. As previously discussed (see pt. II.C.2, ante ), evidence that defendant engaged in witness intimidation was adduced at the guilt phase. At the penalty phase, the judge instructed the jury on witness intimidation and the prosecutor argued that defendant had directed the shooting of Patricia Lewis's house. Defendant acknowledges that Kenneth Simmons's testimony  reporting Mark Williams's statements  would, if true, tend to establish that defendant directed the shooting of Lewis's house. Defendant maintains, however, that because Mark Williams was an accomplice, and Williams's statements to Simmons were uncorroborated, the trial court's instructing the jury to consider witness intimidation as an aggravating factor violated section 1111. Section 1111 provides, in pertinent part, that [a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. Having examined the record in light of section 1111's elements, we conclude defendant's statutory rights were not violated. Defendant correctly points out that one of Mark Williams's statements (that he and others had gone to take care of some business for Barry), construed as referring to the shooting of Lewis's home, also identifies Williams as an accomplice to that criminal activity. Indeed, the People concede Williams was an accomplice to the shooting of Patricia Lewis's house. Moreover, the People do not dispute that section 1111 governs proof, at the penalty phase, of prior crimes in aggravation. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1321 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) Nevertheless, it is not clear that section 1111 applies to Mark Williams's out-of-court statements. Williams's statements, it will be recalled, were admitted pursuant to the prior inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay rule. In People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516 [153 Cal. Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485], we held that, consistent with legislative intent, the prior inconsistent statements of an accomplice may constitute testimony as the term is used in section 1111. (23 Cal.3d at p. 526.) Thereafter, we held, in a capital case, that a particular [accomplice]'s extrajudicial statement was not `testimony' within the meaning of section 1111 and therefore did not require corroboration. ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1230.) In so holding, we noted [t]he usual problem with accomplice testimony  that it is consciously self-interested and calculated  is not present in an out-of-court statement that is itself sufficiently reliable to be allowed in evidence. ( Ibid. ) People v. Sully involved an accomplice's out-of-court excited utterance to the effect that the defendant there had smashed a victim's face with a sledgehammer. We held that the utterance, testified to by another accomplice, was not only admissible, but did not require corroboration under section 1111 because spontaneous and excited utterances have sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted in evidence without violating a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1229; see also People v. Jeffery (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 209, 218 [43 Cal. Rptr.2d 526] [statements to undercover officer made in course of methamphetamine sales and without knowledge of officer's status not testimony within meaning of section 1111].) The Court of Appeal, in People v. Jeffery, supra, 37 Cal. App.4th 209, has reconciled Belton and Sully thus: From Belton, we conclude that `testimony' within the meaning of ... section 1111 includes all oral statements made by an accomplice or coconspirator under oath in a court proceeding and all out-of-court statements of accomplices and coconspirators used as substantive evidence of guilt which are made under suspect circumstances. The most obvious suspect circumstances occur when the accomplice has been arrested or is questioned by the police. ( People v. Jeffery, supra, 37 Cal. App.4th at p. 218, original italics.) On the other hand, when the out-of-court statements are not given under suspect circumstances, those statements do not qualify as `testimony' and hence need not be corroborated under ... section 1111. ( Ibid., citing People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1230.) The circumstances surrounding Mark Williams's statements to Kenneth Simmons are more analogous to those surrounding the statements we allowed without corroboration in Sully, than to those surrounding the statements we required to be corroborated in Belton. Williams was neither incarcerated nor detained when he spoke to Simmons. Rather, Williams made his statements to a fellow drug user, while they were ingesting drugs together. The record discloses no substantial motive for Williams then to dissemble. Accordingly, we conclude Williams's statements were not given under suspect circumstances, [and, therefore] those statements do not qualify as `testimony' and hence need not be corroborated under ... section 1111. ( People v. Jeffery, supra, 37 Cal. App.4th at p. 218, citing People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1230.) Even assuming, arguendo, that section 1111 properly applies to Mark Williams's statements, the trial court did not violate the statute. Defendant is simply mistaken in asserting that Williams's statements were uncorroborated. Williams's statements were corroborated by Arthur Cox. As previously noted, Cox testified that defendant told Cox he was going to get some witnesses shot in order to beat this case. Defendant, Cox testified, said he was going to get Curtis [Thomas] to shoot one of the witnesses.... Cox further testified the witness defendant referred to was Patricia Lewis. Corroborative evidence sufficient to satisfy section 1111 need not corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testified or establish the corpus delicti, but is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy a fact finder the accomplice is telling the truth. ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 834.) Corroborative evidence may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone. ( Id. at p. 835.) Measured by these standards, Arthur Cox's testimony was sufficient to corroborate Mark Williams's statements testified to by Kenneth Simmons. Defendant reiterates his observation (previously discussed, in connection with defendant's guilt phase arguments) that Cox's testimony was to a statement of future intention by defendant, not to an admission by defendant that he had engaged in witness intimidation. But, as previously discussed, [f]rom the declared intent to do a particular thing an inference that the thing was done may fairly be drawn. ( People v. Alcalde, supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 185.) Therefore, defendant's statement to Cox that he was going to have witnesses or a witness shot constitutes evidence from which the jury could infer that defendant authorized the shooting that actually occurred. Defendant also suggests that any corroboration by Arthur Cox was not sufficient for the purposes of section 1111, because Cox, himself, was certainly an accomplice as a matter of law to the Green Meadow aggravating evidence, and possibly an accomplice as to the Dunn shooting and the Lewis shooting. Defendant's suggestion is insupportable. First, that Cox may or may not have been defendant's accomplice in the Green Meadow Park shooting (in connection with which defendant, in a different trial, was convicted of murdering Donald Billingsley) is statutorily irrelevant to the question whether Cox's testimony, at this trial (for the murder of Jerome Dunn), regarding defendant's engaging in intimidation of a witness (Patricia Lewis) at this trial, requires corroboration. An accomplice [for the purposes of section 1111] is ... defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. (§ 1111.) Second, there is no evidence Arthur Cox was defendant's accomplice in the killing of Jerome Dunn or the intimidation of Patricia Lewis. Cryptically, defendant suggests Cox's status as possible accomplice to the Dunn shooting comes from Cox's testimony about the identity of the people in the van at the time that Jerome Dunn was killed. Defendant's references provide no support whatsoever for the notion Cox might be liable for prosecution in this case. Defendant asserts, without citation to the record, that at the time Cox communicated the statements allegedly made to him by [defendant], Cox was a suspect in one of the homicides for which [defendant] was charged. The record indicates that Cox was, at one time, a suspect in the Green Meadow Park incident, based generally on his membership in the 89th Street Family Bloods gang. As just mentioned, Cox's liability, if any, to prosecution in that case is statutorily irrelevant to his status, in this case, as an accomplice in the killing of Jerome Dunn or the intimidation of Patricia Lewis. The burden is on defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Arthur Cox is an accomplice whose testimony requires corroboration. ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 834, citing People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 960 [127 Cal. Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335].) In order for Cox to have been an accomplice as a matter of law (for purposes of defendant's claim he was convicted on uncorroborated accomplice testimony), the record must establish either that Cox aided and abetted defendant in committing the killing or that Cox was involved in a conspiracy with the intent to commit the offense that was the object of the conspiracy. ( People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 183.) Defendant has cited to no record evidence indicating that Arthur Cox participated in (or aided and abetted) the murder of Jerome Dunn or the intimidation of Patricia Lewis, or that he conspired to do either. In sum, the trial court did not violate defendant's state statutory rights in permitting the jury to consider witness intimidation as an aggravating factor because, even assuming section 1111 properly applies to Mark Williams's out-of-court statements, Arthur Cox's testimony satisfied the statutory corroboration requirement. Defendant also argues that permitting his penalty phase jury to consider witness intimidation as an aggravating factor violated his right to a fair and reliable determination of the proper penalty. Defendant correctly points out that the jury may consider evidence of other crimes in aggravation only when commission of the other crimes has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1075 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277].) Citing In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 108 [185 Cal. Rptr. 120, 649 P.2d 703], defendant argues his penalty jury could not lawfully have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in witness intimidation based on the uncorroborated out-of-court statement of Mark Williams, whom defendant characterizes as an accomplice. Defendant's argument is rather cursorily presented; his citation, however, suggests its legal premise may have evaporated, at least partly, since defendant filed his opening brief. Our decision in In re Miguel L., supra, 32 Cal.3d 100 (that an accomplice's extrajudicial statements were insufficient to prove the defendant there committed a certain burglary), cited by defendant, was based on the rule of People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865] that [a]n extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime. ( Id. at p. 631.) (46) We recently overruled Gould and its corroboration requirement, holding that the sufficiency of an out-of-court identification to support a conviction is henceforth to be judged by the substantial evidence test. ( People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 274-275 [48 Cal. Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290].) Moreover, as already discussed, the factual premise of defendant's argument is mistaken; Mark Williams's statements were corroborated by other record evidence, specifically, that given by Arthur Cox and Patricia Lewis. Thus, whether or not Cuevas undermined Miguel L., defendant has failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in permitting the penalty jury to consider witness intimidation evidence in aggravation. As there was no error, we need not consider defendant's arguments respecting prejudice. In any event, defendant bases those arguments primarily on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury either with the corroboration requirement of section 1111 or to regard accomplice testimony with distrust. We address these asserted instructional omissions, post, in connection with defendant's comprehensive attack on the penalty phase jury instructions.
(47) Defendant next argues his judgment of death must be reversed because the trial court admitted evidence of his gang membership at the penalty phase of his trial. Over defendant's objection, the prosecution was permitted to introduce gang paraphernalia seized from his bedroom, including a poster, a book and a photo album. As revealed in the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant, the seized gang paraphernalia contained gang names and symbols, including the names Mr. Loco, Baby Slaughter and Mr. Butcher. Defendant contends admission of the gang paraphernalia was erroneous in several respects. First, defendant asserts admission of the gang paraphernalia was erroneous because it was irrelevant. Defendant argues, as did defense counsel, that the mere existence of old gang paraphernalia does not indicate present membership in a gang. The People point out that defendant testified at the penalty phase he had ceased being a gang member in May 1980 and argue that gang paraphernalia seized from his bedroom in August 1981 is relevant to impeach defendant's testimony, tending to prove his gang membership continued past that date. The trial court agreed with the prosecution, as do we. Relevant evidence is that having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, § 210.) That defendant testified he had terminated his gang membership in May 1980 made evidence to the contrary relevant, if only as rebuttal to the defense penalty evidence. (See People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1103, fn. 30 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) Defendant concedes evidence indicating his gang membership continued after May 1980 would be relevant. Defendant insists, however, that the gang paraphernalia seized in his bedroom in August 1981, does not tend to prove his gang membership continued after May 1980. Recent precedent (as well, we think, as common sense) is to the contrary. In People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 921, a police officer testified that defendants in that case admitted gang membership some years prior to the murders at issue, and that they continued to associate with other admitted gang members until the time of the murders. We held that the jury, based on such testimony, reasonably could have concluded defendants were still gang members at the time of the murders. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, we upheld the trial court's admission of gang membership evidence. ( Id. at p. 922.) In so doing, we specifically observed that the prosecution's failure to demonstrate defendants were still gang members when the killings occurred goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence of past gang membership. ( Id. at p. 921.) Similarly, here: In view of the evidence of defendant's past gang membership, defendant's testimony that he terminated membership in May 1980 goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the gang paraphernalia seized from his bedroom in August 1981. There was no error. Second, citing Evidence Code section 352, defendant contends admission of the gang paraphernalia was erroneous because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The claim of error was not preserved. The record reveals defendant objected to admission of the gang paraphernalia solely on relevance grounds. Thus, defendant waived any section 352 objection and cannot raise it on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 179.) Although defendant cites People v. Frank, supra, 38 Cal.3d at page 729, footnote 3, for the proposition there was no waiver of that ground under our rules as they existed at the time of trial, we previously have shown defendant's reliance on Frank lacks merit. In any event, there was no error; admission of the gang paraphernalia did not violate Evidence Code section 352. As discussed, the gang paraphernalia was probative of defendant's gang membership after May 1980. It is true, as we have observed, that, [b]ecause evidence that a criminal defendant is a member of a juvenile gang may have a `highly inflammatory impact' on the jury [citation], trial courts should carefully scrutinize the evidence before admitting it. ( People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 922, quoting People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 660.) Here, the record reflects the trial court adequately scrutinized the gang paraphernalia evidence before admitting it. Last, defendant contends that admission of the gang paraphernalia implicated certain of his federal constitutional rights, specifically, his right to due process of law, his Eight Amendment right to a fair and reliable sentence, and his associational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant, however, waived these constitutional objections to admission of gang paraphernalia evidence by failing to raise them at trial. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 179.) Moreover, defendant's due process and Eighth Amendment arguments are perfunctorily raised without argument in support and, for that reason as well, need not further be addressed. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 985, fn. 15.) In sum, admission of gang paraphernalia at the penalty phase of defendant's trial did not infringe his federal constitutional rights. Thus, on none of the grounds defendant advances could his trial counsel have raised a valid objection to admission of the disputed gang paraphernalia. Accordingly, we reject defendant's suggestion his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object.
(48a) Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial made after the prosecutor, when cross-examining defense psychologist Margaret Bennett, referred to certain facts not in evidence  namely, that a probation report mentioned a confrontation defendant may have had with a probation officer respecting defendant's possession of a knife while in jail. We review a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 839 [55 Cal. Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].) Specifically, the prosecutor asked Dr. Bennett: Given the fact that when he [i.e., defendant] was confronted by a probation officer at the time that  after he pled guilty to the possession of the knife in the county jail . At that point, the court interrupted the prosecutor, stating, [c]ounsel, that's not in evidence. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, correctly noting the court previously had admonished the district attorney not to question Dr. Bennett about any matters other than what ha[d] been proved at trial. Trial counsel complained that the impression now before the jury is that there's another charge pending that has not been put in evidence.... The trial court denied the mistrial motion, but admonished the prosecutor, thus: I will tell you this, Mr. [prosecutor], that I specifically stopped you from referring to that probation report in any manner . The court went further: I think it is misconduct and contemptuous. When the prosecutor protested, the court added: I'm not going to let you refer to this probation report in any way. It is hearsay and improper and you know it. Cross-examination of Dr. Bennett then resumed, focusing on other topics. Defendant contends the trial court erred in not granting his mistrial motion because the prosecutor, in deliberately referring to the probation report in contravention of the trial court's ruling, committed egregious misconduct. The People take the position there was no misconduct, arguing the trial court should have permitted the prosecutor to ask psychologist Bennett whether she considered the probation report in formulating her opinion and whether her opinion would be different in light of defendant's denial to the probation officer that he possessed a knife in county jail. Because the prosecutor should have been permitted to ask these questions, the People appear to reason, he cannot have committed misconduct in asking them. The People's argument is flawed. To begin with, the trial court did not prevent the prosecutor from asking Bennett whether she had considered the probation report. In fact, the prosecutor asked Bennett what sources of background information she had used in preparing her report on defendant; Bennett responded she had relied primarily on interviews with and testing of defendant. She did not mention the probation report. Moreover, the prosecutor was permitted to cross-examine defendant, himself, as to whether he told a probation officer that he had not possessed a knife in jail. The only limitation the court placed on cross-examination of Dr. Bennett  that it be restricted to matters that have been introduced into evidence in this case  was clearly appropriate. (49a) A party attacking the credibility of the expert may bring to the jury's attention material that is relevant to the issue of which the expert was unaware [citation], but that party may not by its questions testify regarding the content of that material. ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 81.) (48b) The prosecution's cross-examination of Dr. Bennett was improper, therefore, insofar as it revealed to defendant's penalty jury contents of the probation report previously ruled inadmissible. If the prosecutor had merely been trying to show that Dr. Bennett had not read all relevant background materials, he could easily have asked about the probation report without revealing its contents. (Cf. People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) Too, as defendant correctly notes, the fact Dr. Bennett was not permitted to answer the prosecutor's question does not automatically mitigate the impropriety of its having been asked. (49b) The question itself may place inadmissible hearsay before the jury. ( People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 619 [119 Cal. Rptr. 457, 532 P.2d 105].) (48c) Pointing to the trial court's harsh rebuke of the prosecutor, defendant avers the prosecutor must have known his reference to the confrontation noted in the probation report was improper, and that he intentionally violated the court's prior ruling on the topic. Examining the record, it is difficult to disagree. Nevertheless, despite the prosecutor's apparent misbehavior, we cannot conclude there was reversible misconduct. (50) What is crucial to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not the good faith vel non of the prosecutor, but the potential injury to the defendant. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 793 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].) When [a prosecutorial misconduct] claim focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, a court must determine at the threshold how the remarks would, or could, have been understood by a reasonable juror. [Citations.] If the remarks would have been taken by a juror to state or imply nothing harmful, they obviously cannot be deemed objectionable. ( Ibid., citing People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 [247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218].) (48d) We conclude the prosecutor's remark about a confrontation defendant had with a probation officer could not reasonably have been understood by the jury as conveying significantly damaging information about defendant. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor's question did not contain an unequivocal statement that defendant had another, unrevealed, charge against him. The jury was already aware of defendant's knife possession and his guilty plea respecting it. Nor can we agree with defendant that the question invited the jury to speculate about the existence of other violent behavior by defendant, for the simple reason that the fact defendant was confronted does not imply he behaved violently. Finally, based upon a plain reading of the transcript, we disagree with defendant that the prosecutor's mention of a confrontation between defendant and a probation officer put ... possible uncharged crimes before the jury. In short, we do not think there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood the prosecutor's question as the defendant claims. Accordingly, as the remarks would have been taken by a juror to state or imply nothing harmful, they obviously cannot be deemed objectionable ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 793) so as to support a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. We conclude the trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial.