Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Violations of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment

Text: Right To Be Free from Search and Seizure Defendant made various pretrial motions to suppress evidence seized during several searches. He unsuccessfully argued that his Fourth Amendment right was violated based on (1) the warrantless search and seizure of his cell phone, (2) the issuance of a search warrant based on an intercepted telephone conversation between defendant’s investigator and Moya, and (3) the issuance of a search warrant of defendant’s property (including his laptop computer) without probable cause. Contending that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence, defendant repeats those claims on appeal. We discuss each in turn. “The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 365.) A warrantless search is per se unreasonable. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219.) “Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403.) One such exception, as relevant here, is a search incident to arrest. (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224.) 43 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Another exception, also relevant here, is the inevitable discovery exception. (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 440-450; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800-801.) Section 1538.5 provides a defendant the “sole and exclusive” means before trial to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m); see People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127.) “[D]efendants have the burden of (1) asserting the search or seizure was without a warrant, and (2) explaining why it was unreasonable under the circumstances.” (Williams, at p. 129.) However, the burden is on the prosecution to prove evidence seized during a warrantless search falls within a recognized exception. (See People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 36; Williams, at p. 136.) Thereafter, a defendant can respond by pointing out any inadequacies in that justification for warrantless search. (Williams, at p. 136.)
Incident to Arrest for Data on the Cell Phone On July 29, 2008, the day after Pamela was killed, defendant called the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office to request a welfare check on his nine-year-old daughter, J.F., who lived with Pamela in Camarillo. Earlier that morning, an LAPD detective had gone to the Camarillo residence to tell Pamela’s daughters of their mother’s death. After receiving word that defendant was heading over to the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office with his attorneys, the detective met defendant there. He told defendant that he was under arrest for Pamela’s murder and that he would be transported to the LAPD West Los Angeles Station. Officers searched defendant incident to arrest and took his Motorola cell phone, which they placed in the front seat of the vehicle. They handcuffed defendant and placed him in the backseat. 44 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. The LAPD detective drove defendant some 45 miles from Camarillo to the West Los Angeles Police Station. At the station, defendant invoked his right to remain silent and refused to speak to investigators. An LAPD officer testified that he obtained and possessed defendant’s cell phone for an hour and that he “manipulated” the phone to find the number associated with the phone before handing the cell phone to an FBI agent. Defendant was released two hours later without his Motorola cell phone. Officers returned the cell phone the following Friday when they were serving a search warrant at defendant’s home. On October 9, 2009, in addition to other defense motions discussed below, defendant filed a pretrial motion under section 1538.5 to suppress, arguing the evidence was seized from the illegal search of his Motorola cell phone on July 29, 2008. The pretrial hearing on the suppression motion took place on June 10, 2010. The trial court agreed with the prosecution that the only information officers took from that cell phone was the number itself. With this cell phone number, the LAPD in conjunction with the FBI Fugitive Task Force, sought and obtained a court order authorizing the use and installation of wiretap devices for the “Subject Telephone Number.” After hearing testimony from LAPD detectives, the trial court concluded the search of the cell phone was “illegal,” even if it was incident to a valid arrest. However, it agreed with the prosecution that because there were different sources from which to discover defendant’s cell phone number, including Pamela’s contacts in her cell phone, the evidence was admissible based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. 45 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. On appeal, defendant makes a number of corollary claims challenging the search and his arrest on July 29, 2008.7 Ultimately, the Attorney General concedes that the trial court was likely correct that the search of defendant’s Motorola cell phone was unlawful. (See Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 387 [“[o]nce an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats . . . data on the phone can endanger no one”].) Nevertheless, as the Attorney General underscores, even if the search or arrest, or both, were unlawful, the evidence may nevertheless be admissible under the exception of inevitable discovery. (See Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. 431; People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 800-801.) “Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally seized evidence may be used where it would have been discovered by the police through lawful means. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ (Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 539 [108 S.Ct. 2529, 2534, 101 L.Ed.2d 472].) The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained without 7 For example, he contends that police investigative reports actually classified defendant as being detained, not arrested, and that authorities conducted an unlawful patdown at the Ventura County Sheriff’s Station because there was no indication that defendant was armed and dangerous. It is unnecessary to discuss these claims relating specifically to the underlying search and seizure because we conclude that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies. 46 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. police misconduct.” (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 800; see People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 62 [rule ensures prosecution “is not placed in a better position” absent the illegality but “does not require it be put in a worse one”].) The inevitable discovery rule “applies only to evidence obtained as the indirect product, or fruit, of other evidence illegally seized.” (Hernandez v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 355, 361.) The prosecution must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 62; People v. Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 665, 681 [“The test is not one of certainty, but rather of a reasonably strong probability”].) “As this is essentially a question of fact, we must uphold the trial court’s determination if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1040.) At the suppression hearing, the prosecution presented evidence that shortly after police recovered Pamela’s cell phone at the crime scene, they accessed the phone’s list of contacts, which included the cell phone number for defendant. The police also “obtained independently” defendant’s cell phone number from a search of Moya’s cell phone. Moreover, the search of Goldfinger’s office led to defendant’s cell phone number. In light of these other sources leading to the discovery of defendant’s cell phone number, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the inevitable discovery rule applied and that the evidence of defendant’s cell phone number was admissible. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) 47 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
31, 2008 On July 29, 2008, Detective Spear sought and obtained a warrant to search the premises at the Happy Camp Ranch. In the supporting affidavit, Detective Spear stated that his review of the video surveillance of the parking lot where Pamela was killed showed the alleged suspects fleeing in a red SUV rented by Goldfinger. The affidavit further explained that a suspect had left footprints at the crime scene, which would have been transferred to the vehicle. Detective Spear averred he believed the vehicle was at defendant’s residence. Detectives executed the search warrant on July 29, and found two locked safes that defendant refused to open. On July 30, after locating the red SUV at the Avis Rent A Car location, detectives searched and gathered evidence from the vehicle. Defendant did not seek to suppress evidence seized on either July 29 or July 30. On July 31, Detective Spear sought another warrant to search the premises at the Happy Camp Ranch. The supporting affidavit “incorporated . . . the entirety of” the July 29 search warrant. It also included an “amendment,” adding “personal computers, laptop computers, hard drives, electronic equipment used to store files or written documentation, thumb drives, locked safes, secured lock boxes, authorization of forced entry into locked safes, financial records, soil samples from outside the residence,” among the items to be collected. The amendment also sought “samples of saliva from James Fayed for comparison of evidence collected during the investigation.” To justify the search for these additional items, the amendment explained that during an interview with Pamela’s adult daughter, Desiree, she revealed that “her mother kept records and documentation that incriminates James Fayed on 48 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. her personal computer. Desiree [] advised that the computers that her mother used are in her father’s residence and contain valuable information.” Detectives obtained a search warrant on July 31, which was executed on that day. During the search, authorities seized several laptop computers, over $1 million worth of gold bars, and numerous computer thumb drives. They also found $24,980 in cash wrapped in plastic in defendant’s dresser drawer and another $36,000 in cash in a locked metal briefcase located in defendant’s closet. Defendant moved to quash the warrant, and suppress evidence seized during the search. He alleged that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant and that the warrant was insufficient on its face. For instance, Desiree’s statement that there was incriminating evidence on Pamela’s personal computer was conclusory and “not supported by a single fact in the affidavit.” Also, the warrant was overbroad because while the incriminating evidence was purportedly on Pamela’s laptop computer, the list of search items effectively allowed officers to “search for anything—anywhere, with no specificity.” Further, because detectives had located and searched the red SUV the day before, there was no longer a need to search the premises for the vehicle. Finally, the affidavit on the second warrant contained no facts to support that new evidence had materialized after the first search; thus, the information in the initial affidavit was too “stale” to justify the second search. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash. It found probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The court further found that, even if there was no probable cause, the officers acted in good faith by obtaining a warrant signed by a magistrate before conducting the search. For reasons that 49 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash. When reviewing issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures, we defer to the court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.) To determine whether, based on the facts so found, a search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. (Macabeo, at p. 1212.) We conclude that based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court correctly found probable cause for the issuance of the July 31 search warrant. (See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 230.) First, defendant’s challenge to Desiree’s statement on the ground it was conclusory and lacking factual support to justify probable cause is meritless. As the trial court found, Desiree was presumptively reliable as a “citizen informant.” (See People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 757.) Given her relationship to Pamela and defendant, which was clearly set out in the affidavit, Desiree would naturally be knowledgeable about Pamela’s activities and would be aware that Pamela and defendant were going through a contentious divorce. As the affidavit explained, Desiree told investigators that her mother kept documentation “on her personal computer” and she stated that “computers that her mother used are in her father’s residence.” Whether Pamela used one or several computers in defendant’s residence, it was reasonable to describe the items in “generic terms,” thus subjecting them to a “blanket seizure.” (U.S. v. Lacy (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 742, 746; see U.S. v. Kimbrough (5th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3d 723, 727 50 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. [“generic language is permissible if it particularizes the types of items to be seized”].) Contrary to defendant’s claim, the search warrant was not overbroad because it listed “personal computers” and “laptop computers” as search items and did not limit it specifically to Pamela’s laptop computer. Authorities had no way of knowing which computer, or how many for that matter, belonged to Pamela, or which ones she may have used. It was acceptable for the search warrant to include such generic terms to describe the items. (U.S. v. Lacy, at p. 746.) Further, defendant’s related claim that the July warrant was “moot” because the red SUV was already located and searched is likewise meritless. After locating the SUV, there was arguably more, not less, reason to search defendant’s residence because evidence began tying defendant to the murder, i.e., the recovered vehicle connected to the murder had been rented by defendant’s company, Goldfinger. The supporting affidavit expressly noted that authorities had collected physical evidence from it. Armed with new physical evidence from the SUV, authorities sought soil samples outside the residence and samples of defendant’s saliva “for a comparison of evidence collected during the investigation.” Though just beginning, the investigation was intensifying as each day passed. Moreover, the July 31 warrant was not based solely on obtaining evidence related to the vehicle used in the murder. The warrant also sought Pamela’s computers that Desiree averred were in defendant’s residence. It further sought to recover evidence from two locked safes that defendant refused to open during the July 29 search. Rather than seizing the safes first and asking for a warrant later, detectives followed proper 51 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. procedure by first obtaining a magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Similarly, defendant’s argument that the information in the initial affidavit became stale because authorities failed to seize items during the first search is without legal or factual support. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 370 [whether warrant establishes “it is substantially probable the evidence sought will still be at the location at the time of the search”].) In this case, Pamela was killed on July 28, 2008. The following day, detectives obtained the first warrant to search the premises on defendant’s Moorpark ranch. The day after that, on July 30, detectives located the red SUV, and recovered physical evidence from the vehicle. In the brief three-day period between the crime and the second search on July 31, it is substantially probable that evidence would still be located at defendant’s premises. (Ibid.) Based on the foregoing, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion to quash the July 31 search warrant.
of Defense Investigator’s Questioning of Witness Early in the murder investigation, LAPD detectives applied for court-authorized wiretaps targeting the residential “hardline” (or landline) telephone and two cell phones used by defendant’s sister, Mary Mercedes, and a residential hardline telephone used by codefendant Jose Moya. A magistrate approved two wiretap applications on August 15, 2008 and August 22, 2008, respectively, and granted one extension on September 13, 2008. 52 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. As statutorily required, authorities provided the court several six-day reports containing summaries of some intercepted calls and updates on the investigation. On August 29, 2008, authorities intercepted a call Moya made from his hardline telephone to defense investigator Glen LaPalme. During the 19-minute telephone conversation, the two went over telephone records detailing calls that Moya had made and received on his cell phone. Moya had previously told detectives he reported the cell phone lost or stolen the day after Pamela’s murder. When Moya admitted to LaPalme he could not remember exactly when he lost the cell phone, LaPalme suggested: “Now if you lost, I mean if you lost the phone, like, over that weekend before all this shit hit the fan then at least we would, maybe it was somebody else that had the phone, you know what I’m saying?” Later in the call, LaPalme told Moya he had “no doubt in my mind that [the LAPD] have the vehicle, the SUV, and they’re probably doing all sorts of forensic examinations for hair, skin, all that crap, and of course there were people who were using it so you’re going to find everybody’s hair and skin there.” Moya replied, “Except for Pam.” When LaPalme indicated he did not hear what Moya had said, Moya told him: “No, except for Pam’s, it wouldn’t be in there, it shouldn’t be in there.” On or about September 10, 2008, Detective Abdul sought a warrant to search Moya’s residence at the Happy Camp Ranch in Moorpark. In the supporting affidavit, Detective Abdul recounted the intercepted call on August 29 and opined that Moya’s statement that evidence of Pam’s skin and hair should not be in the SUV, “[t]his statement in itself proves Moya has knowledge of the murder.” Detective Abdul averred that he “believes evidence will be recovered from Moya’s residence that 53 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. will link him to the murder of Pamela Fayed.” On September 10, a magistrate approved the warrant to search the Happy Camp Ranch. The list of items to be searched included “[u]nknown type sharp objects . . . consistent with the injuries sustained by Pamela Fayed,” cell phones, and Moya’s bank records and deposit slips. During the search, authorities recovered three cell phones, which defendant later described as evidence “crucial to the government’s theory of the case.” Before trial, on October 9, 2009, defendant filed a motion to traverse the affidavit, a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in violation of wiretap provisions, and a motion to dismiss for violation of due process. Defendant argued that the LAPD was well aware that LaPalme was a private investigator working for the defense and yet continued to record the call between him and Moya. Because LaPalme was conducting witness interviews for the defense, defendant argued the conversation between LaPalme and Moya was protected under the work product doctrine. Thus, the affidavit’s failure to disclose that LaPalme was a defense investigator was an egregious omission, one that hindered the “crucial, inferencedrawing powers of the magistrate.” (People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 384.) The trial court denied defendant’s motions. It rejected defendant’s argument that the attorney work product doctrine protected the intercepted conversation between LaPalme and Moya. Moreover, it found “ample probable cause” to support the search warrant even if the challenged information were not included. The court also agreed with the prosecution that there was no material omission in the affidavit to the magistrate. On appeal, defendant raises similar arguments as below. He claims that LaPalme and Moya’s conversation was protected under the 54 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. work product doctrine and that it should be considered excised from the affidavit. Even assuming the intercepted call was privileged and should be deemed omitted from the affidavit, we conclude the affidavit’s remaining contents supported probable cause. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297 (Bradford).) In general, statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause that are proven to be false or reckless by a preponderance of the evidence, should be considered excised from the affidavit. (Ibid.) As relevant here, “[i]f the remaining contents of the affidavit are insufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant must be voided and any evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed. [Citation.] [¶] A defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause. [Citations.] ‘Pursuant to [California Constitution, article I,] section 28 [, subdivision] (d), materiality is evaluated by the test of Illinois v. Gates[, supra,] 462 U.S. 213, . . . which looks to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a warrant affidavit establishes good cause for a search.” (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297.) In this case, even without considering LaPalme and Moya’s conversation, the affidavit’s remaining contents provided probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The affidavit included evidence that Moya had access (both before and after the murder) to the red SUV seen leaving the murder scene, statements from defendant’s employee who told detectives Moya was not at the ranch at the time of Pamela’s death, and statements from another employee that said defendant directed him to give Moya $24,000 sometime in mid55 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. July (several weeks before the murder). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court properly concluded the affidavit established probable cause to support the search warrant. (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297.)