Opinion ID: 2009711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Town of Rhine's remaining arguments

Text: ¶ 54 The Town of Rhine asserts that there are permitted uses in the B-2 District in that the landowners can use the property without a conditional use permit, e.g., recreational uses have always been allowed as incidental to the rural nature of certain types of property, especially in relatively undeveloped areas as exist in the Town of Rhine. However, nowhere is that outlined in the ordinance at issue. It is only in the newly amended ordinance that these allowances are made. [23] The version of the ordinance governing this case, however, states, [t]here are no permitted uses in the B-2 District. [24] Furthermore, at the January 6, 2004 meeting, Chairman Sager stated that B-2 zones require a conditional use permit for any use of the land. Therefore, it is clear that a landowner must acquire a conditional use permit, solely at the discretion of the Town of Rhine, in order to use the property in any way. ¶ 55 The Town of Rhine argues, under the code before us today, that conditional uses are permitted uses because once the standards have been satisfied a landowner is entitled to the conditional use. We disagree. First, we find authority contrary to the Town of Rhine's position. See, e.g., S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 477, 402 N.E.2d 100, 103 (1980) (stating that [n]o one, of course, has an absolute right to a special permit); S. Mark White, Classifying and Defining Uses and Building Forms: Land-Use Coding for Zoning Regulations, American Planning Association Zoning Practice, Sept. 2005, at 8 (distinguishing between permitted uses as of right and conditional uses). Second, no authority cited by the Town of Rhine suggests that conditional uses are the same as permitted uses. To support its argument, the Town of Rhine relies on Delta Biological Resources, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Milwaukee, 160 Wis.2d 905, 910-11, 467 N.W.2d 164 (Ct.App.1991). However, Delta simply does not support the Town of Rhine's contention that conditional uses are permitted uses. In Delta, the court of appeals, relying on Skelly Oil Co., stated: A special or conditional use permit is one which the zoning code allows. A special use permit allows a property owner to put his or her property to a use expressly permitted by the zoning ordinance, but only if certain conditions are met. Delta, 160 Wis.2d at 910, 467 N.W.2d 164 (footnote omitted) (citing Skelly Oil Co., 58 Wis.2d at 700-01, 207 N.W.2d 585). ¶ 56 The Town of Rhine's argument is without merit. Permitted uses and conditional uses are different. Even though conditional uses may be authorized pursuant to the ordinance, that does not render them uses as of right. See Gail Easley, Conditional Uses: Using Discretion, Hoping for Certainty, American Planning Association Zoning Practice, May 2006, at 8 (distinguishing between permitted uses as of right and conditional uses). Conditional uses may be expressly permitted by the ordinance so long as the conditions are met, id., but this does not render them permitted uses. ¶ 57 The Town of Rhine, citing to Primeco Communications v. City of Mequon, argues that an entitlement to a conditional use exists once the landowner submits the required information in reasonable compliance with the requirements of a particular conditional use ordinance. 242 F.Supp.2d 567 (E.D.Wis.2003). Primeco, however, does not support this argument. In Primeco, the district court stated: Under Wisconsin law, a conditional use is one that is not inherently incompatible with a particular area, but which might create problems if permitted to locate there as a matter of right. Zoning ordinances that rely on the conditional use mechanism retain the usual residential, commercial and industrial zones specifying the uses permitted in each zone, and, in addition, establish conditional uses for each zone, which are permitted within the zone only if approved by the local governmental body. In other words, a conditional use permit allows property to be put to a purpose that the zoning ordinance conditionally allows. Id. at 576 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 58 Even if an entitlement could be created under a conditional use permit, the Town of Rhine's argument presumes that the standards here are clear and specific enough that once complied with, the conditional use permit shall be issued. However, while we do not decide the constitutionality of the conditional use permit section, i.e., Municipal Code § 4.09(4), that section does not provide certainty. For example, the following standards for obtaining a conditional use permit are subject to significant interpretation: (1) stabilize and protect property values and the tax base; (2) recognize the needs of agriculture, forestry, industry, and business in future growth; (3) preserve natural growth and cover and promote the natural beauty of the township. See Town of Rhine, Wis., Municipal Code § 4.01(2). How does a landowner, who applies for a conditional use permit, establish that a garbage dump or salvage yard will comply with these requirements, or others in § 4.01(2), so to entitle the landowner to a conditional use permit? These standards are simply not specific enough that one can reasonably say that any use as of right exists under the B-2 District, which has no permitted uses. ¶ 59 In addition, the language of this ordinance does not support the Town of Rhine's argument that the landowner is entitled to a conditional use permit as of right. No language exists in Municipal Codes § 4.08(2), B-2 District, or § 4.09, Conditional uses, that would create an entitlement to a conditional use permit. The ordinance does not state for example: If all requirements are met, the conditional use permit shall be granted. Furthermore, while discussing rules that generally govern conditional uses, Anderson's American Law of Zoning states, [t]he designation of a use in a zoning district as a conditional use does not constitute an authorization or assurance that such use will be approved. 5 Alan C. Weinstein, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 34.23, at 573 (4th ed.1997). While perhaps not dispositive, this assertion casts doubt on the Town of Rhine's entitlement argument. ¶ 60 The Town of Rhine also argues that planned unit development zoning is the functional equivalent to Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a), B-2 Commercial Manufacturing or Processing. However, planned unit development districts are different because unlike the case before this court, planned unit development districts may only be established with the consent of the landowner. See Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) (discussing planned unit developments). The Town of Rhine argues that future landowners in planned unit development districts are bound by the restricted uses entered into by the previous landowner. This, however, is an economic and quantifiable decision by the purchaser. It is not that such land has no use, it is that such land has designated rights and obligations. The landowners in the B-2 District did not make a choice to eliminate all permitted uses. Rather, the landowners are precluded from any use unless the Town of Rhine grants a conditional use permit. While the landowner who chooses to purchase land in the B-2 District has notice of the excessive restriction in the B-2 District, this does not, as we see here, preclude a constitutional challenge to the ordinance. ¶ 61 The Town of Rhine asserts that this matter is not properly before the court because the Club did not follow through with seeking a conditional use permit. Therefore, the Town of Rhine argues that we cannot determine if the Club was denied a conditional use permit for unreasonable or arbitrary reasons. The Town of Rhine argues that if the Club was denied a conditional use permit for arbitrary or unreasonable reasons, the Club may have a regulatory taking, or as-applied challenge. We do not disagree that one of these claims may be available if the Club was improperly denied a conditional use permit, but the case at hand is a facial substantive due process challenge to the B-2 zoning ordinance; this is not a challenge to the conditional use permit section of the ordinance, and it is neither a takings challenge nor an as-applied challenge. [25] ¶ 62 To be clear, after today, municipalities still have ample authority to regulate land use  and they should. Such regulation is an appropriate legislative function; it can serve to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public, and it encourages well reasoned growth. The issuance of conditional use permits also is an appropriate function for municipalities. Municipalities certainly have broad authority to restrict land use, but the district at issue today provides for no permitted use as of right, and the only use is garnered through the possibility of obtaining a conditional use permit. No reasonable justification exists for such excessive government control and restriction  especially when that government control is set against land use rights, and the control bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. ¶ 63 The Town of Rhine argues that being able to restrict where less desirable uses develop is the fundamental methodology of Euclidian zoning. We do not disagree, and moreover, we do not seek to limit the power of a town to regulate where and under what conditions land may be used. However, the Town of Rhine, in this case, fails to acknowledge that it can both regulate where undesirable uses develop, and it can provide for permitted uses as of right. ¶ 64 Precluding any permitted use and then only providing generalized standards for obtaining a conditional use permit opens the door to favoritism and discrimination. Under this scenario, a town, pursuant to the ordinance, may arbitrarily preclude any activity on the land in question because (1) there are no permitted uses as a matter of right; and (2) if obtaining a conditional use permit is completely within the discretion of a town, judicial review of a denial is significantly limited because of the non-specific nature of the conditional use standards. As a result, if such an ordinance was deemed acceptable, towns could preclude all uses at will and in a manner that virtually precludes any meaningful judicial review. Such a determination could open the door to abuse. If permitted uses exist as of right, the impact of denying conditional uses is significantly decreased because the landowner has permitted uses as of right. ¶ 65 The facial, constitutional challenge here is sustained. This ordinance is not in balance with the rights of landowners. Because the landowners have demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the ordinance at issue does not provide for any uses as of right, and this restriction in the B-2 District is arbitrary and unreasonable in the sense that it does not bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare, we conclude that Municipal Code § 4.08(2)(a), the B-2 District, is unconstitutional on its face. Accordingly, the Club has met its burden.