Opinion ID: 2751912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individualized Drug Quantity

Text: During the first two sentencings, the district court concluded that the jury's guilty verdict resolved any credibility issues about the testimony relating to the drug quantity foreseeable to Pizarro. In both Casas and Correy, we explained that the district court was wrong, see Casas, 425 F.3d at 64 n.56; Correy, 570 F.3d at 378-79, and we twice ordered the district court to conduct credibility assessments, based on the whole record, see Correy, 570 F.3d at 381, when calculating individualized drug quantity. Pizarro pointed the district court to our decisions when arguing that credibility assessments were required for all witnesses on whose testimony the court was relying for its individualized drug quantity determination. In Correy, we explained: On remand, the appellants developed arguments attacking the credibility and reliability of other witnesses. Though our discussion in the prior opinion was focused on Martínez and Pérez, equally applicable to all witnesses was the rationale for requiring independent credibility assessments by the sentencing judge . . . . [A]fter our remand, the district court should have made credibility 22 This next resentencing will be Pizarro's fourth sentencing. As explained above, Pizarro was initially sentenced in 2002 to life imprisonment. After his first appeal, Pizarro was resentenced in 2006 to 30 years in prison. After his second appeal, Pizarro was resentenced in 2012 to 23 1/3 years in prison. -31- determinations as necessary to resolve the facts in dispute. 570 F.3d at 379 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, in the 2012 resentencing that is the subject of this appeal, the district court again took the position that credibility is not an issue to be considered for any witnesses other than Thomas Martínez and Israel Pérez-Delgado. Therefore, the district court relied on testimony from other witnesses without conducting any credibility assessments. This improper course, now repeated, directly contravened Correy's explicit order. The government claims that the following statement from the district court during the 2012 resentencing indicates that it did perform the required credibility determinations: You point out [sic] to cross examination, to some impeachment, other testimony, but I have to part from that premise. There were convictions in this case as to your client. Some others may have been acquitted, other matters, but if you look at the global [sic] and summarize the testimony, if you look at it globally I understand by the preponderance of the evidence it supports that drug finding. (Emphasis added.) Contrary to what the government posits, the most natural reading of this passage, particularly in light of the district court's explicit statement that credibility is not an issue for witnesses other than Martínez and Pérez-Delgado, is that yet again the district court did not heed our instruction, but rather persisted in its view that the jury verdict was controlling. Correy, 570 F.3d at 379. -32- [W]here the district court has expressly made clear that it is not conducting a credibility inquiry, it would be disingenuous of us to act otherwise. Id. at 381. Therefore, we must vacate Pizarro's sentence and remand for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(A). The district court's credibility assessments must be based on the whole record for all witnesses on whose testimony the court has relied to calculate the conspiracy drug quantity foreseeable to Pizarro. We understand the particular burden that credibility assessments impose on the district court under the circumstances here; however, that burden does not permit a sentence that does not fully comport with all legal requirements.