Opinion ID: 2632441
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Evans relinquish or abandon his expectation of privacy?

Text: ¶ 15 The status of the area searched is critical when one engages in an analysis of whether or not a privacy interest has been abandoned. That is so because courts do not ordinarily find abandonment if the defendant had a privacy interest in the searched area. See, e.g., Dugas, 109 Wash. App. at 596, 36 P.3d 577 (holding defendant did not voluntarily abandon his jacket by placing it on the hood of his car after being arrested). The opposite generally holds true if the search is conducted in an area where the defendant does not have a privacy interest. See, e.g., Reynolds, 144 Wash.2d 282, 27 P.3d 200 (seizure of a jacket containing contraband found underneath vehicle stopped for traffic infraction was reasonable after defendant denied ownership); State v. Young, 86 Wash.App. 194, 935 P.2d 1372 (1997) (seizure of drugs thrown in bushes by defendant prior to his arrest was proper because it amounted to abandonment), aff'd, 135 Wash.2d 498, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). When considering the effect of a denial of ownership, Washington courts have only directly addressed the latter scenario when a defendant has no privacy interest in the searched area. Evans, however, falls into the former. ¶ 16 Washington's case law related to situations like we have here is somewhat limited. There are, however, two cases that help guide our analysis. In State v. Goodman, 42 Wash.App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), the defendant, Goodman, disclaimed ownership of a suitcase found by officers in the trunk of his car after he was stopped while driving. The court held there that the evidence found in the suitcase was inadmissible on other grounds, so its treatment of the abandonment issue is arguably dicta. Nonetheless, the court noted that denial of ownership did not amount to abandonment. See id. at 335, 711 P.2d 1057 (The State's assertions of voluntary abandonment and police exercise of the community care-taking function are without factual support.); id. at 341, 711 P.2d 1057 (The facts before us indicate no grounds for a warrantless search of the suitcase.). Furthermore, in Zakel, Justice Robert F. Utter noted in his majority opinion that disclaimer of ownership would not be sufficient by itself to justify saying Zakel was not in possession of the [car] at the time of the search. Zakel, 119 Wash.2d at 570, 834 P.2d 1046 (addressing automatic standing tests' possessory interest prong). ¶ 17 The Goodman and Zakel decisions suggest to us that a denial of ownership, by itself, did not divest Evans of his privacy interest in the briefcase. But as the Court of Appeals noted, our courts have not analyzed whether one can disclaim property but still challenge a later search, where the disclaimed property remained in an area where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Evans, 129 Wash.App. at 222, 118 P.3d 419. As a result, we consider the guidance offered by Goodman and Zakel in the context of how courts in other jurisdictions have approached a disclaimer of ownership. ¶ 18 A survey of decisions from these other jurisdictions supports a recognition that Evans retained a privacy interest in the briefcase. These courts have concluded that a defendant's denial of ownership does not divest him or her of a privacy interest in that property, provided the search takes place in an area where the defendant had a privacy interest. For example, in State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D.1990), the defendant denied ownership of a bag that was found stuffed under the front seat of his car. The court noted there that the defendant had not discarded the property in a public area, but rather that it was located in an area in which he retained a privacy interest, his car. The court said, as a result, [t]here is little doubt that Huether had an expectation of privacy in his vehicle and in every container therein that concealed its contents from plain view. Id. at 781. Like Huether, Evans did not discard the briefcase and he retained a privacy interest in the car that was searched. ¶ 19 The holding in Huether is consistent with the rulings of other state courts. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, has indicated that the court must look at `the totality of the circumstances, but pay particular attention to explicit denials of ownership and to any physical relinquishment of the property.' People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 813 N.E.2d 93, 105, 286 Ill.Dec. 36 (2004) (quoting United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 836-37 (7th Cir.2000)). But when Illinois courts pay close attention to a disclaimer of ownership, the presence of one is not sufficient, by itself, to demonstrate voluntary abandonment. See, e.g., People v. Lee, 226 Ill.App.3d 1084, 590 N.E.2d 1000, 1002, 169 Ill.Dec. 81 (1992) (confirming privacy interest for purposes of standing). For example, when a defendant denied ownership of a bag stuffed under the front seat of his car, it did not constitute voluntary abandonment. Id. New York's highest court has reached a similar conclusion, indicating that [s]tanding alone, the surrender of control or disclaimer of ownership does not always establish a waiver. People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 666 N.E.2d 207, 213, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1996) (citing 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.6(b)). ¶ 20 The language in the Washington cases cited above and the decisions cited in other jurisdictions is consistent with the privacy protections guaranteed by Washington's constitution. As we have observed in other cases, article I, section 7 of our state constitution provides a strong privacy interest, exceeding that provided by the federal constitution. See Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199. Consequently, in State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990), we held that garbage in a curbside garbage container is not abandoned and police, therefore, needed a warrant to search it. [4] Even under federal law, mere denial of ownership does not necessarily constitute abandonment. See United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir.2006) (courts typically consider two critical factorswhether the defendant physically relinquished, and denied ownership over, the challenged evidence); United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1048 n. 19 (9th Cir.1983) (The majority of previous cases in which the courts have upheld a finding of abandonment have involved both a denial of ownership or interest in the property and a physical relinquishment of the property.); but see United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir.1994) (denying ownership is sufficient to establish voluntary abandonment). ¶ 21 We are persuaded by the language found in the Goodman and Zakel cases and confirmed in the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions that disclaiming ownership is not sufficient, by itself, to constitute abandonment. The circumstances surrounding the disclaimer of ownership dictate whether a defendant has abandoned his or her property. In the circumstances here, Evans had a privacy interest in the area searched, the item that was seizedthe briefcasewas locked, and he objected to its seizure. The fact that Evans denied ownership of the briefcase is not, by itself, sufficient to exhibit the combination of act and intent of abandonment in light of those circumstances. 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.6(b), at 574 (discussing act and intent).