Opinion ID: 1433861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Instructing on aggravating and mitigating factors as a unitary list

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court violated various constitutional rights by failing to delineate which statutory factors were aggravating and which were mitigating. We have consistently rejected this argument. [T]he aggravating or mitigating nature of [the section 190.3] factors should be selfevident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 316, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149.) Here, the court explained that an aggravating factor was anything connected with the crime which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to the injurious consequences.... By contrast, a mitigating factor was any extenuating circumstance short of justification or excuse. Nothing in these commonly understood definitions supports defendant's assertions that the jury could have considered section 190.3, factor (d) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance), factor (g) (acting under the substantial domination of another), or factor (h) (impairment due to mental defect or intoxication) as aggravating, particularly since there was ho evidence of such circumstances. Moreover, in closing argument both the prosecutor and defense counsel identified which factors could be considered aggravating and which mitigating. We are also unpersUaded that language instructing the jury to determine whether or not section 190.3, factors (d) through (h) and (j) existed caused any confusion in this regard. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 420, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) This reference simply complemented the court's generic instruction that the jury's function was to decide what the facts are from the evidence received in the trial.... Furthermore, in the final analysis the constitutional prohibition on arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing `scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute.' [Citation.] ( California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 1009, fn. 22, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457, fn. 22, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171.)