Opinion ID: 3011357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States v. Brockamp

Text: Subsequent to its holding in Irwin, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of when a time limitation applicable to a lawsuit against the government can be equitably tolled. See United States v. Brockamp , 519 U.S. 347 (1997). The Court in Brockamp, considering whether the time limitation set forth in 26 U.S.C. S 651113 could be equitably tolled, was quick to point out that Irwin was not controlling. See id. at 349-50. While the Irwin Court held that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States, the Brockamp Court noted that because section 6511 does not create a cause of action against private defendants, therebuttable presumption created by the Court in Irwin arguably did not apply to the time limitation set forth in section 6511. Id. Nonetheless, the Brockamp Court assumed, but only for the sake of argument, that a tax refund suit and a private suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to warrant asking Irwin's negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply? Id. at 350. _________________________________________________________________ 13. Section 6511 is quite complex and states in part that a [c]laim for . . . refund . . . of any tax . . . shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed . . . within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. 26 U.S.C. S 6511(a) (1986). The statute also states that[n]o credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund isfiled . . . within such period. 26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(1). This point is reiterated: If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period . . . the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return. 26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(2)(A). Finally, the statute states that [i]f the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim. 26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(2)(B). 13 Thus, applying Irwin's rebuttable presumption and addressing the specific time limitation in section 6511, the Brockamp Court first noted that: Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form. Ordinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple language, which one can often plausibly read as containing an implied equitable tolling exception. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c) (requiring suit for employment discrimination to be filed [w]ithin 90 days of receipt of notice of final [EEOC] action). ButS 6511 uses language that is not simple. It sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, that linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions. Id. The Court also noted that: Section 6511 sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits, and those very specific exceptions do not include equitable tolling. See [26 U.S.C.] S 6511(d) (establishing special time limit rules for refunds related to operating losses, credit carrybacks, foreign taxes, self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad debts). Id. at 351-52. The Brockamp Court ultimately held that Congress did not intend to permit equitable tolling with respect to section 6511: To read an equitable tolling provision into these provisions, one would have to assume an implied exception for tolling virtually every time a number appears. To do so would work a kind of linguistic havoc. Moreover, such an interpretation would require tolling, not only procedural limitations, but also substantive limitations on the amount of recovery--a kind of tolling for which we have found no direct precedent. Section 6511's detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken together indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open14 ended, equitable exceptions into the statute that it wrote. There are no counter-indications. Id. at 352. Reinforcing this conclusion, the Court explained that [t]ax law, after all, is not normally characterized by case specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities. Id. The Brockamp Court further pointed out that: The nature of the underlying subject matter--tax collection--underscores the linguistic point. The IRS processes more than 200 million tax returns each year. It issues more than 90 million refunds. See Dept. of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1995 Data Book 8- 9. To read an equitable tolling exception into S 6511 could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for equitable tolling which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification. Id. at 352-53. Thus, a unanimous Court in Brockamp held that the time limitation in section 6511 could not be tolled, regardless of the equities in a given case. C. Equitable Tolling and Section 6532(c) Turning to the case at hand, and the time limitation in section 6532(c), BDC argues that this time limitation is analogous to the time limitation at issue in Irwin and thus can be equitably tolled, while the IRS argues that this time limitation is analogous to the time limitation at issue in Brockamp and thus cannot be equitably tolled. While we acknowledge that the time limitation at issue in this case falls somewhere between the time limitation considered in Irwin and the time limitation considered in Brockamp, we conclude that section 6532(c) is a jurisdictional bar, analogous in almost all relevant respects to the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, and therefore that the time limitation in section 6532(c) cannot be equitably tolled. There are several reasons for our conclusion. 1. Suits Brought Only Against the Government First, like the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, but unlike the time limitation at issue in Irwin, the time limitation in section 6532(c) applies only to suits brought 15 against the government and not suits brought against private defendants. Indeed, section 7426(a)(1), which section 6532(c) modifies, authorizes only suits against the government. Thus, Irwin's rebuttable presumption does not apply; making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits has no meaning in the context of a statute that creates only a cause of action against the government. BDC tries to counter this point by arguing that a suit at common law for recovery of money converted is analogous to a suit brought pursuant to section 7426(a)(1). Therefore, BDC argues, making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the government brought under section 7426(a)(1), in the same way that it is applicable to private suits at common law for the recovery of money converted, amounts to little if any broadening of the congressional waiver, and thus the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants at common law for the recovery of money converted should also apply to suits against the United States brought under section 7426. While this argument is not without intuitive appeal, it fails as matter of law because the time limitation set forth in section 6532(c) does not and would not apply to private suits at common law for the recovery of money converted.14 Our analysis is reinforced by the Supreme Court's skepticism in Brockamp that a tax refund suit brought under 26 U.S.C. S 7422 and a private suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to warrant the application of Irwin's rebuttable presumption. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350 (citing sources for the proposition that a tax refund suit brought under 26 U.S.C. S 7422 and a private suit for restitution are not analogous); see also, e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. _________________________________________________________________ 14. There exists no federal statute, nor as a matter of federal constitutional law could there exist a federal statute, creating a private cause of action for the recovery of money converted by a private individual or entity. Cf. United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that prohibiting by means of federal criminal law the possession of guns in and around local schools is an unconstitutional extension of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause). 16 145, 153-154 (1960) (citing Curtis's Administratrix v. Fiedler, 2 Black 461, 479 (1863)) (distinguishing commonlaw suit against the tax collector from action of assumpsit for money had and received); George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 382-383 (1933); William T. Plumb, Jr., Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 HARV. L. REV. 685, 687 (1947) (describing collector suit as a fiction solely designed to bring the Government into court). In comparing the time limitation at issue in Irwin with the time limitation at issue in this case, it is clear that were we to apply the rule of equitable tolling to suits against the government brought under section 7426(a)(1), it would amount to a substantial broadening of the congressional waiver. Therefore, the reasoning of the Irwin Court is entirely unpersuasive with respect to section 6532(c). The provision at bar is similar to the tax provision considered in Brockamp and distinguishable from the Title VII limitation considered in Irwin, reinforcing the conclusion that section 6532(c) cannot be equitably tolled. 2. The Structure of Section 6532(c) Second, like the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, but unlike the one at issue in Irwin, section 6532(c) sets forth its time limitation[] in unusually emphatic form. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 305. While the time limitation at issue in Irwin was permissive in nature, the time limitation at issue in Brockamp and the time limitation at issue in this case are not. Compare 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c) (1990) ([A]n employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in [42 U.S.C. S] 2000e-5.) (emphasis added) with 26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(1) (1996) (No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund is filed . . . within such period.) (emphasis added), and 26 U.S.C. S 6532(c)(1) (1996) (No suit or proceeding . . . shall be begun after the expiration of 9 months from the date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action.) (emphasis added). Thus the emphatic, non-permissive nature of the language in section 6532(c) also suggests that the time limitation at issue cannot be equitably tolled. 17 Moreover, like the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, but unlike the time limitation at issue in Irwin , section 6532(c) sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limit[], and those very specific exceptions do not include equitable tolling. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 251. Section 6511(d) establishes special time limit rules for refunds related to operating losses, credit carrybacks, foreign taxes, self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad debts. See 26 U.S.C. S 6511(d) (1996). Similarly, section 6532(c)(2) states that [i]f a request is made for the return of property described in section 6343(b), the 9-month period prescribed in [section 6532(c)(1)] shall be extended for a period of 12 months from the date of filing of such request or for a period of 6 months from the date of mailing by registered or certified mail by the Secretary to the person making such request of a notice of disallowance of the part of the request to which the action relates, whichever is shorter. 26 U.S.C. S 6532(c)(2) (1996). The existence of an explicit exception in section 6532(c)(2) to the generally applicable nine-month time limitation in section 6532(c)(1) further suggests that the nine-month time limitation in section 6532(c)(1) cannot be equitably tolled. Moreover, both the time limitation at issue in Brockamp and the time limitation at issue in this case are provisions of the Internal Revenue Code set forth at Title 26, Subtitle F, Chapter 66, entitled Limitations. See 26 U.S.C. SS 6511, 6532(c) (1996); see also Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352 (Tax law, after all, is not normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.).