Opinion ID: 1060661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretrial Motion

Text: We now turn to the issue of whether a defendant must challenge the admissibility of breath-alcohol test results prior to trial. In general, a motion to suppress evidence must be filed prior to trial. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 12(b)(3). The purpose of the rule is not only to avoid the unnecessary interruption and inefficiency in conducting jury trials caused by needlessly removing the jury from the courtroom for protracted suppression hearings, but also to ensure the right of the state to an appeal of an adverse ruling by the trial judge without placing the defendant twice in jeopardy. State v. Randolph, 692 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985). Neither the terms of Rule 12(b)(3) nor Tennessee case law specifies what evidence must be challenged by means of a pretrial motion to suppress. However, the comments to Rule 12(b)(3) state that the rule conforms to its federal counterpart. There is a distinction between filing a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial on the basis that evidence was obtained illegally, and objecting during trial where the prosecution has failed to establish a sufficient foundation for the admission of evidence. The decision in United States v. Barletta, 644 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1981) construes the federal counterpart to Tennessee's rule. The court explains: At least as used in 12(b), suppress has a rather definite and limited meaning, as explained by the Advisory Committee notes accompanying the Rule. Motions to suppress are described as objections to evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, including evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and other forms of illegality such as the use of unconstitutional means to obtain a confession. Put generally, then, suppression motions concern the application of the exclusionary rule of evidence', or matters of `police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt . . . . Id. at 54 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Gomez-Benabe, 985 F.2d 607 (1st Cir.1993) (motion to suppress must be made prior to trial; other motions to exclude evidence may be made during the trial). We also think that requiring a pretrial motion is inconsistent with established Tennessee case law. In Sensing we said that the prosecution must meet six requirements to establish a foundation for the admissibility of breath test results: first, the testing operator must testify that the test used followed Tennessee Bureau of Investigation standards; second, the operator must be certified in accordance with those standards; third, the machine must be certified, tested regularly for accuracy, and working properly; fourth, the motorist must be personally observed for the requisite minutes before taking the test; fifth, the operator must follow the instrument's prescribed operational procedure; and sixth, the operator must identify the test results offered in evidence. Id. at 416. The prosecution's inability to meet one of these requirements means it has failed to establish a foundation for the admission of the breath test results. It does not mean that the evidence was illegally obtained by the State. Moreover, nowhere in Sensing did we state that a defendant must challenge these requirements prior to trial under Rule 12(b)(3). Indeed, the defendant in Sensing preserved the issue by objecting at trial. The State's arguments for requiring a pretrial motion in all cases are unconvincing. First, a pretrial hearing is not required simply because it may reduce disruption or delay of the trial. Although pretrial procedures certainly have that advantage, the rules of evidence provide for other means by which to conduct a hearing out of the hearing of the jury. Tenn. R. Evid. 104(c). In fact, trial courts have great discretion in implementing a procedure by which to rule on evidentiary matters outside the jury's hearing. E.g., Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 104.3, at 27-28 (3d ed.1995). The trial court did so in the present case. Second, the prosecution must establish the Sensing requirements regardless of whether the issue is raised prior to trial or whether an objection is made at trial. Cohen et al., § 401.24, at 131 (Compliance with State v. Sensing is a `condition precedent' to the admissibility of the breath test.) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the State's comment that the defense counsel may engage in sandbagging by intentionally opting not to raise the matter prior to trial is dubious. Moreover, this Court should not require the defense to file a pretrial motion simply to advise the prosecution that it may have a defect in its proof or some problem in establishing the appropriate evidentiary foundation. The responsibility for establishing the Sensing requirements rests only with the prosecution, not the defense. Finally, the State's concern for its right to appeal an adverse ruling is misplaced for two reasons. First, as we observed in Sensing : [I]t is a rare case in which the only evidence introduced to establish that a suspected offender is under the influence is either a breath or a blood test. In most cases there is the testimony of the arresting officer and others at the scene concerning the arrestee's driving pattern and their observations of the individual, including his speech, breath and eyes. Often a field sobriety test has been administered. Scientific tests are corroborative evidence and may serve to exonerate as well as to convict an accused in a close case. Id. at 416-17 (emphasis in original). Second, the argument for preserving a possible appeal by the State would arguably apply to any evidentiary ruling made by the trial court that is adverse to the prosecution. If the position is carried to its logical conclusion, then a defendant would be required to seek pretrial suppression of each component of the prosecution's evidencephotographs, documents, physical evidence, proposed expert testimonyto avoid the penalty of waiver and to preserve a possible appeal by the State in the event the evidence is excluded. [1] We have never given such a broad construction to Rule 12(b)(3).