Opinion ID: 2595534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Policy and the GMA

Text: ¶ 28 Viking next contends that the density limitation violates public policy as set forth in the GMA, the City's comprehensive plan, and the City's zoning regulations. Viking argues that the GMA's fundamental and overarching policy is to concentrate development in urban growth areas. Br. of Resp't at 30 (citing RCW 36.70A.020(1), .110(1)). Because the covenant limits density within such an urban growth area, Viking reasons that the GMA renders the density limitation void or unenforceable. We disagree with this characterization of the GMA and its effects.
¶ 29 The legislature enacted the GMA in 1990 to coordinate the State's future growth via comprehensive land use planning. See Laws of 1990, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 17, codified at ch. 36.70A RCW. The GMA contains 13 expressly nonprioritized goals that guide local governments in the development of comprehensive plans and development regulations. RCW 36.70A.020. These goals include, inter alia, encouraging development within urban areas, reducing the conversion of undeveloped land into low-density development, retaining open space, protecting the environment, and protecting private property rights. Id. ¶ 30 These goals and their accompanying regulatory provisions create a framework that guides local jurisdictions in the development of comprehensive plans and development regulations. RCW 36.70A.3201, enacted by Laws of 1997, ch. 429, § 2; see also 17 Stoebuck & Weaver, supra, § 4.2, at 171. Within this framework, the legislature has affirmed that there is a broad range of discretion that may be exercised by counties and cities consistent with the requirements . . . and goals of [the GMA]. RCW 36.70A.3201. ¶ 31 In other words, the GMA does not prescribe a single approach to growth management. Instead, the legislature specified that the ultimate burden and responsibility for planning, harmonizing the planning goals of [the GMA], and implementing a county's or city's future rests with that community. RCW 36.70A.3201. Thus, the GMA acts exclusively through local governments and is to be construed with the requisite flexibility to allow local governments to accommodate local needs. ¶ 32 Neither the GMA nor the comprehensive plans adopted pursuant thereto directly regulate site-specific land use activities. See Timberlake Christian Fellowship v. King County, 114 Wash.App. 174, 182-83, 61 P.3d 332 (2002) (citing Ass'n of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash.2d 185, 188, 4 P.3d 115 (2000); Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash.2d 861, 873-74, 947 P.2d 1208 (1997)). Instead, it is local development regulations, including zoning regulations enacted pursuant to a comprehensive plan, which act as a constraint on individual landowners. RCW 36.70A.030(7); Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash.2d 742, 757, 765 P.2d 264 (1988).
¶ 33 The test of whether a contractual provision violates public policy is `whether the contract as made has a tendency to evil, to be against the public good, or to be injurious to the public.' Thayer v. Thompson, 36 Wash.App. 794, 796, 677 P.2d 787 (1984) (quoting Golberg v. Sanglier, 27 Wash.App. 179, 191, 616 P.2d 1239 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 96 Wash.2d 874, 639 P.2d 1347 (1982)). Before we will find a restrictive covenant to be in conflict with public policy, the record must demonstrate a legislative intent to declare a general public policy sufficient to override a contractual property right. Mains Farm, 121 Wash.2d at 823, 854 P.2d 1072. A clear demonstration of such intent is especially important in light of the constitutional takings questions that are implicated by the potential violation of such property rights. Id. ¶ 34 In Mains Farm, as noted supra, we affirmed the issuance of an injunction enjoining the operation of an adult family home on a property restricted by covenant to single-family residential purposes, even though the legislature had provided that adult family homes were to be considered residential for zoning purposes. We reasoned in part that [w]hen the legislature intends to affect a private land use restriction ( i.e., a covenant) as compared to zoning, it does so explicitly. . . . Id. at 823, 854 P.2d 1072 (emphasis omitted).
¶ 35 The instant case is an appropriate vehicle to illustrate the effect of public policy. In contrast with the racial restriction, it cannot be maintained that the density limitation has a tendency to evil, nor has the legislature explicitly expressed an intent to override contractual property rights, let alone invalidate those that predate the GMA. The legislature has expressly determined that racial restrictions like that contained in the instant covenant are void. RCW 49.60.224. The GMA neither states nor implies such an effect with respect to the density limitation. ¶ 36 Instead, by Viking's own admission, the GMA was intended to coordinate the State's  future growth. Br. of Resp't at 30 (emphasis added). In other words, Viking concedes, and we agree, the GMA is primarily prospective in nature, and is premised upon the recognition that influencing future planning decisions is more realistic than changing the decisions of bygone eras. In light of this prospective intent, we cannot endorse Viking's assertion that the GMA, enacted in 1990, overrides a contractual property right executed over 60 years ago. ¶ 37 Viking's public policy argument also fails to the extent that it implicitly requires us to elevate the singular goal of urban density to the detriment of other equally important GMA goals. To do so would violate the legislature's express statement that the GMA's general goals are nonprioritized. RCW 36.70A.020 (The following goals are not listed in order of priority. . . .). We are ever cognizant that this is a legislative prerogative and have prioritized the GMA's goals only under the narrowest of circumstances, where certain goals came into direct and irreconcilable conflict as applied to the facts of a specific case. See King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 543, 558, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). We decline Viking's invitation to create an inflexible hierarchy of the GMA goals where such a hierarchy was explicitly rejected by the legislature. ¶ 38 Indeed, although enforcement of a restrictive covenant may impede some of the GMA's goals, it simultaneously furthers the achievement of others. This observation is not surprising within the context of the GMA, inasmuch as the goals are frequently in tension, if not outright in conflict. See, e.g., 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 23, at 8 (noting that there is an inherent tension in seeking to accommodate by comprehensive action all of these goals, some of which are in conflict); 24 Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, Washington Practice: Environmental Law and Practice § 18.2, at 174 (1997) (describing the general goals as vague and contradictory). ¶ 39 Here, it is indisputable that enforcement of the covenant furthers certain GMA goals. For example, because restrictive covenants represent valuable property interests, enforcement furthers the GMA goal of protecting private property rights. See RCW 36.70A.020(6) (Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation having been made. The property rights of landowners shall be protected from arbitrary and discriminatory actions.). Likewise, enforcement of the covenant furthers the GMA goal of preserving open space within the Richmond Beach neighborhood of the city of Shoreline. See RCW 36.70A.020(9). Notably, Viking fails to consider either of these goals in its brief, and courts will not replace the City's determinations with its own preferences. Balancing the GMA's goals in accordance with local circumstances is precisely the type of decision that the legislature has entrusted to the discretion of local decision-making bodies. RCW 36.70A.3201. ¶ 40 In addition to its general claims regarding public policy and the GMA, Viking also claims that the growth management hearings boards have adopted a `bright line' of a minimum four net dwelling units per acre as defining urban development. Br. of Resp't at 31 (citing Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Wash. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., No. 95-3-0039, 1995 WL 903165, 35 (Oct. 6, 1995) [hereinafter CPSGMHB]). The City's comprehensive plan and zoning regulations also call for a minimum of four houses per acre. See SMC 20.50.020. As a result, Viking concludes that the covenant's density limitation grossly contradict[s] the provisions of the GMA, the City's comprehensive plan, and the City's zoning regulations and must be declared void. Br. of Resp't at 29. This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. ¶ 41 First, Viking's claim that the GMA imposes a bright line minimum of four dwellings per acre is erroneous. In making this claim, Viking relies upon a 1995 decision of the CPSGMHB. See Bremerton v. Kitsap County , CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0039, 1995 WL 903165 (Oct. 6, 1995). However, the growth management hearings boards do not have authority to make public policy even within the limited scope of their jurisdictions, let alone to make statewide public policy. The hearings boards are quasi-judicial agencies that serve a limited role under the GMA, with their powers restricted to a review of those matters specifically delegated by statute. See RCW 36.70A.210(6), .280(1); Sedlacek v. Hillis, 145 Wash.2d 379, 385-86, 36 P.3d 1014 (2001) (stating that public policy is set forth in constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, as well as prior judicial decisions). Accord Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash.2d 58, 63, 993 P.2d 901 (2000); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). See also Skagit Surveyors & Eng'rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash.2d 542, 565, 958 P.2d 962 (1998) (stating that the GMA is not to be construed to confer upon a hearings board powers not expressly granted in the GMA). ¶ 42 Second, Viking's argument fails to account for the fact that the GMA creates a general framework to guide local jurisdictions instead of bright line rules. See RCW 36.70A.3201; Richard L. Settle, Washington's Growth Management Revolution Goes to Court, 23 Seattle U.L.Rev. 5, 9 (most GMA requirements are conceptual, not definitive, and often ambiguous). Indeed, the existence of restrictive covenants that predate the enactment of the GMA and limit density within the urban growth areas are the type of local circumstances accommodated by the GMA's grant of a broad range of discretion for local planning. See RCW 36.70A.3201; Cent. Puget Sound Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d at 561, 14 P.3d 133. ¶ 43 Third, although the City's zoning regulations call for a minimum density of four dwelling units per acre, nothing in the regulations compels property owners to develop their parcels to any particular minimum density. Indeed, assuming without deciding that the Homeowners' and Viking's lots constitute nonconformities under the zoning regulations, the regulations provide that they may be maintained indefinitely. See SMC 20.10.040(B), SMC 20.30.280. Moreover, the City has correctly conceded that it has no authority to enforce or invalidate restrictive covenants, CP at 201, and explicitly accounted for the existence of such covenants in its comprehensive plan by forecasting that areas subject to covenants would experience less future growth than other areas within the City. Finally, the city's planning manager, on advice of the city attorney, determined that the covenant was not in irremediable conflict with city policy, and that the City would process building permits on a lot with area that exceeded the minimum densities under the code for the land use district as a nonconforming lot. CP at 310. Accordingly, the density limitation does not violate public policy.