Opinion ID: 1121511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Nature and Duration.

Text: [17] In a related issue, the Supreme Court has stated that due process `requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.' Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 77 L.Ed.2d 694, 103 S.Ct. 3043 (1983) (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 92 S.Ct. 1845 (1972)). Thus, an inquiry into the purposes of the Statute is required. Two underlying purposes for commitment are often advanced  treatment and incapacitation. See La Fond, supra. The Statute at issue here serves both purposes. The Statute requires that constitutionally mandated care and treatment be provided, RCW 71.09.080, and charges DSHS with the responsibility of providing control, care, and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large. RCW 71.09.060(1). DSHS has promulgated regulations to effect this purpose. An individualized treatment plan is developed and maintained for each person committed under the Statute, including: (a) A description of a person's specific treatment needs; (b) An outline of intermediate and long-range treatment goals, with a projected timetable for reaching the goals; (c) The treatment strategies for achieving the treatment goals; (d) A description of [sexual predator program] staff persons' responsibility; and (e) Criteria for recommending to the court whether a person should be released from the [sexual predator program]. WAC 275-155-040(1). The regulations governing the program make it clear that committed individuals shall [r]eceive adequate care and individualized treatment. WAC 275-155050(3)(a). The purpose of incapacitation is also well served by this Statute. The task force responsible for drafting the legislation initially noted that an additional goal of the program was to confine repeat violent offenders who present an extreme safety risk. Report, at I-1. Sexually violent predators, those who are adjudged likely to engage in acts of violence, are housed in a special commitment center which must be located within a correctional institution. The record reflects that the current facility is rated maximum security. Given the nature of sexually violent predators, it would not be safe to house them in a less secure setting. Thus, it appears that the commitment is related to the purpose of the Statute. [18] Finally, petitioners argue that they are constitutionally entitled to the least restrictive alternatives to confinement available. [11] It is true that those who are civilly committed must be treated differently than criminals. The Supreme Court has said this explicitly: Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22, 73 L.Ed.2d 28, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982). Nevertheless, we need not place undue limitations on the administration of state institutions. Romeo, at 322. [19] In light of these considerations, giving the presumption of correctness to decisions made by the appropriate professional (here, DSHS), individuals who have been involuntarily committed have the right to conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these interests. Romeo, at 324. Here, the dangerousness of committed sex predators justifies a secure confinement facility. Moreover, the regulations governing the commitment facility specifically provide a wider range of privileges than those associated with a prison setting: (3) A person the court commits to the SPP [sexual predator program] shall: (a) Receive adequate care and individualized treatment; (b) Be permitted to wear the committed person's own clothes and keep and use the person's personal possessions, except when deprivation of possessions is necessary for the person's protection and safety, the protection and safety of others, or the protection of property within the SPP; (c) Be permitted to accumulate and spend a reasonable amount of money in the person's SPP account; (d) Have access to reasonable personal storage space within SPP limitations; (e) Be permitted to have approved visitors within reasonable limitations; (f) Have reasonable access to a telephone to make and receive confidential calls within SPP limitations; and (g) Have reasonable access to letter writing material and to: (i) Receive and send correspondence through the mail within SPP limitations; and (ii) Send written communication regarding the fact of the person's commitment. (Italics ours.) WAC 275-155-050. There is no evidence in the record addressing either the actual conditions of confinement, or the quality of treatment. These issues are not currently before the court. Facially, the Statute and associated regulations suggest that the nature and duration of commitment is compatible with the purposes of the commitment.