Opinion ID: 2582281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature of the Inquiry Under California Law

Text: With regard to the second issue noted above  the nature of the inquiry required (and permitted) in this context under California law  we observe that the matter presented is not, as the Court of Appeal appears to have assumed, a determination or finding about the [defendant's earlier] conduct itself, such as the intent with which a defendant acted. Instead, it is a determination regarding the nature or basis of the defendant's prior conviction  specifically, whether that conviction qualified as a conviction of a serious felony. California law specifies that in making this determination, the inquiry is a limited one and must be based upon the record of the prior criminal proceeding, with a focus on the elements of the offense of which the defendant was convicted. If the enumeration of the elements of the offense does not resolve the issue, an examination of the record of the earlier criminal proceeding is required in order to ascertain whether that record reveals whether the conviction realistically may have been based on conduct that would not constitute a serious felony under California law. (See, e.g., People v. Woodell, supra, 17 Cal.4th 448, 452-461, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85.) The need for such an inquiry does not contemplate that the court will make an independent determination regarding a disputed issue of fact relating to the defendant's prior conduct (see id. at p. 460, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85), but instead that the court simply will examine the record of the prior proceeding to determine whether that record is sufficient to demonstrate that the conviction is of the type that subjects the defendant to increased punishment under California law. This is an inquiry that is quite different from the resolution of the issues submitted to a jury, and is one more typically and appropriately undertaken by a court. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, numerous state and federal court decisions have interpreted the Almendarez-Torres exception more broadly than defendant urges here, and have concluded that Apprendi does not preclude a court from making sentencing determinations related to a defendant's recidivism. In the present case, the trial court had before it the colloquies from the relevant Nevada proceedings, in which defendant pleaded guilty to the Nevada robbery charges. From this factual inquiry, limited to examining court documents ( Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th 452, 457, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518), the trial court fairly could determine whether each of the prior convictions constituted a serious prior felony conviction for purposes of the California sentencing statute. As we previously have observed, but wish to reiterate, `This is the type of inquiry traditionally performed by judges as part of the sentencing function.' ( Ibid. ) In his supplemental briefing filed in this court, defendant contends that even if Apprendi and its constitutional progeny leave the scope of the Almendarez-Torres exception unclear, the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 ( Shepard ) indicates that a jury trial is required in the present context. In Shepard, the high court addressed whether, under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) (18 U.S.C., § 924(e)), a sentencing court may look to police reports or complaint applications in determining whether a guilty plea in an earlier criminal proceeding formed the basis for a conviction of generic burglary, qualifying the defendant for a minimum 15-year prison sentence under the ACCA. In Shepard, a majority of the high court held that a later court determining the character of an admitted burglary is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. ( Id. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 1257].) In reaching this conclusion  and rejecting the assertion that the sentencing court properly could consider all the documents contained within the record of the prior criminal proceeding  the majority opinion in Shepard stated, in the course of its analysis, that [w]hile the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones [ v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215] and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute. The rule of reading statutes to avoid serious risks of unconstitutionality, see Jones, supra, at 239, [119 S.Ct. 1215], ... therefore counsels us to limit the scope of judicial factfinding on the disputed generic character of a prior plea.... ( Shepard, supra, 544 U.S. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 1262-1263, italics added; [9] see also id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 1257 [[A] later court determining the character of an admitted burglary is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.].) Although the Shepard decision may suggest that a majority of the high court would view the legal issue presented in the case before us as presenting a serious constitutional issue, the high court's decision did not purport to resolve that issue. The issue before the high court in Shepard was resolved as a matter of statutory interpretation, and the court did not purport to decide whether a state is constitutionally precluded from permitting a court to conduct the kind of examination of the record of a prior criminal proceeding that occurred in the case before us in determining whether a conviction constitutes a qualifying prior conviction for purposes of enhancement under a state sentencing statute. [10] Accordingly, we believe that Shepard fails to establish the validity of the Court of Appeal's application of Apprendi. In this regard, it is worth noting that in the several months following the Shepard decision, a number of federal lower courts have reaffirmed the viability of the Almendarez-Torres exception. (See, e.g., United States v. Reeves (8th Cir.2005) 410 F.3d 1031, 1035, quoting United States v. Marcussen (8th Cir.2005) 403 F.3d 982, 984 [We previously have rejected the argument that the nature of a prior conviction is to be treated differently from the fact of a prior conviction; Shepard supports the rule that the sentencing court, not a jury, must determine whether prior convictions qualify as violent felonies]; United States v. Williams (7th Cir.2005) 410 F.3d 397, 402 [trial court can make findings of fact respecting criminal history, be they findings as to the fact of [a defendant's] prior convictions or as to the nature of those convictions, because Shepard acknowledges the continuing validity of Almendarez-Torres ].) In view of the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that Shepard does not provide the type of clear resolution of the issue that would justify overturning the relevant California precedents.