Opinion ID: 590623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count IV: Custom or Practice of the City of Hickory Hills

Text: 41 In count IV of his amended complaint, Mr. Burger alleged: 42 3. That between January 1, 1989, and June 4, 1989, the plaintiff was stopped by various police officers of the City of Hickory Hills at least 10 times while he was driving his motor vehicle, and the police officers searched plaintiff's vehicle on each of the occasions and, finding nothing improper, released plaintiff without issuing any traffic citation or other complaint. 43 4. That on each of the said occasions, plaintiff was not violating any rule of the road or violating any other law and the police officers did not have any probable cause to stop plaintiff and search his vehicle. 44 R. 19 at 6. Mr. Burger further alleged that the unjustified stops had become so frequent as to form a custom and practice in the Hickory Hills police department so as to constitute the act of the City of Hickory Hills. Id. at 7. By way of relief, Mr. Burger sought a temporary and permanent restraining order against the Hickory Hills police department from stopping and searching plaintiff's vehicle where there is no probable cause to believe a traffic or other violation has been committed by plaintiff. Id. 45 In its motion for summary judgment, the City noted that Mr. Burger had admitted in his deposition, which was taken on July 17, 1990, that the Hickory Hills police department had stopped him only once since June 4, 1989, and that stop was to give Mr. Burger a warning for driving without a headlight. The City further argued that plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that a policy or custom exists within the City of Hickory Hills Police Department encouraging its officers to stop and/or arrest the plaintiff without probable cause. R. 38 at 10. The City contended that Mr. Burger had thus failed to produce sufficient evidence to support municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In response, Mr. Burger invited the court's attention to the above-quoted allegations in his verified amended complaint. The district court reasoned that Burger's allegations do not support an inference of an official policy because Burger has not submitted any evidence that any of the stops prior to June 4 [1989] were without probable cause. Therefore, Burger has not established that those prior stops were either illegal or similar to the arrest on June 4. R. 44 at 10. 46 On appeal, Mr. Burger admits that he did not provide any additional evidence in response to the motion for summary judgment but argues that [w]here the movant for summary judgment presents no evidentiary matter on an issue, the party answering need not present any rebutting evidence but may rely on his pleadings. Appellant's Br. at 19. Mr. Burger misstates the evidentiary burdens of summary judgment. The moving party bears the initial burden of directing the district court to the determinative issues and the available evidence that pertains to each. [A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see id. at 325 (the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case). Then, with respect to issues that the non-moving party will bear the burden of proving at trial, the non-moving party must come forward with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions and designate specific facts which establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. The non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue. Id. The non-moving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 47 A non-moving party with the burden of proof on an issue must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Conclusory allegations that have no factual support are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Powers v. Dole, 782 F.2d 689, 695 (7th Cir.1986). Mr. Burger had the burden of proving that the City of Hickory Hills had a policy or custom of stopping his van and searching it without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Thus, in its motion for summary judgment, the City needed only to point[ ] out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. This sufficed to shift to Mr. Burger the burden of establishing that a genuine issue of material fact existed whether the City of Hickory Hills had such a policy or custom. Mr. Burger's response was simply to point to his sworn statement that Hickory Hills police officers stopped him more than ten times without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. As the district court noted, this statement was not sufficiently specific to create an issue of fact whether any stops prior to June 4 were without probable cause or similar to the arrest on June 4. 12 Mr. Burger failed to provide any specific facts about the prior stops. 13 Thus, we conclude that Mr. Burger's reference to the vague, conclusory allegations in his verified complaint did not suffice to discharge his burden of establishing that a genuine issue of material fact existed whether the City of Hickory Hills had a policy or custom of violating his constitutional rights.