Opinion ID: 1953320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: private nuisance action for stray voltage

Text: We first consider whether the doctrine of private nuisance applies to stray voltage claims. The Vogels assert that private nuisance is a viable theory of recovery for stray voltage claims because it constitutes an invasion by the utility of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. GLEC argues that the court of appeals correctly determined that private nuisance is inapplicable to stray voltage claims, and, therefore, the circuit court erred when it submitted the nuisance verdict question and instruction to the jury. [1, 2] A circuit court has wide discretion as to the instructions and special verdicts given to a jury, provided that they adequately cover the law applicable to the facts. See Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 32, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991). The question at issue here is not the sufficiency of credible facts to warrant sending the nuisance issue to the jury. Rather, the question is whether damages caused by stray voltage are recoverable in a private nuisance cause of action. Whether the facts of a particular case fulfill a legal standard is a question of law we review de novo. See Nottelson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 116, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980). This court has previously adopted the definition of private nuisance set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). [2] The Restatement defines nuisance as a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D. The phrase `interest in the private use and enjoyment of land' as used in § 821D is broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property. Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 232, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982). GLEC argues that the concept of invasion in the Restatement necessarily involves a unilateral encroachment. It contends that a nuisance is produced by an activity under the defendant's control to which the plaintiff objects, and not by activity which the plaintiff has requested and facilitated. According to GLEC, the Vogels' act of requesting electrical service and cooperating in the receipt of electricity by connecting its system to GLEC's distribution system negates the concept of unilateral invasion and thus defeats a claim for nuisance. The court of appeals agreed with GLEC and concluded as a matter of law that the provision of electricity to the Vogels' farm cannot be considered a nuisance because it does not constitute the type of invasion on which nuisance liability is typically predicated. According to the court of appeals, [a]s users of an instrumentality they invited onto their land, and have in many ways benefited from over the years, we do not think they now may be heard to claim that the instrumentality has illegally `invaded' their property. Vogel, 195 Wis. 2d at 212. Both the court of appeals and GLEC rely on previous Wisconsin nuisance cases to support the proposition that the Vogels' request for electric service and cooperation in receiving the service precludes a nuisance cause of action. Summarizing these cases, the court of appeals stated: The common thread in these cases is an invasion of the plaintiffs' land: an objectionable activity either undertaken by the defendants or within their control, which has subjected the plaintiffs to an unwanted and harmful interference with the use of their land. In no case has the activity causing the alleged interference been either agreed to or requested by the plaintiffs, as is the situation here. Id. at 211. [3] The Vogels argue that GLEC's interpretation of an invasion as requiring a unilateral action unduly limits the doctrine of nuisance. Further, they assert that while it is true that they requested electrical service, it does not follow that they requested excessive levels of stray voltage. Therefore, the Vogels maintain that their request for electric service cannot itself negate the possibility of an invasion of their interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by excessive stray voltage flowing onto their farm. We agree with the Vogels that their request for electric service itself does not negate the invasion element of nuisance. Both GLEC and the court of appeals fail to distinguish between electrical service generally and excessive levels of stray voltage which may accompany it. While the Vogels requested electric service, they did not request excessive stray voltage to flow through their farm. Similarly, while they received benefit from the electrical service generally, the evidence presented at trial indicates that they hardly benefited from excessive stray voltage. We find no support in the language of the Restatement to support GLEC's unilateral invasion theory of nuisance. Further, such an interpretation is inconsistent with language of the Restatement. Under the Restatement, a nuisance may be premised on an invasion of an interest of another's use and enjoyment of land that is unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent ... conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822(b). When an unintentional invasion results from negligent conduct, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a defense to the same extent as in other actions founded on negligence. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840B. See also Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 545-47, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956). Therefore, GLEC's position that there must be a unilateral invasion is inconsistent with the existence of a contributory negligence defense in a nuisance action involving an unintentional invasion. We also disagree with the court of appeals that previous nuisance cases in Wisconsin compel the conclusion that stray voltage does not constitute the type of invasion on which nuisance liability is predicated. The court of appeals erroneously focusses on private nuisance as an invasion of land. For example, the court of appeals states that [t]he common thread in these cases is an `invasion' of ... land .... Vogel, 195 Wis. 2d at 211 (emphasis added). Interpreting this court's decision in Prah, the court of appeals states that nothing in [ Prah ] abrogates, or even dilutes, the requirement that there be an invasion of property in order for a nuisance to exist under the Restatement rule. Vogel, 195 Wis. 2d at 212 (emphasis added). However, the Restatement defines nuisance as a  nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (emphasis added). See also Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 231. Although some of the nuisance cases identified by the court of appeals involve a physical invasion of land, the Restatement uses the phrase interest in the use and enjoyment of land broadly to include more than freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself: [That phrase] also comprehends the pleasure, comfort and enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land. Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using land is often as important to a person as freedom from physical interruption with his use or freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself.... [It] is essentially an interest in the usability of land.... Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D, cmt. b. As one commentator has noted, [t]he different ways and combination of ways in which the interest in the use or enjoyment of land may be invaded are infinitely variable. W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 87, at 619 (5th ed. 1984). This court has previously characterized the common law doctrine of private nuisance as being both broad to meet the wide variety of possible invasions, and flexible to adapt to changing social values and conditions. Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 232, 239 (recognizing that private nuisance law has the flexibility to protect both a landowner's right to access to sunlight and another landowner's right to develop land). An interpretation of nuisance as only arising from a unilateral action and a physical invasion of land restricts the essential flexibility of the nuisance doctrine. We decline to do so here. [3, 4] We conclude that nuisance law is applicable to stray voltage claims because excessive levels of stray voltage may invade a person's private use and enjoyment of land. Although excessive levels of stray voltage may be found to constitute a nuisance in certain circumstances, we do not hold that it constitutes a nuisance under all circumstances. The determination of whether stray voltage unreasonably interferes with a person's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land is reserved for the trier of fact. See Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 240. [5] Because the circuit court correctly applied the law of private nuisance under the facts presented, we conclude that it properly submitted the nuisance question to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision ordering the circuit court to strike the nuisance-related damages from the judgment.