Opinion ID: 2369694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appointment and Compensation of Counsel

Text: Blount asserted for the first time in the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred by appointing Black as amicus curiae. He repeats that argument in this Court and says that once notice is given pursuant to Rule 42(b), Tenn. R.Crim. P., actual prosecution of contempt charges may be conducted only by the district attorney general. In Tennessee, Blount says, district attorney generals have a duty to attend the circuit courts in the district, and every other court therein having criminal jurisdiction, and prosecute on behalf of the state in every case in which the state is a party, or in any wise interested. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) (1993 Repl. & 1996 Supp.). Therefore, Blount argues that the district attorney general was legally required to conduct the prosecution of this criminal contempt proceeding and the trial court erred by appointing a private attorney. While we agree that criminal contempt is generally regarded as a crime, see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1481-82, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), prosecutions of criminal contempt are not intended to punish conduct proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws. Rather, they are designed to serve the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court. In punishing contempt, the Judiciary is sanctioning conduct that violates specific duties imposed by the court itself, arising directly from the parties' participation in judicial proceedings. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 800, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2134, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). In our view, Tennessee law only requires district attorney generals to conduct prosecutions for conduct proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws. Therefore, district attorney generals in Tennessee have no mandatory statutory duty to prosecute criminal contempts. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 92-25. Blount's argument ignores the fact that the contempt power of the court is essential to the survival of an independent judiciary. Indeed, to hold that a trial judge may appoint only the district attorney general to investigate and prosecute contempts places the court at the mercy of another constitutional officer who is a member of another independent branch of government. See Dearborne v. State, 575 S.W.2d 259, 264 (Tenn. 1978) (district attorney general is a member of the executive branch of government). The ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt action satisfies the need of the court for an independent means of protecting the administration of justice and the court as an organ of society. Young, 481 U.S. at 796, 107 S.Ct. at 2132. [3] Moreover, Rule 42(b), Tenn. R.Crim. P., clearly indicates that a trial court may appoint an attorney other than the district attorney general to prosecute indirect criminal contempts. (The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the district attorney general or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest) (emphasis added). Though the rule does not provide specific authorization for appointment of a private attorney, it acknowledges the well-settled proposition that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings and the concomitant authority to appoint private attorneys to prosecute such contempts. Young, 481 U.S. at 794-95 107 S.Ct. at 2130-31. Having concluded that district attorney generals have no mandatory statutory duty to prosecute criminal contempts, we emphasize that they are not prohibited from prosecuting such cases. Indeed, we agree with the United States Supreme Court that the better practice is for a trial court to first ask the district attorney to prosecute contempt actions, and should appoint a private prosecutor only if that request is denied. Young, 481 U.S. at 801, 107 S.Ct. at 2134, 95 L.Ed.2d at 755; see also Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 92-25. Blount speculates that had the trial court in this case first asked the district attorney to prosecute the contempt action, payment of attorney's fees would not be an issue since the district attorney is not entitled to receive attorney's fees in such cases. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-105 (1990 Repl.)(No prosecutor in a misdemeanor is entitled to any compensation for his services as prosecutor, or for his attendance as a witness on behalf of the state.) Blount says he should not be required to pay attorney's fees that were incurred as a result of the trial court's mistake. In the alternative Blount argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103 (1980 Repl. & 1996 Supp.) [4] , delineates the exclusive punishment for contempt and does not include ordering payment of attorney's fees. Therefore, Blount says the trial court was without authority to order payment of attorney's fees under general Tennessee law which allows taxing of attorney's fees only when authorized by statute, contract or a recognized ground of equity. Under Tennessee law, issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived. Blount first challenged the trial court's decision to appoint Black in the Court of Appeals. Blount may not now use his own failure to act to obtain a more favorable decision on appeal. Blount's second argument ignores this Court's decision in Ferguson v. Paycheck, 672 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn. 1984), in which the following rule concerning a trial court's authority to appoint and order compensation of counsel was adopted: [t]here must exist a necessity for the services of a member of the bar to serve the court in reaching a proper resolution of questions or issues presented and pending before the court, in which case the court may award compensation to be paid by the party or parties responsible for the situation that prompted the court to make the appointment. The rule excludes the appointment of counsel to serve the interests of litigants, witnesses, or any other private parties. In this case, the trial court appointed Black to investigate, initiate, and prosecute a contempt citation against Blount. Unlike the attorney in Ferguson , who had been appointed to represent certain witnesses, Black was appointed to perform necessary services for the trial court. Black assisted the trial court in properly resolving questions and issues presented by the contempt proceeding. Since Blount is the party responsible for creating the situation which prompted Black's appointment, based on this Court's decision in Ferguson , the trial court was authorized to order Blount to pay attorney's fees. [5] Blount claims that Black's services were not necessary because the district attorney general was available to prosecute the action. As previously explained, any challenge to Black's appointment on that basis should have been raised in the trial court and has been waived. Although we affirm the trial court's decision to order Blount to pay attorney's fees, we note that there is little evidence in this record to establish the reasonableness of the fees awarded. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we remand to the trial court for further proceedings to calculate reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1980), and Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which is a part of Supreme Court Rule 8. One of the factors relevant to that determination is the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. Connors, 594 S.W.2d at 676. The trial court shall consider the fees paid to court-appointed counsel in other contexts when applying that factor to determine reasonable attorney's fees for the services rendered by Black in this case.