Opinion ID: 526440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of the Arbitration Award.

Text: 80 As stated earlier, in accordance with the district court's opinion and order, and while this appeal was pending, the parties submitted their dispute to arbitration pursuant to RLA Sec. 3, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 Second (1982), which resulted in a determination in favor of appellants. The concluding Award of that determination however, stated only that: The questions set before the Board are disposed of as provided in the Findings and Conclusions herein. CSX has since commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York to review the Board's determination, and appellants have moved this court that the district court's order and permanent injunction be vacated and that this case be remanded for further consideration of appellants' counterclaim. We now address that motion. 81 We are met at the outset by CSX's contention that appellants' motion is not properly before this court, because it is based upon facts not in the record of this appeal. CSX claims that the proper procedure for seeking the vacation of a judgment which is on appeal requires that the party first seek an indication of the District Court's disposition to grant the motion before seeking a remand from this Court, citing Litton Sys. v. AT & T, 746 F.2d 168, 171 n. 4 (2d Cir.1984), and Ryan v. United States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir.1962). 82 We reject this contention. There is no indication in Litton or Ryan that the described procedure is mandatory in all cases, rather than an option to be utilized where appropriate in the circumstances. Here a question of law is presented on uncontested facts, and appellants contend in substance that the district court's order should be vacated as moot because of the subsequent event of the arbitral award. It is perfectly appropriate for us to consider such an application in the first instance. See Cedar Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 560 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047, 98 S.Ct. 893, 54 L.Ed.2d 798 (1978); 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 3533.10, at 440-41 (2d ed. 1984). 83 We consider next appellants' application that we vacate the order of the district court and the permanent injunction which that order includes. Appellants contend that the Board's determination vitiates the underlying basis for the district court's order and injunction in this case. We disagree, believing that this contention rests upon a fundamental misconception of the RLA process for the resolution of major and minor disputes. 84 To begin with, the district court determined only that CSX had an arguable or plausible position based upon the extant agreements between the parties, and that a minor dispute was thereby presented which should be arbitrated by an adjustment board pursuant to RLA Sec. 3, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 (1982). This was the proper course, since [t]he resolution of minor disputes is within the exclusive jurisdiction of ... boards of adjustment ..., IAM v. Eastern Air Lines, 847 F.2d 1014, 1017 (2d Cir.1988) (citing Local 553, 695 F.2d at 673-75); see Chicago & N.W. Transp., 855 F.2d at 1286, and courts may not adjudicate the merits of these issues. Local 553, 695 F.2d at 675. 85 The Board which conducted the arbitration thereafter determined that CSX's position, although arguable and plausible, was, on careful analysis, unavailing. CSX has appealed that determination pursuant to RLA Sec. 3 First (q), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (q) (1982), but can prevail only by establishing failure of the [Board] to comply with the requirements of this chapter, ... failure of the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction, or ... fraud or corruption by a member of the [Board]. Id. 86 There is thus no conflict between the determinations of the district court and the Board, and the Board's decision in no way vitiates the underlying basis of the district court's order. On the contrary, absent a determination by the district court that the controversy between the parties was a minor dispute, there would have been no basis for Board jurisdiction over that dispute. Nor is there any conflict between the district court's conclusion that CSX's position was plausible, and the Board's conclusion that CSX should nonetheless not prevail. 9 87 Furthermore, the obvious implication of appellants' application to vacate the district court's anti-strike injunction is that, having prevailed before the Board, appellants are now entitled to strike. This contention counters both the general purposes of the RLA to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein and to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules or working conditions, RLA Sec. 1a, 45 U.S.C. 151a (1982); the corresponding duty imposed upon carriers and employees by RLA Sec. 2 First, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 152 First (1982), see Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. UTU, 402 U.S. 570, 577, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 1735, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 (1971); and the specific provisions of RLA Sec. 3 First (p) and (q), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (p) and (q) (1982), providing for judicial enforcement or review of arbitration awards rendered by RLA adjustment boards. 88 As indicated earlier herein, the RLA dispute resolution process is structured to allow strikes at the end of the lengthy process provided for the resolution of major disputes, but to subject minor disputes to binding arbitration and forbid strikes with respect to them. As we stated in Local 553, [a]s a result of the 1934 amendments [making arbitration of minor disputes compulsory], the RLA for the first time offered a means of resolving technical disputes between labor and management without the risk of strike or work stoppages or prolonged litigation. 695 F.2d at 675 (emphasis added). Appellants cite no authority for the startling proposition that, having prevailed in the arbitration of what the district court correctly deemed a minor dispute, they are entitled to strike. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that they are not so entitled. 89 Rather, as we indicated earlier and as the Seventh Circuit made clear in Chicago & N.W. Transp.: 90 Strikes over minor disputes violate the RLA and may be enjoined by the federal courts in order to effectuate the RLA's purpose to provide for the compulsory arbitration of such matters by the NRAB. 91 Thus, it is clear that the federal courts may issue injunctions against strikes in minor disputes in order to protect the NRAB's exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. Because injunctions barring strikes in minor disputes are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Sec. 3 RLA procedures, they are not proscribed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 92 855 F.2d at 1287 (citations omitted). 93 Similarly, we see no basis for a remand to the district court for consideration of appellants' counterclaim. That counterclaim seeks a declaration that CSX may not change the rates of pay, rules and working conditions of employees on [the Buffalo-Eidenau line] until the [RLA] major dispute resolution processes have been exhausted (emphasis added), and corresponding injunctive relief. 10 The district court concluded, however, as we have, that this controversy is a minor dispute. The Board's arbitral determination does nothing to alter that conclusion, and indeed is in no way directed to that question. See supra note 9; see also General Comm. of Adjustment v. CSX R.R. Corp., Civ. No. 87-1712, slip op. at 9 (M.D.Pa. Feb. 24, 1989) ([o]nly the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the issue of whether a dispute is minor or major). There is accordingly no basis for a remand to consider appellants' counterclaim. 94 Finally, we address the primary concern which appears to motivate appellants' motion to vacate and remand. Both here and in a petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari in RLEA v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 529, petition denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 885, 102 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1989), appellants have contended that the arbitral decision by the Board in appellants' favor here leaves appellants without any remedy, because no employee-contractual right has been violated and the adjustment board has no jurisdiction to enforce the [RLA], so that the board [is] powerless to rectify the actual injury suffered by the employees. 95 As stated earlier, the Board's determination concluded with an Award which merely stated that the questions posed to the Board were disposed of as provided in the Findings and Conclusions herein. Appellants' remedy for any perceived inadequacy in the Board's determination, however, is provided by RLA Sec. 3 First (q), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (q) (1982), which establishes a judicial remedy for any employee or group of employees ... aggrieved by the failure of any [adjustment board] to include certain terms in [its] award. Id. The reviewing court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order ... or to set it aside, in whole or in part, or it may remand the proceeding ... for such further action as it may direct. Id. We note in this connection the statement in Chicago & N.W. Transp., in declining to enjoin the line sale there under consideration, that: 96 If the NRAB rejects [the carrier's] interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements and determines that the employees who are displaced by the challenged rail line sale are entitled to relief, it will be able to order the necessary payment of monies and adjustments in seniority levels it deems necessary to make these employees whole. Thus, it cannot be inferred that the legal remedy available to the RLEA unions in this case (via the NRAB arbitration procedure) is inadequate. 97 855 F.2d at 1288. 98 By noting the possible applicability of this statement to the situation resulting from the Board's arbitral decision in favor of appellants here, of course, we are not to be understood as prejudging, or providing a rule of decision for, any of the issues that may arise in the currently pending, or any subsequent, litigation concerning that decision.