Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of defendant's attempt to interview the trial jurors

Text: Defendant claims that the PCR court's denial of his request to interview the trial jurors was in error. Defendant further claims that our rule precluding post-trial contact with jurors without leave of the court, R. 1:16-1, violates his constitutional rights under the First Amendment. Defendant acknowledges the long-standing common-law rule against inquiring into jurors' motives to impeach their verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2745, 97 L.Ed. 2d 90, 104 (1987). For sound reasons of policy, including the prevention of juror harassment and the avoidance of chilling jury deliberations, courts typically require some showing of extraneous influence before permitting a party to interview jurors. See, e.g., State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 110, 199 A. 2d 630 (1964); see also United States v. Console, 13 F. 3d 641, 669 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076, 114 S.Ct. 1660, 128 L.Ed. 2d 377, and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 812, 115 S.Ct. 64, 130 L.Ed. 2d 21 (1994); United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F. 2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed. 2d 818 (1984). That practice is particularly appropriate when the jury has already been discharged. See Tanner, supra, 483 U.S. at 120-21, 107 S.Ct. at 2747-48, 97 L.Ed. 2d at 106. Before the PCR court, defendant sought permission to contact jurors some seven years after their discharge, but he made no showing that would justify such an extraordinary measure. Defendant's allegations of extraneous influence lack any factual basis and rely on purest speculation. This Court has found that the trial court's conduct of the voir dire was without error. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 93-94, 586 A. 2d 85. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the PCR proceeding was unfair because of the court's denial of his request to interview jurors. We also are unpersuaded by defendant's First Amendment challenge to Rule 1:16-1. The compelling public interest in protecting jurors and their deliberations amply justifies the restriction on contacting them without good cause.