Opinion ID: 2959723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Prejudice

Text: Given the State's clear election of three acts in its closing argument, Carson was not prejudiced by the absence of a Petrich instruction. Because we are reviewing only defense counsel's performance rather than the trial court's failure to give a Petrich instruction, we use the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance claims and require the defendant to demonstrate that his attorney's deficient performance prejudiced him. State v. Robinson, 138 Wn.2d 753, 765-69, 982 P.2d 590 (1999). We use the Strickland standard even where the defendant claims that his attorney's deficient performance affected his constitutional rights. /d. at 765-66; State v. West, 139 Wn.2d 37, 42, 983 P.2d 617 (1999). 12 Under Strickland, we do not presume prejudice unless the trial loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, State v. Webbe, 122 Wn. App. 12 See also In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 674, 101 P.3d 1 (2004) (limiting presumption of prejudice to three circumstances outlined in Strickland plus other circumstances where 'the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into actual conduct of the trial' (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357, 154 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2002))); State v. Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d 222, 228-29, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001) (declining to hold that trial counsel's failure to request a diminished capacity instruction was ineffective per se because [t]he question of whether counsel's performance was ineffective is generally not amenable to per se rules, but requires a case by case basis analysis). 18 State v. Carson .(David), No. 90308-5 683, 694-95, 94 P.3d 994 (2004 ), as when there is (1) a complete denial of the assistance of counsel, (2) the State's interference with counsel's assistance, or (3) an actual conflict of interest. See id.; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 674, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). Strickland explained that a presumption of prejudice makes sense in these narrow circumstances because [p]rejudice ... is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost and that with respect to conflicts of interest, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 13 None of Strickland's presumptively prejudicial circumstances exists here. Consequently, under Strickland's standard of review, Carson bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862. Here, far from demonstrating prejudice, the circumstances of Carson's 13 The Strickland Court elaborated: [Where a defendant is completely denied counsel or the State interferes with counsel's assistance, prejudice] is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent. [When there is an actual conflict of interest], ... it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. 466 U.S. at 692 (citations omitted). 19 State v. Carson (David), No. 90308-5 trial strongly suggest that the absence of a Petrich instruction was harmless because the State, in its closing argument, elected the acts on which it was relying. 14 Petrich's multiple acts instruction applies only when the State fails to elect the act upon which it will rely for conviction. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 572; see also 11 WPIC 4.25 note on use at 110 (If there is evidence of multiple distinct occurrences of the crime, but the prosecution elects to rely upon a specific occurrence to support a conviction, then this Petrich instruction should not be used.). For an election to be effective, either the State must tell the jury which act to rely on in its deliberations or the court must instruct the jury to agree on a specific criminal act. State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 409, 756 P.2d 105 (1988). We have never held that the State's election of an act must be ratified by the court or incorporated into the charging document or jury instructions in order to be effective. On the contrary, and as our use of the phrase tell the jury in Kitchen suggests, id. (emphasis added), an election can be made by the prosecuting attorney in a verbal statement to the jury as long as the prosecution clearly identifie[s] the act upon which the charge in question is based. State v. Thompson, 169 Wn. App. 436, 474-75,290 P.3d 996 (2012) ([b]ecause the State clearly identified the act upon which the sexual motivation allegation was based in its closing argument, no unanimity instruction was necessary); compare, e.g., id., and In re Pers. Restraint of Delgado, 14 In its Court of Appeals brief, the State argued that no Petrich instruction had been necessary because the State had made an election. The Court of Appeals acknowledged this argument in its discussion of Carson's claim that the trial court erred in failing to give a Petrich instruction, Carson, 179 Wn. App. at 972-73, but it neither acknowledged nor discussed it in the context of Carson's ineffective assistance claim. 20 State v: Carson (David), No. 90308-5 160 Wn. App. 898, 902, 251 P.3d 899 (2011) (prosecutor 'clearly elected ... the criminal acts associated with the two counts during its closing arguments'), with State v. Williams, 136 Wn. App. 486, 497, 150 P.3d 111 (2007) (no clear election in closing argument where prosecutor emphasized one act over others but did not expressly elect to rely only on one act in seeking the conviction). 15 Here, the evidence tended to show only three separate acts 16 and an election arguably was not even necessary. But even if we were to assume arguendo that the evidence could be construed as pointing to additional acts, the State, in its closing argument, clearly and explicitly elected the three acts on which it was relying for conviction: the incident where C. C.'s business was twisted ... in the bathroom and the incidents where Carson tried to put his penis in [C.C.'s] bottom in C.C.'s room and in his parents' room. The State specifically disclaimed its intention to rely on any other instances where Carson may have attempted to put his penis in C.C.'s bottom, stating that it was only focusing on the incidents in C.C.'s room and Hagen's room and telling the jury that those were the only incidents that the State would like you to focus on for the purposes of your deliberations. 15 Similar to the Court of Appeals holding in Williams, we held in State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798, 811-13, 194 P.3d 212 (2008), that the prosecution's closing-argument election was ineffective because it was not sufficiently clear. In Kier, like the prosecutor in Williams and in contrast to the closing argument in this case, the prosecutor merely named the acts on which he was relying; he did not, as the prosecutor at Carson's trial did, tell the jury that they were the only acts on which the State was relying. This latter element is essential to a clear election: the State must not only discuss the acts on which it is relying, it must in some way disclaim its intention to rely on other acts. 16 See note 2, supra. 21 State v. Carson (David), No. 90308-5 This suffices to constitute an election. The prosecutor, unlike the court, cannot actually instruct the jury to ignore particular testimony or evidence. By specifying exactly three instances of sexual misconduct and disclaiming the State's intention to rely on other acts, the State effectively elected the acts on which the State sought a conviction. 17 Because Petrich instructions need not be read in cases where the State makes an election, no Petrich instruction was necessary in Carson's trial and the absence of such an instruction did not prejudice Carson. 18 Thus, even if the defense attorney's objection constituted deficient performance, Carson's ineffective assistance claim. would fail.