Opinion ID: 1730820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: whether the evidence was examined under incorrect legal standards?

Text: Billiot argues that there was no presumption for the trial judge to rely on that he was competent to be executed because of this Court's decision in, Billiot v. State, 515 So.2d 1234 (Miss. 1987). In the 1987 Billiot, 515 So.2d 1234, we found that he made the threshold showing that he was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the question of his competence to be executed. We said, [b]ecause we find Billiot's pleading to suggest with statutory and factual particularity that he may be legally insane and thus protected from execution, we remand this case to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County for a hearing on the limited issue of Billiot's present sanity. Id. at 1235 (emphasis added). We further said: Undoubtedly, Billiot has presented allegations under oath which, if true, bring into serious question the legality of execution under both state and federal law. In the face of this fact-backed pleading, we acknowledge Billiot's claim procedurally alive `substantially showing denial of a state or federal right', and conclude that he is entitled to an in-court opportunity to prove his claims. Id. at 1237 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The reasoning contained in the above quote is based on Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5) and (6) (Supp. 1994) which gives this Court the power to grant a defendant's postconviction application to proceed in trial court on a request for post-conviction relief as long as it appears from the face of the application, motion, exhibits and the prior record that the claims presented by such are not procedurally barred under section 99-39-21 and that they further present a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right... . Additionally, in Billiot we remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-23 and 99-39-27 (Supp. 1986). Section 99-39-23(7) (Supp. 1994) explicitly states, [n]o relief shall be granted under this chapter unless the prisoner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to such. The burden was clearly on Billiot to show by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the hearing, he was incompetent to be executed. It is reasonable to conclude that even after he made the threshold showing that entitled him to proceed in trial court on motion for postconviction relief, Billiot faced a presumption that he was sane and competent to be executed. Billiot further attacks the presumption under M.R.E. 301, saying that once he produced evidence from Dr. Johnson that he was incompetent, the presumption of his competency vanished. The argument is not persuasive. M.R.E. 301 states: In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by act of the Legislature or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast. (Emphasis added) The comment to the rule states that Rule 301 is only concerned with presumption in civil proceedings. When this Court granted Billiot's application, he was entitled to proceed in trial court in an attempt to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not competent to be executed. He bore the burden of the proof and the risk of nonpersuasion.
Here Billiot argues that the facts in the record so substantially weigh in favor of finding that he is insane and incompetent for purposes of carrying out his execution that the trial court committed error by not shifting the burden of proof to the state. One could clearly find from this record that Billiot is a schizophrenic and otherwise suffers from various forms of mental illness. However the record also clearly shows that all experts agreed that one could be schizophrenic and still competent to be executed. A determination of legal insanity for purposes of execution is not the same thing as finding that someone suffers from mental illness. Under the present state of law the trial judge had no authority to shift the burden of proof to the State of Mississippi.
Billiot essentially argues here that the trial judge committed error by placing too much emphasis on his intelligence, and not enough emphasis on his rational understanding of his predicament and fate, in determining that he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. The record reflects that the judgment of the trial court was based upon the proper standards  the statute and Ford v. Wainwright . It is not clear from the cited authority that the trial judge's reasoning was inconsistent with constitutional principles and federal interpretation. It is true that the state's experts, and for that matter everyone who testified on the subject, agreed that Billiot is a man of average intelligence. It is not clear however that this factor was so exclusively relied on that it renders the opinion and judgment of the trial court reversible. In fact, intelligence is a relevant factor to consider in a competency hearing. It is certainly conceivable that one could be so intellectually deficient that one could not possibly comprehend one's crime, have a rational understanding of what it means to be executed, understand that one is to be executed, have the ability to rationally connect his crime with the fact that he will be executed, or have the ability to assist counsel. The trial court's ruling explicitly states that it relies on the criteria as set forth in the United States Supreme Court decision of Ford v. Wainwright . Billiot's argument that § 99-19-57(2)(b) is itself unconstitutional is unpersuasive. The interpretation given to that statute by the trial judge incorporated reliance on the Ford case. The statute does not unconstitutionally restrict rights of defendants in light of the Ford v. Wainwright . The essence of the holding in Ford is that a death row inmate must not be insane when he is executed. He must comprehend the reasons for the penalty and its implications, he must understand the penalty's existence and purpose, and in order for the retributive goal of the criminal law to be satisfied, he must perceive[] the connection between his crime and his punishment, and be aware that his death is approaching [so] he can prepare himself for his passing. Id., 477 U.S. at 417, 422, 106 S.Ct. at 2605, 2608. The Mississippi statute, § 99-19-57(2), states: (b) For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be deemed insane if the court finds the convict does not have sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, what he was tried for, the purpose of his punishment, the impending fate which awaits him, and a sufficient understanding to know any fact which might exist which would make his punishment unjust or unlawful and the intelligence requisite to convey such information to his attorneys or the court. The Mississippi statute is harmonious with the import of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as interpreted in Ford v. Wainwright . Furthermore, the trial judge considered Ford when he reached his conclusion. Stated differently, the statute as interpreted by the trial court is not incongruous with the federal constitutional mandate in this area.