Opinion ID: 2159195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Certain Jurors

Text: In Ramseur this Court adopted the death qualification test as reformulated by the United States Supreme Court in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581 (1980), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985). State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256 (Henceforth, trial courts shall use the Adams test in death-qualifying a jury.). In Adams, the Supreme Court held that the death-qualification test is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 589; see also Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 851-52 (the Adams standard does not require that a juror's bias be proved with `unmistakable clarity'; the standard is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath'). We also noted in Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 256, that trial courts must be accorded a sound measure of discretion in determining whether or not a juror's views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially interfere with the juror's performance of his duties: A sensitive weighing and appraisal of a juror's entire response must be made by the trial court in its duty to resolve the question of whether the juror has shown bias or prejudgment in answering the questions. [ Id. at 257.] Before us defendant challenges the exclusion of five jurors, Deborah Campbell, Valeria Cacossa, Grace Cohn, Janet Stone, and George Muller. Although defense counsel objected to the removal of juror Cohn, no objection was asserted in the course of voir dire to the removal of the other four jurors. We have carefully reviewed the interrogation and responses of each of the jurors whose exclusion is challenged. We are convinced that in each case there is substantial support in the record for the trial court's conclusion that the jurors' views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially interfere with the performance of [their] duty. Jurors Cacossa, Stone, and Muller flatly stated that they would never vote to impose the death penalty. Jurors Campbell and Cohn expressed a strong desire to avoid responsibility for a decision resulting in death and their responses indicated that it was highly unlikely that either could ever vote to impose the death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court's exclusion of these jurors did not constitute an improper exercise of discretion.