Opinion ID: 507338
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Amendment and Due Process Claims

Text: 14 Appellants also allege that the delay between their initial arrest in the fall of 1984 and the 1986 indictment violated the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee. We review a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim de novo. United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir.1985). We may reject the district court's determination of the underlying facts, however, only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 1468. 15 The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is intended to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). Of course, once Wallace's 1984 indictment was dismissed, since she was not subject to trial, her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had no application to the delay between her initial arrest and the dismissal. Her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial reattached upon her rearrest pursuant to the 1986 indictment, but no undue delay following the 1986 arrest is claimed. See id. 456 U.S. at 7, 102 S.Ct. at 1501 (Any undue delay after charges are dismissed, like any delay before charges are filed, must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause.) Appellants' Sixth Amendment claim, based on the delay between the initial arrest in 1984 and the return of the 1986 indictment, is without merit because it ignores the intervening dismissal. 16 Pre-indictment delay following dismissed charges may, however, be scrutinized under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process guarantee. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 7, 102 S.Ct. at 1501. First, the defendant must show actual, non-speculative prejudice as a result of the delay, United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir.1985); and, second, the court must balance the government's reasons for causing the delay against the demonstrated prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 781-82; see also Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-90, 102 S.Ct. at 2048. We review the district court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss based on the due process clause for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rogers, 722 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir.1983). 17 Wallace's argument and proof fail the first prong of the test. She argues that she was prejudiced by the loss of a potential witness, Elmer Ray Penn, who she claims would have testified that she was not involved in any heroin trafficking with the Sterling operation. The assertion itself reveals its speculative nature. Elmer Ray Penn would have been a co-defendant of Wallace and Elmore Penn if he were not a fugitive from justice. Moreover, there is little indication in the record to suggest that Elmer Ray Penn, if available, would have testified favorably for Wallace, if he testified at all. 6 Because we conclude that Wallace failed to establish actual prejudice, we do not consider the reasons for and length of the delay. Rogers, 722 F.2d at 562. 18