Opinion ID: 2512535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hawaii's Public Use Clause

Text: Similar to the federal constitution, the Hawai`i Constitution provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Haw. Const, art. I, § 20. In examining whether a particular taking by the state or county government is for a public purpose, this court has long adhered to a rational-basis standard, i.e., so long as the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to the objective sought, the legislative public use declaration should be upheld unless it is palpably without reasonable foundation. Kau v. City & County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai`i 468, 478, 92 P.3d 477, 487 (2004) (citing Hous. Fin. and Dev. Corp. [(HFDC)] v. Castle, 79 Hawai`i 64, 85, 898 P.2d 576, 597 (1995)) (original emphasis omitted). In other words, [t]he crucial inquiry is whether the legislature might reasonably have believed that application of the sovereign's condemnation powers would accomplish the public use goal. Id. (citations, original emphasis, and ellipsis omitted). In Hawai`i Housing Authority v. Ajimine, 39 Haw. 543 (Haw.Terr.1952) (an early case addressing the public use clause), this court stated the general rule that: Primarily, the right to declare what shall be deemed a public use is vested in the legislature; and[,] consequently, when the public nature of a use for which a taking has been authorized by law is disputed, the question as it presents itself to the courts is whether the legislature might reasonably have considered the use public, not whether the use is public. This rule rests on the presumption that a use is public if the legislature has declared it to be such. The strength of that presumption is gauged by the high regard which the courts have for a declaration of public use by the legislature as a decision of a co-ordinate department of the government on a matter within its knowledge and duty. Illustrative of such regard, all the authorities agree that legislative findings and declarations of public use are entitled to great weight. Moreover, a legislative finding and declaration that the particular uses, as here involved, are public is entitled not only to respect but to a prima facie acceptance of its correctness. Indeed, where [as here] the Legislature declares a particular use to be a public use[,] the presumption is in favor of this declaration, and will be binding upon the courts unless such use is clearly and palpably of a private character. But that does not mean that either the decision of the legislature or the presumption is conclusive, for the issue of public use is a judicial question and one of law to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Nevertheless, the great weight accorded to the legislative finding and the prima facie acceptance of its correctness, as well as the binding effect of the presumption, demonstrates that the courts will not lightly disturb such a finding and will not overrule it unless it is manifestly wrong. Id. at 549-50 (emphases added) (some brackets added and some in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The above declaration in Ajimine, as well as subsequent cases, echo the views espoused in Kelo, discussed supra, including Justice Kennedy's concurrence. For example, in Hawai`i Housing Authority v. Lyman, 68 Haw. 55, 704 P.2d 888 (1985), this court explicitly adopted the minimum rationality standard as the appropriate test for judicial evaluation of the legislature's public use determinations. 68 Haw. at 69, 704 P.2d at 896-97. The Lyman court specifically held that, once the legislature has spoken on the social issue involved, so long as the exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to the objective sought, the legislative's public use declaration should be upheld unless it is palpably without reasonable foundation. The crucial inquiry is whether the legislature might reasonably consider the use public, and whether it rationally could have believed that application of the sovereign's condemnation powers would accomplish the public use goal. Id. at 70-71, 704 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Likewise, in HFDC, this court observed that the appropriate test for determining public use in an eminent domain action under both the Hawai`i and United States Constitutions is substantially the same as the least demanding level of equal protection analysis`rational basis,' 79 Hawai`i at 86, 898 P.2d at 598: Under the rational basis test, the court essentially asks whether a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In making this inquiry, a court will not look for empirical data in support of the statute. It will only seek to determine whether any reasonable justification can be conceived to uphold the legislative enactment. Once it is determined that the legislature passed the statute at issue to further a legitimate government purpose, then the pertinent inquiry is only whether the [l]egislature rationally could have believed that the [statute] would promote its objective. Additionally, the lawmakers are under no obligation to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the [statute] is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker. Id. (underscored emphases and brackets in original) (bold emphasis added) (citations omitted) (format altered). See also Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1156 (applying a rational-basis test to a public purpose analysis under both the Hawai`i and United States Constitutions). Consequently, our own case law demonstrates that the rational-basis testidentical to that laid out in the federal precedentis the appropriate standard to be applied in this jurisdiction when determining whether a governmental taking has a public purpose under the public use clause of the Hawai`i Constitution, as well as the federal constitution. Under such standard, the government's determination that a particular taking is for a public purpose will be upheld if it rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. HFDC, 79 Hawai`i at 86, 898 P.2d at 598. In other words, the legislature's public use declaration should be upheld unless it is palpably without reasonable foundation. Lyman, 68 Haw. at 70, 704 P.2d at 897. However, as previously indicated, the great deference given to the government's determination of public purpose is not absolute, and the burden is on the party challenging the legislative judgment [to] convince the court that the legislative facts on which the [legislation] is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker. HFDC, 79 Hawai`i at 86, 898 P.2d at 598 (emphasis in original).