Opinion ID: 1155733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Refusal to Give Defendant's Proposed Penalty Instructions

Text: (12) Defendant argues the court erred in refusing to give instructions proposed by him and dealing with various aspects of the jury's penalty determination. These instructions would have permitted the jury to consider in mitigation such factors as (1) mercy, sentiment, and sympathy for the defendant, (2) defendant's potential for rehabilitation, loving family ties, childhood experiences, probable adjustment to prison life, and remorse, (3) any evidence offered by defendant based on his individual characteristics, and notwithstanding his culpability for the offense, (4) any mitigating aspect of defendant's background or character, and (5) any evidence that defendant was acting under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offenses, regardless of degree, and whether or not the condition reduced his culpability. Defendant also offered instructions that would have admonished the jury to ignore any aggravating factors not specifically listed by the court, and that would have permitted the jurors to consider elements of pity, sympathy or mercy for defendant that persuaded them that death was an inappropriate penalty in this case. As will appear, the court gave instructions that were comparable to those requested by defendant. Thus, the court substantially modified the terms of former CALJIC No. 8.84.1, factor (k) to clarify the jury's responsibility to consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offenses for which he is on trial. (See People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) Additionally, the court directed the jury to disregard guilt phase instructions that told the jury not to be swayed by sympathy. Moreover, the court read to the jury a revised version of CALJIC No. 8.84.2, directing that (1) the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was not a mechanical or arbitrary counting of factors, (2) the jury could assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all the various factors, (3) the weighing process involves determining the appropriate penalty under the relevant evidence, and, (4) to return a verdict of death, the jury must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating ones that they warrant a death verdict. Finally, the court instructed the jury that even if the aggravating factors substantially outweighed mitigating ones, it is within your discretion to return a verdict of either death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Thus, the instructions that defendant proposed largely duplicated those that were actually given in this case. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in refusing to give the additional instructions offered by defendant. (See People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 673-674 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805, fn. 12 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330], and cases cited; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 227-228 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285], and fn. 26 [lack of mercy instruction].) In addition, several of the proposed instructions were argumentative, that is, `of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.' (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 805.) No error is committed in refusing such instructions. ( Id. at pp. 805-806; see People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 1276-1277; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1323-1324 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) We conclude the court did not err in refusing to give defendant's proposed instructions.
(13) Defendant proposed an instruction that would have permitted the jury to consider the concept of fairness as applied to a case in which an accomplice who is equally culpable as a principal was given immunity for the offenses with which defendant was charged. The instruction continued by telling the jury it could consider the disparity of treatment between defendant and Lanora Johnson, his accomplice. Although defendant cites to cases from other states indicating that the sentencer may consider the sentences imposed on the defendant's accomplices, the California rule is clearly to the contrary. (See People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1249 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 69-71 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1]; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 811-813 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) As stated in Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 1249, The focus in a penalty phase trial of a capital case is on the character and record of the individual offender. The individually negotiated disposition of an accomplice is not constitutionally relevant to defendant's penalty determination. We also note that defendant's proposed instruction was argumentative, focusing on the particular evidence in the case and even purporting to characterize (equally culpable) that evidence. As previously discussed, the proposed instruction properly could have been rejected on that basis alone. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 805.) (14) In a related argument, defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his automatic motion for reconsideration of sentence (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) without considering the grant of immunity to Ms. Johnson. Defendant cites no California authority supporting the theory that the trial court is permitted or required to consider such matters in ruling on motions to modify sentence. Indeed, if the subject of disparate sentences for accomplices is irrelevant to the sentencing determination ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1249), it would follow that the trial court should not consider such matters in ruling on modification motions. (See People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892] [court limited to reviewing evidence submitted to jury].)
Defendant asserts the court erred under both state and federal law in failing to delete from the list of potential mitigating factors those clearly inapplicable in the case, thereby permitting the prosecutor to note their absence in his closing arguments. We have rejected similar arguments on several occasions. (See, e.g., People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 957; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1247; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) (15) In a related argument, defendant contends the prosecutor committed Davenport error (see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]) when he argued that the jury could consider as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victims were not coparticipants with defendant in the offenses he committed. The People concede the error, but observe that the trial court sustained defendant's objection to the argument, the prosecutor was admonished not to make, and did not make, any similar arguments, and defense counsel explained to the jury the correct principles. Nothing in the record indicates the jury was misled by the prosecutor's brief argument in this regard. (See also People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 864-865 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270] [harmless error]; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1247 [same]; People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 255 [250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25] [same].)
During the penalty phase, the prosecution was permitted (see § 190.3, factor (b)) to introduce evidence of various prior offenses of defendant, namely, the killing of Thomas Davis, the killing of Arthur Gray, and the armed robbery and attempted murder of Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Davis. Defendant had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing Thomas Davis; the remaining offenses were unadjudicated. (16) Defendant contends admission of evidence of the prior unadjudicated offenses was improper under the due process and equal protection guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions. We have frequently held that neither the state nor federal Constitution forbids admitting evidence of the defendant's uncharged and unadjudicated offenses that involve force or violence, or the threat or attempt to use force or violence. (See People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1188 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146]; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 906-907 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282]; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 42 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631 [767 P.2d 1109]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) In a related contention, defendant argues the court erred in allowing the People to introduce evidence of the circumstances surrounding defendant's prior offenses involving force or violence. According to defendant, section 190.3, factor (b), permits the People to prove only the fact that defendant committed the offense, not the underlying circumstances. We have frequently rejected similar contentions. (See People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 47; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 754 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) Defendant's equal protection claim is based on asserted restrictions on the admissibility of evidence of prior offenses or convictions in noncapital cases. (But see People v. Ratcliffe (1981) 124 Cal. App.3d 808, 823 [177 Cal. Rptr. 627], and cases cited.) It seems sufficient to observe that capital case sentencing involves wholly different considerations than ordinary criminal sentencing and properly allows the jury to focus on the defendant's prior criminal conduct and propensity for violence, factors deemed relevant as possible aggravating circumstances affecting the jury's ultimate penalty decision. (See People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 568 [250 Cal. Rptr. 530, 758 P.2d 1060].) This distinction between capital and noncapital cases adequately justifies the differences in treatment cited by defendant. (See People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1188 [denying equal protection challenge]; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 906-907 [same]; cf. People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].)
(17) Defendant contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit evidence regarding the circumstances of defendant's prior conviction of voluntary manslaughter for the killing of Thomas Davis. (See § 190.3, factor (c).) Defendant asserts that, in light of the manslaughter conviction and the implied acquittal of murder charges, the jury's consideration of evidence tending to show malice or premeditation violated the proscriptions against double jeopardy in the state and federal Constitutions. We have repeatedly rejected similar contentions. (See People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 71 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388]; People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 217; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 17.) As stated in Visciotti, The presentation of evidence of past criminal conduct at a sentencing hearing does not place the defendant in jeopardy with respect to the past offenses. He is not on trial for the past offense, is not subject to conviction or punishment for the past offense, and may not claim either speedy trial or double jeopardy protection against introduction of such evidence. [Citation.] (2 Cal.4th at p. 71.)