Opinion ID: 3009951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Randall Terry

Text: Appellants argue that the district court committed serious errors of law and fact in finding that Terry was not involved in activities related to the July 9, 1993, RHCC blockade in violation of the Revised Permanent Injunction. They contend that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the erroneous legal conclusion that a contemnor must be physically present at the scene to violate the injunction. We agree that the trial court erred as a matter of law by ignoring undisputed testimony that Terry solicited support for the Cities of Refuge campaign and spoke at one of the Cities of Refuge events, thereby acting in concert with Operation Rescue to orchestrate the July 9th blockade.4 See App. at 183-84 (Terry's testimony). 4 Appellants also assert that the court committed a serious factual error in setting the date of Terry's speaking The district court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that Terry violated the order: Plaintiffs failed to establish that defendant Terry was present or active in any of the events in question. . . . Terry did speak at the Valley Forge Hilton Hotel at a date prior to the Cities of Refuge campaign. However, the Hotel is in excess of twenty miles from the Reproductive Health and Counseling Center and the speech concerned the political involvement of those in the pro-life movement. Said activities were not in violation of this court's Order. Roe V at 2. We have previously held that an instigator of contemptuous conduct may not absolve himself of contempt liability by leaving the physical performance of the forbidden conduct to others. Roe IV at 871. In upholding the district court's finding that defendant Michael McMonagle violated the TRO in a 1989 blockade, this court found that actual trespass was not a necessary precondition for holding McMonagle in civil contempt where he had instructed protestors during the blockade and spoken with police officials at the scene. Id. When a party appearance at a date prior to the Cities of Refuge campaign when all the evidence, including Terry's own testimony, indicates that the speech occurred during the campaign, in the evening of the same day as the RHCC blockade. Appellees argue that the error was harmless and that placing Terry's speech on a date prior to the campaign actually supported appellants' argument. A clearly erroneous factual finding may create appropriate grounds for reversal of a trial court's decision in a contempt proceeding. See Harley-Davidson v. Morris, 19 F.3d at 145; Martin v. International Matex Tank Terminals, 928 F.2d at 626. We do not find it necessary to reach this issue, however, because we find sufficient other legal and factual grounds to support our reversal. to the Revised Permanent Injunction urges others to participate in conduct violative of the Injunction, such encouragement may itself suffice to support a finding of contempt.5 Although Terry was not physically present at the July 9th RHCC blockade, uncontroverted evidence establishes Terry's involvement in at least two activities related to the blockade in violation of the Revised Permanent Injunction. First, prior to the blockade, Terry wrote the letter discussed above to encourage financial support for and participation in the Cities of Refuge campaign. The letter explicitly stated that [w]ith God's help, rescues would occur as part of the massive pro-life counteroffensive. App. at 262. Terry's subsequent testimony indicates his equation of rescues with blockades.6 The letter urged: 5 See New York State NOW v. Terry, 732 F. Supp. 388, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding a local group affiliated with Operation Rescue in contempt of injunctive orders that prohibited blocking access to medical facilities that performed abortions where six organizational leaders signed a letter urging the group's members to participate in a National Day of Rescue), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 961 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1992). 6 The testimony includes the following dialogue, in which Roach questioned Terry: A [Terry] When you say rescue, define that. Do you mean blockade? Q To blockade . . . A Okay. Q . . . doors. See also Roe IV at 861 (3d Cir. 1990) (defining rescue missions as anti-abortion blockades and demonstrations). With God's help, the Cities of refuge will have a much larger impact than even Wichita [presumably referring to blockades of clinics in Wichita, Kansas]; more children and mothers will be rescued, more prolifers will be in the street, more abortionists will be exposed and confronted, and more fresh troops will be brought in to the battle. App. at 262. Terry's reference to Wichita, his use of the word rescue, and his battle imagery all suggest that he was encouraging the activity that ultimately occurred at the RHCC. By helping to organize, publicize, and raise money for the Cities of Refuge campaign that, as discussed above, instigated the July 9th blockade of the RHCC, Terry acted in contempt of the Revised Permanent Injunction. Second, Terry was a featured speaker at a nationallypublicized rally in the Philadelphia area on the night of the blockade. His speech was advertised extensively in Cities of Refuge promotional materials that promoted rescue activities in the Philadelphia area. App. at 258-59, 261. Testimony revealed that his presence was meant to attract people to the Philadelphia area events, thus facilitating the July 9th blockade. See App. at 258, 260-61. Given these facts, the trial court's conclusion that [p]laintiffs failed to establish that defendant Terry was present or active in any of the events in question suggests that the court relied on the erroneous legal conclusion that a contemnor must participate on the scene in order to violate the Revised Permanent Injunction. The court's emphasis on the physical distance between Terry at the time he gave his speech and the site of the blockade buttresses this conclusion. We reverse the trial court's decision because it is based on a clear error of law. See, e.g., Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d at 145 (holding that questions of law in a contempt proceeding are subject to plenary review).