Opinion ID: 767955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpreting the Treaties

Text: 21 The United States Constitution provides that ratified treaties are to be regarded as the law of the land. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. However, treaties do not generally create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts. 22 A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamation, so far as the injured parties choose to seek redress.... It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress. 23 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884); see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 474 (1913); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 306 (1829) (The judiciary is not that department of the government, to which the assertion of its interest against foreign powers is confided.). [E]ven where a treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state... it is traditionally held that any rights arising from such provisions are, under international law, those of states and... [that] individual rights are only derivative through the states. Matta-Bellesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992); Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 24 Even stronger than the presumption against private rights of action under international treaties is the presumption against the creation of rights enforceable by the suppression of evidence or by the dismissal of an indictment. Historically, such remedies have been available only in cases implicating the most fundamental of rights. This class has heretofore been limited to those paramount protections secured by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth Amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Sixth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 1983) (observing that the exclusionary rule is designed to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights); United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ([A]s the effect of [suppression] is the loss of relevant and probative evidence, this remedy is not applied for every violation of a federal law but is reserved only for breaches of the most basic constitutional rights.). 25 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, and the complementary Article 35 of the Bilateral Convention, do not create -- explicitly or otherwise -- fundamental rights on par with the right to be free from unreasonable searches, the privilege against self-incrimination, or the right to counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1999) ([T]he Vienna Convention itself prescribes no judicial remedy or other recourse for its violation.); Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993) (Although compliance with our treaty obligations clearly is required, we decline to equate such a provision with fundamental rights.); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (It is clear that Article 36 does not create a 'fundamental' right, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination which originates from concepts of due process.). Defendants who assert violations of a statute or treaty that does not create fundamental rights are not generally entitled to the suppression of evidence unless that statute or treaty provides for such a remedy. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 1991) (Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read such a provision into [an] act.); United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that rights created by Congress are not enforceable by suppression unless Congress has specifically provided for that remedy); Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 ([Article 36] does not create a 'fundamental' right, and therefore the suppression remedy must be available, if at all, from the Vienna Convention itself.). 26 Nor are such defendants entitled to the dismissal of an indictment: Because the public maintains an abiding interest in the administration of criminal justice, dismissing an indictment is an extraordinary step. United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981) (concluding that the dismissal of an indictment was unwarranted absent a constitutional violation that prejudiced defendant's case); Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1359 (1st Cir. 1995) (When a federal court uses its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment it directly encroaches upon the fundamental role of the grand jury. That power is appropriately reserved, therefore, for extremely limited circumstances.); United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 862 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that violation of Vienna Convention would not require suppression of evidence or dismissal of indictment). Thus, we will infer neither an entitlement to suppression nor an entitlement to dismissal absent express, or undeniably implied, provision for such remedies in a treaty's text. We find no such provision here.
27 In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 665 (1992); see also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988); Marquez-Ramos v. Reno, 69 F.3d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1995); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994). But the Vienna Convention and the Bilateral Convention are both facially ambiguous on the subject of whether they create individual rights at all, and do not even address whether those rights would justify suppression of evidence or the dismissal of an indictment. First, it is far from clear that the Vienna Convention confers any rights upon criminal defendants. Cf. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998) ([N]either the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides a... right of action in United States' courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions.). The appellants emphasize the privileges purportedly conferred by Article 36, but the Vienna Convention's preamble explicitly disclaims any attempt to create individual rights: [T]he purpose of such privileges and immunities [as are created by the treaty] is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts. Preamble to Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. 77, 79. Moreover, the preamble's drafters cite an intent to contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations without ever mentioning any intent to equip defendants with the extraordinary remedies sought by appellants. Id. 28 The Bilateral Convention, too, is ambiguous. Article 35 is replete with references to consular officers' entitlements, see Bilateral Convention arts. 35(1), 35(4), 35(5), 35(6), but only once speaks of the rights of detained nationals, and never proposes any particular remedies for the violation of any such rights. Article 35(3) reads as follows: 29 The competent authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform the national of the sending State of the rights accorded to him by this Article to communicate with a consular official. 30 This language, however, offers insufficient support for appellants' arguments. Even if we were to hold that Article 35(3) in fact provided individuals with judicially enforceable rights -- and we decline to so hold in this case -- this language hardly justifies the inference that violation of such rights should be remedied via the suppression of evidence or the dismissal of an indictment. As described above, these remedies are reserved for extraordinary encroachments upon the most fundamental individual rights. Nothing in Article 35(3) of the Bilateral Convention suggests that the rights to which it refers are at all comparable to the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the privilege against self-incrimination, or the right to representation during a criminal proceeding. 31 Indeed, the balance of Article 35 clearly mitigates any focus on the individual that section (3) might suggest. Even those provisions that arguably serve the interests of criminal defendants are couched instead in terms of the interests of the consular officer. Thus, for example, Article 35(1) provides that [a] consular officer shall be entitled... to communicate and meet with any national of the sending State, and Article 35(4) states that [a] consular officer shall be entitled to visit a national of the sending State who has been arrested. We believe that if the authors of the Bilateral Convention intended Article 35 to confer fundamental individual rights of the sort that could be remedied by suppression or dismissal, they would have drafted that Article in terms of those rights, rather than focusing so intently upon the entitlements of consular officers -- officers whose protections under such a clause would be far less reaching than those of criminal detainees.
32 To the extent that the treaties' terms are ambiguous with respect to the issue before us, we will rely upon nontextual sources such as the treaty's ratification history and its subsequent operation. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989).
33 We first consult the United States Department of State's interpretation of the two treaties, to which we accord substantial deference. See, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 119 S. Ct. 662, 671 (1999) (Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty.); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (same). 34 In the State Department's view, the treaties do not create individual rights at all, much less rights susceptible to the remedies proposed by appellants. After devot[ing] considerable time to the issue, see Department of State Answers to the Questions Posed by the First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li (Answers) at A-2, the State Department has concluded that 35 [t]he [Vienna Convention] and the US-China bilateral consular convention are treaties that establish state-to-state rights and obligations.... They are not treaties establishing rights of individuals. The right of an individual to communicate with his consular official is derivative of the sending state's right to extend consular protection to its nationals when consular relations exist between the states concerned. 36 Id. at A-3; see also id. at A-1. The [only] remedies for failures of consular notification under the [Vienna Convention] are diplomatic, political, or exist between states under international law. See id. at A-3. 3 37 Nor is the State Department's position of recent origin. A 1970 letter sent by a Department legal adviser to the governors of the fifty states shortly after the Vienna Convention's ratification advised that the Department did not believe that the Vienna Convention will require significant departures from the existing practice within the several states of the United States. Needless to say, the creation of rights on par with those guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution would constitute just the sort of significant departure[] disclaimed by this letter. Accordingly, the Department has denied the availability of criminal remedies for failures of consular notification. In 1989, a letter from a Department legal adviser informed a foreign national being held in an American prison that [w]hile the U.S. authorities are required to comply with the obligations [of Vienna Convention Article 36], failure to do so would have no effect on [his] conviction or incarceration. 38 Moreover, the State Department has advanced the same view before at least two international tribunals. In 1998, Paraguay brought suit against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Paraguay, which sought to halt the execution of a Paraguayan national named Angel Breard in the Commonwealth of Virginia, argued that Breard had not received consular notification and that his conviction was therefore tainted. In an oral presentation to the ICJ, a State Department Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs offered the following response: 39 Paraguay's Application maintains that the necessary legal consequence for any... breach [of the consular notification obligation] is that [an] ensuing conviction and sentence must be put aside. There is absolutely no support for this claim in the language of the [Vienna] Convention. The Court should not read into a clear and nearly universal multilateral instrument such a substantial and potentially disruptive additional obligation that has no support in the language agreed by the parties. 40 Verbatim Record (Paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426, at 3.20. 41 The issue also arose in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in 1998, when Mexico sought an advisory opinion on the availability of criminal remedies for failures of consular notification. 4 In a written submission to the IACtHR, counsel for the State Department argued that the Vienna Convention does not require the domestic courts of State parties to take any actions in criminal proceedings, either to give effect to its provisions or to remedy their alleged violation. Written Observations of the United States of America, Request for Advisory Opinion OC-16, June 1, 1998 (corrected June 10, 1998).
42 Legal materials produced contemporaneously with the two treaties' passages comport with the State Department's view that they do not confer rights the violation of which can be remedied in the criminal courts. For example, a State Department legal adviser submitted written testimony on the Vienna Convention to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 7, 1969. The statement indicated that [t]he Vienna... Convention does not have the effect of overcoming Federal or State laws beyond the scope long authorized in existing consular conventions, except with respect to a warrant requirement not relevant here. The Department's testimony also emphasized the Vienna Convention's above-quoted preamble, which states explicitly that the treaty's purpose is not to benefit individuals. Appendix, Sen. Doc. Exec. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 43 Two weeks later, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations transmitted the Vienna Convention to the full Senate and recommended ratification. Committee Chairman Senator J. William Fulbright included a short accompanying Report. The Report again highlighted the treaty's preamble and then listed five factors that helped to secure the Committee's approval. The first factor was the Committee's belief that [t]he [Vienna] Convention does not change or affect present U.S. laws or practice. Sen. Doc. Exec. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 44 The Committee on Foreign Relations appended a similar Report when it sent the Bilateral Convention to the full Senate in 1981. Like the treaty itself, the Report characterized Article 35 only in terms of the entitlements bestowed upon consular officials: 45 Article 35... guarantees that a consular officer of a sending state will be notified within a maximum of four days of the arrest or detention of a national of the sending state. The consular official is further entitled to visit such national within two days from the date of the notification of arrest or detention as well as to attend the trial of such person. 46 Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 97-14, 97th Cong., 1st Sess (1981). 5 The Committee appended to the Report testimony from Assistant Secretary of State John H. Holdridge, who also cast the treaty's consular notifications provisions in terms of the privileges conferred upon consular officials, rather than upon criminal defendants. See id.
47 Finally, the manner in which the Vienna Convention and the Bilateral Convention have been treated since their ratification confirms the lessons learned from the State Department's interpretation and the treaties' legislative histories: Individual defendants deprived of consular notification are not entitled to raise their treatment as a defense against criminal prosecution. 48 Indeed, the State Department is apparently unaware of any country party to any consular convention with the United States that remedies failures of notification through its criminal justice process. Criminal justice systems vary throughout the world and in [the State Department's] experience operate independently of consular notification. Answers at A-1. Many, if not most, of the countries with which the United States raises concerns that consular notification obligations have been violated with respect to U.S. citizens will undertake to investigate the alleged violation and, if it is confirmed, to apologize for it and undertake to prevent future recurrences. Id. at A-3. This representation accords with that made to the ICJ by the State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs during the dispute with Paraguay described above. She stated that the Department was not aware of any practice [among signatories to the Vienna Convention] of attempting to ascertain whether [a] failure of notification prejudiced the foreign national in criminal proceedings. Verbatim Record (Paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426, at 2.15. As she asserted, [t]his lack of practice is consistent with the fact and common international understanding that consular assistance is not essential to the criminal proceeding against a foreign national. Id.The Department's written directives to United States consular officers are also instructive. The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) urges United States consular officials aggressively to pursue contact with American nationals detained abroad, and to raise concerns about failures of consular notification with the receiving country. See 7 FAM 410. Nowhere, though, does the FAM state or imply that such failures might be redressed in the host country's criminal justice system. Thus, the United States has never, to the Department's knowledge, asked a foreign court to consider a failure of consular notification during deliberation on a criminal case. These practices evidence a belief among Vienna Convention signatory nations that the treaty's dictates simply are not enforceable in a host nation's criminal courts, and do not warrant suppression or dismissal in any event.