Opinion ID: 1816029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the trial court err in ruling admissible testimony concerning conversations between Hansen and agents and employees of United States Fire?

Text: Subsequent to the explosion and sinking of Gilbert's boat, Hansen had several conversations with Robert Burridge, an insurance agent employed by the Gustin Agency; and Burridge had several conversations concerning the loss with Delores Keller and Walter Gustin, employees of the Gustin Agency, and with Robert Loukota, a claims manager for United States Fire. These conversations dealt with the possibility of affording Gilbert coverage for the loss despite the fact his Great Lakes endorsement had expired on the date of the loss, and were offered for the purpose of proving an acknowledgment on the part of employees and agents of United States Fire, that a mistake was made in issuing the extended coverage endorsement. The defendant's objection to all the conversations was grounded upon the holding of this court in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 241, 114 N. W. 2d 466. However, the trial court ruled admissible certain testimony concerning the substance of these conversations. In Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres, supra , this court held that hearsay statements of an agent are not admissible against his principal, as admissions against interest, unless the agent's statements were within the scope of the agent's authority to speak for his principal. In that case the plaintiff testified as to what an agent of the defendant had said to her. In the present case, with one exception, none of the testimony cited by appellant as inadmissible admissions against interest, were extrajudicial statements of the agent. In each instance, the agent was testifying as to what he had said or done. Such testimony is not hearsay. . . . Two well known definitions of `hearsay' should be noted. One is that `by hearsay is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit to be attached to the witness himself, but rests also in part on the veracity and competency of some other person from whom the witness has received his information.' The other asserts that the hearsay rule `is that rule which prohibits the use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony of the fact asserted, unless the asserter is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion and of his qualifications to make it.' 2 Jones, Evidence (5th ed.), p. 514, sec. 268. Such statements not being hearsay, were admissible in evidence. Evidence of statements of agents, whether or not such statements are authorized, is admissible in favor of and against the principal, if admissible under the general rules of evidence as to the admissibility of such statements by persons not agents. Restatement 2 Agency, p. 651, sec. 289. It is pertinent to note the distinction between the extrajudicial declarations of an alleged agent and his sworn testimony in the trial of a cause. He may, of course, testify in court to any relevant matter of which he has knowledge, whether it be the fact or scope of agency or his acts and conduct with respect to the transaction, or other pertinent facts. 2 Jones, Evidence (5th ed.), p. 669, sec. 355. In one instance, Hansen testified as to what Burridge had said to him. This testimony was hearsay. However, Burridge was in court and available for cross-examination. Hansen had previously testified to the same conversation, without objection. Moreover, Burridge himself had previously testified concerning the same conversation. Therefore, it does not appear that appellant was prejudiced by Hansen's hearsay testimony. Also we find no substance to defendant's argument that these conversations were inadmissible because they constituted settlement negotiations. There is nothing in the record to indicate that settlement of plaintiff's claim was ever discussed. By the Court. Judgment affirmed.