Opinion ID: 1245205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Its Exclusivity)

Text: The essence of the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act for work-related injuries is found at W. Va.Code § 23-2-6 (2003), which provides that an employer is not liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death of any employee, however occurring. [2] In State ex rel. Abraham Linc Corporation v. Bedell, 216 W.Va. 99, 602 S.E.2d 542, 546-547 (2004) (per curiam), we had an opportunity to comment on the important principles underlying the Workers' Compensation system and the scope of this exclusivity provision of W. Va. Code § 23-2-6 (1991): The Workmen's Compensation Act was designed to remove negligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort system. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W.Va. 695, 700, 246 S.E.2d 907, 911(1978), superseded by statute as stated in Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir.1986). The benefits of this system accrue both to the employer, who is relieved from common-law tort liability for negligently inflicted injuries, and to the employee, who is assured prompt payment of benefits. Meadows v. Lewis, 172 W.Va. 457, 469, 307 S.E.2d 625, 638 (1983); see also Persinger v. Peabody Coal Co., 196 W.Va. 707, 713, 474 S.E.2d 887, 893 (1996). State ex rel. Abraham Linc Corp., 216 W.Va. 99, 602 S.E.2d at 546. [In footnote seven, the Court stated: That philosophy has commonly been described as a quid pro quo on both sides: in return for the purchase of insurance against job-related injuries, the employer receives tort immunity; in return for giving up the right to sue the employer, the employee receives swift and sure benefits. Dominion Caisson Corp. v. Clark, 614 A.2d 529, 532-33 (D.C.1992) quoting Meiggs v. Associated Builders, Inc. 545 A.2d 631, 634 (D.C.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1116, 109 S.Ct. 3178, 104 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1989).]       As this Court succinctly stated in State ex rel. Frazier v. Hrko, 203 W.Va. 652, 510 S.E.2d 486 (1998), `[w]hen an employer subscribes to and pays premiums into the Fund, and complies with all other requirement of the Act, the employer is entitled to immunity for any injury occurring to an employee and shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute.' W. Va.Code, 23-2-6 [1991]. 203 W.Va. at 659, 510 S.E.2d at 493. Footnote eleven of Frazier explained: This statute is also known as the `exclusivity' provision, as it makes workers' compensation benefits the exclusive remedy for personal injuries sustained by an employee injured in the course of an resulting from his or her covered employment. Id. at 659 n. 11, 510 S.E.2d at 493 n. 11. State ex rel. Abraham Linc Corp., 216 W.Va. 99, 602 S.E.2d at 547. The immunity provided by § 23-2-6 is not easily forfeited. As the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia explained in Smith v. Monsanto Co., 822 F.Supp. 327 (S.D.W.Va.1992), [u]nder the Act, an employer who is otherwise entitled to immunity under § 23-2-6 may lose immunity in only one of two ways: (1) by defaulting in payments required by the Act or otherwise failing to comply with the provisions of the Act, or (2) by deliberately intending to produce injury or death to the employee. 822 F.Supp. at 330 (citation omitted). State ex rel. Abraham Linc Corp., 216 W.Va. 99, 602 S.E.2d at 547. The effect of this exclusivity is, by statute, far-reaching. In W. Va.Code § 23-4-2(d)(1) and (2) (2003), the Legislature declared: ... that enactment of this chapter and the establishment of the workers' compensation system in this chapter was and is intended to remove from the common law tort system all disputes between or among employers and employees regarding the compensation to be received for injury or death to an employee except as expressly provided in this chapter ...; that the immunity established in sections six [§ 23-2-6] and six-a [§ 23-2-6a], article two of this chapter is [deemed] an essential aspect of this workers' compensation system; that the intent of the Legislature in providing immunity from common lawsuit was and is to protect those immunized from litigation outside the workers' compensation system except as expressly provided in this chapter; that, in enacting the immunity provisions of this chapter, the Legislature intended to create a legislative standard for loss of that immunity of more narrow application and containing more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct; and that it was and is the legislative intent to promote prompt judicial resolution of the question of whether a suit prosecuted under the asserted authority of this section is or is not prohibited by the immunity granted under this chapter. (2) The immunity from suit provided under this section and under section six-a, article two of this chapter may be lost only if the employer or person against whom liability is asserted acted with deliberate intention. [sic] Id. (Emphasis added). When considered together, the words injury and however occurring, in W. Va.Code § 23-2-6 (2003) and the expression of legislative intent in W. Va.Code § 23-4-2(d)(1) (2003) provide employers with an expansive immunity from liability outside the workers' compensation system for workplace injuries of employees. [3] This immunity, however, is not absolute. Exceptions to this immunity are set forth specifically and implicitly in the Workers' Compensation Act. While exceptions to the exclusivity provision of W. Va.Code § 23-2-6 (2003) exist, the Legislature has been extremely restrictive in creating such exceptions. For example, an employer is not immune from lawsuit for workplace injuries if the employer acted with deliberate intention. W. Va.Code § 23-4-2(d)(2) (2003). [4] Messer does not claim that she comes within this exception. The Legislature has also specifically set forth private civil remedies outside of the exclusivity provision for certain discriminatory practices by an employer related to employees who have compensable injuries. W. Va.Code § 23-5A-1, et seq. [5] Though Messer apparently does not invoke these anti-discrimination provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, we do find such provisions revealing with respect to the types of acts and resulting injuries which the Legislature has envisioned to fall within and without of the exclusivity provision of W. Va.Code § 23-2-6 (2003). These exceptions reveal that the most significant word in the exclusivity provision of W. Va.Code § 23-2-6 (2003) for purposes of the issues before us in the instant matter is the term injury. In considering any potential exception to the exclusivity provision, i.e., that an employer is not liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death of any employee, however occurring, we must look to the other provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act to determine the Legislature's intent in defining what is and what is not a compensable injury for purposes of the exclusivity provision. Id. W. Va.Code § 23-4-1, et seq., establishes that injuries and defined occupational diseases incurred in the course of and resulting from [an employee's] covered employment are compensable injuries. W. Va.Code, § 23-4-1, et seq. Implicit in this statutory definition of injury is the limitation that only occupational diseases as hereinafter defined are compensable. W. Va.Code § 23-4-1(b) (2003). We must draw from this express limitation that the Legislature intended certain work-related events, here, occupational diseases not hereinafter defined to not come within the meaning of injury for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act generally and the exclusivity provision specifically. The Legislature also expressly exempted other work-related injuries from the definition of what may be a compensable injury for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. For instance, W. Va.Code § 23-4-1f (1993) states that [f]or the purposes of this chapter, no alleged injury or disease shall be recognized as a compensable injury or disease which was solely caused by nonphysical means and which did not result in any physical injury or disease to the person claiming benefits. It is the purpose of this section to clarify that so-called mental-mental claims are not compensable under this chapter. [6] To this list of work-related injuries exempted from the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (and, consequently, from the exclusivity provision of W. Va.Code § 23-2-6 (2003)), are the other express statutory exceptions within the Workers' Compensation Act discussed above; namely, injuries caused by an employer's deliberate intention, as defined by W. Va.Code § 23-4-2 (2003), and injuries caused by certain discriminatory actions by an employer, as set forth in W. Va.Code § 23-5A-1, et seq. We find these latter two exceptions especially noteworthy for purposes of the matter before us since, in both instances, the Legislature has focused on the acts which underlie the resulting work-related injury as being determinative of whether the exclusivity provision is applicable. C.