Opinion ID: 561210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hitchcock Instruction.

Text: 5 Petitioner first raised the issue of the trial judge's failure to consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence in his first federal habeas petition, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger. Because Hitchcock represents a significant change in the law, petitioner's claim is not procedurally barred. 9 6 This court, in its pre-Hitchcock consideration of petitioner's claim, concluded that the sentencing order read in its entirety, combined with the court's instructions to the jury, indicates that the trial court gave adequate consideration to the evidence presented. 10 And while our determination of petitioner's challenge to consideration of mitigating evidence was under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma 11 and Lockett v. Ohio, 12 Hitchcock does not change the outcome here. As the district court explained, the jury was instructed that they were to consider evidence of mitigating circumstances including but not limited to the statutory circumstances. The Florida Supreme Court explicitly held that the sentencing judge properly instructed the jury under Hitchcock and Lockett. 13 Moreover, in his sentencing order, the judge referred to nonstatutory mitigating evidence concerning petitioner's mental incapacity and its possible link to his Vietnam service. 14 Contrary to petitioner's contention, then, the record at sentencing does not reflect ambiguity regarding consideration given by the judge or jury to nonstatutory mitigating evidence; nor does the record suggest that less than full and serious consideration was given the nonstatutory mitigating evidence. Petitioner's reliance on Messer v. Florida 15 and Penry v. Lynaugh, 16 therefore, is misplaced. 7 Petitioner relies further on Clemons v. Mississippi, 17 in which the Court held that because the trial judge and state Supreme Court opinions were 8 virtually silent with respect to the particulars of the allegedly mitigating evidence presented by [the defendant] to the jury, we cannot be sure that the [state] court[s] fully heeded our cases emphasizing the importance of the sentencer's consideration of a defendant's mitigating evidence. 18 9 The Court, there, vacated the judgment of the lower court. In Mr. Johnson's case, the sentencing court was not silent with respect to specific nonstatutory mitigating evidence. Clemons, therefore, is inapposite. 10 Lockett now, as then, requires the sentencer to consider all offered nonstatutory mitigating evidence. The Lockett issue has already been decided by this court, 19 and as no Hitchcock instruction was given, Hitchcock as new law does nothing to change the outcome. Because no Hitchcock instruction was given, and because we find that the sentencing court fully considered the nonstatutory mitigating evidence, we see no reason to disturb our prior determination that the trial judge knew he could, and did, consider any non-statutory mitigating factors introduced by the petitioner. 20 11