Opinion ID: 5754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements Allegedly Concerning Robberies

Text: Murphy contends that the prosecution stated, in closing argument, that he committed bank robberies other than those for which he was on trial. He is mistaken. During closing argument, the prosecution stated: Members of the jury, what you have here is, based on the evidence, is a smart robber. Yes, the first two witnesses, it was a painful experience. I think you can understand that. They came down here and they told you of course, they selected the photographs and you will have those things like Mr. Stickney said. Yes, they are in evidence. They told you that the appearance--I believe all the witnesses told you that the appearance of the Defendant had changed. Other witnesses told you, and it is established and we have the photographs to prove that, the appearance of the Defendant has changed and that is because the evidence shown him to be the smart robber. This isn't any bumbling, juvenile 7-11 robbery. This is a robbery, these are robberies that have been planned, you have to pick the time, the place. There are obviously some more and I won't get into that. You have seen for yourself. You have to pick the getaway car like on the 26th with that red Honda. No objection was made to this statement. Thus, the standard of review is plain error. United States v. Okenfuss, 632 F.2d 483, 7 485 (5th Cir. 1980); Fed.R. Crim. P. 52(b). Appellant asserts that the sentence There are obviously some more and I won't get into that, should be construed as a statement by the prosecution that Murphy had committed other bank robberies. When the statement is taken in context, while perhaps ambiguous, it reasonably referred only to other factors which would demonstrate that the bank robberies had been well-planned. Murphy relies on United States v. Labarbera, 581 F.2d 107, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1978), in which this Court reversed a conviction because the prosecution inferred to the jury that there was evidence of the defendant's guilt which it had been unable to present. Id. at 109-10. We also reversed based on improper impeachment evidence. Id. at 110. The record in the instant case does not yield the same result. There was no plain error. III. Expert Testimony. Appellant contends that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony regarding tools and the marks on the ignitions. He asserts that FBI Agent Crum's opinion that the marks on the ignitions of the stolen cars may have been made by two of the screwdrivers found in the red Honda and the Mercury Sable was improper. Murphy argues that the mechanics who later removed the ignitions from the stolen cars testified that the ignitions had been removed by a chisel or screwdriver and that those tools may have made the marks on the ignitions as opposed to the tools associated with Murphy. He finally claims that the district court abused its discretion because the Government failed to establish that the marks on the ignitions were not made when 8 those ignitions were removed from the automobiles. A trial court's decision to admit expert testimony over objection is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962). Murphy first relies on Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110-12 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). Evidence that the marks may have been made during removal did not render unreliable the opinion that they may also have been made by Appellant. Each event was possible. Appellant has not shown that Crum's testimony was based on unreliable facts. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury, regarding the expert testimony, that it should consider each opinion received in evidence in this case and give it such weight as you may think it deserves. If you should decide that the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of an opinion are not sound, or that an opinion is outweighed by other evidence, then you may disregard the opinion entirely. The district court exercised caution in its limiting instruction and did not abuse its discretion. Murphy has cited no authority sustaining his contention. Murphy also contends that the expert testimony should have been excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial impact when the Government failed to establish that the marks on the ignitions were not made when the ignitions were removed by the 9 mechanics. Once again, Murphy fails to cite any persuasive authority for his contention. Additionally, given the jury instruction permitting the jury to disregard an opinion it found unsound or unsupported, his contention has little merit. Agent Crum testified that the tools such as the screwdriver associated with Murphy could have made the marks on the ignitions but that he could not positively attribute the marks to the tools identified with Murphy. Crum did not specifically assert that the marks on the ignitions were made by the tools associated with Murphy, therefore one would be hard pressed to see how the testimony could be unfairly prejudicial or confusing. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.2 2 Murphy also challenged his sentence. However, he withdrew this issue at oral argument in light of the Supreme Court's affirmance of our opinion in United States v. Deal, 954 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd. 113 S.Ct. 1993 (1993). 10