Opinion ID: 863099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Excluded Testimony of Dr. Camille Branton

Text: 1. Testimony Relating to Custody of Jennifer Holladay ¶41. Dr. Camile Branton was listed as an expert in Susie's response to interrogatory No. 8, which was filed on October 24, 1997. Susie supplemented the original response with Dr. Branton's opinion on December 1, 1997, and on December 8, 1997, she again supplemented the response with Dr, Branton's resume' and a detailed report in which Dr. Branton gave her opinion on custody of Jennifer and on the turmoil of the marriage. The record reflects that the chancery court limited Dr. Branton's testimony concerning Jennifer to the literal words of her report of December 8, 1997. Dr. Branton had continued to see Jennifer until shortly before trial and her opinion as expressed in her December 8th report did not change before trial. However, she was not allowed to explain or amplify her opinion and recommendation on custody. The trial court restricted her testimony to only the words and phrases actually printed in her report. ¶42. Lawson cites Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327 (Miss.1982), where we held that if an expert had been deposed, but a party intended to offer an opinion on a different issue than was set forth in the deposition, then the party offering the expert is duty bound to seasonably supplement the expert interrogatory answer prior to trial or else face exclusion of that evidence. Lawson basically argues that Dr. Branton's proposed testimony as to custody was trial by ambush since the expert was asked to elaborate on her report of December 8, 1997. ¶43. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(i) states in pertinent part: A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinion to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (emphasis added). ¶44. This case is factually distinguishable from Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327 (Miss.1982). A trial judge must have some discretion in judging whether the answers are sufficient so as to prevent trial by ambush or effective cross-examination, but the entire case is not required to be contained in the answer. Nothing in the case law submitted by counsel or the pertinent procedural rule suggests that an expert will be restricted to testify only to the literal words from their opinion and a summary of the related grounds. The very use of the words substance and summary show that the Rule does not require an expert to state solely the words of their compiled reports. Such a view would place form over substance, and in a chancery court proceeding, we hold that a ruling to that effect is an abuse of discretion. The trial court's limitation of Dr. Branton's testimony under this issue was error. 2. Testimony Relating to Grounds for Divorce ¶45. During the trial on January 22, 1998, Susie stated that she had sought counseling for herself during the summer of 1997. Lawson testified on cross examination that he had visited Dr. Branton two or three times with Susie for marriage counseling. In her response to interrogatory No. 16, Susie stated that Lawson's continued pattern of behavior has forced Susie to suffer emotional and mental anguish and stress and she has had to consult a counselor for herself and for Jennifer. On March 25, 1998, after a continuance and five days before resumption of trial, Susie faxed a supplemental response to Lawson which contained a detailed report on Susie's emotional condition and the resulting effect of the tumultuous marriage. After the trial resumed, Lawson made a motion in limine to exclude all of the testimony of Dr. Branton concerning grounds for divorce because the supplemental response of March 25, 1998 was untimely, and the trial court excluded all of Dr. Branton's testimony concerning Susie's grounds for divorce. ¶46. We have recently held that seven days notice is insufficient to satisfy Rule 26(f), Coltharp v. Carnsesale, 733 So. 2d 780 (Miss. 1999), but the facts of this case are distinguishable. In Coltharp, the trial court changed the trial schedule, and the defendants opposed the change because their expert was going to be out of the country during the revised setting. The trial court allowed the defendants to substitute an expert on May 1, 1997, for trial on May 12, 1997. The defendants supplemented their response and identified another orthopedic surgeon on May 2, 1997, but the responses indicated that the new expert's opinions were consistent with the original expert. However, at trial the new expert advanced a completely new theory of the disputed condition with no notice to the plaintiff. We held that the defendants had a duty to supplement the interrogatories with the new theory. In addition, ten days before trial the defendants listed an expert radiologist whose opinions had never been divulged, and the trial court allowed her to testify. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and we reversed, holding that it was trial by ambush because the plaintiff had not been put on notice of the new theory of the first defense expert or the surprise testimony of the expert radiologist. ¶47. In the case sub judice, Lawson was on notice from at least January 23, 1998, that Dr. Branton was going to testify on Susie's emotional condition. He knew that she was going to testify on the effect of the marital turmoil as it related to Jennifer since December 8, 1997. He had visited with Dr. Branton for marriage counseling. ¶48. We have not set a definite time in which a party must complete supplemental expert responses. Motorola Communications & Elecs., Inc. v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713 (Miss.1989), allowed an expert witness, not previously identified, to testify when his identity and the substance of his opinion were revealed to opposing counsel ten days before trial. The trial court reasoned as follows: [I]n light of the fact that this testimony is on a very narrow issue and that the expert lives here in Jackson and is available and the issue appears to be one to which a number of persons would be qualified to give testimony, the Court will find that the interrogatories were seasonably-- the answers to interrogatories were seasonably supplemented for this purpose. We agreed with this statement but commented that, [I]t's a matter of 'how much' must be accomplished in whatever limited time is available to the short-noticed party prior to trial. Id. at 718. ¶49. In Read v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n, 515 So.2d 916, 921-22 (Miss. 1987), a homeowner sued for negligent distribution of electricity. On the Friday before the first day of trial, the homeowner notified the defendant that an electrician would testify who had not previously been identified. The trial court, over defendant's objections, granted a continuance, and the case was tried three months later. There was a jury verdict for the homeowner, but the trial court granted a JNOV in favor of the defendant. On appeal, we reversed the JNOV, holding that there had been no prejudice to the defendant by the expert's testimony because the continuance had allowed for preparation. We did, however, award reasonable expenses and attorney fees to the defendant. ¶50. In State Highway Comm'n v. Havard, 508 So.2d 1099 (Miss. 1987), an eminent domain case, a landowner's expert was allowed to testify about comparable sales although the landowner had not previously provided the information to the State. While acknowledging that a party must not only supplement interrogatories to reveal the substance of expert testimony if not stated originally in the answer to interrogatories, id. at 1103, we allowed the testimony, because MSHC did not request an order compelling discovery when the Havards gave responses it deemed unsatisfactory. Id. at 1104 (citing Denman v. Hardy, 437 So.2d 426 (Miss.1983)). ¶51. Denman concerned the testimony of two expert witnesses for the defendant. The plaintiff objected to the testimony of the first witness because he relied on measurements and field work which was not specifically disclosed in response to the expert interrogatory. We upheld the trial court's admission of the expert testimony because the plaintiff was not misled, holding that, [T]he entire case is not required to be contained in the answer. Id. at 428 n.1. The defendant failed to reveal the name of the second expert witness until the day before trial, and we held that the trial court committed error by admitting his testimony. ¶52. In the cases cited by Lawson, the exclusion of an expert witness was made only when the failure to identify the expert and the substance of their testimony was gross and unfairly prejudiced the opposing party --- circumstances not present in this case. Dr. Branton's testimony relating to grounds for divorce was no surprise to Lawson. Susie stated in her response to interrogatory No. 16 that Lawson's continued pattern of behavior has caused Susie to suffer emotional and mental anguish and stress and she has had to consult a counselor for herself and for Jennifer. ¶53. Susie identified Dr. Branton as her expert witness in response to interrogatory No. 8. She supplemented Dr. Branton's opinion both on December 1, 1997, and March 25, 1998. Lawson pleads trial by ambush on appeal by way of arguing form over substance. But he fails to show surprise or unfair prejudice by the timeliness of the final supplement to Susie's expert interrogatory response because he had notice of the substance of her testimony and had sufficient time to prepare for cross examination. The chancellor abused his discretion in excluding Dr. Branton's testimony concerning the grounds for divorce. II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JENNIFER HOLLADAY. ¶54. Susie attempted to testify to the emotional and physical condition of her nine-year old daughter, Jennifer, and Lawson objected that the testimony as to what Jennifer had told her mother about her fears and her stomach pains was hearsay. The court sustained the objection and excluded the evidence that Jennifer had not wanted her mother to remain alone with her father during the summer proceeding the separation of the parents, that Jennifer would not go to her own room without her mother, and that Jennifer had stomach pain during this period. Susie's testimony of what Jennifer said and expressed to her should have been admitted as an exception to hearsay pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803: Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of declarant immaterial. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness: 1. Present Sense Impression. A statement describing an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter; 2. Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 3. Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), . . . . ¶55. Jennifer's statement to her mother was admissible under all three exceptions. Susie attempted to testify to Jennifer's words and actions when Susie would try to put her to bed when it meant that Susie would be left alone with Lawson and Jennifer's demands that Susie remain with her. Susie also tried to testify to Jennifer's fright and hysteria. The statements were made at the time when Jennifer was perceiving the event (her removal from Susie, leaving Susie alone with Lawson), it was an excited utterance as Susie testified that Jennifer was crying and clutching her, and it was an expression of Jennifer's then existing mental and emotional condition. Susie also tried to testify that as a result of the turmoil in the marriage, Jennifer suffered stomach pains. Susie's testimony about Jennifer's statements are admissible under these exceptions. ¶56. The chancery court also excluded Susie's testimony concerning Jennifer's reaction to Susie's leaving her on a trip to Chicago and why she asked her son, Haley, to spend the night. The court severely restricted Susie's testimony that Jennifer had constant, severe stomach aches. The court also excluded the corroborating testimony of other witnesses who testified to Jennifer's physical condition. There was other corroborating evidence from Dr. Tibbs's records which showed that Jennifer was prescribed Tagamet for stomach ulcers. ¶57. In passing on M.R.E. 803(1), (2), and (3) as they relate to statements of a child, we have held that such statements to social workers, the mother and grandparents were inadmissible under these exceptions because the statements were made days or weeks after the incident took place. In re C.B., 574 So.2d 1369, 1372 (Miss. 1990). The opinion implies, however, that if the statements had been made at the time or immediately following the incident, the statements would have been admissible. Susie attempted to testify to Jennifer's statements at the time the incidents were occurring and these statements were, therefore, admissible. Jennifer's emotional condition was relevant not only because of the issue of custody, but because it was proof of the turmoil in the marriage. Jennifer's fear for Susie was corroborating evidence of Lawson's behavior. The chancery court abused its discretion in excluding the statements Jennifer made to her mother as hearsay. III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING PROOF OF AN ALLEGED VIOLENT INCIDENT BEFORE MARRIAGE. ¶58. The court excluded any evidence of an incident occurring shortly before the marriage in which Lawson had severely beaten Susie holding that it was not relevant because it occurred before the marriage. In a proffer, Susie testified as follows: He pulled me to the back of my bedroom. He got angry, and he pulled me back there. He was just not himself. He lost control; he was not himself. He beat me. With his head, he beat my head on the bed until I was swollen and bruised. He spat on me and called me a whore, a slut, bitch, cunt. He called me his first wife's name the entire time that he was beating on me. I was so afraid my children would wake up or be terrified or be hurt. I did not scream. ¶59. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as any evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable. If the evidence has any probative value at all, the rule favors its admission. The incident which Susie sought to introduce as relevant because it supported her testimony that she was afraid of Lawson when she started raising his voice and threatening her because of his prior action. ¶60. We have recently addressed this issue in Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1999), where we reversed the trial court for excluding evidence of the husband's prior adulterous affair and its effect on the wife's affection. Bland is analogous to the instant appeal. Hill brought a complaint against Bland for the loss of the affection of Hill's wife and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The jury found in favor of Hill and awarded him $200,000 in damages. Bland appealed, asserting, among other things, the exclusion of evidence relating to a prior adulterous affair which Hill had with another woman. Ten years prior to the lawsuit, Hill had confessed to his wife, Judy, that he was having an adulterous affair, his lover might be pregnant, that he might be the father, and that if he were, he did not know if he wanted to stay married to Judy. The trial court allowed Bland to make an offer of proof as to what Judy would have testified to concerning Hill's affair. Depositions of the parties and witnesses were also incorporated into the record as part of the offer of proof. Counsel for Bland proffered that Judy would have testified that Hill's affair destroyed any love, trust and affection that she had had for Hill. ¶61. Judy also testified that she never regained her trust, love and affection for Hill and that the affair was the cause of the break up of her marriage. Id. at 416. Prior to the trial, the trial court ruled that no evidence of Hill's affair with another woman would be allowed. The trial court relied in part on the condonation argument. Id. at 418-19. We held that the evidence should not have been excluded: Whether Judy condoned Buddy Hill's affair is irrelevant. This was not a divorce action on the grounds of adultery where condonation would be a defense. The issue is not whether Judy condoned Buddy's affair, but whether Buddy's affair was still having an affect on the condition of the marriage. Id. at 419. Susie did not claim that the incident was grounds for her divorce, but instead argued that the incident was proof of her fear of Lawson when he became angry and threatened her. Like the adulterous affair in Bland, the incident was remote in time and Susie had continued to live with Lawson, but the incident still affected her fear of being physically hurt. The chancery court abused its discretion by excluding this evidence. IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE. ¶62. We view the facts of a divorce decree in a light most favorable to the appellee, and may not disturb the chancery decision unless we find it manifestly wrong or unsupported by substantial evidence. Richard v. Richard, 711 So.2d 884, 888 (Miss.1998). The Chancellor, as the trier of fact, evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence based on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony. Rawson v. Buta, 609 So.2d 426, 431 (Miss. 1992). Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, as grounds for divorce, must be corroborated. Chapel v. Chapel, 700 So.2d 593, 597 (Miss. 1997). ¶63. Ignoring all of Susie's proffered testimony, the following facts are uncontroverted: Susie left Lawson twice before the final separation. She sought marriage counseling. Law enforcement authorities were twice involved in marital incidents because of Lawson's violent behavior. Lawson locked Susie out of the home during the Halloween incident in 1994 and refused to allow his daughter to leave the house until the next morning even though she was crying out for her mother. At the time of the last reconciliation in 1994, Lawson entered Charter Behavioral Hospital for treatment and agreed to other conditions for reconciliation. He subsequently demanded that Susie pay him $2,300 out of her net pay of $9,166.03 for additional taxes on his law practice arising from her employment. He closed her bank account, confiscated her checkbook and required her to receive permission before buying clothes for their daughter. ¶64. Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment may be established only by a continuous course of conduct on the part of the offending spouse which was so unkind, unfeeling or brutal as to endanger, or put one in reasonable apprehension of danger to life, limb or health, and further, such conduct must be habitual, that is, done often enough or so continuously that it may reasonably be said to be a permanent condition. Robison v. Robison, 722 So.2d 601, 603 (Miss. 1998). Our cases require more than mere unkindness, rudeness, or incompatibility to support the granting of a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. On the other hand, habitual ill-founded accusations, threats and malicious sarcasm, insults and verbal abuse may cause such mental suffering as to destroy health and endanger the life of an innocent spouse. Id. Because we have held that the impact of the conduct on the plaintiff suing for divorce under these grounds is crucial, we employ a subjective standard. Id. These latter words perfectly describe the marriage which Susie endured for more than nine years. ¶65. Disregarding the proffered testimony of Susie's witnesses, the chancery court admitted enough evidence to support her divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. While we require a high standard for proving habitual cruelty and inhuman treatment, this Court does not require an impossible one.