Opinion ID: 844281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Legislative History of the 1996 Reform Act

Text: Additionally, we consider whether anything in the sparse legislative history of the 1996 Reform Act, of which section 1681t(b)(1)(F) is a part, supports Mortensen's and the Court of Appeal's assumption that a broader reading of that preemption provision clearly was intended. [12] Nothing does. The 1996 Reform Act was the product of years of discussion and negotiations. (Wu et al., Fair Credit Reporting (7th ed. 2010) p. 16.) On April 6, 1995, Senators Bond and Bryan introduced the Consumer Reporting Reform Act of 1995 (Sen. No. 709, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)), a bill based in large part on earlier legislative efforts that had narrowly missed enactment. Senator Bond described the measure as providing limited Federal preemption to ensure that there are uniform Federal standards to govern a number of procedural issues which are part of credit reporting and which will reduce the burdens on the credit industry from having to comply with a variety of different State requirements. (Remarks of Sen. Bond, 141 Cong. Rec. S5450 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995).) Senator Bryan assured that the bill tried to only preempt those areas of this law which affect the operational efficiencies of businesses but do not harm consumers, and that it was not intended to preempt States' rights in the area of liability. (Remarks of Sen. Bryan, 141 Cong. Rec. S5450 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995).) Preemption was appropriate only in order to set a national uniform standard on matters such as disclosure forms or timetables; such limited preemption would not set the consumer movement back, yet should help the business community operate more efficiently. ( Ibid. ) The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs's subsequent report on the bill reflected the same understanding. (Sen.Rep. No. 104-185, 1st Sess. (1995).) [13] The committee explained the new preemption provisions were intended to ensure the FCRA stood as the national uniform standard in these [preempted] areas. (Sen.Rep. No. 104-185, p. 55.) The committee made equally clear that broad field preemption was not intended: Additionally, the Committee understands that states have the power to protect their own citizens, including protection from abuses in the credit reporting industry. Therefore, the FCRA, as amended by the Committee bill[,] will not infringe upon the rights of states to legislate more stringent requirements that fall outside the scope of those areas specifically preempted to the extent such requirements are not inconsistent with any provisions of the FCRA. ( Id. at p. 56.) To the extent these remarks shed light on the intent behind section 1681t(b), they suggest Congress intended preemption only in a few discrete areas where it had in fact adopted a standard intended to serve as a uniform national standard. (See Watkins v. Trans Union, L.L.C. (N.D.Ala. 2000) 118 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1222 [the legislative history behind § 1681t(b) supports only discrete and sharply drawn areas of preemption].) Given this history, it seems more plausible that section 1681t(b)(1)(F) was intended to preempt only those areas governing furnishers where Congress had adopted an actual standard, i.e., for furnisher accuracy in submitting information and furnisher responsiveness in reacting to disputes, than that the section was, in an act of minifield preemption, intended to preempt all state laws implicating any duty that could have been regulated by section 1681s-2 but was not. In short, nothing in the legislative history evinces a clear and manifest congressional intent to displace state law more broadly.