Opinion ID: 1636806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Issues Concerning Voir Dire

Text: The Appellant raises additional issues regarding the trial court's direction of voir dire within the jury selection process in his case. Specifically, the Appellant contends that the court improperly limited the Appellant's ability to learn about potential jurors' attitudes toward mental health evidence, improperly questioned jurors concerning opinions about the death penalty, and improperly commented that the court expected the Appellant to be found guilty. The State asserts that the Appellant has waived any challenge related to jury composition based upon his failure to exhaust all peremptory challenges. With regard to challenges to specific jurors, [3] we agree that the Appellant has waived any challenge on appeal. See generally State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 248 (Tenn.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1339, 127 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 329 (Tenn.1992); State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 247 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1007, 111 S.Ct. 571, 112 L.Ed.2d 577 (1990). It is only where a defendant exhausts all of his peremptory challenges and is thereafter forced to accept an incompetent juror can a complaint about the jury selection process have merit. State v. Coury, 697 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985) (citing Hale v. State, 198 Tenn. 461, 281 S.W.2d 51 (1955); McCook v. State, 555 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tenn.Crim.App.1977)). Further, the record shows that the jury that heard the case was fair and impartial. There is nothing in the record to show that any prejudice resulted to the Appellant by the manner of the selection process utilized. Accordingly, we find no error. However, because of the manner in which the remaining challenges are phrased, we choose to address the challenges on their merits.
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a), in pertinent part, states that the trial court shall permit questioning by the parties for the purpose of discovering bases for challenge for cause and enabling an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. It further states that [t]he court ... may direct that any portion of the questioning of a prospective juror be conducted out of the presence of the tentatively selected jurors and other prospective jurors. Although the rule provides no test for determining whether the scope of questioning is adequate to fulfill the rule's purpose, Tennessee courts have held that the scope and extent of voir dire is entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge, and his actions will not be disturbed unless clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 65 (Tenn.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993); see also State v. Smith, 993 S.W.2d 6, 28 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1023, 120 S.Ct. 536, 145 L.Ed.2d 415 (1999). Thus, the method of voir dire, i.e., individual or group, [4] the questions that may be asked, and the scope of inquiry are all within the discretion of the trial court. [5] In the present case, the trial court, prior to the commencement of jury selection, instructed counsel that individual voir dire would be limited to issues surrounding pretrial publicity and death qualification, unless there has been something on that questionnaire that we need to deal with individually. Defense counsel informed the court that, from the questionnaires, an amazingly large number of jurors recorded for us mental health issues related to themselves or to their family. As this obviously would be a subject of voir dire where they have indicated something which is innately a personal topic, I wonder if the Court would like to consider those questions. [6] The court denied the Appellant's request to question jurors during individual voir dire regarding mental health issues, but stated, that is something that you can deal [with] within the general voir dire. The trial court additionally informed defense counsel that during the individual voir dire they could ask the general question, Will you consider all mitigation? and also permitted the parties to question the potential jurors regarding any matters that the jurors had designated as private on their questionnaires. Regarding group voir dire, the trial court limited inquiry into mental health issues, requiring any question to be an attempt to clarify a position stated in the questionnaire or be a general inquiry regarding the juror's ability to consider mental health testimony. [7] The Appellant now contends that the limitations placed on voir dire prevented him from developing possible cause challenges against jurors who had already expressed negative attitudes about mental health evidence, [8] thereby rendering the limitations essentially meaningless. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Defense counsel had access to the questionnaires of the prospective jurors. The questionnaires combined with the permissible inquiries as to mental health issues during individual and group voir dire provided the Appellant with ample background information from which to exercise peremptory challenges. Accordingly, we find that the limited restrictions placed upon the parties by the trial court were reasonable and were well within the trial court's discretion. This issue is without merit.
The Appellant cites to numerous statements by the trial court which he asserts implicitly conveyed that the court expected the [Appellant] to be found guilty of first-degree murder, so that a penalty phase would necessarily occur thereafter. The Appellant contends that the inference from the trial court's directions to the venire implied that the court viewed the [Appellant's] convictions as a foregone conclusion. Accordingly, he avers that the court's comments resulted in prejudice to the judicial process requiring reversal. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b). Without reiterating verbatim the challenged language of the trial court to the venire, we acknowledge that the court, for example, used the term until he is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first-degree rather than the term unless he is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first-degree. The Appellant argues prejudice without considering the context in which the court's statements were provided. Indeed, one challenged comment of the court, placed in full context of the court's instruction, provided: Mr. Reid hasn't been found guilty of anything. That is what the trial is about, so I want to make certain that you understand he is presumed innocent as he sits in front of you, and that presumption stays with him until he is found guilty after you hear the proof in the case, so just because we are asking you questions with regard to the possible punishments in this case, I want to make certain you keep in mind that he has not been found guilty of anything, but the reason we have to ask you these questions is that we must have jurors who can consider all three possible punishments. We disagree with the Appellant's argument that this instruction compels the finding that the court implied to the jury the Appellant's guilt. Given the entire context of the voir dire, we conclude that no reasonable juror could have believed that the court was instructing him or her to return a guilty verdict. This issue is without merit.