Opinion ID: 3012536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: boone's appeal

Text: Boone makes six arguments in his appeal. We consider each separately. 1. The District Court Erred by Admitting Evidence of Boone's Prior Drug-Trafficking. Boone's defense at trial was that even though he accepted $100 dollars to deliver a bag that happened to _________________________________________________________________ increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi was not raised as an issue by Weston and was only briefly alluded to at oral argument. However, in an over-abundance of caution, we do think that a short discussion of Apprendi is warranted. The superseding indictment charged Weston, Boone, Farris and Jones with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 5 grams of cocaine base (crack) and more than 200 grams of cocaine contrary to 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. As noted above, the government filed an enhanced penalty information against Weston, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. SS 841(b)(1)(B) and 851(a)(1). That information referenced a 1992 state felony conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and Weston does not now challenge that enhancement. As a consequence of his conviction, Weston faces a possible statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(B) (If any person commits such a violation [of S 841(a)] after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and not more than life imprisonment. . . .). We recently applied Apprendi, and reiterated the proposition that the limitations of Apprendi do not apply unless the quantity calculation increases the statutory maximum the defendant is exposed to. If it does, the calculation must be submitted to the jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, however, the district court's drug calculation on remand cannot possibly increase the statutory maximum. That maximum is already set at life because of Weston's prior drug conviction. See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 2676 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Apprendi does not apply where application of Sentencing Guidelines does not implicate a fact that would increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum). See also United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 862-863 (3d Cir. 2000)(Apprendi does not apply to a situation where the district court decides a fact that increases a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines, but the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum). 31 contain cocaine, he was an ignorant go-fer and did not know what he delivered. To meet that defense, the district court permitted the government to admit evidence of Boone's prior drug-trafficking activities pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). However, the court gave a limiting instruction in which it informed the jury that the evidence was being admitted solely on the issue of Boone's knowledge of the contents of the bag, and to demonstrate his prior relationship with Farris and Mills. With that caution, the court admitted evidence that, on different occasions, Mills had observed Boone selling cocaine inside of the nightclubs where Mills worked. The district court also admitted evidence that Boone sold cocaine supplied by Farris. In addition, even though the government also tried to admit Boone's two prior drug-trafficking convictions into evidence, the district court limited the government to a stipulation that Boone had previously twice possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver it. Boone argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . may . . . be admissible . . . for [certain] purposes, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added). Under Rule 404(b),17 evidence of other criminal conduct is admissible whenever relevant to a case other than [to show] the defendant's criminal propensity. United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996). The prime inquiry is whether the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988). The prior crimes evidence was admitted to show that Boone was familiar with drug-trafficking practices and to establish that his relationship with Farris and Mills included drug-trafficking. The evidence demonstrated his knowledge, intent and lack of mistake or accident. It was properly admitted to rebut his defense of ignorance, and not to establish a propensity for criminal conduct. _________________________________________________________________ 17. Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996). 32 Boone does not complain about the limiting instructions the trial court gave. The court cautioned the jury when the evidence was admitted and again as part of the final jury instructions, and those instructions were adequate to address concerns that the evidence would be used for an improper purpose. Boone argues that evidence of his prior drug-trafficking offenses established no logical inferences that he knew the bag contained cocaine, as opposed to stolen jewelry, or platinum dust. Boone's Br. at 9. However, that very argument illustrates the propriety of admitting evidence of Boone's prior drug involvement. The government correctly responds that evidence of one's familiarity with the subterfuge and concealment inherent in drug-trafficking was relevant to the issue of whether Boone may have believed the bag contained contraband other than cocaine. See United States v. Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 1990).18 Finally, we conclude that evidence of Boone's prior drugtrafficking was harmless in any event. Farris testified that he asked Boone to deliver cocaine to Agent Hilton posing as Malik, and that Boone agreed. Hilton testified that he received the cocaine from Boone in a manner that was characteristic of clandestine drug transactions and that the cocaine was plainly visible to Boone. Mills then testified that Boone acknowledged that he got involved because he was then actively dealing drugs. _________________________________________________________________ 18. In Ferrer-Cruz, the court stated: Since one who has previous experience with drugs is . . . more likely to recognize (and hence to know) that the bags' contents were drugs that one without such experience, the inference at issue do not involve character. . . . Moreover, the probative value of the evidence . . . is quite high. . . . [A] juror might have though that the government failed to prove anything beyond [appellant's] presence in a car with cocaine; and, believing that the government failed to prove [appellant] knew it was cocaine or that he intended to deliver cocaine to the co-defendants, such a juror might have voted to acquit. The evidence of a past conviction might have helped convince a juror of guilt through its permissible suggestion that [appellant] knew about drugs and drug possession. 899 F.2d at 138. 33 Boone also challenges the district court's admission of Mills' testimony that between 1984 and 1986, he observed Boone selling cocaine inside the restrooms of two nightclubs where Mills worked. In pressing this objection, he concedes that the evidence was minimally relevant to knowledge. He claims, however, that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and it was therefore inadmissible under the balance required by Fed. R. Evid. 403. Boone did not object to this testimony under Rule 403 in the district court. We therefore again review for plain error, but Boone does not argue plain error even now. Rather, he spends a great deal of time arguing that Mills' testimony was incredible or unreliable. That was clearly an issue for the jury to resolve, and it apparently did so in favor of the government. Moreover, given Boone'sinnocent go-fer defense, this evidence was proper under Rule 403. 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Boone argues that evidence of his knowledge of the contents of the package he delivered was insufficient to sustain his conviction. He insists that he never shared a unity of purpose with Farris, and that he never even spoke with Weston during the time-frame of the charged conspiracy. He maintains that he was never told, and had no dependable basis to know, what was in the package he delivered to Agent Hilton. Boone's Br. at 17. However, Farris' testimony by itself is sufficient to support Boone's conviction, and the jury apparently credited that testimony. Farris testified that he: (1) selected Boone to deliver the cocaine to Hilton because of Boone's long-standing ties to Mills and Boone's prior drug dealing for Farris; (2) told Boone that he wanted him to deliver cocaine and offered Boone $100 and an eighth of an ounce of cocaine for the job; and (3) Boone took the cocaine and agreed to deliver it. See United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1156 (5th Cir. 1992)(uncorroborated testimony of cooperating coconspirators that they had conspired to sell drugs, and that appellant knew of, joined, and helped effectuate the conspiracy, was sufficient to support conviction for violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846). 34 Nonetheless, Boone argues Farris' testimony is not sufficient because, according to Boone, on crossexamination Farris clarified that he only told Boone he had a deal for him, and there was no specific mention of drugs. Boone's Br. at 17. However, Boone mischaracterizes the testimony Farris offered on cross-examination. When asked: what exactly did [he] say to Mr. Boone, Farris testified: That I had something for him, a deal going in on a few days and I asked him, did -- did he want to be a part of it or something like that. Farris failed to offer a verbatim recitation of what he told Boone, even though he was asked for one. Farris related only that he said something like that. Farris' testimony was not an admission that he failed to tell Boone that the package Boone delivered contained cocaine. Moreover, this argument again establishes the propriety of the aforementioned 404(b) evidence. Assuming that Farris only discussed the delivery in vague terms such as doing a deal, it was important for the jury to understand Boone's familiarity with the kind of vagaries that could cloak discussions of a drug delivery. In any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Boone's conviction regardless of any inconsistency in Farris' direct and cross-examination testimony. A jury is free to believe part of a witness' testimony and disbelieve another part of it. United States v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953, 958 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, a witness' testimony is not insufficient to establish a point simply because he or she later contradicts or alters it. See United States v. Stirone, 311 F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1963)(evidence was sufficient even though testimony of a government witness was to some extent self-contradictory). Furthermore, we review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, and we credit all reasonable inferences that support the verdict. United States v. Riddick , 156 F.3d 505, 508 (3d Cir. 1998). We will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the evidence viewed in that light. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). 35 The jury here could easily have credited Farris' direct testimony that Boone agreed to deliver what he was told was a package of cocaine, notwithstanding any purported inconsistency on cross-examination. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Boone's conviction. 3. The District Court Erred by Not Granting a New Trial Based on the Government's Failure to Disclose Brady Material. Boone claims that the government failed to disclose two items of exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, and he is therefore entitled to a new trial. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87. The affirmative duty to disclose includes impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the Court wrote: [T]he term Brady violation is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence--that is, to any suppression of so-called Brady material--although, strictly speaking, there is never a real Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. Id. at 281-82. 36 The first claimed Brady violation is a statement of a confidential informant. Boone first learned about this confidential informant in the Presentence Report, which read, at P 9, as follows: In early 1997, [law enforcement officials] received information from a confidential source19 . . . that several individuals, including THOMAS WESTON, a/k/a Rasul; CURTIS FARRIS, a/k/a C-Allah; LARRY BOONE, a/k/a God Supreme; and HERBERT JONES were responsible for the distribution of significant quantities of crack in the Asbury Park area. After he received a draft of the PSR, Boone, by letter dated May 12, 1999, sought disclosure of information relating to this informant. The government responded by informing Boone that the informant had stopped cooperating with the authorities before Boone was released from state prison in early 1997. In other words, the government conceded that the representation in the PSR that the confidential informant had provided information about Boone was erroneous. Nonetheless, Boone claims this non-disclosure violated due process. The argument is, however, somewhat difficult to follow. If the confidential informant made the statement about Boone, it certainly would not be exculpatory or material. On the contrary, if the statement was made it would have been inculpatory and not subject to Brady disclosure. In any event, Boone contends that if the PSR was correct, i.e., had the confidential informant made an inculpatory statement about him, he (Boone) could have called the confidential informant as his own witness and established that the allegations were false. He claims he could have impeached the unknown informant and shown that Boone had been falsely accused of being an early coconspirator, which created a domino effect, causing Mills, Farris, and Agent Hilton to either lie or mold their stories to fit the framework of their target conspiracy. Boone's Br. at 19-20. _________________________________________________________________ 19. Stewart Mills, who testified at trial, is identified as a second confidential informant in P 9 of the PSR, and is not the same person identified in this excerpt. 37 However, Boone fails to tell us how his new twist on the domino theory would have exculpated him. Moreover, even if we assume that Boone could have somehow shown that the confidential informant had falsely implicated him, he has not even attempted to establish that Mills, Farris and/or Hilton were even aware of the informant's statement, or that they perjured themselves and conspired to mold their testimony to conform to it. Alternatively, Boone suggests that even if the government was correct that the confidential informant's statement was wrong, the statement was actually exculpatory because he could have used the statement to show the jury that he could not have been a member of the Weston, Farris and Jones drug conspiracy during the time he was in state prison. However, assuming arguendo that the statement would be exculpatory as posited, Boone has not shown that it was material. The test for materiality is whether the failure to disclose prejudiced the defendant, i.e., whether the failure to disclose undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 195200 (3d Cir. 2000). The fact that Weston, Farris and Jones were engaged in drug-trafficking prior to Boone's release from state prison does not negate Farris' testimony that he recruited Boone after Boone's release from prison for the express purpose of delivering cocaine to Agent Hilton on July 11, 1997. In fact, it corroborates that testimony. Once Boone agreed to the July 11th transaction, he joined the conspiracy. The second Brady violation Boone asserts involves a statement co-defendant Jones made to a pre-sentence investigator after pleading guilty. Jones told the investigator that Weston typically wrapped his drugs in brown paper bags. According to Boone, he could have used this information to show that the cocaine Farris received from Weston and gave to Boone was wrapped in a brown paper bag, thereby preventing Boone from knowing that cocaine was inside. However, Boone did not need Jones' statement to establish this because Farris testified that the cocaine he delivered to Boone was wrapped in a brown paper bag. Thus, Jones' statement would have been cumulative and, consequently, not material. See United States v. Burns, 162 38 F.3d 840, 851 (5th Cir. 1998)(non-disclosure of information that supported the defense theory that fraudulent billing was caused by untimely reimbursements by victim agency was not material because it was merely cumulative of other evidence elicited by defense on this point). Moreover, Agent Hilton testified that by the time Boone delivered the cocaine to him, it was in a clear plastic bag. Jones' statement does not contradict that statement because the cocaine was wrapped in a clear plastic bag that was then placed in the brown paper bag that was handed to Boone. 4. The District Court Erred in Instructing the Jury That It Could Consider Evidence That Boone Attempted to Influence a Witness as Indicative of Consciousness of Guilt. Boone argues that the court erred in instructing the jury that evidence of the threatening letter Farris received (apparently from Weston, or at his direction) could be considered as consciousness of guilt. That evidence, which we have set forth above, was admitted without objection, and Boone does not challenge its admission here. Boone objected to the charge at trial, but was overruled. He does not now argue that the charge did not accurately state the law. Rather, he argues that the district court's charge was unfair and inappropriate. First, he argues that it was unfair because it lump[ed] together Boone's and Weston's prison contacts with Farris. Boone's Br. at 23. He argues this was unfair because Weston asked Farris to lie, but he (Boone) simply asked Farris to tell the truth. That is, Boone maintains that he asked Farris to truthfully state that Boone innocently accompanied Farris to the Collingwood Auction to ask Mills for a legitimate job, not knowing that Farris had solicited Boone to deliver cocaine. This argument again misstates the trial testimony. Farris testified that he clearly and fully informed Boone that Boone was being hired to deliver cocaine. According to Farris, Boone did not accompany Farris to the Collingwood Auction to ask Mills for a job. Boone's other arguments about the consciousness of guilt instruction are equally meritless. Boone claims that the instruction was unwarranted because the government 39 placed their witnesses among his co-defendants in[the jail] . . . and continuous banter went back and forth to and from Farris. Boone's Br. at 44. Although Boone's point here is rather elusive, we assume (as does the government), that Boone is suggesting that the government attempted to entrap Boone by creating an opportunity for him to discuss his drug dealing in front of Farris after Farris agreed to cooperate. This is apparently based upon an argument that the government intentionally failed to segregate Farris from Boone and Weston after Farris began cooperating. Boone does not offer any proof to support this claim, and we fail to see the legal basis for an entrapment claim even if Boone had such evidence. Therefore, this argument must fail. Finally, Boone claims that Farris, not Boone, initiated their discussion in the library regarding drafting an exculpatory letter. However, that argument misses the point, and is also contradicted by Farris' testimony. The fact that the defense presented other prison inmates who claimed that Farris admitted to them that Weston and Boone were not guilty of the charges only created a jury question regarding Farris' credibility. The court properly left that question to the jury. 5. The District Court Erred by Not Charging That a Single Transaction Does Not Establish Conspiracy Membership, or That a Member Can Constructively Terminate His Membership. Boone argues that the district court improperly denied his request for an instruction that his involvement in a single transaction did not prove that he was guilty of conspiracy. He relies upon our decision in United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 726-29 (3d Cir. 1994). There, we reversed a jury instruction that a defendant could be guilty of conspiring to distribute cocaine by offering to buy cocaine from a member of the conspiracy, even if the buyer had no intention of reselling the cocaine. Here, however, Boone did not buy drugs; he delivered them. Thus, Price does not help him. In fact, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Boone was brought into the conspiracy to deliver Weston's cocaine, collect the purchase price and 40 remit it to Farris. Boone was only to be paid if he delivered the cocaine, and Weston and Farris would receive the money only if Boone delivered the cocaine and collected the sales price. This is sufficient to prove a conspiracy. See United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1292 (3d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, the district court properly denied the requested instruction. Moreover, the evidence refutes Boone's claim that he was only involved in one illegal act. Farris selected Boone to deliver cocaine to Malik on July 11th because Boone had previously delivered cocaine for Farris and because Boone was friendly with Mills. Farris' subsequent attempt to use Boone for another delivery to Malik on August 1, was stymied only because Farris could not find Boone. Meanwhile, Boone was assuring Mills that he (Boone) could provide Mills with large amounts of cocaine to sell. This evidence establishes Boone as a member of an ongoing conspiracy; not a one-time participant. The district court instructed the jury that, after joining a conspiracy, a person may terminate his involvement only by an affirmative act of termination . . . withdrawal or disassociation. Boone argued that he was entitled to a constructive termination instruction based on the argument that he constructively terminated his membership in the conspiracy by participating in only one transaction. He has presented no authority for that rather novel proposition, and we are not aware of any. Rather, we believe the district court accurately stated the law. Boone was required to make a prima facie showing of affirmative acts to defeat or disavow his membership in the conspiracy. Such acts of disavowal include making a full confession to authorities or renouncing the conspiracy to the coconspirators. United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 582 (3d Cir. 1995). The mere cessation of activity is insufficient to establish withdrawal. Id. at 582. Boone did nothing to attempt to withdraw. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to give the requested jury instruction. 41 6. The District Court Erred by Finding that Boone Did Not Accept Responsibility for his Crime. Finally, Boone claims that the district court committed clear error by finding that he did not accept responsibility for his crimes and declining to reduce his Offense Level pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. A defendant seeking a reduction for acceptance of responsibility bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to the reduction, and we review the district court's denial of the reduction for clear error. United States v. Muhammad, 146 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1998). The district court's denial of the reduction is entitled to great deference because [t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1, Application Note 5. Boone's claim of acceptance of responsibility is hard to take seriously. It is based upon a statement he gave to investigators after he was arrested that he now argues was in all respects a complete confession. Boone's Br. at 28. After his arrest, Boone waived his Miranda rights and agreed to give a statement to investigators. In that statement he claimed that, on July 11, 1997, Farris asked him to do a favor and give this guy a package. Boone said he agreed, and Farris drove Boone to the Collingwood Auction. Boone admitted that he delivered the package, and that he skimmed $100 from the money that he received from Malik. He denied any knowledge of Farris' cocaine supplier. Boone did not admit that he committed the charged offenses, and he did not admit that he knew the package contained cocaine. Given the evidence here, his cooperation is more a false exculpatory statement than an acceptance of responsibility. A defendant does not earn the acceptance of responsibility reduction simply by speaking to investigators. See United States v. DeLeon-Rodriquez, 70 F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1995)(district court did not commit plain error by denying acceptance reduction where appellant's pre-trial statement to investigators stopped short of a full confession). Continuing his game ofcat and mouse, Boone argues that he did not admit that he knew that the package contained drugs because he was not 42 specifically asked by the investigators. However, we cannot help but cast a particularly jaundiced eye on that assertion because it strikes us as nothing more than a post-hoc fabrication to buttress his appeal. Boone would be hard pressed to demonstrate that he accepted responsibility even with his post-arrest statement. He seeks the benefit of the portion of U.S.S.G.S 3E1.1 Application Note 2, that provides that where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e. g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct), a defendant may be entitled to the acceptance of responsibility reduction. That provision is of no avail here. Initially, Boone attempted to rely on the panel opinion in United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998)(Singleton I), which held that the government was barred from making promises of leniency to cooperating witnesses in exchange for their truthful testimony against a defendant. Thus, he filed a pre-trial motion seeking to suppress Mills' testimony based on Singleton I . He concedes that his suppression motion was probably a dead letter by the time of trial because the panel decision had been reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit en banc. 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (Singleton II).20 Nonetheless, he claims that even though the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit repudiated Singleton I by the time of his trial, we had not as yet addressed the issue.21 Thus, he argues that he continued to fall under the exception explained in Application Note 2. However, we are hard pressed to see how Boone could seriously argue for an acceptance of responsibility reduction. He opposed the admission of relevant, inculpatory evidence, and challenged as incredible the testimony of government witnesses Mills, Farris and Agent Hilton. We think the law is clear that such actions are _________________________________________________________________ 20. The Supreme Court later denied a petition for certiorari. 527 U.S. 1024 (1999). 21. When this appeal was argued we had decided United States v. Hunte, 193 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) in which we rejected Singleton I. 43 inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility reduction in the Guidelines. United States v. DeLeonRodriquez, 70 F.3d at 767 (acceptance of responsibility reduction properly denied because appellant challenged the admission of and accuracy of the government's trial evidence, and argued for a verdict of not guilty).