Opinion ID: 2626390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Determinate Sentencing

Text: After denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict and pronouncing judgment on the capital count (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the trial court imposed a determinate sentence on the noncapital count. (See § 1170, et seq.) Consistent with the probation report, which it read solely for noncapital sentencing purposes, the court chose the upper term of eight years for the rape of Valery C. (See § 264, subd. (a).) The prison term was then made consecutive to the death sentence. As explained further below, the court relied on both the youth and vulnerability of the victim in making these decisions. (Italics added.) However, the court stayed execution of the determinate term because it had relied, in part, on the facts of the noncapital crime in refusing to modify the death verdict. Defendant insists we must reverse and remand for resentencing because the trial court cited insufficient reasons to support its sentencing choices. Defendant did not raise this claim below. However, his hearing predated our decision in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, 357-358, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040, which imposed a prospective contemporaneous objection requirement on complaints like those raised here. We therefore agree with the parties that the claim has not been forfeited, and that it may be raised for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463, 552, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) Nevertheless, it fails on the merits. Under the statutes and rules in existence at the time of defendant's hearing, the trial court was required to state its reasons for making discretionary sentencing choices. Two such choices included imposition of the upper term and the decision to make one sentence consecutive to another. In deciding to aggravate a sentence in this manner, the court was prohibited from using the same reason more than once, and was required to cite different circumstances to support each choice. (See § 1170, subds. (b) & (c); People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331, 349-350, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040.) The record shows compliance with these rules. The trial court cited two factors in aggravation and no factors in mitigation when sentencing defendant for the forcible rape of Valery C. First, the crime seemed aggravated in the court's view because the victim was relatively young, i.e., 16 years old. Second, the court found the victim to be particularly vulnerable. The court explained at the hearing to modify the death verdict that Valery was pregnant, that she depended on defendant for shelter, and that she had no other apparent place to go. Contrary to what defendant claims, a crime victim can be deemed vulnerable in this context for reasons not based solely on age, including the victim's relationship with the defendant and his abuse of a position of trust. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 638, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) The court properly applied these principles. The record supports the determinate sentence challenged here.