Opinion ID: 686479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kelm's Claim Against Amy Kelm

Text: 41 Although Kelm never specifically included Amy Kelm within his damages claim, he alleged that she invoked the jurisdiction of the domestic relations court in obtaining a CPO through perjury, [and] notified police officers to enforce it through material misstatements about prior service and an immediate threat of violence. Construing this complaint broadly, we read these allegations as an attempt to seek damages from Amy Kelm. 42 Kelm correctly notes that in some instances Sec. 1983 extends to private parties. To establish a viable claim under Sec. 1983, however, Kelm must prove first that Amy Kelm deprived him of a guaranteed right under color of the challenged statute, and second that her actions were properly attributable to the state, i.e. that she qualified as a state actor. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); see also Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1992). Here, although Amy Kelm utilized a state statute, Kelm can not prove that she qualifies as a state actor. 43 In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court found that private parties can be deemed to be acting under the color of state law when acting in conjunction with state officials in garnishment or attachment proceedings. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The Court further noted, however, that even where a private party utilizes an allegedly unconstitutional state statute, courts must focus not on the terms of the statute but on the character of the defendants to the Sec. 1983 suit. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S.Ct. at 2754-55. The Court explained that [a]ction by a private party pursuant to this statute, without something more, was not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a 'state actor.'  Id. 44 Whether a party qualifies as a state actor varies with the circumstances of each case. Thus, the Court has articulated several tests to be used in different contexts. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) (public function test); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946) (state compulsion test); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1615, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (nexus test); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978) (joint action test for cases of prejudgment attachments). Even when we stretch the above tests to their outer limits, Amy Kelm does not qualify as a state actor. Thus, Kelm's damage claim against her must fail. We, therefore, sua sponte dismiss Kelm's damage claim for failure to state a claim.