Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial Discovery of Harlan's Expert Witnesses

Text: Harlan asserts that the trial court's order requiring pretrial discovery of three sentencing phase expert witnesses impermissibly forced him to choose between exercising his privilege against self-incrimination during the guilt phase of the trial and his due process right to present mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase. The scope of our review of this matter is narrow, as we are concerned only with the propriety of the trial court's discovery and protective orders. Even assuming for the sake of argument, without actually deciding that it does, that Harlan's privilege against self-incrimination in the guilt phase of the trial attached to the sentencing phase expert witnesses' evidence, we find that the trial court's order limiting the prosecution's use of the evidence would have adequately protected Harlan's privilege. Consequently, we hold that the pretrial discovery order was proper.
Relying on Crim. P. 16(II)(b), the trial court ordered Harlan to provide the prosecution with discovery by March 27, 1995, one week before the beginning of the guilt phase of his trial, of the mental health experts whom the defense wished to call for mitigation purposes should the trial reach a sentencing phase. Under this order, Harlan was required to provide discovery of any notes, reports, or raw data that the experts had compiled in preparing for the sentencing phase. The trial court also ordered that the prosecution not use the discovery material in framing voir dire questions or for any guilt phase purposes. Harlan maintained that such disclosure would force him to reveal privileged [27] and confidential information. The defendant eventually chose not to call these witnesses, thereby precluding the mental health experts' testimony as to potential mitigating factors.
Section 16-11-103(1)(c), 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.), sets forth the procedural requirements for endorsement of Harlan's sentencing phase witnesses. [28] The trial court was authorized to set reasonable timeliness for discovery. Additionally, Crim. P. 16(II)(b) provides that, subject to constitutional limitations, the trial court could order the defense to provide the prosecution with reports or statements of defense experts, including the results of mental examinations. Harlan chose not to disclose the expert reports and related materials, partly due to a concern that his own witnesses' statements might infringe upon his privilege against self-incrimination during the guilt phase. The trial court realized that its discovery order might infringe upon Harlan's privilege against self-incrimination. It therefore conditioned discovery of Harlan's witnesses by requiring the prosecution to limit use of the material to the sentencing phase: THE COURT: If the defendant wishes not to utilize this information and wishes not to utilize the  if the defense decides  makes a determination not to call these witnesses, that's certainly their determination to make and they don't have to provide any of that information to the defense [sic]. If they decide  they make a decision to call these witnesses and disclose the information to the defense [sic] or  I'm sorry  to the prosecution, then that information can only be used by the prosecution in the penalty phase in regard to aggravation and mitigation. And I realize that no other use can be made of it. .... But it's the court's intention that the information should only be used as the Court had indicated, at the penalty phase of this trial, if this trial reaches a penalty phase, and should not otherwise be utilized. Harlan avoided the risk of any improper use of his statements to his proposed sentencing phase witnesses by electing not to comply with the trial court's discovery order. The limitations the trial court placed on the prosecution's use of the discovery materials adequately responded to Harlan's concerns that the evidence not be used before the sentencing phase. We presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the trial court would effectively enforce its order. Consequently, we find, assuming that Harlan's privilege against self-incrimination during the guilt phase attached to the sentencing phase witnesses' evidence, that the protective order would have sufficiently guarded his privilege. Because we hold that the trial court's protective order was sufficient to safeguard the defendant's guilt phase privilege against self-incrimination, assuming that the privilege attached to the evidence at issue, we decline to determine here whether in fact the guilt phase privilege applies to evidence that a capital defendant seeks to introduce only during the sentencing phase. Prior decisions of the Supreme Court and this court do not yield a clear answer to that question, and resolution of the defendant's claim here does not require reaching the issue. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), the Supreme Court concluded that: A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding. This statement logically leads to another proposition: if a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. The defendant would have no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of this psychiatric testimony by the prosecution. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Buchanan establishes that Harlan can claim no infringement of his privilege against self-incrimination so far as the sentencing phase of his trial is concerned. It is less clear whether Buchanan also yields the conclusion that the discovery order did not contravene Harlan's privilege in the guilt phase of the trial. The psychiatric examination at issue in Buchanan did not contain  any statements by petitioner dealing with the crimes for which he was charged. Id. at 423, 107 S.Ct. 2906 (emphasis added). In contrast, Harlan asserts that he made several incriminating statements to at least two of the three mental health experts he sought to present during the sentencing phase. Moreover, our previous decisions have not squarely addressed whether a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination in the guilt phase is infringed by discovery of sentencing phase material prior to the resolution of the guilt phase. In People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 473 (Colo.1998), we upheld the constitutionality of amended section 16-11-103(3.5)(c), regarding disclosure of written and recorded statements of all witnesses a defendant intends to call at the sentencing phase. However, the challenged materials in that case did not include self-incriminating statements. See id. at 471-72. [29] In People v. District Court (Bellman), 187 Colo. 333, 340-41, 531 P.2d 626, 630 (1975), we held that Crim. P. 16(II)(b) does not facially violate a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, while suggesting that material containing such statements might not be subject to a disclosure order. However, we do not resolve here the question left open by our prior decisions. Again, our concern is only with the propriety of the trial court's discovery and protective orders. The orders were proper because they ensured that the prosecution would make no improper use of the sentencing phase evidence, while also allowing the prosecution a fair opportunity to rebut key sentencing phase evidence the defendant intended to introduce. See Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 499 (Colo.1992) (stating that discovery rules promote fairness in the criminal process by reducing the risk of trial by ambush). [30] The trial court's order protected any constitutional interest Harlan may have had.
We conclude our discussion of this claim with an observation concerning discovery of a defendant's sentencing phase evidence in future capital cases. A new statute and rule are now in effect regarding the timing of disclosure of defense evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. See § 16-11-103(3.5)(c); Crim. P. 32.1(f)(6). Henceforth, the defendant shall provide the prosecuting attorney with discovery materials including those of the type at issue in this case, see § 16-11-103(3.5)(c)(I)-(III), no later than twenty days after a verdict of guilty for a death-eligible offense. The intent of the new statute and rule is that a defendant's disclosure of experts and other material subject to discovery is to occur after the guilty verdict for a death-eligible offense has been rendered.