Opinion ID: 1789783
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional Right to Appointed Counsel at State Expense.

Text: Maghee contends he has a federal due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the appointment of counsel at state expense in this penalty proceeding under Iowa Code section 610A.3. He likens the procedure under section 610A.3 to civil contempt and argues that indigent persons who face imprisonment in a civil contempt proceeding are provided counsel at state expense, as we held in McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 10, 14 (Iowa 1982). In that case, this court held that McNabb was entitled to counsel under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in a contempt hearing that resulted in his incarceration and would be entitled to counsel in any subsequent hearing if the hearing would result in the loss of his physical liberty. McNabb, 315 N.W.2d at 11, 14. In contrast, the State contends that loss of earned time credit does not actually extend the inmate's sentence but only changes the potential for the amount of time that an inmate may serve. Given this fact, the State argues that the section 610A.3 penalty proceeding in which the inmate is facing the loss of earned time credit is more like a prison disciplinary proceeding than a civil contempt action because the inmate is already incarcerated and therefore is not facing the loss of liberty. Because an inmate is not entitled to appointment of counsel at state expense in the disciplinary proceeding, as this court held in Maghee v. State, 639 N.W.2d at 30-31, the State argues that a similar procedure used to take away earned time credit based upon frivolous litigation does not require appointment of counsel at state expense. For reasons that follow, we think the State has the better argument. Because a constitutional issue is raised, our review is de novo. James v. State, 541 N.W.2d 864, 869-70 (Iowa 1995). A. Applicable law. We begin with the applicable statutes in this proceeding. Iowa Code chapter 610A is entitled Civil Litigation by Inmates and Prisoners. As applied to this case, Iowa Code section 610A.2(1)( b ) allows the court to dismiss a civil action filed by an inmate or prisoner when the action is frivolous or malicious in whole or in part. Iowa Code section 610A.2(2) permits the court to consider several factors in determining whether an action is frivolous or malicious. Judge Blane found that four of the six factors listed in section 610A.2(2) applied to Maghee's action against Judge Reade: (1) the action was without substantial justification, see Iowa Code § 610A.2(2)( a ); (2) the action was intended solely or primarily for harassment, see id. § 610A.2(2)( c ); (3) the action was without evidentiary support, see id. § 610A.2(2)( d ); and (4) the action was asserted with an improper purpose, including but not limited to, harassing an opponent, see id. § 610A.2(2)( e ). If the court finds the inmate has filed a frivolous civil action, the court may dismiss the action, see id. § 610A.2, as Judge Blane did here. If the court dismisses the action, the inmate is subject to penalties pursuant to Iowa Code section 610A.3. The penalties include loss of some or all of the inmate's earned time credits. Id. § 610A.3(1)( a ). If the prisoner has no earned time credits to deduct, the court may deduct up to fifty percent of the average balance of the inmate account. Id. § 610A.3(1)( b ). Here, as mentioned, Judge Huscher ordered a deduction of 2000 days of Maghee's earned time credits. Apparently, chapter 610A is the legislature's attempt to deter inmates and prisoners from filing frivolous lawsuits. Iowa is not alone in this attempt. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1932 (West Supp.2005) (loss of earned good time credit for inmates in federal correctional facilities for frivolous civil litigation); Lynn S. Branham, Of Mice and Prisoners: The Constitutionality of Extending Prisoners' Confinement for Filing Frivolous Lawsuits, 75 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1021, 1031 (2002) (pointing out that twelve states permit the extension of a prisoner's incarceration, generally through revocation of good time credits, for filing a frivolous lawsuit). B. Analysis. We turn now to Maghee's federal due process claim. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To establish a due process violation, an inmate must first establish that the inmate has a liberty interest of constitutional dimension. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1748, 75 L.Ed.2d 813, 823 (1983); Sanford v. Manternach, 601 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Iowa 1999). When a state has created a right to good conduct time, that right is embraced within the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 (1974). Iowa's law providing for earned time credits creates a liberty interest. Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 368; see also Iowa Code § 903A.2. Before January 1, 2001, inmates earned good conduct time amounting to day for day credit in the reduction of the inmate's sentence. See Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)( a ) (1999). In addition, the inmate could earn bonus credit for work, treatment, or education amounting up to five days per month in reduction of the inmate's sentence. See id. § 903A.2(1)( a )(1)-(5). This changed into a single unified credit called earned time credit. 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1173, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 903A.2 (2001)). As mentioned, the change became effective January 1, 2001 and applied to all inmates even if they were already in the prison system. See 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1173, §§ 9-10. Up until January 1, 2001, Maghee therefore earned good conduct time plus bonus credit if he was working or participating in a treatment or educational program. After that date, he accrued earned time credits. (For the balance of this opinion, we will refer to both as earned time credit.) In any event, Maghee has a liberty interest in his earned time credits, which affects the duration of his sentence. As mentioned, the earned time credit is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The degree of an inmate's interest in personal liberty, however, is less than the degree of interest in personal liberty possessed by one facing probation or parole revocation or one facing jail in a civil contempt action. For example, the immediate personal liberty of an inmate involved in a prison disciplinary proceeding is not threatened because, as the State points out, the inmate is already incarcerated. In contrast, a parolee facing parole revocation, a probationer facing probation revocation, and a respondent in a civil contempt action facing jail are all subject to an immediate threat to their personal liberty. This difference was underscored in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, a case in which inmates of a state prison brought a civil rights action against a state parole board alleging due process violations in the board's consideration of the inmates' suitability for parole: The fallacy in respondents' position is that parole release and parole revocation are quite different. There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires. The parolees in Morrissey (and probationers in Gagnon ) were at liberty and as such could be gainfully employed and [were] free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. The inmates here, on the other hand, are confined and thus subject to all of the necessary restraints that inhere in a prison. 442 U.S. 1, 9, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 676-77 (1979) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Significantly, in Morrissey the Court held that revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and for that reason the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution does not apply to parole revocation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 (1972). The Court also recognized that [r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions. Id. However, the Court considered the loss of this conditional liberty a grievous one requiring that the parolee be accorded due process. Id. at 482, 92 S.Ct. at 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d at 495. The Court then detailed the minimum requirements of due process for parole revocation, including but not limited to, notice of the claimed violations of parole and an opportunity to be heard at two hearings. Id. at 484-89, 92 S.Ct. at 2602-04, 33 L.Ed.2d at 496-99. The two hearings referred to include (1) a preliminary hearing at the time of the parolee's arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has committed a violation of his parole and (2) if a probable cause finding is made, a revocation hearing to determine whether the facts show that a violation occurred and that revocation of parole is warranted. Id. at 485-88, 92 S.Ct. at 2602-04, 33 L.Ed.2d at 496-98. The Court in Morrissey left open the question whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or appointed counsel at the two hearings. Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d at 499. One year later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court answered the question as to appointed counsel in the context of a probation revocation. 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). Recognizing that probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, the Court held that a probationer would be entitled to the same minimum due process rights accorded a parolee in a parole revocation. Id. at 782, 93 S.Ct. at 1759-60, 36 L.Ed.2d at 661-62. Given the critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, the Court opted for a due process requirement of appointed counsel at state expense on a case-by-case basis: We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness  the touchstone of due process  will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. Id. at 790, 93 S.Ct. at 1763, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666. Although the Court in Gagnon refused to adopt precise and detailed guidelines for courts to follow in determining whether to appoint counsel at state expense, it did provide some guidance: The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation, and a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record. Id. at 790-91, 93 S.Ct. at 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d at 666-67; accord Pfister v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 688 N.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Iowa 2004). A hearing to determine penalties applicable under Iowa Code section 610A.3 is more akin to a disciplinary hearing involving loss of earned time credits than to a parole or probation revocation hearing. The legislature in passing section 610A.3 underscored this similarity by allowing the court to enter an order deducting the earned time credits or allowing the credits to be deducted pursuant to a disciplinary hearing under Iowa Code chapter 903A at the facility where the inmate is held. See Iowa Code § 610A.3(2) (2003). Iowa Code section 903A.3(1) further emphasizes the similarity: Upon finding that an inmate has violated an institutional rule, or has had an action or appeal dismissed under section 610A.2, the independent administrative law judge may order forfeiture of any or all earned time accrued and not forfeited up to the date of the violation by the inmate and may order forfeiture of any or all earned time accrued and not forfeited up to the date the action or appeal is dismissed, unless the court entered such an order under section 610A.3. Id. § 903A.3(1) (emphasis added). Again, this provision makes clear that the inmate may be penalized for the inmate's actions in violation of section 610A.2 either in a court proceeding or a disciplinary proceeding at the correctional facility. The difference relates to the limit the statute places on the amount of accrued earned time that an administrative law judge can order forfeited. No such limit is placed on a district judge. As with the disciplinary hearing, what is at stake in a section 610A.3 penalty hearing is loss of earned time, a liberty interest that does not rise to the level of importance that Morrissey; Gagnon, and Greenholtz attribute to the liberty interest a parolee and probationer possess and that McNabb attributes to one facing jail time in a contempt action. Because there is no due process requirement for appointment of counsel at state expense in a disciplinary hearing, we similarly hold there is no due process requirement for appointment of counsel at state expense in a section 610A.3 penalty proceeding. That brings us to Maghee's contention that the loss of earned time should be set aside.