Opinion ID: 4247847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Corroboration Standard

Text: Under the prevailing framework, Sun bears the burden of proving his eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b), (c) (CAT protection). Asylum and withholding of removal are two alternative forms of relief available to an alien claiming that he will be persecuted, if removed back to his native country. Vanegas-Ramirez v. ‐7‐ Holder, 768 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Asylum allows an otherwise removable alien to remain and work in the United States. To qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that he is a refugee, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), meaning that he is unable or unwilling to return to [his home country] . . . because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). [A] well founded fear of future persecution requires a subjective fear that is objectively reasonable. Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2005)). Sun applied for withholding of removal under both the INA and CAT. Withholding of removal under the INA prevents an otherwise removable alien from being removed to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened . . . because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Eligibility for withholding of removal . . . requires a 'clear probability of persecution,' i.e., 'it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution.' VanegasRamirez, 768 F.3d at 237 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413, 424 (1984)). The clear probability standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the well-founded fear standard for asylum. See id. Accordingly, an applicant ‐8‐ who fails to establish eligibility for asylum fails to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. Id. Lastly, to obtain CAT relief, the applicant must prove that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). In deciding whether to grant asylum and withholding of removal, the IJ often must assess the applicant's credibility. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) and 1231(b)(3)(C). In making this determination, the IJ considers the totality of the circumstances, including the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant, the inherent plausibility of the applicant's . . . account, the consistency between [statements and] . . . the internal consistency of each such statement, and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). There is no presumption of credibility. Id. The applicant's testimony can be sufficient by itself to establish a claim for asylum, but corroborating evidence may be required in certain circumstances. Under the REAL ID Act, the applicant's testimony may be sufficient to sustain [his] burden without corroboration, but only if [he] satisfies the trier of fact that [his] testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Accordingly, an applicant's testimony may be credible and sufficiently detailed and persuasive to prove eligibility without corroboration; in some cases, however, an applicant may be generally credible but his testimony ‐9‐ may not be sufficient to carry the burden of persuading the fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of crucial facts if he fails to put forth corroboration that should be readily available. Where, as here, the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence. Id. The corroboration standard under the REAL ID Act closely tracks our pre-REAL ID Act case law. See Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2000) (While consistent, detailed, and credible testimony may be sufficient to carry the alien's burden, evidence corroborating his story, or an explanation for its absence, may be required where it would reasonably be expected.). The question here is the procedure required when the trier of fact determines that corroboration is required. We conclude that the REAL ID Act is ambiguous on this point, and that, pursuant to Chevron, the BIA's interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference. The BIA here relied on its decision in Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 2015). The BIA reasoned there that § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is ambiguous with regard to what steps must be taken when the applicant has not provided . . . evidence to corroborate otherwise credible testimony, and that the legislative history and broader context of the REAL ID Act make clear that [t]he intent was not to create additional procedural requirements relating to the ‐10‐ submission and evaluation of corroborating evidence, such as requiring advance notice or granting an automatic continuance to collect corroborating evidence. Id. at 518-20. Rather, the BIA held, where an IJ finds that an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal has not provided reasonably available corroborating evidence to establish his claim, the IJ should first consider the applicant's explanations for the absence of such evidence and, if a continuance is requested, determine whether there is good cause to continue the proceedings for the applicant to obtain the evidence. The BIA further held, however, that the REAL ID Act does not require the IJ to identify the specific evidence necessary to meet the applicant's burden of proof and to provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain that evidence prior to rendering a decision on the application. Nevertheless, the BIA acknowledged that [t]here are circumstances in which it is appropriate to continue the proceedings to another merits hearing for an applicant to present additional corroboration, such as where the applicant was not aware of a unique piece of evidence that is essential to meeting the burden of proof. Id. at 522. In reaching its conclusion, the BIA adopted the pre-REAL ID Act approach taken by the Second and Seventh Circuits and applied it to its postREAL ID Act analysis, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's contrary interpretation of ‐11‐ § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Id. at 522-23 (discussing Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011)); Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2014).1 The validity of the BIA's interpretation of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is governed by principles of Chevron deference. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999). At the first step of the two-step Chevron framework, the Court examine[s] the statute itself and determine[s] whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If Congress has so spoken, that is the end of the matter because this Court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Adams v. Holder, 692 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If we determine that the statute remains ambiguous despite our use of all relevant tools of statutory construction and legislative history, we proceed to a second step of analysis to examine whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable, and not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. If the agency interpretation is reasonable, then we must defer to it. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the BIA's construction of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is entitled to Chevron deference. First, the BIA is correct that § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is ambiguous with regard to what steps must be taken when the applicant has not 1 The Ninth Circuit has observed that its interpretation of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is inconsistent with this Courtʹs approach to corroboration. Ai Jun Zhi, 751 F.3d at 1094 n.6 (citing Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009)). ‐12‐ provided . . . evidence to corroborate otherwise credible testimony. Matter of L- A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 518. The relevant portion of the text is as follows: Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The statutory language makes clear that corroborating evidence should be provided under certain circumstances if it is reasonably available. The language is silent, however, as to the procedure to be followed where corroborating evidence is needed. It does not provide, for example, that the trier of fact must advise the applicant that corroborating evidence is necessary before issuing a final decision nor does it provide that the trier of fact must allow a continuance to permit the gathering of corroborating evidence. Sun asks this Court to adopt the Ninth Circuit's conclusion -- that [a] plain reading of the statute's text makes clear that an IJ must provide an applicant with notice and an opportunity to either produce the evidence or explain why it is unavailable before ruling that the applicant has failed in his obligation to provide corroborative evidence and therefore failed to meet his burden of proof. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1090. We decline to adopt this interpretation. The Ninth Circuit's holding was based on a textual reading of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), as it reasoned that because the statute does not say 'should ‐13‐ have provided,' but rather 'should provide,' [it] expresses an imperative that the applicant must provide further corroboration in response to the IJ's determination. Id. at 1091 (emphasis in original). While the Ninth Circuit's interpretation is plausible, it is not the only reasonable interpretation. The Ninth Circuit takes the words should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony and reads into the statute the requirements of notice and an opportunity to produce or explain the absence of corroborating evidence before a ruling is made. But these words simply do not appear in the statute. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (courts must ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)). We conclude that the passage is indeed ambiguous. Moreover, the test is not whether the Ninth Circuit's interpretation is plausible or better than the agency's, as Sun suggests. Pet. Br. at 21. Rather, the test is whether the statute is silent or ambiguous and if so, then whether 'the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,' which is to say, one that is 'reasonable,' not 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' Riverkeeper Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44). With respect to notice, we reject the Ninth Circuit's finding that its interpretation is required to avoid constitutional due process concerns. See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1092-93. As the BIA explained in Matter of L-A-C, applicants are ‐14‐ already on notice about the corroboration requirement because the instructions for the Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal (Form I-589) provide . . . notice to an applicant that he 'must submit reasonably available corroborative evidence' relating to both general country conditions and the specific facts upon which the claim is based, and that the applicant must provide an explanation if such evidence is not reasonably available. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 520. The Seventh Circuit has also observed that the REAL ID Act clearly states that corroborative evidence may be required, placing immigrants on notice of the consequences for failing to provide corroborative evidence. Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008). With respect to an opportunity to respond, the statute does not provide any indication that there must be a continuance so that the applicant can produce additional corroborating evidence. We thus conclude that the statute is ambiguous as to the procedure an IJ must follow when an applicant fails to provide corroborating evidence, and so we move to the second step in the Chevron analysis. Second, we determine that the agency's interpretation of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is reasonable and entitled to deference. As noted above, the BIA's interpretation of the REAL ID Act affords the same protection as this Court's pre-REAL ID Act case law regarding the corroboration requirement. ‐15‐ We explained in Liu v. Holder, a pre-REAL ID Act case, that when an IJ determines that the applicant failed to meet his burden of proof based on the failure to provide corroborating evidence, the IJ should perform the following analysis: (1) point to specific pieces of missing evidence and show that it was reasonably available, (2) give the applicant an opportunity to explain the omission, and (3) assess any explanation given. 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). We noted, however, that though we require an IJ to specify the points of testimony that require corroboration, we have not held that this must be done prior to the IJ's disposition of the alien's claim. Id. (emphasis in original). We reasoned that a factfinder may not be able to decide sufficiency of evidence until all the evidence has been presented and the IJ has had an opportunity to weigh the evidence and prepare an opinion. Id. Finally, the alien bears the ultimate burden of introducing such evidence without prompting from the IJ. Id. As such, it is reasonable not to require that applicants receive a second opportunity to present their case after the IJ identified the specific evidence they need to prevail. The IJ's analysis comported with these procedures. See Special App'x at 6-7 (identifying missing evidence and evaluating Sun's explanation). See also Matter of L-A-C, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 521-22 (describing how IJ should (1) identify evidence that should have been submitted, (2) give applicant opportunity to explain why he could not reasonably obtain evidence, and (3) use ‐16‐ her discretion in whether to grant continuance based on the explanation given). We therefore conclude that the BIA's interpretation of § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is reasonable and entitled to deference, and that the IJ followed an appropriate procedure. Accordingly, we reject Sun's argument that the agency erred in its interpretation of the statute.