Opinion ID: 215814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seniority Decision

Text: The former captains raise three areas of evidence to support their argument that the district court improperly found that there was insufficient evidence of causation on whether the seniority decision was retaliatory: (1) that state officials agreed to read the CBA language in contravention to what it says in an effort to punish the former captains; (2) that AFSCME officials' contact with a Blagojevich administration official and Curry's conversations with a CMS official suggest that defendants influenced the seniority decision; and (3) that the district court ignored the battle between AFSCME and ISEA over representing the captains. When IDOC eliminated the captain position, 64 former captains took correctional officer positions. AFSCME opposed giving seniority credit to the former captains for the time the former captains spent in the officer's RC-6 bargaining unit. AFSCME argued that the RC-6 CBA determined seniority based on their continuous length of service, even though the CBA does not include the word continuous in explaining the seniority calculation. The RC-6 CBA states (emphasis supplied): Seniority for RC-6 and 9 shall, for the purposes stated in this Agreement, consist of the length of service of an employee with their department in an AFSCME bargaining unit(s), except when a previously excluded position enters a bargaining unit pursuant to labor board procedures, seniority for an employee in that position shall consist of the employee's total length of service with their department. IDOC refused to change its plans so AFSCME filed a grievance that proceeded to CMS. CMS determined that the state's position was not viable. AFSCME and IDOC entered an agreement on November 18, 2003, that stipulated that the former captains demoted into the RC-6 unit would receive seniority based on their length of the continuous service ... beginning with their most recent return to the RC-6 AFSCME bargaining unit. The former captains allege that state and AFSCME officials agreed to read continuous into the CBA to harm them. Yet the agreement to read continuous into the CBA language was not so unreasonable as to suggest an attempt to harm the former captains. The language taken as a whole suggests that length of service essentially means continuous length of service because the same provision calculates another group of employees' seniority based on the employee's total length of service with their department. Without reading the term continuous into the first category, the term total in reference to the second category becomes redundant. The former captains also do not contest that the provision has been interpreted to read continuous length of service in previous situations. The AFSCME defendants also presented evidence that AFSCME proposed the provision to prevent non-bargaining unit employees moved back into the unit from receiving prior service credit. Previously, existing members were laid off because they accrued less total seniority than former management employees. Plaintiffs' only argument against this evidence is that the agreement's clear language contradicts this reading. The provision's alleged clarity aside, plaintiffs do not contest AFSCME's reasons for proposing the provision. That the provision governing the seniority calculation in the CU-500 bargaining unit (covering lieutenants) includes the phrase continuous does not control the reasonableness of the interpretation of the RC-6 CBA language. The CU-500 CBA states (emphasis supplied): Seniority shall, for the purpose of layoff and recall, be continuous service as currently defined and administered by the Rules of the Director of Central Management Services. Seniority for all other purposes shall be the continuous length of service in the affected employee's classification, except that employees employed in the CU-500 bargaining unit as of July 1, 1989, shall have his/her length of service prior to July 1, 1989, whether continuous or not, in his/her affected classification counted toward his/her seniority. The CU-500 CBA seniority calculation turns on the phrase continuous, while the RC-6 CBA seniority calculation turns on the phrase total. The RC-6 CBA determines seniority on whether the employee's length of service is either the employee's total length of service or simply the length of service of an employee. The CU-500 CBA determines seniority by either the length of service whether continuous or not or the continuous length of service. That two contracts use different words to delineate the seniority calculationand that CMS eventually agreed with an interpretation favoring AFSCMEdoes not provide sufficient evidence that reading the CBA language in AFSCME's favor was an effort to harm the former captains. The former captains cite a meeting AFSCME official (and appellee) Henry Bayer had with Blagojevich's chief of staff Alonzo Monk to discuss the seniority issue. Bayer testified that the issue was a very, very hot issue for us because these people were going to be coming into our bargaining unit and bringing in seniority, which might potentially enable them to bump one of our members who has weekends off. Bayer's deposition suggests that he met with Monk to protect the interests of existing AFSCME members. Nowhere does Bayer indicate that he met with Monk to punish the former captains. Bayer also testified that CMS chief counsel for labor relations Nancy Pittman made the decision on how to interpret the CBA and that he could not get Curry to change the administration's position on the seniority issue. The former captains point to Curry's acknowledgment that she spoke to Pittman about the grievance as evidence that CMS did not act independently. But nothing about Curry's testimony suggests that she influenced Pittman. Curry said she talked to Pittman about the grievance to get information about the case's progress and the ultimate decision. Curry testified that Pittman resolved the grievance on her own and on the merits of the case. The former captains argue that if CMS acted independently, Curry would have had no reason to talk to CMS. The former captains overstate a meeting's significance. As deputy chief of staff, Curry oversaw a review of Illinois agencies' organizational structures. Curry worked with IDOC personnel directors in 2003 to identify IDOC positions to eliminate and consolidate. There are many reasons for Curry to meet with Pittman but there is no evidence that Curry met with Pittman to influence her decision. The former captains only briefly mention their claim against the AFSCME officials. Because the former captains sued the AFSCME officials in their individual capacities, the former captains had to prove that the AFSCME officials were willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); accord Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (holding that a person could be a state actor because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials). AFSCME and ISEA's competition to represent the captains is not sufficient evidence that the AFSCME officials' communications with state officials regarding the seniority issue were retaliatory. The former captains argue that AFSCME went as far as to file intervention petitions seeking to represent the Captains demonstrating the history of the battle over who would represent the Captains. But the former captains do not cite evidence that a desire to harm the former captains motivated the AFSCME officials. The evidence indicates that AFSCME officials acted to protect existing members. The former captains' reply brief argues that a quid pro quo existed because AFSCME's financial support of Blagojevich's campaign meant that it wanted something in return. We can reasonably infer that AFSCME expected something in return for its campaign contributions, but that alone does not reasonably lead to the inference that what AFSCME officials wanted in return was retaliation against the former captains. The former captains allege that the AFSCME officials engaged in a conspiracy with the State Officials based on Bayer's communications with state officials and the resolution of the union grievance against the former captains. Communications with state officials and a complaint's resolution against the former captains but in favor of existing AFSCME members is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate a conspiracy. The former captains fail to cite any evidence suggesting that a desire to punish the former captains motivated the AFSCME officials' actions. The AFSCME officials' communications with state officials and the resolution of the grievance in AFSCME's favor certainly suggest that the AFSCME officials attempted to influence state officials, and perhaps their efforts caused the state officials to resolve the grievance in their favor. But that is where the reasonable inference ends. The former captains failed to show that a genuine dispute exists regarding the AFSCME officials' intent in influencing state officials. [2]