Opinion ID: 1368121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rational Relationship of the Statutory Classification to the Achievement of the Legislative Purpose.

Text: Appellant advances compelling reasons in support of its constitutional challenge to this statute. It argues that the functions performed by the jury system and public regulatory boards flow to the benefit of all of society and that neither it nor the class it represents receives any special benefit from these institutions. Absent a special benefit to this class of private employers, it contends, there is nothing in the nature of the employment relationship that would reasonably justify the legislature's decision to place on private employers the obligation to pay their employees for services and time they furnish to the State's public commissions and juries. Appellee, in justifying the law as a proper exercise of the State's police power, relies principally on the Supreme Court decision in Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 72 S.Ct. 405, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952), which upheld the constitutionality of a Missouri statute making it a misdemeanor for any employer to deduct wages from an employee who absented himself from his place of employment to vote. However, we do not find that this case resolves the compelling equal protection problems raised by the appellant. In the Day-Brite case the Missouri legislature had determined that employers as a class were using their power over their employees' wages to coerce them to vote as they directed. Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, supra at 421, 72 S.Ct. 405. In order to remedy this evil the statute prohibited employers from deducting wages while their employees absented themselves from work to vote. However, in the present case the purpose of HRS § 388-32 is not to prevent employer coercion of employees in the exercise of their franchise, but rather to ensure that those rendering services to the State receive adequate compensation. At issue is the reasonableness of the legislative decision as to who shall be called upon to pay this compensation. Those furnishing their services to juries and public boards and commissions are, in effect, part-time public employees; yet in seeking to increase their compensation the state legislature did not assess the general public through apportioned taxation. Instead it chose to make a class distinction, imposing the economic cost of remuneration solely on private employers. The State has not demonstrated any special benefit to private employers that would justify this class distinction. Absent such a showing there is no rational basis for singling out this one group from the general populace in seeking to achieve the legislative purpose of HRS § 388-32. The general public acting through its elected representatives has assumed the financial and administrative responsibility of having juries and public boards and commissions. These public functions, like the provision of police and fire protection, benefit all who live in the community. The cost of a proper state function conducted for the public benefit cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720 (1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194, 85 S.Ct. 871, 13 L.Ed.2d 753 (1965), reaff'd 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321 (1965). There is nothing in the position of private employers within our society which places them in a relationship to these public institutions different from the relationship of the general public to them. Therefore, we hold that by imposing liability for the cost of juries and public boards and commissions on private employers HRS § 388-32 works an invidious class distinction in violation of the equal protection clauses of both the Hawaii and Federal Constitutions. [6]