Opinion ID: 1685248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wallerman Stipulations

Text: [20] ¶ 100. The second issue for our review concerns Veach's assertion that his counsel should have stipulated to certain elements of the charges against him in order to preclude the State from introducing other acts evidence. In the stipulation, Veach would have conceded that: (1) Becky had not reached the age of 13; and (2) The touching of Becky's intimate parts, if it occurred, was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification. ¶ 101. This type of stipulationa Wallerman stipulationstems from State v. Wallerman, 203 Wis. 2d 158, 552 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1996). In Wallerman, a defendant charged with attempted homicide, attempted sexual assault, and armed burglary, for allegedly attacking a woman, raised as a defense that he was misidentifiedthat he was not the perpetrator. Id. at 160. ¶ 102. At trial, the state introduced other acts evidence of an uncharged incident four years earlier in the form of testimony from a woman who testified that Wallerman attacked her in much the same way. The court admitted the evidence on the issues of motive and intent. Id. at 162. ¶ 103. On appeal, Wallerman claimed that the court erred in admitting the evidence on issuesmotive and intentthat he did not dispute. Id. The state asserted that Wallerman had not offered a concession to motive or intent, so the state was required to prove both elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 162-63. ¶ 104. The court of appeals concluded that to concede an element a defendant had to express a clear and unequivocal intention to stipulate and the stipulation had to completely remove the issues from the case. Id. at 167. It determined that Wallerman had not done so, and affirmed his conviction. The court also stated: When the defendant is faced with other acts evidence but wishes to concede an element of the crime for which the evidence is being offered, the court needs to ensure that the record contains conclusive evidence which the jury may rely on to find guilt before it relieves the State of the duty to prove that element. Id. at 167. ¶ 105. The court set forth guidelines for such a stipulation: First, the trial court should carefully explore the breadth of the defendant's offer. The court needs to determine exactly what the defendant is conceding to. Next, the trial court needs to assess the State's evidence and determine whether the other acts evidence would still be necessary even with the defendant's concession. For example, the State's evidence may no longer be needed to prove those elements which the defendant is willing to concede, but it may nevertheless be relevant to the other elements of the crime that the defendant still contests. Third, the trial court should personally voir dire the lawyers and the defendant to ensure that they each understand the effects of the concession. The trial court needs to ensure that the defendant understands that the State will rely upon the concession to prove its case and will use it when arguing to the jury, and similarly, that the court will instruct the jury about the concession. As important, the defendant must know that he or she has waived the right to produce evidence and make arguments on the element. Fourth and finally, just like questions involving the admissibility of other acts evidence, these concessions or stipulations should be addressed pretrial if possible. Such practice will save resources for the State, which otherwise would have to seek out the factual details of the other acts evidence; for the defendant, who would have to prepare rebuttal; and for the trial court, which would have to gauge whether the evidence is admissible. Id. at 167-68 (citations and footnote omitted). ¶ 106. Two years later, the court of appeals decided State v. DeKeyser, 221 Wis. 2d 435, 585 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998), [11] a case in which a man allegedly sexually assaulted his granddaughter. The state introduced other acts evidence in the form of testimony from the man's other granddaughter that he had sexually assaulted her in a similar fashion. Id. at 441. Defense counsel did not offer a Wallerman stipulation, and the court admitted the evidence on the issues of intent, preparation or plan, and absence of mistake or accident. Id. ¶ 107. The defendant appealed, asserting that his defense was that the sexual assault never occurred, and that his defense counsel should have stipulated that the purpose of the alleged contact would have been sexual gratification and that the age of the victim was under sixteen. Id. at 441. The circuit court denied DeKeyser's postconviction motion, determining that: (1) DeKeyser would likely not have made a concession due to his adamant denial of the charges; (2) the court would not have accepted DeKeyser's proposed stipulation because the other acts evidence was necessary to prove the touching occurred; and (3) there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. Id. at 441-42. ¶ 108. The court of appeals reversed DeKeyser's conviction. Id. at 439. It determined that trial counsel was ineffective in not offering a Wallerman stipulation, to concede elements of a crime in order to avoid the introduction of other acts evidence. Id. at 443. The court stated explicitly that, While we do not hold that a trial court is without discretion to accept a Wallerman stipulation because that issue is not before us, a trial court erroneously exercises its discretion if it rejects such a stipulation based on an erroneous view of the law. [12] Id. at 443-44. The court disagreed with all the circuit court's reasons for rejecting a Wallerman stipulation, and concluded that trial counsel was deficient in not offering such a stipulation. Id. at 451. It then concluded that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant, and so constituted ineffective assistance. Id. at 452. The court cautioned that it did not hold that failure to offer a Wallerman stipulation would necessarily mean ineffective assistance: Counsel may decline to utilize such a stipulation for a variety of strategic reasons. Such a decision is not deficient performance. Further, the receipt of other acts evidence will not always be prejudicial to the defendant. The evidence of guilt may be adequate even without the other acts evidence or the other acts evidence may be of such a nature that it has little impact on the jury. In such cases the receipt of the other acts evidence, even if it could have been excluded by a stipulation, would not undermine our confidence in the verdict. Id. at 453-54. ¶ 109. In the present case, Veach brought a post-conviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h), basing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on DeKeyser, which was decided shortly after Veach's trial but before his postconviction motion hearing. At the post-conviction motion hearing, Veach's trial counsel testified that he did not know about Wallerman stipulations at the time of trial, and asserted that if he had known about them, he would have raised the issue with Veach. Trial counsel was uncertain whether he would have recommended that Veach enter into a stipulation, because of the conceptual problem of arguing both that he did not touch Becky, and that if he did touch her, it was for the purpose of sexual gratification. ¶ 110. Veach testified at the hearing that he did not know what a Wallerman stipulation was at the time of trial, but if he had known he would have stipulated that Becky was under age 13. He said he would not have been willing to stipulate that he touched Becky's vagina or buttocks, but would have stipulated that if he had touched them it would have been for the purpose of sexual gratification. ¶ 111. Judge Murach denied Veach's postconviction motion. He termed a Wallerman stipulation a hypothetical defense where a defendant makes both the affirmation and the negation of the same facts simultaneously, and deemed it extraordinarily cynical. The court distinguished this case from a situation where identity was not an issue, and determined that this was not a case where a stipulation would have been a proper resolution of the facts presented. The court concluded that it would not have accepted a Wallerman stipulation and that any error by trial counsel in not offering a stipulation was harmless. ¶ 112. Veach appealed, and the court of appeals reversed his conviction. Veach, 2001 WI App 143. The court determined that Wallerman stipulations are contrary to this court's decision in Davidson and Hammer, because those cases state that all elements of a crime are of consequence, regardless of whether those elements are disputed. Veach, 2001 WI App 143, ¶ 27. ¶ 113. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that pursuant to Davidson, a Wallerman stipulation to an element of the crime charged would not make inadmissible evidence that related to the stipulated element: [F]or purposes of the second step of the Sullivan analysis, consequential facts are determined with reference to the elements of the crime the State must prove and are not limited to the elements the defendant is challenging in his or her defense. We conclude this holding conflicts with our reasoning in DeKeyser that a defense based on a denial that the defendant was present limits the consequential facts for purposes of the second step of the Sullivan analysis. We must therefore follow Davidson, not DeKeyser, on this point. Id. ¶ 114. The court of appeals suggested that in this case trial counsel could not have precluded the admission of other acts evidence by offering a Wallerman stipulation. It nonetheless concluded that it was bound under DeKeyser to find that trial counsel's failure to offer a Wallerman stipulation constituted deficient performance. Id. at ¶ 42. It then found that Veach suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance, and reversed his conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49. ¶ 115. Judge Lundsten dissented, agreeing that DeKeyser was contrary to Davidson, but asserting that DeKeyser did not compel a finding of prejudice to Veach. Id. at ¶ 57. ¶ 116. Now, on appeal, the State urges this court to overrule Wallerman and DeKeyser, and to reject the idea that Wallerman stipulations operate to bar the admission of otherwise admissible other acts evidence. It argues that Wallerman stipulations are contrary to this court's decisions in Davidson, and Hammer, contrary to the greater latitude rule, contrary to the rule that other acts evidence is admissible to bolster the credibility of child sexual assault victims, and contrary to the rule that the state can prove its case as it sees fit. The State also asserts that conditional Wallerman stipulations, such as the one proposed in this case, are illogical because they result in a person claiming both to have done an act and not to have done the act. ¶ 117. By contrast, Veach contends that Wallerman stipulations are compatible with Davidson and Hammer. He asserts that they serve the purpose of keeping out propensity evidence. He argues that Wallerman stipulations are not illogical, that they tend to focus the evidence at trial onto the issues truly in question. [21] ¶ 118. We determine that to the extent Wallerman and DeKeyser imply that the state and the circuit court are obligated to accept Wallerman stipulations, those cases are incorrect and must be overruled. We conclude that requiring the state or the circuit court to accept a Wallerman stipulation is directly contrary to Wisconsin law as stated in Davidson and Hammer, and in the case of child sexual assaults, is also contrary to the greater latitude rule. While we do not hold that Wallerman stipulations are invalid per se, we do hold that, with the exception of stipulations to a defendant's status, the state and the court are not obligated to accept stipulations to elements of a crime even if the stipulations are offered in compliance with the four-part test set forth in Wallerman. ¶ 119. The first and most important reason for our rejection of Wallerman stipulations in cases such as this one is that a stipulation like the one offered by Veach supposes that a defendant can, by use of a Wallerman stipulation, concede to an element and make evidence relevant to that element inadmissible. Veach assumes in his argument is that both the state and the court must accept a Wallerman stipulation. The DeKeyser court declined to decide whether a court has discretion to refuse a Wallerman stipulation. DeKeyser, 221 Wis. 2d at 443-44. We address the issue here, and decide that a court may refuse such a stipulation. ¶ 120. The court of appeals in this case, both the majority and the dissent, determined that Veach's proposed stipulation to elements of the charge against him brings his proposed Wallerman stipulation into direct conflict with Davidson and Hammer. We agree. ¶ 121. In Davidson and Hammer, we made clear that the state must prove all elements of a crime, even elements the defendant does not dispute. Accordingly, evidence relevant to undisputed elements is admissible. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶ 65; Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶ 25. We stated in Davidson: As already discussed, the defendant's motive for touching [the victim] was an element of the charged crime, and the [previous] assault related to that consequential fact. Under our prior cases, the fact that the defendant denied sexually assaulting [the victim] does not change this conclusion. The state must prove all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the defendant does not dispute all of the elements. Evidence relevant to motive is therefore admissible, whether or not defendant disputes motive. ... [ See ] State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶ 25, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629 (If the state must prove an element of a crime, then evidence relevant to that element is admissible, even if a defendant does not dispute the element.) Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶ 65 (citations omitted). We cannot reconcile a Wallerman stipulation with the language in Davidson and Hammer, if the state and the court are obligated to accept the stipulation. [22] ¶ 122. We also conclude that a Wallerman stipulation in a child sexual assault case is directly contrary to the greater latitude rule for the admission of other acts evidence in child sexual assault cases. The purpose of a Wallerman stipulation in this caseinvolving an allegation of child sexual assaultis to preclude the admission of other acts evidence. The purpose of the greater latitude rule in cases involving allegations of child sexual assault is to  permit `a more liberal admission of other crimes evidence.' Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶ 44 (quoting Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 31) (emphasis added); Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶ 23. [23] ¶ 123. We do not mean to imply that Wallerman stipulations are per se invalid, even in child sexual assault cases. We simply conclude that the state and the court do not have to agree to Wallerman stipulations. ¶ 124. We note that under certain specific circumstances, stipulations to elements of crimes are valid, and acceptance of a properly offered stipulation is required. In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the Supreme Court held that when evidence of a prior conviction is necessary solely to prove the element of prior convictiona defendant's statusit is an abuse of discretion under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to refuse to grant a defendant's offer to concede the prior conviction. Id. The Court made extremely clear, however, that its holding applied only to a defendant's status, not to any element of the criminal act forming the basis for the current charge. Id. at 173. ¶ 125. The Court restated the familiar, standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it. Id. at 186-87. The Court concluded that, This is unquestionably true as a general matter. Id. at 187. The Court made extremely clear that acceptance of the stipulation of a criminal record is required only when the record of conviction would not be admissible for any purpose beyond proving status. Id. at 190. It specifically noted that the government is guaranteed the opportunity to seek admission of evidence if there is a justification for receiving evidence of the nature of prior acts on some issue other than status (i.e., to prove `motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident ....') Id. ¶ 126. In State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997), this court similarly found that a circuit court was required to accept a stipulation to a status element. In Alexander, a defendant attempted to stipulate that he had a certain number of prior convictions, suspensions or revocations for the purpose of counting prior offenses under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1). Id. at 633-34, 639-40. This court concluded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by instead admitting evidence on the element of prior offenses. Id. at 634. Citing Old Chief, we noted that the element of two or more prior convictions is a status element of the offense, which is completely `dependent on some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against [the defendant].' Id. at 644-45 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190). We further said, If evidence is admissible for some other reason, such as proving motive or intent, Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) regarding other crimes evidence guarantees the State the opportunity to seek its admission. Id. at 645 (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190). ¶ 127. Fundamental differences exist between the stipulations offered in Old Chief and Alexander and the stipulation Veach asserts he would have offered. The stipulations in Old Chief and Alexander related solely to the defendant's status, were unconditional, and were absolutely dispositive of the stipulated element. The stipulation offered by Veach was to an element of the criminal act he allegedly committed, was conditional, and was not sufficiently broad and clear to remove the issue from the case. ¶ 128. In Old Chief and Alexander, the defendants' stipulations were essentially I agree that I have one prior felony conviction, and I agree that I have two prior convictions. In other words, the defendants agreed to admit to a status element of the crimes. ¶ 129. By contrast, the stipulation that Veach in retrospect would have offered was conditional. Veach did not offer to stipulate that the touching of Becky's vagina and buttocks was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification. He offered only to stipulate that The touching of Becky's intimate parts, if it occurred, was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification. ¶ 130. The stipulation proposed by Veach was also to elements of the offense that were directly in issue. He wished to stipulate away evidence relating to whether he committed the prohibited acts that made up the crime with which he was charged. This is precisely what Old Chief and Alexander prohibit. Pursuant to Davidson and Hammer, it makes no difference that the evidence in question is other acts evidence. ¶ 131. Additionally, we think the stipulation proposed by the defendant is simply inadequate to inform the jury of what is agreed to and what is in dispute, and to remove the issues from the case. ¶ 132. The stipulation that Veach says he would have offered would reference Wis JICriminal 162 (1996). It would have said: The district attorney and the attorney for the defendant have stipulated or agreed to the existence of certain facts, and you must accept these facts as conclusively proved. ¶ 133. Veach asserts that the agreed facts would have been that, the touching of [Becky's] intimate part, if it occurred, was intentional and for the purpose of sexual gratification. The stipulation proposed by Veach would not properly inform the jury that accident or mistake, two issues which the facts of this case obviously touched upon, were subject to the stipulation.