Opinion ID: 294996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the alleged miranda violation

Text: 9 Relator claims that he is entitled to a new trial because of the admission in evidence of a statement made by him in the course of juvenile proceedings, in the absence of counsel, without a waiver of counsel joined in by the parents of the appellant. 20 This statement makes out a claim of a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination under Miranda v. Arizona, 21 but such claim was not considered by the district court because it held that relator had not exhausted his state remedies with regard to his contentions concerning his confession. 22 The failure to take a direct appeal from the February 12, 1967, judgment of conviction and sentence may have amounted to a waiver of relator's right to raise this alleged Miranda violation. However, the Commonwealth neither made this contention in its answer to paragraph 11, subsection D, of the Petition (see note 21 above) nor is there any indication that this matter was argued before or presented in briefs to the district court. The district court will have the opportunity to determine whether relator has waived the right to raise such possible denial of constitutional rights under the federal standards referred to above, at page 9, at the hearing held pursuant to Part I of this opinion, if such issue is presented to it. 23 In the event the district court finds there has been such a waiver, relator's Miranda claim will be dismissed. However, if the district court finds there has been no waiver, the Commonwealth's contention that relator did not exhaust his state remedies on this issue must be considered. We find that relator's Miranda claim was raised in the second petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act when relator checked the box next to the statement indicating that his conviction resulted from the introduction into evidence of a statement obtained in the absence of counsel at a time when representation is constitutionally required. Also, both counsel covered this point in their briefs submitted to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Not only did question D of the Statement of Questions Involved raise this issue, but also this sentence was included at page 12 of the relator's brief: 10 The record is certainly not clear that he was sufficiently informed that he was entitled to counsel and doubly certain that he was never told that such counsel would be furnished without cost if he could not afford it [citing authorities]   . 24 11 It is true that the criminal court did not consider this claim. 25 Moreover, the Superior Court did not mention this issue in its opinion. Commonwealth v. Turner, 214 Pa.Super. 48, 251 A.2d 684 (1969). Likewise, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which denied allocatur, did not decide the allegation on its merits. However, it is sufficient for exhaustion purposes that the relator has presented the claim to the highest state court. 26 It is not necessary that the highest state court decide the claim on its merits. 27 Here the phrase next to the checked box delineated the issue in narrow and specific enough terms to alert the courts to the possible violation of Miranda. All of the relevant facts were in the record. 28 Since the petition was drafted by relator, this court's statement that pro se petitions may be inartfully drawn and therefore should be read `with a measure of tolerance' is applicable. 29 Furthermore, relator's counsel, who represented him for purposes of the remainder of the proceedings in the trial courts, amplified the points in his Superior Court brief as noted above. Finally, the fact that the district court has undertaken to find a waiver of the Kent claims without remitting relator to the state courts on that issue is a factor to be considered in evaluating exhaustion of state remedies. Cf. United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 411 F.2d 216, 219 (3d Cir. 1969). 12 After considering all of these facts, 30 we hold that relator has exhausted his state remedies. We do not find it necessary to remand for a hearing on the issue of whether relator was advised of his rights to free counsel, because we think the record clearly illustrates that he was not given this warning. 31 The opinion of the Supreme Court in Miranda clearly holds that a suspect must be informed that an attorney will be provided if he is financially unable to obtain one. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see note 21, supra. United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1969); Green v. United States, 411 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1969). While a suspect may waive this right, courts have held that ignorance cannot constitute a knowing and conscious waiver of a constitutionally protected right. 32 13 Therefore, if it is determined that the certification order was proper, the writ must issue unless, within a reasonable time, a new trial is granted relator in the Delaware County Criminal Court, because of the improper admission into evidence of a confession taken from relator when he was without counsel, at a time when he had a constitutional right to appointed counsel and there was no waiver of that right. 14 The November 12, 1969, order of the district court will be vacated and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.