Opinion ID: 303597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 5 In passing upon a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Curley v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 389, 392, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (1947). Thus, the test for sufficiency of evidence is not whether a reasonable doubt was possible, but rather whether a finding of no reasonable doubt was possible. United States v. Harris, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 284, 435 F.2d 74, 88 (1970) (emphasis in original). The raison d'etre of the rule is to prevent the jury from operating beyond its province by engaging in conjecture and speculation. As Judge Prettyman has explained: Guilt, according to a basic principle in our jurisprudence, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. And, unless that result is possible on the evidence, the judge must not let the jury act; he must not let it act on what would necessarily be only surmise and conjecture, without evidence. Cooper v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 346, 218 F.2d 39, 42 (1954). Nevertheless, [f]requently guilty knowledge is incapable of direct proof and is established, if at all, by circumstantial evidence. Anderson v. United States, 406 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1969). In viewing the evidence, however, the judge must assume the truth of the Government's evidence and give the Government the benefit of all legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom. Curley v. United States, supra, 81 U.S.App.D.C. at 392, 160 F.2d at 232. See Powell v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 257, 418 F.2d 470, 473 (1969); Crawford v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 158, 375 F.2d 332, 334 (1967).
6 A review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, does not conclusively establish that appellant Cephas was an active perpetrator of the offense. The victim, Mrs. Jackson, despite an illuminated five or six minute view of her assailants was unable to identify Cephas or McCall at trial or at a police lineup held a few days after the robbery. Indeed, at the lineup she selected two other men as her assailants. 11 Furthermore, her description of Cephas can only be denominated inconclusive at best, a mirage at worst. She described him as about five feet five and [as] wearing rather light pants, an approximately light shirt and a lumber jacket, described later by her as a light jacket. 12 Cephas, who is five feet eight inches tall, was, according to a police photograph, clad in a dark blue sport coat and white turtle neck sweater. 7 Despite the inconclusive identification of Cephas, his conviction may still rest upon the premise that he is an aider and abettor. 13 In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant 'in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.' Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949). See United States v. Lumpkin, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 448 F.2d 1085 (1971); Thompson v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 405 F.2d 1106 (1968); Long v. United States, 124 U. S.App.D.C. 14, 360 F.2d 829 (1966). As we indicated in Bailey (John) v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 98, 416 F. 2d 1110, 1113 (1969), [a] sine qua non of aiding and abetting . . . is guilty participation by the accused; and as the court recognized in White v. United States, 366 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1966), [a]iding and abetting implies guilty knowledge. 8 To overcome the victim's failure to conclusively identify Cephas, the Government must rely upon the inference arising from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property. Pendergrast v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 20, 416 F.2d 776 (1969). However, a prerequisite to the application of the inference is a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was in possession of the property. United States v. Coggins, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 134, 433 F.2d 1357 (1970). Although the requisite possession has been denominated exclusive it 9 is no more than judicial shorthand for the underlying concept that the accused must bear a distinctive relationship to the property before the inference is allowed. . . . 10