Opinion ID: 1822370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Systematic Exclusion of Jurors

Text: The jury selection process took several days and involved four separate jury venires. During voir dire, the following transpired: THE COURT: Montgomery. [STATE]: Peremptory by the State, Judge. MR. KERSHAW: I would like the record to reflect Mr. Montgomery is black. THE COURT: Lapsley. [STATE]: Peremptory by the State. MR. KERSHAW: I would like the record to reflect that Mr. Lapsley is also a black American. ... . THE COURT: Norwood. ... . [STATE]: We will excuse peremptory. MR. KERSHAW: Let the record reflect that Mr. Norwood is also a black American. ... . THE COURT: Blue. [STATE]: Peremptory challenge by the State. MR. KERSHAW: Let the record reflect that Ms. Blue is a black American. ... . [STATE]: And let the record reflect that since it has never been stated before, that none of the defendants are black Americans. ... . [STATE]: State would excuse peremptorily Ms. McGee from the first panel. MR. KERSHAW: Let the record reflect that McGee is black... . I ask at this time the Court to have a Neil inquiry as to why the State has chosen to excuse his five peremptory challenges, five out of the seven peremptory challenges towards blacks. THE COURT: All right. Denied. As noted above, the state exercised five of its first seven peremptory challenges to excuse black jurors, and the trial judge summarily denied the requests for a Neil inquiry. The parties eventually selected six black and six white jurors after the state had exercised sixteen peremptory challenges, seven of which were against black persons. The critical issue is whether the state's peremptory challenges required a Neil inquiry. In Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1989), we stated: [I]n Slappy we expressly reaffirmed the test established in Neil. Under that test, parties alleging that group bias is the reason for the excusal of any distinct class of persons from a venire must (a) make a timely objection, (b) demonstrate on the record that the challenged members are part of that group, and (c) show that there is a strong likelihood these persons have been challenged because of impermissible bias. Neil, 457 So.2d at 486. In Slappy, we extended the principles of Neil by holding that broad leeway must be accorded to the objecting party, and that any doubts as to the existence of a likelihood of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party's favor. Slappy, 522 So.2d at 21-22. Whenever this burden of persuasion has been met, the burden of proof then rests upon the state to demonstrate that the proffered reasons are, first, neutral and reasonable and, second, not a pretext. Id. at 22. Id. at 200 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). We find that this record demonstrates that the appellants satisfied their burden. They timely objected, demonstrated that the challenged jurors were black, and established a likelihood that the peremptory challenges resulted from impermissible bias, specifically, that the state exercised five of its first seven peremptory excusals against black persons. We note, as we did in Slappy, that the likelihood of impermissible bias must be resolved in the objecting party's favor. 522 So.2d at 22. The state initially asserted that these four white appellants had no standing to challenge any systematic exclusion of blacks. We recently rejected this contention in Kibler v. State, 546 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1989), in which we held that the objecting party does not have to be a member of the race being challenged to have standing. In doing so, we based our decision on article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, stating: The right of an accused to an impartial jury cannot be fully guaranteed when the peremptory challenge is used to purposefully exclude members of a cognizable racial group, regardless of the race of the defendant. Id. at 712. We recognized in Kibler that juries are not required to mirror the community in a manner that reflects the racial composition of the community: Parties are only constitutionally entitled to the assurance that peremptory challenges will not be exercised so as to exclude members of discrete racial groups solely by virtue of their affiliation. Id. at 713. While Kibler is controlling, we acknowledge the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Holland v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990). Although the United States Supreme Court held that a white defendant had no sixth amendment right to challenge the exclusion of prospective black jurors, five justices [3] agreed that a white defendant has standing to raise a fourteenth amendment claim of racial bias. Although the state proffered no reasons to justify its actions to the trial court, it now contends that the record shows reasons which were neutral and reasonable and not a pretext. By making this argument, the state is asking this Court to review the bare record and make a determination without the benefit of an inquiry and an independent evaluation by the trial judge. The purpose of a trial judge's Neil inquiry is to (1) obtain additional information about the challenge from the challenging counsel and (2) permit the trial judge to evaluate all of the information that he heard during voir dire with the reasons given by challenging counsel. This process was established to assure that trial counsel gives his or her reasoning at or near the time the challenges are made and to permit the trial judge to evaluate those reasons in light of the jurors' responses to determine whether the reasons are neutral and reasonable and not a pretext. The state argues that the fact that the actual jury contained six black persons establishes that the prosecution did not exclude persons because of race. In Slappy, we quoted the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 836 F.2d 1312, cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265, 109 S.Ct. 28, 101 L.Ed.2d 979 (1988), stating: `[T]he striking of a single black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when there are valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.' Slappy, 522 So.2d at 21. While the responses of some of the challenged black jurors during voir dire appear to indicate valid bases for challenges, it would be impossible for this Court to make that evaluation for each of the black jurors challenged. We conclude that an evaluation by the trial judge was required in this cause.