Opinion ID: 2602478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Analysis of Probable Cause Determination

Text: As the character of judicial review of this probable cause determination ordinarily depends on whether the superior court exercised [its] power to render findings of fact ( Slaughter, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 638, 200 Cal.Rptr. 448, 677 P.2d 854), we begin with a review of the superior court's probable cause ruling to determine whether it did, in fact, make any conclusive factual findings to support its probable cause determination. In this case, the superior court properly exercised its adjudicatory functions to render the findings of fact that the opinions of the district attorney's experts lacked persuasiveness. The superior court found Glen to lack persuasiveness because she relied solely on the Static-99 test. The superior court also found Vognsen's testimony to be unpersuasive because he demonstrated a lack of command of the statistical information and relied almost completely on the Static-99 test. The Court of Appeal concluded that the superior court erred in this case by rejecting the testimony of Vognsen. The Court of Appeal majority determined that the superior court improperly excluded the results of the Static-99 test for purposes of Vognsen's testimony under the Kelly standard for admissibility of new scientific evidence. (See People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240.) According to the Court of Appeal, the superior court erroneously ruled that a risk of reoffense derived from an actuarial instrument could not be used as the basis of an expert opinion. Our review of the record persuades us that the superior court did not, in fact, expressly purport to exclude such evidence; nor did it do so impliedly. Indeed, although it was critical of the reliability of the Static-99 test as a predictive toolat least when used on its own, without adjustment by the use of clinical factorsit entertained testimony by all of the experts concerning the Static-99 test. Thus we conclude that the superior court made a proper factual finding as to the persuasiveness of both Glen and Vognsen based, in part, on their overreliance on this statistical instrument. The court also made the factual finding that the testimony given by Marentez's witnesses was more credible and persuasive than that given by the district attorney's experts. The court expressly noted that Anderson's judgment was partially validated by the psychological testing, and that given his vast clinical and research experience, his testimony was well thought out and considered when compared to the district attorney's two experts. The superior court also found the testimony of Marentez's other witness, Vicary, to be persuasive. Based on these factual findings, the court concluded that there was no reasonable or probable cause, and dismissed the petition. Ordinarily, we would simply review the superior court's factual findings for substantial evidence in order to determine whether to uphold the court's probable cause determination. ( Slaughter, supra 35 Cal.3d at p. 638, 200 Cal.Rptr. 448, 677 P.2d 854.) Our review is made more complicated, however, by the fact that although the superior court's findings of credibility are supported by the evidence, the superior court's determination was based on the improper definition of the word likely in the context of the phrase likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon ... release as stated in section 6602, subdivision (a) (italics added). In announcing its ruling, the court stated that it did not believe that the evidence supports a reasonable belief that Mr. Marentez is more likely than not to reoffend in a sexually violent manner. (Italics added.) Furthermore, the court did not reach the issue of whether there was probable cause to believe that violent criminal behavior in the future would be predatory in nature, as that term is defined in section 6600, subdivision (e). [16] Moreover, not only did the superior court's actual ruling apply the wrong likely standard, but all the expert evidence introduced by both parties rested the assumption that the determination to be made was whether Marentez was more likely than not to reoffend. None of the experts was ever asked to consider the definition of likely that we conclude applies in the context of a probable cause hearingwhether there is a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, that Marentez is likely to reoffend. Nor did they consider whether their statistical predictions or clinical judgment would be altered by Marentez's amenability to voluntary treatment were he to be released. Finally, none of the experts testified as to whether they believed Marentez was likely to commit sexually predatory criminal acts in the futurea requirement that might also affect their statistical predictions and clinical judgment. In essence, therefore, the probable cause hearing can be characterized as a battle of experts, some more credible than others, but all failing to consider all of the required elements, and all applying the wrong definition of the only element in dispute. We conclude, therefore, that the entire proceeding was infected with error. While we could undertake an independent review of the record and make our own determinations as to the existence of the SVP elements, such an inquiry would necessarily require some speculation in an area of highly specialized expert testimony. We note that superior court characterized its ruling as a close case based on the more-likely-than-not standarda standard higher than that which we hold is applicable at the probable cause hearing. Indeed, Marentez's experts highlighted several factors that indicate there is some risk that Marentez will reoffend. In fact, one of Marentez's experts, Vicary, stated at the probable cause hearing that Marentez will always represent a significant risk of sexually reoffending. When making this statement, however, Vicary was not applying the standard that we articulate today. Given the considerable reliance by most of the experts on complex statistical predictors, we do not believe it wise to extrapolate from this evidence that that there is probable cause to believe that Marentez would pose a substantial danger or serious well-founded risk of sexually predatory criminal behavior upon release. It is also unclear from the record whether there is probable cause to believe Marentez is likely to commit predatory offenses in the future. Anderson, Marentez's expert, did suggest that Marentez was a situational offender, but none of the experts specifically addressed the predatory element. The record suggests that Marentez's offenses may have been related to his substance abuse, and thus it is unclear whether his history of past offenses necessarily establishes a clear pattern of predatory over situational or improper familial sexual conduct. (Cf. Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1194, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116 [All three victims were strangers to defendant, which means that defendant's acts were `predatory acts' as defined in section 6600, subdivision (e).].) Because of the incorrect application of the correct definition of likely by both parties and the trial court, and because the parties did not address whether Marentez's future sexual violence would be predatory in nature, we believe that an independent review of the record by this court would be improper, and that remand to the superior court is appropriate. (See Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 895, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949.)