Opinion ID: 2745630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Barbour v. Gunn

Text: 14 ¶30. McDaniel argues that the Court’s decision in Barbour v. Gunn, 890 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 2004), overruled Kellum. Cochran counters that Barbour did not address the time to file an election contest and thus is inapplicable. ¶31. In Barbour, Jep Barbour and Phillip Gunn sought the Republican nomination for District 56 of the Mississippi House of Representatives. Id. at 844. The primary election was held on August 5, 2003. Id. Barbour was declared the winner. Id. Under Section 23-15-923, Gunn filed an election contest on September 8, 2003 – thirty-four days after the primary. Id. The SREC retained jurisdiction and set a hearing date for October. Id. at 845. Gunn, however, chose to file a petition for judicial review. Id. The judge ruled in favor of Gunn and ordered a new election in two precincts. Id. Barbour appealed. Id. ¶32. The Court addressed whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider Gunn’s petition when he did not allow the SREC a reasonable opportunity to act upon the petition. Id. at 846. The question as to whether Gunn timely filed his petition was not addressed. Ultimately, the Court determined that, because the SREC expressed doubt as to whether it could decide the issue before the general election, Section 23-15-927 allowed Gunn to seek judicial review. Id. at 847. ¶33. McDaniel states that, prior to a review on the merits, the Court is required to determine whether it has jurisdiction of a case. McDaniel argues that, as a result, the Barbour Court considered whether Gunn filed his petition timely and, by exercising jurisdiction, the Court determined that the petition was timely. Id. at 39-41. McDaniel cites Drummond v. State, 184 Miss. 738, 185 So. 207 (1938), in support: It has been argued that inasmuch as the high court did not mention the subject 15 of its jurisdiction, or the question of the direct appeal, it may be considered that it did not pass upon that question. The authorities above cited are distinctly contrary to any such argument, for the court was bound to pass upon the question, as already shown. Therefore, instead of assuming that it did not pass upon the question -- which assumption would be that it was oblivious of its duties in the premises -- we must rather assume that it considered the question so plain, that the validity of the statute in that respect was so obvious, that it required no discussion of the point. . . it is the duty of an appellate court to inquire of its own motion, even though the question is not raised by the parties, whether the appellate court has jurisdiction. Id. at 209-210. Hence, McDaniel believes that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in Barbour overruled Kellum. ¶34. Cochran counters that the parties in Barbour did not raise whether the candidate timely filed his election contest and, thus, Barbour’s silence on the issue did not overrule Kellum. In Foster v. Harden, 536 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1988), the Court affirmed a trial court’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an election contest regarding a candidate’s residency despite the fact that the Court had decided the issue differently in a previous case. The Court noted that, in the earlier decision, the parties did not raise and the Court did not address jurisdiction. Id. (citing Gadd v. Thompson, 517 So. 2d 576 (Miss. 1987)). Cochran argues that, like the Foster court, the Court should not treat Barbour’s silence as overruling Kellum, stating that “[t]his Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio.” U.S. v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38, 73 S. Ct. 67, 97 L. Ed. 54 (1952). ¶35. Barbour addressed a different jurisdictional argument. The parties did not raise whether Gunn’s petition was filed timely, and we will not imply that the Court reached the question. We find that, because Barbour did not address the time to file, Barbour did not 16 overrule Kellum’s explicit holding.