Opinion ID: 2058115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Central Falls School District

Text: Before this Court, Central Falls assigns error to the denial of its motion for summary judgment by a Superior Court hearing justice and to several rulings of the trial justice. Because we are satisfied that summary judgment should have been granted in this case, it is unnecessary for us to address those additional contentions. The school district argues that the trial justice erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on the basis of the coaches' immunity. Central Falls contends that the immunity provision set forth in § 9-1-48, which shields its coaches from tort claims, also precludes plaintiff's derivative claim against the coaches' employer. The school district argues that plaintiff's claim is based solely on a theory of vicarious liability and, because the soccer coaches are immune from liability, there can be no derivative claim against the school district. When reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard as the hearing justice. Ensey v. Culhane, 727 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I.1999). In performing that function, we review the pleadings, affidavits    and other [relevant documents] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and proceed to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (quoting Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I. 1994)). The burden of establishing an issue of fact rests with the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and that party may not rely on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions. Taylor v. Mass. Flora Realty, Inc., 840 A.2d 1126, 1129 (R.I.2004) (quoting United Lending Corp. v. City of Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 631 (R.I.2003)). To support its argument that the immunity of its soccer coaches bars the plaintiff's claim against the school district, Central Falls points to DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40 (R.I.1992), in which we analyzed a different immunity statute, G.L.1956 § 28-29-20, [5] the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. In DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 41, the operator of a motor vehicle negligently injured the plaintiff passenger. The plaintiff sued the vehicle operator, as well as the vehicle's owner, invoking the theory of vicarious liability. Id. at 42. This Court held that because the operator of the vehicle was immune from suit pursuant to the exclusivity provision, there could be no cause of action against the vehicle's owner. Id. at 43. The Court held that an owner-lessor is not a tortfeasor except by way of the legal fiction of vicarious liability. Id.; see also DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co., 882 A.2d 561, 564-65 (R.I.2005). In this case, we are confronted with a similar set of facts: the coaches of the Central Falls soccer team, the alleged negligent actors, are immune from suit pursuant to § 9-1-48, yet plaintiff's claim against their employer, the school district wholly rests on a claim of respondeat superior. Based on our holding in DiQuinzio, plaintiff may not look to the Central Falls School District for damages arising from the coaches' negligence. The plaintiff asserts that a principal may be liable despite the immunity of its agent. For this proposition, plaintiff chiefly relies on Trotti v. Piacente, 99 R.I. 167, 206 A.2d 462 (1965), in which this Court held that a principal `has no defense because of the fact that    the agent had an immunity from civil liability   .' Id. at 170, 206 A.2d at 464 (quoting Restatement of Agency 2d § 217(b)(ii) at 469). According to plaintiff, this is the rule in a majority of jurisdictions and should control the result in this case. However, our holding in Trotti was based on the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity, [6] rather than statutory immunity and was decided by this Court in 1965, before the Legislature abrogated the sovereign immunity of the state and its municipalities. In Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 625-29, 390 A.2d 350, 353-55 (1978), we examined the historical development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its demise. Although sovereign immunity has been abolished, there remains a [r]ecognition that there is a zone of governmental operation which should be insulated from tort claims, even in the absence of sovereign immunity. Id., at 629, 390 A.2d at 355. This limited protection from liability is accomplished through legislative enactments granting immunity in certain instances or by this Court, pursuant to the public-duty doctrine. Id.; see, e.g., Houle v. Galloway School Lines, Inc., 643 A.2d 822, 827 (R.I. 1994) (holding that public duty doctrine applied to design of school bus routes to shield municipality and its agents from liability because it was a governmental activity). It is the function of the Legislature to weigh the injured party's demand for justice against the state's equally valid claim to exercise certain powers for the good of all without burdensome encumbrances and disruptive forces. Calhoun, 120 R.I. at 628, 390 A.2d at 355. Section 9-1-48, and the immunity afforded athletic coaches and their assistants is a legislative enactment designed to ensure the continued vitality of interscholastic and intramural sports programs for the state's youth. Based on its determination that important societal interests are furthered by insulating coaches from liability, the General Assembly enacted § 9-1-48, providing for immunity from civil damages for acts or omissions in connection with service as a coach or manager in an organized sports program. Although § 9-1-48 does not contain an explicit provision limiting a municipality's tort liability, the same public policies that support a grant of immunity to a specific class of employee apply with equal force with respect to the employer, absent evidence of independent negligence by the principal. See DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 44 (principal is not immunized from suit based upon its independent act of negligence that contributed to plaintiff's injuries). The public policy that underlies § 9-1-48 is the fostering and encouraging of interscholastic sports programs throughout the state by relieving coaches, team managers, and assistants from exposure to liability. However, because plaintiff in this case was permitted to proceed to trial, the coaches were subjected to the very burden the statute seeks to avoid. Exposure of the school district to potential liability also ignores the primary goal of the statutethe promotion of interscholastic sports. In the case at bar, the burden of proof required plaintiff to establish the coaches' negligence; thus, the focus was on the acts or omissions of the coaches. Consequently, the coaches attended the proceedings, were required to testify, and sat through a trial in which their decisions were questioned and their credibility was scrutinized. In addition, if school districts across the state are subject to liability for the negligence of their coaches, participation in interscholastic athletics may be curtailed or eliminatedan occurrence the statute was intended to avoid. For these reasons, we are persuaded that if the agent is not liable for his conduct, the principal cannot be responsible. Calhoun, 120 R.I. at 630, 390 A.2d at 356. The plaintiff argues that there was independent negligence by Central Falls apart from the personal negligence of the coaches that supported the judgment in this case. In an amended complaint, plaintiff alleged negligence in the operation, control, supervision, management, administration, guidance, direction, and conduct of the Central Falls High School soccer team. In Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District, 755 A.2d 153, 155-56 (R.I. 2000), this Court held that the public duty doctrine did not shield a school district from liability arising from an injury suffered during a cheerleading practice because the injured student was an identifiable person to whom the school district owed a special duty of care. Therefore, the public duty doctrine did not immunize the school district from liability for injuries suffered from a risky cheerleading maneuver. [7] By contrast, however, the case at bar was submitted to the jury based solely on the asserted negligence of the coaches and the vicarious liability of the school district. The plaintiff did not appeal from the judgment entered with respect to her claim against Central Falls based on its own alleged negligence. Thus, the issue of whether Central Falls was independently negligent is not properly before the Court because plaintiff has not appealed from the judgment that was entered with respect to that claim against Central Falls. This issue is deemed waived for purposes of appellate review. [8] See Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England, Inc. v. Rossi, 847 A.2d 286, 293 (R.I.2004) (It is well established that a `litigant must make a timely and appropriate objection during the lower court proceedings before this Court will hear the issue on appeal.'). For the reasons stated herein, the plaintiff's claim against Central Falls is barred pursuant to § 9-1-48, and the judgment against that defendant is vacated. It is therefore, unnecessary for this Court to reach the school district's remaining arguments.