Opinion ID: 1944931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mitigation and Proportionality

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to find several mitigators and in assigning the weight of mitigators. He also claims that the death sentence is not proportional. We address each claim in turn.
Rodgers argues that the trial court erred in failing to find three statutory mitigators about which Dr. Mings testified: (1) Rodgers was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) Rodgers's impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct; and (3) Rodgers's mental age at the time of the crime. On such questions of fact, we affirm a trial court's findings when they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla.1997). As to the first factor, the trial court did not find that Rodgers was suffering an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. In rejecting the statutory mitigator, the court concluded that the record [wa]s totally devoid of any evidence of extreme emotional or mental disturbance which would be `more than the emotions of an average man, however inflamed' as required by [ State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973)]. Rodgers and all the other witnesses testified that after Rodgers confronted his wife in the morning, he put in a full day's work and interacted normally with people who knew him. [7] He also telephoned Verna Fudge, a longtime friend and minister who frequently counseled him on his marital and other problems and with whom he previously had discussed his belief that Teresa was having an affair with her ex-husband. Rodgers told her he was leaving his wife and asked Fudge for help finding a place to stay. [8] Further, Rodgers testified that hours later he went to the daycare to talk to his wife. He said that she surprised him when, without any provocation, she shot at him, and that she was killed in the ensuing struggle. As the trial court noted, Rodgers had ample time for reflection before telling Corbett late in the day that he intended to kill his wife and then going to the daycare to do so. Even the defense's mental health expert testified that Rodgers knew the difference between right and wrong, a fact supported by Rodgers's later decision to commit suicide because he did not want to go back to prison. We conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's rejection of this mitigating factor. The trial court's rejection of Rodgers's claim that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired is supported by the same evidence. After a day of behaving reasonably and responding normally in a variety of situations, Rodgers announced his intention to kill his wife in advance of going to the daycare, bragged about it afterward, and attempted to kill himself to avoid going to prison. Further, he testified that although he was upset, he was not angry with his wife, and claimed the killing occurred in self-defense. [9] We find that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's rejection of this factor as well. Finally, in rejecting the claim that Rodgers's mental age constituted a mitigating factor, the trial court noted there was no link between the defendant's age and the crime, such as immaturity. We agree. The evidence showed that although Rodgers had little formal education, he functioned normally in his relationships with others and in his work, including running his own business. Accordingly, competent, substantial evidence supports the court's decision. Next, Rodgers claims generally that the court should have afforded more weight to the mitigation found. We review a trial court's assignment of weight to mitigation under an abuse of discretion standard. See Blanco, 706 So.2d at 10 (stating standard of review is abuse of discretion). Thus, we defer to the trial court's determination unless it is unreasonable or arbitrarythat is, unless no reasonable person would have assigned the weight the trial court did. Perez v. State, 919 So.2d 347, 372, 376 (Fla.2005), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 126 S.Ct. 2369, 165 L.Ed.2d 285 (2006); Elledge v. State, 706 So.2d 1340, 1347 (Fla.1997). We hold that Rodgers has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion.
Even if Rodgers had not raised the issue, this Court is obligated to review each death sentence to determine whether it is proportional to other cases. See Floyd v. State, 913 So.2d 564, 578 (Fla.2005); Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990). [W]e make a comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the sentence. Anderson v. State, 841 So.2d 390, 407-08 (Fla.2003) (citation omitted). In this case, the trial court found one aggravating factorprior violent felony convictionthat it afforded extremely great weight. This aggravator was supported by Rodgers's 1963 robbery conviction and his 1979 manslaughter conviction, stemming from killing his girlfriend. The court found a single statutory mitigating factorany other factor in the defendant's backgroundand assigned it very, very, little weight. [10] The trial court also found the following nonstatutory mitigation and ascribed the weight indicated: borderline mental retardation (some weight); abandoned by his father (little weight); low bonding to school and no school transportation (very, very little weight); generous and kind to others (very little weight); and had love for and the support of his siblings (very, very little weight). The trial court concluded that none of the mitigation suggests that the ultimate sanction is disproportionate for someone who has killed two women during his lifetime. In conducting proportionality review, we have stated that in the absence of demonstrated legal error, we accept the trial court's findings on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and consider the totality of the circumstances of the case in comparing it to other capital cases. Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1134 (Fla. 2000). Having found the trial court's rejection of mitigating factors to be supported by competent, substantial evidence and that the court did not abuse its discretion in assigning the weight of the aggravating and mitigating factors, we do not, as the dissent does, consider in our analysis those factors the trial court rejected or afford them weight. Accordingly, we emphasize that the trial court expressly rejected these statutory mitigators: extreme mental or emotional disturbance, impaired capacity to conform to the requirements of law, the defendant's mental age, and extreme duress. Further, although the trial court did find that Rodgers's intellectual functioning fell in the borderline range, it concluded this fact did not play a role in the murder and afforded the factor only some weight. Thus, as recited above, the mitigation is insubstantial, making this one of the least mitigated cases. We have stated that generally a death sentence is not proportionate when supported by a single aggravator and the mitigation is substantial. Almeida v. State, 748 So.2d 922, 933 (Fla.1999); Jones v. State, 705 So.2d 1364, 1367 (Fla.1998) (noting that death is not indicated in a single-aggravator case where there is substantial mitigation). On the other hand, when the mitigation is not substantial, we have found death sentences to be proportional even when there is but a single aggravator. See Almeida, 748 So.2d at 933 (noting that this Court has affirmed the death penalty in single-aggravator cases where a prior murder was involved). Further, in determining proportionality, we evaluate domestic situations in the same manner as other cases. Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 833 (Fla.2003). Thus, there is no per se `domestic dispute' exception to imposition of the death penalty. Id. (quoting Pooler v. State, 704 So.2d 1375, 1381 (1997)); see Spencer v. State, 691 So.2d 1062, 1065 (Fla.1997). Nor is there a domestic dispute exception for single aggravator cases. In Butler, the defendant, apparently jealous of his former girlfriend's new relationship with another man, sneaked into her apartment as she slept, carried their six-year-old child into another room, and then repeatedly stabbed her mother until she died. The trial court found a single aggravatorthat the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC)and four nonstatutory mitigators. Butler, 842 So.2d at 833. Despite the domestic nature of the murder and the fact that a single aggravator was found, we held the death sentence to be proportionate. Id. at 834. Similarly, in Blackwood v. State, 777 So.2d 399, 412-13 (Fla.2000), we affirmed a death sentence where the defendant murdered his former girlfriend, who was pregnant with her new boyfriend's child. The trial court found one aggravator (HAC), one statutory mitigator (no significant criminal history) and eight nonstatutory mitigators. In this case, the trial court found a single aggravatorprior violent felony conviction. We have previously stated that this aggravator, like HAC, is one of the most weighty in Florida's sentencing calculus. Sireci v. Moore, 825 So.2d 882, 887 (Fla.2002). In fact, in determining proportionality in domestic dispute cases, we have ascribed particular importance to this factor when the prior conviction, as in this case, involved a similar violent offense. See Lemon v. State, 456 So.2d 885, 888 (Fla.1984) (affirming a death sentence for the murder of the defendant's girlfriend where the prior conviction was for assault with intent to kill a female victim, and likening the case to others involv[ing] defendants killing women with whom they had a relationship after a previous conviction for a similar violent offense); King v. State, 436 So.2d 50 (Fla.1983) (affirming a death sentence for the murder of a live-in girlfriend where the prior conviction was for the axe-slaying of the defendant's common-law wife); Harvard v. State, 414 So.2d 1032 (Fla.1982) (affirming a death sentence for the defendant's murder of his second ex-wife where the prior conviction was for aggravated assault arising from a shooting attack on his first ex-wife and her sister). In this case, Rodgers had two prior violent felony convictionsa robbery and his shooting and killing his girlfriend, the latter being a similar offenseand the trial court assigned the factor extremely great weight. Under the totality of the circumstances, we further find this case is comparable to Ferrell v. State, 680 So.2d 390 (Fla.1996), and Duncan v. State, 619 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1993). Ferrell shot his live-in girlfriend in the head during a heated argument, and immediately confessed to a neighbor. Ferrell, 680 So.2d at 391. The single aggravatorhis prior second-degree murder conviction for shooting and killing a woman during an argumentoutweighed the following mitigating factors, to which the court gave little weight: Ferrell was impaired, was disturbed, was under the influence of alcohol, was a good worker, was a good prisoner, and was remorseful. Id. at 391 n. 2. In holding the sentence proportional, we stated that Ferrell's sentence [was] commensurate to the crime in light of the similar nature of the prior violent offense. Id. The same holds true in this case. In Duncan, the defendant lived with his fiancée, her daughter, and her mother. One evening he returned to the apartment angry because his fiancée had gone out for the evening with another man. 619 So.2d at 280. The next morning he armed himself in the kitchen, walked outside where she sat, and stabbed her multiple times. When the victim's daughter ran to her aid, Duncan threatened her with the knife, and she fled. Duncan then sat down and waited for the police to arrive, saying that he killed her on purpose. The trial court concluded that the many mitigating factors were outweighed by his prior violent felony convictions for second-degree murder of another prison inmate and aggravated assault on his girlfriend's daughter immediately after the murder. [11] Citing the prior murder conviction, we found the sentence proportional. 619 So.2d at 284. Rodgers's prior violent felony aggravator was based on his robbery and manslaughter convictions. The latter conviction stemmed from Rodgers's killing of his live-in girlfriend in circumstances similar to the murder of his wife. Although Rodgers did not testify in the penalty phase, through the testimony of the investigating officer, the State presented Rodgers's account to police of the 1979 incident. Thus, by his own admission, Rodgers confronted his girlfriend when she arrived home, and their argument quickly escalated into a physical altercation. Knowing their history of violence, Rodgers retreated from the room when his girlfriend attacked him with a razor blade. Instead of leaving, he armed himself, placing a pistol in his pocket, and then returned and resumed the argument. After she cut him with the razor, he knocked her to the floor and took her weapon. Then she arose and ran toward him with a candy dish. Rodgers shot and killed her before she reached him. Similarly, in the murder of his wife, Rodgers went to the daycare and after ascertaining the children were in an adjoining room, confronted her over her adultery. A physical altercation ensued in which Rodgers hit and kicked his wife. According to the young children who witnessed the incident, he then left the room, returned with a gun, and shot his wife multiple times. Then he left her dying on the floor. See Butler, 842 So.2d at 834 (Butler was also unfazed by the presence of the victim's children in the apartment at the time. The totality of the circumstances in this case, which includes this indifference combined with the brutality of this murder, supports imposition of the death penalty.). We acknowledge that in domestic dispute cases involving substantial mental mitigation we have found the death penalty to be disproportionate. See Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 921 (Fla.2000) ([I]n many of the domestic dispute cases where the death penalty was found to be disproportionate, substantial mental mitigation is present.). But this is not such a case. The trial court applied the correct rule of law in making its findings, assigning weight, and weighing the factors, [12] and we have examined the totality of the circumstances and found this case comparable to other cases involving a serious single aggravator outweighing insubstantial mitigation. Accordingly, we hold that Rodgers's death sentence is proportional.