Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Statement to Sheriffs Detective Regarding Plan to Attack Gang Members

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in allowing, over his objection that the evidence was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, Sheriffs Detective Edward Nordskog to testify that defendant, while in county jail awaiting trial, told him he had been going to cut the throats of three gang members with the shanks he surrendered to Nordskog. Consideration of defendant's claim requires a detailed review of Nordskog's testimony and the court's rulings in regard to it. The court initially heard Nordskog's testimony outside the jury's presence in order to rule on defendant's Miranda objection. Nordskog stated he had contacted defendant in the jail after receiving information defendant was in possession of shanks and was planning to do a hit on somebody. Without giving Miranda advisements, he asked defendant if he had any knives on him; defendant said he did and told Nordskog where they were. After collecting the knives, Nordskog took defendant back to his office and conducted a lengthy interview, the purpose of which was to find out if there were any more weapons or planned crimes, and to ensure jail security. During that interview, which again was not preceded by Miranda advisements, Nordskog asked if defendant was having problems with the gangsters in the dorm. Defendant said he was having serious problems and had planned to kill at least three members of the gang that had been giving him trouble. The trial court overruled defendant's objection as to defendant's response to Nordskog's initial questions about knives, finding those statementsthat he had two knives and where they werewithin the public safety exception to Miranda (see New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550), but sustained the objection as to anything said in the interview that followed in Nordskog's office. Following that ruling, defense counsel suggested Nordskog also be permitted to testify that defendant said he was having problems with gangs. The court said defense counsel could ask that question, but warned he would thereby open the door to further testimony regarding the office interview, on the principle that when one party puts part of a conversation into evidence the other party may inquire into the whole of the conversation. (Evid.Code, § 356.) As the court explained: [Y]ou're trying to show that here poor Mr. Sakarias is a victim of gang violence and here he is being victimized, and you want me to excise the part where he says, `yeah, I want to use these knives to kill some other people.' Well, I'm not going to do it. If defense counsel asked about defendant's statement regarding gangs, the court warned, I will also then allow ... [the prosecutor] to go into the rest of the conversation. Defense counsel responded, Well, obviously then I'm not going to ask that question. On direct examination before the jury, Nordskog testified that in 1988 he was assigned to investigate security problems stemming from gang activity inside the jail system. He contacted defendant after receiving information he had illegal weapons. The possession of such weapons, Nordskog stated, usually means there is a fight about to occur, or there is going to be a hit or an attempted murder, or a murder, or something like that. (Defendant did not object to this testimony.) Defendant admitted he had two shanks, and Nordskog found them concealed on defendant's person. The prosecutor did not ask about the subsequent office interview. On cross-examination, the following colloquy ensued: Q. [Defense counsel]: You were not investigating the defendant because you suspected he was involved in gang activity, were you?
Q: Well, did you find that he was involved in gang activity? A: As a possible victim, yes. On redirect, the prosecutor asked, What did you suspect his involvement was? Nordskog answered, I had understood that he had been robbed earlier by force by several male Hispanics, and that he was attemptinghe was going to do a hit on at least three of them. The court, finding defense counsel had opened the door by inquiring into what Nordskog had learned about defendant's involvement with gangs, denied defendant's motion to strike this question and answer, and permitted the prosecutor to inquire further as to what defendant had said in the office conversation about gang activity. Continuing on redirect, the prosecutor asked what defendant said he was going to use the weapons for. Nordskog answered, He said later that night he was going to cut the throats of three gang members in that dorm. Defendant contends his trial attorney did not open the door to introduction of his Miranda -violative statements made in the office interview, because defense counsel did not seek to introduce any of the statements that defendant made to Nordskog during the second interrogation.... Rather, defense counsel asked Nordskog if defendant was `involved in gang activity,' i.e., was defendant a gang member. Defense counsel did not ask if defendant was a victim of gang violence; the deputy offered that information on his own, and it was not responsive to the question that counsel posed. (Emphasis in original.) We cannot agree with defendant's view of events. True, defense counsel's first quoted question on cross-examination (You were not investigating the defendant because you suspected he was involved in gang activity, were you?) did not call for any statements defendant made in the office interrogation. But his next question (Well, did you find that he was involved in gang activity?) did call for such statements. Under the circumstances as known to counsel from Nordskog's testimony in the Miranda hearing, Nordskog could only have f[ou]nd whether defendant was involved in gang activity from the office interview, which concerned that exact topic. Although counsel may not have expected Nordskog's exact answer (defendant argues the expected answer was simply no), by asking Nordskog about what he had learned from defendant's statements in the office interview, counsel opened the door, under Evidence Code section 356, to a fuller exploration of the contents of those statements. In effect, defense counsel asked the very question he earlier indicated he would not ask. The trial court did not err in allowing redirect examination on the same subject.