Opinion ID: 1377077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Probative Value of Other-Crimes Evidence Balanced Against Its Prejudicial Effect, Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(3)

Text: Although relevant, other-acts evidence may be excluded under 404(b) if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The State contends that because the General Assembly chose to make a defendant's prior conviction an essential element of the offense of felony escape, it does not unfairly prejudice the defendant when the State proves that element by introducing the name of the past crime rather than an indeterminate, unspecified felony. The defendant, in turn, urges this Court to adopt the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). Indeed, although we decline to follow the federal procedural analysis in Old Chief , we find Old Chief's substantive rationale on the issue of the probative value of prior-convictions evidence to be most persuasive. The defendant in Old Chief was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of a federal statute. Like the defendant in this case, Old Chief offered to stipulate to his prior felony conviction, arguing that his offer of stipulation rendered evidence of the name and nature of his prior offenses inadmissible as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The Government refused to join the stipulation, arguing that it had a right to present its own evidence of the defendant's prior convictions. The trial court agreed, and it allowed the Government to introduce into evidence the judgment record for the prior conviction. Old Chief was convicted of the charged offense, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Old Chief's conviction, holding that the admission of the name of his prior crime was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected Old Chief's offer to stipulate to his prior conviction and instead admitted the full record of a prior judgment. Although the Court acknowledged the standard rule that a defendant's offer to stipulate an element of the offense generally cannot prevail over the Government's choice to offer evidence showing guilt, the Court distinguished between stipulations to a status element of the offense as opposed to stipulations to other elements of the offense: [W]hen the point at issue is a defendant's legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him[,].... the fact of the qualifying conviction is alone what matters. .... Given these peculiarities of the element of felony-convict status and of admissions and the like when used to prove it, there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in evidence. For purposes of the ... weighing of the probative against the prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190-91, 117 S.Ct. 644. We are persuaded by the rationale in Old Chief and consequently hold that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the specific offenses for which the defendant had been previously convicted instead of accepting his stipulation concerning his status as a felon. There can be little doubt that a trier of fact will view an individual with a substantial criminal history as more likely to have committed a crime than an individual with little or no past criminal history. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 420 N.W.2d 499, 503-04 (1988). As this Court has recognized, a real probability exists that the jury could be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of prejudicial evidence and that the jury could be tempted to convict based upon a defendant's propensity to commit crimes rather than convict solely upon evidence relating to the charged offense. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 488 (Tenn.2001) (citations omitted). This danger is especially prevalent when, as in this case, a prior conviction is similar to other charges in a pending case, which only increases the likelihood that `a jury would convict on the perception of a past pattern of conduct, instead of on the facts of the charged offense.' Id. Accordingly, we hold that when the sole purpose of introducing evidence of a defendant's prior convictions is to prove the status element of the offense, and when the defendant offers to stipulate his status as a felon, the probative value of the evidence is, as a matter of law, outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Therefore, in this limited instance, the trial court should have accepted the defendant's stipulation in lieu of disclosing the names or nature of his previous convictions, as the latter evidence had little probative value and was likely to provoke the jury's prejudice. [7]