Opinion ID: 172554
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicable Precedent.

Text: As a starting point, the plaintiffs rely on basic Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence. They contend Tenth Circuit law was clear at the time of the incidents that traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment. They emphasize that the stops here were not isolated instances, but part of numerous stops pursuant to Mountain View's policy of ticketing motorists outside town boundaries. Under our cases, a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring. United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). And our cases are clear that the reasonableness of the traffic stop is an objective inquiry. We do not consider the subjective motivations of law enforcementthose motivations are irrelevant. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995). Instead, the sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction. Id. (quotation omitted). We agree with the plaintiffs that Colorado law does not permit officers to enforce traffic infractions outside their home jurisdiction. As we held in United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.2008), when officers stop a suspect for a traffic violation outside their jurisdiction, they violate[] Colorado law. But this violation of Colorado law does not necessarily mean the defendants violated the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. With this general framework in mind, we turn to the precedent that applies to extra-jurisdictional police stops. The plaintiffs and the district court rely on a 1990 case, Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir.1990), to support their conclusion that the officers committed a constitutional violation. They contend Ross stands for the fundamental principle that Fourth Amendment seizures outside an officers' home jurisdiction are unconstitutional. In Ross, a visitor on Indian tribal land claimed that an Oklahoma state police officer who had observed him commit a crime unlawfully arrested him on tribal land. The defendant contended the officer could not arrest him because a federal statute limited jurisdiction on tribal lands to federal agents and Indian officials. Id. at 1351. We found the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, holding that a warrantless arrest executed outside of the arresting officer's jurisdiction is analogous to a warrantless arrest without probable cause and is presumptively unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. Id. at 1354. Relying on Ross, the plaintiffs contend the law was clearly established that extra-jurisdictional traffic stops are likewise unconstitutional. At first blush Ross provides appealing support for that position. An examination of subsequent Tenth Circuit cases interpreting Ross, however, shows its holding cannot be stretched so far. Two cases that limit the breadth of Ross are particularly relevant. The first is United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir.1999). In Green, we held that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when effectuating a warranted search, even if they were acting outside of their jurisdiction in violation of state law. That an arrest, search, or seizure may have violated state law, we explained, is irrelevant as long as the standards developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended. Id. at 1105. We specifically distinguished Ross on the grounds that the officers there made a warrantless arrest outside the arresting officer's jurisdiction, while the officers in Green had a warrant. [W]e decline[d] to extend Ross to the context of warranted searches, we said; [t]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied where, as here, officers obtain a warrant grounded in probable cause and phrased with sufficient particularity, from a magistrate of the relevant jurisdiction authorizing them to search a particular location, even if those officers are acting outside their jurisdiction as defined by state law. Id. at 1106 (emphasis added). In a more recent case, we further limited the scope of Ross. In United States v. Mikulski, 317 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.2003), we held a Utah detective did not violate the Fourth Amendment when making a warrantless arrest outside his home jurisdiction, but within another political subdivision of the state. The arrest in Mikulski occurred after officers investigating suspects for an unrelated crime noticed the suspects' truck lacked a front license plate. After approaching the vehicle, an officer conducted a frisk in the interest of officer safety and to check for identification. In doing so, the officer discovered a pistol in the driver's pocket, and placed the driver under arrest. Id. at 1230. Utah has a statute that permits a peace officer to exercise authority beyond the limits of that officer's jurisdiction, but within the state, in limited circumstances. For example, an officer may act outside his jurisdiction when (1) in cooperation with local authorities, the officer is participating in an investigation of criminal activity which originated in the officer's jurisdiction, (2) the officer is in fresh pursuit of a suspect, or (3) the officer observes the commission of a public offense. Id. at 1231. Prior to taking any action authorized by that statute, the officer must notify and receive approval of local law enforcement authority, or, if prior contact is not reasonably possible, the officer must notify the local authority as soon as reasonably possible. Id. The officers in Mikulski conceded they did not comply with Utah law in coordinating their investigation with local law enforcement authorities. Id. We explained, however, that a violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation. Id. at 1232. We then concluded that [d]espite the apparent violation of state law, we cannot say that the officers' actions amounted to a federal [Fourth Amendment] violation. Id. at 1233. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that state law allowed peace officers (with authorization) to act within neighboring political subdivisions, whereas in Ross, under no circumstances would the officer have had authority to act on tribal lands. Id. at 1232-33. We found it significant that the detectives, upon noticing the equipment violation, had probable cause to believe a public offense had been committed. Id. at 1233. We also noted that the detective learned Mikulski was armed. Under the circumstances, we concluded the extra-jurisdictionalbut within a political subdivision of the state arrest by the detective did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Finally, our most recent relevant decision, United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir.2008)although decided after the incidents (and after the -12-district court's summary judgment order in this case)provides further support for our conclusion. Gonzales illustrates the limited scope of Ross and highlights why the conduct at issue here did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment principles as of 2006. In Gonzales, we held that an extra-jurisdictional traffic stop based on an observed traffic violation does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, despite the fact that the stop violated state law. Id. at 1181-83 & n. 2. Relying in large part on Mikulski and Green, as well as Callarman and Botero-Ospina, we concluded that the traffic stop outside the officers' home jurisdiction did not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. Id. at 1182 (citing Mikulski, 317 F.3d at 1232 (The officers' violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation.), and Green, 178 F.3d at 1105 (noting that a state-law violation is irrelevant as long as the standards developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended)). We also cited Virginia v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1605, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008), where the Supreme Court instructed us to disregard state law variation for Fourth Amendment purposes: while local law enforcement practices might vary from place to place and from time to time, Fourth Amendment protections are not so variable. We explained that although Tenth Circuit law holds that compliance with state law may be relevant to the court's Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis, we have never held it to be determinative of the constitutionality of police conduct. Gonzales, 535 F.3d at 1182. Instead, compliance with state law is `highly determinative' only when the constitutional test requires an examination of the relevant state law or interests. Id. And in the context of traffic stops, we explained, compliance with state law provided little help. Id. at 1183. Rather, pursuant to our clear precedent a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring. Id. (citing Callarman, 273 F.3d at 1286 (quotation omitted)). Moreover, if reasonable suspicion exists, our law provides that the subjective motivations of the officer are irrelevant. Id. at 1181. In specifically addressing Ross, we explained that subsequent cases declined to extend [the Ross ] holding to the context of warranted searches. Id. at 1182 n. 2 (citing Green, 178 F.3d at 1106). Ross, moreover, was inapplicable in the context of a traffic stop for two independent reasons. First, a traffic stop is more analogous to a warranted seizure because traffic stops do not require warrantsthe only requirement for a lawful stop is an observed traffic violation. Id. Second, the arrest in Ross took place on federal tribal land, and not within a political subdivision, i.e., a municipality, of the same state. Id. (citing Mikulski, 317 F.3d at 1232). We explained that the federal test for determining the validity of a traffic stop simply requires us to determine whether a traffic violation has occurred.... It does not require an examination of a state law or interests, but focuses instead on whether the stop was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 1183. We thus concluded that even a warrantless arrest following a traffic violation would not necessarily rise to a constitutional violation when the officers were acting within political subdivisions of the same state. In short, we concluded that the traffic stop outside the officers' home jurisdiction, even if unauthorized by state law, did not constitute an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. [5]