Opinion ID: 1919617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Strike Default

Text: Petitioner contends that Judge Joseph Pines erred in denying his motion to strike the default judgment. Respondent answers with alternative contentions: 1) that no timely appeal was taken from the denial of the motion to strike; and 2) that, in any event, the denial of the motion was proper. The following chronology of events is relevant to the question of the timeliness of the appeal: 10/24/84  Action filed. 10/26/84  Banegura served. 11/29/84  Order of default entered. 11/30/84  Notice of default sent by clerk. 1/ 4/85  Order of judgment by default entered. 2/ 4/85  Motion to strike filed. 2/11/85  Hearing on motion, and entry of order denying motion. 2/14/& 2/15/85  Jury trial on damages. 2/22/85  Motions for new trial filed. 3/22/85  Entry of order denying post-trial motions. 4/19/85  Appeal filed. Respondent argues that the order of January 4, 1985, was a final judgment on the issue of liability, and that the time for appeal expired thirty days after its entry. Furthermore, she says, the filing of the motion to strike thirty days later did not extend the time for taking an appeal. If petitioner were correct concerning the nature of the January 4 order, her analysis of the effect of the later motion to strike would be sound. Unnamed Atty. v. Attorney Griev. Comm'n, 303 Md. 473, 486, 494 A.2d 940 (1985). She is wrong, however, in treating the order of January 4 as a judgment. It was not a judgment  indeed it served no function at all and must be considered a nullity. Respondent in seeking that order, and the court in granting it, were adhering to a default procedure that existed under former Maryland Rule 310, but which was changed by the adoption of Rule 2-613, effective July 1, 1984. Under the former procedure, a default judgment could be entered for failure of a defendant to plead, and when entered, became a final and appealable judgment as to liability. Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 254 A.2d 181 (1969). Under the current procedure, which was in effect when Banegura defaulted, the order of default was correctly entered, but a judgment should not have been entered until there had been satisfactory proof of damages. Rule 2-613(e). The amendment to the rule was specifically designed to avoid piecemeal appeals, and no appeal may be taken from the entry of an order of default. Adams v. Mallory, 308 Md. 453, 459-60, 520 A.2d 453 (1987); O'Connor v. Moten, 307 Md. 644, 647 n. 2, 516 A.2d 593 (1986). Likewise, an immediate appeal could not have been taken from the denial of Banegura's motion to strike the default order. That order was interlocutory, because it did not dispose of the entire claim. Rule 2-602. As an interlocutory order, it was subject to revision within the general discretion of the trial court until a final judgment was entered on the claim. Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 328, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986). Banegura's motion to strike, filed more than thirty days after the entry of the order of default, must be viewed as a request that the trial court invoke its authority to revise an order intended to be final in nature, but which was, in fact, interlocutory. A trial judge possesses very broad discretion to modify an interlocutory order where that action is in the interest of justice. Henley v. Prince George's County, supra, 305 Md. at 328, 503 A.2d 1333. See also Zimzores v. Veterans Admin., 778 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir.1985); Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. of America, 764 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir.1985). With respect to the entry of the order of default, there was no error. Banegura was personally served on October 26, 1984, a fact he readily acknowledged. He did not respond within thirty days, and the order of default was therefore properly entered. Notice of the default was received by Banegura, yet Banegura took no action to have the default set aside within the thirty days permitted by Rule 2-613(c). His motion to strike was not filed until sixty-seven days after the entry of the default order. With respect to the later refusal of the court to modify the order denying the motion to strike, we find nothing about the circumstances of this case that would justify appellate interference with the discretion exercised by Judge Pines. Banegura and Burke offered two different explanations for this failure to file an answer to the complaint or a timely motion to strike the default. Banegura said he had turned over all the papers to Burke, as he received them, and that Burke had agreed to represent him. Burke, on the other hand, said that although he had represented Banegura for a number of years, and had received the suit papers and notice of default, he had not been retained by Banegura until February 4, 1985. [4] Neither Burke nor Banegura set forth a legal or a factual basis for a defense to Taylor's claim, or generally alleged that any defense existed. We conclude that under these circumstances Judge Pines would have been justified in refusing to strike the default order even if Banegura's motion had been filed within thirty days after the entry of the default. Banegura's motion did not comply with the requirement of Rule 2-613(c), which provides that [t]he motion shall state the reasons for the failure to plead and the legal and factual basis for the defense to the claim. As Chief Judge Murphy recently pointed out for the Court in Carter v. Harris, 312 Md. 371, 378, 539 A.2d 1127 (1988), failure to comply with the mandate of this rule may not deprive the trial judge of the right to grant the motion, but it may furnish justification for the denial of it. Moreover, there was little in either version of the facts given by Banegura and Burke to suggest to Judge Pines that it would be equitable to excuse the failure to plead. If Burke correctly stated the facts, Banegura had no one to blame but himself for his failure to retain an attorney. If Banegura was correct, as now seems more likely, there is no apparent excuse for Burke having failed to file a timely plea. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-36, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390-91, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). We do not suggest that Judge Pines could not have granted the motion  rather, we make clear that it was well within his discretion to deny it even if it had been timely filed. If Banegura cannot succeed in his challenge to the trial judge's exercise of discretion in a situation where that discretion would be somewhat circumscribed by rule, he obviously cannot succeed in his appeal from an action over which the trial judge had very wide discretion.