Opinion ID: 1823992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forfeiture of Credits

Text: Mayes and Bennett also argue that when their conditional release supervision was revoked and they were returned to prison, the Department improperly forfeited the 800 days of provisional credits awarded to them under Gomez v. Singletary, 733 So.2d 499 (Fla.1998). The credits were awarded in early 2000, after Mayes and Bennett were returned to prison, but were immediately forfeited due to their 1999 conditional release violations. Petitioners first assert that there was no statutory authority for the forfeiture of overcrowding gain time (including provisional credits) upon supervision revocation until 1998 when this Court issued its decision in State v. Lancaster, 731 So.2d 1227 (Fla.1998). That being so, they argue, since petitioners' offenses were committed prior to that date, forfeiture of their gain time constitutes an ex post facto violation. In sum, petitioners argue that the Department may not retrospectively apply the Lancaster decision to a preexisting criminal offense. We disagree. The Supreme Court has held that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution does not generally apply to case law. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977). The clause applies to a judicial opinion only when it results in an unforeseeable enlargement of a criminal statute. Id. at 192, 97 S.Ct. 990 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964)); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) (holding that Bouie only restricted the retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes to those that are unexpected and indefensible by reference to prior law). The Lancaster decision does not fall within this category. First, the Lancaster decision did not create the statutory authority for the forfeiture of overcrowding gain time upon supervision revocation. That authority has been in effect since 1988, and it has provided for the forfeiture of all gain time upon conditional release supervision revocation. 731 So.2d at 1230-31; see also ch. 88-122, § 9, at 538, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988)); id. § 92 at 572 (providing for effective date). Prior to Lancaster, the Department had not considered most types of overcrowding credits to be gain time. In Lancaster, this Court corrected that misinterpretation and made clear that the Department always had the authority to forfeit such creditsat least with regard to those inmates whose offenses were committed on or after the pertinent date in 1988. Lancaster, 731 So.2d at 1230-31. Lancaster's interpretation of the gain time forfeiture statutes was not an unforeseeable enlargement of that statute. The Department had long considered administrative gain time to be forfeitable upon supervision revocation, and this Court had previously held that provisional credits were essentially the same as administrative gain time. See Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So.2d 500, 501 n. 1 (Fla.1994). Therefore, we conclude that the portion of the holding in Lancaster concluding that all types of gain time (including overcrowding credits) are forfeitable under the general gain time forfeiture statutes was not unforeseeable and thus there is no ex post facto violation. Mayes and Bennett next argue that the Department may not forfeit credits for conduct which occurred before the credits were awarded. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree. When the Department of Corrections is informed of a new court opinion requiring that it recalculate an inmate's gain time for periods of time in the past, it calculates the gain time due and awards it nunc pro tunc. In other words the Department records the gain time as if it had been awarded at the appropriate time in the past. When the Department does this, it refers to the date when the gain time should have been awarded as the accrued date. The date on which a data entry employee enters the gain time award into the computer and credits it to the inmate's account or record is called the posting date. Petitioners assert that the Department should not be permitted to forfeit gain time which was posted to their records subsequent to their conditional release revocations. However, the posting date is not at all the relevant date for our consideration. The conditional release statute specifically provides for forfeiture of all gain time  earned up to the date of release. See § 947.141(6), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). Although petitioners' 800 days of provisional credits were posted in 2000, they were earned in the mid 1990s, on the Department's accrued date. Accordingly, the accrued date and not the posting date is the relevant date we must consider when determining whether late-awarded gain time may be forfeited. To do otherwise would result in inmates such as these petitioners receiving Gomez credits but not forfeiting them for a conditional release violation, while another inmate who received Gomez credits before being released on conditional release would forfeit the credits for a later violation. Because we find that petitioners' provisional credits were properly forfeited, they are not entitled to relief on this issue. Finally, petitioners contend that the Department has, in essence, deemed them to have been on conditional release supervision while they were actually in prison and, therefore, is not giving them credit for this time. The Department's records show this to be a misconception. With regard to actual time (as opposed to gain time or overcrowding credits), the Department is simply refusing to credit the petitioners only for the actual time they spent outside of prison on conditional release. We find no impropriety in this action. Accordingly, we deny the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.