Opinion ID: 874061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Patricia Shelton's Breach of Contract Claim Fails to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

Text: Owens relies on Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932), and Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816 (2001), in asserting that the district court erred in holding that Patricia Shelton may bring her legal malpractice and breach of contract claims in the same cause of action. Bishop asserts that Hayward is inapplicable because it relates to medical malpractice claims and was based on a statute that strictly required all actions related to medical care to be pursued in the context of the local standard of care. See Hayward, 136 Idaho at 349-51, 33 P.3d at 823-25. Trimming and Hayward were actions where the plaintiffs tried to assert contract claims in medical malpractice suits in order to avoid the statute of limitations defense applicable to tort claims. Id.; Trimming, 52 Idaho at 415-17, 16 P.2d at 662-63. Specifically, this Court rejected such claims, asserting that they pertain to the provision of or failure to provide health care under I.C. § 6-1012. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 349-50, 33 P.3d at 823-24 (quoting I.C. § 6-1012). This Court affirmed the claims as malpractice tort actions, regardless of the label assigned to them. Id. at 350, 33 P.3d at 824. Thus, Owens contends that where legal malpractice actions based on breach of duty are asserted, not based on any obligations or undertakings specifically provided in a contract, a claim in tort remains the sole cause of action. See Trimming, 52 Idaho at 415-17, 16 P.2d at 662-63; Hayward, 136 Idaho at 349-50, 33 P.3d at 823-24. Although the medical malpractice cases on which Owens relies are governed by a specific statute, the fact that a proponent labels his or her action as sounding in contract as well as malpractice does not make the underlying action contract. The theory of relief sought is not different. A holding to the contrary would create a per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action. Legal malpractice has traditionally been treated as the proper claim where an attorney breaches his or her duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship. As noted in the previous section, because the contingent fee agreement in this matter contained no express language providing for a higher standard of care, the duty owed by Owens is not defined by the contingent fee agreement. The language in the contingent fee agreement that [a]ttorneys shall represent Client in said matter and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard thereto is not materially different from the standard applied in the legal malpractice claim. Thus, this action is really a legal malpractice claim disguised as a contract claim. A person cannot change a tort action into a contract action simply by labeling it as such. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 350, 33 P.3d at 824. As previously discussed, professional malpractice actions traditionally have been characterized as tort actions in the context of the statute of limitations. To hold that this claim is clearly a separate contract cause of action would render the two year statute of limitations applying to legal malpractice actions moot. See Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585-87, 51 P.3d 396, 399-401 (2002). It would also call into question matters such as the standard of care regarding legal malpractice actions, which is to comply with the local standard of care by an attorney, as well as the application of the economic loss rule to legal malpractice claims. Therefore, this Court holds that Bishop's breach of contract claim, which asserts the same claim as the legal malpractice theory, which has traditionally been treated as the proper claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.