Opinion ID: 2997748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Relating to the Suspension

Text: City Colleges argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the suspension claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. We review the district court’s decision de novo and examine all of the evidence in the record to determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of national origin discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 2002). “In so doing, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. In sum, we “will overturn a jury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no rational jury could have found for the plaintiff. . . .” Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1173 (quotation omitted). This is obviously a difficult standard to meet. In a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a Title VII discrimination action, we must give deference to the jury verdict. “[O]nce a trial is complete and judgment rendered, the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas falls away: Post-trial we consider only whether the record supports the resolution of the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 1174 (citation and quotation omitted). The question we must answer, then, is not whether the reaNos. 04-2403 & 04-2278 7 sons given for Waite’s suspension were pretextual, but whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that Waite was discriminated against because she is Jamaican. In order to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented, a number of factors should be considered; these factors include “the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49. We will first consider the strength of the prima facie case for discrimination. Waite demonstrated that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside of her class more favorably. See Foster v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 1999). Waite provided evidence that Tanya Woods, who was not Jamaican, worked on the IDHS contract renewal package for fiscal year 2003. Woods submitted the package so late that funding was actually delayed, and yet she was not disciplined. Armster testified that she did not discipline Woods because she was not as familiar with the renewal process as Waite had been, and she was a part-time employee when she began working on the contract. Armster also claimed that Woods was in constant contact with the IDHS while she was working her way through the application. Waite responded that these reasons were not believable because Woods had the prior contracts to use as examples, and the information for the 2002 and 2003 contracts was surprisingly similar; therefore, the delay could not be blamed on inexperience. Also, Waite provided documents showing that Woods did not communicate with the IDHS until after the renewal package was submitted in October 2002. 8 Nos. 04-2403 & 04-2278 Because evidence was presented which tended to show that Armster’s reasons for treating Woods differently than Waite were questionable, the jury was entitled to reject Armster’s testimony. In fact, the district court found that it was reasonable for the jury to disbelieve Armster’s testimony because she was “less than candid,” “failed to explain her actions satisfactorily,” and was not a “particularly good witness.” (April 21, 2004 Tr. at 4). These credibility problems were also directly relevant to the question of whether the jury was permitted to find that Armster’s reasons for suspending Waite were pretextual. Armster claimed that she recommended that Waite be disciplined because she “thought it was outrageous that [Waite] would leave for vacation, this contract had not been done, there was half a million dollars at stake, and that she would send this document with vague instructions to our office by way of her husband instructing [Armster] to complete this or make sure that it is completed.” (Trial Tr. at 126). Waite provided evidence at trial that Armster did not truly fear losing funding from the IDHS. Armster admitted her belief that if the IDHS received the application soon, there would be no loss of funding. (Trial Tr. at 110). An IDHS representative testified that she did not make any statements to Armster that should have led Armster to believe that City Colleges would lose the funding based on the late submission. (Trial Tr. at 145-46). Another representative testified that she only knew of one situation in which the IDHS had rescinded a contract, and in that case the entire fiscal year had almost passed and the renewal package had still not been submitted. (Trial Tr. at 178-79). City Colleges points out that it is not enough for the jury to disbelieve the explanation of the employer; “the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.” Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148). It is true that the “plantation mentality” statement is the only evidence in the record that points to Nos. 04-2403 & 04-2278 9 discriminatory intent; but, in this case, it is sufficient. Waite provided an explanation of what she believed this statement meant. Armster did nothing to refute Waite’s analysis, although she could have done so during her district court testimony. Armster did, however, testify that one of the reasons she recommended that Waite be disciplined was because she was outraged that Waite would ask her to finalize the contract. Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Armster disciplined Waite because Waite, a Jamaican, left work for Armster, an AfricanAmerican, to complete; Armster felt like Waite was treating her like a slave and displaying the “plantation mentality” she had accused Waite of exhibiting approximately one month before. The jury was permitted to infer that this “plantation mentality” remark was evidence of discriminatory animus. City Colleges next argues that Armster’s statement is not evidence of discriminatory intent because Armster was not a decision-maker in Waite’s suspension; Armster initiated the disciplinary hearing, but Shaw made the decision to suspend Waite. Shaw conducted a hearing in which there was no mention of Waite’s national origin, and Shaw testified that she did not consider Waite’s national origin when deciding whether Waite should be suspended. But, even if Armster did not mention Waite’s national origin to Shaw, Armster’s feelings about Jamaicans could have tainted her assessment of Waite’s job performance. See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, even though there is no evidence that Shaw herself had a discriminatory intent, Waite was able to show that Armster, “an employee with discriminatory animus[,] provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.” Id. (collecting sources). We find that the “plantation mentality” remark is, therefore, important evidence that was properly considered by the jury. 10 Nos. 04-2403 & 04-2278 The jury in this case considered all of the evidence and determined that Waite was suspended because of illegal discrimination based on her national origin. While this is not the strongest case we have seen, we find that sufficient evidence does support the jury’s verdict. The “plantation mentality” remark, the meaning of which was not explained by Armster, allowed the jury to conclude that Waite was suspended because she is Jamaican.