Opinion ID: 1189066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Court's Judgment Vacating the Injunction

Text: Left only with their cross-appeal, Minnesota and the MPCA urge us to affirm the district court's denial of Northshore's [Rule 60(b)] motion and clarify that the federal injunction is still valid. By asking us to reverse the district court and hold that the injunction remains valid, Minnesota and the MPCA ask us to conclude that the district court erred by vacating the air-emissions provisions of the injunction. We review the district court's modification of an injunction for abuse of discretion, see Keith v. Mullins, 162 F.3d 539, 540-41 (8th Cir.1998), recognizing that a federal court of equity has inherent jurisdiction in the exercise of its equitable discretion and subject to appropriate appellate review to vacate or modify its injunctions, Booker, 585 F.2d at 352. An injunction may become moot if the defendant can demonstrate that `there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.' United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir.1945)). The determination of whether it is appropriate to dissolve or modify an injunction rests primarily on the shoulders of the district court that issued the injunction in the first place. Booker, 585 F.2d at 353. The district court may exercise this power when it realizes that the injunctive relief is no longer needed due to intervening circumstances. See Keith, 162 F.3d at 540-41. The Second Circuit was faced with a similar situation concerning a request for injunctive relief in New York v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1016 (2d Cir.1987). In Seneci, the State sought to enjoin Seneci and others from future racketeering practices and fraudulent acts under New York Executive Law § 63(12) by filing suit in New York state court. Id. After the case spent three years stalled in state court, the State sought the same injunctive relief in federal court, alleging violations of § 63(12) and the federal RICO statute. Id. The federal district court dismissed for lack of standing, and the State appealed. Id. After the Second Circuit heard oral argument on the appeal, the state court in the parallel action entered an order permanently enjoining Seneci and others from engaging in future fraudulent practices. Id. at 1017. Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that the state court's injunction provided the State with all of the ... relief requested in the present case and dismissed the appeal as moot. Id. Here, we conclude that Minnesota and the MPCA have not shown that the district court abused its discretion by vacating sua sponte the injunction's air-emissions provisions. When we modified the injunction in 1975, we did so to prevent Reserve from emitting harmful levels of fibers into the air in violation of Minnesota's pollution control regulations. At that time, neither Minnesota nor the MPCA had pursued any parallel state court or administrative proceedings. Since then, however, the MPCA has issued, litigated, and enforced permits addressing the same concerns regarding Reserve's, and later Northshore's, compliance with Minnesota's air pollution control regulations. In fact, these permits contain the exact same standardthe control city standardas that contained in the injunction. In light of the fact that the MPCA's permits contain identical language to our 1975 injunction, specifically requiring Northshore's fiber emissions to be below a medically significant level and below the fiber level in the ambient air of a control city such as St. Paul, we find that [the MPCA] has given [Minnesota and itself] all of the ... relief requested in the present case. See Seneci, 817 F.2d at 1017. The injunction and the MPCA's permits were crafted to afford the same reliefpreventing Northshore from violating Minnesota's air pollution control regulations by limiting the output of fibers. See id. Moreover, Minnesota and the MPCA have not shown any reasonable expectation that, in the absence of the injunction, Northshore is likely to repeat its violation. See W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894. On the contrary, the thirty-seven-year history of this litigation has demonstrated Minnesota and the MPCA's unwavering commitment to ensuring that the operations of Northshore's Silver Bay facility comply with Minnesota's air pollution control regulations. Based on our recognition of the tools available to Minnesota and the MPCA to enforce Northshore's regulatory permits, see, e.g., Minn.Stat. §§ 116.07, 116.072, and the absence of any evidence suggesting that such state enforcement would fail to prevent Northshore from violating Minnesota's air pollution control regulations, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in vacating the air-emissions provisions of the injunction.