Opinion ID: 2632238
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Privilege application

Text: Gwich'in advances four main arguments which we address in turn.
Gwich'in first argues that the initial decision by the Office of the Governor is facially inadequate to sustain the privilege because the decision failed to state sufficient reasons for withholding the documents and therefore did not satisfy requirements stated in regulation and case law. The Office of the Governor promulgated 6 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 96.350 (2000), which requires that an administrative appeal determination of a Public Records Act request denial must be in writing, must specify the specific statute, regulation, or court decision that is the basis for the denial, and must state briefly the reason for the denial. We have never addressed what an agency must show to invoke the privilege under 6 AAC 96.350. [35] In City of Colorado Springs v. White, [36] the Colorado Supreme Court thoroughly discussed what an agency must do to invoke the privilege successfully following a public records act request. The court there adopted the well-established procedure federal agencies must follow to protect documents from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. [37] Under federal law, an agency must assert the privilege by preparing a Vaughn index. [38] The court stated that the index should (1) describe specifically each document claimed to be privileged, noting its author, recipient, and subject; (2) explain how each document qualifies for the privilege, describing the deliberative process to which the document is related and the role the document played in that process; (3) include an affidavit discussing why disclosure would be harmful; and (4) describe which portions of large documents are and are not subject to disclosure. [39] The requirements of 6 AAC 96.350 are not as extensive as the requirements for a Vaughn index, but the purpose is the sameto provide litigants with fundamental information about the allegedly privileged material, and provide them with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the government's claims. [40] When it initially denied Gwich'in access to the documents, the Office of the Governor provided information about each document's author, subject matter, date, length, and reason for nondisclosure. Ayers's written determination of the administrative appeal listed the specific documents, the reasons for nondisclosure, and the legal authority for nondisclosure. The Office of the Governor therefore complied with 6 AAC 96.350. Moreover, the superior court's in camera review and the full briefing before that court allowed Gwich'in a meaningful opportunity to challenge the claim of privilege. [41] Because we hold that the administrative decision and the superior court's in camera review were sufficient, we do not need to address the Office of the Governor's cross-appeal.
Gwich'in next argues that the Office of the Governor fails to meet the threshold requirements of the privilege. The documents fall into three categories: (1) three memoranda from Decision Management Inc. (DMI), a lobbying company, to the Office of the Governor regarding lobbying strategies; (2) a draft media plan from The Wexler Group, another lobbying company, to the Office of the Governor; and (3) three e-mail communications between staffers in the Office of the Governor regarding how the state might proceed with the proposed media plan.
The Office of the Governor withheld an eleven-page February 4, 1997, memorandum to John Katz from DMI regarding Congressional passage of ANWR bill. It also withheld two five-page February 26, 1997, memoranda from DMI to Katz regarding the same subject. Gwich'in first argues that nothing in the administrative record establishes that the DMI memoranda were directly solicited. To qualify for the privilege, the communication or document at issue must be an internal communication or one directly solicited  by a government official. [42] Outside consultants' reports have been held to be privileged if the agency uses them in its decisionmaking process. [43] After reviewing the February 4, 1997, memorandum, we conclude that the document establishes that it was directly solicited. The Office of the Governor clearly invited DMI to submit a proposal and DMI responded. The February 26, 1997, memoranda were merely addenda to that proposal and therefore were also directly solicited. Second, Gwich'in argues that the three DMI memoranda are not predecisional because no specific decision was identified; the memoranda were incorporated by reference in a document disclosed by the state, a contract between Arctic Power and DMI; and the memoranda relate to an agreement beyond the decisionmaking capacity of the executive, namely a contract between two private parties. No specific decision needs to be identified for a document to be predecisional. [44] The privilege protects the give-and-take deliberative process, not final decisions; no ultimate conclusion needs to be identified, or even reached, for the privilege to attach. Documents that are incorporated by reference or expressly adopted in a final decision by an agency may lose their predecisional status. [45] Here the DMI memoranda were incorporated by reference into DMI's private contract with Arctic Power. Incorporating an otherwise privileged document into a private contract cannot be a basis for the loss of that privilege because that contract is not the agency's final decision. [46] We conclude that the DMI memoranda are both predecisional and deliberative. As Gwich'in notes, the decision about whether Arctic Power would contract with DMI was beyond that office's authority, but we conclude that DMI submitted the memoranda in February 1997 as proposals suggesting a strategy for public information and lobbying campaigns to be overseen by Arctic Power. Although DMI ultimately contracted with Arctic Power, the DMI memoranda are inextricably intertwined with the proposed lobbying plans of the Office of the Governor; those plans may have included using Arctic Power to lobby for it. [47] The privilege therefore serves to protect the very process at issue herethe deliberative consideration of proposals which were not adopted.
The Office of the Governor also withheld a November 25, 1997 [d]raft media plan for ANWR from Wexler Group to John Katz. The Wexler Group had originally contracted with the state in September 1995 to lobby for opening ANWR for oil and gas development. That contract was extended through June 1998. First, Gwich'in argues that the administrative record fails to show that the media plan was directly solicited. Unlike the DMI memoranda, the draft media plan itself does not establish that the Office of the Governor directly solicited the plan from The Wexler Group. But we conclude that other documents withheld by the Office of the Governorthe e-mails between David Ramseur and John Katzdo establish that the draft media plan was directly solicited. Second, Gwich'in reasons that the privilege protects nongovernmental, directly solicited documents because disclosure would tend to silence informants who provide confidential information. It concludes that disclosure here would have no such chilling effect because the Wexler Group was contractually obligated to provide information. But the privilege does apply in this context, because disclosure might chill honest and frank communications between hired consultants and the agency. [48] Third, Gwich'in claims the media plan is not predecisional to the decision to undertake a media campaign, a decision made when the Office of the Governor hired The Wexler Group in 1995. Even though that decision had already been made, the draft plan is the kind of communication that the privilege protectsa preliminary communication that reflects the give-and-take deliberation of an executive agency. Ongoing deliberation continued on how to effectuate the Office of the Governor's goal of opening ANWR by lobbying Congress in a variety of ways, including deliberation on what media strategy to use. The primary characteristic of the media plan is predecisional. [49] Disclosure could chill planning strategy and communicating with hired consultants.
In June 1997 David Ramseur, the governor's Deputy Chief of Staff, and John Katz wrote three e-mail messages about hiring a media consultant. Gwich'in argues that the e-mails were not predecisional because the Office of the Governor did not identify a decision and because the decision to undertake a media campaign had already been made. A specific decision need not be identified for the privilege to attach, and decisions were ongoing regarding the Office of the Governor's lobbying strategies. [50] Gwich'in also argues that the e-mails were not deliberative because the privilege only protects communications from subordinates. Communications from a senior to a subordinate are not necessarily postdecisional. [51] These three messages reflect the give-and-take deliberative process of arriving at a decision. None reflects any directive on how to implement a particular plan or course of action from a senior to a junior employee; instead, each shows ongoing discussion and deliberation about whether to hire a media consultant and whom to hire. Our review of these three messages shows that they were all predecisional and deliberative. The Office of the Governor's determination and our in camera review establish both threshold requirements for all seven withheld documents. We therefore hold that the privilege presumptively attached and that Gwich'in was obliged to show that its need for the documents outweighed the Office of the Governor's interest in secrecy.
Before it addresses the balancing of interests, Gwich'in argues, citing a Washington case, [52] that the privilege evaporates when the decision that the documents preceded is finally made. It argues that because over a year has passed, all the decisions relating to the withheld documents must have been implemented already. The question is not whether the decision has been implemented, or whether sufficient time has passed, but whether disclosure of these preliminary proposals could harm the agency's future decisionmaking by chilling either the submission of such proposals or their forthright consideration. [53] Disclosing proposals madebut not adoptedcould chill the possible future adoption of those or similar proposals, or the relationships between the Office of the Governor and its lobbyists. We therefore hold that the communications have not lost the privilege.
Finally, Gwich'in argues that the documents relate to the fate of the Gwich'in's culture and way of life and that the public has a proprietary interest in the expenditure of over a million dollars of state funds. It further claims that the Office of the Governor's interest is weaker when the documents relate to political lobbying and not to an essential executive branch function. The Office of the Governor argues that Gwich'in failed to produce any evidence it had a particular interest in disclosure, and that the public has an interest only in how funds are actually spent, not how they might have been spent. It counters Gwich'in's essential executive function argument by citing Capital Information Group, which allowed the privilege for documents unrelated to the constitutionally mandated executive activity of policymaking. [54] When balancing the interests in Capital Information Group, we held that agency proposals submitted to the governor fell under the privilege. We explained: [The Governor] is formulating his own political legislative package which will reflect his own priorities and agenda. In doing so, he must determine not only which of the agency proposals have merit but also which warrant the expenditure of his own political capital in their pursuit. This is one of the most sensitive and important functions that the Governor performs while in office, and the need for frank discussion of policy matters among the Governor's advisors is perhaps greater here than in any other area ... the need for effective decisionmaking in the Governor's office in the formulation of his legislative agenda is not overcome by [the requestor's] desire to shed light on the needs of the agencies. [55] Gwich'in's attempt to resurrect its essential executive function argument in the balancing test therefore fails. The privilege may protect any governmental decisionmaking function, including the governor's policymaking and lobbying of either state or federal government. Generally, it is difficult for a requestor to override a presumptive privilege. [56] Relevant factors include: the degree of confidentiality and sensitivity of the communication; the time elapsed after deliberation concluded and after communications were made; and whether deliberation is ongoing. [57] Here, even though two years have passed and the communications do not appear to be highly sensitive, the scales tip in favor of nondisclosure. The governor's national political agenda for the state is no less important than the governor's state political agenda, a topic we discussed in Capital Information Group. And while the public has an interest in how the state spends public money, it has less interest in knowing how the state might have spent public money, but did not. Finally, Gwich'in has a great interest in maintaining its way of life and culture, but it can conduct its own lobbying efforts to advance that interest. We therefore hold that the deliberative process privilege protects all seven disputed documents.