Opinion ID: 891839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicable Standard for Harmless Error Review

Text: {25} Improperly admitted evidence is not grounds for a new trial unless the error is determined to be harmful. State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 37, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804; State v. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 47, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198. A very limited class of errors, not at issue here, is deemed structural and is not reviewed for harmless error but instead require automatic reversal. State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 51, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699. Where, as here, a constitutional error has been established, the State bears the burden of proving that the error is harmless. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 1, 162 P.3d 156 (The State has the burden of establishing that [a] constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {26} The concept of harmless error arose as a reaction to an era marked by automatic reversal of cases for any procedural error. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 47, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198 (citing 7 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 27.6(a), at 99-100 (3d ed. 2007)). The harmless error rule originally developed outside the context of constitutional review, simply to require appellate courts to affirm lower courts notwithstanding technical errors, defects, or exceptions which did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 48, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198 (quoting 7 LaFave, supra, § 27.6(a) at 101 internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). {27} Although not always employing the term harmless error, New Mexico courts historically evaluated claims of error by inquiring into how severely the defendant was affected thereby. In State v. Coyle, for example, this Court considered whether or not a trial error worked a prejudice against the defendant, concluding that the error was harmless because [n]one of the evidence here in question could have influenced the jury. 39 N.M. 151, 155, 42 P.2d 770, 772 (1935); see also State v. Pruett, 22 N.M. 223, 235, 160 P. 362, 366 (1916) (A trial error was not harmless because improperly admitted testimony was highly prejudicial to the defendant.); State v. Varos, 69 N.M. 19, 23, 363 P.2d 629, 631 (1961) (improperly admitted testimony about a lie-detector test was reversible error because its net effect . . . was to cast doubt upon the truth and veracity of the defendant in a manner not countenanced by the courts, thereby taint[ing] the jury's verdict.); State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124, 128, 419 P.2d 966, 969 (1966) (The prosecution's inquiry into the defendant's prior conviction was fraught with such harm to defendant as to be irremediable. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {28} In the 1960s, with the unprecedented expansion of federal constitutional protections into the criminal process, harmless error analysis was imported into the constitutional context. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 49, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198 (citing 7 LaFave, supra, § 27.6(a) at 101). In Fahy v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held that the erroneous admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence required reversal, noting that the Supreme Court was not concerned . . . with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the [defendant] could have been convicted absent the erroneously admitted evidence, but rather whether there was a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963). The Supreme Court refined this principle in Chapman v. California, holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which tracked the prosecution's burden of proof for establishing guilt in the first instance. The Supreme Court made clear that constitutional errors meeting this standard would be found so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. Id. at 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824. Within a few years, appellate courts in New Mexico were applying this emerging federal constitutional standard to their harmless error review. [3] See, e.g., State v. Jones, 80 N.M. 753, 753-54, 461 P.2d 235, 235-36 (Ct.App. 1969) (State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a prosecutor's comment to the jury about the defendants' failure to testify was harmless.); State v. Spearman, 84 N.M. 366, 369, 503 P.2d 649, 652 (Ct.App. 1972) (State did not meet its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction was harmless.). {29} In 1980, this Court departed significantly from the harmless error standard developed in Fahy and Chapman, and announced a new three-part test for reviewing courts to apply in their harmless error analysis: For an error by the trial court to be considered as harmless, there must be: (1) substantial evidence to support the conviction without reference to the improperly admitted evidence, (2) such a disproportionate volume of permissible evidence that, in comparison, the amount of improper evidence will appear so minuscule that it could not have contributed to the conviction, and (3) no substantial conflicting evidence to discredit the State's testimony. State v. Moore, 94 N.M. 503, 504, 612 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1980). {30} In Moore, the defendant was convicted of criminal sexual penetration, among other crimes. Id. He appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to admit testimony of the victim concerning her mental state following the rape. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of possible prejudice from the admission into evidence of improper testimony. Id. On review, this Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the victim's testimony was improperly admitted. Id. The Court went on, however, to apply the three-part test quoted above to conclude that the erroneous admission of the victim's testimony was harmless. Id. {31} Moore announced the three-part test without analysis or persuasive precedent. The two cases cited in support, State v. Day, 91 N.M. 570, 577 P.2d 878 (Ct.App.1978), and State v. Self, 88 N.M. 37, 536 P.2d 1093 (Ct.App.1975), neither adopted the three-part test nor provided a logical foundation for its use. Rather, Day held that an error is only harmless if the reviewing court concludes that the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that there is no reasonable probability that the misconduct contributed to the conviction. 91 N.M. at 573-74, 577 P.2d 878, 881-82. [4] Self cited two prior Court of Appeals opinions, neither of which anticipates the three-part test created by Moore. One of those opinions, State v. Thurman, explained that an error would be treated as harmless if there was no reasonable possibility that evidence improperly admitted, and then stricken by the trial court, contributed to the conviction. 84 N.M. 5, 9, 498 P.2d 697, 701 (Ct.App.1972) (citing Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)). The other opinion, State v. Lopez , determined that a trial error was harmless because `[t]he evidence, exclusive of the improperly admitted exhibits, points so overwhelmingly [5] to the guilt of defendant of the crime of which he was convicted, that there is no reasonable possibility that the admission into evidence of these improperly received exhibits contributed to his conviction.' 80 N.M. 599, 458 P.2d 851 (Ct.App.1969) (quoting State v. Gray, 79 N.M. 424, 428, 444 P.2d 609, 613 (Ct.App. 1968)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Holly, 2009-NMSC-004, 145 N.M. 513, 201 P.3d 844. {32} These opinions from the dozen or so years preceding Moore all provide slightly different phrasings of the same conceptthat a trial error should be held harmless if there is no reasonable possibility (if the claimed error is constitutional in nature) or no reasonable probability (if the claimed error is evidentiary or procedural but does not implicate the defendant's constitutional rights) that the error contributed to the defendant's conviction, which might be determined in part by the overall strength of the evidence that the State marshaled against the defendant. {33} No opinion of this Court prior to Moore, including the cases Moore relied upon that are discussed above, employed a three-part test for evaluating harmless error, and none appears to have made any reference to the third Moore factorthe presence or absence of substantial conflicting evidence from the defendant. 94 N.M. at 505, 612 P.2d at 1316. Moore, then, shifted the harmless error inquiry away from an assessment of an error's impact on the verdict, and toward a more mechanical approach that requires appellate courts to weigh an error against properly admitted evidence in favor of conviction as well as any contrary evidence discrediting the prosecution's case. Id. {34} In addition to lacking a reasoned foundation in New Mexico law for its existence, the Moore test has never been fully adopted by this Court, casting further doubt on its legitimacy and utility. While numerous cases have relied on Moore, many other opinions have avoided discussion of the three-part test altogether and instead followed the well-established principle of federal harmless error review that whether a given error requires reversal depends upon the reasonable possibility or reasonable probability that the error contributed to the conviction. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-028, ¶ 42, 129 N.M. 556, 11 P.3d 131 (applying the reasonable probability standard to a non-constitutional error); Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 25, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 (applying the reasonable possibility standard to a constitutional error); State v. Zamarripa, 2009-NMSC-001, ¶ 52, 145 N.M. 402, 199 P.3d 846 (applying both the reasonable possibility standard and the requirement that the error be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Other opinions, without specifically invoking the reasonable possibility or reasonable probability standard, have remained focused on the likelihood that the error contributed to the underlying verdict. See, e.g., State v. Paiz, 2011-NMSC-008, ¶ 19, 149 N.M. 412, 249 P.3d 1235 (analyzing whether error in misjoinder resulted in prejudice through a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Fuson v. State, 105 N.M. 632, 634, 735 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1987) (determining that impairment of a petitioner's right to a peremptory challenge prejudice[d] the petitioner, requiring a new trial). {35} The present appeal is not this Court's first effort to address Moore's divergence from established standards of harmless error review. In Barr, we examined how New Mexico courts had up to that point applied the Moore test, noting that the test had in some cases replaced the reasonable possibility (or reasonable probability) standard in determining whether an error is harmless. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 52, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198; see also State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 562, 874 P.2d 12, 23 (1994) (Montgomery, C.J., specially concurring) (suggesting that Moore provides a measure of harmless error that is different from the reasonable possibility standard). {36} In Barr, the defendant was tried for the murder of a former roommate. Another former roommate testified on behalf of the State, and defense counsel attempted to impeach that witness by citing inconsistencies between his in-court testimony and a videotaped statement that he had made to police. 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198. The State then introduced, and the district court admitted, the videotaped statement, in which the witness detailed the defendant's killing of the victim and reflected on the defendant's bad character. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. After being convicted, the defendant appealed on the basis that the admission of the videotaped statement was improper. Id. ¶ 22. The State responded that even if the admission of the statement was error, that error was harmless. Id. ¶ 46. We agreed that the error was harmless, and went on to clarify the standard that appellate courts must apply in making such determinations. We re-fortif[ied] the boundary between non-constitutional and constitutional error for the purpose of harmless error analysis, id. ¶ 53, explaining that it is appropriate to review non-constitutional error with a lower standard than that reserved for our most closely held rights, id. ¶ 51, and therefore reviewing courts should only conclude that [a constitutional] error is harmless when there is no reasonable possibility it affected the verdict. Id. ¶ 53. By comparison, a non-constitutional error is harmless when there is no reasonable probability the error affected the verdict. Id. ¶ 53. Recognizing the federal constitutional underpinnings for such a distinction, id. ¶¶ 49-51, we observed that the reasonable possibility standard continues to resemble the reasonable doubt standard while the reasonable probability standard requires a greater degree of likelihood that a particular error affected a verdict. Id. ¶ 54. We reaffirm that holding here. {37} Barr then discussed the long-standing three-part test from Moore, which we noted makes no mention of the `reasonable possibility' standard. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 52, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198. We proceeded to sanction the three Moore factors, not as a mandatory test as they had been utilized to date, but rather as a useful framework which would provide ... a reliable basis for determining whether an error is harmless. Id. ¶ 55. Since Barr, however, courts have continued to employ the Moore factors as an inflexible test when assessing the harmfulness of erroneously admitted evidence. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 2011-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 40-42, 149 N.M. 273, 248 P.3d 315; State v. Tom, 2010-NMCA-062, ¶ 20, 148 N.M. 348, 236 P.3d 660. Because this Court has a responsibility to correct a judicial misinterpretation of our caselaw that may otherwise remain on the books as an erroneous precedent, Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 41, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803, we overrule Moore to the extent that it mandated the three-part test as the proper analytical framework for reviewing harmless error. For the reasons discussed below, we also overrule that portion of Barr that recognized the legitimacy of Moore, even when its factors are used more flexibly, as well as all other cases to the extent that they applied Moore to resolve a claim of harmless error. [6] {38} In sum, we no longer recognize the Moore three-part test or any of the factors thereof as accurate statements of law. To explain our renunciation of Moore, we examine the factors individually, beginning with the first factor: whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction without reference to the improperly admitted evidence. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198. This factor, through its use of the phrase substantial evidence, runs the risk of allowing the more deferential sufficiency of the evidence standard of appellate review to seep into a court's harmless error analysis. See, e.g., State v. Aragon, 2010-NMSC-008, ¶ 36, 147 N.M. 474, 225 P.3d 1280 (focusing on the sufficiency of the evidence that supports a conviction to conclude an error was harmless); Tom, 2010-NMCA-062, ¶ 19, 148 N.M. 348, 236 P.3d 660 (relying on the sufficiency of the evidence standard when applying the first Moore factor). {39} Where a defendant appeals from a conviction on the ground that it was not supported by sufficient evidence, the appellate court must determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 30, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In conducting such a review, the court indulg[es] all reasonable inferences and resolv[es] all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict. State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By contrast, [t]he jury verdict should not automatically be afforded deference when a constitutional error has infected the trial, and so in harmless error review the verdict is entitled to deference  only when the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict was not tainted by the constitutional error. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 30, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699. {40} The second Moore factor directs courts to consider whether the prosecution presented such a disproportionate volume of permissible evidence that, in comparison, the amount of improper evidence will appear so minuscule that it could not have contributed to the conviction. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 52, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198 (quoting Moore, 94 N.M. at 504, 612 P.2d at 1315). The first two factors are closely linked and invite the same type of potential misuse: that an error may be deemed harmless simply because of the sheer volume of other evidence supporting conviction. There are some circumstances where ... the evidence of a defendant's guilt is sufficient even in the absence of the trial court's error, that still require the reviewing court to reverse the conviction if the jury's verdict appears to have been tainted by error. Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 38, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804; see also State v. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 11, 136 N.M. 348, 98 P.3d 998 ([C]onstitutional error must not be deemed harmless solely based on overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.). There are several reasons why it is improper for overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt to serve as the main determinant of whether an error was harmless. First, such an approach moves the inquiry away from its appropriate central focus, which is whether there is a reasonable possibility or probability, depending on whether the error offends the defendant's constitutional rights, that the erroneous evidence might have affected the jury's verdict. Id. In addition, excessive reliance on overwhelming evidence of guilt also ignores the principle that even if conviction appears inevitable, there is a point at which an error becomes too great to condone as a matter of constitutional integrity and prosecutorial deterrence. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 31, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Moore, 94 N.M. at 505, 612 P.2d at 1316 (Sosa, C.J., dissenting) (Though evidence of guilt was great in this case, I believe that prosecutors should nonetheless conform to legal standards in obtaining convictions.... Convictions should not be obtained at any cost, but should be obtained in accordance with the rules of evidence.). In addition, when an appellate court gives too much consideration to overwhelming evidence, it risks simply weighing the evidence in favor of and against guilt, which would usurp the role of the jury. State v. Stephen F., 2008-NMSC-037, ¶ 41, 144 N.M. 360, 188 P.3d 84; see also Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 38, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804 ([I]t is not the role of the appellate court to re-weigh the evidence to decide a defendant's guilt or innocence.). {41} The third Moore factor queries whether there is substantial conflicting evidence to discredit the State's testimony. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198. In addition to the same potential for confusion posed by the term substantial evidence, discussed above, the third factor runs the risk of inappropriately shifting the burden of proof from the state to the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 122 N.M. 15, 27, 919 P.2d 1080, 1092 (1996) (holding error to be harmless in part because defendant failed to offer substantial conflicting evidence to discredit the State's testimony (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. McClennen, 2008-NMCA-130, ¶ 15, 144 N.M. 878, 192 P.3d 1255 (holding error to be harmless in part because the defendant did not testify and [t]hus, there is not substantial evidence in the record to discredit the State's evidence). The burden of proof in the underlying criminal proceeding will always rest with the State. See UJI 14-5060 NMRA (The burden is always on the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.); see also Moeller v. Weber, 689 N.W.2d 1, 16 (S.D.2004) (the defense cannot be required to present any evidence whatever.). Similarly, once a constitutional error has been established it is the State's burden to demonstrate that the error is harmless. See Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 1, 162 P.3d 156. Because the third Moore factor appears to reduce that burden, it cannot be a proper component of our harmless error analysis. 94 N.M. at 504, 612 P.2d at 1315. {42} Considering the Moore test as a whole, perhaps most significant and most problematic is what it omits: the central inquiry of whether an error was likely to have affected the jury's verdict. By limiting their harmless error review to the weight or volume of evidence in favor of guilt, courts avoid inquiring into the nature and likely impact of the very error at issue. See United States v. Coughlin, 821 F.Supp.2d 35, 42 (D.D.C.2011) (The inquiry is `whether the error itself had substantial influence. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946))). In sum, even if applied more flexibly as a useful framework rather than as a rigid test, Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 55, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198, the Moore factors misstate the law and distort the proper focus of harmless error review from whether the verdict was impacted by the error to whether, in spite of the error, the right result was reached. Barr, 2009-NMSC-024, ¶ 57, 146 N.M. 301, 210 P.3d 198. {43} We now turn to what relevant considerations reviewing courts may use in place of the Moore factors when assessing the reasonable possibility (or reasonable probability) that impermissible evidence contributed to a defendant's conviction. To be sure, there are no scientific answers to the ultimate question of whether the trier of fact was influenced by an error, as the reviewing court cannot conclusively determine what went on in the mind of another or of twelve others. Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 23 (Ohio State Univ. Press 1970). But in reaching a judgment as to the likely effect of the error, courts should evaluate all of the circumstances surrounding the error. This requires an examination of the error itself, which depending upon the facts of the particular case could include an examination of the source of the error and the emphasis placed upon the error. Of course, evidence of a defendant's guilt separate from the error may often be relevant, even necessary, for a court to consider, since it will provide context for understanding how the error arose and what role it may have played in the trial proceedings; but such evidence, as discussed above, can never be the singular focus of the harmless error analysis as it was under Moore. As we have previously explained, when reviewing an error's role in the trial, courts may, depending upon the circumstances of the cases before them, examine the importance of the [erroneously admitted evidence] in the prosecution's case, as well as whether the [error] was cumulative or instead introduced new facts. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 11, 136 N.M. 348, 98 P.3d 998 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). These considerations, we are careful to note, are not a substitute test provided in place of Moore; for instance, improperly admitted evidence that is cumulative [7] is not ipso facto harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 37, 136 N.M. 348, 98 P.3d 998. {44} Reviewing courts must keep in mind that harmless error review necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (The inquiry ... [is] whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.); see also Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 37, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804 ([H]armless error analysis requires an appellate court to review the effect of an error in the unique context of the specific evidence presented at a given trial.). When assessing two cases that are factually analogous, with similar errors, the reviewing court thus may find the impact of the error harmful in one case and harmless in the other. In addition, because an error may be prejudicial with respect to one conviction, but harmless with respect to another, courts must separately assess the effect the error may have had on each of the defendant's convictions. See Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029, ¶ 31, 136 N.M. 348, 98 P.3d 998.