Opinion ID: 4526150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Text of Section 4B1.2(b)

Text: McClain argues that because the text of Guideline § 4B1.2(b) does not include the word “deliver,” as in TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a)(4), his conviction under subsection (a)(4) cannot serve as a controlled-substance offense. Though we held in Havis that “[t]he text of § 4B1.2(b) controls,” we did so in concluding that “[t]he Commission’s use of commentary to add attempt crimes to the definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ deserves no deference” because the text of the Guideline included only completed offenses. 927 F.3d at 386–87. Havis presented a narrow question about the role that the commentary plays in interpreting the Guidelines themselves; it does not disturb the categorical approach, which requires federal courts to ignore the labels describing an offense. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016) (“[T]he label a State assigns to a crime—whether ‘burglary,’ ‘breaking and entering,’ or something else entirely— has no relevance to whether that offense is an ACCA predicate.”). Whether “manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense” from Guideline § 4B1.2(b) includes or encompasses “deliver” as in TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a)(4) has nothing to do with whether the commentary in the Guidelines goes beyond interpreting the text of the Guidelines. McClain must still demonstrate 7 No. 19-5963, United States v. McClain that he could be convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in Tennessee “without necessarily having committed a ‘controlled substance offense’ as that term is defined by the Guidelines,” which he fails to do. See United States v. Merriweather, 728 F. App’x 498, 515 (6th Cir 2018); see generally Goldston, 906 F.3d at 395–97 (conducting an elementsbased inquiry of TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a)(2) under the categorical approach in the ACCA context). We have rejected this argument before. In United States v. Douglas, we explained that this argument “reads too much into these lexical differences. Our inquiry is not whether the elements of the crime contain the same words as the Guidelines’ definition—it is ‘whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the definition of a controlledsubstance offense.’” 563 F. App’x 371, 377 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Woodruff, 735 F.3d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 2013)). Admittedly, Douglas applied plain-error review and did not formally apply the categorical approach. See id. at 376–78. Nevertheless, this does not permit McClain to use Havis to side-step the categorical approach.