Opinion ID: 1869140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Case Number 1940678Alfa's Appeal

Text: Nationwide concedes that the trial court's judgment requires Alfa ultimately [to] pay Nationwide twice. Brief of Appellee, at 26. It justifies this result on the ground that Alfa's obligations, Nationwide argues, are based upon two different [theories of recovery]. Id. The first theory is, of course, the one under which it recovered in Nationwide I, based on Alfa's status as a co-provider of primary insurance coverage of the same insurable interest, subject matter, and risk. 643 So.2d at 561. Nationwide's second theory of recovery from Alfa is based on its construction of Ala.Code 1975, § 27-23-2, [1] under which, Nationwide contends, it became a judgment creditor of Alfa because of the judgment entered against Hall. Under this theory, Nationwide seeks to recover now the same amount it sought unsuccessfully to recover in the proceedings before our remand in Nationwide I. Recovery under this theory would require Alfa, which, because of its settlement with Packer and the judgment in Nationwide I, has already paid over $420,000 on a policy that contained a $300,000 limitation of liability, to pay an additional $286,092.30. In opposition to this theory, Alfa argues (1) that § 27-23-2 does not apply to the parties in this case and (2) that a second recovery is foreclosed by this Court's holding in Nationwide I, which, Alfa contends, conclusively determined the extent of Alfa's liability for contribution to Nationwide. We need not address the applicability of § 27-23-2, because we hold that the judgment against Alfa contravenes the holding in Nationwide I, which is now the law of this case. In Nationwide I, after concluding that the Alfa and Nationwide policies provided primary coverage and that Alfa had settled with Packer at its own risk, we said: We hold, therefore, that because the record undisputedly shows that Alfa knew of Friedlander's claim for indemnification long before it paid the entire proceeds of its policy to settle the claims against Hall, the circuit court properly held Alfa liable to Friedlander's other insurer, Nationwide, for a pro rata contribution to the amount Nationwide paid to settle the claims against Friedlander and the cost of conducting Friedlander's defense, even though Alfa had already paid the limits of the policy covering both Hall and Friedlander in settlement of the claims against Hall. 643 So.2d at 562 (emphasis added). We agree with Alfa that Nationwide I squarely held that, because Nationwide provided primary coverage for Friedlander, it  should share the settlement costs and expenses. Reply Brief of Appellant Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, at 5 (emphasis added). Otherwise stated, Nationwide I held that Alfa and Nationwide must share the cost of the very expense for which Nationwide now seeks full reimbursement. It is well established that on remand the issues decided by an appellate court become the `law of the case,' and that the trial court must comply with the appellate court's mandate. Gray v. Reynolds, 553 So.2d 79, 81 (Ala.1989); Stewart v. ATEC Associates, Inc., 652 So.2d 270, 273 (Ala.Civ.App.1994). See also Walker v. Carolina Mills Lumber Co., 441 So.2d 980 (Ala.Civ.App.1983). The law of this case, as established in Nationwide I, prohibits a second recovery by Nationwide from Alfa under any theory. This is true regardless of the eventual disposition of the action against Hall. We agree with Alfa's argument that to hold otherwise would essentially render meaningless the decision of the Court in the first appeal. Reply Brief of Appellant Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, at 5. The summary judgment is, therefore, reversed as to Alfa, and a judgment is rendered in favor of Alfa. 1940678REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. 1940756REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.