Opinion ID: 1436223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Problems arising from the procedure-substance distinction.

Text: The second question upon which arguments of counsel were requested on rehearing was what, if any, other reasons there may be in support of or opposition to the distinction in the original majority opinion between matters of structure or procedure and matters of substantive policy, including what, if any, problems may result from the application of that distinction in future cases. Neither counsel for the State of Oregon nor counsel for the unions made any attempt to support the procedure-substance distinction. As previously stated, both rejected and disowned that distinction. Counsel for the cities, on the other hand, characterized the procedure-substance distinction as a rule which will involve the courts of Oregon in a tussel with a tar baby and suggested examples of problems that will arise in future cases from the adoption of such a rule, including the following: (a) In the important area of land use planning, serious problems could arise in the application of state statutes in a metropolitan area involving two cities, such as Eugene and Springfield, both of which have charter or ordinance provisions on that subject. Such local charter or ordinance provisions may well include procedures for land use planning. Under the procedure-substance distinction such charter or ordinance provisions, because they involve procedures, could not be superseded by state law unless held to come within the exception as stated by the previous majority opinion under which such provisions may be superseded by state statute if such a statute is justified by a need to safeguard the interests of persons or entities. The application of such a test, however, would require the court to make a pure policy determination and one which would be made without the benefit of any identifiable criteria in precise words of the constitution. [8] That determination would also be much more difficult by the requirement of a finding of need, i.e., necessity. How much more realistic it would be to simply cut through this two-layer cake of procedure and substance and determine whether the state's interest in land use planning predominates over local choice of procedure for land use planning, as under the test previously adopted by a unanimous court in Heinig. (b) The open meeting law is also an example of a statute which arguably, if not probably, involves a matter of procedure, at least if and when applied to overrule the provisions of a city charter or ordinance which permit nonopen meetings, such as executive sessions of a city council. Under the proposed opinion state law would not prevail unless justified by a need to safeguard the interests of persons or entities  a pure policy determination. Under the Heinig test, however, it would be much more simple to hold that the state has a predominant interest in openness in government at all levels, including cities. (c) The Australian ballot is another example of a possible conflict between state laws and provisions of city charters or ordinances on a procedural matter as to which, under the proposed opinion, state law could only be held controlling upon a finding of a need to safeguard the interests of persons or entities  a test which is obviously not based upon any identifiable criteria to be found in the words of Art. XI, § 2, or Art. IV, § 1(5). In addition, the entire procedure-substance dichotomy requires an exercise in semantics that will lead to more problems and litigation than it will solve and prevent. For many years the courts have been criticized by legal scholars for their tendency to decide cases by the adoption and application of categories which may become little more than labels, i.e., for the application as an exercise in mechanical jurisprudence. [9] One of the principal objects of attack by these legal writers has been the distinction between matters of substance and procedure. [10] As pointed out by them, these terms are by no means infallible categories and the meaning to be given to them, as well as the distinction between them, often defies logical or objective explanation. [11] As also stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1964), The line between `substance' and `procedure' shifts as the legal context changes. Indeed, this court has rejected the distinction between procedure and substance as a test for application in determining whether a state statute is to be applied retroactively. Thus it was held in Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or. 545, 549, 495 P.2d 273, 275 (1972), that    The labels [procedural and substantive] were applied [in past decisions by this court] after the court decided whether it thought a new statute affected legal rights and obligations arising out of past actions. [12] Finally, under the heading of problems created by the majority opinion, as well as by the previous majority opinion, it is important to again bear in mind the financial impact upon the cities of a rule of legislative supremacy in all matters addressed primarily to substantive social, economic, or other regulatory objectives of the state. As stated in my original dissent (281 Or. at 192, 576 P.2d at 1233): The most pernicious feature of the doctrine of state supremacy over cities is the tendency of the legislature to lay burdens on the cities.    Indeed, according to the cities, the financial burden imposed by these statutes may well cause some small cities to choose between a volunteer fire department or a paid one. [13] Under the Heinig test this court could properly consider the financial impact of state statutes upon a city as at least one factor in deciding whether the interest of the city predominates over that of the state. Under the majority's rule of legislative supremacy, however, no consideration may be given to that fact. Instead the questions to be decided by this court would be whether the statute is addressed primarily to substantive social, economic, or other regulatory objectives of the state or, if the statute involves a matter of the structure or procedures, of local government, whether there is a need to safeguard the interests of persons or entities. With all due respect, it is submitted that to adopt such rules as the basis for decision of Home Rule cases is to adopt rules stated in rubbery adjectival language that will only cause more problems than they will solve.