Opinion ID: 2585525
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation

Text: Courts serve an important role in resolving conflicts and defining rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that, [o]ver the course of centuries, our society has settled upon civil litigation as a means for redressing grievances, resolving disputes, and vindicating rights when other means fail. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 643, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985). The Court has also noted that it traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). Consistent with the important role of the courts, we have recognized the importance of meaningful access to them. See Setala v. J.C. Penney Co., 97 Hawai`i 484, 491, 40 P.3d 886, 893 (2002). The litigation privilege's purpose of encouraging witnesses and parties to take part in judicial proceedings is based on the premise that the threat of subsequent liability discourages participation. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333, 103 S.Ct. 1108. By protecting communications during judicial proceedings, the litigation privilege affords litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365, 369 (Cal.1990); see also Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes, and Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.1994) [hereinafter, Levin ]; Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 674. Hawai`i courts have also recognized that the threat of subsequent litigation affects access to the courts. In the context of an action for malicious prosecution, the ICA noted: We do not wish to open the door to a second lawsuit being filed by the defendant every time the plaintiff loses a previous lawsuit, followed, we suppose, by a third lawsuit if the plaintiff in the second lawsuit loses that one and so on ad infinitium. We think that one of the things that distinguishes our society is the citizen's relative freedom of access to the courts. The preservation of that freedom lies behind the basic American rule against allowing attorney's fees to the successful party in litigation except where such is provided by agreement, statute, rule or precedent. To adopt [the policy urged] with respect to granting summary judgments in malicious prosecution suits would be to expose the plaintiffs in the original action to the harassment and expense of malicious prosecution suits without the person bringing the second action having any basis for his claim of malice. This would tend to discourage resort to the court where irreconcilable conflict exists. Brodie v. Hawaii Automotive Retail Gasoline Dealers Ass'n., Inc., 2 Haw.App. 316, 321, 631 P.2d 600, 604 (1981) (emphases added), rev'd on other grounds, 65 Haw. 598, 655 P.2d 863 (1982). [17] As the ICA has indicated, liability in subsequent proceedings tends to discourage parties from turning to the courts where an irreconcilable conflict exists. In this manner, the chilling effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation hinders access to the courts, which undermines the courts' role in resolving disputes and vindicating rights. Given the importance of access to the courts, the policy of avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation generally favors limiting liability in subsequent proceedings.