Opinion ID: 1153977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Blake's Action Brought Within the Applicable Limitations Period?

Text: Interference with contract rights or other economic relations is a recognized tort, [17] and the statute of limitations relating to torts generally applies. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 1027, 1030 (1974). In Alaska the period of limitations for tort actions involving injury to intangible rights is two years. AS 09.10.070. The parties' dispute concerns the time from which the period of limitations is measured. Blake argues that Gilbert's acts caused repeated and continuing injury and, thus, the limitations period did not begin to run until the date of the last injury. Blake's argument fails. The acts of interference alleged by Blake were onetime occurrences, even though they may have continuing consequences. They are not analogous to a continuing trespass or nuisance, where repeated and continued tortious acts are committed. See Marcus v. National Life Insurance, 422 F.2d 626 (7th Cir.1970) (malicious interference with contract caused injury at time of breach; there can be no continuous inducement to carry on continuing breaches). Blake alleged interference by Gilbert with two separate contracts  the contract between D.E.I. and appellee Haakon Olson, and the contract between D.E.I. and Swiftsure. The act of interference with the contract between D.E.I. and Olson occurred no later than April 11, 1977, when Olson, by a letter to the Division of Occupational Licensing, discounted his association with D.E.I. Gilbert's interference with the alleged agreement between D.E.I. and Swiftsure must have occurred prior to May 1977, when Gilbert entered into an agreement with Swiftsure to design and install the electrical work at Swiftsure's Kodiak plant. Blake initiated his action on March 10, 1980, beyond the period of limitations in both instances. Even if the period is measured from the date of discovery, the claims are still barred. The record reveals that Blake apparently knew of Gilbert's acts by May 1977, and certainly by March 1, 1978, when he obtained D.E.I.'s right to the action. [18] We affirm the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of interference with contract rights.