Opinion ID: 1443864
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Purpose of the AHRA

Text: In interpreting a statute, we also look to the language of the statute in light of the purposes for which it was enacted. Tesoro Alaska, 746 P.2d at 904. In stating the purpose of AS 18.80, the legislature found that discrimination against an inhabitant of the state because of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex, physical or mental disability, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy or parenthood is a matter of public concern and that this discrimination not only threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state but also menaces the institutions of the state and threatens peace, order, health, safety, and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants. AS 18.80.200(a). Alaska Statute 18.80 was enacted in order to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment, in credit and financing practices, in places of public accommodation, in the sale, lease, or rental of real property because of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy or parenthood. AS 18.80.200(b). Muller and Relkin argue that an expansive interpretation of marital status is more in keeping with the purposes of the AHRA. They contend that interpreting marital status narrowly may lead to results that do not protect married couples from employment discrimination. BP counters that the plain meaning of marital status better comports with the purposes of the AHRA. We agree. The purpose of the AHRA is to prevent prejudices and biases borne against persons who are members of certain protected classes; it seeks to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases against the members of those classes. [5] The more expansive interpretation of the term marital status does not protect the members of the class, but instead effectively enlarges it to include all persons wishing to work with their spouses, thus invalidating any relevant anti-nepotism policies. Anti-nepotism policies exist to prevent potential emotional interference with job performance, collusion in grievance disputes, favoritism, morale problems resulting from the appearance of favoritism, and conflicts of interests that arise if an employee is required to supervise the employee's spouse. Miller, 362 N.W.2d at 654. Whether these reasons are valid in all circumstances or not, they do not appear to reflect offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, or biases. Id. Therefore, interpreting marital status as plaintiffs propose would not advance the AHRA's purpose of protecting class members from prejudices or biases borne against them. See Whirlpool Corp., 390 N.W.2d at 626-27 (holding that the legislative intent behind the Michigan Civil Rights Act was to prevent prejudice against persons based on their membership in a particular class, and to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases; consequently, the no-spouse rule was not discrimination on the basis of marital status, but instead was permissible different treatment based on the fact that one's spouse works in the same place). Similarly, we find that the purpose of AS 18.80.220 is to prohibit discrimination against a person based on his or her condition of being married or unmarried, not on the identity of one's spouse. To whom one is married is not a class-defining factor, unlike all the other factors listed in AS 18.80.220(a)(1). Extending the reach of the anti-discrimination law to employment decisions based on to whom a person is married would change the focus of the law from discrimination based on broad categories, which can give rise to demeaning stereotypes and biases, to a highly individual factor. Thus, adopting Muller's and Relkin's interpretation of marital status would be inconsistent with the structure and purpose of the statute, because it would prohibit discrimination based on individual rather than class factors. We have held that Alaska's civil rights statute should be broadly construed `to further the goal of eradication of discrimination.' Alaska USA Fed. Credit Union v. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d 804, 806 (1982) (holding that a nonprofit credit union was an employer for purposes of AS 18.80, and thus subject to the prohibition on sex discrimination) (quoting Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Products, Inc., 601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979)). We have also held that Alaska's anti-discrimination statute gives the [Alaska Human Rights] Commission a more aggressive mandate than that held [under federal law]. State v. Meyer, 906 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Alaska 1995). We have long recognized the strong statement of purpose of AS 18.80, and its avowed determination to protect the civil rights of all Alaska citizens. Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Alaska 1976) (holding that compensatory and punitive damages are available as relief under AS 18.80). Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of the term marital status achieves the goal of AS 18.80.220 of eradicating discrimination against a person based on the condition of being married or unmarried, and thus best serves the purposes of the AHRA.