Opinion ID: 1193933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sex Discrimination Claim for Failure to Promote

Text: Fischer first appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to her failure to promote sex discrimination claim. Fischer argues that sex discrimination was at the root of her failure to obtain promotions to the Strategic Accounts Region Director position in October 2003 and May 2004, as well as to the same position in the Central Region in May 2004 and October 2004. The district court found however, and Fischer concedes on appeal, that Title VII's 300-day limitation period for filing a charge with the EEOC bars Fischer from holding Defendant liable for any discrete discriminatory acts occurring before September 24, 2004. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges). Thus, Fischer's only timely failure to promote claim concerns Sieverding's permanent appointment to the role of Central Region Director in October 2004. This does not mean, however, that these earlier, time-barred incidents are irrelevant. Rather, time-barred acts [are allowed] as support for a timely claim. West v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Corp., 405 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Davis v. Con-Way Transportation Central Express, Inc., 368 F.3d 776, 786 n. 4 (7th Cir.2004)); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (Title VII does not bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.) In light of this 300-day limitations period, we turn to whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Fischer's sex discrimination claim with respect to her failure to be promoted to the permanent Central Region Director position in October 2004. A failure to promote claim can be established through either the direct method of proof or the indirect burden-shifting method established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Volovsek v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade, & Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 689, 692 (7th Cir.2003). [1] The prima facie case for a failure to promote claim under the indirect method requires that the plaintiff show: 1) [s]he belongs to a protected class, 2)[s]he applied for and was qualified for the position sought, 3)[s]he was rejected for that position and 4) the employer granted the promotion to someone outside of the protected group who was not better qualified than the plaintiff. Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir.2003). Under this burden-shifting method, once the plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to set forth evidence supporting a finding that the employment decision was made on a nondiscriminatory basis. Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir.1996). If the defendant is successful in presenting a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for not promoting the plaintiff, the burden then shifts again to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Id. At issue between the parties is the fourth prong of the prima facie case [2]  whether Fischer was as qualified as Sieverding for the Central Region Director position. Defendant claims Sieverding was made the permanent Central Region Director based upon the fact that he successfully demonstrated, while serving in the acting capacity, that he had the ability and willingness to meet the responsibilities of the permanent post. Accordingly, Defendant argues that Fischer cannot show that she was similarly qualified for the position, since she had never served as acting Central Region Director. This argument alone, however, cannot carry the day. While Sieverding's appointment to the permanent Central Region Director position is Fischer's only timely claim, Avanade's time-barred acts may still be used to support her timely claim. See West v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Corp., 405 F.3d at 581. This is particularly true in a circumstance like this, where Sieverding's appointment to the acting Central Region Director position, which Fischer claims was made on a discriminatory basis, is the sole reason offered by Defendant for Sieverding's subsequent promotion to the permanent post. Looking then to Fischer's and Sieverding's respective qualifications when Sieverding was named acting Central Region Director in May 2004, we find that these two individuals were similarly situated, thus satisfying the fourth prong of the prima facie case. Both Fischer and Sieverding came to Avanade with over ten years' experience in the technology field, and both entered at a Level 3 skill level. Furthermore, Fischer and Sieverding had both worked on projects for the Bank prior to the two jointly sharing the responsibilities of Strategic Accounts Region Director in October 2003. As for Fischer, she had managed three to four concurrent projects for the Bank and received the strong recommendation of the Bank's Assistant Vice President for the Strategic Accounts Region Director position in October 2003 and the high recommendation of the Bank's Vice President when the position re-opened in 2004. With respect to Sieverding, he was brought on to lead a project that was facing numerous problems, particularly with respect to its original budget and release date, when he was brought on board. Although Sieverding oversaw a group ranging in size from twenty to ninety while at the Bank, the parties dispute Sieverding's success on the project. Fischer in particular points to the fact that Sieverding's reliance upon a handshake deal for 200 undocumented change requests apparently led Avanade to have to issue a rebate and provide uncompensated work to the Bank totaling $600,000. Avanade's reference to Sieverding's exceptional rating in 2003 and promotion to Level 60, compared to Fischer's exceeds expectations rating and promotion to Level 55, is insufficient to disprove that the individuals were similarly situated, particularly when the promotion level disparity is allegedly the result of discrimination. For these reasons, we find that Fischer has offered sufficient evidence to meet this fourth prong and show a prima facie case against Avanade. Having shown sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method, the burden then shifts to Avanade to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for hiring Sieverding to the Central Region Director position. See Debs v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 153 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1998) (Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, there is a presumption of discrimination that obligates the employer to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.). Defendant claims that Evans promoted Sieverding to the permanent Central Region Director position based upon the fact that while serving in the acting role, Sieverding had performed well and displayed his ability to fulfill the position's responsibilities. While we recognize that Sieverding's promotion to the permanent Central Region Director position is Fischer's only timely claim, we note that with respect to Sieverding's promotion to the acting position, Avanade offers that this decision was based on Sieverding's present availability, interest in the Central Region, experience managing a large project, and ability to handle the position. Having offered these legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring Sieverding, the burden shifts back to Fischer to show that this proffered explanation is pretextual. Pretext is a `lie, specifically a phony reason for some action,' Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Russell v. Acme-Evans, Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995)), and thus, [t]o show pretext, `a plaintiff must show that [ (1)] the employer's nondiscriminatory reason was dishonest; and [ (2)] the employer's true reason was based on a discriminatory intent.' Brown v. Ill. Dep't of Natural Res., 499 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir.2007)). This can be done with either direct or indirect evidence. If the plaintiff proceeds to offer indirect evidence, the plaintiff must show that the employer's reason is not credible or that the reason is factually baseless. Id. (quoting Perez, 488 F.3d at 777-78). In addition, `[the plaintiff] must also provide evidence of at least an inference that the real reason for [the adverse employment action] was discriminatory.' Id. (quoting Perez, 488 F.3d at 777-78). Furthermore, when a defendant has offered multiple nondiscriminatory reasons for its hiring decision, showing that one of these reasons is pretextual is not enough, although there may be circumstances where multiple grounds offered by the defendant . . . are so intertwined, or the pretextual character of one of them so fishy and suspicious, that the plaintiff could withstand summary judgment. Russell, 51 F.3d at 69-70. As part of her offer of evidence of pretext, Fischer is permitted to look to events occurring prior to the 300-day limitations date. Davis, 368 F.3d at 786 n. 4. Thus, Fischer's time-barred claims regarding Lewis' and Sieverding's promotions in May 2004 to Directors of the Strategic Accounts and Central Regions, respectively, are relevant. With these governing principles in mind, we turn to Fischer's evidence of pretext. First, Fischer argues that not only was she as qualified as Sieverding for the permanent Central Region Director position, but that she was in fact more qualified than Sieverding for this post. Fischer, however, is unable to support this argument with respect to the permanent Central Region Director position and is only able to offer reasons why she was more qualified than Lewis for the Strategic Accounts Region Director position and more qualified than Sieverding for the acting Central Region Director post. Defendant claims that Sieverding was named to the permanent post based upon his demonstrated ability and enthusiasm while serving in the acting Director capacity. Regardless of whether Fischer's performance was superior to Sieverding's at the Bank, or whether Fischer was the superior candidate for the acting Director position, Fischer has offered no evidence to directly contest Sieverding's performance while serving in the acting capacity aside from Laura Rafferty's testimony that upon coming to the acting Director position, Gamso described Sieverding as practically clueless. By failing to offer any evidence beyond this, Fischer falls short of clearing the high hurdle necessary to establish pretext through reference to her own superior qualifications for the position. As this Court has stated, evidence of the applicants' competing qualifications does not constitute evidence of pretext unless those differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at issue. Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1059-60 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180 (7th Cir.2002)). Despite Fischer's arguably superior qualifications to Sieverding's for the acting Director position, Fischer has failed to establish that no reasonable person could have chosen Sieverding over Fischer for his subsequent permanent appointment to the post. This, however, does not end the inquiry into pretext. The district court erred in appearing to make such a showing mandatory, stating that Fischer  must establish the superiority of her credentials according to this standard in order to show pretext, rather than fully acknowledging that Fischer can establish pretext through other direct or indirect evidence as well. We thus turn to Fischer's other arguments of pretext. The most compelling evidence of pretext involves Joseph Mendel's role in the entire promotion process. Fischer has offered testimony by Laura Rafferty [3] that, if found credible by a jury, would show that as early as February 2004, Mendel had pre-ordained that Lewis would have fast-track status to the Strategic Accounts Director position and Sieverding was to be moved to the Central Region. According to Rafferty, in February or March 2004, before Lewis came to the Strategic Accounts Region, Gary Gamso, the Central Region Director at the time, informed her of Mendel's intention to move Sieverding out of the Strategic Accounts Region and bring in Lewis to fill the Director position. According to Rafferty, Gamso related to her that Mendel had requested Sieverding be removed from the Strategic Accounts Region, apparently due to performance concerns, and that, since they had no other place to put him, were going to move him into the Central Region. Gamso then relayed to Rafferty that Mendel desired to bring Lewis into the Strategic Accounts Region for 90 days, after which, if he had a good relationship with the Bank, he would be promoted to Director. [4] Lewis' streamlined path to the Strategic Accounts Region Director position prior to its posting is corroborated by the fact that in February, Howard Kilman documented that Lewis was a potential [Director] for Joe [Mendel], and that he needed to help Lewis understand the [opportunity]. Similarly, Mendel's alleged displeasure with Sieverding's performance is corroborated by Mendel's statement to Fischer on May 26, 2004 that Sieverding is not practice director material. Fischer is also able to offer evidence creating an inference that Mendel's actions were based on sex discrimination. Defendant does not dispute that in both 2003 and 2004, Mendel was dismissive of Fischer when she raised concerns regarding male employees enjoying company-paid dinners at a gentleman's club. Fischer further asserts that it was after raising this complaint that Mendel began criticizing her people skills. In addition, according to Fischer, when Mendel determined that Fischer and Sieverding would share the duties of Strategic Accounts Region Director, Mendel promoted Sieverding to a Level 60, but after Fischer expressed concerns about this inequality, only raised Fischer's status to Level 55. The degree to which this evidence regarding Mendel is material to Fischer's timely claim, however, depends upon whether Fischer can establish that Mendel's allegedly discriminatory actions implicate the reasons proffered by Defendant as to why Gamso and Evans named Sieverding to the acting and permanent Central Region Director positions. We find Fischer has provided sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring Sieverding over Fischer were pretextual. First, Gamso and Evans jointly engaged in soliciting Sieverding and determining that he should be appointed to the acting Director role, and based on Rafferty's testimony, Gamso was aware of Mendel's desire to move Sieverding to the Central Region due to performance concerns. Thus, Gamso's awareness of Mendel's concerns and motivations regarding Sieverding is sufficient to raise a material question of fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for soliciting Sieverding for the acting position  that they felt he was qualified and capable of fulfilling the Director responsibilities  was pretextual. Furthermore, Mendel's prior statement to Gamso, as well as his statement to Plaintiff that Sieverding is not practice director material, is at odds with the allegedly good review Mendel gave regarding Sieverding as part of the hiring process for the acting Director position. Furthermore, Mendel's influence went beyond Sieverding's initial transfer to the Central Region and extended to Sieverding's appointment to the permanent Central Region Director role, since Evans sought Mendel's approval of this promotion. As an additional matter, Evans' proffered reason for naming Sieverding rather than Fischer to the Central Region Director position also demands scrutiny. On appeal, Fischer launches a broad attack at declarations offered by seven witnesses who had been previously deposed by Fischer's counsel. [5] Fischer claims that these declarations included statements that were new, contradictory, and beyond the testimony given at the depositions and thus reveal a concocted sham defense on Avanade's part requiring reversal of summary judgment. This includes a specific charge against Evans' testimony. At his deposition on April 14, 2006, Evans was asked why Fischer had not received the acting Central Region Director position. Evans simply replied, I appointed Joe Sieverding to the role. Then, on June 12, 2006, the same date Avanade filed its motion for summary judgment, Evans submitted a new declaration, purporting to explain why Fischer would not have received the acting Director position even if she had expressed interest in it. In the declaration, Evans stated that he did not know if Fischer was interested, or if her workload would allow a transition to the Central Region. Additionally, Evans declared that it was his understanding that Sieverding had more experience in managing large projects. This Court has stated that [a]ffidavits, . . . when offered to contradict the affiant's deposition are so lacking in credibility as to be entitled to zero weight in summary judgment proceedings unless the affiant gives a plausible explanation for the discrepancy. Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.2002). Accordingly, Fischer argues that Evans' declaration contradicts his earlier deposition testimony on this issue. Defendant in contrast, argues that these statements are not contradictory, and observes that where the deposition testimony is ambiguous or incomplete, . . . the witness may legitimately clarify or expand upon that testimony by way of an affidavit. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1007 (7th Cir. 1999). According to Defendant, Evans' declaration statement answers a hypothetical question not asked at the deposition  whether Fischer or Sieverding would have been more qualified for the acting Director position, had Fischer in fact applied for the job. We find that Evans' more fulsome testimony in his declaration cannot be said to contradict his earlier, curt response at his deposition. [6] However, Defendant's failure to fully address until Evans' declaration why Fischer would not have received the position does raise credibility concerns. See Wilson v. AM General Corp., 167 F.3d 1114, 1121 (7th Cir.1999) (affirming denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to jury's finding of pretext, based in part on jury's credibility determination regarding Defendant's failure to disclose reason for termination until discovery, despite being directly asked at time of termination); see also Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991) (genuine issue of material fact with respect to pretext exists when specific reason for promoting one employee over the plaintiff was not disclosed until after litigation, which might suggest . . . a later fabrication). Fischer provided Defendant with at least two opportunities prior to the submission of Evans' declaration to explain why she was not named to the acting Director position. In late May, following Lewis' and Sieverding's moves to their respective Director positions, Fischer approached Human Resources Generalist Tracy Spielmann about whether these promotion decisions were all set up. Spielmann simply responded, Oh, no, failing to provide Fischer with any further clarification regarding Defendant's hiring decisions. Then, at Evans' deposition, although he provided reasons for selecting Sieverding, his only response when directly asked why Fischer did not receive the acting Director position was, I appointed Joe Sieverding to the role. While Evans' more complete declaration statement is not inconsistent with Defendant's prior responses, this late justification for why Fischer would not have been hired, provided at the eleventh hour in conjunction with Defendant's motion for summary judgment, raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this justification is a later fabrication on Defendant's part. Furthermore, the first reason Evans offers in his declaration for not hiring Fischer  that Evans did not know if she was interested in leaving her current position  borders on the illogical if Evans is answering, as Defendant maintains, why he would not have hired Fischer even if she had in fact expressed interest in the position. For these reasons, we find that Fischer has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's promotion of Sieverding to the acting Central Region Director position was pretextual. Furthermore, with respect to Sieverding's appointment to the permanent Central Region Director post, the individuals with authority over this decision were largely the same, seeing as Evans made the decision, with Mendel's approval, to name Sieverding to the permanent post. Additionally, here too, when Evans was asked at his deposition why Fischer was not awarded the permanent position, Evans responded, Joe Sieverding was appointed to the role. It was not until Evans' declaration that Defendant disclosed its justification for naming Sieverding to the permanent position, namely, Sieverding's performance in the acting capacity. Based on the evidence offered by Defendant, Sieverding's appointment to the permanent position can be seen as the last step in a scheme to fast-track Lewis into the Strategic Accounts Region's Director position and switch Sieverding into the Central Region, leaving Fischer without a Director role. While this theory largely depends upon credibility determinations, most notably regarding Laura Rafferty's testimony and Defendant's eleventh hour justifications, credibility is not an issue to be resolved at summary judgment, but is one reserved for the jury. See Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003) (On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations). If Fischer's evidence is deemed credible by a jury, Sieverding's appointment to the permanent Central Region Director position becomes sufficiently intertwined with the earlier promotions of Lewis and Sieverding that the evidence of pretext from Fischer's time-barred claims would similarly support a finding that the reason offered for Sieverding's promotion to the permanent post was also pretextual. See Russell, 51 F.3d at 70 (There may be cases in which the multiple grounds offered by the defendant for the adverse action of which the plaintiff complains are so intertwined, or the pretextual character of one of them so fishy and suspicious, that the plaintiff could withstand summary judgment.). Accordingly, because Fischer has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reason for naming Sieverding to the permanent Central Region Director position was pretextual, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this claim.