Opinion ID: 2326933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Respondent's Due Process and Infirmity of Proof Claims

Text: We consider first Respondent's due process and infirmity of proof arguments, and reject both. The record amply shows that Respondent was afforded notice and a full hearing before a trial judge in Maryland and obtained review of that trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law from the Court of Appeals of Maryland. See In re Edelstein, 892 A.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C.2006) (due process is afforded when the disciplinary proceeding provides adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard) (quoting In re Day, 717 A.2d 883, 886 (D.C.1998)). As noted, Respondent complains specifically about the fact that the transcript of the September 13, 2004 hearing before Judge Thompson and exhibits to which Respondent referred during his testimony on that date [11] were not transmitted to the Maryland court before it issued its June 23, 2005 ruling. [12] However, although the Maryland court did not review the September 13 transcript before issuing its opinion, the court was apprised of its contents through Respondent's Exceptions to Judge Thompson's findings, and the court concluded that the testimony given would not have changed its disposition of the matter. See Zakroff, 876 A.2d at 686 n. 17. Also, as the Board found, [t]he four challenges Respondent made to the trial court's findings based upon the missing [September 13, 2004] transcript related to findings of fact that the Maryland Court did not rely upon for its conclusions of law. Board Report at 6 (quoting Zakroff, 876 A.2d at 686). Finally, Respondent filed with the Maryland court a Motion for Reconsideration in which he raised the missing transcript issue and to which  he confirmed at oral argument before us  he appended the theretofore missing transcript. [13] Thus, the Maryland court had an opportunity to review the transcript before it denied Respondent's motion (on August 9, 2005). We owe due deference to the Maryland court's ruling in which, notwithstanding the court's opportunity to review Respondent's September 13, 2004 testimony, the court rejected Respondent's due process challenge. In re Robertson, 618 A.2d 720, 723 (D.C.1993). In light of all these factors, we conclude that Respondent has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied due process in the Maryland disciplinary proceedings. In essence, Respondent's infirmity of proof argument is that the Maryland court's factual findings do not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in any intentional wrongdoing. However, the infirmity of proof exception is not an invitation to the attorney to relitigate in the District of Columbia the adverse findings of another court in a procedurally fair hearing. In re Gansler, 889 A.2d 285, 288 (D.C.2005) (quoting In re Bridges, 805 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.2002)). We conclude here, as we did in Gansler, that Respondent's assertion falls well short of meeting [the] `heavy' burden that must be met by a Respondent seeking to avoid the factual findings of another disciplining court. 889 A.2d at 288. The Maryland court's findings rested in part on Judge Thompson's credibility determinations, and we are not in as good a position as the trier of fact was to judge who is and who was not telling the whole truth. In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C.1988) (quoting In re Gamblin, 458 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Mo.1970)). We conclude  borrowing the terminology used in Gansler  that the Maryland court devoted substantial attention to the issue of whether Respondent intentionally misappropriated client funds and misled the bankruptcy trustee, and we discern no infirmity in its ruling. Gansler, 889 A.2d at 288.