Opinion ID: 1743393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Right to Free Speech

Text: Plaintiffs also assign that dissolving Class I school districts prior to the November 7, 2006, referendum election results in a denial of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Neb. Const. art. I, § 5. Again, we disagree. The parameters of the constitutional right to freedom of speech are the same under both the federal and the state Constitutions. State v. Rabourn, 269 Neb. 499, 693 N.W.2d 291 (2005). States allowing ballot initiatives have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the initiative process. . . . Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999). But if a state has conferred the right of initiative and referendum, it is obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988). State restrictions on initiative and referendum rights violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee when they significantly inhibit communication with voters about proposed political change, and are not warranted by the state interests (administrative efficiency, fraud detection, informing voters) alleged to justify those restrictions. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192, 119 S.Ct. 636 (holding that Colorado's requirements that circulators be registered voters and wear identification badges violated free speech guarantee). Direct restrictions on initiative and referendum procedures that curtail political expression are subject to exacting scrutiny. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (affirming court of appeals' decision that prohibition against paid circulators violated First Amendment protections of free speech). Accord State v. Radcliffe, 228 Neb. 868, 424 N.W.2d 608 (1988). Although plaintiffs primarily rely on Meyer and Buckley to support their position, neither case is applicable to initiative or referendum processes that do not restrict political communication or association. See, Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir.1997); Stone v. City of Prescott, 173 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.1999); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491 (11th Cir.1996). Neither do they apply to legislation which is not intended to regulate these procedures. L.B. 126 does not impose any restrictions or conditions on plaintiffs' right to communicate with voters about the political change they seek. Compare State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 738, 605 N.W.2d 440 (2000) (holding that state restriction on timing and amount of independent expenditures by political groups supporting candidates was unconstitutional regulation of elections and impermissibly burdened right to engage in political speech). Nor does L.B. 126 attempt to regulate the circulation of initiative or referendum petitions. Compare Radcliffe, supra . Rather, plaintiffs' assertion that their right to free speech has been diminished is based entirely upon their claim that unless L.B. 126 is suspended until the referendum vote, the ability of those opposed to L.B. 126 to persuade voters to reject it will be more difficult. Plaintiffs' claim is not based upon any actual restrictions on their right to communicate with voters. Given the conditions the people of Nebraska have imposed on their power to suspend an act's operation pending a referendum election, the difficulty, as described by plaintiffs, can be avoided only by this court's expanding the scope of the referendum power itself. As discussed, the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a right of referendum, and to expand this right would be to ignore the clear and unambiguous procedure set out by the people in article III, § 3, of the state Constitution. This we shall not do. See Biddulph, 89 F.3d at 1500 (`[t]he state, having created such a procedure, retains the authority to interpret its scope and availability'). We conclude that plaintiffs' claim that L.B. 126 violates their constitutional right to free speech, based on the fact that Nebraska's referendum provisions make it difficult for them to repeal the act and even more difficult to suspend its operation, is without merit.