Opinion ID: 211763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whistleblower Protection Act Claims

Text: McCollum additionally raises three issues before this court from his Whistleblower Protection Act claims. McCollum argues that the Board’s finding that NCUA had shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed him in the absence of his protected disclosures is not supported by substantial evidence. Because the remedy that McCollum seeks based on this claim is the same as the remedy already granted on his claim that his removal was not in accordance with law— i.e., return to the position he would have been in had the act complained of not occurred—we need not decide this issue. McCollum also argues that the Board misinterpreted 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) in holding that NCUA’s refusal to provide an accommodation with respect to his directed reassignment and NCUA’s refusal to allow him to remain in work status while his removal was being processed were not personnel actions. With respect to his claim regarding accommodation, even if he prevailed, 05-3015 13 McCollum would be entitled to at most a return to his position prior to the retaliatory action. Given that we have already granted that relief with respect to his adverse action claim, we need not reach this issue. However, his claim that he was improperly required to use annual leave instead of being allowed to remain in work duty status would entitle him to restoration of the leave used during the period when his removal was being processed. McCollum argues that NCUA’s requirement that he use annual leave instead of remaining in work duty status constitutes a personnel action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix) because it is a decision concerning pay or benefits. NCUA argues that McCollum waived this argument by not objecting to the AJ’s order precluding this issue from consideration at the hearing. NCUA further argues that McCollum’s contention is without merit because the Board found that NCUA Board officials had no reason to retaliate and that they did not retaliate against McCollum. Finally, NCUA argues that McCollum has failed to establish a nexus between the denial and his protected disclosures. We agree with McCollum that refusing to allow an employee whose removal has been proposed to remain in work duty status, as is required by 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(b)(3), is a personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix) because it is a decision concerning pay and/or benefits. NCUA’s arguments do not address the merits of this determination and are without merit in any event. First, NCUA is incorrect that McCollum waived the issue. NCUA admits that McCollum raised this issue and that it was ruled upon by the AJ at the July 10, 2002 status conference. No more is required to preserve an issue for appeal. Wallace v. 05-3015 14 Dep’t of the Air Force, 879 F.2d 829, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that “the issue must be raised with sufficient specificity and clarity that the tribunal is aware that it must decide the issue, and in sufficient time that the agency can do so”). Second, whether the NCUA Board members had a motive to retaliate is irrelevant since McCollum does not have to show a motive to retaliate. Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is thus evident in light of the WPA’s modifications to the CSRA that though evidence of a retaliatory motive would still suffice to establish a violation of his rights under the WPA, a whistleblower need not demonstrate the existence of a retaliatory motive on the part of the employee taking the alleged prohibited personnel action in order to establish that his disclosure was a contributing factor to the personnel action . . . .” (citation omitted)). Moreover, there was no evidence that the NCUA Board had any role in the decision to remove McCollum from work duty status after he refused the directed reassignment. The evidence at the hearing indicated that Executive Director Jordan was the driving force behind that decision. Finally, NCUA’s argument that McCollum has failed to show a nexus between the denial of his request to remain in work duty status and his protected disclosures is particularly unconvincing, given that the AJ precluded McCollum from pursuing the issue at the hearing. Thus, we reverse the Board’s determination that a denial of work duty status while a removal is pending is not a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) and remand this issue to the Board for adjudication of McCollum’s claim in the first instance. 05-3015 15 Because on remand, the Board is likely to rely on its prior findings regarding McCollum’s Whistleblower Protection Act claims, we address one of those findings that will be pertinent to the remand issue and that McCollum has challenged before this court. Although the AJ found that “[n]either the Board members nor Ms. Jordan had any apparent motive to retaliate against the appellant,” Removal Opinion at 21, that finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The AJ’s stated rationale was that the protected disclosure naming Jordan and NCUA Board member Wheat as possible participants in prohibited personnel practices was found by the Inspector General to be unsubstantiated. Id. It is unclear why the fact that McCollum’s accusation was found to be unsubstantiated, which is in the middle of three possible findings, the other two being disproved and substantiated, would nullify any motive to retaliate based on the accusation. Although Jordan testified that she did not remember seeing the Inspector General’s report on McCollum’s accusation, Trial Tr. at 207 (Oct. 28, 2002), both Dollar and Wheat, the two NCUA Board members who testified at the hearing, testified that they read the report and remembered it. Id. at 34, 99. In fact, Dollar testified that he gives “serious consideration to any IG report” and “always take[s] their recommendations and their findings very seriously.” Id. at 34. Given the NCUA Board’s serious consideration of such a report, Jordan’s testimony that she could not remember it and “may or may not have looked at it,” id. at 207, is at least suspect, especially where it named her personally as possibly being involved in prohibited personnel practices. In any event, the AJ did not expressly rely on her credibility nor cite her testimony as a basis for the lack of motive to retaliate. See Larson v. Dep’t of the Army, 260 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (overturning AJ’s fact finding where the AJ did not make 05-3015 16 findings with respect to the credibility of witnesses nor even mention the testimony in his decision). Thus, the evidence adduced at the hearing indicates that Jordan possessed at least some motive to retaliate.