Opinion ID: 2025994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Insanity Toll

Text: Zumpano alone argues that he suffers from a mental disability as a direct result of defendants' abuse and that he was consequently rendered incapable of protecting his legal rights. He no longer argues that CPLR 208 tolls the statute of limitations, [3] but contends that defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations since their misconduct caused his insanity. This argument also lacks merit as he fails to establish a continuing disability. The record reflects that, as an adult, Zumpano held a full-time job for nine years. He also successfully prosecuted a personal injury action on his own behalf in 1986. As a matter of law, these facts contradict the assertion that Zumpano suffered from an ongoing mental disability and was unable to protect his rights. Finally, our holding here is in keeping with those in several other jurisdictions addressing similar issues ( see e.g. Baselice v Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 2005 PA Super 246, 879 A2d 270 [2005] [doctrine of fraudulent concealment inapplicable to toll the statute of limitations where plaintiff failed to allege any affirmative act of concealment causing him to delay bringing suit]; Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 692 NW2d 398 [2004] [fraudulent concealment unavailable to toll the statute of limitations where plaintiff knew or should have known about his claims against defendants]; Mark K. v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 67 Cal App 4th 603, 79 Cal Rptr 2d 73 [1998] [finding estoppel by concealment inapplicable to toll the statute of limitations because plaintiff was aware of his injury, the priest's identity and his connection with the church]; Doe v Archdiocese of Washington, 114 Md App 169, 689 A2d 634 [1997] [statute of limitations was not tolled by the fraudulent concealment doctrine where plaintiff did not allege any acts subsequent to the abuse that prevented him from being aware of his claims]; compare Martinelli v Bridgeport R.C. Diocesan Corp., 196 F3d 409, 430 [2d Cir 1999] [finding evidence to support the jury's determination that there was a fiduciary relationship between Martinelli and the diocese and that the diocese owed him a duty to investigate and to warn him in order to prevent harm]). We conclude as we began: however reprehensible the conduct alleged, these actions are subject to the time limits created by the Legislature. Any exception to be made to allow these types of claims to proceed outside of the applicable statutes of limitations would be for the Legislature, as other states have done. [4] Accordingly, in each case, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs. G.B. SMITH, J. (dissenting in Estate of Boyle v Smith ). The complaint alleges facts that arguably could result in the defendants being equitably estopped from asserting the bar of the statute of limitations. I conclude, however, that those allegations are not sufficiently specific to preclude the statute of limitations defense here. Thus, I join the disposition to the extent that the present complaint is dismissed. I would permit the plaintiffs to replead their claims. On October 8, 2002, 42 plaintiffs filed a complaint against 13 priests, a monsignor, a bishop and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn alleging sexual abuse. The plaintiffs attended religious services at parishes in Queens and Brooklyn, New York in the 1960s, 1970s, and the early 1980s. The abuse is alleged to have occurred in various locations in and around the State of New York. The complaint makes a number of tort claims, including sexual abuse and battery against both boys and girls, intentional infliction of emotional distress, failure to remove, failure to supervise, failure to investigate, failure to warn, failure to provide a safe environment, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. On December 9, 2002, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging fraudulent concealment of the abuse and secret payments to the victims to prevent them from disclosing the abuse. In order to prevent the plaintiffs from publicizing the abuse, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in a covert policy and practice to conceal the problem of the sexual abuse of children by parish clergy, engaged in the routine practice of transferring abusive priests to new parishes, made secret payments to victims in return for the victims' silence, maintained secret church accounts to make such payments, intentionally failed to investigate complaints of sexual abuse . . . by defendant priests and others, did not attempt to ascertain if there were other victims of a particular offending priest once they received information that he had in fact sexually abused a child and intentionally failed to warn plaintiffs, their parents or other potential victims or parishioner parents of the danger posed by a known sexually abusive priest. All plaintiffs were adults by 1990. They allege that defendants are equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense because of their fraud, misrepresentation, and concealment. On November 18, 2002, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition. The CPLR 3211 (a) (5) [1] motion was heard on January 28, 2003. On April 11, 2003, Supreme Court, Queens County granted the motion and determined: Inasmuch as all of the plaintiffs had reached the age of majority by 1990, they do not dispute that the Statute of Limitations for all the claims asserted herein expired prior to the commencement of this action (see, CPLR 208, 213, 214 and 215[c] [ sic ]) . . . . Inasmuch as the plaintiffs were the objects of the sexual abuse alleged herein, and they were aware of what was happening to them when the incidents occurred, they clearly possessed personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to their intentional tort claims when those claims accrued, as well as sufficient time to ascertain the facts alleged in relation to their breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims prior to the running of the limitations period (citation omitted). On February 7, 2005, Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the decision of the trial court and wrote: A defendant may be estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense where, by fraud, misrepresentation, or deception, he or she has induced a plaintiff to refrain from filing a timely action. However, due diligence on the part of a plaintiff in bringing the action is an essential element of equitable estoppel. If a plaintiff possesses sufficient knowledge of the possible existence of a claim, he or she is under a duty to make inquiry and ascertain all the relevant facts before the statute of limitations expires. Here, the plaintiffs possessed personal knowledge of the facts underlying their intentional tort claims from the time of the offenses, and they also knew that the priests were employed by the Diocese. Despite this knowledge, the plaintiffs did not pursue their claims at an earlier time. Moreover, even assuming that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to establish a fiduciary relationship between themselves and the Diocesan defendants, equitable estoppel is not applicable on this basis. As all of the plaintiffs reached the age of majority by 1990, their allegations failed to establish that they brought this action within a reasonable time after they became adults, when they were no longer subject to the supervision and influence of those defendants (15 AD3d 338, 339-340 [2005] [citations omitted]). On June 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.