Opinion ID: 1297188
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marsden Claim

Text: On August 7, 1986, a few months before the case was assigned to Judge Golde for trial, defendant filed one of his several pro se pleadings, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, on a standard form approved by the Judicial Council. Defendant stated the following grounds upon which he based his allegation that his imprisonment or detention is illegal: I have a [ sic ] attorney I do not trust and conflict of interest. [¶] My attorney wants me to plead guilty. In response to the form question why he had not previously presented the ground, defendant stated: I did not know how to get another attorney. See [ Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 (140 Cal. Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750)]. On August 13, 1986, without holding a hearing, the superior court issued a minute order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus because there were no grounds alleged upon which relief may be granted. (3a) Defendant contends that the document, although styled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, was, in essence, a `Marsden motion' ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44]), and that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing before denying it. We disagree. (4) In People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at page 124, we held that a judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations, despite a defendant's offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of the attorney. Because of this, [w]hen a defendant moves for substitution of appointed counsel, the court must consider any specific examples of counsel's inadequate representation that the defendant wishes to enumerate. Thereafter, substitution is a matter of judicial discretion. Denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would `substantially impair' the defendant's right to assistance of counsel. [Citations.] ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 435 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].) [A] trial court's duty to permit a defendant to state his reasons for dissatisfaction with his attorney arises when the defendant in some manner moves to discharge his current counsel. ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) We do not necessarily require a proper and formal legal motion, but at least some clear indication by defendant that he wants a substitute attorney. ( Id. at p. 281, fn. 8.) (3b) The Attorney General argues that the habeas corpus petition was not a Marsden motion because it sought [defendant's] release from confinement, not substitute counsel. If [defendant] had desired the appointment of a new attorney, the record fully demonstrates that he was capable of making that desire known to the court. We need not decide that question, however, for even if we assume that the petition was the equivalent of a Marsden motion, the court properly acted upon it without further inquiry. Defendant did not orally request new counsel in court, but chose instead to file a formal written petition. The form he used permitted him to state all reasons for the relief requested. The question on the form immediately after defendant stated the grounds for his allegations asked defendant to state the facts which support each of the grounds. Defendant left this question blank, which indicated he was relying on the grounds he had already stated. There was no reason for the trial court to suppose defendant withheld his reasons or supporting facts, or wished to state further examples of counsel's inadequate representation. He certainly did not offer to relate specific instances of misconduct. ( People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 124.) The petition was a self-contained document. In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290], in a prior case, the defendant had sent a detailed letter to the trial judge explaining why he was unhappy with his trial attorney.... ( Id. at p. 580.) We found no error in the court's denial of new counsel without further inquiry. When the basis of a defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel is set forth in a letter of sufficient detail ... a full-blown hearing is not required. ( Ibid. ) A full-blown hearing was not required here either. The only reason stated for the lack of trust and the conflict of interest was that defendant's attorney wanted him to plead guilty. The petition was filed months before trial; defendant did not claim that counsel would be unprepared if the case went to trial, as it eventually did. Defense counsel is obligated to advise the defendant regarding plea offers and possible guilty pleas. In light of this, defendant did not state an adequate basis for substitution of counsel. ( People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 689, 696-697 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192]; People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal. App.3d 291, 299-300 [159 Cal. Rptr. 360]; see also People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 580-581 [citing Terrill with approval].) People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal. App.4th 724 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 105], cited by defendant, is distinguishable. There, the defendant wrote a letter to the superior court requesting a new attorney. The letter contained specific claims of defense counsel's alleged malfeasance which, if well-founded, may have warranted the appointment of new counsel. The trial court was apparently unaware of the letter, and took no action regarding it. The Court of Appeal found the court erred in not even considering the Marsden motion, although the error was cured by later events. ( Id. at p. 731-732.) Here, by contrast, the court did consider and deny the petition. Defendant stated neither sufficient grounds for substitution of counsel nor anything requiring further inquiry. There was no error.