Opinion ID: 6534115
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dog's Entry of Vehicle

Text: [¶74] As to the remaining prong of the two-part analysis, the requirement that a dog's vehicle entry during an exterior sniff be instinctual rather than law enforcement-orchestrated, the district court again concluded that the State met its burden of proof. Citing Deputy Colling's testimony, the court found that Frosty entered Mr. Pier's vehicle spontaneously and not at Trooper Kirlin's command or encouragement. Based on my record review, I must disagree. For reasons that are not apparent from the record, the State did not call Trooper Kirlin as a witness in the suppression hearing. For the reasons that follow, I believe this left a gap in the State's evidence that was not filled by Deputy Colling's testimony. 10 I would therefore  conclude that the district court clearly erred in ruling that the State met its burden of proof on this prong of the two-part test. [¶75] A dog's vehicle entry is instinctual if the dog enters the vehicle without assistance, facilitation, or other intentional action by its handler. Pierce , 622 F.3d at 214 . The Sixth Circuit has summarized the required inquiry: [W]hile it is a Fourth Amendment violation for a narcotics canine to be trained to jump into cars, it is not a Fourth Amendment violation for a dog to jump into a car on its own volition and instinct when sniffing for drugs, as long as the dog's behavior has not been facilitated by law enforcement. This inquiry focuses on the police's conduct in training the dog before the search and the officers' conduct during the search. It is a Fourth Amendment violation for a narcotics detection dog to jump into a car because of something the police did, like training the dog to jump into cars as part of the search or facilitating or encouraging the jump. Sharp , 689 F.3d at 620 . [¶76] In addressing whether Frosty's entry into Mr. Pier's vehicle was instinctual as opposed to law enforcement-orchestrated, the district court found: 42. Here, Deputy Colling testified that he did not see Trooper Kirlin command or encourage Frosty to enter into the vehicle but, instead, led him around the vehicle to conduct a standard sniff of the vehicle. After Frosty spontaneously entered the vehicle, he alerted to the presence of a controlled substance. [¶77] The record does not support this finding. First, Deputy Colling did not testify that he did not see Trooper Kirlin command or encourage Frosty to enter the vehicle. Deputy Colling testified: [Trooper Kirlin] led his dog around from the-from the driver's side, so he started at the back, the back driver's side of the truck. He led his dog towards the front of the vehicle. I saw Trooper Kirlin walk past the open door and directed Frosty towards the front quarter panel of the vehicle in front of the open door. Frosty stopped by the driver's side door that was already open. I saw Frosty sniff in the air and then Frosty jumped into the vehicle. I'm not a K9 handler, but it appeared that Frosty stuck his nose right by that black bag and kind of stiffened up. Trooper Kirlin told me later that Frosty had alerted to the odor of a controlled substance. [¶78] Deputy Colling was not asked whether Trooper Kirlin commanded or encouraged Frosty to enter Mr. Pier's vehicle, and he did not volunteer any such testimony. His testimony was simply silent on that question. Moreover, on cross-examination, Deputy Colling was reluctant to commit to Trooper Kirlin's actions. Q.    Now, did Trooper Kirlin, when he was walking the dog around there, he had the dog on the leash, correct? A. Correct. Q. He did try to pull the dog out of the truck when the dog jumped into the truck? A. I don't know. You'd have to ask him. Q. Okay. So you don't know, but he left the dog in there and the dog got all the way into the center of the pickup truck before it alerted, correct? A. I couldn't tell you exactly at what point he alerted. I know that he locked up on the-on the center console of the vehicle.    Q. So how long was the drug sniff dog inside the vehicle? A. A few seconds. I don't know exactly how long. Q. Well, what were you doing when all this was happening? Were you observing Mr.-or Trooper Kirlin when he was running the dog. A. Yes. Q. You observed him, but you don't recall whether    Trooper Kirlin pulled the dog-tried to pull the dog out of the vehicle? A. No. No. And I-to observe very minute body movements from another office[r] or another person in general is very difficult.  Q. You observed all of the body movements from Mr. Pier, and you couldn't observe Officer-or Trooper Kirlin? A. I don't recall him trying to pull the dog out of the vehicle. [¶79] Deputy Colling's reservations are understandable. Courts, including this Court, have recognized that a drug dog's handler is uniquely qualified to interpret that dog's behaviors during a sniff. See Phippen , ¶ 16, 297 P.3d at 109 (recognizing drug dog may exhibit behaviors during sniff that will have meaning to handler but not to officer who lacks the same training and experience with the dog); United States v. Ludwig , 10 F.3d 1523 , 1528 (10th Cir. 1993) (giving greater weight to handler testimony to resolve discrepancy between handler and non-handler testimony). As the Sixth Circuit observed: [T]he primary issue in determining the credibility of a dog's alert is not the capability or ability of a dog to accurately identify particular scents, but is instead the communication between the handler and the dog based on that indisputable ability. This determination in turn rests almost entirely on the credibility of the dog handler's testimony because the handler is the only witness who can speak to the subjective interaction during a particular dog alert. United States v. Howard , 621 F.3d 433 , 449 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 1278 , 131 S.Ct. 1623 , 179 L.Ed.2d 514 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation to district court decision omitted); United States v. Christian , 452 Fed. Appx. 283 , 286 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Howard , 621 F.3d at 449 ). 11 [¶80] This brings me to the deficit I find in the evidence before the district court: Trooper Kirlin did not testify at the suppression hearing. The absence of handler testimony distinguishes this case from other cases addressing a dog's vehicle entry during an exterior sniff. In the great majority of cases I have reviewed, the courts expressly relied on handler testimony to determine whether the dog acted instinctively or was trained, encouraged, or guided to enter a vehicle. See United States v. Almeida , 2012 WL 75751 , , 12 (D. Me. 2012) ; Guidry , 817 F.3d at 1002 , 1006 ; Sharp , 689 F.3d at 620 ; Pierce , 622 F.3d at 210 , 214 ; Lujan , 398 Fed. Appx. at 351 ; Vazquez , 555 F.3d at 930 ; Lyons , 486 F.3d at 373 ; Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1329-30 , 1331 ; Stone , 866 F.2d at 364 ; Nance , 2010 WL 4004782 ,  ; Woods , 2008 WL 11396770 ,  ; Hutchinson , 471 F.Supp.2d at 510 n.10 ; State v. Warsaw , 125 N.M. 8 , 956 P.2d 139 , 142-43 (N.M. App. 1997). In these cases, the courts had sufficient evidence to determine whether the drug dog in question had been trained or encouraged in any manner to enter the vehicle. In this case, that evidence is entirely lacking. 12 [¶81] I reiterate that I do not intend to suggest that the State may only prove the legality of this type of search with handler testimony. It may be that the State can make the required showing that a drug dog acted instinctively with other qualified evidence. In this case, however, Deputy Colling was by his own admission unable to interpret either Frosty's or Trooper Kirlin's actions, and the State offered no other evidence to aid in that  interpretation. Additionally, while this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, this does not give the Court leeway to interpret the actions of Trooper Kirlin and Frosty. The record does not tell us how Frosty was trained to respond to open vehicles, Frosty's past experience with open vehicles, how Trooper Kirlin handled Frosty on the leash, or the cues, if any, Trooper Kirlin may have given Frosty. Without that information, any meaning this Court may attach to the actions of Trooper Kirlin and Frosty would go beyond drawing favorable inferences from the evidence and amount to no more than speculation. [¶82] Based on the lack of evidence explaining or interpreting the actions of Trooper Kirlin and Frosty, I would conclude that the district court clearly erred when it found the State had met its burden of proving the legality of Frosty's vehicle entry. I therefore dissent, and I would suppress the drugs seized during the search.