Opinion ID: 864432
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether an officer's decisions while driving

Text: ARE DISCRETIONARY OR MINISTERIAL. ¶30. Relying on Mosby v. Moore, 716 So. 2d 551 (Miss. 1998), the City argues because Officer Baker was in the pursuit of criminals, his actions were discretionary and immunity should apply. However, the City completely ignores this Court's subsequent decision in Jones v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 744 So. 2d 256, 260 (Miss. 1999), where we adopted the public policy function test which requires discretionary acts to be in furtherance of public policy in order to be granted immunity. In determining whether governmental conduct is discretionary the Court must answer two questions: (1) whether the activity involved an element of choice or judgment; and if so, (2) whether the choice or judgment in supervision involves social, economic or political policy alternatives. Jones v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 744 So.2d 256, 260 (Miss. 1999). Therefore, the Jones test requires a determination of (1) whether the supervision of security officers involves an element of choice or judgment; and if so (2) whether the choice or judgment involved social, economic, or political policy. Bridges v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 793 So.2d 584, 588 (Miss. 2001). ¶31. According to the first prong regarding the element of choice or judgment, Officer Baker was required by law, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-517 (Rev. 1996), to warn other drivers by using his siren when he responds to an emergency call. Section 63-3-517 states: 12 The speed limitations set forth in this article shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when responding to emergency calls and the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, siren, or exhaust whistle. This section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street, nor shall it protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others. (emphasis added). Therefore, there was no element of choice or judgment in how Officer Baker responded to the emergency dispatch. ¶32. With regard to the second prong of the test concerning policy alternatives, this Court determined in Bridges that immunity is only appropriate where the governmental entity can prove the act occurred within a policy-oriented decision making process. 793 So. 2d at 589. Officer Baker was making no such policy-oriented decision. He was only responding to an emergency dispatch. Therefore, this argument is without merit. 13