Opinion ID: 1713477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procedural History and Newly Discovered Evidence.

Text: ¶ 91. After the convictions, Armstrong filed a postconviction motion that requested a new trial, arguing: (1) Orebia's identification of Armstrong should have been inadmissible because of the State's use of hypnosis to enhance his memory; (2) the line-up identification of Armstrong was unreliable and was therefore inadmissible; (3) the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by allowing two color murder scene photographs of Kamps' to be sent to the jury room; and (4) the State breached its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence by failing to provide an accurate copy of a parking ticket received by the defendant. See State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 559-60, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983). This court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals later denied Armstrong's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Armstrong v. Young, 34 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 1994). ¶ 92. On February 26, 1991, Armstrong moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, specifically DNA evidence that excluded him as the source of semen on Kamps' robe. The circuit court for Dane County, Honorable Michael B. Torphy, Jr., denied the motion, concluding that this evidence would not probably produce a different result on retrial. See State v. Armstrong, No. 1992AP232-CR, unpublished slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. June 17, 1993). The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 1. ¶ 93. The court of appeals determined that the semen evidence was an insignificant piece of circumstantial evidence linking Armstrong to Kamps and to her apartment. Id. at 2. Further, the court of appeals stated: Of much greater importance to the state's case was the unshaken testimony of Kamps' neighbor who saw Armstrong acting strangely while going in and out of Kamps' apartment building during the hours when the crime occurred. Armstrong attempted to present an alibi for that time that the state effectively demolished. Other physical evidence, such as blood and hair samples found on his body and at the crime scene, also inculpated Armstrong. Additionally, the day after the murder Armstrong made an unusually large deposit of $315 in cash in his bank account. Kamps was known to have had $400 in her apartment the previous day that was never found. Armstrong was aware of the cash because it was he who had paid it to her to satisfy a debt. This evidence would likely produce a guilty verdict on retrial even with Armstrong's conclusive proof that he did not leave his semen in Kamps' apartment. Id. at 3. ¶ 94. On May 17, 2001, Armstrong filed another motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This motion was based on three findings, which the State did not dispute. ¶ 95. First, DNA testing conducted by Dr. Edward Blake excluded Armstrong, as well as Kamps' boyfriend, Dillman, as the source of the two hairs found on the robe belt. As noted above, at trial, the State's forensic expert testified that using microscopic analysis, she concluded that one hair was similar and one consistent with Armstrong's hair. Second, Blake found no traces of blood when examining a piece of cloth accompanying slides allegedly prepared from the hemostick swabs and scrapings from Armstrong's thumbs and large toes. Third, Armstrong reasserted that the DNA analysis conducted in 1990 excluded Armstrong as the source of the semen on the Kamps' bathrobe. ¶ 96. The only issue was whether this new evidence created a reasonable probability that the result would be different at a trial. Armstrong claimed that it did, while the State contended: [O]ne of the things you do, when you analyze that is, what was the strength of the scientific evidence that we presented? Franklyand you alluded to this earlier [Armstrong's counsel] did a superb job of cross-examining Miss Wegner in deflating the significance of this evidence. He brought out the fact that 80 percent of the population is secretors. It was clear, by the time she was done testifying, that the boyfriend or the defendant could have been contributors of the semen, but we didn't knowwe couldn't say precisely who. He cross-examined her and elicited that there were, I think, 54 pubic hairs on the bed spread forcibly extracted of unknown origin. I believe that there were 50 not consistent with either the victim or the defendant. Five in the vacuum sweepings around the bed with the same characteristics. One on the bathrobe itself. There was a bevy of hair that was testified to that would not have included either the defendant or the victim, but was attributable to no one that we knew of at that point. And [Armstrong's counsel] argued very effectively that the hair evidence was not that significant. . . . . ... He talked about hair goes everywhere. He introduced evidence concerning the sharing of hairbrushes between Charise Kamps, Jane May, who was the defendant's girlfriend, and the defendant. I think two of those hairbrushes were at the scene. And, beyond, which we have the defendant's admission, that he was in the apartment on the night of the murder. So the fact that there's hair there, that is seen as consistent with the defendant, is no surprise. Now I think the Court correctly pointed out that the defendant's contention that these hairs are now that Miss Wegner's testimony, that the hairs were consistent with or similar to the defendant's, does not fallit's clear that to the extent somebody wants you to draw the inference that those hairs are the defendant's, that you can't draw that inference anymore, but she stated what was known to her at the time, and there's no indication, that in fact, in the kind of characteristics she was looking at, that these hairs aren't consistent or similar to the defendant's. They simply aren't the defendant's. ¶ 97. In response, Armstrong argued the following: [Y]ou don't even need a crime scene expert to see, as the Court has already indicated, from your preface here, the critical importance of this; because it is the belt, that there's a good chance was the instrument of death, but beyond that, it's right over the body where the killer had to have been during the course of the murder, and the hairs are on top of it, and I can't think of a forensic expert, a crime scene expert, who would be the appropriate expert in this case, who wouldn't say that that was extremely probative, highly probative. That it was deposited at or around the time of the murder. It's common sense. It's what they would say, because it's in accord with the usual transfer of principles and, indeed, you know, who said that to the jury? [The prosecuting attorney.] He didn't just say indicative of guilt, as he said in his argument; he said conclusive, irrevocable, and he said it persuasively, notwithstanding our praise of our colleague, [Armstrong's trial counsel,] for pointing out there's an 80 percent chance the serology could have meant somebody else. That wasn't it. What's important here? The fact, very fact that you're isolating on, and that is these are very, very probative pieces of evidence. The hairs right on top of the belt, right over the crime scene, with the semen below. A juror looking at this evidence, reasonably listening to what [the prosecuting attorney] said, what the rebuttal was, about timing and explanations for all these different kind of things, and Orebia's opportunity to observe, and everything else, what do people ordinarily do in a common sense way? They say show me the physical evidence that's most highly probative, that we can use one way or another to corroborate, and what the State said here, in very forceful terms, it's conclusive, it's irrevocable, the hair is there, obviously that's hair, and that there's a high likelihood, extraordinarily high likelihood left by the killer, because of where it's found, and the semen below, that obviously could not be demonstrated at the trial conclusively didn't come from Armstrong. Both the hair and the semen, it's not going to be a question of opinion; it's a question of fact. They are not from Ralph Armstrong. That was something that this jury, I'm sure, would rely on when they considered everything, as the tipping point, because it is so highly probative. It is so critical to who committed this crime. ¶ 98. The circuit court for Dane County, Honorable Patrick J. Fiedler, denied Armstrong's motion. Regarding the hemostick tests and how they did not show the presence of any blood, the circuit court found that Wegner's analysis expended all of the blood found. The court further concluded that Wegner's testimony regarding finding blood underneath Armstrong's nails was proper. ¶ 99. Regarding the semen, the circuit court determined that this evidence was minor. Moreover, the court observed that Armstrong established that 80 percent of the population are Type A secretors and that there was no way of knowing when the semen stains were placed on the robe. Thus, the circuit court concluded, the jury was well-apprised of the weight to be given to the evidence. ¶ 100. With regard to the hair evidence, the court acknowledged that the bulk of the scientific evidence concerned the hair analysis. However, the new hair DNA tests did not sufficiently tip the scale in Armstrong's favor, the circuit court concluded. The court was persuaded by the fact that the evidence was properly admitted given the science of the times and that the State made a fair presentation of the evidence in its opening and closing arguments. Also, viewing the entirety of the State's presentation of its closing argument, the court concluded the hair evidence played but a small role in the State's case. If the case were to be retried, the circuit court posited: I am satisfied the jury would also hear that it is impossible to ascertain with any precision when the hairs found their way on the belt. That this would be consistent with other hairs, to which we cannot give ownership to, that are found in the apartment, including that of an animal, and that with the advancement in science over the course of the last 20 years, while it may be that the hair analysis would certainly be different, I am satisfied, given the way that it would be dealt with in its entirety, that the result would remain the same. ¶ 101. The court said that the most critical evidence was the time-distance testimony as it related to Armstrong's whereabouts. Thus, the court concluded that Armstrong did not meet his burden of clear and convincing evidence that the newly discovered evidence created a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different on retrial. ¶ 102. Armstrong appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals first determined that judicial estoppel did not lie against the State. Armstrong, Nos. 2001AP2789-CR and 2002AP2979-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶ 31. Armstrong noted that at his trial in 1981, the State argued that the semen and hairs found on the victim's bathrobe unmistakably implicated Armstrong as the murderer. Id., ¶ 30. In light of the new DNA tests, the State now argued that neither the semen nor hair was connected to the murder and that innocuous reasons explain why that physical evidence was present. Id. Armstrong claimed the State should be judicially estopped from making this turnabout. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that because Armstrong was asserting newly discovered evidence, the facts could not be the same. Id., ¶ 31. Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned, judicial estoppel did not lie against the State. Id. ¶ 103. The court of appeals next turned to Armstrong's newly discovered DNA tests. Id., ¶¶ 32-34. Initially, the court of appeals had to decide whether the newly discovered evidence test applied. Id., ¶ 32. Armstrong proposed that it did not and that a harmless error test did. Id., ¶ 33. Rather than seeking to add new and relevant evidence to the fold, Armstrong sought to remove a powerful inference of guilt from the hair and semen that is now known to be utterly irrelevant to establishing his guilt. See id. As it was now known that the evidence was erroneously introduced and used, Armstrong argued the State bore the burden of proving the error was harmless. Id. ¶ 104. The court of appeals concluded that the newly discovered evidence test was proper, but wrestled with this conclusion, writing: Which test we use is of potential significance. This is an extremely close case. It is not possible to tell from this record whether Armstrong is innocent or guilty. While we affirm the trial court's decision to use the newly discovered evidence test, the use of a harmless-error test would probably result in our reversing the trial court's order. We agree with Armstrong's argument that innovations in science cast doubt on evidence admitted at trial. These advancements in technology, however, do not render the trial court's evidentiary rulings erroneous at the time they were made. A motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence does not claim that there were errors in the conduct of the trial or deficiency in trial counsel's performance. [ State v. Brunton, 203 Wis. 2d 195, 206-07, 552 N.W.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1996).] The distinction Armstrong makes between newly discovered evidence not presented to the jury and evidence later shown to be false is a rational distinction. Additional evidence is conceptually different from evidence from which the State argued false conclusions. But this distinction has not been recognized and we cannot escape the undisputed fact that Armstrong's DNA evidence is newly discovered. It may be anomalous that we use a more strict test where the State benefits from false factual conclusions than where the State benefits from an erroneous evidentiary ruling. But the test for newly discovered evidence is the test the supreme court and this court continue to use. Id., ¶ 34. ¶ 105. The State disputed only whether Armstrong had clearly and convincingly proven that the new `evidence create[s] a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different on retrial.' Id., ¶ 36 (quoting State v. Avery, 213 Wis. 2d 228, 234, 570 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1997)). The court of appeals observed that Avery determined that `[i]f there is a reasonable probability that a jury would harbor a reasonable doubt as to guilt, it follows that there exists a reasonable probability of a different result.' Id. (quoting Avery, 213 Wis. 2d at 241). The court of appeals determined that [its] job is not to determine how, if at all, the false evidence influenced the jury in the first trial. Id., ¶ 37. Instead, the proper inquiry, the court of appeals stated, is whether a hypothetical, future jury at retrial would find Armstrong not guilty based on the totality of the evidence, including the new evidence obtained from advances in DNA testing. Id. ¶ 106. After reviewing the record, the court concluded that [d]espite the closeness of this case, Armstrong has not persuaded us that the newly discovered evidence would reasonably cause a new jury to discredit the incriminating circumstantial evidence. Id., ¶ 44. Although it is easily possible that a new jury could reach a different verdict, id., the court of appeals held that Armstrong has not shown that the newly discovered evidence clearly and convincingly creates a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different on retrial. Id., ¶ 44. ¶ 107. Finally, the court of appeals questioned whether it had the authority to grant a new trial in the interests of justice because the case was not on direct appeal, but it decided that even if it had the power, it would decline to exercise it. Id., ¶¶ 4, 46-47. The court of appeals distinguished State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 153, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996), where this court concluded that the real controversy of identification was not fully tried when the State used the hair evidence assertively and repetitively as affirmative proof of Hicks' guilt and when later DNA tests excluded Hicks as the donor of the hair. Id. at 48. The court of appeals stated: Here, the sole issue of the case was whether Armstrong murdered Kamps. The jury considered eye witness testimony, along with other circumstantial evidence, and found that Armstrong murdered Kamps. The misleading hair and semen evidence did not so cloud or distract the jury from deliberating this issue. Likewise, the DNA evidence excluding Dillman [the victim's boyfriend] as the source of the hair and semen is not important enough testimony bearing on the controversy to warrant a new trial. We conclude that the real controversy was tried fully. Id., ¶ 50. ¶ 108. Armstrong seeks review.