Opinion ID: 2766899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timing of the Sentencing Hearing

Text: Ramos contends that the district court erred by giving him only nineteen days to review, and comment on, the updated PSR -33- that was prepared after his retrial conviction. He relies on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which states, in pertinent part: Minimum Required Notice. The probation officer must give the presentence report to the defendant, the defendant's attorney, and an attorney for the government at least 35 days before sentencing unless the defendant waives this minimum period. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e)(2) (emphasis added). A district court's compliance with Rule 32 is reviewed de novo, and we will remand for resentencing if we find error that was not harmless. See United States v. González-Vélez, 587 F.3d 494, 508-09 (1st Cir. 2009).
Ramos's updated PSR was disclosed by the Probation Office on March 20, 2012. On April 6, along with his response to the PSR, Ramos filed a motion to continue sentencing on the ground that he needed more time to prepare a request for a lower sentence based on his medical condition. Ramos, then 43 years old, reported that he was awaiting additional medical records so he could submit an expert opinion on the impact that a long term period of incarceration will have upon [his] cardiac condition. He therefore sought the 35-day statutory time period to properly address these issues. The district court denied the requested continuance at the sentencing hearing, which was held as scheduled on April 9. The court acknowledged that only nineteen days had elapsed since -34- disclosure of the amended PSR, but it deemed that period adequate because it thought an amended PSR was unnecessary and that Ramos could have been sentenced based on the original PSR. The court said it gave [Ramos] the break when it ordered an amended PSR so he could pursue his claim that his criminal history was incorrectly calculated.20 The court thus concluded that Rule 32(e)'s 35-day notice period did not apply.
The government argues that the application of Rule 32 in the particular circumstances of this case is a novel question and that the district court's reading of the rule was reasonable. The government further asserts that any error was harmless because the record demonstrates that a continuance to satisfy Rule 32's 35-day requirement would not have resulted in a different sentence. It points out that the district court emphatically rejected the possibility that further information about Ramos's heart condition -- the reason he said he needed a continuance -- would impact the sentence. We do not take lightly the requirements of Rule 32, whose time limits are integral to the fair and orderly process of 20 The Probation Office in fact concluded that a prior conviction had been improperly counted toward Ramos's career offender status, but the PSR substituted another conviction to support the recommendation for career offender status. That substituted conviction is the subject of the claimed error discussed in Section III.B infra. -35- imposing sentence. United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 59 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The procedures it prescribes may not be dismissed as mere technicalities. United States v. López-López, 295 F.3d 165, 169 (1st Cir. 2002). Hence, we are inclined to conclude that the full array of Rule 32's protections ordinarily should accompany a PSR that is revised and reissued after a new trial and guilty verdict. It is no less important for a new sentencing to be fair and accurate than it was for the original proceedings, and the Rule sets the default time periods for achieving that objective. A defendant's circumstances could have changed in any number of ways during the lapse of time between convictions. He may have a new attorney, new convictions, or new evidence of mitigating factors -- all of which may influence the sentencing process. Indeed, the district court in this case acknowledged that the amended PSR served an important function because its preparation revealed that an ineligible conviction had previously been counted to establish career offender status. The logic in excluding an amended PSR from the scope of Rule 32, when that report is part of a wholly new proceeding, prepared after a retrial and verdict, is not apparent. Enforcing the Rule's time limits need not compromise a court's interest in avoiding redundancies and moving cases to completion. In many instances of resentencing after re-conviction, the Probation Office will be able to take advantage of its earlier -36- work, and, hence, the investigative stage of the process will proceed quickly. In addition, both the defendant and the court have the ability to modify the 35-day minimum period where appropriate. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e)(2) (allowing waiver by the defendant); 32(b)(2) (allowing the court to change the Rule's time limits for good cause). Time for deliberation is intentionally built into the system, however, and the production of an amended PSR following a retrial and new conviction would seem to trigger the Rule's protections as a matter of course. Nonetheless, even if the district court erroneously denied a continuance in this case, that error would not require a remand for resentencing. We agree with the government that the district court's statements at the sentencing hearing demonstrate beyond debate that the court would not have sentenced Ramos more favorably even if presented with additional evidence on the impact of incarceration on his cardiac condition. Cf. Casas, 425 F.3d at 63 (finding a reasonable probability that the district court will impose a more favorable sentence on remand). The court firmly rejected the value of the proposed testimony of Ramos's surgeon, stating that it already had reviewed Ramos's medical records and understood the dire nature of his very serious cardiac condition. The court noted that Ramos had been seen by a first class cardiologist during trial because he felt sick, and the doctor had -37- found only the typical complications that any person who has had a heart valve transplant faces. The court also expressly rejected the applicability of Guidelines Section 5H1.4, which allows a downward sentencing departure for [a]n extraordinary physical impairment and gives as an example the case of a seriously infirm defendant [for whom] home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. The court viewed Ramos's condition as serious, but unpredictable: He could live until he's 70. But he has a cardiac condition, and he could also die tomorrow. The court thus demonstrated unwillingness to further consider sentencing leniency based on Ramos's medical condition. As the pursuit of further medical information was the only justification offered for Ramos's requested continuance, we conclude that the refusal to grant the extra time, if error, was harmless.