Opinion ID: 682427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Thornburgh's Capacity to Assent

Text: 57 The district court found that the law provides for personal liability if a member or officer or candidate authorizes, assents to, or ratifies a committee transaction. 49 Thornburgh challenges this statement of the law, claiming that under the law governing unincorporated nonprofit associations only members or officers of the association have the legal capacity to incur personal liability for its debts. 58 Again, state law answers the question, who may be held responsible for the debts of an unincorporated political campaign committee? 50 In decisions addressing the liability of individuals for the debts of such committees, state courts have frequently recited the governing legal standard in terms of the actions of officers or members or both. 51 We do not read these cases, however, to exclude the capacity of the candidate qua candidate--by his own acts--to become liable for the debts of his designated principal campaign committee. To the contrary, many of these cases implicitly recognize that candidates have such capacity. 59 In Bloom v. Vauclain, 52 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew no distinction among candidates, members, and officers in its discussion of the rule governing the liability of individuals for the debts of campaign committees: 60 The principles of law governing the responsibility of candidates and officers of such committees have been before the courts, and in all cases we have adhered to the rule laid down for voluntary associations. The mere fact that one is a candidate, an officer, or a member of a political organization does not, of itself, establish his liability, personally or otherwise, for debts incurred by that organization.... But those who make a contract, not forbidden by law, are personally liable, and all are included in such liability who assented to the undertaking. 53 61 Likewise, in Progress Printing Corp. v. Jane Byrne Political Committee, 54 Hunt v. Davis, 55 and W.H. Brewton & Sons, Inc. v. Kennedy, 56 state courts discussed the potential personal liability of the candidate in a manner reflective of the fact that those courts drew no distinction among the respective capacities of the candidate, a member, and an officer of the committee, to incur liability for a campaign committee's debts. 57 62 In fact, we have uncovered only one other case in which the question of a candidate's capacity to assent to a contract of his campaign committee was even raised. 58 The opinion in that case is unclear whether the committee in question was the candidate's principal campaign committee; and we are aware of no decision in which a court has held in favor of a candidate based on a finding that he lacked the capacity to incur liability for his principal campaign committee's debts. 63 Thornburgh offers no legal foundation to support his conclusionary assertion that courts should fashion a rule that would insulate the candidate (but not the members and officers of his committee) from personal liability for the debts incurred by the candidate's principal campaign committee. Query whether any reasonable explanation even exists, given that such a rule would appear to defy both logic and equity. To hold that candidates do not have capacity to incur liability for the debts of their principal campaign committees but that members and officers do could very well lead to perverse and anomalous results: Campaign committee officers and members could incur personal liability for campaign committee debts by assenting to or ratifying such debts but the candidate, for whose election the officers and members labor, could not. Although we recognize that Congress has constructed a somewhat analogous--and anomalous 59 --legal regime to shield candidates from liability for violations of FECA, absent express direction from that branch, we decline to extend further such an apparently inequitable rule. 64 As the district court concluded that a candidate qua candidate does have the capacity to incur personal liability, the court was not required to make--and thus did not make--a specific ruling whether Thornburgh was a member of the Committee. We agree with the district court's conclusion of law as to a candidate's capacity to incur liability, but we also are satisfied that, as a matter of fact, Thornburgh was a member of the Committee. At the very least, Thornburgh's active participation in the Committee's activities estops him from denying membership in the Committee. 65 The record contains no Committee membership roster or list, a fact we do not find particularly surprising in light of the nature of political campaign committees. Although the Indiana legislature enacted a provision specifically stating that a candidate is an ex officio member of his own campaign committee, 60 neither Congress nor Pennsylvania or Texas lawmakers have been so accommodating. 61 Neither are we aware of any other such legislation. 62 Finding little guidance from the Committee's documents or applicable state statutes, we next examine state common law to determine whether Thornburgh was a member of his own principal campaign Committee. 63 Under both Texas and Pennsylvania law, an unincorporated association is defined generally as a body of individuals acting together for the prosecution of a common enterprise. 64 As such entities typically are loosely organized, written formalities are not required for membership; a person joins an association when--either expressly or tacitly--he is accepted as, and agrees to become, a member. 65 The intent of both parties, the putative member and the association, is what governs. 66 Whether a person is a member of an association is a question of fact. 67 66 Thornburgh testified conclusionally that he was not a member of the Committee. Circumstantial evidence, however, may be considered to determine whether a person acted in a manner evincing membership. 68 In the instant case, we are satisfied that such evidence compels the conclusion that both Thornburgh and the Committee contemplated his membership. 67 The Committee was formed for the sole purpose of promoting Thornburgh's senatorial candidacy during Pennsylvania's 1991 special election--obviously an objective shared by Thornburgh himself. As Thornburgh and the Committee shared this common goal, the only open question remaining is what was the intent of each party, i.e., did Thornburgh intend to associate voluntarily with the Committee and did the Committee approve of his affiliation, either expressly or implicitly. Based on the record before us, we believe that the evidence strongly supports affirmative answers to both questions. 69 68 We note initially that a candidate is not necessarily a member of any committee established to promote his election. We are aware of two instances--and there are likely more--in which candidates were completely uninvolved with, and in one case even opposed to, the efforts of committees ostensibly organized to support their candidacy for federal office. 70 In both cases, however, the candidates made clear that they had no intention of affiliating with the committees. 71 This, however, is not such a case. 69 The instant record is replete with evidence that Thornburgh and the Committee voluntarily chose to associate with one another. Thornburgh designated the Committee as his one and only principal campaign committee. By doing so, Thornburgh expressly sanctioned the Committee as the only organization authorized to receive and expend contributions on his behalf. 72 He campaigned extensively in concert with employees of the Committee; spoke almost daily with Committee employees who were supporting his candidacy; and actively facilitated contracts entered into by the Committee (as noted, for example, Thornburgh reviewed and approved several vignettes appearing in fundraising letters for the September Contract, and facilitated its performance by providing a signature exemplar and his personal mailing lists). And--in the words of Mason--Thornburgh was ultimately in control of the entire campaign, including all activities undertaken by the Committee. For any reasonable finder of fact, these would establish Thornburgh's membership in the Committee beyond cavil. 70 Even absent a finding that Thornburgh's activities with the Committee were sufficient to evince his intent to affiliate with that organization as a member, based on these same interactions Thornburgh would have to be estopped from now denying his membership in the Committee. [A] person may be estopped from denying membership in an association, particularly where there has been active participation in its activities. 73 It seems clear to us that this rule applies with particular force when, as here, the candidate's sole purpose in claiming estrangement from the committee is the evasion of personal liability for the committee's debts, 74 especially where such claim is proffered post hoc. 71 As the facts of this case compel the conclusion that Thornburgh had the capacity to incur personal liability for the debts of the Committee, we next consider whether he did so. 72