Opinion ID: 1462263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the benjamin case.

Text: Docket Nos. 180-79 and 468-79 are before the Board on Professional Responsibility on the report of Hearing Committee No. 2. The Hearing Committee was confronted by a petition that concerned three separate charges arising out of respondent's conduct of the defense of Peggy M. Benjamin against criminal charges. For convenience, the three matters can be identified as the bond review matter, the government plea offer dispute, and the issue concerning the quality of respondent's communications with his client. On the bond review matter, the Hearing Committee concluded that respondent had intentionally fail[ed] to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law in violation of DR 7-101(A)(1). [1] In connection with the violation found on the bond review matter, the Committee recommended an informal admonition as the appropriate sanction. In connection with the government plea offer matter, the Hearing Committee concluded that Bar Counsel had failed to make out a violation of DR 7-101(A)(1) (intentional failure to pursue the client's lawful objectives) in connection with respondent's failure to assist his client in entering her plea of guilty. The Committee recommended that the charges based on the government plea bargain matter be dismissed. Finally, the Hearing Committee recommended that we find that Bar Counsel had failed to make out a case of neglect on his charge that respondent had failed to communicate adequately with his client and had failed adequately to advise her. Finding no violation, the Hearing Committee recommended dismissal. [2] This Board agrees with the Committee's finding that a violation was made out in connection with the bond review matter but disagrees with the Committee's conclusion that no violation was proved in connection with the government plea offer matter.
Ms. Benjamin had a number of criminal cases pending against her at roughly the same time. The procedural history of the relevant cases are summarized in detail in the report and recommendation of the Hearing Committee, and we do repeat that history here. By way of brief summary, Ms. Benjamin had two criminal cases pending against her in the Superior Court at the same time. The first, which the Hearing Committee labeled the underwear case, was based on a charge of attempted larceny of assorted underclothing from Hecht's department store. Respondent was appointed to represent Ms. Benjamin in the underwear case. The second case, which the Hearing Committee labeled the crabmeat case, was also a charge of attempted larceny. Ms. Benjamin was represented by other counsel, particularly Mr. Bright, in the crabmeat case. It was uncontested in the record before the Hearing Committee that at the time of Ms. Benjamin's arraignment on the underwear case, her bond was set at $1,000 with a 10% payment. Not having the requisite $100 to secure her release, Ms. Benjamin was incarcerated. It is also uncontested that Ms. Benjamin sent respondent a letter requesting him to file a bond review motion for her. Her request was unequivocal. Respondent did not answer Ms. Benjamin's written request. A few days later Ms. Benjamin telephoned respondent from the District of Columbia Jail and renewed her request to him to file a bond review motion. Respondent admits that after the letter and the telephone conversation outlined above, he did not prepare or file a bond review motion or make any other effort to obtain Ms. Benjamin's release from the District of Columbia Jail by helping her to secure the necessary $100. Consequent to respondent's inactivity, Ms. Benjamin remained in the District of Columbia Jail for seventeen days until her son, who had been out of town, returned to Washington and posted the requisite $100. After Ms. Benjamin's release, respondent received a plea offer from the United States Attorney. Her two sets of lawyers disagreed about the advisability of her accepting the government's plea offer. The lawyers representing Ms. Benjamin on the crabmeat case concluded that acceptance of the government's plea offer was in the best interests of Ms. Benjamin. Respondent, on the other hand, concluded that the plea offer was not in Ms. Benjamin's best interests and he so recommended to her. Respondent concedes that he had an adequate opportunity to urge his views upon Ms. Benjamin and that she was competent to make the decision whether to plead guilty. After consideration of the competing advice of her two sets of lawyers, Ms. Benjamin concluded that she wished to accept the government's plea offer. Accordingly, Ms. Benjamin's other lawyers arranged for a hearing before Judge Neilson on October 15, 1979, at which time Ms. Benjamin was to plead guilty in both the underwear and crabmeat cases and to be sentenced. At the hearing, respondent volunteered to the Court that he had advised Ms. Benjamin that the plea arrangement was improvident and unwise and respondent asked Judge Neilson to take this fact into account in the Rule 11 proceeding that he was then conducting on Ms. Benjamin's attempts to plead guilty. Ms. Benjamin's plea was accepted over respondent's objection, and she was sentenced. As noted above, Bar Counsel brought a petition alleging three areas of misconduct: (1) in connection with the respondent's failure or refusal to file a bond review motion, Bar Counsel charged him with neglect and with intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his client; (2) in connection with respondent's failure or refusal to assist Ms. Benjamin in accepting the government's plea bargain, Bar Counsel charged violations of the same two Disciplinary Rules; and (3) Bar Counsel charged respondent with failure to conduct meaningful communication and to provide assistance to his client amounting to a violation of the Disciplinary Rule prohibiting neglect.
Respondent has briefed and argued several points concerning the conduct of the proceedings below. His arguments are not well taken.
First, respondent brings a welter of charges the net effect of which is that Bar Counsel hoodwinked a contact member into approving an informal admonition by presenting false and incomplete evidence to the contact member. Respondent's argument is put to rest by the Hearing Committee's finding of a disciplinary violation and by the disposition that we make of this case. Whatever evidence Bar Counsel presented to the contact member, there was more than probable cause, there was in fact clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated one or more provisions of the Disciplinary Code. The requirement that a contact member review and approve petitions and informal admonitions is meant to act as an additional protection for respondents so that they are not faced with wholly unsubstantiated charges. Our review of the record convinces us there was more than adequate probable cause to go forward on this case. There is no review of the probable cause determination provided for in our system any more than there is a review of the probable cause determination readily available to a defendant in a criminal case where the full panoply of due process rights applies. If this Board is to perform its functions of fairly and speedily determining when violations of the Disciplinary Code have occurred and of protecting the public from those who violate the Code, our proceedings cannot be allowed to descend into a hodgepodge of interlocutory reviews. The essence of fairness in our proceedings is that the matter is brought as promptly as possible before a hearing committee which hears the matter in a fair and even-handed way.
Turning next to respondent's argument that the petition should have been dismissed on its face, we also cannot agree with its contentions. Our rules do not provide, nor do we think they must, for cases to be decided on motions made before the hearing. As we said in In the Matter of Erias Hyman, Bar Docket No. 69-79, a hearing committee has no authority to dismiss charges. A hearing committee is to recommend to this Board what disposition should be made of any motions brought by respondent. If the motion requires the taking of evidence, the hearing of that evidence should be consolidated with the hearing on the merits. Recommendations both as to the ultimate disposition on the merits and as to any motions are then made by the hearing committee upon the basis of a fully developed factual record. Once again, the same values are at stake. If this Board's procedures are not to suffer more complication and delay than now attends them, we must be careful not to allow procedural issues and motions practice to distract the Board's attention from the central questions: was there a violation and, if so, what sanction is appropriate. While the fundamental aspects of procedural fairness must be, and we believe are, observed, we must also bear in mind that these are not criminal cases and that the several layers of procedural due process protections that exist in criminal cases are inappropriate in the disciplinary system. Respondent argues strongly that no lawyer should be put to the trouble and inconvenience of a hearing on a petition that is faulty on its face. Respondent's case does not test his argument since no fault appears on the face of the petition that respondent has attacked in this case. However, we feel bound to say that the inconvenience of a hearing before one of our committees is not a reasonable price to pay for the privilege of holding a license to practice law. This is particularly true in light of the fact that charges are brought only after a contact member of a hearing committee concurs with Bar Counsel's probable cause finding. Once a basis of that sort has been laid, then the underlying purposes of the Board require that we proceed directly to a hearing on the merits rather than being detoured into questions of pleading and form. While the Board would have no hesitation in recommending dismissal of a case in which the respondent was not fairly notified of the charges against him because the petition was so inadequate as not to allow him to know with what he was charged, that determination is made at the Board level so that any possible objection to the petition can be considered together with the factual record in the case.
Last, we address respondent's argument that the hearing committee chairman acted beyond his authority when he conducted two pretrial conferences and disposed of certain matters in an attempt to simplify and expedite the hearing before the Committee. Respondent recognizes that our rules do indeed authorize a committee chair to act in this regard. Chapter 8, Section 3, Subsection (j) of the Board's Rules. However, respondent claims that a contradictory rule of the Court of Appeals requires that a hearing committee can act only by all three of its members. Rule XI, Section 5(b), District of Columbia Court of Appeals. However, we believe that the rule respondent cites refers only to the final reports and recommendations that hearing committees make to this Board. [3] Therefore, we do not feel there is any contradiction between that rule and the Board's rule that allows a hearing committee chair, acting alone, to dispose of certain procedural matters before the hearing begins. We wish to take this opportunity to encourage the chairs of the various hearing committees to utilize the pre-trial procedures provided in our rules. We also point out that, contrary to respondent's arguments, the hearing committee chair is under no obligation to consult with other members of the committee in making such pre-hearing determinations. The chair in this case chose to consult with the other attorney member of the committee before making his rulings. He was certainly within the spirit and letter of our rules when he chose to consult with his fellow committee member. However, we wish to make it absolutely clear, that he was under no obligation to do so and was free to act alone. Of course, a hypothetical respondent who felt that a pre-hearing ruling of a chairman had deprived him of valuable rights would be free to raise the issue again before the hearing committee. In that event, we trust that the hearing committee would make a recommendation to this Board as to how the matter should be disposed of. Full review occurs at the Board level. Once again, it is important not to allow our procedures to become bogged down in multiple determinations and redeterminations of issues that are properly committed to the chair of the hearing committee. The twin goals of our proceedings always must be swiftness and fairness.
We agree with the Hearing Committee's conclusion that respondent violated DR 7-101(A)(1) when he refused to file a bond review motion on behalf of his client in the face of her direct instruction to do so. A lawyer who refuses to file a motion as fundamentally important as a bond review motion after being instructed to do so by his client is in violation of the disciplinary rules except in certain unusual circumstances. The factors involved in a judge's decision to reduce the severity of a criminal defendant's conditions of release are so subjective that no lawyer can be sure that such a motion would be frivolous except in certain clearcut cases. To be sure, if the client is subject to a five-day hold, is also arrested on an escape warrant from another sentence, has been revoked on his probation or parole, or otherwise has no possible chance of being released, then an attorney might be justified in refusing to file a bond review motion despite his client's request. Such a motion might be frivolous, and the lawyer would have an obligation not to burden the court with a pointless motion. On the other hand, where the client can theoretically be released, then a bond review motion should always be filed when requested by the client. [4] It is simply impossible to predict with absolute certainty how a court will react to such a motion. Sometimes even the mere passage of time will convince a judge to reduce the severity of the conditions of release. Thus, the motion should always be filed when the client insists upon exercising his absolute statutory right to such a motion unless the lawyer determines that the motion would be wholly frivolous. D.C.Code § 23-1321(d). This is not to say that a lawyer could not advise his client that such a motion was so unlikely to succeed as not to be worthwhile. A lawyer would certainly be justified in urging his opinion on the client and in telling his client that the lawyer's time and efforts would be better spent on other aspects of the case. However, if the client, having heard his lawyer's opinion and having understood it, rejects it and insists upon a bond review motion being filed, the lawyer is obligated to pursue his client's lawful objectives through reasonably available means permitted by law. There is no question that a bond review motion is a reasonably available means permitted by law. The respondent in this case flatly refused to file such a motion despite repeated requests by his client. It was his judgment that such a motion would be worthless and that the client would be better off in jail. Our point is that an attorney is not entitled to substitute his own judgment for that of the client in a matter as fundamental as whether or not to ask that the client be released pending trial. The case belongs to the client, not to the lawyer. The lawyer is bound to exercise his professional judgment in advising the client. But if the lawyer's advice on such a fundamental matter is rejected, the lawyer has only two choices: either pursue the lawful objective of the client or withdraw. What the lawyer may not do is simply substitute his own judgment for that of the client and leave an incarcerated indigent client isolated in the District of Columbia Jail with no one to turn to, his lawyer having simply overruled him. When a lawyer represents an indigent criminal client, particularly one who is incarcerated, his duty is particularly compelling. For an indigent locked up in the District of Columbia Jail, the world is a hostile place indeed. Communications with one's family and friends and neighbors may be difficult or virtually impossible. The incarcerated indigent typically has few or no resources with which to deal with the many problems that confront him. The one person in the complex criminal justice system who is supposed to be unreservedly devoted to the interests of such a client is the appointed lawyer. When that lawyer ignores the views of the client, the client is left completely without assistance in a world that is then unrelievedly hostile.
We part company with the Hearing Committee on the issue of respondent's handling of his client's attempt to plead guilty. In this case, complainant received contradictory advise from two different lawyers. One lawyer, Mr. Bright, urged complainant to accept a package plea of guilty in several cases, one of which was the case in which respondent was representing complainant. Respondent vigorously disagreed and urged his client not to accept the plea bargain. We believe that the Hearing Committee misconstrued its role in resolving the question whether respondent intentionally failed to pursue his client's lawful objectives in this matter. Our misgivings are based upon our view that the merits of respondent's opinion concerning the wisdom of the plea bargain are absolutely irrelevant to our determination of this case. Whether respondent was right or wrong in his views of the plea bargain has no place in our deliberations nor in our decision. We are therefore troubled by the discussion at pages 23 and 24 of the merits of the Hearing Committee's report concerning respondent's views of the plea offer as against those of Mr. Bright. We are particularly troubled by the following excerpt from page 25 of the Hearing Committee's thoughtful and carefully conceived report: Even if one assumes that Respondent's judgment on that point was erroneous, it was not so far fetched as to justify a finding of `neglect' or of `intentionally' failing to pursue a client's objectives. Frankly, we can hardly conceive of a good faith opinion of a lawyer concerning a legal matter which would be so far fetched as to justify a finding of `neglect' or of `intentionally' failing to pursue a client's objectives. A lawyer is duty-bound to exercise his best professional judgment on behalf of his client. Only where total inattention or incompetence is made out on the part of the lawyer in reaching the decision should we ever be in the business of assessing the correctness of the lawyer's advice to his client. Otherwise, we put ourselves in the position of a sort of court of appeals from lawyers' judgments. Any attempt on our part to do so would be the worst sort of second-guessing or Monday morning quarterbacking. Therefore, we conclude that the Hearing Committee was incorrect when it discussed the rightness or wrongness of respondent's views about the plea and purported to base its decision, at least in part, upon its view of the reasonableness of respondent's views. What is to us much more troubling concerning respondent's conduct in this matter is the fact that, after a full opportunity to urge his views upon a competent client who disagreed with those views, respondent persisted in pressing his views in open court in an attempt to thwart his client's rationally arrived at decision to accept the plea bargain. The facts show that respondent had had a full opportunity to argue to the complainant that she should not accept the plea bargain. In fact, respondent conceded at oral argument before the Board that he had had such an opportunity. Respondent further stated in argument before the Board that he had no doubt that the complainant was competent to make the decision that she made. Once a lawyer's client, after full consultation, has reached a decision that the client is competent to make, then it seems to us that the lawyer is bound by that decision unless the client's decision is to seek an unlawful objective. In this case, there is absolutely no question that the client's objective  to plead guilty  was a lawful one. At that point, we believe respondent had an obligation to do his best to effectuate his client's desires. At an absolute minimum, he should have remained mute in court while the other lawyers conducted the plea procedure. However, in this case respondent chose to take a more active role and to urge on the court his own personal views, which were in contradiction to the considered conclusion of his client. At page 4 of the transcript of the plea bargain, respondent interjected himself into the proceedings when no one had addressed him to say the following: MR. STANTON: Would your honor note that in [case number] 8520, I would  I would endorse the waiver of trial under protest. I advised the defendant but  that I think this plea arrangement is improvident and unwise, and I have so advised her. I ask your honor to consider that fact. Bar Counsel Exhibit 23 at page 4. The court correctly and accurately perceived the anomaly of what respondent was doing. The court responded as follows: THE COURT: Well, in what way can I consider it? She said she wished to plead guilty. I mean, the court hasn't a right to prevent a person from pleading guilty. She said she knows and understands fully what she is doing and wants to plead guilty. And, her attorney indicates the same. MR. STANTON: I just want the Court to be fully informed of all the facts in case 8520. THE COURT: Well, she is willing. There is nothing I can do, so long as she does it willingly and voluntarily. . . Id. Respondent's conduct, which is made out by the most clear and convincing evidence possible  his own words transcribed in open court  seems to us to be a serious violation of the Disciplinary Rules. No possible purpose of his client's was served by respondent's spreading his own personal views of the matter on the record after the client had decided to reject his advice. It is not a lawyer's place to seek to vindicate his own views, as opposed to those of his client, before a judge. Respondent's conduct was particularly serious in the context of the importance of the transaction to Mr. Stanton's client. She was entering a plea of guilty in a series of cases. That plea would determine the status of her personal liberty for many months into the future. She earnestly believed, after full consultation with all of her lawyers, that the steps she was taking were in her best interest and would minimize the amount of time that she would ultimately have to spend in jail. Despite the clear fact, conceded by respondent, that his client was rational and fully informed, he interjected himself into the court procedure in an attempt to thwart the client's achieving her lawful objective of pleading guilty. This conduct violates the Disciplinary Rules. Only the wisdom and vigilance of the presiding judge prevented respondent's intemperate behavior from frustrating his client's will. The fact that respondent did not succeed in frustrating his client's attempted plea does not weigh heavily in his favor. On two separate occasions in the instant case, respondent simply overruled his client's stated views on the grounds that he knew better than the client did. He did not have the right to do so. If his client had been wealthy, had been on release in the community, or had been better educated, she might simply have retained the services of another lawyer who would do her bidding. However, the appointed lawyer whose client is in jail has an almost entirely captive audience in his client. The client has neither the resources nor the ability quickly and easily to change lawyers, particularly in connection with a matter like bond review which must be acted upon speedily. For all these reasons, it seems to us that an appointed lawyer with an incarcerated indigent client has a particularly high duty of fidelity to that client's considered judgments. [5] When he breaches that duty in the high-handed manner that respondent breached his duty in this case, then his conduct rises to a considerable degree of severity. In short, we believe that respondent violated the disciplinary rules when he intentionally failed to pursue his client's lawful objective and interjected his personal views in a forum where they had no place.
We pause to note that we agree with the Hearing Committee's conclusion that, where respondent had communicated with his client, it is not our business to assess the quality of those communications. A neglect charge might be made out in a situation where no communications had occurred or where those communications were inappropriately brief or truncated in view of the complexity of the matters at hand. Neither situation appears on this record. Therefore, there could be no clear and convincing evidence of neglect based upon the quality of what a lawyer told his client unless the lawyer's competence were called into question.