Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garrison's failure to identify defendant in court

Text: Garrison, who is African-American, testified that prior to the crime, he had body work done on his Oldsmobile Cutlass. He did not know the man who worked on his car, but Garrison described him as a darkskinned man, five feet six to eight inches tall, with kind of straight hair. This description matched defendant. Significantly, Garrison also testified that the man had the word Apache tattooed on the inner part of his forearm. Defendant bears such a tattoo. Garrison testified the two agreed to commit a robbery, jointly decided to target Barry's Chevron, and consummated their plan, resulting in Elliott Dolinka's murder. Garrison testified the man he knew as Apache lived four blocks from the body shop. Sergeant Quinn later testified defendant lived in that area. Garrison's account was corroborated by Shirley Funk, who reported seeing an African-American man at Barry's Chevron, and then a man who was neither Caucasian nor African-American, but possibly Hispanic or Asian, come up and speak to the African-American man. Another witness, David McLaughlin, positively identified defendant as the dark-skinned man who came up to converse with Garrison. At trial, which (it must be remembered) was seven years after the crime, defense counsel asked Garrison whether defendant was the man he knew as Apache, who had participated in the Dolinka crime with him. The following exchange took place: A. [Garrison] It doesn't look like him to me, no. Q. [Defense Counsel Barnett] So is it your testimony that that is or is not the person or that you don't know? A. I would say I don't know. Defense counsel then moved to strike Garrison's testimony. It's apparent that Mr. Garrison is not identifying Mr. Gurule as the person whom he knew as Apache and who committed this crime with him. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike Garrison's testimony because, in light of Garrison's failure to identify defendant in court, his testimony was not relevant. A trial court has no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence. ( People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 321, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669, disapproved on another ground in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1149, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306; Evid.Code, § 351 [all relevant evidence is admissible].) Respondent counters that defendant failed to preserve the claim for appeal. Although a close case is presented on the forfeiture issue, we conclude that even if defendant adequately preserved this claim, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to strike Garrison's testimony. Addressing the forfeiture issue first, respondent argues defendant failed to preserve the claim for appeal because the trial court denied the motion to strike Garrison's testimony without prejudice, stating it was premature, thereby impliedly inviting defendant to renew the motion after the People had completed presenting their case. Defendant rightly points out the trial court expressly stated The court denies your request to strike the testimony of Mr. Garrison ..., suggesting he had made a timely objection and had obtained a final decision on the objection. But immediately after denying the motion, the trial court explained that over a period of time people do change in their appearance, not deliberately necessarily, but by reason of age alone. The court noted the prosecutor had not yet completed his presentation of the case and that the relevance of Garrison's testimony might be shown by other evidence the prosecutor might yet introduce. Accordingly, [y]our motion to that exten[t] may be taken under submission to the extent there is no connection drawn between Mr. Gurule and Apache. However, ... at best I would say that your motion is premature. (Italics added.) As can be seen, by stating it was taking the matter under submission, the trial court left the door open for defendant to renew his objection if, on completion of the People's case, insufficient evidence linked defendant to the person Garrison referred to as Apache. Because no additional evidence on the issue of Garrison's identification of defendant was presented, it is at least arguable that defendant was justified in relying on his earlier objection and that the matter was preserved for appeal despite his failure to renew his objection. We need not, however, resolve the forfeiture point. Assuming for argument the issue was preserved, we find the trial court did not err. The trial court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 922, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93, disapproved on another point in People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 369, fn. 2, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 2%, 914 P.2d 846 (cone. opn. of George, C. J., joined by a majority of the court)), and its decision to await the complete presentation of the People's case before making a final decision was reasonable. Defendant further argues his defense counsel were ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial in light of Garrison's inability to identify defendant. A motion for mistrial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We have explained that '[a] mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.' ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 985-986, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) In light of the other evidence of defendant's guilt, most prominently his admission to police of his participation in the robbery, it is clear the trial court would have denied a motion for mistrial for lack of prejudice had defense counsel made the motion. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that his counsel were constitutionally ineffective. We likewise reject for the same reason defendant's further claim, made with little discussion, that the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal.