Opinion ID: 2121771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claims wholly waived

Text: We now turn to the final group of claims raised by the defendant. These are all issues that were presented or could have been presented on direct appeal and therefore are wholly waived. We will consider these contentions in the sequence in which they appear in the defendant's supplemental post-conviction petition. The defendant argues, in claim II of the petition, that the prosecutor interfered with the defendant's selection of counsel. The defendant argues that, prior to trial, the prosecutor improperly contacted an attorney, George Howard, whom the defendant was then attempting to retain, and persuaded Howard not to take the defendant's case. This question came up during a status hearing, shortly before the beginning of trial, when the defendant mentioned his efforts to obtain different counsel. One of the prosecutors then said that he had spoken on the telephone to Howard's secretary and had told her that the defendant had deposited cash bail in the amount of $10,000, that the trial court would seek to apply the sum remaining after the 10% deduction toward the reimbursement of defendant's appointed counsel, and, finally, that the prosecutor did not believe that much, if any, would remain for the payment of new counsel. Howard did not represent the defendant in these proceedings. The post-conviction judge correctly dismissed this claim on grounds of res judicata. This court rejected the same contention on direct appeal, finding no impropriety in the prosecutor's actions. This court concluded then that the prosecutor did not interfere with the defendant's right to select counsel. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 436-38, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) In light of this court's original holding on this issue, principles of res judicata preclude our considering the same issue again here. The defendant argues, however, that res judicata does not bar the present claim because trial counsel, whom defendant was seeking to replace with Howard, proved to be ineffective. We do not agree with the defendant that trial counsel's performance has any bearing on this issue. As the State observes, the defendant's right to select counsel is distinct from his right to the effective assistance of counsel; having found no interference with the defendant's selection of counsel, we do not believe that counsel's performance at trial is relevant in this regard. Finally, we must reject, as waived, the defendant's further contention that the prosecutor's conduct concerning the bond money improperly interfered with assets belonging to the defendant. We consider next several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct that are not disposed of elsewhere in the present opinion. In his final series of allegations in claim III, the defendant contends that the prosecution made a number of improper comments in opening statement and closing argument. This court rejected several of these contentions on direct appeal. Other points not previously raised could have been raised, and we decline to review them here. Briefly, the defendant contends that the prosecution argued certain facts not in evidence, erroneously commented that Sandra Douglas' trial testimony was consistent with her statement to Alabama authorities (see Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 429-30, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38), improperly suggested the existence of other evidence of defendant's guilt (see Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 444-45, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38), improperly suggested that the defendant was dangerous, speculated with regard to the defendant's motive in making his statement to the police and bolstered the credibility of the officer who testified to the statement, and improperly argued that the defendant had the burden of producing a certain witness. These allegations of trial error were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal, and there is no need for us to consider them here. The defendant argues, in claim VII of his supplemental post-conviction petition, that the trial judge incorrectly explained to the prospective jurors the defendant's constitutional right not to testify. The trial judge told the prospective jurors that the Fifth Amendment says the defendant need not testify, need not incriminate himself. The defendant argues that the judge's comment improperly suggested that any testimony from the defendant would be self-incriminatory. The post-conviction judge dismissed this claim on grounds of res judicata, but the defendant insists that fundamental fairness warrants consideration of this issue. On direct appeal, this court rejected the defendant's challenge to the remark quoted above, concluding from a review of the record as a whole that the statement did not constitute an adverse comment on defendant's failure to testify. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 439, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) In explaining its holding, the court quoted a portion of the judge's remarks to the prospective jurors at the beginning of voir dire; at that time, the judge told the venire: So when and if a defendant charged elects to remain silent, he puts a legal burden on the Court to determine whether, at some point, the State has established the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant now argues that this separate comment by the judge improperly suggested that the State's burden of proof would arise only if the defendant chose not to testify at trial. Clearly, the defendant's challenge to this remark comes too late. The defendant could have raised the same issue on direct appeal but failed to do so. We do not agree with the defendant that considerations of fundamental fairness warrant further review of this question here. In claim VIII, the defendant argues that certain comments made by the trial judge during voir dire erroneously suggested to the jury that a capital sentencing hearing was certain to occur in this case. In explaining the course of procedures for trial and sentencing, the judge stated: The first thing, of course, that must be accomplished in the trial is the production of the testimony by the State in support of its indictment, and then the election by the defendant, whether he thinks he has to testify against it, or if he wants to, and at that point, then, Step One in the process will be pretty close to accomplishment and that is the question of whether the case has been proven. So before you get into the question of capital punishment, there must first be a finding of guilty of murder and that's the only thing which capital punishment can be predicated upon. All of this means that your Jury services [ sic] is going to be performed in certain segments. The defendant now argues that the prospective jurors would have understood the preceding comments to mean that a capital sentencing hearing was bound to be held and that the trial was merely a formality leading up to the sentencing hearing. The defendant did not raise this argument on direct appeal from his conviction and sentence, and therefore we consider it waived. In any event, we note that the post-conviction judge considered and rejected this argument on the merits, concluding that the trial judge's comments did not go beyond what was necessary to properly qualify the jury under Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, and its progeny. We would agree. The balance of the trial judge's remarks clarified the comments quoted above. The judge continued his explanation of trial and sentencing procedures by stating: First the trial of the primary charge, and thenand the other charges, and then assumingand I have no right to assume anything    but assume for the moment that you were satisfied that the State proved the case and you returned a verdict of murder, then there would be separate hearing and you would continue as the jury. The trial judge went on to refer to the return of a guilty verdict as a prerequisite for the holding of a sentencing hearing. Viewing the trial judge's comments in their entirety, we do not believe that the jurors would have been confused about the true purpose of the trial or about the conditional nature of the prospective sentencing hearing. The defendant next contends, in claim IX of his supplemental post-conviction petition, that the trial judge improperly allowed prosecution witness Sandra Douglas to testify regarding hearsay statements made by Pamela Thompkins. This court rejected the same argument on direct appeal, concluding then that the statements in question constituted spontaneous declarations and were therefore admissible under that exception to the hearsay rule. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 427-29, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) In light of this earlier disposition, the post-conviction judge correctly declined to consider this question on grounds of res judicata, and we need not address this issue again. We must reject the defendant's contention that further review is warranted here because the court was not called upon to consider, in its earlier opinion, his theory that the hearsay testimony was inadmissible because Pamela was not shown to be unavailable to testify. Contrary to the defendant's view, unavailability of the declarant is not a prerequisite for the admission of a spontaneous utterance. White v. Illinois (1992), 502 U.S. 346, 352-56, 112 S.Ct. 736, 741-43, 116 L.Ed.2d 848, 857-60. The defendant complains, in claim X of his supplemental post-conviction petition, that the trial judge improperly restricted defense counsel's cross-examination of prosecution witness Keith Culbreath, denying the defendant his sixth amendment right of confrontation. (See Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347.) At trial, defense counsel attempted to ask Culbreath whether the prosecution had charged Culbreath with a drug offense to coerce him to testify against the defendant. The trial judged refused to permit the inquiry. On cross-examination, Culbreath explained that the pending charge against him was to be dropped in exchange for his truthful testimony in the defendant's case, that he would later be relocated, and that he was being held in protective custody in the meantime. This court rejected on direct appeal the defendant's challenge to the trial judge's ruling. This court found that the information elicited from Culbreath in his testimony sufficiently showed his potential bias in the case, and it concluded that any error in limiting counsel's inquiry was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 441-42, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) Given this earlier holding, we must conclude here, as the post-conviction judge did, that reconsideration of this issue is barred by res judicata. We consider next the defendant's related contention that the prosecution committed misconduct by coercing Culbreath into testifying in behalf of the State. Following the judge's ruling limiting the defendant's cross-examination, defense counsel informed the court that he had been told by Culbreath's attorney that Culbreath had been arrested and charged with the offense of unlawful delivery of cocaine to induce him to testify against the defendant. The defendant challenges here the prosecution's actions with respect to Culbreath, as disclosed in counsel's statement to the trial court. This was an issue that could have been presented on direct appeal but was not. In its earlier opinion, this court discussed two separate questions concerning Culbreath's testimony. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 441-44, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) The defendant could have raised the related allegation made here, that the prosecution improperly charged Culbreath with an offense to gain his cooperation and his testimony. The defendant has offered no new evidence in support of this allegation, and we decline to consider it here. In claim XI of the petition, the defendant argues that the trial judge erred in refusing a defense-tendered instruction on the credibility of a habitual user of illicit drugs. The court rejected the same argument on the defendant's direct appeal, concluding then that there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's charge that prosecution witness Sandra Douglas was an addict. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 440-42, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) As the post-conviction judge determined, this earlier holding bars reconsideration of the same issue here. The evidence of Douglas' occasional drug use cited by the defendant was part of the trial record and thus was known to this court when it upheld the trial judge's ruling. Moreover, issues concerning jury instructions are generally not cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding. People v. Goerger (1972), 52 Ill.2d 403, 406, 288 N.E.2d 416. The defendant, in claim XII of his petition, argues that the trial judge erred in denying the defendant's motion in limine that sought to preclude the State from using the defendant's prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to prevent the prosecution from impeaching the defendant with evidence of two prior convictions. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and aggravated battery in 1971, received a sentence of 15 to 20 years' imprisonment, and was released from prison in 1975. The defendant was tried on the charges involved in the present case in 1982. The defendant now contends that the trial court's unfavorable ruling on the motion in limine induced him not to testify at trial. The post-conviction judge rejected this claim as meritless, concluding that the trial judge's ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The same argument could have been raised on direct appeal, and therefore it may not properly be considered here. Moreover, we note that the defendant's failure to testify at trial means that the issue would have been waived even on direct appeal. ( Luce v. United States (1984), 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443; People v. Miles (1989), 186 Ill.App.3d 370, 372-73, 134 Ill.Dec. 351, 542 N.E.2d 530; People v. Redman (1986), 141 Ill.App.3d 691, 699-700, 95 Ill.Dec. 866, 490 N.E.2d 958; see People v. Whitehead (1987), 116 Ill.2d 425, 444, 108 Ill.Dec. 376, 508 N.E.2d 687.) For these reasons, we decline to address this issue here. The defendant argues, in claim XIII of the petition, that the trial judge erred in permitting the prosecution to present evidence that one of the murder victims, Arthur Sheppard, was survived by a child. The defendant contends that the testimony denied him his right to a fair trial. This information was introduced during the testimony of the victim's wife, Lynetta Sheppard, who appeared as a life and death witness at the defendant's trial. The court rejected an identical argument on direct appeal, holding then that this isolated reference to the victim's surviving family members could not have been prejudicial. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 446-47, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) Again, this court's original holding on this question makes reconsideration of the issue unnecessary here, and the post-conviction judge correctly gave res judicata effect to the prior ruling. In claim XIV, the defendant contends that the trial judge erred in his handling of a question submitted to the court by the jury while it was deliberating. During deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note asking, May we get a copy of the transcript? After discussing the matter with the parties, the judge informed the jury in a written response that a transcript would not be available for several days and asked whether the jury had a question about any particular testimony. The jury then returned a note indicating that it did not have any further questions. Although the judge's handling of this question was consistent with the wishes of the defendant's trial attorney, the defendant now argues that the judge failed to exercise his discretion in responding to the jury's request because he did not ask the jury what particular testimony it wanted. This was an issue that the defendant could have raised on direct appeal, and thus it falls outside the proper scope of the present proceeding. But even if we considered the question we would conclude, as did the judge below, that it lacks merit. We fail to see in what way the trial judge's actions here represented a failure to exercise discretion, as the defendant charges. The trial judge accurately explained to the jury that a transcript was not then available and specifically asked whether the jurors wished to receive any particular portion of the trial testimony. The jury thus was provided with an opportunity to request any further information it might have wished to receive. The defendant next raises, in claim XVIII, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct at the sentencing hearing. We discuss several of these issues elsewhere in this opinion. The defendant's remaining contention is that the prosecutor made false and negative insinuations about the defendant's character during cross-examination of the defendant's wife at the sentencing hearing. This court rejected the same contention in the defendant's direct appeal, however, and accordingly we need not consider this issue further. Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 453-54, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38. The defendant also argues, in claim XXXIII of the post-conviction petition, that the bail statute invoked by the trial judge in the present case cannot be applied to him without violating the ex post facto proscriptions of the Federal and State Constitutions. U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 16. Pursuant to section 113-3.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the trial judge ordered the statutory maximum of $5,000 of the defendant's $10,000 cash bond to be sequestered and applied toward the reimbursement of the defendant's appointed counsel. The statute did not take effect until July 1, 1982, the date when the trial judge sentenced the defendant. The defendant argues that applying the provision to his case violates the ex post facto prohibitions of the Federal and State Constitutions because the new statute disadvantages him retrospectively. See generally Miller v. Florida (1987), 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351; Tiller v. Klincar (1990), 138 Ill.2d 1, 149 Ill.Dec. 206, 561 N.E.2d 576. The defendant presented a related contention on direct appeal. On that occasion, the defendant argued that the trial judge's statement, earlier in the proceedings, that the judge was authorized to apply a portion of the defendant's cash bond to reimbursing the cost of appointed counsel had caused the defendant to forgo attempting to retain counsel because he mistakenly believed that he would then have no funds left. This court rejected the defendant's contention, noting that the trial judge's statement was equivocal and, moreover, that the defendant had persisted in his efforts to retain counsel even after the trial judge made the comment in question. ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 437, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38.) Clearly, the defendant could have raised on direct appeal the argument he now asserts. This court's prior decision is, therefore, res judicata with respect to this claim. In a final series of arguments, raised as claims XXII through XXXII of the supplemental post-conviction petition, the defendant contends that various features of the Illinois death penalty statute, section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1), violate the Federal and State constitutions. We have repeatedly rejected the same contentions, as the post-conviction judge observed, and we see no reason to reach a different result here. This court has held that the statutory language does not effectively prevent the sentencer from giving meaningful consideration to a defendant's mitigating evidence. ( People v. Page (1993), 155 Ill.2d 232, 283, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160; People v. Strickland (1992), 154 Ill.2d 489, 538-39, 182 Ill.Dec. 551, 609 N.E.2d 1366.) The statute does not place on a defendant the risk of nonpersuasion at the sentencing hearing ( People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 76, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791; Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 456, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38; People v. Orange (1988), 121 Ill.2d 364, 390, 118 Ill.Dec. 1, 521 N.E.2d 69; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 49, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223), nor is it invalid for failing to require the State to carry a burden of persuasion at the second stage of the hearing ( People v. Jones (1988), 123 Ill.2d 387, 426, 123 Ill.Dec. 944, 528 N.E.2d 648; Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 456-57, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38; People v. Eddmonds (1984), 101 Ill.2d 44, 68, 77 Ill.Dec. 724, 461 N.E.2d 347; People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 421, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218). The statute is not invalid for failing to require the State to provide the defendant with pretrial notice of its intent to seek the death penalty ( Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 456, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38; People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill.2d 147, 161-62, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415; People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342, 369, 58 Ill.Dec. 795, 430 N.E.2d 1046) or of the evidence in aggravation that will be introduced at the capital sentencing hearing ( People v. King (1986), 109 Ill.2d 514, 547, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill.2d 504, 540, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246; Gaines, 88 Ill.2d at 369, 58 Ill.Dec. 795, 430 N.E.2d 1046). The discretion afforded by the statute to the prosecutor in deciding whether to seek the death penalty in a particular case does not result in its arbitrary or capricious imposition ( People v. Williams (1991), 147 Ill.2d 173, 264-66, 167 Ill.Dec. 853, 588 N.E.2d 983; Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d at 456, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38; People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 531, 539-43, 34 Ill. Dec. 137, 397 N.E.2d 809), nor does it violate separation of powers principles by vesting a judicial function in a nonjudicial officer ( People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 119-20, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743; People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill.2d 129, 146, 58 Ill.Dec. 895, 430 N.E.2d 1346; People ex rel. Carey, 77 Ill.2d at 535-39, 34 Ill.Dec. 137, 397 N.E.2d 809). The statute is not invalid for failing to require the sentencing authority to make a separate determination that death is the appropriate punishment in the case. ( People v. Whitehead (1987), 116 Ill.2d 425, 462, 108 Ill.Dec. 376, 508 N.E.2d 687; People v. Montgomery (1986), 112 Ill.2d 517, 534, 98 Ill.Dec. 353, 494 N.E.2d 475; People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 76-77, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840.) Nor is the statute invalid for failing to require the sentencing authority to provide a written statement of its findings. People v. King (1986), 109 Ill.2d 514, 550-51, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949; People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill.2d 463, 497, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227; People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 541-44, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181. The defendant also argues that the death penalty statute is unconstitutionally vague in its references to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that may be presented by the parties and considered by the sentencer. In support of this contention the defendant cites the district court decision in United States ex rel. Free v. Peters (N.D.Ill.1992), 806 F.Supp. 705. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has rejected the district court's reasoning ( Gacy v. Welborn (7th Cir. 1993), 994 F.2d 305) and has reversed the district court's decision ( Free v. Peters (7th Cir.1993), 12 F.3d 700). We agree with the appeals court, and we accordingly reject the defendant's contention here. People v. Fair (1994), 159 Ill.2d 51, 96, 201 Ill.Dec. 23, 47, 636 N.E.2d 455, 479. This court has previously rejected the defendant's argument that the death penalty statute has been applied in a discriminatory manner against particular defendants who have chosen to exercise their constitutional right to trial ( People v. Richardson (1988), 123 Ill.2d 322, 358, 123 Ill.Dec. 908, 528 N.E.2d 612; People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill.2d 129, 148-49, 58 Ill.Dec. 895, 430 N.E.2d 1346), and the present defendant offers no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case. The court has also rejected the contention that the statute is unconstitutionally applied to discriminate on the basis of the offender's or victim's race. ( People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 291-92, 138 Ill. Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202; People v. Orange (1988), 121 Ill.2d 364, 392, 118 Ill.Dec. 1, 521 N.E.2d 69; People v. Davis (1987), 119 Ill.2d 61, 64-68, 115 Ill.Dec. 553, 518 N.E.2d 78; see McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262.) The defendant does not elaborate on his additional assertions that the death penalty statute has been applied in a discriminatory fashion on the basis of sex and poverty, and we need not consider those claims here. The defendant also contends that the death penalty statute is applied arbitrarily and capriciously. The defendant again cites studies that purport to show that the death penalty is applied in a discriminatory manner. The defendant also insists that there is no rational way to distinguish the few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. This court has already rejected the defendant's contention that the statute has been unconstitutionally applied in a discriminatory manner. We must reject the defendant's further argument that cases in which the sentence is imposed are not rationally distinguishable from those in which the sentence is not imposed. The court has, however, rejected the contention that the statute is invalid for its failure to provide for comparative proportionality review of all death sentences. People v. King (1986), 109 Ill.2d 514, 551, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949; People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill.2d 463, 499, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227; People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 541-44, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181. For the reasons stated, we reverse that portion of the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, the defendant's contention in claim XV that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to adequately investigate and present evidence in mitigation. In all other respects, however, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We remand the present cause to the circuit court of Cook County for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on the specified portion of the defendant's supplemental post-conviction petition. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.