Opinion ID: 14461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-remand Dismissal Inadequately Supported

Text: 88 Conkling also argues that in any event the district court's post-remand dismissal is not justified. We agree. 89 As previously stated, the district court's post-remand dismissal was based on its conclusion that the parties through counsel and the court had agreed, some time on March 18 or 19, 1992, and before the jury was discharged on the latter date, that if the jury verdict were for Turner, or in light of such verdict, then Conkling would not pursue any claim that had not been tried in the event this Court affirmed the judgment on the other claims. We assume--at least arguendo--that such an agreement, properly documented or reflected in the record, could be enforced. As the district court recognized, however, nothing in the transcript or in any order or writing whatever--including any letter to or from the court or any of the parties or counsel or even any informal notes of the court, counsel, or anyone else--reflects such or any similar agreement. Conkling's lead counsel has denied under oath making any such agreement, and his other counsel, more than four years after the event, simply had no recollection. Turner's lead counsel testified that Conkling's counsel stated after the verdict that if the court were to give judgment for Turner on the RICO count then he had no desire to try the rest of the case. Turner's associate counsel, though he was unclear as to whether this occurred before or after the verdict, testified that Conkling's counsel said if his RICO case was dismissed because of the finding of no fraud, that the stand alone Harmony claim wasn't big enough or sufficient enough to justify his going forward. The testimony by Turner's attorneys not only relates to statements after the verdict--in contrast to the district court who plainly was speaking of a pre-verdict agreement--but, more importantly, if credited would ordinarily have led to a dismissal of Conkling's pendent breach of fiduciary duty claim for failure to prosecute. See Sturgeon v. Airborne Freight, 778 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir.1985); Lopez v. Aransas County Independent School District, 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.1978). Cf. G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 951-53 (5th Cir.1981) (plaintiff's counsel's announcement, at unrecorded conference to modify the pretrial order on the first day of trial, that evidence would not be presented on the section 10b-5 claim did not amount to dismissal or waiver of that claim, where not incorporated into the pre-trial order and plaintiff's counsel later that day disputed any abandonment). But that is not what the district court then did. Rather, it expressly granted Turner's motion for summary judgment on that claim, because (as the April 1992 order recited) it found there is no factual or legal basis to support plaintiff's breach of fiduciary [duty] claim which was set forth in the complaint, and dismissed the claim on that basis. By the same token, the testimony of Turner's attorneys does not describe any character of agreement, much less the unusual and somewhat complicated one found by the district court following remand, namely that Turner would be free to continue-- in this same suit--his pendent breach of fiduciary duty claims if, but only if, this Court (or the district court acting on a post-judgment motion for new trial) were to reverse or order retrial of (presumably in whole or in part) the judgment for Turner on the RICO claims (or, presumably, on the breach of contract claim). 90 The district court, in support of its order following remand, also relied on the language in the second paragraph of its order for judgment entered April 9, 1992 (dated April 7), referring to following a pre-verdict agreement of the parties and the court as to the court's post-verdict procedure. While this language does indeed support the conclusion that there was some pre-verdict agreement between all concerned as to what would be done post-verdict, the April 9, 1992, order, taken as a whole, clearly does not support, but rather tends to contradict, the agreement found by the court following remand. The April 1992 order reads as follows: 91 On March 19, 1992, the jury found that the defendants were not guilty of any fraud and that there was no redemption agreement entered into between the parties in 1962. [ 19 ] At the conclusion of the evidence, both the plaintiff and the defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law. The Court finds that defendants' motion is moot. The Court also finds that the evidence clearly supports the jury's verdict. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied. 92 Prior to the jury's verdict, the Court and the parties agreed to a procedure to be followed by the Court once the jury's verdict was returned. Following that procedure, the Court finds as follows. 93 The Court reconsiders its prior decision which denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and now finds that plaintiff's claim under RICO should be dismissed since the jury found no fraud on the part of the defendants in this case. The Court also finds that there is no factual or legal basis to support plaintiff's breach of fiduciary claim which was set forth in the complaint. Therefore, the Court finds that the plaintiff's RICO claims and plaintiff's breach of fiduciary claims must be dismissed as a matter of fact and law. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment on these claims is granted. In summary, the Court finds as follows: 94
95 2. Considering the jury's verdict, defendants' motion for a judgment as a matter of law is DISMISSED AS MOOT. 96 3. Upon reconsideration, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiff's claims under RICO and breach of fiduciary relationship are DISMISSED. 97 4. Judgment shall be entered dismissing plaintiff's entire case with prejudice at plaintiff's costs. (Emphasis added). 20 98 This order expressly grants Turner's motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim and orders its dismissal for that reason; and, it grants that summary judgment because [t]he Court ... finds there is no factual or legal basis to support plaintiff's breach of fiduciary [duty] claim which was set forth in the complaint. There is nothing in this order suggesting that Conkling refused to proceed further after the verdict or that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was dismissed for that reason. Nor does anything in the April 9 order suggest that Conkling agreed, or the court determined, that if the summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim were reversed on appeal, but the judgment on the RICO and contract claims were affirmed, that Conkling nevertheless would not pursue the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Indeed, the form of the April 9 order suggests the very opposite--that in such event Conkling could pursue the breach of fiduciary duty claim--for that is the legal effect of the order, as our prior disposition reflects, absent some express provision to the contrary. The April 9 order is far more consistent with Conkling's attorneys' understanding--that he did not proceed with the breach of fiduciary duty claim because the district court had already said that it would dispose of that by reconsidering Turner's motion for summary judgment--than it is with the district court's post-remand view of what was understood between the parties and the court. 21 99 We note also that on the prior appeal Turner defended the breach of fiduciary duty summary judgment on the merits (see note 18, supra ), and never contended that it should not be remanded because there was an agreement not to pursue it should the judgment dismissing the other claims be affirmed. 100 The district court, in its remarks at the February 13, 1997, hearing, also relied on two passages in the transcript of the proceedings in the late afternoon and early evening of March 18, 1992. The first of these occurred after the jury arguments and the charge had been given and, at 5:02 p.m., the jury had been excused but told not to begin deliberations until so directed by the court. Then the court heard further objections to the charge. When this was completed, and just before the jury was brought back in to hear a portion of the charge which the court had earlier inadvertently failed to read to the jury, the court remarked to counsel as follows: 101 The Court: One of the things I want to do when we get through with this, and y'all take a break or two, I want y'all to come sit down with me and tell me, depending on which verdict comes in, what we need to do. So, if you get a verdict tonight we can tell the jury to come or not come back. I think we ought to start planning that phase (jury enters). 102 The jury then entered and the court read the jury the previously omitted portion of the charge, and at 5:10 p.m. the jury was sent out with directions to begin its deliberations. Thereafter the court directed the marshal to get the jury the verdict forms and counsel to get together the exhibits to be taken to the jury room. Then, after some instructions to counsel as to being available and the procedures to be followed if there were a jury note, the court made the following remarks to counsel (this being the second of the two paragraphs relied on by the court), viz: After y'all take a break for a few minutes, I want y'all to come see me and let's just sit and see what the effect of these verdicts are and where we're going to go from here, because I don't want to discharge the jury tonight erroneously. The court then instructed counsel that if they wanted they could wait on the jury in two specific rooms upstairs or outside in the hallway. The transcript then reflects that there was recess from 5:15 p.m. until 7:34 p.m., when the jury sent in a note saying they wanted to go home for the evening. The jury was brought in, and at 7:41 p.m. was excused for the evening and told to come back at 9:00 a.m. the following morning. The court advised that it would be out of the courthouse in the morning but could be reached, and that counsel did not have to come to the courthouse the next day until there was a jury note. The court suggested to the parties Conkling and Turner personally that they consider settlement, and at 7:45 p.m. recessed for the evening. 103 While these passages do reflect that the court was concerned about how to proceed after any verdict, wanted to avoid erroneously discharging the jury, and wanted to discuss this with counsel, they do not in any way suggest what was said or agreed on at any subsequent discussion. 22 104 The above-noted transcript passage of the court's statement to counsel, just after the jury was excused following its verdict on Thursday, March 19, [w]e agreed last night that we would have arguments on the motion on Friday at 9:00 if anybody wants oral argument, does reflect that there was an agreement for arguments on motions, but does not reflect any other or further agreement. Nor is it inconsistent with Conkling's counsel's asserted understanding, as stated in his testimony, that this referred to the court's statement the previous evening that the court was going to reconsider the defendant's motions for summary judgment. 23 And, that is what the April 9 order said the court did. 105 In sum, the court's reasons for its post-remand dismissal are ultimately not adequately supported by anything in the record other than the court's recollection of what was said by counsel during an informal, unrecorded status conference over four years previously, as to which no one, the court included, has any confirmatory order, minute entry, correspondence, or on-the-record remarks, or even informal notes, and as to which the recollections of the lawyers involved on each side differ not only from each other but also from the court's recollection. Moreover, the most natural inferences from the April 9, 1992, order do not support, but rather tend to undercut, the district court's reasons for its post-remand disposition. In these circumstances, the risk of misunderstanding what was said and intended years previously is simply too great to allow such a disposition to stand. 24 106 In analogous circumstances, we have held that while we would not insist on a signed, written stipulation for a post-answer voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(a)(1) to be without prejudice, although the terms of the rule require that, nevertheless any oral stipulation must, however, be unequivocal and in the record. Ocean Drilling Explor. v. Mont Boat Rental Serv., 799 F.2d 213, 218 (5th Cir.1986). This was thought necessary to avoid later dispute. Id. See also Camacho v. Mancuso, 53 F.3d 48, 52-53 (4th Cir.1995). 25 107 The district court's post-remand decision here was obviously taken in complete good faith and represents its sincere and conscientious view of what happened in March and April 1992. Nor do we purport to say that this is in fact not what actually happened. We do hold, however, that there is inadequate record support for the more than four-year-old oral agreement found by the district court, and too much room for confusion, doubt, and misinterpretation in that respect, to justify the belated dismissal of the remanded claims on the basis thereof. We consequently reverse the district court's February 1997 order of dismissal and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent herewith. The case shall proceed on the basis that the claims previously remanded are not precluded by any such agreement as found by the district court, nor by any failure to proceed or statement of intention to waive or the like (as urged by Turner in section 1 of his memorandum below in support of his post-remand motion to dismiss or for summary judgment).