Opinion ID: 678881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Elements of Section 212(c) Relief and the Standard of Review

Text: 12 Section 212(c) permits the Attorney General to grant discretionary relief from deportation or exclusion to lawful permanent residents who meet the statute's seven year residency requirement. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(c) (1988); Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that section 212(c), despite its reference only to the exclusion of aliens, applies to deportation proceedings). As we explained in Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir.1993): 13 In exercising his responsibility, an IJ must determine whether to grant section 212(c) relief based on all the facts and circumstances of a particular case, taking into account the social and humane considerations presented in an applicant's favor and balancing them against the adverse factors that evidence the applicant's undesirability as a permanent resident. In re Edwards, Interim Dec[.] No. 3134, 1990 WL 385757, 1990 BIA . 14 The BIA has enumerated several factors to be considered in determining whether or not to grant a section 212(c) petition. Favorable considerations include: 1) family ties within the United States; 2) residence of long duration in this country (particularly when residence began at a young age); 3) hardship to the petitioner or petitioner's family if relief is not guaranteed; 4) service in the United States armed forces; 5) a history of employment; 6) the existence of business or property ties; 7) evidence of value and service to the community; 8) proof of rehabilitation if a criminal record exists; 9) other evidence attesting to good character. Id. 1990 WL 385757, 1990 BIA LEXIS 8, at 10-11. To be weighed against these factors are: 1) the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion or deportation ground at issue; 2) additional violations of the immigration laws; 3) the existence, seriousness, and recency of any criminal record; 4) other evidence of bad character or the undesirability of the applicant as a permanent resident. Id. 1990 WL 385757, 1990 BIA LEXIS 8, at 11. 15 Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1365-66 (footnotes omitted). In this weighing process, [a]s the negative factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the alien to introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence, which in some cases may have to involve unusual or outstanding equities. In re Roberts, Interim Dec. No. 3148, 1991 WL 353515, 1991 BIA LEXIS 9, at  5. A single serious crime or a pattern of misconduct can trigger a need to make this showing, id., and to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion, an applicant with a criminal record will ordinarily be required to present evidence of rehabilitation, id. 1991 WL 353515, 1991 BIA LEXIS 9, at  6. However, there are cases in which the adverse considerations are so serious that a favorable exercise [of discretion] is not warranted even in the face of unusual or outstanding equities. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1366. 16 This court reviews the agency's factual conclusions under the substantial evidence standard, see id. (citing Martinez v. INS, 970 F.2d 973, 974 (1st Cir.1992)), and the balancing of the equities for abuse of discretion, id. (citing Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir.1987)). The agency must state its reasons for its decision and demonstrate that it considered all appropriate factors. Id. Questions of law, such as whether the BIA applied the appropriate legal standard, are reviewed de novo. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1228 (9th Cir.1988). When appropriate, however, we apply the principles of deference to an agency's construction of a statute that it is charged with administering as articulated in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and its progeny. See, e.g., Hernandez-Vivas v. INS, 23 F.3d 1557, 1560 (9th Cir.1994); Kahn v. INS, 20 F.3d 960, 962 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam); Mendoza v. INS, 16 F.3d 335, 337 (9th Cir.1994). Finally, in cases such as this, in which the Board has exercised its power to conduct a de novo review of the IJ's decision, we review only the decision of the BIA. See Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1366-67.