Opinion ID: 6331052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The ADA and RA Claims

Text: For their next point of error, the Timpsons contend the district court improperly dismissed their ADA and RA claims and wrongly excluded evidence of South Carolina’s financial resources. See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603, 607 (“[T]he resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities” may be considered in determining whether providing requested services would “entail a fundamental alteration of the State’s services and programs.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). For context, the RA provides, “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II defines “public entity” as, inter alia, “any State or local government” or “any department, agency, [or] special purpose district.” Id. § 12131(1). “To the extent possible, we construe the ADA and [RA] to impose similar requirements. Thus, despite the 26 different language these statutes employ, they require a plaintiff to demonstrate the same elements to establish liability.” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). We need not reach the merits of the Timpsons’ claims, however, because their opening brief on this issue—much like their amended complaint below—fails to identify: (1) either the specific conduct complained of or which Defendant allegedly engaged in any given unlawful action; (2) how that conduct injured either Johnny or Sandra; or (3) how that conduct violated either statute. Nor do the Timpsons present any argument that they were harmed by the dismissal of their RA claims. Thus, they have presented no basis for reversing the judgment below, Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 252 n.11 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]his Court normally views contentions not raised in an opening brief to be waived.”), and have “failed to point to persuasive indications that any one of [their] bases for reversal of the district court’s judgment has merit,” First Pros. Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 607 F. App’x 276, 290 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). The Timpsons’ appeal to Olmstead is also unavailing. A state that decides to provide services under the Medicaid Act must do so “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). But “the State generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an individual meets the essential eligibility requirements for habilitation in a communitybased program. Absent such qualification, it would be inappropriate to remove a patient from the more restrictive setting.” Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court expressly did not hold “that the ADA imposes on the States 27 a standard of care for whatever medical services they render, or that the ADA requires States to provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.” Id. at 603 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Timpsons made no showing or assertion in their opening brief as to how South Carolina’s purportedly improper diversion of funds had any effect on Johnny’s treatment and care. See Carter, 283 F.3d at 252 n.11. We therefore affirm on this ground as well.