Opinion ID: 2599165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Degree Burglary Rendered Superfluous

Text: It is a rule of statutory construction that courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute. Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai`i 217, 221, 941 P.2d 300, 304 (1997). One such statute that would be rendered superfluous by the majority's interpretation of the UEMV statute is second degree burglary, HRS § 708-811 (1993). [1] Like the UEMV statute, the burglary statutes are found in Chapter 708. The wording of the UEMV statute directly models the wording of the second degree burglary statute. The only difference between the two statutes is that the word building, as it appears in the second degree burglary statute, is replaced with the phrase motor vehicle in the UEMV statute. See supra note 1. Both the UEMV and second degree burglary statutes are class C felonies. See HRS § 708-811(2)(1993); HRS § 708-836.5(2) (Supp. 2000). An interpretation of the UEMV statute that prohibits any crime committed in a vehicle (including simple assault), would render the second degree burglary statute superfluous as it pertains to vehicles. The definition section applicable to the burglary statutes defines building to include vehicles used for lodging. [2] The majority's interpretation of the UEMV statute eliminates the need for that part of the second degree burglary statute, as the UEMV statute criminalizes all crimes committed upon unauthorized entry of any vehicle, whether or not the vehicle is used for lodging. If the legislature intended to criminalize Lagat's conduct (i.e., assault) under the UEMV statute, a better route would have been to amend the burglary statute to model those of other jurisdictions who have enacted similar statutes.