Opinion ID: 3040568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The Tatoyans first argue that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support their currency reporting and bulk cash smuggling convictions under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) (requiring a “willful” violation of the currency reporting requirement) and 5332(a)(1) (requiring an “intent to evade” the currency reporting requirement) because Inspector Lou failed to follow the Customs Service’s internal procedures for apprising travelers of the currency reporting laws. A district court’s determination that sufficient evidence supports a conviction is reviewed de novo. United States v. Weber, 320 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2003). “There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. [1] Under the currency reporting statutes, a defendant acts “willfully” if he has “knowledge of the reporting requirement” and a “purpose to disobey the law.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994). Although Inspector Lou did not follow the protocol of presenting the Tatoyans with form CP 503—which might have more clearly established that they had “knowledge of the reporting requirement,” id.—a rational fact-finder still could have concluded that the Tatoyans had actual knowledge of the requirement because Inspector Lou repeatedly explained it to them orally and because Customs Form 4790 (which the Tatoyans were given), as well as placards posted around the airport and warnings in the Tatoyans’ passports, detailed the requirement in writing. See United States v. Gomez-Osorio, 957 F.2d 636, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Alzate-Restreppo, 890 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 1979). A rational fact-finder also could UNITED STATES v. TATOYAN 1129 have concluded that the Tatoyans had a “purpose to disobey the law,” Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141, based on their misrepresentations both to Inspector Lou and on Form 4790, as well as their careful concealment of the exact amount of money they failed to report. [2] These conclusions are unaffected by the argument that the currency examination procedures Inspector Lou failed to follow were “mandatory” according to the Customs Service’s internal policies.4 Compliance with these internal agency regulations is not “mandated by the Constitution or federal law,” see United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979),5 and, therefore, it is not the province of this court to penalize the government for non-compliance. Cf. id. at 749-50 (tape recording admissible even though procured in violation of “mandatory” IRS procedures); United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2000) (package contents admissible even though postal service procedures not followed); United States v. Ani, 138 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1998) (package contents admissible even though customs regulation violated). Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to discourage the Customs Service from promulgating internal guidelines that, in general, provide travelers with important information to help them avoid inadvertent customs violations. Cf. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 755-56 (“[A] rigid application of an exclusionary 4 See supra note 1. 5 The Tatoyans disagree and argue that, because Congress authorized the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe regulations . . . requiring reports on foreign currency transactions,” 31 U.S.C. § 5315(c), any and all regulations related to these reports are also “mandated by . . . federal law” for Caceres purposes. This is incorrect. All § 5315(c) requires is that the Secretary “require[ ] reports on foreign currency transactions” and that these reports “contain information . . . necessary to carry out [the statute].” Form 4790 fulfills this function. The statute says nothing about the currency examination procedures inspectors must follow, nor does it suggest that other forms, like CP 503, must be given to travelers. Cf. United States v. SotoSoto, 598 F.2d 545, 550 (9th Cir. 1979) (19 U.S.C. § 482 was directly violated by an unlawful search). 1130 UNITED STATES v. TATOYAN rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and police procedures.”). [3] Therefore, Inspector Lou’s failure to follow the Customs Service’s internal procedures neither violated due process under Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749, nor warranted an automatic finding of insufficient knowledge under Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141. His actions merely made it more difficult— though, as evidenced by this case, not impossible—for the government to prove “actual knowledge.”