Opinion ID: 2524431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: today's absolute exclusion of small-claims litigants from the benefit of summary process offends the equal protection clause

Text: ¶ 18 Absolutely excising from the benefits of summary process every small-claims litigant, including even those who need not resort to discovery, is no less offensive to the Equal Protection Clause than subjecting prisoners to a different mode of trial (nonjury) for mental-health commitment from that which is accorded other persons. [30] In both instances a valuable and critical procedural device is denied without any rational relation to some characteristic that would make the distinction free from an impermissibly discriminatory impact. [31] ¶ 19 A party litigant cannot be deprived of a valued procedural device, otherwise available in the district court to other litigants, unless the exclusion bears a rational relationship to the legitimate objective to be attained. The remedial objective of small-claims procedure is to prevent delay and foster expeditious decision-making. [32] Only delay-causing discovery is banned. When utilization of summary process would cause no delay, there is no rational relationship between exclusion of summary process and the legislative purpose of eliminating delay. [33] ¶ 20 Summary relief clearly is compatible with the speed factor that is legislatively infused. Its purpose is to eliminate the delay and the expense of a needless trial where there is no material fact issue to be examined. [34] Today's myopically and absurdly rigid construction of the Act prohibits summary relief for all small-claims litigants where no discovery is required. This approach plainly offends due process and equal protection standards. ¶ 21 No delay component was present in this case. Both parties pressed for summary judgment in an effort to avoid a needless trial on the claim pressed by the other. Neither party sought discovery. Summary judgment was resisted by the exterminator on the contention that fact issues made its application impermissible. The appraiser's counterclaim was summarily disposed of without the necessity of trial. On this record, today's hyperglobal jurisprudential treatment is plainly injurious to the bench and bar. It lures practitioners as well as judges into a false sense of security by not affording them an in-depth examination into the fundamental law's impact on the court's blanket condemnation of summary relief, total or partial.