Opinion ID: 2507905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror Robert R.

Text: On August 17, 1992, Juror Robert R. signed a declaration prepared by defense counsel detailing three instances during voir dire where he failed to disclose information indicating a potential bias. Robert R. provided this information to defense counsel during an interview with him: (1) In June 1991, Robert R. had a criminal case pending for felony possession of 0.5 grams of methamphetamine. At the initial stages of the case, Robert R. had agreed to become an informant to work off the case but had later changed his mind; (2) five years prior to defendant's trial, he was prosecuted in Lodi, California, but the charges were dropped after police discovered that the person they were seeking had the same name; (3) when he was around 12 years old, he had been the victim of a crime in which he was attacked and repeatedly stabbed.
When misconduct involves the concealment of material information that may call into question the impartiality of the juror, we consider the actual bias test of People v. Jackson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 700, 705, 214 Cal.Rptr. 346, adopted by this court in People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146. Although intentional concealment of material information by a potential juror may constitute implied bias justifying his or her disqualification or removal [citations], mere inadvertent or unintentional failures to disclose are not accorded the same effect. `[T]he proper test to be applied to unintentional concealment is whether the juror is sufficiently biased to constitute good cause for the court to find under Penal Code sections 1089 and [former] 1123 that he is unable to perform his duty.' ( People v. Jackson, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 706, 214 Cal.Rptr. 346.)[¶] Whether a failure to disclose is intentional or unintentional and whether a juror is biased in this regard are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Except where bias is clearly apparent from the record, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the state of mind of a juror or potential juror on voir dire examination. [Citations.] ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Applying McPeters here, we determine whether any of Robert R.'s three failures to disclose are grounds for reversing the judgment.
Prior to voir dire, the jurors filled out a juror questionnaire. Question 15 asked whether the prospective juror had ever been involved in a criminal case as a victim, defendant, or a witness. Voir dire commenced on January 6, 1992. In testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the new trial motion, Robert R. stated that he did not reveal his June 1991 methamphetamine arrest because I thought there was no charge. I thought it was dropped. I didn't think there was nothing. He stated that he confirmed with the district attorney's office that no charges were pending against him several times. He added that he was not notified that charges were filed against him until after the jury had been dismissed. He further testified that he never thought about the incident at any time during the course of the trial. Robert R. also testified that 10 years earlier he had been arrested in Lodi and spent the night in jail before discovering that the police had confused him with another person with his name. He stated that he had to hire a private investigator to locate the real suspect before charges were finally dropped. Robert R. testified that he did not inform the court about this incident because the police made a mistake and that was it. In making its determination, the trial court acknowledged that it had not specifically asked Robert R. if he had previously been charged with an offense. The court accepted his testimony that he believed the methamphetamine case had gone away, given that six months had passed from the date of arrest to the date voir dire commenced. As to both incidents, the trial court concluded there was no misconduct because the failure to disclose was inadvertent or unintentional, and there was no resulting bias. We find no abuse of discretion in this conclusion. ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.)
Robert R., who was 34 years old at the time of the new trial hearing on August 27, 1992, admitted that 22 years beforewhen he was 12 or 13 years olda group of five Latino youths had stabbed him about 15 times in the side, the head, and under the chin. He suffered broken ribs, and still has scars on his forehead and buttocks. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred: The Court: Have you ever been the victim of a crime? Robert R.: No, not thatnot that I can remember. The Court: How about an assault on your person, any kind of assault, battery on your person? Robert R.: No. The Court: As a youth or as an adult? Robert R.: No. The Court: You have never personally been the victim or the subject of any violence of any kind, is that correct? Robert R.: That's right. At the evidentiary hearing, Robert R. stated that he did not disclose this information to the court because I ... just never thought about it, to be honest with you. He added that It just never came to me or else I would have put it down. I mean I had no reason ... not to put it down. He left question 19 of the juror questionnaire blank, where he was asked if he had ever been a crime victim. When asked why the answer was left blank, Robert R. stated, Like I said, I, my mind just wentI never thought about it. Defense counsel then asked whether the incident had come back to him when he heard the victims in this case had been stabbed. He replied, No, I never thought about it, to be honest with you. My focus was to be [unbiased]. I thought like, like we was supposed to be. He also stated: [W]hen I was chosen as a juror, I mean [its] like anything else I do, I try to do to the best of my ability, and I think I, my main thing was trying to listen ... to the testimony, and listen to the Court's instructions and to everybody in general here, not nothing to do with nothing outside. Robert R. told defense counsel that the only reason he told him of these incidents after the trial is because the juror thought there was nothing, there would never be nothing else said about it. The trial court reviewed several juror declarations, and at an evidentiary hearing questioned Robert R. and submitted him to cross-examination by defense counsel. The court concluded that Robert R. did not intentionally fail to disclose the 20-year-old stabbing incident. First, the court found that Robert R. was credible: [Robert R.] appeared to be frank with the Court and counsel. [He] [d]idn't seem to have anything to hide. [He] [d]idn't even seem to be too uncomfortable at being here. [He] didn't hesitate in his responses. [He] [d]idn't seem to contradict himself.... [¶] [I]t appears to me that [Robert R.] has been forthright with the Court, did not exhibit the often-seen symptoms of a person caught up in something, making desperate attempts to extricate themselves, and otherwise giving the symptoms of discomfort that often accompany a person who is not or may not be telling the truth. The court ultimately was persuaded as to Robert R.'s inadvertence because Why would he mention it to [defense counsel] two months later? If you are going to hide this from the Court and counsel in January, why not do so in June? Why unload it on a one-to-one, six months later? The court concluded that Robert R. was a fair and impartial juror in this case. Notwithstanding this determination, juror misconduct may still be found where bias is clearly apparent from the record. ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) To the degree that the trial judge concludes that juror concealment, even when not intentional, reflects a state of mind that would prevent a person from acting impartially, then consistent with the standard in Jackson and McPeters a new trial must be granted. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 700, 214 Cal.Rptr. 346; cf. People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 934-936, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77 ( Diaz ).) We defer to the trial court's judgment on Robert R.'s credibility. The court noted that Robert R. cooperated fully with defense investigators, and ultimately concluded that Robert R. was a credible witness at the evidentiary hearing and a fair and impartial juror in this case. On this basis we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that no such bias was apparent and no misconduct occurred. (See People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) In so concluding, we distinguish two cases with a factual background similar to this one. In Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77, a case involving a defendant charged with assault with a deadly weapon (knife), a juror concealed during voir dire that she had been assaulted at knifepoint during an attempted rape 13 years before, notwithstanding having been specifically asked. ( Id. at p. 931, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) During the last day of the four-day trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case, the juror revealed to court personnel her prior knife attack. She stated initially that she did not remember being specifically asked whether she had been a victim of any similar type of incident involving a knife, but later stated that it never occurred to her the assault on her was an assault with a deadly weapon. ( Ibid. ) Both the bailiff and clerk testified that the juror seemed to be prejudiced as to violent crimes. ( Ibid. ) As the trial had not yet ended and no alternate jurors had been selected, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he was willing to proceed with 11 jurors. Defense counsel refused to stipulate, and the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the juror. The defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. ( Id. at p. 930, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing to discharge the juror pursuant to former section 1123, now Code of Civil Procedure section 233. ( Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 932, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) The court found that when a juror has been victimized by the same type of crime, the probability of bias is substantial and often unconscious and thus unlikely to be admitted during an evidentiary hearing. ( Id. at p. 939, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) When this occurs, the court reasoned that bias should be implied as a matter of law ( ibid. ), rebuttable `by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court's examination of the entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining party resulting from the misconduct.' ( Id. at p. 934, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) The Court concluded that the prosecutor failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 936-937, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) Assuming Diaz is correct that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises when jurors fail to disclose their material prior history as crime victims, we conclude that the presumption was rebutted in the present case. In contrast to the juror in Diaz, Robert R. was consistent in his explanation that he never thought about the stabbing during voir dire or trial. The trial court found him credible based on its specific observations of his demeanor and on the fact that it made no sense for him to disclose this information voluntarily to defense counsel six months after the verdict if he intentionally failed to disclose it. Nor was there in the present case any evidence affirmatively indicating juror bias, as there was in Diaz. Thus, unlike in Diaz, any presumption of prejudice was surmounted by substantial evidence that Robert R. was in fact an unbiased juror. In Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir.1998) 151 F.3d 970, 973-983, the Ninth Circuit found that a juror's misconduct on voir direthe concealment of the fact that her brother had been murderedrequired application of the doctrine of implied bias and reversed a murder judgment without resort to a harmless error analysis. The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court erred in accepting, without further inquiry, the juror's explanation that the shooting was an accident, given that the court file, which was in the court's possession at the time it made its ruling, indicated that the victim was pistol whipped four times and then shot in the back of the head. Unlike the cursory examination performed by the trial court in Dyer, the trial court before us conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing, considering juror declarations, additional evidence, and live testimony from jurors. We are satisfied on this well-developed evidentiary record the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Robert R.'s failure to disclose the stabbing incident was not deliberate and that he was not biased. (Cf. Dyer v. Calderon, supra, 151 F.3d at pp. 976-978.)