Opinion ID: 811960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: White’s Incriminating Statements

Text: White also contends that the District Court should have suppressed all of his incriminating statements. He argues that his statement that the minivan was a “rent-a- rock” vehicle should have been suppressed because it was made before he received any Miranda warnings, and that all subsequent investigation should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (employing “fruit of the poisonous tree” label for evidence tainted by illegal search or seizure). In addition, White says that the record contains only one “Miranda card,” or signed waiver form, which corresponds to the follow-up interview conducted by Sergeant Rick Bachtell. (Appellant‟s Br. at 31-32.) According to White, there is no evidence that he was given Miranda warnings prior to his interrogation by Sergeant Black, during which he made incriminating statements about a shooting in Pennsylvania. He contends, therefore, that those statements should also be suppressed, and that any statements that followed in the second interview should have been suppressed as additional fruit of the poisonous tree. The record belies those Miranda arguments. First, White‟s “rent-a-rock” statement was volunteered; it was not given in response to questioning. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Butler testified that while White was sitting on the 9 guardrail, he told him that the reason for the stop was that the vehicle had been reported stolen. According to Butler, White then blurted out that “the vehicle is not stolen and that it‟s a rent-a-rock vehicle.” (App. at 76-77.) Under those circumstances, no Miranda violation occurred. Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation. Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1994). Informing a suspect of the reason for his arrest, as Trooper Butler did when he informed White that the minivan had been reported stolen, does not constitute interrogation for purposes of Miranda. See United States v. Benton, 996 F.2d 642, 643 (3d Cir. 1993) (explanation of why defendant was arrested is not the “functional equivalent of interrogation” because it is not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the District Court did not err in denying White‟s motion to suppress his statement that the van was a “rent-a-rock” vehicle. Second, the uncontroverted evidence at the suppression hearing showed that White, prior to his interrogation by Sergeant Black, was advised of his Miranda rights and agreed to waive them.6 Trooper Butler testified that White received Miranda warnings when he was initially processed at the MSP barracks. The advice of rights form 6 Indeed, the record contains three Miranda waiver forms, not just one as White asserts. White signed a waiver form in the name of “Tyrone Edwards” when he was first processed at the MSP barracks. (App. at 76-78, 294; Supp. App. at 1.) He signed another one as “Tyrone Edward” before his interview with Sergeant Bachtell. (App. at 43, 102-04, 298-301.) And he signed one in his own name, “Marcus White,” before he was interviewed by officers from the FBI, the U.S. postal inspector‟s office, and the Lower Pottsgrove Township Police Department. (App. at 122-24, 338-39; Supp. App. at 3.) 10 which White signed as “Tyrone Edwards” was introduced into evidence at the hearing. After White signed the waiver, Trooper Butler asked him about the handgun, and White said that “there is more to the handgun than just the stolen vehicle. I am not taking the whole rap.” (App. at 78.) Butler then told Sergeant Black what White had said, and Sergeant Black conducted a formal interview of White during which White made an incriminating statement about a shooting at a Philadelphia restaurant. Butler was present during the interview. It is true that Sergeant Black did not advise White of his Miranda rights a second time, but there was no need for him to do so. White had just signed an advice of rights form, using a false name. “Miranda … does not necessarily require that a suspect be warned anew each time he is questioned.” United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2005). Rather, White‟s original Miranda waiver remained in full effect as long as nothing “occur[ed] between the warnings and the statement, whether the passage of time or other intervening event, which rendered the defendant unable to consider fully and properly the effect of an exercise or waiver of those rights before making a statement to law enforcement officers.” Id. at 246-47 (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not appear from the evidence that any significant amount of time passed before Sergeant Black joined Trooper Butler in questioning White. Nor does it appear that anything occurred that would have rendered White‟s waiver of rights ineffective. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it denied White‟s motion to suppress his statements.