Opinion ID: 2168838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lead opinion

Text: Even though today's case fits naturally within the framework of state case law, the lead opinion relies primarily on Chadha when concluding that JCAR review constitutes a legislative act. Also, in the spirit of Chadha, the lead opinion would hold that JCAR review usurps gubernatorial authority in violation of the Presentment, Enactment, and Separation of Powers Clauses of our constitution. In adopting the logic of Chadha, the lead opinion concludes that the provisions of the APA at issue in this case are similar to those that the legislative veto struck down in Chadha. Op. at 536. The lead opinion summarizes the four factors utilized in Chadha for determining whether congressional action constitutes the type of legislative power governed by Article I of the United States Constitution. Op. at 535-536. However, if we are to take guidance from Chadha, I would categorize the factors in a slightly different fashion: (1) whether the status of persons outside the legislative branch have been altered, (2) whether the action in question is legislative in its character and effect, (3) whether the statute involves policy determinations that may only be made by enactment and presentment, and (4) whether the governing constitution prescribes rules for legislative action by one house. Chadha, supra at 952-955, 103 S.Ct. 2764. As will be discussed below, JCAR review maintains the status quo, is not legislative in character and effect, does not require policy determinations requiring enactment or presentment, and does not involve legislative action by one house. Additionally, although Chadha bears some resemblance to the present case, I disagree with the conclusion of the lead opinion that Michigan's JCAR review process carries the same constitutional significance as the legislative veto at issue in Chadha. [10]
In Chadha, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2), was at issue. The act provided that either house of Congress could pass a resolution invalidating the United States Attorney General's decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States. Chadha, supra at 923, 103 S.Ct. 2764. Section 244(a)(1) conferred upon the Attorney General the discretion to suspend deportation. Section 244(c)(2) allowed a single house of Congress to override the suspension and order that the alien be deported. Thus, in Chadha, Congress conferred upon the Attorney General the authority to make a decision regarding the deportation of a particular alien. By exercising its legislative veto, it nullified the Attorney General's decision. The result was that the delegation of authority conferred no authority at all because one house of Congress could unilaterally take away the effect of the Attorney General's decision. Thereafter, the Attorney General remained powerless to respond. Importantly, the legislative veto came into play after the Attorney General exercised the delegated authority. That is not the case here. In this case, JCAR review is part of the rule-approval process. Rulemaking authority is not conferred and then taken away; rather, the APA establishes a rulemaking process. The executive agencies have only been delegated the power to act within that process. Also, unlike Chadha, the executive agency has the opportunity to revise proposed rules. The plain language of §§ 45 and 46 provide procedures for the executive agency to follow in the face of JCAR disapproval. When the agency follows the provisions of the APA, it has an opportunity to overcome the JCAR's decision. Here, the DOC simply decided to ignore the plain language of the APA because it felt that it was not bound by the statute. Further, Chadha held that the Immigration and Nationality Act was constitutionally flawed because Congress's ability to order deportation was legislative in its character and effect and had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons outside the legislative branch. Id. at 952, 103 S.Ct. 2764. Today's lead opinion similarly opines that allowing JCAR review of administrative rules would affect the rights of individuals outside the legislative branch. Specifically, the lead opinion argues that the JCAR review process interferes with the DOC director's ability to administer his department. Yet, the director only has power to enact rules pursuant to the administrative procedures act.... MCL 791.206(1); MSA 28.2276(1). JCAR review does not limit the director's power or alter his rights and duties, rather, the director's power is subject to JCAR review. Michigan's APA is quite different than the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under Michigan law, rules do not become effective until they undergo JCAR review. MCL 24.245, 24.246; MSA 3.560(145), 3.560(146). The purpose and effect of JCAR review is not to legislate. Rather, JCAR disapproval maintains the status quo ante. Persons who would otherwise be affected by the rules retain the same status because the rules have never been in effect at the time when the JCAR disapproves. The rights of the executive branch similarly remain unchanged because the executive agency never had the authority to promulgate rules outside the scope of JCAR review. Instead, JCAR review is part of the required process. If the agency ignores the procedural requirements imposed by the terms of delegation, then the executive has exceeded the power delegated to it. As such, the analysis simply returns to whether the DOC rules must be invalidated. Michigan law clearly provides that agency rules must be invalidated if procedural standards are not satisfied. Here, the DOC failed to satisfy the constitutionally valid procedural standards of the APA when it proceeded without JCAR approval. Therefore, the rules cannot stand.
When examining enactment and presentment, it is important to recognize the reasons that the Enactment and Presentment Clauses of the United States Constitution were key to Chadha. Chadha depended on the separation of powers doctrineby using the legislative veto to alter individual rights other than by legislation, the legislative branch was stepping outside its prescribed powers. Id. at 957-958, 103 S.Ct. 2764. However, the federal constitution, unlike our state constitution, contains no express Separation of Powers Clause. The separation of powers argument was reached by making reference to federal precedent, and by noting the checks and balances that the federal constitution does explicitly impose. Id. Presumably, because Michigan's Constitution does expressly provide for a separation of powers between branches, the result in Chadha could be reached without reference to bicameralism or presentment even though Chadha explains how enactment, presentment, and bicameralism are directly linked to the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 946, 103 S.Ct. 2764. If we are to analogize the present case to Chadha, then we must carefully consider Chadha's presentment and enactment arguments. The lead opinion concludes that JCAR review involves policy determinations akin to those at issue in Chadha. Op. at 536-537. Yet, I find that the lead opinion misses the mark. The question is not simply whether the Legislature is engaged in making policy determinations, but whether the Legislature is engaged in making the type of policy determinations that need to be made in the form of legislation. The analysis of the lead opinion is tied to its misconception that any legislative action taken by a subset of the Legislature is legislation. I disagree for the reasons stated in part III of this opinion. [11] In my view, the action taken by the DOC was more akin to legislation than is the JCAR review process. Because this Court has already decided that agency rulemaking does not constitute impermissible legislation as long as necessary guidelines are followed, I would further conclude that review of agency rules as part of the promulgation process is similarly not legislation. Therefore, JCAR review does not violate the Enactment and Presentment Clauses of our constitution.
Chadha is also clearly distinguishable because it repeatedly made reference to the one-house veto, and placed importance on the bicameralism requirement of the United States Constitution. JCAR review is clearly not the same thing as a one-house veto. [13] Instead, the JCAR is a joint committee, composed of both senators and representatives. MCL 24.235; MSA 3.560(135). When the JCAR disapproves of a rule, both houses are given notice and an opportunity to pass a joint resolution. MCL 24.245; MSA 3.560(145). [14]