Opinion ID: 2784707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Appeal

Text: As a threshold matter, we consider the officers' and the City's motion to dismiss Patterson's appeal of the jury verdict. They argue that Patterson's notice of appeal was not timely pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Generally, Rule 4(a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order or judgment. Subsection (4) of Rule 4, applicable to this case, states that the 30-day clock does not begin to run until the district court rules on certain post-trial motions. Those motions include a motion to alter or amend a judgment, a motion for a new trial, and a motion for relief under Rule 60 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] if the motion is filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). The officers and the City argue that Patterson's 30-day clock began to run no later than April 10, 2013, after the district court dismissed Patterson's last challenge to the jury's verdict and the court's -6- denial of a new trial. Thus, Patterson's appeal of the jury's verdict and denial of a new trial would be untimely because the notice of appeal was filed on October 1, 2013, far outside the 30-day window. Our jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals taken from 'final decisions of the district courts.' Gannon Int'l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). A 'final decision' is ordinarily one which disposes of all the rights of all the parties to an action. In re Licht & Semenoff, 796 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1986). We decline to dismiss the appeal. The district court's bifurcation of issues into separate trial proceedings did not create two separate actions, but merely separated the action into two separate phases. The issue decided in the first phase—the officers' liability in their individual capacities—resolved a threshold matter for the second phase that examined the officers' liability in their official capacities and the Monell claims against the City. We addressed a similar circumstance in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. State of Minnesota, 48 F.3d 373 (8th Cir. 1995), in which we found that an appeal from Phase I orders was properly before the court at the end of Phase II because the Phase I orders were not final—that is, they resolved only threshold issues and remained reviewable following the conclusion of Phase II of the litigation. Id. at 375. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court issued on December 14, 2012, was not a final decision and neither was the court's order on April 10, 2013. As a result, we find that the October 1, 2013 notice of appeal was timely filed after the court's final disposition of the motion for summary judgment. Pattertson's notice of appeal preserved all issues relating to the alleged inconsistency of the jury's verdict for this appeal. -7- B. Consistency Between the Finding that Excessive Force Was Used and an Award of Nominal Damages Turning to the merits of the appeal, [w]e review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2006). We will not reverse the district court's decision unless there is a clear showing that the outcome is against the great weight of the evidence so as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. Blair v. Callahan, 664 F.3d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted). When assessing the findings of the jury, [w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, assuming as true all facts which [the prevailing party]'s evidence tended to prove. Mary Ellen Enters. v. Camex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). We considered a finding of excessive force paired with an award of nominal damages in Westcott, in which a victim's wife brought a § 1983 action when police shot and killed her husband, Arden Westcott. Westcott, 133 F.3d at 659. In Westcott, the jury instructions required that the evidence establish a causal link between the force used and the injury suffered. Instruction No. 17 stated that if [the police officer's] use of force in shooting Arden Westcott was, under the circumstances, excessive because the particular force was not reasonably necessary for the purpose of protecting [the officer] from serious physical injury, and if Arden Westcott suffered damages as a direct result of [the officer's] action, then the jury should return a verdict for Westcott. Id. at 663. When the jury returned a verdict for Westcott, it necessarily found that the officer's action of shooting Westcott was excessive force and that Westcott's injury (his death) was directly linked to this use of excessive force. Thus, the court found that the jury's award of $1.00 in nominal damages for such a loss of life was inadequate as a matter of law. Id. Patterson's case, however, is distinguishable from Westcott. Here, Patterson did not establish the direct causal link showing that Hasiak's use of excessive force caused Patterson's injury. First, the jury did not make a finding on which of the three uses of -8- force—the punch, the knee, and the kick—were necessary and which were excessive. Second, Patterson did not, and could not show which application of force caused his injury. While the medical doctors opined that it was most likely that the angle kick caused Patterson's injuries, they could not say this with a medical certainty when compared with other alternative sources of trauma. When Dr. Steier was asked at trial whether a kick to the abdomen could disrupt internal organs, he answered [y]es, it could. When asked if falling on a level board could cause the same type of injury, Dr. Steier responded [t]hat's a hard question to answer because it all depends on the position of the board and how your body addresses the board as it's falling. Dr. Hovey was a bit more certain. When asked at trial whether he thought the blunt force of a punch or a knee strike to the abdomen could cause an intestine tear, he replied I don't believe so. When asked about whether Patterson's falling on the barbeque pit could have caused the tear, he replied Unless you're falling on something, you know, pointed and with—you know, with a high energy transfer right in one location, I don't think so. Finally, when asked if a kick could have caused the tear, he answered [t]hat—of all the energy—or of all the mechanism of injury that would be the—seem to be the most likely. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we agree with the district court that there is no inconsistency with the jury's award of nominal damages. In Westcott, we acknowledged situations where a jury may reasonably conclude that compensatory damages are inappropriate despite a finding that excessive force was used, one of which occurs when there is evidence that both justifiable and unjustifiable force might have been used and the injury may have resulted from the use of justifiable force. Id. at 661 (citing Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding a jury's decision not to award compensatory damages because the plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that his injuries were proximately caused by the use of excessive force)); see also Haywood v. Koehler, 78 F.3d 101, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an award of nominal damages because the conflicting accounts of the use of force allowed a jury to find that the plaintiff's -9- injury arose from the use of justifiable force). Here, the jury could have concluded that both necessary and excessive force were used, but Patterson's severe injuries resulted from the application of necessary force. Additionally, the post-trial jury statements to the parties can be interpreted as an effort to harmonize their finding of excessive force with the nominal-damage award. First, the jury's statement to Hasiak that it appears that some force was necessary, however we felt that it escalated too quickly and to a level that crossed a line of excess confirms that the jury found that both necessary and excessive force were used to subdue Patterson. Second, the jury's statement to Patterson that it was unfortunate that you sustained these injuries, however you were responsible for your own actions when you failed to comply with Officers' [sic] instructions can be interpreted to mean the jury believed Patterson's injuries resulted from some indistinguishable combination of necessary and excessive force because he failed to comply with the officers' orders.3 In light of the court's reliance on Westcott and our review of the jury statements,4 we find no abuse of discretion because the clear weight of the evidence 3 We reach this interpretation in our attempt to harmonize the jury statements with the verdict as is done when a jury submits written answers to questions accompanying a general verdict form pursuant to Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Gallick v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963) ('Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.' (quoting Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962))). 4 Patterson does not raise whether or not the jury statements are appropriate for our review on appeal. As expressed at oral argument, our consideration of the jury statements strikes us somewhere in between the unreviewable statements of a jury when interviewed by an attorney after trial and the reviewable written answers given in tandem with a general verdict form as requested by the court. Compare United States v. Krall, 835 F.2d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 1987) and Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), with Fed. -10- does not compel us to overturn the jury verdict. Patterson relies principally upon inconclusive medical expert testimony that might contradict the jury's verdict. Even the medical experts, however, could not establish the causal link between any specific use of force and Patterson's injuries. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of Patterson's motion for a new trial. C. Granting of Summary Judgment Patterson argues that the district court erred in granting the officers' and the City's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Patterson argues that the grant of summary judgment denied Patterson his right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Patterson also contends that his lack of financial resources prevented his use of discovery tools necessary to defend against the motion. Patterson appears to bring a facial constitutional challenge to summary judgment as a procedural mechanism for resolving cases. In doing so, he fails to cite any controlling or convincing legal authority to support this argument. Additionally, Patterson similarly fails to support his argument that his indigency should be taken into consideration at the summary judgment stage. Patterson's general statements of dissatisfaction with the legal system and the process in the instant case do not suffice to warrant reversal of the grant of summary judgment below. See Milligan v. City of Red Oak, Iowa, 230 F.3d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (finding that an argument made in passing that is not supported with any argument or legal authority is waived and need not be addressed). We affirm the district court's disposition. R. Civ. P. 49(b). The jury statements in this case are more analogous to the latter. -11-