Opinion ID: 3194674
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deputy Sheriff Andre Stinson

Text: We confront a closer question in determining whether the district court properly denied summary judgment to Deputy Sheriff Stinson. Unlike Nurse Williams, Stinson was not physically inside ward 4SW during the time of the assault; he was instead manning the ward’s duty station. In addition, Stinson testified that he did not know that Horvath was sharing a cell with another inmate at the time. The dispositive inquiry regarding Stinson is therefore whether Richko presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that (1) Stinson heard the thumps, shouts, and banging coming from cell 14 while he was inside the duty station, and that he simply chose not to respond; and (2) Stinson failed to promptly respond to the incident once Williams informed him that Horvath was missing. Stinson points to several facts that would tend to show that he was not on notice of a serious altercation, and therefore could not have actual knowledge that Gillespie posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Horvath. For one, Stinson notes that he had a conversation with Horvath that same morning, and that Horvath never mentioned feeling uncomfortable or No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 14 unsafe in his cell with Gillespie. Moreover, Stinson noted that two other officers performed separate “walk-throughs” of the ward that morning, at 8:07 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., respectively, and neither found any evidence of suspicious behavior. But this evidence is irrelevant to our present analysis. The key issue here is instead whether, during the relevant time period beginning at 8:34 a.m., there is any evidence showing that Stinson heard the assault taking place and chose not to respond. We need not consider what information Stinson had before the time of the attack, but whether, once the attack began, Stinson perceived a risk of harm to Horvath and chose to disregard that risk. Stinson certainly raises doubts as to what he could hear and see at the time of the attack. He disputes Richko’s contention that he heard the assault from the duty station, pointing to the fact that, in order to speak with Horvath earlier that morning, he had to bring Horvath out of his cell into the hallway and “off the ward completely.” And he also disputes Richko’s claim that there was a 10-minute gap between the time he was notified by Williams and the time he went inside the ward to locate Horvath. But all of these arguments are disputes of fact and not of law. They are therefore outside our jurisdictional purview for purposes of this appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995) (limiting interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity to cases presenting “neat abstract issues of law” and not to factual controversies (citation omitted)). Indeed, Stinson might very well prevail in proving that he did not hear the attack, and thus that he could not have deliberately disregarded the risk that Gillespie posed to Horvath. But such arguments are appropriately reserved for a jury, not for this court at the summary-judgment stage of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (noting that the district court, at the summary-judgment stage, is tasked with determining “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hether the defendants did the deeds alleged . . . is precisely the question for trial.” (emphasis in original)). Here, Richko proffered enough evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Stinson did have knowledge of the risk to Horvath and that he deliberately disregarded that risk. First, No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 15 she presented evidence indicating that sounds, and especially loud ones, can be heard from the duty station. Deputy Sheriff Jeremy Meinke testified that “you can hear a good amount” from the duty station, and that “it gets loud” when inmates play cards or watch TV. This evidence is bolstered by the fact that Stinson himself noted that he “may be able to hear some noise” from the duty station. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Richko, a reasonable juror could infer that Stinson heard the banging, yelling, and pounding from the duty station, that he simply chose not to respond, and that he further delayed responding for 10 minutes even after being notified by Nurse Williams that Horvath was missing. All of Stinson’s arguments are thus best left to a jury, which will be tasked with weighing the evidence presented by Stinson against that proffered by Richko. We therefore conclude that the district court properly denied Stinson’s motion for summary judgment that was based on his claim of qualified immunity.