Opinion ID: 2316708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: qualified privilege and common law malice

Text: Although Littman's statements were actionable assertions of fact, not constitutionally protected opinion, Stanbury had the burden of proving Sigal (through Littman) was negligent, including the fact that Littman's statements were false. See supra note 5. The trial court accordingly gave the jury a negligence instruction. [16] Sigal does not contest, on appeal, either that the statements were false or were negligently made. Sigal does contend, however  and Stanbury does not dispute  that Littman's negligent statements were subject to a qualified privilege. [17] Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 152, 334 S.E.2d 846, 853 (1985); see Brown v. Collins, 131 U.S. App.D.C. 68, 72, 402 F.2d 209, 213 (1968). According to the Virginia Supreme Court: A communication, made in good faith, on a subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or owes a duty, legal, moral, or social, is qualifiedly privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. Great Coastal, 230 Va. at 153, 334 S.E.2d at 853 (quoting Taylor v. Grace, 166 Va. 138, 144, 184 S.E. 211, 213 (1936)); see Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1024 (D.C. 1990); Alfred A. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan, 374 A.2d 284, 290 (D.C.1977) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 596). Recently, we have characterized this particular kind of privilege as a qualified `common interest' privilege. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1023-24. Once the privilege applies, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the defendant has abused, and thus lost, it. Chatelain, 374 A.2d at 290; Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 14, 325 S.E.2d 713, 727, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S.Ct. 3513, 87 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985). To defeat the privilege, a plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with common law malice. See Moss, 580 A.2d at 1024; Great Coastal, 230 Va. at 149, 334 S.E.2d at 851 n. 3, 853-54. Such malice implies a greater level of ill will than the mind-set reflected by mere negligence. In this jurisdiction, we have equated common law malice with bad faith. See Moss, 580 A.2d at 1024; Chatelain, 374 A.2d at 290. In Virginia the common law malice formulation, which the trial court used for its instruction, includes bad faith but is more comprehensive. [18] The trial court instructed the jury, moreover, that a privilege is abused when the plaintiff proves common law malice by clear and convincing evidence. [19] Importantly, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See supra note 3. Only if there is no evidence to support a finding of common law malice will a court be justified in withholding the issue from the jury. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410, 414 (4th Cir.1965); see May Dep't Stores Co. v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767, 774 (D.C.1973). There was sufficient evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Stanbury, from which a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that Littman and Sigal had abused the qualified privilege under Virginia law by acting with such gross indifference or recklessness as to amount to wanton and willful disregard of the rights of Stanbury. Great Coastal, 230 Va. at 151, 334 S.E.2d at 854, and supra note 18; see Moss, 580 A.2d at 1025-27. Littman testified, and Stanbury's testimony confirmed, that Littman had never supervised, worked with, evaluated, or read an evaluation of Stanbury. Moreover, Littman testified that he had not received information from anyone in particular, let alone anyone who had had a work-related relationship with Stanbury. Littman's sources for his statements to Janes were observations in the company's halls and general office contacts with unnamed third parties, perhaps at casual lunches or project executive meetings or over beer on a Friday afternoon. But he could recall none of the conversations or otherwise provide any concrete support for his statements, whether first-hand information or hearsay. Littman admitted that he had no facts to support any of his statements to Janes and that he had never sought to verify the information before giving his evaluation. Littman also testified that he knew Janes wanted to speak with someone who had interacted with Stanbury at Sigal, and yet Littman further testified that he did not tell Janes he had never done so. Nor did Littman tell Janes the altogether vague sources of his statements. To make matters worse, according to Janes testimony, Littman told Janes that he had worked with Stanbury on a project. In short, this is a case of pure rumor or gossip or scuttlebutt conveyed as fact, without any disclaimer or explanation, coupled with Littman's erroneously leading the prospective employer to believe he had worked on a project with Stanbury. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Stanbury, as we must, we cannot say there was no record basis for the jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that Littman made the statements to Janes with gross indifference or recklessness amounting to wanton and willful disregard of Stanbury's rights under Virginia law. See Great Coastal, 230 Va. at 151, 334 S.E.2d at 854, and supra note 18; Moss, 580 A.2d at 1025-27. In sustaining the conclusion that Sigal (through Littman) abused the qualified privilege, we do not mean to imply that employers are at serious risk when providing employment references in the normal course of business. Nor are we suggesting that employers, when providing such references, may not rely on information from the employee's co-workers, even when hearsay. Our analysis here is limited to an office gossip situation where the recommender (1) has conveyed information which cannot be traced to anyone with personal knowledge of the employee whose reputation is at stake, (2) has not qualified his statements by disclosing the nebulous source of his information, and (3) has led the prospective employer to believe he has worked on a project with the employee and thus has first-hand information. Caselaw concerning publication of unconfirmed defamatory rumors supports our conclusion. In Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.1986), Babb, an employee, was fired for moon[ing] another employee and offering sexual favors to another. Minder, a supervisor at the company where Babb worked, went to Babb's immediate supervisor, told him of Babb's behavior, and urged him to fire Babb. Based on Minder's representations, Babb was fired. Babb sued for defamation (among other things). The employer claimed a qualified privilege and argued there was no evidence showing abuse of the privilege. The jury, the District Court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the employer. According to the Court of Appeals: The evidence adduced at trial indicates that Minder acted with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the defamatory statements and thus supports the jury finding of actual malice.... Minder acted on an unconfirmed rumor about the mooning incident conveyed to him off-handedly in one telephone conversation.... Once informed of the mooning rumor, Minder did not contact plaintiff nor the employee who supposedly witnessed the incident. Minder did not receive any written statement before Babb was fired.... In effect, Minder made no investigation at all despite the seriousness of the allegations and their great potential for harm.... Minder acted recklessly in not looking into the situation further before defaming Babb. Id. at 756. See also Cunningham v. Skaggs Co., 729 F.2d 1156, 1158 (8th Cir. 1984) (abuse of privilege in reporting employee as thief without investigation, coupled with failure to report employee's side of story); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 361 N.W.2d 875, 882 (Minn.1985) (abuse of privilege based on former employer's defamatory statement of reason for termination of employment), rev'd on other grounds, 389 N.W.2d 876, 890-91 (Minn.1986) (affirming jury's decision that employer abused the privilege); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 115 at 835 (5th ed. 1984). [20] Cases holding there was no abuse of the qualified privilege are easily distinguishable. This is not a case, for example, where an employee's supervisor, who has worked directly with the employee, provides a negative reference based on personal experience. See Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F.Supp. 487, 495, 497 (W.D.Ark.1982); Zuschek v. Whitmoyer Labs., Inc., 430 F.Supp. 1163, 1166 (E.D.Pa. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 573 (3d Cir.1978). Nor is this a case where the reference is based on a careful, thorough investigation, see, e.g., Rouly v. Enserch Corp., 835 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir.1988); Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 390-91 (5th Cir.1987), or on the employee's own admission, Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F.Supp. 1373, 1380-81 (D.Mass.1980), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821, 102 S.Ct. 105, 70 L.Ed.2d 93 (1981). [21] On this record, therefore, the jury could find wanton, willful, or reckless conduct that amounted to abuse of the qualified privilege.