Opinion ID: 780904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Robles-Rodriguez

Text: 10 The present case appears to differ little from Robles-Rodriguez. Here, Defendant was convicted for a second time of possession of marijuana. Under Arizona law, the maximum penalty for a second drug-possession conviction is one year of jail time. Thus, as in Robles-Rodriguez, Defendant's conviction was not punishable by more than one year of imprisonment under applicable state law and would not appear to qualify as a felony or an aggravated felony for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 11 The government argues, however, that this case is factually distinguishable. In Robles-Rodriguez, although the relevant conviction was the defendant's second for possession of drugs, he had not yet been convicted of his first offense when he committed his second. 4 That sequence is significant because the federal drug-possession statute provides: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance.... Any person who violates this subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year, ... except that if he commits such offense after a prior conviction [under federal or state law] has become final, he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more than 2 years. 12 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to be treated as a recidivist under the federal statute, a defendant must commit not just a second offense, but a second offense after a prior conviction.  Id. (emphasis added). As the government explains, had the defendant in Robles-Rodriguez been sentenced under federal law, he would have been treated as a first-time offender under 21 U.S.C. § 844 even though he was being sentenced for his second offense. In that circumstance, the maximum penalty to which the defendant could have been sentenced was a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year and, accordingly, his second offense could not have been treated as an aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). 13 As the government points out, Defendant's situation under federal law is different. He was convicted of his first drug-possession offense in 1996 and committed his second drug-possession offense in 1997. That is, he committed his second offense after he had already been convicted of his first and, therefore, would have been sentenced as a second-time offender under federal law. A second offense under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) is punishable by a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more than 2 years, rather than by imprisonment for less than one year. For this reason, the government argues that Defendant's case is governed not by Robles-Rodriguez but, instead, by United States v. Garcia-Olmedo, 112 F.3d 399 (9th Cir.1997), and United States v. Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 14 In Garcia-Olmedo, 112 F.3d at 402, we held that a defendant's second Arizona conviction for possession of a controlled substance constituted an aggravated felony for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. We did not discuss whether the defendant's state conviction was punishable under state law as a felony. 5 Instead, we analyzed only whether the offense would have been a felony had the defendant been charged with a federal crime. Id. at 400-01. Citing 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), we held that the defendant's second conviction for drug possession would have been a felony under federal law because that offense was punishable by up to two years' imprisonment. Id. at 401. Accordingly, we held that the defendant's conviction was a felony for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act and an aggravated felony for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Id. 15 We reaffirmed Garcia-Olmedo in Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d at 1200. In that case, we held that a defendant's second California conviction for possession of cocaine would have been punishable by up to two years in prison had the defendant been convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Id. Thus, we reasoned, the offense was a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act. Id. Relying on Garcia-Olmedo, we held that the defendant's second state drug-possession conviction was also an aggravated felony for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Id. 16 The government argues that Garcia-Olmedo and Zarate-Martinez govern, because they — not Robles-Rodriguez — are factually identical to this case. Defendant responds by arguing that, after Robles-Rodriguez, it is of no consequence that his state conviction would have been punishable as a felony under federal law. He finds some support for that argument in Robles-Rodriguez, which suggests that, when a state conviction is not a felony under state law, the federal punishment for the offense is not germane to the aggravated felony analysis: 17 [W]e think that Congress, by defining aggravated felonies with reference to state law, intended to accord respect in the federal sentencing scheme to each state's judgment regarding the appropriate punishment of criminal offenses.... [A] state's judgment about the appropriate punishment for an offense is entitled to deference in the federal sentencing scheme. 18 Since deference is due to a state's decision to punish an offense more severely than would the federal government, similar deference should apply when the state's punishment is less severe. 19 Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d at 905. Unfortunately, the Robles-Rodriguez opinion failed to explain how that statement could be reconciled with the holdings of Garcia-Olmedo and Zarate-Martinez. See United States v. Camper, 66 F.3d 229, 232 (9th Cir.1995) (stating the principle that one three-judge panel cannot overrule another three-judge panel).