Opinion ID: 3061892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Miller’s Sentence

Text: The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an aboveGuidelines sentence for Miller’s violation of § 924(c)(1).3 In United States v. 3 We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Livesay, 5 Pounds, we held that “every conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) carries with it a statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment, regardless of what subsection the defendant is sentenced under.” 230 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000). In this case, the permissible sentencing range was between five years’ and life imprisonment for Miller’s violation of § 924(c). The district court sentenced Miller to 119 months for this count, a sentence that is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. The district court did not procedurally err because it correctly calculated Miller’s Guidelines’ range, properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, and fully explained its reasoned decision for imposing an aboveGuideline’s sentence. Both the 119-month sentence for Count 3 and the 240month total sentence are substantively reasonable, especially considering that Miller’s criminal history category did not reflect his previous murder conviction in the United Kingdom. IV. Miller’s Motion to Forbid Sentence-Appeal Waivers The district court did not err in denying Miller’s motion to forbid the government from seeking a sentence-appeal waiver as a condition to entering into a plea agreement.4 Sentence-appeal waivers are constitutional, as the right to appeal 525 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). We review Miller’s sentence for both procedural error and substantive reasonableness. See id. at 1091. 4 We review constitutional and jurisdictional issues de novo. United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Donovan, 532 F.3d 1134, 1136 (11th Cir. 2008). 6 is not a constitutional right, but is rather statutory in nature. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1993). As such, a sentence-appeal waiver is enforceable if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consents. Id. at 1350.5