Opinion ID: 1775392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury's Advisory Role

Text: We specifically address this issue because it affects the resentencing proceeding and because we are deeply disturbed about the interpretation of Florida's death penalty process and the application of Caldwell by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in its decisions in Mann v. Dugger , and Adams v. Wainwright relied on by Combs in this proceeding. Combs contends that the prosecutor minimized the jury's role and misstated Florida law by advising the jurors during voir dire and in final argument that their decision would be advisory, and that the ultimate decision rested with the trial judge. Combs asserts the trial judge erred under Caldwell in failing to instruct the jury that a life sentence carries substantial weight and that a jury recommendation of life could be overridden only if virtually no reasonable person could differ. He further asserts the trial judge erred in instructing the jury from our standard jury instructions that the final decision as to what punishment should be imposed rests solely with the judge of this court. Combs relies on the Eleventh Circuit decisions in Mann and Adams to support this contention. We reject this argument and find Caldwell inapplicable to this case. In Caldwell, the United States Supreme Court was considering the application of the Mississippi death penalty procedure which is dissimilar to that utilized by Florida. Under the Mississippi procedure, the jury makes the final determination of whether to impose the sentence of life or death. That sentence cannot be overridden by the trial judge and is subject to review only by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. In Caldwell, the prosecutor, in his final argument, commented: Now, they would have you believe that you're going to kill this man and they know  they know that your decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable. They know it. 472 U.S. at 325, 105 S.Ct. at 2637. In explaining the Mississippi procedure, the United States Supreme Court quoted with approval from one of the dissenting opinions which stated: The [mercy] plea is made directly to the jury as only they may impose the death sentence. Under our standards of appellate review mercy is irrelevant. Id. at 331, 105 S.Ct. at 2640 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Id. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639 (emphasis added). At the outset, we hasten to point out that in Caldwell, unlike the instant case, the defendant had objected to the Mississippi prosecutor's comment. The Caldwell opinion does not hold that the misleading statement concerning the jury's responsibility constituted fundamental error. Moreover, the Florida procedure is clearly distinguishable from the Mississippi procedure. The Florida procedure does not empower the jury with the final sentencing decision; rather, the trial judge imposes the sentence. We recognize that the cited Eleventh Circuit opinions in Mann and Adams appear to support Combs' contentions. In Mann, that court explained our sentencing procedure in the following manner: After a jury determination of guilt, a separate sentencing hearing is held before the same jury who then renders a recommended sentence based on their assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors. The trial judge then weighs the aggravating and mitigating factors and imposes a final sentence. In making that determination, the trial court must give great weight to the jury's recommendation, and may reject the jury's recommendation only if the facts are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. Consequently, the jury plays a critical role in determining the appropriateness of death. 817 F.2d at 1482 (citations omitted). The Mann panel found that the prosecutor improperly instructed the jury during voir dire examination that: (1) their sentence recommendation was advisory; (2) the ultimate responsibility for imposition of the sentence rests with the trial judge; (3) and the trial judge would have an opportunity to learn more about the defendant before he imposed a sentence. Further, that court expressly found improper the following portions of our standard jury instruction: Final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the judge of this court; however, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the court an advisory sentence as to what punishment should be imposed on the defendant. ... . ... [I]t is now your duty to advise the court as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant.... As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of the judge; however, it is your duty to follow the law that will now be given you by the court and render to the court [an] advisory sentence... . Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) (for § 921.141, Fla. Stat.) The Mann court concluded that, because the jury had been told their recommendation was advisory, they were left `with a false impression as to the significance of their role in the sentencing process' because the jury was not instructed that their recommendation would be given great weight. Mann, 817 F.2d at 1482 (quoting Adams, 804 F.2d at 1531 n. 7). The Mann court found that the trial judge's responsibility was over-emphasized, stating: The jury was told that the alternative decision maker was the trial judge  a person jurors might view as more entitled than they to make such a decision. The court made some of the misleading comments, increasing the likelihood that the jury would believe that their recommendation would be merely advisory. Nor did the court ever withdraw or correct its misleading statements or accurately describe the jury's role. Id. at 1482-83 (citations omitted). We disagree with this interpretation of our death penalty instructions. Fortunately, Mann has been set aside pending rehearing en banc. We find the phraseology of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), which expressly directs that the jury responsibility is advisory, was apparently not taken into account and that our standard jury instructions appear to have been considered out of context. The majority opinions in Adams and Mann focus on the use of the term advisory, and find its use improper. The dissent in Mann explains that [i]t serves no purpose to dwell on the word `advisory' ... because that is the procedural structure established by the Florida statutes. 817 F.2d at 1485. It is difficult to understand the reasoning of these opinions when advisory is the statutory term for the jury's role and the United States Supreme Court has accepted Florida's jury role as advisory. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). A simple reading of section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1985), explains why the prosecutor and defense counsel stated to the jury that its role was to render an advisory sentence. That statute provides in part: (2) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY.  After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters: (3) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCE OF DEATH.  Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death... . Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, under our process, the court is the final decision-maker and the sentencer  not the jury. This Court had no intention of changing the clear statutory directive that the jury's role is advisory when we held that, before a judge may override a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, he must find the facts are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ, Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). In fact, four months after this Court decided Tedder, we expressly approved In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 327 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1976), that contains the objectionable language cited in the Adams and Mann opinions. Although the instructions have been modified and amended in 1981, In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 (Fla.), modified, 431 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1981), and in 1985, The Florida Bar re Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases, 477 So.2d 985 (Fla. 1985), the contested language has remained the same and, consequently, has been used in virtually every death penalty case in this state since 1976. We believe the instructions, in their entirety, properly explain the jury's role under the Florida statute. The portions criticized are taken out of context and no mention is made of the last paragraph which emphasizes the importance of the jury's role: The fact that the determination of whether you recommend a sentence of death or sentence of life imprisonment in this case can be reached by a single ballot should not influence you to act hastily or without due regard to the gravity of these proceedings. Before you ballot you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that human life is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your advisory sentence. Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) (for § 921.141, Fla. Stat.) The prosecutor's statement to the jury that the trial judge may have an opportunity to learn more about the defendant before he imposes a sentence is a correct statement of the law and has been expressly approved by this Court and the United States Supreme Court. See Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1983); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). The United States Supreme Court, in describing the Florida death penalty process, has expressly characterized the jury's role in Florida to be advisory in nature. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Spaziano v. Florida , explained our procedure in the following manner: In Florida, the jury's sentencing recommendation in a capital case is only advisory. The trial court is to conduct its own weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and, [n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, is to enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death; in the latter case, specified written findings are required. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1983). 468 U.S. at 451, 104 S.Ct. at 3157 (emphasis added). See also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). It is important to note that in Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, reh'g granted and order vacated, 828 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir.1987), a decision rendered by the Eleventh Circuit four months after Adams but two months before Mann, that panel held the identical instructions and similar comments did not mislead the jury as to the importance of its advisory role. Id. at 1099. We realize that the opinions in Harich and Mann have now been vacated and those causes set for a rehearing en banc. If we were to apply Caldwell strictly in accordance with the Mann and Adams decisions, we would necessarily have to find that our standard jury instructions, as they have existed since 1976, violate the dictates of Caldwell. This would result in a resentencing proceeding for virtually every individual sentenced to death in this state since 1976. We find no justification exists for such a holding.