Opinion ID: 779290
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marvin Warner's Attorney's Testimony

Text: 29 Green argues that the district court erred in allowing Marvin Warner's attorney to testify despite the presence of a witness sequestration order and that the trial court should have granted a mistrial because of this. Green also argues that the trial court improperly limited the cross-examination of Marvin Warner's attorney, in violation of his right of confrontation. The district court's rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 835-36 (6th Cir.1982); see also United States v. Wall, 130 F.3d 739, 745 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that the court reviews a district court's denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion which exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.) 30 The record does not contain a sequestration order. However, the government appears to concede that such an order was in place at trial, and a review of the relevant portions of the transcript tends to indicate that such an order was in place — both the government and Green's counsel referred to such an order. Thus, we assume that a sequestration order was in fact in effect at trial.
31 Federal Rule of Evidence 615 provides that: at the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. This rule serves two purposes: (1) it prevents witnesses from tailoring testimony to that of other witnesses; and (2) it aids in detecting false testimony. United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.1978) ( en banc ) on reh'g. 612 F.2d 887 ( en banc ), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980). It is well-established that a violation of a sequestration order does not automatically bar a witness's testimony. United States v. Bostic, 327 F.2d 983 (6th Cir.1964). 32 In Gibson, supra, a panel of this court explained: 33 Most authorities agree that particular circumstances sufficient to justify exclusion of a witness are indications that the witness has remained in court with the consent, connivance, procurement or knowledge of the party seeking his testimony. United States v. Kiliyan, 456 F.2d at 560; Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.1967); United States v. Bostic, 327 F.2d 983 (6th Cir.1964); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917, 82 S.Ct. 1553, 8 L.Ed.2d 497 (1962). 34 Gibson, 675 F.2d at 835-36. 35 Federal Rule of Evidence 611 limits cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination. See also United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.1990).
36 Here, Marvin Warner testified on direct examination that the cocaine supplier was an individual he knew as Kenny Green and identified Green at trial. On cross-examination, however, Green's counsel produced a letter written by Marvin Warner to his ex-wife Robin Warner in which he wrote: I have also heard someone named Willie Green got picked up in Florida. That was the name in the paper under your write-up. Who is that? 37 The government was not aware of the existence of the letter prior to trial. As a result, the government sought to call James Tullis Rogers (Rogers), Marvin Warner's attorney, to question him regarding Marvin Warner's knowledge of Green's identity. Marvin Warner gave a limited waiver of attorney-client privilege for Rogers to testify in this regard. On direct-examination, Rogers testified, apparently over an objection which is not on the record, that he received a phone call from Marvin Warner shortly after his arrest in which he stated that he remembered Kenny's last name. Rogers then testified that he called a Detective Price to relay the information. Thus, Roger's direct-examination was confined as to how and when Rogers first heard from Marvin Warner regarding Green's identity. 38 During cross-examination by Robin Warner's attorney, Rogers admitted that he had been present for part of Marvin Warner's testimony. During cross-examination by Green's counsel, the lawyer attempted to ask Rogers why Marvin Warner sought his representation. The trial court refused to allow this line of questioning, based on the limited waiver of attorney-client privilege and because the questioning was outside of the scope of the direct examination. 1
39 From our review of the record, we find no violation of the sequestration order. As the government points out, it did not know of the existence of the letter prior to Marvin Warner's cross-examination. Thus, the government could not have known to have Rogers absent during Marvin Warner's testimony. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Rogers to testify or in denying Green's motion for a mistrial because of Rogers' testimony. 40 We also conclude that the trial court properly limited Green's counsel from questioning Rogers about his representation of Marvin Warner as being outside the scope of direct-examination and outside the limited waiver of attorney-client privilege. As such, there was no violation of Green's right of confrontation.