Opinion ID: 2384392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Right of Limited Cross-Examination

Text: After the guilt hearing and prior to the penalty phase of this bifurcated trial, defense counsel moved that the State be prohibited from cross-examining the defendant during the sentencing hearing with regard to the circumstances of the offense. The defendant insisted that such a ruling would be proper if he chose to take the witness stand for the limited purpose of testifying about mitigating factors unrelated to evidence of the crime for which he had been convicted. The State argued that cross-examination should be permitted on all matters relevant to sentencing, including the circumstances of the offense. The trial court agreed with the State and denied the motion. The defendant, against the advice of counsel, testified at the sentencing hearing. During direct examination he said that he had been drunk the night of the murder and remembered nothing until he awoke Sunday morning. On cross-examination, the prosecuting attorney inquired about the defendant's reaction when he awoke on Sunday to find blood on his clothes, car, and tools. The defendant asserted his innocence and denied that there had been any blood on his clothing the morning after the crime. During closing argument, the prosecutor questioned the defendant's statement that he would black-out when he became drunk and that he had done so on the night of the murder. The prosecutor also skeptically pointed out that the defendant did not volunteer any information about or explain how his fingerprints came to be on the window screen and lightbulb at the crime scene. The defendant contends in this appeal that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for limited cross-examination. He asserts that he retains his Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself by discussing the circumstances of the offense if he testifies only about his background and other mitigating circumstances unrelated to the offense itself. Relying on Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1542 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 502 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991), the defendant also argues that the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument violated his state and federal constitutional rights against self-incrimination under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), which held that the Fifth Amendment bars a prosecutor from commenting to the jury on the defendant's failure to testify at trial. While agreeing that the trial court erred, the State argues that any error was harmless because the defendant was only questioned on cross-examination about matters that he reasonably raised during direct. The State further contends that the prosecutor's remark was not error because the defendant had attempted to explain some facts regarding the night of the murder, thereby waiving his Griffin rights on the subject. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), provides that [n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies to a capital sentencing proceeding. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). In Estelle , a psychiatrist testified for the state during the penalty phase, relating statements made by the defendant during a psychiatric examination, despite the fact that the defendant had not been advised of his Miranda rights before the examination. The Court ruled that the testimony violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, stating that `the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.' Id., 451 U.S. at 462, 101 S.Ct. at 1873 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). The Court concluded that [g]iven the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental guarantees. Id., 451 U.S. at 462-63, 101 S.Ct. at 1873. While this Court has never expressly addressed the specific self-incrimination issues raised here by the defendant, the United States Supreme Court held in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), that [a] defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives. ... (Emphasis added.) See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494, 37 S.Ct. 192, 198, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917) (It is permissible for the prosecutor or the court to advise the jury that it may draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence when the defendant has testified as to some facts concerning the crime charged, but has refused to testify as to other facts within his knowledge). Similarly, our own intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled that: A witness cannot discontinue testimony as to transactions already disclosed by the witness. Once he discloses a fact, though incriminatory, he must testify with respect to the details of that fact.... A witness who testifies on direct examination is bound to answer questions on cross-examination with respect to the testimony that he gave on direct. State v. Stapleton, 638 S.W.2d 850, 855 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (Emphasis added). Harrison and Stapleton emphasize that a defendant can waive the privilege against self-incrimination regarding certain subjects by discussing those subjects on direct examination. Other cases have decided more broadly that once a defendant takes the witness stand he waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and makes himself liable to cross-examination as an ordinary witness. United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 334 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932, 91 S.Ct. 1524, 28 L.Ed.2d 867 (1971). See also People v. Szabo, 113 Ill.2d 83, 100 Ill.Dec. 726, 731, 497 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1330, 94 L.Ed.2d 181 (1987) (testimony at sentencing hearing limited to defendant's good behavior since incarceration was subject to impeachment). In Lesko, supra, 925 F.2d at 1542, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant's penalty phase testimony about mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the charges against the individual does not operate as a complete waiver of the defendant's self-incrimination privilege or rights under Griffin . Explaining the rationale for its position, the Lesko court concluded: Without the protection of Griffin , a capital defendant in the penalty phase of his trial could avoid prosecutorial comment about his failure to address the charges against him only at the price of not providing what may be his life or death testimony about collateral mitigating circumstances. This is too high a price to require the accused to pay for the maintenance of his fifth amendment privilege. Lesko, 925 F.2d at 1543. Significantly, the Lesko court recognized the interplay between the defendant's asserted right to be subjected to only limited cross-examination at the sentencing hearing and the defendant's Eighth Amendment right to present evidence in mitigation of the crime for which that defendant stands convicted. As we have previously held, a sentencer in a capital case must not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 251 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031, 110 S.Ct. 3288, 111 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution  requires States to allow consideration of mitigating evidence in capital cases. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1233, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) (emphasis in original). See also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377-78, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1196, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). Moreover, as stated in McKoy : Under our decisions, it is not relevant whether the barrier to the sentencer's consideration of all mitigating evidence is interposed by statute, ...; by the sentencing court, ...; or by an evidentiary ruling, ... . Whatever the cause, ... the conclusion would necessarily be the same: Because the [sentencer's] failure to consider all of the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence, in plain violation of Lockett [ v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973], it is our duty to remand this case for resentencing. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. [104] at 117, n. [102 S.Ct. 869, 878, n. 71 L.Ed.2d 1] ... (O'Connor, J., concurring). McKoy v. North Carolina, supra , (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1865-66, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988)) (citations omitted). We agree with the analysis set forth in Lesko that recognizes both the Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment implications raised in a decision whether to permit only limited cross-examination of a defendant at a capital sentencing hearing. Although we recognize the general Tennessee rule that [a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case ..., Tenn.R.Evid. 611(b), we are also cognizant of the gravity of a capital sentencing proceeding and the constitutional mandate to ensure that all relevant mitigating circumstances be presented to a sentencing body. We thus conclude that, only in the limited sphere of a death penalty sentencing hearing, a capital defendant's testimony regarding mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the merits of the charges against him does not operate as a complete waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. [5] Accordingly, a defendant has a right to limited cross-examination if he or she wishes to testify about only collateral mitigating circumstances at the penalty phase of a capital trial. We reiterate, however, that even in such special situations, a defendant may be completely and thoroughly cross-examined about all testimony given or fairly raised by that defendant on direct examination. Applying that rule to the present case, it is clear that the trial court's failure to limit cross-examination of the defendant did not result in prejudicial error. The defendant testified on direct examination about the night of the murder and said that he could not remember anything after becoming drunk until he awoke the next morning. It was, therefore, not error for the prosecutor to inquire specifically into the defendant's memory of the next day, including the physical condition of his clothing, car, and tools when he awoke. In view of the defendant's testimony during direct examination, the inquiries propounded by the prosecutor were proper. We further conclude that the comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument did not violate the principles set forth in Griffin . The United States Supreme Court has held that Griffin does not prohibit a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's silence, if such comment is a fair response to a position taken by either the defendant or defense counsel. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-33, 108 S.Ct. 864, 868-70, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988). Here, the prosecutor cast doubt on the defendant's testimony that he was drunk or blacked-out at the time of the offense by describing the calculated and intentional acts that were necessary to break into the victim's home. In addition, the prosecutor argued that the defendant you know, didn't volunteer anything, you know, explain the fingerprints on the screen and things of that nature, which I thought was somewhat amazing. We conclude that such comments constitute, in this case, a fair response to the defendant's claim of innocence and his claim of memory loss.