Opinion ID: 1123584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: part iii. neither laches or estoppel bars a collateral attack on the agreed judgment.

Text: Boiled down, Peoples asserts that either laches or estoppel should be applied to bar collateral attack on the approved settlement and agreed judgment. We find the arguments of Peoples without merit. Peoples' position on laches and estoppel focuses exclusively on Lee, the guardian and the inequity of allowing him to delay in attacking the agreed judgment and the consequent prejudice caused to Peoples. Nowhere does Peoples allege that Harding, the ward, has been guilty of any inequitable conduct or unreasonable delay. In essence, Peoples asks us to punish Harding for the supposed misdeed of Lee in delaying an attack on the settlement and/or agreed judgment. This we will not do. Initially we note that laches is an affirmative defense whereby the person claiming the benefit thereof has the burden of proof. Nadel v. Zeligson, 207 Okla. 658, 252 P.2d 140, 144 (1952). It is an equitable defense to stale claims. Olansen v. Texaco, Inc., 587 P.2d 976, 985 (Okla. 1978). In a situation where the judgment is void our statutory law provides that a judgment may be vacated at any time on motion of a party or person affected thereby. 12 O.S. 1981, § 1038, now 12 O.S.Supp. 1993, § 1038. We relied on this express statutory directive in Chaney v. Reddin, 201 Okla. 264, 205 P.2d 310, 313 (1949), to affirm a trial court's judgment sustaining a motion to vacate a default judgment even though more than eight years had elapsed before the plaintiff attacked the void default judgment. In our view, Peoples presented nothing to the trial court, and has presented nothing to us, that would call for taking this matter outside the confines of the express directive of § 1038 which statutorily allows a void judgment to be attacked at any time and we find there is no basis in this record for application of the doctrine of laches. For the same reasons we reject Peoples' laches claim we reject Peoples' assertion some type of estoppel should be applied to bar this collateral attack on the void agreed judgment. We also add we have not been particularly eager to find a ward estopped from attacking an invalid judgment by conduct of the guardian. See Lowery v. Richards, 120 Okla. 261, 248 P. 622, Fifth Syllabus (1926) (guardian of minor cannot, by commencing action on behalf of his ward, enter into compromise and settlement, and confess judgment against his ward, quieting title of the ward's lands in defendant, and a judgment entered by such confession by the guardian does not create an estoppel against a ward who thereafter asserts the invalidity of the judgment). Although Lowery is not identical to our case (it had within it an element of fraud and did not concern a mortgage under § 385 or a predecessor statute) it does exhibit our longstanding recognition that the statutory rights of minors and incompetents are to be jealously guarded. Very simply, Peoples has presented us with no valid rationale for application of the doctrines of laches or estoppel and we refuse to apply either doctrine to bar attack on either the void approved settlement or the void agreed judgment. [15] For the reasons set out in this opinion, the trial court's order refusing to set aside the sheriff's sale and to vacate the agreed judgment, and the trial court order denying Lee's motion for new trial, are REVERSED. ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur. HARGRAVE, J., concurs in result. OPALA, J., concurs in judgment.