Opinion ID: 2753819
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dismissal of Commonwealth Defendants.

Text: Next, the plaintiffs assail the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the Commonwealth defendants. Had the court kept those defendants in the case, the plaintiffs say, it would have been able to fashion a more salubrious island-wide remedy. Sua sponte dismissals, which by definition are entered on the court's own initiative and without advance notice or an opportunity to be heard, are disfavored. See González-González v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2001); Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, a sua sponte dismissal will not be set aside where the aggrieved party cannot show any prejudice. See Vives v. Fajardo, 472 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2007). -23- In this instance, the plaintiffs cannot show a smidgen of prejudice. When the sua sponte dismissal was questioned, the district court prudently invited briefing on the underlying issues and reconsidered its action. The entry of a new order of dismissal after reconsideration effectively cured any prejudice. See Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001); Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 402 (5th Cir. 1998). Our holding that the order of dismissal is not subject to reversal on procedural grounds does not end the inquiry. The plaintiffs submit that there was no valid basis for the dismissal of the Commonwealth defendants. In their view, the Commonwealth's participation in a remedial scheme is necessary to afford complete relief. This amounts to a claim that the Commonwealth defendants are required parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). We reject the plaintiffs' importunings. A party is a necessary party within the purview of Rule 19(a)(1)(A) only if, in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties. Relief is complete when it meaningfully resolves the contested matter as between the affected parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee note to 1966 amend.; Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013). To be complete, however, the relief need not align exactly with the remedy sought by the plaintiff. See Salt Lake Tribune Publ'g Co. v. AT&T Corp., 320 F.3d 1081, 1097 (10th Cir. 2003). As long as a party's absence -24- does not prevent the district court from affording complete relief, Rule 19(a)(1)(A) does not mandate that party's continuing presence.6 See Bacardí Int'l Ltd. v. V. Suárez & Co., 719 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 640 (2013). In this case, we detect no error in the district court's conclusion that complete relief as between the main protagonists — the plaintiffs and the municipalities — can be accomplished without the involvement of the Commonwealth defendants. See Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 494 (1947) (holding that absent party is not indispensable if relief-granting decree is effective without requiring that party to do a single thing). The court's remedial scheme redresses the constitutional violations in the communities that the plaintiffs joined in their suit, and no action by the Commonwealth is needed for the municipal defendants to implement that remedy. Surely, the presence of the Commonwealth defendants is not required in order for the municipal defendants to, say, collect and distribute keys, monitor compliance, and sanction offenders. Of course, the fact that an otherwise proper defendant is not a necessary party does not mean that it must be dismissed from the case. But where, as here, certain defendants are dispensable parties whose presence is not required to afford complete relief, 6 The plaintiffs' assignment of error implicates only Rule 19(a)(1)(A). They do not contend that the Commonwealth defendants are required parties under Rule 19(a)(1)(B). -25- the trial court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss them. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Rockefeller, 322 F. Supp. 678, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21). So viewed, the issue reduces to whether the district court's decision to fashion a remedial scheme that does not involve the Commonwealth defendants is an abuse of discretion. We think not. Faced with the need to remedy ongoing constitutional violations, the district court reasonably could have chosen to ameliorate those violations by a decree addressed either to the municipalities or to the Commonwealth defendants. There are advantages and disadvantages to either alternative. Given this choice, we believe that the district court acted within its discretion in selecting the municipalities as the medium for effectuating relief. Once this selection was made, the Commonwealth defendants became superfluous. And while the ensuing implementation of the remedial scheme has had its challenges, those challenges cannot fairly be attributed to the absence of the Commonwealth defendants. Indeed, the Commonwealth defendants have assured us, both at oral argument and in a letter submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), that the -26- Puerto Rico police are aware of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and are under orders to assist them.7 In any event, the district court wisely left open the possibility of future participation in the case by the Commonwealth defendants. See Watchtower II, 712 F.3d at 12-13. As a practical matter, the dismissal of the Commonwealth defendants operated without prejudice. If the district court, in light of unfolding events, were to conclude that it is desirable to have the Commonwealth defendants before the court in order to afford effective relief, it possesses the flexibility to take corrective action. See Amado, 517 F.2d at 1360.