Opinion ID: 170909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether the degree of departure is reasonable

Text: Our review of the degree of the district court's departure is `deferential,' Wolfe, 435 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d at 1253); see also United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 807 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that Gall forbids application of heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines range). As such, we curtail our consideration, looking only at the district court's proffered justifications [for the departure], as well as such factors as: the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, correctional treatment, the sentencing pattern of the Guidelines, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Wolfe, 435 F.3d at 1303 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 418 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir.2005)). In justifying its departure, the sentencing court must articulate both factual bases for the departure and its reasons for the degree of departure. Jose-Gonzalez, 291 F.3d at 705. While we do not require the district court to justify the degree of departure with mathematical exactitude, ... we do require the justification to include some method of analogy, extrapolation or reference to the sentencing guidelines. Wolfe, 435 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d at 1254). Here, the sentencing court [a]nalogiz[ed] to other guidelines, thereby employing a primary method by which district courts may justify the reasonableness of their departure. United States v. Neal, 249 F.3d 1251, 1258 (10th Cir.2001). Indeed, the court, by adopting the Jose-Gonzalez methodology, extrapolated from U.S.S.G § 3D1.4. Additionally, the court explained its decision to employ this methodology by noting that the Commission's justification for the grouping rules is that all such offenses share the same single victim  the societal interest in controlling immigration. Jose-Gonzalez, 291 F.3d at 707. However, [w]hen ... the gist of the offense is injury to persons, the offense against each human victim belongs in a different group. Id. Therefore, the upward departure was warranted because of the court's concern for human safety and the sanctity of life. Because the pertinent portion of Jose-Gonzalez remains valid, we cannot find fault with either the district court's rationale for the departure or the degree of that departure. Lastly, Munoz challenges one additional aspect of the court's process. He claims that the court, while relying on § 5K2.1, neglected to discuss on the record the factors delineated in that section. The district court did not expressly address the defendant's state of mind and the degree of planning or preparation, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1, but the district court did expound on another appropriate factor[], id. Specifically, the district court discussed the fact that multiple deaths resulted in detail. Id. In the Fourth Circuit case that Munoz relies on, the sentencing court had provided no guidance as to its rationale for departing upward pursuant to § 5K2.1 and had failed to consider any of the aforementioned factors. See United States v. Terry, 142 F.3d 702, 709 (4th Cir.1998) (emphasis added). Thus, Terry is distinguishable and Munoz's final argument is unavailing.