Opinion ID: 1590214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims of alleged prosecutorial misconduct.

Text: Walker contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that denied him a fair trial and an accurate sentence determination. Walker did not object at trial to any of the alleged misconduct he now raises before us. Therefore, he must establish plain error. In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), the United States Supreme Court stated the following concerning a prosecutor's responsibility: `The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. `It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none.' 295 U.S. at 88, 55 S.Ct. 629. `A prosecutor's statement must be viewed in the context of all of the evidence presented and in the context of the complete closing arguments to the jury.' Reeves v. State, 807 So.2d 18, 44-45 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1026, 122 S.Ct. 558, 151 L.Ed.2d 433 (2001), quoting Roberts v. State, 735 So.2d 1244, 1253 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). The standard for evaluating the propriety of a prosecutor's argument is whether the argument `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). `A prosecutor may argue in closing any evidence that was presented at trial. He may also `present his impressions from the evidence. He may argue every matter of legitimate inference and may examine, collate, sift, and treat the evidence in his own way.' Williams v. State, 601 So.2d 1062, 1073 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), aff'd without opinion, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala. 1992), quoting Donahoo v. State, 505 So.2d 1067, 1073.'  Broadnax v. State, 825 So.2d 134, 208 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), quoting Williams v. State, 627 So.2d 994 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992), aff'd, 627 So.2d 999 (Ala.1993). Turner v. State, 924 So.2d 737, 766-67 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). First, Walker maintains that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a witness for the State. The State presented testimony from Timothy Byrd, a former cell mate of Walker's, who testified that Walker admitted to him that he shot Thweatt. During Byrd's testimony, the State and Walker elicited testimony from Byrd' that he had repeatedly petitioned the court and the district attorney for leniency in his sentences. The prosecutor, when questioning Byrd on redirect examination and later on cross-examination when Byrd was called as a witness for the defense, asked questions attempting to establish that the prosecutor's office did not at any time support a lenient sentence for Byrd. Additionally, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Byrd that indicated that by testifying Byrd had placed his safety in danger if he was sent back to prison. Walker consistently asked questions attacking Byrd's credibility and tending to establish the inference that Byrd was biased in favor of the State and had received a lesser sentence in exchange for his testimony. During closing argument the prosecutor stated: We called Tim Byrd. . . . You don't believe the District Attorney; I knew about the prior conviction. You don't believe I know he wrote me a letter? You don't believe your DA who you are looking at, that you elected. . . . But didn't make no deals. Additionally, the prosecutor commented that Byrd testified against Walker because Where is nothing more evil and wicked in this community than [Walker] and Beckworth. The law concerning a prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of a witness is well settled. A distinction must be made between an argument by the prosecutor personally vouching for a witness, thereby bolstering the credibility of the witness, and an argument concerning the credibility of a witness based upon the testimony presented at trial. `[P]rosecutors must avoid making personal guarantees as to the credibility of the state's witnesses.' Ex parte Parker, 610 So.2d 1181 (Ala.1992). See Ex parte Waldrop, 459 Sold 959, 961 (Ala.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed.2d 323 (1985). `Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching for his credibility are normally improper and error. . . . The test for improper vouching is whether the jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor was indicating a personal belief in the witness' credibility. . . . This test may be satisfied in two ways. First, the prosecution may place the prestige of the government behind the witness, by making explicit personal assurances of the witness' veracity. . . . Secondly, a prosecutor may implicitly vouch for the witness' veracity by indicating that information not presented to the jury supports the testimony.'  United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034, 104 S.Ct. 1304, 79 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984). DeBruce v. State, 651 So.2d 599, 610-11 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), aff'd, 651 So.2d 624 (Ala.1994). Reading the prosecutor's comments in context and considering them in light of the entire record, we do not find plain error. Even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor vouched for the veracity of Byrd's testimony or placed the weight of the State behind Byrd's testimony and that in doing so erred, we cannot conclude that the statements when read in light of the entirety of the record affected the fairness of Walker's trial. See Turner, supra. Therefore, the record does not establish plain error. [3] Walker further contends that the prosecutor improperly expressed his opinion that Walker deserved to be found guilty of capital murder and to be sentenced to death. Walker directs this Court to the following statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments: The State has an interest in this case. The law has passed certain circumstances where the State can prosecute people who commit the most evil, wicked, heinous type crimes in this community and this is one. . . . . This is the worst case. Children, elderly people need protection. This is the worst of the worst. Do not make a mistake on this case. Additionally, Walker provides a grocery list of alleged misconduct during the prosecutor's closing argument, including that the prosecutor improperly: argued that Walker lacked self control; asked the jury to send a message to the community; compared Walker's rights to the rights of the victim; urged the jury to consider Thweatt's age and position, in the community when determining Walker's sentence; and injected religion into the trial. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has held: `It is not enough that a prosecutor's comment in closing arguments was undesirable or even universally condemned; the question instead is whether the comment so infected the trial' with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Burton [v. State], 651 So.2d [641,] 651 [(Ala.Cr.App.1993), aff'd, 651 So.2d 659 (Ala.1994)], quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). ` . . . [A]s we have previously stated, a prosecutor's comment must be viewed as delivered in the heat of debate, and, as such, is usually valued by the jury at its true worth. `[W]e must not lose sight of the fact that a trial is a legal battle, a combat in a sense, and not a parlor social affair. The solicitor is yet under duty to prosecute with earnestness and vigor to strike hard blows, but not foul ones.' Berger v. United States, [295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) ]. Taylor [v. State], 666 So.2d [36,] 64 [(Ala.Cr.App.1994)], quoting Arant v. State, 232 Ala. 275, 280, 167 So. 540, 544 (1936).'  Melson v. State, 775 So.2d 857, 885 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 775 So.2d 904 (Ala.2000). . . . Retribution is a proper subject of prosecutorial argument. Perkins v. State, 808 So.2d 1041 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999); McWilliams v. State, 640 So.2d 982, 1001 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd in pertinent part, rem'd, 640 So.2d 1015 (Ala.1993). See also Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003, 1033 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (there is no impropriety in a prosecutor's appeal to the jury for justice); Kuenzel v. State, 577 So.2d 474, 498 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (retribution is a valid consideration in sentencing) (quoting Johnson v. Wainwright, 778 F.2d 623, 630 (11th Cir.1985)), aff'd, 577 So.2d 531 (Ala.1991). Smith v. State , [Ms. CR-97-1258, December 22, 2000] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim.App.2000), rev'd in part on other grounds, [Ms. 1010267, March 14, 2003]' ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2003). We have reviewed in their entirety the prosecutor's arguments' Walker says improperly expressed the opinion that Walker deserved to be found guilty. [U]rging the jury to render a verdict in such a manner as to punish the crime, protect the public from similar offenses, and deter others from committing similar offenses is not improper argument. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 36 (Ala. Crim.App.1993). Many of the comments were replies-in-kind to Walker's arguments and legitimate inferences from the record. Additionally, the comments were delivered in the heat of debate. No plain error exists. Walker also contends that during the guilt phase of his trial, the prosecutor improperly argued facts not in evidence, demonstrated how the attack on Thweatt occurred, and improperly informed the jury that Walker was known to a law-enforcement officer before the offense for which he was being tried occurred. After reviewing the testimony and the arguments, we conclude that no plain error occurred in this regard. Although some of the prosecutor's statements were questionable, the prosecutor's argument did not `so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Turner, 924 So.2d at 767 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 169, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). Next, Walker contends that the prosecutor improperly presented victim-impact evidence and argument during the guilt phase of his trial. During his opening argument, the prosecutor provided some factual information about Thweatt, including her age, her family history, her activities in the community, and her character. Additionally, the State presented testimony from one of Thweatt's daughters and a friend. In Ex parte Rieber, 663 So.2d 999, 1006 (Ala.1995), this Court held: It is presumed that jurors do not leave their common sense at the courthouse door. It would elevate form over substance for us to hold, based on the record before us, that [the defendant] did not receive a fair trial simply because the jurors were told what they probably had already suspectedthat [the victim] was not a `human island,' but a unique individual whose murder had inevitably had a profound impact on her children, spouse, parents, friends, or dependents (paraphrasing a portion of Justice Souter's opinion concurring in the judgment in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 838, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2615, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). Although portions of the argument and testimony during the guilt phase of Walker's trial may have been inappropriate, we unequivocally conclude that the testimony and the argument had no prejudicial impact on Walker's trial. Cf. Calhoun v. State, 932 So.2d 923, 968-69 (Ala.Crim. App.2005), and the cases cited therein, holding that the improper admission of victim-impact evidence during the guilt phase did not constitute reversible error. Finally, Walker contends that the cumulative effect of the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of due process and a fair trial. Because Walker has not demonstrated that his claims of prosecutorial misconduct are any stronger when the instances of misconduct are considered cumulatively, we find no error. See Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909, 918 (Ala.1996).