Opinion ID: 2424222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fees for Work Before the Hearing Examiner

Text: The tenants filed a motion for reasonable attorney's fees and supporting memorandum, pursuant to D.C.Code § 42-3509.02, and 14 DCMR §§ 3825.1 to -.12, with the Commission on October 7, 2008, subsequent to the Commission's decision to deny the substantial rehabilitation petition. The Commission found that the tenants were entitled to attorney's fees under the D.C.Code provision, which creates a presumptive award of attorney's fees for prevailing tenants in both tenant-initiated and landlord-initiated proceedings. See Hampton Courts Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 573 A.2d 10, 13 (D.C.1990) (emphasis in original). The Commission awarded attorney's fees to the tenants for work performed before it. It determined, however, that it was without jurisdiction to consider attorney's fees for work performed before the hearing examiner unless the tenants had raised the issue before the hearing examiner and then the issue was appealed to the Commission. The tenants argue that the Commission erred as a matter of law: that it does, in fact, have jurisdiction to grant attorney's fees for work done at administrative hearings, and that they were not required to raise the issue of entitlement to a fee award before the hearing examiner until they prevailed before the Commission. We have previously remanded cases to the Commission to determine attorney's fees for work performed before the hearing examiner and the Commission. See Alexander v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 542 A.2d 359, 361 (D.C. 1988) (With respect to ... (administrative litigation fees), we think that the determination of such fees is, in the first instance, to be made by the Commission acting within its sound discretion in light of this opinion.). The statute that creates the presumption of attorney's fees states that the Rent Administrator, Rental Housing Commission, or a court of competent jurisdiction may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any action under this chapter. ... D.C.Code § 42-3509.02. The statute does not specify that each entity can only award attorney's fees for work done before it; instead it indicates that the listed entities can grant attorney's fees for any action under this chapter. We need not, however, determine whether the Commission's interpretation of the statute is a permissible reading. In their motion for attorney's fees, the tenants noted that on October 1, 2006, the Office of Administrative Hearings assumed jurisdiction over all administrative proceedings previously adjudicated before hearing examiners in the Rental Accommodations and Conversion Division (RACD). See D.C.Code § 2-1831.03 (Supp.2005). The tenants argued that as a result, there was no way for the Commission to remand the action to the original hearing examiner or to the RACD. On remand, the Commission should either decide the fee issue itself or it can remand to an appropriate hearing officer within the Office of Administrative Hearings to determine attorney's fees for the work performed before the original hearing examiner. We agree with the tenants that they could not have raised the issue previously (before the hearing examiner or in their appeal to the Commission) because they were not the prevailing party until the Commission had ruled in their favor. Consequently, they did not waive the issue and should not be prevented from recovering attorney's fees on the basis that the Commission does not have jurisdiction.