Opinion ID: 460972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Enelow-Ettelson Doctrine

Text: 11 CP & P first contends that the district court's order staying the judicial proceedings pending arbitration is appealable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1) (1982). 5 Under section 1292(a)(1) we have jurisdiction over appeals from [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.... The Supreme Court has held that a court's order granting a stay of its own proceedings pending the outcome of proceedings in another forum is analogous to an injunction and is appealable under section 1292(a)(1). Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co., 293 U.S. 379, 381-83, 55 S.Ct. 310, 310-12, 79 L.Ed. 440 (1935); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 317 U.S. 188, 63 S.Ct. 163, 87 L.Ed. 176 (1942); see also Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 75 S.Ct. 249, 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955). 12 The Enelow-Ettelson doctrine construes a stay as an injunction if: (1) the original cause of action could have been maintained only at law before the merger of law and equity, and (2) the stay is sought to permit the interposition of an equitable defense or counterclaim. Salinas Cooling Co. v. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Workers, Local P-78-A, 743 F.2d 705, 706-07 (9th Cir.1984); Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir.1984); Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1462 (9th Cir.1983); Brannon v. Warn Brothers, Inc., 508 F.2d 115, 118 (9th Cir.1974); Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F.2d 454, 455 (9th Cir.1973). We examine each of these requirements in turn. 13 The Trust's complaint meets the first prong of the test because it asks primarily for money damages for CP & P's withdrawal. The equitable relief it requests is only that which to the court shall seem necessary for the enforcement of defendant's payment obligation. Under either of the tests used to determine whether a suit is equitable or legal, the historical test or the dominant purpose test, this case may be characterized as legal. See Mediterranean Enterprises, 708 F.2d at 1462 (dominant purpose test); Salinas Cooling, 743 F.2d at 706-07 (historical test); see also Langley v. Colonial Leasing Co., 707 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1983) (discussing both); USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, Ltd., 574 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1978) (same). The Trust's action for withdrawal liability is analogous to a contract action for liquidated damages, which historically could be maintained only at law. 6 Alascom, 727 F.2d at 1421 (claim for money damages is action at law); Wren, 654 F.2d at 533 (breach of contract actions are actions at law); Bear v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 526 F.2d 734, 735 (9th Cir.1975) (per curiam) (contract action is action at law). And because the equitable relief the Trust requests is purely incidental to the legal claim for money damages, the predominant purpose of the action is not equitable but legal. See Brannon, 508 F.2d at 119. The Trust's suit therefore satisfies the first prong of Enelow-Ettelson. 14 The arbitration order does not satisfy the second prong of Enelow-Ettelson, however, because the stay was not sought to permit the interposition of an equitable defense. Several decisions of this court have held that reliance on an arbitration agreement to avoid immediate litigation constitutes an equitable defense. Mediterranean Enterprises, 708 F.2d at 1462; Brannon, 508 F.2d at 118; Danford, 488 F.2d at 456. The district court's order, however, was not issued to allow CP & P to raise the equitable defense of arbitration. Instead, the order granted the plaintiff's (the Trust's) request in its motion for summary judgment and in its opposition to CP & P's motion for summary judgment for an order requiring the parties to arbitrate. To find that a prayer for arbitration in a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment constitutes the interposition of an equitable defense would require an extremely permissive interpretation of Enelow-Ettelson. In light of the presumption against allowing piecemeal interlocutory appeals, see Baltimore Contractors, 348 U.S. at 181-82, 75 S.Ct. at 252-53; Danford, 488 F.2d at 457, we decline to adopt such an interpretation, and find that we lack jurisdiction under the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine. 7 15