Opinion ID: 2510879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: What standard of review applies?

Text: Aranda first argues that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review in reversing the district court's award of sanctions pursuant to K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-211. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-211 states in relevant part: (b) The signature of a person [on a pleading] constitutes a certificate by the person that the person has read the pleading, motion or other paper and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances : . . . . (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; ... . . . . (c) ... If a pleading, motion or other paper provided for by this article is signed in violation of this section, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative upon notice and after opportunity to be heard, shall impose upon the person who signed it or a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including reasonable attorney fees. A motion for sanctions under this section may be served and filed at any time during the pendency of the action but not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment. (Emphasis added.) Based on the plain language in subsection (c), sanctions are mandatory when a pleading is signed in violation of the statute. The court in In re Marriage of Stockham, 23 Kan. App. 2d 197, 201, 928 P.2d 104 (1996), rev. denied 261 Kan. 1085 (1997), repeated the clarification of the past standard: At one time the decision whether to impose sanctions under 60-211 was a matter of judicial discretion, if an attorney violated the statute willfully, knowingly, and in bad faith. Under the current version of 60-211, as well as 60-2007, sanctions are no longer a matter of discretion; they shall be imposed if the requirements of the statute are shown to be present. [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.) 23 Kan. App. 2d at 201. Accordingly, when an appellate court reviews a district court's decision to impose sanctions under K.S.A. 60-211 the appellate court's function is to determine whether substantial competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact that the statutory requirements for sanctions are present. In re Hesston Corp., 254 Kan. 941, 988, 870 P.2d 17 (1994); Giblin v. Giblin, 253 Kan. 240, 252, 854 P.2d 816 (1993). 23 Kan. App. 2d at 201. Aranda, however, contends that the correct standard of review is abuse of discretion. He points to Judge Marquardt's dissent, citing Wood v. Groh, 269 Kan. 420, 429, 7 P.3d 1163 (2000), for support. Wood states: The imposition of sanctions pursuant to K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-211 is discretionary with the trial court, and its ruling on sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted.] 269 Kan. at 429. Wood, however, is not incongruous with Stockham. The question in Wood was not whether the statutory requirements to award sanctions were satisfied; rather, the issue was whether the type of sanction imposed was error: The plain wording of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-211(c) requires that a district court `shall impose' a sanction when a violation of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-211(b) is found, as in this case. The statute, however, does not specifically require a sanction of attorney fees, as it gives the district court the discretion to apply `an appropriate sanction.' Further, the statute indicates that the sanction `may include' attorney fees. The statute does not require a district court to award monetary sanctions for a violation of 60-211(b). The word `sanction' does not require courts to award `fees'.... .... We hold that the plain meaning of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-211(c), coupled with the legislative intent of the statute, allows courts to impose nonmonetary sanctions in the form of admonitions, as well as monetary sanctions. Courts are not required to award attorney fees when a violation of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-211(b) is found. The district court has the discretion to determine what type of sanctions are appropriate in a given case.  (Emphasis added.) 269 Kan. at 430-31. Because the only question on appeal is whether the court erred in imposing sanctions, not whether the court erred in imposing a certain type of sanction, the abuse of discretion standard does not apply. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that substantial competent evidence is the standard of review.