Opinion ID: 1367095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the appointment of the guardian ad litem and trustee

Text: In objecting to the appointment of the guardian ad litem, plaintiff mistakenly refers to the statutory requirements for appointment of a general guardian. [22] A general guardian is one entrusted with the general care and supervision of either the person or the estate of his ward or both. [23] A guardian ad litem is a guardian of special or limited powers appointed by a court to prosecute or defend for an infant in any suit to which he may be a party. [24] As such, the latter is merely an officer or representative of the court, [25] and, unlike the general guardian, usually has no right to interfere with the infant's person or property. [26] A separate procedure for appointing a guardian ad litem is specifically set forth in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) which states in part: The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person. The determination of the need for a guardian ad litem is left within the sound discretion of the trial judge, [27] and it is frequently the case that a guardian ad litem will be appointed even though parental custody rights have not been suspended. [28] In the instant case, given the long-term neglect of the interests of the children of the marriage and the mother's continued opposition to those interests, there is every reason to believe that the lower court's discretion has been wisely exercised. The only valid aspect left to the appellant's argument is that it would still be improper for a court to appoint a guardian ad litem for a competent adult. [29] However, as the guardian ad litem points out, such an argument is rendered frivolous if the relevant paragraph of the order is reasonably construed to mean that a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent only the remaining minor and not the three adult children of the marriage. The plaintiff also complains that the court was without authority or jurisdiction to appoint a trustee for the three children of the marriage who were no longer minors. The appellant relies on AS 09.55.210(5) which provides: In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide (5) for the appointment of one or more trustees to collect, receive, expend, manage, or invest, in the manner the court directs, any sum of money adjudged for the maintenance of the wife or the nurture and education of minor children committed to his care and custody; ... (emphasis added) At the time the original decree was entered, all of the children were minors, and the court had ample authority to appoint the trustee. As has been indicated previously, we uphold the court's power to appoint the trustee for the purpose of enforcing its original decree. Moreover, the trustee functions merely as a collection agent or receiver for the adult children. No long term trustee-beneficiary relationship is contemplated. Finally, the presence of only one minor child might be said in certain cases to be enough to justify the appointment of a trustee for all the children, e.g. where the res is not to be distributed until the youngest child reaches majority or where allowing unencumbered legal title to remain in the trustee's hands may simplify and expedite real estate conveyances. In one regard, however, we believe that the order of March 8, 1974 must be modified. The costs of partition of the Richardson Highway homestead were ordered to be borne equally by the plaintiff and the defendant. The Richardson Highway property was owned by the defendant alone so that essentially it was due to his recalcitrance that it became necessary for the court to order its partition. Moreover, had the defendant sold the property as originally required by the court, the costs of sale would have had to have been borne out of the proceeds from such sale. We thus conclude that the order of March 8, 1974 and our order of September 29, 1975 affirming it should be amended so as to provide that the costs of the partition be paid pro rata by those receiving the property. As so modified, the order of March 8, 1974 is affirmed. Affirmed.