Opinion ID: 183995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of rights to silence and counsel

Text: Tim claims ineffective assistance of counsel occurred during testimony regarding his invocation of his rights to silence and counsel. At trial, after Trooper Brown (―Brown‖) explained that he had tested Tom‘s hands for gunshot residue on the day of the shooting, the Commonwealth asked why Tim‘s hands were not tested for gunshot residue. Brown responded, ―he said that he wasn‘t going to permit it, to say anything to us, and he requested his attorney.‖ (App. at 552a.) Defense counsel did not object and 10 direct examination of Brown ended soon after Brown gave this testimony. On crossexamination of Brown, defense counsel stated, ―[i]n relationship to what you just said, it sounds to me like Mr. Hanson exercised his Miranda rights, for his right to speak to an attorney before talking to you, et cetera; is that right?‖ (App. at 553a.) Tim claims that his counsel was ineffective when neither of them objected to the Commonwealth‘s questions and when defense counsel mentioned Tim‘s invocation of his Miranda rights.
The court was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that defense counsel‘s failure to object during Brown‘s testimony was not an error so serious as to render counsel‘s performance deficient. The trooper testified that Tim did not have his hands tested because ―he said he wasn‘t going to permit it.‖ (App. at 552a.) Under Supreme Court and Pennsylvania precedent, the testimony that Tim did not permit a gunshot residue test does not implicate Tim‘s right to silence because the admission into evidence of a defendant‘s refusal to submit to a physical test does not offend the right against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 549 A.2d 231, 235–36 (Pa. 1988).
After being asked why the gunshot residue test was not conducted on Tim‘s hands, Brown answered that Tim said ―he wasn‘t going to . . . say anything to us, and he requested his attorney.‖ (App. at 552a.) Because Brown‘s statement was an unsolicited passing reference to Tim‘s invocation of his rights, the Commonwealth‘s question is not inherently objectionable. Even if counsel was deficient in not objecting and not moving 11 for a mistrial, the Superior Court‘s finding that this testimony did not result in actual prejudice is not objectively unreasonable. Shortl y before invoking his rights to silence and to an attorney, Tim confessed to troopers that he was holding the shotgun when it went off. Because Tim had already confessed, the jury would have no reason to assume Tim‘s silence demonstrated guilt. The abundance of other evidence of Tim‘s guilt, including Tom‘s and Betty Jo‘s testimony, Tim‘s initial statement to the troopers, and the results of Tom‘s gunshot residue test, make it reasonable to conclude that the outcome of the trial would have been the same even without this alleged error. Thus, the court was not objectively unreasonable by concluding that the prejudice prong was not met. Additionally, the court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that defense counsel‘s performance was not deficient when counsel referenced and solicited testimony regarding Tim‘s invocation of his right to remain silent. On cross-examination of a witness who referred to Tim‘s invocation of his rights to silence and counsel, Tim‘s counsel said, in part, ―it sounds to me like Mr. Hanson exercised his Miranda rights, or his right to speak to an attorney before talking to you, et cetera; is that right?‖ (App. at 553a.) Trial counsel stated that he referred to Tim‘s invocation of his rights ―to convey that [Tim] exercising his constitutional rights was a proper and common thing to do‖ ―in an effort to minimize any negative inference.‖ (App. at 1152a.) After Trooper Brown responded to the question, defense counsel asked, ―[h]ad Corporal Wrable already spoken to [Tim], however, if you know, prior to your arrival?‖ (App. at 553a.) This second cross-examination question shows the broader context of the 12 question regarding Tim‘s invocation of his Miranda rights. Defense counsel was likely trying to emphasize that Tim had already been cooperative and made a statement to the troopers prior to invoking his right to silence. Moreover, it is reasonable for a court to conclude that the statements on direct examination regarding Tim‘s invocation were unsolicited passing references. On these facts, a court could reasonably conclude that Tim‘s defense counsel‘s reference to the invocation could be a strategic choice that fell within the wide range of reasonable and effective assistance of counsel. Because the court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that Tim did not establish error regarding his counsel‘s reference to his invocation, we need not reach the issue of prejudice. B. Stipulation to evidence regarding Tim’s juvenile proceedings6 During Tom‘s testimony at trial, Tom testified that, before the shooting, he was talking to Tim about ―turning himself in‖ to ―the law.‖ (App. at 76a.) Defense counsel made no objection. Next, the Commonwealth asked why Tim and Tom were discussing Tim turning himself in. Defense counsel objected.7 The Commonwealth asked no further questions about Tim‘s juvenile proceedings during Tom‘s testimony. Later on during the trial, defense counsel stipulated to reading certain statements that specific state troopers would have testified to and introduced into evidence, had they indeed testified. Specifically, defense counsel stipulated to testimony that would have 6 Although both Appellant and Appellees refer to this issue as a stipulation to admit Tim‘s ―juvenile record,‖ there was no juvenile record admitted into evidence under this stipulation. 7 There is a dispute regarding whether the objection was overruled or sustained, which we need not resolve now. 13 been given by Sergeant Smeal — that visitation records at the Clearfield County Jail indicated that Helen Gallaher, Tim‘s sister, visited Tim at the jail six times from 1987 to 1988. Defense counsel also stipulated to testimony that would have been given by Trooper Zimmerman — that he had gone to the Hanson home twice in December 1987, looking for Tim because Tim, on December 2, 1987, had left a juvenile facility where he had been placed the previous day by court order as a result of a separate juvenile charge that was irrelevant to the instant case.8 Appellant claims that defense counsel stipulating to these statements regarding Tim‘s juvenile proceedings was deficient performance of counsel that prejudiced the defense even though Tom had already testified without objection, prior to the stipulation, regarding Tim potentially turning himself in to the law. Appellant‘s COA did not claim ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel‘s failure to object to Tom‘s first reference to Tim turning himself in to the law. The Superior Court was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that entering into this stipulation was not deficient performance. Prior to the stipulation, the court had allowed testimony regarding Tim running from the house after the shooting, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the court had informed the jury that Tim‘s flight could be evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The court found that defense 8 Defense counsel stipulated to testimony that would have been given by other troopers, but this other evidence is not related to Tim‘s juvenile proceedings and is not at issue on appeal. Defense counsel stipulated that Trooper Davidson would testify that he had been to the Hanson home twenty-three times during 1987 because he was looking for Carl Hanson, Jr., Tim‘s brother, on unrelated charges and that Trooper Davidson usually heard voices coming from inside the home, but nobody would answer the door for him. 14 counsel entering into the stipulation was a strategic choice to explain that Tim went into the woods after the shooting, not because he was the shooter, but because he did not want to be detained due to his juvenile proceedings. Tim asserts that defense counsel objecting to the questions regarding his juvenile proceedings during Tom‘s testimony demonstrates that stipulating to the admission of similar testimony later was ineffective assistance of counsel. The Magistrate Judge opined that this shift in strategy could be explained by defense counsel not learning of Tom‘s new account of events until the second day of trial, which was after Tom‘s testimony. Even though Tim‘s counsel was aware of his new description of the shooting shortly before Tom testified on the first day of trial, defense counsel might not have had sufficient time to develop, or act according to, the new theory of the case during Tom‘s testimony. Alternatively, defense counsel could have made a strategic decision to object to Tom‘s testimony while later stipulating to testimony regarding similar topics.9 Tim‘s counsel could have stipulated to the additional information as part of a strategic decision because Tom‘s testimony that he talked to Tim about Tim ―turning himself in‖ to ―the law‖ was already in evidence and because it is likely that the evidence in the stipulation would have been admitted under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b). Evidence of criminal charges, crimes, wrongs, or acts can be admissible for the limited purpose of 9 Defense counsel may have objected to similar testimony from Tom because Tom may have testified to incriminating facts or statements made by Tim that were not included in the testimony to which defense counsel later stipulated. 15 establishing motive. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Glover, 286 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 1972). Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b), character evidence is inadmissible to prove conduct, but other crimes, wrongs, or acts can be admissible under certain exceptions. 404(b) provides: (1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. (2) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge . . . . (3) Evidence of other crimes wrongs, or acts proffered under subsection (b)(2) of this rule may be admitted in a criminal case only upon a showing that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice. PA. R.E. 404(b). This evidence regarding Tim‘s juvenile proceedings would likely have been admissible under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b).10 Tim argues that defense counsel‘s failure to request a limiting instruction for this evidence was deficient performance of counsel. However, the statement was merely that Tim had ―a separate juvenile charge, that juvenile charge having nothing to do with the case,‖ so it is unlikely that this statement would unduly prejudice Tim‘s defense or lead a jury to make improper conclusions regarding character in a murder trial. Because the state court‘s decision regarding the stipulation was not objectively unreasonable, we need not inquire into prejudice. Even if defense counsel did not 10 Although Tim claims that this evidence would be prohibited by 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6354, the disposition of a child may be used against the child ―in a criminal proceeding, if the child was adjudicated delinquent for an offense, the evidence of which would be admissible if committed by an adult.‖ 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6354(b)(4). 16 stipulate to the admission of the juvenile proceedings, the fact that the evidence was likely admissible to prove motive and that Tom testified to talking with Tim about Tim ―turning himself in‖ to ―the law‖ would have made it reasonable for the state court to conclude that the trial result would have been the same, even without the stipulation.11 C. Testimony of Sara Brant At trial, the Commonwealth asked Tom about a statement he allegedly made to David, David‘s girlfriend (Sara Brant), and David‘s mother (Linda Pollard). Defense counsel objected to the question. Outside of the jury‘s presence, the Commonwealth stated that they were trying to introduce statements Tom allegedly made. Specifically, his statement that, if he and Tim thought ―pigs‖ were at their door, ―they‖ would shoot. (App. at 117a–20a.) The Court declined to admit the statement because it was hearsay unless Tim, not Tom, had made the statement. (App. at 120a.) The Commonwealth tried, once again, to ask Tom about the statement. Defense counsel objected and, after a sidebar, Tom denied making the alleged statement to Linda Pollard. Defense counsel called Sara Brant and solicited testimony from her regarding the same statement. She said that she heard Tom tell David the day before the shooting that David, ―better make sure that they knew who he was when he came or else they‘d shoot.‖ (App. at 592a– 93a.) The Superior Court was not objectively unreasonable when it found that defense counsel soliciting this testimony from Sara Brant was not deficient performance. The 11 On direct examination, defense counsel solicited testimony from Tim regarding his ―burglary charge‖ and Tim leaving the juvenile facility. (App. at 597a.) 17 Court found that trial counsel had a ―reasonable strategic basis‖ for this decision; trial counsel testified that the testimony fit into Tim‘s defense theory. (App. at 1165a.) Although Tim argues that this testimony fit the Commonwealth‘s theory and not the defense theory, it is not objectively unreasonable to conclude that defense counsel might have reasonably chosen to use the testimony ―to show that it was more plausible for Tom to be the shooter because he was the person who‖ stated that ―we‘d shoot.‖ (App. at 1165a–66a.) That defense counsel objected to the Commonwealth‘s earlier attempts to solicit similar testimony from Tom does not make counsel‘s subsequent solicitation of this testimony unreasonable. Because the Superior Court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that this solicitation of testimony was not error, we need not inquire into prejudice. D. Testimony of Linda Pollard During the direct examination of Linda Pollard, David‘s mother, the Commonwealth solicited testimony that David had a child ―on the way‖ and that David had planned to marry Sara Brant. (App. at 417a.) Defense counsel did not object. Tim argues that the lack of objection deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The state court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that the failure to object did not prejudice Tim‘s defense. Even though this testimony was arguably irrelevant, Tim did not demonstrate that these statements were ―so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial‖ or that, but for the failure to object, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 18 Because the state court was not objectively unreasonable in reaching its conclusion regarding prejudice on this concern, we need not inquire into whether defense counsel was deficient. E. The aggregated alleged deficiencies Finally, Tim argues that the state court unreasonably concluded that counsel‘s errors, in the aggregate, were prejudicial under Strickland.12 This argument is foreclosed by the fact that, with the potential exception of the testimony of Linda Pollard, we have upheld the state court‘s findings that counsel‘s performance was not otherwise deficient. Here, counsel‘s alleged errors, individually or collectively, do not amount to a constitutional violation.