Opinion ID: 2382352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Governmental ImmunityScope of Duties

Text: [¶ 15] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) (LexisNexis 2009) provides: A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112, and limited by W.S. 1-39-121. The WGCA is a closed end tort claims act such that any claim is barred unless it falls within a statutory exception. Sponsel, 126 P.3d at 105. [¶ 16] Rice contends that several provisions of the WGCA apply and effectively strip the County Defendants of their governmental immunity, and that the district court was in error when it granted summary judgment to the County Defendants, finding that immunity had not been waived. [¶ 17] First, Rice points to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-108(a) (LexisNexis 2009), which provides that a governmental entity is liable for damages caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of public utilities and services including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, heating and ground transportation. Rice argues that the emergency communication system at issue in this case qualifies as a public utility and service within the scope of this statute, and thus, the County Defendants are liable. The County Defendants argue that a fire page is not the operation of a public utility for purposes of the waiver of immunity under § 1-39-108(a). [¶ 18] Both parties rely upon City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102 (Wyo.1993), to support their arguments. In that case, this Court held that firefighting is not a public utility or service for purposes of § 1-39-108(a). We stated in Huitt: If we would accept respondent's contention that firefighting is included among the governmental operations for which immunity is waived by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108, although not so specified therein, the same could also be true for all other governmental operations. The legislature, then, would have done a useless thing in specifying certain operations in the statute for which immunity is waived. Further, should we accept such contention, the legislature would also have done a useless thing in providing exceptions to immunity in other statutes contained in the Act, e.g., uses of motor vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105 (1988); for operation of a building, recreational area or public park in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106; or for peace officers in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-112 (1988). Huitt, 844 P.2d at 1104-1105. Citing Huitt, the district court reached a similar conclusion by employing the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius and held that because the statute enumerated certain activities to be included, it should be construed as excluding all things not expressly mentioned. The County Defendants echo the district court and also contend that if firefighting is not covered, then certainly a page by a county dispatcher to volunteer firefighters should also not be included as part of the operation of a public utility. However, Rice argues that Huitt should not be read this way, in light of the language of the statute and this Court's subsequent decision in Sponsel. [¶ 19] In Sponsel, this Court considered whether erecting and maintaining highway signage qualified as a public utility or service under § 1-39-108. There, this Court noted the statute provides for liability for operation of public utilities and services including gas, electricity, water, etc. Sponsel, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d at 109. Because of the word including that preceded the list of public utilities, Sponsel recognized the enumerated utilities could not be interpreted as an exclusive list: [T]he use of the word `includes' is significant because `includes' generally signifies an intent to enlarge a statute's application, rather than limit it, and it implies the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically enumerated. That general rule certainly has vitality, but it cannot so broaden the statute at issue here, so as to make a `public service' of all things that are a `public responsibility,' without regard as to whether or not they are somehow related to the more limited concept of `public utilities and services.' Sponsel, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d at 109. Ultimately, in Sponsel the decision was that a failure to communicate a dangerous condition by use of a road sign did not fall within the public utility exception to liability even though the county undertook the responsibility to provide proper road signage. We reasoned that [t]he statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis instructs us that the legislature must have intended a catch-all phrase to include things similar to those specifically listed. Sponsel, ¶ 16, 126 P.3d at 109 (citations omitted). [¶ 20] As in Sponsel, we apply the same statutory construction rule here. Although Sponsel recognized that the enumerated utilities in the statute is not an exclusive list, we cannot extend that list to the fire page system at issue in this case, in part because of our holding in Huitt, which says that firefighting is not similar to or of the same genre as gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, heating and ground transportation. Huitt, 844 P.2d at 1105. Although the fire page system is not firefighting, we nevertheless reject Mr. Rice's argument that it qualifies as a public utility. Section 1-39-108 cannot be construed to make a public service of all things that are a public responsibility. [5]