Opinion ID: 380310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Law of Unfair Competition

Text: 51 The federal law of unfair competition is not significantly different, as it bears upon this case, from that of New Jersey. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), provides in relevant part that 52 Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil action . . . by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation. 53 It is well established that section 43(a) proscribes not only acts that would technically qualify as trademark infringement, but also unfair competitive practices involving actual or potential deception. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650-51 (3d Cir. 1954); see Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d at 641-42 (§ 43(a) creates federal statutory torts of unfair competition beyond simple trademark infringement); Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1977) (§ 43(a) standing to sue extends beyond trademark owner to other injured parties); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1974) (§ 43(a) extends rights to parties injured by false advertising). The statute on its face proscribes passing off, as does New Jersey law, but it has been construed more broadly to proscribe other competitive torts, including those defined in the First Restatement of Torts. Judge Hastie's opinion in L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954), a leading case so construing section 43(a), for example, holds that the Lanham Act reflects the expansive viewpoint of section 761 of the Restatement. Id. at 651. Certainly the Act is broad enough to include the tort of unprivileged imitation, the imitation of any nonfunctional physical details of a competitor's product that have acquired a secondary meaning. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d at 642; Truck Equipment Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d at 1215; see In Re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 929 (C.C.P.A.1964) (setting forth secondary meaning and nonfunctionality test). On the facts of this case we perceive no essential difference between the formulation of the tort of unprivileged imitation relied on by the New Jersey courts and First Restatement of Torts and the acts proscribed by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act except for the Lanham Act's required element of interstate commerce, which is not here in dispute. Moreover there is no suggestion in the Sears and Compco cases that federal patent policy somehow limited the scope of section 43(a), for the Court had no need in those cases to address the reach of a federal tort over which Congress has complete control. 54 Since, except for the interstate commerce requirement, the elements of the unfair competition torts proscribed by New Jersey law and by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act are the same, we need not repeat the factual discussion as to likelihood of success on the merits of the federal cause of action. The district court could properly find that SKF had a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its Lanham Act claim.