Opinion ID: 2361632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Evidence Exists to Support Agency's Decision

Text: Under D.C. Code § 1-1509(e) (1981) an administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law which are based on substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Hockaday v. D.C. Department of Employment Services, 443 A.2d 8, 12 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted). Petitioner was employed as a special diet cook at the Washington Hospital Center when, on October 9, 1983, she slipped and fell at work, hitting her head, neck, shoulder, back and hip. The employer paid compensation benefits for temporary total disability beginning October 10, 1983, but terminated claimant's benefits on May 12, 1984, on the ground that claimant unreasonably refused to undergo an independent medical examination. [1] Employer Washington Hospital Center contends petitioner failed to show up for three appointments scheduled for her with Dr. Jenkins, the physician who was to render an independent medical opinion. At the hearing petitioner stated that she did not know why she was being asked to see Dr. Jenkins, and did not go to see him because she was already seeing a third doctor, Dr. Toerge. The reasonableness or unreasonableness of claimant's inaction was not addressed at the hearing because the Department of Employment Services (DOES) hearing examiner found petitioner was no longer disabled in May, 1984. The hearing examiner thus determined that the employer's termination of voluntary payment of compensation benefits on May 12, 1984 was justified. There was substantial evidence to support this determination. Specifically, the examiner relied on the report of petitioner's treating doctor, Dr. Cooney, dated April 18, 1984 stating there were no objective findings to which claimant's persistent complaints of pain and weakness in her right arm could be attributed. The doctor also noted there were inconsistent findings when testing for sensation and motor function, and that the results of a myelogram were normal. Dr. Cooney further stated that he saw no reason why claimant should not be able to think about returning to work. Petitioner argues that Dr. Cooney's latter statement cannot be interpreted as indicating that she was released to return to work. We agree that the statement, standing alone, is somewhat ambiguous. However, read in context, we cannot find the examiner's determination to be unreasonable. [2] This court's function in review is not to weigh the testimony and substitute itself for the trier-of-fact who received the conflicting evidence and determined the weight to be accorded such evidence. Communication Workers v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 367 A.2d 149, 152 (D.C.1976). The examiner had the claimant and the medical reports before her. She found Dr. Cooney's opinion to be consistent with a later report of Dr. Jenkins' (November 1, 1984) which concluded that there was no organic basis for petitioner's complaints and that claimant could return to work without restrictions. [3] Based on all the evidence in the record, the examiner determined that Dr. Cooney's statement should be understood to indicate claimant was at that time able to return to work. [4] The Director of DOES found the examiner's determination to be reasonable and so do we.