Opinion ID: 1787963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in fiing an unrealistically low payment by appellee to rduce arrearages found due.

Text: By his responsive pleading, appellee demurred to the court's jurisdiction of his person and of the subject matter; demurred generally, pleaded the statute of limitations, waiver, equitable estoppel and unclean hands; asserted payment of substantial amounts; alleged that he had suspended child support payments on advice of counsel, upon the ground that appellant had refused to allow the children to visit him; and alleged that appellant had endeavored to sever all relations between him and the children. He sought a change in the custody of the children or, in the alternative, substantial visitation rights. We must first dispose of a contention by appellee on cross-appeal. He asserts that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction of this cause of action under § 29-801. He points out that § 29-803 sets forth the required contents of an application for the registration of a foreign judgment, among which are the authentication of entries of record relating to execution, payments, and the like. Since there was no authentication as to these items, and there was evidence at the hearing that certain items reduced to judgment in that decree (but for which judgment was not sought here), had been paid by appellee and that substantial child support payments had been made, appellee asserts that the basis of appellant's petition was not sustained by the evidence. These facts would have been revealed, says appellee, had appellant complied with Ark.Stat. Ann. § 29-803. It is on this basis only that appellee attacks the jurisdiction of the court. He cites no authority to support that contention. Appellee raised the question of jurisdiction only by his demurrer to jurisdiction of the subject matter, which specified no grounds. Although the court's decree recites a finding that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, we are not certain that this particular question was ever presented to the trial court on this basis. Assuming, however, that this question has been preserved, we find no merit in the argument. The constitutionality of the proceeding under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and its applicability to a judgment or decree awarding child support to be paid in regular periodic installments and the propriety of enforcement of that decree in the state where it is registered, has been recognized. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 168 Neb. 850, 97 N.W.2d 348, 72 A.L.R.2d 1251 (1959); Light v. Light, 12 Ill.App.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612 (Okl, 1976). We agree with these holdings. The statute defines a foreign judgment as any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or any State or Territory which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 29-801. The court in which the judgment is registered then treats the judgment and enforces it exactly as it would a judgment rendered by it. Mangold v. Mangold, 294 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. App, 1956); Ehrenzweig v. Ehrenzweig, 86 Misc.2d 656, 383 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1976). A failure to strictly comply with the requirements of § 29-803 as to subsequent entries did not totally deprive the trial court of jurisdiction of the subject matter in this case where appellee was personally served and responded. No levy on the judgment was attempted under § 29-806 prior to the trial court's decree. The Kansas court could not have retrospectively modified the child support payments. Ediger v. Ediger, 206 Kan. 447, 479 P.2d 823 (1971); Grunder v. Grunder, 186 Kan. 766, 352 P.2d 1067 (1960). Actually, in Kansas, a past due installment becomes a final judgment as of the due date, rather than a right to judgment, as in Arkansas. Ediger v. Ediger, supra. The judgment was beyond doubt, entitled to full faith and credit in Arkansas. Loomis v. Loomis, 221 Ark.743, 255 S.W.2d 671. The abstract of the record does not reveal whether the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sebastian County requested information from the Clerk of the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas, as required by Ark.Stat.Ann. § 29-803. At any rate, appellee does not contend that this particular failure was jurisdictional. If the allegation of appellant's petition with regard to subsequent entries was not correct, appellee could easily have invoked this action as a means of disclosing the truth of the matter, which he did not deny in his pleading. Another reason for rejecting appellee's argument as to jurisdiction is the fact that by his counter-petition, appellee sought affirmative relief, thereby waiving all objections to the court's jurisdiction. This gave the trial court jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties and, when jurisdiction is acquired for any purpose, the trial court may settle the rights of the parties, since the jurisdiction of the subject matter was not wholly beyond the power of the court. Du Fresne v. Paul, 144 Ark. 87, 221 S.W. 485. Christmas v. Raley, 260 Ark. 150, 539 S.W.2d 405. See also Jamison v. Henderson, 189 Ark. 204, 71 S.W.2d 696. It should be pointed out that the jurisdictional question here does not go to the power of the court to act in the premises. The court would have had jurisdiction and power to act in an action on a foreign judgment even in the absence of the uniform act. See, Baldwin v. Cross, 5 Ark. 510; Brian v. Tims, 10 Ark. 597; Hallum v. Dickinson, 54 Ark. 311,15 S.W. 775; Motsinger v. Walker, 205 Ark. 236, 168 S.W.2d 385; Berger v. Berger, 222 Ark. 463, 261 S.W.2d 259.