Opinion ID: 1542376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DeJesus' Request for Legal Assistance

Text: DeJesus argues that the trial justice erred when he admitted defendant's recorded statements into evidence and that such evidence should have been excluded because, according to him, he had requested legal assistance from Det. Hartnett at their first meeting and all further interrogation was prohibited. See State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 681, 360 A.2d 548, 550 (1976) (holding that once the defendant requested an attorney, his statements made to an undercover police officer in his jail cell were inadmissible). Therefore, defendant contends that the subsequent undercover interrogation by Viera (who the state concedes was an agent of the police), contravened his rights against self-incrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). It is clear that [a]n accused has an unqualified right to stop any interrogation and request consultation with an attorney. Once such a request is made, there can be no further questioning until the accused has had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer. State v. Lachapelle, 112 R.I. 105, 111, 308 A.2d 467, 470 (1973). The state does not quibble with the proposition that if DeJesus had requested legal assistance then all interrogation should have ceased. [13] Indeed, Det. Hartnett testified that if DeJesus had requested legal assistance, he would have understood that to be an unequivocal exercise of his right to have counsel. However, it was disputed whether DeJesus requested legal assistance or waived his rights during his meeting with Det. Hartnett at the ACI before Viera's undercover operation. Therefore, the threshold issue is whether DeJesus requested counsel. Although the question of whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights is normally a mixed question of law and fact, whether DeJesus requested counsel or not is a question of fact. See State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 1044 (R.I.1998). When reviewing questions of fact, we give deference to a trial justice's determination and we will not reverse such a finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. During the pretrial hearing, the trial justice heard testimony from both Det. Hartnett and DeJesus. After observing the witnesses on the stand, listening to their testimony, and weighing the respective credibility of each of them, the trial justice found that Det. Hartnett read DeJesus his rights at their first meeting, on June 20, 2003, which rights DeJesus intelligently and knowingly waived when he tried to exculpate himself from the robbery. The trial justice concluded that the interview ended after DeJesus asserted that he had nothing to offer the detective and after he contended that he would have helped him if he were able. In fact, the trial justice concluded beyond peradventure, that DeJesus did not request any legal assistance at this time, or any time thereafter. The trial justice concluded that DeJesus had confused the first meeting with Det. Hartnett at the ACI with the second meeting at the District Court, because DeJesus testified that Det. Hartnett confronted him on robbery and death. However, on June 20, the date of the initial interview, Mauricio Flores was still alive  he did not die until July. The trial justice also credited Det. Hartnett's testimony over that of DeJesus' with respect to the second interview, finding that DeJesus hotly denied his involvement in the crime, but that again, he did not request legal assistance. In our opinion, the trial justice was not clearly wrong in finding Det. Hartnett more credible than DeJesus. Both DeJesus and Det. Hartnett testified that DeJesus told Det. Hartnett at their first meeting that he would have helped the police if he could. This demonstrates that DeJesus expressed a willingness to talk to Det. Hartnett, but that he said he had no information to provide. Because we have no basis to believe that the trial justice committed clear error, we affirm his ruling that DeJesus did not invoke his right to consult with an attorney. Therefore, we hold that DeJesus' recorded statements to Viera properly were admitted at trial.