Opinion ID: 1163854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: 7a Sixth. Does section 987.8 of the Penal Code deny indigents equal protection of the laws?

Text: No. It is contended that section 987.8 violates the equal protection clause, on the ground that it is applicable only to indigents; but there is no merit to this contention. Only persons who in the initial stages of a criminal prosecution are classified as indigents receive appointed counsel. Of those persons, only those who at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings are found to have the financial ability to pay their counsel fees, or a part thereof, are ordered to make payment, and then only to the extent the court determines that they have such ability to pay. Under the statute, indigent defendants have the same rights with respect to the fixing of attorney's fees as civil litigants generally. In addition to having authority with respect to fixing fees for indigent defendants where counsel has been appointed in criminal matters, as hereinabove discussed, the trial judge is regarded as competent from his own knowledge of legal practice to fix the amount of attorney's fees to be paid to or by civil litigants when there is entitlement thereto. (See Spencer v. Harmon Enterprises, Inc., 234 Cal. App.2d 614, 621 [1] [44 Cal. Rptr. 683]; Mason v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App.2d 587, 594 [7] [141 P.2d 475].) It has been suggested that a denial of equal protection results because section 987.8 does not require a hearing identical to that required for civil litigants under Randone v. Appellate Department, supra, 5 Cal.3d 536; and Blair v. Pitchess, supra, 5 Cal.3d 258. (8) However, as stated by this court in In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3d 513, 522 (9), Although statutes which affect a particular class must be based upon rational distinctions or classifications [citation], there is no constitutional requirement of uniform treatment [citation]. (7b) On the record before us, we find that the notice and hearing given to defendant before the determination was made that she had the financial ability to pay $50 of the $100 found to be reasonable for her appointed counsel's fee constitute the substantial equivalent of the notice and hearing required in other civil judgment debtor proceedings. As a result, defendant is on an equal footing with other civil litigants and cannot complain that she has been denied equal protection of the laws. The statute, it will be recalled, specifically provides that the order may be enforced by execution as on a judgment in a civil action but not by contempt. Accordingly, the unequal treatment condemned by the Supreme Court of the United States in James v. Strange, supra, 407 U.S. 128, in which the indigent defendant was deprived of most of the exemptions of a normal civil debtor, does not exist here. The order is affirmed.