Opinion ID: 3151870
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutes Concerning a Driver's Duty to Stop

Text: Petitioner contends the trial judge erred in charging sections 56-5-233012 and 56-5-274013 concerning a driver's duties at stop signs on intersecting highways because these statutes are inapplicable and conflict with the judge's instruction on section 56-5-2715,14 which specifically addresses a driver's duty to stop at a railroad crossing that SCDOT has deemed particularly dangerous. We agree with Petitioner that the trial judge erred in charging sections 56-5- 2330 and 56-5-2740. Without dispute, these statutes were irrelevant as neither governs a driver's duty to stop at a railroad crossing. The statutes also conflict with stipulation regarding the accuracy of the data from the train's event recorder. Although CSX did not concede that it breached its duty of reasonable care, the admission of counsel and the stipulation clearly equate to a finding of negligence per se, i.e., breach of duty. See Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 398 S.C. 90, 727 S.E.2d 407 (2012) (recognizing that the violation of an applicable statute constitutes negligence per se). However, as acknowledged by Petitioner, there remained questions of fact as to proximate cause and damages. 12 See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2330(b) (2006) (providing requirements for motorists when they approach a stop sign and stating in part that every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it (emphasis added)). 13 Id. § 56-5-2740 (providing requirements for motorists when they approach a stop sign at a crosswalk and stating, in part, that [e]very driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, in the event there is no crosswalk, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting highway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting highway before entering the intersection). 14 Id. § 56-5-2715 (authorizing SCDOT to designate particularly dangerous railroad crossings and erect stop signs thereat and stating that [w]hen such signs are erected, the driver of any vehicle shall stop within fifty feet, but not less than fifteen feet, from the nearest rail of the railroad and shall proceed only upon exercising due care (emphasis added)). the directive of section 56-5-2715 that a driver shall stop within fifty feet, but not less than fifteen feet, from the nearest rail of the railroad. Had Colvin complied with the general provisions of sections 56-5-2330 and 56-5-2740 and stopped at the stop line, which was located 9.75 feet from the near rail of railroad track, she would have violated the fifteen-foot limit mandated by section 56-5-2715. Given this conflict, we believe the jury could have been confused as to which statutory provisions governed Colvin's duty to stop at the railroad crossing. If the jury applied sections 56-5-2330 and 56-5-2740, it may have deemed Colvin negligent for violating section 56-5-2715. See Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 398 S.C. 90, 727 S.E.2d 407 (2012) (recognizing that the violation of an applicable statute constitutes negligence per se). In turn, the jury may have concluded that Colvin's negligence superseded any admitted or proven negligence of CSX or SCDOT. See Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 150, 742 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2013) (To exculpate a negligent defendant, the intervening cause must be one which breaks the sequence or causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the injury alleged. (citation omitted)); Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 628, 124 S.E. 321, 325 (1962) (In order to relieve the defendant of responsibility for the event, the intervening cause must be a superseding cause. It is a superseding cause if it so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in the slightest degree, produces the injury. (citation omitted)). Consequently, we find that Petitioner was prejudiced by the judge's error.