Opinion ID: 577187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Treatment of Growers of Fewer than 50 Plants

Text: 34 Defendants, who have been convicted of growing more than 100 plants, claim that the sentencing classification of section 841 violates their due process rights by arbitrarily treating them more harshly than growers of fewer than 50 plants. There is a reasonable basis, however, for Congress's decision to penalize large scale growers more harshly than small-time offenders. 35 As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, the equivalency scheme reflects Congress's beliefs concerning the seriousness of the crime, not the actual or potential weight of the plant. See United States v. Motz, 936 F.2d at 1025. In Motz, the Ninth Circuit held that it is rational to penalize large-scale marijuana growers more harshly than other growers. The defendants in that case challenged the 1 plant = 100 gm. equivalency claiming that there was no evidence that the ratio accurately reflected the actual weight of the seized plants, 8 926 F.2d at 1025, but the court noted that: 36 There is no constitutional requirement that the penalty for an offense involving one marijuana plant be equal to the penalty for an offense involving the quantity of dried marijuana the plant would yield. 37 Id. The equivalency scheme reflected Congress's belief that a grower of 101 plants has committed an offense as serious as a distributor of 101 kilograms of dried marijuana. In other words: 38 The table does not state that the yield of a plant is 100 grams, but rather that the offense level for a crime involving one marijuana plant is the level that would apply in a case involving 100 grams of dried marijuana. 39 Id. (emphasis added). Applying the reasoning in Motz, we find that Congress could have rationally chosen the current penalty scheme to halt the problem earlier in the cycle, making it less likely that the drug would ever be distributed to the public. 9 40 In fact, the statute embraces the market-oriented approach to the problem of rampant marijuana proliferation. This approach mandates intense focus in the first instance on major traffickers who are responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities of drugs, and in the second instance on managers at the retail levels. See United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 979 n. 10 (8th Cir.1990); H.R.Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1986). 41 In addition, courts continually have upheld statutes that treat certain drug offenders more harshly than others. In Holmes, this court held that it was rational to punish an individual possessing an amount of pure cocaine laced with legal substances more harshly than an equal amount of pure, unlaced cocaine. 838 F.2d at 1178. Congress had reasonably chosen to punish retailers harshly because they made the drug more readily accessible to users. In United States v. Bishop, 894 F.2d 981 (8th Cir.1990), the Eighth Circuit similarly upheld the district court's inclusion of LSD blotter paper in determining the weight of LSD possessed by defendant. The court believed that [t]he blotter paper serves the purpose of making the LSD ready for retail sale and ingestion by the user and that Congress consequently intended the weight of the carrier to be included in order to punish more severely those who made the LSD more available to users. Id. at 985. 42 Another analogy can be found in the Eighth Circuit's decision in Buckner. In that case, defendants challenged a statute that required the possession of one gram of crack cocaine to be treated the same as the possession of 100 grams of powder cocaine. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975. The court upheld the sentencing scheme because [m]embers of Congress considered cocaine base to be more dangerous to society than cocaine because of crack's potency, its highly addictive nature, its affordability, and its increasing prevalence. Id. at 978. Hence, the equivalency system was meant, there as well as here, to reflect the seriousness of the offense (one gram of crack was as bad as 100 grams of powder), not the actual weight of the drug or even the number of uses possible from a specific amount. 43 The guidelines and the statute clearly indicate that Congress was attempting to measure the severity of the offense, not the actual weight of marijuana grown. That explains why the equivalency changes from 100 grams to 1000 grams at the 50 plant mark. This sentencing elevation is obviously not a recognition that individual plants grown in groups of 50 or more have any greater weight than individual plants grown in groups of less than 50. Instead, it is a reflection of Congress's belief that growing a large number of plants (capable of large scale distribution) is an exponentially more severe offense than growing a small number. 44 Both the government and the district court rely on United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781 (8th Cir.1990), for the proposition that weight, not number, of plants is the appropriate measure for sentencing purposes. However, the Streeter case does not speak to the issue before this court. Streeter holds that [t]he statute clearly indicates that in cases involving less than fifty plants, defendants are to be sentenced on the basis of the weight of the marijuana involved. Id. at 790. It was therefore incorrect for the Guidelines to apply a 100-gram-per-plant equivalency for offenses involving fewer than 50 plants, especially when there was no justification that the yield of marijuana plants averages 100 grams per plant. 10 45 The Streeter court spoke only to the issue of an offense involving fewer than 50 plants. In fact, by constantly stressing Congress's intent concerning this small number of plants, that court implicitly recognized that a different system would be used for offenses involving more than 50 plants. 46 There is no case law supporting the district court's finding on this issue. In addition, the district court failed to apply the correct standard when it found that: 47 there is no rational basis to support the commission's 1000 gram per plant ratio for plants in groups of 50 or more. The record clearly demonstrates that a 1000 gram equivalency cannot be empirically supported. 48 United States v. Osburn, 756 F.Supp. 571, 576 (N.D.Ga.1991). But, as Motz and Buckner recognized, the equivalency ratios are rational because they measure the seriousness of the offense, not the actual weight of the drug and are therefore rational equivalencies. Rather than looking for any reasonable basis to justify the statute, as required by Holmes and Carolene Products, the district court improperly narrowed its inquiry to the issue of whether one plant could actually yield 1000 grams of marijuana. There is a rational basis for the Congressional sentencing scheme, and we are therefore compelled to uphold the 1000-gram-per-plant equivalency for offenses involving 50 or more plants.