Opinion ID: 2538584
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Failures to Appear

Text: Because the length-of-delay factor in this case is measured from arrest to trial, we must discuss the other circumstance germane to delay: Appellant's failures to appear at his March 25, 2010 pretrial conference and April 5, 2010 trial. As previously noted, Appellant failed to appear at both events because he was incarcerated in Ohio on other charges. [6] Appellant has offered no valid reason for his failures to appear. He argues that his incarceration renders his failure to appear involuntary, and therefore excusable. We disagree. When the trial court called Appellant's case in court on March 25, 2010a scheduled pretrial conference dateAppellant was not present. His attorney informed the court that he ha[d]n't been in contact with [the Department of Public Advocacy] for several weeks, even though staying in contact with his attorney was a condition of Appellant's bond (as was being ready for all court appearances). A bond forfeiture hearing was scheduled, a bail-jumping charge was added to his pending charges, and the judge's notes indicate that he issued another bench warrant. The following week Appellant failed to appear for his April 5 trial due to his incarceration in Ohio. Consequently, the trial was rescheduled for January 31, 2011. The reason for the eight and one-half month delay from April 5, 2010, to January 31, 2011, lies squarely with Appellant. When one fails to appear for trial without good reason, he must bear the burden of any resulting delay and any prejudice that might result from that delay. While out-of-state incarceration may make a failure to appear in court involuntary in the loosest of senses, it is not, without more, excusable. Had Appellant contacted his attorneya condition of his bondfrom the Ohio jail, perhaps his attorney could have facilitated extradition or made other arrangements for Appellant to make his scheduled appearances. In any event, under the circumstances of this case we conclude that, for purposes of assigning fault for delay, out-of-state incarceration is not a valid, justifiable reason for delay under Barker, and the burden of the weight must fall upon Appellant. [7] , [8] In sum, we hold that the reasons-for-delay factor does not weigh in Appellant's favor. We pause, however, to address Appellant's argument that, even if the trial had commenced on April 5, 2010, he would still have a speedy trial claim. [9] In that case, virtually all of the fault for delay would be attributable to the Commonwealth, and this factor would weigh in favor of Appellant. [10] This, however, ignores the rule that the period of delay is measured in this case from arrest to trialnot the opportunity for trial. See Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 569 (stating that the length of delay is the time between the earlier of the arrest or the indictment and the time the trial begins ) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we must evaluate all events causing delay between arrest and trial. Here, both parties are equally at fault in causing the two year and four month delay. Thus, this factor cannot weigh in Appellant's favor.