Opinion ID: 1218473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Five-level sentence enhancement for pattern of activity

Text: First, Olfano again appeals the five-level sentence enhancement based on the District Court's finding a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. PSR at ¶ 32. The commentary to section 2G2.2 defines pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor as any combination of two or more separate instances of the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant, whether or not the abuse or exploitation (A) occurred during the course of the offense; (B) involved the same or different victims; or (C) resulted in a conviction for such conduct. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 1 (2002). [2] This court has held that, as used in the Guidelines, sexual abuse refers to conduct covered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2243, and 2224, while sexual exploitation of a minor refers to conduct described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), (b), and (c)(1)(b). United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 794 (3d Cir.1996). We did state, in that opinion, that any activity covered by section 2G2.2 of the Guidelines  which involves trafficking in child pornography  does not itself constitute sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. Id. at 795. In this case, the District Judge looked to Olfano's two previous indecent assaults and determined that it is obvious in review of the report that there was a combination of two or more separate instances of sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor by the defendant. App. at 88. The first incident occurred in 1986, when Olfano was 15 years-old. It involved Olfano's inserting his finger into a juvenile female's vagina. At the age of 17, he touched his nine-and-a-half-year-old [half-sister's] vaginal area on two or three occasions[.] Id. Olfano argues that they do not constitute a pattern because the incidents are too different in kind, and too remote in time, from the offense to which he pled guilty. The Sentencing Guidelines do not place an explicit time limit on the previous activities that a court may consider in finding a pattern of activity, and there appears to be no case support for the proposition that previous events can be too remote in time to amount to a pattern. While this court has not addressed the remote in time question in a precedential opinion, other courts have addressed this issue. See United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir.2002) (Nothing in § 2G2.2(b)(4) or its current commentary requires a temporal nexus between any instances of sexual abuse or exploitation.); United States v. Woodward, 277 F.3d 87, 90-92 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that incidents of sexual abuse that occurred from 1974-1978 could establish a pattern of activity for purposes of sentencing in 2001); United States v. Lovaas, 241 F.3d 900, 903-04 (7th Cir.2001) (rejecting defendant's argument that the decades-old instances of sexual misconduct upon which the district court relied are not relevant conduct[.]). Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently issued an opinion that upheld a district court's reliance on sexual misconduct that occurred at least 35 years ago. United States v. Garner, 490 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.2007) (The plain language of the Commentary to § 2G2.2 eliminates the need for any temporal or factual nexus between the offense of conviction and any prior act of sexual abuse or exploitation; the provision obviously intends to cast a wide net to draw in any conceivable history[.]). We agree that there is no temporal nexus necessary to establish a pattern of activity of sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The District Court's reliance on Olfano's 1986 and 1989 conduct was therefore not erroneous. We also reject Olfano's argument that his prior conduct is too factually dissimilar from his present conviction to create a pattern of activity. The Commentary to the applicable Guidelines explicitly states that the incidents upon which the enhancements were based need not be related to the present offense or involve the same victim. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 1 (2002). Although trafficking in child pornography does not constitute sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, such trafficking is precisely the kind of conduct that is subject to a sentence enhancement based on sexual abuse or exploitation. It appears that the Guidelines contemplate a difference in kind between the conduct that leads to conviction and the conduct that leads to enhancement; trafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that the district court did not err in using a previous conviction for gross sexual imposition to enhance a sentence for receiving child pornography); Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 414 (upholding a section 2G2.2(b)(4) enhancement where a defendant convicted of receiving child pornography had previously been convicted of sexually abusing his daughter); Lovaas, 241 F.3d at 904 (affirming sentence enhancement for defendant who pled guilty to transmitting and possessing child pornography and had previously engaged in sexual conduct with two teenage boys); United States v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 750-51 (11th Cir.1998) (rejecting defendants' argument that prior offenses could not be used for enhancement because, unlike their current conviction, the prior offenses did not involve producing sexually explicit images of a minor). Olfano has presented no cases holding that certain acts are too different from the offense of conviction to properly enhance a section 2G2.2 sentence. We recognize Olfano's argument that his current conviction is for receipt of child pornography through a computer, while the prior incidents that constitute his pattern of activity do not involve receipt of child pornography, and do not involve use of a computer. Nonetheless, the prior incidents involve inappropriate touching of juvenile females, which amounts to sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. We conclude, based on the plain language of the Guidelines, that because there is no similarity requirement and Olfano's previous incidents of sexual misconduct are not so different in kind, they can be used to enhance his sentence for receiving child pornography via the Internet. Accordingly, we see no problem with the District Court's five-level enhancement under section 2G2.2(b)(4) of the Guidelines.