Opinion ID: 1830792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether there is general acceptance of the scientific technique.

Text: Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The court emphasized that the Rule 702 inquiry is flexible, and added: Its overarching subject is the scientific validityand thus the evidentiary relevance and reliabilityof the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has provided further guidance to the federal courts on the admissibility of expert evidence, first in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997), and then in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). In Joiner, the Supreme Court held that the question of admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 is reviewable on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142-43, 118 S.Ct. 512. The Court's recent decision in Kumho clarified that Daubert applies not only to scientific evidence, but also to expert testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge under Rule 702. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167. In Kumho, the Court also reiterated that the Daubert factors are meant to be helpful, not definitive, that the factors will not apply in every instance, and that the district courts have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. With this background, we now turn to the question here, namely, whether we should follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in Daubert or adhere to our Frye-Mack standard for admissibility of evidence. Having previously considered and refused to abandon Frye-Mack, and given expectations for consistency in the law, we will only abandon Frye-Mack if the reasons for departing from that standard greatly outweigh those for retaining it. Cf. Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 243 Minn. 58, 68, 66 N.W.2d 763, 770 (1954). A number of arguments have been made for adopting Daubert in Minnesota. First, critics of the Frye general acceptance standard claim that it may at times exclude cutting-edge but otherwise demonstrably reliable, probative evidence, and thus represents a more conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence. See Giannelli, supra, at 1223-24; Lorie S. Gildea, Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness Testimony in Minnesota After the Daubert Trilogy, 26 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 93, 106 (2000). For example, the Frye standard might exclude a new, but reliable, methodology or test because of the inherent time lag between the development of a new scientific technique and its general acceptance in the field. See Giannelli, supra, at 1223. Also, a generally accepted theory or technique, although admissible, may not always be correct. See id. at 1224-25 (citing the general acceptance of the paraffin test to detect gunshot residue on skin in the 1930s, which was later found to be unreliable). By comparison, because Daubert stresses a more liberal and flexible approach to the admission of scientific testimony, it has been viewed as relaxing the barriers to the admissibility of expert evidence. See, e.g., Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142, 118 S.Ct. 512 (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye ). However, in practice, Daubert does not necessarily make admissible expert evidence that was not admissible under Frye. One commentator has noted that [t]he post- Daubert era can fairly be described as the period of `strict scrutiny' of science by non-scientifically trained judges. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DePaul L.Rev. 335, 341 (Winter 1999) (arguing that trial judges are raising the threshold of scientific proof needed to have expert causation testimony admitted). The Frye general acceptance standard has been criticized for other reasons, most notably that it improperly defers to scientists the legal question of admissibility of scientific evidence. Some are concerned that Frye  `abdicates' judicial responsibility for determining admissibility to scientists uneducated in the law. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 392, 394-95 (Alaska 1999) (adopting Daubert ). However, in repossessing the power to determine admissibility for the courts, Daubert takes from scientists and confers upon judges uneducated in science the authority to determine what is scientific. This approach, which necessitates that trial judges be amateur scientists, has also been frequently criticized. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Adina Schwartz, A Dogma of Empiricism Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 149, 158 (Winter 1997). [S]cientists often have vigorous and sincere disagreements as to what research methodology is proper, what should be accepted as sufficient proof for the existence of a `fact,' and whether information derived by a particular method can tell us anything useful about the subject under study. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.1995) (Daubert II) . Under Daubert, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not `good science,' and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was not `derived by the scientific method.'  Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1316; see also United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 66 (D.Mass.1999) (commenting that Frye was perfectly suited to the court's competence, while Daubert requires a judge, a notable generalist, to second guess a scientist). A key assumption to this approach is that judges can not only resolve disputes among qualified scientists who have spent years immersed in their field of study, but can do so without also adopting the substantive positions of some scientists but not others. [8] See A. Schwartz, supra, at 158. By comparison, the Frye general acceptance standard ensures that the persons most qualified to assess scientific validity of a technique have the determinative voice. See People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal.1994). Although this approach is discounted by some as focusing on nose counting rather than on scientific validity, [a]dmissibility can be based on scientific merit only if judges defer to practicing scientists' assessments of scientific merit. A. Schwartz, supra, at 194. Another noted criticism of Frye is that it can be difficult to apply because it raises additional questions such as: (1) does the court look to general acceptance of a technique or the general acceptance of the underlying scientific principle; (2) who is the relevant scientific community; and (3) what is general acceptance  a majority, or a credible minority? See Giannelli, supra, at 1208-15. These types of criticisms, however, are not unique to Frye-Mack given that general acceptability is also one of the Daubert factors. Further, because the law is continuously evolving, answers to these questions will be set forth in case law as the issues properly present themselves. See Leahy, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d at 329-30. In addition to these criticisms of the Frye-Mack standard, it is also argued that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Daubert should be persuasive because Rule 702 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence is identical to its federal counterpart, and as such it does not contain any reference to the general acceptance standard. Compare Fed.R.Evid. 702, with Minn. R. Evid. 702. However, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence were promulgated in 1977. See Order Promulgating the Rules of Evidence (Minn. April 1, 1977), reprinted in 50 Minn. Stat. Ann. VII-VIII (West 1980). In 1980 we decided Mack, transforming the standard for admissibility in Minnesota into the two prong Frye-Mack standard. See Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768-69, 772. In 1989 we decided Schwartz, where we reaffirmed our adherence to Frye-Mack in light of a direct challenge to that standard based on the rules. See Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 424-25. There have been no developments in Minnesota since Mack and Schwartz to convince us that the Frye-Mack standard is now incompatible with those same rules of evidence in existence at the time of these decisions. Cf. Leahy, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d at 328 (reasoning that by applying the Frye standard after the adoption of the evidence code, the California Supreme Court had concluded Frye was compatible with the code); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304, 1314 (1996) (noting that by adopting the rules of evidence and continuing to adhere to Frye, the Washington Supreme Court signaled that Frye and the evidence rules coexist as the law of th[e] state [of Washington]). Finally, the potential for non-uniformity in the law under Daubert gives us considerable cause for concern. Cases built on similar facts and offering similar scientific techniques could have widely disparate results. For example, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that Daubert overruled the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 431-34 (5th Cir.1995). As a result, each federal district court will need to consider the admissibility of polygraph evidence anew each time it is raised. While some argue that this would ensure that the courts have the flexibility to change as science evolves, this practice will also lead to greater variation in decisions at the district court level that may not be correctable at the appellate level under an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142-43, 118 S.Ct. 512 (holding that Rule 702 admissibility determinations are reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard). In contrast, under the Frye prong of the Frye-Mack standard, the trial judge defers to the scientific community's assessment of a given technique, and the appellate court reviews de novo the legal determination of whether the scientific methodology has obtained general acceptance in the scientific community. See State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54, 58 (Minn.1989). Thus, Frye-Mack is more apt to ensure objective and uniform rulings as to particular scientific methods or techniquesour primary concern in previously refusing to abandon Frye-Mack in Schwartz. See Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 424. Having reviewed the cases and the commentary surrounding this issue, we reaffirm our adherence to the Frye-Mack standard and reject Daubert. Therefore, when novel scientific evidence is offered, the district court must determine whether it is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. See Moore, 458 N.W.2d at 97-98; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 424-26. In addition, the particular scientific evidence in each case must be shown to have foundational reliability. See Moore, 458 N.W.2d at 98; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 426-28. Foundational reliability requires the `proponent of a    test [to] establish that the test itself is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.'  Moore, 458 N.W.2d at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn.1977)). Finally, as with all testimony by experts, the evidence must satisfy the requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 402 and 702be relevant, be given by a witness qualified as an expert, and be helpful to the trier of fact. See State v. Nystrom, 596 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn.1999).