Opinion ID: 540010
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pedro Cruz.

Text: 43 Cruz claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on count one for narcotics conspiracy, count seven for possession of heroin with intent to distribute it, and count fifteen for a section 924(c)(1) firearm violation. Since Cruz challenges his conviction under count one for narcotics conspiracy, and all the remaining appellants whose insufficiency claims we must consider contest only their convictions under this count, it is appropriate at this juncture to consider the general principles governing sufficiency of the evidence to sustain conspiracy convictions. 44 Since conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953, 100 S.Ct. 2921, 64 L.Ed.2d 810 (1980), the  '[e]xistence of and participation in a conspiracy ... may be established ... through circumstantial evidence.'  United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858, 103 S.Ct. 128, 74 L.Ed.2d 111 (1982)). However, knowledge of the existence and goals of a conspiracy does not of itself make one a coconspirator. United States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir.1963). 45 Similarly, [a]ssociation with a conspirator, without more, is insufficient to establish the requisite degree of participation in a conspiratorial venture.... United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1134 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976); see also United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir.1975) ([g]uilt may not be inferred from mere association with a guilty party). Moreover,  'absent evidence of purposeful behavior, mere presence at the scene of a crime, even when coupled with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy....'  United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 554 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1002 (2d Cir.1985)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 530 (1988). 46 Thus, evidence of purposeful behavior designed to further a conspiracy must be shown to prove membership in that conspiracy. See United States v. Torres, 519 F.2d 723, 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 457, 46 L.Ed.2d 392 (1975). However, once a conspiracy is shown to exist, the evidence sufficient to link another defendant to it need not be overwhelming. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1156 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990). 47 We now turn to the specifics of Cruz' insufficiency claim. Cruz was arrested on June 24, 1987 when a team of NYDETF agents gained access to an apartment at 2700 Grand Concourse through the use of a battering ram. Agents then entered one of the back bedrooms of the apartment, where they encountered six individuals, four of whom were emptying a duffel bag filled with glassine envelopes out a window. The duffel bag was then flung from the window and was recovered by a NYDETF agent stationed in the courtyard below. The bag contained approximately 6,150 glassine envelopes of heroin packaged in bundles of ten and weighing a total of approximately 215 grams. An agent also testified that when he entered the room, Cruz was lunging for a loaded nine millimeter semi-automatic weapon lying on a table in the room, but was intercepted by the agent before he reached the gun. 48 In addition to the testimony of the arresting officers, the Government presented other evidence linking Cruz with the Torres Organization, including the testimony of agents who surveilled Cruz coming and going from several locations controlled by the Torres Organization, often with packages in hand. In addition, several accounting slips sent to Flores by Velez made reference to a runner named Pete, which was Cruz' nickname. Further, the government presented a taped conversation between Cruz and Flores in which they discussed the operation of one of the Torres Organization's sales locations. 49 Despite this evidence, Cruz disavows any involvement in the conspiracy, and contends that his presence in the apartment on the day of his arrest was simply a chance presence in an environment of criminality, where he was wearing a matching cabana set and asserts that he had made a brief stop en route to an outing at the beach. Cruz also contends that since he was not seen in physical contact with the heroin jettisoned from the window, he cannot be charged with its possession, and further that the act of lunging for the weapon does not meet the requirement of section 924(c)(1) that during and in relation to any crime of ... drug trafficking ..., [he] use[ ] or carr[y] a firearm. 50 We conclude, however, that the evidence was sufficient to convict Cruz on all counts. The government's wiretap evidence, the appearance of Cruz' name on the accounting slips, and his presence in the apartment at the time of the raid provided ample evidence for the jury to conclude that he was part of the charged conspiracy. Cruz' conviction on count seven, for possession of heroin with intent to distribute it, was also supported by the evidence. 51 There is no requirement that a defendant be observed in physical contact with narcotics in order to be convicted of its possession. Rather, possession of narcotics may be actual or constructive. See United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 263 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Tribunella, 749 F.2d 104, 111 (2nd Cir.1984).  'Constructive possession exists when a person ... knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.'  United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 167 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973)). On the facts presented, it was quite reasonable for the jury to have concluded that the heroin jettisoned from the window of the apartment by Cruz' codefendants was within the constructive possession of Cruz. 52 Finally, Cruz claims with regard to count fifteen that his thwarted effort to reach the semi-automatic weapon when the NYDETF agents entered the apartment does not constitute the use of that firearm within the meaning of section 924(c)(1). As discussed above, however, section 924(c)(1) has been applied in numerous situations where firearms were simply kept available in locations where narcotics activities took place. See e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 654 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990); United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 166, 107 L.Ed.2d 123 (1989); United States v. Robinson, 857 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir.1988). A fortiori, Cruz' barely thwarted effort to utilize a firearm so located against the NYDETF agents violates the statute. In view of the evidence, furthermore, that the agents announced their presence before battering down the door to the apartment, and that the agent who entered the room was wearing a bulletproof vest with DEA written across it and had a gold police shield on a chain around his neck, the jury was surely entitled to conclude that Cruz was attempting to use the firearm knowingly against law enforcement officers. 53