Opinion ID: 1231990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Jury Instruction on Sentencing Discretion

Text: The court gave the 1986 version of CALJIC No. 8.84.2, which reflects the changes suggested in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440] (revd. on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837]). The instruction read as follows: It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed on defendant. [¶] After having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. [¶] The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you simply determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. [¶] You shall now retire and select one of your number to act as foreman, who will preside over your deliberations. In order to make a determination as to the penalty, all twelve jurors must agree. (18) Defendant contends that the instruction given (CALJIC No. 8.84.2, 1986 rev.) was invalid because it did not state the following language from section 190.3: If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. His contention fails. In People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, we noted that instruction in the terms of the statute had the potential to confuse jurors and thus suggested the adoption of an instruction like the one given here. ( Id. at p. 545, fn. 19.) The instruction given informed the jurors that to return a verdict of death they must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. We do not think that there is a reasonable likelihood that any of the jurors would have concluded that, even if the mitigating factors outweighed those in aggravation, the so substantial in comparison with language nevertheless might demand imposition of the higher punishment. (See Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370,  [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329, 110 S.Ct. 1190].) The instruction clearly stated that the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. There was no need to additionally advise the jury of the converse (i.e., that if mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating, then life without parole was the appropriate penalty). Defendant also contends that the instruction given here created a presumption in favor of death because once any aggravating factor has been found, a death sentence is mandated unless the defendant meets the burden of overriding the aggravation with sufficient mitigation. He relies on Adamson v. Ricketts (9th Cir.1988) 865 F.2d 1011 and Jackson v. Dugger (11th Cir.1988) 837 F.2d 1469. We rejected a similar contention in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 230 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]: The instruction in Jackson and the statute in Adamson suffer from a similar defect: in each the sentencing entity is told that a sentence of death is the norm, and that a lesser penalty may be imposed only if the defense presents sufficient mitigating evidence. In both instances, the accused bore the burden of demonstrating that death was not an appropriate penalty. In contrast, our statute and instruction give the jury broad discretion to decide the appropriate penalty by weighing all the relevant evidence. The jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigating evidence, that the aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial enough to warrant death. Unlike the language involved in Jackson and Adamson, the language at issue here does not create a presumption in favor of death. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 63-64, fn. 16 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109].) Moreover, the continuing validity of Jackson and Adams seems doubtful after the decision in Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299 [108 L.Ed.2d 255, 110 S.Ct. 1078], finding that the Pennsylvania death penalty statute satisfied the requirements of the Eighth Amendment even though it mandated a death sentence upon the jury's finding one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances.