Opinion ID: 1413472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Threats Against a Class.

Text: Defendant urges that the court erred in permitting Marie Sanders to testify as follows: Well, it was about a mile this side of Frannie. We had a flat tire, and Johnny got out to fix it, and he asked for his gloves, and I reached in the cubby hole, and there was a gun in it, and I asked him if it was loaded, and he said `yes', and he said that there was three bullets in it, one for Mabel, if she divorced him, and if that didn't get her, the second one; the third that was for any son-of-a-bitch he caught out with her. The alleged error is predicated upon the viewpoint that the statement refers to a class of persons and is therefore inadmissible against defendant; and defendant insists, though not convincingly, that the prosecuting attorney thereafter adopted the theory that the deceased had not been out with defendant's wife and was therefore not even within the class. In support of his objection, defendant quotes 40 C.J.S. 1110 as follows: As a general rule, general threats to kill, not shown to have any reference to deceased, are not admissible in evidence, but a threat to kill or injure some one not definitely designated is admissible where other facts adduced give individuality to it. General threats by accused to kill or injure some one, or statements showing a general malevolent spirit, which are not shown to have any reference to deceased are not as a rule admissible on the question of malice, deliberation, or premeditation.    In order that threats, claimed to have been made against deceased, may be admissible, the language used, or the circumstances under which it was used, must be broad enough to include deceased within its terms.    Threats to do violence to a class of persons, one of whom became the victim, are admissible to show malice and state of mind, even though no particular person was named by accused. Thus threats against peace officer or officers or members of a particular family are admissible, where deceased was a member of the class referred to. Evidence of threats against a class, however, is not admissible when the cause of the fatal difficulty did not relate to the connection of deceased with such class. (Emphasis supplied by defendant.) In the portion of the above text which defendant omits, we find a statement which we think is most meaningful and fully relevant to the instant case:    General threats not referring to anyone in particular, however, may be admissible under certain circumstances. Thus a general threat to kill or injure someone, not definitely designated, is admissible when other facts adduced give individuality to it so that, as it is generally held, the jury may infer that the threat referred to deceased, or when the threat was made shortly before the commission of the crime to which it may be construed to refer. (Citing many cases.) To the same effect see 26 Am.Jur. 403, citing Annot., 89 Am.St.Rep. 691, 698. Since most of our criminal law has its source in Indiana, it is significant to review that State's law on the subject. In Brown v. State, 105 Ind. 385, 5 N.E. 900, 905, a prosecution for murder, the lady, with whom defendant had been supplanted by deceased, was permitted to testify over the defendant's objection: `I never heard him make any threats against any particular one. He said he would kill any one if I received their company, but him.' The court in discussing the matter said: This evidence was clearly admissible for what it was worth. To the same effect are Parker v. State, 136 Ind. 284, 35 N.E. 1105; Wheeler v. State, 158 Ind. 687, 63 N.E. 975; Johnson v. State, 201 Ind. 264, 167 N.E. 531, all holding in substance that to authorize proof of threats, whether general or special, it is necessary only to show that the person injured is within the scope of the threats uttered. Under this last stated philosophy, the evidence was admissible, especially in the light of defendant's own connective testimony that on the afternoon of the shooting he talked to the deceased about his wife and said, I don't want you to be calling her any more    if you do, Ray, `I'll shoot you'.    `don't bother her any more, Ray'.    `you better (stay away), Ray, or I'll shoot you.' It was within the province of the jury to determine whether or not defendant's statements to Marie Sanders, in fact, referred to the deceased.