Opinion ID: 1722787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Guiter Was Entitled to a Directed Verdict.

Text: The claims made against the defendant Guiter were based on alleged negligence. The trial court permitted the jury to consider whether he was negligent in two particulars, i.e., in altering the auger so as to adversely affect safety features and in failing to warn of ... such alterations or changes. The evidence viewed most favorably to the plaintiff reveals that when Guiter purchased the Westfield auger from Van Zetten in September of 1974 he perceived that the detachable mesh shield was a safety feature. He described its purpose as being to keep people from getting their personals caught in the augering mechanism. In his own use of the auger he regularly made sure that the shield was attached until it was accidentally damaged when the box of a dump truck borrowed from the Chillicothe Grain and Livestock Company closed down on it bending it in such a way as to make it impossible to thereafter attach it to the auger. Guiter continued to use the auger without a safety shield for perhaps two years after the shield was damaged. In March of 1979 he sold it without a shield to the Chillicothe Grain and Livestock Company, plaintiff's employer. He did not inform the buyer that the auger had originally been sold with a shield or that there was a shield mechanism available for use on the auger. Plaintiff seeks to establish from these facts a liability claim against Guiter under the doctrine recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 (1965): One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. We have generally approved the standard of care recognized by this section of the Restatement in Rinkleff, 375 N.W.2d at 267; Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 188 (Iowa 1982); and West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 209 (Iowa 1972). Plaintiff correctly points out that under comment c of this section of the Restatement the liability imposed by section 388 extends to any person who for any purpose or in any manner gives possession of a chattel for another's use, or who permits another to use or occupy it. It is not limited to persons for whom the supplying of such chattels is a business or occupation. While we agree that the Restatement rule applies to this casual sale of farm machinery we do not believe that its application to the present facts will support a finding of liability on Guiter's part on either the alteration claim or the failure to warn claim. The alteration of the shield, if it may be called that, was not an occurrence which presented a danger to third persons during the time the auger remained in Guiter's control. No breach of duty to the plaintiff could have occurred until Guiter supplied the auger to plaintiff's employer in its altered state. At this time, Guiter's duty under the Restatement rule was only to warn of dangers known to him which he had reason to believe would not be realized by persons using the auger. The evidence of superior knowledge in the present case differs substantially from that which was presented to this court in West, 197 N.W.2d at 209. In West, the plaintiff was an ironworker who put too much pressure on a sling which snapped causing him serious injury. There was evidence that plaintiff was unaware of the weight limit which the particular sling could safely accommodate. We found such evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact concerning the necessity of a warning concerning the capacity of the sling. In the present case, the auger mechanism which caused plaintiff's injuries is completely exposed to view. The danger it poses when it is in operation to those parts of the human body which might come in contact with it would be obvious to anyone using it. Where risks are known and obvious, there is no need for a warning under the standards provided in section 388. Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687-88 (8th Cir.1981) (plaintiff knew or should have known danger of pull-out in gas pipes); McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir.1978) (tipping commode). The plaintiff testified that he had grown up on a farm, had frequently worked around augers, and was aware it would be dangerous to permit his feet or hands to come in close proximity to the moving part of the auger. We conclude that, under section 388 of the Restatement, a supplier's duty is to warn of dangers which are not obvious with respect to use of the chattel in the condition in which it is supplied. It does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means for amelioration of obvious dangers, even though it is aware of these means and the party to whom the chattel is supplied is not. See Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 293, 252 A.2d 855, 862-63 (1969) (applying comment k of section 388). On the present record, we can see no basis on which to conclude that Guiter, who was a farmer making a casual sale of used machinery, possessed superior knowledge over either the grain dealer to whom the machinery was sold or the plaintiff. We find no basis in the present case upon which the jury could have determined that Guiter was negligent. The trial court erred in failing to grant Guiter's motion for directed verdict.