Opinion ID: 797149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Laville's Arrest Was Supported by Probable Cause

Text: 24 We must, therefore, determine whether Officer Santos's warrantless arrest satisfied the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the arrest be reasonable. Reasonable suspicion and probable cause are determined with reference to the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge at the time of the investigative stop or arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). The arresting officer need not have contemplated the specific offense for which the defendant ultimately will be charged. The appropriate inquiry, rather, is whether the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge at the time of an investigative stop or arrest objectively justify that action. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588. 25 Santos went to the wharf between 7 and 8:00 A.M. to investigate a report, phoned in by Sperber, that a boat had run aground in Christiansted harbor and illegal aliens were coming ashore. When he arrived at the wharf, Santos observed firsthand that there was in fact a boat stranded in the harbor with a number of people still onboard. He also met face-to-face with Sperber, who pointed out a group of four individuals sitting nearby on the boardwalk. These individuals identified themselves to Santos as Cubans who came into shore off the boat (App. vol. II at 38), and, as the District Court found, indicated that other aliens were in the vicinity (App. vol. I at 6). Sperber separately informed Santos that more suspected aliens were around the corner and offered to point them out. (App. vol. II at 39.) Acting on this information, Santos and his fellow officers walked down the boardwalk and around the corner, and, there, found Laville and two companions sitting on a bench. 26 Taking these facts together with all reasonable inferences, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we find that by the time Santos approached Laville and his companions on the boardwalk, he had, at the very least, reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. If no further circumstances had existed, Santos would have been justified in performing an investigative stop of Laville and his companions. As it so happened, however, subsequent events elevated Santos's reasonable suspicion to the level of probable cause for an arrest. 27 When Laville and his companions spotted the approaching police officers, they immediately stood up and started walking away really fast. (App. vol. II at 39.) Their actions did not evidence an intent simply to go about their business, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); rather, the men suddenly, and deliberately, fled. The rapid walking soon gave way to headlong flight: Santos heard a fellow officer exclaim of one of the suspects, he's running, and personally observed Laville in open flight. (App. vol. I at 6-7.) 28 It is well established that where police officers reasonably suspect that an individual may be engaged in criminal activity, and the individual deliberately takes flight when the officers attempt to stop and question him, the officers generally no longer have mere reasonable suspicion, but probable cause to arrest. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 705, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Peters v. New York, decided with Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) ([D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest.); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.6 (4th ed. 2007) ([I]f there already exists a significant degree of suspicion concerning a particular person ..., the flight of that individual upon the approach of the police may be taken into account and may well elevate the pre-existing suspicion up to the requisite Fourth Amendment level of probable cause. (internal footnotes omitted)). Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Thus, when Laville fled at the sight of the approaching officers, Santos no longer merely had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot; he now had probable cause to make an arrest. We find that, given the totality of the circumstances, Santos's arrest of Laville was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.