Opinion ID: 796898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction with respect to the conspiracy claims

Text: 51 Chesher's argument that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal with respect to her conspiracy claim belies her own expansive allegations regarding the misconduct at issue. Chesher successfully argued before the district court that the employee defendants had engaged in a continuing civil conspiracy (1) with one another and Condon in 2000 and 2001 to permit Condon to undertake his art project, and (2) with the County Prosecutor's Office to cover up their misconduct from 2001 until at least July of 2003. 52 Chesher attempts to distance herself from these arguments on appeal by shifting her factual allegations. She omits on appeal any reference to the overt acts allegedly committed in 2003. In addition, in the context of her jurisdictional argument, Chesher asserts that the alleged conspiracy relates only to the offending photographs, with no reference to the continuing cover-up. Chesher now questions where in the record is there evidence that [the defendants] engaged in cover-up activities after April 9, 2003? 53 The answer to her question lies in her successful opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the conspiracy claim, where she alleged that Tobias and others in the Coroner's Office engaged in a cover-up with the County prosecutors that extended beyond April 9, 2003. In Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court cited with approval Am.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, §§ 50-73 in defining Ohio civil conspiracy law. Section 65 provides, with regard to the accrual of civil conspiracy claims, as follows: 54 In determining when the period of limitations begins to run, the statute does not begin from the date of the conspiratorial agreement, but from the occurrence of damage pursuant to the conspiracy. However, under various decisions, the limitations period may run from the date of the last overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy, or from the last overt act causing damage to the plaintiff, or from the date of each overt act causing damage. 55 16 Am Jur.2d, Conspiracy § 65 (2006) (footnotes omitted); cf. State v. Tolliver, 146 Ohio App.3d 186, 765 N.E.2d 894, 899-900 (2001) (holding in the context of a criminal conspiracy that the statute of limitations begins to run with the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy). 56 Using any of the above measuring points, Chesher's conspiracy claim alleging acts in May, June, and July of 2003 accrued after April 9, 2003. Ohio law also establishes that acts of coconspirators are attributable to one another. Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 868. We therefore conclude that Chesher's allegations of conspiratorial acts that allegedly took place between May and July of 2003 acted as a de facto amendment to her complaint and establish our jurisdiction over the employee-defendants' interlocutory appeals. 57 Chesher's argument that her conspiracy claim accrued prior to April 9, 2003 is also untenable in light of our determination of when her infliction-of-emotional-distress claim accrued. Ohio does not recognize conspiracy as an independent tort. See Orbit Elecs., Inc. v. Helm Instrument Co., 167 Ohio App.3d 301, 855 N.E.2d 91, 100 (2006) (An action for civil conspiracy cannot be maintained unless an underlying unlawful act is committed.); Putka v. First Catholic Slovak Union, 75 Ohio App.3d 741, 600 N.E.2d 797, 803 (1991) (noting that an independent claim of conspiracy is not a recognized tort under Ohio law) (quotation marks omitted). Here, where the underlying infliction of emotional distress did not accrue until after April 9, 2003, it would be incongruous to hold that the conspiracy claim premised on those tortious acts accrued earlier.