Opinion ID: 1662359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: expanded juror questionnaires

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request to provide jurors with an expanded questionnaire. Appellant reasons that because the trial court refused to allow the use of such questionnaires, and because the trial court later cut short Appellant's voir dire examination, he was denied a fair trial. Appellant's argument fails on both grounds. In the first instance, Appellant is incorrect in his assertion that the trial court interrupted his counsel during voir dire because counsel's examination of the potential jurors was too lengthy. The record clearly reflects that the only time counsel was interrupted was when the State made an objection to the form of a question being asked by Appellant's counsel. In ruling on the objection, the trial court admonished counsel about asking improper questions and questions that had already been asked. The trial court further informed counsel that the court would interrupt her if she continued to ask improper or repeated questions. We are not at all persuaded that the trial court's actions restricted Appellant's voir dire examination. Moreover, Appellant has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by this admonishment. Similarly, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the use of expanded pretrial juror questionnaires. Appellant's argument in support of the use of expanded juror questionnaires is correlative to that normally relied upon in support of a motion for individually sequestered voir dire. Appellant argues that in cases of capital murder where the death penalty is sought, jurors will undoubtedly be questioned extensively about their positions on the death penalty. Appellant further argues that in this particular case there were also concerns about the jurors' feelings of racial bias or prejudice, as Appellant is a black man and the victim was a white man. Appellant asserts that because feelings about the death penalty and race are strong and personal, jurors would feel more comfortable answering questions about them privately. Appellant further reasons that if jurors feel more comfortable they will be more truthful and forthcoming in their answers. Appellant made his motion for expanded juror questionnaires during a pretrial hearing. The trial court initially denied Appellant's motion, reasoning that it was the court's experience that jurors felt more comfortable as a group fielding attorneys' questions and listening to responses from other jurors than they did being examined individually. The trial court did, however, state that it may reconsider the ruling once Appellant submitted a sample questionnaire. Appellant did submit a sample questionnaire, but he did not obtain the trial court's ruling on the issue. The State argues that Appellant's failure to ultimately obtain a ruling on the issue bars his argument on appeal. We believe, for purposes of this appeal, that the trial court's initial denial was a final ruling, and as such, sufficiently preserves this issue for appeal. The State additionally argues that this issue is nonetheless procedurally barred because Appellant failed to abstract the proposed juror questionnaire submitted to the trial court. Our recent case law does not, however, support the State's position. In Chenowith v. State, 321 Ark. 522, 905 S.W.2d 838 (1995), we held that the appellant's failure to abstract that portion of the record revealing the terms of his motion for directed verdict did not preclude this court from reviewing the issue on appeal. We concluded that, [w]e would not address this point of appeal but for our Rule 4-3(h) which requires that we examine the record of trial in life imprisonment cases and review all errors prejudicial to the appellant. Id. at 524, 905 S.W.2d at 839. Likewise, in Owens v. State, 325 Ark. 110, 926 S.W.2d 650 (1996), we held that for cautionary reasons, pursuant to Rule 4-3(h), we would address appellant's challenge to the trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction even though the appellant failed to abstract the instruction given, as the case involved a sentence of life imprisonment. In the case at hand, the omission from the abstract of the proposed questionnaire does not inhibit our inquiry, as we are convinced that the decision to allow the use of expanded juror questionnaires lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 provides: The circuit court shall require members of petit jury panels to complete written questionnaires setting forth the following information: (i) age; (ii) marital status; (iii) extent of education; (iv) occupation of juror and spouse; and (v) prior jury service. Upon request, such questionnaires shall be made available by the clerk of the court to the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney. Upon a showing of good cause, additional information may be furnished regarding jurors by order of the court. Rule 32.2 provides for voir dire examination of potential jurors and specifically grants the trial judge the power to permit such additional questions by the defendant or his attorney and the prosecuting attorney as the judge deems reasonable and proper. (Emphasis added.) We have consistently interpreted that Rule as providing trial judges with wide latitude in conducting and monitoring voir dire. In Henry v. State, 309 Ark. 1, 828 S.W.2d 346 (1992), we held that the extent and scope of voir dire is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of this discretion. See also Bryant v. State, 304 Ark. 514, 803 S.W.2d 546 (1991); Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 617, 770 S.W.2d 128 (1989). Furthermore, in Heffernan v. State, 278 Ark. 325, 645 S.W.2d 666 (1983), we held that sequestration of the jury for purposes of voir dire is also within the discretion of the trial court. We are convinced that Rule 32.2 is controlling of this issue since the concept of expanded juror questionnaires is merely a written form of voir dire examination, and as such, the decision to deny Appellant's motion was well within the trial court's discretion. We are further satisfied that Appellant was given ample opportunity to thoroughly examine potential jurors during voir dire. Because the trial court's ruling was discretionary, and because Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced or that the trial court abused its discretion, we affirm the trial court's ruling.