Opinion ID: 678782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: During and In Relation To

Text: 45 Once it is determined that the defendant has used or carried a gun, the more difficult question is whether he has done so in relation to a drug trafficking offense. As the Court noted in Smith, this requirement at a minimum, means that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2059. For the statute to be violated, therefore, the gun must 'facilitat[e] or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating' the drug trafficking offense. Id. (quoting Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540) (alterations in original). Using a gun to protect one's drugs, drug paraphernalia, or the proceeds of one's drug sales is therefore clearly a prohibited use of the gun. Our prior decisions under Sec. 924(c)(1) recognize as much. 46 The First Circuit refers to this relationship quite generally as a facilitative nexus. That court looks only to whether the gun was kept [where it was] to be available for use in an ongoing drug offense. See, e.g., United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.1994). The court's rationale is readily explained: once a person acquires a firearm and puts or keeps it where it can be used more actively in his drug activity, that firearm becomes a part of the drug activity and thus is used by the defendant in relation to the drug activity. It matters little whether the use is described in terms of emboldening the defendant to commit the drug trafficking crime, see, e.g., Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540, protecting the defendant's possessory interest in his drugs, see, e.g., United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir.1990), or otherwise; any way one puts it, the firearm is being used as part of the drug activity. Therefore, like the First Circuit, we look to whether the gun was positioned so as to be available for use during ongoing drug activity in order to determine whether the use was within the scope of Sec. 924(c)(1). 47 Note that in order to relate to a drug trafficking offense, the use of the gun need not actually have furthered the offense. As the Supreme Court said in Smith, the gun need only ha[ve] the potential of facilitating the drug trafficking offense. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently held that [t]he ordinary meaning of the words ['relating to'] is a broad one--'to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.'  Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)); see also District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 580, 583, 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992) (noting that when the Congress uses the phrase relates to, it has chosen  'deliberately expansive' language (quoting Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987))). The Congress's use of that phrase here was clearly deliberate and an indication that it intended Sec. 924(c)(1) to be a broad prohibition, reaching more than conduct that actively advances the underlying predicate drug offense. 48 The legislative history of Sec. 924(c)(1) reveals that the Congress expressly retained the in relation to requirement in preference to a more restrictive in furtherance of requirement. One bill that passed the Senate as part of the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of the current version of Sec. 924(c)(1) would have penalized [w]hoever, during and in relation to any [one of a number of enumerated drug] felon[ies] ... uses a firearm, or carries a firearm in furtherance of such crime.... 131 Cong.Rec. 18,155, 18,235 (July 9, 1985) (reprinting S.49, a predecessor bill, as passed by the Senate). The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms criticized this proposal, however. Referring to the then-current version of Sec. 924(c)(1), it argued that because existing law already requires that the carrying be 'in relation to' the underlying crime, the proposed bill would weaken[ ] the existing mandatory penalty provision. 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1346 (1986). Therefore, the in furtherance of requirement was deleted. This suggests that the Congress carefully avoided any implication that it intended to narrow the relationship that must be shown between the gun and the predicate offense in order to support a conviction under Sec. 924(c)(1). 49 In sum, it is apparent that positioning a firearm in such a way that it protects or is otherwise integrated into one's drug trafficking is not just a use of that gun, but is a use of that gun in relation to a drug trafficking offense and is therefore covered by the statute. What, then, is sufficient evidence that a gun found at the scene of a drug crime is being used in this way? 50 Whenever there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant at some time during the commission of the predicate drug offense put or kept a firearm in a place where it would be proximate to and accessible from a place that is clearly connected to his drug trafficking (e.g., a place used to store, manufacture, or distribute drugs, or to keep the proceeds of drug transactions), the jury may also infer that the gun was being used to protect the drug trafficking operation, and was therefore being used in violation of Sec. 924(c)(1). We emphasize that the jury may draw this inference regardless whether the predicate offense is one of drug distribution or of possession with intent to distribute drugs; we reject any suggestions to the contrary in our prior opinions. Cf. Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1055 (Since possession with intent subsequently to distribute is in a sense a passive crime, it becomes somewhat difficult analytically to determine how one goes about using a gun in relation to that crime). As the Eighth Circuit has stated: 51 It has become common knowledge that drug traffickers typically keep firearms available to protect themselves and their drugs and drug money. The presence and the availability of the firearms are often crucial to the success of the drug enterprise. It is therefore permissible for juries to infer that firearms found among a drug trafficker's paraphernalia are used to further the drug venture and are thus used during and in relation to drug trafficking within the meaning of section 924(c)(1). 52 United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir.1990). 53 Obviously, a defendant is free to present evidence that he possessed the gun solely for a different purpose--for example, as part of a collection of guns that just happened to be kept in a place that later became involved in drug trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 229, 234-35 (6th Cir.1994) (noting that defendant had argued that he was a gun collector); United States v. Morrow, 923 F.2d 427, 435 (6th Cir.1991) (noting that defendant had strenuously argued at trial that the only purpose for the gun was to shoot snakes). It will be the duty of the trier of fact, however, and emphatically not of this court, to weigh all such evidence and to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the weapon was being used as part of a drug trafficking operation. 54 This test for use is not only an accurate means of ensuring that the scope of Sec. 924(c)(1) is as broad as the Congress intended it to be; it will also avoid the problems with the Bruce-Morris- Derr approach that we outlined above. First, as we have already noted, placing or keeping a gun in such a way that it protects a drug trafficking operation is clearly a use of a gun in relation to a drug trafficking offense. In most cases, the gun's proximity to and accessibility from the actual site of the defendant's drug trafficking will be the most probative evidence that the defendant was using the firearm to protect his drug trafficking. Similarly, whether the defendant carried the gun with, or to or from the location of, the drugs will be the most probative evidence that he carried it during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Second, this test can be readily administered both by the district court, which must determine whether the Government's case may go to the jury, and by the appellate panel that must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under Sec. 924(c)(1). As such, it will assure greater uniformity across cases while penalizing more precisely the conduct that the Congress intended to reach.