Opinion ID: 329593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CEQA Standing.

Text: 31 CEQA, as the California courts have recognized, was modeled after NEPA, and despite substantial differences in its detailed provisions CEQA's purposes are almost identical to those of NEPA. See Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 1972, 8 Cal.3d 247, 260-61, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 769-70, 502 P.2d 1049, 1057-58. Thus, failure to prepare an EIR, like failure to prepare an EIS, does a procedural injury to persons or entities having a geographical nexus with the site of the challenged project; Davis has standing, therefore, under CEQA, for the same reasons it has standing to sue under NEPA. See Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Commission of Ventura County, 1975, 13 Cal.3d 263, 272, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 254-55, 529 P.2d 1017, 1022-23.III. NEPA and CEQA. 32 Because it found standing lacking, the district court did not reach Davis' claim that the defendants should have prepared an EIS/EIR. As a consequence of the court's mistaken impression that proof of environmental damage is a prerequisite of standing, however, the parties did address below the significance of the Kidwell project's environmental impact, and that is the relevant question in determining whether an EIS or an EIR is required. Moreover, since the date of the district court's decision this court has recognized that there is a close relationship between NEPA and the § 128 issues raised on this appeal. Lathan v. Brinegar, supra, 506 F.2d at 687-689. For these reasons, and in the interests of expediting this litigation, we think it appropriate for us to decide the EIS/EIR issues now. The current record makes it clear that the decision not to prepare an EIS/EIR cannot be squared with either NEPA or CEQA. 33 A. Standard of Review. 34 NEPA requires preparation of a detailed EIS for all major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). This threshold test is met when a plaintiff allege(s) facts which, if true, show that the proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of environmental quality. 15 Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 9 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 814, 817 n. 5; Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 5 Cir., 1973, 472 F.2d 463, 466. This standard does not require the courts to determine whether a challenged project Will in fact have significant effects. Rather, we are to determine whether the responsible agency has reasonably concluded that the project will have no significant adverse environmental consequences. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, supra, 472 F.2d at 467. 35 In making this determination, however, we must bear in mind the inherent danger that the most serious environmental effects of a project may not be obvious, and that the purpose of the EIS requirement is to ensure that  to the fullest extent possible agency decisionmakers have before them and take into proper account a complete analysis of the project's environmental impact. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. A.E.C., supra, 449 F.2d at 1114. Thus, where substantial questions are raised as to whether a project will have significant adverse impacts it is hardly reasonable for an agency to conclude, prior to study, that an EIS is not required. Accordingly, an EIS must be prepared whenever a project May cause a significant degradation of some human environmental factor. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, supra, 472 F.2d at 467 (emphasis added). 16 36 The CEQA test for determining the necessity of an EIR is similar. Public Resources Code § 21100 requires an EIR whenever a proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment. The California Supreme Court has indicated that the threshold for application of this requirement is low: an EIR must be prepared whenever it can be fairly argued on the basis of substantial evidence that the project may have a significant environmental impact. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 1974, 13 Cal.3d 68, 75, 82-86, 118 Cal.Rptr. 34, 38, 43-46, 529 P.2d 66, 70, 75-78. Also, the existence of serious public controversy concerning the environmental effects of a project in itself indicates that preparation of an EIR is desirable. Id. 13 Cal.3d at 86, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 46, 529 P.2d at 78. 37 B. The Standard Applied. 38 The Negative Declaration prepared by CDHW, see n. 8, Supra, portrays the Kidwell Interchange as a mere accessory accommodation to inevitable industrial development. Such a portrayal stands reality on its head. Without the Kidwell Interchange, development may not be inevitable; with it, development may be inevitable. The Director of the Solano County Industrial Development Agency asserts that only three prospective tenants have to date shown serious interest in the University Research Park. Perhaps other prospects have realized the truth of that which Solano County and the other defendants deny: that the interchange is an indispensible prerequisite to rapid development of the Kidwell area. Without it, accessibility costs for industrial plants may rise appreciably, and the driving distance to U.C. Davis will at least double hardly a major selling point for a development whose appeal consists almost entirely of its close proximity to the campus. Thus, the Kidwell Interchange must be seen as an essential catalyst for the fruition of Solano County's plans. 39 The Negative Declaration is nothing more than bureaucratic doubletalk. No development presently exists, we are told, but the area is about to undergo a rapid change to urban development because of its proximity to U.C. Davis, and the interchange will provide direct and safe access between . . . the University and the proposed industrial research center. Although the proximity to U.C. Davis will in practical terms result from the access created by the interchange, the conclusion drawn is that the project's environmental effects will not be significant. 40 This is totally inadequate. Regardless of the weight accorded to the expert opinions and supporting data submitted by Davis, it is obvious that constructing a large interchange on a major interstate highway in an agricultural area where no connecting road currently exists will have a substantial impact on a number of environmental factors. That this is so is recognized in the Department of Transportation's own PPM 90-1, August 24, 1971, 2 Env.L.Rep. 46106, which governs preparation of impact statements for federal-aid highway projects: 41 The improved access and transportation afforded by a highway may generate other related actions that could reach major proportion and which would be difficult to rescind. An example would be a highway improvement which provides access to a nonaccessible area, acting as a catalyst for industrial, commercial, or residential development of the area. Id., Appendix E, P 2f, 2 Env.L.Rep. at 46110. 42 The growth-inducing effects of the Kidwell Interchange project are its raison d' etre, and with growth will come growth's problems: increased population, increased traffic, increased pollution, and increased demand for services such as utilities, education, police and fire protection, and recreational facilities. The expert opinions and studies that Davis has submitted during this litigation bolster the conclusion that CDHW, when it prepared the Negative Declaration, could not have known enough about the environmental effects of this project to reasonably conclude that they would not be significant. Here are some of the things that the studies show: 43 1. The water table in the Davis area has been declining for a number of years. Since the last study was completed five years ago, the problem may have become worse. On the basis of the earlier studies, however, there is a possibility that industrial development in the Kidwell area would place demands on Davis' water supply which could not be met indefinitely. The declining water table has also created a depression or sink in ground water levels, and the lowest levels are directly beneath Davis. If this depression has worsened since the last study, industrial wastes emanating from the Kidwell area might seep into this sink and contaminate the city's water supply. 44 2. Another casualty of the Kidwell development might be Davis' policy of controlled growth; the city has decided to resist becoming a bedroom community by restricting all but internal growth. The influx of highly educated employees that the research oriented Kidwell development would require would tend to increase Davis' population disproportionately because of the city's unique academic and cultural amenities. This possibility is even more alarming to Davis in view of the fact that there is already a housing shortage in Davis. 45 3. A rapid increase in population brought on by development would require expanded residential development, probably on currently productive agricultural acreage. Residential expansion would bring on increased commercial development and the beginnings of urban sprawl. The demand for all city services would increase, but the ultimate cause of the increase, industrialization, would be immune from the increased taxes necessary to supply the demand, because the Kidwell area is in Solano County. 46 We cannot, of course, predict with certainty that any of these consequences, or others, will result, in either the short or long term, from construction of the Kidwell Interchange. The nature and extent of development which the project will induce is still uncertain. Davis' fears may be exaggerated. But currently available information and plain common sense indicate that it was hardly reasonable for CDHW or FHWA to conclude, without further study, that the environmental impact of the proposed interchange will be insignificant. We think that this is precisely the kind of situation Congress had in mind when it enacted NEPA: substantial questions have been raised about the environmental consequences of federal action, and the responsible agencies should not be allowed to proceed with the proposed action in ignorance of what those consequences will be. NEPA and CEQA require that the interchange's environmental impact be studied and analyzed in good faith before CDHW and FHWA decide whether the project is to be completed as planned, or to be modified or abandoned. Davis has raised disturbing questions. It is now up to the defendants to answer those questions. 17 47 We reject CDHW's position that the uncertainty of development in the Kidwell area makes the secondary environmental effects of the interchange too speculative for evaluation. Certainly the assertion that there may be no development even if the interchange is built taxes credulity (as well as being inconsistent with the assertion that development is inevitable). What we have here, after all, is a proposal to build a major interchange in an agricultural area near the edge of urban development, and the purpose of the project is to connect a freeway with a road which does not yet exist. If the interchange is built, development will occur. And regardless of its nature or extent, this development will have significant environmental consequences for the surrounding area, including Davis. It is true that the development potential which the interchange will create comprehends a range of possibilities. The ultimate outcome will depend on the plans of private parties and local government outside the direct control of state and federal government. In this context the purpose of an EIS/EIR is to evaluate the possibilities in light of current and contemplated plans and to produce an informed estimate of the environmental consequences. That the exact type of development is not known is not an excuse for failing to file an impact statement at all. Uncertainty about the pace and direction of development merely suggests the need for exploring in the EIS/EIR alternative scenarios based on these external contingencies. Drafting an EIS/EIR necessarily involves some degree of forecasting. 48 While foreseeing the unforeseeable is not required, an agency must use its best efforts to find out all that it reasonably can: 49 It must be remembered that the basic thrust of an agency's responsibilities under NEPA is to predict the environmental effects of proposed action before the action is taken and those effects fully known. Reasonable forecasting and speculation is thus implicit in NEPA, and we must reject any attempt by agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling any and all discussion of future environmental effects as crystal ball inquiry. 50 Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. A. E. C., 1973, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092. 51 Nor does characterization of industrial development as a secondary impact aid the defendants. As the Council on Environmental Quality only recently pointed out, consideration of secondary impacts may often be more important than consideration of primary impacts. 18 52 Impact statements usually analyze the initial or primary effects of a project, but they very often ignore the secondary or induced effects. A new highway located in a rural area may directly cause increased air pollution as a primary effect. But the highway may also induce residential and industrial growth, which may in turn create substantial pressures on available water supplies, sewage treatment facilities, and so forth. For many projects, these secondary or induced effects may be more significant than the project's primary effects. 53 While the analysis of secondary effects is often more difficult than defining the first-order physical effects, it is also indispensable. If impact statements are to be useful, they must address the major environmental problems likely to be created by a project. Statements that do not address themselves to these major problems are increasingly likely to be viewed as inadequate. As experience is gained in defining and understanding these secondary effects, new methodologies are likely to develop for forecasting them, and the usefulness of impact statements will increase. 54 Fifth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, 410-11 (December 1974). 55 The defendants have also objected that the environmental consequences of development will result from local and private action, not federal action, and that therefore they need not consider the consequences of development in determining whether an EIS is required. They are wrong. It must be remembered that the main purpose of the interchange, and its only credible economic justification, is to provide access to the Kidwell area for future industrial development. The argument that the principal object of a federal project does not result from federal action contains its own refutation. See National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 9 Cir., 1973, 485 F.2d 408, 411-12. Thus, we hold that NEPA requires consideration of the effects of the planned development. 19 56 C. Laches. 57 We reject defendants' contention that the NEPA and CEQA claims are barred by laches. While Davis received a copy of the Negative Declaration in the summer of 1971, we cannot, on the facts of this case, conclude that it  slept on its rights by failing to file suit until October 24, 1972. Laches requires more than delay; it requires a lack of diligence. Costello v. United States, 1961, 365 U.S. 265, 282, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551; Lathan v. Brinegar, supra, 506 F.2d at 691-92. An indispensable element of lack of diligence is knowledge, or reason to know, of the legal right, assertion of which is delayed. The complexity and uncertainty of the law applicable to this case makes us most reluctant to charge Davis with the knowledge requisite to invocation of the equitable doctrine of laches. 58 A Davis official received the Negative Declaration, a document apparently not then authorized by any published, readily available regulation or PPM, 20 marked for your information. The Negative Declaration did not indicate that comments were being solicited nor that the decision not to file an EIS/EIR, which was not expressly acknowledged, was open to challenge in the courts. Further, the statutes on which Davis now relies NEPA, CEQA and 23 U.S.C. § 128 are not now and certainly were not then easy statutes to understand. 21 In 1971 judicial interpretations and critical commentary were just beginning to appear, whereas the confusing avalanche of interpretative regulations, PPM's DOT Orders and draft instructional memoranda was already well underway. In light of the situation in 1971, we think that ignorance of its legal rights by Davis prior to retention of outside counsel in early October, 1972, is more than understandable. There is no evidence that the city knowingly slept on its rights. 59 We also think that this is an inappropriate case for laches because of the kinds of issues raised. Davis will not be the only victim of possible environmental damage that might follow the defendants' failure to comply with NEPA and CEQA. The brunt of any such damage will be borne by individuals residing in Davis and other nearby communities. NEPA was enacted to protect the environmental interests of all citizens by making consideration of environmental factors a primary duty of all federal agencies. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 6 Cir., 1972, 468 F.2d 1164, 1182-83; City of New York v. United States, E.D.N.Y., 1972, 337 F.Supp. 150, 160 (Friendly, J. for three-judge court). CEQA has the same purpose in California. To make faithful execution of this duty contingent upon the vigilance and diligence of particular environmental plaintiffs would encourage attempts by agencies to evade their important responsibilities. It is up to the agency, not the public, to ensure compliance with NEPA in the first instance. See Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 8 Cir. In banc, 1974, 498 F.2d 1314, 1324; Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 10 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 1244, 1250-51; Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra, 468 F.2d at 1182-83; Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 4 Cir., 1972, 458 F.2d 1323, 1329; Cf. Lathan v. Brinegar, supra, 506 F.2d at 692. 22 The courts have a corresponding responsibility to insist on full, fair, bona fide compliance with NEPA by all federal agencies. Lathan v. Brinegar, supra, 506 F.2d at 693. We would be remiss if we exercised our discretion to invoke laches in cases like this one. 60