Opinion ID: 2630484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The rearraignment prior to retrial changed Eaton's charges

Text: ¶ 26 Arraignment is the legal procedure by which a defendant is formally presented with an information charging him with a crime and serves to notify the defendant of the charges pending. See 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1105, 236 (3d ed. 2004) (Arraignment consists of calling the defendant before the court to ascertain his identity, to inform him of the charge against him, and to obtain his answer to the charge. The defendant's answer to the charge is his plea.). It is the information presented by the State at the arraignment which details the charge against the defendant. CrR 2.1(a)(1). This information and charge may be amended so long as it does not prejudice substantial rights of the defendant. CrR 2.1(d). ¶ 27 Before Eaton was first tried, the State properly amended the information and rearraigned Eaton to charge him with possession of cocaine. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, Eaton was rearraigned using the original information, which charged Eaton with possession of amphetamine. This information was never amended nor was Eaton rearraigned. ¶ 28 The majority recognizes there was a `rearraignment' on the `original' information [1] but then incorrectly opines the only existing, effective information charged the defendant with possession of cocaine. [2] In substance the majority gives effect to the rearraignment which charged possession of cocaine, but refuses to give effect to the subsequent arraignment which charged possession of amphetamine. Even the State recognized this information was effective to charge possession of amphetamine, as it unsuccessfully moved to amend the information to charge possession of cocaine prior to the second trial. ¶ 29 The majority rests its analysis on the belief that Eaton attempts to repeal the proper amendment of the information because the third arraignment was upon the original information. However, this is an incorrect understanding of the situation. Instead of resurrect[ing] the original information, [3] the arraignment prior to the retrial superseded the amended information, just as surely as the amended information superseded the original information. Whether the information used at the rearraignment was the original information or a new document is of no importance. Eaton was rearraigned and the information used at that rearraignment became the proper charging document. ¶ 30 To further support its decision that the rearraignment was inconsequential, the majority asserts the defendant generally need not be rearraigned at a subsequent trial. Majority at 1272. Even if this is true, it does not change the fact that Eaton was rearraigned on an information charging Eaton with possession of amphetamine, not cocaine. This arraignment, like the prior arraignment, must be given effect. Because the rearraignment occurred, Eaton was charged with, and tried for, possession of amphetamine, not cocaine.