Opinion ID: 3016662
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment and Retaliation

Text: Both Angeloni’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim and her retaliation claim depend upon her ability to prove that she was constructively discharged. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that a plaintiff trying to prove quid pro quo sexual harassment must show that “her response to unwelcome advances was subsequently used as a basis for a decision about [employment].”). This is fundamental to her claims, because “constructive discharge acts as the functional equivalent of an actual termination” that can ground an employment discrimination suit. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 446 (3d Cir. 2003). To find constructive discharge, a court “need merely find that the employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.” Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). Put somewhat differently, the plaintiff must show that the alleged discrimination goes beyond a “threshold of ‘intolerable conditions.’” Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2001). “Intolerability . . . is assessed by the objective standard of whether a ‘reasonable person’ in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign—that is, whether [she] would have had no choice but to resign.” Connors v. Chrysler Financial Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). with reference to this case was to file her complaint in the District Court on February 20, 2002. 5 Although we have considered an employer’s suggestion or encouragement that one resign as indicative of constructive discharge, see Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1161 (3d Cir. 1993), any such suggestion or encouragement is not dispositive. See Suders, 325 F.3d at 446 (noting that the inquiry into constructive discharge is “a heavily fact-driven determination.”) (internal citations omitted). Here, it is not disputed that, in December of 1997, Bishop Dougherty suggested that if Angeloni did not feel comfortable working at Villa St. Joseph, she could resign; however, this suggestion was made during the course of a meeting with Angeloni’s mother, during which she had expressed concerns for her daughter’s safety. As Bishop Dougherty explained in his deposition, he suggested the possibility of resignation because he “felt as a priest that [he] wanted to reach out to [Angeloni’s parents].” A258-59. Significantly, during that same meeting, Bishop Dougherty offered to have a meeting with both of Angeloni’s parents and Reverend Hazzouri to see if they could come to some sort of resolution. And, when Angeloni continued to work after the December 1997 meeting, Bishop Dougherty said that he was “thrilled with that.” A263. Not only does Bishop Dougherty’s suggestion that Angeloni consider resigning seem completely benign, but the conduct of which Angeloni complained had ended months earlier and the decision to resign was made by Angeloni and her parents at home. Given these facts, there is little or nothing in the record that supports Angeloni’s argument that a reasonable person would consider her work conditions so intolerable that she would feel compelled to resign. That conclusion destroys any constructive discharge 6 claim and, thus, there was no adverse employment action. Summary judgment was, therefore, proper on both the quid pro quo sexual harassment and the retaliation claims.3