Opinion ID: 792362
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Activity Was Constitutionally Protected

Text: 22 In considering the first element of First Amendment retaliation — whether a state-employed teacher's in-class speech is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment — this Court has consistently applied the balancing test announced in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), and refined in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1055 n. 7 (citing cases); Hardy, 260 F.3d at 678; Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 811-12 (6th Cir.2000); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir.1995). 23 Under that familiar test, we first determine whether Evans-Marshall's activity constitutes speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1048. If Evans-Marshall's activity was speech, she must show: (1) that she was disciplined for speech that was directed toward an issue of public concern; and (2) that her interest in speaking as [she] did outweighed the [school's] interest in regulating [her] speech. Hardy, 260 F.3d at 678 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731); Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1050 (same). In determining whether speech is on a matter of public concern, we look to the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Hardy, 260 F.3d at 678 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684). As to the content of the speech, so long as the speech relates to matters of `political, social, or other concern to the community,' as opposed to matters `only of personal interest,' it shall be considered as touching upon matters of public concern. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-49, 103 S.Ct. 1684). 24 The concurrence would reexamine our application of Pickering to in-class curricular speech because [t]he Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment applies to a teacher's classroom speech, and there is good reason to think it would not do so. Conc. ¶ 6. Of greater relevance is that the Supreme Court has never removed in-class speech from its presumptive place within the ambit of the First Amendment. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) (The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the `freedom of speech.' Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.) (emphasis added). 25 Moreover, the Supreme Court has characterized the proposition that students and teachers do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression at the schoolhouse gate as the unmistakable holding of [the] Court for almost 50 years. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). See also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731 ([T]eachers may [not] constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest.); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967) ([T]he theory that public employment. . . may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.). The assumption that the Court would draw a distinction between the schoolhouse gate and the doors of the classroom is counterintuitive. See id. at 683 (The classroom is peculiarly the `marketplace of ideas.'); Hardy, 260 F.3d at 671 (In light of [Supreme Court] precedent, the argument that teachers have no First Amendment rights when teaching, or that the government can censor teacher speech without restriction, is totally unpersuasive.). 26 In any event, applying Pickering pursuant to Cockrel, the district court held that dismissal of the individual defendants was inappropriate: 27 [T]aking the facts in Plaintiff's Complaint as true and giving her the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, it is clear that her assignment of certain books to her students constitutes speech, that the Complaint does not, upon its face, sufficiently detail the subject matter of the allegedly offensive books sufficiently to allow this Court to determine whether they touch upon matters of public concern and, further, that this Court cannot undertake the balancing test required by [ Pickering ] based upon the Complaint alone. Moreover, a reasonable inference to be drawn as pled by the Plaintiff, if accepted by the trier of fact, may lead it to conclude that the decision to terminate her was based, at least in part, upon her decision to assign the books in question. 28 Dist. Ct. Dec. at 2. We conclude that this decision was not in error.
29 As an initial matter, the activity at issue is speech for the purposes of the First Amendment. In this case, the disputed materials — three well-respected novels and a movie adaptation of a Shakespeare play — are clearly protected by the First Amendment. See Metzger v. Peracy, 393 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir.1968) (Motion pictures, like books, are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press.). Furthermore, our precedent establishes that the assignment by a public school teacher of protected materials is itself speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1049 (holding a teacher's sponsorship of an in-class speaker on industrial hemp was speech, despite the lack of a particularized message such as advocating or speaking against hemp's use as an environmental alternative to cutting down trees); Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 214-15 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that a teacher's in-class use of movies on sexual maturity is protected by the First Amendment), rev'd on other grounds by Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 304-05, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). 30 Relying on Fowler v. Board of Education, 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.1987) (single-judge opinion), the individual defendants argue that the assignment of the disputed materials is not speech and that the allegations of the Complaint do not establish an advocative or expressive purpose in the assignment of the various literary works. Id. at 662-64 (Milburn J., concurring) (holding that the in-class showing of a movie on a non-instructional day was not speech since the teacher conceded she had no curricular, communicative, or expressive intent). However, as we have recently noted, Fowler is a single-judge opinion and as such not binding on this Court. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1049-50. Furthermore, the two remaining judges on the Fowler Court concluded that the showing of the movie was speech for the purposes of the First Amendment. See id. (citing Fowler, 819 F.2d at 667, 669-70).
31 Having determined that the Complaint alleges activity sufficient to be considered speech, Evans-Marshall must now establish by allegation that the speech is constitutionally protected. To do this, Evans-Marshall must allege sufficiently that her speech touched on a matter of public concern. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1050. 32 In the Complaint, Evans-Marshall contends that her termination was retaliation for the curricular and pedagogical choices she made while teaching at Tippecanoe High School and the exercise of rights under the First Amendment. Evans-Marshall specifies that she assigned the books Siddhartha, Fahrenheit 451, and To Kill a Mockingbird, and the movie Romeo + Juliet, to an upper-level high school language art class. Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Rossborough Mfg. Co., 301 F.3d at 489. We draw the reasonable inference that Evans-Marshall taught the main themes of the work she assigned. For instance, in teaching To Kill a Mockingbird, it is reasonable to infer that Evans-Marshall taught the themes of race and justice in the American South. Such content is clearly a matter of public concern. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052; Hardy, 260 F.3d at 679 (noting that race, gender, and power conflicts in our society are matters of overwhelming public concern). The same can be said of the other disputed works: spirituality ( Siddhartha ), the intersection of love and politics, ( Romeo + Juliet ), and, of course, government censorship of books ( Fahrenheit 451 ).
33 Having established that Evans-Marshall's speech was of public concern, we now balance the speech against the interests of the Board. The individual defendants identify a host of factors that support the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. The individual defendants argue that Evans-Marshall was terminated for insubordination, lack of communication, and lack of teamwork, and not for her First Amendment activity. The individual defendants then note that the Board has a statutory duty to control the curricular and pedagogical choices of its teachers. See Ohio Rev. C. § 3313.60(A) (2005) (The board of education of each city and exempted village school district . . . shall prescribe a curriculum for all schools under their control.). Finally, the individual defendants note that the Board may limit curricular speech with which it does not agree. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (holding that student speech in a school newspaper is subject to reasonable regulations by principal). 34 The individual defendants have not shown that the allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom fail to establish any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229. The claim that Evans-Marshall's termination was for non-retaliatory reasons cannot be considered without some factual discovery. On a motion to dismiss, we are required to assume the plaintiff's factual allegations to be true. See Rossborough Mfg. Co., 301 F.3d at 489. Here, Evans-Marshall alleges that the Board's reasons for termination were merely a pretext for retaliation. This is supported by factual allegations that Evans-Marshall received negative job evaluations due to criticism from the community related to the alleged speech, and not due to her employment performance. Such allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 35 Regarding control of the curriculum and disassociation with objectionable speech, our precedent is instructive. We have previously concluded that the prior approval of controversial speech by the school or the Board undercuts the interests of the state in controlling the workplace. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1054-55 ([W]e cannot allow [concerns of harmony, efficiency, and discipline] to tilt the Pickering scale in favor of the government . . . when the disruptive consequences of the employee speech can be traced back to the government's express decision permitting the employee to engage in that speech.); see also Stachura, 763 F.2d at 214-15. 36 Evans-Marshall alleges that the three novels had been purchased and approved by the Board. Furthermore, the movie used in class was rated PG-13, and according to Evans-Marshall, could be shown without prior approval. Nonetheless, after a public outcry related to the use of the disputed materials, Evans-Marshall alleges that she was criticized publicly by Wray, received negative evaluations for the first time, and was eventually terminated. Such allegations are sufficient to establish protected First Amendment activity under the Pickering test, at least for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.