Opinion ID: 2446391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Crawford's Actions

Text: The defendants assert that, as a matter of law, Crawford's conduct could not have proximately caused the accident and Samuel's death. Their focus on whether or not Crawford's conduct was outrageous is misplaced. The focus should initially be on whether the facts material to a determination that Crawford acted grossly negligently in the first instance are in dispute. The focus should turn to whether the car thieves' intervening negligence was so extraordinary, abnormal or unforeseeable under the circumstances, that their actions should supersede Crawford's gross negligence (and the other defendants' negligence), thereby relieving them of liability. The record here discloses inconsistent facts that could lead to a finding of ordinary or gross negligence. These facts include Crawford's decision to terminate his pursuit, the time when he turned off the emergency lights, and his proximity to the residential neighborhood and Samuel's vehicle when making these decisions. A jury might also consider the importance of catching suspected car thieves against the risks of pursuing those thieves at a high speed near and in a residential neighborhood. As the trial judge observed, Crawford and Rentz testified differently about their distance from the perpetrators' Acura when it struck Samuel's vehicle. The police report discloses that the police cruiser was a block and a half to two blocks back from the Acura. Crawford testified that the chase lasted 30, 45 seconds maybe, as well as one to two minutes. Nor does the thief Matthews's testimony categorically support the trial judge's conclusion that both perpetrators considered the police to have terminated the chase. [16] Crawford's inconsistent testimony creates a material factual issue of how long after terminating pursuit the fatal collision occurred. Crawford testified in his deposition that the Acura collided with Samuels's vehicle `almost instantaneously' after he had terminated pursuit. In his affidavit, however Crawford stated that the police discontinued the pursuit long before the collision between the perpetrators' and Samuel's vehicles. The record also does not reflect whether Crawford had slowed down, disengaged his emergency lights, or simply decided to terminate pursuit. The trial judge's and the appellees' focus on the conclusion that Crawford did not act outrageously, obscures the required analysis. The first question is whether a reasonable juror, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, could conclude that Crawford's actions constituted gross negligence. The second question is, even if so, were the thieves later intervening actions so extraordinary, abnormal or unforeseeable that they should be found to supersede Crawford's gross negligence, thereby relieving him of liability? There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Because police must terminate some high speed chases to protect the public, a vehicular police chase initiated or conducted in a grossly negligent manner could, in some circumstances, proximately cause an injury. In this case, a jury could find that, but for the police officers' decision to initiate and pursue the perpetrators, the suspects would not have fled at a high rate of speed and collided with an innocent third party. A jury could also find that the suspects' intervening actions superseded Crawford's alleged gross negligence. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mary, we cannot hold that as a matter of law that under no circumstances could a jury have found Crawford, the Department or the City liable. [17]