Opinion ID: 3030609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: castro’s entitlement to total

Text: DISABILITY DURING VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION The ALJ in the present case found Abbott applicable to Castro’s case and held that Castro was entitled to total disability benefits for the period during which he was enrolled in his vocational rehabilitation program. On appeal, General Construction argues (1) that Abbott was wrongly decided and should not be applied to this case and (2) that even if Abbott was correct on its facts, Castro’s case is distinguishable. We address these arguments in turn.
Purpose The interpretation of the LHWCA found in Abbott and Newport News and adopted by the OWCP Director in this case is supported by the language of the LHWCA and its purpose. The LHWCA does not specifically provide that total disability benefits are to be awarded where a claimant shows that GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO 2411 participation in a rehabilitation program precludes acceptance of alternative employment. But the statute’s silence is not determinative. In fact, the statute is generally silent on the scope and definition of “total disability.” See 33 U.S.C. § 908(a) (providing that where claimant has not lost two major body parts, the existence of “total disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts”). As the Fifth Circuit noted in Abbott, the statute leaves it to the courts to “enunciate standards for distinguishing between the various categories” of disability—total and partial as well as permanent and temporary. 40 F.3d at 125-26. [2] The Abbott rule is consistent with the language and a principal policy of the LHWCA: the encouragement of vocational rehabilitation. The LHWCA specifically provides that “[t]he Secretary shall direct the vocational rehabilitation of permanently disabled employees and shall arrange . . . for such rehabilitation.” 33 U.S.C. § 939(c)(2). Moreover, the LHWCA defines “disability” as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment.” 33 U.S.C. § 902(10). Thus, the LHWCA speaks of disability in terms of economic harm, not just physical harm. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1997). The Abbott rule, consistently with this definition, simply clarifies that it is possible for a claimant to be entitled to benefits for “total disability” when the claimant is physically capable of performing certain work but unable to secure that work for some other reason. See Abbott, 40 F.3d at 127; see also Newport News, 315 F.3d at 295. Amicus LCA argues that Abbott was wrongly decided because in 1984 Congress considered and failed to pass amendments to the LHWCA creating a statutory entitlement to total disability for all claimants during vocational rehabilitation training. We note at the outset that congressional inaction is not a reliable guide to legislative intent. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 2412 GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962). Moreover, the failed amendments in this case would have been more sweeping than Abbott’s rule, since they would have created an entitlement to disability benefits during rehabilitation. H.R. 7610, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19-20 (1980) (providing that “[a]n employee who as a result of injury is undergoing vocational rehabilitation . . . shall be entitled to receive continued temporary total or partial compensation during . . . such rehabilitation”).6 In contrast, the Abbott rule requires a fact-finder to consider on a case-by-case basis an injured worker’s participation in a rehabilitation program as one factor in determining whether suitable alternative employment is available to that worker. Cf. Kee v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 33 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 221 (2000) (applying Abbott and denying temporary total disability benefits when claimant failed to show that enrollment in rehabilitation program precluded acceptance of alternate employment); Gregory, 32 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 264 (same). Congress’s failure to enact an amendment more sweeping than the Abbott rule cannot be taken to invalidate that rule. The text, purposes, and legislative history of the LHWCA thus provide no basis for rejecting the Abbott approach.7 6 See also H.R. Rep. No. 98-570, pt. I, at 83 (1983) (including comments from sponsor of H.R. 7610 (1980) noting that compromises on LHWCA amendments included the elimination of “amendments concerning vocational rehabilitation which assured continued payment of benefits during rehabilitation”). 7 General Construction and LCA also invoke the language of § 8(g) of the LHWCA in support of the contention that the only money Congress intended to be provided to claimants during vocational rehabilitation is a $25 maintenance stipend. 33 U.S.C. §§ 908(g), 944. This argument ignores the plain language of the statute. Section 8(g) states that an injured GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO 2413
General Construction further argues that even if Abbott is a valid interpretation of the LHWCA, it is inapplicable here because Castro’s situation differs significantly from that of the claimant in Abbott. Specifically, (1) Castro’s program did not involve an agreement with the OWCP that expressly forbade his employment during the program; (2) General Construction itself never agreed to the rehabilitation plan; (3) the evidence showed Castro could work while enrolled in his rehabilitation program; (4) Castro was not diligent in attempting to locate work while pursuing the program; (5) completion of the program would not increase Castro’s earning capacity; and (6) Castro, unlike the claimant in Abbott, suffered scheduled injuries, and Pepco therefore limits Castro to recovery under the LHWCA’s schedule. [3] We agree with the Fourth Circuit in Newport News that Abbott did not set forth a rigid rule and that a number of factors enumerated by the BRB may be relevant to determining whether an individual may receive benefits while enrolled in a rehabilitation program. These include whether enrollment in the rehabilitation program precludes any employment; whether the employer agreed to the rehabilitation plan and continuing payment of temporary total disability benefits; whether completion of the program would benefit the claimant by increasing his wage-earning capacity; and whether the claimant showed full diligence in completing the program. Newport News, 315 F.3d at 293 (citing Gregory, 32 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. 264). The Fourth Circuit observed that no one of worker in vocational rehabilitation who is being rendered fit for remunerative occupation “shall receive additional compensation necessary for his maintenance, but such additional compensation shall not exceed $25 a week.” 33 U.S.C. § 908(g) (emphasis added). This language indicates Congress’s intent that the fee be paid in addition to—not in place of— other appropriate compensation. 2414 GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO these factors, standing alone, should necessarily be considered determinative. 315 F.3d at 295-96. [4] With respect to General Construction’s first argument, the ALJ noted that the BRB has interpreted Abbott to require only that a claimant show that, as a practical matter, he cannot obtain suitable alternative employment, not that he is contractually precluded from working. See Kee, 33 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. at 223. This approach makes sense given the language and purposes of the LHWCA, which provides for compensation for a claimant’s reduced earning capacity under a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(10) (defining “disability”), 908(a) (providing for determination of permanent total disability “in accordance with the facts”). A claimant’s earning capacity suffers as a result of his inability to engage in alternative employment, regardless of the cause of that inability. We agree with the ALJ that neither Abbott nor the LHWCA should be read to require that the inability have a contractual basis. With respect to General Construction’s second argument, the ALJ noted that General Construction objected to the rehabilitation plan and to continued benefits. But the ALJ also reasoned that allowing employers an effective veto power over OWCP-approved rehabilitation programs would undermine the LHWCA’s general policy of encouraging rehabilitation. We agree. There was no error in the ALJ’s decision that General Construction’s objection to the rehabilitation program does not sufficiently distinguish Castro’s case from Abbott. With respect to General Construction’s third argument, regarding evidence of Castro’s ability to work while pursuing his rehabilitation program, the ALJ evaluated relevant evidence, including the testimony of Castro and vocational experts Carol Williams and Kent Shafer. The ALJ based his decision that Castro could not work while pursuing his program mainly on Castro’s uncontradicted testimony that, including commuting, class, and study time, he devoted GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO 2415 between forty-six and fifty-four hours per week to completion of the program.8 General Construction notes that Castro worked briefly in a paid internship. But Castro had to resign this internship after eighty hours of work because of the demands of his rehabilitation program. The ALJ found this to be evidence that Castro was willing but unable to work, despite testimony to the contrary by General Construction’s expert. The ALJ’s factual finding is supported by substantial evidence. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3); Container Stevedoring Co., 935 F.2d at 1546. The ALJ similarly considered General Construction’s fourth argument, that Castro failed to show he searched diligently for work while pursuing his rehabilitation program. This argument is largely foreclosed by the ALJ’s determination that the time demands of Castro’s program precluded his employment during the program. Castro also presented evidence that he investigated jobs identified by General Construction but found them either unavailable or impracticable because of his commute. The ALJ’s finding is thus supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ also found that Castro was diligent in completing his program. See Newport News, 315 F.3d at 293 (citing Gregory, 32 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. 264). The ALJ found that, although Castro expressed concerns about falling behind in school, his records indicated that his enrollment since 1999 had not been significantly interrupted and that at the time of the hearing he was on schedule to complete his program. The ALJ’s finding that Castro had pursued his degree in the program diligently is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ also considered General Construction’s fifth argu- 8 Williams stated that Castro’s intellectual capacity and long commute would make combining school with a job difficult, while Shafer noted that travel requirements combined with cognitive capacity could prevent some people from working while in school. 2416 GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO ment, that Abbott should not apply because Castro’s rehabilitation program was not designed to improve his earning capacity. The ALJ noted that, although hotel management starting salaries were comparable to the salaries in the jobs General Construction had identified, Castro’s vocational advisors reasonably determined that training in hotel management would give Castro the best long-term earning potential.9 The ALJ was correct to focus on Castro’s long-term wage-earning prospects in assessing the rehabilitation program, see Newport News, 315 F.3d at 295-95 (“an immediate increase in wage earning capacity . . . is not . . . determinative”); Abbott, 40 F.3d at 128 (looking to employee’s long-term increase in wage-earning capacity in assessing reasonableness of vocational rehabilitation program), and his factual determination that Castro’s rehabilitation program provided the best longterm wage-earning prospects is supported by substantial evidence. [5] Neither the ALJ nor the BRB considered at length General Construction’s argument concerning the application of Pepco, 449 U.S. 268 (1980), to Castro’s case. However, the ALJ’s interpretation of the scope of Pepco correctly precluded application of that case to Castro’s claim for total disability benefits during his rehabilitation program. In Pepco, the Supreme Court held that where a claimant is entitled to partial disability benefits for a scheduled injury, those benefits are the claimant’s exclusive remedy; a claimant with a scheduled injury may not elect to recover benefits for partial disability on the basis of the claimant’s loss in earning capacity. Id. at 273-74. General Construction argues that if a claimant has a scheduled injury, and the employer shows that the claimant is employable, the claimant cannot also be entitled to an award of total disability benefits during a rehabilitation program; the argument implies that allowing recovery for the time spent in 9 Williams estimated that Castro could earn between $30,000 and $40,000 annually as a hotel manager, as compared to the $16,640 to $25,000 potential of the jobs identified by General Construction. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO. v. CASTRO 2417 the rehabilitation program is analogous to allowing recovery for a loss in earning capacity. The argument fails because, as the ALJ correctly noted, Pepco addresses only the statutory provisions for partial disability benefits. See id. at 274 & n.8; see also Brown, 34 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. at 198 (finding scheduled nature of claimant’s injury irrelevant to appropriateness of rehabilitation program and award of benefits for that period); Gregory, 32 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. at 265-66 (noting that “where claimant is totally disabled the schedule does not apply” and that “the fact that any permanent partial disability would be covered by the schedule is not determinative of the total disability issue”). Since Pepco does not address computations of awards for temporary total disability, which is the focus of the Abbott rule, we agree with the ALJ and the BRB that the scheduled or unscheduled nature of a claimant’s injury is irrelevant. [6] We conclude that the ALJ and BRB did not err in finding that Castro’s case did not differ materially from Abbott and Newport News so as to preclude application of the Abbott rule. We therefore affirm the award of permanent total disability benefits to Castro during his participation in his OWCP-approved rehabilitation program.