Opinion ID: 852085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Language of the Instruction

Text: This special advisement has traditionally been accomplished in Indiana by an instruction like the one rejected by the trial court in the present case. Language within Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction 12.01 provides: Where proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence only, it must be so conclusive in character and point so surely and unerringly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence. Ind. Pattern Jury InstructionCriminal 12.01 (emphasis added). Effective juror comprehension and application, however, are compromised by impediments in the instruction's languageespecially the uncertainties embedded in the phrases proof of guilt  and by circumstantial evidence only.  First, the instruction's languagethat it applies where proof of guilt is circumstantial onlyis potentially confusing. Proof of guilt could require that any evidence which supports an individual element of the charged offense be circumstantial, or it could require that all the evidence related to all elements of a charge be circumstantial. Compare Spears, 272 Ind. at 636-40, 401 N.E.2d at 334-35 (finding sufficient absence of direct evidence to warrant reasonable theory of innocence instruction despite direct evidence that the defendant and the victim were fighting earlier in the evening and that the victim was later found unconscious in the hallway, and that he died from skull fractures likely caused when his head hit the floor), with Davenport v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1144, 1149-50 (Ind.2001) (affirming refusal of reasonable theory of innocence instruction where victim died of strangulation and had thirty-nine injuries and witness observed defendant beating on the victim several hours earlier). In most criminal prosecutions, there is some direct evidence that the charged crime was committed by someone. Thus, if the phrase by circumstantial evidence only is construed to not require jurors to consider whether there exist reasonable alternative theories of innocence whenever the occurrence of a criminal offense is shown in part by direct evidence, then the instruction would rarely, if ever, be used. On the other hand, the mens rea element for a criminal offense is almost inevitably, absent a defendant's confession or admission, a matter of circumstantial proof. Thus, requiring jurors to consider the possible existence of an alternate reasonable theory of innocence whenever proof of the mens rea element is circumstantial would lead to use of the instruction in most all criminal cases. See Spears, 272 Ind. at 639-40, 401 N.E.2d at 335 (requiring the reasonable theory of innocence instruction when circumstantial evidence is the exclusive proof of the actus reus [5] but not when used to the mens rea : To hold otherwise would require a circumstantial evidence instruction in every case involving a crime containing the element of intent. Unnecessary confusion would result from such a course.). From our review of jurisdictions employing an instruction similar to our reasonable theory of innocence instruction, we find no consistent approach to resolving these issues. Mississippi requires an instruction requiring the exclusion of all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence whenever there is any direct evidence such as an admission or confession by the defendant to a significant element of the offense, or eyewitness testimony to the gravamen of the offense charged. McInnis, 61 So.3d at 876 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kirkwood v. State, 52 So.3d 1184, 1187 (Miss.2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Michigan, juries are instructed that [i]f the direct and circumstantial evidence, taken together, is open to two reasonable constructions, one indicating guilt and the other innocence, it is your duty to accept the construction indicating innocence. DeWitt, 433 N.W.2d at 329 (emphasis added). But Tennessee calls for the instruction only when the evidence is entirely circumstantial. [6] State v. Knight, 969 S.W.2d 939, 941-42 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997) (emphasis added); see also Teague, 680 S.W.2d at 790. Notwithstanding the strong support in Indiana case law for the concept of a reasonable theory of innocence instruction, in actual fact, the refusal of such instruction has rarely been found to be error, often based on the presence of evidence liberally deemed to be direct rather than circumstantial. See, e.g., Davenport, 749 N.E.2d at 1149-50 (finding direct evidence where son observed his mother being beaten by the defendant, sought to intervene but was struck by defendant and went to bed, and the next day the mother was found murdered by strangulation, which was not witnessed by the son); Clemens v. State, 610 N.E.2d 236, 243-44 (Ind.1993) (finding direct evidence from the defendant's admission that he was present when the victim sustained his mortal injuries and the pathologist testified that those injuries must have been inflicted intentionally); Chapman v. State, 556 N.E.2d 927, 931 (Ind. 1990) (finding direct evidence from testimony of bank teller who identified defendant as person standing outside bank before the robbery, but who could not see the facial features to identify the hooded robber who perpetrated the robbery). While this Court in Spears, which reversed a murder conviction, evaluated the necessity of giving a reasonable theory of innocence instruction by considering whether there was any direct evidence showing the actus reus of a charged crime, rather than just direct evidence of any element of the crime, 272 Ind. at 636-40, 401 N.E.2d at 334-35, this distinction has not yet been applied in any of our ensuing cases. Other than Spears, we find no case from this Court since 1928 that reversed a conviction due to a trial court's refusal to give a reasonable theory of innocence instruction. Landess v. State, 200 Ind. 440, 164 N.E. 267 (1928). [7] These issues are not clarified by the present pattern instruction, which fails to clearly inform jurors whether the requirement of heightened scrutiny of circumstantial evidence applies only when there is a complete absence of direct evidence on every element of an offense, or when there is an absence of direct evidence with respect to a significant element or crucial component of guilt, or when there is an absence of direct evidence proving any single element of the charged statutory offense, or otherwise. Second, the instruction unnecessarily calls upon the jury to determine whether evidence of guilt is circumstantial. Such an evaluation is already the province of the trial judge in deciding whether such instruction is required in light of the nature of the evidence presented. Distinguishing between direct and circumstantial evidence as proof of a particular fact is a legal determination appropriate for judicial evaluation. It may require intricate legal analysis. Direct evidence is [e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption. Black's Law Dictionary 636 (9th ed. 2009). Conversely, circumstantial evidence is [e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation. Id. Indiana case law has expressed it thusly: Direct evidence means evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference, and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact. Circumstantial evidence means evidence that proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. Gambill, 675 N.E.2d at 675. And to explain the meaning of inference, the jury in Gambill was further instructed: An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts. Id. But every evidentiary assertion at trial is direct evidence of something. That is, it is a fact offered as true and if accepted by the jury as such, conclusively establishes that fact. In the grouping of circumstantial evidence, difficulty has arisen from not keeping in mind that most circumstantial evidentiary facts must ultimately in turn become themselves a proposition and be proved by direct evidence and also from confining the latter term to assertions of some main fact in issue. For example, the finding of a bloody knife upon the accused after a secret killing is a circumstance from which an important inference may be drawn; yet this fact of the finding must be proved by some person's assertion. IA John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 25, at 955 (Tillers rev. 1983) (footnote omitted). Thus, as another example, footprints or fingerprints that place an accused at the scene of a crime may be direct evidence of the accused's presence at some point in time but only circumstantial proof that the accused committed the charged offense. [8]