Opinion ID: 1167064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ROSE v. LEPEILBET

Text: Lillian Rose sued her neighbor Leroy LePeilbet for cutting branches of her tree that overhung his land. Petitioner awarded judgment for $45, plus costs, on November 7, 1977. On appeal the superior court ordered judgment for defendant. The commission sustained three counts of wilful misconduct in a contempt proceeding on July 29, 1977, wherein LePeilbet and Braunstein, his attorney, were charged with refusal to pay the $45 in violation of what petitioner perceived as a stipulation in open court. The three counts sustained were (1) petitioner's improper injection of himself into the proceeding, resulting in denial of fair trial, (2) abuse of contempt power, and (3) failure to disqualify himself. The master had sustained only the first count, finding the acts it charged to be both wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct. He found that the acts charged in the second count were prejudicial conduct and that the third was not proved. Rose had filed her complaint on April 22, 1977. A judge other than petitioner issued a temporary restraining order against pruning the tree and an order to show cause. Hearing was held on May 20; the evidence of what happened at the hearing is unclear and disputed. Petitioner overruled LePeilbet's jurisdictional objection based on insufficiency of service. It was established that LePeilbet had completed the pruning before being served with the restraining order. The remaining issue was damages. LePeilbet through Braunstein apparently agreed that the case should be handled as a small-claims matter, authorizing the judge to make an independent investigation (Code Civ. Proc., § 117). Petitioner understood that LePeilbet also agreed to pay whatever damages the court found, and minutes in the docket reflect that understanding. (Both attorneys agreed to let court appoint a disinterested third party to establish the extent of damage done to the tree. Defendant to pay for damage, if any. Both attorneys stipulated that case subject to reopening at future date if necessary.) LePeilbet and Braunstein, however, each denied admitting liability. Their position from the outset was that LePeilbet had a privilege to prune branches overhanging his land. Petitioner wrote LePeilbet on June 3 that he had reviewed the oak tree with the county agricultural commissioner and concluded that LePeilbet's self help caused damage amounting to $45. Proof of corrective measures must be received by this court by July 1 or this matter will be reopened and an adverse judgment will be rendered on behalf of plaintiff.... Once you have met your obligation [for the $45] ... and I have received proof of such, this matter will be concluded once and for all. Braunstein's reply on June 15 contained these statements and others in similar vein: I was shocked by your letter.... [T]he matter heard by you was an Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction. It was not a trial of the facts.... Your statement that my client must take corrective measures on or before July 1st or face an adverse judgment without benefit of trial, smacks of Star-Chamber, a process I thought abolished in this country.... [S]ince you have pre-decided the case, I think you must disqualify yourself from hearing any further proceedings in the matter. On June 20 petitioner gave notice of a hearing on July 1. Braunstein replied on June 28 that he would be outside California on July 1 and had jury trials set for July 11 and 18, and he requested that the hearing be held no earlier than July 20. Petitioner wrote back that in view of your position the hearing would not be continued. Braunstein on June 22 had moved to disqualify petitioner (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6). Rose's attorney, Appelbaum, filed an opposing memorandum on June 30, arguing that petitioner's overruling of Braunstein's jurisdictional objection at the May 20 hearing was a ruling on a contested issue that made the disqualification motion untimely. Only Rose and Appelbaum appeared at the July 1 hearing. Petitioner denied the disqualification motion. He expressed anger at Braunstein's June 15 letter (Star-Chamber), which he read aloud. He suggested that Appelbaum file appropriate affidavits if Rose wished to enforce the May 20 stipulation by contempt proceedings. On July 7 petitioner issued a notice of Order to Show Cause hearing regarding a contempt of court to be held July 29. Declarations of Appelbaum and Rose were attached. The notice cited section 1209.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure but was intended to refer to section 1209, subdivision 5, which provides that disobedience of a court order is contempt. Petitioner regarded LePeilbet's noncompliance with the May 20 stipulation (interpreted as an admission of liability) as contempt under that provision even though no judgment had been entered. His policy in small claims matters was to defer formal judgment, thus relieving voluntarily complying defendants from unnecessary difficulties. At the July 29 hearing Braunstein denied statements in the Appelbaum and Rose declarations that LePeilbet had agreed at the May 20 hearing to pay damages fixed by the court. Petitioner elicited testimony of the Appelbaum version from his bailiff and clerk, then called LePeilbet to the stand. Braunstein invoked LePeilbet's privilege against self-incrimination. To overcome that objection, petitioner withdrew the contempt charge against LePeilbet. He then asked LePeilbet whether Braunstein had advised him not to comply with petitioner's order (the June 3 letter). Braunstein interposed the attorney-client privilege. Petitioner ordered LePeilbet to answer and denied his request to confer with counsel. Braunstein continued to raise the privilege, and petitioner threatened both with contempt. LePeilbet then testified about Braunstein's advice and other aspects of the case. Petitioner reprimanded Braunstein for failing to advise his client to pay the damages. The parties then entered into a written stipulation that the matter is deemed submitted as a motion for summary judgment. Judgment shall not be entered in excess of $45. Though the commission found the stipulation to have been coerced, Braunstein was satisfied with it as a means of obtaining an appealable judgment. Petitioner testified before the master that he overruled the attorney-client privilege because it does not apply where advice to violate a law is concerned. He contends here that he relied on Evidence Code section 956 (no privilege if lawyer's services were obtained to aid commission of crime or fraud). The master asked if petitioner saw any distinction between advice to commit a crime and advice on legal tactics to test the sufficiency of a court order in pending litigation. (See In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 148-149 [65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].) Petitioner answered that he didn't feel there was any pending litigation, other than compliance with the agreement. Appelbaum on October 7 wrote petitioner that, since no payment had been received, entry of judgment was requested. Petitioner scribbled on Appelbaum's letter: If JB [Braunstein] wishes another encounter with the Court he need only disregard my instructions one more time. On October 21 petitioner wrote counsel that, since Mr. Braunstein has failed to comprehend petitioner's preference for voluntary compliance in lieu of judgment, judgment was being rendered for plaintiff. From that judgment Braunstein took his successful appeal. (4) Clear and convincing evidence supports the commission's conclusion that at the July 29 hearing petitioner (1) improperly injected himself into the proceeding, and (2) abused his contempt power. As he now concedes, contempt was not a proper remedy to enforce the supposed stipulation to pay damages. His June 3 letter to LePeilbet stated that the alternative to payment would be entry of a judgment. His policy of deferring entry of small-claims judgments against defendants who would comply voluntarily with an informal decision was inapplicable once Braunstein announced LePeilbet's refusal to comply. The policy then became a purported justification for attempting to deprive LePeilbet of the rights of a judgment debtor. Moreover, petitioner wrongfully assumed a prosecutorial role. ( McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 12 Cal.3d 512, 533.) Petitioner justifiably was angered by the intemperate language of the June 15 (Star-Chamber) letter and properly might have taken remedial steps; e.g., by demanding an apology. It appears that instead he sought vindication through misuse of the contempt power. Thus we agree with the commission that petitioner's improper injection of himself into the proceeding and his abuse of the contempt power were wilful misconduct. (See fn. 4, ante. ) We agree with the master that the charge of failure to disqualify was not sustained. There was at least enough merit in Appelbaum's opposition to the June 22 motion to make its denial reasonable. The commission argues that petitioner should have disqualified himself once he had become personally embroiled. (5) Personal embroilment may require disqualification to adjudge contempt for disrespect to the court. ( Mayberry v. Pennsylvania (1971) 400 U.S. 455 [27 L.Ed.2d 532, 91 S.Ct. 499]; In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 255-257 [110 Cal. Rptr. 121, 514 P.2d 1201, 68 A.L.R.3d 248].) But the contempt charged here was noncompliance with a direction to pay money, not disrespect; and the refusal to disqualify was not misconduct.