Opinion ID: 493663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether FCC Order 81-312 is an Order for Purposes of Sec. 401(b)

Text: 22 The next question is whether FCC Order 81-312 constitutes an order of the Commission within the meaning of Sec. 401(b). 16 Appellants maintain that it does not because the Order resulted from a rulemaking as opposed to an adjudicatory proceeding. The gist of appellants' argument has been accepted by the First Circuit. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Maine, 742 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2902, 90 L.Ed.2d 988 (1986) [hereafter New England Telephone v. Maine ]. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the grant of an injunction under Sec. 401(b) to enforce a nonadjudicatory order. Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 740 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir.1984). 23 In New England Telephone v. Maine, the First Circuit based its decision primarily on two grounds. First, the court adopted the distinction between rules and orders that appears in the Administrative Procedure Act 17 . Second, it concluded that the central role of the FCC in enforcing the Communications Act, and its sole power to seek injunctions under Sec. 401(a), suggested that the scope for private enforcement under Sec. 401(b) should be narrow. 18 The court therefore concluded that an FCC directive that it considered to be the product of a rulemaking proceeding, and that was not specifically directed at the parties against whom enforcement was sought, was not enforceable under Sec. 401(b). 24 Like several other circuit courts, 19 we disagree with the First Circuit's reasoning. So did the FCC. See New England Telephone v. Maine, 742 F.2d at 10-11. 25 To begin with, we find no authority supporting the proposition that the APA's rule-order distinction should be imported into the Communications Act. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551 (use of APA's definitions is mandatory only when APA itself is applicable). In fact, the Communications Act's legislative history indicates that Sec. 401(b) was modeled in part after Sec. 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 16(12) (repealed). The wording of the two provisions is virtually identical, see S.Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). In Pacific Fruit Express Company v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad, 524 F.2d 1025, 1028-31 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1107, 47 L.Ed.2d 315 (1976), we held that Sec. 16(12) authorizes private in junctive actions to enforce ICC rules. The same result would seem to follow for FCC rules under Sec. 401(b). 26 Second, the language of other sections of the Communications Act shows that Congress did not intend to limit Sec. 401(b) exclusively to adjudicatory orders as the APA defines them. When Congress intended the APA's definition of a given term to be incorporated into the Communications Act, it said so. E.g., 47 U.S.C. Secs. 409(a)-(c) (incorporating APA's definition of adjudication). Congress never provided that the APA's definition of order should extend to Sec. 401(b). 20 27 We do not believe that our interpretation of Sec. 401(b) displaces the FCC from its central role in the enforcement of the Act. The FCC has broad discretion to act through either case-by-case adjudication or the rulemaking process. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Company, 392 U.S. 157, 180-81, 88 S.Ct. 1994, 2006-07, 20 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1968); see also SEC v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580-81, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (citing CBS, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 1202, 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1942)). Thus, the FCC can tailor directives to the needs of particular circumstances. Moreover, the FCC can intervene or file amicus briefs in Sec. 401(b) actions or even invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 762 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir.1985) (primary jurisdiction doctrine authorizes suspension of district court proceedings to allow agency to express views on pending issues within agency's special competence); but see New England Telephone v. Maine, 742 F.2d at 11 (noting that primary jurisdiction doctrine lacks needed clarity and efficiency). These mechanisms help to prevent substantially inconsistent application of FCC rules and serious judicial encroachment on FCC responsibilities. 28 We need not decide today whether every rule, order, or regulation promulgated by the FCC is an enforceable order under Sec. 401(b), however. The language of the particular order in question, and the proceedings leading up to it, demonstrate that the FCC intended Order 81-312 to require particular actions be taken by the PUC and private carriers providing service to Hawaii. 21 Appellant PUC conceded that it must abide by those FCC-mandated separations procedures. Under the circumstances, we conclude that FCC Order 81-312 was appropriately interpreted as an order for enforcement by injunction in the district court. 29