Opinion ID: 2584081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶ 16] The appellants argue that the district court's Order Authorizing Sale of Real Property was void ab initio because the district court (sitting in probate) for Johnson County lacked jurisdiction. In their responsive pleading to Allen's petition to sell the decedent's interest in the subject property, the appellants advanced the following argument for the first time in the district court: It appears from the death certificate of Edward Dale George that he was a resident of Sheridan County, Wyoming, at the time of his death; that his death occurred in Sheridan County, Wyoming; and that the real estate the Petitioner seeks to sell is located in Sheridan County, Wyoming, therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction in this matter. (Emphasis in original.) On appeal, the appellants assert, apparently for the first time, that the district court for Johnson County  was not the proper venue and therefore lacked jurisdiction in this matter. (Emphasis added.) They contend that we should reverse the district court's order and remand with instructions to transfer the venue of this matter to the district court (sitting in probate) for Sheridan County. [¶ 17] The district court concluded after the December 17, 2002, hearing that it had jurisdiction in this matter. Subject matter jurisdiction is `the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.' Lacey v. Lacey, 925 P.2d 237, 238 (Wyo.1996) ( quoting Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 903 (Wyo.1977)). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-101 (LexisNexis 2003) provides, in pertinent part: The district courts of the state have exclusive original jurisdiction of all matters relating to the probate and contest of wills and testaments, the granting of letters testamentary and of administration, and the settlement and distribution of decedents' estates. The court granting the letters has exclusive jurisdiction of all matters touching the settlement and distribution of the estates for which letters have been granted. The jurisdiction over subject matter of the district court sitting in probate, sometimes referred to in this Title 2 as the probate court, is coextensive with the jurisdiction over subject matter of the district court in any civil action. Allen's petition to sell the decedent's interest in the subject property clearly touched upon the settlement of an estate for which the district court had previously granted letters of administration. [5] [¶ 18] On appeal, the appellants argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction solely because venue was improper in the district court (sitting in probate) for Johnson County. This argument seems to confuse the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-102 (LexisNexis 2003) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Venue generally. (a) Wills shall be proved and letters testamentary or of administration granted: (i) In the county of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death, regardless of where he may have died[.] The following excerpt, although not specific to probate jurisdiction, generally illustrates the distinction between the two concepts: The district courts in this state are courts of general jurisdiction. Murrell v. Stock Growers' National Bank of Cheyenne, 74 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir.1934). See Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953 (1937). As such, they have inherent subject matter jurisdiction over any and all cases in which jurisdiction is not specifically vested in some court of limited jurisdiction. Wyoming Constitution, Art. 5, § 10; Murrell, 74 F.2d at 831.... Once jurisdiction is acquired, the district court has the power to hear and determine the matter and to render a binding judgment. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.1980); State v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District in and for Natrona County, 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545 (1925). We adopt the analysis found in Sil-Flo Corporation v. Bowen, 98 Ariz. 77, 402 P.2d 22 (1965), and recognize that the power to enter a binding judgment is equally present among all district courts in the state. In this context, venue is never a consideration. See Myuskovich [v. State ex rel. Osborn, 59 Wyo. 406], 14[1] P.2d [540] at 543 [ (1943) ]. It follows that the authority to enter summary judgment or any other order in favor of or against Hall properly is vested in any, or all, of the district courts in the state. That authority does not reside only in the court in which proper venue is found. In view of this widely vested authority, Hall's contention that the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Campbell County was without jurisdiction is without merit. Since jurisdiction, with its inherent power to render judgment, is present despite any impropriety with respect to venue, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District in and for Converse County properly followed § 27-12-601. Subject matter jurisdiction would be present whether it did or did not. It is proper, however to remind our district courts and counsel that the remedy with respect to questions of venue is a request to change venue to the proper court. Unless specifically mandated by statute, the absence of proper venue does not result in a dismissal, a reversal, or a new trial. See Sil-Flo, 402 P.2d at 27. Furthermore, we expect the aggrieved party to make a timely objection, or to request a change. Otherwise, venue will be deemed proper. Such a result is justified because venue normally is founded upon convenience to the parties to the litigation. It does not reach the judicial power. Matter of Larsen, 770 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo.1989). See also Hronek v. St.Joseph's Children's Home, 866 P.2d 1305, 1309-10 (Wyo.1994). [¶ 19] The filings and pleadings in this case contain conflicting information as to where the decedent resided at the time of his death and Straight was the source of some of this conflicting information. Interestingly, despite the conflicting information, the only formal findings the district court made in its prior orders appear to have been that the decedent was a resident of Johnson County at the time of his death. Because the appellants have not provided us a proper record, we do not know what, if any, evidence was presented at the December 17, 2002, hearing in order to evaluate this issue to the extent the appellants now claim it relates specifically to venue. [¶ 20] We do know that, based on the state of the record on appeal, the appellants did not raise this issue in the district court precisely as one based on improper venue. We generally will not review issues raised for the first time on appeal except for jurisdictional issues and those so fundamental in nature that they must be considered. In re Pohl, 980 P.2d 816, 819 (Wyo.1999). Venue does not reach the judicial power. Matter of Larsen, 770 P.2d at 1092. Without a record of the hearing, the above-quoted argument from the appellants' responsive pleading to Allen's petition is the only item indicating the manner in which the appellants raised the issue in the district court. That argument challenges the district court's jurisdiction, not venue, and the appellants did not request that the district court transfer venue to another court. The resulting finding by the district court was that it had jurisdiction. Notably, on appeal (although the appellants appear to confuse the relationship between the two concepts) the appellants specifically discuss venue accompanied by citations to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-102 (probate court venue) and specifically discuss jurisdiction accompanied by citations to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-101 (probate court jurisdiction). In the district court, the appellants only discussed the district court's jurisdiction without citing either statute. [¶ 21] Nevertheless, and notwithstanding other potential issues as to whether the appellants waived consideration of, or should be estopped from raising, this issue in terms of venue, the appellants' remedy on appeal in the instant case is not a reversal of the district court's order authorizing Allen to sell the decedent's interest in the subject property. Matter of Larsen, 770 P.2d at 1092. It is worth noting that the district judge who decided the merits of Allen's petition is the sitting district judge in the District Court for Sheridan County of the Fourth Judicial District, which venue the appellants claim to be the proper venue for the instant case. [¶ 22] Allen asks that we sanction the appellants for lack of cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority. The appellants, although minimally, did generally cite to the record and to some pertinent legal authority, and we conclude that this is not one of those rare circumstances where sanctions pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 are appropriate. [¶ 23] Affirmed.