Opinion ID: 1159635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: interpretation of rcw 42.17.680(3) under wac 390-17-100

Text: The Public Disclosure Commission promulgated WAC 390-17-100 on authorizations for withholding political contributions under RCW 42.17.680(3). It reads: WAC 390-17-100 Contribution withholding authorizations. (1) For purposes of RCW 42.17.680(3), all political contribution withholding authorizations existing on or before January 1, 1993, will expire no later than December 31, 1993. Beginning January 1, 1994, each employer or other person who withholds or otherwise diverts a portion of wages or salary of a Washington resident or a nonresident whose primary place of work is in the state of Washington (a) For the purpose of making one or more contributions to any political committee required to report pursuant to RCW 42.17.040, [42.17].050, [42.17].060 or [42.17].090(1)(k), or (b) For use, specifically designated by the contributing employee, for political contributions to candidates for state or local office is required to have on file the written authorization of the individual subject to the payroll withholding or diversion of wages. (Emphasis added.) Appellants contend that Respondent School Districts violated RCW 42.17.680(3) by withholding dues and COP assessment deductions from the salaries or wages of WEA member-employees without their prior annual written authorization for contributions to political committees or for use as political contributions to candidates for state or local office. Respondent School Districts counter that transmitting the withheld funds to the WEA is not a political contribution under subsection (3). Appellants respond that, since the WEA makes political contributions from the withheld funds, the payments to it are necessarily also political contributions. This is not necessarily so. Respondent School Districts agree with the trial court's conclusion that RCW 42.17.680(3) contains both patent [75] and latent [76] ambiguities which are resolved by the administrative rule promulgated by the PDC. [77] The School Districts' main argument is that their transmitting WEA general membership dues and COP assessments complies with the statute because they have fully complied with WAC 390-17-100. The Districts maintain that WAC 390-17-100 resolves the ambiguities of subsection (3) by requiring employers to obtain annual authorizations for withholding salaries or wages only if (1) the payee is registered as a political committee with the PDC at the time the payment is made or (2) the payment is made as a designated contribution to a person who is a candidate for state or local political office. The Districts argue the contrary interpretation suggested by Appellants would require an employer to follow the money deducted from the employee-member's paycheck, determine its intended use and then require authorization, regardless whether the recipient of the deduction uses the funds as intended. They assert they have no control over expenditure by the WEA of withheld funds they forward to it or its affiliates. The powers of an administrative agency are derived from statutory authority expressly granted or necessarily implied. [78] The PDC has an express grant of authority to adopt rules to implement the policies and statutes contained in chapter 42.17 RCW. [79] Although an agency does not have the power to promulgate rules which amend or change legislative enactments, the agency may adopt rules which fill in the gaps if those rules are necessary for effectuation of a general statutory scheme. [80] Implementation and enforcement of RCW 42.17.680(3) required that the PDC promulgate rules for guidance to employers concerning the circumstances under which an employer must require written annual authorization prior to withholding or diverting a portion of an employee's wages or salaries for political purposes. [A]dministrative rules adopted pursuant to a legislative grant of authority are presumed to be valid and should be upheld on judicial review if they are reasonably consistent with the statute being implemented. [81] [A] party attacking the validity of an administrative rule has the burden of showing compelling reasons that the rule is in conflict with the intent and purpose of the legislation. [82] Appellants have not satisfied this burden. WAC 390-17-100 requires an annual authorization only for funds withheld or diverted from an employee's wages for contributions to a political committee or for political contributions to candidates for state or local offices specifically designated by the contributing employee. When an employer has notice that the funds deducted are for the use of a political committee or candidate, the employer may not then make that deduction without specific annual authorization. However, when the employer makes deductions under the Education Employment Relations Act, RCW 41.59.100, and the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, RCW 41.56.110, and the employer is not made aware of the specific intended use of the funds, the employer has no legal obligation or authority to seek annual written authorization. [83] In analyzing an administrative rule adopted by an agency charged with enforcing a statute, this Court has stated that: The validity of an administrative rule may also be tested by the construction placed on the authorizing statute by the administrative agency. [citations omitted.] Moreover, an administrative construction nearly contemporaneous with the passage of the statute, especially when the legislature fails to repudiate the contemporaneous construction, is entitled to great weight.[ [84] ] Initiative 134 was passed by popular vote on November 3, 1992 and codified in exact language as RCW 42.17.680(3). WAC 390-17-100 was promulgated by the PDC to implement the statute and became effective on August 30, 1993. In November 1996, the Executive Director of the PDC concluded that RCW 42.17.680(3) did not apply to the WEA nor labor organizations generally. [85] The Legislature has neither repudiated that interpretation by the PDC nor amended the statute. In 1997 and 1998, the Legislature considered proposed legislation which would have amended RCW 42.17.680(3) by restricting expenditures by entities receiving funds through payroll deductions. No such legislation was passed. [86] The Legislature has apparently acquiesced in the PDC's interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3) since 1996. Appellants claim the intent of the drafters of Initiative 134, Section 8, was to protect the constitutional rights of labor organization members. They advocate a liberal interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3). [87] Respondents Education Association and School Districts both assert Appellants' constitutional argument is without merit because neither the text of the initiative nor the Voter's Pamphlet refer to the constitution. The intent of the electorate in initiatives must be ascertained from the language of the initiative itself, as well as from statements contained in the official Voters Pamphlet. [88] Initiatives are not construed like other legislation because, in interpreting them, reviewing courts focus on the language of the initiative `as the average informed lay voter would read it.' [89] Although chapter 42.17 RCW is to be construed liberally, this Court need not do so if such a construction would result in an unlikely, absurd, or strained interpretation of the statutory language. [90] Appellants base their arguments on what they perceive to be the intent of subsection (3), while ignoring the language of Initiative 134 and the language of the voters pamphlet. In determining the purpose or intent of the statute based upon the initiative, the Court may consider arguments made for and against the initiative in the Voters Pamphlet. [91] The Voters Pamphlet makes no reference to court decisions or agency practice. [92] The intent of the people of this State in enacting Initiative 134 can be determined from the declarations in RCW 42.17.610 and.620. [93] Appellants contend that RCW 42.17.610(1) and RCW 42.17.620(2) support their position on the purpose of RCW 42.17.680(3). They claim subsection (3) was adopted to stop unions from amassing large funds ... for politics without authorization. [94] However, RCW 42.17.610(1) and RCW 42.17.620(2) relate only to campaign contributions to political candidates, as codified in RCW 42.17.640. The remaining findings in RCW 42.17.610 similarly limit their application to candidates and elected officials. RCW 42.17.620(2) may be construed as applying only to contribution limits for political campaigns. It does not identify large organizational contributors. No distinction is made between labor organizations and corporations with respect to limits on campaign contributions unless specifically noted as in RCW 42.17.760. RCW 42.17.640 relates to contribution limits for all persons. Its language does not distinguish between labor organizations and corporations and treats all donors equally. Under RCW 42.17.640, the intent to reduce the influence of large organizational contributors is achieved by imposition of a maximum contribution limit on all donors. Contrary to Appellants' assertions, the stated intent to reduce the influence of large organizational contributors does not mean that labor organizations are prohibited from using their general treasury funds for contributions and expenditures defined under RCW 42.17.020(14), (19). The full context of Initiative 134 suggests the reference to limiting the influence of labor organizations and all large organizational contributors is associated with the provisions limiting contributions to candidates. This language does not justify creation of unstated prohibitions on a wide variety of campaign activity by labor organizations. Prior to passage of Initiative 134, there were no restrictions on the type of funds a labor organization could use for contributions defined by RCW 42.17.020(14). RCW 42.17.760 restricts the expenditures a labor organization may make in only one way: by preventing labor organizations from using agency shop fees paid by non-members to operate a political committee or influence an election. In prohibiting only the use of agency shop fees paid by nonmembers, RCW 42.17.760 inferentially allows labor organizations to use dues paid by members for contributions to political committees and candidates. The drafters of Initiative 134 prohibited use of agency shop fees collected from nonmembers. This leads to the logical conclusion that the Initiative did not alter the ability of labor organizations to use members' dues for contributions under Chapter 42.17 RCW. Contrary to Appellant's assertions, RCW 42.17.680(3) does not prohibit the use of a labor organization's general treasury funds for political contributions. The trial court was correct in its adoption of the PDC's interpretation in WAC 390-17-100 which clarifies both RCW 42.17.680(3) and RCW 42.17.760. RCW 42.17.680(3) permits a labor organization to use for political purposes general treasury funds obtained from dues of members, while RCW 42.17.760 prohibits the labor organization from using for political purposes agency shop fees paid by non-members. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that, whenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no part of the statutory scheme is rendered superfluous. [95] To accomplish this purpose, all provisions should be harmonized. [96] This we have done. There is no statutory prohibition against a labor organization using general treasury funds obtained from members' dues for the purpose of operating a political committee, influencing an election or to otherwise make contributions to a political committee or candidate.