Opinion ID: 222432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transporting a Firearm in the Course of Dealing Firearms Without a License

Text: Tyson was charged and convicted on twelve counts of transporting a firearm in the course of dealing firearms without a license  a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). [12] Section 922(a)(1)(A) states that it is unlawful for any person except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce[.] To obtain a conviction under this provision, the government must show that the defendant (1) engaged in the business of dealing in firearms; (2) was not a federally licensed firearms dealer; and (3) acted willfully. United States v. Palmieri, 21 F.3d 1265, 1268-70 & n. 4 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 513 U.S. 957, 115 S.Ct. 413, 130 L.Ed.2d 329 (1994); see also United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549, 554 (11th Cir.1996); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (providing mens rea requirement). The District Court held that there was sufficient evidence to prove Tyson was not a federally licensed firearms dealer, but insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he was engaged in the business of dealing in firearms. [13] But what does it mean to be engaged in the business of dealing in firearms? According to the statute, a person is so engaged when he or she devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). To conduct business `with the principal objective of livelihood and profit' means that the intent underlying the sale or disposition of firearms is predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and pecuniary gain, as opposed to other intents, such as improving or liquidating a personal firearms collection. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22). In this vein, the statute explicitly exempts those who make[] occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sell[] all or part of [their] personal collection of firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). By the statute's terms, then, a defendant engages in the business of dealing in firearms when his principal motivation is economic (i.e., obtaining livelihood and profit) and he pursues this objective through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms. Palmieri, 21 F.3d at 1268 (stating that economic interests are the principal purpose, and repetitiveness is the modus operandi ). Although the quantity and frequency of sales are obviously a central concern, so also are (1) the location of the sales, (2) the conditions under which the sales occurred, (3) the defendant's behavior before, during, and after the sales, (4) the price charged for the weapons and the characteristics of the firearms sold, and (5) the intent of the seller at the time of the sales. Id. (explaining that the finder of fact must examine the intent of the actor and all circumstances surrounding the acts alleged to constitute engaging in business). As is often the case in such analyses, the importance of any one of these considerations is subject to the idiosyncratic nature of the fact pattern presented. Here, the government presented substantial indirect evidence of repetitive sales. Over the course of approximately seven months, Tyson flew to the Virgin Islands four times. Directly before each of these trips, he purchased several firearms in Tennessee. Tyson carried some number of these weapons on at least three of his flights and he never registered a single gun with the local police when he landed in St. Thomas. In total, Tyson purchased thirty-five firearms during the relevant time period. Only twelve were ever recovered; eleven guns were seized on July 31 and one weapon  with its serial number obliterated  was confiscated from Jelani LaTorre. A reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that Tyson sold the twenty-three unrecovered (and unregistered) firearms during his first three trips to the Virgin Islands. A jury could further infer that Tyson had similar intentions for the eleven guns with which he was apprehended on the day of his arrest. There was also evidence that Tyson's repetitive sales were driven by a pecuniary motive. In January 2008, LaTorre wired $330 to Tyson in Tennessee. Several weeks later, Tyson purchased a Hi-Point 9mm handgun for $139. The jury was free to infer from this evidence that Tyson had not only sold LaTorre the weapon, but that he did so for a sizeable markup. Such profit-seeking behavior falls squarely within the statutory definition of firearms dealing. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22). In addition, the government introduced a notepad seized from Tyson's residence in Tennessee. One page of the pad contained the notations AK and AR, along with two columns labeled Spent and Profit. Agent Jenkins testified that the AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifle were two of the more common semiautomatic firearms available for sale in Tennessee. Tyson bought several of each. On the notepad, the number 2000 appeared below the Profit column next to AK; the number 1900 was written in the Profit column corresponding to AR. The jury could well have reasoned that the word Profit meant exactly what it said and that the numbers appearing in this column reflected a positive monetary yield. What is more, the overall timing and condition of the sales strongly suggests a pecuniary motive. Before each trip to St. Thomas, Tyson embarked on a purchasing spree, only to resell his newly-acquired arsenal when he arrived in the Virgin Islands. This buy-fly-resell pattern of behavior seems susceptible of no other explanation than one of economic gain. The government's evidence is bolstered by the fact that Tyson himself admitted that he was traveling to the Virgin Islands in order to buy and sell firearms. Delta ticketing agent Breeding testified that she assisted Tyson with his baggage prior to several of his flights. Each time, Tyson told Breeding that he intended to sell the firearms packed in his luggage once he arrived in the Virgin Islands. In one instance, Tyson said that he was an antique gun buyer and collector, and that he had a purchaser for all of the guns when he got back to the islands. The District Court discounted these assertions as mere puffery. Such a finding was unwarranted in light of the record as a whole. Indeed, there was ample evidence that Tyson was transporting large numbers of firearms to the Virgin Islands in order to turn a profit from their resale. Thus, when Tyson told Breeding that this was exactly what he was up to, the jury had every right to conclude that he was telling the truth. By minimizing Tyson's assertions, the District Court overrode the jury's credibility determination and substituted its own. This was error. See United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 348 (3d Cir.2005) (stating that [w]e do not weigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses on sufficiency of the evidence review (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). For the reasons set forth above, we find that the government put on substantial proof to show that Tyson was engaged in the business of dealing in firearms. The record further demonstrates that he did so with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. A defendant must act willfully to be criminally liable under § 922(a)(1)(A). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D). A willful action is one undertaken with a `bad purpose' or an evil-meaning mind. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191, 193, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998). Proof of willfulness therefore requires evidence that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. Id. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (interpreting the term willfully in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D)) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994)). Tyson completed an ATF Form 4473 for each firearm he purchased in Tennessee. This form contains language printed in bold directly above the signature line that states, I ... understand that the repetitive purchase of firearms for the purpose of resale for livelihood and profit without a Federal firearms license is a violation of the law. Each time he signed a Form 4473, Tyson certified his knowledge of the law. This alone is sufficient to demonstrate willfulness in the circumstances present here. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1995). And there was more. Tyson undertook measures to conceal his trafficking activity. He kept coded records. He told others that he was selling antique guns, presumably because he knew that antique firearms are exempted from the trafficking statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1)(3) (defining firearm and stating that antique firearms are not considered firearms for purposes of the trafficking statute). Similarly, Tyson called himself a firearms collector, which, if true, would also have shielded him from criminal trafficking liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (stating that one who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of his personal collection of firearms is not a dealer in firearms). These were lies designed to game the system. After all, none of the firearms purchased by Tyson were antiques and his behavior was decidedly inconsistent with that of a collector. [14] The jury could reasonably conclude that by calling himself a collector, and by describing his firearms as antiques, Tyson crafted a falsehood with the statute's exemptions in mind. Such behavior betrays knowledge of unlawful conduct. In sum, the District Court committed error when it set aside Tyson's conviction on twelve counts of transporting a firearm in the course of dealing firearms without a license. We will vacate the judgment of acquittal with orders to reinstate the jury's verdict on each of the twelve counts.