Opinion ID: 6316806
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invited Error: Total-Restitution Amount

Text: As mentioned, Williams claims that the district court erred by imposing the total amount of restitution that he stipulated to in the Plea Agreement. He faults the district court, not himself. We, on the other hand, fault Williams, who invited any alleged error. “The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action by a court and later seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was error.” United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1178 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). And more specifically, a defendant cannot invite a district court to impose restitution and later complain that the court was without authority to require any restitution. Id. at 1179 (citation omitted) (ruling in a case in which the defendant stipulated to a smaller amount of restitution than the court ordered); see also United States v. Sukhtipyaroge, 1 F.4th 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2021) (ruling in a visa-fraud case that by expressly agreeing that a person “was entitled to at least some restitution as an ‘identifiable victim,’ [the defendant] cannot now make the exact opposite 8 In United States v. Peterson, 268 F.3d 533, 534 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.), the court addressed a similar claim from a defendant who on appeal “sings a different tune.” After reciting the plea-agreement benefits that the defendant sought to keep while contesting his stipulated restitution, the court observed that “[i]t is not clear that he understands the principal implication of this position: that his plea must be set aside, the four dismissed counts reinstated, and the prosecution resumed in the district court.” Id. The court noted that it was “not an option” for the defendant to have the benefits of the plea agreement without the detriments. Id. In the court’s words, “[t]he whole plea agreement stands, or the whole thing fails.” Id. (citation omitted). 13 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 14 argument on appeal” (citation omitted)); United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that defendant waived any challenge to the restitution amount when he stipulated to that amount in his plea agreement). By stipulating to the total-restitution amount, Williams did more than not object. With eyes open, he agreed that he owed $1,146,828.28 of restitution—the amount he still owed on his fraudulent bank loans. His stipulation on total restitution led the government to move to dismiss the remaining counts and agree not to charge him further. Yet Williams now complains that $1,146,828.28 in restitution exceeds the $787,574.58 he then owed on his fraudulent loan charged in Count One, his sole count of conviction. But Williams knew that $1,146,828.28 exceeds $787,574.58 when he stipulated to the totalrestitution amount. By stipulating to the total-restitution amount while referencing the MVRA, Williams necessarily agreed that the MVRA supported that amount. 9 And here, as 9 As we understand it, Williams may be trying to short-circuit this conclusion by suggesting that the MVRA disallows a defendant from stipulating in a plea agreement to total restitution. In this regard, he contrasts language in the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, stating that “[t]he court may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement” with the MVRA’s silence on that point. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). This misses the mark. The quoted language from subsection (a)(3) simply allows the parties to stipulate to restitution in “any criminal case,” not just cases involving the crimes specified in subsection (a)(1)(A). Otherwise stated, the “to the extent agreed” phrase modifies “any criminal case,” not “restitution.” Reading this sentence as Williams does requires treating “any criminal case” as surplusage. Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be ignored.”). Further, neither the MVRA nor the VWPA limits total restitution—by allowing parties to stipulate to restitution for nonvictims, both statutes take any cap off restitution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(1)(A), 3663A(a)(3). 14 Appellate Case: 19-1229 Document: 010110565060 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 15 explained below, the district court could consider both the MVRA “victim” definitions in accepting and adopting the parties’ stipulated total-restitution amount. In that circumstance, Williams is stuck with any error he invited with his stipulation. He cannot escape his invitation by now seeking to undermine its bank-fraud-scheme underpinnings with arguments for extensions or reinterpretations of our circuit law (as discussed later). By leading the district court to impose total restitution of $1,146,828.28, Williams necessarily conceded that his § 1344 bank-fraud scheme justified that amount of restitution under the MVRA. The parties couldn’t get to that high a figure without accounting for the losses from the entire scheme. Simply put, Williams invited any alleged error.