Opinion ID: 2979757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Standard for Equitable Tolling

Text: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides a one-year statute of limitations for filing petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 4 No. 09-5447 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D). Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year statute of limitations applicable to Petitioner’s habeas petition began to run on October 5, 2003, after his conviction became final. The statute of limitations was tolled 11 days later on October 16, 2003, when Petitioner moved for state post-conviction relief. The clock began to run again on October 2, 2006, after the Tennessee Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over Petitioner’s post-conviction appeal. Petitioner’s filing window expired 354 days later on September 21, 2007. Petitioner concedes that his petition for habeas corpus, filed on October 23, 2007, is barred by the statute of limitations. However, the AEDPA statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006). Therefore, courts may review time-barred petitions for habeas corpus under the doctrine of equitable tolling provided that “a litigant’s failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.” Robertson v. Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). To qualify for equitable tolling, Petitioner must make the two-part showing that (1) he diligently pursed his appellate rights and (2) “some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing.” Id. at 784 (citing Holland v. Florida, __ U.S. __ , 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010)).1 An 1 Prior to Holland, this Court considered five factors when determining whether to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations: (1) the petitioner’s lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner’s lack of constructive 5 No. 09-5447 attorney’s failure to comply with professional standards of conduct may constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief. See, e.g., Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562–65; Gordon v. England, 354 F. App’x 975, 980 (6th Cir. 2009). Extraordinary circumstances may also exist when petitioners face a substantial, involuntary delay in learning about the status of their appeals. See Miller v. Collins, 305 F.3d 491, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2002). However, “the statute of limitations may only be tolled where the circumstances are both beyond the petitioner’s control and unavoidable even with due diligence.” Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1008; accord Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, Petitioner must demonstrate that he exercised reasonable diligence in protecting his appellate rights.