Opinion ID: 1301570
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty under Wisconsin law

Text: ¶ 11 Duty has always been a relevant element in Wisconsin's negligence analysis even though cases have more often been limited by the application of public policy factors. Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 20, ¶ 36, 308 Wis.2d 17, 746 N.W.2d 220; see also Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 2009 WI 71, ___ Wis.2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Roggensack, J., concurring) (discussing duty under Wisconsin negligence law). The prevalence of a public policy factor analysis, however, does not eliminate consideration of the four elements of negligence. See Hoida, 291 Wis.2d 283, ¶ 23 n. 12, 717 N.W.2d 17 (reaffirming that there are four elements to a negligence analysis). Our focus in this case centers on the first element of duty. Under the first element, duty, involves two aspects: (1) the existence of a duty of ordinary care; and (2) an assessment of what ordinary care requires under the circumstances. Id., ¶ 27 (citing Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank Wis., 2005 WI 109, ¶¶ 17-18, 283 Wis.2d 234, 700 N.W.2d 15). ¶ 12 While Wisconsin has adopted the minority view from Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), which established that everyone owes a duty to the world at large, the duty owed to the world is not unlimited but rather is restricted to what is reasonable under the circumstances. Hoida, 291 Wis.2d 283, ¶¶ 30-32, 717 N.W.2d 17. As a result, Wisconsin courts have in the past precluded negligence actions because a defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances. See Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, ¶¶ 18-21, 277 Wis.2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1 (concluding that the architect did not have a duty to supervise the construction of a church because the architect's contract stated he had no responsibility for construction of the church); Hatleberg, 283 Wis.2d 234, ¶¶ 19-25, 700 N.W.2d 15 (concluding that a trustee of a bank did not have a duty to review a trust document to ascertain whether it worked for the stated purpose of the trust). ¶ 13 For example, in Hoida, we concluded that the plaintiff's claims were precluded because its claim of a breach [wa]s based entirely on the theory that the defendants' duty of ordinary care under the circumstances required them to undertake certain tasks that we [] concluded ordinary care under the circumstances did not require. Id., ¶ 46. Thus, because there was no duty under the circumstances, no breach occurred, and there was not a viable negligence claim. Id. In Hoida, we relied on contractual provisions to evaluate the circumstances bearing on the scope of the defendant's duty of ordinary care. Id., ¶¶ 38-39. In the case at hand, we rely on common law doctrines governing surface water to ascertain the defendants' duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.