Opinion ID: 2335410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: 2009 Disqualification of Mann as Witness

Text: Judge Rome's alternative 2009 basis for disqualifying Mann was his belief that Mann was a possible witness in this matter likely to testify favorably to the defense on the contested question of causation. He regarded Mann's mention in his February 19, 2001, letter to the driver's insurance company of paralysis [Venters] sustained as a result of the automobile accident as one of Mann's conflicting representations on the cause of Venters' paralysis. Apparently Judge Rome also viewed Mann's settlement of Venters' claim against the driver as another admission that the auto accident, rather than Sellers' malpractice, was the cause of Venters' paralysis. This court has evaluated whether an attorney must be disqualified as a necessary witness by looking at what is required of an attorney under the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 3.7 and its modifying rules, Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.9. Dimaplas, 267 Kan. at 68, 978 P.2d 891. Only Rules 3.7 and 1.7 are relevant here. KRPC 3.7, Lawyer as Witness, states: (a) A lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2)the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. (a) A lawyer may act as an advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 562). KRPC 1.7, Conflict of Interest: Current Clients, states: (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a substantial risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 472-73.) This court has noted that KRPC 3.7 prohibits a lawyer from being an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is a material witness on a contested issue. (Emphasis added.) Dimaplas, 267 Kan. at 71, 978 P.2d 891 (citing In re Harris, 261 Kan. 1063, 934 P.2d 965 [1997]). Comment 1 to KRPC 3.7 states that the concern underlying this rule is that [c]ombining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 562.) Comment 2 to KRPC 3.7 further explains that [t]he opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's right in the litigation. (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 562.) The burden of proof on showing if an attorney is likely to be a necessary witness in a motion to disqualify under KRPC 3.7 is generally on the moving party. Chrispens, 257 Kan. at 755, 897 P.2d 104. In Chrispens, we reaffirmed that the burden of proof to disqualify an attorney under Rule 1.9(a), which, like Rule 1.7, deals with conflict of interest, is upon the party alleging the conflict. Chrispens, 257 Kan. at 755, 897 P.2d 104; see e.g., National Bank of Andover, N.A. v. Aero Standard Tooling Inc., 30 Kan. App.2d 784, 792, 49 P.3d 547 (2002); LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart, 19 Kan.App.2d 740, 746, 750, 876 P.2d 184 (1994). Federal cases also place the burden of proof under these circumstances on the movant. See, e.g., Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F.Supp. 949, 957 (D.Kan.1991). Placing the burden of proof on the party seeking disqualification is consistent with this court's concern with avoidance of abusive practice. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 266 Kan. at 1057-58, 975 P.2d 231 (purpose of rules of professional conduct can be subverted when used by opposing parties as procedural weapons). Our Court of Appeals has further observed that the potential for abuse of disqualification motions is heightened when the party seeking to call an attorney as a witness is the same party seeking disqualification, as here. See National Bank of Andover, 30 Kan. App.2d at 791, 49 P.3d 547 (citing LeaseAmerica Corp., 19 Kan.App.2d. at 750, 876 P.2d 184). The United States District Court for the District of Kansas has expressed this same sentiment. See Chapman, 766 F.Supp. at 959 (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Frazier, 637 F.Supp. 77, 81 [D.Kan.1986]). We agree. The burden of demonstrating the need for disqualification of Mann under Rule 3.7 properly rests with Sellers. This court has not previously articulated an analytical approach for determining whether an attorney is likely to be a necessary witness under KRPC 3.7 when the opposing party is the party seeking disqualification. But we have noted generally that a court should consider the privacy of the attorney-client relationship, the prerogative of a party to choose counsel, and the hardships that disqualification imposes on the parties and the entire judicial process. Lansing-Delaware Water District v. Oak Lane Park, Inc., 248 Kan. 563, 571, 808 P.2d 1369 (1991). Our Court of Appeals has provided further sound guidance: There are three factors to be considered when weighing a motion to disqualify an attorney because the opposing party desires to call the attorney as a witness: (1) whether it has been shown that the attorney would give evidence material to the determination of the issues being litigated; (2) whether the evidence could not have been obtained elsewhere; and (3) whether the attorney's testimony would have been prejudicial or potentially prejudicial to the testifying attorney's client. National Bank of Andover, 30 Kan.App.2d 784, Syl. ¶ 9, 49 P.3d 547. See also LeaseAmerica Corp., 19 Kan.App.2d at 750-51, 876 P.2d 184. The first and second factors listed by the Court of Appeals go to the question of whether the attorney is in fact a necessary witness. The third factor addresses the concern of a concurrent conflict of interest between an attorney and his or her client expressed in KRPC 1.7. Before Judge Rome, Sellers argued that Mann would be a necessary trial witness because of his February 19, 2001, letter and because of the decision of the driver's insurance company to settle Venters' claim for the driver's policy limits. Judge Rome's ultimate decision to disqualify Mann because of his witness status appears to have been based solely on Mann's 2001 letter and O'Neal's affidavit. At oral argument before this court, however, counsel for Sellers no longer took the position that Mann was likely to be called as a witness on causation. Still, he characterized Mann's 2001 letter as a possible admission against his client's interest. We detect several fatal legal and factual infirmities in Sellers' shifting positions and Judge Rome's decision on this issue. First, Sellers' assertion that counsel for plaintiff can be pressed into service as a defense causation witness in a medical malpractice case has no legal foundation. The establishment or contest of causation in such a case requires expert medical testimony. Plaintiff's cases lacking such testimony are vulnerable to defense summary judgment motions. See Puckett v. Mt. Carmel Regional Med. Center, 290 Kan. 406, 435-36, 228 P.3d 1048 (2010) (requiring expert testimony in order for evidence to be sufficient to create jury question on whether superseding, intervening cause was not foreseeable); Maunz v. Perales, 276 Kan. 313, 322, 76 P.3d 1027 (2003) (noting expert testimony generally required in medical malpractice cases to prove causation); Hare v. Wendler, 263 Kan. 434, 440-41, 949 P.2d 1141 (1997) (same). On the record before us, Mann did not attend medical school or otherwise obtain the knowledge, skill, or experience necessary to give a qualified medical expert opinion on the causation of his client's paralysis. Any statement he made about the event from which his client's paralysis resulted was never going to be admissible to challenge the contrary opinion of a physician. Second, it is also doubtful that Mann's reference in his 2001 letter or any argument he made to the driver's insurance company representative in an effort to settle Venters' claim would otherwise be admissible. The facts of this case are similar to those in our Court of Appeals' LeaseAmerica Corp. case, in which counsel for one party sought to disqualify counsel for the opposing party on the ground that counsel should be entitled to examine opposing counsel regarding the contents of letters [opposing counsel] wrote on behalf of LeaseAmerica to Stewart's former attorney. LeaseAmerica Corp., 19 Kan.App.2d at 741, 876 P.2d 184. The correspondence occurred as part of a discussion in an effort to avoid a lawsuit in the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's disqualification decision, stating: We recognize that in the real world attorneys correspond with each other in an attempt to resolve disputes before resorting to litigation. An attorney has a duty to zealously represent a client, and the representation should not be overshadowed by the concern that what an attorney wrote in a letter to opposing counsel during the dispute resolution process may later be used by the opponent as a tactical weapon under the guise of MRPC 3.7.  (Emphasis added.) LeaseAmerica Corp., 19 Kan. App.2d at 752, 876 P.2d 184. Here, Mann's letter was sent to the driver's insurance company, not opposing counsel, but the same principle applies. The letter accompanied a settlement agreement and release designed to memorialize Mann's successful effort to settle Venters' claim against the driver. If an attorney can easily be called to testify about such settlement documents in subsequent ancillary litigation, then the representation risks being overshadowed by an attorney's concern that anything he or she puts in writing may lead to disqualification. Cf. Griffin v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 280 Kan. 447, 451-52, 124 P.3d 57 (2005) (noting offers and acceptances of settlements are generally inadmissible). There is yet another reason why Mann's letter and settlement position vis-a-vis the driver's insurance carrier would be likely to be inadmissible in the trial of this case. References to parties' insurance coverage generally are not permitted. See, e.g., K.S.A. 60-454 (Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from liability for that harm is inadmissible as tending to prove negligence or other wrongdoing.); Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, 629, 244 P.3d 642 (2010) (noting Kansas' long-standing position that insurance should not be interjected in a trial). Although the insurance company with whom Mann negotiated on Venters' behalf was not the carrier for a party to this suit, admission of evidence touching on Venters' recovery of insurance proceeds from any source had the potential to exert unduly prejudicial downward pressure on any verdict. Sellers' argument on this issue also fails because Judge Rome again applied the wrong legal standard. The judge concluded that Mann was a  possible witness and that the rules of professional conduct require[d] barring any attorney likely to testify. This is incorrect. KRPC 3.7 provides that an attorney's testimony must not only be possible or likely but necessary. (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 562); see LeaseAmerica Corp., 19 Kan.App.2d at 747, 876 P.2d 184 (noting that the language in KRPC 3.7 requires an even more specific showing of necessity). And, even if Sellers had shown necessity, Comment 4 to KRPC 3.7 explains that a judge should apply a balancing test rather than automatically disqualify. (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 563); see Lansing-Delaware Water District, 248 Kan. at 571, 808 P.2d 1369. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Judge Rome was aware of or engaged in any sort of balancing test. Judge Rome also erred by going too far with his remedy. Mann was disqualified as the attorney for Plaintiff, while KRPC 3.7 only prohibits disqualified counsel from acting as an advocate at a trial. See Dimaplas, 267 Kan. at 71, 978 P.2d 891 (stating that KRPC 3.7 prohibits a lawyer from being an advocate at a trial  [emphasis added]). Finally, even if all of the legal infirmities reviewed above could be disregarded, there was also an absence of substantial competent evidence to support Judge Rome's decision on this issue. Sellers failed to come forward with evidence that Mann was a necessary witness. His 2001 letter and his settlement position on behalf of Venters on the claim against the driver did not exist in a vacuum. It is possible that representatives of the driver's insurance company also could testify about the subject matter Sellers considered so vital to his defense.