Opinion ID: 894512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of Immunity Based on Premises Defects

Text: The Mirandas contend that their pleadings fall within the Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity for both premises defects and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property. The Act provides that a state agency is liable for injury and death caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.021(2). The Mirandas' pleadings allege injuries caused by a falling tree limb, which falls under the definition of real property i.e., `land, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land.' San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex.2000) (quoting Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex.1985) (Gonzalez, J., concurring)). The Mirandas' allegation of an injury caused by a tree limb falling on Maria Miranda constitutes an allegation of a condition or use of real property and is an allegation of a premises defect. To state a claim under the recreational use statute, the Mirandas must allege sufficient facts to establish that the Department was grossly negligent. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE §§ 75.002(c)-(d), 101.021, 101.025, 101.058. The Mirandas contend that both their allegations and the evidence presented on the plea establish claims of gross negligence. Looking first to the relevant factual allegations in the third amended petition, the Mirandas claim that (1) they specifically asked the Department's employee for a recommendation of a safe camping location; (2) at the campsite, Maria was struck by a falling tree branch that severely injured her; (3) the unpruned, uninspected tree branches created a dangerous, defective condition on the premises of which the Department was aware; (4) the Department knew of the dangers of its falling tree branches but failed to inspect, prune, alleviate the dangers, or otherwise make safe the dangerous conditions of its trees; (5) the Department consciously and deliberately failed to warn the Mirandas of the extremely dangerous condition; and (6) the Department's conduct was willful, wanton, or grossly negligent. A liberal construction of these allegations, as required, demonstrates that the Mirandas stated a claim against the Department for gross negligence. This conclusion should not be read as a suggestion that the Department has a duty to inspect every tree in each of the many parks that the Department manages. Instead, in this case, the Mirandas alleged sufficient facts to survive a plea to the jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. Justice Jefferson's dissent contends that the Mirandas' third amended petition does not state a claim for gross negligence because the allegations are conclusory and do not assert enough specific facts alleging that the Department had actual subjective awareness of the risk involved and proceeded, nevertheless, with conscious indifference. He suggests that to state a claim the Mirandas should have pled that the Department had actual knowledge that the branch would fall yet nevertheless instructed Maria to camp beneath it. 133 S.W.3d at 242. The pleading hurdle he seeks to erect would be groundbreaking, indeed, extending beyond current requirements under our rules of civil procedure and case law. Rules 45 and 47 require that the original pleadings give a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give the opposing party fair notice of the claim involved. Tex.R. Civ. P. 45, 47; Paramount Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex.1988); Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.1981). Rule 45 does not require that the plaintiff set out in his pleadings the evidence upon which he relies to establish his asserted cause of action. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d at 494-95. While it is clear that [t]he party suing the governmental entity must establish the state's consent, which may be alleged either by reference to a statute or to express legislative permission, Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638, and that [m]ere reference to the Tort Claims Act does not establish the state's consent to be sued and thus is not enough to confer jurisdiction on the trial court, Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587, the Mirandas' pleadings allege sufficient facts to bring their claims under the recreational use statute and the Tort Claims Act. Although facts alleged in a petition should not be improperly stretched to state a claim for gross negligence, Justice Jefferson's pleading standard for gross negligence would be virtually impossible to meet, even when grossly negligent conduct occurred, absent an admission of liability. His standard requires specific factual allegations in an original petition of what the defendant knew and thought i.e., its state of mind. His pleading hurdle would require discovery into the very extrinsic facts which he bemoans consideration of in the plea to the jurisdiction. The Mirandas' third amended petition provided sufficient notice to ascertain the nature and basic issues of the controversy and the evidence that probably would be relevant. JUSTICE JEFFERSON also contends that the Mirandas are entitled to replead. As a practical matter, the Mirandas have already repled to try to cure the defects that Justice Jefferson raises. The Mirandas no doubt filed their third amended petition, in which allegations of gross negligence were raised for the first time in this lawsuit, in response to the Department's plea to the jurisdiction. However, because the Mirandas' third amended petition satisfies the notice pleading requirements of our procedural rules, the Mirandas do not need, nor are they entitled to, an opportunity to replead. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 47.
The Department challenged the Mirandas' pleadings and also submitted evidence to controvert the factual allegations supporting jurisdiction. We consider the relevant evidence submitted to decide this jurisdictional challenge. See Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555. The Department attached the deposition testimony of Craig VanBaarle, the assistant park manager for Garner State Park, to its plea to the jurisdiction. VanBaarle testified that while the park normally inspects and maintains its trees, tree limbs are only pruned or trimmed if they appear to be dead. According to VanBaarle, the tree limb that fell on Maria was living. He testified that both dead and living tree limbs have fallen at various locations in the park. He testified that the park knows that tree limbs can fall and have fallen on approximately twenty occasions. However, no one had ever been injured by falling tree limbs. He also testified that the tree limb that injured Maria Miranda fell from fifty feet above the campsite and that the park employees would not have been able to see the limb clearly without climbing the tree even if the limb had been dead. In addition, the Department attached the affidavit of Roy B. Inks, operations and maintenance specialist at Garner State Park. Inks' responsibilities included supervision of park maintenance including preservation and maintenance of trees at campsites. According to his affidavit, Inks inspected the campsite after the accident. His examination of the tree and the fallen branch failed to reveal any indication that the branch was dead, decaying, or in need of pruning. Inks opined that there was no reason to conclude that the tree presented a dangerous or hazardous condition. Inks further opined that the branch that struck Maria broke away from the tree as a result of an unpredictable and unforseeable phenomenon known as `sudden branch drop syndrome.' Inks explained that [i]t would be rare for anyone to be able to predict which branches will fall and which ones will not as a result of this phenomenon. The Mirandas cite the Department's evidence as proof that the Department knew about sudden branch drop syndrome and did nothing about it, thus establishing gross negligence. The Mirandas did not cite any controverting evidence in their response to the Department's plea. We first examine this evidence to determine whether it establishes that the Department was grossly negligent. We have observed that with regard to the subjective component of gross negligence, it is the defendant's state of mind whether the defendant knew about a peril but nevertheless acted in a way that demonstrated that he did not care about the consequences that separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence. Louisiana-Pacific, 19 S.W.3d at 246-47. We search the record for evidence that the Department's acts or omissions demonstrate that it did not care about the consequences to the Mirandas of a known extreme risk of danger. The Mirandas fail to point to any evidence, and the record contains no evidence, that shows that sudden branch drop syndrome constitutes an extreme risk of danger or that the Department had actual, subjective knowledge of that risk but nevertheless proceeded in conscious disregard for the safety of others. Nor is there any evidence that the Department could have taken any reasonable steps to minimize the dangers of an unforseeable and unpredictable phenomenon. We conclude that the evidence in the record establishes that the Department was not grossly negligent and that the Mirandas have failed to raise a fact question regarding the Department's alleged gross negligence. The Mirandas fall short of satisfying the requirements for the Legislature's limited grant of a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit under the applicable statutes. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
In his dissent, Justice Brister takes the view that all pleas to jurisdiction based on immunity must take the form of two standard or established motionseither special exceptions or motions for summary judgment. 133 S.W.3d at 239-40. This approach might be appropriate, if we were starting from scratch. Given that we are not writing on a blank slate, that pleas have been a useful procedural vehicle in Texas for over 150 years, and that use of its counterpart (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)) to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in the federal judicial system when evidence is involved has been authorized by every federal circuit court, the Court declines to abolish by written opinion such pleas to the jurisdiction. The plea to the jurisdiction was included in procedural rules promulgated by this Court in 1877 and has been used as a procedural vehicle to challenge subject matter jurisdiction in trial courts for over a century and a half. See TEX.R.CIV. P. 85; Tex. Dist. Ct. R. 7, 47 Tex. 597, 617 (1877); Hosner, 1 Tex. at 769. In fact, as early as 1893, Texas courts indicated that evidentiary challenges to subject matter jurisdiction raised in pleas to the jurisdiction should be considered by trial courts. See, e.g., Gates, 291 S.W. at 949; Gentry, 21 S.W. at 570. With such a long lineage, one wonders why a plea to jurisdiction does not qualify as a standard or established motion. Perhaps a second mention in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure would suffice. We decide that refining the rules for considering a plea supported by evidence is a better approach than eliminating the motion. This approach is consistent with precedent, is not disruptive to civil practice going back more than a century, and furthers the legislative purpose of timely adjudicating subject matter jurisdiction when the immunity and liability facts are the same. There is a suggestion in the dissents that confirming in this opinion the authority of trial courts to consider evidence in a plea to the jurisdiction is unfair to the parties in this case. The facts undercut this assertion. At the trial court, both parties relied on extrinsic evidence in briefing the plea, and both parties had extrinsic evidence on file with the court. Furthermore, plaintiffs expressly stated in their response to the plea that they were relying on Defendants' responses to discovery requests, and upon the deposition of Craig VanBaarle [the Department's assistant park manager]. In fact, the Mirandas deposed VanBaarle months before the Department filed its plea. There is good reason why Plaintiffs have not argued unfair surprise. Given Texas precedents and the actions of the parties, there was none.