Opinion ID: 796224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fernandez's Grievance

Text: 34 The Department contends — for the first time on appeal — that Fernandez pursued a mixed discrimination case because his claim involves a prohibited personnel action over which the Merit Systems Protection Board has jurisdiction. The significance of the Department's argument is that, in a mixed case, Fernandez would have been required to appeal to the MSPB under § 7121(d) before commencing this action in the District Court, which he clearly did not do. Based upon our review of the Record, however, we conclude that Fernandez raised a pure discrimination claim and, therefore, that he was required to pursue his administrative remedies in the EEOC. 35 First, Fernandez was advised by letter dated December 13, 2001 that his EEO complaint was being dismissed because the matter was raised in a negotiated grievance procedure that permits allegations of discrimination. That letter characterized Fernandez's claim as a formal complaint of discrimination that raise[d] an allegation of retaliation identical to the one raised in the negotiated grievance procedure. Significantly, the letter specifically notified Fernandez that, while any allegations of discrimination must be raised in the grievance process because he elected to pursue his grievance in that forum,  [t]he final decision on the grievance may be appealed to the EEOC.  (emphasis added). The letter mentioned nothing of a mixed claim, a claim involving a prohibited personnel action under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MSPB, or a right to appeal to the MSPB if the result of arbitration was not favorable. As far as Fernandez knew, he had raised a pure discrimination claim and could appeal the final decision of the arbitrator to the EEOC. 36 Second, the Department's own motion to dismiss recognized that Fernandez had raised a pure discrimination claim that could be exhausted only in the EEOC. In support of the motion, the Department asserted that [e]ven if the decision to withdraw the arbitration was made by the union and not [Fernandez], [Fernandez] was still required to appeal to the EEOC before filing the present lawsuit if he was dissatisfied either with the [Department]'s offer, with the NTEU's decision to withdraw the arbitration, or with any other aspect of the grievance process. The Department further stated that Fernandez did not appeal to the EEOC, or take any other steps to pursue his grievance and [c]onsequently, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the union grievance process, thereby precluding him from bringing suit in court. Finally, the Department recognized that it had informed [Fernandez] in December 2001 that his EEO claim was barred by his prior decision to file a union grievance . . . . It also informed him that he could appeal the outcome of the grievance to the EEOC. The District Court relied on the Department's arguments and concluded that Fernandez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not appeal[ing] the result of the grievance process to the EEOC. 37 Third, the form Complaint provided to Fernandez at the time that he commenced this action characterized his claim as brought for discrimination in employment pursuant to . . . Title VII. The Complaint contained a notice advising that [i]n order to bring a suit in federal district under Title VII, you must first obtain a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In reliance upon this notice, Fernandez contacted the EEOC office to request a right to sue letter, but his request was denied. Based upon the foregoing, we find no evidence to support the Department's novel claim that Fernandez pursued a mixed case or was notified of his right to appeal to the MSPB and, in fact, find evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, we conclude that Fernandez pursued a pure discrimination claim.
38 It is undisputed that Fernandez irrevocably elected to pursue the negotiated procedure to resolve his pure discrimination claim. Based upon the collective bargaining agreement in place between the Department and NTEU at the time that Fernandez was denied reinstatement, the NTEU requested a dispute resolution meeting on behalf of Fernandez and thereafter invoked arbitration. 39 An aggrieved employee who files a grievance with an agency whose negotiated agreement permits the acceptance of grievances which allege discrimination may not thereafter file a[n EEO] complaint on the same matter under this part 1614 irrespective of whether the agency has informed the individual of the need to elect or of whether the grievance has raised an allegation of discrimination. 40 29 C.F.R. § 1614.301(a) (emphasis added). Because Fernandez elected to proceed with the negotiated grievance procedure in the first instance, his EEO complaint filed on November 15, 2001 was properly dismissed inasmuch as arbitration of the same matter already had been invoked. 41 Although Fernandez now attempts to avoid the preclusive effect of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d) by arguing that the NTEU invoked the negotiated grievance procedure without notifying him, that objection is not properly before us inasmuch as it is being raised for the first time on appeal. In any event, even assuming that Fernandez was unaware of the NTEU's September 7, 2001 letter requesting formal dispute resolution, the Record reveals that Fernandez was notified of this fact in the December 13, 2001 correspondence dismissing his EEO complaint on the basis of the ongoing grievance procedure and that he subsequently supported the NTEU's role in the procedure by specifically designating Talarico as his bargaining representative. Moreover, nothing in the Record demonstrates that Fernandez ever requested that the NTEU cease negotiations. 42 Nevertheless, when Fernandez rejected a proposed settlement that the NTEU viewed to be reasonable, the union abandoned his grievance by unilaterally withdrawing from arbitration. Therefore, the issue presented on this appeal is what, if any, avenue of relief was available to Fernandez after the NTEU withdrew from arbitration.
43 Because we have concluded that Fernandez pursued a pure discrimination claim cognizable in the EEOC, we reject the Department's argument that Fernandez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not appealing to the MSPB. We also reject the Department's strained reading of § 7121(d) as barring an employee from seeking review of a final arbitration decision in the EEOC in all instances. Under § 7121(d), [s]election of the negotiated procedure in no manner prejudices the right of an aggrieved employee to request the Merit Systems Protection Board to review the final decision pursuant to [5 U.S.C. § 7702] of this title in the case of any personnel action that could have been appealed to the Board, or, where applicable, to request the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to review a final decision in any other matter involving a complaint of discrimination of the type prohibited by any law administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 44 (emphasis added). 45 The Department contends, for the first time on appeal, that because Fernandez is pursuing the same matter — discrimination underlying the Department's refusal to reinstate him — that he previously pursued in his grievance, § 7121(d) does not authorize him to seek review before the EEOC. The Department argues that: 46 [I]f Congress had intended the EEOC to review grievances, it could have provided in § 7121(d) that an employee has the right to request the EEOC to review the final decision of the grievance process (like it did with respect to the MSPB) or the matter that was raised in the grievance process. Instead, Congress wrote that such an employee has the right to request the EEOC to review any other matter involving a complaint of unlawful employment discrimination. 47 The Department therefore interprets any other matter to mean any other act of discrimination not previously alleged in the negotiated grievance process. 48 The term any other matter in § 7121(d), however, refers to the nature of the employee's claim, not to whether the claim was raised previously. Where the employee raises a mixed claim, an appeal from an arbitrator's decision lies in the MSPB. See Johnson, 996 F.2d at 401 ([S]ection 7121(d)'s preservation of the mixed claim employee's right to appeal to the MSPB created the bridge by which the employee following the negotiated procedure could revert to the statutory path and seek judicial review.). Where, as here, the employee raises a pure discrimination claim, an appeal from an arbitrator's decision lies in the EEOC. The provision in § 7121(d) allowing an employee to request the EEOC to review a final decision in any other matter involving a complaint of discrimination therefore refers to cases of pure discrimination as opposed to the cases within the jurisdiction of the MSPB to review. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.401(d) (A grievant may appeal the final decision of the . . . arbitrator . . . on the grievance [to the EEOC] when an issue of employment discrimination was raised in a negotiated grievance procedure that permits such issues to be raised. A grievant may not appeal under this part, however, when the matter initially raised in the negotiated grievance procedure is still ongoing in that process, is in arbitration, [or] is appealable to the MSPB.  (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we read any other matter to refer to pure employment discrimination claims as distinguished from the other types of claims involving prohibited personnel practices cognizable by the MSPB. 49 Although Fernandez elected to proceed along the negotiated grievance route, the NTEU chose not to go forward with arbitration. We note that only parties to the collective bargaining agreement may pursue binding arbitration of a grievance not otherwise satisfactorily settled. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(1)(C)(iii). The NTEU both submitted Fernandez's grievance to arbitration and withdrew it, and the Record does not reveal that Fernandez was provided with an opportunity to represent himself or that he had the right to do so. Moreover, Fernandez could not be compelled to accede to a settlement agreement that was unacceptable to him. The failure by Fernandez to exhaust administrative remedies available under the CSRA was therefore attributable to the NTEU's actions in preventing a final decision from which he could have otherwise appealed. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d). Since the CSRA left Fernandez with no avenue of relief after the NTEU unilaterally withdrew from arbitration, the District Court should consider this fact on remand in determining whether the failure to exhaust EEOC remedies can be excused.