Opinion ID: 2331412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fraudulently concealing within three years of the operation a breach of their duty to warn prior to the operation.

Text: [¶ 21] Fraudulent concealment is an equitable remedy [25] recognized by courts as a potential means to ameliorate the harsh application in individual cases of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind.1995) (quoting Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1980)). Fraud is a mixed question of fact and law. Bixler v. Wright, 116 Me. 133, 135, 100 A. 467, 468 (1917); see also Meadors v. Still, 344 Ark. 307, 40 S.W.3d 294, 312, 315-16 (2001) (recognizing that the issue of fraudulent concealment is normally a question of fact that is not suited for summary judgment; however, because there was no proof of a positive act of fraud, the court remained unwilling to extend the doctrine to include negligent acts). We have held: If one intentionally misrepresents to another facts particularly within his own knowledge, with an intent that the other shall act upon them, and he does so act, he cannot afterwards excuse himself by saying, `You were foolish to believe me.' It does not lie in his mouth to say that the one trusting him was negligent. Bixler, 116 Me. at 136-37, 100 A. at 469 (quoting E. Trust & Banking Co. v. Cunningham, 103 Me. 455, 465-66, 70 A. 17, 22 (1908)). [¶ 22] To benefit from section 859, a plaintiff must establish that defendants actively concealed material facts from her and that she relied on their acts and statements to her detriment[,] or ... that a special relationship existed between the parties that imposed a duty to disclose the cause of action, and the failure of defendants to honor that duty. Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, ¶ 6, 701 A.2d 370, 372. When a plaintiff contends a genuine issue of material fact concerning the defendant's fraudulent concealment has been generated, the court assesses the facts against the elements of fraud: (1) the making of a false representation; (2) of a material fact; (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false; (4) for the purposes of inducing another to act upon it; and (5) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the other. Id. ¶ 7, 701 A.2d at 372. [¶ 23] When a special relationship exists, that is a fiduciary relationship, omission by silence may constitute the supplying of false information. Glynn v. Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 1999 ME 53, ¶ 12, 728 A.2d 117, 121. Generally, in such a relationship, where the defendant knows particular facts and does not disclose them causing the plaintiff to rely on those facts, an inference of fraud is appropriate. See id. ¶ 13, 728 A.2d at 121 (citing Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1978) (holding that evidence created an inference of fraud when the officer of the corporation did not disclose all pertinent facts before signing an agreement to sell stock)). [¶ 24] The plaintiffs who visited the OSA oral surgeons after receiving a notice of possible dangers assert that the surgeons engaged in a pattern of conduct designed to mislead them about the severity of their injuries  a pattern that may both constitute active negligence and amount to fraudulent concealment of earlier negligence. [26] See, e.g., Brewington v. Raksakulthi, 584 S.W.2d 112, 113, 115 (Mo.Ct. App.1979) (plaintiff visited physician several times complaining of serious physical problems after childbirth and on each occasion was told her problems were normal and that she would get better with time; the court concluded the conduct constituted fraudulent concealment). These plaintiffs raise the possibility that the OSA defendants effectively lulled patients, with their confident reassurances, into believing that teflon implants presented no problems. [¶ 25] We agree, however, that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that might be found to be fraudulent concealment within the three-year period after the operations of eighteen of the twenty-one patients. After a cause of action expires pursuant to the three-year statute of limitation no amount of subsequent concealment can revitalize an already stale claim. We therefore affirm the Superior Court as to its judgment with respect to those eighteen claims. [27] [¶ 26] Plaintiffs Harrington and Foster received their implants on January 14, 1987, and March 16, 1988, respectively. There was evidence presented by those two plaintiffs that the OSA defendants during the three-year period following those operations engaged in conduct that a fact finder might conclude amounted to fraudulent concealment. We therefore vacate the summary judgment to the extent that it was granted to the OSA defendants against Harrington and Foster on their claims of fraudulent concealment. [¶ 27] Although plaintiff Molnar received his implant on February 27, 1987, and may have had a claim for fraudulent concealment, he learned of his predicament more than six years prior to this notice of claim on May 11, 1998, and therefore judgment was properly entered against him as to that claim.