Opinion ID: 1119858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantiality

Text: Our inquiry does not end there, however. In rejecting the residuum rule, we reject any categorical method of determining substantiality. While our task is not to substitute our judgment for that of the agency, we must decide whether the finding of substantiality is reasonable in the light of countervailing as well as supporting evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c); Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or. 292, 295, 787 P.2d 884 (1990). ORS 342.143(2), see supra note 3, requires the applicant to furnish evidence satisfactory to the commission of good moral character. At the beginning of the hearing, TSPC's attorney conceded that petitioner's application for a teaching license establishes on its face, at least prima facia [sic] showing that the [petitioner] meets the eligibility requirements and so we will go forward in terms of order of proof to show why    [petitioner] does not meet the requirements of good moral character. Thus, TSPC concluded that petitioner met his burden under ORS 342.143(1) and (2). TSPC was the proponent of the allegation concerning sexual misconduct. ORS 183.450(2) provides: The burden of presenting evidence to support a fact or position in a contested case rests on the proponent of the fact or position. Thus, TSPC had the burden of presenting substantial evidence to support its allegations that petitioner was guilty of sexual misconduct. [22] The substantial evidence inquiry necessarily is case specific. Davis suggests, and we agree, that in assessing the substantiality of the evidence or lack of it, variable circumstances may be considered, such as: the alternative to relying on the hearsay evidence; the importance of the facts sought to be proved by the hearsay statements to the outcome of the proceeding and considerations of economy; the state of the supporting or opposing evidence, if any; the degree of lack of efficacy of cross-examination with respect to the particular hearsay statements; and the consequences of the decision either way. [23] When the alternative to relying on hearsay is to get the better evidence that is readily available, refusing to rely on the hearsay is appropriate. 3 Davis, supra, at 243. In this case, there was a convenient and apparently inexpensive alternative to relying on the challenged hearsay. Michelle, Leasa, and the other students apparently were readily available to be called as witnesses. No reason was given why they did not testify. In its summation, TSPC was invited by its attorney to continue [the] hearing and to direct [the litigants] to bring in these students and hear their testimony directly. TSPC had the authority to issue subpoenas to require the students to testify at the hearing. ORS 183.440(1). It is beyond question that the students' direct testimony is better evidence than their hearsay statements. The importance of the facts asserted in the hearsay statements to the outcome of this proceeding is likewise indisputable. TSPC's findings of fact, conclusions of law, opinion, and order were based entirely on hearsay, particularly the hearsay testimony of Castner, Minette, and Costelow. [24] Moreover, Castner, Minette, and Costelow were permitted to express their opinion, based on that hearsay, multiple hearsay, gossip, and rumors, that Michelle and Leasa were telling the truth. [25] That reliability of particular evidence must depend upon the quantity and quality of supporting and opposing evidence and on the whole circumstantial setting should be too obvious for argument. 3 Davis, supra, at 245. Evidence in the record countervailing TSPC's findings shows: 1. The only time Leasa made a sworn statement under oath was before the Marion County Grand Jury. At that time, Leasa stated that she had no recollection of petitioner's touching her in the vaginal area. (H) 2. Leasa told Castner that petitioner's touching of Leasa's breast was an accident. (H) 3. The door to petitioner's classroom apparently could not be locked from the inside, contrary to what Leasa's hearsay statement indicated. 4. The classroom in which petitioner allegedly committed inappropriate sexual contact with Leasa was in full public view with large windows on both sides of the room and on the classroom door. 5. Leasa was a student in petitioner's class less than 10-15 days. 6. A teacher's aide testified that she remained in petitioner's classroom after school the whole time, except for a few minutes to do some photocopying, and that she never saw Leasa in petitioner's classroom after school. 7. A teacher testified that he usually met with petitioner after school and that he had never seen petitioner alone with Leasa or Michelle. 8. Leasa was upset because many of her friends were transferred out of petitioner's class. 9. Leasa wanted to be transferred out of petitioner's class to be with her friends. 10. A few days after petitioner reported Michelle to a school counselor for drug abuse and prostitution problems, a school clerical employee overheard Michelle tell Leasa that I'm going to get [petitioner]. (H) 11. Michelle and Leasa were friends. 12. Michelle, Leasa, and the other students whose hearsay statements were received in evidence were friends. 13. Petitioner testified and denied the alleged sexual misconduct. When unsworn hearsay constitutes the major (in this case, the entire ) support for the administrative decision, the importance of providing the adversary (here, the petitioner) with the opportunity to test on cross-examination each of the available declarants' perception, memory, narration, and veracity is undeniable. TSPC had no basis for evaluating the credibility of the declarants of the challenged hearsay on which it based its order. Even where hearsay is sufficiently reliable to be admissible and might be relied on when the consequences of the decision would be minor, that same hearsay might not be relied on when the consequences of the decision would be a profound impact on, for example, the ability of an individual to pursue a chosen profession. The latter is the case here. TSPC drew several conclusions of law, including that [a]ny of these specifications in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above, are sufficient alone to support the conclusion that [p]etitioner is guilty of gross neglect of duty and gross unfitness. However, while TSPC attempts to establish that each finding is independently adequate to support its decision, each finding relies on, and cannot be supported independently of, the evidence which we determine is not substantial evidence. Paragraph 3 relies on the finding that petitioner engaged in repeated acts of inappropriate contact with female students, and paragraph 4 relies on the finding that petitioner engaged in sexual contact with Leasa. We have determined that these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Paragraph 5 concludes that [p]etitioner is guilty of gross neglect of duty and gross unfitness based on his efforts to persuade female students from his class, including Leasa   , to withdraw the allegations against him. This conclusion also relies on the factual findings regarding inappropriate contact with female students which we determine is not supported by substantial evidence. This is necessarily so, because paragraph 5, in isolation, suggests that a person who we must assume was falsely accused of something until proven otherwise can be ineligible for a teaching license for attempting to persuade the accusers to tell the truth. If attempting to persuade someone to tell the truth is a proper basis on which to deny a teaching license or, as paragraph 5 continues, to find that a teacher has exploit[ed] professional relationships with any student for personal gain, or in support of persons or issues, TSPC must do a better job than it has done thus far of explaining why this is so. Because the factual findings TSPC made and relied on to reach its conclusions of law are not supported by substantial evidence, the conclusions of law based on those findings are not permissible. We hold that TSPC's decision in this case was not based on substantial evidence under ORS 183.482(8)(c).