Opinion ID: 1349673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bailey v. Leoni Twp.

Text: Plaintiff John Bailey worked as a firefighter for defendant Leoni Township beginning in 1966. On July 21, 1987, he was injured while attempting to pull a driver from a vehicle, suffering sharp pain in his neck and shoulder. Bailey stopped working as a result of the injury in September 1987. On November 8, 1987, he returned to work, performing restricted duty of inspecting buildings. He continued to work until March 1988. While working for Leoni Township, Bailey also worked as a self-employed, part-time electrical contractor. In May, 1988, Bailey had surgery performed on his neck, removing a disk and fusing one of the neck bones. In September 1988, Dr. Rawal sent a note to Leoni Township regarding Bailey's physical condition. The township responded that the only work available was full duty, as opposed to light duty, and, consequently, that there was no work available for Bailey. After Bailey exhausted his sick leave with the township, the township informed him that he was no longer an employee. In 1987, Bailey had been working a day or two a week as an electrical contractor, and, after convalescing from his surgery, he resumed his work in 1988 as an electrical contractor, now working approximately three days a week. In June, 1988, Bailey sought worker's compensation. In an opinion dated November 27, 1989, the magistrate awarded him only reasonable and related medical expenses for his injury, but denied him weekly benefits: Plaintiff has two suitable, skilled [employments] for which he is qualified [ÔÇö]electrician and fireman. Even if he is unable to continue to work as a fireman, does he have a loss of wage-earning capacity if he is still able to work full time as a[n] electrician[?] No. I believe this is precisely the situation the new definition of disability was enacted to address. Here is a man with two skillsÔÇöfireman and electrician. Even if [he] is unable to perform one skill, he is still able to do the other. The fact that he is self-employed, works an average of 3 days per week, and earns for tax purposes less than what he makes as a fireman is not determinative of his wage-earning capacity as an electrician. The test of wage-earning capacity is whether he would earn as much working full time as an electrician as he would working full time as a fireman. He never testified that he could not find employment as an electrician or that he even sought such employment. Based on the record, I find his proofs [lacking?] by a preponderance that he is disabled under the new definition of disability. [1990 Mich. ACO 1311, 1316 (emphasis added).] Bailey appealed the decision, and the WCAC modified the magistrate's decision. The WCAC noted that the magistrate found as fact that Bailey was partially disabled, but denied him benefits because the injury did not impair his work as an electrician. The WCAC found that Bailey was impaired in his work as a firefighter and, consequently, that he suffered a limitation of his wage-earning capacity: The instant plaintiff has a limitation in the skill of firefighting. The Magistrate found as fact that he has a partial disability in the field of his skill. Firefighting, since at least 1966, and until he was injured at it, was work plaintiff could do, and did. No serious argument can be made that it was not work suitable to his qualifications and training. He now has a limitation in his ability to do that work. The fact that he has no great, or any, limitation in his ability to do electrical contracting has no bearing on the inquiry about a limitation in work suitable to his qualifications and training. Before the injury, plaintiff's wage-earning capacity included, inter alia, electrical contracting and firefighting, both suitable to his qualifications and training. He is now impaired in his ability to fight fires, so he has a limitation in his wage-earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications and training. Probably because he has more time, he now does more electrical contracting than he was doing in July 1987, and to the extent of the increment, defendant is entitled to credit against compensation ordered. [ Id. at 1317-1318 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).] Leoni Township sought leave to appeal and the Court of Appeals denied leave. On December 30, 1992, this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted. [4] On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion: [A]lthough plaintiff was capable of performing other work which fell within his medical restrictions, he was unable to perform the duties of a firefighter. He suffered a limitation in his ability to perform work suitable to his qualifications and training as a firefighter. Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statutory definition of disability, even though he may be capable of performing other work which falls within his medical restrictions. [Issued May 23, 1995 (Docket No. 160469).] Leoni Township appealed, and this Court granted leave to appeal. [5]