Opinion ID: 2570125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Willingham

Text: Although the rationale of Willingham is based largely upon K.S.A. 22-3424(f), which applies to sentencing after a trial, this court has consistently stated that a defendant who benefitted from a favorable plea may claim an Ortiz exception when seeking to file an appeal of his or her sentence out of time. See, e.g., Phinney, 280 Kan. at 402, 122 P.3d 356; State v. Redmon, 255 Kan. 220, 222-23, 873 P.2d 1350 (1994). In Phinney, this court explained the rationale should be extended because fundamental fairness requires all defendants to be advised of their rights to appeal. 280 Kan. at 402, 122 P.3d 356; see also Kargus v. State, 284 Kan. 908, 921-24, 169 P.3d 307 (2007) (discussing cases). Under these cases, sentencing issues may be raised in an untimely appeal if an Ortiz exception applies and the right to appeal has not been waived in a plea agreement or otherwise. As a result of this line of cases, the question before us is whether there is substantial competent evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Scoville was fully informed of his appellate rights, including the time frame in which those rights must be exercised. See, e.g., Mitchell, 231 Kan. at 147, 642 P.2d 981 (A full awareness of one's rights surely must include the knowledge that there is a time frame within which those rights must be exercised.). The same issue was recently addressed in a case strikingly similar to the case at hand Harp, 283 Kan. 740, 156 P.3d 1268. As here, the defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that he should be resentenced under McAdam. This court held that relief was not available under K.S.A. 22-3504 because Harp's sentence was not illegal. 283 Kan. at 744, 156 P.3d 1268. Regardless, we considered Harp's case as a direct appeal under Ortiz. Because he was not fully advised of his right to appeal, an Ortiz exception had been met. In describing the circumstances, this court observed that Harp admitted having a general awareness of the right to appeal. At an Ortiz hearing, however, Harp testified and indicated that at his 2002 sentencing defense counsel did not advise him of his right to appeal the sentence within 10 days. Harp further indicated that, had he been apprised of the possibility of a shortened sentence under the identical offense sentencing doctrine, he would have instructed defense counsel to appeal. Harp denied being informed of his appellate remedies, the steps necessary to implement an appeal, or the possibility of an appeal on the identical offense doctrine. 283 Kan. at 747, 156 P.3d 1268. There was no indication that a written waiver of Harp's right to appeal was obtained pursuant to K.A.R. 105-3-9, and Harp's testimony indicated that defense counsel did not present such a document to him in 2002. We also pointed out that the sentencing judge failed to advise Harp of his right to appeal or its attendant procedures. 283 Kan. at 747, 156 P.3d 1268. Concluding that substantial competent evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the facts required an Ortiz exception because Harp was not advised of his right to appeal, we held that Harp's direct appeal of his sentence was properly before this court. Harp's sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing under McAdam. 283 Kan. at 748-49, 156 P.3d 1268. Here, the district judge reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Scoville was informed of his rights, and the Court of Appeals agreed. 37 Kan.App.2d at 344, 152 P.3d 1262 (concluding substantial competent evidence shows that Scoville knew of his appeal rights). Scoville argues the Court of Appeals' holding that he was informed of his rights is contrary to the record and the long line of Kansas cases which recognize that simply knowing one has the general right to appeal is not enough; a defendant must be informed of the time limit for filing an appeal in order for the defendant to have a meaningful understanding of his or her appellate rights. We agree that there is nothing in the record to support a finding that Scoville was advised that an appeal must be filed within 10 days. The judge discussed rights to appeal at the plea and sentencing hearings. Yet, no mention was made of the 10-day limit for filing an appeal at either the plea or sentencing hearing. Similarly, at the Ortiz hearing, defense counsel admitted that he did not recall advising Scoville of the 10-day limit. In short, the record does not contain substantial competent evidence to support the district court's and Court of Appeals' conclusions that Scoville had an awareness of his right to appeal. Consequently, we conclude that Scoville was not fully informed of his appellate remedies. Specifically, he was not informed of the steps necessary to implement an appeal, including the 10-day time limit for filing an appeal. Moreover, there was no indication that a written waiver of Scoville's right to appeal his sentence was obtained at the time of the plea or after sentencing. See Willingham, 266 Kan. 98, Syl. ¶ 2, 967 P.2d 1079 (Where it can be shown that the defendant was fully aware of his or her right to appeal, or was fully advised of his or her right to appeal by counsel at the time of sentencing, a waiver of that right may be established.); K.A.R. 105-3-9 (appointed counsel directed to obtain written waiver). Therefore, Scoville may file an appeal even though the time for a direct appeal has passed, and his appeal of his sentence is properly before this court.