Opinion ID: 1236954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prevailing party status under the Copyright Act

Text: The district court found the Trust and May-Loo were prevailing parties, relying on our 1941 decision in Corcoran, 121 F.2d 575. The district court was correct to follow controlling circuit precedent, but we now overrule Corcoran because it is clearly irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Buckhannon. Miller, 335 F.3d at 893. In Corcoran, the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss but granted their motion for a more definite statement on a copyright claim. Rather than amending the complaint, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, and the district court ultimately awarded defendants attorney's fees. We rejected plaintiff's contention that dismissal without prejudice does not confer prevailing party status under the Copyright Act. The authority given is not in terms limited to the allowance of fees to a party who prevails only after a trial on the merits. Where, as here, a defendant has been put to the expense of making an appearance and of obtaining an order for the clarification of the complaint, and the plaintiff then voluntarily dismisses without amending his pleading, the party sued is the prevailing party within the spirit and intent of the statute even though he may, at the whim of the plaintiff, again be sued on the same cause of action. Corcoran, 121 F.2d at 576. Although we have not cited Corcoran in subsequent decisions applying the Copyright Act's attorney's fees provision, neither have we overruled or questioned its continuing viability. In Buckhannon, however, the Supreme Court held a plaintiff was not a prevailing party under the FHAA when the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct without a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree. 532 U.S. at 600. Relying on the definition of prevailing party in Black's Law Dictionary, the Court concluded a `prevailing party' is one who has been awarded some relief by the court. Id. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The key inquiry is whether some court action has created a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Oscar, 541 F.3d at 981, we followed Buckhannon in deciding whether an involuntary dismissal without prejudice conferred prevailing party status on the defendant in a lawsuit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Because a dismissal without prejudice is not a decision on the merits and plaintiff was free to re-file his complaint in federal court, dismissal without prejudice does not alter the legal relationship of the parties because the defendant remains subject to the risk of re-filing. Id. Oscar distinguished Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.2003), in which we applied Buckhannon and concluded a dismissal of a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) without prejudice to plaintiff's right to seek relief in state court did confer prevailing party status on the defendant. This was so because [t]he dismissal eliminates the federal ADA claim from further proceedings in federal court and thus has changed the legal relationship of Miles with respect to the State. Id. at 989; see Oscar, 541 F.3d at 982. We conclude Corcoran cannot be reconciled with Buckhannon 's material alteration test. First, Corcoran focused on the expense the defendants incurred and expressly disregarded that the parties' legal relationship had not changed as a result of the voluntary dismissal. See Corcoran, 121 F.2d at 576 (holding defendant to be prevailing party even though he may, at the whim of the plaintiff, again be sued on the same cause of action). Second, we construed prevailing party in light of the policies underlying the Copyright Act, rather than relying on the plain meaning of the phrase as the Supreme Court did in Buckhannon. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (suggesting legislative history would not overcome plain meaning of prevailing party). Although the Trust and May-Loo are correct that Buckhannon was not a copyright case, the distinction is immaterial. As discussed, we have understood the Court's construction of prevailing party applies to federal fee shifting statutes other than the FHAA that contain that phrase, which is appropriate given the Court's reliance on a dictionary definition for its holding. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Accordingly, we hold the material alteration test the Supreme Court articulated in Buckhannon governs the prevailing party inquiry under § 505 of the Copyright Act and overrule Corcoran to the extent it is inconsistent with Buckhannon. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 893. Our holding is consistent with every circuit court that has considered whether Buckhannon governs prevailing party status under the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Riviera Distribs., Inc. v. Jones, 517 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding voluntary dismissal with prejudice of copyright claims confers prevailing party status on defendants under Buckhannon ); Torres-Negron v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 164 & n. 9 (1st Cir.2007) (holding Buckhannon material alteration test applies to copyright claims and concluding dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not confer prevailing party status); see also Southfield Music, Inc. v. London Music, U.K., 226 Fed.Appx. 491, 493-94 (6th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (applying Buckhannon to copyright claims).