Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury inquiry re meaning of duress.

Text: On the second day of penalty deliberations, the jury submitted a written request for clarification of sentencing factors (d) (whether the capital offense was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and (g) ([w]hether . . . the defendant acted under extreme duress or the substantial domination of another person), as set forth in CALJIC No. 8.85. With the agreement of both counsel, the court first instructed the jurors that factors (d) and (g) are mitigating factors, orally recited both factors, and advised that the jury must resolve whether each of these factors was present or absent. When the court asked whether this response satisfied the jury, the foreperson stated that the jurors wanted a good legal definition of duress. The foreperson acknowledged, in response to the court's query, that they wished to know what the word means, then stated that I think that the otherthe part of `duress' that we are concerned with is how direct or indirect can the duress be, at what distance might duress be impacted. The court asked for clarification of this latter concern, whereupon the foreperson said, Well, both in a physical and in an abstract sense, how doeshow does one put another under duress. Before withdrawing to consult with counsel, the court confirmed, in response to a question from another juror, that it was the jury's province to decide whether there was evidence to support any sentencing factor. Court and counsel then conferred outside the jury's presence. Defense counsel argued that the jury's question suggested it was concerned about whether duress could be triggered by long-past events, such as childhood experiences. Defense counsel agreed with the court's intention to instruct the jury that it should use its commonsense understanding of duress, that a dictionary defined the word to mean compulsion or coercion, and that whether duress was present was an issue for the jury to decide based on the evidence. However, defense counsel requested an additional instruction that the application of duress can extend to as far in time as [the jurors] deem appropriate. The court declined this instruction, stating that whether or not the duress in this case has existed for a long period or a short period of time is a factual issue for [the jurors] to determine from the evidence in this case and the inferences therefrom. Back before the jury, the following colloquy occurred: The Court: Mrs. [S.] [(the foreperson)], we've given thistried to give this response a lot of thought, and I'm not so sure this will be a satisfactory answer to you, but this is the best thing we can come up with. First of all, with respect to the definition of `duress,' I'm going to tell you to use your common sense understanding of what `duress' means. To assist you, in Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary Unabridged, it can be defined as `compulsion or coercion.' All right? The second thing, as I understand Mr. [M.'s] [(another juror)] question, is whether or not you can have direct or indirect duress and how long can it last. Is that what you're asking? Is that the question? [¶] The Foreperson: If duress can be directed from outside. [¶] The Court: Okay. Now, see, you're asking me to testify and give you information. I can't do that. [¶] The Foreperson: Oh. [¶] The Court: All I can tell you, is thatthat you have to decide for yourself based upon the evidence that you've received in this case and any reasonable inferences that you, as the fact finders, come to. See, I can't tell you stuff that's not in the evidence. Okay? [¶] The Foreperson: I see. [¶] The Court: So I hope that helps you with the definition of duress. All right? Okay. We'll send you upstairs. Out of the jury's presence, counsel renewed a request for the previously proposed additional instruction. The court reiterated its satisfaction with the answer it had given. On appeal, defendant claims that three flaws in the court's response to the jury's inquiry violated his rights, under both state law and the federal Constitution, to a properly instructed capital penalty jury. First, he asserts the court was obliged to respond to the jury's specific question whether duress could be indirect and imposed from outside. Second, he contends that by saying the jury was asking it to provide information not in the evidence, the court implied there was no factual basis for a finding of duress. Third, he insists the court's instruction that the jury was to determine the issue of duress by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence interfered with the jury's discretion to view the mitigating evidence subjectively in making the normative penalty decision. Assuming these arguments were preserved by counsel's limited request below for an instruction on the temporal duration of duress ( Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6), we find they lack merit. The court responded to the request for a definition of duress by giving the jury, with the approval of all counsel, a dictionary definition of the term as synonymous with coercion or compulsion. (See Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 75 [for purposes of factor (g), the phrase extreme duress is not unduly vague; duress has a generally understood meaning of coercion or compulsion, and extreme is generally understood as describing the farthest end or degree of a range of possibilities].) Defendant cites no authority suggesting the court was obliged to strike out on its own ( Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d 68, 97) and expand upon this dictionary definition by explicitly addressing issues such as the temporal duration of duress, or its direct or indirect nature. The court properly instructed that the presence or absence of extreme duress was a factual issue for the jury to decide. Nor could the jury reasonably have understood the court's comments to mean there was no factual basis for a finding of duress. The court merely conveyed to the jurors that their specific questions about the meaning of duress called upon the court to exceed its proper role by invading the jury's province to find the facts for itself. The court repeatedly made clear that it was for the jury to decide, from the evidence, whether duress was present. (20) Finally, the court did not err by telling the jury to resolve the issue of duress by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. The penalty decision itself is subjective and normative, but it cannot be factually untethered. Instead, it must relate to evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in section 190.3. For this reason, both we and the high court have confirmed that instructions and argument admonishing the jury to decide penalty on the basis of the facts and the evidence are proper. (E.g., California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 542-543 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); see id. at pp. 544-545 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.); People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 437 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000] [upholding prosecutorial argument that jury should decide penalty in accordance `with the facts and in accordance with the evidence presented to you in this case' (italics omitted)]; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 443 [276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221] [upholding prosecutor's plea that jury should not decide penalty on `an emotional basis,' but on `a cool, clear, logical basis' and on `the facts and the law']; Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1225 [instruction that admonished against penalty decision based on mere sympathy upheld because it warned only against factually untethered sympathy]; see Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1176 [prosecutor's antisympathy argument merely pursued the theme that the particular defendant did not deserve mercy on the basis of the evidence actually presented].) It follows that, in finding the facts that underlie the jury's normative penalty decision, the jury should rely on the evidence presented and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. A court instruction to this effect is not error. The court responded properly to the jury's request. No basis for reversal appears.