Opinion ID: 2192460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: personal facts

Text: 19. Mrs. Finney has two other children, a son being cared for by her grandparents and a daughter being cared for by her sister, Michelle Thomas. She sees both children on a regular basis. 20. Deborah Finney saw her daughter Taurus two or three times at the prison before the hearing at which her parental rights were terminated. 21. Deborah Finney is presently at Huron Valley Correctional Facility with an `out date' of June, 1983. 22. Deborah Finney was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in 1973, and attempted possession of heroin and delivery of heroin in August, 1977. The evidence offered at the trial also showed that Mrs. Finney had two other children, Aleka, a daughter born in 1976, born addicted to heroin or methadone, and a son, Alayho, born in 1968. Taurus, her third child and the subject of these proceedings, was conceived after Mrs. Finney escaped from prison. The natural father, Martin Cowens, was also incarcerated. Deborah Finney was married to James Finney when Taurus was conceived and born. However, he has been absent for some time, and his whereabouts are unknown. The probate court issued its opinion and order on August 24, 1978. The probate court concluded that the material allegations in the petition were substantiated, that the child was within the court's jurisdiction on the basis of § 2(b), subds (1) and (2), and that the parental rights of Deborah Finney, Martin Cowens, the putative father, and James Finney, the legal father, should be terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(d); MSA 27.3178(598.19a)(d). [5] It is important to note that the mother, Mrs. Finney, is the only person that has appealed the termination of parental rights to this Court. Therefore, we do not address any of the possible errors with respect to the termination of parental rights of the biological father and the legal father. The probate court's decision was appealed to the Washtenaw Circuit Court, and, on October 26, 1979, the circuit court upheld the decision to terminate parental rights. The circuit court concluded that the probate court acted properly in finding that it had jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in its evaluation of the evidence presented. It found that there was sufficient evidence to establish the jurisdiction of the probate court as there was not conclusive evidence that the child's aunt was available to care for the child. [6] Once the circuit court decided the jurisdictional issue under MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b), it reviewed the dispositional phase, i.e., the termination of parental rights, and concluded that parental rights were properly terminated pursuant to the second criterion of MCL 712A.19a(d); MSA 27.3178(598.19a)(d). The court found that the parent was imprisoned for such a period that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of more than 2 years. The court found first that the child was without a normal home at that time and second that given the mother's sentence she would not be released until 1985, thus depriving the child of a normal home for more than two years. The circuit court concluded that it was unnecessary to review the first criterion of § 19a(d), [a] parent or guardian of the child is convicted of a felony of a nature as to prove the unfitness of the parent or guardian to have future custody of the child as there was a sufficient basis for terminating the parental rights under the second criterion. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on April 23, 1980, for the reasons stated in the opinion of the circuit judge. Deborah Finney then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. On October 3, 1980, this Court stated: On order of the Court, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is considered and it is granted. The delayed application for leave to appeal is considered, and while it is being considered, this Court, pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7) remands the case to the probate court for the County of Washtenaw for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact by the probate judge as to (1) the current status of appellant, her sister, her husband, her daughter born March 17, 1978, and her daughter's natural father; (2) placement alternatives presently available. The probate judge also may make a present recommendation as to custody and placement. These findings and a transcript of proceedings are to be filed with the clerk of this Court within 60 days of the certification of this order. A hearing on remand was held in January of 1981, and the probate court's findings of fact and recommendations were filed on February 2, 1981. The probate court stated that [i]t is the court's unqualified recommendation that Taurus should remain in the foster home and that adoption should be pursued. We granted leave to appeal on March 27, 1981, and the matter was argued before us on October 13, 1981. On July 7, 1982, this case was once again remanded to the probate court. The probate court was directed to explicate the basis for its assumption of jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b) and for its disposition of this matter pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(d); MSA 27.3178(598.19a)(d). The probate court was specifically directed to make findings of fact concerning the propriety of a possible temporary    or permanent placement [with the child's aunt]. [7] The findings of fact and explication of the court were received by this Court on September 7, 1982, and an amendment was received on September 9, 1982. Aided by the amplification by the probate judge of the record below, we proceed to consider the difficult issues presented by this case. In passing, we are compelled to observe that, inasmuch as it is psychologically and socially of extreme concern that the child find proper placement with the parent(s) or a relative, or foster care, or in adoption in the shortest possible period of time, it is essential that the probate court not only act expeditiously, but with meticulous regard for all statutory requirements so as to (1) protect all rights and (2) avoid the possibility of appeal or (3) if appeal is necessary, have such a complete record with specific and substantiated findings that there can be accurate and swift appellate determination without appellate speculation as to the facts from not only a cold but also an incomplete record.