Opinion ID: 1184798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions for Judgment and New Trial.

Text: Prior to the trial appellant moved for summary judgment. The motion was denied. Appellant claims this was error. Appellant suffered a loss of memory as a result of the accident and had no recollection of the collision. Brooks, a passenger in appellant's car, testified by deposition that appellant's car was traveling toward Anchorage on Gambell Street at about 35 miles an hour as they approached the intersection where the collision occurred, that he observed a flashing or blinking yellow light at the intersection, that as appellant's car entered the intersection appellee's car came shooting into the intersection from an intersecting street on the right, and that the cars collided. Brooks stated that appellee's car was about a half a car's length away when he first saw it, and that appellee came up too fast and so suddenly that it was all over before it started.    In a deposition appellee testified that he was traveling on Ninth Street at about 15 to 20 miles an hour, that the visibility was good, that he stopped when he got to the intersection of Ninth and Gambell Streets where there was a flashing red light facing him, that he looked to the right and left and did not see anybody and so started across the intersection, that at that moment appellant's car hit his car, and that he hadn't seen appellant's car until the collision. The accident took place at about 2:30 a.m. Appellee stated that he had eaten no supper the evening before, that he had drunk from seven to ten 1-ounce drinks of whiskey from the time he went to work at 8:00 a.m. the morning before until 2:00 a.m. of the following day, the day of the accident, and that between midnight and 2:00 a.m. he did not recall having any drinks but that he might have. Based on the foregoing testimony found in the depositions of Brooks and appellee, appellant contends that he made a prima facie case showing: (1) that appellee had violated Title 13, Section 85, Alaska Administrative Code, [1] and Section 19-38 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Anchorage, [2] in that he failed to observe a traffic control device, the flashing red light; (2) that appellee had violated Title 13, Section 102, Alaska Administrative Code, [3] in that he failed to yield the right of way at a stop intersection; (3) that appellee violated AS 28.35.030 [4] and Section 19-23 of the Anchorage Code [5] by driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; and (4) that appellee was guilty of driving his vehicle in a reckless and careless manner in violation of AS 28.35.040(a). [6] Appellant then argues that the foregoing traffic laws, ordinances and regulations were promulgated for the protection of travelers on highways, that appellant was one of the class of persons to be protected, that his injuries were caused by appellee's violations of such laws, ordinances and regulations, that under our decision in Rogers v. Dubiel [7] the burden was upon appellee to justify such violations, that he failed to sustain that burden, that there was thus established a prima facie case of negligence on appellee's part which appellee failed to rebut, and therefore, that summary judgment ought to have been granted to appellant on the issue of appellee's negligence. Appellant's argument and his reliance on Rogers v. Dubiel is based on the assumption that it was clear as a matter of fact that the accident was caused by appellee's violation of the law and therefore there were no genuine issues of fact remaining for trial. [8] That is not so. There was an issue of fact as to the question of whether appellee stopped his car at the red flashing light before entering the intersection, because Brooks testified that appellee came shooting into the intersection and appellee testified that he had made a stop and had then proceeded across the intersection in a normal manner. There was an issue of fact as to whether appellee was guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Appellant contends that because of the number of drinks that appellee admittedly had had, it follows that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On the other hand, appellee testified that he was not at all high nor at all affected by the drinks that he had consumed. There was also an issue of fact as to whether appellee had failed to yield the right of way. Appellee pleaded, as an affirmative defense, contributory negligence on the part of appellant. Even assuming, arguendo, that appellee's entry into the intersection without seeing appellant approaching amounted to a violation of some law, ordinance or regulation relating to the driving of a motor vehicle, and established negligence on appellee's part, the contributory negligence of appellant would bar his recovery. [9] Brooks testified that appellant was driving at a speed of 5 miles an hour in excess of the posted speed limit when he entered the intersection, that appellant's car hit appellee's car, and not vice versa, and that appellant did not apply his brakes when he saw appellee's car enter the intersection. Brooks also testified that shortly before appellant entered the intersection a car passed appellant's car going between 50 and 60 miles an hour and that if we had been going any faster we would have been in his trunk. A fact finder could infer from this that appellant was traveling at a speed in excess of the speed that Brooks testified he was traveling, that is 35 miles an hour. Such testimony raised factual questions as to whether appellant had acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances for his own safety, i.e., whether or not appellant was guilty of contributory negligence. [10] There were genuine factual issues to be determined at the time appellant moved for a summary judgment, and therefore the court was correct in denying the motion for summary judgment. [11] Appellant's reliance on the case of Rogers v. Dubiel [12] is misplaced. That case dealt with a situation where a person standing on a non-travelled portion of a highway was injured when he was struck by the defendant's car which slid out of a traffic lane. We held that in skidding out of the lane of traffic defendant violated the law, and since a collision resulted the burden of proving excuse or justification for the violation fell on the defendant and that he failed to discharge his burden. We said: Plaintiff had established a prima facie case when he showed that he was standing on the shoulder of the street in a location where he had a legal right to be and was injured by the departure of defendant's vehicle from the lane of traffic it was required to use. Thereafter the burden was on defendant to convince the trier of the facts that he was not negligent. [Footnote omitted] [13] The Rogers case is inapposite. In that case there was no issue of contributory negligence. Here such an issue exists. Even assuming for the sake of argument that appellant had established by deposition testimony that appellee violated the law by failing to yield the right of way to appellant, summary judgment for appellant would not be appropriate because there would still be the issue of appellant's contributory negligence to be decided by the trier of the facts. At the close of the evidence, appellant moved for a directed verdict on the questions of appellee's negligence and appellant's contributory negligence. The motion was denied. Following the return of the jury's verdict, appellant made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. This motion was also denied. Appellant maintains that in denying these motions the court erred. There was no error in denying the motions for judgment. At the close of the trial there had been presented evidence on the issues of appellee's negligence and appellant's contributory negligence which was substantially the same as the evidence by deposition which the court below had considered when it denied appellant's motion for a summary judgment. Such evidence makes it clear, in our opinion, that there was room for diversity of opinion among reasonable men as to whether appellee was negligent and as to whether appellant was contributorily at fault. These were questions for the jury to decide. [14] There also was no error in denying the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. We repeat here what we said in Ahlstrom v. Cummings: [15] The matter of granting or refusing a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. We shall not interfere with the exercise of his discretion except in the most exceptional circumstances and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The circumstances which would require our intervention do not exist here. From a review of the record we cannot say that evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. On the contrary, we find that the issues which the jury were called upon to decide turned upon facts which were in dispute, and that there was clearly an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. [Footnotes omitted]