Opinion ID: 1773990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the lower court acted improperly by sentencing appellant to 60 years in the mississippi department of corrections.

Text: ¶ 32. In addition to arguing his sixty-year sentence is excessive and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, White asserts the evidence was insufficient to find he sold drugs within 1,500 feet of a church. White waived a trial by jury on the enhancement provision, and Judge Pickard found the sale occurred within 1,500 feet of a church. The record supports this conclusion, as Crew and Whitaker both testified the farthest the car could have been from the church was 1,015 feet. Each officer testified to the various measurements taken. White's only argument is that because the officers could not see exactly where the transaction took place, they cannot state conclusively the sale took place within 1,500 feet of the church. Both Crew and Whitaker saw the point at which White's car turned around. This point, which represents the farthest possible distance from the church the car could ever have been, was measured at 1,015 feet. This portion of the assignment is without merit. ¶ 33. Next, White asserts his sentence of sixty years is extremely disproportionate to the crime committed, and, in effect, amounts to a life sentence because he was thirty-four at the time of sentencing. He asserts the twelve-year sentence offered by the State as a plea bargain is an appropriate sentence for this offense. ¶ 34. Upon conviction for the sale of cocaine, a person may be sentenced to not more than 30 years ... Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(b)(1) (1993). Mississippi law provides a sentence for sale of cocaine may be enhanced under one of four enhancement statutes: § 41-29-142 (1993) (providing for discretionary sentencing of up to twice that authorized for sale of controlled substances within certain distances of schools, churches and other public buildings and locations); § 41-29-147 (1993) (providing for discretionary sentencing to term and/or fine of up to twice that authorized for second or subsequent drug conviction); § 99-19-81 (1994) (providing for mandatory maximum sentence without parole or probation for offenders who have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime and who have been sentenced to separate terms of one year or more); and, § 99-18-83 (1994) (providing for mandatory life sentence without parole or probation for offenders convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime who have been sentenced to separate terms of one year or more where any one of such felonies was a crime of violence). In the present case, following the terms of § 41-29-142 (sales close to schools, churches, etc.), Judge Pickard doubled White's thirty-year sentence, given under § 41-29-139(b)(1), to sixty years. ¶ 35. As a general rule, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum period allowed by statute will not be disturbed on appeal. Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Miss.1992). However, a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed is subject to attack on Eighth Amendment grounds. Id. ¶ 36. The elements for evaluating proportionality are: (1) The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Comparison of the sentence with sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) Comparison of sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for commission of the same crime with the sentence imposed in this case. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). This Court has adopted the test in numerous instances. See Stromas, 618 So.2d at 122-23 (Miss.1993); Wallace, 607 So.2d at 1188; Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 302-03 (Miss.1992); Jones v. State, 523 So.2d 957, 961 (Miss.1988); Clowers v. State, 522 So.2d 762, 764 (Miss.1988); Presley v. State, 474 So.2d 612, 618-19 (Miss.1985). ¶ 37. When a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of `gross disproportionality' the proportionality analysis of Solem is used. Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 538 (Miss.1996) ( quoting Smallwood v. Johnson, 73 F.3d 1343, 1347 (5th Cir.1996)). One seeking to prove a sentence violative of the Eighth Amendment carries a heavy burden. See Stromas, 618 So.2d at 123. Although White's sentence is severe, the Solem proportionality analysis is not implicated in this case. See id. ¶ 38. The State argues Stromas is analogous to the case at bar. Stromas was convicted of a single sale of a small amount of cocaine and sentenced to the maximum penalty of thirty years for his crime. Stromas, 618 So.2d at 123. Under the subsequent offender statute, Stromas' penalty was doubled to sixty years. Id. Like White, Stromas received the maximum number of years to serve, but he received less than the maximum total penalty since no fine was imposed. Id. Unlike Stromas, who had a prior conviction for possession of marijuana, id., White has no prior convictions for drug-related offenses. ¶ 39. In Stromas we noted § 41-29-139(b)(1) was very broad in its application. The statute applies to the sale of any amount of cocaine, no matter how small. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(b)(1) (1993). The Court went on to point out the sentence was severe, but it was not grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. Stromas, 618 So.2d at 123. The Court recognized the public had expressed grave concern over the growing drug problems, and, it was the Legislature's prerogative, and not that of this Court, to set the length of sentences. Id. Solem was not implicated because the sentence was within the statutory guidelines, and the Legislature had set stiff penalties for convicted drug offenders. Id. Finally, the Court noted where a sentence is within the prescribed statutory limits, it will generally be upheld and not regarded as cruel and unusual. Id. at 124. ¶ 40. Although not mentioned by the parties, the recent case of Davis v. State, 724 So.2d 342 (Miss.1998), is applicable to our analysis. Davis involved an instance where a twenty-five-year-old mother was sentenced to sixty years in prison for the sale of two-tenths of a gram of cocaine within 1,500 feet of a church. Davis, 724 So.2d at 344. This Court remanded for resentencing, finding there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the maximum sentence allowable under the statute. Id. at 345. The dissenters in Davis maintained because the sentence was within the limits proscribed by the statute, there was no abuse of discretion. Id. at 346-49. (Smith, J. and Mills, J. dissenting). ¶ 41. As noted supra, and recognized by the Davis majority, sentencing is generally within the sound discretion of the trial judge and the trial judge's decision will not be disturbed on appeal if the sentence is within the term provided by statute. Id. at 344. The practical effect of the general rule is that a trial judge's sentencing decision has traditionally been treated as unreviewable so long as the sentence was within the statutory limits. ¶ 42. Judicial discretion is defined as a sound judgment which is not exercised arbitrarily, but with regard to what is right and equitable in circumstances and law, and which is directed by the reasoning conscience of the trial judge to just result. Black's Law Dictionary 848 (6th ed.1990) ( citing State v. Grant, 10 Wash.App. 468, 519 P.2d 261, 265 (1974)). Rather than implying bad faith or an intentional wrong on the part of the trial judge, an abuse of discretion is viewed as a strict legal term that is clearly against logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing. Black's Law Dictionary 10 (6th ed.1990). ¶ 43. Any attempt at more concrete or concise definition of discretion would be futile. Likewise, the phrase abuse of discretion does not lend itself to a definitive or precise meaning. This ambiguity is necessary to allow judges enough room to exercise their own sound judgment in the cases coming before them. A more narrow definition of the term would constrict a judge's ability to do what a judge is supposed to domake sound judgments on the issues before the court within the boundaries of the laws of this State, the Mississippi Constitution and the United States Constitution. This is an awesome responsibility and it places a great deal of power in the hands of our trial judges. This power and responsibility should not be taken lightly in any case. ¶ 44. The discharge of judicial duties requires consideration, deliberation and thoughtful use of the broad discretion given judges under the laws of this State. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed. 204, 234 (1824). ¶ 45. The Legislature has not required judges to sentence offenders to a specific term for the sale of cocaine. Instead, the Legislature has provided a wide range of possible sentences,a sentence of from zero to thirty years upon a conviction for sale of cocaine or, a sentence of from zero years to life imprisonment without parole or probation when an applicable enhancement statute is involved. Only when a defendant has been convicted of a felony or federal crime twice previously and sentenced to two separate terms of one year or more has the Legislature removed any element of judicial discretion and mandated the defendant be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment allowed. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-19-81 to -83 (1994). The Legislature wisely provided such a broad range of sentences to allow trial judges, using their discretion, to issue appropriate sentences in each individual case. It is incumbent upon those trial judges to use this power wisely. ¶ 46. Here, as in Davis, we are faced with a first-time offender who has sold a small amount of cocaine. Like Davis, White has been sentenced to sixty years in prison. Even though in this case we have the benefit of a presentencing report to use in our review, as in Davis, there is simply nothing in the record to justify a sixty-year prison term. What is clear from the record, however, is the trial judge did not exercise any discretion in sentencing White to sixty yearsthe maximum term allowed by statute. ¶ 47. Sixteen appeals of convictions involving sale of cocaine and one of the four enhancement statutes were affirmed by either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in 1998. See Appendix. In ten of these cases imposition of the maximum term of imprisonment allowable was mandated by either § 91-19-81 (subsequent offender) or § 91-19-83 (habitual offender). Five of these sixteen cases evidenced proper use of discretionary sentencing authority based on the charges and facts of the individual cases. The sentences and fines in these five cases ranged from fifteen years to serve to thirty years to serve plus a $2,000 to $10,000 fine. In fact, a review of all sale of cocaine related cases affirmed or reversed on appeal in 1998 revealed only three instances in which a first time offender was sentenced to a term of sixty years under one of the enhancement statutes. All three sentences were issued by the same trial judge. White v. State, 742 So.2d 1126 (Miss.1999) (the case sub judice ); Davis v. State, 724 So.2d 342 (Miss.1998) (remanded for resentencing); and Lewis v. State, No. 97-KA-00460-COA (Miss.Ct.App. Sept. 15, 1998) (a case, nearly factually identical to Davis and White, decided by the Court of Appeals three months before our decision in Davis. ). ¶ 48. The Legislature has provided a wide range of possible sentences for those convicted of sale of cocaine. We are duty bound to insure this broad discretionary authority is properly put to use. The failure of our trial courts to use discretion in sentencing may result in the loss of this freedom through the adoption of sentencing guidelines as was done in the federal system. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1 to 8E1.3 (West 1996 & Supp 1999). For these reasons we vacate White's sentence of sixty years and remand this case for reconsideration of sentence consistent with this opinion.