Opinion ID: 2809695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breier and Blum

Text: ¶62 The Newspaper argues that Breier bars the Commission from raising a defense that no responsive record existed at the 34 No. 2013AP1715 time of the Newspaper's request. The Commission argues that, under Blum, it may assert that defense although it did not raise that defense before the Newspaper filed the mandamus action. ¶63 In Breier The Milwaukee Journal requested that the Milwaukee Police Department disclose daily arrest records, including the charges upon which persons were arrested. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 420-21. The police department refused to disclose records of the charges, so The Milwaukee Journal brought a mandamus action seeking an order compelling disclosure of those records. Id. at 421-22. The Breier court stated: The duty of the custodian is to specify reasons for nondisclosure and the court's role is to decide whether the reasons asserted are sufficient. It is not the trial court's or this court's role to hypothesize reasons or to consider reasons for not allowing inspection which were not asserted by the custodian. Id. ¶64 Unlike the case at issue, in Breier the requested records existed at the time of the request. The police department denied the public records request for public policy reasons in order to protect the arrested individuals from possible personal and economic harm. Id. at 421. This court held as a matter of law that the harm to the public interest in the form of possible damage to arrested persons' reputations does not outweigh the public interest in allowing inspection of the police records which show the charges upon which arrests were made. Id. at 440. Accordingly, this court remanded for the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling 35 No. 2013AP1715 disclosure of the requested records. Id. In the present case, the circuit court could not have ordered that relief at the time the lawsuit was commenced because no record existed then, and in the Commission's ordinary course of business a record would not have existed until the next regular meeting in late March. ¶65 Thus, Breier will sometimes prohibit a court from considering reasons for denying a public records request that were not asserted by a custodian prior to the commencement of a mandamus action. See Oshkosh Nw. Co. v. Oshkosh Library Bd., 125 Wis. 2d 480, 484, 373 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1985) (Where inspection is denied, it is the custodian, not the attorney representing the governmental body after a mandamus action is commenced, who must give specific and sufficient reasons for denying inspection.). But Breier does not always require that prohibition, especially if no record exists. ¶66 In Blum a student, Elizabeth Blum, filed a public records request with the Johnson Creek Board of Education. Blum, 209 Wis. 2d at 379. The request sought records indicating the interim grades of a student who received a scholarship over Blum. Id. The board denied the request, stating that calculating interim grades would be burdensome and that interim grades were immaterial for determining the recipient of the scholarship. Id. at 380. Blum then filed a mandamus action to compel the board to disclose the requested records. Id. ¶67 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order denying Blum's mandamus petition. Id. at 380, 391-92. The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 118.125, which 36 No. 2013AP1715 states that pupil records maintained by a public school are confidential, exempted the requested records from disclosure under the public records law. Id. at 385. [U]nless there exists: (1) a 'clear statutory exception'; (2) a common law limitation; or (3) an overriding public interest in keeping the record confidential, the information sought must be disclosed. Id. at 383 (quoting Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, City of Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984)). The court of appeals concluded that § 118.125 was a clear statutory exception to disclosure. Id. at 385. ¶68 The court of appeals rejected Blum's argument that, because the board did not rely on Wis. Stat. § 118.125 in its response to her public records request, Breier forbade the court from considering whether that statute exempted the requested records from disclosure. Id. at 391-92. Because the board relied on § 118.125 in its response to the mandamus petition, [t]he trial court thus was not required to 'hypothesize' the applicable statutory exception, which would have been prohibited under Breier. See id. at 388 n.6. The court of appeals concluded, the Board's insufficient denial letter to Blum does not prevent a court from determining whether a 'clear statutory exception' applies to the requested interim grades. Id. at 388. ¶69 Thus, under Blum, Breier does not prohibit a court from considering whether a requested record is statutorily exempt from disclosure under the public records law, even if a 37 No. 2013AP1715 custodian did not assert the statutory exemption prior to the commencement of a mandamus action. ¶70 The Newspaper urges this court to rely on Breier and conclude that it has prevailed in substantial part. The Newspaper argues that Breier requires a custodian to be specific in its response to a public records request so that a requester can challenge the response and so a court can review the sufficiency of the response. The Newspaper contends that the Commission actively misled the newspaper into believing that it had created a record of the motion at issue, only to assert that no record existed after the mandamus action was filed. The Newspaper argues that, had it known that no record existed, it would have filed suit under the open meetings law instead of the public records law. ¶71 The Commission urges us to rely on Blum and thus allow it to raise its affirmative defense that no responsive record existed at the time of the Newspaper's request. It argues that a record's non-existence provides a clear statutory exception to disclosure under the public records law. The Commission reasons that the public records law does not require the creation of a record or the release of a record that does not exist. The Commission further argues that there is no evidence . . . that the [Commission] purposefully or maliciously misled the Newspaper into believing that a record existed. Rather, the Commission argues that it mistakenly believed that the Newspaper was requesting information, not records, and that the lack of clarity of the Newspaper's requests resulted in confusion. 38 No. 2013AP1715 ¶72 To determine whether the Commission may assert its affirmative defense that no responsive record existed at the time of the Newspaper's request, we will determine whether a requested record's non-existence provides a clear statutory exception to disclosure under the public records law. See Blum, 209 Wis. 2d at 388. The [public] records law affords the right to inspect and make or receive a copy of a 'record.' George, 169 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(b)). Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) states that, [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right to inspect any record. Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) (emphasis added). Similarly, § 19.35(1)(b) states that, [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right to inspect a record and to make or receive a copy of a record. Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(b) (emphases added). ¶73 Accordingly, the public records law provides neither a right to inspect nor a duty to disclose a non-existent record. See George, 169 Wis. 2d at 579 (holding that [a] non-existent record cannot be inspected or copied and [t]he [public] records law does not require the custodian to . . . create a record for the benefit of a requester.). A governmental entity may not circumvent disclosure of a record by failing to create a record that it is legally required to create. However, the public records law does not require the government to create a record or release a non-existent record. The public records law is designed to make existing records available to the public unless withholding such documents is specifically authorized by 39 No. 2013AP1715 law. Gehl, 306 Wis. 2d 247, ¶13 (emphasis added) (citing Zinngrabe, 146 Wis. 2d at 633). See also Compliance Outline, supra, at 18 (The public records law provides access to existing records maintained by authorities.). Thus, [t]he public records law does not require an authority to provide requested information if no record exists . . . . Compliance Outline, supra, at 18. In short, a record's non-existence provides a clear statutory exception to disclosure under the public records law. ¶74 We are not persuaded by the Newspaper's argument that Blum applies only to a confidentiality-based clear statutory exception to disclosure. The court of appeals in Blum held that it may consider a clear statutory exception to disclosure, although the custodian did not rely on the exception in its response to a public records request. Blum, 209 Wis. 2d at 38788. Although the court discussed a confidentiality statute, it did so because that kind of statute was at issue in that case. The court did not suggest that its holding was limited to confidentiality-based statutory exceptions. Further, in Breier, the court did not address the issue of whether a custodian could assert a statutory exception, such as a record's non-existence, for the first time after a mandamus action has been filed. ¶75 We are also not persuaded by the Newspaper's argument that the Commission's affirmative defense is barred because the Commission, by failing to disclose that no record existed, hindered both the Newspaper's ability to prepare a challenge and a court's ability to review the sufficiency of the Commission's 40 No. 2013AP1715 denial. Accepting this argument would require us to overturn Blum, which we are unwilling to do. In fact, the court of appeals in Blum rejected the same argument. See id. at 386-88. The court of appeals in Blum explained that Breier requires custodians to be specific in their responses to public records requests so that courts can review the sufficiency of the responses. Id. at 386-87. However, if the information requested is specifically exempted by statute from disclosure, the legislature has already determined that the information need not be disclosed. Id. at 387. [A] reviewing court's de novo determination whether certain information is statutorily exempted from disclosure is not aided by anything a custodian might say in a denial letter, nor is it deterred by the custodian's silence. Id. at 387-88. In the present case, although the Commission's responses did not state that no record existed, that omission does not impair our ability to determine whether a statutory exemption to disclosure applies.26 ¶76 We conclude that under the circumstances presented, this court may consider whether a record existed when the public records request was made, even though the custodian's response 26 We also disagree with the Newspaper's argument that we should ignore the Commission's affirmative defense because the Commission actively misled the Newspaper into believing that a record existed. There is no evidence that the Commission actively misled the Newspaper. The Commission did not know whether a responsive record existed when it responded to the requests. In addition to the fact that no record existed that could be produced, the Commission acted reasonably in responding to what it deemed to be a request for information. 41 No. 2013AP1715 to the request did not specifically state that the record did not exist. See id. at 388 (holding that a court may consider a clear statutory exception to disclosure even if a custodian did not rely on that exception in its response to a public records request). Based on the foregoing discussion, the Commission lawfully denied the Newspaper's request because no responsive record existed at the time of the request.