Opinion ID: 1706325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether the comments made by the State in closing argument were plain error.

Text: ¶ 38. In closing argument, counsel for the State made the following statements: I suspect that sometime that afternoon whenever they came back from Magee, Clarissa, Jermaine, and Deandre to Tamesha's apartment, and Clarissa and Jermaine went back south, I suspect if they had not done, it before, that there was a conversation that I'm going to say you were over there, and I'll say I drove the Toyota over here and you weren't even involved, Tamesha. I'll just say I drove the Toyota over here, and he came and picked me up in the Mustang. That gets you off the scene and takes me off the scene while the man is being killed. I'll say we don't know nothing about it. Okay? Is that the defense? Well, we have something to prove that that's a lie. . . . . Is there any possibility that they were giving Clarissa that Jeep to satisfy her to keep her from going to the police? . . . . That paperwork that afternoon was nothing more than to try to get [Clarissa] to not go to the police. That's what that was about, because she was pushing it. Dampier now argues that these comments were: without any foundation at all. It was completely made for the sole purpose of inflaming the sentiments of the jury. It had no basis in facts presented at trial. While [Dampier] did not make an objection at trial, the comments were so out, rageous that the trial court should have objected on its own motion. Because the comment was so inflammatory, this case should be reversed. The State responds that the comments: of which Dampier complains amount to no more than the State properly arguing its theory of the case and making deductions and conclusions based on the evidence presented. The comments were in no way improper. Furthermore, they could not have prejudiced Dampier as they did not concern his obvious guilt. Rather, the statements relate to the involvement of Dampier's confederates. Alternatively, the State argues that if the prosecutor's comments were improper, they did not prejudice Dampier, and the error was harmless. ¶ 39. In general, the failure to object to the prosecution's statements in closing argument constitutes a procedural bar . However, in extreme cases, a failure to object to questions which were violative of a constitutional right will not act as a procedural bar to consideration. Ross v. State, 954 So.2d 968, 1001-1002 (Miss.2007) (citations omitted). Absent the application of a procedural bar, this Court has stated that: [a]ttorneys are allowed a wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury. However, prosecutors are not permitted to use tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. Hiter v. State, 660 So.2d 961, 966 (Miss. 1995). The standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Ormond v. State, 599 So.2d 951, 961 (Miss.1992). Sheppard v. State, 777 So.2d 659, 661 (Miss.2000) (emphasis added). See also Brown v. State, 907 So.2d 336, 341 (Miss. 2005). In closing argument, that wide latitude extends not only to the facts presented in evidence, but also to deduction and conclusions he may reasonably draw therefrom, and the application of the law to the facts. Sanders v. State, 801 So.2d 694, 704 (Miss.2001) (quoting Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 506 (Miss.1997)). However, [a]rguing statements of fact which are not in evidence or necessarily inferable from facts in evidence is error when those statements are prejudicial. Ross, 954 So.2d at 1002 (citations omitted). ¶ 40. Preliminarily, this Court concludes that Dampier's failure to object to the now-disputed comments in closing argument creates a procedural bar, as those comments did not infringe upon Dampier's constitutional rights. See Ross, 954 So.2d at 1001. Assuming arguendo that the procedural bar is inapplicable, this Court must determine (1) whether the individual comments constituted improper argument and (2) if so, whether that improper argument created unjust prejudice against Dampier. Sheppard, 777 So.2d at 661. Applying that standard, [w]e find the substance of th[ese] argument[s] is not out-of-bounds for closing arguments; so there is no plain error to be found there either. Minor v. State, 831 So.2d 1116, 1123 (Miss. 2002). ¶ 41. This Court finds that one reasonably could infer that the use of forged title applications to deter Clarissa from contacting the police could be argued as a logical deduction from the evidence presented. Immediately after asking Jermaine and Dampier if they stole the vehicles, Clarissa demanded to see the paperwork. Jermaine first told her that the paperwork was at McClendon's apartment and then had Dampier fill out the blank title applications because Clarissa knew his handwriting. Given that testimony, this comment was well within the wide latitude extended to attorneys in closing argument. Id. ¶ 42. As to the comment regarding whether there was any possibility that Jermaine and Dampier were giving Clarissa the Jeep as incentive not to contact the police, this Court finds nothing improper. When Clarissa asked for the keys to the Corolla, Jermaine immediately gave her the keys to the Jeep. According to Harth's testimony, however, Jermaine promised Dampier that he would get a truck out of the deal. The form of the question posed by the State in closing argument is only whether any possibility existed that Clarissa was given the Jeep in an attempt to encourage her inaction. Based upon the evidence presented, the argument could be made that one logically could deduce giving Clarissa the Jeep originally intended for Dampier was an attempt to dissuade her from contacting the police. Accordingly, this Court concludes that this comment was within the wide latitude extended to attorneys in closing argument. ¶ 43. Finally, this Court addresses the comment. suggesting a possible conspiratorial conversation between Dampier and McClendon. Dr. Vorder Bruegge testified that if the green Mustang came down [Highway 49] in that period from 11:00 to 12:00, then it was at . . . 11:25:32. Dr. Vorder Bruegge further testified that if the black Jeep followed the green Mustang, as Dampier claimed, then it did so ten seconds later at 11:25:42. If a trier of fact accepted that testimony, he or she could conclude that Jermaine did not pick up Dampier at McClendon's apartment before returning to Five Star for the Jeep. That testimony suggests that Dampier remained at Five Star for the entire nineteen-minute, time frame between the end of Charlotte's conversation with McGuffee and the point at which the vehicles left the Five Star lot. As such, the Corolla necessarily would have been brought to McClendon's apartment by a third party. [30] The circuit'judge stated that [i]t seems rather clear to me that [Dampier] and [Jermaine] were let out at the dealership and committed the crime that they did, and then got in the two vehicles and headed south. Therefore, we conclude that the substance of the comment lies within an acceptable range of deductions and conclusions which reasonably may be drawn from the facts presented in evidence. See Sanders, 801 So.2d at 704. Such comments encourage deductive reasoning by a jury, as opposed to speculation. [31] Thus, no plain error is present.