Opinion ID: 203763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prima facie case for eligibility under the CAT

Text: Even where a party filing an untimely motion to reopen can qualify under an exception that excuses the late filing, an agency may still deny the motion if the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case sufficient to ground a claim of eligibility for the underlying substantive relief. Raza, 484 F.3d at 128; Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168; Poniman v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir.2007). Here, Larngar is seeking relief under the CAT. As a general matter, to establish eligibility for CAT protection, a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon return to his country. Khan v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 573, 575 n. 2 (1st Cir.2008). To establish a prima facie case for relief under the CAT, however, the applicant need only produce objective evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that he can establish that he is more likely than not to be tortured. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir.2002); see also Romilus v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2004). [8] In this case, the agency appears to have concluded  independent of its analysis with respect to the existence of changed country circumstances  that Larngar failed to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for protection under the CAT. Specifically, the BIA remarked that the respondent's filing is insufficient to support reopening on the likelihood of it being found `more likely than not' that the respondent would be tortured at the hands of a government official if returned to Liberia. This alternative and independently dispositive ruling again places the jurisdictional issue at center stage. In cases such as this one, where our jurisdiction is limited to review of legal determinations, we have never explicitly addressed whether the BIA's determination that an applicant has failed to make out a prima facie case for substantive relief is typically legal or factual in nature. Compare Mehilli, 433 F.3d at 93 (changed circumstances are usually factual determinations.). We strike a familiar refrain. Under Conteh, the question of whether a party has established prima facie eligibility for relief under the CAT could be characterized as, at bottom (and reminiscent of our analysis of the first jurisdictional issue in this case), a question about whether a party has satisfied a correctly framed burden of proof. See Conteh, 461 F.3d at 63; EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 603 (1st Cir.1995) (We agree with the district court that the EEOC carried its burden of producing facts sufficient to limn the three elements essential to its prima facie case.) (internal citation omitted); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir.2005) (describing a prima facie showing as little more than a showing of whatever is required to permit some inferential leap sufficient to reach a particular outcome) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1228 (8th ed.2004)); Thomas v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, No. 07-3907, 2009 WL 146692, , 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 1362, at  (3d Cir. Jan. 22, 2009) (unpublished) (noting the government's argument that whether the documentary evidence [an applicant] proffered establishes prima facie eligibility ... is purely a factual determination... requir[ing] weighing and evaluation of the evidence ... [which is] reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.). Moreover, in the motion to reopen context, a number of courts have reviewed BIA determinations that an applicant has failed to establish prima facie eligibility for the substantive relief sought under a substantial evidence standard of review. The cases thus suggest that we lack jurisdiction in this context. See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313 ([W]hen [the BIA] denies a motion to reopen on the ground that the applicant has failed to make a prima facie showing [of entitlement to the substantive relief sought], we yet review that determination to ensure that it is supported by substantial evidence ) (emphasis added); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir.2008) (concluding that the BIA's denial of the applicant's motion to reopen because of, among other things, the applicant's failure to establish a prima facie case for asylum was supported by  substantial evidence ) (emphasis added); Poniman, 481 F.3d at 1012 (same); see also Gorvokovic v. Filip, No. 08-0463, 2009 WL 166534, , 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 1496, at  (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2009) (unpublished) ([S]ubstantial evidence supports the BIA's conclusion that [the petitioner] failed to establish prima facie eligibility for ... relief under the Convention Against Torture ('CAT').). Ultimately, however, we will not resolve the question here. Even if the BIA's determination that an applicant has failed to make out a prima facie case for substantive relief is typically a factual one, the BIA's treatment of this issue was so summary that we hesitate to reach any conclusions based on this record. Adding to our reluctance to reach this issue, we note that the government does not rely on the BIA's alternative ruling as an additional jurisdictional bar to our review. Nor has Larngar briefed this jurisdictional question. The BIA is free, of course, to take up this issue anew.