Opinion ID: 624962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims Against DOCS and Dr. Wright

Text: Hilton also challenges the district court's dismissal of his claims against DOCS and Dr. Wright in his official capacity under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. [7] Defendants argue that the dismissal should be affirmed because Hilton has failed to produce any evidence that Dr. Wright or DOCS regarded him personally as being substantially limited in a major life activity. Until January 1, 2009, when amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 12102 went into effect, see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. 110-325, §§ 4(a), 8, 122 Stat. 3555, (2008), the defendants would have been correct, as Hilton would not have been able to demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Prior to that point, a plaintiff, such as Hilton, seeking to avail himself of the regarded as prong of the definition of disability needed to show that he was perceived as both impaired and substantially limited in one or more major life activity. See Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express, Inc., 159 F.R.D. 672, 678 (N.D.Ill.1994) (TNT . . . must perceive that Flasza has a physical defect and that the defect substantially limits one or more of Flasza's major life activities.); accord Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir.2002); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir.1996). Because we determine disability on an individualized, case-by-case basis, Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir.1998), under the old regime, Hilton could survive summary judgment on his ADA claim only if he could raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether Dr. Wright and/or DOCS regarded him personally as being substantially limited in a major life activity. The record is devoid of any such evidence. In 2008, however, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act, which substantially reworked the language of Section 12102. Among other things, what was formerly subsection (2)(C) became subsection (1)(C) and was amended to include the following parenthetical: as described in paragraph (3). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006) with ADA Amendments Act § 4(a). Paragraph (3), in turn, was completely new and reads in relevant part: (3) Regarded as having such an impairment For purposes of paragraph (1)(C): (A) An individual meets the requirement of being regarded as having such an impairment if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity. Id. (emphasis added). Lest there be any confusion about the amendment's effect on subsection (1)(C), the Committee Report states: The Committee therefore restores Congress's original intent by making clear that an individual meets the requirement of being regarded as having such an impairment if the individual shows that an action (e.g. disqualification from a job, program, or service) was taken because of an actual or perceived impairment, whether or not that impairment actually limits or is believed to limit a major life activity. H.R.Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14 (2008) (emphasis added). Although both parties thought that Hilton needed to demonstrate that the defendants regarded him as being substantially limited in a major life activity, it is clear that he was only required to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether Dr. Wright and/or DOCS regarded him as having a mental or physical impairment. Hilton was not required to present evidence of how or to what degree they believed the impairment affected him. Regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) continue to include drug addiction among the conditions qualifying as a physical or mental impairment, 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(ii) (2011), and there is no dispute that the defendants regarded Hilton as a former drug user. There thus seems to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants regarded Hilton as having a drug addition, which, to the extent that the DOJ's definition is persuasive, [8] would constitute a physical or mental impairment for the purposes of Section 12102. Obviously, none of this would matter if Hilton's suit for damages is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment as the district court appears to have held. The district court, however, was not express in its reasoning and did not even refer directly to the Constitution. Given that Hilton may have presented an otherwise triable issue of fact regarding his ADA claim, we are not inclined to affirm summary judgment upon so thin a reed. Instead, we remand Hilton's ADA claim for clarification and for expansion of the district court's Eleventh Amendment analysis. If the district court determines that Dr. Wright and DOCS are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment, the court may move on to consider whether drug addition constitutes a physical or mental impairment, see supra note 8, and, if so, whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to the other elements of a Title II ADA claim, cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.