Opinion ID: 223510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Huggans contends that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of either charge. We review the sufficiency of the evidence after a bench trial in the light most favorable to the verdict, upholding the verdict if a reasonable factfinder could find the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the evidence rationally supports two conflicting hypotheses. Kain, 589 F.3d at 948 (internal quotation marks omitted). [W]e will reverse only if the [factfinder] must have had a reasonable doubt concerning one of the essential elements of the crime. United States v. Hoffman, 626 F.3d 993, 995 (8th Cir.2010). To convict [Huggans] of conspiracy to distribute ... cocaine, the government had to prove that a conspiracy to distribute ... cocaine existed, that [Huggans] knew of the conspiracy, and that [Huggans] intentionally joined the conspiracy. United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 985 (8th Cir.2008). Huggans does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of the Sais conspiracy. At issue, therefore, is whether there was sufficient evidence that he knew of the conspiracy and knowingly became a member of the conspiracy. United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 634 (8th Cir. 1981). Intentional participation in a criminal conspiracy ... need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a development and a collocation of circumstances. Id. at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, to be guilty of a single conspiracy, the conspirators need not know each other or be privy to the details of each enterprise comprising the conspiracy as long as the evidence is sufficient to show that each defendant possessed full knowledge of the conspiracy's general purpose and scope. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). We believe the government adduced more than adequate evidence connecting Huggans to the conspiracy. We reject Huggans's argument that the government's evidence failed to establish anything more than a buyer-seller relationship between Stiles and Huggans. Because the crime of conspiracy requires a concert of action among two or more persons for a common purpose, the mere agreement of one person to buy what another agrees to sell, standing alone, does not support a conspiracy conviction. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, ... buyer-seller relationship cases ... involve[] only evidence of a single transient sales agreement and small amounts of drugs consistent with personal use. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, in this case, Stiles testified that he sold wholesale quantities of cocaine  totaling in excess of 600 kilograms, according to Stiles's estimate  to Huggans on a regular basis for several months during 2006. [6] The purchase of such a large amount of cocaine raises an inference of knowledge of a drug distribution venture that goes beyond an isolated buyer-seller transaction. Williams, 534 F.3d at 985. Additionally, the fact that Huggans bought large quantities of cocaine from Stiles on numerous occasions suggests more than a mere buyer-seller relationship. United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir.2010) (holding that the evidence is sufficient to support a conspiracy where the drugs were purchased for resale, and recognizing that [w]here the evidence shows multiple transactions involving large amounts of drugs, we have held this is sufficient to support a conclusion that the drugs were purchased for resale); United States v. Hester, 140 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that the jury instruction that a buyer-seller relationship does not establish a conspiracy is not appropriate when there is evidence of multiple drug transactions, as opposed to a single, isolated sale). As to the attempt count, [t]o prove attempt, the government must show 1) intent to engage in the crime and 2) conduct constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the crime. United States v. Burks, 135 F.3d 582, 583 (8th Cir.1998). A substantial step goes beyond mere preparation but may be less than the last act necessary before commission of the substantive crime. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Huggans does not dispute intent, but contends that the government failed to prove that he took a substantial step towards acquiring the twenty kilograms of cocaine from Rice. Huggans maintains that he had engaged only in mere preparation at the time of his arrest on April 12, 2007. Huggans argues that his case is materially indistinguishable from United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838 (8th Cir.1982), in which we held that the defendant had not yet passed the preparation stage in his attempt to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. In that case, Joyce was contacted several times by a government informant who told Joyce that cocaine was available in St. Louis. After the third call, during which a tentative price was discussed, Joyce flew from Oklahoma City to St. Louis to meet with the informant and an undercover police officer, who was posing as a cocaine seller. The parties agreed on a price, but Joyce refused to tender the money until the police officer opened the package which allegedly contained cocaine. The police officer refused to open the package, and finally Joyce left without making the purchase. He was arrested and in his possession was the approximate amount of money which he had told the informant he would pay for the cocaine. United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1077 (8th Cir.1987) (summarizing the facts of Joyce ). This court held that a reasonable jury could not find a substantial step because the attemptor's act must have passed the preparation stage so that if it is not interrupted extraneously, it will result in a crime, and Joyce, despite having both the opportunity and ability to purchase the cocaine at the agreed upon price, unambiguously refused. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841-42 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). That is, Joyce voluntarily abandoned [w]hatever intention [he] had to procure cocaine before being arrested. Id. at 841. Thus, Joyce turned on whether it was the defendant himself  rather than a third party  who ended the chain of events leading toward, but not resulting in, the commission of a substantive crime, Burks, 135 F.3d at 584, as have subsequent decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 878 (8th Cir.2010); Burks, 135 F.3d at 584; United States v. Jonsson, 15 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1994); Mims, 812 F.2d at 1078. Here, the government, not the defendant, ended the chain of events. Spencer, 592 F.3d at 878. The government's evidence, admitted in the form of witness testimony, telephone recordings, and a videotape of the transaction, demonstrated that Huggans arranged to purchase approximately twenty kilograms of cocaine from Rice, that he met Rice in a hotel room bringing nearly $330,000 in cash, that he actually handed over the money to Rice, and that he accompanied Rice out of the hotel room with the intention of obtaining the cocaine from one of Rice's associates. Huggans's conduct during his preliminary conversations with Rice, at the hotel room meeting, and continuing right up until the moment when he was arrested, strongly corroborated his unwavering purpose to purchase [cocaine]. Jonsson, 15 F.3d at 762; cf. Joyce, 693 F.2d at 843 n. 5 (noting that if Joyce had given [the undercover officer] the money necessary to purchase the cocaine but [the undercover officer] refused to give Joyce the cocaine, Joyce would have committed an attempt to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute). At no point did Huggans voluntarily abandon his intention to procure cocaine. We hold that given this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could find that Huggans intended to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of the statute and that he took a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. Accordingly, we affirm Huggans's convictions on both counts.