Opinion ID: 326271
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conspiracy by Sherpix : The first count of the indictment charges:

Text: 23 Commencing on or about December 1, 1971, and continuing to on or about November 16, 1972, within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, Louis K. Sher, defendant, and Saul Shiffrin, a co-conspirator only, and the original defendants, and co-conspirators, Paul Glickler, Richard P. Lerner and Harry Brandt Booking Co., Inc. unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, with each other and others, and through their use of Acorn Films, Inc., Sherpix, Inc., and Trans-Lux Theatre Corporation, to commit offenses against the United States by transporting and causing to be transported in interstate commerce by common carrier and for the purpose of sale, distribution and presentment, on obscene, lewd, lascivious and filthy motion picture .... 24 App. 21a-22a (emphasis added). At trial, Sherpix, Inc. (the corporation) moved to dismiss this count as to it on the ground that the indictment did not assert that Sherpix had conspired with anyone and hence did not charge it with the commission of any crime. (Tr. 510-11). However, the trial court denied the motion, and Sherpix was convicted and sentenced under this count. 25 Both at trial and on appeal, the Government argued that the conspiracy count could be sustained against Sherpix on the grounds that a corporation is criminally responsible for the acts of its officers and thus can be charged with their conspiracies. 7 Since the corporation's president, Sher, was included in the list of conspirators, the Government asserted that this was sufficient to hold the corporation liable. However, this argument is beside the point. The issue here is not whether Sherpix can be found guilty of conspiracy but whether the allegations of the indictment are sufficient to charge Sherpix with an offense. 26 It is fundamental that the indictment must inform an accused of the nature of the charges against him, 8 and it is a necessary corollary that the indictment must also give the accused notice that he is in fact being accused. The factual allegations in the instant indictment do not measure up to these standards. They fail to charge Sherpix, Inc., with the essential element of a conspiracy, i. e., the agreement with another person to commit a crime. 9 Merely listing the corporation as an instrumentality used by an officer in the conspiracy is not sufficient to establish that the grand jury charged the corporation as a co-conspirator. Individuals or corporations used without their knowledge or consent by others in the commission of offenses may not possess the requisite criminal intent to be guilty of an offense. 10 That the grand jury did not intend to charge Sherpix, Inc. in Count I is self-evident from the failure to name Sherpix as a party defendant or to allege that Sherpix did conspire, combine, cooperate and agree with any other person to commit offenses against the United States. 27 The grand jury showed itself quite capable of clearly expressing its intent when it wished to include a corporate entity among the parties accused. In the second and third counts, both Sherpix and Sher are clearly designated as accused parties, e. g., the second count charges: Sherpix, Inc., Louis K. Sher (and others) ... did unlawfully and knowingly transport and cause to be transported in interstate commerce ... an obscene ... motion picture .... (App. 25a-26a). Furthermore, in the first (conspiracy) count itself, another corporate entity, Harry Brandt Booking Co., Inc. was designated as a co-conspirator. While the exact reasons the grand jury chose to frame the first count as it did, without designating Sherpix, Inc. as a defendant or as a party to the unlawful agreement, may never be known, the conclusion is inescapable that it did treat Sherpix in a class apart from those it charged as defendants and as co-conspirators in the offense. We therefore hold that the allegations of the first count are insufficient to charge Sherpix, Inc., with the crime of conspiracy. On a retrial appellant Sherpix, Inc. cannot be tried as a defendant in the conspiracy count as that count is presently charged. We do not express any opinion as to whether a new indictment may be in order. 28 B. The Seizure of the Film : On November 1, 1972, an FBI Special Agent viewed a showing of the film at the Trans-Lux Theater in Washington, D.C. In support of his subsequent application for a search warrant, the agent drafted a detailed affidavit describing the film, and a warrant was obtained from a United States Magistrate. It was executed the same day and four reels of film were seized. The Government then petitioned for an adversary hearing before the Magistrate on the question of obscenity. At that hearing, held on November 3, Sherpix was represented by counsel. After viewing the film and hearing argument, the Magistrate determined that the film was obscene under the existing standards of obscenity. Appellants contend on appeal that the seizure of the film violated their first and fourth amendment rights, that the post-seizure adversary hearing violated their fifth amendment right to due process, and that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to conduct the post-seizure hearing. 29 In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637, 88 S.Ct. 2103, 20 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1968), the Court specifically left open the question of whether a judge must view the film before issuing a warrant for its seizure. However, we have since had occasion to consider this issue and have concluded that a proper affidavit can convey enough information to a Magistrate to enable him to make a determination of the alleged obscenity of the film sufficient to issue a warrant for its seizure. See United States v. Pryba, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 389, 400-02, 502 F.2d 391, 402-04 (1974): 30 (T)he affidavit must afford the magistrate an opportunity to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity. 31 Id., 502 F.2d at 403. 32 We find the affidavit prepared by the agent in this case was sufficient to meet this standard. At the time the warrant was requested, the question before the Magistrate was one of probable cause. The affidavit is a lengthy account of the film, describing each scene in detail and with explicit language, but suggesting no conclusions to be drawn from the description. 11 This clearly was sufficient to enable the Magistrate to exercise an informed and independent judgment concerning the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant for seizure of the film. Even if we had some doubt as to the sufficiency of the affidavit, the Magistrate's determination of probable cause is entitled to great deference, 12 and we find that he had a substantial basis for his decision. We therefore hold that the seizure of the film pursuant to the warrant was valid notwithstanding that the Magistrate had not personally viewed the film. 33 While it is not clear from appellants' brief, it is possible that by claiming violations of first amendment rights, they are also asserting they were entitled to an adversary hearing before the film was seized. In Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 2795, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973), the Court indicated that no such right exists where first amendment interests are otherwise safeguarded: 34 If such a seizure is pursuant to a warrant, issued after a determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate, and, following the seizure, a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding is available at the request of any interested party the seizure is constitutionally permissible. 35 Furthermore, in United States v. Pryba, supra, we considered and rejected a similar argument: 36 It is now clear, too, that where allegedly obscene matter is seized pursuant to a search warrant for evidentiary use in a criminal prosecution, there is no absolute right to a prior adversary hearing. 37 502 F.2d at 405. Since the present appellants were afforded an adversary hearing promptly after the seizure, they can have no grounds to complain that the hearing was not held sooner. 13 38 We also reject appellants' argument that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to conduct the adversary hearing. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), (e)ach United States Magistrate ... shall have ... (1) all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners by law or by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts .... The film in this case was seized pursuant to a warrant issued under Rule 41, Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 Since the holding of a prompt adversary hearing is constitutionally required in order to validate the seizure, 15 that hearing is a necessary part of the warrant proceeding. Thus if the instant procedure fits within Rule 41, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to conduct the hearing. 39 Rule 41(c) authorizes the Magistrate to require the appearance of the affiant (i. e., the FBI agent) and to examine the affiant and his witnesses, and Rule 41(e) only provides for a suppression hearing on motion of the party whose property has been seized. Thus Rule 41 does not specifically deal with the situation presented by this case. However, it has been held that Rule 41 authorizes an adversary hearing prior to the issuance of a warrant: 40 Although the amendment of Rule 41(c) refers only to witnesses produced by the affiant, it is clear from the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the proposed change that the purpose was to give the magistrate an opportunity to make a careful decision as to whether there is probable cause based upon legally obtained evidence rather than have the issue raised only later on a motion to suppress the evidence. Thus, while the drafters may not have specifically contemplated the present situation, we believe that their intent can best be effectuated, without doing violence to the language of the rule, by construing it to authorize an adversary hearing of the type conducted by (the) Magistrate .... 41 Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515, 522 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Jacobs, 513 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1974). 42 We adopt this construction of Rule 41 for purposes of the present case as well. If the Magistrate has jurisdiction to hold an adversary hearing prior to the issuance of the warrant, we see no justification for a different result where the hearing is properly deferred until after the film has been seized. In fact, at that point the argument is even sounder since the Magistrate is then exercising a form of in rem jurisdiction over property which has come into the possession of the court via the warrant. In any event, where the Constitution requires the prompt holding of an adversary hearing in order to protect substantial first amendment interests, it is incongruous to argue that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction sufficient to afford these protections to appellants. 43 Finally, appellants argue that the order directing them to show cause at the adversary hearing confronted them with a choice of not appearing and abandoning their first amendment interests in exhibiting the film or appearing to contest suppression of the film and thereby abandoning their right against self-incrimination. 16 However, this situation is not unlike the appearance by an accused at a hearing on his motion to suppress evidence. In that context, the Supreme Court, stated in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968): 44 In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not therefore be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection. 45 Id. at 394, 88 S.Ct. at 976. This reasoning applies perforce to the instant situation to preclude the introduction by the Government at trial as part of its case-in-chief of testimony given by a putative defendant opposing the seizure at an adversary hearing in an obscenity case. As so limited, the procedure followed in this case involved no restriction on appellants' right against self-incrimination. 46 C. Validity of the Obscenity Statutes. We find appellants' arguments relating to the constitutionality of the statutes they are accused of violating to be without merit. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), rejected the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1461, as applied to a pre-Miller offense, was unconstitutionally vague. The same construction will certainly be given to the determination of obscenity in section 1465, under which appellants were convicted, in light of its similar language. Hamling indicated the approach a court should take in ascertaining the relevant community standards for determining obscenity, see 418 U.S. at 104-06, 94 S.Ct. 2887, and these considerations will of course shape the instructions to the jury in the event of a retrial. The Court's formulation of the use of community standards in Hamling also disposes of appellants' argument that the conspiracy court under 18 U.S.C. § 371 is void for vagueness because it alleged a conspiracy to distribute film throughout the country rather than just locally. 47 The appellate courts in this jurisdiction have apparently not yet construed D.C.Code § 22-2001 in light of Miller test (b). (But see United States v. Plummer, Crim. No. 54967-72, D.C.Sup.Ct., Block, J., May 9, 1974 (section 22-2001 held valid)). However, we note that this statute uses language similar to that used in the federal statutes which have already been held constitutional and was also enacted by Congress. Thus we believe that the local statute is to be given the same construction as the federal statutes and is therefore constitutional. 48 D. Sufficiency of the Evidence : Appellants' arguments relating to the sufficiency of the Government's evidence at trial are equally devoid of merit. Their attack on the federal convictions is predicated on the fact that the trial court dismissed the charges of interstate shipment by common carrier, 18 U.S.C. § 1462, with the following statement: 49 I think that count three (§ 1465) is a clearly-made count. I think we have questions about count two (§ 1462) and I don't see any reason to allow the jury to speculate on something that I am not convinced about. 50 Tr. 503. Appellants argue that since there was no evidence of shipment by other than common carrier, the evidence was also too speculative to support convictions under section 1465 or for conspiracy to violate that section. This argument completely ignores the fact that the sections require proof of different elements to make out an offense under each. The elements of an offense under section 1462 are (1) use of a common carrier, (2) to transport obscene material in interstate commerce, whereas section 1465 prohibits (1) interstate transportation of obscene material, (2) for purposes of sale or distribution. While we express no opinion as to the soundness of the court's decision to dismiss the section 1462 charge, the evidence did show that appellants caused the movement of the film from New Jersey to the District of Columbia and that they intended to distribute the film here. Thus the evidence at least was sufficient to take the section 1465 count to the jury. 51 As to the count charging violations of D.C.Code § 22-2001, appellants argue that since their only role was distribution of the film and since they took no active part in the exhibition of the film, they have committed no offenses locally. However, as is customary in most jurisdictions, in the District of Columbia aiders and abettors are charged as principals. See D.C.Code § 22-105. 17 The court instructed the jury: 52 It is enough if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant presented the film either directly, or pursuant to a conspiratorial agreement, or that they aided and abetted others in presenting such film. 53 Tr. 712. Appellants' acts of supplying the film to the exhibitor in return for a share of the proceeds from the exhibition were certainly sufficient evidence to take the local charges to the jury under an aiding and abetting theory.