Opinion ID: 2178437
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statement on the Law.

Text: To be a qualified voter, one must meet the age, citizenship and residency requirements of IC 1971, 3-1-7-26, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-3426 (Burns Code Ed. Supp. 1974), [hereinafter cited as voter qualification statute], which provides: Every person who will be at least eighteen [18] years of age at the next ensuing general or city election, who is a citizen of the United States, who, if he continues to reside in the precinct until the next following general or city election, will at that time, have resided in the state of Indiana six [ 6 ] months, in the township sixty [60] days and the precinct thirty [30] days, shall be entitled, upon proper application, to be registered in such precinct. [Emphasis added.] This statute must be read without the italicized language, for it has been declared unconstitutional. Affeldt v. Whitcomb (1970), D.C., 319 F. Supp. 69, aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1034, 92 S.Ct. 1304, 31 L.Ed.2d 576 (1972). Under the voter qualification statute, respondent met the citizenship and age requirements. Thus, respondent would be a qualified voter for purposes of the declaration of candidacy statute if he also met the residence requirement of the voter qualification statute. Residence as that term is used in our voting laws means domicil. Perhaps unfortunately, the terms have been used interchangeably in Indiana case law. Thus, in Yonkey v. State ex rel. Cornelison (1866), 27 Ind. 236, 245-50, we find the following statement: But, from the evidence in the case, we think it too clear to admit of controversy, that Yonkey, in going to Washington, under the circumstances and for the purposes shown in evidence, did not lose his residence in Clinton county, or `cease to reside' therein as alleged. As a general rule, where a man is the head of a family and is a house keeper, the domicil of the family is presumed to be his legal place of residence. It requires an intention in order to change the domicil, and therefore if a person leaves his place of residence temporarily, on business or otherwise, but with the intention or returning, he does not thereby lose his domicil, as he could not by such absence acquire one elsewhere. See Bouvier's Law Dic., title `Domicil,' and authorities cited. Here, Yonkey resided with his family in Clinton county, and his family continued to reside there. It was his residence, and in going to Washington it is evident that he did not intend to lose his residence in Clinton county or change it to Washington. He therefore continued to reside in Clinton county. Ordinarily, residence simply connotes the place where a person lives. In this sense, a person may have more than one residence; i.e., he may have a summer home in Indiana, and a winter home in Florida. As that term is employed in the voting laws, however, the mere fact that one has a residence in Indiana does not ipso facto mean that such person's domicil or legal home  his residence  is in Indiana so that he may exercise the right of franchise or become an office-seeker. Thus, it must be kept in mind that the term resident as it appears in our voting laws is a word of art, which represents the legal conclusion of domicil. The significance of such distinction is that while one may have several residences, he may have only one domicil. Restatement of Conflicts § 11 (1934). In the following discussion, I will use the terms resident and residence, because those are the terms appearing in both the statutes and the case law; however, the precise legal issue is respondent's domicil. In determining residence, there are constitutional, statutory and case law guidelines to be applied. I have no disagreement with the majority's restatement of Pedigo v. Grimes (1887), 113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700, that residence is established when a ... person definitely intend[s] to make a particular place his permanent residence and act[s] upon that intention in good faith, although such restatement appears a little broad. The portions of Pedigo from which the legal standard was gleaned states: We cannot, therefore, disturb the decision of the court unless the testimony clearly shows that the persons who were asked to state for whom they voted cast illegal votes. This the testimony does not show. Taking the view of the testimony most favorable to the appellant, the utmost that can be said of it is that the voters entered the state university at Bloomington without at the time of entering having formed a definite intention of making that place their residence, but that they did subsequently determine that it should be their residence. This gave them the right to vote, because there is no evidence that this was not their intention, formed and acted upon in good faith. We think it clear that if they had gone to Bloomington with the intention of remaining simply as students, and there was no change of intention, they would not have acquired a residence. Granby v. Amherst, 7 Mass. 1; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa.St. 302, 10 Amer. Rep. 698; Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170; Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N.W.Rep. 119. Where, however, the intention is formed to make the college town the place of residence, and that place is selected as the domicile, then the person who does this in good faith becomes a qualified voter.       It can, we conceive, make no difference that the person is a student, if he has in good faith elected to make the place where the college is located his residence, since there is no imaginable reason why a person may not be both a student at a college and a resident of the place where the college is situated. If he is at the place merely as a student, then he is not a resident; but if he has selected that place as his abode, he acquires a residence which entitles him to vote if he possesses the other qualifications.       ... In this instance, the citizens, having taken up a residence in Bloomington, and having no other home, were entitled to vote there, although they may not have intended to remain there always. It is frequently said in the books that a man must have a home somewhere, and it is agreed that this home is at the place where he is bodily present with the intention of making it his domicile, although he may have in view a change of residence at some future time. Cooley, Cont. 754; McCrary, Elect. § 39. A similar formulation of residence may be found in Green v. Simon (1896), 17 Ind. App. 360, 367, 46 N.E. 693, 695: The general rule is that a man can have but one place of residence, and that, to lose his residence in one place, he must acquire residence in another place. Personal presence alone at another place does not determine the matter. He must remove without the intention of returning to his home, as such. He must remove to another place with the intent to make it his home. See Culbertson v. Board, 52 Ind. 361, and cases cited; Astley v. Capron, 89 Ind. 167; Moore v. Dunning, 29 Ill. 130. See also, Brendel v. Kugler (1951), 122 Ind. App. 104, 101 N.E.2d 661; Brownlee v. Duguid (1931), 93 Ind. App. 266, 178 N.E. 174; Petty v. Petty (1908), 42 Ind. App. 443, 85 N.E. 995; Brittenham v. Robinson (1897), 18 Ind. App. 502, 48 N.E. 616. And finally, in State ex rel. White v. Scott (1908), 171 Ind. 349, 358-59, 86 N.E. 409, 412-13, we find the following summary: The question of residence is largely one of intention. A mere intention, however, to change from one place to another is not sufficient. To effectuate a change of residence the intent to remove must be unequivocally formed, and a fixed settlement at another place resolved, and either accomplished or its establishment entered upon, with no present intention of returning to the former place, or of departing from the latter. Intention and action must coexist. Pedigo v. Grimes (1888), 113 Ind. 148, 153, 13 N.E. 700, and authorities cited; Culbertson v. Board (1876), 52 Ind. 361; Green v. Simon (1897), 17 Ind. App. 360, 46 N.E. 693. See, also, Fry's Election Case (1872), 71 Pa. 302, 10 Am.Rep. 698. We said in a recent case that `a purpose to change such residence, unaccompanied by actual removal or change of abode, does not constitute a change of domicile.' Eel River, etc., Co. v. State (1900), 155 Ind. 433, 447, 57 N.E. 388. To the same effect see Penfield v. Railroad Co. (1890), 134 U.S. 351, 10 S.Ct. 566, 33 L.Ed. 940, and 24 Am. & Eng.Enc. (2d ed.) p. 697, and cases collated. An unsettled, or indefinite or floating intention, as it is sometimes called, to establish a permanent home or residence in some undermined locality does not affect the actual residence. So it may be here said that a journey into another state or territory for inspection, accompanied with an intent to permanently remove to such other state if a satisfactory place is found, does not amount to a change of residence until an approved location has been not only discovered and chosen, but some affirmative step taken in the transfer of personal effects from the former to the latter place, as the only and bona fide home. Moreover, a review of the above case law indicates a presumption which may be useful in determining one's residence. According to Green, supra : We may take into consideration, in this connection, the presumption that the residence of a person shown to have been in a particular place continues in that place until the contrary is shown. See also, State ex rel. White v. Scott, supra ; but see Vlandis v. Kline (1973), 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63. The statutory guidelines are set forth in IC 1971, 3-1-21-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803 (Burns Code Ed.), which provides:  Residence of voters  Rules for determining.  In determining the residence of a voter the precinct election boards shall be governed by the following rules so far as they are applicable: (1) A person shall not be considered to have gained a residence in any county into which he has come for temporary employment, educational, or other purposes merely without the intention of making such county his permanent home; (2) If a person goes into another state or county within this state with the intention of making it his residence, he shall be considered to have lost his residence in this state, or the county from which he removed; (3) If a person removes to another state with the intention of remaining there for an indefinite time as a place of residence, he shall be considered to have lost his residence in this state, notwithstanding he intends to return at some future time; (4) The place where a man's immediate family resides shall be considered his residence, but if it be a temporary establishment for his immediate family, or for transient purposes it shall not be so considered; (5) If a man has his immediate family living in one place and he does business in another, the former shall be considered his residence, but when a man has taken up his abode at any place with the intention of remaining there, and his family refuses to reside with him, then such place shall be considered his residence; a married woman not living in a household with her husband may establish a separate voting residence from that of her husband; (6) Subject to the provisions of this article [3-1-1-1 - 3-1-33-2], the residence of a single man shall be considered to be where he usually sleeps; (7) No person employed temporarily in the construction or repair of any railroad, canal, municipal, or other work of public nature, or state or federal work project shall acquire a residence in any precinct into which he came for such purpose; but this provision shall not be held to extend to station agents or sectionmen who permanently reside in such precinct, and in determining the right of any person employed by a railroad company or upon any public work to register to vote, all the members of the precinct election board shall be satisfied that he is a bona-fide resident of the precinct and not there for temporary purposes merely, and his unsupported affidavit shall not be held conclusive as to any fact necessary to entitle him to vote; (8) No soldier, seaman, or marine, in the army or navy of the United States or of their allies, shall be deemed to have acquired a residence in the state in consequence of having been stationed within the same; nor shall any such soldier, seaman or marine have the right to vote; (9) Any permanent inmate of a soldier's home shall be considered a resident of the precinct in which the same is located; (10) No person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in the state by reason of his absence either on business of this state or of the United States; (11) If a person is adjudged insane or feeble minded and is committed to an institution for the insane or feeble minded, he shall not be considered to have gained a residence for voting purposes in the county, township, ward or precinct in which the institution to which he is committed is located. The constitutional provisions are Art. 2, §§ 3 and 4. Those provisions correspond with IC 1971, 3-1-21-3(8) and (10), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803(8), (10), (Burns Code Ed.), and so are not repeated here.