Opinion ID: 1540218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admitting A.L.F.'s First Statement to M.C.C. Was an Abuse of Discretion

Text: Appellant argues that A.L.F.'s statement to M.C.C., in which she said L.L. did bad things to me ... we were in the bedroom and he pulled his pants down and he pulled my pants down and when he was done he ran into the bathroom[,] was erroneously admitted as an excited utterance over appellant's hearsay objection. Because the decision whether a statement is admissible as a spontaneous utterance depends on the particular facts of each case and is thus a discretionary matter, this court reviews such matters only for abuse of discretion. Brisbon v. United States, 894 A.2d 1121, 1128 (D.C.2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this review, the appellate court makes two distinct classes of inquiries.... It must determine, first, whether the exercise of discretion was in error and, if so, whether the impact of that error requires reversal. It is when both these inquiries are answered in the affirmative that we hold that the trial court `abused' its discretion. Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 367 (D.C.1979). A discretionary ruling founded on a mistake of law ... is by definition erroneous. Simmons v. United States, 945 A.2d 1183, 1187 (D.C.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the excited (or spontaneous) utterance exception, the following factors must exist: (1) the presence of a serious occurrence which causes a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in the declarant, (2) a declaration made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure that the declarant has not reflected upon his statement or premeditated or constructed it, and (3) the presence of circumstances, which in their totality suggest spontaneity and sincerity of the remark. Odemns v. United States, 901 A.2d 770, 776 (D.C.2006) (citations omitted); see also Clarke v. United States, 943 A.2d 555, 558 (D.C.2008) (the earmarks of an excited utterance [are] spontaneity, lack of reflection or forethought, [and] a reflexive response to a traumatic event); Smith v. United States, 666 A.2d 1216, 1223 (D.C. 1995) (The critical factor is that the declaration was made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure that the declarant has not reflected upon his statement or premeditated or constructed it.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, even when circumstances satisfying the first element are demonstrated, if the reaction has ceased during peaceful hours between the event and the utterance, the statement cannot be admitted. Alston v. United States, 462 A.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. 1983). Thus, in determining whether A.L.F.'s statement was an excited utterance, we consider the impetus for the statement, the length of time that passed between the serious occurrence and the statement, and whether the totality of circumstances suggests that the statement was made without prior reflection. Odemns, 901 A.2d at 776-77. When we apply the legal standard to this record, it becomes apparent that A.L.F.'s statement to M.C.C. should have been excluded. Although a youth perhaps may remain in a state of shock longer than an adult, see Beausoliel v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 111, 114, 107 F.2d 292, 295 (1939), our case law simply does not support the proposition that a statement made six months after the startling event may constitute an excited or spontaneous utterance. See Alston, 462 A.2d at 1128 (statement of four-year-old girl was not an excited utterance because it was made after several peaceful hours passed between the time of the alleged offense and the time of the child's initial response to her mother's inquiry). A.L.F.'s statement certainly was not a calm narrative of a past event, Alston, 462 A.2d at 1127, but A.L.F. clearly had not been in the throes of the traumatic episode, before she could reflect, for the entire six months between the sexual encounter and her statement. See Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1304 (D.C.1982) (en banc). To the contrary, right before she made the statement, A.L.F. was having a pleasant conversation with her foster mother, confiding how much she enjoyed living at her house. It was not until M.C.C. urged A.L.F. to talk about what had happened to her that A.L.F. began to cry and shake. The District of Columbia argues that because A.[L.]F. was not upset prior to her statement, but rather became upset when she `reflected on what her brother had done to her,' she was still under the emotional stress caused by the traumatic event. However, it is precisely because A.L.F. had reflected on her experience that her statement falls outside the realm of excited utterances. See Smith, 666 A.2d at 1223 (the key inquiry in conducting an excited utterance analysis is to assure that the declarant has not reflected upon his statement) (citations omitted); Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 214 n. 2 (D.C.1993) (The [fourteen-year-old] complainant in the instant case had sufficient time, given her age, to reflect on the assault. The fact that she was crying and distraught six weeks later when she told her aunt about the assault is insufficient, standing alone, to make the declaration admissible under the excited utterance exception.) (citations omitted). A person surely may become distraught by reliving a traumatic experience, but that is because she has reflected on the event-she has revived bad memories. Our colleagues in the military have said it well: There is a difference between the stress or excitement caused by the original event and that caused by the trauma of having to retell what happened after initially calming down. Only the former is admissible as an excited utterance. The basis of the excited utterance exception is that the speaker is under the fresh emotional impact of a startling event, not that the speaker relives her emotions when later telling about the event. United States v. Green, 50 M.J. 835, 840 (Army Ct.Crim.App.1999) (quoting United States v. Barrick, 41 M.J. 696, 699 (A.F.Ct. Crim.App.1995)). The government mistakenly relies on our decision in Price v. United States, 545 A.2d 1219 (D.C.1988). There, the victim, who had recently begun a romantic relationship with Ms. Wilson, was shot by defendant Price, with whom Ms. Wilson was also romantically involved. Id. at 1220-21. Although Ms. Wilson was on the scene of the shooting, it appeared that she did not know that the victim had been seriously injured. Id. at 1221. About two hours later, the victim's brother called from the hospital and told her that the victim had been wounded. Id. Sounding as if she was in tears, [Ms. Wilson] blurted out, `I didn't know he was gonna do that,' and kept repeating the words. Id. In response to questioning, she named Price as the shooter. Id. The trial court admitted these statements as excited utterances, over defense objection. Id. at 1223. We affirmed, holding that the indicia of nervous shock and spontaneity in the instant case were sufficient to sustain as a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion the admission of the challenged statement as an excited utterance, particularly in a situation where such utterance, by incriminating a man whom the declarant professed to love, could scarcely be viewed as the product of reflection. Id. at 1227. We concluded that [i]n view of the romantic relationship between witness and victim, the discovery that the latter had been wounded and hospitalized might well have caused her to burst into tears and triggered the words exculpating herself and incriminating her other lover. Id. at 1226. The spontaneity of the statements was confirmed by the declarant's reluctance to incriminate the defendant at the police interview the following day, showing that upon reflection, the witness had already regretted her disclosure. Id. at 1227. The government relies on Price to argue that the length of time between the offense and A.L.F.'s statements to M.C.C. is irrelevant because A.L.F. made the statements in response to the stimulus of M.C.C. mentioning her brother, L.L. However, we have never held that the declarant's thinking about a traumatic event is sufficient to trigger an excited utterance. See Smith, 666 A.2d at 1223 (trial court properly admitted statement to 911 operator as an excited utterance after determining that victim's excited state was caused by the shock of being robbed at gunpoint, rather than by discussing the robbery with his mother, who insisted that he call 911). Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances surrounding A.L.F.'s statements lacked indicia of nervous shock and spontaneity. Price, 545 A.2d at 1227; see also Portillo v. United States, 710 A.2d 883, 885 (D.C.1998) (holding that admission of statement as excited utterance was error where the statement was made to a police officer under circumstances that were much more deliberative in nature than spontaneous). Unlike the declarant in Price, A.L.F. did not receive any new and startling information from M.C.C. Instead, M.C.C. coaxed A.L.F. to describe the problem with L.L., even invoking her status as a police officer to elicit the explanation. As the trial court observed, it was only when [A.L.F.] reflected on what had happened to her and what the respondent had done to her that she became distraught. Contrary to the trial court's interpretation and the government's argument, the fact that A.L.F. made the statement as a result of reflection negates the conclusion that it was an excited utterance. See Price, 545 A.2d at 1227 (In all cases the ultimate question is whether the statement was the result of reflective thought or whether it was rather a spontaneous reaction to the exciting event.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The statement therefore should have been excluded.
Having decided that it was error to rely on the substance of A.L.F.'s statement does not end our inquiry.... We must now address whether the error was reversible, and thereby an abuse of discretion. Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1194 (D.C.1999). See Washington v. United States, 884 A.2d 1080,1095 (D.C. 2005) (In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling, we consider `whether the exercise of discretion was in error and, if so, whether the impact of that error requires reversal.') (quoting Johnson, 398 A.2d at 367). In this context, we must look at the `totality of the circumstances' and decide whether we can say, `with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.' Goines v. United States, 905 A.2d 795, 802 (D.C.2006) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). When announcing its findings, the trial court expressly relied on A.L.F.'s statement, as related by M.C.C. Nevertheless, the government argues that admission of the statement was harmless because, [w]hile [the trial court] found that M.C.C.'s testimony corroborated C.[]L.'s testimony, that does not necessarily mean it was used as substantive evidence. According to the government, A.[L.]F.'s statements did no more than establish that a sexual assault was reported.... This argument overlooks the fact that excited utterances normally are admitted for their substantive value. [2] Indeed, the prosecutor vigorously argued that the first statement should be admitted, not merely under the report of rape doctrine, but as an excited utterance, so that does come in substantively. At the end of this argument, the court ruled that it would allow the first statement in as an excited utterance, and it never stated or even suggested that it was only admitting the statement as non-substantive corroboration. Because the trial court expressly referred to the substance of the statement when explaining its decision that L.L. was guilty of first degree child sex abuse, we hold that admitting the statement was an abuse of discretion. See Johnson, 398 A.2d at 367 (an abuse of discretion occurs when the exercise of discretion was in error and ... the impact of that error requires reversal). [3]