Opinion ID: 852959
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The City's Right to Assert the Claim

Text: Defendants contend the City cannot sue at all, and even if it can bring some claims, it cannot obtain injunctive relief.
Indiana Code section 32-30-6-7 allows an action to abate or enjoin a nuisance to be brought by the attorney of any city or town in which a nuisance exists. Indiana Code section 32-30-6-8 allows a nuisance to be enjoined or abated, and damages recovered for the nuisance. Section 7 allows a unit of government to bring an action for abatement or injunction without regard to its status as an injured party. These statutes authorize the City to bring such a claim.
The trial court found Indiana statutes limiting the powers of municipal corporations to bar the City from bringing this lawsuit. First, we do not agree that the filing of this lawsuit violates Indiana Code section 35-47-11-2, which prevents the regulation of firearms by cities. This lawsuit does not seek to implement a regulatory scheme. It seeks redress under existing state law of nuisance and negligence. The manufacturer-defendants contend that judicially fashioned tort remedies may be viewed as a form of regulation. For this proposition they cite cases finding that judicial action may constitute regulation for purposes of determining whether a state law of statutory or judiciary origins impermissibly interferes with interstate commerce. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 573 n. 17, 116 S.Ct. 1589; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.2001). We do not believe this doctrine grounded in federal-state relationships is applicable to interpretation of the state municipal law statute the defendants cite. The same contention of judicial regulation could be leveled at any nuisance claim, and, as noted elsewhere, Indiana statutes expressly authorize the City to seek relief against public nuisances. In sum, the City seeks redress against certain techniques that are alleged to generate a nuisance. Its lawsuit is no more regulation of firearms than a suit to enjoin any form of nuisance is a regulation of the activity. Unless this form of regulation runs afoul of the Commerce Clause, which it does not, it is a well-established form of permissible relief under state law.
The trial court also found Indiana Code section 36-1-6-4 to bar the City's claim. That section authorizes a municipal corporation to enjoin persons from violating an ordinance regulating the use of property or engaging in conduct without a required license. The trial court accepted the defendant's contention that this section contained an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which the City may seek injunctive relief. We do not agree. First, this section is a part of the chapter entitled enforcement of ordinances. Here, the City does not seek to enforce an ordinance. Rather the City seeks relief from alleged harm under tort theories. Second, the language of the statute grants a municipal corporation the power to seek injunctive relief when either of these two events occurs but does not purport to limit a city's injunctive power under other circumstances. Third, if there were any doubt, the public nuisance statute expressly authorizes the City to bring such a claim. I.C. § 32-30-6-7. A statute specifically addressing a subject controls over a generally worded one. Ross v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ind.2000).
The trial court also cited Indiana Code sections 36-1-4-1 through 18 and held that this lawsuit amounted to an attempt by the City to regulate people, property and activities outside of the City's boundaries. Once again we disagree. It is true that Indiana Code section 36-1-3-9(b) defines the jurisdiction of a City as its corporate boundary, and Indiana Code section 36-1-3-8 expressly prohibits a City from imposing duties upon other political subdivisions. However, once again the controlling point is that the City is seeking redress for harm caused within its geographical boundaries. The fact that some of the actions that allegedly generate the injury take place outside the City does not preclude the suit so long as the City can demonstrate that the defendants contribute to the harms alleged. See, e.g., City of Chicago, 271 Ill.Dec. 365, 785 N.E.2d at 31 (allowing public nuisance claims against dealers, manufacturers and distributors outside City limits).
The trial court found Indiana Code sections 36-1-3-1 through 9, commonly referred to as the Home Rule Act, to deny the City the authority to sue. The Home Rule Act grants local governing bodies all the powers that they need for the effective operation of government as to local affairs. I.C. § 36-1-3-2. The Act explicitly declares that [a]ny doubt as to the existence of a power of a unit shall be resolved in favor of its existence. I.C. § 36-1-3-3(b). In view of this provision, the public nuisance statute, which expressly authorizes the City to bring a claim, resolves any doubt. I.C. § 32-30-6-7(b)(2).