Opinion ID: 162329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Title III Evidence

Text: Both Tyler and Collins argue that the district court erred by denying their motion to suppress certain Title III evidence – specifically, tape recorded telephone conversations. Defendants contend that the Government’s failure to provide them with copies of the court order and accompanying application authorizing the recording more than ten days prior to trial requires suppression of the recordings. On a review of a motion to suppress, the district court’s factual findings will be accepted unless clearly erroneous, questions of law are reviewed de novo, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 428 (10th Cir. 1995). The statute at issue provides that: The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party, not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which the interception was authorized or approved. This ten-day period may be waived by the judge if he finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the above information ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving such information. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9). The purpose of the 10-day requirement “is to give the defendant an opportunity to make a pretrial motion to suppress wiretap evidence.” United - 16 - States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1992). In order to justify the reversal of a conviction, the violation of § 2518(9) must have caused the defendant prejudice. United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1154 (1st Cir. 1981). In this case, the district court agreed with Defendants’ contention that the Government had failed to comply with § 2518(9)’s 10-day requirement. On the first day of trial, during the first witness’s direct examination, Defendants objected to the introduction of the tape recordings. The court ruled that the statute had been violated, and ordered a continuance of the trial to allow Defendants to file a motion to suppress. The motion was ultimately denied, and trial was resumed six weeks later. Defendants contend that they were prejudiced simply by the fact that, at the time their trial began, they had not been provided with the required materials more than ten days previously. Defendants knew that wiretap evidence was going to be used against them – they simply had not been given copies of the wiretap application or the court order authorizing the wiretap. The district court stopped the trial before any of the wiretap evidence was introduced and gave Defendants more than ten days to file their motions to suppress based on the materials disclosed by the Government. Trial did not resume until weeks later, when the motions had been fully briefed and ruled upon. Defendants’ position would not - 17 - only convert § 2518(9) into a strict liability statute, but it would mean that once the provision is violated, the underlying evidence could never be used. Defendants offer no legal support for such an interpretation, and we reject it. In a cursory statement, Tyler also contends that the Title III intercepts from Darrell James’s mobile phone should have been suppressed because the Government failed to prove necessity. In its order denying the motion to suppress, the district court devoted five pages to detailed findings as to why the wiretaps were necessary. The district court’s analysis is more than sufficient, especially given Tyler’s failure even to hint at how the court might have erred.