Opinion ID: 303769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of District of Columbia Law

Text: 93 Unlike our conclusion in regard to the situation of Manufacturers, we find Hartford's argument that the transaction was not subject to District of Columbia law to be unpersuasive, and we therefore decline to overrule the referee's position that the Hartford transaction is governed by D.C. law. 37 94 In the case of Manufacturers, it did not maintain a Washington office for the purpose of making real estate loans, and the decision to make the loan was made by Manufacturers at its home office in Toronto, Canada. Manufacturers had no agent in the District of Columbia, at that time, authorized or empowered to make such loans. 38 The referee also specifically found The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company made no loans in the District of Columbia between January 1, 1959 and May 7, 1968 at a rate of interest in excess of 6% per annum. 39 95 No such specific finding as the latter was made in the case of Hartford. In further contrast, the referee referred to Walker & Dunlop, Inc., who unquestionably made the Hartford loan originally, as a corporation with its principal office in the District of Columbia. 40 There is little doubt that D.C. law is designed to regulate this kind of lender, and the weight of whatever countervailing factors which may exist 41 is not sufficient to upset the premise of the referee and District Court that District of Columbia law applied to the Hartford (Walker & Dunlop) loan. 96 We therefore conclude that Hartford not having established itself as a holder in due course, Walker & Dunlop's actions not being exempt under Sec. 26-610, and the applicable law being that of the District of Columbia, that the loan and accompanying deed of trust are therefore subject to Sec. 26-601. We hold that the objection of the Trustee to the allowance of the claim of Hartford as a secured claim on the basis of the deed of trust was valid, the action of the District Court in denying the objection was erroneous, and we therefore remand to the District Court for the entry of the proper order. 97