Opinion ID: 2976722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Speculation

Text: A second aspect of Hughes’s sentencing that warrants vacating his sentence involves speculation by the district court. The government argues that the district court speculated during the sentencing about issues such as whether SunTrust would prefer fast repayment over Hughes serving a prison sentence, J.A. 58 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 22:5-10), whether SunTrust had somehow initiated prosecution of the case at a time of its choosing, J.A. at 55 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 19:16-23), and how Hughes came into possession of the checks involved in the crime. J.A. at 54 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 18:19-22). Hughes argues (but does not provide support for the proposition) that the district court was permitted to make “logical inferences” after viewing the evidence during trial. Appellee Br. at 22. We examine each alleged instance of speculation in turn. First, we conclude that the district court inappropriately speculated about SunTrust’s wishes regarding the sentence to be imposed on Hughes. After announcing that it did not think imprisonment was appropriate for Hughes, the district court stated that Hughes would need to begin making restitution payments to SunTrust. The district court concluded: “I feel that that’s all the bank really wants anyway.” J.A. at 58 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 22:5). As the Ninth Circuit recently held, however, district courts may not make “unfounded assumptions” when fashioning a sentence for a defendant. United States v. Romero, No. 07-30147, 2008 WL 681911, at  (9th Cir. March 11, 2008) (unpublished) (citing Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597) (vacating a sentence in part because the district court speculated about a defendant’s statistical likelihood of becoming a recidivist). Gall requires that a district court “adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Because the district court’s statements imply that it considered what sentence the bank might prefer that it impose and there was no support in the record for the district court’s statement that SunTrust would prefer 13 a particular type of sentence, we conclude that the district court engaged in unreasonable speculation.7 In addition, we conclude that the district court unreasonably speculated about the government’s reasons for prosecuting Hughes. The district court stated during the sentencing hearing: [W]hat looks to me happened here is that the bank was perfectly content to not lodge criminal charges against Dr. Hughes or try to get him charged criminally, and it was only when they decided he simply wasn’t paying according to his schedule that he—they trotted over to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and got Dr. Hughes indicted, not very attractive facts for extracting from Dr. Hughes years in prison. J.A. at 55 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 19:16-23). Speculation regarding aspects of the government’s decision to pursue a prosecution, absent evidence indicating that such a decision violated the Constitution, would not be a reasonable factor for the district court to consider when fashioning a sentence. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 76162 (1997). Because the record implies that the district court may have considered the circumstances surrounding the government’s decision to prosecute Hughes when fashioning his sentence, and there is no indication that such prosecution was brought in violation of the Constitution, we conclude that the district court engaged in unreasonable speculation. Finally, we conclude that the district court’s recital of hypotheses regarding how Hughes came into possession of the checks at issue did not render Hughes’s sentence unreasonable. During sentencing, the district court stated: 7 Even if there were support in the record that would allow the district court to infer that SunTrust preferred that Hughes receive a sentence that would allow him to earn money to pay his debt as soon as possible (instead of serving a lengthy prison term), the district court did not explain why the particular desires of this victim should affect the legal analysis necessary for sentencing Hughes. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Crime Victims’ Rights Act) (2006). 14 And then the large check, I am still totally puzzled as to how this happened, how this check came into his possession. I think the government is still puzzled. They had a theory at one point that he reached through his post box and grabbed it out of another box. I guess my own personal favorite theory is there’s somebody at the post office involved in this whole situation, which nobody has ever found out about. But the exact way in which Dr. Hughes came into possession of this check or these earlier checks to me is still very befuddling and very confusing. And the fact remains Dr. Hughes knew that check wasn’t his; he deposited that check. J.A. at 54-55 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 18:19-19:7). Despite the district court’s interest in how Hughes gained possession of the checks, the record does not indicate that the district court considered its various hypotheses when fashioning Hughes’s sentence; indeed, the district court explicitly acknowledged immediately after discussing the hypotheses that it was clear that Hughes knew the checks were not his (i.e. there was no mistake) and that he deposited the checks. J.A. at 55 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 19:5-6). Thus, the district court’s discussion of how Hughes obtained the checks was merely an extraneous interlude. In sum, we conclude that the district court unreasonably based Hughes’s sentence in part on speculation about SunTrust’s wishes regarding the sentence to be imposed on Hughes and the timing of (and reason for) Hughes’s prosecution. We conclude that Hughes’s sentence should be vacated because of the unreasonable weight placed on Hughes’s attempts at repayment and because of the district court’s unreasonable speculation regarding SunTrust’s wishes and the timing and rationale for Hughes’s prosecution.