Opinion ID: 2506395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subsection (1)'s Other Limit Language

Text: The plaintiffs' third argument centers on the other limit language of article X, section 20. Subsection (1) states, [o]ther limits on district revenue, spending, and debt may be weakened only by future voter approval. The plaintiffs assert that SB 07-199 weakened an other limit, specifically a limit created by the School Finance Act, and therefore required explicit voter approval. We find this argument has no merit because the other limit language is inapplicable in this case. As previously discussed, the 1993 School Finance Act incorporated by reference the property tax revenue limit and each district's corresponding ability to waive that limit. In other words, there is a specified limit at issue in this case, the limit created by subsection (7)(c). The limit imposed by the School Finance Act was nothing but a reference to the subsection (7)(c) limit, not an other limit. Interpreting the School Finance Act as creating an independent limit would create unnecessary redundancy, or would amount to treating a reflection in a mirror to be a real object. We have routinely held that [i]n discharging our judicial function, we afford the language of constitutions and statutes their ordinary and common meaning. We ascertain and give effect to their intent. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Colo.2001). To find that the School Finance Act creates a separate and distinct limit outside of the article X, section 20 limit it specifically references would be contrary to this requirement. Therefore, we decline to find that the other limit language of subsection (1) is implicated in this case.