Opinion ID: 369386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent to Jurisdiction.

Text: 45 Appellees argue that by filing its complaint in the bankruptcy action, PIC consented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction: 46 There is hardly any question of law better settled than that . . . a court of bankruptcy has no jurisdiction, Without the consent of the adverse Claimant, to hear and adjudicate in a summary proceeding a controversy as to title of or claims upon property held adversely to the bankrupt estate, where such property came into claimant's possession prior to bankruptcy. 47 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, Supra, P 23.06(1) at 494 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction to order surrender of voidable preferences asserted and proved by a trustee in response to a claim filed by the creditor who received the preferences. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966). Two consent issues are present in this case, whether as a matter of law PIC subjected itself to the counterclaims in the bankruptcy court by initiating this action and whether even if it did not, PIC failed to contest the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court when the counterclaim was asserted. 48
49 PIC came into the bankruptcy court to ask it to lift the automatic stay over legal actions against Vita Management. It sought to exercise its right to evict Vita from occupancy of the hotel upon termination of the lease. PIC asked for administrative rentals for the period in which Vita Management possessed the hotel. The rentals were not claimed under the lease, which had been terminated, but for use and occupancy of the premises. In re Fredrick Meats, Inc., 483 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1973); S & W Holding Co. v. Kuriansky, 317 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1963). The broader questions surrounding the July 10, 1975 agreement were not raised in answer to PIC's complaint, but by Losee's Restaurant Equipment & Supply Co. when it intervened in the action. 50 It is clear that the bankruptcy court may, upon a proper counterclaim, determine all the rights of the parties connected with and arising out of the transaction. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, Supra, P 23.08(5) at 551. The very action of entering the bankruptcy court conveys consent as to the transaction. But this consent does not extend to totally unrelated counterclaims. In re Bankers Trust Co., 566 F.2d 1281, 1288 (5th Cir. 1978). Similarly, a mere general appearance for the purpose of presenting claims and opposing other claims will not amount to consent to a summary proceeding instituted by the trustee to determine title to property acquired by the claimant prior to bankruptcy. In re Vadner, 17 F.2d 721, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1927). 51 PIC was not even presenting a claim to the bankruptcy court. It was, however, asking that court to recognize the termination of its lease agreement with the Vita interests. In so doing, PIC consented to the adjudication of counterclaims relating to that lease. 52 As the district court noted in its memorandum and order on rehearing: 53 The filing of the original Complaint did, however, constitute a limited consent to the bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction. Since PIC sought to enforce its rights under the lease, it necessarily consented as well to a determination of the lease's validity. 54