Opinion ID: 582746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Should the district court have deferred ruling on the

Text: 16 summary judgment motion pending discovery? 17 Plaintiffs requested that the district court notify them, prior to ruling on the summary judgment motion, if it was inclined to deny their Rule 56(f) motion. In such an event, they wanted oral argument and a short period of time to submit additional affidavits or other factual material prior to the Court's ruling on summary judgment. I R. doc. 22. The district court implicitly denied the Rule 56(f) motion and granted summary judgment, all without adopting Plaintiffs' suggested procedure. 18 We review a district court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for an abuse of discretion. Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir.1984). Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion should be liberally treated. James W. Moore & Jeremy C. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice p 56.24 (1988). A prerequisite to granting relief, however, is an affidavit furnished by the nonmovant. Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832 (10th Cir.1986). Although the affidavit need not contain evidentiary facts, it must explain why facts precluding summary judgment cannot be presented. 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2740 at 530 (1983). This includes identifying the probable facts not available and what steps have been taken to obtain these facts. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice p 56.24. In this circuit, the nonmovant also must explain how additional time will enable him to rebut movant's allegations of no genuine issue of fact. See Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir.1987); Patty Precision, 742 F.2d at 1264. Plaintiffs' submission in opposition to summary judgment contained in the record, I R. doc. 22 & 23, fails both independent requirements. 19 We have considered presumably unverified statements in attorney memoranda and found them wanting as grounds for a Rule 56(f) continuance. See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, 850 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir.1988); Weir v. Anaconda, 773 F.2d 1073, 1083 (10th Cir.1985). Notwithstanding, we agree with the Third Circuit that counsel's unverified assertion in a memorandum opposing summary judgment does not comply with Rule 56(f) and results in a waiver. See Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1393-95 (3rd Cir.1989). The purpose of the affidavit is to ensure that the nonmoving party is invoking the protections of Rule 56(f) in good faith and to afford the trial court the showing necessary to assess the merit of a party's opposition. First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co. Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1380 (D.C.Cir.1988). Advocacy by counsel does not suffice for evidence or fact in the Rule 56(f) context. Radich, 886 F.2d at 1395. 20 Defendants moved for summary judgment on November 13, 1989. Plaintiffs were granted two extensions, until December 28, 1989, to respond. On December 28, Plaintiffs provided the following unverified explanation by counsel in support of a deferred ruling: 21 In particular, certain of the defendants, including defendant Campbell, need to be deposed. Additionally, because of the intervening holiday period, plaintiffs have been unable to completely gather affidavits that will establish the long history of censorship on the campus of Oklahoma State University. These affidavits are needed to fully demonstrate the need for a permanent injunction and appropriate procedural safeguards to assure that the First Amendment will not continue to be violated. 22 I R. doc. 23 at 2. Defendants moved for summary judgment on seven grounds, including qualified immunity, 7 yet Plaintiffs provide few clues as to how the additional time would have enabled them to rebut Defendants' factual allegations 8 or establish other disputed material facts. No explanation appears as to why President Campbell's deposition was essential and little explanation appears as to why Plaintiffs could not provide affidavits of unnamed parties, other than a general reference to the holiday season. The affidavits ultimately produced concern evidence to which both parties conceivably had access. Moreover, a vague reference to a long history of censorship suggests no more than a fishing expedition in progress. If the allegation of pervasive, longstanding, recurring and institutional censorship is true, plaintiffs certainly had ample time in which to allege specific acts of censorship. See Korf v. Ball State University, 726 F.2d 1222, 1230 (7th Cir.1984). 23 The district court was not required to inform the Plaintiffs of its inclination to grant summary judgment in the absence of additional discovery and urge them to provide additional materials. Even in the absence of a properly supported request under Rule 56(f), a district court may, in the interest of justice, allow a party additional time to marshal what evidence he does have in opposition to a summary judgment motion. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice p 56.24. In these circumstances, however, we cannot conclude that the district court's procedure went beyond its allocated discretion. 24