Opinion ID: 1233878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Any prosecutorial misconduct occurring at trial was harmless error

Text: Deitz next contends that various incidents of prosecutorial misconduct and government overreaching occurring at trial warrant the reversal of his conviction. Where a defendant objects at trial, we review the claims of prosecutorial misconduct de novo. United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 687 (6th Cir.2008). [T]o determine whether a prosecutor engaged in misconduct, [we first] must consider `whether the prosecutor's conduct and remarks were improper.' Id. (quoting United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir.2001)). If the conduct was improper, we then determine whether the improprieties were flagrant such that a reversal is warranted. Id. at 687-88 (citing Carter, 236 F.3d at 783). In considering whether a prosecutor's conduct was flagrant, we ask whether: (1) the conduct or remarks in question tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) the conduct or remarks were deliberate or accidental; and (4) the evidence against the defendant was strong. Id. at 688; see also United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 394 (6th Cir. 1997). Flagrantly improper remarks by the prosecution must be reversed ... [and] prosecutorial misconduct may be so exceptionally flagrant that it constitutes plain error, and is grounds for reversal even if the defendant did not object to it. Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 688 (internal citations omitted). If the challenged remarks are not flagrant, however, reversal is warranted only if proof of the defendant's guilt was not overwhelming, the defendant objected to the improper remarks, and the court failed to cure the error with an admonishment to the jury. Id. (quoting United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 915 (6th Cir.2007)). Deitz contends that the government engaged in misconduct by: (1) improperly referring to hearsay and impeachment evidence during closing argument; (2) misstating the facts to introduce a new theory of conspiratorial liability during closing argument; and (3) misstating the law regarding buyer-seller transactions. We consider each of Deitz's arguments below. a. The prosecutor did not improperly use hearsay and impeachment evidence during closing argument First, Deitz claims that the government improperly referred to hearsay and impeachment evidence during closing argument to argue that the cocaine seized from Deitz's borrowed car in 1991 had been given to him by members of the Dayton chapter. Specifically, Deitz objects to the following statement by the prosecution: Do you think [the events of March 20 and 21, 1991 were] just a big coincidence? Just a big coincidence that the informant said he was going to pick up a load, and then, lo and behold, when he's stopped, there's the cocaine? (JA 1133.) Deitz asserts that the government's statement improperly asked the jury to infer that the cocaine seized from the car was provided by a member of the Dayton chapter and that the remarks prejudiced Deitz by substantially increasing the probability that the jury would convict Deitz of conspiracy. Because Deitz did not object to the statement during trial, we review the prosecutor's conduct for plain error. See United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 938 (6th Cir.2004); see Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1425. Under this standard, the prosecutor's remarks do not warrant the reversal of Deitz's conviction because, as we have noted earlier, the evidence to which the government was referring was properly admitted to show the background of the government's surveillance of Deitz. Second, Deitz claims that the government prejudiced him during closing argument by encouraging the jury to use certain trial testimony by Kinser to infer that Deitz was still closely associated with the Outlaws as late as 2002 or 2003. At trial, the court overruled defense counsel's objection to a tape recording of a telephone conversation between Kinser and James Fowler, a fellow Outlaw, reasoning that the government had properly used it only to challenge Kinser's credibility. Deitz asserts that rather than using the evidence merely to challenge Kinser's credibility, the prosecutor used the evidence in support of its case-in-chief, when he made the following statement during closing argument: In that particular tape Mr. Kinser is indicating that Deitz's shit ... was with his wife while he was in there [ i.e. prison], suggesting if not outright proving that Mr. Deitz was still associated with the Outlaws at that point ... Mr. Kinser is talking about Mr. Deitz's wife having his colors while Mr. Deitz was in prison. What I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, is that indicates a continued association of Mr. Deitz with the Outlaws. (JA 1145, 1147.) Again, because Deitz failed to object to this remark during trial, we review it for plain error. Combs, 369 F.3d at 938. And again, Deitz's argument fails because to the extent that the prosecutor's comments sought to use the conversation for purposes other than impeachment, the prosecution's remarks were isolated, occurring primarily during closing argument at the conclusion of a lengthy trial. See United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that improper comments warrants reversal only where the error is so plain that `the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it'); Gillard v. Mitchell, 445 F.3d 883, 898 (6th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1155 (6th Cir.1991) (prosecutorial misconduct was isolated to one portion of the trial, closing argument)). In addition, the trial court employed limiting instructions to rectify the improper remarks and explained to the jury that counsel's argument were not evidence. See Wilson v. McMacken, 786 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir.1986) (concluding that defendant could not establish prejudice where trial judge provided jury with limiting instruction before and after prosecutor's closing argument containing contested statements). Given that juries are presumed to understand and follow directions from the court, Carter, 236 F.3d at 787, we conclude that the prosecutor's statements did not confuse or improperly influence the jury.