Opinion ID: 1351744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Later Wyoming Cases

Text: The defendant in Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 728 (Wyo. 1963) was charged with second degree murder  purposely and maliciously without premeditation, kills another  the court held purposely means intentionally or deliberately. Citing Parmely, supra, the court said:    [W]here the accused was charged with assault and battery with intent to kill and murder, this court approved an earlier decision holding that the specific intent to kill must be proved as any other fact in a case. Doubt was expressed in the Parmely case as to whether it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit a felony. Likewise we find doubt in the instant case as to whether it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Nunez intended to kill McCullum, or that he killed him on purpose.    Of course it is equally incumbent upon the state to prove circumstances from which intention might be justly inferred.       Inferences contrary to direct testimony are not ordinarily sufficient to support a finding. Hence, in the absence of concrete evidence on the part of the state to show intent, and in the absence of anything to contradict or impeach the testimony of defendant and his wife, there can be no presumption of law on intent. State v. Parmely, supra. (Emphasis added) In Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68, 71 (Wyo. 1972) this court recognized that intent may be inferred from the conduct of a defendant and from circumstantial evidence upon which reasonable inferences may be based. In State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1974) the court held a statute unconstitutionally vague which read: Whoever    unlawfully breaks and enters    into any locked or sealed dwelling house   , etc., is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court held that unlawfully does not equate with intentionally or knowingly and without a mens rea the statute could proscribe an innocent breaking and entering. In Sims v. State, 530 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Wyo. 1975) an unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance resulted in a conviction from which defendant appealed on three grounds, one of which was whether intent to deliver could be inferred by the jury without specific instructions from the court. No instruction was objected to and none offered by defendant on the subject of intent. The court found at least three instructions that made it clear that intent to deliver    was a necessary ingredient of the offense and a material allegation that must be proved, in addition to possession. The court again by dictum then permitted itself the gratuitous reference to Murdock, saying:    The instruction given [in Murdock ] was a variation of the correct statement of the law voiced in that case, `It is a general rule applicable in all criminal cases including those in which specific intent is an element of the crime, that the accused is presumed to intend the necessary or the natural and probable consequences of his unlawful voluntary acts.' The court in Sims then continued: Defendants in criminal cases do not care for it, but most intent instructions are directed toward an understanding of what proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary and assisting the State in this overwhelming burden, such as, for a further example, the instruction that intent is proven through the acts and words of a person and is seldom, if ever, capable of being shown by direct proof. The defendant has not even here demonstrated what specific instructions should have been given, but has spoken in generalities of sound but inapplicable principles. Reversed, and informations dismissed.