Opinion ID: 1908179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sequence of counseling sessions and allegations of irreconcilable differences

Text: Appellant also argues that because appellee had not alleged irreconcilable marital differences as a grounds for divorce prior to attending the marriage counseling sessions, he was prejudiced when the Court allowed the amendment. We find no merit in this argument. Appellant asserts that the cause of action, namely, irreconcilable marital differences, was not extant at the time of the filing of the complaint. It is a well established rule that a court will not consider acts giving rise to causes of action which occur after the suit is brought. Page v. Bourgon, 138 Me. 113, 22 A.2d 577 (1941). The rule seems to be well established that acts occurring after suit for divorce is brought cannot be made grounds for divorce, although it is well settled that the court may look at the conduct of the husband toward his wife since the commencement of the action to ascertain the weight and color of the acts alleged and proved. Hink v. Hink, 131 Okl. 164, 268 P. 282, 283 (1928). Marriage counseling is not an element of irreconcilable marital differences. The requirement of marriage counseling before a divorce is decreed on grounds of irreconcilable marital differences represents merely a legislative attempt to resolve those differences and thereby save the marriage. Moreover, it is conceivable that marriage counseling that occurs prior to any allegation of irreconcilable marital differences would be more fruitful since both parties would be more receptive to reconciliation. It is clear that any marital counseling that otherwise complies with the statutory requirements is sufficient if proximately related to the complained-of marital differences. The amendment is authorized by Rule 15(c), M.R.C.P. [4] Since the basic pleading sought a termination of the marital status, the amendment merely added an additional basis therefor, thus relat[ing] back to the date of the original pleading. We dispose of appellant's other points rather summarily. The testimony of the marriage counselor was not objected to at trial once his qualifications were established, nor was there any subsequent motion to strike. Thus, the admissibility of the evidence is not now subject to review. See State v. Kelley, 357 A.2d 890, 894 (Me.1976). The written report of the marriage counselor was admitted over an objection which did not specify the reason therefor. The admissibility is not reviewable. Moulton v. Perkins, 116 Me. 218, 222, 100 A. 1020, 1021 (1917); see also Rule 103(a)(1), Maine Rules of Evidence; Field and Murray, Maine Evidence, § 103.2 at 5. Not having been raised at the trial level, the issue of the constitutionality of the irreconcilable marital differences amendment to 19 M.R.S.A. § 691 is not ripe for appellate review. Reville v. Reville, 289 A.2d 695 (Me.1972), is dispositive of this argument. See also Younie v. State, 281 A.2d 446 (Me.1971); Frost v. Lucey, 231 A.2d 441 (Me.1967). The entry is: Appeal denied.