Opinion ID: 1380015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of plaintiffs' claim as statutory heirs of Mrs. Weber.

Text: The next question relates to the claim of plaintiffs that they are entitled to one-half of the property as statutory heirs of Mrs. Weber by virtue of sections 228 and 229 of the Probate Code as these sections read at the time of Mrs. Weber's death in 1936. Section 228 then provided that if, as here, neither the decedent nor the predeceased spouse left children or descendants of children surviving, then one-half of the community property of decedent and the previously deceased spouse should go to certain heirs of the predeceased spouse and the other half to certain heirs of the decedent. Section 229 provided that if decedent left no issue, and the estate was separate property of the previously deceased spouse and came to the decedent from such spouse by gift, descent, devise or bequest, all of such property goes to certain heirs of the predeceased spouse. Plaintiffs are the heirs of Mrs. Weber's predeceased husband. The trial court found that all the property of Mrs. Weber except the lot on which the home was located was community property of herself and Mr. Weber and that plaintiffs were entitled to one-half thereof. The court found, further, that title to the home, which had been purchased with funds of both Mr. and Mrs. Weber, had been acquired in the name of Mr. Weber but was subsequently transferred to Mrs. Weber and that this transfer constituted a gift of Mr. Weber's one-half interest. The court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to a one-half interest in the home. Defendant concedes that in the event of intestacy plaintiffs would be entitled to a one-half interest in the home. He contends, however, that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that the remaining property was community property of Mr. and Mrs. Weber. He urges that it was conclusively shown that it was held by them as joint tenants and that, assuming intestacy, it vested in Mrs. Weber, the survivor, on her husband's death, and on her death passed to her blood heirs alone. His argument is that sections 228 and 229 of the Probate Code did not then apply to joint tenancies. The record shows that certain items of property, including stocks, bonds and other securities, real property, and bank accounts were held in the name of Mr. Weber alone. Other real property and two bank accounts stood in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Weber as joint tenants. The court found that this property was held in joint tenancy merely for the purpose of convenience and to save expense of probate and that Mr. and Mrs. Weber had agreed that, regardless of title, all their property should constitute community roperty. [6] It is of course well established that evidence is admissible to show that a husband and wife who took property apparently as joint tenants actually intended it to be community property and that property may be converted into community property by oral agreement. (Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754, 757-758 [146 P.2d 905].) [7] The evidence offered by plaintiffs in this connection consists, first, of declarations of Mr. Weber in the presence of Mrs. Weber and not denied by her. Mr. Weber, during his lifetime, stated in the presence of Mrs. Weber that he had his property in joint tenancy to avoid probate costs. He also said you save probating costs, and it is the best and the cheapest in the end; and ... that is the way I have all mine. Mrs. Weber did not reply. Mr. Weber told a witness that he had carried a bank account in joint tenancy to simplify the handling of their estates. Mr. Weber transacted all the business for both of them. Several witnesses testified that Mr. Weber always spoke of the various properties as his; that he said he had made purchases and sales; that he never spoke of any property or money that his wife had; and that Mrs. Weber, who heard these statements, never contradicted them. Mrs. Weber also made numerous declarations regarding the various properties. She said she had never attended to any of the business. With reference to certain oil wells, subsequently sold, she said: Web had a sweet income from that. She observed that although the money in the bank was in a joint account, it was Web's money, that It isn't my money, it is all Web's, and that she couldn't do anything with it. She made similar statements with respect to certain stocks, street bonds, and real property. Defendants urge that these statements of Mrs. Weber were made immediately following Mr. Weber's death when she was in a distraught condition, but the effect of such circumstances on the weight of the evidence was a question for the trier of fact. Additional declarations were made in the course of the probate proceedings. The petition for letters of administration in the estate of Mr. Weber, in which Mrs. Weber, John Rule, and defendant joined, stated that decedent left an estate consisting of community personal property, and the petition referred to checks payable to decedent, stocks, bonds, and other personal property. In the probate order settling the final account and distributing the property in the estate of Mr. Weber it was found that all the property in the estate, including all the securities and certain other personal property of Mr. and Mrs. Weber, and four parcels of real property, was community property. It is true that this did not include eight parcels of real property and the two bank accounts held under the names of both Mr. and Mrs. Weber as joint tenants and searately listed in the inheritance tax appraiser's report. But at the inheritance tax hearing after the death of Mr. Weber, Mrs. Weber testified that there was no joint personal property that stood in joint tenancy that she knew of, other than the two bank accounts mentioned heretofore. She also testified that she still had the money that she had at the time she married Mr. Weber. The transcript of the tax hearing also shows the following: By Mr. Peck [attorney for the inheritance tax department]: Apparently she had some and he had some. That has been commingled probably in the same way. How would it be to just call it community property? By X: That is what we are trying to do. (The letter X was used when the reporter did not know who made the statement.) Plaintiffs assert that the context shows that Mrs. Weber gave the answer here, but in any event it is clear that she made no objection to this procedure. It is apparent from the foregoing that the trial court was warranted in concluding that all of the property of Mr. and Mrs. Weber involved herein was community property, despite the use of the joint tenancy form in some of their holdings.