Opinion ID: 1774377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the complaint tribunal err in denying carter's motion for relief of default judgment on his original disbarment?

Text: The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure apply to default judgments in disciplinary procedures. Harrison, 637 So.2d at 215. Default judgments are not favored. Terrell v. Mississippi Bar, 635 So.2d 1377, 1381 (Miss. 1994). This Court will review grants of default judgments under an abuse of discretion standard. Williams v. Kilgore, 618 So.2d 51, 55 (Miss. 1992). The three prongs for determining abuse of discretion are (1) good cause for the default; (2) a colorable defense to the merits of the claim; (3) prejudice suffered by the non-moving party if default is set aside. Williams, 618 So.2d at 55. Carter states that his depression prevented him from responding to the Bar's complaint. His psychologist, Dr. William McQuinn, stated that Carter could not respond to any stressful situations as a result of his depression, including the filing of income tax statements for seven years before his hospitalization in late 1991. [1] However, the law presumes mental competence and sanity of individuals. Rich v. Nevels, 578 So.2d 609, 614 (Miss. 1991). Carter continued to practice law, and also responded to the complaint with a notice of appeal on the original disbarment, in October 1991. Carter also participated in team sports throughout the spring of 1991. Carter stated that he knew that there was a bar complaint against him in May 1991. He further stated that he knew it required an answer. Furthermore, Dr. McQuinn has stated Carter has been able to practice law since April 1992. However, Carter has still failed to respond to this Court's show cause order made October 27, 1994, while he was presumably competent to practice. This set of circumstances indicates a selective inability to respond to difficulties, which does not demonstrate a lack of competence. Carter has not met the first prong of this point. Carter has no defense, let alone a colorable defense, to the merits of the original matter of disbarment. During the hearing, Carter only stated that he had a defense to Bardo's complaint, without spelling out what his client did that hindered Carter's representation. Carter's clients themselves have testified that Carter took their money and failed to represent them in several matters, including a lawsuit and a bankruptcy matter. Furthermore, Carter's mental condition is a mitigating factor, and not a defense, to his violations of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. See Harrison, 637 So.2d at 227 (mental condition of lawyer is mitigating factor). The third prong, prejudice to the Bar, is closer to Carter's favor. The Complaint Tribunal found insufficient proof of prejudice against the Bar, nevertheless refusing to set aside the default judgment. However, Carter's actions in violating the duties he owed his clients, in addition to his practice in contravention of this Court's order, prejudice the standing of the legal profession in the eyes of the community.