Opinion ID: 760146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Dismissal for Want of Prosecution.

Text: 19 Months later, following the close of discovery, the parties submitted their pretrial materials. On March 31, 1993, the magistrate judge entered an order approving the pretrial submissions, and returned the case to the trial court. On April 1, 1993, the trial court entered an order setting the trial for September 14, 1992, rather than 1993. The order was signed by the district court judge and stated that each side was notified by telephone of the trial date. It is undisputed that neither side received notice of the trial date, either by telephone or otherwise, and consequently no one appeared for trial on September 14, 1993. The district court issued and entered a written order the next day, September 15, 1993, noting that the case had been called for trial, that no one had appeared, and that the court was dismissing the case due to Grun's failure to appear. 4 The record demonstrates that the dismissal order was never signed by the district court judge, and also notes that two dismissal notices were mailed to the parties. Counsel for the defendant received this dismissal notice but Grun's lawyers claim they did not receive the notice at any time. 20 Still under the impression that he was awaiting a trial date, Grun filed a change of address form in May of 1994 and sent copies to defendants' counsel, but apparently not to the court. Defendants' counsel received the change of address form, but elected not to contact Grun to advise him that his case had been dismissed. Grun's Chicago counsel, 5 Ms. Dougherty, states in an affidavit that she has not received a single notice from the court since the March 1993 notice from the magistrate judge which explained that the case was being returned to the district court for the setting of a trial date. She states further that she had clerks from her office periodically check the court file, that on one occasion she personally checked the court file, and that neither she nor any of the clerks ever found an order setting the case for trial, much less dismissing the case. In addition, counsel states that she expressly recalls telephoning the district judge's law clerk in May of 1994, and was told that the case had not come through yet for trial but that she would be notified when the trial date was set. 21 In August of 1996, Grun's counsel filed a motion to advance the case for trial. At the hearing on the motion, she was advised for the first time, by defendants' counsel, that the case had been dismissed in 1993. The district court denied the motion to advance (because there was no case to advance) and suggested that Grun file a motion to vacate the dismissal order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Grun did so, relying on Rule 60(a) and Rule 60(b)(6). In his reply to Pneumo Abex's response, Grun also argued that the dismissal order was void under Rule 60(b)(4). After the motion was briefed, the trial court issued and entered a minute order requiring Grun's counsel to produce a copy of the court's call as listed in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin for the day of trial, September 14, 1993. Grun's counsel filed a copy of the court's call; Grun's case did not appear in the Bulletin. 6 On December 20, 1996, the district court denied Grun's motion to reinstate the case under all three provisions of Rule 60. See Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 170 F.R.D. 441, 444-47 (N.D.Ill.1996). Alternatively, it declared the dismissal order void ab initio and, recognizing this meant the case was still technically pending, dismissed the case for want of prosecution pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and Local Rule 21(A), because Grun had waited three years to bring any error to the court's attention ... and Pneumo Abex no longer has the ability to defend itself.... Id. at 447. The court docketed a final judgment terminating Grun's case on December 20, 1997.