Opinion ID: 181368
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Government's permission to appeal

Text: Finally, Turnley argues that the government did not obtain the requisite approval required for it to appeal his sentence. He cites the rule from United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.1990), that, in order for the government to appeal a sentence, it is required to provide written proof of the personal approval of either the Attorney General or Solicitor General . . . dated no later than the day on which the notice of appeal was filed by the government. Id. at 328 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)). But Turnley acknowledges that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) was modified after Smith and that the statute no longer requires approval from a high-level officer until further along in the appellate process. He argues, however, that Smith set forth a rule that was separate from the statutory requirements and thus not abrogated by the statute's subsequent amendment. Turnley further contends that because this court issued the rule in a legislative rather than adjudicative capacity under its supervisory powers, this court can change the rule only prospectively and must apply the current version of the rule to Turnley's case. We conclude that Turnley's argument fails because it mischaracterizes the Smith rule. The version of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) that was in effect when Smith was decided required that the government obtain approval from either the Attorney General or the Solicitor General before filing its notice of appeal. Even though the statute did not require that this approval be in writing or filed with the court, Smith added the requirement that written proof of the approval had to be filed with the court. Smith, 910 F.2d at 328. The purpose of the rule in Smith was to ensure that the government submit in writing the approval that was required by § 3742(b). Smith required this approval to be dated no later than the day on which the notice of appeal was filed by the government, but Smith chose this deadline based on the deadline for approval that was set forth in § 3742(b). Id. The submission of written proof is the crux of Smith's rule; the deadline for when approval must be obtained is simply a carryover from the statutory framework. Accordingly, we conclude that because the statutory deadline for obtaining this approval was extended, Smith's requirement that the approval be submitted in writing should accordingly incorporate the new statutory timeline for obtaining that approval. This court has already so interpreted Smith in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Mercer, 22 Fed.Appx. 415, 422 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the government satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) by obtaining permission prior to filing its appellate brief because the government no longer needs approval to accompany its notice of appeal, but rather now needs approval only before further prosecution of the appeal). Here, the government satisfied its obligation when it filed its approval from the Solicitor General in this court prior to the filing of its appellate brief. The government, in fact, was careful to obtain permission to extend the time for filing of its brief specifically so that it could obtain the Solicitor General's approval before filing, and Turnley did not object to this extension. In addition, contrary to Turnley's contention that the government's delay was needless, the complex issues involved in this case and the directly on-point Supreme Court case of Dillon, which was pending during much of the relevant time period, justify the extended time that the government took before filing its appellate brief.