Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Excuse Juror for Bias

Text: Juror No. 7 indicated on his questionnaire that he favored the death penalty as a deterrent to crime but did not have strong feelings on the subject, did not believe in the principle of an eye for an eye, needed to know all the circumstances surrounding the case before making a penalty decision, believed all types of evidence about the defendant's background could be relevant to penalty, would not always vote for either life or death if the defendant were found guilty of murder with a felony-murder special circumstance, and could see himself imposing either penalty in the appropriate case. Nevertheless, he answered affirmatively the question whether the death penalty should be automatic for anyone who intentionally commits murder (not in self defense), adding his own explanatory note, premeditated [and] special circumstances. On individual voir dire, the court repeated its explanation, given earlier before the panel of prospective jurors, that if the jury in the first phase of trial convicted defendant of first degree murder with special circumstances, there would be a second phase in which the jury would hear additional evidence of factors in mitigation and aggravation and would then be asked to weigh those factors. The following exchange with Juror No. 7 ensued: Q. [The Court]: Would you be able to do that or are you telling me that the minute you decided that he was guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances you would always vote death?
Q. [The Court]: This is important that we know that, because if what you're saying is that you would vote death at the beginning, then obviously there is no reason to have the second phase of the trial. A. [Juror No. 7]: That's right. Q. [The Court]: So is that what you're telling me? A. [Juror No. 7]: Basically, yes. After other prospective jurors were questioned, the court entertained challenges for cause from both the prosecutor and defendant. The following exchange occurred: The Court: But I guess my first question was [Juror No. 7]. And if I understand his answers correctly, he had indicated that he would automatically vote death, even before we got to the penalty phase of the trial, if he found you had committed first degree murder with special circumstances. I don't know if you want to exercise a challenge as to him, but that would certainly seem to be an appropriate challenge for cause. I don't know if Mr. Ramos had any comment. Mr. Ramos [the prosecutor]: I agree with the court. In fact, I'd stipulate to number 7. [Defendant]: Which one? [Juror # 7], number 7, I would like to keep him. I would like to keep Mr. The Court: I'm sorry? [Defendant]: I would like to keep him. The Court: You want to keep [Juror # 7]? Mr. Ramos: I'll withdraw my request. The Court: Unless I misunderstood him, I thought he said he would automatically vote death if he found you were guilty of first degree murder. You still want to keep him? [Defendant]: Yes. The Court. Okay. Defendant did not use a peremptory challenge on Juror No. 7, did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, and accepted the jury as seated. Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible constitutional error by including in the penalty jury a juror who would vote automatically for the death penalty without considering mitigating evidence and regardless of the court's instructions. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 423-424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841 105 S.Ct. 844]; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 910 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103].) The Attorney General does not address whether the record shows Juror No. 7 was biased, instead arguing the trial court had no sua sponte duty to excuse the juror, and defendant's claim is therefore waived by his failure to challenge Juror No. 7 and exhaust his peremptory challenges or, alternatively, is barred under the doctrine of invited error. (10) We agree with the Attorney General that defendant, having chosen not to challenge Juror No. 7 for cause or peremptorily, and having neither exhausted his peremptory challenges nor expressed dissatisfaction with the jury, cannot raise on appeal the trial court's failure to excuse Juror No. 7. Under our state law, a defendant who wishes to preserve a claim of error in the improper denial of a challenge for cause must (1) use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question; (2) exhaust his or her peremptory challenges or justify the failure to do so; and (3) express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 741; see also People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1290 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 190 P.3d 616] [dissatisfaction requirement applies to trials conducted after 1994 decision clarified the law]; People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 34 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620, 178 P.3d 1113] (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [noting ambiguity as to application of justification option].) Here, as the Attorney General argues, defendant failed to challenge the juror for cause or peremptorily; nor did he express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately seated. Indeed, defendant affirmatively stated he wished to keep Juror No. 7 on the jury. By these choices he waived any claim of error in the juror's retention. If the trial court had a sua sponte duty to excuse jurors on the basis of disqualification under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, independent of the parties' challenges for cause, we would have to decide whether the court erred in not excusing Juror No. 7 on its own motion. The court, however, had no such duty. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 315 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374]; accord, People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 365 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169].) Arguing otherwise, defendant cites our statement in People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at page 742, that [t]o establish that the erroneous inclusion of a juror violated a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, the defendant must show either that a biased juror actually sat on the jury that imposed the death sentence, or that the defendant was deprived of a peremptory challenge that he or she would have used to excuse a juror who in the end participated in deciding the case. Here, he argues, he has met this burden because the trial court's questioning of Juror No. 7 shows he was actually biased in that he had prejudged the question of penalty. The quoted passage from Blair, however, addressed the merits of the defendant's claim, this court having determined in the immediately preceding passage that the claim had been properly preserved; the passage does not speak to whether a defendant has preserved or waived a bias claim. ( Id. at pp. 741-742.) Defendant points out that in none of this court's decisions holding a juror bias claim had not been preserved did the trial court make an express finding of bias, as defendant contends the court did here, yet retain the juror. But the trial court's remarks here did not amount to a finding of actual bias. Rather, the court observed that on the basis of Juror No. 7's questionnaire and voir dire responses a challenge for cause would be appropriate. This remark suggests that at that pointabsent any further attempts to rehabilitate the jurorthe court was inclined to grant such a challenge, if it were made. But the court did not rule out further questioning of Juror No. 7, which in light of his other questionnaire responses might well have rehabilitated him sufficiently. [15] Under these circumstances, even where the defendant represented himself, we adhere to the well-established rule that to preserve a claim a biased juror was improperly permitted to serve, the defense must exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury as sworn. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 741.) Because of this conclusion, we need not reach the question of invited error.