Opinion ID: 1788754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: double barreled error

Text: In opening statement plaintiffs' counsel proceeded to inform the jury that this was not the only time General Motors had failed to inspect and placed a defective axle on the market. And, this is despite the fact, despite the fact, that eighteen axles from this type vehicle, identical to this axle, prior to the time of this accident in December, which we will be getting to in a minute, December the 14th of 1984, despite the fact eighteen accidents had happened with this type axle in it, where there was allegations it had fractured and broken. You would have witnessed the fact that every one of those eighteen, as in this one, General Motors was like a bunch of magpies on a fence. Impact fracture. Impact fracture. Impact fracture. (Emphasis added.) There were prompt objections by counsel for General Motors and Grenada Sales, which were overruled. Vol. XVII, 449. Counsel did not stop there. When the defense was putting on its case, in cross-examination of Chiddester we read: Q. Dr. Chiddester, you are aware, are you not, that prior to this accident date of December of 1984, General Motors had experience, had they not, or had knowledge of, or knew of, 18 other rear axles that had failed on these type vehicles? You are aware of that, aren't you? (Emphasis added.) A. No, I'm not. Q. And you are not aware of the fact then, sir, that General Motors took the position in every one of them they were single event impact fractures? A. It doesn't surprise me. They probably were, because very few axles have failed otherwise. Vol. XXIII, 1632. Having made these grave charges that General Motors had eighteen times placed on the market vehicles with defective axles which broke in use, and subsequently telling a bald-faced lie about all of them, counsel most assuredly was under a duty to offer substantial proof of these charges. They offered none. Instead, in a court of this State they first slandered the ability of General Motors to make a quality product and then slandered its character, and all with complete impunity. At no time in trial did plaintiffs offer one word of evidence to substantiate these charges. Unquestionably, it is reversible error for counsel in opening statement to allege facts which are either inadmissible as evidence, or which he knows he cannot prove. Gillson v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co., 42 Ill.2d 193, 246 N.E.2d 269 (1969); Kester v. Bruns, 326 N.W.2d 279 (Iowa 1983); State v. Browner, 587 S.W.2d 948, 16 A.L.R. 4th 795 (Mo. 1979). Unquestionably, it is reversible error to accuse or insinuate during cross-examination of the opposing party that he has committed other acts of misconduct, and then offer no proof of any of them. Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789 (Miss. 1988). In Hosford we held that cross-examining an accused of other similar acts of misconduct in which the State offered no proof was outrageously unfair and reversible error. In this case the error was committed twice, both in opening statement and cross-examination of Chiddester. After throwing this polecat slander in the jury box, how could the jury ignore it? Yet the majority sees nothing amiss in this slander of a company and its employees; they do not fare as well in our Court as a man accused of child sexual abuse. Indeed, the majority does not even see reason to mention this error. It should also be pointed out that the circuit judge blatantly erred in the first place in overruling General Motors' motion in limine prior to trial to exclude evidence of other defective axles in the absence of some showing of a similarity of circumstances. Mitchem v. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co., 515 So.2d 852 (Miss. 1987); Parmes v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 440 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss. 1983); Hartford Insurance Group v. Massey, 216 So.2d 415, 417 (Miss. 1968). Even with the green light from the court, however, the best plaintiffs' counsel could do was make charges they never attempted to prove.