Opinion ID: 50060
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Second, Kendle argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he was guilty of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack cocaine. We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 937 (2004). “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, this [c]ourt views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the 17 prosecution’s favor.” United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). “A jury’s verdict must be sustained against such a challenge if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). In order to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the [controlled substance] and that he intended to distribute it.” United States v. Mejia, 97 F.3d 1391, 1392 (11th Cir. 1996). These elements can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (11th Cir. 1989). “Evidence of surrounding circumstances can prove knowledge.” United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1027 (11th Cir. 1988). “Possession may be actual or constructive, and the latter can be established by evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises on which it is concealed.” United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 778 (11th Cir. 1984). “Constructive possession may be shared with others, and can be established by circumstantial or direct evidence.” Id. The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, demonstrates that Kendle actually or constructively possessed the crack cocaine. A 18 jury could reasonably infer that Kendle lived in the house at 867 Southwest 6th Street and exercised ownership, dominion, or control over the house in which the drugs were concealed based on (1) the phone bill and car title that both listed his address as that of the house in question; (2) his ownership of keys to the residence; (3) the prescription bottles that bore his name that were found at the residence; and (4) the fact that he was seen at the residence almost every day that police testified to surveilling the house. Additionally, the jury heard testimony that Kendle indicated to the police where to search for the drugs in the house and the police found drugs in those locations, that Kendle was seen making what appeared to be a drug sale on March 24, that he was nearly always at the house when drugs were being sold, and that on the date of Kendle’s federal arrest Officer Mead saw Kendle take a plate with what looked like a crack “cookie” into another part of the house and the plate later tested positive for drug residue. Such evidence was certainly enough for the jury to infer that Kendle knowingly possessed the crack cocaine. Finally, Kendle’s intent to distribute could be inferred from the testimony that (1) stashes of drugs were found individually packaged in small bags; (2) a large amount of cash was seized from the residence; and (3) a scale and plastic bag sealer were found at the house.