Opinion ID: 2327039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Uncharged Drug Possession

Text: During trial, the government introduced evidence that appellant Bishop had drugs on the hood of appellant Brown's car prior to the shooting. Bishop argues that evidence of the uncharged drug possession should not have been introduced because the government did not establish possession by clear and convincing evidence, and because the evidence did not fall within one of the exceptions recognized in Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App. D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85, 89 (1964) ([E]vidence of another crime is inadmissible to prove disposition to commit crime, from which the jury may infer that the defendant committed the crime charged.). Drew does not apply, however, to evidence of uncharged criminal conduct where such evidence (1) is direct and substantial proof of the charged crime, (2) is closely intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime, or (3) is necessary to place the charged crime in an understandable context. Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C.1996) (en banc). Bishop's drug possession took place immediately prior to the shooting, and the government presented it in order to complete the story of the crime . . . by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings. See Holmes v. United States, 580 A.2d 1259, 1266 (D.C.1990) (quoting Williams v. United States, 549 A.2d 328, 333 (D.C.1988)). The evidence helped to explain the reason why appellants, as part of a turf war over drugs, would approach two strangers and immediately shoot them in the back. Moreover, any prejudicial effect from the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value given the close temporal relationship between the uncharged conduct and the shooting. See Wilson v. United States, 690 A.2d 468, 474 (D.C. 1997) (Ruiz, J., concurring). As a result, we perceive no error by the trial court.