Opinion ID: 729937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Insufficient Showing of Cause and Prejudice.

Text: 20 Because Rodgers's appeal is from the district court's denial of a § 2255 motion, Rodgers must demonstrate both cause for his failure to raise on direct appeal the issues he now raises and prejudice flowing therefrom. Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68, 102 S.Ct. at 1594; Pipitone, 67 F.3d at 38. Rodgers has shown neither. 21 Rodgers bases his showing of cause on an assertion that the time for direct appeal had lapsed before the governmental misconduct allegedly breaching the plea agreement was fully consummated. Rodgers concedes that he was aware of the facts underlying his claims of government misconduct, but argues that one of the alleged acts of misconduct--the government's release of confidential transcripts pursuant to a court's discovery order--had not been completed until after the time for a direct appeal had lapsed, and thus his failure to pursue a direct appeal should be excused. This argument, however, falls short of establishing the requisite showing of cause. 22 The record plainly indicates that, by the time of the October 28 sentencing hearing, Rodgers was aware of the facts underlying his claims of misconduct including the FBI agent's instigation of the letter-writing campaign by fraud victims and the communication of information regarding the calculation of missing proceeds and the polygraph test to DiDonato. Rodgers offers no excuse for his failure to pursue these claims on direct appeal. Moreover, at the time of the October 28 sentencing hearing, Rodgers was aware of the government's compliance with the court order to release the transcripts of his conversations with investigators. Even if the government did not actually release the transcripts until after the time for a direct appeal lapsed, Rodgers's showing of cause is insufficient. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 51 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 205, 133 L.Ed.2d 139 (1995). 23 Although we need not reach the question, we note that Rodgers's failure on direct appeal to pursue his claim of government misconduct in violation of the plea agreement did not result in any actual and substantial prejudice. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, 102 S.Ct. at 1595-96. Under the plea agreement, Rodgers agreed to cooperate with government investigators in exchange for a recommendation by the government that the district court depart downward in sentencing. Rodgers's original guideline sentencing level, after a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, was 35 at criminal history category II, calling for an incarceration range of 188-235 months. The government upheld its end of the bargain by filing a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 that recommended that the sentence not exceed the 97-121 month range. The district court, exercising its discretion to sentence Rodgers to 121 months, awarded him a downward departure of 67 months. Rodgers got precisely the reduced sentence for which he had bargained. 24 Finally, although it is unnecessary to reach the question absent a showing of cause and prejudice, we note that the government misconduct alleged did not breach Rodgers's plea agreement. We interpret plea agreements according to principles of contract law. United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 334 (2d Cir.1996). In determining whether any particular plea agreement has been breached, we look to the reasonable understanding of the parties, United States v. Carbone, 739 F.2d 45, 46 (2d Cir.1984), and resolve any ambiguities in the agreement against the government. United States v. Feigenbaum, 962 F.2d 230, 234 (2d Cir.1992). In this case, the plea agreement was unambiguous. In exchange for the defendant's cooperation, the government, under the agreement, was required only to recommend a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The government fully complied with this obligation. Nothing in the plea agreement prevented the government from presenting relevant aggravating circumstances to the sentencing court, and nothing barred the government from encouraging defrauded victims to voice their views on Rodgers's sentence. Whatever unseemliness appears from Agent Lucht's recommendation that fraud victims fax their letters to the FBI 24-hours a day, 7 days a week rather than to the district court directly, nothing in the plea agreement prevented such conduct. Moreover, nothing in the agreement restricted Agent Lucht from discussing Rodgers's fraudulent conduct with the attorney for the bankruptcy trustee, and nothing prevented the government from complying with court order discovery. In short, we are not aware of any provision of the plea agreement that was breached in this case.