Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Competency During Penalty Retrial

Text: Third, defendant argues that, irrespective of his level of competence at the commencement of the penalty retrial, the trial court erred by failing to declare a doubt as to his competency during the retrial. Specifically, defendant asserts he acted irrationally in refusing to agree to a continuance sought by his counsel for his own benefit, pending the ruling of the Court of Appeal on a writ petition seeking to bar the penalty retrial on double jeopardy grounds; made bizarre statements during jury selection; gave testimony filled with non sequiturs, rambling and irrelevant responses, and offensive remarks; and delivered a bizarre and incomprehensible monologue before the jury concerning his study of the dictionary, his moral and religious beliefs, his preference for the death penalty over imprisonment for life without parole, and other matters. Defendant additionally argues the testimony of Psychiatrist Kaushal Sharma showed he was unable to participate rationally in his own defense: Dr. Sharma, who had interviewed defendant three times, agreed with Dr. Vicary that defendant was psychotic and with another psychiatrist who had diagnosed defendant as having bipolar disorder. Dr. Sharma stated, on cross-examination by the prosecutor, that he did not think defendant fully understood that others saw him as strange and crazy when he talked about his religion and similar matters. [5] Lay witnesses testified during the penalty retrial to defendant's deteriorating behavior before the commission of the offenses. Defendant also notes that during a conference on jury instructions, he requested the jury be asked their opinion of the proposition that we have a heavenly father and that we cannot be forgiven unless we forgive. When the court responded that the jury could not be instructed on religious matters, but only on the law, defendant said: That doesn't sound like the law to you then, what I had stated to you? ... I mean, that is the law of the creator of this world and you and I. Finally, during his sentencing hearing, defendant gave another statement filled with references to the dictionary and his religion. Defendant asserts the foregoing evidence raised a substantial doubt of his competency to stand trial. We disagree. Nothing in this record suggests that defendant lacked a rational understanding of the roles of the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, or jury in this case, or the purpose of the proceedings. That he apparently viewed religious and moral questions as most salient in the normative determination of penalty, and repeatedly sought to bring them to the jury's attention, does not reflect incompetency; indeed, such matters are commonly thought to be relevant and often are presented in the defense case in mitigation. (See, e.g., People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 67, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 332, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846; People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1069, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035.) Dr. Sharma's testimony regarding defendant's mental disorders added nothing significant to the information already before the trial court, which we have concluded failed to generate a duty to institute competency proceedings. The trial court therefore did not err in failing to declare a doubt and initiate proceedings under section 1368 during the penalty retrial. And, as we discuss below (64 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 764-767, 165 P.3d at pp. 548-550, post ), the circumstance that the trial court denied defendant's Faretta motions (see Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562) before the commencement of the penalty retrial (on the stated basis that he was mentally incapable of preparing and conducting his defense in a rational manner) does not undermine this conclusion; the court's belief that defendant was so preoccupied with guilt feelings that he likely would sabotage his own defense did not reflect any doubt regarding his competency to stand trial as defined in Dusky v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, and section 1367.