Opinion ID: 4535004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The IDEA’s Legal Framework

Text: The IDEA authorizes the disbursement of federal funds to States 6 that develop appropriate plans to, among other things, provide a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to children with disabilities. 7 To provide a FAPE to each student with a disability, a school district must develop an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” 8 The IEP must identify the student’s “particular educational needs . . . and the services required to meet those needs.” 9 the appeal in Mendez by summary order filed simultaneously herewith, in which we dismiss the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Of course, upon the issuance of the mandate in Ventura de Paulino and Navarro Carrillo, our analysis in this opinion will bind the District Court in Mendez. 6“The term ‘State’ [in the IDEA] means each of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each of the outlying areas.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(31). 7 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2014) 8 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)). 9 Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998). 10 The IDEA also requires participating States to develop an administrative review process for parents who are dissatisfied with their child’s education and wish to challenge the adequacy of the child’s IEP. 10 To that effect, the State of New York “has implemented a ‘two-tier system of administrative review.’” 11 In the first tier, a parent can file an administrative “due process complaint” challenging the IEP and requesting a hearing before an impartial hearing officer. 12 The party aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision may then “proceed to the second tier, ‘an appeal before a state review officer.’” 13 Once the state review officer makes a final decision, the aggrieved party may seek judicial review of that decision in a state or federal trial court. 14 At the crux of these cases is a provision in the IDEA known as the “pendency” or “stay-put” provision. 15 It provides that, while the 10 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)–(8). 11Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for the Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 2002)). 12 Id. (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)). 13Id. (quoting Murphy, 297 F.3d at 197) (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(2); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)). 14 See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)). 15 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). 11 administrative and judicial proceedings are pending and “unless the school district and the parents agree otherwise,” a child must remain, at public expense, “in his or her then-current educational placement.” 16 The term “educational placement” refers “only to the general type of educational program in which the child is placed” 17— i.e., “the classes, individualized attention and additional services a child will receive.” 18 Parents who are dissatisfied with their child’s education can “unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency of review proceedings” 19 and can, for example, “pay for private services, including private schooling.” 20 They “do so,” however, “at their own 16Mackey, 386 F.3d at 160 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)). The IDEA’s implementing regulations under federal law, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(a) (“Child’s status during proceedings”), and New York state law, see N.Y. Educ. L. § 4404(4)(a), impose the same requirement. 17 Concerned Parents v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1980). 18 T.Y. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009). 19Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 373–74 (1985) (“Burlington”); see also Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (“Carter”). 20T.M., 752 F.3d at 152 (citations omitted); see also R.E. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2012). 12 financial risk.” 21 They can obtain retroactive reimbursement from the school district after the IEP dispute is resolved, if they satisfy a threepart test that has come to be known as the Burlington-Carter test. 22 A parent can obtain such reimbursement if: “(1) the school district’s proposed placement violated the IDEA” by, for example, denying a FAPE to the student because the IEP was inadequate; (2)“the parents’ alternative private placement was appropriate”; and (3) “equitable considerations favor reimbursement.” 23 B. The Parties’ Relationship and Administrative Proceedings Ventura de Paulino is the mother of R.P., and Navarro Carrillo and Garzon are the parents of M.G. Both Students, R.P. and M.G., are minors with disabilities stemming from acquired brain injuries, who are entitled to a FAPE under the IDEA. During the 2017-2018 academic year, the Students were unilaterally enrolled by the Parents at iHOPE, a private school. The Parents filed due process complaints alleging that the Students’ IEPs proposed by the local committee on special education for that school year was inadequate and that iHOPE’s IEP was appropriate for the Students. In both instances—in June 2018 in the case of R.P., and in April 2018 in the case of M.G.—impartial hearing officers determined that: 21 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374. 22 E.M. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 451 (2d Cir. 2014). 23 T.M., 752 F.3d at 152 (citations omitted); see also E.M., 758 F.3d at 451. 13 (1) the City had failed to provide the Students with a FAPE in violation of the IDEA; (2) the Parents’ alternative placement at iHOPE for the 2017-2018 school year was appropriate; and (3) equitable considerations favored reimbursement to the Parents. The impartial hearing officers ordered the City to reimburse the Parents for the expenses incurred at iHOPE during the 2017-2018 school year and ordered the local committee on special education to draft a new IEP that incorporates all the items of iHOPE’s IEP. The City did not appeal. Following the reimbursement orders, in or around June 2018, the Parents unilaterally enrolled the Students at iBRAIN, a newly created private school, for the 2018-2019 school year. On July 9, 2018, the Students’ first day at iBRAIN, the Parents filed a due process complaint alleging that the City continued to fail to provide the Students with a FAPE for the new school year. In that complaint, the Parents asked for an order pursuant to the IDEA’s stay-put provision directing the City to fund the Students’ placement at iBRAIN during the pendency of the proceedings. On November 22, 2018, the impartial hearing officer in R.P.’s proceeding denied the request for a pendency order and concluded that, consistent with the June 2018 administrative order that the City did not appeal, iHOPE was R.P.’s pendency placement. Although Ventura de Paulino quickly appealed the interim decision to a state review officer, she did not wait for a final decision and filed a complaint in the district court. 14 On March 5, 2019, the impartial hearing officer in M.G.’s proceeding denied the request for a pendency order on the basis that iBRAIN and iHOPE were not substantially similar and that M.G.’s pendency placement remained at iHOPE. Navarro Carrillo and Garzon did not appeal the interim decision to a state review officer. Instead, they too filed their own complaint in the district court. C. District Court Proceedings On January 9, 2019, Ventura de Paulino filed her complaint seeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction requiring the City to pay for R.P.’s iBRAIN tuition and services. On March 20, 2019, the District Court rejected the City’s argument that Ventura de Paulino was required to exhaust New York’s two-tier review process, but denied her application for emergency relief. 24 On May 31, 2019, the District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as well as the 24See Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-222 (GBD), 2019 WL 1448088, at , 5–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019), reconsideration denied sub nom. Ventura De Paulino v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-222 (GBD), 2019 WL 2498206 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019). 15 motion to dismiss by co-defendant State of New York. 25 Final judgment dismissing the case was entered on the same day.26 On April 2, 2019, Navarro Carrillo and Garzon filed their complaint seeking the exact same remedy sought by Ventura de Paulino. On June 13, 2019, after concluding that iHOPE and iBRAIN were substantially similar, the District Court granted the requested preliminary injunction and vacated the March 2019 Interim Order by the impartial hearing officer in M.G.’s proceeding. 27 The District Court ordered the City to pay for M.G.’s education at iBRAIN during the pendency of M.G.’s FAPE proceeding.28 These appeals followed. In Navarro Carrillo, the District Court granted the City’s motion to stay the order of preliminary injunction pending the City’s interlocutory appeal. See Ventura De Paulino v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-222 (GBD), 25 2019 WL 2499204, at –3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019). 26On appeal, Ventura de Paulino’s reply brief belatedly objects to the dismissal of the State of New York, but her failure to raise the objection in her opening brief waived any challenge to the District Court’s dismissal. See EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 625 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007). In any event, any such challenge to the dismissal would be meritless, since Ventura de Paulino’s complaint does not plausibly allege any claims against the State of New York, or even seek any relief from it. 27Navarro Carrilo v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 3d 441, 459–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 28 Id. at 465. 16 D. Unfamiliar Litigation and a Curious Set of Facts Before proceeding to analyze the Parents’ claims, we would be remiss not to emphasize the somewhat unusual set of facts presented in these tandem cases, which in turn have given rise to an unfamiliar pattern of IDEA litigation. To our knowledge, these tandem cases are just two of approximately 23 cases presenting similar, if not virtually identical, legal questions in our Court and in the Southern District of New York. In these cases, the parents or natural guardians of the students with disabilities transferred their children from iHOPE to iBRAIN for the 2018-2019 school year without the City’s consent and are now claiming that they are entitled to an order requiring the City to pay for the educational services at iBRAIN on a pendency basis. The vast majority, if not all, of these plaintiffs are represented by the Parents’ counsel in these tandem cases. The arguably unusual circumstances surrounding the mass exodus of students from iHOPE to iBRAIN were thoroughly described by Judge Jesse M. Furman of the Southern District of New York in one of the many iHOPE-to-iBRAIN-pendency cases. 29 It has been alleged 29While tangential to our disposition of the Parents’ legal claims, we rely on Judge Furman’s summary as an interesting backdrop for our analysis set forth below. See Ferreira v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-2937 (JMF), 2020 WL 1158532, at  n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020) (denying the parent’s motion for summary 17 that, during the summer of 2018, there was a “’split between the original founders and some of the [iHOPE] board’ over whether [iHOPE] should admit students with disabilities besides traumatic brain injuries,” 30 and that “‘the original founders and some of the administration w[ere] ousted’ from [iHOPE].” 31 Donohue left iHOPE and became the founder and registered agent of iBRAIN. 32 Donohue also happens to be the founder of the Brain Injury Rights Group, 33 the law firm representing the Parents in these tandem cases and the other plaintiffs seeking public funding from the City for iBRAIN’s tuition and related services. judgment and application for preliminary injunction, and granting the City’s crossmotion for summary judgment), appeal filed No. 20-908-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2020). 30 Id. (quoting Fiallos v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-334 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019), ECF No. 59, at 6-7, appeal filed No. 19-1330-cv (2d Cir. May 3, 2019)). 31 Id. (quoting Mendez v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-CV-2945 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019), ECF No. 27, at 6-7, 17, appeal filed No. 19-1852-cv (2d Cir. June 24, 2019)). 32 Id. (quoting Navarro Carrilo, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 447, 450 (alteration omitted)) (citing Docket No. 19-cv-2937, ECF No. 33, at 11 & n.9, 169). 33 Id. (citing Donohue v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-CV-9364 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2018), ECF No. 7, ¶ 8; id. ECF No. 34, at 2). 18