Opinion ID: 2301227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substantial Public Interest Exception

Text: Alternatively, plaintiff has suggested that we overlook the standing requirement by invoking this Court's so-called substantial public interest exception. It is true that [o]n rare occasions this [C]ourt has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest. Burns, 617 A.2d at 116. After a review of our case law, in our opinion, whether to apply the substantial public interest exception lies within the discretion of this Court, and we respectfully decline to exercise it in this case. We observe that plaintiff waited until thirteen days before the expiration of the 2008 budget year to bring this action. Further, it gives this Court pause, as it did the motion justice, that plaintiff has taken no steps to join all the interested parties in this action. Although his complaint names the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate as defendants, none of the organizations that received money via a process plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional are named as parties. The plaintiff argues that those organizations are not necessary parties because he does not seek reimbursement to the state. However, if a court were to reach the merits of this case, and if plaintiff prevailed, the rights of these absent parties unquestionably would be affected. In our opinion, the fact that the plaintiff essentially is seeking an advisory opinion disguised as a request for a declaratory judgment leads us to refrain from exercising our discretion by overlooking the issue of standing. [15] This Court will not be persuaded to vault over the required showing of a particularized injury, economic or otherwise, when faced with questions of constitutional import that bear on the authority and duties of a coordinate branch of state government. In our opinion, to do so under these circumstances would be imprudent because this case lacks the concrete adverseness that assists us when we are required to address thorny constitutional questions. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942; Baker, 369 U.S. at 204, 82 S.Ct. 691. Additionally, if we were to dispense with the requirement of standing here, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, it would tend to distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and would verge on government by injunction. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974). Accordingly, we agree with the motion justice's finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and therefore affirm her ruling granting the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.