Opinion ID: 1968694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application To Wrongful Death Action

Text: Eagan next presses his argument that the doctrine does not apply because the children's action derives from that of their mother, who would not have been barred from suing her husband had she lived. That, too, we reject. A wrongful death action, unlike a survivor's action that may be filed by a personal representative, is not derivative in the sense asserted. See Stewart v. United Electric Light and Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906); Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633, recons. denied, 325 Md. 665, 602 A.2d 1182 (1992). While certainly based on the death of another person, it is not brought in a derivative or representative capacity to recover for a loss or injury suffered by that person but, rather, is brought by a spouse, parent, or child, or a secondary beneficiary who was wholly dependent on the decedent, to recover damages for his or her own loss accruing from the decedent's death. United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993). It follows from the fact that the action is a personal one to the claimant that the claimant is ordinarily subject to any defense that is applicable to him or her, whether or not it would have been applicable to the decedent. Thus, the fact that Gladys would not have been barred by any doctrine of parent-child immunity from suing John does not relieve Laura and Kevin of that impediment. See Heyman v. Gordon, 40 N.J. 52, 190 A.2d 670 (1963) (child's wrongful death action against his father for the death of his mother barred by parent-child immunity), overruled in part by France v. A.P.A. Transport Co., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970) (abrogating parent-child immunity for motor torts); Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 85 So.2d 807 (1956) (parent-child immunity prohibited a minor's wrongful death action against her father for the death of her mother), overruled in part by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906 (Miss.1992) (abolishing parent-child immunity for motor torts); Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240, reh'g denied, 70 Nev. 290, 269 P.2d 265 (1954) (common law doctrine of parent-child immunity barred an action by a child's guardian ad litem against the child's mother for the wrongful death of the child's father), overruled in part by Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974) (abrogating parent-child immunity). As Maryland continues to recognize the parent-child immunity doctrine and as Eagan stands in the stead of Laura and Kevin, he labors under the disability of that doctrine.