Opinion ID: 1592553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mattingly, Inlow, Tipton, Martindale, and Gaines, or the Alabama Five:

Text: The remaining five defendants also claim to be out of the reach of personal jurisdiction under the doctrine recognized in Thames, supra . The holding of Thames, supra, applied only to nonresident defendants who had never been in Alabama and who had never personally `performed any act or omitted to perform any act in Alabama which resulted in tortious injury in Alabama.' (Emphasis added.) Thames, supra, at 642. These defendants do not fall into the class of defendants who are protected by the holding of Thames, because each had been to Alabama on at least one occasion and each had allegedly performed an act or omitted to perform an act in Alabama which act or omission proximately caused the plaintiffs' injury. The defendants next argue that if Thames, supra, does not apply to them, nevertheless their contacts with Alabama are simply insufficient to satisfy the requisite `minimum contacts' standard of constitutional due process, citing Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); Sporting Goods Distributors, Inc. v. Whitney, 498 F.Supp. 1088 (N.D.Fla.1980). The defendants argue that the analysis of Whitney, supra, is particularly appropriate for the five defendants. We set out below all the analysis of the Whitney court: Whitney's contacts with Alabama were few. He made two brief visits to Alabama, both after the contract in dispute was entered and before the alleged breach and conversion. Whitney's only other contacts with Alabama were phone calls and letters to Sporting Goods' Mobile headquarters. The contacts were not important and in no way could be construed as placing Whitney in a position where he relied on and enjoyed the benefits of Alabama's laws. The visits were brief and not important to a business which was carried on primarily through the United States mail. As significant contacts with Alabama the phone calls and letters are particularly inadequate. Interstate communication is today an almost inevitable accompaniment to doing business and cannot fairly be considered a contact justifying exercise of jurisdiction. See, Lakeside Bridge and Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., Inc., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.1979); Aaron Ferer and Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir.1977). Whitney's two visits are peripherally related to the cause of action. He made them during performance of the contract involved. But they are not related to either the breach or the conversion and were at Sporting Goods' urging. Contacts Whitney did not have are much more significant and demonstrate the constitutional defectiveness of the Alabama judgment. The contract in dispute was made in Florida. Performance was in Florida. Any breach occurred in Florida. In short, every significant event happened in Florida. The significant party-state contacts actually were between Sporting Goods and Florida, not between Whitney and Alabama. The secondary factors also call for finding Whitney's contacts insufficient to justify the Alabama court exercising jurisdiction over him. Alabama has no particular interest in this type of litigation. Thus the situation is not comparable to McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). All the significant events occurred in Florida. The contract was made in Florida; witnesses other than the parties will most likely be found in Florida. The breach occurred in Florida, as did the conversion. Sporting Goods does business in Florida and thus is much better equipped to come to Florida than Mr. Whitney is to go to Alabama. Whitney, supra, at 1091 (emphasis added). In Whitney, supra, the employer of a salesman sought to enforce an Alabama judgment against the salesman in a Florida federal district court. The Alabama judgment was based on breach of an employment contract, account, and conversion, and was in regard to property of the employer held by the defendant in Florida. The defendant argued that the Alabama judgment was invalid because the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction. The salesman had made an oral contract of employment in Florida and his sales territory was in Florida. He traveled to his employer's headquarters in Mobile on only two occasions. These trips were instigated by the employer and were for purposes of instruction, merchandise inspection, and picking up samples. The trips were in no way related to the cause of action in the Alabama court. We think the facts of Whitney distinguish it from the instant case. The inquiry in cases such as the one before us is particularly factual. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). Two recent Alabama cases and one U.S. Supreme Court case are more appropriate to the instant case: Calder v. Jones, supra ; Cagle v. Lawson, 445 So.2d 564 (Ala.1984); Alabama Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141 (Ala.1983). In Hanby, supra, this Court upheld personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who had signed a guaranty agreement in Mississippi in connection with a sale of stock of an Alabama corporation. Although most of the documents in connection with the sale were executed in Alabama, this Court did not find these contacts significant in regard to the analysis of personal jurisdiction. The Court summarized the law: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant. Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). Under Alabama's long-arm procedure, Rule 4.2, ARCP, as interpreted by Court decisions, an Alabama court may acquire in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has sufficient `minimum contacts' so that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 444 U.S. 286, 290, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Bryant v. Ceat S.p.A., 406 So.2d 376, 377 (Ala.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944, 102 S.Ct. 2008, 72 L.Ed.2d 466 (1982).     This state's long-arm procedure for service of process is not limited to rigid transactional categories. Instead, in personam jurisdiction of an Alabama court under Rule 4.2(a)(2), ARCP, is as broad as the permissible limits of due process. See DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Industries, Inc., 350 So.2d 447 (Ala. 1977); Schoel v. Sikes Corp., 533 F.2d 930 (5th Cir.1976). See also Rule 4.2, ARCP, Committee comments. In determining whether the nonresident appellants possessed sufficient contacts with this state for the trial court to obtain in personam jurisdiction, we must necessarily examine all the relevant facts and attendant circumstances of the case. J. Moore, 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 4.41-1[3] at 4-449. The guaranty agreement which was signed by all of the appellants, including the non-resident appellants, stated as follows: `Guarantee of the performance of the above contract [the agreement not to compete] by the shareholders of Alabama Waterproofing Company, Inc., and their spouses: We, for $1.00 and other sufficient consideration, hereby guarantee the performance of the foregoing agreement.' While the `Agreement Not to Compete' was a contract between Alabama Waterproofing Company, Inc., and each of the appellees, the guaranty agreement was a separate contract signed by each appellant. Irrespective of the singular fact that the nonresident appellants actually signed the guaranty in Mississippi, the Court is of the opinion that the trial court could have found that the guaranty signed by each appellant was a significant aspect of the negotiations which occurred in Alabama and that it was foreseeable that appellants' transaction would have consequences in this state. See Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F.Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D.N.Y.1975); see also Bond v. Montego Bay Dev. Corp., 405 F.Supp. 256, 259 (W.D.Tenn.1975). Furthermore, based on the facts as presented, it is quite evident that the trial court could have found that the nonresident appellants had good reason to expect to be sued in an Alabama court in the event Alabama Waterproofing failed to fulfill its obligations to appellees. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2586, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra , the Supreme Court of the United States opined: [T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, 436 U.S., at 97-98, 98 S.Ct., at 1699-1700; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S., at 216, 97 S.Ct., at 2586, and see id., at 217-219, 97 S.Ct. at 2586-2587 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the orderly administration of the laws, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., at 319, 66 S.Ct., at 159, gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit. 444 U.S., at 297, 100 S.Ct., at 567. Hanby, 431 So.2d at 144-146. The more recent case by this Court, Cagle v. Lawson, 445 So.2d 564 (Ala.1984), summarized the law in this manner: Recently, in View-All, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, 435 So.2d 1198 (Ala. 1983), this Court, quoting Professor Moore, summarized the correct constitutional requirements in this area: `The first requirement is that there must be some minimum contact with the state which results from an affirmative act of the defendant. But it is not necessary that the defendant have been in the state or that it have had agents there. `In addition to some minimum contact with the state, it must be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and defend that action.... [I]n determining what is fair and reasonable, the court may consider factors associated with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but need not give them overriding importance.... `Based as they are on notions of fairness and reasonableness, the Supreme Court decisions do not permit a simple generalization of the rule pertaining to in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations.... `If there are substantial contacts with the state, for example a substantial and continuing business, and if the cause of action arises out of the business done in the state, jurisdiction will be sustained. If there are substantial contacts with the state, but the cause of action does not arise out of these contacts, jurisdiction may be sustained. But if there is a minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, it will normally be fair and reasonable to sustain jurisdiction. If there is a minimum of contacts and the cause of action does not arise out of the contacts, there will normally be no basis of jurisdiction, since it is difficult to establish the factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable test.' `2. J. Moore, Federal Practice, Para. 4.25, pp. 4-258 through 4-267 (2d Ed.1982).' 435 So.2d at 1201. Where, as here, there is a minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, we consider the quality and nature of the activity in this state in order to determine whether maintenance of the suit will offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Williams v. Barrington Ford, 402 So.2d 903 (Ala.1981). Also relevant are the foreseeability by the defendant of being sued in Alabama as a result of his activity in this state and the level of inconvenience to the defendant in defending the suit. 445 So.2d at 565 (Ala.1984) (emphasis added in Cagle. ) We also find that the principle of Calder v. Jones, supra , is applicable, and conclude that the court erred in dismissing the cause as to defendants Mattingly, Inlow, Tipton, Martindale, and Gaines. On the basis of the authorities cited, we hold that the defendants Mattingly, Inlow, Tipton, Martindale, and Gaines were subject to personal jurisdiction of an Alabama court and that the defendants Duncan and Chapman were not. We, therefore, affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the action of the trial court, and remand the cause to the circuit court. AFFIRMED, IN PART; REVERSED, IN PART; AND REMANDED. JONES, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.