Opinion ID: 2162178
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Heading: Defendant had a constitutional and statutory right to counsel. Amendment #6, Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 10, Constitution of Iowa, Section 775.4, Code of Iowa.

Text: The right to counsel extends to the sentencing proceeding. Losieau v. Sigler, Warden, 406 F.2d 795, United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, decided February 4, 1969 and cases cited therein. II. What is commonly called a bench parole is authorized by section 247.20, Code of Iowa. This section to the extent applicable here provides: The trial court    may    suspend the sentence and grant probation to said person during good behavior.    Section 247.21 provides for the custody, care and supervision of the person to whom probation is granted by a parole agent or agency designated by the court. Section 247.20 says the court may suspend sentence. The granting of a suspended sentence and parole is a matter of grace, favor, or forbearance. It is not a matter of right. Pagano v. Bechly, Judge, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798; Lint v. Bennett, 251 Iowa 1193, 104 N.W.2d 564; Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164, 131 N. W.2d 1; State v. Rath, 258 Iowa 568, 139 N.W.2d 468. III. Trial courts have broad discretion in the granting or withholding of bench paroles and an appellate court will seldom interfere with their determination of such matters. There is, however, a duty to consider and determine an application for parole. State v. Boston, 233 Iowa 1249, 11 N.W.2d 407. See also second appeal in the same case, 234 Iowa 1047, 14 N.W.2d 676. In that case defendant had been indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter. We quote from the opinion on the first appeal, page 1256 of 233 Iowa, page 411 of 11 N.W.2d: After the verdict and before sentence defendant filed a verified application for parole by the court   . [D]efendant's counsel read the application for parole to the court who stated `that he never allowed a parole; that in all his experience on the bench he had never allowed a parole and would not do so in this case, and that no evidence would be received or hearing had on that matter   .' Defendant produced witnesses and asked to be sworn to testify. The court declined all the offers and summarily denied the application. We held defendant was entitled to have his application considered on its merits and reversed and remanded, for that purpose only. Following remand the trial court held a hearing, listened to arguments, filed a written ruling and again denied parole. Defendant again appealed. We held that the trial court had performed the duty required and affirmed. We said: The scope of the inquiry is and should be largely in the hands of that official.    No one convicted of a crime can demand a parole as a matter of right.    We are not prepared to hold that the court may take into consideration nothing other than the record of the trial   . loc. cit. 1051-1052 of 234 Iowa, loc. cit. 679 of 14 N.W.2d. From these pronouncements it is clear that a trial court has a duty to hear an application for parole but has wide discretion in what must be considered in granting or denying the application. IV. In the case before us defendant concedes that sentencing procedures are governed by different evidentiary rules than the trial itself; that the sentencing judge should be in possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics; that a sentencing judge should not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial. Defendant cites Williams v. People, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 and State v. Delano, Iowa, 161 N.W.2d 66. These cases are of no help to defendant and in fact amply support the position of the state. Here the trial court stated that he had received an oral recommendation against probation from the parole agent. Assuming, arguendo, that the court considered the recommendation, there is no indication that the court abdicated its responsibility to the parole agent. Defendant was not denied the right to testify. He was not denied the right to call witnesses in his own behalf. He was not permitted to call the parole agent for the purpose of examining the validity of Sorci's conclusion that defendant was not a fit subject for probation. A trial in a criminal case is an inquiry as to facts; a search for the truth of the charge made against the defendant. Rigid rules of procedure and admissibility of testimony are followed. Opinions and conclusions of witnesses as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are not received. After guilt has been determined and the question of probation arises the same rigid rules do not apply. The sentencing judge may then resort to such sources of information as he thinks might be helpful to his judgment as to what should be done with defendant. As said in Boston, supra, the scope of the inquiry is in his hands. The responsibility and decision is the court's. Defendant may not successfully challenge the soundness of the trial court's discretion even though involved therein were conclusions or matters not ordinarily admissible. As said at the end of the second Boston opinion, supra, Whether the decision was as some other court would have decided is beside the point. loc. cit. 1053 of 234 Iowa, loc. cit. 680 of 14 N.W.2d. V. Incidentally, although we do not base our opinion thereon, the information given by defendant to the pre-sentence investigating parole agent indicated reasons for his conclusion that defendant was not a fit subject for probation. Past personal record and a job for the future are important considerations. Defendant's personal record was not commendable and his employment record was bad. Previous probation had been tried and obviously had not resulted in reform. He was in trouble again for a similar offense. Defendant had not worked for several months. Although he had not been interviewed he had called about a job and thought he could get it. His tentative plans were that he would like to find a job in Iowa City. VI. Defendant's complaint is that denial of the right to examine the validity of the parole agent's conclusion was a denial of defendant's right to be effectively represented by counsel at a critically important proceeding. This argument proceeds from a faulty premise. The hearing did not involve any right of defendant to probation. It was a hearing to determine whether the sovereign state against which defendant had offended should grant grace, favor or forbearance. Section 247.26, Code of Iowa, provides that a suspension of sentence may be revoked at any time without notice by the court or judge. A defendant has no vested right to a parole under section 247.20 and acquires none by parole except as limited by section 247.26. In State v. Rath, supra, a case involving revocation of parole, we commented on and reaffirmed our previous holdings as to the status of a defendant. If defendant's request for probation does not rest on a right (we have repeatedly said it does not) and the trial court is not limited as to sources of information it follows that it was not error to refuse examination into the validity of a recommendation the court was in no way bound to accept. VII. Our recent consideration of issues comparable to the case at bar appears in State v. Delano, supra. We need not repeat at length the analysis and citation of authority. During sentencing procedure defendant does not have a constitutional right to confront all witnesses against him.    if the court could not protect the sources of its information, those sources would dry up.    [R]efusal to disclose presentence investigation report is not a violation of due process of law. [Citations]    But the sentencing judge may consider information, even though obtained outside the courtroom, from persons whom the defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-examine.    The sources of confidential information need not, however, be disclosed. `    The main consideration against full disclosure is the prospect that the revelation of certain material given the probation officer in confidence, would result in the destruction of the sources of such material and its availabilitya consequence which would be highly prejudicial to the difficult task of imposing a proper sentence.   ' (loc. cit. 70, 71 and 72 of 161 N.W.2d 66) In State v. Patterson, Iowa, 161 N.W.2d 736, 737, in commenting on the statutory authority for pre-sentence investigation, we said: They permit, but do not require, the trial court to order a pre-sentence investigation. The statute leaves the use of such procedure to the discretion of the trial court. VIII. We conclude that defendant had neither constitutional nor statutory right to examine the investigating officer as to the validity of his conclusion. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The Supreme Court of the United States in Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 89 S.Ct. 1134, 22 L.Ed.2d 442, decided April 2, 1969 said: Pre-sentence reports are documents which the rule does not make available to the defendant as a matter of right. There are no formal limitations on their contents, and they may rest on hearsay and contain information bearing no relation whatever to the crime with which the defendant is charged. While the sentencing process is not immune from scrutiny we find here no abuse of the trial court's discretion. Defendant's right to counsel at the time of sentence and his right to be heard in support of an application for parole do not extend to the point of requiring examination of an investigating officer as to the validity of his opinion. The case is Affirmed. GARFIELD, C. J., and LARSON, MOORE, STUART and LeGRAND, JJ., concur. MASON, RAWLINGS and BECKER, JJ., dissent.