Opinion ID: 1833794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Trial Court's Conditionally Granted New Trial

Text: In the present case, we note that the trial court conditionally granted a new trial if the JNOV was reversed as permitted under LA.CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1811(C)(1), (2), but did not specify the grounds for granting the motion. [11] As provided in LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1972, a new trial shall be granted, upon contradictory motion, where (1) the verdict or judgment is contrary to the law and evidence; (2) important evidence is obtained after trial; or (3) the jury was either bribed or behaved improperly. [12] Moreover, pursuant to LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1973, a new trial may be granted if there is good ground therefor except as otherwise provided by law. [13] In Lamb v. Lamb, 430 So.2d 51 (La. 1983), we set forth the standard for granting a new trial pursuant to LA.CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1973. There we stated: A proper application of this article necessitates an examination of the facts and circumstances of the individual case. When the trial judge is convinced by his examination of the facts that the judgment would result in a miscarriage of justice, a new trial should be ordered.... We have recognized that the [trial] court has much discretion regarding this determination. However, this court will not hesitate to set aside the ruling of the trial judge in a case of manifest abuse. Lamb, 430 So.2d at 53. In a motion for new trial under either LA.CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1972 or 1973, the trial court may evaluate the evidence without favoring either party; it may draw its own inferences and conclusions; and evaluate witness credibility to determine whether the jury had erred in giving too much credence to an unreliable witness. Smith v. American Indem. Ins. Co., 598 So.2d 486 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d 685 (La.1992). The applicable standard of review in such matter is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Anthony v. Davis Lumber, 629 So.2d 329 (La.1993). As we stated at the outset of this discussion, the trial court did not specify any grounds for its decision to conditionally grant the motion for new trial. In stark contrast to the procedure employed by the trial court, we point out that LA.CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1811(C)(1) mandates that the trial court specify the grounds which support its action. The evident purpose of Article 1811's requirement for specifically stated grounds for the trial court's action on the motion for new trial is to provide a reviewing court with particularized reasons with which to assess the propriety of the motion; to require anything less relegates the reviewing court to speculation. A conditional grant of a new trial is not to be used to give the losing party a second bite at the apple without facts supporting a miscarriage of justice that would otherwise occur. Considering both LA.CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1972 and 1973, and our affirmation of the trial court's JNOV as to the jury's apportionment of fault to Joseph, we neither find peremptory nor discretionary grounds upon which the trial court could have based its conditional grant of a new trial. Accordingly, we conclude that a conditional grant of a new trial on issues on which we have reversed the lower courts would constitute an abuse of discretion and reverse that ruling. Having found that a new trial is not merited, we reinstate the jury's adjudication of 72.4% fault to Stevedore and 14% fault to Broussard. However, because we find that the lower courts properly found on JNOV review that Joseph was not comparatively at fault, we must reallocate the 14% fault which the jury assessed against him. After reviewing the Watson factors, we find that fault should be reallocated 15.5% to Broussard and 84.5% to the Stevedores. [14]