Opinion ID: 1704647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ineffectiveness as to codefendant's confession

Text: In Davis's fourth claim, he alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce Valessa Robinson's statement at trial under section 90.804, Florida Statutes (1999). Davis argues that trial counsel should have established Valessa's unavailability by subpoenaing her and thereby forcing her to invoke her privilege against self-incrimination. Davis claims that this failure to establish her unavailability constituted ineffective assistance under Strickland. As stated above, the elements of ineffective assistance under Strickland are deficiency and prejudice. The postconviction court denied this claim. The court began by noting Traina's testimony that he spoke to Valessa's attorney, who stated that if Valessa did testify it certainly wouldn't be something that would be consistent with [Davis's] defense. It would be adverse to Adam Davis. Postconviction Order at 21. Traina testified that based on these statements, he concluded Valessa either would not testify if subpoenaed or, if she did, her testimony would be harmful to Davis. The postconviction court also noted that Traina stated that he could not have admitted Valessa's statement because Traina did not have the corroborating evidence that section 90.804(2)(c) required. See § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999) (A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement.). The postconviction court then concluded: Mr. Traina made a strategic decision not to subpoena Valessa Robinson to testify at [Davis's] trial and that decision was reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, trial counsel testified that he had no corroborative information to have Valessa Robinson's statement admitted into evidence, which Florida Statutes Section 90.804(2)(c) requires. Thus, trial counsel's decision did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Postconviction Order at 22. We affirm the postconviction court. Davis's argument in his instant brief is exclusively that counsel should have established Valessa's unavailability. The trial judge in Davis's original trial did not state or even discuss Valessa's unavailability as a basis for denying Traina's attempt to introduce Valessa's statements through the two officers who took her confession. Thus, Davis's claim is meritless. Additionally, as the postconviction court noted, Traina testified that he had no corroborative evidence with which to introduce Valessa's statement under the provisions Davis now cites. Davis has not alleged that any such corroboration exists. Because Davis has not established what Traina could have done differently to have the evidence admitted, he has not established that Traina was deficient. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of relief on this claim.