Opinion ID: 198585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prisoner's Dock

Text: 30 Moore, relying on this court's decision in Young v. Callahan, 700 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1983), asserts that he was deprived of due process by being required to sit in a prisoner's dock throughout trial even though the dock served no security interest in his case. The Commonwealth argues that Moore may not raise this claim of error because he relies on a rule of criminal procedure not announced until after his conviction became final. Although a defendant generally may not rely on a new rule of criminal procedure, we conclude that the rule announced in Young was not a new rule and that Moore may rely on it to support his claim of error. On the merits, we conclude that the trial court's use of the dock did not result in a deprivation of due process.
31 A defendant alleging constitutional error in a federal habeas proceeding may not generally take advantage of new rules of criminal procedure announced after his conviction has become final. 7 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). However, a case does not announce a new rule of criminal procedure if the rule was dictated by precedent existing when the defendant's conviction became final. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). A rule is dictated by precedent whenever we can say that a state court has acted objectively unreasonably, under existing precedent, in denying the relief the defendant now seeks in federal court. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997). At bottom, . . . the Teague doctrine validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 32 This court first held that use of the prisoner's dock in the absence of security concerns violated due process in 1983, see Young, 700 F.2d at 37, well after Moore's conviction became final in 1979. The district court concluded that the rule announced in Young was not a new rule because it was dictated by precedent existing when Moore's conviction became final. See Moore II, 924 F. Supp. at 1289-91. We agree with the district court's analysis. 33 In 1970, the Supreme Court indicated its approval of using physical restraints to control unruly defendants in criminal trials, but stated that such restraints should only be used as a last resort. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). In 1976, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether compelling a defendant to appear at trial in prison or jail attire violated his due process rights. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that defendants may not be compelled to attend trial in prison or jail clothing because it could impair the presumption of innocence. See id. at 504. The Court recognized that prison or jail attire constantly reminds jurors of the defendant's incarceration and could affect their judgment. See id. at 504-05. In contrast to the use of physical restraints when they serve a legitimate security purpose, the Court recognized that prison or jail attire furthers no essential state policy. See id. at 505. 34 Before Moore's conviction became final in 1979, this court, in dicta, strongly criticized Massachusetts's practice of forcing criminal defendants to sit in a prisoner's dock at trial. See Walker v. Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (1st Cir. 1979). The Walker court noted that confinement in a prisoner's dock was analogous to the compelled use of prison and jail attire condemned in Williams. See id. at 1080. The court stated that [b]ecause confinement in the prisoner dock is unnecessary to accomplish any important state interest and may well dilute the presumption of innocence, the Massachusetts prisoner dock must be considered, as a general matter, to be an unconstitutional practice. 8 Id. at 1081. This court squarely confronted the issue in Young and held that use of the prisoner's dock, in the absence of security concerns and a curative instruction to the jury, violates a defendant's right to due process. See 700 F.2d at 36-37. 35 Based on our review of the legal landscape at the time Moore's conviction became final, we agree with the district court's well-reasoned conclusion that use of the prisoner's dock, absent security concerns, would violate a defendant's right to due process. See Moore II, 924 F. Supp. at 1289-91. In Williams, the Supreme Court recognized the deleterious effect badges of confinement could have on the presumption of innocence and the jury's assessment of the defendant's guilt. See Williams, 425 U.S. at 504-05. As this court recognized in both Walker and Young, the Supreme Court's concerns about the effects of prison and jail attire apply with equal force to defendants compelled to sit in a prisoner's dock during trial. See Young, 700 F.2d at 34-37; Walker, 599 F.2d at 1080-81. As the Young court also recognized, the practice of using prisoner's docks in jury trials was nearly non-existent in other jurisdictions, and ABA Standards, relied upon by the Supreme Court in Williams, advised against using physical restraints in the courtroom. See Young, 700 F.2d at 35-36 & nn.5-6. In response to Moore's direct appeal, the SJC adopted a prospective rule forbidding use of the dock absent security concerns. See Moore I, 393 N.E.2d at 907-08. Although the SJC did not directly address the constitutional issue in Moore I (because Moore did not raise a constitutional objection), it reconsidered the practice of using the prisoner's dock in response to this court's Walker decision. See id. (citing Walker and ABA Standards). Based on our review of the legal landscape at the time Moore's conviction became final, we conclude that Young's prohibition on the use of the prisoner's dock, absent security concerns, did not constitute a new rule because it was compelled by precedent existing at the time Moore's conviction became final. Therefore, Moore may rely on this rule to support his claim of error.
36 After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court's use the prisoner's dock did not result in a deprivation of due process. 9 First, we note that the trial court was clearly concerned about security when it considered Moore's request to sit at counsel's table. See Moore I, 393 N.E.2d at 906, 908; cf. Young, 700 F.2d at 35 (Unlike in Bumpus or in Moore, there is no evidence here that the trial court was concerned over security.). In response to counsel's request that Moore be allowed to sit at counsel's table in lieu of the dock, the judge said, 'I will make some inquiry from the sheriff to see, because the Sheriff has, of course, the responsibility of security, so I will make some inquiry with reference to your request to have him sit next to you. That depends on security.' Moore I, 393 N.E.2d at 906. Although the judge did not state on the record the reasons he ultimately denied Moore's request to sit at counsel's table, he clearly articulated security concerns and indicated that he would base his decision on those concerns. Furthermore, the court also complied with Young's requirement that a curative instruction be given to help alleviate the potential prejudicial effects of the dock. See Trial Tr. at 577. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that Moore's placement in the dock did not result in a deprivation of due process. 37 Even if we were to conclude that the trial court's use of the prisoner's dock violated due process, we would agree with the district court's well-reasoned conclusion that the error was harmless. See Moore II, 924 F. Supp. at 1294-95. 38 As the district court properly recognized, the evidence presented at trial of Moore's guilt was highly compelling. See id. at 1292 (recounting the substantial evidence of Moore's guilt). Five independent witnesses testified that Moore admitted to killing Rimer. Moore had a motive for killing Rimer, and the physical and circumstantial evidence placed Moore at the crime scene. Moore testified at trial, and we agree with the district court's conclusion that the jury's impression of Moore was more likely the result of his testimony and the government's evidence, rather than speculation about his placement in the dock. Under these circumstances, we conclude that even if the trial court's use of the prisoner's dock did deprive Moore of due process, that error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict and, thus, was harmless.