Opinion ID: 1191667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: .Analysis. Motion for a New Trial

Text: We review a district court's order denying a motion for a new trial made on the ground of newly discovered evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir.1992). We invoke that standard of review as we have hundreds of times before, but this case forces us to step back and consider precisely what abuse of discretion means, in the context of a trial court's factual findings, as applied to legal rules. In this case, the district court's analysis of Hinkson's motion for new trial involved an application of fact to lawwhether the facts as they occurred at trial, combined with Hinkson's purported newly discovered evidence, warranted a new trial under controlling law. We review applications of fact to law in one of two ways: if the district court's application of fact to law requires an inquiry that is essentially factual, we review it as if it were a factual finding; if the district court's application of fact to law requires reference to the values that animate legal principles, we review it as if it were a legal finding. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1984). Here, the entirety of the district court's analysis rested on the specific facts as they occurred at trial and the relative factual importance of Hinkson's purported newly discovered evidence. The court's analysis did not rest on the values that animate legal principles, such as the meaning of due diligence or the conceptual basis for granting new trials, but instead was, in all respects, essentially factual. Accordingly, for standard of review purposes, we treat the district court's application of fact to law here exactly the same way as we treat factual findings. The Supreme Court explained the meaning of the abuse of discretion standard in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), where the court stated, A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Id. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447. In other words, the Court defined abuse of discretion review of factual findings in terms of clearly erroneous review, holding that [w]hen an appellate court reviews a district court's factual findings, the abuse-of-discretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable: A court of appeals would be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous. Id. at 400-01, 110 S.Ct. 2447. When considering whether a district court erred in applying law to facts, we look to the substance of the issue on review to determine if the question is factual or legal. If application of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquiry that is `essentially factual,'one that is founded `on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct,'the concerns of judicial administration will favor the district court, and the district court's determination should be classified as one of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202 (quoting Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960) (internal citation omitted)). This category includes questions such as motive, intent, and negligence. See id. at 1203-04. If, on the other hand, the question requires us to consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and law and to exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles, then the concerns of judicial administration will favor the appellate court, and the question should be classified as one of law and reviewed de novo. Id. at 1202. This category includes questions such as whether defendants' conduct constituted a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, and questions that implicate constitutional rights. Id. When reviewing factual findings, the Supreme Court has held that a finding is `clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). The U.S. Gypsum Co. definition of clearly erroneous review permits an appellate court to find a trial court's factual determination is clearly erroneousregardless whether there is some record evidence on which the trial court grounded that determinationif the court of appeals decides, definitely and firmly, that the trial court made a mistake. The Court has repeatedly affirmed the U.S. Gypsum Co. explanation of the clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (noting that under the clear error standard of review, a reviewing court must ask `whether, on the entire evidence,' it is `left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed'). The year after U.S. Gypsum Co., however, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949), that a trial court's choice between two permissible views of the weight of evidence is not `clearly erroneous' where the evidence would support a conclusion either way. This contrasts with the notion expressed in U.S. Gypsum Co. that a reviewing court may reverse as clearly erroneous a trial court's factual findings whenever the reviewing court develops a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. Yet, as with the U.S. Gypsum Co. explanation of clearly erroneous review, the Supreme Court has also repeatedly affirmed the Yellow Cab Co. definition of clearly erroneous review. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 400-401, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990) (Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.). Because the Supreme Court has maintained both the Yellow Cab Co. and U.S. Gypsum Co. definitions of clearly erroneous review, our court currently holds that [a] district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law, rests its decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when we are left with `a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.' United States v. 4.85 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Lincoln County, Mont., 546 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir.2008). This present standard, particularly given the final clause, is so broad as to provide us with little effective direction as to when we can exercise our power to reverse a district court's factual finding. Despite the wide latitude seemingly provided to appellate courts by U.S. Gypsum Co. 's definite and firm conviction definition of clear error, we know from Yellow Cab Co. and its progeny that our review of a factual finding may not look to what we would have done had we been in the trial court's place in the first instance, because that review would be de novo and without deference. Rather, the scope of our review limits us to determining whether the trial court reached a decision that falls within any of the permissible choices the court could have made. In other words, the Supreme Court's precedent convinces us that any definite and firm conviction of the reviewing court must still include some measure of deference to the trial court's factual determinations. This principle is illustrated in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). In Anderson, the trial court had made a series of factual findings from which it concluded the female candidate for Recreation Director was skipped over for the job due to her gender, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, after giving close scrutiny of the record, Anderson, 470 U.S. at 571, 105 S.Ct. 1504, made findings contrary to those of the trial court: the court of appeals found that the female candidate was not, in fact, the most qualified candidate, and that, according to its own weighing of the evidence, the selection committee had not been biased against the candidate because she was a woman. Thus, the appellate court held the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, and reversed. Considering the analyses of both the trial court and the appellate court, the Supreme Court concluded that [e]ach has support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record and neither was illogical or implausible. Id. at 577, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Because all the reasons for appellate court deference to trial court factual findings frame the proper issue as whether the trial court 's findingsnot the appellate court'swere clearly erroneous, the Court held the court of appeals had erred in concluding the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous; the appellate court's contrary findings were just as much a permissible view of the evidence as the trial court's. See id. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Thus, in Anderson, the Court held a trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous even though the court of appeals had developed a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, id. at 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, because the trial court's permissible findings were not illogical or implausible and had support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. Id. at 577, 105 S.Ct. 1504. It follows that even when a court of appeals determines a trial court's findings are permissible ( Yellow Cab Co. ) or not a mistake ( U.S. Gypsum Co. ), the court of appeals must reverse if the district court's determination is illogical or implausible or lacks support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record. In sum, this analysis leads us to conclude that, by way of the Anderson case, we can create an objective abuse of discretion test that brings the Yellow Cab Co. and U.S. Gypsum Co. lines of cases together.