Opinion ID: 1952625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority to Entertain Appeal

Text: All of the parties to this appeal urge us to reach the issue of the Board's authority to adopt the dynamic status quo doctrine. Before we can reach this issue, however, we must first determine whether the Superior Court had the authority to entertain the appeal. Section 968(5)(F) provides that parties may appeal a Board decision to the Superior Court provided they file a complaint within 15 days of the date of issuance of the decision. The appellants argue that the Employers' untimely filing of the petition for review deprived the court of the power to entertain the appeal. The appellants further argue that the court lacked authority to grant the Employers' motion for enlargement of time pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 6(b). We agree. In Reed v. Halperin, 393 A.2d 160, 162 (Me.1978), we held that statutory periods of appeal are not subject to a court-ordered enlargement of time. See also Brown v. State, Dep't of Manpower Affairs, 426 A.2d 880, 887-888 (Me.1981) (judicial enlargement of a statutorily provided period of appeal is not possible). If a party does not file an appeal within the statutory period, the Superior Court has no legal power to entertain the appeal. The Employers raise four arguments to overcome this deficiency, none of which is convincing. They first argue that the Superior Court acted within its discretion by granting the one-day extension. They assert that the court properly found that their counsel's reliance on the post office was excusable neglect, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 6(b). In light of Reed and Brown, this argument has no merit. The Employers then argue that the Superior Court could have concluded that the Board's decision was actually issued on September 14, the day on which the Board mailed a corrected copy to the parties. The Employers maintain that [i]t would be unfair to litigants to measure an appeal period from the date that an incomplete administrative decision was issued, especially when the agency subsequently issues a complete and conforming decision. The Employers cannot escape the fact that the front page of the original decision clearly stated that it was issued on September 11, 1992. The fact that the Board later filled in the blank line with information that had already been made available should not affect when the statutory appeal period begins to run. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in City of Newark v. Fischer, 3 N.J. 488, 70 A.2d 733, 735 (1950): The general rule is that where a judgment is amended in a material and substantial respect the time within which an appeal from such determination may be taken begins to run from the date of the amendment, but where an amendment relates solely to the correction of a clerical or formal error in a judgment it does not toll the time for appeal. See also 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 544 (1962) (where an amendment relates solely to the correction of a clerical or a formal error in the judgment, the appeal time is not extended but is computed from the date of the original judgment); cf. Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169, 174 (Me.1971) (where the trial court's amended judgment does not affect the original judgment, the appeal period runs from the entry of the original judgment). The Employers further argue that the fifteen-day time period could run from the date of service, as opposed to the date of issuance. See Town of Old Orchard Beach v. Old Orchard Beach Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 461 A.2d 1054, 1055-1056 (Me.1983) (time period for appealing Board decisions runs from the date of service and, if service is by mail, three days is added to the time period pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 6(d)). As the Employers acknowledge, however, section 968(5)(F) has been amended since the Old Orchard Beach decision. The prior version provided that a complaint must be filed within 15 days of the effective date of the decision, but did not define effective date. We concluded that effective date meant the date of service. Id. at 1055-1056. The current version of section 968(5)(F) provides that the complaint must be filed within 15 days of the date of issuance of the decision, thus rendering Old Orchard Beach inapposite to the present case. The three-day extension for mailing provided for in M.R.Civ.P. 6(d) also does not apply, since the Employers were required to file their appeal from the date of issuance, not the date of service. Finally, the Employers argue that the Superior Court could have ordered that the Petition be deemed accepted by the Clerk's office on September 28, 1992. Under this analysis, the court could have made a finding of fact that, in light of the service standards of the post office, the petition was timely filed with the clerk's office. If the court had indeed made such a finding, it would be adopting a rule that mailing a pleading reasonably prior to the deadline is the equivalent of filing it in the clerk's office. Such a finding would contradict section 968(5)(F), which clearly provides that the petition for review must be filed within fifteen days of the Board's decision. If the Legislature had intended for mailing reasonably in advance of the deadline to suffice, it could have so provided. Although the Employers and their counsel may have reasonably believed that the petition would be timely filed, it was one day late. Even if this late filing resulted from excusable neglect, the result is the same. The Superior Court had no authority to grant a one-day extension pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 6(b), nor did it have the authority over the Employers' appeal. Its judgment reversing the Board's decision must therefore be vacated. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to dismiss the appeal. All concurring.