Opinion ID: 1275251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Deletion of Instructions on Certain Mitigating Factors.

Text: (30a) Defendant argues reversal is required under the rule of Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302, 319-328 [106 L.Ed.2d 256, 276-284, 109 S.Ct. 2934] ( Penry ), because the trial court deleted from the penalty phase instructions any reference to certain mitigating factors it considered inapplicable. Thus, the jury was not instructed it could consider the presence of an extreme emotional disturbance (§ 190.3, factor (d)), participation by the victim in the homicidal conduct (§ 190.3, factor (e)), the defendant's belief in a moral justification for his conduct (§ 190.3, factor (f)), the presence of extreme duress (§ 190.3, factor (g)), or the effects of alcohol or mental disease on the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct (§ 190.3, factor (h)). Defendant does not argue he had a right to have the jury instructed on factors wholly unsupported by the evidence; we need consider, therefore, only whether he was improperly refused instruction on a factor on which evidence was introduced and, if so, the consequences of that denial. (See People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932-933 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676] [trial court is not required to instruct sua sponte on factors not applicable on the record of the case].) The evidence showed defendant had consumed an unspecified number of alcoholic beverages during the roughly 12 hours preceding his arrest, and his blood-alcohol level measured .10 percent some 3 hours after his arrest. As the trial court itself noted in denying the requested instruction on section 190.3, factor (h), There was some evidence at the guilt phase indicating that the defendant had been drinking and had a blood alcohol level that would be consistent with being under the influence for drunk driving cases. The trial court explained it would not instruct on factor (h) because [t]here was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to indicate that it impaired his capacity either to uphold any requisite intent or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, and there were given no diminished capacity instructions at that phase of the trial, and I don't feel that they are, that there is any sufficient evidence to justify such a finding in this phase of the trial. In Penry, supra, 492 U.S. 302 [106 L.Ed.2d 256, 109 S.Ct. 2934], evidence in the record showed that the defendant, who was convicted of murder and rape, was mildly mentally retarded. The high court concluded that while execution of a mentally retarded person is not per se unconstitutional, the defendant's sentence was infirm because state sentencing procedures were inadequate to assure the defendant's jury had considered all mitigating evidence. Although the jury had heard evidence of defendant's retardation, its sentence had been determined by its answers to three judicial inquiries, none of which concerned the defendant's mental capacity or personal history. In the absence of instructions directing the jury to consider and give effect to all of the evidence relating to the defendant's background and mental deficiencies, the high court remanded for resentencing to avoid the `risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.' [Citations.] ( Penry, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 328 [106 L.Ed.2d at p. 284, 109 S.Ct. 2934].) (31) Section 190.3 states that [i]n determining the penalty the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant, and then proceeds to list the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. The statute impliedly requires instruction on any factor applicable on the record of the case, and we have noted the better practice is for a court to instruct on all the statutory penalty factors. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 932.) Such an instruction `ensures that the jury is aware of the complete range of factors that the state considers relevant to the penalty determination. With that knowledge the jury is better able to place the individual defendant's conduct in perspective, and thus its exercise of discretion to select the appropriate penalty is further channeled and directed as required by the Eighth Amendment.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) For a particular sentencing factor, such as section 190.3, factor (h), to apply on the record of the case, the evidence supporting it need not suffice to establish a complete defense to the crime; rather, there need be in the record only some evidence relevant to the factor. The jury would not be called upon to decide penalty, and thus consider sentencing factors, unless it had first returned a verdict of guilt on a murder charge. Applicability of the statutory sentencing factors accordingly cannot be tested by the same standard as that governing the trial court's obligation to instruct on affirmative defenses. (30b) Here, as noted, the record contained evidence, in the form of the blood-alcohol test results, showing defendant was legally intoxicated at the time of the crime. Defendant was entitled to have the jury consider that evidence and to have the exercise of its sentencing discretion informed by section 190.3, factor (h). The trial court erred in refusing so to instruct the jury. We cannot, however, conclude the error was prejudicial. Although the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury to consider the evidence of defendant's intoxication in arriving at its penalty determination, it did instruct the jury that [i]n determining which penalty is to be imposed on the Defendant, you shall consider all the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation and sentence, including, but not limited to, the Defendant's character, background, mental condition and physical condition. Pertinent to that instruction, trial counsel argued to the jury, I ask you to remember the Defendant's physical condition was that of one who had been on his feet in motion, in effect, pulling two shifts, for nearly 24 hours; that he had drunk, that he had not eaten. I don't pretend nor suggest to you that he was intoxicated, or that he was drunk, but that he had by legal definition, enough in him to be under the influence of alcohol. Nothing the prosecutor said in closing contradicted defense counsel's argument. Thus, unlike in Penry, the jury was not precluded from considering the evidence of defendant's consumption of alcohol prior to the offense if it found such evidence to be relevant. Defendant argues, similarly, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on section 190.3, factor (d), whether the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. As discussed above in connection with the failure to instruct on heat of passion as lessening the degree of the crime, however, the record simply contained no evidence (as distinct from the absence of evidence of motive) from which the jury could have found such emotional disturbance; consequently, while the better practice would have been to instruct on all sentencing factors, the failure to instruct on factor (d) was not error in this case. [13]