Opinion ID: 878517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Good Samaritan Argument

Text: In instruction no. 14, the jury was told by the District Court that it was no defense to the plaintiff's claim that the defendant Dr. Alvord was rendering emergency care or assistance without compensation to Annabelle Kuhnke. That instruction became the law of the case. The jury was not to consider that Dr. Alvord was not Annabelle's regular doctor, that he was simply helping out another doctor, and that he would receive no compensation for his effort. In spite of the court's instruction, the following argument occurred: MR. WELLCOME: There has been an interest in the case by the medical community in Bozeman because what it would indicate is if you find a verdict against Dr. Alvord, then no physician in the community of Bozeman is going to feel that he can at any time, get involved in a situation where somebody asked him to help out and where somebody says, `Please come in and help this particular patient. I know it's not your patient, I know you have no responsibility to do that, but, I really need your assistance. Will you help?' And of course, there is a medical ethic too, that they take that requires that type of help, but, look at it, they're really caught between the proverbial rock and a hard spot. MR. LUVERA: Excuse me, Your Honor, I thought you defined the law for the Jury, I thought that that's what this  THE COURT: I did and I think  MR. LUVERA: I object. THE COURT: I can understand that, but, I'm going to let him argue that. MR. WELLCOME: That is a critical point in this case, ladies and gentlemen, there is no doubt about it. Because if you award and arrive at a verdict contrary to Dr. Alvord in this case, then you say to him and you say to the medical community, `Don't get involved in this type situation because you'll be dragged along by the plaintiff, and dragged along by your fellow practitioners, and dragged along by the hospital in which you practice your profession.' It simply should not  it shouldn't happen under the facts and circumstances of this particular case. Plaintiff moved the District Court for a new trial following the adverse verdict. The District Court denied the same. In Bliss v. Wolcott (1910), 40 Mont. 491, 107 P. 423, the District Court granted a new trial and we affirmed because defense counsel in his argument to the jury in summation argued matters that were outside of the record and had been withdrawn from the jury by the court. In Bliss, we stated: A party is entitled to have a trial upon the evidence properly in the case; and while it is true, as counsel for defendant argue, that if the court had persisted in sending the case to the jury upon the theory upon which the instructions were formulated, the plaintiff would have had no cause of complaint, yet, in overruling the objection of counsel for plaintiff and permitting opposing counsel to call the attention of the jury to the excluded evidence, as furnishing a reason why plaintiff should not recover, it allowed the jury to consider evidence not before them. The behavior of counsel was indefensible. The court should not have permitted it. The motion for a new trial was properly granted. 40 Mont. at 496-97, 107 P. at 425. Here the cause comes to us on the denial of the motion for a new trial by the district judge. The stance on the law is, however, the same. In the light of the court's instruction, the argument was indefensible.