Opinion ID: 147525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel's performance was deficient

Text: Under the constitutional standard we employ when reviewing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we must first determine whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and so was constitutionally deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel has an obligation to perform a thorough investigation of the defendant's background or make a reasonable decision that such investigation is unnecessary. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). This obligation exists even if the defendant is reluctant to cooperate or disclose mitigating evidence. See Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir.2005). Phillips's counsel, Kerry O'Brien and Michael Edminister, were alerted to the history of abuse in the Phillips home by two red flags: first, the existence of Summit County Child Services Bureau (CSB) records beyond the five files that Edminister reviewed and described in his notes as very important for mitigation purposes, and second, the knowledge that CSB had come to the Phillips home to investigate an allegation that Phillips's father, William Sr., was sexually abusing Tanya, Phillips's sister. Nonetheless, counsel failed to learn what the CSB files, other than the five to which they were given access, contained or to provide any of the information in those files to Dr. Brown, the psychologist charged with examining Phillips. In fact, Edminister testified that he was completely unaware of any familial violence or that the CSB records indicated a long history of complaints and allegations of neglect, abuse, and assault in the Phillips household. (JA Vol. 10 at 5610.) Edminister explained that he did not move the trial court to order CSB to provide him with full access to the records because he thought there was no chance of such a motion being granted: In his words, he had never heard of that before and so I didn't even bother. (JA Vol. 10 at 5604.) His lack of knowledge may have been due to his never previously having worked on the mitigation phase of a trial; certainly, Phillips's post-conviction counsel do not appear to have had difficulty in obtaining an order requiring CSB to disclose the records. This failure to undertake a full investigation of the CSB records, provide their contents to the psychologist who examined Phillips, and follow the new leads that the files would have generated amounts to constitutionally deficient performance. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (holding that counsel were ineffective because they failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (stating that counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary and that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation); Johnson v. Bagley, 544 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir.2008) (finding deficient performance where counsel failed to read files obtained from a state agency that would have revealed a different mitigation strategy); Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 478 (6th Cir.2008) (finding deficient performance where counsel failed to investigate and locate files revealing the petitioner's unstable and abusive home environment or to present such files to the examining psychologist). As Edminister himself acknowledged, I suspect that I may have failed [Phillips] in not being more forceful in an attempt to obtain copies of all of these documents. (JA Vol. 10 at 5617.) It was not reasonable for counsel to rest their conclusion that no abuse had occurred on the assurances of Phillips's parents, as the abusers themselves cannot be assumed to be forthcoming about their own past crimes; nor did Phillips's own reticence excuse counsel from performing an independent investigation. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (No reasonable lawyer would forgo examination of the file thinking he could do as well by asking the defendant or family relations whether they recalled anything helpful or damaging contained in the file.); Harries, 417 F.3d at 638 (finding that counsel's failure to follow leads indicating a troubled childhood was deficient and that counsel has a duty to pursue such investigation even if the defendant refuses to cooperate); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 449-50 (6th Cir.2001) ([D]efendant's resistance to disclosure of information does not excuse counsel's duty to independently investigate.). O'Brien and Edminister's admission that they distrusted Phillips further demonstrates the unreasonableness of accepting his assurancesdespite their awareness of prior CSB involvement with the Phillips familythat no abuse had occurred. According to the ABA Guidelines on death-penalty representation, which the Supreme Court has used in determining whether penalty-phase counsel's investigation of a defendant's background was deficient, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, defense counsel should consider introducing evidence `that would be explanatory of the offense(s) for which the client is being sentenced,' as well as that which would provide insights `into the client's mental and/or emotional state and life history that may explain or lessen the client's culpability for the underlying offenses.' Johnson, 544 F.3d at 599 (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.11(F) (rev. ed.2003)). The commentary to the ABA Guidelines charges counsel with reviewing records from government agencies that `can contain a wealth of mitigating evidence, documenting or providing clues to childhood abuse,' such that `[r]ecords should be requested concerning not only the client, but also his parents, grandparents, siblings, and children.' See Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 487 n. 2 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting ABA Guideline 10.7 Commentary at 80-83). If Phillips's counsel had met these professional standards, they would have learned of the wealth of mitigating evidence in the CSB records, which in turn would have enabled them to provide Dr. Brownand the jurywith a true picture of the violent, abusive, and neglectful environment in which Phillips spent his life. Not only did counsel fail to obtain these files or provide them to Dr. Brown, Edminister did not remember even talking to Dr. Brown until he walked into the courtroom. (JA Vol. 10 at 5617.) When Edminister was asked whether, as the person leading the charge on mitigation, it was possible for him to put together an effective case without working hand in hand with Dr. Brown, Edminister replied: Probably not. (JA Vol. 10 at 5617.) Nor, given that he delegated most of the responsibility for gathering records to a private investigatorone who, because of counsel's limited financial resources, had no experience in mitigation-related investigationcould Edminister have prepared an effective mitigation case without whatever evidence the investigator uncovered. Yet the private investigator did not begin attempting to develop information in support of mitigation until six days prior to jury selection in the guilt phase of Phillips's trial. Without such information, Phillips's counsel could not have begun preparing significant portions of their mitigation case until during or after the guilt phase. This untimeliness further supports the conclusion that counsel's performance was deficient. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (finding it significant in holding counsel's performance deficient that counsel did not begin to prepare for [the sentencing] phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (concluding that counsel's failure to make any significant preparations for the sentencing phase until after the conclusion of the guilt phase . . . was objectively unreasonable). When he did set about preparing a mitigation case, Edminister explained that he was at a loss as to what strategy he could pursue: In this kid's case, we had absolutely nothing to work with, nothing. I mean, you know, everybody we talked to said . . . what a nice boy he was. [The crime] was so completely totally out of character. So then how do you develop mitigation . . .? (JA Vol. 10 at 5614.) As Edminister stated regarding his decision to call Phillips's father to testify at the penalty phase, we were grasping, I was grasping at straws in an attempt to try and pull together any live bodies that could testify and say something nice aboutsay something at all about him. . . . (JA Vol. 10 at 5618.) Significantly, Edminister himself did not find his mitigation strategy plausible: You tell me how you explain to your client that . . . I don't believe you're telling the truth. I don't think you snapped. I think you are some underlying psychotic and we need to develop that in some way. (JA Vol. 10 at 5616.) Of course, as revealed by habeas counsel and described above, there was a wealth of material available for mitigation that Edminister would have discovered had he pursued the leads of which he already was aware. In light of Edminister's belief that the true explanation for Phillips's crime lay in Phillips's psychological condition, no reasonable counsel in Edminister's position would have abandoned the investigation at the point he did or failed to have a single conversation with Dr. Brown. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (explaining that, in assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the court considers whether the quantum of evidence known to counsel should have led to further investigation). The state court, in concluding that counsel's performance was not deficient, relied on the fact that trial counsel presented several witnesses attesting to Phillips's good character and called Dr. Brown to testify about Phillips's character deficiencies. For three reasons, this conclusion was an objectively unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. First, Phillips's counsel could not have made a reasonable strategic decision not to introduce evidence of Phillips's abusive childhood environment because they failed to learn of it. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 528, 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Williams, 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, even had counsel learned of the evidence, there would have been no strategic benefit to choosing not to present it. Informing the jury of the disadvantages Phillips faced in his everyday life only could have increased the effect of the positive pieces of mitigation evidence, such as the fact that Phillips had not used drugs and the testimony that Phillips was a helpful child. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (reasoning that counsel's failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that did speak in [the defendant's] favor was not justified by a tactical decision to focus on [his] voluntary confession). Third, the state court was objectively unreasonable in finding that the mitigation evidence that counsel failed to discover would have provided only an additional or alternative mitigation strategy. In making this conclusion, the state appeals court ignored the patent absurdity of counsel's attempt to persuade the jury that Phillips was a kind person who cared deeply for Ms. Evans' children, State v. Phillips, No. 20692, 2002 WL 274637, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002), despite the fact that the jury had just convicted him of raping and murdering one of those children. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.) (emphasis added); see also Johnson, 544 F.3d at 603 (finding prejudice where competent counsel would have discovered evidence that would have altered considerably the mitigation theory presented to the jury). The mitigation evidence that counsel failed to discover would have given rise to a viable mitigation theory where none otherwise existed. Yet the state court inexplicably and unreasonably opined that such evidence may actually have been less persuasive. Id. This conclusion cannot stand in light of the considerations above. In sum, the state court's determination that Phillips's representation was constitutionally adequate unreasonably applies federal law as set forth by the Supreme Court.