Opinion ID: 4543349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Detention and Reasonable Suspicion

Text: Shelton first argues he was detained without reasonable suspicion and that Officer Estrada’s subsequent discovery of the gun was therefore the result of a Fourth Amendment violation. A defendant has the burden to prove whether and when a seizure has occurred. United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th 2 We note the district court stated that in assessing Shelton’s motion to suppress, it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. As we recently explained in United States v. Goebel, 959 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2020), that is not the applicable standard. “On a motion to suppress, the district court must assess the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to give to the evidence presented; the inferences the district court draws from that evidence and testimony are entirely within its discretion.” Id. at 1265. In this case, the district court’s incorrect recitation of the applicable standard has no bearing on the appeal because Shelton does not dispute any of the district court’s factual findings. -5- Cir. 1994). “[T]he crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). Shelton contends he was detained when Officer Estrada pulled up behind Shelton’s car and blocked the driveway. But we need not resolve this question because Officer Estrada had reasonable suspicion to investigate the suspicious behavior he encountered. To justify a detention, an officer must point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Reasonableness is determined “in light of common sense and ordinary human experience.” United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997). The totality of the circumstances must be considered, and neither the officer nor the court need “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). We conclude specific and articulable facts were present which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, constituted reasonable suspicion. Officer Estrada observed several people, at midnight, holding -6- flashlights and standing around a car parked in a driveway to a residence. It was rational to infer from those facts that a burglary was in progress. This inference was further supported by the fact that Officer Estrada knew the neighborhood to be a “high crime area.” 3 When the Officer approached the vehicle, Shelton and the two passengers started to walk away. Then, Shelton and one of the passengers began to flee after the Officer asked them to return. The passenger complied but Shelton fled into the back yard as Officer Estrada gave chase. Given these circumstances, Officer Estrada’s suspicion of a burglary in progress was reasonable in light of common sense and ordinary human experience. It was objectively reasonable for a police officer to investigate the situation and resolve his suspicions, thus justifying a brief detention.