Opinion ID: 8598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Law Claims--Ethridge

Text: 49 Ethridge argues that, as a matter of law, Cantu has not alleged acts that constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law, irrespective of whether his acts were authorized by UT-PA. Ethridge essentially argues that the district court's denial of qualified immunity on grounds that the alleged conduct was not in the scope of his authority is in error. The threshold question, which was not addressed, is whether, under the facts as alleged, Ethridge committed such a tort at all. This question is a purely legal one, and we consequently have appellate jurisdiction to consider it in the context of a qualified immunity appeal under any reasonable reading of Johnson. If Cantu has wholly failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Ethridge is necessarily entitled to official immunity under state law, and the court need not decide the second question under Texas official immunity law--whether he, as a government official, is entitled to immunity from suit arising from performance of [his] (1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as [he was] (3) acting within the scope of [his] authority. City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d at 653. 50 It is clear to us that Cantu's allegations against Ethridge do not amount to a tort under Texas law, and, consequently, we hold that, as a matter of law, Ethridge is entitled to qualified immunity. To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law, the plaintiff must establish the following four elements: (1) that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) that the conduct was 'extreme and outrageous'; (3) that the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe. Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 306 (quoting Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 51 Liability [for outrageous conduct] has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.... Generally, the case is one in which a recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would lead him to exclaim, Outrageous. 52 Dean, 885 F.2d at 306 (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 46, Comment d (1965)). 53 Cantu's proffered evidence is that Ethridge embarked on a course of conduct intended to intimidate her, which included the following acts: (1) following her in the hallways; (2) obstructing her passage from a water fountain; (3) showing up in a classroom and positioning himself where Cantu usually sat so that she could not avoid encountering him and (4) repeatedly going in and out of a room where she was taking a make-up exam, which affected her performance. Assuming its veracity, and that the jury fully believed every word of it, this evidence simply could not, as a matter of law, be construed by reasonable jurors as proof of conduct that is beyond all possible bounds of decency, ... atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.... We therefore hold that Ethridge was entitled to state official immunity from Cantu's state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.