Opinion ID: 1698626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bellard v. Biddle caseSingle Act of Malpractice

Text: Bellard v. Biddle, 98-1502 (La.App. 3rd Cir.3/17/99), 734 So.2d 733, the case on which the court of appeal in this case heavily relied to find a continuing tort, involved a single act of malpractice. In Bellard, as in this case, the defendant's negligence consisted of the single act of failing to remove a suture. Although the plaintiff's suit was filed within a year of discovering the suture, the suit was filed more than three years after the act of malpractice and more than three years after the defendant last treated the plaintiff. Adopting a continuing trespass theory, the Third Circuit reasoned that the rubber suture the defendant negligently left in the plaintiff's abdomen served as a continuing trespass analogous to the leaking tanks in South Central Bell and concluded that prescription does not begin to run in the case of a continuing trespass until the offending acts are abated. 98-1502 at p. 4, 734 So.2d at 735. That this was the reasoning on which the Bellard court based its logic is further evidenced by the court's additional comment that [t]he tortious conduct complained of is not only an affirmative act, but also a continuing omission on the part of Dr. Biddle. Id. Dr. Biddle's omissions, according to the plaintiffs allegations, were his failure to look for, detect, and remove the suture. That reasoning tracks the original termination of treatment rule, which theorized that the continuing injury resulting from a single act of malpractice, such as leaving a sponge inside a patient, was a continuing tort. That theory, as discussed earlier, was superseded by the three-year repose rule, save possibly for the fraudulent concealment exception. When, as in Bellard, supra and in this case, the negligence consists of simply a single identifiable act, applying the rule that prescription runs from the date of the wrongful act is simple, straightforward and equitable, and thus the rationale for invoking a continuing tort type doctrine to enlarge the statutory time frame for bringing a medical malpractice suit is lacking. Louissell & Williams, supra ¶ 13.02[3] at 13-47; E. Scott Hackenberg, Comment, Puttering About in a Small Land: Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5628 and Judicial Responses to the Plight of the Medical Malpractice Victim, 50 La. L.Rev. 815, 822 n. 24 (1990)(suggesting continuing tort theory be adopted for cases in which negligent treatment continues over period of time, yet noting cases involving single surgical procedure present a clear act, omission or neglect; a clear point from which prescription will run.) The reasoning in Bellard is erroneous in three respects. First, it fails to apply the three-year overall limitation on the discovery rule to the single act of malpractice. Second, it applies a theory of continued omissions contrary to our prior jurisprudence limiting that theory to instances of fraudulent concealment. Finally, it departs from our continuing tort jurisprudence requiring for a continuing tort not only continuing damages, but also continuing tortious conduct. We thus overrule Bellard.