Opinion ID: 1881163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Legal Standard and Financial Injury.

Text: ¶ 20. The County also contends that the circuit judge misconstrued the applicable legal standard with respect to financial matters. According to the County's interpretation of this Court's previous decision regarding Quitman County, the County had to show the cost of an effective system of indigent criminal defense and the County's inability to fund such a system. Quitman I, 807 So.2d at 408. The County avers that it met its burden and established that it cannot afford to pay any more than it presently does for indigent defense. In response, the State claims that the County's evidence regarding its financial condition showed that the County had sufficient resources to fund a constitutionally adequate indigent defense system and that the County's obligation to pay for indigent defense in non-capital cases has neither caused the County's present economic troubles nor forced the County to substantially reduce other governmental services. ¶ 21. More specifically, the County alleged in its complaint that Mississippi's current indigent defense system has imposed enormous and unpredictable costs and that the financial resources available to fund schools, hospitals, local law enforcement and the traditional health, safety, and welfare obligations of county government have been substantially reduced. However, Butch Scipper, the Quitman County Chancery Clerk, admitted that the reason for the unpredictable spikes in budgetary outlays was the expense of defending capital casesa potentially ruinous cost that is no longer borne by the counties. This cost was alleviated by the creation of the Office of Post-Conviction Counsel and the Office of Capital Defense Counsel in 2000. [1] On March 21, 2005, Governor Barbour signed into law effective July 1, 2005, Senate Bill 2960, which creates the Office of Indigent Appeals. This newly created office will be responsible for handling appeals for the indigent defendants that have been convicted of noncapital crimes. ¶ 22. The circuit judge also found no evidentiary support for the County's assertion that the cost of providing indigent defense services had led to decreased funding for other essential services. As previously mentioned, the circuit judge found the County's deficit was mainly a result of spending in the area of solid waste, other unfunded mandates, natural disasters, and economic development bonds that were not being repaid. Again, the circuit judge found that there was no testimony that resources to fund schools, hospitals, and local law enforcement were reduced because of indigent defense costs as was alleged in the Complaint. The Court is convinced that indigent defense is neither the cause nor the solution to the county's financial difficulties. ¶ 23. The County claims that the circuit judge disregarded the evidence it presented through the expert testimony which unanimously concluded that a statewide, state-funded system is needed to provide the tools of an effective defense. The County further explains that even if one were to hypothesize a standalone county system that provided adequate defense tools, Mr. Farese's opinion was that it would cost $300,000 to $500,000, 10 to 15 times what Quitman can pay. The County asserts that the circuit judge, in addition to disregarding this evidence, never reached the issue framed by this Court and instead, addressed a different one. The County stated that [u]nder this newly devised test, the county could prevail only if it showed indigent defense was the sole cause of the county's financial problems and that these problems would disappear if the financial burden of indigent defense were lifted. The State rebuts this argument by stating: [o]f course, the County's expert did not explain why a full time public defenders' office in a county with a population of 10,000 would cost more than the full-time office in a county (Jackson County) with more than 130,000 people. But even assuming that the cost estimate is correct, the County's argument ignores a crucial point: The Circuit Court found that Quitman County's system of providing indigent defense services is not providing constitutionally inadequate legal representation, even at the current level of funding. Unless the County was able to show that it was providing inadequate services, the question of its ability to pay thousands of dollars more per year simply does not come into play. ¶ 24. The State correctly points out that the County seems to argue that it put on all the proof it needed when Chancery Clerk Scipper announced that the County cannot afford to pay any more for indigent defense than it already does. However, the County does not mention the testimony and documentary evidence that discussed the County's discretionary spending as well as its spending priorities. The State accurately concludes that [i]f the Quitman County Board of Supervisors made indigent defense a higher priority, the County could find the additional fundseven if that meant less discretionary spending on recreation and similar projects. ¶ 25. Similarly, it was not plausible for the County to maintain that the Legislature is prohibited from imposing financial burdens on counties because it is well established that each county is an agency or subdivision of the state, created for administration and other public purposes. See State v. Hinds Cty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 635 So.2d 839, 843 (Miss.1994). As this Court held, [t]he revenues of a county are subject to the control of the Legislature, and when the Legislature directs their application to a particular purpose or to the payment of the claims of particular parties, the obligation to so pay is thereby imposed on the county. Jackson Cty. v. Neville, 131 Miss. 599, 95 So. 626, 629 (1923). ¶ 26. The circuit judge found insufficient evidence that the County's public defenders are providing ineffective assistance on a regular basis, and the judge also determined that the County could afford to spend more if it chose to and the spending on indigent defense was not the cause of the deficit. The circuit judge's findings are not askew from the applicable standard with which this Court reviews this issue. Therefore, this issue is without merit. ¶ 27. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court finds that the circuit judge did not apply the wrong legal standard in concluding that the County did not prove financial injury.