Opinion ID: 1953720
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amended Writ

Text: The final issue on appeal is whether the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by denying the Follonis' motion to amend their writ and add experts. The Follonis moved to add a claim that Exeter Hospital was negligent under the doctrine of respondeat superior because a radiologist at Exeter Hospital misinterpreted the results of a test done on Helen Folloni. Dent argues that all parties had, throughout the course of the litigation, missed virtually every court or rule-imposed deadline, that all parties were in a collective state of unreadiness for trial, and that the trial court's strict ruling was thus unfair and prejudicial to the Follonis. Exeter Hospital argues that the trial court's ruling was proper, particularly because the amendment would have required additional discovery regarding the claim and the expert witnesses. Under RSA 514:9 (2007), a trial court may permit a substantive amendment to pleadings in any stage of the proceedings, upon such terms as the court shall deem just and reasonable, when it shall appear to the court that it is necessary for the prevention of injustice. . . . Accordingly, liberal amendment of pleadings is permitted unless the changes would surprise the opposing party, introduce an entirely new cause of action, or call for substantially different evidence. Bel Air Assocs. v. N.H. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 154 N.H. 228, 236, 910 A.2d 1232 (2006). Although amendment of pleadings is liberally permitted, the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. We will not overturn that decision unless it is an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. In its order, the trial court denied the Follonis' motion to amend and add experts because, inter alia, they appeared to be capitalizing on a continuance that the trial court granted due to a medical emergency experienced by Lawrence Folloni. The trial court had postponed the May 9, 2005 trial date to June 6, 2005, because of this medical emergency. The court then postponed the trial to October, because the defendants' medical experts could not make the June 6 date. On June 8, the Follonis filed their motion to amend and add experts. In its ruling on the motion, the trial court stated, [T]he request . . . is able to be made only because of the fortuity of the plaintiff's illness which caused the May trial to be continued. The trial court found that allowing the amendment would require significant new evidence and, given that the request came after the close of discovery, would cause prejudice to the defendants. It is clear that deposing multiple expert witnesses would require not only substantially new evidence, but also significantly more discovery. The trial court had closed discovery by the date of the request. Dent argues that discovery was not closed by June 6; however, she cites no evidence to support this assertion. Given the broad discretion that trial courts enjoy in the management and supervision of pretrial discovery, see Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A & T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29, 39-41, 917 A.2d 1221, 1232 (2007), we see no reason to rule that the trial court erred by holding to its discovery deadline. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Follonis' motion. Affirmed.