Opinion ID: 2069831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective assistance of counsel first 23-110 motion

Text: For purposes of appellate review, the trial court's determination whether counsel was ineffective presents a mixed question of law and fact. Frederick v. United States, 741 A.2d 427, 436 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 614 A.2d 25, 30 (D.C.1992)). Under D.C.Code § 17-305, we must accept the trial court's factual findings unless they lack evidentiary support in the record. See Frederick, 741 A.2d at 436. The trial court's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See id. at 437. To establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard, Dobson must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that [he] suffered prejudice. Id. Deficient performance requires a showing that trial counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment. Id. (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Judicial scrutiny of trial counsel's performance is deferential, and we will not readily second-guess trial counsel's tactical decisions. Frederick, 741 A.2d at 437. To show prejudice, Dobson must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. In this case, the trial court ruled that Lipps's decision not to put on the alibi witnesses was a tactical one and that his action did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of Strickland. The court observed: What we have here, as I said, is an attorney who heard testimony that was so weak he just did not want to go forward and did not feel the need to. He discussed it with his client. They disagreed. And I am going to but  and I want to make this clear so that the findings  so that if this issue goes up, that it is clear to the Court of Appeals what I am saying. I am ruling that [Dobson] saying to his lawyer, I don't like your tactic, when it doesn't involve absolute constitutional issues, like [the] right to testify, et cetera, does not create automatically without more a Strickland situation. Later, the trial judge stated, I am not finding that [Lipps's] performance was defective. In Edwards v. United States, 767 A.2d 241, 246 (D.C.2001), this court considered the same issue presented here: whether counsel was constitutionally deficient in promising in opening statement to present certain evidence and then failing to present the witnesses who would have supplied that evidence. Edwards had been convicted of second-degree murder of his infant daughter and other crimes. He claimed that his counsel was deficient in that he promised to put on evidence of the mental condition of his wife, Stacy, who he alleged was responsible for his infant daughter's death, and then failed to call experts to present the evidence. [12] Id. We affirmed, holding that Edwards's trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, because counsel's course of action was a reasonable tactical choice, and that Edwards did not demonstrate prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to present the evidence he had promised. Edwards, 767 A.2d at 251. In so doing, we rejected a per se rule that unfulfilled promises in the opening statement constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that the determination whether counsel made a reasonable tactical choice under these circumstances is necessarily fact-based. Id. at 248. We observed: That determination depends upon such factors as [1] the nature and extent of the promises made in opening statement, [2] any strategic justifications for the subsequent decision not to produce the evidence, [3] the explanation provided the jury for the failure to produce the evidence, [4] the presentation of other evidence supporting the promised theory, and generally, [5] the impact upon the defense at trial and upon the jury. Id. Because we are reviewing an ineffective assistance claim based on an unfulfilled promise, I will address the factors set forth in Edwards. The first Edwards factor requires consideration of the nature and extent of Lipps's promise in opening statement. Assuming the witnesses are credible, an alibi is a compelling defense involving impossibility of [the] accused's presence at the scene of the offense at the time of its commission. Gethers v. United States, 556 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C.1989) (quoting Greenhow v. United States, 490 A.2d 1130, 1134 (D.C.1985)). Lipps's introduction of the alibi defense was an important portion of the opening argument, planting a seed in the jurors' minds that Dobson could not have robbed Sawyer if he was not in Washington, D.C., on the night of the robbery. In addition, in his October 31, 1980, post-trial memorandum he indicated that he announced quite fully in opening statement that we would introduce an alibi defense, and spelled it out in some detail. Thus, the nature and extent of the introduction of the alibi was substantial. Therefore, I conclude that this factor and the fourth factor  lack of other evidence supporting the alibi theory  operate in Dobson's favor. Those factors are not determinative, however, and although the same two factors also were present in Edwards, they were not sufficiently weighty by themselves to tip the balance in favor of a finding that counsel was constitutionally ineffective. More significant is the second Edwards factor which, in my view, heavily cuts against Dobson. [13] Lipps explained that the government's identification testimony was weaker than expected because Sawyer  who identified Dobson at trial two years and four months after the robbery  admitted that his initial photo identification of Dobson less than three weeks after the robbery was only 40/45 to 60 percent certain. This uncertainty was buttressed by the videotape of the first lineup, which was conducted little more than a month after the offense, in which Sawyer selected two people other than Dobson. I think it fair to say that Sawyer's uncertainty in his trial testimony (as low as 40/45 percent at the photo identification) and his failure to identify Dobson in a lineup two weeks after the photo identification, could give rise to a reasonable belief on Lipps's part that the jury might not credit the in-court identification made more than two years after the robbery. Based on that reasonable belief, Lipps made the tactical decision not to present the alibi witnesses. From our vantage point  over 20 years later and far removed from the events of the trial  I cannot say that Lipps's assessment, that the identification testimony was weak and unconvincing, was wrong or constituted ineffective assistance in the Strickland sense. Thus, as I said above, this factor weighs heavily against Dobson's position. Finally, as to the fifth Edwards factor  impact upon the defense and the jury  the prejudice potentially resulting from the presentation of Dobson's alibi defense also weighs against Dobson. At first blush, the substance of Dobson's alibi  testimony that he could not have committed a crime in Washington, D.C., when he was in Baltimore  would seem to argue in favor of presenting the evidence. However, any reasonable effective inquiry by government counsel likely would have revealed that the witnesses and Dobson were celebrating what the witnesses called D-Day  Dobson's one month anniversary of his release from jail. In the face of what he then considered to be weak, single-witness identification testimony, Lipps concluded that the jury should not learn of Dobson's criminal past, a revelation that likely would be harmful to Dobson's case. I would not second-guess that judgment, because, as this court has recognized on numerous occasions, it is very damaging to the defense case for the jury to learn about the defendant's criminal record. See Bennett v. United States, 597 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1991) (quoting Fields v. United States, 396 A.2d 522, 527 (D.C.1978)) (The risk from the admissibility of a prior arrest of the defendant is that the jury may infer from the prior criminal conviction that the defendant is a bad man and that he therefore probably committed the crime for which he is on trial.'); Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 419 (D.C. 1988) (quoting United States v. Daniels, 248 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 205, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (1985)) (Once evidence of prior crimes reaches the jury, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to assume continued integrity of the presumption of innocence.). While Lipps was willing to run the risk of revealing Dobson's criminal past if the identification evidence was strong, it was not unreasonable for him to conclude otherwise when the identification evidence turned out to be much weaker then he anticipated. In these circumstances, his decision to forego the alibi defense was purely a reasonable tactical choice[] [made] in light of the situation as it appeared at the time .... Edwards, 767 A.2d at 248. In sum, after weighing the five Edwards factors, I agree with the trial court's ruling that Lipps's performance was not deficient within the meaning of Strickland. [14] The decision to forego the alibi defense was a reasonable tactical decision for the reasons stated above. I conclude, therefore, that counsel's course of action can not be characterized as conduct so serious that he was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment. Frederick, 741 A.2d at 437. Therefore, Lipps's performance did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Dobson's motion.