Opinion ID: 1376005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waiver of Guardianship Fees

Text: Foley claims that Morse & Mowbray spent more than 1150.1 hours of work on the guardianship which were never billed or collected, and that he is entitled to a share of the fees that were waived without his consent. The district court ruled that the guardianship fees were properly waived by Morse, who served as the guardian of the sole minor beneficiary. NRS 159.183 provides that [a] guardian shall be allowed reasonable compensation for his services as guardian and ... reasonable expenses incurred in retaining ... attorneys. Because a client should not have to pay for duplicative services, Morse could not charge full compensation for the same service in his different capacities as guardian, attorney, trustee, and co-executor. Matter of Estate of Larson, 103 Wash.2d 517, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985). However, Morse could have received fees in his capacity as a guardian for performing services different than those as an attorney. See Gaines v. Johnson, 216 Ga. 668, 119 S.E.2d 28 (1961) (one acting as both a guardian and an executor can collect both guardianship fees and executor's fees); see also Prostack v. Songailo, 97 Nev. 38, 623 P.2d 978 (1981) (guidelines necessary to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees include the quality of the advocacy, the character of the work to be done, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the result). Morse could have received fees in his capacity as a guardian for performing services different than those in his other capacities. Generally, guardianship fees are considered personal compensation. See Farish v. Jewett, 120 So.2d 642 (Fla.Ct.App.1960) (a guardian, although a member of a law firm, was entitled to be paid in person for his services as the guardian of an estate); In re Krecl's Guardianship, 85 So.2d 727 (Fla.1956) (personal compensation is allowed so long as guardian does not breach a fiduciary duty). On the other hand, under an employment agreement that Morse seemed to ratify at trial, guardianship fees earned by the partners were to be the property of the firm. Thus, whether Morse was entitled to the fees as a guardian personally or a member of the firm is a question of fact. If Morse were entitled to the fees personally, he had the right to waive them; however, if he were entitled to the fees as a firm member for work he performed as the guardian and there was no legal justification for waiving those fees, then Foley had an interest in a share of those fees that were earned prior to Foley's departure. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling, without taking evidence, that the guardianship fees were appropriately waived.