Opinion ID: 769742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medical Record Pertaining to Disability

Text: 14 We set forth the facts relating to the 1999 judgment that held Shaw not disabled. Formerly employed as a machinist with a high school education, Shaw was seriously injured in four separate auto accidents in 1977, 1981, 1986, and 1989. His injuries and impairments have been extensive, including pinched nerves, memory loss, cognitive defects, a herniated disc, a club foot, difficulty in climbing stairs without pain, muscle spasms, headaches, and dizziness. He has been treated primarily by one physician, Dr. Arminius Cassvan, who concluded that claimant was totally disabled. From time to time he has also been seen by Dr. Aubrey Lewis and Dr. Milford Blackwell, a board-certified neurologist. 15 Shaw last worked regularly in 1977 before his auto accident of that year. After that he was no longer able to work as a machinist. When he visited Dr. Cassvan for the first time it was found that his injuries limited his flexibility, stair climbing and ability to sit or stand for prolonged periods. Later physical examination revealed S1 root compression and extensive paraspinal muscle spasms. The treatment prescribed was physical therapy. After his 1981 accident, EMG testing found mild to moderate neuropathy and mild carpal tunnel syndrome. The treatment again was physical therapy. From March 1982 to March 31, 1985 claimant received no medical treatment. He testified that his no-fault insurance had run out and he could not afford to pay for further treatment. After the 1986 accident he was diagnosed as having a frozen shoulder and weakness in his right upper arm. Soft tissue calcification, limiting the motion of his right hip, was observed. An elastic knee brace and physical therapy was ordered. Following his 1989 accident, Shaw was treated by Dr. Meyer, an orthopedist, and referred by an auto insurance carrier to Dr. Blackwell, who determined that plaintiff had been disabled since April 12, 1989, the date of his accident. 16 At the time Shaw commenced the instant action in federal court, the Social Security Administration had already adjudged him disabled and therefore entitled to SSI benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act as of June 30, 1992, the date of his application. But the SSA ruled against plaintiff with respect to his claim for disability benefits because it found he was not disabled as of March 31, 1985, the date he was last insured for SSD insurance purposes. Plaintiff maintains he was disabled as of March 1982, three years earlier and, pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sought review of this final administrative determination. Thus, the specific issue the district court decided against plaintiff was that he was not disabled on March 31, 1985, the last date of his fully insured status. 17 In this consolidated appeal, Shaw appeals from the 1999 judgment and reinstates his earlier appeal from the 1996 judgment. Shaw's earlier appeal is relevant because if we reverse the 1999 judgment and determine that plaintiff is disabled for disability purposes, then the ALJ's refusal to decide both claims concurrently affects the date from which Shaw is entitled to receive such benefits.