Opinion ID: 164559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States' Cross-Appeal: Downward Departures

Text: 12 For most convictions, a sentencing court may depart from the sentence range set by the Guidelines only if it finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). We review both upward and downward departures under the four-part standard set forth in United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 977, 124 S.Ct. 457, 157 L.Ed.2d 330 (2003). 13 Under Jones, we must first ascertain whether the district court set forth, in a written order of judgment, its specific reasons for departure. Id. at 1299. Second, we must ensure that those reasons advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2), and do not violate any specific prohibition in the Guidelines. Id. (citations omitted). We review this second prong de novo. Id. Third, we must consider whether the factors the district court relied upon were authorized under section 3553(b) and justified by the facts of the case. Id. at 1299-1300 (internal quotations omitted). A factor is only authorized if it is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. Id. at 1300 (citations omitted). We review this application of the Guidelines to the facts de novo, and review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Id. at 1300 & n. 9. Finally, we must determine whether the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range. Id. In reviewing the degree of departure, we give due deference to the district court and uphold its sentence absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citations omitted). 14 Mrs. Lang argues that the standard of review set forth in Jones does not apply to her case because Jones only addressed upward departures. 1 We disagree. Title 18, section 3742(e) of the United States Code, the statutory subsection that mandates de novo review, does not distinguish between upward and downward departures, stating only that [w]ith respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4). Further, subsections (3)(A) and (3)(B) apply to all sentences outside the applicable guideline range. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3). This plain reading of the statutory language finds support in the decisions of other circuits. See United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 764 (4th Cir.2003) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) applies to downward departures); United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943, 945-47 (7th Cir.2003) (same). Therefore, based on the statute's plain text, we reject Mrs. Lang's argument and make explicit that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) mandates de novo review for both upward and downward departures.
15 The United States argues that we should reverse the Langs' downward departures because the district court departed based on unauthorized considerations. As noted above 16 [t]o determine whether the factors [employed by the district court] are authorized, we look to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which provides that a district court may depart if there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. Jones, 332 F.3d at 1300 (quotations omitted). 17 For factors already considered by the Guidelines, departure from the applicable guideline range is warranted only if the factor is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5k2.0; see also United States v. Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir.1998). 18 The district court departed in this case based on the Langs' short involvement as accessories, reasoning that in such situations it would be outside the heartland to sentence the Langs based on drug quantities from drug dealing that ha[d] gone on for an extended period of time. We disagree. 19 The Langs' limited participation as accessories does not warrant a downward departure because the Guidelines already account for an accessory's minimal participation. Section 2X3.1 of the Guidelines relies on the minimal participation inherent for all accessories in deducting six levels from the base offense level of the underlying offense. U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1(a)(1). Moreover, § 3B1.2 directs a sentencing court to decrease a defendant's offense level by 4 levels [i]f the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity or by 2 levels [i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity.... U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The Guidelines note, however, that [t]he adjustment from § 3B1.2 (Mitigating Role) normally would not apply [to an accessory] because an adjustment for reduced culpability is incorporated in the base offense level. U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1, Application Note 2. As these provisions make clear, the Guidelines already consider an accessory's limited participation. Therefore, the district court may depart downward on that basis only if the Langs' involvement as accessories was exceptionally short. 20 Compared to that in other accessory cases, the Langs' involvement, which ranged from a couple of hours to a day, was not exceptionally short. Individuals often act as accessories for a much shorter period. For instance, perjury in respect to a criminal offense falls under the Guidelines' structure for accessory, see U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3, and yet a perjurer often violates the law for only a matter of seconds, see United States v. Renteria, 138 F.3d 1328, 1330 31 & 1334 (10th Cir.1998). Likewise, disposing of a weapon used to commit a felony may take only minutes, and yet this crime falls within the heartland of the accessory guidelines. See United States v. Martinez, 342 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir.2003). Therefore, because the Lang's involvement was not exceptionally short, we find that the district court erred in departing downward on that basis. See e.g. United States v. Jimenez, 282 F.3d 597, 600-01 (8th Cir.2002).
21 The district court also erred in departing downward on Mrs. Lang's sentence based on the allegedly aberrant nature of her criminal behavior. The district court specifically based its aberrant behavior departure on the fact that Mrs. Lang has gone to school, she's graduated from high school, she's trained herself through college, [and] she's up until the recent period [had] a very good work ethic. 22 These factors do not justify an aberrant behavior departure. Application Note 1 to § 5k2.20 of the Guidelines states that an aberrant behavior departure is only permissible if the defendant's crime (A) was committed without significant planning; (B) was of limited duration; and (C) represents a marked deviation ... from an otherwise law-abiding life. U.S.S.G. § 5k2.20, Application Note 1. Even if Mrs. Lang satisfied points (A) and (B), she failed to meet the requirements of point (C). As the district court states, there was a history and is a history of drug use [by Mrs. Lang]. Moreover, Mrs. Lang's Presentence Investigation Report contains additional information that counsels against a finding that her behavior here represents a marked deviation ... from an otherwise law-abiding life. U.S.S.G. § 5k2.20, Application Note 1. 23 Furthermore, Mrs. Lang's education and work history, on which the district court based its aberrant behavior departure, are discouraged factors that a district court should only consider in cases where the surrounding circumstances render the educational and employment accomplishments extraordinary. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.2; see also United States v. Alvarez-Pineda, 258 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir.2001). Neither the district court nor Mrs. Lang have provided any persuasive evidence that her education or employment history are exceptional. Therefore, given the overwhelming evidence that Mrs. Lang's behavior was not aberrant, we find that the district court erred in granting Mrs. Lang an aberrant behavior departure.