Opinion ID: 566319
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determination of Offense Level.

Text: 50 Hernandez argues that the district court incorrectly determined an upward departure in his offense level. We reject this argument. 51 The district court granted Hernandez a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, but then upwardly departed because of his conclusion that Hernandez had used a weapon in dealing drugs. In considering Hernandez's offense level, the district court concluded that based on both the amount of money and on the presence of the triple beam scale    [I find that] Hernandez was dealing in what the government has called a 'white powder' drug of the sort usually weighed out on such a sensitive scale--i.e., cocaine or heroin. Hernandez, 753 F.Supp. at 1199. 52 In determining the extent of the upward departure called for by this relevant conduct based on the offense of conviction, the district court attempted to approach as closely as possible the standards set by those who have fixed the sanctions for what Hernandez actually did. Id. In making this determination, the district judge looked outside the guidelines, to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prescribes a five-year mandatory minimum for a defendant who uses a weapon in the course of committing a drug offense. This five-year sentence shall be in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime   . § 924(c)(1). As a result, after determining Hernandez's base offense level, the district court then added to it a departure measured by this five-year mandatory sentence. 53 Hernandez contends that in doing this, the district court ignored the procedures for upward departures set out in Kim. See Kim, 896 F.2d at 681-86. He also claims that there are no persuasive reasons or authority for imposing a sentence from 'outside the Guidelines.'  54 In determining the extent of its upward departure, the district judge explicitly referred to Kim, and we believe that his careful explanation satisfies that case's requirements for upward departures. The resulting sentence, based on the mandatory minimum set by congress in § 924(c) for the offense that would apply to Hernandez's relevant conduct, did not exceed what Hernandez would have received had he been convicted under § 924(c), which was one of our concerns in Kim. See Kim, 896 F.2d at 684. 55 Another question is whether the ultimate sentence is reasonable. If the district court finds, as it did here, that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines    , the court may impose a sentence outside the range of the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); see also, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. In reviewing such a sentence, we must determine that it is not unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2); United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 36-37 (2d Cir.1988). We also have recognized a 'wide discretion' in the district judge to consider and determine what circumstances might justify    [an upward] departure. United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). 56 Under these principles, we have no trouble in concluding that this upward departure in offense level was reasonable. The district judge carefully considered all the factors surrounding Hernandez's conviction, determined that the guideline range was insufficient and that some upward departure was warranted, and then, in attempting to determine how much of a departure was fair, looked to a federal statute that directly addressed the conduct that served as the basis for the upward departure. The district court found: [T]he aggregate prison sentence imposed on Hernandez is 90 months. I believe this sentence is reasonable when one considers that the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense to which Hernandez pleaded guilty is 10 years   . Hernandez, 753 F.Supp. at 1200. The district court's use of the statute as a guide was proper, and the resulting offense level was reasonable. 57 Hernandez also contends that using § 924(c), even as a reference point in sentencing, when he was not convicted of that crime, violates due process. However, since it is clear that the district court had the authority to make some upward departure, and since it used § 924(c) only as an aid in determining a fair and reasonable sentence, there was no due process violation. The district judge satisfied the requirements both of § 3553(b) and of the guidelines developed in Kim. 58 4. Sufficiency of the Evidence. 59 Hernandez next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's findings that he was involved in white powder drug trafficking, and that the gun was used in connection with this activity. According to Hernandez, there simply was not enough evidence of a predicate drug offense to support a § 924(c) conviction, since mere possession of a weapon in an apartment known to contain narcotics paraphernalia does not automatically lead to a finding of 'use' as required under § 924(c). 60 The district court's finding regarding the use of the weapon is subject to the clearly erroneous standard. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4); United States v. Lanese, 890 F.2d 1284, 1291 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2207, 109 L.Ed.2d 533 (1990). We have previously held that a weapon is used in connection with drug trafficking if it is kept on hand to protect [an] 'apartment as a storage and processing point for large quantities of narcotics.'  United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990) (citation omitted); see also, United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990); United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 166, 107 L.Ed.2d 123 (1989). 61 Hernandez admitted that he had the gun for protection, and this admission, together with the discovery in the apartment of more than $35,000 in cash, the portable telephone, the beeper, and the scale, amply support a finding that the gun was used in drug trafficking. The district court's finding was thus not clearly erroneous. 62 5. The Base Offense Level and Double Counting. 63 Hernandez's final argument is that the district court erred in twice counting his possession of the weapon in determining his sentence. We reject this argument. The district judge first determined Hernandez's base offense level. To do this, he was required to apply the actual conviction--possession of a weapon by a felon--to the guidelines. But as discussed above, the district judge also concluded that an upward departure was warranted because he found that the weapon had been used in drug trafficking. This improper use is separate and distinct from the conduct forming the basis of conviction--mere possession of the weapon--and there is therefore no reason to conclude that the same activity was applied twice by the district court in determining Hernandez's sentence.