Opinion ID: 2181294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Watkins' other contentions.

Text: Watkins' remaining contentions can be disposed of briefly: First, Watkins contends that in reviewing Bowen's grand jury testimony to determine if any part of it was exculpatory and should have been provided to the defense pursuant to Brady, the trial judge failed to include in his inquiry the question whether the testimony tended to negate the government's claim that Bowen's identification of Watkins as his assailant was admissible as an excited utterance. Watkins states in his reply brief that this court should either conduct its own review of Bowen's grand jury testimony or remand the case to the trial judge so that he may inspect the testimony under what Watkins describes as the correct legal standard. Assuming, arguendo, both that Watkins preserved this issue and that the trial judge had the obligation to consider the excited utterance issue as part of his Brady inquiry  and each of these assumptions is dubious to say the least  we have examined the grand jury testimony and conclude that it adds nothing substantial to the record. Bowen testified that after he had been shot, he handed his girlfriend drugs and money from his pocket because he did not want these items found on him. This conduct does suggest at least some measure of reflection, but the girlfriend testified at trial that Bowen had removed the drugs and money from his pocket, and Bowen's motive for doing so was obvious even without the grand jury testimony. Watkins next argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by replacing a juror with an alternate, where, while the case was still on trial, the juror had been approached at night at a liquor store by a stranger who stated that he knew that the juror was on the jury. There was testimony at the trial that a potential witness had been beaten, threatened, and warned not to testify against Watkins. The trial judge might reasonably have apprehended that if the juror who was approached by the stranger later reflected on the testimony regarding the beating, or if he told other jurors about the liquor store incident, the spectre of intimidation might intrude upon the jury's deliberations. There was no claim or evidence that the alternate who replaced the juror was biased or unqualified to serve. Under these circumstances, Watkins' claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in Thomas v. United States, 824 A.2d 26, 31 (D.C.2003) (per curiam). Finally, Watkins contends that the trial judge plainly erred by instructing the jury that there is no death penalty in the District of Columbia. Watkins did not object to the instruction. No party may assign as error any position of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 30. Moreover, the trial judge instructed the jury that it is the responsibility of the court to impose an appropriate sentence, and you are not allowed to consider what, if any, sentence might be imposed. The jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the court. Hairston v. United States, 497 A.2d 1097, 1102 (D.C. 1985). This is a crucial assumption, Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985), for our theory of trial depends on the jury's ability to do so. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 425 (D.C.1988). We conclude that there was no plain error. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 813 A.2d 220, 223 (D.C. 2002).