Opinion ID: 798263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicable Law: The INA's Definition of Aggravated Felony and Our Categorical Approach

Text: A conviction for an aggravated felony renders Higgins ineligible for both cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The INA defines the term aggravated felony to include, as relevant here, an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). In this case, there is no question that Higgins was convicted of an offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. See United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153-54 (2d Cir.2000) (construing the phrase for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year to refer to the actual sentence imposed rather than the authorized minimum term). Accordingly, if a conviction for witness tampering under CGS § 53a-151 constitutes an offense relating to obstruction of justice, we must dismiss Higgins's petition. In order to determine whether a conviction under CGS § 53a-151 relat[es] to obstruction of justice, we apply a categorical approach that looks to the elements of the penal statute rather than the particulars of the alien's conduct. Oouch, 633 F.3d at 122; see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir.2003). Under this analysis, [w]e must ask whether every set of facts violating a statute satisfies the criteria for removability, keeping in mind that only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant. Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir.2004) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).