Opinion ID: 19304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Abitrators' Adjudication of the ADEA Claim

Text: 27 The concept of manifest disregard of the law has not been defined by the Supreme Court. The circuits have adopted various formulations. 2 As indicated by ourforegoing recognition of the standard, we agree with the D.C. Circuit that, in this statutory context, the 'manifest disregard of law' standard must be defined in light of the bases underlying the Court's decisions in Gilmer-type cases. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487. Professors MacNeil, Speidel, and Stipanowich have made a modest proposal that should prove helpful as a basis for articulating and applying the manifest disregard doctrine in the present context: 28 First, where on the basis of the information available to the court it is not manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law, the award should be upheld. 29 Second, where on the basis of the information available to the court it is manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law, the award should be upheld unless it would result in significant injustice, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including powers of arbitrators to judge norms appropriate to the relations between the parties. 30 MACNEIL, supra, 40.7.2.6, at 40:95 (footnote omitted). 31 On the information available to us in the present case, which includes a verbatim transcript of the proceedings, we conclude that it is not manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law in rejecting Williams's ADEA age discrimination and retaliation claims. Consequently, in this case, we need not undertake the second step of the manifest disregard analysis, which entails an inquiry into whether the award will result in significant injustice, that comes into play only when it is manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law. 32 The evidence solidly supports a reasonable finding that Cigna terminated Williams's active agent status, not because of his age, but because of his long period of less than cost-effective sales performance and his burgeoning indebtedness to the company resulting from his loans against anticipated but unrealized commissions. 33 Nor is it manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law in rejecting Williams's retaliation claim. 3 While it is undisputed that Williams's filing of an EEOC charge constituted participation in a protected activity, a reasonable arbitrator could have found that he did not suffer an adverse employment action and that any disadvantage he suffered was not causally related to his EEOC claim. At the meeting on December 22, 1993, the Cigna officers told Williams that if he could not reduce his debt to the company by $18,000 immediately, that he must accept the company's offer to allow him to change to retired agent or broker status before January 1, 1994 or his relationship with Cigna would be terminated completely. Williams rejected Cigna's offer of retired agent or broker status by his failure to accept theoffer before it expired on January 1, 1994 and resulted in his absolute termination. Because Williams filed his EEOC complaint four days later on January 5, 1994 there is no evidence of a causal link between his complaint and his termination. 4 34 Consequently, we conclude that based on the record presented for our review it is not manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law and that their award should be upheld insofar as their rejection of the ADEA discrimination and retaliation claims are concerned.