Opinion ID: 152998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection Class-of-One Claim

Text: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment most typically reaches state action that treats a person poorly because of the person's race or other suspect classification, such as sex, national origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or because the person has exercised a fundamental right, or because the person is a member of a group that is the target of irrational government discrimination. See generally Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2152, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir.2009). The Supreme Court has also recognized the prospect of a so-called class-of-one equal protection claim. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). A class-of-one claim need not allege discrimination based on a suspect classification, but must allege that the plaintiff was singled out arbitrarily, without rational basis, for unfair treatment. E.g., Avila v. Pappas, 591 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.2010); see generally Srail, 588 F.3d at 943 (summarizing Seventh Circuit's divergent class-of-one precedent regarding whether illegitimate animus can substitute for absence of rational basis for state action). Abcarian tries to take advantage of this theory in Count VI of the amended complaint, which alleges that defendants violated his equal protection rights by reporting the Behzad settlement but not the settlement of a malpractice claim against another physician. The district court dismissed Count VI and the related claim for equitable relief on the ground that Abcarian's claim was barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Engquist. Abcarian contends that Engquist applies only to class-of-one claims against governmental employers but not to claims against other government employees. We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the equal protection claim, but for another reason: under the law, defendants had no discretion in deciding whether to report the Behzad settlement. Engquist held that class-of-one claims cannot be based on the highly discretionary and individualized sorts of decisions that public employers must make about their employees. The Court pointed out that its decision in Olech, which first recognized class-of-one equal protection claims, rested on the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. 553 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2153. Some forms of state action by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. Id. at 2154. [A]llowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise. Id. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized. Id. Accordingly, the class-of-one theory of equal protection is a poor fit with employment decisions, which are themselves often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Id. at 2154-55. Based on this analysis, the Court held that a `class-of-one' theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context. Id. at 2148-49. We have interpreted Engquist to stand for the broad proposition that inherently subjective discretionary governmental decisions may be immune from class-of-one claims. See, e.g., Avila, 591 F.3d at 554 (noting in dicta that class-of-one claims cannot rest on governmental activity that is discretionary by design); Srail, 588 F.3d at 945 (rejecting class-of-one challenge to village's subjective and individualized decision not to extend water services); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.2008) (stating that class-of-one challenges may be inapplicable to any governmental action that is the product of a highly discretionary decision-making process). [6] We have also recognized that Engquist has limited applicability when a decisionmaker's discretion is circumscribed by constitutional or statutory provisions. For example, because police discretion is narrowed by objective constitutional limitations such as the Fourth Amendment, not all discretionary police decision-making is immune from class-of-one challenge. See Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir.2009). But when the law gives a state actor no discretion, it is hard to see how a person can claim irrational discrimination when the law is applied to him. State and federal law required the defendants to report the settlement of Behzad's malpractice claim to the relevant federal and state authoritiesno matter however frivolous or insubstantial that claim may have been. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (requiring any entity making a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice claim to report certain information to the NPDB); 225 ILCS 60/23(A)(3) (requiring any entity which indemnifies a physician for his professional liability to report the settlement of a claim). [7] Abcarian's complaint seeks to assert a claim of selective enforcementthe enforcement of a law against only disfavored individuals a claim long familiar in equal protection jurisprudence when based on race, national origin, or other suspect classifications. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (reversing convictions because underlying ordinance was enforced solely against individuals of Chinese ancestry). Notably, such cases are typically brought against police, prosecutors, or other individuals having discretion in the enforcement of the law. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (challenge implicating prosecutorial discretion); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (challenge to ordinance vesting discretion in decisionmaker so great as to be considered naked and arbitrary power). Equal protection claims are allowed in such circumstances not because the particular law at issue is facially invalid or inapplicable to the plaintiff's conduct, but because of the concern that individuals with discretion in law enforcement will take advantage of that discretion to oppress unpopular groups. [8] But Abcarian's claim here has little in common with a typical selective enforcement claim. As we noted above, the defendants were required to report the settlement of Behzad's claim to the authorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a); 225 ILCS 60/23(A)(3). They had neither naked and arbitrary power, Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366, 6 S.Ct. 1064, nor a broad discretion to act, Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524. Unlike a police officer or prosecutor having significant discretion as to how or whether to enforce the law, these defendants had no choice as to whether they complied with the law. If they disregarded their reporting obligations, they ran the risk of civil and criminal penaltiespenalties certainly not at issue when a police officer chooses not to issue a traffic ticket or when a prosecutor declines to press charges. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131(c) (imposing civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for a failure to report); 225 ILCS 60/23(G) (making a failure to report a misdemeanor). Absent any meaningful discretion on the defendants' part to decide whether to report the settlement of a particular malpractice claim, we see little risk of the kind of discriminatory action addressed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court was correct to dismiss Count VI of Abcarian's amended complaint and the related claim for equitable relief.