Opinion ID: 890028
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The State’s Additional Arguments

Text: ¶80 Besides presenting its argument (with which I disagree) as to the “plain reading” of § 45-3-112, MCA, the State argues two other theories for why the statute should not be interpreted to impose any new duties on peace officers. The State’s arguments in this 3 While the legislative intent is, in my view, quite clear, “disclose” arguably was not the best term for the Legislature to use in § 45-3-112, MCA, given that this is a term of art generally associated with Brady and the discovery statutes. Perhaps stating that the investigation must be conducted so as to “expose,” “reveal,” “uncover,” or “discover” all evidence would have effectuated the Legislature’s purpose without inviting the argument, which this Court now adopts, that § 45-3-112, MCA, merely “reflects” decades-old disclosure requirements which already exist under Brady and § 46-15-322, MCA. 34 regard involve considerations extrinsic to the statutory language. I believe it is important to acknowledge these theories and explain why I disagree with them as well. 1. The Role of Peace Officers in the Adversarial System ¶81 First, the State resists the notion that peace officers should have any duty to investigate on behalf of the defense. The State cites a slew of this Court’s cases which have recognized that police officers have no affirmative duty to collect exculpatory evidence and are not required to assist the defendant with procuring evidence on his own behalf. See State v. Heth, 230 Mont. 268, 271-72, 750 P.2d 103, 105 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222, 225, 762 P.2d 853, 855-56 (1988); State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 79, 805 P.2d 537, 547 (1991), overruled on other grounds, State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 74-76, 315 Mont. 395, 68 P.3d 768; State v. Patton, 280 Mont. 278, 284-85, 930 P.2d 635, 638-39 (1996); State v. Belgarde, 1998 MT 152, ¶ 16, 289 Mont. 287, 962 P.2d 571; State v. Saxton, 2003 MT 105, ¶ 32, 315 Mont. 315, 68 P.3d 721; State v. Seiffert, 2010 MT 169, ¶ 15, 357 Mont. 188, 237 P.3d 669. ¶82 As an initial observation, the State’s citation of these cases serves only to bolster my conclusions concerning § 45-3-112, MCA. First, each of the foregoing cases was decided under pre-2009 law. As such, they represent the law as it existed in 2009 when the Legislature enacted § 45-3-112, MCA. We noted in Heth that police officers “have no affirmative duty to gather [exculpatory] evidence absent express statutory mandate.” 230 Mont. at 272, 750 P.2d at 105 (emphasis added). Second, in construing a statute, this Court presumes “that the Legislature acted with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on a subject,” State v. Brown, 2009 MT 452, ¶ 10, 354 Mont. 329, 223 35 P.3d 874, and “that the legislature intended to make some change in existing law by passing [the statute],” Cantwell, 228 Mont. at 333-34, 742 P.2d at 470. It follows, then, that the Legislature intended to change the law reflected in the foregoing cases cited by the State, such that where police officers before did not have a duty to collect exculpatory evidence or assist the defendant with procuring evidence on his own behalf, they now have a duty to conduct their investigations (in cases involving justifiable use of force) so as to discover, expose, and make known all such evidence. ¶83 I appreciate the premise, implicit in the State’s argument, that our criminal justice system is based on the adversarial model, and that it is generally up to a criminal defendant to discover and gather her own evidence in support of a self-defense claim. There are exceptions to the adversarial nature of our system, however—the disclosure requirements of Brady being one example. “By requiring the prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a pure adversary model.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n. 6, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380 n. 6 (1985). The rationale is that “the prosecutor’s role transcends that of an adversary: he ‘is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’ ” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n. 6, 105 S. Ct. at 3380 n. 6 (ellipses in original) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935)); accord State ex rel. Fletcher v. Nineteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 260 Mont. 410, 415, 859 P.2d 992, 995 (1993) (“[A] prosecutor should seek justice and not simply an indictment or a conviction.”). Tellingly, the State cites no provision of law precluding the Legislature 36 from modifying the adversarial system—in a way similar to Brady and § 46-15-322, MCA—such that peace officers are required to essentially assist the defendant with the investigation of cases involving justifiable use of force. ¶84 The State notes that the investigation of crimes by law enforcement necessarily involves “judgment,” “discretion,” and “latitude.” That may be true most of the time; however, the Legislature has lessened the extent of that discretion and latitude when it comes to cases involving apparent or alleged justifiable use of force, and has directed peace officers specifically how their investigations are to be conducted in such cases. At bottom, the State’s arguments regarding the appropriate duties of peace officers in our adversarial system are more properly addressed to the Legislature, not this Court. As the State well knows, the role of the Judicial Branch is to interpret and apply the statutes as written and consistent with legislative intent. Sections 1-2-101, -102, MCA. It is not our prerogative to assume the role of pseudo-legislators and manipulate clear statutory mandates in order to achieve some presumed greater good. When we engage in such activity, it only gives traction to those who would criticize courts and judges for rewriting the laws that a coordinate branch of government has enacted. 2. The Remarks of Two Senators ¶85 The State’s second argument is premised on remarks made by two senators at a subcommittee hearing in March 2009. The State explains that House Bill 228 (HB 228), introduced during the 2009 legislative session, was a rather controversial bill dealing with gun rights and the justifiable use of force in numerous respects. See Laws of Montana, 2009, ch. 332 (titled “An Act Preserving and Clarifying Laws Relating to the Right of 37 Self-Defense and the Right to Bear Arms . . . .”). The bill had been introduced, but not passed, during the previous two legislative sessions. See HB 693 (2005); HB 340 (2007). When HB 228 came before the 2009 Senate Judiciary Committee, that body appointed a three-member subcommittee which, according to the State, “substantially rewrote the original bill.” I note, however, that the section of HB 228 which ultimately became § 45-3-112, MCA, was not rewritten in any way material to this case. In fact, essentially the same language was used in the corresponding sections of HB 693 (2005) and HB 340 (2007). Each of the three bills stated that “the investigation [of an incident involving self-defense/justifiable use of force] must be conducted so as to disclose all evidence.” ¶86 In any event, the three-member subcommittee consisted of Senators Shockley, Jent, and McGee. During the subcommittee’s March 20, 2009 hearing, Senator Jent opined that the section of HB 228 which later became § 45-3-112, MCA, “is duplicative of current law, Brady versus Maryland and 46-15-323 [sic] . . . because they already got to give you evidence that would get you off now under constitutional precedent and under the Code.” Senator Jent thus proposed that this section be stricken from the bill. In response, however, Senator Shockley argued that while the section is “poorly worded” and “say[s] what’s already in the Code,” it “doesn’t hurt nothing.” From this snippet of discussion among two senators in a subcommittee hearing, the State leaps to the conclusion that “[t]he legislators voting for this bill did not believe they were effecting a sea change in the law requiring law enforcement officers to take the place of defense investigators . . . .” 38 ¶87 There are three reasons why I find this argument to be wholly unpersuasive. First of all, the State candidly admits that this argument is presented only “[t]o the extent this Court determines the statutory language is not clear and unambiguous.” And, as the State points out elsewhere in its briefs, the statutory language is plain, clear, and unambiguous. Pursuant to our rules of construction, “[w]here the language is clear and unambiguous, the statute speaks for itself and we will not resort to other means of interpretation.” Rocky Mt. Bank, 280 Mont. at 80, 928 P.2d at 246; accord Cooksey, ¶ 32. Hence, there is no reason here to consider the remarks of two senators in a subcommittee hearing. ¶88 Second, the State’s suggestion that we should attribute dispositive significance to such remarks presents separation-of-powers concerns. As we all know, “[t]he power of the government of this state is divided into three distinct branches—legislative, executive, and judicial,” and “[n]o person or persons charged with the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others . . . .” Mont. Const. art. III, § 1. Equally fundamental is the principle that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); accord Mont. Petroleum Tank Release Compen. Bd. v. Crumleys, Inc., 2008 MT 2, ¶ 57, 341 Mont. 33, 174 P.3d 948 (“interpreting and upholding the law” is a “constitutionally designated role[ ]” of the courts); Best v. Police Dept. of Billings, 2000 MT 97, ¶ 16, 299 Mont. 247, 999 P.2d 334 (the doctrine of separation of powers between branches of government is “[c]losely related” to the fundamental principle that “it is the province and duty of the judiciary ‘to say what the law is’ ”). What these principles mean here is that while it is the province of 39 legislators to enact the laws, it is the province of judges to interpret them. Regardless of what Senators Shockley and Jent may have said about § 45-3-112, MCA, their views do not dictate the meaning of the statutory language that was actually used and adopted by the Legislature. As a matter of constitutional law, that determination is made by this Court applying our rules of statutory construction, and it is based on what the statute actually says, not what we want it to say or what others may have conjectured it says. The statute’s plain language controls, and legislative history cannot be used to show that an apparently clear and unambiguous text does not mean what it says. Johnson, ¶ 26; State v. Merry, 2008 MT 288, ¶ 12, 345 Mont. 390, 191 P.3d 428. ¶89 Third, it is preposterous, quite frankly, to suggest that the remarks of 2 senators during a subcommittee hearing represent what the other 148 members of the Legislature “believed” when they voted on the bill. We do not know which other senators and representatives, if any (besides Senator McGee), were aware of Senator Shockley’s and Senator Jent’s views. Nor do we know whether any senators and representatives agreed with those views. Indeed, it is entirely possible—if not more likely—that some of the senators and representatives who voted for the bill agreed with the views of Gary Marbut, the self-professed “primary developer” of HB 228 and the legislation’s chief proponent. Marbut appeared before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. In addition to his verbal remarks in support of the bill, Marbut provided legislators with a typewritten, section-by-section explanation of the bill’s provisions. That document is included as Exhibit 3 to the House Judiciary Committee’s January 22, 2009 Minutes. Regarding the section that ultimately became § 45-3-112, MCA, Marbut explained: 40 [This section] requires that investigators look for and collect all evidence, including evidence that could exonerate a person claiming self-defense. Investigators say that this need is already included in their professional standards for investigation. If that is so, they shouldn’t object to this requirement being placed in statute, another clarification needed in existing law. Further, citizens shouldn’t be required to rely on changeable occupational standards drawn by un-elected organizations of public employees in order for citizens to stay out of prison. Clearly, the Court’s construction of § 45-3-112, MCA, is contrary to what the “primary developer” of HB 228 had in mind. Of course, just as we do not know how many legislators were aware of and subscribed to the views of Senators Shockley and Jent, we do not know how many legislators read Marbut’s explanation and “believed” that it reflected the true meaning of § 45-3-112, MCA. And that points up the futility of attempting to discern statutory meaning from the various, and often times inconsistent, comments and opinions offered by legislators, proponents, and opponents during committee hearings: It is utterly impossible to discern who heard them, who agreed with them, and whether they represented the “beliefs” of those who voted for the bill. ¶90 In any event, and more to the point, what the legislators “believed” is not the issue. The Montana Constitution gives legal effect to the “laws” the Legislature enacts, Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(1), not the personal beliefs of its members. Cf. Graham County Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1411 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Constitution gives legal effect to the ‘Laws’ Congress enacts, Art. VI, cl. 2, not the objectives its Members aimed to achieve in voting for them.”). The intent of those laws is manifested in the text of the bills which the majority of the legislators voted to enact, 41 not in the audio recordings of off-the-cuff remarks made by two senators during a subcommittee hearing. 4 Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(1); § 1-2-101, MCA; Johnson, ¶ 26. ¶91 In sum, § 45-3-112, MCA, clearly and unambiguously provides that when an incident involves or appears to involve justifiable use of force, a peace officer who is investigating the incident must conduct the investigation so that all evidence, including testimony concerning the alleged offense and that might support the apparent or alleged justifiable use of force, is disclosed, i.e., discovered, exposed, and made known. I now consider the statute’s application to Cooksey’s and Mitchell’s cases.