Opinion ID: 472660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ortiz

Text: 33 Defendant-appellant Freddie Goldbaum Ortiz was charged with: (1) Conspiracy to Import Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 952(a), 960(b)(2)(3), 963, 853 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (Count 1); (2) Conspiracy to Distribute Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846 (Count 2); and (3) Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (Count 14). On April 22, 1985, Ortiz joined in co-defendant Saucedo's motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Ortiz also filed a motion to sever his trial from that of the other co-defendants. The district court denied his motion to sever. On August 26, 1985, a jury found Ortiz guilty of the conspiracy charges in Counts 1 and 2 but acquitted him of the possession charge in Count 14. 34 Ortiz appeals the denial of his motion to suppress on the ground that the record does not support the trial court's finding that the sheriff's deputies had a founded suspicion to make the investigatory stop of Ortiz's vehicle. Ortiz also appeals the denial of his motion to sever. He claims that he was denied his sixth amendment right to cross-examine co-defendant Saucedo regarding his out-of-court admission revealed during trial which implicated Ortiz.
35 We review de novo whether there was founded suspicion justifying an investigatory stop under the fourth amendment. United States v. Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 371 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 790, 83 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985) 36 On April 4, 1984 in an isolated location near Bowie, Arizona, United States Customs officials were conducting an air and ground surveillance of a vehicle used by the smuggling organization. At approximately 2:30 p.m., the ground surveillance team spotted a low-flying red and white high-wing airplane flying north. The officers intercepted the message No go, no go, airplanes and helicopters, go to Bombers Square over radio frequency 123.45. Bombers Square is an isolated, abandoned military landing field commonly used for smuggling drops. Customs officials had observed on prior occasions the red and white airplane drop marijuana bales at Bombers Square and then fly into Mexico. 37 The surveillance team contacted the Customs office in Tucson and requested that law enforcement officers be dispatched to Bombers Square. The Pinal County Sheriff's Department was also notified. Sergeant David Harrington was sent to Bombers Square. 38 At about 3:15 p.m., a Customs officer surveilling Bombers Square spotted a pick-up truck with a camper shell on the airstrip. After the officer had been in the area for a period of time, he heard over frequency 123.45 several clicks and the words Hey, hey, hey, hey.... At the same time, at approximately 3:30 p.m., he observed a white with dark trim single engine, high-wing Cessna making a low-level pass over Bombers Square. A more detailed identification was not possible. The airplane did not land but turned and flew south. 39 Sometime after Sheriff's Deputy Harrington arrived at Bombers Square he observed a tan pick-up truck with a camper top on the landing strip. Deputy Harrington observed a white and dark colored airplane fly over the landing strip. He was not close enough to make a more detailed identification. Approximately 20 minutes after the aircraft flew over the strip, Deputy Harrington stopped the pick-up as it was leaving Bombers Square. Ortiz consented to a search of the vehicle. Two lanterns and a ground-to-air radio were seized. The radio was turned to frequency 123.45 but the batteries were almost dead. Lanterns of the type seized are commonly used to guide planes in night landings. The vehicle also contained green trash bags. The windows of the camper shell were covered with green plastic. 40 Law enforcement officers must have a founded suspicion of criminal conduct to justify an investigatory stop. Maybusher, 735 F.2d at 371; cf. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (an investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity). Founded suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts, together with the rational inferences drawn therefrom, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the person to be detained may have committed or is about to commit a crime. Maybusher, 735 F.2d at 371; United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1047 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 936, 103 S.Ct. 2106, 77 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983). 41 We review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was founded suspicion to stop Ortiz's vehicle. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695 (the whole picture must be taken into account). We look to the collective knowledge of all the officers involved in the criminal investigation although all of the information known to the law enforcement officers involved in the investigation is not communicated to the officer who actually makes the stop. We agree with the Tenth Circuit that the collective knowledge rule applies where an officer makes an investigatory stop based in part on information or directions from other law enforcement officials. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1268 & n. 9 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983). 42 Our review of the record supports the district court's conclusion that the officials conducting the surveillance on April 4, 1984, had a founded suspicion that Ortiz's vehicle was involved in criminal activity. The officers were aware of the following facts: (1) a low-flying aircraft which appeared to be similar to an airplane previously observed in smuggling activities was sighted at Bowie, Arizona; (2) the message No go, no go ... go to Bombers Square was heard over a radio frequency used by drug smugglers; (3) Bombers Square was a commonly used smuggling area, see United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327-28 (9th Cir.1975) (articulable fact is stop area being noted for high number of smuggling violations), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 778, 46 L.Ed.2d 639 (1976); (4) Bombers Square had been used previously by the same organization for a drug drop; (5) Ortiz and Saucedo were observed in the remote desert area at Bombers Square in a vehicle used in the smuggling organization, see United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir.1979) (actions were consonant with drug owners), overruled on other grounds, United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984); (6) officers observed a low-flying plane over Bombers Square similar to the one previously observed at Bowie; (7) the officers intercepted a radio communication over frequency 123.45 at Bombers Square. 43 Deputy Harrington was aware of the following facts before he stopped the pick-up truck: (1) he saw the low-flying plane over Bombers Square; (2) he observed Ortiz's vehicle sitting on the landing strip. 44 There is no question that the collective information known by the officers justified the stop of Ortiz's vehicle. Based on their experience in the investigation of smuggling activities, the Customs officials properly inferred from these facts that a drug drop had been attempted first at Bowie and then again at Bombers Square. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419, 101 S.Ct. at 695-96 (founded suspicion can be based on inferences drawn from innocent appearing facts by experienced officers). The articulable facts known by Deputy Harrington combined with those known by the Customs officials, see Hickman, 523 F.2d at 327-28 (cumulative impact of known facts is considered), reasonably warranted the suspicion that Ortiz's vehicle was involved in a drug drop. See Burnette, 698 F.2d at 1047 (the officer's knowledge plus their observations, provided founded suspicion). 45 The fact that Deputy Harrington did not actually observe any criminal activity is irrelevant as the facts are measured against an objective reasonable man standard, not the subjective impressions of the particular officer. United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir.1973). It is irrelevant that the vehicle could have been at Bombers Square for innocent purposes. The test is not whether the conduct under question is consistent with innocent behavior; law enforcement officers do not have to rule out the possibility of innocent behavior. United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1010, 95 S.Ct. 2634, 45 L.Ed.2d 674 (1975). 46 We hold that under these circumstances the officer had a particularized and objective basis for making the investigatory stop of Ortiz's vehicle. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695. The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
47 The district court denied Ortiz's motion for a severance of his trial from that of his co-defendants. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. The standard of review for a denial of a motion to sever is abuse of discretion. United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 823 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 105 S.Ct. 2684, 86 L.Ed.2d 701 (1985). The test for determining abuse of discretion in denying a severance under Rule 14 is whether a joint trial would be so prejudicial that the trial judge could exercise his discretion in only one way. United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, 101 S.Ct. 154, 66 L.Ed.2d 71 (1980). Before this court will reverse a conviction because of a district court's refusal to grant severance, 'the defendant must show that failure to sever was so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighed the dominant judicial concern with judicial economy and compelled the exercise of the trial court's discretion to sever.'  United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1446 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 563 (9th Cir.1980)). The defendant must show a violation of one of his substantive rights, such as denial of the sixth amendment right to confrontation, in order to make a showing of such manifest prejudice. See id. 48 Ortiz contends manifest prejudice resulted from the denial of his motion to sever because he was deprived of his sixth amendment right to cross-examine an adverse witness under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Bruton, a government witness testified at trial that Bruton's co-defendant had orally confessed to him that Bruton and the co-defendant had committed the armed robbery for which they were being prosecuted. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. at 1621. The trial court instructed the jury that the testimony was only admissible as to the co-defendant and should not be considered in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. Id. at 125, 88 S.Ct. at 1622. The Supreme Court held that because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining [Bruton's] guilt, admission of [the co-defendant's] confession in this joint trial violated [Bruton's] right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 126, 88 S.Ct. at 1622. The Court stated: Plainly, the introduction of [the co-defendant's] confession added substantial, perhaps even critical weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since [the co-defendant] did not take the stand. [Bruton] thus was denied his constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at 127-28, 88 S.Ct. at 1623. 49 Ortiz was tried with co-defendants Albert Saucedo and Valentine Proitte. On the fourth day of trial, the government introduced the testimony of Kathy Ledbetter, Albert Saucedo's girlfriend. Prior to Ledbetter's testimony, the district court gave the following instruction to the jury: 50 Ladies and gentlemen, the testimony that you are going to hear at this time is to be considered only as to the Defendant Saucedo, and is not to be considered in any way in determining the guilt or innocence of the other Defendants in this case. 51 Ledbetter testified that in about April of 1984, Saucedo had told her that he had been out to catch a load, and that the plane didn't show up, but when they were leaving, they were stopped by the police, and they confiscated the radio, and the lanterns.... Ledbetter did not expressly refer to Ortiz. Ortiz objected to Ledbetter's testimony concerning Saucedo's admission and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion stating that its limiting instruction was sufficient to overcome any prejudice to Ortiz. 52 Although Saucedo's admission to his girlfriend did not refer to Ortiz, the circumstances of this case present a close question regarding Bruton error. Assuming arguendo that the admission of Ledbetter's testimony violated Bruton, we conclude that this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 53 It is clear that Bruton error does not require an automatic reversal. United States v. Vissars, 596 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir.1979). In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), the Supreme Court decided that under some circumstances, a Bruton violation could be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California. Id. at 254, 89 S.Ct. at 1728. In Harrington, the Supreme Court held that the purported Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming evidence of the guilt of the accused and the relatively insignificant impact of the co-defendants' largely cumulative statements. Id. 54 In Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), the Supreme Court stated: 55 The mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule ..., however, does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction. In some cases the properly admitted evidence of the guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error. 56 Id. at 430, 92 S.Ct. at 1059; see also United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir.1984) (violations of the Bruton rule do not require reversal if the other evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the prejudice to the defendant from the co-defendant's admission slight by comparison). 57 The record in this case reveals that the alleged Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The properly admitted evidence of Ortiz's guilt of the conspiracy charges is overwhelming. Ortiz was observed on numerous occasions with other members of the smuggling operation, sometimes at Sutton's residence in Tucson. Ortiz's presence at Bombers Square, a deserted area in the desert, in a truck known to be used by members of the smuggling organization, combined with the timing of events between Bowie and Bombers Square on April 4, 1984 involving previously known participants of the illegal operation leaves no doubt that Ortiz was a member of the drug conspiracy. The fact that the windows of the pick-up truck were taped over with garbage bags and Ortiz's possession of a ground-to-air radio tuned to frequency 123.45 supports the conclusion that he was part of the conspiracy to smuggle marijuana. 58 We are satisfied that Ledbetter's testimony concerning Saucedo's admission had an insignificant impact, if any, upon the minds of the jurors who found Ortiz guilty of the conspiracy charges. Assuming, without deciding, that this testimony violated Bruton, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court did not err in denying the motion to sever.