Opinion ID: 1057765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Bar Norfolk and the Café first challenge the circuit court's judgments holding that they possessed no vested rights to operate as Entertainment Establishments and to sell alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption. That issue was before the circuit court in both Bar Norfolk's and the Café's petitions for a writ of certiorari seeking reversal of the BZA decision and in their complaints for declaratory relief. Regardless of the different proceedings in the circuit court, the issue presented on appeal is a question of law that we review de novo. See Shilling v. Baker, 279 Va. 720, 724, 691 S.E.2d 806, 808 (2010); Code § 15.2-2314. Bar Norfolk and the Café also assign error to the circuit court's judgment holding that the City Council acted lawfully and did not violate their due process rights when it enacted the 2009 Ordinance revoking the 1999 Ordinance and the blanket special exception for Waterside. This issue is likewise a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. See L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163, 176, 736 S.E.2d 711, 718 (2013). We will address the issues seriatim. 14
Bar Norfolk and the Café assert that, when they opened for business in 1999, the City allowed them to provide entertainment and serve alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption under the auspices of the 1983 Ordinance. They also contend that the City's issuance of the Zoning Clearance for Business License to each of them, with full knowledge of the nature of their businesses, was a significant affirmative governmental act that created vested rights. Thus, Bar Norfolk and the Café contend that, whether analyzed under Code § 15.2-2307 or Code § 15.2- 2311(C), both establishments have vested rights to continue such business operations that the City cannot now impair. 5 [I]n limited circumstances, private landowners may acquire a vested right in planned uses of their land that may not be prohibited or reduced by subsequent zoning legislation. Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc., 256 Va. 206, 210, 501 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1998). Pursuant to Code § 15.2-2307, 5 Each of the relevant statutes has been amended multiple times in the past three decades. However, the parties make no claim that the prior wording of the governing statutes, or the case law that preceded or construed the prior statutes, makes applicable any standard different than that set forth in the current statutory language. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc., 256 Va. 206, 210-11, 501 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1998); Town of Rocky Mount v. Southside Investors, Inc., 254 Va. 130, 132, 487 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1997); Snow v. Amherst Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 248 Va. 404, 407-08, 448 S.E.2d 606, 60809 (1994); Holland v. Board of Supervisors, 247 Va. 286, 290-91, 441 S.E.2d 20, 22-23 (1994). Therefore, we employ the current wording of the applicable provisions in this opinion. 15 a landowner's rights shall be deemed vested in a land use and such vesting shall not be affected by a subsequent amendment to a zoning ordinance when the landowner (i) obtains or is the beneficiary of a significant affirmative governmental act which remains in effect allowing development of a specific project, (ii) relies in good faith on the significant affirmative governmental act, and (iii) incurs extensive obligations or substantial expenses in diligent pursuit of the specific project in reliance on the significant affirmative governmental act.[6] The clear intent of the statute is to provide a property owner with protection from a subsequent amendment to a zoning ordinance when the owner has already received approval for and made substantial efforts to undertake a use of the property permitted under the prior version of the ordinance. Goyonaga, 275 Va. at 243, 657 S.E.2d at 159. The statute provides for the vesting of a right to a permissible use of property against any future attempt to make the use impermissible by amendment of the zoning ordinance; it is not intended to permit, nor does it provide for, the vesting of a right to an impermissible use under the existing ordinance. Id. at 244, 657 S.E.2d at 160 (second emphasis added). 6 The circuit court noted that neither Bar Norfolk nor the Café own any portion of the land upon which their respective businesses are located. The court, however, ignored that fact for decisional purposes because of certain language in a section of the 1992 zoning ordinance. Whether Bar Norfolk and the Café can claim vested rights under Code § 15.2-2307 as nonlandowners, therefore, is not before us in this appeal. 16 When Bar Norfolk and the Café opened their respective businesses, the 1997 Ordinance required a special exception to operate as either an Eating and Drinking Establishment or an Entertainment Establishment in the D-1 District. Of course, the City Council granted Waterside a blanket special exception when it enacted the 1999 Ordinance, which applied to Bar Norfolk and the Café. Upon revocation of the blanket special exception with the enactment of the 2009 Ordinance, Bar Norfolk and the Café asserted vested rights under the 1983 Ordinance to operate as Entertainment Establishments and to provide alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption. That ordinance, however, only authorized the use of property as an urban marketplace type shopping center having uses such as . . . food and beverage stalls and restaurants, including the sale of beer, wine and mixed beverages for on-premises consumption within [a] piece or parcel of land known and designated as Parcel R-1. (Emphasis added.) As the circuit court found, no portion of Bar Norfolk's premises was located within Parcel R-1 encompassed by the 1983 Ordinance. And, only a small portion of the Café's premises lay within Parcel R-1. The portion of the Café within the R-1 parcel, according to the floor plan presented at trial, included only one-eighth to one-sixth of the total space occupied by the 17 Café. 7 Furthermore, the 1983 Ordinance did not create any special exception for business establishments located in Parcel R-1 to operate as an Entertainment Establishment. Thus, except for the small portion of the Café's premises that was within Parcel R-1, the special exception found in the 1983 Ordinance did not apply to either Bar Norfolk's or the Café's business establishment. Providing entertainment or serving alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption was never a permissible use of their respective properties under the 1983 Ordinance. Because Bar Norfolk and the Café assert vested rights to an impermissible land use under the 1983 Ordinance, the circuit court did not err in finding that neither had any vested rights under Code § 15.2-2307. See Goyonaga, 275 Va. at 244, 657 S.E.2d at 160 (Code § 15.2-2307 provides for the vesting of a right to a permissible use of property . . . ; it is not intended to permit, nor does it provide for, the vesting of a right to an impermissible use under the [applicable] ordinance.). Alternatively, Bar Norfolk and the Café assert the right to continue their business operations pursuant to Code § 15.2- 2311(C). They contend that the Cash Receipt each of them received, which was signed by the zoning administrator, bore the 7 Bar Norfolk and the Café do not contest these factual findings. 18 description of Zoning Clearance for Business License, and listed the License Category as an Eating Place, constituted a determination that they could operate as Entertainment Establishments and sell alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption. The provisions of Code § 15.2-2311(C), according to Bar Norfolk and the Café, prohibit any change or modification to that determination. That section states: In no event shall a written order, requirement, decision or determination made by the zoning administrator or other administrative officer be subject to change, modification or reversal by any zoning administrator or other administrative officer after 60 days have elapsed from the date of the written order, requirement, decision or determination where the person aggrieved has materially changed his position in good faith reliance on the action of the zoning administrator or other administrative officer unless it is proven that such written order, requirement, decision or determination was obtained through malfeasance of the zoning administrator or other administrative officer or through fraud. The 60-day limitation period shall not apply in any case where, with the concurrence of the attorney for the governing body, modification is required to correct clerical errors. In contrast to Code § 15.2-2307, this section does provide for the potential vesting of a right to use property in a manner that otherwise would not have been allowed. Goyonaga, 275 Va. 19 at 244, 657 S.E.2d. at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, we agree with the circuit court. The Cash Receipt was not a specific determination by the zoning administrator or any other City official that either of these businesses could use their respective premises in a manner not otherwise allowed under the zoning ordinances in effect at that time. See Board of Supervisors v. Crucible, Inc., 278 Va. 152, 161, 677 S.E.2d 283, 288 (2009); Code § 15.2-2307 (the following are deemed to be significant affirmative governmental acts[:] (vii) the zoning administrator . . . has issued a written order, requirement, decision or determination . . . .). In other words, those documents did not reflect a determination that either Bar Norfolk or the Café could operate as an Entertainment Establishment and provide alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption contrary to the terms of either the 1983 or the 1997 Ordinances. Furthermore, the apparent acquiescence of the City officials in the business operations of Bar Norfolk and the Café does not satisfy the specific requirements of Code § 15.2-2311(C). The burden of establishing the vesting of a right to an otherwise impermissible use of property under Code § 15.2- 2311(C) falls upon the property owner. Goyonaga, 275 Va. at 244, 657 S.E.2d at 160. Bar Norfolk and the Café did not satisfy that burden. Thus, the circuit court did not err in 20 determining that neither Bar Norfolk nor the Café had any vested rights under this statute. B. Statutory Notice and Constitutional Due Process Rights Bar Norfolk and the Café argue that the City Council provided inadequate public notice of agenda item R-19A, to revoke the 1999 Ordinance, in violation of Code § 15.2-2204, and that its denial of their special exception applications without allowing an opportunity for adequate preparation was arbitrary, capricious, and a violation of their due process rights. 8 According to Bar Norfolk and the Café, the City Council denied them adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. They contend that the City Council's procedures did not comply with law, . . . due process or basic notions of fairness and reasonable conduct. Code §§ 15.2-2204(A) and (B) contain certain advertising and written notice requirements applicable when, inter alia, a governing body intends to adopt a comprehensive plan, zoning 8 Bar Norfolk and the Café also claim that the City Council's inclusion of agenda item R-19A violated Code § 2.2- 3707(F). That section requires that [a]t least one copy of all agenda packets and, unless exempt, all materials furnished to members of a public body for a meeting shall be made available for public inspection at the same time such documents are furnished to the members of the public body. They did not make this argument in the circuit court, and we, therefore, will not consider it on appeal. See Rule 5:25. 21 ordinance, or amendment thereof. 9 Code § 15.2-2204(B), however, provides: A party's actual notice of, or active participation in, the proceedings for which the written notice provided by this section is required shall waive the right of that party to challenge the validity of the proceeding due to failure of the party to receive the written notice required by this section. Bar Norfolk and the Café were notified two weeks in advance of the date of the meeting at which the City Council would consider their special exception applications. As the circuit court found, their counsel, employees, and representatives were present at the City Council meeting, and some addressed not only the special exception applications but also the proposed ordinance to revoke the 1999 Ordinance. Both Bar Norfolk and the Café had actual notice and actively participated in the City Council meeting, thus waiving any challenge to the notice based on the statutory provisions. See Code § 15.2-2204(B). In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 9 Contrary to Bar Norfolk's and the Café's arguments, those sections address only advertising requirements, not public notice of the items on a governing body's meeting agenda. 22 (1990). In other words, individuals whose property interests are at stake are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Bar Norfolk and the Café had both. Thus, the circuit court did not err in determining that any statutory notice to which Bar Norfolk and the Café were entitled under Code § 15.2-2204 was waived by their actual notice of and active participation in the City Council meeting, and that the City Council did not violate Bar Norfolk's and the Café's procedural due process rights. 10