Opinion ID: 751138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wilson's Sentencing Argument6

Text: 55 Because the amount of cocaine relevant to Wilson's crimes exceeded 150 kilograms, his base offense level was set at 38 under the Sentencing Guidelines. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1). Judge Norgle increased Wilson's offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1, and applied a four-level reduction under § 3B1.2(a) due to Wilson's status as a minimal participant in the conspiracy. Accordingly, Wilson's final offense level was set by the court at 36 which, in light of Wilson's criminal history, yielded a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment. Judge Norgle sentenced Wilson to a term of 200 months. 56 On appeal, Wilson now argues that the district court erred by not considering Application Note 14 to § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines. This Note provides that, in the absence of certain disqualifying factors, the court may consider a downward departure in a defendant's sentence only if it first finds the following: (a) the amount of controlled substance for which the defendant is accountable results in a base offense level greater than 36; (b) the offense level overrepresents the defendant's culpability; and (c) the defendant qualifies for a mitigating role adjustment under § 3B1.2. 7 Under these circumstances, the court can depart downward to a sentence from the guideline range that would have resulted if the defendant's base offense level had been 36 instead of 38. Had the court chosen to apply this Note to Wilson, for example, his final offense level would have been 34, with a sentence range of 151 to 188 months. 57 Wilson faces two insurmountable hurdles in making this argument. The first is that the district court chose to sentence Wilson to 200 months imprisonment, which the court found appropriately reflected the seriousness of Wilson's crime, when it could have sentenced him to 188 months. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that Judge Norgle thought that Wilson deserved a sentence of less than 188 months. 58 The second hurdle is that Wilson did not request that Judge Norgle consider Note 14 and exercise his discretion in this regard. We review waived sentencing arguments for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Monem, 104 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir.1997). Nonetheless, Wilson contends that his failure to raise the argument in the district court cuts in his favor: He argues that since no mention of the Note was made in the district court, Judge Norgle was not aware of his authority under this provision to depart from the sentence mandated by the Guidelines, and that this asserted error therefore is reviewable on appeal. See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590-91 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that a decision not to depart from the Guidelines is reviewable on appeal when it is the result of an erroneous legal conclusion about the court's authority to depart), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827, 112 S.Ct. 96, 116 L.Ed.2d 67 (1991). Wilson's argument, however, rests on the faulty presumption that the district court is unaware of discretion-vesting provisions that are not raised. We presume that the opposite is true: [A] claim that a seasoned judge ... didn't understand his discretion will rarely, if ever, be successful when built merely on inference. Article III judges are presumed to know the law.... United States v. Kezerle, 99 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir.1996). Because this Court is precluded by statute from reviewing discretionary refusals to downwardly depart, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742; United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1257-58 (7th Cir.1996), and because Wilson has presented no evidence to overcome our presumption that Judge Norgle exercised his discretion in this regard, we reject Wilson's argument concerning his sentence.