Opinion ID: 2213177
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Residence as Domicile

Text: The Indiana Constitution requires that gubernatorial candidates be residents of the state for the five years preceding the election. The specific constitutional language provides: No person shall be eligible to the office of Governor... who shall not have been five years a citizen of the United States and also a resident of the State of Indiana during the five years next preceding his election... . Ind. Const. art. V, § 7 (1851). The framers left us little to discern their intention about the meaning of the phrase resident of the State. The history of this provision, the purpose of the residency requirement, and the caselaw defining residence in other contexts lead us to interpret resident of in art. V, § 7 to mean domiciliary. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had a residency requirement for the Governors of territorial governments. A similar requirement became part of the state constitution when Indiana joined the United States. The first Indiana Constitution provided that the Governor shall have been a citizen of the United States ten years, and have resided in the State five years next preceding his election; unless he shall have been absent on the business of the State, or of the United States... . Ind. Const. art. IV, § 4 (1816). At the 1850 constitutional convention, a delegate suggested that the residency requirement be deleted but the proposal failed. Journal of the Convention of the People of the State of Indiana to Amend the Constitution 537 (1851). The convention did move the two exceptions relating to absence on business of the State or of the United States to the provisions on suffrage. Ind. Const. art. II, § 4 (1851). In framing the issue, we are not interpreting the word reside but rather construing the present phrase resident of in contrast to the prior phrase resided in found in the 1816 constitution. The concept recognized by the phrase resident of was utilized in lieu of the combination of resided in with the express exception for out-of-state government service. It could reasonably be concluded that by eliminating the out-of-state government service exclusion but adopting resident of instead of resided in language, the 1851 Constitution embraced a pure domicile theory. Only two state supreme courts have found constitutional durational residency provisions to require continual physical presence. Both cases involved state constitutions requiring the gubernatorial candidate be both a citizen of the state and a resident of the state. Ravenel v. Dekle, 265 S.C. 364, 218 S.E.2d 521 (1975); Secretary of State v. McGucken, 244 Md. 70, 222 A.2d 693 (1966). In each case, the court read residency to require continuing physical presence because any other interpretation would have made the requirement mere surplusage to the requirement of state citizenship. Ravenel, 265 S.C. at 375-376, 218 S.E.2d at 527; McGucken, 244 Md. at 74, 222 A.2d at 695-696. The Indiana Constitution requires the gubernatorial candidate be a citizen of the United States and a resident of the state. We therefore have no reason to conclude from the constitutional language that residency requires continual physical presence. A constitutional provision for eligibility for office must be interpreted in light of its democratic purposes. Our system of government favors an informed electorate choosing from a range of qualified candidates. It works best on the basis of maximum rather than minimum participation in democracy. The durational residency requirement insures both an informed electorate and a knowledgeable candidate. Voters are assured of the opportunity to scrutinize the candidate and observe for themselves the candidate's conduct, character, philosophy, and experience in government. The residency requirement also insures that candidates have had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the people of Indiana and a sufficient stake in the state they wish to govern. Using traditional legal notions of domicile as a way of determining a candidate's status as a resident of the State furthers these purposes. The concept of domicile insures that a candidate is sufficiently familiar with the state without placing undue limitations on the voters' right to select the candidate of their choice. Such an interpretation of the residency requirement allows voters to consider the candidate's relationship to the state and judge his or her familiarity with its citizens and the issues confronting them. These purposes differ from those advanced by laws requiring a public officer to reside within the political subdivision he serves. Physical presence is necessary to retain office once elected. Such a requirement is intended to make the public officer accessible and responsive. In this context, we have held that a public officer abandons his office when he physically removes himself from the state. See Relender v. State (1898), 149 Ind. 284, 49 N.E. 30 (construing constitutional requirement that county officers reside within their respective counties). In other contexts, we have interpreted residence to mean domicile. In construing residency under the provisions of the tax assessment law, we noted, The word `domicil' is not used in our constitution. Culbertson v. Board of Commissioners of Floyd County (1876), 52 Ind. 361, 366. We examined the constitutional residency requirements for voters and office holders, including the office of Governor, and concluded: The words `inhabitant' and `resident,' `reside' and `resided,' are used as synonymous [sic]. Id. at 366. We determined that for purposes of the enjoyment of a privilege, or the exercise of a franchise, ... domicile and residence are deemed to be equivalent or synonymous, i.e. that the word residence is deemed to mean domicile. Board of Medical Registration and Examination v. Turner (1960), 241 Ind. 73, 79, 168 N.E.2d 193, 196 (construing licensing statute). We have interpreted residence to mean domicile in a variety of other circumstances. State ex rel. Flaugher v. Rogers (1948), 226 Ind. 32, 77 N.E.2d 594 (school admission); Croop v. Walton (1927), 199 Ind. 262, 157 N.E. 275 (taxpayer residency); State ex rel. White v. Scott (1908), 171 Ind. 349, 86 N.E. 409 (eligibility of county office holders); Maddox v. State (1869), 32 Ind. 111 (voter eligibility).