Opinion ID: 785471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of the Magnitude of the Departure

Text: 30 In challenging the district court's decision that the extent of the departure would remain as originally imposed, Barresi argues not only that the extent of the departure was unreasonable but also that despite this Court's directive, the district court deemed the issue [of sentencing] moot and refused to re-tabulate its upward departure so that it would only take into account the two grounds which this Court deemed permissible for upward departure. (Barresi brief on appeal at 23; see also Barresi reply brief on appeal at 1 (contending that the court provided no explanation for the magnitude of the departure at resentencing).) The contentions that the district court believed the matter moot, refused to confine its reconsideration to the two permissible grounds, and gave no explanation are squarely contradicted by the record. 31 As set forth in Part I.B. above, the district court began its decision at the resentencing hearing by stating, I don't agree with the government that addressing sentencing at this time is moot.... (2003 Tr. at 8.) The court then made clear that it would confine its consideration to the two permissible grounds on which it had found a departure warranted, stating that it would go forward with this sentencing procedure eliminating the two factors which the Court of Appeals found improper ( id. ); would tak[e] into account only the extent of the harm to the F.B.I. and to Mr. Barres[i]'s victim ( id. ); and would again depart eight levels on all of the legal grounds for departure ... [that] remain applicable ( id. ). The court stated, Of course I'm not including the impermissible grounds.... ( Id. at 10.) The record thus makes it clear that the magnitude of the departure imposed at resentencing was based only on the two grounds that this Court had found permissible. 32 Nor do we find merit in Barresi's contention that the extent of the departure imposed by the district court on resentencing was either unexplained or unreasonable. In making its determination as to the extent of the departure that was warranted, the court was required to make clear on the record how the court determined the magnitude of the departure, United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 26-27 (2d Cir.1992); see, e.g., United States v. Evans, 352 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2003), although it was not required to undertake a `mechanical level-by-level review of the extent of the upward departure.' United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d at 26 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 847, 113 S.Ct. 140, 121 L.Ed.2d 92 (1992)). The requirement that an explanation be provided is met if the district judge states his reasons for departing and then announces that the sentence he is imposing is appropriate under the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d at 26. 33 In resentencing Barresi in reliance on only the two permissible factors, the district court incorporated by reference its discussion of those factors at the original sentencing hearing held on January 2, 2002, in which the court discussed in detail the harms caused by Barresi's offense, both in the misdirection of valuable federal investigative resources ( see Hearing Transcript, January 2, 2002 (2002 Hearing), at 24), and the emotional harm suffered by the target of Barresi's false accusations ( see id. at 26-27). We consider the statements made at the 2003 hearing sufficient to discharge the district court's obligation to make clear on the record how it determined the extent of the departure imposed. Further, having reviewed the 2002 Hearing explanations, which are summarized in detail in Barresi I, 316 F.3d at 71-72, familiarity with which is assumed, and giving due deference to the district court, we regard the court's explanations as sufficient to show that an eight-step departure was not unreasonable. 34 Imprisonment, however, is ordered in terms of a precise number of months, and our remand for reconsideration required not only a decision as to the appropriate number of steps to climb on the offense level ladder to reach a given Guidelines range but also a determination of the precise number of months to be imposed within the resulting range. The district court determined at resentencing that the eight-step departure was warranted; but it declined to make a finding as to the sentence that would have been imposed within that range, stating, I don't see any reason for me to attempt to analyze precisely what sentence would have been imposed had I not included the[ impermissible factors] where the defendant has already served his time. (2003 Tr. at 10.) Such a reluctance is understandable in view of the fact that time gone by cannot be recaptured. However, given the possibility that Barresi's sentence could be adjusted by a means other than reducing his prison term — i.e., by reducing his term of supervised release — we conclude that the court's failure to determine precisely what prison term within the range of 15-21 months would have been imposed, based only on the permissible factors, left unfinished business. 35