Opinion ID: 91
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stanley's Interrogation and Confession

Text: Stanley contacted the police on the evening of June 19, 1986, to report his wife and five-year-old daughter missing. See State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 809 P.2d 944, 946 (1991). The next afternoon, with the consent of both Stanley and his father, officers searched the pair's auto repair shop, where Stanley's wife's sisters had reported discovering bloodstains and a spent shell casing in the wife's car. See id. at 946-47. While officers searched the shop, Stanley was asked and agreed to accompany Officer Saravo (an investigator) to his office at the county building to be interviewed regarding the disappearance of his wife and daughter. See id. at 947. Stanley was specifically informed that he was not under arrest and was not a suspect. Saravo initially approached the interview as a follow-up to a missing persons report, asking questions to reconstruct the family's activities on the night of the disappearance. He also asked questions to determine where they might have gone. However, there were indications early in the hour-long interview that Saravo suspected Stanley's involvement. Approximately fifteen minutes into the interview, Saravo began to ask Stanley questions related to the officers' discovery of blood in his wife's car. Approximately twenty minutes into the interview, Saravo turned to questions directed toward Stanley's use of his gun in connection with the car. Approximately twenty-five minutes into the interview, Saravo increased the pressure, but still did not reveal his suspicions. (Can you tell me any reason why there would be blood on the outside of your vehicle?); (Can you tell me any reason why there would be blood on the inside of your vehicle?); (I want to tell you right now that there is blood on the vehicle.). About thirty minutes into the interview, after advising Stanley of his Miranda rights, Saravo sought permission to search Stanley's apartment, to which Stanley consented. Before reading the Miranda warnings, Saravo assured Stanley, You weren't under arrest and you're not under arrest at this time . . . He explained that the rights were being read just because we're going to ask you for a consent to search at this point. After reading Stanley his rights, Saravo again stated, you're not under arrest at this time . . . Stanley granted consent to the search approximately thirty-six minutes into the interview and was allowed to leave to get a drink. When Stanley returned, Saravo began to point out the holes he saw in the story Stanley had related. Finally, approximately forty-five minutes into the interview, Saravo confronted Stanley with his suspicion: Do you really think somebody actually surprised you (sic) wife at the shop, took your gun and put her in that car and took her out and killed her and brought the car back? After Stanley answered in the affirmative, Saravo replied, I don't think that could have happened, and then continued, I think if that happened, if that in fact is what happened, that person almost had to have been you. When Saravo then asked Stanley who the perpetrator would have had to have been, Stanley answered, [m]e. At that point Stanley said, I think I better talk to a lawyer. I don't want to say any more. After confirming that Stanley did not wish to answer questions, Saravo indicated that he was concluding the interview and stopped the recording. He did not tell Stanley that he was free to leave. After an unknown period of time elapsed, Saravo turned the tape recorder back on. He purported to recognize Stanley's invocation of his rights (You have requested to talk to an attorney, you don't have to talk to me.), then confronted Stanley with additional evidence and resumed questioning. (It appears now that very strongly that your wife has met some foul play, understand?); (There's nothing more that you would like to do to locate your wife and child?). At least ten minutes passed with Stanley sobbing and Saravo coming and going from the room before the tape ran out. Subsequently, Stanley apparently confessed to the killing. Our colleague in dissent assiduously catalogs every heinous detail of this gruesome crime. See Dissenting Opinion, p. 629-30. There is no doubt that the facts of this case are repulsive. But that is true for every case where the death penalty is imposed. If the resolution of this case rested on the relative heinousness of the offense, we would have no quarrel with our colleague in dissent. However, our charge is to look at the merits of the legal issues raised rather than to focus on the degree to which we are repulsed by the inevitably grisly details of the case. Indeed, our precedent leaves no doubt that the heinous nature of the underlying offense should not be the determining factor. See Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 723 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence can be prejudicial even when the defendant's actions are egregious); see also Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003) (The gruesome nature of the killing did not necessarily mean the death penalty was unavoidable. (citations omitted)).