Opinion ID: 2559630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A More Nuanced Look at the Evolution of the Maryland Law of Post-Arrest, Post-Miranda Silence

Text: That the Supreme Court holds that it is not unconstitutional for a prosecutor to offer evidence relating to a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence in fair response to a claim made by defendant does not end our inquiry. Although holdings of the high Court serve as a national federal constitutional minimum, see Baldwin v. State, 324 Md. 676, 683, 598 A.2d 475, 478 (1991), the Supreme Court recognized that state courts are not force[d] ... to allow impeachment through the use of ... silence. Each jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more probative than prejudicial. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240, 100 S.Ct. at 2130, 65 L.Ed.2d at 96; see Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605, 102 S.Ct. at 1311, 71 L.Ed.2d at 493 (The principles which evolved on the basis of decisional law dealing with appeals within the federal court system are not, of course, necessarily based on any constitutional principle. Where they are not, the States are free to follow or to disregard them so long as the state procedure as a whole remains consistent with due process of law.). Thus, our task is to determine, under our evidentiary rules and caselaw, whether it was error for the prosecutor to elicit evidence regarding Petitioner's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence. Petitioner argues generally that Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights provides heightened protection to the right to silence. Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides [t]hat no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case. We have stated repeatedly that the privilege against self-incrimination protected by Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ` generally ' is ` in pari materia ' with the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Marshall v. State, 415 Md. 248, 259, 999 A.2d 1029, 1035 (2010). A common misperception notwithstandingthat statutory or constitutional provisions that are  in pari materia  with one another must be construed in a like mannerwe said that simply because a Maryland constitutional provision is in pari materia with a federal one ... does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart. Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002). Not inconsistent then with the phrase,  in pari materia,  we have ... interpreted Maryland's privilege against self-incrimination ... to be more comprehensive than that contained in the federal Bill of Rights. [9] Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285, 316, 863 A.2d 321, 339 (2004). Further, more than a half-century ago, in Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 607, 39 A.2d 820, 821 (1944), we noted that the right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination has always been liberally construed in order to give the fullest effect to this immunity.... It is through this lens that we evaluate and understand Maryland caselaw regarding post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, in prior cases and the present one. [10] In Grier, supra , the defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, maiming, and related offenses. Grier, 351 Md. at 244, 718 A.2d at 213. At trial, the trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's questioning of an arresting officer about the defendant's post-arrest [11] behavior asking, [d]id the defendant offer any explanation as to what [the incident] was about? Grier, 351 Md. at 248, 718 A.2d at 214 (emphasis omitted). At a bench conference, the judge informed the prosecutor that the State's question was leading, and the trial court was satisfied with the prosecutor's offer to rephrase the question. Grier, 351 Md. at 248, 718 A.2d at 215. Later, however, the prosecutor was permitted to ask the officerover defense counsel's objection[W]hat, if any, explanation did the defendant offer to you ever why he was or why this was taking place? to which the officer responded, He didn't offer any. Id. (emphasis omitted). We issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether evidence of [defendant]'s post-arrest silence was admissible as `fair response' to the defense theory of the case. Grier, 351 Md. at 244, 718 A.2d at 213. We began our analysis by reiterating a few general principles of law relating to the admissibility of post-arrest silence: Evidence of post-arrest silence, after Miranda warnings are given, is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624 n. 37, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). As a constitutional matter, allowing such evidence would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process. As an evidentiary matter, such evidence is also inadmissible. When a defendant is silent following Miranda warnings, he may be acting merely upon his right to remain silent. Thus, a defendant's silence at that point carries little or no probative value, and a significant potential for prejudice. Grier, 351 Md. at 258, 718 A.2d at 219-20 (some citations and quotation marks omitted); see Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 241, 322 A.2d 211, 216 (1974) (quoting Burko v. State, 19 Md.App. 645, 652, 313 A.2d 864, 868 (1974)) (stating that allow[ing] the police to make an accusatory statement to one who had elected to remain silent and then to permit the police to testify that when the defendant had been accused he did not answer would cloak[] the precepts of Miranda in an armor of gauze). In Grier, however, we did not rely only on the aforementioned principles; we also addressed the State's contentions that the admission of evidence relating to post-arrest silence was permissible under either the opening the door and fair response doctrines. [12] Regarding the opening the door doctrine, we stated that, although the doctrine operates to make evidence which was previously irrelevant... now relevant through the opponent's admission of other evidence on the same issue, Grier, 351 Md. at 260, 718 A.2d at 221 (quoting Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 85, 629 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1993)), the doctrine does not permit the admission of evidence that is inadmissible for reasons other than relevancy or incompetent evidence. Clark, 332 Md. at 87 n. 2, 629 A.2d at 1244 n. 2. We held that the State's evidence of Grier's post-arrest silence was incompetent, not merely irrelevant, and, accordingly, the evidence was not admissible under the opening the door doctrine. Grier, 351 Md. at 261, 718 A.2d at 221. Finally, regarding the fair response doctrine, we held that because Grier merely asked the jurors to pay close attention to the police officers' investigation, [he] had said nothing to generate a response by the State, and, accordingly, the evidence was not admissible under that doctrine. Grier, 351 Md. at 263, 718 A.2d at 222. [13]