Opinion ID: 1842908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: butler's statement to law enforcement officers

Text: Butler complains of the admission into evidence of the third statement she made to law enforcement officers in which she admitted striking the baby in the abdomen. There is no question but that the officers scrupulously gave all the Miranda warnings. Objectively, there was nothing more they could have done. On appeal, however, Butler maintains she lacked the intelligence to knowingly waive her 5th and 6th amendment constitutional rights. In the 1966 landmark decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court mandated specific warnings to an accused  for many years now familiar to every law enforcement officer  of her right to remain silent, that anything she said could be used against her, that she had a right to the presence of an attorney, and an attorney would be appointed for her if she could not afford one. The Court added that after such warnings, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights. (Emphasis added) The Court also stated that when an interrogation continued without the presence of an attorney, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. (Emphasis added) 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. See also, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979); Moran v. Burdine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986). In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n. 9 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 387 (1981), the Court held that whether or not the purported waiver was knowingly and intelligently given was to be found under the totality of the circumstances. In a hearing challenging the competency of a confession, any careful circuit judge can rather easily determine by objective inquiry whether the specific warnings required by Miranda were given. But, suppose the accused is of limited intelligence as so frequently is the case in criminal prosecutions? Miranda has been consistently interpreted by this Court, as well as other state and federal courts, to additionally require a trial court inquiry into the mental capacity of the accused, a far more difficult undertaking. Did he have the mental capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive two very valuable rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution  the right not to incriminate himself, and the right to have the presence and advice of a lawyer before he said anything? Merrill v. State, 482 So.2d 1147 (Miss. 1986); Stevens v. State, 458 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1984); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984); Gator v. State, 402 So.2d 316 (Miss. 1981); Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 399, 401 (Miss. 1976); Hancock v. State, 299 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1974); Harrison v. State, 285 So.2d 889 (Miss. 1973); Dover v. State, 227 So.2d 296 (Miss. 1969); Harvey v. State, 207 So.2d 108 (Miss. 1968). See, Annotation, Mental Subnormality as Affecting Voluntariness or Admissibility of a Confession, 8 A.L.R. 4th 16 (1981). Winfrey v. Wyrick, 836 F.2d 406 (8th Cir.1987) cert. denied sub nom. 488 U.S. 833, 109 S.Ct. 91, 102 L.Ed.2d 67 (1988); Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1972); People v. Henderson, 83 Ill. App.3d 854, 39 Ill.Dec. 8, 404 N.E.2d 392 (1980); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 321 N.E.2d 822 (1975). The above decisions support the finding of the circuit judge in this case that Butler had the intelligence to waive these rights. More importantly, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), held that there is no Constitutional requirement that an accused knowingly and intelligently waived his or her 5th or 6th Amendment rights. Respondent would now have us require sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, see, e.g., Fed Rule Evid 601, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false. Lisenba v. California, 314 US 219, 236, 86 L Ed 166, 62 S Ct 280 [289] (1941). We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the taking of respondent's statements, and their admission into evidence, constitute no violation of that Clause. ... . We think that the Supreme Court of Colorado erred in importing into this area of constitutional law notions of free will that have no place there. There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a voluntariness inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context. The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion. See United States v Washington, 431 US 181, 187 [52] L Ed 2d 238, 97 S Ct 1814 [1818] (1977); Miranda, supra, [384 U.S.] at 460, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602 [1620] 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298, 305, 84 L Ed 2d 222, 105 S Ct 1285 [1290] (1985). The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on free choice in any broader sense of the word. (Emphasis added) Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-70, 107 S.Ct. at 521-23, 93 L.Ed.2d at 484-86. Thus, under Colorado v. Connelly , there is no Constitutional requirement in making a determination whether a confession is free and voluntary to examine the mental capacity of the defendant; the focus is directed entirely to conduct on the part of the state. Also, Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 399 (11th Cir.1988) cert. denied 489 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1329, 103 L.Ed.2d 597 (1989); Winfrey v. Wyrick, 836 F.2d at 411; Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir.1987), reversed in part on other grounds, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Even though there is no Constitutional requirement to do so, it nevertheless remains true as a matter of evidence that before any confession is admissible, it must have been given by a person with enough intelligence to be a competent witness. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 828; Redwine v. State, 258 Ala. 196, 61 So.2d 724 (1952); Ford v. State, 75 Miss. 101, 21 So. 524 (1897). Butler obviously had the intelligence to understand the statements she made to law enforcement officers. It is also true that, aside from any constitutional guarantee, an extorted confession has always been considered worthless as evidence. This Court has always recognized that a confession resulting from threats, physical force or promise of reward was not free and voluntary, and, therefore, incompetent as evidence. The vice of induced confessions, whether under pressure of threat or promise, is seen not so much in the method as in the result. It is the improbability of its being true that vitiates it, even though the courts take frequent occasion properly to condemn forcible methods. Usrey v. State, 198 Miss. 17, 22, 20 So.2d 847, 848 (1945). See also Ammons v. State, 80 Miss. 592, 32 So. 9 (1902); Hamilton v. State, 77 Miss. 675, 27 So. 606 (1900). See generally 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 822 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970).