Opinion ID: 1589326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Juror Matlock

Text: Mr. Baumruk contends that the trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to strike juror Ronald Matlock due to Mr. Matlock's statements during voir dire that he was aware of the case due to media coverage at the time of the event. He stated that it was his understanding that a man had shot his wife in a courthouse and that a gun battle ensued. In response to questioning, Mr. Matlock expressed his belief that Mr. Baumruk previously was convicted and that there were numerous witnesses to the shootings. Because of all the witnesses, Mr. Matlock questioned his ability to presume Mr. Baumruk innocent of the crimes. Defense counsel cross-examined Mr. Matlock about his preconceptions: MR. KENYON: Okay. And then [the prosecutor] also asked you some questions about your ability to presume, you know, Mr. Baumruk is innocent. You said that you have read a number of things that convince you in your mind that he shot his wife and other people in the courtroom back in 1992; is that correct? VENIREPERSON MATLOCK: That's correct. MR. KENYON: Okay. So, have you heard anything at all in the case that had anything to do with what his mental state might have been at that time? VENIREPERSON MATLOCK: Not that I recall. MR. KENYON: Okay. When [the prosecutor] asked you if you could presume that he was innocent and if he failed to prove him guilty, if we were to concede that Mr. Baumruk was the one that committed the shooting, but that's a different thing than saying whether or not you can presume him innocent of murder in the first degree. Murder in the first degree requireswell, I'm not, excuse me, I'm not permitted to get into the definition of the crime of murder in the first degree. Suffice it to say, he has been charged with murder in the first degree and it does involve a mental ailment [sic]. Do you know anything about the mental ailment [sic] of Mr. Baumruk at the time that this crime was committed? VENIREPERSON MATLOCK: No, I do not. MR. KENYON: Okay. So, would you be open and able to consider evidence that might be presented to you, if you were a juror on this case that pertained to the mental state of the defendant? VENIREPERSON MATLOCK: I guess I could. You mean like he just like snapped? MR. KENYON: That or any other number of things that might be presented with regard to his mental state. And I'm not asking you to tell me whether you think that that's true or that actually happened in this case. Obviously you have not heard any evidence. All I'm wondering is whether or not, whether or not you would be able to keep an open mind as to those elements, you know, the elements that pertain to his mental state as it relates to the crime of murder in the first degree. If you could keep an open mind about that thing and listen to the evidence and make your own decision about those things. VENIREPERSON MATLOCK: I guess I could, seeing as how I have not heard anything like that. MR. KENYON: Fair enough. I don't have any other questions. Mr. Matlock also was questioned at length about his ability to recommend the death sentence. On his juror questionnaire, Mr. Matlock wrote, I just could not live with myself knowing that I sent someone to die. I know that it was wrong what a person did, but I could not send them to die. Mr. Matlock repeated this sentiment during questioning and only after significant discussion did Mr. Matlock concede that he could vote for a death sentence under the right circumstances. Here, Mr. Baumruk's failure to challenge Mr. Matlock for cause results in a waiver of review. State v. Wright, 30 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Mo.App.2000). The rule requiring contemporaneous objections to the qualifications of jurors is well founded. It serves to minimize the incentive to sandbag in the hope of acquittal and, if unsuccessful, mount a post-conviction attack on the jury selection process. State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. banc 1991). For that reason, juror challenges made for the first time after a conviction are highly suspect. Id. A clear abuse of discretion and a real probability of injury to the complaining party must be shown, and doubts as to the trial court's finding that a juror is qualified will be resolved in its favor. Id. at 423-24. Despite this waiver, this Court may consider whether plain error occurred. Id. Relief under the plain error rule is granted only when the alleged error so substantially affects the rights of the accused that a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice inexorably results if left uncorrected. Id. at 423. All prejudicial error is not plain error, and [p]lain errors are [only] those which are evident, obvious, and clear. Scurlock, 998 S.W.2d at 586 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only if plain error is found must the court then proceed and determine whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 586. As such, here, this Court must first determine whether plain error occurred. [A] trial court is under no duty to strike a juror on its own motion. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d at 424. See also State v. Eastburn, 950 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Mo.App. 1997). In State v. Overby, this Court emphasized that [t]he absence of any showing by the transcript that the juror was challenged precludes [the Court's] finding that the trial court erred in the respect charged. 432 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Mo.1968). The trial court was under no duty to strike the juror on its own motion. Id. Furthermore, [t]rial strategy is a significant consideration and such assertions of plain error are normally denied without comment. State v. Hatcher, 835 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Mo.App.1992). Here, defense counsel failed to strike peremptorily Mr. Matlock or seek to strike him for cause. As such, this challenge is highly suspect. See Hadley, 815 S.W.2d at 423. The trial court in Mr. Baumruk's proceedings was under no duty to strike Mr. Matlock on its own motion, and, therefore, there was no evident, obvious or clear error. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that defense counsel sought to rehabilitate Mr. Matlock as a viable juror as part of his trial strategy. In reference to another venire member, defense counsel stated that, [a]s a matter of trial strategy [he] did not request to strike [a different venire member] based on certain responses that she gave on the death penalty, but if [he] didn't have to deal with that issue [of the death penalty] it would have been a strike for cause ... or [he] would have requested a strike for cause otherwise given that she had heard that [Mr. Baumruk] had already been sentenced. As in the case of this other juror, the record would support a motion to strike Mr. Matlock for cause; however, the record also demonstrates that Mr. Matlock had great trepidation over voting for a death sentence. This trepidation over voting for the death penalty would be appealing to defense counsel, and defense counsel could decide, as a trial strategy, not to request a strike for cause. The trial court was under no obligation to interfere with defense counsel's trial strategy and strike Mr. Matlock sua sponte and, as such, there was no plain error.