Opinion ID: 2197150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Negative Consequences

Text: The majority lists several negative consequences that would supposedly occur if comparative sentencing analysis were allowed. The first negative consequence the majority espouses is that the permissible range of sentences could be effectively reduced below that set by statute because judges would be forced to follow more lenient sentences given in other cases. The majority reaches this conclusion only because of its refusal to consider the argument actually presented. Defendant argues solely that courts should, in their discretion, be permitted to consider evidence of sentences in other cases as one of the many factors a court considers in fashioning a sentence. Under a discretionary system, judges would be free to consider or reject comparative sentencing information and could assign it whatever weight they deem appropriate. The majority's assertion that the prior lenient sentence would control the later case is simply untrue and unfairly characterizes defendant's argument. It is a well-settled rule that courts are not required to recite and assign a particular value to any particular factor at sentencing. See, e.g., People v. Mayoral, 299 Ill.App.3d 899, 913, 234 Ill.Dec. 72, 702 N.E.2d 238 (1998); People v. Cord, 239 Ill.App.3d 960, 968-69, 180 Ill.Dec. 505, 607 N.E.2d 574 (1993); People v. Kyse, 220 Ill.App.3d 971, 975, 163 Ill.Dec. 334, 581 N.E.2d 285 (1991); People v. Keyes, 175 Ill.App.3d 1013, 1019-20, 125 Ill.Dec. 550, 530 N.E.2d 708 (1988). Defendant does not argue that the evidence of sentences in comparable cases should be assigned any particular value, let alone be deemed controlling, and the majority offers no support for its assertion that this factor would be treated differently. This claim by the majority is merely an incorrect statement that serves only to make the subsequent erroneous conclusion more palatable. The majority denies that it is misconstruing defendant's argument and devotes a paragraph to explaining why its characterization of defendant's argument is accurate. Suffice it to say that the briefs and oral arguments in this case are a matter of public record, and anyone who is interested can find out if it is the majority or the dissent that correctly states defendant's argument. One statement in the majority's characterization of defendant's argument needs to be clarified. The majority seizes on defense counsel's statement at oral argument that, if comparative sentencing evidence is presented to a trial court, the court must consider it. What the attorney said at oral argument was that, like any other evidence that is presented to a court, the court should at least look at it, but that the court could give it whatever weight it is worth, which could be none. In other words, defendant concedes that the trial court has the discretion to give the evidence absolutely no weight. In further explaining why it is not misconstruing defendant's argument, the majority trumpets in italics that defendant seeks to attack his sentence because it is grossly disparate to sentences imposed in other cases. I am unsure what point the majority is trying to make or how that defeats my argument. Of course defendant is seeking to attack his sentence in this case. Whose sentence, if not his own, would he be attacking? The reason we are considering this appeal is that defendant is seeking to attack his sentence based upon a comparative sentencing argument. The only issue is whether defendant should be allowed to make that argument, not whether the other sentences should control defendant's sentence. Finally, even assuming that defendant did argue that courts should be required to engage in comparative sentencing analysis, that does not mean that we could not adopt a discretionary approach. If one party argues black and the other party argues white, we are free to say that the answer is gray. Our responsibility in this case is to state the proper rule for the lower courts, and we are not bound by what either side argues. The majority next argues that comparative sentencing analysis runs the risk of erroneous conclusions. The majority's argument here is that comparative sentencing is not an exact science and that a court will never know all of the facts and circumstances of the other cases. Aside from the fact that such an argument goes only to the weight that should be given the information, not to whether it should be considered, the majority's premise is demonstrably false. Assume a situation in which a first time offender with numerous mitigating factors and no aggravating factors receives the maximum sentence for an offense, while no one else in that circuit, including violent repeat offenders, had ever received the maximum. Would a court really need to know everything about all of those cases to know that the defendant's sentence was unfair and disproportionate? Under the majority's rule, a defendant could not even present that evidence to the court. The majority also argues that comparative sentencing information would be flawed because published appellate opinions represent an incomplete sample that does not include the numerous cases disposed of by unpublished orders. This is a strange argument for the majority to make, given that the defendant in this case relied on Rule 23 orders at the hearing on the motion to reconsider his sentence. One of the main cases defendant compared his to was People v. Estrada, 263 Ill. App.3d 1122, 225 Ill.Dec. 380, 683 N.E.2d 548 (1994) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), in which the defendant committed the same crime in the same county, had substantial aggravating factors, but received a sentence 11 years shorter. The State argues that Rule 23 orders and summary orders cannot be relied on as legal precedent. This argument misses the point because defendant was not relying on the cases for their legal analysis, but as evidence of sentences handed down in similar cases. Further, comparative sentencing information would not be skewed because the Department of Corrections publishes statistics of sentences in criminal cases and makes this information available to trial and appellate courts to be used in imposing and reviewing sentences. [2] See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4.3 (West 1998). Thus, if a court believed that the information presented to it did not fairly represent the range or average of sentences, the court could consult these statistics. The appellate court has referenced these statistics in certain cases in finding that a sentence was excessive. See People v. Weiss, 263 Ill.App.3d 725, 735-36, 200 Ill.Dec. 296, 635 N.E.2d 635 (1994); People v. Neither, 230 Ill.App.3d 546, 551-52, 172 Ill.Dec. 61, 595 N.E.2d 124 (1992); People v. McCumber, 148 Ill.App.3d 19, 24-25, 101 Ill.Dec. 772, 499 N.E.2d 139 (1986). Thus, the majority's concerns about skewed samples are illusory. The court also discounts the use of information about sentences from other cases on the grounds that persons who commit crimes independently are `seldom, if ever, similarly situated.' 189 Ill.2d at 58-59, 243 Ill.Dec. at 180, 723 N.E.2d at 212, quoting People v. Palmer, 162 Ill.2d 465, 491, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797 (1994), quoting People v. Conaway, 101 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 56 Ill.Dec. 756, 427 N.E.2d 1302 (1981). This empty assertion is oft-stated but never proved or supported by authority. The fact is that people who commit the same types of crimes very often are similarly situated. They are not identically situated, of course, but different defendants will frequently exhibit similarities upon which they can be compared. Hundreds of defendants are sentenced every day in this state. Although a court considers many specific factors in sentencing a defendant, the most important considerations are generally the crime committed, other trouble the defendant has been in, and the defendant's rehabilitative potential. For the routine crimes that are committed every day, the judge will have seen countless defendants who are similarly situated. An experienced judge will likely have an idea of what a fair sentence would be, based on the numerous other similar cases that judge has heard. For instance, when a trial judge is faced with a second-time DUI offender, and the assistant State's Attorney recommends the typical disposition for a second-time offender and the trial judge agrees, is the court carefully crafting a sentence based on the individual's circumstances, or is the court giving the defendant the same sentence he gives all other similarly situated defendants? [3] The majority offers no support for its bald assertion that people who commit similar crimes are rarely similarly situated. Trial judges who sentence thousands of defendants cannot be expected to act in a vacuum. See People v. Tye, 141 Ill.2d 1, 23-24, 152 Ill.Dec. 249, 565 N.E.2d 931 (1990). Comparative sentencing evidence would merely augment a judge's own memory of similar cases. Trial judges should not be expected to forget what they did in every other similar case and reinvent the wheel every time a new defendant comes before them.