Opinion ID: 2160832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: instruction on felonies

Text: Myers also complains that, although he had been charged with use of a firearm to commit a felony, the jury was not instructed that any of the other offenses submitted to the jury were, in fact, felonies. As previously noted, the jury was instructed on first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter. The record reflects that the court gave two instructions on the firearm charge, one in the language of the statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-1205(1) (Reissue 1989), and one setting forth the elements of the offense, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof. The defense made no objection to either instruction at the instruction conference, even though the trial court had omitted setting forth that each of the homicide charges upon which it had previously instructed were felonies. Nor did the defense request or submit a proposed instruction that first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter were felonies for the purpose of the firearm charge. Failure to object to a jury instruction after it has been submitted to counsel for review precludes raising an objection on appeal absent plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice. State v. Drinkwalter, 242 Neb. 40, 493 N.W.2d 319 (1992). A party who does not request a desired jury instruction cannot complain on appeal about incomplete instructions. See State v. Huffman, 222 Neb. 512, 385 N.W.2d 85 (1986). On the other hand, we held in State v. Bridger, 223 Neb. 250, 256, 388 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1986), that [when] a trial court fails, after specific request by the defendant, to define a word which makes up an essential element of the crime charged, such failure is prejudicial error requiring reversal. (Emphasis supplied.) The case implies that the trial court is not required to define such terms if a definition is not requested by the defendant and the term has such a generally understood and accepted meaning that no instruction is necessary. Myers argues that although the court and the attorneys knew that first and second degree murder and manslaughter were all felonies, the jury could not be presumed to know this. The word felony is a legal term of art and applies to numerous charges which cannot be said to have a generally understood and accepted meaning to the public at large. We agree with Myers that, in the absence of a definition of felony, the jury was left to speculate as to an essential element of the firearm charge. Once more exercising our prerogative to review the record for plain error, we again note that it is the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury on the pertinent law of the case, whether requested to do so or not, and an instruction which by the omission of certain elements has the effect of withdrawing from the jury an essential issue or element in the case is prejudicially erroneous. State v. Breaker, 178 Neb. 887, 136 N.W.2d 161 (1965). Whether the crimes upon which the jury was instructed are felonies for the purpose of the firearm charge is part of the pertinent law of Myers' case. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on that essential element of the case was prejudicially erroneous. This is plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice and entitles Myers to reversal of his use of a firearm conviction and a new trial.