Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of attorney-client and work product privileges.

Text: In preparation for the sanity phase of the trial, appellant was examined by seven psychiatrists retained by the defense. Only Drs. Mills, Rosenthal, and Satten were called to testify. The names of the other experts were not revealed to the prosecutor, [33] who learned them through jail sign-in sheets and social contacts. In anticipation that the prosecution would seek to elicit evidence that those experts had also examined appellant, appellant sought an in limine ruling that reference to those examinations be excluded on grounds that admission of evidence that other psychiatrists had seen appellant and the content of their interviews would violate the attorney-client and work product privileges. The prosecutor acknowledged that he might seek to argue to the jury that the defense had consulted several experts before finding ones who would testify that appellant was legally insane and seek to establish that an individual who took psychological tests repeatedly could become sufficiently familiar with them to tailor responses favorably. The court ruled that the fact that additional psychiatric reports existed was not shielded as work product, and that during cross-examination of the testifying experts, those experts could be asked if they were aware that other studies and tests had been done. The actual reports were within the work product privilege. Defense counsel then agreed with the court that admission of evidence that other examinations had been made might raise an Evidence Code section 352 problem and the court ruled that eliciting evidence that the defense had been shopping around for psychiatric experts was more prejudicial than probative and could not be admitted unless for some legitimate purpose other than simply showing that additional psychiatrists had examined appellant. During cross-examination of Drs. Mills, Rosenthal, and Satten the prosecutor was permitted, over objection based on the work product and attorney-client privileges, to ask whether they were aware that Drs. Custer, Mates, and French had evaluated appellant. He was also permitted, over objection, to list the credentials of Dr. Mates. In closing argument during the sanity phase the prosecutor emphasized that the defense experts who did testify were engaged many months after the crimes were committed and had no knowledge of the findings of the psychiatrists, engaged by the defense, who had examined appellant earlier and closer to the time of the events. [34] Appellant claims that this violated both the attorney-client and work product privileges, constituted impermissible comment on the exercise of a privilege (Evid. Code, § 913), [35] and denied him due process and the right to counsel guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We agree that the prosecutor's use of this information was improper. While there was no violation of the attorney-client privilege, the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defense experts and his argument did violate the work product privilege. Any error in permitting the questions and argument was harmless, however. The attorney-client privilege is a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer. (Evid.Code, § 954.) That privilege encompasses confidential communications between a client and experts retained by the defense. (Evid.Code, § 952; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 509-510, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) Neither evidence that appellant had been examined by experts other than those who testified nor evidence that the testifying experts were aware or not aware of the opinions of the nontestifying experts disclosed a confidential communication between defense counsel and appellant or appellant and any psychiatrist. Therefore, the decision of the defense to call only three of the experts who had examined appellant did not constitute the exercise of the attorneyclient privilege and comment was not precluded by Evidence Code section 913. The work product privilege, now codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 2018 and applicable in criminal as well as civil proceedings ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 59, 177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534), absolutely bars the use of statutory discovery procedures to obtain [a]ny writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018, subd. (c)), and bars discovery of any other aspect of an attorney's work product, unless denial of discovery would unfairly prejudice a party. ( Id., subd. (b).) This privilege reflects the policy of the state to: (1) preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of the case; and (2) to prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary's industry and efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018, subd. (a).) The prosecutor's cross-examination and his invitation to the jury to infer that defendant had been examined by other experts who had not been called to testify contravened that policy. Work product encompasses the investigation of defendant's mental state to assess both the favorable and the unfavorable aspects of the case. It also encompasses counsel's impressions and conclusions regarding witnesses who would be favorable and those who would not be so. ( Nacht & Lewis Architects, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 214, 217, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 575.) It follows that the party's decision that an expert who has been consulted should not be called to testify is within the privilege. ( County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 647, 656-658, 271 Cal.Rptr. 698.) The prosecutor did not seek or learn the identities of the nontestifying experts through discovery. Regardless of how the information is obtained, however, if a party were permitted to use information about pretrial investigation that reveals opposing counsel's thought processes and reasons for tactical decisions, thorough investigation would be discouraged. By inviting the jury to infer that the other experts were not called because their testimony would not be favorable, the prosecutor also took advantage of defense counsel's efforts and industry. Appellant failed to object to that aspect of the argument, however, and his questions to the defense experts who did testify elicited only answers that knowledge of the nontestifying experts' opinions would not have had any bearing on their own diagnoses. For that reason, and because defendant's mental state was thoroughly explored by the five experts who did testify, and those experts disagreed only as to the severity of his mental illness, any error in permitting the cross-examination was clearly harmless.