Opinion ID: 1529699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fl 12-104

Text: The circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals held that, although the Domestic Relations Master never reached the issue of whether there was a material change of circumstances under FL 12-104, as a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence to support any such finding. We disagree. Before discussing the evidence that could have supported a finding of material change of circumstances, we expressly reject Elizabeth's alternative argument that the Domestic Relations Master implicitly made a finding of material change of circumstances and her reliance on Voishan v. Palma, 327 Md. 318, 609 A.2d 319 (1992). Voishan involved a case where the parties' gross income exceeded the guidelines so that there were no applicable child support guidelines. On appeal, the husband contended that the trial judge's decision to double the support for the minor child was improper because the court had made no express finding of a material change of circumstances. See FL 12-104(a). There was evidence of income and expenses at the time of the pre-guidelines order, which was over five years before the hearing, and of the current income and expenses. Both parties acknowledged before the trial judge that some modification might be in order, and since there were no directly applicable child support guidelines, the only basis asserted for any modification was a material change of circumstances under FL 12-104. We concluded from the record that it was apparent Judge Thieme implicitly made a finding that a change of circumstances had been shown. Voishan, 327 Md. at 324-25, 609 A.2d at 322. In the instant case, the Domestic Relations Master looked only to FL 12-202(b) and neither explicitly nor implicitly found a material change of circumstances under FL 12-104. In determining if there is a material change of circumstances, a court must first look to the circumstances at the time of the original support order. FL 12-202(a)(2)(iv), which was in effect at the time of the June, 1990 order, provides that a trial court need not apply the guidelines if they would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, but the court must state, in writing or on the record, the reasons for departing from the guidelines. A permissible inference in the instant case could be that the parties in their agreement and/or the judge who signed the divorce decree considered the full amount of support called for by the guidelines unjust or inappropriate in light of 12-202(a)(2)(iii) and Earl's obligation to pay one-half of the mortgage on the home where the children were primarily residing. FL 12-202(a)(2)(iii) specifically states: In determining whether the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, the court may consider: 1. the terms of any existing separation or property settlement agreement or court order, including any provisions for payment of mortgages ... [and] the terms of any use and possession order or right to occupy to the family home under an agreement.... Further, FL 12-204(j) provides: Use, possession or occupancy of family home.  (1) Upon the expiration of a use and possession order or the expiration of the right to occupy the family home under a separation or property settlement agreement and upon motion of either party, the court shall review the child support award. (2) If the allocation of financial responsibility for the family home was a factor in departing from the guidelines under subsection (a) of this section, the court may modify the child support, if appropriate in all the circumstances, upon the expiration of the use and possession order or the expiration of the right to occupy the family home under a separation or property settlement agreement. The 1990 order which Elizabeth seeks to modify was based on the agreement of the parties. The amount specifically designated as child support was apparently below the amount called for by the child support guidelines. Even after Earl's salary went down and Elizabeth's salary went up, Earl's support obligation under the agreement was apparently much less than the guidelines support calculated by the Master. The record does not contain the reasons why the judge who issued the divorce decree and support order went below the child support guidelines, but it is reasonable to assume that a significant factor was Elizabeth's use of the family home coupled with Earl's agreement to pay one-half of the mortgage. Earl's mortgage payments were a form of income to Elizabeth and the children, as well as a deduction from Earl's available resources. Thus, Earl's obligation to pay one-half of the mortgage payments may have been a reason for ordering support below the guidelines. If so, when that obligation ceased, there could be a change of circumstances. Whether that change was material will have to be determined on remand. Only part of Earl's mortgage payments directly benefited the children; part of the payments benefited Elizabeth and part of the payments directly benefited Earl by increasing the equity in the house. We have no indication from the judge who signed the divorce decree of the extent to which that expenditure resulted in a decrease in child support because of the decrease in Earl's resources which otherwise would have been applied toward child support. There is also no indication in the record of what Elizabeth's payments will be under the mortgage which is being refinanced to pay off Earl's interest in the home. For all of these reasons, a remand is necessary to determine whether, based on the current circumstances including the cessation of Earl's mortgage payments, there was a substantial change of circumstances and, if so, giving due regard to the entire circumstances including the parties' agreement and their change in income, what amount of child support should be ordered. [1] For the guidance of the court below in determining on remand whether there has been a material change of circumstances by virtue of Earl's cessation of the mortgage contribution, the court must first determine whether the agreement to pay one-half of the mortgage was in some manner a form of child support or was unrelated to child support. If the June, 1990 order provided for child support substantially below the guidelines, it may be assumed, absent evidence to the contrary, that the downward departure from the child support guidelines was based on Earl's obligation to pay one-half of the mortgage. As to whether there would be a material change, although FL 12-202(b) is not directly applicable, it may provide helpful insight into legislative intent. A twenty-five percent change in a support obligation is not a mandatory threshold under FL 12-104, but that twenty-five percent figure may give some guidance in determining what the legislature intended when it required a material change under FL 12-104. We also point out for the bench and the bar that, while parties are encouraged to settle domestic disputes, when doing so, they must be mindful of the needs of their children. When a judge approves and incorporates an agreement of the parents into an order of support, the judge must do more than merely rubber stamp anything to which the parents agree. Judges have an obligation to assure that children do not suffer because of any disparate bargaining power of their parents. Even before the guidelines, this Court made it clear that agreements between the parents were not binding on a court ordering child support. See Stancil v. Stancil, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030, 1033 (1979) ([T]he Chancellor cannot be handcuffed in the exercise of his duty to act in the best interests of a child by any understanding between parents.). See also Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 111, 591 A.2d 501, 504 (1991) (Generally, the duty to support one's minor children may not be bargained away or waived.); Shrivastava v. Mates, 93 Md. App. 320, 327, 612 A.2d 313, 317 (1992) (The law and policy of this State is that the child's best interest is of paramount importance and cannot be altered by the parties.); Rand v. Rand, 40 Md. App. 550, 554, 392 A.2d 1149, 1152 (1978) (The fixing of child support derives from the obligation of the parent to the child, not from one parent to another.). In reviewing support agreements, judges should refer to the child support guidelines, and when approving and incorporating into a court order an agreement containing a downward deviation from the guidelines, the record should reflect the reasons why the judge adopted such an agreement. FL 12-202(a)(2)(iv) specifies: 1. If the court determines that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, the court shall make a written finding or specific finding on the record stating the reasons for departing from the guidelines. 2. The court's finding shall state: A. the amount of child support that would have been required under the guidelines; B. how the order varies from the guidelines; C. how the finding serves the best interests of the child; and D. in cases in which items of value are conveyed instead of a portion of the support presumed under the guidelines, the estimated value of the items conveyed. There is no exception in the statute for child support orders which are based on agreements of the parents. Had the judge who signed the June 13, 1990 order of support indicated for the record whether the child support ordered was below the guidelines and, if so, whether Earl's contribution to the mortgage payments made application of the guidelines unjust or inappropriate, then there probably would have been no need for this extensive and expensive litigation. We would also suggest that where one parent, as part of an agreement, agrees to pay, for a period of time, something that would ordinarily be part of the other parent's expenditures for child support, the parties should make clear their intentions upon expiration of that payment obligation. When such a payment obligation is part of an agreement which also provides for support below the guidelines, it is reasonable to assume that the payment is intended to be a form of child support. The evidence presented at the hearing before the Domestic Relations Master could justify a finding that some or all of Earl's payments of one-half of the mortgage were a form of child support and were a basis for the downward departure from the child support guidelines in the June, 1990 court order. If cessation of Earl's mortgage payments is found to be a material change of circumstances under FL 12-104, there will also have to be a determination of any offsetting effect of the parties' salary changes. For these reasons, the matter is remanded to the court below for further proceedings. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS. McAULIFFE, J., concurs in the result only.