Opinion ID: 795795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Transfer of Martinez to the United States

Text: 29 Finally, Martinez contends that his sentence of life imprisonment plus ten years was imposed in violation of an agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic in connection with his extradition that he would not receive a sentence of imprisonment in excess of 30 years. He contends that the Dominican Republic conditioned his extradition on the promise of the United States to limit any sentence Martinez might receive to 30 years imprisonment. As a consequence, Martinez argues, the sentence that he received was illegal. 3 The district court rejected this challenge on the basis of its factual finding that Martinez's return to the United States was not conditioned on any agreement between the two countries so limiting his sentence. Martinez challenges this finding and, in addition, contends that the district court abused its discretion in making the finding without first holding an evidentiary hearing. 30 As a preliminary matter, the Government contends that if the United States contracted to limit the duration of Martinez's sentence, the right to enforce the agreement belongs to the Dominican Republic and not to Martinez. Different courts in this circuit have viewed the issue differently. See, e.g., United States v. Martonak, 187 F.Supp.2d 117, 121 (S.D.N.Y.2002); United States v. Nosov, 153 F.Supp.2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y.2001). This court has not ruled on the question. 31 We need not resolve this question. We affirm because we find no error in the district court's findings or proceedings. In the first place, the extradition treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic contains no provision so limiting sentences. Secondly, although the Dominican Republic apparently has a law providing for such a limitation when it extradites its citizens to other countries, Martinez failed to submit any document showing that the Dominican Republic invoked the law in its dealings with the United States in connection with Martinez's extradition. 32 The Government's papers in response further confirmed that the United States received no communication from the Dominican Republic seeking agreement limiting his sentence, and that none of the procedures conventionally followed by extraditing nations in seeking such agreements were followed by the Dominican Republic. Martinez submitted nothing to rebut the Government's showing. In short, the most that was shown by Martinez's submissions was that officials of the Dominican Republic believed, no doubt based on the domestic law of the Dominican Republic, that Martinez's sentence would be so limited. None of the submissions by Dominican officials, however, pointed to any agreement or undertaking made by the United States to limit his sentence or even to a communication from the Dominican Republic to the United States expressing an expectation that the sentence would be so limited. 33 Martinez's legal argument is necessarily predicated on the existence of an undertaking by the United States vis-a-vis the Dominican Republic that his sentence would not exceed 30 years. The statutes of the Dominican Republic would not, of their own force, bind the United States. Cf. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1192 (2d Cir.1980) ([N]o nation may unilaterally bind another sovereign by the sheer force of its statutory enactments . . . .). Although he had over six months between the jury's finding of guilt and the actual sentencing proceeding, Martinez failed to produce any evidence that the United States ever entered into an agreement or undertaking to limit the duration of his sentence. Furthermore, while Martinez requested an evidentiary hearing, he produced no indication what witnesses he would call or what evidence he would adduce beyond the inadequate contents of his written submissions. 4 34 The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing during sentencing . . . remains in the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Cotto, 347 F.3d 441, 448 n. 7 (2d Cir.2003); see also United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 330 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that such discretion is broad). Under the circumstances presented in this case — including the length of time between conviction and sentencing; the lack of evidence establishing an agreement or undertaking on the part of the United States vis-a-vis the Dominican Republic; and Martinez's failure to identify what, if any, evidence he might have submitted at a future hearing to challenge the conclusion that no such agreement was reached — we find that the district court neither abused its discretion nor erred in rejecting Martinez's claim without conducting a hearing.