Opinion ID: 1095272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the claim against the louisville municipal school district, david chambliss and bobby bowman should have been dismissed based on the doctrine of qualified immunity

Text: ¶ 13. We have stated: In 1982, this Court abolished judicially created sovereign immunity in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1982), holding that it was the legislature's duty to determine the extent of sovereign immunity. The legislature responded by enacting Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-46-1 et seq., which was a comprehensive torts claim act providing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Hord v. City of Yazoo City, 702 So.2d 121, 123 (Miss.1997). However, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-6 stated that the Act was not yet effective and that the common law that existed before Pruett would govern until the act became effective. In 1992, in Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 608 So.2d 1288 (Miss.1992), we held that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-6 was unconstitutional because it sought to revive law by reference. Subsequently, we held that Presley was to be applied prospectively only. Robinson v. Stewart, 655 So.2d 866 (Miss.1995). Jackson v. Daley, 739 So.2d 1031, 1040 (Miss.1999). The case sub judice is a post- Pruett, pre- Presley cause of action because it arose August 29, 1991. Therefore, according to Robinson, we must follow § 11-46-6 which directs us to apply pre- Pruett common law. Jackson, 739 So.2d at 1040. ¶ 14. For the District, the doctrine of sovereign immunity mandates a finding of non-liability. See Gressett v. Newton Separate Mun. School Dist., 697 So.2d 444, 445-46 (Miss.1997) (finding school district was protected by sovereign immunity for incident occurring in August 1993). ¶ 15. For Bowman and Chambliss individually, [p]re- Pruett common law mandates a finding of whether the act involved is a discretionary function or a ministerial function.... An official will be immune when the act being performed is discretionary. Id. (citing Coplin v. Francis, 631 So.2d 752, 753 (Miss.1994)) (internal citations omitted). ¶ 16. In Quinn v. Mississippi State University, 720 So.2d 843 (Miss.1998), we were faced with a factual situation comparable to the present case. Bobby Quinn was injured June 22, 1992, while participating in a summer baseball camp at Mississippi State University. An instructor at the camp hit Quinn with a baseball bat during a hitting demonstration. Quinn lost one tooth and suffered permanent damages to four other teeth. Quinn, 720 So.2d at 844-45. Quinn sued the university President, the head baseball coach and an assistant baseball coach, who was also director of the camp. Id. ¶ 17. We affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the three defendants stating limited immunity applies to actions by a state agency, an arm of the state or local government and the members thereof, who either for remuneration or as a public service, engage in discretionary functions for which the agency or governmental arm was formed. Id. at 849. (citations omitted). The three defendants in Quinn were not present at the time of the injury, but they were engaged in hiring employees, and coordinating, and supervising the baseball program either directly or indirectly. The motion for summary judgment was correctly granted as [the defendants] were engaged in a discretionary activity that served a public interest. Id. ¶ 18. In a case even more factually akin to the case at bar, Lennon v. Petersen, 624 So.2d 171 (Ala.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the effect of qualified immunity on a negligence action brought against a soccer coach and university trainer by an injured soccer player. Lennon, 624 So.2d at 171. Patrick Lennon alleged his coach was negligent in not recognizing his injuries and providing the proper treatment. Id. at 173. Lennon experienced sharp pain in his hip and groin during soccer practice and received treatment from the University of Alabama at Huntsville athletic trainer, Debbie Lee. Id. Lee diagnosed his injury as groin strain and treated him with ice and electricity. Id. Lennon's injury persisted and he sought treatment from a physician after the season ended. Lennon's physician diagnosed his condition as avascular necrosis which had worsened because of the treatment he received during the course of the soccer season from Lee and under the direction of Peterson, his soccer coach. Id. Lennon required surgery to help his problem, but was forced to avoid any activities that could cause a jarring of his hip bones. He also faced the prospect of premature arthritis and a hip joint replacement in the future. Id. ¶ 19. In addressing the negligence claim against Lennon's coach, the Alabama Supreme Court stated: Petersen's actions clearly fall into the category of discretionary acts. Petersen had to rely on his own judgment and discretion in making difficult decisions while performing his job. He had to determine what drills his players needed and how long the drills should last. He also had to evaluate his players to determine if they were playing to the best of their ability. He had to make difficult decisions in determining whether a player was injured and should report to the trainer or whether the player was merely faking an injury to avoid practice. He also had to be aware that some players would hide their injuries so that they would be allowed to practice or to play in a game. He was responsible for motivating the players and evaluating their performance. Petersen was acting within his authority in using his discretion in such matters, and he is entitled to discretionary function immunity. Id. at 174 ¶ 20. Like the defendants in Quinn, high school football coaches Bowman and Chambliss were responsible for coordinating and supervising the football program at Nanih Waiya High School. Bowman and Chambliss also faced the same daily coaching decisions as did Coach Peterson in Lennon. The Alabama Supreme Court's description of the nature of a coach's job is important to consider. In a typical practice there are strains, sprains and complaints from a coach's players. A coach must consider the good order and discipline of the team when confronted with situational complaints by the players. A coach must use his discretion in judging whether or not an individual player is injured and then, whether the player should report to a trainer or seek other medical aid. There was no evidence presented in the lower court to show that either Bowman or Chambliss did anything beyond exercising ordinary discretion in supervising the Nanih Waiya football practice on August 29, 1991. Prince produced no facts that evidenced any disregard for his health or any other outrageous action on the part of Bowman or Chambliss that might have warranted a departure from our previous holdings. The trial court correctly found the coaches were protected by qualified immunity. ¶ 21. For the reasons discussed above, this assignment is without merit.