Opinion ID: 1932899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mrs. Cowee's Negligence as a Matter of Law

Text: Country Club also appeals the pretrial order of December 30, 1997, in which the trial court held that Mrs. Cowee was not negligent per se for entering Route 52 without stopping. Country Club argues that Mrs. Cowee violated 21 Del. C. §§ 4133 and 4165 because she failed to stop at the exit of the country club's private roadway, and that this failure constituted the proximate cause of the accident. [19] It is not disputed that Mrs. Cowee failed to stop upon leaving Country Club's private roadway prior to entering Route 52. The issue is whether the trial court correctly held that significant evidence existed to permit the jury to find that Mrs. Cowee likely did not know she was about to exit Country Club's private roadway and enter Route 52. 21 Del. C. § 4133 provides in relevant part: The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a roadway from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed. 21 Del. C. § 4165 provides in relevant part: The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, driveway, private road or building where there is no official traffic-control device shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across any alleyway, driveway or private road and shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid collision, and before entering the roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway. Country Club argues, therefore, that Cowee was negligent as a matter of law in entering Route 52 because it is not disputed that she did not stop before she entered the highway. The Superior Court correctly declined to hold Cowee negligent per se as a matter of law because it followed the Delaware common law rule that before a traffic statute requiring a driver to yield to other vehicles can be enforced, it must be established that the motorist is aware or as a reasonable person should be aware, that the situation in which she is in requires compliance with the statute. In Green v. Millsboro Fire Company , [20] we held that in a collision between a plaintiff driver and a defendant emergency vehicle, before the plaintiff could be found guilty of violating the right-of-way emergency vehicle statute, 21 Del. C. § 4134, for purposes of a finding of negligence per se, it must first be established that the plaintiff was aware or should have been aware of the emergency vehicle. The Superior Court in its December 30, 1997, Order correctly held: Cowee was not negligent per se as a matter of law because if there are no reasonable circumstances from which an ordinary, prudent driver could conclude that the intersection was located anywhere other than where it actually was, then the driver may be found negligent per se for failing to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic under §§ 4133 and 4165. If, under the circumstances at the time of the accident, an ordinary, prudent driver might reasonably be unable to ascertain the actual location of the intersection or that the driver was approaching an intersection, then a driver's contributory negligence for failure to stop and yield the right-of-way becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine. The Court finds that a question of fact exists as to whether, under the conditions as they existed on the night of November 13, 1997, Cowee could have reasonably ascertained where the intersection was located. [21] Country Club attempts to distinguish Green from the present case in that Green involved a moving vehicle, which led to the great difficulty the plaintiff had in seeing the emergency vehicle, whereas here, Route 52 could not be considered a hidden danger due to its static location and size. We are unpersuaded. The Superior Court correctly found that a reasonable person could have difficulty in ascertaining the exact location of Country Club's private roadway exit due to a lack of visibility or misleading location devices, and because there was no traffic-control device that would put a motorist on notice of the Route 52 intersection.