Opinion ID: 2614604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fields's entitlement to credit for presentence confinement

Text: In order to obtain mandamus relief, Fields must satisfy a three-part test. See Meredith, 954 P.2d at 601. First, he must have a clear right to the relief sought. Id. Second, the DOC must have a clear duty to perform the act requested. Id. Third, Fields must not have any other available remedy. See id. The central issue in this case is whether Colorado law requires the DOC to give Fields 329 days presentence confinement credit towards his parole eligibility date. The resolution of this case thus turns on the harmonization of the statute governing parole eligibility for prisoners serving life sentences with the statute setting forth a prisoner's entitlement to credit for presentence confinement. When Fields was sentenced in 1982, the following statute applied to his eligibility for parole: (b) No inmate imprisoned under a life sentence for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1977, shall be paroled until he has served at least twenty calendar years, and no application for parole shall be made or considered during such period of twenty years. § 17-22.5-104(2)(b), 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.). Presentence confinement credit was governed by section 16-11-306, 8 C.R.S. (1981 Supp.), which provided: XX-XX-XXX. Credit for presentence confinement. A person who is confined prior to the imposition of sentence is entitled to credit against the term of his sentence for the entire period of such confinement. At the time of sentencing, the court shall make a finding of the amount of presentence confinement to which the offender is entitled and shall include such finding in the mittimus. Such period of confinement shall be deducted from the sentence by the department of corrections. (Emphasis added.) Fields asserts that section 16-11-306 requires that he receive 329 days credit towards the twenty calendar years he must serve before being eligible for parole. The DOC takes the position that the twenty calendar years for inmates serving life sentences does not begin to run until the date on which the inmate is actually sentenced to the DOC. Thus, the DOC claims that section 16-11-306 does not apply to inmates serving life sentences. The DOC relies in part on two Colorado Court of Appeals cases, decided a decade apart, holding that the DOC is not required to take presentence confinement credit into account in calculating parole eligibility dates for inmates serving life sentences. See Derrick v. Colorado Bd. of Parole, 747 P.2d 696 (Colo.App.1987), cert. dismissed, (Colo. Dec. 8, 1987); People v. Payseno, 954 P.2d 631 (Colo.App.1997), cert. denied, (Colo. May 11, 1998). In Derrick, the court of appeals was interpreting section 17-22.5-104(2)(a), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), which provided that [n]o inmate imprisoned under a life sentence for a crime committed before July 1, 1977, shall be paroled until he has served at least ten calendar years, and no application for parole shall be made or considered during such period of ten years. Derrick, 747 P.2d at 697. Derrick held that subsection (2)(a)'s reference to calendar years indicated the General Assembly's intent that the ten-year period not be reduced by any type of time credits, including presentence confinement credits. Derrick, 747 P.2d at 696. In Payseno, the court of appeals relied heavily on Derrick to hold that section 17-22.5-104(2)(b) (one of the two subsections involved in this case) did not permit a credit for presentence confinement towards the twenty calendar years that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment must serve before being eligible for parole. See 954 P.2d at 633. However, there is one critical difference between the facts in Derrick and Payseno. When the defendant in Derrick was sentenced in 1975, the presentence confinement credit statute relevant to this case, section 16-11-306, was not yet in effect. Unlike section 16-11-306, the predecessor statute then applicable did not mandate a day-for-day reduction in the sentence of imprisonment: In sentencing a defendant to imprisonment the sentencing judge shall take into consideration that part of any presentence confinement which the defendant has undergone with respect to the transaction for which he is to be sentenced. Chapter 44, § 39-11-306(1), 1972 Colo. Sess. Laws 249 (emphasis added). When the Payseno court concluded that Derrick was controlling authority, it failed to take account of this critical change in the presentence confinement credit statute. See Payseno, 954 P.2d at 632-33. For the following reasons, we conclude that Payseno was incorrectly decided, and we hold that section 16-11-306 requires the DOC to credit Fields with the 329 days he spent in presentence confinement when it calculates his parole eligibility date. First, sections 17-22.5-104(2)(b) and 16-11-306 are not in conflict. The plain language of section 17-22.5-104(2)(b) does not prohibit a defendant from receiving credit for presentence confinement in calculating the twenty calendar year period; indeed, it makes no mention of presentence confinement. The presentence credit of section 16-11-306 is a day-for-day credit and is as much calendar time as is straight time served in the DOC. As we stated in People v. Freeman, 735 P.2d 879, 881, Section 16-11-306 mandates that presentence confinement in a jail facility becomes part of the time served on the convicted person's sentence. Giving effect to the plain meanings of both section 17-22.5-104(2)(b) and section 16-11-306, Fields is therefore entitled to credit for the period of his presentence confinement against the twenty calendar years he must serve before being eligible for parole consideration. Second, even if we were to find the term calendar years in section 17-22.5-104(2)(b) to be subject to alternative interpretations, the rule of lenity would persuade us to adopt the construction we do today. The rule of lenity requires us to construe any ambiguities in a penal statute in a manner favoring the person whose liberty interests are affected by the statute. Faulkner v. District Court, 826 P.2d 1277, 1278-79 (Colo.1992) (holding that although the statutes governing good time credits were capable of alternative interpretations concerning their applicability to persons serving jail time as a condition of probation, such persons are eligible for good time credit). Third, again assuming that section 17-22.5-104(2)(b) is ambiguous, we recognize our duty to construe statutes in a way that does not raise constitutional concerns. [S]tatutory terms should be construed in a manner that avoids constitutional infirmities. Thus, if a statute is capable of alternative constructions, one of which is constitutional, then the constitutional interpretation must be adopted. People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Colo.1994) (citations omitted). Here, the interpretation that the DOC urges us to follow raises equal protection concerns. Indigent defendants who are not able to post bail and who are subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment would be treated more harshly than defendants who have the financial resources to post bond. [9] Cf. State v. Seeley, 212 Wis.2d 75, 567 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Ct.App.) (indicating that an inmate's equal protection argument would have merit if financial considerations were the only considerations in denying inmate presentence incarceration credit for purposes of parole eligibility), review denied, 212 Wis.2d 689, 569 N.W.2d 590 (1997). It was precisely to prevent this unequal treatment of rich and poor that the General Assembly made presentence confinement credit mandatory rather than discretionary. See Massey v. People, 736 P.2d 19, 21 (Colo.1987) (stating that [t]he purpose of section 16-11-306 is to eliminate the unequal treatment suffered by indigent defendants who, because of their inability to post bail, are confined longer than their wealthier counterparts). We therefore hold that Fields is entitled to 329 days presentence confinement credit towards his parole eligibility date. We overrule People v. Payseno, 954 P.2d 631 (Colo. App.1997), to the extent it is inconsistent with our holding today. We briefly return to the three elements necessary for the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus. First, the DOC does not dispute the fact that Fields spent 329 days in presentence confinement. Based on our holding today, it is clear that Fields has a right to be credited with this time towards the calculation of his parole eligibility date. Second, it is also clear that the DOC has a duty to recalculate his parole eligibility date accordingly. The only remaining question is whether any other remedy is available to Fields. We have already determined that habeas corpus is not appropriate. See section II. A., supra. Nor can Fields obtain relief under Rule 35, since this case does not concern the legality of the sentences imposed by the Arapahoe County District Court. Thus, we find that no other remedy apart from mandamus is available to Fields. Hence, the issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus is appropriate.