Opinion ID: 2602242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: expert eyewitness identification testimony

Text: ¶ 13 Defendant argues the trial court's exclusion of the proffered expert testimony regarding the dangers and fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony violated his rights to due process and to present a defense. The State counters that State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133, specifically resolves this issue in the State's favor. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the testimony of defendant's proposed expert witness regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification. ¶ 14 Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identification should be allowed is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at ¶ 43, 27 P.3d 1133 (citing, inter alia, State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982)); see also State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981). Because the admission of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification may not be improper in all instances, we noted parenthetically in Butterfield that the admission of eyewitness identification testimony is conditional. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at ¶ 43, 27 P.3d 1133 (quoting 31A Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 370 (1989)). We have not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. Instead, we recognize that whether to allow proffered expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification testimony is a matter best left to the trial court's discretion because of the trial court's superior position to judge the advisability of allowing such testimony. ¶ 15 Certainly a defendant may have witnesses, including expert witnesses, testify on his or her behalf. Whether testimonial evidence is admitted, however, including the testimony of an expert witness, is controlled by the trial judge. Proffered expert testimony about the deficiencies in the identification testimony of one or more percipient witnesses presents a dilemma. If the expert witness is permitted to testify, he or she will evaluate for the jury, either directly or indirectly, to what extent the percipient witness testimony should be believed. Permitting an expert witness, either directly or indirectly, to analyze the credibility of a percipient witness for the jury and thereby opine regarding whether eyewitness testimony is reliable or not, to a certain extent, steps into the province of the jury, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility, At Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 46 A.L.R.4th 1047 § 3[a]; 31A Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 371 n. 71 (1989), and in our judicial system it is the role of the jury to decide how much weight to give the testimony of particular witnesses, not the role of independent experts. On the other hand, if a proposed expert witness is not permitted to testify about the limitations inherent in eyewitness identifications, the jury might not be educated about the potential deficiencies of eyewitness identification, and it will fall upon the court to instruct the jury on the limitations and problems that research has discovered. ¶ 16 In Butterfield this court acknowledged the limitations inherent in eyewitness testimony, and we reiterated that because of these inherent deficiencies trial courts are required to give a cautionary jury instruction when eyewitness identification `is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense.' 2001 UT 59 at ¶ 42, 27 P.3d 1133 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986)). In Butterfield we stated, the calling of expert witnesses to testify as to matters which would apply to any crime or any trial does not in the true sense offer testimony of a witness who has knowledge of the facts of the case. Rather, it would be in the nature of a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the evidence. Id. at ¶ 43. We then reiterated that a trial court's refusal to admit evidence would not constitute an abuse of discretion when proffered expert testimony would amount to a lecture to the jury as to how they should weigh testimonial evidence. Id. ¶ 17 In some cases, to permit one expert to analyze circumstances present when an eyewitness observed a defendant and suggest how accurate an eyewitness' identification is would undoubtedly result in a similar analysis by an opposing expert who would analyze the same circumstances and offer a contrary opinion. Such expert testimony, regardless of whether it is presented hypothetically or by applying the circumstances of a particular case, will result in dueling experts evaluating for the jury how much weight to give to the testimony of percipient witnesses. In some cases, the proffered testimony might be a lecture to the jury regarding the scientific bases and research underlying the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification. Therefore, it is left to the trial court's sound discretion to decide whether the proffered expert testimony would constitute a lecture, the substance of which can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a jury instruction, as opposed to through expert testimony. ¶ 18 If the trial court determines that the better result would be to educate the jury through a Long instruction, counsel are certainly able to present proposed Long instructions that explain the potential effects of certain circumstances on the powers of observation and recollection and present their positions on how the Long cautionary instruction should be given. ¶ 19 In this case the trial court gave a cautionary Long instruction instead of permitting expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. [4] The jury instruction could have better explained the substance of the proffered expert testimony, supra, n. 1, namely the research and scientific principles underlying the limitations of eyewitness identification. See Long, 721 P.2d at 488-494 (providing an overview of scientific research on the unreliability of eyewitness identification). Nevertheless, such proffered expert testimony is the type of lecture testimony that, in cases such as these, can be adequately conveyed to the jury through an instruction. ¶ 20 [A] trial court's determination that expert testimony would amount to a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the evidence, and its subsequent refusal to admit such testimony into evidence `is not an abuse of discretion, particularly where there has been no showing that the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict.' Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at ¶ 43, 27 P.3d 1133 (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982)). Arguably, had the eyewitness identification expert testified the verdict might have been different because the substance of the proffered testimony research and theory concerning memory, the reporting of memory, and the variables known to influence memory and memory reportswas not part of the Long instruction given. However, the trial court correctly found that the proffered expert testimony would amount to a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the evidence, noting that the proffered testimony would, in fact, merely lecture the jury, and that it would have a significant tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role as fact finder.... Moreover, we are not convinced that the expert's proffered testimony would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict. In the cautionary instruction the court admonished the jury to evaluate whether the witnesses' identification of the defendant was the product of their memory, asking them to consider the length between the incident and the photo array identification, the witnesses' capacities, the witnesses' exposure to opinions and descriptions of identifications given by other witnesses, whether any eyewitness gave a description inconsistent with the defendant's appearance, and the circumstances of the photo array presentation in the parking lot. Although this instruction was not ideal, it tracks one of the proposed instructions in Long. [5] Its failings do not disqualify it from use, and it satisfies our expressed concerns about the need for cautionary instructions. Long, 721 P.2d at 495. We continue to trust, however, that trial courts will be able to specifically tailor instructions other than those offered in Long that address the deficiencies inherent in eyewitness identification. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the expert testimony and in giving the instruction it did.