Opinion ID: 156794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mandate of Appellate Court

Text: 36 The FDIC also argues that Defendants' Rule 60(b) motions were an attempt to have the district court disregard this court's mandate on remand. The district court appears to have assumed that it was precluded from granting Defendants' motions by this court's mandate. The district court stated that Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be properly used to alter the substantive content of a judgment once it has been affirmed on appeal, except in extraordinary circumstances. The district court then concluded that Defendants had failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and that reconsideration of any issue other than the Lowe settlement would therefore violate the Tenth Circuit mandate remanding for further proceedings consistent with the Tenth Circuit's opinion. 37 This court's mandate did not, however, preclude the district court from granting Defendants relief under Rule 60(b). Although strict compliance with the mandate of the reviewing court is required, a district court may consider a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen a decision that has been affirmed on appeal when the basis for the motion was not before the appellate court or resolved on appeal. See Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18-19, 97 S.Ct. 31, 50 L.Ed.2d 21 (1976). A court is not flouting the mandate of the appellate court by acting on a motion raising events occurring after the trial or appeal because the appellate mandate relates to the record and issues then before the court, and does not purport to deal with possible later events. Id. at 18, 97 S.Ct. 31. 38 In this case, Defendants were seeking to reopen the judgment to consider whether they are entitled to a credit for the FDIC's post-trial recovery from the remaining collateral. Defendants' motions thus related to facts arising after the trial: the post-trial settlements with investors and the liquidation of the remaining collateral. The motions did not raise an issue which was resolved on appeal, either expressly or implicitly. 39 In our prior opinion, this court did refer to the loan collateral. In addressing Defendants' argument that there was no loss under the bonds because the loan was fully collateralized, the court stated that whether a loss occurred is determined regardless of the security the bank has for the loss. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotations omitted). The court then continued: 40 The value of the collateral does not define the loss; rather, if the collateral is finally determined in favor of the insured, under the terms of the bond, it becomes a recovery applicable against the loss. The certificates of deposit and promissory notes that remain the subject of separate litigation have not yet been finally determined in favor of the FDIC; therefore, until such time as they are, or until the FDIC enters into settlements with the remaining investors, the value of the certificates does not reduce the FDIC's loss. 41 Id. (citations omitted). 42 This court further rejected Defendants' argument that there was no loss under the bonds because the FDIC was a holder in due course of the remaining collateral. The court stated that this case was not the proper forum for deciding whether the FDIC was a holder in due course of the collateral, as the investors were not parties in the case. See id. at 1081-82. The court further noted that 43 the ultimate collectibility of the notes and certificates does not absolve Defendant from its present liability under its bond. This is so because Defendant is liable until the notes and certificate are finally determined in favor of the FDIC, or until the FDIC enters into settlements with the remaining investors. 44 Id. at 1082 (internal quotations, alterations, and citation omitted). 45 Although the above language in this court's prior opinion did not expressly address or approve Defendants' present claims, the language certainly did not foreclose Defendants from requesting that the district court reopen the judgment based on the FDIC's post-trial recovery on the remaining collateral. Nor would the district court's grant of relief under Rule 60(b) flout this court's mandate remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Id. at 1083. The district court was therefore not precluded by this court's mandate from considering the Rule 60(b) motions. The district court's denial of relief on the ground that such denial was dictated by this court's mandate thus constituted an abuse of discretion. Cf. Lyons, 994 F.2d at 727. 46