Opinion ID: 1838104
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: It must be conceded the existent unrestricted prior felony conviction impeachment view, to which reference is above made, has been subjected to more than minimal criticism.

Text: We inceptionally note this censorious observation in McCormick on Evidence, § 43 at 93-94: The sharpest and most prejudicial impart of the practice of impeachment by conviction    is upon one particular type of witness, namely, the accused in a criminal case who elects to take the stand. If the accused is forced to admit that he has a `record' of past convictions, particularly if they are for crimes similar to the one on trial, the danger is obvious that the jury, despite instructions, will give more heed to the past convictions as evidence that the accused is the kind of man who would commit the crime on charge, or even that he ought to be put away without too much concern with present guilt, than they will to its legitimate bearing on credibility. This places the accused, who has a `record' but who thinks he has a defense to the present charge, in a grievous dilemma. If he stays off the stand his silence alone will prompt the jury to believe him guilty. If he elects to testify, his `record' becomes provable to impeach him, and this again is likely to doom his defense. Where does the balance of justice lie ? Most prosecutors would say with much force that it would be unfair to permit the accused to appear as a witness of blameless life, and this argument has generally prevailed. But in England and in Pennsylvania the accused who takes the stand is shielded, under certain circumstances, from inquiry or proof as to misconduct or conviction of crime when offered to impeach. Similarly the Uniform Rule provides that if the accused does not offer evidence supporting his own credibility the prosecution shall not be allowed, on cross-examination or otherwise, to prove for impeachment purposes his commission or conviction of crime. On balance it seems that to permit, as these provisions do, one accused of crime to tell his story without incurring the overwhelming prejudice likely to ensue from disclosing past convictions, is a more just, humane and expedient solution than the prevailing practice. See generally Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (1964); State v. Underwood, 248 Iowa at 447-448, 80 N.W.2d at 733, State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657, 659-662 (1971); People v. Farrar, 36 Mich.App. 294, 193 N.W.2d 363, 368-369 n. 20 (1971); cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (concurring opinion); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479-481, 69 S.Ct. 213, 220-221, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); 41 Iowa L. Rev. at 337-345. But see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1471, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971); Spencer v. State of Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-565, 87 S.Ct. 648, 652-654, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967); State v. Van Voltenburg, 260 Iowa 200, 210, 147 N.W.2d 869 (1967); Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255, 260-262 (1973).