Opinion ID: 6497738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Violation—Excessive Force

Text: The Fourth Amendment prohibits state and federal governments from making unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Excessive force claims are “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). That standard asks whether the police employed objectively 9 Appellate Case: 20-3132 Document: 010110705190 Date Filed: 07/05/2022 Page: 10 reasonable force given the totality of the circumstances. See Thomson v. Salt Lake City, 584 F.3d 1304, 1313 (10th Cir. 2009). This inquiry pays “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” City of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). In Graham, the Supreme Court identified three factors a court should consider when evaluating a claim that police officers used excessive force: “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 490 U.S. at 396. Accepting the district court’s factual determinations, as we must, we find that the district court did not err in denying summary judgment in favor of Finch. The district court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that (1) Rapp fired a shot when he could see Finch’s hands were empty, (2) Rapp’s assertion that Finch made a threatening motion was false, and (3) Rapp could not see Finch’s movements clearly due to darkness and distance, along with numerous other facts.1 Thus, it found that a reasonable jury could also conclude Rapp did not reasonably believe Finch posed a threat. 1 The district court concluded a reasonable jury could find: (1) Finch was confused but attempted to comply with officers’ commands and his movements did not indicate hostile or threatening action; (2) persons yelling at Finch were not immediately recognizable as police; (3) Finch simply moved his arms when officers were giving him multiple commands; (4) Finch’s movements did not suggest he was attempting to draw a firearm; (5) Finch was never told to keep his hands up in the air or that he would be shot; (6) an officer could see Finch was not actively resisting commands; and (7) Rapp was unaware Finch was attempting to go back into the house when Finch was shot. 10 Appellate Case: 20-3132 Document: 010110705190 Date Filed: 07/05/2022 Page: 11 Rapp now argues we are not bound to accept the district court’s determination of what a reasonable jury could find. But an appeals court may deviate from its usual deference and review an interlocutory appeal of summary judgment de novo in only three circumstances: (1) the district court failed to identify the particular charged conduct it deemed as supported by the record, (2) the district court’s account of facts is “blatantly contradicted by the record,” or (3) the reasonable factual inferences arise during the motion to dismiss stage. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2010). These exceptions do not apply here. Rapp argues the district court ignored video evidence that “blatantly” contradicts the court’s findings. See Lewis, 604 F.3d at 1226. But nothing in the video footage offered by Rapp indisputably contradicts the district court’s findings that Finch’s motions “did not reasonably suggest he was attempting to draw a firearm” and Finch did not “pose[] a threat of serious physical harm to others.” Aplt. App., Vol. IV, at 1019. In the video, we see Finch raise his hands—but there is nothing that could “blatantly contradict” the conclusion his actions were nonthreatening. Estate of Valverde v. Dodge, 967 F.3d 1049, 1062 (10th Cir. 2020). Rapp also argues that the district court erred by focusing on the testimonies of other officers located at different perspectives than Finch. But the various conflicting testimonies of other officers are relevant to whether a jury could find that Rapp reacted reasonably for an officer in his position—they demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Whether Rapp reasonably believed Finch presented any threat is a genuine issue of fact for the jury to determine. 11 Appellate Case: 20-3132 Document: 010110705190 Date Filed: 07/05/2022 Page: 12