Opinion ID: 180780
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court’s March 2009 Decision

Text: The district court’s March 2009 remand order was not final for purposes of § 158(d)(1). In a line of cases, we have held that “when a district court sitting as a court of appeals in bankruptcy remands a case to the bankruptcy court for significant further proceedings, the remand order is not ‘final’ and therefore not appealable under § 158(d).” In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2006). Whether a case has been remanded for “significant further proceedings” turns on whether the bankruptcy court is required to perform additional judicial functions or mere ministerial functions. In re Caddo Parish-Villas South, Ltd., 174 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1999). A remand requires significant further proceedings if it “necessitates further factual development or other significant judicial activity involving the exercise of considerable discretion,” or if it “is likely to generate a new appeal or affect the issue that the disappointed party wants to raise on appeal from the order of remand.” In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., 157 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1998); see also In re Aegis Specialty Mktg. Inc. of Ala., 68 F.3d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1995). Here, after remand, the bankruptcy court was required to conduct a trial and make findings of fact and law. These are quintessential judicial functions that implicated the bankruptcy judge’s discretion and did in fact generate new proceedings and a new appeal. Because the district court’s remand order did not end the litigation on the merits, it was not an appealable final decision under § 158(d)(1). 7 Case: 09-41233 Document: 00511317038 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/09/2010 No. 09-41233 It is true that the district court’s remand order was styled a “judgment” and rejected two potential bases for avoiding the foreclosure sale of the Gomezes’ home. Simply calling a remand order a “judgment” does not, however, reflect “unmistakable intent” to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), particularly when the district court did not mention, and the parties did not even request, Rule 54(b) certification. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 540. Nor does it, in the alternative, satisfy the stringent certification requirements for an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b). See Linton v. Shell Oil Co., 563 F.3d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 2009) (alerting “district judges to the need to provide in their certification orders some demonstration that the governing standards for an interlocutory appeal have been met”); Askanase v. Livingwell, Inc., 981 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1993) (dismissing appeal because district court’s decision “was neither in form nor content a final decision,” nor did it “make the certifications necessary” for interlocutory appeal); In re First Financial Dev. Corp., 960 F.2d at 26 (same); cf. DeMelo v. Woolsey Marine Indus., Inc., 677 F.2d 1030, 1033-35 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing interplay between Rule 54(b) certification and § 1292(b) certification). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction under either § 1291 or 1292(b). We need not inquire whether the district court’s remand order had the practical effect of “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving” an injunction, and hence might have been appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Even if the district court’s decision had such an effect (or, for that matter, had been certified as a partial final judgment or for interlocutory appeal), the Gomezes’ notice of appeal was not filed until December 1, 2009 and therefore would have been untimely. See F ED. R. A PP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring notice of 8 Case: 09-41233 Document: 00511317038 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/09/2010 No. 09-41233 appeal to be filed within 30 days); Smith v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 691 F.2d 724, 725 (5th Cir. 1982) (“For purposes of appealability, a judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) is a final judgment, and an appeal must be taken within thirty days after its entry.”); Burnley v. City of San Antonio, 470 F.3d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 2006) (observing that timely appeal is ‘mandatory’”).