Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Corroboration to Support the Witness-Killing Special-circumstance Finding and Related Instructional Error

Text: Defendant contends that the witness-killing special-circumstance finding, like the murder conviction, must be reversed because it was based on insufficient evidence of corroboration of the accomplices in this case, namely Juarez, Rodriguez, Rojas, and codefendant Richard Avila. But because we have concluded that there is sufficient independent evidence to corroborate the testimony of Juarez, Rodriguez, Rojas, and Richard, assuming they were all accomplices, defendant's argument that the witness-killing special circumstance must be reversed on this issue fails at the threshold. Alternatively, defendant contends that the witness-killing special-circumstance finding must be reversed nevertheless because the trial court failed to instruct the jury sua sponte that the witness-killing special circumstance could not be based on the testimony of an accomplice unless it was corroborated by evidence tending to connect defendant with that special circumstance. Defendant's contention is without merit. When a special circumstance requires proof of a crime other than the charged murder, that crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But when it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which [the] defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement of section 1111 does not apply. ( People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730; see also People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 632, fn. 9, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Here, the trial court informed the jury that it must determine the truth of any charged special circumstance only if it found that defendant was guilty of first degree murder. (See CALJIC No. 8.80.1 (1993 rev.) (5th ed.1988).) Further, the witness-killing special circumstance did not require proof of a crime other than the charged murder; rather, it required that [t]he victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal ... proceeding .... (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10).) Accordingly, the requirement of section 1111 did not apply to the witness-killing special circumstance, and no instructional error occurred.