Opinion ID: 2224792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Admit Testimony Regarding a Traffic Count Carried out by Bradley's Investigator

Text: The final error alleged by Bradley was the trial court's refusal to allow into evidence testimony from Bradley's investigator concerning the frequency with which cars passed the location where Thunder Hawk's body was deposited. The traffic count in question was carried out in March 1987, a different season from August 1986, when Thunder Hawk's body was left by the wayside. The offer of proof by Bradley at trial reveals that the time span, between cars, was as long as seventeen minutes, whereas Lillegaard, whose testimony the traffic count was supposed to weaken, indicated that the time taken to decapitate Thunder Hawk and dispose of her remains took as little as seven minutes. The coroner estimated that the decapitation itself could take five to ten minutes, or much less, even for the average person, depending on that person's level of motivation. The traffic count, as the trial court indicated in the record, had very little probative value and would confuse and mislead the jury. The weakness of this evidence is reflected by Bradley's argument that the results were actually less favorable to him than a count in August would be, as traffic was heavier then. State v. Jenkins, 260 N.W.2d 509 (S.D. 1977), sets out a three-part test for experimental evidence: (1) Is the evidence relevant; (2) does it have probative value; and (3) is the recreation of conditions so dissimilar to the original event that, even after effective highlighting of the dissimilarities, the demonstration would be misleading to the jury? Jenkins, id. at 511. The test facing the trial judge is one of weighing the probative value of the experiment evidence against the dangers of misleading the jury. Jenkins, id. (citing McCormick on Evidence § 202 (2d ed. 1972)). Here, the trial court found a lack of foundation relating the results of the count to the conditions prevalent in August 1986, little probative value, and potential for confusing the jury. While there would probably be more cars on the road in August than March, reducing the interval, Bradley made no showing of how different the time intervals might be. Questions concerning relevance and materiality rest largely in the trial court's discretion and do not constitute grounds for a new trial or reversal unless abuse is clearly demonstrated. Sabag v. Continental South Dakota, 374 N.W.2d 349, 354 (S.D.1985). [T]he question of whether evidence is immaterial, conjectural or remote must be left to the practical judgment of the trial court and rests largely in its discretion. State v. McNamara, 325 N.W.2d 288, 291 (S.D.1982) (citing Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1977)). There was no abuse of discretion on this record. Conviction of premeditated murder affirmed. WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN and MILLER, JJ., concur. SABERS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.