Opinion ID: 657236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Encroachment.

Text: 52 We have discussed in the preceding the central separation of powers issue presented to us in this appeal--that is, whether Congress has impermissibly undermined the role of the Executive Branch by permitting private parties to exercise some measure of prosecutorial authority. We must also resolve a distinct, but in this case less difficult, separation of powers problem: whether the qui tam provisions disrupt the proper balance of power between the three branches by permitting the Judicial Branch to encroach on executive authority. We recognize the general rule that under Article III, courts may not exercise executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 123, 96 S.Ct. at 684. The purpose of this rule is to maintain the separation between the Judiciary and the other branches of the Federal Government by ensuring that judges do not encroach upon executive or legislative authority or undertake tasks that are more properly accomplished by those branches. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680-81, 108 S.Ct. at 2613. 53 Boeing argues that the FCA gives federal courts too much control over whether the government may intervene later in a qui tam action which it initially declined to take over, because the Act requires the government to demonstrate good cause to do so. Boeing asserts that the good cause hurdle significantly interferes with the government's prosecutorial authority. Boeing attempts to support that assertion by noting that the court denied the government's intervention request in one out of only two cases of which it is aware in which the government has sought late intervention. 17 Boeing further argues that the FCA impermissibly grants the judiciary approval authority over government decisions to dismiss qui tam suits. 54 We conclude that the judicial involvement which the FCA authorizes does not contravene the separation of powers principle. First, in the absence of any meaningful indication that these requirements pose significant barriers to the Executive Branch's exercise of its prosecutorial authority, we see no reason to construe them as such and thereby heighten constitutional concerns. See note 8. Second, as we noted earlier, ample precedent exists for judicial oversight of the government's decision to dismiss a qui tam action. See note 12. 55 Furthermore, the extent of judicial involvement in the qui tam scheme is no greater than the extent of judicial involvement in implementation of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. The Court in Morrison held that the Constitution permits Congress to vest power in a special federal court to decide whom to appoint to the office of independent counsel, as well as to define a counsel's jurisdiction and perform a variety of other functions which, though essentially ministerial, do require the exercise of some judgment and discretion. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676-81, 108 S.Ct. at 2611-13. The Court also held that the special court's power to terminate the office of independent counsel is not a significant judicial encroachment on executive authority, even though it is not a typically judicial power and has few analogues among the court's more traditional powers. Id. at 682, 108 S.Ct. at 2614. The Court explicitly construed the termination provision narrowly in order to save it from constitutional infirmities, though it acknowledged that an adventurous special court conceivably could use its termination power aggressively. Id. 56 In light of Morrison, we believe it is not dispositive that no direct analogue exists for judicial authority to determine whether the government has demonstrated good cause to take over a case prosecuted in the name of United States. 18 This power may affect the government's prosecutorial discretion to some degree, but it does not amount to the power to supervise the prosecutorial conduct of either the Attorney General or a relator. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 681, 108 S.Ct. at 2614 (The Act simply does not give the [special court] the power to 'supervise' the independent counsel in the exercise of his or her investigative or prosecutorial authority.) By comparison, we note that Morrison approved a scheme in which the Attorney General relinquishes all unqualified prosecutorial discretion with respect to a matter referred to an independent counsel once he or she has decided to request appointment of a counsel. Moreover, Morrison specifically held that the provision that the Attorney General must show good cause to remove an independent counsel and that the removal decision is subject to judicial review does not offend constitutional principles by permitting excessive judicial involvement. Id at 691, 108 S.Ct. at 2619. 57 Considering the matter with a practical eye, cf. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851, 106 S.Ct. at 3257 ([I]n reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.), we conclude that the FCA does not authorize the judiciary to infringe on prosecutorial authority to a degree beyond the bounds establish in Morrison. The government's authority to intervene at the outset of an action is unfettered; we have seen no indication that it is difficult for the government to show good cause to intervene late; and, in view of analogous authority, judicial oversight of the government's dismissal power is unremarkable. 58