Opinion ID: 203677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Provide Conflict-Free Representation

Text: Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel's conflict of interest prevented counsel from aggressively challenging the testimony of Dr. Kessler, the Commonwealth's medical examiner whom counsel concurrently represented. Because his trial counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest in representing him, petitioner argues that prejudice is presumed and he is entitled to relief without independent proof of prejudice as required under Strickland. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Alternatively, petitioner argues that he can show that the dual representation adversely affected the representation because it caused counsel to: (a) refrain from cross-examining Dr. Kessler about the timing and cause of Jameel's death as aggressively as he would have absent the conflict; and (b) refrain from calling another expert witness to rebut Dr. Kessler's conclusion that Jameel died as a result of multiple blunt traumatic injuries. [8] As a result, petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to advance a theory that Jameel died after the first blow, which, if pursued, would have undermined the prosecution's theory of first degree murder based on extreme atrocity and cruelty, of which petitioner was ultimately convicted. As a threshold matter, although petitioner has failed to establish that his waiver of trial counsel's conflict was involuntary or invalid, under our precedent it would appear that even a knowing acceptance by defendant of counsel's representation despite a potential conflict of interest does not preclude a showing, under the standard of Cuyler, that the conflict became actual and had an adverse effect on representation. United States v. Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 929 F.2d 747, 750 (1st Cir.1991) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 835 (1st Cir.1985) (Although we find that [petitioner] executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of [counsel's] potential conflict of interest, a waiver doesn't foreclose the possibility that an actual conflict could adversely have affected the adequacy of representation and violated [petitioner's] [S]ixth Amendment right to counsel.). However, `[if] a defendant has voluntarily chosen to proceed with [a potential conflict] ... it is fair, if he later alleges ineffective assistance growing out of a conflict, to require that he demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of representation.' Fahey, 769 F.2d at 835 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (Brennan, J., concurring)). The SJC heard this claim and rejected it on the merits, holding that the dual representation did not warrant a reversal of the convictions because trial counsel's conflict of interest, was only potential, not actual. Boateng, 781 N.E.2d at 1217. [9] In so holding, the SJC distinguished a state case petitioner relied upon, Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 434 N.E.2d 1246 (1982), in which the SJC concluded that a defendant received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel's law firm partner represented a key prosecution witness in an unrelated civil proceeding. Here the SJC noted that unlike in Hodge, where the conflict of interest caused the conflicted attorney to refuse to present important evidence on the defendant's behalf, it could not conclude, in this case, that trial counsel's representation of the medical examiner prevented him from presenting important evidence on [petitioner's] behalf.... Boateng, 781 N.E.2d at 1218. Rather, the court disagree[d] that the circumstances [were] similar and that the evidence to which [petitioner] now points would have assisted him. Id. The SJC reasoned that to the extent that a more aggressive cross-examination of Dr. Kessler or the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Kanfer would have present[ed] an alternative `single blow' theory [10] to rebut the conclusions of the medical examiner, such testimony would not have assisted the petitioner in defending against charges of extreme atrocity or cruelty. This is because, as a matter of Massachusetts law, even a single blow, especially when directed against an infant, may support a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 736 N.E.2d 841 (2000)). Moreover, under Massachusetts law, murder may be found to have been committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty based on a jury's finding of any one of the so-called Cunneen factors: defendant's indifference to the victim's suffering, the degree of the victim's suffering, the extent of the injuries, the number of blows, the manner and force with which the wounds occurred, and the disproportion between the means necessary to cause death and the force employed by the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 449 N.E.2d 658, 665 (1983). Given that the jury heard evidence that Yeboah-Sefah crushed [the baby's] skull, broke several of his ribs, and seriously damaged his lungs, the SJC concluded that the jury had ample evidence from which to make such a finding. Boateng, 781 N.E.2d at 1218. Further, the SJC found that the medical examiner's testimony regarding the cause of death was peripheral to [petitioner's] defense of insanity, and in fact, based on trial counsel's testimony at the hearing on the new trial motion, aspects of the medical examiner's testimony, ... including the ghastliness of the killing, ... supported the defense theory of insanity. Id. We find that § 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA applies to petitioner's claim that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest because the SJC heard and adjudicated this claim on the merits. [11] Analyzing that decision through the lens of AEDPA, we are unable to conclude that the SJC appli[ed] [Supreme Court] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005). Under clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), an ineffective assistance claim normally requires demonstrating prejudice, i.e. a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If however, the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance,' then Strickland 's stricter prejudice showing does not apply. Id. at 692-93, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708); see United States v. Segarra-Rivera, 473 F.3d 381, 385 n. 2 (1st Cir.2007) (distinguishing claims alleging counsel performed incompetently, which require showing of prejudice, from claims showing that counsel labored under actual conflict of interest, which may entitle petitioner to relief without regard to proof of prejudice). Under the standard delineated by the Supreme Court, however, a mere theoretical division of loyalties is not itself, contrary to petitioner's contentions, an actual conflict of interest. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Rather, a potential division of loyalties rises to the level of an actual conflict only where defendants shows that the conflict actually affected the adequacy of his representation. Id. ; see also United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253, 264 (1st Cir.2003) (adverse performance is the touchstone of Sixth Amendment error under the Supreme Court's actual conflict-of-interest jurisprudence ...). Showing an adverse effect . . . requires more than mere speculation. United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 77 (1st Cir.2008). [12] Rather, some adverse action or inaction is required that can be traced to the conflict in loyalty. United States v. Burgos-Chaparro, 309 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir.2002). Here, the SJC determined that trial counsel presenting the single blow theory, through questioning of Dr. Kessler or by calling a separate pathologist, would not have helped petitioner's defense, and thus, petitioner had failed to establish that the dual representation adversely affected the adequacy of representation. In light of the overwhelming evidence of brutality present on the record, it was certainly reasonable to conclude that any testimony elicited from Dr. Kessler or another expert, that in fact the first of petitioner's numerous blows to the baby was of sufficient force as to be fatal, would not cause a reasonable juror to doubt whether the murder was atrocious or cruel. The SJC, thus, logically held that counsel's alleged conflict of interest did not rise to the level of an actual conflict of interest. We cannot conclude that the SJC's decision constituted an unreasonable application of Federal law.