Opinion ID: 200587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government's Sentencing Appeal

Text: Given an intended loss of five million dollars, Thurston's crime led to the statutory maximum sentence of five years. The district court departed downward from the Guidelines range by sixteen levels, however, sentencing Thurston to three months' imprisonment to be followed by twenty-four months of supervised release. The court imposed no fine and recommended that the term of imprisonment be served in a halfway house.
The government argues that each of the stated grounds for downward departure was in error.15 First, it contends that the 15 The court stated: [I]n granting the motion for downward departure, I'm basing it on two grounds. First, the downward departure is justified because of the defendant Thurston's record of charitable work and community service[, which] is unique, extensive and extraordinary. I think the record should reflect that in over fourteen years of sentencing defendants, it's my judgment that no one had a more extraordinary devotion to charitable work, community service, and especially his dedication to his church. And the second ground is that which is set out in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual under Chapter 1, Part A, Section 3, which is entitled . . . The Basic Approach, paren, policy statement, closed paren, setting forth the rationale of the guidelines, it's cited here that Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity. -40- district court was forbidden to depart downward based on a disparity between Thurston's sentence and the sentence of the company president, a cooperating co-conspirator who pled guilty. Next, it argues that departure for good deeds is discouraged and that the facts provide no basis to warrant a finding that Thurston's good deeds are so exceptional as to make such a departure appropriate.
On April 30, 2003, certain provisions of a new statute affecting the courts of appeals' review of sentencing provisions became effective. The PROTECT Act changes the applicable standard of review on certain issues in appeals from departures from the sentencing guidelines. Section 401 of the PROTECT Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which now reads: (e) Consideration. -- Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence -- . . . . (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and We have a situation here where coconspirator Isola, the president of Damon and the architect, at least the prime architect of this conspiracy, received a sentence of three years' probation, and it is, in my judgment, a violation of the fundamental purpose of the Sentencing Commission Guidelines to impose a sentence which is not at least somewhat similar to that incurred by a coconspirator who was more involved in the conspiracy t[h]an this defendant. -41- (A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons required by section 3553(c); (B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that --
forth in section 3553(a)(2); or
3553(b); or
this case; or (C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range, having regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section 3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); . . . . . . . . The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and, except with respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. (emphasis added). This changed the prior law. Under Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), the appellate courts were not to review a departure decision de novo, but were to ask whether the sentencing -42- court abused its discretion.16 Id. at 91, 96-100. Where a district court grants a departure, we have, before the PROTECT Act, engaged in a three-part review: (1) we determine whether the stated ground for departure is theoretically permissible under the guidelines; (2) if so, we examine the record to assess whether there is adequate factual support; and (3) we determine the appropriateness of the degree of departure. United States v. Bogdan, 302 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2002). Whether a stated ground for departure was theoretically permissible (part (1)) was a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Bradstreet, 207 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2000); cf. United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 98-99 (1st Cir. 2002) (We review de novo whether the district court utilized a proper basis for [an upward] departure.). Under Koon, we then reviewed the remaining two parts for abuse of discretion. See Koon, 518 U.S. 96-100; United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 31 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Martin, 221 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2000). The courts of appeals are now charged with de novo review of the second issue: whether the facts are exceptional (or outside 16 Before Koon was decided in 1996, the rule in this circuit was that we would review de novo whether, taking the reasons for departure stated by the district court at face value, those reasons will as a matter of law justify abandonment of the guidelines. United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1447 (1st Cir. 1991). We point this out because Thurston's fraudulent conduct took place before Koon and when this court used a de novo standard of review, as is now mandated by the PROTECT Act. -43- the heartland), thus warranting consideration of a departure. Congress requires the courts of appeals to consider whether a sentence that departs from the applicable guideline range is based on a factor that: (i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case[.] 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B). Thurston argues that the PROTECT Act should not be interpreted to apply to this case and that, if it did apply, it would be retroactive and invalid. He makes two statutory intent arguments: (1) that the internal structure of the statute means it should not be applied to cases already pending on appeal; and (2) that the presumption against retroactivity should apply. First, Thurston argues that Congress meant application of the de novo review provisions in the PROTECT Act to be deferred until appeals arise from sentences entered after the Act became effective. This is evident, Thurston says, since the Act imposed a new requirement for the district judge to give a written statement of reasons. From this, Thurston argues, all provisions of the Act were meant to apply only to post-Act sentencing. The argument is plausible, but we are unpersuaded. Even before the PROTECT Act, a trial court was required to give some reasons, though not necessarily in writing, for a downward departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000) (pre-PROTECT Act version); United States -44- v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 973 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing discouraged ground for departure); United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1324 (1st Cir. 1994) (same). A requirement that this statement of reasons be written, rather than oral, has no particular connection to the appellate standard of review. Although the Act does not expressly say that its de novo review provision applies to pending appeals, it does give an effective date of April 30, 2003. The effective date of a statute does not by itself establish that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317 (2001) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257 (1994)). Still, we agree with the Eighth Circuit that the new statute applies to appeals pending as of the effective date of the statute. See United States v. Aguilar-Lopez, 329 F.3d 960, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2003). Subject to constitutionally-based retroactivity concerns, it is certainly within Congress's power to change a standard of review. See, e.g., Hines v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Consumers Union of U.S. v. FTC, 801 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1986); cf. Bierce v. Waterhouse, 219 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1911). Much of the conduct regulated by this part of the PROTECT Act is that of the courts of appeals (and indirectly, the district courts now under closer scrutiny), and that involves conduct dating from April 30, 2003 forward. -45- Thurston's fall-back argument is that applying a changed standard of review to a case already on appeal would have an impermissible effect on him under the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264. Not so. The change of a standard of appellate review is one in procedure for the courts; procedural changes that do not affect substantial rights are not usually considered retroactive. This legislation is little different than the Supreme Court's changing the standard of review by directing the courts of appeals to decide ultimate Fourth Amendment questions by de novo review. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996). When the Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation that must be applied retroactively to all criminal cases on direct review. See Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)). Changing the appellate standard of review, as done here, could upset no legitimate reliance interest by a defendant,17 could not have induced alteration of the behavior that led to the crime, and could not have upset settled expectations. We see no unfairness to defendants in Congress's requiring a closer look by appellate courts at whether a district court committed an error in deciding that the guidelines permitted a departure. It is 17 In Thurston's case, there could be no reliance interest in any event, since this court used a de novo standard of review at the time he committed the crime. -46- the substance of the sentencing rules, both Guidelines and statutory, that impacts defendants. Thurston makes a cursory argument that the PROTECT Act presents serious constitutional separation-of-powers questions. At the request of the Senate, the Chief Justice, expressing the views of the U.S. Judicial Conference, did advise the Senate of the Conference's opposition to portions of the bill, including alteration of the standard of review. See Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy (undated), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea 3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/Rehnquist_letter.pdf. The U.S. Sentencing Commission requested that Congress not act until the Commission had the opportunity to analyze data and study the matter. See Letter from Judge Diana Murphy, Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, et al. to Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy (April 2, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/ public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/stcg _comm_current.pdf. But judicial opposition to legislation on policy grounds is one thing, and unconstitutionality of the legislation is another. No real theory of unconstitutionality has been presented by this appeal, and so the issue is waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). -47-

The district court felt there was an unfair disparity between a five-year sentence of imprisonment for Thurston and the three-year probation sentence for co-conspirator Isola. It viewed Isola as the architect, at least the prime architect of this conspiracy. Apparently the district court felt that Isola, Thurston's superior, was the guiltier of the two, and that this fact overshadowed other differences between their cases. Isola pled nolo contendere to willful blindness about the apolipoprotein conspiracy. As the law of this circuit makes clear, basing the departure on grounds of disparity in sentence alone between Thurston and Isola was beyond the district court's authority. United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 25 n.5 (1st Cir. 1991). Sidestepping circuit precedent, the district court referred to a statute that requires a sentencing court to consider not only the Commission's Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements, but also the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This provision was unchanged by the PROTECT Act. -48- Yet the same statute also requires that the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range [of the pertinent Guidelines], unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). That is why, since as early as 1991, this court has interpreted the statute to preclude sentencing judges from departing downward based on a perceived need to equalize sentencing outcomes for similarly situated codefendants, without more. Wogan, 938 F.2d at 1448 (emphasis added). The more that is needed refers to circumstances not adequately considered by the Commission, and none have been shown here with regard to disparity. In the pre-Guidelines era, the district court's attempt to avoid perceived unfairness would have had greater weight. The Guidelines bind us and they bind the district court. The downward departure based on disparity in sentences among co-defendants was impermissible.
The second ground, based on Thurston's good works, poses the most difficult issue in the case. We have found disparity alone an impermissible ground; it is possible the trial court would not have granted so extensive a departure based on good works alone. It may also be that if the court had granted a modest -49- departure on the second ground, the government would not have appealed. But the trial court did not differentiate and the government on appeal argues that any departure at all based on good works (like the departure for disparity) was contrary to law. The Sentencing Guidelines discourage downward departures from the normal sentencing range based on good works -- that is, civic, charitable, or public service. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11. Such departures are permitted only when the good works are exceptional.18 See United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2001). The district court based its finding that Thurston's good works were exceptional on Thurston's record of charitable work and community service[, which is] unique, extensive and extraordinary. The court continued, I think the record should reflect that in over fourteen years of sentencing defendants, it's my judgment that no one had a more extraordinary devotion to charitable work, community service, and especially . . . to his church. Thurston is a member of the Church of Latter Day Saints, tithes ten percent of his income (as his church encourages him to do), and devotes hours every week to unpaid service with the church in a variety of positions. Letters from his fellow congregants characterize him as 18 Good works may also be considered in setting a sentence within the Guidelines range or in setting certain conditions. This does Thurston no good, however, since the applicable Guidelines range is sixty-three to seventy-eight months, all above the statutory maximum of sixty months. -50- a man of principle and impeccable character19 -– characterizations undermined, of course, by the jury's finding of guilt. In any event, it is good works, objectively measured, and not good character that is at issue. In addition, Thurston has taken family members and others into his home and has been helpful to his neighbors. For example, the parents of a woman undergoing rehabilitation at a local medical center stayed at Thurston's home for several weeks. On another occasion, Thurston and his family laid sod for an infirm neighbor. Save for his crime, Thurston appears to have lived a creditworthy life. The issue then becomes, as we engage in de novo review, the point of reference by which to determine whether Thurston's good works provide a basis for a departure. Earlier, under Koon, 518 U.S. 81, the very sensible rationale was that the district courts, which saw far more sentencing cases than the courts of appeals, were better positioned to determine what was exceptional, and appellate courts owed deference to that more expert determination. See id. at 96-100. The PROTECT Act has abrogated 19 During the trial, numerous witnesses for both sides testified to Thurston's reputation for honesty and integrity. During the sentencing phase, many of Thurston's friends and family members explicitly or implicitly said they thought the jury verdict was incorrect. Good character is covered by the aberrant behavior guidelines, and here is no claim on appeal that Thurston was entitled to a departure on those grounds. -51- that deference. There are many policy arguments in favor of deference to the district court, which were presented to Congress by the Judicial Conference of the United States. But Congress chose to decide the balance differently, expressing concern that the departure rate for certain crimes and within certain districts threatened to undermine the Guidelines regime. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 108-66, at 58-59, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr066&dbname=cp10 8&; 149 Cong. Rec. H3059, H3066 (daily ed. April 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). In reviewing de novo whether any departure is permissible, the PROTECT Act and the case law require courts of appeals to consider three sources: other decisions under the Guidelines; the Commission's relevant Guidelines and statements; and the congressional purposes behind sentencing. Even before the PROTECT Act, the question of whether a discouraged factor was present in an exceptional way was determined in large part by comparison with other Guidelines cases. See Pereira, 272 F.3d at 80 (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 98). Such other cases are not limited to cases involving convictions for the same offense. See United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1324 (1st Cir. 1994). Second, appellate courts are also to consider policy statements and official commentary by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Third, Section 401 of the PROTECT Act instructs courts of -52- appeals to consider whether a departure is consistent with the purposes of sentencing stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) -- that is, retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. As to comparisons with other reported cases, each side has some circuit authority in support of its position; the government's cases are a closer fit. The government cites United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1998) (divided court reverses a downward departure because good works are not exceptional for someone of defendant's income and preeminence in a small town); United States v. Kolbach, 38 F.3d 832, 838-39 (6th Cir. 1994) (vacating a good works departure because it is usual and ordinary, in the prosecution of similar white collar crimes involving high-ranking corporate executives . . . to find that a defendant was involved as a leader in community charities, civic organizations, and church efforts); and United States v. Haverstat, 22 F.3d 790, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1994) (vacating a departure for good works where the defendant's charitable and volunteer activities did not make him an atypical defendant in an antitrust price-fixing case). In United States v. Bogdan, 284 F.3d 324 (1st Cir. 2002), this court found no basis for a downward departure for a caring and generous father who made efforts to improve his relationship with his ex-wife and supported her financially and who was introspective and remorseful about his crime. Id. at 329-30. When the district -53- court again granted a downward departure because it thought the sentence unconscionable, this court again reversed. United States v. Bogdan, 302 F.3d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2002). In turn, Thurston relies on several circuit decisions affirming good works downward departures. These cases are less persuasive than those cited by the government, since the circuit courts merely hold that there was no abuse of discretion and since the facts are less analogous. See United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming a downward departure based on exceptional charitable works in light of the defendant's meager resources); United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 1998) (in a bankruptcy fraud case involving a defendant who transformed the lives of two girls and cared for an elderly friend, a one-level downward departure was not an abuse of discretion); United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1996) (no abuse of discretion to depart downward based on a combination of medical condition and civic good deeds). We would find the expertise reflected in the decisions of the district courts to be useful as well in determining whether particular good works are exceptional. But the parties have not cited any such cases. As the government's cases indicate, corporate executives are usually better situated to make large financial contributions and are often expected, by virtue of their positions, to engage in -54- civic and charitable activities. The ability to make large contributions should not keep a defendant out of jail. See United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990). And those whose place in life does not give them similar opportunities should not be disadvantaged. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. For similar reasons, we would be reluctant to find a defendant's good works exceptional solely on the basis of actions that were required or encouraged as a condition of membership in a religious institution. Such a result -- which would seemingly entitle all members in good standing to a downward departure -- could undercut the principle that religion (like socio-economic status) is a forbidden basis for departure. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. On the other hand, good works should not have less weight because a defendant was motivated by religious belief. Thurston should not be disadvantaged by his church involvement. It would, in any event, do a disservice to Thurston to categorize him entirely in terms of his economic or religious status. His good works predated his executive status and continued over time; they exceeded the bare requirements for church membership; and they involved costs to him in terms of time and effort. In sum, the comparison to other case law is not dispositive and is, in any event, only one part of the analysis. We move on to the Guidelines and to the purposes of sentencing. -55- Two salient principles emerge from the Guidelines: the goal of parity between white collar and other criminal defendants and the goal of discouraging departures based on good works. Congress and the Sentencing Commission were clear that under the pre-Guidelines regime, sentences for white collar crimes were too lenient.20 The Sentencing Commission intended to equalize punishments for 'white collar' and 'blue collar' crime. United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 955 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, J.). Viewing the departure in terms of the purposes of sentencing also militates against the departure. Thurston was convicted of a serious crime, a massive fraud at public expense involving deceit, trickery, and sophistication. The federal government spent approximately $249 billion on Medicare last year. 20 See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 359, 372-76 (2003) (discussing the Sentencing Commission's concern that white-collar crimes have been grossly undersentenced); id. at 396-401 (collecting data on the undersentencing of white-collar crimes and arguing that the prevalence of downward departures in white collar cases threatens to undermine the integrity of the Sentencing Guidelines); see also Testimony of Sentencing Commissioner Stephen Breyer Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Oct. 22, 1987, reproduced in 146 PLI/Crim 811, 824 (1987) ([T]he Commission considers present sentencing practices, in which white collar criminals receive probation more often than other offenders who committed crimes of comparable severity, to be unfair.); 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2000) (The [Sentencing] Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense.). The recent enactment of enhanced penalties for many white collar crimes only underscores Congress's disinclination towards leniency for white collar criminals. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 801-1107, 116 Stat. 745, 800-10. -56- One group has estimated that about three percent of the $1.4 trillion the country spent on health care in 2001 was lost to fraud.21 A Sick Business, The Economist, June 28, 2003, at 64 (citing data from National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association); see National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, Health Care Fraud, at p. 2, available at http://www.nhcaa.org/pdf/all_about_hcf.pdf (n.d.). The retribution and deterrent interests in sentencing would be significantly undercut by permitting a good works departure on this record. Good works do not stand alone. They must be evaluated in the context of the crime and the purposes of sentencing. Health care fraud, a form of white collar fraud, is a serious national problem, affecting the financial integrity of programs meant to aid tens of millions of people in need of health care. Every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar that could have provided medical care to the elderly or the disabled. By definition, Medicare fraud will most likely be white collar fraud, committed by educated people with responsible jobs. Thurston's executive position at Damon, which gave him the resources to undertake many of his charitable 21 For other circuit court cases involving Medicare and Medicaid fraud, see United States v. Baxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (fraud exceeding two million dollars); United States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2001) (kickback scheme for referrals); United States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2001) (fraud exceeding fifteen million dollars); United States v. McClendon, 195 F.3d 598 (11th Cir. 1999) (fraud exceeding three million dollars); and United States v. Polin, 194 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 1999) (Medicare kickback scheme). -57- works, also enabled him to perform the crime. Were it not for the statutory maximum, he would, under the Guidelines, have been sentenced to imprisonment for more than five years. A five-year term of imprisonment in light of the nature of the crime reflects the seriousness of the offense, the need for congruity with blue collar crime, and the need to deter other executives from similar law-breaking. Thurston's admirable good works simply are not so exceptional, in context, as to provide a basis to depart. The government's argument that Thurston's conduct warranted an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice based on perjury at trial need not be resolved, given our disposition of the other issues. The statute caps his period of incarceration at sixty months. It is noteworthy, though, that Thurston's testimony on key matters of fact was contradicted by multiple witnesses.
The government argues that the sentencing judge erred by failing to impose a fine on Thurston in accordance with the Guidelines. Thurston argued, and the district court accepted, that he should not receive a fine because that would create an unacceptable disparity between his sentence and that of codefendant Isola. Sentence disparity is an unacceptable basis for refusing to impose a fine and is plain error for the reasons discussed earlier. -58- Thurston contends that the government has forfeited its argument that a fine must be imposed by failing to object after the judge ruled. The government earlier took the position that a fine must be imposed and also argued that the court could not refuse to impose a fine on the basis of disparity -- the only argument Thurston presented. In these circumstances, the issue was not forfeited. See Gallant, 306 F.3d at 1187-88 (holding that a sentencing issue was not forfeited as a result of counsel's failure to object after the court's ruling); cf. United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 325 (1st Cir. 2001) (motion to strike unnecessary to preserve evidentiary issue where party objected prior to trial court's ruling). Even were this an instance of forfeiture, the district court committed plain error in its rationale. Before this court, Thurston attempts to defend the decision not to impose a fine on the basis that the statutory definition of his crime, which provides that a fine may be assigned, trumps the Guidelines, which provide that a fine must be assigned barring special circumstances. The crime of which Thurston was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 371, provides for a prison term, a fine, or both. By contrast, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) says, The court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine. (emphasis added). The defendant did not establish, or even seek to establish, inability to pay. The -59- sentencing judge made no finding, implicit or explicit, that Thurston could not pay. The PSR estimated that Thurston had a net worth of over $1.5 million, and the minimum fine under the Guidelines was $12,500. Because the sentence fixed by U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) is within the range contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Guideline is not trumped by the statute. See United States v. Page, 84 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1996) (There is no reason why the Guidelines may not make their own classifications within the statutes, and hence definitions which the courts must observe, so long as these are not internally inconsistent or in violation of the Constitution or a federal statute.). Here there is no inconsistency and the district court was required to impose a fine.