Opinion ID: 1698184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of Direct Appeal

Text: The second issue presented here is whether the district court erroneously dismissed Price's direct appeal. Price argues that the Fifth District erroneously approved his pro se, voluntary dismissal even though he was then represented by counsel. Price asserts that he was deprived of his opportunity under Anders [1] to have his issues on direct appeal examined by the court. Although this issue is not the one on which jurisdiction is based, we may, in our discretion, consider other issues properly raised and argued. See Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla.1982). We exercise our discretion to review this issue. When the public defender filed the Anders brief that asserted there were no arguable issues for appeal, the Fifth District's Anders order invited Price to respond within fifteen days to the public defender's Anders brief. Price argues that the Fifth District should have treated his voluntary dismissal as a waiver of his right to file a responsive brief. However, in Price's motion to voluntarily withdraw his direct appeal, he specifically stated that he moved to dismiss the above-styled cause pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.350. Rule 9.350(b) states that [a] proceeding of an appellant or petitioner may be dismissed before a decision on the merits by filing a notice of dismissal.... (emphasis added). Thus, it should have been apparent to Price that he was dismissing the proceeding, not just the right to file a responsive brief. Additionally, Price argues that the district court should have examined the record to determine whether the case was wholly frivolous as Anders requires. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396. He argues that only after examination of the record could the district court grant the public defender's motion to withdraw as counsel and decide whether to dismiss the direct appeal or reach a decision on the merits. While Price's reading of Anders is correct, his argument does not take into account the fact that his voluntary dismissal of his appeal made this examination moot. After Price withdrew his appeal there was no longer a need for the district court to decide whether the case was wholly frivolous or whether to grant counsel's motion to withdraw. Price further argues that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to be represented by counsel and act pro se. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472, 474-76 (Fla.2003) (holding that a defendant does not have the right to simultaneously represent himself and be represented by counsel). Even though Price does not have a constitutional right to be both represented by counsel and to act pro se, we have held that it is in the sound discretion of the appellate court whether to allow a convicted defendant the ability to proceed pro se in an appellate proceeding. See id. at 474 (quoting Davis v. State, 789 So.2d 978, 980 (Fla.2001)). Therefore, the Fifth District had the discretion to allow Price to act pro se when voluntarily withdrawing his direct appeal. Reversible error has not been demonstrated.