Opinion ID: 1619901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Emergency Motion to Stay the Judgment

Text: In view of the propriety of the Rule 54(b) certification, the status of this proceeding reverts to the posture presented at the time Scrushy filed his emergency motion to stay execution of the judgment. Rule 8, Ala. R.App. P., provides, in pertinent part: The appellant shall not be entitled to a stay of execution of the judgment pending appeal (except as provided in Rule 62(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.) unless the appellant executes bond with good and sufficient sureties, approved by the clerk of the trial court, payable to the appellee (or to the clerk or register if the trial court so directs), with condition, failing the appeal, to satisfy such judgment as the appellate court may render, when the judgment is: (1) For the payment of money only, in an amount equal to . . . 125% [of the amount of the judgment] if the judgment exceeds $10,000.00. . . .  (Emphasis added.) The default rule is that the prevailing party may immediately execute on the judgment. If the appellant desires a stay, it is his responsibility to post the required bond. This Court has held that [t]he language utilized in the rule is mandatory; the trial judge is given no discretion in setting the amount of the supersedeas bond. Ex parte Spriggs Enters., Inc., 376 So.2d 1088, 1089 (Ala.1979). In Ware v. Timmons, case no. 1030488, in response to a motion to suspend the requirement of Rule 8(a)(1), this Court issued an order in which it recognized a narrow exception to Rule 8. In that case, this Court directed the trial court to accept the maximum bond obtainable, based on the appellants' entire net worth and available insurance coverage. . . . The Ware exception is now recorded in the Committee Comments to Rule 8(a) and (b), Adopted January 12, 2005. The Comments note that the modification to the supersedeas bond requirement in Ware was derived from this Court's authority under Rule 2(b), Ala. R.App. P., to suspend a rule of procedure for good cause shown. [4] In his brief in support of his motion to stay execution of the judgment that he filed with the trial court, Scrushy stated that [t]hrough counsel, [he] has investigated obtaining a supersedeas bond and cannot do so. As evidence, he presented an affidavit by William S. Dodson, Jr., president of Robinson-Adams Insurance, Inc., a property and casualty insurance agency in Birmingham. Dodson's affidavit states, in pertinent part, as follows: 4. After being contacted by . . . counsel for Mr. Scrushy, I have worked to help Mr. Scrushy procure an appeal/supersedeas bond in the amount of $59,300,000 in this case. 5. Specifically, I have talked to Safeco, CNA, St. Paul/Travelers, AIG, Hartford Indemnity Company and Centennial Casualty Company. All of these sureties have declined to offer a bond to Mr. Scrushy. 6. I have also talked to Capitol Indemnity Insurance Company and Zurich Insurance Company. Each of these surety companies said that they would not consider issuing the required supersedeas bond unless Mr. Scrushy would fully collateralize the surety's bond obligation by posting an irrevocable evergreen letter of credit in the amount of the bond penalty issued by a bank that was acceptable to the surety company. To date, I have not been informed that Mr. Scrushy can or will obtain an acceptable letter of credit in the required amount to fully collateralize an appeal bond, so no surety has, at this point, been willing to entertain further the issuance of the bond. This evidence did not show that Scrushy could not obtain a bond, but only that he would first have to obtain a letter of credit. Notably, Scrushy presented no evidence indicating that he could not obtain a letter of credit. Dodson's statement that he had not been informed that Scrushy could obtain a letter of credit explains the state of his knowledge, but it does not offer any evidence as to Scrushy's ability to do so. In Scrushy's emergency motion to stay execution of the judgment, counsel asserted that [n]either he [Scrushy] nor any other individual could conceivably come up with $60 million in cash for such a bond. Absent evidence from Scrushy as to his inability to make any arrangements that would satisfy the requirements for posting a supersedeas bond, consideration of the Ware option is premature. We therefore deny the emergency motion to stay execution of the judgment. STAY ISSUED FEBRUARY 8, 2006, VACATED; EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT DENIED. NABERS, C.J., and SEE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, and PARKER, JJ., concur.