Opinion ID: 2600520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lawfulness of Arrest and Search

Text: Crawford contends that he was unlawfully arrested for disorderly conduct and that the arrest and search incident to arrest violated his constitutional rights. We first examine the superior court's determination that Crawford's claims should be dismissed because the arrest and search were lawful. Disorderly conduct is a misdemeanor under AS 11.61.110. The relevant sections of AS 11.61.110 provide: (a) A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct if, . . . . (2) in a public place . . . and with intent to disturb the peace and privacy of another or with reckless disregard that the conduct is having that effect after being informed that it is having that effect, the person makes unreasonably loud noise; [or] . . . . (6) the person recklessly creates a hazardous condition for others by an act which has no legal justification or excuse[.] The misdemeanor complaint against Crawford charged that he committed disorderly conduct by making an unreasonably loud noise and by recklessly creating a hazardous condition. Crawford maintains that his voice was not unreasonably loud given the totality of the circumstances and that he did not create a hazardous condition. Kemp responds that Crawford's arrest was lawful because it was supported by probable cause. Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and circumstances known to an officer would support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the suspect. [4] Probable cause is determined objectively and requires only a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing that such activity occurred. [5] Kemp argues that because there was a fair probability that Crawford was being unreasonably loud, there was probable cause to arrest Crawford. The focus of our inquiry is on the reasonableness of Kemp's belief that Crawford's words were unreasonably loud or created a hazardous condition. Although all facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to Crawford, the reasonableness of an officer's actions is to be assessed in light of all the relevant circumstances of the case at hand. [6] Alaska Statute 11.61.110(b) defines noise as unreasonably loud if, considering the nature and purpose of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances known to the defendant, including the nature of the location and the time of day or night, the conduct involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would follow in the same situation. This provision goes on to clarify: `Noise' does not include speech that is constitutionally protected. [7] The superior court concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Crawford for making unreasonably loud noise because [r]easonable behavior in the lobby of the clerk's office, where members of the public gather to do research and file papers, means using a normal speaking voice. But this finding seems to improperly discount Crawford's argument that Kemp arrested him because Crawford continued to speak after Kemp repeatedly warned him that he would be arrested if he simply spoke any further. In his complaint, Crawford described the sequence of events directly before the arrest: 57. I turned in my chair to face Kemp and in a normal speaking tone said that I would like him to make sure no harm came to the tape because I would be requesting a copy of it. 58. Kemp then approached me, this time on my right side. 59. He came right to my side and leaned down close to my face, placing his left hand on the back of my chair, behind me. 60. Kemp was now between me and A.B. 61. Kemp said that he had repeatedly warned me that my speech was disorderly, and that he would arrest me if I spoke any further. 62. I said that I was still sitting and that he had approached me. 63. I said that it was him who had his hand on my chair and I didn't think that made me disorderly at all. 64. He then said that he wasn't going to warn me anymore and that if I spoke anymore he would arrest me for disorderly conduct. 65. As he had been speaking he was also getting increasingly close to my face. After one of his warnings to cease speaking a small amount of spittle came out of his mouth and landed on my face. 66. I said to him that he had spit on my face, I asked him to please stop spitting on my face. 67. He did not back up and he said to stop speaking or he would arrest me for disorderly conduct. 68. I asked him to please stop spitting in my face. 69. He stayed there in front of me leaning towards me without backing up and said he had warned me already that my speech was having a disorderly effect on him and that if I didn't stop speaking he would arrest me for disorderly conduct. 70. I said to please stop spitting in my face. 71. He said that's it, stand up, you're under arrest. Crawford's recitation of events in his complaint was supported by his deposition testimony, in which he recounted that Kemp told him that he would be arrested if he continued to speak to Kemp: He's saying I cannot speak to him because if I speak to him at all that's disorderly conduct and II probably wouldn't have been arrested if I had just shut up right then and I didn't say anything but I knew that I wasn't required by law to just shut up like he wanted me to. When asked if Kemp had instructed him to calm down or keep his voice down, Crawford responded, No. He didn't. . . . He said don't talk to me. Crawford testified that every time [Kemp] says cease speakingI remember thathe said stop talking, stop talking, that's disorderly conduct and I'll arrest you and I said no it's not. Crawford maintains that Kemp never said don't be loud or don't annoy other people. The superior court's probable cause determination also failed to give any weight to Bijan's affidavit, which stated that throughout the ten-minute incident, both Crawford and Kemp spoke to each other at about the same level of voice volume, a very formal and normal tone of . . . voice. Bijan also recounts that [n]o one indicated . . . that this incident bothered them. During this incident, no one (in the lobby of the clerk of the court) asked anyone to lower their voices. Crawford's version of events, set out in his complaint and his deposition, and the affidavit of his friend, Bijan, raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the facts and circumstances known to Kemp would support a reasonable belief that Crawford's words were unreasonably loud or created a hazardous condition. We therefore conclude that the superior court could not determine as a matter of law that Kemp acted reasonably or that a jury would inevitably find that Kemp was reasonable in believing that Crawford's actions justified an arrest for disorderly conduct. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Crawford, [8] we conclude that there is a genuine issue of fact as to the lawfulness of Kemp's arrest of Crawford. [9]