Opinion ID: 890183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 2. Did the District Court manifestly abuse its discretion in denying Evans' motion for a new trial?

Text: ¶ 51 As for the merits of the appeal, Evans argues that she was denied a fair trial because Stuivenga engaged in improper argument during summation. The basis of this claim is that Stuivenga violated the District Court's earlier ruling regarding evidence of DUIs when he referred to the dismissal of the DUI charge arising out of the October 2008 accident. (As noted, the Powell County Attorney dismissed this charge with prejudice prior to trial in the instant case.) Evans asserts that Stuivenga's reference to the dismissal was highly prejudicial because she could not rebut the implication that the issue of who was driving had already been resolved by the Powell County Attorney. Evans further contends that, in referring to the dismissal, Stuivenga introduced facts not in evidence. ¶ 52 As to the first point, Evans is incorrect about the scope of the District Court's ruling. That ruling, quoted above at ¶ 9, pertained specifically to Stuivenga's prior DUI convictions. Evans cites an excerpt from the transcript where the trial judge observes that I've got a commitment from attorneys for Ms. Evans that there will be no further evidence about the DUI in the case. But when this statement is read in context, it is unmistakably clear that the judge was referring to evidence of prior DUIs. In fact, the discussion in this portion of the transcript resulted from Stuivenga's objection to Evans' questioning regarding his prior DUI convictions. There was no discussion at this time regarding the dismissed DUI charge. As to the second point, the record reflects that there was testimony, by Evans herself on cross-examination, revealing the DUI charge and dismissal. This evidence was not objected to. Thus, Stuivenga did not introduce facts not in evidence. ¶ 53 When the basis of a motion for a new trial is an irregularity in the proceedings or surprise, we review the denial of the motion for a manifest abuse of discretion. Styren Farms, Inc. v. Roos, 2011 MT 299, ¶ 12, 363 Mont. 41, 265 P.3d 1230. A manifest abuse of discretion is one that is obvious, evident, or unmistakable. Styren Farms, ¶ 12. Here, we conclude that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying Evans' motion for a new trial. ¶ 54 Affirmed. We Concur: MIKE McGRATH, C.J., MICHAEL E. WHEAT, JIM RICE, and BETH BAKER, JJ.