Opinion ID: 1174739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Error

Text: Defendants contend that the State did not comply with U.C.A., 1953, § 77-1-3(3) (1982), requiring that informations be presented and signed by a prosecuting attorney. The informations were subscribed and sworn to by Guy W. Blunk, a police officer, before a circuit judge. On the back side of the informations appears the statement, Authorized for presentment and filing: Ted Cannon, County Attorney, and the personal signature of W.C. Gwynn, Deputy. In State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, Utah, 646 P.2d 727, 730 (1982), this Court determined that the requirement of § 77-1-3(3) is met by an information being sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been committed and authorized by a prosecuting attorney. Thus, the informations in the present case met the necessary legal requirements. Moreover, defendants waived any objections to defects in the informations where they made no objections to the informations either before or during trial. See State v. Hall, Utah, 671 P.2d 201, 202 (1983); Utah R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1), (d). Defendants also argue that there was no probable cause for their arrests. A defendant's failure to object to the legality of his arrest prior to trial constitutes a waiver of that issue. Utah R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1), (d). In the present case, defendants waived any objections to the legality of their arrests.
Defendants next contend that they were denied their due process rights with respect to their preliminary hearings. Specifically, their charges include the following: the prosecution suppressed mitigating evidence at Mildred Lairby's preliminary hearing; the court improperly admitted affidavits of Carri Long referring to her victimization; and there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause. In support of their argument, defendants have attached their own (uncertified) copies of a partial transcript of the preliminary hearings. In doing so they have not complied with Utah R.Civ.P. 75(m). Nowhere in the record is it established that the State or the court has approved the transcripts, and the transcripts were not made a part of the record. Defendants' assignments of error cannot be considered by this Court in the absence of record evidence. See State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (1982). [1]
Defendants next contend they were denied their constitutional right to a speedy trial. Mildred Lairby was arrested May 14, 1981, and Timothy Lairby was arrested July 22, 1981. Both were tried in the same proceedings on October 26, 1982. They rely on Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1982), which lists the following factors as probative in evaluating whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated: length of delay, reasons for delay, whether defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial, and whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Accord State v. Knill, Utah, 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1982). The continuances, except for those on the court's own motion due to a crowded calendar, were stipulated to by defendants' counsel. One continuance was at defendants' request. Defendants admit that their counsel advised them that time was in their favor, but that in hindsight, defendants now believe the lapsed time was a conscious, wilfull [sic], and purposeful act on the part of the Deputy County Attorneys involved to gain a tactical advantage over the accused, specifically, to allow the coaching of the child witnesses in their testimony. This Court has held that a defendant who has not asserted his or her right to a speedy trial in the lower court has waived the right to raise the issue on appeal. State v. Sparks, Utah, 672 P.2d 92, 94 (1983). Thus, in the present case defendants waived a speedy trial because they did not assert their rights below and because their counsel stipulated to the continuances. Finally, defendants' claim of prejudice is unsubstantiated. Whether the victims fabricated the incidents was a decision for the trier of fact. Additionally, both defendants were granted pretrial release and were therefore not prejudiced by having been incarcerated for an unconscionable period of time. For the same reasons, defendants' argument that Timothy Lairby's preliminary hearing was delayed unreasonably is without merit. The parties stipulated to the continuances, no objection was made below, and there is no showing of prejudice.
Defendants also contend the district court lacked jurisdiction over them because there was only a circuit court information and no district court information reciting that defendants were bound over to that court. Defendants rely on a former Utah Code provision, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-4 (1978), requiring the recitation of the binding over on an information. The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure was revised effective July 1, 1980, and the foregoing provision was repealed. 1980 Utah Laws ch. 15, § 1. Defendants were arrested in 1981, and therefore the old provision was not in effect. Moreover, even under the former code provision, failure to make a timely objection to the information constitutes waiver. State v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 64-65, 252 P. 280, 284 (1926). This point is therefore without merit.
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a notice of taking depositions of Carri and Tracy Long, the latter being the older child of Mildred Lairby. It was served on the social worker supervising the girls, who had been placed in shelter, with a copy to the prosecuting attorney. The girls did not appear, and no one appeared on behalf of the State. [2] Defendants brought a motion to compel, which the court denied, saying that defendants were entitled only to a list of prospective witnesses under U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16 (1982). Defendants contend their rights were abridged by this denial, citing U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-14(h) (1982), which states: Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state ... as to afford reasonable grounds for believing that he will be unable to attend a trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the court for an order that the witness be examined conditionally by deposition. Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at the deposition and the court shall make whatever order is necessary to effect such attendance. Utah R.Crim.P. 14(h). Tracy and Carri in fact departed from the state to Arizona approximately one month later. Carri testified at trial, but Tracy did not. [3] Defendants' motion to compel did not recite that a material witness was about to depart the state, nor did it cite § 77-35-14(h) as grounds for the motion. The trial court, the State argues, could not be expected to apply § 77-35-14(h), since it had not been advised at the time the motion was presented that the witnesses were about to leave the state. We agree. In general, a trial court is allowed broad discretion in granting or denying discovery, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16(f) (1982), and its determinations on this subject will not be overturned on appeal unless the court has abused its discretion. State v. Knill, Utah, 656 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1982); see also State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 357, 360, 517 P.2d 1315, 1317, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 3175, 41 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1974). Moreover, defendants have not shown how they were prejudiced by the denial. The defense had the opportunity to confront Carri Long when she testified at trial and had the right to secure the attendance of Tracy Long from out of state on their own behalf had there been a likelihood that her testimony would have been exculpatory. Since she did not testify at trial, there was no need to cross-examine her on damaging testimony. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion.
Defendants argue that the trial was heard by an unconstitutional panel of jurors, composed as it was of eight members. Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution provides: In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. Thus, the Utah Constitution permits a panel of eight jurors in noncapital criminal cases. See also U.C.A., 1953, § 78-46-5 (Supp. 1983). In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1907, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that a jury of six persons in a criminal case is constitutional. In Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152, 1154 (10th Cir.1970), the Tenth Circuit specifically ruled, in light of the Williams holdings, that the eight-juror panel for noncapital offenses under the Utah Constitution is constitutional. Defendants therefore have no valid sixth or fourteenth amendment claim.
Defendants contend the lower court erred by not admitting into evidence the contents of the deposition of an Arizona psychologist, Dr. Clinton Street. Nowhere in the record can we find an attempt by defendants to introduce Dr. Street's deposition, and it appears that only one reference was made to its contents. In cross-examining Richard Long, the former husband of defendant Mildred Lairby, defense counsel referred to the report of the psychologist. The prosecutor objected to any testimony about the report on the ground that the psychologist was not present, and the objection was sustained. In the absence of an attempt to introduce the deposition, we will not consider defendants' arguments under Utah R.Evid. 63(3), 9B U.C.A., 1953 (1977).
Defendants claim the trial court erred by refusing to secure the attendance of an out-of-state witness, Tracy Long, the natural daughter of Mildred Lairby, who resided with defendants during the period when the alleged events occurred. Defendants argue that they were entitled to have the court issue a certificate ordering her attendance from Arizona pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 77-21-3 (1982). The record discloses that on the second day of trial, defendants, upon noting Tracy Long was not present, made an oral request to the court that she be subpoenaed from Arizona. Defense counsel did not apprise the trial court that he sought an order compelling the attendance of an out-of-state witness at an in-state criminal proceeding pursuant to § 77-21-3. Moreover, no showing was made before the lower court, nor has one been made on appeal, that Tracy Long was a material witness as required under the Act. No proffer was made regarding the contents of her testimony. A mere allegation of materiality does not justify a finding that a witness is material. See People v. Nash, 36 Ill.2d 275, 281, 222 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 906, 88 S.Ct. 222, 19 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). On appeal, defendants likewise merely allege materiality. No description of the witness' evidence is offered, and no suggestion is made as to how her testimony would affect defendants' case. Under the circumstances, there is no showing of prejudice, and the trial court's refusal was not erroneous.