Opinion ID: 165739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Black Hawk Officials

Text: 18 Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine establishes that the non-governmental defendants are not liable for requesting that Black Hawk engage in anticompetitive activities, it does not resolve the question whether city officials Kathryn Eccker, Lynnette Hailey, and James Maloney are liable for acceding to these requests. 10 Defendants' claims for monetary relief against Black Hawk officials, however, are nevertheless barred by the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (LGAA). 19 Congress passed the LGAA in response to an increasing number of antitrust suits, and threatened suits, that could undermine a local government's ability to govern in the public interest. See Tarabishi v. McAlester Reg'l Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558, 1564 (10th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted). The act provides that [n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) from any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a). The provisions of the Clayton Act cited by the LGAA provide the private damages remedy for violation of the Sherman Act. Crosby v. Hosp. Auth., 93 F.3d 1515, 1536 (11th Cir.1996). According to the complaint, Eccker, Hailey, and Maloney were at all times relevant the mayor, city attorney, and city manager of Black Hawk. These defendants are therefore official[s] or employee[s] of local government and are immune from damages for violations of the Sherman Act. 20 Plaintiffs nevertheless argue the city officials were not acting in an official capacity within the meaning of the LGAA because they acted beyond the scope of their authority and pursuant to their personal interests when they entered into a conspiracy to block the southern access road. The legislative history of the LGAA, however, demonstrates that Congress intended the phrase acting in an official capacity to be given broad meaning encompassing all lawful actions, undertaken in the course of a defendant's performance of his duties, that reasonably can be construed to be within the scope of his duties and consistent with the general responsibilities and objectives of his position. Sandcrest Outpatient Svcs., P.A. v. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 853 F.2d 1139, 1145 (4th Cir.1988). In this case, plaintiffs do not allege that the city officials lacked the authority to cause the city of Black Hawk to sell the undivided interests in the mining claims or to withhold Winn's certificate of occupancy. Their only contention is that in exercising these legitimate powers the city officials acted pursuant to an illegitimate motive. The LGAA, however, makes no provision for consideration of a defendant's motives. Id. at 1146 (rejecting the argument that allegations of a conspiracy convert otherwise authorized conduct into unauthorized conduct); see also Cohn v. Bond, 953 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir.1991) (An allegation of conspiracy is akin to an allegation that [defendants' conduct] was done in bad faith or with malice, which is clearly irrelevant in determining the application of the immunity. (quotation omitted)); Thatcher Enters. v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir.1990). 21 For these reasons, this court concludes that the Black Hawk officials are immune from monetary liability for Sherman Act violations. 22