Opinion ID: 152981
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Based on Sex

Text: In assessing the totality of the circumstances offered to prove a hostile work environment, a fact-finder may consider only abusive conduct proven to be based on sex. Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir.2002); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 621 (2d Cir.2001). [3] This may be proven by `harass[ment] in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . [as] to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace,' Raniola, 243 F.3d at 621 (alteration in original) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)), or by offering some circumstantial or other basis for inferring that incidents sex-neutral on their face were in fact discriminatory. Alfano, 294 F.3d at 378. A plaintiff may rely on incidents of sex-based abuse to show that other ostensibly sex-neutral conduct was, in fact, sex-based. See Raniola, 243 F.3d at 621-22; see also Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 156 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that a rational jury could infer that facially-neutral abuse was sex-based because perpetrator had previously made several sexually-derogatory statements). Applying these standards, we conclude that Pucino has offered sufficient evidence to allow a trier of fact to find that the alleged abuse was indeed sex-based. Pucino offered evidence showing that both Hinspeter and Moore subjected women to disparately harsh working conditions. These included the disparate assignment of work in dangerous areas and the refusal to provide assistance to female workers that was provided male co-workers. Verizon has proffered no evidence suggesting a legitimate non-discriminatory explanation for the foremen's conduct. A trier of fact could also find disparate treatment based on gender in the provision or denial of tools and the use of bucket trucks. There was similar evidence with regard to access to public restrooms by male and female employees that would allow a trier of fact to conclude there was an attempt to force female employees to use restrooms that had no locks. Pucino also offered evidence sufficient to allow a trier to find that Hinspeter and Moore engaged in verbal attacks on Pucino that were sex-based. In that regard, Pucino and the EEOC suggest that the word bitch is such an intensely degrading sexual epithet that its use implies as a matter of law hostility toward women. It surely is the case that use of that word in many contexts reflects such hostility. However, we cannot say that use of the word bitch always and in every context has that meaning or that its usage need not be viewed in context. See Kriss v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1281 (8th Cir.1995); see also Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir.2007) ([A] gender-specific term of abuse, such as `son of a bitch,' need not imply hostility based on the abused person's sex any more than saying `she is a bad worker' need imply hostility based on her sex.) (internal citation omitted). We also see no need to worry that a trier of fact cannot make the appropriate judgment about the word's use. We therefore reject a rule that would automatically command an inference of gender-based hostility to be drawn from its use. Having said that, we also have no doubt that such a trier could find that Hinspeter's constant use of the word over several years in the context of the present record was sex-based and reflected hostility to women. See EEOC v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir.2007) ([Defendant] frequently made indisputably gender-related remarks, and tolerated the use of the word `bitch' to describe [plaintiff]. Under these circumstances, we think a jury should decide whether these comments were made because of gender animus.). We also conclude that the combination of disparate treatment and gender-based verbal abuse here can support a further inference that the other complained of instances of abuse involving the two foremen were in fact gender-based. There is little question that incidents that are facially sex-neutral may sometimes be used to establish a course of sex-based discriminationfor example, where the same individual is accused of multiple acts of harassment, some overtly sexual and some not. Alfano, 294 F.3d at 375. Here, even if incidents, such as the denial of overtime, did not directly amount to disparate treatment when considered alone in isolation, an inference that such conduct was gender-based could be drawn by a trier because Hinspeter and Moore were behind them. Notwithstanding the above analysis, Verizon argues that the evidence upon which Pucino relies is simply too conclusory to support an inference that the conduct in question was gender-based. We disagree. While purely conclusory allegations of discrimination that are devoid of concrete particulars do not suffice to avoid summary judgment, Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985), Pucino has proffered detailed evidence that Hinspeter and Moore treated similarly-situated male and female workers differently, including the accounts of others who witnessed such conduct. For that reason, we conclude that Pucino has proffered evidence sufficient to show gender-based discrimination.