Opinion ID: 785761
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Failure to Advise Claim

Text: 28 Conoshenti argues that PSE & G's failure to advise him of his right to twelve weeks of FMLA leave, after he properly gave notice of his serious health condition, constituted an interference with his FMLA right to that protected leave. Had he received the advice PSE & G was obliged to provide, Conoshenti insists, he would have been able to make an informed decision about structuring his leave and would have structured it, and his plan of recovery, in such a way as to preserve the job protection afforded by the Act. We conclude that this is a viable theory of recovery and that the District Court accordingly erred in granting summary judgment on it against Conoshenti. 29 As we have noted, the parties stipulated in the District Court that, for purposes of summary judgment, PSE & G did not advise Conoshenti of his rights under the FMLA. As we have also noted, the regulation under the FMLA imposed a duty on PSE & G to do so. It follows, we believe, that Conoshenti will show an interference with his right to leave under the FMLA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), if he is able to establish that this failure to advise rendered him unable to exercise that right in a meaningful way, thereby causing injury. Neither PSE & G in its brief nor the District Court in its opinion contest the theoretical basis for this claim, and we believe that basis is supported by the relatively sparse authority relevant to the issue. 30 In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002), the Supreme Court had before it the FMLA regulations requiring an employer to advise employees of FMLA rights. It was called upon to determine the validity of a regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.770(a), 7 which imposed a penalty on an employer who failed to advise that a leave taken by an employee would count against her FMLA entitlement. Under this regulation, the twelve week FMLA leave did not commence until this advice was given. In Ms. Ragsdale's case, this would have entitled her to 30 weeks of leave, even though she could not show that she was in any way prejudiced by the employer's breach of duty. The Court struck down this penalty provision, noting that it was unconnected to any prejudice the employee might have suffered from the employer's lapse and, accordingly, incompatible with the FMLA's comprehensive remedial mechanism which affords no relief absent prejudice from a statutory violation. Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 88-89, 122 S.Ct. 1155. 31 The Ragsdale Court expressly noted that the validity of notice requirements of the regulations themselves was not before it. Accordingly, Ragsdale is not dispositive of anything before us. It is helpful, however, because the Court found reasonable Ragsdale's suggestion that a failure to advise of FMLA rights could constitute an interference with an employee's exercise of basic FMLA rights in violation of § 2615: 32 Section 825.700(a), Ragsdale contends, reflects the Secretary's understanding that an employer's failure to comply with the designation requirement might sometimes burden an employee's exercise of basic FMLA rights in violation of § 2615. Consider, for instance, the right under § 2612(b)(1) to take intermittent leave when medically necessary. An employee who undergoes cancer treatments every other week over the course of 12 weeks might want to work during the off weeks, earning a paycheck and saving six weeks for later. If she is not informed that her absence qualifies as FMLA leave — and if she does not know of her right under the statute to take intermittent leave — she might take all 12 of her FMLA-guaranteed weeks consecutively and have no leave remaining for some future emergency. In circumstances like these, Ragsdale argues, the employer's failure to give the notice required by the regulation could be said to deny, restrain, or interfere with the employee's exercise of her right to take intermittent leave. 33 This position may be reasonable, but the more extreme one embodied in § 825.700(a) is not.... [It] establishes an irrebuttable presumption that the employee's exercise of FMLA rights was impaired — and that the employee deserves 12 more weeks. There is no empirical or logical basis for this presumption, as the facts of this case well demonstrate. Ragsdale has not shown that she would have taken less leave or intermittent leave if she had received the required notice. 34 Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89-90, 122 S.Ct. 1155. This portion of the Ragsdale opinion, together with our own assessment of the reasonableness of the notice regulations, persuades us that the Supreme Court would find an actionable interference in violation of § 2615(a) here in the event Conoshenti is able to show prejudice as a result of that violation. 35 The District Court from which this appeal comes to us has previously endorsed the theory of recovery Conoshenti advances here. In Nusbaum v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d 377, 379-80 (D.N.J.2001), after plaintiff Margot Nusbaum learned that she required back surgery, she requested that her employer allow her to take medical leave and also requested information regarding the employer's medical leave policy. The employer refused to provide this information. Moreover, Nusbaum never received any materials providing information on FMLA leave and the employer had not complied with 29 U.S.C. § 2619's requirement that it post a notice outlining the FMLA's important provisions and the employees' FMLA rights. Her employer also failed to prospectively designate her leave as FMLA leave in violation of 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.208 and .700. Nusbaum took the leave required for her surgery, and was discharged during her absence. Nusbaum then brought suit, alleging that her employer's failure to notify her of her right to twelve weeks of FMLA-protected leave, and her subsequent termination, interfered with her FMLA rights in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The District Court denied the employer's motion to dismiss, holding as follows: 36 [T]he purpose of the regulations enacted by the DOL ... is to ensure that employers allow their employees to make informed decisions about leave.... The overall intent of the FMLA is lost when an employer fails to provide an employee with the opportunity to make informed decisions about her leave options and limitations. Without such an opportunity, the employee has not received the statutory benefit of taking necessary leave with the reassurance that her employment, under proscribed conditions, will be waiting for her when she is able to return to work. 37 Id. at 385-86. The court concluded that Nusbaum was, therefore, not given the proper information that would have allowed her to structure her leave in a way that would have left her protected by the FMLA. Id. at 386. We find this reasoning of the Nusbaum Court persuasive. 38 The District Court in Conoshenti's case accepted his claim that the regulations imposed a duty on PSE & G to advise him of his FMLA rights and that a failure to do so could result in an interference under § 2615(a)(1). It distinguished Nusbaum, however, on the ground that Conoshenti had proven no prejudice as required by Ragsdale. In support of this conclusion, the Court first noted that his ignorance of the nature of his leave ended on December 27. Accordingly, it held that Conoshenti's reliance on Nusbaum could only be used to delay the commencement of his twelve weeks of FMLA-protected leave from December 6th to December 27th; this would, in any event, have left him unprotected by the FMLA before he returned to work. The Court then observed that Conoshenti had presented no evidence that he could have made a different choice had PSE & G informed him that his FMLA leave began on December 6, and made only the bare assertion that he could have made different decisions. App. at 16a. We hold that the District Court's analysis is at odds with well-established principles governing the propriety of summary judgments. 39 The record indicates that in December 1999, Conoshenti contacted his union in order to learn what he needed to do to protect his job during his recovery. In response to this inquiry, the union advised Conoshenti to inform PSE & G that he wanted his leave to be considered FMLA leave. The record further indicates that Conoshenti then sent a letter to PSE & G on December 27, 1999 stating that he would like to request an immediate leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. App. at 73a. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that Conoshenti knew that he was entitled to only twelve weeks of protected leave. Rather, the record simply reflects what Conoshenti was told to say and what he did say. The summary judgment record thus does not speak to Conoshenti's knowledge of his relevant FMLA rights on December 27th or thereafter during his leave. 40 Similarly, the summary judgment record, as the District Court correctly noted, contains no competent evidence regarding the alternatives that would have been available to Conoshenti had PSE & G advised him of his rights when he requested leave on December 6th. Only Conoshenti's brief contains a statement of what he would have done had he been advised of his rights. 8 41 While we agree with the District Court that these gaps in the record required it to deny Conoshenti's motion for summary judgment, they clearly did not warrant the grant of PSE & G's motion. It is well established that a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Here, PSE & G never asserted that Conoshenti could not meet his burden of proving that he could have structured his leave differently. Nor did PSE & G argue that a showing of prejudice was an essential element of Conoshenti's claim or that such a showing was material in any way. Accordingly, we conclude that PSE & G, as the moving party, did not satisfy its initial burden of pointing to an absence of evidence as to whether Conoshenti had been prejudiced. Conoshenti was therefore not required, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), to respond with specific facts establishing a genuine issue with respect to the prejudice requirement. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.