Opinion ID: 1571354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clemency Proceedings

Text: Grossman next argued in his third successive postconviction motion that the death penalty is arbitrary and capricious as applied to him because he had a clemency proceeding in October 1988, but has not had an opportunity to present further information about his life in a recent clemency proceeding. He asserted that newly discovered evidence would explain why he acted impulsively at nineteen years of age when he committed the murder. He further contended that the clemency procedures are impermissibly arbitrary. We conclude that the trial court properly denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing. This Court recently rejected an identical claim in Johnston v. State, 27 So.3d 11 (Fla. 2010): Johnston contends that his original clemency hearing was inadequate to protect his rights because it was conducted before his full life history and mental illness history were developed. We rejected a similar argument in Bundy that time must be given to prepare and present a case for clemency in a second clemency proceeding before the death sentence may be carried out. Bundy[v. State], 497 So.2d [1209] at 1211 [(Fla. 1986)]. We also noted in Marek v. State, 14 So.3d 985 (Fla.2009), after Marek raised a second challenge to the clemency process, that five justices of the United States Supreme Court concluded [in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998)] that some minimal procedural due process requirements should apply to clemency ... [b]ut none of the opinions in that case required any specific procedures or criteria to guide the executive's signing of warrants for death-sentenced inmates. Marek, 14 So.3d at 998. We again conclude that no specific procedures are mandated in the clemency process and that Johnston has been provided with the clemency proceedings to which he is entitled. Further, we decline to depart from the Court's precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of clemency in capital cases. Johnston has not provided any reason for the Court to depart from its precedents or to hold that an additional clemency proceeding is required before a death warrant is signed. Because these same claims have been raised and ruled on in the Court's prior precedents, and Johnston has provided no reason for the Court to depart from those precedents, relief is denied. Johnston, 27 So.3d at 25-26, 2010 WL 183984, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at S69; see also Marek, 14 So.3d at 998; Bundy, 497 So.2d at 1211. Similarly, Grossman has not provided any reason why this Court should depart from its well-established precedent on this issue, and we thus deny relief on this claim.