Opinion ID: 801483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause v. Reasonable Suspicion

Text: Mr. Whitley argues that the stop in this case was invalid because it was not based on a traffic violation and lacked probable cause. He appears to argue that probable cause is required for a traffic stop in the absence of a traffic violation. We disagree. The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause is generally required before an officer may conduct a search or a seizure. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722-23, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Ordinarily, a searcheven one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrantmust be based upon probable cause to believe a violation of the law has occurred. (quotations omitted)). But in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court established that a law enforcement officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person to investigate possible criminal behavior even if he lacks probable cause to arrest. United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir.2011), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 278, 181 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011). Such [a]n investigatory detention is justified at its inception if the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime. Id. (quotations omitted). Because a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio guide [our] determination as to the reasonableness of a traffic stop. United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 866 (10th Cir.2012) (quotations omitted) (citation omitted); United States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir.2011) (The principles governing investigative detentions outlined in Terry v. Ohio govern the lawfulness of traffic stops. (quotations omitted) (citation omitted)). Although we often state that [a] traffic stop is justified at its inception if an officer has ... reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular motorist has violated any of the traffic or equipment regulations of the jurisdiction, see, e.g., United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.2009), the lawfulness of such a stop is not limited to situations where an officer suspects a traffic or equipment violation. Instead, we apply the same standard as for a Terry stop, whether or not the vehicle stop involves a traffic violation. Such a stop is justified if the officer bears a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. United States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1205-06 (10th Cir.2007) (quotations omitted); Winder, 557 F.3d at 1135 (An officer may initiate a traffic stop once he has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is, has, or is about to occur. (quotations omitted)); United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 792 (10th Cir.1997) (In order to conduct a lawful investigatory stop of a vehicle, the detaining officers must have, based on all the circumstances, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. (quotations omitted)); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ([The Fourth Amendment's] protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest... [T]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. (quotations omitted)). In Arvizu, the Supreme Court upheld a vehicle stop made in the absence of an observed traffic violation. 534 U.S. at 271-72, 122 S.Ct. 744. The Court held that the stop was justified because the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was smuggling drugs. Id. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744. Numerous other cases have determined a traffic stop to be valid when it is based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity unrelated to a traffic offense. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 415-16, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (suspicion of smuggling illegal aliens); Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d at 793 ([W]e conclude that [the deputy] was entitled to stop the vehicle to investigate further his suspicions that the occupants were involved in smuggling activities.). Thus, the officers were required to have reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, that Mr. Whitley was engaged in criminal activity, and the criminal activity need not be limited to a traffic offense. [2]