Opinion ID: 691351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reliance on testimony from co-defendants' sentencing

Text: 15 Harvey's presentence report recommended a three-level increase in his base offense level, under Guideline Sec. 3B1.1(b), to reflect a supervisory role in the conspiracy. Although the government initially supported this recommendation, by the time of Harvey's sentencing hearing the prosecutor had concluded that such an increase would be inappropriate and declined to call witnesses on that issue. The prosecutor explained at the hearing that the change in position stemmed primarily from the result of Blackwell's sentencing, where the court found, based on similar facts, that there was insufficient evidence to support a role increase. 16 The court, however, evidently believed that the testimony presented at the other defendants' hearings, all of which took place before Harvey's, identified Harvey as the primary force behind the conspiracy. Thus, despite lengthy discussion in which both the prosecutor and defense attorney characterized the conspirators as a loosely knit group who sometimes helped each other and discussed their activities, without a real leader, the court imposed a two-level increase based on its belief that Harvey played a relatively more pivotal role in the conspiracy. 17 No evidence was presented at the hearing, which consisted almost entirely of colloquy between the court and the two lawyers. The probation officer, in response to a question from the court, did briefly relate conversations she had had with two codefendants concerning Harvey's role. See n. 6 infra. Harvey also made a statement after the court announced its finding on the role issue, but before formal imposition of sentence. 18 On appeal, Harvey argues that the district court's reliance on testimony from hearings that neither he nor his lawyer attended denied him a fair sentencing by depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against him. He therefore asserts that the case must be remanded for a new hearing and resentencing. 19 It is well established that a convicted defendant has the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate and reliable information, and that implicit in this right is the opportunity to rebut the government's evidence and the information in the presentence report. See United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir.1989). The Supreme Court has emphasized that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 contemplates full adversary testing of the issues relevant to a Guidelines sentence and mandates that the parties be given 'an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence.'  Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 135, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2186, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1)). 2 20 As discussed earlier, however, see supra at 1234, a trial judge has wide discretion in the matters it may consider when imposing sentence, and more than one circuit has condoned reliance on evidence from related trial proceedings of codefendants. See United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 19 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1032 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1495-96 (11th Cir.1990). As with any other sentencing information, the court simply is obligated to give the defendant an opportunity to rebut such evidence. 21 In seeking a remand, Harvey relies heavily on the First Circuit's decision in Berzon, whose facts closely resemble the facts of this case. At issue there was the testimony of a Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent, who commented on defendant Berzon's role in a narcotics ring in the course of testifying at a codefendant's prior sentencing hearing. On appeal, Berzon's attorney stated that he first learned of the earlier testimony after Berzon's hearing, apparently upon inquiry triggered by his surprise that the court had found Berzon to be a leader or organizer without testimony from that agent. 22 The First Circuit remanded for review of Berzon's sentencing because the previously undisclosed testimony included significant, unfavorable statements bearing on Berzon's role in the offense. 3 Failing to provide a defendant with notice that such information would be considered, the court ruled, was tantamount to depriving him of his opportunity to respond to it, since  '[t]h[e] right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed,'  id. at 18 (quoting Burns, 501 U.S. at 135-37, 111 S.Ct. at 2186 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950))). The appeals panel directed district courts to alert defendants in advance if they anticipate considering extra-record materials in imposing sentence. 23 In finding that remand was necessary, however, the panel carefully distinguished Berzon's case from others in which courts had found no error, such as Notrangelo and Pimentel. In those cases, the First Circuit pointed out, the sentencing judge's reliance on a codefendant's proceeding was proper because the same facts adduced through testimony had been included in the defendant's presentence report. 941 F.2d at 19-20. The court noted: 24 We agree entirely with the results in those cases. The difficulty here, by way of contrast, is that the testimony and argument at [the codefendant's] sentencing included information not in the PSI nor otherwise in the record in Berzon's case. 25 Id. (emphasis in original). 26 In a slightly different setting, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion about the importance of notice in the sentencing process. The case, Burns v. United States, involved a district court's sua sponte upward departure from the Guidelines at the conclusion of a sentencing hearing. The plea agreement in Burns had stated the parties' expectation that the defendant would be sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range, and the presentence report confirmed this expectation, concluding that there were no factors warranting departure. 27 Resolving a split in the circuits, the Court held that Rule 32 obliged the district court to furnish advance notice of its intent sua sponte to depart from the Guidelines. The Court pointed to Sec. (a)(1) of the Rule, mandating an opportunity to comment on sentencing matters, and observed that a sua sponte departure from the Guidelines is [o]bviously a  'matte[r] relating to the appropriate sentence.'  501 U.S. at 135, 111 S.Ct. at 2186. It then went on: 28 In our view, it makes no sense to impute to Congress an intent that a defendant have the right to comment on the appropriateness of a sua sponte departure but not the right to be notified that the court is contemplating such a ruling. 29 Id. (emphasis in original). The Court therefore held that Rule 32 requires a court to provide specific notice of the ground on which it is contemplating a sua sponte upward departure. Id., 501 U.S. at 137-39, 111 S.Ct. at 2187. 30 Harvey urges us to view this case as akin to Berzon and Burns, and to remand, because the district court gave no notice of its intention to rely on evidence presented at his codefendants' sentencing hearings. This is not enough, however, to establish error. As we have seen, the fairness of a sentencing turns not on whether the defendant had the same access as the court to all relevant information, but on whether the defendant had sufficient notice to permit a meaningful response to the information considered. 31 The fact that Harvey and his attorney were not present at the prior hearings is thus significant, but not dispositive of his claim. 4 The caselaw discussed above suggests to us a two-prong inquiry: first, was the specific evidence considered by the court from the prior sentencing hearings previously undisclosed to Harvey, and second, if he had no prior knowledge, was he given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the information. 32 In order to address the first issue, we have carefully compared Harvey's presentence report with the transcript of his sentencing hearing. We have found that, for the most part, the content of the testimony to which the district court made reference at Harvey's hearing was at least generally included in the PSI. The district court's lengthy summary of his reasons for imposing a role-in-the-offense increase included the following statements: 33 [T]here was testimony [at Blackwell's sentencing] from other individuals [besides Blackwell], as well as Inspector Cashmere[sic], that Mr. Harvey did teach the game to the group ... and there was testimony from at least Terence Grimes that Mr. Harvey was getting a split of the accounts. 34 ... The court finds that it is undisputed in the record that the box of checks and identification was kept by Mr. Harvey, and that the box was, at least for a part of the time during this conspiracy, kept in the trunk of Mr. Harvey's car. 35 . . . . . 36 In any event, the evidence clearly establishes to this court's satisfaction that Mr. Harvey was not only an active participant but was a leader. He played an active role in the recruitment of accomplices, and certainly the evidence is clear that he trained or taught others how to engage in this illegal activity, and it's hard for this court to believe that he would not have shared in some way from the benefits derived from that activity. 37 There is some evidence that proceeds were shared with this defendant, and that may or may not have been the arrangement with each of the codefendants. The record is not clear in that regard. But, it just defies the imagination to say that somebody is going out and recruit and train and provide the tools with which the scheme could be carried out without expecting and receiving a share in the fruits of the conspiracy. 38 . . . . . 39 ... [T]he court feels that in this case while this defendant may not have directly controlled each of the codefendants, he did in the court's judgment place himself in a position where he was responsible for the offense insofar as the actions of these codefendants are concerned. And he was ... in a position where he controlled the tools of the trade, recruited the individuals, trained them, and that in the court's judgment is a key role in the commission of the offense. 40 Harvey Sentencing Hearing, Tr. at 27-31. 41 Harvey's PSI contained the following explanation for the recommendation that he and Blackwell receive three-level increases based on managerial or supervisory roles in the offense: 42 David Harvey and Dashielle Blackwell were involved in training all of the codefendants involved in the instant offense; providing false identification to them; and instructions on how to execute the bank fraud scheme. The evidence also suggests both Mr. Harvey and Mr. Blackwell received a percentage of proceeds from each fraud scheme executed. 43 PSI, at 18. 44 This paragraph is a concise summary of most of the same factors that led the court to make its finding. On the issue of profit-splitting, however--which the district court appeared to treat as significant, making repeated references to it--we believe there was a deficiency in what Harvey knew about the evidence available to the judge. Other than the general statement in the PSI about what the evidence suggests, the 45-page report contained no reference to Harvey's receiving a split of the profits from transactions in which he did not participate. 5 Harvey specifically objected to this assertion in his response to the PSI, thereby imposing on the court the obligation either to resolve the dispute by making a finding on the issue, or to determine that a finding is unnecessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing, Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1). 45 At the hearing, the court seemed to find, although not expressly, that Harvey did receive a split of the accounts, see supra at 1237-38, and reached this conclusion at least partially in reliance on Terence Grimes' testimony at Blackwell's hearing. 6 In our view, Grimes' specific testimony was different not merely in degree, but in kind from the vague assertion contained in the PSI. 46 Moreover, although not explicitly included in his summation, the district court earlier in the hearing referred to Inspector Cashmer's testimony at Blackwell's hearing supposedly describing Harvey as the main man in the conspiracy. 7 In fact, Cashmer's testimony was that Terence Grimes had stated that Harvey was the main man as well as Dash [Blackwell]. See Blackwell's Sentencing Hearing, Tr. at 33. Upon further questioning at that hearing, Cashmer confirmed that Grimes also described others as being main men, and that the label apparently referred to anyone involved in the conspiracy, not to who was directing it. See id. at 32-33. A specific assertion by Grimes that Harvey was the main man would have been significant new information, if accurate, and Harvey obviously had no notice of such an allegation. 8 47 Having concluded that certain significant evidence taken into account by the district court was not disclosed to Harvey before the hearing, we must turn to the second prong of our inquiry and examine whether he was given a reasonable opportunity to respond to that evidence. In this respect, Berzon and Burns are distinguishable because both involved a total lack of notice before sentences were imposed. In Berzon, defense counsel did not discover the existence of the prior testimony until after his client's sentencing. In Burns, the presentence report confirmed the parties' agreement that a departure was unwarranted, and the court announced its decision to depart unexpectedly, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. 48 Here, the government initially supported the role increase, the probation department continued to maintain throughout the pre-hearing period that such an increase was appropriate, and the court engaged in a lengthy dialogue with both the prosecutor and defense counsel before imposing sentence. The defendant, in other words, was on notice of a dispute between himself and others and was given some opportunity to respond to the new evidence before he was sentenced. Arguably, had he been more prepared for the hearing, perhaps bringing witnesses to testify, he would have been in a position to offer evidence to rebut Grimes' statements. 49 On balance, however, we do not believe Harvey was given sufficient notice to allow him meaningfully to rebut the prior testimony. Because the government backed away from a role increase, Harvey knew that no new evidence would be introduced at the hearing to support such an increase. 9 Additionally, the PSI had dealt with the role-in-the-offense issue for both Blackwell and Harvey together, and he knew that the same judge had found the evidence insufficient to support such an increase for Blackwell. Therefore, despite the probation department's continued recommendation for an upward adjustment, Harvey had reason to expect the court to adopt the government's changed position. That prospect was made all the more likely by Harvey's agreement with the government that, rather than litigating the role increase, his somewhat greater involvement in the conspiracy would be reflected through holding him responsible, like Blackwell, for the entire amount of the loss. See Harvey's Sentencing Hearing, Tr. at 4. 50 Thus, when they arrived for the sentencing, Harvey and his attorney reasonably would not have anticipated the need for evidence to rebut new, damaging information, and they obviously did not suspect that the court and prosecutor would remember incorrectly Cashmer's testimony at Blackwell's hearing. Had he been on notice of the court's skepticism of the government's new position against a role increase, however, and the basis for that skepticism, Harvey in all likelihood would have approached the hearing in a much different fashion. Presumably, he would have sought transcripts from the prior hearings, and perhaps would have sought to call Grimes as a witness. Indeed, the prosecutor, too, undoubtedly would have been better prepared. See Tr. at 13-15. 10 We therefore conclude that Harvey did not receive sufficient notice, as required by Rule 32, so that he could comment meaningfully on the court's decision to impose a role increase. 11 51 This conclusion does not fully resolve the matter. Once confronted with the new information, the logical step for Harvey would have been to request a continuance to enable him to prepare to respond. 12 And, although his attorney repeatedly pointed out to the court during the hearing that neither he nor his client was present for the codefendants' testimony, implying a limited ability to respond to what they had said, see Tr. at 16, 18, 23, he neither asked for a continuance nor lodged a specific objection to the court's decision to sentence Harvey based on that testimony. 52 One could thus make a non-frivolous argument that Harvey's claim to lack of adequate notice, while potent, nevertheless was waived. While recognizing the importance of an appellant's obligation to bring claims of error clearly and completely to the trial court's attention, we choose in this instance to err, if at all, in a direction that ensures the integrity of the sentencing process. No party came to this hearing prepared to advocate against the three-level increase recommended by the probation department and, as we have seen, that situation led to faulty and uncorrected recollections of the prior testimony. Additionally, in its summation on the role adjustment, the district court characterized the evidence as limited, see Tr. at 30, and, seemingly as a consequence of that determination, chose to impose only a two-level increase rather than to adopt the three-level recommendation. 13 Finally, the contrary finding with respect to Blackwell, in the face of the government's stated belief that we really don't think there's justification for having a different result between the two defendants, Tr. at 11, suggests a significant likelihood that the lack of notice and concomitant limited ability to respond affected Harvey's sentence. We therefore think it prudent, if not necessary, to remand this case for resentencing. See United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 63 (1st Cir.1991) (in sentencing,  'it is of the utmost importance not only that justice be done but that it appear to be done' ). 14 Cf. United States v. Patrick, 988 F.2d 641, 647-49 (6th Cir.1993) (sentencing court's failure to provide advance notice of intention to rely on evidence adduced at codefendant's plea hearing constitutes harmless error).