Opinion ID: 186155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Internet Condition

Text: 10 We begin with Stanfield's challenge to the internet condition that will apply during his supervised release. The revised condition states: 11 The defendant's use of the internet is limited as follows: 12 a) The defendant may use the internet as any employer legally directs, so long as he has no access to personal information including bank account numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers and birth dates. 13 b) The defendant may not view and use internet sites that provide personal information as described in [section (a)]. 14 c) Within these parameters, the probation office may alter this limitation on internet use as needed to ensure that it is clear and tailored to prevent further identity thefts. 15 d) The defendant must permit the probation office to search his e-mail accounts and his computer, including the drives and storage devices, at any time. If the defendant uses the computer or e-mail account of a friend or employer, he must first obtain permission from that person for a possible search of the computer, including the drives and storage devices, or the e-mail account. 16 The imposition of a term of supervised release after imprisonment is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Subsection (d) of that provision specifies that the court may order any condition of supervised release it considers to be appropriate, to the extent the condition is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, and to the need to deter crime, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide needed training, medical care, or other correctional treatment to the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). The condition also must entail no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to provide adequate deterrence, to protect the public, and to meet the defendant's vocational and medical needs. Id. § 3583(d)(2). 17 The parties and amicus American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area dispute whether the internet restriction comports with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and the First Amendment. Amicus tells us that seven federal appellate decisions have upheld internet restrictions, while six have struck them down. See Amicus Br. at 14 & n.10. The government argues that the cases on which defendant and amicus rely are distinguishable because of the greater breadth of the restrictions at issue in those cases. See Appellee Br. at 56-57. 18 Before we can assess such arguments, we need to know the reach of the restriction at issue. Stanfield and amicus contend that the condition is vague in significant respects. It does not state explicitly that Stanfield may use a computer only as any employer legally directs, but at oral argument Stanfield's counsel — who was also his counsel at the hearing when the condition was imposed — stated that she believed the condition included that limitation. Oral Argument at 07:55; see also Reply Br. at 20 (construing section (a) of the condition as allowing internet use only at work). Stanfield also argues that the condition is overly expansive, and offers the example of newspapers' internet sites, which typically include birth dates in obituaries or death notices. On its face, with its ban on accessing any site that contains birth dates, the restriction could bar Stanfield from reading an encyclopedia or a newspaper online (even though he could freely buy a print edition of these materials and obtain the same information). 19 The government offers a reading of the restriction that does not suffer from the vagaries that Stanfield alleges. In the government's view, it is obvious that Stanfield is free to have a personal computer and e-mail account, because section (d) refers to his e-mail accounts and his computer in a context distinct from the employment realm, immediately providing for additional steps to be taken when the computer belongs to an employer or friend. Appellee Br. at 55. At oral argument, in response to questioning, government counsel represented that the restriction would not preclude Stanfield from accessing newspapers online, despite the fact that such sites contain prohibited information such as birth dates. Oral Argument at 35:49. 20 We are reluctant to address the validity of the internet restriction in the absence of a clearer understanding of its scope; we need more solid footing before deciding where we stand. The evolutionary process the internet restriction has undergone in this case — involving challenges by the defendant, redefinition by the district court without providing notice to or hearing argument from the defendant, and sporadic concessions by the government — has culminated in a lack of clarity about what exactly is before us. That is problematic enough as a general matter; neither the defendant nor the probation office and district court should have to consult the judgment, the briefs before this court, and the transcript of oral argument to determine the scope of the condition. Subsection (f) of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 specifies that: 21 The court shall direct that the probation officer provide the defendant with a written statement that sets forth all the conditions to which the term of supervised release is subject, and that is sufficiently clear and specific to serve as a guide for the defendant's conduct and for such supervision as is required. 22 See also United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir.2003) (Due process requires that the conditions of supervised release be sufficiently clear to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 23 But quite apart from these concerns, the confusion over the scope of the internet restriction counsels restraint on our part before attempting to consider the validity of the restriction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and the First Amendment. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 495, 106 S.Ct. 2034, 2038, 90 L.Ed.2d 480 (1986) (We do not think ... that it is desirable to express any more detailed views on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question... without a fuller development of the disputed issues in the case.). Although section (c) of the condition authorizes the probation office to clarify and tailor the restriction, the extent of the confusion here, and the First Amendment concerns that this case implicates, render that option inadequate. See United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir.2003) (Easterbrook, J.) (terms of supervised release should be precise, because open-ended delegations to probation officers create opportunities for arbitrary action — opportunities that are especially worrisome when the subject concerns what people may read). We accordingly remand to allow the district court to clarify the scope of the restriction. See United States v. Smith, 332 F.3d 455, 462 (7th Cir.2003) (remanding for clarification of ambiguous condition of supervised release); see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2519-20, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) (remanding to court of appeals for clarification of its findings); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 478, 482-83 (D.C.Cir.1996) (remanding for district court to clarify the grounds for its ruling). We leave to the district court in the first instance the appropriate means of addressing the confusion that has arisen.