Opinion ID: 545168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Statements Made During Plea Bargaining

Text: 18 Paden argues that the district court erred in concluding that statements made by Paden during the course of plea bargaining were admissible in the sentencing phase of his trial. Paden cites Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6)(D), which is based upon (and virtually identical to) Fed.R.Evid. 410(4). Rule 11(e)(6)(D) provides that any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn is not admissible against the criminal defendant who made the statement. 19 The incriminating statements in question were made during plea negotiations in August 1988. According to Paden, the Government unilaterally ended these negotiations, and consequently cut off the Government's opportunity to use any statements Paden made during the negotiations. Paden maintains that his subsequent plea agreement with the Government in April 1989 did not resurrect the Government's opportunity to use the incriminating statements. 20 This Court disagrees. We find nothing in either Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6)(D) or Fed.R.Evid. 410(4) requiring that a particular discussion or series of discussions must produce a plea agreement. Neither do we find anything in these rules that prevents either side from discontinuing negotiations for a time. Progress toward a plea is rarely smooth and unbroken. Both rules look only to the end result of the process. Here, the end result of Paden's discussions with the Government was a guilty plea. By their express language, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6)(D) and Fed.R.Evid. 410(4) do not prohibit statements made during plea negotiations that lead to a plea of guilty. 3 21 At sentencing, the district court may rely upon any evidence of the defendant's credibility and responsibility that is sufficiently reliable. United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir.1989). In this case, the statements are sufficiently reliable, because they came directly from Paden. Once it was shown that the statements were sufficiently reliable, Paden had the burden of showing that this information upon which the district court relied in sentencing was materially untrue. Flores, 875 F.2d at 1113. Paden has not satisfied this burden. He insists that the statements he made during the plea negotiations were coerced by threats from the Government prosecutors, but he has not denied on appeal that the statements he made were accurate. Even if Paden may be said to have denied the truth of his incriminating statements, he has not alleged a colorable claim that his statements were involuntary. He claims that Government prosecutors pressured him to tell the truth, and suggested that Paden might receive the death penalty or life imprisonment if he did not admit that he was the one who lit the match that sparked the Lakeland Stationers fire. Encouraging a defendant to tell the truth, however, does not render a statement involuntary. United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir.1978). Neither does a recitation of the potential sentence a defendant might receive render a statement involuntary. Id. at 1062-63. 22 In this case, the district court, based on all the available evidence, reached a decision that Paden's prior incriminating statements during plea negotiations were relevant and helpful to a determination of the sentence Paden would receive. This Court cannot conclude that the district court's decision was in error.