Opinion ID: 1097684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: voir dire, testing qualifications of expert

Text: In the voir dire inquiry of Dr. McParland's qualifications, he was asked if he knew Marlene Tobin, and replied, Yes. Then, he was asked if he knew Lillian or John J. Hamparian, to which he responded he did not recall the name, but might know them. Then he was asked if they had not sued him. He replied he did not know about Hamparian, but there was a suit just instituted, ... she didn't sue me; she sued ten doctors ... and I was not the doctor attending her at the time that that suit was instituted. (Vol VII, pp. 955-956) He was asked what the suit was about, how it was he was sued, and he replied Dr. Donald D. Dwyer was the attending physician. When asked her problem, he replied she was a 40-year-old woman who developed cancer and had a lot of other problems. All the above testimony was elicited without objection. Dr. McParland was then asked, What about Marlene Tobin? An objection to this question was sustained. Counsel then asked the doctor if he had been sued by anybody else, to which he responded, Once. There was then an objection, which was overruled, and Dr. McParland replied that he had been one of the doctors sued in an anesthetic death that had occurred a number of years before, he could not recall when. Bankers Life argues the above was improper voir dire but counsel has failed to favor us with any case in point. Most of this testimony was elicited without objection, following which there was an objection to a question, which was sustained, but no motion for a mistrial. We are therefore confined to the question of whether reversible error was committed in the doctor's answer to the final question. Dr. McParland was offered as an expert on the human anatomy. If there was anything about his past conduct which reflected upon his knowledge, clearly it was admissible. See: Wood v. American Life Ins. and Trust Co., 7 How. 609 (Miss. 1843), p. 631; ... when particular credit is concerned, particular inquiries are proper. The question is whether such past conduct was relevant to the inquiry. In this case the questioning never proceeded to the point where it is clear, one way or another, that the one suit affected his knowledge in the capacity in which he was testifying. In hindsight we can observe it would have been preferable for the inquiry concerning the litigation in which Dr. McParland found himself a party defendant to have been conducted in chambers in order to ascertain whether such suit in any way bore upon his professional qualification to express an opinion. No such request was made, however. In inquiries of this nature, trial courts are given broad discretion, and there must be a showing of an abuse to warrant a reversal. See: 3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev. 1970), Section 991, pp. 922-926; Jones The Law of Evidence (6th Ed.), Vol. 2, § 14:30, p. 668. We cannot find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and even if there were, it was not reversible error. In these litigious times the mere fact some person has been sued hardly affects either his reputation or credibility. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. WALKER, P.J., and ROBERTSON and PRATHER, JJ., dissent. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court, Part II: Bankers Life argues that the amount of damages awarded  $1,600,000  is grossly excessive and should be substantially reduced. The point is brought before us by Bankers Life's assignment that the trial judge erred when he denied Bankers Life's post-trial motion for a remittitur of punitive damages or, alternatively, a new trial on the amount of punitive damages. This issue must be adjudged under the same process of adjudication as is applicable on any other assignment of error. This involves the familiar three-step process of identifying and articulating the applicable rules of law, resolution of all questions of evidentiary fact, and application of the law to the facts. See Boardman v. United Services Automobile Association, 470 So.2d 1024, 1029 (Miss. 1985) With regard to punitive damages, our rules are necessarily general. Once it is established that punitive damages in some amount should be allowed, the quantum thereof is determined by reference to certain general factors which include: (1) Such amount as is necessary for the punishment of the wrongdoing of the defendant and deterring defendant from similar conduct in the future, Standard Life Co. of Indiana v. Veal, 354 So.2d 239, 249 (Miss. 1977); (2) Such amount as is reasonably necessary to make an example of the defendant so that others may be deterred from the commission of similar offenses. Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. McGee, 444 So.2d 803, 808 (Miss. 1983); T.C.L., Inc. v. LaCoste, 431 So.2d 918, 923 (Miss. 1983); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 460 (Miss. 1983); Snowden v. Osborne, 269 So.2d 858, 860 (Miss. 1972); and (3) The pecuniary ability or financial worth of the defendant, Collins v. Black, 380 So.2d 241, 244 (Miss. 1980); Allen v. Ritter, 235 So.2d 253, 256 (Miss. 1970); Standard Life Insurance Co. of Indiana v. Veal, 354 So.2d 239, 249 (Miss. 1978); Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 610, 7 So.2d 519 (1942). Punitive damages are an important component of the remedial side of our law whose purpose is the protection of the customer. On these facts our law would seem to authorize a quantum of punitive damages to be that amount reasonably necessary to punish defendant and to provide a substantial deterrent to it and others similarly situated from the commission of similar offenses, all consistent with the pecuniary ability and financial worth of the defendant. In this context, we note that Bankers Life reported to the Commission of Insurance in its 1980 report total assets in excess of $1,300,000,000, and net assets of approximately $294,000,000. Our case law is to the effect that the determination of the amount of punitive damages is a matter committed solely to the authority and discretion of the jury. See e.g., Commodore Corp. v. Bailey, 393 So.2d 467, 471 (Miss. 1981); Collins v. Black, 380 So.2d 241, 244 (Miss. 1980); Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 220 Miss. 609, 71 So.2d 752 (1954); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Pope, 175 Miss. 393, 166 So. 539 (1936). These same cases, frequently in the same sentence as has been used to commit sole discretion to determine the amount of punitive damages to the jury, use language expressing a view to the effect that the jury's verdict may be interfered with if it is found arbitrary or unreasonable or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Commodore Corp. v. Bailey, 393 So.2d at 472. Other cases recognize that a jury's finding on amount of punitive damages may be disturbed for exceptional causes. Collins v. Black, 380 So.2d at 244; Snowden v. Osborne, 269 So.2d 858, 861 (Miss. 1972); Woodall v. Ross, 317 So.2d 892, 896 (Miss. 1975). Our general rule is that a damage award is so excessive that it should be altered or amended when it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience. Jesco, Inc. v. Shannon, 451 So.2d 694, 705 (Miss. 1984); Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So.2d 437, 444 (Miss. 1982); James Reeves Contractor, Inc. v. Chain, 343 So.2d 1229, 1232 (Miss. 1977). This shock must be experienced by the judicial conscience, not the actual conscience of the members of this Court. Schoppe v. Applied Chemicals Division, 418 So.2d 833 (Miss. 1982), (contrast amount of verdict with amount of actual damage). We are not authorized to disturb a jury verdict regarding amount of damages because it seems too high or seems too low. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. v. Sanford, 375 So.2d 1036, 1037 (Miss. 1979). Where this test is met, the trial judge is authorized generally to enter a remittitur or an additur as may be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the particular case. [Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-55 (Supp. 1984)]. This authority to enter a remittitur or an additur exists where the nature of the damage award at issue is punitive or exemplary. See Standard Life Insurance Co. of Indiana v. Veal, 354 So.2d 239, 249 (Miss. 1977) (rule impliedly recognized). We hold that motions challenging the quantum of punitive damages and seeking either a remittitur or an additur are subject to the same rules as motions challenging the amount of damage awards generally. This means that on appeal we are reviewing a matter which is by its very nature committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So.2d 706, 714-716 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring). What in essence we are dealing with is a motion for a remittitur or in the alternative for a new trial on the issues of damages only. Where the trial judge acts upon these matters, we reverse only if the trial judge abuses or exceeds his discretion. Dorris v. Carr, 330 So.2d 872, 874 (Miss. 1976). While no hard and fast rule may be laid down with regard to the maximum amount of punitive damages which may be awarded in a given case, it is difficult to imagine that, consistent with the rules of law recited above, the judicial conscience could be shocked by a punitive damages assessment which is less than 1% of the financial net worth of the defendant. The record reflects that the net worth of Bankers Life in the year immediately preceding the trial was $294,000,000. The amount of punitive damages assessed by the jury was $1,600,000 or 0.54421% of the net worth of the company. However high that amount may seem, it may not, consistent with our rules of law in the area, be said to shock the judicial conscience. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. WALKER, P.J., and HAWKINS, ROBERTSON and PRATHER, JJ., dissent.