Opinion ID: 2626387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Do the statutes authorize separate punishments?

Text: ¶ 16 Again, if the statutes explicitly authorize separate punishments, then separate convictions do not offend double jeopardy. See Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 776, 888 P.2d 155; In re Pers. Restraint of Burchfield, 111 Wash.App. 892, 896, 46 P.3d 840 (2002); cf. RCW 9A.52.050. Therefore, we begin our analysis with the most important question; what did the legislature intend? Evidence of legislative intent may be clear on the face of the statute, found in the legislative history, the structure of the statutes, the fact the two statutes are directed at eliminating different evils, or any other source of legislative intent. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985); Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 777-78, 888 P.2d 155. ¶ 17 In this case, the statutes do not explicitly authorize separate punishments. Compare R CW 9A.56.200 (first degree robbery) with RCW 9A.36.011 (first degree assault). Freeman and Zumwalt argue that we should infer legislative intent based on the legislature's silence in the face of a long line of prior holdings that tended to find the two crimes to be the same for double jeopardy purposes. They note that since 1975, courts have regularly vacated assault convictions when the assault furthered a first degree robbery. See generally 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4706, at 340-43 (3d ed.2004) (collecting cases). Freeman and Zumwalt argue that the fact the legislature has not indicated its discontent with these cases proves its approval. Cf. State v. Coe, 109 Wash.2d 832, 846, 750 P.2d 208 (1988). ¶ 18 It is true that since 1975, courts have generally held that convictions for assault and robbery stemming from a single violent act are the same for double jeopardy purposes and that the conviction for assault must be vacated at sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Prater, 30 Wash.App. 512, 516, 635 P.2d 1104 (1981); State v. Springfield, 28 Wash.App. 446, 453, 624 P.2d 208 (1981) (Springfield's one punch ... can support a conviction for either the robbery or the assault, but not both.), substantially overruled by Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 777, 888 P.2d 155; State v. Bresolin, 13 Wash.App. 386, 394, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975) (merging assault and robbery); see generally 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2107, at 455-465 (3d ed.2004); 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., supra § 4706, at 340-44. Vacation of the assault charge is so ubiquitous that the model form in Washington Practice for a motion to merge counts at sentencing lists assault and robbery in the text of the model form. Id. at 350-51, 534 P.2d 1394; but see State v. Tanberg, 121 Wash.App. 134, 87 P.3d 788 (2004) petition for review deferred pending resolution of this matter ( Wash. Nov. 30, 2004 ). However, we conclude that no per se rule has emerged; instead, courts have continued to give a hard look at each case. See generally Vladovic, 99 Wash.2d 413, 662 P.2d 853. ¶ 19 When an assault elevates the degree of robbery, courts have regularly concluded that the two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. However, with the exception of Springfield (which was substantially overruled by Calle ), courts have not held as a matter of law that the two crimes are the same. The fact the legislature has not acted is also, potentially, evidence that it is satisfied with our current practice of analyzing these cases individually. ¶ 20 Similarly, the State argues that we can find legislative intent to punish these crimes separately in the fact that the two statutes are directed at different evils. See generally Calle, 125 Wash.2d 769, 888 P.2d 155. But in Calle, this court reviewed in detail the history and academic material bolstering its conclusion that the legislature did intend to combat different societal evils through the rape and incest statutes. Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 780-81, 888 P.2d 155. No such historical review appears in the briefing here. Further, a per se holding that the legislature never intends these two crimes to merge would also require us to substantially overrule a long line of cases. State v. Mahoney, 40 Wash.App. 514, 517, 699 P.2d 254 (1985); Prater, 30 Wash.App. at 516, 635 P.2d 1104; Bresolin, 13 Wash.App. at 394, 534 P.2d 1394; cf. Vladovic, 99 Wash.2d at 419, 662 P.2d 853; Johnson, 92 Wash.2d at 680, 600 P.2d 1249. ¶ 21 We find no explicit or implied legislative intent from the legislature's silence in the face of our holdings. Nor do we find explicit or implied legislative intent whether, as a matter of law, these statutes necessarily forbid different types of bad acts. ¶ 22 However, there is an important piece of evidence that recent legislatures intended to punish first degree assault and first degree robbery separately, at least under some circumstances. As the legislature is well aware, when a court vacates a conviction on double jeopardy grounds, it usually vacates the conviction for the crime that forms part of the proof of the other. See, e.g., State v. Valentine, 108 Wash.App. 24, 26, 29 P.3d 42 (2001); State v. Read, 100 Wash.App. 776, 792, 998 P.2d 897 (2000); Prater, 30 Wash.App. at 516, 635 P.2d 1104; Springfield, 28 Wash.App. at 453, 624 P.2d 208; State v. Cunningham, 23 Wash.App. 826, 863, 598 P.2d 756 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 93 Wash.2d 823, 613 P.2d 1139 (1980); Bresolin, 13 Wash.App. at 394, 534 P.2d 1394. This is because the greater offense typically carries a penalty that incorporates punishment for the lesser included offence. Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L.REV. 1, 28 (1995). But when a first degree assault raises a robbery to first degree robbery, the case is atypical. The standard sentence for first degree assault (in this case, 111 months) is considerably longer than the standard sentence for first degree robbery (in this case, 41 months). Given the fact of the current sentencing schema, it is unlikely the legislature intended this result. While this is not necessarily dispositive, it does weigh upon our analysis. Cf. Burchfield, 111 Wash.App. at 900, 46 P.3d 840 (considering the seriousness level assigned by the legislature when determining how the legislature intended two related crimes to be treated). ¶ 23 However, when assault in the second degree elevates robbery to the first degree, the result is more typical. In Zumwalt's case, he received a standard range sentence of 54 months on the greater robbery conviction and 17 months for the lesser assault conviction, to be served concurrently. ¶ 24 Accordingly, we conclude that there is evidence that the legislature did intend to punish first degree assault and robbery separately. But we find no evidence that the legislature intended to punish second degree assault separately from first degree robbery when the assault facilitates the robbery.