Opinion ID: 150474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The District Court's Erroneous Application of Strict Scrutiny

Text: Before proceeding to the merits of plaintiffs' discrimination claim, we must clarify that the District Court erred in applying strict scrutiny to evaluate plaintiffs' claim. The District Court began its analysis by applying the correct legal standard, as it first examined, at length, whether the CEP `unfairly or unnecessarily burden[ed] the political opportunity of any party or candidate'that, of course, is one part of Buckley 's version of the exacting scrutiny standard. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 333-34 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612). Ultimately, the District Court concluded that the CEP did, in fact, impermissibly burden the political opportunity of minor-party candidates. That is a legal conclusion that we reverse, as set forth below. Nonetheless, assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the District Court was correct to hold that the CEP impermissibly burdened the political opportunity of minor-party candidates, the Court was, at that point, required to proceed to a second step of the inquiryto determine whether a less searching standard applied in evaluating plaintiffs' discrimination claim. Yet the District Court did exactly the opposite: it held that strict scrutinya more searching standardapplied in evaluating plaintiffs' discrimination claim. [9] In applying strict scrutiny, the District Court relied on two cases from our sister Circuits, Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 466 (1st Cir.2000), and Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir.1996). In those cases, candidates claimed that a state public financing system violated the First Amendment because it was overly coercive, effectively requiring that every candidate accept public money. The courts applied strict scrutiny because they concluded that the right to decline public fundsand to raise and spend one's own money in an election campaignwas a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment. We have no occasion to address whether strict scrutiny was the correct standard to evaluate the claims raised in Daggett and Rosenstiel. We note only that the claims raised in those cases were far different from the claim raised by plaintiffs in Count One: the plaintiffs in Daggett and Rosenstiel claimed that a public financing system was overly coercive and thereby violated the First Amendment, whereas plaintiffs here claim that a public financing system unconstitutionally discriminates in its differential treatment of minor-party candidates and major-party candidates. The District Court's reliance on Daggett and Rosenstiel was, therefore, misplaced. It is, instead, Buckley that provides the best guidance in this context, as Buckley addressed the same type of claim that plaintiffs raise in Count One. Again, as we have explained, in no event does Buckley suggest that strict scrutinya standard that is more demanding than exacting scrutinyapplies to the type of claim raised in Count One. In sum, the District Court erred in applying strict scrutiny.
Having clarified the legal standard with which to evaluate plaintiffs' claim of unconstitutional discrimination in Count One, we now turn to the merits of that claim. As explained above, we will follow Buckley's example and assume for the sake of analysis that Buckley's version of exacting scrutiny applies. Thus we ask (a) whether the CEP was enacted in furtherance of a sufficiently important governmental interest and (b) whether the CEP burdens the political opportunity of a party or candidate in a way that is unfair or unnecessary. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-96, 96 S.Ct. 612. The answer to the first question whether the CEP furthers a sufficiently important governmental interestis straightforward. As Buckley held, public financing as a means of eliminating improper influence of large private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest. Id. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612. The District Court found that the CEP was enacted in furtherance of several goals, including to eliminate improper influence on elected officials. See Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 309 (explaining that the CEP was [s]purred in large part by the fall-out from the corruption scandals that culminated in the resignation of Governor Rowland and his subsequent indictment and conviction). Accordingly, the District Court held that the CEP was enacted to further a sufficiently important governmental interest. See id. at 351. We agree with that holding. The answer to the second question whether the system burdens the political opportunity of a candidate in a way that is unfair or unnecessaryis more complicated. Plaintiffs claim, primarily, that three aspects of the CEP impermissibly burden their political opportunity: (1) the CEP's single-election qualification criteria, (2) the CEP's statewide qualification criteria, and (3) the CEP's distribution formulae. We address each aspect of the CEP in turn. A. The Single-Election Qualification Criteria The District Court determined that the CEP's single-election qualification criteria, see generally Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-705, impermissibly burdened the political opportunity of minor-party candidates because the criteria ma[de] it extremely difficult for minor party candidates to become eligible for even partial public funding, Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 344. We cannot agree with that application of law to fact.