Opinion ID: 2570469
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grave Consequences

Text: ¶ 21 An offense not of moral turpitude may nevertheless be jury eligible, as explained in Dolny, depending on the severity of the consequences to the defendant's life. Benitez argues that driving on a DUI suspended license involves such grave consequences that a jury right must attach. Relying on Rothweiler, he repeats the contention that if simple DUI is jury eligible, then driving on a DUI suspended license which carries the same prison potential and fine, as well as a potentially longer license suspension, must certainly be jury eligible. He claims his potential license suspension carried a maximum of one year, or, four times the length of the 90-day suspension possible in Rothweiler. ¶ 22 The statute contradicts this argument. A violation of the suspended license statute requires a suspension for an additional like period, A.R.S. § 28-3473(D)(1), and thus could never result in a longer period of suspension. Nonetheless, though the license suspension faced by a defendant under section 28-3473(D)(1) may be the same length as that faced by Rothweiler, there are clear differences between the factors that make DUI jury eligible and a DUI suspended license violation ineligible. ¶ 23 In Rothweiler, we were concerned not just with the consequences of the license suspension, but with the moral implications of driving under the influence. Simply put, driving sober on a DUI suspended license does not reach the moral repugnancy nor deserve the consequences of a conviction for driving a vehicle while actually under the influence of alcohol. ¶ 24 The Supreme Court of Hawaii reached the same conclusion in State v. Wilson, 75 Haw. 68, 856 P.2d 1240 (1993). Hawaii's distinction between a DUI charge and a DUI suspended license violation is instructive. Though the jail term and fine available in Hawaii for a DUI suspended license conviction are less than those available under the Arizona statute, the potential license suspension period is the same. Confronted with Hawaii precedent holding DUI jury eligible, see State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 38, 704 P.2d 883 (1985), the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that driving on a DUI suspended license differed from the grave and therefore constitutionally serious offense of drunk driving. Wilson, 856 P.2d at 1244 (quoting O'Brien, 704 P.2d at 887). The court did not condone the actions of DUI-license suspension violators who refuse to abide by their punishment, [but could not] say that their continued driving is, in and of itself, as serious and tragic a problem as those who drive or continue to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Wilson, 856 P.2d at 1244. The court applied its O'Brien test and held that the offense did not warrant trial by jury. For the same reasons, we reach a similar conclusion. ¶ 25 Benitez further argues grave consequences by reason of the impact on his employment. He claims the loss of one's ability to drive would impact employment by denying transportation to and from work. Though an understandable argument, it leads nowhere because it renders the reason for the suspension immaterial. It would apply to any license suspension, whether the result of a DUI conviction or of any other vehicular offense. ¶ 26 This court does not recognize driving as a right. Instead we view it as a privilege. See State v. Harrison, 164 Ariz. 316, 318, 792 P.2d 779, 781 (App.1990) (The loss of a privilege is not nearly so serious or burdensome as the loss of a recognized right). We recognize that license suspension limits the job functions of those who must drive for a living, but we cannot base our analysis of jury eligibility on the effects of a conviction upon a particular occupation or field. Jury eligibility is determinable on the basis of the offense, not the defendant. When faced with consequences to the employment function, the courts must decide whether the effects are sufficiently widespread to create a grave offense with a jury right. Because we do not view the potential loss of the driving privilege as a grave or serious consequence, we hold today that the inability to get to and from work created by the suspension of one's license does not support a right to trial by jury.