Opinion ID: 77853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of Without Lawful Authority

Text: Citing the legislative history of § 1028A and the title of Aggravated Identity Theft, Hurtado argues that § 1028A(a)(1) was enacted to punish individuals who steal another person's actual identity, not those who commit simple passport fraud. Hurtado emphasizes that Congress did not define what is meant by without lawful authority and that the most reasonable reading is that the defendant stole the means of identification. Hurtado argues that his two § 1028A(a)(1) convictions should be reversed because the government did not present any evidence that he stole Colon's identity. `In interpreting a statute we look first to the plain meaning of its words.' United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir.2001)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2028, 167 L.Ed.2d 771 (2007). The plain language of a statute is presumed to express congressional intent. United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002). Section 1028A(a)(1) plainly requires that the transfer, possession, or use of the means of identification of another person be without lawful authority. Nothing in the plain language of the statute requires that the means of identification must have been stolen for a § 1028A(a)(1) violation to occur. For sure, stealing and then using another person's identification would fall within the meaning of without lawful authority. However, there are other ways someone could possess or use another person's identification, yet not have lawful authority to do so. There is no dispute here that Hurtado did not have any authority, much less lawful authority, to use Colon's identification. We need not attempt to define every situation where transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification would be without lawful authority. It is clear that the plain language of this phrase indicates Congress's intent to prohibit more than just the defendant's transfer, possession, or use of identification that was obtained by theft by that defendant. This plain reading of § 1028A(a)(1) is reinforced by the fact that Congress explicitly inserted the word stolen three times in the preceding statutory section, 18 U.S.C. § 1028, which enumerates eight identity fraud violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2), (6). `It is well settled that where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1342 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2125, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001)). If Congress intended to provide for an enhanced penalty only when an identification was stolen by a defendant and then used in the commission of another crime (such as passport fraud), it easily could have used the words stolen or theft in § 1028A(a)(1). The fact that Congress used the word stolen in § 1028, but chose the broader phrase without lawful authority in § 1028A(a)(1) plainly indicates that Congress intended to prohibit a wider range of activities in § 1028A(a)(1) than just theft. Our reading of the phrase without lawful authority in § 1028A(a)(1) is consistent with the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hines, 472 F.3d 1038, 1039-40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 235, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007). Upon being arrested for defrauding several retailers by obtaining credit in another person's name, Hines told police that he was Joseph Miller and provided Miller's social security number. Id. at 1039. Hines later admitted to prison staff that he had used Miller's name without permission, but testified at trial that he paid Miller cash and marijuana for the use of his name. Id. In holding that evidence was sufficient to convict Hines under § 1028A(a)(1), the Eighth Circuit concluded that regardless of whether Hines used Miller's name without permission or based on consent obtained in exchange for money and illegal drugs, Hines acted without lawful authority in using Miller's identification. Id. at 1040. Thus, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hines is consistent with our conclusion that the phrase without lawful authority prohibits methods of obtaining another person's identification beyond stealing. In sum, based on a plain reading of § 1028A(a)(1) and Congress's explicit use of the word stolen in § 1028, we conclude that § 1028A(a)(1) did not require the government to prove that Hurtado stole Colon's identity. [6]