Opinion ID: 2585966
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Utah's Grandparent Visitation Statute

Text: ¶26 [L]egislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and . . . they should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional frame work [sic]. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974). Therefore, when analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, the court presumes that the statute is valid and resolve[s] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191. Moreover, we will construe the statute to avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant constitutional mandates, so long as the resulting construction does not conflict with the reasonable or actual legislative purposes of the statute. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995). With these principles in mind, we hold that Utah Code section 30-5-2 (Supp. 2005) can be interpreted consistently with the principles announced in Troxel. [4] ¶27 First, the Grandparent Visitation Statute protects parental liberty interests by explicitly incorporating a presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2) (There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent's decision [concerning grandparent visitation] is in the grandchild's best interests.). Accordingly, courts must generally give deference to a parent's grandparent visitation decisions and may only override them where the petitioning grandparent rebuts the presumption. A grandparent meets this burden when the grandparent shows that there are special circumstances that permit the court to set aside the parent's decision even after the court has given it special weight. See id. We read the statute to require that a court must, as a threshold matter, specifically determine that the grandparent has met this burden in the process of considering whether the court should order visitation. The court's inquiry must acknowledge that, at all times, the burden of proof rests on the petitioner and not on the parent. ¶28 The Grandparent Visitation Statute does not specify a standard of proof by which the parental presumption must be rebutted. The degree of proof required in a particular type of proceeding has traditionally been left to the judiciary to resolve. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the parental presumption deals with parental liberty interests, and accordingly should be afforded great deference by the courts, we conclude that a clear and convincing standard of proof should apply to satisfy due process requirements. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 (mandating the application of at least a clear and convincing standard in parental rights termination cases). Therefore, a grandparent petitioning the court for visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Statute must clearly and convincingly rebut the parental presumption. [5] ¶29 In addition to incorporating the parental presumption, Utah's Grandparent Visitation Statute contains a second structural component to prevent judgments based on mere disagreement between the judge and the parent by listing several relevant factors that may justify setting a parent's decision aside. These factors are: (1) whether the petitioner is a fit and proper person; (2) whether visitation with the grandchild has been denied or unreasonably limited; (3) whether the parent is unfit or incompetent; (4) whether the petitioner has acted as the grandchild's custodian or caregiver or has a substantial relationship with the grandchild the loss of which is likely to cause harm to the grandchild; (5) whether the petitioner's child (the parent of the grandchild) has died or become a non-custodial parent; (6) whether the petitioner's child has been missing for an extended period of time; and (7) whether visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2)(a)-(g). These factors can be grouped into three categories, which we will discuss below. ¶30 The first category generally addresses situations where a family has been divided by some turn of fatedeath, divorce, loss of custody, a missing person, or a declaration that a parent is unfit or incompetent. The statute recognizes that when a family unit has been touched by these events a situation may arise where the child's interests differ from those of the parent. This is particularly true where the direct family line between grandparents and grandchildren has been severed, leaving the in-law relationship as the only remaining adult connection. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(c), (e), (f). Recognizing the potential for conflict in the relationship between the parent and the in-law and the resulting potential for interference with the grandparent-grandchild relationship, the statute provides an avenue for grandparents and grandchildren to maintain their relationship. [6] ¶31 The second group of statutory factors encompasses situations where the state has an interest in protecting the child from harm. Thus, a court may grant grandparents visitation if the grandparents can clearly and convincingly show they share a substantial relationship with the grandchild and the loss or cessation of that relationship is likely to cause harm to the grandchild. Id. § 30-5-2 (2)(d). The state's interest may also extend to situations where the child's parent has denied or unreasonably limited visitation, id. § 30-5-2(2)(b), because of the increased probability that the parent is not acting in the child's best interests. ¶32 The third category of statutory factors may be more accurately categorized as necessary threshold findings. These are findings that a court must make in order to grant visitation. For example, a court cannot order visitation if the petitioning grandparent is not a fit and proper person to have visitation with the grandchild. Id. § 30-5-2 (2)(a). Likewise, a court cannot order visitation unless it is in the best interests of the child. See id. § 30-5-2(g). This holds true even if the petitioner has satisfied other statutory factors. ¶33 We recognize that the statute describes best interests and grandparent fitness as relevant factors to the determination of whether the parental presumption has been rebutted. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(g). However, a judge could not rely solely on these factors in determining whether the parental presumption has been rebutted and still comport with due process. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 ([T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made.). Allowing these factors alone to rebut the parental presumption would come too close to allowing a judge to supercede a parent's decisions based solely on a disagreement between the parent and the judge. Thus, while a grandparent must be fit to receive court-ordered visitation, we do not believe a grandparent's fitness, standing alone, would ever properly serve as a reason to override the parent's decision. Rather, it is only one of many factors that a court can consider in determining whether the circumstances allow it to intervene in the parent's decision-making process. Moreover, in order for the statute to adhere to constitutional requirements, we read the statute to require that the parental presumption be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence before a court orders visitation based on the child's best interests. This distinction is not readily apparent from the plain language of the statute, but it is necessary to sufficiently protect parental rights. We recognize, of course, that the factual findings that support other statutory factors, such as whether the loss of a substantial grandparent relationship will affirmatively harm the child, will often overlap with facts relevant to the ultimate determination of whether grandparent visitation is in the child's best interests. ¶34 While the statute lists several means by which a grandparent can rebut the parental presumption, the presumption is most clearly rebutted when the court finds the existence of several relevant factors, such as in this case. Here, the court found that (1) Ms. Thurgood, the grandparent's child, had died; (2) the grandparents had a substantial relationship with the child, due in large part to a prior caretaking relationship, and the loss of the grandparent-grandchild relationship would harm the child; (3) the grandmother was fit; and (4) Mr. Thurgood had unreasonably limited or denied visitation. ¶35 We therefore hold that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is not unconstitutional under Troxel. The statute expressly incorporates the parental presumption, thereby ensuring that courts give special weight to the decisions of fit parents. Moreover, it provides guidance to courts in determining whether the petitioning grandparents have established circumstances under which the courts can, nevertheless, supercede the parent's decision. ¶36 Our holding that the statute is constitutional does not suggest the statute is flawless. We acknowledge that the statute is confusing, and consequently, provides very little guidance to a district judge trying to resolve a grandparent visitation dispute. [7] However, it is not our role to repair drafting defects that do not render a statute unconstitutional. This task falls to the legislature. Accordingly, we suggest, and indeed encourage, that our state legislature clarify the statute to provide more guidance to courts confronted with grandparent visitation issues. We hope that our decision in this case will assist the legislature in that undertaking. ¶37 Having determined the Grandparent Visitation Statute is constitutional, we now turn to whether the trial court's application of the statute violated the liberty interests of Mr. Thurgood.