Opinion ID: 217639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jensen's Remaining Claims

Text: Jensen advances two theories of state preemption of Rules 220 and 310. Jensen first argues that insofar as [Rules 220 and 310] were issued pursuant to Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 93116, they are preempted. Because Rules 220 and 310 were issued pursuant to Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 39656, 39659 and 39666, not Cal.Code Regs. tit. 17, § 93116, there is no basis for Jensen's claim that § 93116 preempts Rules 220 and 310. Jensen also argues that Rules 220 and 310 are preempted by Cal.Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2450 et seq. which creates California's Portable Equipment Registration Program. These regulations preempt districts from permitting, registering, or regulating portable engines and equipment units ... except in the circumstances specified in the regulations. Id. Registration is voluntary and [i]n the event that the owner of an engine or equipment unit elects not to register under this program, the engine or equipment unit shall be subject to district permitting requirements.... Id. at § 2451(d). Because Jensen has not alleged that it participated in this voluntary program, the Rules are not preempted as applied to Jensen.
Jensen also raises a substantive due process challenge to the Rules. To succeed on a substantive due process claim that, like this one, does not implicate a fundamental right or suspect classification, Jensen must demonstrate that there is no rational basis for the Rules. United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1491 (9th Cir.1995). Here, Jensen admits that the Rules serve the legitimate governmental interest in minimiz[ing] air pollution from diesel engines. Accordingly, we hold that Jensen's substantive due process claim fails. Finally, Jensen argues that Rules 220 and 310 violate the California Constitution, Article 13A because they levy a tax not approved by the electorate rather than a regulatory fee. Jensen did not raise this argument in its complaint, and the argument was not considered by the district court. Accordingly, we conclude that it is waived. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941).