Opinion ID: 1656256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Achieving a Compelling Governmental Interest.

Text: ¶ 36. As already stated, the state's burden here is to demonstrate that a compelling state interest will be achieved by applying the Canon to sanction judges who speak their views about gay rights. Even our Founders were well aware that the government cannot always be trusted to accurately discern what is, and is not, a compelling state interest. Indeed, the primary reason we have the First Amendment to our Constitution is that our Founders did not trust the government to always protect the rights of the people against the powers of the government. Many states refused to ratify the Constitution without a Bill of Rights, granting the citizens protection from the government. Perhaps Justice Stevens said it best when he declared for the Court: The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1508, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996). ¶ 37. Judge Wilkerson challenged the Commission to articulate the compelling state interest in sanctioning judges who announce their private views on gay rights. The Commission's only attempt to do so was in its brief filed with this Court, wherein it pointed out that impartiality of the judiciary is a compelling state interest, and that impartiality means the lack of bias for or against (sic) either party to the proceeding. ¶ 38. We agree that the Commission articulated a compelling state interest: impartiality of the judiciary. However, the task is not finished. Having articulated a compelling state interest, the Commission must next demonstrate how preventing judges from announcing their views on gay rights will serve to achieve that compelling state interest. This it never did. Instead, it equated impartiality of the judiciary with the appearance of impartiality of the judiciary. ¶ 39. No credible person could dispute that having impartial judges is a compelling state interest. But impartiality is not the same as the appearance of impartiality. [4] We find no compelling state interest in requiring a partial judge to keep quiet about his prejudice so that he or she will appear impartial. ¶ 40. Whatever state interest the Commission may find in preventing judges from announcing their private views on gay rights would conflict with, and be outweighed by, the more compelling state interest of providing an impartial court for all litigants, including gays and lesbians. Allowing  that is to say, forcing  judges to conceal their prejudice against gays and lesbians would surely lead to trials with unsuspecting gays or lesbians appearing before a partial judge. Unaware of the prejudice and not knowing that they should seek recusal, this surely would not work to provide a fair and impartial court to those litigants.