Opinion ID: 2344868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cognizability

Text: First degree assault is a statutory offense. Chapter 632 of the Acts of 1996, effective October 1, 1996, abrogated the common law crimes of assault and battery and enacted, inter alia, the statutory offense charged here. Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698 (1999). Maryland Code (2002), § 3-202 of the Criminal Law Article (CL) sets forth the conduct constituting the felony of assault in the first degree. In relevant part, it reads: (a) Prohibited.  . . . (2) A person may not commit an assault with a firearm, including: (i) a handgun[.] Assault is defined by CL § 3-201(b) to mean the crimes of assault, battery, and assault and battery, which retain their judicially determined meanings. [2] In determining the conduct proscribed by CL § 3-202(a)(2)(i), assault with a handgun, we look to the judicially determined meaning of assault. CL § 3-201(b). This Court has said: Maryland recognizes two forms of assault: (1) an attempt to commit a battery or (2) an intentional placing of another in apprehension of receiving an immediate battery. Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 699, 625 A.2d 984, 992 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 617, 583 A.2d 1056, 1059 (1991); Dixon v. State, 302 Md. 447, 457, 488 A.2d 962, 966 (1985), both quoting R. Perkins, Criminal Law 114 (2d ed.1969). Judge Cole, writing for this Court in State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 510 A.2d 253 (1986), described a battery to be ` any unlawful force used against the person of another, no matter how slight [.]' Id. at 510, 510 A.2d at 257 (quoting, with emphasis added, Kellum v. State, 223 Md. 80, 85, 162 A.2d 473, 476 (1960)). This Court further said that an unlawful touching is `[a]ny touching of the person in an angry, revengeful, rude or insolent manner[.]' Duckett, 306 Md. at 510, 510 A.2d at 257 (quoting L. Hochheimer, The Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure § 255, at 288 (2d ed. 1904) (Hochheimer)). Consequently, other than that the victim be a human being, CL § 3-202 does not require that the victim be identified by name in the charging document in order for it to allege a cognizable crime under that statute. The point raised by Mr. Edmund is either one of pleading or of constitutional dimension. Neither affects the fundamental jurisdiction of the court.