Opinion ID: 1833463
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof

Text: It is immediately apparent, in reviewing the trial court's ruling here, that the trial court failed to apply the statutory standard and instead applied an improper standard in determining the contestant's burden under the contest statute. The trial court began its analysis by stating: [I]t is well established and reflected in the opinion of Judge Joanos and Smith v. Tine[ [13] ][sic], that in order to contest election results under Section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes, the Plaintiff must show that, but for the irregularity, or inaccuracy claimed, the result of the election would have been different, and he or she would have been the winner. It is not enough to show a reasonable possibility that election results could have been altered by such irregularities, or inaccuracies, rather, a reasonable probability that the results of the election would have been changed must be shown. In this case, there is no credible statistical evidence, and no other competent substantial evidence to establish by a preponderance of a reasonable probability that the results of the statewide election in the State of Florida would be different from the result which has been certified by the State Elections Canvassing Commission. This analysis overlooks and fails to recognize the specific and material changes to the statute which the Legislature made in 1999 that control these proceedings. While the earlier version, like the current version, provided that a contestant shall file a complaint setting forth the grounds on which the contestant intends to establish his or her right to such office or set aside the result of the election, the prior version did not specifically enumerate the grounds for contesting an election under this section. Those grounds, as contained in the 1999 statute, now explicitly include, in subsection (c), the [r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election. (Emphasis supplied.) Assuming that reasonableness is an implied component of such a doubt standard, [14] the determination of whether the plaintiff has met his or her burden of proof to establish that the result of an election is in doubt is a far different standard than the reasonable probability standard, which was applicable to contests under the old version of the statute, and erroneously applied and articulated as a preponderance of a reasonable probability standard by the trial court here. A person authorized to contest an election is required to demonstrate that there have been legal votes cast in the election that have not been counted (here characterized as undervotes or no vote registered ballots) and that available data [15] shows that a number of legal votes would be recovered from the entire pool of the subject ballots which, if cast for the unsuccessful candidate, would change or place in doubt the result of the election. Here, there has been an undisputed showing of the existence of some 9000 undervotes in an election contest decided by a margin measured in the hundreds. Thus, a threshold contest showing that the result of an election has been placed in doubt, warranting a manual count of all undervotes or no vote registered ballots, has been made.