Opinion ID: 1511906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Meaning of the Statute.

Text: Appellant's second contention is that the correct construction of the statute does not include the gun which was in his possession at the time of his arrest. In defining the term firearm the Congressional language states that it means any weapon,    which is designed to expel a projectile    by the action of an explosive and a firearm muffler or firearm silencer, or any part or parts of such weapon. [7] The pistol here in question was not equipped with a silencer nor is there, according to the testimony of the government's expert, a commercially made silencer for this .32 caliber weapon. It is conceded, however, that a silencer could be made for it and there is evidence of a demonstration of the successful fitting and operation of a made-over .25 silencer on a gun of the same make, model and caliber. The appellant's argument is that the plain words of the statute, in which the conjunctive and is used instead of the disjunctive or or a combination of the two, limits the application of the statute to guns which are provided with a silencer, or where one may readily be applied. This being the plain meaning, he says, and the statute a penal one, resort should not be had to extrinsic sources like Treasury Regulations or legislative debates and hearings to give it some other meaning. If the premise of plain meaning were acceptable, there is something to be said for the suggested conclusion. We do not agree with the appellant's argument about the plain meaning. The statute as a whole indicates an ambitious plan for dealing with firearms in interstate commerce. The very sentence upon which appellant relies shows, in the last phrase, the intent of Congress to deal with the parts as well as the whole. The appellant's interpretation of the language requires the word and to be read as combined with. This, it seems to us, is quite a jump from plain meaning. It is a much narrower construction than we believe Congress meant in view of the statute as a whole and the concluding clause of the sentence referred to. That Congress had no such narrow limitation in mind is clear from the discussion of the statute prior to its passage. Both the proponents and opponents of the Act thought of its provisions in the broadest terms, applicable to a gun of any type, firearms of all kinds, etc. [8] This reference is not made to put in the statute something which is not there. But, it is a matter for consideration in determining what the scope was of the problem the legislature had in mind. [9] There is an additional point of administrative regulation also. Section 903 of the Act relates to licensing of manufacturers of and dealers in firearms and this is committed to the Treasury. Regulations were issued under which the clauses were rearranged and numbered to make explicit the disjunctive relation of the gun and the silencer. [10] The Congress subsequently amended the definition of ammunition in the very same statute. [11] The opportunity was then present to modify the firearms definition if the Congress had considered that the administrative officers had carried it beyond it original meaning. We think this is a case where what the Treasury had evidenced as being its understanding of the meaning of the statute, Congress impliedly confirmed as being correctly interpretative of the legislative intent. [12] Our conclusion upon this point is that the pistol here in question was within the definition of firearms given in the statute.