Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the Political Power Factor to the Right to Gay Marriage in Connecticut

Text: I agree with the majority in its formulation of the political power factor: [A] group satisfies the political powerlessness factor if it demonstrates that, because of the pervasive and sustained nature of the discrimination that its members have suffered, there is a risk that that discrimination will not be rectified, sooner rather than later, merely by resort to the political process. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249. The majority has little difficulty in concluding that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political progress. Unlike the majority, however, I come to the opposite conclusion: it is very clear to me that the discrimination to which the plaintiffs have been subjected in the past is no longer a factor preventing them from availing themselves of the political process to secure their rights. The most compelling illustration of that development is that the differential treatment of which the plaintiffs complain and seek to remedy by this casethe denial of the right to marry would be rectified by the political process very soon. It is the unfortunate consequence of the majority opinion that it has short-circuited the democratic process. I first emphasize that this case must be viewed realistically. It is not a case about trying to remedy the history of discrimination against gay persons in this state in general. As I explain in part I C 1 of this opinion, our current legislation effectively has done that, insofar as any lawlegislative or judicialcan do so. Just as the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in its gay marriage case: The legal battle in this case has been waged over one overarching issuethe right to marry. Lewis v. Harris, supra, 188 N.J. at 433, 908 A.2d 196. Indeed, in light of the extensive gay rights legislation that we have in this state, the principal form of discrimination of which the plaintiffs complain, and what they seek to remedy in this case, is what they call marriage discrimination. The plaintiffs state in their brief: The journey of Connecticut lawmakers in confronting and eliminating aspects of discrimination against lesbian and gay people has been remarkable, but the legislature also has failed with respect to ending marriage discrimination.... While the legislature has addressed different manifestations of discrimination against gay people, it has consistently set aside any issue of marriage discrimination. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) I also emphasize that this factor should be applied in the context of Connecticut today. It is today's Connecticut constitution that we are interpreting and applying; it is today's Connecticut marriage and civil union statutes that are under consideration; the plaintiffs are residents of Connecticut; and it is the conditions of their lives in this state now and for the foreseeable future that should inform the question of whether they have been denied the equal protection of the laws under the Connecticut constitution by being denied the right to marry. With these emphases in mind, I conclude, for two fundamental reasons, that the political power factor compels the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not denied the equal protection of the laws by our civil union and marriage statutes.