Opinion ID: 1931497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of the Contempt Finding

Text: In State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 298 A.2d 867 (1973), we observed that the contempt power was an ancient one and that its modern-day application was often misunderstood. In an effort to set forth some basic ground rules, we noted that there was a form of grid into which contempt proceedings might fall: contempt could be criminal or civil and it could be direct or constructive, leaving the prospect of a direct criminal contempt, a direct civil contempt, a constructive criminal contempt, and a constructive civil contempt. The alleged contempt here was clearly constructive, rather than direct, so we need not dwell on the distinctions between those two forms and may, instead, look only at the civil and criminal varieties. In an attempt to define some boundaries, we observed in Roll and Scholl that a civil contempt is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to an action and to compel obedience to orders entered primarily for their benefit. Civil contempt proceedings are therefore remedial and coercive in nature. They are intended not to punish for past misconduct inflicted against the court but to force present or future compliance with the court's orders. Thus, a penalty for civil contempt, if it is to be coercive rather than punitive, must provide for purging; it must permit the defendant to avoid the penalty by some specific conduct that is within the defendant's ability to perform. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is punitive, not coercive, in nature. It is precisely to punish past disobedience and therefore does not require a purging provision. We recognized in Roll and Scholl that the line between civil and criminal contempt was frequently hazy and indistinct, and that there remained the confusing prospect of conduct embracing aspects of both kinds. See id. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876. Apart from occasional ambiguity in pigeonholing past misconduct, there are also situations, which frequently arise in the context of enforcing support orders, in which the court desires to achieve both objectives, of punishing past misconduct through criminal contempt and enforcing compliance in the future through a coercive civil contempt order. In 1997, we attempted to bring some greater procedural clarity to the exercise of the contempt power, particularly in support enforcement cases, through a rewriting of the Rules governing contempt proceedings. In Rule 15-205, we directed that a proceeding for constructive criminal contempt be docketed as a separate criminal action and that it not be included in the action in which the contempt occurred. Because the action is a criminal one, it may be initiated only by the court, a State's Attorney, the Attorney General, or the State Prosecutor, and if the court initiates the action, it may, and should, appoint one of those officials to prosecute it, so that the court is not acting as both prosecutor and judge in the same case. See Maryland Rule 15-205(b) and (c). If the case is in a circuit court and there is the prospect of any imprisonment, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, and that right can be waived only in conformance with Maryland Rule 4-246. See Maryland Rule 15-205(f); Ashford v. State, 358 Md. 552, 567, 750 A.2d 35, 43 (2000); Dorsey v. State, 356 Md. 324, 342, 739 A.2d 41, 51 (1999). In a constructive criminal contempt case, the prosecution has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, `a deliberate effort or a wilful act of commission or omission by the alleged contemnor committed with the knowledge that it would frustrate the order of the court.' Dorsey v. State, supra, 356 Md. at 352, 739 A.2d at 56 (quoting In re Ann M., 309 Md. 564, 569, 525 A.2d 1054, 1056 (1987)). In contrast, Rule 15-206 directs that a proceeding for constructive civil contempt be filed in the action in which the contempt occurred, that any party to that action may initiate the proceeding, and that, in a support enforcement case where the contempt is based on failure to pay child or spousal support, an agency authorized by law may bring the action. The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Maryland Rule 15-207(e)(2). A defendant in a constructive civil contempt action is not entitled to a jury trial. Dodson v. Dodson, 380 Md. 438, 453, 845 A.2d 1194, 1202 (2004); Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492, 508-09, 754 A.2d 1018, 1027 (2000). It is evident, just from these distinctions, that criminal and civil contempt actions are entirely separate, in their origin, in their objectives, and in their method of adjudication. In the context of enforcing support orders, however, this Court, through the adoption of Maryland Rule 15-207(e), attempted to create a method by which both kinds of proceedings could be used in a way that was functional and practical and that yet adhered to appropriate legal constraints. Overturning the contrary holding in Lynch v. Lynch, supra , the Rule permits a finding of contempt upon proof that the defendant did not pay the amount owed, accounting from the date of the support order through the date of the contempt hearing, unless the defendant establishes either (1) that limitations has run, or (2) that, during that period, the defendant never had the ability to pay more than was actually paid and that he/she made reasonable efforts to become or remain employed or otherwise lawfully obtain the funds necessary to make additional payments. A finding of constructive civil contempt in non-support cases is not precluded simply because the defendant cannot meet a purge on the day of the hearing or order. Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra, 362 Md. at 553, 766 A.2d at 107-08. Under the Rule, however, the finding of contempt in non-support cases is not the toothless gesture it was thought to be when Lynch was decided. In adopting the Rule, we recognized that, in many cases, the problem lay in the fact that the defendant was impecunious because he/she was not employed and had not actively and in good faith sought employment. Although in a civil contempt case, the defendant's state of penury precludes a punitive sanction, such as incarceration, that the defendant has no ability to avoid by payment of money, the Rule authorizes the court, in consequence of the finding of contempt  the past wilful disobedience  to enter other kinds of coercive directives reasonably designed to produce an income from which the required support could be paid. Rule 15-207(e)(4) thus provides: If the contemnor does not have the present ability to purge the contempt, the order may include directions that the contemnor make specified payments on the arrearage at future times and perform specified acts to enable the contemnor to comply with the direction to make payments.  (Emphasis added). A Committee Note to that provision explains: If the contemnor does not have the present ability to purge the contempt, an example of a direction to perform specified acts that a court may include under subsection (e)(4) is a provision that an unemployed, able-bodied contemnor look for work and periodically provide evidence of the efforts made. If the contemnor fails, without just cause, to comply with any provision of the order, a criminal contempt proceeding may be brought based on a violation of that provision. (Emphasis added). The thrust of Rule 15-207(e)(4), with the gloss of the Committee Note, is that, where the contemnor's inability to comply with the support order is his/her lack of gainful employment or other access to available funds, the court may address that problem directly by ordering the contemnor to take reasonable steps to obtain such employment or access and, if warranted, enforcing those directives through criminal contempt proceedings. The court obviously has some flexibility in deciding what directives to issue. The contemnor may be in need of employment counseling or training, and, if those services are available to the contemnor at a cost he/she can afford, the court may order the contemnor to take advantage of them. If there are other impediments to employment or access that can be remedied, the court may order the contemnor to take lawful and reasonable steps to deal with those impediments. That is what the domestic relations master attempted to do in February, 2002. There are, of course, limits on how far a court may go in this regard; it cannot order things that are either inherently punitive in nature or that are so onerous, impractical, or unrelated to the objective of enabling the defendant to meet his/her obligation as to become punitive. Subject to that constraint, however, the court is not required to give the contemnor a free ride on unemployment and impoverishment, to the detriment of his/her children. The Rule expressly permits those kinds of remedial orders to be enforced through criminal contempt proceedings, but it does not preclude their enforcement through civil contempt proceedings as well. The Rule permits both civil and criminal contempt proceedings to be brought against an alleged contemnor and to be consolidated for hearing and disposition. What the rules do not permit, however, is for the two to become merged or for the court, in a civil contempt case, to apply sanctions that are available only in a criminal contempt case. There can be no combined charging document, nor can a civil contempt proceeding be converted, mid-stream, to a criminal one. Dorsey v. State, supra, 356 Md. at 350, 739 A.2d at 55. That, essentially, was the problem here. This case began as, and it always remained, a civil contempt proceeding. There was never a criminal contempt petition filed against appellant. Every pleading, motion, and order, from beginning to end, referenced and was filed in the paternity action. The orders entered by the court on June 27 and 28, 2002, however, when read together, were clearly in the nature of a criminal sentence. As we have observed, the June 28 Order For Constructive Civil Contempt imposed a finite 180 day sentence of incarceration on appellant, of which 150 days was suspended. Appellant was ordered to report to the sheriff to serve the remaining 30 days unless, prior to the day he was to report, he paid $1,000 to DSS, but there was no evidence before the court from which any finding could be made that appellant would be able to pay that $1,000 by that time. [4] The June 27 Order for Probation was not only captioned  State of Maryland v. Joseph Bryant,  in clear distinction to the civil caption of  Howard County Department of Social Services v. Joseph David Bryant,  but, especially when coupled with the addendum to it, was criminal in its form and substance. It placed appellant under the supervision of the Division of Parole and Probation, a unit within the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services responsible for supervising persons who have been placed on probation after conviction of a crime. See Maryland Code, § 6-111 of the Correctional Services Article. The general conditions listed in that order were those peculiar to probation entered as part of a criminal sentence  report to probation agent and follow his/her lawful instructions, get agent's permission before changing job or address, notify agent if probationer is arrested, permit agent to visit probationer's home. The addendum had similar criminally-oriented provisions  pay all fines, restitution, and fees ordered by the court, totally abstain from alcohol or drugs, attend NA meetings, participate in self-help activities, and submit to alcohol and drug testing. Those kinds of directives go well beyond what is permissible under Rule 15-207(e)(4), as they are not only quintessentially criminal in nature but have only the most strained and tenuous connection with forcing appellant to obtain employment, which he already had, and resuming his child support payments. They constituted an unlawful criminal sentence imposed in a civil contempt proceeding and were therefore invalid. Because they were invalid, they could not serve as a lawful basis for the finding of contempt on October 9, 2003. The Order for Constructive Civil Contempt filed on October 9, 2003, must be vacated. Our vacation of that Order does not, of course, affect in any way appellant's on-going obligation to pay the child support and payments on the arrearage that previously had been established and ordered. ORDER FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CIVIL CONTEMPT ENTERED BY CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AND FILED OCTOBER 9, 2003, VACATED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.