Opinion ID: 4388694
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burdensome Provisions

Text: That is not to say, however, that the United States is likely to succeed on the merits as to the entirety of AB 103. Only those provisions that impose an additional economic 9 We note the practical merit of this conclusion. Rejecting a de minimis exception permits a clearer distinction between intergovernmental immunity and the related—but distinct—doctrine of obstacle preemption. Intergovernmental immunity is implicated when any burden is imposed exclusively on the federal government; obstacle preemption is implicated when an obstructive burden is imposed, regardless of its discriminatory nature. Our conclusion is also consistent with M’Culloch, the seminal intergovernmental immunity decision. There, the Supreme Court was loath to undertake the “perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power,” and opined that “[a] question of constitutional power can hardly be made to depend on a question of more or less.” M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 327, 430. UNITED STATES V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 33 burden exclusively on the federal government are invalid under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. California maintains that all of AB 103’s requirements duplicate preexisting inspection demands imposed on state and local detention facilities. It points to regulations requiring its Board of State and Community Corrections (the Board) to inspect not only compliance with general health and safety standards—which are included in AB 103, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 12532(b)(1)(A)–(B) (requiring review of “the conditions of confinement” and “the standard of care” of detainees)—but also the availability of legal reference materials and confidential communications with counsel. See Cal. Penal Code § 6031.1; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 1063–64, 1068. California argues that AB 103’s requirement that the California Attorney General review the “due process provided to” civil immigration detainees, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12532(b)(1)(B), is therefore duplicative, on the assumption that “due process” refers to “conditions of confinement that affect detainees’ ability to access courts— such as the adequacy of the facility’s law library, the availability of unmonitored communications with counsel, and the ability to send and receive mail.” See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (recognizing that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law”); Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 897–98 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the Bounds right is “not limited to people who are committed following criminal proceedings”). At oral argument, California maintained that its Attorney General’s interpretation of “due process” is indeed as limited as its brief suggests, and thus does not compel any additional 34 UNITED STATES V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA inspection requirements beyond those applied to other state facilities. In the context of this appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction, we accept California’s limited construction. We therefore conclude that AB 103’s due process provision likely does not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, and that the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to this provision should be affirmed. We note, however, that a broader reading of the term “due process” might empower the California Attorney General to scrutinize, say, an immigration judge’s analysis, the results of the Board of Immigration Appeals, or other related court proceedings—all of which are well outside the purview of a state attorney general, and not duplicative of the inspection requirements otherwise imposed on California’s state and local detention facilities. That is not the end of our inquiry, for as the United States observes, California “does not even attempt to identify any provision of the pre-existing inspection scheme analogous to the unique requirement for immigration detainees that inspectors must examine the circumstances surrounding their apprehension and transfer to the facility.” See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12532(b)(1)(C). This is a novel requirement, apparently distinct from any other inspection requirements imposed by California law. The district court was therefore incorrect when it concluded that “the review appears no more burdensome than reviews required under California Penal Code §§ 6030, 6031.1.” California I, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 1093. In light of this apparent factual error, and the district court’s erroneous reliance on a de minimis exception to the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, we reverse the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to UNITED STATES V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 35 California Government Code section 12532(b)(1)(C)—the provision of AB 103 requiring examination of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension and transfer of immigration detainees.