Opinion ID: 76484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Treatment of Claim During Habeas Proceedings

Text: 77 The state habeas court found Carr's trial counsel's performance deficient as to the presentation of mitigating evidence. It noted that 78 [Carr's] mother, Georgia Carr, was readily available to aid her son's defense; however, counsel failed to elicit a fraction of the mitigating information Mrs. Carr was prepared to present... 79 For the purposes of the habeas hearing, Mrs. Carr testified that [Carr's attorney] failed to prepare her prior to her testimony at the sentencing phase of the trial and did not allow her to ask the jury for mercy for her son. According to Mrs. Carr, [Carr's attorney] did not touch on most of the information in her narrative. 80 . . . 81 [C]ounsel failed to present evidence concerning [Carr's] reaction to the death of his father, which might have served to explain his drug and alcohol abuse and his relationship with Burgeson. It might also have better explained the events leading to Young's death. 82 [Carr] has also presented affidavits of numerous witnesses who would have described his depression and mental state in the days preceding Young's death and who would have testified about Burgeson's abusive behavior toward [Carr]. Had these witnesses been contacted by [counsel] and given an opportunity to testify, the result of the sentencing phase likely would have been different. 83 . . . 84 The defense strategy at trial was to demonstrate that Burgeson intimidated [Carr] into following her command to attack Young; however, counsel only presented [Carr's] testimony to support this theory, despite the availability of supporting witnesses.... Counsel's failure to contact these potential witnesses or to use their testimony to corroborate [Carr's] testimony is unreasonable and likely was prejudicial such that the outcome of the sentencing could have been different. 85 R2-10, Ex. Vol. 27, Ex. 63 at 33-35. The state habeas court also noted that Georgia Carr's affidavit and counsel's billing statements directly contradicted Carr's attorney's testimony that he had interviewed everyone who had presented a [testimonial] letter in support of Carr. Id. at 39. It found a reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing phase would have been different had the jury heard testimony about [Carr's] good character. Id. at 40. 86 The Georgia Supreme Court held that state habeas court's findings [we]re either clearly erroneous factually or legally insufficient. Carr II, 544 S.E.2d at 419. The court noted that, prior to trial, Carr's attorneys received reports from a psychiatrist, two psychologists, and a social worker experienced as a mitigation investigator, and interviewed several of Carr's family members and solicited letters from other family members and acquaintances for mitigation evidence. Id. at 414-15. Specifically, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the record showed that Carr's trial counsel contacted several of the[] potential witnesses `who would have described [Carr's] ... mental state in the days preceding Young's death and who would have testified about Burgeson's abusive behavior toward [Carr],' and that Carr's trial counsel's testimony about his reluctance to call various Carr family members and friends indicated valid strategic reason[s] for limiting the use of these witnesses. Id. at 421. It also found that there was no actual prejudice because Carr and his experts [and other witnesses] testified about Carr's ... mental state ... as well as Burgeson's dominating personality and behavior. Id. Moreover, the court found that Carr's counsel was not deficient with regard to the presentation of good character evidence since he presented Carr's mother and uncle to testify about Carr's good, non-violent character and believed a large number of character witnesses would not have been effective in light of Carr's criminal record and the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 424. 87 The federal district court denied relief on this claim, finding that Carr failed to show that the decision by the Georgia Supreme Court had unreasonably applied the applicable law or unreasonably applied the facts in light of the evidence presented. The court specifically noted that there was no reasonable probability that, absent the alleged errors, the state courts would have concluded the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death in this case. R2-17 at 13.