Opinion ID: 2394524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: standard of review

Text: In the case sub judice, we are reviewing the administrative decision of the Civil Service Board. As this Court has previously explained, the basis of judicial review of an administrative decision may be by explicit statutory authorization or by a common law or equity writ. Harvey, 389 Md. at 296, 884 A.2d at 1203; Gould, 273 Md. at 500, 331 A.2d at 64-65. Regardless of the basis for judicial review, the standard of the review is the same. Harvey, 389 Md. at 296, 884 A.2d at 1203 ([A]n administrative proceeding, even if not subject to judicial review under the APA, would be subject to judicial review, of essentially the same scope, in an action for mandamus, certiorari, injunction or declaratory judgment [under the framework of Heaps [ v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945)], Gould, and their progeny]). See also Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 147, 680 A.2d 1040, 1048 (1996); Silverman v. Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 317 Md. 306, 325-26, 563 A.2d 402, 412 (1989); Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County, 273 Md. 245, 255-56, 329 A.2d 18, 25 (1974). Like statutory reviews of administrative actions, we shall confine our appellate review to that of the decision of the Civil Service Board itself. Dep't of Public Safety and Corr. Serv. v. Demby, 390 Md. 580, 614, 890 A.2d 310, 330 (2006); Consumer Protection Division v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160, 874 A.2d 919, 939 (2005). In reviewing the administrative decision of the Civil Service Board, we utilize the standard of review set forth in the state Administrative Procedure Act to determine if the actions of the Board are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable. Gould, 273 Md. at 500-01, 331 A.2d at 65 ([T]his Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they posses to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.); Harvey, 389 Md. at 296, 884 A.2d at 1203. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we may: reverse or modify the decision [of the administrative body] if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because of a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious. Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article. In other words, in reviewing the Civil Service Board's factual findings, we shall utilize the substantial evidence test, asking whether the factual findings or the inferences made from those findings are reasonably supported by the administrative record, when viewed as a whole. See Maryland Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005); Spencer v. Maryland State Board of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 529-30, 846 A.2d 341, 349 (2004). In reviewing the Civil Service Board's legal conclusions, we shall determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. United Parcel Srv., Inc. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); accord Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 252, 923 A.2d 100, 106 (2007). In doing so, we give the administrative agency's interpretation and application of the statute which [it] administers considerable weight. Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). See also, e.g., Montgomery County v. Glenmont Hills Associates, 402 Md. 250, 271, 936 A.2d 325, 337 (2007) ([A] reviewing court should give deference and `considerable weight' to the interpretation of a statute by the agency created to administer it.); Anderson v. General Casualty Ins. Co., 402 Md. 236, 244-45, 935 A.2d 746, 751 (2007) ([W]e give significant weight to the agency's experience in interpreting a statute the agency administers.). In other words, we accord a degree of deference to the position of the administrative agency in our review of the administrative agency's legal conclusion, especially when the statutory language [of the statute at hand] is ambiguous. Macke Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 18, 22-23, 485 A.2d 254, 257 (1984); accord Banks, 354 Md. at 69 n. 2, 729 A.2d at 381 n. 2. Despite this considerable deference granted to the administrative agency, it is [still] within our prerogative to determine whether an agency's [interpretation and] conclusions of law are correct, and to remedy the situation if found to be wrong. John A. v. Bd. of Education, 400 Md. 363, 382, 929 A.2d 136, 147 (2007). On the other hand, when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, administrative constructions, no matter how well-entrenched, are not given weight by this Court. Id; see also, e.g., Noland, 386 Md. at 572 n. 2, 873 A.2d at 1155 n. 2; Maryland Division of Labor and Industry v. Triangle General Contractors, 366 Md. 407, 417, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001).