Opinion ID: 1913579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is LSA-R.S. 4:211(5) a local or special law?

Text: The pertinent parts of Art. 3, § 12 entitled Prohibited Local and Special laws provides: A. Prohibitions. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the legislature shall not pass a local or special law: (6) Regulating labor, trade, manufacturing or agriculture ... (7) Creating private corporations, or amending, renewing, extending, or explaining the characters thereof; granting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity. We must determine what constitutes a special or local law. This issue can be traced as far back as the last century. In State v. Dalon, 35 La.Ann. 1141 (1883), the court found the real distinction between public or general laws, and local or special laws, is that public/general laws affect the community as a whole, whether throughout the State or one of its subdivisions. On the other hand, local/special laws benefit private persons, private property and local or private interests. The issue was before us in Lakeside Imports, Inc. v. State, 94-0191 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 253. As a licensed motor vehicle dealer, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 51:193 because the statute prohibits the sale of new or used cars on Sundays. In addition to a challenge based on equal protection grounds, plaintiff alleged that the statute was a special law. In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the suit, we determined that the statute was not special legislation. Relying on State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178 So. 493 (1938) we found A law is considered special if it affects only a portion of the citizens or is restricted in its operation to persons or places which do not comprise all the objects or persons which naturally belong to the class. Lakeside Imports, Inc., 639 So.2d at 258. We choose to follow this court's well reasoned opinion in Polk, 626 So.2d 1128. In that case, plaintiff challenged the state's decision to license a single major gambling facility and locate it in one city. We decided that the best suited single location was the Rivergate site located in New Orleans. Speaking in general terms, a statute is considered special or local if its restrictions can affect only a portion of the citizens or a fraction of the property embraced within the created classification. Whereas, laws are considered general if persons or things throughout the state are affected, if it operates on a subject in which the people at large are interested or operates over the whole territory of the state instead of just a particular locality. Where persons throughout the state are affected, or if a law operates on a subject in which the people at large are interested, even though its application and immediate effect is restricted to a particular locality, a statute is not a local or special law. See also, Louisiana Paddlewheels v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Com'n, 94-2015 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 885. Contrary to the trial court's holding, we find that the statute at issue was enacted in furtherance of a general and public purpose. The statute falls within chapter 4 of our revised statutes entitled Racing. While the purpose of horse racing is clearly set forth in LSA-R.S. 4:142, the House Committee which offered the bill to the full House heard testimony by the bill's sponsor concerning the purpose of the offtrack wagering statutes. In a Commerce Committee meeting on May 28, 1987, State Representative Benoit explained the purpose of House Bill No. 1153. [6] According to the representative, legalized offtrack wagering was needed not only by the racing facility, but the entire industry and further explained that the breeding farms, race tracks, as well as hotels and restaurants in the areas would benefit. In a subsequent meeting on June 23, 1987, he provided testimony that offtrack wagering would create approximately 1200 new jobs and increase the state's revenues by $4.5 million and local government revenue by $6 million. Representative Benoit's theme of more revenue for the state and the fact that other businesses prospered with the addition of offtrack wagering in Louisiana was noted in the findings of the First Circuit. The appellate court opined: Ordinarily, legislative intent is, at best a signpost for interpretation. Here, the intent forms part of the statute itself. At the time the statutes were passed, the five pari-mutuel facilities licensed to conduct live horse racing were facing a decline in racing revenues. The number of on track patrons was dying out. The horse racing statutes were enacted as a means of protecting and preserving live horse racing. The preservation of live racing meant that the breeding industry would continue to exist. With the breeding industry, other business spawned: such as veterinary services, fencing construction workers, feed suppliers, farriers, hot walkers, training facilities, and real estate sales and development. Offtrack wagering was viewed as a means to secure additional revenue for those tracks in existence at the time the offtrack wagering statutes were enacted. Had Livingston Downs been in existence at that time, it too would have benefitted from the offtrack provisions of the law. See Livingston Downs Racing Association, Inc., 653 So.2d at 1314. Without question, the surrounding parishes, cities, towns and political subdivisions near the pari-mutuel facilities offering offtrack wagering benefit because of the proximity and location of these facilities, however the evidence of this case shows that the state as a whole benefits due to the additional revenues and employment opportunities. Consequently, the lower court erred by failing to conclude that the statute meets the definition of a general law as opposed to special or local legislation.