Opinion ID: 4238387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Crim. P. 33(c) Motions for New Trial

Text: ¶21 We must first resolve whether Bueno timely filed his motion under Rule 33(c). This issue presents a specific question: Whether the phrase “entry of judgment” in Rule 10 33(c) encompasses a verdict or finding of guilt alone, or whether judgment does not enter until imposition of a sentence. ¶22 Rule 33(c) affords criminal defendants the opportunity to move for a new trial “in the interest of justice” if (1) the defendant produces newly discovered evidence, or (2) for some other reason the defendant believes a new trial is warranted. Crim. P. 33(c). The rule sets forth separate timelines for each type of motion:  Motions predicated on newly discovered evidence “shall be filed as soon after entry of judgment as the facts supporting it become known to the defendant.”  Alternatively, “[a] motion for a new trial other than on the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be filed within 14 days after verdict or finding of guilt or within such additional time as the court may fix during the 14-day period.” Id. (emphases added). ¶23 Thus, by Rule 33(c)’s plain language, “entry of judgment,” which triggers the timing for a motion based on newly discovered evidence, is different from a “verdict or finding of guilt,” which triggers the timing for a motion based on another ground. Recognizing this textual distinction, the division below persuasively reasoned that the two different phrases must have different meanings. Bueno, ¶ 21 (citing Carlson v. Ferris, 85 P.3d 504, 509 (Colo. 2003) (articulating this interpretive canon)). We agree. Because Rule 33(c) creates two distinct timing mechanisms—one that begins running after “entry of judgment” and the other that begins running after “verdict or finding of guilt”—the phrase “entry of judgment” must refer to more than a verdict or finding of guilt. 11 ¶24 In other words, “entry of judgment” must be more than a “verdict or finding of guilt” alone. Otherwise, the rule would have used a “verdict or finding of guilt” to trigger the timing for both types of motions. We therefore decline to adopt the People’s argument that entry of judgment occurs when the court accepts the jury’s verdict, because to do so would render the difference between the terms meaningless. See Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, ¶ 39, 403 P.3d 160, 166 (noting that we do not “interpret statutory provisions so as to render any of their words or phrases meaningless”).7 Thus, we hold that “entry of judgment” for purposes of Rule 33(c) does not occur until both a verdict or finding of guilt and the imposition of a sentence. ¶25 Applying this holding here, we conclude that Bueno’s motion for a new trial was not time-barred. Bueno has not yet been sentenced; therefore, he filed his motion based on newly discovered evidence before entry of judgment. As such, Bueno filed his motion ahead of the deadline Rule 33(c) prescribes. ¶26 Accordingly, we conclude that Bueno’s motion was timely filed. Having determined that Bueno timely filed his Rule 33(c) motion, we turn to the merits of his Brady claim. 7 Adopting the People’s argument would also contradict our previous explanation that “judgment” means more than just a verdict or finding of guilt: “The judgment in a criminal case includes imposition of the sentence.” People v. Campbell, 738 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Colo. 1987) (relying on the definition of “judgment” in Crim. P. 32(b)(3) to construe Crim. P. 35), superseded by statute on other grounds, § 16-12-102, C.R.S. (2017), as recognized in People v. Blagg, 2015 CO 2, ¶ 14, 340 P.3d 1137, 1141. 12