Opinion ID: 2088275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Sixth Amendment Assistance of Counsel

Text: In Lodowski I we held that when the third statement was obtained from Lodowski he was not entitled to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)) which provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. This was so, we said, because the right is applicable only upon the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, and at the time the statement was obtained from Lodowski such proceedings had not been initiated.... 302 Md. at 716, 490 A.2d 1228 (citing Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 598-599 and 606, 474 A.2d 1305 (1984) and United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2300, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984)). The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion with respect to Burbine, where also the events that led to the inculpatory statements preceded the formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. And it rejected the notion that custodial interrogations require a different rule. 106 S.Ct. at 1145-1147. Therefore, in light of Burbine, we adhere to our holding that Lodowski's waiver of his Miranda rights was not ineffective under the right to counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment.