Opinion ID: 782410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Common Law Definition of Stolen

Text: 81 Schultz argues that the Court must look to the common law definition of stolen to determine whether the antiquities at issue are covered by the NSPA. 10 Schultz cites United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957), in which the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the term stolen in the context of the statute that served as the precursor and model for the NSPA. See id. at 410-11, 77 S.Ct. 397. The Supreme Court stated: We recognize that where a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law meaning. Id. at 411, 77 S.Ct. 397. Schultz contends that interpreting the NSPA to apply to items that are stolen in the sense that they are possessed by a defendant in violation of a foreign patrimony law would be in derogation of the common law. However, in Turley, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that `stolen' (or `stealing') has no accepted common-law meaning. Id. If stolen has no common law meaning, we cannot look to the common law to assist us in interpreting that term. 82 The Supreme Court also stated in Turley that the term stolen included all felonious takings ... regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny. Id. at 417, 77 S.Ct. 397. In other words, according to the Supreme Court, the precursor to the NSPA — and by extension the NSPA — covers a broader class of crimes than those contemplated by the common law. Accordingly, we find this argument unpersuasive.