Opinion ID: 2094157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment for the 1961-64 Policy Years.

Text: The district court also granted summary judgment for INA for the policy years between May 1, 1961, and May 1, 1964. We agree with Interstate that this was a gratuitous act on the part of the court because INA's summary judgment motion only extended to matters relating to the policies in effect between 1941 and 1961. Ordinarily this would be ground for reversing that portion of the court's ruling without further discussion. See Prouty v. Clayton County, 264 N.W.2d 761, 762 (Iowa 1978) (judgment should be reversed when court's ruling on motion extends beyond the issues presented). We note, however, that the parties have briefed this portion of the district court's ruling on the merits. Because, considering only the issues of law presented, we are in disagreement with the court's ruling, we consider these issues on the merits in order to provide guidance following remand. Unlike the earlier policy years where liability insurance for property damage was limited to damage caused by accident, the policy in effect from May 1, 1961, to May 1, 1964, provided: With respect to Coverage I(b) [Property Damage Liability], occurrence means either an accident happening during the policy period or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally causes injury to or destruction of property during the policy period. All damages arising out of such exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence. (Emphasis added.) The district court denied coverage under this clause on the grounds that (1) no occurrence under the policy definition occurred during the period from May 1, 1961, to May 1, 1964; and (2) Interstate failed to establish that the injury was unexpected and unintentional. We disagree with both of these conclusions. The court's ruling that no occurrence, as defined in the policy, occurred during the time the policies were in force was premised on two factors. First, the coal tar and other solid residues that were the basis of the contamination had been placed on or in the ground many years before these insurance policies went into effect. Second, the court viewed Interstate's response to INA's defense of untimely notice as a concession that the occurrence on which it was relying to establish coverage occurred at a time after these policies ceased to be in force. To summarize, the district court ruled that any actual occurrence with respect to the damage that occurred was prior to the policy period and that the occurrence relied on by Interstate was after the policy period. Occurrence is defined so as to include any injury to or destruction of property that unexpectedly and unintentionally occurs during the policy period as a result of a repeated exposure to conditions. The repeated exposure to conditions element of the definition is stated as an alternative to the accident element. [1] There is nothing in the policy language that requires the repeated exposure to conditions to have occurred during the time that Interstate was operating the manufacturing plants. All that is necessary is that the repeated exposure to conditions cause some damage during the policy period. And this is amplified by the additional language providing [a]ll damages arising out of such exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence. In Weber v. IMT Insurance Co., 462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990), this court interpreted the definition of occurrence in a general liability umbrella policy that contained repeated exposure to conditions language similar to that contained in the present policy. We concluded that environmental damage caused by manure spills over a protracted period of time was the result of an occurrence as so defined. In First Newton National Bank v. General Casualty Co., 426 N.W.2d 618 (Iowa 1988), we dealt with an umbrella policy that contained a definition of occurrence that included repeated exposure to conditions language similar to that in the present policy. We concluded that the time of occurrence for purposes of that policy was when the actual damages were sustained and not when the act or omission that caused the damage was committed. First Newton Nat'l Bank, 426 N.W.2d at 623-24. As a consequence of our holdings in the Weber and First Newton National Bank cases and the evidence in the record that the damages at issue in the present case were constantly increasing over the passage of time, it may not be concluded as a matter of law that no injury by occurrence occurred during the period between May 1, 1961, and May 1, 1964. The district court erred in concluding otherwise. Our view of this matter is not diminished by the contents of Interstate's response to INA's defense based on untimely notice. Although it alludes in that response to occurrences antedating the policy period, these statements were intended to identify those occurrences that alerted it to the need for providing notice to the insurance company. As will be discussed further in the following division of this opinion, those occurrences involved an entirely different set of circumstances than the occurrence or occurrences that trigger liability coverage for property damage. We also must reject the district court's conclusion that summary judgment was properly granted because Interstate failed to show that the injury or damage at issue here was unexpected and unintended. In viewing the summary judgment motion papers, it is clear that it was not their burden to negate the policy provision requiring unexpected and unintended injury. To obtain a grant of summary judgment on some issue in an action, the moving party must affirmatively establish the existence of undisputed facts entitling that party to a particular result under controlling law. Griglione v. Martin, 525 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 1994); Goodwin v. City of Bloomfield, 203 N.W.2d 582, 588 (Iowa 1973). It was INA's burden to show that the injury was expected or intended. This does not appear as a matter of law. This is not a situation analogous to the intentional-act exclusion cases that are relied on by INA. These cases, Allied Mutual Insurance Co. v. Costello, 557 N.W.2d 284, 286-87 (Iowa 1996), and Altena v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Iowa 1988), involve assaultive conduct in which the actors intended the assault and in which the immediate consequences of the actions would be foreseen by the actor. Here, the acts of disposing of environmental waste were not calculated to produce any immediate harm. Some of the disposal was done by predecessors in interest or third parties. Whether the environmental damage that ultimately resulted was expected or intended by Interstate during the time this insurance was in force is an issue of fact. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.