Opinion ID: 1670921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to grant agnew's requested lesser included offense jury instruction for manslaughter.

Text: ¶ 6. The standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is as follows: Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case, however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368, 380 (Miss.2000) (citing Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 7. Agnew proposed a jury instruction on manslaughter as a lesser-included offense instruction at the close of all the evidence. The trial judge refused this instruction, and the jury was only instructed on the murder charge. Agnew claims that the only evidence presented by the State at trial indicated manslaughter and not murder. Further, he claims that the State failed to present any evidence of deliberate design and/or malice aforethought, one of which is a requirement to the finding of murder. ¶ 8. Agnew relies on the testimony of two witnesses and some photographs to support this proposition. Tupelo Police Officer Ronnie Thomas testified that the living room was kind of in general disarray. Officer Thomas's testimony was used to introduce photographs of the living room in the apartment. The pictures show the living room with a few things on the floor e.g., Kristy's glasses, a throw rug which appears to be somewhat crumpled, and a broken end table. Misty testified that this was not the way that she and Kristy usually kept the apartment and that the living room was not in that condition when she went to bed earlier in the evening. Agnew asserts this suggests that an altercation took place. ¶ 9. The State asserts there was no evidentiary basis to support a manslaughter instruction. Specifically, the State argues there is nothing in the record to connect the photographs of, and testimony regarding, the living room with anything that happened between Kristy and Agnew. The only evidence shows that Agnew stabbed Kristy with a butcher knife and that Kristy died. Thus, the State concludes that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the manslaughter instruction because it had no evidentiary support. We agree. ¶ 10. There is a test to determine whether a lesser-included offense should be submitted to the jury: A lesser included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judgeand ultimately this Courtcan say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense (and conversely not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge). Graham v. State, 582 So.2d 1014, 1017 (Miss.1991) (citing Gates v. State, 484 So.2d 1002, 1004 (Miss.1986)). The evidence must warrant an instruction on the lesser-included offense before it can be granted. Id. ¶ 11. Our case law leans heavily in favor of instructing the jury on a lesserincluded offense. As recently as 1997, we reaffirmed that the jury should be given the option of a lesser-included offense where there is any evidentiary basis. Russell v. State, 729 So.2d 781, 787 (Miss. 1997). However, such an instruction should not be indiscriminately or automatically given. Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324, 1329 (Miss.1989). Such an instruction should only be given after the trial court has carefully considered the evidence and is of the opinion that such an instruction is justified by the evidence. Id. ¶ 12. Thus, it is necessary to assess the distinction between murder and manslaughter. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-35 defines manslaughter committed in the heat of passion: The killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter. Murder is the killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner ... when done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a). ¶ 13. Malice and deliberation are necessary elements of murder, and the absence of deliberation is one element distinguishing manslaughter from murder. Guest v. State, 96 Miss. 871, 52 So. 211 (1910). In the case sub judice, Agnew asserts there was no evidence of deliberation or of premeditation. He claims at most, there was evidence that he acted in the heat of passion. Specifically, he claims that his unusual conduct on the day of Kristy's death coupled with the testimony and photographs of Kristy's living room support his assertion that he acted in the heat of passion. ¶ 14. We have defined heat of passion as: A state of violent and uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain other provocation given, which will reduce a homicide from the grade of murder to that of manslaughter. Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. The term includes an emotional state of mind characterized by anger, rage, hatred, furious resentment or terror. Graham v. State, 582 So.2d at 1017 (citing Mullins v. State, 493 So.2d 971, 974 (Miss. 1986)). Further, the passion felt by the person committing the act should be superinduced by some insult, provocation, or injury, which would naturally and instantly produce, in the minds of ordinarily constituted men, the highest degree of exasperation. Id. at 1018 (citing Barnett v. State, 563 So.2d 1377 (Miss.1990)). In other words, passion and anger alone are not sufficient to reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter. Id. at 1018 (citing Windham v. State, 520 So.2d 123, 127 (Miss.1987)). Additionally, there must be such circumstances as would indicate that a normal mind would be roused to the extent that reason is overthrown and passion usurps the mind destroying judgment. Id. ¶ 15. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Agnew and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of Agnew from the evidence, we find that no reasonable jury could find Agnew guilty of manslaughter. Agnew makes much over the physical condition of the living room. Yet, this evidence of the living room, even when coupled with Agnew's abnormal behavior earlier in the day, fails to establish any nexus between this and any occurrence or event which might have provoked him into acting in the heat of passion. Any heat of passion argument is purely speculation, totally void of any evidentiary support. Accordingly, the court below did not err by refusing the manslaughter jury instruction.