Opinion ID: 2507169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: May Wahkiakum School District Perform Suspicionless, Random Drug Tests of Student Athletes?

Text: ¶ 12 The school district argues we should follow federal cases and allow suspicionless, random drug testing of its student athletes. Two federal cases are apposite to our consideration. These cases, while helpful, do not control how we interpret our state constitution. City of Seattle v. Mighty Movers, 152 Wash.2d 343, 356, 96 P.3d 979 (2004). There are stark differences in the language of the two constitutional protections; unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7 is not based on a reasonableness standard. ¶ 13 The United States Supreme Court has held public school searches presented a special need, which allowed a departure from the warrant and probable cause requirements. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). [5] The T.L.O. Court held school teachers and administrators could search students without a warrant if: (1) there existed reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school, and (2) the search is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733. ¶ 14 Next, in Acton, a public school district implemented a random drug testing of school athletes, similar to the one at issue here. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564. Each student athlete was tested at the beginning of the season and then each week 10 percent were randomly selected for testing. Most critics of Acton are not persuaded the majority's analysis justifies a suspicionless search of the student athletes. But the Acton majority claimed individualized suspicion would unduly interfere with the government's goals and might actually make the situation worse. Its reasoning was based primarily on three rationales: (1) individualized suspicion would transform[] the process into a badge of shame, id. at 663, 115 S.Ct. 2386 where teachers could claim any troublesome student was abusing drugs; (2) teachers and student officials are neither trained nor equipped to spot drug use; and (3) individualized suspicion creates an unnecessary loss of resources in defending claims and lawsuits against arbitrary imposition, when students and parents will inevitably challenge whether reasonable suspicion did indeed exist. Id. at 664, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (In many respects, we think, testing based on `suspicion' of drug use would not be better, but worse.). [6] ¶ 15 But these arguments were unpersuasive several years earlier when the Court applied an individualized suspicion standard to public schools in T.L.O. The Acton majority never adequately explained why individual suspicion was needed in T.L.O. but not in Acton. Justice O'Connor spent much of her dissent taking issue with this standard: [N]owhere is it less clear that an individualized suspicion requirement would be ineffectual than in the school context. In most schools, the entire pool of potential search targetsstudentsis under constant supervision by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker rooms. . . . . . . The great irony of this case is that most (though not all) of the evidence the District introduced to justify its suspicionless drug testing program consisted of first- or second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students acting in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of in-school drug useand thus that would have justified a drug-related search under our T.L.O. decision. Acton, 515 U.S. at 678-79, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). [7] ¶ 16 The Wahkiakum School District modeled its policy after the one used by the Vernonia School District. But simply passing muster under the federal constitution does not ensure the survival of the school district's policy under our state constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides for [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis hinges on whether a warrantless search is reasonable, and it is possible in some circumstances for a search to be reasonable without a warrant. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 652, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is `reasonableness.'). But our state constitutional analysis hinges on whether a search has authority of lawin other words, a warrant. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
¶ 17 Our state constitution provides, No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. It is well established that in some areas, article I, section 7 provides greater protection than its federal counterpartthe Fourth Amendment. State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46 (2002); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984) ([T]he unique language of Const. art. 1, § 7 provides greater protection to persons under the Washington Constitution than U.S. Const. amend. 4 provides to persons generally.). When determining whether article I, section 7 provides greater protection in a particular context, we focus on whether the unique characteristics of the constitutional provision and its prior interpretations compel a particular result. State v. Walker, 157 Wash.2d 307, 317, 138 P.3d 113 (2006). We look to the constitutional text, historical treatment of the interest at stake, relevant case law and statutes, and the current implications of recognizing or not recognizing an interest. Id. ¶ 18 This requires a two-part analysis. First, we must determine whether the state action constitutes a disturbance of one's private affairs. Here that means asking whether requiring a student athlete to provide a urine sample intrudes upon the student's private affairs. Second, if a privacy interest has been disturbed, the second step in our analysis asks whether authority of law justifies the intrusion. The authority of law required by article I, section 7 is satisfied by a valid warrant, limited to a few jealously guarded exceptions. Because the Wahkiakum School District had no warrant, if we reach the second prong of the analysis we must decide whether the school district's activity fits within an exception to the warrant requirement. Relying on federal law, the school district claims there is a special needs exception to the warrant requirement that we should adopt. The York and Schneider parents point out we have not adopted such an exception and urge us not to do so here.