Opinion ID: 835339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: merits of petitioner's habeas claim

Text: Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner could not pursue habeas relief because he had the alternative remedy of a Section 1983 claim to vindicate the alleged violations of his federal due process rights. The Court of Appeals relied upon the following passage from Penrod/Brown: `[W]e emphasize the two essential elements that must coincide to make the writ of habeas corpus a proper instrument of judicial inquiry [into the circumstances respecting the custody of a prisoner]: The need for immediate attention, if this appears from the urgency of the harm to which the prisoner claims to be exposed or if it is found to be required as a matter of constitutional law, and the practical inadequacy of an alternative remedy to meet this need.' Barrett, 209 Or.App. at 299, 150 P.3d 1064 (quoting Penrod/Brown, 283 Or. at 28, 581 P.2d 934). However, as Penrod/Brown makes clear in the sentences immediately preceding the passage quoted by the Court of Appeals, that passage refers to alleged deprivations of a prisoner's legal rights other than a prisoner's claim that he has been unlawfully subjected to further imprisonment or restraint of his person while in custody. Penrod/Brown, 283 Or. at 28, 581 P.2d 934. In Penrod/Brown, this court stated that a habeas writ is available for two kinds of casesthose challenging a prisoner's further restraint and those alleging other deprivations of a prisoner's legal rights, such as overcrowding, the quality of prison food, and similar conditions of imprisonment. 283 Or. at 27, 581 P.2d 934. It was with respect to this second kind of habeas claim, id. at 28, 581 P.2d 934, that this court used the words quoted by the Court of Appeals and emphasized that habeas will lie for such claims only if the petitioner shows the practical inadequacy of an alternative remedy to meet this need. Id. Here, petitioner specifically disclaims any challenge to general prison conditions and relies precisely on the claim that placement in IMU is a further `imprisonment or restraint' of his person, Penrod/Brown, 283 Or. at 28, 581 P.2d 934, that is unlawful because it was imposed in violation of his federal due process rights. Petitioner's claim thus is the kind of claim that traditionally has been cognizable in habeas. See also Bekins v. Cupp, 274 Or. 115, 117, 545 P.2d 861 (1976) (habeas petition was proper procedure to challenge prison officials' placement of petitioner in segregation as alleged violation of due process rights). Even if a successful Section 1983 action could lead to injunctive relief, such as an order that petitioner be released from IMU placement, that alternative remedy does not foreclose petitioner's habeas claim. The wrongful deprivation of liberty by the state, which petitioner alleges here, is a serious claim that justifies immediate judicial attention. The writ of habeas corpus provides a speedy remedy for the deprivation of a specific constitutional rightthe right to be free from unlawful imprisonment or restraint when no other remedy will provide timely relief: If the person is imprisoned or restrained by virtue of any order, judgment or process specified in ORS 34.330 and the person challenges the conditions of confinement or complains of a deprivation of rights while confined, the petition shall    [s]tate facts in support of a claim that the person is deprived of a constitutional right that requires immediate judicial attention and for which no other timely remedy is practicably available to the plaintiff  ORS 34.362 (emphasis added). As this court stated in Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or. 562, 566, 770 P.2d 909 (1989), The central characteristic of the writ of habeas corpus is the speed with which it triggers judicial scrutiny. If the petition has legal merit, a judge must issue an order without delay, requiring the custodian to show cause why the writ should not be allowed. ORS 34.370(1). The court or judge before whom the party is brought on the writ shall, immediately after the return thereof, proceed to examine into the facts contained in the return, and into the cause of the imprisonment or restraint of such party. ORS 34.580. If no legal cause is shown for the imprisonment or restraint, or for the continuation thereof, the court or judge shall discharge such party from the custody or restraint under which the person is held. ORS 34.590. Few other legal remedies provide such swift relief. Moreover, this court has stated specifically that the mere existence of a federal remedy does not deprive a prisoner of the protection of the writ of habeas corpus in state court. [8] We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a civil rights lawsuit for tort damages and injunctive relief is an adequate alternative remedy for a habeas petitioner who alleges an unconstitutional imprisonment or restraint of his person. We turn to the state's alternative argument that, even if petitioner may challenge his IMU placement in a habeas petition, his claim fails. Petitioner's principal constitutional claim is that placement in IMU is a further deprivation of liberty beyond the constraints placed on other prisoners and, therefore, that he was entitled to a hearing before he could be placed in IMU. The lack of a hearing before being transferred to IMU, he contends, violated his rights under the. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [9] The burden that petitioner must meet is a heavy one. First, because petitioner does not challenge his underlying convictions or imprisonment, he must show that placement in IMU is a further restraint on his liberty that imposes atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Second, petitioner must show that the Due Process Clause requires that the state provide him a hearing before being placed in IMU and that the procedures afforded him by the state to challenge his IMU placement are constitutionally inadequate. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) (once liberty interest is established, court considers what procesa is due). As to the first point, petitioner argues that his privileges are curtailed to such an extent in IMU that placement there is punishment and constitutes further deprivation of liberty: In IMU I am denied access to a phone, I am denied my property, denied outdoor recreation, denied visits with nonfamily, denied canteen, I'm not permitted to leave my cell, I am not permitted educational or learning material as well as a myriad of other denied privileges and rights. This denial is based on punishment and not security concerns. Accordingly, petitioner contends that he is entitled to a hearing before placement in IMU: Because IMU is a punishment unit my placement in IMU denies me Due Process rights in a hearing, such as a notice in accordance with due process, the right to be heard, the right to question witnesses, to have documentary and physical evidence, and a prompt hearing violates my constitutional rights[.] The state responds that the United States Supreme Court has held that placement of a prisoner in disciplinary segregation does not impose[ atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and therefore does not implicate a liberty interest for due process purposes. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The trial court accepted that argument, and it provided the basis for the trial court's conclusion that petitioner had not stated a claim for relief and for Judge Edmonds's concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals. Sandin, however, involved a 30-day disciplinary sanction, and petitioner argues that placement in IMU is a more significant deprivation of liberty than was involved in Sandin. He asserts that IMU placements may last indefinitely and ordinarily are reviewed only every six months. He contends that, at some of the different levels of placement within IMU, an inmate is in solitary confinement, allowed out of his cell less than an hour a day, and denied outdoor recreation and visits with nonfamily members. Petitioner argues that those restrictions impose atypical and significant hardships on an inmate, compared to the normal incidents of prison life and therefore constitute a further deprivation of a liberty interested protected by the Due Process Clause. Petitioner relies on a United States Supreme Court case decided after Sandin, Wilkinson, in which the Court considered a challenge to the procedures for assignment to an Ohio Supermax prison, where inmates were kept in solitary confinement, required to remain in their cells 23 hours a day, and banned from eligibility for parole. The Supermax placements were for an indefinite period, subject only to an initial 30-day review and annual reviews thereafter. The Court held that placement in the Supermax prison constituted a further deprivation of liberty beyond that experienced by other inmates in the Ohio prison system and therefore implicated a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 545 U.S. at 223-24, 125 S.Ct. 2384. From petitioner's allegations and the administrative rules with respect to IMU placement, it is apparent that IMU placement involves a greater restriction on liberty than the 30-day sanction in Sandin, but less of a restriction than the solitary confinement in the Ohio Supermax prison at issue in Wilkinson. Inmates placed in IMU are initially assigned to level two of four program levels, in which the inmate is permitted two visits a month, canteen items, and educational materials that meet security requirements. See OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(2)(b) (IMU inmates begin at level two): OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(1)(b) (description of level two services). Inmates can be demoted to level one, where they are not permitted to have visits, if they engage in behavior that threatens the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the IMU. OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(2)(c). Inmates who have no major rule violations and no more than one minor rule violation for two months at levell two are advanced to level three, which allows more visits and other privileges. OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(2)(d). Similar good behavior for three months leads to advancement to level four and then to review within 30 days for transfer out of IMU. Id; OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX. The state therefore asserts that IMU placement (and changes in levels within IMU) is based on inmate behavior and is more fluid and less harsh than Supermax placement. For that reason, the state argues, IMU placement does not infringe any protected liberty interest. We need not decide, however, whether petitioner's IMU placement deprives him of a protected liberty interest because, even assuming that it does, his claim fails the second part of the test for demonstrating a due process violation. The process required by the Due Process Clause depends on the nature of the individual's interest that is at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest given the procedures used by the state, and the state's interest. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224-25, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). In Wilkinson, the Court, as noted, held that placement in the Ohio Supermax prison was an infringement of a liberty interest, but also concluded that due process requirements could be satisfied by informal, nonadversary procedures   . Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 229, 125 S.Ct. 2384. The Court in Wilkinson indicated that notice of the factual basis for the placement and a fair opportunity for rebuttal were among the most important procedural mechanisms to avoid erroneous decisions, id. at 226, 125 S.Ct. 2384, but it declined to require Ohio to allow an inmate to call witnesses or to provide other attributes of an adversary hearing. Id. at 228, 125 S.Ct. 2384. Although the Ohio procedures approved in Wilkinson included an informal, nonadversary hearing before an inmate was placed in the Supermax prison, nothing in the Court's decision suggested that due process required a hearing before placement. Indeed, the Court in Wilkinson cited its earlier decision in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), as provid[ing] the appropriate model for procedures in prisons and as instructive for that decision's discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 229, 125 S.Ct. 2384. In Hewitt, the Court held that the prison officials who placed the inmate in that case in administrative confinement were obligated to engage only in an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting [the inmate's] administrative confinement, including whatever statement [the inmate] wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confin[ement]. 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. 864 (emphasis added). See also id. at 476, 476 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 864 (due process requires some notice of charges on which administrative segregation is based and opportunity for inmate to present his views; proceeding must occur within reasonable time after transfer). Oregon provides inmates placed in IMU with procedures to challenge their placement that are similar to those that the Court found sufficient in Wilkinson and Hewitt. Oregon inmates receive preplacement written decisions regarding their classification and assignment and are provided with notice of their opportunities to seek review. OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(4). An Oregon inmate can seek administrative review of an IMU placement and submit a statement and other evidence in support of the inmate's position. OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(5); OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX. The inmate initiates administrative review by submitting a request to the administrator of the classification unit, OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(2)(c), and review is then conducted by the Special Population Management-Inmate Program Committee, OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(22). Moreover, IMU placements, and changes in the privileges that are granted or denied to IMU inmates, are based on specific criteria, such as the inmate's type of offense, misconduct in prison, affiliation with security threat gangs, time until release, escape risk, and other factors, thus limiting the chance of erroneous placement decisions. See OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX, Attachment 1 (Custody Classification Guideline); OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX to XXX-XXX-XXXX (criteria for IMU assignment and programming levels); OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX (criteria for determining custody level classification). IMU placements, like other custody level determinations, are reviewed every six months. OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX. The state does not provide a formal, pre-placement hearing of the kind petitioner seeks before an inmate is placed in IMU or is demoted from an initial IMU level two to the more restrictive IMU level one. However, as noted, the Court in Wilkinson held that a formal, adversary hearing was not required, and while the Ohio procedures upheld in Wilkinson included an informal hearing prior to transfer, the Court did not indicate that a prior hearing was constitutionally mandated. Rather, the Court referred to Hewitt, where it had held that notice and an opportunity to submit a written statement within a reasonable period as part of an administrative review after an inmate's transfer to administrative segregation satisfied due process. That procedure is particularly likely, to be sufficient to prevent erroneous IMU placement because the criteria for the maximum custody classification that is a prerequisite for IMU placement are specific and generally objective. In any event, petitioner himself alleges that the state conducted a hearing with respect to the February 2003 fight that led to petitioner's 180-day administrative segregation and also conducted a hearing (which petitioner declined to attend) related to the September 2003 fight that led to his placement for 180 days in a disciplinary segregation unit. The factual issues related to those fights are the primary basis for petitioner's challenge to his IMU placement. In addition to hearings related to two of the fights in which petitioner was involved, the state provided him preplacement notice of the reasons for his IMU placement and an administrative review which permitted him to submit evidence in support of his objection to that placement. Defendant does not challenge the promptness of that review. For the reasons set forth above, on the facts set forth in the petition and the due process challenges this petitioner makes, we conclude that the petition failed to state a claim for relief and that the trial court properly dismissed the petition as meritless under ORS 34.370(6) and (7). [10] The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.