Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First degree felony murder based on an arson-murder theory

Text: Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the first degree murder conviction on a felony murder theory based on arson. We conclude otherwise that substantial evidence supports that basis of first degree murder liability. All murder ... which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson ... is murder of the first degree. (§ 189.) As previously discussed, the mental state required for felony murder  is the specific intent to commit the underlying felony ( People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1140, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 52 P.3d 572 ), and  'the evidence must establish that the defendant harbored the felonious intent either prior to or during the commission of the acts which resulted in the victim's death.'  ( People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 755 P.2d 1017 .) A killing has been committed in the perpetration of the [underlying felony] if the killing and the felony are parts of one continuous transaction. ( Ibid . ) Defendant argues that his conviction for first degree felony murder based on arson cannot stand because the arson was merely an afterthought to the killing. Specifically, he asserts that the arson was for the purpose of concealing Kerr's identity and destroying evidence connecting him to her killing. Defendant's argument is premised on his view of the evidence, which  is that he believed he had killed Kerr when he strangled her. However, as more fully discussed ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pages 385-386, 396 P.3d at pages 525-526, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant knew Kerr was alive, albeit unconscious, at the time he doused her and the interior of her car with accelerant and set the car on fire. And although defendant may have intended to commit arson for the additional purpose of concealing Kerr's identity and his role in her killing, we have observed that concurrent intent to kill and to commit the target felony does not preclude a felony murder theory of first degree murder. ( People v. Gutierrez, supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 1141, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 52 P.3d 572 .) A jury reasonably could infer that the killing and the arson were parts of one continuous transaction. ( People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 755 P.2d 1017 .)