Opinion ID: 465022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: technical objections to the committee's exercise of the subpoena power

Text: 145 Appellants raise the following technical objections to the Committee's subpoenas: 1) the Committee's use of executive law enforcement officers (FBI agents) to serve the subpoenas violated the Act and constitutional principles; 2) the Committee cannot compel appellants to appear in Committee proceedings or subpoena enforcement proceedings outside, and more than one hundred miles from, the Southern District of Florida, where they reside and were served; and 3) Williams cannot be compelled to produce the appointment diaries, guest sign-in sheets, and telephone logs described in the subpoena duces tecum served upon her because those documents are in the possession and under the control of Judge Hastings alone. We find no merit in these contentions.
146 The Act provides that judicial council subpoenas shall be served in the manner provided in Rule 45(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 332(d)(1). That Rule states, A subpoena may be served by the marshal, by his deputy, or by any other person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3052 specifically empowers agents of the FBI to serve subpoenas. We can perceive no imaginable separation-of-powers obstacle to the Committee's service of its subpoenas in a manner wholly consistent with those provisions. Appellants have suggested that service should instead have been effected by a United States Marshal, but United States Marshals, no less than FBI representatives, are executive officers within the Department of Justice. 28 U.S.C. Secs. 561-76; 28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.1. 25 147 Appellants also claim that service by FBI agents violated the confidentiality requirements of the Act, section 372(c)(14), in that it revealed to those agents the identity of persons subpoenaed by the Committee. Even assuming that the Committee's decision to use FBI agents to serve subpoenas is reviewable in this court despite section 372(c)(10) (which precludes judicial review of certain orders and determinations under the Act), such a narrowly limited breach of confidentiality is necessary if Committee subpoenas are to be served at all. This manner of service, therefore, offends no statutorily protected rights of appellants. 148
149 Although the Act does not expressly define the geographical bounds of the Committee's subpoena power under section 372(c)(9)(A) and section 332(d)(1), we hold that the Act confers power to issue subpoenas at least throughout the circuit. Section 372(c)(9)(A) grants judicial councils full subpoena powers, and nothing in section 372 or section 332 imposes any geographical restriction. Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern the issuance and service of subpoenas by judicial councils under the Act, see discussion of Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(3), supra, but rather apply only to the issuance of subpoenas by the district courts, Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, the one-hundred mile restriction of Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(e)(1) is inapplicable. It would be nonsensical to conclude, absent an express restriction, that the judicial council of a circuit cannot exercise circuit-wide subpoena power under the Act. This is especially true when, as we have held, the subpoenas are issued under the seal of the court of appeals and are enforced by that court. Indeed, many federal administrative agencies have statutory authority to serve subpoenas nationwide. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. Sec. 49 (Federal Trade Commission); 15 U.S.C. Secs. 78u(b), 79r(c) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 29 U.S.C. Sec. 161 (National Labor Relations Board). Since Williams, Ehrlich, Simons, and Miller all reside within the Eleventh Circuit, the Committee plainly did not exceed the geographical scope of its subpoena power when it subpoenaed them. We need not decide whether such a subpoena may be served beyond the circuit. 150 Given the Committee's circuit-wide subpoena power, there can be no obstacle to conducting subpoena enforcement proceedings at a location within the circuit that happens to be outside and more than one hundred miles from the Southern District of Florida. By way of analogy, this amount of travel and attendant expense is often required to prosecute or defend an appeal, or to bring a petition for review of federal administrative agency action, in the court of appeals. Indeed, certain statutes even require that any challenge to particular federal administrative actions be brought only in courts sitting in the District of Columbia. See 2 U.S.C. Sec. 437g(a)(8)(A); 47 U.S.C. Sec. 402(b). 151 C. Whether Williams, Secretary to Judge Hastings, May Be Compelled to Produce Appointment Diaries, Guest Sign-in Sheets, and Telephone Logs 152 The subpoena duces tecum served on Williams was not misdirected because seeking documents generated in Judge Hastings' chambers. We assume that Judge Hastings, as between the two, had paramount power over the disposition of the documents within his chambers. Nonetheless, a subpoena duces tecum can be enforced against a person in possession of records belonging to another. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921); Mattie T. v. Johnston, 74 F.R.D. 498, 502 (N.D.Miss.1976); United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 65 F.R.D. 415, 420 (C.D.Cal.1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 940, 95 S.Ct. 1668, 44 L.Ed.2d 97 (1975); United States v. Re, 313 F.Supp. 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y.1970). Williams had immediate physical possession and custody of these documents at her place of work, had full access to them, and indeed even created and maintained some or all of them, in the performance of her duties. She has responded to two previous virtually identical subpoenas--the first served on her on October 12, 1981 in connection with the Hastings grand jury proceedings and the second served on her on April 11, 1985 in connection with the Committee's investigation--by producing similar categories of documents, including many of the same documents (to the grand jury) and copies of most if not all of the same documents (to the FBI). Accordingly, we have no qualms about Williams' custody of the documents and her ability to produce them in compliance with the subpoena duces tecum. Judge Hastings' interest in the disposition of the subpoenaed documents is amply protected in that he is a party to the appeal before us (in which he seeks equitable replevin of the documents turned over by Williams in response to the Committee's April 11, 1985 subpoena), and, as a practical matter, has had a full opportunity in this court to show why the subpoena duces tecum against Williams should not be enforced. 26 153 V. APPELLANTS' CLAIM OF A PRIVILEGE PROTECTING COMMUNICATIONS AMONG JUDGE HASTINGS AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF 154 Appellants urge this court to decline to enforce the subpoenas directed to Williams, Ehrlich, Simons, and Miller because they have invoked a testimonial privilege--claimed by Judge Hastings and honored by his staff--that purportedly protects against disclosure of confidential communications among an Article III judge and members of his staff regarding the performance of his judicial duties. Appellants liken this privilege to the executive privilege surrounding Presidential communications, the protection expressly accorded Congressional activities by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 6, clause 1, and common-law privileges such as that protecting the confidentiality of communications between attorney and client. Enforcement of these subpoenas, it is urged, would require that Williams, Ehrlich, Simons, and Miller reveal confidences entrusted to them by Judge Hastings and would thereby threaten the independence and the effective functioning of the judiciary by chilling and obstructing the full and frank exchange of ideas within chambers necessary to a judge's performance of his official duties. 155 But with regard to Williams and Ehrlich, the claim of testimonial privilege is not yet ripe for decision. Williams was subpoenaed to testify on May 20, 1985, Ehrlich on May 27, 1985. Both witnesses failed to appear, asserting privilege. It is well settled that a witness whose testimony is subpoenaed cannot simply refuse to appear altogether on grounds of privilege, but rather must appear, testify, and invoke the privilege in response to particular questions. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 695 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir.1982); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 641, 1503, 564 F.2d 567, 571 (D.C.Cir.1977). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2670, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 694 F.2d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 1218, 59 L.Ed.2d 457 (1979); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir.1969). Otherwise, a court would be forced to attempt to determine the existence, application, and scope of an asserted privilege in ignorance of the context in which it is alleged to apply. No possible testimonial privilege here would be of such a kind as could excuse Williams and Ehrlich from the fundamental obligation of appearing before the Committee for testimony, and then invoking the privilege before the Committee. Thus, we will not adjudicate Williams' and Ehrlich's claims of testimonial privilege as they are currently framed. 156 Besides commanding Williams to testify, her subpoena commanded her to produce certain documents. We will consider Williams' claim of privilege in respect to these. We will also consider Simons' and Miller's claims of testimonial privilege because both have appeared before the Committee and invoked a privilege in response to specific questions. 27 157 Although we have found no case in which a judicial privilege protecting the confidentiality of judicial communications has been applied, the probable existence of such a privilege has often been noted. In Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C.Cir.1973), the District of Columbia Circuit analogized President Nixon's executive privilege, intended to protect the effectiveness of the executive decision-making process, to that among judges, and between judges and their law clerks. The same court subsequently reiterated this analogy in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 729 (D.C.Cir.1974). Judge MacKinnon's dissent in Nixon v. Sirica traced such authorities as existed to support the recognition of a judicial privilege, noting, Express authorities sustaining this position are minimal, undoubtedly because its existence and validity has been so universally recognized. Its source is rooted in history and gains added force from the constitutional separation of powers of the three departments of government. Id. at 740 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1971), Judge Wilkey, discussing Freedom of Information Act exemptions from disclosure of certain executive branch information, stated, [I]t must be understood that the privilege against disclosure of the decision-making process is a tripartite privilege, because precisely the same privilege in conducting certain aspects of public business exists for the legislative and judicial branches as well as for the executive. It arises from two sources, one common law and the other constitutional. See also Statement of the Judges, 14 F.R.D. 335 (N.D.Cal.1953); Comment, The Law Clerk's Duty of Confidentiality, 129 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1230 (1981). 158 Express Supreme Court acknowledgment of such a privilege is sparse; however, Chief Justice Burger has noted the Court's inherent power to protect the confidentiality of its internal operations: 159 With respect to the question of inherent power of the Executive to classify papers, records, and documents as secret, or otherwise unavailable for public exposure, and to secure aid of the courts for enforcement, there may be an analogy with respect to this Court. No statute gives this Court express power to establish and enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy of our deliberations and records. Yet I have little doubt as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be required. 160 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n. 3, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2160 n. 3, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 161 The Supreme Court's reasons for finding a qualified privilege protecting confidential Presidential communications in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), support the existence of a similar judicial privilege. The Court based the executive privilege on the importance of confidentiality to the effective discharge of a President's powers, stating, 162 [T]he importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process. 163 Id. at 705, 94 S.Ct. at 3106. The Court discerned the constitutional foundation for the executive privilege--notwithstanding the lack of any express provision--in the constitutional scheme of separation of powers and in the very nature of a President's duties: 164 [T]he privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings. 165 Id. at 705-06, 94 S.Ct. at 3106-07. 166 If so, the same must be true of the judiciary. The Court, indeed, likened [t]he expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence to the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 94 S.Ct. at 3107. Judges, like Presidents, depend upon open and candid discourse with their colleagues and staff to promote the effective discharge of their duties. The judiciary, no less than the executive, is supreme within its own area of constitutionally assigned duties. Confidentiality helps protect judges' independent reasoning from improper outside influences. It also safeguards legitimate privacy interests of both judges and litigants. 167 We conclude, therefore, that there exists a privilege (albeit a qualified one, infra) protecting confidential communications among judges and their staffs in the performance of their judicial duties. But we do not think that this qualified privilege suffices to justify either Williams' noncompliance with the Committee's subpoena duces tecum, or Simon's and Miller's refusals to answer the questions directed to them by the Committee. 168 A party raising a claim of judicial privilege has the burden of demonstrating that the matters under inquiry fall within the confines of the privilege. The judicial privilege is grounded in the need for confidentiality in the effective discharge of the federal judge's duties. In the main, the privilege can extend only to communications among judges and others relating to official judicial business such as, for example, the framing and researching of opinions, orders, and rulings. Accordingly, Williams had the burden of showing that the Committee's subpoena duces tecum called for the production of documents that would reveal communications concerning official judicial business. We conclude that she has failed to meet that burden. 169 The Committee's subpoena duces tecum served upon Williams directs her to produce only the following documents: 170
171
172
173 From this description alone, we cannot determine that the above documents would come within a judicial privilege. Most such documents would not ordinarily be expected to reveal the substance of communications among Judge Hastings, his colleagues, and his staff concerning Judge Hastings' official duties. That Judge Hastings met or spoke with a particular visitor at a particular time, without more, would not involve the substance of the communications between them. 28 Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir.1982) (attorney-client privilege ordinarily applies only to content of communications, not to dates, places, or times of meetings). 174 Moreover, even if the subpoenaed materials were to include some substantive matters that fell within the privilege, we conclude, for reasons stated subsequently in our discussion relating to Simons and Miller, that the privilege would not support Williams' refusal to comply. The seriousness of the Committee's investigation, and the apparent relevance of the subpoenaed documents to that investigation, would justify enforcement of the subpoena in these circumstances regardless of the assertion of privilege, the privilege being qualified, not absolute. See infra. We accordingly reject Williams' assertion of privilege to justify non-compliance with the Committee's subpoena duces tecum. 29 175 Turning next to the testimony of Simons and Miller before the Committee, our review of the transcripts leaves little doubt that the boundaries of the judicial privilege do encompass the subject matter of the Committee's inquiries to them. They invoked the privilege in response to questions probing the core of the confidentiality interest at stake: communications among Judge Hastings and his staff concerning matters pending before Judge Hastings. That the privilege applies, however, does not end the matter. The judicial privilege is only qualified, not absolute; it can be overcome in an appropriate case. 176 The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, has made clear that the executive privilege is a qualified one: 177 However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. 178 The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III. In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence. 179 While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. , at 635 [72 S.Ct. 863, at 870, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) ] (Jackson, J., concurring). 180 To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of a workable government and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III. 181 Id. at 706-07, 94 S.Ct. at 3106-07. The judicial privilege, arising from similar constitutional underpinnings, shares similar limitations and restrictions. 30 Like any testimonial privilege, the judicial privilege must be harmonized with the principle that  'the public ... has a right to every man's evidence.'  United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950). This principle is no less applicable to proceedings under the Act than to criminal proceedings. 182 Once the party asserting the privilege has met the burden of showing that the matters under inquiry implicate communications among a judge and his staff concerning performance of judicial business--as Simons and Miller have shown here--those matters are presumptively privileged and need not be disclosed unless the investigating party can demonstrate that its need for the materials is sufficiently great to overcome the privilege. To meet this burden, the investigating party can attempt to show the importance of the inquiry for which the privileged information is sought; the relevance of that information to its inquiry; and the difficulty of obtaining the desired information through alternative means. The court then must weigh the investigating party's demonstrated need for the information against the degree of intrusion upon the confidentiality of privileged communications necessary to satisfy that need. We hold that the judicial privilege asserted by Simons and Miller on Judge Hastings' behalf is overridden, under the circumstances present here, by the Committee's need for Simons' and Miller's testimony to further its investigation. 183 There can be no question that the Committee's investigation is a matter of surpassing importance. While criminal remedies may no longer be in issue, a proceeding which could result in recommending the exoneration of a sitting Article III judge, or in certifying to the House of Representatives that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, obviously implicates concerns of fairness and thoroughness of a high order. And the charges being investigated--particularly the allegation of bribery--are grave. 31 As we said in our previous opinion arising out of the Hastings investigation, 184 Moreover, the question under investigation--whether an Article III judge should be recommended for impeachment by the Congress, otherwise disciplined, or granted a clean bill of health--is a matter of great societal importance. Given the character of an investigating committee and what is at stake--the public confidence in the judiciary, the independence and reputation of the accused judge--paragraph (c)(5) must in our view be read, with very few strings, as conferring authority to look into whatever is material to a determination of the truth or falsity of the charges. 185 In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d at 1269-70. 186 The Committee's inquiries of Simons and Miller, like the grand jury records the Committee sought and obtained in its previous suit, appear closely pertinent to the Committee's effective discharge of its responsibilities under the Act. These inquiries relate to the role played by Simons and Miller in the preparation of an order entered by Judge Hastings on October 6, 1981 in United States v. Romano, 523 F.Supp. 1209, an order that was alleged to be the result of bribery. The Committee could hardly undertake a full and complete investigation of a complaint growing out of charges that a judge's ruling was influenced by bribery without questioning the judge's staff about the in-chambers communications that led to the particular ruling. We can think of no adequate substitute for this line of questioning, assuming the Committee's investigation is to be meaningful. The Committee's particular questions to Simons and Miller adhere to this legitimate investigatory goal. 187 We recognize that the Committee already possesses records of the Hastings grand jury proceedings, apparently including transcripts of the grand jury's examination of Simons and Miller, and that the Committee may also possess transcripts of the Hastings and Borders criminal trials, apparently including examination of Miller. But possession of these does not defeat the Committee's authority to compel Simons and Miller to testify before it. As to matters not addressed in their prior testimony, ipso facto there exists no previous testimony to diminish the Committee's need to hear these witnesses' testimony now; as to matters that were previously testified to, the force of any asserted privilege is mitigated somewhat--even absent any formal waiver by Judge Hastings 32 --by the fact that these witnesses already have testified previously and thereby breached confidentiality to some degree. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 718 (D.C.Cir.1973) (confidentiality of taped Presidential conversations substantially diminishe[d] by public testimony concerning the substance of those conversations). 188 More important, regardless of how much prior testimony of Simons and Miller the Committee may possess or acquire in transcript form, the Committee is entitled to believe that live testimony is crucial to the goal of a thorough investigation. Only through the medium of such testimony can the Committee hear and judge for itself the demeanor and credibility of relevant witnesses, rather than be relegated to reliance on a cold transcript. Given the importance of the investigation, this goal of thoroughness is a weighty one. As we noted in our previous opinion in this matter, 189 The Committee is charged under the Act with conducting an investigation in order to further the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.... 28 U.S.C. Sec. 372(c)(6)(B). As already noted, the Committee's investigation is to be as extensive as it considers necessary. Section 372(c)(5). A thorough investigation is essential not only to ensure the integrity of federal judges, but also to instill public confidence in the judiciary.... The Committee must be able to represent to the Council, and the Council must be satisfied, that all available evidence of possible materiality has been sifted: for the Committee to examine matters extensively and find nothing may be as much a part of its duty as to look at evidence whose incriminating nature is known in advance. The object of the investigation is not to prove a case against the judge but to determine whether there is or is not a case. 190 In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d at 1273. See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 717 (President must turn over, in compliance with grand jury subpoena, relevant portions of taped Presidential conversations; court stresses importance of thorough grand jury investigation to fulfill grand jury's function not only to indict persons when there is probable cause to believe they have committed crime, but also to protect persons from prosecution when probable cause does not exist). Allowing witnesses to withhold evidence relevant to the Committee's investigation could call into question the Committee's ability to arrive at an accurate recommendation and thus could gravely impair the Committee's performance of its statutorily-assigned functions. Under all the circumstances, therefore, we place a heavy weight on the Committee's need for the testimony of Simons and Miller concerning the subject matter as to which they asserted a privilege. 191 Under the principles enunciated in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, the Committee's need for the testimony of Simons and Miller must be weighed against Judge Hastings' interest in the confidentiality of the in-chambers communications that may be revealed. In Nixon the Court held that the need for relevant evidence in criminal proceedings overrode the President's assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality. Id. at 712 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. at 3109 n. 19. The Court placed substantial emphasis on the general nature of the asserted interest, carefully distinguishing it from a specific claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets. Id. at 706, 94 S.Ct. at 3106; see id. at 710, 712 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. at 3108, 3109 n. 19. The Court accordingly held, 192 A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. 193 We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. 194 Id. at 712-13, 94 S.Ct. at 3109-10. 195 In the instant case, as well, Judge Hastings' assertion of a confidentiality interest is generalized in nature. Judge Hastings has not directed the attention of this court to any further, specific need for secrecy over and above those needs which normally apply and give rise, in the first place, to a privilege. On the other side of the balance, again, the Committee's particular need for these witnesses' testimony implicates concerns of great moment. 196 The procedures surrounding an investigation under the Act, too, present circumstances which mitigate the force of Judge Hastings' confidentiality interest in avoiding testimony about assertedly privileged communications. In Nixon, the Court--as a means of protecting confidentiality to the maximum possible extent--ordered in camera examination by the district court of the subpoenaed tape recordings and documents. Id. at 706, 714-16, 94 S.Ct. at 3106, 3110-11. The principle, of course, is that disclosure of privileged information to a federal judge constitutes an extremely limited breach of confidentiality, see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 719-20, since federal judges can be expected as an obligation of their office to respect the confidentiality of sensitive or privileged information. See also Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405-06, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2125-26, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1576 (11th Cir.1983). In the instant case, the Committee itself consists of federal judges, so disclosure of the substance of the privileged communications here threatens Judge Hastings' confidentiality interest little more than would in camera examination. See In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d at 1274. Federal judges will be uniquely cognizant of the need to safeguard the confidentiality of in-chambers communications among an Article III judge and his staff. 33 In addition, any privileged testimony or documents received by the Committee will remain confidential under the provisions of section 372(c)(14) of the Act. 34 Therefore, having weighed the competing concerns in the balance, we hold that the Committee's need for these witnesses' testimony outweighs Judge Hastings' asserted interest in non-disclosure. 197 We add that while the Committee's questions to Simons and Miller were manifestly relevant here, we would enforce the subpoenas upon a lesser showing of relevance so long as a reasonable degree of materiality could be discerned. Where, as here, a judicial council investigation concerns allegations of unquestionable seriousness, we believe that, given the make-up of judicial councils and the secrecy surrounding their investigations under the Act, any subpoena for material protected only by an asserted generalized need for confidentiality should be enforceable so long as the information sought does not on its face seem irrelevant to the investigation. The issuance of such a subpoena means that Article III judges already have satisfied themselves of the relevance of, and need for, the information sought and the existence of probable cause for the investigation itself. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir.1983) (grand jury subpoena is enforceable without a specific showing of relevance and need, despite witness' claim that enforcement of the subpoena could impair the right enjoyed by the target of the investigation to counsel of his choice); In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 694 F.2d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir.1982). We need not determine here whether more (or less) scope might be given to the assertion of a claim of judicial privilege in other contexts, such as where the investigation is aimed at conduct less serious than the potentially impeachable offense of bribery; where a privilege is asserted to protect specific sensitive items rather than to promote a generalized need for confidentiality; or where a privilege is invoked in a proceeding other than an investigation under the Act. 198 For the reasons stated, the court finds 1) that it has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine motions to enforce or quash subpoenas issued under its seal pursuant to the Act; 2) that appellants' constitutional and technical objections to the Committee's issuance and service of subpoenas either are beyond this court's jurisdiction, may not properly be decided in the present proceedings, or lack merit; and 3) that the Committee's subpoenas directed to appellants are enforceable despite appellants' invocation of a privilege protecting communications among Judge Hastings and his staff. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The motions to quash filed by Williams, Ehrlich, and Simons are DENIED. Williams and Ehrlich are ordered to comply with the Committee's subpoenas at a time and place to be prescribed by the Committee. Simons and Miller are ordered to testify fully as to all pertinent matters at a time and place to be prescribed by the Committee. 199 So ordered.