Opinion ID: 2411780
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: voters' asserted injury

Text: We must similarly determine whether the asserted injury to voters' rights of association, and to express themselves under the First Amendment, are in fact implicated in this case, applying the Anderson test. Not all restrictions placed on a candidate's eligibility impose suspect burdens on fundamental rights of voters to associate and to choose among candidates. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Generally, evenhanded restrictions on candidate eligibility that serve legitimate state goals, unrelated to First Amendment values, are upheld. See, Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1570, fn. 9, citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1952). First, we must note that we are not persuaded that appellants have standing to raise voters' claims under First Amendment challenges of the statutes. In cases assessing the impact of candidate eligibility requirements on the rights of voters, one or more voters supporting the candidate are typically parties to the action. In Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783, 103 S.Ct. at 1566, suit was brought by independent presidential candidate, John Anderson, and three registered voters; in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 136, 92 S.Ct. at 852, voters supporting candidates intervened in the action; and in Zielasko, supra, at 958, a registered voter supporting the candidacy of Zielasko joined the action challenging the constitutional validity of age requirements to any judicial office under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Assuming that appellants, indeed, have standing to raise claims that voters' rights have been infringed, we find no basis to substantiate their assertion of injury. The fundamental right of voting, speech, and association does not grant voters an absolute right to vote for a specific individual, regardless of whether that candidate meets reasonable eligibility requirements. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 967, 102 S.Ct. at 2845, Zielasko v. State of Ohio, at 961. Furthermore, the anti-nepotism provisions in these statutes neither favor or disfavor particular viewpoints or political parties. Voting for candidates for the school board is only limited by excluding those persons who fall within the parameters of the challenged statutes. While the opportunity of voters to select particular candidates may be obstructed by these statutes, surely most candidates are not precluded from the voters' consideration. No substantial segment of the community is therefore barred from the ballot by these provisions. See Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F.Supp. 143 (D.Del.1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir.1973). Neither do the challenged statutes inhibit the free exchange of ideas. See Anderson v. Celebreeze, supra, 460 U.S. at 792, 103 S.Ct. at 1572; see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 13-20, p. 1109 (2d ed. 1988). The instant case therefore does not involve any significant injury to voters' First Amendment rights.