Opinion ID: 1717605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: state auto's motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal

Text: State Auto's motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal is premised on the theory that a party cannot accept benefits from a judgment and at the same time contest that judgment. The appellants retort that their acceptance of the judgment payment was not inconsistent with the points they now specifically raise on appeal, to wit, the $50,000 offset for Van-Beber's liability coverage was error, a 12 percent penalty should have been assessed, and the attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest awarded were inadequate and constituted an abuse of discretion. The governing law on this issue was handed down early on, and both sides cite it in part: Again, a party may prosecute his appeal from a judgment, partly in his favor and partly against him, even after accepting the benefit awarded him by the judgment, provided the record discloses that what he recovers is his in any event that is, whether the judgment be reversed or affirmed. But he waives his right to an appeal by accepting a benefit which is inconsistent with the claim of right he seeks to establish by the appeal. A party cannot ratify and yet repudiate the same transaction in one breath. He must make his election at the outset to repudiate it in toto or take it cum onere, and, when once made and acted upon, he is estopped from assuming an attitude inconsistent with his first position and detrimental to the rights of others. Bolen v. Cumby, 53 Ark. 514, 515, 14 S.W. 926 (1890). That basic proposition has been quoted with approbation by this court in later cases. See, e.g., Arkansas State Hy. Comm'n v. Marlar, 236 Ark. 385, 366 S.W.2d 191 (1963); Anderson v. Anderson, 223 Ark. 571, 267 S.W.2d 316 (1954); Jones v. Rogers, 222 Ark. 523, 261 S.W.2d 649 (1953); McCown v. Nicks, 171 Ark. 260, 284 S.W. 739 (1926). This issue, therefore, turns on whether the appellants' appeal is inconsistent with their acceptance of the judgment amounts. We think not. The judgment awards that were accepted were the appellants in any event. In contrast, their claims on appeal expressly go to additional awards related to the liability policy offset, penalties, attorneys' fees, and interest as set forth in their Statement of Points. We are mindful that the Order of Disbursement states that the judgment is satisfied in full and that State Auto is discharged from liability due to its payment. The appellants, however, were not notified of the Order and aver that they did not agree that the Order satisfied the liability of State Auto in full. To be sure, State Auto paid the judgment amounts ordered by the trial court. But the order does not purport to foreclose the appellants' right to appeal regarding any additional liability of State Auto. On this point, it is instructive that the trial court itself contemplated an appeal when it stated with reference to its decision to deny a 12 percent penalty at the November 13, 1991 hearing: Well, I realize this will be appealed and I assume you'll find out when it is, how far I'm out of line and then we'll know. That statement suggests that the trial court anticipated that an appeal was in the offing. Under the circumstances, we do not believe that the appellants' acceptance of State Auto's judgment payments or the language of the Order of Disbursement prevent an appeal on the separate points raised in this appeal. We deny State Auto's motion to dismiss.