Opinion ID: 879244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Trial Court Improperly Exclude Evidence Favoring FIG?

Text: FIG contends that in addition to the above circumstantial evidence that Britton set the fire, it should also have been allowed to show (1) evidence of polygraph examinations which Britton failed and two other suspects successfully passed; and (2) evidence that Britton had a history of three other fires and subsequent recovery of insurance proceeds from those fires. Taking the polygraph issue first, it appears that Mike Stotts, employed by the State Fire Marshall's office, after the fire of September 22, 1981, conducted three polygraph tests of Britton. Britton submitted a motion in limine to exclude the polygraph results. A hearing was held on the motion on April 13, 1983, before the first trial and before District Judge John S. Henson who was then in jurisdiction in the cause. At the hearing, Britton called David Lykken, Ph.D., and qualified him as an expert on polygraph interrogation. Lykken testified that the polygraph results have zero probative value, and that allowing polygraph evidence in the courtroom would be on a par to allowing testimony of astrologers and fortune tellers. At the hearing, Mike Stotts was present in the courtroom. FIG's counsel did not call him in connection with an offer of proof on the polygraph results, but counsel for Britton interrogated Stotts, and developed from him that he had performed the polygraph examinations without determining the effect of the various medications which Stotts knew that Britton had been taking. Stotts wrote after the polygraph examination to one Robert Hensor, at the Backster School of Lie Detection, in San Diego, California, requesting information as to whether Britton's heart problem and medication could be the reasons that Britton appeared to be deceptive. Hensor answered in writing that he could not answer the question as to medication though he regarded the polygraph results as deceptive. FIG failed to make a record as to the details of the polygraph examinations of Russell Britton and Sally Lucas, the results of which FIG now claims should have been admitted to evidence. Judge Henson granted the motion in limine and excluded the polygraph test of Britton, relying on State v. Beachman (Mont.1980), 616 P.2d 337, 37 St.Rep. 1558; Gropp v. Lotton (1972), 160 Mont. 415, 503 P.2d 661, as determining that in Montana polygraph results are inadmissible in civil and criminal trials. (After Judge Henson's order in 1983, section 37-62-302, MCA, became effective, which provides that results of a polygraph examination may not be introduced or admitted in a court of law.) On May 19, 1983, Britton moved for an order in limine to exclude all reference in the trial to prior fires occurring to Britton's properties on which he may have received insurance proceeds. In ruling on the motion, the District Court had before it the testimony of Britton at a hearing held on May 19, 1983, and the deposition of Sally H. Lucas taken on September 24, 1982. Britton testified that he had disclosed on the morning of the fire to FIG's investigator information about other fire losses during the course of his life. One involved the fire loss of a Trail Boss, which is a combination mobile home and two-horse trailer. Britton testified that the Trail Boss had caught fire as he was pulling it down the road with his pickup. It was worth $16,000 on a proposed sale, and there was a $7,000 loan to the Ronan State Bank. The insurance coverage was $11,000. The trailer fire occurred in April 1979. In 1967, he had a fire loss involving a farm home at Ovando, Montana. He received a check for $10,000 covering mortgage insurance which he used to buy a trailer house in place of the home at Ovando. He was not present when the fire occurred but was in Billings, Montana. The home was destroyed because of a chimney fire. A third fire involved property in Hamilton, Montana, which was in the possession of his former wife after divorce. His name was on the insurance policy and when the fire loss occurred, he simply signed the insurance proceeds to the mortgage holder on the wife's property. He was not present when the fire occurred. The deposition of Sally Lucas is unworthy of consideration. It is unintelligable regarding the prior fires, and is replete with irrelevancies and hearsay upon hearsay. Judge Henson granted the motion in limine to exclude reference to the prior fires at the commencement of the first trial on May 23, 1983. During the course of the second trial, before District Judge R.D. McPhillips, FIG made an offer of proof. It sought to elicit from Adam Kirsch testimony to the effect that he had loaned to Britton $7,106 in 1977 and that it was repaid on April 9, 1979; that in connection with making the loan in 1977, the Bank took a security interest on a Trail Boss which was on the market for $16,000. It was insured and a loan was made for one year. In March 1979, a fire occurred to the horse trailer, the insurance proceeds were received and two weeks later the loan was made to the Ronan State Bank. The basis of the offer of proof was that it showed evidence of a common scheme or motive. Judge McPhillips denied the offer of proof, stating that Judge Henson had already ruled in the matter. Taking the matter of the refusal of the polygraph results first, it is clear that the District Court was correct in denying the polygraph evidence. Gropp v. Lotton, supra. FIG contends that because it is being sued for bad faith the polygraph results ought to be admissible as proof of FIG's good faith in refusing to pay the claim. FIG relies principally on Moskos v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co. (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 130, 17 Ill.Dec. 389, 376 N.E.2d 388. In Moskos, it was held by the Third Division of the Illinois Appellate Court that whether the polygraph test results were accurate or inaccurate was irrelevant but the fact that the insurance company had knowledge of the results in denying the claim was relevant to establish that the insurer did not act in bad faith in contending that the plaintiff committed arson. There is, however, a later different decision in another division of the appellate level in Illinois respecting the admissibility of polygraph results within the knowledge of the insurer when denying a claim on the basis of arson. In Lynch v. Mid-American Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (Ill.App.1981), 94 Ill.App.3d 21, 49 Ill.Dec. 567, 575, 418 N.E.2d 421, 429, that appellate court said: ... The trial court refused an offer of proof that a polygraph test was given to Boes and the examiner's opinion was that he showed deception when he denied setting the fire or knowing who did. The parties did not dispute that the evidence would have been inadmissible for purposes of showing that Boes was guilty of arson. There is authority for its admissibility if limited to proof of defendant's good faith in refusing to pay [citing Moskus. ] As the evidence would likely to have been improperly considered by the jury as to the arson policy defense despite any limiting instruction the trial court did not err in balancing the prejudice against the probative value and denying admission. We hold that the polygraph results were inadmissible in this case. Such was the declared public policy of this state in section 37-62-302, MCA when this case was tried, even though Judge Henson's ruling preceded the effective date of that declared public policy. The District Court properly followed the decided law of Montana in Gropp v. Lotton (1972), 160 Mont. 415, 503 P.2d 661 in denying evidence of the polygraph results. In like manner, we find no error in the denial by the District Court of evidence or testimony relating to prior fires on which Britton may have received insurance proceeds. In the usual case, questions of admissibility of evidence are left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review only in case of manifest abuse. Cech v. State (1979), 184 Mont. 522, 604 P.2d 97. The proffered evidence did not meet the test of relevancy, in that it did not make probable that Britton had committed arson either from the viewpoint of motive, intent or the deed itself. Rhodes v. Weigand (1965), 145 Mont. 542, 402 P.2d 588. Unless evidence naturally and logically tends to establish a fact in issue, it is not admissible, Brion v. Brown (1959), 135 Mont. 356, 340 P.2d 539. See McConnell-Cherewick v. Cherewick (Mont.1983), 666 P.2d 742, 40 St.Rep. 1102.