Opinion ID: 109308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The jurisdictional issue to which the Court devotes 10 pages, only to conclude that there is indeed jurisdiction over the merits of this case both here and in the District Court, was not raised in this Court by the parties before us nor argued, except most peripherally, [1] in the briefs or at oral argument. The question involves complicated questions of legislative intent and a statutory provision, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h), which has baffled district courts and courts of appeals for years in this and other contexts. [2] Of course, this Court is always obliged to inquire into its own jurisdiction, when there is a substantial question about whether jurisdiction is proper either in the lower courts or in this Court. But since here there is, according to the Court, jurisdiction over the cause of action in any event, [3] I would have thought it the wiser course merely to note that there was jurisdiction in the District Court either under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 or under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), leaving the resolution of the question of which is applicable to a case in which the decision is of some consequence, and in which the parties have, either of their own volition or upon request of the Court, briefed and argued the issue. [4] Surely, the Court does not intend to adopt a new policy of always on its own canvassing, with a full discussion, all jurisdiction issues lurking behind every case, whether or not the issue has any impact at all on the resolution of the case. Because the Court nonetheless treats the question fully, I am obliged to do so as well. For, at least insofar as my own research and consideration, unaided by the help ordinarily offered by adversary consideration, is adequate, I am convinced that the Court is quite wrong about the intended reach of § 405 (h), and that its construction attributes to Congress a purpose both contrary to all established notions of administrative exhaustion and absolutely without support in the clear language or legislative history of the statute. Further, today's decision is in square conflict with Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974). And finally, even if § 405 (g) is the exclusive route for adjudicating actions seeking payment of a claim, I do not see how it can apply to the declaratory and injunctive aspects of this suit.
The Court rejects the District Court's conclusion that § 405 (h) is no more than a codified requirement of administrative exhaustion on the basis of the third sentence of the section, which it characterizes as sweeping and direct and [stating] that no action shall be brought under § 1331, not merely that only those actions shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been exhausted. Ante, at 757. But the sentence does not say that no action of any kind shall be brought under § 1331, or other general grants of jurisdiction, which may result in entitling someone to benefits under Title II of the Act; it says merely that no action shall be brought under § 1331 et seq. to recover on any claim arising under [Title II]. (Emphasis added.) This action, I believe, does not arise under Title II in the manner intended by § 405 (h), and it is, at least in part, not an action to recover on a claim. See Parts B and C, infra. Section 405 (h), I believe, only bans, except under § 405 (g), suits which arise under Title II in the sense that they require the application of the statute to a set of facts, and which seek nothing more than a determination of eligibility claimed to arise under the Act. Thus, I basically agree with the District Court that § 405 (h), including its last sentence, merely codifies the usual requirements of administrative exhaustion. The last sentence, in particular, provides that a plaintiff cannot avoid § 405 (g) and the first two sentences of § 405 (h) by bringing an action under a general grant of jurisdiction claiming that the Social Security Act itself provides him certain rights. Rather, on such a claim a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies, and the District Court is limited to review of the Secretary's decision, in the manner prescribed by § 405 (g). The Court suggests that this reading of § 405 (h) makes the last sentence redundant. But this is the reading which the Social Security Board itself gave to the provision soon after it went into effect. In a document prepared for and approved by the Board in January 1940 as an outline of the procedures to be followed under the newly enacted Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, [5] the interaction between §§ 405 (g) and (h) is described as follows: The judicial review section of the act, section [405 (g)], provides for civil suits against the Social Security Board in the United States District Courts. These may be filed by parties to hearings before the Board who are dissatisfied with final decisions of the Board. The review of the Board's actions in these suits will consist of a review of the Board's records in these cases. Thus, on the one hand, the Board is protected against the possibility of reversals of its decisions in separate actions filed for the purpose . . . . Actions of this kind are specifically excluded by section [405 (h)]. On the other hand, judicial review on the basis of the Board's records in the cases makes it necessary that the record in each case be in the best possible state so as to avoid difficulties if a challenge in court occurs. Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Basic Provisions Adopted by the Social Security Board for the Hearing and Review of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Claims With a Discussion of Certain Administrative Problems and Legal Consideration (1940), in Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedures in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 39 (1941). Since the last sentence of § 405 (h) is the only part of the section which specifically exclude[s] any action, the italicized portion obviously refers to that sentence. Thus, the agency responsible for the enforcement of Title II adopted a construction of the statute which gave the last sentence the very meaning which the Court now rejects as superfluous and already performed by other statutory provisions. Ante, at 757, 759, and n. 6. As explained in the margin, [6] the sentence is not superfluous, and the Board obviously did not regard it as such. Administrative interpretations by agencies of statutes which they administer are ordinarily entitled to great weight, see, e. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S., at 367-368; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). And in this instance, the contemporary Social Security Board was intimately involved in the formulation of the 1939 amendments, [7] and thus must be presumed to have had insight into the legislative intent. [8] Indeed, to adopt the Court's view of the last sentence of § 405 (h) is, as far as I can determine, to assume that it was inserted precisely to cover the situation herea suit attacking the constitutionality of a section of Title II and seeking to establish eligibility despite the provisions of the statute. Yet, the Court is able to point to no evidence at all that Congress was concerned with this kind of lawsuit when it formulated these sections, and I have not been able to find any either. Without any clear evidence, indeed without any evidence, the Court should not attribute to Congress an intention to filter through § 405 (g) this sort of constitutional attack. Adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U. S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in result); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S., at 368. [9] See 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.04 (1958). Thus, in a case such as this one, in which no facts are in dispute and no other sections of the Act are possibly applicable, the only question of exhaustion was whether to require exhaustion of nonexistent administrative remedies. Id., at 78. See Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 773 (1947). To assume, with no basis in the legislative history or in the clear words of the statute, that Congress intended to require exhaustion in this kind of case, is to impute to Congress a requirement of futile exhaustion, in which the only issues are in the case are not discussed, in which the actual issues are in no way clarified, in which no factual findings are made, and in which there is no agency expertise to apply. I see no basis for imputing such an odd intent, especially since, as discussed below, I believe the clear import of the wording of the statute is to the contrary.
I think it quite clear that a claim arising under Title II is one which alleges that the Title grants someone certain rights. This claim does not arise under the Title because, if the statute itself were applied, Mrs. Salfi would certainly lose. Instead, this case arises under the Constitution and seeks to hold invalid the result which would be reached under the statute itself. Johnson v. Robison, supra , as well as cases construing the meaning of arising under in other jurisdictional statutes, [10] dictate this result. In Johnson, construing the language which appears ante, at 761, we said, 415 U. S., at 367: The prohibitions would appear to be aimed at review only of those decisions of law or fact that arise in the administration by the Veterans' Administration of a statute providing benefits for veterans. A decision of law or fact `under' a statute is made by the Administrator in the interpretation or application of a particular provision of the statute to a particular set of facts. . . . Thus, . . . `[t]he questions of law presented in these proceedings arise under the Constitution, not under the statute whose validity is challenged.'  (Citation omitted.) The Court, ante, at 761-762, suggests that this interpretation turned on the precise wording of the statute construed in Johnson, specifically on the words decisions. . . on any question of law and fact. First, as the quotation above shows, Johnson in fact concentrated not upon what constitutes a decision of the administrator but upon what is a decision under a statute. But more significantly, the statute construed in Johnson had, between 1957 and 1970, read in part: [D]ecisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be final and conclusive. . . . 38 U. S. C. § 211 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). See Johnson, 415 U. S., at 368-369, n. 9. The italicized language is obviously quite similar to that used in § 405 (h). The Court's opinion in Johnson made clear that the holding that the section does not apply to constitutional attacks on veterans' benefits legislation encompasses all prior versions of the section, and that the claim for benefits language in no way affected this construction of the statute. [11] Aside from Johnson, our cases concerning the meaning of arising under in the jurisdictional statutes affirm that this claim arises under the Constitution and not under the Social Security Act. We have consistently held that a controversy regarding title to land does not arise under federal law merely because one of the parties to it has derived his title under an act of Congress. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 570 (1912). See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 676, and n. 11 (1974). Rather, a suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily one arising under the . . . laws of the United States. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 507 (1900); Oneida Indian Nation, supra, at 683 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). Unless the dispute requires, for its resolution, a decision concerning federal law, the case does not arise under federal law even if, but for a federal statute, there would be no right at all. Shulthis v. McDougal, supra, at 569; Oneida Indian Nation, supra, at 677. Thus, arising under is a term of art in jurisdictional statutes referring, at least in part, to the body of law necessary to consider in order to determine the rights in question. Here, there is no dispute about the application of the Social Security Act; the only controversy concerns whether the Constitution permits the result which the Social Security Act would require. Therefore, this case does not concern a claim arising under Title II, and is not precluded by the last sentence of § 405 (h) from consideration under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
Not only does this case not concern a claim arising under Title II, but it is, at least in part, not an action. . . to recover on any claim. (Emphasis added.) A three-judge District Court dealt with the recover on [a] claim aspect of § 405 (h) in Gainville v. Richardson, 319 F. Supp. 16, 18 (Mass. 1970). [12] Judge Wyzanski wrote concerning the effect of the last sentence of § 405 (h): In the present action, while plaintiff does, perhaps improperly, seek damages, his complaint also has prayers for a declaratory judgment that § 203 (f) (3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 403 (f) (3) is unconstitutional, and for an injunction restraining defendant from applying that section. If he were to be successful with respect to those prayers, plaintiff would not, in the language of the statute, `recover on any claim' for benefits. For recovery of benefits he would still need to resort to the administrative process. The only effect of a declaratory judgment or injunction by this court would be to preclude the Secretary from making the challenged deduction. 319 F. Supp., at 18. This holding seems eminently sensible to me. The legislative history and administrative interpretation of § 405 (h), supra, at 790-792, and n. 8, reveal no basis for supposing that the section was to apply to suits which did not request immediate payment of a claim as part of the relief. To construe the statute to cover all actions which may later, after administrative consideration, result in eligibility under Title II is to mutilate the statutory language. The holding in Gainville, supra, applies squarely to this case. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to both the named plaintiffs and the class, as well as retroactive benefits. App. 12-13. The injunction sought was either an order to provide benefits or an opportunity for a hearing on the genuineness of their status, [for] plaintiffs and all those similarly situated. Id., at 13. Thus, even if § 405 (h) precludes granting retroactive benefits except under § 405 (g), it would not, under the rationale of Gainville, supra, preclude granting any declaratory and injunctive relief to the class, since the relief requested would not necessarily be tantamount to recovery on a claim. Indeed, the appellants seem to have conceded as much in this case, since it argued here that §§ 405 (g) and (h) were preclusive only with regard to retroactive benefits, see n. 1, supra. The Court concludes that there was jurisdiction over the claim for retroactive benefits for the named plaintiffs under § 405 (g). (But see Part D, infra. ) Under the Gainville rationale, there would be jurisdiction under § 1331 over the claims for class declaratory and injunctive relief. And if there was jurisdiction under one jurisdictional statute or another for each part of the action, surely there was jurisdiction over the whole. [13]
Finally, even if I could agree, and I do not, that § 405 (g) is the exclusive route for consideration of this kind of case, I would dissent from the Court's treatment of the exhaustion requirement of § 405 (g), ante, at 764-767. The Court admits, ante, at 765, that the purposes of administrative exhaustion have been served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and that the claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different section of the Act. Nonetheless, the Court construes the statute so as to permit the Secretary [to] specify such requirements for exhaustion as he deems serve his own interests in effective and efficient administration. . . . [A] court may not substitute its conclusion as to futility for the contrary conclusion of the Secretary. Ante, at 766. (Emphasis supplied.) If, as the Court holds, the finality and hearing requirements of § 405 (g) are not jurisdictional, [14] ibid., then I fail to see why it is left to the Secretary to determine when the point of futility is reached, a power to be exercised, apparently, with regard only to the Secretary's needs and without taking account of the claimants' interest in not exhausting futile remedies, [15] and in obtaining promptly benefits which have been unconstitutionally denied. Further, the Court leaves the way open for a lawless application of this power, since the Secretary can evidently, once the case is in court, assert or not assert the full exhaustion requirements of § 405 (g), as he pleases. Moreover, and significantly, it flagrantly distorts the record in this case to say that the Secretary waived the exhaustion requirements of § 405 (g), recognizing their futility. True, the Secretary does not here claim a lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust on the individual claim, see n. 1, supra. But he did, in the District Court, move to dismiss the entire action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Notice and Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, at Record 114-117. The Secretary said, referring to §§ 405 (g) and (h): From the above provisions, it is clear that the only civil action permitted to an individual on any claim arising under Title II of the Act is an action to review the `final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing . . . .' The complaint, however, does not allege jurisdiction under section [405 (g)] . . . . Moreover, there has been no `final decision' by the Secretary on the matters herein complained of . . . and plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies. The exhaustion of any available administrative remedies is a condition precedent to the plaintiffs [ sic ] bringing this action against the defendants, and the issue is one of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at Record 65. (First emphasis added.) In the face of this statement, the Court's conclusion that the Secretary determined that for the purposes of this litigation the reconsideration determination is `final,'  ante, at 767, is patently indefensible.