Opinion ID: 735363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sleep Deprivation Expert.

Text: 36 Plaintiff's sleep deprivation expert, Dr. Dement, testified that the driver was fatigued and that sleep deprivation was the primary cause of the accident. Defendants argue the admission of Dement's expert testimony was error. The district court has broad discretion with regard to whether to admit expert testimony, and its decision will be affirmed unless 'manifestly erroneous.'  Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). We find no abuse of discretion here. 37 Defendants first argue that because Dement is not an expert in accident reconstruction, this causation testimony was outside his area of expertise and should not have been admitted. Defendants are correct that Dement is not an expert in accident reconstruction, but he did not attempt to reconstruct the accident through his testimony. Thus, the objection that Dement testified outside his area of expertise is without merit. 38 Defendants also argue that a jury does not need an expert to understand the role of fatigue. However, the focus of Dement's testimony was not just the role of fatigue, but the existence of fatigue. Expert testimony is admissible if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702. The district court has broad discretion to determine if testimony would be helpful to the jury; we will not second guess its decision to admit expert testimony on fatigue in this case. See Carroll, 896 F.2d at 212. 39 Finally, defendants argue that Dement improperly testified to the ultimate legal conclusion, that sleep deprivation was the primary cause of the accident. However, under Fed.R.Evid. 704(a), experts are allowed to testify as to the ultimate issue in a case. Moore v. Wesbar Corp., 701 F.2d 1247, 1253 (7th Cir.1983). Defendants cite Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1983), for the proposition that testimony as to causation is impermissible as a legal conclusion. However, the Owen court did not hold that any testimony as to causation embraces a legal conclusion. Rather, it distinguished between factual and legal causation. In Owen, plaintiff ran his bulldozer into defendant's pipe, which exploded. Defendant asserted plaintiff was contributorily negligent for not investigating the location of the pipe. The court did not allow defendant's expert to testify as to the cause of the accident, holding that the inadmissible question must have been asking about legal causation because there was no dispute as to the factual cause of the accident. Id. at 240. In the instant case, however, there was a factual dispute as to whether the driver was fatigued, and whether that fatigue could have caused the driver to hit Miksis' construction bucket. Given these facts, we cannot say the district court's decision to admit this testimony was so manifestly erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Carroll, 896 F.2d at 212. 40