Opinion ID: 879541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Indian Highway

Text: The transcript does not disclose what the Indian Highway is, but a letter to the Solid Waste Bureau from the United States Department of the Interior attached to the Appellant's brief indicates that it is a public road built with federal funds and in accordance with 25 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 170.8, free public use is required. From the record it appears that the Green facility can be publicly viewed from the Indian Highway as claimed by the Department. However, the lower court concluded: In addition the court finds that the Indian Highway was built after the wrecking facility and the law does not apply to the Indian Highway, and therefore that is not a consideration before the Court. If a person were offended by traveling the Indian Highway and driving by the facility, they could detour North approximately two miles on oil to Highway No. 2 and avoid passing by the facility without increasing the miles traveled to Wolf Point. If the evidence preponderates against a trial court's finding, this Court may review the record to evaluate the evidence and make independent findings of fact. Hagfeldt v. Mahaffey (1978), 176 Mont. 16, 575 P.2d 915. Such a review of the record is proper in this case for the purposes of determining if it preponderates against the trial court's findings. The testimony of the witnesses and the court's order found that the facility could be seen from both the Indian Highway and U.S. Highway 2. It is of no consequence to the enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Recycling and Disposal Act and the Junk Yards Along Roads Act, that a person might have to have a certain eyesight acuity to identify it as a junk yard, that a particular highway was built after the wrecking facility was started, or that a particular highway was thought to be an unnecessary road. These factors are not relevant here. The applicable laws were in effect since 1967 and apply to Green's business which substantially began in 1978. A review of the record discloses the preponderance of the evidence indicates defendant's facility is in public view. It is one of the largest facilities in the State. Defendant has known of the laws mandating shielding compliance for several years and has not brought his facility into compliance at any time during the growth and expansion of his business. Defendant is not immune from the shielding regulations and is required to bring his facility into compliance with the applicable laws and regulations. The second issue raised by Department is whether the trial court erred when it failed to find a violation of § 75-10-511, MCA, the separate statute requiring defendant to obtain a license to operate his motor vehicle wrecking facility. The trial court found that defendant was eligible to receive a license from the Department upon payment of the statutory fee because the shielding requirements did not apply to the defendant. As we have found in the previous issue, the shielding requirements do apply to the defendant's facility. These requirements are only one aspect of operating a motor vehicle wrecking facility within the mandates of the law. Section 75-10-511, MCA, states that any person operating a motor vehicle wrecking facility must obtain a license. It states: (1) A person may not conduct, maintain, or operate a motor vehicle wrecking facility ... without a license issued by the department. ..... (3) An annual fee of $50 shall be paid to the department for the license ... ..... (6) The license expires on December 31 of the year issued. The specific requirements for obtaining a license are set out in § 16.14.201, Administrative Rules of Montana which provides: (1) Application for license to operate a motor vehicle wrecking facility shall be made on forms furnished by the department ... (a) All the information requested on the application form must be completed before the department can act on the application. (2) When the completed application is received, the department is to approve the site location before a license will be issued. (3) Before an application will be approved and a license to operate will be issued, the facility must be in compliance with the shielding requirements of ARM 16.14.202. Defendant contends he has an inalienable right to acquire junk vehicles on his property without a license. While it is true that he does have certain constitutional rights to acquire and possess real and personal property, these property rights must be balanced with the rights of the public which the Department is mandated to protect. This question of balance was addressed in State of Montana v. Cecil Bernhard (1977), 173 Mont. 464, 568 P.2d 136 as follows: Article II, Section 3, 1972 Montana Constitution declares that the right to a clean and healthful environment is an inalienable right of a citizen of this state. Consistent with this statement and the case cited, we hold that a legislative purpose to preserve or enhance aesthetic values is a sufficient basis for the state's exercise of its police power in 69-6802 now § 75-10-511(1), MCA. In sum, defendant's contention has been previously answered by this Court. It is clear that the Department correctly required the facility to obtain a license to operate whether or not it was exempt from shielding requirements. We reverse the trial court on this issue and hold defendant must obtain a license to operate his facility in keeping with the applicable statutes. The third issue is closely related to the licensing issue above. It is essentially a pro se cross claim by respondent who questions whether his practice of not purchasing junk cars from insurance companies makes a license unnecessary. Section 75-10-520, MCA, provides: An insurance company settling an insurance claim on a damaged motor vehicle as a total loss less salvage may dispose of the motor vehicle at a motor vehicle wrecking facility only if it is licensed under the provisions of XX-XX-XXX. This statute and the licensing statutes are separate and independent requirements within the Motor Vehicle Recycling and Disposal Act which may be independently enforced. Respondent may not therefore use the fact that he does not purchase junk vehicles from insurance companies as a reason for not obtaining a valid license. A license is still required to operate his motor vehicle wrecking facility. The respondent has failed to comply with the licensing requirements. He is subject to the provisions of the Act to be determined by the trial court pursuant to §§ 75-10-541 and 75-10-542, MCA. Reversed and remanded. HARRISON, SHEEHY, WEBER and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.