Opinion ID: 1174818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did appellant's crimes constitute spree offenses for which consecutive sentences were improper?

Text: Appellant was convicted of nine counts of armed robbery and one count of aggravated assault arising from three incidents that occurred within a one and one-half hour period. These crimes were committed in a similar manner and within a few miles of one another. Appellant asserts that he is entitled to concurrent sentences for these crimes because he is a spree offender.
Convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction for purposes of this section. There is, however, no express statutory language which directs that A.R.S. § 13-604(H) limits sentences imposed pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01. We have, however, applied this statutory limitation to a similar repeat offender statute, namely, (former) A.R.S. § 13-1206, which punished dangerous or deadly assaults by a prisoner. See State v. Mulalley, 127 Ariz. 92, 97, 618 P.2d 586, 591 (1980). We can find no cogent reason why A.R.S. § 13-604(H) would apply to repeat offender provisions like A.R.S. § 13-1206 and § 13-604 but not to another statute in pari materia, A.R.S. § 13-604.01. We conclude that A.R.S. § 13-604(H) limits sentences imposed under A.R.S. § 13-604.01. We must accordingly decide if the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentences for spree offenses in the present case. The trial judge punished these three armed robbery incidents separately by imposing separate consecutive sentences for each criminal incident. The only question, therefore, is whether these incidents were different occasions for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-604(H). Appellant asserts that the instant offenses arose on the same occasion because they occurred pursuant to a common scheme of appellant and his codefendants to rob whomever they could in the river bottom area. Offenses committed by reason of such an ill-defined conspiracy do not, however, necessarily indicate that such offenses were committed on the same occasion. Similarly, although the spatio-temporal proximity and similarity of modus operandi of these criminal incidents is relevant to determining whether they occurred on the same occasion, these factors are not of controlling importance. Cf. State v. Roylston, 135 Ariz. 271, 660 P.2d 872 (App. 1983) (abuse of discretion for trial court to presume without considering the evidence that four burglaries were committed on the same occasion for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-604(H) merely because these burglaries occurred within a 24-hour period). We have never before explained the test for what constitutes an occasion for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-604(H). Initially, we note that A.R.S. § 13-116 already bars multiple punishment for the same conduct. The specific focus of A.R.S. § 13-604(H), if this statute is not to be mere surplusage, must be to prohibit multiple punishment for separate criminal conduct that occurs on the same occasion. The only other state with similar statutory provisions, New York, would follow this same construction. See subsection (2) [analogue to A.R.S. § 13-116] and subsection (3) [analogue to A.R.S. § 13-604(H)] of N.Y. Penal Laws § 70.25 (1984) and the commentary to subsection (3) (Subdivision 3 is designed to cover cases where consecutive definite sentences are imposed for offenses committed by separate acts, but perpetrated in a single incident or transaction). Some states have passed statutes like A.R.S. § 13-604(H) which bar multiple punishment for crimes committed on the same occasion, incident, transaction, episode, or similar locution. See Alaska Laws § 12.55.025(g)(2) (sentences may be consecutive if the crimes are part of a continuous criminal episode); Idaho Code § 19-2520(E) (Supp. 1984) (no enhanced punishment for offenses committed in the same indivisible course of conduct); Ill. Criminal Laws and Procedure Ch. 38, ¶ 1005-8-4(a) (1982) (barring consecutive sentences with certain exceptions for multiple offenses which were committed as part of single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective). Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1(c) (Supp. 1984) (no enhanced punishment for offenses committed at same time or as part of the same transaction); Md.Crim.Law art. 27 § 643B(c) (Supp. 1984) (only enhanced punishment for dangerous offenses that don't arise out of the same incident); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-17(B) (1978) (no enhanced punishment for offenses committed on separate occurrences or as part of a separate transaction); N.Y.Penal Laws § 70.25(3) (1984) (limiting punishment for multiple offenses which were committed as parts of a single incident or transaction); Wyo. § 6-10-201(a) (1977) (no enhanced punishment for crimes that arose out of separate occurrences). Some model legislation has included similar prohibitions. See Model Penal Code § 1.07(1)(e) (Proposed Final Draft, 1962) (no consecutive sentences if the offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted unless the law provides that specific periods or instances of such conduct shall constitute separate offenses); Model Sentencing Act § 17 (1972) (sentences for a single criminal episode shall be concurrent); Uniform Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 3-107(1) (1979) (sentences shall be concurrent for multiple offenses committed as part of a single continuous course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective). Courts in jurisdictions without such statutes have imposed similar transactional limitations on multiple punishment. See, e.g., Edmond v. State, 280 So.2d 449, 450, 453 (Fla.App. 1973), Comment, Cumulative Sentencing for Offenses within a Single Transaction, 26 U.Fla.L.Rev. 367 (1974). There is, however, a split of authority as to whether this common law limitation on multiple punishment is part of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See Statutory Implementation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 Yale L.J. 339, 344 (1956). Various tests have evolved to determine what constitutes a criminal transaction or occasion for purposes of preventing multiple punishment. See Westen & Drubel, Towards a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 S.Ct.Rev. 81, 116; see also Note, One Transaction  One Conviction: the Texas Doctrine of Carving, 25 Baylor L.Rev. 623, 630 (1978); Note, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the Neal Doctrine, 58 Calif. L.Rev. 357, 363ff (1970). These tests are quite similar to the criteria for determining whether there is multiple punishment for purposes of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Thus, for example, some courts have adopted the independent motivation test, finding a single occasion only if the defendant acted for a single and not separate criminal objectives. See Neal v. State, 55 Cal.2d 11, 19, 357 P.2d 839, 842-43, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 610-11 (1960); People v. Stewart, 45 Ill.2d 310, 259 N.E.2d 24 (1970); State v. Cloutier, 286 Or. 579, 596 P.2d 1278 (1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.505(2) (1984) (`criminal episode' means continuous and uninterrupted conduct that establishes at least one offense and is so joined in time, place and circumstances that such conduct is directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective); Comment, Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender  A Comprehensive Approach, 59 Ore.L.Rev. 339 (1980). Other courts have adopted as a criterion the singleness of the act or course of conduct. See People v. King, 66 Ill.2d 551, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 897, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844 (1977) (rejecting the independent motivation test); Comment, Separate and Distinct Acts is the Appropriate Test for Multiple Convictions and Concurrent Sentences, 1978 U. of Ill.L.F. 180. Still other courts would focus upon the differences between elements of the multiple offenses, the sameness of the evidence to prove the multiple crimes, or the intent of the legislature. See generally Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 267 (1965); Westen & Drubel, supra, at 111. We believe that under any of these tests, the crimes committed in this case were committed on separate occasions. To determine if the instant offenses were committed on the same occasion, we must examine recognized instances of spree offenses. The Comment to A.R.S. § 13-704(F) [now A.R.S. § 13-604(H)] provides an example of offenses committed on the same occasion: If the offender commits a robbery and in order to escape he or she kidnaps the victim, a consolidation of the two felonies with a conviction on the robbery would not subject this spree offender to the provisions of Section 704 in the event of his conviction for kidnapping. Arizona Criminal Code Commission, Arizona Revised Criminal Code § 704, at 96-97 (1975). See also State v. Hannah, 126 Ariz. 575, 577, 617 P.2d 527, 529 (1980) (this same comment cited with approval in dictum). We also found a spree offense on the facts of State v. Mulalley, supra . In that case, the accused was a prisoner who attempted to escape from a courtroom by taking a court reporter as a hostage. Mulalley, 127 Ariz. at 93, 618 P.2d at 587. A policeman tackled the prisoner and disarmed him. Id. The defendant was convicted of two violations of A.R.S. § 13-1206: one for assaulting the hostage and another for assaulting the police officer. Id. On appeal, we held that enhanced sentences for these two crimes could not be imposed consecutively because they occurred on the same occasion. Id. These examples are distinguishable from the instant case for three reasons. First, in both of the aforementioned examples, there was a specific target offense (or offenses) and not merely an overly vague conspiracy. Second, although not alone a controlling factor, there was greater spatio-temporal proximity between the crimes in the aforementioned examples than in the crimes at bar. Third, although occasion is such a basic word that it is not easily defined, these three robbery encounters appear to have all the features of separate criminal incidents. In each of these three armed robbery incidents, there were distinct crimes committed against distinct victims, with different valuables taken in each robbery. The acts used to establish the elements of each robbery incident were distinct. There was separate danger created in each robbery by appellant's use of the shotgun to threaten the victims. In two of these three incidents, one of the victims was actually harmed by appellant. Overall, nine persons were robbed; ten persons were threatened with deadly weapons. Appellant and his accomplices apparently did not form the intent to proceed to a new robbery until after completing the prior robbery. The additional criminal incidents were not necessary to complete either the initial robbery encounter or to escape afterward. Different evidence was used to prove each robbery incident because there were different eyewitnesses to each crime. Additionally, to classify such a vague and potentially open-ended conspiracy as an occasion for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-604(H) would not promote the policies of this statute. One aim of A.R.S. § 13-604(H) is to mitigate the severity of imposing consecutive enhanced sentences for multiple offenses committed on the same occasion. Another aim, no doubt, is to permit the law to punish more severely those who have committed separate or multiple offenses. In that light, we do not believe that it would promote the intent of this statute to bar consecutive sentences in this case. Additionally, we note that the legislature has indicated some concern with the potentially broad scope of A.R.S. § 13-604(H). As originally enacted, A.R.S. § 13-704(F) [now A.R.S. § 13-604(H)] read in pertinent part: Convictions for two or more offenses not committed on the same occasion or as part of a single continuing course of action ... may be counted as prior convictions for purposes of this section. Before the effective date of this statute, it was renumbered as A.R.S. § 13-604(H) and amended to its present form. The above underlined language, which appears to broaden the scope of the statute, was eliminated. Given all these circumstances, we disagree with appellant's expansive construction of the statute. [2] We acknowledge the conceptual difficulties in distinguishing between occasions for the purposes of A.R.S. § 13-604(H). We decide in the present case only that a vague and potentially open-ended conspiracy to commit whatever crimes can be committed is alone insufficient to unite apparently distinct crimes. We find no error with the consecutive sentences imposed.