Opinion ID: 2538150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Relationship to Other Statutes

Text: The Gunther court relied heavily on what it perceived as a deliberate legislative choice to require proof of intentional discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, pursuant to which plaintiffs recover minimum damages of $4,000 (see § 52, subd. (a)), while allowing unintentional ADA access violations to be remedied under the Disabled Persons Act (§§ 54-55.3), [8] another California statutory scheme guaranteeing access to individuals with disabilities, which provides for minimum damages of only $1,000 (see § 54.3, subd. (a)). ( Gunther, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 239-242.) The court believed that under its interpretation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the two statutes dovetail nicely. Where there is intentional discrimination, there is a four times larger minimum penalty; if there isn't, plaintiff still recovers, but less. ( Gunther, at p. 242.) Historically, however, it could not have been the Legislature's intent to create the contrasting set of remedies Gunther describes. That is because in 1992, when the Legislature added subdivision (f) to section 51, making violations of the ADA violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act as well (and doing the same for the Disabled Persons Act by adding subd. (d) to § 54.1), the minimum damages under the two laws were identical, $250. (Historical and Statutory Notes, 6 West's Ann. Civ. Code (2007 ed.) foll. § 52, pp. 577-578; Historical and Statutory Notes, 6A West's Ann. Civ. Code (2007 ed.) foll. § 54.3, p. 21; Stats. 1976, ch. 366, § 2, p. 1013; Stats. 1981, ch. 395, § 1, pp. 1582, 1583.) The 1992 amendment could not, therefore, have been intended to balance a greater scienter requirement in section 52 with greater minimum damages, as the Gunther court imagined. [9] Nor is Gunther persuasive in its assertion that Lentini 's interpretation, under which ADA violations, even if not involving intentional discrimination, would be remediable by either section 52 or section 54.3 ( Lentini, supra, 370 F.3d at pp. 846-847), renders section 54.3 . . . redundant ( Gunther, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 241). The Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Disabled Persons Act clearly have significant areas of overlapping application, although the Unruh Civil Rights Act, of course, applies to many more types of discrimination, while the Disabled Persons Act contains unique specific provisions regarding guide, service, and signal dogs (§ 54.2) and may apply to more public places, facilities, and services than the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Compare § 51, subd. (b) [all business establishments of every kind whatsoever] with § 54, subd. (a) [streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings . . . and other public places] and § 54.1, subd. (a)(1) [accommodations, advantages, facilities, . . . telephone facilities, . . . places to which the general public is invited].) Recognizing the substantial overlap, the Legislature has expressly prohibited double recovery under sections 52 and 54.3. (§ 54.3, subd. (c).) [10] As to ADA violations, the overlap is plainly deliberate, the Legislature having specified that ADA violations are also violations of both the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 51, subd. (f)) and the Disabled Persons Act (§ 54.1, subd. (d)). This acknowledged overlap, therefore, does not require us to restrict, artificially and contrary to the statutory language, the types of ADA violations remediable under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Gunther also noted that under its interpretation of section 51, subdivision (f), violations of the ADA that do not involve intentional discrimination might still find a remedy in California law through an action charging an unlawful business practice (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200, 17203). ( Gunther, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 234.) Though true, that could not have been a purpose of adding subdivision (f) to section 51. Violations of federal as well as state and local law may serve as the predicate for an unlawful practice claim under Business and Professions Code section 17200. (See Quacchia v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1450, fn. 5 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 508]; Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 838-839 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 438].) Assuming all other requirements for such an action were met, therefore, violations of the ADA's accessibility mandate, whether involving intentional discrimination or not, would be remediable through Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17203. It did not take incorporation of the ADA mandate into the Unruh Civil Rights Act to achieve that result.