Opinion ID: 1450597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct Closing Argument at the Penalty Phase

Text: Beuke contends that the prosecutor's closing argument during the penalty phase violated his due process rights. For the prosecutor's misconduct to violate the defendant's due process rights, it is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned; instead those comments must so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464. [T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor, because the aim of due process is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (quotations omitted). To succeed on this claim, the petitioner must demonstrate that the prosecutor's conduct was both improper and flagrant. Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 641 (6th Cir. 2005). We begin by determining whether the prosecutor's comments were improper. Beuke challenges five categories of statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument: (1) statements indicating that the death penalty sends a deterrent message to criminals and a reassuring message to the law-abiding public; (2) statements where the prosecutor allegedly relied on his own personal experience to persuade the jury; (3) statements about the victims of the attempted murders, Wahoff and Graham; (4) statements indicating the prosecutor's personal fear of Beuke; and (5) statements warning the jurors that Beuke could be paroled if he did not receive a death sentence. We turn first to Beuke's challenge to the prosecutor's statements about the need for the jury to send a deterrent message to criminals and a reassuring message to the public. The prosecutor began his closing argument with broad statements about the death penalty in general, noting that our society will take a life in order to let a message ring out to [c]riminals and potential criminals in this community [that] we won't tolerate this. The prosecutor also stated that in instances where aggravating circumstances sufficiently outweigh mitigating factors, the death penalty sends a message of justice[ ] to the law-abiding people in the community, and [t]he only way [the public] can be satisfied . . . is if capital punishment is measured out[.] Beuke characterizes these statements as urging the jurors to impose the death penalty as part of their civic obligation to deter criminal activity and satisfy the community. This is not a fair characterization of the prosecutor's statements. When considered in context, these statements are general background information on the death penalty and the need to punish guilty people, rather than an impassioned command that the jurors must recommend death based on some amorphous societal obligation. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court made the same assessment of these statements by acknowledging that these comments consist[ed] of a general discussion of the death penalty. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d at 280. We accordingly find that the prosecutor's discussion of background information on the death penalty and the need to punish guilty people  devoid of any overt attempt to incite the passions of the jurors  was not improper under the circumstances. See Byrd, 209 F.3d at 538-39 (noting that the prosecutor's comments were not necessarily improper because he did not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers, rather he discussed the purpose of capital punishment as a way of arguing that the jury should find that these purposes would be served by imposing the death penalty on [p]etitioner); Hicks, 384 F.3d at 219 (acknowledging that a prosecutor may properly make general references to the societal need to punish guilty people). Beuke next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referencing his own personal experience. It is well-established law that a prosecutor cannot express his personal opinions before the jury. Bates, 402 F.3d at 644 (quotations omitted). The allegedly offensive comments occurred when the prosecutor stated: [I]f there ever was a case for the death penalty, it is this case right here. . . . If there ever was a case that fits the specifications more closely to a course of criminal conduct, shooting, killing people, it is this case right here. . . . This crime stands out in your mind as being a terrible act, something that just can't be forgotten by the members of this community. Again Beuke attempts to mischaracterize these statements as an appeal to the prosecutor's personal experience. On the contrary, the prosecutor did not improperly interject his own assessment of the facts or evidence  such as stating, for example, I have tried several murder cases and find this to be one of the worse, see United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 632-33 (6th Cir.2003) (finding a prosecutor's statements to be improper where he stated, I have tried several cases myself where we see the [defendant make this argument]), or stating, I do not find the defendant's mitigating evidence to be at all credible, see Bates, 402 F.3d at 644-45 (finding a prosecutor's statements to be improper where he stated, when discussing the testimony of mitigation witnesses, You don't believe that, and I don't believe it [either]). Rather, the prosecutor here merely said that because of the stark facts and lack of mitigating evidence, this case was appropriate for the death penalty. Far from relying on his own experience, the prosecutor implored the jurors to determine whether Beuke's terrible acts stand[] out as particularly egregious in their own minds. Because the prosecutor did not appeal to his own personal experience, we do not find these statements to be improper. Beuke next challenges the prosecutor's numerous references to the victims of the attempted murders, Wahoff and Graham. During his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the impact of Beuke's actions on all three of the victims: Craig, Wahoff, and Graham. He noted that Wahoff tried to help Beuke by offering him a ride and, in return for his benevolence, was shot in the back and now sits paralyzed for the rest of his life. He then told the jury to think about Mr. Wahoff. . . and his little babies and [h]is little girl[] who he will never dance with because he is paralyzed. Beuke argues that the prosecutor should not have referred to Wahoff, Graham, or their families because the aggravated murder of Robert Craig, not the attempted murders of Wahoff and Graham, was the only offense relevant at the sentencing hearing. This argument fails to appreciate that Beuke's eligibility for a death sentence depended on the jury's finding that Beuke murdered Craig as part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful attempt to kill two or more persons. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(A). Beuke's attempted murders of Wahoff and Graham were part of the conduct that rendered him death-penalty eligible under Ohio law, and it was not inappropriate for the prosecution to discuss the impact of Beuke's conduct on those victims and their families. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (holding that the Constitution erects no per se bar to the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject). [9] In contrast, we find that the last two prosecutorial statements challenged by Beuke were improper. At the end of his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that he was scared to death of [Beuke] and did not want him out on the street again. The prosecutor then concluded by likening Beuke to a cancer on society, instructing the jurors that, even though [i]t is going to hurt quite a bit, they should proceed through an operation to remove that cancer. He also noted that if they chose some lesser treatment, there is no guarantee [that the cancer] is not going to kick back up again and spread. Defense counsel objected to these and other statements, but the trial court overruled the objections and instructed the jurors on multiple occasions: What counsel says to you in closing argument is not evidence. It is not the law. But [he] . . . can make reasonable inferences based upon what the evidence is, and you determine what the evidence is. It is well-established law that a prosecutor cannot express his personal opinions before the jury, Bates, 402 F.3d at 644 (quotations omitted); thus it was improper for the prosecutor to reference his personal fear of Beuke. Moreover, a prosecutor cannot make statements calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors, Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 315 (6th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Bowling, 344 F.3d at 501 n. 3; thus the prosecutor acted improperly by appealing to the juror's fears that Beuke would commit additional crimes if he was eventually released from prison, see Broom, 441 F.3d at 413 (stating that it was improper for the prosecutor to imply that the petitioner would commit future rapes if he was released from prison). Having determined that the prosecutor made some improper statements, we must determine whether these comments were flagrant enough to so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464. [F]our factors are considered in determining whether the challenged conduct is flagrant: (1) the likelihood that the remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) the total strength of the evidence against the defendant. Bates, 402 F.3d at 641. First, we find it is unlikely that the prosecutor's improper statements misled the jury. His improper statements did not mischaracterize the applicable law or the relevant evidence, see Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (finding no due process violation where the prosecutor did not manipulate or misstate the evidence), but merely reflected a somewhat overzealous attempt to persuade the jury, see Byrd, 209 F.3d at 532 ([T]he state should not be required to present . . . closing arguments that are devoid of all passion.) (second alteration in original). Second, these improper statements were isolated, and not pervasive; third, the prosecutor deliberately made these improper statements; fourth, we recognize that the prosecution produced strong aggravating evidence against Beuke at sentencing. After balancing these factors, we conclude that the prosecutor's improper statements were not flagrant and therefore did not violate Beuke's due process rights. See Broom, 441 F.3d at 413-14. Our conclusion is buttressed by the trial court's numerous cautionary instructions informing the jurors that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence alone, and that the arguments of counsel were not evidence. Darden, 477 U.S. at 182, 106 S.Ct. 2464; see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) ([T]he trial court took special pains to correct any impression that the jury could consider the prosecutor's statements as evidence in the case.).