Opinion ID: 2058346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Coleman's Arrest

Text: On July 13, 1987, a hearing was held by the Superior Court on Coleman's motion to suppress the statements that he had given to the police. See Super.Ct.Crim.R. 41(e), 47(b). At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Coleman's motion was denied. Coleman argues that the Superior Court committed plain error when it denied his motion to suppress the statements which he made following his arrest. Coleman contends that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, rendering his warrantless arrest illegal and, his statements given as a consequence of that illegal arrest inadmissible. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is lawful whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony. 11 Del.C. § 1904(b)(1). This Court has held that `reasonable ground to believe' is ... the legal equivalent of `probable cause' and should be accorded the same meaning. Thompson v. State, Del.Supr., 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (1988). In addition, this Court has described probable cause for a warrantless arrest as a `practical, nontechnical conception.' Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983)). The requisite analysis in determining the sufficiency of probable cause for a warrantless arrest is determined according to a totality of the circumstances test. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231, 103 S.Ct. at 2328). In this case, the issue is whether the police had probable cause to believe that Coleman had committed the felony offenses for which he was eventually indicted. Two police officers, who had seen Coleman during the valid investigatory detention, viewed the bank's videotape of the crimes and identified Coleman as the assailant. Coleman argues that the videotape was blurred and not clear enough to permit a proper identification. The trial judge considered the police identifications of Coleman from the videotape in making his ruling following the suppression hearing and found their testimony to be credible, notwithstanding the videotape's imperfections. Coleman also argues that the observation of a suspect with a jacket behind the Newark Police Department shortly after his detention and release precluded a determination of probable cause for his arrest. [16] Coleman asserts that there was insufficient time for him to have walked from the restaurant parking lot to the area behind the police station. In support of his position, Coleman correctly points out that the testimony by the police officers was in conflict on that issue. One police officer testified that there was sufficient time and one concluded otherwise, speculating that another suspect was involved. The trial judge weighed all of the testimony during the suppression hearing and found that these apparent conflicts did not negate what was otherwise probable cause for Coleman's arrest. See Williams v. State, Del.Supr., 539 A.2d 164, 169 (1988). It has long been our law that the [trier of fact, in this setting, the trial judge] is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony. Tyre v. State, Del.Supr., 412 A.2d 326, 330 (1980). In this case, in addition to assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the trial judge weighed the other evidence and concluded that it supported a determination of probable cause, i.e., the description of the assailant as compared to Coleman's appearance at the time of the initial stop, Coleman's failure to give a good account of his presence when initially detained by police [17] , and the fact that Coleman was not wearing a coat in very cold weather. [18] The Superior Court reviewed the totality of the circumstances which were known to the police prior to Coleman's warrantless arrest. Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d at 1055-56, 1059. The record supports the Superior Court's conclusion that Coleman's arrest was based upon sufficient probable cause. We find that the Superior Court followed the correct legal analysis and committed no reversible error. Id. at 1059. Therefore, we find that the Superior Court properly denied the motion to suppress the statements which Coleman gave to the police following his arrest.