Opinion ID: 4270549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Once again, we review Kpodi’s challenge to his sentence for abuse of discretion. Kpodi I, 824 F.3d at 126. We first “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). At this step, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Brown, 857 F.3d 403, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2017). A district court commits legal error and therefore abuses its discretion when it fails to abide by the law-of-the-case doctrine or the mandate rule. See United States v. Singleton, 759 F.2d 176, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1985). We thus review the District Court’s application of both doctrines de novo. See United States v. Alston, 722 F.3d 603, 606 (4th Cir. 2013) (mandate rule); Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 1998) (law-of-the-case doctrine). If we find that the District Court’s sentencing decision was procedurally sound, we “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed . . . tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. B. The Mandate Rule and the Law-of-the-Case Doctrine The mandate rule embodies the simple principle that “an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court.” Briggs v. Pa. R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948). It is “a more powerful version of the law-of-the-case doctrine, which prevents courts from reconsidering issues that have already been decided in the same case.” Indep. Petrol. Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 235 F.3d 588, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 The law-of-the-case doctrine “is a rule of practice whereby ‘courts generally . . . refuse to reopen what has been decided.’” Singleton, 759 F.2d at 178 (quoting Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)). “It is predicated on the premise that . . . it would be impossible for an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently and expeditiously if a question, once considered and decided by it[,] were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal.” Id. (quoting White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1981)). Kpodi asserts that the District Court’s statement that it “did not [rely on the shooting incident] before” violated both this court’s mandate in Kpodi I and the law of the case. In Kpodi’s view, this statement by the District Court caused it to “fail[] to re-assess the § 3553 factors when it re-sentenced appellant.” Appellant’s Br. 7. In other words, Kpodi argues that because the District Court did not believe that it had erred in considering the April 4 shooting during his initial sentencing, the court erred in failing to “subtract that incident” from its calculus during resentencing. Id. at 11. The Government, for its part, contends that the District Court merely “express[ed] its disagreement” with the Court of Appeals’ finding that it had relied on the shootout, but did not improperly revisit that determination or fail to carry out the resentencing mandate that this court’s opinion imposed. Gov’t Br. 16–17. Appellant is correct in arguing that, under the law-of-thecase doctrine and mandate rule, a district court commits legal error by failing to reconsider a sentence on the ground that it disagrees with the court of appeals’ reading of its prior sentencing transcript. See Singleton, 759 F.2d at 180; Briggs, 334 U.S. at 306. In this case, however, the District Court clearly 10 followed this court’s instruction to resentence the defendant without consideration of the improper inference from the shooting evidence. The District Court initially disagreed with Kpodi I’s finding that the court had considered the April 4, 2013 gunfight when it first sentenced Kpodi. However, the judge ultimately made it clear that the decision to resentence Kpodi to the same sentence was reached without any reliance on the April 4 shooting incident. Indeed, the court reiterated that point at least three times. Furthermore, the District Court explained the events and evidence that it did rely on in support of its finding that Kpodi had a propensity to use dangerous weapons in connection with his drug crimes. Resentencing Transcript at 39–40 (“[T]he April 27 traffic stop, the October 30th search, combined with the other evidence in his record of arrest, where he was also found in possession of a gun, all does show that he has a propensity to use firearms.”). That evidence did not include the April 4 event, and it was more than sufficient to support the court’s conclusion. Id. For example, the court described the several occasions on which Kpodi was arrested or charged with criminal activity and noted that “it seems like every time he had been arrested, even from 2010 through 2013 . . . , he always had a loaded gun on him.” Id. at 39. The court also noted that, [T]he conclusion about the defendant’s propensity to possess illegally loaded guns, including as part of his drug business, is supported by his drug and gun conviction in 1997, the possession of a loaded gun in his car twice when he was arrested in 2010 and April 2013, and his possession of drugs and a loaded gun in May 2013 without any need or any 11 reliance whatsoever on whatever his role was in the April 4, 2013 shootout in the residential neighborhood where he then lived, and without drawing any inference whatsoever about whatever his role might have been in that shootout. Id. at 40. In addition, the District Court explained: The D.C. Circuit said, in its remand decision, quote: “The evidence from the April 27 traffic stop and October 30 search may ultimately support the district court’s conclusion that Kpodi had a propensity to use firearms in connection with his drug dealings,” period. And it does. Id. at 39 (quoting Kpodi I, 824 F.3d at 128). The District Court plainly accepted this court’s conclusion that any consideration of the shooting incident or any inference about Kpodi’s role therein was inappropriate and it heeded this court’s mandate to resentence Kpodi without considering that evidence. The District Court engaged in a careful and thoughtful analysis of the remaining evidence and the sentencing factors, and it reached a reasonable conclusion. The sentence the court imposed was procedurally and substantively sound, and we will not disturb it. 12 C. Inappropriate Statements By the Prosecutor Kpodi’s frustration with the proceedings below is understandable. The most concerning thing about the transcript of the resentencing hearing is Government counsel’s suggestion to the District Court that it should go so far as to disregard the Court of Appeals’ decision. See Resentencing Transcript at 17–18. Parties are, of course, free to disagree with a court’s findings. But as appellate counsel for the Government agreed, it is highly improper for the Government to urge disregard of the Court of Appeals’ decision before the District Court on remand. See Oral Arg. Recording at 11:52–12:00, 12:36– 12:50, 13:40–13:55. As the Supreme Court has explained, the United States Attorney “is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law . . . [and it] is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). That duty extends to sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1475 (2d Cir. 1993) (ascribing “a higher standard of professional and ethical responsibility” to government attorneys); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“There is, indeed, much to suggest that government counsel have a higher duty to uphold because their client is not only the agency they represent but also the public at large.”). Statements like those Government counsel made in this case have significant consequences for the public’s perception of judicial proceedings. And activity that threatens the perception of fairness in those proceedings undermines faith in our system of justice. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 13 Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.) (“[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”). Those consequences are heightened when a defendant’s liberty is at stake. Cf. Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987) (opinion of Brennan, J.); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970). Consider Kpodi’s perspective: He believed his initial sentence was invalid. He appealed it. He convinced this court he was right. But at his resentencing, Government counsel attempted to contradict the plain terms of our judgment in Kpodi I. A defendant who hears what the prosecutor had to say might justifiably wonder if he has truly had his day in court. However, as was her duty, the District Court judge ultimately ignored Government counsel’s impermissible overtures and resentenced Kpodi properly under the law.