Opinion ID: 1664341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of the (i)(5) Aggravating Circumstance

Text: The appellant next argues that the meaning of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance has been so broadly interpreted by the courts of this state that it now fails to adequately narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. More specifically, the appellant refers to several cases from this Court which (1) allow torture to include severe mental pain, see State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn.1985); (2) allow a finding of torture without any intent on the part of the defendant to inflict torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, see State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn.1998); and (3) allow jurors to use their common knowledge and experience in finding that physical and mental torture was inflicted upon the victim, see State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn.1998). Because of each of these broadening constructions, the appellant argues, this aggravating circumstance is applicable in virtually every first degree murder and fails to properly narrow that eligible for the death penalty. Again, we must disagree. The very purpose of the consideration of aggravating circumstances within a scheme of capital punishment is to provide some principled guidance for the sentencing authority to choose between death and a lesser sentence. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980); see also State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tenn.1999). Although a court could interpret an aggravating circumstance so broadly that it would allow the jury unlimited discretion in imposing the death penalty, cf. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), the test for constitutional infirmity is whether one could fairly conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, see Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (invalidating aggravating circumstance that an ordinary person could honestly believe described every murder); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-429, 100 S.Ct. 1759 (A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.'). We have consistently upheld the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203(i)(5) in the face of arguments that it applies to all defendants, and we have repeatedly rejected the contention that it is vague or overbroad. See, e.g., State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tenn.1999); State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 280 (Tenn.1998); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 181 (Tenn.1991). Although the appellant's argument today differs somewhat from those previously advanced in other cases, we reaffirm the constitutionality of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. First, it is clear that by defining torture to include severe mental pain, this Court has not broadened the scope of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance so as to render it unconstitutional. In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of Arizona's especially heinous, cruel or depraved aggravating circumstance. Although finding the wording of the circumstance facially vague, the Court nevertheless upheld its application because of the limiting constructions placed on the wording by the Arizona courts. One of the limiting constructions placed upon this aggravating circumstance was that the crime must have been committed in an especially cruel manner when the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death. In upholding this circumstance as applied, the Walton Court expressly stated that a limiting construction which defines mental anguish to include a victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate passes constitutional muster. Id. at 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047. In addition, several other states with a statutory aggravating circumstance virtually identical to our (i)(5) circumstance have held that the word torture necessarily includes mental anguish within its meaning. [2] Accordingly, we conclude that the inclusion of severe mental pain within the definition of torture has not rendered this aggravating circumstance unconstitutional. Second, the fact that the statute does not require an intent on the part of the defendant to inflict torture or serious physical abuse upon the victim also does not broaden the scope of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance so as to render it unconstitutional. We have repeatedly rejected this argument in the past, see State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Tenn.1999); State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 281 (Tenn.1998); see also State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 26 n. 5 (Tenn.1996), and we do so again today. Once again, we note that [c]ircumstance (i)(5) does not require a mens rea. The aspect of torture focuses on the circumstances of the killing. Carter, 988 S.W.2d at 150. The United States Supreme Court has never held that the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel circumstance is unconstitutional in the absence of any mental requirement, and we conclude that the absence of a mental state does not render this circumstance constitutionally infirm in this state. Nothing in our statutes or cases, however, precludes consideration of the defendant's mental state in mitigation of sentence. In fact, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(j)(9) specifically provides that the jury shall consider [a]ny other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense at either the guilt or sentencing hearing. This broad catch-all provision necessarily includes consideration of the defendant's mens rea at the time the victim is tortured or receives serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. Cf. State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 659 P.2d 22, 27 (1983). In addition, before a jury may impose death, it must conclude that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1). This calculus also necessarily includes consideration of the circumstances of the offense and the defendant's mental state at the time he or she inflicts torture or serious physical abuse upon the victim. Accordingly, the fact that a mental state is absent from the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance does not render this circumstance constitutionally infirm. Finally, we reject the contention that allowing a jury to use its common sense, knowledge, and experience somehow renders the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance constitutionally infirm. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, this aggravating circumstance is not susceptible to mathematical precision, Walton, 497 U.S. at 655, 110 S.Ct. 3047, and so long as the jury is given some meaningful guidance in the sentencing process, it is anomalous to conclude that the jury cannot then reach its final determination through the use of its collective knowledge, experience, and common sense. [3] If the appellant did not wish to have a jury use its collective knowledge and common sense to determine an appropriate sentence in his case, we observe that procedures were available for him to request sentencing without a jury. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-205(b). A jury's ability to use its collective knowledge, experience, and common sense to assist in reaching a determination in these weighty and complex matters is the very strength of the jury system, not evidence of its frailty or unconstitutionality. In summary, we hold that a rational jury could have found the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence was more than sufficient to establish that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved both torture and serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. Further, the trial court was not required to give an additional unanimity instruction as to the particular theory supporting this aggravating circumstance, because its general unanimity instruction with regard to the aggravating circumstances as a whole was adequate. Finally, interpretations of this Court have not expanded the meaning of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance beyond constitutional bounds. We affirm the application of this aggravating circumstance to the appellant's case.