Opinion ID: 629118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carrozza's Sentence

Text: 58 Defendant/appellant Robert F. Carrozza appeals from a judgment of conviction and a 228-month sentence imposed by the district court, after Carrozza pleaded guilty to 49 counts of racketeering-related offenses, including violations of the RICO statute, extortion, kidnapping, loansharking, narcotics distribution, gambling, obstruction of justice, and intimidation of a witness. 807 F.Supp. 156. Carrozza argues that the district court's decision to assume that Carrozza's base offense level should be adjusted upwards for his role in the offense constituted plain error. 59 After extensive plea negotiations, Carrozza and four of his codefendants entered into plea agreements with the government. Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(C), Carrozza and the government agreed that a specific sentence of 228 months was the appropriate disposition of the case, constituting a justifiable departure within the meaning of Sec. 6B1.2(c)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Both parties agree on appeal that this justifiable departure was understood to have been a downward departure. 60 Apart from the agreed sentence, Carrozza received two additional benefits in exchange for his plea of guilty. First, the government promised not to prosecute Carrozza for his alleged involvement in the murder of William Grasso and the attempted murder of Francis Salemme, Sr. Second, the government promised that Carrozza would not be subpoenaed to testify in any federal grand jury investigation in the District of Massachusetts relating to the activities of the Patriarca Family occurring before the date of the plea agreement. 61 The plea agreements for all five defendants were made expressly contingent upon the district court's acceptance of the pleas of guilty from each defendant. According to the government, the interdependency of the plea agreements reflected the government's major purpose in entering the agreements--eliminating the need for any trial, which the parties estimated would take from six months to a year or more. Because removing some but not all of the defendants would not significantly reduce the time necessary to try the case, the government bargained for, and obtained, the option to withdraw all five plea agreements if any of the defendants moved successfully to withdraw his plea. 62 The district court conditionally accepted the guilty pleas pending consideration of the presentence reports (PSR). The preliminary PSR for Carrozza was completed on April 3, 1992. The preliminary PSR calculated his applicable guideline range, based on an offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of IV, to be 188-235 months, and therefore concluded that the agreed sentence of 228 months was consistent with the guidelines. The PSR determined that there were no factors warranting departure. 63 On April 9, the government filed its objections to this PSR, complaining that some of the PSR's calculations of Carrozza's offense level were too high and some were too low. The key objection made by the government was that the PSR should have made an upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(a) for Carrozza's role as an organizer or leader in several of the offenses charged. The government calculated the applicable guideline range to be 235-293 months, based upon an offense level of 35 and a criminal history category of IV. Finally, the government argued that there were justifiable factors to support a downward departure. 64 Carrozza filed several specific objections to the PSR on April 17. Although Carrozza did not discuss the particulars of his own calculation of the applicable guideline range, he did argue that a downward departure to the agreed upon sentence was warranted. Carrozza did not dispute the government's calculations as to his role in the offenses charged. 65 The Addendum to the PSR was completed on April 23. The Addendum accepted some of the government's objections calling for a downward revision in the offense level calculations, but rejected the government's role in the offense objection because the government had not provided sufficient information ... in the details of the particular episodes to delineate the individual roles of the defendant within those episodes. The Addendum recalculated the total offense level to be 31, yielding a guideline range of 151-188 months. The Addendum noted that this range would require an upward departure if the Court were to sentence the defendant to the amount of time designated in the plea agreement [228 months]. 66 On the same day that the Addendum to the PSR was disclosed, the government and Carrozza filed separate sentencing memoranda, each arguing to the court that the agreed upon sentence constituted a justifiable downward departure. 67 The sentencing hearing was held on April 29, 1992. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the court explained that under Rule 11(e)(1)(C), it could either accept the plea agreements and impose the agreed-upon sentence in each case, or reject the agreements and offer the defendants an opportunity to withdraw their pleas. The court clearly articulated the disparate guideline ranges calculated by the government and the probation office and then stated: 68 I think the most sensible thing to do is to not resolve that dispute but to decide whether the 228-month sentence, which I think is about 19 years, if it is, indeed, an eight-month downward departure as the Government intends, is appropriate....Well, I am going to proceed ... in the following fashion: I am not deciding whether the Guidelines are 151 months to 188 months or [if] Probation's calculation is followed, which would involve 40-month upward departure or whether, as the Government contends, that Mr. Carrozza has assumed up to now, [or] at least up to the time of his plea, the calculations might be 235 to 293 months. 69 I am going to analyze this in the context of the question being whether--if the Guidelines are 235 [to] 293 months, the seven-month downward departure to 228 months [as] called for by the plea agreement is justifiable. 70 The court explained that it was not resolving the dispute because Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 does not require resolution of issues that will not be material to the sentence to be imposed. 71 When asked if anyone objected to this procedure, the parties responded no. Consistent with their prehearing positions, both Carrozza and the government argued that the agreed upon sentence represented a justifiable downward departure from the applicable guideline range. 72 The court thereafter sentenced Carrozza to 228 months imprisonment, to be followed by 60 months supervised release. On the same day, the district court entered an order relating to the presentence reports. In this order, the court stated that one of the justifications for its downward departures for several of the defendants was that the departures eliminated the need for both a lengthy trial (which it was estimated would take six months to a year) and for protracted sentencing hearings to resolve disputes relevant to the term of incarceration to be imposed on each defendant. 73 On April 30, 1992, the court entered its Second Order Relating to Presentence Report in Carrozza's case. In that order, the court expressly relied on Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D)(ii) as its justification for failing to calculate the sentencing guideline range applicable to Carrozza: 74 With regard to the government's objections to the PSR, the court, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D)(ii), did not decide whether the applicable Sentencing Guidelines were 235 to 293 months as asserted by the government or 151 to 188 months as recommended by the Probation Officer. Rather, the court assumed the Sentencing Guidelines were a minimum of 235 months and agreed with the government and the defendant that if the binding plea agreement, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C) [sic], calling for a sentence of 228 months represented a departure, there were justifiable reasons for it. Thus, the agreed-upon 228 month sentence was imposed. 75 Judgment was entered on May 1, 1992. Notwithstanding the court's previous assertions that it was merely assuming that the government was correct, the judgment indicates that the court found the guideline range to be 235-293 months and imposed a downward departure for justifiable reasons. In a May 7, 1992 memorandum explaining its sentence, the court once again stated its basic assumption: 76 In the Presentence Report, the Probation Department calculated Carrozza's Sentencing Guidelines to 151 to 188 months. The government, however, contended that the proper calculation of Carrozza's Sentencing Guidelines was 235 to 293 months. Carrozza's plea agreement specified a sentence of 228 months, or 19 years, in prison. The court analyzed his plea agreement on the assumption that the required sentence represented a seven month downward departure. 77 On appeal, Carrozza contends that the sentencing procedure employed by the district court was patently unlawful because the court failed to determine the applicable guideline range.
78 Carrozza concedes that because he failed to object to the district court's course of conduct during the sentencing hearing, his sentence can be reversed only upon a showing of plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Carrozza has failed to make such a showing here. 79 The Supreme Court recently interpreted the plain error rule in United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). In Olano, the Court reiterated the three limitations on appellate authority to recognize errors under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b): (1) there must be an error, (2) the error must be plain, and (3) the error must affec[t] substantial rights. Id. --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78. Even if a defendant can establish all three criteria, an appellate court has discretion not to review the error because Rule 52(b) is written in permissive, not mandatory, terms. Id. --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. The standard to guide that discretion was stated in United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936): appellate courts should correct plain forfeited errors affecting substantial rights if the errors seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1779. 80 We agree with Carrozza that the district court committed error when it assumed that Carrozza's guideline range was 235-293 months prior to its downward departure to 228 months. Before accepting a plea agreement that contains a specific sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(C), a sentencing court is required to satisfy itself either that: (1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or (2) the agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons. U.S.S.G. Sec. 6B1.2(c). To determine whether the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons, the court must first determine what the applicable guideline range is and then analyze whether a departure is authorized by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b) and the general departure rules in Chapter 1, Part A (4)(b) of the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 6B1.3, Commentary. In effect, Sec. 6B1.2(c) instructs courts to apply general guideline principles when determining whether to accept a plea under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(C). See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1 (general instructions on applying the guidelines). 13 81 In sentencing Carrozza, the district court mistakenly believed that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) authorized its decision not to determine an actual guideline range for Carrozza's offenses. As we have stated, this was error. Rule 32(c)(3)(D) 14 apparently relates to factual inaccuracies in a presentence report, not to mixed questions of law and fact that a defendant does not dispute. See United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir.1990) (defendant's disagreement over PSR's legal conclusion that defendant was not a minor participant does not allege factual inaccuracies in the PSR and does not implicate Rule 32(c)(3)(D)). But see United States v. Rosado-Ubiera, 947 F.2d 644, 646 (2d Cir.1991) (Rule 32(c)(3)(D) was violated when court failed to resolve the defendant's precise role in the offense). 82 To be sure, a district court has inherent power not to decide disputes that are immaterial or irrelevant to the ultimate sentence. For example, a sentencing court need not determine whether prior convictions should be added to a defendant's criminal history score if the addition will not affect the defendant's criminal history category. See United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2032, 114 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). We have also held that a sentencing court need not choose between two overlapping guideline ranges when the same sentence would have been imposed under either range. United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 718 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1005, 122 L.Ed.2d 154 (1993); United States v. Concemi, 957 F.2d 942, 953 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir.1988). Here however, the two ranges did not overlap, nor was the sentencing factor immaterial to Carrozza's guideline range. Instead, if the disputed factor was decided in the government's favor, Carrozza's sentencing range would be 235-293 months, but if the issue was decided as the probation office recommended, Carrozza's guideline range would be 151-188 months. 83 We have also intimated in the past that if a sentencing court intends to depart, an error in applying the guidelines may prove to be harmless if the court makes clear that it would have departed to the same sentence regardless of the exact guideline range. United States v. Plaza-Garcia, 914 F.2d 345, 347 (1st Cir.1990). We have never, however, suggested that a sentencing court need not decide a sentencing factor when one decision will result in an upward departure and another in a downward departure. Such a rule would be inimical to the very principle behind guideline departures. United States v. McCall, 915 F.2d 811, 814 n. 3 (2d Cir.1990) (rejecting government's argument that incorrect application of guidelines, resulting in range of 151-188 months instead of 87-108 months, was irrelevant to court's ultimate sentence because court indicated an intent to depart down for substantial cooperation--an indication that could not be reconciled with court's 108-month sentence, which was at the high end of the correct guideline range). 84 The district court, therefore, erred when it simply assumed that Carrozza's guideline range was 235-293 months, and ignored the probation office's suggestion that the range should be 151-188 months. And while we can understand and sympathize with the district court's desire to avoid an obtuse decision that may have seemed academic, we think the error was plain in the sense that it was both clear and obvious. See Olano, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. That is enough to pass the second hurdle to appellate authority under Rule 52(b). 85 We now turn to the third and often deciding factor in our plain error analysis--whether the error affects substantial rights. In most cases, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the 'affecting substantial rights' prong of Rule 52(b). Olano, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. For several reasons, we think Carrozza has not made such a showing here. 86 First, Carrozza has not argued, and points to no evidence suggesting, that an actual adjustment for his role in the offense would have been improper. Instead, Carrozza merely assumes that the district court's assumption was in fact wrong, and argues that he was prejudiced because his actual guideline range might have been years shorter than that assumed by the district court. However, analysis of the record reveals that, in all likelihood, the district court's assumption that Carrozza's base offense level was 35 was correct. 87 The difference between the government's and the probation office's calculations of Carrozza's base offense level resulted entirely from whether or not an upward adjustment should have been given for Carrozza's role in the drug conspiracy. The probation office assigned a level 26 to Carrozza's drug trafficking activity. The government argued that this level should be increased by four levels to 30 because Carrozza was an organizer/leader of this activity and because the activity involved more than five participants. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(a). Because Carrozza's narcotics activities yielded the highest offense level among Carrozza's various offenses and, therefore, served as a starting point for the multiple count analysis under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.4, the difference was crucial. Applying the multiple count analysis, both the probation office and the government added five levels--the probation office arriving at a total offense level 31 and a guideline range of 151-188 months, and the government calculating a total offense level 35 and a guideline range of 235-293 months. 88 The probation office rejected the government's request for a role in the offense adjustment for any of Carrozza's offenses, contending that there was insufficient evidence as to Carrozza's role in the individual offenses to make such a determination. While the specifics with regard to Carrozza's role in his bookmaking and extortion offenses are rather sketchy, the government provided more than sufficient evidence that Carrozza directed the narcotics activities of five or more participants. The government's 104-page factual submission to the probation office is replete with evidence that Carrozza directed and organized the drug trafficking conspiracy. Given this evidence, it is understandable why Carrozza completely neglected to argue the propriety of a role in the offense adjustment in his appellate brief and below. Since it is Carrozza's burden to establish that the district court's error affected substantial rights, his failure to argue that a four-level role in the offense adjustment would have been improper, combined with the fact that an adjustment would have been appropriate at least with respect to the crucial narcotics conspiracy, undermines Carrozza's claim of prejudice. 89 To be sure, a role in the offense adjustment is a mixed question of law and fact. In most instances, an appellate court will not examine such questions in the first instance. We make the analysis only to indicate the unlikelihood that Carrozza was prejudiced by the district court's failure to decide the issue. 90 A further reason for finding no error affecting substantial rights is the significant benefits Carrozza received in exchange for his plea of guilty. In exchange for Carrozza's agreement to a 228-month sentence, the government promised not to prosecute Carrozza for his alleged involvement in the murder of William Grasso--an offense that could carry a sentence of life imprisonment--and the attempted murder of Frank Salemme, Sr. In addition, the government promised not to subpoena Carrozza to testify in any federal grand jury investigation in the District of Massachusetts relating to the activities of the Patriarca Family. This later promise was probably significant to Carrozza, who, as a made member of the Patriarca Family, had taken the oath of omerta to protect the secrets of the Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra to his grave. In light of the significant benefits Carrozza received from the plea agreement, it is difficult to see how he was prejudiced by the district court's acceptance of his plea and sentencing him to a term of imprisonment upon which he had specifically agreed. See United States v. Ybabez, 919 F.2d 508, 510 (8th Cir.1990) (We do not discern a miscarriage of justice when a defendant receives the sentence he bargained for in a plea agreement.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 454 (1991). 91 Finally, even if Carrozza were able to establish some form of prejudice from the district court's failure to address his role in the offense and thereby pass the third and final hurdle of appellate authority under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), the case would be an inappropriate one for us to exercise our discretion to recognize plain forfeited errors. The Supreme Court has made clear on numerous occasions that courts of appeals should correct plain forfeited errors affecting substantial rights only if the errors  'seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'  Olano, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160, 56 S.Ct. at 392). We see no such serious effect here. Carrozza failed to object in circumstances strongly indicative that he wished to accept the compromise sentence because of the benefits it conferred. The attendant circumstances do not reflect discreditably upon the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding. 92 We vacate Patriarca's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. Carrozza's sentence is affirmed.