Opinion ID: 812677
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Huerta’s Professional Negligence Claim

Text: While acknowledging Peeler’s general force, Huerta argues that its sole proximate cause bar is inapplicable to this case because the facts here are distinguishable from those of Peeler and, relatedly, the policy justifications for imposition of the bar would not be advanced by its application here. In particular, Huerta contends that, unlike counsel in Peeler, Shein’s representation was not “in connection with” Huerta’s conviction, because Shein was not his trial counsel, nor did they represent him on direct appeal. Thus, Huerta argues that because Shein’s alleged malpractice occurred “in connection with” his habeas application rather than the underlying trial or direct appeal, the policy concerns at issue in Peeler would not be defeated by permitting Huerta to pursue his professional negligence claim. As such, Huerta maintains that the Texas Supreme Court would not apply Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar to this case, were it to decide the issue. We are not persuaded that Peeler itself does not control the outcome of this case. Nonetheless, even if we grant as much, Huerta acknowledges that several intermediate appellate courts in Texas have applied Peeler to facts materially indistinguishable from those presented here. In Falby v. Percely, for example, inmate Allen Falby hired an attorney and the attorney’s unlicensed associate to 6 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 file a state habeas application on Falby’s behalf. No. 09-04-422-CV, 2005 WL 1038776, at  (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 5, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). For unexplained reasons, neither man actually filed Falby’s application. Id. Falby subsequently brought suit, alleging that because of the attorney’s negligence “in failing to file a state writ, a deadline for filing a federal writ passed.” Id. Applying Peeler, the lower court granted the attorney’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at . On appeal, Falby argued that Peeler was inapplicable because, as a habeas applicant, his suit against his attorney was “unrelated to his conviction.” Id. The appellate court rejected this argument, however, finding that “the gravamen of [Falby’s] complaint [was] that he [had] lost the ability to challenge his conviction through a federal post-conviction writ of habeas corpus because of [his attorney’s] negligence.” Id. The court thus held that Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precluded Falby’s recovery because his habeas application related to, and flowed from, his conviction. Id. at –3. Similarly, in Meullion v. Gladden, an inmate who had hired an attorney to prepare his habeas corpus application later sued the attorney for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and a Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) violation. No. 14-10-01143-CV, 2011 WL 5926676, at  (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). The lower court dismissed the inmate’s suit after applying Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar. On appeal, the inmate argued that the lower court erred in applying Peeler’s bar because his attorney “was not connected to the conviction as trial counsel, nor was he the attorney on direct appeal.” Id. at  (internal quotation marks omitted). In analyzing the inmate’s claim, the Meullion court noted that several other courts had “declined to distinguish between the application of Peeler to suits against a convict’s trial counsel, counsel on direct appeal, or counsel retained in connection with seeking habeas or other post-conviction relief.” Id. 7 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 at . Aside from Falby, the court also cited to Nabors v. McColl, in which another Texas appellate court applied Peeler’s bar after finding that the inmate’s illegal conduct, rather than the attorney’s alleged negligence in handling a postconviction matter, was the sole proximate cause of the inmate’s injuries. Id. (citing Nabors, No. 05-08-01491-CV, 2010 WL 255968, at –3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)); see also Butler v. Mason, No. 11-05-00273-CV, 2006 WL 3747181, at –2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 21, 2006, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that Peeler precluded an inmate’s suit against his attorney for the attorney’s alleged mishandling of the inmate’s habeas applications). The Meullion court agreed, adopted the reasoning of these other cases, and concluded that the inmate’s “claims concern[ed] the quality of legal counsel retained ‘in connection with’ [the inmate’s] conviction.” 2011 WL 5926676, at . Because the inmate’s criminal conduct was “the only cause in fact of any injuries ‘flowing from the conviction,’” the court held that his claims were precluded under Peeler. Id. (citing Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 498). Although Huerta admits that these cases are squarely on point, he essentially argues that were the Texas Supreme Court to consider this precise issue, it—unlike the state’s intermediate appellate courts—would not extend Peeler to negligence claims brought against post-conviction counsel. Aside from general public policy statements, however, Huerta points to no authority from a Texas court that supports his assertion. We therefore defer to the state’s intermediate appellate court decisions and hold that Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precludes Huerta’s negligence claim against Shein.2 2 Given that we do not agree with his argument that Peeler does not extend to negligence claims brought against post-conviction counsel, Huerta requests that we certify the questions raised in this case to the Texas Supreme Court. While we may appropriately seek the guidance of a state’s supreme court when the state’s law is “genuinely unsettled,” we unduly impose upon those courts when we certify questions as to which the law is not 8 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346