Opinion ID: 2087597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Butler's Previous Offenses

Text: The Court of Appeals characterized Butler's claim concerning the class of his prior conviction as a question of factual basis. We begin by explaining why it is more than that. Because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of constitutional rights, a trial court has a duty to evaluate the validity of every plea before accepting it. Stowers v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 403, 363 N.E.2d 978. Indiana Code § 35-35-1-3 outlines the parameters of this obligation when it requires courts to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea and whether there is a factual basis for it. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-1-3 (West 1986). [10] These requirements parallel those utilized in the federal courts, [11] where they rest on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than on any constitutional basis. [12] See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). Since the 1930's, Indiana courts have recognized the need to find that a guilty plea is voluntary. Ketring v. State (1936), 209 Ind. 618, 200 N.E. 212. By contrast, factual basis emerged as a requirement only more recently. See Brimhall v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 153, 279 N.E.2d 557. Our General Assembly created a factual basis requirement in 1971 by adopting Section 35-4.1-1-4 and recodifying it in 1973 at Section 35-35-1-3. Some judges made such inquiries before the General Assembly required it. See Turner v. State (1991), Ind., 580 N.E.2d 665, 669 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). The factual basis requirement primarily ensures that when a plea is accepted there is sufficient evidence that a court can conclude that the defendant could have been convicted had he stood trial. See III American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice § 14-1.6, Commentary § 14-1.6(a) (1986). In short, this standard ensures that a person who pleads guilty truly is guilty. [13] This is particularly important where a defendant pleads guilty with an understanding of the nature of the charge, without realizing that his conduct did not actually fall within the charge. 2 Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 20.4(f), n. 118 (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, Advisory Committee Note) (1991); see also South Dakota v. Lashwood, 384 N.W.2d 319 (S.D.1986) (observing that purpose is to protect one who might not realize his conduct does not fall within scope of charge). Moreover, inquiry into the factual basis of the plea provides the court with a better assessment of the defendant's competency and willingness to plead guilty ..., increases the visibility of charge reduction practices, provides a more adequate record and thus minimizes the likelihood of the plea being successfully challenged later, and aids correctional agencies in the performance of their functions. 2 LaFave & Israel, § 20.4(f), n. 120 (citing ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty 33 (Approved Draft, 1968)); see also John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for all Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 88, 95-100 (1977). Despite the wealth of writing on the benefits of the factual basis requirement, court decisions and statutes specifying the precise quantum of evidence constituting factual basis are non-existent. 2 LaFave & Israel, § 20.4(f)(1) (citing, for comparison, ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 350.4(3) (1975)) (requiring courts to find reasonable cause exists before accepting a plea). This is because a finding of factual basis is a subjective determination that permits a court wide discretiondiscretion that is essential due to the varying degrees and kinds of inquiries required by different circumstances. See Snyder v. State (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 154, 157. Obviously, a court need not find evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that a factual basis exists. See, e.g., Broadie v. Wisconsin, 68 Wis.2d 420, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975); see also Arizona v. Hamilton, 142 Ariz. 91, 688 P.2d 983 (1984) (factual basis may be established by strong evidence of guilt, but need not be shown beyond reasonable doubt). Such a high standard would transform the guilty plea hearing into a veritable bench trial, the very process that one pleading guilty seeks to avoid. Instead, this Court and others have held that a factual basis exists when there is evidence about the elements of the crime from which a court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is guilty. [14] Relatively minimal evidence has sometimes been held adequate. See, e.g., Lowe v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (defendant's admission of guilt after prosecutor read all allegations adequately established factual basis). [15] Trial court determinations of adequate factual basis, like other parts of the plea process, arrive here on appeal with a presumption of correctness. See Centers v. State (1986), Ind., 501 N.E.2d 415. We typically review claims of error about pleas under an abuse of discretion standard. For example, when a trial court denies a defendant's request to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, the post-conviction court reviews the trial court's acceptance of the plea for an abuse of discretion. See Trueblood v. State (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 897, 113 S.Ct. 278, 121 L.Ed.2d 205 (reviewing request to withdraw of plea before sentencing); Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-1-4(b) (decision on motion to withdraw plea before sentencing reviewable only for abuse of discretion). This standard is also appropriate where the defendant asks that his plea be set aside through a motion for post-conviction relief on grounds that the factual basis was inadequate. In Butler's case, deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in accepting the plea necessarily requires examination of the inquiry undertaken at the time and the facts established as a result of it. Butler told the trial judge the allegations of the information were accurate. Furthermore, the hearing before the post-conviction judge demonstrates that a more complete production of evidence about Butler's prior conviction would have produced information that pointed in both directions. On this record, we cannot say that all the evidence pointed unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the post-conviction court, namely, that the guilty plea judge did not commit an abuse of discretion in accepting the plea. The real question here is whether the plea was contrary to law. This is the same question we recently addressed in Weatherford v. State (1993), Ind., 619 N.E.2d 915, involving a petition for post-conviction relief aimed at a habitual offender finding. Denying the petition, we explained that a petitioner may not prevail simply by putting the State to its proof as though the case were being tried or appealed in the first instance. Instead, [he] must demonstrate that he was not an habitual offender under the laws of the state. Weatherford, 619 N.E.2d at 917-18. We will not retry this case on appeal. To succeed, Butler must prove plainly that he is not an habitual offenderthat he did not commit the predicate offenses required by § 35-50-2-10. He has not done so. When the plea was taken, the State recited the evidence it would produce at trial, including the official court record which would show that the defendant was convicted of D.U.I., Class A misdemeanor on June 19th, `86 for offense committed on May 22,- '86 ... and evidence to show second D.U.I., Class A misdemeanor February 16,- '87, offense occurred July 19th, `86 ... which qualifies [Butler] as a habitual offender. (R. 17 (emphasis added).) After the prosecutor related this evidence, Butler recounted how he drank alcohol most of the day of the accident and then drove into Juanita McClendon's car. He pled guilty to having two prior unrelated driving while intoxicated offenses and told the court he did in fact have two prior `D.U.I.'s.' (R. 73-77.) The post-conviction court appropriately looked beyond the information presented to the sentencing court because Butler alleged error based on information the sentencing court did not know at the time it accepted his plea. The post-conviction court rejected Butler's claim, basing its decision on the text of the citation, Butler's testimony, and statutory elements of the offenses. The post-conviction court found that Butler's 1987 predicate offense was a class A misdemeanor. We cannot say that the evidence as a whole led unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.