Opinion ID: 4512151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction on Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: Greer and Yeshiva acknowledge that the district courtʹs jury instruction set forth the ʺcorrect statement of law ‐‐ at least in part.ʺ Defs.‐Apps. Br. at 15. They argue, however, that more extensive instructions were warranted given the ʺcontroversial and emotional natureʺ of the allegations of sexual abuse of a minor in this case. Id. In particular, they contend that the district court should have included language to the effect that the privilege ʺmay have been asserted [by Greer] for a variety of reasons, including reasons unrelated to [his] guilt or innocence of any matters related to this case.ʺ Appʹx at 54; see Defs.‐ Apps. Br. at 15‐17. We are not persuaded.
We review a district courtʹs instructions to the jury de novo. Uzoukwu v. City of New York, 805 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 2015). ʺJury instructions are erroneous if they mislead the jury or do not adequately inform the jury of the law.ʺ Id. For a verdict to be set aside based on an erroneous jury charge, the appellant must show that the ʺerror was prejudicial in light of the charge as a - 12 - whole.ʺ E.g., Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Brinkʹs Inc. v. City of New York, we upheld the admission of evidence of witnessesʹ invocations of the privilege where the district court instructed the jury that a ʺwitness ha[s] a constitutional right to decline to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him [and] you may, but need not, infer by such refusal that the answers would have been adverse to the witnessʹ interest.ʺ 717 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1983) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 45 F.3d 969, 979 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding jury instruction was proper where district court stated ʺ[a] witness has a constitutional right to decline to answer on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate himʺ and jury ʺmay draw an inference for or against a partyʺ); Leonard B. Sand et al., 4 Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Civil, Instruction 75‐5 (2019) (ʺ[I]n civil cases, you are permitted, but not required, to draw the inference that withheld information would have been unfavorable to the defendant.ʺ). We have addressed whether a party‐witness suffers prejudice from a courtʹs adverse inference instruction regarding the privilege. In Woods v. START - 13 - Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., we held that the party suffered ʺacute prejudiceʺ where the jury instructions included language permitting the jury to infer that, but for the assertion of the privilege, the party would have answered ʺyesʺ when asked whether she had been accused of unethical conduct. See 864 F.3d 158, 170‐71 (2d Cir. 2017). In Woods, the district courtʹs instruction effectively directed the jury to adopt the negative inference. Noting the questionable probative value of the adverse inferences there, we held that admission of the invocations and the instruction were improper.5
We conclude that the district courtʹs jury instruction here was neither erroneous nor unfairly prejudicial. As to the claim of error, the district court advised the jurors that they ʺmay, but are not required to, inferʺ from Greerʹs invocation of the privilege that his ʺanswer would have been adverse to [his] interest.ʺ D. Ct. Doc. 153 at 15. 5 In Woods, the court instructed the jury that ʺyou may infer that the plaintiffʹs answers at the deposition, if she had not refused to answer, would have been ʹyesʹ to the questions asked.ʺ 864 F.3d at 170. Moreover, most of the disputed questions asked whether the plaintiff had been accused of something, and, as we noted, mere accusations have little, if any, probative value. Id. Other questions asked whether the plaintiff had ever been convicted of ʺany immoral or unethical conduct,ʺ and these questions risked the admission of evidence of prior convictions that did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). Id. 170‐71. - 14 - This instruction was an accurate statement of the law and was not materially different from the adverse inference instruction we approved in Brinkʹs. And while Greer desired additional language to advise the jury of its ability to ʺtotally disregard the evidence of the assertion of the Fifth Amendment by [] Greer,ʺ Appʹx at 54, there is no requirement that jury instructions be favorable to a party, see Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 1994) (ʺWhile a more specific instruction might have been helpful, there is no basis for concluding that the jury was given a misleading or inaccurate impression of the law.ʺ); see also Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, 1309 n.8 (11th Cir. 2014) (ʺ[W]hen the instructions, taken together, properly express the law applicable to the case, there is no error even though an isolated clause may be inaccurate, ambiguous, incomplete or otherwise subject to criticism.ʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 45 F.3d at 979 (holding that district court did not err in ʺnot cautioning the jury that the Fifth Amendment may be invoked by an innocent partyʺ); cf. United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 378 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that even though ʺʹa more specific instruction might have been desirableʹʺ and the ʺproposed instruction may have more adequately presented his defense theory,ʺ a district court does - 15 - not abuse its discretion where defendantʹs proposed instructions were ʺclearly coveredʺ by the district courtʹs instruction (citation omitted)). Greer and Yeshiva do not cite any example of a case where the instruction they requested was actually given. As to the claim of prejudice, the district courtʹs instruction to the jury was not prejudicial. Unlike in Woods, where the instruction suggested that the jury should assume the negative inference, the instruction here did not invite prejudice against Greer by implying that Greerʹs silence should be construed as an outright admission. Accordingly, the district courtʹs jury instruction was proper.