Opinion ID: 691028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Call a Mistrial

Text: 31 Jack Wilkins complains that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial. He alleges that the testimony of his coconspirator Thornton so prejudiced his trial as to make it unfair. Thornton was charged with the Wilkinses and Massey in the indictment and initially entered a plea of innocence. All four were tried together. On the third day of the trial, however, Thornton announced his intention to plead guilty to the conspiracy count in exchange for the dismissal of the other counts. Counsel for Massey and the Wilkinses moved for a mistrial on the ground that Thornton's absence would create prejudicial inferences of guilt. The court denied the motion, but gave a cautionary instruction to the jury, informing it to draw no inferences from the absence of Thornton. 32 On the sixth day of the trial, the government called Thornton as a witness against Massey and the Wilkinses. Thornton testified about his and the Defendants' involvement in the European Loan Program. He also testified that he had been charged in this case but had changed his plea to guilty on the conspiracy count. The district court instructed the jury at that point: 33 [T]he guilty plea by Mr. Thornton may not be regarded by you as evidence from which you may draw an inference of guilt as to any of the remaining Defendants. You'll recall I instructed you at the outset that the case must be separately established by evidence against each person on trial here. 34 R.O.A. at 745. The jury was similarly instructed in the written instructions. 35 Jack Wilkins claims that he was prejudiced because the jury saw that Thornton had originally claimed innocence and then changed his plea to guilty during the course of the trial. He believes that this injured him by raising the suggestion that his claim of innocence is also false and that the cautionary instructions were insufficient to cure this prejudice. 36 The decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court judge and we will reverse only if there is a showing that the trial court abused that discretion. United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107, 108 (10th Cir.1990). We have regularly approved the introduction of evidence of a coconspirator's guilty plea to assess the coconspirator's credibility and show an acknowledgment by the witness of participation in the offense. United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 815 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1255, 122 L.Ed.2d 653 (1993); United States v. Davis, 766 F.2d 1452, 1456 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908, 106 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed.2d 240 (1985). The district court must instruct the jury, however, that a guilty plea by a coconspirator may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt. Davis, 965 F.2d at 815-16. In addition, we have held that a judge may inform a jury that a co-defendant has pled guilty during the midst of a trial, so long as the jury is instructed not to use the plea as evidence of his or her codefendants' guilt. United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir.1983); United States v. Earley, 482 F.2d 53, 58-59 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111, 94 S.Ct. 841, 38 L.Ed.2d 738 (1973). See also United States v. Bavers, 787 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (6th Cir.1985) (no need to call a mistrial when codefendant changed plea and testified against other codefendant). 37 Wilkins provides little in the way of evidence or authority to suggest why the district court abused its discretion. He solely argues that the turnaround by Thornton caused the jury to think that he was lying about his innocence as well. However, the jury was twice instructed that it could not infer anything about Wilkins' guilt from the fact of Thornton's guilty plea. Further, the jury was carefully instructed of Wilkins' presumption of innocence and the need for the government to prove his guilt through evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Cautionary instructions are ordinarily sufficient to cure alleged prejudice. United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 846, 112 S.Ct. 143, 116 L.Ed.2d 109 (1991). In addition, the fact that Thornton switched his plea cuts two ways. Admittedly, it may have caused the jury to wonder if Jack Wilkins' plea of innocence was untruthful. However, the switch also may have reduced the credibility of Thornton as a government witness. Finally, Wilkins fails to provide any authority or convincing argument why his situation is any different from previous cases in which we have allowed the judge to inform the jury of a midtrial switch of a codefendant's plea or allowed coconspirators testifying against a defendant to acknowledge their guilty pleas. Lacking any evidence of prejudice, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilkins' motion for a mistrial. 38