Opinion ID: 1741655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The court erred in refusing to instruct on severance damages.

Text: The landowners submitted an instruction which recited that the property condemned constituted only a part of the lands owned by the landowner and that the landowner is entitled to just compensation for the fair market value of the land actually taken    and also the actual amount of compensation for the lowering, if any, of the fair market value of the remainder land   . In other words, appellant sought an instruction measuring his compensation by the value of the lands taken plus damages to the remainder. Many cases could be cited which set out our measure of damages in partial-taking cases. It has long been the difference between the market value of the whole tract before the taking, and the market value of that part which remains after the taking, less any enhancement peculiar to the lands. St. Louis, Arkansas and Texas R. R. v. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167 (1882); Myers v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 238 Ark. 734, 384 S.W.2d 258 (1964). In the case at bar the trial court gave such an instruction without objection. Three alternative formulas are recognized for measuring just compensation in partial-taking cases: (i) The value of the part taken rule; (ii) Value of the part taken plus damages to the remainder rule; and, (iii) The before and after value rule. One authority contends the last method more easily skirts the danger of double counting of damages and comes closer to a true approximation of the actual damage suffered by the owner. 1 Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain, § 48-64 (2d Ed., 1953). The distinction between the second and third formulas is narrow, but the important point here is that they are alternatives. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to instruct the jury as to both formulas, as requested by appellants. This does not mean that evidence of the value of the lands taken plus damages to the remainder is not admissible. In fact, it is appropriately considered by appraisers as two of the many guides for determining before and after values. For example, all the appraisers in this case followed that procedure. All of the value witnesses diminished the value of the lands remaining because of severance. A number of our cases point out that in a partial taking the landowner is entitled to the value of the lands taken, plus damages to lands not taken. Clark County v. Mitchell, 223 Ark. 404, 266 S.W.2d 831 (1954); Ross v. Clark County, 185 Ark. 1, 45 S.W. 2d 31 (1932); Hempstead County v. Huddleston, 182 Ark. 276, 31 S.W.2d 300 (1930). In Ross , the court in fact instructed the jury on that criteria, doubtless because of the very narrow distinction between that rule and the before and after rule. Whether it is error to ever use, in an instruction, the criteria in Ross is not before us. We do, however, hold in the case here that it was proper for the trial court to refuse to instruct on both bases of recovery. Finally on this point, appellants contend that they were prohibited from presenting to the jury the explanation of the law as reflected by their proffered instruction. We know of no reason why counsel could not present to the jury a resume of severance damages which the many witnesses testified they used in arriving at their before and after values. The standard instruction given by the court, without objection, on full compensation, covered every admissible element of damage, of which severance was only one.