Opinion ID: 1641838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the prosecutor's arguments in the penalty phase amount to improper testifying?

Text: Deardorff asserts that the prosecutor improperly testified in the penalty phase of his trial. Specifically, Deardorff states: The prosecutor presented as evidence facts, inferences, and opinions going to critical issues at the penalty phase .... The prosecutor offered testimony that the victim suffered `extensive pain,' `great fear in his heart,' and `great torture in his mind' and that he was kept `gagged and bound' in his house and dragged to his death. Deardorff's reply brief at 21-22. During the penalty phase of Deardorff's trial, the State offered no evidence; instead, it relied on the evidence presented during the guilt phase of the trial. See § 13A-5-45(c), Ala.Code 1975. However, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to argue the properly incorporated evidence during the evidentiary stage of the penalty phase. According to Deardorff, [t]his ... misconduct apparently is infrequent in Alabama capital trials, as [his] research has [found] no published decisions dealing with [this] precise situation. Deardorff would have us recognize the allowance of such argument as plain error. Under the facts of this case, we will not do so. Deardorff's trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's untimely argument. This failure weighs against the claim of prejudice Deardorff makes on appeal. See Brooks v. State, 973 So.2d 380, 387 (Ala.Crim.App.2007). To rise to the level of plain error, the claimed error must not only seriously affect a defendant's `substantial rights,' but it must also have an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. Hyde v. State, 778 So.2d 199, 209 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), aff'd, 778 So.2d 237 (Ala.2000). We cannot conclude that the prosecutor's arguments seriously affected Deardorff's substantial rights or that they had an unfair impact on the jury's penalty-phase deliberations. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the trial court carefully charged the jury on the applicable law. The jury was told three times that the arguments of the attorneys were not evidence. As the trial court began its instructions to the jury during the penalty phase, it reminded the jury of the instructions given at the end of the guilt phase and offered to recharge the jury if any juror felt that it was necessary for it to do so. No juror requested any repetition of the earlier instructions. Under these circumstances, we consider it highly unlikely that any juror considered the prosecutor's untimely arguments to be evidence. In fact, the prosecutor specifically asked the jury to consider the evidence that it had already heard in the guilt phase. At no point did the prosecutor suggest that the jury disregard the evidence or substitute his recollection of the evidence for its own. In his application for rehearing, Deardorff alleges that the prosecutor's untimely argument referred to facts that were unproven by reliable, sworn testimony. Our review of the record indicates that that is not the case. For example, the prosecutor argued that the victim had suffered a fractured cheekbone that would have been painful. A forensic pathologist had testified that the fracture had resulted from blunt-force trauma and that it would have caused severe pain. Although Deardorff argues that there was no evidence indicating that Turner's cheekbone was fractured before Turner was killed, he ignores evidence elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination of prosecution witness Walter Fambro that Deardorff told him that he and Peacock had taken turns beating Turner until Turner lost consciousness. In fact, during the cross-examination of the forensic pathologist, Deardorff's trial counsel raised the possibility that the bluntforce trauma had rendered Turner unconscious before the shooting. We certainly do not sanction allowing any attorney to make arguments during the evidentiary stage of the penalty phase of a capital-murder trial. However, under the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that allowing such an argument amounted to plain error. See Brooks, 973 So.2d at 387. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF JANUARY 4, 2008, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED. SEE, LYONS, WOODALL, SMITH, and BOLIN, JJ., concur. MURDOCK, J., concurs in the result. COBB, C.J., and STUART, J., recuse themselves.