Opinion ID: 786787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: substance of pichardo's motion to reconsider

Text: 26 This Court reviews an appeal from the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. See Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 357 (2d Cir.2003). A motion for relief from judgment is generally not favored and is properly granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir.2001). The burden of proof is on the party seeking relief from judgment[.] Id. Rule 60(b) provides, in pertinent part: 27 On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ...; (3) fraud ..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, ... or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 28 Subpart (6) confers broad discretion on the trial court to grant relief when appropriate to accomplish justice [and] it constitutes a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case. Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908, 107 S.Ct. 1353, 94 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore,  it is properly invoked where there are extraordinary circumstances, or where the judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship [.] Id.; see also Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992) (courts may reconsider an earlier opinion if there has been an intervening change of controlling law ... new evidence [has become available], or [there is a] need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 29 We note that, as a general matter, a mere change in decisional law does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(6). See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir.) (denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief where Supreme Court reversed ruling on claims for indemnity under RICO statute after entry of final judgment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 277, 93 L.Ed.2d 253 (1986). However, for all of the reasons discussed above, this case is different. Absent a meaningful and substantive review of Pichardo's case, manifest injustice will occur because the change in law goes to the very basis of Pichardo's deportation. Pichardo's order of deportation is undermined in light of dramatic changes to governing law, a fact that existed at the time his habeas petition was pending before the district court. It is inexplicable that neither party came upon this significant fact. The district court's failure to reconsider Pichardo's order of deportation once it was made aware of such an important fact, which in large part was due to incompetent lawyering, amounts to an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we hold that extraordinary circumstances exists to warrant reconsideration of the district court's judgment.