Opinion ID: 222763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Witness Tampering Verdict

Text: Mr. Washington next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his witness-tampering conviction. More specifically, he contends that the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that he perform[ed] a substantial step that was `an appreciable fragment' of murder, and that [h]is actions went no further than `devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense.' Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. On the other hand, the government asserts that [a] fair review of the evidence ... reveals multiple, substantial steps taken toward commission of the crime, from phone calls and meetings to travel and sterile gloves. Aplee. Br. at 29. We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Mr. Washington's conviction.
This circuit reviews sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims de novo, ask[ing] whether a reasonable jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. United States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir.2008). In so doing, we will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury, United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted), nor will we examin[e] the evidence in bits and pieces, United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1222-23 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir.2004)) (internal quotations omitted). Rather, we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by `considering the collective inferences to be drawn from the evidence as a whole.' Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1229 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir.1997)).
In order to establish Mr. Washington's guilt of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that [he] knowingly attempted to kill [Lt. Stark] and (2) that he did so with the intent to prevent [Lt. Stark's] attendance or testimony at an official proceeding. United States v. Rose, 362 F.3d 1059, 1067 (8th Cir.2004); accord 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A). An attempt requires both (1) an intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) the commission of an act which constitutes a substantial step towards commission of the substantive offense. Vigil, 523 F.3d at 1267 (quoting United States v. Smith, 264 F.3d 1012, 1015 (10th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a defendant's actions amount to an attempt, and, in particular, whether his actions qualify as a substantial step, is a highly fact-specific inquiry. See United States v. DeSantiago-Flores, 107 F.3d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir. 1997) (The dividing line between preparation and attempt is not clear and depends to a high degree on the surrounding factual circumstances.), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 906 (4th Cir. 1996) (Whether conduct represents a substantial step depends on the `surrounding factual circumstances' and, therefore, such determinations are necessarily fact specific.). A substantial step must be something more than mere preparation, Vigil, 523 F.3d at 1267, yet may be less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime, United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir.1980); see also United States v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 182 (10th Cir.1986) ([M]odern `attempt' law allows criminal liability to attach at some point prior to the last proximate act.). The fact that further, major steps remain before the crime can be completed does not preclude a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial. Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1297 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a substantial step is appropriately found where the defendant undertook an appreciable fragment of a crime ... of such substantiality that, unless frustrated, the crime would have occurred. Smith, 264 F.3d at 1016 (quoting DeSantiago-Flores, 107 F.3d at 1479) (internal quotation marks omitted). The act or acts must be strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent. United States v. Bunney, 705 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, Mr. Washington contends that he did not perform a substantial step that was `an appreciable fragment' of murder. Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. More specifically, he claims that the only steps he took  supposedly, only conspiring with Mr. Collins to kill Lt. Stark and traveling with him to Muskogee  were preparatory act[s] that were insufficient to warrant a conviction for attempt. Id. In arguing that his actions were merely preparatory, Mr. Washington relies heavily on United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir.1979). There, this court found insufficient evidence to support a conviction for attempting to receive an explosive in interstate commerce where there was nothing more than preliminary discussion[s] about the purchase of some dynamite. Id. at 1317. The defendants in that case had asked the government informant what the price of a box of dynamite would be, and had later, and more specifically, asked the informant what [he] would ... take for the dynamite that he possessed. Id. A price was never indicated, as the informant told them the dynamite was not for sale, and there was no suggestion that the defendants actually had the money to pay for the explosives. Id. The panel concluded, therefore, that this evidence, consisting as it does of mere abstract talk,  could not show a substantial step towards completion of the crime. Id. at 1318 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that mere acts of preparation, not proximately leading to the consummation of the intended crime, will not suffice to establish an attempt to commit it, especially when made at a distance from the place where the substantive offense is to be committed, for there must be some act moving directly towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As courts invariably and correctly state, the question of when preparation ends and attempt begins is exceedingly difficult. Prichard, 781 F.2d at 181; see also United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir.1950) (Hand, C.J.) (The decisions are too numerous to cite and would not help much anyway, for there is, and obviously can be, no definite line [between preparation and attempt]....). In Monholland, although we held that mere abstract talk was not a substantial step, we also observed that [i]f the activity had proceeded to a further length, that is, if a tangible act which constituted proximate and tangible evidence of a real effort had emerged, the government's [charge] would be more tenable. Id. at 1317 (emphasis added). The government contends that this presents just such a case. Specifically, it notes that the talk in this case was also accompanied by the fact that Mr. Washington was arrested while traveling to Muskogee, purportedly to perform the hit, with latex surgical gloves on his person. Mr. Washington, in contrast, downplays the significance of the trip, noting that he and Mr. Collins were [not] driving to a location where Stark might have been. Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. Claiming that [t]he destination of the trip to Muskogee was to obtain the $25,000 which was to be paid up-front, Mr. Washington suggests that his traveling to Muskogee was merely a preparatory act because [w]ithout the money in hand there clearly would not be a murder. Id. As he sees it, [w]ith no gun, no up-front money, and no knowledge of Stark's location, [he] was several vital steps away from the commission of murder when he was stopped outside of Muskogee on the Arkansas River bridge. Id. at 18-19. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support Mr. Washington's conviction. The fact, as he puts it, that he was several vital steps away from murdering Lt. Stark is hardly dispositive. As we have observed, the defendant need not be on the verge of committing the specific act that constitutes the crime to warrant a conviction for attempt. Prichard, 781 F.2d at 182. Rather, the government may prevail if, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to it and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Washington committed an act that constituted an appreciable fragment of [the] crime that was of such substantiality that, unless frustrated, the crime would have occurred. Smith, 264 F.3d at 1016 (quoting DeSantiago-Flores, 107 F.3d at 1479) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case  although several steps did remain before the planned murder would take place  we conclude that Mr. Washington's presence in a vehicle headed towards Muskogee (a city in which he had no apparent business beyond the planned hit), with Mr. Collins (the person who had facilitated the murder-for-hire agreement), on the very day that the hit was planned to take place (i.e., in close temporal proximity to the planned crime), combined with the extensive conversations he had with Mr. Collins about the planned killing, provide a very powerful indication that, but for the interference of the police, the planned criminal act would have come to fruition. Indeed, a number of courts have considered traveling to a location as part of a planned crime important in their substantial step inquiry, and we see no reason why we should not do the same under these facts. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801, 809 (8th Cir.2009) (finding that defendant took a substantial step towards committing the crime of enticing a minor to engage in sexual activities when he arranged to meet the minor at a certain time and place and then traveled to the designated meeting location); United States v. August, 835 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir.1987) (Certainly a reasonable jury could believe ... that one who travels over three hundred miles to a pre-arranged rendezvous, bearing the agreed cash consideration for a cocaine buy, has taken a substantial step toward possessing the contraband.). Furthermore, as the government suggests, it is significant that Mr. Washington was arrested with a pair of latex surgical gloves on his person. Mr. Washington admitted at trial that gloves are often used to hide fingerprints. Although this is not necessarily the type of evidence which, on its own, indicates a substantial step, it does, when taken in context, provide additional, corroborating evidence of Mr. Washington's intent to commit the crime. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)(e) (stating that possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, that are specially designed for such unlawful use or that can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose). In light of the foregoing, we reject any suggestion that the evidence only established that Mr. Washington engaged in mere abstract talk, Monholland, 607 F.2d at 1311, regarding the killing of Lt. Stark, or that the jury's verdict rested on virtually nothing more than evidence of conspiring behavior, without an adequate substantial step. We are confident that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support Mr. Washington's witness-tampering conviction.