Opinion ID: 2277244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Witherspoon Excludables

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding three jurors for cause under the standard set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed. 2d 776 (1968), as modified by Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581 (1980), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985). In Ramseur, we accepted the Adams-Witt modification of Witherspoon as the relevant standard for determining whether a juror's scruples concerning the death penalty prevents him or her from sitting in a capital case. 106 N.J. at 255-56. Under the Adams-Witt test, a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 589. Prospective capital jurors need not aver that the gravity of the task will have no effect on their ability to perform their duties. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256. Trial courts are granted a sound measure of discretion to determine whether a juror can discharge his or her duties or whether the juror's views on the death penalty would substantially impair his or her ability to perform those duties. Ibid. It is against these standards that we test the exclusion of the three jurors.
When Kanzler was questioned by the trial court about her views regarding the death penalty, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: I would like to ask the question concerning your viewpoint of the death penalty. MS. KANZLER: Well  THE COURT: What is your opinion of the death penalty? MS. KANZLER: For many years I thought if someone else took another person's life they should receive the death penalty, but now I have changed my philosophy and I think everyone is entitled to his life unless God takes it. So I wouldn't think of the death penalty. THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this: If you were selected as a juror and there was a finding by that jury, and I'm not talking about death now, I'm talking about whether or not the defendants are innocent or guilty. If the jury concluded that they were guilty of murder and then the jury goes into the second phase of the case, as I explained before, that is, to determine whether or not the defendant must be put to death, could you consider the imposition of the death penalty? We are not saying how you would decide, but would your mind be open enough to consider the death penalty and listen to the factors of the case? As I told you before, in the penalty phase of the case, there must be aggravating factors in order for there to be a death penalty. And the jury may take into account, if presented, mitigating factors. And after they receive both of those, if they are in existence, then and only then can they determine whether to impose the death penalty. Would you be able to participate in such a jury and consider whether to impose the death penalty, or would you be automatically opposed to the death penalty? Do you understand the question? MS. KANZLER: Yes, I do, but I think I wouldn't think of the death penalty. I would rather him go serve a sentence in prison. THE COURT: So it's your opinion that your opinion is firm, if I understand you correctly, that regardless of the manner in which the homicide was committed, you would not vote for the death penalty. Is that your opinion? MS. KANZLER: I don't think I could, really. THE COURT: Do you feel that there is a set of circumstances that would cause you to vote for the death penalty, or are you saying that no matter what type of case it is, no matter how the homicide is committed, under no circumstances would you vote for death? MS. KANZLER. I really wouldn't want to, no. THE COURT: I don't think any jurors want to in that sense, but do you think you would be able to even consider the question, or is your mind completely closed against the death penalty? Do you understand what I am trying to ask? MS. KANZLER: Yes, I know what you are trying to ask me, but I don't know. I wouldn't think that I could, truthfully. Defendant contends that because Kanzler did not state unequivocally that she would never consider the death penalty, and did not indicate that she would automatically vote against the death penalty, her exclusion for cause was improper. Applying the Adams-Witt test, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this juror's scruples substantially impaired her ability to follow the law.
Defendant contends that Kozlowski, who opposed the death penalty on religious grounds, was erroneously excluded because he indicated that despite his view, he understood the societal concerns were served by the death penalty. After the juror stated his opposition to the death penalty for religious reasons, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: That opinion that you have right now, as you have expressed it, is that opinion so firm that you are stating to the Court that under no circumstances would you vote for the death penalty, assuming the proofs are there, because of your religious belief? MR. KOZLOWSKI: I really can't answer that question. But in my own conscience, I don't know. This is the first time it was put to me in my life. I don't know really what to say. THE COURT: How firm is your religious belief that you should not take a life? In other words, in this instance, vote for the taking of a life? How firm is your religious conviction on that point? MR. KOZLOWSKI: I always believe that a man deserves a second chance in life. He only has one life, and I can't really condemn a man to life myself. If I had anything to do with it, really, a man could be put away or something, but I can't say that, you know, because he maybe committed a terrible crime and then I would like to condemn him to death. I would be like judge, God and jury altogether. I couldn't do that. I don't know what to answer to that, honestly. THE COURT: All right. MR. KOZLOWSKI: I would be afraid. THE COURT: All right. MR. KOZLOWSKI: When the day comes that I will be judged, I will be afraid. THE COURT: Are you stating to the Court that if you were to be selected in this case, that regardless of the evidence or regardless of the manner in which this alleged crime of a homicide was committed, you would not be able to consider the imposition of the death penalty? MR. KOZLOWSKI: As far as my conscience is concerned, I don't think I would be able to, no. The prosecutor moved to excuse Kozlowski because the juror had expressed firm opposition to the death penalty. Thompson's counsel, however, urged the court to ask whether the juror would be able to put aside his religious convictions. The trial court agreed, and elicited the following response from Kozlowski: Well, I am not a highly religious man, Your Honor, but it's a thing that's born into you. You see, thou shalt not kill and things like that are born into you. Even if a man is a criminal, he is supposed to be forgiven or you put the man in a place where he will do no harm to anyone or something like that, you know? But taking a life, I mean, I don't know. In response to a further question whether Kozlowski was saying that he could not even consider the death penalty, the juror responded: I don't know what to say to you. To harm someone, even though he is a criminal or whatever, if he is proven guilty like you said beyond a shadow of a doubt like earlier, I don't know what to say, really. It's something inside of you that you feel that it's not right. You may be doing right for society but you are not doing right for yourself. The court excused the juror. Jurors cannot be expected to state unambiguously or with unmistakable clarity that they would never impose the death penalty. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 257. Here, the trial court was obliged to determine from the juror's responses whether his scruples against the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair his ability to perform his duties as a juror in a capital case. We find that the trial court's questioning manifested a sufficiently sensitive appraisal of the juror's capabilities, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in excusing this juror for cause.
When Marino initially expressed religious opposition to the death penalty, the trial court inquired into the firmness of the juror's religious convictions: THE COURT: Do you feel that your religious conviction is so strong that you would not even consider the death penalty, if you were a juror? THE JUROR: It would bother me. THE COURT: All right. And recognizing  THE JUROR: I don't say they shouldn't get the death penalty but this is my feelings. THE COURT: That's what we are talking about. If you were a juror and that jury concluded that a Defendant was guilty of murder by his own conduct, are you stating to the Court that when that jury went into the penalty phase of a case, that your religious convictions are such, your personal religious convictions are such that you could not vote or you could not even consider the death penalty? THE JUROR: Well, it's pretty much so, yes, I would say so. THE COURT: In other words, regardless of the nature of the manner in which the murder was committed, are you stating that your religious convictions are so firm that you would not be able to consider the death penalty? THE JUROR: To be perfectly truthful, it would bother me. THE COURT: All right. How much would it bother you. THE JUROR: Well, it would bother me. I wouldn't want to be involved in giving the death sentence to anybody. After this questioning, the prosecutor moved to exclude the juror, and neither defense counsel argued that the juror's responses revealed an open mind toward the death penalty. Thompson's counsel stated that he had no objection, and Hunt's counsel indicated that his only objection was the exclusion of a juror from the guilt phase because he or she would be unable to consider the death penalty in the penalty phase. The trial court excused the juror. Defendant now argues that although the juror's responses indicated nervousness and unease about imposing the death penalty ( e.g., it would bother me), those responses do not establish that the juror would be unable to perform his duties in accordance with the law ( e.g., I don't say they shouldn't get the death penalty but this is my feelings). In so arguing, defendant draws on the explanation in Adams: [N]either nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court's instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the death penalty. [448 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. at 2529, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 593.] Many of Marino's responses, which are couched in terms of feelings, could be construed as mere expressions of nervousness. Other statements, such as I wouldn't want to be involved in giving the death sentence to anybody, suggest a firm opposition to the death penalty. Given the probing question of the trial court and the failure of defense counsel to object to the excuse of the juror, we are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this juror for cause.