Opinion ID: 2135209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fundamentality.

Text: Initially the defendants contend that the employment at issue involves no fundamental interest and so the privileges and immunities clause is inapplicable. A certain surface plausibility is lent to this theory because the term fundamental has been used to describe several very different concepts in constitutional analysis. Carchman v. Korman Corp., 456 F. Supp. 730, 738 & n. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Note, Of Interests Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. Rev. 462 (1977). Our attention is directed to cases that hold certain rights fundamental for purposes of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, rights which, therefore, can be restricted only upon the showing of a compelling State interest. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-10 (1978) (discussing fundamental nature of equal access to the ballot). Admittedly, employment opportunities, whether public or private, have not been given this extraordinarily high level of protection. For purposes of art. IV, § 2, however, from the earliest incorporation of the notion of fundamentality, the clause has been thought to protect the right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (Washington, Circuit Justice). This position has been consistently followed. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870). Indeed, reconciling the holding in Baldwin, supra, which allowed a substantially higher licensing fee to be charged to out-of-State hunters, with the holding in Toomer v. Witsell, supra , which negated a substantial differential in license fees for commercial shrimp fishing, is possible because the Court in Baldwin, supra, recognized a constitutional difference between recreational activity and the pursuit of a livelihood. [16] See Note, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A Reaffirmation of Fundamental Rights, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 691, 693 (1979). Limiting a particular kind of work opportunity because of a person's place of residence does impinge upon a fundamental right and thus satisfies the first element of a privileges and immunities analysis.