Opinion ID: 177567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Pleas.

Text: A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before the court imposes sentence if `the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.' United States v. Murphy, 572 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B)). Defense counsel's performance can serve as the requisite fair and just reason for withdrawal [of a guilty plea] only if [the defendant] demonstrates both that his attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by it. United States v. McMullen, 86 F.3d 135, 137 (8th Cir.1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted). If the district court determines the defendant has presented a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea, the court may consider several other factors, such as, whether the defendant asserts his legal innocence of the charge, the length of time between the plea and the motion to withdraw, and whether the government will be prejudiced by the withdrawal. Murphy, 572 F.3d at 568 (quoting United States v. Gray, 152 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.1998)). However, if a defendant does not present a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea no need exists to examine the other factors. Gray, 152 F.3d at 819. This court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rollins, 552 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir.2009). De Oliveira asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas because his counsel's ineffective assistance caused him to plead guilty, despite his innocence. [1] More specifically, De Oliveira asserts that Southern failed to prepare for trial and failed to advise him of an available legal defense, which effectively coerced him into pleading guilty because he did not want to face a hopeless trial with incompetent counsel. To support his claims, De Oliveira relies on the testimony of his wife, who stated at the evidentiary hearing that Southern appeared to be generally unprepared and just commencing his review of the government's evidence only a few days prior to trial. She also stated that Southern's opinion of the case then abruptly changed from it being easily defensible at trial to a virtually certain loss. De Oliveira additionally relies on his new counsel's argument that the government cannot show he knew or should have known that his workers were illegal because he never had a reason to suspect their illicit status, as he did not fill out any I-9s and as Allwire reviewed the workers' paperwork prior to issuing identification badges. Finally, De Oliveira relies on his own assertions of innocence and claims that Southern was unprepared and pressured him into pleading guilty. We can find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of De Oliveira's motion. At the change of the plea hearing, De Oliveira admitted under oath all of the factual elements of each crime and testified that his guilty pleas were voluntary and that he was satisfied with Southern's representation. Additionally, the record indicates that Southern actively participated in De Oliveira's case until he was discharged at the sentencing hearing, as Southern filed numerous motions, took depositions, and filed an extensive set of objections to the PSR. Moreover, we have no reason to doubt the district court's factual determination that, had Southern coerced De Oliveira into pleading guilty, De Oliveira's very involved wife would have notified the lower court of the issue earlier. Consequently, De Oliveira failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas because he did not substantiate his claims of deficient counsel. Moreover, the strong evidence of De Oliveira's guilt, including his own admissions, and the timing of the motion to withdraw would more than justify the lower court's denial. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's decision.