Opinion ID: 727816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Restitution: Inability to Pay, Delegation to Probation

Text: 25 Borkowski contends the court abused its discretion in imposing restitution because the court failed to find he has the ability to pay, and because it delegated the payment schedule to the department of Probation. These arguments are without merit. 26 United States Sentencing Guideline § 5E1.1 provides that the court shall enter a restitution order if such an order is justified under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664. Eighteen U.S.C. 3663 authorizes the sentencing court to impose an order of restitution in addition to any penalty authorized by law. Eighteen U.S.C. 3664(a) requires that court to consider the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant. 27 The guidelines do not, however, require the sentencing court to make express findings demonstrating its consideration of the factors set forth in the statute. See U.S.S.G. 5E1.1. As long as there is some evidence in the record that the defendant may be able to pay restitution in the future, the duty imposed on the court by § 3664 is satisfied. United States v. Ramilo, 986 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir.1993). The present indigence of the defendant does not bar an order of restitution; if the defendant's future financial status is indeterminate, an order of restitution may be appropriate. United States v. Jackson, 982 F.2d 1279, 1284-85 (9th Cir.1992). 28 Here, the court found Borkowski owes $44,311.69 in restitution to the estate of Terry Leftrook, the victim of Borkowski's fraud. The court considered the defendant's potential ability to pay restitution in the future and found restitution appropriate. 29 At the October 31, 1995, sentencing hearing, the district court stated she had read and considered the two presentence reports and their respective addenda. The presentence reports show Borkowski graduated cum laude (top 10% of his class) from Dryden High School in Dryden, Michigan. He was a member of the National Honor Society and the Student Council. He attended Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan, although he did not graduate. The presentence reports also show Borkowski had been employed as a paralegal as recently as February 1994. 30 Based on these facts regarding Borkowski's education and employment history, the court was entitled to infer Borkowski had a reasonable likelihood of gainful employment upon his release from prison, and thus some future ability to pay restitution. 31 The court also considered the possibility Borkowski would participate in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP). ER 214. The IFRP requires inmates to make payments towards court-ordered obligations, including restitution. 28 C.F.R. 545.10, 545.11 (1995). If an inmate has a job while in prison, a portion of any earned wages is applied towards such obligations. Id. Borkowski's potential participation in IFRP is additional evidence of his future ability to pay restitution. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an order of restitution in the amount of $44,311.69. 32 Where the maximum amount of restitution is set by the court, the court may grant the probation office discretion to determine the manner and amount of restitution payments. United States v. Barany, 884 F.2d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1034 (1990). Here, the court determined the total amount of restitution owed, and merely assigned the task of supervising the payment of restitution as a condition of release to the probation department. There was no abuse of discretion. 33 We have considered Borkowski's arguments in his pro se brief filed June 6, 1996, and reject them as meritless. 34 The district court's judgment of conviction and sentencing order are hereby AFFIRMED.