Opinion ID: 169368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Admission of Deposition Testimony

Text: M r. Barger next claims the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the deposition of M r. Smith to be used in lieu of live testimony in court, thereby denying the defendant the opportunity to confront witnesses against him in violation of the Sixth Amendment. “In considering a Confrontation Clause claim on habeas . . . we review a state court decision by assessing whether it is reasonably supported by the record and whether its legal analysis is constitutionally sound.” Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999). “As a general matter, federal habeas corpus relief does not lie to review state law questions about the admissibility of evidence, and federal courts may not interfere with state evidentiary rulings unless . . . [they] rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.” M oore v. M arr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The district court provided a thorough analysis of Oklahoma law on the admission of deposition testimony, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence according to O klahoma law . Although the district court -6- did not specifically say that Oklahoma law in this instance is in line with the Confrontation Clause, we conclude that it is. Testimonial statements of a w itness w ho does not appear at trial are admissible under the Sixth Amendment so long as the witness was “unavailable to testify, and the defendant . . . had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). M r. Barger does not dispute that the witness, M r. Smith, was unavailable. M oreover, M r. Barger’s counsel was present during M r. Smith’s deposition and took full advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. M r. Barger argues, however, that he did not have a proper opportunity to cross-examine because he changed counsel between the deposition and trial, and his trial counsel thus did not have an opportunity to cross-examine M r. Smith. Unfortunately for Petitioner, the Confrontation Clause provides him “only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (internal quotation marks omitted). Barring evidence of ineffective counsel at the deposition, which is not claimed, we find no precedent suggesting that switching counsel in the midst of trial proceedings automatically renders cross-examination by the defendant’s first counsel ineffective. Indeed, such a rule would invite parties to engage in the strategic replacement of counsel whenever an important witness, who had -7- previously been cross-examined, becomes unavailable to testify at trial. Not surprisingly, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has accepted such an argument, and we do not believe it w arrants a certificate of appealability.