Opinion ID: 2998219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whittaker Has Failed To Show an Adverse Em-

Text: ployment Action Title VII also prohibits employers from treating employees differently on the basis of sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1). To establish a claim of sex discrimination, or disparate treatment, a plaintiff can proceed either directly, by presenting direct and/or circumstantial evidence of the employer’s discriminatory intent, or indirectly, through the burden-shifting method set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Wyninger, 361 F.3d at 978. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach can also be used to establish indirectly a claim of retaliation 10 No. 04-3759 in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).1 See Wyninger v. New Venture, 361 F.3d 965, 981 (7th Cir. 2004). Whittaker here proceeds under the indirect method on both her sex discrimination and retaliation claims. Accordingly, we will address these two claims in tandem. To establish a sex discrimination claim under the indirect method, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach provides as follows: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on her membership in a protected class; (2) once a prima facie case is made, a presumption of discrimination is established and the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non discriminatory reason for the challenged action; and (3) once the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must establish that those proffered reasons were mere pretext. See, e.g., Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 88586 (7th Cir. 2001). In turn, to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate performance expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). To establish a claim of retaliation under the indirect method of McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) after lodging a complaint about discrimination, (2) only he, and not any otherwise similarly situated employee who did not complain, was (3) subjected to an adverse 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) provides: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” No. 04-3759 11 employment action even though (4) he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner.” Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, the familiar burden-shifting approach again takes hold, requiring the defendant to come up with a noninvidious reason for the adverse action; “[o]therwise there must be a trial.” Id. at 644. So, whether it be her sex discrimination or retaliation claim, Whittaker must show that she suffered an adverse employment action. Indeed, we need look no further than this required element—and Whittaker’s failure to satisfy it—to dispose of both claims. “Typically, adverse employment actions are economic injuries.” Markel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 276 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2002). For that matter, a suspension without pay—such as the three-day suspension that Whittaker was scheduled to serve between May 31 and June 2, 1999—would constitute an adverse employment action. See id. However, because she voluntarily left her job in mid-May—taking a leave of absence from which she would never return— she never actually served this suspension. And because she never served the suspension, she never realized any economic effect from the slated employment action. Simply put, a suspension without pay that is never served does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610. 617 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n action which, it turns out, had no effect on an employee is not an ‘adverse action.’ ”). Of course, “adverse job action is not limited solely to loss or reduction of pay or monetary benefits. It can encompass other forms of adversity as well.” Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Collins v. State of Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)). “[T]he adverse action must materially alter the terms and conditions of employment.” Stutler v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2001). The terms and 12 No. 04-3759 conditions of Whittaker’s employment, however, were never so altered. While Whittaker’s negative evaluation, written warnings, and placement on “proof status” are putatively disciplinary measures, none “result[ed] in tangible job consequences and therefore are not adverse employment actions actionable under Title VII.” Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 276 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s “negative performance evaluations and being required to substantiate that her absences from work were illness-related . . . did not result in tangible job consequences and therefore are not adverse employment actions actionable under Title VII”); Oest v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that neither “unfavorable performance evaluations” nor “oral or written reprimands” constitute adverse employment actions under our case law). Certainly, we can conceive of reprimands that carry with them immediate, albeit non-economic, consequences that in and of themselves go so far as to materially alter the terms and conditions of employment. For example, if a written warning also led to “ineligibility for job benefits like promotion, transfer to a favorable location, or an advantageous increase in responsibilities,” perhaps then we would find an action that is adverse. See Oest, 240 F.3d at 613. But Whittaker has adduced no evidence of such immediate consequences here. And while one might argue that “each oral or written reprimand brought [the plaintiff] closer to termination[,] [s]uch a course was not an inevitable consequence of every reprimand . . . ; [rather,] jobrelated criticism can prompt an employee to improve her performance and thus lead to a new and more constructive employment relationship.” Id. Before closing, we must note that the standards for actionable adverse action for discrimination claims under § 2000e-2(a) and retaliation claims under § 2000e- 3(a) are not identical. “Section 2000e-3(a) is ‘broader’ than No. 04-3759 13 § 2000e-2(a) in the sense that retaliation may take so many forms, while § 2000e-2(a) is limited to discrimination ‘with respect to [the worker’s] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’ ” Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 03-3818, slip op. at 3 (7th Cir. August 22, 2005); see also Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that, to be actionable under Title VII, retaliation need not involve “an actual employment action”). In the retaliation context, an employer’s action will be actionable under § 2000e-3(a) if it would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Washington, slip op. at 7. Nonetheless, Whittaker’s claim, reduced to written reprimands, falls short of this broader standard as well. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s sex discrimination and retaliation claims must fail. While Whittaker does not argue constructive dis- charge, we pause for good measure to note that she would lose on that score as well. “Working conditions for constructive discharge must be even more egregious than the high standard for hostile work environment because in the ordinary case, an employee is expected to remain employed while seeking redress.” Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000). Because, as we have already found, Whittaker has failed to show work conditions so egregious as to meet the stringent hostile work environment standard, she certainly cannot reach the even higher threshold required to show a constructive discharge. As Whittaker cannot establish that she was subject to an adverse employment action, she has failed to make her claims of disparate treatment and retaliation. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on these counts accordingly. 14 No. 04-3759