Opinion ID: 2354151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Standards Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: [¶ 9] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution ensure that a criminal defendant is entitled to receive the effective assistance of an attorney. The U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence, U.S. CONST. amend VI, while the Maine Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by the accused and counsel to the accused. ME. CONST. art. I, § 6 (2005). The primary purpose of the effective assistance of counsel requirement is to ensure a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Aldus v. State, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 15, 748 A.2d 463, 468. [¶ 10] The Supreme Court and this Court have enunciated two-prong tests for adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme Court's test, as set forth in Strickland, holds that: A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction . . . has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [¶ 11] Similarly, our test, first articulated in Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d 914, 915 (Me.1981), was recently expressed as: [F]irst, whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel amounting to performance . . . below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney; and second, whether any such ineffective representation likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense. Aldus, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 12, 748 A.2d at 467 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 12] We have previously noted that the federal and state guarantees are virtually identical. See id. The burden is on the defendant to prove both prongs. See, e.g., State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶ 15, 699 A.2d 1139, 1143. Additionally, the test is applied on a case-by-case basis, and evaluations of ineffective assistance of counsel claims are guided by the overall justness and fairness of the proceeding. Aldus, 2000 ME 47, ¶¶ 14-15, 748 A.2d at 468. See also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case.). [¶ 13] In applying the test, we begin with the second prong regarding prejudice because if it is determined that there was no prejudice, there is no need to address the first prong regarding whether counsel's performance was deficient. See Pottios v. State, 1997 ME 234, ¶¶ 9-10, 704 A.2d 1221, 1223-24; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one). With respect to the second prong of the analysis, we have noted that [t]o establish that he has been deprived of a substantial ground of defense, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance likely affected the outcome of the trial. Whitmore v. State, 670 A.2d 394, 396 (Me.1996). Similarly, in Strickland, the Supreme Court noted that [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The reasonable probability requirement of the second prong means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Aldus, 2000 ME 47, ¶ 20, 748 A.2d at 471 (quotation marks omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.). Accordingly, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to establish that his attorney's performance deprived him of a substantial ground of defense, or that counsel's performance likely affected the outcome of the trial. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶ 20, 699 A.2d at 1144 (citations omitted).