Opinion ID: 1679590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the conveyance by the city of vestavia hills to the vestavia hills board of education is invalid.

Text: Utz argues that the City of Vestavia Hills failed to comply with the provision of § 11-47-20, Ala.Code 1975, in connection with its conveyance of Subject Property to the Vestavia Hills Board of Education. That statute provides as follows: `The governing body of any city or town in this state may, by ordinance to be entered on its minutes, direct the disposal of any real property not needed for public or municipal purposes and direct the mayor to make title thereto, and a conveyance made by the mayor in accordance with such ordinance invests the grantee with the title of the municipality.' The above statute has been construed by the Supreme Court of Alabama to require a finding in the ordinance authorizing the conveyance that the property to be conveyed is no longer needed for public purposes. In Jones v. City of Dothan, 375 So.2d 462 (Ala.1979), Jones sought specific performance of a contract for the purchase of certain land owned by the City of Dothan saying that the Board of Commissioners at one of its regular meetings had agreed to sell the same to him. Affirming the decision of the trial court in favor of the City of Dothan, the Supreme Court held that the Board of Commissioners had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 11-47-20 because they had not made the necessary finding that the property was no longer needed for public purposes. In the present case, the City Council of Vestavia Hills failed to make a finding in its Resolution 416 that the Subject Property was no longer needed for public purposes. However, the ordinance did state that the property was being conveyed to the Board of Education for `public school purposes.' Counsel for Vestavia Hills and the Board say that the Jones decision is distinguishable from the facts in this case. They say, first, that in Jones, supra, the Board of Commissioners of Dothan had decided they did not wish to sell the property to Jones and Jones was seeking to enforce the contract of sale, while in the present case, the conveyance by Vestavia Hills to the Board took place in 1975, over eleven years before Utz and the other plaintiffs sought to set aside the conveyance. Secondly, Vestavia Hills and the Board say that in the present case the ordinance adopted by Vestavia Hills authorized the conveyance to the Board `for public school purposes.' They argue that it would be superfluous to require a finding by the City Council of Vestavia Hills that the property was no longer needed for public purposes when it was being conveyed to the Board for a public purpose. Third, Vestavia Hills and the Board cite the decision in O'Rorke v. City of Homewood, supra , as authority for holding that a property not devoted to public use may be disposed of by the city without such required findings so long as the city is acting in good faith and without fraud. They say that in O'Rorke, the ordinance adopted by the City of Homewood is summarized and the required finding that the property was no longer needed for public purposes was not included. In O'Rorke, the Supreme Court referred to the ordinance adopted by Homewood as follows: `(6) The major portion of the 7.63 acres is limited in its usefulness for a public park, recreation area, or any other municipal purpose, inasmuch as the same is subject to flooding and does flood extensively at periodic intervals.' While the Homewood ordinance as described by the Supreme Court did not find that the property was no longer needed for public purposes, it did state that the property was limited in its usefulness for public purposes because it was subject to periodic flooding. Such a statement could be considered by the Supreme Court as sufficient compliance with § 11-47-20. It appears to this Court that the occurrence which caused Utz and the other property owners to file this lawsuit was the notice dated October 25, 1985, received by them of the proposed rezoning of the subject property from R-2 to R-8 for the intended purpose of constructing townhouses. The notice stated that the proposed rezoning was requested by the Vestavia Hills Board of Education represented by its attorney, Pat Boone. However, Pat Boone testified that while he was then and is now the attorney for the Board of Education, he was never engaged or asked to apply for the rezoning of the Subject Property and no application for such rezoning was ever filed by him on behalf of the Board. The manner and circumstances under which the application for rezoning of the Subject Property was filed remains undetermined. However, it is questionable whether the language in Ordinance No. 416 adopted by Vestavia Hills authorizing the conveyance of the Subject Property to the Board of Education for public school purposes constitutes a legal restriction or limitation on the Board's right to dispose of the Subject Property. With respect to the lapse of time since the conveyance, no evidence has been presented of any intervening rights on the part of third parties, nor has any evidence been presented that the Board made any expenditures or changed its position in other manner to its detriment in reliance on its ownership of the Subject Property. This Court concludes that provisions of Section 11-47-20, Ala.Code 1975, are applicable to the conveyance of the Subject Property by Vestavia Hills to the Vestavia Hills Board of Education and required a finding by the City Council of Vestavia Hills that the Subject Property was no longer needed for public purposes. In the absence of such finding, the conveyance by Vestavia Hills to the Board of Education was invalid and due to be set aside. In accordance with this opinion, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. The prayer for relief by Utz that the Court declare the Subject Property subject to a trust that it be used, kept and owned as a park for the inhabitants of the City of Vestavia Hills, Alabama, is hereby denied. 2. The alternative prayer by Utz and the other plaintiffs asking that this Court declare that the Subject Property remain subject to the restrictive provisions contained in the Pizitz deeds conveying the same to the city of Vestavia Hills is hereby denied. 3. The prayer for relief by Utz and the other plaintiffs asking that this Court declare invalid the conveyance of the Subject Property made by the City of Vestavia Hills to the Board of Education of Vestavia Hills is hereby granted. The conveyance by the City of Vestavia Hills to the Board of Education of Vestavia Hills for the following described property is hereby vacated and set aside: `Lots 3 and 4, Block 3, according to the survey of Shades Park, as recorded in Map Book 7, page 74, in the Probate Office of Jefferson County, Alabama; `Parcel `C' according to a resurvey as recorded in Map Book 61, page 96, in the Probate Office of Jefferson County, Alabama, of Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Block 2, Shades Park.' 4. Title in fee simple in and to the above described property is hereby vested in the City of Vestavia Hills, Alabama. All costs of court incurred in this proceeding are taxed against the defendants, the City of Vestavia Hills, Alabama, and the Board of Education of Vestavia Hills, Alabama. Done this 26 day of August, 1987. Marvin Cherner, Circuit Judge. The judgment is affirmed. 87-85 AFFIRMED. 87-86 AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.