Opinion ID: 3013871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: (1970); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of

Text: With the possible bases of the C-Y- Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, Z- decision in mind, we turn to Chen’s 822-23 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme argument that the BIA’s interpretation of Court repeatedly has instructed that neither the 1996 amendment, by drawing a the fact that a classification may be distinction between married and unmarried overinclusive or underinclusive nor the couples, “evinces such a lack of rationality as to be arbitrary and capricious.” 5 While this argument bears some similarity to a rational-basis Equal 4 In the case of a forced abortion, Protection Clause argument, it is clear that conception in violation of the program Chen is not attempting to make a could constitute the “resistance,” and since constitutional argument here. Nor does involuntary sterilization often follows Chen contend that any standard of review prohibited conception, this same theory more stringent than “rationality” ought to might work in that context as well. apply. 7 fact that a generalization underlying a distinction could be viewed as serving two classification is subject to exceptions purposes: (1) providing a convenient way renders the classification irrational.”).6 to weed out cases in which “close family This principle is well illustrated by ties” were lacking and (2) avoiding cases involving immigration laws that “problems of proof and the potential for attempt “to provide some – but not all – fraudulent visa applications.” Id. at 798, fam ilies with relief from various 799 n.8; see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. immigration restrictions that would 53, 62 (2001) (finding need for reliable otherwise hinder reunification of the evidentiary verification “that a biological family in this country.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 parent-child relationship exists” to be an U.S. 787, 797 (1977). For example, in important government interest justifying Fiallo, the Supreme Court upheld the disparate treatment of illegitimate children constitutionality of provisions that born to citizen mothers and those born to excluded illegitimate children and their citizen fathers). Likewise, a law requiring fathers (but not illegitmate children and aliens who married United States citizens their mothers) from special preference while in removal proceedings to wait imm igration status. The Court outside the country for two years before acknowledged that these provisions could qualifying as I-130 “immediate relatives” have the effect of “deny[ing] preferential has been found to be rational as a method status to parents and children who share of deterring sham marriages. Almario v. strong ties,” id. at 798, and the Court noted INS, 872 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1989); the argument that “the statutory distinction Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 1222 [was] based on an overbroad and outdated (5th Cir. 1989) (“Congress logically could stereotype concerning the relationship of have concluded that aliens who are unwed fathers and their illegitimate engaged in deportation proceedings are children,” id. at 799 n.9. Nevertheless, the more likely than aliens not so situated to Court concluded that the statutory enter into fraudulent marriages as a means of avoiding expulsion from the United 6 States.”).7 Indeed, the marriage relation is used in so many areas of the law (income tax, 7 welfare benefits, property, inheritance, The Supreme Court has reversed at testimonial privilege, etc.) that it would least one prior attempt by this Circuit to seem absurd to characterize reliance on engage in more searching review of linemarital status in C-Y-Z- as arbitrary and drawing exercises by the political capricious. Cf. Montgomery v. Carr, 101 branches of government in the area of F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1996) (deeming immigration law. In INS v. Hector, 479 rational the enforcement of a school anti- U.S. 85 (1986) (per curiam), the nepotism policy against married couples Supreme Court rejected a holding but not cohabitants). allowing for the possibility of treating nieces as “children” in a hardship 8 Similarly, we may say that the BIA forced abor tions an d steriliza tion “logically could have concluded that aliens procedures tend to have a more severe who are [married] are more likely than impact on spouses than on unmarried aliens not so situated” to be severely partners. The BIA might also have been injured in the ways noted above when their concerned that unmarried asylum-seekers partners are forced to endure forced would falsely claim to have had an abortions or sterilization. Indeed, in light intimate relationship with a person who of the “crushing caseload” faced by the suffered a forced abortion or sterilization,8 BIA in recent years, see Dia v. Ashcroft, and the BIA might have felt that it would 353 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2003) (en be too difficult to distinguish between banc), it was entirely rational for the Board those unmarried persons who had a truly to adopt a position requiring marriage, close relationship with the person who which can often be proven easily and underwent the medical procedure and reliably through objective documentary those unmarried asylum seekers who did evidence such as marriage certificates or not. 9 Chen does not explain why the BIA “household registration booklets.” See, e.g., Zhao, 265 F.3d at 87; C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & 8 N. Dec. at 916. By contrast, a rule An analogy may be drawn here to the extending C-Y-Z- to non-spouses would tort of negligent infliction of emotional create numerous practical difficulties that harm. As explained in Restatement the BIA might reasonably have chosen to (Second) of Torts § 436, recovery under avoid. For example, in cases in which a this tort may be available when members male applicant claims to have fathered an of the immediate family of a victim witness illegitimate child who was forcibly aborted the infliction of harm. Id. § 436(3) by government officials, the problem of (emphasis added). “However, where a proving paternity would be even more stranger is involved . . . there may be acute than those presented in Fiallo and sufficient uncertainty as to the genuineness Nguyen. Moreover, the BIA might or seriousness of the emotional disturbance reasonably have decided that, in general, to justify, as a matter of administrative policy, a denial of liability.” Id. cmt. h. Here, the BIA may have concluded that, analysis if it could be shown that a given the difficulty of determining the “parental-type relationship” existed. See “genuineness” of emotional harm felt by id. at 87. Whether any unfairness to the one upon hearing of harm to his fiancee, nieces in such “parental-type the strict limitation of C-Y-Z- to married relationship[s]” may have resulted did couples was justified “as a matter of not enter into the Court’s calculus; all administrative policy.” that mattered was that Congress, in 9 defining “children,” had not seen fit to That some applicants could include nieces raised as effective conceivably be able to present such adoptees. See id. at 90-91. convincing evidence is beside the point. 9 was irrational in deciding on a bright-line B. rule for this class of cases, rather than Chen argues, however, that even if submitting each individual claim to a it is rational not to extend C-Y-Z- to cover detailed (and probably inconclusive) all unmarried partners, it is irrational to psychological analysis concerning the exclude him and other unmarried persons nature of a claimed relationship. who wanted and indeed tried to get For these reasons, we conclude that married but were prevented from doing so the BIA’s decision not to extend C-Y-Z- to by a law that is unmarried partners satisfies step two of an integral part of a program of Chevron. The BIA’s interest in promoting persecution. This argument must be administrability and verifiability is rejected for reasons similar to those sufficient to clear the low hurdle presented already discussed. Chen’s situation simply by the step two standard, especially in light shows that C-Y-Z- is underinclusive with of the limited number of spots allowed by respect to a narrow but sympathetic class, Congress for asylum claims based on the and as noted, a rule is not irrational just 1996 amendment. 10 because it is underinclusive to some We note that Fiallo did not require any asylee’s status.” Respondent Br. at 19. special exception to be carved out for Because “the existence of a valid, legal fathers who could prove actual paternity of marriage is required before an immigrant illegitimate children when they had not visa may be issued,” the government adopted or legitimated them. Nor did concludes that the disparate treatment of Almario and Anetekhai provide those who married and unmarried applicants is married during removal proceedings an “consistent with the statutory design and opportunity to present evidence showing the family unification policies underlying that their marriages were not shams. Such the issuance of immigration visas.” Id. rules, like the one adopted by the BIA This argument is not without some merit. here, represent pragmatic approaches that However, given the current length of the make it possible for an overburdened conditional asylee waiting list, spouses agency to do the work with which it is granted conditional status under C-Y-Z- charged. today must wait at least seven years before 10 The government offers an alternative they can even apply for such a visa on explanation for the BIA’s distinction behalf of their spouses. Accordingly, we between married and unmarried asylum doubt as a practical matter that the applicants, noting that “[a] grant of asylum potential eligibilty for preferential visas to an applicant present in the United States actually operates to hasten the admittance enables the asylee to have his or her to the United States of spouses directly spouse and children admitted to the United persecuted under coercive population States as derivative beneficiaries of the control programs. 10 extent. significantly interfere with decisions to Of course, if the Chinese enter into the marital relationship may authorities’ refusal to permit Chen and legitimately be imposed.”); cf. Zablocki, Chen Gui to marry was itself an act of 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring) persecution, then Chen suffered past (“A State may not only ‘significantly persecution. But although minimum interfere with decisions to enter into the marriage ages of 23 and 25 are contrary to marital relationship,’ but may in many our traditions and international practice, circumstances absolutely prohibit it.”) we cannot go so far as to say that (footnote and citation omitted). Laws enforcement of these laws necessarily setting reasonable minimum marriage ages amounts to persecution. are also recognized as legitimate and desirable under international human rights American constitutional law law.12 recognizes marriage as a fundamental right, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 It is certainly true that marriage (1967), but all states impose minimum laws in this country set the minimum age marriage age requirements,11 and we for marriage considerably below 23 or 25. assume that these laws are constitutional. Almost all states set 18 as the minimum See Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d age to marry without parental consent. 13 Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (law requiring Where parental consent is provided, as it parental consent for marriage of apparently was in the case now before us, individua ls under 18 deemed most states permit marriage at the age of constitutional, as a rational means for helping “prevent[] unstable marriages 12 See Convention on Consent to among those lacking the capacity to act in Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and their own best interests”); Maynard v. Hill, Registration of M arriages, Dec. 9, 1964, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (state legislature art. 2, 521 U.N.T.S. 231, 234, at may prescribe “the age at which parties http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp may contract to marry”); see also Zablocki (“States parties to the present Convention v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) shall take legislative action to specify a (“[R]easonable regulations that do not minimum age for marriage.”). We note, however, that the apparent purpose of the 11 Convention’s minimum age requirement See Legal Information Institute, (as stated in the preamble) is not Cornell Law School, Marriage Laws of the population control, but rather the Fifty States, District of Columbia and elimination of child marriages and the P u e r t o R i c o , a t “betrothal of young girls before the age of http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/Table puberty.” Id. pmbl., 521 U.N.T.S. at 232. _Marriage.htm (citing age requirements 13 and pertinent statutes) (hereinafter See Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, Marriage Laws of the Fifty States). supra note 11. 11 16.14 It is also true that the marriage laws number of children they want. . . . People of other countries generally set the can . . . still have 2, or 3, or 10 children, if minimum marriage age at 18 years or less, their individual biology and preferences and it appears probable that no other lead them to do so and the government country sets the minimum as high as does does not forcibly abort their children or China.15 sterilize them.”). It is perhaps worth A law or practice, however, does noting that the median ages of first not necessarily rise to the level of marriages for men and women in this “persecution” simply because it does not country now exceed the minimum age satisfy American constitutional standards requirements that Chen contends amount or diverges from the pattern followed by to persecution.16 Although defining the other countries. As we have noted, outer boundaries of the concept of persecution is an “extreme” concept that “persecution” is hard, we cannot say that “does not encompass all treatment that our requiring a person to wait until reaching society regards as unfair, unjust, or even the age of 23 or 25 is so far outside the unlawful or unconstitutional.” Fatin v. accepted realm of human decency as to INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 & n.10 (3d Cir. constitute persecution. 1993). C. Here, we cannot say that the BIA We acknowledge that our reasoning was bound to conclude that minimums of may appear to be in tension with that of 23 and 25 amounted to persecution. Chen Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. and Chen Gui were not permanently barred 2004). In that case, the petitioner Ma and from marrying, and marriage at the his partner were married in a “traditional” minimum ages in question would not have Chinese ceremony in their village. precluded them from having a long life Because Ma was underage, the marriage together or from raising children. See Li could not be officially registered with the v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1164 (9th Cir. Chinese government. Ma’s partner 2004) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) conceived two months later and went into (“[T]he higher marriage age does not hiding to avoid detection by the necessarily restrain people from having the authorities. Ultimately, however, she was found and forced to undergo an abortion, 14 Id. and the couple was fined for “early” 15 Angela Melchiorre, Right to 16 Education Project, At what age? 15-21 (2d See United States Census Bureau, ed. 2004) (listing marriage age Statistical Abstract of the United States 60 requirements 156 countries). A few (123d ed. 2003) (noting that 85.4% of countries, including Algeria, Cambodia, males and 74.0% of females under the age India, Indonesia, Togo, and Vietnam, set of 25 in the United States have never been age requirements above 18 years. Id. married). 12 pregnancy and marriage. Ma subsequently married”). Because Ma’s express holding fled to the United States. When he applies only to putative husbands and not attempted to apply for asylum under C-Y- unmarried partners, it is inapposite here.17 Z-, the BIA rejected his claim on the Nevertheless, we acknowledge that ground that he was not legally married Ma’s reasoning could be applied to under Chinese law. By this time, however, someone in Chen’s shoes. The Ma court Ma had actually reached the legal age to reasoned that it is “absurd and wholly marry in China. He therefore applied for unacceptable” to deny asylum to a person and obtained a certificate from the Chinese based solely on a consequence of a government indicating that his marriage population control policy expressly was considered valid, and he submitted “deemed by Congress to be oppressive and this certificate to the BIA with a motion to persecutory.” Ma, 361 F.3d at 559. reconsider, which the BIA ultimately According to Ma, this would “contravene[] denied. Ma petitioned for review, and the the purpose and policies of the [IIRIRA] Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that C-Y- statutory amendment.” Id. at 560. In other Z-’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(42) could words, the Ma Court concluded that the not rationally be limited to exclude BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(42) “husbands whose marriages would be failed step two of Chevron because it was legally recognized, but for China’s clearly contrary to Congress’s intent, or, as coercive family planning policies.” Ma, the Ma Court put it, Congress’s “purpose 361 F.3d at 561 (emphasis added). and policies.” Id. We must disagree with Because Ma’s marriage had been this analysis because we see no basis for recognized by the Chinese government by concluding that Congress’s intent in the time of the BIA’s decision, it was unnecessary for the Ninth Circuit to reach the question whether the BIA can 17 See, e.g., Ma, 361 F.3d at 559 (“The reasonably refuse to extend C-Y-Z- to question presented here is whether cases involving persons whom the Chinese husbands, whose marriages are denied authorities refuse to recognize as married. recognition by virtue of the population But assuming that the holding in Ma control program that Congress has reaches all persons married in traditional condemned, may be deprived of eligibility ceremonies that the Chinese government for asylum on the basis of that denial.”) does not sanction, Chen would still not (emphasis added); id. at 560 (“BIA’s qualify, since he does not claim that he and decision to limit asylum eligibility so as to Chen G ui ever formalized their exclude husbands . . . contravenes the relationship in that way. Indeed, Chen has purpose and policies of the statutory never argued that he is actually married in amendment.”) (emphasis added); id. at 561 any sense, and in fact he affirmed precisely (“Application of the BIA’s rule would the opposite in his asylum application. See result in the separation of a husband and App. II at 265 (checking box labeled “not wife . . . .”) (emphasis added). 13 amending § 1101(a)(42) was to afford imposition of a yearly cap clearly reveals relief to every person who is a victim of an intent to carefully limit the scope of any rule or practice that forms a part of the relief made available by the amendment. Chinese population control program. Against this background, it is hard “The starting point in discerning to see how Ma could have concluded that congressional intent is the existing a rule limiting C-Y-Z- to married couples statutory text . . . .” Lamie v. United was contrary to Congress’s intent. If Ma States Tr., 124 S. Ct. 1023, 1033 (2004). meant to say that individuals who suffer The language of the 1996 amendment to under a coercive population program may § 1101(a)(42) has several indications of be eligible for asylum even if their intent that we think are unmistakable. The suffering (or feared suffering) is not first is that proof of “persecution” or proved or presumed to rise to the level of “well-founded fear of persecution” is persecution, we emphatically disagree.19 absolutely required to make a successful As we have explained, the asylum statute claim for asylum, just as was the case prior plainly limits relief to cases involving to the amendment. The second point is “persecution.” That scheme necessarily that, with the exception of forced abortions excludes cases involving lesser harms, and sterilizations, the concept of even when those harms implicate to some “persecution” is left completely undefined. degree the humanitarian interests that We infer from Congress’s use of this animated passage of the asylum statute.20 ambiguous term an intent to delegate interpretive authority to the agency, including the ability to decide, within a Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425. reasonable range, the precise contours of 19 We note that the opinion in Ma never its meaning. FDA v. Brown & Williamson explicitly finds or assumes that the Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) p e t i ti o n e r ha d a ctu all y s uffere d (“Deference under Chevron to an agency’s persecution. construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s 20 For example, the statute extends relief ambiguity constitutes an implicit to those who are persecuted “on account of delegation from Congress to the agency to race.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42). The primary fill in the statutory gaps.”).18 Third, the purpose of that provision is no doubt to extend aid to certain individuals who suffer the effects of gross racial inequality 18 There is no question that Congress has in their countries of origin. Yet courts delegated authority to the BIA generally to routinely deny relief to those who suffer “make rules carrying the force of law,” cf. racial discrimination that falls short of Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27, and that its “persecution,” see, e.g., Nagoulko v. INS, interpretations of ambiguous statutory 333 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2003), terms are entitled to Chevron deference. even though it might be said that such 14 Alternatively, it may be that Ma’s legislators who considered the amendment position was that the BIA’s interpretation to § 1101(a)(42) thought that persons such of the term “persecution” fell outside the as Chen would qualify thereunder.21 To acceptable range of meanings within the contrary, it seems that some legislators which Congress authorized the agency to had reservations about the ease with which choose. However, there is no indication “young Chinese single-unmarried-males ” that Congress intended to put limits on the might falsely claim eligibility for asylum meaning of the term “persecution” beyond under the proposed amendment, resulting t h o s e i m po s ed b y t he n or m al in a flood of meritless applications. 142 understanding of the word. Matter of Cong. Rec. S4593 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, at 223 (BIA (statement of Sen. Simpson). Statements 1985). (“Congress chose not to define the from others suggest that the reference to word ‘persecution’ . . . because the “persecut[ion]” in the amendment was meaning of the word was understood to be simply intended to include actions such as well established by administrative and “torture” and “sexual abuse” that would court precedents.”). Of course, with the qualify as persecution under the prevailing 1996 amendment, Congress did add the definition of the term. See 142 Cong. Rec. constraint that “persecution” could not be H2634 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2996) interpreted in a way that would exclude (statement of Rep. Smith).22 involuntary sterilizations or abortions. But At a more general level, we note this merely shows that Congress knew how that some members of Congress have in to be very specific regarding what the past actu ally considered—and constituted persecution when it wanted to. Furthermore, we find it highly unlikely 21 that Congress could have intended to There is at least one statement in the dramatically broaden the notion of Congressional Record which speaks “persecution” with respect to persons disparagingly of China’s “marriage bans,” suffering under coercive population but that statement is made in reference to programs while contemporaneously permanent restrictions on marriage i m p o s i n g a yearly cap s trictly motivated by a desire to “avoid new births circumscribing the relief available to them. of inferior quality,” and not the sort of agebased restrictions at issue in this case. See An examination of the relevant 140 Cong. Rec. S327-28 (daily ed. Jan. 28, legislative history only confirms our 1994) (statement of Sen. Helms). understanding of Congress’s intent. We cannot locate any evidence that the 22 In such cases, the amendment would serve to clarify that such actions, if taken in response to resistance to a coercive denials disserve Congress’s broader policy population control program, should be of providing relief to victims of racial deemed inflicted “on account of political injustice. opinion.” 15 rejected—the possibility of providing an However, the 1996 amendment to explicit definition for “persecution” in § 1101(a)(42) is limited in scope. Under connection with another portion of the that amendment, the worst effects of the INA. It was reasoned that Chinese program – forced abortions and any such definition would involuntary sterilization – are deemed to necessarily limit application cons titute “persecuti on,” b ut the o f t h e p r o v is i o n t o amendment does not provide similar particular, presently treatment for other adverse effects of the f o r eseea ble s i tu a t i o n s. program, such as, to take one example, Persecution, however, has dismissal from employment for failure to and will continue to take abide by the one-child policy.23 Even many forms and it is the though a person who is fired for violating intention of the committee the policy is a victim of the objectionable in recom m ending this Chinese program, such a person cannot legislation to allow the prove past persecution simply by maximum amoun t of establishing the occurrence of and the flexibility possible in its reason for the dismissal. 24 It is apparent, adm inistration. The inclusion of a necessarily 23 See United States Dep’t of State, limited and rigid definition Country Report on Human Rights would be inconsistent with Practices—2002: China (2003) (noting such an intent. China’s r e l ia n c e o n “ e duc a tio n, H.R. Rep. 95-1452, at 6-7 (1978), propaganda, and economic incentives, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, well as on more coercive measures such as 4705-06; cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 the threat of job loss or demotion and U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (“In enacting the social compensation fees”). Refugee Act of 1980 Congress sought to 24 give the United States sufficient flexibility Under the 1996 amendment the reason to respond to situations involving political for the dismissal (failure to comply with or religious dissidents and detainees the one-child policy) might well qualify as throughout the world.”) (internal quotation “resistance to a coercive population omitted). control program,” but the person who was fired would still have to show that To be sure, we assume that the dismissal was severe enough to amount to members of Congress who voted in favor persecution. While we express no opinion of the 1996 amendment to § 1101(a)(42) on this point, we re iterate that considered the Chinese population control “persecution” is an extreme concept that program as a whole to be objectionable “does not encompass all treatment that our and that they found fault with many society regards as unfair, unjust, or even specific features of the program. unlawful or unconstitutional.” Fatin, 12 16 therefore, that it was not Congress’s intent Chen further argues that, even if he to provide relief for every victim of any did not suffer persecution in the past, he feature of the Chinese program. Rather, still has a well-founded fear that he would Congress obviously had the more modest suffer future persecution if he returned to purpose of providing relief for a much China. He points to several cases and more limited class. Especially in light of secondary sources generally describing the rather low yearly cap on the number of incidents of harsh treatment that Chinese asylum applications that may be granted prison officials have inflicted upon under the 1996 amendment, the BIA’s political prisoners, including refugees refusal to extend C-Y-Z- may be viewed as returned to China. See Petitioner Br. at furthering this congressional goal. 20-22. This generalized evidence