Opinion ID: 1624043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: riverside's liability under lewis' claim for fraud.

Text: In the course of its opinion, the court of civil appeals specifically rejected Riverside's contention that there was no evidence to support the jury verdict finding that Riverside had committed a fraud upon Lewis. 572 S.W.2d at 559. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to meet the court's instruction on fraud. Id. The court also recited the elements of actionable fraud, as set forth in Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank and Trust Co. of Dallas, 516 S.W.2d 138 (Tex.1974), and concluded that those elements were established in our case by undisputed evidence or by jury findings. 572 S.W.2d 559. In this Court, Riverside has failed to submit a point of error attacking the lower court's holding that there was some evidence of fraud. [6] Thus, we will not review the lower court's judgment insofar as it permits Lewis to recover his actual damages from Riverside on the theory of fraud. See Life Insurance Company of North America v. First National Bank of Fort Worth, 464 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.1971). Lewis, however, has brought forward points of error challenging the lower courts' holding that there was no evidence to support the jury findings of malice, or its award of exemplary damages. 572 S.W.2d at 559-560. We have previously held that exemplary damages may properly be awarded when the plaintiff has suffered actual damages as the result of fraud intentionally committed for the purpose of injuring him. Dennis v. Dial Finance & Thrift Company, 401 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex.1966). In the instant case, Lewis claims that there was at least some evidence that Riverside acted in such a manner as to warrant his recovery of exemplary damages. We agree. There was evidence presented at trial showing that: (1) Arthur Carroll, acting in the scope of his employment, advised James Lewis to put false statements in his loan application; (2) the ultimate reason for Riverside's refusal to lend the money to Lewis was the presence of these false statements within the application; (3) from May 6 to May 15, Arthur Carroll, acting in the scope of his employment with Riverside, consistently represented to Allied Bank and James Lewis that the loan either would be or had been paid; (4) on May 14, James Means decided that Riverside Bank would not make the loan to Lewis, and conveyed this decision to Carroll; (5) on May 15, Carroll had Lewis come to Riverside Bank and sign a negotiable promissory note in the amount of $12,851.80; (6) on May 16, for the first time, Carroll told Allied Bank that the loan would not be approved; (7) there was no communication from Riverside to Lewis, before repossession of the car, stating that the loan had been refused; (8) Riverside Bank never told Lewis the reasons for that refusal; and (9) for two years after the refusal of the loan, Riverside held Lewis' $12,871.80 promissory note, without offering to return it, or marking it void. We believe that this testimony constitutes some evidence that Riverside acted with the requisite mental state necessary to support an award of exemplary damages. We do not, and cannot, however, pass upon the question whether this evidence was sufficient to support the jury award for exemplary damages. For determination of this issue, we remand the cause to the court of civil appeals. The cause of action based upon the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is severed. The holding of the court of civil appeals awarding Lewis $16,562.50 under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is reversed, and judgment rendered that Lewis take nothing by his claims under the DTPA. The holding of the court of civil appeals that Lewis is entitled to recover actual damages under his allegations of fraud is affirmed. The holding of the court of civil appeals that there was no evidence of malice to support the award of exemplary damages is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of civil appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Dissenting opinion by CAMPBELL, J., in which POPE, DENTON and SPEARS, JJ., join.