Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The prior crimes as evidence of intent and a common scheme or plan

Text: (26) Generally, the prosecution may not use a defendant's prior criminal act as evidence of a disposition to commit a charged criminal act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) But evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) To be admissible to show intent, `the prior conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference that defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance.' ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1194 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811], quoting People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 121 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166]; accord, People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) To be admissible to show a common scheme or plan, a greater degree of similarity is required than to show intent, and the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual. ( Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.) (27) Because evidence of other crimes may be highly inflammatory, the admission of such evidence `must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.' ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392], quoting People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of a defendant's prior acts must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ( People v. Ewoldt, supra, at p. 404; Evid. Code, § 352.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1195.) Here, although the prior acts occurred 17 years before the crimes against Polly, they were not so remote as to warrant their exclusion, as defendant had only remained free from incarceration for a total of three years during the intervening period. (See People v. Peete (1946) 28 Cal.2d 306, 308-309, 318-319 [169 P.2d 924] [24-year lapse since prior conviction was not significant when the defendant had been incarcerated for 18 of those years].) The prior crimes against Frances M. and Frost were sufficiently similar to this case to provide evidence of a common scheme or plan and intent to commit a sexual assault or a lewd act. [6] In those offenses, as in this case, defendant abducted a stranger, a female; used a weapon; assured the victim that he would not harm her; took her to a remote location; and carried bindings with him, indicating that the behavior was planned. The sexual nature of the prior crimes against Frances M. and Frost was obvious from his attempt to force Frances M. to sexually gratify him and his statements to court-referred psychiatrists that he assumed he would have some fun with Frost, and that he masturbated twice daily thinking about these victims and tying them up. Defendant emphasizes the age difference between Polly and adult victims Frances M. and Frost in arguing the dissimilarity of the present crime. But when Sergeant Meese asked defendant if Polly looked like she was 12 years old, defendant responded, I never even think about her like that. Defendant repeatedly referred to Polly as a broad, a slang term generally used to describe an adult woman, thus implying that he did not regard Polly's adolescence as significant. The prior crimes against Mitchell and Kreiger and the burglary of the Linden Street garage were sufficiently similar to this case to provide evidence of a common scheme or plan and intent to commit burglary. In each case, defendant targeted the home of a stranger, was armed, focused on a female resident, and entered the residence with an intent to tie up or assault the victim under circumstances indicating that he lay in wait outside before executing his plan. Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the prior crimes against Frances M., Mitchell, Kreiger and Frost as evidence of a common scheme or plan to steal, and that it erred in allowing the jury to consider defendant's prior assault against Mitchell as evidence of a motive and a common scheme or plan to commit a sexual assault or lewd act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the court erred in allowing the jury to consider these offenses for the described purposes, the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and because the trial court properly admitted the evidence of these offenses for the other purposes previously described in this part.