Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Seek Reasons for Excusal

Text: Defendant contends that, once the trial court ruled he had made a prima facie showing of group bias regarding the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror V.J., who was Black, it was required to seek the prosecutor's reasons for using a peremptory challenge against S.A., who was also Black, notwithstanding the court's earlier ruling that no prima facie showing of group bias had been made as to S.A. As stated, defendant did not object to S.A.'s excusal or otherwise join in codefendant Richard's objection to her excusal. We nevertheless reach the merits of the claim because defendant argues that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to reexamine S.A.'s excusal once it found a prima facie case of group bias as to V.J., and defendant effectively preserved the issue of V.J.'s excusal. This case raises the following question: once a trial court finds a prima facie case of group bias as to the excusal of one prospective juror, must it require the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations for all challenges made thus far to the members of the group in question, including those the court had ruled upon earlier? One Court of Appeal decision, People v. McGee (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 559, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 309 ( McGee ), addressed this question and answered in the affirmative. As we will explain, we disagree with the Court of Appeal and answer in the negative. A defendant may make out a prima facie case of group bias in jury selection by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. ( Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) The high court recently reaffirmed this principle, stating that a defendant makes out a prima facie case of group bias when he produces evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. ( Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417].) The defendant ultimately carries the `burden of persuasion' to `prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.' ( Ibid. ) In McGee, the Court of Appeal characterized Wheeler motions as challenging the selection of a jury, not the rejection of an individual juror; the issue is whether a pattern of systematic exclusion exists.  ( McGee, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 570, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, italics added.) Accordingly, it held that once the trial court has found a prima facie case of group bias in the excusal of one prospective juror, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations for all challenges to prospective jurors who are members of the same group. ( Ibid. ) The premise of the Court of Appeal's analysis in McGee, however, is incorrect. When a party makes a Wheeler motion, the issue is not whether there is a pattern of systematic exclusion; rather, the issue is whether a particular prospective juror has been challenged because of group bias. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Although the McGee court relied on People v. Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 435, another Court of Appeal decision, the Gore decision did not frame the issue in this manner. Gore merely recognized, correctly, that a pattern of systematic exclusion of a particular cognizable group from the venire raises an inference of purposeful discrimination, and that when such systematic exclusion occurs, everyone (the defendant, the excluded jurors, and the community) is harmed because the public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice is undermined. [38] ( People v. Gore, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 705, 700, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 435; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 [Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the `result bespeaks discrimination.'].) Of course, a single discriminatory exclusion may also violate a defendant's right to a representative jury. ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 716, fn. 4, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75; see also Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417, fn. 5]; Batson, supra, at p. 95., 106 S.Ct. 1712) As will be discussed, we hold that, when a trial court determines that the defendant has made a prima facie showing that a particular prospective juror has been challenged because of such bias, it need not ask the prosecutor to justify his challenges to other prospective jurors of the same group for which the Batson/Wheeler motion has been denied. Accordingly, we disapprove of People v. McGee, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 559, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, to the extent it is inconsistent with this holding. People v. Gore, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, provides little guidance on this issue. In Gore, during jury selection, the defendant did not make any Wheeler objections to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to four Hispanic prospective jurors, and the jury was sworn. Later, when the prosecutor used his first three peremptory challenges to the only three Hispanic prospective alternate jurors called to the jury box, the defendant finally made a Wheeler objection. The defendant argued that the prosecutor was systematically excluding Hispanic jurors, listing the seven Hispanic jurors who had been excused. The trial court limited the defendant's arguments to the three Hispanic prospective alternate jurors, finding the Wheeler objection untimely as to the first four Hispanic prospective jurors because the jury had been sworn. The court then found a prima facie case of group bias as to the three Hispanic prospective alternate jurors, although it ultimately concluded the prosecutor's reasons for their excusals were unrelated to group bias. ( Id. at pp. 697-699, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 435.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial court should not have barred the defendant from objecting to the dismissal of the first four Hispanic jurors on a procedural finding of untimeliness, given that the pattern of challenging Hispanic prospective jurors permeated the selection of the 12 jurors and alternates and the Wheeler objection was brought before jury selection was complete. ( Id. at p. 705, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 435.) Gore has little application to McGee, where the trial court declined to inquire about the prosecutor's reasons based on a substantive finding that there was no prima facie showing. In other words, the issue raised in McGee  whether the prosecutor must explain earlier challenges that did not create a prima facie showing of group bias once the court finds a presumption of group bias as to a later challenge  was not before the Gore court. In People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, the defendant made several Wheeler motions in response to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to Black prospective jurors, the first after the prosecutor excused four Black prospective jurors. The trial court asked the prosecutor for an explanation, but the prosecutor was not prepared to give one. Accordingly, the court reserved its ruling on the motions and indicated it would note which prospective jurors were Black, and that it would have the prosecutor's reasons before trial commenced. After the prosecutor excused three more Black prospective jurors, the defendant objected, and the court stated it would `consider [counsel's objection] a continuing motion.' ( Id. at p. 712, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) In total, the prosecutor excused 14 Black prospective jurors, 10 during the selection of the trial jurors and four during the ensuing selection of alternates. At the conclusion of voir dire, the prosecutor made an attempt to explain his challenges. The court ruled that the defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing, but it nevertheless examined the prosecutor's purported reasons for excusing a total of 14 Black prospective jurors, ruling on the challenged jurors as a group. ( Id. at pp. 712-713, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) We concluded that the court made an implied finding of a prima facie showing of group bias, and that it violated the defendant's constitutional right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16) by failing to carefully evaluate the prosecutor's explanations. ( People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 710, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) In so concluding, we noted that every questioned peremptory challenge must be justified. ( Id. at p. 715, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) The McGee court cited our language in Fuentes that every questioned peremptory challenge must be justified ( People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 715, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75) in support of its holding. But the McGee court read our holding too broadly. Unlike in McGee, the Wheeler objection in Fuentes was a continuing one, and thus the court's implied finding of a prima facie showing of group bias applied to all the identified Black prospective jurors. Also unlike in McGee, the trial court in Fuentes did not initially deny the defendant's earlier Wheeler motions only to revisit its rulings at the end of voir dire. Accordingly, the point in McGee, that later excusals can undermine earlier findings of no prima facie showing of group bias, is unsupported. Admittedly, a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to several prospective jurors in a particular racial or ethnic group may appear more suspect than if he or she exercised merely one. Accordingly, even if a defendant's Batson/Wheeler motion pertaining to the first prospective juror of a particular cognizable group excused is denied for a lack of a prima facie showing, he is likely to make one or more subsequent Batson/Wheeler motions after a prosecutor peremptorily challenges several more prospective jurors of that same group. And if a trial court finds a prima facie showing of group bias at a later point in voir dire, the court need only ask the prosecutor to explain each suspect excusal. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Each suspect excusal includes the excusals to which the defendant is objecting and which the court has not yet reviewed. We addressed the converse situation in People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365 ( Alvarez ). There, the defendant made a Batson/Wheeler motion after the prosecutor challenged seven African-American and Latino prospective jurors. The trial court found a prima facie case of group bias, and the prosecutor satisfactorily explained his reasons. The defendant made a subsequent motion after the prosecutor challenged another African-American prospective juror, and the court denied the motion after determining that he had not made a prima facie showing of group bias. ( Id. at pp. 194-195, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the court's determination he had made a prima facie showing of group bias as to his first Batson/Wheeler motion extended to his subsequent motion. We disagreed and explained that the presumption that a prosecutor uses his peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner is suspended when the defendant makes a prima facie showing of the presence of purposeful discrimination but reinstated . . . when the prosecutor makes a showing of its absence. ( Id. at p. 199, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Thus, on a later motion, the defendant must make a prima facie showing anew. ( Id. at p. 199, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; see also People v. Irvin (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1351, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 [Although Wheeler motions may be made seriatim, each Wheeler motion is itself separate and discrete and is resolved definitively and independently of each other.].) McGee, which fails to acknowledge our decision in Alvarez, is inconsistent with the premise that each Wheeler objection is a discrete event and should be resolved independently of each such motion. Applying these principles to the record before us, we conclude that the trial court was not required to ask the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations for excusing Prospective Juror S.A. because the only suspect excusal before the court was that of V.J. It is true that defendant noted V.J. was the second Black prospective juror peremptorily challenged and the court likewise noted that, in view of the small number of African-Americans on the panel, two excusals constituted a prima facie showing, both alluding to the earlier excusal of S.A. But the earlier excusal of S.A. was merely a part of the totality of the relevant facts to be considered in determining a prima facie case of group bias on the Wheeler objection, which was made as to V.J. only. Although we hold that the court has no sua sponte duty to revisit earlier Batson/Wheeler challenges that it had previously denied, upon request it may appropriately do so when the prosecutor's subsequent challenge to a juror of a protected class casts the prosecutor's earlier challenges of the jurors of that same protected class in a new light, such that it gives rise to a prima facie showing of group bias as to those earlier jurors. But the burden is on the party making the later motion to so clarify, for that party ultimately has the burden of proof. (See, e.g., People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 423, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790 [defendant bears the burden of establishing that denial of a continuance request was an abuse of discretion]; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 484, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182 [defendant bears the burden of proof on his motion for a change of venue]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68 [the party seeking severance has the burden to clearly establish there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that charges be separately tried].) Defendant did not do so here.