Opinion ID: 2260370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disposition of the $40,000

Text: Having reached this point, the Court of Special Appeals applied the common law presumption that when a spouse titles property as tenants by the entirety, there is a gift to the other spouse. Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 270, 477 A.2d 1163, 1170 (1984). In Grant we did not abolish that common law presumption. We noted, however, that [u]nder the Act, a determination of what constitutes marital property for the purpose of granting a monetary award is not dependent upon the legalistic concept of title. 300 Md. at 269-270, 477 A.2d at 1170. And we held that when characterizing property as marital or nonmarital under [§ 8-203(a)] for the purpose of granting a monetary award under [§ 8-205(a)], a presumption of gift does not arise from the titling of property as tenants by the entirety. Id. at 271, 477 A.2d at 1171 [footnote omitted]. See also Dorsey v. Dorsey, 302 Md. 312, 487 A.2d 1181 (1985). Seemingly, the intermediate appellate court concluded that, since the trial court had refused to grant a monetary award to Wife, §§ 8-203 through 8-205 were no longer implicated; the questions of marital property and its value were no longer in the case because the question of marital award was no longer in it. On that analysis, the $41,000 was divided equally between Husband and Wife because the common law presumption of gift from the former to the latter applied and was unrebutted. We believe, however, that a different analysis must be applied, and it does not involve presumptions or nonpresumptions of gift. Had the trial judge recognized the existence of the marital debt, he would have deducted its amount in reaching the net value of the marital property. That would have left a certain amount available for distribution by way of a monetary award. As we have seen, Wife's request for an award was denied; Husband never requested one. But what the parties did after the trial court's decision was to agree, in effect, to treat the condominium (and its ultimate proceeds) as marital property. In an agreement dated 4 November 1986, after the condominium had been sold, they, in effect, made their own monetary award, by dividing equally (subject to minor adjustments) $34,740 of the $76,740 proceeds of sale, net of encumbrances. They paid into court the remaining $42,000 (now reduced to $40,000) attributable to the loan. See n. 2, supra, and accompanying text. In other words, they undertook to treat the $76,740 fund as marital property. Because they could not agree that the loan was a marital debt, they did not, at that point, charge its amount against the proceeds. Instead, they divided the balance, leaving for subsequent determination the status of the loan. We have now held that the loan is marital debt. Because it represents marital debt, and the marital debt is payable by Husband, the $40,000 remaining in court is payable to him, for the purpose of discharging that debt. Schweizer, 301 Md. at 636, 484 A.2d at 272. This is the treatment that it would have received had the court made the monetary award the parties themselves accomplished. The result should not be different simply because the parties, and not the court, worked out their own monetary award. [6] Since the fund now in the registry of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County must be paid to Husband, we must reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTION TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. McAULIFFE, J., concurs in the result only.