Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of a Separate Jury

Text: Following completion of the guilt phase, defendant renewed his claim for a separate jury to decide his claim of insanity. Counsel argued that the defense argument at the sanity phase would be that defendant, due to mental impairments, was unable to conform his conduct to the law, a defense at odds with their guilt phase argument that defendant made a conscious decision to knock out Radford but not to kill him, and that he killed Levoy when he fell into a blind rage when she bit his thumb. The trial court denied the motion for a separate jury, noting that mental health experts testifying at the sanity phase would be subject to cross-examination based on defendant's testimony at the earlier guilt phase, and the jury's knowledge of that prior testimony would be important. Defendant now claims the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a separate sanity phase jury. He argues that because the guilt phase jury had just found him guilty, use of that same jury at the sanity phase forced him to be tried by a jury predisposed to find him sane. As evidence of that claim, he points to the fact the jury deliberated just 42 minutes before finding him sane, and that three jurors were laughing and talking during the reading of the sanity phase jury instructions. Section 190.4, subdivision (c), added to the Penal Code by initiative in 1978 and unchanged since that time, provides the applicable law. It states in pertinent part: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to Section 1026, . . . unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. ( Ibid., italics added.) The appropriate standard of review when considering a trial court's denial of a separate jury under section 190.4 is the abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) In this case, the trial court concluded the anticipated testimony from mental health experts would be difficult to understand unless the jury was aware of defendant's previous testimony at the guilt phase. That decision was well within the court's discretion and consistent with the Legislature's expressed preference for a single jury in capital cases. To sustain his claim that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant must at the very least show good cause existed for a separate sanity phase jury. He fails to do so. Although he argues his defenses at the guilt and sanity phases were conflicting, more than speculation or the desire of counsel is necessary [to demonstrate good cause]. [Citations.] A new jury is not required, for example, simply because there is a deviation between defense strategy at the guilt trial and at the penalty trial. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 483, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373 [defendant sought separate penalty phase jury].) Contrary to defendant's claim, the speed with which the jury reached a sanity phase verdict does not necessarily show the jury was biased. (See also the discussion in pt. II.B.13., post. ) It is sheer speculation whether the rapidity of the jury's decision was the result of bias, inattention, weakness of defendant's case or strength of the state's case. We also find the alleged laughter and inattention of some jurors an insufficient basis on which to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying a separate sanity jury. Evidently, no contemporaneous objection was made to the behavior (defense counsel brought it up later in a motion for new trial), and we assume the trial court was aware of what happened in open court and would have admonished the jury if some jurors' actions were inappropriate. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a separate jury, there was no constitutional error, and the sanity and penalty phase verdicts need not be reversed due to the use of the same jury throughout the trial.