Opinion ID: 1107651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Decision in Perkins

Text: In reversing the defendant's VCC designation, the district court considered that the State presented no evidence that Hearns's BOLEO conviction involved the use or threat of force. In Perkins, however, we clarified that the particular circumstances of the case do not matter. In that case, the defendant shot and killed a drug dealer who tried to rob him during a drug sale. The defendant claimed self-defense. The State argued that the defense was not available because at the time of the shooting the defendant was engaged in cocaine trafficking, which, the State argued, was a forcible felony under the final clause of section 776.08. We rejected that argument and articulated a statutory elements test for determining whether an offense is a forcible felony within the meaning of the final clause of section 776.08: The statute does not say that a forcible felony is any felony that may sometimes involve violence, or even a felony that frequently does involve violence. Rather, the statute requires that the felony actually  involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. (emphasis added). § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (1987). Taken in its ordinary and plain meaning, the term involve means to contain within itself, to make necessary as a condition or result. Oxford American Dictionary 349 (1980). Its general sense is to include. Id. Thus, in the strict and literal sense required by Florida law, this language can only mean that the statutory elements of the crime itself must include or encompass conduct of the type described. If such conduct is not a necessary element of the crime, then the crime is not a forcible felony within the meaning of the final clause of section 776.08. Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1313 (emphasis added). Therefore, Perkins held that for an offense to be a forcible felony under section 776.08, the use or threat of physical force or violence must be a necessary element of the crime. If an offense may be committed without the use or threat of physical force or violence, then it is not a forcible felony. In this case, the district court acknowledged Perkins, but then created conflict with that case by analyzing not the necessary elements of the crime of BOLEO, but the State's proof. The court began its analysis by reviewing the elements of the BOLEO statute. It noted that BOLEO may be committed either by intentionally touching a law enforcement officer against his will, or by intentionally causing a law enforcement officer bodily harm. The court held that when BOLEO is committed by intentionally touching a law enforcement officer, it does not involve the use or threat of physical force or violence. Hearns, 912 So.2d at 378. Under Perkins, that is the end of the analysis. By determining that physical force or violence is not a necessary element of BOLEO, the district court determined that BOLEO is not a forcible felony under the VCC statute. The district court went further, however. It developed its own hybrid test. The court suggested that if the State could prove that Respondent's BOLEO conviction was based on causing bodily harm, then the conviction could be used as a qualifying offense. Absent evidence of bodily harm, however, the district court held that it must give Respondent the benefit of the doubt and assume he had been convicted for the least violent of the BOLEO elements: The State has not shown with any certainty (has not shown at all, in fact) whether the battery on a law enforcement officer was a mere unwanted touching, see section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), or caused bodily harm, see section 784.03(1)(b). . . . Following Perkins, with no record evidence that Hearn's conduct against a law enforcement officer was a forcible felony, it cannot be used as a qualifying prior for purposes of VCC sentencing. Hearns, 912 So.2d at 379. To the extent the district court held that Perkins allows courts to look beyond the statutory elements of an offense and analyze the evidence in a particular case, the court's opinion conflicts with Perkins. We disapprove that part of the opinion. We reiterate that the only relevant consideration is the statutory elements of the offense. If the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual is not a necessary element of the crime, then the crime is not a forcible felony within the meaning of the final clause of section 776.08. Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1313.