Opinion ID: 2585534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Identical Versus Different Conduct

Text: When criminal statutes prescribe different penalties for identical conduct, a person cannot be sentenced to the harsher punishment without violating Colorado's equal protection guarantee. See Stewart, 55 P.3d at 114 (collecting and citing Colorado cases on point). In determining whether two statutes proscribe identical conduct, we compare their statutory elements. Id. at 115. Possession of a controlled substance under section 18-18-405(1)(a), and use of a controlled substance under section 18-18-404(1), do not contain identical statutory elements. Section 18-18-405(1)(a), a potential class four felony, provides, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to ... possess ... a controlled substance. As to use, section 18-18-404(1), provides in relevant part: any person who uses any controlled substance, except when it is dispensed by or under the direction of a person licensed or authorized by law to prescribe, administer, or dispense such controlled substance for bona fide medical needs, commits: (a) a class five felony ... One can possess a controlled substance without using it; this distinction is real in fact and is reasonably related to the purposes of the criminal legislation. We have consistently held that possession and use of a controlled substance are not identical conduct for equal protection purposes. Although possession can occur without use, use is preceded by possession. Possession ends when the drug is consumed. Cagle, 751 P.2d at 620. In People v. McKenzie, 169 Colo. 521, 458 P.2d 232 (Colo.1969), the defendant argued that because one must, out of necessity, possess marijuana in order to use it, there is no rational basis for the distinction between the treatment of possession as a felony and use as a misdemeanor. Id. at 233. We determined, however, that possession and use were two distinct offenses because, Under the Drug Act, the State must prove that the accused had actual or constructive possession of a narcotic drug. And under the Use Act, it is sufficient to prove that the accused used or was under the influence of a narcotic. Id. at 235. In Cagle, we again determined that possession and use are not identical conduct, and that possession occurs prior to use. Possession of a controlled substance does not necessarily involve use. If a person is holding a plastic bag containing a psilocybin mushroom, he possesses a schedule I controlled substance. He does not use it until he ingests the mushroom. To use the mushroom, he must first possess it. Once he uses the mushroom, he no longer possesses it. Use and possession are therefore not identical acts. Cagle, 751 P.2d at 620 (emphasis added). The General Assembly specifically declared that strict control of controlled substances in this state is necessary for the immediate and future preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. Id. ; § 18-18-401. The legislature demarcated the difference between possession and use with the temporal concept that consumption ends possession. Cagle, 751 P.2d at 620 (reasoning that a person who uses a controlled substance primarily threatens only his or her own health and well-being, while one who possesses a controlled substance poses a greater threat to the public). The principle is that use ends the capability of the defendant to place the controlled substance in the hands of another. In People v. District Court, 964 P.2d 498 (Colo.1998), we again found that possession and use of a controlled substance are not identical acts because possession may occur without use. An examination of the two statutes indicates that proof of the elements of the unlawful possession offense does not establish the elements of the unlawful use offense. That is, one may be convicted of unlawful possession even though one has not used the controlled substance. Id. at 501. In the same opinion, we also proceeded to state that the converse is also true. Conversely, proof of the elements of the unlawful use offense does not establish the elements of the unlawful possession offense. In other words, the offenses do not comply with the statutory elements test where each offense necessarily requires proof of at least one additional fact which the other does not. Id. We later corrected this statement in People v. Villapando, 984 P.2d 51 (Colo.1999). In Villapando, a probable cause case, we determined that use of a controlled substance necessarily requires possession of the substance. While it is possible to possess a controlled substance without using it, we can envision no scenario in which an individual could voluntarily use a controlled substance without first possessing it. Id. at 54. Regardless, the fact that use of a controlled substance necessarily requires possession does not make the conduct identical for equal protection purposes. We affirm our determinations in McKenzie, Cagle, and District Court on the point that possession of a controlled substance does not require use of the substance; nor, is possession of a controlled substance equivalent to use of a controlled substance. The elements of the crimes are different. The conduct is not identical; rather, possession precedes use. The General Assembly's disparate classifications and punishments of possession and use of a controlled substance are based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the general purposes of the legislation. The General Assembly may impose greater penalties for acts that it perceives to have graver social consequences, even if the difference is only a matter of degree. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 115. Punishment of possession more harshly than use is justified by the fact that, as long as one is in possession of a controlled substance, he or she has the capability to distribute or dispense it, whether or not the defendant actually does so or has the intent to do so. See Cagle, 751 P.2d at 620. This distinction is not arbitrary. Campbell's sentence under section 18-18-405(1)(a), the possession statute, does not offend equal protection. Section 18-18-405(1)(a), prohibiting possession of a controlled substance, and section 18-18-404, prohibiting use of a controlled substance, do not describe or punish identical conduct. Furthermore, possession and use of a controlled substance are not identical conduct for equal protection purposes, even when the drugs possessed and used are the same.