Opinion ID: 3017180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: If so, may review be appropriately secured on

Text: direct appeal, through a petition for a writ of mandamus, or in some other manner? Coady, 251 F.3d at 489. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court advised that where: discretionary actions and criteria are not being contested but rather the actions of the board taken pursuant to changed statutory requirements are being challenged, an action for mandamus remains viable as a means for examining whether statutory requirements have been altered in a manner that violates the ex post facto clause. Such an action could be brought in the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. Absent a change in the statutes governing parole, however, denial of parole would generally constitute a discretionary matter that is not subject to review. 15 Coady, 770 A.2d at 290. Importantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Coady provided guidance only as to challenges to denials of parole premised on violations of the ex post facto Clause. It specifically held that “parole denial claims are not normally suited to review by way of mandamus.” Id. at 290. It held, moreover, that “[m]andamus will not lie to compel a purely discretionary act.” Id. Inasmuch as Weaver has never been overruled, we conclude that it is the best indication of how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve the issues raised by DeFoy. Because the Commonwealth Court’s decision in that case is directly on point, it is highly instructive here. Therefore, a Pennsylvania state prisoner challenging the denial of parole need not file a petition for a writ of mandamus in order to satisfy the dictates of exhaustion. The Weaver Court held that mandamus is not available to a prisoner denied parole based upon a constitutional error by the parole board. 688 A.2d at 771–72. The Court explained: 16 Mandamus is based upon a duty by an agency to follow a law and is available only when, under a correct interpretation of that law, the agency has an absolute ministerial duty—no choice—to act in a certain way. Mandamus cannot be used to say that an agency considered improper factors, that its findings of fact were wrong, or that the reasons set forth in its decision are a pretense. If that was the nature of mandamus, there would be no difference between it and an appeal from the agency’s decision or other forms of actions to address those concerns. Id. at 777 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). As in Weaver, DeFoy’s refusal to admit guilt was the dispositive— albeit potentially improper— factor in the denial of his parole. As the Weaver Court explains, however, mandamus is not available to review a parole board’s consideration of improper factors. By force of logic, therefore, DeFoy is not entitled to seek a writ of mandamus on his claim. We do not believe the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Coady is in conflict with our conclusion. Our certified question in that case concerned the availability of mandamus for challenges to the denial of parole premised solely 17 upon the ex post facto Clause, not upon any and all constitutional protections. In response, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that mandamus is available where a challenge to the denial of parole is premised on the ex post facto Clause. In the same breath, however, it held that “[a]bsent a change in the statutes governing parole . . . denial of parole would generally constitute a discretionary matter that is not subject to review [via a petition for writ of mandamus].” Coady, 770 A.2d at 290. The Court also explained that “parole denial claims are not normally suited to review by way of mandamus.” Id. A fair reading of Coady suggests a hesitance on the part of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to permit a writ of mandamus to review the denial of parole. We therefore read Coady’s holding narrowly, applying only to ex post facto claims. Indeed, if mandamus extended beyond the holding in that case, it would—as the Commonwealth Court explained in Weaver—be no different than a direct appeal. See Weaver, 688 A.2d at 777. And 18 whatever the status of mandamus, it is settled that no direct appeal is available. See Coady, 770 A.2d at 289. Thus, mandamus is not available for Pennsylvania state prisoners seeking to challenge the denial of their parole on constitutional grounds other than the ex post facto Clause. Accordingly, in answer to the question submitted by the District Court, we conclude that claims of constitutional violations in the denial of parole in Pennsylvania need not be presented to the state courts via a petition for writ of mandamus in order to satisfy the requirement of exhaustion. We reverse the District Court to the extent it held otherwise and remand so the District Court may address the merits of DeFoy’s petition.4 4. We do not reach DeFoy’s constitutional argument under the Fifth Amendment. He alleges that because Pennsylvania’s practice makes parole for any sex offender contingent on participation in the Sexual Offender Treatment Program, and the Program in turn requires that he admit guilt, the Program violates his rights under the Fifth Amendment. We acknowledge that if DeFoy’s allegations are accurate, then he was presented with an unenviable choice: refuse to admit guilt and be ineligible to participate in the Program, thereby losing eligibility for parole, or admit guilt and incriminate himself, (continued...) 19