Opinion ID: 203644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Semi-automatic weapon ban

Text: Marceau first argues that the eight-level offense level increase (from twelve to twenty) for theft of semi-automatic weapons should not have been applied because Congress allowed the statutory proscription against possessing such weapons to expire in 2004. Thus, Marceau argues, the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in April 2006 when it voted to retain the enhancement. We disagree. Before detailing our reasoning, we sketch the relevant background. The Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994 [5] made possession of various semi-automatic firearms illegal, but contained a sunset provision under which the ban expired September 13, 2004, ten years after its implementation. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(declaring weapons unlawful)(repealed 2004); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30) (defining semiautomatic assault weapon)(repealed 2004); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (defining firearm). Responding to directives within the 1994 Act, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 522, which amended U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 to enhance base offense levels for possession of statutorily-defined semi-automatic assault weapons, without regard to their use in another offense. Also enacted was Amendment 531, which prescribed an upward departure for semi-automatic firearms with a capacity exceeding ten cartridges possessed in connection with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense. Both amendments became effective November 1, 1995. Courts responded to the expiration of the weapons ban in different ways. Some questioned whether the expired ban could continue to support sentence enhancements, see, e.g., United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.2006) (questioning whether possession of an assault weapon was a crime of violence for Guidelines purposes), while others applied the enhancement without regard to the present legality of the weapon, see, e.g., United States v. Ray, 411 F.3d 900 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Vega, 392 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.2004). In response to what it described as inconsistent application of the enhanced base offense level following the expiration of the weapons ban, the Commission subsequently adopted Amendment 691, which deleted the explicit statutory reference to the now-expired weapons ban, and instead applied the enhanced offense level in § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) to a semiautomatic weapon capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. Amendment 691 took effect November 1, 2006, and was in effect at the time of Marceau's sentencing. Marceau argues that enactment of Amendment 691 after the expiration of the assault weapon ban violated the Commission's obligation to promulgate Guidelines consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). While it is true that Congress has granted the Commission broad discretion with respect to Guideline formulation, the Commission must nevertheless bow to the specific directives of Congress. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). Thus, if Amendment 691 is at odds with [a statute's] plain language, it must give way. LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 757, 117 S.Ct. 1673. In this case, however, we agree with the district court that the enhanced BOL in Amendment 691 is not at odds with any statute because it does not penalize the mere possession of legal firearms, but only possession by certain prohibited persons. The district court approvingly cited Ray, in which the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) enhancement to a defendant who possessed a semi-automatic weapon which remained legal due to a grandfather clause in the 1994 Act. Rejecting the argument that the enhancement could only be applied to illegal weapons, the Ray court concluded that [t]hrough § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), the sentencing commission decided to punish more severely the possession of semiautomatic firearms, even those of the pre-ban variety, by those who have lost the right to possess firearms. Id. at 906; see also U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 2 (2007); 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), (n). We took a similar approach in United States v. Laureano-Velez, 424 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.2005). There, we rejected the defendant's argument that possession of a grandfathered, pre-ban weapon could not form the basis of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug offense. Instead, following the course laid by Ray, we concluded that the grandfather clause created an exception only with respect to the separate crime of simple possession of such weapons under § 922(v)(2). Id. at 41 ( citing Ray, 411 F.3d at 905-06; Vega, 392 F.3d at 1282-83). We follow a similar course here. We find no conflict between the lapse of the statutory assault-weapon ban and the imposition of a higher offense level for use of such a weapon by anyone in a class of prohibited persons. [6]