Opinion ID: 1609293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Covert Interrogation Cases

Text: A brief review of the cases relied on in Hattaway for the assertion that the Supreme Court has erected a per se barrier against waivers will reveal waiver of the right to counsel was never an issue in any of these cases due to the nature of the elicitation of the statements from the defendants. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), Massiah was indicted along with a man named Colson for conspiracy to possess and to distribute cocaine. Massiah retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. Colson agreed to cooperate with government agents in their continuing investigation into Massiah's narcotics activity and allowed a transmitter to be installed under the seat in his car. Massiah and Colson subsequently held a lengthy conversation in the car, in which Massiah made several incriminating statements, while a government agent listened over the radio. The Supreme Court reversed Massiah's conviction on the ground that the incriminating statements were obtained in violation of Massiah's rights under the Sixth Amendment. The basic holding of Massiah is as follows: [Massiah] was denied the basic protections of [the right to the assistance of counsel] when there was used against him at trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. Massiah, Id. at 206, 84 S.Ct. at 1203. The other Supreme Court cases relied on in the Hattaway opinion were also clearly limited to situations involving covert interrogation. See Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45, 88 S.Ct. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 48 (1967) (hidden government agent overheard conversations between accused and informant); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) (defendant's cellmate, an informant for the FBI, was told by the government to pay attention to statements made by defendant); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (C1985) (defendant's co-indictee/accomplice agreed to cooperate with the police and wore a wire transmitter to record his conversation with defendant). In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), on the other hand, the Court rejected defendant's argument his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated. Defendant had been arrested and arraigned and was placed in a cell with someone who had previously agreed to act as an informant for the police. The cellmate had been specifically told he should only listen to the statements defendant made and should not ask any questions or initiate any conversations. Defendant made incriminating statements and was later convicted. The Court specifically held that the Sixth Amendment does not forbid admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a jailhouse informant who was placed in close proximity but [made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged. Id. at 456, 106 S.Ct. at 2628. [6] The common thread of these cases is the use of covert investigatory techniques which are essentially the equivalent of direct police interrogation by the government agents in order to obtain statements from the defendant. The defendants were not aware they were making statements which would fall into the hands of the government and which could be used against them. Because it is a form of interrogation occurring after the right to counsel has attached, defendant has a right to counsel during the interrogation. The nature of the covert interrogation, however, deprives defendant not only of the opportunity to exercise his right to counsel but also obviously precludes any discussion of waiver of that right. These cases, therefore, in no way hold, literally or by implication, that waiver of the right to counsel can never be valid once defendant is represented by counsel; only that waiver is not an issue in certain types of interrogation.