Opinion ID: 1345745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Attorney-client privilege/self-incrimination.

Text: (12) The attorney-client privilege serves a different purpose, however. It exists to permit a client to freely and frankly reveal confidential information, including past criminal conduct, to the attorney or others whose purpose is to assist the attorney, and to thereby enable the attorney to adequately represent the client. (See United States v. Zolin (1989) 491 U.S. ___, ___ [105 L.Ed.2d 469, 484, 109 S.Ct. 2619].) In a criminal case the privilege also serves to preserve the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination that might otherwise be deemed to have been waived by his revelation of incriminating information. [30] To make adequate representation possible, therefore, these privileges assure criminal defendants that confidential statements to their attorney will not be admissible in any proceeding. These purposes were unaffected by Dr. Weinberger's revelation of defendant's statements to his potential victims. The Legislature has recognized this distinction in purpose in Evidence Code section 1024, where it provides that there is no privilege under this article, i.e., article 7, which contains only the psychotherapist-patient privilege, if the therapist believes it is necessary to disclose the communication. This section confirms that the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not to preclude use of the defendant's statements in a legal proceeding, and reflects recognition that the purpose of promoting the therapeutic relationship can no longer be achieved once the therapist has revealed the confidential communications to third parties. No similar provision reflects an intent that the attorney-client privilege terminate if a communication to an attorney is made public without a waiver of confidentiality by the client. (13) Since defendant's statements to Dr. Weinberger were also communications made in the attorney-client relationship (Evid. Code, § 952; People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1060, fn. 11 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680]; Torres v. Municipal Court (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 778, 784 [123 Cal. Rptr. 553]), unless defendant waived the privilege or did not intend that the statements be confidential they continued to be privileged notwithstanding the fact that they were no longer confidential at the time of trial. The People argue that defendant did waive the privilege, or did manifest an intent that his statements be revealed to third parties, when Dr. Weinberger advised him that she might have to reveal his threats and he expressed satisfaction that this would cause the potential victims to worry. Since the statements were made before Dr. Weinberger advised defendant that she might reveal them, he did not waive the privilege by making them, and the trial court did not find a waiver in defendant's response to the warning. Since there was no clear intent to waive the privilege in that statement, we cannot conclude that the privilege was waived. The People argue alternatively that the privilege does not extend to threats of future criminal conduct. No express exception to the attorney-client privilege exists for threats of future criminal conduct. Evidence Code section 956, however, provides that the privilege does not apply if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud. That section was enacted in 1965 when the code itself was adopted. Similar exceptions were created in the code by Evidence Code section 981, which provides that the marital communication privilege does not exist if the communication was made, in whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud, and in Evidence Code sections 997 and 1018, which provide that the physician-patient and psychotherapist privileges do not exist if the provider's services were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a tort or to escape detection or apprehension after the commission of a crime or tort. The comments of the California Law Revision Commission accompanying these sections suggest that no exception was intended to apply to a statement of intent to commit a crime alone. The comment on Evidence Code section 956 states only that California now recognizes this exception. Abbott v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App.2d 19, 177 P.2d 317 (1947). Cf. Nowell v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App.2d 652, 36 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1963). (29B West's Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 956, p. 553.) The comment on Evidence Code section 981 states, however, with regard to substantially the same wording: ... It is important to note that the exception provided by Section 981 is quite limited. It does not permit disclosure of communications that merely reveal a plan to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud; it permits disclosure only of communications made to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud. Thus, unless the communication is for the purpose of obtaining assistance in the commission of the crime or fraud or in furtherance thereof, it is not made admissible by the exception provided in this section. (Italics added.) The authorities relied upon by the People do not support the argument that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to statements of intent to commit future crimes. United States v. Friedman (9th Cir.1971) 445 F.2d 1076 said that communications lose their privileged character when they concern contemplated unlawful acts by the client. Calif.Evid.Code § 956 ... ( id. at p. 1085), but in a more complete statement correctly held: The attorney need not himself be aware of the illegality involved; it is enough that the communication furthered, or was intended by the client to further, that illegality. ( Id. at p. 1086.) Abbott v. Superior Court (1947) 78 Cal. App.2d 19, 21 [177 P.2d 317], relied on by the California Law Revision Commission to support its comment that Evidence Code section 956 states the existing law, also involved communications intended to further a client's unlawful purpose. While the court did state that [t]he continuous and unbroken stream of judicial reasoning and decision is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of this privilege (78 Cal. App.2d at p. 21), the actual holding was that the privilege did not cover communications in which the defendant, an attorney, was counseling a fellow member of the conspiracy in an attempt to further its illegal purposes. ( Ibid. ) Thus, the existing law to which the comment accompanying Evidence Code section 956 refers is consistent with the language of the section, that the privilege does not encompass communications between attorney and client that are intended to further future criminal conduct. [31] Cases decided since the adoption of the Evidence Code recognize the limited nature of the exception to the attorney-client privilege created by Evidence Code section 956: This exception is invoked only when a client seeks or obtains legal assistance `to enable or aid' one to commit a crime or fraud. The quoted language clearly requires an intention on the part of the client to abuse the attorney-client relationship, ... ( Glade v. Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal. App.3d 738, 746 [143 Cal. Rptr. 119]. See also, BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 1240, 1249 [245 Cal. Rptr. 682]: Evidence Code section 956 codifies the common law rule that the privilege protecting confidential attorney-client communications is lost if the client seeks legal assistance to plan or perpetrate a crime or fraud.) The People finally contend, however, that even if erroneously admitted, the evidence was not prejudicial. We agree. Defendant's statements to Dr. Weinberger were a minor aspect of the overwhelming evidence of aggravating factors reflected in the circumstances of the crime itself. That evidence included evidence of defendant's willingness to commit serious crimes, including murder, to vindicate his beliefs. Whatever impact the evidence that he would also like to kill others who offended his sense of rectitude might have had was tempered by his testimony that he no longer believed that revenge was appropriate. We conclude, therefore, that it is not reasonably possible that a reasonable jury would have rendered a different verdict had the evidence been excluded. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 449 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].)