Opinion ID: 2571623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jury instruction defining maliciously

Text: [¶ 16] As was mentioned above, one of the elements of first-degree arson that must be proved by the State is that the defendant maliciously started a fire. One of the trial battles in the instant case was over the correct definition of the word maliciously. The district court gave the following instruction to the jury: INSTRUCTION NO. 15 Maliciously means acting in the state of mind in which an intentional act is done without legal justification or excuse. The term maliciously conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility and implies a wicked state of mind. [¶ 17] The appellant objected to Instruction No. 15 and offered the following instruction in its place: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. H Maliciously means acting in the state of mind in which an intentional act is done without legal justification or excuse. The term maliciously conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another. (Emphasis added.) The wording of this proposed jury instruction is identical to the wording of a suggested definition contained in the Use Note to W.Cr.P.J.I. 31.01A (1996), which is the elements instruction for first-degree arson. That suggested definition borrowed and modified the definition of malice found in W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), which is one of the homicide instructions. [¶ 18] There are two interrelated issues raised by these conflicting definitions. First, does the malice or the malicious act have to be directed toward another? And second, does the State have to prove either (1) that the act was done with no legal justification or excuse, or (2) that it was done with hatred, ill will or hostility, or does it have to prove both (1) and (2)? [1] [¶ 19] The words malice, malicious, and maliciously have appeared as elements in several crimes and causes of action, including murder, arson, malicious mischief, and malicious prosecution. Because the terms are not statutorily defined, this Court has at times been called upon to determine their meanings in their different contexts. A review of some of that case law may help to put our issues into perspective. For instance, in malicious prosecution, the term means that the prosecution was instituted from an improper motive, which is `any motive other than one to further the ends of justice or to punish an offender against the criminal law.' Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1045 (1933) ( quoting Henning v. Miller, 44 Wyo. 114, 8 P.2d 825, 831 (1932)). [¶ 20] In Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373, 374 (1922), the defendant was convicted of violating a statute against willfully and maliciously kill[ing] any . . . neat cattle . . . the same being the property of another . . . . In reversing the conviction, Justice Blume delivered the following analysis of the word maliciously as used in that statute: The defendant asked an instruction to the effect that the jury must find that the killing of the animal was done through malice, hatred, or ill will toward George and Henry Frederick, or that the killing was so cruel that malice could be inferred therefrom . . . . The court gave, on this subject, over the objection of the defendant, the following instruction: You are instructed that malice includes not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. Malice is not confined to ill will toward an individual, but is intended to denote an action flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done with a wicked mind, where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as evince plain indications of a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief; hence malice may be implied or inferred from any deliberate and cruel act against another, or his property, which shows an abandoned and malignant heart. The case of State v. Johnson, 7 Wyo. 512, 54 Pac. 502 [1898], is a case involving malicious mischief, and the court, in speaking of the malice essential to be shown in such cases, although the act there involved was only a misdemeanor, said in part: The authorities are nevertheless substantially agreed that the malice necessary to constitute the offense is something more than the malice which is ordinarily inferred from the willful doing of an unlawful act without excuse. The statutes were not intended to make every willful and wrongful act punishable as a crime, but they are devised to reach that class of cases where the act is done with a deliberate intention to injure.    And it seems to be generally held that in order to bring an offense under the head of malicious mischief it must appear that the mischief was itself the object of the act, and not that it was incidental to some other act lawful or unlawful. The principle laid down in that case that the malice in such cases is something more than what is ordinarily understood as legal malice, but is that malice as it is more ordinarily understood in common speech, has been the settled rule of law in this state since 1898, and we see no reason for departing therefrom. . . . . . . Maliciously, in this sentence, is still more significant and controlling. It means, with ill will, malevolence, grudge, spite, wicked intention, enmity. And this ill will cannot exist without an object. It must be aimed at some one; and assimilating this offense to malicious mischief, which it very much resembles, we hold the malice the culprit entertains must be directed to the owner of the premises. Wiggin, 206 P. at 374 ( quoting Johnson v. State, 61 Ala. 9 (Ala.1878)). [¶ 21] Clearly, at least in 1922, and at least as applied to malicious mischief, the concept of malice included not only an element of ill will, but it required that such ill will be directed toward a particular person. Less than two years later, however, in penning the opinion that became the source for the pattern jury instruction definition of malice in murder cases, and indirectly, in arson cases, Justice Blume reached a noticeably different conclusion: As to what constitutes malice is not easily defined . . . . In its popular sense, the term malice conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another. . . . That is not its legal meaning, but the term nevertheless implies a wicked condition of mind while the homicide is committed; a mind, we may say, committing the very act willfully. . . . In Bennett v. State, 15 Ariz. 58, 136 Pac. 276 [1913], it was said: The legal import of the term `malice' extends beyond and is more comprehensive than ill will, hatred, or revenge. It includes all states of the mind under which the killing of a human being by another takes place without any cause which will, in law, justify or excuse it or mitigate the homicide to manslaughter. . . . [I]t is said that the term includes all those states and conditions of mind which accompany a homicide that is committed without legal excuse or extenuation. State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 423 (1924). [¶ 22] In the definition of malice in Wiggin, emphasis was placed upon the concept of ill will toward another person. In the definition of malice in Sorrentino, emphasis was placed upon the concept of an act committed without legal justification or excuse. The old pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.106 (1978), and the new pattern jury instruction, W.Cr.P.J.I. 21.01D (1996), contain both concepts. [2] The problem is that the concepts are not identical, leaving considerable doubt as to exactly what it is the State has to prove in a given case. [3] Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, the source note to the new pattern instruction directs attention to Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wyo. 1987), where this Court, in a homicide case, said simply that [m]alice has been defined as intentional killing without legal justification or excuse and under circumstances which are insufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter. See also Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 729 (Wyo.1963). In Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1113-14 (Wyo.1992), we noted the confusion that can arise because of differing legal and common definitions of malice, yet we also cited Sorrentino with approval and noted that the passage of six decades had failed to endow our language with suitable synonyms. [¶ 23] In Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 642-43 (Wyo.1983), we considered the meaning of the word maliciously specifically within the context of the first-degree arson statute. The value of Dean as precedent, however, is diminished by the fact that the crime in that case was charged under a statute, now repealed, that did not much resemble the present statute. For ease of comparison, we will set out both statutes in full. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-121 (1957) states: Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or any kitchen, shop, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto or any standing timber on public or privately owned land, whether the property of himself or of another, shall be guilty of arson in the first degree . . . . Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a) states: A person is guilty of first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure. [¶ 24] In Dean, in a discussion focused mainly on the fact that the old statute defined a general intent crime, while the new statute defined a specific intent crime, we quoted with approval the following definition of the word maliciously as used in the old statute: `. . . [M]alicious when used in defining the crime of arson is quite different from its literal meaning.    The malice    need not be express, but may be implied; it need not take the form of malevolence or ill will, but it is sufficient if one deliberately and without justification or excuse sets out to burn the dwelling house of another.'. . . . . . To be a willful and malicious burning in the law of arson, the burning must simply be done voluntarily and without excuse or justification and without any bona fide claim of right. . . . `[M]aliciously' means that state of mind which actuates conduct injurious to others without lawful reason, cause or excuse. Dean, 668 P.2d at 642-43 ( quoting State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 576 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1978)). See also 5 Am.Jur.2d Arson and Related Offenses § 7 (1995). [¶ 25] The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, of which the new arson statute is a part, abolished common law crimes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102 (LexisNexis 2001). Consequently, the important question is not what maliciously may have meant as part of common law arson, or even as part of the earlier statute, but what it means in the current statute. See 5 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at §§ 1, 2. In making that determination, however, we may resort to prior case law as an interpretive aid. Id. The ordinary rules of statutory construction, however, are our primary guide. [¶ 26] We have often stated our principles of statutory construction, and we will not repeat them here at length. Suffice it to say that, if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we simply abide by its plain meaning. If the statute is ambiguous, which means that its meaning is uncertain and it is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we may construe it. Our primary goal is to determine legislative intent. Statutes are to be given a reasonable interpretation with reference to their purpose. Ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. Union Pacific R.R. v. Trona Valley Federal Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1203, 1205-06 (Wyo.2002); DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo.2002); State v. Nelson, 2002 WY 99, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d 185, 188 (Wyo.2002); Jones v. State, 2002 WY 35, ¶ 10, 41 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 27] In applying the Sorrentino definition of malice, it becomes obvious that different evidence is required to prove the hatred or ill will that characterizes malice in its common meaning than the evidence that is required to prove the absence of a legal justification or excuse. In applying its murder statutes, the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared that the element of malice may be established by at least three different types of proof: (1) express hatred, ill-will or spite; (2) commission of inherently dangerous acts in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief; or (3) a condition of mind which prompts a person to [act] intentionally without just cause, excuse or justification. [ State v.] Reynolds, 307 N.C. at 191, 297 S.E.2d [532], 536 [(1982)]. State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 527 S.E.2d 45, 47 (2000). This approach relieves the dichotomy between the concept of ill will and the concept of no legal excuse or justification left by Sorrentino, in that it suggests that the varying definitions are alternatives. We must then ask whether the legislature intended for either or both of those alternatives to apply under the first-degree arson statute. [4] [¶ 28] In his analysis of the revised criminal code that included the new arson statute, Professor Theodore E. Lauer concluded that the word maliciously may well be surplusage in the statute: The word maliciously in first-degree arson is probably unnecessary. While traditionally arson has required that a fire be willfully and maliciously started, the term maliciously has meant something less than intentionally. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 856-61 (3d ed.1982), where a malicious state of mind is said to be one wherein there is an absence of justification, excuse or mitigation, and either an intent to cause a particular harm or the wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result. Id. at 860. But where, as in first degree arson, the act of starting the fire must be done with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure, it is clear that only an intent to cause the harm will suffice, and a knowing or reckless state of mind is not enough. Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, XIX Land & Water L.Rev. 509, 511 n. 12 (1984). We are not, however, free to ignore any word that the legislature has chosen to place in a statute, and every word is presumed to have a meaning. Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 509 (Wyo.1999). Furthermore, maliciously is a word that gives the statute a mens rea element, without which it would reach innocent conduct. [5] State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 347 (Wyo.1974); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 27 at 164-65 (15th ed.1993). See also Dean, 668 P.2d at 642 and State v. Laude, 654 P.2d 1223, 1229 (Wyo.1982). [¶ 29] Wyoming is far from alone in having attempted to modernize its arson laws. The commentaries to the Model Penal Code describe a vast legislative development of the offense of arson in the United States. Model Penal Code, § 220.1 at 4 (1980). Three patterns existed in this legislation: (1) offenses classified in relation to the types of property involved, but with criteria discriminating according to the likelihood of endangering life; (2) offenses classified specifically with reference to danger to persons; and (3) offenses classified solely on the basis of the type of property burned. Id. at 5-9. In most legislation, the concept of danger to others was incorporated through use of the term maliciously or by denoting that the property burned had to be the property of another. Id. at 18-25. [¶ 30] Arizona's experience with the mens rea element of its first-degree arson statute is enlightening as we study our own statute. [6] Prior to 1978, first-degree arson in Arizona required that a person willfully and maliciously set fire to a structure. That phrase was judicially construed to mean voluntarily and without excuse or justification and without any bona fide claim of right. Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-37390-1, 116 Ariz. 519, 570 P.2d 206, 209 (1977). After a full revision of Arizona's criminal code, and a couple of subsequent amendments, the mens rea element of the first-degree arson statute now is knowingly and unlawfully damaging an occupied structure.... Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-1704 (West 2001). In construing the word unlawfully and its statutory definitioncontrary to law or, where the context so requires, not permitted by lawthe Arizona Court of Appeals emphasized the dangers of fire: A fire poses unique hazards. As a means of destruction, it is difficult to control and may quickly spread to nearby buildings or fields. Firemen and policemen are endangered. Neighbors and passers-by, fearing that a structure is occupied, may attempt hazardous rescue efforts. State v. Newfield, 161 Ariz. 470, 778 P.2d 1366, 1369 (1989) ( quoting State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1983)). [¶ 31] The point of this detour into Arizona law has been to show that there is little difference between the concept of unlawfully (contrary to law or not permitted by law) and maliciously (without legal justification or excuse). Beyond that, the use of these terms in conjunction with the burning of an occupied structure, rather than the burning of the property of another, suggests that the goal of the first-degree arson statutes in both cases is to protect all members of the public who might be harmed, not just the owner of the property or some other identified individual. In turn, this suggests that in a prosecution for first-degree arson, the State does not have to prove that the malice or the malicious act was directed toward another. [7] [¶ 32] Earlier in this opinion, we noted that we do not construe statutes that we have not first found to be ambiguous. If a statute is not ambiguous, we simply abide by its plain meaning. Union Pacific R.R., 2002 WY 165, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d at 1205-06; DeLoge, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d at 1237; Nelson, 2002 WY 99, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d at 188; Jones, 2002 WY 35, ¶ 10, 41 P.3d at 1252. In that regard, we must ask whether the word maliciously is ambiguous as it appears in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a). Despite the lengthy analysis through which we have just gone, we conclude that the answer is no. In enacting statutes, the legislature is presumed to have acted with full knowledge of the existing law. In re Estate of Fosler, 13 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo.2000); Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 306 (Wyo.1999). In the present context, that means that in 1982 when the legislature adopted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a) as part of the new criminal code, it was aware of the definition of malice that this Court has been applying since at least 1924. That definition has always contained the alternative theories of actual hostility or ill will and the doing of an act without legal justification or excuse, the latter alternative not requiring the direction of ill will toward any particular person. The legislature's use of the word maliciously in a statute designed to protect any person who may be endangered as a result of an arson comports with that definition. The fact that the pattern jury instructions, in not distinguishing between the alternate theories, may have created questions for juries, does not make the statute ambiguous. [¶ 33] We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing the appellant's proposed jury instruction defining the term maliciously. In fact, the jury instruction as given may have been prejudicial to the State in that it appears to require the State to prove both that the appellant acted with ill will and hostility and that he acted without legal justification or excuse. The jury instruction does not distinguish between actual malice and implied malice. The facts of the instant case bear out the need for such distinction. The appellant may not have felt actual hostility or ill will toward his roommate or toward the police officers who responded to the 911 call. His actions, nevertheless, placed them all in great danger. That is exactly the type of conduct that can be characterized as being without legal justification or excuse.