Opinion ID: 3010227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Maleng to this Case

Text: In the present case, the district court has jurisdiction over Young's pet for the same reasons the Supreme Court found jurisdiction in Maleng: although the district court lacks jurisdiction over a direct challenge to Young's 1989 convictio should have construed Young's petition as attacking the sentence he is currently se See 490 U.S. at 493-94. While Young's petition referred only to his expired 1984 conviction, his subsequent filings provided sufficient information concerning both 1984 and 1989 convictions and their relationship to his present sentence to support construction.0 Moreover, the purpose of Young's petition is presumably to terminate sentence he is presently serving. 0 It apparently made no difference to the Court that the 1958 conviction actually enhanced Cook's sentence for his subsequent conviction. Id. 0 The Commonwealth argues that, because Young did not fully apprise the cou the relationship between his 1989 conviction and his present custody until after th Report and Recommendation was filed, Young effectively waived such a claim. This ar has no merit. As noted above, the various documents that Young filed after the mag judge filed his Report and Recommendation explain the relationship between his sent and convictions. Not only should a habeas petition [be] construed with the defere which pro se litigants are entitled, Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493, but Fed. R. Civ. P. states that leave shall be freely given when justice so requires to a party seeki amend his pleadings. The Commonwealth made no waiver argument in response to Young objections to the Report and Recommendation and has cited nothing to support its im 7 It is true that the circumstances of Young's incarceration do not follow usual Maleng pattern of conviction A, whose sentence has been served, followed by conviction B, whose sentence is enhanced because of conviction A. See 490 U.S. at 4 also Tredway v. Farley, 35 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 9 (1995); Feldman v. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1990); Collins v. Hesse, 957 F. 747 (10th Cir. 1992); White v. Butterworth, 70 F.3d 573, 574 (11th Cir. 1995). How as the Commonwealth concedes, the differences do not render Maleng inapplicable. Yo presently serving a sentence which he plainly seeks to terminate and under which he currently in custody. Thus, we hold that Young's petition should have been const challenging his current sentence, that he is in custody under that sentence, and the district court has jurisdiction over Young's petition. See Brock v. Weston, 31 887 (9th Cir. 1994) (construing petitioner's attack on expired conviction allegedly as a predicate for his confinement under the Washington Sexually Violent Predators an attack on that confinement).