Opinion ID: 889643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Analysis of Kingman's Claim

Text: ¶ 41 Kingman filed his motion for change of venue during the pretrial period, based on media coverage and community sentiment that existed as of late June 2009. The District Court approved the jury questionnaire in August, held a hearing in September, and rendered its decision on October 7, five weeks before trial commenced. By stipulation of the parties, the court's ruling was based on the responses to the questionnaires and on the exhibits submitted by Kingman (recordings of KBZK television broadcasts, copies of newspaper articles, census information, and circulation statistics for the Bozeman Daily Chronicle ). Kingman did not renew his motion for change of venue at the conclusion of voir dire or during trial. He states on appeal that his motion is based on presumed prejudice, not actual prejudice. ¶ 42 The Supreme Court's decision in Skilling and our decisions in Spotted Hawk, Dryman, and Coburn indicate that a variety of factors may bear on the question whether prejudicial, inflammatory publicity about the case has so saturated the community as to warrant a presumption that an impartial jury cannot be drawn therefrom. First, the size and characteristics of the community in which the crime occurred are clearly relevant. The larger and more diverse the jury pool, the more likely that 12 impartial individuals can be empaneled from that pool. See Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2915. Second, community sentiment is relevant. The more demonstrably enraged or inflamed the community is, the less likely it will be to find jurors who can render a decision free from bias. See Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. at 53-55, 55 P. at 1031-32; Dryman, 127 Mont. at 586-89, 269 P.2d at 799-801; Coburn, 202 Mont. at 30, 655 P.2d at 507. A third factor is the nature of the publicitywhether it is of the type that readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight, and whether it invites prejudgment of the defendant's culpability. See Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2916; Dryman, 127 Mont. at 589, 269 P.2d at 801; Coburn, 202 Mont. at 30-31, 655 P.2d at 507; see also Devlin, ¶ 24 (`Inflammatory' publicity is publicity which, by its nature, has the tendency to stir up in the community pervasive and strong passions of anger, hatred, indignation, revulsion, and upset such that there are reasonable grounds to believe that jurors chosen from this community could not determine the defendant's guilt or innocence in a fair and unbiased manner and based solely upon the evidence admitted at trial.). Another relevant factor is the amount of time that elapsed between the crime and the defendant's trial, and whether community passions diminished during that period. See Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2916; Dryman, 127 Mont. at 586-87, 269 P.2d at 799-800. Lastly, and of prime significance when evaluating post-verdict whether prejudice existed, is the question whether jurors' actions ultimately ran counter to a presumption of prejudicee.g., if they acquitted the defendant of some of the charges. See Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2916 (Skilling's jury acquitted him of nine insider-trading counts); U.S. v. Arzola-Amaya, 867 F.2d 1504, 1514 (5th Cir.1989) (The jury's ability to discern a failure of proof of guilt of some of the alleged crimes indicates a fair minded consideration of the issues and reinforces our belief and conclusion that the media coverage did not lead to the deprivation of [the defendants'] right to an impartial trial.). This list identifies some, but not necessarily all, of the factors pertinent to a presumed prejudice analysis. ¶ 43 In the present case, the District Court determined that the number of eligible jurors in Gallatin County was 63,000, from which a representative sample of 150 was drawn. The court observed that Kingman had been charged with a serious offense, but that homicide charges sadly are not a rare occurrence in Gallatin County recently. The court noted that the news articles and broadcasts presented by Kingman contained factual accounts of the background of the case and various courtroom proceedings occurring after Kingman's arrest. While the reports spoke of the brutality of the injuries inflicted on Overby, the court found that the information was not reported in an inflammatory manner, that terms such as allegations, accusations, and charges were used, and that the reports were not calculated to improperly sway public opinion against Kingman. ¶ 44 Nine of the ten articles provided by Kingman were from the Bozeman Daily Chronicle; one article was from a monthly publication entitled The BoZone; and the nine broadcasts were from local television station KBZK. Based on the statistics provided by Kingman, the District Court estimated that roughly half of the households in Gallatin County are exposed to the Chronicle on a daily basis. Furthermore, the KBZK news report, in conjunction with the station's sister affiliate in Butte, reaches approximately 100,000 viewers; however, the court had insufficient information to estimate how many individuals eligible to serve as jurors in Gallatin County are exposed to KBZK news reports daily. The court noted that six of the Chronicle articles and six of the KBZK reports were printed/aired in the first 36 days following the incident, that the remaining articles and broadcasts were printed/aired in late 2008 and early 2009, and that trial was set for November 12, 2009. ¶ 45 Finally, as to ostensible adverse community reaction, the District Court rejected Kingman's argument that the fundraising efforts to assist Overby were indicative of, and fostered, a community-held perception that Overby was an innocent victim and Kingman was a brutal, unprovoked attacker. The court observed that Kingman had presented no evidence in support of this contention. Turning to the juror questionnaires, the court noted that 27 of the 150 respondents had marked yes to the question: As a result of what you have seen, heard, read or discussed about this case, have you formed an opinion that would affect your ability to serve as a juror? (As noted, 108 marked no and 15 left the question blank.) The court found this percentage of affirmative responses to be insufficient to establish that Kingman could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Gallatin County, particularly since the question provided no insight into what the juror's opinion was, why the juror believed that opinion would affect his or her ability to serve, and whether the juror could lay that opinion aside and render a verdict based on the evidence presented. The questionnaire also asked those respondents who had read, heard, seen, or discussed the case to please tell us everything you think you know about this case, in as much detail as possible. In response, some of the prospective jurors indicated they had heard a great deal about the case, and they described what they knew using terms that had been utilized in news reports, such as attack, stabbed, and the victim was injured and unconscious. Kingman claimed these responses showed that numerous jurors actually had formed an opinion about the case and about his guilt which affected their ability to be impartial, even if they were not aware that they had formed such an opinion. The District Court rejected this argument, however, observing that while 96 of the 150 prospective jurors indicated they had read, seen, or heard something about the case, 108 respondents indicated they had not formed an opinion that would affect their ability to serve. The court refused to infer that mere knowledge of the case, even in some detail, equates to prejudice against Kingman or a fixed opinion about his guilt. ¶ 46 For these reasons, the District Court concluded that Kingman had failed to show a reasonable possibility that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Gallatin County due to prejudicial pretrial publicity. Kingman disagrees with the court's analysis and argues that several factors mandate a finding of presumed prejudice. ¶ 47 First, Kingman contends that the circumstances of the fight, in which he inflicted extensive injuries with his hands and then expressed pleasure about having done so, would reasonably elicit revulsion and antipathy. He asserts that the news accounts used evocative and emotional language to describe the events, emphasized the graphic details of Overby's injuries, and presented a hackneyed narrative in which Kingman was portrayed as a dangerous outsider who disturbed the tranquility of a small community by committing a brutal, vicious, and savage crime against an esteemed local. Having reviewed the articles and broadcasts, however, we cannot agree that the media reports were as slanted and inflammatory as Kingman suggests. Although the reports describe a brutal and gruesome beating, the incident is not reported in a sensationalized manner. The reports do not go beyond an objective dissemination of information, nor do they inflame an already angry populace. Cf. Coburn, 202 Mont. at 30-31, 655 P.2d at 507. The reports do not take a position on Kingman's guilt. Cf. Dryman, 127 Mont. at 582-83, 269 P.2d at 797-98. They use terms such as allegations, accusations, and charges. Most of the complained-of reports were published or broadcast within the first few weeks after the fight, over a year before Kingman's trial. Notably, a subsequent Chronicle article, dated May 28, 2009, reports Kingman's side of the story and his claim that Overby was the aggressor and Kingman acted in self-defense. While Kingman speculates that the impact of the early publicity had not appreciably diminished by the time of trial, we do not agree that this is a case like Dryman, where the impact of the news items was still felt more than a year after they were published. See 127 Mont. at 586, 269 P.2d at 799 (opinion of the Court), 127 Mont. at 591, 269 P.2d at 802 (Anderson & Angstman, JJ., dissenting). Contrary to Kingman's characterizations, the September and October 2008 media reports were not so provocative as to leave the Gallatin County citizenry chomping at the bit for 13 months to exact retribution on Kingman. ¶ 48 Second, Kingman observes that his dramatic confession in the voicemail left for Zane was reported in three newspaper articles and one television broadcast (all in late September and early October 2008). He asserts that this is the type of information which, like the videotaped confession in Rideau, readers and viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight. He also points out that even where the information reported by the media is factual (as opposed to editorializing), it may still have a prejudicial impact. He maintains that his confession was blatantly prejudicial. ¶ 49 It is true that factual information may create prejudice in the community. See e.g. Dryman, 127 Mont. at 590, 269 P.2d at 801 (the fact that Dryman had pleaded guilty was one of the main reasons that the widespread and deep-seated opinion in Toole County was that he was guilty and should be hanged); Devlin, ¶ 22 (factual information may be reported in an inflammatory manner, and the reporting of factual information may be inflammatory in light of the particular circumstances). It is also true that exposing prospective jurors to a defendant's recorded confession raises concerns about whether the jurors can shut out this information and judge the defendant impartially. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. We are not persuaded here, however, that the reporting of Kingman's voicemail message justifies presumed prejudice. It should be noted that the message was not broadcast or printed repeatedly. One of the Chronicle articles cited by Kingman does not quote from his message at all, and a second article purports to recite information contained in charging documents. The third article, dated September 20, 2008, and the KBZK broadcast of the same date both report that the prosecution played the voicemail message at Kingman's bail hearing. The article quotes a significant portion of what Kingman said, and the KBZK broadcast (a copy of which is contained in the record) includes a somewhat indiscernible snippet of the message being played at the bail hearing, with Kingman quoted as saying: I was just like crack, crack, crack, crack on this . I felt, oh god it felt so good. So good. Call me back when you get this. In Rideau, however, the Supreme Court emphasized the inherently prejudicial impact of repeatedly viewing Rideau confess in detail during a 20-minute interrogation by the local sheriff. 373 U.S. at 724, 83 S.Ct. at 1418. The Court stated that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trialat which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419 (emphasis in original). Whereas the television broadcasts of Rideau showed him admitting, under questioning by authorities, that he had committed three crimeshence the Supreme Court's observation that this in a very real sense was Rideau's trialthe broadcast here involved an excerpt of a voicemail message in which the speaker engaged in a drunken and adrenaline-hyped rant to a friend. Thus, purely as a qualitative matter, the present case is distinguishable from Rideau in that Kingman's voicemail message cannot fairly be characterized as his trial to those who heard it. But more importantly, his confession during the message was not broadcast or printed repeatedly and in depth. In fact, it was broadcast briefly, and only once, on television. Likewise, it was quoted only once in the newspaper (twice, if one also considers the short quotations taken from charging documents in the second article). Importantly, these instances occurred early on, and long before trial. On these facts, we will not presume that the entire jury pool was prejudiced against Kingman. ¶ 50 Third, Kingman argues that the fundraising efforts for Overby are evidence that the community was inflamed by the pretrial publicity. He quotes in part from Maine v. Super. Ct. of Mendocino Co., 68 Cal.2d 375, 66 Cal.Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372 (1968), wherein the California Supreme Court observed: One of the victims, the girl, was discovered on a public road nearly unconscious with bullet wounds about her neck and head. Her condition was critical and several complicated operations were performed to save her life. Local citizens immediately organized a fund to help the girl's parents defray the medical expenses, and the Ukiah Daily Journal, the local newspaper, urged every citizen to contribute. It is no small measure of the community's laudable warmth and generosity that a substantial sum was quickly raised, mostly in modest contributions. We do not hold it to be an invariable rule that sympathy for a victim demonstrates antipathy to the alleged perpetrators of an offense. But such pervasive civic involvement in the fate of a victim, particularly when the events all transpire in a relatively small community, is a strong indication that the venue should be changed. Maine, 66 Cal.Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d at 378-79 (footnote omitted). In the present case, Overby's friends placed donation jars in several local bars and at Poor Richard's News on Main Street, set up a fund at Big Sky Western Bank, and organized a benefit in Big Sky that raised $5,800. As Kingman notes, these fundraising activities are a tribute to the kindness and generosity of the people of Gallatin County. Kingman has not shown, however, that they constitute such pervasive civic involvement in Overby's fate as to justify a presumption of communitywide antipathy toward Kingman. There is no evidence that the media or Overby's friends urged every citizen to contribute. In fact, Kingman has produced no evidence as to how many individuals provided contributions and how much of the community was involved in the fundraising. It bears repeating that a motion for change of venue requires ... fact-specific proof by the moving party. Devlin, ¶ 30. ¶ 51 Lastly, Kingman argues that the publicity's pervasiveness and prejudicial effect is evidenced by the 27 questionnaire respondents who marked that, as a result of what they had seen, read, heard, or discussed about the case, they had formed an opinion that would affect their ability to serve as jurors. He also posits that the 96 respondents who indicated that they had seen, read, or heard something about the case could be predisposed toward conviction. Regarding this latter point, he asserts that social science has repeatedly correlated potential jurors' exposure to pretrial publicity and prejudgment of criminal defendants. [3] Even if such a correlation exists, however, it does not justify presuming in this case that Kingman could not obtain an unbiased jury in Gallatin County. Showing that some of the potential jurors know about the case does not suffice to demonstrate that an irrepressibly hostile attitude pervaded the community. See Stafford, 34 F.3d at 1567. Moreover, Kingman reads way more into the questionnaire responses than is warranted. Nearly a third of the respondents indicated that they had not seen, read, or heard anything about the case, and nearly three-quarters of the respondents indicated that they had not formed an opinion that would affect their ability to serve as jurors. These numbers belie a presumption that the entire jury pool was corrupted by anti-Kingman press coverage. Even with regard to the 27 persons who indicated that they had formed an opinion, this question is not very useful in assessing prejudice. As the District Court noted, the question provides no insight into what the juror's opinion was, why the juror believed that opinion would affect his or her ability to serve, and whether the juror could lay that opinion aside and render a verdict based on the evidence presented. As we have pointed out before, it is not required that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues or that jurors be without any impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. Indeed, the mere existence of a preconceived notion as to the accused's guilt or innocence, without more, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality. The relevant question is whether the juror can lay aside his or her impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Devlin, ¶ 32. The questionnaire responses here do not show that the jury pool was firmly predisposed to convict Kingman. ¶ 52 Kingman raises a few other considerations, none of which merits discussion. In light of all the facts and circumstances discussed above, we hold under the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kingman's motion to change venue based on presumed prejudice. Kingman's evidence of pretrial publicity and community sentiment does not even come close to meeting the high standard necessary to establish such prejudice. There is no indication that the Gallatin County populace was incensed. Nor is there any evidence of a circus atmosphere or lynch mob mentality directed at Kingman. He has not shown that an irrepressibly hostile attitude pervaded the jury pool. More to the point, he has not demonstrated that the complained-of publicity effectively displaced the judicial process and dictated the community's opinion as to his guilt or innocence. Indeed, Kingman's claim of presumed prejudice is substantially refuted by the fact that he ultimately was acquitted of the more serious charge of attempted deliberate homicide and convicted instead of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. It would be odd for an appellate court to presume prejudice in a case in which jurors' actions run counter to that presumption. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2916. ¶ 53 Issue 2. Whether Kingman's right of dignity under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution was violated by the prosecutor's arguments during sentencing. ¶ 54 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment. As justification, he pointed to the savage nature of the beating, the severity of the injuries suffered by Overby, Kingman's animalistic voice describing in the voicemail message how much joy and satisfaction he felt, and the fact that the next morning Kingman asked the physician who attended to his injured hand (and who later testified at trial) whether he would be able to punch again. The prosecutor also cited Kingman's criminal history, the violent nature of some of his past offenses, his failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his previous probation, and the need to protect the public. Finally, the prosecutor discussed the psychological evaluations of Kingman, which found that he had problems with anger and impulse control, especially when under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Then, to sum up his argument, the prosecutor stated: The basis for this recommendation is very simple, and it's based upon a very simple concept. Some animals need to be caged. Some creatures are so dangerous that society can't risk them being amongst us. What Mr. Kingman did in September of 2008 is inhuman. No one does that. He does not need to be treated with any sort of respect or admiration. When he's over at the Detention Center acting up, pounding on walls, breaking sprinkler heads, [4] he's acting as the State has just characterized himas a caged animal. And that's where he needs to be. ¶ 55 Defense counsel, as noted, took issue with the prosecutor's characterizations. He argued that it is downright offensive and wrong to label anyone as an animal that needs to be locked up in a cage. Counsel noted that [p]eople in this country are afforded at least some measure of human dignity. And regardless of what they've done,... they're still people. Counsel then argued for less than the maximum sentence in light of the fact that Kingman initially had attempted to walk away from the altercation with Overby but Overby continued to provoke and shove Kingman from behind. Counsel asserted that this is not a case of Mr. Kingman walking down the street and randomly attacking someone. This is a case of self-defense gone too far. Counsel then went on to discuss Kingman's difficult family background, his problems with chemical dependency, and the findings in the psychological reports that his personality disorders are treatable. Counsel argued that Kingman's potential to be a productive member of society would be wasted if he were given the maximum sentence. Counsel recommended five years. Kingman then gave a statement in which he apologized to Overby and Overby's family. ¶ 56 In pronouncing sentence, the District Court acknowledged Kingman's personality disorders and the positive prognosis for rehabilitation. The court also noted Kingman's willingness to take responsibility for his actions and his honest expressions of remorse for what he had done. Nevertheless, the court imposed the maximum sentence of 20 years at Montana State Prison. In so doing, the court explained that none of the factors identified by Kingman and his counsel mitigated his culpability. The circumstances of this crime are outrageous; they're aggravated; they are intolerable. They cannot be mitigated or explained by the defendant's social history or excused by his use or abuse of alcohol and drugs. The court observed that Kingman's actions were deliberate. He did not walk away when he could have. He totally lost control of himself, and he continued to beat Mr. Overby after he was down on the ground. Moreover, after the attack, Kingman was not horrified by what he had done or how he had responded. Instead, he was thrilled with the effect of what he did and how he continued to beat Paul Overby like `Rocky punching wet meat.' The court also factored into its consideration the severity of the injuries inflicted by Kingman and his significant criminal history involving violence and anger mixed with drug and alcohol abuse. In addition, the court noted Kingman's repeated failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his previous probation and his instances of misconduct and property damage while incarcerated on the current offense. The court found that Kingman cannot currently function in the community, he is a danger to any community in which he stays with his anger uncontrolled and his alcohol and drug abuse unchecked, and he requires long-term incarceration to protect the victim and society. ¶ 57 Kingman contends on appeal that in order to secure the maximum sentence, the prosecutor dehumanized Kingman by referring to him as an animal that needs to be caged. Kingman contends that this violated his right to human dignity under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, which states: The dignity of the human being is inviolable.... Kingman requests that we vacate his sentence and remand his case for resentencing before a different judge. ¶ 58 At the outset, certain of the prosecutor's remarks at the sentencing hearing clearly pushed the bounds of proper argument. The prosecutor's statement that Kingman does not need to be treated with any sort of respect is both wrong and inappropriate, and we categorically reject it. Moreover, the prosecutor's suggestion that the court ought to view Kingman as an animal needing to be caged is likewise inappropriate. As we have recognized, treatment which degrades or demeans persons, that is, treatment which deliberately reduces the value of persons, and which fails to acknowledge their worth as persons, directly violates their dignity. Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶ 81, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872. `The reformation and prevention functions of punishment both express the community's disrespect for the actions of the criminal, but the processes of punishment must never disrespect the core humanity of the prisoner.' Walker, ¶ 81 (emphases added) (quoting Matthew O. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution's Dignity Clause with Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L.Rev. 301, 331 (2000)). These principles apply no less to the proceeding in which the appropriate punishment is determined, and argument which, in that context, deliberately reduces the value of the convicted defendant or disrespects the defendant's core humanity is improper. ¶ 59 That being said, we cannot agree with Kingman's premise that the prosecutor's remarksoffensive as they may have been actually played any part in the District Court's decision to impose the maximum sentence. For one thing, defense counsel made a point of arguing to the court that it could not sentence Kingman based on the notion that he is an animal. Furthermore, in reviewing the prosecutor's recommendation, the court did not even acknowledge the animal remarks. The court observed: Chief Deputy County Attorney Whipple has argued that the case has to be considered under its own facts and circumstances, that this defendant is a dangerous individual, who has spent a number of years in and out of prison in California; who has a history of anger issues and severe drug and alcohol abuse and committed this crime while extremely intoxicated, that he has continued to act out in anger even while participating in counseling and receiving medication for his mental health issues. The State feels that it is imperative that he not have an opportunity to hurt anyone else. [Emphases added.] Finally, the court's articulated reasons make it clear that the court based Kingman's sentence on the heinous and outrageous nature of the offense, the severity of the injuries inflicted on Overby, Kingman's initial thrill over what he had done, his criminal history, his pattern of violence and anger mixed with drug and alcohol abuse, and the danger that he posed to the community. These are all valid considerations when sentencing. See § 46-18-101, MCA; State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 72, 342 Mont. 1, 180 P.3d 1102 (a sentencing court may consider evidence relating to the crime, the defendant's character, background history, mental and physical condition, and any other evidence the court considers to have probative force). ¶ 60 Kingman notes in his opening brief that he claims no improper action on the part of the district court in regard to his sentencing. His claim, therefore, appears to be that when a prosecutor makes improper argument at sentencing, the defendant is entitled to be resentenced (by a different judge) even though the prosecutor's remarks had no influence on the trial court's decision to impose the concededly legal sentence that the defendant received. It is questionable whether such a rule would serve any remedial purpose. But, in any event, we decline to adopt this rule in the circumstances presented here.