Opinion ID: 2498587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsection 10-1-135(10)(a) Applies Pre-Verdict

Text: ¶ 13 Petitioners argue that section 10-1-135 does not address the pre-verdict calculation of the reasonable value of medical expenses, or the admissibility of evidence on that issue. Instead, Petitioners claim, the statute only applies to post-verdict procedures because it limits the rights of a subrogated health insurance company to be repaid from settlement or judgment proceeds that the insured has already recovered from a tort defendant. Again, we disagree. ¶ 14 When interpreting a statute, we strive to give effect to the legislative purposes by adopting an interpretation that best effectuates those purposes. Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo.2010). In order to ascertain the legislative intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the language its commonly accepted and understood meaning. Id. (citations omitted). When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo.1992). ¶ 15 Section 10-1-135 contains ten subsections, most of which expressly concern post-judgment subrogation. See, e.g., § 10-1-135(3)(a)(I) (Reimbursement or subrogation pursuant to a provision in an insurance policy. . . is permitted only if the injured party has first been fully compensated for all damages arising out of the claim.). The plain language of subsection 10-1-135(10)(a), however, is not limited to post-judgment situations. It states in the relevant part: The fact or amount of any collateral source payment or benefits shall not be admitted as evidence in any action against an alleged third-party tortfeasor or in an action to recover benefits under [the uninsured motorist coverage statute]. § 10-1-135(10)(a) (emphasis added). ¶ 16 The plain meaning of the phrase any action includes this ongoing case because the term any is comprehensive enough to encompass both pre- and post-verdict proceedings. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it applied subsection 10-1-135(10)(a) pre-verdict.