Opinion ID: 1186846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutionality of the aerial observation

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. Article I, Section 5, of the Hawaii State Constitution similarly protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and additionally guarantees Hawaii's citizens the right of privacy. Appellant's major contention is that the aerial observation by police was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and an impermissible governmental invasion of privacy under Article I, Section 5, of the Hawaii State Constitution. Thus, defendant reasons, the search warrant issued as a result of the aerial surveillance was illegal and all evidence seized from defendant and his premises should have been suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The court below found that the helicopter surveillance was a search but came within the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment and denied the motion to suppress. Although we find that the circuit court's decision was correct, our affirmance rests on different reasoning. This, of course, does not disturb the conclusion reached by the court below. Waianae Model Neighborhood Area Association v. City and County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 40, 514 P.2d 861 (1973); Federal Electric Corp. v. Fasi, 56 Haw. 57, 527 P.2d 1284 (1974). The initial question to be decided is whether the helicopter observation by Officer Pereira constituted a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), is the leading case on the scope of the Fourth Amendment. There, the Supreme Court held that the governmental bugging of a caller in a public phone booth was a search to which the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment applied. In Katz, the court rejected the idea that some areas are automatically accorded constitutional protection while others are not, saying But this effort to decide whether or not a given area, viewed in the abstract, is constitutionally protected deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511. The opinion has generally been understood to hold that official intrusions into matters or activities as to which an individual has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy are searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable expectation of privacy is something more than just a subjective expectation of privacy, it must also be an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Harlan, J., concurring, United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516. Even before Katz, however, the courts had recognized that certain governmental observations, interceptions and seizures were beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment. One such exception has been where an object or activity is open and visible to members of the public. In this situation, it is obvious that no reasonable expectation of privacy can be asserted since the object or activity is in open view for any person to observe. Thus, in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924), federal revenue agents on private land without a warrant who observed defendant drop a jug of moonshine whiskey were allowed to testify as to their observations. The Supreme Court, in finding the testimony admissible, stated The only shadow of a ground for bringing up the case is drawn from the hypothesis that the examination of the vessels took place upon (defendant's) father's land. As to that, it is enough to say that . . the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects is not extended to the open fields. 265 U.S. at 59, 44 S.Ct. at 446. Accord, Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974) (approving Hester v. United States, supra ); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (also approving Hester v. United States, supra ). Similarly, in United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927), when a Coast Guard patrol boat on the high seas approached a rum runner's launch to examine it with a search light, the Supreme Court could say that no search on the high seas [was] shown. 274 U.S. at 563, 47 S.Ct. at 748. While this open view exception has sometimes been categorized under the plain view exception, it should be distinguished from those instances in which the view takes place after an intrusion into activities or areas as to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the latter instance, if the original intrusion is justified, such as by consent, hot pursuit, warrant or as incident to an arrest, objects sighted in plain view will be admissible so long as the view was inadvertent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), discussion beginning at 465, 91 S.Ct. 2022. However, in the open view situation no search is involved and the requirement that the view be inadvertent is not applicable. Although this court has never decided a case on the basis of the open view doctrine, in State v. Hanawahine, 50 Haw. 461, 443 P.2d 149 (1968), we recognized that [a] search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed and it is not a search to observe that which is open to view ... What is in open view, if no dominion is exercised over it, is not a search. [Citations omitted.] 50 Haw. at 465, 443 P.2d at 152. Turning now to the facts in the instant case, we must determine whether defendant Stachler had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his marijuana patch. The lower court found, and we do not disturb that finding, that applying state law and Civil Aeronautics Board [3] regulations, the police helicopter was flying at a lawful and reasonable height, and that therefore Officer Pereira had a right to be where he was at the time of the aerial observation. [4] We do not believe that the height of the helicopter is determinative in every instance, but should be only one factor in considering the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. We believe that, consistent with Katz, in some cases reasonable expectations of privacy may ascend into the airspace and claim Fourth Amendment protection. Dean v. Superior Court for County of Nevada, 35 Cal. App.3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973). This is not such a case. If the lower court had found that the height of a helicopter was unreasonably low or violated applicable laws and regulations, or that there had been continued aerial harassment or prolonged aerial surveillance of the Stachler property stretching out over hours or days, or that highly sophisticated viewing devices had been employed, we might well decide differently. [5] Similarly, if it had been shown that helicopter flights were rare occurrences in the area, the objective reasonableness of defendant's expectation of privacy would be more credible. However, the lower court found that although this was a sparsely populated area there were occasional helicopter flights over the area by the National Guard and crop dusters and there was testimony that light aircraft, including tour, pleasure and business craft, flew over the area each day. Finally we think that defendant Stachler could have no reasonable expectation of privacy as to observation, from a reasonable height, of his open marijuana patch. We look to the decision in Dean v. Superior Court for County of Nevada, supra , for guidance in this relatively new area of search and seizure law. In Dean, defendant claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy from airplane surveillance in a marijuana field about half the size of a football field located in the Sierra foothills. The court, in holding that the aerial overflights which revealed the open marijuana fields did not violate the Fourth Amendment, said One who establishes a three-quarter-acre tract of cultivation surrounded by forests exhibits no reasonable expectation of immunity from overflight. The contraband character of his crop doubtless arouses an internal, uncommunicated need for secrecy; the need is not exhibited, entirely subjective, highly personalized, and not consistent with the common habits of mankind in the use of agricultural and woodland areas. Aside from an uncommunicated need to hide his clandestine activity, the occupant exhibits no reasonable expectation of privacy consistent with the common habits of persons engaged in agriculture. 35 Cal. App.3d at 117-118, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589. In the instant case, defendant Stachler's expectation of privacy was also not exhibited and entirely subjective, and it was certainly inconsistent with the common habits of persons engaged in agriculture. It is true that the marijuana patch in this case was only 9 x 12 feet while in the Dean case the marijuana covered three-quarters of an acre. Yet that difference does not fundamentally change the principle that, consistent with the common habits of an agriculturist, one growing a crop in an open field would not expect privacy from overflight. If defendant had been engaged in growing taro, sweet potato or banana, surely he would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to his crop from aerial observation. And, society as a whole would not find such an expectation of privacy objectively reasonable according to the common habits of mankind. Since we find that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation, conducted at a reasonable height, as to his open marijuana patch, it follows that the helicopter surveillance in this case was not a search in the constitutional sense and Officer Pereira's observation falls within the parameters of the open view doctrine discussed above. Defendant's additional argument that the helicopter observation was an invasion of privacy prohibited by Article I, § 5, of the Hawaii State Constitution is without merit. In State v. Roy, 54 Haw. 513, 510 P.2d 1066 (1973), we discussed the phrase invasion of privacy and noted that it had been added to Article I, § 5, in 1968. We said A careful review of Report No. 55 of the 1968 Constitutional Convention, in which the amendment was proposed, and of the debates in the Committee of the Whole regarding that amendment, has led us to conclude that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention added to article I, § 5 the words invasions of privacy out of a concern to protect against extensive governmental use of electronic surveillance techniques... . 54 Haw. at 517, 510 P.2d at 1068. Additionally, Report No. 55 of the 1968 Constitutional Convention shows that the amendment was also intended to guard against undue government inquiry into and regulation of those areas of a person's life which are necessary to insure man's individuality and human dignity. Proceedings of the 1968 Constitutional Convention, p. 234. Our holding above that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to his open marijuana patch viewed from a helicopter operated at a legal and reasonable height, disposes of defendant's contention that the observation was an undue government inquiry into his life. The marijuana patch was open to the view of any member of the public who happened to be flying over defendant's property. There was no search or inquiry in the instant case and there has been no showing that sophisticated electronic surveillance techniques were employed. [6] As we indicated above, if there had been such a showing, this case would come to us in an entirely different posture.