Opinion ID: 1309215
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Subsequent Crime

Text: As previously indicated, the prosecutor at the penalty phase was permitted, over objection, to present evidence that defendant had committed a forcible kidnapping of a young girl in Albany and had been convicted of that offense. (27) Because the crime occurred three months after the Salazar murder, defendant now contends that the evidence of the Albany kidnapping was inadmissible because it did not involve a prior offense. The point lacks merit. Under the 1977 death penalty law applicable here, the People were permitted to present evidence as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including ... the presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence.... (Former § 190.3, italics added.) The same section provided that, in deciding penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account (b) The presence or absence of [forceful or violent] criminal activity by the defendant ... Neither of these provisions was limited to prior criminal activity. The section also contained, however, two further references to the subject. One unnumbered paragraph of former section 190.3 excluded evidence of other criminal activity which did not involve force or violence, while another paragraph excluded evidence of  prior criminal activity (italics added) for an offense of which defendant was acquitted. Neither of these latter two paragraphs is applicable here, and we find no legislative intent to limit the penalty phase evidence to forceful or violent criminal activity which preceded the charged offense. In light of the penalty jury's role, it would be anomalous to exclude from its consideration highly relevant evidence regarding the defendant's violent character and background. (See People v. Bentley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 458, 460 [24 Cal. Rptr. 685, 374 P.2d 645] [subsequent crime admissible at penalty phase].) People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-204 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], supports our conclusion. There, we construed the language of the 1978 death penalty law, permitting consideration of the defendant's violent or nonviolent  prior felony convictions (italics added) as limited to nonviolent convictions entered before the charged offense was committed. Significantly, we observed that as to violent crimes, Subdivision (b) [of § 190.3] allows in all evidence of violent criminality to show defendant's propensity for violence. (P. 202, italics in original.) We so stated despite the fact that other language in section 190.3 provided (in language identical to the 1977 law discussed above) that no evidence of prior criminal activity shall be admitted for an offense of which defendant was acquitted. Balderas thereby implicitly rejected the present argument that one isolated inclusion of the word prior in section 190.3 disclosed an intent generally to limit the admission of evidence of defendant's violent criminal activity. Nor can we think of any sound policy reason for limiting the penalty phase evidence in the manner suggested by defendant. Similarly, we see no abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting the People to explore the details of the Albany kidnapping, rather than restricting them to proof of the bare fact of that offense. Defendant now suggests that the trial court should have merely admitted proof of the prior conviction, without the sordid details, but former section 190.3 contained no such restriction on proof of forcible or violent criminal activity. We conclude that the circumstances surrounding defendant's subsequent offense were properly admitted. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]; People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 68; People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 773.)