Opinion ID: 2438852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Management

Text: The language we have used about class actions splintering into separate cases requires examination in the context of Justice George Rose Smith's language in the Drew case. We should never depart from his assertion that, in deciding whether a class is to be certified, we must consider whether certification would be fair to all the parties. Clearly, it would have been unfair in the Drew case to have held that First Federal could present its defenses to the claims of some but not all of the members of the plaintiff class. Just as clearly it would have been unfair to prohibit Ark-La from presenting all its defenses with respect to the leases in the Morris case. Just as clearly it would be improper for us to hold that the unions in the case before us now could not present all their defenses to the individual claims of the non-union members who are the members of the putative class. But to assume that any of these injustices will occur is to assume that the action will not be managed by the trial court. By limiting the issue to be tried in a representative fashion to the one that is common to all, the trial court can achieve real efficiency. The common question here is whether the unions can be held liable for the actions of their members during the strike. If that question is answered in the negative, then the case is over except for the claims against the named individual defendants which could not be certified as a class action. If the question is answered affirmatively, then the trial court will surely have splintered cases to try with respect to the damages asserted by each member of each of the subclasses, but efficiency will still be achieved, as none of the plaintiffs would have to prove the unions' basic liability. Is that unfair? It is not unfair to the unions, as they will be able to defend fully on the basic liability claim, and they will have the opportunity to present individual defenses to the claims of individual class members if their liability has been established in the first phase of the trial. They lose nothing. Would it be fair to the class members to require them to sue individually? The evidence so far shows that each putative class member has a claim that is too small to permit pursuing it economically. If they cannot sue as a class, the chances are they will not sue at all. We agree with the unions' argument that the sole fact that the claims are small is not a reason to permit a class action, but it is a consideration which has appeared when other courts, as we must do, have considered whether the class action is superior to other forms of relief. See C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, supra, § 1779, n. 21, citing Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.1978), affirmed on other grounds, sub nom. Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980); Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674 (D.C.N.Y.1974); and Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581 (D.C.Minn.1973). We recognize that the trial court has substantial power to manage a class action even though the directions given in our Rule 23 are not as extensive as those given in the comparable federal rule. This power to manage the action contributes to the discretion we find in the trial court to determine whether a class should be certified. We conclude there was no abuse in this case.