Opinion ID: 1270666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is a Lease to a Beneficial New Industry Exempt from Competitive Bid Requirements?

Text: The City contends that the disposition of property pursuant to AS 29.48.260(e) is not subject to the competitive bid requirements of AS 29.48.260(c). [17] The City argues that, because a lease under AS 29.48.260(e) may be upon the terms and conditions the assembly or council considers advantageous to the community, a municipality may negotiate such a lease rather than putting it out to bid. [18] We disagree. We find that AS 29.48.260(e) merely sets forth a purpose for which municipalities are authorized to acquire and hold property; it does not affect the applicability of procedural requirements imposed by other parts of the statute. We have not previously construed the statute in question, and we therefore start our analysis with the language of the statute itself. [19] It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that, when possible, effect should be given to all provisions of a statute so that no part of the statute is superfluous. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973) (hereinafter Sutherland). We find that AS 29.48.260(e), even when construed so as not to create an exemption from the competitive bid requirements, still has considerable meaning and importance. AS 29.48.010(9) grants to municipalities the general power to acquire, manage, control, use and dispose of property, but such action by the municipality must be for a purpose authorized under ... law... . [20] AS 29.48.030 sets forth some of the approved purposes. It authorizes municipalities to exercise the powers necessary to provide certain public facilities and services, and it specifically authorizes a municipality to provide cold storage plants. [21] AS 29.48.260(e) is another provision which sets forth a purpose in pursuit of which municipalities may exercise their power under AS 29.48.010 to acquire or dispose of property  namely making sites available for beneficial new industries. This specific authorization is important in two respects. First, the general rule is that municipalities may acquire and hold land only for a public purpose. See 2A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law §§ 20.00 & 20.10 (1979) (citing the great weight of authority) (hereinafter Antieau); 10 E. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 28.11 & 28.12 (3d ed. F. Ellard 1966) (hereinafter McQuillan). AS 29.48.260(e), however, authorizes a municipality to acquire land for a private, not a public, purpose, when the purpose is to make sites available for beneficial new industries. [22] Second, the grant of power is important because municipalities generally must have specific authorization to acquire and hold land outside the territorial limits of the municipality. See 1 Antieau §§ 5.10 & 5.11; 2 McQuillan § 10.07. AS 29.48.260(e) provides (emphasis added): A municipality, in order to make sites available for beneficial new industries, may acquire and hold real property, either inside or outside the corporate limits. ... This is one of several sections in title 29 which authorize extra-territorial activity of a municipality for specified purposes. [23] We do not believe that the legislature, in adopting AS 29.48.260(e), intended to create an exception to the procedural requirements of AS 28.48.260(c). AS 29.48.260(c) sets forth the formal procedure that a municipality must establish by ordinance for the sale, lease or disposition of real property. This section requires an appraisal of the property, public notice, public auction or opening of sealed bids; if the property or interest in the property is worth more than $25,000, the transaction must be ratified by the voters. [24] Two of the subsections of AS 29.48.260 authorizing particular types of property transactions contain explicit language exempting those transactions from the procedural requirements of subsection (c). Subsection (b), for example, authorizes the municipality to engage in certain transactions [n]otwithstanding the provisions of (c) of this section. Subsection (d), authorizing land transactions with the state, similarly includes the phrase, in which event the provisions of (c) of this section do not apply. On the other hand, subsection (a) contains no language exempting transactions pursuant to that subsection from the requirements of subsection (c). Likewise, subsection (e), which is in question here, contains no explicit exemption. Since the legislature demonstrated its awareness of subsection (c) by explicitly exempting some types of transactions from its requirements, we must conclude that the legislature intended not to exempt transactions under subsections (a) and (e) from its requirements. [25] Where the legislature inserted an explicit exemption in some subsections and not in others, it would be inappropriate for us to find an implied exemption in a subsection where the legislature obviously chose not to insert an exemption. Moreover, as pointed out in Justice Rabinowitz' concurring opinion, the statutes which preceded the present AS 29.48.260(e) specifically exempted from voter ratification requirements those municipal property transactions which sought to establish new beneficial industries in the community. The exemption was achieved by expressly providing that such transactions were not within the category subject to the ratification requirement. [26] These specific exemptions show that the legislature was aware of the arguable need for such transactions to be free from the restraints imposed by the ratification requirement. We conclude that the legislature's failure to include such a specific exemption in the present statute evidences an intent not to exempt transactions under subsection (e) from the requirements imposed by subsection (c). We base our decision on this construction of the statute despite the apparent willingness of appellants' counsel to concede that AS 29.48.260(e) does create an exception to the competitive bid requirements. [27] It would be within our power to find that appellants had waived this point by their failure to brief or argue it. See Fairview Development, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks, 475 P.2d 35, 36 (Alaska 1970). Competitive bid requirements for the letting of public contracts, however, are intended to protect the public and to insure that the government body in question obtains the most favorable terms possible in its contracts. 1A Antieau § 10.26 (1974); 10 McQuillan § 29.29. Where, as here, the public is the intended beneficiary of a statutory requirement, we do not believe it would be appropriate to recognize a waiver of that requirement. Cf. 2A Sutherland § 55.08 (laws enacted for the protection of third persons should not be permitted to be waived since the third persons interested in the statute are not made parties to the waiver). We conclude that AS 29.48.260(e) does not establish an exemption from the bid requirements of AS 29.48.260(c), and we therefore reverse the decision of the superior court on this issue.