Opinion ID: 1919580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of the Sewerage and Water Board

Text: The lower courts ruled that the S & WB was negligent in failing to repair timely the fault in the feeder line supplying power to the two large pumps when the feeder line had been inoperative for three months at the time of the flood. The lower courts further ruled that the S & WB's inability to use Pump B because of the negligent failure to repair the fault was a cause-in-fact of those damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of additional flooding and of the prolonged presence of the floodwaters. The S & WB challenged these rulings on both negligence and causation. Under the duty-risk approach to determining tort liability, the court first determines whether the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's damages. Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So.2d 1 (La.1989); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So.2d 821 (1970). This determination is usually a but for inquiry that tests whether the damages would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. The substantial factor inquiry is also useful to determine cause-in-fact when the conduct of each of two or more persons actually contributes to the plaintiff's harm even though the harm would have occurred without the interaction of one. Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of N.O., 284 So.2d 905, 913 (La.1973); William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort, 22 Loy L.Rev. 903, 904-05 (1976). In the present case, the S & WB contends that any negligence on its part was not a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs' damages because the Lower Coast would have flooded even if Pump B had been fully operational. The S & WB argues that the heavy rains which in fact caused the damages were a force majeure which it did not cause and could not have prevented. The term force majeure means a superior or irresistible force. Black's Law Dictionary 645 (6th ed. 1990). The concept of force majeure is similar to the common law concept of act of God, which has been defined as a providential occurrence or extraordinary manifestation of the forces of nature which could not have been foreseen and the effect thereof avoided by the exercise of reasonable prudence, diligence and care, or by the use of those means which the situation renders reasonable to employ. Southern Air Transp. v. Gulf Airways, 215 La. 366, 375, 40 So.2d 787, 791 (1949). When a force majeure or act of God combines or concurs with the conduct of a defendant to produce an injury, the defendant may be held liable for any damages that would not have occurred but for its own conduct or omission. Brantley v. Tremont & Gulf Ry., 226 La. 176, 75 So.2d 236 (1954). There can be, and frequently is, more than one cause of a particular injury. A party's conduct is a cause-in-fact of harm to another whenever it is a substantial factor in bringing about that harm. Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of N.O., 284 So.2d 905, 913 (La.1973); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298, 302 (1962). Michael Ports, an expert in civil engineering, hydraulics and hydrology, explained that the rate of arrival of water at the pumping station was far in excess of the maximum pumping capacity of the drainage station, even if both large pumps and the constant duty pump had been in operation. Ports therefore concluded that the flooding still would have occurred even if Pump B had been operational during the storm. On the other hand, Jerome Pepper, an expert in land surveying and civil engineering, concluded that the failure of Pump B at DPS 11, while not being the major cause of the flooding, contributed (along with the PPG's blockage of the gap in the levee) to the rapid rise in the surface elevation of the floodwaters and to the prolonged duration of the flooding. With respect to the failure of Pump B at DPS 11, Pepper concluded that an additional 5.6 inches of water would have been pumped out of the Lower Coast and into the Intracoastal Waterway if Pump B been operational during the flooding. Dr. Steve McCutcheon testified as an expert in civil engineering, hydrology, and hydraulic engineering. Dr. McCutcheon opined that the failure of Pump B at DPS 11, combined with the shell dam at the Highway 406 crossing, resulted in a total of six inches of additional flooding to the Lower Coast. He calculated that the net effect of Pump B's failure was an approximate three-inch difference in the surface elevation of the floodwaters. The trial judge noted that both Dr. McCutcheon and Ports provided impressive and credible testimony, but that [w]here they differed was the acreage used in their figures. The judge credited Dr. McCutcheon's conclusions that the unavailability of Pump B caused a three-inch rise in the water surface elevation because Dr. McCutcheon limited his calculations to the lower areas of the Lower Coast where the water had ponded, rather than using the entire 4,500 acres in the Lower Coast. The judge concluded that the S & WB's negligence, along with the PPG's building the shell dam, concurred with the force majeure in the damage to plaintiffs by causing six additional inches of rain to enter their homes and creating a longer duration of flooding. [5] The S & WB challenged Dr. McCutcheon's calculations pertaining to the amount of additional flooding caused by the S & WB's conduct. The canal and pumping system of the Lower Coast of Algiers drained approximately 4,500 acres. Dr. McCutcheon calculated the total amount of water that Pump B, if the pump had been operational, would have pumped out of the Lower Coast during the period between the time Pump A began operating and the time the floodwaters reached their peak. He then calculated that the highest surface elevation of the floodwaters would have been three inches lower if Pump B had been available. On cross-examination, he calculated that the total amount of water attributable to the absence of Pump B, if spread over the entire 4,500 acres, would have caused only a one-inch rise in the surface elevation of the floodwaters. He pointed out, however, that this amount of water actually caused a difference of three inches in surface elevation of the floodwaters, explaining that he confined his calculations primarily to the ponded area, which was the lower area into which the drainage canals transported the rain water. In his calculations he also took into account the backwater effect that extends back into the drainage canals and keeps the surface elevation higher because of the water's inability to pond up immediately in the lowest position. Because of the backwater effect and the mounding effect of water building up as it moves down to the lower levels, Dr. McCutcheon explained, the flooding is not limited to the elevations below the elevation of the ponded water surface. We cannot say that the trial judge erred manifestly in accepting Dr. McCutcheon's opinion evidence over other credible expert testimony. Dr. McCutcheon's testimony provided sufficient support for the trial judge's conclusion that if all three pumps at DPS 11 had been operating, the surface elevation of the floodwaters at their highest point would have been two and one-half inches lower. Conversely, the S & WB's failure to maintain properly the feeder line necessary to keep both large pumps operational caused two and one-half inches of additional flooding and a prolonged period of flooding in the Lower Coast of Algiers. We conclude that the lower courts correctly ruled that the S & WB's pumps' operating only at slightly above one-half capacity was a cause-in-fact of the damages resulting from additional flooding and from the prolonged period of flooding. The next inquiries are whether the S & WB had a duty to conform its conduct to a specific standard and whether the S & WB's conduct failed to conform to that standard. In the present case, the S & WB clearly had a duty to maintain the DPS 11 pumps in a reasonable manner under the circumstances in order to prevent flooding. The principal issue is whether the S & WB breached that duty. Several S & WB employees testified regarding the repair of the feeder line. The supervisor of drainage operations testified that a fault occurred on January 9, 1983 in the feeder line that supplied power to the two large pumps in DPS 11. He promptly reported the disabled feeder line to the supervisor of electrical maintenance and to the superintendent, who immediately issued a repair order. According to the supervisor, efforts to locate the fault with fault locators and other equipment began the same day, but the efforts were hampered because the feeder line passed through several miles of woods and swamps. The fact that they discovered more than one fault further complicated the repair efforts, since only one fault can be located at a time. Several periods of rainy weather also impeded efforts to locate the faults. Despite these problems, the feeder line was placed back in service in July, 1983, six months after the fault first developed and three months after the flooding at issue in this litigation. James Tudor, an expert in electrical engineering and in the design of electrical systems, testified that locating a problem such as the breakdown or fault in DPS 11's underground feeder line should take only a few hours and that repairing the fault, once located, should normally take less than a day. While Tudor admitted that the length of time necessary for location and repair of the fault could be affected somewhat by the terrain, he opined that the repair of a fault in an underground system should take less than a week, even in a swampy area such as the Lower Coast of Algiers. Pump B could have been utilized during the flooding, according to Tudor, either if the fault in the underground system had been repaired timely or if there had been two separate underground lines as there were in the other S & WB systems. [6] The breach of duty issue boils down to a credibility choice between two reasonable versions of the repair efforts. The S & WB asserted that it took six months of prompt and diligent efforts to locate and repair the fault or faults in the feeder line. Tudor asserted that this amount of time to locate and repair faults was totally unreasonable, regardless of the terrain in which the feeder line was located. The trial judge resolved the conflicting testimony in favor of plaintiffs, noting that the S & WB had no reasonable excuse to allow one-half of the pumping capacity of DPS # 11 to be idle for three months in an area subject to heavy rainfall. We agree with the court of appeal that the factfinder's reasoned choice between two credible versions was not manifestly erroneous. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989). The primary purpose of the large pumps was to handle the water generated by greater than normal rainfall, and a period of six months to locate and repair problems in the large pumps' only power source was almost facially unreasonable, especially since this was the rainy season in an area of heavy rainfall that was located partially below sea level and since there was only one back-up generator. We cannot say that the trial judge's rejection of the S & WB's excuses was clearly wrong or that he erred manifestly in ruling that the S & WB breached its duty to maintain the pumps properly. There is no dispute as to the scope of duty issue, since the duty breached by the S & WB clearly encompassed the damages sustained by plaintiffs. The damages issue has not yet been tried. We therefore affirm the lower courts' judgments that the S & WB was liable for plaintiff's damages caused by the additional and prolonged flooding.