Opinion ID: 4541297
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Take 5 and Take 10

Text: The district court found the use of Take 5 and Take 10 violated the IEP because under Texas law, “[t]he use of time-outs must be limited on a student’s IEP if they are to be used,” and because the procedures were time-outs as they “were mandatory isolations for O.W. away from his regular setting and other students.” The district court also found the use of the take-discipline inconsistent with the IEP’s general requirement that staff use a calm interaction area, redirect O.W., and remind him of his ability to access a cooling off area. Texas law provides a “[t]ime-out may only be used in conjunction with an array of positive behavior intervention strategies and techniques and must be included in the student’s IEP and/or BIP if it is utilized on a recurrent basis to increase or decrease a targeted behavior.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1053(g). Thus, an IEP or BIP which does not authorize the recurrent use of time-outs effectively prohibits such use. The parties do not dispute that O.W.’s IEP did 15 Bobby R. defined the inquiry as whether a district “failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP.” 200 F.3d at 349. However, the panel focused the substance of its inquiry on whether the violation of the IEP (rather than the provision) was de minimis. Id. at 348. 21 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 not authorize the use of time-outs, 16 or that the take-discipline was utilized on a recurrent basis to increase or decrease a targeted behavior. However, the School District contends the Take 5 and Take 10 disciplines were not time-outs under Texas law because the desk was in O.W.’s classroom and was not separated from other students and because O.W. was given an opportunity to pursue preferred activities during the discipline. The code defines a time-out as “a behavior management technique in which . . . the student is separated from other students for a limited period in a setting: (A) that is not locked; and (B) from which the exit is not physically blocked by furniture, a closed door held shut from the outside, or another inanimate object.” Id. § 89.1053(b)(3). While the School District is correct the desk was in O.W.’s classroom and that O.W. was allowed to partake in preferred activities, nothing in the administrative definition of “time out” suggests the definition is limited to placement in a separate room or is inapplicable when the student is provided certain activities. Section 89.1053(b) only requires a “separat[ion] from other students for a limited period . . . .” Although the parties cite no specific evidence as to the location of the desk, references by school employees to the procedure as an “isolation” or “time-out,” while not dispositive, support the district court’s finding that the desk was separated from other students. Thus, we conclude the district court did not err in finding the take-disciplines to be timeouts. Because O.W.’s IEP prohibited time-outs, the recurrent use of the take-discipline amounted to a substantial or significant departure from the IEP. Regarding the fourth factor, the district court found the failure to 16 The School District does not argue the IEP’s authorization to “[d]irect [O.W.] to the cool-down area” amounted to an authorization to use time-outs under Texas law. We deem this argument forfeited. See United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 284 n.9 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ny issue not raised in an . . . opening brief is forfeited.”). 22 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 23 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 implement the IEP “denied O.W. the educational benefits sought under the IEP, and that such failure denied O.W. a FAPE.” We agree. It is undisputed that after the IEP was implemented, O.W.’s grades dropped 17 and his behavior deteriorated to the point where school officials determined his school day should be shortened to three hours. This regression shows neither an educational nor a behavioral benefit. See generally Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 583 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n IEP must be likely to produce progress, not regression . . . .”) (emphasis added). In sum, the use of the take-discipline was a significant or substantial departure from O.W.’s IEP. During the time period this departure occurred, O.W. regressed both educationally and behaviorally. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not err in finding an actionable failure to implement O.W.’s IEP as to take discipline.