Opinion ID: 202990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FERC's Conditional Approval

Text: At this time, we decline to review the merits of FERC's conditional project approval because it is not yet ripe for review. Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction. Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993)). Even in cases raising only prudential concerns, the question of ripeness may be considered on a court's own motion. Id. at 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026. We now consider the question. The ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent courts from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies and from improperly interfering in the administrative decision-making process. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). In determining whether a case is ripe for review, we must examine both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Id. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507. Under the first prong of this ripeness inquiry, fitness for judicial review, we consider whether the matter involves uncertain events which may not happen at all, and whether the issues involved are based on legal questions or factual ones. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004); see also McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir.2003) (In the fitness inquiry, . . . prudential concerns focus[] on the policy of judicial restraint from unnecessary decisions.). If the court's interest tends toward postponement, we must then weigh this consideration against the immediate impact of the actions on the challengers, and whether that impact is so harmful that present consideration is warranted. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 589 F.2d 603, 618 (D.C.Cir.1978). In making the fitness determination, the prospect of entangling ourselves in a challenge to a decision whose effects may never be felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties, Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, is an especially troublesome one. We have explained that premature review not only can involve judges in deciding issues in a context not sufficiently concrete to allow for focus and intelligent analysis, but it also can involve them in deciding issues unnecessarily, wasting time and effort. W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 959 F.2d 360, 366 (1st Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon `contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985)). A pragmatic view of the facts in this case reveals that it is not ripe for review. Plainly stated, WCE's proposed LNG project may well never go forward because FERC's approval of the project is expressly conditioned on approval by the USCG and the DOI. Neither agency has yet given its final recommendation, and each has expressed serious reservations about the project. The USCG has remarked that it appears that the waterway may not be suitable for the type and frequency of LNG marine traffic contained in [the WCE] smaller tanker proposal, and that the entire proposed transit route . . . presents a unique challenge to water-borne security. Likewise, the DOI has warned that if Taunton River is designated as a National Wild and Scenic River (a designation that has strong local support), it is unlikely that [the DOI] will . . . be able to provide the statutorily required affirmative statement of no adverse impact, due to the unavoidable adverse site impacts. Because [c]ourts have no business adjudicating the legality of non-events, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 677 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir.1982), we decline to decide whether FERC's actions thus far were proper. The balance of hardship to the parties in this case does not persuade us otherwise. Appellants retain every opportunity to challenge FERC's decision in the event the USCG and DOI approve the project. Such a challenge would not be barred by the statute of limitations. A time limitation on petitions for review . . . can run only against challenges ripe for review. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 672 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C.Cir.1982); see also Whittle v. Local 641, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 56 F.3d 487, 489 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that a cause of action accrues when it is sufficiently ripe that one can maintain suit on it). While the statute of limitations may pose a bar to claimants who delay filing their complaints based on their own assessment of when an issue is ripe for review, see, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905 (D.C.Cir.1985) (articulating the limited circumstances under which the court will engage in `retrospective ripeness analysis' after the statutory review period has expired), the appellants here will not suffer that consequence. Because we hold that Appellants' challenge to FERC's approval of the WCE project will not be ripe for review until the USCG and the DOI have given their respective approvals for the project, the statute of limitations period will not begin to run against Appellants until WCE obtains those approvals. Cf. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 672 F.2d at 149-50 (dismissing the petition on ripeness grounds, but reassuring the petitioner that the statute of limitations would not begin to run until its claims ripened). Concerns about hardship to the parties are further lessened by the fact that FERC's decision will have no immediate impact on Appellants. Because WCE may not proceed with the NLG project until it obtains approval from the USCG and the DOI, no one will experience the effects of FERC's decision unless and until the agencies authorize the project. See New Hanover Twp. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 992 F.2d 470, 473 (3d Cir.1993) (concluding that the challenge to defendant's issuance of a general permit to landfill corporation was not ripe for review because corporation needed further approval from state agency before proceeding with landfill project). Given that decisive questions remain open, we think it wiser to allow the agencies to continue their decision-making process at least until final authorization is granted by all three agencies. See Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 589 F.2d at 620 (Exhaustion of this administrative process will refine and focus the factual basis upon which both the public interest determination and the overall authorization rest, and will avoid a multiplicity of suits challenging conditional, tentative [agency] decisions.). Until then, our review would be advisory, and likely irrelevant to the ultimate approvability of the project. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 677 F.2d at 263 (declining to review adequacy of Final EISs prepared for proposed highway sections that might never be built, noting that [r]eview now might well adjudicate matters which are ultimately immaterial and would by no means put the matter to rest, since actions brought after a decision to build [the highway] has been made can challenge the present [Final EISs] as obsolete.); see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir.1980) (holding that adjudication of the legality of an agency's recommendation would be premature where project undergoing further study could ultimately be abandoned or substantially altered).