Opinion ID: 727991
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CMM's Employment Metaphor & Expression Originality: Waiver

Text: 37 A threshold issue is whether, as WPOR maintains, CMM has waived this argument. WPOR asserts that to the extent that CMM argues that it is appealing the district court's ruling that the employment theme was not protected by copyright law due to a lack of originality, CMM has waived its right to appeal this issue by its failure to object to the court's jury instructions on this point: there is no copyrightable interest in ... the work or employment metaphor. WPOR argues that an appeal of a prior determination of the trial court that is repeated in the court's instructions to the jury is, in essence, a revisiting of the point and requires an objection to the instruction. See Wells Real Estate v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 809 (1st Cir.1988) (noting that a long line of precedents in this circuit instructs that failure to raise an objection subsequent to the actual charge constitutes waiver under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51); McGrath v. Spirito, 733 F.2d 967, 968 (1st Cir.1984) (We have held that the rule requires that the objection to jury instructions be made after the charge, not before.). Thus, WPOR concludes, CMM's objection is too late and results in a waiver of the objection and the issue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. In all events, we need not resolve this contretemps. Assuming, arguendo, that the issue is properly preserved, we nonetheless reject CMM's position on the merits. 38 Originality: The Law and The District Court's Decision 39 Before addressing CMM's arguments, we review the applicable law and the district court's opinion. As the district court noted, the Supreme Court has made clear that 40 [t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. 41 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. at 1287. As CMM correctly points out, the threshold of creativity within the meaning of the copyright statute is very slight: 42 To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might be.... Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. 43 Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author..... [I]f the selection and arrangement are original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection. Id. at 348-49, 111 S.Ct. at 1289 (internal citations omitted). What is protectible then is the author's original contributions, id. at 350, 111 S.Ct. at 1290. No matter how original the [contribution], however, the [unprotectable elements] themselves do not become original through association. Id. at 349, 111 S.Ct. at 1289. 44 Despite this low threshold, the district court concluded that neither the employment metaphor itself nor CMM's expression of it were original within the meaning of copyright law and, thus, that neither were copyrightable. As to the employment metaphor itself, the district court concluded that it was not an original contribution of CMM, because Izor, the creator of CMM's payroll games, testified during the hearing on the preliminary injunction that the employment concept originated from WWW. As to CMM's expression of the employment metaphor, the district court rejected CMM's argument that Izor added a sufficient modicum of originality by expanding the promotion to include both sexes, to run all week (as opposed to only Wednesdays) and to add a grand prize. According to the district court, these 'original' contributions do not extend or vary the employment metaphor; they simply expand the operating scope of the promotion. CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 198. In addition, the district court concluded that these contributions lacked the minimal quantum of creativity required for copyright, reasoning that expanding the promotion to include men and to run for five days is of the same magnitude as the geographic selection and alphabetic arrangement of telephone numbers in Feist. Id. at 198 (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. at 1296-97). In reaching its conclusion it also noted that CMM admitted that radio promotions generally run five days a week and are open to men and women. 45 With this in mind, we turn now to CMM's arguments. 46 Originality: A Jury Question? 47 CMM first argues that the district court erred by ruling as a matter of law on the originality of CMM's expression, contending that originality is a fact question determinable by the jury, not by the court on summary judgment. In support of this proposition, CMM cites to three cases: North Coast Industries v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that whether copyright holder's expression of idea inspired by French designer was copyrightable was for jury where it was not clear that expression was substantially similar and differences merely trivial); Dezendorf v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 99 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.1938) (holding that common-law copyright suit could not be summarily disposed of on motion to dismiss where suit involved question of originality which was one of fact and not of law); Knickerbocker Toy Co., Inc. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F.Supp. 1309, 1318 (D.N.H.1982) (holding that summary judgment on the question of originality must be denied if there is a material question of fact as to the issue of independent creation, such as where evidence exists from which a jury could find the existence of an original aesthetic appeal). 48 While we do not dispute that the question of originality can be a question of fact for the jury, it is not necessarily so. Feist itself makes this clear. There, the Supreme Court decided the question of originality as a matter of law when it held that the white page listings in a telephone directory were not entitled to copyright protection because they lacked the requisite originality. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364, 111 S.Ct. at 1297; see, e.g., American Dental Assoc. v. Delta Dental Plans Assoc., No. 92 C 5909, 1996 WL 224494, at  17 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.1996) (noting that [w]hether a work is original is treated by some courts as a question of fact and others as a question of law). We reject CMM's first claim of error, because courts clearly may determine the question of originality and, in turn, copyrightability so long as they do so in accord with the familiar rules governing summary judgment: where there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the originality of the work, such that no reasonable trier-of-fact could find originality, then the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 495 (4th Cir.) (finding no reversible error in court's instruction that jury need not concern themselves with [question of copyrightability] given court's ruling as a matter of law that works were original and, thus, subject to copyright protection), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 53, 136 L.Ed.2d 16 (1996); Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk, 867 F.Supp. 673, 681 (N.D.Ill.1994), aff'd, 59 F.3d 719 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 520, 133 L.Ed.2d 428 (1995); Magic Marketing, Inc. v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F.Supp. 769, 771-72 (W.D.Pa.1986) (noting that issue of copyrightability is typically resolved by a motion for summary judgment). Indeed, we note that in North Coast, relied upon by CMM, the Ninth Circuit noted that it has not hesitated in granting summary judgment where no reasonable trier-of-fact could find substantial similarity. 972 F.2d at 1034. 49 Originality: Is CMM's Expression Original? 50 On appeal, CMM does not dispute that it borrowed the employment metaphor, but instead insists that the district court erred in concluding that the employment metaphor itself and its expression thereof was not original within the meaning of copyright law. It essentially advances two arguments: (i) the district court misapplied the copyright concept of originality, imposing instead the higher patent-derived standard of novelty; and (ii) it failed to focus on the true differences between WWW and Payroll Payoff TM, maintaining that the features contributed by CMM went far beyond the full week, both sexes, and grand prize features. According to CMM, it meets the low originality threshold because Izor['s] expan[sion of] the employment phraseology she heard ..., translat[ion of] the idea graphically and independent[ ] creat[ion of] employment images such as the time clock and newspaper classified ads cannot be considered trivial additions, especially when coupled with other standard radio direct mail features never previously used together in one campaign. CMM's Brief, pp. 22-23. Finally, it also claims that whether payroll campaigns were commonplace or in the public domain prior to Payroll Payoff TM was a hotly-contested issue and, thus, the question of originality should have been decided by the jury. 51 At the outset, we dismiss CMM's claim that the district court imposed the patent-derived standard of novelty. As we noted above, the district court set forth the correct applicable law, see CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197-98, and, as we discuss, it did not err in its analysis. 52 That said, we turn first to the originality of the employment metaphor itself. Upon de novo review, we conclude that, by CMM's own admission, the similarity between the two promotions' employment concept--the use of the metaphor of earning an hourly wage--was, to borrow from Feist, not fortuitous but, rather, the result of copying. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. at 1287. Indeed, not only does CMM concede that it borrowed the employment metaphor from WWW, it also concedes in its Statement of Disputed Facts that the WWW campaign used the employment phraseology to get on the clock which it also uses and claims WPOR infringed. Because copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author, Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. at 1289, we agree with the district court that the employment metaphor itself does not enjoy copyright protection as it was not an original contribution of CMM within the meaning of copyright law. 53 In so concluding, we do not dispute that, as CMM points out, the mere borrowing of elements from previous works will not defeat copyrightability as long as the author has devised a new version of the work or has otherwise rearranged or transformed it so as to have made an original contribution. Towle Mfg. Co. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 986, 992 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (citing 1 Nimmer § 3.01, at 3-10 (1985 ed.)); cf. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27, 35 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that variations, although minor, to preexisting copyrighted sketch of Paddington Bear were original). We also do not dispute that CMM, as it insists, devised its own embellished version of a payroll contest using an employment metaphor. However, as we discuss below, CMM's contributions building upon the borrowed employment metaphor are either insufficient to satisfy the minimal requirements of originality or are unprotectable elements. 54 Before explaining why we reach this conclusion, we add this: Because we affirm the district court's conclusion that the employment metaphor itself was not original to CMM and, thus, not copyrightable, we accept WPOR's invitation not to address its cross-appeal from the district court's conclusion that the employment metaphor is protectable expression ... [and] that the use of the employment related terms and images in the various tangible works associated with CMM's promotions is protectable expression. CMM Cable Rep, 888 F.Supp. at 197. We prefer to do what the district court did at the preliminary injunction stage: decline to answer the more difficult question--determining whether copyright protection extends to the employment metaphor for the idea of an accumulating jackpot radio promotional sweepstakes on the basis that the metaphorical terminology of employment is protected expression--because we conclude that, even if protectible expression, it is not copyrightable here due to CMM's failure to meet the originality prong required for copyright protection. See CMM Cable Rep., 879 F.Supp. at 135. By not addressing WPOR's cross-appeal, we neither address its merits nor comment on the correctness of the district court's conclusion nor, for that matter, the similar determination made by an earlier court. See CMM Cable Rep., Inc., 888 F.Supp. at 197; CMM Cable Rep., Inc., 870 F.Supp. at 633-34 (same). 55 We turn next to the originality of CMM's contributions expanding the scope of the WWW promotion. Upon de novo review, we affirm the district court's conclusion that CMM's expansion of the promotion's scope does not constitute the modicum of originality necessary for copyright protection, finding no error in its reasoning. We note that, even assuming, as we read the record most favorably to CMM, that there were few, if any, prior payroll campaigns and even assuming that CMM's expansive contributions were original, they simply cannot enjoy copyright protection: to do so would be to erroneously extend copyright protection to a method of conducting a radio promotional contest. 16 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197 (noting that CMM cannot copyright the ideas, concepts, or methodologies that constitute the promotional contest itself); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 300 n. 1 (9th Cir.1979) (noting that game concepts are specifically not protected by the copyright laws). Cf. Lotus Develop., 49 F.3d at 815 (holding that Lotus' menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable method of operation). As another court noted in a previous copyright infringement case brought by CMM, a copyright infringement claim is not established merely by virtue of the fact that the CMM Payroll Payoff TM and the alleged infringer's campaigns share the same features involved in a radio promotional cash giveaway. Keymarket, 870 F.Supp. at 637. Cf. Barris/Fraser Enterp. v. Goodson-Todman Enter., 5 USPQ.2d 1887, 1988 WL 3013 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (For an infringement to be found, the copied material must be more than a stock element of television game shows.). Thus, we affirm the district court's ruling that, [t]o the extent that CMM's complaint can be interpreted as claiming infringement on the promotion itself (i.e., a method of conducting a radio promotional contest), ... summary judgment [is granted] in favor of WPOR. CMM Cable Rep., 888 F.Supp. at 197. 17 56 Finally, we turn to the originality of CMM's alleged expansion of the employment phraseology, which, as CMM explains, is part of the heart of its expression which WPOR allegedly infringed. In response to WPOR's observation that CMM fails to point to any record evidence regarding what specific employment phraseology was original to Izor as opposed to having been lifted from the WWW promotion, CMM insists it had nothing tangible to copy when it created Payroll Payoff TM. 18 Even assuming this is true, and that CMM's employment phraseology was original to it, 19 we nonetheless conclude that it is not subject to copyright protection. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818. 57 It is axiomatic that copyright law denies protection to fragmentary words and phrases and to forms of expression dictated solely at functional considerations on the grounds that these materials do not exhibit the minimal level of creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection. 1 Nimmer, 2.01[B], at 2-13-18; see, e.g., Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that single words and short phrases in copyrighted text are not copyrightable); Magic Marketing, 634 F.Supp. at 771 (noting that phrases describing envelope contents and instructing recipients are unprotectable); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir.1972) (holding that most personal sort of deodorant is short phrase or expression, not an appreciable amount of text, and thus not protectible); Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 598 F.Supp. 445, 448 (E.D.Mo.1984) (Cliched language, phrases and expressions conveying an idea that is typically expressed in a limited number of stereotypic fashions, [sic] are not subject to copyright protection.). 20 The Copyright Office's own interpretive regulations explicitly embrace this rule of non-copyrightability. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1994) (excluding from copyright protection [w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans and familiar symbols and designs). 21 58 Here, the phraseology about which CMM claims infringement involves cliched language that is typically used to convey the idea of employment: if you're still 'on the clock' at quitting time and clock in and make $50 an hour. In addition, CMM's call in, clock in, and win is nothing less than a slogan as it is clearly a phrase expressing the aims or nature of an enterprise ... [and/or] a catch phrase used in advertising or promotion. Webster's II New Riverside Univ. Dictionary (1988). Even viewing the text as a whole, as CMM urges, it simply does not involve an appreciable amount of text or the minimal level of creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection; indeed, this is particularly true given CMM's concession that the phraseology to get on the clock was used in the WWW promotion. Furthermore, we cannot disregard the fact that, while perhaps not dictated solely at functional considerations, the phraseology is nonetheless inescapably functional in that it tells potential participants how to participate and how the contest works; as such, it essentially communicates the promotion's rules of the game. In addition, we are also cognizant that the limited space on, and costs of producing, the brochures favor (presumably) simple, catchy or hackneyed phrases. Accordingly, we conclude that the phraseology used by CMM in its expression of the employment metaphor, which itself was unoriginal to CMM in the first instance, is not protectible expression. See, e.g., Magic Marketing, 634 F.Supp. at 771 (noting that even colorful descriptions, such as advertising slogans, are not accorded copyright protection). 59 In reaching this conclusion, we simply disagree with CMM that the foregoing cases do not support this result. While certainly distinguishable on their facts, these cases nonetheless stand for, or otherwise support, the proposition that copyright protection simply does not extend to words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1994). That said, we understand--and do not dispute--CMM's point that it has not claimed copyright protection in the phraseology alone but rather in its brochure as a whole. This, however, does not alter our conclusion. Alberto-Culver is particularly instructive. Just as CMM alleges that WPOR copied the entire essence or heart of CMM's brochures, in Alberto-Culver the plaintiff similarly alleged that the defendant copied the same general image and thought. Alberto-Culver, 466 F.2d at 708. More important is the court's response to what it considered to be plaintiff's strongest case[:] ... that [its] label copyright as a whole was infringed. Alberto-Culver, 466 F.2d at 710. While the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the label as a whole--as a pictorial composition--is copyrightable, id. it nonetheless reversed on the ground that the phrase most personal sort of deodorant is uncopyrightable as, inter alia, it is a 'short phrase or expression' ... hardly qualify[ing] as an 'appreciable amount of original text.'  Id. (quoting Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.1959)). Similarly, here, although CMM may have obtained a copyright in the brochures as a whole, the fact remains that copyright protection does not extend to its ordinary employment phraseology which lacks the minimal level of originality. 60 We also reach this conclusion despite CMM's implicit assertion, which we in no way doubt, that CMM and Izor invested a substantial amount of effort into customizing and developing Payroll Payoff TM. However frustrating or disheartening as it may be, substantial effort is largely immaterial to the question of copyrightability. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 354-61, 111 S.Ct. at 1292-96 (rejecting the notion that copyright protection can be obtained merely through the sweat of the brow). That we so conclude with respect to the employment metaphor and its expression, however, does not necessarily leave CMM without any copyright protection in its brochures. 22 While the employment metaphor and its expression are not copyrightable given that copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author, Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. at 1289 (emphasis added), the jury reasonably found, 23 particularly after hearing Izor's testimony regarding her design of the brochure and her creation documents, that CMM's KIX brochure was nonetheless copyrightable as it was undisputed that [its] selection and arrangement are original and independent work products of CMM's Izor, id. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1004 (noting that Feist makes clear [that] a work may be copyrightable even though it is entirely a compilation of unprotectible [sic] elements). 61