Opinion ID: 526119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual v. Official Capacity

Text: 4 The district court held that Nix initiated her suit against Norman in his official capacity as director of the Academy. It subsequently refused to modify its decision to allow Nix to sue Norman in his individual capacity. We agree with the district court that, as written, the complaint only stated a claim against Norman in his official capacity and was not sufficiently clear to give Norman notice that he was being sued in his individual capacity. 5 On its face, the complaint did not indicate whether Nix sought to recover damages from Norman directly or whether she sought to hold Norman responsible only as the director of a state agency. The caption of the case in the district court read Laura Nix v. Bobby Norman, Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training and the State of Arkansas. In paragraph five of her complaint, however, Nix alleged: 6 The actions of the defendant Norman were taken in his official capacity as director of the Academy and were adopted and ratified by the other defendants to such an extent that such actions constitute an accepted policy or custom of the other defendants for which they should likewise be held liable. 7 Thus, paragraph five appears to indicate that Norman's allegedly unconstitutional actions were made pursuant to authority delegated to him by the Commission and the State. 8 Generally, individual-capacity suits involve actions taken by governmental agents outside the scope of their official duties. Official-capacity suits typically involve either allegedly unconstitutional state policies or unconstitutional actions taken by state agents possessing final authority over a particular decision. Nix's complaint and her brief on appeal indicate that Nix believes the Commission delegated to Norman the final authority over personnel matters and that his decision to fire her was made pursuant to this authority. Thus, the district court correctly held that she stated only an official-capacity claim against Norman. 9 Nix concedes that her complaint was not a picture of clarity, but argues that the district court should have interpreted it as a suit against Norman in both capacities. As a judgment against a public servant in his individual capacity exposes him or her to compensatory and punitive damages, we have repeatedly stated that section 1983 litigants wishing to sue government agents in both capacities should simply use the following language: Plaintiff sues each and all defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Rollins by Agosta v. Farmer, 731 F.2d 533, 536 n. 3 (8th Cir.1984). This language guarantees that the defendant receives prompt notice of his or her potential personal liability. See Jackson v. Crews, 873 F.2d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir.1989) (district court correctly held that complaint stated individual-capacity claim as it provided clear notice to defendant that he was being sued in his individual capacity). Other than mentioning joint and several liability in her prayer for relief, Nix failed to indicate with the requisite clarity that she sought damages directly from Norman. 10 Finally, Nix argues that an express averment in the complaint as to Norman's capacity was unnecessary, citing to Rule 9(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(a) provides: 11 (a) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of the party to sue or to be sued    except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the court. 12 The Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights cases against states and their employees. Rose v. State of Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 547, 88 L.Ed.2d 476 (1985). That being the case, Rule 9(a) appears to require Nix to make a capacity stipulation in the complaint. 13 Nix also argues that the district court erred in refusing to modify its original order or to allow her to develop the record as to whether Norman or the state agency was the moving force behind the wrongful conduct in this case. As we stated above, however, the defendants raised a jurisdictional issue in their motion to dismiss and the question was properly addressed at that time.