Opinion ID: 1978971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State's Preservation for Appellate Review of the Intervening Cause Issue

Text: We now examine whether the State preserved for appellate review its intervening circumstance argument. Petitioner contends that because the State failed to argue to the motions court that the arrest constituted an intervening circumstance, the State failed to preserve that argument for appellate review. Petitioner explains that the prosecutor put forth only two arguments to the motions court: that the stop was consensual and that Petitioner's identity is not subject to exclusion, even if the stop was unlawful. To support this latter argument, the prosecutor cited, and relied upon, Gibson v. State, 138 Md.App. 399, 771 A.2d 536 (2001), an intermediate appellate court decision in which that court concluded, inter alia, that an individual has no expectation of privacy in his or her identity. Petitioner then explains that, in the intermediate appellate court, the State abandoned the identity argument and replaced it with the contention that an arrest, pursuant to an outstanding warrant, was an intervening circumstance that dissipated any taint flowing from the officer's illegal stop of Petitioner. Petitioner asserts that the State's intervening circumstance argument differs dramatically from the initial argument advanced at the trial level, such that this Court should hold, as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the intervening circumstance argument was not preserved for appellate review. The State counters arguing that, although the prosecutor never specifically mentioned the words dissipate or attenuate to the motions court, the argument was preserved by mention of the outstanding arrest warrant and reference to Gibson, because that case explains the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the three theories of unpoisoning the fruit; attenuation and dissipation of taint are fruit of the poisonous tree concepts. The State asserts that by citing Gibson, the underlying doctrine of unpoisoning the fruit of the alleged illegal stop was before the motions court and, therefore, the Court of Special Appeals erred by holding otherwise. We reject Petitioner's argument and the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals, as to this point, and hold that the intervening cause or circumstance issue is properly before us. It is well settled that an arrest is constitutionally valid where the arresting officer acted in good faith and obtained a warrant based upon probable cause. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2035, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 688-89 (1969) (establishing standards for searches incident to a lawful arrest). The burden of production and persuasion is on the party who would rebut the presumptive validity of the warrant. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641 (1980) (noting that Petitioner . . . bears the burden of proving that the search . . . was illegal); Duncan and Smith v. State, 27 Md.App. 302, 315-16, 340 A.2d 722, 731 (1975) (stating generally that the defendant has the burden of going forward with the evidence at a suppression hearing, and `[t]he burden of persuasion remains throughout upon the one who at the outset has asserted the affirmative of the issue') (citations omitted). The issue before us is a question of law, and we review questions of law de novo. State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 444 (2003) (noting that on appellate review of a suppression motion, we undertake an independent constitutional review of the record and apply the law to the facts and circumstances of the case). In the instant case, the State contended at the suppression hearing that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant. For certain, the burden was on Petitioner to prove at that hearing that his arrest was unlawful. In that regard, Petitioner argued that the stop was unconstitutional and that the subsequent arrest and seizure of evidence were the fruits of the poisonous tree. In response, the State did not use the words intervening circumstance or cause. Its basic premise, however, was the same at the suppression hearing and on appealthat Petitioner was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant; the burden was on the defense to show that the arrest warrant was invalid. In addition, the State relied on Gibson, 138 Md. App. 399, 771 A.2d 536, which involved an explanation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the applicable process that is employed to dissipate or attenuate the taint of the primary illegality. We hold that the issue as to the legality of the arrest was plainly preserved, for appellate review, even though the State did not use the magic words, dissipate or attenuate, to explain why the initial encounter [did] not matterbecause of the intervening event, i.e., the discovery of an outstanding warrant and an arrest pursuant thereto. Thus, we are satisfied that the issue was put forth at the trial level and the contention that there was an intervening circumstance is properly before us. [4]