Opinion ID: 2638912
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review Applicable to Persons with Mental Disabilities

Text: {11} The next step in analyzing an equal protection claim is to determine what level of scrutiny should apply to the challenged legislation. There are three levels of equal protection review based on the New Mexico Constitution: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. See Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 12; see also Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 32, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 [ Trujillo III ] (abolishing fourth tier of equal protection analysis in New Mexico). Rational basis review applies to general social and economic legislation that does not affect a fundamental or important constitutional right or a suspect or sensitive class. See Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 12. This standard of review is the most deferential to the constitutionality of the legislation and the burden is on the party challenging the legislation to prove that it is not rationally related to a legitimate government[al] purpose. Id. ¶¶ 12, 24. {12} On the other end of the spectrum, strict scrutiny requires the most exacting review by a court. Only legislation that affects the exercise of a fundamental right or a suspect classification such as race or ancestry will be subject to strict scrutiny. See Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 16. If legislation affecting such rights or classifications is challenged, the party supporting the legislation has the burden of proving that the legislation furthers a compelling state interest. Id. {13} Occupying a middle ground, intermediate scrutiny is more probing than rational basis but less so than strict scrutiny. Id. ¶ 15. Like strict scrutiny, the burden is on the party supporting the legislation to prove the constitutionality of the legislation; however, the party must only prove that the classification or discrimination caused by the legislation is substantially related to an important government interest. Id. This standard of review has been previously applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. Id.; see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (gender); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988) (illegitimacy). {14} We have previously recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution affords rights and protections independent of the United States Constitution. See Chapman v. Luna, 102 N.M. 768, 769-70, 701 P.2d 367, 368-69 (1985), citing Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321, 322 (1965) (holding that the Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution of California and the United States Constitution provide generally equivalent but independent protections in their respective jurisdictions). While we take guidance from the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the federal courts' interpretation of it, we will nonetheless interpret the New Mexico Constitution's Equal Protection Clause independently when appropriate. In Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 629 n. 5, 798 P.2d 571, 579 n. 5 (1990) [ Trujillo I ], overruled on other grounds by Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 12, 19, 25, we stated that federal cases dealing with intermediate scrutiny do not control our development of intermediate scrutiny based on the New Mexico Constitution. Federal case law is certainly informative, but only to the extent it is persuasive. See State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 436, 863 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1993). In analyzing equal protection guarantees, we have looked to federal case law for the basic definitions for the three-tiered approach, but we have applied those definitions to different groups and rights than the federal courts. {15} In analyzing which level of scrutiny should apply in an equal protection challenge, a court should look at all three levels to determine which is most appropriate based on the facts of the particular case. The determination of which level of scrutiny is applicable under the Constitution is a purely legal question, and is reviewed de novo. See Pinnell v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 1999-NMCA-074, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 452, 982 P.2d 503; see also Montano v. Los Alamos County, 1996-NMCA-108, ¶ 7, 122 N.M. 454, 926 P.2d 307; Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.2004); Coalition for Fair and Equitable Regulation of Docks on Lake of the Ozarks v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 297 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir.2002). {16} In this case, all the parties agreed that strict scrutiny is not applicable. We agree with that determination. Petitioners and Respondents devoted much of their briefs to what rational basis test our prior cases adopted under the New Mexico Constitution. We discussed this question in Wagner and do not need to do so again here. 2005-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 11, 24, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050 (applying the modern rational basis test that requires the challenger to demonstrate the absence of a firm legal rationale or evidence in the record to support the legislative classification as articulated in Trujillo III. 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 14, 30). Nevertheless, the courts should always make a determination of which of the three levels of scrutiny is applicable to a given case based on either the right or the nature of the group affected by the legislation. See id. ¶ 12 ([W]e must identify the appropriate level of scrutiny for reviewing the challenged law.); Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 2 ([I]t first is necessary to determine the applicable [level of scrutiny] analysis for this type of equal protection challenge.). {17} We now turn to the question of whether intermediate scrutiny should apply to this case based on New Mexico jurisprudence. There are two different ways that legislation can trigger intermediate scrutiny review. The Legislation must either (1) restrict the ability to exercise an important right or (2) treat the person or persons challenging the constitutionality of the legislation differently because they belong to a sensitive class. In this case, the Act is general social and economic legislation and the benefits conferred under the Act do not rise to the level of important rights in the constitutional sense. Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶ 27, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. Thus, because the Act does not affect an important right, the only way for intermediate scrutiny to apply to Petitioners is if they belong to a sensitive class as defined by our equal protection case law. {18} We have not previously discussed at length the standard to determine if a group of persons should be considered a sensitive class. In Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., we stated that the class of tort victims affected by the damage cap is `sensitive' enough to the injustice wrought to warrant applying the heightened test. 107 N.M. 688, 699, 763 P.2d 1153, 1164 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 18-21, 32. However, our decision was based much more on the important right of access to the courts rather than the sensitive nature of the class. Id. We did note, however, that the definition of a suspect class justifying strict scrutiny was a discrete group `saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' Id. at 696, 763 P.2d at 1161 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973)). While we believe that the definition of a suspect class for the purposes of justifying strict scrutiny is instructive for a determination of whether a group of people qualifies as a sensitive class justifying intermediate scrutiny, it is too exacting. First, for purposes of the first part of the definition from Richardson, the group need not be completely politically powerless, but must be limited in its political power or ability to advocate within the political system. Second, the level of protection needed from the majoritarian political process does not have to be as extraordinary as necessary for strict scrutiny because the level of scrutiny is less in intermediate scrutiny. To assist us in determining whether a group of people should be considered a sensitive class, we will look to the analysis used by the United States Supreme Court to afford sensitive class status to certain legislative classifications. Again, when we interpret the New Mexico Constitution more broadly than the United States Constitution we rely on United States Supreme Court precedent only to the extent it is persuasive. {19} In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court reiterated that intermediate scrutiny is applied to classifications based on gender because `our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.' 518 U.S. 515, 531, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)). For most of our Nation's history, women have been denied the same rights enjoyed by men and kept out of the political process in which women could possibly advocate for equality under the law. Systematic denial from the political process is a particularly persuasive reason to apply intermediate scrutiny, because a politically powerless group has no independent means to protect its constitutional rights. The Court noted in United States v. Virginia, that even after women were granted the right to vote in 1920, it remained the prevailing doctrine that government, both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as any `basis in reason' could be conceived for the discrimination. Id. {20} The Supreme Court has also noted that even though women have made remarkable advances in the political sphere, [n]evertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764. Thus we will apply intermediate scrutiny even though the darkest period of discrimination may have passed for a historically maligned group. Intermediate scrutiny should still be applied to protect against more subtle forms of unconstitutional discrimination created by unconscious or disguised prejudice. Thus, the courts should be sensitive to classes of people who are discriminated against not because of a characteristic that actually prevents them from functioning in society, but because of external and artificial barriers created by societal prejudice. The historical treatment of both women and persons with mental disabilities makes clear that the courts should be sensitive to classes of people who are discriminated against in this manner. See Laura F. Rothstein, Disabilities and the Law § 1.03 (2d ed.1997). {21} In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982), the United States Supreme Court employed what can be described as an intermediate scrutiny analysis or a middle level standard of review. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 18.3, at 219, § 18.13, at 488-91 (3d ed.1999). After concluding that undocumented immigrants are not a suspect group for purposes of constitutional analysis, the Court held that children in this group are nonetheless susceptible to discrimination through legislation based on arbitrary discrimination. If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. Id. at 230, 102 S.Ct. 2382. The Court appeared to rest much of its decision to afford children of undocumented immigrants this higher standard of review because they were being discriminated against by virtue of circumstances beyond their control, which the Court held was the type of treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish. Id. at 217 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382. These cases suggest that intermediate scrutiny is justified if a discrete group has been subjected to a history of discrimination and political powerlessness based on a characteristic or characteristics that are relatively beyond the individuals' control such that the discrimination warrants a degree of protection from the majoritarian political process. {22} Persons with mental disabilities have also suffered a history replete with societal discrimination and political exclusion based on a characteristic beyond their control. Justice Marshall detailed the grotesque history of discrimination against persons with mental disabilities in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 461, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Marshall likened this `lengthy and tragic history' of segregation and discrimination of persons with mental disabilities to the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Id. at 461-62, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (quoting Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978)). Persons with mental disabilities have been subjected to forced institutionalization and sterilization. Id. at 462-63, 105 S.Ct. 3249; see also Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temp. L.Rev. 393, 399-408 (1991) (discussing the historical mistreatment of persons with disabilities). The denial of these `basic civil rights of man,' Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 463, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)), was perpetuated with the acquiescence and support of government at all levels. See Cook, supra. Government officials actively inculcated fear of persons with disabilities, particularly persons with intellectual disabilities, and directed their identification and exclusion from public services. Id. at 402. Many state laws declared that a person with disabilities was unfit for citizenship based on his or her defect. Id. at 400-01. Government policies mandating segregation and institutionalization helped create and justify societal prejudice against persons with disabilities, and mental disabilities in particular. Because the government approved these discriminatory policies, societal discrimination is even more deep rooted and harder to reverse. Id. at 407-08. {23} The Findings and Purpose section of the Americans with Disabilities Act contains language that further describes the historical mistreatment of persons with mental disabilities and their exclusion from the political process. The Congress finds that  . . . (2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem; (3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services; (4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination; (5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,. . . overprotective rules and policies, . . . exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, . . . benefits, . . . or other opportunities; (6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally; (7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society; (8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and (9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity. Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. {24} Although this language was directed at all persons with disabilities, we note that [e]ven within the disability community, persons with mental illness are often the poor stepchild, and remain the last hidden minority. Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & Health 15, 20 (1993-94). Surveys show that mental disabilities are the most negatively perceived of all disabilities. Michael L. Perlin, Their Promises of Paradise: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional Least Restrictive Alternative Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 Hous. L.Rev. 999, 1032-33 (2000) (noting that mentally disabled individuals are denied jobs, housing, and publically funded programs based on behavioral myths that suggest they are deviant, strange, disproportionately dangerous, and presumptively incompetent). {25} We note that Congress and the New Mexico Legislature have enacted laws to ensure better living standards for those with mental disabilities. These laws show the continuing need that mentally disabled persons have for protection from societal discrimination. While some legislation may recognize the need to affirmatively protect persons with mental disabilities, this group-chiefly because of its history of invidious discrimination-is nonetheless susceptible to the type of baseless stereotyping that has motivated and perpetuates the more subtle forms of gender-based classifications. {26} Federal legislation attempting to remove discrimination against persons with mental disabilities includes the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (2002) (IDEA), which aims to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs. Id. at § 1400(d)(1)(A). Under IDEA, states that receive federal educational funding must offer procedural safeguards to help ensure the education of the special needs child. Id. at § 1415(a). The IDEA requires that schools and parents develop an individualized education program (IEP) as a tool to enforce compliance with the free appropriate education requirement. See id. §§ 1401(11), 1414(d). Additionally, the Mental Health Parity Act mandates parity in insurance coverage to raise mental health coverage to the same level as physical disability coverage in certain situations. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2000). These federal laws show an increased awareness on the part of Congress that persons with disabilities, and mental disabilities more specifically, must be afforded a measure of protection from societal discrimination. {27} In recent history, New Mexico has been at the forefront of affording greater protection for the mentally disabled. In our recent decision of State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, ¶ 13, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264, we noted the characteristics of mentally retarded criminal defendants that could potentially prejudice their trial and the need for procedural rules to minimize those risks. Further, New Mexico was one of the first states to define the least drastic means principle, or least restrictive alternative concept, for purposes of involuntary civil commitment. See NMSA 1978, § 43-1-3; see also Perlin, Their Promises of Paradise, supra, at 1017. Therefore, New Mexico has continually shown a concern for protecting the mentally disabled against possible discrimination. {28} Based on our development of New Mexico's Equal Protection Clause, it is appropriate to apply intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on mental disability because such persons are a sensitive class. The historical discriminatory treatment of persons with mental disabilities shows that the courts should be sensitive to possible discrimination against persons with mental disabilities contained in legislation that purports to treat them differently based solely on the fact that they have a mental disability. {29} Finally, we are not basing our decision to consider persons with mental disabilities a sensitive class for purposes of equal protection on any notion that such persons cannot advocate for themselves in the political process. To the contrary, persons with mental disabilities and their political allies are active participants in the political process. However, their effective advocacy is seriously hindered by the need to overcome the already deep-rooted prejudice against their integration in society. The gains in societal acceptance and political advocacy made by the disability rights movement today could easily be reversed through discriminatory laws in the future. Just as classifications based on gender continue to warrant a heightened scrutiny even though women have become much more integrated into the political arena in recent decades, see Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764, similar gains by persons with mental disabilities do not obviate the need for heightened scrutiny to examine legislation that draws distinctions based on mental disabilities.