Opinion ID: 1187129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Valuation of Property for Reward Purposes

Text: City contends that the valuation of the property for purposes of determining Remy's reward was contrary to law. The trial court in valuing the property included the fair market value of the property on the date of the attempted transfer, the fair market value of the producing and non-producing mineral interest, the fair rental value of the property from October 19, 1967 through January 18, 1977 and the fair rental value of the mineral interest for that same period. The heart of City's argument deals with the inclusion of the fair rental value as a part of the value of the property for purposes of determining Remy's reward under 62 O.S. 1971 § 373. The only guidance provided by § 373 is that the reward shall be one-half the amount of money and one-half the value of the property recovered. In the original petition filed in 1972, Remy requested the land be returned to the City, for an accounting for the monies and consideration received by the other defendants (Johnson heirs) from the use of the property, and a money judgment for the City for these same monies and consideration; or, alternatively for a judgment against the other defendants for the City based on fair rental value of the property during the time of wrongful possession by the other defendants. We know that this action is one for a reward under § 373, supra. Section 373 provides that upon meeting certain conditions the taxpayer may institute and maintain any proper action for the recovery of such property and shall be rewarded upon recovery of the property one-half the value of the property recovered. The statute speaks of a proper proceeding (in law or equity) when referring to the recovery of property by a municipality and of a proper action which proper officers of the City might maintain or institute when a taxpayer acts. The statute mentions the basis of the proceedings for recovery of property transferred is for the value of any unauthorized, unlawful, fraudulent or void contract made. Thus we ponder the meaning of what encompasses value or its definition. It is axiomatic that under § 373 a reward is valuable [5] and likewise the measure of value under the statute is damages. Damages in itself is a term as imprecise as our rewarding statute, § 373. We note the statutory emphasis given to void, unlawful, fraudulent or unauthorized contracts, and we are inclined, and do hold, that our plaintiff taxpayer is entitled to a reward in an amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom. [6] We are not unmindful that there is no technical breach of contract as contemplated in the damages statute last referred to, but we find it broad enough to include the value of the reward provisions as an unlawful, void, fraudulent or unauthorized taking under § 373. [7] At the hearing on value on March 15, 1979, the City and Remy stipulated to the valuation technique or formula to be used in arriving at the value of the land for reward purposes. [8] Since the City formally stipulated that value of the land for purposes of determining Remy's reward would consist of two elements: (1) actual fair market value on October 19, 1967, plus (2) rental value for the period from October 19, 1967, to January 18, 1977, it cannot now be heard to complain that the reward included the fair rental value as a part of the value of the property and was therefore not a reasonable reward, nor can it complain that Remy did not recover for the City the fair rental value of the property from October 19, 1967, to January 18, 1977. [9] We would point out that had there not been a stipulation, the statute which states, one-half the value of the property recovered, would seem to dictate that the date for assessing the value would be logically the date that Remy recovered the property for the City, i.e., 1977.