Opinion ID: 865149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: denial of motions to dismiss for violation of

Text: RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL ¶58. The standard of review for a speedy trial claim focuses on the fact question of whether the trial delay arose from good cause. DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512, 516 (Miss. 1998). If substantial credible evidence exists from which a finding of good cause may fairly have been made, we will leave the finding undisturbed. Folk v. State, 576 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Miss. 1991). Defendants in criminal cases are guaranteed the right to a speedy trial by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Watts v. State, 733 So.2d 214, 235 (Miss.1999). Flora alleges a violation of both his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.
¶59. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. C ONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV; see Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967). ¶60. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). The four factors to be considered are: (i) length of the delay, (ii) reason for the delay, (iii) defendant’s assertion of his right, and (iv) prejudice to the defendant. In regard to these four factors, the 25 Court admonished that they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. Id. at 533. ¶61. This Court has adopted and applied these factors on several occasions. Hersick v. State, 904 So. 2d 116, 121 (Miss. 2004); State v. Woodall, 801 So. 2d 678, 680-81 (Miss. 2001); Perry v. State, 637 So. 2d 871, 874 (Miss. 1994); Flores v. State, 574 So. 2d 1314, 1321 (Miss. 1990). “No mathematical formula exists according to which the Barker weighing and balancing process must be performed.” Beavers v. State, 498 So. 2d 788, 790 (Miss. 1986).
¶62. The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest, indictment, or information, when a person has been accused. It is a “triggering mechanism” and unless there is delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need for further inquiry under Barker. We recognize a delay of eight months to be presumptively prejudicial. Hersick, 904 So.2d at 121 (citing Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989)), Flora was arrested on September 11, 2001, was indicted on December 11, 2001, and waived arraignment on February 19, 2002. The trial began on December 1, 2003, far more than eight months later. Flora’s constitutional right to a speedy trial attached on September 11, 2001, because it was at this time “actual restraints were imposed by the State against [Flora] through an arrest and institution of criminal charges.” Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 648 (Miss. 2005). Thus the delay of more than two years was presumptively prejudicial, and “the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the 26 legitimacy of these reasons.” State v. Ferguson, 576 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Miss. 1991). This factor weighs in favor of Flora, and we must proceed to consider the other three factors.
¶63. A total of 810 days elapsed from the date of Flora’s arrest on September 11, 2001, to December 1, 2003, the date on which the trial began. Several occurrences may justify a delay in a criminal case, one of these being “well-taken” motions for continuance. In the case at bar, several motions for continuance were made: some by agreement; some by the State, and some by Flora. The record is difficult to follow regarding the number of motions for continuance, who filed the motions, when they were filed, and what period of time each covered. The trial court’s computerized court docket information shows only that this case was continued on April 11, 2002; May 22, 2002; August 1, 2002, August 17, 2002, and November 4, 2003, and states no facts about any of these2 . Also shown within the docket information are Flora’s motions to dismiss and demands for a speedy trial which are discussed infra. ¶64. The first hearing on these motions was held by the trial court on January 24, 2003, and the transcript of that hearing provides the information for our speedy trial analysis. First, defense counsel gave a brief overview of actions taken on Flora’s behalf, without specificity beyond the months on which the motions for speedy trial and to dismiss were filed. She 2 The designation of the record is not an all inclusive one, and it does not make any specific reference to orders. While there are many orders found within the clerk’s papers, none of them address the continuances. 27 pointed out that there are two cases involved, in two separate actions, one for capital murder and the present one for murder, and the arguments she makes are for both. She mentioned generally the court granting motions for continuances ore tenus to the prosecution, and that the prosecution and the court had ignored all requests for speedy trial. She concluded by asking the trial court to dismiss the case, release Flora on his own recognizance, or allow the trial to go forward on February 3, 2003. At that point, the prosecutor provided more specific information, including that when Flora waived arraignment in February 2002, the case was continued to the June 10, 2002, term of court. On March 7, 2002, and June 6, 2002, Flora requested more time for investigation and discovery, and trial was continued to the August term. On August 5, the defense requested another continuance, which was granted to September 23, 2002. On that date the State requested more time for a psychological evaluation of a then co-defendant. On November 20, 2002, Flora filed his first request for a speedy trial, although the trial date had already been set by the court for December 2, 2002. Ultimately that trial setting was continued until February 3, 2003, because the trial court judge had a scheduling conflict with another “special setting” case. At the January 16 docket setting, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion for continuance, over Flora’s objection that although the prosecutor announced ready for trial of other cases also scheduled on February 3, those defendants had not been incarcerated as long as Flora. The record is silent as to whether any date certain was set for the trial. At the January 24, 2003, hearing the trial court considered the arguments of counsel and reviewed the history of the case to that point. 28 Before announcing his ruling on the motions, without specifically addressing any particular motion, the trial court noted that Flora was facing “the most serious charges that could be leveled against any defendant. One is capital murder, the second is murder, and the third is armed robbery” 3 , and went on to say: And obviously it takes time on the part of the defendant to prepare the case, the defendant’s attorneys to prepare the case defending the defendant; and it takes also a lot of time for the State to get ready to prosecute the case. And so with that understanding, and in consideration of the nature of the charges, the seriousness of the charges, as well as the necessary continuances which were requested by the defendant to have an opportunity to get everything ready for the defense, and then for the State on that occasion that has been mentioned which related to the codefendant, and for these reasons the Court is of the opinion that there has been no denial of a speedy trial, no violation of the speedy trial requirements of the State. And so the case, you know, will, of course, proceed as soon as the Court can get to it. This Court has a tremendous volume of criminal cases, and we can only try so many cases in a period of time. But every effort will be made to try this case as soon as possible. . . . The Court is of the opinion that there is no factual basis or legal basis for supporting the defendant’s demand for speedy trial, and the same for the motion to dismiss. . . . So the Court is going to deny each of these motions and each of these causes that have been raised by the defendant. At that point the trial court asked if there was anything else to be considered, to which Flora’s attorney answered “No, your honor.” ¶65. On March 7, 2003, a second hearing was held, this time regarding the State’s motion for continuance requested the previous day. The court granted the State’s motion, which included need to secure DNA testing, weapons analysis, and the absence of a key witness, 3 The appeal before this Court is from the murder charge only. 29 Subrena Levy. This motion was granted until the next term of court on a date to be assigned by the court administrator4 and defense counsel acquiesced. On May 8, 2003, Flora filed his third demand for a speedy trial, and on May 15, the State requested more time in order to get blood samples tested in addition to needing more time to find a material witness to their case. On May 23, a third hearing was conducted, this time regarding the blood samples from Flora for testing, and the trial judge granted the blood testing. The transcript does not reveal that there was any specific accounting for the days of delay caused by the time necessary to get the samples and testing done. On June 13, the court ordered the same from witness Subrenda Levy. On September 12, 2003, Flora renewed his demand for a speedy trial, actually in a fourth case, in which Flora was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. However, that case was also set for trial September 22, and the hearing involved various matters on all four of the Flora cases, including severance. With regard to the present case, the prosecutors pointed out that they had been waiting more than six months for DNA results from Reliagene, which were needed specifically for the murder case, and that a date certain setting appeared to be necessary to get the testing completed. There was no ruling from the court at the close of the hearing, other than to instruct the attorneys to get with the court administrator to select a date, and trial was subsequently set for December 1, 2003. On October 17, 2003, defense counsel informed the court he was unavailable on that day, and requested a continuance, but it was denied. From then until the December 1, 2003, trial, 4 Apparently the date set was for September 22, 2003, based on argument by the prosecutor at the May 23, 2003 hearing. 30 there were various motions for, and responses and supplements to, discovery from both Flora and the State. On October 20, Flora filed six motions in limine, and on the following day filed motions for funding for DNA expert to assist, and for additional discovery. In November there were more motions and numerous orders. Although on the record before us we are unable to allocate a specific number of days of delay to each party, we are persuaded that sufficient good cause was shown related to matters beyond the control of the State, for us to uphold the decision by the trial court. ¶66. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Flora’s motions. We do, however, urge the trial courts and prosecutors of this State to guard against becoming complacent with regard to making a clear record to allow proper review of speedy trial claims. This Court should not be expected to simply accept at face value the claims of crowded dockets, backlogged laboratory testing, and other similar logistical problems, which undeniably exist. Under the facts and circumstances in the record before us, the reason for the delay factor weighs in favor of Flora.
¶67. This factor weighs in favor of Flora. It is undisputed that Flora asserted his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial on several occasions beginning with his demand for speedy trial and first motion to dismiss, on November 20, 2002, some 14 months after his arrest. His second demand was made on January 17, 2003; and his third on May 8, 2003, together with his second motion to dismiss. However, Flora’s assertion of his right 31 to a speedy trial is a ground for reversal or dismissal only if, after viewing together and evaluating all factors of the Barker analysis, we conclude that his right to a speedy trial was violated. Stark v. State, 911 So.2d 447, 453 (Miss. 2005).
¶68. To assist in analyzing this factor, the Barker Court identified three interests protected by the right to a speedy trial to be considered when determining whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay in bringing him or her to trial. These interests are: (a) prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (b) minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (c) limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. Id. In State v. Magnusen, 646 So. 2d 1275, 1284 (Miss. 1994), this Court found presumptive prejudice from a fifteen-month delay between arrest and trial but no actual prejudice and weighed the prejudice factor against the defendant. We look to such questions as whether witnesses have died or become unavailable, documents or other evidence have been destroyed, or memories have dimmed so that the accused is at a disadvantage which would not have attended him at a prompt trial. Jaco v. State, 574 So. 2d 625, 632 (Miss. 1990); see Perry v. State, 419 So. 2d 194, 200 (Miss. 1982); Wells v. State, 288 So. 2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1974). ¶69. While there are certainly societal disadvantages of a lengthy pretrial incarceration, this case does not present a situation in which the incarceration was oppressive, especially when 32 one considers the complexities of preparation for multiple charges filed against multiple defendants, in four separate cases, plus the heavy caseload in the offices of both the Hinds County Public Defender who represented Flora, and the Hinds County District Attorney who prosecuted the case, as well as the Hinds County Circuit Court. There were a number of continuances filed, or agreed to, by Flora. Furthermore, no proof exists of extraordinary anxiety or of loss of evidence or witnesses. Flora attempts to use “prosecutorial misconduct” in support of his speedy trial claim. This claim is without merit as we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the reasons given for the State’s continuances were for “good cause.” As to Flora’s allegation that the prosecutor deliberately misrepresented the fact that the DNA testing was being done, the record reflects that, at that time, the state crime lab was without an analyst who could perform the DNA testing, and upon learning of this, the prosecutor promptly proceeded to take the steps necessary to obtain testing from Reliagene. This unquestionably caused delay, but the record does not reflect that the State’s failure to obtain timely testing was done to purposefully disadvantage Flora, nor that Flora’s ability to defend against the charges was affected. Ultimately, all witnesses were available for trial. This factor weighs in favor of the State, as no actual prejudice existed. Under the totality of the circumstances, and upon examination and analysis of the Barker factors, we conclude that Flora’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. See Hersick, 904 So.2d at 125.
¶70. Flora also alleges a statutory violation of his right to a speedy trial, under Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-17-1 (Supp. 2000), which provides: “[u]nless good cause be shown, . . . all 33 offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy days (270) after the accused has been arraigned.” Therefore, we simply start Flora’s statutory speedy trial clock two months later, on February 19, 2002, when he waived arraignment and entered his not guilty plea. However, the same analysis of good cause shown and continuances duly granted is applicable in the statutory context as in the constitutional context. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we are convinced that fewer than 270 days must be counted against the State. The only intervals where it appears that, arguably, a noteworthy amount of time ran against the State was between the waiver of arraignment and Flora’s first continuance, which amounted to sixteen days; between the State’s first motion for continuance on September 23, until December 2, 2002, the first date set for trial, which was seventy days; between the state’s second motion for continuance on January 16, until the March 7, 2003 hearing on that and other motions, which was fifty days; and between March 7, until May 15, 2003, which was sixty-nine days, for a total of 205 days. Considering the record as a whole, we conclude that while the length of the delay was substantial, and while Flora undisputedly asserted both his statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial, the reasons for the delay were legitimate and “good cause” was shown. In light of Mississippi’s current case law on this point, we hold that Flora was not denied his statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial. This issue is without merit VII. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF THE NAMES OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS AND DISCLOSURE OF THE CRIMINAL HISTORIES OF JOHNSON AND SPANN 34 ¶71. In reviewing rulings of a trial court regarding matters of evidence, relevancy and discovery violations, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 891 So. 2d 179, 181 (Miss. 2004). ¶72. Flora asserts the trial court denied to him the names and identities of the police officers who were present at his arrest in the early morning hours of September 11, 2001, and also denied him the criminal histories of Roger Johnson and Ray Spann. Flora submits only that this information may have been favorable and possibly could have supported the defense that Flora did not fire the murder weapon. ¶73. The law is well-settled on this disclosure issue. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court established the principle that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is either material to guilt or to punishment. However, the Supreme Court also recognized that not all failures to disclose exculpatory evidence constitute reversible error, holding that “. . . the question is whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different but for governmental evidentiary suppression which ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985)). Soon thereafter, we adopted this principle and stated that in order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove the following: 35 (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. King v. State, 656 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (Miss. 1995) (emphasis added). ¶74. Flora argues the State suppressed favorable evidence; however, Flora fails to show, as required by Brady, either that the evidence was favorable or that the prosecution even possessed the same. In fact, Flora acknowledged this through his motion for discovery that he asked the trial court to order the Jackson Police Department, the Hinds County Sheriff’s Office, the Mississippi Department of Public Safety and the Mississippi Department of Corrections to provide him all the records indicating all criminal charges or convictions with regard to five persons who “may be material witnesses in this case and may be called to testify”(emphasis added). There is no proof in the record that would allow this Court to decide whether such evidence was favorable or unfavorable. Even if this Court presumes that the evidence was favorable and that the evidence was in the prosecution’s possession, Flora still must satisfy the remaining prongs. ¶75. Under the second prong of Brady, the defendant must prove that he “does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it with any reasonable diligence.” King, 656 So. 2d at 1174. Presuming Flora did not possess the evidence, no proof exists in the record that Flora could not obtain the evidence with reasonable diligence. Flora argues that “state and federal law bar Flora from directly accessing the information via the public entities responsible for 36 maintaining national criminal information databases and access to these databases,” but does not cite authority and does not provide any proof that he sought to obtain such information and it was denied. Further, this argument is in direct conflict with a recent decision by the Mississippi Court of Appeals which correctly stated that: “[c]onviction records are a matter of public record equally available to the defense as to the State.” McNair v. State, 814 So. 2d 153, 157 (Miss. App. 2001). Moreover, while the names and addresses of the police officers were in the State’s possession, Flora failed to demonstrate he could not obtain this information through reasonable diligence. ¶76. Even if Flora were to satisfy the first and second prongs, he fails to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the Brady test. Under the third and fourth prongs of the test, the defendant is required to prove that the “prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence and that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” King, 656 So. 2d at 1174 (emphasis added). In 2001, this Court held that “in any case, Brady requires a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different outcome, not a mere possibility.” Todd v. State, 806 So. 2d 1086, 1091 (Miss. 2001). Ultimately, Flora cannot prove to a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this evidence been in his possession. Flora not only admitted to being at the scene of the crime, but he also admitted to being in a struggle with the victim. Evidence also exists which places the weapon used to commit the crime in Flora’s possession soon after the crime. Furthermore, gunshot residue was found on Flora 37 soon after the crime, and blood of the victim was found on Flora’s clothing. At best, a mere possibility exists that the outcome of trial would have been different, certainly not satisfying Brady or the standard required by this Court’s precedent. See id. at 1091. Moreover, there is no evidence of suppression by the State. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow Flora to discover potentially favorable evidence. VIII. DENIAL OF FLORA’S REQUEST TO QUESTION STEVEN HAYNE ABOUT ILLICIT DRUGS IN THE BLOOD OF THE VICTIM ¶77. The standard of review for the exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion. Herring v. Poirrier, 797 So.2d 797, 804 (Miss. 2000). The trial judge is empowered with the discretion to consider and to decide which evidence is admissible, and unless this judicial discretion is so abused as to be prejudicial to the accused, then, the ruling of the lower court must be affirmed. Clark v. State, 891 So.2d 136,139 (Miss. 2004). ¶78. During direct examination by the State, Dr. Steven Hayne testified that he drew blood and urine specimens from the body of the victim for toxicological testing by the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, and that the testing would show the presence or absence of ethyl alcohol or “drugs of abuse” in the bloodstream. Dr. Hayne also testified on direct examination that the crime laboratory results showed an absence of ethyl alcohol. Dr. Hayne further testified that the crime laboratory result of the ethyl alcohol testing was the only report he received. On cross-examination, Flora attempted to ask whether the urine of the victim showed the presence of “drugs of abuse” to which the trial court sustained the State’s objection to that question. Had Flora not possessed the results of both the ethyl alcohol and “drugs of abuse” 38 reports, his argument would certainly be stronger regarding a possible discovery violation. Flora was, however, in possession of both reports; counsel stated in a proffer outside the presence of a jury: “I’ve got the testing documents and the results on them which would be negative for all drugs other than marijuana in the urine -- of the blood of Mr. Spann [victim].” It is certainly not the State’s duty to enter into evidence all documents in its possession, especially when the person testifying has no knowledge of the contents of an offered or proposed document. ¶79. Flora also argues that the State created a “false impression of the evidence” by only referring to the ethyl alcohol testing. This argument would have merit only if Dr. Hayne was aware of the “drugs of abuse” report of which he clearly denied having knowledge on several occasions. By asking Dr. Hayne about the only toxicological report of which he had knowledge, the State did not create a false impression of the evidence, and Flora cannot justifiably claim a due process violation. ¶80. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Flora the opportunity to ask Dr. Hayne about the results of the “drugs of abuse” report. IX. DENIAL OF FLORA’S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, PEREM PTORY INSTRUC TION, AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ¶81. “[T]he standard of review for denials of a motion for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a request for peremptory instruction is the same.” Jefferson v. State, 818 So. 2d 1099, 1110 (Miss. 2002); see also Shelton v. State, 853 So. 2d 1171, 1186 (Miss. 2003). “A directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a request 39 for peremptory instruction all challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.” Jefferson, 818 So. 2d at 1099. This Court considers all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and gives the State the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Seeling v. State, 844 So. 2d 439, 443 (Miss. 2003). This Court is “not at liberty to direct that the defendant be discharged short of a conclusion on our part that given the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was guilty.” Ashford v. State, 583 So. 2d 1279, 1281 (Miss. 1991). ¶82. In Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889 (Miss. 1968), we stated that in considering whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows “beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.” However, this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge 40 to the sufficiency of the evidence “point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,” the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render. Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985) (citing May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984)); see also Dycus v. State, 875 So. 2d 140, 164 (Miss. 2004). ¶83. The precise issue is whether, on the evidence before us, fair-minded jurors could have found Flora guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Without question, there is ample evidence pointing to Flora’s guilt. Flora admitted to being at the scene of the crime, and he admitted to being in a struggle with the victim. Evidence also exists which places the weapon used to commit the crime in Flora’s possession soon after the crime. Gunshot residue was also found on Flora soon after the crime. In addition, blood of the victim was found on Flora’s clothing. Flora’s contention that the case relies entirely on circumstantial evidence is simply incorrect. ¶84. Considering the evidence offered by the State, as set forth above, Flora’s argument that the trial court erred in denying the motion for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the request for peremptory instruction is without merit. When observed in the light most favorable to the State, and with the State receiving the benefit of all favorable inferences, we conclude that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to support the conviction in this case.