Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of Certain Pieces of Evidence

Text: Defendants claim that various pieces of evidence -- the testimonies of Marco A. Díaz Narváez (Díaz), Carlos Rivas Serrano (Rivas or Gordo), and Officer Luis Vázquez Torres (Officer Vázquez), and the two phone calls between Cummings and Christopher -- were improperly admitted. As explained in more detail below, all of the evidence was admissible.

Díaz was a member of the conspiracy who agreed to cooperate with the government. According to Díaz, he was a seller in the organization and would also store guns for Christopher. After discussing his involvement, Díaz testified about three 18 Cummings makes a similar unpreserved argument regarding the jury instructions for these counts, alleging that it was error to instruct the jury on crack cocaine as opposed to cocaine base because crack and cocaine base were no longer synonymous under DePierre. For the same reasons discussed above, we reject this argument. -25- specific instances. The first two involved rounds with Juan. During these rounds, Díaz -- driving Cummings's car -- would take Juan to a specified location, find the person they were looking for, beat the person up, put the person in the trunk of Cummings's car, and then drive for a while before letting Díaz out and continuing to drive onward with the victim in the trunk. Díaz testified that he never knew in advance where they were going, who they were looking for, or why they were looking for that person. Rather, he just followed Juan's instructions, which were being carried out on Christopher's behalf. Díaz added that Juan was armed both times and that Christopher was the leader of the conspiracy. The third incident occurred one night in the Housing Project. According to Díaz, he had been on duty selling drugs late one night when he heard two shots. Shortly thereafter, Juan and Christopher appeared and enlisted Díaz's help putting a young man with a gunshot wound in his leg into a car. Díaz testified that he was later told that Juan had shot the young man -- who was not from the Housing Project -- twice at Christopher's behest.
Defendants contend that this testimony was irrelevant and thus should have been excluded. Because they made this objection at trial, we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. -26- Richardson, 421 F.3d 17, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). Contrary to Defendants' assertion, however, the testimony was relevant. We reject Defendants' suggestion that Díaz's testimony shows that the rounds were not part of the drug conspiracy. Though Díaz did testify about the rounds in response to questions from the prosecutor about actions aside from the drugs, a review of the transcript as a whole makes clear that the rounds were related to the drug organization. Given this relationship, there is little question that the testimony was relevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.). The testimony helped establish a connection between Defendants -- Juan, acting on Christopher's orders, used Cummings's car -- and between Defendants and the drug conspiracy -- the rounds, being conducted by Juan on Christopher's behalf, were in connection to the drug organization. It also helped to prove at least two allegations in the indictment -- that the roles of Christopher and Juan were leader and enforcer, respectively, and that the leaders of the organization would use force, violence, and intimidation in order to protect the conspiracy and maintain control. See United States v. Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d 78, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that evidence of murders was relevant to -27- show the existence of a single, overarching drug conspiracy and to prove the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy). As a fallback position, Defendants contend that even if the evidence was relevant, it should still have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendants never raised this objection below, and thus we review for plain error. Id. at 95; see also United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2012). Under any standard, however, this argument fails. Evidence is only excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 'the danger of unfair prejudice.' United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 121 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403). And unfair prejudice is often reserved for evidence that invites the jury to render a verdict on an improper emotional basis or for evidence that is shocking or heinous and likely to inflame the jury. Id. at 122 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Díaz's testimony does none of these things, and thus its admission was not unfairly prejudicial.

Like Díaz, Rivas was also a member of the conspiracy who chose to cooperate with the government. Rivas's testimony focused mostly on Christopher. First, Rivas described an incident where Christopher had a problem because some people . . . shot at his -28- car with his kids in it while they were traveling near a bakery. According to Rivas, in response to this attack, Christopher and Coquito and Monchi -- two of the drug conspiracy's triggermen -- went in search of the shooters. Rivas testified that he knew all three were armed because [h]e was always armed every time that they would go out to solve a problem and they weren't going out to the shopping mall to look for clothing. They were going out to look for the enemy.
Like with Díaz's testimony, Defendants allege that Rivas's testimony is both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. However, neither of these objections was raised below, so we review for plain error.19 See Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 26. Once again, we find no error. Rivas's testimony is relevant because it helps to establish that Christopher was a leader of the organization -- he was targeted shortly after another leader was murdered and it is unlikely that a low-level member of the organization would be targeted for assassination -- and that the drug organization resorted to violence to protect its territory. Moreover, the fact that Christopher and his men were armed provides proof of the 19 Christopher did object to Rivas's statement that the men were armed and his subsequent explanation as to how he knew this, but the objection was based on a different ground. See United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 35 n.11 (1st Cir. 2006) (Because that objection was on different grounds, however, we deem the defendant's present argument of error, raised for the first time on appeal, as unpreserved.). -29- conspiracy charged in Count Nine -- conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d at 95-96. And because the testimony was neither shocking, heinous, nor likely to inflame the jury, it need not have been excluded under Rule 403. See Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 122.

During Officer Vázquez's testimony, a video was played showing Christopher and others attending the funeral of Miguel Ruiz Sánchez (Miguel) at the Housing Project. Officer Vázquez commented on the video, explaining that [a]ccording to [his] investigation, Miguel Ruiz Sánchez was one of the leaders of the conspiracy and that the reason some of the individuals were seen in the video picking up shell casings from the basketball court at the Housing Project was because according to [their] investigation, the previous day they were having a wake . . . for Miguel Ruiz Sánchez inside the project. The officer then proceeded to identify one of the individuals in the video as Antero Rivero Marrero (Rivero). On cross-examination, Officer Vázquez testified that according to his investigation, Rivero was serving as an escort 20 Defendants also challenge parts of Officer Vázquez's testimony as overview testimony. That is addressed in Part III.B.1, infra. -30- for Christopher because Christopher feared for his life, and . . . was hot in the street. On re-direct examination, the government asked Officer Vázquez about Rivero's escort services. Officer Vázquez testified that Rivero had a fictitious license to escort dignitaries and agreed with the statement that no license would permit possession of the two AK-47 rifles that were seized from Rivero because it is not legal to carry firearms to protect a drug trafficker.
Defendants once again challenge the relevance and undue prejudice of this testimony. Once again, our review is for plain error, and, once again, their challenge fails. See Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 26. Both pieces of evidence -- the picking up of the shell casings and the questioning into Rivero's escort services -- are relevant. Regarding the shell casings, the evidence is relevant for two reasons. First, the testimony connects Christopher with Miguel, who was known to be a leader of the drug organization. By establishing that Christopher was sufficiently connected to Miguel to attend his funeral, the evidence supported the conclusion that the two were part of the same organization. Second, the collection of the shell casings helps support the allegation that the organization used weapons (thus providing evidence of the gunrelated conspiracy charge) and that the conspirators were familiar -31- with the firearms. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d at 95-96. Once again, nothing about this testimony was unfairly prejudicial. See Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 122. As to the testimony regarding Rivero, the majority of this testimony was relevant for much the same reason as the testimonies already discussed: it helped establish Christopher's role as a leader in the organization since a low-level conspirator would likely not need the level of protection that Christopher needed. And though the district court could have in its discretion applied Rule 403 to exclude Officer Vázquez's agreement that it was not legal for Rivero to carry firearms to protect a drug trafficker, its failure to do so does not constitute plain error, especially given our great deference to a district court's 403 rulings. See id. In any event, this one comment was harmless given all of the other evidence presented. See United States v. Landrón-Class, 696 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2012).

As mentioned above while discussing the disqualification of Cummings's counsel, two conversations involving Cummings were recorded while he was detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), Guaynabo. In both calls -- one on June 5, 2012, and one on July 14, 2012 -- Cummings spoke with Christopher, who had not yet been arrested. Besides discussing the payments to Cummings's -32- counsel, the two also discussed whether Juan was looking for Gordo -- recall, this is Rivas's alias. Cummings informed Christopher that Juan was working in the kitchen at MDC, Guaynabo and had been looking for Rivas but was unable to find him. In addition, Cummings and Christopher spoke about the attack on Christopher and his family outside the bakery, specifically focusing on the fact that other members of their organization had advance knowledge of the attack and that there would be retaliation against those who shifted loyalties.
Juan objects to the admission of the two phone calls on hearsay grounds. Because he failed to object when the statements were first admitted and at the close of evidence, we review for plain error.21 See Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 25-26 (holding that to preserve a challenge to the admission of co-conspirator statements, a defendant must object on hearsay grounds when his or her coconspirator's statement is provisionally admitted and must renew the objection at the close of evidence). We reject this challenge, as the calls were properly admitted as co-conspirator statements. 21 Juan did initially object on Confrontation Clause grounds, but does not renew that objection on appeal. See Wallace, 461 F.3d at 35 n.11. Even if he had, that argument would fail as well, as coconspirator statements are by their nature, not testimonial, and thus not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 31; see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987). -33- Though hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible in criminal trials, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a statement made by a defendant's coconspirator 'during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy' may be introduced as the nonhearsay admission of a party opponent. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)). For a statement to qualify, the declarant and the defendant must be members of a conspiracy when the statement was made and the statement must have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. The calls here meet both requirements. As to the first, the government provided significant evidence that Juan, Cummings, and Christopher were all members of the same drug organization -- and thus the same conspiracy -- and there is nothing in the record to suggest that any Defendant affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy. See United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2002) (Where a conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and a continued performance of acts, it is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that it has terminated. (internal quotation marks omitted)). As to the second requirement, the calls did in fact further the ends of the conspiracy. At the time of the calls, Cummings and Juan had been arrested but Christopher had not, and the evidence showed that the conspiracy was still ongoing at the Housing Project. For example, Officer Vázquez testified that -34- surveillance continued until November 2012, months after the June and July telephone calls. Moreover, when Christopher was arrested, additional guns and drugs were seized, suggesting that the contraband seized in the earlier raids had been replenished. See United States v. Elwell, 984 F.2d 1289, 1293 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding a conspiracy to be ongoing and defendant to still be a part of it even after his arrest). Given that the organization was still operating, the calls can reasonably be interpreted as promoting the conspiracy. Cummings and Christopher discussed how certain members of the conspiracy -- such as Rivas -- knew that Christopher was going to be attacked and that Christopher was contemplating retaliating against those who were disloyal. Maintaining loyalty from others clearly promotes the conspiracy. See Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 30 (finding that statements served to placate . . . and forestall any dissension were in furtherance of the conspiracy); Elwell, 984 F.2d at 1293. The calls, therefore, properly qualify as co-conspirator statements and were thus properly admitted.