Opinion ID: 452104
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Facial Attack

Text: 8 The district court held that the doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiffs from arguing that the forfeiture provisions are unconstitutional on their face. The test for determining the applicability of this doctrine is well-settled: 9 For a prior judgment to bar a subsequent action, it is firmly established (1) that a prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) that there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) that the parties, or those in privity with them, must be identical in both suits; and (4) that the same cause of action must be involved in both suits. 10 Jones v. Texas Tech University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1141 (5th Cir.1981), quoting Stevenson v. International Paper Company, Mobile, Alabama, 516 F.2d 103, 108 (5th Cir.1975). The plaintiffs agree that the first three elements of this test have been satisfied. They contend, however, that the present cause of action is different from the one they instituted in 1981 and that, for this reason, the fourth element of the test has not been satisfied. 11 We recently discussed the meaning of the term same cause of action in Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc). In doing so, we stated: 12 Various tests have been advanced to determine whether the substance of two actions is the same for res judicata purposes: Is the same right infringed by the same wrong? Would a different judgment obtained in the second action impair rights under the first judgment? Would the same evidence sustain both judgments? This Court has recognized that the principal test for comparing causes of action is whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each action. 13 Id. at 559, quoting Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir.1979). In Nilsen, the plaintiff filed successive suits against the City of Moss Point for refusing to hire her as a firefighter. She first sought to recover under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. (Title VII), but the district court entered an adverse judgment against her. She then sought to recover under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We held that the Sec. 1983 suit involved the same cause of action as the consolidated Title VII suits and was therefore barred, explaining: 14 [The plaintiff's] claims here are based 'upon the same facts and circumstances as are alleged [in her previous suits]': in a word, upon the same transaction. Moreover, the same right, to be free of intentional sex discrimination in employment, is claimed to have been infringed by the same wrong, that discrimination. The primary right and duty asserted and the primary wrong complained of are the same in each action. Only the legal bases advanced for relief are different. 15 Nilsen, supra, at 559. See also Fleming v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 707 F.2d 829, 833 (5th Cir.1983).
16 The plaintiffs here advance three reasons why this suit involves a different cause of action from the one involved in Atkins, the previous suit. The first is that this suit involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the 1983 amendments to the Texas Controlled Substances Act, while Atkins involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the 1981 amendments to the Act. As the district court properly noted, however, the forfeiture provisions of the 1983 amendments that the plaintiffs are now challenging, Secs. 5.05 and 5.07, are essentially the same as the forfeiture provisions of the 1981 amendments that the plaintiffs challenged in Atkins. In fact, apart from minor cosmetic changes in the language of Sec. 5.07, 3 the provisions are identical. 17 The plaintiffs contend in this suit that Secs. 5.05 and 5.07 of the 1983 amendments are unconstitutional because they fail to provide for a hearing within thirty days of seizure. Sections 5.05 and 5.07 of the 1981 amendments also failed to provide for such a hearing. Thus, the primary right asserted (the right to a timely hearing) and the primary wrong complained of (the absence of a timely hearing provision) are the same in both actions. That the pertinent provisions of the 1983 amendments at issue here are not identical in other respects to the pertinent provisions of the 1981 amendments at issue in Atkins is irrelevant.
18 The plaintiffs' next argument is that this cause of action is different from the previous one because the 1981 amendments at issue in Atkins did not legally exist at the time Atkins was decided. This argument is inspired by certain language in Ex Parte Crisp, 661 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). In that case, which involved a petition for state court habeas corpus relief, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declared the 1981 amendments unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution because the bill by which they were enacted, H.B. 730, contained a defective caption. In discussing the effect of its ruling on the amendments, the court held that the Controlled Substances Act stands as though H.B. 730 had never been enacted. Id. at 948. The plaintiffs here argue, in effect, that the 1981 amendments did not exist when Atkins was decided and that Atkins should therefore be deemed not to have involved a cause of action at all and certainly not the same cause of action that is at issue in this case. 19 The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). The general rule is that [j]udgments rest[ing] on invalid statutes are commonly entitled to full res judicata effect.... So long as the parties were afforded a fair opportunity to raise the question of validity [in a prior proceeding], the judgment should be honored whether the question was not raised or was raised and resolved incorrectly. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 4429 (1981). The plaintiffs do not deny that they could have raised the same challenge in Atkins to the validity of the statute that the petitioners successfully made in Ex Parte Crisp, supra. Their argument thus fails that, for this reason, the judgment in Atkins should not be given full res judicata effect.
20 The plaintiffs' final argument regarding the facial invalidity of Secs. 5.05 and 5.07 is that in present case the challenge to these two provisions is based on procedural due process, whereas in Atkins the challenge was based on substantive due process. Even assuming this to be true, we have frequently stated that a judgment or decree upon the merits in the first case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action or suit, not only in respect of every matter which was actually offered and received to sustain the demand, but also as to every ground of recovery which might have been presented. Jones, supra, 656 F.2d at 1141. Since the plaintiffs could have raised their procedural due process challenge in Atkins, their final argument likewise lacks merit.