Opinion ID: 1823197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the chancellor erred in modifying custody and granting Stephen primary physical custody of S.G.

Text: ¶ 8. When this Court reviews domestic relations matters, our scope of review is limited by the substantial evidence/manifest error rule. See R.K. v. J.K., 946 So.2d 764, 772 (Miss.2007) (citing Mizell v. Mizell, 708 So.2d 55, 59 (Miss. 1998)). Therefore, we will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Id. ¶ 9. [T]he polestar consideration in child custody cases is the best interest and welfare of the child. Albright, 437 So.2d at 1005. This Court has previously noted that a change in custody is a jolting, traumatic experience. Ballard v. Ballard, 434 So.2d 1357, 1360 (Miss.1983). As such, children do not need to be bounced back and forth between their parents like a volleyball[.] Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1298 (Miss.1984). See also Cooley v. Cooley, 574 So.2d 694, 699 (Miss. 1991) (overruled on other grounds) (The best interest of the child requires that the child have some degree of stability in his or her life.) Therefore, [a] change in custody should never be made for the purpose of rewarding one parent or punishing the other. Tucker, 453 So.2d at 1297. All courts must be consistent, diligent, and focused upon the requirement that only parental behavior that poses a clear danger to the child's mental or emotional health can justify a custody change. Morrow v. Morrow, 591 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss.1991). See also Ballard, 434 So.2d at 1360 (It is only that behavior of a parent which clearly posits or causes danger to the mental or emotional well-being of a child (whether such behavior is immoral or not), which is sufficient basis to seriously consider the drastic legal action of changing custody.). ¶ 10. Additionally, chancellors are charged with considering the totality of the circumstances. Tucker, 453 So.2d at 1297 (quoting Kavanaugh v. Carraway, 435 So.2d 697, 700 (Miss.1983)). In other words: [a]n isolated incident, e.g., an unwarranted striking of a child does not in and of itself justify a change of custody. Before custody should be changed, the chancellor should find that the overall circumstances in which a child lives have materially changed and are likely to remain materially changed for the foreseeable future and, of course, that such change adversely impacts upon the child. Tucker, 453 So.2d at 1297 (emphasis added). The test for a modification of child custody is: (1) whether there has been a material change in circumstances [ [8] ] which adversely affects[ [9] ] the welfare of the child and (2) whether the best interest of the child requires a change of custody.  Floyd v. Floyd, 949 So.2d 26, 29 (Miss. 2007) (citing Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So.2d 581, 585 (Miss.1999)) (emphasis added). See also Sanford v. Arinder, 800 So.2d 1267, 1272 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (quoting Brawley v. Brawley, 734 So.2d 237 (Miss.Ct.App.1999)) (the non-custodial parent must satisfy a three part test: `a substantial change in circumstances of the custodial parent since the original custody decree, the substantial change's adverse impact on the welfare of the child, and the necessity of the custody modification for the best interest of the child.') (emphasis added). Therefore: the non-custodial parent's request does not simply mean a re-weighing of the Albright factors to see who now is better suited to have custody of the child. Although a re-weighing of Albright factors may be triggered, in reviewing the circumstances, there must be shown . . . a material change  not just a change  in circumstances, that has had an adverse affect [sic] on the child and which requires, or mandates, a change in custody for the best interests of the child. Sanford, 800 So.2d at 1272 (emphasis added). Stated otherwise, a non-custodial parent must first sufficiently prove a material change in circumstances which has an adverse effect on the child that clearly posits or causes danger to the mental or emotional well-being of a child[,] Ballard, 434 So.2d at 1360, as a condition precedent to re-weighing the Albright factors. The Albright factors may ebb and flow yearly, quarterly, monthly or even less, but in the absence of a substantial adverse effect upon the child, physical custody changes are not only unwarranted, they are unwise. Our body of law could not be clearer. ¶ 11. This Court has repeatedly held that the mere moving of the custodial parent does not constitute a material change in circumstances for child custody modification purposes. See Cooley, 574 So.2d at 699; Spain, 483 So.2d at 320-21; Pearson v. Pearson, 458 So.2d 711, 713-14 (Miss.1984). See also Lambert, 872 So.2d at 685. This Court has never found a non-custodial parent's relocation creates a material change in circumstances sufficient for modification of child custody. [10] Logic dictates that if the move of the custodial parent is not considered a material change in circumstances, then the move of the non-custodial parent is likewise not a material change in circumstances. To hold otherwise would permit a non-custodial parent to unilaterally create a material change in circumstances and then seek modification of custody. ¶ 12. This Court concludes that the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard, R.K., 946 So.2d at 772, in modifying custody. Therefore, we are required to reverse. The chancellor erred in finding material changes in circumstances and then disuniting isolated incidents to find an adverse affect on S.G. According to this Court in Floyd, there must be a material change in circumstances which adversely affects the welfare of the child[.] 949 So.2d at 29 (emphasis added). In other words, the two cannot be separated. Furthermore, the material change in circumstances must be in the custodial home. See Riley, 884 So.2d at 793. The material change in circumstances relied upon by the chancellor was the move of the non-custodial parent. Relocation of either parent is insufficient grounds for modification of child custody. Lambert, 872 So.2d at 685. Collectively, the chancellor erred in finding that Stephen's substantial visitation combined with his transfer to San Diego constituted a substantial change in circumstances. Additionally, the material change in circumstances must be unforeseeable at the time of the original decree. See Lambert, 872 So.2d at 684; Tingle, 573 So.2d at 1391-92. Stephen's employment with the United States Navy comes with the eminently foreseeable certainty of transfers throughout his career. The record reflects that during Stephen's years in the Navy, he had already been assigned to duty stations in Italy, Mississippi, and California. At the hearing, Stephen conceded that he will likely be transferred again in three years. ¶ 13. The chancellor applied clearly erroneous legal standards in modifying custody. Furthermore, Stephen failed to show that the mental and emotional well-being of the child was in any danger as a result of living with Elizabeth. Lambert, 872 So.2d at 685. The Court of Appeals erred in attempting to divine the chancellor's intent, by disregarding his stated reasons, and then relying upon implied facts.