Opinion ID: 212834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The EEOC Determination

Text: Before digging into the merits of the parties' arguments, we address first the district court's treatment of the EEOC's administrative determination. After investigating Silverman's charges, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that the Board discriminated against Silverman because of her pregnancy and retaliated against her for filing a discrimination charge. Silverman argues that the EEOC determination alone ought to show that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the Board. The district court chose not to consider the EEOC determination in deciding the Board's motion for summary judgment. We conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion, and pursuant to its obligation to make a de novo decision on the plaintiff's claims. We held in Tulloss v. Near North Montessori School, Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 152-54 (7th Cir.1985), that the district judge, as fact-finder, has great discretion in the treatment of an EEOC reasonable cause determination. We explained that Congress rejected a proposal to provide only deferential judicial review to EEOC findings, and chose instead to give the parties a right to de novo review by district courts of the merits of charging parties' discrimination claims, so that the fact-finder is a district judge rather than an administrative agency hearing officer. Id. at 152, citing H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, at 58-63. We also observed that the need for discretion was even more important in the context of claims tried to a jury in light of the greater risks of prejudice, misinterpretation, and delay. Id. at 153 n. 2. (In 1991, after Tulloss was decided, Congress amended Title VII to provide for jury trials in cases like Silverman's. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c), enacted as section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166.) [1] Whether an EEOC determination is in favor of a charging party or a respondent, a district judge or jury cannot evaluate the weight it deserves, if any, without understanding what evidence was presented to the EEOC and whether that evidence is properly admissible in court. See, e.g., Tulloss, 776 F.2d at 154-55 (describing prejudicial and inadmissible contents of EEOC investigative file). That sort of effort will rarely add much to the probative value of the admissible evidence that is actually submitted to the court or jury for a de novo decision on the merits. See Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Department, 590 F.3d 427, 442 (7th Cir.2009) (concluding district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding EEOC reasonable cause determination); Young v. James Green Management, Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 623-25 (7th Cir.2003) (affirming decision to exclude EEOC findings of discrimination from evidence in jury trial). Silverman contends without explanation that some evidentiary material available to the EEOC was not available to the district court. As the district court observed, however, the parties had every opportunity to present their full case, including evidence offered in the EEOC proceedings, in the district court. The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the EEOC determination was not probative in its analysis. For the same reason, neither is it probative in ours. We proceed to the merits of Silverman's claims.