Opinion ID: 1655515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVERTING ESCUDE'S M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION INTO A M.R.C.P. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?[1]

Text: ¶ 3. Jones argues that the trial court committed reversible error in granting its strange combination of summary judgment and sustaining Escude's motion to dismiss. We, however, have repeatedly held that motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment have been by rule declared interchangeable. Walton v. Bourgeois, 512 So.2d 698, 699 (Miss.1987) (citations omitted). The motion for summary judgment is the functional equivalent of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, only it occurs at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. Like the motion to dismiss, it tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim to undergird his insistence that further proceedings be had. Gray v. Baker, 485 So.2d 306, 307 (Miss.1986). ¶ 4. A party against whom a motion to dismiss under M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) has been filed is thereby on actual notice that the motion to dismiss may be treated as a motion for summary judgment if the conditions prescribed in the rule are found, including the opportunity to present any relevant material. See Walton, 512 So.2d at 700. M.R.C.P. 12(b) specifically provides: If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.... ¶ 5. In Jones' case, Escude's motion to dismiss was properly converted to a motion for summary judgment through the submission of affidavits by both parties. This assignment of error is without merit.