Opinion ID: 1968789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Property Excluded

Text: We do not cover property:       10. In or on a vehicle that is not attended. An attended vehicle has a person actually in or on the vehicle. This person must be you, your employee, or a person whose duty it is to attend it. (Emphasis added). Id. at 707. The court set forth the facts: On December 9, 1991, George Kessler, Tivoli's wholesale jewelry salesman, who was traveling between sales locations, placed jewelry valued at $78,000 in the trunk of his car. Kessler stopped at a check cashing business owned by his friend in Houston. Parking in the parking lot and locking the car, Kessler left the jewelry in the trunk. Inside the building, he used the restroom located in a locked security area behind the lobby. Exiting the restroom, Kessler stood by a window with his friend in the secured area overlooking the check cashing business's lobby. Kessler saw thieves taking the jewelry from his car's trunk. He ran from the secured area through the lobby and attempted unsuccessfully to stop the thieves as they drove away. Id. The court said, We must determine whether the insurance claim was properly denied. One issue is whether the `unattended vehicle' exclusion contained in the insurance policy is ambiguous, as maintained by Tivoli and Goldman, so as to preclude summary judgment. Id. at 710. In denying the claim, it said: We hold in this case the salesman did not have the jewelry in his possession at the time of the theft. We also hold the property was left in an unattended vehicle when he went into the building. Id. at 711. In Jerome I. Silverman, Inc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 422 F.Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y.1976), the policy excluded: `... Loss of or damage to property insured hereunder while in or upon any automobile, motorcycle or any other vehicle unless, at the time the loss or damage occurs, there is actually in or upon such vehicle, the Assured, or a permanent employee of the Assured, or a person whose sole duty it is to attend the vehicle.....'  Id. at 90. In that case, the salesman parked his car in a parking garage. He left his keys in the ignition so that the parking attendant could move the car if necessary. He told the attendant that he would give him an extra tip if he would watch the car. Id. The salesman walked about one and one-quarter blocks to a customer. Id. Later, after sitting in the car for a period, he went to a telephone booth about fifteen feet in front of the car where he said he could view the car. Yet later he went to see another customer. The jewelry was missing when the salesman finally returned. The court concluded that no loss occurred while [the salesman] was in or around the automobile and that the parking lot attendant [q]uite simply [was] not `a person whose sole duty it [was] to attend the vehicle.... ` Id. In Williams v. Fallaize Ins. Agency, 220 Ga.App. 411, 469 S.E.2d 752 (1996), the policy stated: `This policy does not insure loss of or damage to property: 3) in or upon any automobile or any other vehicle unless at the time the loss or damage occurs there is actually in or upon the vehicle, the Assured, or a person whose sole duty it is to attend the vehicle.' Id. at 412, 469 S.E.2d at 754. The saleswoman was inside a store delivering jewelry to a customer at the time the jewelry was stolen. She was at least twenty-five feet away from her car. While she was in the store, someone smashed her car window, punctured the tires, released the trunk, and stole a briefcase containing the jewelry. The court said, [I]t is apparent that at the time of loss, [the saleswoman] was neither `actually in' nor `upon' her vehicle. Id. at 414, 469 S.E.2d at 755. In Steinzeig v. Mechanics & Traders Ins. Co., 297 S.W.2d 778 (Mo.Ct.App.1957), the policy provision excluded loss  `... unless at the time the loss occurs there is actually in or upon such vehicle, the Assured or a permanent employee of the Assured ...'. Id. at 779. In that instance, the car was left unattended from 9:30 p.m. until sometime the following morning. The court said, [U]nder the facts in this case, the plaintiffs cannot recover, because the loss occurred from an automobile at a time when it was not occupied by the insured or a permanent employee of the insured. Id. at 782. In William Kinscherf Co. v. St. Paul Fire & M. Ins. Co., 234 A.D. 385, 254 N.Y.S. 382 (1931), the policy excluded  `[l]oss or damage to property insured [t]hereunder whilst in or upon any automobile, motorcycle or horse drawn vehicle unless such conveyance is attended at the time the loss occurs by a permanent employee of the assured....'  Id. 254 N.Y.S. at 383. The employee left the car parked at the curb of a street while he called on a customer and had lunch. The court said that under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, bill of particulars, and proof of loss, [the employee] was not in attendance and no person was present `to attend the conveyance' while the loss occurred. Id. 254 N.Y.S. at 384. Hence, it ruled against the claim. Royce Furs, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 291 N.Y.S.2d 529, 30 A.D.2d 238 (App.Div.1968), involved a furrier's block policy. In that case liability was denied under the policy  `... unless at the time the theft occurs there is actually in or upon such vehicle, the insured or a permanent employee of the insured or a person whose sole duty it is to attend such vehicle.... ` Id. 291 N.Y.S.2d at 530. The court recited the facts: The vice-president drove up to a certain hotel and parked the car in a position which was approximately six to 10 feet from the hotel's entrance; he locked the car, checked the furs which were in the trunk, and saw that the trunk was locked. He then went to the registration desk. There was testimony that adjacent to the desk was a large window from which the car could be seen. After registering, which took but a few minutes, he started to walk back to the car. As he did so a man `bolted' into the car, started it up and drove off. This all took but a few seconds. Some time later the car was found and the furs were gone. Id. The court said, in denying recovery: [T]here was no employee of the insured in or upon the vehicle, nor was there present the insured or a person whose sole duty it was to attend the vehicle. It should be noted that the language provides for the necessity of having a person in or upon such vehicle is prefixed by the word `actually.' That word must be given a meaning. Id. 291 N.Y.S.2d at 531. There are a number of cases that have focused on the presence in a policy of the adverb actually. Revesz v. Excess Ins. Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 125, 106 Cal.Rptr. 166 (1973), involved a salesman's floater policy. Recovery was to be denied  `... unless, at the time the loss or damage occurs, the assured is actually in or upon such vehicle and the merchandise is in his possession.' Id. at 127, 106 Cal.Rptr. at 167. The court recited the facts: In order to get directions to [his ultimate destination], he parked his car at a curb in front of a service station, locked the ignition, got out of the car, taking his car keys with him, and walked around in front of his auto to the parkway. Thirty seconds after leaving the car and while [the salesman] was still within two to three feet thereof, he heard a door slam and the motor of his car start; he turned and saw an unidentified man drive off at high speed. Id. at 126-27, 106 Cal.Rptr. at 167. The court denied liability, saying: At the time of the loss the jewelry was not in his `personal custody' and he was not `actually in or upon' his vehicle, as required by the policies, in any sense of these words. The temporary abandonment is clearly evidenced by the fact that the thief was able to take possession of the vehicle and its contents without interference from him. Id. at 129, 106 Cal.Rptr. at 168. In Greenberg v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 188 Misc. 23, 66 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1946), a policy excluded a claim  `... unless, at the time the loss occurs, there is actually in or upon such vehicle the Assured or a permanent employee of the Assured, or a person whose sole duty it is to guard the property....'  Id. 66 N.Y.S.2d at 459. The loss occurred while the supposed custodian was in a restaurant with a friend. The court said that prior to entering the restaurant one of the party requested a stranger standing nearby to watch the car and promised to pay him a dollar for his services.... Id. 66 N.Y.S.2d at 458. One of the doors of the car had been pried open and the property in question had been stolen when the party returned about an hour later. The court said: We must give due recognition to the use of the word `actually' and must conclude it was inserted and intended for a definite purposeto indicate the intention that presence in realitypresence in factwas required and not a constructive or theoretical one. If we do not adopt that view then care and accuracy in the use of words is a meaningless effort. Id. 66 N.Y.S.2d at 459. Recovery was permitted in Lackow v. Insurance Co., 382 N.Y.S.2d 529, 52 A.D.2d 579 (1976). The policy provision in question required that the employee  `actually [be] in or upon such vehicle' at the time of the loss. Id. 382 N.Y.S.2d at 530. The court held that the employee's position at the time of the robbery, at the rear of the vehicle opening its trunk, was in compliance with the `Jeweler's Block Policy' provision. Id. 382 N.Y.S.2d at 529-30. No reasoning is set forth. Wideband Jewelry v. Sun Ins. Co., 619 N.Y.S.2d 339, 210 A.D.2d 220 (1994), likewise contains no analysis. The exclusion denied coverage  `... unless [the assured], an employee, or other person whose only duty is to attend the vehicle, are actually in or upon such vehicle at the time of the theft.'  Id. 619 N.Y.S.2d at 339. The employee was approximately six feet from his vehicle when the thieves opened the trunk and stole the jewelry in question. The court said, The plaintiff's employee was clearly not `actually in or upon' the vehicle at the time of the theft.... Id. The policy in Dreiblatt v. Taylor, 188 Misc. 199, 67 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1947), was similar to a jeweler's block policy in that the policy there excluded  `loss of the property insured [t]herein from road vehicles of every description when such vehicles are left unattended.'  Id. 67 N.Y.S.2d at 379. The vehicle in question was watched from the front window of an apartment on the first floor of an apartment house before which it was parked. The court said: The attendant, assuming the watcher to be such, was not shown to be actually within or upon the automobile, or so near thereto as to be able to observe a theft of the contents. The term `unattended' has a connotation of lack of due diligence or protection which would exclude coverage. Id. American Stone Diamond, Inc. v. Lloyds of London, 934 F.Supp. 839 (S.D.Tex.1996), involved yet another case in which the policy provision required that there [be] actually in or upon such vehicle, the Assured, or a permanent employee of the Assured, or a person whose sole duty it is to attend the vehicle. Id. at 841. There the representative of the wholesale jewelry company involved pulled into a service station to purchase gasoline for the trip home. After refueling the car, he went inside the station to pay. As the court put it, [A]fter waiting a minute or less in line, [he] noticed a black car pull up behind his rental car. Because the gasoline pumps were crowded with vehicles, [he] decided to return to his car to move it to allow the black car access to the pump. As [he] approached his car, the black car sped off and a customer informed [the custodian] that someone had stolen something from the trunk of [the] car [in question]. Id. at 840. The court said in denying liability: Indeed, the use of the word `actually' in the requirement that the assured or properly-designated person be `actually in or upon' the vehicle at the time of loss belies any contention that constructive possession of the type urged by Plaintiff can avoid the exclusion. See Royce Furs, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 531 (The `in or upon the vehicle' language of the coverage exclusion `is prefixed by the word actually. That word must be given a meaning.'); Revesz, 106 Cal.Rptr. at 168 (Agreeing with courts that `placed great emphasis on the word actually, indicating that it clearly negates constructive presence and possession.'). See also Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Last Days Evangelical Ass'n, Inc., 783 F.2d 1234, 1238 (5th Cir.1986), citing Blaylock v. Am. Guarantee Bank Liab. Ins. Co., 632 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex.1982) (`[W]e attempt to construe a contract so as to avoid rendering any of its terms meaningless.').... American Stone, 934 F.Supp. at 843.