Opinion ID: 1571247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Consideration of the Presentence Investigation Report

Text: Barnes contends that the trial court reversibly erred when it considered the comprehensive presentence investigation report (PSI) over his objection. He asserts that this violated his constitutional confrontation rights as enunciated in Crawford v. Washington [14] and that the information in the report was more prejudicial than mitigating. Because this claim is not preserved by specific objection below to any statements contained in the PSI that Barnes contends were testimonial hearsay, the claim is procedurally barred and without merit. Barnes made several general objections to the PSI, arguing that it contained incorrect or prejudicial information and that it contained hearsay. However, Barnes failed to specifically identify for the trial court and specifically object to those portions of the PSI or attached investigative report that he now contends were prejudicial testimonial hearsay in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. The trial judge advised Barnes each time he objected to the PSI that she could not make a blanket ruling and that when the time came for consideration of the PSI, it needs to be presented and you make specific objections. Barnes never identified for the trial court any specific portions of the PSI or the attached investigative report that he believed were testimonial hearsay in violation of his confrontation rights. Even if Barnes' claim were preserved, we would find it to be without merit. First, Barnes had a fair opportunity to rebut or dispute any matters contained in the PSI but did not take the opportunity to do so. [15] Second, even if consideration of portions of the PSI was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harmless error analysis applies to Crawford violations. See Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655, 665 (Fla. 2006) (holding that any possible Crawford violation is subject to a harmless error analysis); Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136, 1153 (Fla.2006) (same). Most of what Barnes now contends was prejudicial testimonial hearsay was not even contained in the PSI report. Several of the examples he cites in his briefthat he had symptoms of antisocial personality disorder, was a psychopath, and lacked conscience or empathywere addressed in the testimony of Dr. Riebsame, who was subjected to full cross-examination during the Spencer sentencing hearing. Other potentially prejudicial information that he cites in his brief and contends came from the PSI was actually contained in a police investigative report from 1988 and in Dr. Riebsame's written report, neither of which was admitted into evidence or included in the PSI. [W]here the evidence introduced in error was not the only evidence on the issue to which the improper evidence related, the introduction can be harmless. Hojan v. State, 3 So.3d 1204, 1210 (Fla.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 741, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 78 U.S.L.W. 3319 (2009). Moreover, the vast majority of the alleged testimonial hearsay now cited by Barnes was not included in the sentencing order, although that information generally supports the extreme mental disturbance mitigator that the trial court did find. As this Court stated in Rodgers, [a]n error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, after considering all the permissible evidence, a court concludes that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's recommendation of death. 948 So.2d at 665. In this case, that same principle applies, and we consider whether there is a reasonable possibility that any error in consideration of the PSI contributed to the trial court's decision to impose death. In making this determination, the Court will consider both the permissible evidence on which the trial court could have legitimately relied and impermissible evidence which might have possibly contributed to the imposition of a death sentence. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). In this case, the trial court heard testimony from Dr. Riebsame that Barnes had a history of antisocial behavior, lack of conscience, lack of empathy and predatory behavior. He also testified that Barnes had a psychopathic personality. Dr. Riebsame reported that Barnes had a history of stealing, aggressiveness and fire-setting. Further, this testimony was presented in support of the statutory mitigator of extreme mental disturbance, which the trial court found in the sentencing order. In light of the fact that the information complained of by Barnes was either not contained in the PSI or was presented in live testimony subject to cross-examinationand considering the weight of the six uncontested aggravators in this case there is no basis to find that had the trial court not considered the PSI, Barnes would have received a life sentence. Nor can we conclude that anything contained in the PSI contributed to imposition of the death sentence. Thus, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the claim is procedurally barred, and because any error would be harmless, relief is denied on this claim. [16]