Opinion ID: 462475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Objections to Evidentiary Rulings

Text: 14 All three defendants argue that the district court misapplied United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 2836, 61 L.Ed.2d 283 (1979), when it admitted certain hearsay testimony of Werning, the unindicted co-conspirator. We conclude that the district court did not commit clear error in determining that, even without the hearsay testimony, a preponderance of the evidence established that Werning and appellants were members of the conspiracy. United States v. James, supra; United States v. Ackal, 706 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.1983). In considering whether Lamp and Eberwine were members of the conspiracy with Werning, the district court was entitled to consider Werning's testimony of Lamp's and Eberwine's own statements and action. This testimony alone supports the district court's conclusion. The district court was also entitled to conclude from evidence independent of the hearsay testimony that Yuretich was a member of the conspiracy. In making this determination, the district court was entitled to consider Werning's accounts of Yuretich's false statements. Other evidence, independent of the controverted hearsay testimony that supported this conclusion, included: the similarity of the false statements made by Yuretich to those made by Werning, Lamp and Eberwine to the IRS agents and the grand jury and acknowledged by Werning to have been false; evidence of Yuretich's presence at a meeting the day before a grand jury session where the concocted story about the purchase and ownership of the Corvette was discussed and Yuretich's testimony the following day before the grand jury that was consistent with the coaching session. 15 Lamp argues that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing before ruling on the admissibility of the co-conspirator's hearsay. James, however, expressly permits trial courts to forego such a hearing when it determines it is not reasonably practical. 590 F.2d at 582. The trial court obviously so determined in this case. 16 The defendants complain of several other rulings by the district court admitting evidence against them.
17 Yuretich argues that certain charts and summaries designed to support the government's case were erroneously admitted because they were cumulative. This court rejected a similar argument in United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 817 (5th Cir.1983). The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to use charts and summaries in this complex tax evasion case.
18 Lamp argues that Fed.R.Evid. 615 2 was violated because Werning discussed his testimony with his brother, who, apparently without Werning's knowledge, had been subpoenaed by Eberwine on the evening of the first day of the trial. Even though Werning's brother was never called as a witness, Lamp now argues that the district court should have excluded all of Werning's testimony because of his violation of the court's sequestration order. 19 In United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), we rejected such a draconian sanction[,] tantamount to an exclusionary rule, and held that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate sufficient prejudice to require reversal. Rule 615 is designed to avoid the testimony of one witness improperly influencing that of another. Id. Because Werning's brother was never called as a witness, Lamp failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of the violation of Rule 615. Consequently, Lamp's argument is rejected.
20 Lamp and Eberwine argue that the district court erred in admitting evidence of their involvement in the other crimes, the manufacture and sale of methamphetamines. 21 The source of Lamp's income was a relevant issue in the tax evasion and conspiracy counts. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the drug trafficking to show the nature and extent of Lamp's income. Because the evidence was admitted on a question that was directly at issue in the charges for which defendants were on trial, the drug-related offenses are not extrinsic to this prosecution and it is unnecessary to consider the admissibility of this evidence as extrinsic offenses under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). United States v. Carrillo, 561 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir.1977).
22 Eberwine argues that his personal income tax returns for two years during the existence of the conspiracy, which were admitted into evidence over his objection, were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The government offered Eberwine's return to rebut his assertion that he was legitimately employed during the years in question and to support the government's theory that Eberwine was Lamp's partner. This tended to establish that Eberwine had a motive for helping Lamp frustrate the IRS's investigation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
23 Yuretich and Eberwine suggest that two packets of information that the district court examined in camera may contain material that should have been disclosed to them under the Jencks Act. After reviewing this evidence, we agree with the district court that the material falls outside the Jencks Act.
24 All three defendants complain that the district court abused its discretion in limiting their cross-examination of certain witnesses. 25 They argue first that the court should not have limited the cross-examination of attorney Myles Appleberry. Appleberry, who had once represented Lamp and Werning, was called by the government to rebut Lamp's claim that he filed his tax returns during the IRS investigation on the basis of Appleberry's advice. The court declined to allow Appleberry to be cross-examined about any possible conflict of interest arising from his having represented both Werning and Lamp. 26 Lamp argues that United States v. Abel, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984), requires that a defendant always be given an opportunity to demonstrate the bias of a witness who may have a conflict of interest. This reading of Abel is much too broad. First, Abel upheld the admission of evidence, which is very different from reversing a trial court's decision to exclude evidence. In affirming the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence, the Court in Abel expressly emphasized the wide discretion a district court enjoys in making determinations of admissibility. Second, the evidence at issue in Abel was much more clearly probative of bias than the evidence at issue in this case. Abel involved a witness and a defendant who both belonged to a violent secret society (the Aryan Brotherhood) whose members were sworn to commit perjury to advance the aims of the society. Mr. Appleberry is a licensed attorney, with no apparent reason to commit perjury. The fact that he represented both Lamp and Werning lends no support to this contention. The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination of the witness. 27 Lamp, relying on Abel, also argues that he should have been allowed to cross-examine IRS Agent Barrows, who managed the investigation of his tax case, about the allegedly demeaning and inhumane and degrading arrest of Lamp. The proffer by Lamp revealed that Barrows was one of eight government agents present at the arrest, that Barrows waited outside Lamp's apartment until the arrest had been accomplished, and that Agent Barrows himself insisted that Lamp be allowed to get dressed before being transported to jail. Barrows' participation in the arrest was so unrelated to Barrows' supposed incentive to falsify his testimony the district court did not abuse its discretion in keeping this line of questioning out of the trial. 28 Eberwine and Yuretich, argue that the trial court erred in prohibiting Werning from being cross-examined about his possession of a handgun a few days before the beginning of the trial. The defendants suggested that this was relevant either: 1) to prevent the jury from supposing that Werning, who admitted that he and the defendants were co-conspirators, was now reformed or 2) to suggest that Werning's motive for testifying against the defendants was to curry favor with the prosecutor, who would have been in a position to decide whether to bring firearms charges against him. 29 We agree with the government that all of this is quite far-fetched. Werning was extensively cross-examined about his prior arrests, his involvement with illegal drugs, and his immunity agreement with the government. The jury therefore had ample information that would dispel any naive inference that Werning's testimony was motivated by public-spiritedness. Further, the evidence presents no reason to suppose that Werning thought the authorities were investigating him for illegal possession of a gun. Also, the evidence does not suggest an awareness by any law enforcement agency of the firearm allegation until Eberwine's lawyer brought it up during his cross-examination of Werning. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.
30 Eberwine, having made no timely objection, now argues that it was plain error for the prosecution, during its closing argument, to emphasize Eberwine's involvement in the illegal drug enterprise and his possible tax problems, none of which was directly at issue in the government's case against him. The district court did not err in permitting the government to respond to defense counsel's arguments disclaiming any association between Eberwine and Lamp in the drug business and questioning the government's failure to charge Eberwine with tax evasion. Also, immediately after the prosecutor made the remarks, which are complained of, the trial judge admonished the jury not to convict the defendants on the basis of anything they were not charged with.