Opinion ID: 2801829
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Categorical Exclusion of Fees Associated with

Text: Tasks Other Than Pretrial and Trial. As explained in his affidavit offered in support of Ryan’s fee request, Ryan’s attorney divided the requested fees into five categories. The affidavit identifies the hours and fees incurred in connection with each category. The supporting billing log also contains a column, which identifies the category to which each time entry belongs. The district court eliminated all fees associated with four of the five categories, explaining that the issue of fees for the excluded categories was “moot” or the supporting 4 Ryan does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in its calculation of recoverable costs. Therefore, we limit our inquiry to the district court’s calculation of recoverable fees. 18 RYAN V. EDITIONS LTD. WEST information was “not sufficiently detailed to show that [the fees] are specifically related to prosecution of the contributory copyright infringement claim.” Importantly, the district court eliminated all fees incurred in connection with the Ryan I appeal and Ryan’s pre-litigation cease-and-desist efforts. The categorical elimination of these fees was error, as the work associated with the Ryan I appeal and the cease-anddesist letter plainly involved prosecution of Ryan’s contributory copyright infringement claim. Indeed, in Ryan I, Ryan obtained a reversal of the district court’s earlier grant of summary judgment on her infringement claims. And this court reserved for the district court the determination of whether to award fees associated with that appeal. Similarly, the fees associated with Ryan’s cease-and-desist efforts were also plainly related to the eventual prosecution of her infringement claim, as the cease-and-desist letter specifically demanded that ELW cease all infringing activity with third parties. To the extent the Agreement’s fee-shifting provision extends to pre-litigation activities, Ryan is entitled to recover the reasonable fees incurred in connection with her ceaseand-desist efforts. The district court certainly was permitted, and in fact required, to analyze whether Ryan achieved only limited success in the underlying litigation and how her requested fee award should be reduced to account for her limited degree of success. However, the district court erred by mechanically excising entire categories of fees that undoubtedly involved important work relating to Ryan’s prosecution of her copyright infringement claim without meaningful explanation. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–38. RYAN V. EDITIONS LTD. WEST 19 On remand, the district court may in its discretion reduce the requested hours and fees to comport with Ryan’s limited success and to eliminate hours that the court finds are excessive. There is no precise formula or methodology that the district court is obligated to follow. Id. If certain hours are clearly unrelated to Ryan’s contributory copyright claim or associated issues, those hours may be eliminated. Id. But, the district court must provide a more detailed explanation for its reductions and must consider the interrelated nature of the claims involved in the underlying litigation.