Opinion ID: 2441011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Skillicorn's Statement

Text: Skillicorn alleges reversible error because his confession was improperly admitted in that 1) the warnings he received were inadequate; 2) he was promised leniency in return for his confession; 3) the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact concerning whether his statement was voluntary; 4) he was illegally interrogated prior to receipt of Miranda warnings and, therefore, the statement should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree; and 5) under the totality of all the circumstances the confession was involuntary. Grounds 1), 2), and 3) were not preserved below. We review them for plain error only. Rule 30.20. In order for Skillicorn to have voluntarily waived his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning, his choice must have been uncoerced, and he must have been aware of his rights and the potential consequences of abandoning them. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 856, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). Voluntariness depends on the absence of police overreaching, not on the mental ability of the defendant to make a `choice.' State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 650 (Mo. banc 1993) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522-23, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). The determination of police overreaching depends on the circumstances, including the defendant's physical and mental state, and length of questioning. Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at 573-74, 107 S.Ct. at 857; Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at 170, 107 S.Ct. at 523. Skillicorn was read his Miranda rights before he made the statement that was used against him at trial. The following discussion took place between FBI Agent McOmber and Skillicorn prior to Skillicorn's confession: SKILLICORN: Is that the formality? MCOMBER: No, that's not formality. That's just to make sure I don't say something I shouldn't say. Basically, all we have here, you've seen the movies where you gotta make sure people understand their rights and this is all that is. I usually like to read this to the people and I like them to understand that and then we talk about it to make sure you exactly understand what's going on, okay. Uh, `cause like, uh, Dale said we, we've been straight up with you so far and that's how we're gonna be.' Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your Rights. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. ANYTHING YOU SAY CAN BE USED AGAINST YOU IN COURT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER FOR ADVICE BEFORE WE ASK YOU ANY QUESTIONS, AND HAVE A LAWYER WITH YOU DURING QUESTIONING. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD A LAWYER, ONE WILL BE APPOINTED FOR YOU, uh, BEFORE ANY QUESTIONING IF YOU WISH. IF YOU DECIDE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW WITHOUT A LAWYER PRESENT, YOU CAN STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO STOP ANSWERING ANY TIME YOU ALSO HAVE THE RIGHT TO STOP ANSWERING ANY TIME TILL YOU TALK TO A LAWYER. And why don't you go ahead and read this portion right here to make sure you understand that. SKILLICORN: I read this statement of my rights and I understand what the rights are. I'm willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know I am doingknow what I'm doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressures or certain MCOMBER: Coercion. SKILLICORN: coercion of any kind has been, uh, used against me. MCOMBER: Okay, sign right there. Formality out of the way. Skillicorn signed an advice of rights form, did not ask for an attorney, and did not, at any time, request to terminate the interview. Skillicorn insists that because he could not properly pronounce the word coercion and because no one offered to explain the meaning of that word, his statement was not properly warned and was not voluntary. The terms pressure and coercion used in this context mean essentially the same thing. Moreover, Skillicorn's mental ability to make a choice is not the measure of voluntariness. Connelly, supra, at 169-70, 107 S.Ct. at 522-24; State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 650 (Mo. banc 1993). [M]ental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should [n]ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional `voluntariness.' Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. at 520. Nor can the agent's statement that the waiver form was a formality, without more, be considered overreaching. A confession extracted by a direct or implied promise of leniency is inadmissible. State v. Chandler, 605 S.W.2d 100, 116 (Mo. banc 1980). But the record belies Skillicorn's claim that agents offered him leniency in return for his statement. Skillicorn points to the following exchange as an implied promise of leniency: SKILLICORN: I don't, I'm debatin' whether or not I want to discuss that... or not, you know. I mean I'm just debatin' it. Because I already know basically that, uh, beyond a reasonable doubt, uh, regardless of what I say, I'm convicted, okay. I mean let's be real, MCOMBER: So what can you do to help this situation? SKILLICORN: you know. . . . . . MCOMBER: Like you just said, obviously, we would not be sitting here if we didn't have evidence against you. And ... I think I'm gonna try and help you understand here right now is that you are in a position to be the utmost ... for yourself.... . . . . . SKILLICORN: The only thing you can do is execute me and you're gonna do that regardless of what I say at this table. MCOMBER: No, that's not the truth ... That's not true. SKILLICORN: what's gonna motivate me to go into detail about anything? MCOMBER: The, courts are only concerned with three things. They're concerned, first of all right off the bat, are you cooperative. Do you have a feeling of remorse for what's happened and that's evident, you obviously do. Two, are you willing to come clean and, and, and clear up this whole matter. The truth is what the court sees. That's all they see. And you're in a position right now, Dennis, where you can provide us with more.. with the truth.... Now, I can understand your frustrations and feeling that ... nothing you can do that'll help you.... We believe differently because of the system.... There was no implicit or explicit promise of possible leniency or mitigation of punishment. If defendant had a hope of leniency, that hope sprang `from the seeds of his own planting [and] is not sufficient to render the resulting confession inadmissible.' State v. Hunter, 456 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo.1970) (citations omitted). At most the statements of the interviewing agents were encouragement to cooperate with the courts and law enforcement agencies. General encouragement to cooperate is far different from specific promises of leniency. United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 1741, 100 L.Ed.2d 204 (1988); State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336-37 (Mo. banc 1991). We also reject Skillicorn's claim that the trial court did not make adequate findings of fact concerning the voluntariness of his confession. The court overruled the motion to suppress Skillicorn's statement and stated: I went through the exhibits you offered at length. Mr. Skillicorn went through his travels or activities. And it's obvious to me it's voluntary based upon reading the statement I have or the exhibit I have. The finding here that the defendant voluntarily made statements is sufficient to support overruling the motion to suppress. A judge need not make any particular formal finding. The only prerequisite is that the trial court's conclusions make unmistakably clear that the confession is voluntary. If one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent. State v. Schnick, supra at 336 (citing Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 541-43, 87 S.Ct. 639, 642, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967)). Similarly, Skillicorn's claim that the statement was inadmissible because it was the fruit of an unwarned interrogation commencing before the recorded portion of his statement fails for at least two reasons. First, there is no indication that anything more than casual conversation commenced before the recorded statement. Second, even if Skillicorn had been questioned before the recorded statement at issue, [i]n the absence of some coercion by police in obtaining the original statement, the `fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine has no application. Id. at 337. There is no evidence of coercion prior to or during the recorded statement. Finally, Skillicorn asserts that even if each of these claimed violations alone does not amount to reversible error, the totality of the circumstances mandates reversal. There is nothing to suggest any basis for a finding of police overreaching in the present record. Id. The State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's statements made while in custody were voluntarily given. Absent a showing of special circumstances, the State need only make a prima facie showing of voluntariness. State v. Wood, 596 S.W.2d 394, 402 (Mo. banc 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876, 101 S.Ct. 221, 66 L.Ed.2d 98 (1980) (citing State v. Olds, 569 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. banc 1978); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1968)). The state sustained its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were given voluntarily. Schnick, supra at 337. Point Thirteen is denied.