Opinion ID: 612642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII and the PDA

Text: Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by enacting the PDA to explicitly extend protection to pregnant women: The terms because of sex or on the basis of sex include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA created no new rights or remedies, but clarified the scope of Title VII by recognizing certain inherently gender-specific characteristics that may not form the basis for disparate treatment of employees. Hall, 534 F.3d at 647 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-79 [103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89] (1983)). The PDA `made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.' Id. (quoting Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 [103 S.Ct. 2622]); see also Griffin v. Sisters of Saint Francis, Inc., 489 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir.2007) (stating that pregnancy is a proxy for gender, and, therefore, discrimination against pregnancy is discrimination against women). Thus, Serednyj's claim for pregnancy discrimination is a claim for gender discrimination, and the legal analysis for both claims is the same. Griffin, 489 F.3d at 842-43. Accordingly, we analyze these claims together.
A plaintiff can show that she was a victim of intentional discrimination either by proceeding under the direct method or the indirect, burden-shifting method. Rhodes v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir.2004) (citing Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 727-28 (7th Cir.1998)). Serednyj proceeds under both methods of proof. Under the direct method, the plaintiff may show, either through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the employer's decision to take the adverse job action against her was motivated by an impermissible purpose, such as sex. Id. (citing Cianci, 152 F.3d at 727). Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would prove discriminatory conduct on the part of the employer without reliance on inference or presumption. Id. (citing Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir.2003)). This type of evidence requires an admission by the decision-maker that [her] actions were based upon the prohibited animus. Id. (quoting Rogers, 320 F.3d at 753) (internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff may also establish her direct case by presenting a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker. Id. (quoting Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.1994)). Serednyj's circumstantial evidence `must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer's action.' Id. (quoting Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.2003)).
Beverly's modified work policy provides accommodations to qualified individuals with a disability under the ADA or to those employees who sustain work-related injuries. Serednyj argues that the policy's terms violate the PDA's provision that pregnant employees shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). According to Serednyj, an employee who is disabled or suffers a work-related injury and receives an accommodation of light duty work receives better treatment than a pregnant employee, like Serednyj, who needs the same accommodation to maintain her employment. The PDA requires that an employer ignore a female employee's pregnancy and treat that employee the same as it would have if she were not pregnant. Piraino v. Int'l Orientation Resources, Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.1996); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738. In the context of this case, this means that an employer is not required to provide an accommodation to a pregnant employee unless it provides the same accommodation to its similarly situated nonpregnant employees. See Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir.2000) ([T]he Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not protect a pregnant employee from being discharged after her absence from work even if her absence is due to pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are overlooked.); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (The Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires the employer to ignore an employee's pregnancy, but ... not her absence from work, unless the employer overlooks the comparable absences of nonpregnant employees.). Contrary to Serednyj's assertion, Beverly's modified work policy is not direct evidence of discrimination. The policy complies with the PDA because it does, in fact, treat nonpregnant employees the same as pregnant employees  both are denied an accommodation of light duty work for non-work-related injuries. This is all the PDA requires. We, therefore, agree with the district court and find that Beverly's modified work policy is pregnancy-blind, and therefore valid. See Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that the same policy against the same defendant is valid under the PDA and citing Troupe and Piraino ); see also Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir.2006) (holding a similar policy valid because the policy does not grant or deny light work on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition and citing Troupe ); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir.1998) (holding a similar policy valid because the light-duty policy treated pregnant employees the same as nonpregnant employees and citing Troupe and Piraino ).
Serednyj does not have direct evidence that Beverly discriminated against her due to her pregnancy. Thus, to survive summary judgment under the direct method, Serednyj must present a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer intentional discrimination by Beverly. Serednyj's mosaic may be comprised of three categories of circumstantial evidence, each of which is sufficient by itself to support a judgment for the plaintiff. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736. The first category consists of suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent may be drawn. Id. The second category consists of evidence that similarly situated employees outside of the protected group (pregnancy, sex, race, etc.) received systematically better treatment. Id. The third category consists of evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the job in question but passed over in favor of (or replaced by) a person not having the forbidden characteristic and that the employer's stated reason for the difference in treatment is unworthy of belief, a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. As her first piece of circumstantial evidence, Serednyj contends that before she became pregnant, she received assistance from other Beverly employees, including Christe and other CNAs, in performing such job duties as moving dining room tables and transporting residents by wheelchair or geri chair to and from planned activities. But after she became pregnant and asked for the same assistance in the form of an accommodation, Beverly denied her request and terminated her employment. For purposes of the PDA and Title VII, a request for an accommodation is materially different than a request for assistance. The assistance Serednyj received from her co-workers before she became pregnant was completely voluntary and given in a spirit of teamwork. If a coworker could not or would not assist her in her job duties, that co-worker was free to decline her request, and was otherwise under no obligation to provide assistance. If Beverly were to grant Serednyj's request for an accommodation, however, Serednyj's job duties would be formally modified to light duty work, and the assistance given by her co-workers would be obligatory. Beverly's decision to deny Serednyj's request for an accommodation is not circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. Instead, as the district court observed, it is direct evidence that Beverly applied its modified work policy to her. Serednyj also contends that Beverly discriminated against her by not providing her an accommodation with respect to certain job duties that were not listed as Essential Functions in her written job description. Serednyj argues, [n]owhere in the internet job posting, or the job description given to [Serednyj] that contained the essential functions of her job, stated anything about lifting, transporting patients, doing the activity board, or lifting shopping bags, the very accommodations which [Serednyj] requested. In determining the essential functions of a position, a court may consider, but is not limited to, evidence of the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential, and the written job description in effect before the employee interviewed for the position. Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir.2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). According to Beverly, an Activity Director must be able to perform certain physically strenuous activities in order to carry out the duties of the position, such as transporting patients by wheelchair. Moreover, the job description for the Activity Director position contains a physical and sensory requirement which expressly provides that an Activity Director must be able to, among other things, reach, climb, lift, push, and pull. The fact that this requirement was listed under the Other Functions heading rather than the Essential Functions or Qualifications headings of the job description is not evidence that the physical requirements of her job  i.e., pushing wheelchairs, lifting shopping bags, hanging the monthly calendar, and moving tables  were not essential to the overall fulfillment of the Activity Director position. Indeed, Serednyj expressly admitted in her deposition that these physical demands were in fact duties of her job. We, therefore, conclude that Beverly's understanding of the essential functions of the Activity Director position was correct, and is not circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. Serednyj next argues that after she provided the March 21, 2007, letter to Beverly requesting an accommodation pursuant to the PDA and the ADA, Beverly began to think of ways to fire her. In support of this argument, Serednyj cites to the notes that Mount made of her conversation with her, which include the words office mess, attendance, and overall organization. Serednyj's argument contradicts the record facts, including her own testimony, that her employment had already terminated on March 13, 2007, following a meeting with Mount. Thus, there is no supporting evidence that Beverly began to think of reasons to terminate her employment after March 21, 2007, as she was no longer an employee of Beverly. Finally, Serednyj attempts to show pregnancy discrimination by summarily stating, without any record citation, that Beverly terminated her while she had paid leave remaining. This argument is not supported by the record evidence, which reflects that Beverly did pay Serednyj all of her unused sick and vacation leave pursuant to its policies. These four pieces of evidence, taken together, fail to create a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer intentional discrimination on the part of Beverly. We now turn to Serednyj's indirect case.
As noted above, a plaintiff may also use the indirect, burden-shifting approach to frame her case. The indirect method requires a plaintiff to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. For purposes of Serednyj's pregnancy discrimination claim, Serednyj must show that: (1) she was pregnant and her employer knew she was pregnant; (2) she was performing her job duties satisfactorily; (3) she was terminated; and (4) similarly situated, nonpregnant employees were treated more favorably. Griffin, 489 F.3d at 844 (citing Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir.2001)). Once a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her. Id. If such a reason is advanced, the plaintiff can survive summary judgment only by showing that the defendant's reason was a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. The first, second, and third elements of Serednyj's prima facie case are not in dispute. Serednyj is a member of a protected class, was performing her job satisfactorily, and was subject to an adverse employment action. With respect to the fourth element of her prima facie case, Serednyj claims that similarly situated, nonpregnant employees were treated more favorably than she, and that disabled or pregnant employees were also treated more favorably than she. Employees are similarly situated if they are directly comparable to her in all material respects. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir.2002). This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them. Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir.2000). The similarly situated inquiry is a flexible one that considers `all relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case.' Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Radue, 219 F.3d at 617). A plaintiff need not show complete identity with a proposed comparator, but she must show `substantial similarity.' Id. (quoting Radue, 219 F.3d at 618). Serednyj's would-be comparators include a woman named Bonnie, Susan Eckman, Carol Williams, Pam Seibert, and Gina Sizemore. With respect to Bonnie, Christe testified that Bonnie is a CNA in her late fifties who received assistance transporting and transferring patients. Christe did not know Bonnie's last name, and does not know if she has a medical restriction. Mount testified that since November 2004, the only individual employed by Beverly with the first name of Bonnie was Bonnie Curtis, a CNA, who in fact never requested nor received any accommodation from Beverly. Susan Eckman was employed by Beverly as a CNA and LPN between September 2006 and March 2007. According to Serednyj, Eckman had breast augmentation surgery during this time period, and was provided light duty work. Serednyj testified that she had no personal knowledge of this, but was told this information from her friend and co-worker, Gina Sizemore. Moreover, Mount testified that Eckman never sought nor received an accommodation for a breast augmentation. Carol Williams was employed by Beverly who, according to Serednyj, worked as a CNA and suffered from and was being treated for an L3, L4 disc degeneration in her back. Serednyj claims that Williams' disc problem was not work-related; however, Beverly allowed her to work with significant lifting, bending, and twisting restrictions. Mount testified that Williams was an LPN, and suffered two non-work-related injuries during her employment. As a result of her non-work-related injuries, Williams was not eligible for light duty under Beverly's modified work policy, but took two leaves of absence instead. Williams also sustained two work-related injuries in 2006 and 2007. The record does not indicate whether Williams asked for and received an accommodation for her work-related injuries, but if she had, it would have been pursuant to Beverly's modified work policy. Pam Seibert was a speech therapist who worked at Beverly's Golden Living facility with Serednyj. Although Seibert and Serednyj worked at the same facility, Seibert was an employee of Aegis Therapies, a separate company with separate employment policies. Because Seibert had a long-term medical condition, Aegis allowed her to use a rolling walker to move about the workplace and allowed her to take breaks at her desk. Serednyj alleges that Seibert was terminated within thirty days of requesting the accommodation. To the extent that Serednyj's claim is true, Seibert is not similarly situated to Serednyj because Seibert was not an employee of Mount, and was not subject to Beverly's modified work policy. Gina Sizemore worked as a CNA at the Golden Living facility, and was pregnant at approximately the same time as Serednyj. Serednyj testified that she and Sizemore were friends, and that Sizemore told her that she (Sizemore) had to go on FMLA due to restrictions from her pregnancy. Sizemore tried to return to work following the expiration of her FMLA leave, but was terminated by Mount because her doctor would not remove her restrictions. Sizemore does not help Serednyj's case for two significant reasons. First, Serednyj's evidence is based on inadmissible hearsay. And second, Sizemore is actually an example of Beverly applying its modified work policy uniformly. Serednyj has not come forward with a similarly situated, nonpregnant Beverly employee who was treated more favorably than she. Serednyj's evidence in this regard lacks reliability, and in certain circumstances, is belied by the record. Having failed to set forth a prima facie case, we need not reach the issue of pretext, and the inquiry ends. See Cowan v. Glenbrook Sec. Servs., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 445 (7th Cir.1997) (We need not reach the issue of pretext, as plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under McDonnell Douglas. ). Accordingly, the district court correctly granted Beverly's motion for summary judgment on Serednyj's gender and pregnancy discrimination claims.