Opinion ID: 195118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Made Exclusively by Driesse.15

Text: 31
32 Driesse claims that the district court committed reversible error by allowing the government to introduce, over timely objection, an inadmissible hearsay statement. James Noe testified that he was told by Robert Labrecque, Driesse's cousin, that Labrecque was selling cocaine for Driesse in late 1988 and early 1989; that is, after Driesse reached age eighteen. No reason was assigned for admitting the hearsay statement over the Driesse objection. Moreover, Driesse contends that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Labrecque was a coconspirator, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), whose statement would have been admissible if made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 33 [A] [putative] coconspirator's statement, standing alone, is insufficient to meet the preponderance standard of Rule 801(d)(2)(E); the proponent of the statement must submit some extrinsic evidence of the declarant's involvement in the conspiracy. Sepulveda, [15 F.3d at 1181-82]. There is no such extrinsic evidence in the record. Labrecque's statement was the sole source of Noe's knowledge about Labrecque's complicity. Beyond that, Noe simply testified that Driesse and Labrecque were cousins, who lived in the same apartment project, and that Noe had observed Labrecque with Driesse on previous occasions. See United States v. Gomez, 921 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1991) (mere association does not establish conspiratorial involvement). Although Noe sold cocaine to Labrecque for Labrecque's use, not for [re]selling, Noe never observed Labrecque selling drugs, let alone doing so in Driesse's company, or for Driesse. Although the government argues that the trial court was permitted to conclude that it was more likely than not that Labrecque was an unindicted coconspirator, except for the hearsay statement itself there was no evidentiary basis, only conjecture, to support such an inference. 34 Although admission of Noe's hearsay statement was error, we conclude that the error was harmless. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). No less than five other witnesses offered unequivocal testimony with respect to Driesse's active involvement in the conspiracy. See supra Section I.D. Thus, the Labrecque hearsay statement was merely cumulative, and had no significant effect on the verdict. See United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 26 (1st Cir.1988). 16 35
36 Driesse contends that he was entitled to a missing witness instruction, which would have permitted the jury to infer, from  'the failure of a party to produce available evidence that would help decide an issue, ... that the [missing] evidence would [have been] unfavorable to the party to whom it is available or whom it would normally be expected to favor.'  United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 597 (1st Cir.1989) (citation omitted). As the proponent of such an instruction, Driesse was required to show that the absent witness (Labrecque) would have been (1) favorably disposed to testify in the government's behalf by virtue of his status or relationship to the parties, (2) peculiarly available to the government, or (3) within the government's exclusive control. Id. Driesse asserted that Labrecque could more easily have been located by the government since he was under the probationary supervision of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections. 37 We review the refusal to give a missing witness instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Arias-Santana, 964 F.2d 1262, 1268 (1st Cir.1992). Given the available evidence that Driesse and Labrecque were family members who had resided in the same apartment project, Driesse can make no serious claim that Labrecque was naturally predisposed to testify for the government. Moreover, given the familial relationship, the bare fact that Labrecque was a state probationer did not establish that he was peculiarly available to the government, let alone unavailable to Driesse. Indeed, the government provided the defense with Labrecque's two last-known addresses, cf. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d at 598 (upholding denial of instruction where government allegedly knew missing witness's whereabouts during trial), attested that he was not in the government's control, and disavowed any intention (or need) to call Labrecque as a witness. 17 In these circumstances, absent any evidence that Labrecque was not available to his cousin Driesse, or that the government interfered with any effort to locate or produce Labrecque at trial, the district court acted well within its discretion in denying a missing witness instruction. 38
39 Finally, Driesse challenges the drug quantity calculation recommended in the presentence report (PSR) and relied on by the court at sentencing. The PSR calculation was based on the trial testimony of Norberto Perez that Driesse accompanied Perez on about 20 drug runs between 1987 and 1989, involving from one kilogram to 113.4 grams of cocaine per trip. The PSR assigned an average of 16 ounces per trip, resulting in a total estimate of 9.09 kilos (or 320 oz.). Thus, Driesse was assigned a base offense level (BOL) of 32 (5-15 kilograms). 40 Where the sentencing court relies solely on the rough drug quantity estimates of a lay witness, expressed in terms of a range, rote averaging is an insufficiently reliable basis for a supportable drug quantity finding. Sepulveda, [15 F.3d at 1196-99]. Unlike the sentences imposed on Driesse's codefendants, Tony Rood and William Wallace, which were based on rough ranging estimates not only of the number of drug runs but the cocaine quantity per trips, the only rough averaging involved in the drug quantity finding for the Driesse sentencing was the wide ranging estimate of the quantity of drugs per trip (4 ozs. to 1 kilogram). Nevertheless, since the lowest estimated quantity range (4 ozs.) per trip would yield a total drug quantity of approximately 2.3 kilograms, dropping Driesse well below BOL 32, 18 we vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing, in accordance with our decision in United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1202 (1st Cir.1993). 19 41 The judgments of conviction entered against Christopher Driesse and Shane Welch are affirmed. The sentence of Christopher Driesse is vacated and case No. 92-1370 is remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.