Opinion ID: 899653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stafford’s Challenges to the Conviction

Text: The court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, but that decision will be affirmed “if 2 Stafford’s counsel referred to the two-level enhancement under Guideline § 3C1.2 as “obstruction of justice.” The title of the guideline is “Reckless Endangerment During Fight.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 8 the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ramirez, 635 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A court will reverse a judgment due to insufficient evidence “only if [the] judgment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence upon the record as a whole.” United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To convict a defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a jury must find that the defendant “had a previous felony conviction, that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm specified in the indictment, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Morrison, 594 F.3d 543, 544 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stafford challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conclusion that he possessed the firearm. Stafford argues that the evidence is insufficient because the Government’s case hinges on one eyewitness, Officer Figula, whose testimony was “inconsistent.” Stafford cites six specific instances of Figula’s inconsistencies: (1) Figula initially testified that he saw the shooter “at the bottom of the hill” on Kerstetter Way, which measured between 193 and 223 feet away, but then subsequently testified that the shooter was “further up from the bottom of the hill” and only “170 feet” away; (2) Figula testified that he saw the shooter as the last two shots were fired, yet Figula failed to give any description of the shooter when he made the first “shots fired” call and did not give a description of Stafford until Stafford had emerged from the Tremont Street alley into the McDonald’s parking lot and was running past Figula’s car; (3) Figula initially stated in his report that he saw Stafford shooting “directly east” towards Uncle Vic’s nightclub, but at trial he testified that Stafford was aiming “in a southeasterly direction towards the corner of Kerstetter [Way] and Broad Street”; (4) Figula testified that, when he heard the No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 9 shots, his police cruiser was “at the top of the hill” on Broad Street approaching the intersection of Kerstetter Way and that he had “a clear view down the sidewalk on what would be the west side of Kerstetter Way,” but defense witness Bruce Freeman testified that after he left the area of Uncle Vic’s and traveled toward the intersection of Broad Street and Kerstetter Way, he did not see a police car in the area when he heard the gunshots and his window was struck by a bullet; (5) Figula admitted that he stated in his report that Kerstetter Way was “choked with pedestrians and vehicle traffic” such that he was “prevent[ed] . . . from driving the marked patrol vehicle towards Stafford,” yet he testified that he had a clear view of the shooter and there was “no one” obstructing his view; and (6) Figula testified that he lost sight of the suspected shooter for approximately thirty seconds between the time the suspect ran from the scene of the shooting and when he emerged from the alley into the McDonald’s parking lot. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable jury could find Stafford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court “neither independently weighs the evidence, nor judges the credibility of witnesses who testified at trial.” Ramirez, 635 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate court “cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Id. at 255–56. Stafford’s arguments regarding the inconsistencies in Figula’s testimony go primarily to the credibility of the Government’s witness. While the jury heard the inconsistencies in Figula’s testimony, it also heard substantial direct evidence on which it could rely to convict Stafford. Figula testified that he “had a clear view of the shooter.” Figula described the shooter’s clothing: The shooter was wearing a black like zipup sweat shirt that had black and white stiped [sic] collar that would zip up [and] kind of cover the neck area. As the shooter turned, I was able to see cursive writing, a white print covering the entire back of the sweat shirt and I believe jean-style pants. Figula described seeing the muzzle flashes that accompanied the final two gunshots. Figula stated he had “observed the shooter turn and run north from where he had been No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 10 standing,” and that he “observed the shooter run down, turn and run—[into] an alleyway here known as Tremont Street—turn down that alleyway and continue[] running away from me.” Figula described seeing Stafford emerge from the alleyway: I observed the same person that was shooting the weapon off here emerge out of the alleyway this way, running westbound, running from the exit or entrance of the alleyway. . . . I observed the same person as far as the same clothing and same appearance as I saw the person shooting the weapon. . . . He looked right at me . . . . Figula also testified about finding the firearm and the spent shells. Having heard both the eyewitness testimony and its inconsistencies, the jury could have found Figula credible. As for Stafford’s argument that Figula’s identification is questionable because he did not describe Stafford as the shooter over the radio until after he saw Stafford emerge from the alley, Figula explained that the reason he did not describe Stafford in the first instance was that his “main concern . . . was getting officers heading in [his] direction.” He continued, “The reason I didn’t give the description until a few seconds later is because I just didn’t have the opportunity in between turning around, entering the parking lot, and then all of a sudden [Stafford showing up] in front of me.” The jury presumably considered both the defense’s argument and Figula’s explanation in its deliberations. It is not unreasonable for a rational juror to credit Figula’s explanation. The jury was also presented photographic evidence of Stafford wearing the jacket Figula identified. Figula testified that the Government’s photograph depicted Stafford as he was taken into custody near First Merit Bank, and that Stafford was wearing “the same jacket that [Figula] had seen the shooter wearing.” Figula described the jacket in the photograph for the jury: “It is a black and colored sweatshirt style zipup and has the white writing across the back with the cursive that was able to stick out in my mind as [Stafford] turned to flee away from me on foot.” Stafford also questions Figula’s seemingly inconsistent testimony that Kerstetter Way was both “choked with pedestrians and vehicle traffic” and yet he had a clear view No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 11 of the shooter firing his weapon. Review of the testimony indicates, however, that Figula stated that while pedestrians were fleeing the scene and running up the hill, there were no pedestrians on the same side of the street as Stafford at the time of the shooting. Figula stated that “there was nobody other than the one person that I observed shooting the gun . . . on this side of the road. . . . I had a clear view of the shooter.” A rational juror could find Figula’s testimony on this issue credible. As for Freeman’s testimony that he did not see any police cars at the intersection of Kerstetter Way and Broad Street at the time of the shooting, Freeman also stated on direct examination that he “was not paying enough attention with everything going on outside the car to really notice a police cruiser.” The jury heard sufficient testimony to assess Freeman’s credibility in relation to Figula’s version of the events. Moreover, the jury could reconcile the testimony of Freeman and Figula. Regarding the circumstantial evidence of Stafford’s guilt, “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and . . . [such] evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Ramirez, 635 F.3d at 256 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Actual or constructive possession is sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under § 922(g). Both actual and constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Castano, 543 F.3d 826, 837 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 545 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury heard testimony linking the shell casings and bullet recovered at the scene to the firearm found in the Tremont Street alley. Joshua Barr testified as a ballistics expert for the Government. Barr compared the shell casings found at the scene with shell casings he test-fired from the recovered firearm. Barr concluded that “[m]icroscopic comparisons” of the recovered shell casings with the test-fired shell casings revealed that the recovered shell casings had been fired from the recovered firearm. Barr also compared a bullet recovered at the scene with a test-fired bullet and testified that the recovered bullet had “matching individual detail with the test-fired No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 12 bullets.” Barr concluded that the bullet recovered at the scene was fired from the recovered firearm. The jury heard testimony that the shooter was wearing a black zip-up sweatshirt with white writing, that the shooter ran down the Tremont Street alley after seeing Figula’s police car, that Stafford was wearing the same clothing when he emerged from the alleyway and ran past Figula’s car, that Stafford continued running and hid behind the back of the First Merit Bank building, that Stafford wedged himself between the building and an electrical power box, that Stafford refused to surrender or show his hands to police when he was found, that Stafford continued to struggle with police as they arrested him, and that a scuffed firearm with a partially ejected magazine was found in the Tremont Street alley that matched the spent shells found near the scene of the shooting. The jury could therefore rationally infer that Stafford threw the gun into the alley as he was running from police. Additionally, Stafford’s actions raise an inference of guilt: he continued to run from police and refused to cooperate when asked to show his hands and to come out of hiding. Although circumstantial, the evidence is sufficient for a juror to infer that Stafford was the shooter. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could find Stafford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Stafford’s conviction is affirmed. 2. Gunshot-Residue Evidence and Expert Testimony The court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. United States v. Ashraf, 628 F.3d 813, 826 (6th Cir. 2011). “District courts have broad latitude in deciding whether to admit expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Such decisions are similarly reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. (citations omitted). Stafford argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the gunshot-residue evidence and the related expert testimony because they both fail to meet the standards of Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Stafford made similar No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 13 arguments before trial as to the admissibility of the gunshot-residue evidence and the experts’ testimony, but the district court concluded that both were admissible because Stafford’s “arguments [went] to the weight, not the admissibility,” of the evidence and testimony. Stafford makes four arguments regarding the inadmissibility of the gunshotresidue evidence. First, Stafford states that “[gunshot-residue] testing will not determine whether an individual fired a gun, was present when a gun was fired by someone else, or was merely in an environment in which [gunshot residue] existed.” Stafford claims that because these three possible outcomes summarize the testimony of the Government’s expert Robert Lewis—and because Lewis could not testify whether Stafford actually fired the weapon—Lewis “could not reasonably make any conclusions as to the actual source of the six [gunshot-residue] particles found,” and therefore Lewis’s testimony did not meet the standards of Daubert or Rule 702. Under Rule 702, an expert may offer scientific or technical testimony if the court finds the witness is qualified by “‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’”; that the testimony is relevant; and that the testimony is reliable. In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). Stafford, in claiming that the expert’s conclusion is inadmissible, is challenging the expert’s reliability, not his qualifications or the testimony’s relevance. To determine the testimony’s reliability, the court does not “determine whether [the opinion] is correct, but rather [determines] whether it rests upon a reliable foundation.” Id. at 529–30. As gatekeeper, the trial court only determines the admissibility of expert evidence; the jury determines its weight. The court’s focus is “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. The district court was clear when it admitted the expert testimony relating to the gunshot residue test: “Whether the jury will put any weight on either [expert], I don’t know, but [the Defendant’s] arguments go to the weight [of the evidence], not the admissibility.” The district court stated that allowing the expert to testify would allow vigorous cross-examination of the expert’s “vague conclusions” and the jury would then No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 14 decide. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination . . . [is a] traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). In revisiting the issue on the second day of trial, the district court stated: I am allowing the government to put [the expert’s testimony] in. But given that your own expert is going to say it is possible that he has got those two traces either because he was right near a shooter, [was] a shooter of a gun[,] or that he came into contact with residue, I am permitting the defense to point that out. The two go together. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Robert Lewis relating to the results of the gunshot-residue test. Second, Stafford argues that gunshot-residue testing is imprecise in that “[t]here is no consensus in the discipline as to how many particles . . . must be identified in order to report an item of evidence as positive for [gunshot residue].” Despite this argument, the trial record indicates that Stafford did not object to the district court’s statement that “the Defendant is not disputing he had gunshot residue on his hands.” Additionally, Stafford relies on a Summary of the FBI Laboratory’s Gunshot Residue Symposium report in both his Brief and his motion in limine filed August 8, 2011. The Summary states that “[m]ost experts felt that even one particle is enough for a ‘positive’ result.” As the Supreme Court noted in Daubert, “[w]idespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. At trial, the Government’s expert testified that Stafford’s gunshot-residue test revealed five qualifying particles present on Stafford’s left hand. The results of the test indicate that the conclusion that Stafford had gunshot residue on his hand was reliable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of the gunshot-residue test. Third, Stafford claims that the possibility of inadvertent transfer of gunshotresidue particles to a suspect’s hands creates prejudice that outweighs the test’s probative value. Stafford’s argument goes to the admissibility of circumstantial evidence, not the admissibility of scientifically reliable evidence. The district court found, correctly, the gunshot-residue evidence to be sufficiently reliable and allowed its No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 15 admission. The admission of such circumstantial evidence need not “remove every hypothesis but guilt.” United States v. Ingrao, 844 F.2d 314, 315 (6th Cir. 1988). As to its probative value, which is discussed further infra, the evidence allowed the jury to infer that Stafford was in possession of the firearm and to decide how much weight to give that conclusion. The trial record also indicates that the defense crossexamined the Government’s expert extensively on this very point—that there can be inadvertent transfer of gunshot residue resulting in “contamination.” Finally, Stafford argues that the gunshot residue is inadmissible because it is undisputed that the Elyria Police Department “fail[ed] to use proper evidence gathering techniques in testing for [gunshot residue].” The trial record indicates that the officers, in conducting Stafford’s arrest: did not bag his hands; could have transferred gunshot residue to Stafford’s hands from handling their own weapons, from the backseat of the police car, or from the booking area of the Elyria Police Department; and did not swab Stafford’s hands until after he had been booked. These arguments, while potentially valid as to the accuracy of the test and the conclusions to be drawn from it, do not relate to the test’s reliability or the reliability of the expert testimony. Furthermore, Stafford’s arguments go to the weight of the gunshot-residue evidence, not its admissibility, which was properly considered by the jury. Again, the cross-examination of the expert at trial allowed the jury to consider the weight of the gunshot-residue evidence and any shortcomings in evidence collection by the Elyria Police Department. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Stafford also argues that the gunshot-residue evidence was improperly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, as its “probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.” See Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Because of the highly discretionary nature of this balancing process, the district court’s decision is afforded great deference.” United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 445 (6th Cir. 2008). “In reviewing the district court’s balancing of prejudice and probative value, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 16 minimizing its prejudicial effect.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stafford contends that because a positive finding of gunshot residue on a defendant could only reveal (1) that the individual “discharged a firearm,” (2) that the individual “was in close proximity to a firearm when it was discharged,” or (3) that the individual “came into contact or handled something that had gunshot residue on it,” its probative value was “questionable” because it offered “two non-incriminating possibilities and one incriminating possibility.” Stafford did not attempt to impeach the conclusion that gunshot residue was found on his hands, and defense counsel thoroughly explored the weaknesses in the gunshot-residue testing on cross-examination. Regarding the issue of whether the evidence was probative, the district court stated that if the gunshot-residue evidence was being used to corroborate Figula’s eyewitness account, “it becomes relevant because it bolsters the credibility of [the Government’s] witness.” Viewing the admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the gunshot-residue test corroborates Figula’s testimony that Stafford was the shooter outside Uncle Vic’s nightclub and was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. The district court’s admission of the gunshot-residue evidence and accompanying expert testimony is, therefore, affirmed.