Opinion ID: 2075944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the exclusion of the medical evidence

Text: The defense proffered the testimony of a physician who had examined W.D. The doctor was said to be prepared to testify that W.D. had contracted a venereal disease and that there was a cheesy white extrudance in her genital area. Counsel described the extrudance in his proffer as a heavy discharge. He contended that it was incredible that Roundtree would have committed the crime under these circumstances. [29] The prosecutor opposed admission of the evidence. He argued that, in the light of the defense, [30] the evidence was irrelevant, and that its admission would be prejudicial to W.D. and to the government. The judge found the evidence irrelevant to any issue. She never reached the question of prejudice. I think the proffer was plainly relevant to the issue of motive (or the lack thereof) and disincentive. The jury could reasonably find it less likely that Roundtree, whose lustful motivation [31] the government made substantial efforts to show, [32] would want to come into oral contact with a diseased genital area than with a healthy one. If such evidence made it less probable that Roundtree was motivated to commit the crime, it likewise made it less likely that W.D. was telling the truth when she testified that Roundtree committed it. Motive is evidence of the commission of any crime. United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3543, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392 (1983). It is a state of mind that is shown by proving the emotion that brings it into being. United States v. Tierney, 760 F.2d 382, 387 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S.Ct. 131, 88 L.Ed.2d 108 (1985). Relevancy objections to evidence relating to motive have long been disfavored. Moore v. United States, 150 U.S. 57, 60-61, 14 S.Ct. 26, 27-28, 37 L.Ed. 996 (1893); Tierney, supra, 760 F.2d at 387. [I]n general, any fact may be offered which by possibility can be conceived as tending with others towards the emotion in question. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra, note 20 § 389, at 417 (emphasis in original). The opportunity for sexual gratification can obviously provide a motive for Roundtree's conduct. But evidence about motive is a two-way street. [T]he absence of motive tends to support the presumption of innocence; it is a fact to be reckoned [with] on the side of innocence. People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401, 423, 164 P.2d 753, 765 (1945) ( en banc ). Any evidence which tends to shed light on the defendant's motive is admissible against him, but he may then, in turn, offer rebutting proof tending to negate motive. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218, 228-29, 116 A.2d 37, 42 (1955); State v. Vojacek, 49 N.J.Super. 429, 433-34, 140 A.2d 228, 231 (1958). As the court explained in Pollard v. State, 218 Ind. 56, 60, 29 N.E.2d 956, 957 (1940), [t]he absence of a motive for committing the crime charged is in the nature of an exculpatory circumstance which a defendant on trial is entitled to establish ... To exclude such proof would place an arbitrary limitation on the accused that would be unjust, in view of the freedom allowed the prosecution in adducing facts and circumstances pointing to his guilt. Accord, People v. Kepford, 52 Cal.App. 508, 510-11, 199 P. 64, 65 (1921); People v. Cotto, 28 A.D.2d 1116, 1117, 285 N.Y.S.2d 247, 249 (1st Dept.1967) ( per curiam ). In the present case, the cheesy extrudance tended to show more than a lack of motive to sodomize; a reasonable jury might conclude that it provided a powerful disincentive to do so. If evidence of lack of motive is relevant, then evidence of disincentive is even more probative. Concededly, we cannot know for sure whether Roundtree would have wished to have oral sex with W.D. even if she suffered from the affliction which the physician was said to be prepared to describe. As Justice Cardozo aptly observed for the court in Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 224 N.Y. 18, 22, 120 N.E. 56, 57 (1918), however, the law contents itself with probabilities, and declines to wait for certainty before drawing its conclusions. Ordinarily, any evidence which is logically probative of some fact in issue is admissible, Ahrens v. Broyhill, 117 A.2d 452, 455-56 (D.C.1955), unless it conflicts with some settled exclusionary rule. Fowel v. Wood, 62 A.2d 636, 637 (D.C.1948). [I]f the evidence conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in controversy, it should go to the jury. Home Insurance Co. v. Weide, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 438, 440, 20 L.Ed. 197 (1871). It is enough if the item could reasonably show that a fact is slightly more probable than it would appear without that evidence. Even after the probative force of the evidence is spent, the proposition for which it is offered still can seem quite improbable. Thus, the common objection that the inference for which the fact is offered does not necessarily follow is untenable. It poses a standard of conclusiveness that very few single items of circumstantial evidence ever could meet. A brick is not a wall. MCCORMICK, supra, § 185, at 542-43 (footnotes omitted). At trial, W.D.'s credibility was a critical issue. The doctor's evidence would have provided a reasonindeed, a jury exercising its common sense and experience might very well have found it a persuasive reasonto question whether Roundtree was likely to have been motivated to sodomize W.D. as she alleged. The existence of the disease might have appeared to the jury sufficiently likely to inhibit Roundtree from committing oral sodomy to create a reasonable doubt as to the truthfulness and plausibility of W.D.'s account. I cannot agree with the trial judge's conclusion that the evidence was irrelevant.
In rhetoric which I do not find to be understated, the government contends that the proffered testimony would have been the rankest imaginable form of prejudicial character assassination with absolutely no countervailing probative value. Accordingly, says the government, there was no abuse of discretion in excluding it. As the foregoing recitation of the manner in which the issue was decided demonstrates, however, I can find nothing in the record to show that the trial [judge] was exercising [her] discretion in excluding the testimony, and [I] therefore cannot [vote to] uphold the exclusion on those grounds. State v. Dutremble, 392 A.2d 42, 46 (Me. 1978); see also Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 725, 732-33, 484 P.2d 599, 604-05, 94 Cal.Rptr. 623, 628-29 (1971) ( en banc ) (error to fail to weigh probative value against prejudicial impact). [33] Although the trial judge has wide latitude in balancing these factors, evidence should be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. McCORMICK, supra, § 185, at 545 (emphasis added). The Judge made no such determination here, and the probative value of the evidence was substantial. [34] It should have been admitted.