Opinion ID: 3052818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Spokane Municipal Code

Text: [10] Logan Neighborhood lastly contends that its claim under the Spokane Municipal Code independently creates fedSHANKS v. DRESSEL 11845 eral subject matter jurisdiction. A state-law claim invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction only if it “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); see also id. at 313 (explaining that a “substantial” federal issue is one that “indicat[es] a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum”). Logan Neighborhood’s state-law claim does not satisfy any of these requirements. [11] First, Logan Neighborhood’s state-law claim presents no “necessarily raised” or “actually disputed” federal issue. According to Logan Neighborhood, its claim that Spokane and the Dressels violated the Spokane Municipal Code cannot be decided without looking to the “Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation” and the NHPA itself. This is incorrect. Mission Avenue Historic District’s listing on the National Register of Historic Places is not controverted. Spokane has not attempted to apply the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation to the Dressels’ construction. Logan Neighborhood’s state-law claim turns entirely on Spokane’s compliance with its own municipal code, and does not require the construction or application of federal law. Second, a federal interest in the availability of a federal forum to adjudicate Logan Neighborhood’s state-law claim is also missing. Cf. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. No special need for federal expertise or uniformity is apparent here, particularly because the NHPA does not regulate how private owners make use of listed properties. Cf. id. at 315. Logan Neighborhood mistakenly relies on Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976), to bolster its argument. There, we merely recognized that Congress took “one step toward implementing the national policy in furtherance of historic 11846 SHANKS v. DRESSEL preservation” when it enacted the NHPA.11 Id. at 438. Nothing in that case suggests that a federal forum must be open to hear every claim touching upon the integrity of a federally listed historical landmark. [12] Third, allowing Logan Neighborhood’s state-law claim to go forward in federal court would undermine “Congress’s intended division of labor between state and federal courts.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 319. Although the absence of a private federal right of action is no longer dispositive after Grable, it remains relevant to our assessment of the “ ‘sensitive judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.” Id. at 318; cf. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986). The absence of a private right of action in the NHPA is a “missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances,” because acceptance of Logan Neighborhood’s argument would result in federal jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff sues on a state law that refers to a concept defined by federal law. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 318. This cannot be. Logan Neighborhood’s claim under the Spokane Municipal Code does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction.