Opinion ID: 1240566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative vs. Executive Powers

Text: In Manchin, we outlined the division of powers and responsibilities among the three branches of state government: Generally speaking, the Legislature enacts the law, the Governor and the various agencies of the executive implement the law, and the courts interpret the law, adjudicating individual disputes arising thereunder. 167 W.Va. at 168, 279 S.E.2d at 631 (citing W.Va. Const. art. VI, § 1; art. VII, § 5; art. VIII, § 1); see also Springer v. Govt. of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928) (Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions.). There can be no question that the Grant Committee falls within the ambit of the executive branch of government as that committee is charged with the task of implementing specific legislation. See W.Va. Code § 29-22-18a(d)(3). Similarly beyond dispute is the fact that the Legislature can play no role in the implementation of the laws it enacts. This Court's decision in Manchin squarely confronted the issue of legislative encroachment into powers reserved for the executive branch. The Legislature had sought to create for itself a mechanism for legislative review of executive action by conferring on a legislative committee the power to veto proposed agency rules. 167 W.Va. at 173, 279 S.E.2d at 633. In striking this mechanism as violative of the separation of powers, we observed that this `extra-legislative control device' [wrongly] ... permits the Legislature to act as something other than a legislative body to control the actions of the other branches. Id. at 173, 279 S.E.2d at 633; accord State ex rel. Meadows v. Hechler, 195 W.Va. 11, 462 S.E.2d 586 (1995) (finding separation of powers violation in legislation that sanctioned veto of agency regulations from committee inaction). Underlying any encroachment of power by one branch of government is the paramount concern that such action will impermissibly foster[] ... dominance and expansion of power: [18] Manchin, 167 W.Va. at 177, 279 S.E.2d at 635-36. Applying that concern to the facts presented in Manchin, we observed that: In effect, the executive exercise of discretion is replaced by committee exercise of discretion, increasing the role of the legislature at the expense of the executive. 167 W.Va. at 177, 279 S.E.2d at 636. In addition to upsetting the balance of powers between the branches, we identified the risk that maximization of self-interest could result where the normal limits on discretionary power are no longer in place due to legislative involvement in an executive function. Id. at 178, 279 S.E.2d at 636.