Opinion ID: 2595488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of AG

Text: AG's initial testimony was an account of the circumstances wherein Metzger committed an act of indecent liberties on her. She was then asked by the prosecutor what she did after that event occurred: Q. And then what did you do? A. I told [EM], `Lets go to the park and play.' Q. Why did you want to go to the park? A. Because I needed to talk to her. Q. Why did you need to talk to her? A. Because I needed to tell her what her uncle did to me. Q. You wanted to tell her what her uncle did? A. Yeah. Q. And did you tell her? A. Yes. Q. And what did [EM] say? A. `He does that all the time to MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. That's hearsay. THE COURT: I'll sustain. The last two questions and responses are stricken. It's hearsay. Q. (By Mr. Schafer) And then after that, what did you do? A. We were riding on the bikes. I was behind her, and I told her, `Your uncle touched me in the private.' She said, Well, its all right. He does it to me all the time. Q. Okay. THE COURT: I'd make the same rulings since I think there was an objection pending to the hearsay statements of [EM]. I'd ask the jury to disregard the hearsay statements. Thank you. Early on in the proceedings, the trial court had determined that AG's testimony could come in as proper evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) and that ruling of the trial court is not challenged here. The challenge asserts that the prosecutor's calculated questioning went beyond the trial court's ruling. Rule 404(b) provides: (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. It is clear from our past decisions that the trial court properly allowed AG to testify to this prior crime. Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1047-49 (Wyo.1979). Keeping in mind that this was a witness who was nine years old at the time she testified, and the overall context of AG's testimony, we conclude that the witness's hearsay statements were inadvertent and not a deliberate effort by the prosecutor to get the witness to introduce that hearsay into evidence. The trial court immediately corrected the problem by instructing the jury to disregard both of AG's hearsay responses. We must assume that the jury followed the court's curative instruction. Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo. 1987). Metzger asks that we rely instead on our holding in Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 363 (Wyo.1988) that curative action cannot take the sting out of every mistake, i.e., we do not always presume that the jury will follow the court's curative instructions. In Zabel, we declined to follow our usual rule because an expert's testimony led the jury through a truthfulness evaluation (of a victim under circumstances similar to this case) which ultimately told the jury that the victim was truthful and the defendant was guilty. In this case, AG's stricken statements did tend to corroborate EM's accusations; however, the trial court's remedial action was immediate and comprehensive. Under the circumstances of this case, we opt to follow our general rule that the jury did obey the corrective instructions utilized by the trial court. In this regard, Metzger also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his contemporaneous motion for mistrial. The denial of a motion for mistrial is a ruling made in the sound discretion of the trial court and can be reversed only when that discretion has been abused. Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 898 (Wyo.1998). We find no abuse of discretion under the circumstances presented here.