Opinion ID: 6323337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consolidated Case

Text: In his second motion to reopen, Wang argued that his notice to appear (“NTA”) was defective because it did not provide the date and time of his hearing and thus did not stop his accrual of presence for cancellation of removal and did not vest jurisdiction with the IJ. We grant this petition and remand to the BIA. While Wang’s jurisdictional argument lacks merit, the BIA should reconsider whether to reopen for Wang to apply for cancellation of removal. A nonpermanent resident, like Wang, may have his removal cancelled if, among other requirements, he can show 10 years of continuous presence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). In Pereira v. Sessions, the Supreme Court held that an NTA must include a hearing time and place to trigger the stop-time rule, which cuts off a noncitizen’s accrual of physical presence or residence for purposes of qualifying for cancellation of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), (b), (d)(1). In rejecting Wang’s motion, the BIA reasoned that the subsequent hearing notice provided the missing information and stopped the accrual of presence. The Supreme Court has since rejected the BIA’s position, holding that an NTA that does not contain a hearing date and time as 9 required by Pereira is not cured for purposes of the stoptime rule by a subsequent notice of hearing that provides the missing information. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S.Ct. 1474, 1479, 1481-82 (2021) (requiring the Government to issue a single NTA containing all statutorily required information rather than providing the information in separate documents). Accordingly, we remand on this basis because the BIA “misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail.” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). Wang’s additional argument that the NTA was inadequate to vest jurisdiction in the immigration court is foreclosed by Banegas Gomez v. Barr, which held that that Pereira does not “void jurisdiction in cases in which an NTA omits a hearing time or place.” 922 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted). In contrast to the statute governing the stop-time rule, the regulation vesting jurisdiction does not require an NTA to specify the time and date of the initial hearing, “so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the alien.” Id. at 112 (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court’s ruling in Niz-Chavez does not alter this conclusion. 10 For the foregoing reasons, the lead petition for review is DENIED and the consolidated petition is GRANTED, the October 28, 2019, BIA decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for reconsideration of Wang’s motion to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 11