Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Record Portions of Grand Jury Proceedings

Text: The district attorney sought an indictment from the grand jury. Defendant contends critical portions of the grand jury proceedings were not recorded, thereby violating state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, defendant argues reversal is required because of the failure to record the superior court's interview of prospective grand jurors and an alleged meeting between the prosecutor and the grand jury. We disagree. (1) At the time of defendant's trial, section 190.9 required that, [i]n any case in which a death sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the . . . superior courts . . . shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present. (Stats. 1993, ch. 1016, § 3, p. 5739.) Defendant cites Dustin v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1321-1323 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 176] for the proposition that section 190.9 applies as well to grand jury proceedings in capital cases. While the federal Constitution does not require that all proceedings be transcribed, it does require that there be a record adequate to permit meaningful appellate review. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1165-1166 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315].) A record is inadequate only if the complained-of deficiency is prejudicial to the defendant's ability to prosecute his appeal. ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 8 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) It is defendant's burden to show that any deficiencies are prejudicial. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1170 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 105 P.3d 487].) Inconsequential inaccuracies or omissions are insufficient to constitute prejudice. ( Ibid. ) Nor will mere speculation suffice. ( Ibid. )
(2) On May 18, 1994, the Orange County Superior Court selected 19 individuals from a roster of 29 nominees to comprise the 1994-1995 grand jury (§ 895). Section 896 requires that the superior court personally interview each prospective grand juror to ascertain whether they possess the qualifications required by section 893. [4] As part of the appellate record completion process, defendant sought to augment the record with transcripts of the superior court's interview and selection of the grand jury. Neither the interviews nor the selection process were recorded. [5] Defendant argues this constitutes reversible error. We disagree. Section 190.9 requires that all proceedings be reported in a case in which a death sentence may be imposed. The Court of Appeal concluded in Dustin that section 190.9 applies to grand jury proceedings in death penalty cases where indictments are returned. ( Dustin v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.) That case is unlike this one. There, the Court of Appeal considered a defendant's pretrial claim that the prosecutor violated section 190.9 by ordering the court reporter to leave while he gave his opening and closing statements to the grand jury. (99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315.) Even assuming Dustin was correctly decided, section 190.9 cannot reasonably be interpreted to apply before a case even exists. Defendant did not commit his crimes until September 1994, he was not arrested until October 1994, and the case was not presented to the grand jury until January 1995. The case could not have been said to exist in May 1994 when the 1994-1995 grand jury was interviewed, selected, and empaneled. Section 190.9 does not impose a duty to record the personal interviews of prospective grand jurors. Nor is there a constitutional violation, as defendant has failed to establish that the absence of the sought record prejudices his ability to prosecute his appeal. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 196, fn. 8.)
On Thursday, January 5, 1995, Deputy District Attorney Carolyn Kirkwood presented the state's case to the grand jury. The next morning, Friday, January 6, Kirkwood gave her closing argument and answered the grand jury's questions. The foreperson then excused Kirkwood and the court reporter so the jury could begin deliberating. Later that afternoon, Kirkwood and District Attorney Guy Ormes returned to address several written questions the jury had submitted. Afterwards, the grand jury resumed deliberations, but recessed for the day without returning an indictment. On Wednesday, January 11, Ormes and Kirkwood returned to address more questions submitted by the grand jury. Ormes noted the jury had recessed Friday without returning an indictment and said, Since that time you presented me with aactually several questions . . . . Ormes indicated the People were prepared to address the questions by calling additional witnesses. Ormes and Kirkwood first addressed several questions themselves. When addressing one of the questions, Kirkwood remarked, We received a note from the grand jury on [Monday,] January 9, 1995 . . . . The People then examined several witnesses, after which Kirkwood made concluding remarks and the jury resumed its deliberations. Later that afternoon, it returned an indictment against defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. He argued that the grand jury indicted him only after the prosecution presented additional, allegedly inadmissible, evidence on January 11. At a hearing on the motion, counsel for both sides discussed whether the jury refused to return an indictment on January 6, whether it deliberated on January 9 and 10, and how it transmitted its questions to the prosecution. Defendant asked to examine Ormes and the foreperson about whether the jury deliberated on January 9 and 10, whether it had taken a vote prior to January 11, and whether there were any unreported discussions between it and the prosecutors. The court denied the request, but ordered the prosecutor to produce the jury's written questions for in camera review. The court reviewed the written notes in chambers with only the prosecutors present. One note, written by the foreperson, was dated January 9 and contained questions about the People's DNA evidence, whether there was any non-DNA evidence implicating defendant, and about exculpatory evidence. Another note, also written by the foreperson, was dated January 10 and began, These 4 points are what I told the panel I had discussed with you. The note then listed points regarding the DNA evidence, the existence of corroborative evidence, and exculpatory evidence. The note concluded by informing the prosecutor that the grand jury would be convening at 8:45 a.m. on January 11. As part of the appellate record completion process, defendant sought to augment the record with an explanation of the procedure followed for transmitting the grand jury's questions to the district attorney, any record of when grand jury proceedings took place, and transcripts of any communications between the grand jury and any prosecutor other than remarks contained in existing transcripts. At a hearing, the superior court appellate clerk explained that there were no other transcripts to produce. She indicated that the district attorney had told her the jury had been deliberating on January 9 and 10, so there was no transcript for those days. The jury wrote questions down on those days, transmitted the questions to the district attorney, and the questions were answered on January 11. The People indicated there was no set procedure for communicating questions from the grand jury to the district attorney and it could therefore not say how it was done in this case. (3) Defendant contends the record suggests the prosecutor had a number of unreported communications with the grand jury in violation of section 190.9 and Dustin v. Superior Court. He first relies on the January 9 and January 10 written questions, which he claims suggest unreported communications took place because the grand jury had to give the written questions to the prosecutor. He also places great weight on the prosecutor's readiness to answer the questions on January 11 with live testimony, arguing this demonstrates the existence of unreported communications. We conclude that neither establishes an unreported communication took place. It is just as likely that the grand jury transmitted its notes to the district attorney in an innocuous manner without direct communication, putting the district attorney on notice that it needed to present more evidence to answer the jury's questions. Moreover, even assuming unreported communications took place, defendant has failed to identify anything other than mere speculation to support his contention that he has suffered prejudice, i.e., that the grand jury's decision to indict may have been in some way influenced by the alleged unreported communications. ( People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) A defendant seeking postconviction reversal for irregularities in grand jury proceedings must establish that the complained-of errors were structural or resulted in actual prejudice relating to his conviction. ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 800 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938].) Defendant does not establish the existence of an irregularity justifying postconviction reversal. Defendant also points to the opening sentence of the January 10 note. In it, the foreperson wrote These 4 points are what I told the panel I had discussed with you. This statement does indicate the foreperson had an unreported conversation with the district attorney. However, even assuming this constitutes error, defendant fails to establish the necessary prejudice to warrant postconviction reversal. ( People v. Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 800; People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 196, fn. 8.) The statement indicates that the topic of conversation was memorialized in the note. Moreover, the contents of the January 10 note are nearly identical to the substance of the January 9 note, suggesting that the four topics identified in the two notes constitute the extent of the jury's interest. [6]