Opinion ID: 1121151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Contract of Indemnification

Text: Moving to the argument that the liability of the county is based on contract rather than on tort and hence the rule of governmental immunity is inapplicable, we note that plaintiff relies largely on the views advanced in the brief of Olson and Torginol, which seem to be that the contract provision is binding since the board of county commissioners had the statutory power and authority to enter into a lease agreement with Olson. The portion of the contract on which they rely requires the county to indemnify Olson and hold it free and harmless from any and all claims for injury to persons incurred in connection with the use and occupation of the leased premises by the county, specifically:    The Lessee does hereby covenant and agree with the Lessor that it will:    indemnify and hold the Lessor free and harmless from any and all claims or demands for damage to property or injury to the persons of any patrons, customers, or other persons incurred in connection with or as a result of the use and occupation of the demised premises by the Lessee, and to maintain adequate public liability and property damage insurance covering the Lessee's use and occupation of said premises   . Without immediately centering on the authority of the county to enter such arrangements, we observe that the provision is less than clear in that if interpreted literally it would seem to be a type of insurance, covering not only the negligence of the county or its agents but of anyone, including the lessor. Assuming, however, that the provision was intended to hold the lessor harmless from any claims or demands for damage to property or injuries caused by the county or its agents, Olson and Torginol are scarcely in a position to prevail here since if the fault were that of the county or its agents Olson and Torginol perforce have no liability while if the negligent acts of either Olson or Torginol were the cause of the injury they would have no occasion to charge the county with responsibility for their own misconduct. The argument of the appellants therefore falls of its own weight. Additionally, appellants are confronted with an insurmountable obstacle in their implicit claim that the indemnity clause gives a right of action where because of governmental immunity none would otherwise exist. It is well settled that indemnification against liability must always be regarded as having reference to existing grounds of liability and not as creating new ones. Becker v. Keokuk Water-Works, 79 Iowa 419, 44 N.W. 694, 695; Van Horn v. City of Des Moines, 63 Iowa 447, 19 N.W. 293, 294. As this court said in Maffei, supra, 338 P.2d at 817, it is beyond the power of a governmental unit to waive an immunity which it possesses by virtue of its being an arm of the state government and any waiver of such an immunity must come by direct action of the legislature or through the clear and unmistakable implication of its legislative acts. From what has been said, it follows that the trial court was warranted in the summary judgment. Affirmed.