Opinion ID: 1158507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Telephonic Deposition

Text: Before trial, the state filed a motion for a videotaped deposition of Ms. Toby Falk. The state presented evidence that the witness, who was in New York, was ill and unable to travel. Grannis moved for a telephonic deposition instead. Webster opposed the taking of the deposition by videotape or telephone and asserted his right to be present during the deposition, pursuant to rule 15.3(d). The trial court ordered that the state be allowed to take a videotaped deposition of Falk and ordered the state to produce additional evidence from Falk's doctor that she could not travel to Arizona. The state filed a facsimile letter from the doctor saying that Falk could not travel because she had multiple sclerosis and was undergoing treatment. The state then made an oral motion for a telephonic deposition when neither Webster nor his attorney were present, and the trial court granted the motion. Falk, who was in New York, was telephonically deposed on April 19, 1991. Webster was not present in Tucson for the telephonic deposition; however, Webster's counsel was present and had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. During the deposition, Webster's counsel made several hearsay objections. At trial, Webster's counsel objected to the hearsay statements and alleged there were numerous errors in the typed transcript of the deposition. The audiotape of Falk's deposition was played to the jury during the trial. We have compared the tape-recorded statement with the transcript of it prepared by a court reporter and find that the reporter inaccurately transcribed the deposition in several places. Because we are reversing the convictions on an unrelated ground, and we find that the admission of the tape and transcript was error for reasons unrelated to the transcription mistakes, we need not address the effect of the transcription errors. Ms. Falk testified that she heard screams coming from Richard's house on the night he was killed and that she called the police that night about the screams. Toby Falk's son, Daniel Falk, testified at the trial that he, too, heard screams coming from Richard's house the night of the murder. Webster argues that admission of the deposition violated rules 15.3(d) and 19.3(c)(1), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Webster further argues that admission of the deposition at trial violated his right to face-to-face confrontation under the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. 6; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. He asserts that the state did not adequately prove that the witness was unavailable and that the trial court failed to make a factual finding of unavailability. See rule 804(a)(4), Arizona Rules of Evidence; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538-39, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177, 181-83, 665 P.2d 59, 63-65 (1983). The state argues that Webster did not properly preserve the issue for appeal because he did not object at trial when the state played the audiotape to the jury. We find that Webster properly preserved the issue for appeal by filing a motion for status conference, in which he asserted his right to be present at the taking of the deposition, before trial. See State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 476, 720 P.2d 73, 77 (1986) (stating that pretrial motion ruled on by court preserves issue for appeal even if counsel does not renew objection at trial). The state was the moving party, and thus under rule 15.3(d) had the duty to notify the officer having custody of the defendant of the deposition, and no such notice was given here. Rule 15.3(d) also requires a written waiver of an in-custody defendant's right to be present at a deposition, and no such written waiver exists here. Rule 804(b)(1), Arizona Rules of Evidence, states that former testimony in criminal actions is not excluded as hearsay as provided in Rule 19.3(c), Rules of Criminal Procedure if the declarant is unavailable. [A] condition precedent to admissibility under Rule 19.3 is that the deposition be taken in accordance with Rule 15.3. State v. Alvarado, 158 Ariz. 89, 93, 761 P.2d 163, 167 (App. 1988). Rule 15.3(d) provides that a defendant  shall have the right to be present at any examination under Rules 15.3(a)(1) and (a)(3), even if the defendant is in custody. (Emphasis added.) Falk's deposition was taken pursuant to rule 15.3(a)(1), which states that the trial court may order a deposition if [a] party shows that the person's testimony is material to the case and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person will not be available at the time of trial. The purpose of rule 15.3 is to protect the defendant's right to confrontation. Rule 15.3, comm. cmt. to 1993 Amendment. The rule was amended in 1993 to permit the recording of a deposition by audio recording device, to permit the taking of a deposition by telephone, and to reduce expense to the parties and inconvenience to witnesses. Id. The state argues that the rule requires that a defendant show his presence is reasonably necessary at the deposition. The state cites as authority State v. Apelt, 176 Ariz. 349, 365-67, 861 P.2d 634, 650-52 (1993), which upheld the denial of a defendant's request for funds for counsel or an investigator to travel to Germany to look for mitigating evidence in a death case with no adequate showing of necessity. We find Apelt to be inapposite and reject the proposition that rule 15.3(d) includes a qualification that defendant's presence be reasonably necessary. See State v. Shearer, 164 Ariz. 329, 335-36, 793 P.2d 86, 92-93 (App. 1989); Alvarado, 158 Ariz. at 93, 761 P.2d at 167. The deposition was not taken in compliance with rule 15.3(d) because Webster was not present at the deposition and did not waive his right to be present, and therefore we find it was error to admit this testimony. See, e.g., People v. McClendon, 197 Ill. App.3d 472, 143 Ill.Dec. 856, 863, 554 N.E.2d 791, 798 (1990), citing Alvarado as an example of a state court that has found a defendant must waive his presence at the deposition prior to its admission. Because we find that admission of the deposition violated Webster's right to be present under rule 15.3(d), we do not reach the constitutional issue of whether admission of the deposition violated his confrontation clause rights. Because we reverse Webster's conviction on other grounds, we will not consider whether this constituted harmless or reversible error. DISPOSITION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the convictions and death sentences of Grannis and Webster and remand their cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FELDMAN, C.J., MOELLER, V.C.J., and ZLAKET and MARTONE, JJ., concur.