Opinion ID: 2337353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adequacy of the Limiting Instruction.

Text: At the close of the State's case, the trial court gave the following limiting instruction concerning the other-crimes testimony of K.J. and L.C.D.: I alert you now specifically to the testimony of [L.C.D.], who testified before lunch and [K.J.] who testified after lunch, that their testimony vis-a-vis the activity with Mr. Oliver is submitted to you for a very limited purpose. Each of those witnesses testified as to certain acts done to them by this defendant on prior occasions. Now, normally we do not allow evidence such as this either singly or together to be admitted in our courts of law. This is so because our Rules of Evidence specifically state that evidence that a person committed a crime on a prior occasion is inadmissible, not admissible.    Therefore, you may not once you start deciding the case take that evidence and conclude from it that the defendant is a bad person, or has a disposition which shows that he's likely to have done this act which he is charged with in the case that you are hearing. Or to show a general disposition of the defendant to commit bad acts. This is not for the purpose of allowing the testimony and it should be, should not be considered by you as such. Our Rules of Evidence do in certain situations permit such testimony where such evidence relates to some other fact in issue such as intent or plan. The evidence was admitted as it may bear on the issue of whether the alleged sexual assault had any similarities which you will determine for those two witnesses and how they roll one with the other for the two ladies who testified in chief designated as victims by our law. Now, whether such item does in fact or doesn't in fact bear on the ultimate issue here, ladies and gentlemen, is for you and for you alone to decide. You notice how we leave the hard questions for you, and you may determine that the testimony does not bear on any of the issues, that is that it has no bearing or relationship to any of the issues to be decided by you. In this event you may disregard the testimony as not being helpful to you at all, or you may consider such evidence bearing on one of those issues that I have just referred to. That is for you and you alone to decide. (Emphasis added.) In charging the jury, the court referred to its earlier limiting instruction. Following a discussion of intent, it stated: And at this juncture, ladies and gentlemen, I won't recharge you as to it. Remember I told you about the limited purpose of the testimony of the two ladies who are not victims in this indictment. That probably goes into that area as to whether you find there is some type of intent or plan by the defendant. You as jurors should find your facts from the evidence adduced during the trial. (Emphasis added.) In Cofield, supra, we stated that when other-crime evidence is admitted under Evidence Rule 55, the limiting instruction should narrowly focus the jury's attention on the specific use of other-crime evidence rather than merely make reference only to the generalities of the Rule. 127 N.J. at 341, 605 A. 2d 230. See also Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 304, 558 A. 2d 833 (stating that instruction should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere). The trial court in Cofield told the jury not to use the other-crime evidence to determine that the defendant had been predisposed to commit the crimes charged, but failed to instruct it clearly on exactly how to use the other-crime evidence. The court simply stated that `[s]uch evidence is admissible and can only be considered by you,    [for the] limited purpose of proving some other fact in issue.' 127 N.J. at 333, 605 A. 2d 230 (quoting trial court's charge). That instruction's lack of specific guidance on how to use the other-crime evidence allowed the jury free rein and constituted plain error justifying a reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id. at 342, 605 A. 2d 230. The charge given in the present case closely follows that quoted and approved in State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 530 A. 2d 806 (App.Div. 1987). However, the significant difference is that the Cusick charge explained in greater contextual detail the permissible uses of the other-crime evidence: The rules of evidence do[,] however, permit such testimony where such evidence relates to some other fact, where it relates to some other fact in issue here including motive, including intent, including absence of mistake, or accident, or some such other issue. Here the evidence was admitted as it may bear on the issue of whether the alleged touching of R.S. or K.S. was accidental or it was a mistake. Likewise, it might also bear on the defendant's motive for allegedly touching the victims here. This is to obtain some sort of sexual gratification, or on the issue of his intention to touch the children, victims here. [ Id. at 466, 530 A. 2d 806 (quoting trial court's charge).] The trial court in Cusick did not state merely that the evidence could be used on the issues of intent, motive, or absence of mistake; rather, it explained those abstract issues in context and thus illustrated to the jury how it could apply the other-crime evidence to those issues for which the evidence had been admitted. By contrast, the trial court in this case did not explain the relationship between the other-crime evidence and the issues and facts on which it could be considered. Although the court did clearly instruct the jury that it was not to use the evidence to determine that defendant was a bad person or that he had been disposed to commit the crimes charged in the indictment, it did not clearly instruct the jury on how it could use the other-crime evidence. Precisely that situation prompted this Court to find reversible error in Cofield. Although the instruction given in this case may not be as plainly erroneous as the one in Cofield, which instructed the jury to consider the other-crime evidence on some other fact in issue, the trial court's instruction here is no more informative. It recites the bases  intent or plan  on which the evidence had been admitted, but unlike the Cusick instruction it fails to relate those abstract issues to the facts. This Court has stated that `more is required to sustain a ruling admitting such evidence than the incantation of the illustrative exceptions contained in the Rule.' Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 341, 605 A. 2d 230 (quoting Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 305, 558 A. 2d 833). The remainder of the instruction, to the extent that it can be understood at all, appears to admonish the jury to use the evidence to determine whether any similarities existed between the assaults testified to by K.J. and L.C.D. and those charged in the indictment. That use is not an independent basis for the admission of other-crime evidence under Evidence Rule 55, nor does the charge include an explication of what is meant by intent or plan. As we have emphasized, plan contemplates more than a strong factual similarity between crimes. Inviting this jury to use the other-crime evidence on the issue of whether the alleged sexual assault had any similarities with the indicted assaults not only gave the jury free rein to use that evidence as it wished but implicitly gave the court's blessing to any such uses of the evidence.