Opinion ID: 629120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bribery Charges

Text: 26 Coyne first argues that his conduct is not covered by Section 666, the federal bribery statute. He frames his argument as jurisdictional because the designated jurisdictional amount of federal assistance, $10,000, was purportedly not met. Although federal financial assistance to the County was at all pertinent times in excess of that amount, neither the civic center project, the automobile purchases, nor the dive team were supported by federal funds. Coyne argues that, for purposes of Section 666(b), the federal assistance in question must be earmarked for the project at issue. 27 At the time of the offenses alleged in Counts I (conspiring to violate Sec. 666(b) & (c)) and II (violating Sec. 666(b)), Section 666(b) provided: 28 Whoever, being an agent of an organization, or of a State or local government agency, described in subsection (a), solicits, demands, accepts, or agrees to accept anything of value from a person or organization other than his employer or principal for or because of the recipient's conduct in any transaction or matter or a series of transactions or matters involving $5,000 or more concerning the affairs of such organization or State or local government agency, shall be imprisoned.... 29 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666(b) (Supp.1984). Section 666(a) defines an organization or a state or local government agency as one that receives benefits in excess of $10,000 in any one year period pursuant to a Federal program involving a grant, a contract, a subsidy, a loan, a guarantee, insurance, or another form of Federal assistance. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666(a) (Supp.1984). The statute was amended in 1986, but not in any way material to the instant matter. 30 The Supreme Court has instructed that [c]ourts ... applying criminal laws generally must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language. '[O]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions' in the legislative history will justify a departure from that language. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2902, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985) (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75, 105 S.Ct. 479, 482, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984)). The statutory language of Section 666 requires proof only that the accused be an agent of a local government that received in excess of $10,000 of federal funds in the one year period. The language neither explicitly nor implicitly requires that the $10,000 be directly linked to the program that was the subject of the bribe. 31 Appellant cites several portions of what he describes as legislative history that purportedly reflect a congressional intent to limit the reach of the legislation to bribery in specific local programs that are directly funded by the federal government. Our analysis of that legislative history begins with the Senate Report that accompanied Section 666(b). It stated: PART C--PROGRAM FRAUD AND BRIBERY
32 This part of title XI is designed to create new offenses to augment the ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal monies that are disbursed to private organizations or State and local governments pursuant to a Federal program. The proposal is derived from S. 1630, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981 approved by the Committee in the 97th Congress. 1
33 As indicated, this part of title XI covers both theft and bribery type offenses.... [T]here is no statute of general applicability in this area, and thefts from other organizations or governments receiving Federal financial assistance can be prosecuted under the general theft of Federal property statute, 18 U.S.C. 641, only if it can be shown that the property stolen is property of the United States. In many cases, such prosecution is impossible because title has passed to the recipient before the property is stolen, or the funds are so commingled that the Federal character of the funds cannot be shown. This situation gives rise to a serious gap in the law, since even though title to the monies may have passed, the Federal Government clearly retains a strong interest in assuring the integrity of such program funds. Indeed, a recurring problem in this area (as well as in the related area of bribery of the administrators of such funds) has been that State and local prosecutors are often unwilling to commit their limited resources to pursue such thefts, deeming the United States the principal party aggrieved. 34 With respect to bribery, 18 U.S.C. 201 generally punishes corrupt payments to Federal public officials, but there is some doubt as to whether or under what circumstances persons not employed by the Federal Government may be considered as a public official under the definition in 18 U.S.C. 201(a) as anyone acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function.....
35 Part C adds a new section 666 to title 18, United States Code. Subsection (a) makes it a Federal crime for an officer, employee or agent of an organization or of a State or local government agency that receives benefits in excess of $10,000 per calendar year pursuant to a Federal program to steal, embezzle, obtain by fraud, willfully misapply or otherwise knowingly convert without authority property valued at $5,000 or more.... The terms agent, organization, government agency, and local are defined in subsection (d) and require no further explication. The Committee intends that the term Federal program involving a grant, a contract, a subsidy, a loan, a guarantee, insurance, or another form of Federal assistance be construed broadly, consistent with the purpose of this section to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence by bribery. 36 S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 369-70 (1984), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1984, pp. 3182, 3510, 3511. 37 Although appellant attempts to divine from this statement the limitation described above, we fail to see any implication, much less a direct expression, of such an intent. Indeed, most of the Report's discussion relates to thefts rather than bribes. Appellant's main focus, however, is on the final sentence of the first paragraph in the quoted text, which states that Section 666 was derived from S. 1630 ... approved by the Committee in the 97th Congress. This sentence is accompanied by the quoted footnote referring to S.Rep. No. 97-307, the Committee Report accompanying S. 1630. In this Report, appellant does find remarks supportive of his position 1 and asks us to read Section 666(b) in light of those remarks. We need not pause to question whether this derivative legislative history is the extraordinary showing of contrary intentions required by Albertini because the argument is fatally flawed for other reasons. Both the section of S. 1630 relating to theft and that relating to bribery included specific limitations that are not in Section 666. Section 1731(c)(34)'s prohibition on thefts was thus limited to thefts of property [of] the [federally funded] program. More importantly, Section 1751(c)(1)(I)'s prohibition on bribery was limited to payments to an agent or fiduciary of ... an organization charged ... with administering monies or property derived from a federal program, and the recipient's conduct is related to the administration of such program.... In short, the legislative history of S. 1630 is unhelpful because the proposed legislation actually contained express limitations to property or conduct related to a program directly funded by the federal government. The failure of the 98th Congress to include such a limitation in Section 666 hardly reflects an intent helpful to Coyne--in fact a contrary inference can be drawn--much less an extraordinary showing of such an intent. 38 In so concluding, we agree with the other circuits who have considered the question. In United States v. Little, 889 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 2176, 109 L.Ed.2d 505 (1990), the Fifth Circuit held that if the agency received $10,000 in any given year, then the agents were subject to Section 666. There is no requirement that the particular program be the recipient of the federal funds. Id. at 1369 (citing United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 576 (5th Cir.) (stating that Section 666 did not require the government to trace federal funds to the tainted transactions of a local government agency covered by the statute), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820, 109 S.Ct. 62, 102 L.Ed.2d 39 (1988)); see also United States v. Simas, 937 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir.1991). 39