Opinion ID: 2371529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of carter's testimony

Text: In admitting Carter's testimony, the trial court effectively made two separate evidentiary determinations: the first under Rule 404(b) on the issue of the relevance and purpose of the challenged evidence, and the second under Rule 403 which bars evidence, although relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See Neal v. State, 320 Ark. 489, 898 S.W.2d 440 (1995); Thrash, 291 Ark. 575, 726 S.W.2d 283; Snell v. State, 290 Ark. 503, 721 S.W.2d 628 (1986), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2090, 104 L.Ed.2d 653 (1989); White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986). Appellant argues the trial court's ruling on the Rule 403 issue was error because the testimony was offered solely for prejudicial effect. This argument is based upon appellant's contentions that: (1) the state's case was virtually a sure thing before Carter's testimony was given as the final prosecution witness, (2) the possible prejudice resulting from erroneous admission of evidence in the present case is distinguishable from cases where no death penalty was sought, such as Thrash , and (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the specific purposes for which Carter's testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b). Certainly the state's capital felony murder case against appellant was founded upon and strengthened by the stipulated fact that appellant killed the victim. However, as noted, the charged crime also required the state to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the killing occurred in the course of or in immediate flight from appellant's commission or attempt to commit the victim's rape or kidnapping under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. None of these additional required elements of the charged crime was stipulated to or confessed by appellant. Conflicting evidence pertinent to the alleged kidnapping and attempted kidnapping predicate offenses was introduced when the testimonies of Ms. Pree and Ms. Williams are compared with appellant's custodial statement. Ambiguous evidence was admitted pertinent to the alleged rape and attempted rape predicate offenses inasmuch as the victim was discovered nude below the waist but the autopsy report showed no evidence of rape and appellant denied raping or attempting to rape the victim in his custodial statement. Further, the state's case against appellant included circumstantial evidence of blood, hair, fiber, and other physical items introduced at trial as exhibits to various forensic reports prepared by the FBI and the State Crime Lab. Although appellant stipulated to the admissibility of these reports analyzing the circumstantial evidence, he did not stipulate as to the truthfulness of any conclusions or findings of fact contained therein. On this record, we cannot conclude the state's capital felony murder case was virtually a sure thing at the time Carter took the witness stand. Therefore we reject appellant's first contention that the testimony was offered solely for prejudicial effect. Next, appellant states the possible prejudice resulting from the erroneous admission of evidence is greater in death penalty cases. The conclusion he draws from this observation, apparently, is that Carter's testimony was offered solely for its prejudicial effect because the state sought the death penalty in this case. Appellant's second contention fundamentally misinterprets Rule 403, which, as noted above, excludes relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. The prejudice referred to in Rule 403, however, denotes the effect of the evidence upon the jury, not the defendant. See generally 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 403[03] (1994). Hence the nature of the sentence that may be imposed in the event of the defendant's conviction is not a factor in the trial court's Rule 403 analysis. Therefore, because it is based upon a false premise, we reject appellant's second contention that the testimony was offered solely for prejudicial effect. Finally, although appellant was entitled to a cautionary instruction to the jury limiting the purposes for which it should have considered Carter's testimony, his failure to request the instruction precludes our consideration of this argument on appeal. Lindsey v. State, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584 (1994); White, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784. Therefore we reject appellant's third and final contention that the testimony was offered solely for prejudicial effect. As with other evidentiary determinations, the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect is a matter left to the trial court's sound discretion. Neal, 320 Ark. 489, 898 S.W.2d 440; Robinson v. State, 314 Ark. 243, 861 S.W.2d 548 (1993). In this case, the trial court held Carter's testimony concerning appellant's 1988 crimes of second degree battery, kidnapping and rape was probative of appellant's intent and modus operandi in the present case under Rule 404(b). We are mindful of the state's burden in this case to prove one or more of the predicate offenses, the commission or attempt to commit the victim's rape or kidnapping. We conclude the 1988 crimes bore sufficient similarity to the present crime to justify proof of the former as probative of appellant's intent to commit the predicate offenses of the latter. Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993); Snell, 290 Ark. 503, 721 S.W.2d 628. The record in this case shows that on December 31, 1992, less than six months before the commission of the present crime, appellant was discharged from the Arkansas Department of Correction having completed his sentence for his 1988 crimes. Both the 1988 crimes and the present crime involved female victims on duty as employees of E-Z Mart stores located in neighboring communities. Both were committed shortly after midnight by appellant, without accomplices, after he had purchased items from the victim at the store and had made several trips to the store on the day of the attack. Both involved a physical struggle between appellant and the victim that started in one part of the store and moved to other parts. Both involved sexual implications. In 1988, Carter pleaded for her life, whereas the victim in the present case was killed. In 1988, appellant apparently travelled to the E-Z Mart on a bicycle, whereas he borrowed his brother's pickup truck in the present case. Clearly, the challenged testimony had probative value which, we conclude, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Rule 403. The dissent contends the challenged testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because the 1988 crimes were not sufficiently similar to the present crime, and, therefore, the trial court need not have reached the Rule 403 issue. Appellant articulates no argument to this court that the challenged testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). However, pursuant to Ark.Sup. Ct.R. 4-3(h), we consider this issue. The degree of similarity between the circumstances of prior crimes and the present crime required for admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is a determination that affords considerable leeway to the trial judge, and may vary with the purpose for which the evidence is admitted. See 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 112, n. 4 and accompanying text (2d ed.1994) (To be probative, prior criminal acts must require an intent similar to that required by the charged crime, although it is usually said that the prior crime need not closely resemble the charged crime.); 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 190, n. 31 and accompanying text (4th ed. 1992) (The similarities between the act charged and the extrinsic acts [admitted to show the act charged was not performed inadvertently, accidentally, involuntarily, or without guilty knowledge] need not be as extensive and striking as is required ... [to show modus operandi ]). See generally 2 Jack B. Weinstein, et al., Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 404[12] (1995); 2 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 302 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). On this record, we conclude the similarity between the circumstances of the 1988 crimes and the predicate offenses of the present crime was sufficient to support the trial court's admission of the challenged testimony under Rule 404(b) as independently relevant proof of appellant's intent to commit the predicate offenses. This court has repeatedly ruled that trial courts have broad discretion in deciding evidentiary issues, including the admissibility of evidence under Rules 403 and 404(b), and that those decisions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Neal, 320 Ark. 489, 898 S.W.2d 440; Lindsey, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584. We conclude appellant has failed to show an abuse of discretion.