Opinion ID: 1385412
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is the Futility Exception to the Exhaustion Requirement Applicable?

Text: The exhaustion requirement is excused when exhaustion would be futile because the administrative procedures do not provide an adequate remedy. Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. 592 (stating that parents may bypass the administrative process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate (citing. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984))). In Heldman, we acknowledged that the exhaustion requirement does not apply when pursuit of the administrative remedies would be futile because the agency either was acting in violation of the law or was unable to remedy the alleged injury. Heldman, 962 F.2d at 159. The party seeking to avoid exhaustion bears the burden of showing futility. Polera, 288 F.3d at 488 n. 8 (citing Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. 592). Appellants have failed to demonstrate that their case warrants an exemption from the exhaustion rule. Appellants argue that there was no point in pursuing an administrative appeal of the findings of the Section 504 team or the decision of the CSE, because Dr. Robert Dillon, the superintendent of the school district, initially made a decisive recommendation against allowing the dog to enter the school's premises, a recommendation that would allegedly control the outcome of subsequent administrative review procedures. See Br. of Appellants at 9. Weighty though this recommendation might have been at the initial stages of appellants' complaint against the school, there is not the slightest indication that the superintendent was in any position to affect, let alone control, the further determinations by local and state authorities. Appellants were entitled, under the IDEA and the New York Education Law, to a due process hearing, which would have been conducted by an impartial hearing officer; if dissatisfied with the officer's findings, they could have then pursued their claims at the state level before instituting a lawsuit. Cave, 480 F.Supp.2d at 636 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)-(2)). The IDEA explicitly requires that the officer conducting the hearing not be . . . a person having a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the person's objectivity in the hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(0(II). Absent any evidence casting doubt on the impartiality of the local or the state review officers who would examine appellants' claims, we cannot presume that they would be biased. In the past we have excused exhaustion in cases involving systemic violations that could not be remedied by local or state administrative agencies because the framework and procedures for assessing and placing students in appropriate educational programs were at issue, or because the nature and volume of complaints were incapable of correction by the administrative hearing process. J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir.2004). For example, in Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1982), a class action by handicapped children challenging New York city and state educational authorities' failure to provide them with appropriate public education, the city's education commissioner acknowledged that he would be unable to expeditiously process the appeals of all the members of the plaintiff class were they to pursue administrative proceedings. Id. at 869. Because of this admission and the complexity of the educational issues involved, we held that we could not be sure that resort to state administrative remedies would not be `futile' for purposes of obtaining class relief. Id. Here, an individual student complains about the school's denial of his request that a service dog be permitted to accompany him in class. There is no allegation of a system-wide violation of the IDEA's mandates or of a district-wide policy of discrimination against hearing-impaired students. Nor do appellants make a plausible argument that the administrative process is so structurally tainted that they would not have been afforded a fair and impartial forum to present their claims. We conclude that appellants were required to first seek relief through the administrative review procedures available to them under the IDEA before proceeding with a federal lawsuit. We sympathize with the concerns of John, Jr.'s parents and their effort to help him overcome the obstacles posed by his hearing impairment. Their federal claims, however, were not properly brought before the district court. In Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884), the Supreme Court noted the existence of an inflexible rule that without exception requires federal courts, on their own motion, to determine if jurisdiction is lacking. Id. at 382, 4 S.Ct. 510. Issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal, and even by the court sua sponte. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976). If a court perceives at any stage of the proceedings that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then it must take proper notice of the defect by dismissing the action. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that [i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. (Emphasis added). We therefore direct the district court to dismiss without prejudice appellants' federal causes of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.