Opinion ID: 685666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 20 Because we base our decision on statutory and regulatory grounds, we must address the government's contention that there can be no pattern or practice jurisdiction in this case unless there is a constitutional violation. 6 The government argues that the language of Campos I compels this result. Because the reasoning of that case goes beyond the precise language used, we reject the government's contention. 21 Under the system that Congress devised to govern deportation proceedings and asylum claims, a district court generally may not hear an appeal of a final order of deportation. The courts of appeals possess exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of adverse deportation or asylum decisions. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(a) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2342. The exception we nevertheless recognized in Campos I allows a district court to entertain a suit in equity alleging a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct existing beyond the context of any singular deportation hearing. Campos I, 940 F.2d at 497-98. See also Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir.1990); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). 22 In Campos I, we expressly contemplated the right of a class of aliens to bring an action to enjoin a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct. Unconstitutionality of the pattern or practice is not a requisite, however. Campos I as well as Montes and McNary support the principle that such jurisdiction exists even if Judge Nail's policy violated only federal statutory rights. In McNary, for example, the Supreme Court considered a claim by alien farm workers that the INS violated their rights to procedural due process in administering a special amnesty program for farm workers. Congress had provided that determinations of legalization could be subjected to judicial review only in the review of an order of exclusion or deportation. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1160(e)(3)(A). The Court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs could bring an action in district court to challenge the pattern or practice of the INS. In so ruling, the court pointed out that restricting judicial review to the courts of appeals as a component of the review of an individual deportation order is the practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review of generic constitutional and statutory claims. McNary, 498 U.S. at 497, 111 S.Ct. at 899. (emphasis added). See also Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2494-95, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993). 23 Our reasoning in Montes and Campos I did not hinge upon the source of the federal right. 7 It hinged on the difficulty of perceiving a pattern or practice in an individual case and the corresponding inability of an alien to obtain appropriate relief in a deportation hearing. Montes, 919 F.2d at 536; Campos, 940 F.2d at 497-98. In El Rescate Legal Services, Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 752-53 (9th Cir.1992), we remanded a similar case to district court, ordering it to address whether the class's privileges, opportunities, or rights were violated by the EOIR's application of the BIA's policy[.] We indicated there that jurisdiction would exist if the EOIR applies a policy in such a manner that it systematically denies the class either its statutory privileges and opportunities or its constitutional rights. Id. (emphasis added). See also National Center for Immigrants' Rights v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir.1990) (although district court jurisdiction regarding aliens released on bond is generally limited to habeas corpus proceedings under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(a)(1), the district court had jurisdiction to hear a constitutional and statutory challenge by a class of aliens regarding the I.N.S.'s blanket imposition of a no-work condition in alien release bonds) rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 183, 112 S.Ct. 551, 116 L.Ed.2d 546 (1991). Thus we conclude that a statutory or regulatory violation can support a pattern or practice case as well as a constitutional violation. 24 In this case, the class alleged a pattern of conduct that was not readily apparent in individual deportation proceedings. Only after comparing the results of numerous cases was the unlawful policy discernible. In light of the limited ability of aliens to conduct discovery in individual deportation proceedings, such a pattern would be difficult or impossible to raise either as a defense or as a basis to obtain the immigration judge's recusal in such proceedings. Consequently, appropriate relief would not be available under the statutory scheme for appeals. Under these circumstances, district court properly has jurisdiction over a case challenging the unlawful pattern or practice.