Opinion ID: 2375316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Expert Testimony Under CRE 702

Text: The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by not making an adequate inquiry and specific findings under Shreck about the reliability of the scientific principles employed by Dr. Sirotnak and any potential prejudice. A trial court determines whether expert testimony is reliable and relevant, and thereby admissible, under CRE 702. Shreck, 22 P.3d at 70. CRE 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In determining admissibility of expert testimony, a trial court employs a Shreck analysis, which requires that: (1) the scientific principles underlying the testimony are reasonably reliable; (2) the expert is qualified to opine on such matters; (3) the expert testimony will be helpful to the jury; and (4) the evidence satisfies CRE 403. Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77-79; see also Martinez, 74 P.3d at 322. This inquiry should be broad in nature and consider the totality of the circumstances of each specific case. Shreck, 22 P.3d at 70, 77. Thus, the trial court may, but is not required to, consider a wide range of factors pertinent to the case at bar including the factors mentioned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), or other courts. Shreck, 22 P.3d at 70, 77. This inquiry is balanced by the requirement that the trial court apply its discretionary authority under CRE 403 to ensure that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. at 78-79. When the trial court makes a determination of relevance and reliability under CRE 702, it is required to issue specific findings regarding its analyses. Id. at 70, 79. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court should have made a determination under Shreck regarding the reliability of child abuse testimony by Dr. Sirotnak. Because Rector did not challenge the admissibility of Dr. Sirotnak's testimony about medical child abuse during the trial, [5] we examine only the pretrial request for a Shreck hearing and conclude that the pretrial motion did not give rise to a Shreck analysis, much less call for an evidentiary hearing. As a preliminary matter, Rector argues that Shreck requires the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. Once a party requests a Shreck analysis, a trial court is vested with the discretion to decide whether an evidentiary hearing would aid the court in its Shreck analysis. A trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing under Shreck provided it has before it sufficient information to make specific findings under CRE 403 and CRE 702 about the reliability of the scientific principles involved, the expert's qualification to testify to such matters, the helpfulness to the jury, and potential prejudice. People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 383 (Colo.App.2007); People v. McAfee, 104 P.3d 226, 229 (Colo. App.2004); see also Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77. This discretion comports with the trial court's need to avoid unnecessary reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Moreover, a trial court may exercise its discretion and determine that a party's request does not give rise to a Shreck analysis at all. If a party fails to state a specific challenge pursuant to Shreck, a trial court may determine that the request does not warrant a Shreck analysis. Likewise, if the request challenges testimony an expert does not intend to offer, a trial court may determine that no Shreck inquiry is necessary. Thus, not every motion will necessitate a Shreck analysis, much less an evidentiary hearing. In deciding whether a determination of admissibility requires a Shreck inquiry, a trial court must consider the issues as framed in the motion before it. Though on appeal Rector challenges Dr. Sirotnak's expert testimony on the grounds that the medical diagnosis of child abuse was not scientifically reliable and resulted in prejudice, her motion before the trial court differed dramatically. Rector framed the motion as one to exclude medical speculationspecifically, speculation regarding shaken-baby syndrome. In the motion, which did not reference Dr. Sirotnak, Rector argued that she believed Dr. Winston would offer an opinion that shaken-baby syndrome was the cause of injury to T.D. Throughout the motion, the reply brief, and the motions hearing, Rector asserted that a hearing was required to establish whether shaken-baby syndrome was the proper diagnosis. Rector did not discuss or object to any anticipated testimony by Dr. Sirotnak, but only discussed the testimony of Dr. Winston and only in the area of shaken-baby syndrome. At the motions hearing, Rector also argued that the doctors ha[d] inferred that there [wa]s no accidental trauma and in fact, the conclusion that the doctors reach[ed] support[ed] the bringing of ... charges [for] the intentional act to abuse the child. Rector now asserts that this statement was sufficient to alert the trial court that she was challenging the medical diagnosis of child abuse, and specifically the testimony of Dr. Sirotnak. We disagree. A trial court cannot be expected to intuit the challenge brought by the parties. Rather, a party raising a challenge under Shreck to the admissibility of expert testimony must sufficiently identify the testimony and/or the witness being challenged. Here, Rector's motion was too general for the trial court to identify a challenge to Dr. Sirotnak's testimony regarding medical child abuse. This is because the only specific testimony challenged in the motion or at the hearing was the testimony of Dr. Winston and then only with respect to shaken-baby syndrome. At the hearing, the People asserted that there would be no testimony about shaken-baby syndrome from any doctor and that, accordingly, no Shreck hearing on shaken-baby syndrome testimony was necessary. The People explained that the experts would testify that T.D.'s injuries were the result of non-accidental trauma because the trauma to T.D.'s head was inconsistent with the story that was given by the defendant. The experts were also expected to testify that there were a number of ways that such a head injury could occur, some accidental and some non-accidental or inflicted. Though one of those possible scenarios included shaken-baby syndrome, the People were not asserting that shaken-baby syndrome was in fact the cause of T.D.'s injuries. Based on the motion and the arguments, the trial court understood the motion as a combination of a discovery request, [6] which it granted, and a request for a Shreck hearing on shaken-baby syndrome, which it denied. It is clear from the record that the trial court declined a Shreck hearing on shaken-baby syndrome because it appeared not to be an issue in the case. [7] Additionally, and alternatively, the trial court denied the request for a Shreck hearing on shaken-baby syndrome determining that the syndrome is recognized in Colorado as a reliable scientific principle, and that based on the evidence, arguments, and People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316 (Colo. 2003) (in which this Court examined the admissibility of shaken-baby syndrome testimony), [8] no Shreck hearing was required. The trial court then ordered additional expert discovery on the issue of non-accidental trauma. Because Rector requested additional discovery on this issue and argued that a determination of whether the information was scientific and reliable should follow that discovery, the trial court found the request for a Shreck hearing premature. Rector did not submit a subsequent request for a Shreck analysis on the reliability or potential prejudice of Dr. Sirotnak's testimony regarding medical child abuse or non-accidental trauma. Based on the record before us, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rector's motion for a pretrial Shreck hearing. Rector chose to fashion the request for a Shreck hearing generally and only challenged testimony by Dr. Winston and then only with respect to shaken-baby syndrome. Since the experts did not intend to testify as to shaken-baby syndrome, the trial court properly denied a Shreck hearing on the issue. Finally, Rector did not renew her motion or file any new request for a Shreck hearing prior to trial. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.