Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burglary and burglary-murder special circumstance

Text: Defendant contends his two convictions for burglary and the burglary-murder special-circumstance finding must be reversed for insufficient evidence. He relies on two theories. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient that he formed the intent to steal before he entered either the victim's home, her bedroom or Carlon's bedroom. We disagree. Intent to steal is often proved by circumstantial evidence ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 36, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673, overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135), and this case is no different. Here, substantial evidence showed defendant intended to commit a theft-related offense at the time he entered his mother's home. Candina Bravo testified defendant asked her for money shortly before the crimes and that defendant had, in the past, clashed with his mother over money. Defendant's possession and subsequent sale of goods stolen from the victim's home shortly after the crimes is strong circumstantial evidence that he harbored the intent to commit larceny when he entered her home. ( People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 131, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) Moreover, [t]here is no better proof that [defendant] entered the [victim's house] with intent to commit robbery than a showing he did in fact commit robbery after his entry. ( People v. Du Bose (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 544, 551, 89 Cal.Rptr. 134.) Second, defendant contends that because he lived with the victim, there was insufficient evidence of burglary because one cannot be guilty of burglarizing his own residence. He is correct as a general matter ( People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 721, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083; People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365), but even assuming he lived with the victim, the charge was not limited to entry into the victim's home. The second amended information charged defendant in count 4 with entering an inhabited dwelling house ... and inhabited portion of a building occupied by BEATRICE LOZA. (Italics added.) It similarly charged him in count 5 with entering an inhabited dwelling house ... and inhabited portion of a building occupied by SUZIE [ sic ] CARLON. (Italics added.) The wording of the information is consistent with section 459, which provides in pertinent part: Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, ... or other building ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. (Italics added.) With regard to count 4, we conclude there was sufficient evidence defendant burglarized his mother's bedroom. Although the victim may have permitted defendant to be in her home, a point we need not resolve, [7] defendant fought with the victim in her bedroom causing her to scream. When Chachi came to see what was happening, defendant told him to return to his room. Defendant then reentered the victim's bedroom. The jury could have concluded that, under the circumstances, defendant at that time lacked the victim's consent to enter her bedroom; that he may have had a possessory right to enter the home does not preclude a conviction for burglary on these facts. (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) With regard to count 5, Carlon testified that on returning to the house, the lock on her bedroom door had been broken and her electronic equipment had been stolen. Consistent with her testimony, the prosecutor argued that the minute someone went into Susie Carlon's bedroom with the intent to steal from her, they are guilty of burglary. As defendant broke into Carlon's locked bedroom and stole her electronic equipment, that he may have lived in the house is immaterial. ( People v. Wilson (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 611, 256 Cal. Rptr. 422 [invited guest who, without permission, breaks into a locked bedroom commits burglary], cited with approval in People v. Sparks (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 81, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289.) We thus conclude the evidence was sufficient to support both counts of burglary. That being so, we also reject defendant's claim there was insufficient evidence to sustain the burglary-murder special circumstance. To the extent he claims our interpretation of the law of burglary renders the special circumstance unconstitutionally broad, such that it fails to perform the constitutionally required narrowing function, we reject that as well. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1095, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335 [§ 190.2 not unconstitutional because of the breadth of the felony-murder special circumstance].)