Opinion ID: 1991056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanctions Pursuant to Inherent Authority

Text: The conclusion that Rule 11 sanctions are unavailable does not end our inquiry in this case, as this court may affirm a decision for reasons other than those given by the trial court. Chevalier, supra note 2, 576 A.2d at 724. Thus, we find it necessary to consider also whether the imposition of sanctions might, none-the-less, be deemed a proper exercise of the trial court's inherent authority. Apart from the authority granted pursuant to Rule 11, the Superior Court has the inherent authority to award sanctions in appropriate circumstances for intentional abuse of the litigation process. In re Estate of Delaney, 819 A.2d 968, 998 (D.C.2003). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.: It has long been understood that certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution, powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others. For this reason, Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. These powers are governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (citations and quotations omitted). [T]he inherent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct. Id. at 49, 111 S.Ct. 2123; see also id. at 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123 ([W]hen there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.); Delaney, supra, 819 A.2d at 998 ([W]hile a court's rules may reach only specified conduct, the court's inherent power fills the gaps.). A court thus may act sua sponte to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority even when it may not pursuant to the Rule 11 procedures. See Chambers, supra, 501 U.S. at 49, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (discussing the inherent power for sua sponte dismissals despite the existence of Rule 41(b) dismissal procedures). Among the sanctions that can be awarded in the exercise of inherent authority are counsel fees. Id. at 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123. However, before a trial court can exercise its inherent authority to assess counsel fees, a prerequisite finding must be made: specifically, that a party against whom the fees are assessed has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Id. at 45-46, 111 S.Ct. 2123; Delaney, supra, 819 A.2d at 998. A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees. . . . Chambers, supra, 501 U.S. at 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123. [A] party is not to be penalized for maintaining an aggressive litigation posture, nor are good faith assertions of colorable claims or defenses to be discouraged. Delaney, supra, 819 A.2d at 998. [T]he court must scrupulously avoid penalizing a party for a legitimate exercise of the right of access to the courts. For this reason, the standards of bad faith are necessarily stringent. Under these stringent standards, the awarding of attorneys' fees for bad faith litigation is proper only under extraordinary circumstances or when dominating reasons of fairness so demand. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). In the present case, the trial court enumerated numerous examples of conduct and written representations that could have justified an assessment of sanctions  some sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, while others available only in the exercise of the court's inherent authority for conduct beyond the reach of the Rule. However, without expressly finding that the appellants acted either in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, the trial court did not find that appellants acted pursuant to the improper motive necessary for an award of sanctions pursuant to the court's inherent authority. Chambers, supra, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. 2123. Bad faith must be distinguished from, for example, negligence or professional incompetence. Cf. Chevalier, supra note 2, 576 A.2d at 724 (upholding, as an exercise of inherent authority, sanctions erroneously assessed under Rule 11 because the trial court had expressly found that appellant proceeded in bad faith). Thus, we reverse the award of fee sanctions and remand the case for a finding as to whether appellants acted in bad faith so as to justify sanctions pursuant to the court's inherent authority.