Opinion ID: 1940704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Negligence on Universal's Part which was the Proximate Cause of the Accident

Text: Two days prior to this accident, Universal sold to Crane the 1953 Mercury automobile which at that time was on a used car lot over which was a large sign reading Guaranteed which Universal's president stated referred to the cars on the lot. On August 1, 1957  one month before the accident  Universal's record indicated that car's mileage at 48,860 miles. Twenty days after the accident the car's mileage was 48,947 miles indicating the car had been driven only 87 miles in 26 days. How much of this driving took place after the sale to Crane and until the date of accident is not shown. Approximately an hour and fifteen minutes after the accident, Crane gave a written question and answer statement to Captain Morphy, then duty officer for the Pittsburgh City police department in which the following appeared: Q. What was the condition of your brakes? A. Well, I went to pull the emergency brake and there was no brake there. I held my foot on the foot brake and I pushed the foot brake to the floor but it would not hold. When Captain Morphy was examined by the County's counsel as to oral statements made by Crane, he gave the following testimony: Q. What were those statements? A. I asked him the reason for hitting the officer. Q. What was his response? A. He stated that he could not stop. Q. Did he tell you why he could not stop? A. Yes, he did. Q. Why could he not stop? A. He said that he went to pull on the emergency brake and there was none, and he pressed on the foot brake and it went clear to the floor. . . . Q. Did Mr. Crane make any other comments about this accident to you, Mr. Morphy? A. Yes, he did. I asked him for the reason he did not stop before he hit the officer. Q. What was that reason? A. He stated he applied the brakes and the car would not stop. He said after he hit the officer, his car went out of control. The brakes were applied before he hit the officer, and he definitely stated that to me. After the accident Crane's automobile was taken to the City Pound where it remained from September 1 to September 5, 1959 when it was taken to Universal's garage where it was examined on September 20, 1959 by Leo Geis, an expert mechanic, in the presence of one Davis, a county police officer. Geis testified: A. I jacked the car up, got underneath it, checked all the cables, the rods, and I could see that they weren't touched. They were all rusted and full of  you couldn't even see the nuts on them. So that was an indication that nobody had touched them. Q. What was their condition? A. There just weren't any brake. Geis further stated that the brake lining on the front wheels was new and the brakes were in good condition but the emergency brake did not engage at all and the cables were loose. There was too much free pedal travel between the master cylinder and the foot brake. On removing the front wheels he found: The eccentric bolts on the brake were not properly adjusted. By that, the shoe was wore on the bottom of the shoe, where it should have been wore ever around. I would say it was improperly adjusted. The court below fully answered Universal's contention that there was no evidence of its negligence as the proximate cause of the accident. . . . [Crane], in a written statement one hour after the accident, . . . asserted that at the time of the accident he applied his emergency brake and `there was no brake there'. He then put his foot on the brake pedal and he `pushed the foot brake to the floor but it would not hold.' These statements are direct evidence that the brakes failed. [Crane] did not need to be an expert to attest to the facts that the brakes failed, for such is a matter which can be understood by any person without special knowledge, training or skill. Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 397. Objection was made by [Universal] to the admission of certain testimony concerning the inspection of the condition of the brakes approximately twenty days after the accident. The evidence has been objected to as too remote. The mere passage of time, unless considerably greater than twenty days, cannot change the condition of the brakes. The greater the passage of time, however, the greater the opportunity there is to deal unfairly with the evidence, and cause the evidence to reflect a condition that did not actually exist at the time of the accident. This could also be accomplished in a few minutes. Whenever the condition of a thing is in question, evidence of its condition at a prior or subsequent time is admissible if accompanied by proof that its condition has not changed in the meantime. [citing a case]. Where a car is not used between the time of an accident and the time of its inspection about a month later, and it was under lock and key in the meantime, it is not error to admit testimony as to the condition of the brakes at the time of the examination, in the absence of evidence that the car was used. [citing a case]. In the case before us, there was evidence to the effect that the car was towed from the scene of the accident to the City Pound immediately following the accident; that the automobile remained in the City Pound for the five days succeeding the accident; and in the possession of [Universal] the remaining period before the inspection took place. There was no testimony to the effect that the automobile had been used after the accident. There was evidence to the effect that the automobile was not in condition to be used before the inspection. Thus, the only element of remoteness proved was the mere passage of time. The testimony provided evidence from which the jury might infer that the condition of the vehicle had not changed, through use or otherwise, during the twenty days. [Universal] further contend[s] in [its] motion that there was no competent evidence that the condition of the brakes was the proximate cause of the accident. [Universal] state[s] that since there was evidence to the effect that . . . [Crane] entered the intersection at 35 miles per hour, and since at that speed [Crane] could not have stopped before colliding with the officer, even assuming that [Crane] had adequate brakes, the failure to have adequate brakes could not have been the proximate cause of the accident. Where facts are admitted, or reasonably inferable from the evidence, it is for the Court to determine whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to another. Allega v. Motor Express Co., 378 Pa. 1, 5. But where facts are disputed, or where from the undisputed facts there is room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendant's act was the, or a proximate cause of the injury, the matter is for the jury to decide. Helmick v. South Union Township, 323 Pa. 433; Restatement, Torts, § 453. The speed at which [Crane] entered the intersection, and how far [Crane] was in the intersection when he struck the officer, his reactions at the time of the accident  these are matters in dispute. It is therefore for the jury to determine whose negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. In Trusty v. Patterson, 299 Pa. 469, 149 Atl. 717, the defendant, a garageman, rented a car with defective brakes to a bailee, who, after reporting to defendant that the brakes were defective, continued to use the car and ran into the plaintiff. We held, in affirming a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff, that the jury could properly find, as it did, that defendant was negligent and that the defective brakes, rather than the speed of the car, was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The Trusty case and the Restatement, Torts, § 447 clearly support the ruling of the court below. Universal's contention is without merit and its appeal cannot be sustained.