Opinion ID: 1147225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the appellant have a legal right to receive the funds in question by virtue of his office or employment?

Text: Appellant was indicted under § 97-11-25 Miss. Code Ann. (1972), which provides: If any State officer or any county officer ... or any other person holding any public office or employment, or any ... attorney at law ... or any other person undertaking to act or for others and intrusted by them with business of any kind, or with money, shall unlawfully convert to his own use any money or other valuable thing which comes to his hands or possession by virtue of his office or employment, or shall not, when lawfully required to turn over such money or deliver such thing, immediately do so according to his legal obligation, he shall ... be committed to the Department of Corrections for not more than twenty years, or be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.) The principle is well settled in this State that embezzlement is the wrongful conversion of property lawfully possessed by the person charged. Sisk v. State, 294 So.2d 472 (Miss. 1974). The question is raised and the appellant argues that he is not guilty of embezzlement for the reason that he did not lawfully possess the check. Therefore, the technicality should allow his acquittal. In Lambert v. State, 518 So.2d 621 (Miss. 1987), a justice court judge was accused of embezzling money orders that were sent in to pay fines for traffic violations. The judge would then dismiss the charge and cash the check, keeping the money. The justice court judge argued that once the charges were dismissed, there was no money owed to the State that could legally come into his possession by virtue of his office which he could convert to his own use. This Court was not persuaded by that argument and held that the justice court judge lawfully came into possession of the mailed money by virtue of his office and the conviction was sustained. Embezzlement differs from larceny in that it is the wrongful appropriation or conversion of property where the original taking was lawful or with the consent of the owner. Sisk v. State, 294 So.2d 472 (Miss. 1974). Larceny involves trespass and the felonious intent must exist at the time of such taking. Mahfouz v. State, 303 So.2d 461 (Miss. 1974); 29A C.J.S., Embezzlement, § 4 (1965). Appellant was an associate and employee at the Dukes Law Firm. He had access to the files in the office and could lawfully inspect those files in the course of his work on that and on other cases in the office. That right to lawful access of files and other property in the office constructively put appellant into possession of the check in question. Cases such as the one at bar border on embezzlement and on larceny. We hold that under the facts of this case, the appellant was constructively in possession of the check by virtue of his employment and his indictment for embezzlement is valid. Issues number one and two are rejected.
For the answer to this issue, we look to the Mississippi Constitution, the statute and the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Article 6, § 165, of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 provides: No judge of any court shall preside on the trial of any cause, where the parties or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity of consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties ... There is no constitutional prohibition against this trial judge presiding over the case, since he is neither related to the parties nor has an interest in the case. Miss. Code Ann., Section 9-1-11 provides: The judge of a court shall not preside on the trial of any cause where the parties, or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity of consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, or wherein he may have been of counsel, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties. There is no reason under the statute for the trial judge to recuse himself, since it merely tracks the constitutional provision. Cannon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding ... The appellant went to the home of the trial judge one afternoon, while the judge was painting his house. Appellant told the judge that he was leaving the law firm of Holmes and Dukes. The judge regarded that as a social call and remembered nothing about it, since he was busily engaged in his painting. Therefore, he denied the motion for recusal. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of his activities. The case at bar is distinguished from the cases of In re Moffett, 556 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1990) and Jenkins v. Forrest County General Hospital, 542 So.2d 1180 (Miss. 1989). In those cases, this Court held that the trial judge should have recused himself because both cases involved medical malpractice suits against Forrest General Hospital and in both cases the judge's brother was a partner in the firm which represented the hospital. Also, the record indicated that the hospital got him (judge) elected to the bench in the last election. The case at bar is distinguished from the above cases. It was shown that the judge had known appellant for approximately nine years but there was no indication of any bias or prejudice for or against the appellant. The entire record of this case does not indicate any such bias or prejudice and reflects that the appellant received a fair trial. We note that in many areas, particularly rural areas, where judges have known practically all the people for many years, if such were a disqualification, the judge could never preside on most cases. The issue is rejected.
Appellant contends that the check was of no value since it was stale and had a stop payment order placed upon it. Section 75-4-404 of the Miss. Code Ann. (1972), provides that just because a check is classified as stale, i.e., six months old, does not mean that a bank cannot cash the check. In Bell v. State, 251 Miss. 511, 170 So.2d 428 (1965), the Court held that credit cards described in the indictment were the property of the person, firm or corporation to whom they were issued and that they had value to the owner, although the value may have only been nominal. Other jurisdictions have held that the value of a negotiable check has been defined as the amount for which it is drawn. Examples follow: The value of a negotiable check has been defined as the amount for which it is drawn. State v. Evans, 669 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). See State v. McClellan, 82 Vt. 361, 73 A. 993 (1909) (check payable to holder, though unendorsed, could be the subject of larceny, and its value would be the amount it represented); Bigbee v. State, 173 Ind. App. 462, 364 N.E.2d 149 (1977) (value of check made payable to cash is that amount written on its face); People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 113 (1974) (prima facie value of a check is its face value). The value of a check is usually held to be the amount for which it is drawn, but, if the check is worth less than that amount, its actual or market value seems to be the determinative factor. 52A C.J.S., Larceny § 60(2)(b). Appellant argues that the check had no value, yet he negotiated the same and received the $16,000 face value for it. The issue is rejected.
The appellant objects to the following instruction, S-5, granted to the State: The Court instructs the jury that intent implies purpose to do an act. The instruction although abstract, has been approved by the Court on previous occasions and is patterned after Mississippi Model Jury Instruction 104.17. See Jones v. State, 172 Miss. 597, 161 So. 143 (1935). Appellant also contends that the lower court erred in granting its instruction S-4 which states: The Court instructs the jury that the value of a check shall be deemed to be the value of the money transferred or affected thereby. The language used in the jury instruction is taken directly from the statute. The instruction did not mislead or confuse the jury and was supported by the evidence. Appellant next contends that the lower court erred in refusing Instruction D-2 requested by the appellant. The Court instructs the Jury that if you can view the evidence upon any reasonable accounting consistent with Mr. Medley's innocence, it is your sworn duty as jurors in this case to find Mr. Medley `not guilty'. The instruction is classified as a two-theory instruction. Such an instruction is given only in circumstantial evidence cases and it was properly refused. See Johnson v. State, 347 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1977); Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601 (Miss. 1980). Last, appellant contends that instruction D-4 should have been given. It follows: The Court instructs the Jury that if you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Jim Dukes and Engel Realty Company lost anything of value as a result of the acts of Mr. Don Medley; then, it is your sworn duty as Jurors in this case to return a verdict in favor of Mr. Don Medley. Further, appellant objects to S-1 because it does not track the indictment word for word. There is no merit to these objections. The instruction D-4 is cumulative of other instructions given to the appellant and there is no merit in the objection to S-1. The jury was properly instructed, considering all instructions together, and the lower court did not commit reversible error in either giving or refusing instructions. The issue number five is rejected.

We have carefully reviewed the record relating to the above two issues and we find no merit in them. Therefore, the issues are rejected.
The Appellant contends that the lower court should have ordered a presentence report before sentencing him. He cites Rule 6.02 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice which states: Upon acceptance of a plea of guilty, or upon a finding of guilt, and where the Court has discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, the Court may direct the presentence investigator to make a presentence investigation and report. Rule 6.02, Unif.Crim.R.Civ.Ct.Prac. (Emphasis added). The rule is permissive rather than mandatory and the use of the presentence report is solely in the trial judge's discretion. This is not a case in which the trial judge attempted to enter upon the presentencing procedure and failed to comply with it. He stated into the record that he was familiar with this defendant, his background, attributes, his standing in the community, and that he was sufficiently informed to proceed at this time with sentencing. The maximum statutory sentence is twenty years and the judge imposed a ten year sentence, or one-half the maximum. The trial court will not be held in error or to have abused its discretion, if the sentence imposed is within the limits fixed by statute. Johnson v. State, 461 So.2d 1288 (Miss. 1984). The issue is rejected as being without merit. There being no reversible errors in the trial below, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. CONVICTION OF EMBEZZLEMENT AND SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs in results only. SULLIVAN, J., not participating.