Opinion ID: 4549623
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wage Payment Claim

Text: We noted above that the correct characterization of plain‐ tiﬀs’ wage payment claim is contested. See nn. 2–3, supra. The Wisconsin wage payment statute generally requires employ‐ ers every month to pay “all wages earned by the employee to a day not more than 31 days prior to the date of payment.” Wis. Stat. § 109.03(1). State law provides a private right of ac‐ tion to recover the amount of wages due and unpaid and up to double damages. § 109.11(2)(a)–(b). The statute does not apply to employees who are “covered under a valid collective 22 No. 19‐3142 bargaining agreement establishing a diﬀerent frequency for wage payments, including deferred payments exercised at the option of employees.” § 109.03(1)(a). In this case, plaintiﬀs complained that Maysteel wrong‐ fully withheld the union’s dues or fair share fees from their paychecks “without authorization.” If that claim depended on holding invalid the union security term of the collective bargaining agreement—as the district court thought it did, at least in part—it failed because the union security clause was valid for the reasons explained above. Any other framing of the claim is self‐defeating, since it assumes the union was entitled to the fees deducted from plaintiﬀs’ paychecks and leaves no room to recover wages that were “due” but “unpaid.” Contra Wis. Stat. § 109.11(2)(a)–(b). And any other framing of the claim, though not depending on the embedded federal question supporting jurisdiction of the unfair labor practice claims, would be within the district court’s sound and unchallenged assertion of supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But we agree with the district court that the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction was redundant. Plaintiﬀs were “covered under a valid collective bargaining agreement estab‐ lishing a diﬀerent frequency for wage payments, including deferred payments exercised at the option of employees.” Wis. Stat. § 109.03(1)(a). Plaintiﬀs therefore needed to invoke the collective bargaining agreement (either the old or the new agreement, depending on the claim). Construed as a claim for unauthorized deduction in violation of the agreement’s check‐oﬀ provision, plaintiﬀs’ wage payment claim arose un‐ der § 301 and failed on the merits for failure to exhaust the agreed private remedies. See Allis‐Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, No. 19‐3142 23 471 U.S. 202, 220–21 (1985). Construed as based specifically on the employer’s failure to keep records of plaintiﬀs’ check‐oﬀ authorizations while continuing to make deductions, the claim alleged an arguable unfair labor practice within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see 29 U.S.C. § 186(c). Plaintiﬀs basically conceded as much by filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board before bringing this lawsuit. And because the Board would not order the damages remedy sought by plaintiﬀs on these facts, see Mode O’Day Co., 290 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1234 (1988) (“This approach results in the par‐ ties being placed in the posture they would have been in had no unfair labor practices occurred”), any state damages rem‐ edy was preempted. Wisconsin Dep’t of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986) (“the Garmon rule prevents States … from providing their own regulatory or judicial remedies for conduct prohibited or arguably prohibited by” the Wagner Act). That is so, anything in Act 1 or elsewhere in Wisconsin law notwithstanding. Machinists District Ten v. Allen, 904 F.3d 490, 503–07 (7th Cir. 2018). On any theory of the wage pay‐ ment claim, therefore, dismissal was proper.