Opinion ID: 379222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Considerations: Circumstances Common To Both Confessions

Text: 148 The panel opinion emphasized two considerations common to both confessions which suggest involuntariness: (1) the pre-confession conduct of the police and prosecuting attorneys, and (2) Jurek's limited mental capacity. We discuss each consideration separately. 149
150 The panel opinion suggested that the two written confessions were suspect because they were the fruits of an extraordinary series of actions by the police and prosecutors. 593 F.2d at 677. Specifically, the panel pointed out that Jurek was arrested, taken from his home without shirt or shoes, kept from his family, was not given an attorney for 42 hours, and was moved from Cuero to Austin and then back to Cuero, then to Victoria and back to Cuero. Id. at 678. The panel then cited a Supreme Court case, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967), for the proposition that compelled travel during interrogation is a factor suggesting involuntariness. 593 F.2d at 678. The panel also pointed out that Jurek was arrested without a warrant. Id. Earlier in the opinion the panel had indicated that Jurek was logged into jail at 2:30 a. m. on August 17 and was questioned for at least the next ten hours (although) there were some respites, during which Jurek apparently was allowed to sleep. Id. at 674 (emphasis added). 151 The statements of the panel are in marked contrast to the findings and inferences by the Courts below. The Federal District Court explicitly found: 152 There is no evidence that Jurek's incarceration in the Victoria Jail was an effort to or resulted in lack of communication with his family. Nor is there any evidence that Jurek's confessions were a result of or were tained (sic) by a delay in taking Jurek before a magistrate. The circumstances of Petitioner's arrest after midnight and the fact that he was barefoot until he got to the jail do not amount to overbearing of will. 153 R. 445-46. Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 154 (T)he record reflects that the authorities had ample evidence to detain, question and arrest appellant. On the afternoon of the homicide, witnesses saw appellant, in his patchwork and haphazardly painted pickup, talking with the deceased in the Cuero City Park, where she had gone swimming. Shortly thereafter witnesses saw her riding in the back of this unusually colored pickup, screaming for help, as it sped through town. A relative soon reported her missing, and the search for her ensued. That evening, one of the witnesses who had seen this particular pickup at the park, identified it as the truck parked at appellant's residence. Appellant was therefore a logical person to question about the missing child's whereabouts. . . . There is no showing that the detention contributed to the making of appellant's two confessions. . . . 155 Appellant was arrested at 1:15 a. m. on August 17, approximately six hours after the child's disappearance. At police headquarters, the two arresting officers read appellant his Miranda warnings, and questioned him for approximately 45 minutes. He denied any knowledge concerning the child's whereabouts. At 2:30 a. m., he was placed in a jail cell, which contained a bed, and was left alone until the next morning, when the county attorney, who also read appellant his Miranda warnings, questioned him for approximately 15 minutes. He continued to deny any knowledge about the child's whereabouts. Two or three other officers spoke with him briefly during the morning. 156 Later in the day, two officers took appellant to Austin for a polygraph test. During the examination, he admitted murdering the girl. Her body was later recovered on the basis of information supplied by appellant at this time. The officers arrived back at Cuero with appellant at approximately 9:30 a. m. (should read p. m.). He was immediately taken before Magistrate Albert Ley, who read appellant his rights from a magistrate's certificate. Approximately four hours later, after being questioned by the district attorney and the county attorney, appellant gave his first confession. The confession stated that he killed the child because she made derogatory comments about his family. He was taken to the County Jail at Victoria at about 1:15 a. m. He was returned to Cuero at 2:00 p. m. and gave his second confession at 7:30 that evening after again speaking with the district attorney and the county attorney and several others. In the confession he stated that he had not told the complete truth in his earlier statement and that he killed the girl because she refused his sexual advances. 157 The record reflects that appellant was repeatedly warned of his constitutional rights under Miranda. There is no evidence in the record that appellant was deprived of food or sleep, or that he was not in complete control of his faculties when he gave the confessions. He was left alone in his cells between interrogations and was offered food and beverages at various times during this two day period. There is evidence that he was alert enough to make minor corrections in the confessions before signing them. 158 Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 942-43 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (footnote omitted). 159 Most of the facts discussed by the Federal District Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals are undisputed. Moreover, we agree with the inferences drawn by these Courts from the undisputed facts with respect to the ultimate issue of voluntariness. Indeed, after making our own examination of the record, we are puzzled because of the large quantity of evidence contradicting the factual assertions made by the panel and the lack of any evidence in the record to support some of the panel's statements, despite the panel's claim to be relying only on undisputed facts. 593 F.2d at 674 n.2. 160 For example, the panel's suggestion that Jurek was questioned throughout the night after his arrest is not only unsupported by but is flatly contradicted by the record. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. I, 111-12; Tr., Vol. VI, 1333 (testimony of County Attorney Post); Tr., Vol. VIII, 1668-69 (testimony of Cuero Police Chief Wright). 12 Jurek's own attorney conceded in closing argument that after being put in jail, Jurek was left alone the rest of the night. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1815. And those who saw Jurek the next day testified that he appeared rested. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. VI, 1336 (testimony of County Attorney Post). 161 It is true that Jurek was taken to Austin for a polygraph test and was then moved to the Victoria Jail. However, the panel opinion is grossly misleading because it fails to consider adequately if at all the undisputed facts surrounding these events. To begin with, it is undisputed that the polygraph test was given at Jurek's own request. Tr., Vol. VI, 1311 (testimony of County Attorney Post). Jurek has at no time brought forth any evidence to rebut the undisputed evidence that he requested the polygraph test. Moreover, it is undisputed that Jurek was taken before a magistrate as soon as he returned from Austin (about 9:30 p. m.). Tr., Vol. VI, 1315-16 (testimony of County Attorney Post). And Jurek was offered meals and cigarettes before, during, and after his trip to Austin. Tr., Vol. VI, 1339-41 (testimony of County Attorney Post). 13 We find it incredible that Jurek can claim in this Court that the conduct of the police was coercive when the police were merely abiding by Jurek's own wishes. 162 Regarding Jurek's transfer to the Victoria Jail, the undisputed evidence establishes that this move was for Jurek's own safety. As the record makes clear, the victim's father was a county patrolman in Cuero and had access to the DeWitt County Jail in Cuero. All of the witnesses who testified on the matter agreed that Jurek's safety was the sole consideration in the decision that he stay at the Victoria Jail, not at the county jail in Cuero. E. g., Tr., Vol. I, 136, 141 (testimony of Sheriff Dietze); Cheatham Dep., 35-37 (testimony of District Attorney Cheatham). Indeed, there was evidence that Jurek himself expressed a desire to stay at the Victoria Jail. Tr., Vol. VI, 1324 (testimony of County Attorney Post); Tr., Vol. VI, 1440-41 (testimony of Robert Pickens). There is no evidence that Jurek suffered from this good faith transfer. Indeed, Victoria is less than 30 miles from Cuero. 163 It is also undisputed that on numerous occasions before the two confessions were given, Jurek was given his Miranda warnings. 14 For example, Judge Albert Ley, the Magistrate before whom Jurek appeared on the evening of the 17th, testified at length that he gave Jurek his warnings. 15 164 Like the District Court, we conclude that little, if any, significance can be attached to the fact that Jurek was not wearing shoes or a shirt at the time of arrest. 16 Both of Jurek's parents (who testified that Jurek was arrested without shirt and shoes) conceded that the police returned to the Jureks' residence the next day and picked up shoes and a shirt. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1734-35 (testimony of Mrs. Jurek); Tr., Vol. VIII, 1752 (testimony of Mr. Jurek). And Deputy Sheriff McMahan recalls that during the next day, Jurek was wearing shoes. Tr., Vol. VII, 1641. At most, Jurek went for one night without shoes and shirt, hardly a basis, either alone or in conjunction with the other factors, for declaring his confessions involuntarily. 17 165 The facts discussed above do not in any way suggest an attempt to break Jurek down. Panel Op., 593 F.2d at 678. Nor can we say that their effect could only have been to disorient Jurek, to weaken his resistance and heighten his suggestibility. Id. There are present here none of the egregious facts upon which Supreme Court holdings of involuntariness have been based. 18 The interval between arrest and the confessions was devoid of any coercive or unfair tactics by the police and prosecution. In the words of the Supreme Court: No threats were made, no promises offered, (and) no force used . . . . Thomas v. Arizona, supra, 356 U.S. at 401, 78 S.Ct. at 891, 2 L.Ed.2d at 871. (W)e find ample support in this record for a finding that the officers did not intend to take advantage of petitioner and that nothing they did had the effect of overbearing (petitioner's) will. Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 431, 78 S.Ct. 1354, 1357, 2 L.Ed.2d 1443, 1447 (1958). 166
167 The panel opinion, in holding both of Jurek's written confessions involuntary, relied heavily on Jurek's limited mental capacity. The evidence is undisputed that Jurek is of somewhat low intelligence. The various doctors who testified agreed that Jurek's overall IQ is about 80. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. VIII, 1709 (testimony of Dr. Kenneth Owens); R., 82 (testimony of Dr. Russell Adams). The District Court found that Jurek is an individual of below-average intelligence, mildly retarded, with possible organic brain damage. And the evidence established that Jurek had only a seventh grade writing ability. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1678 (testimony of Dr. William McKinney). However, the effect of Jurek's dull normal intelligence on his ability to give a voluntary confession is not established by the evidence and clearly the panel's statement, (T)here is a serious danger both that Jurek did not want to confess and that his susceptibility to the police officers' influence made him confess to things he did not do, 593 F.2d at 677, is flagrant appellate fact finding at its worst. The District Court found that the psychiatric testimony presented to it was inconclusive and not convincing. R., 434. After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the District Court concluded: Considering Jurek's intelligence, either alone or in conjunction with the other factors, does not indicate an involuntary confession. R., 445. 168 There is some support in the record for the panel's position, although the evidence is at best inconclusive. Dr. Lawrence Schoenfeld, a witness at the Federal habeas hearing, testified that Jurek might be coerced into confessing to escape from a tension-producing situation. But Dr. Schoenfeld emphasized that this was not positively the case. See also Tr., Vol. VIII, 1714 (testimony of Dr. Kenneth Owens). Other medical experts were even less conclusive. For example, Dr. William McKinney testified that when he interviewed Jurek, Jurek did not feel coerced into giving answers he did not want to give: 169 . . . I did not feel that that, you know that he was just going just answering the questions just to give me an answer, irregardless. I think this is what you (Defense Attorney) are implying, that he would be willing to say anything to get over the question. I felt that he was giving me what he what he felt, although, at times, his statements were contradictory. 170 Tr., Vol. VIII, 1682. Dr. McKinney conceded, however, that his interviews with Jurek may not have been as stress-producing as police-house interrogation. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1684. Dr. McKinney also conceded that it was possible that Jurek could be swayed into signing a confession against his interests. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1700. 171 Moreover, although there was evidence that Jurek was somewhat susceptible to pressure in a stress-producing environment, the evidence also established that Jurek was capable of understanding the contents of the confessions. For example, Dr. Owens testified that if the two written confessions were read to Jurek he could understand them. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1718. Similarly, Dr. McKinney testified that Jurek could understand the two confessions: 172 I believe that he does have adequate intellectual capacity to read and understand (the confessions). . . . There would only be a few words that I would question whether he would, perhaps, comprehend the meaning of (them). 173 Tr., Vol. VIII, 1678. 174 The panel also stated, based on the psychological testimony, that Jurek is less likely to be able to understand his right to remain silent. He may also be unable to insist effectively that that right be observed. 593 F.2d at 677. The evidence is again very inconclusive, however. While Dr. Schoenfeld testified at the Federal habeas hearing that Jurek might have difficulty understanding the Miranda warnings, R., 37, Dr. Russell Adams disagreed with the tenor of that testimony: 175 There is one particular area that I would take a slightly different view, although I don't know that it certainly is a divergent view with Dr. Schoenfeld's report, and that has to do with whether or not Mr. Jurek understood the Miranda warning. It is my contention that he probably did understand it if it were presented if it were explained to him, I think he would have ability to understand it. R., 75. Later Dr. Adams testified: 176 I felt the patient was able to understand information presented him orally in a no, wait. I felt that the patient's ability to understand information presented him orally and in writing was poor, but it was generally in line with his intellectual ability and in my opinion he did have the ability to understand in general terms the Miranda warning. 177 R., 87. Dr. Adams conceded, however, that the warnings would have to be clearly explained to Jurek, see R., 76, and that Jurek's ability to understand the Miranda warnings was not as high as that of most other people. See R., 88-89. 178 To summarize, while it is undisputed that Jurek's intelligence was somewhat below normal, the exact impact of this on his susceptibility to coercion is far from undisputed. Moreover, it is anything but clear that Jurek could not understand the confessions or Miranda warnings. As stated above, the District Court concluded that Jurek's somewhat limited mental capacity did not, either alone or in conjunction with other factors, render his confessions involuntary. And we must remember that the District Court, having heard testimony by three medical experts, found that testimony unpersuasive and did not find anything persuasive in the record, either. Unlike this Court, the District Court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of these medical witnesses. In our view, because the impact of Jurek's limited mental capacity is so unclear, we think this is one of those occasions when the inferences drawn by the District Court are entitled to significant weight even with respect to the ultimate determination of voluntariness. See Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, 367 U.S. at 605, 81 S.Ct. at 1880, 6 L.Ed.2d at 1059; Haynes v. Washington, supra, 373 U.S. at 515, 83 S.Ct. at 1344, 10 L.Ed.2d at 522. The District Court's conclusion is buttressed by the conclusions of the State Trial Court, jury, and Appellate Court, all of which found, after considering the testimony presented at trial regarding Jurek's limited mentality, that Jurek's confessions were voluntary. Thus, after giving appropriate weight to the inferences drawn below, and after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Jurek's limited mental capacity, considered alone, or in conjunction with the other factors discussed in this opinion, did not make Jurek's written confessions involuntary. 19