Opinion ID: 1163476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Lueck's Testimony

Text: The first issue in this case concerns Lueck's testimony that defendant told him: (1) the altercation which resulted in the holes in the wall were nothing relative to what he [defendant] was capable of doing; (2) Wayne had no idea how easy it would be for him [defendant] to pay somebody to really take care of her; (3) defendant was too smart to do something like that [to Wayne] at a time when it would be obvious that it was his responsibility; and (4) if he [defendant] were to do something, he would wait until an opportune time and circumstances [ sic ] so that suspicion wouldn't be directed towards him. We must determine whether these statements, all of which were made after Lueck refused to act as defendant's lawyer, are protected under the attorney-client privilege. If defendant's statements are found to be unprivileged, we must then decide whether the evidence nonetheless was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. [3]
(1) In the absence of a statute, no person has the privilege to prevent another from testifying or from disclosing any matter. This rule, codified at section 911, subdivision (c), reflects the Legislature's clear intent to abolish common law privileges and to keep the courts from creating new nonstatutory privileges as a matter of judicial policy. (§ 12, subd. (c); Welfare Rights Organization v. Crisan (1983) 33 Cal.3d 766, 769 [190 Cal. Rptr. 919, 661 P.2d 1073, 31 A.L.R.4th 1214].) Under section 954, a client holds a privilege to prevent the disclosure of confidential communications between client and lawyer. As pertinent here, a client includes a person who consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or advice from him in his professional capacity (§ 951), while confidential communications include information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence (§ 952). A client who has no guardian or conservator is the holder of the privilege (§ 953, subd. (a)), and only the holder may waive it. (2) In codifying the attorney-client privilege, the Legislature determined that `the benefits derived therefrom justify the risk that unjust decisions may sometimes result from the suppression of relevant evidence.' ( Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 600 [208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 691 P.2d 642], quoting City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 235 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.4th 1418].) The attorney-client privilege is based on grounds of public policy and is in furtherance of the proper and orderly functioning of our judicial system, which necessarily depends on the confidential relationship between the attorney and the client. ( People v. Velasquez (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 319, 327 [237 Cal. Rptr. 366].) Without the ability to make a full disclosure of the facts to the attorney, the client risks inadequate representation: `Unless he makes known to the lawyer all the facts, the advice which follows will be useless, if not misleading; the lawsuit will be conducted along improper lines, the trial will be full of surprises, much useless litigation may result.' ( City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 235.) The privilege applies not only to communications made in anticipation of litigation, but also to legal advice when no litigation is threatened. ( Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 371 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 330, 853 P.2d 496].) Thus, by encouraging complete disclosures, the attorney-client privilege enables the attorney to provide suitable legal representation. ( City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 235; see People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 620 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].) In the criminal context, these policies assume particular significance: `As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice. ... Thus, if an accused is to derive the full benefits of his right to counsel, he must have the assurance of confidentiality and privacy of communication with his attorney.' [Citations.] ( People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 691 [175 Cal. Rptr. 612, 631 P.2d 46].) (3) To further its purposes, the attorney-client privilege does not require that the attorney actually be retained. [W]here a person seeks the assistance of an attorney with a view to employing him professionally, any information acquired by the attorney is privileged whether or not actual employment results. ( People v. Canfield (1974) 12 Cal.3d 699, 705 [117 Cal. Rptr. 81, 527 P.2d 633]; People v. Dorrance (1944) 65 Cal. App.2d 125, 129 [150 P.2d 10]; Estate of Dupont (1943) 60 Cal. App.2d 276, 288-289 [140 P.2d 866].) The rationale for this rule is compelling: no person could ever safely consult an attorney for the first time with a view to his employment if the privilege depended on the chance of whether the attorney after hearing his statement of the facts decided to accept the employment or decline it. ( Estate of Dupont, supra, 60 Cal. App.2d at p. 289.) (4) Although the attorney-client privilege is essential to our system of justice, it can and does result in the withholding of relevant information from the fact finder. Therefore, [t]he party claiming the privilege carries the burden of showing that the evidence which it seeks to suppress is within the terms of the statute. ( D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 729 [36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 388 P.2d 700]; Collette v. Sarrasin (1920) 184 Cal. 283, 288 [193 P. 571].) (5) On appeal, the scope of judicial review is limited. When the facts, or reasonable inferences from the facts, shown in support of or in opposition to the claim of privilege are in conflict, the determination of whether the evidence supports one conclusion or the other is for the trial court, and a reviewing court may not disturb such finding if there is any substantial evidence to support it [citations]. ( D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 729.) (6a) In this case, the question is whether, as a matter of law, the record establishes that the incriminating statements attributed to defendant by John Lueck constituted information transmitted between client and attorney in the course of an attorney-client relationship. [4] The trial court determined below that the statements attributed to defendant by Lueck were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. According to the record, Lueck, an attorney, was defendant's friend and had been to defendant's home approximately 15 times. [5] The two shared a business relationship in which Lueck referred between 100 and 200 clients to defendant. In May or June of 1987, defendant telephoned Lueck and asked him to come to his house. Defendant was upset over having just been served with dissolution papers. Before defendant made any incriminating disclosure, Lueck specifically stated he would not represent defendant in the dissolution proceedings. Lueck was very clear that he in no way wanted to be involved in the dispute between defendant and Wayne. Although the record contains no explanation for the trial court's refusal to find the privilege applicable, we may infer that the above evidence, which was uncontradicted by defendant, persuaded the court that no attorney-client relationship existed at the time of defendant's disclosures. In ruling that the trial court erred, the Court of Appeal placed heavy emphasis on other evidence in the record indicating that issues of a legal nature were discussed during Lueck's visit to defendant's home. This evidence consisted of Lueck's testimony at the bail review hearing that defendant showed him some papers from the dissolution action, including a declaration by Wayne, which apparently contained assertions that defendant physically assaulted Wayne. Lueck read the declaration and asked defendant: Is this true? When defendant replied that most of it was, Lueck told defendant to retain capable counsel quickly. In addition, the subject of venue was brought up at some point, with Lueck commenting that a change of venue might be appropriate. [6] Noting that for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, the term client is statutorily defined as a person who ... consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or advice from him in his professional capacity (§ 951), the Court of Appeal concluded that the privilege was not limited to those cases where the client agreed to pay the attorney for advice or where the attorney agreed to represent the potential client. (7) We cannot endorse the Court of Appeal's apparent view that the attorney-client privilege applies whenever issues touching upon legal matters are discussed with an attorney. That has never been the law. Significantly, a communication is not privileged, even though it may involve a legal matter, if it has no relation to any professional relationship of the attorney with the client. ( Solon v. Lichtenstein (1952) 39 Cal.2d 75, 79-80 [244 P.2d 907] [where client asked attorney to pursue transfer of cemetery lots to certain relative of client, balance of conversation concerning client's family arrangements for division of property upon death was not privileged].) Moreover, it is not enough that the client seek advice from an attorney; such advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. (§ 951.) (6b) In contrast to the authorities relied upon by the Court of Appeal, this is not a situation in which an individual disclosed information while exploring the possibility of retaining the lawyer. ( People v. Canfield, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 704-705 [privilege protects indigent defendant's disclosures to public defender's representative, including defendant's financial eligibility statement]; see also People v. Dorrance, supra, 65 Cal. App.2d at p. 129; Estate of Dupont, supra, 60 Cal. App.2d at pp. 288-289.) Nor is the situation here similar to that in Benge v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 336 [182 Cal. Rptr. 275], in which the court found privileged communications made at a closed union meeting attended by union members, two attorneys whose law firm was under a retainer agreement to provide legal advice to both the union and its members, and possibly a doctor. In that case, the union members had gone to the meeting for the purpose of discussing their legal rights against the employer and others for job-related injuries. (131 Cal. App.3d at pp. 347-348.) Unlike the factual scenarios in those decisions, the record here demonstrates that defendant was told in no uncertain terms, prior to making any of the challenged communications, that Lueck wanted no involvement in the legal proceedings concerning defendant and Wayne. The instant case thus finds no parallel in those decisions. While it is firmly established that the privilege protects confidential communications made during initial consultations with an attorney, neither the relevant statutory provisions nor California decisional law suggests that the privilege extends to disclosures made after the attorney refuses to undertake representation. Indeed, such a proposition seems to stand in direct contradiction to one older decision, Finnell v. Finnell (1909) 156 Cal. 589 [105 P. 740]. In that case, an attorney was permitted to testify, over a defendant's objection, concerning a conversation in which the attorney expressed a brief legal opinion in reply to a question. There we held that the defendant's claim of attorney-client privilege was properly rejected, noting that the attorney further said that he was not anybody's attorney in the matter. (156 Cal. at p. 602.) Nonetheless, while that decision is apposite, we hesitate to find it dispositive because its facts indicate that an unauthorized third person was present when the challenged remarks were made, and the holding did not specify the grounds for rejection of the privilege. (See ibid. ) Although there is a dearth of California case law directly addressing the issue, authorities in other jurisdictions appear to uniformly hold that the attorney-client privilege does not protect statements made after an attorney declines employment. (E.g., State v. Hansen (1993) 122 Wn.2d 712 [862 P.2d 117, 121]; United States v. Dennis (2d Cir.1988) 843 F.2d 652, 657; State v. Iwakiri (1984) 106 Idaho 618 [682 P.2d 571, 574, fn. 1]; McGrede v. Rembert Nat. Bank (Tex.Civ.App. 1941) 147 S.W.2d 580, 584; Farley v. Peebles (1897) 50 Neb. 723 [70 N.W. 231, 233].) [7] As the Washington Supreme Court reasoned in State v. Hansen, supra , once the attorney refused to represent the defendant and explained that he might be better off finding another attorney, there was no basis for the defendant to form a reasonable belief that an attorney-client relationship existed. (862 P.2d at p. 121.) This viewpoint is shared by the authors of two leading treatises on evidence. In Wigmore's words, if the client continues his communication after the attorney's refusal to act for him, or if a person knowingly attempts to retain one who is already retained by the opponent and therefore was not retainable by the consultant, he does not need or deserve the protection of the privilege. (8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton ed. 1961) § 2304, p. 587, fn. omitted.) McCormick agrees, noting: Of course, statements made after the employment is declined are not privileged. (1 McCormick on Evidence (4th ed. 1992) The Client's Privilege, § 88, p. 322, fn. 3.) While not controlling, the above authorities are compelling in their logic. Although we are not convinced that the Evidence Code in California requires the adoption of a bright line rule that any communication made after an attorney's refusal of representation is unprivileged as a matter of law, nonetheless we are persuaded that a person could have no reasonable expectation of being represented by an attorney after the attorney's explicit refusal to undertake representation. (Compare with People v. Gardner (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 882, 887 [165 Cal. Rptr. 415] [criminal suspect's letter, which was addressed to public defender's office but seized by police prior to its delivery, found to be privileged where letter contained request for legal advice and suspect had a reasonable expectation of being represented by public defender ].) Moreover, evidence of an attorney's express refusal of representation may give rise to a reasonable inference that, in continuing to speak to the attorney, the person is not thereafter consulting with the attorney for advice in his professional capacity. In this case, Lueck's unequivocal refusal to represent defendant, made before any of the incriminating disclosures were made, detracts significantly from defendant's claim of privilege. There is no evidence indicating that, at the time of Lueck's visit to his home or when he made the incriminating statements, defendant did not understand Lueck's position. Defendant's insistence on talking with Lueck, despite Lueck's clear and reiterated unwillingness to act as defendant's lawyer or to have any involvement in defendant's legal dispute with Wayne, gives rise to the reasonable inference that defendant sought to speak with Lueck in his capacity as a friend, not as an attorney. [8] Taken together, this evidence lends substantial weight to the conclusion that, even though legal topics were discussed, defendant was not consulting with Lueck for advice in his professional capacity. Accordingly, the record adequately supports the trial court's determination that no attorney-client relationship existed. [9] That Lueck agreed some four or five months later to represent defendant on a one-time emergency basis, and that the disclosures surrounding this emergency matter were found to be privileged by the trial court, fail to undermine the conclusion that the earlier communications were unprivileged. (See Carroll v. Sprague (1881) 59 Cal. 655, 660.) Under these circumstances, it was error for the Court of Appeal to disturb the trial court's determination. ( D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 729.) [10]
(8) Defendant argues that, even if the privilege does not apply, Lueck's testimony should have been excluded as being substantially more prejudicial than probative. (§ 352.) We disagree for the reasons stated below. As indicated above, the challenged testimony included defendant's statements that Wayne had no idea how easy it would be for him to hire someone to really take care of her, that defendant was too smart to do something to Wayne in an obvious manner, and that if he were to do something, he would wait until an opportune time to avoid suspicion. Since the principal issue in the case was the identity of the person who prompted the physical assault on Wayne and Luby, these statements were of significant probative value as evidence of defendant's motive, plan and design. We reject defendant's contention that the statements attributed to him were not probative because they were made long before the assaults occurred and were therefore remote. We are also unpersuaded by his argument that the statements were simply expressions of hurt and anger made on the day Wayne left him. Even though the statements were made almost a year and a half prior to the assaults, they were not so remote as to be lacking in probative value, especially since the statements themselves indicated that if defendant were to do something, he would time his actions so that he could avoid suspicion. Moreover, whether the statements reflected merely a transitory state of mind, as opposed to something more, was a question for the jury to decide. In light of the highly probative nature of the statements, the trial court acted well within its broad discretion under section 352 in concluding that the potential for prejudice was outweighed. (9) As we recently explained: The prejudice which exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence. `[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant's case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is prejudicial. The prejudice referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, prejudicial is not synonymous with damaging.' [Citation.] ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189], italics added.) No error appears. [11]