Opinion ID: 2332411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request for Lesser-Included Offense Instructions

Text: Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in denying requests for additional instructions on the crimes of manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and simple assault. A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when (1) all elements of the lesser offense are included within the offense charged, Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349-50, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965); Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134, 76 S.Ct. 685, 100 L.Ed. 1013 (1956); Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919, 924 (1975), and (2) there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the lesser charge. Id.; United States v. Comer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 218, 421 F.2d 1149, 1153 (1970). As to the first requirement, appellant is correct that manslaughter long has been recognized as a lesser included offense of second degree murder. Pendergrast v. United States, supra at 924. Accord, Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896); United States v. Comer, supra ; Belton v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 382 F.2d 150 (1967). The answer is more complex with respect to the requested assault instructions, but there is support for the view that assault can be a lesser-included offense in a robbery, see United States v. Bauer, 198 F.Supp. 753 (D.D.C.1961), and even dicta to the effect that assault can be a lesser-included offense in a homicide. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 307, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429 (1892) (dicta); United States v. Hamilton, 182 F.Supp. 548, 551 (D.D.C.1960) (dicta). [1] We therefore cannot say that appellant's request for lesser-included offense instructions must be automatically denied. We are obliged, as a result, to apply the second requirement for a lesser-included offensethe need for a sufficient evidentiary basisto which we now turn. A lesser-included offense instruction will not be proper unless proof of the greater offense charged will require the jury to find a disputed fact that need not be found to prove the lesser offense. Sansone v. United States, supra . Once a defendant asserts that there is such a factual dispute, the court must give a lesser-included offense instruction if there is some evidence upon the subject. Stevenson v. United States, supra, 162 U.S. at 314, 16 S.Ct. at 839. This evidentiary requirement is a minimal one; it means `any evidence' . . however weak. Belton v. United States, supra, 127 U.S.App.D.C. at 206, 382 F.2d at 155. Accord, Pendergrast v. United States, supra, at 925. In United States v. Comer, supra, 137 U.S.App.D.C. at 219, 421 F.2d at 1154, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the procedural approach of the First Circuit in Driscoll v. United States, 356 F.2d 324, 327 (1st Cir. 1966), vacated on other grounds, 390 U.S. 202, 88 S.Ct. 899, 19 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1968), requiring a two-step inquiry: We take Sansone to mean that [1] when the government has made out a compelling case, uncontroverted on the evidence, on an element required for the charged offense but not for the lesser-included offense, there is [2] a duty on defendant to come forward with some evidence on that issue [ i. e., on the element uniquely required for the charged offense] if he wishes to have the benefit of a lesser-included offense charge.    Two prerequisites [to denying a lesser-included offense instruction] seem vital: [a] that there be no factual dispute and [b] that a finding contrary to the only evidence on the issue would be irrational.  (Emphasis by D.C.Circuit Court.) It is important to note, therefore, that even when there is no dispute about the facts tending to prove the element uniquely required for the charged offense, it is still possible that a lesser-included offense instruction will be necessary, for the court must appraise all the testimony and evidence to determine whether it is capable of more than one reasonable inference. United States v. Comer, supra, 137 U.S. App.D.C. at 219, 421 F.2d at 1154. On undisputed facts capable of only one inference, however, no lesser-charge instruction will be proper, let alone required. In the present case, the element of the second-degree murder charge not required for manslaughter is malice; thus, the first step toward a lesser-included offense charge for manslaughter can be taken. However, we do not find `any evidence'. . . however weak that would support a jury finding of no malice. It is undisputed that Mr. Sutton was brutally beaten. The only dispute was whether appellant or others did it. There was no evidence of provocation, self-defense, or any other circumstance that would negate a jury finding of malice. Any conclusion by the jury to the contrary would be irrational. Id. As to the requested assault instructions, the only defense witness, Melvin Clark, Jr., testified to seeing two persons, other than appellant, beat Mr. Sutton. Therefore, in his opening and closing statements to the jury, defense counsel suggested that Mr. Sutton was the victim of a second beating which included the fatal blow. Appellant now argues that Mr. Clark's testimony created some evidence that appellantas but one of the attackers  could be guilty at most of assault with a deadly weapon. Although the jury's role as fact-finder is so central to our jurisprudence that, in close cases, the trial court should generally opt in favor of giving an instruction on a lesser included offense, if it is requested, id., we cannot overlook the fact that Mr. Clark's testimony was simply not credible. His placement of the incident in the spring or summer at approximately 8:00 p. m. when it was semi-dark was so unbelievable, in contrast with the testimony of four other witnesses, that the prosecutor did not cross-examine and the trial judge, at a bench conference, expressed condolences to defense counsel after Mr. Clark had testified. When the only defense witness is so incredible as to provide no plausible evidence at all in support of the defendant's theory of the case, it does not reach the level of some evidence on the subject required for the lesser-included offense instruction. [2] We conclude, therefore, that the evidence provides no rational basis for a lesser charge of assault with a deadly weapon, let alone simple assault. The court was not required to put the case to the jury on a basis that essentially indulges and even encourages speculations as to bizarre reconstruction. United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 15, 444 F.2d 888, 890 (1971).