Opinion ID: 6316245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Our Out-of-Control Jurisprudence

Text: {¶ 50} For a long time, our postrelease-control jurisprudence was a mess. See generally Grimes at ¶ 57 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only). Between 2004 and 2020, we issued a variety of bewildering pronouncements about what judges needed to say to offenders and what they needed to write in their sentencing entries so as to allow the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) to supervise the offenders after they left prison. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio6085, 817 N.E.2d 864; State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961; State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958 (lead opinion); Grimes. We also issued a confusing, and changing, set of rules about challenges to an improper postrelease-control advisement. See, e.g., Bezak; State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332; State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960; Simpkins; Grimes. {¶ 51} Our jurisprudence suffered from two basic problems. First, we had largely ignored the straightforward statutory scheme created by the legislature concerning postrelease-control advisements. See Grimes at ¶ 41 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only). Second, we had abandoned traditional principles of res judicata and allowed an improper postrelease-control advisement to be challenged at any time. Id. at ¶ 37 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only). {¶ 52} We fixed the second problem last year in Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, and State v. Hudson, 161 Ohio St.3d 166, 2020-Ohio-3849, 161 N.E.3d 608. In those cases, we held that an error in the 20 January Term, 2022 imposition of postrelease control rendered a sentence voidable, not void. Thus, any challenge to the postrelease-control portion of a sentence needed to be brought on direct appeal. {¶ 53} What we need to do now is fix the other problem. If we do that—if we simply follow the language of the postrelease-control statutes—this is an easy case. III. The Postrelease-Control Statutes Easily Resolve This Case {¶ 54} While our caselaw on postrelease control is bewildering, the statutory scheme is straightforward. A. The statutes require only oral notification at the sentencing hearing {¶ 55} R.C. 2967.28 sets forth the postrelease-control period for various felonies and specifies whether postrelease control is mandatory or may be imposed at the discretion of the parole board. The only notifications concerning postrelease control are to be provided “at the sentencing hearing.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). (Although the numbering of the statute has changed since Bates’s sentencing, the statutory language is substantively the same.) A trial court that has imposed a prison term is to notify the offender that he “will” or “may” be subject to postrelease control under R.C. 2967.28 after he leaves prison. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and (d). In addition, the trial court must notify the offender that if he violates the terms of his postrelease control, the parole board may impose a prison term of up to one-half of the original prison sentence. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e). That’s it. These two oral notifications are all that is required by statute concerning postrelease control. There is no requirement that anything be included in the sentencing entry related to postrelease control. {¶ 56} The notion that postrelease control must be imposed in a sentencing entry is completely judge-made law. It comes from this court’s decision in Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, a case that might charitably be described as under-reasoned. There, without any analysis, the court proclaimed: 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO “[B]ecause the separation-of-powers doctrine precludes the executive branch of government from impeding the judiciary’s ability to impose a sentence, the problem of having the Adult Parole Authority impose postrelease control at its discretion is remedied by a trial court incorporating postrelease control into its original sentence.” Id. at ¶ 19. {¶ 57} What we didn’t do in Jordan, and what we have failed to do in the years since, is explain in any cogent fashion why the separation-of-powers doctrine requires the judiciary to include a rote recitation about postrelease control in a sentencing entry. The judicial power is the power to render judgments and decide cases. See Stanton v. Tax Comm., 114 Ohio St. 658, 671-672, 151 N.E.760 (1926). It includes the authority to determine guilt or innocence and to make individualized sentencing determinations. State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 136, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000), citing State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629, 648, 4 N.E. 81 (1885), and Stanton at 672. The legislative power is the power to make generalized enactments, including the power to prescribe punishment for crimes. See State v. Morris, 55 Ohio St.2d 101, 112, 378 N.E.2d 708 (1978), citing Toledo Mun. Ct. v. State ex rel. Platter, 126 Ohio St. 103, 184 N.E. 1 (1933); In re Victor, 31 Ohio St. 206, 208 (1877); Peters at 647. {¶ 58} Once an offender has been convicted of a crime, the question whether someone is subject to postrelease control does not depend on the exercise of the judicial power. Rather, the legislature has made a generalized determination of the crimes for which postrelease control is mandatory and those for which postrelease control is discretionary. With respect to those crimes for which it is discretionary, the legislature has granted the APA the power to decide who must serve postrelease control and for how long. A judge has no decision-making authority in the process, only a statutory obligation to provide oral notification about postrelease control to the offender. 22 January Term, 2022 {¶ 59} When it comes to postrelease control, the judge’s role is purely ministerial. Thus, it is nonsensical to say that the judicial power is infringed upon “by the imposition of postrelease control absent advisement in the sentencing entry. Such a hypertechnical reading of the separation-of-powers doctrine does nothing to promote the independence of the judiciary; to the contrary, it treats judges as bureaucratic functionaries.” Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 52 (DeWine J., concurring in judgment only). B. A court is authorized to issue a corrected judgment entry {¶ 60} Presumably recognizing that this court was causing needless confusion in the area of postrelease control and imposing requirements upon trial judges that were not found in statute, the legislature enacted R.C. 2929.191 to allow trial judges to correct postrelease-control advisements that failed to meet statutory and judicially imposed requirements. {¶ 61} As this court has explained, R.C. 2929.191 establishes a procedure to remedy a sentence that fails to properly impose a term of postrelease control. It applies to offenders who have not yet been released from prison and who fall into at least one of three categories: those who did not receive notice at the sentencing hearing that they would be subject to postrelease control, those who did not receive notice that the parole board could impose a prison term for a violation of postrelease control, or those who did not have both of these statutorily mandated notices incorporated into their sentencing entries. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, at ¶ 23. {¶ 62} Under R.C. 2929.191, a court is empowered to hold a hearing any time before a defendant is released from prison, to provide an offender with a 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO postrelease-control advisement, and to incorporate that advisement into a sentencing entry. That is exactly what happened in Bates’s case. The majority says that this hearing somehow doesn’t count on the theory that Bates wasn’t notified that the postrelease-control error would be corrected until he was in front of the judge. But Bates and his counsel were present for the hearing and there has been no suggestion that he suffered prejudice as a result of any deficiency in notice. Moreover, Bates has not raised any argument relating to deficient notice on appeal. {¶ 63} Our decisions in Harper and Hudson put to rest the idea that a postrelease-control error rendered a sentence void and could be corrected on that basis at any time. But even though Bates’s sentence was not void, R.C. 2929.191 provided statutory authorization for the court to render more complete the advisement about postrelease control in Bates’s sentencing entry. The statute remains good law, and there is no reason to ignore the fact that the trial court in this case acted with statutory authorization when it issued a corrected sentencing entry. C. The statutory scheme renders most postrelease-control errors harmless {¶ 64} Furthermore, the statutory scheme renders nearly all postreleasecontrol errors that occur at sentencing harmless. For sentences imposed after July 11, 2006, the failure of a court to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(d) of this section that the offender will be supervised under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the offender leaves prison or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal a statement to that effect does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of supervision that is required for the offender. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d); see also R.C. 2967.28(B). The statute could not be clearer. A trial court’s failure to notify an offender, either orally or in 24 January Term, 2022 the judgment entry, that he is subject to a mandatory term of postrelease control does not affect the ability of the APA to impose postrelease control upon the offender. {¶ 65} Likewise, a trial court’s failure to notify an offender of the consequences of violating the conditions of postrelease control or to include a statement to that effect in the judgment entry “does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the authority of the parole board to so impose a prison term for a violation of that nature if    the parole board notifies the offender prior to the offender’s release of the board’s authority to so impose a prison term.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f); see also R.C. 2967.28(D)(1) (requiring the parole board to notify the offender of the potential consequences of violating a condition of postrelease control). D. If we simply follow the statutes, this case is easily resolved {¶ 66} So if we follow the statutes, this case can be resolved in the state’s favor on any number of bases: 1. The only challenge Bates raised was to the terms of his initial sentencing entry, not to the oral advisement. There is no statutory requirement that anything about postrelease control be included in the sentencing entry. So, on this basis alone, the state should prevail. 2. If we ignore the fact that the statute doesn’t require the postrelease control advisement to be repeated in the sentencing entry, the state still prevails. This is because R.C. 2929.191(C) expressly authorizes a court to provide a corrected judgment entry. 3. Even if we ignore the absence of a statutory requirement for a postreleasecontrol advisement in the sentencing entry and we ignore the court’s authority to correct a sentencing entry, the parole board still has the authority to supervise Bates upon his release from prison. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and 2967.28(B) make this clear. 25 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO