Opinion ID: 1533372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Subsequently Issued Search Warrant

Text: The State anticipated that the warrantless nighttime entry into Mason's residence would not withstand judicial scrutiny. Thus, the State argues in the alternative in this appeal that the evidence seized from Mason's home pursuant to a search warrant issued following the illegal entry need not be suppressed according to Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). In Segura, the United States Supreme Court framed the issue as whether, because of an earlier illegal entry, the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence seized later from a private residence pursuant to a valid search warrant which was issued on information obtained by the police before the entry into the residence. Id. at 797-98. The Court held: Whether the initial entry was illegal or not is irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence because there was an independent source for the warrant under which that evidence was seized. Exclusion of evidence as derivative or fruit of the poisonous tree is not warranted here because of that independent source. Id. at 813-14. The Court viewed this position as consistent with its earlier decisions on the exclusionary rule because Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920), and other cases allowed the admission of evidence, regardless of a prior illegality on the part of the authorities, when the link between the illegality and that evidence was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 815, 104 S.Ct. at 3391. The Court pointed out that evidence will not be excluded as `fruit' unless the illegality is at least the `but for' cause of the discovery of the evidence. Id. The Court concluded that the illegal entry into [Segura's] apartment did not contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant; ... therefore, ... not even the threshold `but for' requirement was met in this case. Id. The holding in Segura was premised upon the specific finding by the Supreme Court that the subsequent search of the residence was independent of the original entry and pursuant to a valid search warrant. Id. at 813-14, 104 S.Ct. at 3389-90. Therefore, before an application of Segura can be considered, we must address the threshold question of the validity under Delaware law of the nighttime warrant for the search of Mason's residence, which warrant was issued subsequent to the initial entry and seizure of the residence by the police. No one disputes the fact that the police had probable cause to obtain a warrant to search Mason's home during the daytime. However, the Delaware statute with respect to the requirements for the issuance of a warrant to search a residence during the nighttime is clear and unambiguous and requires more than probable cause. [20] It requires a determination that such action is necessary to prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be searched for. 11 Del.C. § 2308. Mason argues that the search warrant was improperly issued because the application for the warrant did not demonstrate that it was necessary to prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be search for and that, therefore, the requirements of 11 Del. C. § 2308 were not met. In this case, the application for the search warrant had been prepared almost entirely in advance. The prepared portions of the affidavit recited the events of the three weeks which preceded the cocaine purchase from Barnett on August 29, 1985. After the purchase from Barnett the following three paragraphs were added to the affidavit. 11. On 29 Aug 85 Det Eller purcharchedan [sic] ounce of cocaine from Barnewtt [sic] for $2100.00 and via surveillence it was determined that Barnett went into Masons apartment to get the cocaine. Det Bullen observed same. Det Eller purchased the cocaine at 2320-2330. 12. Aftr [sic] being read and advised of his rights Barnett after being arrested for trafficking in cocaine related thathe [sic] paid the $2100.00 to Mason and there was only Mason and his girlfriend in the apartment at the time. 13. Due tothe [sic] nature of the deal it is necessassary [sic] for the issuance of a nighttime time [sic] search warrant to preserve any evidence that may be destroyed. [21] This Court has held that the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a nighttime search warrant must be tested by considering the affidavit as a whole. [T]he four-corners test is ... applicable to the determination of whether a warrant may authorize a search at nighttime under § 2308. In other words, sufficient facts showing that a nighttime search is necessary to prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be searched for must appear on the face of the affidavit before such a search may be authorized. Only in this way can a reviewing court verify existence of the statutory requirements. Henry v. State, Del.Supr., 373 A.2d 575, 577 (1977) (emphasis added). Nothing in the affidavit in this case comports with the statutory requirements that there be a demonstration that the nighttime search is necessary to prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be searched for. 11 Del.C. § 2308. See Henry v. State, 373 A.2d at 577-578. Compare Jensen v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 105, 112-13 (1984) and Dunfee v. State, Del.Supr., 346 A.2d 173, 175-76 (1975). On the contrary, the affidavit recites a series of contacts with the Mason residence over several weeks. There is nothing in the affidavit to support the conclusion that Mason was going to flee from his residence immediately during the nighttime or destroy any evidence. There was no indication in the affidavit that the nature of the deal on August 29, 1985, was any different from the nature of the deals with Barnett from Mason's residence during the previous three weeks. Moreover, the only evidence which the police actually knew was in Mason's home was the $2,100.00 in marked money [22] which he was unlikely to want to destroy. [23] In Alderton v. State , the court was confronted with similar circumstances and held that there were no exigent circumstances which justified a warrantless entry into defendant's home for the purpose of detaining him while securing a search warrant in order to prevent his departure or destruction of marked money allegedly used to purchase illegal drugs. 438 So.2d 1000 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983). However, not only did the application for the nighttime search warrant fail to satisfy the specific initial statutory requirements of Section 2308, but also the search warrant itself did not meet other statutory requirements. The final language of 11 Del.C. § 2308 prohibits a judicial officer from issuing a warrant for a nighttime search of a residence unless he is satisfied that it is necessary to prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be searched for and the authority shall be expressly given in the warrant. Henry v. State, 373 A.2d at 577. In fact, the form of the search warrant to be issued when a nighttime search for a dwelling has been authorized is prescribed by statute. 11 Del.C. § 2310(c). That statute provides in pertinent part as follows: GREETINGS: Upon the annexed affidavit and application or complaint for a search warrant, as I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that certain property, namely (describe the property) used or intended to be used for .......... is being concealed on the (premises) (person) described in the annexed affidavit and application or complaint; and that search of the premises in the nighttime is necessary in order to prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be searched for; NOW THEREFORE, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED within 3 days of the date hereof to search the abovenamed person, persons, house, place or conveyance for the property specified in the annexed affidavit and application, and to search any occupant or occupants found in the house.... Id. (emphasis added). The form of warrant required by statute for the nighttime search of a residence was not used in this case. In fact, the form of search warrant which was issued appears to more closely follow the form of search warrant where search of a dwelling house in the nighttime is not authorized. [24] The search warrant in this case provided in pertinent part as follows: TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER(S): WHEREAS, facts have been sworn to or affirmed before me, by written affidavit(s) attached hereto, from which I have found probable cause, I do authorize you to search the herein described premises and/or place(s) and/or vehicle(s) and/or person(s), and to seize, secure, inventory and make return according to the Delaware Code, the herein described items. ( ) This Warrant should be served no later than 10 ( ) A.M. (X) P.M. 9 Sept, 1985 and shall be served anytime during day or night Issued under my hand this 30th day of Aug., 1985, at 12:20 A.M. o'clock. . . . (SEAL) [25] The statutory directive for a specific finding of necessity for a nighttime search of a residence, by a neutral magistrate, was not satisfied in this case. Superior Court Criminal Rule 41(c) provides that the issuance and contents of a search warrant shall be as provided by statute. Subsection (e) of that same Rule provides for the suppression for use as evidence anything obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure.... The search warrant in this case was not issued in accordance with the requirements of the applicable Delaware statutory law. First, the Delaware legislature has set out a specific form for both the Affidavit and Application for Search. 11 Del.C. § 2310(a). The affidavit here failed to allege with particularity facts indicating the existence of exigent circumstances justifying the issuance of a nighttime search warrant even though the need for those requirements appear conspicuously on the preprinted form that was used. [26] Second, and most importantly, the statutory form for a nighttime Search Warrant, 11 Del. C. § 2310(c), was not used. Section 2310(c) which requires an impartial magistrate to make a specific finding that a nighttime search was necessary to prevent the escape or removal of the person or thing to be searched for. Finally, contrary to the statutory directive of Sections 2308 and 2310(c), the form of warrant used by the magistrate authorized the execution of the search warrant within the next ten days. This time limit far exceeds the three day limit that the Delaware legislature has statutorily placed on the execution of nighttime search warrants. It follows from this statutory analysis that the evidence seized by virtue of the authority set forth in the illegal search warrant must be suppressed. See Henry v. State, 373 A.2d at 578.