Opinion ID: 3155338
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 3d 97, 98 (R.I. 2011) (Snell III).

Text: -2- violence, but, instead, actually stipulated to this fact before the jury.” 2 At the hearing, the parties submitted memoranda and stipulated facts, the hearing justice heard oral arguments, and Snell testified. Snell’s trial counsel could not be located and therefore was unavailable to testify. In his bench decision denying Snell’s application, the hearing justice noted that count 4 charged Snell with violating G.L. 1956 § 11-5-3 which, because it would be his third offense, “required [the state] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Snell] had at least two prior convictions of domestic violence offenses.” See G.L. 1956 § 12-29-5. 3 The hearing justice considered the stipulation to be a tactical decision, reasoning that Snell’s trial counsel chose to stipulate to the existence of the prior convictions, “[r]ather than allow[ing] the jury to see or consider the certified copies of the convictions and to hear the details of the prior crimes    as well as the resulting sentences imposed for each of those prior convictions    .” The hearing justice further noted that “the trial court properly characterized the prior convictions as elements of crimes charged and cautioned the jury from considering or using [the stipulation] for any other purpose or in any other way.” As to Snell’s contention that his counsel should have stipulated to the convictions outside the presence of the jury, the hearing justice countered that counsel had no control with regard to “whether [the trial court] was going to read that stipulation to the jury[.]” 2 Snell also alleged in his application that his trial counsel was deficient by not timely objecting to the fact that he was wearing prison clothes, handcuffs, and leg shackles at trial. He does not press these issues on appeal. 3 The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, G.L. 1956 § 12-29-5, provides in pertinent part: “(c)(1) Every person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 shall: “(i) For a second violation be imprisoned for a term of not less than ten (10) days and not more than one year. “(ii) For a third and subsequent violation be deemed guilty of a felony and be imprisoned for a term of not less than one year and not more than ten (10) years.” -3- He also noted that “the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, including the fact that that stipulation was read to the jury.” 4 After three unsuccessful appeals, Snell is again before this Court, this time arguing that the hearing justice erred in denying his application for postconviction relief.