Opinion ID: 2544552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court properly calculated the excludable days between the indictment and commencement of trial.

Text: Diaz argues that the trial court erred on two points when it denied her motion to dismiss pursuant to HRPP Rule 48. First, she argues that the 208 days the trial court found excludable was error because the prosecution failed to demonstrate due diligence in serving the grand jury bench warrant. Second, Diaz argues that she never waived her right to a speedy trial or her rights under HRPP Rule 48.
Diaz argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the charges because the grand jury indictment was filed on October 27, 1999, she was not served with the bench warrant until January 12, 2000, and trial did not begin until July 26, 2000. She argues that the prosecution failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delays should be excluded. The trial court's findings of fact stated that: 1. The Defendant . . . was indicted . . . on October 27, 1999. 2. Defendant's Motion for Dismissal for violation of HRPP Rule 48 was filed . . . on July 18, 2000[.] 3. The total number of days elapsed from October 27, 1999, to July 17, 2000, is 263 days. 4. Subtracting 180 days, there is a balance of 83 days. 5. 208 days are excluded. 6. 125 days remain to run under Rule 48. The trial court's conclusions of law stated: 1. 77 days that it took for the sheriffs to serve the grand jury bench warrant upon. . . [Diaz] [were] based upon the unavailability of [Diaz]. 2. The 131 days from March 1, 2000, to July 10, 2000 are excluded because [Diaz] did not object and did consent to the continuance of trial requested by the State. Because the prosecution evidenced sufficient diligence in serving the bench warrant, the trial court did not err in calculating excludable days. This court has consistently stated that HRPP Rule 48(b) mandates the dismissal of criminal charges if a trial on those charges does not commence within six months, construed as one hundred eighty days, from the time of the arrest or of filing of charges, whichever is sooner. State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 28, 881 P.2d 504, 515 (1994). Pursuant to HRPP Rule 48(c), however, certain periods must be excluded from the computation of the six month period. State v. Jackson, 81 Hawai`i 39, 50, 912 P.2d 71, 82 (1996). Thus, to determine whether dismissal was required under HRPP Rule 48, the start date and all excludable periods must be identified. See State v. Dwyer, 78 Hawai`i 367, 893 P.2d 795 (1995). It is uncontested in the instant case that the indictment was filed on October 27, 1999 and is the date that triggers HRPP Rule 48(b)(1). It took the sheriff's deputy seventy-seven days to serve the bench warrant on Diaz. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss charges pursuant to HRPP Rule 48, the prosecution questioned sheriff's deputy, Cathy Miyata. Deputy Miyata testified that her first action, after being assigned the bench warrant, was to check the OCCC [O`ahu Community Correctional Center] log to see if the defendant might be in OCCC. She then explained that the deputies' standard action is to request a photo from the HPD, if a photo is available. There was no photo of Diaz at that time. Deputy Miyata was unable to locate Diaz during the month of November based upon the efforts described above. Deputy Miyata then submitted a welfare [17] and completed an address summary. At each of the addresses listed for Diaz, Deputy Miyata was unable to find anyone who knew of Diaz. On January 10, 2000, Deputy Miyata completed another computer check and discovered an Ala Ilima Street address. No one was home when Deputy Miyata made the first visit to this address. On the second visit, an unidentified person was home, which led to Deputy Miyata serving the bench warrant on Diaz. During cross-examination, Deputy Miyata admitted that she had not checked with the post office for a forwarding address, did not look in the white pages of the phone book, or call the telephone company. When questioned about the addresses she visited prior to finding Diaz, Deputy Miyata stated that one address was discovered when Diaz had listed it in paperwork related to a minor traffic accident. Deputy Miyata went to that address and no one knew Diaz. The other address was listed on the bench warrant, but the resident manager at that address had no information on Diaz. A third address that came up under [Diaz's] name was discovered to be a closed road. In Lei, 95 Hawai`i at 285, 21 P.3d at 887, we cited, with approval, an ICA decision in which the diligence of the prosecutor was at issue. See State v. Mageo, 78 Hawai`i 33, 889 P.2d 1092 (App.1995). The factors identified by the Mageo court, and relied upon in Lei, included the complete absence of an explanation for the delay in the record, no offer of proof at the hearing to explain the delay, and the availability of the defendant. Lei, 95 Hawai`i at 285, 21 P.3d at 887 (quoting Mageo, 78 Hawai`i at 38-39, 889 P.2d at 1097-98). In Lei, we found that the delay was unnecessary because the defendant was available to be served, the prosecution did not adduce any evidence that it attempted to serve the defendant or that service would be futile, and perhaps most important, the prosecution had opportunities to serve the defendant and failed to take advantage of them. Lei, 95 Hawai`i at 285, 21 P.3d at 887. Unlike the situation in Lei, the prosecution in this case presented testimony regarding the attempts to serve Diaz. The Deputy went to three addresses that Diaz appears to have used. One address was a closed road, and the occupants of the other two had no knowledge of Diaz. Because there was no evidence that the delay in service of the bench warrant was the result of a lack of due diligence on the part of the prosecution, the trial court did not err in excluding the 77 days.
Diaz argues that she did not knowingly waive her HRPP Rule 48 and speedy trial rights. Diaz premises her argument on the idea that waiving the HRPP Rule 48 right is akin to waiving Tachibana [18] rights. The colloquy that occurred in the instant case was as follows: [THE COURT]: Good morning. And what is the defendant's position on the motion to continue? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We have no objection to the State's motion for continuance of trial. [THE COURT]: And, Ms. Diaz, you understand that the witness is a law student in San Diego and cannot return until this summer. And I've been told by Mr. Agmata that you don't have a problem with continuing the case until the summer. Is that right? [DIAZ]: Yes. Diaz suggests that because the court never engaged Diaz in a colloquy in which the court questioned her as to whether she knew she was giving up these rights, her waiver was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Although this court has never addressed waiver in the context of HRPP Rule 48, the rule itself provides guidance. HRPP Rule 48(c) provides: (c) Excluded periods. The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial commencement: . . . . (3) periods that delay the commencement of trial and are caused by a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or defendant's counsel[.] Thus, the rule only requires consent from either the defendant or the defendant's counsel. In the instant case, both the defense counsel and Diaz consented to the continuance. Because HPD Officer Bumanglag had moved to the mainland and was attending school at the time the prosecution requested the continuance, the days would have been excluded under good cause. Further, because defense counsel and Diaz consented to the continuance, the trial court did not err when it excluded the 131 days.