Opinion ID: 789742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Certification of Questions of State Law

Text: 99 The Utah Names suggest that (1) the district court erred when it refused to certify certain questions to the Utah Supreme Court and (2) we should sua sponte certify the questions of whether the English court met the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. We reject each contention and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 100
101 We review the district court's decision not to certify questions of state law for abuse of discretion. Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir.1988). Utah's open courts provision requires: 102 All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 103 Utah Const. art. I, § 11. 104 In general, open courts provisions in Utah serve two principal purposes: First, they were intended to help establish an independent foundation for the judiciary as an institution.... Second, open courts or remedies clauses were intended to grant individuals rights to a judicial remedy.... Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1016 (Utah 2002). The Names attempt to invoke the open courts provisions in connection with their alleged waiver of their at the time-unknown due process rights. 105 While certification is appropriate where the legal question at issue is novel and the applicable state law is unsettled, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664, 667 (10th Cir.1990), it is never compelled. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974). [U]nder the diversity statutes the federal courts have the duty to decide questions of state law even if difficult or uncertain. Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir.1998) (citing Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943)). There is little caselaw suggesting that English law or any foreign law somehow abrogates the Utah Constitution. We have established there is no due process violation and that the Names waived their procedural rights in advance. See Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 185, 92 S.Ct. 775. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected the Utah Names' motion to certify. 106
107 We next consider whether we should certify this question to the Utah Supreme Court directly. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a) states: 108 The Utah Supreme Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance with the provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain. 109 Thus, there is a procedural mechanism for certification to the state court that we may consider using. However, we note that a necessary but not controlling component is the difficulty in determining the local law. Cf. Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 390, 94 S.Ct. 1741 ([T]he mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for the start of another lawsuit.). Lehman Brothers further noted that [w]e do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory. Id. at 390-91, 94 S.Ct. 1741. 110 While no Utah court has rendered a decision on the precise issue in question, our analysis above establishes that there is no unusual difficulty in deciding the state law question or a likelihood that Lloyd's theory of liability would be adopted by the Utah courts. Thus, given the above conclusions, certification is unnecessary. 111