Opinion ID: 2571433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Parties' Arguments Regarding The Enhanced Sentence

Text: Ruggiero proposes that the district court erred in premising his sentence on the commission of a second offense within a five-year period, pursuant to HRS § 291E-61(b)(2), see infra note 10, because the prior conviction was a nullity due to constitutional defects. He asserts that sentencing him according to the provisions set forth for second-time offenders denies [him] his Due Process and Double Jeopardy rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution [5] and Article I, §§ 5 and 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution. [6] (Citing State v. Sinagoga, 81 Hawai`i 421, 918 P.2d 228 (App.1996).) Ruggiero contends that HRS § 291E-61 is a purely recidivist statute and that the district court erred by failing to follow the sentencing procedure prescribed by the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Sinagoga, 81 Hawai`i at 447, 918 P.2d at 254, for the ordinary sentencing of repeat offenders, which he contends requires that the sentencing court confirm that any prior convictions upon which an enhanced sentence will be based are valid at the time of sentencing. He maintains that under a straightforward recidivist statute, due process requires that enhanced sentences be based on convictions that are valid at the time of sentencing. [7] (Citing State v. Veikoso, 102 Hawai`i 219, 74 P.3d 575 (2003); State v. Shimabukuro, 100 Hawai`i 324, 60 P.3d 274 (2002); State v. Hahn, 238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, 535 (2000).)
The prosecution asserts that, by amending HRS § 291E-61(c) to require the sentencing court to treat the time of commission of the subsequent offense as the touchstone for determining the validity of prior convictions for sentencing purposes, the legislature clearly intended to create a status offense. Therefore, the prosecution argues, the underlying predicate conviction need only be valid at the time of the commission of the subsequent offense, regardless of whether the underlying conviction is later vacated. [8] (Citing State v. Lobendahn, 71 Haw. 111, 113, 784 P.2d 872, 873 (1989).) This reading of HRS § 291E-61, the prosecution maintains, comports with the legislative intent to deal harshly with scofflaws who reoffend while appealing previous DUI convictions. (Quoting Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1185, in 2003 Senate Journal, at 1523.)