Opinion ID: 2315959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Prejudice to Penalty Phase from Guilt-Phase Evidence

Text: Defendant argues as plain error that evidence presented during the guilt phase prejudiced the penalty-phase proceedings. At issue are records of defendant's prior conviction for carnal abuse of Gladys Colon, the previously-mentioned statements by defendant that he had killed before and might have to kill again, and three 8 X 10 color photographs of the autopsy. The photographs were admitted to prove the manner and cause of death. One photograph showed the cuts to the victim's left hand, and a second showed the fatal stab wound to the victim's back. The last photograph not only showed the slash wounds to the victim's chest and neck, but also depicted the icy stare frozen on the victim's face. As previously discussed, the records of defendant's prior conviction for carnal abuse were admitted to prove that defendant was on parole at the time of the killing. His statements that he might have to kill again were admitted to prove his intent. Without objection from defendant, all of that evidence was incorporated by reference at the penalty phase. At no time during the penalty phase did the trial court issue a limiting instruction concerning the use of the evidence. Both photographs and other-crimes evidence have the capacity to prejudice penalty-phase proceedings in capital murder cases. See S. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 469, 585 A. 2d 864 (noting capacity of prejudicial photos to taint the penalty phase); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 638-39, 562 A. 2d 1320 (1989) (the need to weigh the prejudicial value of photographs is especially critical in the penalty phase of a capital case); State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A. 2d 117 (1988) ( M. Moore ) (prejudice from other-crimes evidence may warrant severance of an indictment); State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 533-36, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988) ( Rose I) (error to have admitted autopsy photo). When the same jury hears both phases of such a case, evidence admitted on the guilt phase may sometimes taint the penalty phase. See, e.g., Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 249-50, 593 A. 2d at 279 (movie shown during guilt phase so prejudicial as to require vacation of death sentence). With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern. On this record, we do not find that the trial court committed plain error on the guilt phase by admitting the other-crimes evidence and the autopsy photographs. That conclusion, however, does not foreclose defendant from challenging admission of those items on remand. If the State again seeks the death penalty, the court can minimize prejudice by empaneling separate juries to hear the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(1); see M. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 277, 550 A. 2d 117 (recommending the use of separate juries to avoid prejudice to defendant from other-crimes evidence); cf. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A. 2d at 194 (separate juries likely will be required when State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a)). A separate penalty-phase jury commends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial. See State v. Monturi, 195 N.J. Super. 317, 478 A. 2d 1266 (Law Div. 1984) (considering a pre-trial motion for separate juries). A separate jury would obviate death qualification of the guilt-phase jury and would permit admission of evidence at the guilt phase without regard to the carry-over prejudicial effect on the penalty phase. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 396-99, 558 A. 2d 1259 (1989) (Handler, J., dissenting) (discussing the use of two juries throughout the trial); Monturi, supra, 195 N.J. Super. 317, 478 A. 2d 1266 (discussing the need for separate juries when other-crimes evidence is admitted on guilt phase). When the same jury hears both phases of the trial, the court should provide instructions on the extent to which the jury may use guilt-phase evidence on its penalty-phase deliberations. Even when guilt-phase evidence is not incorporated in the penalty phase, the danger abides that the jury will rely on it during the penalty-phase deliberations. See Rose I, supra, 112 N.J. at 505-08, 548 A. 2d 1058 (vacating defendant's death sentence because of danger that jury considered irrelevant other-crimes evidence). Thus, the court should instruct the jury concerning the evidence that it may use in its penalty deliberations and the purposes for which that evidence may be used.