Opinion ID: 4536265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the fourth amendment claims fail

Text: Next, we turn to a pair of suppression claims, both of which fail.
Amendment Wilson and Moore sought to suppress the evidence seized from their rental car in North Carolina. Moore argues that the initial stop was improper. And both claim that the police officer impermissibly extended the stop before he found the evidence. The District Court denied their motions to suppress. We agree and will affirm that ruling. We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). Our review of the facts is aided by the dashcam video from Officer Joshua Freeman’s patrol car, which is in the record and lasts the duration of the traffic stop. 1. There was reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop. Moore first argues that any evidence from the traffic stop should have been suppressed because the stop was pretextual and not supported by probable cause. But traffic stops require only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2012). And pretext is irrelevant: “[T]he Supreme Court [has] established a bright-line rule that any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely pretext for an investigation of some other crime.” Mosley, 454 F.3d at 252 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). 10 Officer Freeman had reasonable suspicion that the driver had broken traffic laws. He testified at the suppression hearing that he saw the car speeding, changing lanes without signaling, and tailgating the car in front of it. The District Court credited this testimony. And we can see the tailgating violation for ourselves on the video. All of these violate North Carolina traffic law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-141(a)–(b), (d); 20-152(a), 20154(a), (b). So there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 2. Officer Freeman did not impermissibly prolong the stop. A traffic stop may last as long as needed to “to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.” United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 409–10 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)). Beyond that point, the officer must have reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and investigate further. Id. at 410. Here, the officer did. Within minutes, Officer Freeman learned suspicious facts that gave him cause to investigate further. When he first pulled the car over and asked Wilson for his license and registration, Wilson explained that it was a rental car. Freeman asked Wilson to get out of the car. While Wilson was exiting, Freeman peered through the hatchback into the trunk area and noticed that there was no luggage. The rest of Officer Freeman and Wilson’s conversation took place in the front of Freeman’s cruiser. Freeman explained the traffic violations that he had witnessed. Wilson then volunteered that he was driving from Philadelphia to Georgia for his uncle’s funeral, that he was tired, and that he 11 planned to stay for a week. During this exchange, Freeman kept communicating with dispatch while checking Wilson’s license and the rental-car information. He learned that Wilson’s name was not on the rental agreement and that the day before, the car had been rented for one month. This all happened within about four minutes. Officer Freeman then went to talk with Moore and Foster, who were still in the rental car. They said they had been traveling all night to Atlanta to see their brother and that they planned to stay for a week, but said nothing about a funeral. When Freeman asked why they had no luggage, they answered that they would just buy what they needed in Georgia. Freeman asked Wilson the same question and got the same answer. Wilson also admitted that he had a juvenile drug arrest. Next, Officer Freeman confronted Wilson with his suspicions that Wilson and his passengers were lying about the real reason for their trip. Freeman told Wilson that he did not buy his story about his uncle’s funeral. And he asked how much cash was in the car. Wilson hesitated before finally admitting that he thought there was roughly $20,000. We can hit pause on the story right there. At this point, less than ten minutes had elapsed since Officer Freeman had pulled over Wilson’s car. As Freeman had not heard back from dispatch with information about Wilson and the rental car, the stop was still justified for traffic enforcement. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614–15. By then, Freeman had learned more than enough to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion that the three men were trafficking drugs: They were driving through North Carolina in a rental car they had picked up the day before 12 in Philadelphia, but the person named in the rental agreement was not in the car. They said they were going to Georgia for a week, but the car was rented for a month and they had no luggage. They gave conflicting stories about their trip’s purpose. And Wilson confessed to having a lot of cash in the car. Especially given Freeman’s extensive experience interdicting drugs, his suspicion was objectively reasonable. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002). Thus, by the time Freeman extended the stop to investigate other crimes, he had more than enough evidence “to establish reasonable suspicion that [the passengers] w[ere] involved in drug trafficking.” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615). 3. Wilson and Moore forfeited the argument that Wilson’s consent was invalid. After Officer Freeman gave Wilson a written warning, Wilson consented to a search of the rental car. Only then did Freeman discover the stolen cash. In the District Court, Wilson and Moore challenged the voluntariness of that consent, but the court found that it was voluntary. On appeal, Wilson and Moore allude to this issue in passing but do not press it. Thus, they have forfeited this issue. So we need not decide whether Wilson’s consent was valid. See, e.g., Sikirica v. Wettach (In re Wettach), 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (appellants forfeited an argument by “fail[ing] to develop” it before the court of appeals). B. Use of the cell-site location data was proper under the good-faith exception Wilson and Moore also argue that, at trial, the Government improperly introduced cell-site location information about 13 Wilson’s cell phone. In 2014, the Government got a court order compelling production of that data under a statute that did not require a search warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). At the time, our precedent approved of this practice, permitting cell-site orders without probable cause. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). Years later, the Supreme Court abrogated that precedent, holding that these cell-site searches require a warrant supported by probable cause. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–21 (2018). So Wilson and Moore argue that Wilson’s cell-site location information should have been suppressed. Not so. After Wilson and Moore filed their briefs, we held that cell-site location information gathered under § 2703(d) before Carpenter is protected by the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2019). Relying on a § 2703(d) order was objectively reasonable at the time. Id. And there is no claim that the Government violated the procedures required by § 2703(d). Id. So the evidence was admissible.