Opinion ID: 2331431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: issue 7: did outbursts from trial spectators prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial

Text: For the first time on appeal, McCullough claims that comments and emotional outbursts from trial spectators prejudiced her right to a fair trial and now require remand for a new trial. The State claims this issue was not preserved or, in the alternative, that McCullough failed to make an adequate record of the disturbances to merit review. We agree and hold that this assertion of error was not preserved. We also find the record inadequate to address the question, even if it could be reached. Trial courts have a duty to maintain order and ensure that justice is not obstructed by a person or persons. State v. McNaught, 238 Kan. 567, 577, 713 P.2d 457 (1986). Emotional outbursts and demonstrations often occur, particularly in homicide cases. Nevertheless, emotional outbursts, weeping, fainting, applause, or other demonstrations can prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial. See State v. Franklin, 167 Kan. 706, 709-10, 208 P.2d 195 (1949). Trial courts are granted broad discretion to determine whether the jury was or could have been influenced by a disturbance. That discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears prejudice occurred. McNaught, 238 Kan. at 577-78, 713 P.2d 457. While McCullough indicated there were problems with spectators at several points during the trial, she never requested the trial court to admonish the jury or sought a mistrial. McCullough also failed to argue these outbursts violated her right to a new trial in her motion for new trial. Generally, appellate courts do not address constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. For an appellate court to proceed under these circumstances, it is necessary for the party raising the constitutional issue to satisfy one of three recognized exceptions to the general rule, which are: (1) The newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the claim is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; or (3) the district court is right for the wrong reason. State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 862, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010). McCullough argues this court considered this issue for the first time on appeal in Franklin and the claim therefore is properly before this court. But while McCullough is correct that the defendant in Franklin did not request an admonition or move for mistrial after a spectator's outburst, Franklin is distinguishable because the defendant raised the issue in a motion for new trial. In addition, Franklin predates this court's more assiduous approach to preservation of error issues. See State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (stressing the importance of the legislative mandate in K.S.A. 60-404). A contemporaneous effort by counsel to address courtroom outbursts on the record is important because the trial court witnessed the outburst, viewed the jury's reaction, if any, and its determination of whether the circumstances justify intervention gives the situation context that is beneficial for appellate review. A timely trial objection also helps ensure that a sufficient record is created for appeal. The party claiming an error occurred has the burden of designating a record that affirmatively shows prejudicial error. State v. Nguyen, 285 Kan. 418, 430, 172 P.3d 1165 (2007). The record from McCullough's trial discloses several instances when disturbances to the court proceedings are referenced several times during voir dire and three at trial. Outside the presence of the jury pool, McCullough's counsel indicated that three members of the victim's family had rushed from the courtroom in tears at different times during the final 2 days of voir dire. The district court indicated it did not see any spectators leave, instructed the State to admonish its witnesses and spectators to maintain courtroom decorum, and assured McCullough's counsel it would remove any spectators that were unwilling to comply. At trial, McCullough's counsel indicated that the victim's family was sitting behind him in close proximity to the jury and he could hear them talking and laughing during his cross-examination of a detective. He also stated that someone was crying earlier that day. The State appears to concede one of the victim's family members had run out of the courtroom in tears the previous day, and the prosecutor had instructed them not to do that again. But she claimed the defendant's family was also making audible sighs and stuff during trial. The district judge indicated he was unable to hear any conversations, but he agreed to admonish all spectators to behave with decorum. McCullough's counsel responded, I think that's appropriate. With that statement, defense counsel appeared fully satisfied with the trial court's suggested outcome. The only contemporaneous record of a disturbance occurred later while McCullough's counsel questioned a witness. The district court stated sua sponte, Let's have the other lady also step out, ma'am. At which point an unidentified spectator stated, I don't want to go, I want to see everything. I have her kids, I want to stay and see everything. After the spectator agreed to respect courtroom decorum, the trial proceeded without further discussion. There is no record of what caused the trial court to admonish this spectator or whether the jury had any knowledge of a disturbance before the trial court spoke. And while it is possible the spectator's comments referred to the victim's children, there is nothing establishing this point or even explaining how it would matter. Defense counsel did not request any additional remedial action the court should have taken. The last discussion about disturbances occurred during the instructions conference when McCullough's counsel indicated he could hear comments by spectators during his examination of witnesses. Counsel indicated he was concerned because spectators were within 10 feet of the jury. He then warned that he would file a motion for mistrial if it occurred during closing argument. But again, counsel did not identify which spectators were making the comments, and there is no record regarding the substance of the disturbance. The decision by McCullough's counsel not to file a motion for mistrial as threatened is a strong indication that there was not another disturbance and that the concern did not materialize. In short, at no time did defense counsel lodge an objection to the manner in which the district court was handling an obviously emotional trial setting. The failure to pose an objection is a failure to preserve the issue. Gomez, 290 Kan. at 862, 235 P.3d 1203. We also find no basis to consider any of the possible exceptions. The appellate record establishes there were some disruptions at trial, but the record is inadequate to determine whether McCullough's right to a fair trial was violated. The spectators causing the disturbance were rarely identified, the substance and extent of the disturbance is unknown, and it is unclear whether the jury even was aware of the disturbances. Affirmed. MORITZ, J., not participating. LEBEN, J., assigned.