Opinion ID: 6332190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duong’s Motion for an Adverse Inference

Text: We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s decision on a motion for a sanction such as an adverse inference due to spoliation of evidence. In re Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1997). Spoliation occurs where (1) the evidence was in the party’s control, (2) the evidence is relevant to the claims or defenses in the case, (3) the evidence was actually suppressed or withheld, and (4) the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the party. Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2012). Sanctionable spoliation requires a showing of bad faith. Id. at 79 (“[A] finding of bad faith is pivotal to a spoliation determination.”); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Such [an adverse] presumption or inference arises … only when the spo[li]ation or destruction [of evidence] was intentional, and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, and it does not arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent.” (citation omitted, fourth alteration in original)). 3 The District Court had jurisdiction over this diversity case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 5 There is no dispute that the video footage of the altercation between Stewart and Duong was in Benihana’s control, that it was relevant to Duong’s claims, and that it was deleted. Furthermore, the need to preserve the video was rendered reasonably foreseeable by both the police’s advising Benihana to keep the footage and Stewart’s declaring that he would be filing assault charges against Duong and an unfair termination claim against Benihana. Indeed, Crowley and Chang both apparently did foresee the need to preserve the footage, and Chang communicated that need to Cintado. Nonetheless, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was insufficient evidence of bad faith to justify imposing sanctions on Benihana. After all, Crowley – the individual who terminated Duong after watching the footage and thus would have had the most knowledge about whether the footage would help or hurt Benihana in subsequent litigation – had suggested preserving the footage, even though her recommendation was disregarded as it was passed up the chain of command to individuals with no personal knowledge of the video’s contents. It thus does not appear that there was any fraudulent intent to hide inculpatory evidence. Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that Duong did not suffer additional prejudice from the loss of the video. Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994) (listing “the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party” as a necessary consideration before imposing sanctions). As noted by the District Court, even accepting Duong’s own account of the altercation, Benihana was entitled to summary judgment. There was no abuse of discretion in denying Duong’s motion for an adverse inference. 6