Opinion ID: 1175246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendants in This Case Are Immune

Text: [2] In deciding whether immunity is appropriate in this case, the question is whether the proceedings established for dependency cases by RCW 13.34 are adversarial proceedings in need of the same sort of protection recognized as a necessity in Imbler, Butz and Briscoe. It should be apparent from the proceedings actually conducted in this case that they are, particularly where the report and recommendation of DSHS is concerned. First, the report of DSHS cannot be received in a fact-finding or disposition hearing except as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. RCW 13.34.110. Second, the Department is required to make its report and recommendation available to parents of dependent children, and the Legislature has stipulated that: This section [relating to the Department's report] shall not interfere with the right of the parents or custodians to submit oral arguments regarding the disposition plan at the hearing. RCW 13.34.120. In the August 1982 hearing, Rudolph Babcock was represented by counsel who vigorously cross-examined Mark Bronson, the DSHS witness who presented the report to the court. Babcock's counsel was given a full opportunity to argue that the court should disregard the DSHS report and recommendations and he did so. In all the hearings conducted in this matter, all parties had a full opportunity to offer evidence, cross-examine and argue to the court and those opportunities were fully exploited. The proceedings here were fully adversarial, as contemplated by the Legislature. Under the logic of Imbler and progeny, therefore, immunity for DSHS caseworkers acting in dependency proceedings is required. First, although it was not a consideration here, the threat of subsequent civil suits would surely cause Department employees to fail to initiate dependency proceedings in cases where they otherwise would do so. In this the caseworkers resemble prosecutors, but note that what matters is not the nature of the officials, but the nature of the proceedings. Without immunity for DSHS caseworkers, the adversarial character of dependency proceedings would suffer in the same way that criminal trials would suffer if prosecutors were threatened with liability: the cases would never be brought. Second, immunity is required to protect the caseworkers in their role as witnesses. This too bears on the adversarial nature of dependency proceedings. The Department is required to submit a broad range of information to the juvenile court under RCW 13.34.120. It does so in both written reports and in testimony before the court. Without immunity, caseworkers may well hold back critical information needed by the court in order to render a proper decision. In adversarial dependency proceedings, this might lead the court not to declare dependency where it would in fact be in the best interests of the child, because DSHS has not been able to do the vigorous job that RCW 13.34.120 contemplates. Third, the adversarial nature of dependency proceedings renders subsequent civil proceedings unnecessary as a check on the fairness or thoroughness of the dependency process or DSHS itself. Despite the tragic outcome in this case, the fact remains that, to the best of the judiciary's ability, the rights and interests of all participants were fully protected in the dependency proceedings. The Babcocks, as adversary parties, had every opportunity of notice, cross examination and argument to challenge the DSHS within the dependency proceeding and to expose the shortcomings of the Department's report. Permitting a second contest over the same matter would have no deterrent or encouraging effect on the Department not already provided by the adversarial nature of the dependency proceeding itself. Fourth, as a related matter, it is obvious that this dependency matter was fought out in repeated, and redundant, hearings over the course of many months. For the sake of finality of judicial decisions and for the sake of efficiency of the judicial process, the matter should rest there. The civil suit contemplated by the plaintiffs here is not barred by the strict rule of res judicata, but the redundancy and expense of such suits is certainly a significant factor favoring the grant of immunity to Department caseworkers. Therefore, we hold that caseworkers carrying out their statutory duties in connection with dependency proceedings under RCW 13.34 are entitled to immunity from subsequent suit, on the ground that such immunity is required to preserve the integrity of that adversarial process.