Opinion ID: 695622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bennett's Claim

Text: 40 Bennett received a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment because he committed the instant violations after having received two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A). In imposing a mandatory term of life imprisonment, the district court relied on two prior Georgia convictions, one in 1981 and the other in 1989, for possession of drugs. Bennett challenges his mandatory term of life imprisonment on two grounds. 41
42 Bennett first argues that the district court should not have used the 1989 conviction to enhance his sentence because that conviction was related to an overt act of the instant conspiracy. Thus, he contends that the 1989 conviction is not distinct enough in time to be considered a prior, unrelated conviction. Because the question of whether prior convictions [are] related or unrelated for purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A) involves a factual inquiry, we review the district court's decision for clear error. United States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601, 606 (11th Cir.1995). 43 In Rice, the defendant argued that his multiple prior convictions should be considered a single prior conviction for purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A) because they were all part of one overall conspiracy. This court, however, rejected his argument, holding that the separate criminal acts for which [the defendant] was convicted, whether or not part of an over-arching conspiracy ..., are not 'related' convictions justifying lesser penalties under section 841(b)(1)(A) because they are separate in time and locale and were acts requiring separate planning and execution. Rice, 43 F.3d at 608. Thus, under Rice, the threshold issue is whether a prior conviction is separate in time and locale; the fact that prior convictions may have resulted from criminal conduct in furtherance of one overall conspiracy is, for the most part, meaningless. 44 We recognize that Rice is slightly distinguishable from the facts of this case, for we must determine whether a previous conviction is sufficiently related to the instant conspiracy so as not to be counted as a prior offense for the purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A). Nonetheless, we find Rice persuasive, particularly since it relied on cases that address the precise issue that we face. For example, Rice relied on United States v. Garcia, 32 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir.1994), where the Seventh Circuit had to determine whether the defendant's prior 1991 state conviction was sufficiently related to his instant federal conviction for participating in a conspiracy from 1990 to 1992. The Seventh Circuit held that a section 841(b)(1)(A) enhancement was proper because after the defendant's state conviction for possession of cocaine became final, he continued to engage in [the] drug-related [conspiracy] for eighteen months. Garcia, 32 F.3d at 1020; see also United States v. Hughes, 924 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.1991) (also cited in Rice, and standing for the same proposition as Garcia ). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the purpose of the mandatory minimum enhancement is to target recidivism, [thus] it is more appropriate to focus on the degree of criminal activity that occurs after a defendant's conviction for drug-related activity is final rather than when the conspiracy began. Garcia, 32 F.3d at 1019-20. 45 Bennett's Georgia conviction became final on March 20, 1989. He, however, continued to engage in the Hansley conspiracy until his arrest on November 9, 1990. Ironically, like the defendant in Garcia, Bennett continued to engage in drug-related, conspiratorial activity for over eighteen months. Although Bennett's 1989 conviction may have resulted from criminal conduct taken in furtherance of the Hansley conspiracy, he continued to engage in the conspiracy for a significant period of time. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in enhancing Bennett's sentence based on his 1989 conviction.
46 Bennett also argues that his two prior convictions were mere possession offenses, and that Congress did not intend for such simple violations to stand as a predicate for a mandatory term of life imprisonment under section 841(b)(1)(A). Bennett's contention presents an issue of [s]tatutory interpretation[, which] is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 600 (11th Cir.1994) (construing enhancement provision in section 841(b)(1)(A)). 47 In 1991, when the district court sentenced Bennett, the definition of a prior felony drug offense appeared in section 841(b)(1)(A). The definition provided: 48 the term felony drug offense means an offense that is a felony under any provision of this subchapter or any other Federal law that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances or a felony under any law of a State or a foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances. 49 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A) (1990). 7 The definition does not contain any language excluding state felonies for simple possession. Thus, under the plain language of the statute, it appears that a felony drug offense includes any criminal conduct relating to narcotics, including simple possession, which a state has proscribed as a felony. 8 50 Furthermore, in a different recidivist provision, Congress has used the language serious drug offense as opposed to felony drug offense. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e) (emphasis added). In defining serious drug offense, section 924(e) limits such convictions to offense[s] under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Thus, the definition of serious drug offense excludes state convictions for simple possession. We can only conclude that if Congress meant to place a similar limitation on section 841(b)(1)(A), it would have used the serious drug offense language and it would have provided a similar definition. Thus, we reject Bennett's second argument and affirm his life sentence.