Opinion ID: 2508696
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Shootout

Text: Wilkerson's challenges to admission of the evidence of his shootout with Deshazer have varied over time. Before and during trial he focused primarily on persuading the judge that any evidence of the shootout could be admitted only under K.S.A. 60-455 and thus would require a limiting instruction consistent with that statute. Although the judge did not accept the argument that K.S.A. 60-455 applied and admitted the evidence independent of it, he invited the defense to submit a limiting instruction of its own design for his consideration. The defense did not do so. In his appellate brief, Wilkerson argued that the evidence should not have been admitted because it 1) does not directly establish the crime charged as required by the `other crimes' rule, and 2) the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed, by far, any probative value the unreliable testimony of Sean Deshazer may have possessed. The probative value/prejudicial effect balance echoes the third factor in evaluating K.S.A. 60-455 evidence, see State v. McHenry, 276 Kan. 513, 519, 78 P.3d 403 (2003), as well as other relevant evidence, see K.S.A. 60-422. Finally, at oral argument before this court, Wilkerson's counsel resurrected the K.S.A. 60-455 argument, asserting that the shootout evidence could have been admitted only if accompanied by an instruction limiting its consideration for the purpose of proving motive or identity, i.e., that Wilkerson had a motive to kill Lattimore because of his shootout with Lattimore's friend or that the gun Wilkerson used in the shootout was the same gun used by Lattimore's killer. We first address Wilkerson's K.S.A. 60-455 argument. The statute provides in pertinent part: [E]vidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion. . . is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion, but . . . such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. The State insists that Wilkerson waived or abandoned his argument based on this statute by failing to submit a proposed limiting instruction to the district judge and by failing to argue the issue sufficiently in his appellate brief. We are satisfied that Wilkerson has done what is necessary both at trial and on appeal to require us to address the issue. Many previous cases have held that, when evidence is admitted by the prosecution in a criminal trial to demonstrate one of the material facts listed in K.S.A. 60-455, a limiting instruction must be given to guard against the jury's use of the evidence merely to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal behavior. See, e.g., State v. Denney, 258 Kan. 437, 443, 905 P.2d 657 (1995); State v. Whitehead, 226 Kan. 719, 722, 602 P.2d 1263 (1979); State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168, 176, 523 P.2d 397 (1974). On appeal, we review a district judge's performance of the analysis necessitated by the statute on an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., McHenry, 276 Kan. at 519; State v. Higgenbotham, 271 Kan. 582, 588-89, 23 P.3d 874 (2001). Here, we agree with Wilkerson that evidence of the shootout was relevant to demonstrate motive and identity, but it was also relevant to explain the tit-for-tat sequence of events leading to the murder, the pattern and reliability of the police investigation, and the history of the parties' relationship, particularly the context for the killer's statements to Lattimore about his homeboys. The evidence also bolstered the credibility of Gibson's eventual identification of Wilkerson as the shooter; it demonstrated that she had heard from his own mouth and seen a demonstration of his willingness to avenge betrayal, making her hesitant to identify him. Under all of these circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision that the shootout evidence could be admitted independent of K.S.A. 60-455. In addition, although the better practice may have been to give a modified limiting instruction  one that cautioned the jury not to use the evidence to demonstrate propensity but allowed it to use the evidence for other purposes, including but not limited to motive and identity  we see no error in failing to give such an instruction on the unique facts presented here. The shootout evidence was so interwoven with the commission of the charged crimes and with the investigation leading to Wilkerson's apprehension that we see little or no chance the jury would have relied on that evidence only to demonstrate his general propensity toward criminality. We next address Wilkerson's argument regarding the other crimes rule. The rule is derived from our decisions in State v. Schlicher, 230 Kan. 482, 490, 639 P.2 467 (1982); State v. Holt, 228 Kan. 16, 21, 612 P.2d 570 (1980); and State v. Solem, 220 Kan. 471, Syl. ¶ 3, 552 P.2d 951 (1976). It states simply: Evidence which is otherwise relevant in a criminal action is not rendered inadmissible because it may disclose another or independent offense. Solem, 220 Kan. 471, Syl. ¶ 3. Moreover, evidence which has a direct bearing on and relation to commission of an offense is admissible without a limiting instruction. Solem, 220 Kan. at 476 (citing State v. Martin, 208 Kan. 950, Syl. ¶ 2, 495 P. 2d 89 [1972]). In Solem, we upheld a district court's admission of a prior uncharged offer to sell drugs attributed to defendant. We said: In the instant case the record discloses continuing contacts related to drugs, between the agents of the attorney general's office and defendant. The statement attributed to defendant tended to prove those contacts existed and eventually led to the transaction which resulted in defendant's arrest. Defendant's prior offer to sell the drugs was relevant and material to his ultimate sale of drugs to the agent. As stated in Martin, the fact the questioned evidence related to a prior crime . . . does not prohibit its introduction to show commission of the offense charged. Solem, 220 Kan. at 476. In Holt, which Wilkerson urges us to overrule, we upheld the admission of evidence that the defendant had threatened one individual with a gun sometime prior to shooting a second individual with the same gun. There, we said: This evidence was not offered under K.S.A. 60-455 to prove motive or any of the other factors listed in that statute, nor was it introduced in rebuttal to evidence of defendant's good character. It was offered to show that defendant had the alleged murder weapon in his possession prior to the killing with which he was charged. As such it was relevant for a purpose independent of K.S.A. 60-455, and thus the criteria of that statute are inapplicable and no § 455 limiting instruction is required. Holt, 228 Kan. at 21. Finally, in Schlicher, we upheld the admission of incriminating statements alleged to have been made by the defendant long after the charged crime, even though an explanation of their context revealed other criminal activity he had engaged in. We said: As pointed out in State v. Martin , . . . the admissibility of evidence tending directly to establish a crime is not destroyed because it discloses the commission of another and separate offense. . . . In each instance, the testimony about other crimes was admissible to show the background and circumstances present when the defendant made damaging admissions which connected him with the commission of the [charged] homicide. The admissions themselves were clearly relevant and admissible to show the defendant had particular knowledge about the circumstances of the crime and his participation therein. Schlicher, 230 Kan. at 490. A version of the rule of these cases has now found its way into the Comment to PIK Crim. 3d 52.06, which states: Evidence tending directly to establish the crime charged is not rendered inadmissible because it discloses the commission of another and separate offense. (Emphasis added.) PIK Crim. 3d 52.06, Comment III B(6). Wilkerson focuses his argument on the word directly. The other crimes rule cannot apply to him, he contends, because the shootout evidence only circumstantially linked him to the murder and was more prejudicial than probative. He also insists that Deshazer's credibility was highly questionable. Where evidence is admissible independent of K.S.A. 60-455, the primary test for its admission is its relevance to an issue in question. State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 853, 26 P.3d 657 (2001). Further, [t]he admission of evidence independent of K.S.A. 60-455 is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Deal, 271 Kan. 483, 501, 23 P.3d 840 (2001). A review of our cases persuades us that the inclusion of the word directly in the other crimes rule is misleading. In fact, direct evidence of the crime charged is not required. We have held that circumstantial evidence linking a defendant to a murder weapon, the modus operandi of the crime charged, or the victim is admissible under the rule. See Holt, 228 Kan. at 21 (evidence defendant brandished gun similar to murder weapon before murder admissible to show possession); State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 29-30, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (evidence of logically connected similar incident admissible when same gun used in both shootings); Deal, 271 Kan. 483 (evidence of defendant's earlier threats admissible to show rocky relationship with victim). To the extent the shootout evidence was circumstantial rather than direct evidence against Wilkerson, the distinction is of no moment. We agree with the State that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this relevant evidence, which had a tendency in reason to prove several material facts. State v. Lietner, 272 Kan. 398, 412, 34 P.3d 42 (2001) (defining relevant evidence). Cf. State v. Coburn, 32 Kan. App. 2d 657, 671, 87 P.3d 348, 360 (2004) (Johnson, J., concurring) (difficult to distinguish evidence to prove some other material fact under K.S.A. 60-455 from evidence admissible independently for its direct bearing on and relation to commission of charged offense). Finally, we also agree with the State that the district court struck a sound balance between the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the evidence. It was reasonable to conclude that the evidence was highly probative. In contrast, the relative blameworthiness of the shootout and the charged crimes made undue prejudice unlikely. Wilkerson's argument regarding Deshazer's credibility is addressed to the wrong decision-making body. It is not this court's function to weigh witness credibility. See State v. Moore, 269 Kan. 27, 30, 4 P.3d 1141 (2000).