Opinion ID: 200653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the Accrual Standard

Text: 48 In some applications of the discovery rule to the question of accrual, there will be an issue about the reasonable diligence of the plaintiff in investigating the fact and cause of her injury. In the Skwira family's case, their reasonable diligence is not at issue. Rather, we can resolve the question of accrual, as did the district court, on the basis of the information the family received from government officials and the local press, prior to any independent inquiry undertaken by the family. The district court concluded that the Skwira family's cause of action accrued, at the latest, the day after Skwira's autopsy (in November 1996), when the family first learned that Skwira did not die of the causes listed on his death certificate. By that point in time, the family had knowledge of the numerous press reports describing an ongoing investigation into the unusually high number of deaths in the same ward in which Skwira died. Those reports indicated that the actions of a particular nurse were the focus of the investigation. When government investigators asked the Skwira family for permission to exhume Skwira's body, they informed the family that they had suspicions about the high number of deaths at the VAMC during a relatively brief window of time that included the period in which Skwira was hospitalized. Finally, the autopsy demonstrated conclusively that the cause of death listed on Skwira's death certificate was incorrect. These accumulated facts provided a sufficient basis in November 1996 for a reasonable person to believe that there was a causal connection between the injury (Skwira's death) and the acts or omissions of a government employee. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations clock began ticking at that point. 49 The family's subjective beliefs, described in deposition and trial testimony, reinforces the correctness of this conclusion. Skwira's son Philip testified in his deposition that it was a surprise that Skwira had died of a cardiac event since he had been admitted only for treatment of his alcoholism. Skwira's daughter Marsha Yarrows testified at Gilbert's criminal trial that she was shocked by the unexpected news of Skwira's cardiac arrest, and during her deposition she also expressed her belief that his care at the VAMC had been inadequate. 50 Yarrows also testified during Gilbert's trial that she had read the press reports regarding a murder investigation into deaths on Ward C. She stated that when she read these accounts, it was like a light bulb went off because I knew that was exactly what had happened to my father. She also testified that after reading the newspaper accounts, 51 It — it really bothered me, and even though my father's name wasn't mentioned as being one of the people who was investigated, I knew right then and there that that was exactly what had happened to him, that he was one of those people that they must be investigating the death of. 52 Despite this realization, and despite the press reports and the information provided by investigators after the autopsy, the Skwira family insists that their claim did not accrue in November 1996 since [t]he critical facts regarding the existence and cause of [Skwira's] injury were inherently unknowable until June of 1998. The government was in possession of Skwira's heart and tissue samples until that time, and the technology and testing protocols for detecting epinephrine were, by and large, invented for the Gilbert prosecution. Hence, the family argues, there was no way they could have known in November 1996 the actual cause of Skwira's death, and the statute of limitations should be tolled until they did. See Gonzalez, 284 F.3d at 288-89 (indicating that statute of limitations may be tolled if the factual basis for the cause of action [is] `inherently unknowable') (quoting Attallah, 955 F.2d at 780). 53 The Skwira family reads inherently unknowable too broadly. The factual basis of a claim is inherently unknowable when, as in Attallah, there are no facts discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence which would permit a plaintiff to reasonably believe that her injury is connected with some act of the government. See Attallah, 955 F.2d at 780. As explained above, by November 1996 the Skwira family was aware of press reports concerning the suspicious deaths on Ward C; they knew that the government had begun a criminal investigation into Skwira's death; and they knew that the cause of death printed on Skwira's death certificate was incorrect. This information provided sufficient knowledge to start the limitations clock ticking in November 1996. From that point in time, the family had two years to seek out independent legal and medical advice to determine if they should file an administrative claim against the VA. Moreover, as we explained in Part III, supra, to file an administrative claim and preserve ones rights under the FTCA, one need only be in possession of sufficient information for the agency to investigate the claims. Santiago-Ramirez, 984 F.2d at 19. 54 We realize that considerable enquiry and investigation may be necessary before [a plaintiff] can make a responsible judgment about the actionability of her claim. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 556, 120 S.Ct. 1075. The Skwira family may have felt that need acutely in the difficult circumstances of this case. However, as the Supreme Court noted in Rotella, identifying professional negligence may also be a matter of real complexity, and its discovery is not required before the statute starts running. Id. (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122, 124, 100 S.Ct. 352). One does not have to be certain of actionability in order to submit an administrative claim. 17 Simply put, the Skwira family failed to meet the modest burden of filing an administrative claim within two years of the claim's accrual. 18 The district court therefore properly dismissed the action. 19