Opinion ID: 778880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pervasively Sectarian Test

Text: 27 The district court concluded that Lipscomb University is a pervasively sectarian institution. The district court set forth the law governing this analysis as follows: 28 The pervasively sectarian test is based on the line of cases beginning with Tilton [v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971)], and extending through Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988). In Hunt v. McNair, the Court found that aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting. 413 U.S. 734, 743, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973). Thus, the rule under the pervasively sectarian test, as stated in Roemer v. Board of Publ. Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976), is that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so `pervasively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones.... 426 U.S. at 755, 96 S.Ct. 2337. 29 Steele, 117 F.Supp.2d at 707 (parallel citations omitted). 30 The district court made the following finding: 31 The evidence presented in the depositions and literature of Lipscomb shows that, while Lipscomb may effectively teach a wide variety of secular courses, the central mission of the school is to inculcate and promote Churches of Christ doctrine as the true word of God. Students are taught entirely by Churches of Christ members; are informed of the importance of the Bible in all areas of their lives; are expected to attend Bible courses and chapel on a daily basis and surrounded by an environment thoroughly saturated by Churches of Christ doctrine. The school does not follow the Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom of the AAUP, and the section of the faculty handbook dealing with research states that the primary aim of every instructor should be to give superior academic instruction, emphasizing daily instruction in the Bible. Lipscomb's Board of Directors, which controls all major decisions of the school, contains only members of the Church of Christ. Christian education is one of the three principal duties of the president of the school. In this environment, the chance that religion would seep into the teaching of secular subjects, as discussed in Roemer, 426 U.S. at 751, 96 S.Ct. at 2347, seems inevitable. 32 Id. at 715 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the district court found that Lipscomb University is a pervasively sectarian institution. 33 The vitality of the pervasively sectarian test is questionable in light of subsequent, more recent decisions from the Supreme Court. In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000), six of nine Justices rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to loans of educational materials directly to parochial schools. Justice Souter pointed out in his dissenting opinion that [N]o one, indeed, disputes ... that the Roman Catholic schools which made up the majority of the private schools participating, were pervasively sectarian.... In his plurality opinion, Justice Thomas responded by stating that: 34 [T]he dissent is correct that there was a period of time when this factor mattered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian school was a primary or secondary school. But that period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past. 35 Id. at 826, 120 S.Ct. 2530. Justice Thomas went on to note that the pervasively sectarian analysis, born of bigotry, should be buried now. Id. at 829, 120 S.Ct. 2530. 36 Yet, Mitchell is a plurality opinion. Thus, the district court, and this Court, are still bound by pre- Mitchell law with regard to the pervasively sectarian doctrine. As the district court correctly noted: 37 It is well settled that in a plurality opinion, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 354 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)); see also, Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764, fn. 9, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Reese v. City of Columbus, 71 F.3d 619, 625 (6th Cir.1995). In Mitchell, there is no single part of any opinion that commands the support of a majority of the Court. As a result, the only binding precedent of Mitchell is the holding. See Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to be A Part: The Precendential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 Colum. L.Rev.2083, 2084-85 (1995); Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 Cornell L.Rev. 593, 1596-98 (1992). 38 Steele, 117 F.Supp.2d at 706 (parallel citations omitted). 39 Further, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that the lower courts are to treat its prior cases as controlling until the Supreme Court itself specifically overrules them. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). In reaffirming its prior mandate the Court noted in Agostini that if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Id. citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). It is for the Supreme Court, not this Court, to jettison the pervasively sectarian test, which it has not done. 40 Regardless of whether the pervasively sectarian test is still the law, we conclude that, given the nature of the aid in question, the issue of the bonds does not offend the Establishment Clause. 41