Opinion ID: 1520158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The father's second contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence of a clear and convincing nature on which the District Court could base the order to terminate his parental rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (Supp.1985). Specifically, he argues that the record does not sufficiently support either of the District Court findings that provided alternative grounds for terminating the father's parental rights; namely, 1) that he is unable to protect Randy from jeopardy and that those circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs, § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i); and 2) that he is unable to take responsibility for Randy within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs, § 40-55(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii). The gravamen of the father's complaint is that his parental rights were terminated because of his long-term incarceration rather than because of any defect in his relationship with his son. Incarceration of a parent, standing alone, does not furnish a ground for automatic termination of parental rights. In re Daniel C., 480 A.2d 766, 768-69 (Me.1984). Incarceration, however, does not insulate an inmate from the termination of his parental rights if the record contains the clear and convincing evidence that would support the termination of the rights of any other parent. Id. In the case at bar there was ample evidence before the District Court to support its finding that the father is unable to protect Randy from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet Randy's needs. Under 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(6)(A) jeopardy may be evidenced by serious harm, which itself may be proved by showing severe anxiety, depression or withdrawal, untoward aggressive behavior or similar serious dysfunctional behavior on the part of the child. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(10)(B) (Supp.1985). See also In re Dean A., 491 A.2d 572, 574-75 (Me.1985). The testimony at the hearing showed that Randy has suffered and will continue to suffer emotional trauma unless he is free to be adopted and can achieve a situation of stability. A psychological evaluation of Randy showed that he was a severely disturbed young boy that would need psychotherapy for years and that he needed an extremely stable foster home where the parents resolved problems cooperatively, rather than through violence. Frank Walsh, a clinical social worker involved with Randy and his family, testified that if by chance the father was released from prison it would still be impossible to reintegrate Randy into the father's home: I don't see any way that that could possibly happen without Randy needing to be institutionalized, or at least placed in residential treatment. Walsh recommended adoption as soon as possible because of Randy's age (now 13¾ years) and the fact that he would become even more difficult to adopt if termination of the father's parental rights was delayed. Furthermore, there was testimony that there existed a direct correlation between Randy's contacts with his father and his psychological deterioration. The District Court was well justified in finding, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, that the father could not protect Randy from jeopardy within a time calculated to meet Randy's needs. Having so found, we need not consider whether the District Court's alternative ground for terminating the father's parental rights (namely, his inability to take responsibility for Randy within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs) was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Under 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b), either of the District Court's basic findings is independently adequate to justify the termination of parental rights. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.