Opinion ID: 1990299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Rhode Island Condominium Act

Text: Adopted in 1982, chapter 36.1 of title 34, as enacted by P.L. 1982, ch. 329, § 2, is known as the Rhode Island Condominium Act (Condominium Act). The Condominium Act was made applicable to any condominium created in Rhode Island after July 1, 1982. See § 34-36.1-1.02(a)(1); see also America Condominium Association, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117, 127 (R.I.2004). This Court has previously observed that the Condominium Act `contains a strong consumer protection flavor', and has remarked upon the statute's clear direction that, except where it expressly provides for the possibility, provisions of the statute are not to be modified by agreement. America Condominium Association, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 870 A.2d 434, 437 (R.I.2005). In view of the fact that the Newport On-Shore Condominium was created in 1985, it unquestionably falls within the purview of the Condominium Act. This case requires us to analyze whether the provision of the Newport On-Shore Condominium's declaration that allows the board of directors to alter the method of fee assessment contravenes the mandates of the Condominium Act. The allocation of common expenses is addressed in § 34-36.1-2.07(a) of the Condominium Act. It provides as follows: The declaration shall allocate a fraction or percentage of undivided interests in the common elements and in the common expenses of the association, and a portion of the votes in the association, to each unit    and state the formulas used to establish those allocations. Section 34-36.1-3.15 describes the method of assessment for common expenses and provides in pertinent part: (b)(1) Except for assessments under subsections (c)(e), all common expenses must be assessed against all the units in accordance with the allocations set forth in the declaration pursuant to § 34-36.1-2.07(a). (Emphasis added.) The exceptions that are set forth in subsection (c) of § 34-36.1-3.15 [3] stipulate that, to the extent required by the declaration, the distribution of certain costs among members may be based on a method that correlates the percentage of benefits received with the percentage of costs paid. For example, subsection (c)(1) of § 34-36.1-3.15 authorizes, to the extent required by the declaration, the assessment of costs for a limited common element against the units to which that element is assigned. The subsection allows such assessment to be made equally, or in any other proportion that the declaration provides. Id. Subsection (c)(2) provides that, to the extent required by the declaration, [a]ny common expense or portion thereof benefiting fewer than all of the units must be assessed exclusively against the units benefited[.] Subsection (c)(3) provides for a similar assessment for disproportionate benefit gained from insurance. The plaintiffs argue that a particular provision of the Marina Declaration, Article VI, violates the mandates of the just-cited statutory provisions. Article VI of the Marina Declaration delineates the maintenance fees and other assessments, providing in relevant part as follows: The Maintenance Fee for each Marina Unit shall be determined by applying a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of Marina Units owned by a particular Marina Owner and the denominator of which is the total number of Marina Units in the Marina as of the first day of each fiscal year of the Marina Association, to the total of all Common Expenses    and shall then be assessed against and prorated among all of the Marina Unit Owners in proportion to the number of Marina Units owned. Provided, however, that the Board of Directors may, in its reasonable discretion, allocate between Marina Slips of differing size those budget items which it determines are reasonably related to the size of a slip.    Such an allocation, if adopted, will result in Marina Unit Owners being assessed different Maintenance Fees based on the size of slip used. (Emphasis added.) Mindful of the fact that this Court is the final arbiter with respect to questions of statutory construction, we shall now proceed to employ our long-established procedure for interpreting statutes. New England Expedition-Providence, LLC v. City of Providence, 773 A.2d 259, 263 (R.I.2001). In analyzing a statute comprised of language that is clear and unambiguous, this Court applies the statute as written by giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning. See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 960 (R.I.2007); see also State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I.1998). When this Court must decide what the General Assembly intended when it enacted a particular statute, we always begin with the principle that the plain statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent. Chambers, 935 A.2d at 961 (internal quotation marks omitted). The clear language of the Condominium Act unambiguously states that the differential method of assessing the expenses of a condominium association is permissiblebut only to the extent required by the declaration. The declaration of Newport On-Shore Marina, Inc. does not require a footage-based assessment of the costs of operating the marina. Instead, the declaration provides that the maintenance fee for each marina unit shall be determined by dividing equally among the units the common expenses. Later in the text of that same declaration, the board of directors is provided with the discretion to allocate, based on slip size rather than ownership percentage, certain budgetary items which it determines are related to slip size. In no sense can we conclude that such language, which vests the board of directors with discretion to change the method of assessing the marina's costs, requires that a footage-based method of assessment be employed. As such, Article VI's grant of discretion in that regard clearly violates the crucial criterion set forth in § 34-36.1-3.15. We agree with the hearing justice's observation that the Defendants overlook the use of the term `required' in the introductory statement of § 34-36.1-3.15(c)   . We further agree with the hearing justice's statutory construction, in which he stated that [a] plain reading of the statute reveals that in order for the exceptions    to apply, the declaration must require a different assessment method. We therefore conclude that the board of directors' modification of the method of assessing common expenses violated the plain language of the Condominium Act. Because Article VI of the Marina Declaration here at issue contravenes the express mandates of the Rhode Island Condominium Act, the decision of the hearing justice to grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs must be affirmed.