Opinion ID: 6491069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of the Corpus Distribution Provision

Text: Appellants maintain that the circuit court erred in determining that the corpus is to be distributed among the grandchildren per cap-ita. Appellants contend that the phrases “share and share alike” and “by right of representation” in the corpus distribution provision apply only to the issue of any deceased grandchildren and not to the grandchildren themselves. Appellants then argue that, inasmuch as the foregoing phrases apply only to the issue of any deceased grandchildren, the remaining phrase “divide and distribute” calls for the grandchildren to take their share of the corpus by right of representation or per stirpes. Other jurisdictions have construed corpus distribution provisions similar to the one in the instant trust. In Condee v. Trout, 379 Ill. 89, 39 N.E.2d 350 (1942), the Illinois Supreme Court (the court) was faced with construing the following corpus distribution provision in a will: At the end of fifteen (15) years after my death I direct that my executors and trustees shall distribute all of my property in equal parts to my children and grandchildren then living. In case of the death of any one of my children leaving heirs of their body or blood, such child or children shall take the part or parts from my estate that would [ha]ve gone to their mother if living. Id. at 351 (emphases added). The appellants contended that the foregoing provision clearly mandates a per capita distribution. Id. The appellees, on the other hand, argued that the foregoing provision dictates that the testator “did not intend that his grandchildren ... take in competition with their living mothers and plainly indicates an intent for a stirpital distribution.” Id. The court noted that, standing alone, the phrase “in equal parts to my children and grandchildren then living” indicates “that a per capita distribution was intended.” Id. at 352 (emphasis added). The court then stated that the latter phrase “[i]n case of the death of any one of my children leaving heirs of their body or blood, such child or children shall take the part or parts from my estate that would have gone to their mother if living” was an “expressed intention that a child or children of a deceased child of the testator shall take per stirpes the share that would have gone to the mother if living at the time of distribution.” Id. The court went on to note that, “[i]f a per capita distribution was intended!,] there clearly could be no necessity for the provision for per stirpes distribution to the grandchildren whose mother had deceased, nor would such have been a fair and even distribution to them.” Id. Consequently, the court held that the corpus was to be divided equally among the children, with the share of any deceased child going to his or her issue per stirpes. Id. at 353. In In re Craighead’s Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 301 (Pa.Orph.1955), the Orphans’ Court of Pennsylvania (the court) was faced with two corpus distribution provisions in a will. Id. at 302. The first provision, which was before the court for interpretation, stated: Immediately upon the death of my said daughter, Bertha, I direct my trustees to pay over the balance of principal of said trust fund, together with any accrued and undistributed income thereon, to such of my children as may then be living and the issue of such as may be dead, equally share and share alike. Id. (emphasis added). At the time of Bertha’s death, the testator had no living children but had living grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and great-great-grandchildren. Id. Another provision of the will, which was not before the court for interpretation, stated: In the event there shall be no issue then living of Horace M. Craighead, Jr.,[ 6 ] I direct my trustees to convey and divide the said trust principal among my then living children and the issue of any deceased child, such issue to take the share their parent would have taken if living. Id. (emphasis added). The court stated that [t]he use of the phrase, “equally share and share alike,” in lieu of the phrase, “such issue to take the share their parent would have taken if living,” shows that [the testator] intended that in the case of the trust for his daughter [ie., the first provision] on distribution there should be an equal division of the estate per capita between the children and issue of deceased children. Id. at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also observed that the testator “knew how to direct a per stirpes distribution when [he] so intended[,]” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), inasmuch as the second provision included words of stirpital distribution. Finally, the court noted that, “in the absence of other language disclosing an intention to distribute stirpitally, the words ‘equally to be divided,’ ‘divided into equal parts,’ and the like, ordinarily favor distribution per capita rather than per stirpes.” Id. at 303-04 (internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted). Consequently, the court held that the first provision mandates an equal division of the corpus per capita between the children and the issue of deceased children. Id. at 304. In this case, contrary to Appellants’ position, the phrase “share and share alike” clearly applies to both the grandchildren and the issue of any deceased grandchildren, as in the trusts construed in Condee and Craig-head’s Estate. However, we agree with Appellants that the phrase “by right of representation” applies only to the issue of any deceased grandchildren and not to the grandchildren themselves. As such, consistent with Condee and Craighead’s Estate, we believe that the phrase “between and among the grandchildren of [the Robinsons] and the issue of any deceased grandchild of theirs, share and share alike,” standing alone, indicates that a per capita distribution was intended for the grandchildren and the issue of any deceased grandchildren. “Words such as ‘in equal shares,’ ‘divided equally,’ and ‘share and share alike ’ usually import equal treatment, or a division per capita.” In re Lopez, 64 Haw. 44, 57, 636 P.2d 731, 739 (1981) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, the following phrase “such issue to take by right of representation” clearly directs that the issue of any deceased grandchild, not the grandchildren themselves, takes his or her deceased parent’s share per stirpes. Essentially, this latter phrase denotes that the Robinsons did not intend the issue of any deceased grandchildren of theirs to take in competition with their living grandchildren. Because there is an absence of language disclosing an intention to distribute the corpus stirpitally to the grandparents, a reasonable construction of the trust dictates that the Robinsons’ grandchildren are to take per capita, that is, each surviving grandchild and each predeceased grandchild who left surviving issue takes an equal share of the corpus upon the termination of the trust.