Opinion ID: 1959972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: circuit courts' authority under krs 533.250(2)

Text: In creating Kentucky's Pretrial Diversion Program, the General Assembly provided: The Commonwealth's attorney shall make a recommendation upon each application for pretrial diversion to the Circuit Judge in the court in which the case would be tried. The court may approve or disapprove the diversion. [21] And, in resolving the primary issue before the Court, our task is to ascertain the legislature's intentions in the second sentence of this subsection, i.e., [t]he court may approve or disapprove the diversion. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court's authority to approve an application for pretrial diversion exists only when the Commonwealth makes a favorable recommendation. Appellee Elliott, however, argues that the statutory scheme contemplates circumstances under which a trial court would grant diversion without the Commonwealth's agreement. Because the statutory language does not speak directly to this issue, we must interpret a statute that we find susceptible to reasonable alternative interpretations. Although we recognize that the issue before the Court addresses itself only to a narrow question of statutory interpretation  i.e., whether, under KRS 533.250(2), a circuit court has the authority to approve a pretrial diversion application over the Commonwealth's objection  and that the constitutionality of this enactment is not before the Court, we observe that, if there are two ways to reasonably construe a statute, one upholding the validity and the other rendering it unconstitutional, we `must adopt the construction which sustains the constitutionality of the statute.' [22] Because we conclude that Appellee Elliott interprets KRS 533.250(2) in a manner that would assign purely executive functions to the judiciary  i.e., an interpretation that would upset the separation of powers mandated by Kentucky's Constitution  we endorse the Commonwealth's interpretation and hold that KRS 533.250(2) authorizes circuit courts to grant applications for pretrial diversion only with the Commonwealth's agreement. In interpreting the scope of the authority granted to circuit courts under KRS 533.250(2), we initially observe that the title of the  Pretrial Diversion Program created by the General Assembly is misleading. KRS 533.250(1)(e) states that, [a]ny person shall be required to enter an Alford plea or a plea of guilty as a condition of pretrial diversion. [23] Thus, unlike the more typical, deferred-prosecution diversion schemes  such as the one authorized in district courts by our Rules of Criminal Procedure [24]  the type of diversion program that the legislature has authorized for Class D felony charges in circuit courts is not, in any meaningful sense, pretrial. Contrary to Appellee Elliott's argument, however, KRS 533.250 diversion cannot be characterized as simply a sentencing alternative  akin to a sentence of probation or conditional discharge  which is available for the trial court's consideration. The most significant distinguishing feature is that, unlike a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or conditional discharge, admission into a diversion program permits a defendant who successfully completes diversion to avoid a felony conviction entirely. And, we conclude that this interruption of prosecution prior to final disposition requires the Commonwealth's agreement. It is manifest that the prosecution of crime is an executive function and that the duty of the executive department is to enforce the criminal laws. [25] Although it is beyond dispute that the executive branch's prosecutorial function includes the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, [26] it is argued in favor of Appellee Elliott's interpretation of KRS 533.250(2) that, after the grand jury returns an indictment, the disposition of a criminal matter is exclusively a judicial function. We observe, however, that this view of the scope of prosecutorial authority is contradicted not only by established understandings of this authority, [27] but also by Kentucky statutory law and the precedent of this Court and its predecessor. In defining the duties of Commonwealth's attorneys, the General Assembly clearly contemplated that they would perform executive prosecutorial functions both before and after indictment: The Commonwealth's attorney shall ... have the duty to prosecute all violations of the criminal and penal laws which are to be tried in the Circuit Court in his judicial circuit. In addition, he shall have the primary responsibility within his judicial circuit to present evidence to the grand jury concerning such violations. [28] And, because prosecutors have the sole discretion whether to engage in plea bargaining with a defendant, [29] this court and its predecessor have held that, unless the Commonwealth consents, courts cannot: (1) accept pleas of guilty and unilaterally limit the sentences which may be imposed; [30] (2) amend a charge prior to the presentation of evidence; [31] or (3) dismiss a valid indictment: [W]here an indictment, for any cause, is to be dismissed or filed away, it can only be done upon motion of the commonwealth's attorney, or the county attorney who may be acting for him .... A prosecution by indictment is a litigation in which the state is plaintiff or complainant, and is represented by the commonwealth's attorney. The judge does not represent the state any more than he does the defendant in the prosecution. His right to control the prosecution goes only to the extent of determining whether the indictment is good on demurrer. If he holds it to be a good indictment, he is without power to direct its dismissal. [32] By approving a defendant's application for pretrial diversion, a circuit court permits the defendant to embark upon a path, which, if successfully negotiated, will result in the defendant's charges being dismissed-diverted  a status indistinguishable from any other dismissal as it is defined by statute as one that shall not constitute a criminal conviction. [33] Appellee Elliott argues that a circuit court's authority to unilaterally order pretrial diversion is tantamount to the court's authority under KRS 431.078 to expunge misdemeanor and violation convictions because, after expungement, the proceedings in the case shall be deemed never to have occurred. [34] In response to this claim, and with the caveat that the constitutionality of KRS 431.078 is not an issue before the Court, we observe that the authority granted by KRS 431.078 arises only after the executive branch has discharged its prosecutorial function  in fact, it does not arise until any sentence imposed has been fully executed because KRS 431.078 permits expungement no sooner than five (5) years after the completion of the person's sentence or five (5) years after the successful completion of the person's probation, whichever occurs later. [35] As such, unlike Appellee Elliott's interpretation of KRS 533.250(2), the expungement authority granted by KRS 431.078 does not permit the judiciary to exercise executive authority by interrupting the prosecution prior to final disposition. To interpret KRS 533.250(2) as permitting a trial court to approve pretrial diversion applications over the Commonwealth's objection  and thus conferring upon circuit courts the discretionary authority that we have previously held to be within the exclusive province of the executive branch  would construe it in a manner inconsistent with Kentucky's constitutional separation of powers provisions. [36] In accordance with the rule of statutory construction referenced above, we therefore hold that KRS 533.250(2) gives a circuit court the discretion to approve or disapprove an application for pretrial diversion only when the Commonwealth has recommended that the court approve the application. Thus, in cases such as Appellee Elliott's, where the Commonwealth objects to pretrial diversion, circuit courts cannot unilaterally approve a defendant's diversion application.