Opinion ID: 169045
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof at Sentencing

Text: After listening to Mr. Cole’s arguments during the second sentencing hearing, the District Court concluded that his statements concerning self-defense “do not overcome the weight of the foregoing facts and admissions.” According to Mr. Cole, in finding that his statements “do not overcome” the weight of certain facts and admissions, the court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the Government to him. But as discussed above, the court based the enhancement solely on admitted facts. In other words, the Government had no burden to prove sentencing facts that Mr. Cole had already admitted, and the court did not engage in any judicial fact-finding. In the absence of any new 3 Under Kansas law, “[a] person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such aggressor’s imminent use of unlawful force.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3211 (2005), amended by 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 194. 4 In Kansas, a person commits an aggravated assault if he or she uses “a deadly weapon,” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3410 (2005), and “intentionally plac[es] another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm,” id. § 21-3408. -7- evidence, the court clearly did not err in concluding that the facts Mr. Cole admitted in his plea agreement establish the felony offense of aggravated assault for purposes of the enhancement. Similarly, because the enhancement was based on facts Mr. Cole admitted, rather than facts found by a judge, Mr. Cole’s argument that sentencing facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is misplaced. But even if the enhancement were based on judge-found facts, his argument would fail. After Booker, sentencing facts, including facts concerning uncharged conduct, need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as Mr. Cole argues. Rather, as long as a district court applies the Guidelines in an advisory fashion, facts may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. RodriguezFelix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In the aftermath of Booker, we have routinely permitted a district court to enhance a defendant’s sentence using uncharged conduct proven to the court by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Provided the resulting sentence is within the range authorized by the statute under which the defendant was convicted, judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence does not violate the Constitution. United States v. Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1319 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that sentencing facts under the advisory Guidelines need only be found by a preponderance of the evidence because “a conviction, by itself, authorizes a sentence up to the statutory maximum”). -8-