Opinion ID: 1057290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stigma in the Present Case

Text: ¶ 15. In the trial below, plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law on the stigma-plus claim at the close of defendants' case. V.R.C.P. 50. He argued he had proven both that defendants stigmatized him in the process of terminating his employment and that the January 2002 meeting with the school board was not an adequate name-clearing hearing. After the superior court denied his Rule 50 motion, the jury found, on the parties' special verdict form, that the school district had not violated plaintiff's due process rights by the manner in which it terminated his employment without providing a proper hearing. Plaintiff renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law on his due process claim, and when that motion was again denied, he appealed here. ¶ 16. We review judgment as a matter of law under the same standard as the trial court. Gero v. J.W.J. Realty, 171 Vt. 57, 59, 757 A.2d 475, 477 (2000). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, excluding the effect of any modifying evidence. Monahan v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 2005 VT 110, ¶ 2, 179 Vt. 167, 893 A.2d 298. In this case, the wording of the special verdict form merged two separate issues involved in this stigma-plus claim into one question. The issues might have been better put to the jury by asking first whether plaintiff had been stigmatized by defendants in the course of his termination from employment, then, if that question was answered in the affirmative, asking whether defendants failed to provide plaintiff an adequate name-clearing hearing. Instead, the special verdict form in this case asked both questions at once. Consequently, by answering in the negative to the compound question asked, the jury may have arrived at either of two conclusions: first, that plaintiff was not stigmatized, or, second, that he was stigmatized but defendants gave him an adequate opportunity to clear his name. While we recognize the possibility that the jury may have reached the second conclusion, we conclude, upon review of the evidence under Rule 50 standards, that the evidence supports judgment for defendants because plaintiff was not stigmatized as that term is legally understood for purposes of due process analysis. See Northshire Communications, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 174 Vt. 295, 299, 811 A.2d 216, 220 (2002) (as long as any evidence fairly or reasonably supports a lawful theory of the nonmoving party, we affirm the trial court's denial of a Rule 50 motion). ¶ 17. Plaintiff argues that Herrera I established that he was stigmatized by defendants' statements and that the sole issue on remand was whether defendants provided an adequate name-clearing hearing. He contends Herrera I concluded, as a matter of law, that defendants' statements and actions stigmatized him in violation of his due process rights. Plaintiff's characterization, however, was not our holding in that case. ¶ 18. In concluding that plaintiff's stigma-plus claim was not appropriate for summary judgment in Herrera I, we relied on the fact that the trial court had neither considered nor resolved the import of a statement the Rutland Herald attributed to the board that there had been potentially costly and damaging reasons for the firing  reasons not fit for public review. We twice cited the reasons not fit for public review phrase from the article, Herrera I, 2006 VT 83, ¶¶ 29, 31, 181 Vt. 198, 917 A.2d 923, and observed that  if it was accurate, the board members implied that they had some extraordinary reason, beyond plaintiff's alleged incompetence, for dismissing him. Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis added). Under such circumstances, we opined, the Due Process Clause entitled plaintiff to some opportunity to confront and refute such allegations. Id. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, we did not hold that the article itself established that government actors had stigmatized plaintiff as a matter of law. Our remand was for the superior court to determine the entire question of whether plaintiff was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. ¶ 32. This included whether the comments as related by the newspaper article could be established, if defendants had created stigma against plaintiff, and whether it was remedied by a name-clearing hearing. ¶ 19. The jury instructions on stigma, to which both parties agreed, explained that the evidence must show more than vague allegations of unspecified incompetence and more than the employment decision itself to place Doctor Herrera on administrative leave. This instruction serves as the law in this case, Lemnah v. Am. Breeders Serv., Inc., 144 Vt. 568, 573, 482 A.2d 700, 703 (1984), and is consistent with the federal courts' interpretation of the law in stigma-plus cases. The first part of the jury instruction is taken directly from a United States Court of Appeals opinion, cited in Herrera I, requiring that the defamatory statements be more than `vague statements of unspecified incompetence.' Herrera I, 2006 VT 83, ¶ 28, 181 Vt. 198, 917 A.2d 923 (quoting O'Neill v. City of Auburn, 23 F.3d 685, 693 (2d Cir.1994)). And, as explained above, to succeed in a stigma-plus claim, plaintiffs must prove not merely the loss of employment, but also that defendants made stigmatizing statements in the course of the employment decision. Thus, the second part of the jury instruction is not inconsistent with federal case law on stigma-plus claims. Plaintiff's evidence, however, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendants, did not show anything more than the employment decision itself and that defendants made vague allegations of unspecified incompetence. Such evidence fails to satisfy the standards set in the instruction and the case law. ¶ 20. To establish the stigma element of his due process claim at trial, plaintiff presented the Rutland Herald article as an exhibit, and called several community members to testify to the impact of the Rutland Herald article on plaintiff's reputation in the community. Each witness stated that the article raised questions in the minds of people in the community as to why plaintiff was placed on leave. One of the witnesses stated that everybody [in the community] thought ... that possibly something horrible took place, or he did something very wrong to be let go. The second witness stated that if [the reason for terminating plaintiff's employment] was so bad they couldn't talk about it, then it leaves you to wonder, speculate, and obviously you speculate the worst. ¶ 21. In addition to the article and the witnesses, plaintiff introduced the videotape of the December school board meeting on which the article was based. The video shows, however, that the article was inaccurate in reporting that board members said that there had been potentially costly and damaging reasons for the firing  reasons not fit for public review. The video establishes that the board members said nothing of the sort. Instead, the board avoided specific details regarding plaintiff's employment because they were bound by plaintiff's right to confidentiality and were attempting to avoid the possibility of litigation over the same  not because plaintiff's conduct was somehow too terrible or too culpable to disclose. Instead, defendants explicitly stated, repeatedly, that plaintiff's employment was terminated for performance reasons. No defendant mentioned an instance of particular, let alone extraordinary, misconduct or any example of egregiously poor performance. Their comments at that meeting go no further than making the kinds of vague allegations of unspecified incompetence that are insufficient to establish stigma. Cf. Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 631-32 (2d Cir.1996) (school district stigmatized assistant principal when it placed extensively detailed lists of her supposed professional failings in her personnel file, which was likely to be seen by potential future employers). ¶ 22. Because the videotape of the school board meeting proves that the article was not accurate, we conclude that the article is incapable of proving that defendants stigmatized plaintiff. Assuming, arguendo, that the passage concerning undisclosed misconduct unfit for public consumption could be construed as stigmatizing, that statement was neither made nor implied by the board members or the superintendent. The Constitution does not provide due process protection for individuals who are stigmatized by private, rather than by governmental, parties. Accord Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm'n, 300 F.3d 92, 103-04 (1st Cir.2002). ¶ 23. The other evidence adduced by plaintiff to show that defendants stigmatized him consisted of testimony by plaintiff and the superintendent. Plaintiff testified that, during the year after he was placed on administrative leave, he applied for forty to fifty administrative positions in schools around New England, and many more positions in the following year. According to his testimony, he was an interviewee and finalist for several principal positions, but once the potential employers discovered that he had been placed on administrative leave, his candidacy for those positions ended. Plaintiff called the superintendent as a witness, and in response to questions, the superintendent testified that the act of placing a school principal on administrative leave during the school year would be perceived very negatively by potential future employers, and would make it very difficult for that principal to get a new job in a school system. ¶ 24. Whatever negative inference could be drawn from plaintiff's termination, it is indistinguishable from the unfortunate implications arising from any dismissal on undisclosed grounds of nonperformance. Showing no more than the negative connotation typically associated with the employment decision itself to place Doctor Herrera on administrative leave, as explained in the agreed-upon jury instruction, plaintiff's evidence was inadequate to establish the element of stigma. His evidence did not prove a stigmatizing statement or action by defendants beyond the underlying statement of dismissal itself. It was not disputed, for example, that the superintendent, when called by potential employers of plaintiff, never gave any reasons for the school district's decision to place plaintiff on leave or to not renew his contract. The superintendent's statements at the public meeting regarding the employment decision did not venture past vague statements of unspecified incompetence insufficient to establish stigma, both under the law of this case and established stigma-plus precedent. Herrera I, 2006 VT 83, ¶ 28, 181 Vt. 198, 917 A.2d 923 (internal quotation and citation omitted). ¶ 25. The evidence presented at trial failed to establish that defendants stigmatized plaintiff, in the constitutional sense of depriving him of employment opportunity, beyond the act and declaration of his termination for performance reasons. Without such evidence, the trial court correctly concluded plaintiff was not due judgment as a matter of law on his stigma-plus claim. Consequently, the jury's verdict of no liability stands, and, because there was no stigma, we do not reach the question of whether plaintiff received a name-clearing hearing. Plaintiff's remaining claims are moot. Affirmed.