Opinion ID: 2023007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Admitting Evidence of the Subsequent Act of Abuse by the Defendant?

Text: Our scope of review and the governing legal principles have been set forth in the preceding division and will not be repeated here. The evidence challenged by the defendant consisted of testimony by Enriquez that in November, after the October 11 assault, she and Rodriquez had another altercation. Enriquez was leaving for work and the defendant wanted her to come straight home when she was done. She refused to agree to this demand, so he told her she could not leave. The defendant then took her money. When she proceeded to walk out the door, he tried to pull her back in by the hair. Rodriquez then ran back into the apartment, got a knife, and began chasing Enriquez. Escobedo, Enriquez's mother, witnessed this event. After this incident, Enriquez called the police and reported the November assault and identified Rodriquez as the assailant in the October assault. We will not engage in an analysis of the relevancy of this evidence nor will we review the trial court's balancing of the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. We do not do so because we think that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, such admission was harmless error. Reversal is not required for the erroneous admission of evidence unless prejudice results. State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1994); State v. Windsor, 316 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa 1982). In determining the prejudicial effect of evidence, the court reviews the other evidence presented and weigh[s] it against any prejudicial effect. State v. Holland, 485 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 1992). To establish prejudice, [the defendant] must show a reasonable probability that but for the error the outcome of the trial would have been different. State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1996). Although it is difficult for a reviewing court to surmise what answer to what question by what witness tipped the burden of proof and thus precipitated the verdict, where the other evidence overwhelmingly establishes the defendant's guilt, we have applied the harmless error doctrine. State v. Brodene, 493 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1992). We think that even without the subsequent bad acts evidence, there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. He admitted the assault. Both Enriquez and her mother testified that even after Escobedo arrived at the apartment on October 11, the defendant still would not allow Enriquez to leave. The emergency room physician corroborated both the nature and extent of Enriquez's injuries. In addition, he testified to the force that was required to inflict these injuries as well as the fact that the injury to Enriquez's trachea could have been life threatening. This evidence, together with the prior bad acts evidence we have previously detailed, supported each element of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, including the elements of confinement and specific intent, which he had disputed. When we weigh this evidence against the prejudicial effect of the subsequent bad acts evidence, we do not think the defendant was prejudiced. The prejudicial effect of the subsequent had acts evidence was minimal when viewed in the context of the other evidence of the defendant's assaultive behavior already in the record. We simply cannot conclude that but for the admission of the subsequent bad acts evidence, the outcome of the trial would have been different. For these reasons, we hold that the admission of evidence of the November assault, even if erroneous, was harmless.