Opinion ID: 1922393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adoption of State's Proposed Findings in Sentencing Order

Text: In his next issue on appeal, Bevel argues that the trial court erred in adopting verbatim the State's proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law in its order sentencing Bevel to death. Specifically, Bevel asserts that the following aspects of the aggravating circumstances section of the State's memorandum in support of the imposition of the death penalty as to Sims indicate that the trial court improperly adopted the State's memorandum verbatim: (1) a handwritten note by the judge stating Insert 2 followed by a handwritten edited sentence; [10] (2) the last sentence of the introductory paragraph had been scratched through; [11] and (3) the trial court adopted virtually verbatim the State's proposed findings of facts. A trial court has the independent responsibility of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2005); accord Morton v. State, 789 So.2d 324, 333 (Fla. 2001). This Court has previously held that a trial court may not request that the parties submit proposed orders and adopt one of the proposals verbatim without a showing that the trial court independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 964 n. 9 (Fla.2001). However, as long as the sentencing order reflect[s] the trial judge's independent judgment about the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors and the weight each should receive, then the Court should deny relief. Blackwelder v. State, 851 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla.2003). In the instant case, the sentencing order clearly indicates that the trial judge independently weighed the aggravators and mitigators. Although Bevel is correct that the trial court handwrote notes and crossed out several lines in the prior violent felony section of the State's memorandum on victim Sims, the trial court substantially revised the prior violent felony section of the State's memorandum on victim Stringfield. Furthermore, the trial court did not even follow the State's recommended weight as to the prior violent felony aggravator for either countthe State recommended that the prior violent felony aggravator be given great weight, yet the trial court gave it very great weight. It is therefore clear that the trial court independently assessed the aggravating circumstances and did not merely rubber-stamp the State's memorandum. See id. The trial court also discussed several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that were not addressed in the State's memorandum, including the defendant's low IQ, the defendant's remorse to the point of being suicidal, and his appropriate courtroom behavior. In fact, the State even conceded that Bevel had proven each of the thirteen mitigating circumstances addressed in its memorandum, yet the sentencing order disagreed and found that several mitigating circumstances were not proven. Additionally, although the trial court essentially adopted the State's facts section almost verbatim, Bevel does not indicate that the trial court's statement of the facts is erroneous; more importantly, these findings are supported by the record and the testimony adduced at trial. Because it is clear that the trial court did not merely rubber-stamp the State's memorandum but independently considered the evidence and weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we reject this claim.