Opinion ID: 561846
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clean Air Act Violation

Text: 36 As effective at the time of the asbestos emissions, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7401 et seq., provided in pertinent part, No air pollutant [such as asbestos] to which [an established emission] standard applies may be emitted from any stationary source in violation of [the established] standard.... Any person who knowingly violates ... [this prohibition] ... shall be punished by a fine ... or ... imprisonment ... or ... both. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 7412(c)(1)(B), 7413(c)(1)(C) (1986) (emphasis added). 37 The statutory language makes knowledge an element of the crime of violating emission standards; however, the statute requires knowledge only of the emissions themselves, not knowledge of the statute or of the hazards that emissions pose. [W]here a statute does not specify a heightened mental element ..., general intent is presumed to be the required element. Brown, 915 F.2d at 225. Indeed, in the phrase knowingly violates ... section 7412(c), section 7412(c) serves as a shorthand expression for the specific acts that 7412(c) forbids in detail. Cf. United States v. Int'l Minerals and Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562-63, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700-01, 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971). Such phrases do not signal an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Id. 38 Because of the very nature of asbestos and other hazardous substances, individuals dealing with them have constitutionally adequate notice that they may incur criminal liability for emissions-related actions. See id. at 565, 91 S.Ct. at 1701. [W]here ... dangerous or deleterious ... products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. Id.; see also United States v. Elshenawy, 801 F.2d 856, 858-59 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1309, 94 L.Ed.2d 164 (1987). Accordingly, in attempting to establish a due process violation, Buckley misplaces his reliance upon Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29, 78 S.Ct. 240, 242-43, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), in which there were no circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of [taking action]. Id. at 228-29, 78 S.Ct. at 242-43. 39 Here the district court properly instructed the jurors that they could not find Buckley guilty unless he knowingly failed ... to comply with ... standards. The district court also explained the meaning of knowledge for the jurors. The court noted that under the law, the government could establish Buckley's knowledge by showing that Buckley closed his eyes to obvious facts or failed to investigate when aware of facts which demanded investigation. Finally, near the end of its explanation of knowledge, the district court noted that the jury could not convict Buckley if it found that he actually believed that the pipe and stove coverings contained no asbestos. 40 Accordingly, we hold that whether evaluated separately or together, these instructions accurately state the law and do not offend due process.