Opinion ID: 2977632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness of Goward’s Sentence

Text: 3 Notably, the instant matter is distinguishable from White and Mendez on this issue because those cases dealt with “acquitted conduct,” whereas here, Goward’s sentence was enhanced based on conduct that was never presented to the jury even though it was “clearly known” and “could have been.” The matter is also distinguishable from Bustos in that there, defendant was sentenced after entering a guilty plea. Bustos, 186 F. App’x at 553. Nevertheless, in light of this Circuit’s clear holding permitting judicial fact-finding at sentencing under the preponderance of the evidence standard, we cannot find the district court committed clear error. No. 06-2586 United States of America v. David A. Goward Page 11 Goward challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Specifically, Goward contends the district court posed an unreasonable sentence on him because the court did not expressly respond to each of the criminal history guideline scoring arguments raised in his sentencing memorandum, or articulate why Goward’s relationship with his son and his postoffense rehabilitation did not warrant a lower sentence. Additionally, Goward argues on appeal that the district court committed plain error in calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range by including convictions for operating while impaired (OWI) and conspiracy to possess counterfeit currency that took place outside of the relevant ten year period. The points added for the convictions moved Goward from criminal history category II to category III, resulting in a twopoint increase. At sentencing, a district court is tasked with imposing “a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2006). Where the district court applies advisory guidelines at sentencing, the defendant contests the manner in which the court applied the consulted guideline, and objections are properly reserved, we review the selection of a sentence for reasonableness. Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644; United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005). A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court failed to consider the applicable guidelines range, or neglects to consider the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Brika, 487 F.3d 450, 462 (6th Cir. 2007). Goward’s sentencing transcript, including a detailed exchange with Goward regarding his criminal history, the court’s goals of sentencing, the need for deterrence, the societal problems No. 06-2586 United States of America v. David A. Goward Page 12 caused by illegal drugs, the observation that the need to incapacitate Goward was “not a principal factor here,” and agreement that Goward’s criminal history score may have been “slightly overstated” before imposing Goward’s sentence, reflects the court’s consideration of the pertinent § 3553(a) factors. The court was not required to provide specific reasons for rejecting “any and all arguments by the parties for alternative sentences.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2008). Nor was the court required to address Goward’s post-sentencing rehabilitation. United States v. Worley, 453 F.3d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, we find Goward’s contention that the district court erred by not articulating why Goward’s relationship with his son and his post-offense rehabilitation did not warrant a lower sentence is without merit. Goward concedes that although he challenged his criminal history scoring in the PSR and in a sentencing memorandum filed for consideration at his re-sentencing, he did not “present the precise argument before the trial court that he raised on appeal concerning the timing of his felony conviction.” Accordingly, the plain error standard is the applicable standard of review. United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 460 (6th Cir. 2006). At trial, the government’s informant, David Novak, testified that Goward had been involved with drug trafficking “since the early 1990s.” However, at Goward’s original sentencing hearing, the court noted that it was clear “that the jury did not accept the testimony of . . . Mr. Novak concerning the involvement of Mr. Goward,” and that “like the jury, the court . . . will reject that testimony.” In an exchange with the court at his re-sentencing hearing, where Goward generally objected that the criminal history categorization overstated his true criminal past, the court acknowledged that Goward’s criminal history might have been overstated, No. 06-2586 United States of America v. David A. Goward Page 13 expressly pointing to “the impaired driving conviction when [Goward] was 21 years old.” However, the district court did not make a specific finding regarding when Goward began his criminal enterprise, nor did the court state that it changed its feelings toward the weight to be given to the trial testimony. The offenses for which the jury convicted Goward occurred in 2002. Goward’s PSR added one point to his criminal history for a May 10, 1991 OWI conviction, and two points for a March 13, 1990 conviction to possess counterfeit currency. Thus, both fell outside of the relevant ten year period. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(2) (prior sentences within ten years of commencement of the instant offense are counted in calculation defendant’s criminal history). Based upon oral argument and a thorough review of Goward’s sentencing and resentencing hearing transcripts, we find that the district court committed plain error in adding points to Goward’s sentence for his OWI and counterfeit convictions, which clearly affected Goward’s substantial rights by increasing his criminal history category and subjecting him to a higher sentencing range. The district court’s failure to explain its factual determinations on Goward’s prior convictions requires us to remand the case for re-sentencing. Accordingly, we vacate Goward’s sentence and remand the case for re-sentencing.