Opinion ID: 1834622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: one final point

Text: The State attempts to distinguish Pruett's case from Wilson's by asserting that non-profit or public interest attorneys should be paid less than regularly appointed counsel. Moreover, according to the state, Pruett's attorneys ... actively sought appointment as his counsel in his retrial ... Brief of Appellee at 3. Pruett, on the other hand, insists that Judge Coleman solicited counsel to take responsibility for the trial both because he was having difficulty finding counsel willing to tak on a case as notorious and complex as Pruett's. Reply Brief of Appellant at 1. To briefly address this first point, we emphasize several things about this case. This was an extremely complex case which aroused the community's outrage. See, Mississippi Publishers, 515 So.2d 1163; see also Pruett v. Thigpen, 444 So.2d at 819. Had Judge Coleman appointed other attorneys, they would have had to familiarize themselves with all the litigation that had transpired in the case before the retrial. They would have had to trace every step already taken by prior counsel. In the end far more money would have been spent in prosecuting this matter. Cf. Murray v. Giarrantano, 492 U.S. 1, ___, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2771, 106 L.Ed.2d 1, 12 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Sensible for state to concentrate resources in providing attorneys for capital defendants during the trial and appellate stages in capital proceedings. Capable lawyering there would mean fewer colorable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be litigated on collateral view. ) Thus, this would have increased the possibility of having ongoing litigation concerning errors made during the course of the trial. In a second argument the State asserts that these salaried public interest lawyers, who are not personally paying office expenses, should be paid on a scale which takes this into account. As a matter of fact, according to the State, because this organization is funded by grants and donations [and] offers free representation to death row defendants this would militate against their receiving any additional compensation for this case. Brief of Appellee at 3-4. This argument as presented by the state is devoid of a scintilla of merit. The immediate response to this argument is if these attorneys are not permitted reasonable compensation for these reasons then very few attorneys would be entitled to no more than token compensation. For example, every associate in a law firm receives a salary and none pays overhead expenses. In the event that a corporate attorney is qualified to handle a capital case, then to pay an attorney more just because he/she is part of the corporate structure runs afoul of equal protection and equal justice. Stated another way, to pay a public interest lawyer less just because he/she has chosen to accept the most unpopular cases says a lot about the state's commitment to assuring that constitutional protections are continued to be of paramount importance in American Democracy. Cf. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 681 (N.D.Cal. 1974), aff'd 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) (The rationale of awarding reasonable attorneys fees ... springs from the need for placing the legal defense of certain constitutional principles ... on an equal footing with the protection of private interests). In most instances these are the attorneys who provide the best assistance to defendants and therefore, if there is a distinction to be drawn, they should be the ones who are paid more. In any event public interest lawyers should be paid no less than private attorneys. This fact just recently has been reiterated by the Supreme Court. The Court explained: ... fee awards [should not] vary depending on whether [the client] was represented by private counsel or by a non-profit legal services organization. That a non-profit legal services organization may ... have agreed not to charge any fee [from the client] ... does not preclude the award of a reasonable fee [by the government] ... calculated in the usual way. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95, 109 S.Ct. 939, 945, 103 L.Ed.2d 67, 76 (1989) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)). Reasonable fees should be the yardstick used to determine what compensation is due to an attorney. Courts must avoid ... decreasing reasonable fees because the attorneys conducted the litigation more as an act of pro bono publico than as an effort at securing a large monetary return. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 (quoting Stanford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at 681). Therefore, the Supreme Court held: In determining the amount of fees to be awarded, it is not legally relevant that plaintiffs' counsel... are employed by ... a privately funded non-profit public interest law firm. It is in the interest of the public that such law firms be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees to be computed in the traditional manner when its counsel perform legal services otherwise entitling them to the award of attorneys' fees. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. 5047 (¶ 9444), 5048-59 (C.D.Cal. 1974)). Accord Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 688 F. Supp. 1176, 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1987) order modified, Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 688 F. Supp. 1210, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.1990) (Reasonable fees are determined by the prevailing market rate; the prevailing market rate is the rate existing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation; prevailing market rate must be the same, irrespective of whether a plaintiff was represented by private counsel or by a nonprofit legal services organization. ) (emphasis added). Any amount that is awarded to Pruett's counsel, even if its determined by market value or reasonableness, cannot be characterized as a windfall because: ... [F]ee wards, properly calculated, by definition will represent the reasonable worth of the services rendered ... It is central to the awarding of attorney's fees ... that the district judge, in his or her good judgment, make the assessment of what is a resonable fee under the circumstances of the case. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 96, 109 S.Ct. at 946, 103 L.Ed.2d at 77. Based on the foregoing, it is unquestionable that public interest attorneys should be paid at the same rate that private counsel are paid when they are appointed to represent indigent defendants. [42]