Opinion ID: 2158807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Dower House

Text: GRA argues that the BZA exceeded its authority by including the Dower House within the special exception granted to the Foundation. Specifically, petitioner asserts that the grant by the BZA, giving the Foundation the right to use the Dower House as an accessory to the house museum, is beyond the statutory power of the BZA because an accessory use must be on the same lot of record as the principal lot. GRA contends that because Dower House is not on the same lot of record as Tudor Place, the BZA lacked the authority to extend the special exception to the Dower House. In addition, GRA argues that the BZA incorrectly interpreted the term lot to include adjacent properties that are taxed as one lot. To extend the special exception to include the Dower House, the BZA relied on language in the zoning regulations contained in 11 DCMR § 217.1(b) (1995), which clearly contemplates that a site may contain more than one building. Section 217.1(b) states that the building in question, not including other buildings on the `lot', must be 10,000 square feet or greater. Moreover, the BZA explained, a lot and lot of record are not equivalent terms. Under the zoning regulations, lot is defined as: The land bounded by definite lines that, when occupied or to be occupied by a building or structure and accessory buildings, includes the open spaces required under this title. A lot may or may not be the land so recorded on the records of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia. Id. at § 199.1 (1995) (emphasis added). By contrast, a lot of record is a lot recorded on the records of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia. Id. Since a lot by definition may or may not be a lot of record, the BZA concluded that the Dower House simply needed to be located on the same lot as Tudor Place in order to be part of the special exception approvalit did not have to be on the same lot of record. The BZA's interpretation of the applicable section is consistent with the zoning regulations. See Glenbrook Rd. Ass'n, supra, 605 A.2d at 30. This court has recognized the distinction between the terms lot and lot of record: while a lot is a general term used to describe any plot of land, [a] lot of record is a lot platted and recorded by the District of Columbia Surveyor. Sagalyn v. Foundation for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107, 112 n. 7 (D.C.1997). Thus, while Dower House, an adjacent property, must be located on the same lot as the principal property, it need not be located on the same lot of record. The BZA did not exceed its authority by extending the special exception to the adjacent Dower House. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, the BZA's consideration of this matter reflects a reasoned and thorough review of the relevant legal and factual issues. Accordingly, the decision of the BZA is Affirmed.