Opinion ID: 1542376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Teresa's 9-1-1 Telephone Call

Text: The defendant next argues that the admission of Teresa's 9-1-1 call into evidence at trial violated Rule 403 because it lacked relevance and was unfairly prejudicial. The state counters that the 9-1-1 call assisted in identifying DeJesus as the robber because defendant described Teresa as religious and mimicked her cry of oh my God, similar to the incantation in Spanish on the 9-1-1 call. The defendant argues that the statements made on the 9-1-1 tape were irrelevant because the emergency call occurred outside of the earshot of the robber, and, therefore, the robber could not have known what Teresa said when she rushed to her apartment to make the call. DeJesus also argues that playing Teresa's hysterical voice, as she chanted Blessed God and Glorious God over and over again, inflamed the jurors' passions and was so unfairly prejudicial that it substantially outweighed any probative value the information may have had. We have said that a trial justice's discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be used sparingly. Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1193 (R.I.1994). It is only when evidence is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that a trial justice must exclude it. State v. Silvia, 898 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2006) (citing Wells, 635 A.2d at 1193). Because [t]he ultimate determination of the effect of evidence lies in the discretion of the trial justice, we will not disturb such a determination on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 924 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Aponte, 649 A.2d 219, 223 (R.I.1994)). We conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he determined that the 9-1-1 call was more than marginally relevant in identifying defendant as the robber and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Determining the identity of the robber was the major issue at DeJesus' trial and it is the state's burden to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Silvia, 898 A.2d at 717 (quoting State v. Carter, 744 A.2d 839, 847 (R.I.2000)). The state's theory in this case was that DeJesus demonstrated knowledge of facts about this robbery that were not known to the public because those facts were outside of the regular stream of public information. On the other hand, defendant tried to demonstrate that the information regarding the robbery that he had talked about either was known in the community or was revealed by Det. Hartnett to defendant directly. The 9-1-1 call may have had the potential to inflame the passions of the jury, or create sympathy for the deceased or his family, but this does not overcome the high probative value of the evidence. Further, it is our opinion that the introduction of this evidence was not unfairly prejudicial and it was no more [prejudicial] than that which `is always sustained by the introduction of relevant evidence intended to prove guilt.' Silvia, 898 A.2d at 717 (quoting State v. Fenner, 503 A.2d 518, 526 (R.I. 1986)). Indeed, [a]ll evidence tending to prove guilt in a criminal trial is prejudicial to a defendant.    [N]o doctrine in the law    is designed to insulate [a] defendant from relevant truths[,]    even if such truths might lead the jury to draw less favorable inferences concerning defendant than if they were not exposed. Oliveira, 774 A.2d at 924. We observe that only the first few minutes of the first of four 9-1-1 calls made by Teresa were played to the jury. We believe the state appropriately offered only that portion of the phone call that was necessary to show that Teresa's prayerful reaction was similar to the reaction described by defendant, and we conclude that this evidence was not improperly admitted.