Opinion ID: 2669163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issues Relating to All Defendants

Text: Two of the appellate issues relate to all of the defendants: (1) introduction of opinion testimony by the Government’s gang expert, and (2) denial of the motions for a judgment of acquittal. On these issues, we reject the Defendants’ arguments.
At trial, the Government called Officer Break Merino to testify as an expert on the Tongan Crips Gang. 2 This testimony covered: ! TCG’s history and structure, ! TCG’s insignia, such as tattoos, hand signs, and clothing, ! Tongan culture, and ! TCG’s criminal activities, including shootings, stabbings, thefts, and car jackings. Officer Merino also testified that each defendant was a member of TCG. Before and during the trial, the Defendants raised three objections to Officer Merino’s testimony: (1) The testimony was not needed for the jury to understand TCG; (2) Officer Merino’s methodology was unreliable; and (3) introduction of the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because the officer simply repeated inadmissible hearsay. The district court overruled these objections. On 2 He also testified as a fact witness regarding an interview conducted with Daniel Maumau. See Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 17, at 3242-60. But this appeal involves the officer’s expert testimony rather than his fact testimony. 12 appeal, the Defendants assert the same three errors regarding Officer Merino’s testimony. Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, 3 we reject the Defendants’ first two arguments. We reject the first because the district court could reasonably conclude that an average juror would not know how TCG operated. We reject the second because the district court could reasonably conclude that Officer Merino relied on multiple sources and filtered the information through his expertise. Engaging in de novo review, 4 we reject the third contention because Officer Merino did not simply repeat information obtained from outside sources. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s admission of Officer Merino’s expert testimony. 1. Officer Merino’s Testimony Was Helpful to the Jury Mr. Kepa Maumau argues that Officer Merino’s testimony “went far beyond interpreting gang signs, discussing clothing, or explaining organizational 3 We review the district court’s admission of Officer Merino’s testimony for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 476 (10th Cir. 2011). In this situation, we reverse only if: (1) the district court’s ruling is “‘arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly unreasonable,’” or (2) the district court “‘made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.’” United States v. Avitia-Guillen, 680 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003)). 4 See United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that we review de novo the district court’s treatment of the claim involving the Confrontation Clause). 13 hierarchy” and “essentially summarize[d] the factual investigation of TCG.” Kepa Maumau’s Opening Br. at 33-34. 5 According to Mr. Kepa Maumau and three other defendants, this “summary” cannot constitute proper expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because jurors do not need an expert’s opinion to understand evidence about TCG. But we have recognized that expert testimony regarding gang activity is appropriate under Rule 702; thus, we reject the Defendants’ argument. Rule 702 states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2011). 6 This rule applies to experts beyond those in the field of science. And we have long recognized that police officers can testify as experts based on their experience “[b]ecause the average juror is often innocent of the ways of the criminal underworld.” United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 477 (10th Cir. 5 Mr. Daniel Maumau also argued that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Officer Merino’s testimony, which Mr. Toki and Mr. Tuai join. 6 We use the 2011 version here because that is the version that applied in the trial, which took place in September 2011. 14 2011); see also United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1206 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have allowed police to testify as experts under Rule 702 on many occasions.”). Thus, we have upheld officer–expert testimony regarding use of a strawman to buy guns, 7 means and methods of drug dealing, 8 and participation in gang activity. 9 Under these decisions, the district court had the discretion to regard Officer Merino’s testimony as helpful to the jury. For example, the district court could have believed the jury would benefit from Officer Merino’s expertise about TCG’s structure, insignia, and history. And the district court could have assumed that a typical juror would lack knowledge of the gang terminology and the significance 7 See United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 477 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that the “average juror is as likely to be unaware of the dynamics of the illicit arms trade as of the trade in narcotics”). 8 See United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing the use of guns in the drug trade); see also United States v. Quintana, 70 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining terminology used by drug traffickers); United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 459 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining methamphetamine labs and the use of guns in these labs); United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1520-23 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining the significance of certain quantities and packaging of cocaine, as well as the exchange of drugs for food coupons); United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 775-76 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing characteristics of documents used in drug enterprises). 9 See United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1296 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have affirmed district courts’ admission of gang-expert testimony as helpful to a jury when a defendant is a gang member.”); United States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding the government’s use of an officer–expert’s testimony regarding the Black Mafia Crip Dawgs’s objective of distributing cocaine and crack cocaine). 15 of TCG insignia. Accordingly, the district court had the discretion to regard Officer Merino’s testimony as helpful to the jury. 10 2. Officer Merino’s Methods Were Sufficiently Reliable The Defendants also argue that Officer Merino’s testimony was not reliable under Rule 702. 11 E.g., Toki’s Opening Br. at 40-41; Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 42-45. We disagree, for Officer Merino relied on multiple sources and verified his information whenever possible. Officer Merino based his expert testimony on years of experience, adding that he filtered information from numerous sources based on his experience in the Glendale school system and as a law enforcement officer. Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 20, at 3844-45. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Officer Merino had based his conclusions on his “expertise, derived over many years and from multiple sources.” Id. vol. 1, pt. 3, at 685. 10 We recently rejected a similar argument in United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2013). There we held that an officer–expert’s testimony regarding the Sureños Tortilla Flats gang did not violate Rule 702 because the expert’s testimony assisted the jury. We reasoned that the expert’s testimony provided context to the jury. Id. at 1296-97. 11 Stray comments in the Defendants’ briefs also appear to question Officer Merino’s qualifications. E.g., Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 42 (noting that “[t]here was nothing to indicate that Officer Merino had taken any courses or received any training beyond a high school education and military and police officer training”). But the Defendants do not appear to challenge the district court’s ruling that Officer Merino could offer expert opinion testimony. 16
The Defendants rely heavily on a case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008). There the officer–expert identified various crimes committed by MS-13 gang members. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the officer–expert’s testimony “impermissibl[y] substitut[ed]” factual evidence by “simply disgorg[ing] [his] factual knowledge to the jury” to “satisfy the elements of the charged offense.” United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Officer Merino’s testimony differs from the officer’s testimony in Mejia. Unlike the Mejia expert, Officer Merino based his testimony on his accumulation of information from multiple sources, which he then filtered and analyzed based on his TCG expertise. See id. at 197 (noting that testimony “synthesi[zing] . . . various source materials” constituted proper expert testimony); United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 636 (4th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Mejia because the expert witnesses in Johnson were applying their expertise rather than simply passing “along an important testimonial fact . . . learned from a particular interview”). And in testifying about this analysis, Officer Merino described this progression in criminality not in terms of specific crimes (as in Mejia), but in generalities to explain the context in which TCG operated. 17 The Defendants’ reading of Mejia is overly broad. And even if this reading of Mejia were correct, we would be required to apply our own precedents, which have upheld expert testimony similar to Officer Merino’s.
The Defendants argue that Officer Merino’s testimony violated Rule 702 because it was not based on scientific methodology. But we have elsewhere rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the officer–expert’s testimony was unreliable because “no conceivable ‘science’ could illuminate” the subject matter of the expert’s testimony and “recognizing that police officers can acquire specialized knowledge of criminal practices and thus the expertise to opine on such matters as the use of firearms in the drug trade”). The district court allowed Officer Merino’s testimony after finding that it helped the jury by providing insights into the distinctive traits of TCG, a topic beyond the knowledge of most jurors. This ruling fell within the district court’s discretion; accordingly, we reject the Defendants’ arguments based on Rule 702. 18 3. The Introduction of Officer Merino’s Expert Testimony Did Not Violate the Confrontation Clause Defendants Kepa Maumau, Daniel Maumau, and Sitamipa Toki 12 also invoke the Confrontation Clause, arguing that Officer Merino based his testimony on interviews with cooperating witnesses and other gang members. We disagree. Introduction of expert testimony violates the Confrontation Clause only when the expert is simply parroting a testimonial fact. That did not occur here. Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a criminal defendant enjoys “the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. art. VI. This right has been refined in Supreme Court precedent. For example, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). “Testimonial statements” include statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations or given by a confidential informant. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 730 (10th Cir. 2010). Introduction of a testimonial statement is unconstitutional only when it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. 12 Mr. Tuai joins in his codefendants’ Confrontation Clause argument. Tuai’s Opening Br. at 47. 19 We have stated that a “prime example of where an out-of-court statement might be admitted for a purpose other than to establish its substantive truth . . . is when an expert witness testifies regarding the out-of-court development of facts or data on which the expert’s opinions were based.” United States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280, 1287-88 (10th Cir. 2012). Introduction of opinion testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the experts rely on their independent judgment—even when this independent judgment is based on inadmissible evidence. United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2009). But if the expert is simply “parrot[ing] ‘out-of-court testimonial statements of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants directly to the jury in the guise of expert opinion,’” the testimony would be inadmissible. Id. at 635 (quoting United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2007)). The distinction between the two “is a question of degree.” Pablo, 696 F.3d at 1288. Accordingly, we must determine whether Officer Merino was: (1) basing his opinion on his independent judgment, or (2) simply “parroting” testimonial hearsay. Mr. Daniel Maumau, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Toki generally describe Officer Merino’s testimony, but they do not identify the parts that involved the recitation of testimonial hearsay. See Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 49-50 (stating, without any supporting citation, that “Merino simply parroted information” received from others); Kepa Maumau’s Opening Br. at 37 (claiming, 20 without any supporting citation, that “the District Court allowed Officer Merino merely to parrot the statements of his[] alleged sources, with no opportunity for cross-examination, rather than conveying independent judgment”); Toki’s Opening Br. at 39-40 (citing passages in Officer Merino’s testimony as inflammatory, but failing to identify the parts that violated the Confrontation Clause). Without such guidance, we are hard-pressed to find testimony by Officer Merino that simply parroted a testimonial fact learned from a particular interview. Like the district court, we conclude that Officer Merino applied his expertise, formed by years of experience and multiple sources, to provide an independently formed opinion. 4. The Defendants’ Statements Implicating Rule 403 Finally, in their opening briefs, the Defendants say that Officer Merino’s testimony was “prejudicial.” E.g., Toki’s Opening Br. at 41-42 (noting that Officer Merino’s testimony was found to be unduly prejudicial in an appeal of Mr. Toki’s Utah state conviction arising from the same conduct). These references implicate Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which allows the district court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Though the Defendants suggest prejudice, they have not briefed the issue in a meaningful way. For example, Mr. Toki mentions a state court decision (where 21 much of Officer Merino’s testimony was considered inadmissible) and referred once to Rule 403. Toki’s Opening Br. at 41-42 & n.22. But Rule 403 is never discussed in the brief. Similarly, Mr. Tuai refers to Rule 403 in a heading and introduction, but fails to discuss the rule. Tuai’s Opening Br. at 47. Because the Defendants did not sufficiently brief an appellate argument under Rule 403, we decline to address the Defendants’ characterization of the expert testimony as “prejudicial.” See United States v. Banks, 451 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2006).
Following the close of the evidence, each defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury. The district court denied each motion. On appeal, the Defendants renew their challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. These challenges are rejected. All defendants contend that the Government failed to show that TCG could constitute a RICO enterprise. We disagree, concluding that the jury could reasonably find an enterprise based on TCG’s purpose, the relationships among the members, and the longevity of TCG. On the RICO conspiracy count, Mr. Kamahele, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Tuai contend that the evidence failed to establish a nexus between the enterprise and racketeering activity. We disagree. The testimony allowed a reasonable jury 22 to find that TCG required members to commit crimes, and this requirement could have constituted the required nexus. Mr. Tuai argues that the evidence did not show that he had agreed to the commission of two or more predicate acts under RICO. But another TCG member testified that Mr. Tuai wanted to “earn stripes” for the gang. From this testimony, the jury could infer that Mr. Tuai joined TCG with knowledge that the gang would commit multiple racketeering acts. Accordingly, Mr. Tuai’s argument fails. On the VICAR counts, Mr. Daniel Maumau, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Toki challenge the strength of the evidence that they had committed the violent crimes (the Faamausili home shooting and the robberies of Gen X, El Pollo Loco, and Jack in the Box) to maintain or advance positions within TCG. We disagree. For the shooting at the Faamausili home, the jury could have inferred this motivation from evidence involving: (1) the manner in which the Defendants committed the offense, (2) their donning of TCG insignia when committing the crimes, and (3) TCG’s general purpose of instilling fear in the community. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki had acted with the purpose of maintaining or advancing their positions within TCG. For the robberies of Gen X, El Pollo Loco, and Jack in the Box, the jury could infer the required purpose from testimony by Mr. Kepa Maumau’s accomplice in these robberies, the “Exit Plan” document (written by Mr. Kepa 23 Maumau and found in his car), and testimony that the two robbers were wearing blue bandanas. Finally, Mr. Tuai argues that the evidence was insufficient for a finding that he had carried a real gun when robbing Wal-Mart. We reject this argument based on surveillance video, the discovery of a matching gun, and testimony by a victim and an accomplice.
We engage in de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. See United States v. Irvin, 682 F.3d 1254, 1266 (10th Cir. 2012). In conducting this review, we treat the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and ask whether a rational fact-finder could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. See id. In addressing this question, we do not weigh conflicting evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077, 1081 (10th Cir. 2004). Instead, we “simply determine ‘whether [the] evidence, if believed, would establish each element of the crime.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001)). Reversal is warranted only when no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Irvin, 682 F.3d at 1266. 24 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the RICO Conspiracy Convictions Mr. Kamahele, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Tuai were found guilty on Count 1, conspiracy to commit a racketeering offense in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006). This law criminalizes conspiracy to violate any of the three substantive RICO provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006). Count 1 alleged conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in . . . interstate . . . commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). A “pattern of racketeering activity” consists of two or more acts of racketeering activity (commonly referred to as “predicate acts”), which are related and “‘amount to, or . . . otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity.’” Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 867 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989)). For the predicate acts, the Government alleged violations of the Utah and Arizona robbery statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2006) (defining “racketeering activity” as robbery that is “chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year”); Utah Code § 76-6-301(1)(a) 25 to -(b) (2004) (defining robbery); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1902(A) (2001) (defining robbery). The parties agree that the Government had to prove that: ! the defendant knew about the commission of two or more acts that constituted a pattern of racketeering activity, and ! the defendant participated in an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 13 In light of this evidentiary burden, the Defendants make three arguments. First, Mr. Kamahele, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Tuai challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that TCG was an “enterprise.” Second, they question the proof of a nexus between the enterprise and racketeering activity. Finally, Mr. Tuai contends that the evidence did not show that he had agreed to the commission of two or more predicate acts. 13 These elements were identified in United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). After Smith, we held that in a prosecution under § 1962(d), the Government need not prove the existence of an enterprise. United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, the district court instructed the jury that the § 1962(d) charge required the existence of an enterprise, and the Government did not object. Thus, the Government concedes that it had to prove the existence of an enterprise. See United States v. Romero, 136 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998). 26
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that the evidence sufficed for the jury to find the existence of an enterprise.
The term “enterprise” “includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). An association-in-fact requires: (1) a purpose, (2) relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and (3) longevity sufficient to permit those associated with the enterprise to pursue the enterprise’s purpose. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009). An enterprise may exist even without a formal hierarchy, chain of command, fixed roles, a name, established rules, initiation ceremonies, or regular meetings. Id. at 948. To qualify as an enterprise under RICO, the association need only be a “continuing unit that functions with a common purpose.” Id.; see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (concluding that an association-in-fact enterprise constitutes a “group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct”). 27
The evidence would have allowed a rational jury to conclude that Mr. Kamahele, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Tuai were members of the gang and acted to promote its criminal purposes through the robberies of the Wal-Mart, El Pollo Loco, Jack in the Box, Republic Parking, and Gen X Clothing Store. The Defendants argue that while TCG was “a street gang drawn together by connections to their native Tonga and their geographic neighborhood,” the evidence was not sufficient to establish that TCG members associated together with a common purpose of committing RICO predicates. See, e.g., Kamahele’s Opening Br. at 17. For this argument, Mr. Kamahele downplays the criminality of the gang by pointing to its beer thefts, which he characterizes as innocuous youthful indiscretions rather than the sort of criminality associated with a criminal enterprise. But the jury was entitled to view the gang in a different way. For example, the jury could reasonably view the Wal-Mart robbery as a complex undertaking. The five robbers met to discuss the layout of the store, the location of security cameras, the amount of money that was accessible ($100,000), the manner in which the employees would bring the money into the cash room, and the details of the cash room. The plan was sufficiently complicated to require three separate meetings. In these meetings, the robbers arranged for a lookout (who would call Mr. Kamahele and Mr. Tuai when the Wal-Mart employees headed to 28 the cash room), a getaway driver (who would wait outside for Mr. Kamahele and Mr. Tuai), and a Wal-Mart insider (who would enter the Wal-Mart store after the robbery to gain intelligence on the police investigation). With evidence of this planning, the jury could reasonably reject Mr. Kamahele’s view that the gang involved only adolescent mischief. Mr. Kamahele and Mr. Kepa Maumau argue that TCG does not qualify as an enterprise because members were “drawn together by connections to their native Tonga and their geographic neighborhood,” Glendale, rather than racketeering purposes. Kamahele’s Opening Br. at 17. For this argument, the Defendants point to cases in which the gangs committed drug trafficking, drug dealing, and running prostitution rings. See United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that Crips gang sets constituted an association-in-fact enterprise when they “jointly operated the houses from which various set members sold drugs”); United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a gang constituted an enterprise for RICO purposes when the group used drug-distribution proceeds to support the families of fellow gang members), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Killip, 819 F.2d 1542, 1545-46, 1549-50 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a chapter of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club constituted a RICO enterprise when the chapter operated a drug-distribution scheme). 29 The gang here was different because it did not involve drugs or prostitution. But the jury could find that TCG was a continuing unit that functioned for a common purpose: enhancing the gang’s reputation by instilling fear through criminal activity and profiting from that activity (either in the form of proceeds or goods from robberies). See Smith, 413 F.3d at 1271 (concluding that the purpose element could consist of maintenance of the group’s fearsome reputation through acts of violence). The Defendants argue that because gang members did not pool their money or jointly share in the profits of drug dealing, TCG could not qualify as a RICO enterprise. But economic gain is not required for the existence of an enterprise. See Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261-62 (1994) (holding that “RICO contains no economic motive requirement”). Though the Defendants focus on their Tongan roots, the Government’s evidence focused on the criminal purposes of the group that transcended the larger Tongan community. Through this evidence, the Government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to infer an enterprise.
The jury could also have inferred relationships among the TCG members. To infer these relationships, jurors could have relied on testimony that TCG members had met and shared TCG insignia, such as tattoos. Similarly, the “Exit Plan” described the gang’s shared hostility toward anyone wearing red in the 30 neighborhood (the color associated with a rival gang), stating that TCG gang members “learned to hate anybody that [the] gang didn’t get along with[,] . . . a tradition passed down from generation to generation.” Kepa Maumau R. vol. 2, pt. 1, at 138-39. The evidence also suggested that gang members committed crimes together and looked out for fellow members. This unity was sufficient on the relationship prong. See United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the “relationship” prong was satisfied when Crips members met, socialized at the “Crip club,” and “shar[ed] colors and handshakes”).
The evidence was also sufficient to establish that TCG had the longevity for an association-in-fact enterprise. For example, the evidence indicated that TCG had begun in the 1990s and spanned multiple “generations” of TCG members. See Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 10, at 1807-08; see also Harris, 695 F.3d at 1136 (concluding that the third prong was satisfied when the evidence supported a “pattern of activity . . . over a period of years”).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable jury could conclude that TCG had a common purpose, relationships, and longevity, as required for an associate-in-fact enterprise. 31 b. Nexus Between the Enterprise and Racketeering Activity The Defendants also argue that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence tying TCG to the robberies of Gen X, El Pollo Loco, Jack in the Box, and Wal-Mart. E.g., Kepa Maumau’s Opening Br. at 46. We disagree, for a reasonable jury could connect these robberies and TCG from testimony that: (1) TCG members had to commit crimes to maintain their status in the gang, and (2) the robbers intended to share the Wal-Mart money with other TCG members. Conduct “‘forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.’” See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)). The jury could infer a connection between the robberies and the enterprise (TCG). For example, the jury could have relied on testimony by Mr. Kamoto and a recorded statement of Mr. Kamahele. Mr. Kamoto accompanied Mr. Kepa Maumau on three of the robberies. At trial, he stated that TCG members committed robberies to maintain their criminal reputation. And, when Mr. Kamahele was asked whether he would stop committing robbery, he said in a jailhouse conversation that he needed to put in “at least three.” From this statement, a jury could reasonably conclude the Defendants had committed the robberies to “earn stripes” and “put in work,” a requirement of TCG membership. 32 Mr. Tuai focuses on the Wal-Mart robbery. But this robbery, like the others, involved two characteristics identified with TCG. First, while discussing his participation in the Wal-Mart robbery, Mr. Latutaofieiki Fakaosiula testified that he and the other robbers had planned to give part of the stolen money to the families of incarcerated TCG members and possibly to rent a house to distribute marijuana. Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 6, at 1059, 1084-85. Mr. Kamahele argues that Mr. Fakaosiula’s testimony was inconsistent with other statements that Mr. Fakaosiula had given to police. And Mr. Vainga Kinikini testified that no such statements were made by or in front of him regarding the Wal-Mart robbery proceeds. Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 7, at 1276-77. But we cannot weigh the evidence and must view the testimony in the light most favorable to the Government. See United States v. Irvin, 682 F.3d 1254, 1266 (10th Cir. 2012). Second, Mr. Fakaosiula testified that Mr. Kinikini, Mr. Tuai, and Mr. Kamahele were members of TCG and that Mr. Tuai wanted to commit the WalMart robbery to get “stripes” and “make his name known.” Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 6, at 1083, 1161. From Mr. Fakaosiula’s testimony, the jury could tie Mr. Tuai’s participation in the Wal-Mart robbery to his membership in TCG. 33 c. Mr. Tuai’s Agreement Involving the Commission of Two Predicate Acts Finally, Mr. Tuai argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish an agreement for a coconspirator to commit at least two predicate acts, as required to convict him of RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d). For this argument, Mr. Tuai stresses that the jury found him guilty of only one predicate act: the Wal-Mart robbery. We reject Mr. Tuai’s argument because the jury could reasonably find that Mr. Tuai had agreed to other predicate acts by himself or by fellow TCG members. As previously discussed, the Government does not need to prove that each defendant personally committed two predicate acts to prove a RICO conspiracy. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (“There is no requirement of some overt act or specific act in the [RICO conspiracy] statute . . . .”). And the jury could have inferred that Mr. Tuai agreed to other predicate acts by fellow gang members. In drawing this inference, a juror could point to Mr. Fakaosiula’s testimony when he said that Mr. Tuai had wanted to commit the Wal-Mart robbery to get “stripes” and “mak[e] his name known.” Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 6, at 1083, 1161. From this testimony, the jury could have inferred that Mr. Tuai had agreed to commit at least one other racketeering act. This inference would have been permissible even in the absence of an express agreement for other gang members to commit two specific predicate acts. 34 Even without this level of specificity, the Government can prove an agreement “through ‘inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from circumstantial evidence of a scheme,’ amounting to evidence that each defendant necessarily must have known that the others were also conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005)). The Government presented evidence that Mr. Tuai was a member of TCG and understood the gang’s expectations that members commit crimes. There was also evidence that supported an inference that his membership in TCG predated the commission of the other predicate acts the jury found on Count 1. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Tuai, by joining TCG and participating in its affairs, agreed to the commission of two or more predicate acts. See Smith, 413 F.3d at 1272. Mr. Tuai could have been guilty even if the jury had inferred an agreement for others to commit more crimes. As previously noted, the Government’s evidence indicated that gang members had to earn “stripes,” which involved crimes. And in a jailhouse call, Mr. Kamahele stated he had to get at least three stripes. A jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Tuai recognized a need for the gang to commit at least one more crime besides the Wal-Mart robbery. Thus, the evidence sufficed on Mr. Tuai’s conviction for RICO conspiracy. 35 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the VICAR Convictions Mr. Daniel Maumau, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Sitamipa Toki argue that the evidence was insufficient under VICAR, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (2006), which prohibited violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity. The Defendants assert two grounds for their argument: (1) TCG does not constitute an enterprise; and (2) the Government did not establish that the three defendants had committed the underlying crimes to maintain or advance their positions within TCG. As discussed above, the evidence was sufficient to infer the existence of an enterprise. We also conclude that the jury reasonably could have connected the crimes to the enterprise (TCG). This connection could have arisen from: (1) the manner in which the crimes were committed, including the TCG insignia worn during the shooting and the robberies, and (2) the expectations for TCG members to commit crimes. To establish a VICAR conviction, the Government had to prove that: (1) TCG was an enterprise within the meaning of RICO, (2) TCG engaged in racketeering activity, (3) the defendant was a member of TCG, (4) the defendant committed the predicate violent crime, and (5) “his general purpose in doing so was to maintain or increase his position in [TCG].” United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). 36 Mr. Daniel Maumau, Mr. Kepa Maumau, and Mr. Sitamipa Toki challenge the first and fifth elements, arguing that the Government failed to prove that TCG was an enterprise and that the Defendants had intended to maintain or enhance their positions within the gang. We reject these challenges. a. The Existence of an “Enterprise” We have elsewhere concluded that the Government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to regard TCG as an “enterprise” under RICO. The same reasoning would have allowed the jury to find an “enterprise” under VICAR. 14
Enterprise (TCG) Accordingly, we address the Defendants’ contention that the Government failed to prove the fifth VICAR element: that they committed the underlying violent predicate to maintain or advance their positions within TCG. 14 A VICAR “enterprise” includes “any partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2) (2006). As previously discussed, RICO similarly defines “enterprise” as “includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). Perhaps because of the similarity in the definitions, the parties do not suggest any differences in the assessment of an “enterprise” under VICAR and RICO. See United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 843 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[C]ases decided under [RICO] may also be used to determine what constitutes an enterprise under [VICAR].”). 37
Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki challenge the sufficiency of the evidence arising from the shooting into the Faamausili home. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, they argue that the Government failed to prove that they had acted with the purpose of maintaining or increasing their positions within the enterprise. According to the Defendants, the shooting was personal. We conclude that three factors support the jury’s conclusion that the shooting was to further or maintain the Defendants’ positions in TCG: (1) Mr. Toki enlisted two of his fellow gang members to retaliate; (2) during the commission of the shooting, Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Kamoto donned blue bandanas, which were insignia of TCG; and (3) the shooting was in broad daylight, suggesting that the shooters wanted the family and others to know that TCG was responsible. From these factors, the jury could have inferred an intent to commit violent crimes to maintain or further TCG’s reputation in the community as a fearsome gang and to maintain or enhance their own positions within TCG. The Government does not need to prove that the defendant’s “sole or principal motive” was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise. United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). Rather, the Government need only establish that the predicate violent crime was committed as an “integral aspect of membership” in the enterprise (TCG). Id.; see 38 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that one could be guilty under § 1959 if the violent crime was “an integral aspect of membership” even if it was not the “sole or principal motive”). Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki focus on the personal nature of the dispute. In their eyes, Mr. Toki wanted to retaliate for being interrupted during sex and punched in the face. Because the shooting was based on personal motives, they continue, the evidence was insufficient to tie the shooting to their status in TCG. For this argument, Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki cite cases holding that the fifth element was satisfied when the predicate assault was directed at a rival gang or at someone who had threatened the activities of the gang. E.g., Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 19-23. The two defendants argue that these cases are distinguishable because they involved the functioning of the gang, unlike the personal affront to Mr. Toki. Id. at 24-27. In the view of Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Toki, the Government’s evidence resembles that in United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994), and United States v. Jones, 291 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Conn. 2003), two of the cases invoked by Mr. Daniel Maumau. E.g., Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 21-23. In Thai, the defendant, a gang leader, was offered $10,000 to bomb a building; in attempting to execute his plan, the gang leader employed fellow gang members. See Thai, 29 F.3d at 818. The Government argued that the fifth element 39 was satisfied because the gang’s purpose was to make money through crime. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the evidence did not connect the bombing to the gang. Id. Because any such connection was based on “pure speculation,” the court reversed the § 1959 conviction. Id. The facts in United States v. Jones, 291 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Conn. 2003), were similar. There the defendant, another gang leader, confronted an acquaintance who had allegedly disrespected the defendant’s girlfriend; the defendant retaliated by killing the acquaintance with the help of two friends. The Government argued that without retaliation, the insult would have diminished the defendant’s reputation in the gang. But the district court concluded that the evidence did not “support an inference that any act of disrespect directed at Jones personally was also an affront or threat to the [gang’s] and Jones’s leadership position.” Jones, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 88, 92. Our facts bear some similarity to the facts in Thai and Jones. For example, the jury could infer that Mr. Toki went to the Faamausili home for personal reasons rather than to advance the standing of his gang. But the jury could also have inferred an effort to promote the gang and Mr. Toki’s status within the gang. In inferring an intent to promote the gang, the jury could have focused on three aspects of Mr. Toki’s retaliation. First, Mr. Toki retaliated by recruiting two other TCG members, Mr. Kamoto and Mr. Daniel Maumau. Second, when the three men fired, two of them donned blue bandanas, the signature clothing of 40 TCG. Third, the shooting took place in broad daylight. Without any evidence of concealment, the jury could infer that Mr. Toki intended to instill fear in the community, one of TCG’s purposes. The jury could have found not only an intent to promote the reputation of TCG, but also an intent to enhance Mr. Toki’s standing with the gang. See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that “section 1959 encompasses violent crimes intended to preserve the defendant’s position in the enterprise or to enhance his reputation and wealth within that enterprise”). For example, the jury could have inferred that Mr. Toki’s reputation for toughness would have diminished by a failure to retaliate after being punched in the face. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Daniel Maumau and Mr. Kamoto responded to an assault on Mr. Toki, one of their fellow gang members, to maintain their reputations and TCG’s. Though the motive may have been partly personal, the jury could also have found that Mr. Toki acted with the “integral or essential” purpose of promoting the gang and maintaining or advancing his position in the gang.
and Jack in the Box Mr. Kepa Maumau challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his VICAR conviction relating to the 2008 robberies of the Gen X Clothing store, the 41 El Pollo Loco, and the Jack in the Box. He argues that the Government failed to provide sufficient evidence that he had committed these robberies for the purpose of maintaining or increasing his position in TCG. We disagree. The evidence allowed the jury to infer the required connection to TCG from: (1) an accomplice’s testimony that TCG members were expected to commit crime and that the robberies served to enhance his reputation and Mr. Kepa Maumau’s, (2) the “Exit Plan” document, which was written by Mr. Kepa Maumau and found in his car, describing his involvement with TCG and his desire to enhance his criminal reputation by committing crimes, and (3) testimony that the two robbers wore blue bandanas (TCG insignia) when stealing from the Jack in the Box. According to Mr. Kepa Maumau, “there was no evidence presented here that these robberies had any connection to TCG other than the fact that Mr. [Kepa] Maumau and Mr. Kamoto were allegedly members.” Kepa Maumau’s Opening Br. at 49. But Mr. Kepa Maumau’s accomplice (Mr. Kamoto) testified that he and Mr. Kepa Maumau were TCG members, that TCG members were expected to commit crimes, and that criminal activity served to advance their reputations in the gang. Mr. Kamoto also testified that the crimes had raised his status in the gang and that he had received greater attention from fellow gang members upon his release from prison. This testimony supports the inference that the gang not only knew about the robberies, but also encouraged members to engage in this type of criminal behavior. 42 The Government also presented a document titled the “Exit Plan,” which was discovered in Mr. Kepa Maumau’s car after the Arizona robberies. In this document, Mr. Kepa Maumau described his involvement in TCG and confirmed that he had committed crimes to advance his reputation in the gang. Finally, a witness to the Jack in the Box robbery testified that the two robbers were wearing blue bandanas, the signature clothing of TCG. When viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, this evidence sufficed for a jury to conclude that Mr. Kepa Maumau had committed the robberies to maintain or further his position in TCG. 4. Sufficiency of the Gun Evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Finally, Mr. Tuai argues that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find that he brandished a gun during the Wal-Mart robbery. The deficiency, according to Mr. Tuai, is the absence of any evidence that the gun was real. We disagree. A jury could infer that the gun was real based on testimony by Mr. Tuai’s accomplice in the Wal-Mart robbery and a victim in the robbery, surveillance video of the robbery, and the discovery of a matching gun used by Mr. Kamahele during another robbery. The Government must prove that the defendant used a real gun when committing the predicate offense. See United States v. De León-Quiñones, 588 F.3d 748, 751 (1st Cir. 2009) (“A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires proof that the defendant used a real firearm when committing the predicate 43 offense.”); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) (2006) (defining the term “firearm”). But the Government need not produce the actual gun that was used. See United States v. Floyd, 81 F.3d 1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under § 924(c) based on a failure to present the actual gun in evidence). Rather, “[c]redible witness testimony is sufficient to establish that a defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a crime.” Id. Sufficient evidence existed for the jury to infer that the gun used in the WalMart robbery was real. For example, Mr. Latutaofieiki Fakaosiula, who acted as the lookout during the robbery, testified that: (1) the plan had called for Mr. Kamahele to carry a gun, and (2) Mr. Kamahele had carried a sawed-off shotgun on the night of the robbery. Wal-Mart employee Bethany Powell confirmed Mr. Fakaosiula’s testimony. Ms. Powell testified that when Mr. Kamahele had approached her outside the cash office, he lifted his shirt and showed her a gun that looked like a sawed-off shotgun. She added that she had felt the gun being pushed against her back during the robbery. The jury not only heard this testimony, but also saw the surveillance videos showing one of the robbers carrying a long gun. Finally, the jury heard evidence that Mr. Kamahele had used a sawed-off shotgun (the same type of weapon) when he robbed the Republic Parking Garage 44 earlier that year, as well as evidence that the police discovered two shotguns—one of which was sawed-off—outside the house where Mr. Kamahele was arrested. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Kamahele had used a real shotgun during the Wal-Mart robbery. See United States v. Bowers, 638 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “[t]he possibility that a gun is fake does not prevent a reasonable jury from determining the gun was real”); see also United States v. Kirvan, 997 F.2d 963, 966-67 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a conviction under § 924(c) based on two lay witnesses’ testimony); Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382, 1383-85 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding a conviction under § 924(c) when the gun was never recovered and the only evidence offered by the government was the testimony of two bank employees that the defendant had carried a gun and that he had threatened to “‘[b]low [their] . . . head[s] off’”). Accordingly, we reject Mr. Tuai’s argument.