Opinion ID: 146297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The OCCA's decision is contrary to Beck.

Text: The Supreme Court's decision in Beck provides the basis for Mr. Phillips's contention that the OCCA's decision concluding that Mr. Phillips was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree depraved mind murder violated clearly established federal law. In Beck, the Court held that a sentence of death [may not] constitutionally be imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense, when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense, and when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Id. at 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382. As a result, state rules barring properly supported lesser-included offense instructions in a capital case are constitutionally impermissible because such rules `diminish the reliability of the guilt determination' and `enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.' Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1050 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Beck, 447 U.S. at 638, 100 S.Ct. 2382). The Supreme Court has reiterated that the goal in Beck was to eliminate the distortion of the factfinding process that is created when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 646-47, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984)). Beck emphasized that when the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense  but leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense  the failure to give the jury the `third option' of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. 447 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382. The Court concluded that [s]uch a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake and that if the unavailability of a lesser included offense instruction enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction, [a state] is constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing that option from the jury in a capital case. Id. at 637-638, 100 S.Ct. 2382. The Court has since reaffirm[ed its] commitment to the demands of reliability in decisions involving death and to the defendant's right to the benefit of a lesser included offense instruction that may reduce the risk of unwarranted capital convictions. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 456, 104 S.Ct. 3154. Mr. Phillips's Beck claim has two components. First, he must establish that the crime on which the trial court refused to instruct was actually a lesser-included offense of the capital crime of which he was convicted. Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir.1999). Second, he must show that the evidence presented at trial would permit a rational jury to find him guilty of the lesser included offense and acquit him of first degree murder. Young v. Sirmons, 486 F.3d 655, 670 (10th Cir.2007); see Taylor, 554 F.3d 879, 888 (10th Cir.2009) (noting that [t]he proper inquiry is whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to `allow a jury to rationally conclude' that the defendant was guilty of the lesser-included offense (citing Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1308)); Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1223-29 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing Beck ). We consider the OCCA's analysis of each component in turn.