Opinion ID: 2631067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the judicial proceeding privilege and excessive publication

Text: ¶ 25 We must now determine whether the judicial proceeding privilege applies to the statements the Nelsons made during the press conference, which include the Kingston Complaint, the Prepared Statement, and any other oral statements. And if the privilege generally applies, we must then determine whether the Nelsons lost the privilege through excessive publication of their various statements. A. The Judicial Proceeding Privilege Clearly Applies to the Kingston Complaint, but as to the Prepared Statement and Other Oral Statements Made by the Nelsons It Is Doubtful the Privilege Applies ¶ 26 As to the law of defamation, we have stated that false and defamatory statements are not actionable if they are protected by a legal privilege. A number of legal privileges are recognized in circumstances where communication must be wholly open, frank, and unchilled by the possibility of a defamation action. This is so even though the reputation of a person may be harmed by such statements. [42] ¶ 27 The common law judicial proceeding privilege immunizes certain statements that are made during a judicial proceeding from defamation claims. The privilege is intended to promote the integrity of the adjudicatory proceeding and its truth finding processes. [43] It does so by facilitating the free and open expression by all participants . . . [that] will only occur if they are not inhibited by the risk of subsequent defamation suits. [44] ¶ 28 In order to establish absolute immunity under the judicial proceeding privilege, the statements must be (1) `made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding'; (2) `have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding'; and (3) be `made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.' [45] ¶ 29 We have held that the first requirement, that a statement must be made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding, is interpreted broadly. [46] Indeed, [t]he privilege applies to every step in the proceeding until final disposition, [47] including certain pretrial [48] and posttrial statements. [49] [W]e have indicated that a statement may qualify as made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding [even] if the communication is preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding. [50] Thus, [t]he judicial proceeding privilege extends to statements made prior to the filing of a lawsuit because it is intended to encourage reasonable efforts to resolve disputes prior to the filing of a complaint. [51] ¶ 30 As to the second requirement, a statement must have some relationship to the cause or subject matter involved, although it need not be relevant or pertinent to the judicial proceeding from an evidentiary point of view for the privilege to apply. [52] Thus, if doubt as to relevancy exists, it should be resolved in favor of the statement having reference to the subject matter of the proceeding. [53] ¶ 31 The third requirement is relatively straightforward. The statement must be made by someone acting, with respect to the case at hand, in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel. ¶ 32 The Kingston Complaint was, at the time it was filed, clearly protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. It inarguably qualified as a statement made in the course of a judicial proceeding that had reference to the subject matter of the proceeding and was made by a litigant or counsel. Thus all three requirements for application of the judicial proceeding privilege were met with respect to the Complaint. While the Prepared Statement and other oral statements did have reference to the subject matter of the proceeding and were made by a litigant or counsel, it is doubtful statements made at a press conference qualify as having been made in the course of a judicial proceeding, even given our broad interpretation of that requirement. Regardless, even were we to assume that the Prepared Statement and other oral statements were otherwise privileged under the judicial proceeding privilege, that privileged status was lost through excessive publication. B. Any Privilege that the Nelsons' Statements May Have Otherwise Enjoyed Was Lost Through Excessive Publication ¶ 33 A party may lose the absolute immunity afforded by the judicial proceeding privilege through excessive publication. We have stated, Case law generally holds that communications that are otherwise privileged lose their privilege if the statement is excessively published, that is, published to more persons than the scope of the privilege requires to effectuate its purpose. [54] Indeed, a publication is excessive if the statement was published to more persons than necessary to resolve the dispute or further the objectives of the proposed litigation, in other words, if the [statement] was published to those who did not have a legitimate role in resolving the dispute, or if it was published to persons who did not have an adequate legal interest in the outcome of the proposed litigation. [55] Thus, the purpose of the excessive publication rule is to prevent abuse of the privilege by publication of defamatory statements to persons who have no connection to the judicial proceeding. [56] ¶ 34 When deciding if a statement was excessively published, we look to the overall circumstances of the publication and determine if the purpose of the judicial proceeding privilege, which is to promote candid and honest communication between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes, is furthered by the statement's publication. [57] ¶ 35 We hold that the Nelsons' statements made during the press conference, including the Kingston Complaint, the Prepared Statement, and other oral statements, lost through excessive publication any privileged status they may have otherwise enjoyed. In explaining the basis for this holding, we will first discuss our caselaw and the application of the excessive publication rule as it relates to press conferences and statements made or distributed by parties to the media.
¶ 36 In the case before us, the Nelsons organized a press conference to discuss publicly their lawsuit filed against various alleged members and associations of the Kingston Order. During the press conference, the Nelsons made several statements to reporters concerning the nature and purposes of their lawsuit. Additionally, the Nelsons distributed the Kingston Complaint and the Prepared Statement to several reporters, and those statements were later disseminated through various media outlets, including newspaper, television, and the internet. Although no Utah case discusses the application of the excessive publication rule with respect to press conferences and the media, several cases illustrate that when looking at excessive publication we consider (1) whether the recipients of the publication have a sufficient connection to the judicial proceeding and (2) whether the purpose of the judicial proceeding privilege would be furthered by protecting the publication. If the recipients of the publication are not sufficiently connected to the judicial proceeding and the purpose of the privilege would not be furthered by protecting the publication, then the statements in question lose their absolute immunity and privileged status. ¶ 37 In Krouse v. Bower, [58] we held that a demand letter was not excessively published even though it was sent to people who at the time were not directly involved in a lawsuit. [59] In that case, counsel for two condominium owners sent a demand letter to counsel for the condominium owners' association. [60] The letter indicated that courtesy copies of the letter were to be delivered to the individual condominium owners within the association, and, indeed, these copies were later distributed to the other owners. [61] Although the plaintiffs, who were mentioned in the letter, later sued for defamation, the trial court held that the letter fell within the judicial proceeding privilege. [62] ¶ 38 On appeal, we affirmed the privileged status of the demand letter and reviewed the issue of whether it was excessively published. [63] In doing so, we expressed concern that delivery of the letter directly to the individual owners, rather than to just their counsel, was not necessary to effectuate the purpose of pursuing settlement, which was the alleged purpose of the letter. [64] Nevertheless, we held that the individual owners had a clear legal interest in the letter's subject matter. [65] We noted the overall circumstances of the letter's publication and pointed out that the association members were clients of the attorney who was the addressed recipient of the letter. [66] Further, we noted that the owners' association was a potential, and later named, party to the threatened lawsuit. [67] In light of these facts, we held that the individual owners would have likely received a copy of the letter or known of its substance and existence. [68] Because the purpose of the judicial proceeding privilege is to encourage open, forthright discussion and to promote honest communication between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes, we concluded that publication of the letter to the individual owners was not excessive. [69] ¶ 39 In DeBry v. Godbe, [70] we held that a letter sent to six people discussing out-of-court occurrences was not excessively published. [71] The letter was sent by Ms. Godbe, Mr. DeBry's counsel during his divorce proceedings. [72] In that case, we first held that the judicial proceeding privilege applied to the letter. [73] Next, we determined which of the people who received the letter had a sufficient connection to the judicial proceedings. [74] We held that four of the people, including the trial judge, Mr. DeBry, Ms. Godbe's co-counsel, and Ms. DeBry's counsel, were all directly involved in the judicial proceeding. [75] We noted that the letter was not published to a fifth person because she never received or read it. [76] Finally, we held that the sixth person, Ms. Godbe's own attorney, was sufficiently connected to the judicial proceeding because he had originally advised her to send the letter and therefore had a legally justified reason for receiving the letter. [77] Accordingly, we held that Ms. Godbe's letter did not lose the judicial proceeding privilege through excessive publication. [78] ¶ 40 Consistent with these cases, to determine whether the Nelsons' statements were excessively published, we must decide whether the reporters and media outlets to whom the Nelsons published their statements had a sufficient connection to the judicial proceedings. Then we must determine whether the purpose of the judicial proceeding privilege would be furthered by protecting such publication to the press.
¶ 41 In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, [79] the United States Supreme Court held that Fitzsimmons, a prosecutor who allegedly made defamatory statements in a pretrial press conference, was not entitled to absolute immunity. [80] The Court noted that while the speech of a counsel is privileged by the occasion on which it is spoken, [c]omments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial process just because they are made by a prosecutor. [81] ¶ 42 Although the Court never discusses an excessive publication exception to the judicial proceeding privilege, it appears that, in Buckley, the Court was of the view that, at the very least, statements made by counsel to the press concerning a case are not per se covered by an absolute privilege. And while Buckley arose in a criminal context and concerned state officials, the Court stated that prosecutors, like all attorneys, were entitled to absolute immunity from defamation liability for statements made during the course of judicial proceedings and relevant to them, [while] most statements made out of court received only good-faith immunity. [82] It appears that the Court was unwilling to provide the privilege to statements made to people or in places that have no functional or legal tie to the judicial proceedings. [83] ¶ 43 In Green Acres Trust v. London, [84] the Arizona Supreme Court determined that the press generally lack a relationship to the proposed or pending judicial proceeding, and therefore the judicial proceeding privilege did not apply to statements made by counsel during a press conference. [85] In that case, the attorney defendants were preparing to file a class action lawsuit against Green Acres on behalf of various clients. [86] The attorneys met to review the draft of their complaint, and one of the attorneys invited a reporter to their law offices to learn about the basis for the class action. [87] The attorneys gave the reporter a draft of the complaint, and at least one attorney discussed the case with her. [88] Based in part on information obtained from the draft of the complaint and the conversation held with the attorneys, the reporter wrote an article describing the grounds of the class action suit and unfavorably characterizing the manner in which Green Acres did business. [89] ¶ 44 Green Acres sued the attorneys for defamation regarding the statements made and distributed to the reporter. [90] The attorneys claimed that there was an absolute privilege for statements made to the press by attorneys concerning pending litigation. [91] But the Arizona Supreme Court held that the reporter had no relation to the proposed class action and played no role in the actual litigation other than that of a concerned citizen. [92] The court concluded that because the reporter lacked a sufficient connection to the proposed proceedings, public policy would be ill served if [the court] immunized the communications made to the reporter by the lawyer defendants. [93] Moreover, [t]he press conference simply did not enhance the judicial function and no privileged occasion arose. [94] ¶ 45 In Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., [95] the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also declined to extend the judicial proceeding privilege to statements, including a previously filed complaint, made and distributed to the media. [96] The court stated, In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. [97] ¶ 46 We are inclined to agree with the Arizona Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit in this matter. We hold that the press generally lack a connection to judicial proceedings sufficient to warrant an extension of the judicial privilege to statements made by parties to the press. Thus, in this case, the Nelsons' statements, when made to the press, were not protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. Their statements were published to more persons than necessary to resolve the dispute or further the objectives of the proposed litigation. The press had neither any relation to the pending litigation nor any clear legal interest in the outcome of the case. At most, the reporters at the press conference were acting only in the capacity of concerned citizens. Further, the reporters played no legitimate role in resolving the dispute between the parties. As a result, the press in this case clearly lacked a sufficient connection to the pending proceedings.
¶ 47 Extending the judicial proceeding privilege to statements made or distributed during a press conference would ill-serve the public policy underlying the privilege. In Asay, the Eighth Circuit stated that [a]llowing defamation suits for communications to the news media will not generally inhibit parties or their attorneys from fully investigating their claims or completely detailing them for the court or other parties. Also, the important factor of judicial control is absent. The salutary policy of allowing freedom of communication in judicial proceedings does not warrant or countenance the dissemination and distribution of defamatory accusations outside of the judicial proceeding. No public purpose is served by allowing a person to unqualifiedly make libelous or defamatory statements about another. . . . The scope of the privilege is restricted to communications such as those made between an attorney and client, or in the examination of witnesses by counsel, or in statements made by counsel to the court or jury. Thus, while a defamatory pleading is privileged, that pleading cannot be a predicate for dissemination of the defamatory matter to the public or third parties not connected with the judicial proceeding. Otherwise, to cause great harm and mischief a person need only file false and defamatory statements as judicial pleadings and then proceed to republish the defamation at will under the cloak of immunity. [98] ¶ 48 We have also stated that the purpose of the judicial proceeding privilege is intended to promote the integrity of the adjudicatory proceeding and its truth finding processes. [99] Moreover, the privilege is meant to encourage open, forthright discussion and to promote honest communication between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes. [100] Statements made and distributed to the press concerning pending or ongoing litigation do little, if anything, to promote the truth finding process in a judicial proceeding. Further, statements made to the press do not generally encourage open and honest discussion between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes; indeed, such statements often do just the opposite. Certainly, parties to a proceeding, whether attorneys, litigants, or witnesses, are free to speak their minds without fear of reprisal in the form of a defamation suit so long as their statements concern the subject matter involved and are made during or in the course of the judicial proceeding. And we generally have interpreted during or in the course of a judicial proceeding broadly to include certain statements made before, during, or even after the proceeding. But we are disinclined to extend this broad requirement to statements made directly to the press, especially in a case such as this where a party called a press conference and distributed various statements to the media for widespread dissemination.