Opinion ID: 1283283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: foster's claim

Text: The version of the Land Registration Law germane to these appeals was adopted by the Territory of Alaska in 1953. Ch. 134, SLA 1953 (codified as amended at AS 34.10.010-.240 (repealed 1978)). The Law required owners to register with the district recorder any real property located outside of organized cities. AS 34.10.040. Failure to register would result in a fine of $5 and a lien on the property. AS 34.10.050. In cases of continued non-payment, the state could foreclose, resulting in complete termination of any prior interest. [1] However, [t]he record owner at the time of ... foreclosure or his assigns may, at any time before sale of the foreclosed property by the state, repurchase the property for the nominal amount of the foreclosure judgment, plus interest. AS 34.10.220. [2] We believe that two purposes of the Land Registration Law are evident from its terms: (1) to determine ownership of remote parcels, and (2) to return abandoned land to the state. Pursuant to the Land Registration Law, the Territory foreclosed in 1957 on the three parcels Foster now claims. The parcels are known as U.S. Mineral Surveys (M.S.) 572, 574, and 636, because they were originally staked as mining claims before being patented by the federal government. Following foreclosure proceedings, deeds to the properties were issued to the Territory of Alaska in 1958. The State then succeeded to the Territory's interests. Foster, a newcomer to the three properties, obtained quitclaim deeds to them in 1981, presumably for the purpose of repurchasing the properties from the State. He filed the complaint which initiated this suit in April, 1982, seeking to compel the State to allow him to repurchase the properties. John Schnabel and the State were among the defendants. In its answer to the complaint, the State alleged that Foster had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In January of 1983, Foster pursued his administrative remedies by filing applications with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to repurchase the properties. He presented evidence of the chain of title, attempting to show that he was an assign of the former record owner and eligible to repurchase under AS 34.10.220. The DNR denied his applications because he failed to clearly establish who the record owner was at the time of foreclosure, and whether Foster was an assign of that record owner. In other words, the chains of title were full of gaps. [3] After the DNR made its decision, Foster renewed this litigation, seeking to establish his right to repurchase the properties. At that point, Schnabel, one of the defendants, counterclaimed that he owned M.S. 572 in fee simple. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State on the question of present ownership of the three parcels. The court, apparently treating Foster's action as an appeal of the prior administrative decision, affirmed that decision rejecting Foster's repurchase application: The Land Registration Law does not provide for judicial determination of the most probable record owner at the time of the foreclosure... . As a matter of law, where the record owner of the property is not clear from the record, no statutory right to repurchase exists. [4] On appeal, Foster challenges the superior court's ruling rejecting his right to repurchase the parcels. The issues are (1) whether the superior court erred in treating Foster's case as an administrative appeal; and (2) assuming the court was correct in treating the case as an appeal, whether the court erred in affirming the administrative decision.
The foreclosure process established by the Land Registration Law makes good title out of bad. Thus, the State received perfect title [5] following foreclosure, thereby terminating the long history of gaps in the chain. If the State were now to sell the parcels, the buyer would take perfect title. However, the buyer would have to pay the State a fair purchase price. Repurchase is another story. Like a foreclosure sale, repurchase also passes perfect title. But the repurchaser, rather than paying market value, pays only the nominal amount of the foreclosure judgment  which in this case is a mere $8.30 plus interest. See AS 34.10.050. We believe that the Territorial Legislature did not intend that a repurchaser should get the benefit of perfect title without paying for it. Instead, especially at this late date, repurchase can be allowed only when the title is good at the onset. That is, the repurchaser has the burden of establishing that, but for the foreclosure, the chain of title leading to him is perfect. Registration pursuant to the Land Registration Law was a procedure to compile information. Unlike a quiet title action, registration was not a procedure to make good title out of bad. An owner who did register his land had no better title than he had before he registered. Therefore, it makes no sense to allow a chain of owners who did not register their land, and in fact abandoned it for perhaps 45 years, [6] now to obtain better title than they would have, had they properly registered it. However, the statutes never explicitly required that a prospective registrant have perfect title. In fact, the Territory or State may have never before challenged a statement of ownership filed pursuant to the Land Registration Law. Why, then, should the State refuse to recognize the imperfect title of a repurchase applicant? The answer is that timely filing of a registration statement did not entitle a registrant to any new rights; if the title was full of holes, it remained full of holes. In contrast, granting an application to repurchase bestows a valuable new right  perfect title  for a nominal fee. Thus, the State is justified in requiring that an applicant's claim be indisputable, before granting him that valuable right.
Foster claims the superior court erred in treating this action as an administrative appeal, rather than as an action to completely re-examine his chain of title. We disagree. The Land Registration Law does not establish a right to a superior court determination of eligibility to repurchase. Instead, it addresses jurisdictional questions only in the most general language: The Department of Natural Resources shall administer this chapter. AS 34.10.010. We interpret this as a grant of original jurisdiction exclusively to the DNR. Agency determinations, of course, are subject to judicial review under Appellate Rule 601. Nor does any other statute create a cause of action for Foster that could be brought directly in superior court to determine one's right to repurchase. For example, the right to a quiet title action is spelled out in AS 09.45.010, but only for one in possession of property. [7] An owner not in possession of property may bring an action for ejectment under AS 09.45.630. [8] But since Foster does not claim to be the current owner, he has no present right to eject. While a declaratory judgment action might seem possible pursuant to AS 22.10.020(b), such actions cannot normally be used to circumvent limitations inherent in appeals, such as scope of review. [9] Also, the case was not so pleaded. Even without a statutory cause of action, the superior court arguably could have exercised its equitable powers to examine Foster's chain of title anew. Equitable jurisdiction generally is not dependent on statutory authorization. See, e.g., Dutton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, 438 P.2d 674, 684 (Mont. 1968); Marley v. Cannon, 618 P.2d 401, 404 (Okla. 1980); Robinson v. Manning, 378 P.2d 277, 280 (Or. 1963). But, [t]he exercise of equitable jurisdiction is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Wolff v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 770 (Alaska 1977). Thus, Foster's only right in superior court was the right to appeal the adverse agency determination. The superior court, in its appellate capacity, could have granted a trial de novo. Alaska R.App.P. 609. However, it declined to do so, stating, This court will not decide the probable record owner or discount gaps in the chain of title. Since Foster has advanced no good reason why he should be allowed to present the same evidence twice, we will not disturb the superior court's exercise of discretion. [10]
The DNR held that Foster was not eligible to repurchase, since he did not satisfy the statutory requirement of being [t]he record owner at the time of ... foreclosure or his assign[]. [11] Foster argues that the DNR was mistaken, and that the superior court was wrong to affirm. The basis for this argument is that the DNR failed to appreciate the distinction between the `record owner' and the `assign' of the record owner. Foster admits that it is unclear which of two people was the record owner at the time of foreclosure. But, he claims the uncertainty is irrelevant since he is the assign of both of them. Thus, Foster claims that he is eligible to repurchase. Furthermore, he asserts in his brief that there is no requirement in the Land Registration Law that the `assign' of the record owner be of record. The administrative decision does not indicate that the DNR considered only evidence from the land records. Rather, the decision indicates in great detail that Foster simply failed to establish both who the record owner was, and whether Foster is an assign (either on or off the record) of that person. The question whether Foster is an assign of the former record owners is a question of fact. Foster presented evidence to show that he was an assign. The DNR found his evidence inadequate. The appropriate standard of review for agency factual findings is the substantial evidence test. See State Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Decker, 700 P.2d 483, 486 (Alaska 1985); Storrs v. State Medical Board, 664 P.2d 547, 555 (Alaska 1983). This court has defined substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Galt v. Stanton, 591 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Alaska 1979) (quoting Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406, 411 (Alaska 1963)). The DNR identified numerous gaps in Foster's evidence which are certainly adequate to support the agency's decision. The superior court correctly affirmed the DNR decision, and we AFFIRM.