Opinion ID: 741151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Halotron Claim

Text: 14 In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for AmPac stated that the SEC had not proceeded against AmPac. There was an immediate objection, which was sustained. Abromson now asserts that the very mention of that matter was sufficient to constitute reversible error. 15 We have not previously decided whether a reference during the trial of a private securities action to the absence of a SEC enforcement proceeding constitutes error at all. We do not reach that question today because it is clear that the reference was harmless. [W]hen an appellate court ponders the probable effect of an error on a civil trial, it need only find that the jury's verdict is more probably than not untainted by the error. Haddad v. Lockheed Calif. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.1983). Moreover, we have refused to find reversible error where concededly improper remarks were made, but not repeated, during opening statements or closing arguments. See, e.g., Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d 831, 838 (9th Cir.1979); Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 966 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 681-82 (9th Cir.1974). The trial of the Halotron claim lasted eighteen days. The allegedly improper reference to the SEC that Abromson complains of occurred in AmPac's opening statement, and the district court instructed the jury that it should only rely on the evidence in the case. It also stated that there would be no evidence on the subject of the absence of an SEC proceeding. The reference was not repeated, and it is highly improbable that it had any effect on the verdict. Thus it was harmless. 16 Abromson complains of the district court's failure to give her requested jury instruction on the specific legal standard regarding misleading projections and statements of belief and optimism. However, she has waived any objection. When the district court indicated that the proposed instruction was argumentative and proposed a different one that covered the matter, she did not object, even though it cannot be said that an objection would have been futile. Instead, Abromson acquiesced in the court's substitute instruction. The court said, Take a look at this one, and her attorney said, That's acceptable from our perspective, your honor. By agreeing with the court, rather than preserving an objection to the court's denial of the proposed jury instruction, Abromson waived her right to appeal that issue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 (No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.); see also Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (Canby, J., plurality opinion); Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, Inc., 806 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir.1986). In light of her acquiescence in the court's ruling, it can hardly be said that Abromson stated distinctly the matter objected to and the ground of the objection. 4