Opinion ID: 171023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegations Involving Mr. Gonzales

Text: At issue here is Mr. Bryson's assertion of a constitutional right to gain access to evidence used in his conviction, which if subjected to DNA testing can definitively establish his actual innocence. Aplee's Br. at 1. The existence and contour of this right have split the Courts of Appeals at least three ways. The Fourth Circuit has held that such claims can never be brought under § 1983, because they would undermine the finality of criminal judgments and intrude on the legislative process of creating the proper process for post-conviction DNA testing. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 374-77 (4th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit has disagreed, holding that such claims are an extension of the disclosure requirement of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) as a post-conviction right. Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Eleventh Circuit has taken a middle course, rejecting a constitutional claim by a plaintiff who had not consistently maintained his actual innocence, but not foreclos[ing] the possibility that a § 1983 plaintiff could, under some extraordinary circumstances, be entitled to post-conviction access to biological evidence for the purpose of performing DNA testing. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1339 (11th Cir.2006); id. at 1340-43 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)); see also Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d 226, 246-49 (D.Mass.2006) (Gertner, J.); McKithen v. Brown, No. 02-1670, 2008 WL 2791852,  (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2008); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 315-18 & n. 6 (4th Cir.2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (all recognizing a procedural due process right to post-conviction access to DNA evidence under certain circumstances). We need not resolve this controversy and do not decide whether the Due Process Clause protects such a right. Whatever the contours of the right to obtain access to DNA evidence, assuming it exists, the complaint fails to allege Mr. Gonzales's participation in the violation of the right. The complaint contains no allegation that Mr. Gonzales ever refused a request for DNA evidence, nor an allegation that he was sufficiently involved in Mr. Macy's and Ms. Gilchrist's actions to justify liability for their misdeeds. Nor is there any factual allegation from which we can plausibly infer these actions. The complaint mentions Mr. Gonzales only three times [2] once in connection with a § 1983 violation not appealed here, and twice in connection with this claim. According to the complaint: Defendant Sam Gonzales was Oklahoma City Police Chief from 1991 until 1997 and during his tenure was responsible for development and enforcement of administrative policies related to the Oklahoma City Police Laboratory and was responsible for the supervision and training of Joyce Gilchrist. He is sued individually and in his official capacity. App. 18-19. And: Defendants Gilchrist, Campbell, Wilhelm, Wilder, McBride, Gonzales, and Oklahoma City, in derogation of their duties to establish fair and constitutional administrative policies, and in disregard of Mr. Bryson's constitutional rights, allowed Mr. Macy to exercise control over evidence and influence administrative policy decisions concerning the testing, storage, disposal, and destruction of evidence. Once such deference to Mr. Macy was established, no Defendant took material action to correct or modify Mr. Macy's influence over police policy. App. 20. Even drawing all plausible inferences in Mr. Bryson's favor, these allegations are not enough. First, we consider Mr. Gonzales's own conduct. He did not become police chief until 1991. This was eight years after Mr. Bryson was convicted, three years after Ms. Gilchrist (falsely) claimed that the evidence he requested had been destroyed, and one year after Mr. Bryson discovered the lie and was again rebuffed by Mr. Macy. So far as the complaint tells us, Mr. Gonzales had nothing to do with any of these actions, which appear to be the gravamen of Mr. Bryson's claim that his due process rights were violated. The year prior to Mr. Gonzales's arrival in 1991, the complaint alleges that the evidence was in the custody of the court clerk and that Mr. Bryson sought access to the DNA evidence through the district attorney, who (as discussed below) is not under Mr. Gonzales's supervision. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Bryson asked the Oklahoma City Police Department for access to the evidence any time after Mr. Gonzales's arrival. Indeed, the complaint does not allege any relevant acts by the plaintiff or any defendant between 1990 and 1995, when Mr. Bryson's attorney filed a petition in state court for a writ of mandamus to compel access to the evidence, along with a request for post-conviction relief. App. 22; 360. The matter remained under adjudication in state court until approximately the time of Mr. Gonzales's departure in 1997. The complaint contains no allegation of resistanceby Mr. Gonzales or anyone elseto the court's process or eventual order to grant Mr. Bryson access to the evidence. This is not enough to support a constitutional claim against this defendant. If Mr. Gonzales or his department was never asked to give Mr. Bryson access to the DNA evidence during his tenure in office, he could not have unconstitutionally refused it. Once the state judicial process was in motion, Mr. Gonzales was not required to turn over the evidence before the court made a ruling. We do not mean to fault Mr. Bryson for turning to the judicial system to vindicate his claims; this was likely a wise course given the recalcitrance he faced. But Mr. Gonzales cannot be held individually liable for the consequences of Ms. Gilchrist's and Mr. Macy's recalcitrance from 1982 to 1990. Second, the complaint alleges that Mr. Gonzales was responsible for the supervision and training of Joyce Gilchrist. App. 19. Mr. Bryson contends that even without alleging Mr. Gonzales's personal malfeasance, this is enough to hold him liable for Ms. Gilchrist's unconstitutional acts as her supervisor. Aplee.'s Br. 25. This was the theory relied on by the district court. But supervisory liability is not . . . a theory of respondeat superior. Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000). Supervisors are not strictly liable for the torts of their underlings; instead, they are liable only when they personally participated in the alleged violation. Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996). [J]ust as with any individual defendant, the plaintiff must establish `a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.' Id. at 994-95 (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir.1992)). That is why we require evidence of an affirmative link between a supervisor's conduct and the constitutional violation before liability can attach. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir.2008). Here, the complaint contains no allegation of Mr. Gonzales's personal participation in Ms. Gilchrist's torts, and therefore no such link. Ms. Gilchrist's alleged misconductprincipally, her lie to the defense that the DNA evidence had been destroyedoccurred before Mr. Gonzales arrived. There is no allegation that Ms. Gilchrist committed any misfeasance on his watch that he should have prevented by proper supervision. [3] Absent any such allegations of personal involvement, Mr. Gonzales does not answer for Ms. Gilchrist's torts. We do not mean to overstate Mr. Bryson's burden[h]eightened pleading is not required in § 1983 cases, Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1164but the complaint does not contain enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that [Mr. Bryson] is entitled to relief from Mr. Gonzales. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, the complaint alleged that Mr. Gonzales, among others, allowed [the district attorney, defendant Robert Macy] to exercise control over evidence and influence administrative policy decisions concerning the testing, storage, disposal, and destruction of evidence. App. 20. It should be noted, first, that as an independent elected official the district attorney is not under the supervision of the chief of police. Mr. Macy, who is a defendant, may well have violated Mr. Bryson's rights, see McKithen, 2008 WL 2791852, at  17- 19 (holding that the duty to provide post-conviction access to DNA access pertains to the prosecutor), but Mr. Macy's actions are not attributable to Mr. Gonzales. It is unsurprisingand certainly not unconstitutionalthat the district attorney would have some influence over decisions of a legal nature, such as retention of evidence. As to control over the evidence, the complaint alleges that during Mr. Gonzales's tenure as police chief, physical custody of Mr. Bryson's DNA evidence shifted from the county court, to the district attorney, to Ms. Gilchrist, and thus for some period of time Mr. Macy exercised control over it. But we have searched Mr. Bryson's briefs in vain for any explanation why this would have been a constitutional violation on Mr. Gonzales's part. The evidence was not destroyed. Mr. Gonzales did not refuse any request to release it. There is no allegation that Mr. Gonzales did anything other than allow the judicial process to run its coursea process in which Mr. Macy represented the interests of the state in court. Finally, there are also some conclusory allegations that simply name the Defendants genericallysuch as that Defendants, through resort to unreliable evidence, and sometimes fraudulent and/or grossly reckless techniques, took a twenty-year chunk out of the heart of David Bryson's lifetime on earth. App. 13. But none of these allegations are helpful in figuring out what facts Mr. Bryson means to allege about Mr. Gonzales's conduct: In § 1983 cases, defendants often include the government agency and a number of government actors sued in their individual capacities. Therefore it is particularly important in such circumstances that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249-50 (emphasis in original). They do not help Mr. Bryson state a claim.