Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mutilation of Human Remains as a Lesser Related Offense of Attempted Rape

Text: Defendant contends his state and federal constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's denial of his request for an instruction on the crime of unlawful mutilation of human remains, as then defined in section 7052 of the Health and Safety Code, as a lesser offense related to the charges of attempted rape. [32] He argues he was entitled under the California Constitution to such an instruction pursuant to our decision in People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303 ( Geiger ), and that our subsequent decision in People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ( Birks), overruling Geiger, should not be retroactively applied in the present case, because defendant relied upon the state of the law under Geiger in presenting his case at trial. Defendant also claims refusal of this instruction violated his federal constitutional right to a jury instruction on the defense theory of the case. Defendant's contentions are without merit. [33] At the time of defendant's crimes in 1986, Health and Safety Code section 7052 provided, in part, Every person who willfully mutilates, disinters, or removes from the place of interment any human remains, without authority of law, is guilty of a felony. (Health & Saf.Code, § 7052, added by Stats. 1939, ch. 60, p. 672.) Defendant argues this is an offense related to the attempted rape charges in this case, because he testified he did not form the intent to have sexual intercourse with Garcia and Sorensen until after they were dead, and therefore did not attempt to rape the victims but instead mutilated their remains. Under the now overruled holding of Geiger, defendants, upon their request, were entitled to jury instructions on offenses that were not necessarily included in the charged offense, but instead were merely related, if (1) there was some basis for a finding of guilt of the related offense, (2) the offenses were closely related such that the requested instruction on the related offense would have been relevant to determining whether the defendant committed the charged offense, and (3) the defendant's theory of the case was consistent with his or her guilt of the related offense. ( Geiger, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 530-531, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303.) In Birks, however, we overruled the holding of Geiger that a defendant's unilateral request for a related-offense instruction must be honored over the prosecution's objection. ( Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073.) We also concluded this change in the law generally should be applied retroactively. ( Id. at pp. 136-137, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073.) Defendant argues, however, that Birks should not be applied in the present case, because he relied upon the state of the law under Geiger in presenting his defense. We are not persuaded. In Birks, we observed that although the defendant in that case had not raised any claim of reliance upon Geiger in presenting his case, such a claim of reliance could not easily have been made by him or any other defendant, in view of the circumstance that all defendants have a strong motivation to vigorously challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the charged offenses regardless of whether an instruction on a lesser related offense is given to the jury. ( Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 137, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073.) We did not address whether a defendant under circumstances similar to those in the present case could prove reliance upon Geiger and thereby preclude retroactive application of Birks. Moreover, in the present case, because the prosecution's theory was that the murders were committed to facilitate the rapes and defendant's avoidance of detection, the presentation of defendant's version that he did not form the intent to have sexual relations with the victims until after they were dead was essential to the defense's attempt to rebut the prosecution's case. This is true regardless of whether the jury might have been instructed that it could find defendant guilty of mutilation of human remains instead of attempted rape. Indeed, as defendant himself points out, defense counsel committed themselves to the presentation of the defense theory of the case in the opening statement, before the trial court resolved the issue of whether the related-offense instruction would be given. Defendant has not shown he would have conducted his defense any differently had he known he was not entitled to an instruction on the allegedly related offense of mutilation of human remains. We therefore conclude Birks retroactively applies in this case and Geiger is not controlling. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit state constitutional error in refusing to give this instruction. [34] Nor did the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction violate defendant's federal constitutional rights. As we discussed in Birks, there is no federal constitutional right of a defendant to compel the giving of lesser-related-offense instructions. ( Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 124, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073, citing Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. 88, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76.) Further, except for the limited situation in a capital case in which the state has created an artificial barrier to the jury's consideration of an otherwise available noncapital verdict, there is no federal constitutional right to instruction on lesser necessarily included offenses. ( Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165-169, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) To the extent defendant challenges these holdings by arguing there is a general federal constitutional due process right to present the theory of the defense case, thus requiring that the instruction he requested on the crime of mutilation of human remains be given under the circumstances of this case, he merely has recast in different terms the same claims we already have rejected. The absence of an instruction on mutilation of a corpse did not prevent defendant from presenting his version of the events, or from arguing to the jury that he was not guilty of the capital charges, such that we could conclude his trial was fundamentally unfair. Defendant has not presented any compelling reason for us to revisit our decisions in Birks and Breverman, and we decline to do so.