Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Automatic Motion to Reduce Sentence

Text: (71a) Defendant argues, finally, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to modify his sentence, which was automatic pursuant to section 190.4. Defendant concedes that, at the automatic modification hearing, the court reviewed and considered each of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented at the penalty phase. Defendant insists the court nevertheless erred in two ways: in misunderstanding how mitigating evidence is to be considered under section 190.3, factor (k), and in improperly considering defendant's probation report before ruling on the automatic modification motion. We are not persuaded. First, defendant argues the trial court, in ruling on his modification motion, erroneously considered mitigating evidence relevant only insofar as it extenuated the gravity of the charged crimes. In support, defendant notes the trial court, after reviewing certain mitigating evidence, remarked: The Court finds these to be mitigating factors, but they do not extenuate the gravity of the crime which defendant committed and for which he was convicted. Defendant argues the court's statement demonstrates that, in contravention of Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973] and People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], the court considered only statutory mitigation and ignored all nonstatutory mitigating evidence. (72) In Lockett, the high court declared that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. ( Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 604 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2964-2965], original italics.) In Easley, we recognized that a jury that is not specifically informed [that section 190.3, factor (k) should, under Lockett, be interpreted to encompass all proffered mitigating evidence] could reasonably construe the instruction's language to permit consideration only of circumstances that relate to the `gravity of the crime' and not of circumstances that relate to the general character, family background or other aspects of the defendant.  ( People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 878, original italics.) In order to avoid potential misunderstanding in the future, we directed, trial courts  in instructing on the factor embodied in section 190.3, subdivision (k)  should inform the jury that it may consider as a mitigating factor `any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime' and any other `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 878, fn. 10, quoting Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 604 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2964-2965].) (71b) Defendant acknowledges that the trial court here gave the penalty jury proper instructions under Lockett and Easley. Based solely on the trial court's remark mentioned above, however, defendant suggests the trial court failed to follow the law in its own determination of sentence. For several reasons, we conclude the record does not reasonably support such a conclusion. The trial court's full remarks regarding section 190.3, factor (k) were as follows: Evidence was introduced by Mr. Williams at the penalty phase of the trial that Mr. Williams performed satisfactorily in school, that he participated in church services, Sunday school and the church choir, and that his conduct in the cadet corps was exemplary. Also, that he is a devoted father and worked to support his infant son. Further, defendant's background and prior history of being discarded at the time of his birth. [¶] The court finds these to be mitigating factors, but they do not extenuate the gravity of the crime which defendant committed for which he was convicted. A plain reading of the court's remarks suggests  contrary to defendant's interpretation  that, far from ignoring nonstatutory items related to defendant's background and character, the court found those it mentioned to be mitigating factors even though they did not, in the court's view, extenuate the gravity of the crime. Moreover, as the People point out, the court, in stating that certain factors did not extenuate the gravity of the crime, merely quoted the statutory language. Nothing in the record suggests the court was ignorant of section 190.3, factor (k)'s proper interpretation under Lockett and Easley. Indeed, the record suggests the contrary. At one point, the court expressly weighed, as a mitigating factor, Dr. Bennett's finding defendant would probably function well in prison against the fact defendant possessed a weapon while incarcerated. Had the court been laboring under the misunderstanding that mitigating evidence had no relevance unless it extenuated the gravity of the charged crime, it would, logically, have had no reason to weigh Dr. Bennett's mitigating testimony against the weapon-possession evidence, which did not relate to a charged crime. In light of the foregoing, we reject defendant's contention the court too restrictively applied section 190.3, factor (k). Moreover, even assuming error, defendant has not shown prejudice. Defendant suggests strong mitigation in this case might have led to a different modification ruling had the court not misunderstood section 190.3, factor (k), but we discern no such strong mitigation in the record. Defendant argues also that remand is required because the trial court's refusal to modify the death verdict was partly based on its improper consideration of defendant's probation report. Again, we disagree. While there may have been error, there was no prejudice. Just prior to ruling on defendant's automatic modification motion, the court stated: The probation report has been received, has been read and has been considered by the court, and it is hereby ordered filed herein and made a part of the records of this case as provided by law. Thus, as the People concede, it is clear the trial court read the probation report prior to the automatic modification hearing. The better procedure, as we have previously stated, is to defer reading the report until after ruling on the modification motion, which is to be made on the basis of the evidence that was before the jury. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 81.) We have stated that [c]onsideration of the probation report ... before ruling on the application for modification is ... error. ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 866.) In similar cases, however, we have assumed, absent evidence in the record to the contrary, that the court was not improperly influenced by material in the probation report. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 81, citing People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1106 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40]; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 866.) Here, the trial court ruled on the section 190.4 motion after filing the probation report, but did not expressly link the two actions. After ordering the probation report filed, the trial court simply stated: Now, Mr. Williams, this then is the date and time heretofore and duly and regularly set for the court's ruling on your automatic motion to modify the jury verdict imposing the penalty for Count 1 to be death. Significantly, in then proceeding to rule, the court noted that the law of this state requires the trial judge in ruling on your application to review the evidence, consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances provided in section 190.3.... The court also noted it had in fact made an independent determination as to whether the jury's verdict that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is contrary to the law or the evidence presented. As a whole, the record suggests the trial court properly understood its ruling on defendant's automatic modification motion under section 190.4 was to be based solely upon the evidence presented to the jury. Moreover, to any extent the trial court erred, defendant has not shown prejudice. We agree with the People there is no affirmative record indication the trial court would have ruled differently on defendant's section 190.4 motion had it not read the probation report beforehand. Consequently, any error was harmless.
The judgment is affirmed.