Opinion ID: 2531682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Share a Common Dwelling

Text: Section 112A-3(3) provides that persons will be deemed family or household members if they share or formerly shared a common dwelling. In determining what it means to share a common dwelling, the appellate court below relied on People v. Young, 362 Ill.App.3d 843, 849, 298 Ill. Dec. 712, 840 N.E.2d 825 (2005), wherein the court interpreted the phrase family or household member in connection with the domestic battery statute, which also references section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Young, the State contended that the defendant was guilty of domestic battery because the defendant and the victim were family or household members by virtue of the fact that they shared a common dwelling within the meaning of section 112A-3(3). At trial, evidence was presented which showed that the night before the alleged attack, the defendant and the victim had spent the night in the same PADS homeless shelter. The next morning, the defendant and victim left the shelter together and then spent the day together, drinking in a bar. Later that day, when they went to check in at another PADS shelter for the evening, they got into an argument. In the parking lot outside the shelter, the defendant attacked the victim. At trial, the victim testified that she met the defendant at a PADS shelter about 1½ months prior to the attack and that she and the defendant had stayed at various PADS shelters on several occasions since then. The victim denied, however, that she and the defendant were more than social friends, stating that they had been on only one date and did not have an ongoing dating relationship. Based on the evidence, the trial court found that the defendant and victim shared a common dwelling and convicted the defendant of domestic battery. The appellate court reversed, however, finding that the evidence did not support a finding that the couple had shared a common dwelling. The appellate court held that shared lodgings are not a shared dwelling unless the living arrangement has a degree of permanence and a dwelling is where persons stay on an extended, indefinite, or regular basis. Based on the reasoning in Young, the appellate court in the case at bar concluded that Ethan and defendant did not share a common dwelling. The appellate court noted that the Young court recognized the possibility that two people could form a household for the purposes of section 112A-3(3) `by virtue of their consistently lodging together,' thus creating a nomadic household with no fixed place of residence. Nevertheless, the court found no shared common dwelling in the case at bar because there was no testimony at trial indicating the defendant, the victim, and Hampton stayed together in one adult's home on an extended or regular basis. While we agree with the appellate court that the statute does not require a single fixed residence, we do not agree that the evidence in this case does not support a finding that defendant and Ethan shared a common dwelling within the meaning of section 112A-3(3). As recognized in In re Alexis H., 401 Ill.App.3d 543, 559-60, 340 Ill.Dec. 901, 929 N.E.2d 552 (2010), a statute must be interpreted consistent with the purpose and intent of the legislature. When looking at the language used by the legislature to define family or household member in paragraph (3) of section 112A-3, it is clear that the legislature attempted to capture all of the myriad types of familial relationships, both past and present, as well as various situations of cohabitation and shared living arrangements. The statutory definition is broad. There can be no bright-line test for determining household membership. Each case must be decided based on its specific facts. Although the statute does not indicate the length of time or the frequency with which persons must share lodgings to constitute having shared a common dwelling, the amount of time the parties have resided together is one factor that may be considered. No particular length of time is required, nor is length of time the dispositive factor. Other factors that may be considered are: the nature of the living arrangements, whether the parties had any other living accommodations; whether they kept personal items at the shared residence; and whether the parties shared in the privileges and duties of a common residence, such as contributing to household expenses or helping with maintenance. See In re Alexis H., 401 Ill.App.3d 543, 340 Ill.Dec. 901, 929 N.E.2d 552 (2010); Glater v. Fabianich, 252 Ill.App.3d 372, 192 Ill.Dec. 136, 625 N.E.2d 96 (1993). We agree that the statute is not so broad that it includes situations, as in Young, where the defendant and victim had no real connection other than that they slept under the same roof on a few occasions. But that is not the case here. In the case at bar, the evidence showed that for five consecutive days prior to Ethan's death, Ethan and his mother stayed with defendant at defendant's temporary residence on 99th Street. During that time, Ethan and Lovia slept in the same room with defendant and even shared the same air mattress. Some of Ethan's clothes, food, and medicine were kept at defendant's residence and Lovia relied on defendant to provide child care for Ethan when she left to go to work. In addition, the evidence established that Lovia and defendant dated for 1½ years, which was most of Ethan's life. Lovia testified that, on several occasions during that 1½ years, she and defendant resided together either at her family residence or at defendant's residence. Whenever Lovia stayed at defendant's residence, Ethan stayed there too. Thus, the five days prior to Ethan's death was not the only time that Lovia, Ethan and defendant shared a common dwelling, nor was it the first time that Lovia and Ethan stayed at defendant's residence. Also, Lovia testified that August 23, 2006, was not the only time she left Ethan in defendant's care. We hold this evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Lovia, Ethan, and defendant were members of each other's household by virtue of the fact that they shared a common dwelling, even though the dwelling was sometimes the Hampton family home and sometimes the residence defendant shared with his relatives.