Opinion ID: 3066027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Greenpeace USA is the Proper Entity to

Text: Enjoin A common thread in Greenpeace USA’s various challenges is the argument that Greenpeace USA was not directly involved in any prior attacks on Shell vessels. But Shell does not need to show past injury by Greenpeace USA to establish standing or to succeed on the merits of its preliminary injunction motion. See Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]s commentators have noted, ‘the injury need not have been inflicted when application [for an injunction] is made or be certain to occur; a strong threat of irreparable injury before trial is an adequate basis.’ Requiring a showing of actual injury would defeat the purpose of the preliminary injunction, which is to prevent an injury from occurring.” (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948 at 437–38 (1973)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 933 cmt. (1)(b) (“[A] common method of proving a threat of a future tort is by proving a past tort under conditions that render its repetition or continuance probable. It is not necessary, however, to prove past wrong.”). Regardless, Greenpeace USA does not dispute evidence that its own activists carried out the attack on Shell’s Harvey Explorer. And, although the record does not make clear which Greenpeace entity was directly responsible for multiple attacks on Cairn Energy vessels in the Arctic Ocean, 16 SHELL OFFSHORE V . GREENPEACE Greenpeace USA’s executive director essentially took credit for it, describing the perpetrators as “our activists” and boasting that as a result of this direct action, “Cairn didn’t find oil in 2010.” Dkt. 56-19 (Exh. 1015 at 0005). Accordingly, the district court observed that although Shell had “not demonstrated that Greenpeace USA was directly involved in either the New Zealand or Finnish incidents” involving the Noble Discoverer, Nordica, and Fennica, other evidence showed that “stopping Shell and other oil companies from drilling in the Arctic is more likely than not one of the overall priority strategies of Greenpeace worldwide, as well as of Greenpeace USA.” Shell Offshore, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 848. We see no clearly erroneous factual findings undergirding that conclusion.7 7 The dissent argues that Greenpeace USA’s legal status is relevant to this appeal because “a person (or corporation) can be held legally responsible only for his own actions, absent extraordinary circumstances.” Dissent at 25. But this truism, which the dissent derives from cases involving decisions on the merits, see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 618 (1983) (appeal from dismissal of complaint on the merits); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 896 (1982) (appeal from judgment imposing damages liability), has no application to the present context of an appeal from a preliminary injunctive order. To determine whether Shell has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, we must engage in a probabilistic inquiry, an inquiry that simply was not addressed in Claiborne Hardware and Bancec. The questionable nature of the dissent’s reliance on merits-based decisions is further heightened by the limitations inherent in interlocutory review. Unlike review of a decision on the merits, our preliminary injunction decisions are both narrow in scope and rendered without benefit of a fully developed factual record. See Ctr. for Biological D iversity v. Salazar, — F.3d — , 2013 W L 440727, at  (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013). These limitations explain why, as we have observed time and again, preliminary injunctions decisions are just that – “preliminary.” Id. at ; SHELL OFFSHORE V . GREENPEACE 17