Opinion ID: 2423297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Considerations on Remand

Text: Mindful that appellant has received multiple terse, dismissive rulings on her petitions for compensation, we see fit to note various issues that the trial court should address on remand. First, as a legal matter, we observe that appellant did not appeal the denial of her 2008 petition; accordingly, under the doctrine of res judicata, she had no right to re-seek, in her 2010 petition, even with a motion for enlargement of time, the compensation sought in her 2008 petition. See D.C.App. R. 4(a)(1), (5) (notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of order, and the Superior Court may extend this time only if a notice of appeal is filed no later than thirty days after expiration of this time and the party shows excusable neglect or good cause); Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1179 (D.C. 1986) (The doctrine of res judicata operates as a complete bar to the relitigation of claims between the same parties or those in privity with them after the rendering of a valid, final judgment on the merits in a prior suit.). It is unclear to this court the dates for which compensation was requested in the 2008 petition. Appellant stated that she was petitioning for compensation for June 14, 2005 up to date: 30 months, but the petition has a date of November 2, 2008, and was filed on December 23, 2008, approximately forty-one and forty-two months, respectively, after June 14, 2005. One of the trial court's tasks on remand, therefore, is to determine the time period for which appellant sought compensation in her 2008 petition, because compensation for that time period is now a dead issue. Compensation for the remaining time period in appellant's 2010 motion is alive and before the trial court on remand. Before determining appropriate compensation for the live time period in appellant's petition, however, the trial court must rule on appellant's motion for enlargement of time. The decision to grant the motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect, is directed to the discretion of the trial court. See In re Estate of Yates, 988 A.2d 466, 468 (D.C.2010) (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b) (a deadline may be enlarged in [the trial court's] discretion)). In deciding whether appellant's neglect is excusable, the trial court should consider `the danger of prejudice [to other parties], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.' Yates, 988 A.2d at 468 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (alteration in original)). In this regard, we note that appellant has faced multiple obstacles in filing her petitions for compensation, including her limited English language skills, her limited understanding of her rights and duties as guardian, her difficulty in locating an attorney to assist her with filing her petitions and the time the attorney required to work on the 2010 petition, and the necessity of spending all of her time caring for the ward who is unable to care for himself and needs assistance with virtually all life functions. If the trial court finds excusable neglect and grants the motion for enlargement of time, it must consider the merits of appellant's 2010 petition for compensation. A guardian is entitled to compensation for reasonable services rendered in conformance with the court's appointments. Orshansky, 952 A.2d at 211. Accordingly, the trial court, after reviewing the details in appellant's petition, must determine and explain what services appellant appropriately rendered as guardian, the hours of service she provided, and the factors it relies upon in setting rates of reasonable compensation for those services. [3] Finally, we raise again the question the auditor posed when reviewing appellant's 2008 petition. Is continuing guardianship in the District of Columbia appropriate when both the guardian and the ward reside in Virginia, and have since 2005? We note that the ward currently does not meet any of the conditions of the territorial application statute governing intervention proceedings in the District. See D.C.Code § 21-2021 (2001) (guardianship chapter applies to individuals domiciled in the District; non-domiciliaries with property in the District; property coming into the control of a guardian or conservator who is subject to the laws of the District; and incapacitated individuals in the District). Any future termination of guardianship in the District, however, would have no effect on the award of compensation to appellant for services already rendered and not barred by res judicata: Service in good faith pursuant to court order is compensable, regardless of whether the probate court erred in making the appointment. Orshansky, 952 A.2d at 210. [4] Reversed and remanded.