Opinion ID: 1825496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Counsel Bias

Text: In his final claim, Foster contends that the postconviction court erred in denying without an evidentiary hearing his claim that his counsel was racially biased. As addressed above, we relinquished jurisdiction on this claim for an evidentiary hearing relating to whether defense counsel made a racial slur. On January 20-21, 2005, the postconviction court held a supplemental evidentiary hearing. Defense counsel focused on the alleged racial slur and the related comment regarding mitigation and whether counsel failed to present or properly prepare for the mitigation phase. Defense counsel called Janet Vogelsang as the defendant's first and only witness. Vogelsang, a licensed clinical social worker from Greenville, South Carolina, was retained by Smallwood and Kelley in September of 1993 to provide a biopsychosocial assessment of Foster. According to Vogelsang, after she was retained, she sent the attorneys a checklist containing all of the information that she would need; she then talked to investigator Gary Phillips about the records and asked him to perform initial interviews on family members; and she flew to Florida to talk to family members in person. When she arrived, Phillips picked her up at the airport and took her to an initial meeting at a local bar with Smallwood, the attorney who was responsible for the guilt phase. She could not recall when the racial comment was made or what was being discussed at the time, just that the comment was made pretty early in the case and that other people were present. While she could not recall the exact statement, Vogelsang asserted that Smallwood made a comment to the effect that Jermaine is just another dumb nigger and who cares anyway about all this mitigation, the jury is not going to listen. However, Vogelsang did not document anything about the alleged racial slur, nor did she contact the judge about the slur because it was an isolated event. She did not see the comment as a pattern of racism but was more concerned about the dismissive attitude as to mitigation. After her first visit to Florida to obtain information, Vogelsang wrote a letter to counsel stressing all of the items that she still needed, including the medical, school, criminal, psychological, and Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) records for all members of Foster's family up to and including his grandparents, aunts, and uncles. She never received most of the records as to other family members, did not receive the HRS records, and did not have the opportunity to interview Foster's teachers, neighbors, or the social workers. Based in part on the lack of records, Vogelsang did not believe that she had made a complete evaluation in the case. However, she did review a number of records, including Foster's medical records, school records, crime reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the sheriff's office, arrest records, and numerous family records. She also saw records relating to Foster's mother, father, and stepfather. She reviewed portions of the transcripts from the federal trial and read depositions of one of the victims and a codefendant. Vogelsang interviewed a number of people, including Dr. Dee, Foster, his mother, two of his aunts, his father, his brother Tyree, two cousins, both of his grandmothers, and one of his grandfathers. She interviewed two HRS workers and learned the social workers were afraid to go to his neighborhood. In order to prepare for trial, Vogelsang made a number of charts, which included information that she had been given during the interviews and reflected certain risk factors. The charts were never used, however, because the trial judge ruled that she could not testify as to what people told her in interviews. Instead, she simply testified that based on the accumulation of risk factors present in his life, Foster was at high risk and that he was a person whose judgment, insight, and decision-making skills were affected. To rebut Vogelsang's testimony regarding the racial comment, the State called a number of character witnesses. Numerous judges in the community who had the opportunity to observe Smallwood represent clients of all different races testified that Smallwood zealously advocated for his clients regardless of their races. Witnesses who had known Smallwood since he was a child testified that they never observed any racial bias in Smallwood in the years they had known him. Each of the witnesses testified that Smallwood had a reputation in the community of being honest and trustworthy, and each was convinced that Smallwood was not racially prejudiced. The State also called Nick Kelley, Gary Phillips, and Smallwood. Although Vogelsang asserted that she was sure somebody else was present when Smallwood made the racial comment, nobody else testified that such a statement was made. In fact, they strongly disagreed that Smallwood would ever make such a comment. According to Kelley, other than the first meeting, he could not recall a time when Vogelsang was with Smallwood without Kelley being present, particularly since Smallwood was not responsible for the penalty phase. However, Kelley did testify that from the beginning of their appointment, he and Smallwood were concerned about whether race would be a factor in the case because this was a very high profile case where a group of young black men kidnapped a group of mostly Hispanic men and systematically shot all of the Hispanic men but released the one black girl who was also kidnapped. Race was still a concern when Vogelsang first arrived, and Kelley was sure that they had expressed this concern to Vogelsang. The State also inquired into the amount of mitigation provided to Vogelsang. Kelley, Phillips, and Smallwood each testified that Vogelsang never expressed that she was dissatisfied with the information provided to her for her assessment. According to Phillips, the attorneys encouraged Phillips to find as much mitigation as possible. However, some of the records just did not exist or were not available. Phillips had a difficult time reaching certain people, and some witnesses did not want to be involved at all. Kelley also testified regarding whether he prevented Vogelsang from testifying regarding her charts. According to Kelley, ten minutes before she was supposed to testify, Vogelsang brought in two charts and asked to testify at to those charts. Kelley told her that he had prepared his own chart with all the risk factors, and they would use that one. Following the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court entered a lengthy written order denying the claim. The judge first reviewed in detail the evidence presented by the character witnesses and concluded the following. Over the defense's objection, this Court allowed the State to proceed with all of the [character] witnesses. However, it has limited consideration of their testimony, finding that their opinions regarding Mr. Smallwood and Mr. Kelley are relevant, but not dispositive of the issues raised in the Motion for Leave to Amend. What is abundantly clear is that every member of this group of mostly African-Americans is convinced that neither Mr. Smallwood nor Mr. Kelley has any racial bias whatsoever, and that both attorneys have demonstrated themselves to be zealous advocates for clients of all races. The Court finds no reason to conclude otherwise. The court next concluded that Foster did not sufficiently prove that Smallwood made a racial slur. If the alleged racial slur was made, and Ms. Vogelsang found it so troubling as to indicate the attorneys' failure to advocate zealously on behalf of a defendant who was facing the death penalty, logic dictates that she would have documented it and reported it immediately, as required by the ethical code of her profession. It is extremely significant that she did not do so. Instead, she allowed the trial to proceed, Mr. Foster to be convicted and sentenced to death, and the state supreme court to affirm his conviction. Altogether, she waited several years before filing her affidavit about the alleged racial slur, until she was contacted by collateral counsel during the investigatory stages of the postconviction proceedings. This Court concludes that the weight of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing leads to the conclusion that Mr. Smallwood did not make any racial slurs against Mr. Foster. Alternately, if the comment was made, the Court finds that Ms. Vogelsang's interpretation of it was incorrect, because at most, it demonstrated the attorneys' concern for the manner in which a potential Osceola County jury would perceive Mr. Foster, given the racial tensions in Osceola County at the time and the publicity the case had generated. There is simply no support for the proposition that the statement reflected the manner in which the attorneys personally viewed him. Finally, the court rejected Foster's allegation that he was denied due process based on his counsel's racial prejudice and the failure to provide mitigation materials. Ms. Vogelsang testified that she provided defense attorneys Donald Smallwood and Nick Kelley with a checklist of records she needed to complete a biopsycho-social assessment and identify risk factors which can affect an individual's life, but they refused to provide her with all of the materials she needed. She contended that she wrote letters to the attorneys, expressing her concern about the need for additional records and suggesting there was much to be done. Among the records she identified as missing were AFDC and HRS records, birth records of Mr. Foster's mother, and records pertaining to other specific individuals. In summary, she believed she was deprived of records which could have provided extensive details regarding Mr. Foster's family history and environment. Attorneys Nick Kelley and Donald Smallwood, together with investigator Gary Phillips, each testified at the evidentiary hearing. All denied receiving any sort of checklist from Ms. Vogelsang, and all asserted that they made every effort to provide her with everything she requested during her meetings with them. Mr. Kelley handled the penalty phase of the trial. He testified that when Ms. Vogelsang wrote the letter requesting additional materials, he directed Mr. Phillips to retrieve whatever he could, and the package was sent to her via Federal Express. He did not recall her expressing any dissatisfaction with anything he and Mr. Smallwood were doing, nor did he recall her complaining that she was not receiving the information she needed. He further testified that while Mr. Foster's family members cooperated during the investigative interviews, they did not want to testify at trial, and that he was terrified to subpoena them and put them on the stand if they did not want to be there. Ms. Vogelsang wanted to testify about her conversations with them, but the trial judge sustained the State's objection to this. Nevertheless, Ms. Vogelsang was allowed to testify, without objection, to the risk factors she believed were present in Mr. Foster's life, and Mr. Kelley believed she was an effective witness as the trial judge did find mitigation based in part on her testimony. Mr. Phillips testified that both attorneys understood the true value of mitigation and never refused to provide Ms. Vogelsang with any of the items she requested. Some of the records, quite simply, did not exist, in part because social workers were often afraid to go to the part of town where Mr. Foster and his family lived. Mr. Smallwood testified that he did not talk directly with Ms. Vogelsang about the records she needed, as Mr. Kelley was directing the penalty phase of the case. However, from the beginning, he believed that significant mitigating factors existed. He noted that Mr. Foster was young and, in his opinion, involved with others who dominated him. When they met at the jail, Mr. Foster was crying and remorseful, and he was determined to do everything he could to spare Mr. Foster from the death penalty. He believed that Mr. Kelley and Mr. Phillips followed up on each potential mitigating factor, and provided all the information they could locate to Ms. Vogelsang. Returning to the issue of Ms. Vogelsang's personally prepared visual aids, Mr. Kelley testified that he told her he preferred to use his own chart, which he had created after meeting with her to discuss the risk factors. In addition, he was concerned that her chart contained hearsay information which would not have been admissible at trial, although he acknowledged he might not have explained this to her. He wanted her testimony to stand before the jury without objection, which it did until attorney Chris Smith (who represented co-defendant Alf Catholic) tried to use her testimony in his case. During that examination, Ms. Vogelsang offered specific details, to which the State objected, and the jury was told to disregard her remarks, exactly the scenario Mr. Kelley had wished to avoid. In summary, this Court finds no support for the proposition that Mr. Foster's attorneys refused to provide Ms. Vogelsang with records she requested, which were within their power to obtain, or for the proposition that they sabotaged her testimony in any way with respect to her visual aids. Foster contends that the postconviction court erred in its conclusions and requests that this Court keep in mind that Vogelsang had nothing to gain by making such a statement if it were not true. However, such arguments would require this Court to second-guess credibility decisions that are rightfully in the hands of the trial court. As this Court has repeatedly held, the trial court has `the superior vantage point to see and hear the witnesses and judge their credibility.' . . . `[S]o long as its decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on . . . the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.' Peterka v. State, 890 So.2d 219, 232 (Fla.2004) (quoting Guzman v. State, 721 So.2d 1155, 1159 (Fla.1998), and Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001), respectively), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2911, 162 L.Ed.2d 301 (2005). In turning to the case presented, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the postconviction court's factual findings, including the findings relating to the witnesses' credibility. Foster has also failed to show that the court erred relative to its legal conclusions. Accordingly, we deny this claim.