Opinion ID: 2632324
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Record Establishes Fair and Just Reasons to Allow Execution.

Text: Because it relied on the assumption that the Guttchens' lien could not survive without its underlying debt, the superior court did not address the merits of their motion for leave to execute late. Alaska Statutes 09.35.020 establishes the standard: When a period of five years has elapsed after the entry of judgment and without an execution being issued on the judgment, no execution may issue except by order of the court in which judgment is entered. The court shall grant the motion if the court determines that there are just and sufficient reasons for the failure to obtain the writ of execution within five years after the entry of judgment. [14] In State, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Division, ex rel. Inman v. Dean, we construed this statute to require a showing of good cause for delay in execution. [15] Although we noted in Dean that administrative efforts to collect delinquent support payments might show good cause, as might [e]vidence of previous attempts to execute, [16] we have not otherwise defined what would suffice to meet the statutory requirement of just and sufficient reasons for the failure to obtain the writ of execution within five years. [17] Here, both parties urge us to sustain their respective positions on the issue of just and sufficient reasons as a matter of law. Although the issue typically involves a factual component and is therefore usually consigned to the superior court's discretion, [18] both parties in this case had the opportunity to present their positions to the superior court in their memoranda and affidavits, neither party requested an evidentiary hearing before the superior court, and the critical facts surrounding the issue are undisputed. Given these circumstances, we find no impediment to deciding the issue of just and sufficient reasons for late execution as a matter of law. [19] The undisputed facts in the record show the following: (1) the 1989 attorney's fees award and recorded judgment established a lien against any interest the Gabriels held in the Raspberry Island property; (2) the Guttchens perfected their lien before the Gabriels filed for bankruptcy in March 1990; (3) the bankruptcy discharged the Gabriels' personal liability so that the only method of enforcing the judgment was the judicial lien on the Raspberry Island property; (4) the Gabriels' property interest in the Raspberry Island parcel could only be perfected by surveying the property, establishing its boundaries, and obtaining a variance from the Kodiak Island Borough to allow subdivision; [20] (5) despite a provision in the superior court's July 5, 1989, judgment requiring the Gabriels to survey and establish their boundaries within sixty days, neither the Gabriels nor their successors  their children  applied for a variance until 1999; (6) in response, the Guttchens filed a motion for leave to execute on their lien. [21] We find that these circumstances establish good cause for late execution as a matter of law: the Raspberry Island property was the only property of the Gabriels subject to execution, the Gabriels controlled the process of subdividing the property, and they did not timely act upon the superior court's order to apply for a variance in order to subdivide. When Greg Gabriel Jr. applied for a variance in 1999, the Guttchens promptly filed their motion for leave to execute. Because the Gabriels controlled the subdivision process, discharged the underlying debt in bankruptcy, and failed to act to perfect their own interest in the 1.5 acre parcel for ten years, the Guttchens had compelling reason to delay execution until Gregory Jr. ultimately attempted to subdivide the property. Moreover, the Gabriels failed to produce any evidence below suggesting that a delayed execution might actually prejudice them: their personal debt had long been discharged, they had quitclaimed the parcel to their children in 1994, they no longer claimed any personal interest in it, and they offered no factual basis to establish standing to assert any potential prejudice to their successors in interest. [22] On this record, then, we hold as a matter of law that denial of the Guttchens' motion for leave to execute would be an abuse of discretion.