Opinion ID: 1237174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Concerning Description Given By Unidentified Witness

Text: As we have noted, Officer Koestering testified at trial that when officers arrived at the intersection of 37th and Galena, an unidentified individual told the officers that a black man in a black jacket and black cap was pointing a gun at people two blocks away at 35th and Galena. Because that individual was never identified and did not testify at trial, Dodds contends that allowing Koestering to repeat his statement was a violation of his rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We conclude for two reasons that the admission of the witness's out-of-court statement did not violate Dodds' confrontation rights. First, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), holds that an out-of-court statement implicating the defendant may be admissible as a non-testimonial statement when the statement was elicited for the primary purpose of helping the police resolve an ongoing emergency rather than to determine what had occurred in the past. Id. at 822, 827-28, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 2276-77. In this case, the police were responding to a 911 call reporting shots fired and had an urgent need to identify the person with the gun and to stop the shooting. The witness's description of the man with a gun was given in that context, and we believe it falls within the scope of Davis. Second, the problem that Crawford addresses is the admission of hearsay, which is, of course, an out-of-court statement admitted for its truth. E.g., United States v. James, 487 F.3d 518, 524-25 (7th Cir.2007). The witness's statement to Koestering was not admitted for its truththat the witness saw the man he described pointing a gun at peoplebut rather to explain why the police proceeded to the intersection of 35th and Galena and focused their attention on Dodds, who matched the description they had been given. This was a permissible, non-hearsay purpose. United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir.2004). The district court did not give a limiting instruction advising the jury not to consider the witness's statement to Koestering for its truth but solely as an explanation for why Koestering and the other officers approached and questioned Dodds. But the court was not asked to give such an instruction, the lack of such an instruction has not been raised on appeal, and, in any case, we doubt that Dodds was prejudiced by the lack of a limiting instruction. The reference to the witness's statement was brief, it was not mentioned in closing argument, and there was ample direct evidence, including in particular the testimony of Watkins and Woods, that Dodds was seen with a gun, and of course the fingerprint evidence indicating that he had held the gun. See id.