Opinion ID: 2635368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: propriety of certified question

Text: Amici assert that the certified question presented will not be determinative in the legal malpractice action from which it comes. They suggest that the parties' joint motion to certify the question was a manipulative attempt to obtain a collateral reversal of the federal district court's interpretation of K.S.A. 55-1210. Their arguments are not totally unsupported. The district court's minute sheet from the Nebraska action accompanied the certification order. That document reflects that Martin Pringle had received an extension of time to file its answer to the legal malpractice petition, and, indeed, had not filed its answer when the Nebraska district court certified the question to this court. Although Northern apparently filed a brief in support of the joint motion for certification, it does not appear that the district court conducted a hearing or that Martin Pringle submitted a brief. Martin Pringle argues to this court that a certified question is determinative in the underlying litigation when it disposes of a pivotal issue. However, one might ruminate on the efficacy of determining pivotal issues before the defendant answers the petition. For instance, one defense might be that the law firm cannot be held liable for a mistaken opinion on a point of law that has not been settled by a court of last resort and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by informed lawyers. See Bergstrom v. Noah, 266 Kan. 847, 880, 974 P.2d 531 (1999). A subsequent opinion settling the point of law is not determinative on that defense. Likewise, an answer to the certified question from this court that favors Martin Pringle does not unequivocally establish that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals would have reached the same conclusion in the actual Trans Pacific litigation. We find the discussion of certification by the New Mexico Supreme Court to be more persuasive: The intent of the certification of facts and determinative answer requirements is that this Court avoid rendering advisory opinions. Relative to the first requirement, it is sufficient if the certification of facts and the record contain the necessary factual predicates to our resolution of the question certified, and it is clear that evidence admissible at trial may be resolved in a manner requiring application of the law in question. Relative to the second requirement, our answer must be determinative in that it resolves the issue in the case out of which the question arose, and the resolution of this issue materially advances the ultimate termination of the litigation. Schlieter v. Carlos, 108 N.M. 507, 508, 775 P.2d 709 (1989). Moreover, Northern's arguments to this court give credence to the amici's position. Rather than relate its proposed answer to the legal malpractice action, Northern focuses entirely on the reasons it should win against the absent adjacent landowners/royalty owners. For instance, in denying that it is asking for a retrospective statutory interpretation, Northern declares that Northern merely seeks to lawfully protect its substantial capital investment in natural gas storage inventory by maintaining title to natural gas previously produced, purchased, and injected by Northern at great expense into underground storage facilities ultimately for the benefit of natural gas consumers. Likewise, Northern's challenge to Martin Pringle's standing to raise the unconstitutional taking issue plays squarely into amici's arguments that Northern is seeking to take advantage of the adjoining landowners' absence in this action. Nevertheless, by ordering a briefing schedule, this court implicitly accepted the certified question from the Nebraska district court. We are loathe, at this late date, to find that the Nebraska court erred in its findings that the question was determinative of the action in that court. Accordingly, we will proceed to the merits of the certified question. However, we pause briefly to discuss this court's apparent prior practice of accepting all certified questions without prior review. K.S.A. 60-3201 clearly says this court may answer such questions. Other states have exercised that discretion. See, e.g., CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Garden City, 279 Ga. 655, 658, 619 S.E.2d 597 (2005) (declining to answer certified questions because the questions had been addressed previously, were advisory, were anticipatory, or should be made under federal law); Brady v. PPL Montana, LLC, 343 Mont. 405, 405-06, 185 P.3d 330 (2008) (declining to address certified question because unwilling to address constitutional issues in a vacuum); Grant Creek Water Works v. Com'r of Rev., 235 Mont. 1, 3-4, 775 P.2d 684 (1988) (declining to answer because the issue presented would not control outcome of tax court litigation and believed the tax court could resolve the issues of Montana law by applying well-settled principles of statutory construction); Luckey v. Butler Cty., 112 Ohio St.3d 1467, 861 N.E.2d 142 (2007) (after reviewing preliminary memoranda pursuant to court rules, declines to answer certified question); Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 184 P.3d 463, 466-67 (Okla.2007) (declining to answer certified question because it may result in an advisory opinion because federal case may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and see footnote 13 listing cases declining to address certified question); Cray v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 925 P.2d 60, 62 (Okla.1996) (declining to answer certified question because it was appellate review of a federal judge's ruling under the guise of a certified question); Jefferson v. Moran, 479 A.2d 734, 738 (R.I.1984) (declining to answer because addressing certified question is discretionary and the answer would not resolve the controversy because state court involvement was necessary for the party to get relief); Hoffman v. Regence Blue Shield, 140 Wash.2d 121, 128, 991 P.2d 77 (2000), disapproved on other grounds Wash. Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. WUTC, 148 Wash.2d 887, 64 P.3d 606 (2003) (declining to answer second certified question because any decision without a complete record could affect issues outside the questions certified and possibly bind entities who are not parties). Henceforth, we intend to join our sister states in exercising our discretion on questions certified to this court.