Opinion ID: 1742814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions on Malice Aforethought.

Text: The defendant claims the trial court erred in instructing the jury that malice could be inferred from the commission of one of the underlying felonies that served as the basis for submission of the felony murder alternative of the first-degree murder charge: willful injury, participation in assault causing serious injury, and domestic abuse assault. He argues this instruction essentially told the jury that it was not required to find malice aforethought if its verdict rested on one of the felony alternatives. Newell also contends the inference of malice from the commission of these particular felonies is improper because malice is not an element in any of these crimes and specific intent is required in only one of them. We review the defendant's claim of instructional error for the correction of errors of law. See State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 915 (Iowa 2003). In addition, in evaluating the correctness of any particular instruction, we do not consider it in isolation, but in the context of all the instructions. See State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 104 (Iowa 2004) (Jury instructions are not considered separately; they should be considered as a whole.). The marshalling instruction for the first-degree murder charge provided in pertinent part: The State must prove all of the following elements of Murder in the First Degree: 1. That on or about June 15, 2001, the defendant hit and/or strangled Kathleen Gillen. 2. Kathleen Gillen died as a result of being hit and/or strangled. 3. The Defendant acted with malice aforethought. 4.(a) The Defendant acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with a specific intent to kill Kathleen Gillen. OR 4.(b) The Defendant was participating in the offense of Willful Injury as explained in Instruction No. 29. OR [The instruction continues with other alternatives for felony murder based on participation in assault causing serious injury and participation in domestic abuse assault.] (First emphasis added.) Contrary to the defendant's assertions, this instruction clearly told the jury that it was required to find malice aforethought under any of the alternatives for first-degree murder. Furthermore, the instruction defining malice and malice aforethought included the following statement: [Malice] may be found from the acts and conduct of the Defendant and the means used in doing the wrongful and injurious act. Consistently with this instruction, the court also told the jury in another instruction: You may, but are not required to, infer malice from the commission of a Willful Injury or Assault Causing Serious Injury or Assault Domestic Abuse which results in death. We do not think the latter instruction, stating that malice may be inferred from the specified conduct, is the equivalent of telling the jury that malice need not be present at all. Here, before the jurors could convict the defendant of first-degree murder, they were required to find that the defendant acted with a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to [Gillen]. The commission of a forcible felony was simply one factor from which the defendant's state of mind could be determined. Contrary to the defendant's argument, the instructions did not eliminate the requirement of malice aforethought under the felony murder alternatives of first-degree murder. The instructions simply informed the jury of the relevancy of the defendant's actions to the existence of malice. Moreover, there is no requirement that the underlying felony include malice or specific intent as an element in order for the defendant's criminal conduct to be relevant to the issue of malice. See State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1983). We hold the trial court properly instructed the jury.