Opinion ID: 1836662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error during the sentencing hearing by failing to answer the jury's question.

Text: ¶ 75. Flowers next argues the trial court had the authority to answer the question asked by the jury during sentencing deliberation. Flowers specifically contends the trial court had authority to tell the jury that life without parole is life without parole. The State argues Flowers received the instruction he requested and waived any objection with regard to the instruction. ¶ 76. The question asked by the jury was, If Curtis Flowers gets imprisonment without parole-Does that mean he will never get out of prison? [3] The defense asked for the court to instruct the jury that life without parole is life without parole. The trial court decided that because he had no authority to answer the jury's question, he would refer them back to the instructions previously given by the court. The counsel for the defense then asked the trial judge to refer to Instruction Number One, which specifically dealt with the sentencing options. Sentencing Instruction Number One stated in pertinent part: BY THE COURT: You have found Curtis Giovanni Flowers guilty of the crime of capital murder. You must now decide whether Curtis Giovanni Flowers will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole. After each side agreed to waive any objections, the trial court sent a note back to the jury saying, You should refer to Sentencing Instruction number 1. ¶ 77. According to Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-21, [e]very person who shall be convicted of capital murder shall be sentenced (a) to death; (b) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary without parole; or (c) to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary with eligibility for parole as provided in Section 47-7-3(1)(f). Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1) states in pertinent part that [u]pon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of capital murder or other capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, or life imprisonment. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(f) states [n]o person shall be eligible for parole who is charged, tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of Section 99-19-101. The reading of these statutes together indicate that a defendant on trial for capital murder may only be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the eligibility of parole. According to § 47-7-3(1)(f), there is no longer the possibility of life imprisonment. By giving only the sentencing options of death or life imprisonment without parole, the trial judge properly gave the jury all the instructions that were needed. See Pham v. State, 716 So.2d 1100, 1103-04 (Miss.1998). ¶ 78. This Court has repeatedly held that except in habitual offender cases, where a life sentence would automatically mean life without parole, the parole issue should not be considered by the sentencing jury. Smith v. State, 724 So.2d 280, 293-94 (Miss.1998); Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1194-96 (Miss.1996); Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 40-41 (Miss.1990); Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 798 (Miss.1987); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 346 (Miss.1985). In this state's original case on this issue, Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 812-14 (Miss.1984), this Court held that: A jury should have no concern with the quantum of punishment because it subverts a proper determination of the sentencing issue. Reference to the possibility of parole should the defendant not be sentenced to die are wholly out of place at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for two additional reasons. First, such references inevitably have the effect of inviting the jury to second guess the Legislature. The Legislature has declared that persons sentenced to life imprisonment may under certain circumstances become eligible for parole. Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1) (Supp. 1982). It is no more proper for the jury to concern itself with the wisdom of that legislative determination than it is for the jury to consider the Legislature's judgment that death in the gas chamber be an authorized punishment for capital murder. Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 392 (Miss.1982). Second, parole is not automatic. No person sentenced to life imprisonment has any right to parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 677 (1979); Davis v. State, 429 So.2d 262, 263 (Miss. 1983). Allowing argument or testimony regarding the possibility of the defendant some day being paroled is in effect inviting the jury to speculate how ten years in the future the parole board may exercise its legislatively granted discretionary authority. This would introduce into the sentencing proceedings an arbitrary factor proscribed by section 99-19-105(3)(a). Williams, 445 So.2d at 813 (emphasis in original). This Court has reaffirmed this holding on several occasions. See Smith v. State, 724 So.2d 280, 293-94 (Miss.1998); Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1194-96 (Miss.1996); Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 40-41 (Miss.1990); Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 798 (Miss.1987); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 346 (Miss.1985). ¶ 79. This Court has also cautioned judges against making any comments, or giving instructions to the jury after it retires to reach a verdict. Haynes v. State, 451 So.2d 227, 231 (Miss.1984). In this case the jury had already been amply instructed, indeed, more than amply instructed in S-4. There was no need to further instruct them. While the circuit judge was undoubtedly trying to deal with a vexing type of problem as best he could, we believe the proper response to the jury would have been that they had already been properly instructed on this question and to read their instructions. Id. We agree with the Court in Haynes in determining the jury in the case sub judice was amply instructed as to the sentencing options. Unlike the trial judge in Haynes, this trial judge in the case before us today correctly instructed the jury to refer back to the instructions which had been previously given. Also pursuant to the applicable statutes, the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the appropriate sentencing options. This issue is without merit.