Opinion ID: 2831507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Identifying the Relevant Risk

Text: To conduct the risk-utility analysis, we must first identify the product’s relevant risk. The first factor identifies the risk as “the gravity and likelihood of injury from [the product’s] use.” The evidence in this case conclusively established that the toppling of a lift could cause extremely grave injuries: this lift’s fall from forty feet resulted in Logan Matak’s death, and everyone agrees that a fall from even lower heights can also cause serious injury or death. Moreover, Genie admitted that it is foreseeable that the lift will tip over if the leveling jacks attached to the outriggers are raised while the lift is extended and occupied. Genie warned against this very danger: “Attempting to move the machine with the platform raised will tip the machine over and cause death or serious injury.” According to the Mataks, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that the lift was unreasonably dangerous because, despite the foreseeability of such accidents and the likelihood of such serious injuries, Genie “did nothing to eliminate this risk” and instead just 10 put a warning on it. In response, Genie contends that these risks arise only if the lift is misused, in a way that is contrary to the instructions and disregards both the warning and the “open and obvious dangers.” Genie relies on our decision in Timpte, in which we found no evidence that a dual-hopper grain trailer was unreasonably dangerous and noted that “any risk from [the defendant’s product] itself stems only from the risk that a user will ignore both [the defendant’s] warnings and open and obvious dangers.” Timpte, 286 S.W.3d at 314. According to Genie, our “analysis [in Timpte] about how to weigh facts involving a high utility product where the associated risk is obvious and described in clear warnings and where the risk arises only in the unlikely event of intentional misuse should be dispositive here.” Because the lift’s utility is undeniably high and the only risks are obvious risks that result only from misuse, Genie contends, we should hold that the product is not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law, just as we did in Timpte.4 We did not hold in Timpte, however, that risks that arise only from the misuse of a product are irrelevant to the risk-utility analysis, or that a product cannot be unreasonably dangerous if its only risks result from misuse. To the contrary, we explained in Hernandez that “the fact that the foreseeable risk of harm is due to a misuse of the product, rather than an intended use, is not an absolute bar to liability for that portion of an injury caused by a product’s defective design.” Hernandez, 2 S.W.3d at 257. “Instead,” we explained, “misuse of a product is a factor that must 4 Two amicus curiae, the Texas Association of Defense Counsel and the Association of Equipment Manufacturers, have filed briefs supporting Genie’s argument on this point. The TADC asserts that, contrary to our decision in Timpte, the court of appeals here gave “controlling weight to risks caused by intentional misuse and disregarding obvious risks,” when “the risk of harm arises only when users disregard adequate warnings and obvious dangers.” Similarly, the AEM contends that, contrary to Timpte, the court of appeals “gave no weight at all to the intentional misuse, the significant warnings included on the Genie platform, and the obviousness of the risk.” 11 be considered in allocating responsibility for the injury.” Id. When misuse is a factor in the riskutility analysis, and the product’s only dangers result from its misuse, the nature of the relevant risk necessarily changes. We made this point clear in Hernandez, in which the plaintiff alleged that a cigarette lighter was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a child-resistant safety mechanism. Id. at 255. We explained in that case that the relevant risk “is not that a child who plays with a lighter may harm himself. We assume that that risk is substantial. . . . Rather, the risk is that a lighter will come into a child’s hands.” Id. at 260. “The relevant risk,” we explained, “includes consideration of both the likelihood that adults will allow children access to lighters and the gravity of the resulting harm.” Id. In the same way, the question here is not whether it was foreseeable and likely that raising the leveling jacks while the lift is elevated and occupied would cause the lift to tip over and seriously harm its occupant. No one disputes here that it was. The question here is whether this misuse was foreseeable and likely in spite of both the allegedly obvious dangers and the existence of the warning. As Genie argues, the Mataks “conflate the risks arising from a misuse with the risk that a product will be misused in the first place.” I agree with Genie that the relevant risk in this case is “the likelihood that the product will be misused” in a way that results in injury. Thus, the relevant risk here was the risk that operators would raise the leveling jacks and attempt to move the lift when the platform is elevated and occupied, despite the warning and the allegedly obvious and open dangers.