Opinion ID: 2277983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Superior Court Authority to Dismiss An Inherent Power

Text: The authority of the Superior Court to dismiss a cause of action for failure to prosecute, or to comply with its rules or orders, is well established. Gebhart v. Ernest DiSabatino & Sons, Inc., Del.Supr., 264 A.2d 157, 159 (1970). The Superior Court's power to dismiss an action has its origins in the common law judgments of non-suit and non prosequitur.  Id. It is an inherent power of the trial court, which is concomitant to the control vested in a trial court, to manage its affairs and to achieve the orderly disposition of its business. Id. See State v. McElroy, Del.Supr., 561 A.2d 154 (1989). See also Cebenka v. Upjohn Co., Del. Supr., 559 A.2d 1219, 1225 (1989) and Wahle v. Medical Center of Delaware, Del. Supr., 559 A.2d 1228, 1233 (1989). The question presented by this appeal is whether the action taken by the Calendar Judge was within the realm of sound judicial discretion vested in the Superior Court, pursuant to its inherent powers. Superior Court Criminal Rule 48(b) is a codification of the inherent power of a court to dismiss for want of prosecution. State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d at 156 (quoting State v. Fischer, 285 A.2d 417, 418-19 (1971)). However, Rule 48 has been recognized by this Court as serving a broader purpose than guaranteeing a defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Id. Therefore, this Court's jurisprudence with respect to Superior Court Criminal Rule 48 is instructive in the present matter. In construing Rule 48(b), this Court has stated: We hold that for a criminal indictment to be dismissed under Rule 48 for unnecessary delay, the delay, unless extraordinary, i.e., of constitutional dimensions, must, as a general rule, first be attributable to the prosecution and second, such delay must be established to have had a prejudicial effect upon defendant beyond that normally associated with a criminal justice system necessarily strained by a burgeoning case load. State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d at 155-56. The first criteria for dismissal under Rule 48(b), is that the unnecessary delay must be attributable to the State, as prosecutor. State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d at 156. The failure to produce witnesses necessary for the proceedings, for example, is normally a delay attributable to the State, as prosecutor. See State v. Glaindez, Del. Supr., 346 A.2d 156 (1975). Compare Hughey v. State, Del.Supr., 522 A.2d 335 (1987). In Harris' case, the Trial Deputy and the State's first witness were present in the courthouse at 11:30 a.m. and ready to proceed. The decision by the Trial Judge to recess for lunch, which in turn caused a delay of 1½ hours in the commencement of Harris' suppression hearing, is not a delay that can be attributed to the State, as prosecutor. State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d at 157. The second criteria established by this Court, as a condition precedent to a dismissal for unnecessary delay, requires a finding that the delay has been found to work some definable or measurable prejudice to the defendant. State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d at 157. The record reflects that Harris suffered no prejudice from the delay caused by the trial judge's decision to recess at 12:00 p.m., for lunch, until 1:30 p.m. Indeed, Harris' attorney expressly acknowledged on the record that there is no prejudice to him.