Opinion ID: 2588320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactivity of McConnell

Text: We expounded a three-step analysis in Colwell v. State [17] for determining whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively in Nevada. The first inquiry is whether the rule under consideration is new. [18] If a rule is not new, retroactivity is not an issue, and the rule applies even on collateral review of a conviction that is final. [19] If the rule is new, the second inquiry is whether the conviction of the person invoking the rule has become final. [20] If the conviction is not final e.g., it is under review on direct appealthen the new rule must be applied. [21] Finally, if the conviction has become final, a new rule does not apply retroactively unless one of two exceptions to nonretroactivity pertains. [22] So the third inquiry is whether the rule falls within either of the exceptions: Did the rule establish that it is unconstitutional to proscribe certain conduct as criminal or to impose a type of punishment on certain defendants because of their status or offense? Or did it establish a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished? [23] If either question is answered yes, then the rule applies retroactively. [24] Here, Bejarano does not dispute that his conviction is final. We must therefore determine whether McConnell announced a new rule, and if so, we must resolve the first and third inquiries under Colwell to determine if the rule set forth in McConnell applies retroactively.
Our first inquiry is whether McConnell set forth a new rule. Though no brightline rule exists for determining whether a decision set forth a new rule of law, we have guidelines to follow. [25] For example, a rule is not new when it has merely interpreted and clarified an existing rule or applied an established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to those considered in prior case law. [26] On the other hand, a rule is new when it overrules precedent, disapproves a practice sanctioned by prior cases, or overturns a longstanding practice uniformly approved by lower courts. [27] It is clear that McConnell announced a new rule. We recognize that the overarching legal principle employed by this court in McConnell was certainly not new, i.e., that a State's death penalty scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for a death sentence. [28] This principle has been a touchstone of death penalty jurisprudence since 1976. [29] Our decision in McConnell also relied heavily upon the 1988 United States Supreme Court opinion Lowenfield v. Phelps [30] for guidance. However, our analysis and holding in McConnell were new. We addressed Lowenfield for the first time in light of the death-eligibility narrowing constitutionally required of all state death penalty schemes, and we specifically considered the degree of narrowing produced by a felony-murder conviction, pursuant to NRS 200.030(1)(b), in combination with felony aggravators, pursuant to NRS 200.033(4). [31] We concluded that the narrowing in such a case was inadequate and, as a result, deemed it impermissible under the United States and Nevada Constitutions to base an aggravating circumstance in a capital prosecution on the felony upon which a felony murder is predicated. [32] In reaching this conclusion, McConnell acknowledged this court's own contrary precedent, specifically citing two prior decisions that approved the use of the predicate felony as an aggravating circumstance in cases of felony murder. [33] McConnell effectively overruled this precedent. [34] Thus, although predicated upon existing legal principles, McConnell set forth a new rule of death penalty law in Nevada. [35]
Our remaining inquiry is whether either exception to the usual nonretroactivity of new rules pertains here. We conclude that the McConnell rule is substantive in nature and therefore retroactive. Substantive rules As stated above, one instance in which a new rule applies retroactively is when it establishes that it is unconstitutional to proscribe certain conduct as criminal or to impose a type of punishment on certain defendants because of their status or offense. [36] This instance has been described as an exception to the nonretroactivity of procedural rules. [37] But as we recognized in Colwell, a rule forbidding the criminalization of certain conduct or the imposition of a particular punishment on certain defendants is actually substantive, not procedural. [38] Because nonretroactivity is the general requirement only for new rules of criminal procedure, a new substantive rule is more properly viewed not as an exception to that requirement, but as a rule that will generally apply retroactively. [39] Regardless of how we characterize this point, we must determine whether McConnell established a procedural or a substantive rule. The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance for making this determination in Schriro v. Summerlin . [40] Substantive rules include decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish. [41] In other words, [a] rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes. [42] Substantive rules warrant retroactive application because they `carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal' or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose. [43] Rules of procedure, on the other hand, regulate the manner of determining the defendant's culpability. [44] They do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. [45] An example of a new procedural rule is provided by the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Ring v. Arizona. [46] In Ring, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for a judge, instead of a jury, to make findings of fact to support a death sentence. [47] We later concluded that Ring set forth a procedural rule, reasoning that it did not forbid either the criminalization of any conduct or the punishment in any way of any class of defendants. [48] The Supreme Court confirmed this conclusion, holding that Ring propounded a procedural rule that was not retroactive: Ring merely altered the method of determining punishment in accordance with constitutional principles, but not the range of punishment or those persons actually subject to it. [49] Another example is found in our 2002 decision in Palmer v. State. [50] In Palmer, we held that lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea of which a defendant must be made aware. [51] Although Palmer set forth a new rule, we later concluded that it was procedural and required no retroactive application. [52] We recently reached a similar conclusion in regard to the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington. [53] In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that to admit testimonial hearsay, the Constitution requires unavailability of the witness and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. [54] Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue, we have concluded that Crawford set forth a new rule of procedure that does not warrant retroactive application. [55] Our decision in McConnell is not like the procedural rules announced by the Supreme Court in Ring and Crawford or by us in Palmer, concerning the fact-finding process by which a sentence is determined, the admission of hearsay evidence, or the canvassing of defendants who plead guilty. Rather, McConnell concerned the reach of Nevada's death penalty law, determining under what circumstances and to whom it could be constitutionally applied. Applying constitutional strictures, McConnell proscribed the punishment of death based on a felony that is used to establish both first-degree felony murder and aggravated capital murder. Absent retroactive application of this rule, there would be a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot impose. [56] Thus, we conclude that McConnell announced a substantive rule of law that must be applied retroactively. Procedural rules without which the likelihood of an accurate determination is seriously diminished For the sake of completeness, we will briefly discuss the second exception to nonretroactivity. A new rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively if it establishes a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. [57] Here, of course, we are concerned with the likelihood of an accurate sentence. By narrowing the scope of Nevada's death penalty scheme, McConnell arguably increased the likelihood that only those defendants most deserving of a death sentence will receive one. And in this broad sense, it arguably made Nevada's death penalty scheme more accurate. But this effect is a result of the substantive impact of McConnell, not procedural changes. McConnell did discuss one possible new procedure: when the State charges felony murder as an alternative theory of first-degree murder and seeks a death sentence, jurors should be given a verdict form indicating what theory or theories they have relied on in finding first-degree murder. [58] But this procedure is intended simply to satisfy the substantive concerns of McConnell. Having concluded that McConnell sets forth a new substantive rule that demands retroactive application, we must apply that rule to Bejarano's case.