Opinion ID: 1189045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Plea Withdrawal

Text: Patterson's first argument is that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing with regard to his motion to withdraw his plea. The district court rejected Patterson's motion to withdraw his plea because it was filed pro se at a time when Patterson was represented by counsel; the district court also stated that the motion was meritless. The government argues that the district court was correct to reject Patterson's motion because it was never properly before the court and also because Patterson did not meet his burden of showing a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea. Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for both a district court's denial of a motion filed pro se by a defendant represented by counsel, see United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir.2002) ([W]hether a defendant may act as co-counsel along with his own attorney, is a matter within the discretion of the district court.) (citing United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1141 (2d Cir.1989)), and for a district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing, see Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 408 (7th Cir.2008). The decision regarding whether to allow a defendant to represent himself when he is also represented by counsel is `solely within the discretion of the trial court.' Chavin, 316 F.3d at 671 (quoting Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1141). A defendant does not have a right to such an arrangement. See United States v. Gwiazdzinski, 141 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir.1998) (A defendant does not have an affirmative right to submit a pro se brief when represented by counsel.) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1101 n. 7 (4th Cir.1997) (noting that [t]he cases reiterating the principle that courts are not required to allow defendants to split the responsibilities of the representation with an attorney are myriad). Indeed, this court has stated that such arrangements are disfavored. Chavin, 316 F.3d at 672. Here, the district court rejected Patterson's attempt at self-representation and advised him that he could file a motion for substitution of counsel if he wished. In light of the district court's wide discretion to reject pro se submissions by defendants represented by counsel, and because the district court presented Patterson with an alternative avenue that Patterson declined to pursue, we conclude that the district court's denial of Patterson's motion without an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion. However, even if Patterson had properly raised this issue through counsel, the district court would not have abused its discretion by denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if ... the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). But a defendant who states at a plea colloquy that his plea was freely and knowingly given ... faces an uphill battle in convincing a judge that his reasons for withdrawal are fair and just because representations made at a plea colloquy are under oath and are given a presumption of verity. United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir.1995). We have stated that district courts are generally justified in discrediting the proffered reasons for the motion to withdraw and holding the defendant to [his] admissions at the [plea colloquy]. Id. At the hearing on defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his plea, Patterson stated that his lawyer promised [him] a sentence that [he] didn't get and that he did not have enough time to review the plea agreement. While on their face, those reasons appear compelling, we have stated that [c]laims of involuntariness or confusion that in the abstract seem like sufficient reasons to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea, or at least look into the matter further, may be insufficient in the context of a record containing substantial indications of voluntariness and lack of confusion. United States v. Trussel, 961 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir.1992); see also Messino, 55 F.3d at 1248 (citation omitted). One especially important consideration is the defendant's answers to the questions posed at his Rule 11 hearing. Trussel, 961 F.2d at 689-90. Here, defendant's reasons to withdraw his plea plainly contradicted his sworn statements during the plea colloquy. Moreover, Patterson's attorney, who was present at the hearing, told the court he believed the pro se motion lacked merit. It is also worth noting that defendant did not indicate to the district court (and has not indicated on appeal) that he would have presented any other evidence of involuntariness or confusion at a putative evidentiary hearing. Thus, even if defendant had properly requested an evidentiary hearing regarding his request to withdraw his guilty plea, based on these facts, and in light of the heavy burden shouldered by a defendant when requesting to withdraw a guilty plea, we could not conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it denied an evidentiary hearing.