Opinion ID: 3045353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assessing a Motion to Dismiss

Text: for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction A district court sitting in diversity may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent allowed under the law of the forum state. See, e.g., Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984). Establishing personal jurisdiction in the Virgin Islands involves a two-part analysis.4 First, there must be a statutory basis for exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in accordance with the Virgin Islands Long-Arm Statute, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 4903, and second, the nonresident defendant must have minimum contacts with the Virgin Islands sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process.5 See In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Litig. Series, 47 V.I. 267, 279 (Super. Ct. 2005) 4 As our dissenting colleague points out, there is caselaw which states that the reach of the Virgin Islands Long-Arm Statute is coextensive with the maximum parameters of the Due Process Clause and therefore concludes that only constitutional due process considerations are relevant to determine whether personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a nonresident defendant, see Urgent v. Tech. Assistance Bureau, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535-36 (D.V.I. 2003), but we think it best to consider the statutory bases for exercising long-arm jurisdiction in addition to the constitutional requirements in order to ensure that we are honoring “the law of the forum state.” 5 Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, 48 U.S.C. § 1561, makes the Due Process Clause applicable to the Virgin Islands. 10 (“[T]he Court’s in personam jurisdiction is limited first by the terms of the [long-arm] statute and then by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”); Godfrey v. Int’l Moving Consultants, Inc., 18 V.I. 60, 66 (D.V.I. 1980) (“The proper method of testing jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is to first determine whether the long-arm statute authorizes the Court to exercise its adjudicatory powers, and then secondly, to decide if such an exercise is constitutionally permissible.”). The District Court determined that the Metcalfes failed to meet their burden of showing that the exercise of jurisdiction over Renaissance was permissible because they relied on their own “self-serving declaration” which was “simply insufficient.” However, the District Court reached this determination without applying the proper standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. “[T]he burden of demonstrating the facts that establish personal jurisdiction,” falls on the plaintiff, Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368, and “once a defendant has raised a jurisdictional defense,” the plaintiff must “prov[e] by affidavits or other competent evidence that jurisdiction is proper.” Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996). If the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, “the plaintiff[s] need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[i]t is well established that in deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court is required to accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and is to construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 11 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir. 2003); accord O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 316 (explaining that prior to an evidentiary hearing or trial, “the plaintiff[s] [are] entitled to have [their] allegations taken as true and all factual disputes drawn in [their] favor” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Of course, by accepting a plaintiff’s facts as true when a motion to dismiss is originally made, a court is not precluded from revisiting the issue if it appears that the facts alleged to support jurisdiction are in dispute.” Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the Metcalfes did not merely rest on their pleadings but rather submitted a sworn affidavit and other documentary evidence in support of a finding of personal jurisdiction over Renaissance. Nonetheless, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the District Court discredited this evidence when it stated: “[S]ave for the contract for the [Prowler 246], the Metcalfes have not come forward with any competent evidence that Renaissance deliberately targeted Virgin Islands residents. The Court is left with the fact that the Metcalfes contacted a Florida corporation regarding the purchase of a product from that corporation in Florida.” The District Court also construed disputed facts against the Metcalfes, which is reflected in the following statement: “To the extent the Metcalfes again rely on the declaration attached to their opposition, the 12 Metcalfes still fail to meet their burden. That declaration contains several statements that purport to show that Renaissance ‘reached out’ to the Virgin Islands. . . . Here, again, the Metcalfes’ exclusive reliance on bald assertions set forth in a declaration is misplaced for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction.” These excerpts demonstrate that the District Court did not apply the proper standard for evaluating the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although the Metcalfes needed to make a threshold showing in support of jurisdiction, they were entitled to have their allegations viewed as true and have disputed facts construed in their favor. See O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 316; Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 457. Instead, the District Court credited Renaissance’s factual allegations and construed disputed facts in its favor, as if Renaissance were the nonmoving party. In doing so, the District Court committed error by failing to apply the correct standard for evaluating personal jurisdiction at this stage of the litigation. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the Metcalfes have established a prima facie case that the exercise of jurisdiction over Renaissance is consistent with the Virgin Islands Long-Arm Statute and constitutional due process, assuming the sworn allegations that appear in the Metcalfes’ affidavit and the other documentary evidence on record are true and construing factual disputes in their favor. 13 B. Interpreting the Virgin Islands Long-Arm Statute Turning to the statutory bases for exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the Metcalfes argue that subsection (a)(1) and subsection (a)(2) of the Virgin Islands Long-Arm Statute apply to the facts of this case. The relevant portions of the statute state: “A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s (1) transacting any business in this territory; (2) contracting to supply services or things in this territory[.]”