Opinion ID: 2807871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Progressive Discipline for Occurrences

Text: Discipline under this system will begin if during any twelve (12) consecutive month period worked an employee has six (6) occurrences. . . . As has been the Hospital’s practice with all discipline, once an employee is disciplined he/she will continue to progress through the discipline steps unless he/she has had twelve (12) consecutive months worked without an occurrence that requires discipline. Once an employee reaches a final written warning, any additional occurrence shall result in termination. The date of any occurrence that results in discipline will be considered the disciplinary action date regardless of the date the discipline is actually administered. A. Oral Warning – Six (6) but less than Eight (8) Occurrences. B. Written Warning – Eight (8) but less than Nine (9) Occurrences. C. Final Written Warning – Nine (9) but less than Ten (10) Occurrences. Note, any further occurrences, once an employee is at the final written stage, shall result in suspension pending discharge and/or termination. D. Termination – Ten (10) or more Occurrences. Id. at 301-03. Deborah Holden (“Holden”) was employed by the Hospital from April 1980 until her discharge on February 28, 2013. Holden began accumulating occurrences under the Absenteeism Policy in November of 2011. Between November 2011 and July 17, 2012, she accumulated a total of seven occurrences and received an Oral Warning on July 31, 2012 that was effective July 17, 2012. On March 1, 2013, Holden received a Written Warning effective February 22, 2013 for having reached 8.5 occurrences following her absences on February 21, 2013 and February 22, 2013. Also on March 1, 2013, Holden received a notice of termination effective February 28, 2013 for absences occurring on February 26, 2013 and February 28, 2013, which brought her total number of occurrences 3 to ten.2 Holden was familiar with the Absenteeism Policy but was not aware that she had reached ten occurrences because she had not added them up. At the time of these final two absences, she had a few vacation days remaining. The Union filed a grievance on March 7, 2013 protesting Holden’s termination, and the matter proceeded to arbitration. On June 28, 2013, the arbitrator held an evidentiary hearing, during which the parties submitted evidence, examined witnesses, and presented argument. On October 9, 2013, the arbitrator issued a decision concluding that the termination was improper. He acknowledged that Holden had accumulated ten occurrences in a twelve-month period and was thus subject to termination. However, he found that “all of the steps of the contractually agreed upon Progressive Discipline procedures were not followed.” Id. at 361. Prior to the February 26, 2013 occurrence, Holden had accumulated 8.5 occurrences, which warranted a Written Warning under the Policy, but “that Written Warning was not issued until March 1, 2013 which was after her termination.” Id. On February 26, 2013, Holden reached nine but less than ten occurrences, and, at that point, “the Policy required that she receive a Final Written Warning.” Id. Instead, the Hospital skipped over this step and issued a Termination Notice on March 1, 2013 because of her tenth occurrence on February 28, 2013. The arbitrator recognized that the CBA makes “the effective date of the discipline the same as the date of the last occurrence, regardless of when the discipline was issued.” Id. at 362. However, he found this irrelevant because he reasoned, “[w]hen dealing with 2 Holden was not scheduled to work on February 27, 2013, so these were consecutive absences. 4 a no-fault attendance policy it is obviously very important for an employee to be accurately and promptly advised as to which stage of the disciplinary progression they are at in order to be better able avoid, if possible, additional absenteeism infractions and greater penalties.” Id. Noting Holden’s familiarity with the Policy and her thirty-threeyear employment with the Hospital, the arbitrator reasoned that, had Holden been issued a Written Warning or a Final Written Warning prior to her termination, she may have utilized her remaining vacation time to avoid termination. Finally, as to the Hospital’s argument that its established practice was not to follow all of the progressive disciplinary steps, the arbitrator stated that this was “unpersuasive” because the purpose of these steps was to warn the employee and provide a chance for corrective action—a chance which Holden was denied. Id. at 363. The arbitrator concluded that Holden’s termination was improper and that she was entitled to reinstatement. However, because Holden, in failing to seek other employment, did not attempt to mitigate her losses, she was not entitled to back pay. 3 On October 28, 2013, the Hospital filed a motion with the arbitrator to open the record and/or for reconsideration. The arbitrator denied the motion on November 5, 2013. B. On November 7, 2013, the Hospital filed a complaint and a motion to vacate the arbitration award with the District Court. The Hospital asserted that the arbitrator’s award “exceeds his powers, is unreasonable, is irrational, does not draw its essence from 3 On October 23, 2013, the arbitrator filed a Corrected Award, which did not alter the award in any way that is material to this appeal. 5 the parties’ CBA and is unsupported by the record, the established past practice of the parties, or applicable case law and statute.” Id. at 21. The Union answered and counterclaimed to enforce the award on January 5, 2014. On March 6, 2014, the parties filed a report pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) (“Rule 26(f) Report”), which reflected their agreement “that there is no need for fact discovery based on the issues presented.” Id. at 390. On March 20, 2014, the Hospital filed a motion for leave to amend the Rule 26(f) Report to include time for discovery and for amendment of the complaint. The basis of the motion was the Hospital’s finding, after the filing of the Rule 26(f) Report, that Holden had applied for Social Security Disability benefits during the arbitration, “was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration as of March 1, 2013[,] and was awarded disability benefits as of August 2013.” Id. at 397. The Hospital requested discovery “to determine if Ms. Holden committed fraud through her testimony at the Arbitration Hearing and, as such, her testimony should be disregarded” and her grievance rendered moot. Id. Holden’s June 28, 2013 testimony elicited on cross-examination by the Hospital, which the Hospital now claims was fraudulent, is as follows: Q: Now, are you presently working? A: No, I’m not. Q: Is there a reason you’re not working at the present time? A: I am currently collecting unemployment and I am looking for other employment. I just have not found the right job. Q: You’re not representing that you’re incapable of working?
... Q: Have you made applications to any health care facilities for work? A: No, I have not. I have been going on the job search for LPN position, because I have a license. I have looked at them, and currently I can’t go per 6 se to an interview, because my vehicle is down, has been down since I have been terminated. . . . Id. at 204-05. The Union opposed the motion to amend the Rule 26(f) Report, and on August 20, 2014, the District Court denied the Hospital’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and its motion to amend the Rule 26(f) Report. As to Holden’s testimony and her claim for disability benefits, the Court stated, “Ms. Holden was not asked any questions about a social security disability claim, nor did she volunteer any information along these lines. Thus, she cannot be said to have lied in her testimony.” Id. at 6. Moreover, the Court did not believe the “issue [was] relevant to the Arbitrator’s decision which was based on his assigned task to interpret the CBA terms.” Id. As to the issue of whether the Arbitrator failed to draw the decision from the CBA, the Court determined that the decision came not only from the essence of the contract but “from the literal words of the contract itself.” Id. at 7-8. The Hospital filed a timely notice of appeal.