Opinion ID: 1381545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: claim of right to be taken before a magistrate

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court committed error in failing to grant his motion to suppress by virtue of that portion of G.S. 15A-974(2) which requires that evidence must be suppressed if [i]t is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis added.) He contends that there was a substantial violation of certain requirements of G.S. 15A-501 and G.S. 15A-511. G.S. 15A-501(2), upon which defendant relies, provides that upon the arrest of a person, a law enforcement officer [m]ust. . . take the person arrested before a judicial official without unnecessary delay. G.S. 15A-511 provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Appearance before Magistrate. (1) A law-enforcement officer making an arrest with or without a warrant must take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a magistrate as provided in G.S. 15A-501. . . . . . (b) Statement by the Magistrate.The magistrate must inform the defendant of: (1) The charges against him; (2) His right to communicate with counsel and friends; . . . . . . . . (c) Procedure When Arrest Is without Warrant; Magistrate's Order.If the person has been arrested, for a crime, without a warrant: (1) The magistrate must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it, . . . Defendant's essential contention here is that both the letter and spirit of these statutes illustrates the legislative intent that the right of counsel can, and should, be more effectively explained by a judicial officer. He further contends that failure to comply with these statutes was prejudicial to him because, during the two-hour period of questioning by the law enforcement officers, he gave hair samples and an incriminating confession. Unquestionably, the failure of law enforcement personnel in complying with the provisions of these statutes can result in the violation of a person's constitutional rights. We reaffirm, however, our holding under the predecessor statutes to G.S. 15A-501 and G.S. 15A-511 that these statutes do not prescribe mandatory procedures affecting the validity of a trial. State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 531, 173 S.E.2d 753, 763 (1970); see also State v. Curmon, 295 N.C. 453, 457, 245 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1978); State v. Burgess, 33 N.C.App. 76, 234 S.E.2d 40 (1977). Here, we perceive no prejudice against defendant on the basis of the record before us. As we have indicated, supra, defendant was not under arrest prior to the time of his initial questioning. Once questioning began around noon, defendant confessed his guilt within approximately 40 minutes. He was fully informed of his rights on two occasions within that 40 minutes and made an intelligent waiver of counsel. As soon as the confession was recorded, defendant was taken to a magistrate sometime between 2:00 p. m. and 3:00 p. m. at which time he was formally charged. We find that defendant was taken before a judicial official without unnecessary delay. Defendant also contends that failure of law enforcement personnel to take him before a magistrate sooner violates the decisions of our United States Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). Defendant's reliance on these decisions is misplaced. In both those cases, confessions were suppressed by virtue of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Those rules, of course, apply only to the federal courts and the holdings in McNabb and Mallory have expressly not been applied by state courts. See 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 547 at 600 (1967 & Cum.Supp.1979) and cases cited therein. The validity of this approach is bolstered by decisions of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that the McNabb-Mallory Rule is not binding on state courts, and holding that a confession is not inadmissible merely because of an undue delay on the part of police in taking defendant to the magistrate prior to his confession. See, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953), ovrld. on other grounds, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86 (1951). We would further note that the holdings established by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in McNabb and Mallory were greatly modified for federal courts by Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501. This assignment of error is overruled.