Opinion ID: 771786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Testimony of the School Psychologist

Text: 35 Vallejo argues that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the expert testimony of his high school's psychologist and director of special education at trial. 4 The expert was prepared to testify about Vallejo's long-standing, severe language disorder, documented by more than ten years of school and special education records, and the difficulties he experienced understanding and expressing English. The testimony was offered to explain the discrepancies between Vallejo's and the Agents' recollection of the communications which occurred during the interrogation. 36 The district court never clearly articulated why it excluded this evidence. First, the court appeared to misconstrue the import of the proposed testimony, stating, I'm not going to permit a psychologist to say he would have been more comfortable [speaking] in Spanish. When Vallejo clarified that the proposed testimony was offered to explain how high school children like Vallejo cope with communication problems -especially in pressure situations like interrogations -the court was not swayed, ruling that the testimony was totally irrelevant and remote. The court indicated that if Vallejo had trouble perceiving specific questions and answers, he might rule otherwise. Without specific examples, however, the court failed to see why answering interrogation questions was so complex or difficult that it required an expert's explanation. The court reasoned that determining what was actually said during the interrogation and the reasons for any discrepancies were matters that the jury could and should decide for itself. It was also reluctant to allow testimony from an expert who had never personally examined Vallejo. 5 Vallejo asserts that the proffered testimony was admissible under Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and was not rendered inadmissible by application of Rule 403. We agree.
37 The proposed expert testimony was admissible under Rule 702. It provides: 38 [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 39 Expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). To be admissible, expert testimony must (1) address an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layman, (2) bepresented by a witness having sufficient expertise, and (3) assert a reasonable opinion given the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge. United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 1997). The district court is accorded broad latitude in determining the reliability of expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). 40 The proposed testimony of the school psychologist addressed an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson: the special problems that former special education students have when attempting to communicate in English in high pressure situations. His testimony would have explained how two people, like Vallejo and Agent Pina, could have very different perceptions of what occurred during the interrogation, yet could both be correct from a communications standpoint. The expert would have described Vallejo's communication difficulties to help the jury understand how he struggled to comprehend and communicate during the interrogation and why he appeared to struggle while testifying at trial. 41 There was no dispute that the witness had sufficient expertise, based on his degree in psychology and his current job as the High School's director of special education. The expert witness's opinion was reliable. In preparation for trial, as custodian of the school records, he extensively reviewed ten years of school documentation regarding Vallejo's language skills and his progress in special education classes. Although the district court, in its haste to find closure, prevented defense counsel from fully explaining what the records contained, we can discern some of the records' contents from what defense counsel was permitted to argue. Apparently the records would have shown that Vallejo had been in special education classes since kindergarten, but that he had been taken out of those classes in the past couple years. The records would also have shown that Vallejo was in the lowest, i.e. the first, second, or third, percentiles in many verbal categories. 42 The First Circuit found similar testimony to be both relevant and reliable in United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir 1995). Defending against charges of conspiracy and aiding and abetting an attempt to blow up his father's car, Shay sought to introduce expert testimony explaining that his inculpatory statements resulted from a mental disorder called pseudologica fantastica, a condition which causes people to create intricate lies in order to place themselves in the center of attention. See Shay, 57 F.3d at 129-130. Although the district court excluded the testimony on the grounds that the jury could easily determine the reliability of Shay's statements by listening to the testimony of other trial witnesses, the First Circuit reversed, holding that the jury was unqualified to determine whether the false statements were made because the defendant suffered from a mental disorder. See id. at 133. Specifically, the expert testimony was needed to explain why the defendant would make false statements even though they were inconsistent with his apparent self-interest  when [c]ommon understanding conforms to the notion that a person ordinarily does not make untruthful inculpatory statements. Id. 43 We have also admitted expert testimony to explain inconsistencies in an individual's testimony. In United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997), we held that expert testimony regarding the characteristics of delayed disclosure and script memory, commonly found in victims of child abuse, would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the victim was abused as a child and would not infringe on the jury's role of determining witness credibility. Id at 1330-31. We emphasized that the jury was free to determine whether the victim delayed disclosure or simply fabricated the incidents. Id. at 1331. 44 Here, the expert testimony was intended to explain why Agent Pina remembered Vallejo saying that his friend, Francisco, decided not to drive Bebo's car because he suspected it contained drugs, while Vallejo claimed he never said such a thing. We agree with the First Circuit's reasoning in Shay, and conclude that the expert testimony was necessary to assist the jury in determining whether the inconsistencies resulted from Vallejo's recognized language difficulties. As we stated in Bighead, allowing the expert testimony would not displace the role of the jury because, after hearing the expert testimony, the jury was free to decide that the reason for the discrepancy was Vallejo's lack of credibility -not his communications disorder. We therefore hold that the expert testimony was admissible under Rule 702.
45 In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 702, the basis for the expert opinion must be acceptable under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It provides: [t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 46 One of the reasons the district court excluded the expert testimony of the school psychologist was his failure to personally examine Vallejo. However, the district court did not rely upon, nor does the government cite, any cases which require a psychological or medical expert's testimony to be based on a personal physical examination. In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly held to the contrary. In Daubert, the Court stated that an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 47 Following the Court's lead, we have allowed expert testimony regarding the memory difficulties experienced by child abuse victims even when the expert did not testify about the facts of this case, or about the particular victim, whom she had never examined. Bighead, 128 F.3d at 1330. The expert's testimony was admissible because it consisted of her observations of typical characteristics drawn from many years experience interviewing many, many persons, interviewed because they were purported victims of child abuse.  Id. 48 In this case, the Government could have crossexamined the school psychologist regarding his failure to physically examine Vallejo, a fact which goes to the weight -not the admissibility -of the evidence. Vallejo's expert had reviewed ten years of educational and psychological documents concerning Vallejo prepared by school personnel, who taught and worked with Vallejo throughout his educational career and who had the opportunity to form objective and independent assessments of his special needs. These records, coupled with his in-court observations and his background in the field of psychology, provide a sufficient basis for expert testimony. We therefore hold that the expert testimony was admissible under rule 703.
49 Even when expert testimony is otherwise admissible, the district court may exclude it under Rule 403. The only issue before the jury was whether Vallejo knew that there were drugs in the car when he attempted to drive through the Calexico border. The Government's case relied heavily on the discrepancies between Vallejo's testimony and Agent Pina's testimony. The proposed expert testimony would have explained why these discrepancies may have occurred, and would have served to rehabilitate Vallejo on the key issue of knowledge. 50 The Government argues that the discrepancies did not need to be explained because Vallejo was simply lying. According to the Government, Vallejo could not have had difficulty communicating during the interrogation because the conceptswere not complicated. The Government points out that Vallejo did not testify at trial that he was confused by the interrogation, nor did he specifically refer to a problematic statement or exchange. 51 The Government's arguments challenge the weight to be accorded of the expert's opinion rather than its admissibility. The Government does not argue that the testimony would have confused or misled the jury, nor does it argue any specific prejudice that may have resulted from the testimony. Although the Government implies that because the jury would not believe the expert, the testimony would be a waste of time, the credibility of the witness is a question precisely within the province of the jury. See Mannino v. Int'l Mfg Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 1981). 52 Because the Government does not advance any theory of prejudice that might outweigh the highly probative nature of the proffered expert testimony, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by excluding it. As the testimony regarding Vallejo's ability to understand and communicate in English directly addressed the issue of Vallejo's knowledge, we hold the error was not harmless. 6