Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Foundational Hearings

Text: (8) Defendant complains the trial court promised to conduct Evidence Code section 402 hearings prior to actually admitting gang membership evidence, but never did so. Although it was at defense counsel's suggestion the court deferred a determination as to whether police gang experts could testify, counsel raised no objection immediately prior to testimony by Officers Johnson, Holmes or Mejia. As defendant acknowledges, counsel only renewed his motion for exclusion of gang evidence following Officer Johnson's testimony. In response, outside the jury's presence, the court heard arguments of counsel and again denied defendant's motion. Defendant was heard only once more at trial regarding the admission of gang evidence  on a mistrial motion made after Officer Johnson had testified to his assignment with a gang unit. Again outside the jury's presence, the court heard argument on and denied defendant's motion. Under these circumstances the trial court was not bound to provide, unprompted, additional hearings under Evidence Code section 402 merely because it had earlier suggested it would do so at the appropriate time. In determining the admissibility of evidence, the trial court has broad discretion. Thus, it is within the court's discretion whether or not to decide admissibility questions under Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b) within the jury's presence. ( People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 187 [93 Cal. Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193].) A trial court's ruling on admissibility implies whatever finding of fact is prerequisite thereto; a separate or formal finding is, with exceptions not applicable here, unnecessary. (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (c).) A ruling on a motion under section 402, moreover, is not binding on the trial court if the subject evidence is proffered later in the trial. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 343 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149] (dis. opn. of Bird, C.J.), citing Saidi-Tabatabai v. Superior Court (1967) 253 Cal. App.2d 257 [61 Cal. Rptr. 510].) On appeal, a trial court's decision to admit or not admit evidence, whether made in limine or following a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1167 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 676 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) In light of these principles, we conclude the trial court here was within its discretion in failing to conduct additional proceedings outside the jury's presence on the question of gang evidence. Defendant also complains the trial court permitted the prosecution to use gang evidence on the issue of identity, after having ruled such evidence was relevant only to the issue of motive. Defendant is mistaken in stating the court expressly limited gang evidence to the issue of motive. In fact, in ruling on the motion in limine the trial court stated: I want to limit this proof to motive and to identity.... Moreover, the court admonished the jury that testimony relating to gangs was allowed only for the limited purpose of showing motive to commit the crime for which Mr. Williams is on trial or to prove identity. We are satisfied there was no prejudicial error in the admission of gang evidence at defendant's trial.