Opinion ID: 1826001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Motion Requesting a Jury Interview

Text: Stephens alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a motion requesting a jury interview. Stephens cites to an interview given to the Florida Times-Union by jury foreperson Ronald Buck in which Mr. Buck stated the jury believed that Stephens did not intend to kill the victim, [b]ut the child died as a result of the robbery. . . . That's why we convicted him. Stephens argues that this statement by Mr. Buck establishes that the reasons for the jury's recommendation of death were inconsistent with the jury's advisory sentences. The trial court found that Mr. Buck's statement was not inconsistent with the jury's finding that Stephens played a significant role in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. We agree. Even though Mr. Buck did not specifically state that Stephens acted with reckless indifference to human life, his statement to the media indicates that Stephens did act with reckless disregard to human life. In fact, when we addressed Stephens' proportionality claim on direct appeal, we found that Stephens personally committed the crimes of burglary and robbery and that Stephens personally kidnapped the child victim. Stephens, 787 So.2d at 760. We also stated that [t]he record demonstrates that Stephens was indifferent to the fate of this helpless child. Id. Because Stephens fails to demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. Instruction on Aggravating Factors Stephens asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury regarding the HAC aggravator and the pecuniary gain aggravator. Initially, we note that a substantive challenge to the HAC and pecuniary gain jury instructions is procedurally barred because Stephens could have raised these claims on direct appeal. Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650 (Fla.2000). Additionally, the claim is without merit. Stephens first argues that the HAC aggravator did not apply because he lacked the requisite intent to kill and because the trial court did not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. However, the HAC aggravator does not focus on the intent and motivation of the defendant, but instead on the means and manner in which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death. Brown v. State, 721 So.2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998). The record demonstrates that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the HAC jury instruction. Dr. Floro testified that in his expert opinion, Little Rob died of asphyxiation, which can be either strangulation or suffocation. Stephens, 787 So.2d at 752. We have consistently upheld the HAC aggravator in cases where a conscious victim was strangled. See Bowles v. State, 804 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001); see also Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636 (Fla.2000). Stephens also argues that the pecuniary gain aggravator did not apply because pecuniary gain was not the primary motive for the killing and because it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Stephens is mistaken. In order to establish the pecuniary gain aggravator, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain money, property, or other financial gain. Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 680 (Fla.1995) (emphasis added). The record demonstrates that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the pecuniary gain jury instruction. Stephens pled guilty to armed burglary of the Sparrow home and three counts of robbery. Stephens also testified that when he entered the home, his intent was to rob anyone in the house, and that, in fact, he did rob the people in the house. However, Stephens argues that because the burglary of the Sparrow home and robbery of its occupants were over by the time the murder was committed, pecuniary gain could not be considered as an aggravator. We rejected a similar argument in Parker v. State, 873 So.2d 270 (Fla.2004). We held that the pecuniary gain aggravator is applicable where the murder was the culmination of a course of events that began when appellant went into a store, robbed the clerk at gunpoint, and abducted her from the store. Id. at 290 (quoting Copeland v. State, 457 So.2d 1012, 1019 (Fla.1984)). Little Rob's murder in the instant case was the culmination of a course of events that began when an armed Stephens entered the Sparrow home, robbed the occupants, and kidnapped the child for the purpose of trying to escape. Because Stephens fails to demonstrate any fundamental error, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim.