Opinion ID: 78421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Carroll is exempt from execution under Atkins because he is mentally retarded.

Text: Carroll maintains he is mentally retarded and thus exempt from execution under Atkins. As evidence of his mental retardation, Carroll notes he has scored less than 75 on several IQ tests; his reading ability is at the second-grade level, his spelling ability is at the third-grade level, and his arithmetic ability is at the fifth-grade level; and he exhibited poor adaptive behavior in his childhood and adolescence. In Atkins, the Supreme Court held the execution of mentally retarded individuals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. at 2252. Although the Court left to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction, id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. at 2250, it reproduced definitions of mental retardation formulated by the American Association on Mental Retardation and American Psychiatric Association: The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation as follows: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18. The American Psychiatric Association's definition is similar: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Id. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). The Court also noted that `[m]ild' mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70, id., and that an IQ score between 70 and 75 is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition, id. at 309 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 5. When Atkins was decided in 2002, the state of Florida already had a law prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded individuals. See Fla. Stat. § 921.137. That law defines mental retardation as significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The statute further defines significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test. The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this definition as requiring a petitioner to establish he has an IQ of 70 or below. See Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 329 (Fla.2007). Section 921.137, however, applies only to persons sentenced to death after the effective date of the statute in 2001. Fla. Stat. § 921.137(8). Thus, as the district court noted, § 921.137 is inapplicable to Carroll, and it is only within the context of Atkins' mental retardation definition that this Court evaluates Petitioner's claim. The state trial court made factual determinations that Carroll is not mentally retarded and that he possesses an IQ of above 75. In challenging these determinations, Carroll points to evidence in the record indicating he has scored below 75 on previous IQ tests. Specifically, he notes the trial testimony of Dr. Michael Gutman, who testified psychological tests showed [Carroll] to have an IQ of sixty or in the sixty to sixty-nine range. Carroll also states he scored a 58 on an IQ test shortly after being arrested. With respect to his adaptive behavior, Carroll emphasizes his poor cognitive abilities, citing the testimony of Dr. Barry Crown and Dr. Elizabeth McMahon at the evidentiary hearing on his initial post-conviction motion, as well as adolescent behavioral problems, citing an affidavit of Nelly T. Smith, his sister. This evidence fails to undermine the state court's factual determinations or establish those determinations were unreasonable in light of the evidence before the state trial court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The record in this case is replete with evidencepresented at three separate proceedings, two of which were before the same state trial judgesupporting the state court's findings. ( See R2-20, Exh. Vol. 4 at 511-12 [8] (Dr. Gutman's testimony that Carroll was in the high average range of intelligence and his IQ was between 105 and 110); R2-20 Exh. Vol. 4 at 512 (IQ tests on which Carroll had scored in the high 70s and low 80s); R2-20, Exh. Vol. 6 at 758 (school IQ test of 79); R2-20, Exh. Vol. 10 at 1059 (Dr. Gutman's report indicating Carroll was of average to high average intelligence); R2-20, Exh. Vol. 10 at 1064 (Dr. Benson's report indicating Carroll had a borderline IQ); R2-20, Exh. Vol. 10 at 1070 (Dr. Danziger's report describing Carroll's intellect as roughly in the average to below average range); R2-20, Exh. PC Vol. 2 at 229 (Dr. Crown's testimony that Carroll's IQ was 81, which was in a nether nether land between mentally retarded and being low average); R2-20, Exh. PC Vol. 2 at 229 (tests scores showing a verbal IQ of 84 and a performance IQ of 79); R2-20, Exh. PC Vol. 2 at 237-38 (school IQ tests of 80); R2-20, Exh. PC Vol. 2 at 392 (school records indicating Carroll's IQ ranged from 80 to in the 75-to-85 range).) In addition to the facts in the record, Carroll's counsel admitted at the state Huff hearing that Carroll had an IQ range from 75 to 81. [9] ( See R2-20, Exh. PC2 Vol. 1 at 23.) Moreover, the state court considered the same evidence Carroll has presented in his briefs to this Court and found it unpersuasive. Indeed, Carroll does not provide the full context of the testimony regarding his sub-75 IQ scores: the same expert, Dr. Gutman, who testified at trial as to tests showing an IQ in the 60-to-69 range also estimated Carroll's IQ to be between 105 and 110, and Carroll's own expert at the evidentiary hearing on his initial 3.850 motion maintained Carroll's previous IQ score of 58 was likely the result of psychosis. Finally, Carroll has never attempted to proffer any additional evidence to any courtwhether it be the state courts, the district court, or this Courtthat would undermine the exhaustive evidence already in the record indicating he is not mentally retarded. Quite simply, Carroll has had numerous opportunities ( i.e., his competency hearing, his trial, and the evidentiary hearing on his initial 3.850 motion) during the past eighteen years to present evidence supporting a finding of mental retardation. [10] The state trial court judge, who presided over both Carroll's trial and evidentiary hearing on his initial 3.850 motion and was intimately aware of the evidence presented during these proceedings, found he had failed to do so, and the record supports this finding. Our review does not stop here, however, because Carroll also maintains the state court construed Atkins too narrowly, and thus its decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. He maintains Atkins does not require individuals to possess a certain IQ ( i.e., below 75) to satisfy the definition of mental retardation. He further asserts the intellectual functioning prong of the mental retardation inquiry is interrelated with the adaptive behavior prong. Thus, according to Carroll, a borderline IQ, accompanied by a serious mental illness that substantially impairs an individual's cognitive abilities, can satisfy the definition of mental retardation in some circumstances. He asserts his case is one such circumstance. As the district court noted, the mental health experts who have evaluated Carroll have diagnosed him with a myriad of mental disorders, including schizophrenia, psychosis, fetal alcohol syndrome, brain damage, psychosexual disorder, and personality disorder. Although some evidence in the record suggests Carroll malingered during his examinations, we do not doubt Carroll indeed suffers from some, if not multiple, forms of mental illness. That said, the mental retardation inquiry is not different merely because an individual suffers from mental illness. The inquiry still requires an individual to demonstrate significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning along with deficits in adaptive behavior and an onset before age 18. In other words, contrary to Carroll's assertions, the intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior prongs must each be satisfied for an individual to qualify as mentally retarded. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3 (reproducing the American Association on Mental Retardation's and the American Psychiatric Association's definitions of mental retardation, which both state the three-criteria test for mental retardation in the conjunctive); see also Fla. Stat. § 921.137 (stating significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning must exist concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior). Carroll further asserts his mental illness can render him functionally mentally retarded, as was apparently the case when a psychotic episode caused him to perform poorly on an IQ test shortly after his arrest. Under Carroll's interpretation of Atkins, the functionally mentally retarded are also exempt from execution. We reject this argument for the same reasons articulated by the district court. Atkins protects only those individuals who are mentally retarded, as is evident by the third prong of the mental retardation inquiry, which requires onset by age 18. See id., 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3; see also Fla. Stat. § 921.137. Thus, a constitutional rule exempting the functionally mentally retarded from execution would go beyond the holding of Atkins, something this Court may not do when reviewing § 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also infra III.B. In sum, we conclude the state court's factual determination that Carroll is not mentally retarded was reasonable and thus Carroll has failed to demonstrate the state court's denial of his Atkins claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). We also hold the state trial court reasonably applied the controlling Supreme Court precedent ( Atkins ) and thus its decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, we deny this claim.