Opinion ID: 526440
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Textual provisions of the collective bargaining agreements.

Text: 47 CSX's principal argument that the instant dispute is covered in the Agreements is premised upon the RIF provisions of those Agreements. The district court cited a typical RIF clause, which provides in relevant part: 48 (a) When it becomes necessary to reduce expenses, the forces at any point or in any department or subdivision thereof shall be reduced, seniority to govern; and employees affected to take the rate of the job to which they are assigned. 49 (b)(1) Five working days advance notice will be given to employees affected before the abolishment of positions or reduction in force, and list of employees affected will be furnished to the local committee.... 50 Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 110. CSX contends that these RIF procedures are applicable to job abolishments resulting from line sales, as well as other changes in CSX's operations. 51 The district court found that the pertinent collective bargaining agreements also provided for various labor protections and furlough benefits for terminated employees, and that in the last previous (1984) round of collective bargaining, some of the appellant unions had traded off demands for new or enhanced protective provisions for other benefits. See Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 104 & n. 7 (detailing labor protections and furlough benefits). 52 Appellants dispute the applicability of the RIF provisions, and point to the fact that they do not refer specifically to line sale situations. Appellants contend that the RIF provisions only allow management to abolish a position for which work has disappeared. Distinguishing the situation presented by the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line, appellants argue that here work did not disappear, but rather was transferred by a deliberate action of the carrier. Appellants note in this regard that many of the CSX employees who worked on the Buffalo-Eidenau line had seniority rights specific to that line which would not survive a sale under which B & P did not assume any obligation to continue to administer the Agreements providing those rights. 53 Appellants also contend that the district court, by concluding that the controversy presented for determination was a minor dispute, improperly abdicated its exclusive jurisdiction to determine what the status quo is which the Railway Labor Act requires to be maintained during bargaining under that statute. 54 Addressing the last contention first, it seems to us that appellants have the situation analytically backward. As indicated earlier, there is generally no duty to maintain the status quo during a minor dispute, but only during a major dispute. 8 Air Cargo, Inc. v. Local Union 851, IBT, 733 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.1984), for example, on which appellants place considerable reliance, ruled that while the major dispute procedures of section 6 are being carried out, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction to ensure that the status quo is being maintained.... [and] therefore ... to determine what the status quo is. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). It is accordingly necessary to address, as a threshold matter, the nature of the controversy between the parties. Once the district court ruled that the controversy was a minor dispute, the status quo issue upon which appellants rely was mooted. 55 The question remains, of course, whether the district court correctly ruled that a minor, rather than major, dispute was before it. As indicated earlier, the district court was only required to conclude that CSX's position was plausible, see Local 553, 695 F.2d at 673, and not obviously insubstantial, see Southern Ry., 384 F.2d at 327. We conclude that CSX met this relatively light burden with respect to interpretation of the pertinent labor agreements, and that the district court properly so concluded. Any further inquiry by the district court would have been unwarranted, since it is not for [the court] to weigh, and decide who has the better of the argument. If the court [does] this, it overstep[s] its bounds and usurp[s] the arbitrator's function. Maine Cent. R.R., 787 F.2d at 782. 56