Opinion ID: 1648336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: prohibition on introduction of letter

Text: Keen contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the introduction of a letter which prosecution witness Michael Moran wrote to Judge O'Brien, the trial judge in his Michigan case. Keen argues that the letter was admissible [13] as direct evidence of Moran's motive for testifying; as a prior inconsistent statement; and because the prosecution opened the door on direct examination. This claim is without merit. The relevant portion of the letter [14] reads as follows: The circumstances which involved me were not of my making, nor were my actions to the circumstances made with the intent to participate in crime, or injure, or kill anyone. I did not know for certain that a crime had been committed until I was arrested in Iowa, in an area that I am well known to police and other citizens. After my arrest and upon advise of my attorney, I not only identified but caused the arrest and testified against the real killer. Because of my innocence I cooperated freely and I refused a plea bargain which was offered for that cooperation. The circumstances which led to my being in Michigan can be verified by the prosecutor, Mr. King and Detective Sergeant Webb. While I was incarcerated in the Iowa State Penitentiary I was extradited to Fort Lauderdale, Florida as a prosecution witness. I testified against a man who had killed his nineteen year old pregnant wife and then attempted to hire someone to kill the States' chief witness. While in Florida's custody, Iowa paroled me without my knowledge. After testifying, Florida authorities learned that I had been paroled and released me without provision or program. Keen's main argument is that this letter revealed Moran's motive in testifying: He is going out of his way to mention his Florida testimony to the Michigan judge prior to sentencing. Appellant's Initial Brief at, 33. However, despite the fact that Moran was vague about some of the letter's contents, [15] Keen cannot escape the fact that Moran's letter to Judge O'Brien, the Michigan trial judge, was written in 1987. Consequently, the letter can have no conceivable relevance to Moran's motive for testifying in 1995, years after he was sentenced by Judge O'Brien to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Further, because of that fact, this is a collateral issue where defense counsel was bound by Moran's answer to his question of whether he testified against his codefendant in Michigan. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.4 at 440 (1999 ed.) (observing that [i]f the witness has made a prior inconsistent statement concerning a collateral matter, the cross-examining counsel may question the witness about the statement, but he or she must `take the answer'); see also Caruso, 645 So.2d at 394 (reiterating well-established rule that if a witness is cross-examined concerning a collateral or irrelevant matter, the cross-examiner must `take' the answer, is bound by it, and may not subsequently impeach the witness by introducing extrinsic evidence to contradict the witness on that point).