Opinion ID: 1377007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Introduce Evidence of Skillicorn's Behavior at the Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center

Text: Skillicorn first claims that he was prejudiced by the failure of his trial counsel to introduce evidence in the penalty phase of his good behavior while he was receiving chemical dependency treatment at the Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center in Kansas City, Missouri. Skillicorn believes that this failure prejudiced him because the evidence would have portrayed him in a positive light and may have served as mitigating evidence in the assessment of punishment. Further, Skillicorn argues that the evidence would have shown that his codefendant, Allen Nicklasson, exercised his will over him, further mitigating his role in the murder of Richard Drummond. After the post-conviction proceeding, the court found Skillicorn's attorney had access to the Salvation Army records and had spoken to the potential witnesses. [2] The court found that the information the witnesses would have presented would not have been persuasive or helpful, that Skillicorn could not overcome the presumption that it was a part of counsel's trial strategy not to call the witnesses, and that counsel was not ineffective. Skillicorn argues that counsel's failure to explore these critical issues was not a matter of trial strategy. Instead, he asserts that counsel was professionally deficient and this deficiency prejudiced him, citing a number of federal cases to support this argument. None of these cases assist him. In Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.1990), the court determined that counsel was ineffective for failing to contact a witness who would have provided defendant's only possible, indeed, his only reasonable, defense to the death penalty and that this prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 830-32. [3] In Mauldin v. Wainwright, 723 F.2d 799 (11th Cir.1984), [4] the court found that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into the defense's sole theory of the case, that defendant suffered from insanity due to alcohol abuse. Id. at 800. Even though defendant had been hospitalized for the addiction, counsel did not consult a mental health expert on the issue, instead choosing to rely on the statements of the defendant, his wife, and his mother. Id. In Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992), the court noted that even though the defendant's sanity was a critical issue, only minimal attempts were made to procure independent evidence on the issue. Id. at 156-57. Further, the court determined that no strategic decision was made by the attorneys as to the sanity issue and that this failure prejudiced defendant. Id. at 157-58, 160. In Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cir.1999), the court held that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the upbringing and background of the defendant and that such failure prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 617, 621. Finally, in Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir.1999), the court determined that counsel was ineffective for portraying only a hollow shell of the defendant in the sentencing phase instead of developing evidence that would have shown positive aspects of defendant's life. Those positive aspects would have included that he was a hard-working family man who suffered from diabetes and was unemployed. Defense counsel only explored issues of defendant's truth and veracity, indicating that counsel knew little of the defendant. Id. at 1201-02. All of these cases are clearly distinguishable from the present case. Here, during the penalty phase, Skillicorn's attorneys did put on mitigating evidence developing a fairly comprehensive portrait of the defendant. The first to testify was Sabri Esmahan, a jailer with the Clay County sheriff's department who had daily contact with Skillicorn. Esmahan testified that neither he nor any other guard had any problems with Skillicorn. Skillicorn always complied with the directives of the jailers, was quiet, went about his own business, and Esmahan was unaware of any conduct violations by Skillicorn. Additionally, Skillicorn was not violent toward fellow prisoners. He went to Esmahan with a problem that he and another prisoner were having and the situation was resolved peacefully. After Esmahan's testimony, the defense presented more mitigation evidence by reading into evidence the deposition of Special Agent Arthur McOmber of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). McOmber testified about a conversation he had with Skillicorn's codefendant, Allen Nicklasson. Nicklasson claimed that he just snapped when walking Richard Drummond into the woods, that he was angered by Drummond's failure to try to escape, and that his anger rose until Nicklasson decided that he had to shoot Drummond. The final mitigation evidence was the testimony of Linda Daniels, Skillicorn's older sister. She testified that their mother died from cancer when Skillicorn was only eight years old. Skillicorn's father raised him from that point on with some assistance from his older sisters. She maintained a close relationship with her brother, even while he was imprisoned on another murder conviction. Daniels testified that she never saw her brother display any violent tendencies toward anyone inside or outside the family. Despite all that her brother had done, Daniels still loved Skillicorn. The depositions of the Salvation Army employees add little to this picture of Skillicorn. Skillicorn's trial counsel reviewed the defendant's Salvation Army record, looking for additional mitigation evidence. Combined, the testimonies of Jerry Richards, Michael Sommer, and Major Raymond Briggs demonstrate that Skillicorn was one of the finest workers in the treatment program, that he was a model resident, created no problems, often volunteered to help, did not display violent tendencies, was compliant and respectful. Much of this testimony is similar to that of Esmahan and Daniels. Counsel is not ineffective for not putting on cumulative evidence. State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 755 (Mo. banc 1997). The defendant cannot overcome the presumption that this was sound trial strategy on the part of counsel. Id. at 756. In any case, Skillicorn cannot demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice from counsel's actions. In the penalty phase, the jury found the following aggravating circumstances listed in section 565.032 RSMo: [5] In 1980, Skillicorn was convicted of murder in the second degree, [6] section 565.032.2(1); Richard Drummond was killed while Skillicorn and his co-defendants were in the process of kidnapping him, section 565.032.2(11); and finally, Drummond was murdered while Skillicorn and the others were in the process of robbing him. Id. The evidence supported all of these aggravating circumstances that indicated the death penalty was an appropriate punishment for Skillicorn. Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d at 898-99. In addition to the statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury heard an audio tape of Skillicorn's confession to the FBI in San Diego, California. In the confession, he not only talked about his role in the murder of Richard Drummond, but also discussed what he and Nicklasson did as they fled Missouri on a journey southwest. Besides committing a number of house burglaries and attempting to steal a purse from a woman in a grocery store in California, Skillicorn discussed his role in the murders of a husband and wife in Arizona and a woman in a diner in Mexico. In Arizona, Skillicom and Nicklasson's car, the Dodge Intrepid stolen from Richard Drummond, became stuck in the sand. The two men approached the house of Joseph and Charlene Babcock. As in the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Babcock offered assistance to Skillicorn and Nicklasson; and, as here, they were murdered. After Mr. Babcock attempted unsuccessfully to pull Mr. Drummond's company car out of the sand, Nicklasson shot and killed him. Skillicorn and Nicklasson then returned to the Babcock home in Mr. Babcock's truck, where Nicklasson killed Mrs. Babcock in a similar fashion. Later, while in Mexico, Skillicorn pulled his handgun on a woman operating a diner where the two men were eating. Unfortunately, the woman did not understand Skillicorn's demands for money. Nicklasson then shot and killed the woman. After returning to the United States, Skillicorn and Nicklasson were captured. Skillicorn clearly cannot demonstrate any prejudice in light of the aggravating evidence against him. Skillicorn's prior murder conviction, and his conduct in the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of Richard Drummond all undercut his claim. His subsequent conduct in the company of Nicklasson further buttresses this conclusion. Even if trial counsel was ineffective, Skillicorn cannot demonstrate any prejudice from counsel's alleged shortcomings. Hall, 982 S.W.2d at 680. The motion court did not clearly err in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law on this point. Counsel was not ineffective. (2) Counsel's Failure to Present Evidence Regarding Skillicorn's Childhood, History of Chemical Dependency, and Skillicorn's Dependent Personality For his second point, Skillicorn argues that his counsel was ineffective for not presenting evidence regarding his childhood and upbringing, his history of drug and alcohol abuse and addiction, and his personality, which allowed his co-defendant Allen Nicklasson to exercise influence over him. He believes that this prejudiced him in the penalty phase of the trial because the evidence would have provided mitigating factors supporting a sentence of life without parole. The trial court, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, determined that counsel was not ineffective for not presenting testimony in the penalty phase similar to that given by Dr. William Holcomb in the post-conviction proceeding. The court determined that Skillicorn's voluntary intoxication would not negate the required culpable mental state for the crime. State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 617 (Mo. banc 1998). Moreover, the testimony would have been cumulative to testimony offered by Dr. John Spiridigliozzi had he testified, [7] and, in any case, Dr. Holcomb's testimony was supported by scant evidence and was unpersuasive. First, as discussed above, evidence regarding Skillicorn's upbringing and personality was before the jury. Skillicorn's sister testified that their mother died when he was only eight years of age, that his father had a difficult time working through the loss, and that his older sisters helped raise Skillicorn. Evidence regarding Skillicorn's submissive personality was also before the jury. A jailer with the Clay County sheriff's department testified that Skillicorn was a model prisoner. He was compliant with the requests of all guards, going about his own business in a quiet way to avoid conflict. Skillicorn suggests that counsel was deficient for not further exploring his background, claiming that his father turned to alcohol abuse to deal with the loss of Skillicorn's mother. He points to Illinois v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992), and Louisiana v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177 (La.1992), rev'd on other grounds, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), as indicating the failure to investigate defendant's background, where there is evidence of abuse, is grounds for vacating a sentence of death. Those cases are distinguishable from the present one. Here, there is no evidence that Skillicorn's father abused him in any way, while in those cases the defendants grew up in either an abusive, alcoholic, often brutal environment, Sullivan, 596 So.2d at 191, or in a home where the father sold drugs, brought them into the home, abused the children in an alcoholic rage, and routinely whipped the children, often using appliance cords, for defying him, Perez, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d at 989. At the post-conviction proceeding, Dr. Holcomb testified that on the day before the offense, Skillicorn consumed large quantities of beer and schnapps while also smoking marijuana and ingesting Valium and methamphetamine or crank. Evidence of substance abuse is inadmissible to negate the required mental state for first degree murder. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 617. Even if offered as mitigating evidence, counsel cannot be ineffective for not putting such evidence on, as many jurors find that chemical abuse is an aggravating factor engendering no sympathy for the defendant. State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 262 (Mo. banc 1997). Dr. Holcomb's other testimony, that Skillicorn had a difficult childhood after the loss of his mother and that he was a follower who did well in institutional settings, is similar to that offered by his sister and a jailer from the Clay County sheriff's department. Counsel is not ineffective for not presenting cumulative evidence. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d at 755. In any case, there is no prejudice, as the evidence, at best, merely shows that Skillicorn is a follower who has a history of allowing his co-defendants to kill innocent persons while he remains idly by having already stolen items of value from them. Moreover, the submissive nature of Skillicorn is not without contradiction. Tim DeGraffenreid, who was present with Skillicom and Nicklasson when Drummond was murdered, stated that Dennis [Skillicorn] told me to go tell Allen [Nicklasson] to put the clip in his [Drummond's] head. Additionally, any suggestion that Skillicorn somehow was under a kind of duress in the murder of Drummond is inappropriate. This is also true of suggestions trying to minimize Skillicorn's role in planning the murderSkillicorn told Drummond that they were going to have to lose him in the woods even though Skillicorn, Nicklasson, and DeGraffenreid had no rope to tie Drummond up with. The motion court did not clearly err in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue. Counsel was not ineffective and Skillicorn was not prejudiced. Hall, 982 S.W.2d at 680.