Opinion ID: 3181879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The next question presented is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Green-Bowman possessed the shotgun. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2002). The evidence was sufficient if a reasonable jury could have found Green-Bowman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict and draw all reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. See id. Green-Bowman’s argument focuses on the several other people who had recently been in the car and were still nearby when the police found the shotgun. He 6 The dissent also sees impropriety in the government arguing, as the dissent puts it, “Green-Bowman’s actions proved he committed the instant offense because Green-Bowman acted similarly in the past.” Post at 18. But an argument does not go to propensity simply because the argument compares someone’s actions at two different times. It is precisely the similarity between Green-Bowman’s actions that meant evidence concerning what happened in 2011 supported an inference about what he knew—that is, why he acted the way he did—in 2013 and thus was, as the dissent agrees, admissible. Armed with the court’s jury instruction, defense counsel likewise may take time to explain thoroughly to the jury how such evidence does not show propensity and should not be considered as such. -10- asserts no reasonable jury could have found him guilty without additional “affirmative proof” he, rather than someone else, possessed the shotgun. Green-Bowman is mistaken. The government did not need to prove other people did not possess the shotgun. As we have repeatedly explained, and as the district court instructed the jury, “more than one person may possess a thing.” Johnson, 18 F.3d at 647; accord, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004). And that remains true even though the government focused on GreenBowman and did not tell the jury a story about someone else possessing the gun along with him. Cf. Johnson, 18 F.3d at 648. Without evidence someone else had exclusive control over the shotgun, the presence of other people who might have possessed the weapon does not prove Green-Bowman did not also possess it or otherwise undermine the evidence of possession. See id. at 648 n.14 (“That the evidence would permit a conclusion that [the defendant’s] control over [an item] was not exclusive, i.e., he shared it with [someone else], is immaterial. . . . [C]onstructive possession can be joint.”). The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Green-Bowman possessed the shotgun. Constructive possession can be established by the combination of knowing about something and having control over it. Id. at 647. Green-Bowman does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence he knew the shotgun was next to him in the car. As to control, the question is whether the evidence showed “some nexus” between Green-Bowman and the shotgun; just sitting close to it, by itself, probably would not be enough. Id. The nexus in this case includes, most importantly, the shotgun being partially wrapped in what Green-Bowman admits was his jacket, with the shotgun’s stock exposed. Cf. id. at 648 (upholding a finding that a defendant possessed a gun that was protruding from a bag of his clothes on the seat behind him in a car). A reasonable factfinder could infer from that fact, combined with the position of the shotgun, that Green-Bowman not only was aware of the shotgun, but -11- had control over it, and thus constructively possessed it. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.