Opinion ID: 2612478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff's Wrongful Discharge Claims

Text: The majority states as a general principle that the federal interest in union democracy preempts state causes of action for wrongful discharge or related torts.... (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1021.) This assertion does not withstand scrutiny. The majority's conclusion rests upon an uncritical reading of the statement in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal. App.3d 921, that an elected union officer must have the unrestricted freedom `to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own.' ( Id. at p. 926, quoting Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, 441 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 247].) The Tyra court failed to perceive, however, that the Supreme Court in Finnegan did not hold that the LMRDA guarantees union officials unrestricted power to discharge union employees. It held only that the LMRDA does not address the issue of union patronage. Patronage may, of course, be consistent with the purposes of the LMRDA to the extent that it permits union leaders to implement the policies they were elected to carry out, [10] but a proper preemption analysis will focus on the actual effect that a recognition of plaintiff's wrongful discharge claims would have on democratic union governance. In Tyra (as in Finnegan ), the union business agent was discharged precisely because of opposing political views. Permitting a state law action grounded upon such a policy-based discharge could properly be viewed as impinging on the freedom of a union leader, under the LMRDA, to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own, for the purpose of promot[ing] the policies and programs promised to the electorate. ( Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal. App.3d 921, 926.) However, dismissal of a union employee involving bad faith and related torts, such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as plaintiff herein alleges, does nothing to serve the federal interest in democratic union representation. Indeed, such conduct undermines the very purposes of the LMRDA. As the Court of Appeal stated below, Union officials are not elected to breach contracts or commit torts and, if they do so, the fact that they are `democratically elected' is beside the point. This case has nothing to do with [union] democracy.... This is a garden-variety `wrongful termination' case which just happens to be brought against a union.... The majority dismisses the point with the remarkable assertion that it is unworkable to distinguish those claims which implicate the interests of the LMRDA from those which do not. It then states that preemption under the LMRDA must not be based upon an analysis of whether the state law claims against a union relate to the purposes of the Act. These statements defy logic and betray a fundamental misunderstanding of preemption and wrongful discharge principles. As we have seen, when preemption is based upon an actual conflict of state and federal law, the precise question before the court is whether the state law conflicts with either the express or necessarily implied purposes of the federal program. (See Brown v. Hotel Employees, supra, 468 U.S. 491; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra, 383 U.S. 53, 61, 64 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 589, 590-591].) The very task we are called upon to perform is to discern the specific federal interests Congress intended to protect by its enactment and to determine whether the state law at issue relates to those purposes so as to significantly interfere with their achievement. The United States Supreme Court has not, to my knowledge, crafted a new category of preemption based on the workability of differentiating federal and state interests. Moreover, the specter of unworkability raised by the majority dissolves into its ephemeral essence when scrutinized in the light of reason. The majority fears that preemption will be subverted by artful pleading of a garden variety claim of, e.g., discharge for inefficiency or dishonesty rather than for the political needs of the union leadership. However, the complaint must do more than merely allege that the plaintiff was terminated for inefficiency or dishonesty. Otherwise, the complaint on its face will establish good cause for the termination. In addition, in order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff will be required to support the allegations of the complaint with specific evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a triable issue that the discharge not only was not policy based, but was also for improper reasons. Plaintiff's claims here are based on more than mere termination alone. She alleges in addition that the manner of the firing was contrary to the union's established personnel procedures, abusive, and defamatory. Plaintiff alleges that defendant and petitioner Brown instigated the termination by intentionally defaming her with charges of dishonesty when Brown knew that the accusations were false. Brown initially attempted to terminate plaintiff without any notice or opportunity to hear or respond to charges against her, contrary to provisions of the union's personnel manual, while plaintiff was out of the country on leave. When plaintiff was ultimately summoned to the union board meeting โ ostensibly to respond to the charges โ she discovered that the board had already interviewed candidates to replace her. Brown's announcement, before the meeting began, that she would appoint a new business agent also indicated the sham nature of the proceeding. Plaintiff's allegations implicate no legitimate union policy or exercise of union democracy. As Justice Eagleson suggests (see dis. opn. of Eagleson, J., ante, at p. 1037), there is nothing in the general notion of union democracy which prevents a union, as part of a democratically determined policy, from establishing certain rules of personnel practice. And, surely, nothing in the LMRDA is meant to sanction defamation, bad faith, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The point is, unless a termination somehow contravenes the purposes of the LMRDA, the union's actions will be subject to the same regulations as ordinary employers. The courts have uniformly engaged in a straightforward analysis of the competing interests to determine the question. (See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. 347.) Where the discharge is premised on union policy, as in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal. App.3d 921, the matter will be deemed preempted. Where the plaintiff is terminated for refusal to violate a state law, as in Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356 (i.e., a Tameny claim; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314]), or for other improper reasons, the discharge is peripheral to any legitimate interests served by the Act and preemption will not apply. This approach is typified by the high court's decision in Farmer v. Carpenters (1977) 430 U.S. 290 [51 L.Ed.2d 338, 97 S.Ct. 1056]. There, the question was whether a state court action against a union for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted under the NLRA. The plaintiff was a union member and officer who disagreed with other union officials over policy matters. The union began to discriminate against the plaintiff in hiring hall referrals to employers. When the plaintiff complained about the discrimination, he was subjected to an abusive campaign of harassment, threats and intimidation. The Supreme Court found there was no federal protection under the NLRA for such outrageous conduct by union officials. Thus ... permitting the exercise of state jurisdiction over such complaints does not result in state regulation of federally protected conduct. ( Id. at p. 302 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 351].) The Farmer court carefully distinguished those causes of action which implicated the concerns of the NLRA from those which did not. The plaintiff's separate claims for hiring hall discrimination, for example, if supported by evidence before the NLRB, would have established an unfair labor practice, subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. The allegations of emotional distress and attendant physical injury, however, would have no bearing in any hearing before the NLRB. [T]he state-court tort action can be adjudicated without resolution of the `merits' of the underlying labor dispute. Recovery for the tort of emotional distress under California law requires proof that the defendant intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct causing the plaintiff to sustain mental distress. [Citations.] The state court need not consider, much less resolve, whether a union discriminated or threatened to discriminate against an employee in terms of employment opportunities. To the contrary, the tort action can be resolved without reference to any accommodation of the special interests of unions and members in the hiring hall context. ( Farmer v. Carpenters, supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 304-305 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 353], italics added.) In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra, 383 U.S. 53, held that a claim for defamation is not preempted under the NLRA. The court emphasized that malicious libel enjoys no constitutional protection in any context and that it was not protected under the NLRA. ( Id. at pp. 63, 61 [15 L.Ed.2d at pp. 590, 589].) A libel in and of itself does not constitute an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the NLRB and, in any event, [t]he injury that the statement might cause to an individual's reputation ... has no relevance to the Board's function. ( Id. at p. 63 [15 L.Ed.2d at p. 590].) Thus, the high court concluded that permitting a state cause of action for defamation would not interfere with any national labor policy. Here, similarly, plaintiff's state law causes of action for defamation, wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress do not threaten any federal interest in union democracy or any other national interest embodied in the LMRDA. Plaintiff is not a member of the union and there is no collective bargaining agreement with the union-employer; thus there is no conceivable unfair labor practice or other concern within the jurisdiction of the NLRB with which the action might interfere. Plaintiff's state law tort actions can be resolved without reference to any matters governed by the LMRDA (e.g., reporting and disclosure requirements, trusteeship procedures, conduct of union elections, fiduciary responsibilities, and other anticorruption measures). The LMRDA does not purport to regulate relationships between a union and its nonmember employees, and therefore plaintiff's suit does not interfere with any conduct the LMRDA is designed to actually protect. The fundamental question in all cases of wrongful discharge is, What is the reason for the discharge? We do not presume in such cases that the finder of fact is incapable of answering that question. We should not presume so here. If the discharge is for a federally protected policy-based reason, then the matter may be disposed of on demurrer or summary judgment. If, as here, it is undisputed that the reason for the discharge was not based on union policies or any other interest related to union democracy, there is no basis for a finding of federal preemption.