Opinion ID: 2331766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Express Advocacy

Text: ¶ 20 When interpreting a constitutional amendment adopted by citizen's initiative, we give effect to the electorate's intent in enacting the amendment. Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 654 (Colo.2004). To determine what the voters intended, we give words their ordinary and popular meaning. Id. If the language of an amendment is clear and unambiguous, then it must be enforced as written. In re Interrogatories Relating to the Great Outdoors Colorado Trust Fund, 913 P.2d 533, 538 (Colo.1996). If, however, the language of an amendment is susceptible to multiple interpretations, then we construe the amendment in light of the objective sought to be achieved and the mischief to be avoided by the amendment. Zaner v. City of Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 283 (Colo.1996). The electorate, as well as the legislature, must be presumed to know the existing law at the time [it] amend[s] or clarif[ies] that law. Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748, 754 (Colo.2000). Hence, to resolve this case, we determine if there was a settled definition of express advocacy when the voter initiative was adopted by the citizens of Colorado in 2002. ¶ 21 Within the field of campaign finance law, express advocacy was first defined in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659. There, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which, among other things, limited the amount spent on independent communications made  relative to a clearly identifiable candidate. Id. at 7, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). After first determining that contribution limits implicate a fundamental First Amendment rightpolitical speechthe Court proceeded to hold that the limit on independent expenditures was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech. Id. at 14, 41, 96 S.Ct. 612. The court reasoned that even if relative to was interpreted to cover only speech that could be reasonably understood as advocating for or against a candidate, the regulation was still constitutionally infirm because the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Id. at 42, 96 S.Ct. 612. In other words, because there is often significant overlap between candidates and the issues that they champion or oppose, the Court was concerned that independent speech related to issues could be interpreted by some to implicate a candidate and thus trigger the contribution limitation. See id. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 612. This would be unconstitutional because if speech is primarily about an issue and not a candidate, the governmental interest in preventing corruption dissolves and can no longer be used to justify the restriction on political speech. Id. at 47-51, 96 S.Ct. 612. ¶ 22 Accordingly, the Buckley Court held that the limitation on independent expenditures could only be upheld as constitutional if it were defined in the narrowest terms. Id. at 44, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court held that the limitation must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office. Id. In a now famous footnote, the Court elaborated that [t]his construction would restrict the application of [the limitation] to communications containing express words of advocacy or defeat, such as `vote for,' `elect,' `support,' `cast your ballot for,' `Smith for Congress,' `vote against,' `defeat,' `reject.' [6] Id. at 44 n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612. By interpreting the independent expenditure limitation as narrowly as possible and limiting its application to only those words that explicitly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, the Buckley Court was thus able to uphold the statute as constitutional. Id. at 44-45, 96 S.Ct. 612. As a result, the use or omission of the magic words has come to serve as a bright line rule separating express advocacy, which can be regulated, from issue advocacy, which cannot be regulated. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). ¶ 23 In the aftermath of Buckley, every court that has confronted this issue has interpreted footnote 52 to cover not only the magic words, but also other synonymous words or phrases that clearly advocate for or against the election of a candidate. See Glenn J. Moramarco, Magic Words and the Myth of Certainty, 1 Election L.J. 387, 393 n. 37 (2002) (collecting cases). Generally, these courts have reasoned that the inclusion of such as before the list of magic words in footnote 52 indicates that the list was nonexhaustive and thus that the Court was merely attempting to provide guidance to lower courts in the future. Id. at 393. ¶ 24 Less than two years before the adoption of article XXVIII, this interpretation of footnote 52 was adopted in Colorado by a panel of the court of appeals in League of Women Voters v. Davidson, 23 P.3d 1266. There, on facts similar to this case, a non-profit corporation was alleged to have violated Colorado's Fair Campaign Finance Act (FCFA), [7] § 1-45-101 to -118, C.R.S. (2001), which placed registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements on political committees, including organizations that engaged in independent expenditures for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. §§ 1-45-103(7), -103(10)(a), C.R.S. (2001). The plaintiffs alleged that the non-profit violated the FCFA through the production and distribution of eight ads, each containing the picture and issue positions of a candidate or several candidates. League of Women Voters, 23 P.3d at 1268-69. Although the plaintiffs conceded that none of the ads contained any of the magic words listed in Buckley, they argued that subsection 103(7) went beyond the narrow scope of Buckley to also cover speech that could only be interpreted to unambiguouslybut not necessarily explicitlyadvocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 1276. ¶ 25 The League of Women Voters court rejected this approach on the grounds that it was too vague and too overbroad to survive the constitutional framework set forth in Buckley. Id. ([A] narrow or strict interpretation of Buckley is appealing ... [because] it affords the greatest First Amendment protection....). Rather than apply a strict magic words test, however, the court interpreted Buckley 's use of the phrase such as to preface the list of magic words in footnote 52 to mean that the listed words and phrases constitute an exemplary, not exclusive, list. Id. at 1277. Accordingly, the court interpreted Buckley to permit the regulation of speech that used either the magic words or substantially similar or synonymous words. Id. The court held that this definition of express advocacy was constitutional under Buckley because [u]nlike the broad context-based approach, this approach remains focused on actual words, not images, symbols, or other contextual factors. Id. Although the court acknowledged that this test could easily be circumnavigated by speech that implies rather than explicitly advocates for the election or defeat of a candidate, it nonetheless recognized that this careful parsing is required to protect the most cherished form of free speech, political speech. Id. at 1276-77. The court of appeals opinion in League of Women Voters was not appealed. ¶ 26 Accordingly, following League of Women Voters, Colorado law was clear that express advocacy was limited to speech that contained either Buckley 's magic words or substantially similar synonyms, which explicitly exhort the viewer or reader to vote for or against a candidate in an upcoming election. Less than twenty months later, with no intervening alterations to Colorado campaign finance law, the voters passed Amendment 27, which explicitly defined expenditure as a payment made for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(8)(a) (emphasis added). Because we presume that the electorate was aware of the legal significance of the term expressly advocated when article XXVIII was adopted by voter initiative in 2002, we hold that the voters intended to define political committees as those organizations that engage in communications that utilize either the magic words or substantially similar synonyms. ¶ 27 Nevertheless, Ethics Watch argues that under the plain meanings of the words express and advocacy, the definition of expenditure in section 2(8) of article XXVIII was clearly intended to cover all ads that unmistakably communicate support or opposition to a candidate. See Black's Law Dictionary 661 (9th ed. 2009) (defining express as [c]learly and unmistakably communicated); id. at 64 (defining advocacy as [t]he act of pleading for or actively supporting a cause). This interpretation of article XXVIII, however, would require us to ignore the settled definition of express advocacy that existed at the time that Amendment 27 was adopted by the voters. ¶ 28 Under Common Sense Alliance, we presume that the electorate knew the existing law when it adopted a definition of expenditure that was limited to those ads that expressly advocat[e] the election or defeat of a candidate. 995 P.2d at 754; see also City & County of Denver v. Rinker, 148 Colo. 441, 446, 366 P.2d 548, 550 (1961) ([T]here is a presumption that all laws are passed with knowledge of those already existing....). As explained above, in Colorado in 2002, express advocacy was a term of art used to define a discrete category of political speech. Accordingly, we presume that the voters chose this phrase intentionally in defining expenditures in an effort to balance the public concerns related to the impact of independent financing in elections and the constitutional concerns outlined in Buckley, which prohibit limitations on speech that are vague or overinclusive. While Ethics Watch argues that this is an overly technical reading of article XXVIII, it appears to us from decades of campaign finance jurisprudence that express advocacy represents a technical term with a technical definition that was correctly recognized and applied in League of Women Voters. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 96 S.Ct. 612; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249-51, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (holding that a publication that listed pro-life candidates and urged readers to vote for pro-life candidates constituted express advocacy because the publication was an explicit directive); Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th Cir.2000) (explaining that express words of advocacy [are] not simply a helpful way to identify `express advocacy' ... the inclusion of such words [is] constitutionally required for campaign finance regulations to be valid under the First Amendment). ¶ 29 This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the voters as evinced by the explanation of Amendment 27 in the 2002 Bluebook. Colo. Legislative Council, Research Pub. No. 502-7, 2002 Ballot Information Booklet: Analysis of Statewide Ballot Issues 4-5 (2002) [hereinafter Bluebook 2002]; see In re Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, 979 P.2d 549, 554 (Colo.1999) ([A] court may ascertain the intent of the voters by considering other relevant matters such as ... the biennial `Bluebook,' which is the analysis of ballot proposals prepared by the legislature.). The Bluebook distinguished between expenditures and electioneering communications by defining expenditures as the types of political advertisements that  specifically urge the election or defeat of a candidate. Bluebook 2002 at 4 (emphasis original). In contrast, the Bluebook described electioneering communications as the type of political advertisement ... that clearly refers to a candidate without specifically urging the election or defeat of the candidate. Id. at 5 (emphasis original). Thus, the Bluebook distinguished between electioneering communications, which merely refer to a candidate without advocating for his or her election or defeat, and expenditures, which actively instruct the viewer or reader to take action for or against a candidate. ¶ 30 Ethics Watch argues in the alternative that, even if express advocacy had a settled technical definition in Colorado at the time that Amendment 27 was adopted, subsequent jurisprudence from the U.S. Supreme Court requires a more expansive interpretation under the First Amendment. Ethics Watch contends that both McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, overruled in part by Citizens United, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, and FEC v. WRTL, 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, mandate that if express advocacy is to provide a workable standard, it must be interpreted to include advertisements that are the functional equivalent of express advocacy, which includes ads that are susceptible to no other reasonable interpretation than as an appeal to vote for or against a candidate. ¶ 31 We disagree with Ethics Watch's reading of these cases and decline to adopt a functional equivalence test for express advocacy,' which we believe could potentially violate the vagueness and overbreadth concerns at the heart of Buckley. While it is true that these recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have approved of something akin to a functional equivalence test, both of these decisions can be distinguished because they involved electioneering communications, which are statutorily defined to apply in more limited circumstances than the express advocacy at issue in the present case. ¶ 32 In McConnell, the Court rejected a facial challenge to the recently enacted Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's (BCRA) application to electioneering communications. 540 U.S. at 196-97, 124 S.Ct. 619. The BCRA placed significant disclosure requirements on groups or persons who fund electioneering communications, which the Act defined as any advertisement that: (1) is broadcast on radio or television; (2) clearly identifies a candidate for federal office; (3) airs within either thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election; and (4) targets an identified audience of at least 50,000 listeners or viewers. Id. at 194, 124 S.Ct. 619. Although the Court recognized that this definition applied to both express advocacy and the functional equivalent of express advocacy (that is, something beyond the magic words), it reasoned that because the definition of electioneering communication was easily understood and objectively determinable, it could survive the vagueness concerns that drove [its] analysis in Buckley.  Id. at 192-94, 196-97, 124 S.Ct. 619. Importantly, however, the Court recognized that speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy is different from express advocacy, which is narrowly defined as speech containing the magic words. Id. at 191-92, 124 S.Ct. 619. ¶ 33 In WRTL, the Court again interpreted the BCRA's limitations on electioneering communications, but in this instance held that the regulation was unconstitutional as applied to three particular advertisements. 551 U.S. at 481, 127 S.Ct. 2652. There, the Court overturned the regulation of advertisements opposing Senator Feingold's efforts to filibuster the president's judicial appointments as electioneering communications. Id. at 458-60, 127 S.Ct. 2652. Although the ads clearly identified Senator Feingold and were broadcast within the electioneering window to a target audience of more than 50,000 voters, the Court held that the regulation of the ads as electioneering communications was unconstitutional as applied because the ads could reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against Senator Feingold. Id. The Court held that when applied to an ad that could reasonably be interpreted as pure issue advocacy, the regulation served to unconstitutionally chill protected political speech. Id. at 469, 127 S.Ct. 2652. ¶ 34 Notably, the WRTL Court instructed that in determining whether speech could reasonably be construed as not advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate, courts must look at the words used in the ad and not the intention behind them: [A]n intent-based test would chill core political speech. Id. at 468-70, 127 S.Ct. 2652. The Court feared that such a test would open[] the door to a trial on every ad ... on the theory that the speaker actually intended to affect an election. Id. at 468, 127 S.Ct. 2652. The Court reasoned that the threat of such burdensome litigation would serve as a deterrent and chill protected political speech. Id. at 468-70, 127 S.Ct. 2652. Accordingly, the Court narrowed the field of speech that fell under the BCRA's regulation of electioneering communications to only those ads that are susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Id. at 470, 127 S.Ct. 2652. ¶ 35 Unlike the definition of electioneering communication at issue in McConnell and WRTL, the definition of expenditure in article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution does not expand beyond speech that falls under the definition of express advocacy. Although both McConnell and WRTL allow for some regulation of speech that is more than just express advocacy, the Supreme Court was clear in each instance that these limitations were tolerable because of the objective and bright-line criteria used to define electioneering communications under the BCRA. See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474 n. 7, 127 S.Ct. 2652. In other words, the Supreme Court was willing to tolerate the broader scope of speech that fit under the definition of electioneering communication precisely because of that regulation's more narrow application. ¶ 36 In contrast to electioneering communications, which are narrowly defined by the timing, medium, and reach of such ads, our constitutional limitations on political committees that make expenditures apply regardless of the timing or format of any ads that cost more than $200. [8] Thus, if we were to expand our definition of expenditure in article XXVIII beyond a literal interpretation of express advocacy to also cover speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy, our law might violate the vagueness and overbreadth concerns from Buckley that are the bedrock of all campaign finance and political speech jurisprudence. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.). ¶ 37 Given the well-settled definition of express advocacy from League of Women Voters at the time Amendment 27 was adopted, we decline to make a leap that could potentially render article XXVIII unconstitutional under the federal constitution. Accord Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 527 (Colo.2009) (explaining that when we review a statute, we presume that the legislature intended the statute to be constitutional); see also Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215, 229 (Colo.1994) (explaining that a citizen's initiative should not be interpreted so as to arrive at an absurd or unreasonable result). A functional equivalence test might be found to create an unwieldy standard that would be difficult to apply and, as a result, potentially serve to unconstitutionally chill protected political speech. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 468-69, 127 S.Ct. 2652. Therefore, we decline to adopt the expansive interpretation put forth by Ethics Watch.