Opinion ID: 2460973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendants' Offers Were Reasonable.

Text: ¶ 19 Hubbard also argues on appeal that the offers of judgment made by the Defendants, were unreasonably low and, therefore, sham offers. In the present case the offer made by the Defendants was to pay $275.00 per each of seven causes of action. ¶ 20 The purpose of § 1101.1 is to encourage a plaintiff to accept a defendant's offer to confess judgment and to encourage a defendant to offer an early confession of judgment [to] avoid further increases in costs which may be incurred [for] trial preparation. See, Boston Ave. Mgmt., Inc. v. Associated Res., Inc., supra, ¶ 13,: Dulan v. Johnston, 1984 OK 44, ¶ 10, 687 P.2d 1045, 1049. Although the legislature did not specifically require a reasonable standard for the offer, it would not have intended unreasonable acts in the use and implementation of its legislation. The provisions of 12 O.S. Supp.2002, § 1101.1(B)(3) provide in pertinent part: . . . the defendant shall be entitled to reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees . . . Further, 12 O.S. Supp.2002, § 1101.1(B)(4) provides: . . . the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover the reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees . . . The very concept of a reasonable award was the stated purpose of the legislative enactment. See, Sullins v. American Medical Response of Oklahoma, Inc., 2001 OK 20, ¶ 17, 23 P.3d 259, 263: City of Chandler v. State ex rel. Dept. Of Human Services, 1992 OK 137, ¶ 10, 839 P.2d 1352, 1354. Also see, Fuller v. Pacheco, 2001 OK CIV APP 39, 21 P.3d 74, where the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals recognized the reasonableness requirement of an award of attorney fees under § 1101.1. ¶ 21 In this case, applying a reasonable test to these facts, we would consider the facts demonstrated in the record. (1) Defendant had prevailed on summary judgment in a similar case raising identical issues on the same group of wells, CJ-2000-04355 (Tulsa County); (2) Defendants had prevailed before the Oklahoma Tax Commission on similar legal issues on the same group of wells [OTC No. P-94-154]; (3) Defendant had settled a statewide class action, which allegedly bound Hubbard as a class member, covering the issues raised in the present case ( Kouns v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., CJ-98-45, Dewey County); and (4) the Defendants offer of $275.00 per cause of action. ¶ 22 As we have said in this opinion, the purpose of § 1101.1(B) is to encourage settlement by creating the possibility of fee-shifting. The purpose is not to create a trial tactic. It is intended as a realistic method of seeking a resolution of the parties' controversy. It is not the intent of § 1101.1(B) to allow a defendant to make an unreasonable offer of judgment and to, therefore, recover its reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees merely because it prevailed. Such a result would be absurd because it would not further the purpose of § 1101.1(B) which is to encourage settlement. [10] What is reasonable is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact and an unreasonable offer of judgment negates awarding litigation costs and attorney fees provided in § 1101.1(B). ¶ 23 We find the offer in the present case to have been reasonable.