Opinion ID: 2634494
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Madame Chen's Due Process Rights

Text: ¶65 Defendants argue that Madame Chen's right to due process was violated because she was not joined as a party by service of process prior to the commencement of the preliminary injunction proceedings. Moreover, they assert that 50% of the evidence on the preliminary injunction question was received by the court prior to her joining as a party, and that she therefore had no opportunity to object to the evidence and present an opening argument. ¶66 In support of this position, defendants quote Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,: In the absence of service of process . . . a court may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant. 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). However, the complete quotation of this passage includes a parenthetical clause referring to a defendant's ability to waive the right to notice. Id. (In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as defendant[,]) (emphasis added). We find the defendants' failure to quote the passage fully particularly interesting given that the omitted parenthetical describes precisely what Madame Chen did. ¶67 Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. In interpreting this provision, we have previously recognized that 'due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.' Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ¶ 49, 13 P3d 581 (quoting Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 6 L. Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). Instead, due process is flexible and, being based on the concept of fairness, should afford the procedural protections that the given situation demands. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus, [t]he requirements of due process depend upon the specific context in which they are applied. V-1 Oil Co. v. Dep't of Envtl Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997). ¶68 Although the exact requirements of due process may vary from situation to situation, the minimum requirements of due process include adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. See Dairy Prod. Serv., 2000 UT 81 at ¶ 49. To be considered a meaningful hearing, the concerns of the affected parties should be heard by an impartial decision maker. Id. Inasmuch as this question of law requires the application of the facts to the due process standard, we use a clearly erroneous standard for the necessary factual determinations. See State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 22, 48 P.3d 953. ¶69 In the present case, the minimum requirements of due process were satisfied. Madame Chen had notice and the opportunity to fairly state her case. ¶70 Hearings regarding the contempt motions filed against Madame Chen and Ms. Stewart began on October 25, 2001. On November 27, 2001, the contempt hearings were consolidated with the preliminary injunction hearings. On December 12, after hearings on November 27 and 28 and December 10 and 11, Madame Chen's counsel voluntarily entered a notice of appearance on behalf of . . . Hwan Lan Chen, also known as Madame Chen, and the corporation Apogee Incorporated. By entering such an appearance, Madame Chen effectively waived her right to be served. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (Submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place of service upon the person.) cited in Mallory Eng'g., Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc., 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 n.7 (Utah 1980); see also Allen v. Coates, 11 N.W. 132, 132 (Minn. 1882) (defect in service can be waived by general appearance if appearance was not induced by fraud or mistake of fact). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court satisfied the first basic requirement of due process: having entered an appearance by way of counsel, it is clear that Madame Chen had adequate notice of the proceedings. ¶71 We also conclude that although she was not present for four of the consolidated preliminary injunction/contempt hearings, Madame Chen nevertheless had an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Madame Chen was present as a party for eighteen of the twenty-two consolidated hearings. These eighteen hearings extended from December 12, 2001, to June 26, 2002. During these six months, Madame Chen never objected to the trial court's reliance on the evidence entered at the early hearing dates she had missed. Furthermore, nowhere does she describe how she was prejudiced or suffered any disadvantage by not being formally represented by counsel in these early hearings. This is particularly significant given that she was an active participant in the preliminary injunction hearing for nearly six months and had every opportunity to present evidence, call new witnesses, recall former witnesses for cross-examination, or to notify the trial judge of any technical or evidentiary objections to the trial testimony. ¶72 In rejecting her due process claims, the trial court also found that Madame Chen had actual notice of the proceedings. Madame Chen lived with Ms. Stewart, who had been involved in the litigation from the beginning, and Madame Chen also had been involved from the outset of the litigation as a coconspirator with Ms. Stewart. In light of her voluntary waiver of the right to service, the adequate time she had to present her case and challenge, if she desired, the evidence entered in her absence, and her actual notice of the proceedings, we affirm the lower court in rejecting her due process claims. Madame Chen had adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker.