Opinion ID: 2525436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: testimony via closed-circuit television

Text: ¶ 56 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing J.W. and C.W. to testify via closed-circuit television because there was no showing that the children would suffer emotional strain so serious as to justify impinging on her right to face-to-face confrontation. Rule 15.5(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a child under the age of fourteen to testify via closed-circuit television, outside of the defendant's presence, only if the court determines that the child will suffer serious emotional or mental strain if he is required to testify in the defendant's presence, or that the child's testimony will be inherently unreliable if he is required to testify in the defendant's presence. Utah R.Crim. P. 15.5(2). [11] ¶ 57 The United States Supreme Court has held that trial procedures other than face-to-face confrontation are permissible if [the] procedure [is] necessary to further an important public policy. The protection of child witnesses is . . . just that policy. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1025, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). In a later case involving a similar state statute, the Supreme Court held the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). ¶ 58 The Supreme Court also held, however, that there must be a showing of necessity for the alternate procedure in each case, supported by the following three findings: (1) that the procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness; (2) that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant; and (3) that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify. Id. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). ¶ 59 In this case, the trial court appointed psychologist Kevin Gully to evaluate whether the requirements of rule 15.5(2) were met. After extensive interviews, testing, and observation, Dr. Gully submitted a written report stating his conclusions and also testified at a pre-trial hearing on the issue. Based on that evidence, the trial court found that the children would suffer emotional or mental strain and that their testimony would likely be unreliable if forced to testify in the presence of defendant and Travis. Defendant's claim on appeal is that evidence of J.W. and C.W.'s distress did not meet the third Craig factor that the child's emotional distress be more than de minimis. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. 3157. Therefore, the critical inquiry in this case is whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by sufficient evidence. ¶ 60 A trial court's factual findings will not be reversed absent clear error. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ¶ 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108; State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-61 (Utah 1994). To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the defendant must first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. After marshaling the supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at ¶ 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108 (citations omitted). ¶ 61 In this case, defendant has failed to meet her marshaling burden. In her brief, defendant does not set forth evidence in support of the trial court's findings; rather, defendant merely cites to portions of the testimony that favor her position. Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence and demonstrate that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous in light of the evidence allows us to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone. See id. Furthermore, the evidence relied on by the State demonstrates that the trial court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence and thus were not clearly erroneous. ¶ 62 In this case, Dr. Gully testified that both children would be less apt to experience serious emotional distress, be more likely to think clearly and be more responsive to questions if they testify out of the presence of their mother and [Travis]. The testimony indicated that J.W. experienced serious emotional distress to the point she would not be responsive in the presence of defendant and Travis. Dr. Gully expressed his belief that it would take very little . . . to push [J.W.] across that threshold where she may become mute. Furthermore, Dr. Gully opined that C.W. would likely be non-responsive, make only general allegations, and not provide details in the presence of defendant. ¶ 63 Based on the evidence in support of its findings, the trial court did not commit error in finding that J.W. and C.W. would suffer more than de minimis emotional strain. Therefore, the trial court's finding that the State established a necessity for the closed-circuit television procedure was reasonable.