Opinion ID: 1792153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Text: Parker alleges that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. In his amended postconviction motion, Parker set forth a number of claims which he contends require an evidentiary hearing: (1) trial counsel failed to present expert testimony (a) to show that the color of the photographs showing the fatal bullet was subject to manipulation and did not reflect the true color of the bullet and (b) to refute the claim that the bullet that killed the victim was fired from Parker's gun; (2) trial counsel failed to present evidence that there were bullets fired from Parker's gun that were not accounted for and that this evidence would have supported Parker's defense that the police recovered one of these unaccounted-for bullets and switched it with the silver bullet that the medical examiner removed from the victim; [4] (3) trial counsel failed to effectively impeach the witness, Duncan, as there were inconsistencies between her testimony at trial and her prior sworn statement regarding the presence of Deputy McNesby at the time the fatal bullet was fired; and (4) trial counsel failed to competently investigate and present significant mitigation evidence of Parker's abusive childhood and serious mental illness. The trial court refused to grant an evidentiary hearing and summarily denied these claims. Parker contends the court erred in summarily denying these claims because he has made facially sufficient allegations that are not conclusively rebutted by the record which demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Parker argues, we should reverse the court's order and remand for an evidentiary hearing. We agree in part and remand for an evidentiary hearing on counsel's failure to present expert testimony pertaining to the fatal bullet and on counsel's failure to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence concerning Parker's abusive childhood and his alleged mental illness. As a general proposition, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any well-pled allegations in a motion for postconviction relief unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient. See Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla.1996); Anderson v. State, 627 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 1993); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850. The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to meet this burden. See Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912 (Fla.1989). However, in cases where there has been no evidentiary hearing, the court must accept the factual allegations made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. See Peede v. State, 748 So.2d 253 (Fla.1999); Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331 (Fla.1997). We must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record. It is apparent from the record that Parker's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to present expert testimony concerning the fatal bullet and counsel's failure to fully investigate and present mitigation evidence merit an evidentiary hearing. When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish the two prongs outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Parker asserts that trial counsel should have presented expert testimony in photography and tool-marking to demonstrate that the color of the photographs depicting the bullet lodged in the victim's lower spine was subject to manipulation and did not necessarily reflect the true color of the bullet shown in the photographs. Parker alleges that it could not be established with any certainty that the bullet that killed the victim was the same bullet that was fired from Parker's gun. Parker's claim stems from the fact that the medical examiner, Dr. Michael Bell, wrote in his autopsy report that the bullet extracted from the victim was a large caliber silver-colored bullet recovered with very little deformation. Dr. Bell later testified that the prosecutor had called him on the telephone after the autopsy and asked him to both project the picture of the bullet and analyze that projection. After doing so, Dr. Bell realized that he had made a mistake in his autopsy report and that the bullet was, in fact, gold-colored with a cut. The medical examiner changed his testimony during his second deposition, approximately two weeks before trial; yet defense counsel did not get an expert to examine this important piece of evidence. The medical examiner's first analysis was favorable to Parker but became unfavorable when the medical examiner changed his testimony. This fact is significant because the bullets issued to the police officers by the Broward County Sheriff's Office are silver-colored, while the bullets in Parker's gun were copper-colored. Furthermore, this contradiction bolsters Parker's claim that he was at least twenty feet from the victim at the time the witness, Duncan, heard the fatal shot, and thus he could not have been the shooter. As Dr. Bell testified, the gun that fired the fatal bullet was no more than two feet away from the victim when the fatal shot was fired. Parker also asserts that defense counsel should have fully investigated and presented additional substantial mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Though the record shows counsel did investigate and present mitigating evidence of Parker's childhood and intellectual capacity, [5] Parker asserts that he can present new facts and details at an evidentiary hearing which counsel failed to present at his trial. The additional mitigation would include the facts that: (1) Parker suffers from mental illness and possible organic brain damage; (2) Parker was diagnosed as borderline retarded at age fourteen and has a mental age of seven years which would likely regress under pressure; (3) test results indicated that Parker has weaknesses in his logical and abstract thinking ability along with difficulty in interpreting social situations; (4) Parker suffered from head injuries and physical trauma as a child; (5) Parker received little or no mental health assistance as a child due to his mother's own schizophrenic condition; (6) Parker suffered from severe mental distress as a direct result of his being in and out of foster homes throughout his childhood because of his mother's schizophrenia; (7) Parker's mother treated him with detachment and hostility and inflicted physical abuse, including beating him with an electric cord and pouring hot water on him; (8) Parker's mother was unduly critical or, in the alternative, absolutely doting; (9) Parker was gang raped at nine years old and, on other occasions, molested by a man living in his neighborhood; (10) Parker was raped by an older man when he was fourteen years old; (11) Parker was forced to have sexual contact with animals; (12) Parker was the victim of a two-year sexual relationship with his own legal guardian when he was sixteen years old; and (13) Parker was routinely forced to submit to sexual activity with men in return for shelter when he was homeless. In comparing the mitigation evidence presented at trial with the mitigation evidence that Parker indicates he can now present, it appears that there is significant information that was never presented to the trial court which expounds upon both the abuse Parker suffered as a child and Parker's mental infirmities. He is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to present this evidence. Parker also alleges that trial counsel failed to discover and present available evidence that there were bullets fired from Parker's gun that were never accounted for by police investigators. Parker contends that this evidence would have supported his defense that the police secretly recovered one of these unaccounted-for bullets and switched it with the silver bullet that the medical examiner removed from the victim. Parker asserts that his gun had the capacity to hold thirty-three bullets, and since only twelve spent cartridges were recovered at the scene and his gun had only twenty unspent cartridges remaining, then either the police planted one of the twelve spent cartridges on the victim's body in order to frame him, or the police found a thirteenth spent cartridge and planted this cartridge on the victim's body. Parker provides no factual support for these allegations but simply asserts that either one of these theories might be true. As we stated in Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912 (Fla.1989): A defendant may not simply file a motion for postconviction relief containing conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel was ineffective and then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing. The defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant. Id. at 913. Parker's claim is conclusory, and Parker has not cited to specific facts to support his theory. Thus, Parker has not shown that counsel was ineffective, and he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Parker also alleges that trial counsel failed to effectively impeach the witness Tammy Duncan, as there were inconsistencies between her testimony at trial and her prior sworn statement regarding the presence of Deputy McNesby at the time the fatal bullet was fired. However, the record refutes Parker's claim. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Duncan, eliciting from Duncan the contradiction between her prior sworn statement that Deputy McNesby was in close proximity to the victim when the shot was fired and her testimony at trial that Deputy McNesby was sixty to seventy feet away from the victim at the time the shot was fired. Furthermore, defense counsel elicited from Duncan the fact that she could not identify who had shot the victim. Therefore, based upon the record, Parker's contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to properly cross-examine Duncan has no merit. Because Parker's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's failure to present expert testimony on photography and toolmarking and failure to present significant mitigation evidence at the penalty phase are not refuted by the record, we must accept the factual allegations made by Parker and remand for an evidentiary hearing on these matters. See Peede v. State, 748 So.2d 253 (Fla.1999); Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331 (Fla.1997).