Opinion ID: 853048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gunn's Views on the Death Penalty

Text: The State contends that the post-conviction court erroneously found that Gunn would automatically vote for death for an intentional murder and thus was neither competent nor qualified to serve on this capital jury. Appellant's App. at 810. The State argues that there is no evidence that Gunn was an automatic death penalty juror. [2] In her pre-trial questionnaires, Gunn disclosed that if she believed that a person was guilty of the intentional murder of another person, she would automatically vote for the death penalty. Petitioner's Exhibit 11(A) (emphasis in original). In response to another question, however, she indicated her belief that the death penalty should not be mandatory for any particular type of crime. Id. Thereafter, during voir dire, the trial judge asked whether any of the prospective jurors believed that everyone who commits murder should get the death penalty. Trial Record at 863-64. Several jurors indicated that they did, but Gunn was not among them. Id. at 864-65. Gunn was not questioned during voir dire regarding her views of the death penalty. At the post-conviction hearing, Gunn testified that she believed her brother, after being convicted of killing two women in California, deserved the death penalty because, I believe if you kill somebody, you should get the death penalty. P.C.R. Tr. at 18. Had Gunn's opinion been disclosed during voir dire, the defense would have been entitled to remove her for cause. The requirement of jury impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a capital defendant to challenge for cause any prospective juror who would vote to impose death automatically upon a finding of guilt. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229-30, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 501-02 (1992). If even one [partial] juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence. Id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2230, 119 L.Ed.2d at 503. The post-conviction court found that a challenge to the juror in the present case would have been sustained. We are troubled, however, by the fact that the defendant's trial counsel failed to question Gunn on voir dire notwithstanding her pre-trial questionnaire answer that she would automatically vote for the death penalty for a defendant found guilty of an intentional murder. Such inquiry would likely have elicited Gunn's death penalty predisposition and permitted her timely excusal. Among the defendant's post-conviction claims, he asserted ineffective assistance of trial counsel in part for failing to adequately question and challenge juror Gunn for cause. The post-conviction court did not address this claim, finding that [w]hile it is clear that the court would have sustained a challenge for cause of this juror, the misconduct of the juror supercedes any alleged deficient performance by trial counsel. Appellant's App. at 836. To the extent that defense counsel failed to assert a challenge for cause, under the circumstances presented, this omission constituted substandard performance with resulting prejudice. We conclude that, regardless whether analyzed as juror misconduct or as ineffective assistance of counsel, the result is the same.