Opinion ID: 1241163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grandparents Right to Appeal the Adoptive Placement of Their Grandchildren

Text: The grandparents contend that the superior court erred in dismissing their appeal from the DHSS's decision to place their grandchildren for adoption with persons unknown to them. The superior court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that [a]ppeal is taken and jurisdiction exists, if at all, under AS 47.10.230(e), [10] but that the DHSS has made an adoptive placement and AS 47.10.230(f) [11] removes the appellate jurisdiction of this court when the Department ... makes a placement for adoptive purposes. The grandparents appear to concede at this point that the placement of their grandchildren was for adoptive purposes, and, as such, AS 47.10.230(e) does not directly grant them a right to appeal the DHSS's determination to the superior court. They contend, however, that they have a right to an appeal of the DHSS's determination pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Appellate Rule 45. Section 105 of the Indian Child Welfare Act grants the extended family, including grandparents, a right to preference in the adoptive placement of Indian and Native Alaskan Children. [12] The Ahngasuks contend that they have been deprived of their statutory right by the DHSS's decision to place their grandchildren in a home unknown to them, and that the superior court is the proper forum in which to seek review of the decision and assert their right to preference. Although jurisdiction exists in the superior court to adjudicate rights under the Act, [13] the operative provisions are expressly made inapplicable to any proceeding which was initiated or completed prior to May 8, 1979, the effective date of the Act. [14] Here the process of choosing an adoptive placement for V.A. and C.A. was initiated upon order of the superior court on April 11, 1979, prior to the Act's effective date. The Act is applicable, however, to any subsequent proceedings in the same matter or subsequent proceedings affecting the custody or placement of the same child. 25 U.S.C. § 1923 (Supp. 1978). The grandparents argue that the physical placement of the children on May 17, 1979, was a subsequent proceeding in the same matter to which the Act applies. We do not agree. The legislative history of the Act indicates that the applicability provision was intended to provide for an orderly phasing in of the effect of the Act by making its provisions inapplicable to proceedings already initiated as of the effective date, but that Congress intended that the provisions would apply to any subsequent discrete phase of the same matter or with respect to the same child initiated after enactment. [15] (emphasis added). In this case, the actual placement of the children was merely the completion of the entire administrative process of locating and selecting an adoptive placement which was initiated upon the termination of E.A.'s parental rights on April 11, 1979, and cannot be considered a subsequent proceeding or a discrete phase of the same matter. Since the adoptive placement of C.A. and V.A. was initiated by the DHSS prior to the effective date of May 9, 1979, the Act was not applicable and does not provide a basis for appeal in the superior court. The Act will be applicable, however, to any future adoptive proceedings in this case. Under Alaska statutory law a hearing must be held in the superior court prior to entering a final decree of adoption. [16] Where this proceeding is initiated after an adoptive placement has already been made by the DHSS, we think it constitutes the type of subsequent proceeding in the same matter to which the Act was intended to apply. In order that the grandparents may effectively assert their statutory right to preference at such proceedings, we further hold that they have a due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at any adoptive proceedings which may be conducted in the future. Since the grandparents will have an opportunity to challenge the DHSS's placement of their grandchildren at future proceedings, we need not address their remaining contention that they have been deprived of a due process and Rule 45 right to review of the DHSS's determination. Thus, we affirm the superior court's dismissal of the grandparents' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the case of E.A., however, we remand to the superior court for a redetermination in accordance with section I of this opinion of whether her parental rights should be terminated. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BOOCHEVER, J., not participating.