Opinion ID: 1742617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Right to Present Defense.

Text: During one of the bench conferences, defense counsel advised the trial court that he had been unable to serve a subpoena on Jawan Ghoulson, who had testified at the May 2002 trial that Crumble told him that [Appellant] didn't do it, and defense counsel asked permission to read to the jury a transcript of Ghoulson's previous testimony. Instead, the trial court directed defense counsel to give the subpoena to the sheriff and directed the sheriff to attempt to serve it on Ghoulson before the conclusion of the trial. Later in the day, the sheriff advised the court that he had been unable to locate Ghoulson. The trial court found Ghoulson to be unavailable as a witness, as defined in KRE 804(a)(5), and indicated that defense counsel could read his prior testimony. The prosecutor then objected on grounds that the transcript was improperly authenticated, because the certificate of the notary public who had transcribed the testimony from the official videotape read: I, Kimberly Boyd, Notary Public in and for the State of Kentucky at Large, do hereby certify that the foregoing jury trial testimony in Commonwealth v. Dickerson has been transcribed by me to the best of my ability this the 8th day of August, 2002. The trial court reconsidered its ruling and sustained the objection, apparently because CR 30.06(1) requires that the officer taking a deposition shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn by him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness. Defense counsel introduced the transcript by way of avowal. KRE 103(a)(2). For some reason, defense counsel did not request to play the official videotape of Ghoulson's prior testimony to the jury. Regardless, the March 2003 jury never heard Ghoulson's May 2002 testimony that Crumble told him that [Appellant] didn't do it. Civil Rule 30.06(1) applies to a person who places the witness under oath and creates a record of the witness's oral testimony as it is given. That is how a transcript of prior testimony would have been produced prior to our adoption of video recording as the official record. There was no court reporter present at the May 2002 trial who could have prepared an official transcript of that trial. The transcript offered by Appellant did not purport to be official or even a public record. Thus, the applicable rule with respect to the authentication of that transcript is KRE 901(a), i.e., that authentication or identification is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. The answer to this issue is succinctly stated in Bruce v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 435 (Ky.1969): Appellant also contends that the testimony read was not duly authenticated, as required by RCr 7.22. We think this objection is without merit since no contention is made that the testimony read was not the testimony actually given by this witness at the former trial .... Id. at 437-38. Likewise, the prosecutor (who participated in both trials) did not claim that the transcript was inaccurate. Ghoulson's defense testimony lasted seven minutes and the transcript consists of fewer than six typewritten pages. We have compared the transcript with the official videotape and have found that the only discrepancy occurred when the notary, in transcribing defense counsel's statement to the trial court that he intended to introduce a prior inconsistent statement of Ms. Crumble's, substituted existing for inconsistent. Otherwise, the transcript is accurate. The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. This right, often termed the right to present a defense, is firmly ingrained in Kentucky jurisprudence, and has been recognized repeatedly by the United States Supreme Court. An exclusion of evidence will almost invariably be declared unconstitutional when it significantly undermines fundamental elements of the defendant's defense. Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 206-07 (Ky.2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). It is crucial to a defendant's fundamental right to due process that he be allowed to develop and present any exculpatory evidence in his own defense, and we reject any alternative that would imperil that right. McGregor v. Hines, 995 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Ky.1999). A trial court may only infringe upon this right when the defense theory is unsupported, speculative, and far-fetched and could thereby confuse or mislead the jury. Beaty, 125 S.W.3d at 207 (internal citation and quotation omitted). Appellant's sole defense to the sodomy charge was that he did not commit the offense. Ghoulson's testimony with respect to Crumble's prior inconsistent statement was the only evidence other than Appellant's own testimony that proved his defense. If the facts are the same upon retrial, i.e., if Ghoulson is an unavailable witness as defined in KRE 804(a)(5), Appellant shall be permitted to either read the transcript of his testimony at the May 2002 trial or play the videotape of that testimony to the jury.