Opinion ID: 450644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Search of the Santa Marta

Text: 15 Border searches are unique in the law of search and seizure. The mere entry into the United States from a foreign country provides sufficient justification for a border search. Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir.1973). As the Supreme Court has observed, 16 a port of entry is not a traveler's home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is discovered during such a search. 17 United States v. Thirty Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1408, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). Consistent with the right of a sovereign to protect itself, United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1978, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977), travelers entering the country may be required to identify themselves, show their entitlement to come in, and identify their belongings as lawfully admissible. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). 18 The Constitution empowers Congress [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3; border searches thus raise different considerations and call into play rules of law distinct from other searches. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 2667, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). The primary purpose of a border search is to seize contraband property sought to be brought into the country. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 519, 17 L.Ed.2d 439 (1966). To this end Congress has given Customs agents broad authority to search upon entry into the United States vehicles and persons, as well as personal effects, where they suspect the presence of merchandise subject to duty or unlawfully imported into the United States. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 482. 1 Border searches are by their very nature reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and require neither a warrant, probable cause, nor even articulable suspicion. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977); United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1984). 19 The practical difficulty of getting to and searching every vehicle or carrier at the precise moment it crosses land or sea borders has led to recognition that border searches need not always actually occur at the physical border. United States v. Stone, 659 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir.1981). Border searches may take place at the functional equivalent of the border. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). The rules of the border search extend to crossings of ocean boundaries as well as the land boundaries with Mexico and Canada. See United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir.1975). For example, the search of an aircraft which arrived at an inland airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico has been deemed a search at the functional equivalent of the border, United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.1977); so also has been the search of a ship which was observed anchored off Mexico and which later docked at Mission Bay in San Diego. United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.1975). 20 Thus, searches occurring subsequent to a border crossing often also fall within the doctrine of the extended border search. United States v. Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616, 619-20 (9th Cir.1980). Customs agents may learn or realize the significance of suspicious circumstances only after a vehicle or person has crossed the border, Jones v. United States, 326 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.1963) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 1635, 12 L.Ed.2d 499 (1964). Of necessity, the agents may delay a search in a reasonable effort to sweep in associates of suspected smugglers. Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d at 620; Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of Body Search, 74 Colum L.Rev. 53, 70-71 n. 96 (1974). 21 Although some courts have sought to delineate differences between extended border searches and searches at the functional equivalent of the border, e.g., United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 525-26 (5th Cir.1982), the instant case illustrates the difficulty of making sharp distinctions in this area. The search of the Santa Marta occurred in Los Angeles Harbor, its first anchorage in United States waters. It is immaterial whether the situs be called the functional equivalent of the border, or the border itself. The searches occurred within a day and a half after arrival and after an initial cursory search. Under the circumstances, the place of searches was the functional equivalent of the border, and, as we view the facts, they constituted extended border searches. 22 We recognize, of course, that time and place are relevant, since the level of suspicion for extended border searches is stricter than the standard for ordinary border searches. Extended border searches occur after the actual entry has been effected and intrude more on an individual's normal expectation of privacy. Therefore, extended border searches must be justified by reasonable suspicion that the subject of the search was involved in criminal activity, rather than simply mere suspicion or no suspicion. United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422-23 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1367 (11th Cir.1982). Although we have no difficulty in relating this site with the border, we shall, because of the time factor--the lapse of thirty-six hours in conducting the searches--examine the facts under the rules of extended border search. 23 Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 519, 17 L.Ed.2d 439 (1966) set forth the general standards for searches that do not occur at the time of entry or in the immediate vicinity of the border: 24 the legality of the search must be tested by a determination whether the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the time and distance elapsed as well as the manner and extent of surveillance, are such as to convince the fact finder with reasonable certainty that any contraband which might be found in or about the vehicle at the time of the search was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry into the jurisdiction of the United States. 25 Id. at 382. Thus, we look here to determine whether the totality of facts and circumstances within the Customs officers' knowledge warranted a reasonable certainty that the contraband they sought had crossed the border; we know that the vessel did. United States v. Corral-Villavicencio, 753 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Driscoll, 632 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir.1980). Where the contraband is not discovered immediately upon entry, continuity of surveillance over the subject of the search is a factor in determining identity, and hence enters into the totality of circumstances. United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.1984). 26 Serrano-Tellez's first argument is that participation in a search by persons who are not Customs agents 2 nullified the search as a border search. This contention is unacceptable. It is sufficient that the search be executed under the authority and direction of those agencies having jurisdiction in safeguarding the borders. True, in United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.1979), we did not characterize an FBI agent's vehicle search at the border as a valid border search because the FBI agent was not specifically authorized to make a border search, and the search was conducted as part of a general law enforcement effort. Id. at 549-50. Here, in contrast, the search of the Santa Marta was part of a collaborative effort under the aegis of and in cooperation with Customs agents. 27 Customs agents have specific authority to conduct border searches under 19 U.S.C. Sec. 482. Their presence and supervision distinguish this search from merely a random law enforcement effort; rather it was a planned, coordinated execution of an official inspection and search upon entry into the country. Given such authorization, there is no reason why the limited forces of the Customs Service, Border Patrol, Immigration officers, and similarly designated officials cannot enlist the aid of other forces in forming a task force sufficient to meet their needs. We have previously upheld a cooperative search by the Customs Service and the Coast Guard. United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952, 98 S.Ct. 1581, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978). Serrano-Tellez's argument would have the Customs Service powerless to seek assistance from other law enforcement agencies in conducting border searches. Such restriction would make impossible many efforts to halt the illicit importation of contraband. 28 Nor does the initial cursory Customs inspection of the Santa Marta invalidate the later and more thorough search of the ship. We have said that searches need not necessarily occur at the instant a vehicle arrives at the border or at its functional equivalent. E.g., United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422-23 (9th Cir.1984). The fact that some search occurred at the time of the initial border crossing simply does not prevent later searches from coming under the rules of border searches. United States v. Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir.1980). Thus, in Espericueta-Reyes, two searches following an initial border search were upheld where surveillance was constant, the later searches were within an hour and a half of the border crossing and the searches were conducted at or near the border. Id. at 620. See also, United States v. Terry, 446 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946, 92 S.Ct. 301, 30 L.Ed.2d 261 (1971) (second search of an automobile about an hour after the border crossing held to be a border search); United States v. Smith, 629 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir.1980) (search of an international airplane passenger in San Francisco after a previous search of the same passenger in Los Angeles was a border search). 29 The time interval in this case was longer than in the above cited authorities. But we note that the Santa Marta is a large structure. The information communicated to the authorities was that a large quantity of contraband was aboard as part of an operation by organized but unidentified persons. We are not prepared to hold that, under the present circumstances, law enforcement agencies were required immediately to reveal their knowledge and purpose by rushing into a ship-wide search. Cf., United States v. Johns, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 881, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985) (warrantless search of packages three days after their removal from vehicles that agents had probable cause to believe contained contraband reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 30 To be quite clear, we do not view the thirty-six hour delay as dispositive. Courts have upheld border searches one hundred fifty miles from the border and one hundred forty-two hours after a border crossing, United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1444, 39 L.Ed.2d 489 (1974); and fifteen hours after the border crossing, twenty miles away. Rodriquez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.1967). Particularly in light of the information which came to the officers and the constant surveillance of the Santa Marta, the delay did not take this case outside the border search doctrine. It is enough that the totality of circumstances reasonably supported the agents' conclusion that the contraband found was indeed aboard when the vessel came into the country. 31 The facts that cargo was loaded aboard the Santa Marta, and that persons entered and exited the ship without the surveilling officers being able to verify what, if anything, they might have brought on board must be considered. Under some circumstances, conditions may have been so vulnerable to change after a border crossing as to rebut any reasonable certainty that contraband later found was aboard a carrier at entry. For example, in United States v. Petersen, 473 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.1973), officers lost sight of a vehicle for 10 minutes after it crossed the border, during which the driver picked up two passengers. We concluded that it was not reasonably certain that contraband found was in the vehicle when it came across the border. Id. at 876. And the same defect of certainty was found in United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 831, 42 L.Ed.2d 840 (1975), where a vehicle made several stops at the crossing, picking up and discharging passengers, one of whom was seen retrieving a package hidden near a palm tree. We held that given the breaks in surveillance, it was at least as reasonable to infer that contraband found in the car had been picked up at the tree. Id. at 726. 32 In the case of the Santa Marta, however, there was reasonable certainty that the considerable contraband found was aboard when the ship made port. Arrests and searches of several persons as they left the ship led to the seizure of cocaine. It was therefore reasonable for the officers to believe, when they began the searches, that the cocaine they had seized was aboard the Santa Marta when the ship crossed the border, had not been brought there after its arrival, and that there was still more on board, for that was the nature of their information. 33 Constant surveillance of the Santa Marta tended to confirm the confidential informant. The information had been that Rayo would be involved in offloading cocaine from the Santa Marta and that he was connected with the same organization known previously to have engaged in smuggling from a Gran Colombian freighter docked in San Francisco using swimmers in wetsuits to help in offloading. Officers had seen Mora swimming toward the Santa Marta in scuba gear. Thereafter several persons had been arrested leaving the ship with substantial quantities of cocaine. We conclude that the totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring aboard a large ship. Time and surveillance were needed in order to identify the responsible persons. Therefore, we find that the delay was reasonable and that postponement of the search of the Santa Marta was justified.