Opinion ID: 196544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Role in Offense Enhancement

Text: 12 Gilberg challenges the four-level upward adjustment based on his role in the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, contending that the government improperly singled him out for prosecution by cutting deals with the real leaders of the Chancery Court scheme--his attorney and a business partner. Second, he complains that the district court failed to make express findings of fact regarding the comparative responsibilities of the participants in the scheme. We review for clear error, see United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 227 (1st Cir.1991), mindful that battles over a defendant's [role in the offense] ... will almost always be won or lost in the district court, United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.1995). Gilberg's case is no exception. 13 Gilberg concedes that the evidence could support a rational inference that he orchestrated the criminal conduct alleged in the indictment. The evidence disclosed that he was a sophisticated real estate developer who supplied false purchase prices to his attorney, instructed his attorney and prospective buyers to conceal his false statements, and secreted the documentation containing the actual terms. Gilberg cites no authority--nor is there any--for the proposition that a sentencing court must compare the responsibilities of all participants before imposing a U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 enhancement against a defendant. Moreover, in crediting the evidence that Gilberg played the pivotal role in the initial success of the Chancery Court scheme, the district court implicitly found that Gilberg was an organizer, regardless of the precise roles played by each cohort. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n. 4) (noting that an offense may involve more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer); United States v. Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d 105, 111-13 (1st Cir.1995) (We hold that retention of control over other participants, although sometimes relevant to an inquiry into the status of a putative organizer, is not an essential attribute of organizer status.); cf. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n. 2) (authorizing upward departure for management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization, even though defendant neither led nor supervised any other participant).