Opinion ID: 749881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Winston-Salem

Text: 52 The sequence of events leading up to it leaves little doubt about Eldeco's motive for suddenly implementing drug testing of new hires at Winston-Salem; at the very least, the Board's finding of unlawful motivation has substantial support in the record, leaving us no choice but to affirm it. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (findings supported by substantial evidence are conclusive). 53 Terry Christie was a foreman at the Winston-Salem jobsite. On July 14, he told employee Gregory Davis that the company was bringing in ten to twelve workers from South Carolina. Christie mentioned that local union men had applied for jobs, which prompted Davis to ask whether they were qualified. Christie admitted that they were, but continued, We're not having no union men on this job. [Mastalz] won't hire union people on this job. 54 Christie and Davis had a less cordial encounter on July 23. Christie observed Davis talking to a new employee. Suspecting that Davis was a covert union sympathizer, Christie confronted him and asked whether Davis was pro-union. Davis revealed that he was. Christie immediately fired Davis. 55 The discharge of a worker solely on account of his pro-union sentiments is perhaps the most basic of all unfair labor practices. In protest, several employees immediately went on strike, and there was intermittent picketing. The union filed unfair labor practice charges on July 27. 56 Before the strike, Eldeco had never conditioned employment on a drug test and had, as the majority concedes, unlawfully refused to employ known or suspected union sympathizers. Within seven days of the strike, however, Eldeco had both implemented its drug testing policy and invited members of the union to come to work. Was this convergence of events simply a remarkable coincidence of a well-meaning safety improvement and a Grinch-like change of heart? Or, rather, was it simply a legal stratagem designed to enable Eldeco to continue to exclude union members and then, perhaps, to cut its losses before the Board or this court? 57 Surely it was rational for the Board to draw the latter inference. The timing of a policy change is powerful evidence of its unlawful purpose. See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1366 (7th Cir.1983) (antiunion purpose behind facially neutral policy can be inferred from timing). Moreover, there is more than timing here. As I will discuss below, Mastalz expressly admitted to an employee and a prospective employee that the purpose of the drug testing was to get rid of the union guys. This statement alone provides substantial support for the Board's factual finding of unlawful purpose. 58 If the purpose of a work rule is to suppress the exercise of section 7 rights, the employer has committed an unfair labor practice, notwithstanding that the rule is applied to pro- and anti-union alike. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yarn Div'n v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 1133, 1141-1143 (4th Cir.1982). Why? Because every worker has section 7 rights, whatever his attitude at any given time toward collective representation. Heavy-handed retaliatory tactics like Eldeco's drug testing are illegal not just because they may unfairly and coercively blunt a current organizational drive, but also because their example serves to squelch any incipient desires for representation in the existing workforce. Pillories and hangings were public for their salutary effects on witnesses, and many a saber has been rattled to keep the peace. A deliberate show of force is a deliberate exercise of force. 59 Even if it were essential to the policy's illegality that it be discriminatory, there is substantial evidence that it was. In August, Eldeco employee Tony Heath introduced Mark Luper to Mastalz and Christie. Heath needed a helper, and he recommended Luper. Heath told Mastalz that Luper was afraid he might fail the drug test. Mastalz replied that the drug test was not to get rid of the drug users but to get rid of the Union guys and not to worry about it. Luper took the test and failed. There were no adverse consequences--he was hired and permitted to continue to work. 60 In addition to this direct evidence of discrimination, the odd structure of the policy supports a finding of discriminatory motive. Eldeco proposed to test only new applicants, at a time that it believed that its existing workforce was non-union and that the union was trying to organize from outside.  61 Moreover, we ought not--and in my view, we cannot--forgive Eldeco's illegal motivation because drug testing of electricians in Winston-Salem strikes us as a good idea. We have no role in setting the terms and conditions of private employment (other than, of course, those few actually prescribed by law, like minimum wages and maximum hours). It is quite beside the point that drug testing might be a good safety device or a valid public policy decision. Supra at 1012. The goodness and validity of work rules are in the eye of the employer, and their promulgation is its prerogative, with the one big exception relevant here: rules intended to interfere with employees' free exercise of § 7 rights are illegal. 62 Because the drug testing policy violated the Act, the August 3 blanket offers of employment to union members were invalid: an offer conditioned on acquiescence in an unfair labor practice is no offer at all. Likewise, Pope and Cottingham's terminations were based on an illegal policy, rendering the terminations unlawful as well.