Opinion ID: 8870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of Claims Against the D.A. and the Clerk

Text: 44 Brooks also challenges the lower court's holding that District Attorney Koskela and Circuit Clerk Ward were not subject to suit on any of the constitutional claims discussed above. 12 As with the Fourth Amendment claim above, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment.
45 Brooks's claims against Earl Koskela, the George County District Attorney, stem from Koskela's failure to provide a copy of the nolle prosequi motion to opposing counsel. Mississippi Uniform Circuit Court Rule 2.01 (1994) required that [a] copy of all subsequent pleadings and motions, including motions for a new trial, shall be delivered in person or by mail to opposing counsel.... 13 Brooks contends that the district attorney's office, through Gary S. Evans, assistant district attorney, violated this rule, leading to his unconstitutional imprisonment for eight months. At the summary judgment phase, the district court dismissed all claims against Koskela in his individual capacity on the basis of prosecutorial immunity and in his official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment on the basis of his status as a state official in Mississippi. We find summary judgment appropriate in this context. 46 This Court is uncertain whether Brooks has even alleged a violation of Rule 2.01. Mr. Evans merely prepared an order of dismissal for the state trial court after acknowledging in open court that the case would not proceed. The district attorney's office had no duty under Rule 2.01 or, as far as we can discern, under any Mississippi law, to provide copies of the court's orders to opposing counsel. 47 Even if one assumed that the procedure resulting in a court order amounted to a motion, Mr. Evans provided notice on or about January 28 or 29, 1991, of the government's intention to seek dismissal to Mr. Brooks's attorney, William T. Bailey, prior to the open court procedure. 14 Thus we are not convinced that if the nolle prosequi procedure was subject to Rule 2.01's requirements that the district attorney's office even violated the rule. 48 Assuming arguendo that the district attorney violated Rule 2.01, we agree with the lower court that Koskela was nonetheless immune from such suit in his official and individual capacities. The district attorney is considered a state official in Mississippi, as the office is primarily state-funded, and the district attorney has the power to represent the state in all judicial proceedings. Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dep't of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir.1991). As a state actor, the district attorney is shielded in his official capacity by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. No suit against Koskela in his official capacity can be maintained. 49 Koskela is also immune from suit in his individual capacity. Immunity is sustained for acts taken in furtherance of the prosecution of the case; acts which are investigative or administrative do not carry absolute immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Immunity is gauged by the functional activities the prosecutor engaged in and not the status of the defendant. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1119, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Actions which are related to the judicial process fulfill the prosecutor's advocatory function and are considered absolutely immune from suit. See Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 505 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981). 50 In our estimation, the prosecutor's acts through his assistant of requesting that the court enter an order of nolle prosequi of Brooks's criminal charges, of having an order prepared for the court that memorialized the same, and the forwarding of such order to the clerk for filing are all prosecutorial activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995 (emphasis added). The mere fact that the district attorney's office prepared the court's order for it and forwarded the order does not remove these acts from being intimately associated with the judicial process. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's holding that Mr. Koskela is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in both official and individual capacities on all claims brought by Mr. Brooks. 15
51 Wilbur G. Ward was the Circuit Clerk for George County at the time of the incidents which are the subject of this lawsuit. The record indicates that the order of nolle prosequi was filed by Angela Cooper, over the file stamp which indicated that Wilbur Ward was the Circuit Clerk. Brooks alleges that Ward created a policy which had the effect of depriving him of the right to be free from unnecessary restraint by failing to send court orders of dismissal of charges to the defendant in a criminal prosecution, or to his counsel, and failing to adopt a policy for the George County Clerk's office of sending orders. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wilbur G. Ward, circuit clerk of George County, Mississippi (the clerk), based on the fact that the judge, not the clerk, was the final policymaker of the circuit county system in George County with regard to the acts alleged by Brooks. We agree. 52 Under Mississippi law, the judge is the ultimate authority for the supervision of the court in his jurisdiction. As the Mississippi Supreme Court stated, Although the clerk performs the physical act of record keeping, the judge is ultimately responsible for the administration of his court. In re Collins, 524 So.2d 553, 555 (Miss.1987). Only those officials who have final policymaking authority may by their actions subject the government to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bryan Cty., 67 F.3d at 1182. Accordingly, Ward cannot be liable for failing to establish a policy of sending orders to parties in a criminal proceeding because he was not the policymaker for the George County Circuit Court System. 16 53 We also note that nowhere has Brooks shown that circuit clerks have an affirmative duty under Mississippi law to provide the sheriffs of the state, or counsel for criminal defendants, or criminal defendants pro se, with copies of orders or pleadings filed in criminal cases. Nor has Brooks shown an affirmative duty to notify sheriffs, counsel or defendants of the filing and entry of orders and pleadings in criminal cases. The circuit clerks merely have a duty to file and docket all papers filed in each court case. 17 54 Since no duty to act existed, the failure to act did not violate the constitution. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 307 (5th Cir.1992). 18 While it is unfortunate that Brooks languished in the county jail, we can find no duty violated by the clerk to impose liability for the loss. The district court properly granted summary judgment on this issue.