Opinion ID: 2548719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in its refusal to strike portions of meador's affidavit based on hearsay.

Text: ¶ 9. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Trustmark's and MBHS' motions to strike parts of Meador's affidavit. In response to Trustmark's and MBHS' motions for summary judgment, Meador relied solely upon his own affidavit to support his theories of fraud and fraudulent concealment. [1] Meador's only evidence to support his claim for fraudulent concealment is based on what he learned from Brent Farris. This Court finds that these statements are hearsay, not personal knowledge. In his affidavit, Meador claimed that Trustmark and MBHS conspired against him to damage his financial interests. Specifically, Meador stated that it was his belief that Trustmark and MBHS are still actively engaged in a common plan and scheme to damage [his] business, professional practice, credit, reputation, and other business opportunities. Meador stated that, in 2004, he was told by former MBHS consultant Brent Farris that Trustmark and MBHS had entered into a conspiracy to damage Meador's financial interests. [2] ¶ 11. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify on the matter stated therein. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). While most affidavits are hearsay, they are nevertheless properly considered on summary judgment motions as long as they are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts such as would be admissible in evidence. Levens v. Campbell, 733 So.2d 753, 758 (Miss.1999) (citations omitted). Therefore, portions of affidavits that contain inadmissable testimony or allegations that are not based on personal knowledge must be struck and cannot be considered part of the summary judgment record. ¶ 12. While it may be his belief, Meador has no proof based on personal knowledge that Trustmark and MBHS ever entered into a conspiracy. Meador based his allegations upon statements made by Farris, a former consultant for MBHS. Specifically, Meador stated that: Brent Farris informed me in 2004 at about the time of my Amended Complaint, for the first time, that there had been an agreement between MBHS and Trustmark National Bank to exert financial duress upon me in order to deprive me of my medical clinic in Byram, Mississippi and also Mobile Physicians Services, a company I had organized. Mr. Farris informed me that there are available through the United States Department of Justice taped conversations between Trustmark and MBHS confirming the fact. These statements are inadmissable hearsay and should be excluded from Meador's affidavit. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. M.R.E. 801(c). Although there are some exceptions to the hearsay rule, this hearsay does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions provided in the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. ¶ 13. At the time he filed his complaint and, subsequently, his amended complaint, Meador had no firsthand knowledge or evidence that Trustmark and MBHS had engaged in fraud or fraudulent concealment. These alleged statements by Farris cannot be verified and therefore do not create a genuine issue of material fact for several reasons. First, it is undisputed that Farris was never an employee of MBHS. Second, Farris stopped performing consulting work for MBHS in 1998. Lastly, Farris is a convicted felon who pleaded guilty to bankruptcy fraud. At the time of the summary judgment hearing, he was a fugitive from justice. In Meador's Opposition to Summary Judgment, he did not submit an affidavit from Farris. Instead, he furnishes his own sworn statement that this is what his [witness] would say. But such is pure hearsay and Rule 56(e) declares such to be incompetent in support ofor in opposition tosummary judgment. Walker By & Through Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss.1988). ¶ 14. This Court finds that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Trustmark's and MBHS' motions to strike portions of the affidavit. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to determine the need for a trial. To serve this purpose, the evidence offered in support of or in opposition to the motion must be admissible at trial. If inadmissible evidence could defeat a summary judgment motion but not support a jury verdict, the purpose of Rule 56to avoid unnecessary trialswould not be served. Jeffrey Jackson, Admissibility at Trial of Materials Presented, Mississippi Civil Procedure § 11:22 (Rev.2009). Given the fact that these portions of the affidavit are hearsay, this Court reverses the order of the trial court denying Trustmark's and MBHS' motions to strike portions of Meador's affidavit.