Opinion ID: 2613256
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deputy Marconnet's Portable Radio

Text: Defendant admitted that he took Deputy Marconnet's portable radio from him. This admission is corroborated by Ms. Cardenas' testimony that defendant grabbed [the radio] and just threw it at [Deputy Marconnet's] face on his right side. This evidence establishes defendant's criminal liability for aggravated robbery: (1) property was taken from Deputy Marconnet's person  defendant took Deputy Marconnet's portable radio out of his hand; (2) Deputy Marconnet's radio was taken against his will  defendant took it out of his hand while Mickel held the gun on Deputy Marconnet; (3) Deputy Marconnet's radio was taken by force and the force was exercised with the intent to prevent resistance to the taking of the radio  again, defendant took the radio while Mickel held Deputy Marconnet at bay  for the purpose of facilitating their overpowering of Deputy Marconnet by preventing him from further communicating with fellow officers; and (4) the person taking the property was aided by a person who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the robbery, provided means or opportunity to another person to commit the robbery  defendant took Deputy Marconnet's radio and was aided by Mickel who, intending that defendant take the radio, provided defendant with the opportunity to take the radio by holding the gun on Deputy Marconnet. B. The State Presented Substantial Evidence to Support the Kidnapping Charge Section 13-1304(A) defines Kidnapping in relevant part as follows: A person commits kidnapping by knowingly restraining another person with the intent to: .... 3. Inflict death [or] physical injury ... on the victim ...; or 4. Place the victim ... in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury ...; or 5. Interfere with the performance of a governmental .. . function. Based on the trial court's instruction, which tracked § 13-1304(A) virtually verbatim, the jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping, but its verdict did not specify upon which subsection of the kidnapping statute it relied. Because the statute is worded in the disjunctive, however, the jury could have based its verdict on any one of these three subsections. See State v. Bruni, 129 Ariz. 312, 317, 630 P.2d 1044, 1049 (App. 1981) (each of § 13-1304's subsections provides different way in which kidnapping may be committed). We find that the state introduced sufficient evidence to support defendant's kidnapping conviction under subsection 5 of the kidnapping statute. Defendant is criminally liable as an accomplice for Mickel's restraint of Deputy Marconnet. Moreover, defendant admitted that he grabbed, hit, and wrestled with Deputy Marconnet and told Mickel to grab the deputy's gun so that Deputy Marconnet would not take defendant to jail. These actions clearly interfered with Deputy Marconnet's governmental function, which was to identify the Herreras and to determine what, if any, action he needed to take against them as a Deputy Sheriff. In sum, the record shows that the state presented not only evidence substantial enough to preclude a judgment of acquittal on the felony murder charge, but it also presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict as to the aggravated robbery charge, the kidnapping charge, and the first degree felony murder charge. See State v. Carter, 118 Ariz. 562, 563, 578 P.2d 991, 992 (1978) (On appeal, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee [here, the state] and resolve all reasonable inferences against the appellant [here, the defendant]. Only if there is a complete lack of probative facts to support the verdict, will we reverse.). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the felony murder charge. C. The Facts of This Aggravated Robbery Provide a Proper Basis for Defendant's Felony Murder Conviction A person commits felony murder when, [a]cting either alone or with one or more other persons, such person commits or attempts to commit [aggravated robbery], and in the course of and in furtherance of such offense or immediate flight from such offense, such person or another person causes the death of any person. A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2). A death is in furtherance of an underlying offense if the death resulted from any action taken to facilitate the accomplishment of the felony. State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 38, 668 P.2d 874, 881 (1983). This is ordinarily a question to be determined by the trier of fact. Hallman, 137 Ariz. at 38, 668 P.2d at 881. We believe that the facts of this aggravated robbery provide a proper basis for defendant's felony murder conviction. As in this case, the crime of aggravated robbery may be a continuous crime. The robbery of Deputy Marconnet did not end either when Mickel had Deputy Marconnet's gun or when defendant had his radio. The express language of A.R.S. § 13-1902 extended the robbery up to and through Deputy Marconnet's murder. That section provides that a person commits robbery if in the course of taking another's property such person uses force with intent to prevent resistance to such person taking or retaining property. We understand the emphasized language to include within the definition of Robbery any and all force used by a person against one from whom property has been taken in an effort to retain that property. Accordingly, murdering Deputy Marconnet to prevent him from regaining his gun and arresting the Herreras was in furtherance of the aggravated robbery and therefore a proper basis for defendant's felony murder conviction. D. Kidnapping Does Not Merge Into a Subsequent Murder Citing State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228, 403 P.2d 540 (1965), defendant argues that kidnapping merges into a subsequent murder and therefore may not be the basis for a felony murder conviction. Whatever the merits of this argument, if any, we find no error in this case. The record establishes that the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Deputy Marconnet were not conceptually identical and did not occur as part of the same act. Rather, the kidnapping occurred when Deputy Marconnet was attacked and forced to lie on the ground. The murder occurred later, when defendant's order to shoot Deputy Marconnet was carried out. We hold that defendant's conviction for first degree felony murder was properly premised on kidnapping. See State v. Herrera, Sr. I, 176 Ariz. 9, 859 P.2d 119 (1993).