Opinion ID: 712193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Problems with Applying the Hicks Permissive Inference

Text: 56 I concur in the majority's conclusion that the inference permitted by Hicks will only sometimes support a jury finding of discrimination and that Boeing controls as to whether the additional required inference of discrimination will be supported by sufficient evidence. The majority's brief treatment of the issue, however, ignores substantial practical difficulties with applying the suspicion of mendacity language to Rule 50 motions raising the sufficiency of the evidence, either before the trial judge or an appellate panel. 57 Prior to 1991, when Title VII discrimination cases were tried to the judge, we might have reasonably expected that a trial judge would prepare sufficiently detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law tracking relevant liability issues. 4 However, since 1991 for Title VII cases, and historically in ADEA cases, the factfinder is the jury. Title VII cases are typically submitted to the jury on the single issue of intentional discrimination, while ADEA cases are typically submitted to the jury on the dual issues of liability for discrimination and the issue of willfulness. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (prohibiting discrimination because of age); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (providing for liquidated damages upon a showing that the employer's violation of the ADEA was willful). 58 Generally, there are no separate issues submitted which require the jury to determine which reason or reasons have been offered by the employer as an explanation for its actions. Likewise, there is usually no additional finding on the issues of whether the jury disbelieved or rejected such reasons nor whether the jury found any suspicion of mendacity. I submit, therefore, that the following questions demand some better resolution than that given by the majority: 59 (a) How does a reviewing judge determine from the record that the factfinder disbelieved or rejected all of the employer's reasons? 60 (b) Is there any difference between a factfinder's disbelief of the employer's reasons, as used in Hicks, 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, and a factfinder's rejection of the employer's reasons, as used in the same paragraph? Id. 61 (c) How does a reviewing judge determine whether the factfinder's disbelief was accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity? 62 (d) What does the term suspicion of mendacity mean? The term does not appear in any reported federal case (district, Circuit or Supreme Court) prior to its use in Hicks. In addition, the term does not appear in the United States Code or in the legislative history of either Title VII or the ADEA. 63 (e) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, how can a reviewing judge determine whether the factfinder did, in fact, draw the additional required inference of intentional discrimination? 64 If we say (1) that the jury's yes answer to an ADEA liability issue permits the reviewing judge to infer that the jury disbelieved or rejected each of the employer's reasons, and (2) that the jury's hypothetical disbelief or rejection permitted the jury to draw the additional inference of mendacity, and finally (3) because of the prior inferences, we can infer that the jury drew the ultimate inference of discriminatory bias in making its determination, are we not reasoning backward from the result rather than analyzing the evidence involved?