Opinion ID: 590209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Decision to Read Testimony

Text: 34 Appellant next complains that the trial court erred when it answered the jury's question regarding the distance between himself and the drugs by reading a portion of Howard's testimony. His argument on this score appears to devolve into two discrete points. The first grows out of his observation that the jury did not ask for Howard's testimony to be read, but only for an answer to the direct question of how far Davis was from the drugs. 9 It is improper, appellant suggests, for the court to answer such a direct question with the testimony by a government witness; doing so appears to endorse the prosecution's interpretation of the events at issue. Appellant's second argument stems from his belief that the court's selection of just Howard's testimony lent it undue emphasis. 35 In approaching both of these arguments we must acknowledge initially that the trial judge enjoys wide latitude in determining whether and what testimony should be read to a jury during its deliberations. He is in a better position than we to weigh the benefits of allowing the jury to rehear evidence against the risks associated with having bits and pieces of evidence selectively emphasized. See, e.g., United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. An Article of Drug, 661 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir.1981). Consequently, we review his decisions regarding the reading of testimony only to assure that no abuse of discretion has transpired. United States v. Mackin, 502 F.2d 429, 442 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1052, 95 S.Ct. 629, 42 L.Ed.2d 647 (1974); United States v. Thornton, 498 F.2d 749, 753 (D.C.Cir.1974); Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358, 360-61 (D.C.Cir.1968). 36 In the case sub judice we see no abuse of discretion. To begin, the trial judge did not force Howard's testimony on the jury; indeed, after noting the existence of evidence relevant to their direct question, he instructed the jury to retire and decide how you want to proceed.... If you believe you have enough information on that matter from you own recollections, fine. If you believe that you would like to hear the testimony, let me know and we can arrange that. Tr. IV 472-73. Only after the jury foreman informed the court that the jury would indeed like to hear Howard's testimony did he then proceed to read it. Tr. IV 475-76. 37 Moreover, the court did nothing to suggest that Howard's version of events was correct. To the contrary, before reading anything the court reminded the jury of its duty to consider everybody's testimony and to consider every part of th[e] charge and part of that charge included credibility [of witnesses]. Tr. IV 487. After finishing with Howard's testimony, the court again instructed the jury about the need to examine the entire record: I want to caution you to consider the whole--everything I've given you. Consider all of the testimony. Tr. IV 489. 38 Finally, there is nothing invidious about the trial court's selection of Howard's testimony for recitation. Appellant suggests to us no other record evidence the trial court should have read in reply to the jury's inquiry. He mentions no relevant cross examination undermining Howard's statement. Simply put, he has given us no reason to believe that revisiting Howard's testimony was in any way prejudicial to his case. 39 Turning to appellant's second point, we find little support for his contention that the court unduly emphasized Howard's testimony simply by reading it. We acknowledge several cases appellant cites for the proposition that a trial judge may deny a jury request to revisit certain [297 U.S.App.D.C. 404] testimony when he believes doing so might lend that testimony undue prominence. See, e.g., United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.1984); United States v. Varsalona, 710 F.2d 418, 420-21 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 486 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Rabb, 453 F.2d 1012, 1013 (3d Cir.1971). None of these cases, though, suggests that a trial court abuses its discretion--viz. unduly emphasizes testimony--when it grants a request for the recitation of previously heard testimony. 40 In fact, the parties before us are able to identify but one case in which a judge has been found to abuse his discretion simply by allowing testimony to be reheard in response to a jury question. That case, United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595 (9th Cir.1985), is, however, readily distinguishable from ours. In Binder, the Ninth Circuit held that replaying videotaped evidence was highly prejudicial because of the special impact video can have, reproducing as it does the expressions of faces and intonations of voices. Id. at 600-01. Here, of course, the court merely read from a printed transcript. 41 Ultimately, whatever emphasis the trial court may have placed on Howard's testimony was well tempered by the cautionary instructions offered both before and after the event. As noted above, the court urged jurors at both points to recall all of the testimony before them and to weigh carefully the credibility of the repeated testimony. Considering these warnings and the utter absence of any relevant authority indicating that the trial court could not reread the requested testimony, we cannot sustain appellant's undue emphasis argument.