Opinion ID: 2317385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: were apellant's subsequent oral admissions and recorded statements tainted by the initial illegality

Text: Appellant suggests that presuming this Court decides that he should have been given the Miranda warnings when he was questioned on May 6th and 15th, the failure to do so tainted the subsequent admissions and confession after he had been advised of his constitutional rights, and, therefore, these were inadmissible as trial evidence because they were the fruit of the poisonous tree. Generally speaking the case law is clear that evidence obtained through prior illegality is inadmissible against a defendant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S. Ct. 1394 (1947); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920). However, this does not mean that if a person is questioned illegally, i.e., without the requisite warnings, that subsequent statements can never be used against him at trial if preceded by the proper warnings. The United States Supreme Court in Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 stated: We do not suggest that the law enforcement authorities are precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings and then adequately advised of his rights and given opportunity to exercise them. Id. at 496, 86 S. Ct. at 1639. See also Commonwealth v. Frazier, 443 Pa. 178, 279 A. 2d 33 (1971); and Commonwealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39, 239 A. 2d 409 (1968). If the Commonwealth establishes that the last statement or confession is not the exploitation of the original illegality and was obtained under circumstances sufficiently distinguishable to purge it of the original taint, then the latter may be introduced as evidence. See Commonwealth v. Banks, supra. To determine if the Commonwealth has met its burden, one must analyze the totality of the circumstances to see if the taint was in fact dissipated. See Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A. 2d 612 (1968). In the instant case the following facts are evident: Appellant was questioned for six hours on May 6th. During this questioning he admitted ownership of a vehicle matching the description given by witnesses to the crime, but affirmatively denied all knowledge of the crime. Thus, the police learned nothing damaging which could be used against appellant, nor did they learn anything that was useful in their investigation. The only possible thing that was at all damaging to appellant was the fact that he said he was with Floyd Williams the night of the killing, and Williams initially denied this. However, before the police could coercively employ this against appellant, Williams changed his story and said he now remembered being with appellant. So the police gained nothing from this investigation. On May 15th appellant was again questioned for three hours. He still insisted that he knew nothing about the crime and gave no damaging evidence against himself except that he was with George Kenney on the night of the killing. (Kenney actually committed the robbery and killing.) Although this could be viewed as a damaging admission, it must be viewed in light of the fact that appellant still adamantly insisted he knew nothing about the robbery or killing. On May 17th appellant was finally taken into custody and formally arrested. The Commonwealth urges that the probable cause for the arrest was statements given by other individuals, namely, one Cranshaw and Boyd which implicated appellant in the crime. Additionally, the Commonwealth states that nothing learned in the two prior interrogations was in any way the basis for the arrest. When appellant was taken into custody he was advised fully of his Miranda rights and he knowingly and voluntarily waived these rights. It was not until he was confronted with the aforementioned statements that he confessed to his involvement in the crime. Initially, looking at the circumstances, it is clear the appellant had said nothing damaging during the first two interrogations. Although, he admitted being with George Kenney on the night of the crime, he proceeded to explain away his meeting with Kenney. Thus when he entered the police station on the 17th he was not, or did not seem to be at a psychological disadvantage, [1] since he knew in his mind that he had said nothing directly connecting him with the crime. Secondly, focusing on the evidence the police obtained during the interrogation on May 6th and 15th and the ultimate inculpatory admissions and confession, there does not seem to be the necessary causal relationship or nexus between the first two statements and the subsequent inculpation. See generally for statement of rule: United States v. Knight, 395 F. 2d 971 (2d Cir. 1968); Evans v. United States, 375 F. 2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom., Bruton v. United States, 371 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). Nothing that was learned during the prior interrogations was employed against appellant to force him to confess. In Commonwealth v. Frazier, 443 Pa. 178, 279 A. 2d 33 (1971), we stated: In the instant case, nothing appellant said before he was warned was used to incriminate him. No other link was shown between the questioning to which appellant was subjected without warnings and his subsequent confession, made after proper warnings had been given. Id. at 181, 279 A. 2d at 35. In the instant case, since the police had learned nothing of value on May 6th or 15th, the officers who questioned appellant on the 17th could not have been the beneficiaries of information received, cf. Harney v. United States, 407 F. 2d 586 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Pierce, 397 F. 2d 128 (4th Cir. 1968), therefore there could have been no improper exploitation of illegally obtained information, Commonwealth v. Banks, supra, nor is there a showing on the record that the officers who questioned appellant on the 17th were the beneficiaries of whatever pressure that might have been applied to appellant on the 6th or 15th, see Westover v. United States, supra; People v. Young, 131 Ill. App. 2d 113, 266 N.E. 2d 160 (1970). Next, it must be noted that the record indicates the actual cause of appellant's confession was the police confronting him with the information given by Cranshaw and Boyd which identified appellant as the driver of the get-away car (this was after he had been given proper warnings). Thus, the genesis of the confession was not the use of any illegally obtained statements from the appellant's own lips, rather it was information obtained from a totally separate, independent, and legitimate source. The evidence, therefore, was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to purge it of the primary taint, in that the confession was not the produce of exploitation of the original illegality, but rather, the result of confronting appellant with evidence totally devoid of any illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States, supra; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Banks, supra; Commonwealth v. Moody, supra. In Wong Sun, it was stated by the United States Supreme Court that: Rather, the more apt question in such a case is `whether granting establishment of the primary illegality the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. 417. [2] See also Silverthorne Lumber Co., supra (wherein it is stated from an independent source). Since the evidence used to induce appellant to confess had an independent source or it was come at by means sufficiently distinguishable, the ultimate confession was purged of any primary taint. Moreover, looking at the physical aspects of the case, there seems to have been a break in the stream of events which could or would insulate the final statement from the prior illegality. First there was a definite break in the time of questioning  6th  15th  17th  thus there was not a period of continual questioning, cf. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S. Ct. 1338 (1967); Westover v. United States, supra; Evans v. United States, supra at 360; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F. 2d 22, 30 (3d Cir. 1965), and this amount of time would be sufficient to dissipate the illegal taint. [3] Furthermore, there were different officers questioning him on the 17th, thus there would not be continual pressure by one individual. Lastly, and most important, it must be noted that before appellant confessed, he was given and understood the Miranda warnings. The only question that now must be answered is whether the warnings were given at a time early enough in the interrogation process so that appellant could take advantage of them. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 438 Pa. 517, 265 A. 2d 790 (1970). In the instant case, the warnings were given before appellant said anything that directly incriminated him. Thus, if he had so chosen, he could have effectively protected himself by employing his constitutional rights, with the knowledge that by so doing the police would gain nothing which would incriminate him from his own lips. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice JONES took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.