Opinion ID: 791477
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Supremacy Clause and Preemption

Text: 42 The plaintiffs maintain that Section 3(B) is preempted by the comprehensive statutory scheme embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and conflicts with some of its specific provisions. 52 Despite the federal government's primacy over the regulation of immigration, not every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per-se preempted.... DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S.Ct. at 936. The Constitution, by committing regulation of immigration to the federal government, did not deprive the states of all power to legislate regarding aliens. 53 Id. Nevertheless, ostensibly harmonious state regulation may run afoul of the Supremacy Clause if it, in effect, interferes with the goals of federal policy. Id. Yet, even in this context, [f]ederal regulation ... should not be deemed preemptive in the absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained. Id. at 356, 96 S.Ct. at 937 (internal citation omitted). 43 Section 3(B) is unquestionably a permissible exercise of Louisiana's broad police powers to regulate employment within its jurisdiction for the protection of its residents. See id. at 356, 96 S.Ct. at 937 (explaining that a state has broad ... police powers to regulate employment within its borders). The Louisiana Supreme Court was rationally entitled to conclude that the temporary status of nonimmigrant aliens could impede the Bar's regulatory and disciplinary efforts. 54 Conditions that frustrate the administration of Louisiana's licensing scheme are certainly within the mainstream of such police power regulation. Id. at 356-57, 96 S.Ct. at 937. 44 Further, as a state regulation dealing with the employment of nonimmigrant aliens, Section 3(B) is not facially preempted by the INA. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is no indication that Congress intended to preclude state law in the area of [alien] employment regulation. Id. at 358, 362, 96 S.Ct. at 937-38, 940. Thus, the field of alien employment tolerates harmonious state regulation. 45 The fact that Section 3(B) denies Bar admission to some aliens and not to others conflicts neither with the INA nor with the Supreme Court's disposition in Toll. In Toll, the Court invalidated a University of Maryland policy denying in-state tuition status to G-4 nonimmigrant aliens — who are permitted by congressional directive to establish domicile in the United States — as inconsistent with federal policy that prevented these student aliens from establishing state domicile. Toll, 458 U.S. at 11, 102 S.Ct. at 2983. Toll held that, state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress. However, the Court added a caveat: 46 To be sure, when Congress has done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the country temporarily, the proper application of the principle is likely to be a matter of some dispute. 47 Toll 458 U.S. at 12-13, 102 S.Ct. at 2983 (quoting, in part, DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. at 938, n. 6). The substantive holding in Toll is distinguishable from the instant case for two reasons. First, Section 3(B) raises the situation contemplated, but not addressed, in Toll — the validity of state laws affecting transient nonimmigrant aliens. Second, there is no incongruity between what Congress permits of student and temporary worker nonimmigrants and what Section 3(B) prevents. 48 First, as with the alien class in general, the sub-class of nonimmigrant aliens is itself heterogenous, and the distinctions among them are relevant for preemption purposes. Toll specifically distinguished between G-4 nonimmigrant aliens — upon whom Congress expressly declined to impose domicile restrictions — and the F-1 student and H-1B temporary worker nonimmigrant aliens at issue in this case — upon whom Congress has clearly imposed domicile restrictions. 55 Section 3(B) affects only the latter group. 49 Second, Section 3(B) does not succumb to the Toll infirmity of proscribing by state law what Congress expressly permits by federal statute. Section 3(B) does not prevent the legal matriculation of nonimmigrant alien students admitted to the United States on F-1 or J-1 visas. Section 3(B) is, in fact, consistent with provisions that prohibit student visa holders from obtaining gainful employment, require them to obtain specific authorization for certain types of matriculation-related employment, e.g., internships and work-study programs, requires their departure at the expiration of their status, and prohibits them from establishing domicile in the United States. 50 Nor does Section 3(B), contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, prevent them from complying with H-1B nonimmigrant visa requirements. H-1B status requires the nonimmigrant applicant to qualify for a temporary worker visa by presenting documentation of: a state professional license; a bachelor's, or higher, degree in the profession; an equivalent foreign degree; or equivalent foreign experience. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). H-1B's four compliance measures are disjunctive; its professional licensing option is permissive, not mandatory. While Section 3(B) permits one of these alternatives, it does not prevent an H-1B visa holder who satisfies at least one of the other compliance methods from obtaining employment within the broad field encompassed by the practice of law. Moreover, Section 3(B) is consistent with an H-1B visa provision that contemplates non-licensed employment. 56 As demonstrated, Section 3(B) is in accord, rather than conflict, with federal regulation of alien employment. 51 The plaintiffs finally argue that the INA impliedly preempts Section 3(B) because it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363, 96 S.Ct. at 940. We disagree. As the Court made clear in DeCanas, the intersection of state and federal law does not necessarily require or effect preemption. Upholding a California law criminalizing the employment of illegal aliens, DeCanas held that the overlap of state and federal law did not equate to withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a mere peripheral concern to the federal law. Id. at 361, 96 S.Ct. at 939. Similarly, while Section 3(B) prohibits Bar admission of nonimmigrant aliens even though the INA permits H-1B visa holders to seek professional licensing, the provision is peripheral to intersecting federal law which does not itself mandate domestic professional licensing. 52 Section 3(B) is a state Bar rule designed to address local problems arising from the transitory status of nonimmigrant aliens who, by the terms and conditions of their federal status, possess fewer ties to the United States than any other group (besides illegal aliens). Section 3(B) attempts to protect Louisiana residents seeking legal representation and affects a class of persons whom Congress has expressly prohibited from living or working permanently in the United States. See id. at 363, 96 S.Ct. at 940 (explaining that although federal law predominates in the field of immigration, there is minimal federal interest in state laws crafted to address local problems and affecting local entities in a manner consistent with federal declarations). Rather than standing as an obstacle to federal law, Section 3(B) is consistent with the federal policy embodied in the INA.