Opinion ID: 3010965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Iadimarco's Evidence of Discrimination

Text: As noted above, Ms. Williams, a Black female, was given the position Iadimarco applied for. It is undisputed that Iadimarco had received a ranking of superior in each KSA category, and that he was the only candidate to be so ranked when the Monmouth position was filled. Williams never received nor requested a KSA rating. As we also noted above, Towler based his failure to hire Iadimarco on the fact that the other two candidates who received a superior KSA rating had already taken other positions and he (Towler) did not want to simply promote Iadimarco by default. Although that may be true, the fact that Towler then offered the position to someone who had no KSA rating at all certainly raises suspicions. Towler did not simply recruit more applicants to compete with Iadimarco. Rather, he recruited an additional applicant who wasn't even evaluated using the KSA matrix. Moreover, Williams' application was submitted after the deadline for applications had passed. In addition, Iadimarco had previously been In-Plant manager in Trenton, and therefore had experience as an In-Plant manager. Williams did not. Most importantly, however, Iadimarco argues that he was told that an engineering background was a prerequisite for the position of In-Plant Manager at Monmouth. He had an engineering degree, and he alleges Williams did not have one. Thus, although the employer may well have had legitimate reasons for subsequently focusing on the applicant's human relations skills, this does not explain why the initial focus on engineering backgrounds was abandoned as Williams' candidacy emerged Additionally, we must view these circumstances in light of Pankey's diversity memo. In doing so, we caution that the memo is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of illegal discrimination. An employer has every right to be concerned with the diversity of its workforce, and the work environment. Here, however, we must draw all inferences in favor of Iadimarco, the nonmovant for summary judgment. In doing so, we assume that Pankey did write the memo that he signed and distributed even though he subsequently attempted to distance himself from it. As noted above, Pankey admitted that he signed the memo, but stated that it was nothing more than a carbon copy of a memo he had received from headquarters. However, defendants were unable to produce any such memo from headquarters. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that Pankey was not credible, and that his attempt to deny authorship of the memo was consistent with Iadimarco's allegations of bias. A reasonable fact finder could also find Towler's denial that he had interviewed Iadimarco significant. Towler originally conceded that Iadimarco had been interviewed for the position, but later denied that any interview had occurred. Rather, he dismissed his discussion with Iadimarco by asserting that it was merely a conversation.11 In Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986 (3d Cir. 1997), the employer denied interviewing the plaintiff/applicant, but we held that conflicting evidence about the existence of an interview created a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 992 _________________________________________________________________ 11. Q: Okay. The conversation that you had with him, was it a direct result of him asking you could he come up to talk to you about the job? A: Yes. Q: Was it your own opinion to interview him for the job? A: I can't say it was an interview. We had a conversation referencing that particular position. The Court: Face-to-face conversation? The Witness: A face-to-face conversation. App. at 83HH (Towler's testimony). _________________________________________________________________ (there is no testimony to support either conjecture, and, even if there were, it would be up to a jury to reconcile the conflicting testimony surrounding [plaintiff's] interview and the ranking of candidates.). Here, the District Court thought it significant that, except for Williams, all of the supervisors that Towler hired were White. See Dist. Ct. at 8-9; App. at A197 (noting that out of the twentyseven plant managers hired, 74% of them were [W]hite males.). The District Court reasoned that this suggested that Towler did not discriminate against Whites who applied to be supervisors. However, the inquiry is not whether Towler and/or Pankey discriminated against Whites in general, but whether they illegally discriminated against Iadimarco. A fact finder clearly could look at the number of White supervisors Towler had hired and conclude that it suggested that he treated Iadimarco fairly. However, a fact finder could also conclude that Towler tried to manipulate the process to hire Williams because he had already hired many White supervisors. We cite this evidence not to suggest our view of it, but because it shows that there are disputed issues of material fact.12 Summary judgment is precluded if a disputed fact exists which might affect the outcome of the suit under the controlling substantive law. Bray, 110 F.3d at 990 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine `if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'  Josey, 996 F.2d at 637 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The Postal Service has argued that Iadimarco's claim must fail because he accepted another job before Williams was hired. That argument is based on Iadimarco's acceptance of the position of Operations Support Specialist in the Trenton facility in early March or April 1993. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 3. Iadimarco counters by explaining that he _________________________________________________________________ 12. Nor do we mean to infer that Iadimarco was more or less qualified than Williams. We take no position as to the respective qualifications of those two employees. only accepted the other position because it was becoming clear to him that Pankey wanted to fill the In-Plant Manager position with Williams. It defies all logic to hold that an alleged victim of discrimination is precluded from recovering damages under Title VII merely because he or she accepted another position after concluding that racial bias would govern the challenged hiring decision. If that were the law, an employer could freely discriminate by dillydallying until the discrimination victim was forced to take another position. The employer could then insulate itself from its discriminatory animus, and reap the fruits of its bias merely by arguing that the applicant had removed himself or herself from consideration. That would protect and reward the unscrupulous employer willing to delay ultimate hiring decisions in order to force the unwanted applicant to look elsewhere. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court erred in ruling that Iadimarco failed to establish a prima facie case of illegal race discrimination under Title VII. However, that conclusion does not end our inquiry. The District Court ruled that even if Iadimarco had established a prima facie case, the Postal Service presented a race- neutral explanation for its decision to hire a Black female, and Iadimarco had not met his burden of presenting sufficient evidence of pretext to rebut it. Accordingly, we will examine what, if any, evidence of pretext Iadimarco presented.