Opinion ID: 775727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of Juror 8's Assurances of Impartiality

Text: 8 Derry Evans argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to remove a juror who, following his exposure to other jurors' misconduct, refused to give unequivocal assurances that he could be fair and impartial. 9 On the fourth day of trial, in response to the complaint of one of the jurors--juror 15--about the conduct of certain members of the jury, the Court conducted a voir dire of the jury. In the voir dire, juror 8 testified that he had overheard conversations among other jurors concerning the lack of professionalism and lack of interest of defense counsel, and concerning television coverage of the trial. During his examination by the government's lawyer, the following colloquy took place: 10 Q: [Y]ou indicated that some of the jurors or a couple of the jurors had made comments about some of the lawyers. Has that affected your ability to be fair and impartial here today? 11 A: No. 12 Q: And as you said, you have an open mind completely on this case? 13 A: I'm not sure I can say that. 14 Q: Let me ask you this. In the beginning, you were instructed not to make a decision until you've heard all the evidence and the entire case is closed. 15 A: Uh-huh. 16 Q: Are you to the point now where you can't--let me rephrase that. Are you to the point where you no longer have a completely open mind? 17 A: Some of the content has affected me more than I thought it would. 18 Q: But have you--is it going to impact your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict? 19 A: I would certainly hope not. 20 Q: Have you made a decision as you sit right now on guilt or innocence? 21 A: That would not be fair. No. 22 Q: So you haven't done that? 23 A: No. 24 Q: And you're going to reserve making a decision on guilt and innocence until all the evidence is done? 25 A: To the best of my ability. Excerpt of Hearing In Re Jurors at 86-87 (emphasis added). 26 Later, during examination by defense counsel, the following exchange occurred. 27 Q: [A]s you sit now--and we have a long way to go maybe-- 28 A: Uh-huh. 29 Q: --in listening to more evidence--do you have any concerns or qualms about being able to maintain an open mind through the rest of the evidence? 30 A: I will do my best. 31 Id. at 90-91 (emphasis added). 32 Citing Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), Derry argues that the District Court's failure to remove juror 8, despite juror 8's equivocal responses to questions about his impartiality and his ability to keep an open mind, was error. 33 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury. Impartiality is presumed so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986). Although removal of a juror is appropriate if a juror has formed an opinion as to the issue to be tried, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878), [i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his [pretrial] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). District courts have substantial discretion in conducting voir dire, so our review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1984 (2001) ([I]n federal criminal cases, we will not overturn the district court's finding that a prospective juror can put aside any pretrial opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence at trial 'unless the error is manifest.') (quoting United States v. McNally, 485 F.2d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)); United States v. Jones, 193 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1999). 34 In Thompson, a race discrimination case brought by an employee against her employer, the Seventh Circuit considered the district court's failure to remove a juror who expressed a belief that some plaintiffs' claims against their employers are spurious and that her background as an owner of a business would cloud and sway her judgment in the case. 248 F.3d at 624, 626. The court expressed its concern that, in response to questioning, the juror said she would try to be fair, but she expressed no confidence in being able to succeed in the attempt. Id. at 626. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district judge had not pushed hard enough to determine whether [the juror] could relinquish her prior beliefs for purposes of deciding the case. Id. In Gonzalez, a criminal case in which the defendant was convicted for distributing cocaine, the Ninth Circuit considered the district court's failure to remove a juror who, after being asked three times if she could put aside her personal experiences and serve fairly and impartially, responded equivocally with answers such as, I'll try. 214 F.3d at 1111. The juror had testified on voir dire that she had been married to someone who regularly bought and sold cocaine, had a child with that person, and then divorced him on account of his involvement with drugs, all within approximately five years of sitting on the jury. As the court noted, the activities of the juror's husband, which led to her divorce and the break-up of her family, resembled the fact pattern in the case in which she served. Id. at 1114. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 35 The Thompson and Gonzalez courts both concluded: When a juror is unable to state that she will serve fairly and impartially despite being asked repeatedly for such assurances, we can have no confidence that the juror will 'lay aside' her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences and render a fair and impartial verdict. Thompson, 248 F.3d at 627 (quoting Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1114). 36 Despite persistent questioning, juror 8 did not state unequivocally that he would be able to keep a completely open mind, remain impartial, and reserve a determination of guilt or innocence until the conclusion of trial. However, unlike Thompson and Gonzalez, in which there was testimony concerning both the prior beliefs of the jurors in question and the jurors' inability to set aside those beliefs in the case they were to consider, here there is no evidence of any prior bias. Nor is there any evidence that juror 8 learned any extrinsic information that would have prejudiced him. Instead, any doubts that the juror may have expressed on voir dire are traceable to the testimony that he had already heard. Unlike pretrial voir dire, the voir dire in question in this case occurred on the fourth day of trial, after several days of testimony. Not only is there nothing wrong with juror 8's being influenced by such prior testimony, he is supposed to be. This testimony is necessarily going to be a factor in a competent juror's determination of guilt or innocence. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court's decision to accept the juror's assurance of impartiality as sufficient was within its discretion. 37