Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence as to Premeditated Murder

Text: (23a) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of a wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder or even of an intentional killing in this case. He asserts the encounters with the victims were completely unplanned and there was no preexisting reflection involved in the killings. They occurred spontaneously when the victims suddenly began to kick and scream, and defendant simply sought to quiet the victims, not realizing they were asphyxiating. He argues again that his voluntary intoxication on the nights of the killings negated any ability to maturely and meaningfully reflect on the gravity of his acts. [22] (24a) Defendant further argues that since evidence of premeditation is insufficient and since one cannot tell the theory on which the jury relied, his first degree murder convictions must be reversed. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 69-70.) (23b) While evidence of a premeditated murder was less adequate than evidence that the killings were done in the commission of rape and sodomy, we conclude that evidence of premeditated murder was sufficient to go to the jury, and in any event the verdict indicates that a felony-murder theory was relied on. We must first reject defendant's repeated characterization of the facts of these killings as involving his attempt to quiet each of his victims by holding a cloth over her mouth. Evidence supported a finding not just of suffocation but of strangulation, and as we have previously noted, this method of killing is indicative of at least a deliberate intent to kill. ( People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 733-734 [214 Cal. Rptr. 801, 700 P.2d 415]; People v. Rowland (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 1, 9 [184 Cal. Rptr. 346].) It is true, however, that evidence of premeditation and deliberation was not great. (25) We noted in Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, that evidence of premeditation and deliberation fell into three basic categories: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward and explicable as intended to result in, the killing โ what may be characterized as `planning' activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a `motive' to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result of `a preexisting reflection' and `careful thought and weighing of considerations' rather than `mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed' [citation omitted]; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a `preconceived design' to take his victim's life in a particular way for a `reason' which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2). Analysis of the cases will show that this court sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3). ( Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27 (italics in original); see also People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1018 [245 Cal. Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342]; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 556 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]; People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 592 [217 Cal. Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106].) (23c) Evidence of planning in this case is admittedly slim particularly with respect to the Bristol killing. Although there was some evidence defendant may have been acquainted with Bristol, he did apparently encounter her when she was hitchhiking on the night of the killing. His encounter with Ryan was also by chance in that he did not at first seek her out to kill her but instead met her in the park and at the pizza parlor with a group of mutual friends. We have remarked, however, that the reflection necessary for premeditation and deliberation is not measured solely by duration of time. ( Wright, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 593.) As noted above, his van provided no chance for escape once someone was inside. He was in a violent mood on the night of the Bristol killing, admitting in his statement to police that he had set out to beat up a homosexual. Likewise on the night of the Ryan killing he expressed the intent to violently sexually assault Ryan. Given that state of mind and given that the victims were taped and strangled, a jury might infer that the killings were planned even though the time for reflection was slight. (Cf. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1019.) Evidence of motive is clearly present. Both victims were killed in connection with sexual assaults when they screamed and fought violently. The jury might reasonably infer they were killed to silence them and conceal the crime. Further, given the assaults with the baseball bat, biting the victims' breasts, and burning their pubic hair, the jury might even infer that strangulation was sexually motivated, a part of the total abuse of the victims in this case. (See People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 49 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].) Finally, the manner of killing does not necessarily establish a sudden explosion of violence rather than a calculated killing. (See People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 626 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) Again the injuries to the body carried significant sexual overtones. This was not a case of random stabbings or bludgeoning but of specifically sexual violence repeated in almost every detail with both victims. Defendant argues that his expert evidence on voluntary intoxication and his testimony as to his state of intoxication from alcohol and marijuana on the nights of the killings establish that he could not have premeditated and deliberated in the case of either killing; but the jury was certainly entitled to conclude otherwise. As the Attorney General notes, the only evidence of his intoxication on the night of the Bristol killing is defendant's own claim to that effect. And while he did establish he had been drinking and smoking marijuana on the night of the Ryan murder, his own expert conceded it was possible even for an alcoholic while drinking to form the specific intent to kill. It was up to the jury, which was instructed on the diminished capacity defense, to determine whether on the night of the crimes defendant actually had the intent to kill and had premeditated these killings. He had presented only the possibility that his capacity to do so was diminished. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the prosecution sustained its burden of proof on a theory of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. ( Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1018; People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 518 [186 Cal. Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338]; Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 576.) (24b) Finally, we can tell in this case that the jury did not return their first degree murder verdict solely on a premeditation theory. As the Attorney General notes, even though the verdict forms for murder do not indicate the theory relied on, the jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder of each victim was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of rape and sodomy. Defendant objects that the special circumstance finding is not the equivalent of a finding of felony murder since the special circumstance finding does not necessarily require specific intent to rape but only that the killing occur during the commission of rape. It does not matter, however, whether or not the two are equivalent. We are not curing a defect in a felony-murder instruction with a special circumstance finding. We are simply trying to determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested.... ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 69.) The special circumstance findings adequately serve that purpose. [23]