Opinion ID: 200824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discretionary immunity only applies if the actor had actual authority

Text: 97 Discretionary immunity protects government decisions from tort liability only when the decision-maker is acting within the scope of his actual authority. See, e.g., Hatahley, 351 U.S. at 180-81, 76 S.Ct. 745 (holding that the discretionary function does not apply where the decision-maker lacks authority); K.W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 721, 727 n. 4 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that a decision cannot be shielded from liability if the decisionmaker is acting without actual authority) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 800 F.2d at 1196-97 (determining that unauthorized actions are not shielded from liability under the discretionary function exception); Birnbaum, 588 F.2d at 329-30. The majority correctly presented this aspect of the discretionary function test. However, the majority incorrectly concluded that the Coast Guard had authority to order the evacuation of the NORTHERN VOYAGER. 98 The issue upon which I most ardently disagree with the majority is whether the Coast Guard, when asked to provide salvage assistance to a stricken vessel, has authority under 14 U.S.C. § 88, or any other statute, to compel an unwilling master to quit salvage efforts and to evacuate his vessel when Coast Guard personnel determine that further salvage efforts would be futile or dangerous. 99
100 Whatever the scope of 14 U.S.C. § 88, the statute does not confer unlimited authority upon Coast Guard officials to act in any way they see fit merely because they are engaged in rescue efforts. It is true that the statute's cryptic direction to perform any and all acts necessary may sound like a grant of unlimited authority to the Coast Guard. 20 Nevertheless, the language does not empower the Coast Guard, in a rescue context, to issue orders without regard to the statute's purpose or the rights of private citizens. 101 A glance at identical language from analogous federal statutes reveals that Congress cannot have intended such any and all acts provisions to constitute an independent grant of unbounded authority. 21 In nearly every instance in which Congress has granted an agency authority to perform any and all acts necessary to further some legislative goal, it is evident from the context that the provision grants an agency general implementary powers, but is not intended to expand the scope of that agency's powers beyond those that may fairly be implied from the substantive sections and the functions there defined. See PSC of New York v. FERC, 866 F.2d 487, 492 (D.C.Cir.1989) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C.Cir. 1973)). 102 Not surprisingly, when construing other statutes employing this phrase, this Court has found that the phrase any and all acts does not itself grant independent powers, but merely provides for implementation of the core purposes of the statute. For example, when construing analogous language from the Federal Power Act, we concluded: 103 While the Federal Power Act contains a necessary and appropriate provision, see 16 U.S.C. § 825h (granting FERC power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary and appropriate), that provision merely augments whatever existing powers have been conferred on FERC by Congress, without itself comprising a source of independent authority to act. 104 Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 369-70 (1st Cir.1988) (emphasis in the original) (internal citations omitted); see also New England Power Co. v. FPC, 467 F.2d 425, 430-31 (D.C.Cir.1972). 105 The phrase any and all acts authorizes the Coast Guard to implement and maintain a capability to conduct search and rescue operations. The phrase does not literally mean that the Coast Guard may perform any action that is tangentially rescue-related, without regard to that action's lawfulness, or proper delegation, or potential impact on the rights of civilian mariners. 22 106 The majority recognizes the logic of this argument in part when it notes that the Coast Guard's power under the statute is not unbridled. Maj. Op. at II(B)(3). To avoid giving the Coast Guard the unlimited power it claims, yet still give it enough authority to meet the discretionary immunity test, the majority judicially creates a limitation to § 88 out of whole cloth. It holds that Coast Guard authority exists only during life-threatening situations when there is an objectively reasonable belief by safety officers that a true emergency exists and there is an immediate need for assistance or aid. Needless to say, there is no mention of such a limitation in the congressional history or in previous case law regarding § 88, yet the majority depends on this limitation to uphold the proposition that the Coast Guard had actual authority. 107 The problem with judicial legislation is that it often conflicts with the wording and intent of the statute. Such is the present case. The majority's creation conflicts with the very purpose of the discretionary function exception. The basis of the discretionary function exception was Congress' desire to prevent judicial second guessing. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Once a court determines that an agency's decision was discretionary, it is not thereafter free to determine whether the decision-maker properly perceived the emergency to be life-threatening and whether such a perception was objectively reasonable. An agency's discretionary decisions are immune whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Therefore, once a decision is deemed to be the kind of decision the exception was designed to shield, this Court's inquiry must come to an end. As the Supreme Court concluded, where the government is performing a discretionary function, the fact that the discretion is exercised in a negligent manner does not make [the exception] inapplicable. Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 784 n. 13 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 33, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953); Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 539, 108 S.Ct. 1954) (further citations omitted). Likewise, where the Coast Guard is performing a discretionary function, the fact that the decision-maker wrongly perceived the situation to be life-threatening will not make the exception inapplicable. 108 The better and, in my belief, the only correct interpretation of § 88 is one that does not require judicial legislation. Like statutes with similar language, § 88 grants the Coast Guard general implementary powers. It does not grant the Coast Guard the authority to threaten an unwilling master to evacuate his vessel if Coast Guard personnel determine that further salvage efforts would be dangerous. 109 I am unaware of any case or authority, nor does the majority cite to any, conferring such sweeping authority upon the Coast Guard in the search and rescue context, other than the statute in question. 23 Keeping these general limitations in mind, we turn to the substantive language and purpose of § 88 to determine whether the Coast Guard's evacuation order was within the permissible range of actions authorized by the statute.
110 The Coast Guard is the historical product of five federal agencies. 24 In 1915 the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service and the U.S. Lifesaving Service were merged to form a new agency, the U.S. Coast Guard. D.C. Baldinelli, The U.S. Coast Guard's Assignment to the Department of Homeland Security: Entering Uncharted Waters or Just a Course Correction? (Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gcp/history/Homeland Security Baldinelli.html. In the 1930s and 1940s the Coast Guard absorbed the U.S. Lighthouse Service, the Steamboat Inspection Service and the Bureau of Navigation. Id. In 1967, the Coast Guard was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Department of Transportation. Id. In 2003, the Coast Guard was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C.S. § 101 (2003). 111 It thus appears that the Coast Guard, or its predecessors, has been with us since the inception of the Republic. Yet, in all of its various forms there is not a single reported case, not a shred of documented evidence, not an iota of coherent legislative history, sanctioning the exercise of the extraordinary executive powers claimed by the Coast Guard in this case. 112 The earliest Congressional statutes authorizing a government agency to perform search and water rescues provided that rescuers could only aid distressed sailors. See Act of Dec. 22, 1837, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 208 (1837) (cited in The Huntsville, 12 F.Cas. 996 (E.D.S.C.1860) (No. 6916) (Congress authorized the President to cause ... public vessels ... to cruise upon the coast, in the severe portion of the season ... to afford such aid to distressed navigators as their circumstance and necessities may require; and such public vessels shall go to sea prepared fully to render such assistance)). The authority granted by this original statute was only to aid navigators as their necessities required. See id. Other Congressional legislation similarly established Coast Guard stations and provided Coast Guard funding for the purpose of assisting vessels ... from the perils of the sea. Act of Apr. 19, 1906, ch. 1640, 34 Stat. 123; see also Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 417, 39 Stat. 601 (providing funding for cutters to be used for rendering aid to vessels in distress); Act of June 24, 1914, ch. 124, 38 Stat. 387 (providing funding for two cutters to provide medical aid to vessels engaged in the deep-sea fisheries); Act of May 12, 1906, ch. 2454, 34 Stat. 190 (providing funding for a steam vessel to provide service at sea). 113 Similar to previous statutes granting a governmental agency the power to aid distressed sailors, under § 88, Congress granted the Coast Guard broad powers to render aid, rescue and aid and furnish clothing, food, lodging, medicines, and other necessary supplies to distressed persons and vessels. 14 U.S.C. § 88(a)(3). Neither the history of § 88 nor case law interpreting § 88 support the proposition that the Coast Guard has the authority to force a master to evacuate his vessel. 114 Cases involving § 88 focus exclusively on two issues. First, courts uniformly hold that the Coast Guard is legally indistinguishable from private mariners regarding its duty to rescue. 25 See, e.g., In re American Oil Co., 417 F.2d 164, 168 (5th Cir.1969). Second, reviewing courts have concluded that the Coast Guard becomes liable for an attempted rescue when its actions fail to comply with standards of ordinary care and acceptable seamanship. United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir.1967).
115 The Coast Guard does not have a duty to provide aid or rescue services to distressed persons or vessels. See Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir.2003) (finding that [t]he United States Coast Guard does not have an affirmative duty to rescue persons in distress); Sandra & Dennis Fishing, 372 F.2d at 195 (finding that the Coast Guard is under no obligation to provide rescue service on demand). So while § 88 empowers the Coast Guard to maintain rescue facilities and carry out rescue efforts, the Coast Guard is legally indistinguishable from a private salvor when it comes to providing rescue assistance. Accordingly, 116 [t]he Coast Guard, like a private salvor, renders voluntary assistance where no duty to help is owed the person or vessel in distress. True, it is a statutory function of the Coast Guard to establish and operate rescue facilities. Congress has also provided that the Coast Guard may render aid to persons and protect and save property at any time and at any place at which Coast Guard facilities and personnel are available and can be effectively utilized. 14 U.S.C. § 88(b). But this legislation falls short of creating a governmental duty of affirmative action owed to a person or vessel in distress. 117 In re American Oil, 417 F.2d at 168 (quoting Frank v. United States, 250 F.2d 178, 180 (3d Cir.1957)) (internal citation omitted). Thus while § 88 authorizes the Coast Guard to conduct rescues, it does not impose any affirmative duty to do so.
118 Once the Coast Guard engages in aid or rescue efforts, the United States, like its private counterparts, will be liable only where there is a failure to carry out the rescue mission or aid in accordance with standards of acceptable seamanship. Sandra & Dennis Fishing, 372 F.2d at 197. That means that [w]hatever may be the limits of this principle with respect to volunteered salvage, we believe that if the Coast Guard accepts a mission it should conduct its share of the proceeding with acceptable seamanship. Id. (internal citation omitted). 119 Thus, once the Coast Guard begins providing rescue assistance to a distressed vessel or persons, its authority under § 88 is bounded by the duty of acceptable seamanship it owes to the vessel owner or distressed persons. Whatever else may be said about the limits of the statute, § 88 cannot be construed in a manner which would vitiate the Coast Guard's duty of acceptable seamanship when carrying out volunteer salvage services to distressed vessels or persons. 120 Therefore we are presented with the relatively straightforward question of whether the Coast Guard's forced evacuation order was consistent with principles of acceptable seamanship. I conclude it was not. Had a private salvor coercively compelled the master and crew to quit salvage efforts and abandon the NORTHERN VOYAGER, there is no question but that the case would have proceeded to trial to determine whether the salvor's actions affirmatively worsened the condition of the vessel. Here, the Coast Guard, acting in its capacity as a private salvor, violated numerous principles of acceptable seamanship by compelling the master to abandon the NORTHERN VOYAGER and wrongfully depriving him of the opportunity to halt further flooding of the vessel and await commercial salvage assistance. 121
122 Though there are no cases directly on point as to whether an order such as the one issued by the Coast Guard is within the bounds of acceptable seamanship, 26 the law of salvage provides valuable guidance on this issue. Salvage law governs the rescue and salvage of vessels in marine peril. 123 One well-established principle is that shipowners and masters have a right to refuse salvage assistance. The right to refuse salvage is a firmly established right of vessel owners and masters: [u]nder nearly all supposable circumstances when the master is in command and control of his own ship he may refuse and reject salvage services, and no volunteer salvor can force on him, and be rewarded for, services which he forbids. The Indian, 159 F. 20, 25 (5th Cir.1908). This Court has previously acknowledged the master's right to refuse unwanted assistance. In Hamburg-American Line v. United States, we noted that salvage services may not be forced on the unwilling. 168 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir.1948). This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement that salvage cannot be exacted for assistance forced upon a ship. Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 611, 613, 47 S.Ct. 663, 71 L.Ed. 1232 (1927). Other cases strongly support this interpretation of salvage law as well. 27 See New Harbor Protection Co. v. Charles P. Chouteau, 5 F. 463, 464 (D.La.1881) (holding that a master has a perfect right to decline any assistance that may be offered him: he should not be assisted against his will). 124 The majority claims that dicta in two district court cases limits the right to decline salvage assistance to instances where only the owner's property interests are at stake. First, it is important to remember that the majority is relying on mere dicta. Second, this dicta is of dubious value because the rule espoused is contrary to the well-established law of salvage. Third, the dicta cited by the majority limits the right to decline salvage assistance from a private salvor to instances when there is danger of large losses of property to third persons or when the master's decision to decline salvage assistance was so palpably and so grossly wrong as to amount to positive misconduct in reference to the claims of humanity. Ramsey v. Pohatcong, 77 F. 996 (S.D.N.Y.1896); Smit Americas, Inc. v. M/T MANTINIA, 259 F.Supp.2d 118, 134 (D.P.R.2003). The NORTHERN VOYAGER did not pose a threat to the property of third persons. Captain Haggerty's decision to continue efforts to salvage his ship was also not so palpably and grossly wrong, evidenced by the fact that the ship remained upright for fifty-five minutes after he was forced to evacuate the NORTHERN VOYAGER, and afloat for some time after capsizing, all of which was more than enough time to have saved his ship, particularly if the Coast Guard had not interfered with the salvor. The Coast Guard has never claimed that there was any regulatory, military, or law enforcement basis for compelling the NORTHERN VOYAGER's crew to evacuate their vessel. All of the officers who remained aboard the NORTHERN VOYAGER freely volunteered to do so, and there is no indication that any of them were acting in a deranged or reckless manner. 125 The language of § 88, as well as the long line of cases holding that the Coast Guard is legally indistinguishable from a private party when providing voluntary salvage assistance, compel the conclusion that the Coast Guard lacked authority and acted outside the bounds of acceptable seamanship forcing the crew to abandon the NORTHERN VOYAGER. 28 126
127 The lack of federal case law or legislative history granting the Coast Guard authority to force a captain from his vessel has led the majority to analogize the actions of the Coast Guard to actions of state public officials during times of emergencies on land. The majority concluded that it is reasonable to assume  (emphasis added) that Congress intended to confer powers to the Coast Guard analogous to those possessed by state safety officials, namely, the power to rescue a person even against his will in life-threatening situations. Maj. Op. at II(B)(3). I find such an assumption totally unwarranted and, like other parts of the majority opinion, unsupported by any authority. 128 First, there is nothing in the text of § 88 or its legislative history to support such an assertion, and furthermore, the assumption that Congress intended to confer such extraordinary powers by analogy or by implication is in itself a dubious proposition. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 470, 105 S.Ct. 1441 (refusing to transfer, by analogy, the wording of a state statute into a federal statute because neither the language of the [federal] statute nor the circumstances surrounding its passage supported such an analogy). 129 Second, in those cases where courts have found that state safety officials were specifically granted the power to force people from their homes during life-threatening emergencies, that power had been authorized by specific legislative enactment. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.70.075(a)(2) (granting the fire department authority to... order a person to leave a building); see also Conn. Gen.Stat. § 7-313b; Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 6701A(2); N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 154:7; Tenn.Code Ann. § 6-21-703; W. Va.Code § 29-3A-1. In contrast, there is no federal statute remotely similar to these state statutes specifically granting the Coast Guard authority to order a ship's master to abandon his vessel. Moreover, unlike state governments, the federal government does not have a general police power — something that is probably beyond the authority of any branch of the federal government to create extra-constitutionally. See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903). 130 Third, life-threatening emergencies on land are very different from life-threatening emergencies at sea. Many state statutes grant the state governor or local authorities the power to declare an emergency which would result in a forced evacuation. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. 26.23.020; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 252.38; Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 37-B, § 742; Minn.Stat. Ann. § 12.21; Or.Rev. Stat. §§ 401.305, 401.309; Tenn.Code Ann. § 58-2-118. On land, it may be presumed that a trained law enforcement official has more knowledge than an average person about an impending emergency, such as a storm or a fire. At sea, however, a captain's expertise regarding his ship places him in the best position to determine the actual peril of his vessel and how best to save it. Coast Guardsmen, unfamiliar with the vessel involved in the emergency, ought not be able to substitute their judgment for that of the master by forcing evacuation upon him. In an emergency situation, it is unwise for the least knowledgeable to command the most knowledgeable. 131 Fourth, allowing the Coast Guard to dictate to the master how to save his ship interferes with the vital relationship between a master and his vessel. As one expert on the duties of a master has testified, a master has no umbilical cord of support. He is the sole decision maker and he lives with the responsibility that he's got to discharge, under adverse and varied conditions, calling upon those levels of expertise at moments and when he's least expecting it. In re Exxon Valdez, 1995 WL 527990, at  (D.Alaska, Jan.27, 1995). The exigencies and realities of life at sea require that there be a rigid chain of command aboard a ship. A master's responsibility to his ship is nondelegable and should be free from officious meddling. Particularly in times of life-threatening emergencies, it is unwise to interfere with the chain of command by forcing the master to succumb to the orders and directions of an intervening governmental bureaucracy, particularly one which ultimately disclaims responsibility for its actions. 132