Opinion ID: 77304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Hold a Faretta Hearing

Text: 12 Prior to trial, the court considered a potential conflict of interest issue regarding Gamble's continued representation by the Public Defender's Office. The record reflects the following exchange on this matter: 13 THE COURT: Before we get started on all the motions, . . . I think there's an issue that needs to be addressed regarding the continued representing of the defendant, Mr. Gamble, by Mr. Nacke, and in particular, the Public Defender's Office; is that correct, Mr. Nacke? 14 MR. NACKE: Yes, . . . I know the Court is aware of the situation. Our office and myself was instructed to go to my client with a Consent and Waiver Form to ask him to consent and waive a potential conflict because of a relationship between Michael Johnson and Michelle Morley. Michael Johnson being the Chief Assistant Public Defender of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in our office and Michelle Morley being one of the attorneys representing Mike Love. Based on that, and also the fact that Susan Graves who is employed as an Assistant Public Defender in the office of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, the Public Defender's Office, is the wife of Michael Graves, who is counsel for co-Defendant Michael Love. We were asked to notif[y] Mr. Gamble of that situation . . . and to ask him to sign a consent for us to continue representing him and to waive any potential conflict those relationships may create. 15 It has been our position from the outset of this request that, that there was no conflict, that there was no ethical duty for us to obtain this consent or waiver,. . . . The potential itself is, is not a conflict [nor] an ethical violation . . . . 16 As instructed . . . I drafted a Consent and Waiver Form for Mr. Gamble to sign, took it over to him, and he had many reservations. He considered it for a couple of days, and he indicated to me that he did not want to sign it; that, you know, that has caused him to distrust me as his attorney and the office of the Public Defender's Office in representing him. He told me that he wanted to have substitute counsel, did not want us to represent him anymore. I will let him, you know, make that motion himself, your Honor . . . . 17 THE COURT: [M]r. Gamble. 18 GAMBLE: At this time, your Honor, it's not so much that I distrust Mark as he said, I just feel that they brought me this potential conflict and I didn't—I don't see a problem with it but there, you know, I don't understand why it was brought to me if it wasn't a conflict, if it wasn't an ethical problem, you know. I didn't know about it beforehand, so, you know, I have a problem with signing it if, you know, if you can see fit to substitute counsel, you know. 19 THE COURT: Do you know of anything that your attorney has done that is inappropriate or improper on, on your behalf in representing you? 20 GAMBLE: Well, not anything that I could substantiate with law, you know. I've been to the law library here in Lake County and there's nothing that says that he's done anything legally or ethically wrong but . . . 21 THE COURT: Do you know of any improper exchange of confidential or privileged information by your attorney with anybody else in this case? 22 GAMBLE: No, I don't. 23 THE COURT: Is there any hint that that might have happened as far as you're concerned? 24 GAMBLE: Not—No, there's no hint that there was but I just, you know, all I can say is there's a potential of, you know, a relationship between the persons, you know, the situation things could be said at moments that, you know, normally wouldn't leave those two people but in the circumstances. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, sir? 26 GAMBLE: No. 27 After further testimony from counsel for Gamble and co-defendant Love, the court [found] that there are no grounds for removal of your attorney, Mr. Gamble, . . . no evidence to support that [request], . . . and no grounds to appoint another counsel in this case. 28 In addition to agreeing with the trial court's substantive findings as to the necessity of removing and appointing counsel, Gamble, 877 So.2d at 717-18, the Florida Supreme Court held that no Faretta inquiry was necessary in this case because Gamble never asked to represent himself. Id. at 718 (citing Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1028 (Fla.1999)). We cannot say that this determination was contrary to, or was an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent—including Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 29 Faretta held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Id. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Thus, in order for there to be a Faretta violation, the defendant must have indicated that he wishes to conduct his own defense. Gamble's statements to the trial court simply did not express this wish. Rather, Gamble submitted—at most—a conditional request: essentially, I would like to discharge my counsel if the court will appoint a different one. Gamble points to no precedent from the United States Supreme Court supporting his contention that this request should have been treated as an invocation of his Faretta right, and he ignores that Court's strongly worded suggestion to the contrary. 3 30 As the Florida Supreme Court recognized, a defendant's assertion of his desire to proceed without counsel is the starting-point for any federal Faretta claim: If the defendant decides to continue without representation, the dictates of Faretta are triggered, and the trial court must determine whether the defendant's decision is knowingly and intelligently made. Gamble, 877 So.2d at 717. In holding that Gamble did not ask to continue without representation, the state Supreme Court did not contradict or unreasonably apply United States Supreme Court precedent. Therefore Gamble's Faretta claim must fail.