Opinion ID: 2582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Charging Document

Text: The Certificate of Disposition reprinted the Information, which revealed that Savage was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, Sale of Controlled Substance ... in violation of [Connecticut General Statute §] 21a-277(b). At sentencing, the government argued that this charging document established that the charge was narrowed to the sale of a controlled substance. In response, Savage argued that the charging document did not narrow the charge and that, even if it did, it did not narrow the charge to predicate limits. Specifically, Savage argued that if the charge was narrowed, it was narrowed only to a sale and that, under Connecticut law, a sale encompasses more conduct than falls within the Guidelines' definition of a controlled substance offense. Prior to oral argument, in a submission pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), the government, at first, partly abandoned its reliance on the charging document. Citing our recent decision in United States v. Green, 480 F.3d 627 (2d Cir.2007), the government requested that, in the event we were to conclude that neither the statute of conviction nor the plea colloquy established that Savage was convicted of a controlled substance offense, we should remand for further fact-finding on the issue of whether the Sale of a Controlled Substance notation in the Information was (a) a case-specific descriptor of the charges brought against this particular defendant or (b) computer-generated shorthand used by default for generic charges brought under the Connecticut Statute. At oral argument, the government abandoned its reliance on the charging document entirely. The government conceded that the charging document did not narrow the charge because the government had not shown, nor would attempt to show on remand, that the notation was a case-specific descriptor of the offense rather than something generated by a computer upon entry of the statutory section alone. Thus, the only remaining issues on appeal are (a) whether the Connecticut Statute criminalizes conduct that falls outside the federal definition of a controlled substance offense; and, if so, (b) whether the plea colloquy established that Savage was convicted of a narrowed charge that falls exclusively within the Guidelines' definition of a controlled substance offense.