Opinion ID: 1408550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Special Circumstance of Murder During the Commission of Kidnaping.

Text: The finding of a felony-murder special circumstance based on kidnaping is also flawed by the absence of an instruction on the element of intent to kill or to aid a killing. (16) Defendant additionally contends that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove that the murder occurred during the commission of both kidnaping as defined in section 207 and kidnaping as defined in section 209. [14] He points out that the 1977 death penalty law provided a special circumstance for a murder during the commission or attempted commission of several enumerated felonies, including [k]idnapping in violation of Section 207 or 209.... (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(3), italics added.) The 1978 law changed the language to the conjunctive, specifying [k]idnapping in violation of Sections 207 and 209. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), italics added.) This change in the statutory language, he maintains, requires proof of a violation of both section 207 and 209 as a basis for the special circumstance. The Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Talamantez v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal. App.3d 629, 639 [176 Cal. Rptr. 800], and resolved that: The more reasonable statutory construction is that either form of kidnap suffices for invocation of the extreme penalty. Looking at subparagraph (17) of section 190.2, subdivision (a), as a whole, it is a conjunctive enumeration of the various crimes which, if accompanied by murder, may result in the death penalty being applied. The separate enumeration of section 207 and section 209 in subsection (ii) of (17) can thus be reasonably seen as two of these enumerated offenses, also listed conjunctively, but grouped together within one subsection because of their close relationship. Thus, just as both robbery (i) and rape (iii) are individually sufficient, and both are not required, so also are simple kidnap or kidnap for robbery (both in (ii)) each individually sufficient for the statutory purpose. As the Court of Appeal explained in People v. Horn (1984) 158 Cal. App.3d 1014, 1027-1028 [205 Cal. Rptr. 119], the word and is often carelessly used when or is intended. We think that type of error occurred in the drafting of subparagraph (17), and that the intent of the provision was to permit a special circumstance finding if the defendant was convicted of kidnaping under either section 207 or 209, and found to have committed murder while engaged in such kidnaping. Therefore, adopting the construction of the kidnaping special circumstance advanced in Talamantez, we reject defendant's contention that the court erred in not requiring proof of a violation of both section 207 and section 209. As noted earlier, however, the court did err in failing to instruct that the kidnaping special circumstance requires proof that defendant intended to kill or to aid in a killing. The judgment is reversed.