Opinion ID: 1588415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the scra order is final because it disposed of every issue

Text: The majority opinion concludes that Rollins could appeal because custody proceedings are special proceedings and because the court's refusal to grant a stay may result in an order adversely affecting a servicemember's civil rights. I agree that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) [1] is intended to prevent the imposition of orders that adversely affect a servicemember's civil rights during his or her military service. But under Neb.Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008), a special proceeding order is final only if it affects a substantial right. Although parents have a constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, [2] Rollins appeared at the child custody hearing, and her right to be heard on the custody issue was obviously not affected by the SCRA order. And orders that simply move a case forward to trial do not affect a substantial right. [3] In short, the order denying a stay did not affect a substantial right in the manner that we have often interpreted that term under § 25-1902. I concede navigating the appellate swamp of special proceedings and nailing down what is a substantial right can be perplexing. But in this case, I believe Rollins can appeal under § 25-1902 because the order completely disposed of the issue in the SCRA proceeding. Initially, it appears that the majority opinion fails to separately consider whether the orders from the SCRA proceeding and custody proceeding were issued in a special proceeding. The first issue is whether Rollins could appeal from the SCRA order denying a stay of the custody proceeding. And that issue is separate from whether she could appeal from the temporary custody order. Under § 25-1902, an appellate court may review three types of final orders: (1) an order affecting a substantial right in an action that, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; (2) an order affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding; and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. [4] Obviously, a SCRA proceeding is not limited to custody proceedings and is not a necessary step in such proceedings. Instead, it is a stand-alone, federally authorized proceeding, which is similar in effect to a motion to stay judicial proceedings and compel arbitration. Both types of motions invoke a procedure that can result in an order to postpone (or to dismiss in arbitration cases) the main action for reasons that exist independently of the parties' dispute. The proceeding is authorized regardless of whether a pleading raises the right to a stay (or dismissal). And the order in either procedure does not resolve the parties' dispute. [5] We have held that motions to compel arbitration are special proceedings because they are a specific statutory remedy that is not itself an action or a step or proceeding within the over-all action. [6] Under that definition, I believe a motion to stay a judicial proceeding under the SCRA is similarly a special proceeding. But to be appealable, an order in a special proceeding must also affect a substantial right. [7] In an arbitration case, we have held that if the Legislature has not specifically authorized an appeal from an arbitration order, [8] whether a party can appeal from the order depends upon whether it affects a substantial right. [9] We have often stated that a substantial right is an essential legal right, not a mere technical right. [10] A substantial right is affected if an order affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim or defense that was available to the appellant before the order from which he or she is appealing. [11] But our statements have been criticized as failing to provide consistent guidance for determining when an order from a special proceeding is final. [12] And our recent arbitration cases show that a substantial right has more than one meaning. In Webb v. American Employers Group , [13] we held that an order denying the insurer's motion to compel arbitration affected a substantial right in a special proceeding because it prevented the insurer from enjoying the contractual benefit of its agreement to arbitrate disputes. In Webb, we interpreted substantial right to mean the insurer's contractual right. In other special proceedings, we have similarly placed emphasis on the right adversely affected by the order. For example, in juvenile cases, detention, adjudication, and disposition orders are final and appealable because each stage of the proceeding affects parental rights. [14] Appellate review of state interference in the parent-child relationship cannot wait until the court ultimately determines compliance with a rehabilitation plan or decides whether to reunite the family or terminate parental rights. Both juvenile cases and probate cases are examples of what one commentator has called multi-faceted proceedings: long-term proceedings resolving interrelated issues at different stages of the proceedings. [15] In appeals from multifaceted proceedings, I believe the focus should be on whether an order's effect on the parties' rights is significant enough to require immediate appellate review even if other issues are left to be resolved. [16] But hearings to compel arbitration or stay judicial proceedings, like other special proceedings, are not a part of a whole. They are stand-alone proceedings intended to resolve discrete issues. Unlike multifaceted proceedings, they do not involve protracted litigation of interrelated issues. And our identification of the substantial right in Webb as a contractual right conflicts with another recent arbitration case. These cases illustrate that we have sometimes struggled to define a substantial right in stand-alone special proceedings. In State ex rel. Bruning v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., [17] the State appealed from the trial court's order granting the defendants' motion to compel arbitration and dismissing the State's declaratory judgment action. We concluded this was also a final order. But instead of focusing on the State's substantial right as we had in Webb, we focused on the relief granted in the special proceeding: Because the contractual benefit of arbitrating the dispute between the parties [under the federal Arbitration Act] as an alternative to litigation is ordinarily a substantial right ... and because the court dismissed the declaratory judgment action, we determine that under § 25-1902, the order was a final order of the first type, i.e., one which affected a substantial right and which determined the action and prevented a judgment. The order to dismiss the action determined the action and prevented the State from receiving the declaratory judgment that it sought. We therefore conclude that under § 25-1902, the order is a final order for purposes of appeal. [18] Our conclusion that the order prevented a declaratory judgment was correct. But on further reflection, I believe we should not have focused on the relief granted but on whether the order disposed of all the issues. Because we decided the issue on the trial court's dismissal of the main action, the order lost its characterization as a special proceeding order and became an order issued within an action. And we normally hinge our substantial right determinations on whether the order adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant. [19] This determination follows from the rule that only a party aggrieved by an order or judgment can appeal. [20] But in State ex rel. Bruning, the State's substantial right adversely affected by the order could not have been the State's contractual right to arbitrate. Instead, the case is an example of the difficulty of dealing with a final order statute that requires the order to affect an appellant's substantial right. [21] But I believe that we should resolve this problem by incorporating the meaning of a substantial right under the first category of § 25-1902an order affecting a substantial right in an action. As stated, final orders under the first category comprise orders that are issued during a step in an action and that dispose of all the issues, thus preventing a final judgment. Most notably, we have held that a summary judgment proceeding is a step or proceeding within the overall action, not a special proceeding. [22] Orders overruling motions for summary judgment are not appealable, and orders granting partial summary judgment are not appealable unless they decide the action and prevent a judgment. [23] To be a final order under the first type of reviewable order, an order must dispose of the whole merits of the case and must leave nothing for further consideration of the court, and thus, the order is final when no further action of the court is required to dispose of the pending cause; however, if the cause is retained for further action, the order is interlocutory. [24] In short, if the court retains the cause for any further purpose, we will not review the order until the court issues a final judgment in the action. [25] For final orders under the first category, we do not normally analyze the substantial right adversely affected by the order except to sometimes conclude that the order disposed of the appellant's claims. [26] But, clearly, no substantial right is affected by an order under the first category until the court disposes of every issue in the action. So, under the first category of final orders, we implicitly assume that the order affects the substantial right of a party not to be bound by an adverse order that has the effect of a final judgment without an opportunity to appeal. In recent decisions, we have applied a similar reasoning to determine whether an order was final under the second category of § 25-1902. We recognized that a special proceeding order was final because it disposed of all the issues or, conversely, was not final because the trial court had not yet determined the ultimate issue. [27] It appears that our concern about the loss of appellate review also explains why we permit an appeal from some special proceeding orders without analyzing the substantial right adversely affected. For example, we have permitted the State to appeal from writs of habeas corpus, which are issued in a special proceeding, without examining whether the order adversely affected a substantial right. [28] In these cases, the State's right to appeal is best explained by the finality of an order in a stand-alone proceeding that completely disposed of the State's claim that the inmate was not entitled to the writ. Without an opportunity to appeal the order, the State's substantial right to appellate review is lost. The same reasoning explains why the State could appeal in State ex rel. Bruning. The order adversely disposed of its claim that it could not be forced to arbitrate, and no other issues were pending before the court in that proceeding. So, as with final orders under the first category of § 25-1902, the State's substantial right was the right not to be bound by an order adversely affecting its claim without an opportunity for appellate review. Recognizing a substantial right to appellate review would avoid creating another special proceeding problem. By holding that the SCRA order was appealable because it completely disposed of the issues raised in a discrete special proceeding, we would avoid opening the door to appeals from special proceeding orders that may affect a substantial right. Therefore, I believe we should permit appeals from orders disposing of every issue in a stand-alone special proceeding based on the finality of the order. Orders from stand-alone special proceedings are distinguishable from orders affecting an essential legal right in a multifaceted proceeding that has interrelated stages and may require appellate review even if the order does not dispose of every issue. But in this appeal, a rule recognizing a substantial right to appellate review of an order disposing of all the issues in a discrete special proceeding would lead to the same conclusion regarding the SCRA order. So, I concur in the majority's judgment that Rollins could appeal from the SCRA order.