Opinion ID: 2570398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: 53 Whether the expert testimony on MSBP was properly admitted.

Text: ś 54 In regard to evidentiary matters, it is within the district court's discretion to determine whether or not evidence is relevant and admissible. See Beavers, ś 20. District courts are `vested with great latitude in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony.' State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ś 48, 294 Mont. 225, ś 48, 980 P.2d 3, ś 48 (citations omitted). Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn a district court's determinations on evidentiary matters. See Beavers, ś 20. ś 55 Susan challenged the admissibility of the MSBP expert testimony prior to trial. The District Court preliminarily ruled that the testimony would be admissible and that the jury was entitled to receive and weigh such evidence. The court noted that a further hearing outside of the presence of the jury might be necessary. The court conducted the hearing prior to the testimony of one of the State's expert witnesses, Dr. Randall Alexander, a Professor of Pediatrics. Alexander presented his prospective testimony. The court found that the foundational requirement for admission of MSBP testimony had been satisfied and allowed the State to present Alexander's testimony regarding MSBP to the jury. ś 56 Although both parties have framed their argument with regard to the admissibility of the MSBP expert testimony around the Daubert standard, that standard is inapplicable because it only applies to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. See, e.g., Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ś 18, 295 Mont. 345, ś 18, 983 P.2d 869, ś 18 (citations omitted). The expert testimony regarding MSBP is neither novel nor scientific. The term Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy has appeared in medical literature since at least 1977. Cf. State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ś 59, 294 Mont. 225, ś 59, 980 P.2d 3, ś 59 (holding that microscopic hair comparison evidence was not novel because the Court had considered several cases since 1978 and because comparing hair samples with a microscope had been done for decades and therefore Daubert standards were not applicable to determine its admissibility). While this Court has not previously addressed the admissibility of MSBP evidence, other courts have considered such evidence since 1981. See California v. Phillips (1981), 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 175 Cal.Rptr. 703. A Westlaw search reveals that the term Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy has appeared in over forty state and federal cases since then. Thus testimony regarding MSBP is not novel to the field of pediatrics or law. ś 57 Further, Alexander referred to MSBP as a form of child abuse in the field of pediatrics, not a psychiatric disorder, and his testimony on MSBP is therefore not scientific evidence subject to Daubert standards. Cf. Gilkey, ś 20 (holding that a physician's expert opinion on informed consent constitutes specialized knowledge of a medical professional, not novel scientific evidence). ś 58 Instead, we analyze the admissibility of the MSBP expert testimony under a conventional Rule 702 analysis. Rule 702 of the Montana Rules of Evidence, identical to its federal counterpart, states that: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Under such an analysis, a court must, before admitting expert testimony, determine (1) whether the subject matter requires expert testimony and (2) whether the putative expert has either special training or education and has adequate knowledge on which to base an opinion. Southern, ś 60. Regarding the first prong, we have held that `[e]xpert testimony is required in areas not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence.' Hulse v. State, 1998 MT 108, ś 48, 289 Mont. 1, ś 48, 961 P.2d 75, ś 48 (citation omitted). ś 59 We hold that testimony about MSBP is beyond the range of ordinary training or intelligence and is therefore a subject matter requiring expert testimony. [T]he dynamics of child abuse and specifically MSBP are generally not within the knowledge of the average juror. Lynn Holland Goldman & Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Mommie Dearest? Prosecuting Cases of Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy, 13 WTR Crim. Just. 2629 (1999). Cf. Southern, ś 61 (holding that microscopic hair comparison is beyond the range of ordinary training or intelligence and therefore subject on which an expert may testify); Hulse, ś 69 (holding that Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test is beyond the range of ordinary training or intelligence and therefore subject on which an expert may testify). ś 60 Having reviewed the transcript of the admissibility hearing, we also hold that the State established sufficient foundation to show that Alexander was qualified to testify on MSBP and that he had adequate knowledge on which to base an opinion in this case. The record shows that the State sufficiently established Alexander's medical training and experience, specifically his experience with MSBP. As a Professor of Pediatrics, Alexander had written and taught on the subject. The State also established that Alexander had adequate knowledge about the Hocevar family situation on which to base his diagnosis of MSBP. Alexander testified that he was given the medical records on all the Hocevar children and a variety of investigative statements as well as some information on Susan. ś 61 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony regarding MSBP into evidence.