Opinion ID: 2264505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issue 1: did the district court have jurisdiction to review kdhe's certification of the lpd's intoxilyzer 8000?

Text: For the first time on appeal, the State raises the preliminary question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to review the KDHE's certification of the LPD's Intoxilyzer 8000. The State contends that the district court's finding that the KDHE did not follow its own regulations in certifying the LPD and the Intoxilyzer 8000 amounted to an unlawful judicial review of state agency action. In a related argument, the State contends that Ernesti did not have standing to challenge the certification of the device because the certification was directed to the LPD, not Ernesti, and that even if Ernesti had standing, he failed to first exhaust all administrative remedies. Although the State raises these questions for the first time on appeal, jurisdictional matters may be raised at any time and even on an appellate court's own motion. See Shipe v. Public Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 289 Kan. 160, 166, 210 P.3d 105 (2009); Williams v. Lawton, 288 Kan. 768, 778, 207 P.3d 1027 (2009). Further, standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Both the general issue of jurisdiction and the more specific issue of standing are issues of law. Mid-Continent Specialists, Inc. v. Capital Homes, 279 Kan. 178, 185, 106 P.3d 483 (2005). The jurisdiction argument presented by the State begins with the correct statement that the legislature has delegated to the KDHE the task of developing regulations establishing procedures, testing protocols, qualifications, and standards of performing testing of human breath for law enforcement purposes. K.S.A.2009 Supp. 65-1,107(b); see K.S.A. 65-1,109 (making it unlawful for any person to make any test of the human breath for law enforcement purposes unless person has complied with KDHE's rules and regulations and the equipment complies with KDHE's rules and regulations). In fulfilling these duties, the KDHE has developed a procedure for law enforcement and other agencies to obtain certification of breath testing devices. An appeal from such a proceeding, as the State argues, would have to be taken under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. The KJRA requires the filing of a petition in order to begin an action for judicial review, and such a petition was not filed in this case. See K.S.A. 77-607; K.S.A. 77-610. Although these initial steps on which the State's argument is based are correct, those steps do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the KJRA applies to this appeal. The KJRA only applies to appeals of agency actions (K.S.A.2009 Supp. 77-603[a]), and none of the issues required to resolve this appeal involve an agency action. An agency action is defined to mean: (1) The whole or a part of a rule and regulation or an order; (2) the failure to issue a rule and regulation or an order; or (3) an agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any other duty, function or activity, discretionary or otherwise. K.S.A. 77-602(b). Ernesti does not attack the validity of or the failure to issue a rule or regulation. While he focuses on an agency orderthe certificationhe does not attack the process of certifying the LPD and its Intoxilyzer 8000 in January 2008 or on the decision that resulted from that application process. (Ernesti does attack the issuance of the September 2008 backdated certificate but, as will be discussed further, we do not reach the validity of that action.) Rather, the issues we resolve in this appeal were not the subject of any administrative proceeding. Hence, we conclude the State's jurisdiction argument fails. See State v. MacKenzie, 114 Wash.App. 687, 696, 60 P.3d 607 (2002) (holding that in DUI prosecutions trial courts did not reach beyond inherent powers into matters governed by state's Administrative Procedure Act when the courts interpreted administrative regulations on breath alcohol testing machines and addressed issues of regulations' validity and retroactivity). The State's argument that Ernesti lacks standing also lacks merit. While we agree that Ernesti would lack standing in an action under the KJRA regarding the device's certification, as a person charged with DUI based on a breath test failure, he has prudential standing to argue that the State cannot lay the necessary foundation to admit the breath test results into evidence in a criminal DUI proceeding. See State v. Strand, 261 Kan. 895, 898, 933 P.2d 713 (1997) (considering contention that blood alcohol content test results were improperly admitted because device had not been recertified following repair); State v. Pollman, 41 Kan.App.2d 20, 27-28, 204 P.3d 630 (2008) (considering challenge that device was not listed as an approved device in regulation and noting State's failure to show that device had been otherwise evaluated by the KDHE and met the regulations' criteria); State v. Shaw, 37 Kan.App.2d 485, 491-92, 154 P.3d 524 (2007) (addressing DUI defendant's challenge to procedure requirements related to implied consent advisories under K.S.A. 8-1001); see generally State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 892, 179 P.3d 366 (2008) (discussing standing requirement). In defining the evidentiary foundation for the admission of a test failure in a criminal DUI proceeding, this court has required the State, at a minimum, to present evidence that there was compliance with K.S.A.2009 Supp. 8-1002(a)(3). See State v. Bishop, 264 Kan. 717, 725, 957 P.2d 369 (1998). In various cases, this court and the Court of Appeals have paraphrased these requirements and the parties quibble over the significance of words used in some of those opinions. The important concept from the cases, however, is that K.S.A.2009 Supp. 8-1002(a)(3) establishes minimal foundation requirements. It requires the State to show: (A) The testing equipment used was certified by the Kansas department of health and environment; (B) the testing procedures used were in accordance with the requirements set out by the Kansas department of health and environment; and (C) the person who operated the testing equipment was certified by the Kansas department of health and environment to operate such equipment. K.S.A.2009 Supp. 8-1002(a)(3). Of these three requirements, it is only the firstthe certification of equipment by KDHEthat is questioned by Ernesti. He does so by attacking the agency certification issued in January 2008. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR), in its amicus curiae brief, notes that there is no explicit requirement of agency certification in K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 8-1002(a)(3). Nevertheless, K.A.R. 28-32-1(a)(1) (revoked March 14, 2008) established a process where a law enforcement agency applied to KDHE for the certification of the test equipment and through this mechanism the equipment was certified. Cf. K.A.R. 28-32-9(b) (effective March 14, 2008; providing: [1] The agency head shall specify each certified [evidential breath alcohol test] device proposed for conducting evidential breath alcohol testing.). Further, KDHE worded the certificates (both the one effective January 15, 2008, and the one effective March 14, 2008) to reflect that the LPD has met the requirements . . . for testing of human breath for alcohol for law enforcement purposes with the Intozilyzer 8000. Consequently, while K.S.A.2009 Supp. 8-1002(a)(3) does not require proof of agency certification, as a practical matter providing proof of device certification means that an agency applied for and received the certification. We do not, therefore, dismiss Ernesti's argument simply because it is phrased as a failure to obtain agency certification. Further, because our decision today is based on the old regulations, we do not address the foundation requirements under the new regulations. Under the old regulations, as Ernesti argues, the State must establish that the specific testing device was certified in order for the test results to be admitted into evidence, and Ernesti has standing to challenge whether the State sustained its burden. We, therefore, consider the merits of his challenge.