Opinion ID: 3134382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ill App. 3d 961, 977-78 (1990); Long v. Friesland, 178 Ill. App.

Text: 3d 42, 59-60 (1988). The record in this case shows that the employer was not prejudiced by the timing of Morrison's third-party action. A review of the procedural history of this case is necessary for resolution of this issue. The plaintiff filed his action against Morrison on September 20, 1991. Morrison answered the complaint on October 28, 1991. In answers to interrogatories filed on March 23, 1992, the plaintiff stated that he was employed at Baker's Auto Repair. On May 15, 1992, Morrison sought leave to file a third-party complaint for contribution against Ricky Baker, charging that Ricky Baker's negligence caused the accident. This third-party complaint alleged that, at the time of the collision, the plaintiff was an employee of Ricky W. Baker, d/b/a Baker's Auto Repair. Leave to file this third-party complaint was granted by the circuit court on June 1, 1992, and the complaint was filed on that date. Accordingly, as of this time, it was apparent that Morrison was acting under the impression that Ricky Baker was the plaintiff's employer. In August 1992, however, the plaintiff filed answers to interrogatories propounded by Ricky Baker in which the plaintiff listed Tony Baker d/b/a Baker's Auto Repair as his employer at the time of the collision. On September 15, 1992, Morrison moved for leave to file an amended third-party complaint, adding Tony Baker, the employer, as a third-party defendant. The depositions of the plaintiff, Morrison and Ricky Baker, previously scheduled and continued on several occasions, were taken on September 23, 1992. The trial judge entered an order on September 26, 1992, granting Morrison's motion for leave to file the amended third-party complaint and Morrison's amended third-party complaint was filed that same date. Count I again charged Ricky Baker, the plaintiff's coemployee, with negligently causing the collision, but added that Ricky Baker was acting as the employee/agent of Tony Baker at the time of the accident. Count II charged Tony Baker, d/b/a Baker's Auto Repair, with vicarious liability for the negligent acts of his employee/agent, Ricky Baker. Morrison's amended third-party complaint was not served on the employer, Tony Baker, until February 29, 1993. Prior to the time the employer was served, the depositions of the deputy sheriff who investigated the accident and a treating doctor were taken. Upon being served, the employer did not immediately move to dismiss the complaint but, rather, answered the complaint on March 26, 1993. It was not until two months after he was served that the employer filed a motion to dismiss challenging the timeliness of the amended third-party complaint. The employer's motion charged that the amended third-party complaint was not timely filed, and that the delay had prejudiced him because he did not have adequate time to prepare for trial. Alternatively, the motion asked the court to continue the trial date so as to allow the employer sufficient time to conduct discovery and prepare for trial. The trial court entered an order on May 7, 1993, denying the motion to dismiss, but continuing the trial date to September 20, 1993, and extending discovery to September 1, 1993. The trial eventually began on April 4, 1994, 13 months after the employer was served. The employer, represented by counsel, participated fully in the trial. These facts demonstrate that the employer's motion to dismiss the amended third-party complaint was properly denied, and the post-trial order reversing that ruling was an abuse of discretion. The employer's motion to dismiss was clearly concerned with the impending trial date and the lack of time to conduct discovery and prepare for trial. The trial judge alleviated this concern by continuing both the trial date and the time for conducting discovery. Ultimately, the trial did not take place until 13 months after the employer was served. The employer thus had ample time to conduct discovery and prepare for trial. This is particularly true here, where the employer's alleged liability was premised solely on vicarious responsibility for another, Ricky Baker, a party to the action who also happens to be the employer's son. The employer's argument that he was prejudiced because several depositions were taken before he was served must be rejected. The employer had 13 months within which he could have sought to take the depositions of those deponents, if he chose. The employer took no such action. Thus, the record reveals no prejudice to the employer sufficient to warrant dismissal of the third-party contribution claim. The employer also asserts that, even if he was not prejudiced, dismissal was warranted because Morrison failed to offer a reasonable explanation for failing to file the third-party action against the employer earlier. We disagree. Section 2--406(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant may file a third- party action [w]ithin the time for filing his or her answer or thereafter by leave of court. 735 ILCS 5/2--406(b) (West 1992). This court has stated that third-party actions are favored and trial courts should be liberal in granting leave to file them. People v. Brockman, 143 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (1991). The third-party plaintiff's explanation for failing to file a third-party action earlier is simply one factor to be considered in assessing whether prejudice to the third-party defendant outweighs the right to file an otherwise timely action. Where there is clearly no prejudice to the third-party defendant, dismissal of the third-party action is not appropriate simply because the third-party plaintiff failed to provide an explanation for not filing earlier. In any event, the record in this case amply demonstrates that Morrison had a reasonable explanation for failing to file a third-party action against the employer earlier. The record reveals that, prior to the filing of the amended third-party complaint, Morrison was acting under the misconception that Ricky Baker, not Tony Baker, was the plaintiff's employer. The cases cited by the employer are easily distinguishable. In both Grimming v. Alton & Southern Ry. Co., 204 Ill. App. 3d 961 (1990), and Long v. Friesland, 178 Ill. App. 3d 42 (1988), the contribution actions were filed either days before, or during, trial, and the third-party defendants were thus clearly prejudiced by the late filing. No comparable facts are present here. Rather, the employer here was served with the amended third-party complaint 13 months prior to trial and was in no manner prevented from preparing for, or participating in, the trial. We therefore hold that the circuit court's post-trial order granting the employer's motion to dismiss Morrison's third-party action was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order dismissing Morrison's third-party complaint against the employer, and reinstate the third-party complaint against the employer and the jury's verdict on that complaint.