Opinion ID: 2086616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gose

Text: Plaintiff, Tipton G. Gose, commenced employment with defendant Monroe Auto Equipment in 1945. In 1946, plaintiff cut his left ankle; on August 3, 1953, he reinjured the same area. Both incidents occurred while at work. The 1953 incident developed into an ulcerated skin condition which caused intermittent absences from work while plaintiff received treatment. Workers' compensation benefits were voluntarily paid during these absences. By 1960, plaintiff was apparently totally unable to continue employment and on February 19, 1962, plaintiff underwent a below-the-knee amputation of his left leg. Compensation benefits were paid voluntarily through the expiration of a 500-week period. Ten days subsequent to the expiration of that benefit period, March 14, 1963, plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the Workers' Compensation Bureau indicating personal injury dates of August 3, 1953, and the summer of 1960 (presumably the last day of work). The disability was described as ankle, leg amputation thereof, permanent and total disability, and related injuries. The petition was withdrawn August 12, 1963, however, when the defendant-employer agreed to pay compensation on a voluntary basis. This payment continued for 250 more weeks and terminated December 4, 1967. Plaintiff testified that after his amputation he was depressed and felt like killing himself. As a result, in August, 1963, plaintiff was admitted to the Ypsilanti State Hospital and was an intermittent patient at that facility until 1968. Since his release, plaintiff has been on medication and in the care of his brother. On March 14, 1968, plaintiff again filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. This claim was brought against both his employer and the Second Injury Fund. Plaintiff listed the same disability dates (1953 and 1960) and claimed industrial loss of use of both legs, insanity, total and permanent disability and related injuries. Hearing commenced on November 3, 1969, during which Raymond F. Lipton, M.D., who testified that he was a specialist in the treatment of injury cases, was deposed with regard to plaintiff's physical and mental status. As to his physical status, Dr. Lipton found plaintiff suffered from arterial circulatory disease of the right leg. He diagnosed plaintiff's mental problem as chronic psychosis. This diagnosis was partially based on the fact that the social worker who accompanied plaintiff from Ypsilanti State Hospital to Dr. Lipton's office had told the doctor that plaintiff had been diagnosed as psychotic. No other medical testimony was presented, and the testimony of Dr. Lipton at no time related the claimant's psychosis to his employment, although, as stated above, the claimant's own testimony related his mental problems to his amputation. On December 1, 1969, the matter came before the hearing referee for a closing of the record. At that time, plaintiff's attorney officially withdrew from consideration plaintiff's claim of insanity: Well, if your Honor please, I would like to complete it from my standpoint by withdrawing that part of the claim which relates to the claim of insanity. We did not offer proofs in that regard, and we do not want a decision made in that regard. We would like instead for the case to proceed on the allegation of loss of both legs   . No objection to the withdrawal was lodged by defendant. On April 29, 1970, the hearing referee found that plaintiff had suffered industrial loss of the use of both legs and ordered the defendant-employer to pay benefits for 750 weeks; the referee further ordered the Second Injury Fund to pay benefits beyond the 750-week period. The Second Injury Fund appealed this decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (hereinafter WCAB). The WCAB modified the referee's order by denying plaintiff the benefits ordered due from the Second Injury Fund. Apparently no appeal was taken from this modification. In April, 1972, plaintiff again applied for benefits from his former employer and the Second Injury Fund. Plaintiff recited the same injury dates and the same disabilities as previously claimed in the 1968 petition, including insanity. No change in condition was alleged, but testimony pursuant to this claim included that of a psychiatrist. Defendants, employer and Second Injury Fund, filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that plaintiff's present claim was barred by res judicata. A hearing was held on January 26, 1973, which resulted in a finding that plaintiff was incurably insane as determined by court decisions and is permanently and totally disabled. Further compensation, however, was found to be barred by application of res judicata. The WCAB affirmed, finding that plaintiff's contention of insanity was a triable issue at the earlier 1969 hearing, and was therefore barred by res judicata. Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals. That Court, in a peremptory order issued November 21, 1977, ruled: It is ordered, pursuant to GCR 1963, 806.7, that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board for consideration, on the merits of the evidence and without invoking res judicata, of the question whether plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled as a result of incurable insanity under the act. Morgan v Freedman Artcraft, 401 Mich 54 (1977). This Court retains no further jurisdiction. Both defendants sought leave to appeal to this Court. Leave was granted June 1, 1978.