Opinion ID: 179830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finality of Judgment

Text: In Illinois, supplemental proceedings under § 2-1402 are not available to creditors until after judgment capable of enforcement has first been entered in their favor. Marble Emporium, Inc. v. Vuksanovic, 339 Ill.App.3d 84, 273 Ill.Dec. 915, 790 N.E.2d 57, 62 (2003) (citing cases discussing § 2-1402); see also Ill. Sup.Ct. R. 277(a) (A supplemental proceeding authorized by section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be commenced at any time with respect to a judgment which is subject to enforcement.); 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(a). The Rogan Children argue that, when Dexia issued citations to discover assets in the supplemental proceedings, it held a non-final judgment and that the citations were therefore invalid. They submit that although the district court entered a final judgment nunc pro tunc after dismissing nondiverse parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the remainder of the proceedings was void because no new citations based on the final judgment were issued. [3] In this appeal, the Rogan Children do not dispute that the district court's dismissal of nondiverse parties was a proper exercise of its authority under Rule 21. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 & n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989); Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir.2000). We recently held, in a separate appeal filed by Judith Rogan challenging the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction in these same supplementary proceedings, that the district court properly dismissed the nondiverse parties under [Rule] 21 and preserved its jurisdiction. Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602 F.3d 879, 883 (7th Cir.2010). On the claim that they do advancethat the dismissal of non-diverse parties was insufficient to retroactively render the May 2007 judgment finalwe disagree. The Rogan Children make no attempt to explain what purpose would be served by requiring that the discovery citations be re-issued. Nor do they explain why it would be necessary. Rule 21 dismissals are retroactive, Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 829, 109 S.Ct. 2218, and the complaint is read as if the dismissed party had never been included, LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 248 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.2001). Retroactive applications of Rule 21 have permitted appellate courts to affirm decisions of district courts on the merits despite the fact that the change in the parties did not occur until much later in the litigation, thereby avoiding the waste of time and resources [that] would be engendered by remanding to the District Court or by forcing the[ ] parties to begin anew. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 838, 109 S.Ct. 2218. The Supreme Court observed: [i]f the entire suit were dismissed, Newman-Green would simply refile in the District Court against the [defendants remaining after the Rule 21 dismissal] and submit the discovery materials in hand. The case would then proceed to a preordained judgment. . . . Newman-Green should not be compelled to jump through these judicial hoops merely for the sake of hypertechnical jurisdictional purity. Id. at 837, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 854 F.2d 916, 932, 939-40 (7th Cir.1988) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). The Rogan Children have offered us no answer to this rationale. Their suggestion that Dexia should be required to jump through the judicial hoop of refiling their citations, only to proceed in the district court to a preordained judgment, does not comport with the efficient administration of justice. Moreover, the district court's actions were entirely consistent with considerations of finality in those situations where a judgment becomes final during the pendency of an appeal. See Lovellette v. S. Ry. Co., 898 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1990) ([T]he failure to certify a judgment on a separate claim as final under Rule 54(b) can be cured where the rest of the claims and parties are dismissed during the pendency of the appeal.). Just as in Lovellette, [w]e see no reason not to extend an analogous principle to the present situation, id., particularly when we also allow nunc pro tunc orders to render non-final orders final and confer appellate jurisdictionwithout dismissal of the appeal or need to re-file the notice of appeal, see Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1073 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that a district court has the power to add a Rule 54(b) certification to an order nunc pro tunc after the filing of a premature notice of appeal). See also King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1278 (7th Cir.1989). Once the district court properly dismissed the non-diverse parties, only those parties against whom judgment had already been entered remained in the case. The retroactive application of Rule 21 rendered the judgment final and enforceable against these remaining parties, and the court did not err in allowing the matter to proceed upon the citations that had already issued.