Opinion ID: 2807812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: “A motion to reopen is a form of procedural relief that asks the Board to change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or a change in circumstances since the hearing.” Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 12 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the BIA’s denial of such a motion under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Camaj v. Holder, 625 F.3d 988, 991 (6th Cir. 2010). The BIA abuses its discretion only when its determination was made “without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.” Id. (quoting Haddad v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2006)). Where, as here, the BIA provides its own reasoning for the denial, rather than summarily affirming the IJ, we review only the BIA’s decision. Cordova v. Gonzales, 245 F. App’x 508, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2007). B. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Thompson failed to rebut the presumption of receipt of notice
Removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act are initiated when an alien is provided with notice of the proceedings through service of a Notice to Appear. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). A Notice to Appear must provide the alien with notice of particular information, including the nature of the proceedings against him, the acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law, and the time and place at which the removal proceedings will be held. Id. § 1229(a)(1). Where, as here, the Notice lists the hearing time as “to be set,” “the Immigration Court shall be responsible for scheduling the initial removal hearing and providing notice to the government and the alien of the time, place, and date of hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b). An alien may be served with a Notice to Appear (or notice of the time and place of the removal hearing) either in person or by mail. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). Pursuant to § 1229(c), service by mail is considered sufficient if there is proof of attempted delivery to the last address provided by the alien in accordance with § 1229(a)(1)(F). Section 1229(a)(1)(F), in turn, No. 14-3899 Thompson v. Lynch Page 5 requires that the Notice inform the alien of his affirmative duty to provide “the Attorney General” with a written record of (1) “an address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted,” and (2) “any [subsequent] change of the alien’s address or telephone number.” Change-of-address notifications provided to either the Attorney General or to the immigration court—both of which are under the Department of Justiceʼs umbrella—are sufficient to satisfy § 1229(a)(1)(F). Qumsieh v. Ashcroft, 134 F. App’x 48, 50-51 (6th Cir. 2005).
Failure to appear at a removal hearing may result, as it did here, in the IJ’s ordering that the alien be removed in absentia. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5). The immigration court may rescind an in absentia removal order and reopen proceedings in one of three circumstances: (1) the alien files a motion within 180 days of the removal order and demonstrates that he failed to appear due to exceptional circumstances, (2) the alien files a motion at any time showing that he failed to appear because he was in federal or state custody, or (3) the alien files a motion at any time showing that he did not receive proper written notice. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). Thompson’s motion proceeds under the third category. In order to prevail on his claim of nonreceipt, Thompson must overcome the presumption of delivery that arises when a Notice to Appear or notice of hearing is properly addressed and mailed to the last address provided by the alien. See Ba v. Holder, 561 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 673 (BIA 2008)). “To do so, [Thompson] must show: (1) that he provided the court with a correct, current address; and (2) that the notice was never received.” See Timchenko v. Holder, 485 F. App’x 813, 815 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ba, 561 F.3d at 607) (brackets added). This circuit, in assessing nonreceipt claims like Thompson’s, has looked to the following nonexhaustive list of evidence, both direct and circumstantial, as set forth in Matter of M-R-A: (1) the respondent’s affidavit; (2) affidavits from family members or other individuals who are knowledgeable about the facts relevant to whether notice was received; (3) the respondent’s actions upon learning of the in absentia order, and whether due diligence was exercised in seeking to redress the situation; (4) any prior affirmative application for relief, indicating that the respondent had an No. 14-3899 Thompson v. Lynch Page 6 incentive to appear; (5) any prior application for relief filed with the Immigration Court or any prima facie evidence in the record or the respondent’s motion of statutory eligibility for relief, indicating that the respondent had an incentive to appear; (6) the respondent’s previous attendance at Immigration Court hearings, if applicable; and (7) any other circumstances or evidence indicating possible nonreceipt of notice. Ly v. Holder, 327 F. App’x 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matter of M-R-A, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 674). There is no dispute that the immigration court mailed Thompson’s notice of hearing to the East 126 Street address. As a result, only two related issues were before the BIA: (1) whether Thompson’s address was on Colfax Road or on East 126 Street at the time that the immigration court mailed the notice; and (2) whether Thompson lived up to his obligation to supply the immigration court with his current address, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F). The BIA posited two possible scenarios relating to these issues, both of which end poorly for Thompson. Option one: Thompson’s address was 2761 East 126 Street as indicated in the Notice to Appear. In this scenario, Thompson fulfilled his duty to report his current address under § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i), but his motion to reopen should be denied because the court mailed the notice of hearing to the proper address and Thompson failed to rebut the presumption of delivery. Option two: Thompson’s address was 7305 Colfax Road, as he now claims. Under this scenario, Thompson failed to provide the immigration court with his updated address as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii). Having failed to do so, Thompson has no basis to object to his lack of notice and, pursuant to § 1229a(b)(5)(B), to his removal in absentia. But Thompson presents a third option. He argues that, although the East 126 Street address was listed on the Notice to Appear, this was not the “last address provided by” Mr. Thompson, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). While the E. 126 Street address was an address that Mr. Thompson told the immigration officer about during his interview, it was not the address he provided as his address or even as somewhere he could receive mail. It was simply the address of a woman he knew, and he described it as such. The “last address provided” by Mr. Thompson, therefore, is not E. 126 Street, but Colfax Road. No. 14-3899 Thompson v. Lynch Page 7 (Emphasis in original.) In other words, Thompson argues that even though the Notice to Appear did not list his current address, he did not violate the requirements of § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii) because he gave his current address to the immigration officials and never changed his residence prior to the court’s mailing of his hearing notice. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii) (“[T]he alien must provide the Attorney General immediately with a written record of any change of the alien’s address or telephone number.”). 3. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review under similar facts in Velasquez-Escover Thompson’s narrow reading of the immigration statutes is not without support. Based on a strikingly similar set of facts, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit recently granted a petition for review in Velasquez-Escovar v. Holder, 768 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2014). The petitioner in Velasquez-Escovar claimed that, although she verbally gave immigration officials her current address, the officials recorded a different, outdated address on her Notice to Appear. Despite the error, Velasquez signed the Notice to Appear, and the immigration court subsequently mailed her hearing notice to the address contained therein. Because she no longer lived at that address, she never received the notice. And because she never received the notice, Velasquez did not appear at her removal proceeding. She was thus ordered removed in absentia. An IJ denied her subsequent motion to reopen and the BIA affirmed, finding that Velasquez was not entitled to notice for two reasons: (1) she “was informed of her obligation to inform the Immigration Court of her mailing address [but] did not do so”; and (2) “it was incumbent on Velasquez to ensure that a correct address was supplied [but] she did not do so.” Id. at 1004 (alterations omitted). The Ninth Circuit rejected both of the BIA’s rationales. First, the court’s majority concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by irrationally rejecting Velasquez’s assertion that she had, in fact, provided officials with her current address: Per the majority, “[t]he claim is facially plausible and supported by Velasquez’s declaration. There is no contrary evidence, and no adverse credibility finding.” Id. As to the BIA’s second line of reasoning, the Ninth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by taking the Notice to Appear’s instructions too far: That advisal says only that “You are required to provide the DHS, in writing, with your full mailing address and telephone number.” Nothing in the advisal mentions or fairly implies any continuing duty, much less a continuing duty to No. 14-3899 Thompson v. Lynch Page 8 correct the government. Once the alien provides an address and phone number, the alien’s work is done. If the BIA meant to say otherwise, then it abused its discretion. Id. at 1004-05.