Opinion ID: 4376974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agency and the Mortgage Contract

Text: [¶11] The court made the following supported findings regarding the mortgage contract: While not dispositive here, the mortgage contract in this case similarly requires notice of default and right to cure to be sent by 6 the “Lender.” The mortgage’s definition of “Lender” includes “any Person who takes ownership of the Note and this Security Instrument.” “Loan Servicer” is separately defined as “[t]he entity that collects . . . Periodic Payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument and also performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations under the Note, this Security Agreement and Applicable Law.” Clearly, the mortgage contemplates that the Lender and the Loan Servicer are not the same entity. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). [¶12] When “the language of a contract is unambiguous, we review that contract de novo as a question of law.” Williams v. Williams, 2017 ME 94, ¶ 9, 161 A.3d 710. While the court was correct that the lender and the loan servicer are defined as distinct entities in the mortgage contract, the language of the mortgage contract does not require personal performance by the mortgagee when giving notice, and it is not a contractual duty that is deemed nondelegable by public policy. Cf. Pinkham v. Libbey, 93 Me. 575, 577, 45 A. 823 (1900) (“[A] contract for personal services involving the exercise of individual skill and judgment . . . can be performed only by the person named.”). [¶13] Looking to the terms of the mortgage contract, Needham does not suggest any difference in legal effect when an otherwise valid notice is sent by a lender’s agent and not the lender itself. We therefore conclude that the mortgage contract does not prohibit the mortgagee from delegating to its agent loan servicer the mortgagee’s duty to send the notice of the right to cure. 7