Opinion ID: 1795830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Penalty Phase Ineffectiveness of Counsel

Text: Sochor argues that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to investigate, prepare, and present evidence that would support the existence of two statutory mitigating circumstances and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. He claims that counsel did not thoroughly investigate his background and did not provide any information about his background to the mental health experts who evaluated him, rendering their evaluations inadequate for the purpose of developing evidence of mitigating circumstances. He also claims that counsel did not adequately prepare his penalty phase lay witnesses before they testified. Sochor argues that this deficiency in his counsel's performance prevented the jury and the judge from understanding the true nature and extent of his troubled background and mental health status. As a result, he argues, the outcome of the penalty phase was unreliable. He argues that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been sentenced to death had counsel not been deficient. To be entitled to relief on this claim, Sochor must show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). To satisfy the deficiency prong, Sochor must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Sochor must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If Sochor can establish that counsel's performance was deficient, he must then show[] that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In other words, in order to establish the prejudice prong, Sochor must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the Court explained in Strickland, [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In the penalty phase context, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When we review a circuit court's resolution of a Strickland claim, as we do here, we apply a mixed standard of review because both the performance and the prejudice prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact. See id. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (Ineffectiveness is ... a mixed question of law and fact.); Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999). We defer to the circuit court's factual findings, but we review de novo the circuit court's legal conclusions. Stephens, 748 So.2d at 1033 (Thus, under Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower court's factual findings.); see also Hodges v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S475, S476, 2003 WL 21402484 (Fla. June 19, 2003) (Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of law and fact, and are thus subject to plenary review based on the Strickland test. Under this standard, the Court conducts an independent review of the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court's factual findings.) (citation omitted). With these principles in mind, we now analyze Sochor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
We agree with Sochor that his counsel's penalty-phase performance was deficient. Our review of the penalty-phase transcript and the evidentiary-hearing testimony reveals that Sochor's counsel put little time or effort into preparing expressly for the penalty phase. [9] The only witnesses counsel presented at the penalty phase were four members of Sochor's family. One of these witnesses, a sister, was not even contacted by counsel. She learned about the penalty phase from another relative and traveled to Florida on her own. When she arrived, she told counsel that she wanted to testify; counsel quickly glanced at a statement she had prepared and told her she could read it to the jury. The other three witnesses received no more preparation from counsel. Counsel simply asked them to prepare statements to read to the jury. In addition to these lay witnesses, counsel introduced the reports of three mental health experts who testified during the guilt phase. However, counsel did not provide these experts with any information about Sochor's background, nor did he specifically instruct them to examine and evaluate Sochor for the purpose of establishing mitigating evidence. Based on these undisputed facts, counsel's performance was clearly deficient, and the circuit court's holding to the contrary was erroneous. See State v. Lewis, 838 So.2d 1102, 1113 (Fla.2002) ([T]he obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty portion of a capital case cannot be overstated  this is an integral part of a capital case.); Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 571 (Fla.1996) (An attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, including an investigation of the defendant's background, for possible mitigating evidence.) (quoting Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1994)).
We now must determine whether Sochor established that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. See Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2542 (In order for counsel's inadequate performance to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must show that counsel's failures prejudiced his defense.). [10] As we noted above, in order for Sochor to establish that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense, he must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the [penalty-phase] proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2542. [11] The circuit court held that Sochor had not established prejudice. As we explain below, inherent in the circuit court's conclusion, made after hearing the conflicting testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, is the factual finding (which we conclude is supported by competent, substantial evidence) that even if defense counsel had adequately investigated Sochor's background and prepared for the penalty phase, he would not have been able to present at the penalty phase any evidence significantly different from the evidence actually presented. [12] Deferring to this factual finding, we agree with the circuit court's conclusion that Sochor failed to show a reasonable probability that absent counsel's errors, he would not have been sentenced to death. To explain why, we will recount the pertinent penalty-phase lay testimony and the guilt-phase expert testimony that the jury heard as well as the testimony Sochor presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.
As we mentioned earlier, four of Sochor's family members testified at the penalty phase: his parents, Charles and Rose Sochor; his brother, Gary Sochor; and his sister, Kathy Cooper. Their testimony revealed the following facts about Sochor: he was one of ten children; his father singled him out for repeated and brutal beatings; his mother also beat him; when he was four years old, he fell while running with a tin horn in his mouth and the tin horn went through the roof of his mouth; for a period of time when his father had been demoted at work, Sochor gave the family his paychecks; his parents noticed that he changed after he was discharged from the army  specifically, he became violent, especially when under the influence of alcohol; at one point, his parents thought he needed psychiatric help and were able to get him involuntarily committed to a hospital, but he was quickly released when the hospital told the family that although he needed psychiatric help, he was not severe enough to be kept there; and he attempted to commit suicide. Sochor's father, Charles, recounted a time when he had come home from work to learn that Sochor's mother, Rose, had lost her temper and beat Denn[is], then banged his head against the wall. Charles testified that he too would to lose his temper and beat the children, with Denny always getting the worst of it. He told the jury of the head injury suffered by Sochor when he was four years old: Sochor had fallen while running with a tin horn in his mouth, and the horn went through the roof of his mouth, opening a hole that you could see right into his head. Charles also told the jury that he began to notice changes in Sochor after he was released from the army, saying that he was violent, especially when alcohol was involved. He was completely out of control. Charles testified that he and Rose realized at this point that Sochor needed mental help, and he told the jury about their attempt to get him institutionalized. After they convinced a judge to commit him to a mental hospital, Sochor was released after less than a week, on the condition that he would report once a week. Sochor was upset that his parents had him committed to the hospital, so he left home. Sochor's father testified that he had not seen or spoken to Sochor since that incident, with the exception of one phone call he received from Sochor in which Sochor told him that he had attempted to commit suicide. Sochor's mother told the jury that Sochor had a difficult childhood and that she was an abusive mother. She testified that Sochor had a lot of hostility and problems as he got older and things became worse after he was discharged from the army, especially when he drank alcohol. She discussed the time she and Sochor's father tried to get Sochor mental help, telling the jury that the counselors told [them] that he definitely needed psychiatric help, but was not severe enough to be kept there. Sochor's brother, Gary, testified that Sochor was beaten a lot as a child, that he took the brunt of their father's beatings, and that their father used to beat them with a big belt. Sochor's sister, Kathy Cooper, gave the most in-depth and descriptive penalty-phase testimony about the beatings suffered by Sochor as a child. She told the jury that Sochor had a pretty rough life and that most of their parents' frustrations were taken out on Sochor. She described their father as a former boxer who was very strong, knew how to hit, and had a very quick and violent temper. She told the jury that there were times when the other children would have to pull their father off Sochor. She testified that their father would go into a rage and would trap Sochor in a corner and hit him over and over  in the face, arms, and the rest of his body  resulting in Sochor constantly [having] his lips split open, black eyes, [and] bruises all over his body. She described an incident where their father grabbed Sochor's hair and kept banging his head against the wall. She told the jury that their mother watched this happen and did nothing to stop it. Like her parents, Kathy testified that the family tried to get mental help for Sochor but the psychiatric hospital told them that he wasn't bad enough to where he needed help. Sochor's trial counsel also introduced the reports of three mental health experts who had evaluated Sochor and testified during the guilt phase: Dr. Zager, a psychiatrist; Dr. Ceros-Livingston, a clinical psychologist; and Dr. Castillo, a psychiatrist. [13] As mentioned previously, counsel did not provide any background materials to these experts; their evaluations were based solely on information gathered from their clinical interviews with Sochor. Nor did counsel instruct the experts to conduct their evaluations with an eye towards developing evidence of mitigating circumstances; rather, their evaluations were done for the purpose of determining Sochor's competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the crime. They all testified that Sochor was competent to stand trial and was sane at the time of the crime. However, their testimony went beyond merely answering these questions, and counsel referred to their testimony and their reports in his penalty-phase closing argument. Dr. Zager interviewed Sochor, during which he observed Sochor and gathered his history, which Dr. Zager defined as emotional and psychiatric problems, present legal circumstances, medical history, history of drug or alcohol use, educational history, family history, childhood experiences, and relationship history. Dr. Zager also conducted a mental status examination, which consisted of his observations not only of what Sochor said to him, but also how he said it, his stream of thought, and his orientation and awareness of present circumstances. In his guilt-phase testimony, Dr. Zager told the jury the following facts about Sochor: he had a history of drug and alcohol problems and a history of alcoholic blackouts; he claimed to have had an alcoholic blackout the night of the murder; he reported having suffered two concussions and having fallen off a horse and hitting his head as a child; and he believed his mother physically abused him as a child. Dr. Zager also told the jury that after Sochor was arrested, he was prescribed Lithium, a psychotropic medication that Dr. Zager described as a moodstabilizing drug, and Sinequan, which he described as an antidepressant. Dr. Zager told the jury that Sochor appeared to manifest evidence of a longstanding problem of drug and alcohol abuse and of a conduct disorder, socialized, aggressive type as a child. He suspected that Sochor suffered from antisocial personality disorder, and he believed Sochor was a much more aggressive, potentially very violent, individual under the influence of intoxicants. He believed that Sochor acted impulsively and with impaired judgment while under the influence of alcohol. Although he did not believe Sochor met the requirements for involuntary hospitalization under the Baker Act, see §§ 394.451-.4789, Fla. Stat. (2003), he did believe that Sochor was extremely dangerous to the public. Dr. Ceros-Livingston also evaluated Sochor and testified during the guilt phase. She told the jury that Sochor reported a long-term history of drug and alcohol abuse, starting at a very young age; that Sochor reported that the United States Army, upon discharging him, recommended that he get psychiatric care; and that Sochor reported that he had attempted to commit suicide by drowning. Dr. Ceros-Livingston also administered two psychological tests: the Carlson Psychological Survey (CPS) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). She testified that results of the CPS revealed a profile similar to those obtained from people who have alcohol and drug abuse as a major characteristic; it also matched the profile of a person with a quick temper which might result in impulsive and destructive behavior. She testified that the profile obtained from the MMPI was invalid (fake-bad), which means that the person is trying to make [himself] look psychopathological. Based on the fake-bad MMPI profile, and noting that Sochor had recounted some things that had happened in his feelings and what he allegedly said around the alleged crime, Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified that Sochor possibly was malingering. Finally, Dr. Castillo testified for the State at the guilt phase. Like Dr. Zager, Dr. Castillo told the jury that Sochor was being medicated with Lithium, which he described to the jury as a medicine used mostly to treat manic depressive illness. He described manic depressive illness as a mood- and behavior-affecting condition. However, Dr. Castillo also told the jury that he did not believe that Sochor suffered from manic depressive illness. Nor did he believe that Sochor had blacked out on the night of the murder. He believed that Sochor was suffering from a type of selective amnesia. Like Dr. Zager, Dr. Castillo concluded that Sochor suffered from antisocial personality disorder.
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Sochor presented the testimony of the same four family members who had testified at the penalty phase. He also presented the testimony of additional family members and some lay acquaintances whom trial counsel never contacted. Sochor's father testified that he began to beat Sochor with a belt a couple times a week when Sochor was between six and eight years old. When Sochor was older, he would hit him with his fists. He also testified that when Sochor was about five or six years old, his older brother was severely burned. Sochor's mother testified that she had a difficult labor when Sochor was born and that Sochor had marks on his head from the forceps and his head was very pointed and blue. She also told the jury that Sochor's older brother had been severely burned when Sochor was a child. She again testified that she would sometimes hit Sochor and that Charles would beat the children too. Sochor's sister, Kathy Cooper, again testified about the time Sochor's father grabbed Sochor's hair and beat his head against the wall. She also testified about a time when Sochor's father kicked Sochor and then repeatedly punched him in the face. She testified that she was sexually molested by their father when she was a teenager. Sochor's brother, Gary, testified that their father would beat the children with his belt, fist, open hands, whatever, and he would beat Sochor until he was bleeding, knocked out, or knocked down and in so much pain that he did not get up. He also testified that Sochor used a lot of drugs. In addition to these four family members, Sochor presented testimony at the evidentiary hearing from other family members, friends, and teachers. One of Sochor's high school friends, Earl Mitchell, testified about a time when Sochor got into a fight with a man much larger than he. The man picked Sochor up, threw him to the ground, and slammed his head into the pavement. He also estimated that he and Sochor drop[ped] acid over 150 times in 1971. One of Sochor's childhood friends, Marvin Droste, testified that Sochor's childhood home was disheveled and unkempt, and Sochor's family was poor. He testified that Sochor's father had a reputation for being tough on the kids, and Sochor would often tell him that his father had whipped on him. He testified about Sochor's drug use and said that Sochor was prone to quick changes and moods, quick mood swings and bouts of depression. Christine Thatcher testified that she worked with Sochor one summer at a professional acting company where Sochor was an intern. She testified that Sochor performed a dance number that was stunning, but that he was untrained and unskilled. He was unfocused and undisciplined at the beginning of the summer, but was working extremely diligently by the end. Louis Lascala, Sochor's high school teacher and junior varsity basketball coach, testified that Sochor lacked team skills and was quiet and withdrawn from the other kids on the team. Father Melvin Cox, a Catholic priest and high school teacher, testified that Sochor was very unmotivated and showed signs of depression. Helen Foley, a family friend, testified that Sochor's father was quiet and severe and his mother was more laid back. She also testified that Sochor was artistic. Sochor's younger brother, Blaine, and his younger sisters, Lisa Elaine Fisher and Melanie Wheeler, testified that their father used to beat Sochor. Blaine also testified that there were times when they were so hungry they would hunt for food, and Sochor was a very good brother who taught him to play sports and fish. Lisa Elaine and Melanie testified that Sochor was very protective of them. Melanie also testified that their older brother, Gary, molested and sexually abused her when she was eleven or twelve years old, and her parents did not believe her when she reported it to them. She also testified that she caught her father peeking in on her when she was in the shower and feared that he would abuse her too. Sochor also presented the testimony of two new mental health experts: Dr. Greer, a neuropsychiatrist; and Dr. Froming, a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist. In addition, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Ceros-Livingston, the clinical psychologist who had evaluated Sochor and testified for the defense during the guilt phase. Sochor's postconviction counsel provided these new mental health experts, as well as Dr. Ceros-Livingston, with the background materials  jail and prison records, school records, military records  that Sochor claims trial counsel should have provided to the original experts. The new experts evaluated Sochor to determine if any mitigating circumstances could have been presented at the penalty phase. Dr. Greer testified that Sochor suffers from manic depressive illness and alcohol and polysubstance abuse disorder. He testified that he diagnosed Sochor with manic depressive illness based on his review of Sochor's prison records, which indicated that Sochor had been repeatedly diagnosed as having such illness and was being treated with Lithium. He testified that his clinical interview with Sochor confirmed this diagnosis. In the interview, Sochor exhibited tangentiality, flight of ideas, rapid or pressured speech, grandiosity, and a hypomanic or somewhat manic mood. Dr. Greer believed that Sochor suffers from mixed type manic depression, which means that he has florid or full-blown manic episodes as well as depressive episodes. Based on his evaluation of Sochor, Dr. Greer testified that there was evidence to support two mental health-related statutory mitigating circumstances. He believed the combination of manic depressive disorder and Sochor's consumption of alcohol on the night of the murder resulted in Sochor's lacking the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. He testified that although a person in the manic phase of the illness may know that what he is doing is wrong, his hyperactive state prevents him from being able to stop himself. Dr. Greer also believed that Sochor had been under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. He believed that manic depression, being a chronic illness, was likely to have been present at the time of the murder and it was likely that when combined with alcohol, the manic phase of the illness would have been a problem for him. [14] He believed Sochor was in the manic phase of the illness at the time of the murder based on the testimony of those who witnessed him at the time and based on Sochor's own statements that he had the illness, had consumed alcohol, and was in a hypermotoric state. [15] Dr. Froming, the clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist, testified that Sochor had moderately severe brain impairment, a substance dependence disorder, bipolar affective disorder (mild with a mixed episode), and posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of the severe childhood physical and sexual abuse that was in the home. [16] She believed that the background records provided by Sochor's postconviction counsel indicated the presence of several potential risk factors for brain damage: Sochor's mother smoked during pregnancy; she had an extended labor with forceps delivery; Sochor had suffered head injuries, inflicted by his parents and incurred in various accidents; he had a history of alcohol abuse; and he grew up in an environment characterized by severe family violence and abuse. Dr. Froming testified that in her clinical interview with Sochor, she noted his rapid, pressured speech; flight of ideas; tangentiality; and depressed mood. She also testified that she conducted a battery of neuropsychological tests. Like Dr. Greer, Dr. Froming believed that Sochor had been under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder and had been unable to conform his conduct to the law. She testified that the synergistic effect of combining brain damage with manic depressive illness resulted in almost no ability to self-regulate and no ability to inhibit impulse. She believed that because Sochor had abstained from alcohol in the period leading up to the night of the murder, as little as one to three drinks would have made him acutely intoxicated. [17] Dr. Froming criticized the evaluations and testimony of the original experts. She criticized their lack of attention to the fact that Sochor had been prescribed Lithium. She was also critical of Dr. Ceros-Livingston's MMPI analysis. Dr. Froming testified that the raw data could have supported Dr. Ceros-Livingston's fake-bad conclusion, but she believed it also could have supported a cry for help profile or an exaggeration of symptoms due to distress. She believed that Dr. Ceros-Livingston's evaluation was far too brief and there were other things that she could have done to expand and corroborate or refute her fake bad interpretation. Finally, Dr. Ceros-Livingston, the psychologist who had evaluated Sochor and testified for the defense at the guilt phase of the trial, testified for the State at the evidentiary hearing. At this point, she had reviewed the background materials that Sochor's postconviction counsel had provided to the new experts. She stated that her original diagnosis and testimony were unaffected by her review of these new materials. She testified that nothing in the background materials indicated that Sochor suffered from manic depression or organic brain damage. She believed that a diagnosis of manic depressive illness was inconsistent with the fact that Sochor was able to sit still and concentrate during the eight-hour examination conducted by Dr. Froming. She also disputed the significance of the notations in the prison records that Sochor had been prescribed Lithium  a factor relied on by the new experts to support their diagnoses of manic depression. Dr. Ceros-Livingston noted that none of the records actually recorded any symptoms of manic depression, e.g., pressured speech, flight of ideas, distractibility, grandiosity, etc. She also noted that none of the many mental status exams included in the prison records ever reported that Sochor was having mood problems. Even more importantly, she stressed that even though Sochor had been prescribed Lithium in prison, he was at various times taken off the drug and the prison records never indicated that he exhibited any symptoms of manic depression during these Lithium-free periods. She also noted that the military conducts extensive physical exams, and none of Sochor's military records indicated a diagnosis (or even the presence of any symptoms) of manic depression. Finally, she testified that there was nothing in the record that suggested to her that Sochor was in a manic phase at the time of the murder.
After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief. The court found that the lay testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was either cumulative with respect to the penalty phase testimony or insignificant. As for Sochor's relatives who testified at both the penalty phase and the evidentiary hearing, the court found that they testified about the same facts at the evidentiary hearing as they did at the penalty phase. State v. Sochor, Case No. 86-15270CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. order filed Mar. 28, 2001) (Postconviction order) at 13. The court also found that the additional family-member testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was cumulative and was presented at the penalty phase by other family members, and the additional lay testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was cumulative and not significant. Id. at 13-14. With respect to the mental-health testimony, the circuit court gave great weight to Dr. Ceros-Livingston's testimony at the evidentiary hearing. For instance, the court stated: At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified that, even after reviewing the new information provided by the Defendant's appellate counsel, her original opinions regarding the Defendant remained the same. In her opinion, the records presented to her did not indicate manic depression or organic brain damage. There was no indication that the Defendant's behavior changed whether he was on Lithium or not. Postconviction order at 8 (citations omitted). The court found that: Despite the fact that mitigation was not specifically discussed with Dr. Ceros-Livingston, the record indicates that the tests that she performed on Defendant allowed her to draw opinions in regards to his mental health, which were properly presented by defense counsel to the judge and jury during the penalty phase as mitigating factors. Furthermore, Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified at the evidentiary hearing that considering her previous evaluation in conjunction with the records and background material provided to her by the Defendant's appellate counsel in 1999, her diagnosis of the Defendant and testimony at the time of trial would have been the same. Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified at the evidentiary hearing that when the Defendant was evaluated in 1987, he did not have manic depressive disorder. Moreover, based upon the additional information provided to her in 1999, Dr. Ceros-Livingston did not think that the Defendant had bipolar disorder or organic brain damage at the time of the murder. Postconviction order at 9-10 (emphasis added); see also id. at 12 (Dr. Ceros-Livingston clearly stated that her opinion would remain the same after considering the additional records.).
As we stated above, our job is to review independently the circuit court's legal conclusion  that is, whether Sochor has carried his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would have been different had counsel not been deficient. But in doing so, we must defer to the circuit court's factual findings if those findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. As we stated in Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917 (Fla.2001): The reason we have required postconviction evidentiary hearings on capital postconviction motions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel is to provide a defendant an opportunity to present factual and expert evidence which was not presented at the trial of the case and to have the trial court evaluate and weigh that additional evidence. Following such an evidentiary hearing, we have held that the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo review standard but that the trial court's factual findings are to be given deference. So long as [the trial court's] decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court. We recognize and honor the trial court's superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact. Id. at 923 (citations omitted, emphasis added). As our review of both the penalty phase and the evidentiary hearing testimony reveals, the circuit court's finding that Sochor presented no significant, noncumulative lay testimony at the evidentiary hearing is supported by competent, substantial evidence. The main lay-witness testimony at the evidentiary hearing concerned Sochor's abusive childhood and drug abuse. Testimony about Sochor's abusive childhood was presented at the penalty phase, and the guilt-phase experts told the jury about his history of drug abuse. The closer question in this case is whether significant additional mental-health-related mitigation evidence was available that could have been presented at trial if counsel had not been deficient in his investigation and preparation. The answer to this question depends on whose evidentiary hearing testimony should be believed. Drs. Greer and Froming said such evidence was available. Dr. Ceros-Livingston said it was not. The postconviction trial judge heard all the evidence and was in a much better position than we are to assess[] the credibility of [the] witnesses and ... mak[e] findings of fact. Id. at 923. After reviewing the record and affording due deference to the trial court's superior vantage point from which to make credibility assessments, we believe that the trial court's decision to give Dr. Ceros-Livingston's testimony greater weight than the testimony of Sochor's new experts was supported by competent, substantial evidence. [18] Dr. Ceros-Livingston evaluated Sochor much closer to the time of the murder than Sochor's new experts did. At the time of her trial testimony, Dr. Ceros-Livingston was aware of Sochor's history of alcohol and drug abuse. She was also told by Sochor that the army had recommended that he get psychiatric care and that he once attempted to commit suicide. After administering the MMPI, she concluded that Sochor possibly was malingering. This was confirmed by Dr. Castillo, who believed that Sochor was suffering from a type of selective amnesia. While Dr. Froming criticized Dr. Ceros-Livingston's MMPI analysis, she did admit that the raw data could have supported the fake-bad profile. Furthermore, the evidentiary hearing experts' diagnoses of manic depressive disorder were contradicted by Dr. Ceros-Livingston's evidentiary hearing testimony and by the trial testimony of Drs. Zager and Castillo. Dr. Ceros-Livingston testified that even after reviewing the background records that were made available to the new experts, her original diagnosis did not change; she did not see anything in the records that suggested to her that Sochor suffered from manic depression. She noted that the new experts' reliance on the prison records was misplaced because those records did not actually indicate that Sochor had been suffering from any of the symptoms of manic depression; they indicated only that he had been prescribed Lithium. Furthermore, while both Drs. Greer and Froming testified that Sochor exhibited tangentiality, flight of ideas, rapid speech, grandiosity, and a manic mood  all symptoms of manic depression  such behavior was not observed by the trial experts who examined Sochor much closer to the date of the crime. Dr. Zager testified that in his interview with Sochor, he observed not only what Sochor was saying, but also how he said it and his stream of thought. At the time Dr. Zager made these observations, he was aware that Sochor had been prescribed Lithium and Sinequan, but he did not diagnose Sochor with manic depression. Rather, he believed that Sochor suffered from a longstanding problem of drug and alcohol abuse and a conduct disorder, socialized, aggressive type. Similarly, Dr. Castillo was aware that Sochor had been prescribed Lithium, but he affirmatively ruled out a diagnosis of manic depression. We are faced with a situation like the one we were faced with in Porter. [19] As we noted there: At the conclusion of the postconviction evidentiary hearing in this case, the trial court had before it two conflicting expert opinions over the existence of mitigation. Based upon our case law, it was then for the trial court to resolve the conflict by the weight the trial court afforded one expert's opinion as compared to the other. The trial court did this and resolved the conflict by determining that the greatest weight was to be afforded the State's expert. We accept this finding by the trial court because it was based upon competent, substantial evidence. 788 So.2d at 923. Another similar case was Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040 (Fla.2000), where we deferred to the circuit court's factual findings and affirmed its denial of relief, even though Cherry's evidentiary hearing expert testified that Cherry suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, organic brain damage, and mental retardation. Id. at 1044. We wrote the following: Unlike Rose [v. State, 675 So.2d 567 (Fla.1996)], however, the testimony concerning the statutory mitigating evidence and some of the nonstatutory mitigating evidence was controverted either by the State during cross-examination or by Dr. Barnard [whose report was introduced into evidence at the penalty phase of Cherry's trial and who subsequently testified for the State at the evidentiary hearing]. The trial court rejected Dr. Crown's conclusions as to organic brain damage, fetal alcohol syndrome, and mental retardation to the extent they were based on mere speculation from the fact that Cherry's mother drank while pregnant and Cherry had been exposed to toxins as a child. Dr. Crown admitted that he had not performed any physical tests on Cherry to confirm these conclusions. The trial court also found that Dr. Crown's findings as to Cherry's borderline retardation and antisocial personality were contradicted by Dr. Barnard's reassessment of Cherry. Most significantly, Dr. Barnard, after considering the same background materials supplied to Dr. Crown, did not find any indication of organic brain damage and maintained the information did not support any statutory mitigating factors. The applicability of mitigating circumstances and the credibility of expert testimony are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1051 (emphasis added). [20] As in Porter and Cherry, we find that the circuit court's decision to credit the testimony of the State's mental health expert over the testimony of Sochor's new experts is supported by competent, substantial evidence. We also conclude that the circuit court's finding that the evidentiary hearing lay testimony was either cumulative or insignificant is also based on competent, substantial evidence. Based on our deference to the circuit court's factual findings and our independent review of the circuit court's legal conclusion with respect to those factual findings, we hold that Sochor has not established that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. [21] Sochor has not demonstrated that but for counsel's deficient performance the result of the penalty phase would have been different. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's denial of relief on this claim. [22]