Opinion ID: 1906096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: testimony of officer ruther

Text: Schneider next raises for our review the issue as to whether or not it was error for the trial judge to admit Patrolman Ruther's testimony that he had twice advised Schneider of his Miranda rights, that he had asked Schneider if he had been operating a motor vehicle, and that Schneider had responded I will remain silent. Schneider's counsel made no objection at trial, nor did Schneider's counsel make a motion to dismiss on the ground of a mistrial. Schneider contends that this testimony, in response to a question asked by the prosecutor, constituted an impermissible comment on Schneider's right to remain silent and was therefore reversible error. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court commented in Footnote 37, in pertinent part: In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.] Also cited in State v. Bragg, 221 N.W.2d 793, 800 (N.D.1974). We find that Schneider's response I will remain silent was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. We further find that Patrolman Ruther's testimony, in response to a question from the prosecutor, that Schneider had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege was an improper comment on Schneider's right to remain silent and was constitutional error which may be reviewed on appeal even though not objected to at the time of trial. We must review Rule 52 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine if the constitutional error resulting from the patrolman's testimony was reversible error. Rule 52, N.D.R.Crim.P., provides: RULE 52Harmless Error and Obvious Error  (a) Harmless error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.  (b) Obvious error. Obvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. Rule 52, N.D.R.Crim.P., applies only when an error has been made by the trial court. If the trial court has erred, . . . three types of error may be assigned for review by the appellate court. These are (1) harmless error or error not prejudicial to the defendant; (2) reversible error or error that was prejudicial and to which objection was made in the trial court; and (3) obvious error or error so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted even though the action was not objected to at the time. Comments to Rule 52, N.D.R. Crim.P. [See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal § 851 (1969)]. In this case, no objection was made at trial to the patrolman's testimony. We must determine whether the error was (1) harmless error or (3) obvious error. In State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D.1977), we reaffirmed State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D.1974), in which this court adopted the harmless error test enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. den. 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967). In Chapman, supra 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, it was held that federal constitutional errors do not automatically require reversal if it is shown that they were harmless, and before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Carmody, supra 253 N.W.2d at 418; Hilling, supra 219 N.W.2d at 172; and Comments to Rule 52, N.D.R.Crim.P. The beneficiary of a constitutional error has the heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman, supra 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. See Carmody, supra 253 N.W.2d at 418. In the instant case, the introduction of Patrolman Ruther's testimony that Schneider invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent would constitute reversible error under Rule 52(b), N.D.R. Crim.P., unless we could conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To determine the effect of the error on Schneider's constitutional rights we must consider the entire record and the probable effect of the actions alleged to be error in light of all the evidence. State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154, 162 (N.D.1975), citing State v. Johnson, 231 N.W.2d 180, 185 (N.D.1975); and Comments to Rule 52, N.D. R.Crim.P. Although an appellate court must review the entire record to determine whether or not an error is harmless, the review is not to be used as a quest for error. Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 638, 66 S.Ct. 1172, 90 L.Ed. 1484 (1946). In Black v. United States, 309 F.2d 331, 342 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 372 U.S. 934, 83 S.Ct. 880, 9 L.Ed.2d 765 (1963), quoting Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150, 156 (8th Cir. 1961), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the court has repeatedly held that the plain error [1] rule should be applied with caution and should be invoked only to avoid a miscarriage of justice [footnote added]. The Comments to Rule 52(b), N.D.R. Crim.P., also state that: . . . the power to notice obvious error, whether at the request of counsel or on the court's own motion, is one the courts should exercise cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances . . . where a serious injustice has been done to the defendant. After considering the entire record of the case, we conclude that Patrolman Ruther's testimony regarding Schneider's assertion of his right to remain silent was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Schneider, after his arrest, asserted his right to remain silent when asked if he had been operating a motor vehicle. Patrolman Ruther's testimony to this effect, although an impermissible comment on Schneider's right to remain silent, was harmless error because Schneider testified at trial that he had, in fact, been operating the motor vehicle. In Carmody, supra 253 N.W.2d at 418-419, we held that the prosecutor's cross-examination regarding Carmody's right to remain silent was harmless error because the questions and answers did not suggest that he had a duty to testify; Carmody's counsel made no objection; and the prosecutor did not imply guilt from Carmody's silence. In the instant case, the testimony did not suggest that Schneider was required to answer the question; Schneider's counsel made no objection to the testimony; Schneider's counsel made no motion to dismiss on the ground of a mistrial; the prosecutor did not imply guilt from Schneider's silence; and Schneider did, in fact, testify at trial and did admit that he had been operating the motor vehicle prior to his arrest. Under the circumstances, no obvious error occurred which prejudiced Schneider. In Booton v. Hanauer, 541 F.2d 296, 299 (1st Cir. 1976), the court held that any inference as might have been drawn by the jury from the inadmissible evidence was inconsequential, in light of the overwhelming, identical inference drawn from admissible evidence, namely, petitioner's earlier answers. In the instant case, we hold that even if the inadmissible testimony of Patrolman Ruther created an inference of Schneider's guilt, the inference was inconsequential and harmless in light of the fact that Schneider answered the question at trial and admitted the element of the crime that he had been operating the motor vehicle prior to his arrest. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, VANDE WALLE and SAND, JJ., concur.