Opinion ID: 848845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: self-defense and retreat

Text: At common law, a claim of selfdefense, which is founded upon necessity, real or apparent, may be raised by a nonaggressor as a legal justification for an otherwise intentional homicide. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 138, p. 609. When a defendant accused of homicide claims selfdefense, [t]he question to be determined is, did the accused, under all the circumstances of the assault, as it appeared to him, honestly believe that he was in danger of [losing] his life, or great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to do what he did in order to save himself from such apparent threatened danger? [ People v. Lennon, 71 Mich. 298, 300-301, 38 N.W. 871 (1888).] Thus, the killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide only if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm and that it is necessary to exercise deadly force to prevent such harm to himself. See People v. Daniels, 192 Mich.App. 658, 672, 482 N.W.2d 176 (1991). We reaffirm today that the touchstone of any claim of self-defense, as a justification for homicide, is necessity. An accused's conduct in failing to retreat, or to otherwise avoid the intended harm, may in some circumstancesother than those in which the accused is the victim of a sudden, violent attackindicate a lack of reasonableness or necessity in resorting to deadly force in self-defense. For example, where a defendant invites trouble or meets non-imminent force with deadly force, his failure to pursue an available, safe avenue of escape might properly be brought to the attention of the factfinder as a factor in determining whether the defendant acted in reasonable self-defense. [19] However, as Judge Cardozo cautioned in People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 245, 107 N.E. 496 (1914), [g]eneral statements to the effect that one who is attacked should withdraw, must be read in the light of the facts that led up to them. Thus, the generally applicable element of necessity contemplates three reticulate rules that are applicable in certain specific factual scenarios.

Although Michigan's common law that was codified imposes a duty to avoid using deadly force, it is clear that retreat is never required in circumstances similar to those delineated in Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 15 S.Ct. 962, 39 L.Ed. 1086 (1895), [20] the classic American no duty to retreat case: when a person is violently attacked and it does not reasonably appear that it would be safe to retreat. The statement of the governing principles of self-defense as set forth in People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451, 456-457 (1850), is indicative of the common-law rules that were in place when the Legislature enacted Michigan's murder statutes just four years earlier. These principles remain apropos today and have not been modified since their implicit codification more than 150 years ago: First. That a man who, in the lawful pursuit of his business, is attacked by another under circumstances which denote an intention to take away his life, or do him some enormous bodily harm, may lawfully kill the assailant, provided he use all the means in his power, otherwise, to save his own life or prevent the intended harm; such as retreating as far as he can, or disabling his adversary without killing him, if it be in his power. [21] Secondly. When the attack upon him is so sudden, fierce and violent, that a retreat would not diminish, but increase his danger, he may instantly kill his adversary without retreating at all. Thirdly. When from the nature of the attack, there is reasonable ground to believe that there is a design to destroy his life, or commit any felony upon his person, the killing of the assailant will be excusable homicide, although it should afterwards appear that no felony was intended. [Emphasis supplied.] The rules of self-defense as provided in Doe state the obvious: If it is possible to safely avoid an attack then it is not necessary, and therefore not permissible, to exercise deadly force against the attacker. However, one is never obliged to retreat from a sudden, fierce, and violent attack, because under such circumstances a reasonable person would, as a rule, find it necessary to use force against force without retreating. The violent and sudden attack removes the ability to retreat. [22] Where immediate danger to life or great bodily harm is threatened upon the innocent victim, he cannot be required when hard pressed, to draw very fine distinctions concerning the extent of the injury that an infuriated and reckless assailant may probably inflict. Brownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732, 738 (1878). As Justice Holmes reasoned in Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 65 L.Ed. 961 (1921), detached reflection cannot be demanded in the face of an uplifted knife. There, Justice Holmes concluded that it is not a condition of immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with safety ... Id., citing Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 558, 17 S.Ct. 172, 41 L.Ed. 547 (1896). [23] In People v. Macard, 73 Mich. 15, 40 N.W. 784 (1888), this Court reaffirmed that Michigan never recognized at common law an obligation to retreat from a sudden and violent attack before codification. In Macard, the defendant and his neighbor had a history of mutual animosity. The defendant was standing in or near a public road in front of his home when his neighbor began advancing toward him from across the street, carrying a gun and making threats. When the neighbor continued to advance despite the defendant's warning that he stop, the defendant shot him. At his trial for murder, the defendant asserted self-defense and argued that retreating would have exposed him to greater danger. This Court reversed the defendant's conviction of manslaughter and granted him a new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant was justified in shooting [i]f there was no reasonable opportunity or means of avoiding what the [defendant] anticipated as an assault with this deadly weapon: Go which way [the defendant] would, he would only the more surely expose himself to the deadly aim of his antagonist. In such case, about the only question for the jury to determine was, did the [defendant] in good faith believe this to be his true situation? If he did, the jury should have been told [he] was fully justified.... To hold otherwise would be to destroy the right of self-defense. It was not necessary for the [defendant], if without fault, on being suddenly assaulted by the use of a deadly weapon upon the public highway or upon his own premises, to retreat before using his weapon. An instant of delay might have been at the expense of his life, and the law requires no man to run such risks. [Id. at 21-22, 40 N.W. 784 (emphasis supplied).]
Michigan law imposes an affirmative obligation to retreat, where safely possible, in one narrow set of circumstances: where a defendantwho is not in his castleis voluntarily engaged in mutual, nondeadly combat that escalates into sudden deadly violence. This represents the only type of situation in which the English common law imposed upon a defender an affirmative duty to retreat to the wall, Pond, supra at 174-175; Erwin, supra at 195; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.), pp. 1121-1123, 1126, and it is apparent from our case law that Michigan adhered to this rule at the time of the codification of our murder statute. As explained by Professors Perkins and Boyce, by reference to Foster, Crown Law (1762), the use of deadly force in self-defense at English common law was considered in light of the different positions of the parties involved. The first scenario involved a defendant who was without fault: One, entirely free from fault, is the victim of an assault which was murderous from the beginning. He is under no obligation to retreat ... but may stand his ground, and if he reasonably believes it necessary to use deadly force to save himself from death or great bodily harm, he is privileged to do so. [Perkins & Boyce, supra at 1121 (emphasis supplied).] Thus, at common law the innocent victim of a murderous assault had no affirmative duty to retreat; instead, if he reasonably believed that it was necessary under the circumstances to exercise deadly force, he could kill his assailant in self-defense. This rule is consistent with the generally applicable rules of self-defense as codified in Michigan's murder statutes, as discussed above. See Macard, supra at 21-22, 40 N.W. 784; Lennon, supra at 300-301, 38 N.W. 871; Brownell, supra at 738; Pond, supra at 177-178. However, an affirmative obligation to retreat applied to a voluntary participant in mutual combat: One who was the aggressor in a chance-medley (an ordinary fist fight, or other nondeadly encounter), or who culpably entered into such an engagement, finds that his adversary has suddenly and unexpectedly changed the nature of the contest and is resorting to deadly force. This ... is the only type of situation which requires retreat to the wall. Such a defender, not being entirely free from fault, must not resort to deadly force if there is any other reasonable method of saving himself. Hence if a reasonable avenue of escape is available to him he must take it unless he is in his castle at the time. [Perkins & Boyce, supra at 1121 (emphasis supplied).] Thus, the original concept of a `duty to retreat to the wall' applied not to the innocent victim of a murderous assault, but only to the culpable participant of a chance-medley. Perkins & Boyce, supra at 1225. [24] This principle was recognized by this Court in Pond, supra at 175-176: In [cases in which a defensive homicide occurred in a sudden affray], the original assault not being with a felonious intent, and the danger arising in the heat of blood on one or both sides, the homicide is not excused unless the slayer does all which is reasonably in his power to avoid the necessity of extreme resistance, by retreating where retreat is safe, or by any other expedient which is attainable. He is bound, if possible, to get out of his adversary's way, and has no right to stand up and resist if he can safely retreat or escape. Accordingly, we conclude that at the time of the codification of our first murder statute in 1846, the common-law rule in Michigan recognized only one instance in which an affirmative, specific duty to retreat applied, namely, when the defendant was the voluntary participant in mutual combat. [25]

It is universally accepted that retreat is not a factor in determining whether a defensive killing was necessary when it occurred in the accused's dwelling: Regardless of any general theory to retreat as far as practicable before one can justify turning upon his assailant and taking life in self-defense, the law imposes no duty to retreat upon one who, free from fault in bringing on a difficulty, is attacked at or in his or her own dwelling or home. Upon the theory that a man's house is his castle, and that he has a right to protect it and those within it from intrusion or attack, the rule is practically universal that when a person is attacked in his own dwelling he may stand at bay and turn on and kill his assailant if this is apparently necessary to save his own life or to protect himself from great bodily harm. [40 Am. Jur. 2d, § 167, p. 636.] The rule has been defended as arising from `an instinctive feeling that a home is sacred, and that it is improper to require a man to submit to pursuit from room to room in his own house.' People v. Godsey, 54 Mich.App. 316, 319, 220 N.W.2d 801 (1974) (citations omitted). Moreover, in a very real sense a person's dwelling is his primary place of refuge. Where a person is in his castle, there is simply no safer place to retreat.
Defendant, who was outside his home in the driveway or yard between the home and a detached garage at the time of the homicide, contends that he was wholly excused from any obligation to retreat because he was in his castle. We disagree and hold that the castle doctrine, as it applied in this state and as was codified in our murder statute in 1846, applies solely to the dwelling and its attached appurtenances. Although many courts have extended the castle exception to other areas, [26] we conclude that there is simply no basis in the case law of this state, contemporaneous with the enactment of our initial murder statute, to justify extending the rule in this manner. It is unknown whether the English common law applied the castle doctrine which, as we have noted, was relevant only to the voluntary participant in a nondeadly encounterto areas beyond the dwelling. As noted by Professors Perkins and Boyce, the scope of [the] special privilege granted to one so far at fault might have been limited to the actual building [but this] is mere speculation. Id. at 1134-1135, 220 N.W.2d 801. Because the only indication we have of the castle doctrine as it applied in Michigan at the time of the codification of our murder statute is that it applied in the dwelling, Pond, supra at 176 (emphasis supplied), we lack the authority to now extend this rule to areas beyond the dwelling itself. Defendant contends that this Court's statements in Pond indicate that Michigan's common law extended the castle doctrine to the curtilage surrounding the home. However, we agree with the prosecution's contention that Pond did not in any way purport to extend the self-defense castle exception to the curtilage area surrounding the dwelling. [27] With respect to self-defense, this Court explained in Pond that [t]he danger resisted must be to life, or of serious bodily harm of a permanent character; and it must be unavoidable by other means. Of course, we refer to means within the power of the slayer, so far as he is able to judge from the circumstances as they appear to him at the time. A man is not, however, obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling, but may use such means as are absolutelynecessary to repel the assailant from his house, or to prevent his forcible entry, even to the taking of life. But here, as in the other cases, he must not take life if he can otherwise arrest or repel the assailant. [Emphasis supplied.] This statement of the castle rule, taken from a case issued quite contemporaneously with the enactment of our murder statute, provides no basis from which to conclude that the rule applied anywhere but in [the] dwelling, that is, an inhabited building and its attached appurtenances. [28] Pond, therefore, does not allow us to conclude that the castle doctrine, so far as it was a part of the common law of this state when our murder statute was enacted, extended to the curtilage surrounding the dwelling. Instead, by providing essentially the sole indication, contemporaneous with the enactment of the murder statute, concerning whether and to what extent any duty to retreat existed in our common law, Pond establishes that the castle doctrine applies in this State only to a residence. Thus, for example, while the castle doctrine applies to all areas of a dwellingbe it a room within the building, a basement or attic, or an attached appurtenance such as a garage, porch or deckit does not apply to open areas in the curtilage that are not a part of a dwelling. Defendant additionally argues that Lilly provides a basis for extending the castle exception to the curtilage. In Lilly, the defendant was attacked at night on his property in a passageway between his house and a new house that he was constructing. The defendant stabbed and killed the attacker, a farmhand whom he had recently discharged and who had earlier that day threatened the defendant with extreme personal violence. At the defendant's trial for murder, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: If you find that ... [the defendant] could have saved himself from all serious harm by retreating or calling for assistance, and the defendant so knew or believed, but that he did not do so; but stood his ground and resisted [the farmhand], and in such resistance killed [him], such killing would not be justifiable or excusable. If [the defendant] believed that [the farmhand] came to his premises on the evening of the homicide with the intention of seeking a combat with him, and that he sought him for that purpose and the defendant so knew, then it was [the defendant's] duty to have avoided [him], and to have avoided such combat by all reasonable means within his power, and if he chose to stand up and resist the assault when he might have avoided it,... such killing would not be justifiable. [Id. at 275.] This Court set aside the defendant's conviction for manslaughter and ordered a new trial, holding that the jury instructions improperly suggested to the jury that the facts would warrant findings that were not supported by the evidence, especially that defendant did not make reasonable efforts to avoid deceased and avert his attack. Id. Furthermore, this Court held, the instructions were improper because they indicated to the jury ... [that] it was incumbent upon [the defendant] to fly from his habitation where his wife and children were, in order to escape danger instead of resisting the aggressor. Such is not the law. The jury should have been instructed in effect that if they were satisfied that [the defendant] being at his own house had reason to believe and did believe from [the farmhand's] previous and present language, manner and actions, and what had already taken place, that it was necessary to inflict the wounds he did inflict ... to save his own life or to protect himself from danger of great bodily harm, he was excused. ... The charge was inconsistent with the view here explained, and it conveyed the idea that if help was within call and that defendant so believed, then his act was not lawful self-defense. [Id. at 275-276.] We do not agree with defendant's assertion that Lilly abrogates the necessity element of self-defense where the accused kills an assailant within the curtilage of his dwelling. Instead, Lilly reaffirms that the fundamental inquiry with respect to a claim of self-defense is whether the defendant reasonably believed that it was necessary to utilize deadly force against his aggressor. Lilly further establishes that the defendant was not required to leave his premisesthereby subjecting his wife and children to danger in his absenceor to seek aid from third parties. Lilly simply did not involve the castle exception. In short, there is no basis in our case law for supposing that Michigan ever recognized an extension of the doctrine beyond the inhabited dwelling itself at the time the common-law rules were codified. Instead, we adhere to this Court's formulation of the doctrine in Pond, supra at 176, that [a] man is not ... obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling (emphasis supplied). Thus, the castle doctrine is relevant only to acts of self-defense that take place in the dwelling; the doctrine has no application to a conflict outside the home. People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 535, 111 N.W.2d 742 (1961). [29]