Opinion ID: 1343045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Forum Familiar with Applicable Law and Avoiding Conflicts of Law

Text: The fourth public interest is  `the advantages of conducting a trial in a forum familiar with the applicable law and of avoiding conflicts of law.' 184 W.Va. at 234-35, 400 S.E.2d at 242-43. (Citations omitted). The circuit court found that pursuant to Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 187 W.Va. 742, 421 S.E.2d 493 (1992), Michigan law likely will govern in this action because it is the state where the site is located as well as being the state with the most significant interest in this litigation. We agree. In Joy Technologies, we relied upon Triangle Industries, supra. Triangle Industries answered a certified question that asked whether West Virginia substantive law applies to the interpretation of the insurance policies issued in New Jersey for an insured risk in West Virginia with the damage occurring in Ohio. 182 W. Va. at 583, 390 S.E.2d at 565. Triangle Industries was headquartered in New Jersey and owned a plant in West Virginia. This plant produced toxic waste that was disposed of in Ohio. We determined under the facts of the case that the substantive law of New Jersey should apply. In the Syllabus of Triangle Industries, we stated: In a case involving the interpretation of an insurance policy, made in one state to be performed in another, the law of the state of the formation of the contract shall govern, unless another state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties, or the law of the other state is contrary to the public policy of this state. (Emphasis added). In other words, we held in Triangle Industries that the place the insurance contract was entered into generally will control with two exceptions. First, it will not apply if there is a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties in another state or, second, if it results in a conflict of public policy. On an appeal in Joy Technologies, supra, we used the second exception of the Syllabus of Triangle Industries, and we applied the law of West Virginia rather than the law of Pennsylvania which is where the insurance contracts were formed. In addition, although we did not find it necessary to base our decision on the first exception to conclude the law of West Virginia applied, we did determine the facts suggest that West Virginia had a very significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. 187 W.Va. at 746, 421 S.E.2d at 497. As it is relevant to the present case, we find the discussion in Joy Technologies, Inc. with regard to the first exception is persuasive authority. The relevant facts of Joy Technologies are as follows. Joy Technologies, Inc. succeeded Joy Manufacturing Company (collectively Joy), a Pennsylvania corporation with its executive offices also located in Pennsylvania. During a period of time, Joy operated a facility in West Virginia which released PCBs. Over the course of many years, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) issued to Joy certain insurance policies where it obligated itself to defend and indemnify Joy for liability claims based on personal injury or property damage arising out of an `occurrence' ... defined ... as `an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.' 187 W.Va. at 744, 421 S.E.2d at 495. Beginning in 1972, the policies issued by Liberty Mutual also had an exclusion clause which provided: `[T]o bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.'  187 W.Va. at 744, 421 S.E.2d at 495. (Footnote omitted). Thereafter, when Joy sought to have Liberty Mutual defend and indemnify it against damages caused by the PCB contamination, Liberty Mutual denied coverage based upon the exclusion clause. With regard to the first exception of the Syllabus of Triangle Industries, we found in Joy Technologies: The action in the present case arises out of the expenditures of monies for remediating damage caused by pollution to property in West Virginia, and it is rather clear that the pollution arose from operations which were conducted in West Virginia and involved a facility located in West Virginia. Thus, the injury occurred in West Virginia, the instrumentality of injury was located in West Virginia, and the forum selected to try the issues was West Virginia.... [T]he relationship would appear to be more substantial than that of Pennsylvania, where the contract was formed. 187 W.Va. at 745-46, 421 S.E.2d at 496-97. In addition, we cited as support the New Jersey case of Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Co., 254 N.J.Super. 43, 50-51, 603 A.2d 61, 65 (App.Div.1992), aff'd, 134 N.J. 96, 629 A.2d 885 (1993). Under facts similar to Joy Technologies, we quoted the New Jersey court as stating: `We hold that New Jersey courts should interpret according to New Jersey [substantive] law a pollution exclusion clause contained in a comprehensive general liability insurance policy, wherever written, which was purchased to cover an operation or activity, wherever its principal location, which generates toxic wastes that predictably come to rest in New Jersey and impose legal liabilities there on the insured. In such a case, New Jersey has the dominant and significant relationship with the parties, the transaction, and the outcome of the controversy.'  187 W.Va. at 746, 421 S.E.2d at 497. ([S]ubstantive in original). Thus, the New Jersey court applied its law to a pollution exclusion clause rather than the law of the state where the contract was formed. Applying the criteria we used in Joy Technologies to conclude that West Virginia had a more substantial relationship than Pennsylvania, we find Michigan has a more substantial relationship to this litigation than does West Virginia. The present action arises out of money to be spent remediating damage caused by pollution to property in Michigan. In addition, it is clear that the pollution arose from operations which were conducted in [Michigan] and involved a facility located in [Michigan]. Thus, the injury occurred in [Michigan, and] the instrumentality of injury was located in [Michigan]. 187 W.Va. at 745-46, 421 S.E.2d at 496-97. The only fact that may be considered different in the present case from the facts we used in Joy Technologies is that in Joy Technologies West Virginia was the selected forum to try the issues. In the case at bar, Cannelton brought the declaratory judgment action in West Virginia, not Michigan. However, as previously mentioned, Commercial Union filed its action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan prior to Cannelton's filing its action in West Virginia. Moreover, the USEPA and the MDNR are pursuing their action in Michigan. Under these facts, we do not find this difference significant. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, we determine that if this case were tried in West Virginia, the law of Michigan would apply. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the advantages of conducting a trial in a forum familiar with the applicable law and of avoiding conflicts of law favors Michigan. Tsapis, 184 W.Va. at 234-35, 400 S.E.2d at 242-43. [13] Cannelton further asserts that the law of Michigan violates the public policy of West Virginia. In Joy Technologies, we determined that the insurance industry ... represented to the State of West Virginia, acting through the West Virginia Commissioner of Insurance, that the exclusion ... [at] issue... merely clarified the pre-existing `occurrence' clause. 187 W.Va. at 748, 421 S.E.2d at 499. As a result, we said to interpret the clause in a manner inconsistent with the way Liberty Mutual originally represented the exclusion clause to the State to get it approved would be contrary to public policy. See Nadler v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 W.Va. 329, 338, 424 S.E.2d 256, 265 (1992) (stating [i]n Joy Technologies, ... the public policy issue did not arise from the conflict between the substantive law of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, but rather from the wrongdoing of the insurer). We interpreted the policies in Joy Technologies not to exclude pollution damage, even if it resulted over a period of time and was gradual, so long as it was not expected or intended. 187 W.Va. at 749, 421 S.E.2d at 500. (Footnote omitted). Cannelton states [t]he majority of the policies that are the subject matter of this action contain the same or similar pollution exclusion clauses. Cannelton further asserts that in Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 438 Mich. 197, 201, 476 N.W.2d 392, 394 (1991), the Michigan Supreme Court said the pollution exclusion clauses are unambiguous and the definition of `sudden' includes a temporal element as well as a sense of the unexpected, and that `accidental' means unexpected and unintended. Therefore, Cannelton claims it may be denied coverage under Michigan law and, therefore, it would be contrary to the public policy of West Virginia. We do not believe it is necessary to go into a lengthy analysis to decide whether Michigan law violates a public policy of West Virginia when it arises as a result of a forum non conveniens motion and where we already have determined that Michigan has a more significant interest than West Virginia. As the United States Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft accurately and descriptively explained: In fact, if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually useless. Jurisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied. As a result, many plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums. Ordinarily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper.       ... If the possibility of a change in law were given substantial weight, deciding motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens would become quite difficult. Choice-of-law analysis would become extremely important, and the courts would frequently be required to interpret the law of foreign jurisdictions. First, the trial court would have to determine what law would apply if the case were tried in the chosen forum, and what law would apply if the case were tried in the alternative forum. It would then have to compare the rights, remedies, and procedures available under the law that would be applied in each forum. Dismissal would be appropriate only if the court concluded that the law applied by the alternative forum is as favorable to the plaintiff as that of the chosen forum. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, is designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law. 454 U.S. at 250-51, 102 S.Ct. at 263, 70 L.Ed.2d at 432-33. The Supreme Court also stated that every Federal Court of Appeals that had addressed the question, except for the court below in the Piper Aircraft case, held an action may be dismissed upon forum non conveniens even if the plaintiff has a lesser likelihood of recovery in the other forum. 454 U.S. at 250, 102 S.Ct. at 263, 70 L.Ed.2d at 432. We agree with the analysis of the Supreme Court; and, therefore, we find if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually useless.... Thus, if the possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper. 454 U.S. at 250, 102 S.Ct. at 263, 70 L.Ed.2d at 432. For these reasons, we give little weight to Cannelton's argument that the substantive law of Michigan will be less favorable to it than the substantive law of West Virginia. Likewise, for the reasons announced by the Supreme Court, we decline to go through such a lengthy analysis of what law is more favorable and how it will impact Cannelton's interests. As to the argument that Michigan's law nonetheless would violate West Virginia's public policy, the present case is distinguishable from Joy Technologies, supra, in that Joy Technologies was an appeal from an order partially granting a motion for summary judgment. Joy Technologies did not involve the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In sum, we find that Michigan has a more substantial interest than does West Virginia and the law of Michigan would apply if this case proceeded in West Virginia. Therefore, we conclude the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that Michigan is more  `familiar with the applicable law'  and will be more suitable to avoid  `conflicts of law.'  Tsapis, 184 W.Va. at 234-35, 400 S.E.2d at 242-43. (Citations omitted). C.