Opinion ID: 768365
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Competency

Text: 36 Coe also asserts that the Tennessee courts applied an improper standard of competency in deciding his competency to be executed. As discussed above in Part II.A.2 supra, in Van Tran the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the competency standard advocated by Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ford. In determining the proper standard, Justice Powell looked for guidance in the common law tradition and in the modern practice of prohibiting the execution of the insane. He noted that there were differing justifications at common law for not executing insane criminals. One justification, also applied in the context of competency to stand trial, was that a prisoner must be competent to be executed so that he may assist in his defense. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring) ('if after judgment he become of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of sound memory he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution' (quoting 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 35 (1736)). Justice Powell, however, concluded that this justification does not make sense in modern practice. First, he noted that criminal defendants are afforded broader constitutional guarantees than at common law, including the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and extensive judicial review through direct appeal and state and federal collateral review. It is thus unlikely indeed that a defendant today could go to his death with knowledge of undiscovered trial error that might set him free. Id. at420 (Powell, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Powell observed that in cases tried at common law execution often followed fairly quickly after trial, so that incompetence at the time of execution was linked as a practical matter with incompetence at the trial itself. Id. at 420-21 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell then concluded that [t]he more general concern of the common law - that executions of the insane are simply cruel - retains its vitality. Id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring). Furthermore, one of the death penalty's critical justifications, its retributive force, depends on the defendant's awareness of the penalty's existence and purpose. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). In order to achieve this justification, Powell instructed that prisoners should be considered insane for the purpose of execution if they are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). 37 We agree that a prisoner's ability to assist in his defense is not a necessary element to a determination of competency to be executed. Moreover, Coe has not shown how a prisoner could assist his counsel, a mental health professional, or the trial judge in deciding on his competency when the prisoner's very competency is the matter at issue. 38 In arguing that the common law standard governing the modern standard for competency to stand trial, which includes the assistance inquiry, also applies in a competency-to-be-executed proceeding, Coe asserts that the Supreme Court has held that the standard for competency does not change depending on the stage of the criminal proceedings. He cites to Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the competency standard for pleading guilty or for waiving the right to trial is the same as the competency standard for standing trial. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted, [t]he Due Process Clause does not mandate different standards of competency at various stages of or for different decisions made during the criminal proceedings. Id. at 404 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It appears from his opinion, however, that Justice Kennedy was concerned that the same standard be applied from the time of a defendant's arraignment through his sentencing. See id. at 404-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because competency to be executed involves different interests than competency to stand trial in the first instance, we do not believe that a state rigidly must apply the competency-to-stand-trial standard in this context where it does not make sense in modern practice. 39 Moreover, the Supreme Court seems to have accepted Justice Powell's competency standard as the Ford holding. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989) (noting that under Ford v. Wainwright, someone who is 'unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it' cannot be executed (citation omitted)). Therefore, we conclude that the Van Tran opinion's adoption of Justice Powell's standard, that only those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and the reason they are to suffer it are entitled to a reprieve, satisfies due process and is not an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 266 (adopting the cognitive test). 40 We note that Coe also challenges the Tennessee trial court's application of the Van Tran standard in his case. In its ruling on Coe's competency, the trial court stated, Petitioner realizes he is facing execution, and that he knows it is because he has been convicted of murdering a little girl. Coe v. State, No. B-73812, slip op. at 27 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000) (emphasis added). Coe argues that the trial court impermissibly relied on Coe's knowledge that he is to be executed for his murder conviction rather thanCoe's comprehension of the sentence and its implications. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus / Complaint for Relief at 44. We conclude, however, that the Tennessee trial court properly followed Justice Powell's competency standard as adopted and applied in Van Tran and determined that Coe is aware of his imminent execution and the reason for it, showing that Coe has made the requisite connection between his crime and his punishment 4 .