Opinion ID: 386196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: City of Mobile v. Bolden

Text: 10 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), was pending before the Supreme Court when these cases were argued; accordingly, we postponed decision in these cases pending the Bolden decision. After Bolden was announced, we requested supplemental briefs from the parties. As Justice White predicted, however, we still are somewhat adrift on uncharted seas with respect to how to proceed. 446 U.S. at 103, 100 S.Ct. at 1519. 11 No view by the Supreme Court Justices commanded a clear majority. Mr. Justice Stewart, who authored the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Burger, Powell and Rehnquist, was of the view that a vote dilution claim, as opposed to an actual denial of the right to vote, is not a Fifteenth Amendment 8 claim at all, and that a Fourteenth Amendment claim had not been proven because the plaintiffs had not adduced adequate proof that the at-large election system constituted intentional discrimination against blacks, either in its inception or operation. 12 Although Justice Stevens considered a vote dilution claim to be a proper Fifteenth Amendment claim, he would require a plaintiff to prove that the system complained of is either totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the minority. 446 U.S. at 90, 100 S.Ct. at 1512. 13 In dissent, Justices Brennan, White and Marshall, for different reasons and in varying levels of vehemence, disagreed with the plurality that discriminatory purpose had not been shown in this case. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, went further, arguing that an approach based on motivation is unworkable, and that proof of discriminatory impact alone should be sufficient. Justices White and Marshall both viewed the Bolden claim as a legitimate Fifteenth Amendment claim. Justice Brennan took no position on this. 14 Justice Blackmun assumed that if Justice Stewart is correct that discriminatory purpose must be shown, the evidence would support a finding of intent. He concurred in the result, however, because he disagreed with the remedy ordered by the district court. 15 Because no one analysis captured five Justices, we must determine the view with which a majority of the Court could agree. There were five clear votes (Stewart, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.) against the proposition that discriminatory impact alone is sufficient in vote dilution cases. Accordingly, to win a majority of the Court, in addition to impact, discriminatory purpose of some sort must be proven. Justice Stevens articulated the most conservative opinion on the extent to which such purpose must be shown. Because no other Justice concurred in his opinion, that discriminatory purpose must be the only purpose, we reject that analysis. Instead, we adopt Justice Stewart's opinion, though it commanded only four votes. If, in addition to impact, a discriminatory purpose exists in the enactment or operation of a given electoral system, all members of the Court save Justice Stevens agree that that system is unconstitutional. 9 16