Opinion ID: 2631067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Invited Error Precludes Appellate Review of an Issue

Text: ¶ 17 Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error. [17] By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this principle by `discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.' [18] Further, parties are not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal. [19] Thus, [e]ncouraging counsel to actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error. [20]
¶ 18 We have recently stated, Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues. [21] The following cases illustrate affirmative representations that can properly be characterized as leading the court into error. ¶ 19 In State v. Hamilton, [22] the defendant argued on appeal that instructions given to the jury were prejudicial. [23] But before the trial court instructed the jury on the law, defense counsel had approved the disputed language. [24] The trial court specifically required counsel to confirm on the record, that the State takes no exception to the instructions . . . nor does the Defense. [25] Defense counsel did so by affirmatively indicating that they had no objections to the jury instructions. [26] Thus, we held that the manifest injustice exception did not apply because invited error precluded review of the jury instructions. [27] ¶ 20 In State v. King, [28] defense counsel made an affirmative representation to the trial court, both during and after voir dire, that he had no objection to the jury panel that was selected. [29] We held that the defendant had failed to preserve the issue of whether the jury was impartial for appellate review and stated that the defendant must demonstrate plain error. [30] We recognized, however, that defense counsel's affirmative representations to the court that he had no objections to the jury panel implicated the invited error doctrine. [31] But we declined to apply invited error only because the State had failed to raise the issue in its brief. [32] ¶ 21 In State v. Dunn, [33] the defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it reversed its pretrial ruling and allowed questioning about his prior conviction. [34] He argued that if he had known that the prior conviction was going to be admissible, he would not have taken the stand or, at the very least, he would have deflected the impact of the prior conviction by disclosing it during his case-in-chief. [35] We held that the defendant was precluded from raising this claim of error because of the invited error doctrine. [36] ¶ 22 In Dunn, defense counsel moved to exclude the evidence of the prior conviction, providing the trial court with citations to the authority on which the court based its pretrial ruling. [37] But contrary to [the defendant's] position before the trial judge, the law at the time clearly allowed evidence of prior convictions to be admitted for impeachment purposes without any restriction. [38] We concluded that [defense] counsel's actions in making the motion in limine without informing the trial judge of the controlling law had led the trial court into error. [39] We therefore held that the defendant was precluded from asserting that the pretrial ruling misled him into taking the stand. [40]
¶ 23 We have yet to apply the invited error doctrine in a situation, such as here, where a party files an untimely responsive memorandum concerning an issue in the case. We are disinclined to do so now. In this case, the Pratts did not make an affirmative representation that led the court into error. The Pratts' late response in addressing the issue of judicial privilege is not enough on its own to fall within the realm of invited error. As the above cases illustrate, invited error generally occurs in a more affirmative manner, such as where counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly that there is no objection to a specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous authority upon which the court relies. In this case, the Pratts did not, by statement or act, affirmatively represent to the district court that they had no objection to application of the judicial proceeding privilege and, thereby, cannot be said to have led the court into committing any alleged error. [41] ¶ 24 Ultimately, the district court was aware of the judicial privilege argument and resolved the issue in a deliberate manner. While it is true that the district court did not have the benefit of the Pratts' argument, the issue was preserved for appeal when the district court was given notice of the issue (in this case, by the Nelsons) and when the court in response to such notice made a specific ruling on the issue. Regardless of the Pratts' lack of participation in the court's decision-making process, the judicial privilege issue was presented in such a way that the court had an opportunity to rule on that issue; therefore, plain error review does not apply in this case. Accordingly, we now consider the judicial privilege issue on appeal as well as the Pratts' accompanying argument.