Opinion ID: 1038320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hazle’s Claim for Injunctive Relief

Text: Finally, we address Hazle’s claim for injunctive relief under California Civil Procedure Code § 526a. That statute provides a cause of action to taxpayers to enjoin any state agency or a local government entity from carrying on any 13 Because the question whether Westcare, given its role as the Substance Abuse Services Coordination Agency, is a state actor for purposes of section 1983 liability is not before us, we decline to provide a definitive answer in the first instance on the basis of the limited record before us. We remand for a determination on a more complete record. 30 HAZLE V. CROFOOT unlawful actions. See Cates v. Cal. Gambling Control Comm’n, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). In his claim for injunctive relief, Hazle alleged, consistent with the allegations in his § 1983 claims, that the state defendants in their official capacities, including the Secretary of the CDCR, continue to violate the First Amendment by requiring parolees to participate in religious treatment programs in order to be eligible for parole, failing to provide parolees with secular or non-religious treatment alternatives, and revoking the parole of those who protest or resist participation in religion-based treatment programs. Hazle sought an injunction under the statute preventing both Westcare and the aforementioned state defendants from expending state funds in this unconstitutional manner. The district judge held that Hazle’s state law claim for injunctive relief was moot in light of developments that followed our 2007 decision in Inouye. Specifically, in November 2008, and in a direct response to Inouye, the state CDCR issued a directive stating that parole agents “shall not require that a parolee attend AA, NA, or any other religious based program if the parolee refuses to participate in such a program for religious reasons.” The directive required that an objecting parolee instead “be referred to an alternative nonreligious program.” The district judge concluded that, “absent any indication that [this directive] was promulgated only in response to ongoing litigation,” it was “sufficient to render the request for an injunction moot,” and therefore granted summary judgment to all defendants on that claim. The district judge erred in concluding that Hazle’s state law claim for injunctive relief was moot. We do not mean to cast doubt on our prior holding that a defendant may overcome the “heavy burden of proving that the challenged HAZLE V. CROFOOT 31 conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur” with an official “memorandum represent[ing] a permanent change” in policy that is “broad in scope and unequivocal in tone” and “fully supportive” of the relevant constitutional rights. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, however, there is undisputed evidence that the CDCR directive has not been implemented in any meaningful fashion, at least with respect to Westcare.14 The record discloses that defendant Westcare conceded the following facts: 38. Westcare did not receive a copy of [the CDCR] directive until it was produced in discovery in this action. 39. Westcare does not know what the term “alternative nonreligious program” as used in the Directive means. 40. The Directive has not altered the way in which Westcare conducts business. 41. To date, Westcare continues to contract solely with residential providers that use the 12-step program “in some form or fashion.” Further, Westcare’s Senior Vice President provided a declaration, issued fully a year after the CDCR’s directive, 14 Because the district judge granted summary judgment on this claim to the state defendants “for the reasons stated in the Court’s [prior] order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Westcare,” our decision as to Westcare’s motion for summary judgment is equally applicable to both sets of defendants. 32 HAZLE V. CROFOOT stating, “[t]here is no requirement by CDCR, that I am aware of, that requires Westcare to contract with a certain minimum number of non-religious or non-‘12-step’ treatment programs.” These facts establish that, notwithstanding the state’s directive, the defendants do not appear to have taken any concrete steps to prevent other parolees from suffering the same constitutional violations Hazle suffered. Under these circumstances, it is far from “‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,’” as is required to demonstrate that a case has been mooted by a defendant’s voluntary conduct. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). Accordingly, we reverse the district judge’s entry of summary judgment to defendants, and remand for further consideration of Hazle’s claim for injunctive relief.15