Opinion ID: 1692959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Length of Investigative Stop

Text: Soukharith next argues that the excessive length of the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. An investigative stop must be `temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' U.S. v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1279 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). However, `in distinguishing a true investigative stop from a de facto arrest, we must not adhere to rigid time limitations or bright line rules....' State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. at 490, 495 N.W.2d at 638 (quoting U.S. v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1137, 103 L.Ed.2d 198 (1989)). Relevant circumstances include the `law enforcement purposes served by the detention, the diligence with which the police pursue the investigation, the scope and intrusiveness of the detention, and the duration of the detention.'  Id. Whether law enforcement purposes are being served depends upon whether the detention was likely to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions quickly, and with a minimum of interference. Id. According to Soukharith, the fact that the stop lasted a total of 34 to 45 minutes rendered it unconstitutional. We disagree. First, Chatfield retrieved Soukharith's license and registration and then called the dispatcher to conduct an NCIC check. Rather than constituting an undue delay, the NCIC check was most likely the least intrusive way to quickly confirm or dispel Chatfield's suspicions and to determine whether continued inquiry or detention was justified. See U.S. v. Finke, supra (holding that continued detention for purpose of conducting NCIC check is justified when suspicious activity is detected). While he waited for the results of the NCIC check, Chatfield asked Soukharith whether he owned the vehicle. Soukharith told Chatfield that he had purchased what was obviously a new, expensive sports car for $2,000 from someone named Wonum, allegedly Karen's stepson. After hearing Soukharith's story, Chatfield learned from the dispatcher that Soukharith's license had been suspended and called for backup. At this point, approximately 10 to 15 minutes had passed since the initial stop, and another 10 to 20 minutes would pass before Chatfield's backup arrived. Although it took additional time, waiting for backup was appropriate. Chatfield spent the time writing the suspended license citation. Furthermore, Soukharith's suspended license and rather implausible story raised further suspicions in Chatfield's mind that Soukharith had committed or was committing a crime. [O]fficer safety concerns are legitimately heightened when suspicious activity is detected.... U.S. v. Finke, 85 F.3d at 1280. Wyoming State Patrol procedure dictates that where the person stopped is a suspected felon ... the member shall radio for back-up and the stop shall not be made without back-up unless circumstances require. Furthermore, a police officer may take reasonable steps to ensure his personal safety and maintain the status quo during an investigative stop. U.S. v. Brown, 51 F.3d 131 (8th Cir.1995). Chatfield acted reasonably in waiting for backup to arrive before proceeding with his investigation. Approximately 10 to 20 minutes passed from the time backup arrived until Chatfield made the arrest. Immediately after backup arrived, however, Chatfield learned that Soukharith was willing and able to pay cash for the suspended license citation and that the checkbook with which Soukharith claimed to have purchased the car did not support his story. Once again, further questions were created in Chatfield's mind, requiring that the stop be prolonged and the scope enlarged. See State v. Rodriguez, 239 Conn. 235, 684 A.2d 1165 (1996) (holding that when further questions are created in officer's mind, investigative stop may be prolonged and its scope enlarged as circumstances require). The vehicle was then searched, but did not reveal anything concerning the ownership of the car and thus, did not act to dispel any suspicion. Chatfield would have been remiss in his duties had he let Soukharith go at this point. Returning to his cruiser and getting additional information from the dispatcher, which information resulted in Soukharith's arrest, was justified in this instance. See State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975). Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, and giving due regard to the balance between Soukharith's Fourth Amendment rights and the importance of the governmental interests justifying the intrusion, we find from our de novo review that the length and scope of the investigative stop were within constitutional limits.