Opinion ID: 177587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summer 2004 promises

Text: In June 2004, Angel Garcia, an executive vice president at StorageTek, was trying to convince DeFranco to accept a position overseas. According to DeFranco, Garcia “guaranteed that when I came back, I would have permanent employment.” (Apt. App. at 419.) Later that summer, in August, DeFranco received similar assurances from two other StorageTek employees. Pat Martin, the chairman and chief executive officer, “guarantee[d] [DeFranco] a position when [he] returned.” (Id. at 421.) Finally, Roger Gaston, executive vice president of human relations, told DeFranco in August that “StorageTek’s policy is to guarantee permanent employment when you came [sic] back.” (Id. at 422.) These promises, according to DeFranco, were breached when he came back from overseas and was subjected to a RIF within six months of his return. However, these alleged guarantees were made before DeFranco signed the Secondment Agreement. The agreement, by its own terms, “supersedes, terminates, and otherwise renders null and void any and all prior agreements or contracts, whether written or oral, entered into between you and [StorageTek International] or between you and StorageTek or between you and any other StorageTek Affiliate with respect to the matters hereinabove expressly set forth.” (Id. at 214 (emphasis added).) One of the matters “expressly set forth” in the Secondment Agreement was that DeFranco’s employment was strictly at will. The Agreement goes on to provide that “[y]ou hereby acknowledge and agree that all prior contractual obligations of . . . StorageTek . . . have 12 been fulfilled or are fully incorporated herein.” (Id. at 215.) The Secondment Agreement’s at-will provision thus supersedes any guarantees StorageTek employees made to DeFranco prior to his signing the Agreement. DeFranco argues that the Secondment Agreement does not apply to StorageTek because the only signatories to the Agreement are StorageTek International and DeFranco. This argument is unpersuasive. “[C]ommon law contract principles . . . allow for the formation of contracts without the signatures of the parties bound by them.” Yaekle v. Andrews, 195 P.3d 1101, 1107 (Colo. 2008). Here, we need not spend much time considering whether StorageTek International acted with apparent authority to bind StorageTek to the Secondment Agreement, see Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d 357, 363 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (“Apparent authority is established by proof of written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes a person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by a person purporting to act for him.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), or whether StorageTek was a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement, see E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo. 1985) (“A person not a party to an express contract may bring an action on such contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party . . . .”). Either way, on these facts, there can be little doubt that the Secondment Agreement creates enforceable obligations and contractual rights on the part of StorageTek. StorageTek employees asked DeFranco to work for StorageTek UK for a period of time before returning to the United States, 13 suggesting that StorageTek viewed this as an internal move within the overall StorageTek organization, not, as DeFranco would have it, a move to an external company that was largely unaffiliated with StorageTek. (See, e.g., DeFranco Dep., Aplt. App. at 419 (“[Angel Garcia] said that it would mean a lot to StorageTek . . . if I would consider moving out there for a few years.” (emphasis added)).) In fact, the very use of the term “secondment” suggests that this was a move within the same organization. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2051 (1986) (defining “secondment” as “the detachment of a person . . . from his regular organization for temporary assignment elsewhere” (emphasis added)). Thus, given the close relationship between StorageTek and StorageTek International, we find DeFranco’s claim that “he had no reason to believe that [the Secondment Agreement] automatically negated any oral guarantees he was made by [StorageTek]” unconvincing. (Aplt.’s Br. at 12.) The plain terms of the Agreement purport to bind StorageTek, and given the nature of the relationship between StorageTek and StorageTek International—a relationship of which DeFranco was aware given that it was StorageTek employees who asked him to take the assignment with StorageTek International—the Secondment Agreement applied to StorageTek itself as well as StorageTek International. Therefore, the three promises allegedly made by StorageTek employees before DeFranco signed the Secondment Agreement were superseded by the Agreement and cannot support a cause of action for breach of contract or promissory estoppel. 14