Opinion ID: 1853034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in allowing Strickland's prior conviction for theft of property to be used by the State for impeachment purposes.

Text: ¶ 14. With the jury out, the State request[ed] a hearing under Rule 609 of Mississippi Rules of Evidence, Peterson v. State [518 So.2d 632 (Miss.1987)]. The State intends to, with the Court's permission, use [Strickland's] prior felony convictions to attack his credibility as a witness should he elect to testify. The State then tendered certified copies of Strickland's three prior felony convictions in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. [22] Strickland objected, arguing that [a]ll three of those are over ten years. . . . ¶ 15. The State conceded that CC-87-003681-00 was outside the ten-year period and inadmissible. While admitting that CC-90-003838-00 was also outside the ten-year period, the State maintained that: this crime happened in May of 2000. [Strickland] was set for trial in November of 2000, which he ended up not reporting on his bond. There was a Judgment Nisi taken. But for his flight, the State would have been able to bring this case to trial [at] a time in which the time period would not have elapsed. . . . [Strickland's] refusal to show up for [c]ourt and failure to appear as required by the terms and conditions of his bond is the reason that we are trying this case outside the initial term of ten years. As to CC-92-003257-00, the State argued that I think that the way the rule reads, the confinement imposed for that conviction of 15 years, [Strickland] is still under that confinement even today as we sit. [23] Additionally, the State maintained that credibility is directly at issue because it's going to be a believability contest should [Strickland] elect to testify between [him] and [Wright]. As such, the State asserted that when the Peterson factors are weighed, the probative value of allowing this particular conviction [24] in outweighs any prejudicial effect [on Strickland]. ¶ 16. The circuit court deemed only Strickland's conviction in CC-92-003257-00 to be admissible, finding: [w]e have not gotten to . . . 2008. . . . This is within the 15-year period. I am going by what the judge says his sentence was. The judgment was a split sentence to a term of 15 years. One year to serve, the execution of the remainder was suspended pending [Strickland's] good behavior on probation for five. . . . Even after the probation expires, the judge still has the authority to revoke the suspension. That is the law in this state. The circuit court then declared that: I have . . . gone over the Peterson factors; that is, the impeachment value of the prior crime, the point in time between the conviction and his subsequent history, the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime, the importance of his testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. I find that all of these factors weigh in favor of allowing impeachment with this particular crime [CC-92-003257-00] and not the other two. . . . Furthermore, the circuit court found this prior conviction to be relevant and will not be excluded because I do find that the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ¶ 17. Strickland argues that [t]he lower court based it[s] decision to allow the conviction in on the sentence, not the conviction date or the release from confinement, which was only a year. Regarding the Peterson factors, Strickland insists that his prior conviction for theft has little, if any, impeachment value[,] as to the crime of armed robbery; this prior conviction occurred over 13 years prior to the trial in the instant case[;] Strickland was the only defense witness and, therefore, [t]he importance of [his] testimony weighs against the admissibility of the conviction[;] and since theft is not a crime of dishonesty, it has no reflection on his credibility. As such, Strickland maintains that the lower court['s] evaluation process of the five Peterson factors to the facts of the instant case were in error and, furthermore, that the prejudicial effect of admitting this prior conviction outweighed its probative value. The State replies that Strickland has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this conviction. ¶ 18. The circuit court's decision to admit the prior conviction for impeachment is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Henderson v. State, 641 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Miss.1994). Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609 states, in pertinent part, that: (a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that (A) a nonparty witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and (B) a party has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party; and (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of punishment. (b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by the specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Miss. R. Evid. 609(a) and (b) (emphasis added). Theft crimes are categorized under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). See Blackman v. State, 659 So.2d 583, 585 (Miss.1995). [C]onvictions offered under 609(a)(1) to impeach a party must be analyzed under the guidelines set forth in Peterson . . . to determine if the probative value is great enough to overcome the presumed prejudicial effect to that party, and findings should be made on the record by the judge. Miss. R. Evid. 609 cmt. The Peterson factors include: (1) The impeachment value of the prior crime. (2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness' subsequent history. (3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime. (4) The importance of the defendant's testimony. (5) The centrality of the credibility issue. Peterson, 518 So.2d at 636. ¶ 19. The circuit court addressed the fifteen-year split sentence in CC-92-003257-00 for purposes of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609(b), and correctly noted that a suspended sentence may be revoked by the circuit court. See Johnson v. State, 925 So.2d 86, 93 (Miss.2006) (quoting Carter v. State, 754 So.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Miss. 2000) (Mills, J., dissenting)). However, Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609(b) provides that evidence of a conviction under Rule 609(a) is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date. . . . Miss. R. Evid. 609(b) (emphasis added). The date of conviction in CC-92-003257-00 is certain, i.e., March 5, 1993. However, release of the witness from confinement is indeterminable from the record before us. The date of the conviction is outside the ten-year period, but we are uncertain as to the date of release of the witness from the confinement imposed[,] and whether that date is greater or less than ten years from the date of trial, August 28, 2006. ¶ 20. However, that issue is not outcome-determinative, as Rule 609(b) establishes an exception to the ten-year time limit if the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by the specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Miss. R. Evid. 609(b). Here, the circuit judge made such a determination, after the State proffered an interes[t] of justice exception based upon the premise that the original trial date was November 2000, and would have remained so but for Strickland's flight. [25] See Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 993 (Miss.2001) (by analogy, within the context of constitutional speedy-trial claims [d]elays which are attributable to one party count against that party.); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Miss.1992) (within the context of constitutional speedy trial claims, delays attributable to the defendant tol[l] the running of time.). While Strickland's conviction occurred more than ten years before trial, the interes[t] of justice exception was available as a result of Strickland's flight. ¶ 21. After reviewing the trial court's Peterson analysis, this Court finds no abuse of discretion in admitting Strickland's conviction in CC-92-003257-00 pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). The circuit court properly made on-the-record findings that all of the Peterson factors weighed in favor of admissibility and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. See Miss. R. Evid. 609(a) cmt. Therefore, this Court finds that this issue is without merit.