Opinion ID: 2977804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction To Revoke Supervised Release

Text: Manning contends that because his three-year term of supervised release began on May 1, 2003, it must have ended on May 1, 2006, and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release on October 10, 2007.2 But this argument ignores 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which states that “[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” It is not clear from the record precisely how much time Manning spent in prison during the relevant time period. His in-court statements range from one year to “right at 18 months or better” to “[a]lmost two years.” If this latter statement is accurate, then his term of supervised release would have been tolled until slightly before May 1, 2008, such that the district court would have had jurisdiction on October 10, 2007. In an abundance of caution, however, it is safe to say that the record clearly reflects that Manning spent a minimum of one year imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, 2 “The question of whether a district court has jurisdiction to rule upon a petition to revoke a defendant’s supervised release after the term of supervised release is alleged to have ended is a question of law that is subject to de novo review.” United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). -5- No. 07-4472 United States v. Manning State, or local crime, thus tolling the expiration of his supervised release until at least May 1, 2007.3 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), “[t]he power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment and . . . a further term of supervised release, extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation.” Thus, even if Manning’s term of supervised release expired on May 1, 2007, the district court would still have the power to revoke his supervised release and sentence him to prison if (a) the events underlying the revocation occurred before May 1, 2007, (b) a warrant was issued before May 1, 2007, and (c) the period between the expiration and the revocation was no longer than reasonably necessary to adjudicate those matters. These conditions are met here. The events described in the final petition all occurred on or before December 19, 2006. A warrant was issued on December 28, 2006. The nine-and-a-half-month delay between that time and the revocation was reasonably necessary to adjudicate the matters because Manning was evidently in state custody until his appearance was secured pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. See United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding as reasonably necessary a three-year delay between the issuance of a warrant and the revocation of supervised release, where the defendant “was either in government custody or being brought up on 3 Although we do not formally take judicial notice of it, this conclusion is consistent with public records of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, which indicate that Manning was incarcerated for more than a year during the relevant period. -6- No. 07-4472 United States v. Manning charges almost constantly” during the interval); United States v. Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding as reasonably necessary a two-year delay). Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Manning’s supervised release and impose a sentence.4