Opinion ID: 2144415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Were rulings made by the trial court during the course of the trial an abuse of discretion?

Text: Martinson alleges that the trial court made several rulings during the trial which constituted an abuse of discretion and reversible error. He sets forth 11 such specifications of error. We address each separately. 1. Martinson alleges that the court permitted Powers' counsel to lead witnesses on direct examination by overruling Martinson's counsel's objections to those questions. Rule 611(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides as follows: (c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony. Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination.... The rule gives the trial court wide discretion over the mode and order of presenting evidence. This comports with our case law prior to our adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Comment to Rule 611, N.D.R.Ev. In 1931, this court held that leading questions should not be allowed in the examination in chief of a willing, intelligent witness, but that courts will not reverse a case for the violation of this rule unless prejudice results. Crosby v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 61 N.D. 293, 237 N.W. 803 (1931). The court discussed the reasoning for allowing discretion to the trial court in permitting leading questions by citing the following language from State v. Hazlett, 14 N.D. 490, 105 N.W. 617, 618 (1905): `Whether leading questions shall be permitted or not is necessarily very largely discretionary with the trial court, and its rulings in that respect will not be disturbed, unless it is apparent from the record that the discretion was abused to the prejudice of the appellant. It is often necessary to resort to leading questions in order to elicit facts from a witness, who, because of hostility, ignorance, diffidence or other reasons will not or cannot give fair and full answers.    The general rule, however, is that leading questions should not be allowed.    The rule is a salutary one, and should never be departed from unless the circumstances are such as to warrant an exception.    If the record shows that the circumstances did not in fact justify the departure from the rule, and the violation of the rule is such that prejudice to the objecting party may be reasonably inferred, the appellate court will not hesitate to reverse on that ground.' 237 N.W. at 808. Rule 611(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence continues to give the trial court wide discretion in deciding whether or not leading questions should be permitted on direct examination of witnesses. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in interpreting the same language as Rule 611(c), N.D.R.Ev., held that the rule does not prohibit leading questions and that the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether or not the question is truly leading and suggestive and whether or not the circumstances justify a leading and suggestive question. Jordan v. State, 93 Wis.2d 449, 287 N.W.2d 509, 519 (1980). In that case the trial court allowed the prosecution to ask a witness a leading question because the witness could not fully remember a conversation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in holding that there was no prejudicial error, said: Leading questions may properly be used in order to refresh the witness's recollection when her memory is exhausted. Id. (Citations omitted.) In the instant case, Martinson argues that the following line of questioning was leading and that the trial court erred in overruling his counsel's objections: Q. Were there ever any other problems in the apartment that you remember? A. No, I don't, not right offhand. Q. Did you have any problems with frost inside of your apartment? A. Yes, just around the windows and on the windows. Q. Would it be on the walls at all? A. On the walls MR. ARRESTAD: Objection, leading. Q. Where would you see the frost? THE COURT: Whenever there's an objection, don't answer any more. The objection, was there frost on the wall, you objected it's leading? It's overruled, you may answer. A. It was on the wall behind the dresser. Q. Was that in the wintertime? A. Yes. Q. What happened when the frost thawed? A. It run down onto the carpet. Q. Did it cause any problem with the carpet? A. It shrunk wherever the water run, you know. Q. Do you know of any other problems in the apartment when you were there? A. No, not that I recall right offhand, it's been so long. Q. It's been a long while, is that right? A. Yes. Q. Ever any problems with the hot water heater? MR. AARESTAD: Objection, leading again. THE COURT: That's overruled, you may answer that. Q. Were there ever any problems with the hot water heater? A. Yes, people would call me and tell me they wouldn't have any hot water. Then I'd have to go down in the laundry room and flip every breaker. Q. Was thathow often would that happen? A. Oh, depends on how much hot water people were using, once a day, probably twice a day. Q. Did you report that to Mr. Meerbach? A. Yes. We are not convinced that the questions are leading but, assuming for the sake of argument that they are, we conclude that the questions used by Powers' counsel were necessary to refresh the witness's memory. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the questions under the circumstances. 2. Martinson contends that the trial court's receipt into evidence of pictures of the apartment building taken in the summer of 1979 was prejudicial error because the pictures were not representative of the condition of the apartment building when purchased. The pictures were introduced, however, for the purpose of explaining to the jury how the siding had been put on the apartment building with staples which had broken the veneer on the siding. They were not introduced to show the condition of the building in 1977. Further, the jury was informed that the pictures were taken in the summer of 1979. It is incumbent upon the party contesting the ruling of the trial court to show that the error complained of was prejudicial. Haider v. Finken, 239 N.W.2d 508, 518 (N.D.1976); Gleson v. Thompson, 154 N.W.2d 780, 788 (N.D.1967). We conclude that it was within the trial court's discretion to receive the photographs with the explanatory information. 3. Martinson contends that because Powers was permitted to call an undisclosed witness he was surprised and prejudiced. The witness, Kathy Anderson, is the wife of Wilfred Anderson, a witness who was disclosed to Martinson long before the trial began. She was also one of Martinson's caretakers until the spring of 1977. Kathy Anderson did not present any testimony which was not corroborated by another witness. She testified about problems experienced by tenants living in the building. The tenants about whom she testified had previously testified concerning those problems. She testified that Martinson knew about the problems with the apartment building. This testimony was substantiated by other witnesses. Because Kathy Anderson did not testify to anything which another witness had not testified to or concerning, we hold that the trial court did not err in permitting Powers to call her without previously disclosing her identity. It should be noted also that she was not a stranger, but someone whom Martinson should have been cognizant of as a possible witness or person with knowledge of difficulties with the apartment building. 4. There were two 12-plexes adjacent to the one at issue in this case which were also built by GM Enterprises, Inc. Powers testified that he had talked with Mrs. Swartzentruber, the manager of the other two 12-plexes as to their vacancy and occupancy levels. Martinson asked Mrs. Swartzentruber to give her opinion as to why there was a variance in the occupancy rate between Powers' apartment and the other two nearby apartments. The trial court did not allow Mrs. Swartzentruber to express her opinion. Martinson alleges that was error. When this testimony was excluded, however, Martinson made no offer of proof at the trial. Rule 103(a)(2), N.D.R.Ev., reads: (a ) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and       (2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. We have, in the past, stated that the record is inadequate to raise the issue of exclusion of testimony without an offer of proof. Halverson v. Pet, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 887, 894 (N.D.1978). We said in Halverson that the only exception to that rule under our Rules of Evidence, is if the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context within which the question was asked. In this case, the substance of Mrs. Swartzentruber's opinion is not apparent from the context and, because no offer of proof was attempted to be made, we find no error in the trial court's ruling excluding the testimony. 5. Martinson alleges that the trial court's decision to not admit testimony to the effect that Martinson had offered to pay for broken light globes on the grounds that that testimony went to the issue of settlement and was therefore not admissible, was error. Again, there was no offer of proof attempted to be made. Accordingly, as the substance of the evidence was not apparent from the context within which the question was asked, we find no error in the ruling of the trial court. 6. Martinson contends that because there were two similar buildings adjacent to the apartment building in question he should have been allowed to introduce testimony concerning the structural status of those buildings. The court refused to allow such evidence on the basis that those buildings existed under different conditions and circumstances. As previously discussed, the testimony indicated that there were high levels of moisture inside the walls of the apartment building purchased by Mr. Powers. There was testimony that this moisture affected the exterior siding. Although an offer of proof was made, it went only to show that the other buildings were constructed in the same manner as the building that Powers purchased. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court could reasonably have determined that testimony relative to the construction of the two apartment buildings adjacent to Powers' apartment building was irrelevant to the issues of this case. 7. Martinson contends that the trial court erred by allowing Powers' counsel to ask Martinson questions which called for a legal conclusion. The question was whether or not the city ordinance requiring smoke detectors was in effect at the time the apartment building was built. The court ultimately took judicial notice of the building code and ruled that it was in effect at the time the building was constructed. We therefore hold that there was no prejudice to Martinson in requiring him to answer the question. 8. Martinson contends that the trial court erred in preventing him from amending his answer to allege failure of consideration as an additional defense. Rule 15(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend his pleadings only by leave of court or by written consent to the adverse party if the action has been placed on the trial calendar. It provides that, leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Rule 15(a), N.D. R.Civ.P. Martinson's attorney moved to amend his pleadings just before the plaintiff rested and he began presenting the defendants' case. The trial court denied the motion stating: ... This action was started with the summons and complaint dated September 24th, 1979 and the note of issue was filed on January 4th, 1980. The answer was filed by the Defendants on October 16th, 1979. There was a hearing allowing the amendment to the answer resulting in an Order of this Court on December 19th, 1980 which at that time amended the complaint and the answer in some respects. Now, when the Defendant has is about to proceed on its case in chief, he makes a motion to amend the answer. And I feel that it's not timely. I think that changing or allowing that amendment at this time would work an injustice and surprise and prejudice on the opposing side. I'm fully aware of the fact that amendments should be freely given under the Rules of Civil Procedure. But when these amendments are given leave to operate by the Court to the detriment of the other side, then the Court has got to weigh one against the other. I think it's too late ... to get into it. Because we have determined that the jury awarded damages based on fraud, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the answer to include the defense of failure of consideration. Failure of consideration would not be a defense to fraud. 9. Martinson contends that the court erred in preventing further cross-examinations of Powers about the earnest money agreement. Martinson's attorney asked Powers, on cross-examination, why the selling price shown on the earnest money agreement was reduced from $190,000 to $185,000 and when the reduction took place. Powers' attorney objected to the question and the trial court sustained that objection. Powers had already testified on cross-examination why the selling price shown on the earnest money agreement was reduced from $190,000 to $185,000 and when that was done. He said he had sold the apartment house owned by him previous to buying the Martinson apartment house for $5,000 less than his asking price. Accordingly, he testified that he and Martinson agreed to reduce the sales price of the Martinson apartment house from $190,000 to $185,000. Further examination, therefore, would have been repetitious. Gary Martinson later gave his explanation for the reduction of the purchase price shown in the earnest money agreement. The jury, therefore, had before it both the explanation of Powers and the explanation of Martinson. It was for the jury to decide which of the witnesses to believe, or, if possible, to reconcile the testimony. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court for this ruling and, therefore, find no error in the ruling. 10. Martinson contends that the trial court erred by receiving into evidence an abstract of title to the property in issue. He argues that title was not an issue and therefore the abstract of title was irrelevant. Powers' counsel argued that the abstract was offered to verify the dates of the sale and to show title to the property. The trial court received the abstract of title into evidence ruling that it was relevant for those purposes. Because the date of the transaction was in issue and because Gary Martinson testified that GM Enterprises had sold the building to the Heifners and Martinson, which testimony was not supported by the abstract, we conclude that the abstract was relevant for both the purpose of showing the date of the transaction and for impeachment purposes. 11. Martinson contends that the trial court erred in receiving into evidence exhibit 14 which was a detailed billing of the items repaired on the apartment building. Martinson argues that the bills were improperly received into evidence because of the lack of a proper foundation. The foundation was laid by questions asked of Roger Geroy, an employee of Builders Management, Inc. Builders Management, Inc., was the management firm hired by Powers to manage and repair his apartment building. Geroy was the supervisor in charge of Powers' apartment building repair project. Mr. Geroy testified that all of the items on the bill were for materials received and applied to the plaintiff's property. He also testified that all the bills in the exhibit were submitted to Mr. Powers at least a year or a year and a half before the trial. He testified that the bill was not put together for purposes of the lawsuit. Mr. Geroy, as an employee of Builders Management, Inc., had personal knowledge of the billing. We therefore conclude that a proper foundation was laid and that the trial court did not err in receiving the exhibit. We affirm. VANDE WALLE, PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.