Opinion ID: 1560416
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditional Motion to Vacate

Text: We begin our discussion with plaintiffs challenge to the terms and conditions upon which the trial justice conditioned the grant of her motion to vacate judgment, terms and conditions that she characterizes as unfair and unduly burdensome. She particularly objects to the requirement that she post a bond of $60,000, which she argues constitutes a financially insurmountable barrier. She further contends that the trial justice abused his discretion by requiring her to be responsible for defendants' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees in connection with the motion to vacate and in addressing the opinion of her new medical expert witness, as well as the costs defendants would incur with respect to trial preparation. Rule 60(b) provides in part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding    [for] (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. On appeal, this Court employs an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the ruling of a trial justice. A Rule 60(b) motion to vacate is addressed to the trial justice's sound judicial discretion and `will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of abuse of discretion.' Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University, 850 A.2d 912, 916 (R.I.2004) (quoting Crystal Restaurant Management Corp. v. Calcagni, 732 A.2d 706, 710 (R.I.1999)). Our Rule 60(b) is nearly identical to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, as a result, we find federal cases interpreting this rule to be instructive. See Hall v. Insurance Co. of North America, 727 A.2d 667, 669 (R.I.1999) ([F]ederal-court interpretations of a procedural rule that is substantially similar to one of our own state rules of civil procedure should serve as a guide to the construction of our own rule.). In Diehl v. H.J. Heinz Co., 901 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1990), an order was entered dismissing the suit as a sanction for the plaintiffs failure to cooperate in discovery. The plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order and the trial judge granted the motion on the condition that the plaintiff agree to comply with all outstanding discovery requests by close of business this date, which essentially required the plaintiffs attorney to obtain his client's signature on a document and return the document to the court by the end of the day. Id. The plaintiffs attorney agreed to the condition although satisfying it would be impossible because of the distance between the courthouse, the lawyer's office, and the client's residence. Id. The plaintiffs attorney did not meet the condition for the motion to vacate to be granted and, as a result, the defendant's counsel filed a renewed motion to dismiss, which the trial judge granted. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the condition was unreasonable, because [the condition] could not be complied with. Diehl, 901 F.2d at 75. As a result, the court concluded that the conditional motion to vacate was irrational and likewise the eventual dismissal of the suit was predetermined by a condition placed on the motion to vacate. Id. The court acknowledged that the trial judge likely failed to realize that compliance would be, in fact, impossible given the circumstances. Id. The Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiff a fresh start by reversing the dismissal of the suit. Id. at 75-76. In Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C.Cir.1966), the trial judge conditioned a motion to vacate on the defendant's placing the maximum amount that the plaintiff demanded in her complaint, nearly double the amount entered by the default judgment, in a joint bank account. As a result, the plaintiff was placed in a substantially better position than she was at the outset of the litigation. Id. at 695. The court commented that when conditions are placed on motions to vacate, [t]he condition most commonly imposed is that the [party in default] reimburse the [opposing party] for costs  typically court costs and attorney's fees  incurred because of the default. Id. at 694. The court stated that [w]hen such an extraordinary condition is approved it must be accompanied by supporting findings to show that it represents a reasonable exercise of discretion. Id. at 695: The court also stated that if a trial judge concludes, with supporting findings, that an unusual condition is called for, he should also consider whether one less onerous than that originally imposed may not be more appropriate. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that if the defendant's claim that he simply is unable to comply with the condition imposed is true, serious questions are raised, questions having an aura of denial of due process of law. Id. (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209-10, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958) ( Societe Internationale )). In the instant case, it is evident from a review of the transcripts of the two hearings on December 15, 2005 and January 3, 2006, [2] that the trial justice gave a great deal of thought and consideration to the question of, as he phrased it, how to deal in an equitable and just way with the fact that none of the [parties] sitting here today brought about the circumstance that ultimately led to the dismissal of this case. Rather, the situation that confronted the court was precipitated by an unanticipated decision of a trial expert to abandon the plaintiffs claim after some four or more years of reliance by the plaintiff on the opinions articulated by that expert which form the basis for the claim itself   . In granting the motion to vacate judgment the trial justice imposed several conditions, three of which required plaintiff to assume responsibility for various costs and attorneys' fees defendants incurred. The relevant paragraph of the order reads as follows: 1. Plaintiff shall be responsible to each Defendant for payment of the following costs and attorneys' fees incurred: a. All reasonable costs and attorneys' fees related to Plaintiffs post-Judgment Motion to Vacate, including but not limited to reviewing and researching all materials submitted by Plaintiff in support of her motion, researching and preparing any responses to that motion and attending any and all hearings regarding that motion; b. All reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in addressing the disclosure(s) and opinions, of Dr. Mayo, including but not limited to researching, investigating and analyzing the opinions and background of Dr. Mayo, including medical literature research, deposing Dr. Mayo and having defense experts research, analyze and/or respond to the opinions of Dr. Mayo; and c. All reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred with respect to trial preparation, should this matter proceed to a trial on its merits. We need not linger over the first two conditions, paragraphs 1(a) and (b), for it is clear to us that plaintiff has waived any objection to them. When asked by the trial justice on December 15, 2005, What would you consider to be terms that would be just if I were to do what you're asking me to do?, plaintiffs counsel responded, Your Honor, whatever you feel is just is  if you feel that we have to reimburse the defendants for the cost of their experts, reviewing a deposition transcript and formulating new opinions and submitting updated responses to an expert interrogatory, I don't have a problem with that. Shortly thereafter, the following exchange took place: [THE COURT]: But, what I'm thinking about is in the nature of putting the defendants in a position, financially, at least, where they would be, had it not been for the turn of events resulting in both the motions for continuance and the motions for entry of judgment and entry of judgment in this motion, and whatever might occur subsequent to this motion, if I were to grant it. So, I am thinking in terms of attorney's fees, costs, expert witness fees on their part, whatever travel expenses or other costs are associated with getting this case back to trial, and I would want to hear from the defendants as to any other costs that they feel would put them back in a position of being in the position they were at before we embarked on this journey. [PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: I don't have a problem with that, Your Honor. At the hearing on January 3, 2006, plaintiffs counsel took issue with the extent of the additional costs that defendants had indicated were anticipated if the judgment were to be vacated. Nevertheless, plaintiffs counsel agreed with the trial justice that defendants' experts would have to review Dr. Mayo's responses to interrogatories or deposition transcripts, stating: I don't think it would be unreasonable for the Court to make that part of the order as far as the costs to be paid. In light of these representations by counsel, we believe plaintiff has waived any objection to reimbursing defendants for their reasonable costs and attorneys' fees related to the motion to vacate and to addressing the disclosure(s) and opinions of Dr. Mayo. We are of the opinion, however, that paragraph 1(c) of the order requiring plaintiff to be responsible to defendants for [a]ll reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred with respect to trial preparation constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be stricken. Whatever the intention of the trial justice may have been, the language of paragraph 1(c) is overly broad and open-ended. The condition arguably encompasses a wide range of potential expenses totally unrelated to plaintiffs eleventh-hour replacement of her primary expert witness. It would be clearly unjust to require plaintiff to subsidize defendants for trial preparation expenses, some of which they undoubtedly would have incurred had the trial proceeded on November 28, 2005. We vacate, therefore, paragraph 1(c) of the order. The condition that causes plaintiff the greatest consternation is paragraph 2 of the order requiring that plaintiff post a corporate surety bond of $60,000, $20,000 for each defendant, or see her motion to vacate judgment be denied. The plaintiff asserted both in the Superior Court and in this Court, in conjunction with motions for a stay, that she lacks the financial means to procure such a bond and, consequently, the requirement for all practical purposes deprives her of a right to a trial on the merits. Indeed, after we remanded the case to the Superior Court, she represented that she could not comply, and her motion to vacate was denied. On appeal, plaintiff reiterates that the bond requirement was unfair and unduly burdensome and placed a substantial and inequitable burden upon [her] to raise significant sums of money just to enable her to proceed with the trial on the merits. She further contends that she has already invested significant time and expense in the preparation of her case, expenses which were significantly increased by the necessity of engaging a new expert witness. We are satisfied that the imposition of the bond requirement amounted to an abuse of discretion by the trial justice. After granting the motion to vacate, the trial justice noted that under Rule 60(b) he could do so only upon such terms as are just. He then considered, appropriately we believe, the additional burden and expense accruing to defendants thereby. He said: [I]t seems to the Court that the rule gives to the Court ample discretion in overriding the finality of a judgment in favor of allowing a case to be determined on the merits to ensure as best as possible that the defendants not pay the price for the extraordinary circumstances which have formed the basis for the motion, because, clearly, those extraordinary circumstances were not caused by them or by their counsel. And they should not bear the financial burden of the Court's allowing the case to be reinstated. He then estimated the anticipated costs to each defendant to be approximately $20,000 and ordered plaintiff to post a $60,000 bond as a condition of proceeding to a trial on the merits. [3] He did not, however, at any time consider the financial wherewithal of plaintiff or her ability to obtain such a surety bond. If she lacked the financial means, as she later asserted, the condition was no condition at all; rather, it was an absolute bar and, in effect, a denial of her motion to vacate. Access to our courts ought not depend upon pecuniary preconditions. See Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, (in the context of a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 there are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause). Although he said it was a close call, the trial justice granted plaintiffs motion to vacate, finding that plaintiff was placed in an untenable position when her expert witness jump[ed] ship through no fault of her own or her counsel's. He further found that counsel did what had to be done and what was necessary to try to secure    expert testimony when faced with extraordinary, unique circumstances. He also considered the additional expenses to which defendants probably would be exposed, as a result of vacating the judgment of dismissal. He did not, however, consider plaintiffs ability to obtain a $60,000 corporate surety bond as prerequisite to proceeding to a trial on the merits. Thus, there-are insufficient findings to enable us to conclude that the bond requirement was a reasonable exercise of discretion. Lacking such supportive findings, we are of the opinion that the trial justice abused his discretion by conditioning the grant of the motion to vacate upon an obligation that proved' impossible to perform. Accordingly, we vacate paragraph 2 of the order, as well as paragraph 1(c), but we affirm the order in all other respects. [4]