Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury SelectionChallenge for Cause

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excused Prospective Juror Lloyd G. based on his views against the death penalty. On his jury questionnaire and several times during voir dire, Lloyd G. specifically stated that he was biased against the death penalty, and that he saw no need for this type of punishment in society. However, defendant contends the prospective juror stated that he could apply the law according to the court's instructions. Thus, defendant claims the trial court violated his right to a fair and impartial jury under both the state and federal Constitutions by excusing Lloyd G. For reasons that follow, we disagree. `[I]n a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror's views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties. [Citations.] A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) If the prospective juror's responses to voir dire questions are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court's determination of the juror's true state of mind is binding upon the reviewing court. [Citations.] ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1319, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) We find no error. Lloyd G. stated that the prosecution would have to convince him of the need for capital punishment not only under the particular facts of this case, but also as a general proposition before he would vote to impose it. He thus possessed a bias against the death penalty which ``prevented] or substantially impair[ed]'' his ability to perform his duty as a juror. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Defendant points out, however, that Lloyd G. said he was not totally opposed to the death penalty, and that he could possibly change his mind about voting for life imprisonment rather than death. Despite his bias against capital punishment, the juror stated he could apply the law according to the court's instructions. At the very least, however, Lloyd G.'s responses were conflicting or equivocal. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1319, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Accordingly, we are bound by the trial court's determination of Lloyd G.'s state of mind. ( Ibid. )