Opinion ID: 721469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Complete Preemption, Conflict Preemption, and ERISA

Text: 14 In Taylor, the Supreme Court extended the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule to ERISA cases. Taylor held that the complete preemption doctrine applied to certain ERISA claims because Congress intended to make all suits that are cognizable under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions federal question suits. Lister, 890 F.2d at 944 (citing Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-64, 107 S.Ct. at 1546-47). 15 Following Taylor, numerous cases relied on ERISA preemption as an independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. However, because the jurisdictional doctrine of complete preemption included the word preemption, confusion arose between the jurisdictional doctrine and the federal defense of preemption, known as conflict preemption. 16 In Rice, we sought to clarify the distinction between complete preemption and conflict preemption under ERISA. See also, Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531 (6th Cir.1995) (explaining the difference between complete preemption and conflict preemption under ERISA). We began by looking at the development of the complete preemption doctrine in general, and more specifically as applied to ERISA. Against that backdrop and citing Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2846-48, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983), and Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63, 107 S.Ct. at 1546, we held that a claim brought under ERISA, § 502(a) provides the basis for complete preemption whereas § 514(a) provides the basis for conflict preemption. 4 Rice, 65 F.3d at 639-40. Three factors are relevant for determining whether a claim is within the scope of § 502(a): (1) whether the plaintiff [is] eligible to bring a claim under that section; id. at 641(2) whether the plaintiff's cause of action falls within the scope of an ERISA provision that the plaintiff can enforce via § 502(a), id.; and (3) whether the plaintiff's state law claim cannot be resolved without an interpretation of the contract governed by federal law. Id. at 644. 17 The remaining discussion in Rice concerned whether a state law vicarious liability claim fell within ERISA § 502(a) and was completely preempted or was merely subject to § 514(a) conflict preemption. As in this case, Rice was a lawsuit against a plan administrator for vicarious liability based on the alleged negligence of one of the plan's listed physicians. We concluded in Rice that the plaintiff's vicarious liability claim fell within § 514(a) rather than section § 502(a) and therefore was not subject to complete preemption under ERISA. Accordingly, we remanded to the district court for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In doing so, however, we noted that the state law claim may be susceptible to conflict preemption under § 514(a), but merely as a defense and not a basis for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 646 n. 10. 18