Opinion ID: 596599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of the sentencing guidelines to pre-guidelines escape

Text: 3 Defendant escaped from federal custody on or about July 11, 1986. He was arrested and charged with escape on April 30, 1991. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3601-3624, 3661-3673; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. I 1989)), offenses occurring after November 1, 1987, are governed by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced appellant pursuant to the Guidelines. Appellant argues that because his escape took place before November 1987 when the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated the Guidelines Manual establishing sentencing ranges for the crime of escape, the district court's sentencing him under the Guidelines amounted to application of an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.[T]wo critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. 4 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (footnote omitted). Appellant's claim undeniably satisfies the second of these requirements since the punishment meted out to escapees under the Guidelines is in several respects more severe than that usually imposed under the pre-Guidelines sentencing regime. For example, the Guidelines require that sentences for escape be served consecutively to, not concurrently with, any uncompleted previous sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. However, because of the nature of the crime of escape, appellant's claim does not satisfy the first of the two Weaver requirements and therefore does not establish a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 5 The Supreme Court has held that the crime of escape from federal custody as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) is a continuing offense and ... an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413, 100 S.Ct. 624, 636, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). Though appellant escaped from federal custody more than fifteen months before the Guidelines were issued, he remained at large for an additional three and one-half years following the date that they took effect. As such, the violation of § 751(a) to which he pleaded guilty was based in part on his failure to return to federal custody during the period between November 1, 1987, and April 30, 1991. This behavior post-dated the promulgation of the Guidelines and may therefore properly be punished under them. On these facts, the district court's sentencing appellant under the Guidelines did not constitute application of an ex post facto law. In sustaining the constitutionality of applying the Guidelines to such an escape, we are in agreement with the Third Circuit which reached the same conclusion in a case presenting identical facts. See United States v. Audinot, 901 F.2d 1201 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 179, 112 L.Ed.2d 142 (1990). 6 Citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), appellant contends that the Ex Post Facto Clause bars the government from applying a new law to an individual until such time as that person has been warned of the change in the law. Appellant's Brief at 14-15. Appellant argues that because he does not speak or read English, he was never adequately warned of the changes in the way escape is treated under the Guidelines and that, therefore, it was improper to apply them to him. Appellant misconstrues Miller. That case simply restated the well-established principle that a new law may only be applied to conduct occurring after the date of its enactment. Miller recognized no special duty on the part of the government to warn citizens upon the enactment of new penal laws. Rather, the case addressed the topic of warning only by way of rejecting the government's contention that penal laws might permissibly be applied to pre-enactment conduct so long as the public had been warned that the law might be subject to revision. Id. at 431, 107 S.Ct. at 2451-52. 7 Courts have never construed the Ex Post Facto Clause as requiring the government to take special steps to apprise the public of the existence of newly enacted penal laws. Rather, [t]he principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1701, 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971). Under unusual circumstances such as where the law criminalizes behavior that the average person would not presume to be prohibited, the Constitution's due process requirement may bar imposition of criminal liability on a defendant who was unaware of the law's existence. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229, 78 S.Ct. 240, 243, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957). That, however, is not this case. Thus, there is no merit to appellant's claim that the Guidelines may not properly be applied to him because he was not warned of their promulgation.