Opinion ID: 201500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of the Bulger/Flemmi Group and its Exploits

Text: 15 We begin by evaluating the admission of the testimony concerning the Bulger/Flemmi group and its criminal exploits. Michael argues that because this testimony, which is described in detail below, was only marginally relevant, if at all, to the charged offenses and unfairly prejudicial, it should have been excluded under Rules 401, 402, and 403. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Generally, [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, while [e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. However, even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 8 Fed.R.Evid. 403. We note at the outset that [o]nly rarely — and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Sabetta, 373 F.3d 75, 82-83 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Testimony Describing Persons Involved with the Bulger/Flemmi Group 17 Michael first questions the admission of St. Croix's testimony concerning individuals involved with the Bulger/Flemmi group. Specifically, he contests the admission of statements that: Stephen and Bulger were partners in a criminal organization (the Bulger/Flemmi group) 9 ; George Kaufman and Phil Costa were members of, and collected money owed to, that organization; and Frank Salemme was the head of the New England mafia and Stephen's ally. 18 The admission of these statements was not an abuse of discretion. Michael was charged with obstructing an investigation into the Bulger/Flemmi group and these statements were relevant because they provided the jury with useful background information — they introduced individuals associated with the investigation that Michael was charged with obstructing. See United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 941 (2d Cir.1997) (To be relevant, evidence need only tend to prove the government's case, and evidence that adds context and dimension to the government's proof of the charges can have that tendency. Relevant evidence is not confined to that which directly establishes an element of the crime.); see also United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir.1988) ([T]he trial court may admit evidence that does not directly establish an element of the offense charged, in order to provide background for the events alleged in the indictment.). 19 Moreover, the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial to Michael, as St. Croix never suggested that Michael was a member of the Bulger/Flemmi group. And, any prejudice that it may have caused was mitigated by the district court's limiting instructions. 20 Testimony About an X Fund 21 Michael next objects to the admission of Weeks' testimony that the Bulger/Flemmi group had an X fund — a fund comprised of money that was put aside every time we made a score ... for expenses that would come up, ... you know ... payoffs. The testimony was relevant because it indicated that the members of the Bulger/Flemmi group were intent on concealing the group's criminal activities, and thus, it tended to support the government's theory that Stephen recruited St. Croix (who, in turn, recruited Michael) to remove guns from the hide. And, any claim that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial to Michael is weak because Weeks never indicated that Michael had anything to do with the X fund. There was no error in the admission of this testimony. 22 Testimony About the Use of Coded Communications 23 Michael also asserts that the district court erred in admitting (1) St. Croix's testimony that, when possible, St. Croix, Weeks, Allen, and Michael avoided using intercom phones when communicating with Stephen in prison (they would, for example, hold up signs and gesture with their hands), and (2) Weeks' testimony that members of the Bulger/Flemmi group used nicknames when referring to law enforcement agents in front of Michael and that Michael understood the coded references. This testimony was highly relevant because it indicated that Michael was a trusted ally of the Bulger/Flemmi group (such that it would not be unreasonable to think that St. Croix would have enlisted his help in moving the guns) and that he was aware of, and willing to cover up, the group's activities (which helped establish his knowledge of the group's — and his brother's — unlawful behavior, as well as his intent to commit the crimes with which he was charged). We do not think that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony based on its high probative value. We also note that any danger of unfair prejudice was considerably lessened by the limiting instructions the district court gave. 24 Testimony About the Bulger/Flemmi Group's Criminal Activities 25 In addition, Michael attacks the admission of Weeks' testimony concerning: (1) the three people — Barrett, McIntyre, and Hussey — who were murdered in Weeks' presence and buried in Dorchester; (2) two others, Brian Halloran (Halloran) and Michael Donahue (Donahue), who were also murdered in Weeks' presence; and (3) the Bulger/Flemmi group's unlawful acquisition of a liquor store in which Weeks was directly involved. With regard to the murder victims, Weeks gave a brief account of the circumstances surrounding each murder. 10 In terms of the liquor store, Weeks stated that he intimidated the owners of the store (by brandishing a gun) so they would sell the store to the Bulger/Flemmi group. 26 The government defends the admission of this testimony by pointing out that the testimony (which brought to the fore Weeks' extensive criminal history) was important to Weeks' credibility and arguing that such impeachment evidence may be elicited on direct examination. 11 There is support for the government's position. See United States v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir.1986) ([T]he prosecution, having called a witness, may then `take the wind out of the sails' of the defense by questions eliciting possible bases for impeachment.); see also Fed.R.Evid. 607 (The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.). Michael even concedes that informing a jury of the nature of a witness' prior criminal conduct is fair game. Nevertheless, he contests the admission of Weeks' testimony on the ground that the prejudicial effect of permitting the government to delve into the particulars of the Bulger/Flemmi group's crimes substantially outweighed the testimony's probative value. We disagree. Although there may be circumstances where a criminal defendant would be wronged if the prosecution were allowed to delve too deeply into the particulars of its witness' criminal history on direct, we do not think that this is such a case. Here, all but one of the statements had significant probative value. 12 And, there was little danger of unfair prejudice: there was no suggestion that Michael was involved in the crimes that Weeks described and the jury was instructed to that effect. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Weeks' testimony. See United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 28 (1st Cir.1988) (It is perhaps true that the government could have [made due] without so much detail concerning the prior [events], but this is essentially a Rule 403 balancing decision left to the broad discretion of the trial judge. (emphasis in original)). 27 Testimony that Weeks Sought a Gun from Stephen 28 The next challenge concerns Weeks' testimony that he visited Stephen in prison and asked Stephen for permission to take one of the guns from the hide so he could act on threats that had been made against him. According to Weeks, Stephen agreed to the request and stated that Stephen, Weeks, and Bulger were the only ones [who] knew [about the hide]. On appeal, Michael disputes only the admission of that portion of the testimony where Weeks stated that he sought a gun to act on threats made against him. The challenged statement was relevant because it prompted, and provided context to, the unchallenged, and clearly relevant, testimony concerning the hide. 13 See Sabetta, 373 F.3d at 83 (recognizing that testimony is relevant if it helps explain [ ] the chain of events). Although the challenged statement's probative value may not have been particularly high, we do not see how its admission caused Michael unfair prejudice — there was no indication that Michael knew of the conversation between Stephen and Weeks or Weeks' plan to act on the threats made against him. Consequently, there was no error in the testimony's admission. 29 Testimony Regarding a Bombing in which Stephen was Implicated 30 Michael also objects to the admission of St. Croix's testimony that he first obtained personal knowledge [of Stephen's] criminal activities ... in 1974 when he learned that Stephen had been implicated in [a] bombing. This testimony provided relevant background to the development of the illegal relationship between St. Croix and his father, a relationship that culminated in the concealment conspiracy in question. See United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir.2003) (noting that evidence is relevant in a conspiracy case if it explains the background of the illegal relationship). And, the naked reference to a bombing in which Stephen was allegedly implicated was not unfairly prejudicial to Michael, as there was no allegation that Michael was involved in, or knew of, the bombing. Moreover, any potential prejudice was counteracted by the limiting instructions. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. 31 Testimony Concerning St. Croix's Relationship with Stephen 32 Michael further contends that it was an abuse of discretion to allow St. Croix to testify that he and Stephen agreed that if St. Croix chose a life of crime, Stephen would show [him] how to do things and [St. Croix would] tell [Stephen] everything [he] was involved in ... to make sure [that he] didn't hurt any of [Stephen's] friends. We disagree. Immediately after St. Croix gave the challenged testimony, he told the jury that he took his father up on his offer and report[ed] to him on a regular basis. Therefore, the testimony was relevant as it established the background and formation of the illegal relationship between St. Croix and Stephen, and it explained why Stephen would feel comfortable telling St. Croix about the hide and asking him to move the guns. See id. (noting that, in a conspiracy case, evidence is relevant if it explains the background [and] formation ... of the illegal relationship and ... help[s] the jury understand the basis for the co-conspirators' relationship of mutual trust (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, it is not clear how the testimony could have caused Michael unfair prejudice because there was no suggestion that he was in any way involved in St. Croix's life of crime. 33 Michael also finds fault in the admission of St. Croix's statements concerning Stephen's reaction after he learned that St. Croix's brother, Stephen's other son, refused to visit him because he was angry at him. According to St. Croix, Stephen said, What the hell has he got to worry about? All he had to do was 18 months. I may spend the rest of my life in prison. Michael, however, used the testimony pertaining to the length of Stephen's prison term to his advantage when he later relied on the likelihood that Stephen would spend the rest of his life in prison in presenting his defense: In his closing argument, Michael argued that St. Croix was angry at his father for killing Hussey and that, because he could not take direct revenge against his father, who would likely spend the rest of his natural life in prison, he falsely testified against Michael as an indirect way to punish Stephen. Under the circumstances, Michael can hardly complain of prejudicial error. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo-Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir.1994). 34 In any event, there was no error in the admission of this testimony. The testimony was relevant because it helped establish that St. Croix was upset with his father (St. Croix testified that his father's cavalier reaction to his brother's anger really [ ] upset him), 14 and thus, it supported Michael's defense that St. Croix falsely testified against him as a way to punish Stephen. See Frappier, 807 F.2d at 259 (stating that the prosecution may elicit possible bases for impeachment on direct). Moreover, we do not see how the testimony, which in no way reflected on Michael, could have caused Michael unfair prejudice. 35 Testimony that Stephen Confessed to Murdering Hussey 36 Michael next disputes the admission of St. Croix's testimony that, on January 20, 2000, Stephen admitted to killing Hussey in front of St. Croix and Michael. He did not object to the admission of this testimony below, and we do not find any error, much less plain error, in its admission. The testimony was highly relevant because Michael was charged with, among other things, perjuring himself before the grand jury, and on June 7, 2000, subsequent to the conversation in question, he told the grand jury that he had no idea whether Hussey was alive. 15 Although the testimony was certainly damaging to Michael, the district court did not err in finding that the danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the testimony's probative value. Testimony About Defense Funds 37 This brings us to the final piece of testimony pertinent to the Bulger/Flemmi group and its criminal exploits that Michael challenges on appeal: St. Croix's testimony about the existence of defense funds for members of the group. Despite Michael's insistence to the contrary, the district court did not err in allowing St. Croix to testify that a portion of the proceeds from the illegal activities in which he was involved were used to pay the legal expenses of Stephen and some of his associates. The testimony was relevant for impeachment purposes (its admission enabled the government to bring out on direct examination the fact that St. Croix was engaged in illegal activities), see Frappier, 807 F.2d at 259, and because it provided insight into the relationship between St. Croix and Stephen, see Santana, 342 F.3d at 67. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, because the testimony did not implicate Michael in St. Croix's illegal activities. 38