Opinion ID: 411925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Limitation on Jurisdiction in Section 14(b).

Text: 6 Section 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973l (b) (1976) provides in relevant part: 7 No court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia ... shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to [section 4 or 5] ... or any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of any provision of this subchapter or any action of any federal officer or employee pursuant hereto. 8 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331, 86 S.Ct. 803, 820, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the section's requirement to litigate in the District of Columbia, a distant forum for the litigants, did not violate due process. However, in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 559, 89 S.Ct. 817, 828, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), the Supreme Court interpreted section 14(b) as not applying to suits brought by private persons seeking a declaratory judgment that a new state enactment was subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The private litigant in Allen was thus permitted to bring his action in the local federal district court. Dictum in Allen suggests, moreover, that the jurisdictional limitation of section 14(b) applies only to declaratory judgment actions brought by the State. Id. at 559, 89 S.Ct. at 828. Reich relies on this dictum to argue that section 14(b) should not be interpreted to deprive the district court for the Eastern District of California of jurisdiction to hear his challenge to the Voting Rights Act. We disagree. 9 This dictum suggesting an exclusion of private litigants from the reach of section 14(b) applies only to declaratory judgment actions brought pursuant to section 5 (393 U.S. at 558, 89 S.Ct. at 827). In such cases, the issue raised by the private litigant will be whether a particular state enactment is subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act .... (393 U.S. at 559, 89 S.Ct. at 828.) This issue can be decided in the district courts, since it is not a substantive question such as whether a new enactment is racially discriminatory, or whether the Voting Rights Act itself is constitutional. 10 Reich's declaratory judgment action is not brought pursuant to section 5. Thus, even though it is an action brought by a private litigant rather than the state, it does raise a substantive issue (i.e., whether the Voting Rights Act is constitutional) and can only be brought in the District of Columbia district court, under section 14(b). 3 11 This construction is consistent with the legislative history of section 14(b). The Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the Act states: 12 Subsection 14(b). This subsection [confines] to the District Court for the District of Columbia jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment or any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement [of] any provision of this bill or any action of a Federal officer or employee under the authority of the bill.... All challenges to the constitutionality or legality of any provision of this bill or any action taken pursuant to it must be litigated in the District Court for the District of Columbia .... 13 S.Rep. No. 162, Pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 reprinted in 1965 U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News 2437, 2508, 2569. 4 Accordingly, we conclude that Section 14(b) applies to all suits, whether brought by an individual or a state, which raise constitutional challenges to the Voting Rights Act. 14 Appellant's claims raise a constitutional challenge to the Act. He argues that the bilingual assistance provisions of the Act infringe his first amendment rights to communicate in his own words with the voters in a local election. He would have the local district court take jurisdiction of his suit and declare these provisions of the Act 5 unconstitutional. Unfortunately, only the district court for the District of Columbia may hear such a suit. 15 At oral argument and in his brief, appellant persuasively argued that application of section 14(b) would effectively preclude him from litigating his challenge to the Act because the costs of bringing suit in the District of Columbia would be prohibitively high. We do not dispute the truth of his assertions. Nonetheless, Congress, when it enacted the Voting Rights Act, concluded that the importance of a uniform interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Act by a single district court outweighed the hardship and chilling effect such restraints might have on distant litigants. We cannot second-guess Congress' considered judgment in such legislative matters. Accordingly, we agree with the district court for the Eastern District of California that it had no jurisdiction to hear the instant suit. 16