Opinion ID: 453286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions Regarding Mitigating Circumstances

Text: 5 In the first of his two extant grounds for requesting habeas corpus relief, 2 the petitioner claims that the trial judge's charge to the sentencing jury did not satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment because it failed to give proper guidance regarding the nature and function of mitigating circumstances. The Eighth Amendment does require that the jury consider all mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate and individualized sentence for a particular defendant. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). As the court explained in Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 3495, 73 L.Ed.2d 1374 (1982), a requirement that the jury consider all relevant mitigating evidence would have no meaning at all unless the jury understands how to recognize and evaluate a mitigating circumstance. See also Chenault v. Stynchcombe, 581 F.2d 444 (5th Cir.1978). Therefore, the trial judge at the sentencing phase must give the jury careful instructions to explain the nature and function of mitigating circumstances. 3 6 The exact contours of such instructions must be decided on a case-by-case basis. No single incantation, such as the use of the words mitigating circumstances, is necessary in every case. Nevertheless, several recent precedents lead us to conclude that the instructions in this case did not properly guide the jury in its consideration of mitigating circumstances. 7 In Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 3495, 73 L.Ed.2d 1374 (1982), the court stated that in most cases 4 a judge must tell the jury what a mitigating circumstance is and what its function is in the jury's sentencing deliberations. The instruction in that case, which merely authorized the jury to consider all the evidence before them, failed to communicate to the jury that the law recognizes the existence of facts or circumstances which, though not justifying or excusing the offense, may properly be considered in determining whether to impose the death sentence. Id. at 472 (footnote omitted); see also Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 801-02 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983). 8 Later cases have noted that a trial court does not fulfill its responsibility simply by informing a jury that it may consider mitigating circumstances. Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir.1984); Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643 (11th Cir.1983); Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.1983). The words mitigating circumstances, while they have meaning to most jurors, still do not adequately communicate the precise nature or function of that concept in the context of a sentencing trial. Mere reference to the possible consideration of mitigating circumstances does not tell a jury why the law allows such a consideration and what effect a finding of mitigating circumstances has on the ultimate recommendation of sentence. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d at 1503. 9 The trial judge in this case gave the following instruction at the sentencing trial regarding mitigating circumstances: 10 You are authorized to consider all of the facts and circumstances[,] if you find any, in extenuation and mitigation of punishment. You are also authorized to consider all of the facts and circumstances, if you find any, regarding the gravity of the offense and your knowledge of the personal background of the defendant as shown to you by the evidence. 11 This instruction could be taken as a proper explanation of the nature of mitigating circumstances. Yet, it might have left the jury confused about the nature of mitigating circumstances, for first it mentions mitigating circumstances and then it says you are also authorized to consider... (emphasis added). A juror could have concluded from this that the facts and circumstances discussed in the second sentence were separate and distinct from the mitigating circumstances introduced in the first sentence. 12 Further, and most importantly, the instruction did not explain the function of a mitigating circumstance. The charge never set forth the reasons that a mitigating circumstance might be significant and never explained that mitigating circumstances could lead a jury to recommend mercy. The courts in Morgan and Westbrook both stressed that the failure to explain the function of mitigating circumstances was a serious shortcoming that rendered the instructions hollow. 743 F.2d at 779; 704 F.2d at 1503. Likewise in this case, the court's charge left the jury without proper guidance in its sentencing deliberations, which amounted to a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court properly granted habeas corpus relief on this ground.