Opinion ID: 2625080
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant Was Precluded from Making Contract-Based Claims Because He Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies.

Text: The superior court dismissed Grant's contract claims because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The trial court also found that Grant had not provided any reasons justifying relief from this requirement. Grant argues that he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement because his termination was not a grievable claim under the CBA, the CBA's requirement that he file an individual grievance within three days of the union's decision not to represent him was unreasonable, and filing a grievance would have been futile.
Grant argues that the language of the CBA, together with the union's refusal to pursue his grievance, demonstrate that his termination was not grievable. Whether Grant had a grievable claim involves the proper interpretation of a contract provision and is therefore a matter of law. [3] Grant's argument fails because his reading of one CBA provision makes another provision of the CBA a nullity. Grant interprets article 5, subsection 2(A) of the CBA to suggest that if the union declines to pursue an employee's grievance, it is not grievable, and the grievance guidelines of the CBA do not attach. Article V, subsection 2(A) provides: A grievance is defined as any dispute between the Employer and an employee or the Association regarding the interpretation or violation of this Agreement which has not been resolved by prior submission of the problem through the chain of command, and which has been accepted as a grievance by the Executive Board of the Association. Grant contends that the clause which has been accepted as a grievance by the Executive Board of the Association means that unless a dispute is certified by the union it is not a grievance. While the language of this subsection does suggest Grant's result when read in isolation, article 5, subsection 2(O) of the CBA suggests a different result: If the Association declines to pursue a termination grievance of a non-probationary employee and the employee still wishes to grieve the termination, he/she will notify the Chief and the Labor Relations Office, in writing, within three (3) days of receiving notification from the Association that it has declined to pursue the grievance. Upon receipt of the employee's request, the Labor Relations Officer shall select an arbitrator certified by the American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator shall hear and resolve the grievance as provided under subsections 5.2(I) through 5.2(M) above. Grant's reading of the last clause of subsection 2(A) renders all of subsection 2(O) a nullity because in every case that the association declined to pursue an employee's termination grievance, it would not be a grievance permissible under the CBA. If this were the case, the terminated employee would always be excused from subsection 2(O)'s notice and arbitration provisions. Instead, the terminated employee would be free to immediately file a lawsuit regarding the termination. We have held that [t]o the extent possible, all provisions in a contract should be found meaningful. [4] Since subsection 2(O) would be meaningless under Grant's reading, the superior court correctly read the CBA as a whole [5] to require Grant to file a grievance despite the union's refusal to file a grievance on his behalf. Since this issue is a question of law, the superior court was correct in granting APD summary judgment on this issue.
Grant also argues that the factual issue of when the three-day notice period of article 5, subsection 2(O), ran was not resolved. But Grant never pursued a grievance; instead he filed suit. Therefore, the three-day deadline did not play a role in this case, and Grant may not challenge it because it did not adversely affect his rights.
Finally, Grant argues that attempting a grievance would have been futile. He cites Casey v. City of Fairbanks [6] to support the proposition that the union's refusal to prosecute his grievance excuses his failure to file an individual grievance. However, Grant omits a crucial element of the Casey holding: that under the CBA in effect in Casey, the plaintiff had no other recourse if the union declined to pursue his grievance. [7] Grant, by contrast, had a CBA that expressly allowed him to file a grievance if his union declined to represent him. Accordingly, the holding of Casey does not apply here, and the superior court properly refused to excuse Grant's failure to file a grievance. [8]
We have consistently held that employees must first exhaust their contractual or administrative remedies, or show that they were excused from doing so, before pursuing a direct action against their employer. [9] Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate on Grant's claims because he was not excused from pursuing the available administrative redress. Our decision in Cozzen v. Municipality of Anchorage controls the analysis in this case: the facts are very similar, the relevant language of the CBA is identical, and the procedural history is the same. [10] Cozzen involved a wrongful termination suit filed by an APD officer who was terminated because he could no longer meet APD's minimum hearing standards for sworn officers. [11] Interpreting the same language from the predecessor of the CBA governing this case, we affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment based on Cozzen's failure to exhaust his contractual remedies. [12] Grant's claims rely on his contractual rights to employment. The CBA provides his rights and remedies. Because he fails to persuasively distinguish Cozzen instead relying on Beard v. Baum [13] and Casey v. City of Fairbanks, [14] which Cozzen specifically distinguishes [15] he cannot prevail. Accordingly, the superior court correctly granted summary judgment on Grant's contractual claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, and violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [16]