Opinion ID: 62347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kimbrough v. United States

Text: Kimbrough overruled Williams: “A district judge must include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting consideration. The judge may determine, however, that, in the particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing. In making that determination, the judge may consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ 5 treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses.” Kimbrough, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 564 (citation omitted). In light of Kimbrough, we have vacated sentences where the sentencing judge had not been permitted to consider the defendants’ arguments that the crack/powder disparity was bad policy.1 We have affirmed sentences where the crack/powder disparity issue was raised for the first time on appeal,2 and when the sentencing judge stated that the Guidelines were “too high” and reduced the sentence accordingly.3 Other circuits have addressed Kimbrough. In United States v. Trotter, 518 F.3d 773 (10th Cir. 2008), the defendant argued at sentencing that the district court was free to consider the crack/powder disparity. The Government responded that the court could not address these arguments, and the district court did not address them. The Tenth Circuit remanded the sentence for reconsideration in light of Kimbrough: “We are unable to tell from the sentencing transcript whether the 1 United States v. Tolbert, No. 07-14925, 2008 WL 879981 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2008); United States v. Dawson, No. 06-16372, 2008 WL 194914 (11th Cir. Jan. 24, 2008); United States v. Stratton, 519 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2008). 2 United States v. Berggren, No. 07-12796, 2008 WL 565095, at  (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2008) (“Nothing in either the decision of the Supreme Court in Kimbrough or in our precedents obliged the district court to consider the powder-crack disparity.”) 3 United States v. White, No. 07-11260, 2008 WL 747616 (11th Cir. Mar. 21, 2008). 6 district court’s rejection of Defendant’s argument was based on its conclusion that the crack/powder disparity did not warrant a below-Guidelines sentence in Defendant’s particular case—a permissible conclusion under Kimbrough—or on its acceptance of the Government’s argument that the disparity could not constitute a valid reason for varying from the Guidelines in any case—a position that has been overruled by Kimbrough.” Id. at 774. Here, it is appropriate to remand to the district court for reconsideration in light of Kimbrough. We are left in doubt as to whether the district court understood that it would not have abused its discretion if it had reduced McGowan’s sentence based on a policy disagreement with the crack/powder disparity. See United States v. Regalado, 518 F.3d 143, 147 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“Since the district court was, quite understandably, unaware of (or at least insecure as to) its discretion to consider that the 100-to-1 ratio might result in a sentence greater than necessary, there was an unacceptable likelihood of error.”); United States v. Bush, No. 07-1307, 2008 WL 1745342,  (7th Cir. Apr. 17, 2008) (“we remand for resentencing because it is unclear from the record whether the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it not believed it was constrained by the 100:1 ratio.”); United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2008) (“When a district court does not consider an argument because it is 7 unaware of its power to do so, however, a remand is appropriate. . . . It is unclear whether the district court declined to use its discretion in the requested manner because of then-current Eighth Circuit precedent or because it did not find that the disparity warranted any variance from the guidelines.”). The Government argues that the district court did consider, and reject, McGowan’s argument regarding the crack/powder disparity. But there is no indication in the record that the court considered this argument, or that it believed it lawfully could. In fact, if the district court had reduced McGowan’s sentence based on the unfairness of the crack/powder disparity, we would have reversed in light of Williams.4 We cannot presume that the district court, anticipating Kimbrough, understood that it would not have abused its discretion if it had reduced McGowan’s sentence because it viewed the crack/powder disparity to be unfair. See United States v. Taylor, No. 06-4123, 2008 WL 782739,  (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 2008) (“[T]he fact that a judge—the judge in this case for example—does not say anything about the ratio cannot be taken to mean that he (in this case she) thinks it is fine.”); United States v. Padilla, No. 06-4370, 2008 WL 833994,  (7th Cir. Mar. 31, 2008) (“The district court did not address his agreement or disagreement with the 100:1 ratio, 4 We affirmed McGowan’s sentence after Williams was decided, but before Kimbrough overruled it. 8 making no comments about whether he thought he could consider the disparity in rendering a sentence. But we need not infer from his silence that the district court agreed with the 100:1 ratio.”). We remand to the district court to give it an opportunity to indicate whether it would have imposed a different sentence if it had understood that it had discretion to disagree with the Guidelines policy expressed in the crack/powder disparity. If the district court concludes that consideration of the crack/powder disparity would make no difference in McGowan’s sentence, it need not conduct a resentencing hearing, and may simply reenter the sentence previously imposed. The sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the sentencing court for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. 9