Opinion ID: 2330535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Order Granting Immediate Possession

Text: The trial court expressly linked the grant of immediate possession to its decision to strike Mr. Franco's defenses. Because we have held that the court improperly struck the pretext defense, we in turn vacate its grant of immediate possession. NCRC argues that the court could have granted immediate possession without striking the defenses. That may be true, but we cannot be sure that the court would have done so. We therefore remand for further consideration of this issue. We are concerned, however, about the practicalities of transferring possession back to Mr. Franco. We anticipate that NCRC will renew its motion for immediate possession and will urge the trial court to grant that motion before resolving the pretext defense. Title has already passed to NCRC, see D.C. Code § 16-1314(b) (2001), and it is at least possible that the trial court will once again transfer immediate possession to NCRC. Because such a scenario would be disruptive, to say the least, we stay (for a period of ninety days following issuance of our mandate) any reversion of the property that may flow from this decision so that the parties may engage in further litigation on the possession issue in the Superior Court. We discern no harm in staying this portion of our judgment for a short period, since courts commonly consider possession of condemned property separately from the propriety of a taking. See, e.g., Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg, 318 F.2d 455, 460 (4th Cir. 1963) (the condemnation court possesses the power to authorize immediate entry by the condemnor upon the condemned premises. . . . [I]f it should ultimately be held that the taking, itself, was improper, the condemnor, who had entered upon the land pending appeal, would be responsible to the owner for damages.). Accord, East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 826 (4th Cir. 2004).