Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Firearm Conspiracy Conviction Following

Text: Rehaif54 Pelullo was charged with a conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, having two objects: first, to provide firearms arguments in this subsection as belonging to “the Defendants” for the sake of simplicity. 53 Scarfo and Pelullo were each found to have agreed to all eight of the listed predicates. Supra p. 81. William Maxwell was found to have agreed to the commission of mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, extortion, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, money laundering, and fraud in the sale of securities. John Maxwell was found to have agreed to the commission of mail fraud, wire fraud, extortion, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, money laundering, and fraud in the sale of securities. 54 “[U]npreserved Rehaif claims are subject to plain- 90 to felons (namely, Scarfo and himself), contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), and, second, to unlawfully possess firearms as a felon, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He objects to his conviction on that count and asserts that the government failed to allege in the indictment and prove at trial, under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the guns. Even if that claim had merit, however, his challenge fails because he has not identified any error in his conviction as to the first object of the conspiracy – namely, to transfer firearms to felons in violation of § 922(d)(1). Because that is an independent and sufficient basis to affirm the guilty verdict on the conspiracy count, we need not, and do not, address whether there was error as to the second object of the conspiracy, the possession of firearms. In its investigation, the government seized a small arsenal of guns and ammunition from Pelullo’s and Scarfo’s homes, Pelullo’s office, and their yacht. It also collected evidence showing how Pelullo and Scarfo had acquired those weapons: for example, it uncovered Pelullo’s and the Maxwell brothers’ coordinated efforts to have John Maxwell drive a firearm across the country from Dallas to Scarfo’s home in New Jersey. See infra Section V.E.1. Since Pelullo and Scarfo had previously been convicted of felonies, neither of them was allowed to have a gun. As noted earlier, supra p. 8, Pelullo had convictions for bank fraud, making false statements in an SEC filing, and wire fraud, while Scarfo’s criminal record included a guilty plea for conducting an illegal gambling business. The government thus alleged in the indictment that Pelullo error review[.]” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2099 (2021). 91 unlawfully conspired both to violate § 922(d)(1) by providing firearms to Scarfo and himself and to violate § 922(g)(1) by possessing firearms. Pelullo focuses his arguments on the second object of the conspiracy charge, the § 922(g)(1) violation, but he does not argue that there was insufficient proof that he conspired to transfer firearms to Scarfo in violation of § 922(d)(1). That failure dooms his claim. In a “multiple-object conspiracy” like this one, a guilty verdict will stand so long as there is sufficient evidentiary support for any of the charged objects. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 47, 56-57 (1991). We may thus “affirm [Pelullo’s] conviction[] as long as we find that there was sufficient evidence with respect to one of the [two] alleged prongs of the conspiracy.” United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2003). Section 922(d)(1) makes it unlawful “to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm … to any person” while “knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person” has been indicted for or convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[.]” That same mens rea (or guilty state of mind) – namely, “knowing or having reasonable cause to believe” that the recipient of the firearms is a convicted felon – also applies to cases, like this one, involving a conspiracy to violate § 922(d)(1). That is because the government cannot secure a conspiracy conviction without proving that the defendant had the mens rea required for the substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alston, 77 F.3d 713, 718 (3d Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court’s Rehaif decision applied the “presumption in favor of scienter” (that is, a presumption of intent or knowledge of wrongdoing) to read 92 into § 922(g) a requirement that the defendant know his status as a member of a class of persons prohibited from having a firearm, but that has no bearing on § 922(d), which contains an express mens rea element. 139 S. Ct. at 2194-96; see also id. at 2209 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority read into § 922(g) a mens rea element more stringent than the one that Congress explicitly required for § 922(d) charges). Perhaps it is no surprise that Pelullo does not challenge the § 922(d)(1) object of the conspiracy conviction, since overwhelming trial evidence shows that Pelullo knew or, at a minimum, had powerful cause to believe, that Scarfo was a felon when Pelullo conspired to transfer a firearm to him. Pelullo’s counsel explained to the jury, in his opening statement, that “[t]he reason why [Pelullo] helped Mr. Scarfo is because they’re both prior felons.” (JAC at 100.) Counsel leaned on Scarfo’s and Pelullo’s prior felonies as part of a narrative of rags to riches turned sour by government overreach, painting them as “two felons who were in business together that had a checkered past” who had turned their lives around to “mak[e] millions of dollars” in “legitimate” business. (JAC at 96.) In his closing argument, Pelullo’s counsel again emphasized to the jurors that Pelullo and Scarfo were “two convicted felons” who had supposedly “partner[ed] in good faith to succeed in business legitimately[.]” (JAC at 12805.) Moreover, as more fully described in the next section, infra Section V.E.1, the way in which Pelullo endeavored to procure a firearm for Scarfo by secretive means – having John Maxwell buy a gun in Texas and drive it halfway across the country to New Jersey and instructing him to avoid law enforcement officials along the way – demonstrates Pelullo well understood that Scarfo, as a prior felon, was prohibited from having firearms. Because there was sufficient evidentiary support for 93 the § 922(d)(1) object of the conspiracy count at issue, that in itself is enough to sustain the conviction, regardless of any potential Rehaif error associated with the § 922(g)(1) object.55 55 Pelullo also asserts that the Rehaif error entitles him to “complete dismissal of the indictment” or, at a minimum, vacatur of the RICO conspiracy conviction, since the indictment and the government’s case at trial relied heavily on the firearms. (3d Cir. D.I. 322 at 21-24.) But any Rehaif error here would not require automatic reversal of his conviction. Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2100. Rather, because Pelullo did not object to the government’s mentions of the firearms (or the presence of the guns in the courtroom), he bears the burden, on plain-error review, of showing a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted of the other charges but for the gun evidence. Id. at 2096-97. His conclusory claim of “extreme prejudice” due to a “changed … dynamic [at] trial” caused by the guns is insufficient to carry that burden. (3d Cir. D.I. 322 at 25.) It is also unsupported by the record. While the RICO conspiracy portion of the indictment mentioned the firearms, none of the charged racketeering predicate offenses had anything to do with the firearms conspiracy. And the case against Pelullo at trial on the other counts rested on a great deal more evidence than just his involvement with firearms – namely, the extensive testimonial and documentary proof of his leading role in the FirstPlus takeover scheme. 94