Opinion ID: 2227435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Allegedly Unreliable Aggravation

Text: Defendant claims that unreliable aggravation was used to obtain the death penalty when testimony that Mr. Jackson had committed a residential burglary was introduced although the residential burglary charged had been nolle prossed. At the second phase of defendant's death penalty hearing, Officer Francis Higgins testified that he was on patrol on October 24, 1985, when he was flagged down by defendant's cousin, Vincent Rowe. Rowe said defendant had burgled his residence; Rowe said he had seen defendant running from the building. A television was among the items taken. Officers proceeded to defendant's residence, where Higgins stationed himself out of sight near the rear door, and other officers went to the front door. About 20 seconds later, defendant came out the back door and was arrested. Defendant was returned to the scene of the burglary where he was identified by a Ms. Young as the man she had seen earlier, carrying a television down a stairwell. Higgins affirmed that the State had dropped charges, apparently because the victim chose not to proceed with the case. Defendant's sister later testified that she was aware defendant had burgled the residence of her cousin, Vincent Rowe. Hearsay evidence of crimes that did not result in prosecution or conviction is admissible at the aggravation and mitigation phase of a death penalty hearing if the evidence meets the requirements of relevancy and reliability. ( People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 53-54, 131 Ill. Dec. 86, 538 N.E.2d 461.) The evaluation of testimony's relevance and reliability is left largely to the sentencing judge's discretion. People v. Richardson (1988), 123 Ill.2d 322, 361-62, 123 Ill.Dec. 908, 528 N.E.2d 612; Brisbon, 106 Ill.2d at 365, 88 Ill.Dec. 87, 478 N.E.2d 402. We cannot say, after having examined the record, that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Higgins' testimony. Vincent Rowe made a complaint to Higgins, indicating that (1) his residence had been burgled, (2) a television was among the items taken, and (3) he had seen defendant running from his building. Higgins later apprehended defendant under circumstances strongly suggesting that defendant was attempting to evade police officers at his front door. Rowe's allegations against defendant were supported by Young's identification of defendant as the man she had earlier seen carrying a television down a stairwell in Rowe's building. Finally, defendant's sister acknowledged she was aware defendant had committed the burglary, although she did not disclose the source of her information. Higgins' testimony appears to be relevant and reliable. People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357, cited by defendant, is distinguishable. At issue in Harris was admission, at a death sentencing hearing, of some evidence which implicated defendant in a 1969 killing. Although there was some inculpatory evidence against defendant, there was substantial evidence which exculpated defendantevidence which had prompted the State to drop charges against defendant. This court held that it was error to admit evidence of the 1969 incident and error to exclude evidence of the prosecutor's reasons for dropping charges. Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 163, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357. Harris does not stand for the proposition that evidence underlying a charge subsequently dropped can never be used at sentencing. The basis for the decision in Harris was substantial evidence that defendant had not committed the crime, evidence which convinced the prosecutor that charges should be dropped. There was no such evidence in this case. To the contrary, substantial evidence implicated defendant. It appears that the charges against defendant were dropped because the victim, defendant's cousin, chose not to proceed against defendant. Under the circumstances, we cannot say this evidence was unreliable. 5. Instruction Including Residential Burglary Finally, we address defendant's contention that he was erroneously found eligible for the death penalty based upon murder in the course of residential burglary. The sentencing jury was instructed that defendant would be eligible for the death sentence if it found (1) that defendant was 18 years old or older at the time of the commission of the murders, and (2) that one or more statutory aggravating factors existed. (See IPI Criminal 2d No. 7A. 11.) The jury subsequently returned verdicts finding eligibility for death based upon several aggravating factors: (1) defendant murdered two or more persons; (2) defendant killed Dana Winder, who was under 12 years of age and whose death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; (3) defendant killed Vernita Winder in the course of another felony; (4) defendant killed Shirley Martin in the course of another felony; and (5) defendant killed Mark Brown in the course of another felony. The jury was instructed that the predicate felonies in this case were armed robbery, home invasion and residential burglary. This court has held that murder in the course of residential burglary does not establish eligibility for the death penalty. People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill.2d 233, 250, 256, 135 Ill.Dec. 543, 543 N.E.2d 1290. Although residential burglary may not be a proper predicate felony, armed robbery and home invasion were. Defendant was found guilty of five counts of armed robbery and home invasion by the same jury that determined eligibility. The jury would have found defendant had killed in the course of another felony, even if residential burglary had been omitted from the instructions. Defendant was not prejudiced by the erroneous inclusion of residential burglary in the instructions. See People v. Pitsonbarger (1990), 142 Ill.2d 353, 375, 154 Ill.Dec. 562, 568 N.E.2d 783 (presence of other aggravating factors made alleged error at eligibility phase harmless); People v. Coleman (1989), 129 Ill.2d 321, 345, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330 (Illinois statute does not place special emphasis on any aggravating factor and does not accord added significance to multiple aggravating factors). In a related argument, defendant claims that the improper basis of eligibility was used to prejudice him at the second stage of the death penalty hearing. We disagree. Defendant had engaged in conduct which resulted in a residential burglary conviction, therefore the jury could consider that conduct at the sentencing phase even if it was not proper to do so at the eligibility phase. Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 346, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330 (During the second phase of the sentencing hearing, the jury was free to consider any relevant and reliable evidence in aggravation and mitigation). In People v. Simms (1991), 143 Ill.2d 154, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947, the jury was also incorrectly instructed that residential burglary was one of the predicate felonies for imposition of the death sentence. Although this court vacated the death penalty in that case, we find the case at bar to be distinguishable from Simms. The Simms jury returned a general verdict form. The signed verdict form simply stated that the jury unanimously found that a statutory aggravating factor existed, without specifying which underlying felony or felonies the jury relied upon to establish the defendant's eligibility for death. Simms, 143 Ill.2d at 171, 157 Ill. Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947. Here, five specific verdict forms were utilized by the jury to find defendant eligible for the death sentence, each based upon an aggravating factor. While three of those verdict forms could be termed defective because the aggravating factors included residential burglary as one of the predicate felonies, the remaining two verdict forms listed as the aggravating factors (1) that the defendant murdered two or more persons; and (2) defendant killed Dana Winder, who was under 12 years of age and whose death resulted from exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In order to find eligibility for imposition of the death penalty, the jury had only to sign one of those verdict forms while it did, in fact, sign all five. Thus, the fact that three of those five verdict forms were not entirely correct is not sufficiently grave as to have deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. ( Simms, 143 Ill.2d at 170, 157 Ill. Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947.) Thus, the defendant would still have been eligible for the death penalty had the three incorrect verdict forms never been signed by the jury. 6. Alleged Disparate Sentencing Defendant argues that his death sentence is unreasonably disparate from his codefendant's life sentence when his codefendant, who had committed a prior murder, initiated the murders and participated in the stabbings. It is the duty of this court, under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions, to determine whether a death sentence has been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously or is unduly severe considering the circumstances of the offense and the character and rehabilitative prospects of the defendant. ( People v. Bean (1990), 137 Ill.2d 65, 134, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258.) As a means to that end, this court has compared a defendant's death sentence to the sentence of a codefendant ( Bean, 137 Ill.2d at 134, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258; Jimerson, 127 Ill.2d at 54, 129 Ill.Dec. 124, 535 N.E.2d 889; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 161-71, 44 Ill.Dec. 483, 411 N.E.2d 849), focusing on the particular defendant's extent of involvement in the offense, the nature of the offense, the character and background of the defendant, including any criminal record, and his potential for rehabilitation ( Bean, 137 Ill.2d at 134, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258; Gleckler, 82 Ill.2d at 162-66, 170-71, 44 Ill.Dec. 483, 411 N.E.2d 849). Arbitrary and unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants is impermissible. People v. Kline (1982), 92 Ill.2d 490, 508, 65 Ill.Dec. 843, 442 N.E.2d 154; People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill.2d 47, 55, 61 Ill.Dec. 524, 434 N.E.2d 1121. The basic premises of defendant's disparate-sentencing argument are (1) that Driskel's background contained more aggravation than defendant's background, and (2) that Driskel was at least as culpable. We first compare the backgrounds of defendant and Driskel for whatever insight into their character we may derive. As the State points out, both defendant and Driskel had two prior felony convictions: defendant for robbery and failure to return from furlough; Driskel for burglary and robbery. Driskel also had a disorderly conduct conviction. Both had been arrestedDriskel for theft, defendant for burglaryand had had charges dropped. Not to be lightly regarded, however, is testimony that Driskel had committed a murder in the course of a burglary when he was a juvenile. Assuming the jury believed the testimony of Driskel's accomplice, the fact that Driskel had killed before is a weighty factor indeed. We do not, of course, know whether the jury accepted or rejected this testimony. We do find it somewhat odd that the State chose not to present other witnesses on this point. In any event, this is not the only evidence we must take into consideration. Defendant observes, Among the things that codefendants Bobbie Driskel and Lawrence Jackson have in common are drug addiction, coming from large poor broken families, childhood trauma, poor school records and bad behavior in jail. The State points out that while both men were drug addicts, at age 18 Driskel sought treatment through a TASC program, but was denied access. Nothing of record indicates defendant ever sought treatment. While defendant's father had abandoned the family, Driskel's father was an alcoholic who physically abused everyone in the family. Defendant, as a child, had seen his older brother killed by an automobile, but defendant's mother testified that defendant had not indicated the event still had an impact on his life. Driskel had been given an overdose of LSD by a teacher and was twice hospitalized for psychotic behavior. Although Driskel's record while incarcerated was not impeccable, it was far better than defendant's. While in Cook County jail, Driskel was disciplined for possessing shanks, once kicked another inmate in the face during a fight, and was cited for fighting on another occasion. On the other hand, Driskel received his GED during his first incarceration and left Joliet with the highest status, Grade A. Driskel later took courses at Wright College and completed a program in truck driving. While awaiting trial in this case, Driskel attended classes and counseled with a minister. Driskel displayed a propensity for self-improvement. Driskel had also had a degree of success in the workplace. Between 1980 and 1986, Driskel held jobs with the Urban Progress Center, the Urban Restoration Conservation Program, Hagerty Service and Vulcan Company. The manager of Vulcan testified that Driskel was a good and reliable employee who worked hard. He admitted, however, that Driskel had been dismissed for taking property from a customer. Contrast defendant's institutional record, educational aspirations and work history. Defendant was cited for 53 disciplinary violations while in the State's correctional system between December of 1981 and November 15, 1983. Although many violations were for relatively minor things, such as unauthorized movement and jamming open cell doors so they would not lock, the remaining violations were of a more serious nature. On December 23, 1981, defendant was cited for attempting to strike a correctional officer with a broom handle. A shank was found in defendant's cell on August 3, 1982. On February 3, 1983, defendant approached a teacher, Brian Tessor, telling Tessor he would kill him if he ever saw him on the streets. Defendant waived his hand in Tessor's face, pointed his forefinger at him, and called Tessor a mother fucker. On October 11, 1983, defendant refused to provide identification upon request of a correctional officer, telling the officer, you better get away from me. When asked again, defendant came at the officer as if to swing at him. Then, moving within inches of the officer's face, defendant said, You'd better just go and get out of here before you get hurt. It was not until a weapon was leveled on defendant from a gun tower that defendant backed away. Defendant was cited for numerous disciplinary violations while in Cook County's correctional system, awaiting the outcome of this case. Defendant was charged with fighting and gambling on February 13, 1987. Defendant explained that another inmate had been cheating at cards so defendant hit him. On July 8, 1987, defendant was charged with fighting and gang activity. Defendant admitted he was a member of the Vice Lords. He was in fact a leader in that organization. A shank was found under defendant's mattress on July 29, 1987. On August 6, 1987, defendant was cited for fighting with a correctional officer. The officer had ordered defendant to move to a different wing of the facility. Defendant refused and, in the officer's presence, received contraband from another inmate. The officer ordered defendant to turn over the contraband, to which defendant replied, I ain't giving up shit. Defendant then pushed the officer who was subsequently treated at a hospital for injuries to his hands. In April of 1988, defendant was charged with refusing to obey an order, threats by words and possession of a weapon. Defendant had refused a search and had told the officer involved that, he and his people would kick [the officer's] ass and any other officers who came to wing 2-J. Defendant called upon other inmates to attack the officers. When other officers arrived on the scene, defendant was searched and a sharp metal objectthought to be a knifewas found on his person. On June 7, 1988, defendant was charged with assault for striking another inmate in the eye. Defendant pled guilty to the charge. Defendant frequently harassed a female correctional officer in the Cook County correctional system. Kelly Byrne testified that she cited defendant for fighting and sexual misconduct on several occasions. Once, when Byrne was working a midnight shift, Byrne ordered defendant to return to his bunk. Defendant went to his bunk and, as he lay down, he took his penis from his underwear and began to masturbate while looking directly at Byrne. As a result of the incident, defendant was removed to segregation for three or four days. When he returned, he began exposing himself to Byrne almost daily. In April or May of 1986, defendant, in an apparently menacing manner, asked Byrne how her little girl was doing. Sometime around June of 1986, defendant told Byrne, I'll find you and I'll get you. Obviously, defendant's institutional record consisted of more than a few isolated violations of the rules. At this juncture, we note in passing the testimony of Gigga Bibbs, the victim of defendant's 1980 robbery, and that of Officer Lawrence Beyer, who investigated the robbery and apprehended defendant. Bibbs testified in aggravation that defendant struck her in the face during the course of the robbery. Officer Beyer testified that he apprehended defendant and, as Beyer was placing defendant in a police vehicle, defendant told Beyer, I'm going to kill you and everyone as soon as I get out of here. We note, too, the testimony of Officer Joseph Pedersen, who, responding to a report of shots fired, observed defendant drop a 410-gauge shotgun over a fence, into some bushes. Officer Francis Higgins testified that defendant had been implicated in a burglary; however, charges were dropped when the victim chose not to proceed. We now turn, briefly, to defendant's educational aspirations and work history. Defendant apparently never expressed an interest in improving his mind. His mother testified he dropped out of high school after one year because, she supposed, he just didn't like going. Nothing of record indicates defendant took classes while in prison, other than, perhaps, defendant's verbal abuse of Brian Tessor. There was, however, no affirmative testimony indicating that defendant took classes. According to his sister, defendant never held a real job. We find no refutation of that statement in this record. Despite some evidence that he had killed someone earlier in his lifea factor not to be lightly regardedDriskel's background is not so dominated by violence and threats of violence as is the case with defendant. Defendant demonstrated a readiness to engage in acts of violence, involving both other inmates and correctional officers. His prior offenses also involved acts of violence. A rational distinction can thus be drawn between Driskel's situation and defendant's. Defendant was, is, and probably would continue to be a danger to other inmates and correctional officers in the prison setting. Apart from that, an equally important factor in this case is the relative culpability of the codefendants. Defendant claims Driskel was at least as culpable as he and seeks to portray Driskel as the moving force in the commission of the offense. There was significant evidence to the contrary, indicating defendant may have been the instigator. Considering only defendant's statements, it is clear defendant was in possession of the knives used in the offense, and gave Driskel a knife outside Brown's apartment door. According to defendant's oral statement, as Driskel stood near Brown and defendant stood nearby, defendant asked Driskel, What are you going to do? This statement could be interpreted either as a genuine question, or as prompting Driskel to proceed. Driskel immediately thereafter stabbed Brown, as did defendant. Moreover, it was defendant who forced open the bedroom door to get to the women and children. When one of the women ran out of the bedroom, it was defendant who ordered Driskel to kill her too. These facts seem consistent with evidence presented in support of Driskel's defense of compulsion which, while not a proper defense to the murders, was nonetheless submitted to the jury for consideration on the other charges. Although the jury apparently rejected the defense as to most of the chargesit acquitted Driskel of home invasionit would have been proper for the jury to have considered evidence of compulsion as mitigating evidence sufficient to preclude execution. (See Gleckler, 82 Ill.2d at 165, 44 Ill.Dec. 483, 411 N.E.2d 849.) Driskel testified that he had been stabbed by defendant approximately one month prior to the murders. Defendant was by far the larger man of the two. Driskel testified that his intention had been to burgle Brown's residence if no one were home. Defendant prompted him to proceed even though people were present and, to that end, defendant handed him the knife and urged him to commit various acts once inside the apartment. For instance, defendant directed him to stab Urica Winder, and Driskel did so, but only after defendant threatened him with a knife. Driskel's sister testified that Driskel was indeed a follower who would do what defendant told him to do. Evidence that a defendant is a follower, rather than a leader, has been held to be a significant mitigating factor in disparate sentencing analysis. ( Gleckler, 82 Ill.2d at 171, 44 Ill.Dec. 483, 411 N.E.2d 849.) We note, too, that Driskel had told the jury he moved the baby, Shanita, to a bedroom to keep her from being harmed. We find evidence in the record which could account for the disparate treatment of defendant and Driskel. Therefore, defendant's death sentence was not unreasonably disparate from his codefendant's natural life sentence. 7. Constitutional Issues Defendant raises several constitutional issues which this court has previously addressed and rejected. He claims that the provision of our death penalty statute, which makes one eligible for the death penalty if the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty is so vague that it results in arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. We held otherwise in People v. Kidd (1989), 129 Ill.2d 432, 454-56, 136 Ill.Dec. 18, 544 N.E.2d 704, and People v. Odle (1988), 128 Ill.2d 111, 138-41, 131 Ill.Dec. 53, 538 N.E.2d 428. We see no reason to reexamine the question here. We take the same position with respect to defendant's arguments that the death penalty statute (1) places the burden on defendant to prove death should not be imposed; (2) grants unguided prosecutorial discretion to select candidates for the death penalty; and (3) does not sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death sentences. This court rejected these contentions in People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508, 531-34, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181, People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 531, 533-43, 34 Ill.Dec. 137, 397 N.E.2d 809, and People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill.2d 437, 503-04, 69 Ill.Dec. 30, 447 N.E.2d 247. See also People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 49, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Tuesday, January 14, 1992, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court shall be executed. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law (Ill. Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 119-5). A certified copy of this order shall be transmitted by the clerk of this court to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of the Stateville Correctional Center, and to the warden of the correctional institution wherein defendant is confined. Affirmed. BILANDIC and FREEMAN, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.