Opinion ID: 2974001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Written Commission Agreement

Text: Alternatively, Plaintiffs maintain that even if the alleged oral agreement between Spurling and Forestland is discounted, the June 9 Dutrow Letter constitutes an offer to pay a commission, -7- which Spurling accepted. We hold that the Dutrow letter did not create a contract, and that the district court therefore erred in assuming that a written contract existed. In Tennessee, it is well established . . . that a contract can be expressed, implied, written, or oral, but an enforceable contract must, among other elements, result from a meeting of the minds and must be sufficiently definite to be enforced. The contemplated mutual assent and meeting of the minds cannot be accomplished by the unilateral action of one party nor can it be accomplished by an ambiguous course of dealing between the two parties from which differing inferences regarding continuation or modification of the original contract might reasonably be drawn. In addition, a mere expression of intent or a general willingness to do something does not amount to an “offer.” Jamestowne on Signal, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 807 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (internal citations omitted). At least three clear provisions of the Dutrow Letter indicate its tentative, rather than conclusive, nature. First, “[f]urther interest . . . would be dependent on an initial, cursory investigation . . . to assess the probability that the property would satisfy [the] financial and forestland criteria.” Second, while Forestland “recognize[d] certain advantages of pursuing [its] interest through [Matheson]” it also indicated that would conduct “an initial investigation to determine if there [was] substantive interest in pursuing purchasing of the property” after which it “would look forward to sitting down with [Matheson] and determining an appropriate fee arrangement.” In addition, the language makes clear the “anticipat[ion] [of] paying a reasonable commission provided that the land transaction between The Forestland Group and the Faust family is satisfactorily concluded.” While this language states Forestland’s general willingness to continue preliminary communications with Plaintiffs, perhaps leading to a commission agreement, it is precatory and did not confer acceptance. It is clear from the Dutrow Letter as a whole that while there may have been a “general willingness” to continue to communicate about a possible agency relationship, there was no current intent to recognize Matheson and/or Plaintiffs as Forestland’s -8- agent without further negotiations. In short, the June 9 letter does not establish Forestland’s commitment to pay a commission. Further, the June 16 letter requesting that Massengale “clarify in writing” the definition of a “reasonable commission fee” completely undermines Spurling’s assertion that any agreement–oral or written–involving the material terms of an agency agreement had been reached. See Jamestowne, 807 S.W.2d at 564 (quoting RESTATEMENT (Second) Contracts § 33)) (“The fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.”) Accordingly, although for different reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendants. Because the Dutrow letter was not a valid, binding written contract, but merely Forestland’s general willingness to continue preliminary negotiations with Plaintiffs, it did not amount to a binding contract. By the same token, it did not provide parole evidence of a valid, binding, oral agreement.