Opinion ID: 1959906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permission to Enter the Dwelling

Text: The defendant next claimed that he did not violate the scope of his permission to enter the house and that he could not be convicted of breaking and entering because Tess's room was not a dwelling house, the entry of which could support a burglary conviction. Therefore, he argued, the trial justice erred in not granting defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The circumstances of this case support defendant's conviction of burglary, [5] notwithstanding his assertion that at common law, consent to enter the dwelling was a complete defense to a burglary prosecution. Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Maintainability of Burglary Charge, Where Entry into Building is Made with Consent, 58 A.L.R.4th 335 (1987). It has long been held that while one may have permission to enter parts of a dwelling, entry into a room within that dwelling that a person does not have permission to enter can constitute burglary. See United States v. Bowen, 24 F.Cas. 1207 (D.C. Cir.1835) (No. 14, 629) (holding that though slave was lawfully in the house, he could be convicted for burglary if he entered into his mistress's room with intent to kill her); 1 Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, 554 (London 1736) (discussing that a servant who sleeps in one part of the house and his master in another, and who unlatches the door of his master's chamber and enters with intent to kill the master, may be convicted of burglary; also if a lodger at an inn opens the chamber door of another lodger at the inn to steal his goods, the intruder may be convicted of burglary). [6] Moreover, several courts have held that a room within a house can constitute a dwelling house for the purposes of a burglary prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Descant, 42 So. 486, 488 (La. 1906) (different rooms of a house with doors and entry common to all, constitutes each room the `dwelling house' of the particular occupants;    therefore, an illegal entry into part of the house may be made by one who has a right to be in another part); Monks v. Dykes, 4 M. & W. 566, 569, 150 Eng. Rep. 1546, 1547 (1839) (stating that room in a house may or may not be a dwelling house, depending on circumstances). In a similar application of the common law, this Court has held that a dormitory room was an apartment within the meaning of § 11-8-3. State v. Riely, 523 A.2d 1225 (R.I.1987). We explained the policy behind considering such a room an apartment: Professor Perkins has emphasized that the terms `dwelling' or `dwelling house' import a human habitation or a place of abode used as a `place to sleep in.' He also has pointed out that there may be more than one dwelling or dwelling house under the same roof, referring to apartment houses and other similar structures. R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law, at 255-59 (3d ed. 1982).    In our opinion, § 11-8-3 attempts to afford some degree of security to one's abode whether the occupant resides in an apartment or a dormitory room because both units are to be found in multiple dwelling structures that provide the occupant with sleeping accommodations and other facilities   . Riely, 523 A.2d at 1226. More recently, in State v. Turner, 746 A.2d 700, 703 (R.I.2000) (per curiam) we held that a private apartment of an on-site manager within a bed-and-breakfast was a dwelling house within the meaning of § 11-8-2(a). We noted that only the manager and her husband had access to the door through which the defendant entered  a private entrance, separate and apart from the building's front entrance. [7] Here, Tess and Eddie shared the bedroom in the context of an intimate relationship. The bedroom door had a lock on the knob and an additional dead-bolt lock, clearly rendering the room deserving of the same level of security and protection as that afforded to a dormitory room or a private apartment within a bed-and-breakfast. Accordingly, we hold that the victim's bedroom was adwelling within the meaning of the law of burglary. Moreover, the trial justice was correct in stating that the law of burglary protects not only the dwelling house generally, but the private quarters or apartments of each person who lives within the dwelling house. Although testimony that defendant told Eddie that he would wait for him outside the Ames Street house could lead to the conclusion that defendant was not permitted to enter the home at that time, the record is silent on details such as whether other members of the household were present or awake when defendant entered. But even assuming that defendant had permission to enter the house, the evidence clearly demonstrated that defendant had no permission to enter the bedroom but instead entered Tess's room with the intent to commit a felony therein. Therefore, the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.