Opinion ID: 2052640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Can the Statute be Construed to Preserve its Constitutionality?

Text: A statute must always be read, if possible, to conform with constitutional mandates. The general principle has repeatedly been invoked that if a legislative enactment is of such a character that it is subject to differing interpretations, one of which would result in the act being held unconstitutional and the other permitting its being upheld as valid, the latter alternative will be accepted. In other words, the presumption is that the legislature would not intend to pass an act in contravention of a constitutional restriction or otherwise invalid.  (Emphasis added.) State Bar of Michigan v Lansing, 361 Mich 185, 195; 105 NW2d 131 (1960). In interpreting language contained in revenue statutes, general rules of construction have been established. As summarized in the WILLIAMS opinion for reversal in an equally divided court, in Borden, Inc v Dep't of Treasury, 391 Mich 495, 513-517; 218 NW2d 667 (1974), revenue laws containing doubtful language are to be strictly construed against the taxing authority. Ecorse Screw Machine Products Co v Corporation & Securities Commission, 378 Mich 415, 418; 145 NW2d 46 (1966); Ready-Power Co v Dearborn, 336 Mich 519, 525; 58 NW2d 904 (1953); Hart v Dep't of Revenue, 333 Mich 248, 252; 52 NW2d 685 (1952). At the same time they should receive a reasonable construction with a view to carrying out the legislative purposes. In re Detroit & Windsor Ferry Co, 227 Mich 143, 146; 198 NW 725 (1924). In his treatise on taxation, COOLEY explained the relationship between these two rules in the following manner: In construing revenue laws, special consideration is of course to be had of the purpose for which they are enacted. That purpose is to supply the government with a revenue. But in the proceedings to obtain this it is also intended that no unnecessary injury shall be inflicted upon the individual taxed. While this is secondary to the main object  the impelling occasion of the law  it is none the less a sacred duty. 2 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed), § 503, p 1113. Therefore, when there is doubt as to the interpretation of a revenue statute, that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer only if such resolution is consistent with the purposes of the Legislature. Further, in the construction of a statute the manifest intent of the legislature must prevail over the literal sense of the terms used. Bates Twp School District v Elliott, 276 Mich 575, 578; 268 NW 744 (1936) citing, Stambaugh Twp v Iron County Treasurer, 153 Mich 104, 107; 116 NW 569 (1908). The Court of Appeals found § 13 so clear and unambiguous on its face that there was no room for judicial construction. 63 Mich App 577, 584. Admittedly, if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, there is no need for judicial construction, Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244, 249; 191 NW2d 307 (1971); Ypsilanti Police Officers Association v Eastern Michigan University, 62 Mich App 87, 92; 233 NW2d 497 (1975), but we do not find § 13 to be such a statute. As posited in Wyandotte Savings Bank v State Banking Commissioner, 347 Mich 33, 40; 78 NW2d 612 (1956), and reaffirmed in People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557, 563-564; 208 NW2d 504 (1973), in similar language: Few words [within a statute] have a `content so intrinsic' that their meaning does not become doubtful in the context of a particular question. The language of § 13 is no exception to this rule; it is not so clear and unambiguous as to preclude judicial interpretation. It is, in fact, equally compatible with two interpretations, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional; we must, therefore, choose the former. State Bar of Michigan v Lansing, 361 Mich 185, 195; 105 NW2d 131 (1960). The language of § 13 is phrased in the singular rather than the plural with reference to assessing officer and assessing district. Ford Motor Company and the Court of Appeals each stressed this to interpret the same as affording a separate election for each assessing district. However, this Court in Ready-Power clearly interpreted similar language to apply to the assessing officers in several districts without any trouble whatsoever. In conclusion we hold that art 9, § 3 of the Constitution requires us to place an interpretation on § 13 which results in uniformity, if we can, and we do so.