Opinion ID: 1714221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Prejudicial Trial Errors

Text: ¶ 23. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that there were prejudicial errors committed by the trial court when the jury was allowed to hear evidence concerning GMAC's procedures in other states, allowed improper lay testimony drawing legal conclusions, commented on the credibility of a witness, and failed to take corrective action when Hicks's counsel made prejudicial statements during closing arguments. In defense, Hicks argues that it was not error to admit evidence of statutes in eight other states which require automatic refunds of unearned premiums on credit life policies because the purpose was to show that MIC Life and GMAC had knowledge that an automatic refund system was practical and could have been followed in Mississippi. Furthermore, Hicks asserts that the other alleged errors, when taken in the context of the trial as a whole, did not have any prejudicial effect. We agree with the Court of Appeals that these errors clearly require reversal of the punitive damages award against MIC Life. A. Statutes of Other States ¶ 24. The first allegation of error concerns evidence of procedures in other states that impose a duty upon lenders, like GMAC, to make refunds of unearned premiums. Hicks referred to a GMAC manual that informed its dealers that in eight states it was necessary for the creditor to refund unearned premiums on credit life policies. The argument for the relevance of this evidence is that the defendants were aware that requiring the borrower/insured to request a refund was not as effective as the system in these other eight states. Hicks argued at trial that the system in place was ineffective in refunding unearned premiums. This argument necessarily implicates MIC Life as well as GMAC because MIC Life was the party holding the unearned premium and the one obligated under our statute to return the premium. Though the statutes of the other states require the creditor (GMAC) to refund the premium, they were offered to show that both defendants were aware that requiring the insured to request the refund was not as effective as the procedures utilized in other states. Hicks sought to impose a duty on both GMAC and MIC Life, not just GMAC, to return the premiums. ¶ 25. The evidence of other statutes was offered to suggest there were methods by which both companies voluntarily could have applied a direct reimbursement approach in Mississippi. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it was error to allow this testimony in that it is much more likely to mislead a jury than to assist. B. Testimony of GMAC Employee ¶ 26. The second allegation of error is in regard to questions posed to Mildred Wilbanks, a GMAC employee, asking her to interpret the insurance contract between Hicks and MIC Life and the OLA scheme. Wilbanks is not an attorney and is not qualified to testify as to legal conclusions. Thus, we find that this line of questioning was improper and prejudiced both GMAC and MIC Life. ¶ 27. It is clear that the questions were meant to establish knowledge and role in a conspiracy on the part of GMAC. It is clear from the record that a central allegation at trial was the conspiracy theory. As Court of Appeals Judge Irving stated in his dissent, the allegations of conspiracy were the bedrock of Hicks's action, though the complaint did not allege an outright conspiracy between MIC Life and GMAC. The parties understood this to be the case, and the case was tried accordingly. GMAC and MIC Life were tied together by more than just the allegations of conspiracy. GMAC is the corporate grandparent of MIC Life, GMAC financed the premium for the life insurance, and the evidence at trial showed that though the two are separate entities, there was much interplay between the two. C. Judge's Comments on the Credibility of a Witness ¶ 28. The witness, a MIC Life employee, stated he was not qualified to comment on the refund procedures set out by the statutes of other states and that he was unable to comment on the motivation behind GMAC, another company not his employer, in lending money for life insurance. The trial judge, more than once, chastised the witness for, what he determined was, equivocating. He instructed the witness to be candid. He told defense counsel that you people need to tell your witness how to testify. First, these statements were improper and amount to reversible error. Second, whether the witness was evasive was a question of credibility properly for the jury, and instructing a witness to be candid is tantamount to informing the jury that the witness is being deceitful and evasive. The trial judge clearly invaded the province of the jury. Moreover, a judge's comments carry great weight with a jury which was not likely to forget such egregious comments by this trial judge. Though the witness was asked to testify to matters regarding GMAC, he was an employee of MIC Life. D. Prejudicial Statements by Plaintiff's Counsel ¶ 29. Hicks's counsel told the jury about a $38 million verdict up here not long ago. The jury returned a verdict of $36 million. These comments were improper, and it cannot be said that they had no effect on the jury when one considers the similarity between the actual verdict and the one mentioned by Plaintiff's counsel. ¶ 30. We find that these errors clearly require reversal. The trial was sufficiently flawed as to draw into question the verdict against both defendants. Those errors that did not prejudice MIC Life directly prejudiced MIC Life indirectly as the alleged co-conspirator of its co-defendant.