Opinion ID: 2205569
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Executive Exemption.

Text: The district court concluded the sergeants serving as assistant district commanders/road sergeants, vehicle theft sergeants, and sergeants assigned to capitol security are exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA due to the act's executive exemption. To be exempt under the short test, the employer must show the employee's primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, and includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more other employees. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f). Other regulations further define the exemption. For instance, 29 C.F.R. § 541.104 defines a customarily recognized department or subdivision. It provides: The phrase a customarily recognized department or subdivision is intended to distinguish between a mere collection of men assigned from time to time to a specific job or series of jobs and a unit with permanent status and function. In order properly to classify an individual as an executive he must be more than merely a supervisor of two or more employees; nor is it sufficient that he merely participates in the management of the unit. He must be in charge of and have as his primary duty the management of a recognized unit which has a continuing function. Id. § 541.104(a). 29 C.F.R. § 1.102 further defines the term management. According to the regulation, the following types of work are consistent with managerial responsibilities: Interviewing, selecting, and training of employees; setting and adjusting their rates of pay and hours of work; directing their work; maintaining their production or sales records for use in supervision or control; appraising their productivity and efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or other changes in their status; handling their complaints and grievances and disciplining them when necessary; planning the work; determining the techniques to be used; apportioning the work among the workers; determining the type of materials, supplies, machinery or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought, stocked and sold; controlling the flow and distribution of materials or merchandise and supplies; providing for the safety of the men and the property. Id. § 541.102(b). 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 defines primary duty. The regulation begins by stating, [A] determination of whether an employee has management as his primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case. Id. § 541.103. In an ordinary case, a good rule of thumb is that primary duty means a major part or over fifty percent of the employee's time is spent in management. Id. Although time is a relevant factor, an employee's primary duty can be management, even if the employee spends less than fifty percent of his or her time in management. Auer v. Robbins, 65 F.3d 702, 713 (8th Cir.1995). The factors we need to consider in deciding whether a sergeant's primary duty is management if the sergeant spends less than fifty percent of the sergeant's time performing managerial duties are: 1. The relative importance of the managerial duties as compared with other types of duties; 2. The frequency with which the employee exercises discretionary powers; 3. The employee's relative freedom from supervision; 4. The relationship between the employee's salary and the wage paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the supervisor. Id. at 712; 29 C.F.R. § 541.103. Lastly, 29 C.F.R § 541.115 explains the concept of the working foreman. It provides: (a) The primary purpose of the exclusionary language placing a limitation on the amount of nonexempt work is to distinguish between the bona fide executive and the working foreman or working supervisor who regularly performs production work or other work which is unrelated or only remotely related to his supervisory activities. (The term working foreman is used in this subpart in the sense indicated in the text and should not be construed to mean only one who performs work similar to that performed by his subordinates.) (b) One type of working foreman or working supervisor most commonly found in industry works alongside his subordinates. Such employees, sometimes known as strawbosses, or gang or group leaders perform the same kind of work as that performed by their subordinates, and also carry on supervisory functions. Clearly, the work of the same nature as that performed by the employees' subordinates must be counted as nonexempt work and if the amount of such work performed is substantial the exemption does not apply. (Substantial, as used in this section, means more than twenty percent. See discussion of the twenty-percent limitation on nonexempt work in § 541.112.) Id. § 541.115. With these legal principles in mind, we now turn to the specific issues raised by the sergeants to determine if substantial evidence supports the district court's findings regarding the executive exemption.
The State employs the majority of the sergeants in these job positions. The district court found these sergeants are exempt, because management constitutes the position's primary duty, and the position entails supervising at least two employees. Although the district court acknowledged some of the duties these sergeants perform overlap with the troopers' duties, there are additional duties completely separate and distinct from those of the troopers. These administrative duties include tasks such as setting work schedules, performing building maintenance duties, and clerical duties. The sergeants also review the troopers' reports, take charge of crime scenes, give considerable input in the promotions of the troopers, train subordinates, and make arrangements pertaining to special assignments. The district court found these sergeants also perform executive-type functions such as being immediate supervisors to the troopers in the chain of command. Troopers look to these sergeants for guidance and direction. Sergeants employed in this position also ensure their area of assignment is patrolled and secured. They schedule work assignments, set duty schedules, oversee incoming calls, and are accountable for all assets and facilities. They forward police reports and evidence to the proper jurisdictions. Pursuant to the Department rules associated with discipline, these sergeants have several disciplinary duties. Significantly, these sergeants are responsible for the entire district when the district commander is not on duty. Additionally, the assistant district commander acts as the district supervisor at times when the lieutenant district commander is unavailable. In conclusion, the district court found in its consideration of the totality of the circumstances, these sergeants' duties are akin to management and supervisory positions and they, therefore, are exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA due to their executive status. These sergeants argue the trial court made no finding with respect to how much time they spend on management or supervisory duties. They further argue, if an employee performs twenty percent of his or her time in non-exempt work, it is considered substantial. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(e). They also assert fifty to seventy percent of these sergeants' time is spent doing routine patrol and only twenty-five to thirty percent is spent doing duties that could be considered managerial. Finally, they argue that many of the duties the district court characterized as managerial duties are actually clerical duties such as answering the phone and greeting walk ins. Although these sergeants emphasize the percentage of time they spend performing regular trooper duties as compared to the time they spend performing supervisory functions, this is not the determinative factor in the court's analysis. See Auer, 65 F.3d at 712. Our determination must be based on all the facts in a particular case and the application of the four-prong test articulated in Auer to decide whether management is the employees' primary duty when these sergeants spend less than fifty percent of their time on managerial duties. Id. Substantial evidence supports the district court's findings that the sergeants employed as assistant district commanders/road sergeants are exempt executives. The patrol's performance plan lists these sergeants' responsibilities to include supervising, assigning duties, controlling, organizing, and planning field deployment, and maintaining proficiency in work-related discipline to assure accountability in conformance with the patrol regulations. These sergeants spend their patrol time doing management duties such as meeting with troopers, riding with troopers, and notably, training troopers to do a better job in their law enforcement functions. A summary of activity reports for the patrol shows these sergeants spend only 26.71% of their time patrolling, compared with troopers, who spend 67.86% of their time on routine patrols. These sergeants average 1.4 citizen contacts per duty day, while troopers average 6.55 citizen contacts per day. These sergeants are the ranking officer at any accident or arrest scene. These sergeants' rate of pay is more than the troopers' rate of pay. This differential in pay shows the Department is paying for more than the value of basic patrol services. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's decision as to these sergeants.
The district court found the duties of the vehicle theft sergeants include assisting the lieutenant in administrative, investigative, and technical operations. The district court also found the position supervises the troopers by overseeing field investigations, evaluating performance, interviewing, evaluating needs, and coordinating activities. Finally, the district court found, except for performing undercover investigations, the duties of vehicle theft sergeants are exclusively managerial. These sergeants argue the trial court failed to make any finding with respect to the amount of time spent on these duties or that these duties are primary. Our review of the record indicates there is substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that these sergeants' primary duty is management under the four factors set forth in Auer, 65 F.3d at 712. State patrol regulations provide this sergeant is the immediate supervisor of the vehicle theft troopers. In order to supervise the troopers properly, these sergeants by necessity must oversee field investigations, evaluate performance, evaluate needs, and coordinate activities. The duties primarily consist of managerial duties. These sergeants also argue they are working foremen. As to these sergeants' working-foremen argument, some courts have held the working-foremen regulation is not applicable when the short test is used, as in this case. See, e.g., Hays v. City of Pauls Valley, 74 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (10th Cir.1996) (holding an employee qualifying under the short test is not entitled to a working-foremen instruction because that provision is inapplicable to the short test). We need not make that determination because substantial evidence supports the conclusion the managerial duties performed by these sergeants require they have more discretion and responsibility over their subordinates than those of working foremen under 29 C.F.R § 541.115. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision as to these sergeants.
There are two sergeants working in this assignment. The district court found these two sergeants perform the same supervisory duties as assistant district supervisors. Therefore, the trial court found these sergeants to be exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA due to its executive exemption. These sergeants argue they only spend twenty percent of their time doing supervisory duties. The time spent is not the determinative factor. See Auer, 65 F.3d at 712. The record supports the finding these sergeants perform the same managerial duties as assistant district supervisors. Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that these sergeants are exempt executives under the factors set forth in Auer. Id. These sergeants also argue they are working foremen. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion these sergeants have more discretion and responsibility over their subordinates than those of working foremen under 29 C.F.R. § 541.115. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision as to these sergeants.