Opinion ID: 2441447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross-Examination of Trooper Newton

Text: Finally, Mr. Bailey contends that he was denied his right to effectively crossexamine Trooper Newton. Particularly, the trial court refused to allow Mr. Bailey to ask Trooper Newton whether he was transferred to Monroe County because he had left the scene of an accident involving his girlfriend. The relevant evidentiary rule at issue, A.R.E. 608(b), provides in pertinent part that: [s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness... We have interpreted this rule to permit inquiries into conduct on cross-examination that are clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, but to disallow cross-examination into specific instances that are merely probative of dishonesty. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 498, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994). Specifically, we have adopted a three-part test of admissibility: (1)the question must be asked in good faith; (2) the probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect; and (3) the prior conduct must relate to the witness's truthfulness. Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 316, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983). This test must be considered along with our settled law that evidentiary matters regarding the admissibility of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and rulings in this regard will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. White v. State, 330 Ark. 813, 819, 958 S.W.2d 519 (1997). In the present case, we cannot say that the specific incident regarding Trooper Newton's transfer because he left the scene of an accident involving his girlfriend automatically translates into an example of untruthfulness. In fact, Mr. Bailey does not allege that his questions were probative of Trooper Newton's truthfulness. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Mr. Bailey to pursue this line of questioning. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment. NEWBERN and IMBER, JJ., concur and dissent in part.