Opinion ID: 2209739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Relevance to Intent

Text: Harrold also argues that the rules were relevant to an intent-based defense. To be found guilty of violating § 28-813(1)(a), the State must prove that the defendant knowingly printed, copied, manufactured, prepared, produced, or reproduced obscene material. Essentially, Harrold is claiming that he thought the material he produced and distributed was indecent, but not obscene, and he offers the CableVision rules concerning indecency and obscenity in furtherance of this argument. Section 28-807(5) defines knowingly as having general knowledge of, reason to know, or a belief or reasonable ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of the character and content of any material, taken as a whole, described in this section, which is reasonably susceptible to examination by the defendant. We have stated, with reference to this language: `It is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecution show that a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the material he distributes, and he knew the character and nature of the materials.' . . . To require proof of a defendant's knowledge of the legal status of the materials would permit the defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law. . . . State v. American Theatre Corp., 196 Neb. 467, 471, 244 N.W.2d 59, 62 (1976) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974)). Harrold is attempting to prove, through this and other evidence, that although he was aware of the contents of the videotape, he did not know it to be legally obscene. Even if this were proved, however, it would not provide Harrold with an effective defense to the charge brought against him. The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that Harrold, as the producer, director, and sole actor in the videotape, had sufficient knowledge of the contents thereof to satisfy the definition from § 28-807(5) set forth above. The following colloquy from Harrold's trial testimony aptly illustrates the evidence that was presented: Q. Did you copy the material onto the tape that was delivered to CableVision on September 14, 1995, and as Exhibit No. 1? [Harrold]. Yes. . . . . Q. And it was you actually that distributed it or gave it to or circulated it to CableVision on September 14, 1995, correct? [Harrold]. Yes. Q. And when you did that tape and when you gave it to CableVision, you knew what was on the tape, correct? [Harrold]. Yes. Q. And you knew the nature and character of the tape? [Harrold]. Yes. In a jury trial of a criminal case, an erroneous evidentiary ruling results in prejudice to a defendant unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Buechler, 253 Neb. 727, 572 N.W.2d 65 (1998). Even assuming that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that might be relevant to Harrold's intent, we find that the evidence at trial indisputably establishes that Harrold had general knowledge of, reason to know, or a belief or reasonable ground for belief which warranted further inspection or inquiry of the character and content of the videotape. See § 28-807(5). Consequently, we conclude that any erroneous exclusion of evidence relevant to Harrold's intent was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.