Opinion ID: 1229854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Mr. Hanrahan's Prior Testimony

Text: Mr. Hanrahan next argues that the District Court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the court permitted a witness for the Government to read Mr. Hanrahan's testimony from the first trial into evidence in the second trial. [2] Under the Fifth Amendment, [a] defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives. Harrison, 392 U.S. at 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008. But if a defendant chooses not to testify, the Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on that decision. See United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1212 (10th Cir.2006) (The general rule of law is that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment rights which defendant exercised. (quotation omitted)). In reviewing whether the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's silence, the court looks at whether the language used by the prosecutor was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). In this case, Mr. Hanrahan does not point to any statement made by the prosecutor that amounts to a comment on his decision not to testify. Instead, he argues that his former testimony in large part corroborated the Government's other evidence, and thus its primary effect was to highlight to the jury that he was not testifying in the present case. This argument is without merit. When the Government introduced Mr. Hanrahan's prior statement into evidence, it did not reveal that it was testimony from a prior trial; it was read into evidence by ATF Special Agent Frank Ortiz, who testified simply that he was present when the defendant gave a statement under oath. Similarly, the prosecutor revealed nothing that would indicate to the jury that the testimony came from a prior trial  let alone that would cause the jury to consider it a comment on Mr. Hanrahan's choice not to testify in the current trial. In addition, the Government presented Mr. Hanrahan's former testimony as part of its case-in-chief, before it was clear whether Mr. Hanrahan would or would not testify. Thus, the jury could not naturally and necessarily construe the Government's introduction of Mr. Hanrahan's prior testimony as an impermissible comment by the prosecution on Mr. Hanrahan's decision not to testify in his second trial. We similarly reject Mr. Hanrahan's suggestion that the prosecutor improperly commented on the testimonial evidence during closing argument. During closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to Mr. Hanrahan's statement as evidence that Mr. Hanrahan knew of the gun's presence and had access to it in the truck. This was a fair comment on the evidence and did not amount to an impermissible comment on Mr. Hanrahan's silence. See Nelson, 450 F.3d at 1213 (prosecutor's reference to defendant's post-arrest statements was not impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify when it was clear that prosecutor used defendant's words as an admission of guilt).