Opinion ID: 2101341
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support the Habitual Offender Finding

Text: Jackson contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his status as an habitual offender. To establish habitual offender status, the State must show that the second offense was committed after the commission of and sentencing upon the first offense; and that the principal offense upon which the enhancement is being sought was committed after commission of and sentencing upon the second offense. See McCombs v. State (1989), Ind., 536 N.E.2d 277, 279. The record reveals that Jackson committed robbery on September 28, 1962, and was charged with the offense on October 3, 1962. Jackson was sentenced for this crime on April 4, 1963. On December 30, 1985, Jackson was charged with a theft he committed two days earlier. On October 10, 1986, he pled guilty to theft and was sentenced. However, Jackson argues that the second felony was proved only by the introduction of a minute sheet from the Marion Municipal Court and not by a certified copy of a judgment of conviction. In addition, as to the first felony, he contends that the proof of the felony was defective because it does not recite a conviction and is unsigned by the Judge. Upon review of the record, we find both of Jackson's contentions to be without merit. In both instances, official certified copies of the minute sheets were obtained from the Clerk's office and both recite the felonies committed by Jackson. We find no error in the utilization of these documents to prove the habitual offender status. Jackson also contends that the evidence is insufficient because of the staleness of the 1963 conviction that was introduced by the State. He contends that the Indiana Constitution precludes reliance by the State upon a conviction more than 25 years old to establish his status as an habitual offender. We find nothing in IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 1990) or the Indiana Constitution to support this argument. The statute provides only two instances in which a prior conviction may not be used in the proceeding. These are: (1) a prior conviction that has been set aside and (2) one for which the person has been pardoned. The legislature has not included remoteness of the prior conviction as disqualifying the prior conviction. Additionally, the requirement of article I, section 18 of the Indiana Constitution that [t]he penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice does not require us