Opinion ID: 1922714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the state proved the elements of armed robbery.

Text: ¶ 27. Hughes argues that his armed-robbery conviction cannot stand because there was no taking or attempted taking of any property as required under the armed-robbery statute. [9] Hughes is correct that nothing was ever taken or demanded from the Warners prior to or after the shootings. ¶ 28. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-79, states, in pertinent part, that: Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the personal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery. . . . Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79 (Rev.2006) (Emphasis added). An attempt to commit a crime consists of three elements: (1) an intent to commit a particular crime; (2) a direct ineffectual act done toward its commission; and (3) the failure to consummate its commission. Spann v. State, 771 So.2d 883, 891 (Miss.2000) (citing Greenwood v. State, 744 So.2d 767, 769 (Miss. 1999)).
¶ 29. Intent to rob can be shown from the facts surrounding the crime. Walker v. State, 913 So.2d 198, 224 (Miss.2005) (citing Lynch v. State, 877 So.2d 1254, 1266 (Miss.2004)). Intent to commit a crime is a question of fact to be determined by a jury based on the facts presented in the case. Walker, 913 So.2d at 224 (quoting Knox v. State, 805 So.2d 527, 531 (Miss.2002)). ¶ 30. We find that intent to rob can be inferred from the facts of this case. Hughes and Webster had been riding around discussing ways to make money, which included the subject of robbing. Late at night, Webster and Hughes parked their vehicle on a small dirt road and walked about 150 to 200 yards to the Warners' home. Webster told Warner a false story about being out of gas. Upon returning to their truck, Webster asked Hughes, Why did you run? That was our lick. ¶ 31. Intent to rob also can be inferred from the suspicious activity witnessed by a neighbor just before the crimes occurred. Barbara Warner, who lived two houses down from the Warners, testified that shortly before 10:00 p.m. on May 2, 2006, a red old style boxy, short wheel base truck pulled into her driveway and sat for about two or three minutes. The vehicle described by Barbara is consistent with the vehicle driven by Webster on the night in question. Barbara's home was well lit outside with five large night lights and she had three dogs in her yard. Barbara could see the heads of two people in the truck. After sitting in her driveway a short time, the truck pulled out of Barbara's driveway and headed towards the Warners' home.
¶ 32. An overt act is one that will apparently result, in the usual and natural course of events if not hindered by extraneous causes, in the commission of the crime itself, and an act apparently adapted to produce the intended result is sufficient to constitute the overt act essential to an attempt. Greenwood, 744 So.2d at 769 (citing Bucklew v. State, 206 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss.1968)). ¶ 33. We find that assault with a deadly weapon was the act chosen to carry out the robbery. In the normal course of events Warner was incapacitated and/or Hughes did not runa robbery would have resulted.
¶ 34. Property need not be taken for a robbery to occur. Spann, 771 So.2d at 891-92. In Greenwood, this Court affirmed a robbery conviction even though nothing was ever taken or demanded. Greenwood, 744 So.2d at 769-70. Greenwood told a co-indictee that he planned to rob a certain person and said that he planned to knock on this person's door and point a gun to the person's head. Id. at 770. Yet Greenwood failed to carry out his initial plan and asked for gas instead. Id. After the victim assumed that Greenwood and his companions had left, shots were fired and a concrete block was thrown through the victim's plate-glass, sliding door. Id. at 769. However, Greenwood and his cohorts fled when the victim retrieved his hunting rifle and returned gunfire. Id. This Court held that the jury was free to infer that the only reason no robbery was consummated was because the intended victim had returned gunfire. Id. at 770. ¶ 35. Hughes cites Anderson v. State, 168 Miss. 424, 151 So. 558 (1934) for support. In Anderson, two men went to the back door of a store and asked for a pack of cigarettes. Anderson, 151 So. at 558. After one of the store's owners returned with the cigarettes, the defendants proceeded to shoot all three men who were at the store. Id. at 559. After the shootings, both defendants simply left. Id. This Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support felonious intent to take personal property. Id. To infer any further intent would have been the merest speculation. Id. ¶ 36. We find Anderson distinguishable because felonious intent is not merely speculative in this case. A juror reasonably could infer that Webster and Hughes intended to rob the Warners, but abandoned their plan when Warner did not go down after being shot multiple times. ¶ 37. For the aforementioned reasons, we find that the state proved the essential elements of armed robbery.