Opinion ID: 2337380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wrongful discharge claims

Text: Our well-established rule is that when an employee's employment is for an indefinite term, either party may terminate the relationship without cause or atwill. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988). We modified the employment-at-will doctrine to provide that where an at-will employee (one employed for an indefinite term) relies on a personnel manual or employment agreement that expressly states that he or she cannot be discharged except for cause, the employee may not be arbitrarily discharged in violation of such a provision. Id. In Sterling, supra , we stated: [W]e have no hesitancy in concluding that Arkansas law would recognize at least four exceptions to the at-will doctrine, excluding implied contracts and estoppel. These are: (1) cases in which the employee is discharged for refusing to violate a criminal statute; (2) cases in which the employee is discharged for exercising a statutory right; (3) cases in which the employee is discharged for complying with a statutory duty; and (4) cases in which employees are discharged in violation of the general public policy of the state. Id. In Sterling, supra , we recognized the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when we stated: A[n] employer should not have an absolute and unfettered right to terminate an employee for an act done for the good of the public. Therefore, we hold that an at-will employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the state. This is a limited exception to the employment-atwill doctrine. It is not meant to protect merely private or proprietary interests. Id. (citations omitted). In finding a violation of public policy, we have stated that it is generally recognized that the public policy of a state is found in its constitution and statutes. Id. Appellant contends that two areas of public policy under the Arkansas Age Discrimination Act and the Fiscal Responsibility Act support her claims for wrongful discharge. As her first allegation for wrongful discharge, appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining that the Council is not a public employer under the Arkansas Age Discrimination Act. She argues that the Council is a public employer, and therefore, the Council should be subject to the public policy against age discrimination as set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 21-3-203, which prohibits a public employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of his or her age. The statute provides: (a) It shall be unlawful for a public employer: (1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual's age[.] Id. In making its ruling, the trial court relied upon Palmer v. Arkansas Council on Economic Education, 154 F.3d 892 (1998), where the Eighth Circuit held that the Council was a private employer within the definition of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) under 29 U.S.C. § 621-634. Palmer, supra . In answering the question, the court first addressed the issue whether the Council fit under the definition of employer under the act: (b) The term employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees.... The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a state...[.] Id. Because the Council did not have the requisite number of employees to qualify as an employer under the first part of the definition, the court then determined whether the Council qualified as an agency or instrumentality of the ADE or the State of Arkansas. Id. Citing federal case law, the court held that the Council was neither an agency nor an instrumentality of ADE or the State of Arkansas. Id. The Eighth Circuit stated: The facts of this case show that the ACEE is a private employer. The ACEE's employees do not share in the ADE's or state's employee pension funds, and they are not subject to a common civil service employment or grievance policy. While Palmer has shown that the ACEE's creation included the involvement of people closely tied to the ADE, she has not shown that either the State of Arkansas or the ADE ever controlled the terms of employment for the ACEE's employees. Although the ADE provides significant funding for the ACEE, the ADE does so with the expectation of receiving value from the ACEE. The fact that the ADE and State of Arkansas rely on the ACEE to provide services to Arkansas' citizens does not transform the ACEE into an agency of the ADE or State of Arkansas under the ADEA. Id. We are called upon to decide the same issue in this case. Under the Arkansas Age Discrimination Act, a threshold question is whether the Council qualifies as an agency of the State. Arkansas Code Annotated § 21-3-201 states: For the purposes of this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires, public employer shall mean any agency, department, board, commission, bureau, council, institution, or other entity of the state supported by appropriation of state or federal funds, or any county or municipality or other political subdivision of this state. Public employer specifically includes public universities, colleges, and public school districts. Id. Because the Eighth Circuit has already decided the issue whether the Council is an agency or instrumentality of the State, we first consider whether our review of the same issue in a dispute between the same parties is barred from appellate review under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of issues of law or fact previously litigated by the parties. Fairchild v. Norris, 317 Ark. 166, 876 S.W.2d 588 (1994). When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties. Id. The elements of collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated; (3) it must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; and (4) the determination must have been essential to the judgment. Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450, 844 S.W.2d 954 (1993). A federal court judgment may preclude relitigation of issues in state court. Scogin v. Tex-Ark Joist Co., 281 Ark. 175, 662 S.W.2d 819 (1984). We conclude that appellant is precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from rearguing the issue whether the Council is an agency of the State, and consequently a public employer. Fairchild v. Norris, 314 Ark. 221, 861 S.W.2d 111 (1993) (per curiam) (holding that appellant cannot reassert the issue on appeal and is precluded from doing so under the doctrine of collateral estoppel). It follows that because the Council is not a public employer, the argument that appellant is entitled to the protection of Ark.Code Ann. § 21-3-203 must fail. As her second allegation for wrongful discharge, appellant argues that she was wrongfully discharged from her employment with the Council as a matter of public policy because she voiced her concern over the Council's placing both state and private funds in the same bank account. Specifically, appellant argued that the commingling of the funds is prohibited by the public policy of fiscal responsibility. In support of her argument, appellant cites the Fiscal Responsibility Act and general state accounting laws found at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 19-1-601 to 19-1-612 (Repl.1998), Ark.Code Ann. §§ 19-4-101 to XX-X-XXXX (Repl.1998 and Supp.1999), Ark.Code Ann. §§ 21-5-101 to 21-5-107 (Repl.1996 and Supp.1999), and Ark.Code Ann. §§ 21-5-201 to 21-5-219 (Repl.1996 and Supp. 1999). We have stated that an at-will employee cannot be terminated if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the State under Counce, supra , but that such public policy must be outlined in our statutes. Appellant voiced her concern in a staff meeting over commingling state and private funds in the same bank account. She later testified: There was talk at a staff meeting of depositing the state and private funds into the same account at a staff meeting.... I tried to explain why we had never done thatbecause state grant money was subject to audit at any time.... [The Chairman] thought we should have one checkbook and put the monies together. I suggested to [him] to check with Senator Keet and Senator Russ because they would know where it was written and how it came about. I was terminated before I knew what happened. In order to support her argument, appellant must offer statutory authority to show that her dispute with the Chairman is based upon a violation of the public policy of Arkansas. Based upon our standard of review in evaluating an order granting summary judgment under Crockett, supra , we cannot say that appellant has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact by meeting proof with proof. Here, the argument fails because there are no state statutes, including those statutes cited by appellant, that prohibit an entity from combining state and private funds. Appellant conceded this point during her deposition. Because appellant has not demonstrated that she was wrongfully discharged because of her opposition to commingling state and private funds, we affirm on this point.