Opinion ID: 2293324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weber's Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal.

Text: Weber claims that the trial judge erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Under this heading, Weber advances three arguments: (1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence identifying him as the perpetrator of the crimes; (2) his right to confront witnesses was violated; and (3) the trial judge should have instructed the jury regarding the weight of the identification evidence.
Weber argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to enable a reasonable juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Weber committed the charged crimes. We review de novo a trial judge's denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal to determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of a crime. [42] Other than identity, Weber does not dispute the sufficiency of the State's evidence regarding the other elements of the charged crimes. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that Weber was the person seen in the surveillance video accosting Naspo. Although Naspo did not positively identify Weber as his assailant, Hawk independently identified Weber as the person shown on the surveillance video. Naspo was seventy four years old at the time of the incident, which occurred at approximately 10 p.m. Naspo's contact with Weber lasted only a few seconds. Hawk, however, testified that he had known Weber since 1985. Moreover, the jury watched the surveillance tape at trial, thus enabling the jurors to make their own determination. [43] On appeal, Weber argues that Hawk could not sufficiently identify Weber as the assailant because: (1) it [was] clearly the officer's opinion and under Delaware law, only experts can state their opinion; and (2) the identification was based on viewing a video and without the opportunity to view a person['s] height, weight, etc. which cannot be judged from a video. Although Hawk did not testify as an expert witness, a lay witness may also express opinions, if those opinions are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge [. . .]. [44] Weber appears to contend that Hawk's opinion does not satisfy the first requirement because Hawk did not base his testimony on his own perception but rather on his review of the surveillance videotape  a review the jury could have independently performed. This contention is without merit. Hawk identified Weber based on two factors: his review of the surveillance video and his familiarity with Weber's appearance. Not only had Hawk known Weber since 1985 but also he saw Weber on the day of the incident. The jurors did not know how Weber looked on the day of the incident. They only knew how Weber looked at the time of his arrest (from pictures taken at the police station) and how he looked during the trial (through direct observation). Hawk's opinion also satisfies the second requirement because it was helpful to a clear understanding of [his] testimony regarding why he decided to arrest Weber after having initially released him. Finally, Hawk's identification opinion satisfied the third requirement because it was not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, but merely on Hawk's review of the videotape and his personal knowledge about Weber's appearance. The jury also heard other evidence concerning identification. Naspo originally described his assailant as a white male, approximately 35 years old, 5'6, 5'7 in height, short brown hair, no facial hair, approximately 160 pounds . . . The person was wearing jean shorts and a blue t-shirt. Weber matched that description. [45] Alimenti testified that when he stopped Weber approximately 45 minutes after the attempted robbery, Weber was wearing blue jeans and a large blue shirt, t-shirt. Hawk testified that when he went to Weber's home to arrest him, the first clothing items that Hawk saw on the floor in Weber's bedroom were a pair of long jeans and an oversized blue t-shirt. Weber's proximity to the scene of the crime also supports the sufficiency of the State's identification evidence. Responding to a complaint about a person knocking on doors in the Dunlinden Acres development (located cattycorner across the street from the gas station) in search of a ride, Alimenti stopped Weber approximately 150 yards from the gas station in question. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Weber committed the crimes. Therefore, the trial judge did not err by denying Weber's motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Weber appears to contend that the trial judge violated his right to confront witnesses, guaranteed by both the federal and the Delaware Constitutions, by refusing to admit Weber's driver's license into evidence. Weber argues that, without that license, he could not effectively crossexamine Hawk. Weber's driver's license contained a restriction requiring Weber to wear glasses while driving, and the picture on that license showed Weber wearing glasses. The assailant shown in the surveillance tape was not wearing glasses. Hawk testified that, when he saw Weber in the Sleepy's parking lot and when he arrested him, Weber was not wearing glasses. Hawk also testified that he had never seen Weber wearing glasses and did not know of Weber's driving restriction. Alimenti also testified that Weber was not wearing glasses on the evening of the incident. We find no merit to Weber's argument. On two separate occasions, defense counsel crossexamined Hawk regarding Weber's driving restriction. Therefore, the trial judge did not deny Weber his right to confront witnesses by excluding Weber's driver's license.
Weber also contends that the Superior Court should have [given] a jury instruction on the essential issue of identification. Weber misrepresents the record because the trial judge gave the following standard jury instruction on identification: A matter that has been raised in this case is the identification of the defendant. You must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was, indeed, the one who did the act charged and that this act actually took place before you may find him guilty of any crime. If there is a reasonable doubt about his identification, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. Weber did not object to the form of this instruction, which represents a correct statement of the law. [46]