Opinion ID: 6353097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Because Mr. Gordon did not present a Rule 29 motion at the close of the government's case nor after his presentation of evidence, and he did not move for judgment of acquittal after the jury's verdict, we review his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for clear and gross injustice. See United States v. Hernández-Román, 981 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir. 2020). In this connection, [t]here can be no clear and gross injustice if the evidence, scrutinized in the light most congenial with the verdict, can support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Mr. Gordon's challenge centers on whether the evidence showed he willfully committed copyright violations. [W]hen used -11- in the criminal context, a 'willful' act is one undertaken with a 'bad purpose.' Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998) (footnote omitted). That is, in order to establish a 'willful' violation of a statute, 'the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.' Id. (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)). Guilty knowledge can be inferred based on the defendant's disregard of warning signs sufficient to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry notice. United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). This standard aligns with the jury instructions given at Mr. Gordon's trial, and Mr. Gordon does not challenge those instructions, only the sufficiency of the evidence as to willfulness. There is overwhelming evidence that Mr. Gordon could be found not merely to have deliberately closed his eyes to the illegality of his conduct. More fundamentally, the jury could easily have found that he acted with actual knowledge that his conduct was illegal. As a filmmaker, Mr. Gordon took care to mark his own work for copyright protection. In fact, he described to a colleague how to seek copyright protection, the reasons for doing so, and the risks for filmmakers in using copyrighted work belonging to others. In the course of selling copied DVDs — from which he stripped the FBI copyright warnings used in the originals -12- — he received complaints from copyright holders. Mr. Gordon persisted in his activities even while knowing he was under investigation by the Maine Attorney General and the federal government. With this record, a rational jury could readily conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gordon acted willfully. Mr. Gordon says that he considered the potential illegal nature of his actions and that he did his best to obey the law by following his understanding of the concepts of orphan works and of fair use. But those arguments wither in the light generated by the many warning signs demonstrating his knowledge that he was breaking the law. We are tasked with construing the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict. With that in mind, even if we could discern some plausibility to Mr. Gordon's arguments, there is more than sufficient evidence for the jury to have found a willful intent. Mr. Gordon testified at trial about why he believed his actions were legal. The jury understandably did not choose to credit his testimony. Moreover, the jury heard an abundance of evidence summarily recounted here that included a demonstration that Mr. Gordon continued to copy movies after receiving multiple warnings from copyright owners and being under state and federal investigation. It was well within the bounds of reason for the jury, having weighed Mr. Gordon's contentions against the record, to find his actions willful. -13-