Opinion ID: 2160914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special mobile equipment....

Text: Special mobile equipment means every vehicle not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and incidentally operated or moved over the highways, including farm tractors, road construction or maintenance machinery.... The foregoing enumeration shall be considered partial and shall not operate to exclude other vehicles which are within the general terms of this definition. [MCL 257.62; MSA 9.1862. Emphasis supplied.] We believe that the Legislature's special mobile equipment exemption from the Motor Vehicle Registration Act makes it unmistakable that a front-end loader is encompassed in the definition of a motor vehicle and thus supports this Court's broad construction of the owner's liability statute and the classification of all self-propelled vehicles not operated upon stationary rails or tracks as motor vehicles. See Frazier, supra . Consequently, we find that the owner's liability statute imposes liability for a broad set of risks, caused by motor vehicles of all types, whether used on public highways or other areas open to the public at large, and, accordingly, it is that purpose that must be considered in resolving this dispute. C Further, the defendants urge this Court to construe the is or may be language to impose a requirement that a motor vehicle be capable of lawful operation on a highway in order to be considered a vehicle for the purpose of the owner's liability statute. As a general rule, the word may will not be treated as a word of command unless there is something in the context or subject matter of the act to indicate that it was used in such a sense. Bloom v Texas State Bd of Examiners of Psychologists, 475 SW2d 374, 377 (Tex Civ App, 1972), rev'd on other grounds. [11] Accordingly, the term may be is equivalent to possibly, perhaps, by chance. State v Howland, 153 Kan 352, 360; 110 P2d 801 (1941). The defendants interpretation of is or may be runs afoul of fundamental principles of statutory construction. A statute must be construed without violating the plain wording of the act so as to accomplish the intent and purpose of the Legislature. The amici curiae, The Associated General of Contractors of America, et al, along with defendants, claim that a front-end loader is not a motor vehicle because it is incapable of lawful operation upon a highway. They point out that construction equipment is not designed to be driven over the highways and that such equipment lacks the safety requirements applicable to other motor vehicles. [12] Amici curiae also claim that the Court of Appeals decision has erroneously transformed construction equipment into motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicle Code. MCL 257.62; MSA 9.1862 and MCL 257.216(d); MSA 9.1916(d), were enacted in 1949. Since their enactment, construction equipment as well as other types of special mobile equipment enumerated in the statute have been considered to be motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicle Code. Therefore, amici curiae's assertion is simply incorrect because all such equipment is capable, under limited circumstances, of being lawfully operated on the public highways of this state. See Woods v Progressive Mutual Ins Co, supra at 337, n 3, [13] and Harder v Harder, 176 Mich App 589; 440 NW2d 53 (1989). The controversy in this case exists because the Court of Appeals panel in Calladine, supra, erroneously interpreted the language of this Court's decision in Frazier and failed to look at Ladner. The Calladine panel ruled that because the forklift could not be lawfully operated on a highway and was not being driven upon the highway at the time of the accident, the Legislature did not intend that the forklift fall within the purview of the owner's liability statute. Id. at 181. Later, in Jones v Cloverdale Equipment Co, supra , the Court of Appeals addressed the same issue again. The trial court granted summary disposition for the defendant, quoting the Calladine panel's interpretation of the is or may be language found in the definition of vehicle. The Jones panel determined that a forklift was incapable of lawful operation on a highway. Consequently, under Calladine, a forklift is not a vehicle and therefore not a motor vehicle for purposes of the owner's liability statute. Id. at 514. In view of general rules of statutory construction, the Calladine and Jones panels' rulings were impermissibly narrow, especially in light of Frazier and Ladner. Section 401 of the civil liability act has been in existence since 1949. It has been amended three times in the last forty-four years, and the Legislature has never seen fit to add language to that chapter that says, This provision applies only to accidents occurring on the highway, or This provision pertains only to vehicles capable of lawful operation on the highway. Conversely, if you look at § 601, which is the beginning section of the chapter on obedience to traffic laws, there the Legislature specifically stated, The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. MCL 257.601; MSA 9.2301. The defendant also argues that the no-fault act should be considered in pari materia with the Motor Vehicle Code definition of motor vehicle for confirmation and clarification. However, we find that no clarification is gained by attempting to consider the two acts in pari materia. [14] The definitions of MCL 257.33; MSA 9.1833 and MCL 257.79; MSA 9.1879 clearly include within their purview the vehicle involved in the accident that injured the plaintiff. Furthermore, there is nothing in either definition to suggest that vehicles that meet the definition must be capable of lawful operation on the highway. If the Legislature had intended to limit ownership liability to those devices that could lawfully be operated on a highway, it would have used such language to carry out its intent. Therefore, we find that a front-end loader is a motor vehicle. Comprehensive liability insurance is akin to all risk insurance. [15] All-risk insurance is a special type of insurance policy that, as a rule, covers every loss that may occur, except as a result of fraudulent acts of the insured. [16] Midwest Malls purchased a comprehensive liability insurance policy to cover risks. The risk of injury from the negligent operation of the front-end loader is a risk that should have been covered under that policy.