Opinion ID: 1763781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: hunt's telephone bill was properly excluded.

Text: During the months preceding the murder, Hunt had a cellular telephone through Cingular. Hunt's daughter, Kay Miller, received the bill electronically on her computer and made the monthly payment. Hunt sought to introduce the bill for the November 2004 time period through Miller's trial testimony in order to show that Hunt and Bettina talked frequently by phone, sometimes at great length, to demonstrate that the couple, by inference, had a congenial relationship. The Commonwealth objected upon the grounds of failure to establish a proper foundation, and the trial court sustained the objection. Hunt alleges the trial court's ruling was error because it deprived him of his right to present a defense. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. KRE 901(a). For purposes of authentication, the condition of fact which must be fulfilled by every offer of real proof is whether the evidence is what its proponent claims. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky.2004). Part of the identification of evidence is a demonstration of its integritythat it is in fact what its proponent claims it to be. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Ky.1999). Hunt attempted to introduce the telephone billing records for the truth of the matter contained therein; and, thus, the records must clear the hurdle for the admission of hearsay evidence. KRE 803(6) addresses the admissibility of business records under the hearsay rules. The rule states, as relevant here, as follows: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rules, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . . (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A . . . record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, [or] conditions, . . . made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. . . . Similarly, Professor Robert G. Lawson discusses the issue as follows: Business records are writings. Writings must be authenticated, i.e., accompanied by preliminary evidence sufficient to support a finding that they are what their proponents claim. This preliminary proof is commonly referred to as `foundation.' KRE 803(6) requires `testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness' concerning the prerequisites for admitting business records. . . . [I]t is `essential' testimony without which business records `must be excluded.' It is also well-settled that the foundation witness need not be the custodian of the records nor the person who made them. Anyone who can testify from personal knowledge about the circumstances surrounding the making and keeping of the records can qualify as a foundation witness. As stated by one authority, `in the end the requirement may be satisfied by the testimony of anyone who is familiar with the manner in which the record was prepared, and even if he did not himself either prepare the record or even observe its preparation.' THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 8.65 at 463 (3d ed. 1993). Here, Hunt did not introduce the bill through the testimony of the custodian of Cingular's telephone bill, nor was Miller an other qualified witness. Miller had no personal knowledge of how Cingular prepared the bill, its billing procedures, or any other competent knowledge which would allow her to testify to the verity of the content of the bill. While she was generally aware that Hunt and Bettina talked frequently on the phone, she had no knowledge of specific calls or the length thereof. Nor were the self-authentication provisions of KRE 902(11) followed. Because the bill was not properly authenticated, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it. [9]