Opinion ID: 2331603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jury instruction regarding prior drug use

Text: Next, Adams argues that the trial court gave an improper jury instruction regarding testimony about prior drug use. This contention has no merit. The instruction with which Adams takes issue is the third part of Instruction 13, which was patterned on PIK Crim.3d 67.13-D. The relevant portions of the instruction provided the following: When a Defendant is in nonexclusive possession of the premises upon which a controlled substance is found, it cannot be inferred that the Defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance unless there are other circumstances linking the Defendant to the controlled substance. Factors you may consider in determining whether the Defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance include: 1. Defendant's use of controlled substances.... Because Adams did not object to this jury instruction, the standard of review is whether the instruction is clearly erroneous. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3). Jury instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the error not occurred. State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 196, 262 P.3d 314 (2011). The first question under this standard is whether the trial court erred by giving the instruction. See Tully, 293 Kan. at 196, 262 P.3d 314. In asserting there was error, Adams cites State v. Boggs, 287 Kan. 298, 317-18, 197 P.3d 441 (2008). In Boggs, the defendant was arrested after a marijuana pipe was found under the passenger seat of the car in which he was riding. Boggs argued the pipe was not his and he was not aware it was in the car. In an attempt to link Boggs to the pipe, the State introduced evidence that Boggs had used drugs a month before his arrest. The Boggs court considered K.S.A. 60-455 to determine if the evidence of prior drug use was admissible. The version of the statute in effect at the time provided: Subject to K.S.A. 60-447 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but, subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448 such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. K.S.A. 60-455. Applying 60-455, the Boggs court concluded that because the only issue was whether the driver or the passenger possessed the pipe, intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake were not disputed issues and, therefore, the introduction of Boggs' prior convictions did not fall within the exceptions of K.S.A. 60-455. Boggs, 287 Kan. at 308-09, 197 P.3d 441. The Boggs court explained that [i]f a person asserts that he or she does not know that there are drugs in a residence ..., prior use of drugs neither proves nor disproves the validity of that assertion. Boggs, 287 Kan. at 317, 197 P.3d 441. Specifically, the Boggs court held: While a defendant's use of a controlled substance may be admittedsubject to the requirements of K.S.A. 60-455when such evidence is relevant to prove a disputed material fact, the defendant's use of a controlled substance is not a factor that is automatically admissible as an exception to the specific mandates of K.S.A. 60-455. To the extent that PIK Crim.3d 67.13-D suggests otherwise, the instruction is disapproved. (Emphasis added.) Boggs, 287 Kan. at 318, 197 P.3d 441. This limitation on the use of the prior crimes evidence arose in the context of showing that Boggs had used drugs a month prior to his arrest. Similarly, in the recent decision of State v. Preston, ___ Kan. ___, 272 P.3d 1275 (2012), where we applied Boggs, we held evidence of a prior drug conviction was inadmissible to prove constructive possession. In contrast, the evidence of Adams' drug use was use at the time he was committing the crimes for which he was charged. Both the version of K.S.A. 60-455 at issue in Boggs and the current version found at K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-455, apply to evidence the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion. (Emphasis added.) Hence, by its plain language, K.S.A. 60-455 does not apply to a circumstance involving the same occurrence. Further, admission of evidence of drug use is not contrary to the purpose of K.S.A. 60-455the evidence is not admitted as propensity evidence but as circumstantial evidence showing a defendant had possession and control over the drugs. Consequently, many courts allow the admission of evidence establishing that a defendant had just used drugs or was under the influence of drugs at the time of an arrest because that evidence links the defendant with any drugs that are found in an area. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 948, § 8[a], pp. 962-65, and p. 103 (2011 Supp.). We conclude it is not error to use PIK Crim.3d 67.13-D to inform a jury that a defendant's use of drugs is a factor the jury may consider in determining whether the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance when the evidence at trial is limited to the defendant's use of controlled substances on the same occasion as the one when the drugs were allegedly possessed by the defendant. In light of that conclusion, we need not consider whether the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction not been given.