Opinion ID: 1188723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the juror's affidavit

Text: After the jury had returned its verdict in this case, defendant moved for a new trial. So far as pertinent to this appeal, that motion questioned whether the jury had improperly arrived at its verdict. Defendant submitted the affidavit of Judy Couey, a juror at the trial, which stated, inter alia, that the other jurors told her the jury must reach a unanimous decision, that in her opinion defendant was not guilty, and that she concurred in the verdict reached by the majority only because she believed that her only alternative was to convince all the other jurors that she was right. The state submitted opposing affidavits of two other jurors. Defendant assigns error to the trial court's refusal to admit the Couey affidavit and to his denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined, except as provided in Rule 59, U.R.C.P. [Emphasis added.] Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: (a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 [governing harmless error], a new trial may be granted ... for any of the following causes; ...       (2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. [Emphasis added.] Since the affidavit under consideration here did not allege that the verdict had been determined by chance or as a result of bribery, the trial court properly refused to receive the affidavit into evidence. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 41; U.R.C.P., Rule 59(a)(2); Johnson v. Simons, Utah, 551 P.2d 515 (1976); Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33, 439 P.2d 850 (1968); Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 240, 408 P.2d 709 (1965); Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952). [11] The former § 77-38-3, now superceded by the current § 77-35-24 but in force at the time of this trial, states other circumstances where a trial court can grant a new trial in a criminal case: When a verdict or decision has been rendered against the defendant the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial in the following cases only:       (4) When the verdict has been determined by lot or by any means other than a fair expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors. [Emphasis added.] The Couey affidavit states that I did not feel that I could freely and fairly discuss with my fellow jurors the evidence and the deductions to be drawn therefrom. No court can ensure that, in the give and take of lively jury deliberations, every juror's opinion will be politely heard. We cannot referee the deliberative process. An affidavit alleging verdict by chance, bribery, or the like would present a different case, but the affidavit under consideration here contains no suggestion that the verdict was arrived at by a means other than the fair expression of opinion on the part of all the jurors. Nor would Couey's allegation that she misunderstood the rule of law pertinent to unanimity, even if proved, compel the court to grant a new trial where, as here, the jury had been properly instructed on that point. Johnson v. Simons, supra ; Ostertag v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959). In Johnson v. Simons, 551 P.2d at 516, this Court refused to grant a new trial despite the submission of affidavits from jurors who sat on the case which would indicate that the jury were confused as to the applicable law as enunciated by the court in its instructions, or that they disregarded the law in arriving at a verdict. The rule that the court will ordinarily not entertain juror affidavits attempting to undermine the integrity of a verdict is of long standing and supported by the clear weight of authority. See ABA, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury 166-167 (Approved Draft, 1968); Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, §§ 2348, 2349 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah stated in People v. Flynn, 7 Utah 378, 384, 26 P. 1114, 1116 (1891): It is well settled that affidavits of jurors will not be received to impeach or question their verdict, nor to show the grounds upon which it was rendered, nor to show their misunderstanding of fact or law, nor that they misunderstood the charge of the court, or the effect of their verdict, nor their opinions, surmises, and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict. More recently, this Court has stated, Such post mortems would be productive of no end of mischief and render service as a juror unbearable. Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah at 428, 250 P.2d 932. To overturn a jury verdict on the kinds of subjective grounds suggested by the juror's affidavit here would be to open the jury room to the importunities and appliances of parties and their attorneys, and, of course, thereby to unsettle verdicts and destroy their sanctity and conclusiveness. Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 211 (1866). The judgment of the district court is affirmed as to the convictions for aggravated sexual assault and kidnaping. The conviction for forcible sodomy is reversed and remanded for a new trial. So ordered. HALL, C.J., and STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur. MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments, but died before the opinion was filed.