Opinion ID: 1996136
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Heading: Introduction to Inventory Searches

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that searches of private property be reasonable. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Montague v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181. This generally means the search must be authorized by a properly issued warrant. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979); Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271. It is a cardinal principle in search and seizure jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment  subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)); Montague, 266 Ind. at 55, 360 N.E.2d at 185. When the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence that was seized during a warrantless search, it bears the burden of showing both the need for an exemption from the warrant requirement and that its conduct fell within the bounds of the exception. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2412-13; Robles v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 660. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), the Supreme Court defined what has become known as the inventory exception when it held that the police may conduct a warrantless search of a lawfully impounded automobile if the search is designed to produce an inventory of the vehicle's contents. See also Dixon v. State (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 1318. Because the police are performing an administrative or caretaking function rather than a criminal investigatory function when they impound an automobile, the Court declared that the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are inapplicable. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. at 3097 n. 5. Thus, the justification for an inventory search does not rest on probable cause and ... the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2608, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983); Rabadi, 541 N.E.2d at 274 (Probable cause is not an issue in such inventory searches because of the non-criminal context in which they occur.). The inventory search is now considered a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643, 103 S.Ct. at 2608; Foulks v. State (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 374, 376. As in all Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the test of constitutionality in inventory cases is reasonableness. The First Circuit has observed that reasonableness has a protean quality which renders it more a concept than a constant, United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 774 (1992), such that it cannot be usefully refined in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In determining the reasonableness of an inventory search, courts must examine all the facts and circumstances of a case. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. This examination typically encompasses two overlapping sets of circumstances. First, the propriety of the impoundment must be established because the need for the inventory arises from the impoundment. Second, the scope of the inventory must be evaluated. Where either is clearly unreasonable, the search will not be upheld. In borderline cases, however, the ultimate character of the search is often most clearly revealed when both the necessitousness of the impoundment and the scrupulousness of the inventorying are viewed together.