Opinion ID: 1842972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: legal and litigation expenses

Text: The chancellor awarded Dr. Luckett $46,693.56 in damages for the expense he had gone to in defending the actions of Mrs. Luckett in the Florida state court. On this issue, there was competent proof which was not contradicted that Dr. Luckett had paid large sums of money to his attorneys for the litigation in Florida. There was proof of damages, but again there is the question of foreseeability. Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co . We do not have to decide the nebulous question of whether or not these expenses were reasonably foreseeable by Merrill Lynch, however, because Dr. Luckett failed to prove that Merrill Lynch's conduct did in fact cause or was a contributing factor in causing Mrs. Luckett to move to Florida and file suit against him. The following facts are established from the record: 1. Mrs. Luckett made out a check payable to her mother, Mrs. Patricia Cook, in the amount of $13,571, which somebody cashed. 2. Mrs. Luckett in this time period went to Florida with her two children. 3. Mrs. Luckett filed one or more lawsuits in Florida against her husband, which were later dismissed. 4. Dr. Luckett spent $46,693.56 in lawyers' fees in this litigation with Mrs. Luckett. Neither Mrs. Cook nor Mrs. Luckett testified in this case. [3] While it may very well be true that Mrs. Cook cashed the check, gave the money to her daughter, Mrs. Luckett, and the daughter used it to travel to Florida and filed suits against Dr. Luckett, there is no proof but that Mrs. Luckett would have done precisely the same thing if the funds had remained on deposit with Merrill Lynch. Dr. Luckett was required to prove with some reasonable certainty that Merrill Lynch's release of the funds did in fact cause this harm to Dr. Luckett. Not only must we resort to sure speculation as to whether nor not Mrs. Luckett's plans were affected by her mother's cashing of the check, we do not even know that Mrs. Cook did in fact deliver the money to her daughter. As a general rule, damages which are uncertain, contingent or speculative are not recoverable. Ordinarily, no recovery can be had where resort must be had to speculation or conjecture for the purpose of determining whether or not the damages resulted from the act of which complaint is made, or some other cause. Hudson v. Farrish Gravel Company, Inc., 279 So.2d 630, 636 (Miss. 1973). 25 C.J.S. Damages, § 27, p. 684 states the general rule as to the proof required in proving that the defendant's conduct in fact caused the damage: Uncertainty as to cause. Where it is not shown with reasonable certainty that the harm or loss resulted from the act complained of, there can be no recovery of compensatory damages therefor. [4] Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 912 comment (a) (1979), states: When one seeks to recover damages for a particular harm that he claims has resulted to his person or to a tangible thing belonging to him, he has the burden of proving that the other has invaded a legally protected interest of his, that he has suffered the harm and that the act of the other was a legal cause of the harm. Thus when a person has been wounded by another and subsequently blood poisoning develops in any portion of his body, he has the burden of showing that it is more probable than not that the initial wrongful contact was a substantial factor in producing the malady. So when one has been libeled and seeks to prove as a basis for special damages the loss of a particular marriage, he has the burden of establishing that the publication of the libel was a substantial factor in preventing the marriage. In all of these cases the recovery of damages for a particular harm is dependent upon proof that the harm occurred as the result of the tortious conduct, and normally the plaintiff can recover damages for the harm only by proving this with the same degree of certainty as that required in proving the existence of the cause of action. (Emphasis added) Sedgwick on Damages § 170 (1912) on proving damages with reasonable certainty: He is to show, with that reasonable certainty required by law, the nature and extent of the loss for which he is entitled to compensation; and no recovery can be had for any damage which is not satisfactorily proved by the evidence. ... . On this ground no recovery can be had upon a loss which is insufficiently proved to have been actually suffered. So in an action where it appeared that defendant destroyed a hose connected with a fire engine by means of which an attempt was being made to put out a fire on plaintiff's premises, plaintiff claimed to recover the value of his property burned, on the ground that if the hose had not been destroyed the fire would have been extinguished; but this was held too conjectural. So where a performance of the duty would have given the plaintiff an opportunity to make a contract, or special use of property, without any certainty that he would have chosen to do so, no loss is sufficiently proved. And wherever the fact of loss depends upon whether defendant would have chosen or will in future choose to act in a certain way, it is not sufficiently proved. A fortiori if the occurrence of the loss depends upon a future exercise of choice by a third party, it is not usually provable with sufficient certainty... . (footnotes omitted) Also, Crommelin v. Montgomery Independent Telecasters, Inc., 280 Ala. 391, 194 So.2d 548, 551 (1967) (refusal of television station to permit plaintiff to make broadcast he had paid for did not entitle him to damages for loss of race). A political campaign is inherently an adventure. Resort to pure speculation would have to be indulged to conclude that the breach of contract complained of caused the plaintiff's loss of the political races. Id., 194 So.2d at 551. The chancellor erred in awarding Dr. Luckett damages for litigation expenses.