Opinion ID: 1680396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: seizure without probable cause

Text: ¶ 42. Hampton claims she was deprived of her right to be secure in her person against unreasonable seizures without probable cause when the circuit court prosecuted, convicted, fined and sentenced her to jail without probable cause. Additionally, Hampton contends the circuit court failed to issue an order demanding her to appear at the August 27 hearing. ¶ 43. As the State correctly points out, Hampton was never arrested nor searched, thus Hampton's contentions of an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment are without merit. Furthermore, Hampton failed to present this claim in the circuit court; therefore, it is procedurally barred and deemed waived. Read, 430 So.2d at 838. Nevertheless, we will address the merits of this issue. ¶ 44. The circuit court issued two separate orders pertinent to the issue at hand. First, an order was issued on August 9, 2004, to set a time and place for hearing all motions. In this order the circuit judge designated three possible dates for the hearing, one of those three dates was August 27, 2004. ¶ 45. Next, the circuit judge entered a subsequent order on August 13, 2004, which expressly confirmed that the hearing to dispose of all motions and to dispose of all other relevant matters was set for August 27, 2004. Further, to clear up any confusion, the circuit judge sent a letter to both attorneys on August 23, 2004. This letter requested the presence of both attorneys on the morning of August 27. ¶ 46. Although the orders did not contain the distinct language Hampton is commanded to appear the fact remains that attorneys for both parties must attend a hearing ordered by a court. This Court adopts the State's view that an order setting a time, date, and place for a hearing in a cause is of itself notice to the attorneys to appear. An attorney may not pick and choose which court orders to obey. In the case at bar, Hampton's counsel opposite was present and accounted for on the morning of August 27. However, Hampton could not be located. Moreover, Hampton did not present a reasonable explanation for her absence. Thus, Hampton should have attended the August 27 hearing in accordance with the circuit court's orders. ¶ 47. Hampton also seeks relief under the doctrine of clean hands. However, [t]he clean hands doctrine prevents a complaining party from obtaining equitable relief in court when he is guilty of willful misconduct in the transaction at issue. Bailey v. Bailey, 724 So.2d 335, 337 (Miss.1998) (citing Calcote v. Calcote, 583 So.2d 197, 199-200 (Miss.1991)). Because Hampton's absence was an act of wilful misconduct, the clean hands doctrine does not apply. Thus, this issue is without merit.