Opinion ID: 1968428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maximum Period of Incarceration

Text: [¶ 9] After noting the seriousness of defendant's conduct at his second sentencing, the court considered defendant's background. No new materials had been submitted by the parties, but the court stated that it had reviewed the transcript of the original sentencing hearing and the materials submitted at that time. At the first sentencing hearing, the court had been presented with evidence of defendant's extensive criminal history, including a substantial motor vehicle offense record, in both Maine and Massachusetts. Notably, defendant was convicted for criminal threatening in Maine in 1991 and received a 364 day suspended sentence and one year of probation. It was during this probationary period that defendant committed the manslaughter at issue here. Also while on probation for his criminal threatening conviction, defendant was charged with terrorizing, convicted of operating after suspension, and, during the month before the instant offense, was fined for raising the front wheel of his motorcycle off the roadway and warned for speeding. [¶ 10] According to the presentence report, after learning of his manslaughter indictment in the present case, defendant reportedly stopped contacting his probation officer, stopped attending Violence No More as required by his probation order, and was no longer able to be reached at his Springvale residence. Defendant's probation officer reported that defendant was arrested as a probation violator on December 3, 1992 and that his probation was revoked on December 9, 1992 for failure to comply with his probation conditions. In addition to the presentence report, the court also considered the affidavit of Susan Seaman, a jail security officer. According to this affidavit, while defendant was incarcerated in the York County Jail pursuant to his December 1992 probation revocation, Seaman overheard him state to other inmates: They want to ruin my life because I killed some eighty-year-old bag who already lived her life. [¶ 11] Defendant also submitted materials to the court at the first sentencing hearing. The court considered a sentencing memorandum prepared by the defense stressing that the accident at issue was not alcohol-related, that defendant is a young man, and that he has a steady work history and no alcohol or other substance abuse problems. The memorandum states that defendant has no recollection of having made the comment reported by Seaman and attributes any comment he might have made to anger and jailhouse bravado. Supporting the latter contention is the affidavit of Robert Page, a licensed clinical social worker counseling defendant, who stated that defendant had been treated for posttraumatic stress syndrome and that this could explain the angry comment. The memorandum and Page's affidavit state that defendant feels remorse for what happened and that he has accepted responsibility for his actions. The court also heard from defendant and defendant's mother. [¶ 12] In analyzing the aggravating circumstances present in defendant's case during his second sentencing hearing, the court considered defendant's background, his long history of operating vehicles in excess of the speed limit, in a callous attitude towards operation of vehicles and other people. As at his first sentencing, the court found no mitigating circumstances. Given the seriousness of defendant's conduct, the fact that the offense was committed while he was on bail, and what appear[ed] to the Court to be a lack of remorse, the Court deem[ed] . . . an appropriate sentence to be eight years at the Department of Corrections. [¶ 13] During the second step in sentencing, the court is to determine the maximum period of imprisonment by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to that case. These sentencing factors include, but are not limited to, the character of the offender and the offender's criminal history, the effect of the offense on the victim and the protection of the public interest. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C (Supp.1996). We have stated that factors properly considered as mitigating include a lack of prior criminal conduct, true remorse, and factors indicating a favorable prospect of rehabilitation or a lesser likelihood of reoffense. State v. Roberts, 641 A.2d 177 (Me.1994). Aggravating factors to consider include a prior criminal record, lack of remorse, and other circumstances indicating a high probability of reoffense. Id. The sentencing court's determination of a maximum period of incarceration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Corrieri, 654 A.2d 419, 423 (Me.1995). [5] [¶ 14] Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by considering the Seaman affidavit when determining that defendant did not feel remorse for his actions and by giving no weight to defendant's expressions of remorse and his young age as mitigating factors. The court was entitled to disregard defendant's expressions of remorse given his past history and the evidence before the court regarding his statement while in prison. Furthermore, the court's consideration of the Seaman affidavit was not in error. The court has broad discretion to determine what information it will consider in sentencing. State v. Wilson, 669 A.2d 766, 769 (Me.1996). Due process only limits this discretion by requiring that the information be factually reliable. The State offered the statement made by defendant, a party-opponent, by sworn affidavit. The court did not err in considering the affidavit and did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in setting defendant's maximum period of incarceration at eight years.