Opinion ID: 2258481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: magliocco's appeal: pic conviction

Text: Magliocco's challenge to his PIC conviction is based upon the interplay of successive amendments to the PIC statute. A person is guilty of PIC if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally. 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). [1] Prior to 1995, the definitions subsection of the PIC statute (which was found in then-subsection (c)) defined an instrument of crime as: (1) anything specially made or specially adapted for criminal use; or (2) anything commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have. In 1995, this Court considered the issue of whether a baseball bat, not specially made or adapted for criminal use, could be deemed commonly used for criminal purposes such that it could qualify as an instrument of crime under the second cited definition. See Commonwealth v. Ngow, 539 Pa. 294, 652 A.2d 305 (1995). The Ngow Court held that the Commonwealth must present evidence of the proportionality of the criminal use of baseball bats in order to prove common use, rather than, for example, relying upon anecdotal evidence or newspaper articles detailing attacks with baseball bats. Because the record in Ngow lacked such empirical evidence, this Court vacated Ngow's PIC conviction. In a concurring opinion, this author noted that the General Assembly was free to address the apparent inequity uncovered in Ngowi.e., that attacks with a baseball bat, as opposed to attacks with a firearm or other deadly instrument, are not necessarily subject to separate punishment by amending subsection 907(c) to eliminate the word commonly from the second definition of an instrument of crime. Id. at 307 (Castille, J., concurring). Six months later, in July of 1995, and in apparent response to the Ngow decision, the General Assembly amended the PIC statute to delete the word commonly from subsection 907(c)'s second definition of an instrument of crime. See Act of July 6, 1995, P.L. 238, No. 27, § 1 (effective 60 days after date of enactment) (Act 27). Act 27 specifically identified itself as amendatory, i.e., Amending Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, further providing for the offense of possessing instruments of crime. . . . Session Laws of Pennsylvania, Session of 1995, p. 238. Act 27 was printed in accordance with 1 Pa.C.S. § 1104 (governing Adoption and Publication of Constitutional and Statutory Provisions) (Section 1104), which provides that when such amendatory statutes are printed, provisions which have been stricken or eliminated by the amendment are to be placed in brackets, while new words, phrases or provisions inserted into the statute by the amendment are to be printed in italics or with underscoring. [2] Thus, the single change to the PIC statute was indicated in the printing of Act 27 by placing the word commonly in brackets (and boldface). Section 1951 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. (the Act), entitled [i]nterpretation of amendatory statutes, corroborates how such an amendment is to be read: In ascertaining the correct reading, status and interpretation of an amendatory statute, the matter inserted within brackets shall be omitted, and the matter in italics or underscored shall be read and interpreted as part of the statute. Id. § 1951. A year later, in July of 1996, the General Assembly revisited and again amended the PIC statute. See Act of July 11, 1996, P.L. 552, No. 98, § 1 (effective 60 days after date of enactment) (Act 98). Act 98, like Act 27, specifically identified itself as amendatory, i.e., in pertinent part, Amending Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, further providing for the offense of possessing instruments of crime.... Session Laws of Pennsylvania, Session of 1996, p. 552. Act 98 added a totally new subsection 907(c), criminalizing the possession of body armor in the course of committing, or attempting to commit, a felony. Act 98 also redesignated the definitional section (former subsection(c)) as subsection (d); added a definition of body armor; and raised the first letter of the word anything in the definitional section from lower to upper case. Consistently with Section 1104 and the Act, each of the additions/alterations in the printed 1996 amendment was indicated by italics (as well as by boldface), while the deletions were bracketed. The Act 98 amendment, however, appears to have referred to the version of Section 907 which pre-dated the 1995 amendment: i.e., it included the later-stricken word commonly in the second definition of an instrument of crime, but did so in plain typeface, without any editing marks (brackets or italics) indicating either the 1995 deletion or an intent in 1996 to readopt the commonly used requirement. Nor was the word typed in boldface, as is generally indicated to make it easier to locate changes to the statute. The unacknowledged reappearance of the word commonly in the 1996 amendment, an amendment which served primarily to criminalize the possession of body armor, has generated the instant controversy. Magliocco concedes that the PIC statute was amended by Act 27 of 1995 to eliminate the commonly used requirement from the second definition of an instrument of crime, but he contends that the definitional qualifier must be deemed to have been restored as part of the body armor amendment added by Act 98 of 1996. Magliocco argues that a person who consulted the official source material for legislation ( i.e., the Session Laws printed by the Legislative Reference Bureau) would be led to believe that the word commonly was reinserted as part of the second definition of an instrument of crime. Because the Commonwealth did not offer empirical proof of the commonality of the criminal use of baseball bats at trial, as required by the Ngow Court's interpretation of the former commonly used definition, Magliocco argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his PIC conviction. Magliocco argues in the alternative that, even if the re-appearance of the word commonly in the 1996 PIC amendment was in error, that qualifier still must be deemed an element of the crime under the second definition because, otherwise, the statute would violate due process by failing to provide fair notice of the conduct deemed criminal. In Magliocco's view, the PIC statute must be construed to avoid such a notice violation, and therefore, common use must again be deemed an element of PIC under the second definition. Magliocco further argues that, although most of the decided cases addressing fair warning arise from vague or overbroad statutes, the same principle is implicated when a statute is narrow and precise, but when a court interprets the statute to mean something different from what is suggested by a literal reading of its terms. The Commonwealth responds that, while the word commonly does appear in the text of the Act 98 amendment of the PIC statute as printed by the Legislative Reference Service in the 1996 Session Laws, the word was neither italicized nor underscored, and thus, under Section 1951 of the Statutory Construction Act, it cannot be deemed a substantive part of Section 907 of the Crimes Code. The Commonwealth notes that both the Act 27 amendment and the Act 98 amendment occurred during a relatively short period of time, and thus, it is unremarkable that the 1996 amendment worked off the earlier unamended version of Section 907 containing a word which was stricken by the 1995 PIC amendment. In support of its argument concerning the proper reading of Section 907 as amended, the Commonwealth also invokes Section 1954 of the Act, entitled merger of subsequent amendments, which specifically contemplates and governs circumstances involving multiple amendments to a statute: Whenever a statute has been more than once amended, the latest amendment shall be read into the original statute as previously amended and not into such statute as originally enacted. This rule applies whether or not the previous amendment is referred to and whether or not its language is incorporated in the latest amendment. If the insertions in and the deletions from the statute made by the previous amendment are not incorporated in the latter, they shall nevertheless be read into the later amendment as though they had in fact been incorporated therein. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1954. The Commonwealth submits that Sections 1951 and 1954 of the Act exist for the very purpose of avoiding interpretive disputes such as the one that Magliocco pursues here, where two separate amendments follow closely upon one another. The Commonwealth further argues that one need only properly read the 1996 amendment pursuant to the specific and unambiguous principles of construction set forth in the Act to realize that the word commonly was not reinserted into the second definition of an instrument of crime in the PIC statute. With respect to Magliocco's due process argument, the Commonwealth argues that any person reading an act of amendment, which the 1996 Act clearly was, must be presumed to be capable of reading it properly. The Commonwealth notes that Magliocco relies on Volume 1 of the 1996 edition of the Session Laws of Pennsylvania as proof that the word commonly was legislatively readopted as part of the second definition of an instrument of crime, but fails to acknowledge that, in the very same volume, Section 1951 of the Act is quoted, thereby specifically reminding readers of the proper manner by which to construe amendatory statutes. Furthermore, the Commonwealth notes that the preface of every edition of the Pennsylvania Session Laws as well as Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service (a commonly-used secondary source for legislation) clearly explains that only properly highlighted terms in the collected Acts actually alter existing legislation. Consultation of the original statute and prior amendments, thus, is contemplated and that consultation clearly reveals the current content of a statute. The trial court held that Section 1954 controlled. The court recognized that the 1996 amendment, which criminalized the possession of body armor, worked off of a version of the PIC statute that did not include the 1995 deletion of the word commonly. In such an instance, the trial court reasoned, Section 1954's directive that the previous deletion be read into the later amendment as though [it] had in fact been incorporated therein answered the interpretive question. Slip op. at 6. The Superior Court panel majority affirmed. The panel majority recognized that Section 1104(a), and Section 1951 of the Statutory Construction Act, [3] prescribe a mandatory process for printing new language or deleting existing language from a statute, and provide instructions on how to give effect to such an amendment. The panel held that the Act did not empower it to accept as controlling any portion of an amendatory statute that was not printed in the designated manner. Because the word commonly, which was deleted in 1995, did not appear italicized or underscored in the 1996 amendment, the panel concluded that it could not accept Magliocco's contention that the 1996 amendment restored the common use requirement to the second definition. The panel majority also relied upon Section 1954, which it understood to be a legislative recognition that errors in printing could frustrate accurate expressions of legislative acts and the legislative will. Indeed, the panel majority recognized that if the General Assembly did not intend Section 1954 to apply in a case such as this, then this provision of the Act would serve no purpose. The panel found that the reading plainly mandated by Section 1954 required it to recognize the 1995 deletion of the word commonly as having been incorporated into the 1996 amendment. Thus, the panel held that the 1996 amendment did not reintroduce a common use element into the second definition of an instrument of crime; rather, the appearance of the word commonly in the 1996 amendment was a legal nullity. Accordingly, the panel majority found that Magliocco's conviction for PIC was proper. 806 A.2d at 1284-85. President Judge Emeritus McEwen filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, his disagreement being confined to the PIC conviction. P.J.E. McEwen conceded that what he deemed to be the panel majority's corrective construction might be effective in the context of a civil statute but, in his view, it could not withstand constitutional scrutiny in the criminal context because legislative enactments must give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed. Because the 1996 amendment effected by Act 98, as printed, included the word commonly which had specifically been deleted by the General Assembly in the 1995 amendment, but without any new editorial notation indicating addition or deletion, Section 907 is properly subject to rules of statutory construction. E.g. Walker v. Eleby, 577 Pa. 104, 842 A.2d 389, 400 (2004) (statutory construction is appropriate where language of statute is ambiguous concerning point in dispute); 1 Pa. C.S.1921(c). Here, the issue of legislative intentwhich is not answerable by simply reading Section 907 as printed in the 1996 amendmentis whether the General Assembly intended to reintroduce the commonly used requirement into the second definition of an instrument of crime. As the lower courts both properly recognized, that question of legislative intent is specifically answered by those provisions of the Statutory Construction Act which address the proper construction of amendatory statutes. Those provisions, in conjunction with Section 1104, make clear that a commonly used requirement was not legislatively reintroduced. Under Section 1951 of the Act, because the word commonly does not appear italicized or underscored in the 1996 amendment, Section 907 cannot be read and interpreted as though the General Assembly intended to readopt a commonly used requirement. Moreover, Section 1954 of the Act specifically addresses the circumstance of successive amendments to a statute, and its provisions are clear, unambiguous, on point, and dispositive of the issue as a statutory construction matter. Section 907(d) is to be read by including both the 1995 deletion of the word commonly in the second definition and the 1996 additions of the provisions respecting body armor. That reading is legislatively commanded irrespective of whether or not the previous amendment is referred to and whether or not its language is incorporated in the latest amendmentthe precise circumstance which is presented in the case sub judice. The statutory change effected by the 1995 amendment (a single deletion) is to be deemed as though [it] had in fact been incorporated therein into the 1996 amendment. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1954. Thus, as a matter of statutory construction, ascertaining legislative intent respecting the content of Section 907 is discernable. Section 1954 reflects the General Assembly's recognition, based no doubt on hard-earned experience, that inadvertent or careless errors in the drafting or publication of legislative acts may frustrate the accurate communication of legislative action and will. Not to give effect to the clear statutory interpretive directive in those circumstances for which it was intended would defeat the legislative will. Read consistently with the directive in Section 1954, Section 907(d) plainly does not contain a commonly used requirement in its second definition of the term, instrument of crime. [4] We next turn to Magliocco's alternative argument that a construction of the second definition of an instrument of crime as not including a commonly used requirement violates due process because it would operate to deprive him of fair notice of the conduct Section 907 made criminal. [5] The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that due process requires a criminal statute to give fair warning of the conduct it criminalizes. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 1698, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). A lack of fair warning can result from vague statutory language or, less commonly, from an unforeseeable judicial interpretation of statutory language that appeared to be facially narrow and precise. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1701-02, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964); accord Rogers, supra . In the latter situation, due process prohibits the retroactive application of any judicial construction of a criminal statute that is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354-55, 84 S.Ct. at 1703; accord Rogers, 532 U.S. at 455-60, 121 S.Ct. at 1697-99. Retroactive application of a court's construction of a criminal statute may be deemed infirm not only where the construction is at odds with the statute's plain language, but also where it lacks any support in prior case law. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 356, 84 S.Ct. at 1704. In short, notions of due process may bar courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to certain conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266-67, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997); Rogers, supra . The touchstone in this analysis is whether the statute, standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 267, 117 S.Ct. at 1225. This case involves neither vague statutory language nor a judicial construction which deviates from clear statutory language or a prior interpretation of the same language, so as to alter expectations concerning the scope of the conduct deemed criminal. Indeed, the dispute does not concern interpretation of the statutory language, but instead the specific language actually enacted by the General Assembly. This Court's determination of what the statute saysspecifically, whether the word commonly is a part of itis commanded by specific provisions of the Statutory Construction Act. That determination effectuates the plain language of the statute as actually enacted and amended, and there is nothing vague or uncertain in the meaning of the PIC statute's definition of an instrument of crime, once so apprehended. Instead, the due process challenge here only arises from the adequacy of the method of memorializing and conveying legislative intent in the case of successive amendments to a statute. While the proper analysis of that conveyance of legislative intent requires consultation of other legislative provisions which specifically address the successive amendment scenario and make the statutory construction answer clear, we do not believe that such a construct violates due process. To pass due process muster, criminal legislation need not be so simple as to be reducible to sound bites, or subject to communication and conveyance by word of mouth. The very notion of a fair notice requirement presupposes a reasonably intelligent citizen who, if interested, is capable of educating himself concerning the status of the law. So long as courts presume that putative criminal defendants consult (or could consult) the session laws to apprise themselves of what conduct is prohibited before they act, it is no great or onerous additional step to indulge the concomitant assumption that they read those session laws according to legislatively-prescribed principles of construction. In this regard, it is notable that the Statutory Construction Act's interpretive provisions are not aimed exclusively at courts, or lawyers, or legislative specialists; rather, the Assembly broadly mandated that, [i]n the construction of the statutes of this Commonwealth, the rules set forth in this chapter shall be observed, unless the application of such rules would result in a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901. The provisions governing amendatory statutes are set forth plainly, and in the instance implicated in this case, clearly answer the interpretive question. In forwarding an argument premised upon the inclusion of the word commonly in the printing of the 1996 Amendment to Section 907, Magliocco invokes the official source of Pennsylvania legislation, i.e., the Laws of the General Assembly which are printed after each year's legislative session by the Director of the Legislative Reference Bureau. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 503 (recognizing Bureau's publication as legal evidence of laws contained therein). However, any reader who sought to ascertain the status of the PIC statute following the 1996 amendment, and who thereby consulted Volume I of the 1996 Laws of the General Assembly, would see that Section 1951 of the Statutory Construction Act is quoted, and instructs the reader how to read statutory amendments. Additionally, the preface of every edition of these Session Laws (as well as Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service, the unofficial source of Pennsylvania legislation), clearly explains that only the highlighted terms in amendatory acts actually change the words of the existing statute. Such principles of construction, then, are a part of any construction of the printed session laws. The Act at issue here, Act 98 of 1996, specifically identifies itself as an amendatory Act: it states at the outset that it is Amending Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, further providing for the offense of possessing instruments of crime. . . . Within the amendatory act, several sections are printed in boldfaced italics, indicating additions, while others are boldfaced and bracketed, indicating deletions. There is no suggestion that this printing was intended to reflect the definitive, self-contained, current statement of Section 907 as it existed following the 1996 amendment. Rather, Act 98 was explicitly designated as amendatory, purporting to highlight additions and deletions to Section 907 as it previously existed. Consultation with the pre-existing statute, thus, is presupposed, and it is no more difficult to find the prior version of the statute, and the rules of construction, than it is to find the amendment. No legal system dependent upon the salutary assumption that persons know the law could persist absent a concomitant assumption that those who are inclined to find the law are capable of doing so according to general, easily found, and clear principles of construction. Accordingly, we conclude that this Court's construction of Section 907, which is commanded by Section 1954 of the Statutory Construction Act, does not violate due process, and that construction makes clear that the word commonly is not a part of the second definition of an instrument of crime. [6] The Superior Court properly affirmed Magliocco's PIC conviction.