Opinion ID: 2285733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of specific instruction as to intent to deprive permanently.

Text: It is well settled that an intent to deprive permanently the owner of his property is an essential element of the crime of larceny [4] and also, of course, of robbery which is larceny committed by violence or by putting in fear, although neither statute makes specific mention of any requisite intent. 17 M.R.S.A. §§ 2101 and 3401; State v. Greenlaw, 159 Me. 141, 189 A.2d 370 (1963). It is constitutionally mandated that every element of the crime charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In Re Winship, 307 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970). Although intent to deprive permanently is not contained in the language of the statute the omission of a reference to this element in the Justice's charge is error. In Greenlaw we found that it was reversible error to deny the Defendant's request for a specific instruction as to intent to deprive permanently and that the use in the charge to the jury of such expressions as feloniously stolen and taken, commit a larceny steal the automobile, with the intent to commit larceny were insufficient to avoid prejudicial error on the facts present there. In our own case the Justice used similar language in his explanation of the crime of robbery. He read the robbery statute: Whoever, by force and violence or by putting in fear, feloniously steals and takes from the person of another property that is the subject of larceny is guilty of robbery . . .  (Emphasis added.) 17 M.R.S.A. § 3401. He explained that the State charged that the Defendant feloniously did steal, take and carry away from Miss Mproperty which is the subject of larceny. (Emphasis added.) He then defined larceny for the jury as necessarily including the stealing of the property of another. The Justice then went on to explain to the jury that the property must have been taken from the person of the other, that it must have been property which is the subject of larceny, and that it was taken by force and violence or by intimidation. The Defendantlike the Defendant in Greenlaw would have been entitled to a specific instruction on intent to deprive permanently if he had requested it, but no such request was made. When asked by the Presiding Justice, following the charge, if he had any requested instructions, Defendant's counsel replied that he had none. The Justice's omission to instruct as to intent to deprive permanently was error but our concern now is to determine whether manifest error exists. Did the Defendant suffer serious prejudice as a result of the omission? A comparison between the facts in Greenlaw and those in the case now before us reveals significantly different fact situations. In Greenlaw, the two intoxicated Defendants interrupted a ride in a taxi by seizing the driver and telling him that they were armed. They demanded his money. One of the Defendants tried to force his way in behind the wheel from the driver's side, saying he was taking the taxi, and pushed the driver into the middle of the seat. The driver broke loose from the Defendants and escaped from the cab while an onlooker began shouting. The Defendants drove away in the cab and within an hour were found a half mile away asleep in the snow not far from the parked and empty taxi. They were charged with robbery of the taxi. The taxi was yellow with red fenders. On each side in 3 letters were the words Central Cab Company. In Greenlaw, at the close of the Presiding Justice's charge to the jury, Defendants' counsel requested a specific instruction that if the jury found that Defendants' intent was only to make a temporary use of the taxi they must find Defendants not guilty of robbery. The Justice denied this request. It is obvious that a most vital issue in Greenlaw was whether the intoxicated Defendants really intended to deprive permanently the owner of the conspicuous and easily recognized taxi or whether this was in fact only a drunken escape from the scene of unsuccessful criminal activity. The Court said: While in technical and juristic terms the Justice presiding academically and formally told of felonious stealing and larceny, as such, we are constrained to conclude that the instructions in their totality generate an irresoluble doubt as to the adequacy of the jury understanding of the law applicable to the fact of taking, here. The instruction requested by the respondents would have afforded an elucidation which under the circumstances must be deemed to have been necessitous and probably would have supplied definitive enlightenment unpossessed by the jury. There was prejudicial error and the exception must be sustained. (Emphasis added.) State v. Greenlaw, supra, 159 Me. at 149, 189 A.2d at 374. It is clear from a reading of Greenlaw that under the particular circumstances of that case, nothing but a specific explanation of the meaning of intent to deprive permanently would have enabled the jury to evaluate the facts pertaining to that issue. The omission of a specific instruction on intent to deprive permanently was highly prejudicial in Greenlaw where serious fact problems concerning that element were present. Such is not the case here. As the victim walked down the street at about 11:00 P. M. the Defendant and another young man who were sitting on a wall adjoining the sidewalk accosted her and asked her to tell them the time. She looked at her watch and responded to their inquiry. As she walked along she heard a person running behind her and in a moment the Defendant seized her around the neck. She turned and struggled with him, crying out for help, and during the struggle he stabbed her in the chest and she was cut on the finger when she tried to seize the Defendant's knife. During her struggle with the Defendant the other young man seized her purse. The two young men ran away with the purse and she never saw it again. The Defendant denied any participation in the robbery and testified that he was alone in his home at the time the incident occurred. We find that the strong disinclination which the courts have demonstrated toward setting aside convictions for trial errors which were not prejudicial to the Defendant extends to include failures to instruct specifically as to essential elements of crimes. Such failures to instruct have been measured by the same standards we ourselves have used when examining for manifest errorthe presence or absence of serious prejudice. In Claybrooks v. State, 50 Wis.2d 79, 183 N.W.2d 139 (1971) the Defendant was convicted of the statutory offense of armed robbery which included the necessary elements that the robber was 1) armed with a dangerous weapon and 2) that he attempted to conceal his identity. The Presiding Justice failed to instruct the jury as to these two elements of the crime and counsel for the Defendant declined the Court's invitation to submit a request for further instructions and made no objection to the instructions given. The Court on appeal recognized that even though no objections were made or requests submitted, the Court must take note of errors which are so fundamental as to deny the Defendant a fair trial. The Wisconsin Court concluded that although these two unexplained elements were essential, the evidence clearly established that the robbers were armed and that the Defendant attempted to conceal his identity. The Court said: We conclude that in the instant case the trial court committed error in failing to instruct on the essential elements of the crime to wit: that defendant was armed and that he attempted to conceal his identity. However, it is clear from the uncontroverted evidence that this was harmless error. On the record it cannot reasonably be said that had such error not been committed, the verdict might probably have been different. `Upon the record it appears that the conclusion reached by the jury was well-nigh imperative.' In light of the entire record, we are satisfied that justice has not miscarried. Claybrooks v. State, supra, 50 Wis.2d at 86, 183 N.W.2d at 143. In Thomas v. State, Alaska, 391 P.2d 18 (1964) the Defendant and two other men, acting in concert, entered a liquor store where one of them (not the Defendant) threatened the clerk with a knife and forced her to hand him the contents of the cash register which he put into a paper sack. The three then drove away in a car dividing the loot as they rode along. The Presiding Justice instructed the jury: If you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 17th day of July, 1962, at or near Anchorage, the defendant Donald Thomas, also known as L. C. Thomas, did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously aid and abet Harold Harvey to take and steal from the person or from the immediate presence of Nadine Jean Bisig any United States money, by putting her in fear, then you should find the defendant guilty. If you do not so find or you have a reasonable doubt thereof you should acquit the defendant. Thomas v. State, supra at 24, 25. Only after he had completed his charge the Justice was orally requested to give further instruction as to the meaning of steal. The Justice denied the request. The Court on appeal said: Under the circumstances of this case we think that the trial court was correct in his ruling that instruction No. 10 fulfilled the requirements of Crim.R. 30(b) that `[t]he court shall instruct the jury on all matters of law which it considers necessary for the jury's information in giving their verdict. . . .' . . . . . . This evidence clearly established the larceny elements of the case and nothing was developed in the case to negate those elements, namely, the taking of money with the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof. Since the evidence was conclusive that the money was stolen, we find no such prejudicial error in instruction No. 10 as would require a reversal in this case. Thomas v. State, supra at 25. The Court of Appeals of Georgia examined the record of a conviction for robbery in which one man had held a cocked revolver against the victim's ribs while another man searched his pockets and took his money from him. The Defendant had relied upon an alibi. The Presiding Justice had charged in the terms of the robbery statute which did not contain language regarding intent to deprive permanently. The Court found that although the instruction was not a sufficient definition of the offense, the failure to instruct completely was not reversible error under the circumstances of the case. Thomas v. State, 54 Ga.App. 747, 189 S.E. 68 (1936). The State urges us that a correct statement of the applicable law is found in the text of 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 49 at 514-515: Ordinarily the court should charge the jury in some form that the taking must have been with intent to steal, although where the defense was an alibi and the evidence developed no issue or contention that the taking was under a bona fide claim of right or was without any intent to steal, the instructions may be upheld notwithstanding a failure to charge in specific terms with respect to an intent to steal. If the testimony leaves uncertain the intent with which accused took the property, the jury should be instructed to give him the benefit of the doubt. However, in the light of the demands of Winship and our own decision in Greenlaw, we hold to the view that the failure to instruct on specific intent is error, but whether it is manifest and reversible error or not depends upon the presence or absence of serious prejudice. To return to our own situation, we believe that while the Justice's charge on robbery lacked a specific explanation of the necessity of an intent to deprive permanently, its language was sufficient to enable the jury to examine a situation where assailants attack the victim, stab her with a knife, seize her purse, run away with it and never return it or attempt to justify its taking and to evaluate it as an intentional unlawful trespassory taking accomplished by violence for the purpose of getting whatever money the purse might contain. The defense was satisfied to submit the issue of guilt or innocence upon the explanations given by the Justiceuntil after the jury had returned a verdict of guilty. While the jurors were not informed specifically that they must find that Defendant had a larcenous intent, we see no reasonable possibility that a complete instruction on intent to deprive permanently would have resulted in a different verdict. We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the omission in the Justice's charge was harmless error here.