Opinion ID: 46710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Louisiana immunity statute

Text: 7 As to Fuesting's general maritime law negligence claim, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the District because, in its view, the District's attempt to move the shrimp boat was a protected act under LA.REV.STAT. § 9:2798.1(B). 2 8 We must address an important threshold question not addressed by the parties or the district court: whether a state statute limiting the liability of a municipal entity like the District prevents a cause of action arising under the admiralty laws of the United States. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court held that the New York City Fire Department could not employ a New York state law exempting municipal entities from tort liability to defeat a suit against it in admiralty. Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 557-63, 21 S.Ct. 212, 45 L.Ed. 314 (1900). The Workman Court reasoned that admiralty law is not displaced by local law; if it were, the uniformity of maritime law would be undermined. Id. at 558-59, 21 S.Ct. 212. The Court then responded to the city's contention that state law protected it: 9 The maritime law affords no justification for this contention, and no example is found if such law, where one who is subject to suit and amenable to process is allowed to escape liability for the commission of a maritime tort, upon the theory relied upon[, state law]. We, of course, concede that where maritime torts have been committed by the vessels of a sovereign, and complaint has been made in a court of admiralty, that court has declined to exercise jurisdiction, but this was solely because of the immunity of sovereignty from suit in its own courts . . . . [This rule], however, proceed[s] upon the hypothesis of the want of a person or property before the court over whom jurisdiction can be exerted. As a consequence, the doctrine above stated rests, not upon the supposed want of power in courts of admiralty to redress a wrong committed by one over whom such courts have adequate jurisdiction, but alone on their inability to give redress in a case where jurisdiction over the person or property cannot be exerted. . . . 10 [I]t follows that as the municipal corporation of the city of New York, unlike a sovereign, was subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the claimed exemption from liability asserted in the case at bar . . . was without foundation in the maritime law, and therefore afforded no reason for denying redress in a court of admiralty for the wrong which the courts below both found to have been committed. 11 Id. at 566, 570, 21 S.Ct. 212. The Workman Court's holding recognizes that municipalities do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Recently, that proposition has been invoked more explicitly. See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 466, 123 S.Ct. 1667, 155 L.Ed.2d 631 (2003) ([M]unicipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity from suit.). See also N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1689, 1694-95, 164 L.Ed.2d 367 (2006) (endorsing the general principle found in Workman that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit against a city and rejecting a county's sovereign immunity defense in an admiralty suit). However, a municipality can be immune from suit if it was acting as an arm of the State, as delineated by [the Supreme] Court's precedents. Chatham County, 126 S.Ct. at 1694 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), and Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979)). The District, merely because of its status as a public entity and because it meets the criteria of LA.REV. STAT. § 9:2798.1, is not immune from suit in admiralty. The district court must consider whether the Workman principle applies. 3 We invite the district court to do so upon remand.