Opinion ID: 433508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Merrill statement's inadequacy as an indication of legislative acquiescence.

Text: 48 FERC's other argument that relies on the Merrill statement can similarly be rejected. FERC argues that the statement put Congress on notice of the Commission's interpretation and thus Congress, by not amending the statute, acquiesced in that interpretation. See brief for respondent at 21. This theory is unpersuasive for all the reasons discussed above, and also because there is no reason to believe that Congress was generally aware of the statement. The Supreme Court has said: We are extremely hesitant to presume general congressional awareness of the Commission's construction based only upon a few isolated statements. SEC v. Sloan, supra, 436 U.S. at 121, 98 S.Ct. at 1713. And the Sloan statement was made in a case where the argument for congressional knowledge and approval was somewhat better than it is here. In Sloan a congressional committee had apparently recognized and approved of the commission practice at issue. See id. at 119-120, 98 S.Ct. at 1712-1713. 49 5. The Merrill statement's inadequacy as a reasonable rule of procedure necessitated by practical considerations. 50 FERC's last argument is somewhat different. The Commission argues that practical considerations of limited resources and administrative feasibility require that the agency be given the latitude necessary to pursue the statutory scheme. In effect, it argues that strict adherence to the statute's language would be administratively impossible. 51 [N]otice to municipalities is an area which necessarily requires administrative flexibility. For example, in administering the statute, even with regard to cities and towns, the Commission must define what constitutes a potentially interested or affected municipality, language which on its face may include [a] large number of governmental units.    52 Brief for respondent at 21-22. Given this need for flexibility, FERC contends, its practice of failing to notify specialized municipalities is reasonable: 53 There exist in the United States an estimated 50,000 specialized local governmental units performing a myriad of services. Unlike states, counties and cities, many of these governments, such as water, utility or drainage districts, are not readily identifiable. 54 Id. at 22. 55 Although we sympathize with FERC's practical concerns, we must reject its contention that those concerns can justify the Commission's practices. Any administrative approach developed would have to be adequately articulated and within a range of reasonableness with respect to Congress' instruction. Cf. Obremski v. OPM, supra, 699 F.2d at 1269. We have already discussed the unreasonableness of current FERC practices in relation to Congress' language and goal, and the inadequacy of the Merrill statement as an interpretation of congressional intent. When offered as a rule of administrative practice demanded by practical necessity, the statement suffers from the same flaws as well as an additional deficiency. [I]n such a case the agency must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of arbitrar[iness]. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1072, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). Those relying on the procedures set out in a statute have a right to know that those procedures are being given less than their clear meaning. Here, FERC seems never to have made a public statement that clearly purports to explain its notice policies. 12 56