Opinion ID: 2070845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Facial Constitutionality of the Deadlock Instruction

Text: Our precedent is well-established: A party mounting a facial constitutional challenge bears the substantial burden of demonstrating that in any degree and in every conceivable application, the law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment. In other words, the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid ( Matter of Moran Towing Corp. v Urbach, 99 NY2d 443, 448 [2003, Ciparick, J.] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], quoting Cohen v State of New York, 94 NY2d 1, 8 [1999] and United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 [1987]; see also People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 421 [2003] [A successful facial challenge means that the law is invalid in toto and therefore incapable of any valid application (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]). The general approach taken by the courts is to limit the solution to the problem and enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force, or to sever its problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact ( Ayotte v Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 US 320, 328, 329 [2006] [citations omitted]). [3] We decided in LaValle that the deadlock instruction is not severable from the other statutory provisions authorizing the death penalty. The question therefore becomes whether the constitutional and unconstitutional applications of the deadlock instruction are severable. If they are not, defendant's death sentence must be vacated even though the deadlock instruction was constitutionally applied to him. Defendant, while conceding that in certain circumstances the statute may be constitutionally applied, offers three reasons why the Court should take this extraordinary step, which is highly disfavored by long-standing state and federal precedent: (1) the remaining constitutional applications are too few and create a freakish regime contrary to legislative intent; (2) relatedly, the death penalty could not be constitutionally applied to the elderly or the terminally ill; and (3) there are administrative problems.