Opinion ID: 2401009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Victim Impact Testimony Containing Hearsay

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting victim impact testimony from the murder victim's husband, John Tyson, which included hearsay statements made by other family members. [6] We reject this contention on two independent bases: (i) many of the witness's statements fall within the firmly rooted hearsay exception for relevant statements regarding a declarant's state of mind; and (ii) if any error exists at all, it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the sentencing judge explicitly stated he was not relying upon any of the victim impact testimony. Notwithstanding the fact that any possible error was harmless, most of the hearsay statements testified to by John Tyson were properly admitted under the hearsay exception for statements of a declarant's state of mind. Without unnecessarily reciting the entire sum of John Tyson's testimony, Baker primarily objects to the following specific hearsay statements: The girls talked about their grandmother and [she] visited them and had a nice relationship with them.       In trying to tell the impact it had on [Jane Tyson's daughters], I will talk about them as daughters and as a mother of their own children. Each of the girls has shared with me, personally, and also through observations, their pain.       We all talk about our fears of going shopping, what would be safe, could it happen again, will the children be safe. [Tyson's daughters] talk about their part of childhood that was so important for them and so rich in their relationship with their grandmother, and they feel the injustice of not having the grandchildren's grandmother for them.       Karen [one of Tyson's daughters] related to me one day when she was shopping with Carly and Adam for shoes, they said, `This is Gammy's job. Gammy should be doing it.' Brent told Tammy he couldn't remember what Gammy sounded like.       Susan [one of Tyson's daughters] tells me that Mallory starts to talk about her Gammy a little bit now, and always remembers her in her prayers. Baker specifically contends that Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 413(c), [7] as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981), prohibits the admission of this hearsay because it bears insufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible in a sentencing proceeding, especially if the hearsay declarants are available to testify. Maryland law, says the Appellant, is clear that, while the strict rules of evidence do not apply at a sentencing proceeding, unreliable hearsay is inadmissible. The latter principle is sound but what Appellant fails to acknowledge is the firmly rooted hearsay exception for a declarant's state of mind. As one author has observed: Maryland recognizes ... the common law hearsay exception for statements of the declarant's `state of mind,' regardless whether the declarant is available to testify. Under this exception, a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind is admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted, except that it is generally inadmissible (except in will and probate cases) to prove a fact which purportedly happened before the statement was made. 6 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence § 803(3).1, at 356-57 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Appellant's reliance upon Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981), is misplaced. The issue in Tichnell centered around the constitutionality of permitting the State to read portions of the Defendant's trial transcript to a new sentencing jury charged with the duty of deciding whether to impose a death sentence. [8] See Tichnell, 290 Md. at 48, 427 A.2d at 993. Baker correctly asserts the Tichnell case's conclusion that  § 413(c) does not permit, over timely objection, the admission in evidence before a new sentencing jury of the prior recorded trial testimony where the unavailability of the witness is not shown. 290 Md. at 63, 427 A.2d at 1001. On the other hand, Maryland law is replete with cases upholding the hearsay exception for statements regarding the declarant's state of mind. See Maryland Paper Prods. Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 590-91, 139 A.2d 219, 226 (1958) (holding it reversible error not to permit deceased's hearsay statement that, on the morning of fatal accident, he intended to stop on the way to work and pick up a gear wheel for appellant-employer's machine; evidence was admissible to show deceased's intentions); Tittlebaum v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 Md. 397, 402, 174 A. 89, 91 (1934) (holding one boy's testimony admissible regarding statement of a companion that he intended to throw a brick at a train and `bust a window'). Most of the relevant hearsay statements, testified to by John Tyson at the sentencing hearing, fall within this well-established exception. Tyson testified that particular family members shared with him their fears, pain, and concerns. In one instance, Mr. Tyson did testify to hearsay within hearsay when he discussed what Jane Tyson's daughters shared with him concerning Ms. Tyson's grandchildren: Karen [one of Tyson's daughters] related to me one day when she was shopping with Carly and Adam for shoes, they said, `This is Gammy's job. Gammy should be doing it.' Brent told Tammy he couldn't remember what Gammy sounded like.       Susan [one of Tyson's daughters] tells me that Mallory starts to talk about her Gammy a little bit now, and always remembers her in her prayers. Although most material portions of Mr. Tyson's overall testimony were admissible, these hearsay-within-hearsay statements may have been objectionable. This in no way provides a remotely sufficient basis for reversal of the sentence imposed because any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. When Judge Whitfill imposed sentence upon Baker, he stated the following regarding the victim impact testimony provided by Mr. Tyson: In doing this, let me say that I do not rely upon the victim impact statements. I don't care whether the grandmother was a wonderful grandmother and a wonderful mother, whether she was an average mother, or average grandmother, or even if she was mediocre. When we cannot take our grandchildren shopping without the risk that someone will blow our brains away for the sake of our wallet or our purse, we have a problem. So, I cannot believe that under any circumstances that the mitigation, even if [it] were found to exist, that the aggravating factor does not outweigh that. (Emphasis added). It is categorically clear that Judge Whitfill did not rely upon the victim impact testimony offered by John Tyson, and the sentence was based upon independent grounds without regard to the hearsay objected to by Baker on appeal. Even if the admission of some portions of this hearsay was erroneous, because the statements did not otherwise fall within an accepted hearsay exception, it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not warrant reversal under these circumstances. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2629, 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976) and Ramsey v. State, 239 Md. 561, 565, 212 A.2d 319, 321 (1965) (both applying harmless error to admission of arguably impermissible hearsay statement); Vandegrift v. State, 82 Md. App. 617, 636-37, 573 A.2d 56, 65, cert. denied, 320 Md. 801, 580 A.2d 219 (1990) (concluding that curative instruction dispelled any prejudice to defendant from admission of hearsay). In a final challenge to the constitutionality of admitting this hearsay evidence, Appellant relies on the following language extracted from Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988): With respect to findings of guilt on criminal charges, the Court consistently has followed the rule that the jury's verdict must be set aside if it could be supported on one ground but not another, and the reviewing court was uncertain which of the two grounds was relied upon by the jury in reaching the verdict. In reviewing death sentences, the Court has demanded even greater certainty that the jury's conclusions rested on proper grounds. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. [586,] 605, 98 S.Ct. [2954,] 2965 [57 L.Ed.2d 973] [1978]. (`[T]he risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty . .. is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments'); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752, 68 S.Ct. 880, 886, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948) (... `In death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in favor of the accused'). Mills, 486 U.S. at 376-77, 108 S.Ct. at 1866, 100 L.Ed.2d at 395. In Appellant's case, the sentencing judge's conclusion clearly rested on proper grounds and any doubts that did exist were `resolved in favor of the accused.' Id. Judge Whitfill abided by the capital sentencing mandates of Maryland Rule 4-343, regarding the enumeration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances contributing to the decision to impose a particular sentence. [9] He found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Baker committed the murder while attempting to commit a robbery. See Md. Rule 4-343(e) (Section III, aggravating factor number 10, states that [t]he defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery, arson, rape in the first degree, or sexual offense in the first degree). Further, Baker was given the benefit of any doubt concerning one of the mitigating factors itemized by defense counsel in reliance on Rule 4-343. In Section IV of the Rule 4-343 form, mitigating factor number 7 reads as follows: It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Even though the judge found this factor was not proven, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, he stated the following: I will assume, for the moment, that the mitigation as listed in number seven, if I had found [it] to exist, that a weighing process would have been required. So, under the assumption that someone might feel that Dr. Johnson's testimony should have been accepted as proving mitigation, I will review the weighing factors that I would have gone through had I found that to exist. As a result, Mills does not provide the Appellant with any persuasive arguments for reversal. The sentencing judge had ample grounds for imposing the sentence as he did, and he weighed the only mitigating factor that posed the remotest doubt in his mind before making a final decision. In light of this analysis, we hold that significant portions of the hearsay in question were properly admitted under the state-of-mind exception and, even if admitting some portions represented an error, that error was harmless and the statements were not relied upon by the sentencing judge.