Opinion ID: 2065684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Womack v. State [10]

Text: Womack was convicted and sentenced under the same statutory scheme as applied in Teel. One of his convictions was pursuant to § 445(d)(1)(iii), [11] possessing a regulated firearm, having been convicted of a violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years, and the other was pursuant to § 36B (c). Lamenting the Court of Special Appeals' rejection of his contention that he could not be convicted for both transporting a handgun and possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor, he presents a single argument to this Court: [Whether the] Court of Special Appeals erred by ruling that [Womack] could be convicted of carrying a handgun as well as possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor carrying a statutory penalty of more than two years. After discussing the relatively similar chronological history of the statutes in this case and those in the companion cases, the petitioner makes a similar argument to that made in those cases: The legislature clearly intended not to allow convictions for both carrying a handgun and possession of a firearm by a misdemeanant. When the General Assembly included persons previously convicted of certain misdemeanors in § 445, the legislators were aware of this Court's 1990 decision in Frazier v. State, supra . They could foresee that the problem of whether persons could be convicted of both crimes would arise. They knew that, if they wanted to allow punishments for both crimes, they should say so in the statute. They failed to do so. Therefore, it is apparent that they did not intend to allow dual punishment for carrying a handgun and possession of a firearm by a misdemeanant. For the same reasons stated in Teel, supra, we reject that argument. The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals is affirmed.