Opinion ID: 2951061
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Guidelines as the “Starting Point”

Text: The Sentencing Guidelines establish a three-step procedure that district courts must follow in determining the proper sentence: (1) calculate the appropriate Guidelines range, including the offense level and criminal history category of the defendant; (2) consider any applicable departures under § 5H or § 5K of the Guidelines; and (3) consider the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 (2014); see also United States v. Lee, 725 F.3d 1159, 1165 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (same). The Supreme Court has held that even though the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, district courts must use the Guidelines as the “starting point” for determining a sentence. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). While the district court may impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range, “it may not manipulate the calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines in order to produce a Guidelines range that will allow it to impose the sentence it prefers.” Lee, 725 F.3d at 1164. 8 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES Although Rosales-Gonzales contends his case is analogous to Lee, we find the facts sufficiently distinguishable to conclude the district court did not err. In Lee, the district court began by finding a base offense level of 38. 725 F.3d at 1162. The probation officer then recalculated the defendant’s offense level as 35, based on a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a sentencing range of 188–235 months and a mandatory minimum of 120 months. Id. The government subsequently moved for a ten-level reduction under § 5K1.1 based on the defendant’s substantial assistance and requested a 96-month sentence. Id. at 1163. The district court granted the request for a reduction under §5K1.1. Id. The district court then incorrectly calculated the defendant’s new offense level after the departure as 28, and, also incorrectly, stated that the appropriate Guidelines range was 78–97 months. Id. Before the court could impose the final sentence, the probation officer interrupted to explain that, with a ten-level departure, the defendant’s offense level was actually 25, not 28, resulting in a Guidelines range of 63–78 months, so a sentence exceeding 78 months would be an above-Guidelines sentence. Id. at 1163–64. The government then stated that “it believed ‘96 months was appropriate, whatever level one has to depart to, to get that.’” Id. at 1164. Thereafter, the district court granted the government’s amended request for a sevenlevel departure—resulting in a Guidelines range of 87–108 months—and sentenced the defendant to 96 months’ imprisonment. Id. Thus, the district court appeared to manipulate the Guidelines range to impose a 96-month sentence. Here, however, the district court did not engage in calculation or recalculation in an attempt to get to a specific sentence requested by the government or preferred by the UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES 9 district court. The district court judge noted that he had reviewed the parties’ filings, including the request for the fast-track departure, but stated, from the outset, that he did not believe Rosales-Gonzales was entitled to the fast-track departure. The district court then heard argument from both parties, as well as Rosales-Gonzales’s statement, before imposing the final sentence. In doing so, the court first calculated an offense level of 10 and a criminal history category of 5, resulting in a Guidelines range of 21–27 months, a calculation that Rosales-Gonzales does not dispute. The court explained that it disagreed with the government’s assessment that Rosales-Gonzales qualified for the fast-track departure and declined to apply it to his sentence.2 The court concluded that the § 3553(a) factors warranted an “upper end” Guidelines sentence and imposed a 27-month prison term. Although at times the district court judge indicated he would not sentence Rosales-Gonzales to 15 months or fewer—stating he would not “go along with that” and “was not on board with 15 months”—the court also expressed that his thoughts were preliminary and provided the parties an opportunity to argue. Of course, simply terming a predetermination as a “preliminary thought” would not be sufficient, on its own, to distinguish this case from Lee in a 2 The district court based much of its reasoning on a memorandum from the Department of Justice to United States Attorneys regarding when fasttrack departure is applicable. See Memorandum for All United States Attorneys from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf. RosalesGonzales has not challenged the district court’s reliance on this memorandum. Additionally, the factors discussed by the memorandum, at least as noted by the district court, overlap significantly with the § 3553(a) factors. 10 UNITED STATES V. ROSALES-GONZALES meaningful way. However, we do not find the district court’s phrasing here to be disingenuous. The district court calculated the proper Guidelines range at step one, considered the applicable fast-track departure but declined to grant it at step two, and evaluated the § 3553(a) factors at step three. The district court did not commit procedural error.