Opinion ID: 1989516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal, Without Prejudice, of the Assault and Battery Claim (Count I) and the False Imprisonment Claim (Count V)[12]

Text: Now we turn to the trial court's dismissal of Counts I and V on primary jurisdiction grounds. We have held that, when there is a substantial question whether the WCA applies, the administrative agency charged with implementing the statute, given its special expertise, has a primary jurisdiction to make the initial determination concerning coverage before the courts can exercise jurisdiction. We elaborated that, when an injury occurs during the performance of an employee's duties, a substantial question will exist, and thus the agency will have primary jurisdiction, unless the injuries were clearly not compensable under the statute. Estate of Underwood, supra note 6, 665 A.2d at 631 (quoting Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658, 661 (D.C.1979)) (internal punctuation and citation omitted in original). In this case, the Superior Court's jurisdiction over appellant's common law assault and battery claim and false imprisonment claim depends on whether we can say, as a matter of law, that her claims are clearly outside WCA coverage. See id. In her brief, Joyner asserts that the WCA does not apply to Count I, and incorporates by reference her argument from her Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the trial court, which opposed dismissal of both the assault and battery and the false imprisonment counts. In that Opposition, Joyner relied on Underwood for the proposition that her tort claims ought not to be dismissed, because they were injuries resulting from alleged discrimination under the DCHRA. Joyner's argument is unavailing as there are a number of substantial questions, see Underwood, supra note 6, 665 A.2d at 631, that exist regarding the applicability of the WCA to Joyner's assault and battery and false imprisonment claims. These substantial questions include: (1) uncertainty as to whether Joyner suffered the type of injury covered by the WCA; (2) whether the alleged injury occurred, if at all, in the scope of employment; [13] and (3) if the injury occurred, whether it was caused by intentional or negligent conduct. For these reasons, and because Joyner has not made a showing that Counts I and V were clearly outside the WCA, see id., we conclude, as did the trial court, that these claims should have been brought under the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Employment Services (DOES). The trial court, however, should not have dismissed the claims. Instead, the trial court should have stayed the proceeding pending the DOES's disposition of these claims. [14] Tekle v. Foot Traffic, 699 A.2d 410, 413 (D.C.1997) (Because we conclude that there is a substantial question concerning the applicability of the WCA, we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to stay the proceeding until Ms. Tekle has had reasonable time to present her claims to the DOES.) (emphasis added); District of Columbia v. L.G. Indus., 758 A.2d 950, 956 (D.C.2000) (Primary jurisdiction ... applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.) (emphasis added) (internal punctuation omitted). [15]