Opinion ID: 2976330
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Racial composition of the venire

Text: Odeneal and Andres, both of whom are African-American, claim that their right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community was violated. The venire from which the jury was chosen consisted of 66 people, only four of whom were African-American. One AfricanAmerican woman served on their jury. “The Sixth Amendment requires that the jury venire from which a jury is selected represent a ‘fair cross-section’ of the community.” United States v. Allen, 160 F.3d 1096, 1103 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975)). In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). We review de novo whether a defendant has been denied his right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. United States v. Buchanan, 213 F.3d 302, 308 (6th Cir. 2000). The government agrees that African-Americans are a distinctive group within the community, but argues that defendants have not satisfied the second and third elements required for a successful challenge. Defendants presented evidence showing that in the year 2000, 18.9% of the population of the county in which the crimes were committed was African-American. The jury administrator for the Western District of Kentucky testified that the minority population in the other ten counties of that district is much lower. Defendants did not offer evidence regarding the percentage of African-Americans in the relevant judicial district, and so we are unable to conclude that the percentage of African-Americans on this venire was not fair and reasonable when compared to the percentage of African-Americans in the district. As to the third element, which concerns the systematic exclusion of African-Americans, the jury administrator testified that individual names chosen to be placed on the “master wheel” were drawn exclusively from voter registration lists provided by the state. Defendants argue that by using voter registration lists instead of other methods, such as drivers license registrations, AfricanAmericans are systematically excluded because African-Americans register to vote in lower proportions than other groups. Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. Voter registration lists are the presumptive statutory source for potential jurors. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b). The circuit courts are “‘in complete agreement that . . . neither the Act nor the Constitution require that a supplemental source of names be added to voter lists simply because an identifiable group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population.’” United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 587 n.8 (10th Cir. 1976) (omission in original) (citation omitted) (collecting cases). As we have previously held, defendants “must show more than that their particular panel was unrepresentative. Duren requires us to look Nos. 06-5885/5915 United States v. Odeneal, et al. Page 4 at the ‘venires’ from which ‘juries’ are selected, . . . and it has long been the case that defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition—only to a panel from which distinctive groups were not ‘systematically excluded.’” Allen, 160 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538). Moreover, at oral argument, defense counsel conceded that there was no evidence that African-Americans were systematically excluded from the venire.