Opinion ID: 785104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Denial of Appellants' Motion to Opt Out of the Class

Text: 75 Appellants assert that they should have been permitted to opt out of the class because it does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a). Alternatively, they claim that Rule 23 cannot be applied to deny them the opportunity to litigate their claims in a separate proceeding. Appellants raise two arguments in support of this alternative contention. First, they maintain that Mississippi state law affords them the right to proceed with a separate action 30 and that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), requires us to apply state law rather than Rule 23. Second, Appellants suggest that refusing to permit them to opt out impinges on their First Amendment rights. 76 We have held that a member of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) has no absolute right to opt out of the class. Penson, 634 F.2d at 994. Rather, a district court ... acting under its Rule 23(d)(2) discretionary power, may require that an opt-out right and notice thereof be given should it believe that such a right is desirable to protect the interests of the absent class members. Id. Typically, such cases involve hybrid Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, in which individual monetary relief for certain class members is sought in addition to class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief. Id. Such a class action, at least in the relief stage, begins to resemble a 23(b)(3) action, and there has been more concern with protecting the due process rights of the individual class members to ensure they are aware of the opportunity to receive the monetary relief to which they are entitled. Id. 77 Here, the class was certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because Mississippi, in maintaining vestiges of its prior de jure system of higher education, had acted [and] refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(2). This case is not a hybrid class action; the Private Plaintiffs have sought solely injunctive and declaratory relief throughout the litigation. Even in their briefs to this court, Appellants — while expressing their dissatisfaction with the extent of the relief provided for in the settlement agreement — do not request any individual relief, whether monetary or otherwise. Appellants' interests do not diverge from those of the Private Plaintiffs who support the settlement, except to the extent that Appellants believe that they are entitled to greater class-wide injunctive relief. Accordingly, since Appellants have failed to show the existence of individual claims that are separate and distinct from the claims for class-wide relief, the district court correctly concluded that no basis existed for it to exercise its discretion to allow Appellants to opt out. 78 Additionally, we reject Appellants' assertion that the requisites of Rule 23(a) have not been met here. As discussed above, the district court confirmed class certification in its final judgment. Aside from their allegation of inadequate representation, Appellants do not specify why — after nearly thirty years of litigation — they now feel that class certification was improper in this case. Further, Appellants' inadequate-representation argument fails in this context for the same reason that this contention did not cause us to reverse the district court's approval of the settlement: Appellants provide nothing to contradict the district court's finding that class counsel and Congressman Thompson adequately represented the Private-Plaintiff class. 79 Finally, Appellants' contentions based on Erie and the First Amendment lack merit. First, this is not a diversity case; thus, Erie is inapplicable. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 ( Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. (emphasis added)). Moreover, Erie does not affect the application of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, such as Rule 23, in federal court. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule.). Second, Appellants provide no authority for the proposition that denying them the right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(2) class violates the First Amendment. 80 Appellants fail to articulate a viable ground for opting out of the class. Consequently, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' motion.