Opinion ID: 2584011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Malice and Justification

Text: The trial court's ruling was based upon a finding that defendants' interference was not tortious and that defendants' actions had a legitimate business purpose. Not all interference with contractual relationships is tortious. A claim of tortious interference with a contract is predicated upon malicious conduct by the defendant. Turner, 240 Kan. at 12. On the other hand, [a] person may be privileged or justified to interfere with contractual relations in certain situations. Reebles, Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., 29 Kan. App. 2d 205, 211, 25 P.3d 871 (2001) (citing May v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 189 Kan. 419, 424-25, 370 P.2d 390 [1962]). `The term justification has been said not to be susceptible of any precise definition. It is employed to denote the presence of exceptional circumstances which show that no tort has been in fact committed and to connote lawful excuse which excludes actual or legal malice.' Turner, 240 Kan. at 12-13 (quoting 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Interference § 27). In determining whether a defendant's conduct is improper, the following factors should be considered: (1) the nature of the defendant's conduct; (2) the defendant's motive; (3) the interests of the other with which the defendant's conduct interferes; (4) the interests sought to be advanced by the defendant; (5) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the defendant and the contractual interests of the other; (6) the proximity or remoteness of the defendant's conduct to the interference; and (7) the relations between the parties. Reebles, 29 Kan. App. 2d at 212 (citing Turner, 240 Kan. at 14). The issues of defendants' motive and the presence or absence of malice are typically questions for the jury. See generally Burrowwood Associates, Inc. v. Safelite Glass Corp., 18 Kan. App. 2d 396, 400-01, 853 P.2d 1175 (1993). Despite this rule, the trial court, in essence, determined that there was justification because the conduct satisfied the business judgment rule. However, as we have discussed, as that rule is to be applied in this case there are issues of fact which remain as to defendants' motives and, contrary to defendants' arguments, as to whether defendants' actions caused the harm to plaintiffs. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's granting of defendant Unison's and defendant Bunten's motions for summary judgment on the count of tortious interference with plaintiffs' business expectancy. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. ABBOTT, J., not participating. BRAZIL, S.J., assigned. [1]