Opinion ID: 845996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the cure for the constitutional violation

Text: The fact that intermediate sanction cells exist does not necessarily render Michigan's sentencing guidelines statutes unconstitutional. There are legally valid applications of this portion of the guidelines. Also, legally valid applications can be made of the nonintermediate sanction cells. For instance, a defendant's PRV level alone could place the defendant in a straddle cell or a cell requiring a prison sentence without further judicial fact-finding. A problem of constitutional magnitude arises, however, when someone is moved out of an intermediate sanction cell into a straddle cell or beyond by judicial fact-finding. In such situations, the application of the guidelines violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have all the facts that increase the sentence proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The only exceptions are the defendant's criminal record and facts admitted by the defendant. The question becomes: How can this constitutional problem be eliminated? The Court could declare the offending portions of the guidelines unconstitutional and simply sever them from the statutes. I believe this is not feasible. A significant portion of the guidelines involves intermediate sanction cells. The sentences for all class G and H felonies fall in an intermediate sanction cell without consideration of the OVs. MCL 777.68 and MCL 777.69. All class F felonies fall in an intermediate sanction cell if the defendant has fewer than 50 PRV points. MCL 777.67. All class E felonies fall in an intermediate sanction cell if the defendant has fewer than 25 PRV points. MCL 777.66. All class D felonies fall in an intermediate sanction cell if the defendant has fewer than 50 PRV points. MCL 777.65. All class C felonies fall in an intermediate sanction cell if the defendant has fewer than ten PRV points. MCL 777.64. The sentences of class B felons having zero PRV points fall in an intermediate sanction cell. MCL 777.63. And the sentence of no class M2 or A felon could fall in an intermediate sanction cell. MCL 777.61 and 777.62. Given these facts, the magnitude of the problem becomes apparent. Nearly every felony could present a Blakely problem if the defendant has a certain number of PRV points. The comprehensive nature of the problem raises a serious question whether severance is possible. The Legislature encourages saving statutes and acts through severance: In the construction of the statutes of this state the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, that is to say: If any portion of an act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be found to be invalid by a court, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid portion or application, provided such remaining portions are not determined by the court to be inoperable, and to this end acts are declared to be severable. [MCL 8.5.] To determine whether severance is appropriate, this Court must consider whether the portion of the act remaining after the unconstitutional portion has been severed is capable of functioning alone. Blank v. Dep't of Corrections, 462 Mich. 103, 123, 611 N.W.2d 530 (2000), quoting Maki v. East Tawas, 385 Mich. 151, 159, 188 N.W.2d 593 (1971). The Court must also focus on the intent of the Legislature; if the Legislature would not have enacted the act without the severed provisions, the Court cannot sever them. People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 157-159, 228 N.W. 723 (1930), quoting 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), pp. 359-363. I believe that the portions of the guidelines that are unconstitutional are so entangled with the others that they cannot be removed without adversely affecting the guidelines as a whole. The judicial fact-finding required by the sentencing guidelines would be inappropriate with respect to most crimes. An attempt to save the rest of the guidelines would engender confusion in the courts. Defendants, lawyers, and judges would be left guessing at the start of trial which sentencing method will be appropriate and whether judicial fact-finding will later be required or permitted. The prosecution will not be certain about all the facts it will have to prove to the jury. These inconsistencies and uncertainties mitigate against severance. Instead, the act as a whole would have to be found invalid. Blank, 462 Mich. at 123, 611 N.W.2d 530. In addition, the judge would find it difficult to identify the offending sections of the sentencing guidelines statutes. For one defendant convicted of a crime, it would be appropriate to score the OVs. For another convicted of the same crime, it would not be permissible to score the OVs because the defendant's PRV level would place that defendant's sentence in an intermediate sanction cell. The same statutory scheme could apply differently depending on the situation. This is a classic example of entanglement, and it signals that severance is simply not possible. Id. It is also unlikely that the Legislature would have passed only part of the sentencing guidelines. It intended the guidelines to be comprehensive. People v. Garza, 469 Mich. 431, 434-435, 670 N.W.2d 662 (2003). Some of its specific goals were to eliminate sentencing disparity and to ensure that certain crimes that do not warrant prison time result in appropriate sentences. Id. at 435, 670 N.W.2d 662. Severing the portions pertaining to intermediate sanction cells would work against both of these goals. Most importantly, it would directly thwart the Legislature's intent to enact a comprehensive system of sentencing. Everything considered, severance is not appropriate. McMurchy, 249 Mich. at 157-159, 228 N.W. 723. Given that conclusion, this Court must find that Michigan's sentencing guidelines statutes are no longer valid as applied. The question then becomes how sentencing should occur in the future. There have been three options presented to this Court. First, the Court could find the guidelines merely advisory. This is the solution reached by the United States Supreme Court in Booker. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 125 S.Ct. 738. But I believe it is inappropriate in this case. From 1983 to 1998, Michigan's sentencing guidelines were not furnished by the Legislature but by the Court, through administrative orders. They were not mandatory. Judges rendering sentences were obliged to use the guidelines to calculate a sentencing range in each case. But they were not required to sentence convicted parties within those guidelines ranges. People v. Hegwood, 465 Mich. 432, 438, 636 N.W.2d 127 (2001). The Legislature's guidelines replaced the merely advisory judicial guidelines and mandated that judges sentence within the statutory guidelines with few exceptions. To render the statutory guidelines advisory would be directly contrary to the Legislature's intent. The second possible solution is to strike down the guidelines as unconstitutional. This would allow the judges wide discretion in sentencing defendants. The only limitation would be the absolute maximum sentence provided by law. Although this is a better option than the first, it too has serious flaws. Primarily, allowing such discretion would defeat the intent of the Legislature to eliminate sentence disparity. Garza, 469 Mich. at 435, 670 N.W.2d 662. More than likely, this solution would ensure sentence disparity. I believe a third option is the most appropriate and the most consistent with the Legislature's intent regarding sentencing. The third option is to find the sentencing guidelines statutes unconstitutional as applied, but specify how they could operate so as to pass constitutional scrutiny. This would require replacing judicial fact-finding with jury determinations. After a guilty verdict, the prosecution would be required to list the specific OVs that it wished the jury to score. Then, in a bifurcated hearing, the prosecutor would present to the jury evidence regarding each variable. The defense could respond, as in a trial. The jury would then deliberate and make specific findings regarding the OVs. It would indicate which the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the jury would make the determinations, there would be no constitutional impediment to increasing a defendant's sentence from an intermediate sanction cell to a straddle cell sentence. This solution would ensure that the Legislature's intent in enacting the guidelines would be fulfilled. Sentence disparity would be diminished. At the same time, defendants would be afforded full Sixth Amendment protection because the prosecution would be put to its proofs. Given the benefits of this solution, I find it to be the best option available. Therefore, I would require all future sentencing to employ the bifurcated jury procedure where appropriate.