Opinion ID: 535262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Regulation of Vending Machines and Commercial Activity

Text: 32 The next two targets of Gannett's attack are Rules 2 and 3 of the Rules and Regulations, which respectively govern commercial activity and the use of vending machines at Newark Airport. These regulation provide: 33 [Rule 2] No person shall carry on any commercial activity at any air terminal without the consent of the Port Authority. 34 .... 35 [Rule 3] No vending machines for the sale of goods shall be permitted in the public areas of ... Newark International ... which are not occupied by a lessee, licensee or permittee. This provision shall not apply to vending machines in restrooms selling personal hygiene items. 36 Appendix at 555. Citing to the principles enunciated in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), Gannett argues that these regulations are facially invalid. 37 With respect to the regulation of vending machines, we would be required to entertain Gannett's argument were it the case that Rule 3 vested in Port Authority officials the unbridled discretion to choose among vending machines and to permit some but not others to operate at Newark Airport. The simple fact, however, is that no such discretion is conferred by Rule 3. On its face, this regulation prohibits altogether the installation of vending machines for the sale of goods in non-leased areas at Newark Airport, and leaves no room for the Port Authority to carve out exceptions on a case-by-case basis. Because Rule 3 grants no discretion at all to Port Authority officials, it is immune from Gannett's facial attack and therefore survives constitutional scrutiny. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether this regulation would pass muster under Lakewood. 38 Rule 2, on the other hand, does empower the Port Authority to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a person may carry on any commercial activity at any air terminal. Unlike the prohibition of vending machines, this regulation vests Port Authority officials with a considerable degree of discretion to regulate activity at the Airport. Rule 2, moreover, fails to set forth any standards by which the Port Authority is supposed exercise this power. 39 As the Supreme Court stated in Lakewood, however, not all regulations vesting agencies with discretion are subject to a facial challenge. The law in question must have a close enough nexus to expression or expressive conduct to give rise to a substantial threat of undetectable censorship. See Lakewood, 108 S.Ct. at 2145. Unlike the statute struck down in Lakewood, the Port Authority's Rule 2 applies generally to commercial activity, and thus is not narrowly and specifically directed at expression. See id. Like laws requiring individuals to obtain building permits for certain purposes (the example given in Lakewood ), a regulation requiring governmental consent for commercial activity will seldom serve as an effective means of censorship. Of course, like any law conferring a sphere of discretion upon government officials, Rule 2 creates some opportunity for abuse. However, we are persuaded that this regulation provide[s] too blunt a censorship instrument to warrant judicial intervention prior to an allegation of actual misuse. Id. at 2146. Rule 2, therefore, survives Gannett's facial attack. 40