Opinion ID: 2544339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Differential treatment of similarly situated employees

Text: First, Gonsalves alleges that Nissan discriminated against him on the basis of sex in that a similarly-situated female employee, Torres, was not subjected to the same treatment as he was. To prove sexual discrimination based on differential treatment of similarly situated employees, [Gonsalves] must prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation were similar to those employees with whom he seeks to compare his treatment. Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Society, 85 Hawai`i 7, 14, 936 P.2d 643, 650 (1997) (adopting the similarly situated employees analysis in Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir.1994)). This court stated that [g]enerally, similarly situated employees are those who are subject to the same policies and subordinate to the same decision-maker as the plaintiff. Id. This court has already examined the Sixth Circuit's holding in Pierce that the comparison [between the two employees] was invalid because the two employees were not similarly situated: The following distinctions between Pierce and Kennedy are undisputed: Pierce was a supervisor and Kennedy was not; Pierce had responsibility over three offices, whereas Kennedy was an office administrator with no supervisory control over any other employees; Pierce evaluated employees, including Kennedy, while Kennedy evaluated no one; and, unlike Kennedy, Pierce attended agency group meetings and was responsible for enforcement of the company's sexual harassment policy. Id. at 14, 936 P.2d at 650. This court observed that the Sixth Circuit's holding focused on a particularly relevant detail that distinguished them: [U]nlike Kennedy, Pierceas a supervisorcould be considered the employer's agent, and because following this incident the employer was on notice of his behavior, the employer could itself be held liable under Title VII for sexual harassment for any such behavior in the future. This was not true of Kennedy. Id. (citing Pierce, 40 F.3d at 803-04). The same factors that distinguished Pierce from Kennedy likewise distinguish Gonsalves from Torres. Gonsalves, unlike Torres, was a supervisor and could be considered Nissan's agent. Once Nissan had notice of Torres's allegations against Gonsalves, Nissan was potentially liable for future sexual harassment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). Indeed, Gonsalves's complaint acknowledges that he was responsible for enforcing Nissan's written policies, such as the one addressing sexual harassment, with regard to Torres and other subordinates. Thus, Gonsalves and Torres were not similarly situated employees. Accordingly, Gonsalves is unable to demonstrate a claim of sex discrimination based on differential treatment of similarly situated employees.