Opinion ID: 2996218
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (a) state:

Text: Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication under this chapter shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant’s authority to make such application. Each application shall include the following information: The identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the officer authorizing the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) and (1)(a). As previously noted, the application asserted: Pursuant to an application authorized by a duly designated official of the Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, pursuant to the power delegated to that official by special designation of the Attorney General and vested in the Attorney General by sec. Nos. 01-3540, 01-3608, 01-3833, 02-2017 and 02-2018 9 2516 of Title 18, United States Code, to intercept wire communications. In addition, the government included two letters specifying the approval and authorization of an application and an affidavit from the FBI’s lead agent in the investigation. The government’s piecemeal approach resulted in an application which tested the boundaries of complying with statutory provisions. Without demeaning the importance of technical violations, we note that the Supreme Court has said that “[not] every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral communications ‘unlawful.’ ” United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1974). Fudge refrains from viewing the whole picture and instead insists on looking at each document in isolation. While the government was not a model of clarity as to the identity of the authorizing official, we, like the district court, are left with little doubt the authorizing official was Kevin DiGregory. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant General for the Criminal Division, is a person who Attorney General Reno bestowed upon the power to authorize wiretap applications. The district court surmised that Assistant United States Attorney Jeffery Anderson prepared his application to the court before knowing which Department of Justice official would sign the authorization letter. It further posited that Anderson, instead of retyping a new draft, likely chose simply to incorporate the authorization letter by attaching it to the application. We agree with the district court’s conclusion. There was no chicanery or deception involved in this application process. We next consider Fudge’s claim that the order authorizing the interception was improper. Like the wiretap application, she challenges the absence of any indication of 10 Nos. 01-3540, 01-3608, 01-3833, 02-2017 and 02-2018 the person who authorized the application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) and (4)(d). These sections provide: Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall specify: The identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) and (4)(d). The order authorizing the interception of wire communications did not specify by name the person who authorized the application. It did, however, state that the application was authorized “by a duly designated official of the Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, pursuant to the power delegated to that official by special designation of the Attorney General and vested in the Attorney General.” At oral argument, the government admitted that the order failed to identify who authorized the application, but justified the absence by explaining the district court left it out by mistake. We find better solace in Chavez v. United States, 416 U.S. 562 (1974), where the Supreme Court considered errors in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(d). It noted, “[w]here it is established that responsibility for approval of the application is fixed in the Attorney General, however, compliance with the screening requirements of Title III is assured, and there is no justification for suppression.” Id. at 572. In the case sub judice, the order specifically noted authorization was made pursuant to a power delegated by the Attorney General. Thus, we believe that under Chavez, the order’s failure to identify the individual who authorized the application did not violate any substantive requirement of Title III and consequently does not warrant suppression. Fudge has one final basis for challenging the wiretap. She argues the application for the wiretap failed to make the Nos. 01-3540, 01-3608, 01-3833, 02-2017 and 02-2018 11 required showing of necessity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1)(c). This section requires the government, in its application for an interception order, to provide “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). These requirements are set forth in the alternative and thus the government need only establish one of the three. United States v. Adams, 125 F.3d 586, 595 (7th Cir. 1997). Wiretaps do not have to be used only as a last resort in an investigation. United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1340 (7th Cir. 1991). The evil we are trying to avoid is the routine use of wiretaps as an initial step in the investigation. Id. However, the government’s burden of proving necessity is not extraordinarily high, and our review is not hypertechnical. United States v. Dumes, 313 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1976). Fudge’s first argument essentially contends that evidence of a specific individual engaging in a criminal activity obviates the need for any additional, more probing, investigative techniques. Unsurprisingly, she cites no case law supporting this proposition. The government used the wiretap for a number of reasons, not the least of which was to obtain more incriminating evidence. We do not find such a basis problematic. Fudge next claims the wiretap was unnecessary be- cause enough information existed to prosecute each conspirator individually. This argument ignores the fact that this was an intricate investigation involving a large and dangerous drug conspiracy. The government had exhausted most, if not all, of the major methods for obtaining information. The wiretap enabled them to avoid the logistical quandaries that would arise if it had taken the litigation approach Fudge suggests. Moreover, the ability to success- 12 Nos. 01-3540, 01-3608, 01-3833, 02-2017 and 02-2018 fully prosecute all the conspirators would be greatly compromised. This situation is akin to that of United States v. Adams, 125 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1997). In Adams, we upheld the grant of a wiretap because other methods of investigation would be unsuccessful in identifying the drug suppliers and in discerning the full scope of the organization. Id. at 595-96. As in Adams, the government’s use of the wiretap on the P-Stone Nation effectively supplemented the other sources of evidence and permitted them to view the big picture, from the top of the organization to the lowest rung. The wiretap was instrumental in filling the gaps and securing critical evidence against the conspirators; we decline to impose implacable burdens that would frustrate this result. Fudge cites language from other circuits that appears favorable to her position. We do not question the logic of these decisions, rather, they are simply inapplicable to her case. The underlying facts are clear. The wiretap was not the first step of this investigation. Actually, the government made various attempts to obtain evidence from many sources. Fudge’s importance to the scheme and her fungible duties necessitated a wiretap on these phones. Finally, the wiretap was not just an “additional tool” in the investigative process. Actually, it was the method that enabled them to gauge the depth and scope of this conspiracy. Shawn Johnson’s 46-page affidavit was submitted with the application for an order authorizing a wiretap. It detailed the need for the interception of wire communications. It set forth the alternative investigative procedures and their lack of success. The affidavit clearly establishes that the government met the statutory criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). The district court’s grant of the wiretap and admission of the evidence obtained through it was not an abuse of discretion. Nos. 01-3540, 01-3608, 01-3833, 02-2017 and 02-2018 13