Opinion ID: 3047836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Reopen the Removal Proceedings

Text: In general, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and the alien must file that motion no later than ninety days after the date of the final administrative decision denying relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Nevertheless, the numerical and time limitations set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) do not apply if the petitioner can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In addition, a motion to reopen must establish the petitioner’s prima facie eligibility for asylum. Guo, 386 F.3d at 563-64. The prima facie standard requires that the moving party “‘produce objective evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that he can establish [that he is entitled to relief].’” Id. at 563 (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002)). Zhou filed her motion to reopen more than ninety days after the agency issued its final order of removal. Accordingly, for the BIA to grant her motion to reopen, Zhou was required to present material evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of 4 nationality” that was not available during her earlier hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In support of her assertion of “changed country conditions,” Zhou submitted information that was not available at her removal hearing, including the Chinese government’s “Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in China by Foreign News Agencies,” reports detailing the recent arrests of and sentences imposed on political dissidents who published articles critical of the Chinese government on the Internet, and the 2005 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China.2 J.A. at 90-183. The 2005 U.S. Department of State Country Report reported a “trend towards increased harassment, detention, and imprisonment by government and security authorities of those perceived as threatening to government authority” as well as government measures to “control more tightly print, broadcast and electronic media and censor[] online content.” Id. at 182. With respect to the CDP, the 2005 Department of State Report noted that “[d]ozens of CDP leaders, activists, and members have been arrested, detained, or confined.” Id. at 183. The BIA did not specifically address any of this newly acquired evidence, and it 2 Zhou also submitted the 2006 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China. This report was not submitted to the BIA until after it denied Zhou’s motion to reopen on June 28, 2007. J.A. at 5-51. Because our review is limited to the record that was before the agency when it issued the decision under review, we may not consider the 2006 U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in China. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (providing that reviewing court must decide the petition “only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based”); Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is axiomatic that we may not foray outside the administrative record in considering this appeal.”). 5 did not point to any evidence refuting Zhou’s claim of changed country conditions. In deciding that Zhou had failed to demonstrate “changed circumstances in the country of nationality,” the BIA concluded that Zhou has not submitted evidence which tends to demonstrate that conditions in China have deteriorated since the time of [her] hearing. The evidence does not tend to show that Chinese officials’ treatment of dissidents is more severe at this point. Finally, we note that the Immigration Judge found that [Zhou] was not credible, a finding not overturned on appeal. In this motion, the respondent’s claims were not adequately supported by documentary evidence concerning current conditions in China and her assertions on this issue are not credible. J.A. at 54-55. When evaluating the BIA’s decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court is “‘not foreclosed from determining whether the BIA followed proper procedures and considered and appraised the material evidence before it.’” Thu v. Att’y Gen., 510 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 177 (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d at 583). As the Sotto Court noted, “[t]o determine whether the administrative action was arbitrary, the courts must be apprised why evidence, relevant and persuasive on its face, was discredited.” Sotto, 748 F.2d at 837; see also Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 314-16 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding that the BIA abused its discretion when it offered no explanation for its rejection of evidence offered to show changed country conditions). “If the administrative record fails to reveal that such evidence has been fairly considered, the proper course is to remand the case to the INS so that the Service may evaluate such evidence and consider its effect on the 6 application as a whole.” Sotto, 748 F.2d at 837. Based on its perfunctory denial of Zhou’s motion to reopen, the BIA abused its discretion in rejecting her claim of changed country conditions. It failed to explain why newly acquired evidence, most notably the State Department’s 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China and the Chinese government’s “Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in China by Foreign News Agencies,” was discredited or disregarded. Indeed, this Court, in assessing the adequacy of the BIA’s consideration of evidence, has specifically pointed to the failure to consider State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as a ground for remand. Thu, 510 F.3d at 407 (holding that IJ failed to consider all evidence, especially the Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Burma); see also Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907-08 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that BIA failed to conduct sufficient review of claim where it incorrectly described petitioner as Syrian Christian rather than Assyrian Christian and declined to address the U.S. Department of State’s report detailing persecution of Assyrian Christians in Iraq). Nevertheless, the BIA’s failure to mention a State Department report specifically does not automatically render its decision an abuse of discretion. See Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 41617 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that BIA’s decision was adequate even though “the evidence . . . included country reports and various articles” that the BIA “failed to mention specifically”). In Toussaint, this Court determined that the BIA’s asserted 7 consideration of “background evidence” satisfied it “that the BIA considered the country reports and [other] articles.” Id. Here, the BIA’s rejection of Zhou’s motion was supported by conclusory statements asserting that Zhou’s “claims are not adequately supported” and that Zhou “has not submitted evidence which tends to demonstrate that conditions in China have deteriorated since the time of the respondent’s hearing.” J.A. at 54. This analysis does not satisfy us that the BIA “‘considered and appraised the material evidence before it.’” See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 277 (quoting Tipu, 20 F.3d at 583). One observation the BIA did offer in support of its denial of Zhou’s motion to reopen was the IJ’s previous adverse credibility determination. Nevertheless, an initial adverse credibility determination does not automatically taint subsequent applications for relief. Guo, 386 F.3d at 562-63. Instead, each adverse credibility assessment must be supported “with statements or record evidence specifically related to the issue under consideration.” Id. at 562 (“Nor does one adverse credibility finding beget another.”). While the IJ’s credibility assessment stemmed from Zhou’s initial claim of religious persecution, Zhou based her subsequent motion to reopen on changed country conditions in China regarding persecution of political dissidents; there is no indication that the claims asserted in the motion to reopen are related to Zhou’s earlier claims of religious persecution. Further, the BIA offered no explanation of why it found the assertions in Zhou’s motion to reopen based on fear of political persecution to be incredible. See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313 (“Facts presented in the motion to reopen are ‘accepted as true 8 unless inherently unbelievable.’” (quoting Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2005))).