Opinion ID: 1532348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights

Text: Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the land. Petitioner, like the claimants in Johnson, argues that, if the 180-day notice requirement is not tolled for minors, the requirement violates their right of access to the courts under Article 19. Johnson, 331 Md. at 292, 628 A.2d at 165. As we stated in Johnson, Article 19 does guarantee access to the courts.... however, a `statutory restriction upon access to the courts violates Article 19 only if the restriction is unreasonable.' Johnson, 331 Md. at 297, 628 A.2d at 168, quoting Murphy, 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113; see e.g., Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 263, 863 A.2d 297, 308 (2004); Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 205-06, 808 A.2d 508, 518 (2002). As with the Maryland Tort Claims Act, the General Assembly has waived the local government's ability to avoid responsibility for the defense and indemnification of employees under the LGTCA, but has required timely notice as a condition of that waiver. Prior to the enactment of the LGTCA, the County would not have been required to defend and indemnify its employees for wrongdoing committed during a governmental activity. The individual would have had no assurance that a judgment would be paid. The LGTCA provides such guarantees if notice is furnished within 180-days of the injury. In so doing, we recognize that a minor is dependent upon an adult to comply with the notice provision, but, we cannot craft an addendum to the LGTCA to toll the requirement. That is the prerogative of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, Petitioner relies primarily on our reasoning in Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 808 A.2d 508 (2002), a more recent case than Johnson, although similarly authored by Judge Eldridge, for the argument that the 180-day notice requirement as applied to minors violates Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In Piselli, the parents of a son with extensive damage to the growth plates brought a medical malpractice action as next friend of their son five years after his injury, beyond the time period of the statute of limitations. Id. at 196, 808 A.2d at 512-13. The question presented to this Court was whether the time limitations prescribed by [Section] 5-109 [of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article [16] ], as applied to an injured minor's claim, are unreasonable restrictions upon a traditional remedy and the minor's access to the courts and, therefore, are in violation of Article 19 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights]. Id. at 208, 808 A.2d at 519-20. In Piselli, we found that it was an established principle in Maryland law that time periods for bringing suit are tolled during infancy. Id. at 214, 808 A.2d at 523. We determined that [t]he restrictions upon a minor's remedy and access to the courts, contained in subsections (b), (c) and (e) of [Section] 5-109 represent a drastic departure from a principle which has governed minors' causes of action for more than 500 years. Id. at 215, 808 A.2d at 524. Therefore, we concluded that the statutes of limitations contained in Section 5-109 as applied to minors violated Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as an unreasonable restriction. Id. There are significant differences between the case at bar and the facts of Piselli. Under the facts of the case sub judice, the LGTCA does not restrict a traditional remedy or access to the courts unlike the effect of Section 5-109 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Absent the enactment of the LGTCA, local governments would not be required to defend and indemnify their employees in suits arising out of non-constitutional torts committed during governmental activities other than nuisance actions, see, e.g., DiPino, 354 Md. at 47, 729 A.2d at 369-70 (A local governmental entity is liable for its torts if the tortious conduct occurs while the entity is acting in a private or proprietary capacity, but, unless its immunity is legislatively waived, it is immune from liability for tortious conduct committed while the entity is acting in a governmental capacity.). Therefore, the LGTCA cannot be described as restricting a traditional remedy or access to the courts when it legislatively permits plaintiffs to enforce judgments obtained from suit against the employee against the local government. Moreover, to hold that the reasoning in Piselli applies would be to find that the LGTCA purports to place local governments or their employees engaged in governmental activities in the same position legally as the private tortfeasors in Piselli, which was not the intent of the General Assembly. The notice provision of the LGTCA is a condition precedent to the right of action; limitations statutes create defenses. The focus of the two, i.e., notice vis a vis limitations, is very different. Therefore, both Ms. Rios's and Luis's actions are barred for failing to satisfy the notice requirement of the LGTCA. [17]