Opinion ID: 2313631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: History of the Special Exception in Maryland

Text: One of our earliest cases to mention and discuss meaningfully the special exception as a zoning tool [21] is Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 49 A.2d 799 (1946) ( Heath I ), although the case apparently uses the term in a different sense than it is used today. In Heath I, nearby landowners challenged the Baltimore City Board of Zoning Appeals's decision to permit their neighbor to erect a two-car garage. At the time, the Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance permitted the Board of Zoning Appeals to grant special exceptions to such garages in residential areas. We noted that an `exception' within the meaning of a zoning ordinance is a dispensation permissible where the Board of Zoning Appeals finds existing those facts and circumstances specified in the ordinance as sufficient to warrant a deviation from the general rule. Heath I, 187 Md. at 303, 49 A.2d at 803. The Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance empower[ed] the Board of Zoning Appeals to make special exceptions or variances only where the proposed building, alteration, or use `shall not create hazards from fire or disease or shall not menace the public health, security, or morals.' It then provides that the board, in passing upon applications for special exceptions or variances as to use, height, or area, shall give consideration to the various factors enumerated in [the Zoning Ordinance]. Heath I, 187 Md. at 302-03, 49 A.2d at 803. Although we held that the Board of Zoning Appeals had authority to grant the special exception, we reversed its decision because it failed to fairly describe the rationale and supporting facts for its decision. We noted that in passing on an application for a special exception in a residential use district, the Board of Zoning Appeals must take into consideration all pertinent factors enumerated in Section 1, such as fire hazards, traffic problems, transportation requirements and facilities, streets and paving, and schools, parks and playgrounds, and its action must be reasonable in the light of these and all other pertinent facts. In this case the board announced merely that it had `made a study of the premises and neighborhood,' and there was no supporting evidence upon which to base a rational judgment. Heath I, 187 Md. at 305, 49 A.2d at 804. From a modern vantage point, the zoning device at the heart of Heath I actually resembles more the notion of a variance. When the case again came to the Court of Appeals after remand, the Court, applying an analysis grounded in hardship consideration, treated the granting of the special exception as if the applicant were seeking a variance. [22] Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 190 Md. 478, 483-484, 58 A.2d 896, 898 (1948) ( Heath II ). This appears to have been a frequent conflation in cases from that era. The use of the term special exception in the Heath cases seems to have had a different meaning than the one given to the phrase by more recent Maryland land use jurisprudence. See, e.g., Easter v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 195 Md. 395, 400, 73 A.2d 491, 492 (1950) (The burden of showing facts to justify a[ ] [special] exception or variance rests upon the applicant, and it must be shown that the hardship affects the particular premises and is not common to other property in the neighborhood.); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514, 50 A.2d 804; Cleland v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 198 Md. 440, 444, 84 A.2d 49, 51 (1951). For example, in Gleason v. Keswick Imp. Ass'n, 197 Md. 46, 50, 78 A.2d 164, 165 (1951), the Court repeatedly noted that the applicants in that case were seeking a special exception. Over 50 years later, in analyzing Gleason, we deduced that the opinion actually addressed a zoning re-classification, variance, or alternate classification possibility. Richard Roeser Prof'l Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 368 Md. 294, 299, 793 A.2d 545, 549 (2002); see also Zengerle v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Frederick County, 262 Md. 1, 21, 276 A.2d 646, 656 (1971) (describing Gleason as a variance case). The distinction between a variance and special exception was not clarified definitively in our caselaw until Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261 (1953) ( Merlands Club ). In Merlands Club, we reviewed the refusal by the Board of Appeals of Montgomery County to grant a special exception for a private recreational club. In reversing the Board's decision, we held that the special exception provision in the zoning ordinance delegate[s] to the Zoning Board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the legislative body finds in effect prima facie properly residential, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which would change this presumptive finding. The duties given the Board are to judge whether the neighboring properties and the general neighborhood would be adversely affected, and whether the use, in the particular case, is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning plan.[ [23] ] Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 287-88, 96 A.2d at 264 We further noted that where a specific use is permitted by the legislative body in a given area if the general zoning plan is conformed to and there is no adverse effect on the neighborhood, the application can be granted. . . . Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 289, 96 A.2d at 265. Describing the presumption afforded special exception uses, we noted that private clubs are prima facie to be permitted in a residential use area. The applicant for such a use need not show either practical difficulty, unnecessary hardship, or great urgency, but only that the project is a private club and that it would be in general harmony with the zoning plan and would not adversely affect the neighboring properties and the general neighborhood. Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 290, 96 A.2d at 265. Thus, in Merlands Club, the Court discarded the consideration generally of hardship as part of the special exception analysis, unless the particular zoning ordinance explicitly injects hardship as a factor. We later considered the teachings of Merlands Club in the context of special exceptions provided for in the zoning ordinance in Baltimore County. In Oursler v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 204 Md. 397, 104 A.2d 568 (1954) (our first substantial opportunity to examine the regulation of special exceptions in Baltimore County), we affirmed an order of the Baltimore County Board of Zoning Appeals granting a special exception (in Oursler it was referred to as a special permit) to operate a restaurant in a residential area. The zoning ordinance section governing special exceptions in effect at that time was identical to the current version of BCZR § 502.1(a) through (f). In applying the zoning ordinance, we noted: It is the function of the Zoning Commissioner, and the Board of Zoning Appeals on appeal, to determine whether or not any proposed use for which a special permit is sought would be in harmony with the general purposes and intent of the Zoning Regulations, and whether it could be conducted without being detrimental to the welfare of the neighborhood. Accordingly, in Baltimore County, where restaurants are prima facie permissible in residential zones, an applicant for a permit to conduct a restaurant in a residential zone is not required to show that denial of a permit would result in practical difficulty, or unnecessary or unreasonable hardship, as in the case of a variance, but must show only that the exception would be in harmony with the zoning plan and would not be detrimental to the welfare of the neighborhood. Oursler, 204 Md. at 401-02, 104 A.2d at 570; See also Erdman v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Balt. County, 212 Md. 288, 295-296, 129 A.2d 124, 127 (1957) (applying and quoting Oursler ). In Gilmor v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 205 Md. 557, 109 A.2d 739 (1954), the Baltimore City Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals granted a permit [24] to erect a billboard in a first commercial use district. We affirmed and discussed the legislative presumption afforded special exception permits: The argument of the appellants that the erection of a billboard in a first commercial use district, in which there are residences, would lead to slums and, in this way, in the future affect adversely the public health or safety, is an argument that billboards should not be permitted at all in a district in which there are residences or substantial and attractive businesses, although it is zoned first commercial. Whatever the merits of this argument, it is one which should be addressed to the Legislature or the Baltimore City Council in an effort to have the law changed. As the law now stands, the argument is fanciful. The legislative branch of the government, in allowing billboards to be erected in such areas, has said, in effect, that the likelihood that their presence will bring about the dire consequences foreseen by the appellant, is not great enough to forbid generally the use of property to accommodate them. It has added a safeguard for the instances contrary to the general rule in the procedures required by Sections 37, 38 and 39 of the Ordinance, whereby the Board, as a legislative agent, may determine in any particular instance that the public health, safety, welfare, security and morals will be affectednot in the deterioration of the neighborhood over a period of time because of the presence of the billboards, but because of some immediate fact, circumstance or condition which would bring about the evils guarded against. Gilmor, 205 Md. at 565, 109 A.2d at 743. In 1957, we decided Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957). Huff was not a special exception case, but is nonetheless helpful to our analysis here because Huff compared the special exception tool to another, similar zoning device. In Huff, the local legislature enacted a zoning tool which would be described in modern zoning terminology as a floating zone. [25] A landowner meeting certain statutory requirements (such as minimum lot size and parking requirements) could petition for his property to be zoned Manufacturing, Restricted. The decision whether to grant a petition was to be made in the first instance by the Zoning Commissioner with the right of appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals. The statute further stated that such a rezoning was intended to protect the uses in neighboring residential zones and that the building and grounds must be continuously maintained so that they will not adversely affect vicinal properties. Huff, 214 Md. at 59, 133 A.2d at 89. In upholding the legislation creating the Manufacturing, Restricted floating zone, we noted: We read the provisions of the regulations as to the purpose and intent in establishing [Manufacturing, Restricted] Zones and as to the mechanics employed to be sure that the plan approved will continue to protect the uses in neighboring residential zones and not adversely affect vicinal properties, to mean that an area cannot be properly zoned or rezoned Manufacturing, Restricted unless in actual operation and effect it will be a harmonious part of the comprehensive plan and serve the purposes of the enabling act; that is, that the zoning will be not only in the public good but in the interests of nearby property owners. If the regulations be read as we read them, it is clear that the Manufacturing, Restricted classification is analogous to a special exception, and the rules which are applicable to special exceptions would apply, not the general rules of original error or change in conditions or the character of the neighborhood, that control the propriety of rezoning. This is because, as in the case of a special exception, there has been a prior legislative determination, as part of a comprehensive plan, that the use which the administrative body permits, upon application to the particular case of the specified standards, is prima facie proper in the environment in which it is permitted. This prior determination and the establishment of sufficient standards effectively refute the claim of improper delegation of legislative power. Huff, 214 Md. at 62, 133 A.2d at 91. Merlands Club and Oursler were cited favorably in Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Md. 379, 383, 170 A.2d 768, 770 (1961), another Baltimore County land use case. In Crowther, we affirmed the Board of Appeals's denial of a special exception to operate a trailer home park in the Manufacturing, Light zone. We began our analysis by noting the appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating an application for a special exception by noting that conditions upon which a special exception may be granted are set out in the ordinance, and the board is given a wide latitude of discretion in passing upon special exceptions so long as the resulting use is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning plan and will not adversely affect the use of neighboring properties and the general plan of the neighborhood as provided by the zoning ordinance. We determined that substantial evidence supported the Board's denial of the special exception (a) because it would be inconsistent with the continued development of a planned and existing, though only partly developed, manufacturing area needed for such purposes in this particular locality for the development of a large area in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and (b) because it would adversely affect property values in the vicinity. Crowther, 225 Md. at 385, 170 A.2d at 771. In Deen v. Baltimore Gas & Electric. Co., 240 Md. 317, 330-31, 214 A.2d 146, 153 (1965), we addressed a utility's request for a special exception to place overhead transmission lines in Baltimore County. The Zoning Commissioner granted the special exception for only part of the utility company's five-mile right-of-way. The remainder of the power transmission lines would be required to be buried. BG & E appealed to the County Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals, after a six-day de novo hearing, granted the special exception in part, requiring still that some of the power transmission lines be buried. The company appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which held that the special exception should have been granted for the entire right-of-way. In reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court, resulting in affirmance of the Board of Appeals's decision, the Court of Appeals noted that [s]ection 502.1 implies that the effect on health, safety or general welfare must be in some sense unique or else a special exception could never be granted in such an area.... Deen, 240 Md. at 331, 214 A.2d at 153. See also Brouillett v. Eudowood Shopping Plaza, Inc., 249 Md. 606, 608-609, 241 A.2d 404, 405 (1968) (A further reason in support of the Board's action in denying the special exception was the appellees' failure to adduce sufficient evidence that the requested use would not `be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of the locality involved.' In a hearing for a special exception where the requested use is permitted under the existing zoning classification the applicant need only show that the use is consistent with the existing classification and that it would not be adverse to the welfare of the neighborhood.); Bd. of County Comm'rs for Prince George's County v. Luria, 249 Md. 1, 3, 238 A.2d 108, 109 (1968) ([T]he requisites for the granting of a special exception are a finding that the proposed use is in harmony with the general plan and a finding that the proposed use will not have an adverse effect on health and safety nor be detrimental to adjacent properties or the general neighborhood.); Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Board of Appeals of City of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 190-91, 262 A.2d 499, 503 (1970) (If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public interest, [the applicant] has met his burden. (citing Merlands and Oursler )). In Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 55, 310 A.2d 543, 551 (1973), a special exception case emanating from Wicomico County, we again had occasion to describe the burden of the applicant seeking a special exception: While the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards and requirements he does not have the burden of showing affirmatively that his proposed use accords with the general welfare. If he shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public interest, he has met his burden. The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal. In Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md.App. 612, 617, 329 A.2d 716, 720 (1974), Judge Rita Davidson (seven years later to become the author of Schultz ), then writing for the Court of Special Appeals, examined an order of the Baltimore County Board of Appeals denying an application for a special exception to operate a funeral home within a residential zone. Relying on Turner, 270 Md. 41, 310 A.2d 543; Cason v. Board of County Commissioners, 261 Md. 699, 276 A.2d 661 (1971); [26] Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. 183, 262 A.2d 499, and Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261, she described the special exception and the evaluative standard attendant to it thusly: The conditional use or special exception is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that, as such, it is in the interest of the general welfare, and therefore, valid. The special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to allow enumerated uses which the legislature has determined to be permissible absent any fact or circumstance negating the presumption. The duties given the Board are to judge whether the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would be adversely affected and whether the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan. Anderson, 23 Md.App. at 617, 329 A.2d at 720. The intermediate appellate court in Anderson held that the Board of Appeals erroneously denied the special exception. The court noted that in order to deny the right of the property owner to enjoy the requested special exception, the Board needed before it probative evidence that the proposed use would, in fact, create traffic congestion on Sunberry Road, and would, in fact, be detrimental otherwise to the general welfare of the locality involved. In this case there was no such probative evidence presented. Anderson, 23 Md. App. at 617-18, 329 A.2d at 720. In an often-quoted section, the court concluded: There can be no doubt that an undertaking business has an inherent depressing and disturbing psychological effect which may adversely affect persons residing in the immediate neighborhood in the enjoyment of their homes and which may lessen the values thereof. Indeed, it is precisely because of such inherent deleterious effects that the action of a local legislature in prohibiting such uses in a given zone or zones will be regarded as promoting the general welfare and as constitutionally sound. But in the instant case the legislature of Baltimore County has determined that as part of its comprehensive plan funeral homes are to be allowed in residential zones notwithstanding their inherent deleterious effects. By defining a funeral home as an appropriate use by way of special exception, the legislature of Baltimore County has, in essence, declared that such uses, if they satisfy the other specific requirements of the ordinance, do promote the health, safety and general welfare of the community. As part of the comprehensive zoning plan this legislative declaration shares in a presumption of validity and correctness which the courts will honor. The presumption that the general welfare is promoted by allowing funeral homes in a residential use district, notwithstanding their inherent depressing effects, cannot be overcome unless there are strong and substantial existing facts or circumstances showing that the particularized proposed use has detrimental effects above and beyond the inherent ones ordinarily associated with such uses. Consequently, the bald allegation that a funeral home use is inherently psychologically depressing and adversely influences adjoining property values, as well as other evidence which confirms that generally accepted conclusion, is insufficient to overcome the presumption that such a use promotes the general welfare of a local community. Because there were neither facts nor valid reasons to support the conclusion that the grant of the requested special exception would adversely affect adjoining and surrounding properties in any way other than would result from the location of any funeral home in any residential zone, the evidence presented by the protestants was, in effect, no evidence at all. . . . . ... The protestants have shown nothing more than that they would suffer the same degree of harm as would be suffered by any homeowner if a funeral home were permitted on land adjacent or in close proximity to their residences. If the residents of Baltimore County do not want funeral homes in residential use districts, they should prevail upon the local legislature to change the ordinance. (citations omitted) Anderson, 23 Md.App. at 624-25, 329 A.2d at 724. Less than a year after Anderson, in Gowl v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Md.App. 410, 341 A.2d 832 (1975), the Court of Special Appeals [27] purported to inject a new twist to the standards for evaluating special exceptions. Gowl held that, in deciding whether to grant a special exception, the zoning body should compare the adverse effects of a proposed special exception use to the adverse effects of permitted uses allowed in the zone at the site proposed for the special exception. For example, the potential for adverse effect of a proposed use on traffic congestion at a critical intersection in the neighborhood was to be compared to the effect on traffic congestion of permitted uses within the zone. The Court of Special Appeals noted that traffic impact on an application for a special exception ought to be measured against that which could arise under permissible use, and not merely on existing traffic loads around the undeveloped premises. Where, as here, the potential volume of traffic under the requested use would appear to be no greater than that which would arise from permitted uses, we believe it arbitrary, capricious and illegal to deny the application for special exception on vehicular traffic grounds. Gowl, 27 Md.App. at 417-18, 341 A.2d at 836.