Opinion ID: 2787020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coastal Island Exemption

Text: DHEC asserts that because Tract D is surrounded by coastal tidelands and waters, it is a coastal island under Regulation 30-1(D)(11). Further, DHEC argues that Tract D essentially ceased to be a part of Folly Island as a result of the creation of the man-made canals that separate Tract D from 806 East Cooper Avenue. In contrast, Respondent does not dispute that Tract D is surrounded by coastal tidelands and waters, but rather contends that because Tract D remains within the geographical and legal boundaries of Folly Island, it is expressly exempt 5 To the extent an appellate court relies on the law of the case doctrine, the appellate decision affirms the lower court's decision procedurally, rather than on the merits. from being considered a coastal island. As the ALC aptly expressed, This decision [] centers on whether the legislature intended that its declaration of Folly Island as [exempt from the general definition of a 'coastal island'] overrides its declaration that a coastal island is simply high ground which is 'separated from other high ground areas by coastal tidelands or waters.' In other words, the issue here is purely an issue of regulatory interpretation. Generally, [a] specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one. Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 333 S.C. 464, 468, 511 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1999); see also Converse Power Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 350 S.C. 39, 47–48, 564 S.E.2d 341, 346 (Ct. App. 2002) (employing the rules of statutory construction to discern the meaning of a regulation). Here, Regulation 30-1(D)(11) broadly defines coastal islands, but then specifically exempts certain islands, including Folly Island, from the general definition. See S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1(D)(11). Further, the ALC found that Tract D was on and within Folly Island, and as detailed in the court of appeals' opinion, that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Dreher, 399 S.C. at 263–64, 730 S.E.2d at 924–25 (outlining the facts in the record demonstrating that Tract D is part of Folly Island). As such, we agree with Respondent that Tract D is not a coastal island in and of itself; rather, it is part of Folly Island, which is specifically exempted in the regulation. Accordingly, the specific regulatory exemption for Folly Island controls over the more general regulatory definition of coastal island. As a result, Tract D cannot be considered a coastal island, and the minimum acreage requirement found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) does not bar Respondent's bridge construction permit application. In conjunction with Regulation 30-12(F) and the ALC's finding that [t]he proposed bridge was the least environmentally damaging alternative for access to Tract D and, in fact, would have de minimus environmental impact, we find that DHEC and the ALC erred in denying Respondent's permit application. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(F) (outlining the environmental impact standards DHEC should consider prior to granting a bridgebuilding permit).