Opinion ID: 492486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fiat-Allis Agreement.

Text: 17 Pioneer argues that it has already paid commissions based on purchase orders from Fiat-Allis. Pioneer relies on the testimony of Regina Deich, the former in-house accountant for Pioneer, who said: I can recall looking at Fiat-Allis and I believe that most of the commissions, if not all, were paid. Later, when asked the location of any documents that would substantiate this testimony, Ms. Deich replied: When I left Pioneer, they were in the files and records at Pioneer Astro Industries. None of this documentation, if it exists, is in the record to show whether the commissions were or were not actually paid. By contrast, Cavic presented purchase orders which clearly showed his right to receive commissions. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by accepting Cavic's version regarding this issue.
18 Alternatively, Pioneer contends that Cavic's claims to the Fiat-Allis commissions are barred by the applicable Colorado statutes of limitation. 19 The statute of limitations issue was first raised by Pioneer as an affirmative defense in its answer. The issue was again listed in the pretrial order and was read aloud by the trial court at the start of trial as one of several legal theories upon which Pioneer would rely. The issue was never mentioned again until after trial. Pioneer neither argued the issue nor presented evidence to advance any theory as to why the statute of limitations had run. And, not surprisingly, the trial court made no ruling on the question in its findings and conclusions. 20 It is a general rule that a federal appellate court will not consider an issue which was not presented to, considered or decided by the trial court. Eureka-Carlisle Co. v. Rottman, 398 F.2d 1015, 1019 (10th Cir.1968). See also Pell v. Azar Nut Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 949, 950 (10th Cir.1983). The rule may be relaxed when the issue is one of law and the proper resolution is beyond doubt or where injustice might otherwise result. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). Further, [t]he matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. Id. 21 We find that Pioneer did not sufficiently advance its argument before the trial court and that therefore this argument was not properly raised below. Accordingly, we will not consider the issue now, on appeal. Since Pioneer has still not offered any evidence or theory on which to overturn the lower ruling based on statute of limitation grounds, we find no injustice in this decision. 22 Additionally, the proper resolution of the issue is not beyond doubt. We have found only sparse Colorado authority on whether the discovery rule is applicable to when a cause of action accrues under the statute. Moreover, a holding as a matter of law that the discovery rule is applicable to this statute would then require review of certain facts which were unlitigated and unresolved at trial. Given these factors, an exception to the general rule is inappropriate in this case. 23