Opinion ID: 30597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: One ombudsperson appointed by the General

Text: Superintendent. 4. The committee shall conduct a hearing that affords all parties the right to present information according to procedures prescribed by the committee. 5. The committee shall issue an advisory decision to the General Superintendent. 6. The General Superintendent shall review the advisory decision of the committee and issue a decision that shall be final and binding. decisionmaker in instances where a teacher/coach objected to his proposed transfer. However, that Superintendent Wright may have been delegated the final decision in the cases of protested individual employee transfers does not mean that he had or had been delegated the status of policymaker, much less final policymaker, respecting employee transfers. In Pembaur and Praprotnik the Court carefully distinguished between those having mere decisionmaking authority and those having policymaking authority. Pembaur first noted that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances, id. 475 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1298, and that where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly. Id. 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. at 1299. Pembaur went on, however, to emphasize that, for the municipality to be liable, the decision (whether or not one of policy) must be made by an official with final policymaking authority in respect to the matter decided, viz: Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. [footnote omitted] The fact that a particular official—even a policymaking official—has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. [citation and footnote omitted] The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.12 ————— 12 Thus, for example, the County Sheriff mmay have discretion to hire and fire employees without also being the county official responsible for establishing county employment policy. If this were the case, the Sheriff's decisions respecting employment would not give rise to municipal liability, although similar decisions with respect to law enforcement practices, over which the Sheriff is the official policymaker, would give rise to municipal liability. Instead, if county employment policy was set by the Board of County Commissioners, only that body's decisions would provide a basis for county liability. This would be true even if the Board left the Sheriff discretion to hire and fire employees and the Sheriff exercised that discretion in an unconstitutional manner; the decision to act unlawfully would not be a decision of the Board. However, if the Board delegated its power to establish final employment policy to the Sheriff, the Sheriff's decisions would represent county policy and could give rise to municipal liability. Id. 475 U.S. at 484 & n. 12, 106 S.Ct. at 1299-1300 & n. 12. The example of the County Sheriff and Board of County Commissioners clearly reflects that the Court sharply distinguished between decisionmakers and final policymakers. This example was elevated from footnote to text in Praprotnik, where the Court held that it was error to base liability on the employment decisions of officials lacking final policymaking authority in that area, viz: This case therefore resembles the hypothetical example in Pembaur: [I]f [city] employment policy was set by the [Mayor and Aldermen and by the Civil Service Commission], only [those] bod[ies'] decisions would provide a basis for [city] liability. This would be true even if the [Mayor and Aldermen and the Commission] left the [appointing authorities] discretion to hire and fire employees and [they] exercised that discretion in an unconstitutional manner....' 475 U.S., at 483, n. 12, 106 S.Ct., at 1300, n. 12. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 927. Praprotnik similarly states that the authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy.... When an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departures from them, are the act of the municipality, id. 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926 (emphasis in original), and that [s]imply going along with discretionary decisions made by one's subordinates, however, is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. Id. 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 927. The Court then observed: It would be a different matter if a particular decision by a subordinate was cast in the form of a policy statement and expressly approved by the supervising policymaker. It would also be a different matter if a series of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a custom or usage' of which the supervisor must have been aware. See supra, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926. In both those cases, the supervisor could realistically be deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have been formulated or initiated by a lower-ranking official. Id. 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 926-27. Finally, Praprotnik expressly rejected the concept of de facto final policymaking authority. Id. 485 U.S. at 129, 108 S.Ct. at 927.10 While Praprotnik and Pembaur do not expressly use the word final in their examples of officials who have decisionmaking but not policymaking authority, that much seems clearly implied in the description of the situation as one where the policymaking authority left the [decisionmaking official] discretion to hire and fire employees, there being no suggestion of any qualification such as initial discretion or the decisionmaker's action being subject to appeal or the like. The same conclusion follows from Praprotnik 's statement as to discretionary decisions of an official being constrained by policies not of his own making, as 10 Nor do we believe that we have left a gaping hole' in § 1983 that needs to be filled with the vague concept of de facto final policymaking authority.' Post [485 U.S., at 144, 108 S.Ct.], at 935. Except perhaps as a step towards overruling Monell and adopting the doctrine of respondeat superior, ad hoc searches for officials possessing such de facto' authority would serve primarily to foster needless unpredictability in the application of § 1983. Id. that applies even to individual decisions which are not reviewable. The Seventh Circuit expressly took this view of the matter in Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.1992), where it held that the Chicago Superintendent of Police, Fred Rice, was not a city policymaker respecting police officer demotions that were allegedly racially motivated, notwithstanding that he had final authority to make the complained of demotions.11 We took essentially the same 11 The Auriemma Court observed: On the plaintiffs' own theory, the buck stops with Fred Rice. (The complaint alleges that Rice cleared his decisions with Harold Washington, then the mayor, but this is immaterial; the mayor is an executive, not legislative, official in Chicago's system of government.) Unless an entirely executive decision establishes municipal policy because it is final, the plaintiffs must lose. To state the issue in this way is to imply the answer. For what can it mean to say no vicarious liability' unless there is a distinction between creation and implementation of rules? Any city acts exclusively through agents; the city is just a name for a complex of persons. If it were enough to point to the agent whose act was the final one in a particular case, we would have vicarious liability. Action in the course of one's duty is the basis of vicarious liability. That a particular agent is the apex of a bureaucracy makes the decision final' but does not forge a link between finality' and policy'.... One may doubt the footing of Monell ... but that decision is not to be sabotaged by calling the chief bureaucrat who signs off on a particular action the city's policymaker' for that action. Id. at 399-400.  [R]esponsibility for making law or setting policy'—the objective under Praprotnik of our search through local law—is authority to adopt rules for the conduct of government. Authority to make a final decision need not imply authority to establish rules. In Chicago it does not. The Superintendent of Police in Chicago had no power to countermand the statutes regulating the operation of the department. The chief has complete authority to administer the department in a manner consistent with the ordinances of the city, the laws of the state, and the rules and regulations of the police board.' ... If, in the course of selecting senior staff, approach in the en banc opinions in Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 735 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.1984), where we rejected the line of authority ... which would permit policy or custom to be attributed to the city itself by attribution to any and all officers endowed with final or supervisory power or authority. Id. 735 F.2d at 862.12 Although several policies of the DISD board of trustees were put in evidence,13 none purported to grant Superintendent Wright policymaking authority respecting employee transfers. Nor is there any other evidence that the DISD granted Superintendent Wright such policymaking authority. Jett relies on the testimony of Superintendent Wright that he considered whether the DISD policy on employee transfers set out in note 9 above applied to those, such as Jett, who were coaches as well as teachers, as opposed to applying only to those who were Rice discriminated on account of race and politics, he violated rather than implemented the policy of Chicago. Id. at 401. 12 We specifically identified this rejected line of authority as that discussed in part 3 [of our initial en banc opinion, 728 F.2d 762] and represented in particular by our opinion in Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.1980). Bennett, 735 F.2d at 862. Part 3 of our initial en banc opinion in Bennett, 728 F.2d 762 at 766, described Schneider as follows: We stated in Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.1980), that in those areas where a city officer is the final authority or ultimate repository of [city] power his official conduct and decisions must necessarily be considered those of one whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy for which the [city] may be held responsible under § 1983.' Id. at 920. 13 These included those identified in notes 6 and 9, supra, and the DISD's one hundred-plus-page Professional Personnel Guide. merely teachers, to be a gray area in which he had developed some practices he attempted to follow.14 This does not suffice 14 Superintendent Wright's testimony in this respect includes the following: Q. And you were then of the opinion and still are that that was the only procedure, that is the informal meeting and conference that had transpired that existed within the D.I.S.D. to deal with the Jett situation? A. No, it was not the only procedure but it just happened that the end results would have ended up the same because it would still have to come to me for the final decision. Coach Jett could have had the opportunity—whether he was aware of it or not I am not sure—of appealing the decision of Dr. Todd and [sic] which time I would have appointed a panel to hear that. They would have still made the recommendation to me. Since Coach Jett came to me directly as Mr. Santillo directed him then that procedure was bypassed. Q. Are you in agreement with Dr. Todd's testimony yesterday however that under the written transfer policy of the District that Coach Jett actually would have been entitled to a hearing [sic] this matter? A. If he had asked for it before he came to me and if he had wanted it then we could have gone through a formal hearing process but I considered that he considered he was having his hearing when he was there with me. Q. Okay. I see. Well, in fact—let me just find that policy real quickly. Looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 under your Provisions for Involuntary Transfer it states that the first thing that has to be done is that the immediate supervisor shall complete the prescribed form, conduct a conference with the employee, secure the signature of the employee and forward the form to the office of the sub District Superintendent, doesn't it? A. In that case they are talking about teachers. Q. Excuse me. Is that what it says? A. That is what it says, yes. Q. And it doesn't say teacher. It says any employee, right? A. Right. Q. And if the transfer provisions were pertinent just as Dr. Todd said yesterday he didn't follow that, did he? A. Not per se, no. Q. Well, he didn't do any of that, did he? A. He made a recommendation to his immediate supervisor that Dr. Todd be involuntarily transferred to another position. Q. I think you misspoke. You said Dr. Todd. You mean Dr. Todd made a recommendation to his supervisor that he be transferred? A. Yes, sir. Q. Yes, sir. But it doesn't say to his supervisor, does it? It says it shall be sent to the office of the sub District Assistant Superintendent, doesn't it? A. In the case of a teacher that would apply. In the case of a Coach or an Athletic Director it would go to the Athletic Department. Q. First of all, I thought you told us a few minutes ago that the policy of the District where they say teachers are customarily applied to Coaches and Athletic Directors? A. Except that we have a gray area that is not covered here, Mr. Hill, in that Area Superintendents don't make the decision on Athletic Directors and Coaches per se. That is left up between the Athletic Department and the principal and myself. Q. Is there any written statement of that? A. No, sir, there is not. Q. Well, in addition to that Coach Jett was being transferred involuntarily and a teacher too, wasn't he? A. Correct. Q. So these policies would be pertinent to Coach Jett, wouldn't they? A. That is what I meant a moment ago that he could have made such a request if he was aware of it. I doubt he was aware of it. to establish that the DISD board of trustees had delegated to Q. Now, with respect to Coaches and Athletic Directors I believe you have indicated several times here there is no specific policy that covers that? A. Not per se, no. Q. But you have developed some practices that you attempt to follow within the District when those problems arise? A. That is correct. Q. And typically how is that situation handled? A. Well, we try to follow the same procedures of trying to make sure that employees' considerations, employees are considered and the person making the recommendation considered and in the case of Athletic Director and Coach then it generally goes to the Administrator of Athletics which is Mr. John Kincaid and the principal to help work out those differences and then if it can't be resolved there then it is supposed to go to their immediate supervisor and then on up the ladder to me which I am the end of the appeal just like I am with teachers or anyone else. Q. (By Mr. Townend) Superintendent Wright, when a problem arises between a principal and a Head Coach such as with Dr. Todd and Mr. Jett, can you describe the normal approaches or the normal ways in which that problem is dealt with within the District? [Court overrides objection by Jett's counsel.] A. Well, it is not only normal policy and practice but it is not stipulated personnel policy but it is stipulated in other administrative policies that any problem that arises as far as an employee, it goes through channels. In the case of athletics it goes from the principal to the Administrator for Athletics and to the Assistant Superintendent for district wide programs who has the responsibility for Athletics and from that person to the Superintendent. If it is a teacher problem it goes from the principal to the Area Administrator to the Area Assistant Superintendent to the Superintendent so there is a channel for any problem that occurs that would be handled and that is not only normal but it is prescribed by policy under administration, not only personnel. (Emphasis added). Superintendent Wright final policymaking authority concerning employee transfers. Wright's testimony contains no such assertion. He was merely interpreting or applying the written policy of the DISD trustees, and, apparently, he was doing so erroneously, as the parts of the policy addressed (see note 9, supra ) speak of employee or employees, not teachers or coaches or teacher/coaches.15 Moreover, Wright's testimony in this regard is plainly directed only to the particular administrative channel to be initially followed by the supervisor requesting a transfer be made, namely whether the request is to go to the Subdistrict assistant superintendent as the policy says (see quotation at end of first paragraph of note 9, supra ) or whether, as Wright construed it, that did not apply to coaches (or teacher/coaches) and that instead in such a case the supervisor's request would initially go to the DISD's Athletic Department.16 Even if Wright had the authority to provide for such a bureaucratic channel for teacher/coach transfer requests to initially follow, this would not suffice to show that he had relevant substantive policymaking authority respecting teacher/coach transfers, which is the only issue here. Jett contends that Wright had a policy of approving involuntary transfers sought by a principal even though the 15 In other parts of the policy it does refer to teachers and to coaches, and, indeed, to nurses, thus also indicating that the broader word employee or employees was used advisedly. 16 Wright did not testify that the three-person hearing committee procedures (see quoted material in last paragraph of note 9, supra ) were different for coaches or teacher/coaches than for teachers. principal was motivated by the employee's race or exercise of First Amendment rights, so long as there was an irreconcilable personality conflict between the principal and the employee. Assuming, arguendo, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that such a consideration motivated Wright's action in respect to Jett, it was certainly not the basis Wright articulated for his decision,17 and there is no evidence that it was his policy. Jett relies on Wright's testimony that [w]e had something here 17 Principal Todd made various specific complaints about Jett, including Jett's poor attendance at faculty meetings, equipment purchasing policies, and lesson plan preparation. Wright testified that he discussed these matters with Jett, who told Wright he [Jett] thought ... that whenever he [Todd] forced him [Jett] to come to teachers' meetings or faculty meetings and keep records of inventory and things like that that he [Jett] thought that was unreasonable, and that Wright then told Jett I don't consider that unreasonable. Wright further testified: ... I told Coach Jett that I felt that Dr. Todd was only carrying out his responsibilities as principal and that those were the kinds of things I expected him to do and that if, you know, if he was being unreasonable that was one thing but as far as the actual accountability of expecting an accounting for money and requiring him not make unauthorized purchases and requiring him to attend faculty meetings or requiring he have lesson plans, all of those were in the area of expectation of the teacher or Coach or any other employee in that building. Wright further testified: Q. (By Mr. Townend) In your first conference did Mr. Jett suggest to you that Dr. Todd be transferred? A. Yes, sir, he did. He felt that Mr. McWhorter had been unsuccessful and had been transferred and that he had such a successful record that he felt that Dr. Todd was the one in error. That is when I came to the conclusion that there were differences that were not resolvable and I told Coach Jett at the time that if I have to make a decision between the principal and the coach it is obvious that the principal is responsible for the school and would be the one to stay unless he was in error himself and I hadn't found anywhere where Dr. Todd was in error. (Emphasis added). that is unfortunate that happens a lot of time between two people and when it occurs someone has to give and I have to make that judgment decision as to who has to go and in this case it was coach Jett. This is not inconsistent with Wright's testimony (see note 17) that he approved the Jett transfer because the differences were irreconcilable and I haven't found anywhere where Dr. Todd was in error, and certainly does not support an inference that Wright generally approved transfer recommendations despite their being unconstitutionally motivated. More significantly, such would be contrary to the policies of the DISD board of trustees and there is nothing to suggest that they knew or can be assumed to have known that Wright acted on such a basis. As previously observed, there is no evidence of any other unconstitutionally motivated employee transfer (or other personnel action) being taken or approved by Wright. This is a single incident case. The evidence is simply not sufficient to support a finding that Superintendent Wright possessed final policymaking authority in the area of employee transfers. Under Texas law such policymaking authority rested exclusively with the DISD board of trustees, and there is no evidence they had delegated it to Superintendent Wright. Jett in substance argues for the kind of de facto final policymaking authority rejected in Praprotnik. 485 U.S. at 129, 108 S.Ct. at 927. Moreover, there is no evidence that Superintendent Wright's decision in Jett's case either was cast in the form of a policy statement and expressly approved by the DISD board or that a series of decisions by Wright in this area manifested a custom or usage' of which the DISD board must have been aware. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 92627. Accordingly, the judgment against the DISD and in favor of Jett is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the DISD as respects all of Jett's claims against it. REVERSED and REMANDED with DIRECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .