Opinion ID: 159197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DodgeTrial

Text: 28 In the second trial, fourteen plaintiffs (collectively here, Dodge), members of four Lincoln Park families, filed an amended complaint which was virtually identical to the complaint in Boughton I. Although the years of the alleged negligence are slightly different, 6 the Dodge complaint alleged verbatim Cotter's negligence rested on its breach of the duty to properly control and contain the radioactive and/or hazardous materials, and to prevent said radioactive and/or hazardous materials and constituents from being released into the air and allowed to migrate or leak into the groundwater, surface water, rivers and soils in the vicinity. Further, the complaints alleged the breach of the duty to control and contain allowed radioactive and/or hazardous materials to be released into the air and allowing said radioactive material and constituents to migrate or leak into the groundwater, surface water, rivers and soil in the vicinity. The complaint listed the same eleven negligent acts and/or omissions found in Boughton. 7 29 The Dodge plaintiffs moved prior to trial for partial summary judgment on the issues of negligence, trespass, and nuisance, contending those issues were settled in Boughton, and Cotter should be collaterally estopped from litigating them in the second trial. The Dodge plaintiffs represented the district court had streamlined resolution of issues common to all Lincoln Park residents by designating eight Bellwhether [sic] plaintiffs in Boughton. They urged because the Boughton jury finally adjudicated the ultimate issues of negligence, trespass and nuisance . . . [a]pplication of collateral estoppel to these issues is the logical follow-up to the Court's prior decisions, and accomplishes avoiding the unnecessary expense of multiple litigation of the same issues, conserving judicial resources, and encouraging reliance on judicial action. The Dodge plaintiffs relied on Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), contending they had satisfied the four conditions for the offensive use of collateral estoppel. 30 Cotter strenuously resisted the motion, arguing that despite the virtually identical complaints, the first verdict was not clear, fully obscuring which of the eleven asserted grounds of negligence was found; which standard of care was relied upon over the forty-year period of operation; and what period of time Cotter acted negligently toward each plaintiff. Key to its argument, it contended, was labeling the Boughton I verdict a special verdict, when, in fact, it was a general verdict. 31 At the hearing on the motion, 8 Dodge plaintiffs argued that because collateral estoppel is an issue-specific doctrine, its offensive use would insulate only the issue of negligence, the breach of the duty of care, leaving questions of proximate cause, damages, and affirmative defenses for the parties to establish. Cotter countered instructing the jury that the court had already found it was negligent was overwhelmingly prejudicial in the face of the Dodge plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages. Instead, Cotter urged the district court to instruct the jury that judgment was entered in its favor against plaintiffs for dismissal of the negligence claim for medical monitoring, eliminating its need to introduce medical monitoring or physical injury testimony. Cotter relied on Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 517 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1973), in which the Colorado Supreme Court held the application of collateral estoppel was not appropriate to prevent the same defendant in a second trial from litigating affirmative defenses not raised in the first trial. 32 After hearing the arguments, the court ruled the pure issue of negligence had been decided and would not be relitigated, emphasizing the ruling did not affect liability, proximate cause, the negligence of another party, or willful and wanton conduct, all of which certainly is going to be litigated. At the close of five weeks of trial in Dodge, the court then instructed the jury, 33 The Court already has determined that defendant was negligent. The Court's determination that the defendant was negligent must not influence you in determining any of the remaining issues in this case. As you will be instructed further at the end of this case, a finding of negligence is not a finding of liability. You must still determine whether defendant's negligence caused any of the injuries or damages alleged by plaintiffs, whether defendant's conduct constituted gross negligence, and other issues that will affect the liability, if any, of the defendant. 34 The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiffs and awarded damages for physical injuries and diminution of the value of their property on that same day of deliberations.