Opinion ID: 812677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Huerta’s Contract Clause Argument

Text: Finally, Huerta argues that if we apply Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar to his claims, our ruling will operate to deprive him of his rights under the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.4 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The Contract Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Id. Huerta maintains that the common law sole proximate cause bar amounts to a violation of his rights under this clause because the bar prevents him from holding Shein accountable for the contractual obligations into which they entered. We disagree. First, as we have explained, Huerta’s claim is grounded not in breach of contract, but rather in negligence. Moreover, even were that not the 4 Huerta first raises this argument on appeal. Though this court generally does “not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal,” In re Paige, 610 F.3d 865, 871 (5th Cir. 2010), for the reasons noted, Huerta’s argument is, in any event, unavailing. 13 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 case, the United States Supreme Court has foreclosed Huerta’s argument by holding that the Contract Clause “is directed only against impairment by legislation and not by judgments of courts.” Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1924); see also Lipscomb v. Columbus Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 269 F.3d 494, 503 n.34 (stating that “only legislative actions, not judicial actions, can create a viable Contract Clause claim”). Because the sole proximate cause bar is a common law doctrine, the Contract Clause has no application here.