Opinion ID: 2060561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenge to the jury list.

Text: Several weeks prior to trial, Wilson moved for a hearing on why the then current jury list for Kenosha county should not be deemed void and a new list prepared. Late in September, 1971, a hearing was held on the challenge before Judge BODE. At the hearing, Wilson claimed the jury commissioners systematically excluded from the jury list blacks and people in the twenty-one to twenty-four and twenty-five to thirty-four-year-old age groups. In support of this claim, he presented testimony of Dr. Roland J. Derenne, an associate professor of sociology at the University of WisconsinParkside. Dr. Derenne had compared the percentage of persons on the jury list in three different age groups with the percentage of persons in the age groups in Kenosha county as disclosed in the 1970 census. He accomplished this by taking a 10 percent random sampling of persons on the jury list for 1969 through 1971, calling them up and determining their age and race. His findings can be summarized as follows: The census showed that in 1970 there were 68,515 persons in Kenosha county over twenty-one years of age, of which 9.7 percent were in the 21-24 year old group 21.1 percent were in the 25-34 year old group 69.2 percent were in the 35 and over group The 1969 jury list contained 434 persons. Derenne called 43 of these people and found that among the 43 he called None were in the 21-24 year old group 4.7 percent (or two people) were in the 25-34 year old group 95.3 percent (or 41 people) were in the 35 and over group In the 1970 jury list, on which there were approximately 1,000 names to be placed in the tumbler, approximately 100 persons were called, of which 1.0 percent were in the 21-24 year old group 13.9 percent were in the 25-34 year old group 85.1 percent were in the 35 and over group The 1971 jury list contained approximately 1,058 persons. Derenne called approximately 105 of these and found that among those called 2.8 percent were in the 21-24 year old group 16.8 percent were in the 25-34 year old group 80.4 percent were in the 35 and over group On the basis of these figures alone, Wilson claims people in the twenty-one to twenty-four and twenty-five to thirty-four-year-old age groups were underrepresented over a period of time. On cross-examination, Derenne admitted he did not break down the population figures in terms of percentage of people in each age group who were qualified to serve as jurors, and did not determine how many people were qualified electors in the various age groups. He conceded that the underrepresentation might be due to the fact that persons in the lower age groups were not electors or otherwise qualified to serve as jurors. On the issue of underrepresentation of blacks, Dr. Derenne testified that there were 117,917 people (including children) in Kenosha county. Of this total: 115,623 or 98.05 percent were white 1,930 or 1.64 percent were black 364 or .31 percent were other races His 10 percent sampling of the jury lists for 1969 through 1971 showed that of those called: In the 1969 list, there were no blacks and no other races In the 1970 list, there were no blacks and one Mexican In the 1971 list, there was one black and one Mexican The state then called the two jury commissioners who were responsible for supplying names for the circuit court jury list. John A. Beni, aged fifty-nine, testified that he started with polling lists and from there picked people he knew to be impartial, alert, and of good moral character. He tried to get people from both sexes and of all nationalities, races, and vocations; but he did not consider age other than to get people he considered mature. In his words: ... I tried to get people who are mature, and especially for females, I tried to avoid, like, young mothers who have three or four young children; and some of the young lads who are going to school and working at the same time, which might be kind of a difficult way for them to serve on a jury. If possible, I try to avoid those. Although he did not intentionally omit people in the twenty-one to twenty-four age group, of the 800-850 names he submitted for the 1971 list there were possibly five or six persons known to him to be in the twenty-one to twenty-four-year-old group. Four or five of these were girls who bowled with his wife; on cross-examination he admitted he only believed them to be under twenty-five but could not be sure. He knew of quite a few people in the twenty-five to thirty-four age group on the list, but could not name any on the spot. George L. Schlitz, aged sixty-three, was the other jury commissioner who supplied the remaining 200 names on the 1971 jury list. His method of selecting potential jurors was to write down the name of anyone he came across who he believed would make a good juror and later check the person out for qualifications. If that method did not produce enough names, he would take a polling list to town officials and ask them who they thought would make good jurors. He never inquired as to any juror's age because he knew of no qualification that a person had to be a certain age other than over twentyone in order to serve on the jury. He did not know of any people on his list under twenty-five, but knew of a couple of people around twenty-five years of age. On the issue of black jurors, Beni testified that there were eight blacks known to him in the 800 names he submitted for 1971, and there might have been more he picked from the polling lists without knowing their race. Schlitz did not know of any blacks in his 1971 list of 200, but did not know of any blacks who resided in his district, which was rural. Following the hearing, the trial court decided that Wilson had not met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by merely showing lack of proportional representation as disclosed by the 10 percent sampling. Consequently, Wilson's motion was denied. In the past five years, several cases have dealt with the issue of claimed systematic exclusion of certain groups from jury lists. In State v. Bond [6] the defendant claimed that Milwaukee county's use of poll lists to select prospective jurors resulted in an unrepresentative jury list. Rejecting this argument, this court held the poll lists to be a reasonable basis for selection since a juror must be an elector. Noting that [a] defendant challenging the validity of the jury array has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, [7] this court found the record to be devoid of evidence that the poll lists were discriminative, either by calculation or by chance. A defendant is not entitled to a perfectly apportioned representation but only to a fair jury from a panel selected without regard to race or other discriminatory factors. [8] In State v. Holmstrom [9] the defendant challenged the Eau Claire county jury array on the ground that there were few jurors under forty-five years of age. The three jury commissioners testified that they picked names from among people with whom they were personally acquainted. One admitted there were very few persons between twenty-five and thirtyfive on the panel and explained this by stating that jury service worked a financial hardship on young families. On appeal, this court noted that Bond placed the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination upon the defendant. The court quoted United States v. Mirabal Carrion: [10] `[B]efore a jury panel can be quashed on the ground that a cohesive group has been excluded, there must be a clear showing of an intentional and systematic exclusion of said group ... disproportion in the ultimate composition ... furnishes no basis whatsoever for an inference of exclusion.' In Holmstrom this court concluded: [T]o succeed on a challenge to the jury array the defendant must show: (1) A systematic exclusion; (2) Of some representative unit of citizens. A systematic exclusion can be shown by the direct testimony of the jury commissioners or by proving a disproportionate representation of a unit of citizens on the jury array over a period of time. [11] Systematic exclusion of young people was held to be a ground for challenge. Once the defendant presents a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecution. [12] But the court did not reach the issue of whether the state met its burden because the defendant was held not to have established a prima facie case. The commissioners' failure to recommend college students at a time when the voting age was twenty-one was held to be based on reason and common sense. In McKissick v. State [13] this court held that the defendant did not meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case by merely asserting exclusion of blacks without presenting any evidence thereof. Citing Cassell v. Texas, [14] the court stated: ... The mere lack of proportional representation of races on a jury panel does not constitute discrimination. Citing Swain v. Alabama, [15] the court stated that an accused is `not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race ... on the venire or jury roll from which petit jurors are drawn.' Similarly, in State v. Zdiarstek [16] this court held the defendant did not meet his burden by merely asserting that younger persons were excluded, and citing Bond, upheld the county's selection of jurors from poll lists. Most recently, in Brown v. State, [17] this court rejected a claim of unlawful exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one year olds because the jury commissioners had to be given a reasonable time to adjust their lists to the recently lowered voter age. Further, the defendant in Brown was held to have waived his claim of the exclusion of teachers by failing to raise the issue prior to the impaneling of the jury. This court stated: ... The mere lack of a proportional representation has not been regarded as constitutionally deficient, and indeed, it has been held that an accused has no constitutional right to a jury composed of members, or having even a single member, of his or her class, race, or sex. [18] The following rules can be summarized from these cases: (1) The party challenging a jury array has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. (a) He must do so prior to the impaneling of the jury. (b) He may meet this burden by showing an intentional and systematic exclusion of some representative class (including age, race, and sex) by (i) Direct testimony of the jury commissioners, or (ii) Proof of a disproportionate representation on the array over a period of time. (2) Once the challenger establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state, which must then show that the disproportion was not intentional or systematic. Wilson claims he has made out a prima facie case of systematic exclusion by showing a disproportionate representation of a unit of citizens on the jury array over a period of timethree years. Even though it might be concluded that the sampling conducted did not make out a prima facie case of disproportionate representation of the twenty-one to twentyfour and twenty-five to thirty-four age groups, there is no question but what the state clearly met its burden in showing no systematic exclusion. Both jury commissioners used a system of selection like that used by the commissioners in Holmstromi.e., they picked names primarily from among people with whom they were acquainted. Both testified they did not consider age or intentionally omit young people. Nothing other than underrepresentation of young people would indicate that they did systematically exclude a unit of citizens. But disproportion alone, as the earlier cited cases point out, is not sufficient to show discrimination. The claimed exclusion of blacks is without merit for the fundamental reason that there was a failure to make out a prima facie case. Trial counsel for Wilson conceded this. First, the percentage of blacks required (1.64 percent) is so small that one different answer (two instead of the one found) could entirely change the result. Because there was one black found in the 100 people sampled, the list was only .64 of a person short. Second, one jury commissioner knew personally of at least eight black people of the 800 he submitted for the jury list and testified there could be more taken from polling lists whom he did not know. Finally, the census comparison of blacks to whites included children, and thus there was no accurate basis for comparison of the number of blacks and the number of whites qualified to serve as jurors.