Opinion ID: 717547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Uncharged Factual Circumstances and Violations

Text: 42 Hutensky also asserts that the prohibition order was based on uncharged factual circumstances and uncharged legal violations. He contends that, as a result, he was deprived of his due process right to notice and a full and fair opportunity to defend himself. We reject this contention. 43 Hutensky argues that the FDIC has sanctioned [him] based on a whole constellation of uncharged factual circumstances. For instance, he contends that the FDIC improperly relied on evidence pertaining to poor underwriting, sloppy credit analyses, false statements in credit memos, and other misconduct by persons other than Hutensky. However, this evidence merely described the background of the transactions involving Hutensky, and was not used to assert separate allegations against him. In addition, Hutensky claims that the FDIC improperly referred to evidence of the alleged lending limit violations, but this evidence also was used by the FDIC only as background information. 44 Hutensky further argues that he was sanctioned for alleged legal violations that were not charged against him in the Notice. For instance, he asserts that the FDIC found that he had violated Regulation O in connection with the Harding and Reveruzzi loans, but that these charges were not set forth in the Notice. While the charges against Hutensky pertaining to the two loans did not specifically mention Regulation O, they did describe the elements of a Regulation O violation, including the fact that Hutensky failed to notify the banks' boards of the loans even though he would benefit from them. 13 Accordingly, Hutensky was provided with adequate notice that he would have to defend against these charges, even though the charges were not specifically styled as the elements of a Regulation O violation. See Garber v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 276 F.2d 321, 323 (2d Cir.1960) (holding that complaint clearly apprised the petitioner of the facts contended to constitute a violation and the legal consequences claimed to ensue and thus was not required to refer to the particular section claimed to have been violated, at least when [the] failure to do so was in no way misleading); see also Pergament United Sales, Inc. v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.1990) (in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, a respondent has sufficient notice if he is informed of the acts forming the basis of the complaint).