Opinion ID: 883130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Phillips entitled to the relief provided by a writ of mandamus?

Text: A district court's denial of a writ of mandamus is a matter of legal interpretation; we review district courts' legal interpretations as to whether they are correct. Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc. v. Lund (1994), 265 Mont. 463, 466-68, 877 P.2d 1018, 1020-21; citing Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803 P.2d 601. Section 27-26-102, MCA, provides as follows: (1) A writ of mandamus may be issued by the supreme court or the district court or any judge of the district court to any lower tribunal, corporation, board, or person to compel the performance of an act that the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by the lower tribunal, corporation, board, or person. (2) The writ must be issued in all cases in which there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [Emphasis added.] We have stated that the writ of mandamus will lie where, in addition to there being no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the party seeking to invoke the writ is entitled to the performance of a clear legal duty against whom the writ is directed. State ex rel. Neuhausen v. Nachtsheim (1992), 253 Mont. 296, 299, 833 P.2d 201, 203; citing State ex rel. Galloway v. City of Great Falls (1984), 211 Mont. 354, 358, 684 P.2d 495, 497. Here, there is no question that a clear legal duty exists. Under § 7-33-4124, MCA, the Livingston city council is directed to conduct a termination hearing at its next meeting following a firefighter's suspension. Since they failed to do so, the relief specifically provided by § 7-33-4124(2), MCA, is Phillips' reinstatement to his former position. As a general rule, before mandamus will issue to a public officer, board or municipality, a demand for the performance of the act sought to be compelled is required. Liebman v. Brunell (1984), 212 Mont. 459, 460, 689 P.2d 248; citing State ex rel. School District No. 29, Flathead County v. Cooney (1936), 102 Mont. 521, 59 P.2d 48. Phillips has demanded the Livingston city council to hold a termination hearing since the city manager first presided over Phillips' termination hearing. Thus, he has met the demand requirement. Livingston argues that mandamus is inappropriate because Phillips has not exhausted his avenues of remedy under the grievance procedure contained in the collective bargaining agreement. In support of its position, Livingston cites Lueck v. United Parcel Service (1993), 258 Mont. 2, 851 P.2d 1041. In Lueck, we affirmed the district court's summary judgment and dismissal of a former United Parcel Service employee's retaliatory discharge claim because he failed to utilize the grievance procedures available in his union's collective bargaining agreement with UPS. Lueck, 851 P.2d at 1044-45. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Lueck. Lueck did not involve an application for writ of mandamus. Further, there was neither a clear statutory duty for a legislative body to take action, nor was there a clear and mandatory statutory remedy provided for the discharged employee. Here, § 7-33-4124(1), MCA, clearly establishes that the Livingston city council has the duty to hold a termination hearing after the suspension of a firefighter. Section 7-33-4124(2), MCA, just as clearly provides that the remedy for the council's failure to hold such a hearing is Phillips' reinstatement to his former position. Finally, mandamus is the proper remedy in this case because Phillips does not have a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy. Section 27-26-102(2), MCA. Phillips' remedy for the denial of the process provided in § 7-33-4124(1), MCA, is clear. Section 7-33-4124(2), MCA, provides that if the city council or commission does not hold a termination proceeding following a firefighter's suspension, the firefighter is entitled to reinstatement and pay for the term the firefighter was suspended. We hold that the District Court incorrectly interpreted the law and erred by failing to issue the writ of mandamus. For the reasons previously stated, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. TURNAGE, C.J., and GRAY, HUNT, NELSON, TRIEWEILER and WEBER, JJ., concur.