Opinion ID: 2562961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenged Findings of Fact Related to Count 5

Text: ¶ 15 First, Vanderveen challenges the Board's elimination of FF 29 concerning his good character or reputation. As the mitigating factors analysis below demonstrates, the record does not provide substantial evidence to support a finding regarding character or reputation. The Board properly struck FF 29. ¶ 16 Second, and most significantly for the purposes of Vanderveen's sanction, he challenges the Board's and the hearing officer's finding that he acted intentionally. FF 30; CL 36. However, Vanderveen's guilty plea to willful violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5331(a) and 5322 conclusively establishes that he acted intentionally. ¶ 17 Both the hearing officer and the Board found that Vanderveen's conviction established that he acted intentionally based in part on Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that willful in the context of § 5322 means acting with the knowledge that one's conduct is unlawful, and it approvingly cited appellate court cases defining willfully has having both knowledge of the reporting requirement and a specific intent to commit the crime. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137, 141, 114 S.Ct. 655. The Ratzlaf Court reversed the defendant's judgment and remanded the case because the jury instructions did not contain this definition of willfully. ¶ 18 Vanderveen asserts that Ratzlaf applies only to structuring cases. [16] He also contends that Ratzlaf does not provide binding precedent as to what willful means as applied to § 5331. The essence of Vanderveen's latter argument is that Ratzlaf did not interpret willfulness as it applies specifically to § 5331; rather it determined that willfully can have different meanings depending on the context. Due to the malleability of the term, Vanderveen asserts he should be given the benefit of possible alternate interpretations. Resp't's Br. at 16-17. A reading of Ratzlaf reveals that his arguments lack merit. ¶ 19 Although Ratzlaf involved §§ 5324(3), 5331, and 5322(a) and a structuring issue, the Court did not limit its interpretation of the term willfulness to structuring cases. [17] In interpreting the term willfulness in § 5322(a), the Court explicitly stated that it had cause to construe a single formulation [of] § 5322(a), the same way each time it is called into play. [18] Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 143, 114 S.Ct. 655. Thus, as the WSBA argues, the term willfulness should be interpreted the same each time it comes into play under the various subchapters of Title 31, including the section at issue here, § 5331. [19] Thus, when Vanderveen pleaded guilty to acting willfully, he pleaded guilty to acting intentionally, i.e., with the knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. ¶ 20 In addition, Vanderveen challenges the Board and the hearing officer's application of ELC 10.14(c) to conclusively establish his mental state based on his criminal conviction for the purpose of a disciplinary hearing. The ELCs are the rules governing the procedure by which a lawyer may be subjected to disciplinary sanctions or actions for violation of the RPCs. ELC 1.1. ELC 10.14(c) provides: (c) Proceeding Based on Criminal Conviction. If a formal complaint charges a respondent lawyer with an act of misconduct for which the respondent has been convicted in a criminal proceeding, the court record of the conviction is conclusive evidence at the disciplinary hearing of the respondent's guilt of the crime and violation of the statute on which the conviction was based. Pursuant to ELC 10.14(c), when Vanderveen pleaded guilty to violating 31 U.S.C. §§ 5331 and 5322, he conclusively established his state of mind for the purposes of his disciplinary hearing regarding that violation. Resp't's Br. at 19. Under ELC 10.14(c), the WSBA is not required to prove again each essential element of the crime to which a defendant has already been convicted. Vanderveen's guilty plea establishes that he acted intentionally because his intentional or willful state of mind is an essential element of the crime to which he pleaded. ¶ 21 In support of the application of ELC 10.14(c), the WSBA cites In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wash.2d 820, 168 P.3d 408 (2007). In that case, this court held that a lawyer's criminal conviction provided conclusive evidence of his guilt on an assault charge under ELC 10.14(c), despite his hearing testimony that he did not touch the victim. In reaching this conclusion, we quoted the ABA's comments to the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (2007), stating in relevant part that when a disciplinary hearing is based on prior criminal conviction, `[t]he respondent may offer evidence of mitigating circumstances not inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime whose existence is conclusively established by the finding of guilt.' In re Perez-Pena, 161 Wash.2d at 831, 168 P.3d 408 (emphasis added) (quoting Rule 19 cmt.); see also In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Plumb, 126 Wash.2d 334, 892 P.2d 739 (1995) (court rejected evidence containing facts contrary to those necessary to prove prior criminal conviction for welfare fraud). Thus, as the WSBA argues, ELC 10.14(c) and case law prohibit a lawyer from disputing the essential facts regarding a prior criminal conviction for the purposes of a disciplinary proceeding. ¶ 22 Although under ELC 10.14(c) the WSBA is not required to offer additional evidence of Vanderveen's state of mind other than his conviction, additional evidence supports a finding of intentional conduct. As the WSBA argues, the record shows Vanderveen not only failed to report the cash payments but also took deliberate steps to hide them. The WSBA cites the undisputed facts that Vanderveen received two $10,000 cash payments, one in a paper bag left in a courthouse and another in a parking lot. Vanderveen did not take the payments to the bank. He did not enter them into his accounting system, nor did he make any record of their receipt. Instead, Vanderveen took the cash payments to his house and placed them in his home safe. These actions, coupled with Vanderveen's willful failure to file the required form 8300, are consistent with a conscious intent to conceal the receipt of the cash payments.