Opinion ID: 1058293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Carroll's Habeas Corpus Claim

Text: Having decided that habeas corpus jurisdiction lies in Carroll's case, we now review the circuit court's determination that Carroll's habeas corpus claim lacked merit. Carroll contends that the circuit court erred in holding that, assuming it had jurisdiction, Carroll was not entitled to relief because he had been given credit towards his New Jersey sentence for the 288 days spent in Virginia custody. Carroll argues that the language of the sentencing order and Code § 53.1-187 are clear and require that he be credited with 288 days toward his Virginia sentence regardless of whether New Jersey also gave him credit for those days. Alternatively, should the Court determine that it is relevant whether New Jersey gave him credit for the 288 days, Carroll asserts the circuit court erred in denying Carroll an evidentiary hearing on this issue because Ms. Brown's claim that New Jersey gave Carroll credit for the 288 days is nothing more than a bare assertion. The Commonwealth argues that the circuit court did not err in holding that Carroll's claim lacked merit. According to the Commonwealth, Carroll's New Jersey sentence was properly credited the 288 days by operation of law pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers while Carroll was in Virginia custody incident to his trial. The Commonwealth asserts that Carroll's argument that he is entitled to credit for the 288 days toward both his Virginia and New Jersey sentences is without merit based on the sentencing order's language that [t]hese sentences shall run consecutively with all other sentences. The Commonwealth also contends the circuit court properly denied Carroll an evidentiary hearing because Carroll received credit for 288 days toward his New Jersey sentence by operation of law, and Carroll has not claimed in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus that New Jersey did not credit the 288 days against his sentence in that state. The standard of review regarding the circuit court's decision denying Carroll's petition on the merits is as follows: The question whether a prisoner is entitled to habeas relief is a mixed question of law and fact. Consequently, a circuit court's conclusions of law are not binding on this Court but are subject to review to ascertain whether the circuit court correctly applied the law to the facts. Green v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 608-09, 571 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2002) (citations omitted). As previously stated, Code § 8.01-654(A)(1), provides: The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum shall be granted forthwith by the Supreme Court or any circuit court, to any person who shall apply for the same by petition, showing by affidavits or other evidence probable cause to believe that he is detained without lawful authority. (Emphasis added.) The issue before us is whether there is probable cause to believe that Carroll is detained without lawful authority based upon the allegation that he did not receive credit towards his Virginia sentence for the 288 days he spent in Virginia custody incident to his trial. Because we believe Carroll is not entitled to credit for 288 days toward his Virginia sentence as a matter of law, the circuit court did not err in denying Carroll's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the merits and likewise denying him an evidentiary hearing. Carroll's transfer to Virginia from New Jersey was made pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, of which Virginia and New Jersey are party states. Code § 53.1-210; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:159A-1, through 159A-15. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Article V(a), provides that a state in which a prisoner is currently incarcerated (sending state), in this case New Jersey, may send that prisoner to a state in which the prisoner has outstanding charges (receiving state), in this case Virginia, to stand trial. Code § 53.1-210. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Article V(d), describes this as temporary custody, which it provides is only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Article V(f), also provides that the sending state sentence continues to run during an inmate's temporary custody in another jurisdiction: [4] During the ... temporary custody ... time being served on the sentence [imposed by the sending state] shall continue to run.... The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Article V(g), further states: For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law. The plain language of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers provides that Virginia only gained temporary custody of Carroll during the 288 days he spent in Virginia incident to his trial. Code § 53.1-210, art. V(d). The statutory language narrowly defines such temporary custody and limits its scope to allow the receiving state to only prosecute the transferred prisoner for the charges for which the transfer was made. Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Carroll remained a New Jersey prisoner and received credit toward his New Jersey sentence for time spent in Virginia. Thus, our inquiry focuses on whether, under Virginia law, Carroll is also entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence for those same 288 days. Code § 53.1-187 provides, in pertinent part: Any person who is sentenced to a term of confinement in a correctional facility shall have deducted from any such term all time actually spent by the person ... in a state or local correctional facility awaiting trial.... The sentencing order in this case reflected this mandate when it provided that Carroll shall be given credit for time spent in confinement while awaiting trial pursuant to Code § 53.1-187. The decisive factor is whether Carroll was in Virginia custody awaiting trial during the 288 days. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers makes it clear that he was not. As previously stated, Carroll was transferred to Virginia for the sole purpose of being tried on his pending Virginia charges. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers strictly limits Virginia's temporary custody in such situations. As such, Carroll was not in Virginia custody awaiting trial, but was in Virginia custody to stand trial pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers as a New Jersey prisoner. While Carroll was in Virginia custody, he was actually serving his New Jersey sentence because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers provides that he receive credit toward his New Jersey sentence for that time. Code § 53.1-210, art. V(f); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:159A-5, art. V(f). Thus, as a matter of law, Carroll is not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence for the 288 days he spent in Virginia custody incident to his trial because he was in Virginia's temporary custody as a New Jersey prisoner for the limited purpose of being tried on his pending Virginia charges. In addition, the Virginia sentencing order required that his sentences of 13 years be served consecutively with all other sentences, including the New Jersey sentence to which the 288 days were credited. Because Carroll is not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence as a matter of law, the circuit court did not err in denying Carroll's petition for habeas corpus on the merits. The circuit court also did not err in denying Carroll an evidentiary hearing because we determined that Carroll's claim, as a matter of law, is without merit, leaving nothing to be determined by a factfinder.