Opinion ID: 1135325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Patricia L.'s Unavailability as a Witness.

Text: NRS 51.385 requires that a child be unavailable or unable to testify before that child's statement may be admitted if the child does not testify. We realize that testifying in court can be a very traumatic experience for a child and that some children need to be shielded from the defendant or permitted not to testify. Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court was too hasty in its determination that Patricia was unavailable as a witness due to the trauma she might suffer from testifying. The traditional grounds of unavailability set forth in NRS 51.055 [7] were not present in this case. The lower court found that Patricia was not suffering from then-existing trauma. However, in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), the Court assumed the child witness was unavailable, suggesting that a child's prospective psychological inability to testify is a ground for unavailability. Id. at 816, 110 S.Ct. at 3147. Proof of this type of unavailability is usually a medical question that requires expert testimony. The constitutional question at issue is whether a court can determine if a child is unavailable because he or she may suffer severe trauma without placing the child on the stand. In Wright, the Supreme Court left this question open. State statutes vary in the degree of resulting trauma required for a finding of unavailability, and state courts have not reached a consensus on a standard. However, as we discussed earlier, the standard for finding the trauma required to exclude a defendant from the courtroom is high, requiring a showing of necessity. Craig, 497 U.S. at 857-58, 110 S.Ct. at 3169-70. The standard used to excuse a child from testifying altogether, and thereby eliminating the right to confrontation, should be equally strict. Serious psychological trauma, as opposed to merely unnecessary trauma, should be required. See Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. Miami L.Rev. 19, 83 (1985) (advocating a standard of extreme trauma and noting that attorneys and psychologists at a recent conference on CSA reported that a great majority of children are capable of testifying at trial without much difficulty). The California Supreme Court has addressed the problem of determining prospective psychological unavailability in a CSA case. People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal.3d 505, 194 Cal.Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738 (1983) (mother's testimony was insufficient; medical testimony was required to prove psychological unavailability in a CSA case). In Stritzinger, the court held the State should use expert testimony to show that testifying would be relatively impossible, not merely difficult. See also Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C.App.1981) (a factor to consider in finding unavailability is whether the trauma is greater than that normally expected of a CSA victim). To establish an acceptable basis for permitting a child not to testify, we conclude that the State must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it is reasonably probable that testifying will cause the child witness serious, non-transitory psychological injury beyond the discomfort normally expected in these circumstances. The court generally must examine the child in person. If the court determines that face-to-face confrontation will probably cause the child serious psychological trauma, it may inquire into less restrictive alternatives, such as excluding the defendant or the child from the courtroom during the testimony. In accord with Stritzinger, some expert testimony beyond that of the child's parent is usually required, but a parent's testimony is certainly relevant and should be considered. Except in cases that would most probably result in extreme trauma, the district court should carefully consider and ordinarily grant defense requests for an independent expert on this issue. See State v. Babayan, 106 Nev. 155, 787 P.2d 805 (1990) (district court granted defense motion for independent expert evaluations on interviewing techniques based partly on children's incredible stories). The district court heard testimony from both Patricia's mother and Patricia's psychologist, Ms. Bay. They both asserted that testifying would unduly traumatize Patricia. Ms. Bay stated her opinion that testifying could cause Patricia long-term psychological problems, resulting in a complete deterioration of her mental health. In explaining to Patricia what would happen when she testified, Bay used a doll house courtroom and told her that Felix would be present. This resulted in Patricia's decision not to testify because to do so in the presence of Felix was her greatest fear. Bay never explained that the elimination of Felix from the courtroom was possible. Based on Bay's opinion, the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the possibility of resulting trauma was great enough that Patricia need not testify at trial. However, the court never interviewed Patricia directly, either in court or in camera. As previously stated, the court, and not only a psychologist, should explain to the child what testifying will entail and that the defendant may be shielded or removed from the courtroom when the child testifies. Nowhere does the record indicate that Patricia would have been unable to appear before the district judge. The opportunity for the district judge to hear and observe the child is no less important in making the unavailable determination than it is in determining competence. In fact, declaring a child unavailable to testify in most cases will prevent a defendant from any effective cross-examination. Such a finding should be made carefully and based on substantial evidence, with consideration given to alternatives less severe than the child's not testifying at all. Basing a finding of unavailability due to prospective trauma on Bay's testimony is also problematic. Bay played a key role in eliciting the critical statements from Patricia and clearly assumed that the suspected CSA had been perpetrated on the L. children. She conducted ninety-eight interviews with the children and was compensated by Nevada Victims of Crime Fund, with her payment contingent on a determination that Patricia was the victim of a crime, and Bay's report was a critical part of that determination. Her testimony resulted in two of the four convictions rendered by the jury, and throughout the investigation and trial, she seemed to be more of an advocate than an impartial health care professional. We also question whether a psychologist with a M.A. degree in educational psychology has sufficient training to make a medical prediction concerning long-term trauma. Although no particular academic degree is required, a Ph.D. in clinical psychology or an M.D. in psychiatry would serve to strengthen the conclusion of unavailability. The district court would have been well advised to have had an independent child psychiatrist assist the court in making this critical determination. The significance of the court's unavailability determination concerning Patricia can be seen in examining the testimony of her brother, Aaron. Aaron had made the same types of accusatory statements to Bay as Patricia made, and Bay concluded that he was also the victim of sexual assault. But Aaron testified, and the defense was permitted to examine him. His testimony was vague and he recanted the allegations he had made earlier. The appellants were acquitted of the charges involving Aaron, and it is at least problematical whether the same result would have been reached as to the charges involving Patricia if she had testified. We conclude that, in addition to there being an insufficient showing of Patricia's competence to testify and of the reliability of her statements, the determination that Patricia was unavailable is not supported by sufficient credible evidence. Therefore, without more, the admission of Patricia's hearsay statements was erroneous.