Opinion ID: 1239001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Mistrial and Dismissal With Prejudice

Text: An abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a district court's decision to declare a mistrial. State v. Aikins, 261 Kan. 346, Syl. ¶ 23, 932 P.2d 408 (1997). The State contends that the mistrial declaration was improper because the court had other alternatives, short of dismissal of the charge, citing State v. Wilkins, 220 Kan. 735, 556 P.2d 424 (1976). In Wilkins, we affirmed a district court ruling conditionally striking the testimony of two prosecution witnesses if the State did not produce copies of the witnesses' written statements, which the State claimed were lost. Wilkins adds no insight to the resolution of this case. The State argues that it would have taken little time to have produced a replacement copy of the 1995 certification card, had the State been aware of the need to do so. This reasoning weighs against the State. Under Rohr, the State should have known the necessity for the 1995 card. Having known about the missing certification card the evening before trial, the State should have obtained a replacement certification, or if that was not possible, brought the problem to the court's attention before voir dire. The district court could have granted the State a short recess to attempt to obtain the needed certification, as the State suggests. However, the State never requested a recess. K.S.A. 22-3423 governs mistrials. The district judge appears to have based his mistrial ruling on K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), although he did not reference it. Under K.S.A. 22-3423(2), after a mistrial is ordered, the case is to be retained on the docket for trial or other proceedings as may be proper. However, jeopardy had already attached here because the jury had been sworn, and the mistrial occurred during the testimony of the State's first witness. K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) bars further prosecution after jeopardy attaches if the former prosecution was terminated without defendant's consent (subject to certain exceptions not applicable here). [I]f the prosecutor's misconduct was intentional and substantially prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial, double jeopardy would prohibit a new trial. State v. McClanahan, 259 Kan. 86, 101, 910 P.2d 193 (1996). When a defendant's counsel moves for a mistrial, it is generally presumed that the defendant consented to the mistrial, and double jeopardy would not preclude another trial. State v. Smith, 16 Kan. App.2d 478, 480, 825 P.2d 541 (1992). See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 27 L. Ed.2d 543, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971). However, within the narrow circumstances described in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 72 L. Ed.2d 416, 102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982), prosecutorial misconduct can preclude further prosecution, even though the defendant requested the mistrial. In McClanahan, 259 Kan. 86, in affirming the district court's denial of McClanahan's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, we mentioned K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) and the Kennedy test, but determined that the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless error. Citing State v. Cady, 254 Kan. 393, Syl. ¶ 4, 867 P.2d 270 (1994), we articulated the Kennedy test as follows: [A] defendant should be allowed to freely choose whether to request a mistrial and forego the right to have the matter decided by the first trier of fact. Where the prosecutor seeks to force the defendant into a choice, the choice is not freely made and the prosecutor has subverted the defendant's rights protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. Here, if the defendant was forced into requesting a mistrial by the prosecutor's intentional misconduct, retrial would be barred by K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) and by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Kansas and United States Constitutions. McClanahan, 259 Kan. at 102. Kennedy requires intent by the prosecutor to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. A prosecutor's misconduct could be intentional (probably to obtain a conviction), but not intended to provoke a defendant's motion for mistrial. Although the district judge did not mention double jeopardy in his ruling or refer to K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c), he did find that Muck had been prejudiced and the State's conduct was intentional. We must examine the record to see if it supports a mistrial declaration based on intentional prosecutorial misconduct under the Kennedy test. Muck first moved for a mistrial after Weed mentioned chemical testing. Weed's reference appears to have been unintentional, although it occurred during direct examination only minutes after the order in limine precluding mention of the breath test was entered. The order in limine was entered when the prosecutor revealed that his endorsed witness, Fiske, the records custodian for the Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument, was unavailable, preventing the State from presenting the necessary foundation for admission of the breath test results. When the prosecutor later informed the court that Fiske was available, the order in limine was lifted. Although the prosecutor knew on the evening before the trial that Weed did not have his 1995 certification card, he did not share his knowledge with the court. He represented to the court that, with Fiske's availability, he now had the needed foundation evidence for the breath test. Had the judge known ahead of time of the State's foundation problems with Weed's certification, he undoubtedly would not have lifted the order in limine. Muck renewed the motion for mistrial after the State's foundation problems surfaced during the prosecutor's questioning of Weed on his certification. Weed had already testified about administering the breath test to Muck. Muck arguably was forced to move for mistrial at that point. The State contends that the district court's dismissal of the DUI count was an abuse of discretion, pointing out that the prosecutor's conduct may have reflected a misunderstanding of the law, but not a blatant disregard of it, or intention to mislead the court or provoke a motion for mistrial. (The judge acknowledged the prosecutor's inexperience.) Muck contends that the State's misconduct was intentionally misleading, in bad faith, and intended to produce a mistrial. Muck also argues that the district court did not grant his motion for mistrial, but instead declared a mistrial at the responsibility of the State. However, Muck never withdrew his motion for mistrial. Muck cites State v. Clovis, 248 Kan. 313, 330, 807 P.2d 127 (1991) (district court's dismissal of two criminal counts as a K.S.A. 22-3212[g] discovery sanction against State for failure to disclose confidential informant affirmed); State v. Schilling, 238 Kan. 593, 601, 712 P.2d 1233 (1986) (K.S.A. 22-3212[g] discovery sanction order held to be in error) and State v. Winter, 238 Kan. 530, 712 P.2d 1228 (1986) (discovery sanction order of dismissal reversed) as cases involving prosecutorial misconduct resulting in dismissal. These discovery sanction cases are not controlling. This is not a discovery sanction case. Muck also relies on two double jeopardy cases, United States v. Broderick, 425 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Fla. 1977), and United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the court barred retrial after finding prosecutorial overreaching to be gross negligence or intentional misconduct. Kessler and Broderick are pre- Kennedy cases. The Court in Kennedy pared down the type of prosecutorial overreaching that would preclude retrial when the defendant has moved for a mistrial based on intentional misconduct. The prosecutor bad faith conduct standard announced in Divans v. California, 434 U.S. 1303, 54 L. Ed.2d 14, 98 S. Ct. 1 (1977), cited by Muck, also must be considered as modified by Kennedy. In State v. Clover, 924 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. 1996), the Missouri Supreme Court held the trial court's granting of defendant's mistrial motion was not an abuse of discretion, but found error in the declaration of a mistrial with prejudice, absent a finding that the prosecutor intended to provoke the mistrial request. The trial court found that the prosecutor's actions had only the effect of provoking such request. We agree with the Clover rationale. When Muck's counsel accused the State of sabotaging the trial, the prosecutor responded: Judge, I did not sabotage the trial, I was not intending to mislead anybody. The district judge found the State's conduct misleading, stating: Well, it is misleading to Court and counsel, because you suggested to us when you recalled the witness that you hadthat the only problem in foundation was the fact that Mr. Fiske was or was not going to be available. We've got other problems here with regard to foundation which you knew or should have known about. Although the district judge's statement on the record at the time of his ruling did not include a finding that the prosecutor's conduct was intentional, the journal entry provided: After hearing the evidence presented, the Court ruled that the jury was prejudiced by the admission of inadmissable testimony, which the State intentionally put into evidence, and is not correctable by instruction. We acknowledge that the State intentionally put on testimony about the breath test while aware of its foundation problems; however, the district court did not make a finding that the State did so to intentionally provoke a mistrial. Kennedy teaches: Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion, therefore, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.... Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion. 456 U.S. at 675-76. We hold that the district court's findings are inadequate to permit judicial review of the double jeopardy issue under the Kennedy standard. We remand for the purpose of having the district court make a supplemental finding of fact on the issue of whether or not the actions of the prosecutor prompting the mistrial motion were done with the intention of goading Muck into requesting a mistrial. For a similar remand disposition see State v. Rademacher, 433 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Iowa 1988). The district judge's declaration of mistrial is supported by the record. We affirm the mistrial declaration. The case is remanded for the specific purpose stated herein. After making the directed finding, the district court shall enter the appropriate judgment.