Opinion ID: 78459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Penalty-Phase Counsel's Opening and Closing Statements

Text: The state courts' finding that Leinster's comments did not constitute deficient performance was not an unreasonable application of the first prong of Strickland. At the evidentiary hearing, Leinster testified that he made the challenged remarks because he was concerned about losing credibility with the jury if he disputed its first-degree murder conviction by arguing that Windom did not act in a premeditated manner. As the district court pointed out, the Supreme Court has recognized that counsel is not deficient for being candid about his client's crimes and unwilling to challenge the jury's finding of guilt. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-92, 125 S.Ct. 551, 562-63, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004). Further, the record does not support Windom's assertion that Leinster conceded a lack of mitigation. In fact, it shows that Leinster affirmatively argued for the existence of the statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense. While Leinster noted that some of the mitigation factors don't make any sense at all, he stated that some of them had a lot of bearing, and reminded the jury that several witnesses who observed Windom on the day of the murders testified that Windom [was] not who [they] had seen all his life. He was crazy ... [h]e wasn't himself. A1 at 96-97. Leinster further argued that we won't ever know what happened on the day of the murders inside Windom's mind, or whatever bizarre configuration of relays took place that day that caused him to do this, because nobody says today, I think I'll go out and shoot four people. Something happened, and that is all they called the doctor for. Id. The state court's conclusion that Windom suffered no prejudice as a result of Leinster's remarks also was not objectively unreasonable. As noted above, given the strength of the state's case for aggravation and the brutal nature of Windom's crimes, we do not believe that a different closing argument would have resulted in a lesser sentence or that Leinster's remarks in any way undermined the reliability of the jury's death recommendation.