Opinion ID: 621899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Original Decision, Amex I.

Text: The plaintiffs filed a timely appeal. We first decided that the issue of the class action waiver's enforceability was a matter for the court, not the arbitrator. Amex I, 554 F.3d at 310. Neither party takes issue with that holding, which we find survives Stolt-Nielsen and Concepion. Turning to the question of whether the class action waiver in the Card Acceptance Agreement was enforceable, we found that Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000), controlled our analysis: to the extent that [ Green Tree ] holds that when a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs. 531 U.S. at 92, 121 S.Ct. 513. We find that the district court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to bear this burden because they had ignore[d] the statutory protections provided by the Clayton Act. In re American Express Merchants Litigation, 2006 WL 662341, at . On the contrary, the record abundantly supports the plaintiffs' argument that they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the class action waiver. The Card Acceptance Agreement therefore entails more than a speculative risk that enforcement of the ban will deprive them of substantive rights under the federal antitrust statutes. Amex I, 554 F.3d at 315-16. Based in part on plaintiffs' submission of an affidavit from an economist detailing the fiscal impracticality of pursuing individual claims, we concluded that: [since] Amex has brought no serious challenge to the plaintiffs' demonstration that their claims cannot reasonably be pursued as individual actions, whether in federal court or in arbitration, we find ourselves in agreement with the plaintiffs' contention that enforcement of the class action waiver in the Card Acceptance Agreement flatly ensures that no small merchant may challenge American Express's tying arrangements under the federal antitrust laws. The effective negation of a private suit under the antitrust laws is troubling because such private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). Id. at 319. Thus, we held that: the class action waiver in the Card Acceptance Agreement cannot be enforced in this case because to do so would grant Amex de facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing the plaintiffs' only reasonably feasible means of recovery. As already set forth, Section 2 of the [Federal Arbitration Act], 9 U.S.C. § 2, provides that an agreement to arbitrate shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Given that we believe that a valid ground exists for the revocation of the class action waiver, it cannot be enforced under the FAA. Id. at 320. Amex timely filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2401, 176 L.Ed.2d 920 (2010). The Supreme Court granted Amex's petition, vacated our original decision, and remanded for further consideration in light of its holding in Stolt-Nielsen.