Opinion ID: 201039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bivens Claim Against Desrosiers

Text: 10 Under Bivens, a person may sue a federal official in his or her individual capacity for damages arising out of a constitutional violation committed under color of federal law. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999; Aversa v. United States 99 F.3d 1200, 1213 (1st Cir.1996). Relying on Bivens, Santoni claims that because Desrosiers had no legal authority to make an arrest for a state law misdemeanor, his arrest of Santoni constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 4 11 We have not resolved whether an arresting officer's lack of authority under state or federal law to conduct an otherwise constitutionally valid arrest constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The circuits are divided on this issue. Compare Malone v. County of Suffolk, 968 F.2d 1480, 1482-83 (2d Cir.1992) (whether officers have valid authority to arrest pursuant to state law affects constitutionality of the arrest); Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (10th Cir.1990) (arrest executed outside of the officer's jurisdiction violates the Fourth Amendment and gives rise to a potential § 1983 action); and United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989) (custodial arrest is constitutional if arresting officer had probable cause and authority under state or municipal law to effect a custodial arrest for the particular offense) with United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir.1995); ([W]e do not think Fourth Amendment analysis requires reference to an arrest's legality under state law.); Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that there is no § 1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause); and Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir.1974) (same). We do not reach this constitutional question 5 because we conclude that Desrosiers was authorized to swear out the criminal complaint and receive the complaint and warrant for Santoni's arrest, and that the warrant was executed under the lawful authority of Deputy Sheriff Wing. 12 Under federal law, the United States Postal Service has authority to investigate postal offenses and civil matters relating to the Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(7). This authority is primarily exercised through the Postal Inspection Service, which is charged with [e]nforcing laws related to the Postal Service, the mails, other postal offenses and other laws of the United States. 39 C.F.R. § 224.3(b)(2). 13 The federal arrest powers of postal inspectors, however, are limited and specifically defined, including the authority to serve warrants and subpoenas issued under the authority of the United States and to make certain warrantless arrests for offenses against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a); see also 39 C.F.R. § 233.1(a). Postal inspectors are not authorized under federal law to execute a warrant or make an arrest for a state law offense. See United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396, 398 n. 1 (8th Cir.1970) (Postal inspectors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3061 are given power to make arrests for postal offenses upon probable cause but are given no power to make arrests for state offenses by either state or federal statute.). Similarly, while Maine law permits some specifically designated federal officers to make arrests to enforce state law in certain situations, postal inspectors are not among these officers. 25 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 1502-A. Thus, Desrosiers did not have authority under state or federal law to make an arrest for a violation of state law. 14 Nonetheless, the district court concluded that although Maine law did not confer upon Desrosiers authority to arrest Santoni, it did authorize him to swear out a warrant for Santoni's arrest, either in his capacity as a law enforcement official or as a private citizen acting with the approval of the district attorney's office. It further held that the execution of the warrant was lawful because Desrosiers participated in the arrest as a private citizen and was assisted by Deputy Sheriff Wing, who had an affirmative duty to arrest Santoni. Santoni challenges both of these determinations. 15
16 In accordance with Maine law, a Maine district court clerk may, in the absence or unavailability of a justice of the peace or a prosecuting attorney or any of his assistants, prepare and draft a misdemeanor criminal complaint upon the request of any law enforcement officer. 15 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 708. While the statute does not define the phrase law enforcement officer, the district court interpreted it to include postal inspectors. We agree. 17 When interpreting a statute under Maine law, words and phrases are to be construed in accordance with the plain meaning of the enactment. 1 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 72. Applying this rule of statutory construction to 15 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 708, we find that any law enforcement officer includes every kind of law enforcement officer, regardless of whether or not the officer is statutorily authorized to enforce state law. Moreover, we have regularly recognized postal inspectors as law enforcement officers. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo-Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33, 43 (1st Cir.1994) (for sentence enhancement purposes, defendant should have known that postal inspector was a law enforcement officer); see also Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir.2002) (Plaintiff applied for a position as a postal inspector, a highly competitive law enforcement position.); Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.2002) (The Postal Inspection Service is the law enforcement branch of the United States Postal Service.). 18 Santoni argues that the phrase law enforcement officers as used in 15 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 708 does not include postal inspectors because postal inspectors are not among those federal law enforcement officials vested with the power to enforce state law under 25 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 1502-A. However, 15 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 708 does not limit authority to swear out a criminal complaint to state law enforcement officers and federal officers who are specifically empowered to enforce state law. Nor does 25 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 1502-A place any limitations on the kinds of officers who may swear out complaints. Therefore, we agree with the district court that the phrase any law enforcement officer does not preclude postal officials from swearing out criminal complaints. 6 19
20 Santoni also argues, however, that even if Desrosiers was authorized to swear out and receive the complaint, he had no authority to carry out the arrest of Santoni. Once an arrest warrant is issued, only an officer authorized by law may execute that warrant. Me. R.Crim. P. 4(c)(1). As noted, postal inspectors are not among those officers authorized under Maine law to execute arrest warrants. 25 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 1502-A. Santoni argues that Desrosiers also had no authority to execute the arrest in his capacity as a private citizen. Therefore, he claims that the district court's conclusion that Desrosiers was authorized as a private person to arrest Santoni was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 21 Santoni is correct that Maine law does not authorize private citizens to make an arrest for a Class E crime not committed in their presence. See 17-A Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 16; cf. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d at 398 (postal inspector's arrest of individual for carrying a concealed weapon was valid under Nebraska law that authorized private citizens to make an arrest for a felony committed in their presence). However, the district court held that Santoni's arrest was lawful, not because Desrosiers had state law authority to execute the warrant, but because Deputy Sheriff Wing participated in the arrest. In light of Wing's knowing participation in the arrest, the court explained that it would be elevating form over substance to conclude that the validity of the arrest depended on which of the two men uttered the words `You are under arrest,' or placed the Plaintiff in handcuffs. 22 We agree with the district court's conclusion that Santoni's arrest was lawful because it was carried out under Wing's lawful authority. Under Maine law, an arrest warrant shall be executed by any officer authorized by law. Me. R.Crim. P. 4(c)(1). Deputy Sheriff Wing was clearly authorized — and indeed, required — by law to arrest Santoni under 15 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 602, which provides that [i]t is the responsibility of all police and sheriff departments and their officers to use all reasonable efforts to execute the outstanding arrest warrants of which they are aware. See also Kane v. Anderson, 509 A.2d 656, 657 (Me.1986) (concluding that the execution of an arrest warrant is a ministerial rather than a discretionary function); Carroll v. City of Portland, 736 A.2d 279, 283 (Me.1999) ([A] ministerial act is mandatory and requires no personal judgment or choice.) (emphasis in original). It is undisputed that Wing accompanied Desrosiers at Desrosiers' request to Santoni's residence where Santoni was arrested and then transported by Wing and Desrosiers to the Somerset County Sheriff's Department. Based on these facts, the district court appropriately concluded that Wing was aware of the outstanding arrest warrant and had a legal duty to execute it. Desrosiers' presence at the arrest, for the purpose of assisting Wing in the execution of the warrant, did not render that arrest unlawful under state law or constitutionally infirm. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (holding that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant). 23 For the first time on appeal, Santoni argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because it is reasonable to infer that Wing was not aware of the warrant and therefore had no obligation to execute it. This argument relies on statements made by Wing in a deposition taken on January 31, 2003, five months after the entry of summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants. As Santoni acknowledges, however, this transcript was not available to the district court and therefore is not part of the record on appeal. Moreover, Santoni never argued below that Wing was unaware of the warrant. Indeed, his complaint suggested that Wing knowingly participated in the arrest, with a reference to the illegal arrest of Santoni by defendants  and the claim that Defendants DeLong and Wing did not have probable cause to arrest Santoni (emphasis added). Similarly, in his opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Santoni alleged that Desrosiers arrested plaintiff without authority to do so and that the other defendants knew it was unlawful but agreed to participate (emphasis added). Because Santoni failed to raise below his theory that Wing had no obligation to arrest Santoni because he did not know about the warrant, this argument is now procedurally defaulted. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992) (If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.). 24 In sum, Desrosiers had valid authority to swear out the criminal complaint and receive the complaint and warrant for Santoni's arrest, and Wing had valid authority to execute that warrant. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Santoni's arrest was lawful under Maine law and that it did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
25 Because Santoni has not presented a viable constitutional claim, we do not consider whether Desrosiers is protected from liability by qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.); Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir.2004) (Upon finding that there was no constitutional violation, we do not address the issue of qualified immunity.).