Opinion ID: 1287681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 1.. Apprehension of Danger

Text: A long-standing tenet of our self-defense doctrine is that a defendant's use of deadly force must be based upon a reasonable apprehension by the defendant that he or she was at imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury. In Syllabus Point 8 of State v. Cain, 20 W.Va. 679 (1882), we held that: In such a case as to the imminency of the danger, which threatened the prisoner, and the necessity of the killing in the first instance the prisoner is the judge; but he acts at his peril, as the jury must pass upon his action in the premises, viewing said actions from the prisoner's stand-point at the time of the killing; and if the jury believe from all the facts and circumstances in the case, that the prisoner had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, the danger imminent, and that the killing was necessary to preserve his own life or to protect him from great bodily harm, he is excusable for using a deadly weapon in his defense, otherwise he is not. In the case before us, it is clear that the State does not believe that the defendant had a reasonable basis to believe that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury at the time she used deadly force against the decedent. The State acknowledges that the decedent's death followed an evening of physical and sexual abuse inflicted upon the defendant by the decedent, but argues notwithstanding this night of terror a reasonable juror could have found that the defendant's use of lethal force was not reasonable under our law. The State's argument on this point is straightforward. Our law, the State argues, requires that deadly force be employed only to repel an apprehension of death or serious bodily injury existing at the time deadly force is used, and specifically excludes any apprehension of danger previously entertained as justifying the use of deadly force. Under the circumstances of the defendant's case, the State argues, the defendant did not have a reasonable basis to apprehend any imminent danger from the decedent at the time she used deadly force because the facts suggested that there had been a cooling off period after the decedent's violent acts. Therefore, the State argues, because the decedent's violent acts had ended, those violent acts constituted an apprehension of danger previously entertained and could not justify the defendant's use of deadly force. It is clear from the record that the State bases its arguments largely on Syllabus Point 6 of our decision in State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 138 S.E. 732 (1927)(emphasis added), where we held that: Under his plea of self-defense, the burden of showing the imminency of the danger rests upon the defendant. No apprehension of danger previously entertained will justify the commission of the homicide; it must be an apprehension existing at the time the defendant fired the fatal shot. It is also clear that the State bases its argument on the trial court's self-defense instruction. This self-defense instruction, which was offered by the State, contained the following language relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that death or serious bodily injury was imminent: In order for the Defendant to have been justified in the use of deadly force in self-defense, she must not have provoked the assault on her or have been the aggressor. Mere words, without more, do not constitute provocation or aggression. Furthermore, you must find that the apprehension existed at the time that the defendant attacked the victim. No apprehension of danger previously entertained will justify the commission of homicide. (Emphasis added). [4] It is obvious that the referenced portion of the trial court's self-defense instruction was based entirely on Syllabus Point 6 of State v. McMillion, supra . The question our review thus presents is whether Syllabus Point 6 of McMillion, and the State's argument based thereon, conflicts with our more recent precedent holding that prior physical and mental abuse by a decedent is relevant evidence on the issue of the reasonableness of a defendant's belief that death or serious bodily injury were imminent. We find that it does. We begin our analysis by noting that our precedent establishes that the reasonableness of a defendant's belief that he or she was at imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury is a two-part inquiry, with a subjective component and an objective component. In Syllabus Point 8 of State v. Cain, supra , we described this inquiry as requiring that the jury must pass upon [the defendant's] action in the premises, viewing said actions from the [defendant's] stand-point at the time of the killing[.] We further held in Syllabus Point 8 of State v. Cain that the jury must believe from all the facts and circumstances in the case, that the [defendant] had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, the danger imminent. More recently, we addressed the reasonableness inquiry in State v. Cook, 204 W.Va. 591, 515 S.E.2d 127 (1999), where we concluded that the two-part inquiry required a finding that a defendant actually believe that [she] is in danger and that belief must be a reasonable one. State v. Cook, 204 W.Va. 591, 601, 515 S.E.2d 127, 137, citing State v. Elam, 328 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Iowa 1982) ([T]he test of justification is both subjective and objective. The actor must actually believe that he is in danger and that belief must be a reasonable one.). Plainly stated, the reasonableness inquiry is as follows. First, a defendant's belief that death or serious bodily injury was imminent must be shown to have been subjectively reasonable, which is to say that a defendant actually believed, based upon all the circumstances perceived by him or her at the time deadly force was used, that such force was necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury. Second, that the defendant's belief must be objectively reasonable when considering all of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's use of deadly force, which is to say that another person, similarly situated, could have reasonably formed the same belief. Having thus briefly summarized the standard by which the reasonableness of the defendant's actions are measured, we turn to the issue of McMillion's absolute prohibition that no apprehension of danger previously entertained may be used to justify a homicide as having been committed in self-defense. Our precedent since McMillion clearly establishes that a defendant, who has been the victim of domestic violence that tragically ends with the defendant's killing the battering spouse, is entitled to elicit testimony about the prior physical beatings she received in order that the jury may fully evaluate and consider the defendant's mental state at the time of the commission of the offense. State v. Dozier, 163 W.Va. 192, 197-198, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (1979), citing State v. Hardin, 91 W.Va. 149, 112 S.E. 401 (1922) (defendant entitled to introduce evidence that decedent was a quarrelsome man who had previously attacked defendant and threatened defendant's life). We have similarly held that evidence of prior threats and violence is relevant to negate criminal intent. State v. Lambert, 173 W.Va. 60, 63-64, 312 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1984). In State v. Wyatt, 198 W.Va. 530, 542, 482 S.E.2d 147, 159 (1996), we explained that a defendant's domestic abuse was relevant to establish either the lack of malice, intention, or awareness, and thus negate or tend to negate a necessary element of one or the other offenses charged. In State v. Plumley, 184 W.Va. 536, 540, 401 S.E.2d 469, 473 (1990) (citations omitted)(emphasis added), we further noted that: the reasonableness of an individual's beliefs and actions in self-defense must be... viewed in [the] light of the circumstances in which he acted at the time and not measured by subsequently developed facts. State v. Reppert, 132 W.Va. 675, 691, 52 S.E.2d 820, 830 (1949). Moreover, we have explained that the reasonableness of the conduct may depend upon past actions of the decedent, including threats, violence, and general reputation. [State v.] W.J.B., 166 W.Va. [602,] 614, 276 S.E.2d [550,] 556 [1981]. Finally, in State v. Summers, 118 W.Va. 118, 188 S.E. 873 (1936), we addressed a trial court's self-defense instruction very similar to that given in the defendant's case, and which also closely paralleled Syllabus Point 6 of our decision in McMillion. In Summers, the defendant (Mr. Summers) was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment following trial. At trial, Mr. Summers had asserted a claim of self-defense. The evidence showed that the decedent had on previous occasions threatened the life of both Mr. Summers and his wife, and that the decedent had also on a prior occasion threatened to rape Mr. Summers' wife. Mr. Summers testified that he shot the decedent through a screen door, killing the decedent, after observing the decedent threatening his wife with a blackjack. The State's witnesses, however, testified that the decedent came into the confectionery through the side door without using force toward anyone; that Mrs. Summers was at the time behind the counter waiting on the customers; and that [the decedent] did not get within reach of [Mrs. Summers]. 118 W.Va. at 120, 188 S.E. at 874. In reviewing the record of Mr. Summers' appeal, we concluded that the trial court had committed plain error by giving the following instruction: The court instructs the jury that in determining whether the defendant at the time he shot the deceased was acting in the lawful defense of his wife the jury must believe from the evidence in the case that the circumstances at the time surrounding the prisoner were such as gave him good cause to believe, and did believe, that his wife was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased, and it was necessary to fire said shot to protect her from such danger. The acts and conduct, if any, of the deceased at the time and prior to the shooting may be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant had such cause to believe and fired said shot under such belief, but no acts or conduct of the deceased prior to that time would excuse the defendant for shooting the deceased. Summers, 118 W.Va. at 120-121, 188 S.E. at 875. (Emphasis added.) In reversing the defendant's conviction in Summers, we concluded that the instruction permitted the jury to consider the decedent's prior conduct  only for the purpose of determining whether the defendant had cause to believe and did believe at the time of the shooting that his wife was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased. 118 W.Va. at 121, 188 S.E. at 875. We further concluded that the trial court by so limiting the jury in its consideration of the evidence, committed plain error on the basis that the jury should have been permitted to consider the evidence of the previous conduct of decedent for the purpose of determining whether the homicide was murder or manslaughter. Id. It is clear to us that our precedent since McMillion provides that the decedent's violent criminal acts and threats of death are relevant to the determination of the subjective reasonableness of the defendant's belief that she was at imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury. This is to say, under the facts of this case, the defendant's subjective belief that death or serious bodily injury was imminent, and that deadly force was necessary to repel that threat, necessarily included the fact that the decedent had, precipitously preceding his death, physically and sexually assaulted the defendant and repeatedly threatened the life of the defendant and the lives of the children. We therefore hold that where a defendant has asserted a plea of self-defense, evidence showing that the decedent had previously abused [5] or threatened the life of the defendant is relevant evidence of the defendant's state of mind at the time deadly force was used. In determining whether the circumstances formed a reasonable basis for the defendant to believe that he or she was at imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death at the hands of the decedent, the inquiry is two-fold. First, the defendant's belief must be subjectively reasonable, which is to say that the defendant actually believed, based upon all the circumstances perceived by him or her at the time deadly force was used, that such force was necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury. Second, the defendant's belief must be objectively reasonable when considering all of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's use of deadly force, which is to say that another person, similarly situated, could have reasonably formed the same belief. Our holding in Syllabus Point 6 of State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 138 S.E. 732 (1927), is expressly overruled. We further hold that where it is determined that the defendant's actions were not reasonably made in self-defense, evidence that the decedent had abused or threatened the life of the defendant is nonetheless relevant and may negate or tend to negate a necessary element of the offense(s) charged, such as malice or intent. Having thus concluded, we find the State's arguments above-described unpersuasive.