Opinion ID: 178775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Are the FPD office and its expert employees of the court or is the FPD office a government facility under the Act?

Text: Finally, Wright briefly argues that FPD counsel and its expert are under the judiciary, and thus employees of the court, see 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) (requiring child pornography to remain in the care, custody, and control of either the Government or the court), and that the FPD office is a government facility, see id. (providing for inspection of the contraband at a Government facility). Therefore, Wright maintains, defense counsel was entitled to a mirrored copy of the hard drive. Both arguments are contrary to the statute's language and structure, which differentiate between the Government, the court, and the members of the defense team (including the defendant, his or her attorney, and any individual the defendant may seek to qualify to furnish expert testimony at trial). In any event, the government did provide the defense team ample opportunity to examine the hard drive at a Government facilitythe U.S. Attorney's Office. Even assuming the FPD office is a Government facility, the statute does not require the government to provide the defendant access at multiple facilities. D. Jury Instruction Wright's final argument that he was denied a fair trial challenges the jury instructions on Counts 3 through 10. We review de novo whether the jury instructions accurately define the elements of a statutory offense. United States v. Summers, 268 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir.2001). Wright raises two issues; neither of which we find persuasive. First, he argues that the court's instructions did not require the jury to find that Wright knew the images that were specifically charged in the indictment were on his computer or that they contained child pornography. We disagree. The jury was instructed to find whether: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed... a ... desktop computer and hard disk... containing a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexual explicit conduct; (2) the defendant knew that the computer and computer disks ... contain[ed] a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and (3) the defendant knew that the visual depiction contained in the computer ... and hard disk ... contained visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The jury was also told that [i]n this case the parties have stipulated that the images are of child pornography. Thus there is no question that the jury was asked whether Wright knew that the files charged in the indictmentthose stipulated to by the partieswere on his computer or contained child pornography. Second, Wright contests the court's definition of possession. Again, in order to convict Wright of Counts 3 through 10, the jury had to find that Wright knowingly possessed ... a ... desktop computer ... containing a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexual explicit conduct. Wright argues that in defining the term possession, it was error for the court to instruct simply that [p]ossession as it pertains to computer images can include proof that the defendant had control over the images, because such control would be possible even if Wright did not know whether the images were on his computer. However, in the paragraph immediately preceding that instruction, the court told the jury that [a] person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it. More than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it. The district court clearly instructed the jury that Wright had to know the images were on his computer in order to possess them. E. Cumulative Error Wright also argues that even if each alleged error did not rise to reversible error, reversal is required due to their cumulative effect on his trial. Even if no error individually supports reversal, the cumulative effect of numerous errors may support reversal. United States v. Inzunza, 580 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir.2009). An important factor in considering the cumulative effect of errors is the strength of the prosecution's case. See Nobari, 574 F.3d at 1082. We have identified two potential forms of error in this case: the exclusion of 404(b) evidence and the prosecutor's improper statements. Neither error, on its own, requires reversal. However, we recognize that much of the prosecution's case was based on Wright's statements to Agent Andrews and Detective Englander. Because we are remanding to the district court for fact-finding on Wright's motion to suppress those statements, we do not address Wright's claim of cumulative error at this stage of the proceedings. See United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 397 (9th Cir.2004) (declining to consider question of cumulative error in light of remand to the district court for further fact-finding). [19]