Opinion ID: 758679
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Submit Duress Instruction

Text: 221 Watson argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on her duress defense and erred in refusing to allow counsel to argue during closing arguments that evidence of duress negated the government's proof of Watson's intent. Watson's brother, Christopher Smith, testified that he visited his mother's house, where Watson lived, once or twice a week. Smith testified that after Watson's boyfriend, Tony Jones, was murdered in 1991, Watson was afraid to stay at home by herself and was afraid that other family members might be killed. Wonda Cortes testified that the conspiracy would not allow members who threatened its existence to withdraw voluntarily. Watson argues that this evidence established that her participation in the conspiracy was compelled by her fear for her own and her family's safety. 222 Duress, like the related, and often overlapping, defenses of self-defense and necessity, is a form of the affirmative defense of justification. See United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1986). 19 To raise an issue of duress for the jury a defendant must present proof of four elements: 223 (1) that the defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending [threat] of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; 224 (2) that defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be [forced to choose the criminal conduct]; 225 (3) that defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm; and 226 (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the [criminal] action taken and the avoidance of the [threatened] harm. 227 Harper, 802 F.2d at 117 (quoting United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir.1982) (citations and footnotes omitted) (brackets in original)). 228 Because duress is an affirmative defense, a defendant must present evidence of each of the elements of the defense before it may be presented to the jury. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415, 100 S.Ct. 624, 637, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); Gant, 691 F.2d at 1165. In determining whether a defendant has made a threshold showing of the elements of the defense a court must objectively evaluate the facts presented by the defendant. See Gant, 691 F.2d at 1163. An objective analysis of Watson's evidence persuades us that Watson failed to present evidence that she was under a present, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury, or that she had no available legal alternatives other than her continued course of criminal conduct. 229 Watson presented no specific evidence of any threat to her or her family. She attempts to overcome this evidentiary deficit by arguing that Bailey only requires an imminent threat. Watson argues that  'imminent' does not always mean 'immediate,'  and that in a conspiracy case like this one a threat remains 'present, imminent, and impending' ... as long as the conspiracy's potential for violence remains. (Watson's brief at pages 29 and 30) Watson's attempt to drive a semantic wedge between imminent and immediate is of no avail under the facts of this case. Regardless of which adjective is used to describe the threat, our decisions make it clear that the defense only arises if there is a real emergency leaving no time to pursue any legal alternative. In stating why the defense requires proof of absolute and uncontrollable necessity the Supreme Court explained that [a]ny rule less stringent than this would open the door to all sorts of fraud. The Diana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354, 360-61, 19 L.Ed. 165 (1868). 20 230 Nor has Watson presented evidence of the absence of a legal alternative to drug dealing. To establish the absence of a legal alternative a defendant must show that he had actually tried the alternative or had no time to try it, or that a history of futile attempts revealed the illusionary benefit of the alternative. Harper, 802 F.2d at 118 (quoting Gant, 691 F.2d at 1164). In assessing whether reasonable alternatives were available to a defendant a court must objectively evaluate the facts. A [d]efendant's subjective belief as to available legal alternatives is not determinative. As long as defendant's crises permitted 'a selection from among several solutions, some of which did not involve criminal acts,' ... the necessity defense must fail. United States v. Meraz-Valeta, 26 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir.1994). As the Supreme Court explained in Bailey, [v]ague and necessarily self-serving statements of defendants or witnesses as to future good intentions or ambiguous conduct simply do not support a finding of this element of the defense. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415, 100 S.Ct. at 637. 231 A comparison of decisions in which a duress defense has been invoked illustrates the rigorousness of the requirements of a real, imminent threat and the absence of any legal alternative. For example, in one of the few cases in which the defense was held to be available, United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.1982), Panter, a convicted felon, was working as a bartender. He was assaulted by a patron who had been drinking heavily and who had previously been convicted of murder. After a brief argument the patron threatened to kill Panter, pulled a knife, and stabbed Panter in the stomach. As the two men fought on the floor, Panter reached under the bar for a club he kept there. As he reached for the club, his hand fell upon a pistol placed there by another employee, and he shot his attacker. This court held that the defenses of self-defense and necessity were available to Panter in defending against a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon because there was no time for Panter to take any lawful action to avoid being killed. See id. at 271. 232 Contrasted with Panter are the facts in Harper and United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.1990), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.1993) (en banc ). In Harper the defendant, also a convicted felon, had purchased firearms to protect himself and his fiancee after he had been robbed several times. We held that the defense of necessity was not available because there was no evidence that Harper was in danger of any imminent bodily harm when he purchased and possessed the gun, and because Harper had reasonable legal alternatives available to possessing a firearm; for example, he could have notified the police of the threats. See id. at 118. In Harvey the defendant, again a convicted felon, argued that he feared for his life because a rival church faction in his small hometown had engaged in shootouts and that Harvey had been threatened by members of the faction who wanted him to leave town. We affirmed the district's refusal to submit a duress instruction to the jury because Harvey's evidence did not show that any present, immediate threat prevented him from calling the police. See Harvey, 897 F.2d at 1305. 233 Watson's evidence of duress was much more analogous to Harper and Harvey than to Panter. Watson presented no evidence of any imminent threat or that she could not pursue legal alternatives to drug dealing, such as contacting the police. The generalized testimony of her brother that Watson was afraid to stay at home and that she feared for her family's safety and Cortes's testimony that the conspiracy did not allow members to withdraw fell far short of the proof required to raise an issue of duress. A district court's refusal to submit a requested jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1338 (5th Cir.1996). The district court was well within its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of duress. 234 During closing arguments Watson's counsel argued, based on the same evidence that Watson relied on in support of her duress defense, that the government had failed to prove that Watson acted willfully. The government objected that Watson's counsel was attempting to argue indirectly the duress defense. At the government's request the district court instructed the jury that Ms. Watson is not entitled to the defense of duress in this case. Watson argues on appeal that this instruction left the jury with the impression that the evidence of the murders and other violence could not be considered, even in relation to her intent. 235 Evaluating a challenged jury instruction requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury ..., for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (citation omitted). The district court's instruction to the jury was a correct and limited statement of the court's conclusion that she was not entitled to a duress defense. It said no more, and did not foreclose Watson from arguing that the government had not proved her intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 236 Neither Watson's complaint that the district court failed to instruct the jury on her duress defense nor her complaint that the district court instructed the jury that she was not entitled to a duress defense provides a basis for overturning her convictions.