Opinion ID: 835001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consecutive Sentences (Assignment of Error Number 24)

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to impose his death sentence consecutively to the life sentence that he was already serving. The basis for defendant's argument is ORS 137.123(3), which provides: When a defendant is sentenced for a crime committed while the defendant was incarcerated after sentencing for the commission of a previous crime, the court shall provide that the sentence for the new crime be consecutive to the sentence for the previous crime. (Emphasis added.) This court determines legislative intent, in the first instance, from the text and context of the statute, and we must apply the text as the legislature has written it, particularly when the text is not ambiguous. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 171-73, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009) (explaining paradigm); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (same). Defendant urges that, as applicable to this case, the meaning of ORS 137.123(3) is clear from the text. Defendant's sentence of death was imposed for the crime of aggravated murder, which he committed while incarcerated on a sentence of life imprisonment. [15] Under those circumstances, according to defendant, the plain language of ORS 137.123(3) directs that the trial court 'shall provide that the sentence for the new crime' i.e., the death sentence`be consecutive to the sentence for the previous crime' i.e., the life sentence. (Emphasis supplied by defendant.) Defendant argues that the trial court erred because it did not provide that defendant's death sentence be consecutive to his life sentenced. [16] In defendant's view, then, his death sentence cannot be carried out until he has completed his prior sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant, of course, recognizes that if his existing sentence of life imprisonment is completed only when he dies in prison, then his death sentence never can be carried out. Defendant argues that ORS 137.123(3) must be followed, despite that counterintuitive result. The state responds that defendant's interpretation of ORS 137.123(3) is incorrect because it would require that the execution of the death sentence be delayed until the life sentence has been fully servedand therefore not be carried out at all. That result, the state argues, would conflict with the death penalty statutes. The state points out that the death penalty statutes provide that the execution of a death sentence is automatically delayed to allow for direct review by this court, the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and exhaustion of collateral remedies. ORS 137.463(1); ORS 138.686. After the defendant has exhausted or waived those remedies, the trial court must hold a death warrant hearing. ORS 137.463(3), (4). Following that hearing, if the trial court determines that the defendant has exhausted or waived all remedies and is mentally competent, the court issues a death warrant that shall specify a date [on which the death sentence is to be executed] not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days following the effective date of the appellate judgment. ORS 137.463(5). If the death sentence for any reason    is not executed on the date appointed in the death warrant and is not stayed under ORS 138.686 or otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, the court must then issue a new death warrant on motion of the state and without further hearing. ORS 137.463(7). The new warrant must specify an execution date, not more than 20 days after the date of the state's motion. Id. In other words, the state argues, the statutory scheme prescribes a closed set of automatic stays and procedures that act to move the case    along, but does not permit delay of execution while the defendant completes service of another sentence. In the state's view, ORS 137.123(3) can be harmonized with the death penalty statutes by either (1) interpreting consecutive to to mean only that the sentences must be served one after another without overlap, but not in any particular order, or (2) interpreting sentence in ORS 137.123(3) to mean sentence of incarceration, so that death sentences would be excluded from the statute's reach. Defendant responds that either interpretation would conflict with the text of the statute. In particular, he argues that even the state concedes that to be consecutive to means following or right after. Thus, he argues, the new sentence must follow the old sentence. Additionally, defendant asserts, the legislature used the term sentence without qualification in ORS 137.123(3) and thus likely intended that term to include a death sentence. Further, the legislature used the phrase term of imprisonment in other provisions, e.g., ORS 137.123(5), which demonstrates that the legislature knew how to use such a term but did not do so in ORS 137.123(3). To the extent that the statutes conflict and cannot be reconciled, each party claims that one statute is more particular than the other. When a general and [a] particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular intent. ORS 174.020(2). Defendant argues that ORS 137.123(3) applies only to sentences for aggravated murder committed while the defendant is incarcerated after the commission of a previous crime, whereas the death penalty statutes apply to all aggravated murder sentences. It follows, defendant claims, that ORS 137.123(3) is the more particular statute and that it trumps the applicable death penalty statutes. The state argues that the death penalty statutes apply only to death sentences, whereas ORS 137.123(3) applies to sentences imposed for any crime, if the defendant is incarcerated at the time of the crime, and, accordingly, the more specific death penalty statutes should be applied. The state further argues that one of the two counts of aggravated murder of which defendant was convicted was for committing a crime while confined in a correctional facility, ORS 163.095(2)(b). To give effect to the legislature's specific decision to authorize such a murder to be prosecuted as aggravated murderwith the attendant possibility that a jury will decide to impose the death penaltyORS 137.123(3) must be interpreted to permit the imposition of the death penalty even if a defendant is still serving a term of imprisonment. Following the rules of statutory construction mentioned previously, we cannot give effect to ORS 137.123(3) with its requirement of consecutive sentences and, at the same time, give effect to the statutes that provide for the death penalty for an aggravated murder that is committed when the defendant is already serving a life sentence for another murder. The statutes are in conflict. In such an instance, under ORS 174.010 and ORS 174.020(2), we must give effect to all provisions or particulars of the statutes, if possible, and let the specific legislative intent control the general. To state the obvious, the penalty of death is different in kind from incarceration. Incarceration involves the denial of freedoms and privileges through imprisonment in a state or county facility for a period of years, sometimes for the life of the inmate. By contrast, an execution is a single event at the end of a lengthy process of ensuring that the sentence of death is consistent with applicable constitutional and statutory standards. Incarceration of inmates subject solely to the death penalty is necessary only until the execution, assuming that the execution is not foreclosed by some intervening event. The two forms of punishment, particularly in a temporal sense, are not only unlike but are mutually inconsistent. To treat them as interchangeable or capable of treatment as consecutive to one another makes little sense. The foregoing observation assists in distinguishing between general and particular legislative intent. A particular legislative intent is paramount and must control the general legislative intent. ORS 174.020(2). In terms of criminal law sanctions, the death penalty is the seldom-used exception to the more often-used punishment of incarceration. Moreover, it is the most severe, singular sanction that the state can impose for any crimeand it can be imposed only for one crime, aggravated murder. The statutes providing for the imposition of a sentence of death are a more specific expression of legislative intent when compared with a sentence of incarceration, because a sentence of death is exceptional. For that reason, as previously explained, the legislature has enacted a number of specific statutes to regulate the manner in which a death sentence moves toward the issuance of a death warrant and the date of execution. The general intent of the legislature, expressed in ORS 137.123(3), is that sentences for crimes committed in prison must be consecutive to previously imposed sentences. While consecutively adding like forms of punishment is appropriate when multiple sentences of imprisonment are involved, the penalty of death that the legislature provided for this particular crime would rarely be carried out if it is consecutive to an existing sentence of life imprisonment. The legislature has provided a timetable for carrying out the sequence of events following the imposition of a death sentence, and it is that schedule which the legislature intended trial courts and prison officials to observe. Put differently, the legislature did not intend that the schedule for imposition of a sentence of death depend on another, existing, sentence; instead, the schedule depends on the exhaustion of legal proceedings related to the aggravated murder conviction that lead to the imposition of the death penalty and the issuance of the death warrant. We conclude that the particular legislative intent is that the sentence of death be carried out, when its imposition is consistent with proper legal standards, for aggravated murder committed in prison. See ORS 163.095(2)(b) (penalty for aggravated murder applies when [t]he defendant was confined in a state, county or municipal penal or correctional facility or was otherwise in custody when the murder occurred). If we accepted defendant's argument, the sentence of death would be contingent, rather than certain, because the state would have to wait for the completion of defendant's life sentence before executing the death sentence. That result would be inconsistent with the legislature's more specific intent that the death penalty may be imposed for aggravated murders committed in prison. Defendant must continue to serve a period of life imprisonment while he is confined awaiting the execution of the sentence of death. Pursuant to the legislature's intent, the period of imprisonment for defendant's earlier crime runs until such time as the sentence of death for aggravated murder is carried out according to the schedule determined by statute. We reject defendant's argument that the execution of the death sentence must be imposed only after he has served his life sentence.