Opinion ID: 203998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: When 40 miles or more from the antenna - 5

Text: miles.5 3 The United States argued that Santiago had no duty under ¶ 5-5-9 to separate Wojciechowicz's flight from El Yunque because ¶ 5-5-9 applies only for IFR flights and that even if Santiago had a duty to separate Wojciechowicz's flight, he did not breach his duty. 4 The government argued that local air traffic control authorities had the authority to modify Order 3120.4J's curriculum and that Santiago had received adequate training. 5 The provision refers to two exceptions. It does not apply in En Route Stage A/DARC or Stage A/EDARC. There is nothing in the record about these exceptions, but the parties agree they do not apply to this case. -10- ATCM ¶ 5-5-9 (emphasis in original). Here, the required separation was three miles. While plaintiffs' case rests largely on ATCM ¶ 5-5-9 and the training order, also pertinent to the case are the FAA regulations, other provisions of the ATCM, and provisions of other FAA manuals. The FAA has promulgated regulations that govern pilots' operations. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 91. These regulations have the force and effect of law, but here the plaintiffs do not claim a violation of the C.F.R. In addition, the FAA publishes operations manuals, including the ATCM for controllers and the AIM for pilots. The controlling law of this circuit is that the ATCM is not a statute or a regulation but an internal FAA guideline issued to FAA controllers, which governs their conduct. As such, under our case law the ATCM is merely an indication of the standard of care. Fed. Express Corp., 664 F.2d at 835. Further, we treat substantial failures to adhere to the ATCM guidelines as persuasive as an indication of a lack of due care. Id. (quoting Delta Air Lines, Inc., 561 F.2d at 390).6 Independently of ¶ 5-5-9's separation requirement, ATCM ¶ 2-1-6 requires a controller to issue a safety alert to the pilot 6 In arguing that the ATCM carries the force of law, the dissent mischaracterizes the law in this circuit. This panel is bound by circuit precedent, which only an en banc court can change. United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 88 (1st Cir. 2006). -11- if the controller is aware the aircraft is in a position/altitude which, in [the controller's] judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. The AIM, by contrast, is an FAA publication that explains to pilots the application of FAA regulations in different circumstances. Like the ATCM, the AIM is merely indicative of the standard of care. Id.; Delta Air Lines, Inc., 561 F.2d at 390. Several of its provisions also discuss the conduct of air traffic controllers. Paragraph 5-5-8 of the AIM states that a pilot is responsible to see and avoid other traffic, terrain, or obstacles. That provision also says that a controller will issue a safety alert if aware the aircraft is at an altitude believed to place the aircraft in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. A separate provision, ¶ 3-2-6(f), states that no separation services are provided to VFR aircraft in Class E airspace, the class of airspace in which Wojciechowicz was operating at all pertinent times. In addition, AIM § 4-1-17(e) provides that VFR pilots are not relieved of their responsibilities to maintain appropriate terrain and obstruction clearance, or to remain in [VFR-appropriate] weather conditions by the fact that they are receiving basic radar services from a terminal. Finally, FAA Order 3120.4J is an FAA operating manual addressed to air traffic control authorities. It sets forth a -12- national curriculum for training controllers. Two provisions of Order 3120.4J set forth training exercises under which a trainee is required to label or draw topographical features on an unlabeled chart of the local area and to identify significant terrain areas and obstructions on an unlabeled video map.7 The district court entered judgment in favor of the United States. It held that ATCM ¶ 5-5-9 did not apply to VFR flights but only to IFR flights. It further found that, even assuming ATCM ¶ 5-5-9 did apply to VFR flights, Santiago did not violate the provision because the last radar information he had for the flight came well before it entered the three-mile radius around El Yunque. Wojciechowicz, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 269. Crediting the testimony of the government's expert witness, Edward Henderson, that ¶ 5-5-9 requires a radar separation, the court held that [w]ithout the aircraft remaining in radar contact it would have been impossible for Mr. Santiago to apply the aforementioned radar separation criteria to N441AW. Thus, the provisions of [¶] 5-5-9 could not have been implemented because the aircraft was not visible on Mr. Santiago's radar scope. Id. 7 Plaintiffs cite Courses 55060 and 55065. Course 55060 states, Given an unlabeled chart of the local area . . . the individual shall label or draw the following: . . . Topographical features. Course 55065 states, Given an unlabeled video map/overlay, the individual shall identify all items, plus . . . Significant terrain areas and obstructions. -13- The court also found that Santiago did not violate his separate duty under ATCM ¶ 2-1-6. It found the data available to Santiago did not provide him with information about the plane's proximity to terrain, and, because Wojciechowicz was operating as a VFR pilot, Santiago did not know his intentions as to his route. Santiago was therefore not aware that Wojciechowicz was in a position which, in Santiago's judgment, placed him in unsafe proximity to terrain. Id. at 258-60. As to the second issue, the court held that CERAP had leeway to adapt Order 3120.4J's curriculum to local requirements and that it had adequately trained Santiago on terrain features by instructing him on local MVA information. Further, the court found, any deficiency in training did not cause plaintiffs' harm. The general terrain knowledge the training would have provided would not have given Santiago sufficient information regarding the flight's unsafe proximity to terrain to require the issuance of a safety alert. Id. at 259-60, 262. The district court also found that even assuming arguendo that a duty had been owed and breached by the controller . . ., plaintiffs ha[d] failed to prove that any such breach was the cause of the crash . . . or that the pilot's actions in this case were foreseeable. Id. at 277. The court found that Wojciechowicz's actions had been negligent and that his negligence was the sole cause of the accident. Plaintiffs appealed. -14-