Opinion ID: 382203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of F.R.Crim.P. 6(e)

Text: 11 In order to accept the argument of Rittenhouse and Severance that Rule 6(e) applies to forbid disclosure of the requested documents, it would be necessary to conclude that the Rule prevents disclosure, for any purpose, of documents once they are subpoenaed by a grand jury. We cannot so conclude, however, because the policy of secrecy is not absolute. United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 1794, 60 L.Ed.2d 244 (1974). Rule 6(e) shields solely matters occurring before the grand jury. It is designed to protect from disclosure only the essence of what takes place in the grand jury room, in order to preserve the freedom and integrity of the deliberative process. See, e. g., United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681, 78 S.Ct. 983, 985, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954). The Rule is not intended to foreclose from all future revelation to proper authorities the same information or documents which were presented to the grand jury. United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960). The mere fact that a particular document is reviewed by a grand jury does not convert it into a matter occurring before the grand jury within the meaning of 6(e). Documents such as the business records sought by the Commission here are created for purposes independent of grand jury investigations, and such records have many legitimate uses unrelated to the substance of the grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Stanford, supra, at 291. 12 As the Second Circuit stated in United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, supra, while granting the request of the Interstate Commerce Commission for disclosure of a trucking company's records in the custody of a grand jury: 13 (W)hen testimony or data is sought for its own sake-for its intrinsic value in the furtherance of a lawful investigation-rather than to learn what took place before the grand jury, it is not a valid defense to disclosure that the same information was revealed to a grand jury or that the same documents had been, or were presently being, examined by a grand jury. 14 280 F.2d at 54. Thus, once the New Jersey Commission demonstrated a legitimate purpose flowing from its investigatory authority for subpoenaeing the records of Rittenhouse and Severance, disclosure should not have been denied simply because a grand jury had reviewed the documents in an unrelated matter. Access to the records should be refused only if it would compromise the secrecy of the grand jury. The district court erred in assuming that Rule 6(e) automatically controlled when it required the Commission to show a compelling necessity for production from the outset. If the reasons for maintaining secrecy do not apply at all in a given situation, or apply to only an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclosure should not be required to demonstrate a large compelling need. U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1965). In this instance, where the documents are sought for use in an investigation into a different subject than the matter before the grand jury, the party objecting to production must first prove that the policy of grand jury secrecy would be jeopardized. Otherwise, the request for access is not governed by Rule 6(e). 15 Because the record before us does not include the documents sought by the Commission, we must leave to the district court the task of evaluating whether disclosure would reveal matters occurring before, or the content of, the grand jury proceedings. If the district court specifically finds that the secrecy policy of Rule 6(e) is implicated, only then should the Commission be required to show a particular need or compelling necessity for disclosure.