Opinion ID: 26475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. Due Process Constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo.3 The 2 Sims was sentenced to five years probation, a fine of $100,000, and a special assessment of $400. Amtek was sentenced to five years probation and a special assessment of $400. Jerkins was sentenced to five years probation and a special assessment of $100. Case was sentenced to five years probation, restitution of $14,628, a fine of $10,000, and a special assessment of $100. 3 See United States v. Lampton, 158 F.3d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1998). 6 defendants contend that application of Title 42 U.S.C. §6928(d)(2)(A) to the instant facts violates the due process requirement that criminal statutes give fair warning and notice of proscribed conduct. The defendants raise four due process issues on appeal. First, the defendants had no notice or fair warning that they would not be considered generators and thus not exempt from permit requirements for on-site storage of hazardous waste. Second, they had no knowledge of the facts supporting the denial of the on-site storage permit exception which rendered their conduct criminal. Third, the defendants maintain that they did not have notice that Chapter 21 of Louisiana's Hazardous Waste Regulations would apply to them since it was repealed as state law by the Louisiana legislature. Fourth, they argue that the definition of storage is unconstitutionally vague because the definition of storage as applied to compressed gas in a cylinder includes containing gas in a cylinder with no further action on the part of the defendants. a. Whether the defendants were generators A generator is defined by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the EPA as any person, by site, whose act or process produces hazardous waste identified or listed, or whose act first causes hazardous waste to become subject to regulation.4 While storing hazardous waste without a permit is 4 L.A.C. 33:V.109 (1997); 40 C.F.R. §260.10 (1997). 7 usually prohibited, there are exceptions to the permit requirement for generators who meet certain conditions. Small quantity generators (SQGs), those who generate less than 1000kg of hazardous waste in a calendar month, have more lenient standards by which to abide.5 Federal regulations permit SQGs to store hazardous waste on-site without a permit for 180 days as long as they comply with safe storage conditions.6 SQGs who generate 100kg or less of hazardous waste in a calendar month are conditionally exempt SQGs (CESQGs).7 Waste generated by CESQGs is not subject to regulation and may be stored without a permit provided certain conditions are met. The defendants submit that demolition contractors who remove hazardous substances from buildings that are scheduled to be demolished are generators. Recalling that a generator is one who produces or whose act first causes hazardous waste to become subject to regulation, it is clear that neither Albertson's nor the defendants qualify as generators. The facts clearly show that the canisters of methyl bromide were waste when Albertson's bought the property, so neither Albertson's nor the defendants could be considered generators because they did not produce or first cause the hazardous waste to become subject to regulation. 5 40 C.F.R. §260.10 (1997). 6 40 C.F.R. §262.34(d) (1997). 7 40 C.F.R. §261.5 (1997). 8 Even if the defendants were considered to be generators, to be exempt from having a permit as an SQG, certain conditions must be met under both state and federal regulations. The facts to which the defendants stipulated clearly show that they did not meet these conditions and could not qualify for unpermitted storage of hazardous waste. While the defendants argue that the state regulations do not apply, the regulations under Chapter 21 are less stringent than the federal regulations. The defendants failed to meet the more strict federal regulations for CESQGs and are not entitled to the exemption under state or federal law. As a result, even if the defendants were considered generators, they could not qualify for the permit exemption. Accordingly, there was no due process violation. b. Knowledge The defendants maintain that their due process rights were denied because they lacked knowledge of facts that would have rendered their otherwise lawful conduct criminal. They submit that they had no knowledge that they would not be considered generators who were exempt from the permit requirements. The parties stipulated that they lacked knowledge of the history of the canisters. The defendants argued that, as far as they knew, either they or Albertson's were the first to decide whether to dispose of the canisters and thus fall within the definition of generator. This argument fails because even if the defendants were 9 generators, their convictions are valid because they violated the federal regulations for unpermitted storage of hazardous waste as we explain below. c. Vagueness Under RCRA, for waste to be hazardous it must be solid waste.8 For gaseous material to be solid waste it must be contained.9 Storage is defined as the containment of hazardous waste, either on a temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste.10 The defendants argue that the statute's vagueness in defining how one stores contained gaseous material, which is contained from inception, unconstitutionally violates due process. This Court is concerned with the fact that the statute fails to specify a time frame within which, after hazardous waste is discovered in one's possession, that person becomes criminally liable for storing it without a permit. However, under the facts of this case, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The defendants were indicted for illegal storage of hazardous waste. What made their conduct criminal was the knowing storage of hazardous waste without a permit. The defendants argue that the definition of storing gaseous material gave them no fair warning 8 42 U.S.C.§6903(5). 9 42 U.S.C. §6903(27). 10 42 U.S.C. §6903(33). 10 that merely finding the cylinders on a jobsite or placing them on the ground without further containment constitute[d] a felony. The defendants moved the canisters from the building knowing, at a minimum, that they were potentially hazardous because they had poison and fumigant stamped on them, yet the defendants allowed the canisters to remain in an open area for three weeks without reporting their existence. Vagueness challenges outside the First Amendment context must be considered in light of the particular facts of the case.11 We are not persuaded by the defendants' argument that they could not reasonably understand that they were storing hazardous waste without putting the canisters inside an additional container as opposed to putting them out in the open. The question that must be resolved is at what point were the defendants intentionally storing the methyl bromide? This is a question of fact. The defendants should have notified the appropriate agencies that they found potentially hazardous material on their property much sooner than they did. Allowing the canisters to remain in an open area on the property for three weeks, while doing nothing to facilitate their removal or disposal, is storage in violation of §6928(d)(2)(A). While we are concerned with the potential danger of prosecutorial discretion under this statute, as applied to the instant facts, we hold that 11 Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192 & n.7, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). 11 the defendants were storing hazardous waste in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. §6928(d)(2)(A). 2. Deficiency of the Indictment An indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the charged offense, fairly informs the defendant of the charges against him, and ensures that there is no risk of future prosecutions for the same offense.12 The defendants were charged under Title 42 U.S.C. §6928(d)(2)(A) with storing hazardous waste without a permit. Defendants' position that the indictment was deficient results from their incorrect assumption that exemptions to the permit requirement are elements of the offense. The defendants cannot assert that the government need prove that the defendants were not entitled to the permit exemptions provided by statute. It is an affirmative defense, not an element of the crime, that the defendants were entitled to allow the waste to remain on the site as a CESQG.13 We 12 United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1994). 13 The defendants rely on United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991), to assert that it was the government's burden to prove that the defendants stored hazardous waste without a permit and...violated the limited conditions under which [they] could store those wastes without a permit. However, the sufficiency of the indictment was not at issue in Baytank. The Court made it clear that such unpermitted storage was permissible for the ninety day period only if it complie[d] with certain safe storage conditions. The Baytank Court's holding does not necessitate a finding that the government must charge and negate exceptions to a permit requirement in an indictment. See United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1310 n.3 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)(generally, the burden of proving compliance with a statutory exception is on the defendant). 12 hold that the district court was correct in finding that the indictment was not deficient for failing to allege an element of the crime charged. 3. Jurisdiction of the District Court Challenges to the jurisdiction of the district court are reviewed de novo.14 The defendants submit that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case because the government was attempting to enforce state regulations. The state regulations that the defendants claim were enforced against them only applied to SQGs. Because we hold that the defendants were not generators of methyl bromide, the argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce Louisiana regulations applicable to SQGs is without merit. 4. Sufficiency of the Factual Basis A district court's acceptance of a guilty plea is a factual finding which we review under the clearly erroneous standard.15 The district court's conclusion that the factual basis was sufficient to support a violation of Title 42 U.S.C. §6928(d)(2)(A) was not clearly erroneous. RCRA defines solid waste as including any discarded material...resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, 14 United States v. Lynch, 114 F.3d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1997). 15 See United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir.1992). 13 and agricultural operations....16 Methyl bromide is a hazardous waste once it is discarded or intended to be discarded.17 Materials that are abandoned by being...disposed of or accumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in lieu of being abandoned by being disposed of are considered discarded and therefore solid waste under RCRA.18 The defendants contend that the methyl bromide was not waste because the government failed to show that the canisters were intentionally abandoned or discarded. The canisters were clearly discarded or abandoned. Whether it was done intentionally is of no moment. Arguments that the contents of the canisters could have been used as a fumigant or returned to Reddick are not supported by the evidence and therefore without merit. The canisters' contents were never intended to be used as a fumigant by the apartment complex according to the testimony of Ms. Box, and there is there no indication that Albertson's or its agents intended to use the canisters' contents for any purpose. In hindsight, Reddick's possible willingness to take the canisters back does not necessitate a conclusion that the defendants actually intended to return the canisters to Reddick. The canisters sat in an open area for three weeks until they were stolen. There is no possible conclusion but 16 42 U.S.C. §6903(27). 17 L.A.C. 33:V. 4901.D. 18 L.A.C. 33:V.109. 14 that the canisters were abandoned or discarded. The defendants additionally contend that, even if the canisters were waste, they had no such knowledge, negating an essential element of the offense charged. The factual basis is clearly sufficient with respect to whether the defendants knew that the canisters were waste. The defendants stipulated that the canisters contained hazardous material as evident from the labels on the canisters and their corroded appearance. Case and Jerkins also stipulated that they discussed what to do with the canisters, including hiring an environmental company to remove and dispose of them. These facts cannot support the defendants' contentions that it was reasonable to assume that the fumigant was usable or that the defendants would have contacted Reddick to reclaim the canisters. III.