Opinion ID: 4523206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery is a “Crime of

Text: Violence” Because completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924, attempted Hobbs Act robbery is also a crime of violence. In so holding, we agree with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that, when a substantive offense would be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that offense is also a crime of violence. There is no circuit court decision to the contrary. United States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2020) (attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 351–53 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 18, 2019) (No. 19-5267) (analyzing attempted Hobbs Act robbery); Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 352 (2018) (analyzing Illinois attempted murder; holding that “[w]hen a substantive offense would be a violent felony under § 924(e) and similar statutes, an attempt to commit that offense is also a violent felony.”) 6; cf. United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689–93 (7th Cir. 2018) (declining to apply Hill rule where state law did not require proof of intent for attempt conviction). The reasons for this are straightforward. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) explicitly includes as crimes of violence offenses that have as an element the “attempted use” or “threatened use” of force. In order to be guilty of attempt, a 6 The Seventh Circuit analyzed whether attempted murder, in violation of Illinois law, was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. We have held that the operative language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is identical to the portion of the elements clause at issue in this case. See United States v. Fultz, 923 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2019). 20 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ defendant must intend to commit every element of the completed crime. See, e.g., Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1042 (attempt conviction requires evidence that defendant intended to violate the statute). An attempt to commit a crime should therefore be treated as an attempt to commit every element of that crime. Hill, 877 F.3d at 719. “When the intent element of the attempt offense includes intent to commit violence against the person of another, . . . . it makes sense to say that the attempt crime itself includes violence as an element.” Hill, 877 F.3d at 719. Not so, argues Dominguez, because the “substantial step” required for an attempt conviction need not be itself violent. Since the elements of attempt are only an intent to commit the crime, along with a substantial step, Dominguez argues that attempt crimes contain no “element” of force. This argument would have us ignore his specific intention to commit a violent crime, as well as common sense. A criminal who specifically intends to use violence, and then takes a substantial step toward that use, has, by definition, attempted a violent crime, albeit an uncompleted one. Moreover, adopting Dominguez’s approach in this case would be plainly inconsistent with our prior determination that “[t]he ‘attempt’ portion of [a] conviction does not alter our determination that the conviction is a crime of violence. We have ‘generally found attempts to commit crimes of violence, enumerated or not, to be themselves crimes of violence.’” Arellano Hernandez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Riley, 183 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (providing that an aggravated felony includes the attempt to commit the offense)). UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 21 We hold that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). We affirm Dominguez’s conviction on Count Ten.