Opinion ID: 2468034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The failure to define agency.

Text: An instruction was given to the effect that if the accumulation of ice on the highway resulted from the flow of water from the Thompson house, that Thompson knew or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known of the danger thus created, and that his failure to prevent or remedy it was a proximate cause of the accident, the jury should find against him. The same instruction went on to say that he was liable also for a similar negligent failure on his brother Burnley's part if the jury should believe from the evidence that Burnley was his agent for the purpose of inspecting the premises. There was no objection to this instruction. However, after retiring to deliberate on the case the jury asked the trial court, in the presence of counsel, for a definition of agency as mentioned in the instruction. The court declined to give it. Again no objection was presented, nor was any question raised by counsel until the motion for new trial was made. Without implying that there was enough evidence to submit the case against Thompson to the jury in the first place, we think the obvious answer on this point is that if the appellants were not satisfied with any phase or portion of the instructions the time to speak was before they were given to the jury. C.R. 51. We perceive no good to be accomplished by departing from the letter of the Rule. In conclusion, it will be noted that it may very well have been unnecessary to reverse this judgment if it had been possible to tell whether the verdict was based to some extent upon contributory negligence. When instructions are given on both negligence and contributory negligence, this type of blind spot can be forestalled by using a form of instructions in which, following the enumeration of each party's duties, the jurors are required to answer the following interrogatory: Do you believe from the evidence that ______ failed to comply with any one or more of these duties? YES NO (Strike one) If your answer is Yes, do you further believe from the evidence that such failure was a substantial factor in causing the accident? YES NO (Strike one) See C.R. 49.01 and note, The Case for Interrogatories Accompanying a General Verdict, 52 Ky.L.J. 852 (1964). The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. PALMORE, C.J., and MILLIKEN, OSBORNE, REED, STEINFELD and STEPHENSON, JJ., sitting. All concur.