Opinion ID: 1581802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative Intent in Extrinsic Factors

Text: [11] ¶ 37. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) contains a statute of repose that limits the time period within which an action may be brought based on the date of the act or omission. Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 26, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. Because a statute of repose bears no relation to the accrual of a cause of action and may take effect before an injury is discovered or even before an injury has occurred, a statute of repose can be quite arbitrary. ¶ 38. Against this background, the legislature created two clear statutory exceptions to the time limits in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b). ¶ 39. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(2) provides that if a health care provider conceals from a patient a prior act or omission of the provider which has resulted in injury to the patient, an action shall be commenced within one year of discovery of the concealment, or within one year of when the concealment should have been discovered,  or within the time limitation provided by sub. (1), whichever is later  (emphasis added). Subsection (2) is highly relevant to our inquiry. First, it creates an exception to the five-year limitation in subsection (1)(b). Second, it refers to subsection (1) as a statute with a time limitation. ¶ 40. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(3) provides that when a foreign object which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect has been left in a patient's body, an action shall be commenced within one year after the patient becomes aware or should have become aware of the object  or within the time limitation provided by sub. (1), whichever is later  (emphasis added). Subsection (3) is also highly relevant. Like subsection (2), it creates an exception to the five-year limitation in subsection (1)(b). It also refers to subsection (1)(b) as a statute with a time limitation. ¶ 41. The legislature's willingness to provide exceptions to the five-year limitation in § 893.55(1)(b) informs our interpretation when we turn to Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4). Inasmuch as two statutes override the applicable statute of repose in particular circumstances, there is no reason why a third statute should not effect the same objective. [12] ¶ 42. We discern a second major clue to legislative intent in statutory context. Wisconsin Stat. § 655.44(4) uses the word any before the phrase applicable statute of limitations. The word any is normally construed to mean every. Falk v. Tax Comm'n, 218 Wis. 130, 134, 259 N.W. 624 (1935); Juneau v. Wis. Tax Comm'n, 184 Wis. 485, 488, 199 N.W. 63 (1924); Coutts v. Wis. Ret. Bd., 201 Wis. 2d 178, 190, 547 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, Wis. Stat. § 655.44(4) may be interpreted to read: Every applicable statute of limitations is tolled on the date the director receives the request for mediation. The word any is not consistent with the narrow construction urged by the defendants. [13] ¶ 43. Looking back to Wis. Stat. § 893.55, we see its present title: Medical malpractice; limitation of actions  (emphasis added). When § 655.44(4) was approved, the title of § 893.55 was  Limitation of actions; medical malpractice (emphasis added). Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (1983-84). In addition, we see the references in subsections (2) and (3) to the time limitation in subsection (1). We also see that the statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b) is merely a clause within a paragraph and that the paragraph begins as a statute of limitations. It is well established that courts must not look at a. . .portion of a sentence, but at the role of the relevant language in the entire statute. Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587, ¶ 10. ¶ 44. The statutory context provides persuasive evidence that the legislature was comfortable creating exceptions to the statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b), and that it intended to toll every part of the statute under § 655.44(4) because § 893.55(1) is an applicable statute of limitations.
¶ 45. Chapter 655 of the statutes is entitled Health Care Liability and Patients Compensation. This chapter was created by the legislature in 1975. Chapter 37, Laws of 1975. The original legislation created formal panels and informal panels to help resolve claims for bodily injury or death against health care providers. From the beginning, resort to the panels was mandatory. Wis. Stat. § 655.04(1)(b) (1975-76). ¶ 46. The original legislation provided that [n]o action may be commenced in court unless the controversy has first been heard and findings and an order have been made by the panel. Wis. Stat. § 655.04(1)(b) (1975-76). Concurrently, subsection (6) of § 655.04 provided: The filing of the submission of controversy shall toll any applicable statute of limitations, and such statute of limitations shall remain tolled until 30 days after the hearing panel issues its written decision, or the jurisdiction of the panel is otherwise terminated. ¶ 47. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55 did not exist in 1975. [10] It was created in 1980 by Chapter 323, Laws of 1979. Chapter 323 was a general revision of the statutes of limitations. Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 23. 1979 Assembly Bill 326, which led to Chapter 323, described itself as An Act. . .relating to claim procedures against government entities and employees, and statutes of limitations  (emphasis added). ¶ 48. This history is important. First, the legislation creating § 893.55 described itself as an act relating to statutes of limitations. Second, from the time Chapter 323 took effect in 1980 until the subsequent revision of the law on patient compensation panels in 1986, a claimant who went to one of the voluntary panels must have assumed that he or she was tolling all of § 893.55(1) by going to the panel, because the claimant had no option to file suit first. ¶ 49. Wisconsin Stat. § 655.19 (1975-76) also provided that unless the parties have stipulated in writing under § 655.07 to be bound by the panel determination, any party to a panel hearing may, within 120 days after the date of an order made by a panel, commence an action for a trial in the circuit or county court. By using the term any party, the statute contemplated court action by both claimants and respondents. Why would the legislature give a respondent the right to go to court to challenge something a panel did but deny a claimant the right to go to court (after the five-year deadline in the statute of repose) to confirm something the panel did? ¶ 50. Defendants argue that a right to file a suit before going to mediation was created in 1986 to save those plaintiffs confronted with a statute of repose. The problem with this argument is that there was a tolling provision in the original 1975 statute with the same words found in present law. The phrase [t]he filing of the submission of controversy shall toll any applicable statute of limitations, from the 1975 statute, is equivalent to the phrase, [a]ny applicable statute of limitations is tolled, in the current statute. The words were carried over in 1986. We see no evidence that the 1975 words, carried over to present law, have ever failed to save plaintiffs from the statute of reposeuntil this case.
¶ 51. Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose share at least one common objective. They require timely notice to defendants that they will be required to defend a suit. When a claimant files for mediation under Wis. Stat. § 655.44, the same objective is served. Notice is given and defendants are put on alert. ¶ 52. In Aicher, this court discussed the purposes behind statutes of limitation and statutes of repose: Statutes of limitation, which are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence, articulate the principle that it is more just to put the adversary on notice to defend a claim within a specified period of time than to permit unlimited prosecution of stale claims. Statutes of limitation promote fair and prompt litigation and protect defendants from stale or fraudulent claims brought after memories have faded or evidence has been lost.. . .Statutes of repose operate similarly to protect both plaintiffs and defendants form litigating claims in which the truth may be obfuscated by death or disappearance of key witnesses, loss of evidence, and faded memories. Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 27 (citations omitted). Tolling [a]ny applicable statute of limitations, including a statute of repose, for mediation, does not undermine the basic purpose of these statutes. ¶ 53. Little would be gained by requiring the commencement of an action in court. Whether a claimant proceeds under Wis. Stat. § 655.44 or § 655.445, defendants are put on timely notice and they may begin preserving evidence, locating witnesses, and developing theories of defense, even though the formal process of discovery cannot begin. ¶ 54. Something would be lost, however, if the process were to begin with a lawsuit. The legislature intends the mediation system to provide claimants and defendants with an informal, inexpensive and expedient means for resolving disputes without litigation. Wis. Stat. § 655.42(1). ¶ 55. The defendants' argument runs counter to the basic goals of the mediation system because it would force some persons to file an action in circuit court before engaging in mediation. This could have some effect on litigation, encouraging claimants who might otherwise not proceed with an action in court to go forward because they had already filed a complaint. Our holding today ensures that all claimants, whether or not faced with the impending passage of the five-year time limitation for commencing an action, can pursue resolution through Chapter 655 mediation. ¶ 56. The defendants argue that the legislature created Wis. Stat. § 655.445 (allowing filing off medical malpractice action in circuit court before requesting mediation) for the purpose of preventing the situation that occurred here. They insist that any reading of § 655.44 to toll the five-year statute off repose `would render § 655.445 superfluous. We disagree. ¶ 57. First, the defendants argue that § 655.445 was created so that a claimant could file a complaint and avoid the passing of the five-year limitation in situations in which the five-year limitation is close to running. However, this is not the only purpose for § 655.445. Section 655.445 allows a claimant to commence an action in circuit court at any time, before the expiration of the appropriate time limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1). Thus, a claimant can take advantage of the chance to commence a circuit court action whether or not a time limitation is about to expire. ¶ 58. It is apparent that the legislature wanted claimants to have a choice: (1) to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with a defendant in resolving a matter through mediation by first filing a mediation request under Wis. Stat. § 655.44; or (2) to demonstrate the gravity of a matter by first commencing an action in circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 655.445. Whatever the reason, the legislature has decided claimants should have a choice on how to proceed at any time within the applicable time limitation, not just near the statutory deadline. Thus, § 655.445 is not rendered superfluous as a result of our interpretation of § 655.44(4). ¶ 59. We have reviewed the legislative history off Wis. Stat. Ch. 655. Subch. VI, see 1985 Wis. Act 340, § 69r (creating Wis. Stat. Ch. 655 Subch. VI, the current mediation scheme), as well as the prior statutory mediation plan. Wis. Stat. Ch. 655 Subch. II (1983-84). The prior mediation scheme was substantially modified by 1985 Wis. Act 340. [11] We have found nothing in the Legislative Reference Bureau's (LRB) drafting file to support the defendants' argument concerning the tolling of the five-year limitation in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b). Rather, the analysis of 1985 Wis. Act 340 by the LRB demonstrates that the legislature simply wanted claimants to have an option in how to resolve a dispute with a health care provider. Legislative Reference Bureau Bill Drafting File for 1985 Wis. Act 340 (failing to indicate that Wis. Stat. § 655.445 was intended to accommodate cases in which the five-year limitation in § 893.55(1)(b) was close to expiration, stating directly: Claimants may file a request for mediation before filing in court or simultaneously with a court filing.) (analysis by the LRB attached to the second draft of 1986 A.B. 4 (Special Session)). ¶ 60. The defendants also contend that [a]ny argument which ignores that the medical malpractice statute of repose is distinct from the statute of limitation, contravenes this court's prior rulings. We acknowledge that our opinions have long regarded statutes of limitations as different from statutes of repose, [12] but we note that these opinions have wrestled with how a statute of limitations or statute of repose operates, or whether a limitations statute bears on some constitutional right. We have not previously focused on whether the legislature's use of the words [a]ny applicable statute of limitations in a tolling provision includes an applicable statute of repose. See Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99; Estate of Makos v. Wis. Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997), overruled by Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 6. The issue in this case is fundamentally different. [13] ¶ 61. A review of Wis. Stat. Ch. 893a chapter that substantially regulates time limitations on commencing a variety of actionsshows the legislature does not employ the phrase statute of repose. [14] The legislature does, however, use many other phrases to describe temporal limitations on actions. [15] Moreover, computer database searches of the statutes show the legislature has not used the words repose, statute of repose, or statutes of repose in the text of any statute in force. It is apparent that the phrase statute of repose is judicial terminology and is not featured in legislative lingo. [16]