Opinion ID: 1115456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exculpatory Agreement as Interpreted by State Law

Text: As noted, the trial court ruled that the covenant not to sue was not a bar to respondents' claims under state law. The court noted that exculpatory agreements are strictly construed against the party seeking immunity from suit and found that since the word death was missing from the covenant, the term injury was ambiguous and must be construed to exclude death. We agree. Although there are no Alaska cases directly on point, [4] it is well settled that ambiguities in a pre-recreational activity exculpatory clause will be resolved against the party seeking exculpation, and that to be enforced the intent to release a party from liability for future negligence must be conspicuously and unequivocally expressed. See, e.g., Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1979) ([I]t has been repeatedly emphasized that unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts.). Ferrell v. Southern Nevada Off-Road Enthusiasts Ltd., 147 Cal. App.3d 309, 195 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 (1983), is representative. [T]o be effective, an agreement which purports to release, indemnify or exculpate the party who prepared it from liability for that party's own negligence or tortious conduct must be clear, explicit and comprehensible in each of its essential details. Such an agreement, read as a whole, must clearly notify the prospective releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the agreement. The efficacy of this salutory rule is especially applicable in the case before us in which the adhesive agreement was prepared by one of the purported releasee-indemnitees, and was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of being allowed to enter the race. Professors Williston and Prosser have also expressed the view that exculpatory provisions are disfavored. Generally, an indemnity agreement will not be construed to cover losses to the indemnitee caused by his own negligence unless such effect is clearly and unequivocally expressed in the agreement. A promise not to sue for future damage caused by simple negligence may be valid. Such bargains are not favored, however, and, if possible, bargains are construed not to confer this immunity. 15 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1750A, at 143-45 (3d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, at 483-84 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted): If an express agreement exempting the defendant from liability for his negligence is to be sustained, it must appear that its terms were brought home to the plaintiff; and if he did not know of the provision in his contract, and a reasonable person in his position would not have known of it, it is not binding upon him, and the agreement fails... . It is also necessary that the expressed terms of the agreement be applicable to the particular misconduct of the defendant, and the courts have strictly construed the terms of exculpatory clauses against the defendant. .. . If the defendant seeks to use the agreement to escape responsibility for the consequences of his negligence, then it must so provide, clearly and unequivocally, as by using the word negligence itself. Courts in a number of contexts have recognized that an ambiguity exists as to whether the term injury includes death. Tobin v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 606 (4th Cir.1982) (clause in insurance policy which excluded coverage for injury found to be ambiguous with respect to whether injury included death; this ambiguity was resolved against the insurer); Ziolkowski v. Continental Casualty Co., 365 Ill. 594, 7 N.E.2d 451 (1937) (injury in insurance policy exclusion did not include death); Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. TAC Exterminators, 172 Cal. App.3d 564, 218 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1985) (whether injury includes death held to be ambiguous). [5] In view of this ambiguity, the rule of construction disfavoring exculpatory agreements applies. The covenant therefore does not bar respondents' claims. The decision of the superior court is AFFIRMED. COMPTON, J., dissents. BURKE, J., disqualified. MOORE, J., not participating.