Opinion ID: 2243544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Child's Claim Was Timely Filed

Text: We agree with the Jordans that issuance of a medical review panel decision does not shorten the time a plaintiff would otherwise have in which to file a complaint in state court. The statute of limitations for actions brought under the Medical Malpractice Act, found in Ind. Code § 16-9.5-3-1(a) [1] , is an occurrence statute which begins to run on the date of the alleged malpractice. Havens v. Ritchey (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 792, 794. The statute provides that minors under the age of six years old at the time of the occurrence have until their eighth birthday in which to file actions. Thus, under this statute, Shelamiah's limitation period runs until December 10, 1994. Defendants argue that Ind. Code § 16-9.5-9-1(b) [2] cuts short Shelamiah's limitation period to the ninety days following receipt of the panel decision. Defendants rely on Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp. (1980), Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585, 603-4, in which this Court recognized that the legislative intent behind the use of an occurrence limitation period was to shorten the time in which patients could sue health care providers. Waiving the banner of legislative intent, defendants invite us to shorten the limitation period in any manner possible. We decline. The clear meaning of the limitation period found in Chapter 3-1(a) is that a child under six years of age at the time of the occurrence has until her eighth birthday to file a claim. Chapter 9-1(b) operates to toll the applicable statute of limitations, not to shorten it. The word toll means to suspend or stop temporarily as the statute of limitations is tolled during the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction and during the plaintiff's minority period. Black's Law Dictionary, 1488 (1990 6th ed.). Therefore, the running of a limitation period is suspended for the period of time from the date of filing the proposed complaint until ninety days following receipt of the panel opinion. Defendants assert that allowing Shelamiah to wait longer than ninety days after issuance of the panel opinion would be contrary to the policy of the prompt presentation of claims as discussed in Johnson. We do not agree. In fact, because the proposed complaint was filed early, the policy of prompt presentation of claims has been fulfilled. Both sides are aware that litigation is possible and have had the opportunity to investigate the claim. The law did not compel Shelamiah to file her proposed complaint at this early date. We find nothing in Ind. Code § 16-9.5-9-1(b) convincing us that the time otherwise allotted to her should be cut short. In Shelamiah's case, the limitation period began to run on December 10, 1986, the day she was born, at which time Ind. Code § 16-9.5-3-1(a) provided her with eight years in which to file her claim. Under Ind. Code § 16-9.5-9-1(b), the limitation period stopped running for a period of some twenty months beginning on December 3, 1988, the day her proposed complaint was filed, and ending ninety days after receipt of the panel decision on May 7, 1990. Because the running of her limitation period was tolled by Section 9-1(b), her limitation period will not expire until approximately twenty months after her eighth birthday. Because that date has not yet arrived, her claim was timely filed. With regard to the individual claims of Mr. and Mrs. Jordan, however, we reach a different conclusion. Their limitation period began to run on December 10, 1986, and, but for the tolling provision, would have expired on December 10, 1988. At the time their proposed complaint was filed on December 3, 1988, seven days remained on their limitation period. Like Shelamiah's, their limitation period stopped running from the time their proposed complaint was filed until ninety days after receipt of the panel decision on May 7, 1990. When the limitation period began running again in August, 1990, seven days of their two-year limitation period remained. Their complaint was not filed, however, until September 12, 1990, more than seven days later. Therefore, their claims were filed late. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the claims of Mr. and Mrs. Jordan.