Opinion ID: 3052302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Saucier v. Katz

Text: Earlier this year, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008) (mem.). In that 8494 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 grant, the Court ordered the parties to brief and argue “[w]hether the Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) should be overruled?” Pearson, 128 S. Ct. at 1702–03. For me, this case is a poster child for ending Saucier’s “right first, clearly established later” requirement. Saucier instructed courts to follow a “rigid order of battle” in cases involving claims of qualified immunity. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). The threshold question is whether the facts show that an official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Only after having done so may the court then decide whether the right was clearly established. Id. Saucier transformed what was once a best-practice approach to resolving qualified immunity cases into a mandatory, two-step inquiry. Compare County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (describing the two-step inquiry as “the better approach”), with Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Whereas courts used to be able to skip the substantive constitutional question in cases where an official would clearly prevail on the qualified immunity issue, now we must labor to resolve the constitutional issue first. Since it was decided, Saucier has been criticized by judges and scholars for having created a doctrine that is impractical, unduly burdensome, imprudent, and possibly unconstitutional. Citing some of these reasons, twenty-eight states filed a Supreme Court brief a few years ago urging that Saucier be abandoned. Brief for the State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631). There is no need to review these criticisms, as they have been well developed elsewhere. See, e.g., Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201–02 (Breyer, J., concurring); Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, C.J.) (“[T]he Saucier rule may lead to the publication of a lot of bad constitutional law that is, effecREDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8495 tively, cert-proof.”); Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 580–84 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 847, 872–82 (2005); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275–81 (2006). As noted at the onset, this case is a particularly good example of why courts should not be required to resolve constitutional questions before finding that a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The primary rationale behind a mandatory order of battle is that constitutional law will stagnate and constitutional rights will remain immature if courts do not take the time to develop the jurisprudence at every possible opportunity. With some constitutional doctrines, or with respect to some recurring scenarios, this may be true. Courts recognizing those situations would be wise to take the time to resolve the constitutional question. In other situations, though, a doctrine is so inherently factdriven that a precedent will provide very little helpful guidance. Today’s case is illustrative. School officials in this circuit are now on notice that it is unconstitutional to require a thirteen-year-old female honor student to remove her outer garments and shake her bra and underwear, partially exposing her breasts and pelvic area, in front of two female administrators in a private room when the object sought is prescriptionstrength ibuprofen and the only direct evidence against her is the uncorroborated tip of a culpable classmate, and the girl searched has no disciplinary history but has been suspected of consuming and serving alcohol. This precise holding is the only thing officials can rely on. There is no way of knowing in advance which of these facts could be altered, and to what degree, in order to find a search reasonable. This is not the majority’s fault; it is a necessary 8496 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 function of the T.L.O. reasonableness test, which eschews any clear rules in favor of a highly abstract balancing standard that is meant to reflect nothing more than “the dictates of reason and common sense.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343. Of course, because the majority found that a constitutional right was violated at a time when it was clearly established, Saucier did not affect the outcome of this case. As a member of the three-judge panel that found the search to be constitu- tionally reasonable, and as the author of today’s dissent, I would have preferred to grant summary judgment based solely on the qualified immunity issue. This would have been prudent as a constitutional matter, as we were forced to decide this case with a very limited evidentiary picture: the record is comprised of only five affidavits totaling eighteen pages. Separate from the particulars of today’s case, one additional comment about Saucier is in order. By recognizing qualified immunity for an official, a court necessarily holds that the official’s mistake was reasonable because pre-existing law did not provide fair notice that the conduct was unlawful. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (per curiam). Such a ruling may be cold comfort, however, when that official is simultaneously branded a constitutional violator. Whatever thought that person may have had for future positions of public trust will likely be abandoned, for the public at large cannot be expected to have any familiarity with the qualified immunity doctrine. Overruling Saucier, if the Supreme Court chooses to do so, would enable us to spare the reputations and careers of competent officials who, while acting in good faith, do nothing more than commit a reasonable mistake. When deciding Pearson, we can hope the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to consider the utility of Saucier in those areas of constitutional law that spawn a substantial number of relatively useless precedents. Today’s decision, REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8497 along with the rest of T.L.O.’s progeny, would be a great place to start.