Opinion ID: 1468031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Propriety of Certification

Text: Rule XVIII of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio provides the Supreme Court of Ohio with discretion to answer questions of Ohio law certified to it by the federal courts. As a prerequisite to certifying a question, we must determine that there is a question of Ohio law that may be determinative of the proceeding and for which there is no controlling precedent. R. of Prac. Sup.Ct. Ohio XVIII, § 1. In an opinion exhorting the values of federal court certification where resolution of a question of Ohio law is unclear, the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that state[] sovereignty is unquestionably implicated when federal courts construe state law. Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 62 Ohio St.3d 39, 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (1991) (per curiam). The Scott court further explained that [c]ertification ensures that federal courts will properly apply state law. Id. Echoing similar sentiments regarding the virtues of certification, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that certification of novel or unsettled questions of state law for authoritative answers by a State's highest court ... may save time, energy, and resources and help build a cooperative judicial federalism. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 77, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Submitting uncertain questions of state law to the state's highest court by way of certification acknowledges that court's status as the final arbiter on matters of state law and avoids the potential for friction-generating error which exists whenever a federal court construes a state law in the absence of any direction from the state courts. See id. at 79, 117 S.Ct. 1055. Where statutory interpretation is at issue, the United States Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to employ certification or abstention if the unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). In Bellotti, the Court held that the district court erred in failing to order certification and choosing instead to enjoin a Massachusetts statute governing the ability of minors to consent to an abortion. Id. at 151, 96 S.Ct. 2857. The Court stressed that certification should have been ordered by the lower court because the state law was unclear, and there was no doubt that adoption of appellant's interpretation would at least materially change the nature of the problem. Id. at 147, 96 S.Ct. 2857 (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, the Bellotti Court explained that absent an authoritative interpretation by the state court it is impossible to define precisely the constitutional question presented. Id. at 148, 96 S.Ct. 2857. Like the Massachusetts abortion statute involved in Bellotti, at the heart of this appeal is the interpretation of a novel and previously uninterpreted state statute. To resolve the issues presented in this case, we must ascertain what O.R.C. § 2919.123 means when it states that physicians who perform abortions using mifepristone must comply with federal law, as that term is defined in the statute. See generally Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1120 (10th Cir.2008) (concluding that certification to the Kansas Supreme Court was appropriate because it was necessary to determine the scope and meaning of a previously uninterpreted state law before addressing whether it was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad). According to the State, by including the approval letter in the statute's definition of federal law, O.R.C. § 2919.123 effectively prohibits physicians from administering mifepristone to women who are beyond forty-nine days' gestation and from using a treatment protocol different from that found in the drug's final printed labeling (i.e., the statute prohibits the off-label use of mifepristone). Conversely, Planned Parenthood argues that the statute imposes no restrictions on the prescribing practices of physicians; it reads O.R.C. § 2919.123 to require only that physicians who prescribe mifepristone comply with the eight Subpart H requirements set forth in the approval letter because those are the only requirements in the letter that refer to physicians. Planned Parenthood further argues that, by its terms, O.R.C. § 2919.123 does not incorporate the treatment protocol set forth in the drug's final printed labeling. Planned Parenthood concedes that if its interpretation is adopted, then its claims that the statute is unconstitutional will be rendered moot. However, Planned Parenthood asserts that if the statute is interpreted to mean what the State says it means, then the statute is unconstitutional and was correctly enjoined by the district court. Under the provisions of Rule XVIII and precedent from the United States Supreme Court, certification is appropriate here because the manner in which O.R.C. § 2919.123 is interpreted may be determinative of the proceeding, R. Prac. Sup.Ct. Ohio XVIII, § 1, and might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication. Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 146-47, 96 S.Ct. 2857. While certainly we are capable of speculating on how the Supreme Court of Ohio would interpret O.R.C. § 2919.123, such [s]peculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when ... the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification. Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 79, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (internal quotations omitted); see also Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1080 (stating that certification frees federal courts from having to guess how state courts will decide important questions of state law) (internal quotations omitted). This is especially true in circumstances like the present case, where the potential for state-federal friction generated by federal court intervention is heightened because O.R.C. § 2919.123 is a novel statute passed pursuant to Ohio's longstanding power to regulate the practice of medicine within its borders.