Opinion ID: 2973479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Jury Instruction Claim

Text: The defendants also find fault with the jury instruction given for the charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the aiding and abetting statute. Since the defendants did not object to the jury charge at trial, we review for plain error. United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 540 (6th Cir. 2004). Plain error is a stringent standard that requires the court to determine whether “the instructions, when taken as a whole, were so clearly wrong as to produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Wood, 364 F.3d 704, 708 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184, 187 (6th Cir. 1992)). To establish plain error, a defendant must show that an error occurred in the district court that was obvious, that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and the adverse impact of which -9- Nos. 04-3633, 04-3722 United States v. Katuramu seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997). The defendants cannot meet any prong of this test. First, the district court’s instruction was not in error. A district court commits plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the element of intent for aiding and abetting. United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 920-21 (6th Cir. 1972). Such a failure occurs when the court “charge[s] the jury merely that ‘the aiding and abetting statute . . . provides in substance that if anyone aids or abets another in the commission of an offense that he is punishable as a principal also.’” Id. In contrast, the following instruction on intent under the aiding and abetting statute survived plain error review: In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that the accused willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture, and willfully participate in it as he would in something he wishes to bring about; that is to say, that he willfully seek by some act or omission of his to make the criminal venture succeed. United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 631 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, as in Thomas, the district court gave a detailed explanation of the meaning of aiding and abetting, as contrasted with the tautology that was found to be problematic in Bryant. In fact, the district court’s instructions were a verbatim recitation of the aiding and abetting statute and the relevant Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction regarding aiding and abetting. Specifically, the instruction included the following: Before any Defendant may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others it is necessary that the accused deliberately associate himself in some way with the crime and participate in it with the intent to bring about the crime.