Opinion ID: 7377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of Miles on Maintenance and Cure Actions

Text: 67 Maritime argues that Guevara's recovery of punitive damages in his maintenance and cure action is barred by the dictates of Miles. Maritime's argument, of course, cannot rest on the specific holdings of Miles, as Miles did not involve a maintenance and cure claim. The logic and analytical framework of Miles, however, are clearly relevant, and they do support Maritime's argument. 68 Based on our interpretation of Miles, it should be clear that with maintenance and cure actions, we simply need to ask if the factual setting of the case or the situation is one covered by a statute like the Jones Act or DOHSA. 13 Seizing on this framework, some courts have already determined that a maintenance and cure action is not covered by statute, and as such, this general maritime action is not subject to the Miles uniformity principle. See, e.g., Anderson, 797 F.Supp. at 536 ([P]unitive damages for willful failure to pay maintenance and cure, a firmly rooted general maritime law claim, is unaffected by Miles because failure to pay is a contractual claim not reached by any maritime statute. Such claims do not implicate negligence or strict liability values.); Breshears v. River Marine Contractors, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-1850, 1992 WL 245656, at  2 (E.D.La. Sept. 10, 1992) (Actions for the failure to pay maintenance and [c]ure are grounded in the general maritime law and have no counterpart in the tort provisions of DOHSA and the Jones Act.... The principles of uniformity found in Miles ... are, therefore, inapposite to the determination of whether punitive damages are available for a failure to pay maintenance and cure.); Howard v. Atlantic Pacific Marine Corp., Civ. A. No. 89-3073, 1992 WL 55487, at  2 (E.D.La. Feb. 28, 1992) ([U]nlike unseaworthiness and negligence claims, maintenance and cure claims have no counterpart under the Jones Act or the DOHSA.); Ridenour v. Holland America Line Westours, Inc., 806 F.Supp. 910, 911 (W.D.Wash.1992) (The Miles Court, however, did not address maintenance and cure, which is an area of law in which Congress has not legislated against punitive damages. Thus this Court concludes that Miles is not dispositive on this point.). 69 The analysis, however, is somewhat more complicated. A careful examination of the maintenance and cure action belies the contention that it has no analog in the existing statutory schemes. In Cortes, Justice Cardozo was faced with the question of whether death resulting from the negligent omission to furnish care or cure is death from personal injury within the meaning of the [Jones Act] statute. 287 U.S. at 372, 53 S.Ct. at 174 (emphasis added). Initially, Justice Cardozo recognized the peculiar nature of the shipowner's duty to provide maintenance and cure: 70 The duty to make such [maintenance and cure] provision is imposed by the law itself as one annexed to the employment. Contractual it is in the sense that it has its source in a relation which is contractual in origin, but given the relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the incident. ... 71 The duty ... is one annexed by law to a relation, and annexed as an inseparable incident without heed to any expression of the will of the contracting parties. For breach of a duty thus imposed, the remedy upon the contract does not exclude an alternative remedy built upon the tort. 72 Id. at 371-72, 53 S.Ct. at 174-75 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also id. (If the wrong is of such a nature as to bring it by fair intendment within the category of a 'personal injury' that has been caused by the 'negligence' of the master, it is not put beyond the [Jones Act] because it may appropriately be placed in another category also.). Thus, as the Supreme Court explained by way of example: 73 The failure to provide maintenance and cure may be a personal injury or something else according to the consequences. If the seaman has been able to procure his maintenance and cure out of his own or his friends' money, his remedy is for the outlay, but personal injury there is none. If the default of the vessel and its officers has impaired his bodily or mental health, the damage to mind or body is none the less a personal injury because he may be free at his election to plead it in a different count. 74 Id. at 373-74, 53 S.Ct. at 175 (emphasis added). The Court therefore concluded: 75 While the seaman was still alive, his cause of action for personal injury created by the statute may have overlapped his cause of action for breach of the maritime duty of maintenance and cure, just as it may have overlapped his cause of action for injury caused through an unseaworthy ship. In such circumstances, it was his privilege, in so far as the causes of action covered the same ground, to sue indifferently on any one of them. 76 Id. at 374-75, 53 S.Ct. at 175; see also Picou v. American Offshore Fleet, Inc., 576 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir.1978) (citing and discussing Cortes after noting that [t]he defendant takes the position that since a [personal injury] recovery could be available to [the plaintiff] in a simple action for maintenance and cure, he could not allege a tort claim comprehending the same elements of injury.... This is simply not the law.); Gilmore & Black, supra, Sec. 6-13, at 311 (Such [personal injury] damages may be recovered either in an action for maintenance and cure or in an action for negligence under the Jones Act.) (citing Cortes ). 77 Thus, as the Supreme Court has indicated, there are really two types of maintenance and cure actions. The tort-like type involves a personal injury; i.e., typically a worsening of the seaman's physical or mental health caused by the failure to provide maintenance or, more likely, cure. The contract-like type need not involve a personal injury (although it may); it need only involve the loss of a monetary outlay. Because the tort-like maintenance and cure action involves a personal injury, however, it overlaps with the personal injury coverage of the Jones Act. 14 Such an action is frequently brought under the Jones Act. See, e.g., Picou, 576 F.2d at 586-87; Gaspard v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 649 F.2d 372, 376 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1252, 71 L.Ed.2d 445 (1982). As mentioned, once there is a statutory/general maritime law overlap in the factual circumstances that are covered, the Miles damages uniformity principle is invoked, and punitive damages would be precluded under the general maritime action for maintenance and cure. 15 78 Guevara seems to assert that our characterization of a Jones Act overlap is not accurate for maintenance and cure actions that give rise to punitive awards because [i]t is the willful conduct of the vessel owner not negligence of the Captain or crew which gives rise to [an] award of punitive damages for failure to pay maintenance and cure. This argument, however, is misconceived, as the willful refusal to pay maintenance and cure is not a cause of action separate from the negligent failure to pay maintenance and cure. As the Fourth Circuit explained in Manuel: 79 [T]he ... court went astray by treating the arbitrary and willful refusal to pay maintenance and cure as a cause of action separate from the simple failure to pay maintenance and cure benefits when due. There is no cause of action specifically for the arbitrary and willful refusal to pay maintenance and cure. Under general maritime law, a seaman injured while employed aboard a ship is entitled to receive maintenance and cure, and he can bring an admiralty suit to recover any unpaid maintenance and cure benefits. Courts have long awarded punitive damages to seamen where maintenance and cure benefits have been arbitrarily and willfully denied. E.g., Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110, 1118 (5th Cir.1984); Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048, 1051-52 (1st Cir.1973). Punitive damages, however, is merely an additional remedy in the seaman's maintenance and cure action. 80 50 F.3d at 1259-60. Thus, the denial of maintenance and cure benefits gives rise to only one cause of action--failure to pay maintenance and cure--and this one action is cognizable under both the Jones Act and the general maritime law, although the action under the Jones Act for the failure to pay maintenance and cure requires a personal injury as well. If willful conduct is demonstrated, it raises the possibility of a punitive award, but the cause of action for failure to pay maintenance and cure does not require or depend upon proof of willfulness. 81 Based on this rationale, it should be clear that proving even a willful denial of maintenance and cure cannot justify an award of punitive damages after Miles. Under Cortes, a tort-like action for the failure to pay maintenance and cure is cognizable under the Jones Act, but even if willful behavior is established, the Jones Act does not provide for punitive damages. Under the Miles uniformity principle, therefore, the same cause of action under the general maritime law for the failure to pay maintenance and cure cannot provide a punitive recovery, even if willfulness is demonstrated. 82 Of course, our analysis is not yet complete, because in the instant case, Guevara brings a contract-like maintenance and cure action. Guevara suffered no personal injury from the failure to provide maintenance and cure, and therefore, there is no statutory overlap to invoke the Miles uniformity principle. In such a case, the general maritime law is not directly constrained by statute. Nevertheless, for several reasons, we believe that punitive damages should not be available in any action for maintenance and cure, even in those contract-like actions that can only be brought under the general maritime law. 83 First, even admitting that the primary reason for allowing punitive damages is to deter wrongful conduct on the part of a potential wrongdoer--here, the shipowner--it seems peculiar to deny punitive damages to a seaman who suffers personal injury because of a willful failure to pay maintenance and cure, but to allow the possibility of a punitive recovery for a seaman who suffers only a monetary loss. 84 Second, Guevara is asking us to affirm a punitive damages award that is not available under related legislative schemes. As the Supreme Court stated in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 981, 989, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994), [w]hile there is an established and continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress in the field. In the context before us, therefore, American Dredging counsels us to err on the side of harmonization with the legislative schemes, and that nudge towards harmony weighs in favor of prohibiting punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases, at least where, as here, a clear legal basis for the award of such damages is lacking. 85 Third, a concern for uniformity within federal admiralty law affects our decision. It makes little sense to create a fragmentation of admiralty law by allowing punitive damages in one class of maintenance and cure cases (contract-like), yet disallowing punitive damages in the other class of maintenance and cure cases (tort-like). 86 Fourth, when no element of personal injury is involved, these contract-like maintenance and cure actions are just that--primarily contract-oriented claims. Punitive damages, however, are generally unavailable for breach of contract, and to the limited extent that the obligation to pay maintenance and cure is contractual in nature, allowing punitive damages for a breach thereof is anomalous. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sec. 355, at 154-56 (1979); 11 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts Sec. 1340, at 209-12 (3d ed. 1968); 5 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 1077, at 437-39 (1964). 16