Opinion ID: 1154894
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adult defendant and child victim

Text: There is no question about the third aggravating circumstance. When the victim was killed, she was less than fifteen years old and Defendant was an adult. Thus, the A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(9) aggravating circumstance was present. See State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 528, 809 P.2d 944, 953, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 660, 116 L.Ed.2d 751 (1991). 2. Mitigating circumstances Defendant argues that the trial court erred in considering mitigating evidence. Specifically, Defendant claims that the court improperly rejected four mitigating circumstances: 1. Defendant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; 2. Defendant was intoxicated and suffering from withdrawal symptoms at the time of the offense; 3. Defendant's difficult family history; and 4. Defendant's substantial family support. We consider Defendant's claims in turn. The trial court must consider the factors in A.R.S. § 13-703(G) as well as any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less severe than death is appropriate. State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 169, 823 P.2d 22, 36 (1992) (citing cases). Defendant must prove factors supporting mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 504, 826 P.2d 783, 801, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 206, 121 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). We independently examine the mitigating evidence to determine whether the death sentence is justified. Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 551-52, 804 P.2d at 84-85. The one statutory mitigating factor argued by Defendant is that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). Defendant argues that his substance abuse contributed to the offense and is a mitigating circumstance. Defendant's medical expert indicated that absent drug consumption and withdrawal symptoms, it was less likely that Defendant would have killed and that addiction and withdrawal made it more difficult for him to conform to the requirements of law. Other testimony indicated that Defendant had a history of drug use and that, absent drug use, he is a caring person. Defendant's expert admitted that the drug history he relied on came largely from Defendant. This expert had reservations about Defendant's truthfulness regarding his criminal activities and admitted that nothing indicated Defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Although Defendant claimed to have been deprived of alcohol and drugs for several days before the murder, his expert admitted that Defendant had been drinking during that time period. Furthermore, when arrested, the GMC Defendant was driving contained eighteen full mini-bottles of vodka. There was no evidence Defendant was suffering from alcohol deprivation. Nor does the record support a claim that Defendant was intoxicated when the offense was committed; testimony indicated that he acted normally both before and after his arrest. There is no evidence that Defendant used drugs or, absent the two empty 50-milliliter vodka bottles, consumed alcohol the day of the murder. In sum, there is little evidence supporting Defendant's mitigation claim under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). On this record we find no substantial impairment of Defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See, e.g., Stanley, 167 Ariz. at 528-31, 809 P.2d at 953-56; State v. Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 426, 773 P.2d 983, 985 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1047, 110 S.Ct. 1513, 108 L.Ed.2d 649 (1990); Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. at 172-73, 624 P.2d at 850-51. Thus, Defendant did not establish the A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) mitigating factor. We must now determine whether there is other mitigating evidence to weigh, even though it may not constitute an enumerated statutory mitigating factor. See State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 101-02, 664 P.2d 637, 645-46, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 858, 104 S.Ct. 180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 (1983). As noted, there was no real evidence that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense. The evidence addressing historical familial abuse was marginal and equivocal as to its causal connection with the murder. Defendant's mother did not indicate that Defendant was abused or neglected when he was growing up, and Defendant made no showing that any difficult family history had anything to do with the murder, see Wallace, 160 Ariz. at 427, 773 P.2d at 986. Although Defendant's support and love for and by family and friends might have some mitigating force, it does not require a finding of mitigation sufficient to call for leniency. See State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 162, 692 P.2d 991, 1011 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L.Ed.2d 864 (1985). In sum, our independent review of the record shows no significant mitigating evidence. Cf. State v. Herrera, Jr. I, 176 Ariz. 21, 35, 859 P.2d 131, 145 (1993); Cook, 170 Ariz. at 64, 821 P.2d at 755. [42] P. Should this court reweigh or remand for resentencing? Having independently determined that one of the three aggravating circumstances found by the trial court does not exist, and that the trial court correctly characterized the lack of mitigating evidence, we must decide whether this court should reweigh to either affirm or reduce the death sentence or whether the case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Our obligation is to independently decide whether the death sentence is appropriate. See Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 153, 847 P.2d at 1090; Watson, 129 Ariz. at 62-63, 628 P.2d at 945-46. We do so to ensure that the death penalty will not be imposed arbitrarily or on an aberrant basis and is reserved for truly exceptional cases, setting the defendant apart from others guilty of first degree murder and making death the appropriate sanction. See Creech, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1542; Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. at 2742; State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 195-96, 560 P.2d 41, 50-51 (1976). In some cases, and this is one, we have found that the trial court erred in its conclusions regarding aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., Hinchey, 165 Ariz. at 440, 799 P.2d at 360; State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 116, 786 P.2d 959, 967 (1990); State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 369, 728 P.2d 232, 239 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1011, 107 S.Ct. 3243, 97 L.Ed.2d 748 (1987). In other cases, we have found that the trial court incorrectly evaluated or failed to recognize important mitigating evidence. See, e.g., State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 71-72, 786 P.2d 395, 401-02 (1989); State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 15-16, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079-80 (1989); State v. Stevens, 158 Ariz. 595, 599, 764 P.2d 724, 728 (1988). In such cases, our response has been more consistent in theory than in practice. See Karen L. Hinse, Note, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: An Analysis of the Impact of Clemons v. Mississippi in Arizona, 34 Ariz. L.Rev. 141, 157 (1992) (Hinse, 34 Ariz. L.Rev.). In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution do not prevent a state supreme court, engaged in appellate review of a death sentence, from reweighing the evidence and affirming even though the court finds that the trial judge erred in the sentencing process. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748-49, 110 S.Ct. at 1448-49. Indeed, the United States Constitution allows state courts to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence at any stage of the proceeding. See Richmond v. Lewis, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). Although Clemons and Richmond state that the United States Constitution allows us to reweigh at the appellate level, they do not compel us to do so. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 754, 110 S.Ct. at 1451. Both before and after Clemons, some states adopted a procedure of appellate reweighing for altered aggravation or mitigation findings. Compare Sellers v. Oklahoma, 809 P.2d 676, 691 (Okla. Crim.Ct.App.) (post- Clemons reweighing on appeal), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 310, 116 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991) with Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim.Ct.App. 1987) (pre- Clemons reweighing on appeal), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 763, 98 L.Ed.2d 779 (1988); State v. Otey, 236 Neb. 915, 464 N.W.2d 352, 361 (post- Clemons reweighing on appeal in post-conviction relief case), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2279, 115 L.Ed.2d 965 (1991) with State v. Peery, 199 Neb. 656, 261 N.W.2d 95, 102 (1977) (pre- Clemons reweighing on appeal), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 220, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978). In Arizona, however, even after Clemons, we have continued to focus on whether the record compels a particular finding in light of the correct assessment of mitigating and aggravating factors. Compare Medrano, 173 Ariz. at 398, 844 P.2d at 565 (Because one of the two statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court must be set aside, and we can only speculate whether the court would have found mitigation sufficient to overcome the single remaining aggravating circumstance, we remand for another hearing and resentencing.) with Robinson, 165 Ariz. at 60, 796 P.2d at 862 ([T]he elimination of one aggravating factor does not mandate a remand to the trial court for resentencing when the record compels a finding on the issue as a matter of law.). The State has urged this court to eliminate remands for resentencing and reweigh all cases as part of the review process. From an efficiency standpoint, this would be useful by saving time and expediting the process. Of more weight, perhaps, is the argument that remand for resentencing exposes survivors and members of the victim's family to additional emotional trauma. The State has argued that, if we find the trial court erred in sentencing, it would be better in some cases to reduce the sentence to life rather than remand for a new sentencing hearing. This may well be so, and we urge the State to be candid with this court when such issues arise in the future. Matters as important as life or death, however, cannot be decided by using efficiency and convenience as the best and only tests. Painstaking care and pursuit of accuracy and justice are much more desirable. Notwithstanding the trauma to surviving family members, there are cases in which remand is unavoidable. When additional evidence is available or required, that evidence must be presented to the trial court. This court has neither facilities for, nor any custom of, taking evidence, and we cannot decide questions of fact affecting the imposition of sentence by means of evidentiary affidavits. Cf. State v. Rumsey, 136 Ariz. 166, 168-75, 665 P.2d 48, 50-57 (1983) (discussing similarity between capital sentencing hearing and trial and finding that double jeopardy clause applies to sentencing), aff'd, Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). In any capital case where additional evidence is to be received, remand is required. [W]e perform as an appellate court, not as a trial court, Rumsey, 136 Ariz. at 173, 665 P.2d at 55, and we have repeatedly rejected the State's arguments to the contrary, see, e.g., Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 555, 804 P.2d at 88; Hinchey, 165 Ariz. at 440, 799 P.2d at 360; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 516, 662 P.2d at 1023. Some cases will not require the submission of additional evidence but only the reweighing and balancing of the evidence. Many of these cases will involve situations in which the trial judge erred with respect to aggravating or mitigating circumstances and in which there is mitigating evidence of some weight. In these cases, too, remand for resentencing is the better rule. As the United States Supreme Court noted, we have an appellate task in reviewing death sentences and we have placed the sentencing authority in all criminal cases, and especially capital cases, with the trial judge. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 209-10, 104 S.Ct. at 2309. Law and policy would indicate that the trial judge should again make the [sentencing] determination. Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 516, 662 P.2d at 1023. There are important reasons for this procedural rule. First, this court's jurisdiction is appellate. Rumsey, 136 Ariz. at 173, 665 P.2d at 55. We have very limited original jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5, cls. 1-4. In capital cases on direct appeal, we review for error and to determine whether the penalty is appropriate. Even in those cases in which this court is the ultimate finder of fact, we proceed through a master, committee, or commission. See La Paz County v. Yuma County, 153 Ariz. 162, 163-64, 735 P.2d 772, 773-74 (1987); Ariz.R. Civ.P. 53; Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. 47, 48; Ariz.R.P.Comm.Jud.Conduct 11, 12. On appeal, in many cases it is simply impossible to determine how the trial judge  who heard the evidence and saw the witnesses  evaluated and weighed that evidence and testimony. Without these imperative determinations, the aggravating and mitigating factors cannot be balanced. See, e.g., Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 155-56, 847 P.2d at 1092-93 (Feldman, C.J., specially concurring). This is especially true because the trial judge is required by statute to consider at sentencing all evidence admitted at trial. A.R.S. § 13-703(C). Furthermore, the process of weighing is not scientific but, rather, inherently subjective. There is no mathematical formula to apply and none is required. Cf. Creech, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1544. The weighing process conducted in sentencing contains no linear equation allowing us to determine, with much certainty, the effect an error may have had on the outcome. The sentencing statute provides that, following a first degree murder conviction, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered ... shall conduct [the] sentencing hearing. A.R.S. § 13-703(B) (emphasis added). The only exception to this mandate is when the trial judge dies, resigns, or is incapacitated or disqualified. Id. This directive certainly reflects a legislative desire that, when possible, the same judge who personally saw and heard all of the evidence must evaluate and weigh that evidence for sentencing. Even if this court could somehow recreate the many valuable intangibles accompanying live testimony, the practicalities of our docket do not allow us to do so. Although capital cases have a priority, the sheer volume of cases we must process each week, month, and year curtails our review process. The volume of other judicial work, as well as the voluminous nature of the record in capital cases (in this case more than 120 volumes of testimony and numerous exhibits and filings easily exceeding 15,000 pages) simply prevents each Justice of this court from making a personal, intensive, complete, and time-consuming study of the entire record of each case. This is not to imply that the record goes unreviewed. The court and its staff review and read every word of the record in each capital case. The evaluation of the facts of a case, however, is in part based on staff review of the record. Thus, in a practical sense, the trial judge is by far the best person to bear the responsibility for sentence imposition. Other than the defendant and the attorneys, the trial judge  the one individual who received every single exhibit and heard every word uttered in court  is by far a better tool of justice to determine the appropriate sentence. In addition, part of the rationale on which Clemons relied was the fact that reviewing courts usually conduct proportionality reviews and are therefore capable of providing individualized and reliable sentences. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748-50, 110 S.Ct. at 1449; see also Hinse, 34 Ariz. L.Rev. at 152. This court, however, has concluded that proportionality reviews no longer should be a part of appellate review in capital cases. See Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 416-17, 844 P.2d at 583-84. Finally, as is often said, the death sentence is different from any other criminal penalty. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3012, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). No system based on human judgment is infallible. Thus, with the death penalty, we have taken, and should continue to take, the extra step  indeed walk the extra mile  to ensure fairness and accuracy in criminal cases. In light of the trial judge's unique familiarity with the facts of the case, remand is an extra step that should be taken in all but the rarest cases. In sum, we conclude that when new evidence must be received or reweighing and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors and evidence are required, the best approach is our traditional method. The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate credibility and accuracy, as well as draw inferences, weigh, and balance. This, after all, is the careful method that we follow in civil appeals and, we believe, is even more appropriate in capital cases. Therefore, in those cases in which the trial judge has erred in the sentencing process and there is mitigating evidence of more than de minimis weight, we will remand unless the State concedes that sentence reduction is preferable to remand. With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of the present case. The trial judge found three aggravating circumstances. We conclude that one of those was improperly found. Two aggravating circumstances, however, were correctly found. Furthermore, the trial judge properly found nothing of value by way of mitigation. Although Defendant's two previous convictions do not qualify as an aggravating circumstance, they certainly do not constitute mitigating evidence. From our review of the record, nothing submitted to the trial court qualifies as more than de minimis evidence of mitigation. We do not believe that Defendant's habitual drug use is of any value as mitigation in this case, given the fact that there was no evidence it significantly impaired his capacity to control his conduct on the day in question. There is simply nothing to weigh or balance in this case. Thus, in light of the unusual facts of this case, we are able to affirm the imposition of the death sentence even though we have found that one of the three aggravating circumstances was inapplicable. Q. Other issues Defendant raises a number of other issues, all of which we have considered. The analysis applicable to these issues does not merit express discussion in this long opinion. Thus, we reject these claims without express discussion. See State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 573, 691 P.2d 655, 664 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985). DISPOSITION We have examined the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035 and have found none. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences. MOELLER, Vice C.J., and CORCORAN, ZLAKET and MARTONE, JJ., concur.