Opinion ID: 571453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Best Effort Requirement.

Text: 22 Arledge argues that Stratmar's undertaking to provide its best effort in support of Arledge's sales activity, set forth in paragraph 4 of the Contract, precluded termination of the Contract by Stratmar unless in good faith, thus barring application of the at will rule. Read in context, however, Stratmar's best effort promise is simply a commitment to provide Arledge with the resources he would need to be a successful sales representative. We are given no reason to believe that the courts of New York would regard such an undertaking as inimical to a continuing ability to terminate the Contract, given the absence of an agreement establishing a fixed duration. Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 333, 506 N.E.2d at 920, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 211; cf. Foster, 133 A.D.2d at 666, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (when contractual best efforts provision made no reference to intended period of performance, intention of parties as to duration properly determined by court as a matter of law); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., 725 F.Supp. 712, 730 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (meaning of a best efforts clause  'properly determined by the court as a question of law from the four corners of the contract'  (quoting Foster, 133 A.D.2d at 666, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 837)). 23 Nor does any other provision of the Contract, in our view, preclude its subjection to the at will rule. We address specifically the provision in paragraph 1 of the Contract that [Arledge's] contractual agreement will go into effect as of February 1, 1989 and is subject to periodical reviews based on performance. In some cases, the applicability of the at will rule may be limited by an agreement that the employer will not terminate as long as the employee's performance is satisfactory. See, e.g., Baker v. Chock Full O' Nuts Corp., 30 A.D.2d 329, 332, 292 N.Y.S.2d 58, 61-62 (1st Dep't 1968) (per curiam) (defendant must establish honest dissatisfaction to avoid payment of guaranteed amount contractually due upon plaintiff's satisfactory completion of the production of advertising); Sinclair v. Positype Corp. of America, 237 A.D. 525, 528, 261 N.Y.S. 900, 904 (1st Dep't 1933) (plaintiff invited to amend complaint to allege that parties agreed employment would last so long as his services were satisfactory); cf. Leifer v. Scheinman, 179 A.D. 665, 666, 167 N.Y.S. 105, 106-07 (1st Dep't 1917) (parol evidence admissible to prove employment a yearly hiring that could only be terminated for proper cause). 24 Nothing in this record indicates, however, that the parties intended that the Contract's reference to periodical reviews based on performance should mean that Arledge could only be terminated following a periodic review indicating poor performance. As the cases cited in the preceding paragraph indicate, ambiguous contractual language may permit consideration of parol evidence and require findings of fact as to the intent of the contracting parties. We are reluctant to presume such an ambiguity here, however, especially in the absence of parol evidence or even an allegation by Arledge that an ambiguity of this nature exists. See Amusement Business Underwriters v. American Int'l Group, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 878, 881, 489 N.E.2d 729, 732, 498 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763 (1985) ([w]hether ... an ambiguity exists is a question for the court); cf. New York v. Home Indemnity Co., 66 N.Y.2d 669, 671, 486 N.E.2d 827, 829, 495 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (1985) (if the tendered extrinsic evidence is itself conclusory and will not resolve the equivocality of the language of the contract, the issue remains a question of law for the court). Further, we note that, as a matter of common sense, every employment contemplates periodic reviews of performance as an aspect of normal employment practices. Such reviews, without more, do not convert an at will contract into one that can be terminated only on a showing of good cause or honest dissatisfaction.