Opinion ID: 1221981
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: wilson's liability for retaliatory discharge

Text: Although the jury concluded that Wilson was liable on the retaliatory discharge claim along with the Bank, the trial court set this finding aside on the theory that Wilson did not directly fire Harless on December 30, 1976. There was some testimony that the plaintiff had been earlier relieved of his duties at the Bank by Wilson on June 25, 1975. The plaintiff argues that the June 25 release was a firing although he admits he was reinstated at the end of a two-week period; Wilson contends it was not a firing but a suspension. Whether Wilson actually fired the plaintiff, Harless, is not the critical point. In a retaliatory discharge case the person who does the actual firing may have little to do with the underlying controversy. [9] The discharge serves to fix responsibility on the employer but this does not mean that another employee who has been the principal protagonist in obtaining the employee's discharge would not also be liable. Here, Wilson who was the plaintiff's immediate superior and directly involved on behalf of the Bank in the unlawful consumer practices, was hostile to the plaintiff's efforts to rectify the improper practices. The evidence shows that Wilson's views carried considerable weight with the Bank's management and contributed to the ultimate discharge of the plaintiff. We have established in Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., W.Va., 285 S.E.2d 679 (1981); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., W.Va., 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980); and Harless, supra, that a claim for retaliatory discharge is a tort cause of action. The fact that Wilson did not directly fire the plaintiff does not relieve him of liability. Wilson's actions were within the scope of his employment. In Musgrove v. Hickory Inn, Inc., W.Va., 281 S.E.2d 499 (1981), we discussed at some length an employee's personal liability and stated in Syllabus Point 3: An agent or employee can be held personally liable for his own torts against third parties and this personal liability is independent of his agency or employee relationship. Of course, if he is acting within the scope of his employment, then his principal or employer may also be held liable. In State ex rel. Bumgarner v. Sims, 139 W.Va. 92, 111, 79 S.E.2d 277, 289 (1953), we characterized the relationship of master and servant as similar to joint tortfeasors: The relationship of master and servant in those cases, in which the doctrine of respondeat superior applies, is joint, and the parties should be regarded as though they were joint tort-feasors. Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co., 97 W.Va. 476, 125 S.E. 367. In some respects, however, the relation may be regarded as joint and several. We have also recognized in Syllabus Point 4 of Humphrey v. Virginian Railway Co., 132 W.Va. 250, 54 S.E.2d 204 (1948), that an employer might have liability independent of his employee if such liability arose from acts of the employer or another employee: Where, in an action for personal injuries, plaintiff seeks to recover damages against a master and his employee, liability of the master is not predicated solely upon the employee's negligence, but upon the negligence of another employee, or that of the employer himself, a verdict against the employer and exonerating the employee is not inconsistent. In Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co., 97 W.Va. 476, 478, 125 S.E. 367, 368 (1924), suit for a wrongful death was filed against the coal company and its superintendent by reason of employing the deceased under-age miner and we said: If the tortious act be jointly done, or severally done though for a similar purpose and at the same time, without concert of action, the actors are joint tortfeasors. Ordinarily both parties guilty of concurrent negligent acts may be joined in the action, even though they had no common purpose, and there was no concert of action. Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W.Va. [639] 641, 28 S.E. 744. We have traditionally recognized in tort cases that joint tortfeasors need not have the same degree of liability or participation of fault in order to be held liable to the injured plaintiff. E.g., Metro v. Smith, 146 W.Va. 983, 124 S.E.2d 460 (1962); Reilley v. Byard, 146 W.Va. 292, 119 S.E.2d 650 (1961); Sigmon v. Mundy, 125 W.Va. 591, 25 S.E.2d 636 (1943); Hutcherson v. Slate, 105 W.Va. 184, 142 S.E. 444 (1928). Consequently, under the foregoing law, we believe the trial court erred in holding that Wilson could not be found liable for the retaliatory discharge. His supervisory position over the plaintiff coupled with the evidence that directly linked him as an adversary in the central controversy in which the plaintiff was involved at the Bank was sufficient to support the jury's finding of liability.