Opinion ID: 2078371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges

Text: A defendant may challenge a statute as being unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied. Here, defendant has done both. As the term implies, an as-applied challenge calls on the court to consider whether a statute can be constitutionally applied to the defendant under the facts of the case ( see People v Parker, 41 NY2d 21, 24 [1976]; Chapman v United States, 500 US 453, 467 [1991]; Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113 Harv L Rev 1321, 1321 [2000]). By contrast, a facial challenge requires the court to examine the words of the statute on a cold page and without reference to the defendant's conduct. In pursuing a facial challenge, the defendant must carry the heavy burden ( Matter of Wood v Irving, 85 NY2d 238, 244-245 [1995]; Bright, 71 NY2d at 382) of showing that the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications ( see United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 [1987]; Village of Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489, 494-495, 497 [1982]; see also Wood, 85 NY2d at 250 [Levine, J., dissenting]; McGowan v Burstein, 71 NY2d 729, 733 [1988]). A successful facial challenge means that the law is `invalid in toto and therefore incapable of any valid application' ( Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 495, n 5, quoting Steffel v Thompson, 415 US 452, 474 [1974]; see Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-32, at 1036 [2d ed 1988]). That would be true, for example, when vagueness permeates a statute to the point where no standard of conduct is specified at all ( Coates v City of Cincinnati, 402 US 611, 614 [1971]; see also New York Trap Rock Corp., 57 NY2d at 380-381; Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 755 [1974]) or where the vagueness in the statute is so great that it permits officers to exercise unfettered discretion in every single case ( see Bright, 71 NY2d at 383-384). In the latter situation, the potential for arbitrary enforcement in every case would mean that the statute is invalid in all its applications, particularly because the second requirement (adequate guidelines for law enforcement) is perhaps the more important aspect of [the] vagueness doctrine ( Kolender v Lawson, 461 US at 358). [8] Because facial challenges to statutes are generally disfavored ( see e.g. National Endowment for the Arts, 524 US at 580) and legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality ( see Brady v State of New York, 80 NY2d 596, 602 [1992]; Bright, 71 NY2d at 382), a court's task when presented with both a facial and as-applied argument is first to decide whether the assailed statute is impermissibly vague as applied to the defendant ( see Ulster Home Care v Vacco, 96 NY2d 505, 510 [2001]; Nelson, 69 NY2d at 308; Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 495; United States v Mazurie, 419 US 544, 550 [1975]). If it is not and the statute provides the defendant with adequate notice and the police with clear criteria, that is the end of the matter. [T]he court will not strain to imagine marginal situations in which the application of the statute is not so clear ( Nelson, 69 NY2d at 308; People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529, 538 [1995]). It follows, therefore, that if a defendant makes an as-applied vagueness challenge and the court repudiates it, the facial validity of the statute is confirmed ( see Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 505). That is so because, in rejecting the as-applied challenge, the court will have necessarily concluded that there is at least one personthe defendantto whom the statute may be applied constitutionally ( see id. [We hold only that    legislation is not facially    vague if it    is reasonably clear in its application to the complainant]). It would thus be impossible for a defendant to establish the statute's unconstitutionality in all of its applications. [9] Although we have not said it in so many words, our most recent vagueness cases are fully consistent with these principles. In Nelson (69 NY2d 302 [1987]), we upheld a jostling statute as applied to the defendant ( see id. at 308). By concluding that there was at least one person as to whom the statute could be applied constitutionally, we implicitly determined that it was valid on its face. In Bright (71 NY2d 376 [1988]), we undertook a facial analysis of a loitering statute and struck it down because, as in New York Trap Rock Corp., the statute was so vague that it failed to specify any standard of conduct (since it used the words satisfactory explanation) and placed complete discretion in the hands of the police ( id. at 378, 384). Owing to these constitutional ailments, the statute in Bright could not be applied constitutionally under any set of circumstances. In Shack (86 NY2d 529 [1995]), we addressed only the defendant's contention that the aggravated harassment statute was vague as applied to him ( see id. at 538) and upheld the statute. In so concluding, we adhered to the principle articulated in Hoffman Estates and other cases that when considering vagueness challenges of this type courts should first determine whether the statute can be constitutionally applied to the defendant. If it can, the statute is necessarily valid on its face ( see Hoffman Estates, 455 US at 505; see also Wood, 85 NY2d 238 [1995]). In her concurrence, the Chief Judge argues that the no valid applications rule is wrong, and that it is unwise for the Court to employ it ( see concurring op at 429-430). While she has thoughtfully discussed the merits of our rule, we regard it as sound andmore to the pointnote that there is nothing the least bit novel or ground-breaking in our applying it. In McGowan v Burstein (71 NY2d 729 [1988]), we considered a facial constitutional challenge to a method of scoring civil service exams ( see id. at 732-733 [Plaintiffs are not challenging zone scoring as applied to any particular civil service examination   . Instead, they seek a declaration that zone scoring is per se violative of the State Constitution   .]). We applied today's rule by declaring that [t]o sustain their challenge, as so framed [i.e., as a facial challenge], plaintiffs must demonstrate that zone scoring in any degree and in every conceivable application would be unconstitutional ( id. at 733). We rejected the facial challenge, but only after concluding that the plaintiffs have not carried this burden of showing unconstitutionality in every conceivable application ( id. ; see also Wood, 85 NY2d at 250 [Levine, J., dissenting]). [10]