Opinion ID: 2514340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Issue 3: Must the adoption be set aside because of the discovery of new evidence?

Text: M.P.'s second alternative argument is that K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment when there is newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under K.S.A. 60-259. K.S.A. 60-259 requires a motion for new trial within 10 days. Ten days after the final adoption decree, M.P. had not been told by N.T. of A.A.T.'s birth or adoption. Under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2), newly discovered evidence must be so material that its introduction would have been likely to produce a different result. Further, M.P. bears the burden of proof to show that newly discovered evidence of N.T.'s lies and his fatherhood could not have been discovered before trial through his exercise of due diligence. See State v. Munyon, 240 Kan. 53, 63, 726 P.2d 1333 (1986); Plains Transport of Kansas, Inc. v. Baldwin, 217 Kan. 2, 8, 535 P.2d 865 (1975). Our standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. at 862, 934 P.2d 58. The district court denied relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) because, it said, M.P. should have taken action to verify whether [N.T.] had an abortion. M.P. asserts that [t]here was little, if anything, M.P. could have done to discover N.T. had lied to him about the abortion.... While the district court in its decision stated M.P. had numerous `red flags,' there was simply no reasonable way for M.P. to determine whether N.T. was lying to him. Without addressing whether a party in M.P.'s position who did not participate in a proceeding can argue newly discovered evidence as a basis for relief from a judgment, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the natural father, by exercising reasonable diligence, could have discovered the natural mother's lie about obtaining an abortion and her concealment of the birth and adoption of their child. For example, M.P.'s explanation for not asking N.T.'s mother about the abortion was that he did not want to talk to someone who did not like him, which was what N.T. had reported in an effort to prevent the contact. Even though it may have been uncomfortable and awkward for M.P. to have talked to N.T.'s mother, he could have done so in an effort to verify or dispel his suspicions. Consequently, the evidence could have been discovered with minimal diligence, and M.P. is not entitled to relief from the judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2).