Opinion ID: 1266408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federalism Challenge

Text: Under our federal system[,] the administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of [its] delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). Bond contends that, by permitting prosecution of localized offenses without regard to the ... federalism boundaries enshrined in the Constitution[,] § 229 signals a massive and unjustifiable expansion of federal law enforcement into [the] state-regulated domain. Bond's Br. at 10-11, 16. Specifically, she argues that because the statute brings citizens into the federal criminal area for conduct not properly the subject of federal prosecutors, id. at 11, and because it significantly restrike[s] the delicate balance between the federal and state governments, it violates the unique system of federalism protected by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. [2] Id. The Government responds that the Tenth Amendment is no impediment to the operation of § 229 because Congress had authority to enact it under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as a law enforcing its Treaty Power. [3] Relying on Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920), the Government asserts that § 229 need not be authorized by a specific power given to Congress, nor contain a requisite federal interest element, because the Chemical Weapons Convention is a valid treaty and [i]f [a] treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute [implementing it] under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government. Gov't's Br. at 27 (quoting United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.1998)). The Government highlights as well the declaration in Holland that [i]t is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could. 252 U.S. at 433, 40 S.Ct. 382; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004). Thus, states the Government, even if § 229 were otherwise prohibited legislation under the Tenth Amendment, the treaty power invest[ed] Congress with independent authority to pass [it]. Gov't's Br. at 26. These arguments appear to present issues of first impression in our Court. They raise questions about what constitutional authority treaty-implementing legislation must cite, and how far such legislation may reach into an area over which [s]tates possess primary authority. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The arguments also ask us to wade into the debate over the scope and persuasiveness of the decision in Holland. Compare United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1027-28 (11th Cir.2001) (applying Holland to hold that because Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper clause extends beyond those powers specifically enumerated in Article I, section 8, it may enact laws necessary to effectuate the treaty power (internal quotations omitted)), and Lue, 134 F.3d at 84-85 (same), with Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1163 (2d Cir.1988) (remarking that, despite Holland, the ability of the treaty power to override state prerogatives is uncertain). [4] But before we can reach the merits of these arguments, we must ensure that Bond has standing to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to § 229. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (requiring that courts decide jurisdictional issues before considering the merits of a claim). Because this inquiry implicates our jurisdiction, we conduct it even though the parties did not address it in their initial briefs. See Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir.2003). [5] In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 143-144, 59 S.Ct. 366, 83 L.Ed. 543 (1939), utility companies chartered in Tennessee argued that the sale of electrical power by the federally chartered Tennessee Valley Authority was an impermissible federal regulation of a local matter in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the private companies lacked standing to maintain their claim: The sale of government property in competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment. As we have seen[,] there is no objection to the Authority's operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the [utility companies], absent the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the [Tenth] [A]mendment. Id. at 144, 59 S.Ct. 366. [6] Despite this explicit holding, courts of appeals are split on whether private parties have standing to challenge a federal act on the basis of the Tenth Amendment. Two circuit courts have allowed private parties to bring such challenges. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703-04 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116, 120 S.Ct. 934, 145 L.Ed.2d 813 (2000); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n. 16 (11th Cir.1982). [7] Five have not. See United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 525-527 (8th Cir.2009); Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 971-72 (9th Cir.2009); Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 234-35 (2d Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 44, 169 L.Ed.2d 11 (2007); Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 33-36 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904, 126 S.Ct. 2968, 165 L.Ed.2d 951 (2006); United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1284-85 (10th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874, 125 S.Ct. 88, 160 L.Ed.2d 124 (2004). The Seventh Circuit Court stated most clearly the rationale for permitting private parties, notwithstanding Tennessee Electric, to raise Tenth Amendment concerns absent the involvement of a state. Deciding that a state police officer had standing independently to maintain a Tenth Amendment claim against a federal gun regulation, the Court emphasized that standing barriers have been substantially lowered in the decades since the Supreme Court decided [ Tennessee Electric. ] Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 700. It further explained that New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-82, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), cabined the holding of Tennessee Electric by establishing that, in making Tenth Amendment claims, [an individual] actually is asserting his own rights. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703. The Court based this explanation on the Supreme Court's statement in New York that the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals[,] 505 U.S. at 181, 112 S.Ct. 2408, which convinced the Seventh Circuit panel that the Tenth Amendment, although nominally protecting state sovereignty, ultimately secures the rights of individuals. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703. Contrary to this reasoning, the five circuit courts to reject independent private party standing for Tenth Amendment claims have focused on the continuing authority of Tennessee Electric. See, e.g., Oregon, 552 F.3d at 972; Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d at 234. Noting that the Supreme Court's `decisions remain binding precedent until [it] see[s] fit to reconsider them,' Hacker, 565 F.3d at 527 (quoting Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998)), these courts have ruled that Tennessee Electric denies private plaintiffs standing for Tenth Amendment claims because there exists no directly contradictory authority from the Supreme Court. Id. at 526. The courts also point to varying prudential considerations to support their determinations. See, e.g., id. at 527 (suggesting that the holding of Tennessee Electric comports with prudential standing principles that generally limit a plaintiff to asserting his own rights); Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 36 (hesitating to disregard Tennessee Electric because doing so might induce a substantial increase in ... litigation before the federal courts). We are persuaded by the reasoning advanced by the majority of our sister courts and conclude that a private party lacks standing to claim that the federal Government is impinging on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment, absent the involvement of a state or its officers as a party or parties. If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). The holding of Tennessee Electric thus is binding irrespective of the language in New York about federalism's protection of individuals. See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34 (noting also that New York never actually dealt with the question of standing). Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court in this decade granted certiorari on, but later declined to answer, the question of whether private plaintiffs have standing to assert `states' rights' under the Tenth Amendment, Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 148 n. 10, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003), does no more than indicate an interest of at least four Justices in Tennessee Electric 's binding status. Our interpretation makes it evident that Bond lacks standing to pursue her Tenth Amendment challenge to § 229. The requisite representation by the states or their officers is notably absent from her suit, Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d at 234, and she does not even attempt to argue that her interests are aligned with those of a state. Cf. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284 (speculating that a private party could assert a Tenth Amendment claim by showing that her claim align[s] with the state's interest). Accordingly, we will not reach the merits of Bond's arguments concerning the constitutionality of § 229 under our federal system of government. [8]