Opinion ID: 1980248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: points six (6) and eight (8).

Text: We will group and consider specifications #6 and #8 of the motion for a new trial together as both contentions of error are challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. More specifically, asserted error #6 urges the proposition that the state failed to prove malice and purpose. Therefore the appellant's motions for a directed verdict at the close of the state's case-in-chief and at the conclusion of all the evidence should have been granted. Murder in the second degree is defined by statute as follows: Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree ... Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-3404 (1956 Repl.) Thus defined the crime of second degree murder embraces the following essential elements: 1. The killing of a human being. 2. The accompaniment of such killing with malice and purpose. See Helms v. State (1968),  251 Ind. 335, 241 N.E.2d 244; Dickinson v. State (1944), 222 Ind. 551, 55 N.E.2d 325; Landreth v. State (1930), 201 Ind. 691, 171 N.E. 192; Brooks v. State (1883), 90 Ind. 428. In Maxey v. State (1969), 251 Ind. 645, 244 N.E.2d 650, 657, we stated: ... It is well established in Indiana that the use of a deadly weapon against an unarmed person in a manner likely to produce death is sufficient evidence from which to conclude malice existed. The elements of malice and purpose need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Maxey v. State, supra ; Helms v. State, supra ; Sparks v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 245, 195 N.E.2d 469, rehearing granted on other grounds, 245 Ind. 250, 196 N.E.2d 748; Miller v. State (1962), 242 Ind. 678, 181 N.E.2d 633. A conviction will be sustained if there is substantial evidence of probative value to sustain each material element of the crime charged. When the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is raised this court will consider that evidence most favorable to the state together with all inferences to be drawn therefrom. Harris v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 681, 231 N.E.2d 800; Coach v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 226, 235 N.E.2d 493. The record of the testimony by Sandra Hedges, the daughter of the deceased, and Ronald Hewitt indicates that both of them heard shots fired and both saw the appellant and the deceased struggling. The appellant had a .32 caliber pistol in his hand, and the deceased was shot and killed with said pistol. Ronald Hewitt, who came to the aid of the deceased during the struggle, was also shot with the same pistol. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable inferences could be drawn to establish the element of malice under the case law hereinabove set forth.  Moreover, the law has always stated that an individual intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts and such intent implies purpose by operation of law. Newport v. State (1894), 140 Ind. 299, 39 N.E. 926; Pitts v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 168, 23 N.E.2d 673. Consequently, we hold that no error was committed by the trial court in refusing to grant the appellant's motions for directed verdicts or in overruling of specification #6 of appellant's motion for new trial. Specification #8 of the motion for new trial asserts error based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of second degree murder and judgment thereon. The appellant in his brief has failed to make an argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence upon any grounds other than its insufficiency to sustain the essential elements of malice and purpose as heretofore discussed. Therefore, we do not deem it necessary to detail a summary of all the evidence in the case. Suffice it to say the record reveals there was substantial evidence of probative value to sustain the verdict of the jury as regards the requisite malice and purposefulness. We hold that the trial court committed no error in overruling specification #8 of the appellant's motion for new trial.