Opinion ID: 1668690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in granting the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Text: The circuit court issued 28 findings of fact and 6 conclusions of law. Bank argues that because Piner failed to object to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law or to propose her own findings of fact and conclusions of law, our standard of review is limited to the question of whether the findings support the conclusions of law and judgment. Shoop v. Shoop, 460 N.W.2d 721, 723-24 (S.D.1990). As the Bank notes, findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary in a summary judgment action. SDCL 15-6-52(a); Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 211, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968). Since summary judgment presupposes there is no genuine issue of fact, findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary. Wilson, 83 S.D. at 211, 157 N.W.2d at 21. The fact that [t]he trial court chose to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, id., and Piner failed to object to the findings and conclusions or propose her own, does not limit our review. [W]e are not bound by the factual findings of the trial court and must conduct an independent review of the record, Koeniguer v. Eckrich, 422 N.W.2d 600, 601 (S.D.1988) (citation omitted). See Time Out, Inc. v. Karras, 392 N.W.2d 434, 436 (S.D.1986) (Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary in summary judgment proceedings. Therefore, our scope of review on appeal is not under the `clearly erroneous' doctrine, but rather under the strict standards attendant upon entry of summary judgment as delineated in Wilson [.]). See generally City of Belle Fourche v. Dittman, 325 N.W.2d 309, 311 (S.D.1982) (holding that appellants' failure to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested by the trial court in a summary judgment action did not deprive the court of jurisdiction of the appeal because findings of fact and conclusions of law were unnecessary under SDCL 15-6-52(a)). Piner argues that the circuit court erred in granting the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is an extreme remedy, not intended as a substitute for trial. Dahl v. Sittner, 429 N.W.2d 458, 461 (S.D.1988) (citations omitted). It is appropriate to dispose of legal, not factual issues and, therefore, it is authorized only when the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no genuine issues of material fact. Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 601 (citations omitted). See SDCL 15-6-56(c). The moving party has the burden of proof and the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party. Therefore, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and every reasonable inference arising therefrom must be viewed most favorably toward the nonmoving party. Koeniguer, 422 N.W.2d at 601 (citations omitted). Claims of fraud and deceit are usually jury questions. Taggart v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 462 N.W.2d 493, 498 (S.D.1990) [2] (citing Tri-State Ref. and Inv. Co., Inc. v. Apaloosa Co., 431 N.W.2d 311, 314 (S.D.1988) (A claim for fraud and deceit is generally a question of fact for the fact finder.)). In Time Out, Inc. v. Karras , the trial court concluded, on a motion for partial summary judgment, that the registration of the name Time Out Steakhouse & Restaurant was granted improperly and obtained fraudulently. The trial court was reversed on appeal because [i]ssues involving fraud are generally a question of fact. Whether or not the application of appellant filed with the Secretary of State contained representations that constitute fraud is a genuine question of material fact and therefore inappropriate for summary disposition. 392 N.W.2d at 437 (citation omitted). In Wilson, [ ] we held that equitable actions are not usually suited for summary disposition. Id. (citing Ahl v. Arnio, 388 N.W.2d 532 (S.D.1986)). In support of their argument that the circuit court correctly found that the conveyance from Ashwill to Piner was a fraudulent conveyance, Bank relies upon SDCL 54-8-1 and SDCL 54-8A-4. [3] SDCL 54-8-1 provides: Every transfer of property or charge made thereon, every obligation incurred, and every judicial proceeding taken, with intent to delay or defraud any creditor or other person of his demands is void against all creditors of the debtor and their successors in interest and against any persons upon whom the estate of the debtor devolves in trust for the benefit of others than the debtor. As this court held in Andrews v. Reynolds, however, [t]o establish a conveyance as fraudulent, actual intent to defraud must be shown, and the existence of fraudulent intent is a question of fact and not one of law. 409 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (S.D.1987) (citations omitted). While the circuit court found that Ashwill assigned and quitclaimed his interest in the entire 1400 acre parcel to Piner for a purported consideration of $30,000.00, the court further found that the purported assignment from Ashwill to Piner of all interest in the 1,400-acre parcel including the contracts constitute[s] a fraudulent conveyance motivated to delay or defraud creditors of Ashwill. Therefore, according to the circuit court's Finding of Fact XXIII, Piner does not appear before this Court with clean hands as a result of her reliance upon the assignment which is in the nature of a fraudulent conveyance. The question presented by a motion for summary judgment is whether or not there is a genuine issue of material fact. It does not contemplate that the court shall decide such issue of fact, but shall determine only whether one exists. Wilson, 83 S.D. at 211, 157 N.W.2d at 21 (citation omitted). Whether or not the assignment from Ashwill to Piner was a fraudulent conveyance was a genuine issue of material fact, inappropriate for summary judgment. Time Out, 392 N.W.2d at 437. Because genuine issues of material fact exist, the circuit court erred in granting the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. We find it unnecessary to reach the other issues raised by Piner and reverse and remand for trial. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur.