Opinion ID: 3049222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do the facts offered in support of the enhance-

Text: ment create new offenses requiring separate punishment? 4. Is the increase in sentence based on the extent of a conspiracy? 5. Is the increase in the number of offense levels less than or equal to four? 6. Is the length of the enhanced sentence more than double the length of the sentence authorized by the initial sentencing guideline range in a case where the defendant would otherwise have received a relatively short sentence? UNITED STATES v. GONZALEZ 7967 United States v. Johansson, 249 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Valensia, 222 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 532 U.S. 901 (2001)). No single factor is controlling. Dare, 425 F.3d at 642. [9] Although the first four factors are either not particularly relevant or do not weigh in favor of a heightened standard, the last two factors are significant. In Jordan we concluded that a nine-level enhancement, which we have here, “strongly supports application of the clear and convincing evidence standard.” Jordan, 256 F.3d at 929. The offense level increase, the fifth factor, weighs heavily in favor of a heightened burden. The sixth factor, whether the length of the enhanced sentence is more than double the length of the sentence authorized by the initial Guideline range in a case where the defendant would otherwise have received a relatively short sentence, likewise counts in Gonzalez’s favor. The nine-level enhancement raised the applicable Guideline range from zero to six months (where probation is a viable option) to 21 to 27 months, which is more than four times the upper end of the Guideline range. [10] We have previously invoked the clear and convincing evidence standard where only the two final factors favor its application, and nothing suggests that we should take a different approach here. See Jordan, 256 F.3d at 929 (holding that heightened standard should have been applied when the sentence was more than doubled). See also id. at 934 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“Since Hopper, we appear to have consistently held that when the enhancement is greater than four levels and more than doubles the applicable sentencing range, then the enhancements must be proved under the ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof.” (collecting cases)). [11] The district court did not specify the standard of proof nor did Gonzalez’s counsel raise the issue. Gonzalez is not entitled to reversal, however, simply because the district court 7968 UNITED STATES v. GONZALEZ should have applied the clear and convincing standard. The failure to articulate the standard did not prejudice Gonzalez. As we explained in Jordan: An error that is plain must also ‘affect substantial rights.’ In most cases this language means that ‘the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’ . . . Jordan therefore must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy this prong. However, it is evident beyond doubt that Jordan’s increased incarceration caused by the challenged enhance- ments is prejudicial if these enhancements could not have been proved by clear and convincing evidence. 256 F.3d at 930 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Technic Servs., 314 F.3d 1031, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding on plain error review that the record reflected the court found the enhancements by clear and convincing evidence, based on certain statements the judge made). [12] Because the evidence in this case was overwhelming, it is evident that the facts related to the enhancement were established by clear and convincing evidence. The dispute over Gonzalez’s language with respect to the bomb does not change the calculus. Even accepting Gonzalez’s version, coupled with the uncontroverted testimony of the flight attendants and other aspects of Gonzalez’s behavior, the standard is easily met. AFFIRMED.