Opinion ID: 654260
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Constitutionality of the RICO Act

Text: 80 First, Netters argues that the term enterprise is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. We rejected a comparable argument in Dischner. See 974 F.2d at 1511. Nor do we find the 'enterprise' requirement vague as applied to [defendants'] conduct.... The statute adequately warned [defendants] that their association with each other and the Office of the Mayor and the Department of Public Works constituted a RICO enterprise. Id. (citations omitted). 81 Second, Netters asserts that the RICO statute is unconstitutional as applied to cases such as this one because it impermissibly infringes on states' rights to control their electoral processes. He adds that the statute is unconstitutional because it chills the exercise of First Amendment rights, namely the solicitation of campaign contributions. The Supreme Court decided a case which responds to this argument. SeeMcCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 1816, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991). Although the defendant state representative in McCormick was charged with violating the Hobbs Act rather than RICO, the Supreme Court's decision in that case controls this question. 82 In McCormick, the Court recognized that [s]erving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the district and individuals and groups therein is the everyday business of a legislator[, and] ... campaigns must be run and financed. McCormick, 500 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1816. Nevertheless, [p]olitical contributions are ... vulnerable ... if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act. Id.