Opinion ID: 1804268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Applicable Community Standard In Defamation Cases

Text: Because we decline to recognize the tort of false light, we do not address the actual viability of Rapp's false light claim, except to note that her claim is based on statements she asserts are in fact false. Although the Fourth District found that the statements about Rapp being a convert to Jews for Jesus could be highly offensive to a reasonable person, the court also concluded that these statements could not be defamatory because the common mind reading the newsletter would not have found Edith to be an object of hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace. Rapp, 944 So.2d at 464, 467. In so doing, the Fourth District failed to embrace the standard that a communication is defamatory if it prejudices the plaintiff in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of the community. Id. at 465-66. That standard, it noted, is encompassed within comment e to section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, it declined to apply comment e because it concluded that this Court had not adopted that standard in any case. Id. at 466. We recognize that our precedent is silent regarding the relevant community standard for a defamation claim. Nevertheless, because the relevant community standard was the basis for rejecting her defamation claim as a matter of law, we consider this issue important to discuss. [15] Comment e to section 559 states, in pertinent part: A communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes of everyone in the community or of all of his associates, nor even in the eyes of a majority of them. It is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of them, and that it is made to one or more of them or in a manner that makes it proper to assume that it will reach them. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 cmt. e (emphasis added). Although there does not appear to be much discussion in case law on what constitutes the relevant community, except for this provision of the Restatement, this Court has stated that a plaintiff has a claim for defamation if he or she suffers injury in his or her personal, social, official, or business relations. Land v. Tampa Times Publ'g Co., 68 Fla. 546, 67 So. 130, 130 (Fla.1914). The most extensive discussion regarding the applicable community standard appears to be in Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 188, 29 S.Ct. 554, 53 L.Ed. 960 (1909), where the plaintiff brought a libel action against a publisher for the unauthorized use of her picture for an advertisement. In finding in favor of the plaintiff, the Court stated: If the advertisement obviously would hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an important and respectable part of the community, liability is not a question of a majority vote. We know of no decision in which this matter is discussed upon principle. But obviously an unprivileged falsehood need not entail universal hatred to constitute a cause of action. No falsehood is thought about or even known by all the world. No conduct is hated by all. That it will be known by a large number, and will lead an appreciable fraction of that number to regard the plaintiff with contempt, is enough to do her practical harm. Thus, if a doctor were represented as advertising, the fact that it would affect his standing with other of his profession might make the representation actionable, although advertising is not reputed dishonest, and even seems to be regarded by many with pride. Id. at 190, 29 S.Ct. 554. We agree with the logical conclusion of the Supreme Court. Indeed, our Standard Jury Instructions, which state that a defamatory statement tends to injure the plaintiff's business or reputation, or occupation, do not indicate that the statement must be construed as defamatory by the community at large. Standard Jury InstructionsCivil Cases (No. 00-1), 795 So.2d at 57. We find that the harm that stems from a defamatory statement as objectively interpreted by a substantial and respectable minority of the community is entitled to protection. We therefore adopt comment e to section 559 of the Restatement as stating the appropriate community standard for analyzing a defamation claim. [16]