Opinion ID: 214331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under Massachusetts Choice of Law Principles, the Massachusetts Act Governs the Defendants' Immunity

Text: Historically, in tort cases, Massachusetts applied the substantive law of the state where the alleged wrong occurred. Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 417 Mass. 643, 632 N.E.2d 832, 834 (1994). In the last few decades, however, Massachusetts has moved to a functional approach for addressing choice of law issues. Joseph W. Glannon & Gabriel Teninbaum, Conflict of Laws in Massachusetts Part I: Current Choice-of-Law Theory, 92 Mass. L.Rev. 12, 14-15 (2009); see, e.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gourdeau Constr. Co., Inc., 419 Mass. 658, 647 N.E.2d 42, 43-44 (1995); Cosme, 632 N.E.2d at 834. This functional approach responds to the interests of the parties, the States involved, and the interstate system as a whole. Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 473 N.E.2d 662, 668 (1985). In employing this approach, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ha[s] not elected by name any particular choice-of-law doctrine. Rather, [it] consider[s] choice-of-law issues by assessing various choice-influencing considerations, including those provided in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), and those suggested by various commentators. [5] Cosme, 632 N.E.2d at 834 (quotation marks and other internal citation omitted); see also Jasty v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 528 F.3d 28, 40 (1st Cir. 2008). The Second Restatement provides that, in personal injury cases, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971) (hereinafter Restatement). Section 6 of the Restatement cites the following factors as relevant to choice of law decisions: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Id. § 6. The Second Restatement further explains that, in balancing the section 6 factors, courts should consider various contacts, including: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Id. § 145(2). [6] We also note that the law of a single jurisdiction is not necessarily to be applied to all issues in a particular case; rather, we should weigh the relevant considerations according to their relative importance to the particular issue involved. Lou v. Otis Elevator Co., 77 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 933 N.E.2d 140, 151 & n. 27 (citing Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979); Restatement § 145, cmt. d), review denied, 458 Mass. 1108, 936 N.E.2d 435 (2010). Turning to the case at hand, we conclude that the Massachusetts Act's immunity provisions apply to Robidoux's claims because Massachusetts, as compared to Rhode Island, has a `more significant relationship' to the parties and the occurrence under the considerations provided in § 6. [7] Cosme, 632 N.E.2d at 835. First and most importantly, Massachusetts' interests in this case substantially exceed those of Rhode Island. Robidoux is a Massachusetts resident who, after obtaining the approval of a Massachusetts administrative judge, received benefits from a Massachusetts workers' compensation policy for an injury he suffered while employed by a Massachusetts company. Even where the injury occurs out of state, Massachusetts retains a significant interest in the extent to which a resident is compensated for a workplace injury. See, e.g., id. at 836; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 26 (expressly authorizing paying benefits for injuries sustained outside the state); cf. Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976) (holding, in a wife's suit against her husband stemming from a New York car accident, that Massachusetts law governed spousal immunity issue in part because the economic and social impact of this litigation will fall on Massachusetts domiciliaries and a Massachusetts insurer). In addition to its interest in the amount of Robidoux's compensation, Massachusetts also has a stake in who pays that compensation. Specifically, the Massachusetts Act limits immunity to insured person[s] employing such employee and liable for payment of [workers'] compensation in part because permitting recovery from other parties may decrease the cost of workers' compensation insurance by allowing insurers to recoup benefits in some cases. [8] Accordingly, Massachusetts has an interest in injured employees or insurers being able to recover from parties like James Construction and Muholland whenever a Massachusetts' workers' compensation policy assumes responsibility for the payment of benefits. In contrast, Rhode Island has little interest in how Robidoux is compensated or whether these non-Rhode Island defendants are protected by immunity. Cf. Dasha v. Adelman, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 418, 699 N.E.2d 20, 26 (1998) (noting that, although plaintiff was injured in Maine, Maine's interest is significantly diminished because the Maine defendants were no longer parties to the case). The defendants argue that the Rhode Island Act's immunity provision is in part intended to decrease the cost of doing business in Rhode Island, and therefore Rhode Island has an interest in immunizing contractors for any injury that occurs in the state. See also Restatement § 184, cmt. b ([T]o deny ... immunity... would frustrate the efforts of that state to restrict the cost of industrial accidents and to afford a fair basis for predicting what these costs will be.). As defense counsel conceded at oral argument, however, there is nothing in the record establishing that interstate contractors, like James Construction, see a decrease in liability insurance premiums when they take on projects in Rhode Island as opposed to some other state with less generous immunity rules. To be sure, Rhode Island has an interest in regulating conduct within its borders, and it therefore has an interest in applying its own conduct-regulating rules to events that occur in Rhode Island. See Lou, 933 N.E.2d at 151 n. 27; Restatement § 145, cmt. d. The specific question in this case, however, is not whether Massachusetts or Rhode Island standards of negligence apply. Rather, the issue here pertains to the application of workers' compensation immunity rules. Consequently, Rhode Island's conduct-regulating interests are diminished, and our choice of law analysis therefore place[s] a greater emphasis on the State in which the parties are domiciled. See Lou, 933 N.E.2d at 151 n. 27; see also Restatement § 145, cmt. d ([S]ubject only to rare exceptions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied to determine whether the actor satisfied minimum standards of acceptable conduct and whether the interest affected by the actor's conduct was entitled to legal protection.... On the other hand, the local law of the state where the parties are domiciled... may be applied to determine whether one party is immune from tort liability....). We recognize that [a]n important objective of the [Rhode Island Act] was to curtail litigation by injured employees who elected to take advantage of its expedited procedure for obtaining compensation.... See Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 129. Because Robidoux ended up receiving compensation from a Massachusetts policy, however, honoring the purposes underlying workers' compensation has become primarily an issue of Massachusetts concern. As discussed above, Massachusetts prefers to retain third party liability, and the costs associated with it, in order to allow insurers and injured employees to pursue recovery from responsible third parties, which presumably Massachusetts hopes will decrease workers' compensation premiums and attendant welfare costs. Conversely, Rhode Island has traded the benefits of allowing recovery from special employers in exchange for insulating those special employers from the risks of litigation, presumably in an effort decrease the cost of doing business in the state. Here, applying the Rhode Island Act to an out-of-state resident receiving out-of-state workers' compensation benefits would allow Rhode Island to reap the benefits of this trade-off in a situation where the state would not similarly bear any of the burdens. The parties devote considerable space in their briefs to discussing another section 6 factor: their own and each others' expectations about which state's law would govern this type of action. As for Robidoux's expectations, this consideration cuts both ways. On the one hand, Robidoux was a Massachusetts resident, covered by Massachusetts workers' compensation insurance, employed by a Massachusetts company. On the other hand, the entirety of his work for James Construction occurred in Rhode Island. Turning to the defendants' reasonable expectations, we first note the parties' disagreement about whether the defendants knew that 508 was a Massachusetts area code, knew that Labor Systems was a Massachusetts company, and/or expected Rhode Island law to apply. We need not, however, wade into these factual disputes. Suffice it to say that when James Construction secured the services of a temporary worker by calling a Massachusetts-based company at a phone number with a Massachusetts area code, it lost any justification for expecting that an accident involving that temporary worker would only implicate Rhode Island law. Similarly, Muholland lacked a reasonable expectation that he would only be subject to Rhode Island law by supervising a temporary worker who had told him he was a Massachusetts resident and by signing a work order that suggested that Robidoux was based out of a state other than Rhode Island. Even if we accept that James Construction's demand for a Rhode Island workers' compensation certificate reflected its subjective belief that Rhode Island law would govern any workplace incident, that fact would not alter our conclusion about what expectations were reasonable and justified under the circumstances. We acknowledge that this action involves substantial contacts with Rhode Island. The injury and injury-causing conduct occurred in Rhode Island, and the parties' relationship was centered in Rhode Island. See Restatement § 145(2). These Rhode Island contacts, however, are simply insufficient to outweigh Massachusetts' superior interests in this case. Moreover, the contacts with Massachusetts are not insubstantial. Of the two states, only Massachusetts can claim a party as a resident or local company, and the Robidoux-James Construction relationship was formed in part by communicationboth between James Construction and Labor Systems, and between Labor Systems and Robidouxto and within Massachusetts.