Opinion ID: 4245186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Seizure of the Softball-sized Object.

Text: As he was conducting the second pat-down, Wolf felt a softball-sized object hidden in Rasberry's undershorts. After Rasberry dissembled by insisting that the object was part of his anatomy, Wolf arrested him and proceeded to extract the object. Rasberry challenges the constitutionality of this seizure. - 13 - The district court upheld the seizure on alternative grounds. The first of these grounds is questionable. The court — following the government's lead — invoked the plain feel doctrine, under which a police officer can seize an object if, by touch, its incriminating character is immediately apparent. United States v. Schiavo, 29 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375). Thus, the doctrine permits an officer who conducts a lawful pat-down of a suspect's outer clothing to seize an object if its incriminating character is immediately apparent by touch alone. Rasberry argues that, due to the plastic packaging surrounding the drugs, the incriminating nature of the object in his shorts could not have been immediately apparent to Wolf. This argument has a patina of plausibility, but we need not address it: the seizure is fully justified on the alternative ground elaborated by the district court. Consequently, we turn to that alternative ground. The district court held that the totality of the circumstances known to Wolf at the time of the pat-down gave him probable cause to arrest Rasberry and, thus, allowed him to seize the softball-sized object incident to Rasberry's arrest. This holding finds ample support in the record. It is common ground that a Terry stop can evolve to a point at which there is probable cause to make an arrest. See - 14 - Terry, 392 U.S. at 25. At that juncture, the officer can search the suspect for evidence or contraband incident to the arrest. See id. That is precisely what happened here. Probable cause is a fluid concept that is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). It requires only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act. Kaley v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 1103 (2014) (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An objective standard is employed to determine whether an officer has probable cause to effect an arrest. See Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2004). An inquiring court must examine the events leading up to the arrest and then determine whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). Here, the totality of the circumstances militates strongly in favor of a finding that probable cause existed to arrest Rasberry. The officers already had recovered some drugs from Rasberry's accomplice (the renter of the motel room). She had told them that Rasberry was in the room and was in possession of additional drugs. When the officers reached the motel, they found Rasberry in the designated room — confirming to that extent - 15 - the reliability of the accomplice's account. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245 (explaining that tip containing information subsequently found to be accurate can be a factor giving rise to probable cause). In the motel room, the officers' search revealed accoutrements of the drug trade (specifically, plastic baggies, needles, and a digital scale), giving rise to a plausible inference that a drug-distribution operation was afoot. See, e.g., United States v. Fermin, 771 F.3d 71, 79 n.6 (1st Cir. 2014). The officers had been told by Rasberry's accomplice that there were drugs in the motel room and, after scouring the room in vain, the only place that had not yet been searched was Rasberry's person. While patting Rasberry down, Wolf came across a suspicious object in Rasberry's undershorts — an object that Wolf reasonably suspected contained drugs. This suspicion was heightened by Wolf's knowledge that drug dealers frequently conceal drugs in their undergarments. See United States v. Cofield, 391 F.3d 334, 337 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing how suspects often hide drugs in their underwear). When Rasberry was asked directly about the softball-sized object, he responded with an obvious lie. A suspect's blatant prevarication in response to an officer's queries can support an inference of probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007). To say more would be to paint the lily. Here, a host of factors pointed unerringly to a reasonable inference that Rasberry - 16 - was hiding drugs in his skivvies. In the circumstances at hand, the district court did not err in finding that Wolf had probable cause to arrest Rasberry and to seize the softball-sized object incident to his arrest.