Opinion ID: 1186149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Case Must at Some Time Be Decided

Text: The portion of the instruction beginning with the phrase, You should consider that the case must at some time be decided, with its attendant implication that a mistrial will inevitably result in a retrial, presents a somewhat different problem from the admonition to minority jurors. While the latter language was included in the original instruction approved in Allen, the former, as previously noted, was a judicial addition to the Allen text. On the other hand, dictum in People v. Carter (1968) supra, 68 Cal.2d 810, 815-816, does suggest the possibility of reminding [the jury] that in the event of a mistrial the case will have to be retried. (See also People v. Miles (1904) 143 Cal. 636, 639 [77 P. 666]; cf. People v. Burton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 328, 356 [11 Cal. Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 433]; People v. Crowley (1950) 101 Cal. App.2d 71, 74 [224 P.2d 748].) The language regarding the effect of a mistrial is vulnerable to a different, more exoteric objection: such statements are legally inaccurate. It is simply not true that a criminal case must at some time be decided. [15] (4) The possibility of a hung jury is an inevitable by-product of our unanimous verdict requirement. Confronted with a mistrial, the People retain the authority to request dismissal of the action. (Pen. Code, § 1385.) Moreover, this option is frequently exercised, as the criminal bar knows, when the prosecution concludes that its inability to obtain a conviction stemmed from deficiencies in its case. Thus the inconclusive judgment of a hung jury may well stand as the final word on the issue of a defendant's guilt. Because an instruction which implies that a hung jury will assuredly result in a retrial misstates the law, the court erred in giving that portion of the charge stating the case must at some time be decided. (Cf. People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 650 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.2d 810].) (1b) To summarize our conclusions thus far, both controversial features of the Allen -type charge discussed herein inject extraneous and improper considerations into the jury's debates. We therefore hold it is error for a trial court to give an instruction which either (1) encourages jurors to consider the numerical division or preponderance of opinion of the jury in forming or reexamining their views on the issues before them; or (2) states or implies that if the jury fails to agree the case will necessarily be retried. [16] We adopt the foregoing as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. (Cf. People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 363]; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 461 [105 Cal. Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313]; People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 442 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513].) [17] Consequently we need not reach defendant's contention that the reading of the Allen -type charge violated his due process rights to a fair trial.