Opinion ID: 2310847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Later Supreme Court Decisions

Text: The Supreme Court has consistently followed the precedents it established in the post-Civil War cases concerning the scope and effect of a full presidential pardon. For instance, in Ex parte Grossman, supra , the Court held that a full presidential pardon extended to criminal contempt of court. In so ruling, the Court rejected the argument that the authority to punish for contempt rested solely with the judiciary and that any effort by the President to undermine that power would violate the principle of separation of powers. 267 U.S. at 98, 45 S.Ct. at 332. Rather, the Court noted that there were only two limitations on the President's pardoning authority. First, a pardon could not be granted in cases of impeachment, as specified in the Constitution; second, a pardon could not affect the rights of third parties against the pardoned offender, as established in the common law. Id. at 111-112, 45 S.Ct. at 333-334. Thus, even in those areas where the judiciary's authority is said to be dominant, such as criminal contempt, a president may intervene and nullify the sanctions that a court would otherwise have the power to impose. In Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 35 S.Ct. 267, 59 L.Ed. 476 (1915), the Court upheld an offender's right to refuse a presidential pardon. The pardon had been granted in an attempt to compel Burdick to testify in a case in which he had previously asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Burdick refused, however, to accept the pardon. The Court held that he could not be forced to accept it, and that if he did not, the pardon would not become effective. In so holding, the Court balanced the President's pardoning power against the offender's Fifth Amendment privilege. Both have sanction in the Constitution, and it should, therefore, be the anxiety of the law to preserve bothto leave to each its proper place. Id. at 93-94, 35 S.Ct. at 270. The Court noted that there was a confession of guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon, and that the offender had a right to avoid the certain infamy that would result from such a confession. Id. at 91, 35 S.Ct. at 269. In the end, the Court concluded that the harm inflicted on the President's pardoning power was less than the potential injury that the offender might suffer. [12] Twelve years later, however, in a similar case in which the offender's privilege against self-incrimination was not at issue, the Court held that the offender could not refuse a presidential pardon commuting his sentence for murder from death to life imprisonment: Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be done. . . . Supposing that Perovich did not accept the change, he could not have got himself hanged against the Executive order. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486-487, 47 S.Ct. 664, 665, 71 L.Ed. 1161 (1927). The Court expressly declined to extend[] the reasoning of Burdick to Perovich's case. Id. at 488, 47 S.Ct. at 666. In its most recent consideration of the Pardon Clause, the Court once again described the scope of the President's pardoning authority in broad terms. The plain purpose of the broad power conferred by [the Pardon Clause], the Court reasoned, was to allow plenary authority in the President to `forgive' the convicted person in part or entirely, to reduce a penalty in terms of a specified number of years, or to alter it with conditions which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable. Schick v. Reed, supra note 3, 419 U.S. at 266, 95 S.Ct. at 385. Thus, in ruling that the President could reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the Court held that the pardoning power is an enumerated power of the Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself. Id. at 267, 95 S.Ct. at 385. This survey of Supreme Court case law reveals two significant features of a full and unconditional presidential pardon. First, the Court has made clear that such a pardon attaches not just to a criminal conviction, but also to the conduct which is or may be the basis of a conviction. Not only does the Pardon Clause itself speak in terms of offences rather than convictions, [13] but the Court's decisions have often characterized a pardon as obliterating, in the eyes of the law, the offense committed by the pardon's recipient. See, e.g., Knote, supra note 7, 95 U.S. at 153 (A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offence); Carlisle, supra, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 151 (although a pardon does not alter the fact that an offense was committed, it nevertheless close[s] the eyes of the court to the perception of that fact). Second, because the pardon attaches to the underlying conduct, the Court has established that a pardoned offender enjoys immunity not only from criminal prosecution, but also from any other form of punishment or civil disability imposed as a consequence of his actions. Many of the early Supreme Court cases involved attempts by the government to impose non-penal sanctions or disabilities on the pardoned offender, all of which the Court struck down. For example, in Ex parte Garland, the Court's decision to set aside an attorney's exclusion from practice in the federal courts was predicated on a holding that the pardon restored to him all of the rights and privileges he had enjoyed before his involvement in the Civil War. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380; see also Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 453-454, 12 S.Ct. 292, 293-294, 35 L.Ed. 1077 (1892) (a full and unconditional pardon restores the testimonial competency of a convicted felon); Knote v. United States, supra note 7, 95 U.S. at 153 (a pardon releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offence). With these principles in mind, I turn to the specific issue presented in this case.