Opinion ID: 3133690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dow’s and Dole’s Responses

Text: Dow and Dole filed Responses.5 As to Plaintiffs’ argument that the July 11, 1995 order did not take effect until October 11, 1995, Dow counter-argues that the conditional f.n.c. dismissal “is in no way relevant to the denial of the class action certification motion”; the 90-day expedited discovery deadline ending on October 11, 1995 had nothing to do with the dismissal of the Carcamo motion for class certification, which was pending at the time the Texas district court denied “all other pending motions” as moot. More emphatically, Dole argues, “A motion denied is a motion denied. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, there was nothing ‘vague’ or ‘ambiguous’ about the July 1995 Order.” Thus, the Defendants argue that any class action tolling stopped on July 11, 1995, when class certification was denied, and the Plaintiffs had two years from that date to file their Complaint. Dow and Dole also point out that the ICA’s holding is consistent with those of two recent cases examining the effect of the July 11, 1995 order on putative DBCP class actions filed within their respective jurisdictions, Marquiniz and Chaverri, which both concluded that the July 11, 1995 denial of the 5 Respondents Pineapple Growers Association of Hawaii; Occidental Chemical Corporation, and Shell Oil Company joined in Dow’s Response. Respondent Pineapple Growers Association of Hawaii joined in Dole’s Response. 21  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  pending motion for class certification restarted limitations periods. See Marquiniz, 2014 WL 2197621 at , and Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 569. Dow notes both cases hold that the denial of class certification, while not on the merits, was sufficient to end any class action tolling. See Marquiniz, 2014 WL 2197621 at  (“While the denial of the motion was not on the merits, any reliance would have been objectively unreasonable, as the case was dismissed.”); Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 569 (noting that courts “did not make any distinction based upon the type or manner of denial, nor did they require that the denial be on the merits.”). Dow states that these holdings are in line with the majority rule that “the tolling rule announced in [American Pipe] extends only through the denial of class status in the first instance by the district court.” Giovanniello v. ALM Media, 726 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2013). Dole agrees, arguing that “federal courts are in broad agreement ‘that [class action] tolling ceases upon entry of an order denying class certification in the trial court.’” See Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F.Supp.2d 164, 174-75 (D.Mass. 2009).