Opinion ID: 2227557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Use of Peremptory Challenge

Text: [¶ 21.] Rodriguez next asserts that his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated when the State used one of its peremptory challenges to strike the only prospective juror of Mexican descent. Rodriguez is also Mexican. The State counters that Rodriguez did not meet the required initial burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination. We examine the matter under the standard set in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) and followed by this Court in State v. Rhines, 1996 SD 55, 548 N.W.2d 415. To prevail on a claim under Batson, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the jury selection process must be proved. [¶ 22.] In Honomichl v. Leapley, 498 N.W.2d 636 (S.D.1993) we explained that to establish a prima facie case, it must be shown that (1) the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the prosecution removed members of that racial group; and (3) circumstances raise the inference that the challenge was motivated by race. 498 N.W.2d at 638-39. The second element was modified by the United States Supreme Court in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). There, the Court held that the excluded juror and the defendant need not be of the same race for the defendant to object to race-based exclusion. Id. at 409, 111 S.Ct. at 1369, 113 L.Ed.2d at 424. The race of the defendant and the race of jurors peremptorily challenged are now circumstances for the trial court to consider in determining whether defendant raised an inference that State used its peremptory challenges for race-based reasons. Honomichl, 498 N.W.2d at 639 (citations omitted). Once a defendant establishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to present a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. [¶ 23.] Here, Rodriguez did not object at the time the juror's name was stricken. The question whether the peremptory strike was purposefully discriminatory was also not raised in the direct appeal. Batson, however, requires a timely objection. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 422, 111 S.Ct. 850, 857, 112 L.Ed.2d 935, 948 (1991); Ruff v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1996); Clark v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 937 F.2d 934, 939 (4th Cir. 1991). Unless the facts supporting the Batson claim are articulated at trial, `they are lost to the record and appellate review becomes impossible.' Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 997 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citations omitted). [¶ 24.] This matter may nonetheless be reviewed for plain error. SDCL 23A-44-15 (Rule 52(b)); see United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.1996). Under an examination for plain error, the defendant bears the burden of showing the error was prejudicial. State v. Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d 439, 443 (citation omitted). We explained in Nelson what must be shown: Plain error requires (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may we exercise our discretion to notice the error if (4) it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We invoke our discretion under the plain error rule cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances may include cases in which `a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result,' i.e., a defendant is actually innocent. Id. ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d at 443 (alteration in original)(internal citations omitted). [¶ 25.] Because this is a habeas proceeding, Rodriguez must make a greater showing to establish plain error than if the matter had been raised on direct appeal. Williams, 48 F.Supp.2d at 997 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134-35, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 805 (1982))(other citations omitted). Rodriguez contends that the prosecutor's comments at trial suggest that he had a discriminatory state of mind. Rodriguez points to several occasions when the prosecutor asked potential jurors whether they spoke Spanish and whether those who reside in this country should be fluent in the English language. Rodriguez insists these questions show the prosecutor's discriminative intent. [¶ 26.] A closer look at the voir dire shows that the questions were asked chiefly because Rodriguez used Spanish as his primary language, which required the use of an interpreter during the trial. We conclude that Rodriguez has not established that the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings was seriously affected, and that unless this mistake is corrected, a miscarriage of justice would occur. See Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 7, 587 N.W.2d at 443. Moreover, Rodriguez has not shown that had the excused individual remained on the jury the outcome would have been different. Because Rodriguez has failed to meet his burden of showing prejudicial error, we affirm on this issue.