Opinion ID: 1607348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Arguments Advanced by the Plaintiffs

Text: The plaintiffs have also argued that the lease is invalid because its execution does not assist in defraying the expenses of the Levee Board's reclamation projects, a derogation from the requirements of R.S. 38:1235.2. In addition, the plaintiffs contend that the annual payments of $1.00 per acre are insufficient to support a contract of lease, and that in effect the Board is donating or lending the land to the Foundation in violation of Art. 7, § 14(A) of the 1974 Constitution. A reading of the statute belies the plaintiffs' first contention. The phrase to assist in defraying the cost and expenses thereof refers to the state's grant to the Board of its title in the lakefront property and is obviously a corollary to the statute's first phrase, [t]o enable the board to perform the work herein provided for. The language in question is clearly not a condition placed on the Board's activities in disposing of the reclaimed land. Although the plaintiffs refer to the case of Welsh v. Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 168 La. 1037, 123 So. 705 (1929), as support for their position, that decision dealt with constitutional restrictions on the sequence of reclamation projects, and is not relevant to the issues at hand. The second argument advanced by the plaintiffs also lacks merit. Although it is true that the price for a lease must be serious and not out of proportion to the thing's value (C.C. 2464; Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906)), we think that the obligations imposed on the Foundation by the lease constitute serious consideration. Besides the nominal annual payment, the Foundation must construct a building at a minimum cost of $300,000, the design and structure of which are subject to the Board's approval. The building will eventually become the Board's property with no compensation due to the Foundation. The Foundation is also obligated to maintain the improvements during the lease term and to pay insurance premiums on any policies covering the improvements. Certainly the obligations assumed by the lessee are as great as those in City of New Orleans v. Disabled American Veterans, 223 La. 363, 65 So.2d 796 (1953), wherein this court refused to invalidate a lease upon similar arguments. The plaintiffs have further alleged that the contract between the defendants violates R.S. 14:316, which forbids the naming of public buildings for living persons. The plaintiffs contend that the agreement in question amounts to a joint venture, whereby the Board donating the land and the Foundation constructing the building which will, at the agreement's termination, be maintained with public funds. R.S. 14:316 provides: `No public building, public bridge, public park, public fish or game preserve, or public wild life refuge built, constructed, and maintained in whole or in part with public funds and title to which stands in the name of the state or any of its subdivisions or in the name of any institution receiving its support in whole or in part from the state shall be named in honor of any living person. The officer, officers, board, or commissioner in charge of a public building, public park, public fish or game preserve, or public wild life refuge named in honor of any person who is still living shall change the name and destroy, deface, or remove all plaques, signs, or other evidence of the old name appearing on the building, bridge, park, preserve, or refuge. Whoever violates this Section or fails to perform the duties imposed by this Section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars and, in default of fine, imprisoned for not less than thirty days nor more than sixty days. It is well settled that [a]n injunction should not be issued to prevent the commission of a crime, if the only reason for preventing it is that it is a crime. City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 28-29, 101 So. 798, 799 (1924). See also, Pick's Auto Parts No. 2, Inc. v. Hodge's Auto Parts, 334 So.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1976); Simon v. Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Corp., 267 So.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1972), writ refused, 263 La. 625, 268 So.2d 680 (1972). Here the plaintiffs have advanced no reason why enforcement of the statute by criminal prosecution is not adequate in case of a violation. When the building is named, the proper authorities may then determine whether the lease of valuable state property at a nominal sum for the erection of the structure, named for a living person, is a use of public funds prohibited by the statute. A final objection to the lease is that the Board had previously dedicated the land in question as a park to the City of New Orleans by Ordinance 2156 M.C.S., approved by the City Council on April 6, 1961. The plaintiffs contend that the dedication removed the Board's, and indeed the City's, authority to change the status of the property by leasing it to the foundation. However, the record does not reveal any response to this argument other than a general statement that not all the reclaimed land had to be dedicated for public use under the provisions of Art. 16, § 7(h) and its present embodiment, R.S. 38:1235.2. Because this issue has not been developed sufficiently for us to rule, the case is remanded to the district court for a determination of this question. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for proceedings, including responsibility for costs, not inconsistent with the views expressed herein.