Opinion ID: 2722123
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Legislation Test

Text: The parties disagree as to how the special legislation analysis is to be applied when exemptions to a statute are alleged to constitute special legislation. The district court found, and Big John’s agrees, that whether the exemptions are special legislation should be examined in light of the purpose of the entire Act. The State, on the other hand, argues that whether the exemptions are special legislation should be determined solely from the purpose of the exemptions themselves. [11] Both sides are partially correct. In order to determine if there is a “substantial difference of circumstances to suggest the expediency of diverse legislation”32 between the general class governed by a statute and the exempted class, it is necessary to examine both the purpose of the statute and 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. at 827, 749 N.W.2d at 890-91, quoting Le v. Lautrup, 271 Neb. 931, 716 N.W.2d 713 (2006). 31 Id. at 827, 749 N.W.2d at 891. 32 Id. at 826, 749 N.W.2d at 890. Nebraska Advance Sheets BIG JOHN’S BILLIARDS v. STATE 947 Cite as 288 Neb. 938 the purpose behind the exemptions. The question is whether there is a difference in circumstances between the general class and the exempted class so as to justify treating one differently than the other, in light of the purpose of the Act. We explained this premise in Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys.33: “‘Classification is proper if the special class has some reasonable distinction from other subjects of a like general character, which distinction bears some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the legislation. The question is always whether the things or persons classified by the act form by themselves a proper and legitimate class with reference to the purpose of the act.’”
According to § 71-5717, the purpose of the Act is “to protect the public health and welfare by prohibiting smoking in public places and places of employment.” The Legislative history makes it clear that the impetus for the Act was the Legislature’s concern about the negative health effects of secondhand smoke.34 The district court concluded that the Act’s purpose was “to protect the public health and welfare by prohibiting smoking in public places and places of employment and thereby protect employees and the public from the hazards of secondhand smoke.” We view the purpose as slightly broader. Based on the language of § 71-5717 and the legislative history, the purpose of the Act is to protect the public health and welfare by protecting employees and the public from the hazards of secondhand smoke. The means the Legislature chose to accomplish this purpose was by prohibiting smoking in all “public places and places of employment.”35 Thus, the purpose was not to 33 Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 265 Neb. 918, 938-39, 663 N.W.2d 43, 65 (2003). 34 See, e.g., Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 395, Health and Human Services Committee, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 1, 2007). 35 § 71-5717. Nebraska Advance Sheets 948 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS prohibit smoking, but, rather, to provide protection from the hazards of secondhand smoke.
Guestrooms and suites that are rented to guests and designated as smoking rooms are exempt from the smoking ban.36 This exemption was part of the bill when it was originally introduced and was the subject of almost no legislative debate. The legislative history indicates, however, that the exemption was included in the bill because hotels are similar to apartments or private residences37 in which the Act does not prohibit smoking.38 The district court essentially reasoned that even if guestrooms are akin to private residences and thus there is a reason to classify them as something other than “public places,” they remain “places of employment” and there is no substantial difference in circumstances between them and other places of employment regulated by the Act. But the legislative history shows that the issue of employees being exposed to secondhand smoke in private residences was considered by the Legislature,39 and ultimately it concluded that a private residence is a place of employment only when it is being used “as a licensed child care program and one or more children who are not occupants of such residence are present.”40 We have noted that “when the Legislature seeks to inaugurate reforms in the area of economics or social welfare, it need not choose between attacking every aspect of the problem or not attacking the problem at all.”41 Arguably, secondhand smoke is equally harmful whether it is encountered in a private 36 § 71-5730(1). 37 See Health and Human Services Committee Hearing, L.B. 395, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 73 (Feb. 1, 2007). 38 § 71-5726. 39 See Floor Debate, L.B. 395, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 6, 15, 28-29 (Feb. 13, 2007). 40 § 71-5724. 41 Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 856, 620 N.W.2d 339, 347 (2000). Nebraska Advance Sheets BIG JOHN’S BILLIARDS v. STATE 949 Cite as 288 Neb. 938 residence or a public place, but the Legislature chose not to prohibit smoking in private residences except those used for conducting a licensed childcare program. That was a legitimate policy decision. Likewise, there is a logical basis for the Legislature to conclude that guestrooms are akin to private residences, and thus there is a substantial difference in circumstances between guestrooms and other public places and places of employment. Based upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not overcome the presumption of constitutionality with respect to the exemption for guestrooms and suites. This exemption does not constitute special legislation.
The exemption for tobacco retail outlets was not part of the bill when it was originally introduced. Instead, it was proposed by committee amendment.42 One senator stated the exemption was added because it was “reasonable that a business that deals in nothing but tobacco products be able to allow smoking within their facility”43 and that it made “sense to let people try out the wares in the smoke shop.”44 In addition, the owner of a tobacco shop testified during the committee hearing that ideally, customers would be able to sample his products before purchasing, “like going to the supermarket to sample various foods that [it] offer[s].”45 There was no testimony or discussion about whether such sampling is necessary to the operation of a tobacco retail outlet or why any such sampling had to occur indoors, as opposed to outdoors. We conclude that there is no difference in circumstances between tobacco retail outlets and all other public places and places of employment so as to justify the expediency of diverse legislation and that the exemption in § 71-5730(3) is 42 See Floor Debate, Amend. 276, L.B. 395, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 20-22 (Mar. 5, 2007). 43 Id. at 20. 44 Id. at 23. 45 Health and Human Services Committee Hearing, L.B. 395, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 66 (Feb. 1, 2007). Nebraska Advance Sheets 950 288 NEBRASKA REPORTS therefore unconstitutional special legislation. The mere fact that tobacco retail outlets sell only tobacco products does not distinguish them in any substantial way from other public places or places of employment. And allowing patrons of such shops to smoke simply because it is convenient does not comport with the purpose of the Act, which is to protect the public and employees from the dangers of secondhand smoke.
The exemption for cigar bars was not part of the Act as it was originally enacted. Instead, it was enacted by subsequent legislation in 2009.46 The Introducer’s Statement of Intent on the proposed bill specifically stated that the purpose of the exemption was “to provide protection for businesses currently operating in the state as ‘cigar bars.’”47 During debate, the senator who introduced the bill argued that cigar bars should be exempt from the Act because they existed for the purpose of allowing smoking.48 There is no substantial difference in circumstances between cigar bars and other public places or places of employment that justifies treating cigars bars differently. Indeed, the exemption is directly contrary to the purpose of the Act, which is to protect the public health by limiting exposure to secondhand smoke. The exemption in § 71-5730(4) for cigar bars is unconstitutional special legislation.