Opinion ID: 202332
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Basis in Fact for the Pleas

Text: 27 The defendants contend that the district court violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 by accepting their guilty pleas in the absence of a factual basis for the intent element of the carjacking charge. Their claim is that they did not have any intent to harm or kill the victim until after they had seized his car and learned while driving towards Rio Grande that he was a sailor. Hence, they argue, their intent to harm or kill did not meet the at the moment requirement of Holloway. As we indicated above, we will assume the validity of the defendants' reading of Holloway. 28 Rule 11 requires that [b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3). We have explained that the district court has a duty, in plea proceedings, to ascertain whether the record permits a conclusion that the plea has a rational basis in fact. United States v. Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). However, Rule 11 does not require a test of guilt versus innocence, id., much less proof `beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is in fact guilty,' id. (quoting United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir.1970)). The idea is for the district court to ensure that there is, on the record as it stands at the time of the plea, a reasoned basis to believe that the defendant actually committed the crime to which he is admitting guilt. See United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir.2004). The facts relevant to this inquiry may come either from the defendant's admissions and concessions or from credible evidence proffered by the government and not contradicted by the defendant. Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d at 37. 29 First, as to Ortiz-Feliciano, the evidence proffered by the government easily met the requisite standard, even under his interpretation of the law. To take the victim's car, Ortiz-Feliciano pressed a loaded handgun against the victim's body and threatened the victim with death. The presence of ammunition, the death threats, and the fact that he eventually did kill the victim, provide a rational basis to believe that Ortiz-Feliciano was willing to fire his gun if necessary to steal the car. See Lebrón-Cepeda, 324 F.3d at 56-57 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that conditional intent to kill could be inferred as to two defendants from fact that one of the defendants placed a loaded and cocked revolver against [the victim's] head ... and verbally threatened him). See also United States v. Jones, 188 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that conditional intent could be inferred from brandishing of handgun and death threats). 30 The stipulation between the government and Matos-Quiñones precludes any rational basis to believe that he, too, had a conditional intent to kill the victim. However, as we indicated above, the intent element of the carjacking statute requires that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11, 119 S.Ct. 966 (emphasis added). The record provides a factual basis that Matos-Quiñones had the requisite intent to seriously harm. Like Ortiz-Feliciano, he threatened the victim with a handgun at the moment of the carjacking. He later demonstrated his willingness to inflict violent harm when he struck the victim with his handgun. 31 In short, the record provided an adequate basis for the district court to conclude that both defendants were guilty as principals in the carjacking death of the victim. Both defendants participated in taking by force and intimidation a vehicle subject to the jurisdiction of the federal government. Both defendants possessed at the moment [they] demanded or took control over the driver's automobile . . . the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car. The victim's death resulted. These are the elements that the statute requires. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3).