Opinion ID: 6219164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breit Applies to Judicial Conduct

Text: {20} The State contends that because the facts of Breit concerned prosecutorial misconduct, the Breit test was meant to be limited to prosecutors and does not apply to judicial conduct. We disagree. The language of the Breit test itself and its history support its application to judges. {21} Breit directs that retrial is barred when (1) the “improper official conduct is so unfairly prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial,” (2) “the official knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial,” and (3) “the official either intends to provoke a mistrial or acts in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal.” 1996- 8 NMSC-067, ¶ 32. This language is not on its face limited to prosecutorial conduct. In fact, the reference to the “official” and “official misconduct” is certainly broad enough to include judicial conduct. This was no accident. {22} Both New Mexico and federal precedent influenced the language of the Breit test. In State v. Day, although we held retrial was not barred under those facts, we noted that double jeopardy barred retrial when “the prosecutor engaged in any misconduct for the purpose of precipitating a motion for a mistrial, gaining a better chance for conviction upon retrial, or subjecting the defendant to the harassment and inconvenience of successive trials.” 1980-NMSC-032, ¶ 15, 94 N.M. 753, 617 P.2d 142, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980). “This standard was an amalgam of various pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court.” Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 26. For example, Day referred with approval to the standard in United States v. Dinitz: The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. It bars retrials where bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor, threatens the harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant. 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted) (emphasis added); Day, 1980-NMSC-032, ¶ 11. In fact, “[a]ll of the elements of the rule adopted by Day were included in [the] double-jeopardy standard set forth 9 earlier” in Dinitz. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 26. Day also endorsed United States v. Jorn, which provided, “where a defendant’s mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might well be barred.” 400 U.S. 470, 485 n.12 (1971) (emphasis added); Day, 1980NMSC-032, ¶ 13. {23} Following Day, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982), which narrowed the federal double jeopardy rule. See Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 26 (“[T]he federal cases upon which we based our double-jeopardy rule in Day were narrowly restricted by Kennedy to a rule based upon prosecutorial intent.”). But in Breit, we rejected this narrow approach, concluding that “when this Court derives an interpretation of New Mexico law from a federal opinion, our decision remains the law of New Mexico even if federal doctrine should later change.” 1996-NMSC-067, ¶¶ 26, 27. Instead, we adopted a test that was “implicit in Day.” Id. ¶ 32. We utilized a “‘willful disregard’” standard that “encompass[ed] and augment[ed] the circumstances implicated by the rule in Day.” Id. ¶ 36. One such circumstance was judicial impropriety. See id. ¶ 26. Because of this, we used the language “improper official conduct,” id. ¶ 32 (emphasis added), rather than “prosecutorial misconduct,” as used in Day to accurately capture the scope of the double jeopardy bar. Day, 1980-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 2, 5. 10 {24} Thus, based on the language of Breit itself and the history behind its adoption, we conclude that Breit applies to judicial conduct.