Opinion ID: 1385454
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duties of Utility Permit Holder

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court erred in not incorporating into the jury instructions the following statutory standards of care prescribed for the holders of utility permits: [27] An electric transmission, telephone or telegraph line, pole line, railway, ditch, sewer, water, heat or gas main, flume, or other structure which by law may be constructed, placed, or maintained across or along a highway by a person or political subdivision may be maintained or constructed only in accordance with regulations prescribed by the department. No utility project of this nature may be undertaken until it is authorized by a written permit issued by the department. (emphasis added). AS 19.25.010. [28] The permitee shall take all measures necessary to provide for the continued travel of the highway by the public during construction or maintenance of a facility authorized by a utility permit, and shall protect, barricade and sign any obstruction, excavation or hazard across or along the traveled way. 17 AAC 15.060(a). The trial court denied Johnson's request on the ground that the statute and regulation apply only if active construction work is taking place. Johnson argues that the statute and regulation apply because the city was maintaining the railway crossing (the object of the permit). She relies on the statute's definition of maintenance: `maintenance' means the preservation of each type of highway, roadside structure and facility as nearly as possible in its original condition as constructed, or as subsequently improved, and the operation of highway facilities and services to provide satisfactory and safe highways; AS 19.05.130(9). The city, on the other hand, argues that the above definition implies that maintenance refers to some type of active work undertaken to preserve the facility. It argues that applying the statute to the facts of this case would create onerous burdens: If ... the mere existence of a constant, continuing condition is [to be within the term] maintenance, the City would, for example, have to sign every manhole whether being used in active work or not. The city urges us to look not at the statutory definition of maintenance, but rather to the department's regulations which more particularly define the term. Those regulations divide maintenance into routine or major. [29] Each, it argues, implies actual work. Thus, under the city's view, the regulatory obligations of adequate signing would apply only when city crews perform actual work on the crossing. We agree. The regulation specifies certain duties that a holder of a utility permit must undertake when performing actual work on the MUS spur track crossing. No active maintenance work was being performed on the crossing at the time of Johnson's accident and, therefore, the regulatory standard was not applicable. The trial court properly refused to incorporate it into the instructions. Further, we believe the regulation was sufficiently ambiguous such that a prudent person could not reasonably determine whether it applied to other than active maintenance work; accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to adopt the standard in a negligence per se instruction. See McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Association, Inc., 546 P.2d 1305, 1314 (Alaska 1976). Because the standard was inapplicable on the facts, we do not address whether it was specific enough to warrant a negligence per se instruction. [30]