Opinion ID: 2072861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Course of the Legislation

Text: In 1929, the statute prohibiting intoxication while driving became part of the Vehicle and Traffic Law as section 70 (5) (L 1929, ch 54; see King and Tipperman, The Offense of Driving While Intoxicated: The Development of Statutory and Case Law in New York, 3 Hofstra L Rev 541, 545 [1975]). Convictions were based on a defendant's conduct and demeanor at the time of arrest ( see People v Cruz, 48 NY2d 419, 424 [1979]). It was not until 1941, after years of extensive study and debate, that a major amendment permitted the admission at trial of tests for blood alcohol content (L 1941, ch 726; King at 546). Except for adding motorcycles, the prohibition against driving while intoxicated used the exact language as in 1910, and included a statement that evidence of the amount of alcohol in the blood from a test taken within two hours of arrest was admissible to prove intoxication. The test could be by medical or chemical analysis of the driver's breath, blood, urine or saliva. [4] Use of the term intoxicated along with the specific amounts of alcohol in the blood is evidence that the Legislature intendedand likely assumed that the Legislature in 1910 intendedthat intoxication means that a mind is altered by an amount of alcohol. The legislative history of the 1941 amendment supports that interpretation. Dutton S. Peterson, the sponsor, wrote to the Governor: Since this bill has been approved by the highest medical authority, The American Medical Association, bar associations, police organizations, civic organizations, and automobile clubs, and because of the need for a further curb on the drinking driver, I urge that you sign this bill. I have made an extensive study of this matter. (Letter from Assembly Sponsor, Apr. 19, 1941, Bill Jacket, L 1941, ch 726, at 39.) A summary of evidence is enclosed with that letter. Peterson notes that different drinkers are differently affected by the same amount of alcoholic beverages, and, thus, the only fair test of intoxication is to determine the degree of alochol [ sic ] concentration in the blood by scientific tests ( id. at 41). The percentages were arrived at through careful study and thousands of medical tests which were not disputed by any reputable medical authority ( id. at 40, 41). Exhaustive studies were made by the National Safety Council ( id. at 42). The American Medical Association noted the disability by prescribed drugs but used the term intoxication for the amount of alcohol in the blood (AMA, Report of the Committee to Study Problems of Motor Vehicle Accidents, May 1939, Bill Jacket, L 1941, ch 726, at 47-49). The Senate sponsor also sought the admission of scientific tests to prove intoxication to cut[ ] down the number of injuries and deaths caused by the drunken drivers (Letter from Senate Sponsor, Apr. 24, 1941, Bill Jacket, L 1941, ch 726, at 69). Some voiced concern over the medical reliability of the tests and of the amounts of alcohol that would show intoxication. For example, one group noted that it had disapproved a previous 1938 bill because the medical profession was not unanimous in its opinion as to the results obtainable from urine and blood tests, which, according to some, are not determinative on the question of whether or not any particular person is intoxicated (Mem of Comm on Crim Cts Law and Pro of Assn of Bar of City of NY Bill Jacket, L 1941, ch 726, at 4-5; see Rep of NY County Lawyers' Assn, Comm on State Legislation, Bill Jacket, at 7; Letter from Commr of Taxation and Fin, Bill Jacket, at 25 [while tests of the amount of alcohol in the blood may furnish valuable evidence as to intoxication, there ought to be supporting evidence to warrant a conviction]). This extensive documentation demonstrates that the legislative goal of strengthening the ability to prosecute for driving in an intoxicated condition was to address the drinking driver, not the driver who uses drugs. Only after studying exhaustive scientific and statistical tests confirming the validity of the percentages for blood alcohol content did the Legislature pass a law that would find intoxicated drivers liable for criminal penalties. In 1959, section 70 (5) became section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and an implied consent law was added as section 1194 (L 1959, ch 775; King at 561-562 [if a driver refused to submit to breath, blood, urine or saliva sample, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles was required to revoke the driver's license]). A 1960 amendment added a new offense to section 1192 driving while ability to operate is impaired by the consumption of alcohol (L 1960, ch 184). The new subdivision 1 was enacted so that an impaired driverone whose blood alcohol content was .10% or more, and less than .15%could receive a traffic infraction and not be criminally liable. The language prohibiting driving while intoxicated was kept intact, became subdivision 2 and remained a misdemeanor. Underlying the amendment were vast medical and scientific dataincluding laboratory and field investigationsto confirm that the amount of alcohol content would be an accurate showing of impairment (Sponsor's Mem and Appendix, Bill Jacket, L 1960, ch 184, at 1-6). Opposed to the amendment, the New York State Automobile Association found fault with the difficulty of enforcement for such low amounts of alcohol in the blood and wondered why little mention is made of the impairment produced by fatigue, tension, the taking of medicines or even indisposition caused by indigestion (Letter from NY State Auto Assn, Bill Jacket, at 12). The Governor's memorandum, however, indicated that the amendment provides a realistic approach towards reducing the tragic toll of death and injury caused by the drinking driver. Existing law has proved inadequate in this regard in that it is directed towards only the most serious offender, the driver with a blood-alcohol level of at least 0.15%. In requiring that the drinking driver be classified as a criminal, present law has not proved adequate to remove the drinking driver from our highways (Governor's Mem approving L 1960, ch 184, 1960 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2002). The Legislature was focusing on drinking drivers, the more serious ones designated intoxicated. In 1966, the Legislature enacted what is now section 1192 (4), making it a misdemeanor to operate a motor vehicle while a driver's ability is impaired by the use of a drug, and defining those drugs in section 114-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (L 1966, ch 963, §§ 1, 4). (Those drugs are now specified in section 3306 of the Public Health Law.) The sponsor of the bill, Norman F. Lent, wrote: Section 1192 (2) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law as presently written pertains to the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. If a person is convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol, such person is guilty of a misdemeanor and his license may be revoked. More serious penalties result for second or more offenders within a ten year period. The bill would impose equal sanctions on persons convicted of driving while his ability to do so is impaired by the use of a drug, as that term is defined in the bill.... New York is one of the few remaining major states without a law against operating a motor vehicle while one's ability is impaired by the use of drugs and narcotics. Passage of such a law should also curb the present practice employed by defendants in drunk driving prosecutions of claiming they were not drunk, but `merely' under the influence of a drug or narcotic prescribed by their physician. It is just as dangerous to operate a motor vehicle while one's ability to drive is impaired by a drug or narcotic, as it is to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (Letter from Senate Sponsor, June 7, 1966, Bill Jacket, L 1966, ch 963, at 14-15). Other letters demonstrate that the subdivision prohibiting intoxication did not cover the use of drugs. The Attorney General wrote that the bill would amend the statute so that existing provisions of law relating to driving while ability is impaired by alcohol or drunken driving will be extended to apply to driving while ability is impaired by the use of a drug (Letter from Attorney General, June 7, 1966, Bill Jacket, L 1966, ch 963, at 17). The Department of Motor Vehicles similarly recommended passage because, until this enactment, the Commissioner was unable to take effective action by revoking a driver's license from a driver impaired by the use of drugs, and the police agencies were unable to convict a person who drove while so impaired (Letter from Commr of Motor Vehs, Apr. 1, 1966, Bill Jacket, at 18). The Department of Health recommended disapproval, for while [t]he law has established standards for determining degrees of intoxication which can be accurately determined by chemical tests, research was necessary before standards could be devised for ascertaining impairment by the use of drugs (Letter from Counsel for Dept of Health, Apr. 11, 1966, Bill Jacket, at 23). The Department of Mental Hygiene concurred that [a]s contrasted with the standard of intoxication, for which presumptions are created, based on medical research, that certain proportions of alcohol in the blood have certain legal consequences, there is no comparable standard set up for various quantities of the defined drugs (Letter from Counsel for Dept of Mental Hygiene, June 6, 1966, Bill Jacket, at 27). Two other groups also voiced concern in holding a person criminally liable for taking a drug when the driver had no intent to become impaired (Letter from State Adm'r of Jud Conf, Apr. 12, 1966, Bill Jacket, at 21-22; Mem of Supt of NY State Police, Mar. 31, 1966, Bill Jacket, at 30). Nothing in this Bill Jacket suggests that the provision on intoxication included a violation for use of drugs while driving. The legislative history is conclusive that the Legislature in 1966, like previous Legislatures, intended that intoxication refer to inebriation by alcohol. It appears that the Legislature did not want to penalize a driver who inadvertently took prescription drugs without knowing their side effects. In addition, the Legislature sought to limit criminalization by defining the drugs prohibited. In 1970, a new provision, now titled Driving while intoxicated; per se, made it a misdemeanor to drive with a blood alcohol content of .15% or more (L 1970, ch 275, § 3). [5] The Governor's Program Bill stated that the present provisions relating to driving while intoxicated would be substantially reenacted, but the blood alcohol content for prima facie evidence would be changed (Governor's Program Bill Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1970, ch 275, at 1-2). The amendment would also substantially reenact the present provisions governing driving while ability is impaired by the use of drugs ( id. at 2). Further, a new section 1196 (now section 1192 [9]) would be added to permit a conviction ... of a violation of either subdivision 1 (driving while impaired), 2 (.15 or higher) or 3 (driving while intoxicated) of section 1192 where the original charge alleged a violation of either subdivision 2 or 3 of such section ( id. ). The concept of making it unlawful per se to drive with a specific blood alcohol content was patterned after programs in England and Scandinavia. The Automobile Association reversed its opposition because of new research studies, including by the Department of Transportation and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Mem in Support of NY State Auto Assn, Feb. 27, 1970, Bill Jacket, at 21). In his memorandum, the Governor wrote: Present law provides that the presence of this level of alcohol is merely prima facie evidence of intoxication and makes the determination of intoxication one of subjective judgment. As a consequence, existing provisions have not been sufficiently effective in getting drunk drivers off the road and in deterring others from driving while under the influence of alcohol (Governor's Mem approving L 1970, ch 275, Bill Jacket, at 24). The word intoxication here is consistently synonymous with being under the influence of alcohol. Most recently, in 2006, the Legislature amended section 1192 by adding subdivision 2-a, Aggravated driving while intoxicated; per sewhich is violated when a person drives with a blood alcohol content of .18%and subdivision 4-a, Driving while ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs (L 2006, ch 732, §§ 1, 2). Several related statutes were also revised. Penal Law § 125.12, vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, was amended to include subdivision 4-a, and underscores that the Legislators intended that intoxication should be by use of alcohol, not drugs. That section now provides: A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he or she causes the death of another person, and either: (1) operates a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision two, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law..., and as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such a motor vehicle ... in a manner that causes the death of such other person.... Intoxication covers all the provisions including alcohol, while impairment by the use of a drug refers to subdivision 4 and the combined influence refers to subdivision 4-a of section 1192. The 2006 legislation reflects a thorough overview of the broad scope of alcohol and drug related statutes in New York (Senate Introducer Mem in Support of L 2006, ch 732, 2006 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2183). One argument supporting subdivision 2-a was that [t]he more intoxicated a driver is, the greater the risk of an accident. This bill appropriately addresses the seriousness of DWI and establishes graduated penalties for more intoxicated drivers.... (Budget Rep on Bills, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 732, at 9.) Stiff penalties for driving while intoxicated were to deter hard core drinking drivers (Letter from Suffolk County Exec, Sept. 7, 2006, Bill Jacket, at 29).