Opinion ID: 1741825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Prior Consensual Sex

Text: ¶ 15. The defendant argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by refusing to admit evidence of his prior sexual relationship with the complainant as evidence of her motivation to fabricate the charges. The defendant further asserts that this refusal constitutes a constitutional deprivation of his right to confront adverse witnesses and to present a defense. [3, 4] ¶ 16. The constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory process are based in Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. [5] and in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [6] These clauses guarantee to criminal defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in their own defense. See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). While these rights are fundamental and essential to a fair trial, they are not absolute. See id. at 645-46. Confrontation and compulsory process only grant defendants the constitutional right to present relevant evidence that is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effects. Id. at 646. [5] ¶ 17. The defendant's proffer of past sexual contact with the complainant in this case directly implicates Wis. Stat. § 972.11, [7] Wisconsin's rape shield statute. Under the rape shield statute, a defendant may not offer evidence relating to a victim's past sexual history or reputation absent application of a statutory or judicially created exception. See Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1-3; Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 647. [6] ¶ 18. Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1 creates such an exception to the general bar on evidence of prior sexual history by allowing a defendant to offer [e]vidence of the complaining witness's past conduct with the defendant. This exception, and its brethren, encompass those limited factual scenarios in which the legislature has determined that evidence of a complainant's sexual history may be sufficiently probative of a material issue to overcome the prejudicial nature of such evidence. See Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 644. [7] ¶ 19. However, merely offering proof of the general type described in a particular exception is not enough to defeat the rape shield statute. The exceptions to the rape shield statute are also governed by reference to Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11), which provides: In actions under s. 940.225, 948.02, 948.025 or 948.095, evidence which is admissible under s. 972.11(2) must be determined by the court upon pretrial motion to be material to a fact at issue in the case and of sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature before it may be introduced at trial. It is noteworthy that § 971.31(11) inverts the normal weighing of evidence under Wis. Stats. § 904.03 [8] that evidence should be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice. Section 971.31(11) assumes a bias in its balancing test that, absent an evidentiary showing to the contrary, the proffered evidence is more prejudicial than probative. 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence § 420.4, at 177 (1991). [8] ¶ 20. Accordingly, under the terms of Wis. Stat. §§ 972.11(2)(b)1 and 971.31(11), the defendant must make a three-part showing that: (i) the proffered evidence relates to sexual activities between the complainant and the defendant; (ii) the evidence is material to a fact at issue; and (iii) the evidence of sexual contact with the complainant is of sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature. See § 971.31(11); § 972.11(2)(b)1; State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 785, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990) (applying three-part test to § 972.11(2)(b)3). Having laid out the legal standard, we turn then to an analysis of the circuit court's discretionary decision. [9] ¶ 21. In applying the first step of the DeSantis test, we note initially that the rape shield statute provides no guidance as to the evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant to conform with Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1. Faced with the same void under another exception, § 972.11(2)(b)3, the DeSantis court required a defendant to offer sufficient evidence to allow a circuit court to conclude from the proffered evidence that a reasonable person could reasonably infer that the complainant made prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 788. The rationale for adopting that evidentiary burden for purposes of § 972.11(2)(b)3 in DeSantis is equally applicable to § 972.11(2)(b)1. See id. at 787-89. The circuit court must be able to conclude from the defendant's proffer that a reasonable person could reasonably infer that the prior sexual conduct occurred. ¶ 22. In this case the circuit court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing to consider the defendant's motion to admit evidence of prior sexual conduct under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1. At the hearing the defendant testified that he had had sexual intercourse with the complainant on three prior occasions. The State responded to the defendant's testimony by representing to the court that the complainant would deny that a sexual relationship ever existed. However, the State did not offer the complainant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing. ¶ 23. Based on the defendant's testimony, the circuit court assumed that he had met his burden of demonstrating the prior sexual conduct. Relying on this assumption, the court then ruled that the evidence was not material, and even if it were, it should be barred as overly prejudicial. ¶ 24. This evidentiary decision by the circuit court was not an erroneous exercise of discretion. A reasonable person could reasonably infer from the defendant's testimony that a sexual relationship with the complainant had existed. The State offered no direct evidence to contradict the defendant's assertions. Accordingly, the circuit court's threshold assumption of the existence of a sexual relationship was not error. Because the evidence related to the complainant's prior sexual conduct with the defendant, the first DeSantis factor is established. ¶ 25. The second step of the analysis, whether the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case, is more problematic. We agree with the circuit court that consent was not at issue in this case. While the defendant had originally represented to the court that the evidence was offered for purposes of proving consent to the alleged sexual contact, the defense reversed its position on the first morning of trial and, in lieu of its prior representation, asserted that the alleged sexual assault never occurred. However, the defense still maintained its motion, arguing to the circuit court that the evidence of prior sexual history was important because the question of consent. . .is relevant to. . .why she would raise the issue on this occasion on December 1st aside from her anger or perhaps jealously at [the girlfriend] concerning the relationship [the defendant] had with her. ¶ 26. The circuit court then allowed the defendant to testify at the motion hearing concerning his alleged consensual sexual relationship with the complainant. It is noteworthy that when defense counsel asked the defendant about the complainant's motivations, When the fight happened. . .what did you perceive the reasons to be for the fight, aside from the money, the defendant responded, That was it. ¶ 27. Following this testimony, defense counsel argued that the testimony: is relevant, or is material, because of the fact that my client indicates that there was consensual sex in the past, and that that issue demonstrates a relationship between those parties, and that relationship can be explained by the fact that they had relations in the past, and can explain what happened on the date. ¶ 28. When the court pressed for further explanation as to why the evidence was material, defense counsel responded: I think that in a case like that, you have to look at the entire set of circumstances concerning the relationship that people had. . . . And certainly the fact that they had had a relationship in the past certainly would add to the anger that she was experiencing at that point in time. . . .So it's not directly a question of consent, but it's a question of what consent on prior occasion implies about the whole relationship that went on between those parties, and explains why human beings in this situation might have disagreement concerning what happened because of that prior relationship. The circuit court then stated that it found the offer of proof to be very general, a conclusion which defense counsel said he understood, and the court denied the defendant's motion. ¶ 29. In Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 284, 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978), the court of appeals determined that an offer of proof need not be stated with complete precision or in unnecessary detail but it should state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is urged to adopt. Despite several opportunities to show that the evidence of the prior sexual relationship was material, the defendant relied upon only vague arguments and bald assertions to tie his suggestion that the complainant acted out of preexisting anger or jealousy to the facts of this case. Even accepting the allegations of the prior sexual relationship as true, the existence of such a relationship, without more, does not lead to an inference that the complainant was angry or jealous when it ended. The existence of such a relationship, without more, does not lead to an inference that false accusations were leveled in revenge for the termination of that relationship. ¶ 30. Had the defendant proffered sufficient facts to support his undeveloped anger or jealousy theory, the circuit court could have found the prior sexual relationship to be material for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11). However, in the absence of such a proffer, we conclude that the evidence was properly excluded. Any other result would be contrary to the legislature's purpose in enacting the rape shield statutory framework and would allow defendants to routinely skirt the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11). In this case the materiality requirement in the second DeSantis prong was not established and the evidence was properly excluded. [10] ¶ 31. This conclusion is further strengthened by our agreement with the circuit court that even if the defendant had made a proffer comporting with Milenkovic and established the materiality of the evidence, he failed to meet the requirements of the third prong of DeSantis. Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11) embodies the legislature's distrust of evidence of a victim's prior sexual history by initially weighting the balance in favor of a determination that the evidence is inherently prejudicial. See Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 420.4, at 177 (1991). To satisfy the third prong of DeSantis, the defendant must convince the circuit court that the probative nature of the evidence outweighs any prejudice to the defendant. ¶ 32. The circuit court determined that the defendant had not met this burden and we agree. The defendant offered no evidence to support his vaguely stated theories that the complainant may have falsely accused him in revenge for his termination of their prior sexual relationship. Accordingly, because the defendant failed to establish that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice, the circuit court's decision not to admit the evidence was not an erroneous exercise of discretion. [11] ¶ 33. It is true that a circuit court may not deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights through rote application of this state's rules of evidence. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d at 793. However, because the defendant has failed to meet the materiality and weight of probative evidence requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.31(11) and DeSantis in this case, the circuit court's actions do not endanger the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense. The defendant is constitutionally entitled to present only relevant, material, and probative evidence. See State v. McCall, 202 Wis. 2d 29, 44, 549 N.W.2d 418 (1996). Accordingly, the defendant's constitutional challenge to the circuit court's refusal to lift the rape shield must fail. ¶ 34. The defendant asserts in the alternative that his defense was also prejudiced by the circuit court's refusal to reconsider its decision barring the sexual history evidence after the State opened the door during cross-examination of the defendant at trial. During the defendant's testimony, the following colloquy took place: Q. And you're offering here, for the motive for why she wants to do that, the fact that she had some disagreement over finances with you in the home? A. No, it was more to it than it. It was more issues that could have been brought out into court that I was told I couldn't talk about. Q. Mr. Jackson, you're suggesting here that this woman just has it in for you, aren't you? A. Very much so. Q. And one of the things that you used to support that is this claim that she owed you money, or you owed her money rather, and that is one of her motivations, right? A. That's what she said. In a split decision, a majority of the court of appeals panel agreed with the defendant and determined from this chain of questions and responses that the State had opened the door. [12] ¶ 35. However, as the dissent in the court of appeals decision acknowledged, this is not a case of the State accidentally or purposefully opening the door to take advantage of a particular piece of evidence that had previously been ruled inadmissible, thereby requiring this court to apply the doctrine of curative admissibility. See Jackson, 212 Wis. 2d at 218-19 (Brown, J., dissenting); see also Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 702, 706, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971). This is a case of the defendant attempting to beat the door down on his own initiative by taking advantage of a question which did nothing more than summarize the theory repeatedly asserted by the defense that the complainant was acting vindictively over a financial dispute. To declare the State's question in this case sufficient to open the door would effectively prohibit the State from revisiting the defendant's earlier testimony in any way. Consequently, we determine that the circuit court properly declined to reconsider its decision barring sexual history evidence.