Opinion ID: 2648680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dash-Camera Videos

Text: Lard next argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to play the two videos recorded from the dash cameras mounted on both Officer Schmidt’s and Sergeant Overstreet’s cruisers. In addition, Lard claims error because the circuit court permitted the State to play different versions of the videos, which included a compilation or side-by-side view of both videos; the video from Officer Schmidt’s vehicle in slow motion starting at the first shot without audio; the video from Sergeant Overstreet’s vehicle in slow motion beginning at the first shot without audio; and a slow-motion compilation or side-by-side view from both vehicles starting at the first shot without audio. Lard contends that the videos were prejudicial, cumulative, and unnecessary because there were eyewitnesses who observed the events and because he did not dispute that he killed Officer Schmidt while Schmidt was acting in the line of duty. He maintains that the videos were offered for no other purpose than to arouse the passions of the jurors. As a general matter, all relevant evidence is admissible. Ark. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is evidence that has a “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 401. Evidence, although relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ark. R. 19 Cite as 2014 Ark. 1 Evid. 403. Video evidence is admissible “if it is relevant, helpful to the jury, and not prejudicial.” Hickson v. State, 312 Ark. 171, 176, 847 S.W.2d 691, 694 (1993). The same requirements for the admission of photographs apply to the admission of video evidence. Williams v. State, 374 Ark. 282, 287 S.W.3d 559 (2008). We have held that the admission of photographs is a matter left to the sound discretion of the circuit court, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark. 145, ___ S.W.3d ___. When photographs are helpful to explain testimony, they are ordinarily admissible. Blanchard v. State, 2009 Ark. 335, 321 S.W.3d 250. Moreover, the mere fact that a photograph is inflammatory or is cumulative is not, standing alone, sufficient reason to exclude it. Sweet v. State, 2011 Ark. 20, 370 S.W.3d 510. Even the most gruesome photographs may be admissible if they assist the trier of fact in any of the following ways: by shedding light on some issue, by proving a necessary element of the case, by enabling a witness to testify more effectively, by corroborating testimony, or by enabling jurors to better understand the testimony. Decay v. State, 2009 Ark. 566, 352 S.W.3d 319. Yet, we have rejected a carte blanche approach to the admission of photographs. Robertson v. State, 2011 Ark. 196; Newman v. State, 353 Ark. 258, 106 S.W.3d 438 (2003). We have cautioned against “promoting a general rule of admissibility which essentially allows automatic acceptance of all the photographs of the victim and crime scene the prosecution can offer.” Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 228, 718 S.W.2d 447, 450 (1986). We require the trial court to consider whether such evidence, although relevant, creates a danger of unfair 20 Cite as 2014 Ark. 1 prejudice, and then to determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Camargo v. State, 327 Ark. 631, 940 S.W.2d 464 (1997). We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decision that the probative value of the various video recordings substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Typically, the commission of a crime is not video recorded, as was the case here. Although there were witnesses to the events, the recordings represent an objective portrayal of what occurred during the traffic stop and served both to corroborate and to explain the eyewitnesses’ testimony. From our review of the videos, the footage of the actual shootings lasts less than fifty seconds. Because the incident unfolded so quickly, showing the events as they transpired from different perspectives and at slowed speeds allowed the actions of all involved to be clarified and placed in context. Although Lard did not deny committing the offenses, this court has repeatedly held that a defendant cannot prevent the admission of evidence simply by conceding to the facts of the crime. Holloway v. State, 363 Ark. 254, 213 S.W.3d 633 (2005); Garcia v. State, 363 Ark. 319, 214 S.W.3d 260 (2005); Smart v. State, 352 Ark. 522, 104 S.W.3d 386 (2003). More specifically, we have held that photographic evidence is not inadmissible on grounds that it is cumulative or unnecessary due to admitted or proven facts. Watson v. State, 308 Ark. 643, 826 S.W.2d 281 (1992); Cotton v. State, 276 Ark. 282, 634 S.W.2d 127 (1982). Equally as clear, the State is entitled to prove its case as conclusively as it can. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007); Jones v. State, 349 Ark. 331, 78 S.W.3d 104 (2002). Here, the circuit court exercised its discretion to disallow a portion of the recordings that it deemed overly inflammatory. Undeniably, there is a degree 21 Cite as 2014 Ark. 1 of prejudice attached to showing the videos, but we cannot conclude that the prejudice was unfair. Accordingly, we affirm on this point. To the extent that Lard argues that the State should not have been allowed to show portions of the videos during closing arguments, we observe that he did not object when that was done. We will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. Scamardo v. State, 2013 Ark. 163, ___ S.W.3d ___.