Opinion ID: 2260682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: the recommendation of the hearing committee as to violations.

Text: It is worth pausing for a moment at the outset to consider specifically the charges in this case and their proposed disposition by the Hearing Committee. Respondent was charged with four violations: 1) commingling in violation of DR 9-103(A), which was found by the Hearing Committee; 2) misappropriation of client funds in violation of DR 9-103(B), which was found by the hearing committee; 3) dishonesty in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), which was not found by the Hearing Committee; and 4) failure to pay over promptly funds due to his client in violation of DR 9-103(B), which was not found by the Hearing Committee. The majority of the Board proposes to affirm these four findings by the Hearing Committee. I agree as to three of the four. The commingling charge and the misappropriation charge are unexceptionable, and the Hearing Committee's disposition of these two charges can hardly be questioned. I also agree that the Hearing Committee correctly found that Bar Counsel had not proved conduct involving dishonesty by clear and convincing evidence. The entire record of Respondent's conduct in this case demonstrates carelessness, recklessness, and even a callous disregard of his responsibilities concerning client funds under the Code of Professional Responsibility. But there is no significant evidence that Respondent was trying to cheat his client, steal her funds, or otherwise act with dishonesty toward her. However, I feel that the Hearing Committee erred in not finding a violation of Respondent's duty to turn over promptly funds belonging to his client. [1] The Hearing Committee found, with considerable justification, that Respondent was not guilty of delay in turning over his client's funds during the period between August 17, 1984, when he first sent her a check, and the unspecified date in early December when Respondent's client again contacted him in response to his September 25 letter. During that period of time, Respondent believed in good faith that his client: 1) had received his check for part of the recovery representing the net after withholding of his fee; and 2) that her real complaint was that she wanted the entire recovery sent to her so that she could issue a check back to Respondent for his fees. Nevertheless, once the client began to call Respondent regularly during the month of December, he was on notice that there was a problem in this case. Certainly by December 8, 1984, when Respondent received a letter from his client stating that she had not received her check, as he had theretofore believed, he was on notice that DR 9-103(B) required him to take prompt action. Instead, for the next twenty days he did not turn over his client's money to her or, for all that we know, take any action to determine the status of her money. On December 28, his client had obtained the services of a new lawyer, who began trying to contact Respondent in order to urge him to resolve the matter promptly. The new lawyer and Respondent spoke on January 2, 1985, and the new lawyer made it clear to Respondent that he had a very serious problem on his hands and that his former client was likely to complain to Bar Counsel (as indeed she already had) if Respondent did not act promptly. Once again, Respondent took no effective action to: 1) determine whether his client had received her money; and 2) if she had not, to make it good to her promptly as he was required to do under the rules. This situation should have alarmed any reasonably prudent lawyer and should have galvanized Respondent into prompt action. Instead, for the next ten days he once again failed to take any effective action to resolve the matter, thereby forcing his client's new attorney to call him again on January 12, 1985, to urge prompt resolution of the matter. Respondent's response to the new lawyer's second call was to let another two weeks go by so that when his former client's new lawyer called a third time on January 25, 1985, he still had not resolved the matter. During that telephone conversation, the new lawyer told Respondent that his former client had filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. Suddenly, Respondent leapt into action and during the following weekend reviewed the records and determined that he had never received any cancelled check to this client from his bank. Finally, on February 2, 1985, Respondent reacted by sending a new check to his client. Thus, the record reveals that Respondent delayed for fifty-six days, or nearly two months, after his client had brought to his attention her claim that she had not received the money to which she was entitled. [2] It is unproductive to try to define exactly what the word prompt means in the context of DR 9-103(B). Whatever the word means, it does not mean nearly two months of inactivity. Clients expect more responsiveness from their lawyers when it comes to turning over property belonging to the client, and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, they are entitled to it. All Respondent had to do was move expeditiously to determine whether or not his client had cashed the check. Had he done so, he would have discovered that she had not. Thereafter, a simple stop order at his bank and a new check issued to the client would have satisfied his obligation under the Code to turn over property of the client promptly. In sum, I feel that the Hearing Committee erred when it rejected Bar Counsel's charge of a violation under DR 9-103(B).