Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Absence from Meetings Between the Trial Court and Defense Counsel Concerning the Alleged Juror Misconduct

Text: Defendant was not present during the first two ex parte in camera hearings concerning Smith's report of the alleged misconduct on the part of Juror T.W. He contends on appeal that his absence from these proceedings violated his federal and state constitutional rights, as well as state statutory law. As a constitutional matter, a criminal defendant accused of a felony has the right to be present at every critical stage of the trial. ( Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353.) The right derives from the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1010, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) A critical stage of the trial is one in which a defendant's `absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings' ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819, fn. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562) or whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge' ( Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674). ( Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 260, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 949 P.2d 31.) The ex parte meetings between the trial court and defense counsel concerning Juror T.W.'s alleged statement, at which defendant was not present, were not critical stages of the trial for constitutional purposes, because they were merely exploratory discussions concerning the potential problem of juror misconduct and possible courses of action that might be taken to resolve that issue. Defendant, in arguing to the contrary, relies primarily upon the three-judge-panel decision in Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir.2002) 302 F.3d 892. After completion of briefing in the present appeal, the Campbell opinion was vacated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to order an en banc rehearing of the appeal. ( Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir.2004) 386 F.3d 1258.) The court's subsequent en banc decision declined to determine whether error occurred, instead concluding that the California Court of Appeal was not unreasonable in holding that any error resulting from the defendant's absence while the trial court and counsel discussed a possible conflict of interest was harmless. ( Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir.2005) 408 F.3d 1166, 1172-1173 (en banc).) Even to the extent the three-judge opinion might carry some persuasive value, however, the Campbell case is factually distinguishable. In the present case, no final decisions were made during the meetings in question, and the information possessed by the court and defense counsel and their contemplated course of action subsequently were conveyed to defendant (and the prosecutor) in the closed court sessions before any course of action was determined. (Cf. Campbell, supra, 302 F.3d at p. 899 [the in-chambers hearing held to determine whether Campbell's right to conflict-free counsel had been violated must have been a critical stage of the criminal proceedings (italics added)].) There is no indication in the case before us that defendant's presence during the preliminary meetings held between the court and defense counsel was necessary to ensure the fairness of the proceedings or that defendant's absence in any way affected his defense. Indeed, the record reflects that defendant was present during the several discussions that subsequently took place concerning the subjects of the alleged misconduct and Smith's possible conflict of interest, and never sought to add his personal input into the decision-making process. Accordingly, defendant's constitutional right to be present was not violated by his absence at the earlier meetings. Turning to defendant's statutory claims, we have long held that the presence requirement under sections 977 and 1043 is similar to that of the constitutional provisions: under the statutes, a defendant `is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.... [Citation.] [Citation.]' [Citations.] ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 855, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135; see also People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 781-782, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 74, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 103, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 309, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149.) Therefore, essentially for the same reasons we have articulated above in finding that defendant's constitutional right to be present was not violated, we conclude he has not established a violation of the statuteshis personal presence at the in camera hearings did not bear a reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him. Even to the extent that defendant contends the statutory requirement is broader than the constitutional right to be personally present, there is no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had he been personally present at the in camera discussions. Accordingly, any error would in no sense be prejudicial under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836, 299 P.2d 243. (See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 968, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.)