Opinion ID: 2572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Martin and Like Cases

Text: In Martin, this Court considered the sufficiency of an affidavit filed in support of a search warrant of Martin's residence based on information obtained from an FBI investigation into child pornography e-groups. See Martin, 426 F.3d at 73-77. The majority opinion affirmed the district court's finding of probable cause based on the following factors: (1) the e-group's welcome page and title, girls 12-16, made plain its essential purpose to trade child pornography of minor girls; [7] (2) the affidavit's discussion of the modus operandi of those who use computers to collect and distribute child pornography; (3) the affidavit's description of the characteristics and proclivities of child-pornography collectors, including their tendency to collect pornographic images; (4) the fact that the e-group's illicit purpose could be inferred from the website's technological features that facilitated trading in child pornography; (5) the affiant's confirmation that the e-group contained child pornography available to all members; (6) the fact that the defendant lived at the house to be searched; and (7) the fact that the defendant was an e-group member who joined voluntarily and never cancelled his membership. Id. at 75-76. The majority deemed it common sense that an individual who joins such a site would more than likely download and possess such material, and concluded that the affidavit, as corrected to eliminate statements determined to be false, established probable cause for the search warrant. Id. [8] Judge Pooler dissented, expressing her concern that the majority announces a dangerous precedent. Id. at 78 (Pooler, J., dissenting). Under the majority's decision, she explained, the government could obtain a warrant simply where an individual subscribes to an internet e-group that has an illegal purpose, notwithstanding the absence of particularized evidence indicating that the individual visited the e-group after joining or participated in the e-group's functions. Id. But this result, she opined, cannot be squared with the general proscription against finding probable cause based solely on an individual's `mere propinquity to others' suspected of criminal activity. Id. at 81 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979)). In Judge Pooler's opinion, the affidavit provided insufficient particularized facts as to Martin's involvement in illegal activity, and the inferences drawn by the majority were ill-supported. For instance, she believed, the affidavit at issue did not support the inferential leaps that: (1) Martin participated in the functions of the e-group simply because he was a member of the group; (2) the overriding purpose of the e-group was illegal, because the group also fostered discussion that did not necessarily include the sharing of pornographic images of children; and (3) all members collect pornographic images of children simply because some do. Id. at 79-82. Finally, she challenged the majority's attempts to create the required nexus between Martin and illegal activity by appealing to `common sense.' Id. at 83. In this regard, Judge Pooler explained that [w]hile the majority is correct that a magistrate [judge] presented with a warrant may `make a practical, common-sense decision,' that decision must be based on the circumstances set forth in the affidavit.' Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317). Two weeks after Martin was decided, the panel in Coreas expressed its view that  Martin itself was wrongly decided, but under established rules of this circuit adhered to Martin 's holding because that case was heard first. Coreas, 419 F.3d at 159. The affidavit at issue in Coreas was substantively identical to the one considered by this Court in Martin, except that it pertained to a member of a different e-group, titled Candyman. Id. at 157 (finding the distinction immaterial for purposes of the case). [9] The Coreas panel concurred with Judge Pooler's minority position in Martin, and detailed how easy it was to become a member of the e-group, including by the innocent or inadvertent single click of a button. Id. at 156, 158. Coreas also explained that Martin to the extent it focused on the overriding illegal purpose of the group rather than on the activities of the person targeted for the searchmight tend to dilute the First Amendment's protection against guilt by association and diminish the Fourth Amendment's focus on particularity and on protection of the privacy of the individual to be searched. Id. at 158. [10] Our sister circuits have addressed this issue consistently with the majority's holding in Martin, although the facts and considerations of the decisions vary. United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc); United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882 (5th Cir.2004); United States v. Hutto, 84 Fed.Appx. 6 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished). The common thread among these cases is the defendants' membership in or subscription to websites whose principal purpose was the collection and/or sharing of child pornography. See Shields, 458 F.3d at 272-73, 278; Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1070; Froman, 355 F.3d at 890-91; Hutto, 84 Fed.Appx. at  8; see also Wagers, 452 F.3d at 543. [11] Additional factors weighing in favor of probable cause in some of these cases included: (1) acts of the defendant that tended to negate the possibility that his membership or subscription was unintended, see, e.g., Shields, 458 F.3d at 278-79 (defendant's membership in multiple sites undermined suggestion that his membership may have been unwitting or innocent); Wagers, 452 F.3d at 536-37 (same); Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1070 (defendant's subscription required him to provide his credit card information, home address, and e-mail address); (2) e-mail addresses or screen names suggestive of an interest in collecting child pornography, see Shields, 458 F.3d at 279-80 (LittleLolitaLove@ aol.com e-mail); Froman, 355 F.3d at 890-91 (Littlebuttsue and Littletitgirly screen names); and (3) defendant's criminal history relating to child pornography, Wagers, 452 F.3d at 541.