Opinion ID: 2994954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges by Mr. Ford

Text: Mr. Ford first challenges his convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine or cocaine base./10 As described above, Bonner had arranged to meet Mr. Ford on December 8, for the purpose of conducting a sale of cocaine and cocaine base. However, before the exchange took place, Mr. Ford became aware that law enforcement was present and the officers on the scene arrested Mr. Ford before he took actual possession of the drugs. Mr. Ford contends that this lack of actual possession precludes a conviction for possession with intent, which requires a defendant to have either dominion or control over the drugs at issue. In the district court, Mr. Ford moved for an acquittal on this basis. However, the district court rejected Mr. Ford’s argument and, in a postconviction ruling, explained that Mr. Ford’s conviction could be sustained on the ground that he had aided and abetted Bonner’s possession of the cocaine. When considering a criminal defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. We shall reverse a conviction only if no rational trier of fact could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Jones, 188 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1033 (1999); United States v. Gibbs, 61 F.3d 536, 537 (7th Cir. 1995). However, any questions of law raised by Mr. Ford’s challenge are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Hoogenboom, 209 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1998). We believe the law and the record support the district court’s determination that Mr. Ford aided and abetted Bonner’s possession of cocaine and cocaine base. The aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2, states: Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. Id. sec. 2(a). To be convicted as an aider and abettor, it must be shown that Mr. Ford associated himself with the activity at issue and that he tried to make the activity succeed. See United States v. Heath, 188 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Coleman, 179 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir.) (To sustain the conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting, we must find that the government proved that Coleman knowingly participated in the transaction as something he wished to bring about and that he sought by his actions to make it succeed.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 957 (1999)./11 In denying Mr. Ford’s motion for acquittal or a new trial, the district court relied on our decision in United States v. Wesson, 889 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1989). In that case, we held: You may abet the crime of possession with intent to distribute by procuring the customers and maintaining the market in which the possession is profitable, even though you do nothing else to help the possessor get or retain possession. Middlemen aid and abet the offense of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 135. Mr. Ford contends, however, that he was not a middleman such as Wesson, but instead was only a buyer with interests distinct from those of Bonner. Because his relationship with Bonner was merely that of a buyer and a seller, Mr. Ford argues, he cannot be found to have aided and abetted Bonner’s possession. The Government counters that the prior relationship between Mr. Ford and Bonner makes Mr. Ford more than a mere buyer. In making its argument, the Government draws on cases from the law of conspiracy. The Government argues that because Bonner routinely fronted drugs to Mr. Ford, Mr. Ford could be considered part of a conspiracy with Bonner. As we stated earlier, it is well-established in this circuit that the repeated fronting of drugs may demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. See Frazier, 213 F.3d at 415; Ferguson, 35 F.3d at 331; United States v. Cabello, 16 F.3d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1994). The Government contends that because it established that Bonner routinely fronted drugs to Mr. Ford, a conspiracy existed between them; thus, it claims, Mr. Ford may properly be considered to have aided and abetted Bonner. We cannot accept the Government’s arguments for several reasons. First, the Government’s position is premised on a conspiracy theory, but Mr. Ford was not convicted of conspiracy. Second, the Government’s argument implies that aiding and abetting is a lesser included offense of conspiracy, however, in the context of a federal drug prosecution, it is not. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1994). When proof of one crime requires proof of an element not necessary to prove a second crime, the first crime is not a lesser included offense of the second. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989). In this type of proceeding, to win a conviction for aiding and abetting the Government must prove an element not necessary to prove conspiracy: the existence of an overt act by the defendant. Compare Lanzotti, 205 F.3d at 956 (Under federal law, the crime of aiding and abetting requires knowledge of the illegal activity that is being aided and abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed and some act of helping. (emphasis added)) with United States v. Hunte, 196 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1999) ([C]onspiracy liability does not require evidence of an overt act by the defendant.). Because aiding and abetting is not a lesser included offense of conspiracy, the Government’s evidence showing the existence of a conspiracy does not automatically demonstrate that Mr. Ford aided and abetted Bonner. Nonetheless, we believe that Mr. Ford’s conviction may be affirmed. Although the Government improperly focuses on the fact that the fronting of drugs supports a conspiracy conviction, we also have held that the fronting of drugs supports an aiding and abetting conviction: Furthermore, sales on credit, in combination with frequent and repeated transactions, justify an aider and abettor instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kasvin, 757 F.2d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1985). This same evidence would permit a jury to infer that Rivera did not have a mere buyer/seller arrangement with Bradley. United States v. Rivera, 153 F.3d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1998). A person who receives fronted drugs for resale to others may be considered a middleman rather than a buyer, and we have held that middlemen aid and abet the offense of possession with intent to distribute. United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 609 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Wesson, 889 F.2d at 135), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2001). Consequently, Mr. Ford’s conviction as an aider and abettor may be affirmed if there is evidence indicating that Bonner fronted him cocaine on a repeated basis. The record contains such evidence. Bonner testified specifically that he fronted drugs to Mr. Ford. Bonner stated that, when Mr. Gaughan began fronting drugs to him, he in turn began fronting drugs to Mr. Ford: Q. And once you were fronted by Bob [Gaughan], how would that change your relationship with Lonnie [Ford]? A. Well, I would front him too. Q. What does that mean, front? A. Front means to--you receive the merchandise without paying all the money or any of the money. You pay the money later but you get the merchandise first. Tr. at 306-07. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that Bonner fronted cocaine to Mr. Ford. Because, as noted above, the repeated fronting of drugs supports a conviction for aiding and abetting the crime of possession with intent to distribute, we affirm Mr. Ford’s conviction.
Mr. Ford also challenges his conviction for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Mr. Ford does not dispute that the evidence demonstrates that he brought a gun to his rendezvous with Bonner and that he intended to give Bonner that gun. Mr. Ford argues, however, that he brought the gun to Bonner for Bonner’s personal protection and, therefore, the gun was unrelated to his (Mr. Ford’s) participation in the drug trade. Thus, he claims, the gun was not related to a drug trafficking offense. In addition to the penalties the Government may seek for drug traffickers, additional penalties may be sought for any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm[.] 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(c)(1)(A). The term in relation to is expansive and means that the gun at least must facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating, the drug trafficking offense. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Haynes, 179 F.3d 1045, 1047 (7th Cir.) (quoting Smith), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 957 (1999). A conviction under sec. 924(c)(1) is inappropriate if the firearm’s presence is coincidental or entirely unrelated to the crime. Smith, 508 U.S. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Taylor, 31 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith). However, if the drugs and gun are together in the same place it is nearly an inescapable conclusion that they satisfy the in relation to prong of sec. 924(c)(1). United States v. Pike, 211 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996)). At trial, Bonner testified that he wanted the gun for personal protection, not necessarily the protection of his drugs. However, a few weeks prior to the rendezvous with Mr. Ford, Bonner’s apartment was robbed, he was beaten, and some cocaine was taken. This event prompted Bonner to ask Mr. Ford for a gun. Mr. Ford agreed to provide Bonner with a gun, and delivery was intended to take place at the same time Mr. Ford purchased additional cocaine from Bonner. We believe that, given the circumstances described above, the jury could conclude reasonably that Mr. Ford possessed the gun in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Mr. Ford knew Bonner only as his supplier. Furthermore, he knew that Bonner’s desire for the weapon arose from the fact that drugs were taken from Bonner’s apartment. In these circumstances, the presence of the gun could be considered by the jury as not merely coincidental or unrelated to Mr. Ford’s drug trafficking. Instead, the jury was entitled to conclude that Mr. Ford provided the gun to Bonner, his supplier, for Bonner’s protection as well as the protection of Bonner’s cocaine, and that the weapon found in Mr. Ford’s car therefore was related to his drug trafficking offense. We therefore affirm Mr. Ford’s conviction on this count./12