Opinion ID: 2595567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory And Regulatory Interpretation

Text: . . . . In construing statutes, we have recognized that our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. . . . In construing an ambiguous statute, [t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. HRS § 1-15(1) [(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool. Gray [v. Administrative Dir. of the Court], 84 Hawai`i 138,] 148, 931 P.2d [580,] 590 [(1997)] (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995)) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider [t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to discover its true meaning. HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another. HRS § 1-16 (1993). Barnett v. State, 91 Hawai`i 20, 31, 979 P.2d 1046, 1057 (1999) (quoting State v. Davia, 87 Hawai`i 249, 254, 953 P.2d 1347, 1352 (1998)). If we determine, based on the foregoing rules of statutory construction, that the legislature has unambiguously spoken on the matter in question, then our inquiry ends. See, e.g., ( Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). When the legislative intent is less than clear, however, this court will observe the well established rule of statutory construction that, where an administrative agency is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the mandate of a statute which contains words of broad and indefinite meaning, courts accord persuasive weight to administrative construction and follow the same, unless, the construction is palpably erroneous. Brown v. Thompson, 91 Hawai`i 1, 18, 979 P.2d 586, 603 (1999) (quoting Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai`i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997)). See also Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 90 Hawai`i 1, 5, 975 P.2d 211, 215 (1999) ([J]udicial deference to agency expertise is a guiding precept where the interpretation and application of broad or ambiguous statutory language by an administrative tribunal are the subject of review. ([Q]uoting Richard v. Metcalf, 82 Hawai`i 249, 252, 921 P.2d 169, 172 (1996)[.])). [Footnote omitted]. Such deference reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches, insofar as the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of policy than law. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991). The rule of judicial deference, however, does not apply when the agency's reading of the statute contravenes the legislature's manifest purpose. See Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 216, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984) (To be granted deference, . . . the agency's decision must be consistent with the legislative purpose.); State v. Dillingham Corp., 60 Haw. 393, 409, 591 P.2d 1049, 1059 (1979) ([N]either official construction or usage, no matter how long indulged in, can be successfully invoked to defeat the purpose and effect of a statute which is free from ambiguity. . . .). Consequently, we have not hesitated to reject an incorrect or unreasonable statutory construction advanced by the agency entrusted with the statute's implementation. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dang, 89 Hawai`i 8, 15, 967 P.2d 1066, 1073 (1998); In re Maldonado, 67 Haw. 347, 351, 687 P.2d 1, 4 (1984). In re Wai`ola O Moloka'i, Inc., 103 Hawai`i 401, 422-23, 83 P.3d 664, 685-86 (2004) (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiamaker;hole), 94 Hawai`i 97, 144-45, 9 P.3d 409, 456-57 (2000) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted)).