Opinion ID: 1958816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Tender of the Pleas of Guilty

Text: Harris alleges that the tender of the plea of guilty to first degree murder was unreasonable professional conduct on the part of Russell. We look to the circumstances surrounding the tender of the plea to determine the allegation. The compendium of those circumstances which we now set out is based in the main on findings of fact by the judge hearing the motion to withdraw the plea. There was evidence received at the hearing which supported the judge's factual findings, and we accept his findings as not clearly erroneous. What we quote in our recounting of the circumstances reflects the words of the judge. Russell believed that Harris was not incompetent. That he was a rather intelligent person. In negotiations with the State's Attorney Russell was told that there would be no plea agreement, no plea bargain. In effect, that the State's Attorney's Office was requiring unconditional surrender. The judge detailed the evidence available to the prosecution and observed that Russell believed that it was pretty impressive. Russell thought it would be best to have the trial in another county. He filed a suggestion for removal and the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Kent County. At that time the plan of the defense was to have a full trial under pleas of not guilty. At first Harris was not very cooperative. He was nervous and ... afraid, and ... distrustful, and it was hard to deal with him. But Harris had a change of heart. He had evidently undergone a religious experience, and he became more open with ... Russell and told him everything [concerning the murder and robberies] including admitting to being the triggerman.  (Emphasis supplied). [A]t that point the Defense was confronted with the intransigence of the State's Attorney, also the knowledge that [Harris] was indeed the triggerman and that there would be problems putting him on the stand or asserting anything in the way of an affirmative defense or even anything in the way of a negative defense, that is I didn't do it. With full knowledge of the State's case, gleaned from open discovery of State's file, Russell assessed the evidence against Harris as overwhelming. Russell also had misgivings about going to trial before an Eastern Shore jury and [having] the sentencing phase before an Eastern Shore judge. He felt that there might be a better advantage in going back to Baltimore County and having his client throw himself on the mercy of the Court. He felt there would be a home court advantage. That he knew the judge and that at that point no Baltimore County judge had imposed the death sentence. [10] Harris had exercised his absolute constitutional right of removal in order to have the indictment transmitted to the Circuit Court for Kent County for trial. Constitution of Maryland, Art. IV, § 8(b). He sought the consent of the State to withdraw his original motion for removal so the case would revert to Baltimore County for trial. Harris, Russell and the prosecutors entered into an agreement as to the procedure for trial. The agreement was evidenced by a memorandum setting out that Harris would plead guilty, and that the decision to so plead was made knowingly and intelligently after extensive consultation with [Russell] and with members of [Harris's] family. It further stated that Harris would enter the pleas of guilty with the express understanding and knowledge that the State of Maryland intends to seek the death penalty and that there was no plea agreement whatsoever in regard to the disposition of the charges.... The matter of the return of the case to Baltimore County was presented to Judge Rasin presiding in the Circuit Court for Kent County. The State told Judge Rasin that its consent to Harris's request to return the case was premised on the agreement as to trial procedure. Upon inquiry by Judge Rasin, Harris declared on the record that he and Russell had signed the agreement. Judge Rasin conducted a thorough examination of Harris in open court. Judge Rasin first ascertained Harris's age and educational background and that Harris wanted the case to be tried in Baltimore County. Upon probing inquiry by the judge, Harris explicitly acknowledged that he fully understood the terms of the agreement he had made and the effects of that agreement, namely that he waived his right to a jury trial (the judge explained in detail the composition of a jury and its functions); he was to enter pleas of guilty to the first degree murder and robbery of Hviding, the robbery of Lindley and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence; upon conviction of murder in the first degree the penalty was death or life imprisonment; in the event of a conviction of murder in the first degree, there would be a separate hearing before a jury or the court at his election to determine whether he would be executed or imprisoned for life. The judge explained the procedures to be followed at the hearing and what the trier of fact was to consider; he did not think, either directly or through Russell, or any law enforcement officer or anyone else, that he had an agreement with the State concerning the disposition of his case, as to how the trial would take place or what the penalty would be; no one had promised him anything and no one had told him, This is what is going to take place, but don't tell anybody about it; he had all the opportunity he desired to discuss this procedure with Russell or anyone else he might wish to call on for advice in this situation; he had no questions about any of the proceedings up to this point and he understood what is going on today, and what procedure in the past has been. Judge Rasin ordered that the case be returned to Baltimore County. The judge hearing the motion to withdraw the plea found that the judge trying the case after its return to Baltimore County conducted in turn an extremely thorough plea litany of Harris at which Harris demonstrated that the plea was made voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. Rule 731c. He also found that Russell did not at any time guarantee that Harris would get a life sentence. The judge believed, under the totality of the circumstances, that Russell did no more than tell Harris that your best shot is to plead guilty and put yourself on the mercy of the Court. The judge concluded: In sum, Russell felt that the better chance would be to plead guilty, even if it were unconditional and he was unable to get any kind of bargain out of the State's Attorney and throw [Harris] on the mercy of the Court than would be to go through a full scale trial. At this point, too, [Harris] wished to plead guilty. He wanted to get it over with, but of course, did not want the death penalty.       Because of [Harris's] forthrightness, his youth and the remorse factor, which were brought out in sentencing, [Russell] made a judgmental call in which [Harris] apparently concurred that the lesser of two evils would be to go forth with an unconditional plea and take his chances with the Court. We have made our independent constitutional appraisal from the entire record. In so doing we have reweighed the evidence in light of the factual findings of the hearing judge, in order to reach the ultimate question, namely whether as a matter of law Russell's representation was deficient with respect to the tender of the plea of guilty. We eliminate from our consideration, as we must, the hindsight knowledge that the submission on a plea of guilty to first degree murder did not accomplish the result sought, that is, a life sentence and not the death penalty. We reconstruct the circumstances of Russell's concurrence in the plea of guilty from his perspective at the time. Harris wanted to plead guilty and fully understood the possible consequences. This was evidenced, not only upon a probing inquiry in open court by two judges on two occasions, but by a trial procedure agreement which he signed. Russell had made an informed assessment of Harris's situation based not only on the evidence available to the State but in the light of Harris's confession to Russell, which he never retracted, that he was, indeed, the one who fired the shots which killed Hviding. Russell concluded, as the hearing judge found, that a guilty plea afforded Harris the best chance to avoid the death penalty, which in the circumstances was the goal of the defense. We note that the tender of the guilty plea was not entirely void of recompense to Harris. It paved the way for the return of the case for trial to Baltimore County, which was devoutly sought by Harris and Russell as in Harris's best interest. When we weigh all this in the light of the teachings of Strickland  the heavy burden of proof Harris must carry and the presumptions we must entertain  we find it clear that Russell concurred in Harris's desire to plead guilty in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. In other words, Russell's assistance with respect to the tender of the guilty plea was reasonable considering all the circumstances. He made all significant decisions regarding the guilty plea in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. In short, he was functioning as the counsel guaranteed Harris by the Sixth Amendment. We hold that Russell's performance was not deficient as to the tender of the plea of guilty. [11]