Opinion ID: 1175976
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Heading: Exclusivity of section 132a remedy.

Text: Section 132a provides: It is the declared policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment. [¶] (1) Any employer who discharges, or threatens to discharge, or in any manner discriminates against any employee because he or she has filed or made known his or her intention to file a claim for compensation with his or her employer or an application for adjudication, or because the employee has received a rating, award, or settlement, is guilty of a misdemeanor and the employee's compensation shall be increased by one-half, but in no event more than ten thousand dollars ..., together with costs and expenses not in excess of two hundred fifty dollars.... Any such employee shall also be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of the employer. On its face, section 132a's remedies apply only when employers retaliate against employees for pursuing their rights under the workers' compensation law. In Judson Steel, however, we focused on the first sentence of section 132a, which declares a general policy barring discrimination against injured employees. ( Judson Steel, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 667, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564.) We concluded that section 132a's remedies are available whenever an employee suffers discrimination incurred as the result of his injury ( Judson Steel, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 668, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564), including discrimination based on disability ( id. at p. 669, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564). In Portillo v. G.T. Price Products, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 285, 290, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291 ( Portillo ), the court held that, in cases where section 132a applied, it provided an employee's exclusive remedy. The plaintiff in Portillo brought a common law wrongful discharge action, alleging her employer discharged her in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Defendant demurred, arguing that section 132a provided the plaintiffs exclusive remedy, and the trial court sustained the demurrer. The Court of Appeal affirmed. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 286, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291.) Noting that the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board had `full ... jurisdiction' to resolve section 132a claims, the court found applicable the exclusive remedy provisions that apply to other workers' compensation remedies. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 287, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291; see Lab.Code, §§ 3600, 3602, subd. (a).) The court emphasized the legislative compromise underlying the workers' compensation law: The Workers' Compensation Act is designed to afford workers quick determination of their claims for injury without regard to the common law questions of liability, negligence or fault on the part of and other common law defenses available to the employer. The Legislature has balanced this imposition or burden on the employer by limiting the employee to seek redress in a single forum, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. On balance, the fact that the exclusivity of remedy before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is for the benefit of workers generally outweighs any occasional disadvantage that could be argued. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287-288, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291, italics added.) The court also quoted Labor Code section 5300, which provides that proceedings [f]or the recovery of compensation, or concerning any right or liability arising out of or incidental thereto shall be instituted before the [Workers' Compensation] [A]ppeals [B]oard and not elsewhere. ... (Lab.Code, § 5300, subd. (a), italics added; see Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 287, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) Finally, the court emphasized that section 132a addressed the precise wrong that the plaintiff alleged ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 288-289, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291) and that courts should not, by enforcing a common law remedy, say that a different rule for the particular facts should have been written by the Legislature ( id. at p. 290, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291). Accordingly, the court held that section 132a provided the plaintiffs exclusive remedy and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 290, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) In Pickrel, the court extended Portillo to a case specifically involving disability discrimination. The plaintiff in Pickrel brought an FEHA cause of action alleging termination of her employment based on a physical handicap. ( Pickrel, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1060, 252 Cal.Rptr. 878.) The trial court sustained a demurrer, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. ( Ibid. ) Citing Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d 285, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291, and following much of its reasoning, the court held that section 132a provided the exclusive remedy for an employee claiming discrimination based on a work-related disability. ( Pickrel, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1063-1064, 252 Cal.Rptr. 878; see also Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 20 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1526-1527, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 335 [following Pickrel ]; Denney v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 [same]; Fortner v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 229 Cal. App.3d at pp. 548, 551, 280 Cal.Rptr. 409 [same].) The court stated that the result in Portillo was consonant with the trend of recent decisions `... to narrow the range of exceptions to exclusivity, [thus] benefitt[ing] both employers and employees within the system, by ... preserving the low cost, efficiency and certainty of recovery which characterizes workers' compensation.' ( Continental Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 156, 162 [235 Cal.Rptr. 260].) ( Pickrel, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1064, 252 Cal.Rptr. 878.) After the Pickrel decision, we addressed the scope of workers' compensation exclusivity in Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054 ( Shoemaker ) and Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1083, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680. Both cases considered what remedies are available to an employee who suffers a physical or psychological injury as a result of wrongful termination of employment, but neither case involved termination based on a work-related injury or disability. Therefore, neither case implicated section 132a directly. In Shoemaker, the employee alleged wrongful termination and related causes of action, including termination in violation of a whistle-blower protection statute (Gov. Code, former § 19683). We concluded that disabling injuries, whether physical or mental, arising from termination of employment are generally within the coverage of workers' compensation and subject to the exclusive remedy provisions, unless the discharge comes within an express or implied statutory exception or the discharge results from risks reasonably deemed not to be within the compensation bargain. ( Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) By referring to the compensation bargain, we recognized the same legislative compromise that the Portillo court cited (see Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287-288, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291): [T]he employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault, but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort. [Citations.] ( Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) Though we stated that most injuries arising from termination of employment fall within the compensation bargain, we noted that the exclusive remedy provisions are not applicable [to injuries arising from] `conduct where the employer or insurer stepped out of their proper roles' [citations].... ( Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) Therefore, we concluded that an injury resulting from a wrongful termination in violation of a whistle-blower statute lies well outside the compensation bargain, and the exclusive remedy provisions do not apply. ( Id. at p. 23, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) We reasoned that, by enacting the whistle-blower statute, [t]he Legislature clearly intended to afford an additional remedy to those already granted under other provisions of the law; otherwise [the whistle-blower statute] would be rendered meaningless. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 22, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) The decision in Shoemaker turned in part on the fact that the whistleblower statute constituted a specific declaration of the Legislature's intent to create a new, additional remedy. The same could not be said about common law remedies, and we expressly did not decide in Shoemaker whether, in addition to a claim under the whistle-blower statute, the plaintiff could also pursue a common law wrongful discharge claim. ( Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 23, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) We addressed that unresolved question in Gantt, concluding that the ... `compensation bargain' cannot encompass conduct, such as sexual or racial discrimination, `obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality.' ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680, quoting Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25; see also Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 714-715, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559.) Accordingly, we held that workers' compensation exclusivity did not preclude a common law wrongful discharge claim: we decline the invitation to retreat from our long-held view that employees discharged in violation of fundamental public policy may bring an action against their employers sounding in tort. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1098, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680.) In Angell, the court considered whether Pickrel's holding remained valid in light of Shoemaker and Gantt; that is, whether wrongful termination in violation of section 132a could be considered ` a risk reasonably encompassed within the compensation bargain' for which workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy. ( Angell, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 994, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, quoting Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680.) The court seemed to accept without discussion that disability discrimination could form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim. ( Angell, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 995, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541.) The court also acknowledged our holding in Gantt that these claims do not fall within the compensation bargain. ( Angell, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 990, 993, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541.) Nevertheless, the court concluded that, by enacting section 132a, ... the Legislature specifically placed this type of discriminatory termination within the scope of the compensation bargain. ( Angell, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 996, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541.) Accordingly, the court held that section 132a provided an employee's exclusive remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, precluding claims under both the FEHA and the common law. ( Angell, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 997, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541; see also Adkins v. State of California, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1819-1822, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 [following Angell ]; Langridge v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 668-670, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 [same].) In rejecting the conclusions of Portillo, Pickrel, Angell, and related cases, the Court of Appeal in this case focused on the 1993 amendment to the FEHA, reading it as repealing by implication all antidiscrimination laws that provide less protection than the FEHA, including section 132a. Notably, the Court of Appeal did not find an outright repeal of section 132a, but merely a repeal of its exclusivity, thus permitting employees to pursue FEHA and common law remedies in addition to section 132a remedies. We agree with the Court of Appeal that section 132a does not preclude Dillon's FEHA and common law causes of action, but, unlike the Court of Appeal, we reach this conclusion without relying on the 1993 amendment to the FEHA. Accordingly, we do not decide what effect, if any, the 1993 FEHA amendment had on section 132a. Though the Court of Appeal decided Portillo 16 years ago, and though other Court of Appeal decisions have affirmed its holding, we have never addressed its validity. We do so now. As noted, the Portillo court held that, when section 132a applies, it provides an employee's exclusive remedy. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 290, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the exclusive remedy provisions that apply to other workers' compensation remedies. (See Lab.Code, §§ 3600, 3602, subd. (a).) But section 132a is quite different from other workers' compensation remedies. Most workers' compensation remedies compensate an employee for a medical injury. Section 132a, however, addresses a breach of an employee's civil rights and applies regardless of whether that breach causes a medical injury. Because of this distinction, we see no compelling reason to treat section 132a like other workers' compensation remedies. Moreover, the existence of a workers' compensation remedy does not by itself establish that the remedy is exclusive. Rather, the scope of workers' compensation exclusivity depends on the terms of the exclusive remedy provisions. Section 132a does not itself contain an exclusive remedy clause, and, as explained below, the general exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law expressly do not apply to section 132a. Labor Code section 3600, subdivision (a), provides: Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever ..., shall ... exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the employment.... (Italics added.) When section 3600 refers to this division, it refers to division 4 of the Labor Code. Section 132a, on the other hand, is in division 1 of the Labor Code. Similarly, Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (a), provides: Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation is ... the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee.... (Italics added.) Labor Code section 3207 defines `[c]ompensation' as compensation under Division 4 ... includ[ing] every benefit or payment conferred by Division 4 upon an injured employee.... Again, section 132a is in division 1 of the Labor Code, not division 4. Thus, the plain language of the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law apparently limits those provisions to division 4 remedies. Remedies that the Legislature placed in other divisions of the Labor Code are simply not subject to the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions. The Portillo court also relied on the compensation bargain underlying the workers' compensation law, whereby [t]he Workers' Compensation Act ... afford[s] workers quick determination of their claims but limit[s] the employee to ... a single forum, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 287, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) The court reasoned that this same compensation bargain applied implicitly to section 132a. In other words, section 132a affords workers an inexpensive and quick remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, but that remedy is exclusive. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287-288, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) Again, the Portillo court erred. Though the compensation bargain, and in particular the exclusive remedy principle, applies to most workers' compensation proceedings, we recognized in Shoemaker and Gantt that certain employer conduct falls outside the compensation bargain. Specifically, we held in Shoemaker that an injury resulting from a wrongful termination in violation of a whistleblower protection statute lies well outside the compensation bargain, and the exclusive remedy provisions do not apply. ( Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 23, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054.) In Gantt, we reaffirmed Shoemaker and extended its holding to a case involving a common law wrongful discharge cause of action. We concluded that the ... `compensation bargain' cannot encompass conduct, such as sexual or racial discrimination, `obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality.' ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680, quoting Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d at p. 188, 344 P.2d 25.) Termination in violation of section 132a is just as `obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality' as sexual or racial discrimination. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680.) Therefore, a section 132a violation, like sexual and racial discrimination, falls outside the compensation bargain, and workers' compensation is not the exclusive remedy. In addition, the Portillo court relied in part on Labor Code section 5300, which provides that proceedings [f]or the recovery of compensation, or concerning any right or liability arising out of or incidental thereto shall be instituted before the [Workers' Compensation] [A]ppeals [B]oard and not elsewhere....  (Lab.Code, § 5300, subd. (a), italics added; see Portillo, supra, 131 Cal. App.3d at p. 287, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) But, even assuming an employee's rights under section 132a are right[s] ... incidental to the recovery of compensation, Labor Code section 5300 merely establishes the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board as the exclusive forum for pursuing a section 132a claim; it does not establish that the section 132a claim is the employee's exclusive remedy. Therefore, Labor Code section 5300 provides weak support for the Portillo court's conclusion. Finally, the Portillo court emphasized that section 132a addressed the precise wrong that the plaintiff alleged ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 288-289, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291) and that courts should not say that a different rule for the particular facts should have been written by the Legislature. ( Id. at p. 290, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291; see also Angell, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 996, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541 [making a similar argument]; Adkins v. State of California, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1819-1822, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 59 [following Angell ]; Langridge v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 25 Cal. App.4th at pp. 668-670, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 [same].) This argument, however, fails to recognize that the Legislature sometimes enacts a new remedy, intending to supplement other remedies. (See, e.g., Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 75, 82, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373 [the FEHA does not preempt common law remedies].) When courts enforce a common law remedy despite the existence of a statutory remedy, they are not say[ing] that a different rule for the particular facts should have been written by the Legislature. ( Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 290, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) They are simply saying that the common law rule coexists with the statutory rule. Accordingly, we find Portillo 's reasoning unpersuasive. Moreover, the Court of Appeal cases that followed Portillo do not persuade us that section 132a is exclusive. In Pickrel, the court simply cited Portillo and followed much of its reasoning. The court noted that the result in Portillo was consonant with the trend of recent decisions ( Pickrel, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1064, 252 Cal.Rptr. 878), but of course we do not decide cases based on trends. In Usher, Denney, and Fortner, the court merely followed Pickrel. ( Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1526-1527, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 335; Denney v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 170; Fortner v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at pp. 548, 551, 280 Cal.Rptr. 409.) In Angell, as in Portillo, the court failed to recognize that the Legislature sometimes intends statutory remedies to supplement, not supplant, common law remedies. ( Angell, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 996, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 541; Portillo, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 290, 182 Cal.Rptr. 291.) In Adkins and Langridge, the court merely followed Angell. ( Adkins v. State of California, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1819-1822, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59; Langridge v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 668-670, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34.) The provisions of the FEHA, and our decisions interpreting it, further support our conclusion that section 132a is not exclusive. The FEHA broadly announces the public policy of this state that it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of ... physical disability [or] mental disability.... (Gov. Code, § 12920.) The FEHA further provides that [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice ... [¶] ... [f]or an employer, because of the ... physical disability [or] mental disability ... of any person, to ... discriminate against the person.... (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) Nothing in these provisions suggests that the FEHA only applies to physical or mental disabilities that are unrelated to work. Moreover, the FEHA declares that its provisions ... shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. (Gov.Code, § 12993, subd. (a).) A construction of section 12940, subdivision (a), that narrows the term disability to disabilities unrelated to work seems inconsistent with the principle of liberal construction. Furthermore, our decisions have consistently emphasized the breadth of the FEHA. In State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, we considered whether the FEHA covered state civil service employees despite similar antidiscrimination provisions in the Civil Service Act. (See Gov.Code, § 19702, subd. (a).) We concluded that [t]he FEHA was meant to supplement, not ... be supplanted by, existing antidiscrimination remedies, in order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their civil rights against discrimination.... ( State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 431, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, italics added.) Similarly, in Rojo, we considered whether victims of sex discrimination could bring common law wrongful discharge claims in addition to FEHA claims. We concluded that the Legislature intended the FEHA to amplify ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 75, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373) other remedies and to expand ( id. at p. 80, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373) the rights of persons who are victims of employment discrimination. (See also Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 135, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 876 P.2d 1074 [The Legislature intended to create new rights within the FEHA statutory scheme while leaving existing rights intact....].) None of these cases suggest that non-FEHA remedies circumscribe the scope of the FEHA. Finally, the public education provisions of the workers' compensation law support our conclusion that section 132a is not exclusive. Labor Code section 139.6 provides: (a) The administrative director shall establish and effect within the Division of Workers' Compensation a continuing program to provide information and assistance concerning the rights, benefits, and obligations of the workers' compensation law to employees and employers subject thereto. The program shall include, but not be limited to, the following: [¶] ... [¶] (2) The preparation, publishing, and as necessary, updating, of a pamphlet advising injured workers of their basic rights under workers' compensation law, and informing them of rights under ... the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act relating to individuals with a disability. (Italics added.) This legislative mandate to inform injured workers of their FEHA rights would make little sense if section 132a provided an injured worker's exclusive remedy for disability discrimination. In conclusion, we hold that section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and common law wrongful discharge remedies. We disapprove any cases that suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, we emphasize that not every instance of disability discrimination in violation of section 132a gives rise to a valid FEHA claim. The term disability has a specific meaning in the context of the workers' compensation law that it has in no other context. On the other hand, the FEHA includes detailed definitions of `Physical disability' and `Mental disability' that make no reference to the workers' compensation law. (Gov.Code, § 12926, subds. (i), (k).) Because the standards for establishing disability discrimination may well be different under the FEHA than under section 132a, a decision in an employee's favor on a section 132a petition would not establish a FEHA violation. Moreover, to the extent section 132a and the FEHA overlap, equitable principles preclude double recovery for employees. For example, employees who settle their claims for lost wages and work benefits as part of a section 132a proceeding could not recover these damages as part of a subsequent FEHA proceeding.