Opinion ID: 149121
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Address Relevant Factors

Text: The government also argues that the district court failed to address several section 3553(a) factors that were relevant to sentencing, including deterrence, unwarranted disparity, and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment. In the alternative, the government argues that, if the court did consider those factors, it failed to explain how the non-custodial sentence furthered them. Section 3553(a) provides in relevant part that, when imposing sentences, courts shall consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed... to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense ... to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct [and] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant....    (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.... 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1-2, 6). While the district court recited the requirements of sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and section 3553(2)(A)(1), (2008 Sent. Tr. at 24-26), the court did not later address the issues of deterrence, disparity, or the need for the sentence to be just in any of its sentencing considerations or reasoning. The court did note that this is an unusual sentence. ( id. at 47.) The court's explanation that followed could be read as an explanation of this disparity as based on Christman's time on supervised release and the impact on his family, specifically his mother. ( id. at 47-48.) Additionally, the district court implicitly suggested, in one sentence, that the non-custodial sentence will serve the interest of specific deterrence, as Christman did not violate the nearly identical terms of his release pending appeal. ( id. at 30-31 ([O]ne can conclude that Mr. Christman is not a danger to the community since he has had no violations on home detention with electronic monitoring for over four years....).) However, just because Christman did not violate his release before, with the specter of this re-sentencing hanging over his head, does not necessarily mean that supervised release is sufficient to provide even specific deterrence. Moreover, the transcript makes no reference to general deterrence. While the court named the relevant factors, mere recitation of the factors is not sufficient to provide for meaningful appellate review. United States v. Fenderson, 354 Fed.Appx. 236, 244 (6th Cir.2009). As the district court merely impliedly addressed the issues of specific deterrence and potential disparity, and did not address general deterrence, or how this sentence could begin to address the harms to the victims, [6] the court did not adequately address these issues. [7] See United States v. Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823, 834 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that [g]eneral deterrence is crucial in the child pornography context, and holding that a one-day sentence of incarceration for possession of child pornography was substantively unreasonable where the district court gave [no] indication that it even considered how its admittedly `lenient' sentence would deter others generally from purchasing and viewing child pornography and the sentence, which was devoid of any significant period of incarceration, home confinement, or substantial fine undermines the purpose of general deterrence.). Thus, the sentence was substantively unreasonable for failing to provide enough reasoning of the section 3553(a) factors to provide for meaningful appellate review.