Opinion ID: 736908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing and Cause of Action

Text: 14 We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, taking as true any factual allegations in that party's pleading, if they are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. General Elec. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1452 (2d Cir.1991) (GE II ). 15 Defendants argue that Burgio lacks standing to bring a cause of action under the civil enforcement mechanism of ERISA § 502(a) and has no other cause of action in this case. The district court did not specifically identify Burgio's cause of action. It determined that there was federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and concluded that Burgio had standing as an interested party. We agree that Burgio may bring this action. 16 Burgio clearly has standing in the ordinary sense, as that term has been defined by the Supreme Court. By complaining that the State has wrongfully caused the withholding of a significant sum of money owed to Burgio pursuant to a statute preempted by federal law, Burgio has alleged a concrete and immediate injury, caused by defendants, which is likely to be redressed by favorable action in this court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). 17 As we understand the State's argument, it concedes in its main brief that the district court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but asserts that this does not mean that Burgio has an underlying cause of action in this case. The State's claim is that Burgio does not. 18 ERISA § 502(a) authorizes certain categories of complainants to bring a civil enforcement action. A plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may sue to enforce the ERISA statute or terms of a plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Similarly, the Secretary of Labor may bring an action to enforce the statute itself, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5). This court has held that an ERISA enforcement action may only be brought by a party specified in ERISA § 502(a). Albradco, Inc. v. Bevona, 982 F.2d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir.1992). It is beyond dispute that Burgio does not fall within any of the listed categories. As defendants contend, this action is therefore not one commenced directly under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. California Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2855-56, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). 19 The reason for Burgio's suit is to enable it to collect the money the Williamsville School District owes Burgio under its public works contract. Toward that end, Burgio seeks relief from state enforcement of a law Burgio contends is preempted by ERISA and the Supremacy Clause. Defendants respond that the Supremacy Clause does not confer any substantive constitutional rights, citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107-08, 110 S.Ct. 444, 449-50, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989) and Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 118-19 (2d Cir.1975). 20 Burgio argues that it can bring this action under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The Court in that case found ample justification for the assertion that individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings ... to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action. Id. at 155-56, 28 S.Ct. at 452. 21 Although there is some confusion in the cases, we agree with those commentators who have concluded that [t]he best explanation of Ex parte Young and its progeny is that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws. 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3566, at 102 (1984); see also Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting same). But see Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir.1990). As the Supreme Court has stated, the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 425-26, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985). 22 Both the Supreme Court and this court have entertained similar claims brought against state officials by plaintiffs arguing that ERISA preempted contrary state law. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983), the Court noted that: 23 [i]t is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights. See Ex parte Young. A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve. This Court, of course, frequently has resolved pre-emption disputes in a similar jurisdictional posture. 24 Id. at 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. at 2899 n. 14 (citations omitted); see also Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 327-28 (2d Cir.1982), aff'd. mem. sub nom., Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 463 U.S. 1220, 103 S.Ct. 3564, 77 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1983). 25 Defendants argue that these cases are not controlling here [s]ince the issue of whether plaintiffs had a cause of action in Stone & Webster and Shaw was neither raised by the parties nor otherwise addressed by the courts. Defendants rely on two Supreme Court cases, Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 27, 103 S.Ct. at 2855-56, and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), and one of our own, Albradco, 982 F.2d at 85, to argue a contrary conclusion. We are not persuaded. 26 Franchise Tax Board was a suit by a state entity against a union benefit fund seeking a declaration that state laws were not preempted by ERISA. It did not involve the situation we have here, a suit brought against state officials to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional act. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself distinguished between the two situations in Shaw, decided the same day, where it made clear that the Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board did not affect the vitality of Ex parte Young. 463 U.S. at 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. at 2899 n. 14. Albradco involved a suit between private parties. We said there that [b]ecause [plaintiffs] have not sued state officials to enjoin them from enforcing an unconstitutional state law, this case is distinguishable from Shaw and Stone & Webster, 982 F.2d at 87. 27 In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court first found that the Indian Commerce Clause does not confer upon Congress the authority to make a state suable in federal court under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. The Court then considered whether alternatively the plaintiff had an Ex parte Young action to enforce rights created under the IGRA against state officials. The Court ultimately concluded that it did not, cautioning that where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1132. Defendants now argue that because ERISA, like the IGRA, prescribes a detailed remedial scheme, Seminole Tribe requires that we not permit actions against state officials under Ex parte Young. We disagree. 28 First, the Court in Seminole Tribe took great pains to assert the continued viability of Ex parte Young. See 517 U.S. at ---- n. 14, ---- n. 16, ---- n. 17, 116 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 14, 1131 n. 16, 1133 n. 17. Second, the concerns that animated the Court in Seminole Tribe are not present here. In Seminole Tribe, the plaintiff sought to enforce the substantive provisions of the IGRA. In this case, Burgio do[es] not seek to enforce against [New York] any cause of action created by Congress; and no congressionally mandated remedial scheme is implicated. Instead, [Burgio] seek[s] only to prevent [New York officials] from violating the Supremacy Clause ... by encroaching on legal terrain that Congress has properly deemed preempted. CIGNA Healthplan of La. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 644 n. 1 (5th Cir.1996). We have previously recognized that [a] claim under the Supremacy Clause that a federal law preempts a state regulation is distinct from a claim for enforcement of that federal law. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 817 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir.1987). The coincidence that the federal law in question in this case contains its own preemption language, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, does not affect this distinction. Id. at 226. In sum, we conclude that the district court properly held that Burgio could bring its action. 2