Opinion ID: 2534266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting the commissioner's motion for summary judgment.

Text: ¶ 10. The party requesting summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Watson Quality Ford, Inc. v. Casanova, 999 So.2d 830, 833 (Miss. 2008) (citing Estate of Johnson v. Chatelain, 943 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss.2006)). When the moving party has supported its motion in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings; his response ... must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Moreover, summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party has failed to `make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.' Watson Quality Ford, Inc., 999 So.2d at 832 (quoting Bullard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 941 So.2d 812, 814 (Miss. 2006)). Mere general allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts will not prevent the award of summary judgment. Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983) (citations omitted). Pro se parties should be held to the same rules of procedure and substantive law as represented parties. Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So.2d 112, 118 (Miss.1987). ¶ 11. Buckel contends that the chancellor erred in granting summary judgment for two reasons. First, the chancellor incorrectly assigned evidentiary value to the affidavit of an interested witness. Second, the two press releases, the news story, and the Market Conduct Report presented in response to the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Commissioner possessed the documents Buckel had requested.
¶ 12. To satisfy his burden as the movant for summary judgment, the Commissioner had the burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue of material fact.... Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc., 957 So.2d 969, 975 (Miss. 2007) (citations omitted). The Commissioner sought to establish the nonexistence of an element essential to Buckel's case. Watson Quality Ford, Inc., 999 So.2d at 833 (citing Bullard, 941 So.2d at 814). Specifically, under Mississippi Code Section 25-61-3(b) (Rev.2010), the Commissioner attempted to set forth facts showing that MID did not possess the public records Buckel had requested. Public records shall mean all books, records, papers, accounts, letters, maps, photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings or reproductions thereof, and any other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed or retained for use in the conduct, transaction or performance of any business, transaction, work, duty or function of any public body, or required to be maintained by any public body. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-3(b) (Rev.2010) (emphasis added). The Commissioner provided Cromeans's affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment. Cromeans's affidavit stated that she had searched diligently, but MID did not possess the documents Buckel had requested. ¶ 13. Buckel argues for the first time on appeal that Cromeans's affidavit in support of the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment should not have been assigned evidentiary value. He states in his brief that the Chancellor clearly awarded some credence to the affidavit of the commissioner, finding that MID was not in possession of the information which Buckel sought. Citing this alleged error by the chancellor, Buckel argues that the Commissioner failed to prove that no genuine issue of material fact existed. ¶ 14. Buckel, however, failed to contest this affidavit in the trial court and, therefore, may not contest it for the first time on appeal. Bd. of Educ. of Calhoun County v. Warner, 853 So.2d 1159, 1164 (Miss. 2003) (citing Brown, 444 So.2d at 365 (Miss.1983)). In Warner, this Court refused to allow a party to attack an affidavit for the first time on appeal: Where the party against whom a motion for summary judgment is made wishes to attack one or more of the affidavits upon which the motion is based, he must file in the trial court a motion to strike the affidavit. Id. Failing to attack the affidavit constitutes waiver of any objection to the affidavit. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 748 So.2d 725, 731 (Miss.1999). ¶ 15. Assuming arguendo that this Court were to allow Buckel to contest this affidavit on appeal, Buckel still would not be entitled to relief. This Court has articulated its standard for the admissibility of affidavits in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e): [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matter stated therein. Stuckey v. The Provident Bank, 912 So.2d 859, 868 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2005). However, [a] conclusory, self-serving affidavit, unsupported by material facts relevant to the proposition at issue, is insufficient as a basis to grant summary judgment. Dalton v. Cellular S., Inc., 20 So.3d 1227, 1233-34 (Miss.2009). ¶ 16. Here, the chancellor did not err in allowing and considering Cromeans's affidavit. Her affidavit was based on personal knowledge and was not conclusory. She did not simply suppose that MID did not possess the records. The affidavit clearly stated she had conducted a search at MID for the records requested and had supervised others in the search as well. This testimony as to the absence of the records at MID was material to this case, and Buckel has presented no evidence that the affidavit is self-serving, except for the fact that Cromeans worked at MID. ¶ 17. Nonetheless, Buckel argues that an interested witness's affidavit should not be considered under United States Supreme Court precedent. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citations omitted). In Reeves, the Supreme Court stated that when making determinations regarding summary judgment, courts should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that `evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.' Id. Based on Reeves, Buckel asserts that Cromeans was an interested witness, and thus her affidavit should not have been considered by the chancellor in determining the issue of whether to grant summary judgment. ¶ 18. This Court has not specifically adopted the Reeves test, instead relying on its own well-articulated standards for determining the admissibility of affidavits. Dalton, 20 So.3d at 1233-34. Reeves dealt with employment discrimination, not the dissemination of public records. Moreover, as the Commissioner correctly argues, without the testimony of his employees, the other avenues by which to prove the existence or nonexistence of documents would be costly and perhaps also subject to this same interested-party analysis. ¶ 19. In light of these problems, when following the Reeves disinterested-witness requirement, the Fifth Circuit, among other courts, has not strictly applied this requirement: [T]he definition of an interested witness cannot be so broad as to require us to disregard testimony from a company's agents regarding the company's reasons for discharging an employee. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Traylor v. Brown, et al., 295 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2002), to so hold would foreclose the possibility of summary judgment for employers, who almost invariably must rely on testimony of their agents to explain why the disputed action was taken. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 898 (5th Cir.2002). The Fifth Circuit has also held that a decision-maker does not constitute an interested person without further evidence of the witness's interest. Wiley v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 287 Fed.Appx. 335, 339 (5th Cir.2008). ¶ 20. This Court refuses to apply Reeves in the context of today's case. Buckel has not provided further evidence of Cromeans's interest. She is a regular employee, not a decision-maker. Thus, we find the chancellor did not err in assigning evidentiary value to Cromeans's affidavit and in finding that the Commissioner had satisfied his burden as the party moving for summary judgment.
¶ 21. In response to the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, supported by Cromeans's affidavit, Buckel argues that MID's Market Conduct Report created a reasonable inference that MID was in possession of the public records he had requested relating to claims paid and filed. He also points to Commissioner Dale's press releases and news story.
¶ 22. Buckel asserts the State Farm Market Conduct Report indicated that MID was in possession of the requested documents because the Report stated that Commissioner Dale had subpoenaed 43,000 files from State Farm. Buckel, however, overstates the limited evidentiary value of the Market Conduct Report. ¶ 23. Buckel contends that the Report stated that MID had requested the claims information he sought and had in fact received this information provided by State Farm. Yet, nowhere in the Report did it specifically state that MID had requested this information. The Report stated that the examiners, whom MID had contracted to gather data and to complete the Report, had requested and received this information and that [t]his examination was performed by examiners, adjusters, and attorneys appointed by the Commissioner of Insurance [...] in accordance with his statutory authority. While Buckel also argues that a MID employee, Jimmy Blissett, was the examiner in charge, Buckel offers no proof that Blissett was an actual employee of MID, rather than an independent contractor. ¶ 24. While there is no doubt that the contractors/examiners had this data relating to claims filed and paid, there is no evidence that MID possessed the information sought in Buckel's records request. The Market Conduct Report does not indicate with any certainty that MID possessed the data underlying this Report. Nowhere does the Report state that MID was, at any time, in possession of this underlying data or storing this information. MID did not compile information for the Report. At best, the Report creates an inference that because MID contracted to have the Report completed, then MID also had/stored the information underlying the Report. However, this inference, without more, fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Commissioner has ever possessed the documents. Buckel has not brought forth probative evidence legally sufficient to make apparent the existence of a triable issue of fact. Smith v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Grenada, 460 So.2d 786, 792 (Miss.1984) (quoting Union Planters Nat'l Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir.1982)). To create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MID had possession of the requested information, Buckel certainly could have conducted more discovery via the examiners, former Commissioner Dale, and other persons, but failed to do so.
¶ 25. Buckel also points to the press releases and the news story in which former Commissioner Dale updated the public on the number of claims filed and paid. Buckel argues that it is simply not credible to believe that the former Commissioner either guesses at the [exact] figures or recalled the figures from memory based on the data provided from a third party source. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Buckel, this evidence does create an inference that Commissioner Dale had access to the data Buckel seeks, because the press releases do provide exact numbers of claims filed and paid. This evidence, however, does not create a reasonable inference that, years later, MID, under a new Commissioner, currently possesses the data underlying these press releases or news story. In fact, to draw the conclusion that MID possesses the data, one would have to pile inference upon inference. Specifically, one has to infer that Commissioner Dale possessed the data and then infer through Commissioner Dale's possession that MID must have possessed and currently possesses the information sought. Importantly, at the summary judgment hearing, Buckel even appreciated that MID might not have this material he had requested and conceded that MID had no responsibility to compile this information on claims. ¶ 26. Nonetheless, in support of his argument that the Report, the press releases, and the news story create circumstantially a reasonable inference sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion, Buckel argues, [S]ummary judgment is improper when the plaintiff has advanced enough circumstantial evidence to take [his] claims out of the realm of `mere conjecture' and plant them in the solid ground of `reasonable inference.' Thomas v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 233 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So.2d 567, 570 (Miss. 1997)). ¶ 27. From the record before us, this Court is constrained to find that Buckel has not presented circumstantial evidence sufficient for a trier of fact to find that the Commissioner possessed the documents requested. Commissioner Dale made these referenced statements more than two years before MID issued the Market Conduct Report in October of 2008 and almost three years before Buckel's request. These documents do not state that MID possessed this information and only create attenuated inferences that MID currently possesses the information compiled by the examination team. Moreover, Buckel has cast no doubt on the affidavit in support of the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment. ¶ 28. The law is clear that the party opposing the motion is required to bring forward significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact. Brown, 444 So.2d at 364 (citing Woods, 687 F.2d at 119). Without more supporting evidence, Buckel's theory remains merely possible, not probable. Thomas, 233 F.3d at 330. Buckel's evidence consists of mere general allegations and unsupported conclusions, not detailed and precise facts, and is not sufficient to withstand entry of summary judgment in light of Cromeans's uncontroverted affidavit. Brown, 444 So.2d at 362 (citing Liberty Leasing Co. v. Hillsum Sales Corp., 380 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir.1967)). ¶ 29. In sum, we find no error in the chancellor's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner, because Buckel did not put forth sufficient evidence to create a reasonable inference to satisfy this element of his claim, namely that the Commissioner possessed the records requested under Mississippi Code Section 25-61-3(b) (Rev.2006).