Opinion ID: 178775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interstate Predicate Act

Text: The government argues that while the images themselves may not have traveled across state lines, their transmission would not have occurred except for the prior communications from the defendant's file server through the IRC network to the FBI. It is undisputed that this initial connection occurred across state lines. The government contends that it would be nonsensical to protect `necessary intermediate steps' in pornography trafficking such as the defendant's intrastate DCC image transmissions that only occurred because of prior interstate communications. Thus, according to the government, an interstate predicate act satisfies section 2252A(a)(1)'s jurisdictional element. The government initially relies on our decision in United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir.1999), which addressed whether downloading images from a computer bulletin board constitutes shipping or transporting within the meaning of the terms as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). There, the defendant downloaded child pornography from a computer bulletin board in Denmark. Id. at 1043-44. After being convicted of transporting sexually explicit material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1), the defendant argued that he was convicted under the wrong section of the statute. Id. at 1043. We agreed, explaining that downloading is more akin to receiving materials than to transporting or shipping them. Id. at 1050. The government points to one isolated statement in Mohrbacher, where we said: Those who are responsible for providing the images to a customer, by making them available on a computer bulletin board or by sending them via electronic mail, are properly charged with and convicted of shipping or transporting images under § 2252(a)(1). Id. (emphasis omitted). Nothing in Mohrbacher is apposite to the jurisdictional question presented here. Indeed, nowhere in Mohrbacher did we even mention the jurisdictional in interstate commerce requirement. Rather, the language on which the government relies meant to distinguish conduct constituting shipping or transporting images, within the meaning of the statute, from receiving or possessing them under a different subsection. Mohrbacher is irrelevant for purposes of this case. Somewhat more on point is United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 846-47 (9th Cir.1986). There, the defendant mailed undeveloped, unprocessed film containing images of nude teenage girls to an out-of-state developer. Id. at 844. He argued that the unprocessed, undeveloped film did not constitute knowingly ... mail[ing] any visual depiction ... of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id. at 845 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added)). [9] We rejected Smith's argument, holding that the exclusion of unprocessed film from the statute's coverage would impede the child pornography laws by protecting a necessary intermediate step in the sexual exploitation of children, because the fact that the film was undeveloped eliminated neither harm to the victims nor the incentive to produce the images. Id. at 846-47 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2d Cir.1976) ([W]e do not feel that Congress is powerless to regulate matters in commerce when the interstate features of the activity represent a relatively small, or in a sense unimportant, portion of the overall criminal scheme. Our problem is not whether the nexus of the activity is `local' or `interstate'; rather,... so long as the crime involves a necessary interstate element, the statute must be treated as valid. (internal citations omitted)). We reject the government's view that Wright's entirely intrastate acts satisfy the statute's interstate commerce requirement solely because of prior interstate activity. First, to the extent that Smith can be read to suggest that Wright's connection to the IRC network provides an adequate basis for federal jurisdiction, this would ignore the text of section 2252A(a)(1). The statute requires that the defendant  transport ... in interstate commerce ... any child pornography. The transportation of images is the focus, rather than the connection to a network in interstate commerce that contains child pornography. It was through Wright's connection to the interstate network that he allegedly advertised his willingness to exchange child pornography, though he did not transport any images through those channels. To accept the government's argument would be to sustain Wright's Count 2 conviction based on conduct of which Wright was acquitted in Count 1. Count 1 alleged that in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A), (d), Wright did knowingly make, print and publish a notice and advertisement seeking and offering to receive, exchange, display, distribute and reproduce visual depictions involving the use of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, knowing or having reason to know that such notice and advertisement will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce by means of computer. Thus, section 2251(c) punishes a person who advertises the exchange of child pornography if such person knows or has reason to know that such ... advertisement will be transported in interstate ... commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)(2)(A) (2003) (emphasis added). Section 2252A(a)(1), on the other hand, requires that the defendant know he is transporting the actual images across state lines. See also Korab, 893 F.2d at 214-15 (rejecting the government's argument that conduct in connection with the crime of which the defendant was acquitted could be used to satisfy jurisdiction). Therefore, holding that section 2252A(a)(1) can be satisfied by predicate Internet use, e.g. advertising, would conflate it with section 2251(c), of which Wright was acquitted. Second, sustaining Wright's conviction based on interstate conduct outside the actual scope of section 2252A(a)(1) would be contrary to Korab and Sutcliffe, where we held that the act being criminalized in the statute at issue must itself travel across state lines. Indeed, Korab rejected a nearly identical argument to that now advanced by the government. In Korab, the government argued that a January 11 interstate telephone call placed by the defendants to the victim satisfied the interstate communication requirement. 893 F.2d at 214. The call concerned logistical details pertaining to the defendants' extortionate scheme, including defendants' specific instructions to the victim on making the payment. Id. We held such conduct insufficient to maintain a conviction; the interstate call was not an essential element of the crime since it did not contain any threats. Id. Thus, Korab rejected holding that a defendant's interstate predicate act, though perhaps necessary to completing the offense, provides a sufficient basis for jurisdiction where that act was not an essential element of the crime of conviction. See also id. (holding that interstate communications involving threatening phone calls made after the charge set forth in the indictment were not part of the crime of conviction, and therefore could not form the basis for jurisdiction). The government provides a third reason why we should consider Wright's prior interstate activity as a basis for jurisdiction. It argues to hold otherwise would ignore that the statute includes the transportation of child pornography by computer. We disagree. Congress added the phrase by any means including by computer following interstate or foreign commerce in 1988, to section 2252A's predecessors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(c)(2) and 2252(a). Pub.L. No. 100-690, § 7511, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). To be sure, adding the phrase  including by computer signals Congress' intent to call particular attention to computers as a means of interstate commercethat is, a means by which child pornography may be transported interstate. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1143 (2002) (listing among the uses of the word include to call more attention to the single item or smaller class by stressing the fact of its existence or the fact of its not having been overlooked). But that Congress listed computers as one particular means of interstate transport does not permit treating computer transport somehow differently from all other means of interstate travel. See Lewis, 554 F.3d at 214 (The plain language of the statute indicates that we are to treat shipment or transmission by computer the same way we would shipment or transmission by any other means.); Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1202 (The phrase `including by computer' specifies a method of interstate movement; the government must still establish that any computer-related movement crossed state lines.). Whether the defendant transported child pornography by mail, by sea, or by computer, the government must still prove it crossed state lines. Accordingly, we hold that an interstate predicate acthere, Wright's connection to the IRC networkdoes not provide a sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction under section 2252A(a)(1).