Opinion ID: 883276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whereupon the witness was excused.)

Text: Kelly maintains that because defense counsel did not challenge J.C.'s competency or attack her credibility, the trial judge should not have taken it upon himself to question J.C. regarding her competency. He alleges that the trial court's questioning of J.C. amounted to impermissible comment on her credibility as a witness, and therefore we should remand the case for a new trial. There is no age requirement before a person is considered competent to testify. State v. Phelps (1985), 215 Mont. 217, 226, 696 P.2d 447, 453. Rule 601, M.R.Evid., defines witness competency and that rule provides: (a) General rule competency. Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. (b) Disqualification of witnesses. A person is disqualified to be a witness if the court finds that (1) the witness is incapable of expression concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge and jury either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand the witness or (2) the witness is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. Because a witness is presumed to be competent under Rule 601(a), the District Court had no obligation to question J.C. concerning her ability to tell the truth, unless counsel raised the issue of competency or unless the court had some concerns in that regard. If the court found it necessary to interrogate J.C., it should have done so outside the jury's presence. See, State v. Howie (1987), 228 Mont. 497, 503, 744 P.2d 156, 159. State v. Phelps (1985), 215 Mont. 217, 225, 696 P.2d 447, 452. We conclude that the District Court did err in questioning J.C. in front of the jury. If the court, or counsel, was concerned about J.C's competency, then the court should have established her competency before she testified and outside the presence of the jury. We adopt this procedure for future cases. [6] However, in the instant case we will not reverse Kelly's conviction for two reasons. First, Kelly failed to make a timely objection at the first available opportunity, after the court's voir dire of J.C. Section 46-20-104(2), MCA, provides that failure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection. The motion for a mistrial did not come until settlement of instructions, two days after J.C. testified. Therefore we conclude that Kelly failed to object at the first available opportunity, thereby waiving his objection. Secondly, we believe the error was harmless. In State v. Smith (1984), 208 Mont. 66, 676 P.2d 185, the trial court also questioned a child witness concerning her competency as a witness in front of the jury. In that case we noted that although it was not proper to question the witness in the jury's presence, the defendant was not prejudiced by the questioning in light of the overwhelming corroborating evidence. Smith, 676 P.2d at 188. In the instant case, we find that there was substantial direct and corroborative evidence of Kelly's guilt. For example, Louis Hollingshed testified that Kelly visited his apartment with a young girl, that he saw blood on the kitchen floor, and that Kelly had a cut on his thigh. Hollingshed asked Kelly what happened and Kelly replied, The bitch cut me. Hollingshed also testified that the young girl was frantic, crying, and emotionally upset. Angela Schneider testified that J.C. ran to her workplace shaking and screaming he is going to kill me, and pointed to a black man in a blue car. The emergency room doctor who examined J.C. shortly after the incident testified that she had lacerations on her fingers, and other injuries consistent with someone who had been sexually and physically assaulted. The State Crime Lab found that a blood stain found on J.C's shirt was consistent with Kelly's blood, and blood stains on the towel which was taken from Louis Hollingshed's apartment were consistent with both Kelly's and J.C.'s blood. Based on this evidence and other evidence introduced at trial, we conclude that the District Court's questioning of J.C. was harmless error, therefore Kelly's conviction is upheld. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING, CONVICTION AFFIRMED. HARRISON, GRAY, TRIEWEILER and WEBER JJ., concur.