Opinion ID: 2364015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arbitrability of the Present Dispute

Text: The Contract between the Committee and the Association includes a general agreement to submit to arbitration any dispute still unresolved after the first three formal levels of grievance procedure. Article III(D)(4)(A) and (B) provide: A. If the aggrieved person is not satisfied with the disposition of his grievance by Level Three [appeal to the School Committee], or if no decision has been rendered within six (6) days after he has first met with the School Committee, he may, within three (3) days after a decision by the Committee or six (6) days after he has first met with the Committee, whichever is sooner, make a written request of the president of the WTA to submit his grievance to arbitration. B. The Association may, within five (5) days after receipt of such request, submit the grievance to arbitration by written notice to the Committee. There is no provision in the Contract that expressly excludes any particular dispute from arbitration. However, the General section of Article III does restrict the arbitrator's jurisdiction to grievances which emerge from the language of the Contract: A. Grievances that do not arise from the language of this Agreement, or an alleged breach thereof, may be processed through to Level Three [the School Committee], but will not be arbitrable. Before the arbitrator, the Committee objected to his hearing the dispute on the ground that the nonrenewal of an extracurricular contract, as opposed to a regular teaching contract, was not arbitrable. The arbitrator overruled the objection, finding that Articles VI(B) and XIV of the Contract governed the dispute. The Superior Court vacated the arbitration award, finding that the parties never intended the provisions of the Contract to apply to continuing contract teachers acting in extracurricular capacities. In essence, in deciding the issue of substantive arbitrability, the Superior Court had to answer the following question: Were Article VI(B), which provides that the Committee cannot refuse to renew the contract of a continuing contract teacher without just cause, and Article XIV, which gives a preference to members of the bargaining unit in filling vacancies, intended by the parties to apply to extracurricular as well as regular teaching contracts and vacancies? In our judgment, the Superior Court erred in answering this question in the negative for purposes of determining substantive arbitrability. We are compelled to conclude that the Superior Court did not give adequate regard to the general rules for determining arbitrability that flow from the strong legislative policy favoring arbitration. We cannot square a holding here of nonarbitrability with the mandates that [d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage and that the claimant need make only a claim, which, on its face, is governed by the Contract. Although, as noted below, the applicability of Articles VI(B) and XIV to the dispute over the nonrenewal of Dawson's extracurricular coaching contract is far from clear, we cannot say with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Articles VI(B) and XIV provide in full: Article VI B. Continuing contract teachers shall not be disciplined, reprimanded, reduced in rank or compensation, or deprived of any professional advantage, including non-renewal of contract, without just cause. (Emphasis added) Article XIV Promotions Position as used in this article means any position which pays a salary differential and/or involves an additional or higher level of responsibility. A notice of all vacancies and promotional positions, including qualifications for same shall be made available to each bargaining unit member. The Committee agrees to give preference to qualified bargaining unit members when all other factors are substantially equal. The right is reserved, however, to open the position to outside candidates if it will be in the best interest of the system. It is undisputed that Dawson is a continuing contract teacher. Furthermore, reading the above-quoted language alone could reasonably lead to a conclusion that the term non-renewal of contract includes extracurricular contracts, the term salary differential refers inter alia to the extra pay that goes with football coaching, and the extracurricular coaching job is a position or vacancy for which Dawson as a qualified bargaining unit member has certain contract rights. Finally, and most importantly, the parties had in collective bargaining fixed the extra pay to be received by bargaining unit members who accepted extracurricular assignments. The extracurricular pay scale was set forth in Appendix B to the Contract. The fact that the parties bargained over the amount of extra pay that went with extracurricular positions at least suggests that the parties may have intended the provisions governing the nonrenewal of contracts and the filling of vacancies to apply to extracurricular as well as regular teaching positions, at least so far as continuing contract teachers were involved. Consequently, Dawson met the test articulated in Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, supra, 354 A.2d at 165. He made a claim which, on its face, is governed by the collective bargaining contract. The dispute was subject to arbitration.