Opinion ID: 1229856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: burden of proof for duress

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving duress by a preponderance of the evidence. Although both Riker and the State agree that she had the burden of proof, Riker argues that she had to prove the defense only to the extent that it created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to her guilt. This, she argues, is a lower standard than preponderance of the evidence and the failure to specify the proper burden necessitates a new trial. [6] [8, 9] Duress is an affirmative defense. State v. Razey, 54 Wn.2d 422, 426-27, 341 P.2d 149 (1959). Normally, affirmative defenses must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631, 639-40, 781 P.2d 483 (1989) (consent defense to rape); State v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120, 122-26, 683 P.2d 199 (1984) (lack of knowledge defense to accomplice liability); State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104, 110, 483 P.2d 832 (1971) (treaty exemption defense to violation of fishing laws), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); State v. Mays, 65 Wn.2d 58, 68, 395 P.2d 758 (1964) (insanity defense), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 953 (1965); State v. Knapp, 54 Wn. App. 314, 320-22, 773 P.2d 134 (unwitting possession defense), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1022 (1989); State v. Gilcrist, 25 Wn. App. 327, 328-29, 606 P.2d 716 (1980) (involuntary intoxication defense). This is so because generally, affirmative defenses are uniquely within the defendant's knowledge and ability to establish. Knapp, at 320-22. Nevertheless, in the context of duress, we have previously stated that the defendant need only prove the defense to the extent of creating a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the [defendant's] guilt.... State v. Bromley, 72 Wn.2d 150, 155, 432 P.2d 568 (1967). Riker contends that the trial court, by instructing the jury that the duress defense must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, placed upon her a higher burden than that called for in Bromley. However, upon close examination, we do not think that the burden described by the trial court is at all dissimilar from that enunciated in Bromley. The burden of proof described in Bromley is perplexing at best. The two cases upon which it relied involved alibi defenses. State v. Pistona, 127 Wash. 171, 219 P. 859 (1923); State v. Rosi, 120 Wash. 514, 208 P. 15 (1922). An alibi defense denies that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Johnson, 19 Wn. App. 200, 205, 574 P.2d 741 (1978). As such, an alibi defense negates an element of the crime, making it proper to require that the defendant prove the defense only to the extent that it creates a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt. A successful alibi will make it impossible for the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, a defense of duress admits that the defendant committed the unlawful act, but pleads an excuse for doing so. See State v. Russell, 47 Wn. App. 848, 853, 737 P.2d 698, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1032 (1987). The duress defense, unlike self-defense or alibi, does not negate an element of an offense, but pardons the conduct even though it violates the literal language of the law. [7] State v. Peters, 47 Wn. App. 854, 859, 737 P.2d 693, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1032 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 897-98, opinion supplemented on denial of rehearing sub nom. United States v. Emilio, 969 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.1992). See also Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systemic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 225 (1982) (noting that a duress defense recognizes that the conduct was intentional, but is excused because of a defect in control). A successful duress defense does not create a reasonable doubt that the defendant did the crime charged, but rather condones the defendant's admittedly unlawful conduct. Any burden of proof for duress which literally relies on the ability of the defendant to create a reasonable doubt would therefore be impossible to meet, since a duress defense necessarily allows for no doubt that the defendant did the acts charged. The language in Bromley is admittedly confusing. In attempting to establish an evidentiary threshold, the bar was placed too high. Generally, an affirmative defense which does not negate an element of the crime charged, but only excuses the conduct, should be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Rice, 102 Wn.2d at 124-26; see also State v. Box, 109 Wn.2d 320, 323-30, 745 P.2d 23 (1987) (discussing the differences between defenses which negate an element of the crime and those that only excuse the crime). The only logical reading of Bromley is that, as with most affirmative defenses which do not negate an element of the crime, the defendant must prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence. [8] Thus, we affirm the trial court's instruction to the jury.