Opinion ID: 582731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Res Judicata--Claim Preclusion.

Text: 26 The Federal defendants assert that the Fund's present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion because the NEPA claim at issue here is identical to the one previously asserted in a 1985 lawsuit. An appellate court reviews the availability of the defense of res judicata de novo. State of Nevada Employees Ass'n Inc. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 558, 112 L.Ed.2d 565 (1990). 27 A final judgment on the merits bars a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies over the same cause of action. Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1518 (9th Cir.1985). Claim preclusion bars the assertion of any theory of recovery that could have been asserted in the first action. Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir.1988). 28 The Federal defendants assert that the 1985 action brought by the Fund for Animals against the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service, and the Superintendent of Yellowstone, in their official capacities, precludes this suit. In the 1985 action, the Fund alleged that the named defendants allowed bison to leave Yellowstone knowing that hunters, ranchers, and state game wardens in Montana were killing these animals. In an unpublished memorandum, the district court held against the Fund and in favor of the named defendants in ruling on cross motions for summary judgment. 29 The 1985 summary judgment was a final judgment on the merits. Although the two actions name different federal defendants, [t]here is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03, 60 S.Ct. 907, 917, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940); Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir.1984). 30 The defense of res judicata is inapplicable, however, because the Federal defendants have not demonstrated that the 1985 action and the matter before us involve the same cause of action. In determining whether successive lawsuits involve the same cause of action, we have considered the following factors: 31 (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. The last of these criteria is the most important. 32 C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted). 33 After reviewing the record in both proceedings, we conclude that the Fund's current claim is not precluded by the district court's judgment in the 1985 action. In the 1985 action, the Fund alleged that the defendants' failure to prevent bison from leaving Yellowstone required the preparation of an EIS. The district court held in the 1985 action that the named federal defendants were not required to prepare an EIS because [a]llowing migration of some bison out of the boundaries of the park is not an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources. 34 In the present action, the Fund is challenging a bison management plan that will be carried out jointly by the State and Federal defendants. Although the Fund once again contends that an EIS must be prepared, the 1990 bison management plan differs significantly from the passive conduct of the named federal defendants in 1985 in failing to prevent bison from leaving Yellowstone. In this matter, the Federal defendants are active participants in a plan that attempts to achieve specific goals in managing the northern herd with the cooperation of the State of Montana. The Federal defendants' proposal to prevent the State defendants from reducing the northern herd to a number less than 200 is clearly different from the claim that the federal agencies failed to take any action to prevent bison from leaving Yellowstone. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Andrus, 608 F.2d 811, 814-15 (9th Cir.1979) (While interim action involving removal of horses for the protection of the range pending issuance of an EIS may be felt to be insignificant or not 'major,' it would not follow that the ultimate decision to remove horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level would be equally insignificant.). The 1990 bison management plan provides that bison cows, bulls and calves that leave Yellowstone will be treated differently. In the 1985 action, the Fund alleged that the named defendants passively acquiesced in the shooting of all bison that entered the State of Montana from Yellowstone. 35 The present action challenges the adequacy of the EA prepared regarding the interim 1990 bison management plan. The 1985 action concerned different governmental conduct. The defense of res judicata does not apply in this action. The district court erred in ruling that the Fund's claim was precluded by the decision in the 1985 action. 36