Opinion ID: 158495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sentencing--Amount of Methamphetamine

Text: 23 Mr. Eads also contends that the district court erred in determining his sentence based on the actual amount of methamphetamine that he purchased rather than on the weight of the mixture. According to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (1996), the statute in effect when he committed the crime, Mr. Eads could only be sentenced to life imprisonment if he possessed 100 grams of more of methamphetamine . . . or 1 kilogram or more of a mixture . . . containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. The substance that was sold to Mr. Eads weighed 454 grams and was seventy percent pure methamphetamine. At sentencing, the court determined that the substance was 317.9 grams of actual methamphetamine and, because this exceeded 100 grams, sentenced Mr. Eads to life imprisonment. We review the court's factual findings as to the amount of methamphetamine for clear error, and review legal issues de novo. See United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1497 (10th Cir. 1996). 24 According to Mr. Eads, the government impermissibly manipulated his sentence by controlling the purity of the substance that it sold to him. Thus, in determining his sentence, the court should have used the weight of the total mixture rather than the weight of the pure methamphetamine contained within the mixture. In support of this argument, he finds an analogy in USSG § 2D1.1 comment. (n.15), which authorizes a downward departure when an undercover agent sells a controlled substance at a substantially reduced price, thereby inducing a defendant to purchase more than he otherwise would. We find his argument to be without merit. 25 In United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1996), we analyzed a claim of sentencing manipulation under our established outrageous governmental conduct standard. See id. at 963. Under this standard, we ask whether, considering the totality of the circumstances in any given case, the government's conduct is so shocking, outrageous and intolerable that it offends the universal sense of justice. Id. at 964 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We utterly fail to see such conduct here. Mr. Eads does not claim that he was induced to purchase a purer batch of drugs than he otherwise would; nor can he make such a claim, given the fact that he tested the methamphetamine himself and pronounced, [I]t's fine it's good. Aplt. App. tab 1 at 53. Thus, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Eads possessed more than 100 grams of methamphetamine. 26