Opinion ID: 761713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merit of the Ex Post Facto Claims

Text: 13 A sentencing court must apply the version of the sentencing guidelines effective at the time of sentencing unless application of that version would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. See United States v. Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d 1325, 1336 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Mills, 9 F.3d 1132, 1136 n. 5 (5th Cir.1993). The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). The clause generally prohibits the retroactive application of the sentencing guidelines if it results in a more onerous penalty. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 431-33, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987); United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir.1997). [C]entral to the ex post facto prohibition is a concern for 'the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.'  Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30, 101 S.Ct. 960). 14 The district court did not err in finding that the calculation of Kimler's sentence did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause on these facts. Simply put, Kimler had adequate notice at the time he committed the counterfeiting offense in 1990 that his mail fraud offenses would be grouped with the counterfeiting offense and therefore that the 1990 guidelines would apply. It was Kimler's decision to continue his illegal activities related to his mail fraud offenses after the revisions in the sentencing guidelines, and that decision allowed the sentencing court to determine his appropriate sentence with reference to the guidelines in effect when the last criminal act in the grouped series was committed without running afoul of the Constitution. 15 Kimler does not argue that the sentencing court improperly applied § 3D1.2(d) to group his mail fraud counts with his counterfeiting count for sentencing purposes. We have previously held that where a sentencing court groups offenses committed before a change in the sentencing guidelines with offenses after the amendment, and then applies the amended guideline in determining a defendant's appropriate sentence, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated. See Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d at 1335-36. In Castaneda-Cantu, the defendants had been convicted of multiple counts, occurring both before and after November 1, 1991, when the sentencing guidelines were changed to add § 2S1.1(b)(1), which adds three offense levels if a defendant knew that laundered funds were drug proceeds. See id. The sentencing court, applying § 3D1.2(d), 5 grouped the offenses together and applied the post-revision guidelines in order to determine the appropriate sentence. See id. The defendants argued, like Kimler, that application of the revised sentencing guidelines to the group violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. We rejected the defendants' contention, stating that because each defendant had been charged with at least one count subsequent to the guidelines amendment, the sentencing court properly applied the amended guidelines to the grouped offenses. 6 See id. 16 Our decision in Castaneda-Cantu comports with the view of several other circuit courts that have considered this issue. For example, in United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1403-07 (11th Cir.1997), the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that application of the sentencing guidelines in effect when the last of a string of related offenses was committed was consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. In that case, the defendant, Bailey, was found guilty of nineteen related counts of mail fraud, operating a firearms business without a license, possession of a machine gun, possession of hand grenades, making a false statement to a grand jury, and obstructing an official investigation. See id. at 1389. Bailey committed the offenses between March 1989 and April 1992, see id. at 1403 n. 30, and argued on appeal that guidelines provisions enacted after some of his discrete offenses were committed could not be applied to his sentence consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id. at 1403. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, determining that the grouping and one book rules provided proper notice to Bailey that his earlier offenses would be sentenced under the revised guidelines if he continued to commit related offenses. See id. at 1404-05. The court reasoned that 17 the one book rule, together with the Guidelines grouping rules and relevant conduct, provide that related offenses committed in a series will be sentenced together under the Sentencing Guidelines Manual in effect at the end of the series. Thus, a defendant knows, when he continues to commit related crimes, that he risks sentencing for all of his offenses under the latest, amended Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Analogous to a continuous criminal offense, like conspiracy, the one book rule provides notice that otherwise discrete criminal acts will be sentenced together under the Guidelines in effect at the time of the last of those acts. 18 Id. (footnotes omitted). The court then concluded that the use of the edition of the guidelines in effect when Bailey committed the last of his discrete, but related, offenses did not deprive him of  'fair warning' of the punishment for his crimes, and was therefore consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 1406 (quoting Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446). 19 Other federal courts have reached similar conclusions, deciding that the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated when a defendant is sentenced, pursuant to the one book rule, under revised sentencing guidelines for grouped offenses. See United States v. Cooper, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir.1995) (determining that defendant's sentence did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause where defendant's three offenses, only one of which was committed after revision of sentencing guidelines, were grouped and sentencing court applied harsher revised guidelines); United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44, 48-49 (1st Cir.1993) (finding no ex post facto violation where defendant was sentenced for multiple counts of embezzlement based on revised guidelines when some counts were committed before guidelines revision); United States v. Tucker, 982 F.Supp. 1309, 1317 (N.D.Ill.1997) (following Cooper and Regan, finding that application of one book rule to multiple grouped offenses did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause). But see United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 545-47 (9th Cir.) (vacating district court's sentence calculated under revised, more onerous, guideline as violative of Ex Post Facto Clause where some grouped offenses were committed before revision), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 141, 139 L.Ed.2d 89 (1997). 20 We agree with the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in Bailey and the majority of circuit courts that have faced this issue and conclude that a defendant has notice that the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time he committed the last of a series of grouped offenses will apply to the entire group. Application of the revised guidelines thus does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. In this case, because Kimler was sentenced under the sentencing scheme in place when he committed the counterfeiting offense, the last offense in the series of grouped offenses, he was on notice that the revised guidelines would apply to his mail fraud counts as well. 21 Kimler argues, however, that he had no notice that he could be sentenced for the mail fraud offenses under the revised guidelines because all of his illegal conduct, including his counterfeiting offense, was complete before the codification of the one book rule in 1993. Thus, Kimler asserts, even if he had notice that his mail fraud and counterfeiting offenses would be grouped under § 3D1.2(d) in 1990, he had no fair warning that the sentencing court would apply the revised guidelines in determining his offense level, instead of the loss tables found in the 1988 version of the sentencing guidelines. 22 This argument lacks merit. Although § 1B1.11(b)(3) was not codified until 1993, the provision simply reflected the existing practice of courts in applying the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Anderson, 61 F.3d 1290, 1301 n. 7 (7th Cir.1995). In addition, the one book rule, as codified in § 1B1.11, is a clarifying rather than a substantive amendment, Bailey, 123 F.3d at 1406 n. 38; see United States v. Barnett, 5 F.3d 795, 802 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993), and thus could properly have been considered at Kimler's sentencing, which took place after § 1B1.11 was added to the guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11(b)(2); United States v. Camacho, 40 F.3d 349, 354 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Aguilera-Zapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (5th Cir.1990). 23 Thus, we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the government on Kimler's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to raise the ex post facto claims. Despite the fact that the 1988 sentencing guidelines, in effect when Kimler committed mail fraud, included a different fraud loss table and did not include a two-level increase for risking serious bodily injury, Kimler had proper notice that, if he continued to commit related offenses that would be grouped under § 3D1.2(d), he would be sentenced under the guidelines in use when he committed the last offense in the grouped series. Kimler chose to commit the counterfeiting offense in 1990, after the sentencing guidelines had changed. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not protect Kimler from the consequences of his decision. Having determined that Kimler's ex post facto challenges lack merit, we cannot say that Kimler was prejudiced because the sentencing court did not consider them. Kimler was therefore not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.