Opinion ID: 1256399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: recent limitations upon the doctrine

Text: Common to the decisions of all jurisdictions which limit or modify the termination at-will doctrine is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. The principle involved is more easily stated than judicially applied. The difficulty rests in determining a precise definition of the expression public policy. Hence, the public policy exception has been extended by some courts to particular job terminations not recognized by others. In the 1959 seminal case of Petermann, supra , plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for testifying truthfully under oath before a California legislative committee, after having been instructed by his employer's secretary-treasurer to testify falsely. In holding that a cause of action in tort was stated the California Court of Appeals cites the penal code, Section 118 of which makes perjury a crime, as a reflection of the state's public policy. However, in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared public policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be without reason and contrary to the spirit of the law. Petermann , 344 P. (2d) at 27. In Sides, supra , the same result as in Petermann was reached by the North Carolina Court of Appeals is a perjury-related discharge. Prior to her deposition, plaintiff, a Duke University Hospital nurse, was advised by Hospital doctors and Duke attorneys that she should not tell all that she had seen relating to Dr. Down's treatment; ... that if she did so she `would be in trouble.' Despite the warning she testified fully and truthfully. Subsequently, she was fired. She filed suit, which included a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Sides court reaffirmed the employer's right to terminate at-will employment for arbitrary, irrational or no reason but not, however, for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. An at-will prerogative without limits could be suffered only in an anarchy, and there not for long  it certainly cannot be suffered in a society such as ours without weakening the bond of counter balancing rights and obligations that holds such societies together. Thus, while there may be a right to terminate a contract at-will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would encourage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is designed to discourage and prevent. Sides , 328 S.E. (2d) at 826. In Wiskotoni, supra , the plaintiff was employed as a branch bank manager. Pursuant to subpoena he appeared before his county grand jury. Subsequently terminated, he alleged in a retaliatory discharge action that the reason for his termination was his having been served with the subpoena. The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Michigan's recognition of the public policy exception, affirmed a District Court award of damages. Witnesses are compelled to appear before the grand jury and may be punished for failure to appear and to testify. Mich. Comp. Laws Sections 767.5, 767.19c.... these legislative statements of public policy clearly imply the existence of a cause of action for wrongful discharge where the reason for the discharge is that the employee has been subpoenaed to appear and testify before a grand jury. Wiskotoni , at 383.