Opinion ID: 1799288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether prosecution under an amendment to the statute of limitations extending the limitation period in effect at the time of the crime is an ex post facto violation.

Text: The crime was committed in June of 1989. At the time the crime occurred, the applicable statute of limitations was two years under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-1-5 [1] , for the crime of fondling [2] , Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-23. On April 21, 1989, an act was approved by the legislature to take effect on July 1, 1989, amending Miss. Code Ann. § 99-1-5 to provide a seven-year period of limitations in which to commence a prosecution for the crime of fondling. [3] During the first trial, Christmas raised the statute of limitations as a ground for his motion for directed verdict. This was denied by Judge Vlahos. At the second trial, Judge Thomas, treating the motion as a motion to dismiss, concurred in Judge Vlahos's earlier ruling and denied the renewed motion. Christmas argues that his prosecution should have been time barred under the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the crime. He committed the crime in June of 1989. His prosecution did not commence until, at the earliest, January of 1992. This was more than the original two year limitation period. Christmas contends that his prosecution under the revised seven year statute of limitations was a violation of the ex post facto clauses as proscribed in both the state and federal constitutions. [4] Christmas states there are four types of laws that are considered ex post facto. They are defined as follows: 1) Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater that it was when committed. 3) Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 4) Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). He asserts that the fourth type is applicable to this case. The State disagrees. As of July 1, 1989, the effective date of the amendment to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-1-5, prosecution for the crime, which took place in June of 1989, had not become time barred by the two-year statute of limitations then in effect. Therefore, according to the State, it could have prosecuted Christmas at any time within the newly established period. [5] Had the lower court applied the statute of limitations in effect at the time the crime was committed, Christmas contends his prosecution, which began more than two years after the crime, would have been time barred. The State prosecuted Christmas within the amended statute of limitations. Christmas complains such retroactive application of a subsequently amended statute of limitations is a violation of the ex post facto clause. It is axiomatic that statutes of limitations may not be made retroactive to the prejudice of a party. Perkins v. State, 487 So.2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1986). Although the prosecution of Buford Christmas was timely under the amended statute of limitations in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-1-5 (1985), the limitations period did not become effective until subsequent to the commission of the crime. There are two theories why the prosecution was not a violation of the ex post facto clauses. Each provide the Court with adequate authority to affirm the decision by the lower court.