Opinion ID: 774103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evolution of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

Text: 19 Because Milstein has alleged numerous separate acts, each of which must be considered individually, the analysis will be facilitated by an initial discussion of absolute immunity precedent. The seminal case on absolute immunity for prosecutors is Imbler v. Pachtman, where the Supreme Court held that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under §§ 1983. 424 U.S. at 431. This immunity covers the knowing use of false testimony at trial, the suppression of exculpatory evidence, and malicious prosecution. 3 Id. at 416,96 S.Ct. 984. The Court reasoned that these activities are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Id. at 430. The Court acknowledged that at some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator or investigator rather than as an officer of the court, but refused to draw that line in Imbler . Id. at 431 n.33. 20 In Burns v. Reed, the Court held that absolute immunity applied to a prosecutor's appearance in court in support of an application for a search warrant and the presentation of evidence at that hearing. 500 U.S. at 492. The Court reasoned that appearing before a judge and presenting evidence in support of a motion for a search warrant clearly involve the prosecutor's role as advocate for the State, rather than his role as administrator or investigative officer. Id. at 491 (quotations omitted). The prosecutor was thus immune to liability based on the plaintiff's allegations that he had elicited false testimony during the hearing. Id. at 482. The Court reasoned that its conclusion logically flowed from the common-law immunity against defamation suits arising from statements made in judicial proceedings. Id. at 489-90. 4 21 However, the Burns Court refused to grant absolute immunity for the prosecutor's act of providing legal advice to police. Id. at 496. The Court rejected the government's argument that giving legal advice is related to a prosecutor's role in screening cases for prosecution: 22 That argument, however, proves too much. Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive. Rather, as in Imbler, we inquire whether the prosecutor's actions are closely associated with the judicial process. Indeed, we implicitly rejected the United States' argument in Mitchell [v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)] where we held that the Attorney General was not absolutely immune from liability for authorizing a warrantless wiretap. Even though the wiretap was arguably related to a potential prosecution, we found that the Attorney General was not acting in a prosecutorial capacity and thus was not entitled to the immunity recognized in Imbler . 23 Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added) 5 ; see also Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127. 24 The limited availability of absolute immunity was further indicated in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, where the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity to prosecutors who were sued for fabricating evidence during the early stages of the investigation where police officers and assistant prosecutors were performing essentially the same investigatory functions. 509 U.S. at 262-63, 275-76. The fabrication allegation was that prosecutors, after three expert witnesses could not connect a bootprint to the suspect (the §§ 1983 plaintiff), shopped for the opinion of a particular expert who was well known for her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony. Id. at 262. In denying absolute immunity, the Court reasoned: 25 There is a difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand. When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other. 26 Id. at 273 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago , 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J.) (denying absolute immunity for prosecutor who participated in planning and execution of police raid on suspected weapons cache)); Kalina , 522 U.S. at 126; see also Herb Hallman Chevrolet, 169 F.3d at 642 (A prosecutor may only shield his investigative work with qualified immunity.). Additionally, the Court announced a line before which absolute immunity could not apply:A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. Accordingly, the Court noted that the alleged fabrication occurred well before the grand jury was empaneled. Id. at 275. 27 The plaintiff in Buckley had also asserted a claim based upon alleged false statements made to the press. The Court likewise refused to grant absolute immunity. Comments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial process just because they are made by a prosecutor. Id. at 277. 28 The last Supreme Court case to address absolute immunity for prosecutors was Kalina v. Fletcher, where absolute immunity was denied to a prosecutor who filed the equivalent of an affidavit in support of a motion for an arrest warrant. The prosecutor had filed three documents: an information charging burglary, a motion for an arrest warrant, and aCertification for Determination of Probable Cause, a sworn document establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. 522 U.S. at 120-21. The Court reasoned: 29 [P]etitioner's activities in connection with the preparation and filing of two of the three charging documents--the information and the motion for an arrest warrant--are protected by absolute immunity. Indeed, except for her act in personally attesting to the truth of the averments in the certification, it seems equally clear that the preparation and filing of the third document in the package was part of the advocate's function as well. 30 Id. at 129. However, in personally attesting, petitioner performed an act that any competent witness might have performed, and was thus not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 129-30, 131; accord Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1999) (relying on Kalina in denying absolute immunity to prosecutor who executed oath or affidavit in support of arrest warrant). Even when the person who makes the constitutionally required `Oath or affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 131 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).