Opinion ID: 3063500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of Current Action

Text: The Appellees moved to dismiss the Appellants’ second complaint for the same reasons outlined in the orders from the district court and this Court in the first case. The district court ordered the Appellants to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court stated that the complaint was nearly identical to the previous complaint filed by Busse that was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that the Appellants had not cured the deficiencies noted in the first dismissal order. After receiving the Appellants’ responses, the district court granted the Appellees’ motions to dismiss. The district court determined that the Appellants’ complaint was nearly identical to Busse’s complaint in the previous case. The district court stated that it previously had explained its reasoning for dismissing Busse’s claims and adopted the reasoning from its order in the first case. The district court also denied the Appellants’ multiple motions for the district court judge to recuse himself. The Appellants had requested that the district court judge recuse himself because he had ruled against Busse in the previous lawsuit and because the district court’s refusal to find that Resolution 569/875 was invalid showed that the judge was biased. The district court determined that the Appellants had not asserted any reasonable basis for recusal. 6 Finally, one of the Appellees, Wilkinson, moved for sanctions against the Appellants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). Wilkinson alleged that (1) the Appellants knew the district court did not have jurisdiction over their complaint because the court previously had dismissed an identical complaint and (2) the complaint was filed in bad faith to harass the Appellees. Appellee Wilkinson requested that the district court award him attorney’s fees and issue an injunction preventing Busse from representing himself in the case and filing further lawsuits in the court. The district court denied Wilkinson’s motion, but warned the Appellants that they may be sanctioned in the future if they were to file another complaint with similar allegations, file the same document numerous times, or improperly designate a motion as an emergency. The Appellants appeal the district court’s dismissal of their instant complaint and denial of their motion for recusal.5 Appellee Wilkinson cross-appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for sanctions.6 5 We review de novo questions concerning our subject matter jurisdiction, including ripeness. See Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2006). We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 2004). “Courts must construe pro se complaints more liberally than they would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 673 (11th Cir. 1990). We review for abuse of discretion a district judge’s recusal decision. Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1306, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2002). 6 We review the denial of a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 for an abuse of discretion. Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1100 (11th Cir. 1998). 7