Opinion ID: 1342405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of new trial motion based on after-discovered evidence

Text: Following the trial, and while the case was initially on appeal, Solicitor Myers received a letter from Kevin Fuller, who had been one of Thompson's cellmates at the Lexington County Detention Center. In a second letter to Solicitor Myers, Fuller asked for help and some probation with his pending charges. According to Fuller, Thompson had admitted to shooting the victim. Solicitor Myers promptly forwarded Fuller's letters to defense counsel, who filed a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. Because this information came to light after the filing of the appeal, we remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The trial court heard the matter fully and, in a detailed order, denied the new trial motion, both as to the guilt and sentencing phases. Mercer assigns error to the denial of his new trial motion. The decision whether to grant a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not disturb the trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11, 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007); State v. Simmons, 279 S.C. 165, 166, 303 S.E.2d 857, 858 (1983). Having carefully considered the new trial motion, fully cognizant of Mercer's third-party guilt defense, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion. In order for Mercer to prevail in his new trial motion premised upon after-discovered evidence, he must show the after-discovered evidence: (1) is such that it would probably change the result if a new trial were granted; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered prior to the trial; (4) is material; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching. State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 619-20, 513 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1999). The State concedes that all elements are met, save the first element. In this post-trial setting, our jurisprudence recognizes the gatekeeping role of the trial court in making a credibility assessment. [9] State v. Porter, 269 S.C. 618, 621, 239 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1977) (noting that the determination of whether new evidence is credible for purposes of a new trial motion rests with the trial court); State v. Deese, 266 S.C. 534, 538, 225 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1976) (noting that the trial court is tasked with assessing the new evidence in a motion for a new trial); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 33, 207 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974) (quoting State v. Mayfield, 235 S.C. 11, 34-35, 109 S.E.2d 716, 729 (1959)) (The credibility of newly-discovered evidence offered in support of a motion for a new trial is a matter for determination by the circuit judge to whom it is offered. In him, not this court, resides the power to weigh such evidence; and his judgment thereabout will not be disturbed except for error of law or abuse of discretion.). On review, we may not make our own findings of fact. The deferential standard of review constrains us to affirm the trial court if reasonably supported by the evidence. The after-discovered evidence is limited to Fuller's testimony that Thompson admitted to being the triggerman. Thompson's participation in, and first-hand knowledge of, the crime, was clearly known to Mercer and the State from the beginning. With the proper standard of review in mind, we review the trial court findings. We begin with the trial court's conclusion concerning Fuller's testimony: I carefully observed Fuller's demeanor and listened to his testimony. In my view, the inconsistencies in his own stories, the differences between his version and that of Thompson and Johnston, and the inconsistency of Fuller's story with known facts did not result from mistake or failure of recollection, but rather from intentional, calculated misrepresentations. I believe Fuller fabricated the story about Thompson admitting to shooting Sergeant Davis. I believe Fuller purposefully made different statements about this at different times when Fuller's view of what version of the story suited Fuller's interests best had changed. Finally, apart from the factors listed above, Fuller simply left me with the clear impression he was not telling the truth. Fuller's testimony has very little credibility. Fuller's criminal record includes multiple convictions for burglary, aggravated assault and battery, and criminal domestic violence. Fuller characterized his criminal history as a nice record. We recognize that all the key participants in the post-trial hearing have extensive criminal records. More relevant to the inquiry is careful scrutiny of the actual statements Fuller attributes to Thompson. Given the inconsistencies with Fuller's story, there is a basis to sustain the trial court's lack of credibility finding. For example, on cross examination at the evidentiary hearing, Fuller gave varying versions as to when Thompson confessed to the murder. Concerning the substance of the various statements, when Fuller was confronted with the inconsistency about what happened to the gun, he said he miswrote the initial statement because he was in a hurry. [10] Another inconsistency is found in Fuller's account of where Davis was shotas Davis was exiting his vehicle (which is Fuller's account) versus outside the vehicle. Fuller informed investigators in a July 19, 2006, interview that another cellmate could corroborate Thompson's alleged confession. The other cellmate, Timothy Johnston, did testify, but he denied Fuller's account of the Thompson confession. The trial court found Johnston's testimony credible. Fuller's credibility may be assessed not only by internal inconsistencies within his statements and testimony, but also by contrasting the purported Thompson confession against what are fairly solid facts. First, the only witness to the crime, Magwood, provided a physical description of the assailant, a description that closely matched the much bigger Mercer and not the slender Thompson. Second, Magwood saw Davis being forced, apparently at gunpoint, by the heavyset assailant toward the rear of the Navigator; Magwood found Davis lying in the bushes next to the parking lot. This is at odds with the Fuller account of the murder occurring in the area of the driver's door. Third, Fuller testified to a blood smear on the Navigator; the vehicle was stopped only minutes after the murder and no blood was found in or on the vehicle. Fourth, according to Fuller, Thompson shot Davis pointblank... behind his ear. The pathologist opined that, because of the absence of soot or stippling around the wound, the fatal shot came from a distance of at least two feet away from the skin of the victim. Fifth, according to Fuller, Thompson moved the murder weapon during the traffic stop and placed it under Mercer's seat. This is at odds with the testimony of Deputy Stazer, who pulled the vehicle over and saw no such movement in the vehicle. To be sure, Mercer may challenge the certitude of these so-called facts, but their cumulative effect informed the judgment of the trial court in assessing the post-trial motion based on after-discovered evidence. Having thoughtfully considered the evidence, the trial court determined that there is essentially no chance the jury would believe Fuller's testimony that Thompson confessed to shooting Sergeant Davis. This finding of course is beyond the applicable would probably change the result standard. Spann, 334 S.C. at 619, 513 S.E.2d at 99. In denying the post-trial motion as to the guilt phase, the trial court observed that the jury was charged, without objection, on the law of the hand of one is the hand of all. In denying the post-trial motion as to the sentencing phase, the trial court observed that the jury was charged that it could recommend a death sentence only if it found that Mercer was the triggerman. [11] Mercer takes issue with the denial of his post-trial motion. Mercer posits a different view of the facts. Mercer, in essence, invites this Court to make different credibility determinations, especially with respect to Fuller. Beyond Fuller, it is argued that the trial court had a valid reason not to believe cellmate Johnston over Fuller, for Johnston was facing life imprisonment with a pending burglary first-degree charge. [12] We respectfully decline Mercer's invitation to engage in de novo fact finding. We further reject the suggestion to ignore the trial court's gatekeeping role in post-trial after-discovered evidence motions. The credibility of newly-discovered evidence offered in support of a motion for a new trial is a matter for determination by the circuit judge to whom it is offered. In him, not this court, resides the power to weigh such evidence; and his judgment thereabout will not be disturbed except for error of law or abuse of discretion. Mayfield, 235 S.C. at 34-35, 109 S.E.2d at 729. To accept Mercer's premise that a jury must weigh the conflicting evidence ignores the State v. Spann factors and the gatekeeping role of the trial court as outlined in many cases, including State v. Mayfield . Moreover, the approach advanced by Mercer confuses the applicable standard in post-trial after-discovered evidence motions with the admissibility of third-party guilt evidence at trial. The question before us, then, is whether the trial court's denial of the post-trial motion amounts to an abuse of discretion. We hold it does not. In so ruling, we are sensitive to the notion that a mere finding of a witness's lack of credibility does not complete the analysis, because a witness may lack persuasive credibility and still create reasonable doubt. This sensitivity forms part of our consideration. We have drawn the line, however, with Mercer's desire to use Fuller's testimony for residual doubt as to guilt in the sentencing phase. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-74, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (clarifying Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by noting that a state is not constitutionally required to allow a capital defendant to submit residual doubt mitigation evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital case). We affirm the denial of Mercer's post-trial motion based on after-discovered evidence.