Opinion ID: 195635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Assignment of Antitrust Claim

Text: The NFL argues that Sullivan cannot bring this lawsuit because he sold his antitrust claim when he sold the Patriots. The sale contract between Sullivan and KMS Patriots, L.P., provided that Sullivan transferred to the buyers all other assets of the Patriots' and its holding company,5 besides those specifically listed and those specifically excluded. None of the listed or excluded assets include an antitrust claim. According to the NFL, the term all other assets should be interpreted 5 The language of the contract actually states all other assets of Selling Group, which includes Sullivan himself. However, neither party asserts that Sullivan intended to transfer all his personal assets with this clause and, anyway, the all other assets clause is number seventeen on a list of items referred to by the contract as the following assets of the Club and Holdco [the Patriots' holding company]. -33- broadly to include the present antitrust cause of action. We disagree. Absent some express language to the effect that Sullivan was selling his football related antitrust claims or, at the very least, causes of action, we cannot find that Sullivan assigned the present antitrust claim to the buyers of the Patriots. Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 437-40 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Lerman v. Joyce Int'l, Inc., 10 F.3d 106, 112 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming requirement in Gulfstream that assignment of claim must be express but expanding definition of express language to include a grant of all causes of action, claims and demands of whatsoever nature). As no such express language appears in the contract for the sale of the Patriots, Sullivan did not transfer his interest in the present lawsuit to KMS Patriots when he sold the team. The NFL's arguments concerning the application of 1 of the Sherman Act to the facts of this case raise a substantial challenge to the jury verdict and are certainly weighty enough to give us pause. Upon careful consideration of the issues, however, we find Sullivan's theory of the case to be a plausible one and ultimately find the evidence sufficient to support it. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, we see no justification, as a matter of law, for ringing the death knell on this litigation.