Opinion ID: 1156913
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deputization as a Remedial Device

Text: (9) Plaintiffs alternatively assert that even if the statutory scheme does not mandate deputization of county employees, a court may order deputization as a remedy for a county's failure to implement the statutory scheme, or for its violation of federal or state constitutional equal protection guaranties. Under this theory, although County might have found ways to implement the requirements of the Elections Code and to meet equal protection standards without the deputization program, in light of its failure to do so the court could order deputization if, in its judgment, such a measure would effectively remedy County's violation of the law. The Court of Appeal did not reach plaintiffs' equal protection claims, which were rejected by the trial court. As noted above, it is well settled that although a court may issue a writ of mandate requiring legislative or executive action to conform to the law, it may not substitute its discretion for that of legislative or executive bodies in matters committed to the discretion of those branches. In Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728 [135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929], we noted that the courts may not order the Legislature or its members to enact or not to enact, or the Governor to sign or not to sign, specific legislation.... ( Id. at p. 751.) Similarly, although a court may order a local legislative body to perform a nondiscretionary ministerial act, it may not control a local board's discretion. ( Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 344 [124 Cal. Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609].) Serrano is instructive regarding the proper role of a court in providing remedies for violations of law by other branches of government. In that case we rejected a claim that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing an order requiring the Legislature and the Governor to adopt a plan for school financing in conformity with state constitutional guaranties of equal protection. We noted with approval that the trial court explicitly and properly refrained from issuing directives to the lawmakers and the chief executive, stating in its judgment: `... [T]his judgment is not intended to require, and is not to be construed as requiring, the adoption of any particular plan or system for financing the public elementary and secondary schools of the state....' ( Serrano, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 752.) Unlike the court in Serrano, the trial court in this case did not limit its order to requiring governmental defendants to take action in conformity with the law. Its order required County to take a particular course of action  deputization of public employees  specifically committed to County's discretion by statute. (§ 302, subd. (e).) In Legislature v. Reinecke (1973) 10 Cal.3d 396 [110 Cal. Rptr. 718, 516 P.2d 6], we selected a reapportionment plan for the state (ordinarily a legislative act) to remedy the failure of the other branches to effect a plan conforming to the constitutional requirement of equal protection. Our decision in Reinecke, however, was issued only after the Legislature was given a reasonable opportunity to formulate a constitutionally valid plan. ( Id. at p. 400.) We declined in that case to issue an order to the Legislature, relying on the parties to accede to our stated holdings. ( Id. at p. 407; see also Young v. Gnoss (1972) 7 Cal.3d 18, 29 [101 Cal. Rptr. 533, 496 P.2d 445] [declining to issue order to county clerks, relying on them to accede to holding].) Procedures that give other branches of government a reasonable opportunity to devise plans to correct violations of law in matters involving the exercise of their discretion are required by the well-settled rule that mandamus generally will not issue to control discretion. A court seeking to remedy a violation of law should not require a particular remedy unless the respective governmental entity has no discretion to exercise (as when the particular duty is made ministerial either by statute or by constitutional compulsion) [10] or unless, as in Reinecke, it fails to exercise that discretion after being given a reasonable opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the issuance of the preliminary injunction. The statutory scheme does not require implementation of an employee deputization program. Even assuming arguendo that County's present outreach program is inadequate to fulfill the requirements of the Elections Code or violates equal protection principles, the trial court's order requiring an employee deputization program over County's objection was not an available remedy for the alleged violation.