Opinion ID: 2042260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Source of Duty Defendant Is Alleged to Have Breached

Text: The appellate court held that when one undertakes to render veterinary services, the common law imposes upon that person a duty to use the same skill and knowledge normally possessed by veterinarians in good standing in similar communities, unless that person represented he or she had greater or less skill or knowledge. 375 Ill.App.3d at 454, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542. The appellate court concluded, therefore, that defendant's duty to plaintiffs did not arise solely from his position as a member of the faculty at the University, which merely provid[ed] the occasion for his incurring a duty toward them. As such, he was not performing a uniquely governmental function. 375 Ill.App.3d at 455, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court relied on this court's decisions in Currie and Jinkins. In Currie, an Illinois State Police trooper, Lao, was on duty patrolling Interstate 80. He heard and responded to a call regarding a disturbance in the nearby City of Joliet. He activated his lights and siren, exited the interstate, and headed for the location of the disturbance. After he missed a turn, he made a U-turn that resulted in his traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. When he made a left turn to leave the one-way street, he collided with the plaintiff's pickup truck. Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 155, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977. This court concluded that the duty the trooper had allegedly breached did not arise as a result of his employment as a State trooper, but rather arose as a result of his status as the driver of an automobile on a public roadway. Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 161-62, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977. Thus, he was not performing a uniquely governmental function at the time of the collision. Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 162, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977. Because it was not within his normal and official role as a state trooper to respond to police calls in a nearby jurisdiction with its own police department, he was not protected by sovereign immunity and plaintiff's claim was not a matter for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 162, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977. When he chose to respond to the call, he was performing the nongovernmental activity of driving a motor vehicle in a routine manner on a public street ( Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 164, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977), and, thus, he owed the same duty owed by all automobile drivers to their fellow motorists ( Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 163, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977). We distinguished Lao's situation from that of the officer in Campbell v. White, 207 Ill.App.3d 541, 152 Ill.Dec. 519, 566 N.E.2d 47 (1991), who was involved in a high-speed chase. In the course of the chase, he struck the suspect's vehicle, causing the suspect's death. We observed that although Officer White was operating a motor vehicle, he was doing so in a manner in which only a governmental official is authorized to act, and the duty he was alleged to have breached arose solely as a result of [his] State employment. Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 164, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977, citing Campbell, 207 Ill. App.3d at 555, 152 Ill.Dec. 519, 566 N.E.2d 47. Defendant cites Currie, but only to note that this court cited Campbell therein. Relying on Campbell, he argues that, like the officer involved in a high-speed chase, any actions he took while treating plaintiffs' horse were uniquely related to his state employment. At oral argument, counsel for the defendant represented that at the time defendant performed surgery on the animal, students were present and he was teaching. (Counsel explained that these facts have not been pleaded because defendant responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss rather than a responsive pleading.) Counsel also argued that trooper Lao's actions were not unique to his state employment because he was not on duty and he owed a duty of reasonable care as a citizen, while trooper White was on duty, driving his squad car for a purpose uniquely related to his state employment. Defendant is mistaken. In both Currie and Campbell, the defendant police officers were on duty at the time they were involved in automobile accidents. In Currie, the on-duty officer was performing the nongovernmental activity of driving the wrong way down a city street on his way to a location at which his job did not require him to be. Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 164, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977. In Campbell, the on-duty officer was performing the governmental activity of pursuing a fleeing suspect. Campbell, 207 Ill.App.3d at 555, 152 Ill.Dec. 519, 566 N.E.2d 47. Even if we accept defendant's assertion that he was teaching students at the time he performed the allegedly unauthorized surgery, his actions are more like those of Officer Lao than those of officer White. Like both officers, defendant was on duty. That is, he was present at his place of state employment, engaged in his state function of teaching students. When he performed a procedure that the owners of the animal had forbidden, his conduct was like that of Officer Lao, who was acting outside his authority as a state trooper when he caused an accident. Thus, like Officer Lao, whose duty to refrain from these negligent acts is the same duty owed by all automobile drivers to their fellow motorists ( Currie, 148 Ill.2d at 163, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977), defendant owed a duty to perform only those nonemergency surgeries to which the owner has consented. 375 Ill.App.3d at 455, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542. The appellate court also relied on our decision in Jinkins, where we held that a psychiatrist and a licensed clinical professional counselor employed at a state mental health facility owed a duty of care to their patient that arose from their status as professionals, rather than from their state employment. Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 334, 282 Ill.Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411. We rejected the defendants' argument that their only duty to the patient arose from their state employment because they would not have come into contact with him but for their employment at a state facility. Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 333, 282 Ill.Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411. We held that because the defendants were using their professional judgment   , the source of their duty was their mental health professional status. Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 335, 282 Ill.Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411. Defendant responds by commenting that while health-care providers have a duty to their patients that exists above and beyond any duty unique to state employment, the duty owed [in this case] involved property, not people. The appellate court identified several sources of a common law duty of veterinarians: (1) the status of veterinary medicine as a learned profession, which sets certain standards for its members (375 Ill. App.3d at 452-53, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542), (2) numerous cases from other jurisdictions that have recognized a common law duty of care applicable to veterinarians (375 Ill.App.3d at 453-54, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542), (3) cases from our own appellate court that have assumed the existence of a veterinary standard of care (375 Ill.App.3d at 454, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542), and (4) section 299A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, defining the standard of conduct for professions or trades (375 Ill.App.3d at 454, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542). Defendant argues that he owed no duty of care to plaintiffs or their animal. He rejects the first source listed based on his exemption from the license requirement of the Veterinary Medicine and Surgery Practice Act, which we discuss below. As to the second source, he argues that this court should give no weight to the decisions of the many other states that impose a duty of care on veterinarians because those states may not have veterinary colleges. We do not find this argument persuasive. Defendant does not comment on the third source, but we find the appellate cases cited to be of limited value because the duty question was not addressed directly. See Nikolic v. Seidenberg, 242 Ill. App.3d 96, 102, 182 Ill.Dec. 753, 610 N.E.2d 177 (1993) (adoption contract with animal shelter did not waive right to sue associated veterinarian for negligence); Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hospital, Ltd., 157 Ill.App.3d 818, 821, 110 Ill.Dec. 53, 510 N.E.2d 1084 (1987) (damages for loss of companionship were not properly awarded in action against animal hospital and veterinarian for negligently causing the death of plaintiff's dog); Spilotro v. Hugi, 93 Ill.App.3d 837, 49 Ill.Dec. 239, 417 N.E.2d 1066 (1981) (trial court erred by excluding certain testimony of plaintiff's expert witness in malpractice action against veterinarian). We note, however, that these cases are not new and they are not novel. See C. Bailey, Annotation, Veterinarian's Liability for Malpractice, 71 A.L.R.4th 811, 1989 WL 571915 (1989) (listing cases). Defendant does not respond to the appellate court's reliance on section 299A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section, entitled Undertaking in Profession or Trade, provides: Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, at 73 (1965). Comment a to section 299A notes that the word skill, as used here, refers to a special form of competence which is not part of the ordinary equipment of the reasonable man, but which is the result of acquired learning, and aptitude developed by special training and experience. Further, [a]ll professions, and most trades, are necessarily skilled, and the word is used to refer to the special competence which they require. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, Comment a, at 73 (1965). It cannot be disputed that a doctor of veterinary medicine is skilled. It is also beyond dispute that the practice of veterinary medicine and surgery is a profession or trade (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, Comment b, at 73 (1965)) and that the medical or surgical treatment of an animal, with or without a contract for such services, is an undertaking (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, Comment c, at 73-74 (1965)). As the appellate court observed, this court has previously cited section 299A of the Restatement with approval. In Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 242, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986), we discussed the burden on the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to establish the standard of care against which the defendant physician's alleged negligence is judged. We cited comment e to section 299A for the similar locality rule, which requires a physician to possess and to apply that degree of knowledge, skill, and care which a reasonably well-qualified physician in the same or similar community would bring to a similar case under similar circumstances. Purtill, 111 Ill.2d at 242, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, Comment e, at 74-75 (1965). In Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill.2d 1, 23, 223 Ill.Dec. 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996), this court cited section 299A in support of a statement that the standard of care for all professionals is the use of the same degree of knowledge, skill and ability as an ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar circumstances. We noted that standard of care is utilized to measure the conduct of a wide variety of both medical and nonmedical professions, including podiatry and dentistry. Advincula, 176 Ill.2d at 23, 223 Ill.Dec. 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (citing Dolan v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill.2d 279, 281, 32 Ill.Dec. 900, 396 N.E.2d 13 (1979) (podiatric practitioner), and Rosenberg v. Miller, 247 Ill. App.3d 1023, 1028-29, 187 Ill.Dec. 285, 617 N.E.2d 493 (1993) (dentists)). We conclude that section 299A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is an accurate statement of the common law of Illinois with respect to the duty of care owed by members of professions or trades, and we, therefore, agree with the appellate court's holding that a veterinarian owes a duty of care. See C. Bailey, Annotation, Veterinarian's Liability for Malpractice, 71 A.L.R.4th 811, § 2(a), 1989 WL 571915 (1989) (noting that the gravamen of such an action is that in providing veterinary care, the veterinarian failed to use such reasonable skill, diligence, and attention as might ordinarily have been expected of careful, skillful, and trustworthy persons in the profession). Thus, the duty owed by defendant arises independently of his employment by the state and he was not performing a uniquely governmental function ( Jinkins, 209 Ill.2d at 335, 282 Ill. Dec. 787, 807 N.E.2d 411) when he treated plaintiffs' horse. Defendant protests that the appellate court's recognition of a common law duty of veterinarians raises all animalsfrom domestic pets to investments such as race horsesto the same level or plane as human beings. We note, however, that comment c to section 299A states that [i]n the ordinary case, the undertaking of one who renders services in the practice of a profession or trade is a matter of contract between the parties, and the terms of the undertaking are either stated expressly, or implied as a matter of understanding. (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A, Comment c, at 73-74 (1965). This statement implicates the Moorman doctrine. In the typical case, a veterinarian will be providing care to an animal after having formed a contractual relationship with the owner of the animal. Thus, even though the veterinarian is subject to a duty of care, the owner may be limited to a contractual remedy for any breach of duty. The appellate court in the present case held that plaintiffs' claim comes within an exception to the Moorman doctrine so that they are not limited to a breach of contract claim. For the reasons explained previously, we express no opinion on this issue.