Opinion ID: 203677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Request Second Competency Hearing

Text: Finally, petitioner contends that his trial counsel's failure to request a second competency hearing on the day of trial renders his representation constitutionally defective. He asserts that under Massachusetts law, the court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's competency to stand trial when there arises a substantial question of possible doubt about the defendant's competence, see Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 375 N.E.2d 1168, 1170-71 (1978), and that such doubt existed in this case. However, a competency hearing had taken place on February 24, 1994, just five days before the start of trial. At that hearing a forensic psychologist testified that defendant was competent to stand trial, an opinion which the court adopted. Thereafter, trial counsel advised the court that he was waiving a previously-filed motion for a second competency hearing. The judge responded, I am satisfied, unless someone tells me that there has been a change of circumstances. Trial counsel responded that he was unaware of any since [the holding of the competency hearing] last week. As a result, the court made no further competence inquiry. This claim was heard and adjudicated on the merits by the SJC, and therefore, deference under AEDPA applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The SJC concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient, reasoning that petitioner had presented no evidence whatsoever to contradict trial counsel's statement to the court on the first day of trial that [petitioner's] condition had not changed in the intervening week. Boateng, 781 N.E.2d at 1219. Thus, the court concluded that [t]here were no grounds on which to request a new hearing, and trial counsel's decision not to request one was not error. Id. While clearly established federal law provides that a significant change in circumstances in the midst of trial may render a second competency hearing proper, see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), there is no evidence of any such circumstances present on these facts, and thus, no indication that trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment in not requesting a subsequent hearing. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, we cannot say that the SJC applied Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner in finding a lack of deficiency in counsel's performance.
In his final claim petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process of law because it failed to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte on the first day of trial or anytime thereafter, despite there being doubt regarding his competency. As with the related ineffective assistance claim, the SJC rejected this argument on the merits, reasoning that a trial judge is required to conduct a sua sponte inquiry only if a substantial question of possible doubt as to competence arises. Boateng, 781 N.E.2d at 1213. But here, [o]n the first day of trial, trial counsel withdrew his previously filed motion for a competency hearing as moot, and informed the judge that nothing had occurred within the past week to warrant a new inquiry. Id. The court concluded that [i]n these circumstances there was no substantial question that required the judge's sua sponte action. Id. It is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent that the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996). Due process also requires a court to give proper weight to the information suggesting incompetence which [comes] to light during trial, and hold a competency hearing sua sponte in the event that such evidence is brought to its attention. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 179, 95 S.Ct. 896 (holding that further inquiry on competency was required where petitioner's suicide attempt, during the course of trial, raised sufficient doubt as to competence). In this case, however, petitioner was determined to be competent a week prior to trial and no evidence was brought to the attention of the court indicating that its earlier competence determination needed to be revisited. We cannot say on these facts that the SJC's decision rejecting petitioner's claim was anything less than a reasonable application of federal law. Therefore, this claim, and all of petitioner's claims for relief, must fail.