Opinion ID: 2041394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness of oral statements.

Text: Trial court posited its suppression ruling on several grounds. We consider one to be controlling: defendant's involuntary oral and written inculpatory statements were obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights guaranteed by Amendments 5 and 14 of the United States Constitution. Applying the second scope of review exception, supra, division I, we have independently examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant's statements, and reach the same conclusion trial court did. In so doing, we have kept before us those principles of law relating to such determinations. No one factor is determinative of the voluntariness of a confession which necessarily depends upon the totality of the circumstances of the individual case. State v. Cullison, supra at 314; see Checklist, 3 Wigmore on Evidence § 862, n. 11, pp. 352-54 (Chadbourn Rev., 1970). There is no talismanic definition of voluntariness. The totality of the circumstances encompasses the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation process. The court determines the facts surrounding the inculpatory statement, assesses their psychological impact on defendant, and evaluates the legal significance of defendant's reactions. Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862. Defendant's choice to confess must be essentially free and unconstrained with his will not overborne and his capacity for self-determination not critically impaired. Schneckloth, supra; State v. Cullison, supra. When, as here, the inculpatory statement is the result of custodial interrogation absent legal representation for defendant the State has the burden of proving the statement was voluntary. That burden is heavy, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966), although it is by a preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Iowa 1972). In applying the above principles in this case, we turn to those operational facts we deem most significant. The three officers who proceeded to California timed their trip and return to arrive in Council Bluffs during hours which, according to State's brief, traditionally are not judicial business hours. Passing for the moment the matter of instructions emanating from this court that magistrates and judges should make court service available, the officers thus found an excuse for noncompliance with the law that a defendant arrested on warrant    must be taken before the magistrate or clerk without unnecessary delay   . Section 757.7, The Code. An appearance before a judicial officer would have provided a less potentially coercive atmosphere in which to inform Lybarger of his rights and allow their exercise. See State v. Archer, 244 Iowa 1045, 1058, 58 N.W.2d 44, 51 (1953); cf. State v. Tharp, 258 Iowa 224, 230, 138 N.W.2d 78, 82 (1965). All available evidence indicates Lybarger was not the subject of intense police interest because of his bad checks, but as a murder suspect. However, he was neither informed of that fact nor told he was being returned to Iowa to be interrogated about a homicide, as he waived extradition and twice waived his Miranda rights. We do not agree with trial court's determination, as we read the ruling below, that the strategems employed were per se illegal and tainted all subsequent proceedings. See § 759.27, The Code; Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 36 S.Ct. 290, 60 L.Ed. 562 (1916); Herman v. Brewer, 193 N.W.2d 540, 546 (Iowa 1972); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 1493, 1500. We do, however, take into consideration the devious activities of the authorities in this regard as one of the circumstances relevant to the issue of voluntariness of Lybarger's statements. After he was questioned for about an hour in a soft manner, Lybarger was led into taking a polygraph examination. Statements of the officers to him implied others had voluntarily been examined and as a consequence had been cleared of any complicity in the crime. Upon request Lybarger signed a lengthy document entitled Statement of Release. This instrument contained another waiver of Miranda rights but its main purported purpose was to release the Pottawattamie county attorney and his employees (Babbitt, the polygraph officer was one) from all liability for the results of the polygraph examination. The circumstances of this waiver are uncertain. The examiner, Babbitt, testified he merely had Lybarger read over the release form. Two attending officers, although not completely certain, testified Babbitt orally explained at least Lybarger's right to remain silent. In signing the release Lybarger also affirmed Babbitt had thoroughly explained the polygraph technique, a fact not supported by the record. At 6:30 o'clock in the morning the polygraph examination ended. Lybarger had made no inculpatory statements but had been informed his answers were deceitful. He was then subjected to hard interrogation by three police officers with Babbitt also present. Within a few minutes, Lybarger confessed. By the court's calculations he had then been continually awake for twenty-six and one-half hours and under more or less continual interrogation for nine and one-half hours (the last six to six and one-half on a polygraph machine) before breaking. In this situation, several legal concepts apply. Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724-25. The crucial question as to the voluntariness of the statement is whether the accused's will was overborne at the time he confessed. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 920, 9 L.Ed.2d 922, 926 (1963). We consider the length of time Lybarger was without rest and the duration of his interrogation to be among the major circumstances rendering his inculpatory statements involuntary. See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961). We have taken notice of the debilitating effect of sleeplessness on the mind in cases involving lengthy jury deliberations. See State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Iowa 1970); Clemens v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 Iowa 499, 508-509, 144 N.W. 354, 357-58 (1913). While use of polygraphic examination techniques do not per se render subsequent admissions involuntary, see State v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa 1969), their use must be considered as a part of the totality of circumstances, particularly when the testing is this prolonged. The physical and psychological tensions exerted on Lybarger were demonstrated by his condition when the interrogation ended. The officers were alarmed; he was immediately hospitalized. While nervousness alone would hardly render inculpatory statements involuntary, United States v. Arroyave, 477 F.2d 157, 161 (5 Cir. 1973), the admitting doctor in this instance called it a probable psychologic reaction to combination of drugs and situation. Finally, in considering the psychological impact of the above police activity on Lybarger, we are aided by the testimony of Dr. Loeffelholz, an expert who conducted an intensive month-long study of Lybarger at the Oakdale facility. In his opinion, expressed in reply to a fair hypothetical question, Lybarger did not have the ability to volitionally make either the oral or written inculpatory statements. It is true Dr. Mahoney, who saw Lybarger during his hospitalization, made a contrary psychological analysis. But while he claims to have spent as long as twenty minutes with Lybarger, this doctor made the following entry in the hospital records. This patient was brought to the Emergency Room on 2-24-74 at 6:50 P.M. (sic). He was transferred to Marian Wing about 7:15 P.M. (sic). I saw him briefly for a few moments prior to 2-25-74, did not do a complete examination and he was interviewed by police and taken back to jail the same day. I did not make a diagnosis and did not do a history or physical. Dr. Mahoney admitted he would have had a better idea of Lybarger's personality and his reaction to stress had he had the time and employed procedures comparable to those used by Dr. Loeffelholz. In reaching our determination the first oral inculpatory statements were involuntary, we do not ignore the various waivers of Miranda protections made hours before by Lybarger. The first and possibly the second waivers were made without any knowledge of the purpose of the interrogation. Having once made those, subsequent waivers likely assumed less significance in Lybarger's mind. In any event, a waiver does not operate in perpetuity. The accused's knowledge of his rights is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances surrounding voluntariness, but it is not dispositive of the issue. Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 237-38, 93 S.Ct. at 2053, 36 L.Ed.2d at 868-69. Examining the totality of all these circumstances, we hold Lybarger's oral statements were not voluntarily made.