Opinion ID: 835029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: RPC 4.1(a) and RPC 8.4(a)(3)

Text: The Bar alleged that, during the attempted takeover, the accused told various people that he had written authorization from some government entity to take over the clinic. The trial panel agreed and concluded that the accused had violated RPC 4.1(a) and RPC 8.4(a)(3). RPC 4.1(a) provides: In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person[.] RPC 8.4(a)(3) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:      (3) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law[.] The accused responds that the Bar did not demonstrate that he violated either rule because it failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he had told anyone that he or Leveque had written authorization to take over the clinic. We disagree. Two clinic employees who were present at the time of the attempted takeover testified that the accused told them that he had authorization from the Attorney General or a court order to take over the clinic. First, Janus Brown, the clinic manager, in describing the attempted takeover, testified as follows: So when [the accused] addressed me by my name I just said, What is going on and how come you can do this? And he said something about the attorney general, like they've got permission to do this. And I was just floored, and I immediately went to my desk    and called Paul [Stanford]   .      And I'm going, Oh, my god, Paul, I don't know what's going on but, you know, she's got a lawyer here. And he said, you know, in essence, what it seemed to me that he had permission from the attorney general to be in and I don't know what's going on. Scott Carr, a clinic administrator, testified that when he asked the accused to leave during the attempted takeover, the accused stepped forward and said that he had a court order to be there[.] When asked if the accused showed him the order, Carr testified, No. He was kind of, you know, fondling his    briefcase as if he, you know, had    you know, he held it up halfway    you know, as if he was prepared to produce it, but I didn't know what he was talking about. He also testified, He had a leather briefcase as I remember. And when I had asked him to leave, he stepped forward and held it up halfway in front of his torso and said, I have a court order, I believe he said, from the attorney general to be here. In addition, Witte similarly testified that she heard the accused state or imply to the police that he had an order from the Attorney General authorizing Leveque to take control of the clinic. Although the accused cross-examined the witnesses at length as to the specific persons to whom the accused allegedly made his remarks and whether he referred to a court order or to some official document from the Attorney General, the three witnesses all clearly testified that they heard the accused state that he had a government document that authorized Leveque's actions. [5] We find that the Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused made such statements. We also find that the statements were false. The accused did not at that time (or at any later time) have any official authorization from the Attorney General or a court for Leveque or the accused to take control of the clinic or any other aspects of the corporation's operations. A lawyer violates RPC 4.1(a) if, in the course of representing a client, he or she knowingly makes a false statement of material fact. A lawyer violates RPC 8.4(a)(3) if he or she engages in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. Here, the Bar contends that the accused engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation. The Bar therefore can demonstrate both violations by demonstrating that the accused made a material misrepresentation of fact. See In re Kluge, 332 Or. 251, 255-56, 27 P.3d 102 (2001) (describing requirements for violation of former rules). A fact is material if hearing that fact would or could significantly influence the hearer's decision-making process. Id. at 255, 27 P.3d 102. The accused argues that, even if he made the statements described above, he did not engage in conduct involving    fraud [or] deceit under RPC 8.4(a)(3). He maintains that the terms fraud and deceit are used in their tortious sense in the disciplinary rules. See In re Brown, 326 Or. 582, 595, 956 P.2d 188 (1998) (so noting). He argues that the Bar must therefore prove each element of the torts of fraud and deceit, including that the persons to whom the representation was made relied on the representation. See id. (describing elements). The accused contends that none of the employees relied on his alleged misrepresentation. Instead, they insisted that the [a]ccused and his client depart [and] called the police, exactly as they would have if he had not made the misrepresentation. Although this court did state in In re Brown that fraud and deceit were used in their tortious sense in former DR 1-102(A)(3), it also noted that a lawyer can violate the rule by engaging in dishonest conduct and that the Bar need not prove fraud or deceit to show a violation of the rule. The court explained the meaning of fraud and deceit because, if the accused did violate the rule, it may be important to place a specific name on the conduct, for purposes of determining the appropriate sanction. Id. Here, the Bar argues that the accused engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation (not conduct involving fraud or deceit). Proof of reliance is not necessary to establish that the accused engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation. Kluge, 332 Or. at 256, 27 P.3d 102. We conclude that the accused made statements to several individuals that he had an order or some other written authorization from the Attorney General or a court permitting the takeover. Those statements were false and the accused knew them to be false. The statements were intended to convince the employees of the corporation or the police that Leveque was authorized to take over the clinic and therefore that they should permit her to do so. They were material. [6] The accused therefore violated RPC 8.4(a)(3) and RPC 4.1(a).