Opinion ID: 836180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: brown factors

Text: In In re Haley, 476 Mich. at 195, 720 N.W.2d 246, this Court stated: When determining the appropriate sanction, this Court seeks not to punish the judge, but to maintain the integrity of the judicial process and protect the citizenry from corruption and abuse. Based on respondent's conduct, the JTC has recommended that respondent be removed from office, a recommendation to which this Court will ordinarily defer if the JTC has adequately articulate[d] the bases for its findings and demonstrate[d] there is a reasonable relationship between such findings and the recommended discipline. Brown, 461 Mich. at 1292, 625 N.W.2d 744. I believe the JTC's findings and recommendations are supported by the record, and agree that respondent's misconduct warrants removal from office. This is confirmed by my review of the Brown factors, see Brown, 461 Mich. at 1292-1293, 625 N.W.2d 744, as follows: [39] (1) Misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct. The JTC found that this factor weighs heavily in favor of a severe sanction, because respondent had engaged in a long pattern of deceit to hide that he was living outside of the 1st division from 2000 to 2008. I am in agreement with this finding. Respondent moved outside his district in 2000 and continually changed his driver's license and voter's registration to other addresses within the 1st division, and engaged in other actions that served no purpose other than to prevent detection. Further, during a visit from SCAO, respondent was accused of not living within the division from which he was elected. In response, he falsely stated, I am too. Respondent then changed his telephone number on two separate occasions to his Belding Road property, with calls forwarded to 201 Honey Creek, again to prevent his relocation outside his electoral district from coming to light. It was only after respondent was confronted with a homestead exemption form, which clearly showed that he was living at 201 Honey Creek after 2005, that he finally admitted he was living outside of his division after 2005. These actions demonstrate a pattern and practice of conduct designed to conceal. I believe that the JTC correctly concluded that this factor weighs in favor of a more severe sanction. I also conclude that respondent's inappropriate drawings and comments, which consisted of three incidents over a 36-year period, cannot be viewed as a part of the same pattern or practice. Therefore, this conduct does not increase the severity of the first Brown factor. (2) Misconduct on the bench is usually more serious than the same misconduct off the bench. The JTC correctly found that respondent's conduct occurred off the bench, which suggests that a less severe sanction is appropriate. (3) Misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual administration of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the appearance of propriety. The JTC concluded that respondent's conduct, which calls into question his title to office before 2008, jeopardized every judgment that he has imposed from the bench. This is so, it argues, because, without lawful authority to render judgments, those judgments are at risk of being invalidated. [40] I respectfully disagree with this legal conclusion for the reasons stated in People v. Russell, 347 Mich. 193, 196-197, 79 N.W.2d 603, 605 (1956). I nonetheless agree with the JTC that this factor militates in favor of a more severe sanction. Although respondent's decisions may remain valid and binding legal decisions, I do believe that the propriety of these decisions raises legitimate concerns. In particular, I believe that the losing parties in these decisionswho above all participants in the legal process must be genuinely persuaded of the legitimacy and integrity of this processmay understandably feel embittered or resentful concerning the decisions in their own cases. (4) Misconduct that does not implicate the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct that does. For the reasons set forth in the previous factor, I believe that respondent's conduct, at least in retrospect, did create an appearance of impropriety that weighs in favor of a more severe sanction. Because it views this factor as largely duplicative of the considerations set out in the previous factor, the JTC concludes, and I agree, that this factor does not assist significantly in determining an appropriate sanction. (5) Misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less serious than misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated. Although I acknowledge that respondent's initial false statements in response to the unannounced visit from SCAO officials were made spontaneously, his conduct thereafter, including his continuing efforts to keep his actual residence prior to 2005 from being discovered, demonstrates that he engaged in a prolonged effort to mislead SCAO, the master, the JTC, and this Court about his living arrangements. Therefore, I agree with the JTC's conclusion that respondent's actions to avoid detection were deliberate and ongoing, and warrant the imposition of a more severe sanction. (6) Misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a case, is more serious than misconduct that merely delays such discovery. The JTC concluded that respondent's lack of authority to hold office impaired the judicial system's ability reach a just result. I respectfully disagree with the JTC with regard to this factor and do not believe that respondent's conduct undermined the ability of the justice system to discover the truth in legal disputes coming before this Court. Indeed, I do not believe his conduct affected the substantive determination of any case or controversy, assuming, as I do, that respondent continued during the period in controversy to act as a responsible judicial decision maker as his record suggests he has done for the past 36 years. That his conduct may have undermined the ability of the public, and the administrative systems of this Court, to identify his misconduct in moving his domicile is a factor that is more appropriately taken into account in the first and fifth factors. (7) Misconduct that involves the unequal application of justice on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic background, gender, or religion are more serious than breaches of justice that do not disparage the integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship. As concluded by the JTC, this factor does not apply to respondent's conduct, and thus suggests that a more severe sanction should not be imposed.