Opinion ID: 403539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWING THE MSPB's DECISION

Text: 9
10 The provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 that govern judicial review of MSPB decisions require the court to review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings, or conclusions found to be-(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence .... 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (Supp. IV 1980). Petitioner's basic contention is that the MSPB's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. The term substantial evidence has been interpreted to mean  'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 189 (D.C.Cir.1980). 11 Before reviewing the record to determine whether the MSPB decision meets these statutory standards, we first examine the legal bases for both the Army's decision to revoke petitioner's security clearance and its decision to dismiss him. We also review the rational nexus requirement, which we find inherent in the Army's regulation governing security clearance determinations. Finally, given the nature of the Army's presentation to the MSPB, we summarize briefly the general principles governing the use of hearsay evidence in adjudications before administrative boards such as the MSPB. 12
13 Under the applicable statutory provisions, the Army is entitled to remove a civilian employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Petitioner conceded before the MSPB and again in his argument on appeal that, given the need for a Top Secret clearance to perform his job, the Army's decision to terminate his employment was lawful if the revocation of his security clearance was lawful. Conversely, if the Army unlawfully revoked his clearance, his removal from the service was also unlawful, since his removal was based entirely on his failure to retain the security clearance. See Petitioner's Brief at 5, 26-27, 41-42. The issue before the court, then, is the lawfulness of petitioner's security clearance revocation. 14 The Army revoked petitioner's security clearance pursuant to Army Regulation AR 604-5, P 3-1 (May 4, 1972) (hereinafter Regulation), which establishes the criteria for granting, denying and revoking security clearances. 6 The Regulation states in part: 15 The ultimate determination of whether the granting of a clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall commonsense determination based upon all available information, both favorable and unfavorable. The granting, denial, or revocation of a security clearance may be a matter of far-reaching consequences to the Department of the Army as well as to the individual concerned. Therefore, arbitrary and perfunctory decisions must be avoided. 16 Id. P 3-1a. 7 The Regulation lists twenty-three factors that may, depending upon the degree of seriousness, be the basis for denial of access to classified defense information, or revocation of clearance. Id. Lt. Colonel Koslosky explained to the MSPB that the revocation of petitioner's security clearance was based upon several of the listed factors. According to his testimony, petitioner's alleged breaches of security constituted a (w)illful violation or disregard of security regulations under subsection 14 of the Regulation. Id. P 3-1a (14). Petitioner's alleged sexual misconduct and other incidents of indiscretion were viewed by Koslosky as immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, a relevant factor under subsection 17. Id. P 3-1a (17). 8 Finally, according to Koslosky, the allegations in petitioner's psychiatric evaluation indicated poor judgment and a lack of reliability. These latter factors are cited in a number of subsections of the Regulation, specifically subsection 20, which covers 17 (a)ny illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the individual, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case. 18 Id. P 3-1a (20). 9 See Tr. 104-06.
19 In those cases where court review is sanctioned, it is well established that an adverse personnel action cannot withstand judicial scrutiny unless there is some rational nexus between the adverse action taken and the government's articulated reasons for the action. In civil service cases, for instance, numerous judicial opinions have recognized that there must be a rational connection between the dismissal of an employee and the statutory standard of promoting the efficiency of the service. 10 As the court in Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265 (D.C.Cir.1977), aptly stated: 20 In law as well as logic, there must be a clear and direct relationship demonstrated between the articulated grounds for an adverse personnel action and either the employee's ability to accomplish his or her duties satisfactorily or some other legitimate governmental interest promoting the efficiency of the service. Absent a nexus between the cause asserted-here mental disability-and promotion of the efficiency of the service, the adverse action must be condemned as arbitrary and capricious for want of a discernible rational basis. 21 Id. at 272 (footnotes omitted); accord, Bonet v. United States Postal Service, 661 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981); McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1291 (D.C.Cir.1979); Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (4th Cir. 1978); Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1257-64 (7th Cir. 1977); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.Cir.1969). The nexus requirement has figured prominently in cases involving judicial review of adverse actions against employees for engaging in allegedly immoral or disgraceful behavior. E.g., Bonet v. United States Postal Service, 661 F.2d at 1074 (agency (must) establish what has been termed a 'vital nexus' between the misconduct-whether it be criminal, immoral, or both-and the efficiency of the service); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d at 1167 (reviewing court must at least be able to discern some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between an employee's potentially embarrassing (homosexual) conduct and the efficiency of the service); Mindel v. United States Civil Service Commission, 312 F.Supp. 485, 487 (N.D.Cal.1970) (Even if (an employee's) conduct can be characterized as 'immoral', he cannot constitutionally be terminated from government service on this ground absent a rational nexus between this conduct and his duties as a postal clerk.). See note 22 infra. 22 Courts have been equally vigilant in requiring a rational nexus between the denial or revocation of an individual's security clearance and the individual's conduct or other evidence relied upon by the government in denying or revoking the clearance. In Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C.Cir.1973), for example, this court explained: 23 With respect to the sufficiency of proof of a nexus between the conduct involved and security clearance, ... (w)hat is required is that every application for clearance must be considered in its particular factual setting.... The determination in these cases of security clearance ... is to be explained in such manner that a reviewing court may be able to discern whether there is a rational connection between the facts relied upon and the conclusions drawn. 24 Id. at 750-51. In most security clearance cases, courts have specifically insisted upon a rational nexus between the denial or withdrawal of an individual's security clearance and the individual's ability to protect classified information. E.g., McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 1973) (rational nexus requirement satisfied because hearing examiner, in denying applicant a security clearance, made specific findings of fact clearly describing why his homosexuality posed a threat of divulgence of classified material); Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F.Supp. 1373, 1379 (C.D.Cal.1974) (the government (must) offer proof of a rational nexus between (individual's) alleged homosexuality and his ability to safeguard classified information); Wentworth v. Laird, 348 F.Supp. 1153, 1155 (D.D.C.1972) (in order to deny clearance to an admitted ongoing homosexual ... there must be proof of a nexus or of a rational connection between such condition and the ability to safeguard classified information), aff'd sub nom. Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C.Cir.1973). 25 In this case, the Army Regulation governing security clearance determinations includes a nexus requirement consistent with the foregoing case law. The Regulation lists a number of activities and associations that may, depending upon the degree of seriousness, be the basis for denial of access to classified defense information, or revocation of clearance. AR 604-5, P 3-1a (May 4, 1972). The Regulation provides a general standard for security clearance determinations-whether the granting of a clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security-and stresses that arbitrary and perfunctory decisions must be avoided. Id. (emphasis added). The Regulation also requires the Army to determine whether suspension of access is reasonable and warranted  and to conduct an inquiry or investigation in order to provide a sound basis for revocation of the individual's security clearance. Id. P 3-1b (emphasis added). Thus, in order to deny a person access to classified defense information, there must be some evidence that the factors relied upon by the Army bear a rational connection to the interests of national security, specifically the individual's ability to safeguard the type of information to which he has been denied access. Anything short of this requirement would be arbitrary and perfunctory and in derogation of the overall decisional scheme established by the Regulation. 11
26 Because the Army built its case almost entirely on hearsay evidence, it is appropriate to review the principles governing the use of such evidence in administrative proceedings. Provided it is relevant and material, hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings generally and in adverse action proceedings in particular. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 190 (D.C.Cir.1980); Diggin v. United States, 661 F.2d 174, 178 (Ct.Cl.1981). 12 Moreover, under certain circumstances, hearsay can constitute substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); accord, Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d at 190-91 (hearsay may be substantial evidence depending on its truthfulness, reasonableness and credibility; hearsay statements are highly probative where declarants are disinterested witnesses, statements are essentially consistent, and counsel had access to the statements prior to agency hearing); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980) (hearsay may constitute substantial evidence depending upon its probative value and reliability, considering, inter alia, possible bias of the declarant, whether statements are signed and sworn to, whether they are contradicted by direct testimony, whether the declarant is available, and whether the hearsay is corroborated), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Schaefer v. United States, 633 F.2d 945, 952-53 (Ct.Cl.1980); see generally 4 B. Mezines, J. Stein & J. Gruff, Administrative Law § 26.02 (1981). However, as the MSPB noted in this case, mere hearsay lacking sufficient assurance of its truthfulness is not substantial evidence to overcome the sworn testimony of a claimant. McKee v. United States, 500 F.2d 525, 528 (Ct.Cl.1974).