Opinion ID: 732434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Amendment Scrutiny

Text: 46 The First Amendment, which applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1501 n. 1, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996), proscribes laws abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble. Plaintiffs claim that § 169.255(6) violates the speech and associational rights protected by the Constitution. In particular, plaintiffs allege that the annual consent requirement unduly interferes with their right to solicit funds for the furtherance of protected speech, an activity recognized as falling within the scope of the First Amendment. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2673-74, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). 47 It is well-settled that a law restricting speech on the basis of content is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the law be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954-55, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). It is an equally familiar principle that a law neutral with respect to content is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which is satisfied where the law furthers an important governmental interest without burdening substantially more speech than necessary. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2757-58, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Whether a law is content-based or content-neutral is not, however, always an easy question to answer. 48 Plaintiffs contend that § 169.255(6) is content-based, pointing to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990), where the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to various provisions of state and federal campaign finance statutes. In Buckley, the Court addressed federally-imposed dollar limits on political contributions by individuals and political action committees and on expenditures by candidates and political parties. In Austin, the Court considered Michigan's outright ban on political contributions made from corporate general treasuries. Plaintiffs reason that these cases establish the rule that any law relating to political speech warrants strict scrutiny. See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 1516-18, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate state ban on circulation of anonymous political literature). 49 Plaintiffs also argue that the content-basis of the statute is established by the fact that it applies only to automatic payroll deductions that involve political contributions and not to all automatic payroll deductions. Relying upon Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-62, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2289-91, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980), and Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2333, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), they suggest that a government regulation confined to a particular type of speech is always content-based. The claim is that strict scrutiny must apply because compliance with § 169.255(6) can be determined only by examining the nature of the speech. 50 The Secretary of State responds that the annual consent provision is merely a reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech subject to the less-exacting intermediate scrutiny standard. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). Under O'Brien and its progeny, the non-expressive aspects of speech may be regulated so long as the legislative goal is not to stifle speech itself. See id. at 376, 88 S.Ct. at 1678-79 (concerning destruction of draft card); Ward, 491 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct. at 2754 (addressing regulation of volume at outdoor concert). The Secretary of State argues that § 169.255(6), rather than limiting any political expression, merely ensures that the contributions to separate segregated funds by means of automatic payroll deductions are voluntarily made. 51 We are aided in our decision by the Supreme Court's recent clarification of the applicable tiers of review: 52 [T]he First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals. Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny. In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue. 53 .... 54 As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based. By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content-neutral. 55 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 640-43, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2458-59, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (citations omitted). In Turner, the Court reaffirmed that the principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys. Id. at 642, 114 S.Ct. at 2459 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754). See also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2523, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (We thus look to the government's purpose as the threshold consideration.). 56 The question, then, is whether the Michigan legislature adopted the annual consent requirement because of agreement or disagreement with the message inherent in political contributions made via the automatic payroll deduction system, or based upon some other concern unrelated to the message conveyed. The language of § 169.255(6) gives rise to no inference of legislative hostility toward any particular speaker. The statute applies evenhandedly to the Chamber and to plaintiffs alike. By its terms, the section covers [a] corporation organized on a for profit or nonprofit basis, a joint stock company, a domestic dependent sovereign, or a labor organization. We discern no invidious attempt to limit contributions made to separate segregated funds or to favor one class of voters over another. The Secretary of State asserts that the annual consent requirement is necessary to preserve the right of individuals not to contribute to the advocacy of a political message, a right accorded the same constitutional status as plaintiffs' right to solicit political funds. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1799-1800, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). There is no basis in the record for doubting that claim. See also One World One Family Now v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1012 n. 5 (9th Cir.1996). 57 As for the claim that the statute's application only to political speech renders the provision content-based, it must be remembered that the focus is on whether the government has addressed a class of speech in order to suppress discussion of that topic. See, e.g., Turner, 512 U.S. at 642-43, 114 S.Ct. at 2459; Blount v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 61 F.3d 938, 942 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1351, 134 L.Ed.2d 520 (1996); American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C.Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2610, 132 L.Ed.2d 854 (1995). The cases upon which plaintiffs rely highlight the danger inherent in singling out a particular class of speech for special legislative treatment. In Carey, a state statute that prohibited generally the picketing of places of employment but exempted the picketing of places of employment involved in a labor dispute was considered to be content-based because the government had placed speech relating to labor disputes in a favored position with respect to other topics of discussion. Carey, 447 U.S. at 460-62, 100 S.Ct. at 2289-91. In Consolidated Edison, an order of the state Public Service Commission prohibiting a utility from including in its monthly statements inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy, including specifically the desirability of nuclear power, was held to be content-based because it attempted to limit public debate on certain issues. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537, 100 S.Ct. at 2333 (The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.). 58 As Turner Broadcasting makes clear, the real issue is whether the law is aimed at the communicative impact of speech. 512 U.S. at 642-43, 114 S.Ct. at 2459. We do not conclude that the law was content-based simply because it practically applied only to political speech because such a conclusion does not necessarily address that fundamental issue. [T]he Supreme Court does not regard a [law]'s use of subject based categories as automatically establishing it as content-based. The critical issue is whether the state's justification for the distinction is the 'content' of the speech itself or some other concern.... Blount v. S.E.C., 61 F.3d 938, 942 (D.C.Cir.1995). In this case, the statute at issue (§ 169.255(6)) is not facially discriminatory inasmuch as the statute makes no explicit reference to any particular type of speech and treats all speakers evenhandedly. Therefore, we must consider whether there is any concern that the government is subjectively attempting to suppress the communicative aspect of speech. 59 While the subject matter of § 169.255(6) is confined to political speech, there is no basis for concern that the state is trying to suppress that speech. Nothing in the statute evinces a hostility to political speech, whether in the form of contributions or solicitations. Where there is no reason to believe that a legislature has singled out a class of speech in order to give it favored or disfavored status, the policies meriting strict scrutiny are not implicated. That Michigan has evidenced concern about political contributions rather than all contributions of individuals as groups involved does not subject this statute to strict scrutiny. 60 We conclude that the annual affirmative consent provision is content-neutral and that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.