Opinion ID: 1138617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicability of berry

Text: Buehner Concrete urges us to reexamine Berry in light of cases decided by other state courts that have upheld architects and builders statutes of repose under other open courts provisions of state constitutions. [3] According to appellee, eighteen states have interpreted their constitutional open courts provisions to allow architects and builders statutes of repose. Those cases were, however, based on reasoning rejected in Berry, and in a number of cases, they were decided under constitutional provisions having significantly different wording than the Utah Constitution. Additionally, some cases have sustained statutes modified after a prior decision holding an earlier version of the statute unconstitutional. For example, several of the cases cited by Buehner Concrete rely on the rationale that such statutes merely define the time during which a cause of action exists and, by definition, when that time expires, no cause of action exists and none is therefore abrogated. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1367 (6th Cir.1984) (construing Ohio law); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 827 (Colo. 1982); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 417-18 (Del. 1985); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So.2d 1381, 1387-88 (La. 1978); Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr. Inc., 402 So.2d 320, 324 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 110-11, 551 P.2d 647, 651 (1976); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 440, 302 S.E.2d 868, 880 (1983). This reasoning was expressly rejected by the Court in Berry: We reject this view because it begs the question. The question, in our view, is whether there is a remedy by due course of law, and that question, is not answered by arguing that a cause of action is not abrogated but is only defined to be temporally limited. In short, the constitutional protection cannot be evaded by the semantic argument that a cause of action is not cut off but only defined to exist for a specified period of time. 717 P.2d at 679. Buehner Concrete cites other cases for the proposition that the Legislature should not be restrained in its ability to change the law to accommodate changing conditions. See, e.g., Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co., 489 A.2d at 417-18; Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 712-13, 437 N.E.2d 514, 522 (1982); Lamb, 308 N.C. at 441, 302 S.E.2d at 881; Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 503, 491 P.2d 203, 207 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 280-81, 382 A.2d 715, 720-21 (1978). In some instances, this is done by heavy reliance on the presumption of constitutionality generally accorded legislative enactments against federal and state due process or equal protection challenges, coupled with the requirement that there be only a rational basis for the statutory enactment. See, e.g., Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 499 A.2d 178, 187-89 (1985); Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 843-44 (Minn. 1982); McCulloch v. Fox & Jacobs, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). We agree with the proposition that the Legislature must have broad power to shape the law to changing times and conditions, but we cannot ignore the fact that the framers of our Constitution  based on the experience of a number of other states  placed the open courts provision in the Utah Constitution to protect important individual rights against legislative power. Notwithstanding the force of the constitutional language, Berry acknowledges the generally unexceptionable proposition that one of the Legislature's chief functions is to adapt legal remedies to changing times and circumstances. The Court stated: We agree with and affirm those principles as general propositions, but we do not agree that a proper constitutional analysis of section 11 can be made on those principles alone. We are simply not at liberty to eviscerate a mandatory provision of our Declaration of Rights by limiting our analysis to those principles alone. That kind of analysis would result in the legislative power prevailing in every case, and would deprive the constitutional rights embraced in section 11 of any meaningful content or force. If we are free to refuse to give substance and meaning to section 11 because it stands in tension with the power of the Legislature to adjust conflicting interests and values in society, we could as well emasculate every provision in the Declaration of Rights by the same method of analysis. 717 P.2d at 678-79. Other courts have held that the open courts provisions in their constitutions contain no guaranteed remedies or have construed them narrowly. Thus, in Nelms v. Georgian Manor Condominium Association, 253 Ga. 410, 321 S.E.2d 330 (1984), the Georgia Supreme Court held that the architects and builders statute of repose did not unconstitutionally bar any right of access to the courts under the Georgia constitution. The court concluded that the language of the open courts provision of the Georgia Constitution was not intended to afford a general `right of access' to the courts of this state, but that its purpose ... was to provide the right of self-representation to every person. 253 Ga. at 412, 321 S.E.2d at 332. The Utah open courts provision, on the other hand, specifically guarantees, among other things, a remedy by `due course of law' for injuries to `person, property, or reputation.' Berry, 717 P.2d at 675 (footnote omitted). Still other courts have taken restricted views of their constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hammel, 103 Idaho 19, 24, 644 P.2d 341, 346 (1982). The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that the Indiana architects and builders statute of repose did not violate Indiana's open courts provision merely because the statute did not provide a substitute remedy for the remedy that was restricted. Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622, 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). In Berry, we rejected those approaches also and held that it would be an inexcusable enfeeblement of an express constitutional right to allow the abolition of an existing remedy necessary to secure an important constitutional right without providing an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy, unless there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 717 P.2d at 680. Finally, in Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Assocs., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tenn. 1981), the court concluded that its open courts provision has traditionally been interpreted as a mandate to the judiciary and not as a limitation upon legislative power and therefore was not violated by the statute of repose. Conversely, the Utah open courts provision clearly acts to restrict the powers of both the courts and the Legislature, Berry, 717 P.2d at 675, and has never been limited to the courts. The Utah constitutional language is broad and clear in its meaning.