Opinion ID: 1742263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: material provisions

Text: We first note that material provisions are defined as those provisions which express donative and testamentary intent. Matter of Estate of Krueger, 529 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1995). See Matter of Estate of Muder, supra . In support of his argument that the material portions of the will were not in Foxley's handwriting, Hogan cites In re Estate of Sola, 225 Cal.App.3d 241, 275 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990). In In re Estate of Sola, the testator executed a valid will, of which he had a copy. He later scratched out certain names on the photocopy of the will and wrote in the name of another one of his brothers. The court rejected the validity of the change, stating that [w]here the handwriting in itself lacks testamentary intent and substance and has meaning only in relationship to the typewritten words it relates to, there is no complete testamentary document that can be deemed a holographic will. Id. at 247, 275 Cal.Rptr. at 101. Hogan argues that Foxley's additional handwritten words cannot be understood on their own without reference to the original will's typewritten words and that therefore, the handwritten document fails to qualify as a holographic codicil. We agree. When read on their own without reference to the original will, Foxley's words cannot be understood. The statement her share to be divided to between 5 daughters does not express testamentary intent and is not clear without a handwritten reference to which daughter is to be excluded. Similarly, the line through Jane F. Jones is not sufficient because that line has no meaning unless read in conjunction with the typewritten names. Without the requisite testamentary intent, Foxley's handwritten words cannot be deemed material provisions. Therefore, we find that the record does not support the Court of Appeals' judgment finding that the material provisions of the alleged codicil were in Foxley's handwriting.