Opinion ID: 1203661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Retention

Text: Spencer contends that the trial court should have excluded for cause venireman Ann Kent because she had been exposed to pretrial publicity about another murder allegedly committed by Spencer in the City of Richmond. The trial judge, who saw and heard the examination of Kent, ruled that she could be fair and impartial. That finding is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion or manifest error. Mackall, 236 Va. at 252, 372 S.E.2d at 767. [I]t is not necessary that prospective jurors be entirely ignorant of the facts and issues in the case. Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 124, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1489, 99 L.Ed.2d 716 (1988). All that is required is that the venireman can lay aside [his] impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 544, 323 S.E.2d 577, 584 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L.Ed.2d 863 (1985). See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). In this case, venireman Kent specifically stated that, based on what she had read, heard, or seen, she had neither expressed nor formed any opinion as to Spencer's guilt or innocence. She further stated that she could be impartial in terms of reviewing any evidence in court. Thus, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in retaining Kent as a juror. Clearly, the record supports the trial court's ruling.