Opinion ID: 800891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time Limit on Cross-Examination

Text: [5] Petitioner argues that the time limit on his crossexamination of R.H. amounted to a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The “main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested[, allowing the cross-examiner] . . . to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory . . . [and] to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). [6] But the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the right is limited to the guarantee of “an opportunity for FENENBOCK v. DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS 5715 effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. (emphases added). [7] Generally speaking, a court violates the Confrontation Clause only when it prevents a defendant from examining a particular and relevant topic, such as bias: The Supreme Court consistently has held that a Confrontation Clause violation occurs when a trial judge prohibits any inquiry into why a witness may be biased. However, when some inquiry is permitted, trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination. No Confrontation Clause violation occurs as long as the jury receives sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness. Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 518 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis omitted); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam). For example, in Van Arsdall, the Court found a Confrontation Clause violation because the court had “cut[ ] off all questioning about an event that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony.” 475 U.S. at 679. Similarly, in Davis, an error arose when the trial court granted a protective order prohibiting the defense from introducing a witness’ juvenile adjudication, not even for the purpose of demonstrating that the witness “might have 5716 FENENBOCK v. DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS been subject to undue pressure from the police” or “under fear of possible probation revocation.” 415 U.S. at 311. [8] Indeed, a limitation on cross-examination that excludes testimony on a particular topic might violate the rule that “[r]estrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present evidence may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009). For that reason, limiting the time allotted to cross-examination is often considered a better approach than limiting the subject matter. See Holley, 568 F.3d at 1100 (“[T]he court could have limited the time allotted to discussion of the [objectionable topic], rather than excluding all discussion.”). [9] Here, the trial court adopted that preferred approach by limiting the time allotted for cross-examination. Petitioner presents no cogent explanation as to why the time used by his defense counsel at trial (about three hours) plus the unused four hours offered by the trial court would not have sufficed to explore the intended material exhaustively. All he can point to is defense counsel’s unexplained assertion to the trial court that he needed two days to cover four hundred pages of discovery. In this circumstance, the limit was reasonable and did not run afoul of any of the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause precedents.10 10 Our conclusion is unaffected by the trial judge’s apparent motivation for imposing a time limit—R.H.’s discomfort or anxiety. Davis is not to the contrary. That decision held that, when a juvenile witness might suffer “temporary embarrassment” because of inquiry into a particular topic of cross-examination, that embarrassment can be “outweighed by [a defendant]’s right to probe” that topic. 415 U.S. at 319. Davis simply reiterates the rule that restrictions on the content of cross-examination are subject to more searching review; it says nothing about restrictions on the duration of cross-examination. FENENBOCK v. DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS 5717 Petitioner’s argument would fail even under de novo review. It therefore also fails under the more stringent AEDPA standard of review that applies here, where the state appeals court properly identified and applied the relevant rules in adjudicating this claim on the merits. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that a court may “decide the § 2254(d)(1) issue . . . by deciding the constitutional issue de novo first”).