Opinion ID: 1863920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court erred in allowing the state's expertwitness to testify, over the continuous objections of the appellant, as to hearsay and as to such matters as her opinions on the prosecutrix's truthfulness, thereby improperly bolstering the testimony of the prosecuting witness and denying the appellant's right to a fair trial.

Text: Appellant next contends that the testimony of Brenda Chance, a child therapist, contained inadmissible hearsay and further impermissibly bolstered the testimony of the victim. The prosecution characterizes the testimony of Brenda Chance as two-pronged, i.e., (1) that which recounted things told to Chance by the victim, and (2) that which comprised Chance's expert opinion concerning the victim's behavior. The State argues that both forms of testimony were admissible. We address each category separately but first overview the fabric of the testimony given by therapist Chance. Much of Chance's testimony involved a description of characteristics and traits common among sexually abused children. She indicated that the victim in this case exhibited the described characteristics and, in her opinion, had been sexually abused. She further testified that while the victim had likely been abused by more than one person, that appellant was the most threatening due to his family status as a primary provider. According to Chance, the victim saw herself as a maternal figure and protector of appellant due to the psychological damage she sustained from the abuse. Chance was specifically asked by the prosecutor if there were any possibility that the victim had confused appellant with any other individual who had abused her. Chance replied in the negative. At issue in this part of Chance's testimony are two claims: (1) that her testimony concerning the veracity of the victim's complaint was impermissible bolstering, and (2) that testimony regarding child abuse syndrome characteristics was improper expert testimony under the 700 series of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. With regard to the complaint of bolstering, appellant relies on House v. State, 445 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1984) for the proposition that when an expert witness testifies that he believes a prosecution witness is telling the truth, the testimony constitutes improper bolstering. In House, however, quite unlike the present case, the statements of the victim which were relied on by the expert were a product of a hypnotic trance. The Court in House was primarily concerned with whether the testimony stemming from hypnosis by the expert was proper expert opinion. In the present case, Chance's testimony was the direct product of her observations of the victim's display of varying emotions when speaking about each abuse and, moreover, was elicited in direct response to the defense assault on the credibility of the victim. Chance's testimony is excerpted below: Q. What type of affectational response did [the child] have in regards to differentiating between what Billy Hosford did and what other individuals did to her? How did she differentiate between those? A. All right. With the other offenders she appeared more angry, easier to express what the others had done to her. But when it came to talking about Billy Hosford, she was much more fearful and anxious; reluctant to tell me what happened. Primarily scared of what the repercussions would be when she divulged more and more details. Q. Has she been consistent? A. Yes, she has. Q. In what Billy had done to her as opposed to what other individuals had done to her, has she been consistent in that regard? A. Correct. Q. Based upon your educational background and your counseling sessions with [the child], do you have an opinion as to the possibility that [the child] has confused Billy Hosford with other individuals who have victimized her?       A. I don't think that she has confused what has happened, primarily because of what I have already said. The emotional response that she has toward each perpetrator is very specific; very, very specific. And that toward him is specific also. Viewed out of context, the above-quoted testimony treads close to the brink of reversible error as a comment upon the truthfulness of the child's accusations. Had such statements been made wholly without reference to the impeachment of the victim on cross-examination, reversible error may well have occurred. In Williams v. State, 539 So.2d 1049, 1051 (Miss. 1989), the Court held such testimony of dubious competency. See also House, 445 So.2d 815, 821-23. We do not retreat from these cases but hold, under the particular circumstances of this case, that Chance's brief testimony, negating the defense position that the victim had confused appellant with other abusers, did not rise to the level of bolstering and is not reversible error. Appellant also contends that the recounting of the victim's statements by Chance is impermissible hearsay. We need not reach the issue of hearsay exceptions for we find today that Chance's testimony was admissible as non-hearsay under Miss. R.Evid. 801(d)(1). The Mississippi Rules of Evidence allow for the limited rehabilitation of a witness' testimony once that testimony has been subject to impeachment by cross-examination. Rule 801 provides: (d) Statements which are not Hearsay A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior Statement By Witness The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him. Miss.R.Evid. 801(d)(1). The Advisory Committee's Comment to Rule 801(d)(1)(C) refers to Fells v. State, 345 So.2d 618 (Miss. 1977), for the proposition that statements regarding an extra-judicial identification may be introduced as substantive evidence and that such testimony does not constitute impermissible bolstering of the witness. This principle is found in the following statement from the Fells opinion: [I]f the principal witness' identification is impeached, then independent evidence of the identification may be introduced through third persons present at the out-of-court identification. We are persuaded to this view because such evidence not only has greater probative force and thus preserves the better evidence, but also because the witness testifying is in court and subject to cross-examination. Fells v. State, 345 So.2d at 622. See also Stringer v. State, 548 So.2d 125, 132-33 (Miss. 1989). Hearsay statements of a rape victim have long been considered admissible for the limited purpose of rebutting any inference of consent. However, [t]he details of the transaction, the name of the party accused, the place where it is said to have occurred, the time of the alleged offense, cannot be proven by a repetition of the words of the prosecutrix. Anderson v. State, 82 Miss. 784, 788, 35 So. 202, 203 (1903). This rule was later modified so as to make admissible statements regarding the time and place of the rape, Lauderdale v. State, 227 Miss. 113, 85 So.2d 822 (1956), and a description of the attacker given to the police, Oates v. State, 437 So.2d 441, 442-43 (Miss. 1983); see also Cunningham v. State, 467 So.2d 902, 905-906 (Miss. 1985) (allowing hearsay statements regarding the location of the attacker). In Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100 (Miss. 1983), a child sexual abuse case, this Court allowed the admission into evidence of the hearsay statements of the victim (including details of the crime), relying apparently upon the tender years doctrine. 427 So.2d at 102-03 (quoting People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 116, 269 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1978)). However, the tender years exception to the hearsay rule has been abrogated by the adoption of the rules. Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Miss. 1989); Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389, 399 (Miss. 1989). In child sex abuse cases, many courts have allowed corroborative testimony subsequent to impeachment of the victim's testimony at trial. Cases thus applying Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are numerous. Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 348-49 (Wyo. 1987). See also State v. Conroy, 131 Ariz. 528, 642 P.2d 873, 874 (Ariz. App. 1982); Bing v. State, 23 Ark. App. 19, 740 S.W.2d 156, 157 (1987); State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Iowa 1986); State v. Vigil, 103 N.M. 583, 711 P.2d 28, 32-33 (N.M.App. 1985); Dearing v. State, 100 Nev. 590, 691 P.2d 419, 421 (1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215, 1217 (1983); Commonwealth v. Rounds, 510 Pa. 524, 510 A.2d 348, 349 (1986); State v. Roy, 140 Vt. 219, 436 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1981); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173, 179-80 (1984). Where, as here, the defense raises the claim of fabrication without alleging any particular impermissible motive or source of influence, courts have held that rebuttal testimony by third persons may be admitted to demonstrate the absence of influence or motive to fabricate. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (1988). In sum, the testimony of Chance, of which Hosford now complains, was admissible as evidence to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or confusion  suggestions made during the defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim. We next turn to that portion of Chance's testimony concerning characteristics of child abuse victims in general. Our discussion by necessity involves Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702 governing expert testimony. With regard to expert opinion, the inquiry of the trial judge is two-fold: (1) Is the field of expertise one in which it has been scientifically established that due investigation and study in conformity with techniques and practices generally accepted within the field will produce a valid opinion? ( House, 445 So.2d at 822; Miss. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 487 So.2d 1320, 1326 (Miss. 1986)) and (2) will the proposed testimony assist the trier of fact? Miss.R.Evid. 702. Only where these questions can be answered in the affirmative should the expert opinion be admitted in evidence. In the present case, appellant objected to the substance of Chance's testimony, but never objected to her credentials as an expert or to the legitimacy of the field of child therapy. Chance holds a master's degree in clinical social work and works as a child therapist in a clinical setting. She has been affiliated with the Hinds County Welfare Department, the Jackson Mental Health Center, and is now in private practice. In fact, appellant in his cross-examination complimented Chance on her credentials as truly impressive. In Ivy v. State, 522 So.2d 740, 743-44 (Miss. 1988), this Court refused to disqualify an expert witness where proper objection was not preserved. See also May v. State, 524 So.2d 957 (Miss. 1988). Appellant's next objection to Chance's testimony centers on its content, specifically the influence of a child sexual abuse syndrome or profile. At present, it is doubtful that any such profile or syndrome is generally accepted by the scientific community. Myers, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Nebraska Law Review 1, 69 (1989). Until such time as a profile has been scientifically established, courts should be reluctant to allow expert testimony that a child displays the so-called typical characteristics of other victims. We hold this portion of Chance's testimony to be improper but find it harmless on the record before us. The entire defense strategy in this case was predicated not on whether the victim was sexually abused but on the assumption that the child had been sexually abused by person(s) other than the defendant. As early as pre-trial discussions, Hosford's counsel announced that his general trial strategy would be to attack the credibility of the complaining witness by maintaining that, because she had been subjected to previous sexual abuse by others (including her biological father), she was confused  regarding both the identity of the abuser and the nature of paternal displays of affection. BY MR. HARKEY [The Prosecutor]: Judge, I am going to make a motion in limine so as to appraise the Court where the defense is going to be going in this case. [The child], splitting time between her mother, Mrs. Hosford, and her natural father, has also been abused by members of her natural father's family. She has been abused by both sides of the family. We feel that the defense in this case is going to be that she was abused by people in Mobile and not by this gentleman, and that she is all confused and everything... .       BY MR. HAMILTON [Defense Counsel]: Well, Your Honor, as it turns out that is exactly what the defense is going to prove. But so what. We are entitled to a defense. The child victim of the abuse was called as the State's first witness. Direct examination was restricted to the specific incident occurring in January, 1985. On cross-examination, however, defense counsel chose to explore allegations made by the same witness against other family members. BY MR. HAMILTON: Q. [...], didn't you tell people that Paw Paw did something to you, too? A. Yes. Q. Who is Paw Paw? A. Grandpa Cresong. Q. Grandpa Cresong. And didn't you tell some people that Uncle Bill Erwin, you told people that he did something to you too, didn't you. (Pause) How many other people have done something to you, [...]? A. Two. Q. Two other people. Who are they? A. Billy and Dwayne.       Q. Oh, okay. You have already talked about that. Billy did something, Dwayne did something, Uncle Bill Erwin did something, and Paw Paw did something. Is that right? Defense counsel also questioned the child regarding her failure to report the alleged sexual abuse when her grandmother took her to see a doctor the previous year. Finally, defense counsel attacked the child's credibility by posing questions which suggested that she had not disclosed the frequency of the appellant's molestation to anyone prior to trial, inquiring: So today is the first time you have told anybody he has done it lots of times; is that right? Throughout the trial, the appellant repeatedly made statements to the effect that because the victim had been molested by her natural father (among others), she was unable to distinguish between expressions of healthy, natural paternal love and sexual advances. Further, the defense claimed that because of this prior molestation, the child was driven to make allegations of abuse against any person assuming a paternal role. In his closing argument, counsel for Hosford recapitulated this defense theory, stating: And that child confuses these things and gets confused. If you will recall, every man in the [child's life] that we expect any child to love, she accused each one of one time or another of what we consider or what we determine to be sexual molestation. If there was any other man in that child's life who she loved, I suggest to you she would have said they, too, sexually molested her. There was her grandfather, and her uncle. After the child had testified, child therapist Brenda Chance was called to the stand. Most of Chance's testimony is admissible under Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984)); See also State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27, 32 (1988); and Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (1987). Chance's testimony regarding the victim's behavior, especially her failure to immediately report the many incidents of abuse, is plainly a subject beyond common experience and one where specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence of to determine a fact in issue. Miss.R.Evid. 702. The claim that Chance's testimony relating her conclusion that the child had been chronically sexually abused constitutes reversible error, as Hosford contends, is without merit. At trial, Hosford did not dispute that the child had been the victim of some form of sexual abuse inflicted by some adult. Indeed, that fact was central to his defense. In the unusual context of this case, where the defense admitted that the child was a sexual abuse victim, there is no reversible error in allowing expert witness Brenda Chance to give her opinion that the child exhibited the characteristics of a sex abuse victim. For the reasons stated above, Assigned Error II is rejected.