Opinion ID: 768034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of the Phrase Court of Competent Jurisdiction

Text: 14 The FAA regulation sub judice recognizes a final judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction that determines, under the law of the country concerned, [as evidence] that the registration has in fact become invalid. 14 C.F.R. 47.37(b)(2) (1999). The FAA's interpretation of the phrase court of competent jurisdiction would limit the phrase to only a court from the foreign country involved, in this case Brazil. Courts repeatedly have interpreted the phrase court of competent jurisdiction, however, to mean any court that may properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute, although the phrase occasionally connotes personal jurisdiction as well. See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2773, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984); Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 350, 351, 4 S.Ct. 428, 429, 28 L.Ed. 452 (1884). 6 We find no principled reason to apply a different meaning here. 15 In drafting the language of the regulation, the FAA declined to choose more precise language to specify the type of courts that properly might entertain deregistration claims, in contrast to agencies and Congress that have done so in other contexts. Cf. 8 C.F.R. 204.3(b) (1999) (in the context of adoption of foreign orphans,defining competent authority as a court or governmental agency of a foreign-sending country having jurisdiction and authority to make decisions in matters of child welfare, including adoption.); cf. also 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(e)(2) (1994) (in the context of registration of international advisors, specifying a foreign court of competent jurisdiction). Earlier in this regulation, however, the FAA was quite specific in its requirement that a nonjudicial determination must issue from the official having jurisdiction over the national registry of the foreign country. 14 C.F.R. 47.37(b)(1) (1999). Such unequivocal language stands in sharp contrast to the very general language of the following paragraph. Rather than specifying that a judgment or decree must issue from a court of competent jurisdiction of the foreign country concerned,the FAA authorized judgments or decrees from a court of competent jurisdiction decided under the law of the country concerned. Id. 47.37(b)(2). The natural reading of section 47.37(b)(2) is one that recognizes judgments of any court that properly may exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties of the disputed registration so long as the court applies the laws of the country where the aircraft was last registered. 16 This interpretation finds further support from the FAA's inclusion of the modifying phrase under the laws of the country concerned. 14 C.F.R. 47.37(b)(2) (1999). We must interpret this regulation so as to give effect to all its provisions and reject any construction that would render any part of it redundant or superfluous. See Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 900 (11th Cir.1998). If we accept the FAA's argument that the phrase court of competent jurisdiction signifies only the registering country, however, the further limitation of applying only that same country's law becomes a surplusage. Although the FAA argues this language would be necessary even under its interpretation, because matters peripheral to the registration might implicate laws of the United States, the argument has little force and is undermined by the language of the regulation itself. The Chicago Convention mandates that questions of registration be made in accordance with the laws of the deregistering country. See art. 19, 61 Stat. at 1185. In spite of this, the FAA did not specify that an official's statement regarding registration be made according to his country's own law because the limitation of the competent decision-making authority, the official, necessarily implies the limitation of the law that authority will apply. In the section providing for a judicial alternative, in contrast, specification of the proper law to be applied by the court was necessary because of the lack of limitation on the competent decision-making body, the court. 17 The interpretation of court of competent jurisdiction in section 47.37 is a question of first impression, as the only other court to confront this regulation assumed sub silentio that it was a court of competent jurisdiction by hearing the appeal and ordering the FAA to register the petitioner's aircraft. See Air One, 86 F.3d at 883. In Air One, an aircraft owner, unsuccessful in navigating the bureaucratic morass to obtain a statement of deregistration from Spain, sought relief from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court, finding the Spanish registration no longer valid, ordered the FAA to register the aircraft in the United States. See id. at 883. The jurisdictional challenge in that case centered on whether FAA had issued a final agency decision, so the court had no occasion to address whether it was a court of competent jurisdiction. See id. at 882. The dissenting judge, however, expressed doubt about the court's competency that was at least implicitly rejected by issuance of the majority's decision. See id. at 884 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). 18 The FAA argues Air One was incorrectly decided. Even if we were to reject the holding of Air One, however, our disposition of this case would not change becausethe unique facts and circumstances underlying Air One readily distinguish it from those before us. In Air One, the petitioner had not sought a judicial determination of the validity of the Spanish registration but rather applied directly to the Court of Appeals. See id. at 881. In addition, the Ninth Circuit did not apply Spanish law in concluding that Spain's registration had become invalid. See id. at 884 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). In this case, however, IAL adhered to the requirements of section 47.37(b)(2) by securing a final judgment of a Florida court that, according to the laws of Brazil, the Brazilian registration was no longer valid. 19 The FAA's most persuasive argument for its interpretation of the regulation flows from its obligations under the applicable treaties and statutes. If courts in the United States are permitted to determine the validity of foreign registrations, the FAA argues, there will be little incentive for other signatory countries to honor registrations in the United States. Moreover, allowing United States courts to determine the validity of foreign registrations would frustrate the Chicago Convention's goal to avoid friction and promote ... cooperation between nations and peoples of the world. Preamble, 61 Stat. at 1180. 20 Close examination of the FAA's obligations, however, does not alter our reading of the regulation. The Chicago convention dictates that an aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State ... [and] ... transfer of registration of aircraft in any contracting State shall be made in accordance with its laws and regulations. Id. arts. 18-19, 61 Stat. at 1185. Congress iterated that an aircraft may be registered in the United States if it is not registered under the laws of a foreign country, 49 U.S.C. 44102(a)(1) (1994), and admonished the FAA generally to consider applicable laws and requirements of a foreign country. Id. 40105(b)(1)(B). Nothing in the language of the treaties or the statutes requires the intervention of foreign courts as long as due regard is accorded to the laws of that country. If a United States court decides, according to the applicable foreign laws, that the prior registration has ended or become invalid, there is no longer a valid registration in another country that would impede registration in this country. 21 The FAA's suggested interpretation of the regulation that limits the courts that are of competent jurisdiction might help avoid friction, but it is an interpretation that is neither mandated by the applicable laws nor supported by the language of the regulation itself. We therefore conclude that federal and state courts in the United States that properly can exercise subject matter and either personal or in rem jurisdiction are courts of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of 14 C.F.R. 47.37(b)(2). If such a competent court determines, under the laws of the country whose registration is disputed, that the registration has ended or otherwise become invalid, the applicant has satisfied the requirement set forth in section 47.37. 22 In reaching this conclusion, this court is mindful of the potential conflict that might arise from application of the regulation as its plain language suggests and the need for the FAA's circumspection when considering the validity of another country's registration. These policy concerns, however legitimate, are not sufficient to override the language of the regulation which, in the absence of any official agency interpretation, is our only guide. If the FAA remains concerned about the possible friction that might arise from applying the plain language of the regulation, it may consider amending or clarifying the regulation. 23 In view of our holding that the Florida court was a court of competent jurisdiction, its final judgment and decree, concluding that the Brazilian registration wasinvalid under Brazilian law, 7 satisfied the requirements of section 47.37(b)(2). 8 IAL is therefore entitled to have its aircraft registered in the United States.