Opinion ID: 778993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Should Peppers Have Been Allowed to Proceed pro se?

Text: 27 As the issue is whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver, the legal conclusion as to whether the record so indicates is subject to plenary review. United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 113 n. 2 (3d Cir.2002) ( citing Virgin Islands v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 404 (3d Cir.1995)). As we recognized in Charles, when our review is as to facts found by the Court, we employ clearly erroneous review. 72 F.3d at 404 ( citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)). The right of a defendant to represent himself is structural; as such, its denial is not amenable to `harmless error' analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984).
28 Peppers claims that he raised the issue of proceeding pro se three times: on October 20, 2000, in his letter to the court; on November 6, 2000, just prior to jury selection; and in his post-trial motions. In his October 20 letter, Peppers stated: 7 29 (1) After numerous unsuccessful attempts to get my attorney, Allen Welch, to have client/attorney consultation meetings with me, so that we can prepare for trial and have, if not, a effective defense, then at least an adequate defense. Mr. Welch, however, did finally meet with me on the above mentioned date, which is hardly adequate to prepare for trial which commence in two weeks, November 6, 2000. 30 (2) Defendant and counsel have numerous conflicts of interest, from unfiled requested Pre-Trial motions, motions to the court for release of evidence that is in the custody of the government for forensic testing, requested exhibit's for trial, to counsel's refusal to seek permission from the court to file a interlocutory appeal of the courts ruling. 31 (3) Counsel failing to keep defendant informed of the status of his case so that defendant can make intelligent decisions concerning general strategy, and informed decisions regarding the representation. 32 (4) Counsel failing to inform defendant of any motions submitted to the court in defendants behalf and/or consult with defendant prior to the filing of Pre-Trial motions. 33 (5) Counsel failing to submit requested Pre-Trial motions in defendants behalf. 34 (6) So defendant can locate witness' where counsel, thus far has made no effort to locate/interview defense witness' that are on the defense witness list that was supplied to counsel by defendant. 35 Finally, defendant request that the court conduct a hearing consistent with this correspondence, permit defendant to file a Pro Se, interlocutory appeal, and/or permit defendant to represent himself. 36 Your Honor, I believe that for the foregoing reasons that it would not be in the interest of justice to conduct court when such issue's are before the court, and when counsels competence is in question. 37 (Emphasis added). 38 The Court responded to Pepper's letter by forwarding it to his counsel, and writing to Peppers, informing him that it would not entertain motions, or requests that could be deemed motions from litigants who are represented by counsel. On November 2, Peppers' counsel — but not Peppers himself — raised the issue of Peppers' proceeding pro se. Through his counsel, Peppers reiterated his desire to proceed pro se on November 6, 2000, just prior to jury selection. The following interchange took place at sidebar. 39 Mr. Welch: Mr. Peppers just this instant came in and sat down beside me and said he wants to represent himself. 40 The Court: No, he is not going to. 41 Mr. Welch: I understand. 42 The Court: Tell him he can raise the matter again after I have finished jury selection. I have another one after this. I don't want to do it in front of the panel. I need to put a colloquy on the record. 43 Mr. Welch: I understand. 44 After dismissing prospective jurors for lunch, the following colloquy took place. 45 The Court: Mr. Peppers, your counsel indicated that you told him that you preferred to proceed in this proceeding pro se. That is without counsel. Do you still wish to advise the Court as to whether this is your position? 46 The Defendant: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 47 The Court: Mr. Peppers, you have some very, very serious charges against you in this matter. You have had no experience in doing this before. Conspiracy is a complicated matter. So is the killing of an individual in the course of a drug transaction. 48 You also have a lot of witnesses that the government needs to obtain on your behalf. He is out there able to do that. You are confined. You will have every opportunity to convey your wishes to Mr. Welch, to present questions to him to present to the jury. 49 You may place on the record your request. Do you want to put it on the record now? 50 The Defendant: To represent myself? 51 The Court: Yes. 52 The Defendant: Yes, I would like to do that. 53 The Court: Put the microphone in front of you, please. I need to know why. 54 The Defendant: Why? 55 The Court: Yes. 56 The Defendant: Well, a lot of the details with a lot of the pretrial issues, I felt didn't get done. And I felt that those areas were neglected. Therefore, I am not sure about my defense being neglected. 57 The Court: What in this case has been neglected, and how do you presume you will be able to rectify it? 58 The Defendant: Well, I feel that I can best serve my defense by me questioning the witnesses. I don't believe that Mr. Welch knows what type of information to cross-examine to elicit from these witnesses. 59 The Court: Why is that? Have you told him what to elicit? 60 The Defendant: I haven't seen — 61 The Court: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Go ahead. 62 The Defendant: I haven't seen my attorney. I haven't seen him. None of my correspondence was responded to. I don't know exactly where my defense lies and exactly what strategies are going to be used for my defense. 63 The Court: Well, this case is scheduled for the 20th. There are two weeks in between. I am directing Mr. Welch to sit down with you and go over the strategy that he intends. You can certainly supply him with the questions that you want him to address to your witnesses. 64 You will have the opportunity while you are sitting there at trial to present — you will have a pad and paper. You can pass over to him questions. Of course, it is up to him to decide whether or not the question is relevant and whether or not it would be objected to. 65 Do you understand that? 66 At the Court's prompting, Peppers listed other areas of dissatisfaction with his attorney, including the failure to test evidence, to prepare a map as a trial exhibit, to file a pretrial motion challenging Count VII, and to file an interlocutory appeal of the Court's refusal to admit Drake's statements. The Court discussed these areas with Peppers and his counsel, and then stated: 67 The Court: All right. I will take his motion under advisement. It is not likely to be granted. I will let you know today. Court is in recess until two o'clock. 68 On November 14, the District Court issued an order denying Peppers' oral motion to represent himself. After summarizing the colloquy, the Court concluded that because Defendant had no legal training or expertise, and since, at the time of the Court's determination, there was less than one week before trial, Peppers' request would be denied. The Court noted that to allow Defendant to represent himself is equivalent to allowing him to stand trial with no representation at all. 69 On post-trial motions, Peppers again raised the issue of the denial to proceed pro se. The Court prefaced its statement by noting that there was never a formal motion presented. It further noted that since Peppers had not pursued the issue at the November 2 hearing, there was no basis for the court to grant the request. 70 We conclude that the District Court misapprehended the nature of its duty in response to Peppers' initial request to proceed pro se. Its responsibility was to assess whether the defendant's assertion was unequivocal, and, if so, whether his waiver of his constitutional right was done voluntarily, knowingly, and with an understanding of the ramifications and consequences. We view this aspect of a district court's duty to be very important and challenging, yet one as to which there is little guidance. We write so as to explore this issue based on our caselaw. 71
72 The right to counsel embodied within the Sixth Amendment carries as its corollary the right to proceed pro se. These rights are both respected within our jurisprudential tradition, although, since a person cannot secure the right to proceed pro se without sacrificing the right to counsel, we have required defendants to assert the right to proceed pro se affirmatively and unequivocally, and we have placed on the court the burden of establishing that the defendant who does so acts voluntarily, and that he understands both the scope of the right sacrificed and the restrictions and challenges that he will face. Peppers has asserted the right to proceed pro se. 73 As the Supreme Court explained in the seminal case in this area, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Sixth Amendment 74 speaks of the `assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant — not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. 75 Id. An unwanted counsel `represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution; for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense. 8 Id. at 821. Thus, a defendant who chooses to represent himself must be allowed to make that choice, even if it works ultimately to his own detriment. Id. at 834. 76 In Faretta, the court had initially, though reluctantly, allowed the defendant to proceed pro se, but reserved the right to revoke Faretta's privilege to represent himself if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Id. at 808, 811 n. 4. After querying the defendant as to the number of exceptions to the hearsay rule and the number of and grounds for challenging jurors for cause, the court concluded that the ends of justice and requirements of due process require that the prior order permitting the defendant to represent himself in pro per should be and is hereby revoked. Id. at 811 & n. 4. 77 Noting that the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation, the Supreme Court found that the right of self-representation was supported by both the structure of the Sixth Amendment itself and the jurisprudence that gave rise to it. Id. at 812, 818. It specifically rejected the trial court's paternalistic determination that it should ensure that the defendant was capable of defending himself well in order to be allowed to defend himself. 78 We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. 79 Id. at 836. 80 The Court noted approvingly that Faretta's request was made weeks before trial and was clear and unequivocal, and that it was evident from the record that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding. Id. at 835. 81
82 It is the tension between the right to have counsel and the right to represent oneself that places upon the trial court the weighty responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and understanding as well as voluntary. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence reflects a long tradition of concern for persons haled into a legal system that they cannot understand and in need of assistance to help them navigate. See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 720, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948). But requiring a trial court to be particularly vigilant when a defendant waives his right to counsel even predates Von Moltke. 83 This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record. 84 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Citing to Zerbst, the Von Moltke Court stressed that the discourse with the defendant is not a mere procedural formality but that it requires a judge to 85 investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is rendered. 86 This case graphically illustrates that a mere routine inquiry — the asking of several standard questions followed by the signing of a standard written waiver of counsel — may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 723-24. 9 87 As far back as 1965 — ten years prior to Faretta — we also began to articulate the scope of the court's responsibility when a defendant seeks to proceed pro se, drawing upon Von Moltke. See United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 285 (3d Cir. 1965). We have refined those requirements to reflect the obligations placed upon the district court through Faretta and its progeny. 88 In skeletal form, the requirements are these. 89 1. The defendant must assert his desire to proceed pro se clearly and unequivocally. See, e.g., Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 791 (3d Cir.2000). 10 90 2. The court must inquire thoroughly to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, the range of possible punishments, potential defenses, technical problems that the defendant may encounter, and any other facts important to a general understanding of the risks involved. Charles, 72 F.3d at 404. 91 3. The court must assure itself that the defendant is competent to stand trial. Id. 11 92 Because a request to dismiss counsel just before (or during) trial may well require a continuance, our court has also developed a good cause test, whereby a court confronted with a time-sensitive request to proceed absent current counsel should ascertain the defendant's reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir.1982). Accord, Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 471 (3d Cir.1991); Buhl, 233 F.3d at 798. If there is good cause, the court is required to grant a continuance and appoint new counsel, unless the defendant expressly wishes to proceed pro se. If the court does not find good cause, the court must inform the defendant that he can either proceed with current counsel, or represent himself. See, e.g., Welty, 674 F.2d at 187. If he indicates a desire to represent himself, the court must then conduct a Faretta inquiry. Id. 93 While the identification of the defendant's reasons for wishing to dismiss his current counsel is more pertinent when substitute counsel is desired, we have noted that his reasons may also inform the knowing, understanding, and voluntary inquiry as well. Buhl, 233 F.3d at 798-99; see also Stubbs, 281 F.3d at 117 (noting with respect to a mid-trial request to proceed pro se that the defendant's motives may still be relevant as they may shed light on whether the defendant's waiver has been made knowingly and intelligently); Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 290 (3d Cir.2001) (perceiving an assessment by the court of the defendant's intentions in seeking to take over his defense mid-trial as pertinent to a determination of whether his waiver of counsel was knowing); Charles, 72 F.3d at 404 (stating without elaboration that a court must make an inquiry regarding the defendant's reasons for the request as the first step in a Faretta inquiry). We note that every case in which we have iterated the good cause test has involved a request that is on the eve of trial or, as was the case in Stubbs, during trial. 12 94 In sum, a district court cannot make an informed decision as to the knowing and voluntary nature of a defendant's request to proceed pro se without a thorough inquiry, on the record, to assure itself that the defendant fully apprehends the nature of the charges against him, the perils of self-representation, and the requirements that will be placed upon him. This calls for specific forewarning of the risks that foregoing counsel's trained representation entails. Once the court has fulfilled those responsibilities, however, if the defendant still elects to proceed pro se, the court must permit him to do so. 95
96 As noted earlier, Peppers first mentioned the issue of proceeding pro se in a letter/motion to the Court on October 20, 2000, and his attorney referred to the matter again on November 2. The Court never dealt directly with the October 20 letter, referring the matter to counsel, and in its order of November 20 it seemed to downplay the import of its contents based on Peppers' conduct at the November 2 hearing. 13 Whether or not the October 20 letter would have been sufficient to require the District Court to inquire about Peppers' desire to represent himself, the November 6 colloquy clearly sufficed. As the Eleventh Circuit said in Dorman v. Wainwright: 97 To invoke his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta a defendant does not need to recite some talismanic formula hoping to open the eyes and ears of the court to his request. Insofar as the desire to proceed pro se is concerned, petitioner must do no more than state his request, either orally or in writing, unambiguously to the court so that no reasonable person can say that the request was not made. 98 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir.1986) (quoted in part in Buhl, 233 F.3d at 790 n. 9 and Stubbs, 281 F.3d at 118 n. 5). Although the District Court did conduct a colloquy with him at that time, we view it as inadequate under our precedent. While the Court did seek to ascertain the basis for Peppers' dissatisfaction with counsel — his reasons — it did not satisfactorily address the heart of the Faretta inquiry. 99 As stated above, the second, and, in this case, core responsibility that the court bears is to inquire as thoroughly as needed to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, the range of possible punishment, potential defenses, technical problems that the defendant may encounter, and any other facts important to a general understanding of the risks involved. Charles, 72 F.3d at 404. The Court never sought to determine whether Peppers understood the risks — the structural limitations or perils of representing himself — but focused instead on the ways that Peppers could be accommodated by counsel's representation: 100 Mr. Peppers, you have some very, very serious charges against you in this matter. You have had no experience in doing this before. Conspiracy is a complicated matter. So is the killing of an individual in the course of a drug transaction. 101 You also have a lot of witnesses that the government needs to obtain on your behalf. He is out there able to do that. You are confined. You will have every opportunity to convey your wishes to Mr. Welch, to present questions to him to present to the jury. 102 . . . 103 Well, this case is scheduled for the 20th. There are two weeks in between. I am directing Mr. Welch to sit down with you and go over the strategy that he intends. You can certainly supply him with the questions that you want him to address to your witnesses. 104 You will have the opportunity while you are sitting there at trial to present — you will have a pad and paper. You can pass over to him questions. Of course, it is up to him to decide whether or not the question is relevant and whether or not it would be objected to. 105 Although the Court characterized this exchange as advis[ing] Defendant of the dangers of proceeding pro se, it did not apprise him of the full range of risks and structural limitations that would be attendant upon Peppers should he proceed pro se ; nor does it even attempt to ascertain the extent of Peppers' understanding. The responsibility of determining whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary can be fulfilled only through adequate inquiry and thorough explanation by the District Court. Absent a proper inquiry, the District Court had no basis upon which to deny — or to grant — Peppers' request for self-representation. McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 946 (3d Cir.1987). 106 The Court's conclusion to deny Peppers' motion to proceed pro se was based largely on its determination that, taking into consideration the fact that Peppers was charged with serious offenses and incarcerated, he is unable to contact or interview witnesses and prepare a case. Furthermore, Defendant has no legal training or expertise, and to allow Defendant to represent himself is equivalent to allowing him to stand trial with no representation at all. The Court's concern over Peppers' skill and legal competency misses the mark. Federal courts have stated repeatedly that a court must not evaluate whether the defendant is competent to represent himself as part of its determination of whether he is knowingly asserting the right to self-representation: 107 The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.... We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. 108 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36. See also Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (In assessing waiver of counsel, the trial judge is required to focus on the defendant's understanding of the importance of counsel, not the defendant's understanding of the substantive law or the procedural details.); United States v. McKinley, 58 F.3d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 1995) (listing cases finding error when a court denies self-representation based on its evaluation of a defendant's skills or preparation). 109 We have had occasion several times to describe the elements of what a court should or should not do in questioning a defendant when a request to proceed pro se is made. 14 It presents a challenge for a judge, and it seems that invariably such a request comes at a time when it diverts from trial preparation. Just as there is no talismanic formula for a defendant's expression of desire in this regard, there is no talismanic formula for the court's inquiry. We have not hesitated to require that the defendant be informed of all risks and consequences associated with his decision for self-representation. 110 To ensure that an accused is aware of the pitfalls possible in self-representation, the district court should advise him in unequivocal terms both of the technical problems he may encounter in acting as his own attorney and of the risks he takes if his defense efforts are unsuccessful. See United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir.1982). As a matter of constitutional law, we have imposed a clear and unambiguous obligation upon a trial judge who is faced with an accused who states merely that he is aware of his right to counsel but wishes to waive that right.... At a minimum, to be valid [a defendant's] waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. 674 F.2d at 188-89 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (plurality opinion) (reversing denial of habeas petition because standard, pre-printed waiver of counsel form insufficient to satisfy Sixth Amendment)). We have held that an accused's protection under the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel is not satisfied when a trial judge has failed to conduct a penetrating and comprehensive examination of the accused's waiver attempt which ensures that the accused is knowledgeable about his decision, even when the colloquy skips just one of the above factors. See Welty, 674 F.2d at 189 (no waiver where court merely informed defendant that self-representation is inadvisable) ( quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion)); see also United States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303, 1308 (3d Cir.1996) (no waiver notwithstanding trial judge's detailed colloquy with defendant because judge failed to state that he was authorized to impose greater sentence than that imposed in defendant's first trial). 111 Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 166-67 (3d Cir.1998) (granting a writ of habeas corpus where a petitioner had signed a generic waiver form and a petition to proceed pro se, but the trial court had not conducted a detailed colloquy). Nevertheless, we think that the following questions (derived in large part from Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges § 1.02 (4th ed.2000)) would prove a useful framework for the court to assure itself that a defendant's decision to proceed pro se is knowing and voluntary. 112 1. Have you ever studied law? 113 2. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal action? 114 3. Do you understand that you are charged with these crimes: [state the crimes with which the defendant is charged]? 115 4. Do you understand that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has issued sentencing guidelines that will be used in determining your sentence if you are found guilty? 116 5. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count 1, the Court must impose an assessment of $___, and could sentence you to as many as ___ years in prison and fine you as much as $ ___? [Ask defendant this question for each count of the indictment or information.] 117 6. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than one of these crimes, this Court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after another? 118 7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you — or even advise you — as to how you should try your case. 119 7a. Do you know what defenses there might be to the offenses with which you are charged? Do you understand that an attorney may be aware of ways of defending against these charges that may not occur to you since you are not a lawyer? Do you understand that I cannot give you any advice about these matters? 120 8. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence?  121 8a. Do you understand that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial and that, in representing yourself, you must abide by those rules? 122 9. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? 123 9a. Do you understand that these rules govern the way a criminal action is tried in federal court? Do you understand that you must follow these rules? 124 10. Do you understand that you must proceed by calling witnesses and asking them questions, and that, except when and if you yourself testify, you will not be permitted to tell the jury matters that you wish them to consider as evidence? 125 10a. Do you understand that it may be much easier for an attorney to contact potential witnesses, gather evidence, and question witnesses than it may be for you? 126 11. I must advise you that in my opinion a trained lawyer would defend you far better than you could defend yourself. I think it unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself. 127 12. Now, in light of the penalties that you might suffer if you are found guilty, and in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do you still desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? 13. Are you making this decision freely, and does it reflect your personal desire? 128 14. Do you have any questions, or do you want me to clarify or explain further anything that we have discussed here? 129 If the answers to the foregoing questions satisfy the court that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily desires to proceed pro se, the court would then state the necessary conclusions, such as: 130 I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. I will therefore permit the defendant to represent himself (or herself).