Opinion ID: 2581719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Read Miranda Rights Prior to Consent

Text: Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, unless they satisfy one of the specified exceptions. See Rodriguez, 945 P.2d at 1359. One such exception is the defendant's voluntary consent to search. See People v. Licea, 918 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1996). The trial court found that Garcia's consent was voluntary, but that it was the product of an illegal arrest. Cf. People v. Lewis, 975 P.2d 160, 173 (Colo.1999) (stating that the attenuation between an illegal arrest and collection of evidence may dissipate the taint, which would otherwise mandate suppression). We have determined that the evidence found within the residence was not the product of an illegal arrest. We also hold that the trial court erred in its alternative Miranda conclusion. The record demonstrates that (1) Garcia cooperated with the officers; (2) the officers gave Garcia a consent to search form, which Garcia read aloud and signed; and (3) Garcia understood the nature of the document he signed. We have held that a Miranda warning is not required before the police may request that a suspect, even though in custody, consent to a search. See People v. Reddersen, 992 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Colo.2000); Licea, 918 P.2d at 1113; People v. Helm, 633 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Colo.1981). Although a consensual search may produce incriminating physical evidence, the consent itself is not self-incriminating in the Miranda sense. See 3 LaFave, supra, § 8.2(j) at 691 (stating that a consent to search is not testimonial or communicative in the Fifth Amendment sense). Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding that the officers should have read Garcia his Miranda rights prior to asking him for consent to search his residence.