Opinion ID: 182739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Issue: Did the district court err in finding Butch waived his Miranda rights?

Text: Butch opines there was certainly police coercion in his interrogation and concludes the district court erred in finding he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Butch argues his statements do not pass muster under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b), which purports to set forth factors a finder of fact should consider when deciding whether a Miranda waiver is valid. Section 3501(b) provides: The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession ..., (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense... of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel, and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession. In accordance with the implicit assumption of the parties, we assume without deciding the district court was required to weigh the § 3501(b) factors. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (discussing § 3501(b) and stating  Miranda and its progeny ... govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation). Even so, the district court did not clearly err when it found Butch voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Once again, Butch attacks the district court's credibility findings even though such findings are `virtually unassailable on appeal.' Frencher, 503 F.3d at 701 (quoting Guel-Contreras, 468 F.3d at 521). For example, Butch points us to his own testimony that (1) Detective Griffiths told Butch, if you talk to me, I can probably help you out; (2) Detective Song did not read Butch the Miranda warnings; and (3) Butch was cowed into confessing because he lacked experience with interrogations. The district court did not credit Butch's testimony, and the court's credibility findings were not clearly erroneous. Detective Wagner testified she never promised Butch any type of leniency or threatened him. Deputy Peterman and Deputy Griffiths testified no one made any promises of leniency to Butch. When asked whether he made such a promise, Deputy Griffiths stated: [A]bsolutely not. I never make that type of a statement to anybody. I'm not a judge. I'm not an attorney. I'm a police officer. I can't make promises like that to anyone. It is undisputed Butch has a long criminal history and is not unfamiliar with law enforcement officers. Further, as the district court recognized, Butch admitted Detective Griffiths told him before the interrogation that he was in trouble for the guns and drugs that were found in the house. Butch thus knew the nature of the subject offenses. Under the totality of the circumstances, there is substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that Butch voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The officers holstered their firearms after securing the premises; no one raised their voices or argued; Butch was not under the influence of alcohol or any narcotics; and the officers wore plain clothes. Although handcuffed and without counsel during the interview, Butch was in his own home. Deputy Peterman testified Butch was calm, nice, pleasant, concerned. Detective Wagner testified Butch was very calm and there was no tension or conflict in the air. Officer Song testified [t]here wasn't anything specific about [Butch's] demeanor that would indicate ... he was under any kind of emotional distress. Deputy Griffiths testified Butch was relaxed. Interestingly, Butch knew Deputy Griffiths from their days selling cars together at a Des Moines car dealership in the 1970s. Deputy Griffiths knew Butch well enough to call him Butch and not Obell. Butch replied, hi, Tom. The record adequately reflects the officers gave Butch Miranda warnings, and Butch waived his rights by thereafter answering the officers' questions.

With respect to the Vanovers' various sufficiency of the evidence arguments, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of those verdicts, and reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found [the Vanovers] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 964 (8th Cir.2010). [O]ur role is not to reweigh the evidence or to test the credibility of the witnesses, because `[q]uestions of credibility are the province of the jury.' United States v. Dugan, 238 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2000)).

Butch appears to concede, if the district court did not err in failing to suppress his incriminating statements, sufficient evidence supports his drug trafficking convictions. Because the district court did not err in denying suppression, Butch's sufficiency argument is a non-starter. In any event, sufficient evidence supports Butch's drug trafficking convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 3. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. Even if we ignore Butch's incriminating statements in the basementarguably explicit confessions to distribution of methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamineother evidence in the record is sufficient to establish Butch's guilt. [5] Butch's home was filled with indicia of drug dealing, including a relatively large quantity of methamphetamine, weapons, drug paraphernalia, and $4,000 in cash. Detective Griffiths explained methamphetamine is a powerful narcotic and 142 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine is definitely a distribution amount. Detective Griffiths described how firearms, Ziploc baggies, scales, and the other paraphernalia further the drug trade. Dale testified she and her husband bought methamphetamine from the Vanovers at least fifty times between 2005 and 2007, in amounts ranging from a quarter of a gram (in exchange for $20-$25), a gram ($80-$100), and a quarter of an ounce ($250-$540). [6] Dale characterized the Vanovers as working together to sell their methamphetamine. For example, immediately before the methamphetamine sale resulting in their arrests, Butch made arrangements over the telephone for Dale to buy methamphetamine from Barb. Dale testified the Vanovers' methamphetamine business was so successful that, on several occasions, Dale had to wait in line behind as many as five to ten other methamphetamine buyers at the Vanovers' home. Onterio Taylor testified, while incarcerated with Butch after Butch's arrest, Butch admitted arranging the methamphetamine sale to Dale and told Taylor the unidentified Hispanic man was Butch's supplier. The Hispanic man had fronted Butch the methamphetamine, and had come to the Vanovers' home to collect $4,000the exact amount of cash found underneath the Vanovers' mattress. Although Butch contends Dale's testimony was untrustworthy because, among other things, (1) she is a confessed methamphetamine addict; (2) she was not cooperating with the MINE task force on December 19, 2007; and (3) law enforcement officers never recovered the $540, the jury apparently found Dale's testimony to be credible. We will not disturb the jury's verdicts. See Dugan, 238 F.3d at 1045 (leaving credibility questions for the jury); see also United States v. Gaona-Lopez, 408 F.3d 500, 505 (8th Cir.2005) ([W]e do not sit as [a] second jury, and we are completely [u]nwilling to usurp the jury's unique role in judging the credibility of witnesses. The jury is free to believe the testimony of any witness in its entirety, or to reject that testimony as untrustworthy. (quotations omitted)).