Opinion ID: 1855522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in overruling defendant's objection to admission of dr. hayne's testimony derived from dr. ward's autopsy report allowing the state to elicit inadmissible hearsay testimony.

Text: ¶ 29. Alexander's next assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Hayne to testify using Dr. Ward's autopsy report. Alexander claims that the autopsy report is hearsay for which no exception exists and that Dr. Hayne should not have been allowed to use the report to form his own medical opinion. This contention is without merit. Rule 703 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence states: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Furthermore, the Comment to Rule 703 expressly states that an expert witness may use data that is presented to the expert outside of court and other than by his personal observation. ¶ 30. Rule 703 allows an expert to base his opinion on the opinions of others which are not in evidence so long as experts in the field ordinarily rely on such opinions in forming their own opinions. Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 56-57 (Miss. 1998). For example, a psychiatric expert may rely on the reports of a patient's psychiatric history in arriving at his diagnosis. Id. at 57. In such circumstances, the opinion of the non-testifying expert would serve simply as a premise supporting the testifying expert's opinion on a broader issue. Id. ¶ 31. In the case sub judice, Dr. Hayne used the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ward in forming his own opinion as to the victim's cause of death. The record shows that he also used many other reports, records, and documents prepared by others. All of the sources that Dr. Hayne used to form his opinion and reach his conclusion as to Belvin's cause of death, including the autopsy report, are sources that expert witnesses normally rely on to form such opinions. This issue fails.
¶ 32. Alexander argues that the State's handwriting expert, Frank Hicks, was improperly allowed to consider two letters which Alexander had written to his wife in determining whether other incriminating letters were in fact written by Alexander. Alexander contends that the admission of Hicks's testimony violated Alexander's rights protected under the husband-wife privilege of M.R.E. 504(b) by allowing information derived from confidential marital communications to be used against him. He complains that once Hicks viewed the privileged communications, they became intrinsically linked to his handwriting examination and his subsequent testimony, resulting in tainted and incurably prejudicial testimony. ¶ 33. The record reflects that, prior to the testimony by Hicks, the prosecution made the trial court and defense counsel aware of the fact that two of the writing samples relied upon by Hicks were in fact letters which Alexander had penned to his wife. The trial court held that the letters were privileged communications and refused to allow them into evidence. Hicks reevaluated the questioned handwriting without use of the two letters written by Alexander to his wife, and after such reevaluation, Hicks moved one of the questioned documents from the category of a positive identification to that of a strong possibility. Alexander objected to the entire testimony of Hicks, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed Hicks to testify. ¶ 34. While the admission of any information contained in Alexander's letters to his wife would have posed a privileged communication problem, the expert's mere reliance on the letters for handwriting purposes poses no such evidentiary bar. In the latter instance, the expert is not concerned with the actual information contained in the letters; rather, he is concerned with the manner in which the letters and words are formedthe actual handwriting. The content of the privileged letters was not introduced into evidence; and therefore, there was no violation of M.R.E. 504(b). Though unnecessary, the essence of the problem was avoided when the handwriting expert altered his testimony to express opinions unrelated to the documents in question. Today's ruling is consistent with other jurisdictions. See In re a Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Lucy Clark, 461 F.Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y.1978); People v. Saidi-Tabatabai, 7 Cal.App.3d 981, 86 Cal.Rptr. 866, 869 (1970); Jones v. Driver, 282 Ky. 82, 137 S.W.2d 729, 731 (1940) (citing Nelson v. Nelson, 235 Ky. 189, 30 S.W.2d 893 (1930)). Accordingly, this issue fails.
¶ 35. Alexander argues that the evidence in this case is insufficient to support a guilty verdict, but he fails to argue any error committed by the trial court in overruling his motion for a JNOV. He overlooks the fact that we are an appellate court, and in Leverett v. State, 197 So.2d 889, 890 (Miss.1967), we held that, The Supreme Court is a court of appeals, it has no original jurisdiction, it can only try questions that have been tried and passed upon by the court from which the appeal is taken. See also Patterson v. State, 594 So.2d 606, 609 (Miss.1992). We therefore proceed on the assumption that Alexander intended to argue that the trial court committed error in overruling his motion for a JNOV. ¶ 36. Any review of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the defendant was convicted is made in deference to the verdict returned by the jury. Kolberg v. State, 704 So.2d 1307, 1311 (Miss. 1997). The reviewing court therefore looks at all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, giving the prosecution the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 133-34 (Miss.1987). This familiar standard of review also applies in capital cases. Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 36 (Miss.1990). As we explained in Kolberg, [t]he jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witness and the weight to be attached to their testimony. Id. We may reverse only when, [w]ith respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1293 (Miss.1995). ¶ 37. Besides arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity, Alexander alleges no deficiency in the State's proof of the elements for capital murder. Alexander's multiple confessions established a firm basis for his conviction in the eyes of the jurors, who shouldered the ultimate responsibility for determining the weight and credibility of all the evidence. Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we can not find that Alexander's conviction was based on insufficient evidence. This issue fails.