Opinion ID: 624899
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rufo Factors

Text: We now address the three Rufo factors in turn.
The Decree and its 1987 modification aim primarily to prevent the RNC from using, [or] appearing to use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud and to neither hinder[] [nor] discourag[e] qualified voters from exercising the right to vote. (App. at 404-05.) Given these purposes of the Decree, only a change that decreases minority voter intimidation and vote suppression ex ante can be a significant change [that] warrants revision of the decree. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 748. The RNC argues that the following factual changes warranted vacatur or modification of the Decree: first, the President and Attorney General of the United States and the President of the RNC (former) are African American; [12] second, that minority voter registration and turnout have increased; and third, that increased availability of alternative voting mechanisms such as early voting or permanent absentee voting are more widely available. The RNC also presented testimony at the evidentiary hearing before the District Court that the appointment of African-Americans as the RNC Chairman and Chief Administrative Officer decreased the likelihood that the RNC would engage in ballot security programs resulting in minority vote suppression. Testimony presented by the RNC further claimed that with an African-American President, and an African-American Attorney General, [] the laws that are already on the books regarding voter fraud, voter intimidation, and voter suppression are going to be actively pursued by this Justice Department. (Hr'g Tr. 65:22-66:2.) The RNC argues that increases in minority voter registration and voter turnout are changes in factual circumstances rendering the Decree unnecessary because this data demonstrat[es] that minority voters are not being suppressed. (Appellant's Br. 33.) Furthermore, the RNC asserts that the availability of alternative voting methods, such as early voting or permanent absentee voting, allows voters who are worried about intimidation at precincts on Election Day to avoid such intimidation by voting from home or voting early. It contends that records of voters using these alternative voting mechanisms undermine allegations of disenfranchisement and that the availability of provisional ballots squelches any effort to disenfranchise a voter who appears at the polls. ( Id. at 38.) The RNC's argument that the fact that President Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder, RNC Chairman Michael Steele, [13] and another RNC leader are minorities justifies vacatur or modification of the Decree hardly requires a serious response. The RNC posits that a minority President and Attorney General of the United States increase the likelihood of prosecution for violations of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), such as intimidation of minority voters. Are we to conclude that all issues that affect African-Americans will now get greater funding, greater attention, and more focus because of President Obama? Our jurisprudence cannot depend on such assumptions. Even assuming that VRA violations will be more vigorously litigated by the current administration, that litigation would likely be brought after the VRA has been violated, so it will not prevent minority voter intimidation or vote suppression ex ante. Similarly, a handful of minorities temporarily [14] occupying leadership positions in the RNC does not mean that minority voter intimidation or suppression will decrease. Contrary to the RNC's assertions, the increase in minority voter registration and voter turnout since 1982 does not demonstrate that minority voters are not being suppressed. (Appellant's Br. 33.) The RNC has submitted no evidence to support its supposition. Voter registration and turnout data is not statistically relevant regarding the argument that revision of the Decree is warranted. Moreover, the increase in minority voter registration and voter turnout could be evidence that the Decree is necessary and effective. The RNC's data on minority voter registration and turnout demonstrates that, since the RNC consented to the Decree in 1982, minority voter registration and turnout have increased significantly. The Decree's purpose is to help ensure that potential minority voters are not dissuaded from going to the polling station to vote, as they might be if the RNC were unfettered by the Decree. Despite the RNC's bald assertion to the contrary, the availability of alternative voting mechanisms is not a factual change that prevents polling place voter suppression and intimidation. The RNC has presented no evidence demonstrating how alternative voting mechanisms, such as allowing voters to vote prior to Election Day or to mail in their votes, would prevent the RNC from using, [or] appearing to use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud at polling stations. (App. at 404-05.) Furthermore, as the District Court notes, voters should not have to avoid voting at polling stations on Election Day in order to avoid voter intimidation. None of these alleged factual changes renders the continuation of the Decree inequitable. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate or modify the Decree based on the RNC's asserted factual changes.
The RNC's arguments regarding changes in law brought about by the enactments of the Motor Voter Law or NVRA, BCRA, [16] and HAVA are only relevant to our review if they render prospective application of the Decree inequitable. To do that, they must have some bearing on the purpose of the Decreedecreasing the RNC's engagement in minority voter intimidation and suppression. The RNC asserts that the Motor Voter Law, BCRA, and HAVA increase the risk of voter fraud and increase the ease with which eligible voters can register to vote, vote, and file a provisional ballot if they are challenged at polling stations. Even if the RNC's assertions are true, which has not been established, the RNC has failed to carry its burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the Decree. Additionally, none of the changes in law that the RNC puts forth make one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties [] impermissible under federal law or make legal what the decree was designed to prevent. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 748. One of the NVRA's central purposes was to dramatically expand opportunities for voter registration and to ensure that, once registered, voters could not be removed from the registration rolls by a failure to vote or because they had changed addresses. Welker v. Clarke, 239 F.3d 596, 598-99 (3d Cir.2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)). [17] The NVRA authorizes election officials to use mailings to update voter registration rolls. Additionally, the NVRA imposes criminal penalties on individuals who submit false voter registration forms, knowingly cast a forged ballot, or manipulate the tabulation of votes, and it specifies criminal penalties for intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person who is registering to vote or voting. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1)(A), 10(2). The RNC argues that the NVRA renders the Decree antiquated because it has led to significant increases in minority voter registration and turnout. The RNC also asserts that the NVRA creates an increased risk of voter fraud. This argument, that the enactment of a law that expands voter registration opportunities renders inequitable a Decree that aims to prevent voter intimidation and suppression, is unpersuasive. The District Court correctly notes that any increase in minority voter registration or voter turnout caused by the Motor Voter Law is irrelevant to the Decree because the Consent Decree was not designed to encourage minority voter registration, but rather to prevent voter suppression. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 614. Additionally, the District Court cites evidence that the Motor Voter Law reduces the threat of voter registration fraud, but does not attempt to prevent voter suppression. Id. Nor does the NVRA make legal what the decree was designed to prevent. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 748. The NVRA authorizes election officials, not the RNC, to use mailings to update voter registration lists. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(c)(d). The NVRA does not authorize targeting such mailings at predominantly minority precincts nor does the NVRA authorize the presence of voter fraud security teams targeted at predominantly minority precincts on Election Day, both actions that the Decree is designed to prevent. The NVRA provision that makes voter intimidation subject to a criminal penalty is not relevant to the purpose of the Decree because it would not prevent minority voter intimidation or suppression. The provision allows for criminal penalties to be imposed ex post, only after voters had been intimidated and had lost their opportunity to cast their ballots. This provision does not render inequitable the application of the Decree, in which the RNC agreed not to us[e], [or] appear[] to use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud. (App. at 404-05.) The central provisions of the BCRA were designed to address Congress' concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence federal elections. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003). The BCRA made a number of dramatic changes to campaign finance law to achieve these goals, including barring national political parties from soliciting soft money. Shays v. Federal Election Comm'n, 528 F.3d 914, 918 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)). The BCRA also barred state parties from spending soft money on `federal election activity,' including `get-out-the-vote activity' and `voter registration activity.' Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1)). The RNC argues that the BCRA's prohibition on the spending of soft money by state parties for voter registration and get-out-the-vote activity has heightened the risk of voter fraud because it is difficult to track the voter registration efforts of the increased number of groups registering voters. As the District Court mentions, the Decree does not prevent the RNC from collaborating with non-party organizations to register voters and the RNC has not demonstrated that any ineligible voter registered by a non-party organization has ever actually cast a vote. The RNC has not demonstrated that this provision of the BCRA is a significant change in the law that warrants revision of the Decree. HAVA is concerned with updating election technologies and other election-day issues at polling places. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 624 F.3d 1162, 1184 (9th Cir.2010). One purpose of HAVA was to prevent on-the-spot denials of provisional ballots to voters deemed ineligible to vote by poll workers. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir.2004). [18] HAVA also established complaint procedures to challenge alleged voting violations. 42 U.S.C. § 15512. The RNC argues that HAVA increases the risk of voter fraud and reduces the risk of vote suppression by allowing voters to cast provisional ballots. The provisional ballot portion of HAVA is not aimed at preventing voter suppression or intimidation and does not render the prospective application of the Decree inequitable. Despite the RNC's assertions, the fact that HAVA affords every voter the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot is only effective if those voters are not intimidated by voter fraud efforts, such as those targeted by the Decree. As the District Court notes, voter intimidation could prevent voters from entering the polls to obtain a provisional ballot. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 612-13, 616 (Some voters ... may choose to refrain from voting rather than wait for the qualifications of those ahead of them to be verified ... Others may be prevented from waiting by responsibilities ...) (citing DNC Hr'g Ex. 18 at 6; RNC Hr'g Ex. 26 at 56; League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 478 (6th Cir. 2008)). The opportunity to cast a provisional ballot is not relevant to the purpose of the Decree because it does not decrease minority voter intimidation or suppression. The availability of complaint procedures for alleged voting violations under HAVA does not make legal what the decree was designed to prevent. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 748. Moreover, the HAVA complaint procedures, unlike the Decree, do not aim to prevent the RNC from targeting its voter fraud efforts at precincts with higher populations of minorities. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Motor Voter Law, BCRA, and HAVA have not altered [the] calculus of in-person voter fraud or voter intimidation to an extent that justifies vacating or modifying the Decree due to a change in law. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 613.
The RNC argues that vacating the Decree would benefit the public interest by allowing the RNC to engage in programs attempting to prevent voter fraud, which the RNC alleges are hampered by the Decree. Additionally, the RNC contends that there is little need to prevent the intimidation and suppression of minority voters. Specifically, the RNC asserts that voter fraud is a danger and that political parties, candidates, the Government, and the public all have an undisputed interest in protecting the integrity of the election process. (Appellant's Br. at 50.) Thus, the RNC argues that it should be permitted to address voter fraud free from the constraints of the Decree. If the RNC establishes that a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 2595, 174 L.Ed.2d 406 (2009) (holding that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed a heightened standard for its Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry instead of the required flexible approach). However, the RNC has pointed to no remedy other than the Decree that prevents the RNC from using, [or] appearing to use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud. (App. at 404-05.) The District Court declined to determine whether laws passed by Congress sufficiently address the dangers of voter fraud, recognizing that such is not the task of the federal court. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 1245, 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009) (Though courts are capable of making refined and exacting factual inquiries, they `are inherently ill-equipped' to `make decisions based on highly political judgments' ...) (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 894, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)). Instead, the Court noted that Congress is better equipped to make this determination by weighing the dangers of voter fraud against the dangers of voter intimidation. The District Court rejected the RNC's argument that the Decree must be vacated or modified because the risk of voter fraud outweighs the risk of voter suppression and intimidation. As the District Court correctly points out, the Decree only requires preclearance for programs involving the prevention of in-person voter fraud. Furthermore, the District Court has never prevented the RNC from implementing a voter fraud prevention program that the RNC has submitted for preclearance, at least in part, because the RNC has never submitted any voter fraud prevention program for preclearance. Although the RNC pointed to charges that were noted in the Carter-Baker Commission Report against eighty-nine individuals and fifty-two convicted individuals to demonstrate the pervasiveness of voter fraud, those purported instances of voter fraud ranged from vote-buying to submitting false voter registration information and voting-related offenses by non-citizens. (RNC Hr'g Ex. 26 at 45.) Thus, only a fraction of that alleged fraudulent activity was related to in-person voter fraud, which is the type of fraud addressed in the Decree. The FBI report that the RNC submitted regarding irregularities in Wisconsin during the 2004 election did not specify whether the voting irregularities under investigation involved votes cast in person or votes cast through absentee voting or some other alternative process. In support of the notion that most alleged incidents of voter fraud are not related to in-person voting and are, thus, irrelevant to the Decree, the DNC submitted evidence of voting irregularities in Florida during the 2004 election, which was also cited by the RNC, that showed that the majority of those accused of wrongdoing were elected officials and political operatives. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 607. The Supreme Court has also noted the rarity of in-person voter fraud. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) (noting that there was no evidence of any [in-person voter] fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history); see also id. at 226, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (Souter, J., dissenting) ([T]he State has not come across a single instance of in-person voter impersonation fraud in all of Indiana's history.); Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 609 (Justice Stevens acknowledged that, of the `occasional examples' of in-person fraud on which his ruling was based, all but one had been shown to have been `overstated because much of the fraud was actually absentee ballot fraud or voter registration fraud.' (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 n. 12, 128 S.Ct. 1610)). Thus, the RNC has not established that in-person voter fraud is sufficiently prevalent such that applying the Decree prospectively is no longer equitable. Even if the public has an unmet need for the prevention of in-person fraud, the Decree does not prevent the RNC from combating in-person voter fraud if it obtains preclearance. If the risk of voter fraud is as great and consequential as the RNC alleges and an RNC voter security program is a significant part of efforts needed to prevent that voter fraud, it would seem that the RNC would have attempted to obtain preclearance for a voter security program at least once since 1987. The RNC argues that minority voters are not being suppressed, and, thus, the Decree does not serve public interest. (Appellant's Br. 33.) The District Court noted as an example, however, that the voter-challenge list in Malone included 35,000 registered voters who were predominantly minorities. Without the enforcement of the Decree provisions, these voter-challenge lists that are racially-targeted, in intent or in effect, could result in the intimidation and deterrence of a number of voters. When confronted with such targeted voter-challenge lists, some eligible voters may choose to refrain from voting instead of waiting for the verification of their own eligibility or that of others ahead of them in line. ( See, e.g., DNC Hr'g Ex. 18 at 6 (quoting a former Political Director of the Republican Party of Texas, who stated that photo identification requirements could cause enough of a dropoff in legitimate Democratic voting to add three percent to the Republican vote.); RNC Hr'g Ex. 26 at 56 (portion of the Carter-Baker Commission Report on Polling Station Operations, in which the Report noted voter fraud security in some minority communities may be intimidating and that, during the 2004 election, [p]roblems with polling station operations, such as long lines, were more pronounced in some places than others. This gave rise to suspicions that the problems were due to discrimination...).) The District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that public interest concerns, including the prevention of voter fraud and the prevention of voter suppression and intimidation, do not justify vacatur or modification of the Decree.
The RNC argued before the District Court that there were workability issues that required modification of the Decree, as a practical matter. The District Court held that there were four workability issues that weighed in favor of modification: (1) the potential inequity of the RNC being subject to suits brought by entities who were not party to the Decree when, under the BCRA, the RNC has to defend lawsuits using hard money, while the DNC does not have to spend any money on such suits because it would not be party to them [19] ; (2) the twenty-day notice requirement for preclearance prevents the RNC from combating mail-in voter registration fraud in a number of states with later mail-in voter registration deadlines; (3) the Decree lacks a clear definition of normal poll watching activities and the parties have not provided a definition, leading the RNC to refrain from normal poll watching activities, which the Decree was never intended to prohibit; and (4) the Decree lacked a termination date. The District Court, accordingly, modified the Decree in the following ways: (1) allowed only parties to the Decree, the DNC and NJDSC, to bring an enforcement action under the Decree; (2) decreased the preclearance notice requirement from twenty days to ten days; (3) provided clearer definitions and examples of ballot security [20] and normal poll watching [21] activities; and (4) added an eight-year expiration date, December 1, 2017, to the Decree, allowing for an extension of the Decree for another eight years if the DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the RNC has violated the Decree. In addition to determining whether the District Court abused its discretion by declining to make more extensive modifications to the Decree than it did based on workability concerns, we analyze, also under the abuse of discretion standard, whether the District Court's proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748. As noted above, the modification must not create or perpetuate a constitutional violation; it should not strive to rewrite a consent order so that it conforms to the constitutional floor; and a court should not try to modify a consent order other than making those revisions that equity requires because of the change in circumstances. Id. The District Court held that the Decree should be modified because the BCRA creates a potential inequity between the RNC and the DNC if third parties are allowed to bring suits to enforce the Decree against the RNC. Without modification, the RNC would have to defend such third-party suits with limited hard money because it cannot solicit soft money under the BCRA while the DNC, not a party to such suits, would not have to expend resources on these third-party suits. Accordingly, the District Court modified the Decree so that only the DNC and NJDSC can bring an enforcement action under the Decree so that both parties would have to spend hard money on the enforcement action. This modification eliminates any potential BCRA-caused inequity in the prospective application of the Decree. In this respect, the Court revised the Decree only to the extent required because of the change in circumstances brought about by the BCRA. Limiting the ability to bring Decree enforcement actions to parties to the Decree is a modification suitably tailored to the equitable concerns brought about by the hard money restrictions in the BCRA. The RNC argues that this modification does not address the workability issues caused by the costly and distracting enforcement actions filed shortly before Election Days because the money the RNC would have to spend defending those suits takes money away from the RNC's political efforts, regardless of whether the DNC also has to spend money to bring those suits. The nature and timing of election cycles may cause the need to defend against Decree enforcement suits to arise at inconvenient times, but resolving those issues before Election Day is crucial to enforcing the Decree by ensuring access to the polls and preventing suppression of minority votes. In effect, the RNC contends that the Decree should be vacated because it is unworkable for the RNC to spend any money defending itself in enforcement actions. This argument is not persuasive. When the RNC twice consented to the Decree and gained its benefits, it should have anticipated that it would likely need to spend money defending itself in future enforcement actions. Neither modification nor vacatur are justified where a party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it entered into a decree. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385, 112 S.Ct. 748. The District Court noted that a number of states now have voter registration deadlines less than twenty days before the election and that the RNC has a valid interest in preventing fraudulent voter registration. The District Court modified the Decree by decreasing the notice requirement for preclearance from twenty days to ten days. The RNC argues that the ten-day preclearance period should be eliminated because it forces the party to reveal its Election Day strategy to the DNC in order to combat voter fraud and is, therefore, unworkable. The RNC has requested zero days for preclearance or, at least, some decrease in the time period for the preclearance notice requirement. [22] The RNC asserts that any preclearance requirement is tantamount to a prohibition on Election Day activities by the RNC because it means that the RNC must foresee Election Day issues twenty to thirty-five days in advance of an election; forc[es] the RNC to disclose its tactical thinking and Election Day strategy far enough in advance for the DNC and others to craft counter-strategies; and it requires the RNC to place equivalent numbers of poll watchers in all precincts, regardless of political or practical considerations. (Appellant's Br. at 52-54.) The RNC's argument is wholly speculative. The RNC's supposed knowledge and experience of unworkability is mere conjecture because, since the preclearance provision was added to the Decree in 1987, the RNC has never attempted to obtain preclearance. Contrary to the RNC's argument, the preclearance provision does not require the RNC to disclose its tactical thinking and Election Day strategy except with regard to ballot security activities. The RNC points to no statement of the District Court and no provision of the Decree that requires the RNC to place equivalent numbers of poll watchers in all precincts. (Appellant's Br. at 52-54.) On the contrary, the Decree does not require any preclearance for normal poll watching functions, so the Decree would in no way prohibit the RNC from placing different numbers of poll watchers in precincts. Further, there is no basis for any RNC argument that the preclearance provision requires the RNC to place the same number of voter fraud security team members at each precinct. The RNC does not know what level of program detail the District Court would require before granting preclearance. [23] The preclearance provision does not prevent the RNC from achieving its objective of normal poll-watching, carrying out approved ballot security programs, or implementing any other Election Day strategies that do not us[e], [or] appear[ ] to use, racial or ethnic criteria in connection with ballot integrity, ballot security or other efforts to prevent or remedy suspected vote fraud. (App. at 404-05.) With no preclearance provision, the RNC could implement any ballot security program and would only be subject to enforcement of the Decree after potential minority voter intimidation and suppression had already occurred. Thus, the elimination of the provision would thwart the Decree's purpose of preventing minority voter intimidation and suppression ex ante. The District Court shortened the preclearance time to allow the RNC to combat more of the potential voter registration fraud that might occur closer to Election Day, a modification suitably tailored to address the inequity the District Court identified. Although the Decree was never intended to prohibit normal poll watching activities, the RNC claims that is has refrained from engaging in normal poll watching activities because the Decree's definitions of such activities are unclear and it fears it would unintentionally violate the Decree. To address this workability concern, the District Court modified the Decree to provide clearer definitions and examples of ballot security and normal poll watching activities. With the District Court's modifications, [b]allot security is defined to include any program aimed at combating voter fraud by preventing potential voters from registering to vote or casting a ballot, [24] and [n]ormal poll-watch function is defined as stationing individuals at polling stations to observe the voting process and report irregularities unrelated to voter fraud to duly-appointed state officials. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 622. The District Court's modifications more clearly define ballot security and normal poll-watch function under the Decree and provide lists of examples of both. [25] The RNC contends that it cannot engage in normal poll-watch functions because the definitions of the terms remain unclear. Contrary to the RNC's argument that the District Court's definitions and non-exhaustive lists of examples worsen the problem, (Appellant's Br. at 55), the modifications of adding specific definitions and examples of ballot security and normal poll-watch functions give both the RNC and the DNC more clarity regarding what types of activities require preclearance, which do not require preclearance, and which are prohibited by the Decree. Given these modifications, any hardship to the RNC is not a product of the terms of the Decree. Clarity allows the RNC to engage in normal poll watching activities while still maintaining adherence to fulfillment of the Decree's purpose. The District Court's modification is suitably tailored to resolve the prior ambiguity and does not strive to conform to the constitutional floor by allowing the RNC to engage in all activities without preclearance. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 748. The modification clarifies the previous ambiguity. The District Court agreed with the RNC that the lack of an expiration date in the Decree was inherently inequitable. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 671 F.Supp.2d at 621. The District Court modified the Decree by adding an eight-year expiration date, December 1, 2017, and allowing for an extension of the Decree for another eight years if the DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the RNC has violated the Decree. The RNC argues that the District Court's December 1, 2017 expiration date is an abuse of discretion and that the appropriate Decree termination date is either eight years after the parties entered into the Decree in 1982, eight years after the Decree's modification in 1987, or, at worst, eight years after the Malone litigation. Although a considerable number of years have passed since the RNC and DNC agreed to the Decree in 1982 and 1987, the parties entered the Decree voluntarily and for over a quarter of a century neither party objected to the duration of the Decree. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate the Decree due to the length of time since its entry. See BCTC, 64 F.3d at 889 (declining to hold that the mere passage of time is itself sufficient to constitute the type of changed circumstances that warrant lifting of an injunction). Thus, it does not follow that the original decision not to include an expiration date requires vacatur now that the Decree has an expiration date. The District Court noted that it was imposing a termination date of eight years from its ruling because the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, which is charged with enforcing the Voting Rights Act, also imposes consent decrees with time limits of eight years, which can be extended for good cause. The RNC has not shown that the District Court's decision to set a termination date of eight years from the date of its order modifying the Decree with provisions allowing for an extension of that termination date for good cause is arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable. Moyer, 473 F.3d at 542. By adding an eight-year expiration date, December 1, 2017, to the Decree, the District Court modified the Decree to remedy the inequity that it perceived to be caused by the lack of expiration date. [26] Accepting arguendo that the Decree without a time limit is inherently inequitable, the provision allowing for an extension of the Decree for another eight years if the DNC proves by a preponderance of the evidence the RNC has violated the Decree preserves the purpose of the Decree so that the modification does not rewrite the consent order more than equity requires. Moreover, we do not adopt the RNC's argument that the District Court abused its discretion by not starting the eight year period from the date of the entry of the Decree or from its 1987 modification, thus requiring ... immediate vacatur. (Appellant's Br. 42.) The District Court concluded, with ample record support, that the purpose of the Decree had not yet been fulfilled and vacatur would not have been suitably tailored to its findings. The RNC has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any workability issues remaining after the District Court's modification are so acute that prospective application of the Decree is inequitable. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate due to workability. The RNC has not established that any of the District Court's decisions were arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable. Moyer, 473 F.3d at 542. Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the RNC did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the following four Rufo factors necessitated vacatur or modifications beyond those ordered by the District Court: (1) a significant change in factual conditions; (2) a significant change in law; (3) that a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles; or (4) that enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. Furthermore, the District Court's modifications were suitably tailored to the changed workability circumstances.