Opinion ID: 1367155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Availability of Collateral Attack

Text: (6a) Although the trial court erred in assuming that defendant properly could escape his support obligation by resort to plaintiffs' trust fund for their entire support needs, defendant urges that, nevertheless, plaintiffs are not entitled collaterally to attack the judgment which established the support obligation. We agree. As plaintiffs concede, and as we have previously noted ( ante, p. 947), a support order may not be retroactively modified. (Civ. Code, §§ 4700, 4811; Parker v. Parker (1928) 203 Cal. 787, 795-796 [266 P. 283]; In re Marriage of Ford (1972) 24 Cal. App.3d 62, 65 [100 Cal. Rptr. 817]; Singer v. Singer, supra . ) Plaintiffs assert, however, that they may collaterally attack any judgment which, on the face of the record, is in excess of the court's jurisdiction. Plaintiffs specifically maintain that since the judgment is facially defective with respect to defendant's support obligation (there being neither allegation nor finding that defendant was unable to support plaintiffs), a collateral attack should be permitted. Plaintiffs confuse errors in excess of jurisdiction with errors of substantive law which are within the court's jurisdiction. (7) Collateral attack is proper to contest lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or the granting of relief which the court has no power to grant ( Swycaffer v. Swycaffer (1955) 44 Cal.2d 689, 693 [285 P.2d 1] [default judgment in excess of relief demanded by prayer]; Michel v. Williams (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 198, 201 [56 P.2d 546] [court without power to award costs]; see 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Attack on Judgment, § 10, pp. 3590, 3591). Nonjurisdictional errors, however, are not appropriate procedural targets within this context. Thus, a failure to state a cause of action ( Estate of Keet (1940) 15 Cal.2d 328, 334 [100 P.2d 1045]), insufficiency of evidence ( Estate of Kay (1947) 30 Cal.2d 215, 218-219 [181 P.2d 1]), abuse of discretion ( Howard v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 784, 788-789 [154 P.2d 849]), and mistake of law ( Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 114-116 [101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817]; Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1961) 55 Cal.2d 728, 731 [13 Cal. Rptr. 104, 361 P.2d 712]; Leach v. Leach (1959) 172 Cal. App.2d 330, 332 [341 P.2d 758]; Estate of Gardiner (1941) 45 Cal. App.2d 559, 562 [114 P.2d 643]), have been held nonjurisdictional errors for which collateral attack will not lie. (See generally, 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Jurisdiction, §§ 180-217, pp. 708-750.) (6b) The error of which plaintiffs in this case complain does not reach the power of the court to act, but concerns instead a mistaken application of law. Thus the judgment may not be collaterally attacked. (8) Moreover, even were we to assume that the defect in the divorce judgment was jurisdictional, nevertheless, in the absence of unusual circumstances collateral attack will not be allowed where there is fundamental jurisdiction [i.e. of the person and subject matter] even though the judgment is contrary to statute. ( Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 727 [285 P.2d 636].) Where some of the parties have relied on, or changed their position in accordance with the former judgment, a court may deny collateral attack. (See Frank v. Frank (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 717, 722 [80 Cal. Rptr. 141]; Farley v. Farley (1964) 227 Cal. App.2d 1, 11 [38 Cal. Rptr. 357].) (6c) Defendant in the present case made payments pursuant to a judicial order, an order which was 14 years old at the time of the present action. Where, as here, the complaint contains no specific allegations of fraud, concealment, or other intentionally wrongful conduct, to hold defendant liable now for additional support obligations chargeable to him in the past would be manifestly unjust. Plaintiffs argue that the interlocutory and final divorce judgments should not be binding on them because they were not parties to the action giving rise to the judgments. The doctrinal reach of the res judicata bar extends, however, to those persons in privity with parties. ( Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 813 [122 P.2d 892].) As has been said, in considering application of the doctrine, courts examine the practicalities of the situation and attempt to determine whether plaintiffs are sufficiently close to the original case to afford application of the principle of preclusion. ( People ex rel. State of Cal. v. Drinkhouse (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 931, 937 [84 Cal. Rptr. 773].) We have previously held that privity exists where the person involved is `... so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.' ( Zaragosa v. Craven (1949) 33 Cal.2d 315, 318 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461]; see also 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 226, p. 3359.) In the present case, plaintiffs' mother was entrusted with their care and custody and was a proper representative of their interests. While in similar situations we can conceive of a commingling of interests of parent and child in the negotiation of a marital dissolution agreement to the degree that the future interests of a child are clearly and deliberately subordinated to the present interests and advantages of a parent, the record before us discloses no such circumstances. For this reason, we conclude that plaintiffs are bound by the judgment in the divorce action to which their mother was a party. ( Stevens v. Kelley (1943) 57 Cal. App.2d 318, 323 [134 P.2d 56]; Murdock v. Eddy (1940) 38 Cal. App.2d 551, 553-554 [101 P.2d 722]; see 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 229, pp. 3361-3362.) Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant committed fraud in the divorce action, a circumstance which might independently justify collateral attack. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473; Miller v. Miller (1945) 26 Cal.2d 119 [156 P.2d 931]; In re Marriage of Warner (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 714 [113 Cal. Rptr. 556]; Rice v. Rice (1949) 93 Cal. App.2d 646 [209 P.2d 662].) Nor is this a case in which only prospective relief is sought. (See Adamson v. Adamson (1962) 209 Cal. App.2d 492 [26 Cal. Rptr. 236]; Adoption of Stroope (1965) 232 Cal. App.2d 581 [43 Cal. Rptr. 40].) Instead, plaintiffs seek to relitigate the validity of support orders now 15 and 16 years old in order to obtain a reversal with full retroactive effect. As noted above, modification of child support orders cannot ordinarily be given retroactive effect. In the light of all of the circumstances of this case and in the interests of finality of judgments, we will not permit plaintiffs in this case to achieve the same effect through collateral attack. The judgment is affirmed.