Opinion ID: 1358073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: ClayMotion to Suppress

Text: Clay next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search of his home violated the Fourth Amendment. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the factual findings are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Taylor, 519 F.3d 832, 833 (8th Cir.2008). Officers received a warrant to search Clay's residence for controlled substances, contraband, or other evidence related to the conspiracy. Nine months earlier, Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Karen Fehrenbach interviewed Darryl Johnson's sister after Johnson was murdered. Johnson's sister described to Agent Fehrenbach certain items of clothing that were missing from Johnson's house after the murder. Upon searching Clay's house, Fehrenbach found certain items associated with Johnson and described by Johnson's sister, including a black velour jumpsuit, blue alligator shoes, a tennis shoe box container, and several leather jackets. Clay argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because these items were not specifically listed in the search warrant. If an item not particularly described in the warrant is seized, it must fall within an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. United States v. Criswell, 696 F.2d 636, 640 (8th Cir.1983). Here, the government sought to justify the seizure under the plain view doctrine. To qualify under the plain view exception, the government must prove that (1) the item is in plain view; (2) the officer is lawfully located where he may view the object; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). Immediately apparent requires that the agent have `probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.' United States v. Garner, 907 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)). More specifically, probable cause demands that the facts available to a reasonably cautious man would warrant a belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The parties dispute only the incriminating nature of the evidence. Agent Fehrenbach testified that she immediately recognized that the items observed in Clay's residence belonged to the murder victim, explaining that some of the items jumped out at her based on her 19 years of experience and her extensive interview with the victim's sister. The facts known to Fehrenbach would justify her belief that the items were contraband. Clay also argues that the officers rummaged through all of the occupant's belongings without limitation, ignoring the warrant's dictates. He relies on United States v. Clark, 531 F.2d 928, 930 (8th Cir.1976), for the proposition that this type of exploratory search violates the Fourth Amendment. In Clark, officers searched the defendant's residence with a search warrant looking for controlled substances. Id. at 931. Once there, the officers began to inventory all items found, including recording the serial numbers of guns and electronic equipment. Id. at 931-32. The district court granted the motion to suppress because the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. Id. at 931. On appeal, the government argued that the items fell within the plain view doctrine. Id. We disagreed because the incriminating nature of the items searched and seized was not immediately apparent. Id. at 932-33. The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from Clark. The officers searching Clay's residence neither conducted an unbounded exploratory search nor recorded serial numbers of random items in the home seeking incriminating evidence of potential crimes. Furthermore, the incriminating nature of the items seized was immediately apparent to Agent Fehrenbach, who instantly connected the items to Johnson's homicide. We hold that the seizure of these items during the warrant search did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the district court properly denied the motion to suppress.