Opinion ID: 605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Refusal of Prosecution Witnesses To Speak to Defense Counsel

Text: On cross-examination by Mahender's counsel, several of the prosecution witnesses, including Deborah Litras, admitted that they had refused to speak to defense counsel prior to the trial. In the jury instructions, the district court told the jury that defense counsel had acted properly in attempting to interview witnesses, but that the witnesses were also within their rights to refuse to speak: Also, you have heard testimony from witnesses that attorney Stephen Scaring [Mahender's trial counsel] asked to speak to them prior to their testimony. I instruct you that Mr. Scaring had a right to attempt to interview these witnesses before they took the stand. However, I also instruct you that these witnesses had a right to decline to speak to him. And no unfavorable inference should be drawn against them because of that declination. Tr. 5005. Judge Spatt overruled the defense's objection to this instruction at the charging conference. Appellants argue that the district judge's instruction that the jury could draw no unfavorable inference against prosecution witnesses from the fact that they refused to be interviewed by the defense was erroneous because it prevented the jury from evaluating a fact that went to the issue of witness credibility. Absent the instruction, the Sabhnanis contend, the jury could have reasoned that because these witnesses refused to speak to defense counsel, they must have been biased against the Sabhnanis. Moreover, the Sabhnanis argue, the instruction may have cast Mahender's trial counsel in a negative light for even asking witnesses the question whether they had refused to speak to the defense prior to trial. We review a claim of error in the content of jury instructions de novo. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 177 (2d Cir.2006). We have no difficulty concluding that there was no error in the instruction here. Mahender himself concedes that the instruction was correct insofar as it recognized that witnesses have a right to decline to be interviewed. See, e.g., United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1191 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Miller, 381 F.2d 529, 538 n. 7 (2d Cir.1967) (While the Government is doubtless bound not to obstruct a defendant's access to a prospective witness, we know of no rule requiring the witness to submit to an interview.); United States v. James, No. 02 CV 0778(SJ), 2007 WL 914242, at  15 n. 10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.21, 2007). The instruction did nothing more than inform the jury of this right and instruct that a witness does not act wrongfully by exercising it. The defense was still free to suggest and did, through cross-examination and in summationthat the refusal to meet with defense counsel could suggest a witness's greater sympathy for or affiliation with the other side of the case. Moreover, the jury was explicitly charged that it should evaluate the credibility of witnesses based on the circumstances under which each witness testified and every matter in evidence that tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief. Tr. 5011. Among these matters, the judge specifically instructed the jury that: How you choose to believe a witness may be influenced by any bias, resentment or anger that you may perceive the witness to have. Does the witness have a relationship with the government or a defendant that may affect how he or she testified? Does the witness have some incentive, loyalty or motive that might cause him or her to shade the truth? Or does the witness have some bias, prejudice or hostility that may have caused the witness consciously or not to give you something other than a complete, accurate account of the facts? Tr. 5012 (emphasis added). This charge clearly allowed the jury to take into account any bias a witness might have, including any bias resulting from a relationship with the government. Finally, we reject as meritless any claim that the instructions could fairly be read to cast aspersions on Mahender's trial counsel, given the court's explicit statement that counsel had every right to attempt to interview the prosecution's witnesses.