Opinion ID: 1156663
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sister-state cases[16]

Text: Our constitutional provision confining judicial powers to the courts (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1) has counterparts in most other state constitutions, as well as the federal Constitution. (See post, fn. 24 [state constitutional provisions]; U.S. Const., art. III, § 1 [reservation of judicial powers to the courts].) Modern courts, however, have not rigidly construed these provisions. [17] Instead, a more tolerant approach to the delegation of judicial powers has emerged out of a perceived necessity to accommodate administrative adjudication of certain disputes and thereby to cope with increasing demands on our traditional judicial system. [18] The accommodating view of modern courts, however, generally has been conditioned by two limiting principles, one procedural and the other substantive. First, our sister-state cases, like our own ( ante at p. 361), universally recognize the constitutional necessity of the principle of check. They hold the availability of judicial review of administrative decisions is sufficient to satisfy the principle of check. [19] The substantive limitation is expressed in an opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court: As a rule which meets most situations, when an executive board has regulatory functions, it may hear and determine controversies which are incidental thereto, but if the duty is primarily to decide questions of legal right between private parties, the function belongs to the judiciary.... [¶] The creation of an executive board is justified if its service is to determine and maintain a public right or interest. To accomplish its purposes judicial powers may be necessarily exerted. But they must concern matters of an executive character. They are proper if it may fairly be said that there is need of them in order to produce an efficient and effective administrative enforcement of the public interest.... [¶] Whatever the borderland of doubt and interchange, argument seems unneeded to demonstrate that the function of trying and deciding litigation is strictly and exclusively for the judiciary when it is between private parties, neither of whom seeks to come under the protection of a public interest and to have it upheld and maintained for his benefit. ( In re Opinion of the Justices (1935) 87 N.H. 492 [179 A. 344, 345-347, 110 A.L.R. 819.) [20] With these two principles in mind, we review the decisions of our sister states. At least nine states, all of which have constitutional provisions substantially identical to California Constitution, article VI, section 1, have considered the propriety of administrative adjudication of restitutive and compensatory damages. The decisions unanimously hold such remedial power as is involved here does not constitute an impermissible exercise of judicial power. In order to provide more explicit illumination, we will discuss in detail two decisions which, in our view, best express the limiting principles mentioned above. The Maryland Constitution, like ours, provides that the judicial power of the state is vested in the state high court and lower courts. (Compare Md. Const., art. IV, § 1, [21] with Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1 [quoted ante, p. 355].) In Investors, supra, 312 A.2d 225, the Maryland high court considered a challenge under its constitution's judicial powers provision to the authority of a Fair Landlord-Tenant Relations board. The board was established by local government to comprehensively regulate the apartment rental business. (312 A.2d at p. 227.) Although the board did not have the authority to set rents, it was given the power to regulate and adjudicate all manner of landlord-tenant relations and disputes concerning defective tenancies, and to make various remedial orders to enforce its regulations and decisions. An assortment of remedial powers conferred on the landlord-tenant board were challenged: (1) to impose a civil penalty not exceeding $1,000; [¶] (2) to award money damages [to either party] not exceeding $1,000; [¶] (3) to award payments for temporary substitute housing; [¶] (4) to terminate leases; [¶] (5) to order repairs; [and] [¶] (6) to order the return of security deposits and rental moneys paid. (312 A.2d at p. 238.) The landlords asserted such remedial powers were judicial in nature, and therefore could not be exercised by the administrative agency. (312 A.2d at p. 243.) Rejecting that claim, the court first noted that the board did not make final, but merely initial decisions, because an aggrieved party could seek judicial review of the board's decision. Nor, the court reasoned, was the board's decision binding: the board had no power to enforce its orders; instead, court action was necessary to enforce the board's orders. Thus, the court concluded, the principle of check stressed by Professor Davis, ante, page 361, was not violated by the administrative adjudicatory scheme. ( Ibid. ) The court next specifically rejected the landlords' claims that the remedies entrusted to the [board's] discretion are remedies exclusively reserved to the courts (312 A.2d at p. 244), and instead found all of the above-listed remedial powers were proper. The court explained that the `pivotal point in determining the permissible extent of delegable adjudicatory functions is not merely their inherent nature but the context of the regulatory scheme and the enforcement procedure provided by the administrative process.' (312 A.2d at p. 245.) Considering the exercise of the listed remedial powers in the context of the regulatory scheme, the court approved the use of such powers as being reasonably necessary to the board's regulatory goals: We think it plain that the function of the [board] is primarily administrative and the power vested in it to hear and determine controversies involving landlords and tenants is granted only as an incident to its administrative duty; in other words, the [board's] function is not primarily to decide questions of legal rights between private parties, but [that remedial role] is merely incidental, although reasonably necessary, to its regulatory powers. ( Id., at pp. 245-246.) [22] The Missouri Constitution also provides that the state's judicial power resides in the state high court and the lower courts. (Compare Mo. Const., art. V, § 1, [23] with Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1 [quoted ante, p. 355].) In Percy Kent Bag Co., supra, 632 S.W.2d 480, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld, against a judicial powers challenge, the constitutionality of a statute that permitted a state antidiscrimination commission to exercise discretionary power to award backpay to complainant employees. The court distinguished a decades old prior opinion on the ground, inter alia, that its statement therein, that determination of money recovery is a judicial function reserved to the courts alone, was dictum. ( Id. at p. 483.) But the court noted a more important reason why the defendant's reliance on the prior opinion was misplaced: [I]t fails to recognize the enormous changes that have occurred in the area of administrative law in this state and nationally during the intervening years. As was stated in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins [(1940) 310 U.S. 381, 400] in overruling a similar delegation of powers argument, `To hold that there was [an unconstitutional delegation] would be to turn back the clock on at least a half a century of administrative law.' (632 S.W.2d at pp. 483-484.) The Missouri court acknowledged that in exercising its authority the commission necessarily determined factual questions, and exercised discretion, and that it thereby does exercise judicial functions. (632 S.W.2d at p. 484.) Nevertheless, the court reasoned, this did not constitute exercise of true judicial power. It defined such power as `the power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect ...' ( ibid. ), and noted that the commission had no such final authority: It determines if the respondent employer has discriminated against the complainant, and it determines what orders to issue. But it cannot `pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect;' only a court can enforce the Commission's order. A party aggrieved by the Commission's order may obtain judicial review of that order. [Citation.] After review, there is a judgment from a court to be enforced. If a decision is not appealed, the Commission must obtain a court order to enforce the Commission's order. [Citation.] Of course, the respondent, against whom an order has been issued, may comply voluntarily with that order. ( Ibid., italics in original.) Decisions of New Jersey, Wisconsin, Oregon, West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Florida  all of which have judicial powers provisions substantially identical to article VI, section 1 of our own Constitution [24]  are substantially in accord with the principles enunciated by the Maryland and Missouri courts. ( New Jersey : Jackson v. Concord Co., supra, 253 A.2d 793, 800 [[A]t this advanced date in the development of administrative law, we see no constitutional objection to legislative authorization to an administrative agency to award, as incidental relief in connection with a subject delegable to it, money damages, ultimate judicial review thereof being available.]; see also Zahorian, supra, 301 A.2d 754, 760-763 [permitting housing discrimination agency to award restitutory damages for economic loss, and minor or incidental damages for emotional distress]; see generally David v. Vesta Co., supra, 212 A.2d 345, 357 [`If the doctrine of the separation of powers were a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic rigor, the use of the modern administrative agency would have been an impossibility in our law.']; Wisconsin: General Drivers & Helpers U., supra, 124 N.W.2d 123, 127 [state employee relations board's order of money damages to cover backpay and vacation pay does not constitute the exercise of `judicial powers within the meaning of the Constitution']; [25] Oregon: Williams v. Joyce (Ore.Ct.App. 1971) 479 P.2d 513, 522 [There is no constitutional impediment which bars the legislature from authorizing an administrative agency to award damages.]; West Virginia: State Human Rights Commission v. Pauley (W. Va. 1975) 212 S.E.2d 77, 80 [agency awarded actual and punitive damages; court concluded there is no constitutional objection to legislative authorization of such an award by an administrative agency]; Pearlman, supra, 239 S.E.2d 145, 147-148 [extending Pauley to expressly allow administrative award of damages for humiliation, even if no monetary loss is proved]; Kentucky: Fraser, supra, 625 S.W.2d 852, 854 [discrimination commission's authority to award damages for humiliation and embarrassment does not constitute unconstitutional delegation or usurpation of judicial powers]; [26] Tennessee: Plasti-Line, supra, 746 S.W.2d 691, 692-693 [following Fraser, supra, 625 S.W.2d 852, and Percy Kent Bag Co., supra, 632 S.W.2d 480]; [27] Florida: Laborers' Intern., L. 478 v. Burroughs (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) 522 So.2d 852, 856 (opn. on rehg.) [upholding administrative imposition of back pay and front pay in employment discrimination case]. [28] ) [29] All of the foregoing sister-state decisions support an expansive view of constitutionally permissible administrative powers. Indeed, some contain broad statements that in our view may well accord too little consideration to the substantive limitations principle discussed above. We explain below the guiding principles we glean from these decisions.