Opinion ID: 2075955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The existence of a debt.

Text: When the District was substituted by operation of law as custodian of the abandoned property here at issue, it was granted a statutory right to possession. The moment that Riggs refused to turn over funds which it was obliged to deliver under the Act, it became indebted to the partyhere the Districtwhich was entitled to the proceeds. Pursuant to Section 42-219, the District had an immediate right, judicially enforceable under Section 42-233, to possession of the abandoned property within six months of the time when it was or should have been reported as abandoned. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 547, 68 S.Ct. 682, 686, 92 L.Ed. 863 (1948). That the District becomes the rightful custodian of the abandoned funds, rather than their outright owner, does not make it any the less Riggs' creditor. The UPA was designed to give the District all of the benefits of the use of unclaimed property until such time as its legal owners recover it. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Cory, 164 Cal.App.3d 66, 71, 210 Cal.Rptr. 351, 355 (1985). Experience has demonstrated that a large portion of the millions of dollars that are turned over to the States under this kind of legislation will never be claimed. People ex rel. Fahner v. Chicago Transit Auth., 127 Ill. App.3d 405, 408, 82 Ill.Dec. 536, 538, 468 N.E.2d 1316, 1318 (1984). Indeed, our statute is largely predicated on that experience; its principal purpose is to give the District use of unclaimed property in order to promote the District's fiscal growth. See Section 42-201; COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 2. In the simplest terms, Riggs was obliged to pay money representing the abandoned property to the District. When it failed to do so, it became a debtor and the District became its creditor. No more is required.