Opinion ID: 1932230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the mississippi cases

Text: Four decisions by this Court have analyzed the prohibition of more than one amendment by single vote of ง 273. State ex rel. McClurg v. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 So. 927 (1900), involved a proposed amendment making the judiciary elective. By the Constitution of 1890 all Supreme Court judges, and all circuit judges and chancellors were appointive. Section 145 dealt with the appointment of the Supreme Court judges, Section 149 their terms of office, and Section 152 appointment of a Supreme Court Judge when a vacancy occurred in office. Section 153 provided all circuit judges and chancellors were appointed by the governor to four-year terms of office. The proposed amendment struck all these sections and provided that all Supreme Court judges, circuit court judges and chancellors were to be elected for eight- and four-year terms, respectively, and were to be elected as other elective state officers. It also provided the legislature would provide by law for party nominations of the circuit judges and chancellors by districts. The proposed amendment was ratified by the people in November, 1899. Judge Powell, appointed by the governor as circuit judge in 1900, refused to vacate his office, and filed this action in circuit court challenging the constitutionality of the amendment. It can be readily seen that one general purpose was sought by the proposed amendment: to make all trial and supreme court judges elective rather than appointive, and for their election to be held as other elective officers. It could certainly be argued that a voter would wish to treat all judicial officers the same, and whether he favored elective or appointive, he would prefer that all be alike. There was a manifest absence of logrolling. The voter was not required to take a dose of castor oil in order to get his candy. It was a far cry from HCR 41. This Court nevertheless held the proposed amendment violated ง 273. In our application of the State v. Timme, supra , and the general criteria for determining whether a proposed amendment contained disparate amendments, State ex rel. McClurg, supra, we also stated: A voter might have chosen to vote for the election of circuit judges and not for the election of chancellors; and one may have chosen to vote for the election of both circuit judges and chancellors, and yet, not for the election of supreme court judges; one might have been willing to vote for the election of all judges, and yet not willing to sanction, by his vote, a scheme for party nomination by districts, for judges to be voted for by electors of the entire state, such as proposed in these amendments. 77 Miss. at 572, 27 So. 930-31. Fourteen years later, in State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, 106 Miss. 522, 64 So. 241 (1914), this Court had before it a challenge of the validity of an amendment to ง 153 making the offices of circuit judge and chancellor elective rather than appointive. We held the amendment did not violate ง 273, and that the test applied in State ex rel. McClurg v. Powell, supra , was too narrow,: [I]n many cases matters which might stand alone may, it would seem, properly be embodied in the same amendment if they related to the same subject and are designed to accomplish the same purpose. [Emphasis added] 64 So. at 249. We further noted that electing judges by popular vote was of this character, although it would be possible to provide for their election by separate amendment, and that rules for the nomination and then election was merely incidental to this purpose. As to this constitutional restriction, this Court noted courts generally have ordinarily taken a liberal and common sense view. 64 So. at 249. We then quoted with approval language from Courts from other jurisdictions: [C]ertainly no good could result from a separate submission which is not equally as well and better accomplished by submitting them together as one amendment; and the separate submission might result in the absurdity of the ratification of one and the rejection of the other... . In order to constitute more than one amendment, the proposition submitted must relate to more than one subject, and have at least two distinct and separate purposes not dependent upon or connected with the other. [Emphasis added]       [I]f the amendment has but one object and purpose, and all else included therein is incident thereto, and reasonably necessary to effect the object and purpose contemplated, it is not inimical to the charge of containing more than one amendment. 64 So. 249. Again it is obvious the facts in State v. Jones, supra , were a far cry from HCR 41. Two of our subsequent decisions dealt with ง 273, both involving an amendment to Article IV, ง 33: Section 33. The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the legislature, which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives. Chapter 520, Laws of 1941, submitted to the people a proposed amendment to ง 33. The first paragraph of the proposed amendment read: Section 33. The legislative authority of this state shall be vested in a legislature which shall consist of a senate and a house of representatives, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose legislative measures, laws, resolutions and amendments to the constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the legislature; and also reserve the power, at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section or any part of any act or measure passed by the legislature. Paragraph 1 following provided that the first power reserved by the people was the initiative, and by a petition of not more than 7,500 voters any measure could be proposed. Paragraph 2 provided that the second power reserved by the people was the referendum, and by a petition of not more than 6,000 voters a referendum could be held on measures passed by the legislature. Paragraph 3 for putting into effect an emergency measure adopted by the legislature. The first portion of Paragraph 4 read: 4. The word `measure' as used herein means any law, bill, resolution, constitutional amendment, or any other legislative measure. All elections on general, local and special measures referred to the people of the state shall be held at the general state or congressional elections, except when the legislature shall order a special election. Any measure submitted to the people, as herein provided, shall take effect and become law when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise. Such measure shall be in operation on and after the thirtieth day after the election at which it is approved. The veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures initiated by or referred to the people. This paragraph then provided how the elections would be conducted, how petitions could be challenged, and the filing mechanism with the secretary of state. The proposed amendment was ratified by the electorate on November 3, 1914, and inserted into our Constitution by the legislature at the 1916 session, Chapter 159, Laws of 1916, known as the Initiative and Referendum Amendment. The validity of this amendment was challenged in State ex rel. Howie v. Brantley, 113 Miss. 786, 74 So. 662 (1917). This Court noted the objection to the 1914 amendment: The ground of this objection is that the amendment reserves to the people three separate and distinct powers, each of which could have been the subject of a separate amendment: First, power to adopt a statute upon their own initiative; second, power to annul a statute enacted by the Legislature; and, third, power to amend the Constitution upon their own initiative. Noting first a requirement that there be a unity of object ... in the ultimate end, and if in the light of common sense the propositions were not so unrelated that their association be artificial, the majority opinion responded to the objection: Returning, now, to the amendment under consideration, it seems clear from an inspection thereof that the three propositions contained in it are, ... but `parts of one general plan or scheme looking to a more direct control of legislation' (or of the laws, both constitutional and statutory, by which they are to be governed) `by the people.' This purpose can be partially accomplished by the adoption of any one of the three propositions, but can be accomplished in full only by the adoption of all of them. Two vigorous dissents argued that the 1914 amendment by authorizing the people to initiate an amendment to the Constitution as well as statutes clearly embraced more than one subject, and amended not only ง 33 but ง 273 as well. Both the majority and dissents used the test of State v. Jones, supra , but came to opposite conclusions. The last case addressing the 1914 Initiative and Referendum Amendment was Power v. Robertson, 130 Miss. 188, 93 So. 769 (1922), in which we expressly overruled Howie v. Brantley, supra. The majority opinion held that the 1914 amendment violated ง 273, noting that by reserving to the people the right to participate in legislation, as well as to amend the Constitution, it imposed many restraints upon legislative power, and materially changed many sections of the Constitution. It further gave the people the right, by a small percentage of voters, to suspend laws by filing a petition within 90 days after adjournment of the legislature. It removed the veto power of the governor. Thus, not only ง 33, but งง 72 and 273 were materially changed. The opinion finally noted there were several Constitutional proscriptions of the legislature's authority to enact certain types of laws, not proscribed to voters under the Initiative and Referendum Amendment. The opinion concluded with the observation that the Court's holding in State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, supra , was neither affected nor modified by this case. The Court in Power v. Robertson, supra , did not deal with any unity of object criterion, or whether there was an artificial association of propositions to be voted on, finding instead the 1914 amendment fatally flawed because it materially changed several sections of the Constitution, thus literally violating the ง 273 proscription: [A]nd if more than one amendment shall be submitted at one time, they shall be submitted in such manner and form that the people may vote for or against each amendment separately. It would appear the Initiative and Referendum Amendment clearly passed the unity of object test. There was but one single purpose: to give the people the right by signed petition to have a state election on whether a law should be adopted, a statute should be rejected, or whether there should be a certain amendment to the Constitution. This amendment in all likelihood would have passed the test of Amador Valley Joint Union H. School District v. State Board of Education, supra . All parts of the proposed amendment were functionally related, and all parts were an interdependent, interlocking package. Instead, this Court in Power v. Robertson, supra , rejected the amendment using a locational test, holding that it amended several sections of the Constitution. Such Initiative and Referendum Amendments have been approved by the courts of other states as not violative of the two-subject prohibition. State ex el. Hay v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 P. 210 (1914); Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 P. 595 (1915). In my view the Initiative and Referendum Amendment did not violate ง 273 as then written.