Opinion ID: 1058323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Receipt of Stolen Property

Text: Whitehead first contends that the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth at trial was insufficient to convict her of receiving stolen property. When analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and considers any reasonable inferences from the facts proved. The judgment of the trial court will only be reversed upon a showing that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680) (citation omitted). Whitehead was found guilty of 32 counts of violating Code § 18.2-108, which at the time of Whitehead's convictions [3] stated: If any person buy or receive from another person... any stolen goods or other thing, knowing the same to have been stolen, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against, although the principal offender be not convicted. Code § 18.2-108 (2004). This Court has previously established that to prove this offense by showing receipt, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the property was previously stolen by some person other than the accused; that the accused received the [property] from such other person; that at the time he received [the property] he knew [it] had been stolen; and that he received [it] with dishonest intent. Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 449, 65 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1951). Whitehead does not challenge the Commonwealth's proof that the property was stolen, but assigns error to the trial court's holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove she received the stolen property or aided in its concealment. The Commonwealth has never contended that Whitehead was involved in the actual theft of items from the various vehicles, or that she physically received the stolen items from Walden. Instead, the Commonwealth premised its argument as to receipt upon a concept of constructive receipt, because Whitehead received benefits flowing from the sale of the stolen goods. In her statement to police, Whitehead conceded that Walden was stealing to try to support me and our daughter, and that Walden was helping pay the rent and bills at the house with money he obtained by selling the property he had stolen. Based on this evidence, the Commonwealth argued, this is a case in reference not to her actually stealing the items but receiving those items as Mr. Walden was bringing them back to the apartment and then not only allowing it to go on, but I guess getting fruit in reference to that, having her bills paid as toward whatever items was stolen and they could get any money for it. On appeal, the Court of Appeals accepted this proposition, noting that Whitehead admitted that the proceeds of the thefts were used to support her and the couple's child. Whitehead, Record No. 1699-06-3, 2008 WL 762189, at . Based on this admission, the Court of Appeals concluded that [t]he trial court had sufficient information to find [Whitehead] knew that the items she received from Walden were stolen. Id. (emphasis added). On appeal before this Court, the Commonwealth maintains that Whitehead's acceptance of the proceeds of the thefts committed by Walden constituted receipt for the purposes of Code § 18.2-108. In support of this theory of constructive receipt, the Commonwealth cites People ex rel. Briggs v. Hanley, 226 N.Y. 453, 123 N.E. 663, 664 (1919), in which the Court of Appeals of New York sustained a conviction for receiving stolen property when the defendant accepted loan proceeds she knew her boyfriend had obtained using stolen stock certificates as collateral. However, we have never recognized this manner of receipt for the purposes of this offense in our decisions. Furthermore, such a manner of receipt does not fall within the plain meaning of Code § 18.2-108. On this point, the distinction between the Virginia statute and the New York statute is significant. While the version of Virginia Code § 18.2-108 in effect at the time of the alleged offenses made it a crime to buy or receive from another person ... any stolen goods or other thing, the relevant New York statute addresses Criminal possession of stolen property, and provides that a person commits that offense when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof.  N.Y. Penal Law § 165.40 (Consol. 2009) (emphasis added). [4] The benefit element of the New York statute is not a part of the Virginia statute. The Court of Appeals was plainly wrong in holding that Whitehead received the property merely because she benefited from the proceeds of its sale. In addition to its reliance on Whitehead's constructive receipt of benefits, the Commonwealth argues, for the first time on appeal, that Whitehead received the stolen property itself under the doctrine of constructive possession. With regard to the receipt element of the offense of receiving stolen property, we have established that [w]hile reception of the stolen goods by the accused must be substantially proven, actual physical handling by [her] is not necessary. It is well settled that constructive possession is sufficient. Longman v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 461, 465, 188 S.E. 144, 145 (1936). To establish constructive possession, the Commonwealth is required to present evidence of acts, statements, or conduct by the defendant or other facts and circumstances proving that the defendant was aware of the presence and character of the [property] and that the [property] was subject to [her] dominion and control. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). However, whether Whitehead received the stolen property here by constructively possessing it is not properly before us, because the Commonwealth makes this argument for the first time on appeal. It is true that [w]e do not hesitate, in a proper case, where the correct conclusion has been reached but the wrong reason given, to sustain the result and assign the right ground. Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1963). However, cases in which the party seeking affirmance failed to present the argument in the trial court, such that the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on the argument, are not proper cases for the application of the doctrine. Id. This principle applies in criminal as well as civil cases. Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 421 n. 2, 620 S.E.2d 760, 764 n. 2 (2005). Here, the Commonwealth did not argue constructive possession in the trial court or before the Court of Appeals. Consequently, we will not consider the Commonwealth's constructive possession argument here.