Opinion ID: 1862954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the production of the tape recording.

Text: (Hn 6) The appellant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to require the State to produce the tape recording, made at the time of the confession. It developed during the trial that the chancery court reporter, Daniels, who took the confession of the appellant in shorthand, also ran his tape recorder, presumably for his own benefit. Neither the district attorney nor any representative of the State had such recording, but the same was in the possession of Daniels. The court explained to appellant's counsel that they could probably get the recording from Daniels, if they wanted it. It appears that no previous request had been made of the State to produce it. Counsel for appellant made no request of the court to require Daniels to furnish the same to them. Only one word was missing in the confession as transcribed, and Douglas Thompson testified that the word was drunk, which jibes completely with the context of the confession. In Ray v. State, 213 Miss. 650, 57 So.2d 469, where the trial court permitted the State to introduce a tape recording of the appellant's confession, this Court held that such action was not error where the recording was properly authenticated. In Sanders v. State, 237 Miss. 772, 115 So.2d 145, the sheriff, the district attorney, and the county attorney were present when Sanders made a confession that he killed Carter. The county attorney, at the time, made a tape recording of what transpired. The State's evidence as to the confession was offered through the sheriff, who narrated it to the jury in accordance with his best recollection; but he conceded that he could not remember every detail thereof verbatim. Counsel for the appellant moved the court to require the State to produce the recording for use in cross-examination. The court overruled the motion; and this Court, on appeal, held that, under the circumstances, such action of the trial court constituted reversible error. In the present appeal, however, the officer, through whom the confession was offered; did not undertake to recite the detailed story which Parker unfolded. What the accused said was put down in shorthand by a court reporter. After the notes were transcribed, the appellant read the entire statement. He then signed it, and swore to it before Robert L. Daniels, Jr., who was also a notary public. When counsel for appellant, reading from the statement in several instances, asked the officer about his recollection, the officer remembered the exact language. For instance, in the only place in the whole confession where there was an omission, as stated above, counsel read an answer as follows: When we started to leave, Norris Saucier met us at the door, coming in when we were fixing to leave. I was helping Mr. Braddock down the steps. It was kinda bad getting out and he was pretty ..., and then asked do you know what was said there? The officer replied: I do.    Mr. Braddock was pretty drunk. In other words, there was no evidence of error or inaccuracy in the statement whatever. Besides the State was not in possession of the recording. Its counsel informed counsel for the appellant where it could be reached. The court, if requested, no doubt would have required Daniels to present the recording. But counsel for the appellant sought no aid from the court to see that such information was obtained from Daniels. Manifestly the trial court, under the circumstances, cannot be put in error on account of the failure of appellant's counsel to have access to the recording. Besides there is nothing in this record to indicate that the lack of access to this recording resulted in any prejudice whatever to the appellant. It is fortunate indeed that human society is not often required to ferret out and punish so devilish and diabolical crime as that to which the State was called in this instance. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the woman, Margie, was used as the bait with which to trap the unwary Braddock. He bought her clothes and repeatedly paid for the drinks. When he was so completely under the influence of liquor that he passed out, her companions took his money. Their greed and avarice did not stop at that point  they coveted their victim's new automobile. Instead of sparing his life and leaving him by the side of the road where some good Samaritan might give him aid and succor, they chose rather to silence his tongue forever, and leave his mortal remains to be devoured by the beasts of the field and the vultures of the air, with the purpose and in the hope that the identity of his murderers could never be established. If death is ever to be imposed as punishment for the crime of murder, this is certainly an instance for its exaction  the jury were evidently unable to find any extenuating circumstances whatever. (Hn 7) The appellant was given a fair and impartial trial. There is no prejudicial or reversible error in the record. Guilt was conclusively established beyond every reasonable doubt. The judgment of the trial court must be, and it is, affirmed. Affirmed and Friday, June 29, 1962, is fixed as the date for the execution of the death penalty in the manner provided by law.