Opinion ID: 1111406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lee majority

Text: Roughly thirty-five years after Kraft, in State v. Lee, supra , [7] a split but benchmark decision, this court not only significantly amplified its existing police power jurisprudence, but also laid the groundworkwithout ever using the termfor the future emergence of an expressly recognized constitutional right to privacy. Lee had been convicted of violating HRS § 286-81(1)(A) (1968), which, inter alia, mandated that the operator of a motorcycle wear a safety helmet. [8] Lee then appealed from the judgment sustaining the constitutionality of the statute. On appeal, Lee argued that the first precondition ... to the exercise of the police power by the legislature..., namely, [that] it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference[,] ha[d] not been met. He contend[ed] that other members of the public at large [we]re not affected in a deleterious manner, if indeed at all, by the conduct regulated by this statute; that the only realistic effect of the statute [wa]s to compel motorcyclists to take precautionary measures so that they [would] not harm themselves; [and] that harm to self or harm to a particular class is not within the public interest and is outside the scope of the police power to legislate in the public interest. Lee, 51 Haw. at 517, 465 P.2d at 575. By contrast, the prosecution maintained that decreasing fatalities and injuries from motorcycle accidents does impinge directly on the public interest in three respects: (1) economic impact: (a) lessens [the] burden on public agencies such as hospitals, medical[,] and ambulance facilities; (b) reduces addition to the public assistance roles [sic] of disabled motorcyclists and their dependents or survivors; (2) flying missile theory: loose stones on the highway or fallen objects may strike the motorcyclist on the head, thus causing him to lose control and become a menace to other vehicles on the highway; (3) the increase in fatalities and serious injuries is so alarming, so widespread[,] and of such grave dimension that it threatens the very fabric of society. Id. at 517-18, 465 P.2d at 575 (emphases added). The Lee majority took notice of the legislature's expressly stated purpose in first enacting HRS § 286-81: Deaths of persons and injuries to them and damage to property with the other losses suffered on account of highway traffic accidents are of grave concern to the State and its citizens as well as to the federal government. The legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest that the State initiate, coordinate[,] and accelerate every available means to decrease the fatalities, injuries, damages[,] and losses resulting from highway traffic accidents. Id. at 518, 465 P.2d at 575 (quoting 1967 Haw. Sess. L. Act 214, § 1 at 257). Armed with this legislative history, the Lee majority declared that, where the legislature has clearly stated its purpose, we are reluctant to attribute other purposes, unless the facts underlying such other purposes are clearly and convincingly shown. In this case the legislature has not alluded to either economic impact or the flying missile theory, there was no evidence introduced by the [prosecution] to substantiate either argument, and the claimed facts are not susceptible to judicial notice. Id. at 518-19, 465 P.2d at 575. Consequently, the Lee majority regarded itself as being squarely faced with the issue whether the legislature may constitutionally regulate the conduct of an individual so as to require him to protect himself from physical injury and[/]or death; that is, whether physical harm to self is a proper subject of public interest and thus subject to the police power of the legislature. Id. at 519, 465 P.2d at 575-76 (emphasis added). In the Lee majority's view, the issue before it went to the very heart of the nexus between the individual and the state: where does the public interest begin? Id. at 519, 465 P.2d at 576. Having thus framed the issue, and taking judicial notice of (1) the National Uniform Standards for State Highway Safety Programs, H.R. Doc. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which set up the motorcycle safety helmet as a minimum standard to which state highway safety programs must conform, (2) certain published statistics of the New York Department of Motor Vehicles, and (3) data promulgated by the Michigan State Police, id. at 519-20, 465 P.2d at 576, the Lee majority engaged in the following analysis: In our opinion[,] these statistics fairly show that motorcycle accidents are significantly more dangerous than motor vehicle accidents; that there is an enormous increase in motorcycle registrations; [and] that there is a corresponding enormous increase in the number of deaths and injuries due to motorcycle accidents. The question is whether the accelerating rate of deaths and injuries due to motorcycle accidents[,] coupled with the increase in motorcycle registrations[,] has reached such proportions and the class of motorcycle users has become so large and widespread that the continued viability of our society requires that they protect themselves from physical injury or death in short, is the public interest generally affected? We hold that it is. We wish to make it clear that this holding is limited to this case. We start from the proposition that where an individual's conduct, or a class of individuals' conduct, does not directly harm others[,] the public interest is not affected and is not properly the subject of the police power of the legislature. However, where the legislature has determined that the conduct of a particular class of people recklessly affects their physical well-being and that the consequent physical injury and death is so widespread as to be of grave concern to the public[,] and where the incidence and severity of the physical harm has been statistically demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court, then the conduct of that class of people affects the public interest and is properly within the scope of the police power. Of course, where the conduct sought to be regulated is in furtherance of a specific constitutional right, a different situation arises. .... We hold that HRS § 286-81(1)(A) and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it are within the proper exercise of police power. Id. at 521-22, 465 P.2d at 576-77 (emphases added). [9] How, then, did the analysis of the Lee majority augment this court's assessment of the scope of the state's police power to criminalize conduct, as articulated earlier in Kraft? First, it is of critical significance that the majority opinion in Lee in no way diverged from any of the core tenets of the Kraft analysis. See supra section I.A. Second, the Lee majority not only pledged continued allegiance to the harm to others principle, but also tightened it further. Specifically, in order for the public interest ( i.e., the public health, safety, and welfare) to be generally affected, the Lee majority highlighted that the conduct of an individualor a class of individualsmust directly harm others (emphasis added); if it does not, then the public interest is not affected and [it] is not properly the subject of the police power of the legislature. Thus, third, the Lee majority clarified that individual conduct, which entailed the foreseeable and likely risk of physical harm to the actor and no one else, could generally affect the public interest and therefore be properly within the scope of the police power only if the following conditions were satisfied: (a) the legislature determined that the conduct of a particular class of people recklessly affect[ed] their physical well-being; (b) there was (i) consequent physical injury and death (ii) that was so widespread as to be of grave concern to the public; and (c) the incidence and severity of the physical harm has been statistically demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court. Fourth, however, the Lee majority imposed a significant caveat on the foregoing clarification: where the conduct sought to be regulated is in furtherance of a specific constitutional right, a different situation arises. I suggest that this can only mean that the exercise of the police power in order to criminalize conduct that furthers an enumerated, fundamental constitutional right is subject to more rigorous constitutional scrutiny than that employed by the Lee majority. [10]