Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the defense was improperly limited in its closing argument.

Text: ¶ 151. Kolberg next claims that he was wrongly prevented from inquiring about Dr. Galvez's beliefs from other witnesses. The prosecution's hearsay objection was sustained. When Kolberg attempted to comment on Dr. Galvez's absence from the courtroom, the State's objection was sustained based on Dr. Galvez being a witness available to both sides. Kolberg now questions the trial court's sustaining of these two objections. ¶ 152. As to questioning Dr. Galvez's credibility, Dr. Galvez did not testify because he was not called as a witness and his investigations were not introduced into evidence. The information Kolberg sought to elicit from other witnesses about Dr. Galvez's beliefs and opinions were hearsay. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 153. Despite Kolberg's argument that Dr. Galvez was not a witness equally available to both sides, he has provided nothing in the record to support this claim. This Court will consider only those matters that actually appear in the record and does not rely on mere assertions in briefs. Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So.2d 374, 380 (Miss.1996)(citing American Fire Protection, Inc. v. Lewis, 653 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Miss.1995)). ¶ 154. Our decision in Fox v. State, 756 So.2d 753 (Miss.2000) is controlling here. The party that wishes to make a comment about a witness that was not called has the burden of persuasion to prove that the witness was not equally available. Id. at 762. We said that the test for availability depends on whether a party has so superior opportunity for knowledge of the witness, or else upon the relationship of the witness to the party as the same would reasonably be expected to affect his personal interest in the outcome of the litigation and make it natural that he would be expected to testify in favor of the one party and against the other. Id. at 761-62 citing Brown v. State, 200 Miss. 881, 27 So.2d 838, 841 (1946). We also quoted from the decision in Brown as follows: Now the term available in the connection in which we are using it does not mean merely available or accessible for the service of a subpoena, since any witness who may be found may be subpoenaed at the instance of either party to any cause. Quite to the contrary, the availability of a witness to one or the other of the parties to an action depends either upon such party's superior means of knowledge of the existence or identity of the witness, or else upon the relationship of the witness to the party as the same would reasonably be expected to affect his personal interest in the outcome of the litigation and make it natural that he would be expected to testify in favor of the one party and against the other. In other words, a witness may properly be said to have been peculiarly available to one party to an action, so that upon that party's failure to have produced him in court an inference arises that his testimony would have been unfavorable, when such party had so superior an opportunity for knowledge of the witness, or there was such a community of personal interest between the party and the witness, as in ordinary experience would have made it reasonably probable that the witness would have been called to testify for such party except for the fact that it was known or feared that his testimony would be damaging rather than favorable. Fox, 756 So.2d at 762, n. 1 (quoting Brown, 200 Miss. at 889-90, 27 So.2d 838, 841). We believe Kolberg has presented nothing to establish Dr. Galvez was not equally available to him within the meaning of Fox. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit.