Opinion ID: 2507433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: RCW 9A.72.010(1) is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the judge to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law in a perjury prosecution

Text: ¶ 8 A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 769-70, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). Wherever possible, it is the duty of this court to construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality. State v. Reyes, 104 Wash.2d 35, 41, 700 P.2d 1155 (1985). However, `[w]e cannot press statutory construction `to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question.' Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000) (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379, 53 S.Ct. 620, 77 L.Ed. 1265 (1933))). ¶ 9 RCW 9A.72.020(1) provides that [a] person is guilty of perjury in the first degree if in any official proceeding he makes a materially false statement which he knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law. RCW 9A.72.010(1) defines materially false statement as any false statement oral or written . . . which could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding. Specifically at issue in this case, RCW 9A.72.010(1) further provides that whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law.  (Emphasis added.) ¶ 10 In United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that the materiality of a false statement must be submitted to the jury rather than decided by the trial judge. In Gaudin, a case involving a defendant charged with making false statements on federal loan documents in violation of former 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1948), [4] the Supreme Court declared that [t]he Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged, and the materiality of the alleged false statements is an element of the offense. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23, 115 S.Ct. 2310. Two years later in Johnson, where the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which proscribes knowingly making any false material declaration under oath before a grand jury, the Supreme Court similarly declared that there is no doubt that materiality is an element of perjury. . . . Gaudin therefore dictates that materiality be decided by the jury, not the court. 520 U.S. at 465, 117 S.Ct. 1544. ¶ 11 The State concedes that materiality is an element of perjury and must be submitted to the jury. [5] The State argues, however, that the statutory language does not prohibit a jury from determining materiality, but merely requires a judge to determine materiality as well. The Gaudin court noted that [i]t is commonplace for the same mixed question of law and fact to be assigned to the court for one purpose, and to the jury for another. 515 U.S. at 521, 115 S.Ct. 2310. Relying on this language, the State contends that the trial court's determination of materiality is analogous to a trial court's preliminary determination of the relevance of offered evidence, where a jury subsequently weighs the admitted evidence as it sees fit. See, e.g., Vandivier v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (adopting a framework in light of Gaudin, where the trial court make[s] a preliminary determination of materiality when assessing the admissibility of the evidence. If it finds the evidence admissible, it must then submit the issue to the jury for the jury to weigh the evidence and determine whether the State proved materiality beyond a reasonable doubt. (citations omitted)). ¶ 12 When we interpret a criminal statute, we give it a literal and strict interpretation. State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003). Here, the plain language of the perjury statute is expressly at odds with Gaudin and Johnson. The statute does not direct the judge to make an initial determination of materiality; rather, its direction for the judge to determine materiality as a matter of law seems conclusive. And indeed, this is how courts have interpreted this statutory language. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 152 Wash.2d 601, 613, 98 P.3d 444 (2004); State v. Dial, 44 Wash.App. 11, 14, 720 P.2d 461 (1986). ¶ 13 Although, as the State suggests, it is consistent with Gaudin for the trial judge to make a preliminary determination of materiality and then submit the issue to the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, this procedure is inconsistent with the statutory directive for the trial judge to determine materiality as a matter of law. ¶ 14 Under Gaudin and Johnson, the provision of RCW 9A.72.010(1) requiring the court to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law is unconstitutional. There is no set of circumstances under which a judge can constitutionally apply a statute that requires a judge alone to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law. Such a procedure would violate the defendant's right to a jury trial on every element of the crime with which he is charged, a right that our constitution has specifically declared to be inviolate. Wash. Const. art. I, § 21. We find RCW 9A.72.010(1)'s directive that whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law constitutionally infirm.