Opinion ID: 2585470
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inapplicability of Prior Restraint

Text: ¶ 35 The district court was correct in ruling that the determinative issue was licensing rather than censorship, and that the doctrine of prior restraint was simply inapplicable. A ministerial action as to licensing is not presumptively invalid, and unlike most prior restraints, the city is not required to justify its decision in court on every occasion. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. at 606-07. This distinction is important because the constitutionality of the statute turns on whether the licensing scheme functions as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction or a censoring wolf in sheep's clothing that would trigger Freedman's rigid analysis. ¶ 36 Prior restraint is only at issue where the government exercises some form of censorship or indirectly represses the communication of ideas before their dissemination. Generally, ordinances that have failed under prior restraint have either delegated unbridled discretion to state officials or lacked sufficient time restraints for the licensing process. See FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 225-26, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05. ¶ 37 Prior restraint, notwithstanding Dr. John's nearly talismanic reliance on the mere assertion of the phrase, is not implicated by the ministerial requirement of a completed application. The mere invocation of the words prior restraint should not transmogrify a personal battle for laxer sexual mores into a constitutional issue, lest this court be led toward ruling on an issue of fundamental importance when Dr. John's harm is illusory and the restraint self-imposed. The record indicates that had Mr. Haltom truthfully filled out the proper form he would have been granted a license. As a practical matter, it is only Mr. Haltom's refusal to permit classification as an SOB that has allowed him to manufacture a fight with the government. Classification is clearly permissible without implicating any constitutional concerns. The mere fact that ... material protected by the First Amendment is subject to ... licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating [an] ordinanc[e]. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). ¶ 38 The narrow question presented in this case is whether a municipality may require an SOB to complete a different application than a nonsexually oriented business. This question presents no intellectual challenge. The First Amendment has nothing to do with a wholly ministerial requirement that a business apply for and obtain a valid business license, even if that license is somehow different from other commercial establishments. There is no fundamental right to be free from government classification of a business as a certain type, nor a ministerial licensing provision, so long as the process does not restrict or otherwise negatively impact business owners. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2452 ([W]e hold that the State may legitimately use the content of [sexually explicit] materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification. . . .); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 812, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2686, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the statute differentiates between professional fundraisers and volunteer[s] ... [but] this fact alone does not impose an impermissible burden on protected speech, nor does it require that the licensing provisions be subjected to strict scrutiny). ¶ 39 Because municipalities may generally impose licensing requirements for purposes of regulation and zoning, and because the constitutionality of applying a more stringent application process for SOBs has been thoroughly examined by other courts, we forego a rigorous constitutional analysis and uphold the district court's decision. See Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 26 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1149 (W.D.Wis.1998) (holding licensing requirement mandating disclosure of prior criminal convictions not unconstitutional prior restraint); IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 F.Supp. 1402, 1410-11 (D.Nev.1984) (holding any ambiguity in language classifying SOB and subsequent licensing requirements not unconstitutionally vague where as applied to plaintiff it was clear that business was SOB); St. Louis County v. B.A.P., Inc., 18 S.W.3d 397, 408-17 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (holding licensing ordinances governing SOBs sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy constitutional concerns). See generally Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Sex-Oriented Businesses to Obtain Operating Licenses, 8 A.L.R.4th 130 (1981) (listing recent cases where ordinances have been found to be both constitutional and unconstitutional as prior restraints).