Opinion ID: 164917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other alleged loans and withdrawals

Text: The district court found that Cunningham failed to tie any of the other allegedly suspicious transactions he mentions to Adams. It noted, further, that Cunningham’s complaint did not allege that Adams is a Plan fiduciary who could be held liable under fiduciary standards for such transactions. In response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Cunningham presented no evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment in support of his theory that the additional transactions violated ERISA. The evidence he did submit either referred specifically to the August 31, 1986 distribution, did not refer to any specific transaction, or represented only speculation about whether the additional transactions violated ERISA. See Amended Affidavit of Billy Jim Weintz, Aplt. App. Vol. I at 126 (stating Adams directed Weintz to withdraw Adams’ contributions and company matching contributions from the Plan); Affidavit of Paul Venamon, id. at 213-14 (detailing unspecified distribution of $200,000 or more to Adams from Plan); Gary Barnes opinion letter, id. Vol. II at 308 (referring non-specifically to “funds . . . inappropriately transferred to the general operating account of Adams Investment Company”); Gary Barnes affidavit, id. at 331 (stating that entries “indicate[] possible inappropriate -7- actions”) (emphasis added); 2 Gary Barnes Memorandum of April 25, 2003 (stating “the reports I have reviewed are not conclusive” concerning whether Adams “raided” the Plan), id. at 386. By contrast, defendants presented testimony from an expert witness whose firm audited the Plan from 1985 through 2001 and who found no dealings between Adams and the Plan other than the August 31, 1986 distribution. Aplee. Supp. App. at 555-56. “To defeat a motion for summary judgment, evidence, including testimony, must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture or surmise.” Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. , 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). Even giving Cunningham the benefit of every reasonable inference, we conclude that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Cunningham’s claim that the additional transactions constituted improper inurement. 3 2 In any event, the district court struck this affidavit and, as will be seen, we uphold its action in doing so. 3 In his opening brief, Cunningham asserts, citing generally Adams’s deposition filed under seal, that Adams stated “under oath, during his deposition testimony, that over a period of time, he had made in excess of thirteen (13) loans from the PLAN.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. Cunningham further implies that Adams has failed to repaid the loans. We have reviewed Adams’ sealed deposition testimony, and it does not say that Adams made or obtained any such loans from the Plan . See Aplt. App., Vol. III at 43-45 (filed under seal). Cunningham’s counsel has misstated the record. -8- 4. Retaliation claim Cunningham contends that after he requested an accounting of the Plan, defendants retaliated by firing him. He contends this violated ERISA § 510, which provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under [ERISA].” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. At the time of Cunningham’s discharge, he was the second shift finishing supervisor for defendant Central State Business Forms (CSBF) at its facility in Dewey, Oklahoma. The hours of the second shift are 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. Cunningham was required to ensure that production continued throughout his shift. He was generally required to remain on company premises during working hours, but was permitted to leave the premises to deliver customer orders to the United Parcel Service (UPS) office for shipping. Production employees at CSBF are paid for a full eight-hour shift, including mealtimes. They do not, however, have a set meal period and are expected to eat lunch at their work stations. On May 9, 2001, at approximately 8:00 p.m., during Cunningham’s assigned shift, a supervisor at CSBF and another CSBF employee observed Cunningham buying a lottery ticket at a convenience store in Caney, Kansas. Cunningham had gone to Caney after he completed a delivery at UPS. Significantly, the convenience store where he was sighted is located -9- approximately twelve miles north of the CSBF facility, across the Kansas state line, while the UPS facility is to the south , in Bartlesville, Oklahoma. Moreover, the UPS facility closes at approximately 7:00 p.m., an hour before Cunningham was seen in Caney. The next day, Mattix reported to John Rose, General Manager at CSBF, that Mattix had seen Cunningham in Caney, Kansas. Rose discussed the matter with Cunningham’s supervisor, Bill Mattix, and confirmed that Cunningham did not have permission to be at the convenience store and was not on company business when he was observed in Caney. Rose terminated Cunningham’s employment, effective May 16, 2001. Although Rose discussed the termination with Adams, Adams did not make the decision to terminate Cunningham. Cunningham presented no evidence that Rose discussed the pension plan with Cunningham or that Rose was aware at the time he terminated Cunningham’s employment that Cunningham had made any inquiries concerning the Plan. Nor did Cunningham present any evidence that Rose discussed the Plan with Adams. To prevail under section 510, an employee must demonstrate that the defendant had the specific intent to interfere with his ERISA rights. See Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co. , 991 F.2d 645, 649 (10th Cir. 1993). The employee can satisfy his burden by relying on either direct or circumstantial proof of the -10- defendant's intent. See Garratt v. Walker , 164 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Cunningham chose to produce circumstantial evidence of defendants’ intent by employing the well-known, burden-shifting analysis first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr. , 129 F.3d 554, 559 (11th Cir.1997) (applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to a section 510 claim). Under the McDonnell Douglas method, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). The district court found that Cunningham failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, because the record showed that Rose made the decision to terminate Cunningham’s employment and because there was no showing that Adams or Rose even knew of Cunningham’s request for an accounting of the Plan at the time of the termination. We agree with that analysis and therefore affirm summary judgment on Cunningham’s § 510 retaliation claim. 5. Striking of expert witness The district court struck the summary judgment affidavit of Cunningham’s expert witness, Gary Barnes, for three reasons. First, it found that Cunningham had failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) because the information Cunningham disclosed about Barnes’s testimony was incomplete, vague, and unrelated to the opinion given in the affidavit. Second, the district court -11- questioned whether Barnes was qualified as an expert in the area of his testimony. Finally, the court determined that the vast majority of Barnes’s affidavit concerned issues that were not properly before the court. The district court concluded that the affidavit was of no assistance to the court in determining the issues, and should therefore be stricken. We review a district court’s exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Cartier v. Jackson , 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995). In reviewing a court’s determination for abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment. Id. Having reviewed the district court’s decision and the record under this standard, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to strike Barnes’s affidavit. 4 4 The defendants also requested that the district court strike Barnes’s trial testimony; in light of its grant of summary judgment, the district court correctly determined that this portion of the motion was moot. -12- The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Appellant’s motion to supplement the record is DENIED. Entered for the Court Robert H. Henry