Opinion ID: 852652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instructions on Murder

Text: Dorsey argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the murder charge. Dorsey does not dispute the State's assertion that his trial counsel neither objected to the murder instruction nor tendered his own instruction. To avoid procedural default, Dorsey argues that because the murder instruction failed to include the elements of arson, the court committed fundamental error. The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind.2002). The crimes of [knowing or intentional] murder and felony murder each contain elements different from the other but are equal in rank. Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind.1989). For example, to convict a defendant of knowing or intentional murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a knowing or intentional killing, but to convict a defendant of felony murder, the State must prove that a killing (which may have been accidental) occurred while the defendant committed or attempted to commit one of several felonies. Thomas v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ind.2005). Dorsey argues that it is not clear whether the State charged him with knowing murder or felony murder and contends the court's murder instruction did not cure this conflation of the two. The State charged Dorsey with the murder of Karen McCloud, citing Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1 generally. That section reads: A person who: (1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being; (2) kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, consumer product tampering, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, robbery, or carjacking;    commits murder, a felony. Count I of the State's charging instrument read Dorsey L. Mathews, on or about September 16, 1994, did knowingly kill another human being, namely: Karen McCloud, while committing the crime of Arson, thereby inflicting mortal injuries upon Karen McCloud, causing Karen McCloud to die. We agree that this charging instrument suggested that the State would attempt to prove Dorsey guilty of both knowing murder and felony murder. This imprecision carried through to the preliminary and final instructions, both of which read: The crime of murder is defined by statute as follows: A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being, or kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery, commits murder, a felony. To convict the defendant, Dorsay [sic] L. Mathews, of the crime of murder, a felony, as charged in Count I of the Information, the State must prove each of the following elements: The defendant on or about the September 16, 1994 1. knowingly 2. killed 3. Karen McCloud while committing the crime of arson, thereby inflicting mortal injuries upon Karen McCloud, causing Karen McCloud to die. The State must prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. [2] The State concedes that, [a]t trial, the deputy prosecutor appeared to be confused as to whether the information charged murder or felony-murder. The deputy prosecutor, however, tendered a final jury instruction, that the trial court refused to give, that charged both murder and felony-murder. The jury returned a general verdict which stated: We, the jury, find the defendant Dorsey L. Mathews guilty of the crime of murder as charged in Count I of the information. Neither the verdict nor the trial court's judgment or sentencing order distinguished between knowing murder and felony murder. The State argues that if the murder count is read as a charge for knowing murder, then the arson reference in the charge is merely the mechanism for the homicide, and thus superfluous. However, if the charge is deemed to be felony murder, then the murder instruction should be read together with the other instructions, which correctly set forth the elements of arson. Dorsey argues that the arson instruction does not save the flawed murder instruction and the trial court committed a fundamental error. We agree that the instruction was erroneous, but the error was in Dorsey's favor, by addressing unnecessary elements to the crime of murder. As such it is harmless error, not fundamental error. This Court recently dealt with a very similar situation. In Thomas the instruction set out the elements of knowing or intentional murder, but also made reference to felony murder and did not set forth the elements of the underlying felony. 827 N.E.2d at 1133. We held that in light of the jury's unanimous verdict, because both the charging information and jury instructions contain each of the elements of Knowing or Intentional Murder the State met its burden of proof on the charge of Knowing or Intentional Murder. Id. at 1133-34. The same is true here, with even more precision because of the instructions as to arson. In short, the jury was instructed to find Dorsey guilty of murder only if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly killed Karen McCloud while committing arson. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and given its instructions found him guilty of all elements of both knowing murder and felony murder. Dorsey was not prejudiced by the erroneous mixture of the two, and the error certainly did not rise to the level of fundamental error.