Opinion ID: 2458490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Lesser included offense analysis should apply to felony-murder cases

Text: As mentioned above, K.S.A. 22-3414(3) directs courts as to how they must decide requests for lesser included instructions from criminal defendants. Lesser included offense instructions must be issued if there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime. K.S.A. 22-3414(3). It makes no exception for the judicially created felony-murder instruction rule and does not require there to be conflicting evidence as to the commission of the felony before the statute is applied. Accordingly, and after thoroughly reviewing the case law developed since Germany, we find lesser included offense instructions should follow the statutory mandate so that instructions are issued if there is some evidence that would reasonably justify the conviction of the lesser included crime. In short, we would apply K.S.A. 22-3414(3) as written to felony-murder cases. Cf. State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 57, 144 P.3d 647 (2006) (requiring all other crimes and civil wrongs evidence to be governed by K.S.A. 60-455 and ending past practices of permitting admission of such evidence independent of the statute). We disapprove any language to the contrary in our previous opinions. In Berry's case, and using the statutory viewpoint directed by K.S.A. 22-3414(3), we find the evidence could reasonably justify a conviction for lesser included crimes. Indeed, the evidence is undisputed that Berry fled from the traffic stop and recklessly drove down city streets at an unconscionably high rate of speed. His flight caused an automobile accident that took someone's life. Such evidence could support a conviction for second-degree reckless murder. See K.S.A. 21-3402(b) (unintentionally killing a person recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life). Also, the evidence could justify a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. See K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3404(a) (unintentionally killing a person recklessly). And the evidence could support a conviction of vehicular homicide. See K.S.A. 21-3405 (unintentionally killing a person while operating an automobile in a manner that created an unreasonable risk of injury to the person of another and constituted a material deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe under the same circumstances.). As such, the failure to issue the lesser included offense instructions amounts to reversible error when following the statutory directive of K.S.A. 22-3414(3). We reverse Berry's felony-murder conviction based on the above analysis and order a new trial on that charge. Finally, we hold that the decision announced in this case is to have application in all pending felony-murder cases. This court previously has noted that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final. Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, 106, 92 P.3d 574 (2004) (adopting rule set out in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 [1987]). A conviction is generally not final until: (1) the judgment of conviction is rendered; (2) the availability of an appeal is exhausted; and (3) the time for any rehearing or final review has passed. State v. Boggs, 287 Kan. 298, 305-06, 197 P.3d 441 (2008) (holding new rule in criminal prosecutions is applied to cases pending on direct review but not final); see Gaudina, 278 Kan. at 105-06, 92 P.3d 574; State v. Heath, 222 Kan. 50, 54, 563 P.2d 418 (1977). Our ruling in Berry's appeal renders moot the remaining issues he raises, but we elect to discuss the arguments relating to Berry's request for an additional causation instruction and the prosecutor's closing arguments. We do so in the interest of judicial economy and because these questions may arise again on remand.