Opinion ID: 798208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Over Representation

Text: 12 On cross-appeal, the government argues that the district court erred on remand when it departed based upon Mills's over-represented criminal history. This departure, the government argues, violates § 3742(g)(2) 2 , which limits permissible departures on remand. We agree. On remand, a district court may not impose a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines sentencing range unless the ground was specifically and affirmatively included in the written statement of reasons required by section 3553(c) in connection with the previous sentencing of the defendant prior to the appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2)(A) 3 ; United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 852 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that the plain language of § 3742(g) appears to handcuff any court on remand). 13 In Mills I, the district court erroneously consolidated Mills's prior three burglary offenses into one offense. Mills's criminal history calculation went from category VI to category IV; his offense level went from 34 to 31; his sentencing range went from 262 to 326 months to 151 to 188 months. Mills, 375 F.3d at 690. On remand, the district court determined that Mills's criminal history was over-represented and departed downward, causing Mills's criminal history calculation to decline from category VI to category IV; his offense level to go from 34 to 31; his sentencing range to go from 262 to 327 months to 151 to 188 months. Criminal history overrepresentation does not appear as a grounds for departure in the district court's first written statement of reasons. Therefore, the departure granted by the district court violates § 3742(g). We, therefore, reverse.