Opinion ID: 2995202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misappropriation of 3M’s Customized

Text: Resin Formulations As noted above, the jury concluded that 3M had a trade secret in the customized resin formulations that enhance the sheeting and thermoforming capability of resin and give it properties needed in the electronic industry. The jury also determined that the defendants had improperly used or disclosed or threatened to use or disclose that trade secret, and awarded 3M $83,000 in damages. In its motion for judgment as a matter of law, Accu-Tech and its founders renewed an argument that there was no basis for a rational jury to find that the defendants misappropriated any customized resin formulations. The district court, while resolving that the jury had a basis for finding a trade secret in the customized resin formulations, also held that there was no basis for finding misappropriation of any customized resin formulation. In order to understand the basis for the district court’s finding, a brief explanation of the resin sheeting manufacturing process is necessary. The process for making resin sheeting begins with a raw material called a resin pellet. Resin pellets are widely available in a myriad of different formulations. In perfecting its resin sheeting manufacturing process for making carrier tape, 3M expended significant resources in analyzing and experimenting with different types of resin pellets. Besides using these commercially available resin formulations, 3M independently developed one type of resin formulation--a formula for polystyrene resin. Polystyrene resins are general-purpose, high-impact and ignition-resistant resins that meet application needs across a broad range of market segments including the packing industry. In granting the defendants judgment as a matter of law, the district court determined that the only resin formula which could be considered a customized resin formulation was the polystyrene resin. However, the court noted that while the defendants did use a polystyrene resin for making resin sheeting, they used a commercially avail able polystyrene resin rather than plaintiff’s customized formula. Thus, the court found that there was no rational basis for concluding that Accu-Tech had misappropriated 3M’s customized resin formulation. We review a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Massey v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ill., 226 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2000). Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed R. Civ. P. 50(a). Especially after a jury has evaluated a case, we bear in mind that the question is not whether the jury believed the right people, but only whether it was presented with a legally sufficient amount of evidence from which it could reasonably derive its verdict. See Massey, 226 F.3d at 924. But there must have been more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the verdict. When examining the record, we look at the totality of the evidence, and we view that evidence and the inferences which may be taken from it in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted. See id. 3M asserts that the district court erred in granting the defendants judgment as a matter of law. First, 3M notes that the defendants were operating Accu-Tech at the time that 3M was developing its polystyrene resin. Because Skrtic was responsible for the manufacturing of the polystyrene resin and admittedly had some knowledge of this customized resin formulation, 3M posits that the district court ignored evidence that permits a reasonable inference that the defendants used 3M’s customized resin formulation. Second, 3M argues that the district court’s decision ignores the fact that the jury’s verdict could have been based on defendants’ threat to use or disclose 3M’s trade secret. Third, 3M suggests that the district court’s decision that there could be no customized resin formulations simply because 3M bought its resin on the open market was in error. We agree with the district court that no rational juror could have found that defendants used or disclosed 3M’s formula for producing polystyrene resin. There is no dispute that Accu-Tech operated in secret while its founders were employed by 3M. There is also no disagreement that at that time, 3M was developing its own polystyrene resin formula, which Skrtic had some access to. Finally, it cannot be contested that the defendants did in fact use a polystyrene resin formulation in making their resin sheeting. Yet, we cannot draw from these facts a reasonable inference that Accu-Tech was using 3M’s polystyrene resin formulation. First, while he did have access, there is no evidence that proves that Skrtic had knowledge of 3M’s polystyrene resin formula. Furthermore, as the district court noted, the evidence at trial specifically established that Accu-Tech was not using 3M’s polystyrene resin. The testimony presented explicitly revealed that while defendants were engaged in producing resin sheeting from a polystyrene resin, that they used a commercially available resin formula rather than 3M’s customized formula. Against these undisputed facts, 3M’s facts and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them do not amount to a scintilla of evidence. However, 3M is correct to point out that the district court did not address in its grant of judgment as a matter of law whether the defendants had threatened to use or disclose 3M’s customized resin formulation. Yet, the district court’s silence on this matter is of little import. While vacating the jury award for misappropriation, the district court left intact a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from disclosing 3M’s customized resin formulations. Thus, even assuming that the defendants knew 3M’s customized resin formulations, 3M is sufficiently protected against the threat of disclosure by the district court’s injunction. See e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995); American Can, 742 F.2d at 329. In fact, 3M acknowledges that the company would only be entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the future disclosure of the misappropriated secrets. As such, the fact that the jury may have based its finding of liability on the threat of disclosure of 3M’s trade secrets--a questionable assumption given the jury’s award of monetary damages--would not mandate a reversal of the district court’s decision. Finally, we agree with the district court that 3M does not have a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret incustomized resin formulations for commercially available resin products. Simply because 3M expended significantresources in selecting from the market the proper resin formula for making its sheeting does not constitute that selection as a customized resin formulation. As the district court correctly noted, [t]esting many products on the market to choose the one that meets particular needs does not make that product ’customized’ in any reasonable sense of the word. To the extent that 3M now argues that it modifies the commercially purchased resin pellets by blending them in carbon, we find that fact does not assist 3M’s claim. The purpose of blending carbon into a commercially purchased resin is to create a conductive polycarbonate resin. However, testimony at trial revealed that 3M does not make the conductive polycarbonate resin that it uses, but rather that it purchases it from an outside source. More importantly, there is not even a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the defendants misappropriated 3M’s blending method./5 Overturning a jury verdict is not something that should be done lightly. According to our civil justice system, as enshrined in the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, the jury is the body best equipped to judge the facts, weigh the evidence, determine credibility, and use its common sense to arrive at a reasoned decision. As a reviewing court, we must be particularly careful . . . to avoid supplanting [our] view of the credibility or the weight of the evidence for that . . . of the jury. Massey, 226 F.3d at 925. Here, even taking that generous standard of review into account, we agree with the district court that this claim flounders for lack of evidence. Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.