Opinion ID: 2457797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Continuing the poll

Text: Relying on United States v. Spitz, 696 F.2d 916 (11th Cir.1983), Saletta contends that the district court should have stopped the jury poll as soon as the lack of unanimity was revealed and its failure to do so was per se reversible error. We disagree. In Nevada, jury polling is governed by NRS 175.531. The statute authorizes the trial court to poll the jury and provides that if the poll does not show unanimous concurrence in the verdict, the court may direct the jury to continue its deliberation or discharge the jury. We have not previously addressed the issue of whether a district court must stop polling once a juror has dissented from the verdict. However, several federal circuit courts of appeal have addressed this issue in the context of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(d), and, because NRS 175.531 is substantially similar to Rule 31(d), [2] we look to these courts for guidance. Of the six circuit courts that have considered the issue of whether continuing to poll the jury after a juror has dissented constitutes per se reversible error, one has concluded that it does, Spitz, 696 F.2d at 917-18, and five have concluded that it does not, Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1182-85 (6th Cir.2006); Gambino, 951 F.2d at 502; U.S. v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172, 174 (3d Cir.1988); Amos v. United States, 496 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. Brooks, 420 F.2d 1350, 1354 (D.C.Cir.1969). In Spitz, the Eleventh Circuit determined that continuing to poll a jury after a juror dissented from the verdict had the effect of establishing where the jury stands numerically and held that continuing the poll is per se reversible error. 696 F.2d at 917. The court relied on Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), wherein the Supreme Court addressed a trial court's decision to recall a jury from deliberation to inquire about its numerical division, id. at 449, 47 S.Ct. 135, and held that such an inquiry constitutes per se reversible error because it serves no useful purpose, has a tendency to be coercive, and can rarely be conducted without imposing an improper influence upon the jury, id. at 450, 47 S.Ct. 135. The Second Circuit has rejected Spitz 's conclusion that Brasfield requires reversal when a judge continues to poll the jury after a juror has dissented from the verdict. Gambino, 951 F.2d at 502. The Second Circuit noted that other circuit courts had interpreted Rule 31(d) as leaving the jury polling method to the discretion of the trial court, determined that proper deference should be given to the trial court's exercise of that discretion, and suggested factors to consider when assessing whether a polling method is coercive. Id. at 501-02. The Second Circuit specifically identified three factors that should be considered when assessing whether a polling method is coercive: (1) whether counsel objected to the polling, (2) whether the district court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury before excusing the jury for further deliberation, and (3) the amount of time that it took the jury to reach a verdict after deliberation resumed. Id. Other courts considering this issue have also distinguished Brasfield and held that the trial court has discretion to continue polling so long as its polling method is not coercive. Lyell, 470 F.3d at 1182-85; Fiorilla, 850 F.2d at 174-77; Amos, 496 F.2d at 1272-73; Brooks, 420 F.2d at 1353-54. We are persuaded by the Second Circuit's analysis that the district court has discretion to continue polling the jury after a juror has dissented from the verdict so long as the polling method is not coercive. Like Rule 31(d), NRS 175.531 gives the district court the discretion to discharge a non-unanimous jury or direct the jury to continue deliberating. To give effect to this discretion, NRS 175.531 must be interpreted to leave the method of conducting the jury poll to the judge's discretion. Gambino, 951 F.2d at 501. Accordingly, we reject Spitz 's per se rule as too rigid and inflexible, and we adopt the rule that the district court's method for polling a jury shall be reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will constitute reversible error only if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the polling method was coercive. [3] We further adopt the Gambino factors for assessing the coerciveness of a polling method. Here, Saletta did not object when the district court continued to poll the jury. Failure to object generally precludes appellate review. Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1259, 946 P.2d 1017, 1030 (1997). However, we have the discretion to review an unpreserved error if it [is] plain and affected the defendant's substantial rights. Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 365, 23 P.3d 227, 239 (2001); see NRS 178.602. In conducting plain error review, we must examine whether there was error, whether the error was plain or clear, and whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). An error is plain if the error is so unmistakable that it reveals itself by a casual inspection of the record. Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 1525, 1530, 907 P.2d 984, 987 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). [A]t a minimum, the error must be clear under current law, Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 648, 119 P.3d 1225, 1232 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), and, [n]ormally, the defendant must show that an error was prejudicial in order to establish that it affected substantial rights, Gallego, 117 Nev. at 365, 23 P.3d at 239. Applying the Gambino factors, we conclude that the continued polling of the jury in this instance was not coercive. Saletta's failure to object to the district court's decision to continue polling the jury suggests the absence of a coercive atmosphere, the jury was told to look at the instructions again before it began further deliberation, and the jury rendered a guilty verdict after deliberating for an additional 36 minutes, which was noticeably longer than the initial deliberation. Given the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that Saletta has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by continuing to poll the jury after the seventh juror dissented from the verdict and, therefore, he has not demonstrated error on this issue.