Opinion ID: 77035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grant of Qualified Immunity

Text: 7 In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the Supreme Court set out a two-step analysis to determine whether an officer is eligible for qualified immunity. The first step is to determine whether the facts [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right[.] Id. If the conduct did not violate a constitutional right, the inquiry ends there. If the conduct violated a constitutional right, a court must move on to the second step and determine whether the right was clearly established. Id. Under the first step, the district court found that Arrugueta had violated Walters's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court found, however, that under the second step the right violated was not clearly established and thus Arrugueta was entitled to qualified immunity. 8 We first examine whether the district court correctly found that Arrugueta's conduct violated a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable seizures. Deadly force is reasonable for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment when an officer (1) `has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others' or `that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm;' (2) reasonably believes that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some warning about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible. Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)); see also Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.2004) (the `reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officer's actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.). 9 The district court relied on the following facts, taken in the light most favorable to Robinson, in making its determination that Arrugueta's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment: (1) at the time of the shooting, Walters was in between the passenger's seat and the driver's seat, (2) the car was rolling slowly downhill, and (3) Arrugueta could have avoided the vehicle by stepping aside. 10 Though the facts must be taken in the light most favorable to Robinson, the determination of reasonableness must be made from the perspective of the officer. 11 The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. 12 Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir.1994), quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). 13 The law existing in Georgia at the time of this incident instructed that a car driven in a threatening manner can be considered a deadly weapon. Webb v. State, 256 Ga.App. 653, 654, 569 S.Ed.2d 596, 597 (2002) ([O]ne who aims a motor vehicle at another person may be convicted of aggravated assault regardless of whether the victim sustained any injuries or was even touched by the vehicle.). Furthermore, under Georgia law, a law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force to prevent death or great injury to himself/herself or to third parties. See O.C.G.A. §§ 16-3-23 and 17-4-20. 14 Here, Arrugueta was standing in a narrow space between the two vehicles, Walters was disobeying Arrugueta's orders to put his hands up, the Escort was suddenly moving forward and Arrugueta had to make a split-second decision of whether he could escape before he got crushed. At the most, Arrugueta had only 2.72 seconds to react to what he perceived as a threat of serious physical harm from Walters. 15 Our precedent instructs us to take into account that [r]econsideration [after the uncertainty and the excitement of the moment have passed] will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if . . . the future [was known] before it occurred. Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir.2003). Even if in hindsight the facts show that Arrugueta perhaps could have escaped unharmed, we conclude that a reasonable officer could have perceived that Walters was using the Escort as a deadly weapon. Arrugueta had probable cause to believe that Walters posed a threat of serious physical harm. 16 In the case of Brosseau v. Haugen, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 596, 600, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) the Supreme Court held that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Brosseau to use deadly force against a suspect in an attempt to prevent the suspect's escape and potential harm to others. Here, Arrugueta perceived that Walters was attempting to crush him and endanger his life. Because it is constitutionally reasonable for an officer to use deadly force when a suspect is threatening escape and possible harm to others, it is also constitutionally reasonable for an officer to use deadly force when he has probable cause to believe that his own life is in peril. 4 Thus, we conclude that Arrugueta is entitled to qualified immunity under the first step of the Saucier analysis. 17 Even though our inquiry ends at the first step of the analysis, we note that the district court was correct in finding that, under the second step, the law was not clearly established, and thus, Arrugueta is entitled to qualified immunity under this step as well. See Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1332; see also Brosseau, 125 S.Ct. at 599 (Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.). 18 Robinson argues that the law is clearly established in this area. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 12, 105 S.Ct. at 1701 (Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.). Robinson contends that Walters posed no immediate threat to Alrugueta because the Escort was moving slowly and Arrugueta had enough time to get out of the Escort's way. The Supreme Court, however has emphasized that the inquiry into whether the law is clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Brosseau, 125 S.Ct. at 599, quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. We conclude that, at the time of the shooting, no clearly defined preexisting law would have indicated to Arrugueta that his use of force under this specific factual situation was unlawful. 19 C. Material Issues of Disputed Facts Do Not Foreclose the Grant or Denial of Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity 20 Robinson contends that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the events that led Arrugueta to fire his gun and, therefore, Arrugueta, is not entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has instructed, however, that [t]o deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim-could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to `avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.' Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). 5 21 When conducting a qualified immunity analysis, district courts must take the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. When a district court considers the record in this light, it eliminates all issues of fact. By approaching the record in this way, the court has the plaintiff's best case before it. With the plaintiff's best case in hand, the court is able to move to the question of whether the defendant committed the constitutional violation alleged in the complaint without having to assess any facts in dispute. Thus, because material issues of disputed fact are not a factor in the court's analysis of qualified immunity and cannot foreclose the grant or denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity; we decline to entertain Robinson's arguments concerning the allegedly disputed facts.