Opinion ID: 2629661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Source of Error

Text: After the trial court assessed the veracity of the disputed statements, it did not follow the second prong of the Dailey test: It did not evaluate the origin of error for the false statements. Because the trial court deleted all or part of the first statement without determining the source of error, its strike of that information was contrary to Dailey. In addition, if the trial court had performed an evaluation of the origin of error in the first statement, it would not have excised any of it; testimony from the veracity hearing suggests that the source of error was not an intentional falsehood, reckless disregard for the truth, or even negligence. Rather, the affiant relied on the first-hand observations of a fellow officer who recognized Ornelas and Reed. It is well-established that an affiant need not have personal knowledge of statements in an affidavit under the fellow officer rule. People v. Alexander, 797 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Colo.1990) (officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may nevertheless make a valid arrest if (1) officer acted upon the communication of a police officer, and (2) the police, as a whole, have sufficient information to constitute probable cause); People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 908 (Colo.1986) (information supplied by fellow officer was reliable). Therefore, because the reasonable affiant could have relied on information provided by a fellow officer, a trial court cannot excise that information from the warrant affidavit. Similarly, the trial court did not evaluate the source of error for the second statement which incorrectly stated that defendant had moved from Room 3 to Room 12 on November 4th. Like the first statement, this statement cannot be attributed to intentional falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. At best, it shows negligence on the affiant's part to consult the motel records. Again, since a reasonable affiant can rely on information from a fellow officer or from a motel manager who stated that Reed rented motel Room 3, and because evidence indicates that Reed had been in Room 3 prior to November 4th, this error did not require excision from the warrant affidavit. See Young, 785 P.2d 1306 (in a similar case, where officer reasonably relied on information that later proved to be false, the officer was not negligent). In summary, no part of either of the two disputed statements should have been stricken from the affidavit under Dailey. Accordingly, we next proceed to determine whether the unexcised affidavit supported a showing of probable cause.