Opinion ID: 782819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lying in wait Special Circumstances

Text: 56 The jury also found the special circumstance of lying in wait to be true. The instructions defined lying in wait as requiring three elements, waiting, watching, and concealment followed by immediate, surprise attack. The instructions further defined concealment as ambush or alternatively creation of a situation where the victim is taken unawares even though he sees his murderer. The instructions given to the jury qualified this definition by explaining it is only concealment which puts the defendant in a position of advantage from which it can be inferred that lying in wait was part of the defendant's plan to take his victim by surprise. A perceptible interruption between the concealment and watchful waiting and the period during which the killing took place would defeat the special circumstance. 57 Morales argues that California statutes regarding lying in wait murder, 52 as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, violates the Eighth Amendment. Morales claims that the California statutes in place during his trial failed to meaningfully distinguish lying in wait murder from other murder with pre-meditation and deliberation, and that there is an inadequate distinction between lying in wait as an aggravating factor and lying in wait as a special circumstance. 53 58 Specifically, Morales argues that the California Supreme Court decisions regarding lying in wait are so expansive that the special circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment by failing to draw a meaningful distinction between lying in wait murders and any other murders with premeditation and deliberation. Morales's argument makes no reference to the actual instructions the jury was given or the evidence the jury heard in this case. Nor does Morales claim that the actual jury instructions failed to distinguish meaningfully between lying in wait and mere premeditation and deliberation. Without some connection between the claimed vagueness and what actually occurred in Morales's trial, we cannot say that the Eighth Amendment was violated in this case. 59 Further, the California lying in wait special circumstance is not unconstitutionally vague. Under the California statutes at the time of Morales's trial, murder committed by means of lying in wait is, by virtue of that aggravating factor, first degree murder. 54 Murder that is first degree, whether for that reason or another, committed in the special circumstance that the killing is while lying in wait subjects the defendant to a sentence of life without possibility of parole or death. 55 The by means of factor enhances the murder to first degree murder, and the while factor allows the first degree murderer to be death penalty eligible. Then the jury weighs the while factor, along with many others, to determine whether to impose the death penalty. 60 Under Godfrey v. Georgia, for death penalty eligibility standards to satisfy the Eighth Amendment, such eligibility criteria must provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many in which it is not. 56 This requires the state to provide clear and objective standards that channel the sentencer's discretion, obviating standardless discretion. 57 If the standards are so vague that they would fail to channel discretion, then they allow arbitrary and capricious sentencing in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 58 The Court in Tuilaepa v. California rejected a broad challenge to the California scheme before us now, and limited applicability of the Godfrey requirements to death penalty eligibility as opposed to imposition. 59 In so doing the Court held that the Godfrey requirements are not susceptible of mathematical precision so vagueness review is quite deferential. 60 61 We held in Houston v. Roe 61 that the California lying in wait special circumstance is not unconstitutionally vague as an eligibility factor. Our holding in Houston was premised on the conclusion that California had created a thin but meaningfully distinguishable line between first degree murder lying in wait and special circumstances lying in wait. 62 Indeed, the California lying in wait special circumstance does not apply to every convicted murderer, or even every convicted first degree murderer. Under California law, a person can commit first degree murder intentionally, through a variety of means. But to prove the special circumstance of lying in wait, the government must prove intentional murder plus the three elements of lying in wait. 62 Because Houston was not a death penalty case, we did not reach the question whether the statute was specific enough for what the Court in Tuilaepa calls a selection criterion after eligibility is established. But because Tuilaepa holds that selection criteria are less constrained by specificity requirements than eligibility criteria, it follows a fortiori from Houston that the California special circumstance of lying in wait is sufficiently specific as a death penalty selection factor. Thus, Morales's Eighth Amendment challenge to lying in wait as an eligibility and selection criterion fails under Houston.