Opinion ID: 6350443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excessive Force—Deputy Hansen

Text: Magne claims Hansen violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using excessive force in executing the takedown. “A defendant violates the Fourteenth Amendment by purposely or knowingly using force against a pretrial detainee that is ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015)). The objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct “turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is evaluated “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of 4 Appellate Case: 21-1256 Document: 010110697955 Date Filed: 06/16/2022 Page: 5 hindsight.” Id. We “also account for the legitimate interests that stem from the government’s need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in the judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[U]se of an objective standard . . . protects an officer who acts in good faith” and is “forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Id. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether an officer acted reasonably or unreasonably, we may consider the following nonexclusive factors: the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Id. at 397. Our analysis of the pertinent considerations confirms Hansen acted with objective reasonableness in executing the takedown. First, the need for the use of force was commensurate with the amount of force used. Magne had been arrested for a DUI and had grown increasingly disruptive after being placed in the holding cell, where he repeatedly slammed the cell door. When Hansen escorted him to be fingerprinted, Magne held his hands in the air and continued to raise and lower his hands as Hansen attempted to fingerprint him. Magne then inexplicably persisted in touching Hansen for approximately twelve seconds, twice tracing the outline of the 5 Appellate Case: 21-1256 Document: 010110697955 Date Filed: 06/16/2022 Page: 6 patch on Hansen’s shoulder with his index finger, wiping the patch with his hand, briefly pausing, and then repeatedly rubbing the patch with his hand until he reached across Hansen’s chest near Hansen’s neck. At that moment, Hansen executed the takedown. Magne denies reaching near Hansen’s neck, and he faults the district court for failing to credit his version of the events, but the video “blatantly contradicts” him. Emmett v. Armstrong, 973 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 2020) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the video clearly shows that Magne reached across Hansen’s chest and touched Hanson’s uniform (where a pen was clipped to his collar, visible in earlier footage from another angle, see Aplt. App., video 2 at 1:57:17-25), just below his neck, see id., video 1 at 2:07:10; see also id., video 2 at 2:07:29 (showing Magne’s thumb and index finger directed toward Hansen’s throat as Hansen steps back to execute the takedown). Given the potential threat Magne posed by doing so, the need for Hansen’s use of force was proportionate to the force he used. This factor weighs heavily in Hansen’s favor. The second and third factors—the extent of Magne’s injuries and any attempt to temper the amount of force used—could suggest Hansen acted unreasonably. Magne suffered a severe laceration to his head, and he claims he sustained a traumatic brain injury, though he cites no evidence to support his claim. And Hansen made no attempt to limit the amount of force he used. However, Hansen reacted in the split second when Magne reached across his chest near his neck, and when they spun around to the floor during the takedown, Magne inadvertently hit his head on 6 Appellate Case: 21-1256 Document: 010110697955 Date Filed: 06/16/2022 Page: 7 the door frame. We agree with the district court that these factors weigh in Magne’s favor, if only slightly. The fourth factor, the severity of the security problem, weighs in Hansen’s favor. Magne was impaired, if not still intoxicated, and he had grown increasingly disruptive. While he was unhandcuffed, he repeatedly touched Hansen for far longer than necessary to wipe away any spit that may have landed on Hansen’s shoulder. And reaching near Hansen’s neck and touching his uniform posed an obvious and serious threat to Hansen’s personal security. There also was a potential security threat to the jail posed by Magne, who was entirely unrestrained. The fifth factor, which evaluates the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, also suggests Hansen acted reasonably. Hansen testified that Magne’s conduct was “assaultive with the intent of causing bodily harm.” Aplt. App., vol. 1 at 147. The video confirms that Magne touched Hansen’s uniform near his chest, just below his neck. This confirms that Hansen’s perception was reasonable, and accordingly, this factor weighs in his favor. Lastly, the sixth factor, whether Magne was actively resisting, is only marginally applicable. The district court determined that Magne was resisting, but he was not retracting his arm or otherwise refusing to be fingerprinted, although he was acting in a distracting and disruptive manner. Cf. Rowell, 978 F.3d at 1173 (distinguishing between uncooperative behavior and active resistance). Moreover, although Magne denies that Hansen told Magne to stop touching him, neither was 7 Appellate Case: 21-1256 Document: 010110697955 Date Filed: 06/16/2022 Page: 8 there any need for him to touch Hansen for as long or in the manner that he did. This factor does not weigh decisively in favor of either Magne or Hansen. On balance, the relevant factors weigh in Hansen’s favor, and we therefore conclude that his use of the takedown was objectively reasonable. Absent a constitutional violation, we need not consider the clearly-established prong of the qualified immunity test. See Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993). Magne fails to show any reversible error by the district court in granting summary judgment for Hansen based on qualified immunity.