Opinion ID: 1243792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authorization to Record

Text: Because I would hold that the conversations of these four defendants were private and thus protected by the privacy act, it is necessary for me to address an issue not confronted by the majority. That issue is whether these recordings were properly authorized by a judge. As the Court of Appeals observed in the consolidated appeals by 10 of these defendants, this state's privacy act was not intended to authorize judges to grant a `roving commission' to randomly record conversations with any nonconsenting party. State v. D.J.W., 76 Wash.App. 135, 145, 882 P.2d 1199 (1994), review granted, 126 Wash.2d 1008, 892 P.2d 1088 (1995). [2] Before the recording of any private conversation may be authorized, a judge must find that there is probable cause to believe that the nonconsenting party has committed, is engaged in, or is about to commit a felony. RCW 9.73.090(2). Although the probable cause determination need not be based on constitutional probable cause principles, the reviewing court is `to decide if the facts set forth in the application were minimally adequate to support the determination that was made.' State v. Knight, 54 Wash.App. 143, 150-51, 772 P.2d 1042 (quoting United States v. Scibelli, 549 F.2d 222, 226 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 960, 97 S.Ct. 2687, 53 L.Ed.2d 278 (1977)), review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1014, 779 P.2d 730 (1989). The foundation of a judge's probable cause determination must be a finding of compliance with RCW 9.73.130. That statute provides that an application for authority to record communications or conversations is to contain a particular statement of the facts relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that an authorization should be issued. RCW 9.73.130(3). The statement is to include: the identity, if known, of the person whose conversation is to be recorded; the details as to the particular crime that has been or is about to be committed; the type of communication or conversation that is to be recorded; and a showing of probable cause to believe that such communication will occur at the place where the recording is to take place. In addition, it is to set forth the location and manner of the recording, the length of time the recording is to be maintained, and facts showing that other normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed. RCW 9.73.130(3)(a)-(f). The application that was presented to the judge who authorized the recordings of the private conversations between the police informant and prospective defendants did not set forth facts that are minimally sufficient to justify a recording of those conversations. The application, which was presented by veteran Seattle Police Department Captain William Bryant, merely indicated that the informant who was to be utilized in the so-called Operation Hardfall had been involved in a similar operation in California, that this informant had successfully purchased drugs in two of the areas designated as high narcotics trafficking locations, and that there was probable cause to believe that street traffickers dealing drugs in high narcotics trafficking areas of Seattle and unincorporated King County are about to commit violations of the controlled substances act. Clerk's Papers at 98, 93. Rather than demonstrating the ineffectiveness of other investigative techniques that may have been employed, the application indicated only that the recording of these conversations was necessary for the safety of the informant and because his credibility would be subject to attack. The application here was not a particular statement of the facts and, therefore, did not justify the authorization for recording. Specifically, it was deficient because it gave the issuing judge an inadequate and overly generalized description of the geographic areas where the informant would be recording conversations and it did not name or identify the parties whose conversations were to be recorded. Although an application for a recording needs only to describe the nonconsenting parties with reasonable certainty under the circumstances, RCW 9.73.090(5), the application with which we are here concerned did not describe the persons whose conversations were ultimately recorded with any degree of certainty. [3] It merely said that the informant was to drive through the high narcotics trafficking areas referred to earlier [SODAs] [4] for about a two hour period. He will purchase narcotics in transactions initiated in these areas or within 1000 feet of their boundaries. Clerk's Papers at 97. According to the application, the recording equipment was to be in continual operation throughout the process. Clerk's Papers at 97. While judges who authorize recordings pursuant to the privacy act have considerable discretion to determine whether the act's safeguards have been satisfied, the judge's discretion is not unbridled. Fundamentally, the law enforcement officer received precisely the roving commission that the Court of Appeals warned against in State v. D.J.W . The authorization allowed the police informant to record conversations he held with anyone who approached him or entered his car in a geographical area that included a large portion of downtown Seattle, and several other large areas of King County including portions of West Seattle, North Seattle and the Central District. [5] Such a broad license to record private conversations is, in my judgment, beyond the pale of the privacy act. I would, therefore, hold that the recordings of the private conversations with Piggee, T.L.C., Harris, and C.R.G. that took place in the informant's car were improperly authorized and, therefore, should have been suppressed. RCW 9.73.050. [6] MADSEN, C.J., JOHNSON, J., and PEKELIS, J. Pro Tem., concur.