Opinion ID: 1787070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court erred by allowing defense counsel to question herring regarding his use of a seat belt in order to mitigate medical damages.

Text: ¶ 21. Herring argues that the trial court erred by allowing defense counsel to question him regarding his use of a seat belt at the time of the accident in question. Subsequent to asking Herring about the damage caused to his truck by the first and second impacts, defense counsel asked as follows: Q. Now, let's talk about what happened to you inside your truck. You had your seat belt on? A. Correct. Q. And the seat belt remained intact, correct? A. Correct. ¶ 22. Herring's attorney objected to this line of questioning, stating that questions regarding the use or non-use of seat belts to mitigate damages is impermissible. Defense counsel stated that the questions were simply designed to show that Herring had his seat belt on and, therefore, was not thrown about in the car. The trial judge overruled the objection of Herring's attorney, and the questioning proceeded: Q. Back to where we were, you said you had your seat belt on, correct? A. Correct. Q. All right. And, in fact, your seat belt remained intact; it did not come apart or anything?    A. Correct. Q. In fact, you remained in your seat throughout the accident. A. Yes. Q. Now, you testified earlier on your direct exam that as a result of the first impact, that your head, the back of your head, came in contact with the rear window of your truck. A. Correct. Q. The fact of the matter is, that's the only part of your body that came in contact with anything inside of your car as of that first impact, correct? A. Correct. ¶ 23. Herring argues that because Miss. Code Ann. § 63-2-3 (1996) prohibits a defendant from questioning a plaintiff regarding his non-use of a seat belt, this Court should likewise prohibit a defendant from questioning a plaintiff regarding his use of a seat belt. Herring contends that such a prohibition is consistent with the purpose of § 63-2-3. ¶ 24. Herring's argument is without merit. Section 63-2-3 provides: This chapter shall not be construed to create a duty, standard of care, right or liability between the operator and passenger of any passenger motor vehicle which is not recognized under the laws of the State of Mississippi as such laws exist on the date of passage of this chapter or as such laws may at any time thereafter be constituted by statute or court decision. Failure to provide and use a seat belt restraint device or system shall not be considered contributory or comparative negligence, nor shall the violation be entered on the driving record of any individual. The statute provides that failure to use a seat belt may not be considered as evidence of contributory or comparative negligence. It does not purport to bar the admission of seat belt non-usage in all cases, as Herring asserts, but rather forbids such only from being considered as contributory or comparative negligence. See Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264, 1267-68 (Miss.1999). Furthermore, the statute does not provide that the use of a seat belt may not be considered. This Court has stated that § 63-2-3 should be enforced as written and is not given an overbroad application, lest the statute be considered an improper evidentiary statute rather than a substantive one. Id. at 1268 (noting that there can be no statutory rule of evidence). Herring's interpretation of § 63-2-3 improperly expands the language of the statute to prohibit not only evidence of seat belt non-usage in all instances, but also evidence of the use of a seat belt offered for any purpose. ¶ 25. In the case at hand, Poirrier stipulated to his negligence. The only issues before the jury were whether Poirrier's negligence caused Herring's injuries and, if so, to what extent. The testimony elicited from Herring on cross-examination is relevant to both issuesthat is, whether Herring remained in his seat upon impact is relevant to whether Herring sustained injuries from the impact as well as to the extent of those injuries. Furthermore, Herring testified that he was wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident. A jury could not misuse this information to conclude that Herring was somehow contributorily negligent. In fact, the fact that Herring was wearing his seatbelt would tend to prove just the opposite. The trial judge did not err in allowing defense counsel to question Herring regarding his use of a seat belt.