Opinion ID: 1791846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion as a Matter of Law

Text: Union Pacific recognizes that we have already enunciated a rule that near-miss evidence is admissible upon a showing that the events arose out of the same or substantially similar circumstances. See Carter v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 284 Ark. 278, 681 S.W.2d 314 (1984) (quoting Fulwider v. Woods, 249 Ark. 776, 461 S.W.2d 581 (1971)). Nonetheless, we are asked to overrule that case because near-miss evidence is inherently unreliable and unduly prejudicial, and, thus, should be excluded as a matter of law. No case has been cited, and we can find none, that supports a per se exclusion of near-miss evidence. The admissibility of prior similar occurrences has been commonly accepted in Arkansas for many years. See Ford Motor Co. v. Massey, 313 Ark. 345, 855 S.W.2d 897 (1993); Westark Specialties, Inc. v. Stouffer Family, Ltd., 310 Ark. 225, 836 S.W.2d 354 (1992); Fraser v. Harp's Food Stores, Inc., 290 Ark. 186, 718 S.W.2d 92 (1986); Carter v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 284 Ark. 278, 681 S.W.2d 314 (1984); Houston General Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 267 Ark. 544, 592 S.W.2d 445 (1980); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Johnson, 260 Ark. 237, 538 S.W.2d 541 (1976); Fulwider v. Woods, 249 Ark. 776, 461 S.W.2d 581 (1971). In addition, it is generally recognized that evidence of prior similar occurrences is admissible with a showing of sufficient similarity in circumstances. See McCormick on Evidence, 5th ed.1999 p. 703-04 § 200. Thus, Union Pacific presses this court to pioneer a per se exclusion in the face of a sound majority position. While we are urged to adopt a per se rule in railroad-crossing cases, the supporting theory of unreliability is not so limited. Evidence of prior similar occurrences in railroad-crossing cases is not any less reliable than prior similar occurrences in any other context. Furthermore, a necessary predicate to the adoption of a per se exclusion rule would be a decision by this court to break with our prior precedent in Carter v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 284 Ark. 278, 681 S.W.2d 314 (1984). We have held that there is a strong presumption of the validity of prior decisions. Bharodia v. Pledger, 340 Ark. 547, 11 S.W.3d 540 (2000). Although we do have the power to overrule previous decisions, it is necessary as a matter of public policy to uphold prior decisions unless great injury or injustice would result. Id. The policy behind stare decisis is to lend predictability and stability to the law. Id. In matters of practice, adherence by a court to its own decisions is necessary and proper for the regularity and uniformity of practice, and that litigants may know with certainty the rules by which they must be governed in the conducting of their cases. Id. Precedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable. Id. Union Pacific asserts that a near miss leaves no record of the incident. We recognize that there are situations in which a near miss will occur leaving no tangible record of the incident. Yet, this does not mean that a near miss can never be verified or documented. For example, there will be occasions when the near miss is reported to the police, the railroad, or some other agency. Under the rule proposed by Union Pacific, near-miss evidence would be inadmissible regardless of its veracity. The admission of this evidence is considered on a case-by-case basis and the burden rests on the party offering the evidence to prove that the necessary similarity of conditions exists. Westark Specialties, Inc. v. Stouffer Family, Ltd., 310 Ark. 225, 836 S.W.2d 354 (1992). Union Pacific has failed to demonstrate that allowing near-miss testimony into evidence gives rise to a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break in precedent is warranted. Accordingly, we decline to depart from our holding in Carter v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., supra .