Opinion ID: 1092776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: due processvagueness

Text: Defendants contend that LSA-R.S. 40:967 (G)(2) is unconstitutionally vague in its use of the term substantial assistance in prescribing the prerequisites for a defendant to obtain leniency, since this section does not prescribe any criteria by which it can be determined objectively as to when substantial assistance has been rendered. Defendants argue further that because of the failure of the statute to afford any guidance as to when substantial assistance has been provided, it allows for arbitrary enforcement and unreasonable application in violation of their federal and state guarantees of due process of law. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process a statute creating or defining an offense and fixing the punishment therefor must be sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct or conditions required or forbidden, to prescribe the elements of the offense with reasonable certainty, fix an ascertainable standard of guilt, and make it known to those to whom it is addressed what conduct on their part will render them liable for its penalties, and not be so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 580, State v. Baker, 359 So.2d 110 (1978). There is no claim that the definition of the offense or penalties provided are unclear, but the effect of a defendant providing substantial assistance can have a direct bearing on the extent or severity of the punishment imposed. We believe, therefore, that the stated principles regarding due process standards for criminal statutes must be applied. The phrase substantial assistance in the identification, arrest or conviction of other parties or conspirators to the crime for which he was convicted or related crimes is sufficiently definite in the context of the statute taken as a whole. We find the language of the provision sets forth the requirements for leniency with as much exactitude as it is reasonably possible for a statute to do, and that the provision is susceptible of common understanding and can, therefore, be uniformly applied. We, therefore, find the statute constitutional in all respects except in that part which imposes a minimum fine and no maximum, and strike down that part. We further find that the statute must be so interpreted that a reduction of sentence cannot be granted by the courts of this state after the commencement of execution of sentence. We vacate the granting of the motions to quash in the two individual cases now before us, and remand the cases for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. MOTIONS TO QUASH DENIED. DIXON, C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part, agreeing that the provisions concerning the fine should be excised and that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers, but otherwise disagreeing with the conclusion that there is a conflict with the governor's power to commute sentences. WATSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and assigns reasons. LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.