Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to recuse.

Text: ś 273. Evans argues that the trial judge erred when he refused to recuse himself after Evans was granted in forma pauperis status (hereinafter IFP) in pending federal litigation against various individuals in Harrison County, one of whom was Judge Vlahos. Donald Leroy Evans, Dempsey A. Bruner and Manuel Victor Brown, et. al v. Harrison County, Mississippi, Hon. Kosta Vlahos, Joe Price, Rick Gaston, Bobby Eleuterius, Robin Alfred-Midcalf, David LaRosa, Larry Benefield, and C.T. Switzer, Jr., Civil Action No. 1:93-CV43(Br)(R), was attached as Exhibit A to the Motion to Recuse filed by Evans on February 24, 1993. In the lawsuit, Evans alleges that numerous officials, acting in their official capacities, violated Evans' constitutional rights. Specific allegations regarding Judge Vlahos are as follows: 9. Defendant Honorable Kosta N. Vlahos is sued in his official capacity as Senior Circuit Judge of Harrison County. Judge Vlahos is presiding over the capital murder trial of Plaintiff Donald Leroy Evans.       36. Defendant Vlahos intentionally and knowingly is violating Plaintiff Evans' right of access to the courts by denying him access to attorneys who do not represent Plaintiff Evans in his criminal matter. Defendant Vlahos has issued an order in the form of a request to Defendant Price [7] that all counsel except those appointed to handle Plaintiff Evans' capital trial must seek prior approval from his appointed counsel, Judge Vlahos or Sheriff Price before they may meet with Plaintiff Evans. Plaintiff Evans has contacted counsel to handle legal matters other than his criminal matter and sought to have attorney-client visits with these attorneys, only to have them turned away. The requirement, per Judge Vlahos, that such attorneys seek prior approval from Plaintiff Evans appointed counsel, Defendant Price or Defendant Vlahos unreasonably invades the relationship of Plaintiff to the courts. ś 274. Evans was granted IFP status by the federal district court and now argues that this action by the federal court compels the conclusion that the allegations in the lawsuit were not frivolous and that the plaintiffs could proceed. Judge Vlahos, however, indicated that until the federal court made an adverse determination he would continue with the criminal trial. ś 275. Evans cites James v. Alfred, 835 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 1599, 99 L.Ed.2d 913 (1988), wherein the Court held: The claim of one seeking in forma pauperis status must cross the threshold of litigation worthiness. Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.1986). In determining whether a case should be allowed to proceed IFP or be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), we have formulated a three-pronged test: (1) does the complaint have a realistic chance for success; (2) does it present an arguably sound basis in fact and law; (3) can the complainant prove any set of facts that would warrant relief. ś 276. This Court is therefore presented with the issue of whether the filing of a civil rights lawsuit against the trial judge by a criminal defendant requires recusal. In Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898 (Miss.1992), this Court discussed the standards governing judicial recusal: The standard by which the Court determines if a Judge should have disqualified himself or herself, is an objective standard under Canon 3. A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986); Jenkins, 570 So.2d at 1192; Collins, 543 So.2d at 166. The presumption is that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a `reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption) [.] Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss. 1990). When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892 (Miss.1991); Turner, 573 So.2d at 677; Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312 at 317 (1985); ( quoting McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So. 821, 823 (1939)). Under the appropriate standard, the judge is presumed qualified and unbiased. This presumption may only be overcome by evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or not qualified. If a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would doubt the judge's impartiality, the judge is required to recuse him or herself from the case. Collins, 611 So.2d at 901. ś 277. Evans relies on Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971), in support of his argument that Judge Vlahos should have recused himself. Johnson, an active civil rights worker, was served with process requiring his presence in court on contempt charges. Johnson later filed a motion to recuse alleging that the trial judge revealed deep prejudice against civil rights workers and civil rights lawyers. No hearing was conducted on the motion to recuse and Johnson eventually filed a petition to remove his case to federal court. The federal court remanded the case back to Judge Perry and the Circuit Court of Grenada County. ś 278. Johnson later filed a lawsuit in federal court to enjoin trials in the Circuit Court of Grenada County until discriminatory practices were eliminated. Judge Perry, who had been named as a defendant, was temporarily enjoined from engaging in discriminatory practices. Two days after the federal injunction, Judge Perry adjudged Johnson in contempt and sentenced him to four months in jail. Johnson's request for a hearing on the merits and an opportunity to show why Judge Perry should recuse himself was denied. ś 279. The Supreme Court held that Judge Perry should have recused himself. Specifically, the Court held: Beyond all that was the fact that Judge Perry immediately prior to the adjudication of contempt was a defendant in one of petitioner's civil rights suits and a losing party at that. From that it is plain that he was so enmeshed in matters involving petitioner as to make it most appropriate for another judge to sit. Trial before an `unbiased judge' is essential to due process. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1484, 20 L.Ed.2d 522; Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, 505, 27 L.Ed.2d 532. Johnson, 403 U.S. 212, 215-16, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 423. ś 280. Judge Vlahos, like Judge Perry in Johnson, was named as a defendant in a federal civil rights lawsuit. However, in the instant case, there was no successful resolution of the federal litigation against Judge Vlahos. Moreover, the initial IFP determination by the federal court served only to ascertain whether the suit by Evans and others had arguable merit and could not be dismissed unless the federal district court could conclude that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir.1986). In Green, the court further stated: It is, of course, not always easy to determine whether a claim is frivolous simply by examining the pleadings. Prisoner complaints are notoriously difficult to decipher, and pro se pleadings must be construed liberally. Unless the frivolousness of a claim is facially apparent, it is incumbent upon the court to develop the case and to sift the claims and known facts thoroughly until completely satisfied either of its merit or lack of same. Id. at 1119. (citations omitted). ś 281. Most importantly, there is no indication in the record that Judge Vlahos demonstrated any prejudice against Evans that would rebut the presumption of impartiality. However, in Johnson, Judge Perry revealed deep prejudice against civil rights workers and civil rights lawyers. 403 U.S. 212 at 215, 91 S.Ct. at 1779-80. ś 282. We therefore hold that the mere filing of a lawsuit, wherein a prisoner is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, is insufficient to require recusal of a trial judge named as a defendant in that lawsuit where there is no evidence in the record which demonstrates that the trial judge is biased or unqualified. This issue is without merit.