Opinion ID: 196811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Motions for Judgment of Acquittal

Text: 12 Appellant claims reversible error in the denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. Below, Appellant based his motions for acquittal on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, which included the argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove the requisite nexus to interstate commerce under the federal arson statute. 2 On appeal, he raises new arguments based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), which struck down the Gun Free School Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), as exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause 3 to regulate interstate commerce. Appellant now argues that, in light of Lopez, the federal arson statute is unconstitutional and that, accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, Appellant argues that under Lopez there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Galleria II was a building that substantially affected interstate commerce. 13 Specifically, Appellant now claims that this is a simple state arson case which Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to federalize and thereby undercut Massachusetts' power to prosecute Appellant under its own arson statute, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 1. In support of this argument, Appellant insists that Lopez effectively overruled the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 2456, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985), which concluded that the federal arson statute expresses Congressional intent to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause. Id. (holding that rental property was property used in an activity affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of the federal arson statute). Consequently, Appellant challenges the continuing viability of United States v. Medeiros, 897 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.1990), in which we held that after Russell rental property is per se unquestionably sufficiently connected to interstate commerce to confer jurisdiction and satisfy the jurisdictional element of the federal arson statute. Id. at 16-17. Appellant, thus, urges us to reexamine our holding in Medeiros in light of Lopez ' substantially affect nexus requirement between the illegal activity and interstate commerce, and reverse his convictions on the grounds that the evidence does not prove that the attempted arson of the Galleria II substantially affects interstate commerce.

14 Although Appellant failed to raise his Lopez-based challenge below, 4 a claim that a statute is unconstitutional or that the court lacked jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Seuss, 474 F.2d 385, 387 n. 2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied., 412 U.S. 928, 93 S.Ct. 2751, 37 L.Ed.2d 155 (1973); see also, Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) (lack of jurisdiction may be noticed by the court at any time). We review a determination of the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo. See United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir.1995) (applying, without explicitly stating so, de novo review to Lopez-based constitutional challenge not raised during pre-Lopez proceedings); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (6th Cir.1995) (applying de novo review to Lopez-based constitutional challenge to the federal arson statute), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 795, 133 L.Ed.2d 744 (1996); United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir.1992) (reviewing de novo questions of constitutional law). But see United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir.1996) (reviewing only for plain error Lopez-based constitutional challenge not raised below during pre-Lopez proceedings); United States v. Dupaquier, 74 F.3d 615, 619 (5th Cir.1996) (same); Daigle v. Maine Medical Center, Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 687-88 (1st Cir.1994) (The raise-or-waive rule applies with full force to constitutional challenges.). Regardless of what standard of review we apply, the result is the same since even under the more favorable de novo standard, we reject Appellant's constitutional and jurisdictional challenges, finding that Lopez in no way provides grounds for reversal in this case.
15 As with the federal arson statute at issue here, Congress has often invoked its authority under the Commerce Clause to federalize criminal activity. Appellant points to Lopez and its invalidation of the Gun Free School Zone Act 5 as evidence that the Supreme Court's present position is to restrictively interpret the Commerce Clause when it is used as a foundation for a criminal statute. See Lopez, --- U.S. at ---- n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 n. 3 (Under our federal system, the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the federal law.'  (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993))). The Lopez Court recognized three categories of activity which Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: (i) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (ii) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities; and (iii) those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30. 16 After Lopez, the Court explained in United States v. Robertson, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1732, 131 L.Ed.2d 714 (1995) (per curiam), that these three bases of congressional authority are analytically distinct, reaffirming the distinction between activities engaged in interstate commerce and purely intrastate activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Robertson, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1733. The Court stated that the  'affecting commerce' test was developed in our jurisprudence to define the extent of Congress' power over purely intra state commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial inter state effects. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1733 (emphasis in original) (concluding that transporting equipment and workers from out of state fell within 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)'s alternative criterion without regard to the affecting commerce test). 17 We consider the federal arson statute and the Court's pre-Lopez holding in Russell in light of this framework, concluding that Lopez does not invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). First, by its plain language, Section 844(i) clearly falls under both the second and third Lopez categories in that it protects property that is either used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (emphasis added). 18 Second, the federal arson statute contains the requisite jurisdictional element and thus is readily distinguishable from the provision invalidated in Lopez. As we recently noted in Diaz-Martinez, the Supreme Court in Lopez found significant that the statute in that case, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) [the federal firearms possession statute], 'contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.'  Diaz- Martinez, 71 F.3d at 953 (quoting Lopez, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1631). We held that, unlike Lopez, the jurisdictional element was present in 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) because it contains a specific requirement that the firearm with the obliterated serial number have been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d at 953 (holding that [w]hatever the reach of Lopez, it does not invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 922(k)). Here, too, the federal arson statute contains the requisite jurisdictional element which similarly ensures that, case-by-case, the property damaged by the arson must have been used in interstate ... commerce or in an activity affecting interstate ... commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). 19 Third, while the federal arson statute is similar to that struck down in Lopez in that it does not regulate commercial or economic activity, see United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526-27 (9th Cir.1995), it does regulate the damage or destruction of business property that satisfies the requisite interstate nexus, see Russell, 471 U.S. at 860-62, 105 S.Ct. at 2457 (Congress at least intended to protect all business property); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 974 (8th Cir.1996). Particularly in the absence of any mention of Russell in the majority opinion of Lopez, we can find no reason to conclude that Lopez invalidates Russell 's analysis of Section 844(i)'s purpose and legislative history or its conclusion that the federal arson statute constitutionally regulates arson of business property that satisfies the requisite jurisdictional element. Russell, 471 U.S. at 860-62, 105 S.Ct. at 2456-58. After all, whatever Lopez ' reach, it certainly did not purport to overrule cases upholding application of the Commerce Clause power to wholly intrastate activities satisfying the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. See United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir.1996). 20 Furthermore, we reject Appellant's argument that Section 844(i) is unconstitutional because it improperly intrudes into Massachusetts' primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. By virtue of the fact that the federal arson statute is a criminal law it indeed intrudes upon states' traditional dominion over the criminal law. Lopez, --- U.S. at ---- n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 n. 3 (Under our federal system, the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.'  (quoting Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 635, 113 S.Ct. at 1720)). However, not every federal foray into criminal law is invalid. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 584 (3d Cir.1995) (rejecting Lopez-based challenge to the constitutionality of the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119). Where, as here, the criminal statute satisfies the constitutional limits of the Commerce Clause, it withstands the challenge that it interferes with the states' ability to define and enforce the criminal law. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 860-62, 105 S.Ct. at 2456-58. Finally, we note that we join our fellow circuits in arriving at the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) passes constitutional muster under Lopez. See, e.g., Flaherty, 76 F.3d at 974; United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328, 329 (11th Cir.1996); Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1213-14; Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 526. 21 Because we find no basis to question the presumed validity of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), we conclude that the district court properly had subject-matter jurisdiction conferred by virtue of the fact that Appellant was charged with an offense against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. See United States v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir.1994) (noting that if [the jurisdictional] element is not satisfied, then [defendant] is not guilty; but the court is not by the failure of proof on that element deprived of judicial jurisdiction.).
22 With respect to Appellant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, Appellant faces an uphill climb, United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir.1995). If the evidence presented, taken in the light most agreeable to the government, is adequate to permit a rational jury to find each essential element of the offense of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, then [Appellant's] claim fails. Id. (citations omitted). As the district court's disposition of a motion for judgment of acquittal is subject to de novo review, we, like the trial court, must 'scrutinize the evidence in the light most compatible with the verdict, resolve all credibility disputes in the verdict's favor, and then reach a judgment whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 974 (1st Cir.1995)). 23 After thoroughly reviewing the record 6 and applying these straightforward rules, we are convinced that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the government had successfully proved each of the elements--including, as we discuss more thoroughly below, the requisite nexus to interstate commerce--of both Appellant's attempt and conspiracy convictions. Credibility determinations are uniquely within the jury's province; and, we defer to their determinations and the verdict if the evidence can support varying inferences. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Kuilan, 75 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 980 F.2d 788, 790 (1st Cir.1992). Here, the record clearly supports the verdict. That the jury chose to believe the testimony presented by the government, particularly that of Schaller, and disbelieve that presented by the defense was well within its province. 24 As part of our sufficiency of the evidence review, we must determine whether the requisite jurisdictional element is met. Because it constitutes a jurisdictional predicate of the substantive offense, this jurisdictional element, like other elements of the offense, must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 524; Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 15-17 (stating that the government need only show a de minimis connection to interstate commerce in order to satisfy this element). Thus, in order for Appellant to be found guilty under the federal arson statute, the government had to prove, among other things, that the property was either used in or used in an activity affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). This involves identifying for what activity or purpose the building is used. Cf. Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 16 (focusing on the character of a fictitious building in determining whether it was sufficiently connected to interstate commerce). 25 On appeal, Appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the Galleria II was a building used in or affecting interstate commerce, because under Lopez the evidence does not prove that the building substantially affects interstate commerce. Because Appellant did not raise this Lopez argument below, we review only for plain error the district court's ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the jurisdictional element. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (There must be an 'error' that is 'plain' and that 'affect[s] substantial rights.' ); United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560, 567-68 (1st Cir.1996) (discussing Olano ). 26 We find no plain error. At the time of the district court's decision, Lopez had not yet been decided and there was no reason for the district court to question the viability of Russell or Medeiros. Under Medeiros, the government need only show, and the jury need only find, a de minimis connection to interstate commerce in order to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 16-17. Here, the government presented uncontested evidence that the object of the attempted arsons was a building that was being used as a commercial establishment, the Galleria II restaurant. The jury was presented with evidence that Appellant and his partners rented the building; that the building was supplied with natural gas which traveled in interstate commerce; and that the restaurant received food supplies for its operation which traveled in interstate commerce. Indeed, Appellant conceded at oral argument that the building was used as a commercial establishment which received food supplies and natural gas for its operation that travelled in interstate commerce. The district court correctly instructed the jury that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Galleria II was property used in or [sic] affected interstate or foreign commerce. 7 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, this evidence more than satisfies Medeiros ' de minimis requirement, and we therefore reject Appellant's insufficiency of the evidence argument. 8 See, e.g., Ryan, 41 F.3d at 364 (the de minimis standard is easily met, even when the property is temporarily closed or vacant); U.S. v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1229 (7th Cir.) (finding interstate commerce connection where building used partly as commercial business received natural gas and items purchased for resale that moved in interstate commerce), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 515, 130 L.Ed.2d 422 (1994); Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 16 (holding that rental property is per se property used in an activity affecting interstate commerce). 27 We only add this: Even assuming Lopez requires more than a de minimis showing, we nonetheless find that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to support its finding that the Galleria II was a building either used in or used in an activity affecting interstate commerce. Above, we found no reason to think that Lopez in any way undercut Russell 's conclusion that Congress has the authority to regulate arson of business property. 9 Similarly, we find no basis to conclude that Lopez in any way undercuts Russell 's holding that rental property is unquestionably an activity that affects interstate commerce within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Russell, 471 U.S. at 862, 105 S.Ct. at 2457 (We need not rely on the connection between the market for residential units and the 'interstate movement of people,' to recognize that the local rental of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial market in rental properties. (quoting McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 245, 100 S.Ct. 502, 510-11, 62 L.Ed.2d 441 (1980))); cf. Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1213 (finding that building used in educational business of college was building used in an activity affecting interstate commerce). We, thus, reaffirm our holding in Medeiros that rental property is per se sufficiently connected to interstate commerce to confer federal jurisdiction under Section 844(i) and to satisfy the jurisdictional element. See Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 16. Because uncontested evidence was presented that, at the time of the attempted fires, Appellant and his partner rented the building in which the Galleria II was operated, the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to find that the building was used in an activity affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)'s second category. 28 Even assuming further that Lopez undermines Russell and Medeiros ' holding regarding rental property, we would nonetheless affirm the jury's finding. Because uncontested evidence was presented below that the building was used as a commercial establishment which received food supplies and natural gas for its operation that travelled in interstate commerce, the Galleria II also falls within 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)'s real or personal property used in interstate ... commerce. Because the Galleria II was property used in interstate commerce, we need not address whether its activities substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce. Cf. Robertson, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1733. 29 In sum, because we are convinced that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the government had successfully proved each of the elements, we affirm the district court's denial of Appellant's motions for acquittal.