Opinion ID: 1248059
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Heading: Are Corporations Persons for Purposes of Section 251.003(a)(4)?

Text: Legislation governing the operations of dentists is codified in the Texas Occupations Code (the Code). When the Code was recodified in 1999, the legislature added section 1.002, which provides that the Government Code (Code Construction Act), applies to the construction of each provision in this code except as otherwise expressly provided by this code. Tex. Occ.Code § 1.002. The Texas Government Code defines the term person to include corporations unless the statute or context in which the word or phrase is used requires a different definition. Tex. Gov't Code § 311.005(2). Section 251.003(a) does not contain its own definition of person, but nevertheless, OCA argues that the term should not be read to include corporations. The basis of its argument is that the recodification of the Code was not meant to enact substantive change in the law and the prior version of section 251.003(a)(4) did not itself expressly include corporations in its definition of person. See Tex. Occ.Code § 1.001(a) (stating that the revisions were not meant to make any substantive changes). The previous version of section 251.003(a)(4) provided that anyone who engaged in the following conduct was engaged in dentistry: (4) Any one who owns, maintains or operates any office or place of business where he employs or engages under any kind of contract whatsoever, any other person or persons to practice dentistry as above defined shall be deemed to be practicing dentistry himself, and shall himself be required to be duly licensed to practice dentistry as hereinabove defined and shall be subject to all of the other provisions of this Chapter, even though the person or persons so employed or engaged by him shall be duly licensed to practice dentistry as hereinabove defined. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4551a(4) (1935) (emphasis added) (Article 4551a(4)). OCA argues that the references to he, himself, and him limit the definition of person to natural persons. OCA also notes that Article 4551a(4) was passed in 1935 along with an identical criminal statute, Tex. Penal Code art. 754a(4) (1935) (Article 754a(4)), which only applied to natural persons. OCA argues that the doctrine of in pari materia requires the civil statute and the penal statute to be read in harmony because they were adopted by the same legislature regarding the same subject matter. See Garrett v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas, 140 Tex. 394, 168 S.W.2d 636, 637 (1943); Braun v. State, 40 Tex.Crim. 236, 49 S.W. 620, 622-23 (1899). Consequently, the civil statute should be read to only apply to natural persons because the criminal statute's application was limited to natural persons. One problem with this argument is that when these statutes were passed Texas did not subject corporations to criminal liability. See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEX. L.REV. 60, 60 (1968) (noting that Texas did not subject corporations to criminal prosecutions at that time); see also Linda C. Anderson, Corporate Criminal Liability for Specific Intent Crimes and Offenses of Criminal NegligenceThe Direction of Texas Law, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 231, 233 (1984) (stating that the Texas Penal Code was revised in 1974, and that revision incorporated many of Professor Hamilton's suggestions and imposed criminal liability on corporations). Since Texas did not subject corporations to criminal prosecution before 1974, the fact that Article 754a(4) did not apply to corporations tells us little about whether Article 4551(a)(4), a civil statute, was meant to apply to corporations. [8] That still leaves OCA's argument that the previous iteration of section 251.003(a)(4) did not apply to corporations. However, since at least 1925 it has been the law in Texas that in civil statutes unless a different meaning is apparent from the context the word `Person' includes a corporation. Article 23(2) Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, repealed by Acts 1985, 69th Leg. ch. 479, § 224. This provision was essentially replaced by the above referenced provision of Tex. Gov't Code § 311.005(2), likewise enacted by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 479, § 1. See also, e.g., James N. Tardy Co v. Tarver, 120 Tex. 591, 39 S.W.2d 848, 850 (1931) (person in Texas civil statute includes corporation under Article 23); Wyche v. Wichita Engineering Co., 374 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same); United States v. Texas Construction Co., 237 F.2d 705, 706 (5th Cir.1955) (same; not citing Article 23). Assuming arguendo that OCA's argument is correct, we would have to determine how to apply recodified section 251.003(a)(4) when, on the one hand, there is the general legislative directive that the recodification was not meant to make substantive changes to the law, Tex. Occ.Code § 1.001(a), and, on the other hand, the current statutory definition of person includes corporations unless the statute or context in which the word or phrase is used requires a different definition. Tex. Gov't Code § 311.005(2). When presented with a similar situation, the Texas Supreme Court held that a legislative statement that an amendment did not make substantive changes to a law does not overcome the unambiguous language of a recodified statute that the legislature enacts, even if the language in the new statute does change the prior law. Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex.1999). In reaching this decision, the Texas Supreme Court noted that if the general statement that none of the changes made during the recodification was allowed to overturn the current plain language in the statute, no citizen would be able to know what the current law was without combing through volumes of session laws. Id. at 284-85. That was deemed to be an unacceptable result. Id. at 285. Given the holding in Rylander, the only remaining question would be whether the current statutory language unambiguously includes corporations within the definition of person. As stated above, the Code's definition of person includes corporations unless the statute's text or context requires a different definition. Tex. Gov't Code § 311.005(2). The text of the statute does not require a deviation for the general definition because its wording does not refer exclusively to a natural person. Tex. Occ.Code § 251.003(a)(4). This construction is supported by another subsection of the statute and a revisor's note. Following the definition of what constitutes practicing dentistry, the statute specifically excludes a number of persons from that definition. [9] Tex. Occ.Code § 251.004(a). In this section, Dental Health Service Corporations incorporated under the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act are specifically excluded. Id. § 251.004(a)(8). [10] If corporations were not persons under section 251.003(a), there would have been no reason for the legislature to specifically exclude these particular entities. Additionally, the section 251.003 revisor's note four comments that the previous version of section 251.003(a)(5) [Article 4551a section (5)] referred to a person, firm, group, association, or corporation, but that was replaced with person because under Section 311.005(2), Government Code (Code Construction Act), `person' is defined to include a corporation or any other legal entity. That definition applies to the revised law. Tex. Occ.Code § 251.003(a) revisor's note 4 (for the 1999 revision of Article 4551a into the Occupations Code). OCA argues that the revisor's note is inapplicable because it refers to section 251.003(a)(5) (relating to dental appliance fitting etc.), not section 251.003(a)(4). This objection is misplaced, however, because person has the same meaning throughout section 251.003(a). Since the plain language of the Code unambiguously includes corporations in its definition of person, that language must be given effect even if the previous version of section 251.003(a)(4) did not apply to corporations.