Opinion ID: 525548
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sensitive Information

Text: 28 The government's supplemental brief places primary emphasis on the governmental interest in protecting confidential information. The Customs program at issue in Von Raab mandated drug testing for those seeking promotions to positions where they would be required to handle classified materials. The Court stated: We readily agree that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information.... We also agree that employees who seek promotions to positions where they would handle sensitive information can be required to submit to a urine test under the Service's screening program. 109 S.Ct. at 1396, 1397. The Court did not define the contours of truly sensitive information (although the Customs regulations themselves spoke of classified materials). 29 Whatever truly sensitive information includes, we agree that it encompasses top secret national security information. 11 We therefore hold that the injunction must be dissolved as to the third category of employees. There is admittedly some merit to the plaintiffs' contention that [i]t is reasonable to expect that many individuals holding security clearances do not regularly see or have never actually seen any top secret information, but were merely given such clearances because their duties might at some point call for review of such material. Supplemental Brief for Harmon at 9. On balance, though, we think it would not be desirable to ask the Department to draw distinctions, within the class of attorneys holding top secret security clearances, between attorneys who do and those who do not deal with such materials on a regular basis. The whole point of granting top secret security clearances in advance is to provide flexibility, to ensure that employees can be given access to top secret materials as soon as the need arises. If submission to drug testing can legitimately be made a requirement for access to top secret materials--and Von Raab indicates as much--then the government may properly make testing a requirement for holding a top secret security clearance. 30 A different result is not compelled by the fact that the OBD Plan, unlike the Customs program, involves the random testing of employees who work within a traditional office environment. These factors are relevant to our analysis, and in a borderline case they might tip the scales. But whatever the precise scope of truly sensitive information, it seems evident that top secret national security materials lie at its very core. We therefore believe that the government's interest in protecting these materials outweighs the employees' privacy interest, despite the fact that the OBD testing program is somewhat more intrusive than the plan upheld in Von Raab. 31 We do not believe, however, that the government's interest in preserving all its secrets can justify the testing of all federal prosecutors or of all employees with access to grand jury proceedings. We recognize that every employee within the three categories will have access to information which he is duty-bound not to divulge. But whatever the precise contours of truly sensitive information intended by the Von Raab Court, we believe that the term cannot include all information which is confidential or closed to public view. A very wide range of government employees--including clerks, typists, or messengers--will potentially have access to information of this sort. Moreover, the obligation to maintain confidentiality lies at the heart of every lawyer's ethical responsibility. The fact that the employees covered by the Department's drug testing regulations deal with confidential information therefore does not distinguish them from private attorneys, or from government employees generally. 32 The Supreme Court in Von Raab did not define precisely what categories of information would be sufficiently sensitive to warrant mandatory drug testing. It seems to us, however, that the Court gave indications that caution should be used in approving this justification for testing. The principal case cited in support of the proposition that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information, 109 S.Ct. at 1396, was Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988). Egan upheld the denial of a security clearance to an individual who sought a job at a repair facility for nuclear submarines: the information at issue in that case was of the highest order of confidentiality. The Von Raab Court, relying in part on Egan, agreed in principle that under some circumstances the government's interest in protecting its secrets would be a sufficient predicate for a drug-testing program. At the same time, though, the Court expressed concern as to whether the Service has defined this category of employees more broadly than necessary to meet the purposes of the Commissioner's directive, 109 S.Ct. at 1397, and remanded for further consideration by the court of appeals. Against this backdrop, we must conclude that the confidentiality rationale cannot justify the testing of all DOJ employees within the first two broad categories at issue here.