Opinion ID: 663385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the voluntary nature of rox's consent

Text: 11 Richard, Sr.'s first criticism is that the recordings were made without Rox's voluntary consent. Richard, Sr. asserts that the record does not indicate that Rox was ever given a Miranda warning, nor that he was told that he could refuse to consent to the recording. In addition, Richard, Sr. points out that Rox consented to and executed the first recorded conversation before Rox had been arraigned or had the benefit of counsel. Consent is a factual determination for the district court which is overturned only upon a finding of clear error. United States v. Kelly, 913 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir.1990). 12 In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976), the Supreme Court considered seven factors in determining whether or not a consent was voluntary: 1) whether there was any threat or act of violence; 2) whether there were promises made that would flaw judgment; 3) whether consent was given in public or in a police station; 4) whether the person consenting was a newcomer to the legal system; 5) whether the person consenting was mentally deficient; 6) whether the person consenting was unable to exercise free choice regarding consent; and 7) whether Miranda warnings had been issued. See also United States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358, 360-62 (6th Cir.1988) (applying similar factors and finding that consent was not voluntarily obtained due to defendant's limited education, and the failure of officers to provide Miranda warnings). 13 In the instant case, Richard, Sr. does not allege that consent was obtained through threats of violence; nor that Rox was a newcomer to the legal system; nor that Rox was mentally deficient or unable to exercise free will. Richard, Sr. does contend that Rox was not given Miranda warnings, however, this assertion is directly contradicted by Cerniglia's testimony at trial. Consequently, only the second and third factors remain to support Richard, Sr.'s position. However, we determined in United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 30-31 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975), that promises or deals with an individual do not necessarily destroy the voluntariness of proffered consent. Similarly, that consent was given while Rox was in custody is also insufficient, in and of itself, to defeat an assertion that consent was voluntary. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424. Furthermore, Rox has steadfastly maintained that his consent was voluntary, and he did not rescind this consent after consulting with an attorney. We found this to be important in determining whether consent was voluntary in United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1015 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 881 (1992). In light of the foregoing, Richard, Sr. alleges no facts that can support a finding of clear error.