Opinion ID: 2217231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did trial court properly exercise its section 68A.8 equitable power to exclude five of the applications?

Text: As we have already noted, trial court held the applications of five persons who requested confidentiality were confidential records within the meaning of Sec. 68A.8 not subject to disclosure, and the Dubuque officials should, in equity, be estopped from breaching the implied contract of confidentiality. We observe at the outset the advertisements for applicants specifically stated the applications were subject to the open meetings law. This should have alerted knowledgeable, qualified persons the hiring procedures would probably not be secret. Although it is conceded these five persons requested that their applications be confidential, there is no evidence city officials made any assurances these requests would be honored. A threshold issue is whether section 68A.8 was designed to provide an equitable relief valve to the disclosure requirements of chapter 68A, or merely a method of enforcing, by injunction, the section 68A.7 exceptions to disclosure. Our analysis of the statutory language persuades us it is an equitable remedy independent of the section 68A.7 exceptions, and is applicable when specific criteria are met. Section 68A.8 provides the petition must be supported by affidavit that shows (and district court must find) such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably injure any person or persons. It further requires the district court to take into account the policy of this chapter that free and open examination of public records is generally in the public interest, even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others. The final sentence in section 68A.8 provides that a reasonable delay by a public official in permitting a record examination, in order to seek an injunction, is not a violation of the chapter. If a section 68A.7 exception to disclosure was applicable, there would be no need to absolve the public official of the statutory violation due to the delay in obtaining an injunction. Having concluded section 68A.8 provides a procedure for equitable relief against disclosure in a narrow area, we must determine whether the situation before us meets the statutory criteria. A subsumed issue is whether the request for confidentiality is to be given any weight, and if so, how much. Several federal courts that have addressed this or similar questions have indicated a governmental entity's pledge of confidentiality to the provider of information is not enough, in and of itself, to prevent disclosure. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. F.B.I., 602 F.2d 1010, 1014 n.8 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071, 100 S.Ct. 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 752 (1980); Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C.Cir.1974); Robles v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973); cf. Charles River Park A, Inc. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 519 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C.Cir.1975) (`If [the information] is not found to be confidential under the [Freedom of Information Act], it must be disclosed on request even if it was submitted in confidence.). Most courts, however, have considered a pledge of confidentiality to be a factor in the balancing process. See, e.g., Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 616 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073, 99 S.Ct. 847, 59 L.Ed.2d 40 (1979) (citing cases); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Usery, 426 F.Supp. 150, 172 & n.95 (D.D.C.1976); Sonderegger v. United States Department of Interior, 424 F.Supp. 847, 853 (D. Idaho 1976). It is apparent, however, that there was no pledge of confidentiality in the case before us. There is no indication the applications were submitted on the condition they be held confidential. Dubuque officials made no pledge; rather, they merely sought to maintain secrecy with respect to these records. No evidence was introduced to show disclosure would substantially and irreparably injure any applicant. This is a required finding for the court to grant injunctive relief under section 68A.8. Trial court observed that [n]o evidence was introduced bearing on the need of confidentiality in the public interest or showing any substantial or irreparable injury to one or more applicants by disclosing the information sought. Under other specific criteria of section 68A.8, mere inconvenience or embarrassment is not enough. Even assuming the record would support finding an implied contract by Dubuque to hold the applications confidential, it is apparent other statutory prerequisites for section 68A.8 relief were not met. Trial court traveled beyond statutory parameters in granting nondisclosure for the five applicants who requested confidentiality. The Herald further contends chapter 68A is unconstitutional to the extent it prohibits or purports to prohibit Respondent's right of access to the information it requested of the Petitioner. The newspaper appears to have challenged the constitutionality of this chapter as applied by trial court. Because we have determined the Herald shall have the information it requested as to all applicants, its constitutional challenge to the application of the chapter is moot. See State ex rel. Turner v. Buechele, 236 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1975). We have a duty to avoid constitutional questions concerning statutes when the merits of the case may be decided without facing such questions. State v. Conner, 292 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Iowa 1980); Salsbury Laboratories v. Iowa Department of Environmental Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 837 (Iowa 1979); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Iowa 1978). We affirm trial court's decision on Dubuque's appeal, and reverse its decision on the Herald's cross-appeal to the extent that trial court's ruling barred disclosure of requested information concerning the five applicants who asked for confidentiality. Our stay issued August 8, 1979, is hereby nullified. AFFIRMED ON THE APPEAL; AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART ON THE CROSS-APPEAL.