Opinion ID: 2073219
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Heading: Ruling on suppression motion.

Text: December 24, 1975, defendant filed a motion to suppress, asserting, inter alia, the officers' entry on the premises was obtained through trickery and artifice and that they intentionally delayed execution of the warrant in violation of §§ 751.6 and 751.8, The Code. Trial court entered an ex parte order overruling the motion because it was untimely. District Court rule 26(F) required the motion to be filed within 17 days after arraignment. See Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa 1976), where we held the rule was not unconstitutionally vague, it did not deny equal protection, it did not violate a defendant's statutory rights, and district judges had common-law authority to adopt it. Nonetheless, defendant first contends trial court, rather than overruling his motion ex parte on the basis of a local procedural rule, should have granted a Jackson v. Denno type hearing on the merits. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Failure to provide the hearing, he argues, violated his constitutional fair trial rights. Defendant was arraigned November 12, 1975. He retained counsel (not his present attorney) on November 28, 1975. As we have indicated, the motion to suppress filed December 24, 1975 was overruled as untimely. When trial commenced January 5, 1976, defendant excepted to this ruling. He unsuccessfully objected to offers of exhibits found on the premises for the same reasons asserted in his motion and renewed the motion when the State rested. Fifth judicial district rule 26(F), mandated by criminal case congestion in Polk County, was designed to meet the speedy trial requirements of § 795.2, The Code. Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critelli, supra, 244 N.W.2d at 570. That enactment in turn represented a statutory implementation of the speedy-trial provisions of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Satterfield, 257 Iowa 1193, 1195, 136 N.W.2d 257, 258 (1965). In Critelli we noted the rule's opening clause creates an exception permitting suspension of the rule for good cause. 244 N.W.2d at 569-570. Defendant did not utilize this escape valve. He made no effort to show the court any excuse for not timely filing the motion to suppress. Under these circumstances, we hold he waived his right to hearing and to have this evidence suppressed prior to trial. The motion was properly denied. But defendant's brief, charitably interpreted, additionally contends trial court should have sustained his trial objections to the evidence obtained in the search. The State does not raise, nor are we required to reach, the issue whether defendant may assert as grounds for objection the same grounds alleged in his untimely motion to suppress. We examine the merits of defendant's objections. Defendant alleges entrance into the premises was gained by fraud, stealth, ruse, artifice and subterfuge. He argues the resulting search was invalid under Amendment 4, United States Constitution, citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), and People v. Reeves, 61 Cal.2d 268, 38 Cal.Rptr. 1, 391 P.2d 393 (1964). In both of those cases there was no search warrant and no reasonable grounds existed to search before the entry. The trickery involved was to gain entry for search purposes. Those cases are distinguishable from the situation before us. Here the officers went to the premises armed with and intending to execute a search warrant. An opportunity to make a buy presented itself and they pursued it. The subterfuge involved was with respect to an undercover buy. This type of artifice has been approved by our court. State v. Leonard, 243 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Iowa 1976); State v. Tomlinson, 243 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Iowa 1976) (We have upheld the right of the State to engage in artifice and stratagem to apprehend those engaged in criminal activity). Defendant additionally asserts the evidence seized should have been excluded because the search was not immediate, § 751.6, The Code, nor was the warrant executed forthwith, § 751.8, The Code. That the legislature foresaw circumstances might require some flexibility is disclosed by another provision of the same chapter: 751.12 Return of warrant. A search warrant must be executed and returned to the magistrate who issued it within ten days after its date. After the expiration of such time the warrant, unless executed, is void. A search warrant is issued when a proper showing is made before a magistrate that probable cause exists to believe § 751.3 property is kept in or on the premises to be searched. See § 751.5, The Code. Where there is delay in executing the warrant, there is a danger the situation will change so that circumstances which supported the magistrate's determination of probable cause will no longer exist. On the other hand, most courts confronted with the statutory forthwith and immediate language have seasoned their interpretations with a dash of pragmatism. Such terms have been interpreted as requiring service within a reasonable time, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. See, e. g., United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1043-1044 (5 Cir. 1971); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 885 (8 Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cromer, 313 N.E.2d 557 (Mass.1974). In the case before us, the officers were delayed only 45 minutes, the time required for an unanticipated drug buy. Execution of the warrant would have destroyed that opportunity. We hold the delay was reasonable and the evidence was not subject to exclusion on this ground.