Opinion ID: 779052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Railway Labor Act Claims

Text: 36 Konop also appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Hawaiian on his claims under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (RLA). The RLA prohibits interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the designation of representatives by the other. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Third). It also declares that it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining.... Id. at § 152 (Fourth). 37 Konop asserts three claims under 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Third) and (Fourth) of the RLA. First, Konop alleges that Hawaiian interfered with his organizing efforts by accessing his website under false pretenses. Second, Konop alleges that Hawaiian wrongfully assisted a labor group by disclosing the contents of Konop's website to a union leader who supported the concessionary contract. Third, Konop alleges that Hawaiian engaged in coercion and intimidation by threatening to file a defamation suit against Konop based on statements on the website. The district court dismissed these claims on the alternative grounds that it lacked jurisdiction over the RLA claims, and that Konop failed to support them with evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
38 Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over disputes which are grounded in the [collective bargaining agreement], Haw. Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994), and involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation, id. at 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such disputes, labeled minor disputes under the RLA, are subject to mandatory arbitration. Id. Hawaiian argues, and the district court agreed, that Konop's RLA claims are grounded in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and are therefore subject to mandatory arbitration. We disagree. 39 In Fennessy v. Southwest Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir.1996), we addressed whether the district court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's statutory claim under the RLA. The plaintiff in Fennessy alleged that the carrier violated 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth) by terminating his employment in retaliation for his efforts to replace the existing union. Id. at 1360-61. We held that because his claim is based on a statutory provision rather than on the collective bargaining contract, it is not a minor dispute that must be brought to [arbitration]; it is a statutory claim that he may bring directly in district court. Id. at 1362. The plaintiff's unsuccessful arbitration of a related contractual claim under the CBA did not alter this conclusion. Because the statutory claims were not grounded in the collective-bargaining agreement, and the statutory rights were independent of the CBA, we found the district court had jurisdiction. Id. 40 Hawaiian argues that, unlike the statutory claim in Fennessy, Konop's statutory claims are grounded in and dependent on the CBA. To support this position, Hawaiian focuses on conduct which Konop explicitly alleged in his complaint as violating the CBA. Specifically, in the RLA section of the complaint, Konop alleged that Hawaiian violated the CBA by suspending him from work, reducing his employee benefits, requiring him to submit to physical and psychological testing, and giving certain pilots paid opportunities to campaign in favor of the concessionary contract. 41 On appeal, however, Konop does not challenge the district court's dismissal of these CBA-related claims. Rather, he objects to the district court's dismissal of his independent RLA claims. Konop claims that Hawaiian violated the RLA by (1) accessing his website under false pretenses, (2) disclosing the website's contents to the rival union faction, and (3) threatening to sue Konop for defamation based on statements on the website. Hawaiian never explains how these RLA claims are grounded in the CBA, except to say that Konop merely presents them as a precursor to the alleged CBA violations. Nothing, however, requires such a narrow reading of Konop's allegations. Konop, like the plaintiff in Fennessy, presents his statutory claims as independent violations of the RLA. These claims in no way depend upon a finding that Hawaiian, at some later time, violated Konop's contractual rights under the CBA. 42 Accordingly, we hold that the RLA claims which Konop presses on appeal are not grounded in the CBA, are not subject to mandatory arbitration and, therefore, fall within the court's jurisdiction.
43 Hawaiian contends that even if Hawaiian managers accessed Konop's website under false pretenses, conveyed this information to a rival union leader, and threatened to sue Konop for defamation, such conduct did not violate the RLA because it did not interfere with any protected organizing activity. The organizing activity in which Konop engaged principally involved the publication of articles on a secure website. As discussed above, Konop limited access to pilots and other employees on the eligible list and prohibited users from disclosing the contents of the website to others. He also categorically excluded managers. Konop's website publication vigorously criticized Hawaiian management and its proposal for wage concessions in the existing collective bargaining agreement. Because the incumbent union, ALPA, supported the concessionary contract, Konop sought to encourage consideration of alternative union representation. 44 There is no dispute that Konop's website publication would ordinarily constitute protected union organizing activity under the RLA. Hawaiian argues, however, that Konop forfeited any protection he would otherwise enjoy because his articles contained malicious, defamatory and insulting material known to be false. In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a party forfeits his protection under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by circulating defamatory or insulting material known to be false. 10 See also Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 282-83, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974); San Antonio Comm. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir.1997). 45 We assume Hawaiian is referring to the alleged defamatory statements contained in the Facts section of its brief. There, Hawaiian indicates that Konop published the following false statements: (1) Nobles does his dirty work ... like the Nazis during World War II; (2) Soviet Negotiating Style Essential to Nobles Plan!; (3) Nobles is one incompetent at the top.; (4) Nobles has little skill and little ability with people.... In fact, with as few skills as Nobles possesses, it is difficult to imagine how he got this far; and (5) Nobles Suspected in Fraud! and Hawaiian Air president, Bruce Nobles, is the prime suspect in an alleged fraud which took place in 1991. 46 The first two statements, referencing the Nazis and Soviets, are simply rhetorical hyperbole protected by federal labor laws. See Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 286, 94 S.Ct. 2770. The second two statements, commenting on Nobles' competence and people skills, are opinions also protected by federal labor laws. See id. at 284, 94 S.Ct. 2770; San Antonio Comm. Hosp., 125 F.3d at 1237. Konop did not forfeit his protection under the Railway Labor Act, as Hawaiian suggests, simply by publishing statements that were critical of and insulting to Nobles. `[F]ederal law gives a union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty....' San Antonio Comm. Hosp., 125 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 283, 94 S.Ct. 2770) (emphasis added); see also Linn, 383 U.S. at 58, 86 S.Ct. 657 ([R]epresentation campaigns are frequently characterized by bitter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations, misrepresentations and distortions.). 11 47 With respect to the final challenged statement, indicating that Nobles was suspected of fraud, Hawaiian fails to argue or present any evidence that Konop published the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Federal labor law protects even false and defamatory statements unless such statements are made with actual malice — i.e., knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. See Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 281, 94 S.Ct. 2770; Linn, 383 U.S. at 61, 86 S.Ct. 657 (protection under labor law existed even though the statements [were] erroneous and defame[d] one of the parties to the dispute). With no evidence or argument that Konop acted with actual malice, Hawaiian cannot demonstrate as a matter of law that Konop forfeited his protection under the RLA. 48 NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir.1980) (as amended), upon which Hawaiian principally relies, provides little support for Hawaiian's position. In Pincus Bros., the Third Circuit, in considering whether the NLRB abused its discretion by declining to defer to an arbitration award, merely concluded it was at least arguable that the employee published a defamatory statement known to be false. Id. at 376. For Hawaiian to prevail on summary judgment, however, it must do more than show it is at least arguable that Konop knew the challenged statement was false. It must demonstrate this as a matter of law. As Hawaiian presents no evidence or argument that Konop acted with the requisite malice, Hawaiian falls short of satisfying this burden. 49 Accordingly, we find that Konop has raised a triable issue of fact with respect to whether the development and maintenance of his website constituted protected activity under the RLA.
50 Konop argues that Hawaiian managers: (1) interfered with Konop's organizing efforts by viewing the website under false pretenses, (2) wrongfully supported one labor group in favor of another by informing the opposing labor faction of the website's contents, and (3) engaged in coercion and intimidation by threatening to sue Konop for defamation, all in violation of the RLA. Hawaiian argues, and the district court agreed, that Konop failed to present sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on these claims. We disagree.
51 Konop argues that Davis interfered with Konop's organizing efforts by viewing the website under false pretenses. Absent a legitimate justification, employers are generally prohibited from engaging in surveillance of union organizing activities. Cal. Acrylic Indus. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.1998). The reason for this general proscription is that employer surveillance tends to create fear among employees of future reprisal and, thus, chills an employee's freedom to exercise his rights under federal labor law. Id. at 1099. 52 In NLRB v. Unbelievable, Inc., 71 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir.1995), we upheld the Board's finding that the employer engaged in unfair labor practices by eavesdropping on private conversations between employees and [a] Union representative, which occurred in the employee break room. Id. at 1438-39. We see no principled distinction between the employer's eavesdropping in Unbelievable and Hawaiian's access of Konop's secure website. 53 Hawaiian suggests that Davis had a legitimate reason to access Konop's website — to identify and correct any false or misleading statements. Assuming such a concern could justify Davis' monitoring of private union organizing activities, Hawaiian has presented little evidence to suggest that any statements on Konop's website were actually defamatory. Moreover, as discussed below, there are triable issues whether Hawaiian used information it obtained from the website to assist one union faction over another, and to coerce and intimidate Konop. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Konop has raised a triable issue that Hawaiian's access of Konop's website was not justified. 54 Hawaiian also argues that Davis' access did not violate the RLA because it did not appreciably limit Konop's organizing activities. Hawaiian emphasizes that, after learning about Davis' access to the website, Konop restricted access for a mere half-day and declined to temper the language in his articles. Hawaiian, however, presents no authority indicating that employees subject to surveillance or eavesdropping must also demonstrate that they consequently limited their organizing activity. It is the tendency to chill protected activities, not the actual chilling of protected activities, that renders eavesdropping and surveillance generally objectionable under federal labor law. See, e.g., Cal. Acrylic, 150 F.3d at 1099-1100. That a hardy individual might continue his organizing activities undeterred, despite an employer's surveillance, does not render the employer's conduct any less of a violation. 12 55 Accordingly, we find that Konop has raised a triable issue of fact that Hawaiian interfered with Konop's union organizing activity in violation of the RLA by accessing Konop's website.
56 Konop argues that Nobles unlawfully assisted Reno Morella, the union leader who supported the concessionary contract, by disclosing the contents of Konop's website. Generally, the RLA prohibits employers from providing assistance to a union or labor faction. See Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, 897 F.2d 999, 1009 (9th Cir.1990) (per curiam); see also NLRB v. Finishline Indus., 451 F.2d 1280, 1281-82 (9th Cir.1971) (NLRA prohibits employer from telling workers to withdraw from one union and join another); NLRB v. L. Ronney & Sons Furniture Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th Cir.1953) (NLRA prohibits employer from initiating membership drive among his employees for employer-favored union). 57 Konop argues that Nobles disclosed useful intelligence to a rival union faction in an effort to ensure that Konop's faction, which opposed the concessionary contract, would not prevail. Hawaiian does not seriously dispute that disclosure of the contents of Konop's website to Morella would constitute improper assistance. Instead, Hawaiian argues that Konop failed to present sufficient evidence that Nobles made any such disclosure or that Nobles was even familiar with the contents of Konop's website when he spoke to Morella. 58 Morella, however, states in his declaration that Nobles contacted him on December 14, 1995 and informed him that he had just reviewed information which was posted on an internet communications system operated by Hawaiian Airlines Pilot Robert Konop. In addition, Morella states that Nobles also disclosed to me that Konop's internet communications system contained a third written article concerning Konop's efforts to obtain union representation by a labor organization other than the Air Line Pilots Association. This evidence creates a genuine issue of fact whether Nobles was familiar with the contents of Konop's website and whether Nobles disclosed the contents of the website to Morella. 59 Moreover, Nobles confirmed in his declaration that he contacted Morella because he felt that Reno Morella, the Chairman of the ALPA Master Executive Council, should be aware of the newsletter because of its inaccurate attack on the proposed labor agreements and the unfair effect it could have on the ratification process. Nobles thus effectively concedes that he interceded to help ensure that Morella's faction — which favored ratification of the concessionary contract — would prevail over Konop's faction, which opposed the agreement. 60 Accordingly, we find that Konop has raised a triable issue of fact whether Nobles improperly assisted one union faction over another in violation of the RLA.
61 Konop argues that Nobles engaged in unlawful coercion and intimidation by threatening to file a defamation suit against Konop based on statements on Konop's website. An employer's filing or threatened filing of a lawsuit against an employee concerning union organizing activities may, under certain circumstances, violate the RLA. See, e.g., Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (9th Cir.1995) (finding employer's defamation lawsuit against union violated NLRA); GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1014 (1989) (analyzing whether employer's threat to sue employee for defamation violated NLRA), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1991). 62 Hawaiian does not argue that Nobles would be justified in threatening to sue Konop for defamation. Instead, Hawaiian contends that Konop failed to present sufficient evidence that Nobles ever made such a threat. Nobles stated in his declaration that he did mention to Morella that the gross inaccuracies and lies in the newsletter made by Konop amounted to defamation, but that he never said that [he] intended to file a lawsuit against Konop. 63 Morella, however, indicates otherwise. Morella states in his declaration, Nobles advised me that Konop should be cautioned, or informed, of the possibility of a defamation lawsuit by Nobles. Morella also testified, [I]t was my impression and conclusion that Nobles intended for me to contact Konop, or take other action, for the purpose of opposing Konop's efforts to seek alternative union representation. Morella then informed Konop of Mr. Nobles' statements ... regarding caution with respect to a possible lawsuit against Konop for defamation. Konop confirms the same in his declaration. This evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact whether Nobles threatened to sue Konop for defamation. 64 Accordingly, we find that Konop has raised a triable issue of fact whether Nobles engaged in coercion and intimidation in violation of the RLA by threatening to sue Konop for defamation.
65 Konop's retaliation claim under the RLA was tried to the district court. The district court entered judgment against him on this claim, which involved his allegation that Hawaiian violated the RLA when it placed him on sick leave in retaliation for protected labor activities. Konop challenges the district court's judgment on this claim on the ground that his subpoenas for corroborating witnesses were improperly quashed. We review a district court's order quashing subpoenas for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Berberian, 767 F.2d 1324, 1324 (9th Cir.1985). A litigant whose subpoenas have been improperly quashed must also show prejudice. See Casino Foods Corp. v. Kraftco Corp., 546 F.2d 301, 302 (9th Cir.1976). 66 There is some dispute whether the district court's remarks in a pretrial hearing constituted an order to quash subpoenas at all. Assuming, however, that the district court did quash Konop's subpoenas, Konop has not suggested what relevant evidence the subpoenaed witnesses might have provided had they been compelled to testify. Konop has consequently failed to show that he was prejudiced. Accordingly, the district court's judgment against Konop on his retaliation claim under the RLA is affirmed.