Opinion ID: 1630875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether public reprimand, suspension from office and assessment of costs are appropriate sanctions.

Text: ¶ 8. Judge Anderson is accused of violating Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(7), 3B(8), and 3E(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 1 requires that a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. The other canons state, in relevant part: CANON 2 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. B. Judges shall not allow their family, social, or other relationships to influence the judges' judicial conduct or judgment. Judges shall not lend the prestige of their offices to advance the private interests of the judges or others; nor shall judges convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judges. Judges shall not testify voluntarily as character witnesses. CANON 3 A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently. .... B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. (1) A judge shall hear and decide all assigned matters within the judge's jurisdiction except those in which disqualification is required. (2) A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. (3) A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge. .... (7) A judge shall accord to all who are legally interested in a proceeding, or their lawyers, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that: (a) where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits are authorized: provided: (i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and (ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond. (b) Judges may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before them if the judges give notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and afford the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. (c) A judge may consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges. (d) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. (e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communications when expressly authorized by law to do so. (8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly. E. Disqualification. (1) Judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances or for other grounds provided in the Code of Judicial Conduct or otherwise as provided by law, including but not limited to instances where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; (b) the judge served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; (c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse or member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding; ¶ 9. Additionally, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155 (Miss.2004), this Court listed the following factors, which we use when determining the appropriate sanctions (the  Gibson factors): (1) The length and character of the judge's public service; (2) Whether there is any prior case law on point; (3) The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered; (4) Whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct; (5) Whether moral turpitude was involved; and (6) The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Gibson, 883 So.2d at 1158. This Court is not required to follow the Commission's recommended sanctions. In re Collins, 524 So.2d 553 (Miss.1987). However, this Court has stated that [t]he sanction imposed should be consistent with other cases and `ought to fit the offense.' Bailey, 541 So.2d at 1039. ¶ 10. Here, based on the aforementioned, agreed-upon findings of fact, the Commission charged Judge Anderson with the following violations. The Respondent failed to issue rulings in cases, refused to rule in certain criminal cases pending the outcome of a non-issue related Chancery Court case, engaged in ex parte communication with a litigant and based upon that information issued an arrest warrant, held a defendant without bond on a non-capital offense, acquired ex parte information by sitting in on a Chancery Court hearing involving parties that have cases pending before him in Justice Court, improperly reduced a defendant's bond, behaved with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety toward certain litigants and/or persons related to litigants that have cases pending in his court, refused to reduce a defendant's bond based upon information he received ex parte and allowed testimony at a defendant's preliminary hearing about alleged threats that were supposedly made against the Respondent by the defendant. Such allegations erode the public's perception of the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. ¶ 11. The Commission supports its recommended sanctions by citing various cases in which the judge engaged in similar conduct as Judge Anderson and thus received similar sanctions. See Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Sutton, 985 So.2d 322 (Miss.2008) (judge publicly reprimanded and assessed costs of $1,900.89 for ex parte communications, entering orders based on ex parte information, and neglecting to promptly dispose of judicial matters); Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Roberts, 952 So.2d 934 (Miss.2007) (justice court judge publicly reprimanded, suspended for thirty days, fined $1,500, and assessed costs of $100 for improperly issuing arrest warrants, revoking probation, and ordering defendant acquitted of DUI charges not to drive for two years); Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Britton, 936 So.2d 898 (Miss.2006) (judge publicly reprimanded, suspended for thirty days, and assessed costs for ex parte communications and setting aside default judgment based on ex parte information); Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. McPhail, 874 So.2d 441 (Miss.2004) (justice court judge publicly reprimanded, suspended for thirty days, and assessed costs of $401.14 for backdating judgment, entering judgments without notice to a party, ex parte communications, and untimely rendering decisions); Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Perdue, 853 So.2d 85 (Miss.2003) (youth court judge suspended for thirty days and assessed costs of $888.22 for issuing ex parte temporary custody order); and Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Peyton, 812 So.2d 204 (Miss.2002) (justice court judge suspended for thirty days and assessed costs of $100 for conducting ex parte hearing and appointing daughter as public defender). ¶ 12. The Commission also made the following findings regarding the Gibson factors, to which Judge Anderson agreed. 1. The length and character of the judge's public service. The Respondent has served as Justice Court Judge in Lamar County, Mississippi for 19 years. There is nothing in the record to determine any other actions or deeds of Respondent in public service. 2. Whether there is any prior case law on point. [See case law cited above.] 3. The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered. The Respondent failed to issue rulings in cases, refused to rule in certain criminal cases pending the outcome of a non-issue related Chancery Court case, engaged in ex parte communication with a litigant and based upon that information issued an arrest warrant, held a defendant without bond on a non-capital offense, acquired ex parte information by sitting in on a Chancery Court hearing involving parties that have cases pending before him in Justice Court, improperly reduced a defendant's bond, behaved with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety toward certain litigants and/or persons related to litigants that have cases pending in his court, refused to reduce a defendant's bond based upon information he received ex parte and allowed testimony at a defendant's preliminary hearing about alleged threats that were supposedly made against the Respondent by the defendant. Such allegations erode the public's perception of the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 4. Whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct. The Commission took informal Commission action against the Respondent in three separate matters, Commission File Nos. 1991-027, 1993-020, and 1998-313. The conduct of the Respondent in Commission File Nos. 1993-020, where the Commission cautioned the Respondent about avoiding the appearance of impropriety, and 1998-313, wherein the Respondent was warned about involving himself in a matter pending in Chancery Court, is similar to the behavior in the instant case. Also, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Bill Anderson, 691 So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1996), a case for which no written opinion was published, the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered that the Respondent be publicly reprimanded, fined $500.00 and assessed the cost of the proceeding. The Respondent also received a private admonishment in Inquiry Concerning a [Judge] No. 2009-036 for conduct unrelated to this case. 5. Whether moral turpitude was involved. No moral turpitude was involved. 6. The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are present in that Respondent['s] actions reflect adversely on the independence, propriety and impartiality of the judiciary. Mitigating circumstances include the fact that Respondent acknowledged his inappropriate conduct by entering into the Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation with the Commission. ¶ 13. Based on Judge Anderson's improprieties and the Commission's consideration of the Gibson factors, all of which the Commission found by clear and convincing evidence, the Commission recommended that Judge Anderson be (1) publicly reprimanded, (2) suspended from the office of justice court judge for thirty days without pay, and (3) assessed costs of $100.00. ¶ 14. This is not Judge Anderson's first time to be sanctioned for the same or similar conduct, as evidenced by the Commission's findings under the fourth Gibson factor. These previous sanctions stemmed from conduct that is the same as or very similar to Judge Anderson's misconduct in the instant case. Because of Judge Anderson's prior warnings, cautions, reprimands, and fines, we think it is appropriate to increase the sanctions. To accomplish this, the Commission has suggested the additional sanction of a thirty-day suspension without pay, to which Judge Anderson has agreed. We concur with the Commission and adopt the Commission's recommendation.