Opinion ID: 1226660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: selection of jury

Text: Swann claims that his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States were violated by the Commonwealth's peremptory strikes of two prospective jurors, Judith M. Brown and Moses R. Hankins, who were black. Recently, we stated the controlling principles as follows: In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89[, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69] (1986) the Supreme Court ruled that purposeful discrimination based upon race in selecting jurors violates the Equal Protection Clause. Once an accused makes a prima facie showing of such purposeful discrimination, a prosecutor must give a reasonable explanation in rebuttal, showing that his reason for a peremptory strike was race neutral. Id. at 93-94[, 106 S.Ct. at 1721]. If the prosecutor's reason is based upon factors other than a juror's race, it is deemed to be race neutral. Hernandez v. New York, [500 U.S. 352, ___], 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866[, 114 L.Ed.2d 395] (1991). To constitute an equal protection violation, discriminatory intent must be inherent in the prosecutor's explanation. Id. A trial court's determination whether the reason is race neutral is entitled to great deference. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 310, 384 S.E.2d 785, 795 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093[, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073] (1990). The determination will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Hernandez, [500] U.S. at 369, 111 S.Ct. at 1871. Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 186, 427 S.E.2d 379, 386 (1993). Applying these principles, we find no error in the trial court's determination that the reasons given for these peremptory strikes were race neutral. The Commonwealth's Attorney explained that he struck Brown from the panel because of her admission on voir dire examination that in a previous criminal case, her preference for a lighter sentence had resulted in a compromise verdict. Clearly, this explanation sufficiently supports the trial court's finding that Brown was not struck from the panel because of her race. One of the Commonwealth's explanations for striking Hankins from the panel was Hankins's statement that he probably would vote for a life sentence rather than the death penalty if there was evidence that the defendant had been mentally ill. This is a racially neutral reason for striking Hankins. See Wright, 245 Va. at 187-88, 427 S.E.2d at 386-87 (prospective juror's equivocal answers regarding imposition of death penalty gave rise to racially neutral reason for peremptory strike). And we do not agree with Swann's assertion that the Commonwealth's prolonged questioning of Hankins regarding his attitude toward the death penalty was suggestive of bias or intent to discriminate. Our review supports the trial court's implicit finding that these questions reflect no such bias or discriminatory intent.