Opinion ID: 2996501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection

Text: Pruitt next argues that the district court erred in holding that the prosecution had not violated the Equal Protection Clause in using its peremptory challenges to strike only men from the venire, finding instead that the prosecution had offered credible, gender-neutral reasons for each challenge. Pruitt initially raised this objection at the completion of jury selection.3 At the outset of voir dire, the venire consisted of 40 individuals, at least 28 of whom were male (the prosecution says 30). The prosecution exercised six of its seven peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors—all of whom were male. Pruitt’s jury ultimately was comprised of nine men and three women, with one male and one female selected as alternate jurors. After Pruitt raised his objection, the state trial court ruled that Pruitt had failed to make out a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination, without further elaborating on its reasoning for so ruling. (Tr. CC-178.) Because the trial court had not required the prosecution to explain or justify its actions during voir dire, the Illinois Appellate Court discussed a number of permissible, yet entirely hypothetical, reasons that the prosecution may have had to exclude potential jurors. Noting these possible reasons, it went on to affirm the trial court’s ruling, holding that “the court’s decision that defendant did 3 Because, at the time of Pruitt’s trial, the Supreme Court had yet to address the applicability of the federal Equal Protection Clause to discrimination on the basis of gender in the use of peremptory challenges, the objection was made on state-law grounds. Before the Illinois Appellate Court rendered its decision in Pruitt’s appeal, however, the Supreme Court decided J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). The Illinois Appellate Court therefore applied J.E.B. to Pruitt’s case, as it was pending on appeal. 12 No. 02-4100 not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Pruitt, slip op. at 11-12 (Ill. App. Ct.). On habeas review, the district court found that the Illinois court’s determination that Pruitt had failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination was an unreasonable application of federal law established by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs the use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor in a criminal trial, prohibiting the use of such challenges to strike potential jurors on the basis of their race. 476 U.S. at 89. Eight years later, in J.E.B., the Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely on the basis of their gender. 511 U.S. at 129. Since the Batson and J.E.B. decisions, this Court has on many occasions reiterated the three-step process required to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Alverio v. Sam’s Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2001). First, the party alleging the impermissible use of the peremptory challenge must establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45 (suggesting that analysis of gender-based discrimination claims should follow the approach outlined in Batson). For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that the district court was correct in holding that the Illinois court erred and that Pruitt had indeed made the requisite showing. Once the challenging party has made a prima facie showing, the second step in the Batson-J.E.B. analysis requires the party exercising the peremptory challenge No. 02-4100 13 to come forward, if it can, with a gender-neutral explanation for the strikes. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. This is not a difficult step to overcome: “Any neutral reason, no matter how ‘implausible or fantastic,’ even if it is ‘silly or superstitious,’ is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination.” United States v. Evans, 192 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)). The explanation “merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual.” J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145. If gender-neutral reasons are given, the analysis shifts to the third step: the court must determine if the explanation is a mere pretext for discrimination. At this stage, the burden remains on the party alleging the impermissible use of the peremptory challenge to prove intentional discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (“As in any equal protection case, the burden is, of course, on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.” (quotation omitted)); Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (“[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [the impermissible] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”). Because, in the district court’s opinion, Pruitt had established a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination, he was entitled to move to the second stage of the Batson analysis. The district court therefore held an evidentiary hearing to elicit the prosecution’s actual reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges, rather than relying on hypothetical rationales.4 See Pruitt, 1999 4 Pruitt suggests that holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the prosecutor’s intent some nine years after the trial was not an appropriate remedy in his case. Rather, he argues, a new trial should have been ordered because determining the (continued...) 14 No. 02-4100 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13123, at . The two Assistant State’s Attorneys who prosecuted Pruitt appeared at the hearing, offering rather specific explanations, clearly related to the issues involved in the rape trial of a prostitute, for each of the six peremptory challenges. State’s Attorney Howard testified to their general strategy in choosing a jury: We were looking for a very liberal jury. We were looking for a jury that would not condemn Ms. Sims for being a cocaine user and would not hold that against her or hold it against her that she was out at 3:00 o’clock in the morning smoking crack, wandering around the streets. We needed a jury who would be very liberal, who would be perhaps understanding of someone who was a drug user. And we were looking for someone, I would say, an urban juror, who would have had some contact with these types of people. And 4 (...continued) intent of the prosecutors was impractical. See Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If [the court] concludes that the passage of time has unduly impaired [its] ability to make a fair determination of the [non-movant]’s intent, [the court] may so state, in which event the . . . court shall order a new trial.” (quotation omitted)). The State argues that any such challenge on this basis has been waived, as this is the first time Pruitt has raised it. Even so, Pruitt’s argument would not have prevailed. In this case, the district court concluded, and the testimony at the evidentiary hearing confirmed, that the passage of time had not unduly impaired the ability of the court to fairly determine the prosecution’s intent. The prosecutors (after reviewing the voir dire transcript and trial notes) were able to recall a great deal of information about the jury-selection process—sincerely and honestly, in the district court’s opinion. See Pruitt, slip. op. at 13 (N.D. Ill.). Given this, we cannot say the district court erred in choosing the remedial path it did. No. 02-4100 15 if not contact, then at least some knowledge of people like [Sims]. (Hr’g Tr. at 19-20). This generally meant that the prosecution, according to State’s Attorney Morask, wanted “people who lived in Chicago, more than people who lived in the suburbs because . . . people who lived in Chicago would have a better idea of the realities of crime and that anybody can be victimized.” (Hr’g Tr. at 103.) In sum, the prosecutors testified that they had the entirely rational and legitimate goal of selecting jurors who would hear the evidence without starting from a position of bias against the prosecution’s key witness. According to the prosecutors, the six jurors they struck had no contact with the urban areas of Chicago, no experience with crime—either as a victim or as the family or friend of a victim—and no other basis on which the prosecutors believed they could relate to the victim in this case. Given these legitimate, gender-neutral reasons for striking the six male jurors, the court turned to the third step of the Batson analysis: determining whether the proffered reasons were pretextual. “It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant—the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Here, the district court found the proffered explanations persuasive, noting that “[t]he prosecutors who testified appeared sincere and honest as they explained their reasons for striking six male venire members.” Pruitt, slip. op. at 13 (N.D. Ill.). The district court was able to observe the demeanor of both witnesses and thus, as is typical, was better positioned than an appellate court to judge the veracity of the proffered explanations. Given that, “the trial court’s 16 No. 02-4100 determination represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal. We cannot reverse a trial court’s finding that proffered, race-neutral, reasons for a strike were credible unless the court’s finding is clearly erroneous—even if we find it dubious.” Dunham v. Frank’s Nursery and Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted); see also Alverio, 253 F.3d at 940 (“Once the trial judge has been persuaded of the neutrality of the . . . reason for striking a juror, we have no basis for reversal on appeal unless the reason given is completely outlandish or there is other evidence which demonstrated its falsity.” (quotations omitted)). Pruitt contends, however, that the district court’s analysis—and ultimate acceptance—of the prosecution’s justifications was flawed because the court considered them on a juror-by-juror basis, rather than considering them as part of the totality of the circumstances. Cf. Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to consider the “totality of the circumstances” when evaluating defendant’s Batson claim). Coulter makes clear that, “the crucial and determinative inquiry in a Batson claim is whether the state has treated similarly situated venirepersons differently based on race [or, after J.E.B., gender].” Id. Pruitt complains in his brief that “the district court looked to the reasons offered to justify striking each individual male juror without considering whether the reason was applied equally to males and females.” That claim, however, is directly refuted by the district court’s opinion, which addressed that very analysis under the heading “Comparing Males and Females.” Pruitt, slip. op. at 11-14 (N.D. Ill.). In fact, the district court compared two women who were ultimately accepted as jurors (one was an alternate) with the six men stricken by the prosecution. While acknowledging that the women shared an undesirable characteristic (as the prosecution saw it) No. 02-4100 17 with the men—that is, they lived in the suburbs—the court also observed that they possessed characteristics that the stricken men did not. One stated that she had a daughter who had previously been injured as the victim of a fight (perhaps allowing her to better empathize with other crime victims), while the other declared that she had a low tolerance for rape. The district court found that these responses demonstrated that the six stricken men and these two selected women were not “similarly situated,” id. at 14, and any differential treatment could be justified by non-gender-based differences. Picking jurors is a complex and multifaceted process. Individual factors or characteristics often do not provide the “silver bullet” that will mean acceptance or rejection of any potential juror. Rather, it is a combination of factors that will determine whether a party believes a juror will be favorable to their side: “The decision to challenge a juror will often rest on the interplay of various factors.” Dunham, 967 F.2d at 1126. Pruitt has failed to establish that the prosecution’s proffered reasons for striking the six male jurors were designed to hide impermissible discrimination. That, considered in combination with the other evidence relied on by the district court (including the fact that the venire was at least 70 percent male, making it statistically less likely for a woman to be stricken, and the fact that the prosecution did not use its seventh peremptory challenge to strike another male), leads us to conclude that Pruitt’s conviction was not attained in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court was therefore correct in denying Pruitt’s petition on this ground.