Opinion ID: 487400
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reconciliation of Section 306(a) and the Agreement

Text: 33 SAA argues that notwithstanding the evident meaning of section 306 and its legislative history, Supreme Court precedent nevertheless requires that it be construed in a manner that will not require the United States to violate its obligations under an executive agreement. SAA points out that Article VI of the Agreement specifies the circumstances under which a permit may be revoked and contends that this court must construe section 306 in a manner consistent with the permit revocation provision of the Agreement. 34 In debate Senator Lugar asserted that the Sarbanes amendment would require this country to violate the Agreement, and based his opposition to its adoption on this interpretation. Senator Sarbanes, on the other hand, argued that his amendment would not breach the Agreement: [I]t is my contention that we are not unilaterally abrogating the agreement. On the contrary we are working within the parameters of the agreement. 132 Cong.Rec. S11,713-14. Senator Sarbanes argued that South Africa had failed to implement an objective expressed in the Agreement, namely, to 'foster and encourage the widest possible distribution of the benefits of air travel for the [sic] good of mankind ... and to stimulate international [sic] travel as a means of promoting friendly understanding and good will among peoples [sic].'  132 Cong.Rec. S11,712 (quoting Agreement Annex Sec. IV(A), 61 Stat. at 3062). 35 Whatever the merits of this exchange between Senators Lugar and Sarbanes, there is no indication in the legislative history to suggest that in adopting the Anti-Apartheid Act as amended, Congress intended to abrogate any provision of the Agreement. Nor must we decide whether section 306(a) in fact violates any such provision. Cf. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195, 8 S.Ct. 456, 458, 31 L.Ed. 386 (1888) ([W]hen a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty not already executed.... The duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will.). Nevertheless, for the narrow purpose of addressing petitioner's reliance on a principle of statutory construction, we will assume, arguendo, that the mandate in section 306(a)(2) does in fact violate the Agreement. 36 If petitioner's construction of section 306(a)(2) were permissible, the lack of an express congressional intent to abrogate the permit revocation provision of the Agreement would lend support to SAA's position. 2 Since the days of Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court has consistently held that congressional statutes must be construed wherever possible in a manner that will not require the United States to violate the law of nations. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (quoted in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1515, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982)). The Court's extreme reluctance to find a conflict between an act of Congress and a pre-existing international agreement of the United States finds eloquent expression in Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 5 S.Ct. 255, 26 L.Ed. 770 (1884): 37 There would no longer be any security, says Vattel, no longer any commerce between mankind, if [nations] did not think themselves obliged to keep faith with each other, and to perform their promises. Vattel, Book 2, ch. 12. And as sovereign nations, acknowledging no superior, cannot be compelled to accept any interpretation, however just and reasonable, the faith of treaties constitutes in this respect all the security of contracting powers. Ib. ch. 17.... Aside from the duty imposed by the Constitution to respect treaty stipulations when they become the subject of judicial proceedings, the court cannot be unmindful of the fact, that the honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in every inquiry whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be recognized and protected. 38 Id. at 539-40, 5 S.Ct. at 256. 39 The Court in Chew Heong compared the abrogation of a treaty through an act of Congress to the repeal of one statute by another, noting that even in the case of statutes whose repeal or modification involves no question of good faith with the government or people of other countries, the rule is well settled that repeals by implication are not favored, and are never admitted where the former can stand with the new act. Id. at 549, 5 S.Ct. at 260. The Court went on to suggest the circumstances that will permit such implied repeal: 40 [T]here must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new laws and those of the old, and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto, to the extent of the repugnancy. ... [I]t must appear that the later provision is certainly and clearly in hostility to the former. If, by any reasonable construction, the two statutes can stand together, they must so stand. If harmony is impossible, and only in that event, the former law is repealed in part, [sic] or wholly, as the case may be. 41 Id. at 549-50, 5 S.Ct. at 260 (quoting Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 362-63, 10 L.Ed. 987 (1842), and State v. Stoll, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 425, 431, 21 L.Ed. 650 (1873)). 42 As we have noted, however, the purpose of Congress in adopting the Sarbanes amendment was unambiguous. Therefore, if there is in fact a positive repugnancy between section 306(a) of the Anti-Apartheid Act and Article VI of the Agreement, the latter must yield. [S]o far as the provisions of [an] act [of Congress are] in conflict with any treaty, they must prevail in all courts of this country.... Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 195, 8 S.Ct. at 459. Furthermore, it is wholly immaterial to inquire whether by the act ... [Congress] has departed from the [Agreement] or not, or whether such departure was by accident or design.... Id. (emphasis added). 43 Congress has express constitutional powers to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [such] Powers. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8. As this court has noted, Under our constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is nothing the other branches of government can do about it. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1897, 36 L.Ed.2d 390 (1973).