Opinion ID: 392844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Admissions and Jury Instructions

Text: 39 The remainder of defendants' issues in appeal No. 80-3237 of the Lyman Lamb case deal with the admission of certain evidence and with certain instructions by the district court to the jury. First, defendants complain that the court committed prejudicial error by allowing plaintiffs to introduce the findings of an Administrative Law Judge adopted by the Federal Trade Commission in an opinion concluding proceedings against these and other plywood manufacturers pursuant to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). 2 We disagree. 40 The district judge carefully and extensively edited from those findings any finding that indicated or tended to indicate the Commission's conclusions or the outcome of the proceedings. He also edited the findings to eliminate any possible prejudice to defendants. The findings that were admitted were limited to historical and objective descriptions of the industry, production statistics, and industry practices. They neither stated nor implied that the practices were or were not collusive or anticompetitive in origin, operation, or effect. Moreover, the admitted findings were simply cumulative in nature. With insignificant exceptions, the admitted findings were supported by independent evidence in the record. 41 The court carefully instructed the jury that the findings were the result of an inquiry into the pricing practices in the plywood industry, the outcome and results of (which) really are not of significance or consequence here to this case. He also stated that they were not binding upon the jury, but that they may be received as evidence instead of, for example, having a witness testify to those matters or instead of having a document introduced to show it. It is simply evidence to be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. 42 We also conclude that it was not an abuse of the district court's discretion to admit the findings under Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C). Cf. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 1960, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976) (administrative findings with respect to employment discrimination claim admissible); Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1183 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969, 99 S.Ct. 461, 58 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978) (findings in Decision and Order of Coast Guard hearing examiner admissible); United States v. School District of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1978) (findings of Department of Health, Education, and Welfare hearing examiner in school-segregation fund-termination proceeding admissible). Furthermore, defendants came forward with no evidence sufficient to impugn the trustworthiness of the proffered findings. See Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1316 (3rd Cir. 1978). Defendants' arguments on this issue fail. 43 Defendants also complain about the court's charge to the jury in two particulars. First, they contend that it was improper even to give the jury an instruction on the meaning of the term contract as it is used in section 1 of the Sherman Act, since supposedly there was no evidence in the record of any contract containing, referring to, or suggesting an agreement to use west coast freight or standard weights. Our examination of the record, however, discloses examples of exactly the sort of document whose existence defendants deny memoralizations of agreements mutually to preserve freight pickup (phantom freight) on intercompany sales for resale, and even offers to contract for intercompany sales, guaranteeing certain levels of freight pickup, for the expressly stated reason of doing everything possible to stabilize prices, especially in those markets close to the plant where the offeror was experiencing price cutting. It was not error for the court to instruct the jury on the meaning of the term contract as used in section 1 of the Sherman Act. 44 Finally, defendants contend that the court charged the jury that it could consider contracts between manufacturers and opportunity contacts in themselves as evidence of a conspiracy. We do not read the record in this way. The learned district judge charged the jury that these transactions, these contracts, in and of themselves are not illegal. Indeed, they may be vehicles for fostering competition. Phrasing in the conjunctive, he then charged that such matters may also be conduct that, when viewed on their own and in the light of the other evidence, indicate that there were agreements, express or implied, reached between manufacturers that they would use, in selling plywood to others, West Coast freight or standard weights. The learned judge then proceeded at length to stress that intercompany sales agreements and trade meetings were not in and of themselves evidence of illegality under the Sherman Act. We are convinced from a careful reading of the entire charge that it was, in substance, correct. Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1358 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S.Ct. 1740, 68 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981). See Andry v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1973) (if charge viewed as a whole correctly instructs on the law, even though portion be technically imperfect, no harmful error is committed). 45