Opinion ID: 2823792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Batson Analysis

Text: Â¶9Â Â Â Â Â Â For over a century, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the â[e]xclusion of . . . citizens from service as jurors [on account of their race] constitutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure.â Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (describing its holding in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)). But before Batson, a defendant could establish an equal protection violation only by showing a pattern of racially motivated strikes âover a number of cases.â Id. at 92Â (describing lower courtsâ interpretation of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)). That standard âplaced on defendants a crippling burden of proofâ and rendered peremptory challenges âlargely immune from constitutional scrutiny.â Id. at 92â93. Reasoning that ââa consistent pattern of official racial discriminationâ is not âa necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,ââ the Batson Court jettisoned the Swain standard. Id. at 95 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977)). In its place, the Court articulated a three-part test whereby a defendant may prove purposeful discrimination âby relying solely on the facts concerning [jury] selection in his case.â Id. Â¶10Â Â Â Â Â Â At the first step, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was based on the prospective jurorâs race. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003). To raise the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination, the defendant may rely on all relevant circumstances. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. One example of a relevant circumstance, the Batson Court suggested, is âa âpatternâ of strikesâ against members of a cognizable racial group. Id. at 97. But a pattern is not essential to a prima facie showing. âFor evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.â Id. at 95â96 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (ââ[T]he Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.ââ) (quoting Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902). As long as the totality of the circumstances raises an inference of racial motivation, the defendant hasÂ satisfied his step-one burden. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; accord Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 589 (Colo. 1998). Â¶11Â Â Â Â Â Â The burden of production then shifts to the proponent of the strike. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. At step two, the prosecutor must come forward with a race-neutral explanation ârelated to the particular case to be tried.â Id. at 98. Examples include a prospective jurorâs out-of-court obligations, Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478, family membersâ prior convictions, see Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 246 (2005), and lack of ties to the community, see Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341 (2006). Although the prosecutor must do more than deny a discriminatory motive or affirm his good faith, Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, the bar at step two is not high, Valdez, 966 P.2d at 590. To pass muster, the explanation need not be âpersuasive, or even plausible,â as long as it does not deny equal protection. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court has even accepted a prospective jurorâs âlong, curly hairâ as a satisfactory step-two explanation because it was not inherently discriminatory. Id. at 766, 768. Nothing more is required for the inquiry to proceed to step three. See id. at 768. Â¶12Â Â Â Â Â Â At step three, after the defendant has a chance to rebut the prosecutorâs race-neutral explanation, the trial court must decide the ultimate question: whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. It is at this stage that âimplausible or fantastic [step-two] justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.â Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. As we discussed in People v. Wilson, 2015 CO 54, Â¶ 13, ___ P.3d, the trial courtâs step-threeÂ ruling should be based on its evaluation of the prosecutorâs credibility and the plausibility of his explanation. If the trial court is convinced, in light of all the evidence, that the proffered reason was pretextual and that the prosecutor actually based his peremptory strike on the prospective jurorâs race, then it must uphold the Batson challenge. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 252; Wilson, Â¶ 13.