Opinion ID: 183875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sidewalks, Pedestrian Mall, and Rotunda

Text: Bloedorn claims that GSU should be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing its absolute ban on all expressive activity by outside, non-sponsored speakers on the University's sidewalks or its Pedestrian Mall, and in its Rotunda. We are unpersuaded. As we see it, each of these campus sites falls into the category of a limited public forum. Again, a state-funded university is not a traditional public forum, Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, and GSU has expressed no intention to open these areas to the general public for expressive conduct. The University has limited these areas only for use by a discrete group of peoplethe GSU community; its students, faculty, and employees; and their sponsored guests. See Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S.Ct. at 2984 n. 11 (explaining that a limited public forum is established when the government opens property `limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects') (quoting Pleasant Grove City, 129 S.Ct. at 1132); ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 444-45 (4th Cir.2005). This is precisely the definition of a limited public forum. Finally, the University is under no obligation to open its campus to outside, non-sponsored speakers; the First Amendment does not guarantee access to property for speech activities simply because the property is government-owned. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803, 105 S.Ct. 3439. Necessarily then, there is no requirement that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269 (emphasis added). Contrary to Bloedorn's suggestion, it is of lesser significance that the GSU sidewalks and Pedestrian Mall physically resemble municipal sidewalks and public parks. The physical characteristics of the property alone cannot dictate forum analysis. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). Publicly owned or operated property does not become a `public forum' simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983). Instead, we look to the traditional uses made of the property, the government's intent and policy concerning the usage, and the presence of any special characteristics. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (discussing the unique nature of military bases and the fact that these circumstances must be taken into consideration); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (noting the special characteristics of the school environment). Thus, by way of example, even though highway rest areas and municipal parks often are physically identical, we have found that a highway rest area, unlike a municipal park, is not a public forum precisely because the government did not intend to open the forum to the same panoply of activity permitted in municipal parks. Sentinel Commc'ns Co., 936 F.2d at 1204. Similarly, in Greer, the Supreme Court found that, even though a military base permitted free civilian access to certain unrestricted areas, the base was not thereby transformed into a public forum; the presence of sidewalks and streets within the base did not change that determination. 424 U.S. at 830, 835-38, 96 S.Ct. 1211. And, in Kokinda, the Supreme Court found that a postal sidewalka sidewalk running between the parking lot and the post officewas not a traditional public forum because, although it was identical in appearance to the nearby municipal sidewalk, it was not constructed to facilitate the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city, and it was not expressly dedicated ... to any expressive activity by postal service regulations. 497 U.S. at 727-28, 730, 110 S.Ct. 3115. It is immaterial that, inevitably, some expressive conduct may occur in the forum because the law is clear that the government does not create a public forum by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse, id. at 730, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted), and that the occurrence of expressive activity in the context of the forum created does not imply that the forum thereby becomes a public forum for First Amendment purposes, Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805, 105 S.Ct. 3439. Even though GSU's campus possesses many of the characteristics of a public forumincluding open sidewalks, streets, and pedestrian mallsit differs in many important ways from public streets or parks. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269. Perhaps most important, the purpose of a university is strikingly different from that of a public park. Its essential function is not to provide a forum for general public expression and assembly; rather, the university campus is an enclave created for the pursuit of higher learning by its admitted and registered students and by its faculty. Nor is this case like Grace, where the Supreme Court determined that the sidewalks comprising the outer edges of the property of the United States Supreme Court were indistinguishable from other public sidewalks in Washington, D.C., and, thus, constituted traditional public fora. 461 U.S. at 179-80, 103 S.Ct. 1702. Here, the sidewalks, Pedestrian Mall, and Rotunda are all contained inside of the GSU campus. All of the University's entrances are identified with large blue signs and brick pillars, all of the buildings are identified with large blue signs, and all of its parking lots have signs restricting their use to GSU community members. [2]