Opinion ID: 2551366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Risk Inherent in Reinstruction

Text: Before addressing the reinstruction at issue here, we believe it is important to emphasize the substantial risk inherent in any reinstruction. When a jury, during deliberations, requests and receives a supplemental instruction from the trial judge, the risk of error is heightened because a supplemental instruction `will enjoy special prominence in the minds of the jurors.' [43] Accordingly, we emphasized in Davis v. United States that the trial judge must be especially alert not to send the jury back to resume deliberations having most recently heard supplemental instructions which are unbalanced. ... Because the `last word is apt to be the decisive word,' the trial judge must prevent the `poison[ing of] an otherwise healthy trial' by improperly balanced supplemental instructions. [44] Therefore  of importance here  this is not merely a language case; it is a supplemental language case. The risk is particularly high from supplemental language explaining reasonable doubt. In Smith we stressed, in the strongest terms, that the trial court should `resist the temptation to stray from, or embellish upon, that instruction.' [45] We were concerned, primarily, that any deviation would risk constitutional error and, as a result, automatic reversal of a conviction. [46] It is highly questionable, therefore, for any trial judge to deviate from Smith 's exact language. As we said in Foreman v. United States with reference to reasonable doubt: an instruction central to the determination of guilt or innocence may be fatally tainted by even a minor variation which tends to create ambiguity. [47] To be clear: in Smith this court, sitting en banc, prescribed language describing reasonable doubt that we believe accurately reflects the constitutional standard  and thus the minimum burden of proof required for a finding of guilt  that trial judges must convey to the jury in criminal cases. Any reinstruction that allows a jury to find reasonable doubt based on a lower level of proof will be improper, [48] and reversal will be required if this court concludes that, as a result of that reinstruction, there is `a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt' as defined in Smith. [49] There is a related concern. In addition to the particularly high risk of constitutional error from merely revising the language of reasonable doubt used for reinstruction, there is a correspondingly high risk that, if the reinstruction appears to favor the government, the jury will get the message that the judge believes the defendant is guilty and thus that the government has met its burden of proof. The jurors, in asking for clarification, presumably will be listening carefully for any change in the judge's words of guidance, and they will probably be even more alert to change if the judge, as in this case, states expressly that it's change they will hear. Change in language, however, as appellant concedes, does not necessarily imply change in meaning. But even if a judge's invitation to look for change will lead many, if not most, jurors to expect at least some new meaning from reinstruction, mere change as such does not necessarily suggest whom that new meaning is likely to favor. The critical concern, therefore, is the trial court's presentation overall: whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors will have heard the judge, through all aspects of reinstruction, take the government's side by inviting them to find guilt more easily than they could have under the reasonable doubt language they heard, initially, in the judge's recitation from Smith.