Opinion ID: 2513925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Easements by Prior Use

Text: Easements by prior use, sometimes referred to as easements of necessity, can be implied when a property owner has used one part of a single piece of property for the benefit of another part of the property and then divides and conveys the property. In those circumstances, the new possessor of the previously benefited portion of the land may also possess an easement over the previously burdened part of the property. 7 Thompson, supra, § 60.03(b)(4). Thompson suggests that the elements of an easement implied from prior use are: (1) common ownership followed by a conveyance separating the unified ownership; (2) before severance, the common owner used part of the property for the benefit of the other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, continuous and apparent; (3) and the claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel previously benefitted. 7 Thompson, supra, § 60.03(b)(4)(i). The underlying premise is that, because the retained property was necessary to enjoyment of the conveyed property as shown by historical usethe grantor must have intended to convey the easement with the grant. In Wagner v. Fairlamb, 151 Colo. 481, 379 P.2d 165 (1963), the plaintiff constructed a road across the defendant's property that followed a mule pack or wagon trial that was in existence when the property was under common ownership. Id. at 483, 379 P.2d at 167. This court recognized that an easement may be an express easement (which appears in a deed or contract for the sale of land) or an implied easement (which arises out of the existence of certain facts implied from the transaction). Id. at 484, 379 P.2d at 167. The court noted that implied easements have generally not been looked upon with favor by the courts. Id. The elements adopted by the court to prove an implied easement were: (1) Unity and subsequent separation of title; (2) obvious benefit to the dominant and burden to the servient tenement existing at the time of the conveyance; (3) use of the premises by the common owner in their altered condition long enough before the conveyance to show that the change was intended to be permanent; and (4) necessity for the easement. Id. at 484-85, 379 P.2d at 167. Noting that all four elements must be present to support the creation of an easement, the court in Wagner rejected an easement, finding that the use was a terminated intermittent rather than permanent use. See also Lee v. Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 164 Colo. 326, 332, 435 P.2d 232, 236 (1967)(easement by necessity found because of adequate proof of consistent, permanent use of road prior to severance). In Bromley v. Lambert & Son, Inc., 752 P.2d 595 (Colo.App.1988), at the time of the severance of the parcel, the plaintiffs had no access to their land except by right of way over the defendant's property. Id. at 596. The city later constructed a public street adjoining the plaintiffs' property. Id. The court stated: Colorado recognizes implied easements that arise by pre-existing use. A showing of necessity is required to establish an easement by pre-existing use. Proof of necessity is required as of the time of the severance of the original property into separate estates, because it is an indication of the intent of the original grantor and grantee that a permanent servitude be imposed on the servient estate in favor of the dominant estate. Id. (citations omitted); see also Proper v. Greager, 827 P.2d 591 (Colo.App.1992) (noting that the required necessity is the necessity for the easement at the time of severance, not at the time of the court hearing). Accordingly, to imply an easement by prior use, the landowners here would have had to show that the mountain property was being used by Beaubien at the time of the conveyance of the vara strips as a necessary adjunct in order to support the viability of the vara strips. Only by that means could the landowners demonstrate that Beaubien necessarily intended to grant to them such rights. The evidence does not suggest that Beaubien was then making use of the property nor that Taylor Ranch was necessary to the community. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that no one lived on the property at the time of the grants, and that the grazing, timber, and firewood use occurred on property other than the Taylor Ranch. Under those circumstances, an easement by necessity cannot exist. V. Conclusion I do not believe that the landowners here have established their right to use the Taylor Ranch lands as they claim. They cannot, in my view, rely upon the Beaubien Document because it did not comply with the laws in effect at the time of its execution by failing to identify specific grantees. The document was not ambiguous, and therefore cannot support rights by implication. Further, none of the theories for implication of an easement apply to these facts. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and thus respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.