Opinion ID: 1384851
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Heading: adverse possession or prescription by a municipality

Text: Appellants first contend that Wyoming municipalities lack authority to obtain private property for use as roadways through adverse possession or prescription. We have not heretofore directly addressed this question. In Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 71 Wyo. 414, 259 P.2d 766 (1953), we implied that towns had the ability to acquire title to property through adverse possession. In Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 314 P.2d 944 (1957), we suggested that a town can maintain a quiet title action and described the ability of a town council to purchase, receive or sell property by saying, [t]he power granted is broad and comprehensive. Id. at 946. In Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395 (1982), we held that a previous quiet title action in which a city was allowed to obtain title by adverse possession was res judicata. Town of the City of Newcastle v. Toomey, 78 Wyo. 432, 329 P.2d 264, 76 A.L.R.2d 525 (1958), supports the premise that municipalities may acquire roadways by prescription. In all of these cases, we have suggested adverse possession or prescription as a legitimate method for a municipality to obtain title to real property. We now affirm that a municipality may, in appropriate circumstances, acquire real property by adverse possession or prescription. It is generally held that a government body can acquire title to land by adverse possession. Annotation, Acquisition of Title to Land by Adverse Possession by State or Other Governmental Unit or Agency, 18 A.L.R.3d 678 (1968); 7 R. Powell and P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property § 1015 at 91-72 (1987). It is also generally held that the public may acquire a right to use land for highways by prescription. 4 H. Tiffany, Law of Real Property § 1211 (1975); 2 G. Thompson, Thompson on Real Property § 342 at 208-209 (1980). Appellants argue, however, that municipalities may only exercise those powers expressly granted them by statute or those which may be reasonably implied from statutes. Whipps v. Town of Greybull, 56 Wyo. 355, 109 P.2d 805, 146 A.L.R. 596 (1941). Appellants contend that because the legislature has expressly given municipalities the power to acquire property for roads and streets through eminent domain, § 1-26-801, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987) and statutory dedication, §§ 34-12-101 to XX-XX-XXX, W.S. 1977, those two means are exclusive. We disagree. It is well established that statutes providing means by which lands may be dedicated to public uses are not exclusive. Graff v. City of Casper, 73 Wyo. 486, 281 P.2d 685, 52 A.L.R.2d 254 (1955); 26 C.J.S., Dedication, § 3 (1956). With respect to the exclusivity of the eminent domain statutes, § 1-26-503, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987) provides: (a) Nothing in this act requires that the power of eminent domain be exercised to acquire property. Whether property necessary for public use is to be acquired by purchase, other means or by eminent domain is a decision left to the discretion of the person authorized to acquire the property. (b) Subject to any other statute relating to the acquisition of property, any person or public entity authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may also acquire the property for the use by grant, purchase, lease, gift, devise, contract or other means. We are aware of no statute which precludes a municipality from acquiring property through adverse possession or prescription, and we hold that municipalities may acquire property by those means.