Opinion ID: 774807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Board's Actions Comply with Due Process?

Text: 26 Chong claims that the Board violated her due process rights by not giving her notice that it would decide whether she committed a particularly serious crime without remanding to the IJ and by not providing her with an opportunity to be heard on the particularly serious crime issue. We review de novo whether the Board violated Chong's due process rights. See Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000). 27 Aliens facing removal are entitled to due process. Chlomos v. United States Dep't of Justice, INS, 516 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has observed: 28 We are dealing here with procedural requirements prescribed for the protection of the alien. Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty--at times a most serious one--cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness. 29 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation omitted). Specifically, due process requires that Chong: (1) be entitled to factfinding based on a record produced before the Board and disclosed to her; (2) be allowed to make arguments on her own behalf; and (3) have the right to an individualized determination of her interests. See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001). 30 Chong contends that the Board violated her due process rights by affirming the IJ's decision without remanding to the IJ for an individualized hearing. We disagree. An individual's due process right to be heard does not ensure a hearing in all contexts, as such a requirement would grind judicial and administrative gears to a screeching halt. Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 1996). Instead, administrative bodies can preserve an individual's due process right to be heard in many different ways. Id. 31 In this case, Chong received a live hearing before the IJ, at which point she was afforded the opportunity to argue that her drug convictions did not rise to the level of particularly serious crimes, and to present evidence to the IJ supporting her position. The IJ created a record of the proceedings, which was then transmitted to the Board for review. In deciding that Chong had committed a particularly serious crime, the Board looked at the specific facts of Chong's case--engaging in the individualized determination that Abdulai requires--rather than blindly following a categorical rule, i.e., that all drug convictions qualify as particularly serious crimes. 239 F.3d at 549. Due process requires no more. See id. at 549-50; see also Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 903-04 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that once an alien receives a full and fair hearing in front of an IJ, due process is satisfied). 32 Holding otherwise would give Chong the proverbial second bite at the apple. Once an alien has had a chance to offer evidence and raise arguments on the particularly serious crime issue during a removal proceeding, we can see no persuasive reason for requiring that she receive a second hearing on the question. Nor do we think that due process necessitates such a redundant procedural measure. 33 Chong also argues that the Board violated her due process rights by not giving her the opportunity to submit evidence to the Board. In fact, the Board did not prevent Chong from submitting evidence relevant to the particularly serious crime analysis. However, since Chong believed that the Board would remand her case to the IJ for a hearing, Chong did not submit any evidence to the Board. Perhaps the Board should have provided notice to Chong that it would decide the particularly serious crime issue without remanding to the IJ, thereby indicating to Chong that she should submit any evidence she wished to be considered. But the Board's failure to provide notice to Chong does not constitute a due process violation. Chong had the opportunity to present any evidence concerning the particularly serious crime determination to the IJ, and the Board had the administrative record before it when deciding Chong's appeal. This procedure satisfies due process. See Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 549-50; see also Ladha, 215 F.3d at 903-04 (holding that once an alien receives a full and fair hearing in front of an IJ, due process is satisfied). 34