Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted errors in proceedings on automatic application to modify verdict

Text: Defendant contends that proceedings on the automatic application to modify the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e) were so affected by a variety of errors that remand for a new hearing on the application is required. We independently consider the record in reviewing the trial court's ruling. ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1091, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335.) As will appear, we find no error warranting reversal.
First, citing United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 655-657, 659-660, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 ( Cronic ), defendant contends that his trial counsel's inaction  specifically, his filing no documents and making no argument  at this critical stage of the trial (see Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 [recognizing right to effective assistance of counsel in first appeal as of right]; Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128, 134-137, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 [recognizing right to counsel at sentencing]) led to a total breakdown of the adversarial process, requiring reversal without consideration of prejudice. (Defendant expressly makes no claim on appeal that his counsel was ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ( Strickland ).) In Cronic, the high court stated: `The right to the effective assistance of counsel is ... the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted  even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors  the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.' ( In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, quoting Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 656-657, 104 S.Ct. 2039, fns. omitted.) The high court gave examples of the ways in which a trial might cease to afford meaningful adversarial testing: `The Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.' ... `Apart from circumstances of that magnitude, however, there is generally no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt.' ( In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 727, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, quoting Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659, fns. 25, 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039, italics omitted.) In Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 ( Cone ), the high court emphasized the narrowness of its holding in Cronic. When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's failure must be complete.  ( Id. at pp. 696-697, 122 S.Ct. 1843, italics added.) In mounting a guilt phase defense of insanity, defense counsel in Cone presented psychological and neuropharmacological evidence of the defendant's substance abuse and posttraumatic stress related to his military service in Vietnam, as well as testimony by the defendant's mother and evidence of remorse. During the sentencing hearing that followed the jury's verdict of guilty, defense counsel called the jurors' attention to the mitigating evidence they had heard in the earlier phase of trial and asked them to exercise mercy. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's proffer of photographs of the victims' decomposing bodies and, after the junior prosecuting attorney gave a low-key summation, waived closing argument, thereby foreclosing the lead prosecutor, who by all accounts was a highly effective advocate, from offering rebuttal. The high court rejected Cone's claim that his counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to adversarial testing within the meaning of Cronic, reasoning that the claim was not that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points. For purposes of distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, this difference is not of degree but of kind. ( Id. at p. 697, 122 S.Ct. 1843.) This case is similar to Cone. After presenting a penalty phase defense of current mental illness via the testimony of Dr. Wilkinson and arguing his case to the jury, counsel appeared at the hearing on the automatic motion to modify and noted he had reviewed the prosecutor's proposed ruling and had nothing to add. After the trial court read its decision into the record, counsel reminded the court that he had asked it to defer reading the probation report until after ruling on the automatic application. The trial court responded that it had done so. Before the court recessed to consider the report, defense counsel pointed out a factual error in it. These circumstances, which show that defense counsel was present at and actively participating in the penalty trial as a whole, including the evidentiary portion and argument to the jury, do not reach the magnitude of those in which courts have concluded Cronic required reversal without a showing of prejudice. In particular, this is not a case like People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 365, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 580, 48 P.3d 1136, a pre- Cronic decision in which we reversed a conviction after the defendant's counsel expressly refused to participate in the trial beyond appearing in the courtroom, and remained mute throughout the proceedings. In ruling on the automatic application, the trial court is limited to the evidence that was before the jury; thus, trial counsel was not at liberty to present new evidence and clearly cannot be faulted for not doing so. (§ 190.4, subd. (e); People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 196, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) Defendant's central complaint is that counsel did not argue to the trial court, orally or in writing, for reduction of his sentence. But during his penalty phase summation counsel had argued for a verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole based on the evidence he had presented during that phase of trial. That counsel did not repeat himself in the proceedings on the automatic application was not the equivalent of his being absent or failing to subject the prosecution's case to adversarial testing during the sentencing phase of trial. That counsel chose not to present argument at the hearing on the automatic application, moreover, meant that the prosecutor likewise would not enjoy another opportunity to urge the court to confirm the death sentence. The authorities on which defendant relies, all of which predate Cone, supra, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914, are distinguishable on their facts: In Tucker v. Day (5th Cir.1992) 969 F.2d 155, 159, counsel at a noncapital resentencing hearing did not consult with the defendant, had no knowledge of the facts, and acted as a mere spectator of whose presence the defendant was unaware. In Patrasso v. Nelson (7th Cir.1997) 121 F.3d 297, 304-305, counsel in a noncapital case performed no investigation before sentencing and made no effort to obtain a mitigated punishment. As noted, the facts of this case are distinguishable. Our conclusion that the rule in Cronic does not apply here should not be read as an endorsement of defense counsel's performance in connection with the hearing on the automatic application to modify the verdict. Cases in which counsel at such hearings appropriately choose to forgo arguing that their client's life be spared should be rare indeed. As noted, this appeal affords us no occasion to comment on the adequacy of counsel's representation within the meaning of Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at page 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Resolution of any claim predicated on Strickland must await collateral proceedings.
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to modify the verdict due to counsel's conflict of interest (see 32 Cal.Rptr.3d pp. 66-70, 116 P.3d pp. 530-533, ante ). Because we have concluded counsel did not have a conflict of interest, we reject the contention.
Defendant next argues he was denied due process of law because the judge's decision on the automatic application to modify the verdict was tainted by passion, emotion, and religious beliefs. He cites several remarks the trial court made during the sentencing hearing. First, in examining section 190.3, factor (d)  whether the murders were committed while defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance  the court stated: There is no evidence that the murders of John Davies and Lance Turner were committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Even the doctors most favorable to the defendant testified that Jon Dunkle showed no signs of mental illness until 1987.[¶] Those of us who are overcome by the horror of these crimes may have an urge to imagine that Jon Dunkle suffered from some emotional illness[;] perhaps we do this to protect ourselves from the very real fact that some people in this world delight in doing evil. [¶] However, evidence indicates that the defendant has systematically feigned mental problems in order to avoid responsibility for his vicious acts. (Italics added.) Defendant argues the italicized phrase shows that the court's ruling was improperly based on its personal emotion. But he takes this comment out of context. The ruling as a whole makes clear that the court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at trial, applying the section 190.3 factors in exercising its independent judgment to determine that the weight of the evidence supported the jury's verdict. We see no basis for a conclusion the trial court improperly took emotional considerations into account in making its ruling. Defendant further asserts that the court's discussion of section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances of the offenses, revealed that emotion and passion affected the ruling. The court stated: The circumstances of the crime for which the defendant was convicted were particularly vicious. The first of the defendant's chosen victims, John Davies, was especially vulnerable to the defendant's murderous intentions because he regarded the defendant as a friend. He trusted Jon Dunkle. The defendant used this trust, as well as John Davies' youth, to lure him to an isolated area, and there for pleasure, Jon Dunkle murdered his friend. [An] incomprehensible and vicious act. Having accomplished that, he abandoned John's body to the elements, he cruelly allowed the family who had welcomed him to be torn apart by years of searching and heart-[rending] sor[r]ow. [¶] Then the defendant in 1984 murdered again. As before the defendant chose a particularly vulnerable victim, a 12-year-old boy, Lance Turner. A child whom the defendant had never before seen. For a thrill, the defendant brutally stabbed Lance 23 times. For the perverse pleasure of seeing a human being suffer and die, Jon Scott Dunkle ended Lance's life and plunged the Turner family into darkest grief.  (Italics added.) Later, in the course of its comments on section 190.3, factor (b), other violent criminal conduct, the court stated: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt was also presented on a third murder committed by the defendant in 1985. The murder of Sean Dannehl. While the defend[ant] was living in Sacramento and [a]waiting court proceeding on the burglary charge, he happened upon his third victim, a slight 12-year-old boy, riding his bicycle home through the twilight. Jon Dunkle chased him on his own bike, rammed him twice, forcing Sean to stop. Who can imagine the terror that that child must have felt naked, alone and trapped by this defendant? Jon Dunkle brutally and pitilessly stabbed Sean in the heart and eyes. He forcibly penetrated that little skull. He drained Sean's life from him, and left him to decompose in the summer heat. [¶] The defendant confessed to this crime as well. (Italics added.) The italicized comments reveal the court's appreciation of the terror and grief felt by the victims and their families. They do not support defendant's assertion that the court made its ruling on the basis of its personal emotion or passion. Finally, defendant contends certain comments the court made after ruling on the automatic application and after imposing sentence, demonstrate that the court's emotional reactions and religious views improperly influenced its ruling. The court said: To the families of John Davies and Lance Turner: The facts that were presented here in this courtroom constitute a tragedy of incomprehensible proportions. Our children are so much a part of ourselves, their personalities, their uniqueness, become woven into the fabric of our being. When that precious part of our lives is ripped ruthlessly [from] us, as happened in this case, the resulting wound must be beyond endurance. [¶] I know that I speak for each person who sat in the courtroom and listened to the evidence, when I say that our hearts go out to you. We hope now, that somehow the healing process can begin. [¶] We admire your courage and pure faith. You have born[e] unbearable sorrow with grace and dignity. [¶] To Jon Scott Dunkle I say do not look to this court for forgiveness, Mr. Dunkle. I can find no mercy for you in my heart. [¶] What you have done deserves the fullest condemnation of the law. The jury rightly determined that there is no penalty but death to be imposed in this situation and I concur with that determination. [¶] I suggest that you now look beyond this earth for forgiveness, for what is not possible for man is possible for God. When you were younger you went to church. You know that a judgment day that will make this pale in comparison is coming. Direct your thoughts to that judgment that you may not make a wreckage of your eternal life as you have this mortal life. [¶] Court is in recess. As noted, the court made these comments after ruling on the automatic verdict modification application and after imposing sentence. In the course of our review of the ruling, we have independently considered the record and the court's statement of its reasons for the ruling. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 710, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) We are satisfied the court complied with its obligation to weigh the evidence independently and without being influenced by improper religious or emotional considerations. Its postruling comments were personal reflections and not part of a legal ruling.
Defendant contends the trial court's ruling on the automatic application contained several factual errors that violated an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment interest he discerns in the reliable implementation of the last procedural safeguard before imposition of the death penalty. We discuss each asserted error in turn. Defendant criticizes the trial court's statement that: Nothing was presented to the jury to prove that [defendant] was under the influence at the time of the murder [of Lance Turner]. Defendant argues the trial court ignored the portion of his confession in which he described sharing a beer and a marijuana cigarette with the three girls at Waterdog Lake Park before the murder and his explanation that when he drinks alcohol and smokes marijuana, his body chemistry changes and he becomes assaultive. In fact, the trial court considered that evidence and concluded it did not establish that defendant was intoxicated within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (h) at the time of the offenses: The girls who talked to Jon Dunkle before he attacked Lance Turner saw the defendant with one can of beer. They reported no symptoms of intoxication. The defendant himself did not say that he was intoxicated when he saw Lance Turner on the path and decided to kill him. [¶] Perhaps the most persuasive evidence on this point is the careful planning of these murders by the defendant, which was mentioned by the court earlier. Such planning is inconsistent with intoxication. Defendant criticizes the trial court's further statement that: Jon Dunkle also told the police that on the night he killed John Davies he had been drinking and smoking marijuana. However, the defendant did not indicate that he was high when he committed the murder. Defendant complains that the trial court overlooked substantial evidence to the contrary, namely his statement to Belmont police that he was drunk and had been drinking whisky and smoking marijuana that night, and his statement to the FBI attributing the Davies murder to the effects of drink. The court's ruling, however, makes clear that it considered the evidence defendant cites, and simply did not accord it substantial mitigating weight. Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding premeditation and deliberation in the Davies and Turner homicides because they were carefully planned, and such planning is inconsistent with intoxication. In addition to arguing that the evidence in this case fails to show careful planning, defendant argues that premeditation and deliberation may be affected by intoxication, and that evidence of diminished capacity due to intoxication or mental defect, whether or not it rises to the level of a diminished capacity defense, is still a mitigating factor in capital sentencing. We do not infer the trial court overlooked relevant evidence or ignored applicable law to which it referred elsewhere in its ruling. Rather, it simply accorded greater weight to what the Attorney General calls defendant's deliberate goal-oriented behavior at the time of the Davies and Turner killings. Defendant criticizes the trial court's conclusion that defendant had threatened to use force or violence in the course of the Rennie burglary. As we concluded above, however (32 Cal.Rptr.3d pp. 73-74, 116 P.3d pp. 536-537, ante ), the trial court properly could consider the evidence of that incident under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant further argues the trial court improperly considered the fact that he resisted arrest and used force against Sergeant Goulart of the Belmont Police Department when the latter thwarted the Rennie burglary. Defendant notes that the prosecution never gave pretrial notice of an intent to use that fact, and never argued it as a circumstance in aggravation. But defendant cites no authority precluding the trial court, in ruling on an automatic application under section 190.4, subdivision (e), from relying on a factual aspect of a factor (b) offense that was presented to the jury merely because the prosecution did not explicitly argue it in aggravation. Defendant contends the trial court improperly concluded that he delight[ed] in doing evil and had systematically feigned mental problems in order to avoid responsibility for his vicious acts. He admits there is evidence he sometimes produced or exaggerated symptoms of a mental illness he actually had, but  noting he confessed to his crimes  he argues there is no evidence he faked mental illness in order to avoid the death penalty. He also asserts the trial court improperly relied on evidence presented during the second competency trial. We disagree. As the Attorney General observes, at the penalty phase Dr. Missett testified defendant was malingering and Dr. Wilkinson testified defendant at times malingered and was manipulative. The trial court properly could consider this penalty phase evidence in ruling on the automatic application. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in stating: It was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that both during the murders and the legal proceedings the defendant knew right from wrong, and has always had the ability to make choices and maintain control of himself when he wishes to do so. Defendant points out that, in the second competency trial (which the trial court could not properly consider in ruling on the automatic application), the jury made no finding under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and no finding regarding his knowledge of right from wrong or his ability to control himself, nor were the latter issues relevant to the guilt phase. The Attorney General interprets the trial court's comment as referring to the lack of evidence showing that defendant was psychotic at the time of the murders or incompetent at the time of trial. Whether or not that interpretation is correct, we agree with the Attorney General that even if the trial court misapprehended the appropriate standard or improperly considered evidence from the second competency trial, defendant fails to show a reasonable possibility any such error might have affected its ruling on the automatic application. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 172, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in stating, as relevant to section 190.3, factor (d): There is no evidence that the murders of John Davies and Lance Turner were committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Even the doctors most favorable to the defendant testified that Jon Dunkle showed no signs of mental illness until 1987. He cites Dr. Missett's testimony that he was certainly prepared to admit that there are aspects of [defendant's] personality or motivations or intention that may be beyond his control.... But defendant takes Dr. Missett's testimony out of context. Before making the quoted comment, Dr. Missett stated that the principal way in which [defendant] presents himself and the principal characteristic of his acts, involves intentionality, involves awareness of what you are doing, involves awareness and disregard of consequences, and it involves things that are under his control. Dr. Missett went on to say: But the actions themselves, and the amount of devious planning that goes into them, ... those are under his control. Dr. Wilkinson, testifying on defendant's behalf during the penalty phase, said that in reviewing the police reports relevant to the case he saw no symptoms of mental illness that led him to believe it was a dominant explanation for the crimes. The trial court did not err in not treating defendant's statement to police that he develops assaultive behavior after drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana as weighty evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (d). Finally, defendant complains that nothing in the court's ruling suggests it took into consideration the sole penalty phase defense proffered by counsel: current mental illness. To the contrary, in its discussion of section 190.3, factor (k), the court stated: There was presented no circumstance which could extenuate the gravity of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted. Nothing the defendant has presented regarding his personal history, which includes a learning disability, constitutes a basis for a sentence less than death. Nothing in the defendant's background excuses, explains or mitigates the violence and the brutality surrounding the murders of John Davies and Lance Turner. [¶] Evidence that the defend[ant] was influenced by alcohol or drug consumption or schizophrenia at the time of the homicide is not convincing. Jon Dunkle's conduct during the commission of each murder was deliberate and purposeful. It was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that both during the murders and the legal proceedings the defendant knew right from wrong, and has always had the ability to make choices and maintain control of himself when he wishes to do so.  (Italics added.) The trial court considered, but evidently accorded little weight to, defendant's evidence of current mental illness. In sum, in ruling on the automatic application to modify the verdict the trial court made no factual errors sufficient to undermine the validity of its conclusion.
Defendant contends the trial court's ruling on the automatic application for modification of the verdict was prejudicially affected by errors it committed during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, considered individually and cumulatively. He fails, however, to show how any error may have done so, and we reject the point.
Defendant contends that errors in the proceedings under section 190.4, subdivision (e) should be reviewed for their cumulative effect and the judgment should be reversed accordingly. We have found no error that, individually or cumulatively, demonstrates that the trial court failed to accord him proper review under section 190.4, subdivision (e) of the jury's sentencing decision.