Opinion ID: 66777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disruption of Evidence

Text: Reynolds appeals the district court’s decision to permit testimony related to evidence unavailable at trial. The government introduced testimony about the “getaway” car, which was destroyed prior to trial, after Defendants filed a Motion to Preserve Evidence. Further, the government called two bank employees as witnesses whose audiotape statements from the day of the robbery disappeared prior to trial. Reynolds objected to the use of this testimony. The court heard 11 counsels’ arguments, and then ruled the testimony admissible. Reynolds appeals the decision, asserting he was denied his right to due process. Lost evidence does not automatically deny a defendant his or her right to due process. The lost evidence “must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” United States v. Revolorio-Ramo, 468 F.3d 771, 774 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). Further, the loss must be due to the government’s bad faith. Id. Here, the district court held there was no denial of due process because the evidence was not potentially exculpatory, it was brought before the jury by other means, and there was no showing of bad faith by the government. We agree. Before destroying the car, the officers seized what they believed to be all the relevant evidence from the car: the stolen money, shotgun shells, the white jumpsuit, the wig, the knit cap, and spent shell casings. Pictures were also taken of the car which the district court observed “would seem to suffice” and Deputy An testified that they fairly and accurately depicted the vehicle he attempted to stop. The district court further permitted testimony and cross-examination of the officers about the contents of the car, its subsequent destruction and any evidence 12 of bad faith. Reynolds did file a Motion to Preserve Evidence (District Ct. Docket Entry # 40) on May 24, 2006, before the car was destroyed, but the Motion was to preserve all evidence, including “investigative reports, witness statements, documents, . . . contraband, . . . and other physical evidence.” (Id. at 1.) The “getaway” car was never specifically mentioned. Additionally, Reynolds did not move to inspect the vehicle until January 31, 2007, after the car was already destroyed and over eight months after the Motion to Preserve was filed. (District Ct. Docket Entry # 105, Notice of Intent to Inspect Vehicle.) Again, assuming arguendo that the court erred in permitting testimony about the destroyed vehicle, it was harmless. As discussed above, the jury heard testimony about how the vehicle was destroyed. The jury also saw photographs of the car, and the contents of the car were available for Reynolds’ use at trial. Further, the car was not integral to Reynolds’ defense. Reynolds did not specifically name the car in his Motion to Preserve Evidence, nor did he move to inspect the car for eight months after he filed the Motion. The trial court found that “quite frankly, the automobile itself does not appear to me, from my limited perspective, as an important feature of the evidence in this case. The pictures that we have seen of this vehicle would seem to suffice. What is important is the laundry list of items that were found in that vehicle . . . ” Tr. at 231. Finally, there 13 was ample evidence that Reynolds was connected to the car and the car was connected to the robbery. Price, the driver of the car, identified Reynolds as a passenger in the car; Reynolds was chased down after jumping out of the car; Reynolds was seen holding a shotgun in the backseat of the car by both Price and Deputy An; items found in the car were linked to the robbery; and Reynolds was identified by the bank employees as the robber who left the bank in the “getaway” car. Although counsel engaged in some speculation, there was nothing to suggest that examination of the car would have revealed any exculpatory evidence. The court also correctly allowed the bank employees to testify, despite the lost recordings of their previous statements. Reynolds had ample opportunity to establish any inconsistencies in testimony that may have been demonstrated by the lost tapes through other evidence. Reynolds cross examined the bank employees and used investigative notes and officer testimony to bring the witnesses’ previous statements before the jury. The jury also heard testimony from the officers about the lost tapes and the jury was instructed about spoliation of evidence. Further, there was no showing of bad faith. Finally, any error was harmless: the jury heard testimony about the lost tapes, the cross examination of the bank employees, the investigative notes, officer testimony, and the jury instruction of spoliation of evidence before finding Reynolds guilty. 14