Opinion ID: 2978325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Rulings

Text: Defendant first challenges the admission of the statements made by the unidentified woman to Officer LaFave. Defendant contends that the statements were improperly admitted, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 802, which provides that hearsay is not admissible except under certain exceptions. “Hearsay” is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); see also United States v. Childs, 539 F.3d 552, 559 (6th Cir. 2008). The district court ruled before trial, in response to Defendant’s motion in limine, that the woman’s statement could be admitted because it was being offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to aid in understanding the officers’ subsequent actions. “In some circumstances, out of court statements offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken have been determined not to be hearsay.” United States v. Gibbs, 506 F.3d 479, 486-87 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1990)). In Gibbs, the agent’s testimony–that he had been told by another that Gibbs “had some long guns, shotguns and/or rifles hidden in his basement bedroom”–was offered “solely as background evidence to show why Gibbs's bedroom was searched. Whether Gibbs had long guns, shotguns, or rifles in his bedroom was not offered for its truth, because the testimony did not bear on Gibbs's alleged possession of the .380 Llama pistol with which he was charged.” Id. at 486-87. Similarly, in this case, LaFave testified that after being flagged down, he immediately broadcast the information the woman reported about Defendant having been seen in a particular car with a particular license plate number and carrying a gun. The statement by the woman was offered not to prove that Defendant was riding in a certain car, or prove that the car bore a certain license number, or that Defendant was, in fact, in possession of a particular firearm. The testimony, rather, was deployed almost No. 08-1349 United States v. Davis Page 7 surgically to establish that LaFave had broadcast exactly the information the woman gave him, and the influence that the police broadcast appeared to have on Defendant’s subsequent actions: Q: Why were you looking for the defendant that day in a light blue or gray small car with that license plate number? A: I had been stopped earlier in the day. Q: Who stopped you earlier in the day? A: A female. Q: A female? Do you know who it was? A: No. Q: All right. And what happened when that woman stopped you that caused you to be looking for the defendant in that vehicle with license plate BEW 7533? A: She told me the subject was in that car with a gun. .... Q: Okay. Now when you received this information, did you report that information over your radio to your dispatch? A: Yes, I did. (J.A. 113-115.) Officer LaFave also testified that the information reported to dispatch included the name of Thomas Davis, a description of the car, the license plate number BEW 7533, and that Davis had been seen with a gun. In addition, Officer LaFave confirmed that the information was broadcast over the police radio, and that “if someone had a police scanner [and was listening], they would have heard that information.” This testimony, read in context, fairly precisely provides an explanation of what Defendant subsequently did and said that afternoon: midway through his ride in and around the neighborhood, Defendant entered and soon emerged from a house saying that “somebody called the boys on us.” A short while later, Defendant announced his plan to exchange the Chevy Cobalt for another. A logical inference is that Defendant had access to a police scanner–perhaps in the house he visited– and came to know that local officers thought he had a gun and were actively searching for him in a particular car. No. 08-1349 United States v. Davis Page 8 The woman’s statement was not offered to prove the truth of its content. It explained (perhaps only incidentally) what the officer did and, more importantly, it established a foundation for the evidence about the visit to the house that would demonstrate Defendant’s actions and culpable state of mind. In short, the jury was properly invited to focus on Defendant’s reaction to the statement, not the “truth” of its substance.3 “The truth of the matter asserted” in the woman’s statement, either as it was reported to LaFave or repeated by him in the broadcast, was of no consequence to the significance of what Defendant apparently thought and how he was seen to react after hearing that the statement had been uttered. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the statement did not constitute hearsay. The record before us does not reveal how (or even whether) the district court cautioned the jury about the limited scope of this testimony as the Government suggested would be necessary,4 but we also have been presented with no contemporaneous objection to the trial testimony–only the pretrial motion in limine that was denied. Nor, we note, is there any argument now offered by Defendant that the court further erred in the manner it handled the evidence once the motion in limine had been overruled. We sustain the ruling admitting this evidence. Defendant next challenges the admission of the contents of the 911 call. The district court held that the 911 call was admissible as both an excited utterance and a present sense impression. A present sense impression is “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). Here, McIntosh testified 3 Admitting into evidence an anonymous citizen’s statement such as this could also help render understandable what might otherwise make no obvious sense to a jury (and which could, without explanation, appear to be some kind of unsavory or illegal targeting of a suspect ). See United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004) (“There are no doubt times when the testimony regarding a tip from an informant is relevant. If a jury would not otherwise understand why an investigation targeted a particular defendant, the testimony could dispel an accusation that the officers were officious intermeddlers staking out Silva for nefarious purposes.”). A statement such as the one given to LaFave can help to explain the common-sense, legitimate reason that an officer, with or without first making a radio report, set out to look for a suspect with a gun in a specific car. 4 In arguing against Defendant’s motion in limine, the Government stated ,“So we would intend to offer it and of course the Court would have to give a cautionary instruction, but it would be offered not for the truth of the matter asserted.” (J.A. 22-23.) No. 08-1349 United States v. Davis Page 9 that she made the 911 call within thirty seconds to a minute after seeing Defendant. This 911 call, made “immediately []after” witnessing the described event, is not distinguishable from one that was contemporaneous with the event itself. It meets the definition of a present sense impression under Rule 803(1).5 See United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that statements made about an event after walking approximately 100 feet or so qualified as a present sense impression under Rule 803(1)). The district court held that the statements made during the 911 call were also admissible as an excited utterance.6 An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). The district court had “some difficulty” fitting the 911 call within the rubric of an excited utterance and we agree that the statement better fits the present sense impression exception. “The excited utterance exception is based on the belief that the statement is reliable because it is made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement. It is unlikely that the statement is contrived or the product of reflection.” Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir. 1983). This circuit has held that there are three elements for establishing admissibility as an excited utterance. “First, there must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement. Second, the statement must be made before there is time to contrive or misrepresent. And, third, the statement must be made while the person is under the stress of the excitement caused by the event.” Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1057. 5 Although McIntosh told the dispatcher it had been five minutes since she saw Defendant, she later testified that this was incorrect and it had only been between thirty seconds and one minute. Under either scenario, within the context of witnessing a known acquaintance with a firearm, the statements were made “sufficiently contemporaneous to satisfy the requirements of Rule 803(1).” Parker, 936 F.2d at 954. 6 Both parties state that the district court allowed the statement as an excited utterance, but the transcript is unclear as to whether the court allowed the statement under both exceptions, or just as a present sense impression. The transcript seems to suggest that the court considered both exceptions, but ruled that the testimony fit under the present sense impression exception rather than the excited utterance exception. Nonetheless, because the parties both assert that the district court found the statements admissible as an excited utterance, we will address this issue as well. No. 08-1349 United States v. Davis Page 10 Here, McIntosh testified that she saw Defendant with a gun and that she was scared because she thought that Defendant had been involved in a murder which had recently occurred. McIntosh walked quickly away because she felt responsible for taking care of the small children in her custody and soon thereafter called 911. Under these circumstances, the 911 call meets the first and third Haggins elements. Seeing a person with a gun who is thought to have been involved in a murder is a startling event sufficient to meet the first Haggins element, particularly when he was seen while McIntosh was accompanying children for whom she felt responsible. She made the statement soon enough after the event to satisfy the third prong of the Haggins test, where she was still under the stress of the event. Under Haggins and its progeny, it does not matter whether the call was made thirty seconds or five minutes after witnessing the event. “[O]ur cases do not demand a precise showing of the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement. The exception may be based solely on ‘[t]estimony that the declarant still appeared nervous or distraught and that there was a reasonable basis for continuing [to be] emotional[ly] upset.’” United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 185 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1058)). There is some question as to whether the 911 call meets the second prong of the Haggins test, that is, whether the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent. Despite the small amount of time between witnessing the event and the 911 call, there were certain acknowledged “exaggerations” in McIntosh’s 911 call. McIntosh told the 911 dispatcher that Defendant had two guns, instead of the one she testified to, and she told the dispatcher it had been five minutes since she saw him, not the mere thirty seconds to one minute she later was to relate under oath. These exaggerations, however, do not preclude the applicability of the excited utterance exception under Haggins’s second prong. As this circuit has previously held, “a statement that satisfies all of the elements of our test for excited utterances meets the threshold for admissibility under Rule 803(2), even though its reliability might be subject to challenge on such grounds as inconsistency with subsequent statements or the speaker’s motive to fabricate.” United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. No. 08-1349 United States v. Davis Page 11 2005). Here, the statement meets the second Haggins prong because McIntosh made the 911 call only moments after witnessing the event. The fact that she later stated she made “exaggerations” goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the 911 call. See id. (“Any challenges to the reliability of these statements would go to their weight rather than their admissibility . . .”). Thus, we conclude that the 911 call was properly admitted as an excited utterance as well as a present sense impression, and we uphold the district court’s ruling.