Opinion ID: 2533377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 8. ICRR presents five issues on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court committed plain error when it decided plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement before determining whether plaintiffs' claims were properly before the court. (2) Whether trial court erred when it decided disputed, material factual issues in granting plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement; (3) Alternatively, whether the trial court's enforcement of the purported settlement agreement was clearly erroneous and constitutes an abuse of discretion; (4) Alternatively, whether ICRR was erroneously denied discovery (a) related to the unreliable B-reads tendered by plaintiffs in support of their claims; and (b) related to the effect of prior occupational releases on plaintiffs' current claims; and (5) In the alternative, whether the settlement agreement was unenforceable under the Mississippi Statute of Frauds
¶ 9. ICRR claims that the trial judge committed plain error when he chose to proceed with the merits of the plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement before addressing its motion to sever and dismiss. We find, however, that the trial judge's reasoning in doing so is sound and hold that his decision was correct. ¶ 10. At the November 6, 2006, hearing, the trial judge stated: [I]t occurs to me that settlements, just like any other contract, if it was entered into it is enforceable. If it wasn't, of course, it's not. And, of course, if there is ... an enforceable settlement, then there is nothing to transfer and sever, you see. So I think the settlement issue has got to be addressed first. In other words, if the settlement was found to be valid, whether the plaintiffs were improperly joined or in the wrong venue in the original action was irrelevant. If a settlement agreement was reached, the plaintiffs relinquished the right to pursue their claims against ICRR for negligent exposure. Whether they were properly joined in the original action does not affect the consideration exchanged in the settlement-agreement meeting. Indeed, a settlement agreement often is reached before any litigation commences. On a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, what may well be viable defenses to a claim are simply not relevant unless they are a part of the settlement agreement. In this case, that judge found that they were not. Thus, we hold that the trial judge was correct and find this issue to be without merit.
¶ 11. A review of this Court's cases reveals that trial judges presented with motions to enforce settlement agreements customarily make findings of fact related to the existence and/or terms of the settlement agreements as necessary to rule on the motions to enforce settlement. Further, this Court has not found such trial-court action to be improper. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. McDaniel, 951 So.2d 523, 525-26 (Miss.2006) (trial judge made findings of fact in deciding plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement agreement); Howard v. TotalFina E & P USA, Inc., 899 So.2d 882, 888-89 (Miss.2005) (trial judge made findings of fact regarding existence of a settlement agreement in denying plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement agreement); Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Abernathy, 913 So.2d 278, 282-85 (Miss.2005) (trial judge made findings of fact in denying defendant landowners' motion to enforce settlement agreement); WRH Props., Inc. v. Estate of Johnson, 759 So.2d 394, 395 (Miss.2000) (trial judge made findings of fact regarding existence of a settlement agreement in granting defendant's motion to enforce settlement agreement). ¶ 12. In this case, the trial judge made informed findings of fact and law. The trial judge reviewed all of the parties' pleadings, considered all of the other affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs' attorney, Peirce, and ICRR's attorney, Peters, describing their understanding of the settlement negotiations, and conducted two quite lengthy hearings on the disputed issues of fact. Moreover, multiple attorneys representing ICRR appeared before the trial judge and had ample opportunity to present evidence and argument. ¶ 13. ICRR never asked the trial judge to hold a hearing in addition to the two that were held. In fact, at the second hearing, the trial judge even invited the parties to request an additional hearing if they deemed it necessary, but ICRR evidently chose not to request one at that time. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the trial judge prevented ICRR from acquiring additional evidence regarding what Peirce and Peters had agreed to at the Pittsburgh meeting by, for example, deposing Peirce or calling witnesses at either hearing. ¶ 14. In addition, this Court previously has held that unless substantial rights are affected, issues not presented to the trial judge are procedurally barred from being raised for the first time on appeal. Dora v. State, 986 So.2d 917, 925 (Miss.2008). In this case, the record reveals that ICRR never raised the issue of the need for an evidentiary hearing either in addition to or in lieu of the hearings which were held. We conclude that it was proper for the trial judge to make findings of fact in ruling on plaintiffs' motion to enforce settle agreement.
¶ 15. It is well-settled that this Court will not disturb the findings of the chancellor unless it is shown the chancellor was clearly erroneous and the chancellor abused his discretion. Also a circuit judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to ... factual findings as is a chancellor. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. McDaniel, 951 So.2d 523, 526 (Miss.2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In determining whether a trial judge abused his discretion, the reviewing court must have a `definite and firm conviction' that the court below committed a clear error of judgment and the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. Howard v. TotalFina E & P USA, Inc., 899 So.2d 882, 888 (Miss.2005) (quoting Caracci v. Int'l Paper Co., 699 So.2d 546, 556 (Miss.1997)). ¶ 16. A settlement agreement is a contract. McManus v. Howard, 569 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Miss.1990). This Court previously has stated that a meeting of the minds must exist between the parties in order to have a settlement. Thomas v. Bailey, 375 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Miss.1979). Further, in order for a settlement agreement to be enforced, the party claiming the benefit of enforcement must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a meeting of the minds. Hastings v. Guillot, 825 So.2d 20, 23 (Miss.2002). ¶ 17. As noted above, the trial court has thoroughly considered the arguments and evidence that each party presented in support of their conflicting accounts of what Peirce and Peters agreed to at the Pittsburgh meeting. This evidence included the fact that ICRR already had paid approximately 180 of the approximately 216 plaintiffs, and many of the plaintiffs who already had been paid had signed prior releases (when they had settled claims for other occupational injuries). Furthermore, the approximately thirty-six remaining, unpaid plaintiffs had provided the same documentation to ICRR as those plaintiffs who had been paid. Thus, it was not clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to find that Peirce and Peters did have a meeting of the minds regarding settlement of the claims of all plaintiffs, including those who had signed prior releases.