Opinion ID: 2634701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Larson's Free Exercise and Rehabilitation Claims in S-10327

Text: Defendants Cooper and Armstrong discuss two possible standards for analyzing Larson's federal free exercise claim. We need not decide which is the correct standard because Spring Creek's visitation rules satisfy either standard. [4]
The United States Supreme Court held in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith that a neutral, generally applicable law or regulation does not offend the free exercise clause even if the law has an incidentali.e., unintendedeffect on religious practice. [5] As defendants contend, Spring Creek's visitation rules are unquestionably constitutional under this standard: they do not discriminate against religion on their face. They apply to all prisoners, and Larson has not claimed that the rules are aimed at a particular religion. [6]
The superior court held that Spring Creek's visitation rules limiting physical contact do not violate the federal free exercise clause because, following the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley , it reasoned that the rules were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. [7] In Turner the Supreme Court reasoned that this deferential standard was required to prevent courts from becoming unduly involved in the intractable problems of prison administration. [8] The Court listed four factors that are relevant to determining whether a regulation is reasonable. [9] We hold that Spring Creek's visitation rules satisfy each factor. The first factor requires a `valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. [10] Prison security is a compelling governmental interest, [11] and limitations on contact visits are rationally related to this interest. [12] Superintendent Armstrong stated in his affidavit that the types of contact Larson seeks are specifically prohibited, because they facilitate the smuggling of contraband. Larson does not contest this assertion, and we have been given no basis for second-guessing the judgment of prison administrators on this score. [13] Larson asserts that correctional officers are primarily responsible for introducing contraband into Spring Creek and correctional facilities generally. But this proposition, if true, is beside the point. Larson does not argue that contact visits do not also create a significant risk of contraband smuggling. Furthermore, Larson does not directly counter the defendants' argument that the types of contact Larson desires would exacerbate this problem. Thus, any dispute about whether correctional officers are responsible for more smuggling than visitors is not material to the issues properly before us. The second Turner factor requires courts to examine whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates. [14] Larson argues that Spring Creek's contact limitations leave him no alternative means of practicing Physical Religious Worship with his wife. But the alternative means factor merely requires that adherents not be deprived of all forms of religious exercise, not that they remain free to engage in the prohibited activity. [15] In this case, the contact limitations do not otherwise prevent Larson from fully practicing his religious beliefs. The third Turner factor requires courts to consider the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally. [16] Cooper and Armstrong provide evidence of several likely impacts, principally increased security risks from expanded contact visits and the commensurate burden on prison resources created by the need to mitigate those risks through increased searches, monitoring, or both. Larson claims that his requested religious visits would not pose additional security risks and would not require additional security measures, but these arguments fail to create genuine issues of material fact for several reasons. We note preliminarily that Larson did not offer any admissible evidence regarding his religious practices to counter the affidavits Cooper and Armstrong offered in support of their motion for summary judgment. Rather, his opposition to their motion and affidavits relied exclusively on his own unsworn contentions. Ordinarily this would be cause for affirmance, because non-movants may not rely upon assertions of fact in unverified pleadings and memoranda to oppose a motion for summary judgment. [17] But we have held that the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less stringent standards than those of lawyers, and have held that pro se litigants should be informed of the need to submit affidavits or other evidence to preclude summary judgment. [18] The superior court's ruling did not rely on Larson's failure to produce admissible evidence, and instead appeared to treat Larson's pleadings as counter-affidavits. We will do the same in this appeal. Larson asserts that his wife would voluntarily submit to a strip-search before visiting him, that he is always strip-searched following contact visits, and that he could be placed in a dry cell to further ensure that he had not received contraband. But the governing regulations and constitutional law do not permit strip-searches of visitors unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the visitor possesses contraband. [19] Larson emphasizes that his wife would voluntarily submit to such searches. Larson cannot waive his wife's Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches. But even if she unconditionally agreed to submit to pre-visit strip-searches, we are not convinced that her submission would require prison officials to grant Larson's request for extended contact visitation privileges. Suspicionless searches of visitors and prisoners [20] would impose additional burdens on prison staff. Superintendent Armstrong's affidavit established that the prison staff is already short-handed. Intrusive searches are normally not cross-gender, and searches of female visitors would be disruptive, considering that only twelve of the 127 correctional officers are female. Likewise, using a dry cell to prevent the introduction of ingested contraband is even more resource-intensive, because the inmate must be placed under observation in the designated cell until the inmate excretes any ingested contraband. Finally, the impacts resulting from Larson's own visitation requests cannot be considered in isolation. Based on the statements in Superintendent Armstrong's affidavit, we assume that a significant number of other Spring Creek prisoners would ask for similar privileges. [21] Accordingly, the superior court did not err in analyzing the third factor when it held that the impact of allowing for an exception is unduly burdensome to the prison. The final Turner factor requires courts to consider whether there are any ready alternatives to the policy in dispute. [22] The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that [t]his is not a `least restrictive alternative' test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint. [23] The Court further suggested that only those alternatives that would accommodate the prisoner's rights at  de minimis cost to valid penological interests could be considered relevant to a court's inquiry into whether a regulation is reasonable. [24] Larson's proposed alternative of intensified searches imposes more than de minimis costs. The only other alternative that might accommodate Larson's claim would be increased monitoring, which is also a resource-intensive undertaking. Either way, Spring Creek would have to invest more resources in security or simply accept the risk of increased contraband smuggling that Larson's claimed exemption would entail. There is no obvious, easy alternative to Spring Creek's visitation rules. [25]
The superior court held that Spring Creek's visitation rules do not violate the Alaska Constitution's free exercise clause. [26] Frank v. State established a two-part test governing claims brought under this clause challenging facially neutral laws. [27] Under the first part of the test, the challenger must satisfy three requirements: a religion is involved, the conduct in question is religiously based, and the claimant is sincere in his or her religious belief. [28] Under the second part of the test, courts must consider whether the conduct poses some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order, [29] or whether there are competing governmental interests that are `of the highest order and ... (are) not otherwise served.' [30] The superior court assumed that Larson satisfied the first part of the test, and Cooper and Armstrong do not ask us to re-visit this assumption. The superior court addressed the second part of the Frank test by holding that Spring Creek's visitation rules were narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in secure prisons free from contraband. The court further held that granting Larson's religious exemption by adopting the alternative security measures he proposed would be unduly burdensome.
Before they discuss Larson's claims under the free exercise clause of the Alaska Constitution, Cooper and Armstrong address at length the standard governing such claims. They ultimately ask us to adopt a compelling interest/narrow tailoring standard most commonly found in First Amendment jurisprudence governing time, place, and manner restrictions and commercial speech restrictions, rather than the compelling interest/least restrictive means standard applied in federal free exercise cases predating Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith . [31] Defendants argue that we have never clearly articulated the second part of the standard we adopted in Frank. Frank made it clear that only compelling state interests could justify burdens on the exercise of religion. [32] Frank and our subsequent Alaska free exercise cases have not explained exactly what degree of fit is required between the interest and the means used to achieve it to satisfy the second part of the Frank analysis. Nonetheless, this case does not require the elaboration defendants seek. Frank explained that the appropriate question, after a court determines that the claimed exemption implicates a compelling government interest, is whether that interest, or any other, will suffer if an exemption is granted to accommodate the religious practice in issue. [33] This test adequately addresses the closeness of the fit between the state's interest and the means used to achieve it. If an exemption would not harm the government's interest, the means chosen to achieve the interest were probably neither narrowly tailored nor least restrictive. For purposes of this case, Frank and its Alaska progeny adequately state the dispositive standard. Moreover, it is not obvious why Frank's analysis must coincide with either of the two formulations discussed in the defendants' brief. The concepts of narrow tailoring and least restrictive means no longer apply to prisoners' federal constitutional claims or federal free exercise claims generally. [34] We therefore see no reason to determine which of these formulations best characterizes the Frank test in the context of prisoner free exercise claims brought under Alaska's free exercise clause. Finally, in the context of prisoner free exercise claims we think it appropriate to temper our application of the Frank test in recognition of the Supreme Court's observation that [r]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking, [35] and its statement that `prison administrators ..., and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.' [36] This statement indicates that the federal courts apply a highly deferential standard in reviewing the decisions of prison administrators. Larson's case does not require us to consider whether Alaska courts should apply an equally deferential standard. Rather, we simply acknowledge, as we did in Mathis v. Sauser , that [s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict-scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. [37]
The defendants' appellate brief does not directly discuss how the second part of the Frank test applies here. [38] But their analysis of the third and fourth Turner factors impact of accommodation and availability of ready alternativesconvincingly addresses the values that underlie the second part of the Frank test. Superintendent Armstrong's affidavit provides evidence that the contact visitation accommodations Larson seeks (and that other prisoners would also then predictably claim) would require significant resource outlays to mitigate against the resulting increased risk of contraband smuggling. These outlays would result from increased searches, monitoring, or both. [39] Armstrong's affidavit states that budgetary constraints would prevent Spring Creek from implementing the security measures Larson proposes without jeopardizing other areas of Spring Creek. Larson's claim that an accommodation would be virtually without cost does not create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment for the defendants. [40] The record in this case establishes beyond dispute that Larson's recommendation that he and his wife be strip-searched, or that he be placed in a dry cell in connection with each religious visit, would be resource-intensive; the cost would be multiplied by the accommodations needed to satisfy other prisoners who would inevitably claim similar privileges. [41] Likewise, we are unpersuaded by Larson's claim that, because the religious visits would take place in a room currently designated for attorney-client visits, increased monitoring would not be necessary. Larson asserts that the room has large one-way observation mirrors that permit officers in or around the shift supervisor's office across the hallway to monitor visits while going about their other tasks; no additional prison resources would have to be dedicated to the monitoring effort. As a matter of law, this proposed accommodation raises no genuine factual dispute. Monitoring contact visits is an important security function that cannot be informally satisfied by random observations by officers who happen to be going past the observation mirrors. [42] Spring Creek placed additional limits on contact visits in 1999, but did not prohibit them entirely. The defendants argue that the new rules are a proportionate response to the risks posed by contact visits: the new rules limit the opportunities to smuggle contraband while affording some opportunity to engage in the natural desire to be physically affectionate with friends and loved ones. Courts are generally ill-positioned to second-guess prison administrators' judgment that hand-holding between visitors and maximum security prisoners would jeopardize the state's compelling interest in security. In any event, we conclude that Larson has not demonstrated that any genuine, material factual disputes precluded summary judgment for defendants on Larson's state free exercise claim.
Larson argues that his right to rehabilitation, guaranteed by article 1, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution, includes the right to religious visits described above, because such visits promote rehabilitation as nothing else can. Cooper and Armstrong argue that this cannot be correct because nothing in the text of article 1, section 12 or the constitutional convention minutes supports a right to have the extended contact visitation Larson seeks. [43] We recognized in Brandon v. State, Department of Corrections that visitation privileges are a component of the constitutional right to rehabilitation guaranteed by article 1, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution. [44] But we have been referred to nothing in article 1, section 12 or the constitutional minutes that implies any intention to constitutionalize extended contact visits for maximum security prisoners or to preclude prisons from putting reasonable limits on contact visitation of maximum security prisoners. Some physical contact may well promote rehabilitation, but that would not alone justify a conclusion in this case that Larson had an unqualified constitutional right to extended contact visitation with his wife. The security risks posed by contact visits and the high costs of mitigating such risks convince us that the degree of contact permitted between visitors and maximum security prisoners lies within the sound discretion of prison administrators.
Larson also contends on appeal that he has a constitutionally protected religious right to conjugal visits with his wife. But in the superior court he expressly stated that he was not making that contention. He therefore waived any claim that he has a constitutional right to conjugal visits. He cannot make such a claim for the first time in this appeal. [45]