Opinion ID: 778658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to suppress the fruits of consent searches

Text: 40 In reviewing the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings, including its credibility choices, for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 13 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court, here the government. 14 41 A search conducted pursuant to consent is excepted from the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. 15 In order to satisfy the consent exception, the government must establish that consent to search was freely and voluntarily given and that the individual who gave consent had authority to do so and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was voluntary and effective. 16 Additionally, the government has the burden of proving that the search was conducted within the scope of the consent received. 17 42 Consent need not be given by the defendant himself. In the context of searches, it is well established that the police may conduct a warrantless search of an area without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment if a third party with common control over the area consents to the search. 18 43 The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from a totality of the circumstances, and we review the district court's finding of voluntariness for clear error. 19 `Where the judge bases a finding of consent on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong since the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.' 20 This court considers six factors in evaluating the voluntariness of consent to search, all of which are relevant, but no one of which is dispositive or controlling. 21 The consent, however, may not be given simply in acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. 22
44 Pineda argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of his house and the outbuildings behind his house on November 23, 1997, based on the allegedly invalid consent obtained from Pineda's wife. 45 Pineda first contends that his wife's consent was involuntarily given. The district court, after hearing conflicting testimony at a suppression hearing, found that: Pineda's wife was not placed under arrest prior to, or coerced into, signing the form; an INS agent explained the form to Pineda's wife in Spanish and advised her of her rights to refuse consent and to require a search warrant; Pineda's wife was not threatened or promised anything and did not appear to be distraught; Pineda's wife cooperated in the search and pointed out heroin in a closet; based on the court's observations at the hearing, she was intelligent enough to know what was being asked of her; and she was aware that incriminating evidence was at the house because she pointed heroin out herself. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and giving due deference to the credibility determinations of the district court, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its findings and that, under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in concluding that Pineda's wife's consent was voluntarily given. 46 Pineda also argues that the government failed to prove that his wife had authority to give consent to search the house and the outbuildings. He argues that the record does not support the government's reliance on her joint access or control over the residence and outbuildings or that the officers reasonably believed that she was authorized to consent. The district court found that Pineda's wife has authority to consent to the search of the house and outbuildings, because she lived there with her husband and mutually used the property and had joint access to and control over it. Based upon our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous and that, at the very least, the circumstances surrounding Pineda's wife's giving consent to search are such that reasonable officers could have believed that she was authorized to consent to a search of her marital residence. 23 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Pineda's motion to suppress.
47 Jose Meza argues that the district court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence taken from Alfonzo Meza's house — the blue house — in a search on May 14, 1997. We note that Alfonzo Meza filed the motion to suppress the fruits of this search, not Jose Meza. On appeal, the issue of the district court's alleged error in denying the motion to suppress the drugs, guns, and other evidence recovered from the house is specifically raised only by Jose Meza. Jose Meza's argument on appeal may be adopted by Alfonzo Meza through Rule 28(i), because the facts are not specific to Jose Meza vis-à-vis Alfonzo Meza and because Alfonzo clearly has standing to challenge the search of his residence. We conclude, in any event, that neither defendant is entitled to relief on this point of error. 48 To begin with, contrary to Jose Meza's contention, the police did not require probable cause or a warrant to ask Alfonzo Meza whether any weapons were located in the house, where there is no indication that asking him this question amounted to a Fourth Amendment seizure. 24 Nor was probable cause required once the officers obtained Alfonzo Meza's consent to seize the gun he identified as being in his bedroom on a shelf. 25 49 Jose Meza argues that Alfonzo Meza's consent to a search for the gun he identified was not given freely and voluntary. In support of this claim, Jose Meza notes that: seven police officers were present, constituting a show of force and grounds for assuming that the search was inevitable; the police officer asked Alfonzo about weapons only after the officers serving the arrest warrant for Jose Meza searched the house and did not find Jose; Alfonzo was never read a Miranda warning before being asked about weapons; Alfonzo was never advised that he had the right to refuse consent to search for the gun; and there is no evidence that ownership of the gun in his house was illegal. 50 We note first that many of these observations cut in favor of a finding of voluntariness. For example, that Alfonzo was not in custody and that the police were not required to read him a Miranda warning. 26 Moreover, while knowledge that incriminating evidence would be found does not necessarily weigh against a finding of voluntary consent, 27 the absence of an obvious crime in the ownership of a gun certainly does not render consent involuntary. Further, we have held consent to be voluntary even in the face of greater shows of force than the presence here of seven officers, some in uniform and none with weapons drawn or displaying force beyond their presence in numbers. 28 Furthermore, [w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor in determining voluntariness, the failure to advise an individual of the right to withhold consent is not determinative in and of itself. 29 51 We also note that, after hearing testimony at the suppression hearing, the district court found that Alfonzo Meza voluntarily gave oral consent to search the house for the gun. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and crediting the district court's credibility determinations, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Alfonzo Meza's consent to search for the gun in his room was voluntarily given. 52 However, having obtained this consent to search and having proceeded to the room where Alfonzo indicated the gun was located on a shelf, an officer accompanying the officer who was given consent to search for the gun moved a cooler over to the shelf to allow the shorter, searching officer to reach the gun. Jose Meza argues that, in so doing, the police exceeded the scope of the consent to search and violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that this violation tainted the subsequent consent Alfonzo gave to search the entire house. 30 We disagree. The uncontroverted evidence shows that the cooler was moved only in order to effectuate the search for the gun, for which consent was voluntarily given. As such, the officers did not exceed the scope of the consent, 31 and, as the district court found, the heroin found under the cooler was in plain view. 32 53 We further conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, the subsequent consent to search was voluntarily given. The district court, after hearing testimony at the suppression hearing, found that: Alfonzo Meza gave written consent to further search the residence; the consent form informed Alfonzo of his right to refuse consent; Alfonzo was cooperative and was not in custody at the time; there were no coercive police procedures used; and Alfonzo was free to leave and did so. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and giving due deference to the district court's credibility determinations, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its findings and that the district court correctly concluded that Alfonzo Meza's consent was voluntarily given. We hold that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the fruits of the search of Alfonzo Meza's residence. 54