Opinion ID: 2508525
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Statements Regarding the Bible and Philosophical Writings

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to the Bible and religion in order to persuade the jury to sentence defendant to death. In particular, defendant points to the following, delivered somewhere in the middle of the prosecutor's argument: Something I want to touch on. And I want to tell you this is not an aggravating factor. I only bring up the subject in the event any of you have any reservations about it, then hopefully I can ... help with that. That's the subject of religion. This is not aggravating at all. People from time to time have a problem because they say, `Gee, in the Bible it says Thou shall not kill, and Vengeance is mine sayeth the Lord. I will repay.' That's found in Romans. But in the very next passage ..., it goes on and calls for capital punishment and says, `[t]he ruler bears not the sword in vain for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.' He's talking about the ruler, the government, whatever. Now, the Judeo-Christian ethic comes from the Old Testament  I believe the first five books  called the Torah in the Jewish religion. And there are two very important concepts that are found there. And that's, one, capital punishment for murder is necessary in order to preserve the sanctity of human life, and, two, only the severest penalty of death can underscore the severity of taking life. The really interesting passage is in Exodus, chapter 21, verses 12 to 14: `Whoever strikes another man and kills him shall be put to death. But if he did not act with intent but they met by act of God, the slayer may flee to a place which I will appoint for you.' Kind of like life without possibility of parole, haven, sanctuary. `But if a man has the presumption to kill another by treachery, you shall take him even from my altar to be put to death.' There is no sanctuary for the intentional killer, according to the Bible. Now, I'll leave it at that. That was just in the event any of you have any reservations about religion in this case. We recently considered a very similar prosecutorial argument in People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1208-1209, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262. We held this line of argument to be improper ( id. at p. 1209, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262), but nonetheless upheld the defendant's death sentence for several reasons. First, we noted that the defendant had forfeited the issue by failing to object at trial. ( Ibid. ) Second, we held that such forfeiture did not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, reaffirming that `the choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.' ( Id. at p. 1210, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) Third, we held the prosecutor's misconduct to be nonprejudicial. After reviewing our case law on this issue, we stated: Biblical references that rival in length those in the present case were found harmless in People v. Wash [ (1993) ] 6 Cal.4th 215, 261, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107, because after making the biblical references, `the prosecutor embarked upon a lengthy and detailed argument devoted exclusively to the evidence in aggravation.... He did not return to the subject of God or religion, but instead urged a sentence of death based upon defendant's moral culpability for the crimes in light of the statutory factors. Thus, we do not believe the objectionable remarks could reasonably have diminished the jury's sense of responsibility, or displaced the court's instructions. [Citation.] There is no possibility that the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict had the misconduct not occurred. [Citation.]' [¶] The same is true in the present case. The prosecutor's biblical references during his penalty phase argument were improper but harmless. ( People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1211, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) The same can be said in the present case. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecution's biblical argument, and we cannot say from an examination of the appellate record that the lack of objection constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, the biblical argument quoted above was only a small part of a prosecutorial argument that primarily focused on explaining to the jury why it should conclude that the statutory aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. We therefore conclude that the misconduct was not prejudicial. [11] Defendant also claims prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor's quotation of Lord Denning, [12] which he identified to the jury as a judge in the old Court of Appeal in England. That quotation, as stated by the prosecutor, was as follows: Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrongdoing. In order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else.... The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment because the wrongdoer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not. There was no misconduct. The prosecutor in this case merely asked the jury to make the individualized determination that this defendant deserved death for these crimes because they were particularly outrageous, regardless of whether or not his execution would deter other crimes. There was no likelihood the argument would have obscured the jury's proper understanding of its role at the penalty phase.