Opinion ID: 1908442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of the $14,000 check

Text: Defendant's check for $14,000, which he claimed was half payment on the Pittsburgh cars, was excluded by the Court after a lengthy colloquy dealing with the fact that half payment, technically, would be $13,750, rather than $14,000. Obviously dissatisfied with defendant's explanation of the $250 discrepancy (My answer is that it is much easier for me to write checks without odd numbers), the Court rested its exclusion of the check on the best evidence rule: THE COURT: Your [defendant's] exception is noted. We have to go by the best evidence rule. We can't take secondary evidence. The witness has testified that he owned some cars in Pittsburgh. COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: And he has enumerated them. COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Now, if he doesn't have any more evidence than a check, which he isn't quite sure about, I can't let it in, because there must be better evidence. Without reaching the wholly distinct question of whether or not the check demonstrated satisfaction of defendant's obligation on the Pittsburgh cars, we find that the instrument itself should have been admitted, and that its exclusion by the Court was error. We are aware that the presiding Justice is vested with broad discretion in the disposition of evidentiary matters: . . . the admissibility into evidence of an object or article which testimony tends to make relevant as an evidentiary exhibit in the nature of `demonstrative' or `real' evidence, lies, essentially, in the discretion of the presiding Justice. (Citations and footnotes omitted). While such discretion should generally be exercised liberally to admit relevant `demonstrative' or `real' evidence which tends to have probative value, in accordance with the general basic principle favoring the admissibility of evidence of probative force, there remains a large discretion invested in the presiding Justice to evaluate whether the probative benefits of allowing an object or article into evidence as an exhibit are fundamentally minimal or trivial or, even if substantial, are nevertheless overridden by other extraneous non-probative factors. Cope v. Sevigny, Note 6 supra, 289 A.2d at 689. The discretion is not limitless, however, and we find that it was abused here, where the evidence excluded bore a sufficient relationship to the fact to be proven to distinguish its probative benefits from those which are minimal or trivial. Nor are there other extraneous non-probative factors upon which the presiding Justice could have justifiably determined to exclude the check. As we have already noted, the presiding Justice's primary concern seemed to focus upon the requirements of the best evidence rule. The best evidence rule goes only to the competency of evidence, and not to its relevancy, materiality, or weight, Stevens v. Minneapolis Fire Dept. Relief Association, 219 Minn. 276, 17 N.W.2d 642 (1945); Buffalo Insurance Co. v. United Parking Stations, Inc., 277 Minn. 134, 152 N.W.2d 81 (1967), and requires only that evidence be excluded which, considering its own character and the nature of the transaction, raises an inference that there is obtainable other evidence more nearly original in its source. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 778, and appropriate cases cited in n. 41. It is a logical corollary to this aspect of the best evidence rule that primary or original evidence shall not be excluded merely because there might have been introduced other primary or original evidence which is more conclusive or corroborative of the fact which the evidence is intended to support. Masse v. Quartucci, 170 Pa.Super. 234, 85 A.2d 690 (1952). There could have been no better evidence that a check was given (for whatever purpose) than the check itself. What the check represented, or proved, if anything, should properly have been left to the jury, since the apparent defect in the check's probative value, viz., the $250 difference between the check's face amount and the debt it allegedly paid, went to the weight, rather than the admissibility of the evidence. Since the weight to be given the proffered evidence was for the jury, its exclusion constituted error. The entry must be, Appeal sustained. Case remanded for new trial. WEBBER, J., sat at argument but retired before this opinion was adopted.