Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Assault and Trespass as Lesser Included Offenses of the Charged Robbery and Burglary

Text: Defendant contends the trial court was obliged, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on assault as a lesser offense included in the charge of robbery and on trespass as a lesser offense included in the charge of burglary. [4] The jury, he argues, could reasonably have found he lacked the intent to steal necessary for robbery and (as charged here) burglary, in that he and Waidla intended only to take property, the Triumph Spitfire sports car, to which Waidla had a good faith claim of right. (See People v. Butler (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 571-573, 55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703.) We recently overruled People v. Butler to the extent it allowed a claim-of-right defense to robbery where the alleged robber's intent was to collect a claimed debt, rather than to recover specific property taken from him. ( People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 956, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168.) Application of that holding to conduct preceding Tufunga's finality, however, would constitute an unforeseeable retroactive expansion of criminal liability, in violation of due process. ( Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894.) We conclude, nonetheless, that the claim-of-right defense was unavailable on these facts. The record discloses no substantial evidence that defendant's intent, on entering the house or attacking the victim, was limited to taking the sports car, its title slip, or even property of equivalent value. Although defendant told police he and Waidla, while at Crestline, discussed scaring Viivi into giving them the car, on the way to the North Hollywood house, he said, they were planning simply to get some money for food. When they got to the house, rather than carry out any plan of confronting her and obtaining the car, they waited until she left before breaking in. Defendant said their intent on entering was to take something from the house and get away, though later they decided to wait for Viivi to return. When she did return, they made no effort to force her into giving them the car or title slip, instead attacking her as soon as she came in, with overwhelming deadly force. The items they took, Viivi's jewelry and the credit and telephone cards, bore no particular relationship in nature or value to the car to which they believed Waidla was entitled. The evidence shows only a generalized intent to steal from the Piirisilds, a felonious intent that is not negated by even a good faith belief Waidla was owed a particular automobile. (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384 [claim-of-right defense not available where defendant simply seized whatever items of value he could get from robbery victims]; People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1022, 184 Cal. Rptr. 483 [no instruction on defense required where defendants conducted a general ransacking of the bedroom indiscriminately taking items of value never specifically related to any claim of right].) The trial court did not err in failing to give instructions on trespass and assault, even if those offenses were included within the charges of burglary and robbery.