Opinion ID: 1356075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Circuit Court's Jury Instruction Regarding The Offense Of Prohibited Possession Of A Firearm Was Erroneous.

Text: Valentine contends that the jury instruction regarding the charged offense of prohibited possession of a firearm was erroneous because it permitted conviction upon a finding that Valentine recklessly possessed the firearm. Valentine's argument is foreclosed by Pinero I, supra; see also Jenkins, at 109-112, 997 P.2d at 35-38. In Pinero I, we held that the requisite state of mind of the crime defined by HRS § 134-7(b) is established when a previously convicted felon possesses or controls a firearm `intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. ' 70 Haw. at 526, 778 P.2d at 715 (quoting HRS § 702-204) (emphasis added). Therefore, it is not erroneous, as a general matter, to instruct a jury, as the circuit court did in the present matter, that [a] person commits the offense of Prohibited Possession of a Firearm if having been previously convicted of committing a felony he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly owns, possesses[,] or controls any firearm. However, the circuit court's jury instruction was incomplete in the present matter by virtue of its failure to explicate the interplay between a reckless state of mind and possession of a firearm. In relevant part, the circuit court instructed that the elements of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm were: . . . one, that prior to March 22, 1997, . . . Valentine[] was convicted of committing a felony, and two, that on or about March 22, 1997, [he] owned, possessed or controlled a firearm, and three, that [he] did so intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. In addition, the circuit court's jury instruction regarding possession was silent as to the manner in which possession may be reckless. See supra section I.B.2. We have recently held that: for the purposes of HRS § 134-7(b), possession must be analyzed employing a two-pronged analysis: (1) the voluntary act of possession of an object itself is, by way of HRS § 702-202, [4] satisfied where an individual acts knowingly with respect to his or her conduct; and (2) the requisite state of mind with respect to the attendant circumstances  i.e., the particular qualities of the object that make it illegal to possess it  is, by way of HRS § 702-204, satisfied by a reckless state of mind. Thus, as applied, to prove the voluntary act of possession, the prosecution must first adduce evidence that the defendant knowingly procured or received an object, or was aware of his or her control of that object for a sufficient period to have terminated possession. See HRS § 702-202. Second, to prove the requisite state of mind regarding the particular qualities of the object, the prosecution must, at the very least, adduce evidence that the defendant possessed the object in reckless disregard of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that it was a firearm. See HRS § 702-204. Jenkins, at 111, 997 P.2d at 37. (emphasis in original). To provide guidance on remand, inasmuch as the jury may need to be instructed regarding the offense Valentine allegedly attempted to commit, the jury[, on remand,] . . . should [be] instructed in accordance with this analysis. Jenkins, at 111, 997 P.2d at 37.