Opinion ID: 1926229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fair and just prong

Text: Where a defendant moves to withdraw a plea under the second prong of the Pierce test prior to sentencing, withdrawal may be permitted if, for any reason, the granting of the motion seems fair and just. Pierce, 705 A.2d at 1092. Three factors are particularly relevant in considering a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea: (1) whether the defendant has asserted his legal innocence; (2) the length of delay between the entry of the plea and the motion to withdraw it; and (3) whether the defendant had the full benefit of competent counsel at all times. See id. An assertion of legal innocence is a necessary prerequisite, but is not sufficient alone to require a plea withdrawal. See id. at 1092-93. In considering the length of the delay, the court should consider whether the government would have been prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea at the time of the motion to withdraw. See id. at 1093. We have already noted that appellant does not assert his legal innocence. He also does not assert his factual innocence. At best appellant's argument seems to be that because of his intoxicated state, he has no independent recollection whether he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty. As discussed earlier, however, the record indicates that, at the time he entered his plea, appellant agreed with the complaining witness' version of events. See supra note 10. We must also consider whether the government would have been prejudiced by withdrawal of the plea at the time the motion was made. The length of delay between the entry of the plea and the motion to withdraw is not disputedthere were five days between those events. Even though appellant did not delay in moving to withdraw his plea, it was the timing of the plea that prejudiced the government. In this case, the plea came in the middle of trial, after the complaining witness had testified in what was acknowledged by appellant to be a traumatic experience for her. Withdrawal of the plea would imply a new trial, requiring the complaining witness to testify a second time. [11] The remaining factor we usually consider is appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which we have already rejected. [12] Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that justice does not demand that appellant be permitted to withdraw his plea in this case. [13]