Opinion ID: 1509822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prior Civil Protection Order

Text: At the government's request, the trial court took judicial notice that a civil protection order had been entered by another judge of the Superior Court in November 1994. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the order had been issued by consent of the parties. After some discussion about the manner in which such orders could be proven, the court said, I am going to tell the jury that on November 8, 1994, a civil protection order was obtained. . . . It was agreed to by both parties. Later, in its final instructions, the court told the jury: In this case I took judicial notice of the existence of an Intra-Family proceeding filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court ... involving Michelle Hall as the petitioner and David Washington as the respondent. In that case the parties agreed and consented to entry of a civil protection order which was dated November 8, 1994, and remained in effect for twelve months thereafter. You may, if you choose to do so, regard the fact that this order was in effect during this time period as proven evidence, but you are not required to do so because you are the sole judges of the facts. Appellant contends that the court erred in taking judicial notice of the order. In the trial court, appellant argued that the civil protection order was inadmissible because it had been obtained by consent. On appeal, however, he appears to have abandoned that argument, for he now contends only that the order was erroneously brought to the jury's knowledge as an admission of a party opponent. This is not supported by the record; there is no reference in the trial transcript to the order as an admission of any kind. In any event, it has long been settled that a court may take judicial notice of its own records, which is precisely what the trial court did here. See, e.g., Smith v. Public Defender Service, 686 A.2d 210, 212 (D.C.1996); S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 880-881 (D.C.1991); Coleman v. Burnett, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 302, 313, 477 F.2d 1187, 1198 (1973); Fletcher v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 77 U.S.App.D.C. 99, 133 F.2d 395 (1942); cert. denied, 319 U.S. 755, 63 S.Ct. 1163, 87 L.Ed. 1708 (1943). There can be no serious doubt that the order was relevant to the stalking charge, since it was entered during the period encompassed within the charge and was based on some of the same facts about which Ms. Hall had testified. Under Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-370, 384 F.2d 319, 321-322 (1967), we have ample reason to reject appellant's present argument because it was not raised in the trial court. But even assuming that the issue was properly preserved for appellate review, it is entirely without merit.