Opinion ID: 3013872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Here, however, the usual concerns

Text: about judging an officer’s use of force This case illustrates all too clearly from the perspective of hindsight are not the daily reality in which police officers present because our analysis has the often have to make split-second, life-and- benefit of Officer Snyder’s candid death, decisions. The doctrine of qualified testimony. He testified that he saw immunity recognizes that reality and nothing in Carswell’s hands as Carswell protects police from liability that might ran toward him. App. at 1061a.6 He was otherwise arise from the “sometimes hazy then asked, “Had you had non-lethal border between excessive and acceptable weapons, you would not have pulled your force[.]” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, gun [as Carswell ran towards you], am I 206 (2001) (internal quotation marks and correct?” He responded, “Yes.” Id. at 1064a. That testimony would allow a jury denied sub nomine Borough of Roselle v. to conclude that Officer Snyder used Brown, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991) (finding it excessive force in fatally shooting “illogical and contrary to the interests of Carswell and that he did so knowingly. judicial economy” that this court could not directly hold that “a constitutional right As the majority ably discusses, the allegedly violated could not have been fact that a jury could conclude that Snyder clearly established because it has not been used excessive force to subdue Carswell recognized”). Further, I share the majority’s and thus violated Carswell’s Fourth skepticism regarding the admissibility of Dr. Amendment rights is not enough, standing McCauley’s expert testimony. See Maj. Op. alone, to deprive him of qualified at 15-16; see also Peterson v. City of immunity. It is, however, enough to Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1995). support a finding that the use of excessive 5 force resulted from the Borough’s policy Because the claim against Zuger in his official capacity is tantamount to a claim against the 6 The officer was asked, Borough because it employs him, see “What you clearly saw is they were empty, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), the hands?” and he answered, “Yes.” App. at we deal with both claims at once. 1061a. 13 and custom of providing police officers Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-88 (1989). A only with guns, i.e. lethal weapons.7 The municipality cannot, however, be held jury could conclude from Snyder’s liable for the alleged constitutional testimony that, at the very moment he fired deprivation unless “there is a direct causal the fatal shot, he believed that he was link between a municipal policy or custom using excessive deadly force where non- and the [] deprivation.” Id. at 385.9 My lethal force would suffice. Indeed, if the colleagues believe that “the record here jury accepted his testimony as true, it fails to establish deliberate indifference or would have been hard to conclude causation” as a matter of law. Maj. Op. at anything else. The jury could therefore 26. However, “whether or not a reason that the officer had to resort to defendant’s conduct amounts to deliberate excessive force solely because the indifference has been described as a Borough left him no alternative but to use his gun in a situation where non-lethal force could reasonably have been officials . . . so permanent and well settled as employed to subdue Carswell. to virtually constitute law.” Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir.
omitted). “The policy or adopted custom To establish a municipality’s that subjects a municipality to § 1983 liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must liability may relate to the training of police show that plaintiff’s constitutional rights officers. A municipality’s failure to train its were violated by the municipality’s police officers can subject it to liability, deliberate indifference as reflected in its however, only where it reflects a deliberate policy or custom.8 See City of Canton v. or conscious choice by the municipality – a policy as defined in Supreme Court cases.” Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 7 The qualified immunity of 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation the police officers and the liability of the marks, brackets and citation omitted). Borough are two separate and distinct issues, 9 as the majority explains. See Maj. Op. at 25 A municipality like the (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, Borough “may . . . be sued directly if it is 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) and Fagan v. City of alleged to have caused a constitutional tort Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1294 (3d Cir. through a policy statement . . . officially 1994)). adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 8 “Policy is made when a 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (internal quotation decision maker possessing final authority to marks and citation omitted). Alternatively, a establish municipal policy with respect to plaintiff can establish a causal link between the action issues an official proclamation, the alleged constitutional violation and a policy, or edict.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1212 municipality’s custom or practice. (internal quotation marks and citation Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d at 214-15. omitted). “Customs are practices of state 14 classic issue for the fact finder and a elaborated upon this in Board of County factual mainstay of actions under § 1983.” Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 A.M . v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Detention U.S. 397 (1997). It explained: Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 588 (3d Cir. 2004) In leaving open in Canton (internal quotation marks, citation and the poss ibility that a brackets omitted). Given the evidence plaintiff might succeed in here, that should have been an issue for the carrying a failure-to-train jury to decide and the Borough was claim without showing a therefore not entitled to judgment as a pattern of constitutional matter of law under Rule 50. violations, w e s im ply In Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, hypothesized that, in a 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001), we narrow range of quoted City of Canton, noting: circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a It may seem contrary to highly predictable common sense to assert that consequence of a failure to a municipality will actually equip law enforcement have a policy of not taking officers with specific tools reasonable steps to train its to hand le recu rring employees. But it may situations. The likelihood happen that in light of the that the situation will recur duties assigned to specific and the predictability that an officers or employees the officer lacking specific tools need for more or different to handle that situation will training is so obvious, and violate citizens’ rights could the inadequacy so likely to justify a finding that result in the violation of policymakers’ decision not constitutional rights, that the to train the officer reflected policymakers of the city can “deliberate indifference” to reasonably be said to have the obvious consequence of been deliberately indifferent the policymakers’ choice – to the need. namely, a violation of a specific constitutional or statutory right. The high I believe that a jury could reasonably degree of predictability may conclude that this record establishes such also support an inference of deliberate indifference because the c a usa tion – th at th e Borough’s training left Officer Snyder municipality’s indifference with no reasonable alternative to the use of led directly to the very deadly force. The Supreme Court 15 consequence that the police department, and all police was so predictable. officers in the Borough were required to familiarize themselves with it and attest to Id. at 409-10. having read it. It prescribes an official We applied this teaching in Berg v. policy of “progressive force” for the County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261 (3d Borough’s police, stating that “[t]he use of Cir. 2000). There, we reviewed the force will be progressive in nature, and District Court’s grant of summary may include verbal, physical force, the use judgment in favor of the defendants in a of non-lethal weapons or any other means suit alleging a violation of civil rights as a at the officer’s disposal, provided they are result of the plaintiff’s arrest on an reasonable under the circumstances.” App. erroneous warrant. Plaintiff argued that at 998a. Chief Zuger testified further that the defendant county maintained a “flawed “[t]he policy of the Homestead Police warrant creation practice and poor training Department is to use only the amount of procedures.” Id. at 275 (internal quotation force which is necessary in making an marks omitted). Warrants were generated arrest or subduing an attacker. In all “based on a single datum – the criminal cases, this will be the minimum amount of complaint number . . . [with] no other force that is necessary.” App. at 1001a information [and] no check . . . to guard (emphasis added).10 against the kind of mistake [that was] However, as the majority notes, the made. Nor [were] there procedures that Borough provided only guns to its officers. would allow [an] officer . . . who suspects It did not equip them with any non-lethal an error to confirm that suspicion.” Id. We weapons. Rather, an officer had to request concluded that the “failure to provide any non-lethal weapon he/she might wish protective measures and failsafes . . . to carry and the request had to be approved seems comparable to ‘a failure to equip by Zuger. If the request was approved, the law enforcement officers with specific officer then had to undergo additional tools to handle recurring situations’” and training with the new weapon and become reversed the grant of summary judgment certified to use it. App. at 986a-87a. for the municipality. Id. at 277. Although Chief Zuger was not asked about
An even more compelling prima facie case of municipal liability under § 10 Indeed, a municipal 1983 was established here than in Berg. policy that authorized and condoned the Police Chief Zuger compiled the policy use of deadly force when an officer manual for the Boroug h’s po lice reasonably believed non-lethal force to department pursuant to his authority as be sufficient would certainly run afoul of police chief. App. at 984a. The manual the Constitution. Cf. Canton, 489 U.S. at contains the Borough’s official policy for 390 n.10. 16 officers were equipped with a gun and had in these cases to hear expert to be trained in any approved non-lethal testimony that an arrestee weapon they may have carried certainly would have been uninjured supports the inference that the Borough if only the police had been only trained officers in the use of lethal able to use disabling gas or force unless the Borough approved an a capture net or a taser (or individual request for a non-lethal weapon. even a larger number of police officers) and then It is obviously foreseeable that an decide that a municipality is officer who is equipped only with a lethal liable because it failed to weapon, and trained only in the use of buy this equipment (or lethal force, will sooner or later have to increase its police force). resort to lethal force in situations that There can be reasonable officer believes could be safely handled debates about whether the using only non-lethal force under the Constitution also enacts a Borough’s own “progressive force” policy. code of criminal procedure, This record therefore presents that “narrow but we think it is clear that range of circumstances, [where] the the Constitution does not violation of federal rights [is] a highly enact a polic e predictable consequence of a failure to administrator’s equipment equip law enforcement officers with list. specific tools to han dle recurring situations.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. My colleagues state that “we have Id. at 1150-51 (footnote omitted) (quoted never recognized municipal liability for a in Maj. Op. at 27-28). However, defining constitutional violation because of failure our inquiry in terms of whether the to equip police officers with non-lethal Co nstitution creates an approved weapons.” Maj. Op. at 27. I agree. “equipment list” for police is both However, we have never before addressed misleading and counterproductive. That is that precise issue. Accordingly, our failure simply not the issue, and that formulation reject that theory of recovery is neither of the issue obfuscates our inquiry rather relevant nor precedential. I am also far than advancing it. Given the duties of a less impressed with the analysis of the police officer, it was certainly foreseeable Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the Borough’s policy of equipping in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th officers only with guns and training them Cir. 1994) than my colleagues. As the only in the use of deadly force would majority notes, the court there stated: sooner or later result in the use of unjustifiable deadly force. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury Moreover, Chief Zuger’s testimony 17 dispels the fanciful notion that a finding of training program.” Maj. Op. at 26-27. liability here would potentially result in a However, plaintiff never argued that constitutionally mandated “equipment liability should be imposed on the basis of list.” He testified that an officer could a failure to train in the use of deadly force. seek approval for “any” non-lethal Rather, plaintiff argues that the Borough weapon, including mace, pepper spray, a should be liable because its policy of baton, etc. 1020a (emphasis added). The requiring training only in using deadly result is, therefore, not a mandated force and equipping officers only with a equipment list, but a mandated alternative lethal weapon, caused Officer Snyder to to using deadly force in those situations use lethal force even though he did not where an officer does not believe it is think it reasonable or necessary to do so. necessary to use deadly force. We must Moreover, as I have already noted, not forget that “[o]ne of the main given the duties of a police officer, it does purposes of nonlethal, temporarily not require a “pattern of underlying incapacitating devices such as pepper constitutional violations” to alert the spray is to give police effective options Borough to the fact that its policies would short of lethal force that can be used to cause police to unnecessarily use deadly take custody of an armed suspect who force. Rather, as I have argued above, this refuses to be lawfully arrested or record satisfies the teachings of Brown detained.” Gaddis v. Redford Township, because plaintiffs have established that 364 F.3d 763, 774 (6th Cir. 2004). “narrow range of circumstances, [where] a M oreover, interpreting the Fourth violation of federal rights may be a highly Amendment as requiring municipalities to predictable consequence of a failure to provide reasonable alternatives to the use equip law enforcement officers with of deadly force imposes no undue burden. specific tools to handle recurring In fact, here, it would do nothing more situations.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. than effectuate the Borough’s own Thus, even without a pattern of abuse, announced policy of “progressive force.” “t]he likelihood that the situation will My colleagues imply that the recur and the predictability that an officer Borough can not be liable under a failure lacking specific tools to handle that to train theory because its police officers situation will violate citizens’ rights could were properly trained in the use of deadly justify a finding that policymakers’ force. The majority states: “This evidence decision . . . reflected ‘deliberate did not establish a lack of training on the indifference’ to the obvious consequence use of deadly force that amounted to a of the policymakers’ choice.” Id. deliberate indifference, nor does it In Berg, we allowed municipal demonstrate a pattern of underlying liability under § 1983 because procedures constitutional violations that should have were inadequate to guard against someone alerted [the Borough] to an inadequate being arrested as the result of an 18 erroneously issued warrant and municipal defendants “employed a design where the slip of a finger could result in wrongful arrest and imprisonment[.]” 219 F.3d at 277. Reckless indifference that causes the fatal use of excessive force must surely be as actionable as reckless indifference resulting in “the slip of a finger” that merely causes an arrest.11