Opinion ID: 2111373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Judy Hopping Was Entitled to Recover for Time Lost From Working.

Text: Also raised on cross-appeal is Judy's contention that the district court erred in denying her claim for time lost from working as a result of her injury. The evidence indicated that as a result of that injury she did miss work for at least six weeks and perhaps longer. The district court denied Judy's claim for time lost from work on the ground that she was fully compensated during her absence from work as a result of her employer's sick leave policy. The court found that the need to exhaust sick leave had not produced any pecuniary loss. We conclude that the district court erred in characterizing Judy's claim as an attempt to recover for pecuniary loss from using up sick leave. It was simply a claim for time lost from work, which, under our past decisions, is compensable. We have characterized this element of damage as recovery for loss of time and have held that it is competent for the trier of fact to include in the damages assessed the reasonable value of a plaintiff's loss of time in that person's occupation. Alitz v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 196 Iowa 437, 443, 193 N.W. 423, 425 (1923). When the occupation is as a wage earner, the value of the lost time is properly measured by the claimant's regular earnings. Miller v. McCoy Truck Lines, 243 Iowa 483, 491, 52 N.W.2d 62, 66-67 (1952); Smith v. Pine, 234 Iowa 256, 260, 12 N.W.2d 236, 239 (1943). We have recognized that the collateral source doctrine precludes damages for time lost from work from being reduced as a result of sick leave or disability insurance protections against loss of earnings that are not subject to a right of subrogation in the payor. Collins v. King, 545 N.W.2d 310, 311-12 (Iowa 1996). We reverse that portion of the judgment denying Judy's claim for time lost from work. This necessitates a remand to the district court for additional findings of fact on the existing record concerning the length and reasonable value of Judy's absence from work as a result of the February 13, 1994 injury. We have considered all issues presented and for the reasons we have stated we affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to those items of damage it awarded plaintiffs against Bushnell and College Block. We also affirm the judgment in favor of the City of Iowa City. We reverse that portion of the judgment that denied Judy's claim against Bushnell and College Block for time lost from work. We remand the case to the district court on the latter issue for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Costs on appeal are taxed eighty percent to appellants, twenty percent to the Hoppings, and none to the city. AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART ON CROSS-APPEAL.