Opinion ID: 2823804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Possession Merges into Distribution When Both Convictions Arise from the Same Quantum of Drugs

Text: Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We hold that double jeopardy and merger principles require the trial court to vacate Davisâs possession conviction because the evidence at trial did not support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Davis possessed a quantum of drugs different from the one he gave the undercover officer. Accordingly, we reverse the court ofÂ appealsâ holding that âthe evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the possession and distribution charges were each based on a different quantum of drugsâ and therefore did ânot violate double jeopardy principles.â Id. at Â¶ 84. Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After providing the standard of review, we summarize the double jeopardy, merger, and sufficiency-of-the-evidence tenets that control our holding. We then apply those principles to the record in this case.
Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellate courts review errors that were not preserved by objection under a plain error standard. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, Â¶ 14, 288 P.3d 116, 120. Plain error is âobvious and substantial,â id., and must have âso undermined the fundamental fairness of the [proceeding] so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgmentâ to merit reversal, People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005). Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We apply the plain error standard in this instance because defense counsel did not object to the trial courtâs failure to merge Davisâs possession and distribution convictions at sentencing.
Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, Â§ 18; Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128â29 (Colo. 2001). Although the legislature may define multiple offenses and authorize multiple punishments based on the same behavior, People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Colo. 1998), a defendant may not be punished multiple times for the same conduct if â[o]ne offense is included in theÂ other,â Â§ 18-1-408(1)(a), C.R.S. (2014). One offense is included in another if âproof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the [greater]â offense establishes the lesser offense. Abiodun, 111 P.3d at 465 (citing Â§ 18-1-408(5)(a)); see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Possession of a controlled substance under section 18-18-405, C.R.S. (2014), is a lesser included offense of distribution under that section when the possession and distribution charges arise out of actions involving a single âdiscrete quantum of drugs.â See Abiodun, 111 P.3d at 471. 3 As such, convicting a defendant of possession and distribution of the same quantum of drugs violates the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. See id.; see also Â§ 18-1-408(1)(a). When a jury convicts a defendant for both possession and distribution of the same quantum of drugs, then, the trial court should merge the possession conviction into the distribution conviction for sentencing. See Abiodun, 111 P.3d at 471. Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Therefore, whether Abiodun required Davisâs possession conviction to merge into his distribution conviction at sentencing hinges on whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to show the existence of more than one quantum of drugs. We turn now to the record to answer this sufficiency-of-the-evidence question.
Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The evidence provided by the prosecution failed to sufficiently show that Davis possessed and distributed more than one quantum of drugs. To âassess the sufficiency of the evidence,â we consider âwhether any rational trier of fact might accept the evidence, taken as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as sufficient to support a finding . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.â People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619, 625 (Colo. 2004). Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, the only evidence offered by the prosecution that could have supported the theory that Davisâs possession conviction related to a different quantum of drugs than that quantum underlying his distribution conviction was the following trial testimony from the undercover officer: âI asked [Davis] for a 40. He then removed suspected crack cocaine from a baggie and then handed me an amount of crack cocaine.â Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The court of appeals majority reasoned that â[t]he jury could reasonably have inferred from this testimony that defendant handed the officer only some of the drugs that were in the baggie and kept the rest in his possession.â Davis, Â¶ 83. The court of appeals then concluded that this evidence âwas sufficient to support a finding that the possession and distribution charges were each based on a different quantum of drugs.â Id. at Â¶ 84. Writing in dissent, Judge Russel disagreed with the majorityâs sufficiency determination. See id. at Â¶ 104. In his view, âthe evidence does not support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant possessed a share of drugs different from the one that he gave to the undercover officer.â Id. We agree with Judge Russel.Â Â¶40Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Although a reasonable trier of fact might have inferred from the undercover officerâs testimony that Davis possessed and distributed different quanta of drugs, the minimal evidence provided by the prosecution on the âquantum of drugsâ question does not establish such an inference beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable jury could have just as easily inferred that Davis gave all of the drugs he had in the baggie to the officer. The paltry evidence supporting a âmultiple quanta of drugsâ theory is therefore insufficient to prove that Davis possessed and distributed different quantities of crack cocaine. Accordingly, the double jeopardy and merger principles delineated in Abiodun apply in this case. Â¶41Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because Abiodun applies here, the trial court obviously and substantially violated Davisâs right to avoid double jeopardy in a way that so undermined the fundamental fairness of the sentencing proceeding as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the trial courtâs decision to sentence Davis to one year in prison for possession. See Miller, 113 P.3d at 750. The trial court therefore plainly erred when it failed to merge the possession conviction into the distribution conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appealsâ affirmation of the trial courtâs error and remand to the court of appeals with instructions to remand to the trial court to vacate Davisâs conviction and sentence for possession.