Opinion ID: 496185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aiding and Abetting a Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Text: 32 Paradiso received consecutive prison sentences of twenty years each for his convictions for conspiracy and for aiding and abetting Abbamonte in the operation of his CCE under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848. While the Government concedes that employees of a CCE cannot be punished for aiding and abetting the head of the enterprise, see United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3479, 87 L.Ed.2d 614 (1985), it insists that non-employees who knowingly provide direct assistance to the head of the organization in supervising and operating the criminal enterprise can be so punished. Paradiso asserts, however, that because section 848 applies only to a person in charge of a CCE, one cannot incur liability for aiding and abetting such a person. We agree with Paradiso. 33 Congress enacted section 848 as a part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 to target the ringleaders of large-scale narcotics operations. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1367-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865, 100 S.Ct. 136, 62 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979); United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 180 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857, 102 S.Ct. 307, 70 L.Ed.2d 152 (1981). This carefully crafted prohibition aimed at a special problem .... [was] designed to reach the 'top brass' in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot soldiers. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. at 781, 105 S.Ct. at 2413. When Congress assigns guilt to only one type of participant in a transaction, it intends to leave the others unpunished for the offense. See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123, 53 S.Ct. 35, 38, 77 L.Ed. 206 (1932) (acquiescing woman not guilty of aiding and abetting Mann Act violation); United States v. Farrar, 281 U.S. 624, 634, 50 S.Ct. 425, 427, 74 L.Ed. 1078 (1930) (liquor purchaser not guilty of aiding and abetting illegal sale). Here Congress defined the offense as leadership of the enterprise, necessarily excluding those who do not lead. 34 In its original form, section 848 was primarily a sentencing enhancement provision. H.R. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4566, 4649. If a defendant committed a felony as part of a pattern of conduct which was criminal under applicable laws of any jurisdiction, which constituted a substantial source of his income, and in which he manifested special skill or expertise, the prosecuting attorney could file with the court an instrument specifying that the defendant fell in the category of a special offender thereby instituting special sentencing procedures. Id. at 4648-49 (quoting S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1001). However, the original provisions of the CCE section were not in the bill as finally reported. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York and others objected that these provisions allowed sentencing to be imposed without providing a defendant with an opportunity to cross-examine persons providing information as to the continuing criminal offense. Id. at 4650-51. An amendment offered by Representative John D. Dingel and adopted by the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee corrected the defects in the original sentencing bill. Instead of providing a postconviction-presentencing procedure, it made engagement in a continuing criminal enterprise a new and distinct offense with all its elements triable in court. Id. at 4651. While the amendment improved the continuing criminal activity section, id. at 4651, several members of the committee cautioned candor requires that it be pointed out that this section still contains serious objections, including the failure adequately to define a continuing series of violations, or to explain what is meant by deriving substantial income or resources. They observed that the very severe penalty of the continuing criminal enterprise ... is applicable to a broad range of criminal activities, some of which are very mild. Id. at 4651-52. Finally, they worried that mandating a minimum penalty would make it necessary, in the case of a minor offender, either to find him not guilty or to impose a mandatory ten-year sentence. Id. at 4652-53. 35 While the legislative history makes no mention of aiders and abettors, it makes it clear that the purpose of making CCE a new offense rather than leaving it as sentence enhancement was not to catch in the CCE net those who aided and abetted the supervisors' activities, but to correct its possible constitutional defects by making the elements of the CCE triable before a jury. 36 Not only does the Government's distinction between mere employees and those who otherwise help the kingpin lack support in legislative history but it also seems totally unworkable. How does one determine whether a person is an employee or third party? What of the businessman who leases a boat to a CCE engaged in importation? What about the kingpin's bodyguard? Or his lawyer? Ultimately, a subordinate may have all the attributes of a third party and render even greater assistance to the kingpin, yet escape enhanced criminal responsibility because it depends solely on the degree of control exercised by the kingpin over the individual. Normally we would assume that in enacting a later statute (section 848) Congress had the earlier one (section 2) in mind and we would reconcile the two if we could, but we do not believe it possible to do so here and still remain faithful to the plain terms and clear intent of section 848. 37 Thus, we believe that to be punished under section 848 one must meet all the requirements for a conviction under section 848. The Government did not establish these requirements in Paradiso's case. Consequently, we reverse his Count Four conviction.