Opinion ID: 185506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: EPA's Treatment of In Question Lands

Text: 17 Petitioners and EPA agree that under the regime Congress has created in the Clean Air Act, the states have primary responsibility for ensuring that ambient air meets federally established standards. Section 502 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661a, addresses EPA approval of state programs. EPA must establish minimum elements of a permit program and each state must develop such a program. Id. at §§ 7661a(b) and (d). Section 502(d)(3) specifies that [i]f a program meeting the requirements of this subchapter has not been approved in whole for any State, the Administrator shall, 2 years after the date required for submission of such a program ... promulgate, administer, and enforce a program under this subchapter for that State. 42 U.S.C. 7661a(d)(3) (emphasis added). Similarly, if EPA determines that a state (or tribe) is not adequately administering and enforcing a program, or portion thereof then unless the State has corrected such deficiency within 18 months after the date of such finding, the Administrator shall, 2 years after the date of such finding, promulgate, administer, and enforce a program under this subchapter for that State. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(i)(1), (4) (emphasis added). 18 Section 502, 42 U.S.C. 7661a, does not speak of underlying, residual, or even default EPA jurisdiction, authority, or power. It only speaks of the EPA running an implementation program for a state that fails to develop an approved program. EPA has no authority or jurisdiction under section 502 to operate a federal program unless or until the state fails to have a SOP approved within a specified time frame. Further, if EPA does implement a program, the Administrator is instructed only to administer and enforce federally issued permits under this subchapter until they are replaced by a permit issued by a permitting program, and EPA must suspend the issuance of permits promptly upon publication of notice of approval of a permit program under this section.... 42 U.S.C. 7661a(e). Thus, once a state program is approved, EPA's authority to operate a federal program under section 502(d)(3) lapses. 19 Nothing in CAA section 301(d), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d), adds to EPA's jurisdiction to implement a federal program in place of the states. Section 301(d) permits the EPA to treat Indian tribes as States if certain prerequisites are met, including that the functions to be exercised by the Indian 20 tribe pertain to the management and protection of air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). If the EPA determines that treatment of Indian tribes as identical to states is inappropriate or administratively infeasible, then the EPA will directly administer such provisions so as to achieve the appropriate purpose. 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(4). Thus, under section 301, EPA may treat qualifying tribes as states, and if the tribe fails to meet the requirements set out under section 502, then EPA must implement a federal program. Alternatively, if the tribe fails to qualify, then EPA must likewise implement a federal program. Again, there is no suggestion of inherent or underlying EPA authority, but rather a role for the EPA if the tribe, for whatever reason, does not promulgate a tribal implementation program. 21 It is significant that neither the EPA nor the Intervenor, Navajo Nation, can cite a single reference in the Clean Air Act that suggests that the agency has some overarching jurisdiction to implement federal programs. If anything, the structure and history of the Act, to which they appeal, suggest otherwise, for it is an experiment in cooperative federalism, as Intervenor notes. Certainly the Act intended to create an overarching federal role in air pollution control policy, as Intervenor argues, but that overarching role is in setting standards, not in implementation. EPA's role for implementation is limited to the conditions set out in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601(d), 7661a. 22 The Intervenor's brief is telling. To support its contention of default federal jurisdiction it cites vague statements that the Act is national in scope, that it is to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources or that EPA has the authority to issue regulations necessary to implement the Act. But none of these implies that EPA has some default authority to operate an implementation plan except as specified in sections 301(d) and 502 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601(d), 7661a. In its brief, EPA claims that it always has nationwide enforcement authority under the Act because Congress charged EPA not only with generally administering the Act, but also with nationally overseeing and enforcing its requirements. Similarly, in adopting the new Part 71 rules, EPA claimed its authority under the CAA is based in part on the general purpose of the CAA. 64 Fed. Reg. at 8251. However, EPA cannot rely on its general authority to make rules necessary to carry out its functions when a specific statutory directive defines the relevant functions of EPA in a particular area. API, 52 F.3d at 1119. Rather, we have before had occasion to remind EPA that its mission is not a roving commission to achieve pure air or any other laudable goal. See, e.g., API, 52 F.3d at 1119; Ethyl Corp., 51 F.3d at 1058. Commendable though these goals may be, they are not within EPA's portfolio unless the states and tribes fail to implement a program, and the conditions in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601(d) and 7661a are therefore met. 23 Having determined that EPA's only authority to administer a federal operating permit program is found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601(d) and 7661a, we must next determine whether EPA is acting within that authority in the challenged procedure. The answer is plainly no. EPA asserts that where a state has applied to operate a SOP under 42 U.S.C. 7661a, EPA need not actually determine whether the state has jurisdiction. Rather, EPA claims it may administer a federal operating permit program for sources in Indian country, including areas where EPA believes a bona fide question of Indian country status exists. Much of EPA's brief is dedicated to arguing that it has authority to administer a federal operating permit program in Indian country. However, these words are wasted as petitioners do not claim otherwise. At issue in this case is EPA's authority to administer a federal program where the Indian country status is merely in question. The petitioner states do not contend, as EPA and Intervenor suggest, that the states should have jurisdiction over Indian country lands. Petitioners happily concede that tribes, and thus, potentially the EPA--acting for the tribe--have jurisdiction over Indian country. Similarly, petitioners not only concede that EPA may undertake initial jurisdictional linedrawing, subject to judicial review, they insist, correctly, that EPA must make jurisdictional determinations. That is, EPA cannot acquire jurisdiction for itself merely by determining that an area's status is in question. Were we to hold otherwise, EPA would effectively have a blank check to expand its own jurisdiction by not deciding jurisdictional questions. The Clean Air Act does not confer such authority. 24 EPA argues that it is the state's burden under 42 U.S.C. 7661a(d)(1) to make a showing of adequate authority (and thus state jurisdiction) to carry out a SOP, and that unless a state can demonstrate authority to regulate an area, then EPA must provide for effective implementation of Title V programs. EPA contends it need not determine whether the disputed area is within the jurisdiction of a state or a tribe, and that by operating a federal program over in question areas it avoids jurisdictional disputes. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 8254. Because Congress has given EPA discretion to determine how to preserve tribes' statutorily-granted options to seek to run a Title V program for sources within Indian country, EPA argues that this Court should defer to its decision under Chevron step two, as a rule reasonably filling the gap left by Congress. 25 What EPA fails to appreciate is that its actions create a jurisdictional dispute. If a state has an approved implementation plan, then EPA's only grounds for jurisdiction under the Act is the fact that an area is Indian country, not that its status is in question. If the state does not have an approved plan, then EPA is acting for the state. There are no intermediate grounds on which EPA may indefinitely exercise jurisdiction--it is either acting in the shoes of a tribe or the shoes of the state. There is no residual authority granted by the CAA for the EPA to refuse to make a jurisdictional determination and operate a federal program under some general authority of its own. EPA comes close to arguing that because Congress has not expressly forbidden this assertion of federal jurisdiction, the agency may assert it. However, as we reminded the EPA in Ethyl Corp. and American Petroleum Institute, to suggest that Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power ..., is both flatly unfaithful to the principles of administrative law ... and refuted by precedent. 51 F.3d at 1060; 52 F.3d at 1120. 26 EPA and Intervenor Navajo Nation also argue that EPA's obligation to protect Indian interests in land, including jurisdiction and other facets of self-government, and the strong federal interest in preserving the sovereign rights of tribal governments to regulate activities and enforce laws on Indian lands, support the 1999 Part 71 rule allowing EPA to operate a federal program for lands in question. See Exec. Order No. 13175, 3(a), 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000) (Agencies shall respect Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, honor tribal treaty and other rights, and strive to meet the responsibilities that arise from the unique legal relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribal governments.). Intervenor argues that to allow states to implement Title V programs where the Indian country status is in question would infringe on rights that belong to the tribes under both the CAA and general principles of federal Indian law. EPA similarly asserts that by operating a federal program for in question areas, it protect[s] tribal sovereignty interests. EPA essentially argues that its interpretation of the CAA is correct because it favors Indian interests. Yet, the bedrock canon of statutory interpretation in American Indian jurisprudence that  'statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit'  is simply not implicated here. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). EPA is not interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601(d) and 7661a for the benefit of Indian tribes. It does not, for example, propose to give Indian tribes jurisdiction over in question lands. Rather it is refusing to make a jurisdictional determination, thereby depriving both tribes and states of the opportunity afforded them by Title V to operate a permitting program. If anything, by claiming independent federal jurisdiction over in question areas, EPA is construing these statutes for its own benefit. 27 EPA notes in its brief that disputes over whether a particular parcel of land is Indian country typically are resolved by tribunals other than EPA. However, EPA offers no reason why it should refrain from deciding such jurisdictional questions when they arise under the CAA. Quite to the contrary, EPA has willingly accepted that it must make jurisdictional decisions before approving a tribal implementation plan. That very issue was the topic of litigation before this Court just last year in Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000). EPA is not seriously contending that it cannot or should not make jurisdictional decisions. Rather it is suggesting it would prefer just to run the program itself. Ironically in the Tribal Authority Rule at issue in Arizona Public Service Co., EPA stated that a territorial approach to air quality regulation best advances rational, sound air quality management, 59 Fed. Reg. 43956, 43959 (Aug. 25, 1994), yet here EPA does not want to decide who controls the territory, instead leaving pockets of in question lands under federal, not Indian, jurisdiction. 28 EPA claims in its brief that it will only assert authority if there is a bona fide question of an area's status. However, in the Federal Register, EPA concluded that for the purposes of this rule, there may be, but need not be, a formal dispute, such as active litigation or other form of public disagreement, for EPA to consider the Indian country status of the area to be in question. 64 Fed. Reg. at 8254. Thus, at least in the Federal Register, EPA has set a low, indeed virtually undefined, threshold for deciding there is a dispute. In any event, the Clean Air Act does not provide for EPA to administer a federal program even if there is a bona fide question of the area's status. Instead, under 42 U.S.C. 7661a(d), EPA must determine whether the state has adequate authority to carry out the SOP. And EPA must tell the state if the SOP is disapproved because of a lack of jurisdiction. Section 7661a(d)(1) requires that if the SOP is disapproved, in whole or in part, the Administrator shall notify the Governor of any revisions or modifications necessary to obtain approval. As petitioners point out, there either is jurisdiction or there isn't, but either way EPA must decide and not simply grab jurisdiction for itself on the ground that an area is in question. Jurisdiction as between states and tribes is binary, it must either lie with the state or with the tribe--one or the other--and EPA does not have a third option of not deciding. 29 Petitioners correctly fear that EPA is creating a situation in which it may assume jurisdiction for itself and perpetually keep it from the states (or the tribes) because of a lack of showing of jurisdiction, without ever deciding who has jurisdiction. EPA even anticipates such an eventuality. It notes: 30 Where a State and Tribe assert jurisdiction over an area whose Indian country status EPA believes is in question (and EPA has not resolved the question and has not explicitly approved a part 70 program as applying in the area), EPA would not view either the State or the Tribe as having satisfied the CAA section 502(b)(5) requirements to have adequate authority.... Only when the State or Tribe prevails on the Indian country question would EPA then be able to conclude that the section 502(b)(5) requirements have been met for the area. Until that time, the absence of an approved part 70 program in the area necessitates implementation of part 71. By federally implementing the title V program in areas for which EPA believes the Indian country status is in question, EPA can help avoid jurisdictional disputes that might hinder effective implementation of the CAA. 31 64 Fed. Reg. at 8254 (emphasis added). Instead, EPA declines to resolve the dispute and imposes its own program. This situation arises in part because EPA believes there is no reason to impose on Tribes the burden of making a jurisdictional showing prior to EPA administering a Federal program. 62 Fed. Reg. at 13750. The source of EPA's belief is not entirely clear. EPA purports to rely on HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000). However, the issues in that case were quite different from those confronting us today. In HRI, Inc., the court was called upon to determine whether (1) the EPA had properly determined that a parcel of land was Indian country and (2) whether the EPA had determined that another parcel of land was in dispute. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the EPA decisions before it, but remanded for the EPA to make the jurisdictional determination concerning the disputed land. That court certainly did not determine that the EPA had acquired potentially permanent jurisdiction over a parcel of land simply by reason of its status being in dispute. Here we need not decide whether EPA could temporarily operate a Part 71 federal program while determining whether a state or a tribe has jurisdiction, as that is not before us. EPA does not propose to impose federal jurisdiction over in question lands only until it can resolve the dispute, but in perpetuity, or at least until a tribe or state makes an adequate showing through some other regulatory or adjudicatory mechanism. EPA did announce it would work with states, tribes, the Department of the Interior and other stakeholders to assess whether sources are located in Indian country, which EPA defines as including areas for which EPA believes the Indian country is in question. 64 Fed. Reg. at 8256. But that means only EPA will take questions and comments on whether something is in question. EPA does not promise--or even suggest--it will determine jurisdiction. It proposes to run a federal program so long as the area is in question without resolving that question--and EPA lacks that statutory authority to do so. Even if Congress intended for EPA to fill jurisdictional gaps, it did not empower EPA to create permanent, or even semipermanent, ones. 32 Because EPA's only authority under the Clean Air Act to operate a federal permitting program arises from 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601(d) and 7661a, and because these provisions require that EPA make a determination as to whether a state or a tribe has jurisdiction, we vacate the portion of EPA's 1999 Part 71 rule authorizing EPA to treat lands for which EPA has deemed Indian country status to be in question as Indian country for purposes of implementing a federal program in those areas. 33