Opinion ID: 1834341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: collateral estoppel/res judicata

Text: The applicability of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata to this case constitute questions of law. See Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc., supra . With regard to questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent from the trial court's conclusion. Id.; Petska v. Olson Gravel, Inc., 243 Neb. 568, 500 N.W.2d 828 (1993). Although the appellee uses the term res judicata, her arguments raise the point that the same issues addressed in Wagner I, mental capacity and undue influence, are being raised in the instant action. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits is conclusive upon the parties in any later litigation involving the same cause of action. Petska v. Olson Gravel, Inc., supra . Under collateral estoppel, when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in a future lawsuit. Id. Given the substance of the appellee's argument, and the fact that a will contest and a conservatorship proceeding are not the same causes of action, we believe the issue the appellee raises concerns the doctrine of collateral estoppel and not res judicata. There are four conditions that must exist for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply: (1) The identical issue was decided in a prior action, (2) there was a judgment on the merits which was final, (3) the party against whom the rule is applied was a party or in privity with a party to the prior action, and (4) there was an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior action. Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc., supra ; McCook Nat. Bank v. Myers, 243 Neb. 853, 503 N.W.2d 200 (1993); State on behalf of J.R. v. Mendoza, 240 Neb. 149, 481 N.W.2d 165 (1992). In determining the applicability of collateral estoppel to this case, we necessarily will be required to decide whether the issues decided in Wagner I are identical to those raised here. In Wagner I, 220 Neb. at 33, 367 N.W.2d at 738, the issues decided were whether the requirements of [Neb.Rev.Stat.] § 30-2630 [(Cum.Supp.1984)] were met so as to justify the appointment of a conservator for Mrs. Wagner and whether a lease she made should be set aside as the product of undue influence. We will address each of these issues separately. First, we will address the appointment of a conservator. The appellee's argument, in essence, is that the determination of mental capacity for the purposes of a conservatorship proceeding is sufficient to determine the existence of testamentary capacity. However, a comparison of the elements of each clearly shows that mental capacity for the purposes of a conservatorship and testamentary capacity are not the same. See, also, In re Estate of Camin, 212 Neb. 490, 323 N.W.2d 827 (1982) (mental competence is not the same as testamentary capacity). The requirements for the appointment of conservator, as set forth in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2630(2) (Reissue 1989), are that (i) the person is unable to manage his or her property and property affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, or lack of discretion in managing benefits received from public funds, detention by a foreign power, or disappearance; and (ii) the person has property which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided.... One possesses testamentary capacity if she understands the nature of her act in making a will or a codicil thereto, knows the extent and character of her property, knows and understands the proposed disposition of her property, and knows the natural objects of her bounty. In re Estate of Peterson, 232 Neb. 105, 439 N.W.2d 516 (1989). Since the requisite elements for the appointment of a conservator are different than the elements of testamentary capacity, the issues decided in Wagner I are necessarily different than those raised in the instant case. Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to bar the appellant from contesting Delphine Wagner's will for lack of testamentary capacity. We also find that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to prevent the appellant from contesting the will on grounds of undue influence. Again, the issue addressed in Wagner I is different from the one raised here. In Wagner I, the alleged undue influence concerned a lease. Here it concerns a will. A finding that there was no undue influence with respect to a lease made at one time has nothing to do with whether there was undue influence with respect to a will made at another time. In Gutzmer v. Nelsen, 121 Neb. 214, 236 N.W. 614 (1931), this court held that a finding of undue influence used to set aside a will did not conclusively establish by means of the doctrine of res judicata that a deed subsequently made was the product of undue influence. There we stated: Though the parties in the two cases are identical, there is no identity in the things sued for or in the causes of action in the will case and in this case to set aside the deed. Res judicata does not exist where there is no identity in the thing sued for or in the cause of action. (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 217, 236 N.W. at 615. In any event, the standards of proof in the two proceedings are different. The setting aside of a contract for undue influence requires clear and convincing evidence. Miller v. Westwood, 238 Neb. 896, 472 N.W.2d 903 (1991). However, in a will contest, undue influence need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Estate of Price, 223 Neb. 12, 388 N.W.2d 72 (1986). Just because the evidence offered in the prior action was not clear and convincing does not mean that the same evidence could not constitute a preponderance of the evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4), comment f., illus. 11 (1982). Thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel again could not serve to conclusively establish that the will was not a product of undue influence.