Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Focus of Review

Text: We conduct proportionality review to determine whether a particular defendant's death sentence is disproportionate when compared to other defendants with similar characteristics ... [who have] committ[ed] factually similar offenses in the same jurisdiction. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 343, 645 A. 2d 685 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Our review is offender-oriented. We presume[ ] that the death penalty is proportional to the offense, and ask `whether the punishment fits the criminal,' DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 161, 662 A. 2d 442 (citing Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 129, 613 A. 2d 1059, additional citations omitted). `[A] death sentence is comparatively excessive if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar offenses....' Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 153-54, 613 A. 2d 1059 (quoting Tichnell, supra, 468 A. 2d at 17 n. 18). Our dissenting colleague turns this concept on its head when he asserts that [t]he standard measuring disproportionality ... must require ... that, for defendants similarly situated, the death sentence be received in a defined preponderance of cases. Post at 425, 724 A. 2d at 217. Because New Jersey jurors have been sparing in their imposition of the death sentence, it will never be the case that death would be generally received or received in a defined preponderance of cases. Because juries impose death infrequently, we have recognized that death need not be normal or general to be a licit sentence. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 153, 613 A. 2d 1059. The dissent has missed the point. He would have us find that death is the normal sentence when that can never be so. Proportionality review seeks to determine only whether a particular death sentence is aberrational, not whether it compares perfectly with other sentences. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 352, 645 A. 2d 685 (citation omitted). For this reason, statistical disparity is permissible, indeed expected. For this reason also, the Court has repeatedly declined to set a threshold at which the imposition of the death penalty becomes disproportionate. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 171-72, 662 A. 2d 442; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 30, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 351, 645 A. 2d 685. Yet, the dissent again urges a numerical standard for determining proportionality. Post at 418, 724 A. 2d at 214; see also DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 233, 662 A. 2d 442 (Handler, J., dissenting); Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 90-91, 651 A. 2d 949 (Handler, J., dissenting); Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 408, 645 A. 2d 685 (Handler, J., dissenting). We continue to believe, however, that setting such a standard would introduce unacceptable arbitrariness into proportionality review. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 20, 651 A. 2d 949; see also Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 351, 645 A. 2d 685 (stating that [a] general standard, although admittedly imprecise, is not necessarily arbitrary). As we observed in Martini, an absolute numerical standard suffers from an inherent failure to distinguish between defendants. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 32, 651 A. 2d 949. Furthermore, application of a strictly quantitative approach may unduly `limit the legitimate exercise of judicial discretion' and `inappropriately suggest that the complex judgments involved in proportionality determinations can be expressed with mathematical precision.' Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 153, 613 A. 2d 1059 (quoting Final Report, supra, at 42-43). We have never believed that statistics can replace the process of judging; we do believe that statistical results, properly used and understood, can alert us to the need for increased vigilance in our quest for impartial justice.
The Loftin Report includes all death-eligible cases collected by the AOC from 1983 to September 1, 1996. Loftin Report, tbl.1 n. 1. There are 369 death-eligible cases, 154 of which went to penalty trial, producing a rate of forty-two percent. Id., tbl.3. Of the 154 penalty-trial cases, forty-seven, or thirty-one percent, resulted in a death sentence. Id., tbl.2. The overall death-sentencing rate is therefore thirteen percent (47/369). Id., tbl.1.
After establishing the universe of cases, we next convert that universe into a database for comparison purposes. As in our previous proportionality cases, we use two approaches: an a priori approach and an empirical approach. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 163-64, 662 A. 2d 442; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 24, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 345, 645 A. 2d 685; Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 141-43, 613 A. 2d 1059. In the a priori method, we analyze cases based on those factors that experience has shown influenced whether a defendant was sentenced capitally. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 164, 662 A. 2d 442; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 24, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 345, 645 A. 2d 685; Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 141-42, 613 A. 2d 1059. In the empirical method, we review both defendants who were sentenced to death and those who were not to identify those characteristics that determine the patterns of life sentencing versus death sentencing. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 164, 662 A. 2d 442; see also Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 24, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 345, 645 A. 2d 685; Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 142-43, 613 A. 2d 1059. We decline once again to attempt to define in advance all characteristics of a murder case that would capture the critical facts of a particular defendant's case. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 164, 662 A. 2d 442. Such an exercise would fail [both] to distinguish between individual defendants and to recognize the uniqueness of every case. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 24-25, 651 A. 2d 949. Also, as in previous cases, we include in the death-sentenced universe those cases where the defendant's death sentence was reversed on appeal and where the prosecutor chose not to proceed capitally on remand. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 164, 662 A. 2d 442; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 25-26, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 345-48, 645 A. 2d 685; Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 194 n. 10, 613 A. 2d 1059. Although reversed for a variety of reasons, we have found that the original penalty trials ... [still] reflect[ ] juror values of deathworthiness. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 194 n. 10, 613 A. 2d 1059. We continue to analyze the data in two sets, one including defendant and one excluding him. [P]roportionality review is a search for community values, and the case under review is a partial reflection of ... those values. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 27-28, 651 A. 2d 949. An analysis which utilizes both sets of data is therefore more complete but does not attempt to conceal its own limitations, i.e., the bias produced by including defendant's case. Id. at 28, 651 A. 2d 949.