Opinion ID: 2216408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence To Sustain Conviction for Third Degree Arson (Count IX).

Text: The State charged Hage with Third Degree Arson of the Livermore residence. Hage moved for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case contending that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the charge. State v. Haase, 446 N.W.2d 62, 65-66 (S.D.1989); State v. Bonrud, 393 N.W.2d 785, 789 (S.D.1986). The trial court denied Hage's motion and instructed the jury that Third Degree Arson involves an unoccupied structure. Hage contends that the Livermore home, an occupied structure, could not be the subject of Third Degree Arson and his conviction must therefore be reversed. Arson occurs with or without occupancy: The statutes for First, Second, and Third Degree Arson all state that the perpetrator must intentionally set fire to or burn or cause to be burned a structure. First Degree Arson additionally requires knowledge that the structure is occupied. SDCL 22-33-1. Second Degree Arson eliminates the knowledge requirement. SDCL 22-33-2. The Third Degree Arson statute employs the term unoccupied structure meaning any structure which is not an occupied structure. SDCL 22-1-2; SDCL 22-33-3. [2] The definition of structure includes any house. SDCL 22-1-2. If the prosecutor elected not to charge and prove that the Livermore home was an occupied structure, then logically the house fell under the all encompassing category of an unoccupied structure. This Court noted in Goodroad v. Solem, 406 N.W.2d 141, 146 (S.D.1987): We are unaware of why the prosecutor chose the lesser offense for prosecution, whether it was evidentiary problems or purely prosecutorial discretion. In any event, Goodroad is hardly in a position to complain that he was charged and sentenced on the lesser offense.