Opinion ID: 2220653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: attorney fee and costs

Text: Dunning contends that the district court lacked authority to assess an attorney fee as part of the costs and that the district court abused its discretion concerning the attorney fee awarded. In Nebraska, the general rule is that an attorney fee may be recovered only when authorized by statute, or when a recognized and accepted uniform course of procedure allows recovery of an attorney fee. Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier, 238 Neb. 748, 765, 472 N.W.2d 391, 402 (1991). Accord Young v. Dodge Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 242 Neb. 1, 493 N.W.2d 160 (1992). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-370 (Reissue 1988) states: Nothing in sections 42-347 to 42-379 shall prohibit a party from initiating contempt proceedings. Costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, may be taxed against a party found to be in contempt. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 42-347 to 42-379 (Reissue 1988) pertain generally to support, alimony, and disposition of marital property. Furthermore, in Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 119 N.W.2d 512 (1963), which antedates the 1972 enactment of § 42-370, this court considered assessment of costs in a civil contempt proceeding. Although the Kasparek court disallowed an award for damages in a contempt proceeding, the court distinguished a damages award from the question of costs and expenses in a civil contempt proceeding and held that costs and expenses incurred by an injured party may be recovered in the contempt proceedings from the contemner. 174 Neb. at 741, 119 N.W.2d at 519. Therefore, in a civil contempt proceeding, costs, including a reasonable attorney fee, may be assessed against a contemnor. When an attorney fee is authorized, the amount of the fee is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Young v. Dodge Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 242 Neb. at 9, 493 N.W.2d at 165. Because the amount of attorney fee and costs awarded by the district court is supported by sufficient evidence and was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court's judgment assessing costs to Dunning, including a fee for Tallman's lawyer.