Opinion ID: 2995557
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: fape

Text: We agree with the district court and the hearing officer, and find that the district’s recommendation to place Beth in an ELS classroom satisfies the FAPE requirement. In determining whether the district’s placement of Beth meets the standard, we must ask: First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). No one contests that the program recommended during Beth’s IEP review passes muster under this test; the FAPE mandate is, therefore, not at issue. Its discussion is required, however, because of the confusion that ensues when language from the FAPE requirement and analysis is misapplied to the LRE inquiry. Beth’s parents confuse the FAPE side of the coin with the LRE side. They contend that Beth’s current placement satisfies the Rowley standard because she received an educational benefit at Lake Bluff Middle School. So long as the regular classroom confers some educational benefit to Beth, they argue, 458 U.S. at 200, the school district cannot remove her from that setting. This language is misplaced. The Rowley holding applies only to the school district’s responsibility to provide a FAPE--a requirement that analyzes the appropriateness of the district’s placement--not the appropriateness of the ELS alternatives, including the regular education classroom. As the district court properly noted, the FAPE determination is at the threshold of the placement inquiry. Only with the subsequent LRE analysis does the question of the educational benefit to Beth in the regular classroom arise; in that context, the Rowley language does not apply. See also Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).