Opinion ID: 655918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Convict Benitez of Count Three.

Text: 4 Benitez argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 because the evidence was insufficient to convict him on Count Three. In determining whether to grant a Rule 29 motion, the district court must ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there was relevant evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime charged. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988). We apply the same test on appeal. United States v. Hazeem, 679 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 848 (1982). 5 The indictment charged that the Count Three offense occurred on or about July 13, 1991, in the District of Nevada. Because Benitez did not have actual or constructive possession of the cocaine on July 13, 1991, and was not charged with aiding and abetting the offense, the only basis for his Count Three conviction is a Pinkerton theory of coconspirator liability. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could be convicted for the substantive offenses of his coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy even though he did not personally participate in those offenses. To convict a defendant under the Pinkerton theory, the government must prove that (1) the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the offense fell within the scope of the unlawful project; and (3) the offense could reasonably have been foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir.1986). 6 Benitez argues that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the first prong of the Douglass inquiry. He contends that none of the alleged conspirators can be found to have committed a substantive offense in furtherance of the conspiracy. Benitez also asserts that even had such an offense been committed, he was not party to the conspiracy at that time so that he could not have foreseen the offense as prong three requires. In denying Benitez's Rule 29 motion, the district court concluded that defendant Bevans possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it on July 13, 1991; that the offense was committed in furtherance of the Count Two conspiracy; and that Benitez was a party to the conspiracy at that time. 7
8 Benitez contends that Bevans did not actively participate in the cocaine transaction or personally handle the cocaine so that Bevans did not possess the drugs at the time he was arrested. Possession of a controlled substance under section 841(a)(1) 'may be constructive, as well as actual.'  United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1350 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 873 (1979)). [C]onstructive possession may be demonstrated by direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant had the power to dispose of the drug.... Id. However,  ' mere proximity to the drug, mere presence on the property where it is located, or mere association, without more, with the person who does control the drug or the property on which it is found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession. '  Id. at 1351 (quoting Murray v. United States, 403 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1968) (quoting Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 930 (1962))). The government therefore must demonstrate sufficient indicia of dominion and control to support the inference of constructive possession. Id. 9 Although the evidence suggests that Hynes was the primary actor at the meeting between Burton, Hynes, and Bevans on July 9, 1991, the record also supports a finding that Bevans was an active participant in the drug transaction. Bevans accompanied Hynes to the site of the transaction. While Burton showed Hynes a portion of the 165 kilograms of cocaine, Bevans backed up his truck so that the drugs could be loaded into the vehicle. Bevans took the truck's keys with him when he stepped out of the vehicle. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Bevans had control over, and therefore constructive possession of, the cocaine at the moment he was arrested. 10
11 Benitez also asserts that Bevans cannot be found to have participated in the Count Two conspiracy because he lacked knowledge of the conspiracy's objective. Knowledge of the objective of the conspiracy is an essential element of any conspiracy conviction. United States v. Krasovich, 819 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir.1987). 12 It is argued that Bevans thought Hynes and he were meeting Burton to pick up documents, not drugs, and therefore that Bevans did not know the objective of the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The record refutes Benitez's claim. The evidence shows that Bevans assisted in setting up the meeting with Burton to retrieve the cocaine. On July 9, 1991, Castillo informed Burton that he would be sending Lou ... from Avi to Reno, Nevada, to pick up 165 kilograms of cocaine. On July 12, 1991, Bevans contacted Burton using this code phrase. He told Burton De parte de Avi and said it is pretty safe because it's two of us. A meeting was arranged at the Denny's Restaurant located next to the motel where Bevans and Hynes were staying. Not only did Bevans assist in arranging the meeting with Burton, he also actively participated in the transaction as noted above. 13 This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Bevans knew of the conspiracy's objective to distribute cocaine. The district court therefore did not err in finding that a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bevans was a member of the Count Two conspiracy. 14 3. Evidence that Benitez was a member of the Count Two conspiracy at the time Bevans committed the possessory offense. 15 Whether Benitez was a member of the Count Two conspiracy when Bevans was arrested at 12:30 a.m. on July 13, 1991, is a more difficult question. Benitez argues that he did not enter the conspiracy until Rogelio paged him at 1:45 p.m. on July 13th and asked him to pick up the drugs. Thus the issue in this case is not whether Benitez was a coconspirator; the issue is when he became one. 16 Mere association with conspirators does not establish that a defendant is part of the conspiracy. United States v. Lopez, 625 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir.1980). It is clear, however, that the government proved a conspiracy existed at the time of Bevans' arrest. Once the existence of the conspiracy is shown, evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a knowing connection of the defendant with the conspiracy, even though the connection is slight, is sufficient to convict him of knowing participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir.1988). This rule creates a presumption that one who acts in furtherance of a conspiracy knows of the conspiracy's existence. United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 n. 1 (9th Cir.1987). We therefore must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Benitez was connected, even slightly, with the conspiracy at the time of Bevans' arrest. 17 The district court found that a rational jury could conclude that Benitez was a coconspirator at the time of Bevans' arrest based on three principal points. First, on July 9, 1991, Castillo gave Hynes the paper containing the numbers and codes that government agents used to contact Rogelio, and subsequently Benitez. These numbers and codes initially connected Hynes and Bevans with Burton in Reno. After the government arrested Hynes and Bevans, Special Agent Gunn used the paper to contact Castillo's Los Angeles connection. Upon contacting 50 at the number listed on the paper, Gunn was told, presumably by Rogelio, to page his contact person, Luis, at another number. Benitez answered Gunn's page at the given number. The district court concluded that a jury could reasonably have inferred that the immediacy with which the call to 50 revealed Benitez's number meant that Benitez and Rogelio had prepared in advance their plan to retrieve the cocaine. That inference would support the conclusion that Benitez was part of the Count Two conspiracy before Bevans' arrest. 18 Second, the district court noted that when Gunn and Benitez initially met, Benitez identified himself with the phrase, Luis de parte de Rogelio. The district court considered this further evidence that Benitez was tied in closely with the conspiracy. Finally, the court emphasized that Benitez knew when he initially met with Gunn that the transaction involved 165 kilograms of cocaine, which is allegedly worth between $3,000,000 and $16,000,000. 19 None of this evidence directly compels a finding that Benitez was connected with the conspiracy at the time of Bevans' arrest. However, [s]uch [a] connection to a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir.1991). In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, logical inferences are to be made in favor of the government. United States v. Johnson, 804 F.2d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir.1986) (The government is entitled to all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the evidence. At hand, these inferences cannot be based on mere speculation. United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972). 20 We hold that a jury could reasonably have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Benitez was a member of the conspiracy at the time of Bevans' arrest. That Benitez knew the size of the cocaine shipment and that he used the code phrase for the Rogelio organization support a reasonable inference that Benitez participated in the conspiracy before 12:30 a.m. on July 13, 1991. Even more important, however, is the fact that Gunn was immediately told that Benitez would contact him when he dialed the number from the paper that Castillo had provided to Hynes. It is logical and not speculative to infer that Benitez and Rogelio had planned for the arrival of the cocaine well before Gunn contacted them. This inference is particularly reasonable considering the large size of the shipment. Accordingly, we affirm Benitez's Count Three conviction based on the Pinkerton theory of vicarious coconspirator liability. 21