Opinion ID: 2444445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Applying The Best Interest Standard

Text: Ta'Niya argues that the juvenile court erred in denying DSS's petition for termination of Ms. L.'s parental rights because the court failed to apply previous case law and the statutory factors to determine whether exceptional circumstances existed. Ta'Niya attributes this failure on the juvenile court's part to the court's misinterpretation of this Court's holding in Rashawn, as shifting the best interest consideration from the child to the parents. Ta'Niya contends that such an interpretation was erroneous because, in deciding Rashawn, this Court noted that [it] did not regard this Opinion as changing any substantive law. (Quoting Rashawn, 402 Md. at 505 n. 12, 937 A.2d at 194 n. 12). Ms. L. counters by arguing that the juvenile court correctly understood Rashawn. According to Ms. L., the court properly did not find exceptional circumstances because, as the court stated, although it wasn't a great performance by the mother, she did much of what she was asked for. Not timely, not well-documented, but what she didn't do I don't think rises to the level of extraordinary circumstances that would justify termination. In order to assess Ta'Niya's contention that the juvenile court misinterpreted our holding in Rashawn, prompting it to erroneously focus on the parent's circumstances rather than the child's best interest, we must examine the record. First, we see the juvenile court's ruling and the discussion with counsel that preceded it, during which the juvenile court repeated three times that  Rashawn changed the landscape. Next, during DSS's closing argument, the court observed that in Rashawn, [t]he Court of Appeals made new law. ... They took something and they made a new requirement and it overcomes all the past. Then, during DSS's closing argument, the juvenile court explained, [t]he Court of Appeals has changed it now from how it looks to the child to what should happen regarding the parents. ... It's gone from best interest of the child to best interest of the parents. (Emphasis added). Still later, when DSS attempted to point out that Rashawn did not change the fact that the child's best interest was still the governing standard, the court disagreed, [o]h yes it did, I think it did. It changed it from the focus on the best interest, although they refer to that, it really is about a new requirement. Although the Court of Special Appeals concluded that notwithstanding [the juvenile court's judge's] colorful description of the holding in Rashawn, he remained focused on the appropriate legal standard and considered the relevant statutory factors, we do not think the record supports such a conclusion. By its own admission, the juvenile court [went] through [FL Section 5-323] D [sic] considerations very quickly, almost as an afterthought, following its finding that there were no exceptional circumstances, and apparently giving little, if any, weight to the FL Section 5-323(d)(4) factors that address termination of parental rights from the point of view of the child's circumstances. In its finding that there were no exceptional circumstances that would make continuation of parental relationship detrimental to Ta'Niya, the court focused on Ms. L.'s circumstances, not Ta'Niya's best interest. For instance, at the very beginning of its bench opinion, the court observed that overall, although it wasn't a great performance by the mother, she did much of what she was asked for. Not timely, not well-documented, but what she didn't do I don't think rises to the level of extraordinary circumstances that would justify termination. Later, the court reiterated, [t]his mother is not ready, I don't know if she'll ever be ready, but [either] she has not proved herself and [DSS] hasn't proved her to be [] unfit or [the] failure for lack of timely performance do[es] not amount to exceptional circumstances that justify termination of parental rights. In contrast, the court did not address Ta'Niya's emotional ties or lack thereof toward Ms. L. or her half-sibling, Jamiara, under FL Section 5-323(d)(4)(i), or Ta'Niya's feelings about the severance of her relationship with Ms. L. under FL Section 5-323(d)(4)(iii). [22] With respect to the likely impact the termination of Ms. L.'s parental rights would have on Ta'Niya under FL § 5-323(d)(4)(iv), the court found that it would be very upsetting going from where she is now to some place else. I mean, she is in a good circumstance[,] but noted that  Rashawn would almost ask us to ignore that. The court did, however, under FL Section 5-323(d)(4)(ii), find that Ta'Niya was [v]ery good with the foster parents, very good in the community, the home, the placement, and the school since she's been with [the foster parents]. Further evidence that Ms. L.'s interests, as opposed to Ta'Niya's best interest, played the primary role in the juvenile court's determination that no exceptional circumstances existed is the court's apparent belief that a finding of exceptional circumstances is not unique to a particular child. The court was so troubled by the fact that DSS sought to terminate Ms. L.'s parental rights with respect to Ta'Niya after it had returned Jamiara to her, that it could not see how there could be exceptional circumstances with respect to Ta'Niya. The court expressed this belief, saying there's only one mother and you want to label her as unfit, you want to say that all of the factors that are in [FL Section] 5-323, if they are looked upon as supporting exceptional circumstances, then it's the same with respect to Ja'Mira [sic] as it is with respect to Ta'Niya[.] The court elaborated further, [i]f the mother is unfit or if exceptional circumstances exist which would justify terminating the parental relationship between her and Ta'Niya, I just cannot see that being consistent, or the placement of Ja'Mira being consistent with granting the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights with respect to a sibling. Such a characterization of the exceptional circumstances analysis is incorrect as it does not take into account circumstances particular to an individual child. A court may reach different conclusions under FL Section 5-323(d) regarding different children of the same parent. Indeed, as the facts of this case demonstrate, a parent may, for example, have regular and frequent contact with one child, but not the other, and have varying degrees of success in completion of different service agreements with respect to each child. Also, depending on the age at which the children of one parent were placed in foster care, the length of time they spent in foster care, and the frequency of contact with the natural parent, one child may have maintained or formed an attachment to the natural parent, while the other child has not. The Circuit Court's approach fails to treat the child's best interest as the transcendent standard, perhaps because of the no further inquiry language from Ross and McDermott. The observations and findings by the juvenile court convince us that the court did not just give Rashawn a colorful description, as the Court of Special Appeals found, but that it applied the wrong standard. [23] As we instructed in Rashawn, the factors under FL Section 5-323(d) serve both as the basis for a court's finding (1) whether there are exceptional circumstances that would make a continued parental relationship detrimental to the child's best interest, and (2) whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. Id. at 499, 937 A.2d at 190. Since one cannot make a determination of whether there are exceptional circumstances that would overcome the presumption of parental rights and make continuation of parental rights detrimental to the child's best interest without looking into the child's best interest, the ultimate focus of the juvenile court's inquiry must be on the child's best interest.