Opinion ID: 1834498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mayors' Commission

Text: Article VII of the proposed charter provides for the creation of a Mayors' Commission. The Mayors' Commission's primary purpose is to study, evaluate, and recommend the transfer of municipal services to the control of the commonwealth. The Mayors' Commission would be composed of the commonwealth mayor, the mayor of each commonwealth member, and the mayor of other cities having fifty percent or more of their population or area within the commonwealth. Mayors of non-commonwealth member cities would have no voting power on the Mayors' Commission. Each mayor of a city that joins as a commonwealth member would have one vote on the Mayors' Commission. According to the 1990 decennial census the population of Polk County is 327,140 persons. The populations of the cities within Polk County that could be represented on the Mayors' Commission vary widely. These cities' populations are as follows: Alleman 340 Altoona 7,191 Ankeny 18,482 Bondurant 1,584 Clive 7,462 Des Moines 193,187 Elkhart 388 Grimes 2,653 Johnston 4,702 Mitchellville 1,670 Pleasant Hill 3,671 Polk City 1,908 Runnells 306 Sheldahl 315 Urbandale 23,500 West Des Moines 31,702 Windsor Heights 5,190 Unincorporated Polk County 23,084  More than fifty percent of Sheldahl's area lies outside Polk County. The functions of the Mayors' Commission are listed in Article VII, sections 3-10 of the proposed charter. The Commission would have the powers and duties to: 1. Evaluate municipal services of the commonwealth government and propose establishment of service areas and changes in municipal services of the commonwealth government; 2. Identify the service area to be transferred, including the description of the municipal service, geographical area to receive the service, and the service level to be provided; 3. Estimate the cost and property tax levy for each service area; 4. Identify the city employees needed to provide the service by the commonwealth government; 5. Identify real and personal property to be transferred from member cities to the commonwealth; 6. Evaluate the assumption, if any, of current indebtedness for the assets to be transferred to the commonwealth and its allocations to each member city; 7. Compute the first year property tax levy that the commonwealth government will levy for a shared service; 8. Call upon commonwealth boards, commissions, agencies, and special purpose districts to provide studies, statistics, and information pertaining to municipal service delivery; 9. Receive grants, information, and aid from private or nonprofit organizations for studies and evaluations concerning municipal service by the commonwealth government. The Mayors' Commission (or the Commonwealth Council, city council of a commonwealth member, or the voters by petition) may, by resolution, identify municipal services for study and possible transfer to the commonwealth. If the Mayors' Commission then finds the transfer proposal meets the goals of the commonwealth, it can initiate a study of the transfer. After the study is completed, the Mayors' Commission may recommend to the Commonwealth Council the transfer of a municipal service. This is done by issuing a report on the study, accompanied by a resolution of transfer outlining key elements of the proposed transfer. A resolution of transfer cannot be forwarded to the Commonwealth Council except by majority vote of the Mayors' Commission. Once forwarded to the Commonwealth Council, a resolution of transfer may either be approved, rejected, or amended by that body. If the resolution is approved by the Council, the transfer is implemented. If the resolution is amended, it is returned to the Mayors' Commission for a vote. In the event that a resolution of transfer is rejected by the commonwealth or an amended resolution of transfer is rejected by the Mayors' Commission, a joint committee is formed to attempt a resolution. The joint committee would be composed of two Commonwealth Council members appointed by the mayor and two Mayors' Commission members elected by its voting members. If the committee is able, within two months of its organization, to achieve a resolution, the resolution goes back through the entire transfer approval process. If the joint committee resolution fails to receive the approval of the Mayors' Commission or the Commonwealth Council, the proposed transfer resolution dies.
After laying the groundwork in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963), and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), the United States Supreme Court established the one person, one vote principle in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowack, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 18.35 (2d ed.1992). This rule requires that whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56, 90 S.Ct. 791, 795, 25 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 1117, 20 L.Ed.2d 45, 50-51 (1968); see Driskell v. Edwards, 518 F.2d 890, 893 (5th Cir.1975). The goal of this rule is to ensure that in elections for bodies performing governmental functions, some individuals' votes do not carry greater weight than others'. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562-63, 84 S.Ct. at 1382, 12 L.Ed.2d at 527-28. In determining whether the one person, one vote principle applies to the establishment of a given body, the rule requires a threshold determination of whether the body performs governmental functions. Driskell, 518 F.2d at 893; Opinion of the Justices, 294 Ala. 571, 319 So.2d 699, 705 (1975) (en banc); Millsap v. Quinn, 757 S.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Mo.1988) (en banc). In order to govern, an entity must have the power to control, determine, guide, and regulate workings or operations of the government. Millsap, 757 S.W.2d at 595. If the entity at issue does hold governmental power, the one person, one vote rule applies unless either of two circumstances exist. First, the rule does not apply if the members of the body are appointed rather than elected. Hadley, 397 U.S. at 54-56, 90 S.Ct. at 794-95, 25 L.Ed.2d at 49-51. Second, the principle does not apply to an entity if: (1) it exercises only narrow, limited governmental powers; and (2) its activities disproportionately affect a specific group of individuals. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 364, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 1817-18, 68 L.Ed.2d 150, 158-59 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 1229, 35 L.Ed.2d 659, 666 (1973); Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56, 90 S.Ct. at 795, 25 L.Ed.2d at 51; Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F.Supp. 885, 890-91 (W.D.Wash.1990). The Charter Commission argues that the one person, one vote principle does not govern the establishment of the Mayors' Commission because the Mayors' Commission does not perform general governmental functions. The Charter Commission stresses that the functions of the Mayors' Commission are not legislative and as a result, the one person, one vote rule does not apply. The Board asserts that the one person, one vote principle does apply to this case because the Mayors' Commission performs governmental functions and is an elected body. The Board further contends that any reference by the Charter Commission and the district court to legislative versus administrative functions is irrelevant since the determinative factor is whether the body at issue is elected. [1] The Board asserts that Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989), controls this matter and demonstrates that the one person, one vote principle governs the establishment of the Mayors' Commission. Board of Estimate involved a New York City board which consisted of three members elected at large and each of the elected presidents of the city's five boroughs. Id., 489 U.S. at 690, 109 S.Ct. at 1436, 103 L.Ed.2d at 725. The United States Supreme Court held that the one person, one vote principle applied to the board because it was an elected body, it held a significant range of functions common to municipal governments, and it had considerable authority to formulate the city's budget. Id., 489 U.S. at 694-96, 109 S.Ct. at 1438-39, 103 L.Ed.2d at 728-29. Since the borough presidents held equal votes to each other despite the significant difference in the size of their respective boroughs, the Court held that the board's apportionment was unconstitutional. Id., 489 U.S. at 694, 109 S.Ct. at 1438, 103 L.Ed.2d at 727-28. The New York Board of Estimate had vast powers that pervasively invaded the body politic of the city to control its life's blood. A list of its powers is as follows: A. The Board of Estimate exclusively i. determines the use, development and improvement of property owned by the City; ii. approves standards, scopes and final designs of capitol [sic] projects for the City; iii. negotiates and enters into all contracts on behalf of the City; iv. negotiates and approves all franchises that are granted by the City; v. grants leases of City property and enters into leases of property for City use; vi. sets the rates for purchases of water from the City; vii. sets the charges for sewer services provided by the City; viii. approves or modifies all zoning decisions for the City; and ix. sets tax abatements. B. The Board of Estimate acting in conjunction with the New York City Council i. recommends and approves the expense budget of the City without the participation of the Mayor; ii. recommends and approves the capital budget of the City without the participation of the Mayor; iii. periodically modifies the budget of the City; iv. confers with the City Council when agreement on the budget between the two bodies is not reached; v. overrides mayoral vetoes of budget items without the participation of the Mayor; and vi. holds hearings on budgetary matters. C. The Board of Estimate also i. administers the Bureau of Franchises; ii. administers the Bureau of the Secretary; iii. holds public hearings on any matter of City policy within its responsibilities whenever called upon to do so by the Mayor or in its discretion for the public interest; iv. holds hearings on tax abatements that are within the discretion of City administrative agencies; and v. makes recommendations to the Mayor or City Council in regard to any matter of City policy. Id., 489 U.S. at 695 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. at 1439 n. 4, 103 L.Ed.2d at 728 n. 4. In contrast, a review of the powers and duties of the Mayors' Commission listed in Article VII shows that its quiddity is advisory. The choice of words used to describe its activities illustrates that its purpose is to collate information as a basis for making a recommendation to the Commonwealth Council. The Mayors' Commission is to call upon agencies to provide statistics, receive grants and information for evaluations, evaluate municipal services, propose changes in municipal services, identify municipal services for possible transfer, estimate the present cost of the service area, estimate property tax levies, study and evaluate equipment and employees utilized by each member, project future indebtedness, review service areas, recommend Commission action, and propose a transfer of services to the Commonwealth Council. None of the words in quotation marks confers authority in the Mayors' Commission to exercise government powers. These functionally descriptive words do not translate into any decision-making authority impacting a citizen of Polk County. No power is given the Mayors' Commission to enforce any government action that would affect the welfare of the people of Polk County. The Mayors' Commission's reason for being is significant but its authority in law is inexistent. The Mayors' Commission is more similar in function to the board at issue in Millsap. Millsap involved the establishment of a Board of Freeholders which was to study the St. Louis city and county governments and recommend a plan for their reorganization to voters. Millsap, 757 S.W.2d at 592-93. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the one person, one vote principle did not apply to the formulation of the Board. Id. at 595. Even though the members of the Board were appointed, the court based its decision on a threshold determination that the Board held no general governmental powers. Id. The court noted: It cannot enact any laws governing the conduct of citizens, nor does it administer such normal functions of government as the maintenance of streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services. It can recommend ad valorem property taxes and sales taxes, but it cannot levy and collect them. Id. (quoting Ball, 451 U.S. at 366, 101 S.Ct. at 1818, 68 L.Ed.2d at 160) (citation omitted). The agenda conferred on the Mayors' Commission does not sound a tick of constitutional moment next to the powers exercised by the New York Board of Estimate. The role of the Mayors' Commission, unlike the Board of Estimate, does not situate the board comfortably within the category of governmental bodies whose `powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the district' to require that elections to the body comply with equal protection strictures. Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 696, 109 S.Ct. at 1439, 103 L.Ed.2d at 729 (quoting Hadley, 397 U.S. at 54, 90 S.Ct. at 794, 25 L.Ed.2d at 49). In reality, the role of the Board of Estimate more nearly resembles that of the Commonwealth Council in the case at bar, whose equal representation factor has apparently satisfied all constitutional concerns of the Board of Supervisors. While we agree that the test is not whether the Mayors' Commission exercises administrative or legislative powers, we do not believe that the Mayors' Commission can exercise powers such as those of concern in Reynolds and its progeny. Like the Board of Freeholders in Millsap, the Mayors' Commission does not exercise general governmental powers. We therefore hold that the one person, one vote constitutional principle is not violated by the structure of the proposed commonwealth charter.