Opinion ID: 2627219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court applied the proper standard and method of review

Text: ¶ 12 The DABC challenges both the standard of review and the method of review applied by the district court. Regarding the standard of review, the DABC argues that the district court should not have conducted a de novo review in accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), [3] but should have used the more deferential standard of review articulated in section 32A-1-120 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. [4] Regarding the method of review, the DABC argues that the district court should have reviewed the record that was created during the Commission's informal adjudication. We disagree and hold that the district court applied both the proper standard and method of review to the Commission's decision. ¶ 13 Although both parties present persuasive arguments about which standard of review to apply when two applicable statutes conflict, we are ultimately convinced by a recent legislative amendment to Utah Code section 32A-1-120. The amendment clarifies that judicial review of disciplinary proceedings by the Commission shall occur pursuant to the judicial review provisions of [UAPA] Sections 63-46b-14 through 63-46b-18. [5] ¶ 14 The standard of review is a matter of procedural, rather than substantive, law. [6] `[P]rocedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well.' [7] Moreover, when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the meaning of an earlier [statute], the amendment may be applied retroactively in pending actions. [8] ¶ 15 In Kilpatrick v. Wiley , the parties disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of the comparative fault statute and the jury instructions given explaining the statute. [9] On appeal, we declined to reach the issue of whether the trial court had erroneously interpreted the comparative fault statute because the statute had been clarified by an amendment after trial, and we concluded that the amended version of the statute would be applicable on remand. [10] Similarly, in Board of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Commission ex rel. Benchmark, we applied the standard of review articulated in a recent statutory amendment despite the fact that the case commenced before the effective date of the amendment. [11] We reasoned that standards of review are procedural laws, which do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy any vested or contractual rights of the parties. [12] Accordingly, they are retroactively applicable. [13] ¶ 16 Were we to remand this case to the district court, the standard of review articulated in the amendment to section 32A-1-120 would apply on remand and the district court would be obligated to review the Commission's decision pursuant to the judicial review provisions of UAPA. Because the standard of review on remand would be the same standard that the district court applied in the first instance, we need not address which standard of review would have prevailed when the terms of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and UAPA conflicted. ¶ 17 The plain language of UAPA addresses both the standard and the method of review to be applied in reviewing an informal agency decision. Section 63-46b-15(1)(a) provides that [t]he district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings.... [14] Subsection (3)(a) provides that [t]he district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law ... presented in the pleadings. [15] Thus, in conducting a trial de novo, the district court applied the proper standard and method of review.