Opinion ID: 3027618
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionally Protected Conduct

Text: The second hurdle for a prima facie political patronage discrimination claim is for Galli to show that she “engaged in constitutionally protected conduct.” See, e.g., Stephens, 122 F.3d at 176. Our Court sometimes has described this as a requirement that “the employee maintain [] an affiliation with a 13 political party.” See, e.g., Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 663–64 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the constitutionally protected activity here is broader than the act of joining a political party. Indeed, “[t]he threat of dismissal for failure to provide [] support [to the party in power] unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal for failure to provide support only penalizes its exercise.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359. In other words, the right not to have allegiance to the official or party in power itself is protected under the First Amendment, irrespective of whether an employee is actively affiliated with an opposing candidate or party. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 519 (holding that continued public employment “cannot properly be conditioned upon . . . allegiance to the political party in control”). Accordingly, we have held that a plaintiff can meet the second prong of a prima facie political discrimination claim if she suffers because of active support for a losing candidate within the same political party. See, e.g., Robertson v. Fiore, 62 F.3d 596, 600–01 (3d Cir. 1995). In addition, we have ruled that the First Amendment also protects an employee from discrimination for failure to support the winning candidate. See Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 731 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that “a citizen’s right not to support a candidate is every bit as protected as his right to support one,” and quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984), for the proposition that “[f]reedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate”). Finally, and most 14 relevant here, we have suggested that the First Amendment protects an employee’s failure to engage in any political activity whatsoever. Bennis, 823 F.2d at 727 n.4 (“[W]e [] reject [the] suggestion [] that plaintiffs’ alleged associations . . . necessarily had to be political in order to be entitled to [F]irst [A]mendment protection.” (emphasis in original)).3 Despite this protection for constitutionally protected First Amendment activity, the District Court nonetheless concluded that Galli had no constitutional interest at stake because she did not affiliate with a political party and was apolitical. It held that Galli’s silence was not a form of expression, as it was “simply 3 District courts in our Circuit similarly have concluded that the First Amendment protects against discriminatory employment action targeting public employees who are politically neutral or apolitical. See Raniero v. Antun, 943 F. Supp. 413, 422 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that “disinclination to become involved with [protected activity] is protected by the First Amendment,” and citing Rutan, 497 U.S. at 67); Christy v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 904 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Bennis, 823 F.2d at 731, for the proposition that “the right not to politically associate is [] protected”); Conjour v. Whitehall Township, 850 F. Supp. 309, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that “the fact that [a public employee] was not politically active . . . is not dispositive of [his] First Amendment claim” because Bennis interpreted the Elrod-Branti doctrine to protect against “demotions or terminations carried out to make room for political supporters”). 15 a lack of interest” in politics, which is unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court also found it persuasive that Galli was neither compelled to participate in the Democratic Party nor forced to keep her true beliefs to herself. This misreads our interpretation of the Elrod-Branti doctrine. A citizen’s right not to support a candidate is just as relevant for First Amendment purposes as her right to support one. Bennis, 823 F.2d at 731. This applies to public employees as well. Indeed, adverse employment actions taken against public employees merely “to make positions available for political supporters” could amount to political discrimination. Id.; see also Conjour, 850 F. Supp. at 317. Therefore, contrary to the conclusion of the District Court, Galli’s failure to support the McGreevey campaign or the Democratic Party—even if because of a general apathy toward, or disdain for, politics—is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. That Galli was not pressured or forced to support the McGreevey administration or the Democratic Party, or even to silence her true beliefs, does not strip her constitutionally protected interest vested here. “[T]here is no requirement that dismissed employees prove that they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political allegiance.” Branti, 445 U.S. at 517. In this context, the District Court improperly imposed on Galli a coercion requirement in order to find that she established a constitutionally protected interest. 16 Our dissenting colleague faults our analysis on the second prong for relying on “dicta” in decisions of the Supreme Court and our Court. With regard to Elrod and Branti, however, our colleague appears to quarrel with the breadth with which the Supreme Court stated its own holdings. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350 (stating that the question presented was “whether public employees who allege that they were discharged or threatened with discharge solely because of their partisan political affiliation or nonaffiliation state a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights,” and holding that the plaintiff public employees could not be discharged “solely for the reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party”) (emphasis added)); Branti, 445 U.S. at 519 (reaffirming Elrod’s plurality holding and holding that “the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in control of the county government”) (emphasis added)).4 Even if what we read as the holdings of Elrod and Branti could be characterized as dicta and therefore not binding on us, such dicta are highly persuasive. Indeed, with regard to statements made by the Supreme Court in dicta, “we do not view [them] lightly.” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003). Because 4 Interestingly, our colleague turns to statements in Justice Stewart’s dissent in Branti (rather than the majority’s opinion) in an attempt to define the scope of the Court’s holding. Dis. Op. at 13. 17 the “Supreme Court uses dicta to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its limited docket,” failing to follow those statements could “frustrate the evenhanded administration of justice by giving litigants an outcome other than the one the Supreme Court would be likely to reach were the case heard there.” Id. (quoting In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612-613 (3d Cir. 2000)). To ignore what we perceive as persuasive statements by the Supreme Court is to place our rulings, and the analysis that underlays them, in peril. Likewise, while we are not bound by our Court’s prior dicta, we give such statements respect consistent with their persuasive value, see McLeod v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 618, 628 (3d Cir. 2004), and “can, of course, accord dicta as much weight as we deem appropriate,” New Castle County v. Nation Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 174 F.3d 338, 345 n. 7 (3d Cir. 1999). We acknowledge that our Court in Bennis reached issues, including the nonaffiliation issue, that were unnecessary to its conclusion in order to provide guidance to the District Court on remand. 823 F.2d at 730. Nonetheless, we deem its analysis persuasive and adopt the path it suggests. Dicta versus holding aside, Elrod, Branti and Bennis all stand for the proposition that a public employee, not in a policymaking position, may not be fired for failing to support the political party or candidate in power. Galli has presented 18 some evidence that she did not politically support the Democratic Party or Governor McGreevey. Whether her failure to support is evidenced by a decision to support a competing candidate or party, or by a decision to be apolitical and support no candidate or party, it is constitutionally protected.5 Because political unaffiliation, or “failure to support” the official or party in power, creates a constitutionally protected interest under the First Amendment, the District Court erred in finding that Galli did not establish this prong of her prima facie case. 5 Our colleague’s suggestions that a “failure to support” must be “close to a refusal” to support, Dis. Op. at 35, and that by deciding to be apolitical Galli was not really “exercising” her rights, Dis. Op. at 36, are inconsistent with well-settled First Amendment understandings. As the Supreme Court stated in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977): [T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. . . . A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. Id. at 714 (emphasis added). To read the First Amendment in the current context as protecting only party affiliation or active political activity is, in our view, to read the constitutional protection at issue too narrowly. 19