Opinion ID: 3047593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criminal Discovery

Text: “There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Over time a patchwork of statutory and judge-made rules has evolved to govern criminal discovery. Those rules include: (1) the Jencks Act;4 (2) the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs criminal discovery. It has been significantly expanded since the Rules were first adopted, and it now imposes discovery obligations both on the government and the defense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (1966 Amendment); id. (1974 Amendment); id. (1975 Enactment). Unlike civil discovery, where some materials are automatically produced as a matter of right, in criminal discovery, the defendant must invoke the right to discovery. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Once a defendant makes a Rule 16 discovery request and the government complies, the government is entitled to seek reciprocal discovery from the defendant. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1). Work product of the United States and of the defense are not subject to discovery under Rule 16. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2), 16(b)(2). Among the items that the government must produce upon request are: Documents and Objects. Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, docu- 4 The Jencks Act requires prosecutors to turn over to the defense statements made by testifying witnesses if those statements are in the prosecutor’s possession. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Fed R. Crim. P. 26.2; United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1552 (9th Cir. 1986). 2652 UNITED STATES v. FORT ments, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government’s possession, custody, or control and:
defense;
item in its case-in-chief at trial; or
belongs to the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). In the Ninth Circuit, federal prosecutors are deemed to have “possession and control” over material in the possession of other federal agencies as long as they have “knowledge” of and “access” to that material. United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, for the purposes of Rule 16, possession can be imputed to federal prosecutors even if they do not physically possess the materials.
Though not technically a rule of criminal discovery, Brady and its progeny play an important role in the process. Discovery decisions made by prosecutors must always be made with one eye on successful prosecution and the other on the potential for reversible error for failure to disclose information. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). The prosecutor’s duty to disclose information includes a duty to disclose information known to other agents of the government. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency, and notUNITED STATES v. FORT 2653 ing that prosecutors speak for the government as a whole). This principle was reiterated in the context of a state court prosecution in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (imputing knowledge of state police investigators to the prosecutor). “[E]vidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).