Opinion ID: 2328657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coercion of Jury Verdict

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court's screening procedure for jury notes flawed the entire proceedings below and coerced the jury's verdict. [4] Specifically, Johnson refers to the manner in which the trial court handled a note it received from the jury on May 14, 1997. The note was never provided to the court or the parties because the clerk returned the note to the jury after reviewing its contents. The court had previously instructed the courtroom clerk to screen all notes from the jury to determine whether the notes contained inappropriate information concerning the jury's numerical division on the defendant's guilt or innocence. The clerk was apparently instructed to return such a note to the jury and inform the jury that the court could not read the note. On May 14, the clerk apparently received such a note and returned it to the jury with the court's message. The court neither allowed counsel to read the note nor read the note itself. The court, however, did inform the parties that a note had been sent that contained information inappropriate for the court to know. The courtroom clerk informed the court and the parties that other than the inappropriate information, the note also contained the jury's request to go home at that point and to continue deliberating the following Monday. The court and parties then discussed how to proceed in light of the jury's note. Although Johnson conceded at oral argument that the note most likely contained polling information indicating the jury's numerical division, he argues that the court's screening procedure denied him his right to be present during all stages of the trial. [5] See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43 (Rule 43). Because Johnson failed to challenge the trial court's screening process at trial, we review this issue for plain error. See Jones v. United States, 813 A.2d 220, 223 (D.C.2002). The error must be (1) `obvious or readily apparent,' and `clear under current law'; and (2) `so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.' Hasty v. United States, 669 A.2d 127, 134 (D.C.1995) (quoting Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 795 (D.C.1993)). Upon review of the record, we do not find that plain error resulted from the trial court's jury note screening procedure. Even assuming that the court's failure to provide the May 14 note to counsel was an error of law, the error was not so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness of the trial. Hasty, 669 A.2d at 134. Johnson relies on Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823 (D.C.1988), for the proposition that the court's failure to disclose the May 14 note deprived him of the right to be present at all stages of the trial and requires reversal of his conviction in this case. Although we held in Smith that the court's failure to inform the defendant of the jury note (that indicated a numerical split among the jurors) was error, our decision to reverse the judgment in that case was based on the prejudice we perceived Smith to have suffered because of the court's subsequent action. In Smith, we held that it was conceivable that the court's failure to inform the jury that it had not read its note before delivering a Winters [6] anti-deadlock instruction would lead the jurors in the minority to believe that the instruction was aimed at them, thus resulting in a coerced verdict. Nothing in Smith suggests, however, that absent the court's actions in response to the note, we would have reversed the judgment in that case. Similarly, in Foster v. George Wash. Univ. Med. Ctr., 738 A.2d 791 (D.C.1999), a civil case, it was not the trial court's mere failure to share the jury's note with counsel that required reversal. What concerned this court was the fact that the jury note at issue in Foster asked for clarification of the substantive law in the case. Our reversal was based on the fact that, because the jury through previous notes had expressed confusion about the law, the court violated the plaintiff's right to meaningfully participate in all stages of the trial by responding without first consulting with counsel. We concluded that such a failure to consult under the circumstances where the jury had previously expressed confusion about the law, created an unacceptable risk that the verdict stemmed from a mistaken understanding of the law, and this uncertainty was enough to undermine our confidence in the verdict. Id. at 792. In this case, unlike Smith and Foster, the court's failure to disclose the jury note to counsel does not require reversal because Johnson has failed to show that any prejudice flowed from that error, and we can discern none from the record. See Hasty, 669 A.2d at 134 (requiring a showing of prejudice to constitute plain error). Here, unlike in Smith, the trial court did inform the jury that it had not read the note. More importantly, however, the trial court never gave the jury any instruction, let alone a Winters instruction, after the jury delivered its note to the court. In fact, the court's only response was to grant the jury's request to go home and continue deliberating on another day. Given these facts, we do not see how the mere failure to disclose the note in this case coerced the verdict, or in any way prejudiced Johnson. This case is also distinguishable from the circumstances in Foster because, unlike the situation in that case, there is no indication that the court's handling of the jury note created a risk that the jury's verdict was based on a misunderstanding of the law. Johnson's case is more akin to the circumstances in Hallmon v. United States, 722 A.2d 26 (D.C.1998), in which we found a violation of Rule 43 to be harmless due to lack of prejudice. In Hallmon, the jury sent a note to the court during deliberations asking for a copy of the jury instructions. The courtroom clerk received the note, and wrote back to the jury that, although the jury could not have a copy of the instructions, any part of the instructions could be reread to the jury in open court. We found that it was error for the courtroom clerk to respond directly to the jury, thereby depriving the defendant of the opportunity to respond. The error was harmless, however, because the appellant had failed to show prejudice, and we could not discern any prejudice in the record. Our finding of harmlessness was supported by the fact that the jury's note was non-substantive, in that it merely asked for a copy of the jury instructions. Id. at 28. We were unable to see how the clerk's direct response to the jury, even though it violated Rule 43, required reversal in that case. Like the appellant in Hallmon, Johnson has shown no prejudice from the court's failure to disclose the note. This case, in fact, presents less egregious circumstances than those in Hallmon or our more recent decision in Johnson v. United States, [7] 804 A.2d 297 (D.C.2002), because, at most, the jury merely revealed its numerical division and asked to go home and continue deliberations another day. There is no indication in the record that the jury asked for a reinstruction or an explanation on the substantive law in the case. Any argument that the court's failure to disclose the note affected Johnson's substantial rights is purely speculative, and we fail to find any plain error in the trial court's handling of the jury note. [8]
Johnson next argues that the court's failure to poll the jury and deliver an anti-deadlock instruction to the jury resulted in a coerced verdict. After less than three days of trial, the jury began deliberations on May 9, 1997. Thereafter, the jury sent the court a series of notes. On May 12, the jury's note stated: What happens if `we' cannot agree on all three charges?... Must all three charges be agreed upon? In response to this question, the court instructed the jury to continue and try to agree on all of the charges. At the time you find that you absolutely cannot we'll discuss that at that time. About two hours later the same day, the jury sent another note: We can't come to an agreement? [sic] Perhaps we can all agree by tomorrow. The court dismissed the jury for the day, but did not address the jury's inability to reach a decision. The next day, the jury sent the court another note. This note stated: Can we skip a day, Wednesday and come back Thursday? We still cannot come to a united decision on all three counts. How long before it would be a mistrial? The court responded by telling the jury that, because of scheduling conflicts, the court could not allow the jury to skip a day of deliberations. The court did not respond to the jury's question about a mistrial. On May 14, as mentioned previously, the jury asked for permission to leave early and return the following Monday, and the court granted the request. Finally, on Monday, May 19, the jury deliberated for approximately ten minutes and returned guilty verdicts on all three charges. The trial court has discretion in dealing with jury polls and instructions. Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697, 705 n. 14 (D.C.1993). We, therefore, review the trial court's rulings for abuse of that discretion. Id. Johnson alleges that the hints in the jury notes should have indicated to the court that the jury was deadlocked, and the court's failure to give an anti-deadlock instruction ultimately coerced the verdict. We have held that an inquiry into whether a jury verdict was coerced is made from the perspective of the jurors, evaluated in context, and based on several factors. See Harris, 622 A.2d at 701-06. None of the factors we set forth in Harris are present here, and Johnson has not pointed to any of those factors as supporting his contention that the jury was coerced. Because the trial court has the right and duty to urge a jury to work diligently to reach a fair and freely arrived at verdict, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure to give an anti-deadlock instruction. [9] Id. at 701.