Opinion ID: 172508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court must resentence Mr. Charles in the wake of Chambers.

Text: Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of USSG § 4B1.1(a) is a question of statutory construction that we review de novo. United States v. Paxton, 422 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir.2005). When interpreting the Guidelines, we look at the language in the guideline itself, as well as at the `interpretative and explanatory commentary to the guideline' provided by the Sentencing Commission. United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Commentary to the Guidelines is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline. Id. (citation omitted). The PSR calculated Mr. Charles's offense level to be 24, because he had two qualifying federal convictions: (1) a crime of violence (escape from lawful custody), and (2) a controlled substance offense (possession with intent to distribute 7.51 grams of crack cocaine). See USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). After applying a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1, the recommended total offense level was 21. With a criminal history category of IV, the advisory Guideline sentencing range was 57-71 months. Mr. Charles objected to the PSR's inclusion of the crime of escape as a crime of violence, and restated his objection at the sentencing hearing. The district court filed a lengthy order rejecting Mr. Charles's contentions and sentenced him to 57 months of imprisonment. Under his theory, if the court determined his conviction to be a non-violent crime, he would have a total offense level of 17, which yields an advisory guideline range of 37-46 months. The government now joins Mr. Charles in asking the court not to treat his walkaway escape as a crime of violence. Although we appreciate its candor and willingness to simplify our task, the government's concession is not dispositive because a party's position in a case (even when that party is the United States) does not dictate the meaning of a federal law. United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 248, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998)). USSG § 4B1.1(a) provides the parameters for a defendant's career offender status, indicating he is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years of age at the time the felony was committed, (2) the felony is either a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence or controlled substance offense. An offense is a crime of violence if it, among other things, involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. USSG § 4B1.2(a). The commentary refines the definition, noting: Other offenses are included as crimes of violence if (A) that offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted involved use of explosives (including any explosive material or destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id., cmt. n. 1 (emphasis added). In determining whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to engage in `a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.' United States v. Dennis, 551 F.3d 986, 988 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). Under this approach, we consider the offense generically, that is to say, we examine it in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1584, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008); Nijhawan v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) (noting the Court looks to the word `felony' to refer to a generic crime as generally committed) (emphasis supplied). If the statute is ambiguous, or broad enough to encompass both violent and nonviolent crimes, Dennis, 551 F.3d at 988, we employ the so-called modified categorical approach which allows analysis of certain records of the prior proceeding, such as the charging documents, the judgment, any plea thereto, and findings by the sentencing court. Id. (alterations, citations, and quotations omitted); Nijhawan, 129 S.Ct. at 2299. Such review does not involve a subjective inquiry into the facts of the case, but rather its purpose is to determine which part of the statute was charged against the defendant and, thus, which portion of the statute to examine on its face. United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In this case, Mr. Charles was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), which prohibits the generic crime of escap[ing] or attempt[ing] to escape from the custody of the Attorney General, and includes failing to return to custody. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). The district court apparently considered the plea agreement, which specified that Mr. Charles had escaped the custody of a halfway house, but the court was without the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Chambers. Before Chambers, the categorization of an escape conviction was well-settled in this Circuit, because we held that all escape convictions were crimes of violence under § 4B1.2. See United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994) (Every escape scenario is a powder keg.) (holding walkaway escape under North Dakota statute a crime of violence); see also United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir.1999) (where defendant escaped from a prison honor camp, holding categorically that an escape always constitutes conduct that presents a serous potential risk of physical injury to another) (emphasis supplied); United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir.1997) (Oklahoma walkaway from community treatment center was crime of violence under § 4B1.2, applying Gosling ). Thus, pre- Chambers we would likely have determined, as the district court did, that Mr. Charles's walkaway from a halfway house under § 751(a) constituted purposeful and aggressive conduct that is roughly similar to the risk of confrontation in burglary. Rec. doc. 43, at 21; see Gosling, 39 F.3d at 1142 ([E]ven in a case where a defendant escapes from a jail by stealth and injures no one in the process, there is still a serious potential risk that injury will result when officers find the defendant and attempt to place him in custody.). In Chambers, however, the Supreme Court considered a conviction based on a seven-pronged Illinois statute that, in the Court's view, contained at least two separate categories of crimes, and possibly a third: escape from custody, failure to report to a penal institution, and failing to adhere to home-confinement conditions. 129 S.Ct. at 691 (noting that Illinois statute criminalized (1) escape from a penal institution, (2) escape from the custody of an employee of a penal institution, (3) failure to report to a penal institution, (4) failure to report for periodic imprisonment, (5) failure to return from furlough, (6) failure to return from work and day release, and (7) failure to adhere to the conditions of home confinement). Mr. Chambers had been convicted of failure to report. Id. at 690. The Supreme Court concluded that failure to report is not a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because it does not involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id. at 691 (quotations omitted). [2] The Court continued that crimes involving failure to report (or to return) to detention represent a form of inaction, a far cry from the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct potentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion. Id. at 691-92 (internal marks and citation omitted). Here, we must reexamine Chambers 's impact upon our holding that all escape convictions are crimes of violence for purposes of the career offender provisions. See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 752 n. 14 (10th Cir.2008) (We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.) (emphasis supplied); cf. United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 422-23 (6th Cir.2009) ([ Chambers ] requires us to modify our prior decisions suggesting that all manner of escape ... including failures to report, constitute crimes of violence. Chambers ... undermines the notion that a `walkaway' conviction is a crime of violence.). While Chambers did not speak directly to walkaway escapes, as the Sixth Circuit recognized in Ford, Chambers undermines our prior case law. In Chambers, the Court did not discuss whether escape from custody crimes are sometimes or always violent felonies under the ACCA, except to note that failure to report would seem less likely to involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive, more aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody. Id. at 691; but see United States v. Delgado, 320 Fed.Appx. 286 (5th Cir.2009) (holding that walkaway from community treatment center conviction was a crime of violence consistent with Chambers ) (unpublished). As our Sixth Circuit colleagues noted: Much as failures to report to custody represent a distinct form of escape, moreover, so do walkaways. There is a difference between individuals who overcome physical barriers to freedom and those who walk off the grounds  those in other words who leave a facility without removing a physical restraint, without breaking a lock on a door, without climbing over a prison wall or security fence or without otherwise breaking through any other form of security designed to keep them put. Ford, 560 F.3d at 424 (citing United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378, 382-83 (7th Cir.2008) (remanding for resentencing to consider charging papers for escape convictions under Begay )). Chambers compels a modification of our circuit precedent and in turn, the separate treatment of walkaway escapes after Chambers deserves an explanation. Ford, 560 F.3d at 426. This is no simple task and we acknowledge that the determination of whether Mr. Charles's conviction under § 751(a) was a career-offender-qualifying conviction requires some inquiry, [a]nd sometimes the choice is not obvious. Chambers, 129 S.Ct. at 690. The application of the categorical method is not always easy because a subsection of a criminal statute may refer to several different crimes, [a]nd it can happen that some of these crimes involve violence while others do not. Nijhawan, 129 S.Ct. at 2299. Indeed, in Chambers, Justice Alito wrote separately and recognized the many complications that accompany this task and emphasize[d] that only Congress can rescue the federal courts from the mire into which ACCA's draftsmanship [here, the analogous career offender guidelines] and Taylor 's `categorical approach' have pushed us. 129 S.Ct. at 694 (Alito, J., concurring). Because the district court limited its factual findings to pre- Chambers precedent, we must reverse and remand Mr. Charles's case for resentencing. The district court should analyze Mr. Charles's prior escape conviction under § 751(a) in light of Chambers to determine whether or not this conviction was a career-offender-qualifying escape from custody. See United States v. Pearson, 553 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir.2009) (concluding post- Chambers that 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) is overinclusive because it covers conduct that does and does not trigger the career offender enhancement and therefore remanding for a determination of whether the conviction at issue was a career-offender-qualifying escape from custody, or a non-qualifying failure to return or report to custody); United States v. Harris, No. 08-1090, 2009 WL 1610151, ___ Fed.Appx. ___ (10th Cir. June 10, 2009) (remanding where defendant had apparently attempted to escape from community corrections center in violation of a Colorado statute, noting we need not decide whether Chambers dictates that an attempted walk-away escape from a community corrections program is or is not a crime of violence because  subsequent to briefing  the parties agreed that this case should be remanded to the district court for resentencing using a modified categorical approach); United States v. Young, 318 Fed.Appx. 715 (10th Cir.2009) (remanding where the record did not establish the nature of defendant's escape from a community corrections center or the escape statute under which defendant was convicted, for resentencing post- Chambers ).