Opinion ID: 1701978
Heading Depth: 1
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Heading: introduction

Text: Dillbeck was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed burglary. [2] In accordance with the jury's eight-to-four recommendation, the trial judge sentenced Dillbeck to death for the murder conviction, finding five aggravating circumstances, [3] one statutory mitigating circumstance, [4] and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. [5] Dillbeck also received two consecutive life sentences for the armed robbery and armed burglary convictions. We affirmed the convictions and the sentences on direct appeal. Dillbeck v. State, 643 So.2d 1027 (Fla.1994). Dillbeck filed a rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief on April 23, 1997, and an amended motion on April 16, 2001. In the amended motion, Dillbeck raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, some falling under the ineffectiveness per se, presumed prejudice standard of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), and some falling under the traditional, two-pronged standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, Dillbeck claimed that without his consent, his trial counsel conceded that Dillbeck was guilty of first-degree murder. Dillbeck argued that he, therefore, was entitled to relief under Cronic and Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618 (Fla.2000) (applying Cronic to claim that counsel conceded defendant's guilt to first-degree murder without defendant's affirmative and explicit consent), on the ground that counsel's performance was ineffective per se. Second, Dillbeck claimed that his trial counsel conceded the applicability of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance without his consent. Dillbeck argued that he, therefore, was entitled to relief under Cronic and Nixon on the ground that counsel's performance was ineffective per se or, alternatively, under the traditional, two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), on the ground that counsel's performance was deficient and he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Dillbeck also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for (1) failing during voir dire to challenge certain jurors for cause, (2) failing to move for a change of venue, (3) failing to request a PET scan, and (4) introducing at the penalty phase details of Dillbeck's criminal history. Finally, Dillbeck argued that at trial he was denied the presumption of innocence by being forced to wear restraints in the jury's presence. The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which both Dillbeck and Dillbeck's trial counsel testified. The circuit court then denied relief in an inelaborate order, stating only that Dillbeck's motion was without grounds for relief and ... there would be no benefit from a further recitation of the facts or argument by this Court. State v. Dillbeck, Case No. 90-2795-AF (Fla.2d Cir. Ct. order filed Sept. 3, 2002) (Order Denying Amended Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction and Sentence). Dillbeck now appeals the circuit court's denial of relief. [6] He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that Florida's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002).