Opinion ID: 212570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Second Motion to Remand

Text: 3 Johnson’s amended complaint mislabeled this count as Count IV. 7 Johnson never responded to the district court’s order or to Wellborn’s second motion to dismiss. Instead, Johnson filed a second motion to remand her case to state court. Johnson argued, inter alia, that: (1) the claims in her amended complaint arose under state law, the parties were non-diverse and, consequently, subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking; (2) Defendant Wellborn’s removal violated 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because Wellborn was a citizen of Florida; and (3) Defendant Kear failed to file a responsive pleading even though Johnson had served with him with notice of her action electronically and by U.S. First Class mail. The district court denied Johnson’s second motion to remand. The district court explained that Johnson could not rely on her amended complaint to defeat federal question jurisdiction because her original complaint, alleging federal claims, was properly removed to federal court. G. Dismissal Order Granting Wellborn’s Second Motion to Dismiss After setting the trial date, scheduling discovery and referring the case for mediation, the district court granted Wellborn’s second motion to dismiss. The district court did not address Wellborn’s standing argument, but instead concluded that Johnson’s amended complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 8 The district court first noted that Johnson had failed to respond to Wellborn’s second motion to dismiss or the court’s show cause order to do so. As to the tortious interference claim in Count I, the district court emphasized that Johnson did not allege she was a borrower on the mortgage or that she had any contractual relationship with Ocwen. Rather, Johnson’s contract was with N.A.C.A., and the amended complaint did not allege any acts by the Defendants that prevented N.A.C.A. from fulfilling its contractual obligations to try to obtain a loan modification for Johnson. The district court dismissed the IJTCA claim in Count II because the amended complaint did not allege that Johnson was a tortfeasor entitled to contribution. Finally, the district court dismissed Count III, concluding that, because Johnson failed to state a claim in her first two counts, she could not seek an injunction based on these claims. Johnson pro se appealed.