Opinion ID: 687059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unexpected or Unusual Event

Text: 12 The district court's conclusion that the incident involving Craig did not qualify as an Article 17 accident was based on the factual record. The court assumed, as it had to on a motion for summary judgment, that what Craig alleged was so, that is, that fellow passenger Hill's shoes caused Craig to fall, and that the fall caused Craig's injury. Notwithstanding these assumed facts, the court held that it is not unexpected or unusual to find shoes on the floor between seats on an international flight. 13 Craig asserts that slipping on her neighbor's shoes was unexpected. While this assertion is undoubtedly true, it improperly applies the word unexpected to the injury rather than to the cause of the injury. The term unexpected as used in Saks modifies the event that causes injury; such an event is an accident. 470 U.S. at 400. Craig's use of the term unexpected would expand the scope of liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to encompass any misfortune that befalls an airplane passenger. According to the Supreme Court in Saks, this is plainly what the Convention drafters sought to avoid. In interpreting the records of the Convention negotiations, the Court noted: A passenger's injury must be caused by an accident, and an accident must mean something different than an 'occurrence' on the plane. Id. at 403. The more general term occurrence, by contrast, was intended to define the events that would establish liability for damage to baggage under Article 18. Id. at 402. 14 While the district court held as a matter of law that the presence of shoes on the cabin floor was neither unexpected nor unusual, we affirm on a slightly different theory. It was plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that the presence of shoes on the floor between two seats was an unexpected or unusual event. In response to defendant's motion for summary judgment, the only evidence plaintiff offered to that effect was her declaration in which she stated her understanding, based on past experience, that shoes are supposed to be stowed underneath seats or in overhead compartments and her surprise that in this particular instance they were not. Plaintiff did not submit or point to any evidence (such as an affidavit from a flight attendant) that finding shoes on the floor between two seats was unusual or unexpected. Nor did plaintiff ask for a trial or further discovery to establish anything more than her own declaration. Indeed, at the December 1992 hearing on summary judgment, plaintiff's counsel said, I think there is enough information here to make a ruling to deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment.... And in her brief to us, she states that summary judgment in her favor is appropriate. 15 Under the circumstances, Craig's declaration was the only evidence purporting to show that the presence of shoes on the cabin floor was unexpected or unusual, which was the key element that plaintiff had to prove to show that an accident caused her injury. 16 It is true that in her declaration Craig claims that she believed that the patch of floor on which she was stepping was unobstructed, and that the presence of shoes there was--to her--an unexpected event. While these assertions may be true, her belief is not controlling. On this record, we hold that on a motion for summary judgment, absent a proffer by plaintiff of further supporting evidence, the court could conclude that the presence of shoes was not an unexpected event. 17 AFFIRMED.