Opinion ID: 2628033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Equal Protection and the Right To Travel

Text: The Alaska Constitution provides that all persons are entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law. [9] We interpret this provision to be a command to state and local governments to treat those who are similarly situated alike. [10] When equal protection claims are raised, the question is whether two groups of people who are treated differently are similarly situated and therefore are entitled to equal treatment under the constitution. In order to determine whether differently treated groups are similarly situated, we look to the state's reasons for treating the groups differently. As a matter of nomenclature we refer to that portion of a law that treats two groups differently as a classification. [11] We most often review a classification by asking whether a legitimate reason for disparate treatment exists, and, given a legitimate reason, whether the enactment creating the classification bears a fair and substantial relationship to that reason. [12] The legitimate reason inquiry is the standard level of scrutiny that we apply in equal protection cases. But when a classification is based on a suspect factor (for example, race, national origin, or alienage) or infringes on fundamental rights (for example, voting, litigating, or the exercise of intimate personal choices) a classification will be upheld only when the enactment furthers a compelling state interest and the enactment is necessary to the achievement of that interest. [13] We refer to this as the strict scrutiny standard. Some cases fall between standard scrutiny and strict scrutiny. With respect to these we use a sliding scale. As the right asserted becomes `more fundamental' or the classification scheme employed becomes `more constitutionally suspect,' the challenged law `is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at a more elevated position on our sliding scale.' [14] Although theoretically there are any number of requirements that could be used in cases falling between standard and strict scrutiny, we have in practice required that classifications be based on governmental interests that are important, and, as with standard scrutiny, we have insisted that the enactments bear a substantial relationship to the accomplishment of their objectives. [15] In the present case Gallant claims that the classification in question burdens the right to travel. We have recognized the right to travel as a right that is protected by the equal protection clause of the state constitution. [16] In order to determine the degree of scrutiny that should be applied in cases claiming an infringement of the right to travel, we balance the extent of the infringement against the purpose of the statute and the closeness of the relationship between the means employed by the statute to further that purpose and the purpose itself. [17] There is an awkwardness to this approach. In order to determine what degree of scrutiny to employ, we must address the whole range of questions posed by our equal protection methodology. In other words, we have to quantify (a) the importance of the state's purpose, (b) the extent of the infringement on the right to travel, and (c) the closeness of the relationship between the means employed by the statute and its purpose. The answers to these questions determine both the degree of scrutiny that we should employ and whether the challenged statute violates the equal protection clause. [18] Although this approach is cumbersome, we will continue to use it because it requires that we examine in some form the factors that should be examined in cases of this nature.