Opinion ID: 1057821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Facilitation of Escape

Text: The Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for facilitating escape. She claims that because she did not actually help her son, Travis Gilliam, escape from the custody of a penal institution, she cannot be held culpable under the terms of the statute. The Defendant submits that her son's escape was some three months prior to the drowning, not when the State claimed she attempted to thwart his discovery. In response, the State emphasizes that an escape includes failure to return to custody following temporary leave, maintaining that because escape is a continuing offense, the Defendant, by protecting Gilliam from contact with the police, facilitated his escape status. Once again, we begin our analysis with the relevant statutory provisions. It is unlawful for any person arrested for, charged with, or convicted of an offense to escape from a penal institution, as defined in § 39-16-601. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-605(a) (2006). [2] An escape is the unauthorized departure from custody or failure to return to custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose or limited period. . . . Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-601(3) (2006) (emphasis added). Custody means under arrest by a law enforcement officer or under restraint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a court. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-601(2) (2006). Further, an individual commits the offense of facilitating escape where one intentionally or knowingly permit[s] or facilitate[s] the escape of a person in custody. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-607(b) (2006). While prior law required penal legislation to be strictly construed, the 1989 Act provides for an interpretation of criminal statutes according to the fair import of their terms . . . to promote justice, and effect the objectives of the criminal code. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-104 (2006). In analyzing the scope and applicability of these statutes, the Court of Criminal Appeals, relying on an unpublished opinion filed over twenty years ago, began with the premise that escape is a continuing offense, the legislative intent being to sanction an ongoing course of conduct. [3] Although we have never addressed this issue in the context of an escape, [4] this Court has applied the continuing offense doctrine in a kidnapping originating in Alabama with the arrest in Tennessee, holding that every moment an offense is continued, the offense is committed anew. State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 116 & n. 3 (Tenn.1999). In Legg, this Court ruled that [a]n offense may be considered a continuing offense only when `the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that [the legislature] must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.' Id. at 116 (alteration in original) (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970)). Because kidnapping involved an interference with the liberty of the victim, this Court concluded that the crime continued until that liberty was restored. See id. at 117. We held that under the terms of the statute, no period of confinement could be divided into multiple segments with various points of termination. Id. Using rationale similar to our own in Legg, a majority of circuit courts in the federal system have held that escape is indeed a continuing offense. See, e.g., United States v. Lancaster, 501 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Audinot, 901 F.2d 1201, 1203 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 570-71 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728, 732 (8th Cir.1976). Moreover, in United States v. Bailey, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it was clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody as defined in [U.S.C.] § 751(a) is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure. Given the continuing threat to society posed by an escaped prisoner, the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one. 444 U.S. 394, 413, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (quoting Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858); see also Lancaster, 501 F.3d at 680 (stating that the majority rule is the better reasoned approach). Further, the overwhelming majority of state courts have concluded that escape is a continuing offense. The seriousness of the offense of escape together with a manifest legislative purpose of deterrence are typical of the reasons for the interpretation that an escape does not end until the arrest. See, e.g., Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984); People v. Miller, 157 Ill. App.3d 43, 109 Ill.Dec. 146, 509 N.E.2d 807, 808-09 (Ill.Ct.App.1987); State v. Francois, 577 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 1998); State v. Burnett, 292 Minn. 484, 195 N.W.2d 189, 189 (1972); State v. Stull, 112 Nev. 18, 909 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1996); State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 671 (1998); Parent v. State, 31 Wis.2d 106, 141 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1966). We are persuaded that escape is a continuing offense under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-601(3). The statutory language defining escape is broad, encompassing not only an unauthorized departure from custody but also a failure to return to custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose or limited period. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-601(3) (2006). Nothing in the statutory definition provides a basis for determining that an escape ends once an inmate has left the physical boundaries of the prison or has eluded capture for a certain period of time. Thus, the statutory language, coupled with the ongoing danger inherent in an escape, lends credence to the proposition that the offense is continuing in nature. Legg, 9 S.W.3d at 116-17; see also State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tenn.2007) (Legislative intent is determined `from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning.' (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000))). Whether the facilitation of an escape qualifies as a continuing offense is a more difficult question. Several federal decisions have indicated, for example, that the offense of assisting an escape terminates once the escapee has reached temporary safety. United States v. Vowiell, 869 F.2d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Smithers, 27 F.3d 142, 144-45 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that the offense of assisting escape ends once immediate active pursuit of the escapee ends); accord Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566, 568 (4th Cir.1918). These decisions, however, are based primarily on the distinction in federal statutes between the crime of assisting an escape under 18 U.S.C. § 752 and the crime of harboring or concealing an escaped prisoner under 18 U.S.C. § 1072. Vowiell, 869 F.2d at 1267-68. In short, federal statutes specifically indicate that [a]ssisting escapees after the escape is complete constitutes a separate crime  harboring or concealing escapees. Id. at 1269 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1072). At least one state court, however, has rejected this distinction under their statutory scheme. See State v. Martinez, 109 N.M. 34, 781 P.2d 306, 309 (N.M.Ct.App. 1989). In Martinez , the defendant challenged three convictions for assisting escape by arguing that he was not involved in the inmates' escape from the penitentiary and that he did not assist the inmates until three weeks after their escape. Id. at 307. The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected that assertion, holding that [t]he crime of escape does not end at the prison door, nor at a point in time when a prisoner successfully eludes immediate pursuit or reaches temporary sanctuary. Id. at 308. The court concluded that because escape was a continuing offense, a person who intentionally aids a person to avoid recapture, who he knows has escaped from lawful custody, may properly be charged with the offense of assisting escape. Id. at 309. Moreover, the court specifically rejected the claim that the defendant's conduct amounted to harboring or concealing a fugitive but not assisting escape. Id. at 310. While federal statutes specifically proscribed harboring or concealing `any prisoner after his escape, ' the State of New Mexico had no such crime. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1072) (emphasis added). In our view, the reasoning in Martinez is the more compelling of the alternatives. As stated, our definition of escape is broad, encompassing the failure to return from a temporary grant of release. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-601(3) (2006). Additionally, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-607(b) specifically defines the offense of facilitating escape as intentionally or knowingly permit[ting] or facilitat[ing] the escape of a person in custody. The offense is complete whether or not the fugitive was charged with or convicted of a felony but increases from Class E to Class C if a felony. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-607(c)(1), (3). In contrast, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-411, which defines an accessory after the fact, only pertains to those assisting felony offenders: (a) A person is an accessory after the fact who, after the commission of a felony, with knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that the offender has committed the felony, and with the intent to hinder the arrest, trial, conviction or punishment of the offender: (1) Harbors or conceals the offender; (2) Provides or aids in providing the offender with any means of avoiding arrest, trial, conviction or punishment; or (3) Warns the offender of impending apprehension or discovery. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-411(a) (2006) (emphasis added). While section 39-16-607 specifically addresses one who facilitates an escape from any kind of custody, section 39-11-411 only applies to one who harbors or conceals, aids, or warns one who has committed a felony. Our statutory scheme is more like that in New Mexico than in the federal system. Thus, our view is that escape qualifies as a continuing offense and that facilitation of an escape includes any assistance given to those who fail to return to custody. From our interpretation of these statutory provisions and our determination that the escape is a continuing offense, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for facilitating escape. There was proof that the Defendant's son, Travis Gilliam, was being held in a Level Three juvenile justice facility. When granted a pass to visit an ill grandmother, he did not return. The Defendant was aware that her son failed to return to custody. She admitted that he had been staying with her part of the time with the full knowledge that he was on escape status. Moreover, on July 16, 2004, after the victim disappeared and Scott called 911, the Defendant directed her companions to get [her son] out of there before the police got there because they would send him off or put him back in jail. The Defendant's son left the scene with another individual and remained on escape status for over six months thereafter. Under these facts, a rational jury could have found that the Defendant intentionally or knowingly facilitated the escape status of her son. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-607(b) (2006).