Opinion ID: 2613240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: timeliness: exercise of discretion

Text: The State next argues that Judge Swedberg's ruling on the motions raised in the omnibus application and order was discretionary, precluding the later filing of an affidavit of prejudice. Parra contends that the omnibus order, which he describes as a preliminary procedural ruling, was not discretionary. Brief of Appellant, at 7. Both parties cite Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 51 Wn. App. 561, 754 P.2d 1243, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1025 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1015, 104 L.Ed.2d 174, 109 S.Ct. 1736 (1989) in support of their respective positions. In Rhinehart, the trial court had signed two orders; one order set a date certain for complying with an earlier discovery order and the second order permitted substitution of counsel. In its analysis the Court of Appeals defined discretion as follows: The exercise of discretion is not involved where a certain action or result follows as matter of right upon a mere request; rather, the court's discretion is invoked only where, in the exercise of that discretion, the court may either grant or deny a party's request. Rhinehart, at 578 (citing State ex rel. Mead v. Superior Court, 108 Wash. 636, 640, 185 P. 628 (1919)). Applying this definition to the facts, the Court of Appeals in that case held that the two orders required an exercise of discretion. Parra contends that the motions granted by the court in this omnibus order related to discovery matters to which each side was entitled as a matter of right under CrR 4.7. Therefore, applying the definition from Rhinehart, he asserts that the parties did not invoke the court's discretion. Contrary to the defendant's position, the State argues that the requested disclosures in this case were for materials or information covered by the discretionary provisions of the rule. [2] CrR 4.7(a) mandates that the State disclose certain materials to the defense. Likewise, CrR 4.7(b)(1) outlines those materials which the defense is required to disclose. Any matters not covered under those mandatory provisions of the rule fall within the discretion of the court. CrR 4.7(b)(2) lists matters which the court may require the defendant to disclose. CrR 4.7(e)(1) provides that the court, in its discretion, may require the State to disclose matters to the defense which are not otherwise provided for by the rule. Among the motions granted in this case by Judge Swedberg were the following defense requests: 16. To disclose whether it [the State] will rely on prior acts or convictions of a similar nature for proof of knowledge or intent. .... 19. To disclose what physical evidence, if any, has been or will be sent to any agency for testing, and, if so, supply: (a) Name and address of the agency which will be performing the tests; (b) Nature of tests to be performed; and (c) What date the physical evidence will be returned from the testing agency. Omnibus Application and Order; Supplemental Clerk's Papers, at 17-18. These defense requests are not specifically covered in the mandatory provisions of CrR 4.7. Rather, these motions covered matters which the court might, in its discretion, require the State to disclose under CrR 4.7(e)(1), Discretionary Disclosures. The court also granted the following state motions: 15. For discovery of the names and addresses of defendant's witnesses and their statements and dates of birth. .... 19. Defendant to state whether his prior convictions will be stipulated or need to be proved, and if defendant was represented by an attorney. 20. Defendant to state whether he will stipulate to the continuous chain of custody of evidence from acquisition to trial. (Italics ours.) Omnibus Application and Order; Supplemental Clerk's Papers, at 19-20. As with the defense motions listed above, these requests for disclosure made by the State are not within the mandatory provisions of the discovery rule. Rather, they fall under CrR 4.7(b)(2), the discretionary provision of the rule pertaining to defendant's obligations. Since both the defense and prosecution requests noted above fell within the discretionary provisions of CrR 4.7, we find that neither party was entitled to the requested materials as a matter of right. Parra next argues that regardless of whether the parties had a right to the discovery materials requested in the omnibus application, neither the defense nor the State objected to the other's motions; therefore, the judge's discretion was not invoked. The defendant contends that the omnibus order was akin to a stipulation because neither party objected to entry of the order. State ex rel. Floe v. Studebaker, 17 Wn.2d 8, 16-17, 134 P.2d 718 (1943). In Floe, the litigants signed a stipulated order consolidating two court actions for the purpose of trial. Floe, at 16. The Floe court held that for purposes of an affidavit of prejudice such orders did not invoke the court's discretion: Neither do we think it can be said that the court was called upon by any of the attorneys connected with this case to make any ruling involving discretion, as contemplated by the statute. We do not believe it can be said that the court is required to exercise discretion when asked to make an order involving preliminary matters such as continuing a case, or for consolidation, where all the parties have stipulated that such order be made. (Italics ours.) Floe, at 17. The distinction drawn in Floe relating to stipulations makes sense. When first enacted in 1911, the affidavit of prejudice statute did not contain a timeliness requirement. In order to avoid the absurd result of parties invoking the court's discretion and then waiting to see the disposition of the judge before asserting the right, this court read a timeliness requirement into the statute in State ex rel. Lefebvre v. Clifford, 65 Wash. 313, 315, 118 P. 40 (1911). In Lefebvre, the judge made an ex parte order which the moving party perceived as prejudicial. Before the date of trial, the party filed an affidavit of prejudice which the trial court denied. In sustaining the trial court's ruling, this court stated: [W]e cannot conclude that it was intended by the act that a party could submit to the jurisdiction of the court by waiving his rights to object until by some ruling of the court in a case he becomes fearful that the judge is not favorable to his view of the case. In other words, he is not allowed to speculate upon what rulings the court will make on propositions that are involved in the case and, if the rulings do not happen to be in his favor, to then for the first time raise the jurisdictional question. Lefebvre, at 316. Thus, the Lefebvre court's timeliness requirement stated essentially that an affidavit of prejudice was timely so long as it was filed before the court made any ruling apprising the parties of the court's predisposition in the case. As Floe implicitly acknowledged, many issues may be resolved between the parties and presented to the court in the form of an agreed order. These matters will generally resolve pretrial disputes regarding such issues as admissibility of evidence, discovery, identity of witnesses, and anticipated defenses. If the parties have resolved such issues among themselves and have not invoked the discretion of the court for such resolution, then the parties will not have been alerted to any possible disposition that a judge may have toward their case. [3] The distinction between the agreement reached in Floe and the omnibus order here is that the parties had not resolved the issues between themselves. Rather than presenting a stipulation, the parties each submitted motions to the court for its ruling. The following discourse ensued when the parties presented the order to the court: MR. KOMOROWSKI: Your, Honor, I have completed omnibus application on behalf of Mr. Parra, and I have no objection to any of the State's requests. .... MR. GRANT: ... I have no objection to the defense's requests. THE COURT: Very well. Your respective motions will be granted. Report of Proceedings (Oct. 27, 1992), at 3. In an exercise of his discretion, the judge ruled consistent with the positions of the parties. That the judge elected to grant the motions in this case, rather than deny, does not indicate that the judge failed to exercise discretion. To either grant or deny a motion involves discretion. In this same vein, the defendant also urges that the motions raised by the parties became stipulations when counsel for each side announced there would be no objection. We find no merit in Parra's analogy. [4] The following definitions highlight the differences between motions and stipulations. [A motion is] [a]n application made to a court or judge for purpose of obtaining a rule or order directing some act to be done in favor of the applicant. State v. James, Mo., 347 S.W.2d 211, 216.... [Stipulation is] [t]he name given to any agreement made by the attorneys engaged on opposite sides of a cause (especially if in writing), regulating any matter incidental to the proceedings or trial, which falls within their jurisdiction. Voluntary agreement between opposing counsel concerning disposition of some relevant point so as to obviate need for proof or to narrow range of litigable issues. Arrington v. State, Fla., 233 So.2d 634, 636. An agreement, admission or confession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties thereto or their attorneys. Bourne v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 209 Kan. 511, 497 P.2d 110, 114. Black's Law Dictionary at 913, 1269 (5th ed. 1979). Generally, a stipulation is an agreement between the parties to which there must be mutual assent. State v. Adler, 16 Wn. App. 459, 558 P.2d 817 (1976), review denied, 88 Wn.2d 1011 (1977). Furthermore, to be effective, the terms of a stipulation must be definite and certain. 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 2 (1974). Stipulations are favored by courts and will be enforced unless good cause is shown to the contrary. Smyth Worldwide Movers, Inc. v. Whitney, 6 Wn. App. 176, 491 P.2d 1356 (1971). If the court refuses to accept a stipulation, the effect is generally to place the parties in their original positions regarding the matters affected by the stipulation. Each party is then free to seek resolution of the issue through a motion before a judge. [5] Even though in this case neither party objected to the motions of the other, the matters were still before the court for resolution. They had not reached an agreement which would potentially bind them to their positions. While it may be true that a stipulation could have yielded the same result in this case as not objecting to opposing counsel's motions, the parties chose instead to leave the decision to the court. We conclude that a party's decision not to object does not constitute a stipulation by that party. Finally, Mr. Parra compares the omnibus order to pretrial orders in civil cases. He argues that courts in civil cases have held that pretrial matters such as setting trial dates, deadlines for submissions of documents, settlement dates, and pretrial conference dates are not discretionary for purposes of affidavits of prejudice, citing Hanno v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 67 Wn. App. 681, 838 P.2d 1144 (1992) and In re Marriage of Hennemann, 69 Wn. App. 345, 848 P.2d 760 (1993). We find little similarity between the pretrial matters in those cases and the motions granted by the omnibus order in this case. In Hanno, the trial judge declined to accept an affidavit of prejudice on the grounds that he had made a discretionary ruling prior to the filing of the affidavit. In that case, the judge had filled in the blanks on a pretrial order form, setting dates for mediation, settlement demands, and the pretrial conference. The Court of Appeals held that these pretrial orders were not discretionary within the meaning of RCW 4.12.050. Hanno, at 683. The facts in Hennemann were nearly identical to those in Hanno. The only ruling prior to the filing of the affidavit was the entry of a form order on pretrial procedures which was limited to dates for trial, settlement, and pretrial conference. Relying on Hanno, the Court of Appeals held that the judge's ruling did not involve discretion under the language of the statute. Unlike the setting of dates in those cases, the judge's ruling here resolved substantive discovery matters. Mr. Parra expresses concern that if a court's ruling on preliminary matters at an omnibus hearing are held to be discretionary the defendant will be required to use its only affidavit on the possibility that the same judge will later be assigned to preside over the trial. During argument on this case, counsel for the State indicated that a stipulated order procedure is also used in his jurisdiction. Within certain limitations, matters relating merely to the conduct of a pending proceeding, or to the designation of the issues involved, affecting only the rights or convenience of the parties, not involving any interference with the duties and functions of the court, may be the subject of a stipulation. 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 4 (1974). We see no reason that a stipulated order, encompassing matters over which the parties have jurisdiction, cannot be used to overcome the defendant's concern.