Opinion ID: 2829693
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Jay M. Schmeltz

Text: Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Schmeltz violated Benton’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force. We have long recognized that a spontaneous assault by a prison guard on an inmate is grounds for an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995); Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700-01 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that an inmate’s allegations that he was handcuffed in his cell and then beaten by prison guards would constitute a valid Eighth Amendment claim). Similarly, where an arrestee poses Nos. 14-3134/3136/3137 Coley, et al. v. Lucas Cnty., et al. Page 9 no threat to others and is not trying to escape, an “unprovoked and unnecessary blow” violates the Fourth Amendment. McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988). We have held that throwing an unresisting, handcuffed arrestee to the floor and subsequently banging his head against the floor constitutes excessive force. Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 301-02 (6th Cir. 2002); Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that spontaneously striking an arrestee on the head, knocking him to the floor and causing serious injury, would violate his Fourth Amendment rights); Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 385 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that continuing to spray mace in the face of an incapacitated arrestee would constitute excessive force). Because the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment, must look to whether the force used was objectively unreasonable, the inquiry in both contexts focuses on the force itself rather than the injury. We have long held that a plaintiff may “allege use of excessive force even where the physical contact between the parties did not leave excessive marks or cause extensive physical damage.” Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 597 (6th Cir. 1999). “[T]he ‘extent of the injury inflicted’ is not ‘crucial to an analysis of a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.’” Morrison v. Bd. of Tr. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Baskin v. Smith, 50 F. App’x 731, 737 n.2 (6th Cir. 2002)). We look instead to whether “gratuitous violence” has been inflicted. Pigram ex rel. Pigram v. Chaudoin, 199 F. App’x 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Phelps, 286 F.3d at 302). Even so, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment,” and the same principle applies to the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Schmeltz’s shove of Benton—who was handcuffed, in a belly chain and leg irons—so that he fell and hit the wall and cement floor, violated Benton’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Schmeltz argues that Plaintiffs did not allege sufficient injury, but the complaint alleges that the shove caused him to fall “striking his head on the wall and falling straight to the floor,” “unable in any way to break his fall.” Moreover, we look primarily to whether gratuitous force was applied. Such force is clearly alleged here: without provocation, Schmeltz shoved the fully restrained Benton hard enough that he fell straight down onto cement, powerless to help Nos. 14-3134/3136/3137 Coley, et al. v. Lucas Cnty., et al. Page 10 himself. Schmeltz’s argument that he was acting in a good faith effort to restore discipline rings hollow as nothing in the facts alleged suggests a loss of discipline or order at the time the shove occurred. On the contrary, the complaint suggests that Benton was hardly in any condition to cause a disruption, having recently been treated for seizures and then beaten and maced by Lucas County employees—including Schmeltz—at the hospital, from which he was brought to the jail in a wheelchair, fully restrained and subdued. Plaintiffs also allege that Schmeltz’s action was borne of his “frustration” with Benton’s prior resistant behavior in the hospital, leading to a reasonable inference that the shove was the kind of gratuitous punishment that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. Having determined that Schmeltz violated Benton’s constitutional rights, we now turn to whether the law regarding the use of gratuitous force on a restrained detainee is clearly established. To satisfy this second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Clemente v. Vaslo, 679 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The key inquiry is whether a defendant claiming qualified immunity “was on notice that his alleged actions were unconstitutional.” United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 768 F.3d 464, 485 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 313 (6th Cir. 2009)). The inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Clemente, 679 F.3d at 490 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)). We look first to Supreme Court decisions, then Sixth Circuit case law in order to determine if the right claimed was clearly established when the events occurred. Clemente, 679 F.3d at 490. The plaintiff “has the burden of showing that a right is clearly established,” while the defendant “carries the burden of showing that the challenged act was objectively reasonable in light of the law existing at the time.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2009). At the time of the incident, pretrial detainees had a clearly established right not to be gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and subdued. See Pelfrey, 43 F.3d at 1037. Under the Fourteenth, Fourth, or Eighth Amendments, assaults on subdued, restrained and nonresisting detainees, arrestees, or convicted prisoners are impermissible. Id.; Phelps, 286 F.3d at 301-02 Nos. 14-3134/3136/3137 Coley, et al. v. Lucas Cnty., et al. Page 11 (citing cases). The facts alleged show that Schmeltz assaulted the fully restrained Benton so that he fell and hit his head on the cement floor. Schmeltz then attempted to cover up the assault by filing false reports and lying to federal investigators after Benton’s death. These actions reasonably lead us to conclude that Schmeltz violated clearly established law and was “on notice that his alleged actions were unconstitutional.” United Pet Supply, Inc., 768 F.3d at 485. Schmeltz’s argument that his actions did not violate clearly established law fails.