Opinion ID: 2048220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge

Text: We first consider the $4 Criminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge. This charge was imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1(c-9) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-9) (West 2004)). At the time of defendant's conviction this statute provided as follows: There shall be added to every fine imposed in sentencing for a criminal or traffic offense, except an offense relating to parking or registration, or offense by a pedestrian, an additional penalty of $4 imposed. The additional penalty of $4 shall also be added to every fine imposed upon a plea of guilty, stipulation of facts or findings of guilty, resulting in a judgment of conviction, or order of supervision in criminal, traffic, local ordinance, county ordinance, or conservation cases (except parking, registration, or pedestrian violations), or upon a sentence of probation without entry of judgment under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act or Section 410 of the Controlled Substances Act. Such additional penalty of $4 shall be assessed by the court imposing the fine and shall be collected by the circuit clerk in addition to any other fine, costs, fees, and penalties in the case. Each such additional penalty of $4 shall be remitted to the State Treasurer by the circuit clerk within one month after receipt. The State Treasurer shall deposit the additional penalty of $4 into the Traffic and Criminal Conviction Surcharge Fund. The additional penalty of $4 shall be in addition to any other fine, costs, fees, and penalties and shall not reduce or affect the distribution of any other fine, costs, fees, and penalties. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-9) (West 2004). As defendant notes, the plain language of section 5-9-1(c-9) strongly suggests that the charge ought to be considered to be in the nature of a fine, not a fee. The statute repeatedly refers to the charge as a penalty, which connotes a fine, not a fee. See White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 781, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836. Moreover, the statute states that the penalty is to be added to the fine. This statutory language strongly suggests that the legislature intended the surcharge in section 5-9-1(c-9) to constitute a fine. As the State notes, the label used by the legislature is not necessarily definitive. See Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill.2d 444, 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984) (holding that although a $5 charge was consistently labeled a fee within the statute imposing it, it was in reality a tax); People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill.App.3d 678, 682, 279 Ill. Dec. 571, 800 N.E.2d 859 (2003) (both legislature's characterization of charge and charge's substantive character are relevant to determination of whether charge is subject to offset under section 110-14(a)). However, the label is strong evidence of the legislature's intent, especially because the legislature not only referred to the charge in a consistent fashion as a penalty to be added to the fine but also used other labelsother fine, costs, fees, and penalties (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-9) (West 2004))within the same statute, buttressing the conclusion that the terms used were intentional. Nevertheless, the State argues that the charge is actually in the nature of a fee, not a fine. The State calls our attention to the statute creating the traffic and criminal conviction surcharge fund, section 9 of the Illinois Police Training Act (50 ILCS 705/9 (West 2004)). The State notes that the fund is to be used to train governmental employees in law enforcement techniques (see 50 ILCS 705/9(2), (4), (5) (West 2004)), and argues that this makes the charge a fee, according to the definition that a fee is intended to compensate the State for the costs of prosecuting the defendant. See White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 781, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836. Defendant responds that the State's argument sweeps far too broadly, and we agree. The fact that the proceeds of this charge may be used for general police training does not mean that the charge reimburses the State for the cost of prosecuting the defendant and is therefore a fee. As defendant and our appellate court have noted, section 27.6(a) of the Clerks of Courts Act directs that with limited exceptions, some portion [2] of all fees, fines, costs, additional penalties, bail balances assessed or forfeited, and any other amount paid by a person to the circuit clerk equalling an amount of $55 or more are to be deposited into the Traffic and Criminal Conviction Surcharge Fund. 705 ILCS 105/27.6(a) (West 2004). This does not mean that every charge is a fee. The State also argues that the charge should be considered a fee based on the precedent of Ali v. Danaher, 47 Ill.2d 231, 265 N.E.2d 103 (1970). There, we considered the constitutionality of a $1 library fee imposed on all litigants filing civil actions, which fee was intended to help finance the construction or upkeep of county law libraries. Several arguments were raised against the fee: the plaintiff contended that the fee violated separation of powers principles, that it constituted an improper litigation tax, and that it was not assessed equally to all litigants. Ali, 47 Ill.2d at 234, 265 N.E.2d 103. We upheld the fee. In so holding, we stated that funding a county law library is a proper purpose for a fee, because such a library is conducive to a proper and even improved administration of justice. Ali, 47 Ill.2d at 237, 265 N.E.2d 103. The State argues that training government employees in law enforcement techniques is similarly conducive to an improved administration of justice and therefore the charge at issue in this case ought be construed as a fee. The case is clearly distinguishable, for the fundamental reason that Ali did not involve any attempt to distinguish between a fee and a fine. Indeed, the statute imposing the fee at issue in Ali specified that the fee was to be assessed only in civil litigation and `shall not be charged in any criminal or quasi-criminal case.' Ali, 47 Ill.2d at 234, 265 N.E.2d 103, quoting Ill. Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 81, par. 81. The statement to which the State directs our attention is taken entirely out of context and is not sufficient to support the State's argument that we should override the statutory language indicating that the charge is a penalty. Moreover, as a final note, we later clarified that the charge imposed in Ali was in fact not a fee but a tax, because the charge was not imposed to defray costs specific to the litigation in which it was imposed. Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (court charges imposed on a litigant are fees if assessed to defray the expenses of his litigation (emphasis added)). See also Arangold, 204 Ill.2d at 148-49, 272 Ill.Dec. 600, 787 N.E.2d 786 (reaffirming that the charge at issue in Ali, although labeled a fee, in reality, was a tax). Although the State need not demonstrate that a fee represents the exact cost incurred in defendant's litigation (see, e.g., White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 782, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836 (finding probation and lab analysis fees are fees, not fines, even though State did not show that they reflected actual costs the state incurred in prosecuting the defendant's case)), a fee must at least relate to charges incurred in the defendant's case. The State also argues that the legislature cannot have intended to allow this charge to be offset, because everyone who is arrested spends at least part of one day in jail and would thus be entitled to at least a $5 credit for time served. Because this charge is only $4, a $5 credit would wipe out this charge in all cases. However, as was observed at oral argument, this fails to consider the fact that the charge could survive any case where this was not the only fine imposed against defendant. Our ruling here does not have the practical effect of extinguishing this charge in all cases, as the State suggests. Finally, the State notes that in 2005, subsequent to defendant's conviction, the legislature repealed subsection (c-9) and added the $4 surcharge previously imposed in this section to a similar $5 surcharge imposed in subsection (c). Noting that subsection (c) expressly provides that the charge is not subject to offset for presentencing incarceration, the State contends that the legislature must have intended the same to be true of subsection (c-9) all along. We do not find this argument convincing. We faced a similar argument in People v. Hare, 119 Ill.2d 441, 450-51, 116 Ill.Dec. 664, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988). There, as here, at the time of the defendant's conviction the statute imposing the fine at issue lacked any provision excluding the fine from offset for presentencing incarceration credit. In Hare, the statute imposing the fine was subsequently amended to so provide. We acknowledged the rule of construction that an amendment to a statute may be a legislative attempt to clarify the meaning of the statute, but we also noted a countervailing rule that an amendment gives rise to the presumption that the new legislation was intended to effect a change in the law as it formerly existed. Hare, 119 Ill.2d at 450-51, 116 Ill.Dec. 664, 519 N.E.2d 879. We stated that which of the two rules should apply depends on the circumstances involved, specifically, whether the statute was unclear prior to the amendment. We concluded in Hare that the statute was not unclear before the amendment adding the provision excluding the fine from offset and, accordingly, concluded that the amendment constituted a change. The same reasoning applies here. Indeed, as defendant notes, this case would be an even less likely candidate than Hare for interpreting an amendment as a clarification of prior legislative intent, because the legislature did not amend subsection (c-9); it repealed that subsection. Finally, we note that although subsection (c) has existed for a number of years, subsection (c-9) enjoyed a comparatively brief existence, enacted in 2003 and repealed in 2005. For the entire time that subsections (c) and (c-9) coexisted, subsection (c) contained the provision that the charge imposed therein was not subject to offset, while subsection (c-9) contained no such provision. This fact, that the legislature enacted subsection (c-9) without the exclusion when subsection (c) of the same statute did contain such a provision, further strengthens our conclusion that the penalty imposed pursuant to subsection (c-9) was not intended to be exempted from offset. Accordingly, we conclude that the charge imposed by section 5-9-1(c-9) is subject to offset.