Opinion ID: 1426720
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definition of Son

Text: To prevail under the first prong of the Chevron test, Perez must demonstrate that the term son in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) unambiguously includes Robinson. This she cannot do. If anything, the explicit limitation of the statute's reach to a specifically enumerated list of qualifying relationships  spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11)  strongly supports the BIA's interpretation of son to exclude an other individual like a nephew. Indeed, even though the statute does not explicitly define son, the language of the statute seems precise enough to require our denial of the petition. Even if section 1182(d)(11) were ambiguous in this regard, however, application of the second prong of Chevron would require denial of the petition. It directs us to determine whether the BIA's construction of the statute is permissible. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Perez argues that the meaning of son must be determined with reference to the three broad purposes listed at the outset of section 1182(d)(11). The language to which she refers reads: The Attorney General may, in his discretion for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest, waive the otherwise applicable bar to admissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11). According to Perez, the purpose of promoting family unity would be furthered by including her nephew within the meaning of the term son. But the stated purposes of the statute guide not its interpretation, but the exercise of discretion under it. They provide advice on how the Attorney General and his delegates should decide, within the broad limits afforded them, whether to waive inadmissibility with respect to the smuggling of a spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual). Cf. Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 238 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to review an IJ's discretionary denial of the section 1182(d)(11) waiver to an otherwise eligible alien who had attempted to smuggle his infant daughter into the country). They do not contain an explicit or implicit definition of the word son. The BIA's refusal to adopt a functional definition of the word son is consistent with previous decisions interpreting the INA's use of the word son in related statutory contexts. In INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 107 S.Ct. 379, 93 L.Ed.2d 326 (1986) (per curiam), the Supreme Court considered whether discretionary suspensions of deportation on the basis of family hardship to, inter alia, a child could include consideration of the difficulties that might be endured by an alien's nieces. Id. at 86-87, 107 S.Ct. 379. The Court concluded that even if [the alien's] relationship with her nieces closely resembles a parent-child relationship, . . . Congress, through the plain language of the statute, precluded this functional approach to defining the term `child.' Id. at 90, 107 S.Ct. 379; see also Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir.1977) (recognizing that in order to qualify as a `son' or `daughter' for the purpose of obtaining visa preference, one must once have qualified as a `child,' as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101). [3] The BIA's refusal to adopt a functional reading of the word son, then, is at the very least reasonable, and therefore clearly permissible.