Opinion ID: 1689255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Rejection of Other Proposed Mitigating Factors

Text: Finally, Lebron contends that the trial court erred in rejecting, as mitigators, Lebron's: (1) age (21 at the time of the crime); (2) abusive childhood (domestic violence); (3) race; (4) urban residence; (5) institutionalization; (6) psychological factors (in part); and (7) childhood accidents. This claim lacks merit. The trial court did not err in rejecting Lebron's age as a mitigator. Although Lebron's school records (entered into evidence by the defense) reflected that he performed poorly academically and exhibited difficult social behaviors, they also reflected that he had been observed to express age-appropriate interests. The records show Lebron to have been a child of low average or average intelligence, with no indication of organic damage. They show that, up to age eighteen, Lebron was delayed in language and math skills, and had engaged in an escalating pattern of antisocial or delinquent behavior. They do not show, however, that Lebron was not acting at a level consistent with his chronological age at the time the murder was committed, or that his emotional or mental age is inconsistent with his chronological age. Although rejecting certain other proposed mitigators, the trial court found, and weighed, factors relating to some of them. While it rejected a finding of domestic violence, it found Lebron's Parent Profile as a mitigator (assigning it very little weight). It also found, and gave very little weight to, the fact that Lebron's mother had used drugs, but was not addicted to them, during her pregnancy with Lebron. The court found Lebron's school performance to be a mitigating factor, to which it gave some weight, and also found that neglect had been proven, to which it gave some weight. The court found that the evidence established that Lebron had emotional problems, mental health problems, substance abuse problems, was hyperactive and suffered from a speech impairment (although there was no consistent notation in the school records over the years regarding such an impairment). However, the trial court also noted that there was no testimony or evidence presented to show the nature and the degree of those psychological problems; therefore, it gave very little weight to this factor. The trial court found two of the mitigators which Lebron claims were rejected (institutionalization and psychological) to have been established, and it considered those factors (although institutionalization was taken into account in assessing Lebron's Parent Profile, rather than being recognized as a separate mitigator). Lebron made no specific reference to childhood accidents, and none appear to be documented in the record. With respect to Lebron's race (black Hispanic) and urban residence (New York City), Lebron has not cited any case law in support of the appropriateness of these elements as mitigating factors, nor demonstrated how, based upon the particular facts of this case, these claimed factors were shown to be mitigating as to this defendant. While reasonable persons might differ regarding the weight which might have appropriately been assigned the various mitigators, the trial court does not appear to have wholly rejected any proven factors. Rather, consistent with this Court's mandate in Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla.1990), the sentencing order here reflects the trial court's careful consideration of all the evidence presented, and its reasoned determination regarding the weight to be accorded each factor which was established. See generally Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1055 (Fla.2000) (We hereby recede from our opinion in Campbell to the extent it disallows trial courts from according no weight to a mitigating factor and recognize that there are circumstances where a mitigating circumstance may be found to be supported by the record, but given no weight.); Beasley v. State, 774 So.2d 649, 671 (Fla.2000) (discussing proper weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors); Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 19 (Fla.2000) (discussing proper weighing of factors); Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 10 (Fla.1997) (discussing proper weighing of factors); Campbell, 571 So.2d at 419 n. 3 (recognizing that the trial judge can identify and consider mitigators regarding a defendant's background as categories of related conduct rather than as individual acts). Based upon the foregoing, the convictions appealed from are hereby affirmed. The sentence of death is vacated, and the case is remanded for a new penalty-phase proceeding before a jury and resentencing, consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., recused.