Opinion ID: 1451642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court acted within its discretion in dismissing the Complaint without leave to amend.

Text: Because Winget did not request leave to amend the Complaint, the district court's decision not to grant leave to amend the Dismissal Order was within its discretion. The `district court does not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a party leave to amend where such leave is not sought.' Stambaugh v. Corrpro Cos., 116 Fed.Appx. 592, 598 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished decision) (quoting Sinay, 948 F.2d at 1042); see also Evans v. Pearson Enters., Inc., 434 F.3d 839, 853 (6th Cir. 2006) (The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying [the plaintiff's] first request for leave to amend her complaint because she failed to state the grounds for relief with particularity....). Requiring the district court to both state the reasons for its dismissal and then allow Winget to amend the Complaint without Winget's having asked permission would be akin to mandating the district court to issue an advisory opinion. Plaintiffs [are] not entitled to an advisory opinion from the Court informing them of the deficiencies of the complaint and then an opportunity to cure those deficiencies. PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 699 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 214 F.3d 776, 784 (6th Cir. 2000)) (emphasis in Begala omitted). Winget argues that the district court was required to give him the opportunity to amend the Complaint and quotes United States ex rel. Bledsoe, 342 F.3d at 644, for this proposition: [W]here a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the complaint with prejudice. (quoting EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 546 (6th Cir.1993)). While Winget correctly quotes United States ex rel. Bledsoe, it also states that, Denial may be appropriate, however, where there is `... futility of the amendment ....' (quoting Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir.2002)); see Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir.2006) (A district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint ... when the proposed amendment would be futile.). Futility is certainly the case here; Winget's claims were not dismissed for lack of specificity, failure to allege an element of a claim, or other deficiencies. Rather, Winget's claims were dismissed because they were either barred by res judicata or were premature. Regardless of the merits of these claims, or the various ways in which Winget might phrase them in subsequent complaints, Winget cannot pursue them. Winget attempts to circumnavigate the res judicata and prematurity bars by arguing that it could have pled three additional matters that would have cured any defect in the Complaint. These matters are: (i) the context of the Sale Order and the intent of the parties who drafted that Order, (ii) allegations that a later order by [the bankruptcy court] could be interpreted as demonstrating that the Sale Order was not intended to, and did not, preclude the claims in the Complaint, and (iii) pleading of the current impact of harm to Winget, Venco, and P.I.M. from compliance with the negative covenants included in the Guaranty Documents. However, none of these matters would lift the res judicata bar for Winget. With respect to the first two matters, Winget argues that because of their potential impact on the interpretation of the Sale Order, they save Winget from res judicata. However, the cases that Winget cites for this proposition are contract cases that involve the interpretation of ambiguous and conflicting contractual language. See Greenberg, 177 F.3d at 516 (discussing internal inconsistencies in the policy language); Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 178-79 (6th Cir.1996) (concerning a dispute about an oral contract); Klapp v. United Ins. Group. Agency, Inc., 468 Mich. 459, 663 N.W.2d 447, 452-53 (2003) (addressing terms that irreconcilably conflict). Furthermore, the district court held that the terms of the Sale Order were clear, and matters concerning the interpretation of court orders, such as sale orders, are questions of law. Brady, 101 F.3d at 1168. [1] As for the third matter, these claims would not be new to an amended complaint; Winget raised them at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Further, even taking Winget's claims as truethat it is experiencing present harm from restrictions imposed in the negative covenants does not render these claims ripe for litigation. Any allegations of past wrongdoing are barred by res judicata, and present harm does not become justiciable until the Defendants attempt to collect the collateral. Because any amended complaint would have been futile, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting Winget leave to amend the Complaint.