Opinion ID: 1210155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Receipt of Prior Consistent Statements as Substantive Evidence

Text: Defendants contend that the admission into evidence of two prosecution witnesses' prior consistent statements as substantive evidence under Evidence Code section 1236 [2] violated their right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The first prosecution witness, Coach Kelley, testified that he saw Cannady pick up a bat, which was against the exterior wall of the issue room, before thrusting it at Thompson. To impeach Kelley, defense counsel asked him on cross-examination whether he had not made a report in April 1969 containing a specified description of the incident, which description did not mention having seen Cannady pick up the bat, and Kelley responded in the affirmative. Thereafter the prosecutor on redirect examination of Kelley elicited the statement that he had testified before the grand jury in May 1969 that ... Cannady picked up the bat.... The second prosecution witness, Cooper, testified on direct examination to his version of the alleged assault. To impeach him, defense counsel asked him on cross-examination whether he had stated that he did not know anything about the incident when he talked to (1) the public defender's investigator a week before the trial and (2) the district attorney's investigator shortly after the alleged assault. Cooper replied that he had told the investigators that he did not have anything to say to them. Defense counsel also cross-examined Cooper concerning representations made to him by the prosecutor on October 1, 1969, the day before Cooper testified, and Cooper stated that the prosecutor had told him the judge can rehear your case. For the purpose of rehabilitating Cooper, the prosecutor on cross-examination of the district attorney's investigator elicited testimony that when he had interviewed Cooper a second time, in June 1969, Cooper gave a narration concerning the alleged assault, which narration was substantially in accord with his testimony at trial. No instructions were given limiting the purpose for which the prior consistent statements were admitted. In support of their contention that the receipt of the prior consistent statements as substantive evidence under section 1236 violated their Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, defendants rely upon People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1061, 1076 [80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 458 P.2d 479], which held that under the rationale of [ People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646 [68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111]], and based upon the Sixth Amendment, Evidence Code section 1236 is unconstitutional in criminal cases insofar as it permits the substantive use of prior consistent statements against defendant. The rationale of Johnson, however, was specifically rejected in California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 90 S.Ct. 1930]. In Green, which concerned the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements by a witness (1) at the preliminary hearing and (2) to an officer, the United States Supreme Court declared (pp. 158, 161 [26 L.Ed.2d pp. 497, 499]), Viewed historically ... there is good reason to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.... [N]one of our decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause requires excluding the out-of-court statements of a witness who is available and testifying at trial. (2) Kelley and Cooper testified at the trial and were then subject to full and effective cross-examination. Accordingly, the receipt of their prior consistent statements did not violate defendants' Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. (See California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. 149; People v. Bynum, 4 Cal.3d 589, 603 [94 Cal. Rptr. 241, 483 P.2d 1193]; People v. Green, 3 Cal.3d 981 [92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998] [cert. dismissed 404 U.S. 801 (30 L.Ed.2d 34, 92 S.Ct. 20)].) (3) Defendants also argue that the substantive use of the prior consistent statements violated the due process clause of article I, section 13, of the California Constitution. They rely upon People v. Washington, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1061. Washington, however, was based on the federal Constitution, and, as heretofore stated, the rationale upon which Washington relied was rejected in California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. 149. Furthermore, at the trial no objection was made to the admission of the prior consistent statements for their substantive use on the grounds now urged. As a general rule, the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection at the trial ( People v. Mabry, 71 Cal.2d 430, 441 [78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 455 P.2d 759]; People v. De Santiago, 71 Cal.2d 18, 22 [76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353]; People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 894 [44 Cal. Rptr. 762, 402 P.2d 834]). Defendants, however, argue that the foregoing rule is inapplicable since defendants' trial was before People v. Washington, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1061, became generally available to the profession. Washington was filed about two weeks before defendants' trial began, but, even if it had not been filed until after defendants' trial, they would not have been excused from making an objection unless Washington `represented such a substantial change in the former rule as to excuse an objection anticipating that decision.' ( People v. Groves, 71 Cal.2d 1196, 1198 [80 Cal. Rptr. 745, 458 P.2d 985]; People v. De Santiago, supra, 71 Cal.2d 18, 22.) Although Washington was the first case to hold that the admission of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence under section 1236 violated the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, that holding was required by People v. Johnson, supra, 68 Cal.2d 646, a case decided over a year before defendants' trial. Johnson involved the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence under Evidence Code section 1235, but this court noted in Washington (p. 1075), We are unable to perceive any basic difference between the admission as substantive evidence of prior inconsistent statements of a witness on the one hand and prior consistent statements on the other. There appears to be no significant factor present in the former situation whose absence in the latter would obviate any infringement of a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation in a criminal case. Accordingly, Washington did not represent such a substantial change in the former rule as to excuse an objection anticipating that decision. Defendants further argue that Cooper's prior consistent statement was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1236 because the prosecution complied with only one of the two conditions set forth in section 791, subdivision (b), of that code. (See fn. 2 herein.) (4) Defendants admit that there was an express or implied charge by defense counsel that Cooper's testimony was recently fabricated, but they assert that the prosecution failed to show that the statement was made before the ... motive for fabrication ... is alleged to have arisen. However, one motive for fabrication was the representation by the prosecutor that the judge can rehear [Cooper's] case, and Cooper's prior statement preceded that representation. That there may always have existed another motive for fabricating did not deprive the prosecution of its right to show that a motive shown by the evidence did not affect the witness' testimony. (See People v. Duvall, 262 Cal. App.2d 417, 421 [68 Cal. Rptr. 708].) Furthermore, no objection was made at the trial on the ground now urged, and defendants have shown no circumstances that would justify our departure from the ordinary rule that errors not challenged at trial cannot serve as grounds for reversal on appeal. (5) No claim is made that Kelley's prior consistent statement was inadmissible on the ground that the conditions in Evidence Code section 791 were not fulfilled, and no objection was made on that ground at the trial. The admissibility of that evidence under section 791 will therefore not be reviewed on appeal.