Opinion ID: 578165
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fourth Amendment and Exclusion

Text: 17 Although it remains clear that illegally seized evidence may not be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, societal interests have led the Supreme Court narrowly to cabin the reach of the exclusionary rule. The issue before us now is whether the exclusionary rule prevents judges from considering illegally obtained evidence at sentencing. 18 Prior to the Guidelines, we answered this question in the negative. See United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1198, 28 L.Ed.2d 334 (1971). In Schipani, we stated that [w]here illegally seized evidence is reliable and it is clear, as here, that it was not gathered for the express purpose of improperly influencing the sentencing judge, there is no error in using it in connection with fixing sentence. 435 F.2d at 28. Because the Guidelines remove a great deal of judicial discretion and the consideration of illegally seized evidence at sentencing is likely to result in increased penalties, the consideration of such evidence at sentencing now takes on greater significance. Accordingly, we now will examine whether under the Guidelines sentencing judges may consider illegally seized evidence. 19 A search that violates the Fourth Amendment does not confer on its victim a personal right to suppression of the illegally seized evidence. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (exclusionary rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619-20, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved). Although a victim of an illegal search benefits from the exclusion of evidence that links him to an illegal act, the admission of the evidence does not itself invade the privacy of the search victim, which is a fait accompli. We suppress evidence only because doing so will deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48, 94 S.Ct. at 619-20. In fact, the Supreme Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations where deterrence will not ensue. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable if officers relied in good faith on warrant); Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 935 (1986) (Dripps) (The Leon majority announced that [the Fourth Amendment] could be violated but that nothing would happen.); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (exclusionary rule inapplicable when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute). 20 Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed us not to suppress evidence solely because doing so might deter illegal searches. Rather, the likelihood of increased deterrence must be balanced against the considerable cost of excluding reliable information. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 347, 107 S.Ct. at 1166 ([T]he Court has examined whether the rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process.); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2445, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980) ([U]nbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.). 21 Calandra, which dealt with a grand jury witness who had refused to answer questions based on illegally seized evidence, provides some guidance on the proper analysis of exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Dripps at 908-09 (discussing Calandra and the cost-benefit approach to exclusion). In Calandra, the district and appellate courts both refused to compel the defendant to answer questions he had been asked. Both courts found support in the exclusionary rule case law. See In re Calandra, 332 F.Supp. 737 (N.D.Ohio 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir.1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561. 22 The Supreme Court reversed, Justice Powell writing that the application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 620. Employing a balancing test, the Court held that the speculative deterrent effects of exclusion did not justify substantially impeding the role of the grand jury. Id. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. at 622. It is from within this framework of cost-benefit analysis that we approach whether to prohibit sentencing judges from considering evidence seized in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 23 Physical evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment--unlike an involuntary confession taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment--is inherently reliable. See United States v. Schipani, 315 F.Supp. 253, 257-58 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 26, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1198, 28 L.Ed.2d 334. As a result, balancing requires that we invoke the exclusionary rule only where our doing so will provide the systemic remedy of substantial deterrence. 24 The defendants and amici argue that allowing sentencing judges to consider illegally seized evidence will give police an incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment. They posit that police and prosecutors with enough lawfully obtained evidence for a conviction of a relatively minor offense that has a broad sentencing range could guarantee a heavier sentence by seizing other evidence illegally and introducing it at sentencing. They argue that as a result nothing will deter police from making illegal searches, especially in those situations where a conviction of a greater crime would lead to a similar sentence. 25 Defendants and amici do not explain why this supposed incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment will prove incrementally stronger than the rewards that already exist. Illegally seized evidence long has played a role in our legal system, and many of its uses might motivate a police officer to violate the Fourth Amendment. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil deportation proceeding); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916-17, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence may be used for impeachment in a criminal case); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (exclusionary rule does not apply to federal civil proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52, 94 S.Ct. at 620-21 (allowing introduction of illegally obtained evidence before the grand jury). The Supreme Court has held that these uses for illegally seized evidence do not diminish deterrence sufficiently to justify the exclusion of probative evidence. We see no reason why this additional use of illegally seized evidence justifies different treatment. 26 The argument also has been put before us that requiring the consideration of previously suppressed evidence at sentencing is the last step in wholly gutting the exclusionary rule, the other steps having been taken by the Supreme Court in its more recent Fourth Amendment opinions. We do not agree that this case is the straw that breaks the camel's back where Fourth Amendment concerns are at stake. 27 Great rewards still exist for following accepted police procedures. Here, for example, the government could have brought a more concrete case, supported by all the evidence, had the officers searched apartment 3k pursuant to a search warrant. Instead, suppression of the evidence found in apartment 3k forced the government to drop the firearms count of its indictment and the additional sentence that it could have carried. Having had the firearms charge would have allowed the prosecution to have made a strong case based on concrete evidence; instead, it had to proceed on the more circumstantial conspiracy case.