Opinion ID: 2230336
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Heading: the pure versus the modified form of comparative negligence

Text: There remains the question of the form of comparative negligence to be adopted. Under a pure form, the plaintiff's damages are simply reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to him. Under a modified form, a negligent plaintiff may recover so long as the percentage of his fault does not exceed 50% of the total. Defendants argue that should this court decide to adopt comparative negligence, the modified approach should be selected. They point to the basic unfairness of the pure system by example: A plaintiff who is 90% negligent has suffered $100,000 in damages. A defendant who is only 10% negligent has suffered only $10,000 in damages. Defendants here point out the basic unfairness of requiring the 10% negligent defendant to pay $10,000 to a plaintiff who was 90% at fault. The United States Supreme Court answered a similar claim concerning liability under admiralty law. That a vessel is primarily negligent does not justify its shouldering all responsibility, nor excuse the slightly negligent vessel from bearing any liability at all. ( United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. (1975), 421 U.S. 397, 406, 44 L.Ed.2d 251, 259, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 1713.) The liability of a defendant should not depend upon what damages he sustained but should be determined by the relationship of his fault to the ultimate damages. In a suit under a pure form of comparative negligence in which the defendant counterclaims for his own damages, each party must bear the burden of the percentage of damages of all parties in direct proportion to his fault. In the example above, the 90% negligent plaintiff will bear 90% of his own damages as well as 90% of defendant's. On the other hand, the 10% negligent defendant will be made to bear 10% of his own damages as well as 10% of plaintiff's. Neither party is unjustly enriched. Neither party escapes liability resulting from his negligent acts or omissions. It is difficult to see unfairness in such a distribution of liability. See Hoffman v. Jones (Fla. 1973), 280 So.2d 431, 439; Scott v. Rizzo (1981), 96 N.M. 682, 689-90, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241-42; V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 345 (1974). Opponents of the pure form of comparative negligence claim that the modified form is superior in that it will increase the likelihood of settlement and will keep down insurance costs. However, studies done comparing the effects of the pure versus the modified forms show the differences in insurance rates to be inconsequential. (V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 346 (1974).) Fears as to the likelihood of settlement are not supported in fact or logic. It is argued that the negligent plaintiff will refuse to settle knowing that, under the pure system he will be able to recover something in court. The converse can as easily apply: the defendant may be encouraged to settle knowing that he cannot rely on the modified 50% cut-off point to relieve him of liability. A comparison of results under both the pure and modified forms showed that in Arkansas there was only a slight decrease in number of settlements when the State changed from pure to modified. Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A Before and After Survey, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 89 (1959). Wisconsin's modified system has been criticized because a large number of cases appealed focused on the narrow question of whether plaintiff's negligence amounted to 50% or less of the aggregate. (Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1953).) This, in fact, caused the Wisconsin Supreme Court to examine the question of whether the modified system should be replaced with the pure form of comparative negligence. ( Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970), 47 Wis.2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513.) There, as in Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill.2d 193, the merits of the case were not addressed, for the majority of the court ruled that the determination should be left to the legislature, which had originally adopted the modified form by statute. One dissenting and three concurring justices, however, expressed their intent to judicially adopt the pure form if the legislature failed to do so. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975), 13 Cal.3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875; Placek v. City of Sterling Heights (1979), 405 Mich. 638, 660-61, 375 N.W.2d 511, 519; Kirby v. Larson (1977), 400 Mich. 585, 642-44, 256 N.W.2d 400, 428. The pure form of comparative negligence is the only system which truly apportions damages according to the relative fault of the parties and, thus, achieves total justice. We agree with the Li court that the `50 percent' system simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground. ( Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975), 13 Cal.3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874.) There is no better justification for allowing a defendant who is 49% at fault to completely escape liability than there is to allow a defendant who is 99% at fault under the old rule to escape liability. Mindful of the facts stated and that the vast majority of legal scholars who have studied the area recommend the pure approach, we are persuaded that the pure form of comparative negligence is preferable, and we therefore adopt it as the law of Illinois. The collateral issue of contribution among joint tortfeasors has already been resolved under the principles of comparative negligence in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1978), 70 Ill.2d 1, 14, wherein this court found that governing equitable principles require that ultimate liability for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of the relative degree to which [each defendant's] conduct proximately caused them. (See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq. ) We have already noted that the doctrine of last clear chance was created to escape the harshness of the contributory negligence rule. As the need for it disappears in the face of this decision, the vestiges of the doctrine of last clear chance are hereby abolished. We believe that the use of special verdicts and special interrogatories will serve as a guide to assist the jury in its deliberations. We leave the resolution of other collateral issues to future cases.