Opinion ID: 214973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The January Letters

Text: COP next argues that the January letters establish that the Agreement was terminated by the end of the 60-day period. This argument takes two forms. First, in its opening brief, COP claims that the letters satisfied any additional action required to terminate the Agreement. See Aplt. Br. at 18. Second, at oral argument COP suggested that the letters demonstrate the parties' intent that COP did not need to take any further action at the end of the 60-day period and that, unless CWM cured its defaults, the Agreement would automatically terminate at the close of business on January 8, 2008. The bankruptcy court refused to consider these letters because they improperly attempted to provide for the Agreement's termination in violation of the district court's Supplemental Order. We further note that the trustee submitted a supplemental appendix on appeal containing a December 10, 2009 order from the bankruptcy court arising from an adversary proceeding between the trustee and COP. In the order, the court held that the January 5 and 6 letter agreements are declared of no legal effect and avoided by reason of the fact that they were entered into in violation of the United States District Court's Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement of Judgment entered on December 19, 2007. Aplee. Supp.App. at 312. At oral argument, COP argued that the bankruptcy court's December 10, 2009 order did not prevent consideration of the January letters as evidence of the parties' intent. The trustee argues in his brief, however, that consideration of the January letters violates principles of contract law. We agree. Under Utah law, when contract language is unambiguous, as it is here, the plain meaning of that language determines the parties' intent. See Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 216 P.3d 352, 356 (Utah 2009); Cent. Fla. Invs., 40 P.3d at 605. Extrinsic evidence such as the January letters should not be considered under these circumstances. See Mid-America, 216 P.3d at 356 (We consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions only if the contractual language is ambiguous.). Moreover, COP's argument that the January letters met any action-to-terminate requirement conflicts with our and the bankruptcy court's reading of the Agreement as requiring the additional termination action to occur after the 60-day notice period expired.