Opinion ID: 2339712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Objectivity and Specificity of the Class Definition

Text: K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-223(c)(1)(B) requires that a certification order define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses. Although the statute does not explicitly require that a class must be defined objectively and in terms of ascertainable criteria, notice requirements and due process mandate that it must be possible to determine from the class definition whether a particular individual is part of the class. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 72, 694 N.E.2d 442 (1998) (class description must be definite enough to determine whether particular individual is member). The district court in our case adopted the following class definition: The end users of the fax numbers to which Defendant sent or caused to be sent, one or more facsimile transmissions advertising Defendant's products or seminars during the period from March 1, 2005 to March 1, 2008. Taranto initially objects to the phrase end users, which Taranto complains is nonsensical because it does not distinguish between the owner of a fax machine and all those people who make use of that fax machine. The plaintiff responds that the phrase clearly includes and is limited to the entities or people who purchased or leased the fax machines or fax-use time for their businesses or personal interests; the definition, according to the plaintiff, would not include individual employees of a business that leased a fax machine. A plaintiff is not required to allege the exact number or identity of the class members. Holtzman v. Turza, No. 08C2014, 2009 WL 3334909, at  (N.D.Ill.2009). The class definition must nevertheless be precise enough to allow courts and parties to determine in advance of adjudication whether a party belongs to the class. Care should be taken to define the class in objective terms capable of membership ascertainment when appropriate, without regard to the merits of the claim or the seeking of particular relief. Such a definition in terms of objective characteristics of class members avoids problems of circular definitions which depend on the outcome of the litigation on the merits before class members may be ascertained. . . . 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 6:14, pp. 614-15 (4th ed. 2002). We agree with Taranto that the definition as worded is not sufficiently precise to determine which parties are included in the class. The phrase end user does not have a single, authoritative meaning. For example, Black's Law Dictionary 1683 (9th ed. 2009) defines it as: The ultimate consumer for whom a product is designed. The phrase can be found in a wide variety of legal contexts, such as end user license agreements, which attempt to place use restrictions on final purchasers, typically of computer software. See, e.g., Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software, 140 Wash.2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000); see also Saltzman v. Pella Corp., 257 F.R.D. 471, 477 (N.D.Ill.2009) (class definition of end users included only purchasers and not indirect purchasers). The phrase also appears a number of time in Kansas statutes. See, e.g., K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 2-1201(13); K.S.A. 55-1807(c)(4) (`end retail user' means any consumer, person, firm or corporation who utilizes liquefied petroleum gas in Kansas); K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-3401(q). In the area of telecommunications, Kansas statutes distinguish between a service provider and an end user. See K.S.A. 66-2011(a) (As used in this section,. . . .[a]n `internet service provider' means an entity that provides end user access to the internet.). K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-3673(f)(6), relating to sourcing rules for sale of telecommunication services, states (6) `end user' means the person who utilizes the telecommunication service. In the case of an entity, end user means the individual who utilizes the services on behalf of the entity. Although nothing compels the application of this definition to the present case, it illustrates possible ambiguity in the definition of the class. Under this definition, there is the possibility of multiple plaintiffs stemming from one fax transmissionall individuals at a home or employed by a corporate entity, or any person who happens to intercept a fax advertisement by picking it up. See, e.g., J2 Global Communications, Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, No. CV 06-00566, 2010 WL 1609965, at  (C.D.Cal.2010) (fax transmissions may be intercepted by unintended recipients). A class including such plaintiffs differs from what Critchfield explained to the court in its brief and in oral argumentthat the class is limited to the owners or lessees of the fax machines. It is therefore impossible to determine from the class definition who is included in the class of end users of fax numbers. This flaw is not, however, fatal to the class certification. A trial court retains the ability to modify a class at any time before final judgment. Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, 282 Kan. 349, 364, 144 P.3d 1279 (2006) (quoting In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 354 F.3d 1246, 1261 [10th Cir.2004]); see also Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 877-78 (11th Cir.1986) (although expansion of class after trial should be viewed with caution, trial court did not abuse discretion by enlarging class after trial on merits when expansion simply conformed to what had been proved at trial, and defendant made no showing of prejudice); 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 6:14, p. 619 (4th ed. 2002) (federal Rule 23 gives district court broad discretion to modify definition of class even after certification); 3 Newberg on Class Actions § 7:47, pp. 154, 159 (4th ed. 2002) (class rulings may be altered or amended at any time before decision on merits; ability of court to reconsider initial class rulings is vital ingredient in flexibility of courts to realize full potential benefits flowing from judicious use of class actions). Rather than reverse the certification as overly vague, we note the advantages that a class action may offer, including judicial economy and protection of consumers' rights, and direct the district court to modify the class definition to clarify which parties constitute the plaintiff class. Taranto also reiterates its earlier argument that a party must actually receive an unsolicited fax before a violation of the TCPA occurs. Taranto then complains that the class definition makes no reference to the receipt requirement. As we determined earlier, receipt is not a statutory component of the unlawful conduct.