Opinion ID: 1920175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: validity of johnson's felony-murder conviction

Text: The State proceeded at trial on the basis of premeditation and felony-murder. The felony-murder charge was based upon a burglary charge originating from Johnson's actions at the laundromat owned by Larkins. When Johnson sought entry to Larkins' laundromat, the front door was locked, but there were other customers still inside. Johnson came to the door and requested change from Larkins. Larkins retrieved her keys and unlocked the door. Johnson argues that because he was able to gain entry with Larkins' consent, albeit under false pretenses, he has an absolute defense to armed burglary and the felony-murder theory pursuant to Miller v. State, 733 So.2d 955 (Fla.1998). The circuit court held that Miller would not meet the test of retroactive application in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980). [13] We agree. Miller does not apply retroactively. In Witt, this Court held that a change in the law does not apply retroactively unless the change (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. Id. at 931. In Delgado v. State, 776 So.2d 233 (Fla.2000), this Court held that the opinion would not apply retroactively to convictions that have become final. We noted that Delgado did not meet the second or third prongs of the Witt test. Delgado, 776 So.2d at 241 n. 7. Additionally, Judge Sharp stated in her concurring specially opinion in Hodges v. State, 741 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999): [I]n order to be retroactively applied, a change in the law must represent a fundamental change. Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980). What constitutes a fundamental change in the law is a rather fluid concept, not easily pinned down. However, I consider Miller a refinement of the law, and, without direction from the Florida Supreme Court, it should not be applied retroactively. Hodges, 741 So.2d at 1262 (Sharp, J., concurring specially). We hold that Miller, as with Delgado, does not satisfy the second and third prongs of the Witt test. Accordingly, the claim was properly denied summarily by the circuit court. Even if the claim was not procedurally barred, Johnson would not be entitled to relief pursuant to Miller because it is clear in this case that he obtained entry to the laundromat under false pretenses. Consent obtained by trick or fraud is actually no consent at all and will not serve as a defense to burglary. See Schrack v. State, 793 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (affirming burglary conviction after Delgado where defendant gained entry by concocting a story about a surprise party); Alvarez v. State, 768 So.2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that defendant lacked consent to enter where he gained entry into the victim's house on the subterfuge that he wished to use the bathroom); Gordon v. State, 745 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that defendant's conduct in feigning toothache to gain entry into the victim's home negated consent).