Opinion ID: 1210718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Policy Argument

Text: Turning its decision upon the prompt presentment requirements, the majority did not focus upon the evidentiary constraints applicable to a juvenile transfer hearing. An extremely disconcerting trend has insidiously crept into our recent jurisprudence, affording juveniles unwarranted and unnecessary protections at juvenile transfer hearings. Absent a constitutional or statutory requirement, I believe that the presentation of evidence at juvenile transfer hearings should not be subject to the same evidentiary constraints that a trial on the merit demands and that transfer hearings should be treated more in the nature of preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings. [1] At both preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings, adherence to the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is relaxedat least partially due to fact the guilt or innocence of an accused is not to be determined. [2] The purpose of such hearings and proceedings is to ascertain whether, at that time, a particular case against an accused should proceed toward trial. Likewise, the purpose of a juvenile transfer hearing is not to decide the guilt or innocence of a juvenile, but it is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the juvenile proceeding should be transferred to the criminal jurisdiction. W.Va. Code § 49-5-10(d) (1992). [3] I can discern no persuasive reason to strictly adhere to the rules of evidence at a juvenile transfer hearing when the same evidentiary concerns can be raised at a trial on the merits. [4] Even subsequent to disposition, a juvenile transferred to adult jurisdiction is not necessarily sentenced as an adult. In State v. Ball, 175 W.Va. 652, 337 S.E.2d 310 (1985), for instance, we held that circuit courts have authority under W.Va.Code, 49-5-13(e), and W.Va.Code, 49-5-13(b)(5), to sentence a person who commits a homicide while a juvenile to the Anthony Center for Youthful Male Offenders even though he is sentenced as an adult. See also State v. Pettrey, 177 W.Va. 723, 356 S.E.2d 477 (1987). West Virginia Code § 49-5-16(b) (1986 Repl.Vol.) provides: No child who has been convicted of an offense under the adult jurisdiction of the circuit court shall be held in custody in a penitentiary of this State: Provided, That such child may be transferred from a secure juvenile facility to a penitentiary after he shall attain the age of eighteen years if, in the judgment of the commissioner of the department of corrections and the court which committed such child, such transfer is appropriate: Provided, however, That any other provision of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding, prior to such transfer the child shall be returned to the sentencing court for the purpose of reconsideration and modification of the imposed sentence, which shall be based upon a review of all records and relevant information relating to the child's rehabilitation since his conviction under the adult jurisdiction of the court. Thus, [j]uveniles who are transferred to and convicted under the adult jurisdiction of a circuit court are nevertheless afforded the same commitment and rehabilitation rights as those adjudged delinquent under juvenile jurisdiction. State v. Highland, 174 W.Va. 525, 528, 327 S.E.2d 703, 706 (1985). Accordingly, the legislature has provided at least three alternatives to a sentencing court for the proper disposition of such an individual. Id. [5] Advocates of strict adherence to the rules of evidence contend that, unlike preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings, juvenile transfers represent a comprehensive change in the way juvenile cases will be examined. [6] Indeed, there can be no doubt the United States Supreme Court considers a juvenile transfer hearing a `critically important' proceeding that must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) (citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court cautioned in Kent that it did not intend to imply that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing, [7] and, in a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court recognized that it has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1790, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). In fact, the majority of jurisdictions today do not strictly adhere to procedural and evidentiary rules at juvenile transfer hearings. Monica Franklin Hill, Applicability of Rules of Evidence to Juvenile Transfer, Waiver, or Certification Hearings, 37 A.L.R.5th 703, 717 (1996). While I recognize that most courts have held that a juvenile is entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at a juvenile transfer hearing, the rules of evidence are not universally applied in a stringent manner. Some jurisdictions have held that the rules of evidence should be relaxed at the juvenile transfer hearing and that even if confessions are illegally obtained, a judge in a transfer hearing is permitted to consider evidence that might be inadmissible in a criminal trial. In re D. J., 909 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App.1995). In a transfer hearing, the rules of evidence are relaxed because the purpose of the hearing is not to determine guilt or innocence but rather to determine if there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offense. Id. Strict rules of evidence are not applied in transfer proceedings because the weight of evidence is judged by whether it would support an indictment for the offense, and a grand jury considering an indictment is permitted to receive evidence that would be inadmissable at an adjudication hearing or trial. In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d 325, 330 (Tex.App.1994). In State v. Milk, 519 N.W.2d 313 (S.D. 1994), the court recognized that the legislature had statutorily defined the list of exceptions to the applicability of the rules of evidence, and refused to judicially expand those exceptions to include juvenile transfer hearings. Id. at 316. The court reasoned that the decision to admit hearsay at juvenile transfer hearings should be made via the legislative or rulemaking process. Id. [8] In State v. Nicholas H., 131 N.H. 569, 560 A.2d 1156 (1989), the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered the admissibility of hearsay evidence in a juvenile transfer hearing, addressed the absence of any specific exception in the applicability of the rules of evidence, and concluded: In the absence of a clear and specific exemption, we hold that the rules of evidence apply to juvenile certification hearings. Accordingly, we conclude that the hearsay statements [of a witness] were inadmissible and that the district court improperly considered them in making its finding of prosecutive merit under [N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 169-B:24the juvenile transfer statute]. Id. 560 A.2d at 1158. Subsequent to the Nicholas decision, New Hampshire's Rules of Evidence were specifically amended to provide that the rules of evidence do not now apply to juvenile certification proceedings. See In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 621 A.2d 923, 930 (1993). The statutory scheme in West Virginia, codified at West Virginia Code § 49-5-2(j) and (k) (1996), provides that all procedural rights afforded to adults in criminal proceedings, unless otherwise specified, and the rules of evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply to all adjudicatory hearings held under ... article [five].... [9] W.Va. Code § 49-5-2(j)-(k). [10] Although juvenile transfer hearings are not specifically mentioned in either Rule 5.1 or in West Virginia Code § 49-5-2(j) and (k), I believe, as previously mentioned, that juvenile transfer hearings ought to be more closely akin to preliminary hearings than adjudicatory ones and should be treated accordingly. Thus, I urge the legislative branch, and this Court at an appropriate time, to address this issue and to consider moving toward the trend suggested herein, which will afford both juveniles and the state a fair, but more expedited procedure with regard to juvenile transfer to adult jurisdiction.