Opinion ID: 1761035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: uniform mode of assessment.

Text: There remains to be determined the contention of Detroit upon its cross-appeal that the use of a uniform mode for assessment of all properties within the city was correct and that the commission erred in failing to affirm the city's determination of valuation by such method. We agree with the tax commission that a uniform approach to valuation does not always result in uniform assessment. See In re Appeal of General Motors Corporation (1965), 376 Mich 373, 378, footnote 1. While uniform approach may be desirable, it is not the ultimate goal of valuation. The ultimate goal is uniform true cash values. They are not necessarily achieved by a single uniform approach. As we have pointed out, reproduction or replacement cost less depreciation and obsolescence is subject to many variables. Even a slight variation in the percentage of depreciation or of obsolescence may produce a considerable difference in valuation. The percentage to be used is a matter of judgment. Consequently, there is no assurance that the use of a single uniform mode will achieve a uniform assessment. Its use is not forbidden but such use should not foreclose other methods and approaches, depending upon the nature of the particular property, to achieve uniform assessment. With all approaches available for use and comparison of results, valuations of property for assessment purposes are more likely to reflect true cash values than will be the case if only a single mode is used. ADDENDUM: There are many varieties of judicial review. Generally review has been tailored to what courts, legislatures, and constitutional conventions considered to be requisite to due process and the realities of particular situations. For instance, judicial review in workmen's compensation matters is so limited that findings of fact, in the absence of fraud, are conclusive. See article 6, § 28, Const 1963; CL 1948, § 413.12 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.186). In contrast to this, review of chancery matters is de novo, even in this Court. I have set forth the reasons I construe the constitutional language to mean an admittedly limited judicial review of property tax assessments  a special kind of administrative proceeding that goes on year after year and that, statewide, involves hundreds of thousands of valuations  420,000 parcels of real estate and 65,000 personal property assessments in Detroit alone. The law was well established in this field before the 1961 Constitutional Convention. From the constitutional debates, it is clear the 1963 Constitution intends no departure from the previous law. Justice SOURIS' opinion and mine serve to illustrate the practical difficulties involved if courts were to consider the weight of the evidence in these tax matters. In these opinions, there has been a review of the evidence in this single case. If such review were to be allowed as a matter of right, the finality which is now largely reposed in the Michigan State tax commission would pass to the courts. Since the importance of assured revenue for the operation of State and local government was well understood, I do not believe the people, in adopting the 1963 Constitution, intended a kind of review that would defer finality for years as litigation progressed through the courts. I do not disagree with Justice SOURIS that where a hearing has been demanded the commission or the commission's staff has the procedural responsibility of presenting its case on the record for scrutiny and testing by the taxpayer. This issue of adequate presentation was never properly resolved at the hearing in this case  the studies, reports, and other data as to level of assessments never were fully identified and ferretted out of the commission's files  either by the taxpayer or the commission. The commission insisted in a vague fashion that they were a part of the record. Neither the taxpayer nor the city of Detroit insisted upon specification of the same, as they had a right to do. While suggested techniques for coping with this problem have been stated in this opinion, whatever techniques may be necessary should be developed in future tax cases. Affirmed. No costs, neither party having provided the Court with a satisfactory record.