Opinion ID: 2494734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred by requiring Sanders to serve the life sentence pursuant to Count II before being conveyed to the state mental hospital pursuant to Count I.

Text: ¶ 31. Sanders's third assignment of error is that the trial court erred in suspending his mandatory commitment to a state asylum for the insane under Mississippi Code Section 99-13-7 [29] until completion of his sentence on Count II. The trial court is mandated to commit any person acquitted on the ground of insanity when the jury finds that the defendant has not been restored to reason and remains dangerous to the community. [30] Because the jury found for Sanders on Count I (but also found that he remained insane and dangerous), the trial court was required to commit him. [31] The Court of Appeals aptly noted that this mandate was mutually exclusive to Sanders's mandatory life sentence under our habitual offender statute (Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81) [32] as a consequence of his conviction on Count II of the indictment. [33] Because the habitual offender statute contains the additional mandate that such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's sentencing order. [34] ¶ 32. A person cannot be in two places at the same time. The commitment statute for the criminally insane and the habitual offender statute each mandate that the court confine Sanders in mutually exclusive manners. The latter, however, specifically prohibits the suspension of its mandate. [35] That prohibition is not absolute, but exceptions are exceedingly rare. [36] The trial court's order is in accord with the plain reading of these statutory provisions. ¶ 33. The insanity statute is silent regarding whether mandatory commitment may be suspended to allow for simultaneous mandatory incarceration. When a statute is ambiguous or doubtful, we invoke the doctrine of in pari materia. [37] When statutes are in pari materia, although apparently conflicting, they should, if possible, be construed in harmony with each other to give effect to each. [38] The trial court's disposition is the only disposition which logically could give effect to the express prohibition in the habitual offender statute against suspending or reducing the criminal sentence. Though it is a harmonious reading of the statutes, this result raises policy questions. What are the purposes of these two separate forms of confinement, and which confinement is more important? In Michigan v. Webb , the supreme court of that state considered a similar question. [39] Webb killed his father and his father's friend contemporaneously and was convicted of the latter but acquitted of the former by reason of insanity. [40] That court, interpreting its own mandatory commitment provision, said there was no doubt that it is a measure to promote public safety. Persons acquitted by reason of insanity, particularly where the facts are grave, cannot be allowed to simply walk out the front door of the courthouse. [41] An Ohio court considering a similar question found the opposite to be true, saying that the legislature of that state had clearly adopted the human principle that no person shall be either tried or punished while he is insane. [42] The requirement of Mississippi's commitment statute that one found not guilty on account of insanity must be dangerous to the community to be committed suggests that its purpose is more for the protection of society than as a service to the perpetrator. The plain reading Section 99-13-7 reveals that if the jury had acquitted Sanders on both counts and had found him not to have been restored to reason, but had not found that he was a danger to the community, commitment under that statute would not have been mandatory. It might not have been authorized at all. If the Legislature has other purposes, besides societal protection, in mind for rare circumstances such as these, it may enact laws that so reflect. Furthermore, the Department of Corrections is equipped to treat the physical and mental ailments of its wards. Whether this treatment is adequate for Sanders is, certainly, not an issue for us at this time. ¶ 34. Despite the unusual circumstances of the sentencing order, we find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in requiring Sanders first to serve his mandatory life sentence before his term of an indefinite confinement in a mental institution. This issue is without merit.