Opinion ID: 2442682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: due process and equal protection under article 24

Text: Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land. Md. Decl. of Rts., Art. 24. Although the Maryland Constitution contains no similarly expressed equal protection clause, we have observed on numerous occasions that the concept of equal protection is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24. Conaway, 401 Md. at 272 n. 33, 932 A.2d at 602 n. 33; Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 417, 635 A.2d 967, 969-70 (1994); Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 96, 626 A.2d 372, 375 (1993); Atty. Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981). In addition, we have noted consistently that, as a general rule, we interpret Article 24 in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, such that pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court are highly persuasive authorities; nevertheless, we recognize that Article 24 and the Fourteenth Amendment are independent and capable of divergent effect. Conaway, 401 Md. at 272 n. 33, 932 A.2d at 602 n. 33; Verzi, 333 Md. at 417, 635 A.2d at 970; Waldron, 289 Md. at 704, 426 A.2d at 941. In order to determine whether a given statute or ordinance satisfies the due process requirement of Article 24, we ask rhetorically whether the legislative enactment, as an exercise of the legislature's police power, bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the State or municipality. Westchester West No. 2 Ltd. P'ship v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 454, 348 A.2d 856, 860 (1975); Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 236, 335 A.2d 679, 683 (1975). In applying this test, courts perform a very limited function, resisting interference unless it is shown that the legislature exercised its police power arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably. Westchester West, 276 Md. at 460, 348 A.2d at 863 (noting that [p]rice control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty) (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539, 54 S.Ct. 505, 517 78 L.Ed. 940, 958 (1934)); see also Hargrove v. Bd. of Trustees of Md. Retirement Sys., 310 Md. 406, 427, 529 A.2d 1372, 1382 (1987); Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 236, 335 A.2d at 683. The wisdom or expediency of a statute duly adopted by the legislative body is not subject to judicial scrutiny, and the statute will not be held void if there are any considerations relating to the public welfare by which it may be supported. Hargrove, 310 Md. at 427, 529 A.2d at 1382; Westchester, 276 Md. at 455, 348 A.2d at 860; Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 236, 335 A.2d at 683. We have noted that courts are under a special duty to respect the legislative judgment where the legislature is attempting to solve a serious problem in a manner which has not had an opportunity to prove its worth. Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 237, 335 A.2d at 684. As such, courts should hesitate before invalidating an ordinance where doing so would deprive the legislative body contemplating such a statute of any opportunity to discover whether the chosen method will be good, bad or indifferent in its results. Id. at 237-38, 335 A.2d at 684. Where, as here, the legislative action at issue neither interferes with a fundamental right nor implicates a suspect classification, [14] the test for determining whether a statute violates the equal protection component of Article 24 is nearly identical to the due process examination. In such a case, we employ the least exacting and most deferential standard of constitutional review, namely, rational basis review, under which a legislative classification will pass constitutional muster so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Conaway, 401 Md. at 273-74, 932 A.2d at 603-04; Kane v. Bd. of Appeals, 390 Md. 145, 172, 887 A.2d 1060, 1076 (2005); Kirsch, 331 Md. at 104, 626 A.2d at 379; Hargrove, 310 Md. at 424, 529 A.2d at 1381. In general, we will uphold a statute subject to rational basis review against an equal protection challenge unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the court may conclude only that the governmental actions were arbitrary or irrational. Conaway, 401 Md. at 274, 932 A.2d at 604. We noted that a classification having a reasonable basis does not offend equal protection merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. Id. at 275, 932 A.2d at 604; Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 241, 335 A.2d at 686. In addition, we observed that legislative bodies are not required by equal protection to attack all aspects of a problem at the same time; rather, the legislative body may select one phase of a problem and apply a remedy there, neglecting for the moment other phases of the problem. Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 241, 335 A.2d at 686; see also Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dep't of Env't, 410 Md. 326, 346, 978 A.2d 702, 713 (2009). Under both the due process and equal protection tests outlined supra, the challenged statute is presumed to be constitutional. Lonaconing, 410 Md. at 343, 978 A.2d at 711; Conaway, 401 Md. at 274, 932 A.2d at 604; Westchester, 276 Md. at 464, 348 A.2d at 865; Bowie Inn, 274 Md. at 236, 335 A.2d at 683. Where there are plausible reasons for the legislative action, the court's inquiry is at an end. Conaway, 401 Md. at 325, 932 A.2d at 635. In this vein, we have described rational basis review as `the paradigm of judicial restraint,' noting that `[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process [and] that ... judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.' Id. (quoting Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 221 (1993)); see also Md. Aggregates Assoc. v. Md., 337 Md. 658, 673, 655 A.2d 886, 893-94 (1995). It is not the Court's province to determine the fairness or desirability of legislative [decisions and] classifications; that question is left to the legislature itself and ultimately to the affected electorate. Hargrove, 310 Md. at 424, 529 A.2d at 1381. In applying these standards then, we must consider two questions with regard to Appellants' constitutional facial challenge to the Ordinance's validity, namely, (1) whether the Ordinance's stated objectives are legitimate governmental ends, and (2) whether the means chosen by the City in the Ordinance bear a rational relationship to achievement of those ends. See Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 121, 872 A.2d 1, 10 (2005) (noting that, unless a suspect or quasi-suspect class is created or a fundamental or important right is implicated, the appropriate standard of review under due process or equal protection analysis is rational basis review). For reasons we shall explain, we answer each question in the affirmative. As such, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City on Appellants' Article 24 claims, as plead. As noted by Appellants, the traditional purpose of rent control regulation has been the protection of tenants from exorbitant rents. Appellants pointed at the summary judgment hearing in the Circuit Court to an expert statement from their expert witness, Dr. Stephen S. Fuller, a nationally recognized market economist, to this effect. Dr. Fuller explained: [T]he rationale for rent control in its historic context ... focus[es] on two conditions: (1) protecting low-income tenants from owners who would otherwise be able to profit unfairly from monopolistic powers stemming from unusual market conditions, and (2) in response to rapid general inflation occurring during war time or severe economic conditions.    The historic purpose of rent control programs was to have a broad-based effect on the rental stock in order to achieve the objective of the controls and not to burden smaller apartment operators or owners of individual units (condos, single-family units) with these regulations. We noted as much in Riger v. L & B Limited Partnership, 278 Md. 281, 363 A.2d 481 (1976), where we stated that [a] rent control program is designed to regulate the economy, stemming inflation in rental housing where normal market factors are not operating to keep housing costs down. Id. at 295, 363 A.2d at 490. Courts in other jurisdictions have noted similar traditionally-accepted problems for which rent control has been held to be a rational legislative response, including housing shortages, widespread imposition of exorbitant rents, monopoly control of the housing market, and the prevalence of substandard housing. See, e.g., 440 Co. v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 950 F.Supp. 105, 108 (D.N.J.1996) (finding that the validity of a rent control ordinance depends upon the existence of conditions that justify the use of municipal police power to regulate prices, and that a municipality enacting a rent control ordinance must possess a set of facts which permit it to conclude rationally that the competitive rental housing market is not operating in the public interest (quoting Troy Hills Village v. Twp. Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 68 N.J. 604, 350 A.2d 34, 40 (1975))); MHC Operating Ltd. P'ship v. City of San Jose, 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 576 (2003) (noting that the purpose of rent control is to prevent excessive rents); Apt. Ass'n of Greater L.A. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 24 Cal. App.4th 1730, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 228, 229 (1994) (observing that [r]ent control is a proper exercise of a city's police power if the regulation is `reasonably calculated to eliminate excessive rents and at the same time provide landlords with a just and reasonable return on their property' (quoting Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal.3d 129, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 491, 550 P.2d 1001 (1976))); Dep't of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So.2d 1032, 1042 (Fla.1986) (stating that the constitutional justification for rent control is the protection of [tenants] from economic depredation by [landlords]); Brunetti v. New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 350 A.2d 19, 28 (1975) (noting that, in the context of rent control, rationales include but are not limited to proof of a housing shortage, widespread imposition of exorbitant rents, monopoly control of rental housing market or prevalence of substandard housing); Somers Associates, Inc. v. Gloucester Twp., 241 N.J.Super. 323, 575 A.2d 20, 24 (App.Div.1990) (noting that the traditional primary purpose of rent control is protection of tenants, usually with fixed or limited incomes, from burdensome impairments of their standard of living). Nevertheless, courts also recognize a number of other legitimate governmental objectives in addressing housing concerns, including the restoration and revitalization of urban housing, see, e.g., Allen v. Brodie, 573 F.Supp. 87, 90 (D.Md.1983), promoting and preserving neighborhoods that are conducive to families, particularly those with young children, have stable populations, and have low traffic, see Ames Rental Prop. Ass'n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 2007), and preserving the character of single-family residential neighborhoods, Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701, 708 (Utah 2005). The stated objectives of the Ordinance are articulated in § 127-1.A, which describes the purpose of the City's rent control program as follows: 1. To encourage the University of Maryland and the private sector to provide suitable housing to meet the needs of undergraduate and graduate students on or near campus. 2. To encourage the availability of housing for households of all income levels, and to preserve, maintain and improve existing housing. 3. To strengthen College Park neighborhoods by reducing the number of single-family homes that are rental properties. 4. To encourage private reinvestment by homeowners consistent with a neighborhood's character. City Code § 127-1.A. Although the above-stated goals differ from the traditional purpose of rent control legislation, namely, the protection of tenants from exorbitant rents, we cannot say, in light of the relevant case law and the broad discretion granted legislative bodies to determine and protect the public interest, that the goals of the Ordinance are illegitimate governmental ends. [15] We turn to consider whether the means selected by the City in the Ordinance are related rationally to achievement of those objectives. As to the first two stated goals of the Ordinance, encouraging the availability of housing for households of all income levels, including university students, and preserving, maintaining, and improving existing housing, the City maintains that it is reasonable to believe that capping rent in detached dwellings in single-family neighborhoods, but not in apartment buildings, will encourage builders, investors, and the University of Maryland to expedite the construction of apartment buildings capable of housing hundreds of renters in and near the City. In addition, the City asserts that the rent control program would reduce speculative pressure on home prices in single-family neighborhoods, thereby lowering home prices in those neighborhoods and make them more attractive for single-family use. The City contends that it is not irrational to believe that an acceleration in apartment building construction would improve the quality of housing options for renters and that increasing home ownership would help preserve, maintain, and improve housing in traditional residential neighborhoods on the theory that homeowners commit more resources to the maintenance of their homes than do renters and landlords. In response, Appellants direct our attention to the expert statement of Dr. Fuller to the effect that it is his opinion that the Ordinance would result in an increase in the cost of rental housing generally by restricting the supply of less expensive units in single-family neighborhoods, while permitting apartment buildings to increase rents due to increased demand, and that rent caps generally lead to further deterioration of rental properties. Irrespective of the opinion evidence proffer presented by Appellants regarding Dr. Fuller's contrary view of the effect that the Ordinance may have on rental costs in the City and the City's existing housing stock, we cannot say that the City's perceived nexus between the rent control program and the goals of encouraging the availability of housing for households of all incomes is without any rational basis. It is entirely rational to believe that, by capping rents in the City's single-family neighborhoods, speculative investors will be less inclined to purchase such properties and, as a result, the price of those properties will be less inflated. Similarly, we are unprepared to say that the rent control program instituted by the Ordinance is not related rationally to the City's goal of preserving, maintaining, and improving existing housing. If rent control leads to increased construction of apartment buildings, landlords of other rental properties will be forced to improve their properties in order to compete for rental business, and, as noted supra, a decrease in single-family home prices may lead to increased home ownership and, thus, improved maintenance of the City's existing housing stock. Although the City's rent control plan may not result ultimately in achieving these legislative goals, as argued by Appellants, even well-supported criticism of the Ordinance and its likely effects provides an insufficient legal basis to find the Ordinance to be violative of the protections of Article 24. [16] Regarding the Ordinance's second major goal, namely, strengthening City neighborhoods by reducing the number of single-family homes that are rental properties, the City relies on research explicated in the Sage Report demonstrating that renters are cited more frequently for litter and garbage violations than occupying homeowners. Appellants retort by explaining, in considerable detail, that although renters are cited more frequently for litter and garbage violations than homeowners, other portions of the same data base shows that homeowners are more frequent violators of the City code in other ways, such as the presence of inoperable vehicles and miscellaneous violations. According to Appellants, this revelation undermines the City's claim that instituting rent control will strengthen City neighborhoods by reducing code violations. Nevertheless, it is not Appellants' nor this Court's prerogative to determine which municipal code violations are more serious and pose a greater threat to the citizens of College Park; that judgment rests in the hands of the City. We shall not second-guess the City's determination as to which code violations to target and how best to overcome their pernicious effects. In addition, it is not clearly irrational for the City to believe that apartment buildings, where renters enjoy highly convenient waste services and pathways between units are generally confined inside the buildings, do not contribute in similar fashion to violations of the City code as do renters in detached single-family properties. Thus, we cannot say that the Ordinance is unrelated to the City's goal of strengthening City neighborhoods. Regarding the Ordinance's final purpose, encouraging private reinvestment by homeowners consistent with a neighborhood's character, we agree with the City's contentions that it is not irrational to believe that neighborhoods with a high number of private, owner-occupied residences, which, according to the City, will be the likely result of its rent control program, will be more stable than neighborhoods populated by properties whose market prices are driven by absentee landlords speculating on the future of the rental market. The opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Anderson reached a similar conclusion. In that case, the City of Provo amended a zoning ordinance governing residential neighborhoods near Brigham Young University to allow only those homeowners who reside in their homes to rent out accessory apartments, resulting in a distinction drawn between occupying and non-occupying landlords. Anderson, 108 P.3d at 703. Against an equal protection challenge, the court upheld the validity of the amendment, concluding that the disparity in treatment was justified reasonably by the council's stated objective of balancing the city's competing interests in accommodating student housing needs and in preserving the character of single-family residential neighborhoods. Id. at 708. Specifically, the court noted that the city concluded reasonably that preventing absentee landlords from dominating ... neighborhoods would help to retain the neighborhoods' single family character rather than converting them, in effect, to duplexes with both units often occupied by semitransient residents. Id. As acknowledged supra, it is possible that the City's rent control program may prove unsuccessful in addressing effectively the goals identified in § 127-1.A. Nevertheless, it is clear that, despite Appellants' considerable criticism of the City's methods and legislative fact-finding, the City is not without a rational basis to its belief that the Ordinance may achieve its stated objectives. As such, we hold that the Ordinance does not violate on its face Appellants' due process and equal protection rights under Article 24 because there is a rational relationship between the purported goals of the Ordinance, which we have found to be in the acceptable range of legitimacy, and the method chosen by the City to achieve those goals, namely, imposition of a rent control regime. [17]