Opinion ID: 2253827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mental Health Code

Text: Respondent's first argument is that section 3-816 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) guarantees respondent the right to appeal his involuntary commitment. See 405 ILCS 5/3-816(b) (West 2006). Section 3-816 provides: (b) An appeal from a final order may be taken in the same manner as in other civil cases. Upon entry of a final order, the court shall notify the recipient orally and in writing of his or her right to appeal and, if he or she is indigent, of his or her right to a free transcript and counsel. The cost of the transcript shall be paid pursuant to subsection (c) of Section 3-818 and subsection (c) of Section 4-615 of this Code. If the recipient wishes to appeal and is unable to obtain counsel, counsel shall be appointed pursuant to Section 3-805. 405 ILCS 5/3-816(b) (West 2006). Respondent argues that given the limited duration of the orders entered in mental health cases, these cases will technically be moot before an appeal can be heard. Thus, respondent argues that in order to effectuate the right to appeal provided in section 3-816, this court should adopt a general exception to the mootness doctrine that applies in all mental health cases. In support of his argument, respondent cites this court's language in Barbara H. In the portion of the Barbara H. decision cited by respondent, this court stated that the duration of involuntary admissions were far too brief to permit appellate review.    To apply the mootness doctrine under these circumstances would mean that recipients of involuntary mental health services would be left without any legal recourse for challenging the circuit court's orders. Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d at 492, 234 Ill.Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555. [2] Respondent's reliance on the Code and on Barbara H. are misplaced. First, with regard to the Code, nothing in the language of section 3-816 mandates appellate review. Instead, section 3-816 states explicitly that an appeal from a final order may be taken in the same manner as in other civil cases. 405 ILCS 5/3-816(b) (West 2006). In other civil cases, as in this case, mootness is a factor that the courts will consider in determining whether it is appropriate to decide a given case. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill.2d 1, 8, 227 Ill.Dec. 769, 688 N.E.2d 106 (1997) (this court does not review cases merely to set precedent or guide future litigation). With regard to respondent's reliance on the quoted text from Barbara H., respondent is also mistaken, as he has overlooked the context in which this court made the foregoing statement. That statement was made during this court's analysis of the mootness exception for cases that are capable of repetition yet avoid review. The quoted text does not provide a basis for a general exception to mootness for all mental health cases, nor does it contain any interpretation of section 3-816 which would provide for a general exception. Instead, the quoted section establishes that in Barbara H.'s specific case the first element of the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exception, that the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to cessation, was present. It is true, however, that Barbara H. recognizes that some appellate court panels have recognized an exception to [the mootness doctrine] for mental health cases. However, this court never adopted that general exception. Instead, this court stated that whether our court should embrace that exception has not been briefed or argued by the parties    and we shall leave the matter for another day. Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d at 491, 234 Ill.Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555. We then went on to perform a case-specific analysis and utilize a case-specific exception to the mootness doctrine to reach the merits of Barbara H.'s appeal. Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d at 490-92, 234 Ill.Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555. The case-by-case approach utilized in Barbara H. is consistent with this court's prior precedent. See In re Splett, 143 Ill.2d 225, 228, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991) (applying the collateral consequences exception); In re Hays, 102 Ill.2d 314, 317, 80 Ill.Dec. 307, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984) (also invoking the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine). More importantly, the case-by-case approach of Barbara H. is also consistent with subsequent opinions of this court. See In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 45-46, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004) (invoking the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine in a case involving the involuntary medication of a mental health patient); In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 401-03, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002) (also applying the public interest exception). In addition, the general exception for mental health cases that this court noted but left unaddressed in Barbara H. is not universally followed by the appellate court. See In re Sciara, 21 Ill.App.3d 889, 316 N.E.2d 153 (1974); People ex rel. Craine v. Boyd, 41 Ill.App.3d 538, 353 N.E.2d 696 (1976); In re Nancy A., 342 Ill.App.3d 355, 277 Ill.Dec. 10, 795 N.E.2d 377 (2003); In re Andrew B., 386 Ill.App.3d 337, 324 Ill. Dec. 848, 896 N.E.2d 1067 (2008); In re Robin C., 385 Ill.App.3d 523, 325 Ill.Dec. 642, 898 N.E.2d 689 (2008); In re Phillip E., 385 Ill.App.3d 278, 324 Ill.Dec. 33, 895 N.E.2d 33 (2008). In fact, even some of the cases that purport to adopt the general exception for mental health cases actually utilize a form of one of the other established exceptions to the mootness doctrine. In Yiadom v. Kiley , the appellate court stated that [g]enerally, the mootness doctrine is not applicable to mental health cases. Yiadom v. Kiley, 204 Ill.App.3d 418, 424-25, 149 Ill.Dec. 846, 562 N.E.2d 310 (1990), citing In re Garcia, 59 Ill.App.3d 500, 503, 16 Ill.Dec. 684, 375 N.E.2d 557 (1978). The court in Yiadom, however, went on to note that the mootness doctrine should not be imposed where it would preclude issues capable of repetition from ever being reviewed on appeal. Yiadom, 204 Ill.App.3d at 425, 149 Ill.Dec. 846, 562 N.E.2d 310. Thus, the appellate court in Yiadom actually adopted the rationale that the appeal was justiciable under the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exception even though it stated that it was adopting the rationale from Garcia that mootness is generally inapplicable to mental health cases. A similar analysis is seen in In re Alex T., where the appellate court again stated that the mootness doctrine is generally inapplicable to mental health cases and yet cited the collateral consequences exception as the basis for this general inapplicability. In re Alex T., 375 Ill.App.3d 758, 763-64, 314 Ill.Dec. 85, 873 N.E.2d 1015 (2007). Therefore, despite the general exception language contained in a handful of appellate court cases, this general exception is really nothing more than a recognition that a specific appeal of a mental health case will usually fall within one of the established exceptions to the mootness doctrine. However, whether a case falls within an established exception to the mootness doctrine is a case-by-case determination. Therefore, there is no per se exception to mootness that universally applies to mental health cases. Because neither the plain language of section 3-816 nor our prior case law mandates appellate review without consideration of mootness, we now direct our attention to the established mootness exceptions respondent raises.