Opinion ID: 2069410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expiration of the Statute of Limitations

Text: Old Republic argues that it was improper for the Auditor-Master to propose judgment against the surety on these general personal representative bonds, and for the court to enter the judgments, because the applicable five-year statute of limitations had lapsed. Old Republic relies on D.C.Code § 12-301(6) as setting out the time frame within which an action on an executor's or administrator's bond must be brought. [5] Old Republic argues that in a claim against a bond, the cause of action accrues when a breach of the bonded obligation occurs, contending that in this case the cause of action accrued when a claim could be made against the bond, which is when an interested person was injured or damaged by some action of the personal representative. Applying these concepts, Old Republic argues, injury occurred and the claim accrued in July 1988, when the settlement funds were received by the personal representatives of both estates, without fully accounting for them. Thus, the five-year statute of limitations had expired by the time the court entered judgment against the surety on May 13, 1996. Appellees, the respective estates, propose that the time when the action accrues against the surety is when the court makes a final decision establishing wrongdoing on the part of the personal representative. Specifically, 1) the determination that an interested party has been damaged by the personal representative's failure to properly distribute funds received was not made in this case until the Auditor-Master's report was approved by the court on May 13, 1996; and 2) the removal of the personal representatives because of their failure to meet the Probate Division's accounting form requirements, without more, did not trigger the statute of limitations because no financial liability had yet been established. We need not decide what statute of limitations applies or when it starts to run against a surety for a general personal representative bond, because we conclude that Old Republic waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to object to the Auditor-Master's Report assessing liability or raising the issue in any way before the Probate Division. The surety company argues that although it did receive a copy of the Auditor-Master's Report containing a recommendation that the court enter judgment against the surety company, Old Republic was not a party before the court and, as such, had no obligation to object to the Report nor the court order. To the contrary, the surety company was an interested party before the court for the purpose of having an obligation to raise the statute of limitations defense before the Probate Division. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 65.1 provides the Superior Court with personal jurisdiction over a surety that has given security in the form of a bond, stating: Whenever these Rules require or permit the giving of security by a party, and security is given in the form of a bond or stipulation or other undertaking with 1 or more sureties, each surety submits to the jurisdiction of the Court and irrevocably appoints the Clerk of the Court as the surety's agent upon whom any papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. The surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the Court prescribes may be served on the Clerk of the Court, who shall forthwith mail copies to the sureties if their addresses are known. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 65.1 (emphasis added). Furthermore, D.C.Code § 20-523(b) (1997) notes that Termination [of the personal representative] does not affect the personal jurisdiction consented to pursuant to section 20-501 in proceedings which may be commenced against such representative arising out of the performance of duties as personal representative. If the personal representative fails to account for and deliver the property belonging to the estate to the successor personal representative or special administrator, as required by subsection (a), the Court may enter judgment against the personal representative and the personal representative's surety. (Emphasis added.) These provisions, coupled with the fact that Old Republic had notice of the Auditor-Master's Report, [6] made the surety an interested party before the Probate Division, triggering the surety's obligation to timely bring a statute of limitations defense. The Report of the Auditor-Master contained the following Notice informing interested parties that If within thirteen days after the mailing of notice of the filing of this Report, no objections are filed hereto, this Report will be presented to the Fiduciary Judge for an Order approving this Report and recommendations. (Rule 53(e)(2); Rule 6 and Rule 12-I; Civil Rules of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia). A number of months elapsed between the mailing of the Report of the Auditor-Master and the Probate Division's order entering judgment against Old Republic in the two cases, based on the Auditor-Master's recommendation. In the Spinner case, the Auditor-Master filed her Report with the Register of Wills, Clerk of the Probate Division, on September 1, 1995. The order of the Probate Division adopting the Report's recommendations was not entered until May 13, 1996. Similarly, in the Hutchins case, the Auditor-Master filed her Report with the Probate Division on September 6, 1995, and the court did not enter judgment based on those recommendations until May 13, 1996. In both instances, the surety company had ample time to respond to the Report of the Auditor-Master and raise any objections to its recommendations, in particular the recommendation that the court enter judgment against the surety. Because Old Republic failed to file an objection to the Report of the Auditor-Master, or otherwise to bring before the Probate Division, its affirmative defense that the statute of limitations had expired, it is barred from raising the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Mayo v. Mayo, 508 A.2d 114, 116 (D.C.1986) (A statute of limitation defense, once waived. . . may not be raised by a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment or for the first time on appeal.).