Opinion ID: 2078371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New York's Anti-Stalking Statute

Text: In 1992, the Legislature amended the menacing and harassment statutes in its first effort to penalize stalking-type behavior ( see L 1992, ch 345; see also Governor's Mem approving L 1992, ch 345, 1992 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2886). Concluding that these amendments were not up to the task and that stalking behavior    ha[d] become more prevalent    in recent years, the Legislature in 1999 enacted the Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999 (L 1999, ch 635, § 2), creating a new, separate crime known as stalking. The lawmakers were moved by the unfortunate reality [] that stalking victims have been intolerably forced to live in fear of their stalkers and that [s]talkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims, often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical harm upon them ( id. ). Accordingly, like the other 49 states and the District of Columbia before it, [3] New York enacted an anti-stalking law to give greater protections to stalking victims and provide clear recognition of the dangerousness of stalking ( id. ; see also NY Assembly Mem in Support of L 1999, ch 635, 1999 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2012). The Act, codified at Penal Law § 120.45, provides in relevant part: A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: 1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person, a member of such person's immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted; or 2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such person's immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct. On this appeal, defendant contends that Penal Law § 120.45 is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied to him. As he did in the courts below, he argues that the statute neither gives people adequate notice of what conduct it proscribes nor provides adequate guidance to those charged with enforcing it. [4]