Opinion ID: 714125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Increase for Obstruction of Justice

Text: 88 Ross received a two-level increase in offense level for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 7 which reads: 89 If the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, increase the offense level from Chapter Two by 2 levels. 90 Application Note 3(d) to § 3C1.1 explains that among other conduct, this increase applies to concealing or directing or procuring another person to ... conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding.... According to the district court, the increase in this case was predicated upon (1) Ross's directions to ISC consultant Kermith Owens to falsify the spreadsheet given to Special Agent Livengood in order to conceal excess cash in, and unauthorized withdrawals from, the cash control account; (2) Ross's written instructions to Miller, Cooper to withhold ISC documents from Special Agent Livengood; and (3) Ross's false statements to Special Agent Livengood during his inspection. 91 Initially, Ross argues that this allegedly obstructive conduct does not fall within the ambit of § 3C1.1 because Agent Livengood's inspection was not an official investigation, and thus Ross's conduct did not occur during the investigation of his offense. However, § 3C1.1 is not limited strictly to conduct occurring during the pendency of some legal proceeding. See United States v. Kirkland, 985 F.2d 535, 537 (11th Cir.1993). Rather, courts have interpreted an official investigation as requiring investigative action by federal law enforcement or government employees acting within the course and in furtherance of their official duties. Id. at 538 (citing cases). For example, the First Circuit has held that [h]iding rotten poultry and meat products in the freezer so that Agriculture Department inspectors would not find them ... is a flagrant example of concealing evidence material to an official investigation resulting in the defendants' eventual convictions for selling, storing, and transporting adulterated meat products. United States v. Pilgrim Market Corp., 944 F.2d 14, 21 (1st Cir.1991). Here, Special Agent Livengood conducted his inspection as part of his official duties acting for the DOE, and thus Ross's obstructive conduct occurred during an official investigation. Secondly, Ross argues that the increase was not warranted because his conduct did not significantly obstruct or impede Special Agent Livengood or the DOE. We need not address the merits of this argument, however, because as explained below Ross's invocation of this standard is misplaced. 92 Application Note 3(g) to § 3C1.1 explains that the obstruction increase applies to providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation.... (emphasis added). Similarly, Application Note 3(d) to § 3C1.1 states that if directing another person to conceal evidence material to an official investigation occurred contemporaneously with arrest ..., it shall not, standing alone, be sufficient to warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it resulted in a material hindrance to the official investigation.... (emphasis added). These limitations exist to prevent application of the obstruction increase to a mere exculpatory no--i.e., where a defendant futilely denies his guilt, or attempts to conceal his wrongdoing, during questioning or apprehension by officials. See United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 290 (7th Cir.1991). 93 However, these limitations by their own terms do not apply to Ross's conduct. Application Note 3(g) is inapposite because Ross's obstruction was based primarily on directing Kermith Owens and Miller, Cooper to conceal evidence material to the official DOE investigation, rather than on making false statements to a law enforcement officer. The limitation in Application Note 3(d) is also inapplicable because Ross's conduct did not occur contemporaneously with arrest. Thus, Ross's argument based on these limitations is without merit. 94 Lastly, Ross argues that the obstruction increase violated the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause because the evidence forming the basis for the increase also formed the basis for his conviction for false statements under count 11. It is important to note that count 11 was a preguidelines count, and thus its sentence was imposed separately from the sentence for the counts under the guidelines. The calculation relating to obstruction of justice concerns only the increase of the offense level for the guidelines counts. Had count 11 fallen under the guidelines, Application Note 6 to § 3C1.1 provides: 95 Where the defendant is convicted both of the obstruction offense and the underlying offense, the count for the obstruction offense will be grouped with the count for the underlying offense under subsection (c) of § 3D1.2 (Groups of Closely Related Counts). The offense level for that group of closely related counts will be the offense level for the underlying offense increased by the 2-level adjustment specified by this section, or the offense level for the obstruction offense, whichever is greater. 96 But count 11 was a preguidelines offense, and thus the grouping of offenses required under Application Note 6 does not apply. 97 Turning to Ross's argument, the Supreme Court held in Witte v. United States that where evidence of criminal conduct operates to increase the sentence of another crime, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar subsequent prosecution for the enhancing criminal conduct. --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2204-08, 132 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995). The Court reasoned that for double jeopardy purposes, the increase constitutes punishment for the underlying crime and not for the enhancing crime. Thus, bringing a subsequent action to punish the defendant for the enhancing crime does not put him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Id. 98 The separate sentence determinations for the guidelines counts and for preguidelines count 11 present an analogous situation to that in Witte, and thus the Court's analysis controls here. Following Witte, the obstruction increase is properly considered under the Double Jeopardy Clause to be punishment for the guidelines offenses only and not for the actual obstructive criminal conduct. Thus, the Fifth Amendment posed no obstacle to charging and punishing Ross under count 11 for the obstructive conduct itself.