Opinion ID: 463478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the correctness of summary judgment for defendants

Text: 36 The unions argued, in the alternative, that they were entitled to summary judgment. Under plaintiffs' theory of the case, the actions of specific employers in influencing Foundation-sponsored litigation is not the central issue on which liability depends. Plaintiffs alleged instead that the Foundation is controlled by parties generally sympathetic to employers' interests, that the Foundation draws its primary financial support from employers, and that the Foundation's positions on legal issues coincide with those of employers. In following this strategy, plaintiffs overlooked the clear meaning of our holding that specific employer involvement must be shown to make out a violation of Section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA. Instead, plaintiffs latched onto our statement that employer coercion of employees was not likely to be present when legal aid activity was not controlled or initiated by employers, and cannot otherwise be imputed to such employers. 590 F.2d at 1150. Plaintiffs then argued that the Foundation's legal aid activities must be imputed to employers because money is funnelled into the lawsuits of union members by a front for anti-labor, employer interests. 584 F.Supp. at 1224. The showing required to impute legal aid activity to employers, whether by a demonstration of employer control of lawsuits, employer initiation of lawsuits, or other employer activity, is more demanding than plaintiffs' front theory. The plaintiffs simply failed to demonstrate, as this court required eight years ago, that employers exert some identifiable, individualized control over the Foundation's litigation program or over specific litigation judgments made by the Foundation's attorneys. 37 We need not repeat our analysis of Section 101(a)(4). See 590 F.2d at 1149-51. We only emphasize that Congress' purpose in enacting the LMRDA was to protect a union member who may be engaged in a dispute with a labor organization from employers who might cause them to take actions either against their own interests or solely to serve the employers' interests. We think Congress wanted to deny employers the power to cause harassing suits or otherwise to create divisions in the unions with which they had relationships. Id. at 1151. We then held that employers do not have the power to create divisions in the unions when they lack control or employer involvement with the litigation program. Id. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that employers involved in the Foundation have the power to cause union members to bring harassing suits against labor organizations or otherwise to disrupt union harmony. 38 Given the law of this case, summary judgment for defendants was appropriate. As plaintiffs noted in their own motion, a trial would serve no purpose: 39 If this Court, contrary to what we believe the Court of Appeals has held, adopts the narrow legal standard proposed by defendants--direct interested employer involvement in particular Foundation lawsuits--plaintiffs can provide no substantial additional evidence at trial concerning that standard and a trial can only be an exercise in judicial frustration. 40 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. 41 Having neither created a material issue of fact during extensive discovery proceedings nor shown their own entitlement to summary judgment, plaintiffs properly suffered adverse summary judgment. In light of our disposition of this appeal, we dismiss defendants' cross-appeal for a jury trial as moot.