Opinion ID: 1187875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stacking of Inferences

Text: Appellant contends that in finding him guilty of burglary the jury drew an impermissible chain of inferences from the sole fact that the Fergusons' stolen property was found in the car with appellant when he was arrested near Wheatland. Introductory to a discussion of inferences in Downs v. State, supra, the court said: The defendant urges essentially that guilt cannot be based solely on circumstantial evidence because it means piling up inferences. We know of no such concept representing accepted jurisprudence with respect to circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is many times the only way that an ultimate fact may be shown. Blakely v. State, Wyo. 1975, 542 P.2d 857, explains that circumstantial evidence has standing and stature and is to be measured upon the same basis as direct evidence. It is a chain of proven circumstances indicating the guilt or innocence of the defendant. We see no proving of an inference from another inference in this case. There may be something offensive about basing an inference on an inference. It is an extremely technical as well as much criticized theory, Annotation, 5 A.L.R.3d 100, entitled, `Modern status of the rules against basing an inference upon an inference or a presumption upon a presumption,' and has been noted in the jurisprudence of Wyoming but found inapplicable or of at least questionable application in those cases where mentioned. Richey v. State, 1921, 28 Wyo. 117, 201 P. 154, reh. denied 205 P. 304; Rosencrance v. State, 1925, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952. Be that as it may, we cannot see its applicability to this case, even if an accepted rule. In the case before us now, the circumstantial facts presented through direct evidence point to only one ultimate inferential fact  guilt. That is distinctively different from pyramiding inferences. 581 P.2d at 614-615. Sequentially, the chain of proven circumstances referred to in Newell is also present here as a reasonable course of times and events. The Davis car disappeared on February 10; the Fergusons' forged check was cashed by appellant in South Dakota on February 11; Mrs. Ferguson reported that the only time her house was unlocked and susceptible to entry without force was on February 9 or 10; appellant was in Gillette that weekend; he knew who Wiley Ferguson was, and that his wife had worked with Mrs. Ferguson cleaning houses; and appellant was in possession of Davis' car and the Fergusons' property, including checks made payable to himself, when arrested. This series of events satisfies us that the jury could reasonably find appellant guilty of the burglary without basing that conclusion on inference upon inference. Cf. State v. King, supra. Adequate evidence for conviction clearly existed, sufficiently so to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury has an obligation to listen, but is not required to believe everything that it hears. That composite knowledge of reason and realism is the strength of the jury system. The conviction is affirmed.