Opinion ID: 1285551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extension Versus Invalidation

Text: We turn to the question of remedy. Petitioner urges upon us the course adopted in Goldfarb, Wiesenfeld and Frontiero : extension of statutory benefits to males and females alike, without regard to actual dependency. (See also Kalina v. Railroad Retirement Board (6th Cir.1976) 541 F.2d 1204.) (4) Although courts do not lack power to remedy a constitutional defect by literally rewriting statutory language, it is a comparatively drastic alternative, to be invoked sparingly, and only when the result achieved by such a course is more consistent with legislative intent than the result that would attend outright invalidation. (See In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727 [122 Cal. Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406], in which we concluded that to construe deemed denied as meaning deemed granted was proper when the only alternative, striking the provision, would frustrate legislative intent entirely; Note, Extension versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative (1975) 12 Colum.J.L. & Soc. Prob. 115; Note, Developments in the Law  Equal Protection (1969) 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1136-1137; Developments in the Law  Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1971) 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1188-1190.) The broad assumptions concerning women's economic role in the family unit upon which the section 3501 presumption apparently is based seem both to deny equal protection and clearly to conflict with the state policy of abolishing archaic stereotypes in the area of employment. (See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 20-21; Lab. Code, § 1411.) (5a) We do not believe, however, that the provision and its conclusive presumption of dependency can legitimately be extended to encompass widowers, even if that course is the only way to preserve them. In Weinberger, the Supreme Court in effect held that substitution of the word parent for the word mother was consistent with Congressional intent to subsidize parental care for minor children. Similarly, the legislative history of the restrictive widower's annuity provision examined in Goldfarb revealed that Congress had sought to aid the family unit, and had in fact intended to ` equalize the protection given to the dependents of women and of men ' by authorizing widowers' pensions,  because `[ u ] nder the present program insured women lack some of the rights which insured men can acquire. ' ( Califano v. Goldfarb, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 216 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 282], citing Advisory Council on Soc. Sec., Recommendations for Soc. Sec. Legislation, Sen. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 38 (1949).) Faced with a reasonably clear expression of congressional intent, the court could properly choose to implement this double purpose by truly equalizing: that is, extending to widowers the full benefits available to widows. Our own case is somewhat different. Although statutory history is virtually nonexistent, we have one clear, if antique, indication that the Legislature did not want widowers to receive compensation in excess of their actual, demonstrable financial loss: it repealed the original limited presumption affording surviving husbands total dependency benefits on a showing of only partial dependency. (Stats. 1917, ch. 586, § 14, p. 844, repealing and replacing former § 19, Stats. 1913, ch. 176, p. 289.) (6) The general rule which dictates liberal construction of workers' compensation statutes in favor of granting rather than withholding benefits (§ 3202) cannot override a clear expression of intent that a particular provision shall be read restrictively. ( Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 8 [128 Cal. Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449].) (5b) Moreover, we believe that invalidation is a wiser course than extension in this particular instance. Section 3501, enacted at a time when women generally were not the financial mainstays of intact families, probably was intended merely to promote administrative convenience, granting automatic death benefits to all widows rather than incurring the expense and inconvenience of conducting case-by-case hearings which would result in full payment to the vast majority of widows in any event. A determination that the public interest would best be served by extending that presumption to widowers is properly a legislative function. Such action would undoubtedly have some impact on workers' compensation insurance rates, since the present rate structure presumably has been carefully calculated without reference to the additional risk of maximum payout in all cases of female fatalities. Conceivably, the number of women killed in job-related accidents is so small as to make of negligible significance the economic impact of extension. Without data to that effect, however, we believe the wiser course is to strike the offending provision and permit the Legislature in its wisdom to evaluate the competing policies, obtain and examine statistical information, and act upon the basis of an informed and practical judgment. A similar conclusion was reached in Homemakers, Inc., of L.A. v. Division of Indus. Welf., supra, 509 F.2d 20. Having found the California Labor Code provision which sets preferential overtime rules for women employees in conflict with title VII, the appellate court approved the trial court's express rejection of the extension approach on the ground that it was without power to interpret the challenged statutes in a way which would significantly expand the statutorily designated class of beneficiaries. Although such an interpretation might provide the consistency between the challenged statutes and the federal law necessary for upholding the former, it would usurp the legislative power vested exclusively in the state. ( Id., at p. 22.) Under circumstances such as those presented to us, where legislative preference is uncertain and the consequences unclear, judicial caution is appropriate. (See also Craig v. Boren, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 210, fn. 24 [50 L.Ed.2d at p. 414, 97 S.Ct. at p. 463], in which the Supreme Court invalidated a discriminatory liquor statute, leaving it to the state legislature to choose whether to extend beer-purchasing privileges to 18-year-old males, or to withdraw those privileges from 18-year-old females; Stanton v. Stanton, supra, 421 U.S. at pp. 17-18 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 696-697].) Nor do we envision that the invalidation of section 3501, subdivision (a), will result in any substantial disruption of the overall workers' compensation scheme, or any unfair hardship to an employee's survivors. With that particular provision inoperative, all applicants, widows and widowers alike, will be required to prove their dependency, and will be compensated in accordance with the facts and circumstances shown. (§ 3502.) An unemployed spouse presumably can easily establish total financial dependency on the deceased employee, and even an employed spouse may well be able to show partial dependency, since partial dependency is determined in light of the applicant's standard of living. ( Larsen v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1950) 34 Cal.2d 772, 774 [215 P.2d 850]; London Guar. etc. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1943) 57 Cal. App.2d 616, 619 [135 P.2d 7].) Moreover, under section 3501, subdivision (b), a conclusive presumption of dependency in favor of minor children remains in effect. As a result, even if the surviving spouse is financially self-sufficient and unable to show actual dependency, the full death benefit will be available to any minor children left dependent upon the surviving parent. (§ 4702.) For example, a fully employed widow with a minor child, who would have received a $55,000 benefit by operation of the widow's conclusive presumption of total dependency, may under our decision receive nothing herself; but the full $55,000 death benefit which formerly would have been exhausted by the widow, will be awarded to the children. ( State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1950) 95 Cal. App.2d 671 [213 P.2d 518]; see also Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 340 [193 P.2d 468]; Smith v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1966) 245 Cal. App.2d 292 [53 Cal. Rptr. 816].) Thus the family unit loses nothing. The only persons who will suffer substantial loss of benefits by reason of the invalidation of the widow's presumption are childless, financially self-sufficient wives. If the Legislature elects to extend the conclusive presumption to such persons it may easily do so, affording equal treatment to widowers. We hold that the conclusive presumption of total dependency under section 3501, subdivision (a), is invalid and that, pending action by the Legislature, all applicants must be left to establish proof of dependency under section 3502. Finally, we are persuaded that to avoid severe and unforeseen hardships, our decision should have prospective application only. ( Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 801 [87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487].) Heretofore, employers' insurance premiums have been calculated on the assumption that all widows would receive maximum benefits, and numerous settlements and awards that are not yet final were made in reliance upon section 3501. Despite the continuing character of the board's jurisdiction (§§ 5803, 5804), we are of the opinion that previous awards or settlements based upon the widow's presumption should, in fairness, remain undisturbed. Accordingly, the rule announced herein shall be effective only with respect to injuries occurring on or after the date this decision becomes final. The order of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is affirmed. Each side shall bear its own costs.