Opinion ID: 1394852
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Intimidation of John Gross

Text: (12a) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of John Gross at trial are supported by the law and the evidence. He relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Gross was an inmate in the San Diego County jail in the summer of 1981 facing robbery charges. He met Powell and asked him why, if petitioner had paid him to go to the Crake residence, petitioner did not bail him out. Powell responded by disclaiming petitioner's involvement: he said that he went out to the Crake residence on his own and that petitioner had nothing to do with the matter. Gross testified that his appointed attorney, Fred Corbin, would have had him testify. He was afraid, however, to take the stand because his case was still pending sentencing; he was aware of the prosecution's apparent disdain for people who testified for petitioner; he was also aware of Aguilar's arrest and of the threats made to Wallace by prosecution investigator Wilson  he could see that Wallace was a changed man as a product of that act of intimidation. Prosecutor Pippin did not recall giving his admonition to Gross's counsel, but did state that if he had been asked for immunity, he must have said the same thing that he said to the other attorneys. It does not appear that Gross's testimony would have incriminated him. His fears of prosecution retaliation motivated his refusal to testify more than any concern about incriminating himself. The portion of the report summarized above concludes as follows. By the time Gross was called to the stand, the pool of witness intimidation had spread. Aguilar had been publicly arrested. Riley had refused to testify. Gross had noticed the intimidation register on his friend Eugene Wallace stemming from his September 22, 1981, Wilson interview. Given the lack of any prospect for incriminating testimony, it is clear intimidation is what moved him to decline to testify. Petitioner has carried his burden. John Gross was intimidated by the actions of the prosecution in publicly arresting Ste[ph]en Aguilar, Mr. Wilson's threats to Eugene Wallace, and in Mr. Pippin's remarks to the various defense counsel as to his position should witnesses testify for Martin and say anything incriminating. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations relating to Gross. He first claims in substance that the prosecution committed no misconduct toward Gross. In support he relies on the evidently undisputed fact that the prosecution did not threaten Gross, and that indeed it did not know of his existence until he took the stand. Contrary to the Attorney General's apparent assumption, there is no requirement that the prosecution must be found to have committed misconduct toward the individual witness before it can be held to have interfered with the defendant's constitutional right to present the testimony of that witness. The Attorney General also claims that the determination that prosecutorial misconduct was a cause of Gross's refusal to give testimony on petitioner's behalf must be rejected. He first maintains that the arrest of Aguilar could not have contributed to the refusal on the part of any witness, including Gross, to testify at trial. For the reasons we rejected this argument when he made it with reference to Riley and Wallace, we also reject it now. The Attorney General next argues there were no contemporaneous charges or other evidence that Gross refused to testify as a result of prosecutorial misconduct and hence that his refusal to testify could not have resulted from such misconduct. For the reasons we found unpersuasive similar arguments above we find this argument unpersuasive as well. The Attorney General also asserts that Gross is a bad man and a liar and hence cannot be believed when he testifies that prosecutorial misconduct caused him to refuse to testify. The argument is empty because, as we have explained, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Finally, the Attorney General argues that evidence in the record establishes that Gross's testimony on the effect of prosecutorial misconduct on his invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege is unbelievable and therefore must be rejected. Neither of the points on which he relies, however, provides sufficient support to his argument. The first point is that Gross falsely testified he was facing trial at the time he was called as a witness by petitioner when in fact he was facing sentencing. We fail to see  and certainly have not been shown  how such a falsehood could cast substantial doubt on the truth of Gross's statement that he feared the effect his testimony might have on his own case. Moreover, we find it difficult to conclude that Gross gave false testimony in the first place. The Attorney General's point rests on the premise that it is clear that the word trial does not include sentencing. That premise, however, is unsupported. (13) As a plurality of this court stated, while the word `trial' has long been interpreted to refer to the process culminating in the determination of guilt, particularly in bail cases [citation], the word has also been interpreted to include the sentence or judgment in other cases [citation]. Accordingly, we recognize that the word is ambiguous.... ( People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) The Attorney General's second point is as follows: Gross'... claim  that he was afraid to testify because of the impact his testimony would have on his sentence  is unbelievable. The resolution of Gross' case ... included a stipulated sentence.... Gross' testimony for petitioner could not have affected his case. Gross was represented by counsel at petitioner's trial and any possible concern about his case could be taken care of by counsel. We are unable, however, to conclude that Gross's fear is unbelievable. After he learned that Aguilar had been arrested and saw the effects of the prosecution's threats on Wallace, Gross  who had just suffered his only felony conviction and therefore was no criminal sophisticate  could reasonably have believed, as he stated, that testifying for petitioner would provoke the prosecution and thereby cause it to attempt to adversely affect his sentence. (12b) The Attorney General may be understood to claim that even if prosecutorial misconduct was an actual cause of Gross's refusal to testify, the prosecution cannot be deemed legally responsible for his decision. We cannot agree. We recognize that the prosecution evidently committed no misconduct aimed at Gross specifically. We believe, however, that where, as here, the prosecution has engaged in misconduct toward a substantial number of defense witnesses, it is highly probable other defense witnesses would learn of its actions, apply the implications to their own situations, and thus be deterred from testifying. Prosecution investigator Wilson unnecessarily arrested Aguilar in front of three defense witnesses and a representative of the press; and prosecutor Pippin publicly and repeatedly declared that he was blanketly refusing to grant immunity of any kind to any witness in this trial, and would prosecute any witness for any crime he revealed or committed in the course of his testimony. We also believe that the prosecution's misconduct was a substantial factor in Gross's decision not to testify; indeed, the facts do not reveal the presence of any other factor. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the prosecution must be deemed legally responsible for that decision. We conclude that petitioner has sustained his burden of showing a causal link between prosecutorial misconduct and Gross's refusal to testify on his behalf. To carry that burden, as we have explained above, all he need do is demonstrate that the misconduct under challenge was a substantial cause of the witness's refusal to testify. Petitioner has demonstrated that the misconduct here amounts to such a cause. We also conclude that petitioner has carried his burden of demonstrating the materiality of Gross's testimony under both federal and state standards: that testimony would have squarely contradicted the crucial testimony of Powell. After independent review, we hold that the referee's determination that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of John Gross at trial was correct and accordingly adopt it as our own.