Opinion ID: 856125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Addiction as a Mitigating Factor

Text: Petitioner first argues that, during sentencing, Sattler unreasonably failed to focus on his drug addiction. We disagree. Sattler’s decision to rely on Dr. Levy and to focus on other mitigating factors, such as depression, rather than on addiction, was a matter of strategy.12 Sattler’s arguments at sentencing support our conclusion. Her chosen tack— characterizing Petitioner as a relatively normal person who was suffering from depression—evinces a desire to avoid painting Petitioner as a drug addict. At the very least, Sattler’s argument at sentencing raises the possibility that she was motivated by such a strategy, which is all that Pinholster requires. 131 S. Ct. at 1404–07. Because Sattler’s decision not to focus on drug addiction appears to have been motivated by reasonable strategic concerns, that decision is deserving of great deference under Strickland and Pinholster. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The choice of what type of expert to use is one of trial strategy and deserves ‘a heavy measure of deference.’” (quoting Strickland’s statement regarding deference due to counsel’s investigative decisions, 466 U.S. at 691)). Petitioner also argues that Sattler’s representation was deficient because her sentencing arguments discussed 12 Sattler’s deposition supports our conclusion, but after Pinholster, we may not consider that evidence under the AEDPA standard of review. 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (“[E]vidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review.”). Accordingly, we do not rely on Sattler’s deposition. 22 MILES V . RYAN intoxication rather than addiction. Sattler’s decision to avoid asserting that Petitioner suffered from an addiction, while focusing instead on lingering intoxication from the use of crack cocaine, could be seen as inconsistent with a strategy of painting Petitioner as a normal person; if counsel thought that drug use made Petitioner appear less deserving of sympathy, one might think that she would have tried to avoid mentioning drugs at all. But counsel’s strategy and decision are reasonable when viewed from her perspective at the time of trial, as Strickland requires us to do. Petitioner discussed his crack cocaine use in his confession, and it was mentioned in the PSR, so Sattler had to address it somehow. Moreover, Petitioner was sentenced in 1993. As recently as 1998, the Arizona Supreme Court was routinely rejecting addiction as a mitigating factor unless the defendant could show intoxication at the time of the crime. See, e.g., State v. Greene, 967 P.2d 106, 117 (Ariz. 1998) (“To hold that a motivation to kill fueled in part by a desire for drugs is mitigating would be anomalous indeed.”); State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 453 (Ariz. 1995) (“Without a showing of some impairment at the time of the offense, drug use cannot be a mitigating circumstance of any kind.” (citing State v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 882 (Ariz. 1991))); State v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158, 1176 (Ariz. 1994) (“We further believe Defendant’s impulsive personality and history of substance abuse merit little, if any, independent consideration in mitigation. As noted, Defendant was not under the influence of any intoxicating substance at the time of the murders.” (emphasis added) (citing State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1209 (Ariz. 1993))). But see State v. Gallegos, 870 P.2d 1097, 1113–15 (Ariz. 1994) (finding error in trial court’s failure to consider history of substance abuse as a nonstatutory mitigating MILES V . RYAN 23 factor). For that reason, too, counsel would have had to emphasize intoxication. It was only recently, in 2010, that we disapproved the Arizona Supreme Court’s treatment of addiction, in a habeas review of Williams, 904 P.2d 437. Williams v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 1258, 1270 (9th Cir. 2010). Given the state of Arizona law at the time of trial, Sattler would have been operating under the assumption that intoxication was the only viable means of explaining Petitioner’s drug use to the sentencing judge. And the evidence did not rule out some sort of lingering intoxication—Dr. Levy discussed it in his report.13 Seen from this perspective, Sattler’s strategy did not fall outside the wide range of professional competence or below an objective standard of reasonableness.14 Even if Sattler had been deficient in failing to focus on addiction, we see no prejudice, the second prong of the 13 Dr. Levy’s report discusses Petitioner’s condition at the time of the crime as “coming down” from crack cocaine use the previous night and notes that Petitioner was dissociated from the events. At trial, Dr. Levy testified that this state is common among drug users. 14 To be sure, in Williams, we wrote: “T he decision of the Arizona Supreme Court that drug use could not be considered as a mitigating factor ‘of any kind,’ is contrary to the Supreme Court’s consistent decisions in capital cases beginning more than a decade before Williams’ [1992] trial.” 623 F.3d at 1270 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, as Petitioner’s brief acknowledges, under Arizona law at the time of his trial, addiction was not a recognized form of mitigation. Thus, although she could have relied on existing United States Supreme Court decisions to challenge the Arizona practice of ignoring the mitigating value of addiction, her strategy merits deference under Strickland. 24 MILES V . RYAN Strickland standard. In assessing prejudice, we consider the mitigating effect of Petitioner’s drug addiction and how it would have altered the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors discussed at sentencing. See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453–54 (2009) (per curiam) (“To assess th[e] probability [of a different sentence], we consider the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets omitted)). As noted above, Petitioner’s case involved significant aggravating factors, none of which would be affected by addiction. For many of the proposed mitigating factors (remorse, rehabilitation, cooperation), the trial judge made two findings—(1) that the evidence was insufficient to establish the mitigating factor in the first place; and (2) that even if the mitigating factor were established, it would be insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors. It is highly unlikely that a finding of addiction as a mitigating factor would have tipped the scales where none of the other proposed mitigators did. Indeed, addiction could be characterized as merely another element of social history, which the sentencing judge considered and found insufficient to outweigh the aggravators. As stated by the district court: The sentencing judge considered Petitioner’s life circumstances but found them insufficient to warrant leniency. There is no reasonable probability that focusing on Petitioner’s crack cocaine addiction, as opposed to the reasons that led to the addiction, would have changed the sentencing outcome. MILES V . RYAN 25 Under AEDPA, the state court’s decision denying this portion of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim must stand. The state court did not apply Strickland unreasonably. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (“A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.”); cf. id. at 789 (“Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one technique or approach. It can be assumed that in some cases counsel would be deemed ineffective for failing to consult or rely on experts, but even that formulation is sufficiently general that state courts would have wide latitude in applying it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Sattler’s decision not to focus on addiction as a mitigating factor was strategic and because Petitioner was not prejudiced as a result, he fails to meet the Strickland standard here.