Opinion ID: 762390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defect in the Jury Charge

Text: 22 The case was presented to the jury on the theory that all the Natales needed to prove was entitlement to their permits as a matter of state law and denial of the permits by the Municipal Defendants. Whether or not proof of such elements could entitle the Natales to damages in state court on some state law cause of action, such proof does not support a judgment based on a federal claim of denial of property without due process of law. The federal claim is based on the Fourteenth Amendment, as implemented by section 1983, and requires the existence of a federally protectable property right and the denial of such a right in the absence of either procedural or substantive due process. We will defer consideration of the property right issue, and focus at this point on whether the jury was properly instructed as to the standard for a due process violation. 23 Since there is no claim that the Municipal Defendants acted without according the Natales procedural due process (and no such claim would be viable since all denials were preceded by notice and hearing and followed by written explanations), the claim of violation must be for a denial of substantive due process. Contrary to the Natales' implicit premise, such a claim is not established simply by proving that someone did not obtain what he or she is entitled to under state law. For state action to be taken in violation of the requirements of substantive due process, the denial must have occurred under circumstances warranting the labels arbitrary and outrageous. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)([T]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (conduct that shocks the conscience violates substantive due process), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (observing that persons have the right to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning actions); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1221-22 (6th Cir.1992) (To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the state administrative agency has been guilty of arbitrary and capricious action in the strict sense, meaning that there is no rational basis for the ... decision.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 24 Arbitrary conduct that might violate zoning regulations as a matter of state law is not sufficient to demonstrate conduct so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority that will offend the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. See RRI, 870 F.2d at 914 n. 1; Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1034 (3d Cir.1987); Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 482-83 (5th Cir.1986) (in banc). As the First Circuit has observed in rejecting a due process claim where a planning board interpreted state subdivision laws and a state court decision in ways that frustrated the plaintiffs' development plans, 25 the conventional planning dispute--at least when not tainted with fundamental procedural irregularity, racial animus, or the like--which takes places within the framework of an admittedly valid state subdivision scheme is a matter primarily of concern to the state and does not implicate the Constitution. This would be true were planning officials to clearly violate, much less distort the state scheme under which they operate. 26 Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832-33 (1st Cir.1982). 27 Substantive due process is an outer limit on the legitimacy of governmental action. It does not forbid governmental actions that might fairly be deemed arbitrary or capricious and for that reason correctable in a state court lawsuit seeking review of administrative action. Substantive due process standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority. See, e.g., Lewis, 118 S.Ct. at 1716 ([O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1988) (Only a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group animus, or a deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights, qualifies for relief under § 1983.) (citation omitted). 28 The Court was thus obligated to charge the jury to the effect that the plaintiffs could not prevail unless the jury was persuaded that the conduct of the defendants in denying the permits was so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority. The Municipal Defendants requested essentially such a charge, and the Court, with the Natales' encouragement, declined to give it. Instead, the Court charged the jury that the Natales could prevail if they were entitled to the permits under Connecticut law. The charge was deficient in failing to instruct the jury on the relevant constitutional standard. 29