Opinion ID: 1985373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Release from Segregation

Text: Prison officials place inmates who are a safety risk in administrative segregation, which limits their recreation time and restricts their movement. They are not permitted to visit other prisoners in the general population or make trips to the prison law library. They can request that a library assistant come to see them and may visit with outsiders, including their attorneys, as often as they like. Greene was in segregation prior to the kidnapping charge and remained there because of it. Greene requested that the trial court order him released to the general prison population. He said administrative segregation inhibited his efforts to assist in his defense by limiting his ability to do research in the library and by prohibiting his talking with witnesses who were in the general prison population. He also said that being kept in chains and shackles made it more difficult for him to concentrate when talking to his attorney. Greene argues the kidnapping charge is an insufficient governmental interest to justify subjecting him to administrative segregation, citing Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir.1981). Lock is inapplicable for two reasons. First, it deals with a pretrial detainee and not an inmate already incarcerated for an earlier conviction. Second, Lock is a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because this is a criminal case, the issue is whether the administrative segregation unconstitutionally hindered his defense, not whether Greene is entitled to civil relief. We find precedent in Shoulders v. State (1984), Ind., 462 N.E.2d 1034. Prison officials placed inmate Shoulders in administrative segregation after he was involved in a fatal stabbing. Shoulders argued the segregation limited him in interviewing witnesses and seeking assistance of counsel for his defense. This Court held Shoulders had not demonstrated that segregation denied him access to his attorney or potential witnesses. Id. at 1036. Similarly, segregation did not impede Greene's defense. Greene had unlimited access to his attorney. He could request a library assistant to see him. Greene said the privilege was illusory because no one ever responded to his request. Greene, however, had his own attorney doing research thereby alleviating any prejudice he might have suffered by not having access to the library. Nothing in the record indicates prison officials denied Greene's attorney an opportunity to interview any witness in the general prison population who, though not available to Greene, might have proved helpful for his defense. In the absence of any deprivation that affects Greene's fair trial rights, we doubt a trial court has authority to order Greene's release into the general prison population. Greene cites Ind. Code § 35-2.1-2-2 (Burns 1979 Repl.) for the proposition that a trial court has discretion to determine where a defendant already confined in a state institution shall be detained pending trial. The statute allows the court to specify a suitable place where the defendant shall be held before and during a criminal proceeding upon application of the prosecuting attorney. Here the prosecutor never sought to move the defendant. The purpose of the statute is to secure the attendance of defendants at trial. The statute is not an adequate basis upon which to order prison officials where to locate inmates within prison walls. The trial court properly denied Greene's motion for release from administrative segregation.