Opinion ID: 1881936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the court erred in refusing instruction d-19.

Text: ¶ 53. Goodin contends that the trial court erred in refusing Instruction D-19, claiming he was entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. He bases this claim on an assertion that the precise circumstances of the victim's death were unknown as there were no eyewitnesses to the shooting. Instruction D-19 reads: The Court instructs the jury that the killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, shall be manslaughter. In the event that you do not find the Defendant guilty of Capital Murder as charged, nor murder, but do believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that the Defendant is guilty of manslaughter, then it is your sworn duty to find the Defendant guilty of manslaughter. After hearing argument from the attorneys, the trial judge denied Instruction 19, finding that no evidence of manslaughter existed. ¶ 54. Jury instructions will always be considered as a whole as opposed to the singling out of any instruction. Nicholson ex rel. Gollott v. State, 672 So.2d 744, 752 (Miss.1996). We have held that a manslaughter instruction should not be automatically or indiscriminately given, but only when warranted by the evidence. Underwood v. State, 708 So.2d 18, 36-37 (Miss.1998). We have stated: Lesser-included offense instructions should be given if there is an evidentiary basis in the record that would permit a jury rationally to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the greater offense.... A lesser-included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge and ultimately this Court can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused and considering all the reasonable inferences which may be drown in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense (conversely, not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge). Welch v. State, 566 So.2d 680, 684 (Miss. 1990) (internal citations omitted) (quoting McGowan v. State, 541 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Miss.1989)). ¶ 55. Goodin cites Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) in which the United States Supreme Court held that the death sentence may not be constitutionally imposed after a jury verdict of guilty of a capital offense where the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense. Beck does not stand alone. In Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 (1998), the Court explained its ruling in Beck, holding: The Court of Appeals justified its holding principally on the ground that respondent had been placed in the same position as the defendant in Beck that there had been a distortion of the fact finding process because his jury had been `forced into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence.' In so doing, the Court of Appeals again overlooked significant distinctions between this case and Beck. In Beck, the death penalty was automatically tied to conviction, and Beck's jury was told that if it convicted the defendant of the charged offense, it was required to impose the death penalty. This threatened to make the issue at trial whether the defendant should be executed or not, rather than `whether the State ha[d] proved each and every element of the capital crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' In addition, the distortion of the trial process carried over directly to sentencing, because an Alabama jury unwilling to acquit had no choice but to impose the death penalty. There was thus a significant possibility that the death penalty would be imposed upon defendants whose conduct did not merit it, simply because their juries might be convinced that they had committed some serious crime and should not escape punishment entirely. These factors are not present here. Respondent's jury did not have the burden of imposing a sentence. Indeed, with respect to respondent's insanity defense, it was specifically instructed that it had no right to take into consideration what punishment or disposition he may or may not receive in the event of his conviction or ... acquittal by reason of insanity. In addition, the three-judge panel that imposed the death penalty did not have to consider the dilemma faced by Beck's jury; the alternative to death was not setting respondent free, but rather sentencing him to life imprisonment. 524 U.S. at 98-99, 118 S.Ct. at 1901-02 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 56. The Goodin jury did not face the dilemma of the Beck jury. Here, the jury's alternatives in the guilt phase were to convict Goodin of capital murder; simple murder; or to acquit him. Further, the jury's alternatives in the sentencing phase were to sentence Goodin to the death penalty; life imprisonment without parole; or life imprisonment. These options go far beyond sentencing the defendant to death or setting him free as condemned in Beck. ¶ 57. Having found no constitutional flaws in the jury instruction given, we must now determine whether our practice entitles Goodin to a manslaughter instruction. We have held that there must be some evidentiary support to grant an instruction for manslaughter. In the case sub judice, Goodin has shown none. In Burns v. State, 729 So.2d 203 (Miss.1998), we stated: `This homicide having occurred during the course of a robbery, it was capital murder, regardless of the intent of Griffin.' Id. In the case sub judice, Burns was engaged in the commission of robbery when McBride was killed. Thus, no manslaughter instruction was required to be given. The record reveals that Burns never offered any mitigating evidence that would justify manslaughter rather than murder. There was nothing to indicate that this murder was done in the heat of passion. Because the burden to overcome the presumption of murder lies with the defendant, Nicolaou v. State, 534 So.2d 168, 171-72 (Miss.1988), and because Burns failed to meet this burden, this issue is without merit. 729 So.2d at 225 (quoting Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 549 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 58. The evidence in this case supports the trial court's denial of a manslaughter instruction. Goodin testified at trial in his own defense. He testified that he did not rob, kidnap or kill Willis Rigdon; yet he offers no alternative evidentiary scenario to show how the killing was culpable negligence manslaughter. Goodin testified that he went to Rigdon's Store to buy an x-rated video, but that Rigdon did not have any. He stated that he stayed at the store for around an hour and then left at exactly 2:57 a.m. He claims that when he left the store on foot, Rigdon was alive and well. Testimony from several other witnesses show that at 2:57 a.m. Rigdon had been taken to the hospital and pronounced dead. Further, Goodin testified that he was never in Rigdon's truck that morning and that he never saw or spoke to any of the witnesses who testified as to Goodin's whereabouts on the morning after the murder. Goodin contends that all the State's witnesses and the police formed a conspiracy against him in order to frame him for the murder of Willis Rigdon. Critically, Goodin never offered any evidence to justify the giving of a manslaughter instruction. There was no evidentiary basis in the record to permit a jury to rationally find Goodin guilty of manslaughter. The trial judge correctly found that Goodin presented no evidence at trial to warrant an instruction on culpable negligence manslaughter. This assignment of error is without merit.