Opinion ID: 1952455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Accessibility of Medical Services Including Abortion and the Maintenance of Medical Standards

Text: The trial court found that the solid mass of demonstrators outside the Center had prevented some of the Center's potential patients from entering the clinic; it found also that the noise of the protest had had adverse consequences on the patients and on the staff inside the clinic. The Center claims that those findings support the Appellate Division's conclusion that the significant State interests in the preservation of health and the accessibility of medical services justify the injunctive restrictions. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the Appellate Division erred by recognizing a privacy right to abortion, protectable against private interference. We adopt the Center's view of the interests involved and expressly decline to decide the case on the basis of a privacy rationale. Thus, to the extent that the Appellate Division relied on the reasoning of Planned Parenthood v. Cannizzaro, 204 N.J. Super. 531, 499 A. 2d 535 (Ch.Div. 1985) (enjoining protestors at clinic to protect patients' privacy right to abortion), aff'd, 217 N.J. Super. 623, 526 A. 2d 741 (App.Div. 1987), we do not adopt its reasoning. The New Jersey Constitution does not guarantee explicitly a fundamental right to health. Yet, we recognize that New Jersey accords a high priority to the preservation of health. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 304, 450 A. 2d 925 (1982); see also Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748, 757, 70 A. 314 (E. & A. 1908) (noting that preservation of health is [a]mong the most [important] of personal rights). We conclude that because New Jersey has valued it so highly, the preservation of health constitutes at least a significant government interest. Therefore, courts may impose injunctive restrictions to protect health in appropriate circumstances, even if such restrictions might affect some citizens' constitutional rights. Cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 36, 355 A. 2d 647 (noting that in light of State's interest in preservation of life, impingement of religious belief does not present constitutional question), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct. 319, 50 L.Ed. 2d 289 (1976); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A. 2d 670 (1971) (determining that life-saving blood transfusion was appropriate for incoherent patient even though that procedure violated patient's religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witness). As part of its interest in the preservation of health, the State has at least a significant interest as well in insuring that the Center is able to perform the health services it offers safely, under acceptable medical standards. For example, although the federal constitutional right to abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 (1973), is not protected against private interference, see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 753, 758-59, 122 L.Ed. 2d 34, 46 (1993), [t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient. Roe, supra, 410 U.S. at 150, 93 S.Ct. at 725, 35 L.Ed. 2d at 175; see also Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., supra, 939 F. 2d at 63 (finding health-safety rationale significant government interest that justified restrictions on picketers outside health center); cf. Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n Inc., 71 N.J. 478, 488, 366 A. 2d 641 (1976) (noting that hospital's efforts to elevate hospital standards and improve medical care will receive broad judicial support), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2987, 53 L.Ed. 2d 1100 (1977); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 403, 192 A. 2d 817 (1963) (same). Moreover, quite apart from the issue of abortion rights, we conclude that because of its interest in the preservation of health, New Jersey has a significant interest in insuring unrestricted access to the Center's medical services, including family planning, prenatal care, well-baby care, support and education groups, as well as first-trimester abortions. We note that New York City has recently evidenced its interest in protecting access to reproductive health-care services by amending its administrative code to add a chapter entitled Prevention of Interference with Reproductive Health Services. New York City, N.Y., Administrative Code §§ 8.801 to .807 (1994). On March 30 of this year Mayor Giuliani signed that local law, which makes it unlawful for any person, with the intent to prevent any other person from obtaining or rendering, or assisting in obtaining or rendering, any reproductive health care service or counselling (1) to physically obstruct or block such other person from entering into or exiting from the entryway or exit of a reproductive health care facility, or the premises in which such a facility is located; (2) to follow and harass such other person in or about a public place or places or to engage in a course of conduct or repeatedly commit acts when such behavior places such other person in reasonable fear of physical harm; or (3) to physically damage a reproductive health care facility so as to significantly disrupt its operation, or attempt to do the same. [ Id. at § 8.803.] The trial court therefore had the power to issue injunctive restrictions to preserve health even if those restrictions affected defendants' First Amendment rights. Moreover, because insuring the safety of medical procedures is at least a significant government interest, and because the noise from the protest had a detrimental effect on that interest, the trial court could properly issue injunctive relief to promote that interest as well.