Opinion ID: 2559108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Does the CPPA require injury-in-fact as a prerequisite to suit?

Text: The principal, and, for me, difficult issue presented in this appeal is whether the CPPA statute permits a person to sue for relief against unlawful trade practices regardless of whether that person can show injury-in-fact. Appellants and amici [1] present a strong textual argument that the Council of the District of Columbia intended just that when it amended the statute in 2000 to delete language that permitted suit by [a]ny consumer who suffers any damage as a result of a trade practice made unlawful by D.C. law, in favor of language that now allows suit by [a] person, whether acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public. . . seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice unlawful under D.C. law. Compare D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1) (1981) (1996 Repl.) with D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001). The statute defines person as including an individual, firm, corporation, partnership, cooperative, association, or any other organization, legal entity, or group of individuals however organized. D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(1) (2001). It is undeniable that the combination of the expansive definition of personit is difficult to conceive of a broader definitionwith the grant to a person of the right to sue whether acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public is, on its face, sweeping in scope. [2] The broad sweep of the 2000 amendments is to be compared with the language it replaced: any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of an unlawful trade practice. D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1) (1996 Repl.). [A] change in legislative language gives rise to the presumption that a change was intended in legislative result. United States v. Brown, 422 A.2d 1281, 1284 (D.C.1980). It is important to note that this is not a case where the legislature solely omitted language that appeared in a parallel statute, as we recently considered in Gause v. United States, 6 A.3d 1247 (D.C.2010). As appellants point out, the language that was deleted has been the subject of judicial interpretation by this court on the same issue of standing that is before us, which gives added weight to the usual presumption that substantive change was intended. In Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195 (D.C.1991), we relied on the language that was eliminated in the 2000 amendments in concluding that: [s]uffering damage is a condition precedent to suit, and one who has not been injured cannot sue under this statute for any relief whatever. Nothing in the regulations purports to extend the statutory right to such relief, or, indeed, to any remedy, to an individual who has suffered no injury. Id. at 204. The legislature is presumed to enact laws with knowledge of relevant decisional law. See Office of People's Counsel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 477 A.2d 1079, 1091 (D.C.1984). Now that the CPPA statute has been amended to eliminate the language we quoted in Beard as imposing an injury requirement, it is logical to concludeabsent evidence to the contrary that the Council intended to dispense with a requirement of injury as a prerequisite to suit, a conclusion that is particularly valid when the legislature is amending the very language that has been the subject of judicial interpretation. [3] Although courts, including this one, see Burgess v. United States, 681 A.2d 1090, 1095 (D.C. 1996), have been reluctant to go beyond consideration of language that appears clear on its face, the effect of a plain meaning interpretation of the 2000 amendments is so foreign to the manner in which we have understood and applied principles of standing, that I do not object to the majority's recourse to legislative history as a further tool to ascertain legislative intent. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 234, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures from past practice without making a point of saying so.). In Gause we declined to apply the presumption that a radical departure from past practice was intended by a change in language because the legislative history was absolutely silent on the issue and the statute's purpose did not support it. See Gause, 6 A.3d at 1260 & n. 5. In this case, consideration of the legislative history of the CPPA amendments and the purpose of the statute, however, does not lead me to the conclusion the majority reaches that the status quo ante the amendments should prevail in terms of standing. Rather, it tends to confirm that the broad sweep of the amended language should be given effect. As the opinion for the court describes in detail, the 2000 amendments to the CPPA were the product of budgetary constraints. The District was suffering from serious revenue shortfalls and, as a result, its expenses had to be reduced. One of the expenses that was entirely cut was funding for the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs enforcement arm responsible for enforcing the CPPA. In amending D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1), the CPPA section that creates a private right of action, the Council was attempting to supplement, with private efforts, the gap in public enforcement that would result from the budget cuts. Substitution of private for public enforcement was to be accomplished by expanding the categories of plaintiffs who could sue to enforce the law. Elimination of traditional injury-in-fact as a prerequisite to standing in favor of suit by a person (broadly defined) whether acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public is fully consistent with this goal. D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1). Also consistent with this purpose was the clarification, in the remedies section, of the availability of injunctive and other equitable relief (in representative actions, additional relief as may be necessary to restore to the consumer money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of the unlawful trade practice). Id. at (k)(1)(D) & (E). The majority recognizes that the purpose of the 2000 amendments was to enhance the tools available to enforce the CPPA, but its interpretation concludes that the only way in which it sought to do so was by augment[ing] the remedies available to enforce the CPPA under a revised § 28-3905(k)(1) by providing for injunctive relief and merchant disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. See ante at 245. [4] I have no doubt that the Council intended to do what the majority says in terms of remedies, but that is only part of what the Council must have intended, for enhancement of remedies in no way accounts for the change in the language describing who may bring suit, from a consumer who has suffered injury, to a person, whether acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public. D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1). Although the majority appears to recognize that the CPPA was amended to enlarge[] the category of persons authorized to bring a CPPA enforcement action, see ante at 245, it does not explain how, under its interpretation, that category has been enlarged. Because the definition of person was unchanged by the 2000 amendments, the only enlargement in the category of personsas opposed to remedieshas been effectuated by the elimination of the any consumer who suffers any damage language we relied on in Beard as imposing an injury requirement as a precondition to suit and its substitution with the more liberal language. Although it does not quite say so, the majority opinion implies that the enlargement is that certain entities may now bring representative actions to prevent injury to consumers, see ante at 240, but still subject to the injury-in-fact requirement. But even before the 2000 amendments, an organization had injury-in-fact standing to sue if it was itself a consumer [5] that had been injured or sued as a representative of its consumer members who had been injured. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (noting that concrete and demonstrable injury to [an] organization's activities suffices to establish [constitutional] standing to the organization whether the injury is economic or non-economic) ( quoted in Friends of Tilden Park v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201, 1207 (D.C.2002)). If the Council's purpose was as limited as the majority's interpretation implies, it simply should have changed the statute to say that a person (rather than a consumer), which includes any . . . organization, legal entity or group, however, organized, who suffers any damage as a result of an unlawful trade practice could sue. Instead, the Council went further, and deleted who suffers any damage, substituting it with whether acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public. My disagreement with the majority's textual analysis is that it does not give any content to that substantive change in statutory language, rendering it wholly superfluous. There are two additional aids to statutory interpretation that support an interpretation that there is no longer an injury-in-fact requirement for standing to sue under the CPPA. The first is embedded in the statute itself and was added by the 2000 amendments: This chapter shall be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose. D.C.Code § 28-3901(c). One of the statute's purposes, as the majority notes, is to assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy all improper trade practices and the continuing use of such practices. D.C.Code § 28-3901(b)(1) (emphasis added). Another stated purpose of the CPPA is to promote, through effective enforcement, fair business practices throughout the community. Id. at (b)(2). The legislative mandate to construe[ ] and appl[y] liberally to promote these purposes further supports that the court should not shrink from giving the language of subsection (k)(1) its plain meaning. Even without the 2000 amendments mandate that the CPPA should be construed and applied liberally, we had commented that the CPPA is, `to say the least, an ambitious piece of legislation,' with broad remedial purposes. DeBerry v. First Gov't Mortgage & Investors Corp., 743 A.2d 699, 700 (D.C.1999) (quoting Howard v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 708 (D.C.1981)); cf., Tippett, 10 A.3d at 1135-36 (Ruiz, J., dissenting) (concluding that statutory provision is ambiguous and applying statutory mandate that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of strengthening the legal rights of tenants and tenant organizations). Secondly, the initial drafters used and cited the California Unfair Competition Law as a model for the CPPA amendments. See Legislative Committee of the Public-Private Working Group on Consumer Affairs, The Consumer Protection Amendment Act of 1999 at 3 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200 et seq. ); see also District of Columbia Practice Manual, Consumer Protection, 8-1 (2009) (The `private attorney general' provision [of the CPPA] is modeled after a provision of California's Unfair Competition Law.). The California statute, which contains very similar language to the CPPA's subsection(k)(1) creating a private cause of action, [6] had at the time that the Council enacted the amendments been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as permitting a private plaintiff who has himself suffered no injury at all [to] sue to obtain relief for others. Stop Youth Addiction v. Lucky Stores, 17 Cal.4th 553, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d 1086, 1091 (1998) (citing Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 35 Cal.3d 197, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660, 668 (1983) (Allegations of actual deception, reasonable reliance and damage are unnecessary.)), superseded by statute initiated by Proposition 64, Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17204, as recognized by Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.4th 969, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009). Although it is true, as the majority notes, that this interpretation was not referred to in the Council reports, it remains significant that the California Supreme Court gave effect to the plain meaning of very similar language in a consumer protection statutean indication that there is nothing inherently absurd or even unreasonable in such an expansive approach to enforcement of consumer protection laws. That this also would have been the Council's intent in the 2000 amendments is supported by other provisions of the CPPA. For example, the CPPA defines actions constituting unlawful trade practices in violation of the CPPA, whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby . . . . D.C.Code § 28-3904. This statutory definition stands in contrast to our observation in Beard that nothing in the regulations that the suit brought under the CPPA sought to enforce purports to extend the statutory right to such relief . . . to an individual who has suffered no injury. 587 A.2d at 204. Here, a trade practice, to be unlawful and a violation of the CPPA, need not cause actual injury. This is the reason why, even with no damages, a consumer may recover a statutory civil penalty of $1500 per violation. See D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A). Similarly, the D.C. Attorney General has authority to sue to enjoin unlawful trade practices without being required to prove damages . . . . D.C.Code § 28-3909(a); in addition, the D.C. government may recover a civil penalty of not more than $1000 for each violation. Id. at (b). Cf. D.C.Code § 28-3903(a) (providing that DCRA, the principal consumer protection agency of the District of Columbia government, D.C.Code § 28-3902(a), may investigate consumer complaints and initiate its own investigations where the (i) amount in controversy totals $250 or more; or (ii) case, or cases, indicates a pattern or practice of abuse on the part of a business or industry.). A plain-meaning interpretation of the 2000 amendments with respect to the right to sue by private parties, in other words, is in line with the statute's pre-existing provisions that no damages are required for injunctive actions by the Attorney General and that actual damage to consumers is not an element of an unlawful trade practice that otherwise meets the definition of § 28-3904. That these concepts of no injury would have been extended to actions by persons acting as private attorneys general at a time when the Council was seeking to supplement strained public resources is not at all unreasonable. While I am not unsympathetic to the majority's preference that the Council have expressed itself unequivocally in the legislative history and demonstrated that it understood our usual standing requirements and recognized the significant change the amendment language would bring about, I know of no other case where we have imposed such an additional burden on the legislature where the statutory language is otherwise clear and consistent with the statute's broad remedial purpose. Concerns expressed by appellees and their amici [7] about the potential for abuse and procedural difficulties that might be created by the CPPA's far-reaching private attorney general provision are based on policy, not law. [8] As such, they should be addressed to the legislature, not the court charged with implementing a statute that the legislature has enacted. As the California Supreme Court stated in rejecting a similar challenge to a plain-meaning interpretation of the private attorney general provision in California's Unfair Competition Law, it is not for the courts, . . . to determine whether or not the policy of a statute is economically sound or beneficial. That is a matter solely for the legislature. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc., 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d at 1102 (quoting ABC Internal. Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp., 14 Cal.4th 1247, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 931 P.2d 290 (1997)). Finally, I see no inherent unfairness in this statutory scheme such that we should be reluctant to assume that the Council meant what it said or refuse to give it effect. That virtually anyone, regardless of injury, can bring suit to enforce the law is not common, but it bears emphasizing that it does not mean that a plaintiff who suffers no individualized injury can recover windfall damages, as any such claim for damages would fail for failure of proof. The statute, by its terms, provides that trebled damages and the statutory penalty ($1500 per violation) are payable to the consumer, D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A), a category that is narrower than a person who may bring suit as a private attorney general, see note 5, supra, and the intended beneficiary of the CPPA. The relief that the statute permits for a plaintiff who has not been personally injured and is not a consumer is an injunction, punitive damages, and any other relief which the court deems proper. Id. at (k)(1)(C), (D) & (F). Trebled damages, statutory civil penalties and in a representative action, additional relief as may be necessary to restore to the consumer money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of the unlawful trade practice, are for the benefit of consumers. Id. at (k)(1)(A) & (E). All the relief the statute provides, in other words, is either intended for consumers or within the discretion of the trial judge to fashion with the CPPA's consumer protection purpose in mind. With the possible exception of the right to reasonable attorney's fees in a case brought by a self-represented plaintiff-attorneya determination also committed to the trial court's discretionan uninjured plaintiff who brings suit in the capacity of a private attorney general in the interests of . . . the general public, even if successful, does not personally benefit from relief awarded by the court. There is no reason to thwart claims authorized by statute at this early pleading stage, based on speculative concern that judges of the Superior Court will be unable to manage litigation brought by private attorneys general on behalf of the public interest in an orderly manner and consistent with due process concerns. See, e.g., Boyle v. Giral, 820 A.2d 561, 570 n. 11 (D.C.2003) (interpreting CPPA § 28-3911(a) as permitting cy pres distributions into D.C. Consumer Protection Fund); see also Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc., 23 Cal.4th 116, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 999 P.2d 718, 733 (2000) (noting several procedural mechanisms available to litigants and the courts to avoid multiple liability and repetitive actions).