Opinion ID: 765264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 16 Brierly argues that the district court's first order of remand divested it of all jurisdiction in this case, precluding it from later deciding, in the context of a second attempt to remove, that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction to hear the case. This question is governed by 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) and (d). Subsection (c) provides in pertinent part that [i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. Subsection (d) precludes reviewing such remand orders, providing that [a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. . . . 17 Although we have not previously addressed this specific issue, the language in 1447(d) has been universally construed in other circuits to preclude further reconsideration or review of a district court's order remanding a case, because a remand to state court divests a district court of jurisdiction such that it may not take any further action on the case 1 . 18 We recognize, as the Fourth Circuit noted in In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1996), that there are few exceptions tothe general rule that remand orders are not reviewable and that these exceptions have been narrowly crafted by Congress and the courts. In this case, however, the removal by Ellison was not the functional equivalent of a motion to review or reconsider, but an original petition by a party with standing to remove after an initial remand because of his delayed service, the delay having been caused by the district court's stay order. We conclude that it would be unfair to preclude Ellison, a later-served defendant who was not involved in the first removal attempt, from the opportunity to present evidence regarding his residence and effect removal -- with the consent of the remaining defendant, of course. 19