Opinion ID: 168679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commencement of Removal Proceedings

Text: M r. Abiodun next argues that his constitutional rights were violated by immigration authorities “lodging a detainer against him immediately after the jury conviction on April 24, 2002, when he had not waived his appeal as of right.” 4 (...continued) after examination. M r. Abiodun filed his habeas challenge after BCIS acted on his application by denying it. The proper statute for judicial review following such a denial is 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). But the district court could not have taken jurisdiction under that statute because M r. Abiodun failed to exhaust his administrative remedy of appealing the denial to an immigration officer. See id; 8 C.F.R. § 336.9(d). -6- Pet. Br. at 16. Because this argument was presented and rejected during this court’s first review of the removal order, see Abiodun, 461 F.3d at 1217, we cannot consider it again, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(2). M r. Abiodun also argues that the “removal order [is] based on [a] charge that was not sustained by the requisite evidence.” Pet. Br. at 19. But that argument too was raised and resolved during our prior review, see Abiodun, 461 F.3d at 1217, and cannot be addressed again, 8 U .S.C. § 1252(d)(2). M r. Abiodun further argues that “EO IR authorities [5] ” (1) “fail[ed] to notify him of his right to contact consular or diplomatic officials of his native former country for assistance,” Pet. Br. at 22; (2) “fail[ed] to determine his citizenship but proceeded to take evidence,” id. at 19; (3) “fail[ed] to protect the petitioner’s right to counsel under 8 C.F.R. § 292, but proceeded to take evidence,” id. at 20; (4) “coerc[ed] his answers concerning citizenship, nationality and conviction and thus incriminated him,” id.; and (5) failed to “giv[e] petitioner a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him,” id. at 20-21. None of these arguments were raised in M r. Abiodun’s initial petition for review. Nevertheless, 5 M r. Abiodun is apparently referring to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which is the governmental entity that encompasses immigration judges and the BIA . See Rubio-Rubio v. INS, 23 F.3d 273, 274 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994). -7- because they could have been raised initially, they are barred now. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(2). 6 Finally, M r. Abiodun states that he has been transferred to a “new location” which “lacks adequate legal, writing and printing materials to assist the petitioner to effectively represent himself,” and that immigration authorities failed to forw ard Respondent’s docketing statement to the new location. Pet. Br. at 23. M r. Abiodun fails to satisfy the actual injury component of constitutional standing to bring this claim. Although due process applies in removal proceedings, Ferry, 457 F.3d at 1128, and due process requires that prisoners have at their disposal adequate legal tools, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), M r. Abiodun does not indicate how, or even if, the purportedly inadequate materials or the nonforwarded docketing statement impacted this proceeding. Consequently, without deciding the parameters of a removable prisoner’s due process right to adequate legal materials, we simply conclude that M r. Abiodun has failed to demonstrate any actual injury that “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 6 M oreover, it appears that items four and five were not exhausted through the BIA . See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (providing that “[a] court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right”); Galvez Pineda v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2005) (observing that a “[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies by not first presenting a claim to the BIA deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear it”). -8- The petition for review is DISM ISSED. 7 Entered for the Court Jerome A. Holmes