Opinion ID: 614580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sports Equipment under Chapter 95

Text: LeMans contends that, even if the subject merchandise is properly classifiable as apparel, it is also prima facie classifiable as sports equipment, which requires resort to the guidelines set forth in GRI 3(a) to determine which heading provides the most specific description. According to LeMans, a GRI 3(a) analysis requires classification of its goods under Heading 9506, which provides for [a]rticles and equipment for general physical exercise, gymnastics, athletics, others sports, rather than headings 6110, 6201, and 6210. As discussed below, because we disagree that the subject merchandise is prima facie classifiable as sports equipment, we resolve this matter under GRI 1 and do not consider LeMans's argument under GRI 3(a).
The term sports equipment is not defined in the HTSUS, so we are to look to the common and popular meaning of the term. Bauer, 393 F.3d at 1250. Here, the CIT correctly cited the dictionary definition of equipment to find that [t]o qualify as `equipment' for a sport, the good should generally provide `what is necessary, useful, or appropriate [for that sport].' CIT Decision, at 1383 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 768 (2002)). We have employed this same definition for the term sports equipment in our prior decisions. See Rollerblade, 282 F.3d at 1354; Bauer, 393 F.3d at 1250-51. In Rollerblade, we accepted a definition offered for this term that includes those articles that are necessary and specifically designed for use in athletics and other sports. 282 F.3d at 1354. In Bauer, we again considered the definition of sports equipment when we addressed the proper classification for ice-hockey pants. 393 F.3d at 1250-51. There, we found that the CIT erred in applying our Rollerblade decision too strictly when it found that equipment meant only articles that are indispensible to a sport or athletic activity. Because hockey could be played without ice-hockey pants, the CIT held that such pants were not necessary for that sport and, therefore, not eligible for classification as sports equipment. Id. at 1250. We reversed, explaining that, while the term sports equipment includes items that are necessary for a sport, it also includes items that are appropriate and useful for a sport. Id. We concluded that, [b]ecause it is undisputed that Bauer's pants were specially designed and intended for use only while playing ice hockey, we hold, contrary to the [CIT's] conclusion, that the pants are prima facie classifiable under subheading 9506.99.25 as ice-hockey equipment. Id. at 1251. Relying on the dictionary definition of equipment and our case law, LeMans argues that sports equipment means either those goods that are necessary, useful, or appropriate for a sport or those goods that are specially designed and intended for use in a particular sport, even if they might otherwise be wearing apparel. Appellant's Br. 12. According to LeMans, the subject merchandise falls squarely within either definition, particularly in light of the CIT's statement that the subject merchandise is designed, engineered, and produced exclusively for use while participating in motocross activities and other power sports riding. CIT Decision, at 1376 (quoting Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s First Interrogs. & Reqs. for Produc.). Under LeMans's theory, the fact that the merchandise is designed exclusively for use in a particular sport should compel the conclusion that the merchandise is prima facie classifiable as sports equipment, and the court (and Customs before it) should proceed to an analysis under GRI 3(a) to determine which heading provides greater specificity. We do not agree with LeMans that the analysis is so narrow. First, we find LeMans's heavy reliance on Bauer misplaced. LeMans argues that the CIT's holding in this case is directly at odds with our decision in Bauer, which LeMans believes is controlling. As discussed above, Bauer turned on whether the CIT was correct in concluding that, in order for articles to be sports equipment, they must be indispensable for a sport. 393 F.3d at 1250. The CIT's decision in Bauer that the ice-hockey pants were not classifiable as sports equipment hinged entirely on the fact that hockey could be played without such protective pants: While the hockey pants provide protection to the wearer, and are specially designed for use in the sport of ice hockey, Plaintiff concedes that it is possible to engage in the sport of ice hockey without wearing the merchandise in question. As such, the Court finds that the subject merchandise is not essential or necessary for participation in that sport. Consequently, Plaintiff's ice hockey pants are not articles of sports equipment, and are therefore not classifiable as such. Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1357 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (internal citation omitted), rev'd, 393 F.3d 1246 (Fed.Cir.2004). In deciding that merchandise can be sports equipment as long as the goods are useful or appropriate for a sport, we did not address the extent to which the Explanatory Notes to Section 9506 clarified the meaning of the term sports equipment, an issue we find persuasive in this case, as discussed below. The ice-hockey pants at issue in Bauer, moreover, are distinguishable from the subject merchandise. The ice-hockey pants were constructed of a nylon or polyester textile shell and had an internal assembly of hard plastic guards and foam padding. Bauer, 393 F.3d at 1248. Accordingly, they were much more like the examples of pads and guards listed in EN 95.06(B)(13), the subsection of the Explanatory Notes that the CIT distinguished from the subject merchandise in this case. Indeed, the plaintiff-appellant in Bauer expressly argued, both before the CIT and on appeal to this court, that its ice-hockey pants fell squarely within the range of examples of protective equipment for sports listed in EN 95.06(B)(13). Thus, despite LeMans's argument to the contrary, we find that Bauer does not compel the result LeMans urges. Next, as discussed below, resort to the Explanatory Notes to Section 9506 supports the conclusion that the subject items are not classifiable as sports equipment, as LeMans urges.
As the CIT found, and as the government urges on appeal, the Explanatory Notes to Section 9506 offer helpful guidance in our interpretation of the term sports equipment. Although Explanatory Notes are not binding, they are persuasive and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of the tariff provision. Drygel, 541 F.3d at 1134. Thus, in past cases we have credited the unambiguous text of relevant explanatory notes absent persuasive reasons to disregard it. Id. (citing Agfa Corp. v. United States, 520 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2008) and BASF Corp. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (Fed.Cir.2007)). In this case, the Explanatory Notes to Section 9506 indicate that, to the extent sports equipment encompasses articles worn by a user, those articles are not apparel-like and are almost exclusively protective in nature. We agree with the CIT's conclusion that all of the listed examples in Subsection (B) center on non-clothing articles and do not describe apparel like the subject merchandise. CIT Decision, at 1383-84. [6] Example 13, which is the example arguably the closest to the subject merchandise, identifies [p]rotective equipment for sports or games, e.g., fencing masks and breast plates, elbow and knee pads, cricket pads, shin-guards. EN 95.06(B)(13). Even that example, however, refers exclusively to items such as masks, plates, pads, and guards, and it does not reference articles that have more than minimal textile components. LeMans contends that the CIT erred in considering the Explanatory Notes because: (1) the list in EN 95.06(B) is not exhaustive and, therefore, that heading could include apparel-like articles; and (2) the Explanatory Notes conflict with the plain meaning of the term sports equipment. Neither of these arguments is persuasive. Although LeMans is correct that the list of examples in EN 95.06(B) is not exclusive, the CIT did not find that the Explanatory Notes precluded classification of LeMans' goods as sports equipment, it found only that these examples informed its interpretation of the term sports equipment. The examples in EN 95.06(B) do not conflict with the term sports equipment, moreover; they merely clarify the scope of that term. Use of Explanatory Notes in this manner to interpret a heading of the HTSUS is entirely proper. See StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 644 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2011) (rejecting an argument that importation of an exclusion from the Explanatory Notes improperly contradicts a term in a heading, finding that it instead clarifies the scope of the term). This case is unlike Airflow Technology, which LeMans cites, where we discounted the significance of Explanatory Notes because they were broader than, and directly at odds with, a subheading term. Airflow Tech., Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1292-93 (Fed.Cir.2008). In Airflow Technology, we found that, pursuant to dictionary definitions, the term straining cloth in subheading 5911.40.00 meant only material that separated solids from liquids and was not synonymous with filtering cloth, which had the broader capability of separating solids from liquids or from gases, such as an air filter. Id. at 1291-92. The Explanatory Notes to Heading 5911, however, suggested that straining cloth included any type of filtering cloth, including those used for filtering air. Id. at 1292-93. Because the Explanatory Notes were broader than, and directly contradictory to, a common meaning of a subheading term, we did not give those notes any weight. Id. at 1293. In this case, unlike in Airflow Technology, none of the examples in EN 95.06(B) are broader than the term sports equipment, nor do they directly contradict either of the two definitions for that term that LeMans itself proposesi.e., goods that are necessary, useful, or appropriate for a sport, or goods that are specially designed and intended for use in a particular sport. Accordingly, Airflow Technology does not compel a different result here. Lemans also relies on Rubie's to support its position that it is improper to resort to the Explanatory Notes in this case. In Rubie's, we explained that, [a]bsent a clearer showing of congressional intent, we refuse to import incidental characteristics of the examples in the Explanatory Notes into the headings of the HTSUS. Id. at 1359. Like Airflow Technology, however, Rubie's does not compel the conclusion LeMans urges. In Rubie's, we already had determined that the costumes at issue did not constitute fancy dress of textiles, of chapters 61 and 62, such that accepting the government's distinction between accessories and wearing apparel based on the Explanatory Notes would have contradicted our earlier determination. In other words, to the extent our statement in Rubie's simply declined to give weight to Explanatory Notes that contradicted an already-defined term, it is distinguishable for the same reasons as Airflow Technology. The Explanatory Notes in Rubie's, moreover, listed a total of only seven examples on which the government relied that possessed what we described as incidental characteristics, whereas the Explanatory Notes in this case list as examples fourteen separate categories of goods, identifying over fifty individual items, which uniformly consist of goods that are non-apparel like in nature. These non-apparel characteristics are more than merely incidental; they overwhelmingly support the conclusion that the term sports equipment does not encompass apparel such as the subject merchandise. Accordingly, we find that the CIT properly looked to the Explanatory Notes to Section 9506 to assist with the interpretation of Heading 9506. The vast majority of the examples in those notes are items that a user would not wear on his or her body, but instead consist of articles that are entirely separate from the user (e.g., tennis nets, children's playground equipment, archery targets, bobsleds), held by the user in his or her hand (e.g., golf clubs, tennis rackets, polo mallets, hockey sticks), or are accessories fastened to a user (e.g., snow skis, water skis, ice skates). The few examples that a user actually would wear, which are identified in Example (13), are almost exclusively used for protection and would complement, or be worn in addition to, apparel worn for a particular sport. We therefore agree with the CIT that the Explanatory Notes distinguish the subject merchandise in this case from the goods properly classified under Heading 9506. Considering the definition of sports equipment as informed and clarified by these Explanatory Notes, the subject merchandise is not prima facie classifiable as sports equipment under Chapter 95. [7]