Opinion ID: 2058090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Principally Supported by an Association of Churches

Text: [¶ 14] Schwartz also contends that the Commission's finding, pursuant to section 1043(11)(F)(21)(a), that the Mission is principally supported by an association of churches is erroneous for two reasons. First, Schwartz argues that the only criteria that should be used to determine and measure the term supported within the meaning of the statute is financial. She contends that the direct financial support the Mission receives from churches, totaling only $26,000 of the Mission's $1.7 million annual budget, is insufficient to justify the Commission's finding that the Mission is principally supported by an association of churches. [¶ 15] The language of section 1043(11)(F)(21)(a) leads to a conclusion that financial support is not the only kind of support that may be considered in determining whether an organization is principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches pursuant to section 1043. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that when the words of the Legislature are clear, they are to be given their plain meaning and further judicial interpretation is not necessary. Bureau of Employee Relations v. Me. Labor Relations Bd., 611 A.2d 59, 61 (Me.1992). The language of the statute does not restrict the meaning of principally supported to direct financial support, and the Commission did not err when it construed support to include more than just financial support. Support may also include contributed goods and services, and organizational backing and support. Thus, the Commission's interpretation of section 1043 is not contrary to its plain language and is not erroneous. [¶ 16] Schwartz also challenges the Commission's factual finding that the Mission is principally supported by an association of churches, and argues that there is insufficient evidence in the record that the ninety-six churches that do provide financial support to the Mission constitute an association of churches within the meaning of the statute. Schwartz also contends that even if support is not limited to financial support, the evidence of support is insufficient. We disagree. The churches providing support can be said to be an association of churches, and because support within the meaning of section 1043(11)(F)(21)(a) is not limited to financial support, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the evidence in the record is insufficient to justify a finding that the Mission is principally supported by an association of churches. [¶ 17] Nevertheless, the Commission's finding on the principally supported issue is flawed because it is in reality a restatement in conclusory form of the terms of the governing statute. Following this conclusory statement, the Commission's decision cited some of the evidence in the record which indicated that more than fifty percent of the Mission's income is derived from endowments given mostly by individuals motivated by the fact that it is a Christian organization, [4] that Baptist and Congregational churches provide financial support to the Mission, that ninety-six churches donated money or services to the Mission, and that those financial contributions totaled about $26,000. Aside from these financial contributions, the Commission's findings make no mention of the services on which the Commission relies in concluding that the Mission is principally supported by an association of churches. Moreover, there was no mention of services or in-kind services provided, including the loaning of personnel, and the services flowing from the Mission's affiliation with churches, such as the use of a pension program, as well as the value of participation in church meetings and conventions, and the churches' encouragement of donations from their own parishioners. On remand, the Commission should therefore articulate the extent to which the provision of such services to the Mission was a factor in its conclusion that the Mission is principally supported by an association of churches. [¶ 18] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the Commission in order for the Commission to clarify its decision, and determine anew whether the Mission is principally supported by . . . [an] association of churches pursuant to 26 M.R.S. § 1043(11)(F)(21)(a). The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the Unemployment Insurance Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. DANA, J., with whom CALKINS, J., joins, dissenting. [¶ 19] Although I agree we must vacate, because the record does not and could not support a finding that the Mission is principally supported by . . . [an] association of churches, I would remand and direct a judgment for the plaintiff. First, there is no evidence that the ninety-six churches are an association (unless every time multiple churches give money to an entity they become an association) and, there is undisputed evidence that the Mission is principally supported by funds currently contributed by individuals and by income from funds previously contributed by individuals (endowments). Second, there is no evidence in the record from which the Commission, on remand, could value the goods and services provided by the ninety-six churches or by the two national entities (again assuming that the churches and the entities form an association). Finally, there is no evidence from which the Commission could possibly divine the extent to which advocacy by the ninety-six preachers in the ninety-six churches motivated the donors of the current gifts and the endowment funds. For all these reasons, I would not invite the Commission to do the impossible, and would remand with instructions to award the plaintiff her unemployment benefits.