Opinion ID: 2134533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Overview of Sixth Amendment Principles

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that a criminal defendant has a right to have the assistance of counsel for his or her defense. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that an essential part of that right is the defendant's ability to select the counsel of his or her choice. See, Wheat v. United States , 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); U.S. v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir.1994). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that `[i]n general defendants are free to employ counsel of their own choice and the courts are afforded little leeway in interfering with that choice.' United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.1982), abrogated on other grounds, Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). See U.S. v. Ross, supra . Accordingly, because disqualification of a criminal defendant's chosen counsel raises problems of a constitutional dimension, it is a harsh remedy that should be invoked infrequently. U.S. v. Gotti, 9 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y.1998), citing U.S. v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir.1993). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment recognizes a presumption in favor of the defendant's chosen counsel. Wheat v. United States, supra . Among reasons for this presumption are (1) a historic respect for the defendant's autonomy in crafting a defense, (2) the strategic importance of choice in ensuring vigorous advocacy, and (3) practical considerations of cost to the defendant and the judicial system if counsel of choice were wrongly denied. See Roxanne Malaspina, Resolving the Conflict of the Unsworn Witness: A Framework for Disqualifying House Counsel Under the Advocate Witness Rule, 67 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1073 (1992) (explaining these factors). See, also, Linda Ann Winslow, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification Motions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 Wash. L.Rev. 863 (1987) (discussing general harms created by disqualification). But the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment also encompasses the right to assistance of counsel unhindered by a conflict of interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). See U.S. v. Ross, supra . A defendant can waive his or her right to assistance of counsel unhindered by a conflict of interest, provided that the waiver is knowing and intelligent. Indeed, a defendant may waive his or her right to be represented by counsel at all. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). But a court is not required to accept a defendant's waiver in all circumstances. Therefore, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute. Wheat v. United States, supra . A trial court must recognize a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome by a demonstration of actual conflict or a showing of a serious potential for conflict. Wheat v. United States, supra ; U.S. v. Ross, supra . Disqualification in such cases is necessary because when a defendant is represented by an attorney who has an actual or potentially serious conflict, the defendant may be deprived of effective assistance of counsel. See id. So, when determining whether or not to disqualify a defense counsel, the court must balance two Sixth Amendment rights: (1) the defendant's right to be represented by counsel of choice and (2) his or her right to a defense conducted by an attorney who is free of conflicts of interest. U.S. v. Ross, supra . See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized an independent interest of the courts in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. Wheat v. United States, supra . In this case, the concern is that the attorney-client relationship with Regina gave rise to continuing obligations of loyalty and confidentiality and that if the confidences were kept, the representation of Ehlers might prove to be ineffective due to the inability of Schirber to conduct a thorough cross-examination. See, U.S. v. Gotti, supra ; Bruce A. Green,  Through a Glass, Darkly: How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L.Rev. 1201 (1989). The goal is to discover whether a defense lawyer has divided loyalties that prevent him or her from effectively representing the defendant. U.S. v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir.1994). If the conflict could cause the defense attorney to improperly use privileged communications in cross-examination, then disqualification is appropriate. Id. Disqualification is also appropriate if the conflict could deter the defense attorney from intense probing of the witness on cross-examination to protect privileged communications with the former client or to advance the attorney's own personal interests. Id.