Opinion ID: 1130389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Company to provide legal representation for Hamblin Jr.

Text: Robinson asserts that the Company should not have been allowed to provide Hamblin Jr. with legal assistance in this action since Hamblin Jr. was not a named insured in the policy. We disagree. First, Robinson lacks standing to raise any issue concerning Hamblin Jr.'s legal representation. We have stated before that: The doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude. At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating.    A litigant is said to have standing when he has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. This personal stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a tangible interest at stake. Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo.1992) (citations omitted). Since Hamblin Jr. was an opposing party in this suit, Robinson has no tangible interest in Hamblin Jr.'s right to legal representation. Second, Robinson is foreclosed from bringing this issue on appeal since he did not raise it at any time in the court below. We have consistently held that we do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Wyo.1991); Matter of Estate of McCue, 776 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo.1989). We see no reason to deviate from our general rule in this instance. It is true that Robinson appeared pro se in the court below and that this court has spoken to a certain leniency which should be afforded the pro se litigant. See Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 943 (Wyo.1991). The record in this case, however, reveals that the trial court accorded Robinson every courtesy and consideration to which he was entitled. Third, Robinson fails to support his position on this issue by cogent argument or pertinent authority, citing only Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law 4.3. This rule bears no relevance to the question at hand since it concerns the way counsel should deal with an opposing party appearing pro se. Inasmuch as Robinson's sole support is based on an irrelevant source, we decline consideration. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wyo.1996); Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 891 P.2d 773, 778 (Wyo.1995); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo.1994); Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 606 (Wyo.1993); W.R.A.P. 7.01(f).