Opinion ID: 2639868
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Foster Parents Have a Protected Property Interest in Reimbursement Payments for Foster Children's Care.

Text: Due process of law requires that before valuable property rights can be taken directly or infringed upon by governmental action, there must be notice and an opportunity to be heard. When a party raises a due process claim, we first must determine whether there is a deprivation of an individual interest of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection. [6] In City of Homer v. Campbell [7] we quoted approvingly the U.S. Supreme Court's explanation: The hallmark of property ... is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except for cause. Once that characteristic is found, the types of interests protected as property are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating to the whole domain of social and economic fact.[ [8] ] OCS reimburses licensed foster parents for the costs of maintenance that are necessary to assure adequate care of foster children in their custody. [9] Reimbursement payments are made at a standard rate [10] multiplied by the number of days of care provided in the previous month. [11] If a licensed foster parent provides care for a foster child, the parent is statutorily entitled to receive a reimbursement payment. Foster care maintenance reimbursements therefore satisfy the criterion for a protected property interest we adopted in Campbell: they are an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except for cause. [12] Other courts have concluded that foster care benefits ... are a species of property that is protected under the Constitution. [13] OCS contends that the property interest in these payments belongs only to foster children, not foster parents. Citing Wilkerson v. State for the proposition that foster care maintenance payments are not intended to be a source of income to provide foster parents with the basic necessities of life, [14] OCS argues that a foster parent has no legitimate property interest in these payments. Wilkerson does not control our decision here because it involved a different property interest than the one asserted by Heitz. In Wilkerson OCS denied a foster care license to an applicant who had been charged with a felony in the preceding ten years; the applicant argued he was denied due process because he did not have the opportunity to be heard regarding his criminal record. [15] We noted the applicant's property interest in the opportunity to provide foster care was marginal; because foster care payments do no more than cover the foster child's own costs, denial of the opportunity to provide foster care does not deny the applicant any economic benefit. [16] By contrast a person like Heitz, who actually cares for foster children, receives foster care payments because prior expenses are being reimbursed. If OCS erroneously denies reimbursement payments to a parent who already has provided foster care, that parent suffers a net loss of funds, unlike someone denied the opportunity to provide foster care. We therefore reject OCS's argument and conclude that a foster parent's interest in receiving foster care reimbursement payments is a property interest protected by the due process clause. [17]