Opinion ID: 1951369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law on Overbreadth

Text: The doctrine of overbreadth protects against unconstitutional restrictions that may inhibit the exercise of protected First Amendment rights. Thus, a statute may be constitutionally overbroad if it sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). To ensure that First Amendment rights are not unduly burdened, the doctrine requires that laws restricting these rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Because of the importance of the interests this doctrine protects, litigants need not meet the traditional requirement of standing. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114, 92 S.Ct. 2294. Even an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face on the ground that the rights of others not before the court may be unconstitutionally inhibited. Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987). Despite such a loose standing requirement, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is manifestly, strong medicine that must be employed sparingly and as a last resort. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908. To be considered overbroad, the law in question must pose a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (emphases added). Accordingly, in considering an overbreadth challenge, a court must determine whether the statute inhibits First Amendment rights and, if so, whether the impact on such rights is substantial. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). If the statute does not reach[] a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, then the overbreadth claim fails. Id. It is true that conduct may at times be sufficiently expressive to implicate the First Amendment. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) (The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (invalidating a statute that criminalized the burning of the American flag as an infringement on free speech). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the idea that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). To determine whether particular conduct involves sufficient communicative elements to invoke the First Amendment, the Supreme Court considers whether [a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974)). Finally, although some conduct may implicate the First Amendment, such [s]ymbolic expression ... may be forbidden or regulated. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). The United States Supreme Court analyzes whether a statute that prohibits conduct unconstitutionally burdens free speech under the following test: [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673 (emphasis added); accord Clark, 468 U.S. at 294, 104 S.Ct. 3065 (citing O'Brien ). It is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406-07, 109 S.Ct. 2533. The Florida statute clearly meets these requirements, as I explain below.