Opinion ID: 171861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction on “Fleeting Possession”

Text: The District Court refused to give the jury one of counsel’s tendered instructions which stated, inter alia, that “momentary or transitory control of an object is not possession,” and that “you should not find that the defendant possessed the object if he possessed it only momentarily, or did not know that he possessed it.” The District Court refused to give that instruction to the jury, stating that it did not “fit” the facts in the instant case and that the jury had in other -3- instructions been instructed that “possession of a firearm” means “knowing possession.” In general connection with the foregoing, in United States v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1999), we spoke as follows: Thus, even if a felon held a firearm for a mere second or two, unless that felon truly did not know that what he possessed was a firearm or there was some recognized legal justification for his holding the firearm, § 922(g) will still impose criminal liability. If, however, a felon who momentarily possessed a firearm genuinely lacked knowledge that he possessed a firearm or had a legally justifiable reason for possessing it, the fleeting possession theory would apply because the government would have failed in its burden of proving intent. Therefore, the court need only give a fleeting possession instruction when the evidence at trial supports a possible finding that the defendant only momentarily possessed the contraband, and in so doing, lacked either knowledge he possessed contraband or criminal intent to possess it. Further, by way of general background, in United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d 1321, 1326 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007), we stated that this Circuit had never explicitly recognized a “fleeting possession” defense, which requires proof that the defendant “(1) merely momentarily possessed the contraband, and (2) either lacked knowledge that he possessed contraband or had a legally justifiable reason to possess it temporally.” We need not reach that issue in the present case, since, in our view, even if this Circuit recognized the defense of “fleeting possession,” the facts of the present case would not necessitate giving the “fleeting possession instruction.” Defendant’s “possession” was not “fleeting.” -4- Accepting the defendant’s testimony, the defendant, carrying his backpack containing the firearm, exited the apartment which he shared with his girlfriend and then proceeded to exit the apartment building itself. He proceeded through the apartment complex parking lots to a business parking lot where he was seen by a police officer who knew that there was an outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest. Moments later, he was confronted by the officer, whereupon the defendant fled, and in the process, threw off his backpack. That sequence would not require an instruction on “fleeting possession.” As said, it was not “fleeting.” See the recent case of United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. Jan. 26, 2009).