Opinion ID: 754090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preservation Of Errors

Text: The Board Members appeal on two grounds. First, they contend that the trial court improperly denied them JAML on Cross's Title VII retaliation claim, and the jury's verdict on that claim was unsupported by the evidence, because there was no evidence that these defendants either took retaliatory action against Cross or knew or should have known of retaliatory actions against Cross. Second, they contend that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on Cross's state and federal retaliation claims in a single instruction, instead of setting forth each claim in a separate instruction. Cross contends, in the first instance, that the Board Members failed to preserve either of their grounds for appeal with timely and adequate objections before the trial court. We will consider in turn whether the Board Members have preserved each of their issues for appeal. 1 The objection to the liability standard The Board Members assert that they raised the issue of the knew or should have known standard in their motion for JAML at the close of plaintiff's evidence, and again in their motion for JAML at the close of all evidence. Additionally, they claim that they specifically argued for this standard in oral arguments on each of these motions. Furthermore, they contend that their arguments to the trial court that the agency instruction on the retaliation claim was overbroad, because it would tend to cause the jury to believe that the defendants would be responsible for rumors, was essentially an argument that the 'knew or should have known' standard should apply. Reply Brief of Appellants, p. 5. 4 The Board Members thus contend that they presented to the trial court the issue of the appropriate standard for employer liability on a Title VII retaliation claim, but their contentions were overruled. Although the Board Members mentioned as a ground for JAML at the close of Cross's case and again at the close of all of the evidence that Cross had failed to present a submissible case on the element [t]hat these Defendants knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, they plainly failed to reiterate this ground for JAML in their renewed post-trial motion. Rule 50(b) provides for the renewal of a motion for JAML after trial when such a motion has been made at the end of all of the evidence. FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b); 5 BE & K Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO, 90 F.3d 1318, 1325 (8th Cir.1996). The Board Members missed this procedural step. Where an appellant fails to renew its motion for JAML after the verdict, this court  'cannot test the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict beyond application of the plain error doctrine in order to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.'  James E. Brady & Co., Inc. v. Eno, 992 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir.1975)); accord Dupre, 112 F.3d at 336 (errors at trial not properly preserved are reviewed only for plain error); Yannacopoulos, 75 F.3d at 1304 (same); McKeel, 73 F.3d at 211 (same); Rush, 56 F.3d at 922 (same). This court will therefore conduct only a plain error review of the standard for employer liability on Title VII retaliation claims. 2 The objection to the combined instruction The Board Members' procedural default on their objection to the combined instruction on state and federal retaliation claims is different. Instead of failing to renew post-trial an objection raised in a prior motion for JAML or prior objection to jury instructions, the record contains no indication that the Board Members ever raised an objection to the combined retaliation instruction before their post-trial renewal of their motion for JAML or new trial. The Board Members were required to raise an objection to the combined instruction before the jury retire[d] to consider its verdict, and their objection to the combined instruction had to state distinctly the specific objections to the combined instruction and the grounds therefor. FED.R.CIV.P. 51; Westcott, 133 F.3d at 661; Dupre, 112 F.3d at 334; Ryther, 108 F.3d at 845; Starks, 58 F.3d at 361; Doyne, 953 F.2d at 450. The Board Members have pointed to nothing in the record that would lead this court to believe that they ever proffered any objection to the combined instruction before it was submitted to the jury or that, if they raised some objection, that it was sufficiently distinct or specific, or adequately stated the grounds therefor to preserve the error. Even if they proffered separate instructions on the state and federal retaliation claims, this would not suffice to preserve the error of the combined instruction, because [e]ven tendering an alternative instruction without objecting to some specific error in the trial court's charge or explaining why the proffered instruction more accurately states the law does not preserve the error for appeal. Westcott, 133 F.3d at 662; Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Full Serv. Leasing Corp., 83 F.3d at 256-57. Consequently, this purported error in the jury instructions will also be reviewed only for plain error. See Westcott, 133 F.3d at 662; Dupre, 112 F.3d at 334; Ryther, 108 F.3d at 847. Having established the standard of review for the questions presented on this appeal, we turn now to the merits of the Board Members' assertions of error.