Opinion ID: 1282082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In so holding, we have considered the various issues defendants raise, several of which will be referred to in this division.

Text: A. Defendants assert this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal because constitutional notice requirements to all members of the class have not been met, citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). They contend it is a constitutional requirement that notice be given to all members of a purported class so that they may join in the action. We are not persuaded Eisen is applicable to a R.C.P. 42(c) spurious class action. The Eisen case was decided under the new federal class action rule 23(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which results in a binding judgment on all class members (present or absent) who after notice do not request exclusion from the class. The Eisen court enforced the provisions of federal rule 23(c)(2) which required the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. Due process required notice reasonably certain to inform those affected. Eisen, supra, 417 U.S. at 174, 94 S.Ct. at 2151, 40 L.Ed.2d at 747; see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42, 61 S.Ct. 115, 118, 85 L.Ed. 22, 27 (1940); Larionoff v. United States, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 533 F.2d 1167, 1186 (1976). Defendants overlook the crucial feature of Iowa's class action, which, as we have noted above, binds no one not a party or intervenor. See 1 Vestal & Willson, Iowa Practice § 22.09(4), at 426 (1974). The circumstances which required notice to absent class members in Eisen (who would be bound by the outcome) are absent in the case before us. There was no lack of jurisdiction on this ground, either below or here. B. Defendants also assert this court has no jurisdiction to remand to allow plaintiffs to amend their petition, a course plaintiffs' brief suggests would be desirable. Of course where, as here, the appeal is in a law action our appellate jurisdiction is not de novo but is confined to correction of errors assigned. Winter v. Honeggers' & Co., Inc., 215 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Iowa 1974); see R.C.P. 334. We cannot hold there was any error at law in not permitting plaintiffs to amend, because they sought no permission to amend in trial court. Nor will this court allow parties to attempt to amend pleadings on appeal. See Lungren v. Lungren, 197 Iowa 519, 520, 197 N.W. 646 (1924); Decatur v. Simpson, 115 Iowa 348, 351, 88 N.W. 839, 840 (1962). However, we do not consider this issue controlling in this appeal. We have already held plaintiffs pled a sustainable spurious class action, although there was a misjoinder of parties. When the claims of those plaintiffs who purchased seed from each remaining defendant are properly severed, the petition will necessarily be recast into separate actions to reflect the appropriate parties and plaintiff classes. See R.C.P. 81 (correcting or recasting pleadings). At that point the technical (but nonfatal) defects defendants complain of can be obviated. C. Defendants' briefs devote several pages urging the court to take judicial notice that soil, weather and other conditions affecting corn production vary widely in Iowa. We think these matters may be judicially noted, as well as the fact there was widespread damage from southern cornleaf blight in 1970. See, e. g., Grimes v. Polk County, 240 Iowa 228, 237-238, 34 N.W.2d 767, 772 (1949); Slinger v. Farmers' Mutual Hail Ins. Ass'n, 219 Iowa 329, 331, 258 N.W. 101, 102 (1934); Boyd v. City of Oskaloosa, 179 Iowa 387, 396, 161 N.W. 491, 493-494 (1917); 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 9, at 824 (1964); 1 Jones on Evidence § 2:40; at 116-117 (S. Gard 6th ed. 1972). The statement in Bennett, 252 Iowa at 83, 106 N.W.2d at 260, that [o]n the present state of the record, we are restricted to the pleadings alone in ruling whether a class action is properly pled, may have been made because nothing else was before the court. Other courts differ on whether materials beyond the pleadings may be considered. Compare United States v. Preston, 352 F.2d 352, 356 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1965), with Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corporation, Sikorsky Aircraft Division, 50 F.R.D. 242 (D.Conn.1970) and Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 3 F.R.D. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). We agree with the statement in 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1785, at 131 (1972), that [t]he determination [of whether the suit is maintainable as a class action] usually should be predicated on more information than the complaint itself affords. This does not mean trial court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing. But trial court is not obligated to ignore affidavits, briefs and other papers filed, nor facts it might judicially notice. In the final analysis, however, defendants are merely asserting that these differences in corn growing conditions among the plaintiffs demonstrate an absence of common relief, or in any event, with such divergent situations it cannot be said that common fact questions predominate. We have already observed in division II plaintiffs may seek common reliefin this case damagesdespite the fact each is entitled to separate and different amounts. Defendants cite recent federal cases in support of their assertion the questions of law or fact common to the class members must predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974). But these cases are not applicable here because they rely on new federal rule 23(b)(3) which among other things provides a class action can be brought only if the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members   . There is no similar provision in R.C.P. 42. Of course, existence of insignificant or trivial common questions should not satisfy the requirement of rule 42(c). The common questions of law or fact must be substantial. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1964); see 3B Moore's Federal Practice § 23.10[5], at 23-2703. In this case plaintiffs were by pleaded definition those farm owners or operators who suffered losses from corn blight and diseases resulting from the T-hybrid or T-cytoplasm seed corn developed by defendants, which seed was alleged to be highly and unusually susceptible to disease, including corn blight. We consider this a pleading of a substantial common question of fact. It is likely, as defendants argue, other fact issues may be involved in assessing the damages of each plaintiff or intervenor. But that possibility does not authorize us so to interpret the [class action] rules as to nullify them. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, 194 F.2d at 744. These factors may be considered by a trial court when the class action nature of the litigation is under attack. But we do not conceive trial court, exercising a sound discretion, could abort the class-action nature of this litigation on those considerations. To so hold would be to ignore the essential flexibility of our rules and the innovative skills of our trial courts. See R.C.P. 81 (correcting and recasting of pleadings); R.C.P. 185 (consolidation); R.C.P. 186 (separate trials); R.C.P. 205 (special verdicts); R.C.P. 206 (interrogatories). D. Defendants argue the petition before us contains several pleading defects. Assuming these may properly be raised by a motion to drop parties, we deem none of them fatal. Plaintiffs alleged they were bringing the action against the defendants and each and all of them jointly and severally. They seek an aggregate sum of money ($100,000,000) against each    and against all of the defendants. The alternative theory of joint recovery seems inconsistent with the R.C.P. 42(c) requirement that the rights involved be several. But the facts alleged in the petition disclose the rights are in fact several, not joint. In this connection, we relevantly said in Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 105 Iowa 488, 491, 75 N.W. 355, 356 (1898), The name that plaintiff has given his action is of no consequence, provided he has stated sufficient facts to show a right of recovery. In our view, the allegations relating to joint liability are surplusage which, for the purposes of this appeal, may be ignored. See Cavanaugh v. Jepson, 167 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1969); Van Tiger v. Hendricks, 249 Iowa 25, 28, 85 N.W.2d 543, 544 (1957); Bristow v. Pagano, 238 Iowa 1075, 1078, 29 N.W.2d 423, 425 (1947). Defendants argue plaintiffs' prayer for an aggregate sum of money against each    and against all of the defendants omits an essential allegation of the petition and would unconstitutionally violate the substantive property rights of the defendants. It is apparent plaintiffs envisioned a fluid class recovery fund, a procedure proposed by the trial court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). See Note, 60 Iowa L.Rev. 93, 121 (1974). Such a procedure is unavailable under our present rules. Whether or not plaintiffs, after stating an aggregate damage amount, are required to specifically state in their petition the amount each has been damaged where such information otherwise appears has not always been clear. Compare Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 477-478 (S.D.Cal.1957) with Rath v. Armour and Company, supra, 136 N.W.2d at 145-150, 152. What we have already said concerning joint liability, coupled with our rules, impels us to the conclusion the separate damage claims of the plaintiffs, and subsequently the intervenors, should be pled. At the time of ruling below, R.C.P. 70 provided, The petition shall state whether it is at law or in equity, the facts concerning the cause or causes of action asserted, the relief demanded and, if for money, the amount thereof. Plaintiffs did state a total amount of the money relief demanded. Assuming a proper motion was made, failure to satisfy R.C.P. 70 requirements does not automatically result in a dismissal. For example, an error in labeling the action as law or equity has no significance. See § 611.7, The Code; 1 Vestal & Willson, Iowa Practice § 13.51(1), at 272-273 (1974). Ordinarily a statement in the prayer of a petition is not an allegation of a cause of action. See Tacke v. Hauser, 247 Iowa 465, 470, 74 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1956); Baker v. Baker, 220 Iowa 1216, 1220, 264 N.W. 116, 119 (1935); 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 95(b), at 239 (1951). We hold the pleading defects, which may be easily remedied when the claims are severed, furnish no ground for sustaining trial court's action. E. We have studied the other arguments raised by the various defendants. Most, if not all, are treated directly or indirectly in the above discussion. Under the disposition we make of this appeal, they furnish no basis for affirming the ruling below. V. Following remand, another question will inevitably arise which in fairness to the parties should be answered now. The alleged damages occurred in 1970. Other farm owners and operators who claim loss may wish to intervene in the spurious class actions resulting from the severed claims. Should parties be permitted to intervene as members of a spurious class after the termination of a limitation period, when the initial class action complaint has been filed before the applicable statute of limitations period has run? Apparently this is a question of first impression in Iowa. In our view, this appeal presented a misjoinder of parties, not a failure of action within the meaning of § 614.10, The Code. If applicable, that statute would have stayed the operation of limitation statutes upon plaintiffs' filing new actions within six months after failure of the prior action. We have said that courts do not look with favor upon a defense of statute of limitations. Johnson v. Brooks, 254 Iowa 278, 281, 117 N.W.2d 457, 459 (1962). Such statutes are said to be a penalty for laches and protection against stale claims. Higbee v. Walsh, 229 Iowa 408, 421, 294 N.W. 597, 604 (1940). The United States Supreme Court has observed limitation statutes are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared.    [E]ven if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation   . Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-349, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 (1944). In the case before us, it cannot be said the petition filed did not timely inform defendants of the nature of the claims held by the class members or the dimensions of the alleged loss. All of the purposes behind the limitation statutes were satisfied. We have also examined those federal decisions which resolved this issue under the similar provisions of old federal rule 23. The great majority hold if a class action is maintainable as such, it would be incongruous to say that absent members who are represented by those present may not rely upon the commencement of the action by their fellow class members to toll the running of the statute. Escott v. Barchris Construction Corporation, 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965); DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Company, 323 F.2d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1963); Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589-590 (10th Cir. 1961); York v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944); see American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 549, 94 S.Ct. 756, 764, 38 L.Ed.2d 713, 724 (1974); Echols v. Star Loan Co., 290 Ala. 76, 274 So.2d 51, 60 (1973); 3B Moore's Federal Practice § 23.12, at 23-2918, 23-2919. We hold claims of parties properly members of the class, who timely intervene in the proceedings below (see R.C.P. 75), shall be deemed brought, for limitation purposes, when the appropriate defendant was legally served in the original litigation. See R.C.P. 49, The Code, 1973. VI. The court has observed a wide divergence in the printing costs for various papers filed in this appeal. Cost of printing the appendix was $11.25 per page; plaintiffs' brief, $10.20 per page; brief for defendants Garst, Northrup and May, $2.50 per page. Our rule 344.2(c) provides only for taxation of reasonable printing costs. See Jasper v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 248 Iowa 1286, 1299, 84 N.W.2d 21, 29 (1957). In 1974, we limited taxable printing costs to $2.00 per page. Annual cost of living increases since those briefs were printed (which we assume are reflected in costs of printing operations) total at a minimum 25.7 percent (1974 through 1976). We limit the taxable printing costs in this appeal and future appeals to actual cost not to exceed $3.00. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of ruling in conformance herewith. Taxable costs of appeal for all appellee defendants who no longer remain in this litigation are taxed to the plaintiffs. Appeal costs of the remaining parties shall be equitably apportioned by trial court among the severed proceedings and shall be ultimately taxed to the unsuccessful party or parties. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.