Opinion ID: 1525843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellee's Appeals

Text: Appellee first argues that the prosecutor's notes concerning his March 1991 interview with Hammer should have been provided to the defense under the Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573(B)(2)(a)(ii), as substantially verbatim statements of an eyewitness. Moreover, Appellee argues that the notes were subject to mandatory disclosure, because they were exculpatory in that they could be used to impeach Wanner. See Pa. R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a) (implementing a policy of mandatory disclosure for [a]ny evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth). Appellee stresses Wanner's critical role at trial, as he was the only witness to provide evidence corroborating Hammer's version that it was Appellee, and not Hammer, who actually shot the victim. Appellee also highlights testimony by trial counsel indicating that he would have made use of the notes if he had had them. See N.T., July 13, 2005, at 68, 69-70. Appellee invokes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); [12] United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). In terms of prejudice, Appellee references Commonwealth v. Grayson, 466 Pa. 427, 353 A.2d 428 (1976), in which this Court explained: The question of credibility sometimes depends on the slightest inclinations of scale. Where the jury is in doubt as to whether or not to believe a witness, the smallest feather of a palpable exaggeration or an inconsistency in a witness's statement on a minor point may be the very item to tip the scales and discredit the witness on his main testimony. Id. at 429, 353 A.2d at 430 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 417 Pa. 321, 334, 208 A.2d 219, 226 (1965)). Appellee presents a colorable argument that the prosecutor's notes contained potential Brady material of the impeachment variety. However, according to uncontradicted trial and post-conviction testimony, Appellee was a participant in the conversation which the notes concerned. Therefore, the presence or absence of Wanner and/or Rizzo and the content of Appellee's own statements should have been known to Appellee, to the same degree as it was known to Hammer. To the extent that Wanner may have misrepresented aspects of the conversation or the associated circumstances, Appellee should have understood that Hammer could potentially confirm the misrepresentations. Indeed, in other passages of his brief, Appellee complains, at length, that his counsel was remiss in failing to interview Hammer before trial. See, e.g., Initial Brief for Appellee at 37, 41. No Brady violation occurs where the defendant knew or could have uncovered the relevant evidence with reasonable diligence. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 573 Pa. 157, 178, 822 A.2d 684, 696 (2003); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 580 Pa. 594, 599, 863 A.2d 423, 426 (2004). Moreover, it is the petitioner's burden, on post-conviction review, to establish a constitutional infraction, such as a Brady violation. See Commonwealth v. Copenhafer, 553 Pa. 285, 321, 719 A.2d 242, 260 (1998). Here, Appellee has failed to establish a lack of relevant knowledge on his part and/or an inability to obtain such knowledge upon reasonable diligence. [13] Thus, he has not met his burden of proof concerning this asserted Brady violation, and the only potentially extant claim is that of deficient stewardship on the part of his counsel, addressed below.
Relying upon the evidence that the prosecutor told Wanner that he would see what he could do concerning the outcome of sentencing in a prosecution against him, Appellee maintains that the Commonwealth committed another Brady violation by suppressing evidence which would have undermined Wanner's credibility as a key prosecution witness. Appellee also claims that the Commonwealth exacerbated the violation by failing to correct Wanner's false trial testimony that no promises were made to him. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (reaffirming that the government has an obligation to redress the elicitation of testimony which the prosecutor knows to be false). The United States Supreme Court has not provided definitive guidance concerning what constitutes a promise, reward or inducement for purposes of Brady/Giglio. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 884 (11th Cir.1985). In collecting relevant decisions of other federal and state courts, one commentator notes an apparent split, as some courts have interpreted Giglio narrowly to encompass only express agreements, whereas others have applied a broader interpretation encompassing any communication suggesting preferential treatment in return for testimony. See R. Michael Cassidy, Soft Words of Hope: Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1129, 1152-56 (2004) (citing cases). While the Superior Court has taken the narrower approach, see Commonwealth v. Burkhardt, 833 A.2d 233, 243 (Pa.Super.2003), it has been argued that Giglio supports the broader one in which the relevant inquiry is whether the government has said or done anything that might reasonably lead the informant to believe that his interests are aligned with that of the state. Soft Words of Hope, 98 Nw. U.L.Rev. at 1157; see also id. at 1156. We need not address this controversy here, however, since the PCRA court determined that Appellee failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that any form of promise or inducement existed in the first instance. See Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 24-25. While the court recognized that the district attorney's office may have maintained some general policy, it explained that the statements made on the record by Commonwealth agents do not specifically discuss whether that policy was employed in Fritz Wanner's case following his testimony against [Appellee]. Furthermore, the Assistant District Attorney handling Fritz Wanner's case had no knowledge of any alleged agreement. The Commonwealth cannot be found to have failed to disclose an agreement which has not been proven to exist or for failing to correct testimony which has not been proven to be false. Id. Thus, it is reasonably clear that the court rejected Wanner's post-conviction testimony. [14] Wanner's post-conviction testimony was in conflict with his trial testimony, exemplifying that there were reasonable grounds to question its credibility. Since the PCRA court's factual determination carries sufficient support in the evidence and is free from legal error, the present claim does not give rise to a basis for relief.
Appellee next claims that the district attorney violated his discovery obligation after telling trial counsel he would get everything. [15] See N.T., December 29, 1998, at 2; N.T., October 25, 2004, at 153-154. Appellee complains that, despite this agreement, the prosecutor failed to provide trial counsel with: transcripts and court documents showing that, in Lebanon County, Hammer had his sentence modified from 19 to 45 years to 12 to 32 years; a Court Order from Schuylkill County ordering Hammer to cooperate with the Commonwealth with any cases against [Appellee]; a plea agreement that Hammer entered into with the Commonwealth which deleted some of the crimes to which Hammer had originally said he would plead guilty; a preliminary hearing transcript in Schuylkill County in which Hammer testified that, when he gave a statement to the state police in July 1989, they told him they would do whatever they could do to help him; Hammer's trial testimony in Schuylkill County in which he stated that, in exchange for his statement, a state trooper promised Hammer he would talk to the district attorneys and do the best he could for Hammer; and information that, in the course of negotiating a plea agreement in return for testifying against Appellee, Hammer, through his attorney, told a Berks County Assistant District Attorney that he wanted to serve no jail time. Appellee asserts that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's failure in this regard, as he was denied substantial impeachment material, which would have afforded the jurors a fuller understanding of Hammer's incentive to testify for the prosecution, thus undermining his accusations. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, relies on the public character of the documents and transcripts in issue and notes that the out-of-county documents were not within the possession of the Berks County prosecutor. See Brief for Appellant at 25 (According to the plain language of [Rule of Criminal Procedure 573], there is simply no authority to indicate that Berks County was responsible for gathering information from other counties and providing that information to [Appellee].). The Commonwealth also notes that Appellee's challenge was raised in his appeals from his robbery and burglary convictions and was recently decided by the Superior Court in the Commonwealth's favor. See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 869 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2005) (explaining that there is no Brady violation where the parties had equal access to information or if the [a]ppellant knew of or could have uncovered the evidence with reasonable diligence. (citing Grant, 572 Pa. at 55, 813 A.2d at 730)). As to information within the Berks County prosecutor's immediate possession and control, the Commonwealth refutes Appellee's claim of materiality. With regard to previous drafts of the memorandum of cooperation and plea agreement with Hammer, the Commonwealth explains that changes were not made to afford Hammer a more favorable bargain, since the penalties concerning deleted charges were to run concurrently with other charges to which Hammer pleaded, and thus, the actual sentence was unaffected. The Commonwealth further notes that trial counsel conceded that he would not have altered his cross-examination of Hammer based upon this modified agreement. See N.T., January 20, 2005, at 63. Similarly, the Commonwealth contends that Appellee cannot demonstrate that the outcome of trial would have been different if he had been aware that Hammer told the Commonwealth that he did not want to be incarcerated. According to the Commonwealth, Hammer's personal wishes, however unreasonable, were not relevant, particularly since he already had entered his plea after the first trial. See N.T., January 15, 1999, at 265. Moreover, because Hammer did not receive what he was seeking, the Commonwealth contends that the impeachment value of this information is questionable. We agree with the Commonwealth's arguments concerning this claim. Notably, many of the out-of-county documents do not fall within the four corners of Appellee's document requests, other than via the catch-all provision requesting all potentially exculpatory evidence. We do not regard the acquiescence of a county district attorney to such a request as creating an obligation to assemble all potentially relevant records and transcripts from other criminal proceedings in other counties for the benefit of the defense. With regard to the information within the Berks County prosecutor's possession and control, our own assessment concerning materiality/prejudice is in line with that of the Commonwealth.
Appellee develops that, before the PCRA court directed the Commonwealth to furnish a copy of the notes from prosecutor's pre-trial interview with Hammer, the Commonwealth provided the court with twenty-nine pages of documents for in camera review. See N.T., February 16, 2005, at 10-12. He argues that the PCRA court erred by failing to require production of twenty-eight of these pages. Appellee explains that the Commonwealth has indicated that at least five pages concerned meetings about plea negotiations with Hammer's counsel, the state police, and other members of the district attorney's office. Since the notes describe plea agreement discussions with others, Appellee asserts, they are not work product. Moreover, he contends, even prosecutorial work-product is discoverable when the mental impressions of the prosecutor themselves disclose or embody a constitutional violation. Under Rule of Criminal Procedure 902(E)(2), no discovery is permitted at any stage of the post-conviction proceedings on a first, counseled petition in a capital case, except upon leave of court after a showing of good cause. Pa. R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). Appellate courts review the denial of discovery by a PCRA court for abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 159, 855 A.2d 726, 749-50 (2004). Here, Appellee presents no evidence that the PCRA court's in camera screening was erroneous, and, accordingly, we decline to disturb its discretionary determination. See generally id. at 159-60, 855 A.2d at 750-51 (explaining that a showing of good cause under Rule 902(E)(2) requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence that might be discovered if the petitioner is permitted to review requested materials).

Appellee next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to demonstrate to the jury that Hammer lied in pre-trial statements and testimony at Appellee's trial. While this claim is stated very generally, the development in Appellee's brief is centered upon a July 1989 polygraph examination conducted by state police, in which Hammer initially denied having been physically present when the victim was shot or having knowledge concerning the details of the events giving rise to the killing. Further, Appellee contends that his trial counsel was derelict in his failure to interview Hammer, which Appellee asserts would have revealed additional inconsistencies and yielded avenues for the impeachment of other witnesses. Appellee stresses that, at the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel could identify no strategic reason for failing to cross-examine Hammer with the inconsistent statements given to state troopers. See N.T., November 22, 2004, at 216. According to Appellee, if the jurors had heard these lies about the events which formed the foundation of the Commonwealth's case, they would have had an insight into the self-interested motivation for his trial testimony. See Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1098-99 (3d Cir.1996) (holding that counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, failing to impeach a witness with prior inconsistent statements). While Appellee recognizes that trial counsel elicited an admission from Hammer that he had lied in connection with another prosecution, he contends that there is a critical distinction between such falsehood and those involving material facts underlying the present case. Appellee fails, however, to address material aspects of counsel's post-conviction testimony. Counsel testified that he was reticent to raise the substance of Hammer's interview with state police, because he was concerned that Hammer's failure of the polygraph relative to a different version of the events would lend credence to Hammer's trial version of the events. See, e.g., N.T., November 22, 2004, at 219. In failing to acknowledge counsel's stated concerns, Appellee's present argument does nothing to discount it. Thus, he has failed to meet his burden on post-conviction review of establishing that counsel lacked a reasonable basis supporting his actions.
Appellee also argues that trial counsel unreasonably failed to cross-examine Hammer by questioning him concerning his failure of the initial polygraph examination and his refusal to submit to a further examination after having given a statement implicating Appellee. Appellee invokes the legal principle that a witness may be cross-examined as to any matter tending to show the interest or bias of that witness. See Commonwealth v. Nolen, 535 Pa. 77, 83, 634 A.2d 192, 195 (1993). He develops that state police found Hammer to be DECEPTIVE when he denied having shot or helped to shoot Mr. Boyer, and denied having been physically present during the robbery/killing. [16] According to Appellee, the information need not have been introduced for its truth, but rather, could have been offered to demonstrate the extent of Hammer's incentive to curry favor with the authorities. Appellee observes that, at the PCRA hearing, trial counsel admitted, [i]f I could have got the fact that he took a lie detector test and the results of those lie detector tests into evidence, of course I would have done that. N.T., November 22, 2004, at 236. In United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998), the United States Supreme Court upheld a per se ban on the admission of polygraph results in court martial proceedings based upon their inherent unreliability. See id. at 310-12, 118 S.Ct. at 1265-66. Scheffer has been applied more broadly to support the exclusion of polygraph evidence, even in the capital context. See, e.g., United States v. Fulks, 454 F.3d 410, 434 (4th Cir.2006) (` Scheffer, with its emphasis on the unreliability of polygraph evidence and the interest of courts in excluding such unreliable evidence, certainly suggests that exclusion of polygraph results would pass constitutional muster in th[e capital] context, as well.' (citation omitted)). Particularly in light of the federal authority, Appellee has provided no basis to undermine this Court's holdings precluding the admission of polygraph evidence. See, e.g., Brockington, 500 Pa. at 220, 455 A.2d at 629.
Appellee next complains that, despite the key role Hammer played in the prosecution, trial counsel failed to even interview him. Appellee emphasizes that Hammer and Russo were the only witnesses who could expose asserted fabrications by Wanner concerning the overheard conversation between Hammer and Appellee. Appellee acknowledges that counsel tried to locate Russo but faults counsel for failing to even consider the potential that Hammer might impeach Wanner's testimony. According to Appellee, had counsel made the modest effort of interviewing Hammer, he could have learned that Wanner invented the account that Appellee claimed to have taken the gun from Hammer in order to shoot Boyer; and Wanner lied concerning who was present when he purportedly overheard the conversation. In light of counsel's asserted dereliction, Appellee contends, Wanner's testimony went virtually unchallenged. Appellee also challenges the PCRA court's characterization of Wanner's testimony as reflecting only a collateral conversation, Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 26. In this regard, Appellee develops that Wanner was the only person other than Hammer (who, as an accomplice to the robbery, was a corrupt and polluted source) to provide evidence supporting the Commonwealth's critical contention that Appellee shot the victim. Indeed, Appellee highlights, the district attorney specifically relied on Wanner's testimony in closing to gain a first-degree murder conviction. See N.T., January 21, 1999, at 489-90. The Commonwealth responds with the observation that Appellee, as an actual (or at least asserted) participant in the overheard conversation with Hammer, could have provided the same information Appellee now asserts Hammer would have disclosed in any interview concerning the truth or falsity of Wanner's testimony. The Commonwealth's argument carries controlling force in the absence of any contrary evidence, and Appellee's failure to answer it undermines his claim for relief. See supra note 13.
Appellee's next assertion of deficient stewardship on the part of his trial counsel centers on counsel's reliance on the prosecutor's discovery responses in lieu of an independent investigation. See Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 474, 359 A.2d 369, 374 (1976) (explaining that reliance on the prosecution's file is not a substitute for an independent investigation by defense counsel); cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2588, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). According to Appellee, he was prejudiced, because he was denied the use of valuable impeachment evidence against Hammer, see supra note 4 (cataloguing the asserted evidence), and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Appellee also criticizes the PCRA court to the degree that it relied upon counsel's entry into the case shortly before trial, see Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 31, particularly since the record reflects that counsel did not seek a continuance to prepare properly for trial. According to Appellee, the PCRA court has not directly refuted that a better-informed cross-examination and defense would have resulted if counsel had gathered the available information to impeach Hammer and Wanner. In response, the Commonwealth acknowledges, at least arguably, that trial counsel could have obtained the noted documents and information prior to trial. It contends, however, that the information would have done nothing more than to further impeach Hammer, whose credibility was drawn into question from the beginning. The Commonwealth observes that, on Hammer's cross-examination, trial counsel adduced the witness's guilty pleas to several other burglaries and robberies, in addition to his participation in the present offenses, and engaged in extensive questioning concerning the benefits he received in exchange for his testimony against Appellee. The Commonwealth also references trial counsel's post-conviction testimony that he was careful not to cross-examine Hammer too closely regarding his convictions in Lebanon and Schuylkill Counties, as to do so may have risked the exposure of Appellee's identity as Hammer's coconspirator in those crimes as well. Thus, it may have opened the door to the introduction of otherwise inadmissible inculpatory evidence. Accordingly, the Commonwealth characterizes the information Appellee argues should have been admitted as merely corroborative and cumulative of other evidence. On this claim, we find colorable merit to Appellee's claims regarding the arguable merit and reasonable strategy prongs of the ineffectiveness inquiry. Additionally, we find the PCRA court's stated reasoning concerning this claim to be somewhat underdeveloped. See Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 17 (Jeffrey Hammer was subject to cross-examination and impeachment on several issues and it is unlikely that any additional impeachment evidence that was allegedly withheld by the Commonwealth would have changed the outcome of trial.). Nevertheless, we note that trial counsel established powerful motivation on the part of Hammer to curry favor with authorities, in the form of his exposure to capital punishment or sentences aggregating up to 240 years on a host of criminal charges, and his entry into a plea bargain centered on his cooperation in the prosecution of Appellee. See N.T., January 20, 1999, at 327-333. In light of the evidence and argument that was adduced, upon our independent review of the record, we differ with Appellee's assessment concerning the potential impact of the additional impeachment evidence and decline to disturb the court's holding regarding prejudice.
Appellee next asserts that trial counsel failed to pursue helpful lines of cross-examination that were applied to impeach Hammer at the first trial, including developing Hammer's: denial that the .22 caliber pistol used to kill the victim had been purchased from him; initial uncertainty about the caliber of the larger weapon; knowledge concerning how many shells loaded into the clip of the smaller caliber pistol; and earlier-expressed anticipation of parole after nineteen years. According to Appellee, trial counsel offered no reason for not asking Hammer many of these questions at the retrial of Appellee's case. See N.T., November 22, 2004, at 227-29, 232. Although Appellee acknowledges the PCRA court's observation that trial counsel did ask Hammer whether he had told someone else that Appellee had bought the .22 for Hammer, which Hammer denied, he claims that this is far less than what was achieved at the first trial. The Commonwealth's responsive argument is that Appellee has failed to establish sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. With regard to the line of questioning concerning the handgun, Appellee's argument on this claim does not acknowledge that, on cross-examination, trial counsel established Hammer's familiarity with the .22 caliber pistol and the type of ammunition used in the robbery/killing and confirmed Hammer's presence when the pistol was purchased. See N.T., January 20, 1999, at 323-325. [17] Counsel further presented a witness to contradict Hammer's testimony that Appellee had not purchased a small-caliber handgun for him (Hammer). See N.T., January 21, 1999, at 438. In terms of Hammer's expectation concerning punishment, again, counsel aggressively pursued parallel lines of evidentiary development. As to both the circumstances under which the handgun was used and Hammer's cooperation with authorities, the evidence gave rise to counsel's arguments to the jurors, inter alia, as follows: Jeffrey Hammer was responsible for the murder and you heard his testimony that he pled guilty to third degree murder. . . . You heard testimony regarding the position of [sic] Jeffrey Hammer was in in 1989. He was jammed up so he found a scapegoat. My client.    Now the gun. You heard a lot of testimony about this gun .22 caliber pistol, the gun. Let's assume for argument sake that [Appellee] purchased this gun. The evidence is that he did and that came from people who don't have credibility problems but the purchase of this gun is bought [sic] with evidence that it was purchased for Jeffrey Hammer. You'll recall that [the firearms dealer] remembered that Jeffrey Hammer was along when this gun was purchased. He didn't remember [Appellee] but he remembered Mr. Hammer and as you will recall [the dealer] told you that Mr. Hammer frequented the gun shop. Purchasing the gun proves absolutely nothing. Just one other very interesting part of Mr. Hammer's testimony. I asked Jeffrey Hammer do you know what kind of ammunition was used in the gun on April 12, 1987 in this gun, the murder weapon and he said without hesitation CCI. Eleven years later and he knows what type of ammunition was in the gun that caused the death of Richard Boyer. He was very familiar with that gun. He told you everything he could about this gun without admitting that he was the shooter. . . . Now, in 1989, Jeffrey Hammer was jammed up. He was facing ten burglaries, two robberies, one murder and he was also told that the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty. . . . I don't think anyone could be as jammed up as Mr. Hammer was in 1989 so he did what any smart person would, he blamed someone else and he got a deal. He got a plea bargain for 19 years to 55 years in jail and he got out of the death penalty. . . . N.T., January 21, 1999, at 464-65. Again, in line with the Commonwealth's argument and the PCRA court's conclusion, we conclude that Appellee has failed to establish the requisite prejudice.
Appellee next contends that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel when the trial court advised the jurors, prior to their guiltphase deliberations, concerning the specific punishments Appellee could receive for each degree of criminal homicide for which he was charged. [18] According to Appellee, the instruction infused the deliberative process with extraneous and prejudicial concerns, thus creating an unacceptably high risk that the jurors would return a verdict based, not on the facts, but rather, on their visceral sense of what the appropriate punishment should be. Appellee contends that the impact the instruction had on the sentencing deliberations was just as harmful, since, having learned that a lesser offense (second-degree murder) carried a life sentence, there was an unacceptable risk that the jury would feel pressured to return a death verdict so as to reflect the greater culpability attendant to a premeditated murder. Appellee claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instructions or insist upon a limiting instruction that the jury was not to consider these punishments in deliberating guilt or innocence. In support of these arguments, Appellee develops that information as to the consequences of a particular verdict is irrelevant to the jury's task of determining guilt or innocence. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579, 114 S.Ct. 2419, 2424, 129 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994) (explaining that providing jurors with sentencing information invites [jurors] to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion). [19] Further, Appellee invokes his right to a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the relevant law. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574, 101 S.Ct. 802, 809, 66 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981). Appellee distinguishes the decision in Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988), relied upon by the PCRA court and the Commonwealth, on the basis that the trial court in Yarris had issued a limiting instruction, see id. at 597, 549 A.2d at 526, whereas, none was given here. See generally Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375, 383, 378 A.2d 841, 845 (1977) (explaining that, whenever potentially prejudicial information is admissible for a limited purpose, a defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction.). Although Appellee is correct that a limiting instruction was issued in Yarris, the Court's disposition centered on the absence of prejudice. See Yarris, 519 Pa. at 598, 549 A.2d at 526 (Since there is no indication that informing the jury of the various murder conviction penalties was unduly prejudicial, and because, to the contrary, knowledge of the severity of the penalties could serve only to caution a jury as to the seriousness of a conviction, the instruction was permissible.). We recognize that the logic of Shannon would be in tension with the application of Yarris's holding to a non-capital case. Invocation of Shannon would have been to little avail in Appellee's case, however, since the general federal rule discussed there disfavoring the dissemination of sentencing information to jurors is expressly limited to circumstances in which a jury has no sentencing function. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. at 2424; see also id. n. 4 (noting that, particularly in capital trials, juries may be given sentencing responsibilities). Thus the High Court implicitly recognized the realities associated with capital trials, for example, that the process of selecting jurors qualified to discharge the sentencing function will necessarily entail some frank discussion of penalty. Indeed, the specific association between the offense of first-degree murder and the availability of capital punishment was discussed with individual jurors on voir dire at Appellee's trial, see, e.g., N.T., January 12, 1999, at 89, and Appellee has made no claim of trial court error or deficient stewardship associated with such discussion. Finally, for the jurors to have acted along the lines of any of Appellee's theories, they would have been proceeding contrary to the trial court's explicit instructions concerning the elements of the various offenses and the jurors' duty to find Appellee not guilty of each offense upon a finding that any element was not established beyond a reasonable doubt by the Commonwealth. See, e.g., N.T., January 21, 1999, at 526 (reflecting the trial court's admonition that, [i]f you do not find that the Commonwealth has proven this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, your verdict then on the first degree murder is not guilty.). Thus in addition to there being an absence of deficient stewardship, we also find a lack of material prejudice.
Appellee next complains that the instruction provided to the jury in the guilt-phase charge in this case materially deviated from Pennsylvania's standard jury instructions and misdefined reasonable doubt in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Sections 6 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellee develops that, when defining reasonable doubt, the trial court told the jury: A reasonable doubt is a kind of doubt that refrains a reasonable person from acting in a matter of importance to himself or herself. N.T., January 21, 1998, at 498 (emphasis added). Appellee also suggests that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. While, as Appellee develops, this Court has expressed a preference for a different formulation of reasonable doubt charge, see Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 522, 862 A.2d 74, 92 (2004), it has found no basis for reversal upon the issuance of instructions similar to that issued at Appellee's trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 611, 920 A.2d 790, 806 (2007); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 110, 317 A.2d 258, 262 (1974); Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274, 289, 368 A.2d 626, 634 (1976). The federal courts have similarly not found constitutional error upon the issuance of similar instructions. [20]
Appellee claims that his initial direct appeal must be voided and the life sentence imposed in his original trial restored, because that appeal was induced by his prior attorney's guarantee that there was no way the Commonwealth could seek the death penalty if he won his appeal. N.T., January 20, 2005, at 103. According to Appellee, counsel's erroneous guarantee that Appellee could not be death eligible on retrial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, Appellee contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue. [21] As previously developed, the PCRA court's substantive disposition of this claim was based on the issuance, after the relevant advice was given to Appellee, of this Court's decision in Martorano, 535 Pa. at 178, 634 A.2d at 1063 (applying a cleanslate approach to capital resentencing scenarios in Pennsylvania unless a determination was rendered that the prosecution has not proved its case). Prior to Martorano, the court believed that counsel was justified in relying upon prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court such as Bullington, 451 U.S. at 430, 101 S.Ct. at 1852, and Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 203, 104 S.Ct. at 2305, which reflected exceptions to the clean-slate approach. Sattazahn, No. 2194-89, slip op. at 11-12. The difficulty with the PCRA court's analysis, however, is that there was an intervening decision, Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), reflecting a narrow reading of Bullington and Rumsey and adopting essentially the same understanding of the clean-slate approach later applied in Martorano. Indeed, Poland was referenced extensively in Martorano. See Martorano, 535 Pa. at 192-93, 634 A.2d at 1070 (explaining that, in Poland, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the `clean slate' rule . . . and declined to extend Bullington further.). In light of Poland's existence in the time frame in which counsel's advice was rendered, the PCRA court's conclusion that he could reasonably have relied upon a broad reading of Bullington is unjustified. Despite the difficulty with the PCRA court's legal reasoning, a primary weakness in Appellee's contention is that he makes no effort to establish, by way of creditable evidence, that he would not have lodged the appeal had his counsel given different advice. While Appellee appears to believe that it can be assumed that a defendant or post-conviction petitioner would not risk imposition of the death penalty in order to gain a chance at freedom, we do not find such assumption warranted, as it is contrary to experience. It is a post-conviction petitioner's burden to prove all elements of his claims, including prejudice. While certainly the petitioner is not required to testify in support of his claims, again, relief may be unavailable in the absence of such evidence or some reasonable substitute.
Appellee claims entitlement to restoration of his direct-appeal rights in order for this Court to conduct proportionality review and assess the record to determine whether his sentence was the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. See Initial Brief for Appellee at 96-99 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. ง 9711(h)(3)(i)). Appellee notes that the PCRA court failed to address such claims. In terms of proportionality review, Appellee claims a protected liberty interest in meaningful proportionality review. He explains that, from the time of his offenses until June 25, 1997, the Pennsylvania death-penalty statute required this Court to conduct a review to determine whether the sentence of death imposed in his case was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. 42 Pa. C.S. ง 9711(h)(3)(iii) (repealed). [22] Appellee invokes Gribble, which determined that 1997 amendments eliminating the requirement to conduct proportionality review could not be applied to death sentences issued prior to its effective date. See id. at 90-91, 703 A.2d at 439-40. According to Appellee, since his capital offense and initial trial occurred prior to that date, he has a vested right to proportionality review, and this Court's failure to recognize that right on direct appeal violated the ex post facto prohibition against adverse retroactive criminal legislation contained in Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, as well as due process requirements. We differ with Appellee's arguments. As Gribble explains, former Section 9711(h)(3)(iii) applied to all death sentences issued while it was effective. See Gribble, 550 Pa. at 89, 703 A.2d at 439 ( When Gribble was sentenced to death on October 11, 1994, he became statutorily entitled to review in this Court, 42 Pa.C.S. ง 9711(h)(1), which at that time gave him the legislatively created right to proportionality review[.] (emphasis added)). The controlling fact here, however, is that Appellee did not receive a death sentence until after the repeal of the statutory prescription. Appellee does not develop a focused challenge to the understanding, reflected in Gribble, that the operative event which triggered the entitlement to proportionality review was the imposition of a sentence of death. [23] In short, his argument does not give rise to a basis for relief. Appellee's second point concerns the continuing statutory requirement that this Court affirm a death sentence unless it is determined, among other things, that the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. 42 Pa.C.S. ง 9711(h)(3)(i). He points out, correctly, that this Court's opinion on direct appeal did not expressly address this portion of the statute. According to Appellee, this omission violated his statutory and due process rights, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to meaningful appellate review of his death sentence, and he is entitled to reinstatement of his right to a direct appeal. It is traditional for this Court to specifically discuss the review under Section 9711(h)(3)(i) in our opinions on direct appeal, and we acknowledge that it would have been preferable for us to do so in Appellee's case. Since, however, Appellee has been awarded a new sentencing hearing, the final review in this regard as it pertains to penalty, if necessary, may be accomplished at a later stage. At this juncture, we confirm that we have now twice reviewed the full record concerning Appellee's convictions and conclude that they were not the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
Finally, Appellee offers several permutations of arguments resting on the cumulative effects of asserted errors and ineffectiveness. To the degree that Appellee's claims failed on merit or arguable merit, there is no basis for an accumulation claim. To the extent that individual dispositions have centered on the absence of sufficient prejudice to give rise to relief on an individual basis, we are also satisfied that prejudice would be lacking on a collective basis relative to those claims as well. The order of the PCRA court is affirmed. Justice GREENSPAN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justice BEAR, Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY join the opinion.