Opinion ID: 2771327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The (Long) Procedural History

Text: Wasting no time, in March 2009, the workers sued Fortuño, his chief of staff (Blanco), his administrator (Berlingeri), and his wife, First Lady Luz E. Vela-Gutiérrez (Vela), asserting that each of the defendants had a role in their allegedly unlawful terminations and claiming they were fired because they affiliated with non-NPP political parties. The workers' complaint brought § 1983 claims,4 alleging violation of their due process and equal 3 During the summary judgment proceedings before the district court, the workers took issue with documentation the defendants used to verify that a few of the plaintiffs were trust employees. But the plaintiffs did not dispute there (or in their briefing to us) that they were in fact part of the trust service. 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue for constitutional violations. -5- protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and their right to free speech under the First Amendment.5 They also sought relief under numerous Puerto Rico laws and the Puerto Rico constitution. In July 2009, the defendants moved to dismiss the workers' claims, arguing that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The district court allowed that motion and dismissed all of the federal and state claims against all of the defendants. Apparently abandoning their due process claim, the employees appealed only the dismissal of their First Amendment and state law causes of action;6 we vacated the dismissal of those claims and remanded them to the district court. See OcasioHernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2011). With the case back before the trial court, discovery ensued. At its close, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining political discrimination claim, arguing that the workers could not show that the defendants knew of their political 5 The workers later amended their complaint. We refer to the amended complaint (which is the operative one in this case) as the complaint. 6 Readers may be wondering why this case feels so familiar. The answer is likely because our 2011 decision, which involved the same parties, has become well known (and frequently cited) for its detailed explanation of the applicable standard of review for a motion to dismiss. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2011). -6- views or that politics was a reason for the terminations. In a written order, the court allowed the motion as to Fortuño, Vela, and Blanco on the grounds that there was no evidence that these defendants were aware of the workers' political affiliations or that they were personally involved in the terminations. The court held off on Berlingeri because it wanted to engage in additional and deeper analysis and hear oral argument before deciding whether to dismiss the claim against her. The court later ended up dismissing Berlingeri from the case as well, in a separate written decision concluding that there was insufficient evidence that political affiliation was the reason for the dismissals.7 The workers then moved the district court to reconsider its judgment, which the court denied. The workers now bring the case to us once again; on resurgence, they ask us to reverse the district court's summary judgment disposal of their First Amendment claim, as well as the court's subsequent denial of their motion to amend the judgment. We address both rulings in turn.