Opinion ID: 791581
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of the Hostile Work Environment Claim

Text: 67 Before reaching the merits of Davis' hostile work environment claim, we must first resolve the issue of whether the District Court's disposition of that claim constitutes an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Both parties assert the District Court dismissed the hostile work environment claim after the close of evidence. However, the docket does not reflect that the City ever made a motion to dismiss or that the District Court ever entered an order dismissing the claim, either with or without prejudice. Moreover, it does not appear that the District Court made any statements on the record formally dismissing the claim or entering judgment as a matter of law. 68 The District Court seems to have handled the hostile work environment claim largely off the record, and each party provides a slightly different account of the circumstances surrounding the so-called dismissal. While the City claims that Davis' counsel abandoned the claim at an off-the-record charge conference, Davis disputes that he ever stopped pursuing a hostile work environment theory. At a March 15, 2004, sidebar conference, the following exchange took place between the District Judge and counsel for the City (Mr. Waldman): 69 THE COURT: In the course of the charge conference, I think counsel clarified exactly what they see as an issue. 70 MR. WALDMAN: So, as I understand the hostile work environment claim is no longer in the case? THE COURT: That's my understanding. 71 (Pa604-605.) Davis' counsel responded by stating, I thought there was still an element of hostile environment. . . . ( Id. at 605.) After a short exchange in which Davis' counsel explained his harassment theory, the court stated, I just don't see that it fits into hostile work environment under either LAD or Title 7 based on the evidence that you've seen. ( Id. at 606.) The only other treatment of hostile work environment conducted on the record occurred during the jury instructions, when the District Judge gave an instruction on retaliation but stated, There is no claim here for hostile work environment. ( Id. at 621.) Davis did not make a contemporaneous objection to that instruction. 72 In determining whether this disposition constitutes an appealable final decision, we are mindful that § 1291 is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Decisions from both the Supreme Court and this Court have focused the inquiry on whether the lower court intended its ruling to have a final rather than a tentative effect. For example, in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978), the Supreme Court permitted appellate review notwithstanding the district court's failure to enter judgment on a separate document as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Because the lower court's intent to dismiss was clear despite the absence of a separate order, the Court reasoned: 73 [N]othing but delay would flow from requiring the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. Upon dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter the separate judgment, from which a timely appeal would then be taken. Wheels would spin for no practical purpose. 74 Id. at 385, 98 S.Ct. 1117. 75 The effect of the District Court's actions here is unmistakable, and we therefore apply the reasoning of Bankers Trust, even though the District Court did not formally dismiss the hostile work environment claim on the record. The decision to remove a claim from the jury's consideration after the close of evidence and over the plaintiff's protest was clear and had the undeniable effect of a judgment in favor of the City on that claim. We will thus view the District Court's disposition as a judgment as a matter of law under the standards set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. 76 This conclusion is supported by our ruling in Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 278-79 (3d Cir.1992). In that case, the district court granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint within 30 days to correct deficiencies in the pleading. The court neither formally dismissed the plaintiffs' claims nor expressly stated it would grant a dismissal if the plaintiffs declined to make the required amendments. We nevertheless construed the district court's actions as an appealable dismissal because once the amendment period expired, the district court's order had the effect of dismissing the improperly pleaded claims with prejudice. Id. at 278 (emphasis added). Echoing on the reasoning of Cohen and Bankers Trust, this Court stated: 77 It seems clear that the district court planned to dismiss with prejudice any claims not amended. Requiring plaintiffs to return to the district court now would be a wasteful elevation of form over substance. 78 Id. Similarly, by instructing the jury that [t]here is no claim here for hostile work environment, it seems clear that the District Court in this case intended a judgment in favor of the City on that claim. 14
79 This Court's review of a judgment as a matter of law is plenary. Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir.2000). Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate where, viewing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. . . . Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1); Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993).
80 Because we accept as true Davis' testimony regarding the racially charged atmosphere in the Department, the propriety of a judgment in favor of the City on his hostile work environment claim is an admittedly close issue. That said, we hold that the evidence presented does not warrant a reversal of the District Court's judgment under either Title VII or the LAD. Under Title VII, the evidence must establish that: 81 (1) he suffered intentional discrimination because of his [race]; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) it detrimentally affected him; (4) it would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same protected class in his position; and (5) there is a basis for vicarious liability. 82 Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir.2001). The hostile work environment standard under New Jersey law is strikingly similar: 83 When a black plaintiff alleges racial harassment under the LAD, she must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the employee's [race]; and [the conduct] was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a(3) reasonable [African American] believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive. 84 Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 706 A.2d 685, 688-89 (1998) (quoting Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 A.2d 445, 453 (1993)) (modifications in original). 85 In evaluating a hostile work environment claim under both Title VII and the LAD, we are mindful that offhanded comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), quoted in Heitzman v. Monmouth County, 321 N.J.Super. 133, 728 A.2d 297, 304 (1999). Rather, the conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment. . . . Id. 86 In determining whether the conduct at issue is sufficiently extreme, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.1990). As such, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario. Id. at 1484; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) ([W]hether an environment is `hostile' or `abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.); Taylor, 706 A.2d at 692 (Severity and workplace hostility are measured by surrounding circumstances.). The types of circumstances we consider may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, quoted in Heitzman, 728 A.2d at 304. 87 According to Davis, the specific incidents that, when viewed cumulatively, contributed to his hostile work environment include: (1) McKee's comment to Valdora during roll call that it was okay to be in the KKK; (2) Valdora and McKee's use of racial epithets when dealing with prisoners; and (3) the racist graffiti and flyers placed around the Department by unidentified individuals. He also claims that certain facially neutral conduct, such as being referred for unwanted psychiatric evaluations and being berated by Valdora and McKee during meetings, was aimed at harassing him because of his race. 88 We note first that no racist comment, written or spoken, was ever directed at Davis himself. In addition, Davis does not dispute that he never personally saw any racist graffiti or flyers in the Department; he heard about the graffiti and flyers second-hand. As a threshold matter, Davis cannot meet the first element of the hostile work environment claim under Title VII or the LAD — causation — solely by pointing to comments that were directed at other individuals. Davis cannot show that the comments would not have been uttered or written but for his race if Davis was neither on the receiving end nor the subject of any comments. 15 89 Furthermore, comments referring to other individuals that were merely overheard by Davis are the sorts of offhanded comments and isolated incidents that the Supreme Court in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, cautioned should not be considered severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment. Cf. Heitzman, 728 A.2d at 304-305 ([A] derogatory comment about another person generally does not have the same sting as an ethnic slur directed at a minority group member.). Thus, although there was some evidence in this case of inappropriate 16 racist comments, graffiti, and flyers, this evidence was insufficient without more to establish a hostile work environment. 90 That said, Davis' claim was not based solely on comments that were directed at others; he also alleged that Valdora and McKee's conduct toward him, particularly their recommendations for psychiatric evaluation, was racially motivated. Although the racist comments involved in this case cannot alone be the basis of a hostile work environment claim, evidence of those comments may be considered in determining whether facially neutral conduct on the part of Valdora and McKee was actually based on Davis' race. See Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 261-62 ([T]he advent of more sophisticated and subtle forms of discrimination requires that we analyze the aggregate effect of all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, including those concerning incidents of facially neutral mistreatment in evaluating a hostile work environment claim.); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 110-11 (3d Cir.1999); Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 457. 17 91 A reasonable jury believing Davis' account of the surrounding circumstances — that Valdora and McKee exhibited racist tendencies, and that there was no real basis to think Davis was paranoid — could have concluded that Valdora and McKee wrote intentionally false memos and recommended him for psychiatric treatment in order to harass him based on race. This at least calls into question whether the District Court was correct in finding that Davis failed as a matter of law to meet the requirements of a Title VII or LAD hostile work environment claim. 92 However, we conclude that reversing the District Court's decision and remanding on this point would make little sense in light of the jury's factual findings in connection with Davis' retaliation claims. Although the jury did not specifically rule on hostile work environment, it did find, through the use of a special verdict sheet, that the City was not liable for race-based retaliation. The verdict sheet reflects the jury's specific findings that Davis failed to establish (1) that the false memos written by Joseph Valdora were done for racial motives (Pa105); and (2) that Daniel McKee wrote intentionally false memos[.] ( Id. at 107.) 93 Some courts have held that jury findings given in the form of a special verdict should be given preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings involving the same underlying issues where the jury's verdict necessarily resolves an issue in the defendant's favor. United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 85 (4th Cir.1995); see also Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 233-35, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) (a jury's failure to fill out a verdict sheet is not given preclusive effect unless the record establishes that the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendant's favor.); RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1290-94 (5th Cir.1995) (looking to the jury's special verdict sheet to determine what issues were actually litigated in a prior proceeding). We apply the reasoning of those cases here because, in deciding Davis' retaliation claims, the jury's special verdict conclusively determined the factual issues underlying Davis' hostile work environment claim in favor of the City. 94 The jury's conclusion that Valdora and McKee did not write intentionally false memos for racial motives was clearly determinative of the race-based retaliation claim. 18 This conclusion would also be the determinative factual issue in deciding a hostile work environment claim. Because that claim could not be based solely on evidence of racist comments, flyers, and graffiti that were not directed at Davis, it could not succeed without a finding that the defendants were racially motivated when they did act directly toward him. The jury heard all of the testimony regarding the racist comments made by Valdora and McKee and their other conduct toward Davis during meetings and morning roll call and nevertheless found that Valdora and McKee were not racially motivated. 19 95 Davis has pointed to no additional evidence of surrounding circumstances that could have reasonably altered the jury's findings had it considered the hostile work environment claim. The jury would have been faced with identical evidence in deciding the identical underlying factual question, and it would therefore be futile to remand the hostile work environment claim to allow a fact-finder to make the same decision twice. A jury has already conclusively determined that the actions toward Davis were not racially motivated, and that finding is just as fatal to the hostile work environment claim as it was to the race-based retaliation claim. 96 In sum, assuming, arguendo, that the District Court erred in restricting the jury's ability to consider hostile work environment, that error would be harmless. We will therefore affirm the judgment in favor of the City on the hostile work environment claim.