Opinion ID: 2039545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: deputy jark

Text: David Jark began working as a deputy in the Brown County Sheriff's office on November 5, 1974. Jark's employment was terminated on the same day and in the same manner as Fryer's. The following analysis is an application of the evidence in the record pertaining to Jark's discharge to the guidelines we have established. 1) The record indicates that Jark had conflicts with the Sheriff on two occasions during the ten months of his employment. On one occasion Jark was ordered to accompany townspeople on a tour of Aberdeen. Jark made it known to the Sheriff that he did not want to go, but when he realized that the Sheriff was angry with him, he went along. Another conflict arose when two deputies were assigned to drive in separate patrol cars, one to Yankton with a mental patient, and the other to Vermillion with one and one-half ounces of marijuana, on the same date. The Sheriff testified that his office policy was not to carry drugs and mental patients in the same automobile. Jark, on the other hand, testified that he had been told the Sheriff needed the additional mileage on the cars. Although Jark complained about two cars traveling to the same area of the state, he made the trip. Jark heard nothing more about the incidents until the hearing on October 10, 1975. He testified that until that date he was not aware of any complaints about his work, but rather had received compliments from the Sheriff several times, and thought he was doing quite well. 2) Like Fryer, Jark was given no advance notice of his discharge. 3) The evidence and analysis of whether the Sheriff offered economic benefits if Jark would refrain from union activity is the same as that given in the discussion of Fryer's discharge. 4) The discussion of whether the employer was opposed to unionization is also the same as that given in the analysis of Fryer's discharge. 5) Prior to his employment with the Brown County Sheriff's office, Jark had been employed as a reserve deputy sheriff in the County of Cochise, Arizona, for approximately one year, and was a certified deputy there for a year and a month. The county employed approximately forty-five deputies, who were required to complete 280 hours of training. He testified that he had more extensive training than that given in South Dakota, and was not required to attend the Officer School in South Dakota. 6) Jark testified that he was also one of the three deputies who met with the Sheriff in the summer about joining the Union, that he was one of the chief spokesmen at the organizational meeting on August 21, 1975, and that he expressed his personal opinion that he wanted to be represented by the Union. Therefore, the analysis of this point in the discussion of Fryer's discharge is applicable here, also. 7) Again, the discussion of this point is the same as that given to Fryer. 8) The only reason given for Jark's discharge at the 4:30 p. m. meeting on September 9, 1975, was that he had 6,000 unexplained miles on his car. Jark never received any written instructions on the use of the car, or on making reports on its use. He was merely instructed orally to report honest miles, which were never defined. The Sheriff had informed him that he could take the car home and drive it to work. Jark testified that he did not at any time during his employment with the Sheriff's office use the Sheriff's car for personal business of any kind, unless he was first granted permission. Jark was never asked or given an opportunity to explain how he acquired the additional miles, either before or after he was discharged. 9) Jark was singled out in the same manner as Fryer. Therefore, the discussion of this point in the section on Fryer is also applicable here. 10) Although the only reason given for Jark's discharge on September 9, 1975, was the unexplained mileage on his car, at the hearing on October 10, 1975, the Sheriff also listed the incidents involving accompanying the tour of Aberdeen, and the trip to Yankton discussed in point one. Jark had heard nothing about those incidents since they had occurred. Like our analysis of Fryer's discharge, we conclude that there was substantial evidence from which reasonable inferences could be drawn that Jark's union activity weighed more heavily in the decision to fire him than did dissatisfaction with his performance. See Marshfield Steel Company v. N. L. R. B., supra, 324 F.2d at 337.