Opinion ID: 1228032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cross-examination of Joseph Rainier

Text: (15a) Defendant next contends the court improperly restricted his cross-examination of prosecution witness Joseph Rainier regarding the details of Rainier's first degree murder conviction. Before Rainier was called to testify, a conference was held outside the presence of the jury. The prosecutor informed the court that he had shown defense counsel a document entitled Impeachable Prior Felony Convictions (Joseph Rainier), and that he and defense counsel had agreed the four felony convictions listed in the document were the only felony convictions that could be used to impeach Rainier. One of the listed felonies involved the first degree murder of a small child. Because of the sensitive nature of this offense, the prosecutor asked the court for a ruling that defense counsel not be allowed to cross-examine Rainier on the specific facts of the murder conviction. Defense counsel objected to any such limitation, stating that if the fact that the murder victim was a small child became relevant during cross-examination, he planned to ask Rainier about this and other details of the offense. The court stated that although the existence of the prior murder conviction was clearly relevant for impeachment purposes, the court at that time could see no relevance to the specific circumstances surrounding the conviction. The court therefore ruled that, absent some showing of relevance, defense counsel should limit his cross-examination to establishing the type of felony for which Rainier was convicted and the date and place of the conviction. The trial court made clear, however, that if at any point defense counsel believed the details of the murder were relevant to an issue in the case, the court would allow defense counsel to explore the matter on cross-examination, provided he made some suggestion or showing of relevance to the court outside the presence of the jury. In response to the trial court's ruling, defense counsel stated only: If I do intend to ask questions that go to the factual background ... it might be appropriate to make an offer of proof. But I don't even know if I'm going to get to that. At no time during the conference on the matter or during the subsequent cross-examination of Rainier, did defense counsel ever suggest to the court a theory of relevance. Nor did he at any time indicate even that he believed the details of Rainier's prior conviction were relevant or that he wished to question Rainier on the subject. Defense counsel told the court only that if at some point during cross-examination he believed the facts underlying the conviction were relevant, he wanted to be able to ask Rainier about them. Defendant now contends for the first time on appeal that the details of Rainier's first degree murder conviction were relevant to establish his motive for testifying and, therefore, evidence regarding the details of the murder was admissible under Evidence Code section 780, subdivision (f). [29] While serving a life sentence in Folsom Prison, Rainier received information that his life was in danger, apparently because his fellow inmates looked unfavorably on the fact that he had murdered a small child. Without explaining the reason his life was threatened, Rainier testified on direct examination that after learning his life was in danger, he became so concerned for his safety that he asked prison officials to put him in lock up. As Rainier later explained, being placed in lock up meant he was locked in his cell 24 hours a day with no access to the yard or educational facilities and no visiting privileges. Rainier further testified on direct examination that because of fear for his safety and his discontent with being locked in a cell 24 hours a day, he contacted the Attorney General's office and agreed to testify against defendant in exchange for protective custody in another institution. Rainier testified he also expected to receive a letter in his file indicating that he had cooperated with law enforcement officials; he hoped this letter would be helpful if he ever became eligible for parole or a clemency hearing. Defense counsel cross-examined Rainier at great length regarding his motivation for testifying. Defendant now contends the jury could not fully appreciate the depth of Rainier's desire for protective custody and, therefore, the depth of his motivation to testify against defendant, without understanding the reason Rainier's life had been threatened  i.e., because he had murdered a small child. Thus, defendant argues, evidence concerning the details of the murder were relevant and the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from exploring this subject on cross-examination. There is no merit to defendant's contention. First, and contrary to defendant's view, it is far from clear that details of Rainier's murder conviction were relevant under Evidence Code section 780, subdivision (f). Although the fact that Rainier feared for his life and apparently believed his safety could be assured only by obtaining protective custody was clearly relevant to the issue of his motivation to testify for the prosecution, it is difficult to see how the underlying reason for his fear was relevant. Defendant appears to suggest that the circumstances surrounding Rainier's murder conviction were relevant because they tend to demonstrate he had good reason to fear for his life. But whether Rainier's fear was objectively reasonable would appear to be irrelevant to the issue of motivation. By definition, one's motivation to act depends upon one's own perception of the various risks and benefits involved. Rainier made it clear on direct examination that he had a sincere and profound concern for his safety  so profound that he asked to be placed in lock up and refused to leave his cell  and that it was this profound fear that motivated him to contact the Attorney General's office and agree to testify in exchange for protective custody. The fact that Rainier's subjective fear was well founded or objectively reasonable simply has no tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of Rainier's credibility as a witness. (Evid. Code, § 210.) [30] (16a) (See fn. 31.), (15b) Moreover, it is patently clear from the record that the court did not preclude counsel from asking Rainier about the details of his murder conviction. The court went to great lengths to explain to defense counsel that if at any time he could suggest any relevance to such evidence, the court would permit him to pursue the subject on cross-examination. [31] At the time of the court's ruling and, indeed, throughout the trial, it appears both the court and defense counsel believed evidence concerning Rainier's conviction was relevant only to establish an impeachable prior felony conviction. (Evid. Code, § 788.) Evidence of prior felony convictions offered for this purpose is restricted to the name or type of crime and the date and place of conviction. ( People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 773 [80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841]; People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 790 [48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222]; People v. Terry (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 432, 446 [113 Cal. Rptr. 233].) Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that, unless and until defense counsel could suggest some other theory of relevance, inquiry into the details of Rainier's conviction would not be permitted. We conclude the trial court did not improperly restrict defendant's right to cross-examination.