Opinion ID: 1968134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finally, incumbent urges the fees should be assessed as part of the costs under the following bond provision:

Text: Now, if the said Peter Walters shall well and truly pay all the costs that may accrue in said action in said court, or in any other court to which the same may be carried, either to the said Richard Bartel or to the officers of the court, then this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect. (emphasis supplied) We first note the bond reference to all the costs simply conforms to the § 62.6 statutory requirement. Those words in the bond should not be accorded a different interpretation than the same words in the statute. Second, the rule requiring express authorization for the allowance of attorney fees applies to agreements and stipulations as well as statutes. Frost v. Cedar County Board of Supervisors, supra, 163 N.W.2d at 434; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 218, at 455-457 (1940); 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs § 72, at 58-59 (1965). Nor do we believe the language which permits optional payment to Richard Bartel or to the officers of the court expands the concept of costs to include incumbent Richard Bartel's attorneys' fees. We are unconvinced this language was intended as an agreement to pay attorney fees. Further, § 62.24 provides for a cost judgment against the losing party. A winning party ordinarily recovers his costs, §§ 625.1, 621.8, The Code, although there may be no successful party ownership in a cost judgment beyond the costs to which such party is entitled. In re Hayer's Estate, 233 Iowa 1343, 1352, 11 N.W.2d 593, 598 (1943). We see no significance in the inclusion of incumbent's name in the bond other than as a potential successful party who might recover his costs, not attorneys' fees. We hold the bond language does not render contestant liable for incumbent's attorneys' fees.