Opinion ID: 1890344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alternative Relief

Text: In its order of October 22, 2007, the trial court also attempted to grant relief in the alternative by vacating the August 1, 2007 order overruling Appellant's motion for new trial and/or JNOV and ordering it re-entered as of October 22, 2007. In addition, it directed that the Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal, previously tendered on September 10, 2007, is hereby ordered filed as of this date. However, as we noted in Excel Energy, Inc. v. Commonwealth Institutional Securities, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 713 (Ky.2000), tendered and filed have different meanings, to wit: Excel did not file the notice of appeal when it time stamped the notice and left it in the Clerk's office for processing. At most, it merely tendered the notice to the Clerk to be filed on the same date that was time stamped on the notice. In so doing, Excel assumed the risk that the Clerk would not be able to file the notice as tendered because the filing fee had not been paid. Id. at 716. In this instance, the notice of appeal had not only been tendered, but filed. Thus, under CR 73.03(2), the circuit clerk had the responsibility to serve notice of its filing by mailing a copy showing the date filed and a copy of the official docket sheet to the clerk of the appellate court and to the attorney[s] of record. See also CR 5.05(3) (The clerk shall endorse upon every pleading and other papers filed with him in an action the date of its filing.). However, there is no authority or rule, applicable in this instance, granting to the circuit courts the authority to change the responsibilities or records of the circuit or appellate court clerks. See CR 73.03(2); see also Stewart v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 986 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Ky.App.1999) ([T]he circuit court did not err by denying appellant's CR 60.01 and CR 60.02 motion seeking to correct the record by changing the controlling dates noted in the clerk's docket.). If trial courts were granted the general authority to alter a circuit clerk's records to adjust the filing dates, it would wreak havoc on the rules set forth by which appellate procedures are governed in this Commonwealth. The date a pleading or other document has been filed with the clerk should not be altered at the will of a trial court, and thus the trial court's order attempting to change the noted date upon which Appellant's notice of appeal was filed was invalid and void.
The question still remains, however, as to the effect of the trial court's attempt of granting alternative relief, i.e. the vacation and re-entry of the order overruling Appellant's motion for a new trial and/or JNOV. We noted, in Kurtsinger, 90 S.W.3d at 455, that, upon a finding of excusable neglect, a trial court may vacate a CR 59.05 order under CR 60.02 upon a finding that a party did not receive notice of entry of the order. The finding of excusable neglect in Kurtsinger was based upon the trial court's own acknowledged mistake of failing to mail the notice to the affected party, rather than an argument as to whether or not it had been received after proper mailing. Id. We also noted that the appellate rules, particularly CR 77.04, do not override the mistake correcting rule of CR 60.02. Id. at 456; see also Fluor Const, 103 S.W.3d at 90 ([P]ursuant to CR 60.02 the trial judge acted within his broad discretion in vacating his original order and entering a new one.). The question left unargued by the parties then is: what is the effect of the court's alternative relief? Having already addressed the extension of time issue, it is clear that the notice of appeal filed on September 10, 2007, was effective since it was filed within the forty-day window encompassed by the trial court's extension of the time to appeal under CR 73.02(1)(d). Does the trial court's relief in the alternative then vacate the date of August 1, 2007, as the beginning date for calculating the time of appeal under CR 77.04(2), undercutting the previous calculation of forty days under CR 73.02(1)(d)? Under Fluor Const. and Kurtsinger , we clearly held that it does under appropriate circumstances when based upon a finding of excusable neglect. Fluor Const, 103 S.W.3d at 90; Kurtsinger, 90 S.W.3d at 458. Yet, by contrast, we also noted in Kurtsinger that [w]e should not apply one rule in a manner that destroys another and eliminates its essential purpose, and unless harmony is possible ... such would be the result. 90 S.W.3d at 456. While Johnson, deals primarily with the rule of relation forward as applied to premature notices of appeal, we quoted approvingly therein from Ready v. Jamison, 705 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky.1986) concerning our policy on our rules of procedure, to wit: we seek to recognize, to reconcile and to further three significant objectives of appellate practice: achieving an orderly appellate process, deciding cases on the merits, and seeing to it that litigants do not needlessly suffer the loss of their constitutional right to appeal. Thus, we should not read one rule to needlessly deprive another of its intended purpose. One procedural rule or statute does not supersede another merely by providing an alternative means for obtaining the same type of [relief]. Perry v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Kessinger, 652 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Ky.1983). Moreover, it is mandated that our rules shall provide for expeditious and inexpensive appeals. Ky. Const. § 115. And we should always remain cognizant that what we do could turn a system that was designed to promote efficiency into a trap for the unwary. Manly v. Manly, 669 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Ky.1984) (Leibson, J., dissenting). Here, the circuit court attempted, first by CR 73.02(1)(d), to extend the time within which an appeal could be taken based upon its finding of excusable neglect. As we have indicated, this was accomplished. Were this not so, as it obviously feared (since its order was not entered until October 22, 2007), it intended in the alternative to extend the time for appealbased upon the same factual findingby vacating and reentering the August 1, 2007 order overruling Appellant's motion for new trial and/or JNOV under CR 60.02. Notably, Appellant's draft order for the relief requested did not provide for this alternative relief, so we can only surmise as to why it was added. The point is, however, the trial court believed for the alternative relief to be effective, a new notice of appeal would need to be filed after the re-entry of the order overruling Appellant's motion for new trial and/or JNOV. We may only assume that it believed that the notice of appeal filed on September 10, 2007 under the motion requesting an extension of time under CR 73.01(1)(d) would not be effective as a notice of appeal for relief granted under CR 60.02 on October 22, 2007. To this proposition we would agree, as we are not inclined, under the authority cited above, to recognize the effectiveness of a notice of appeal filed under one motion as effective looking forward to relief granted under another. Thus, in the alternative, the trial court attempted to accomplish a re-filing of Appellant's notice of appeal by directing a change in the clerk's records as to the date of its filing. However, for reasons that the trial court's relief in this instance was structured in the alternative, and the further fact that such alternative relief was inconsistent with the primary relief granted under CR 73.02(1)(d)it invalidated it by changing the date from which the appeal time would then be calculatedthe only relief actually granted by the trial court in its order of October 22, 2007 was the ten-day extension of the time to appeal pursuant to CR 73.02(1)(d). Where it is apparent that alternative relief granted by a trial court is inconsistent with the primary relief intended, in that the effect of the alternative relief would destroy the primary relief intended to have been granted, the alternative relief will be held to be invalid. Whether we do this on the patent inconsistency of the alternative relief, or on the basis that it usurps our appellate powers, makes little difference. See Keck v. Hafley, 237 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Ky.1951) (One is not entitled to both remedies because a judgment granting such double relief would be inconsistent.); Walker Mfg., Inc. v. Hoffmann, Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 1054, 1087 (N.D.Iowa 2003) (To enjoin future sales and at the same time make an award based on future profits from the prohibited sales would result in duplicating and inconsistent relief....); Panterra Corp. v. American Dairy Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300, 300 (Tex.App.1995) (The parties request that we dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the court below. We cannot do both.); Ferguson v. DRG/Colony North, Ltd., 764 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex.App. 1989) (In granting appellee a specific award of damages `in the event an appellate court of final review reverses the judgment of rescission,' the trial court sought to exercise the duty and authority expressly granted to [appellate] courts of appeals as part of their appellate jurisdiction. The court below was without authority to do so, and that portion of its judgment is erroneous.); Heezen v. Aurora County, 83 S.D. 198, 157 N.W.2d 26, 32 (1968) (award of permanent damages for taking and injunctive relief against future taking are inconsistent). The alternative relief being invalid, there was no valid vacation or reentry of the August 1, 2007 order and thus, the notice of appeal, as filed on September 10, 2007 was effective pursuant to CR 73.02(1)(d), not CR 60.02. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals in part and reverse in part, but vacate the order dismissing the appeal, and remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the appeal. All sitting. ABRAMSON, CUNNINGHAM, NOBLE, SCHRODER, and VENTERS, JJ., concur. MINTON, C.J., dissents by separate opinion. MINTON, C.J., dissenting: Because I believe the trial court lost jurisdiction over this case once Appellant filed his notice of appeal, I respectfully dissent. To rescue the Appellant from himself, the majority opinion errs by sacrificing longstanding precedent that was clear and easily applied. I fear that the result we reach today will muddy the waters for courts and practitioners going forward. Over fifty years ago, our predecessor Court held that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case when a notice of appeal has been filed: Since the Court of Appeals alone can determine whether an attempted appeal is effective ... when a notice of appeal has been filed ... the circuit court is deprived of jurisdiction of the case to the same extent as when a valid appeal is pending. Monsour v. Humphrey, 324 S.W.2d 813, 814-15 (Ky. 1959). More recently, we have held that [a] notice of appeal, when filed, transfers jurisdiction of the case from the circuit court to the appellate court. It places the named parties in the jurisdiction of the appellate court. City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky.1990). Accord Johnson v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Ky.2000) (As a general rule, except with respect to issues of custody and child support in a domestic relations case, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on any issues while the appeal is pending.); Young v. Richardson, 267 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Ky.App.2008) (it is the law in Kentucky that, with certain narrowly circumscribed exceptions, the circuit court is divested of jurisdiction over a case when a notice of appeal is filed....). The majority cites some of this precedent, but then somehow engages in a reverse-plain meaning analysis to conclude that those opinions were not intended to deprive a trial court of jurisdiction over a case once a notice of appeal is filed, ostensibly because of other civil rules. I readily agree with the majority that our civil rules are meant to function in harmony with each other and that some rules may permit a trial court sometimes to reacquire jurisdiction over a case that is on appeal. For example, CR 60.04 permits a party to move an appellate court to abate an appeal when a motion for relief is filed under CR 60.02 or 60.03. But the majority does not suggest that Appellant filed a motion to abate his appeal under CR 60.04. In the absence of a timely CR 60.04 motion, the Court of Appeals acted properly in this case by relying upon a half-century of precedent that unmistakably holds that filing a notice of appeal transferred jurisdiction of the case to the appellate court, which, in turn, meant that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enlarge the time within which to file an appeal. City of Devondale, 795 S.W.2d at 957. Such a conclusion is completely logical and broadly useful. After all, why would a party need an extension of time to file a document that has already been filed? Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to bendif not breakour Rules of Civil Procedure and precedent to rectify a clear procedural error made by Appellant's counsel. Frankly, the proper course of action for someone in Appellant's unfortunate position, who has failed to receive timely the trial court's order denying a motion for a new trial, should not have been baffling. The proper steps to take in those situations are laid out concisely and clearly in Rodgers v. Henderson, 612 S.W.2d 743 (Ky.App.1980). As the Court of Appeals held in Rodgers : The workload of the circuit courts and practical considerations dictate that the [motion for an extension of time under CR 73.02(1)(d)] cannot always be heard within the 10-day period of time. As long as the appellant moves to file the notice of appeal within 10 days from the date that it was originally due pursuant to CR 73.02(1)(a), and tenders a copy of that notice, the circuit court may grant such an extension upon a proper showing of excusable neglect. If the motion cannot be ruled upon until after the 10-day period has passed, a nunc pro tunc order should be issued. Id. at 745 (emphasis added). So Appellant clearly could have extricated himself from his procedural predicament had he followed Rodgers and: (1) timely filed a motion for extension of time and (2) tenderednot filedhis notice of appeal. I also do not believe CR 60.02 affords Appellant any relief. Although Appellant did apparently seek relief based upon CR 60.02, the mere filing of a CR 60.02 motion does not extend the thirty-day time in which a notice of appeal must be filed. See 7 the late KURT A. PHILLIPS, JR., DAVID V. KRAMER & DAVID W. BURLEIGH, KENTUCKY PRACTICE SERIES RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 73.02 (6th ed. 2007) (A motion pursuant to CR 60.02 does not toll the 30-day time requirement for filing a notice of appeal. CR 73.02 does not specify 60.02; thus, a party should be cautious when filing a post-judgment motion to specify the Rule on which the motion is predicated to insure that the time for filing the notice of appeal is held in abeyance.) (internal footnote omitted). In fact, the trial court's order purporting to extend the time for Appellant to appeal is nonsensical on its face since Appellant had already filed a notice of appeal, and the order makes no mention of CR 60.02. And, even if it did, I agree with the majority that any attempted relief based upon CR 60.02 under these facts would have been ... ineffective to establish jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals. No `notice of appeal' was properly filed thereafter ... and the attempt by the trial court to establish such a finding ... was invalid ... In other words, even if the trial court had somehow granted Appellant relief under CR 60.02, Appellant failed to take advantage of that relief when he inexplicably failed to file a new and timely notice of appeal. I believe that once Appellant filed his notice of appealinstead of merely tendering it along with his CR 73.02(1)(d) motion, as precedent requiredthe circuit court was divested of jurisdiction. Therefore, consistent with our clear precedent, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals to dismiss Appellant's appeal. Because the majority regrettably comes to a different conclusion, I respectfully dissent.