Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Submission on Preliminary Hearing Transcripts

Text: On the second day of trial, July 11, 1988, defendant's chief guilt phase trial counsel, Toton, moved to submit the guilt and special circumstance phases on the preliminary hearing transcript. (Cocounsel Frank was also present during the proceedings.) Toton stated that defendant had agreed to waive his right to a jury trial and to confront witnesses, and to offer no additional evidence, subject to being allowed to argue the legal admissibility of the testimony. The next day, the court informed the parties that although it had not researched the issue, it would allow Toton to take tentative nonbinding waivers of constitutional rights from defendant. These nonbinding waivers included defendant's waiver of his right against self-incrimination. The prosecutor, Ryals, opposed the motion. She stated that although she was willing to accept a stipulation from defendant that he was guilty of the charges and the special circumstance allegations and to proceed directly to a penalty trial, she would not stipulate to the submission of the case on the preliminary hearing transcripts. On July 13, the court told the parties that it believed the prosecution had the right to a jury trial in the guilt and special circumstance phases but that it would entertain further argument from defendant. Toton informed the court that the submission proposal was a compromise made by defendant at Toton's request. Defendant originally had wanted to plead guilty to the capital charges, but Toton would not consent to such a plea, believing that a guilty plea would amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1]. Ryals argued that if the court granted defendant's request to submit the case on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts, the prosecution would be foreclosed from proffering additional evidence gathered since the preliminary hearing. Ryals told the court that the additional evidence was essential to convict defendant and included testimony by Rodriguez (who purchased property stolen from the murder scenes), reporter Trihey, to whom defendant confessed, a police officer, and an employee of the Bakersfield Inn. Toton and Ryals agreed that the prosecution should be allowed to present additional evidence at the guilt phase, and that the defense would present rebuttal evidence and argue the case. Toton then stated to the court: MR. TOTON: Let me attempt then, because there is a lot of things going on, to see if my understanding is correct. We are prepared to waive jury trial on the guilt phase, on the special circumstance. Mrs. Ryals will present additional evidence. We will be able to present additional evidence and argue the matter. At penalty phase, it will be statutory, and, in other words, we understand that she has to put on the facts and circumstances of the case itself. Regular rules of evidence will apply at this point as if they were, as if there had been a jury trial on the guilt phase, and that Mr. Sanchez would be prepared to so waive his right to a jury trial on both and separately on both the guilt phase and the special circumstance. Mr. Frank and I would be prepared to join that on the People's consent to also join. THE COURT: It sounds all right, sounds good. The trial court then allowed Toton to inform defendant of his constitutional rights, but ruled that the waivers would not bind defendant until the following morning. Defendant waived his rights to trial by jury and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, but was not asked to and did not repeat his waiver of the right against self-incrimination. He repeatedly acknowledged, however, that he was waiving his constitutional rights and that his decision was entered freely and voluntarily. Once the waivers were taken, the following colloquy occurred between the court and defendant: THE COURT: I take it that ... Mr. Frank and Mr. Toton have talked to you at some length about the waivers? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you feel you understood them? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I believe I do. THE COURT: And you have had some time to think about it, at least since about 10:30 this morning, and they talked to you later, I take it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you have thought about it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: So far as you are losing your right to confront witnesses, those witnesses whose testimony will be presented to the court through the preliminary examination, you won't get a chance to cross-examine them in this court. You understand that? DEFENDANT: Yes sir. THE COURT: And you are giving that right up then? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Now, so far as the witnesses called ... to augment the People's case and/or in your behalf, the live witnesses called in this case, you will have the right to confrontation and you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I have to tell you that some of the cases in the state of California say that when you present a case to the judge to determine the guilt or innocence on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcript, that's sometimes called a slow guilty plea. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I don't know whether you have heard that language before, but it's used in the cases. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And I want you to be aware of that. I am not telling you how I am going to decide this case, but there is an aura of that in the cases and you should be aware of that fact. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you are willing to give up your right to a trial by jury both as to the guilt of the two homicides alleged and of the other enhancements and the special circumstances; is that right? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you know you have the right, and we are ready to give you a jury on all those issues. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor, I understand all that. THE COURT: And you nonetheless give it up? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Shortly thereafter, the court again confirmed that defendant understood he was waiving important constitutional rights: THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your decision? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am very confident. THE COURT: Because you know we have got a record of everything here. It's going to be kind of hard to tell somebody else, gee, I didn't think about it. The judge coerced me. The [d]istrict [a]ttorney growled at me. My lawyers kicked me around. You know, it's going to be kind of hard to say that after you have been very candid with us here. Are you satisfied with that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am very satisfied. THE COURT: You seem satisfied. I believe you are satisfied. I will make that kind of a finding. Defendant confirmed his intent to waive his jury trial and confrontation rights the following morning, but no mention was made by the court or counsel of defendant's right against self-incrimination. (1a) Defendant now contends that because submitting the case on the basis of the preliminary hearing was tantamount to pleading guilty (or a slow plea), the trial court committed reversible error under Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086] (hereafter Bunnell ) when it failed to advise in the binding waivers that defendant would be relinquishing his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He also contends that the court's failure to advise him of the direct consequences of a conviction requires reversal, as does the fact that he was unaware of the legal ramifications of his initial submission and waiver.
(2a) In Bunnell, this court held that a stipulation to submit a case for decision on preliminary hearing transcripts must be accompanied by advice regarding the personal waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights to jury trial, silence, and to confront and cross-examine, i.e., Boykin-Tahl advice and waivers. ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1960) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].) The Bunnell court held, the record shall reflect that he had been advised of his right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination.... Express waivers of the enumerated constitutional rights shall appear.... In all guilty plea and submission cases the defendant shall be advised of the direct consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute.... ( Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 605.) Thereafter, in People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350] (hereafter Hendricks ) we held that the mandate of Boykin-Tahl applies only to pleas of guilty and submissions on the preliminary hearing transcript, or slow pleas, by virtue of which [defendant] surrenders one or more of the three specified rights. ( Id., at p. 592.) A slow plea is defined as a submission of the guilt phase to the court on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts that is tantamount to a plea of guilty because guilt is apparent on the face of the transcripts and conviction is a foregone conclusion if no defense is offered. ( People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 496 [233 Cal. Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260] [hereafter Wright ].) (3) Deciding whether a submission is a slow plea is often difficult, and courts generally review such pleas based on defendant's willingness to contest guilt during the court trial. Submissions that are not considered slow pleas include those in which (1) the preliminary hearing involves substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and the presentation of defense evidence or (2) the facts revealed at the preliminary examination are essentially undisputed but counsel makes an argument to the court as to the legal significance to be accorded them. ( Ibid. ; see In re Mosely (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-925, fn. 9 [83 Cal. Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473] [extending, in dictum, Tahl advisement and waiver requirement to cases in which defendant's submission on preliminary hearing transcript is tantamount to a guilty plea].) Defendant claims that because counsel did not argue for acquittal of all charges and presented no defense to some of the charges, his submission was a slow plea tantamount to a guilty plea. But as the Wright court observes, [a]n appellate court, in determining whether a submission is a slow plea, must assess the circumstances of the entire proceeding. It is not enough for a reviewing court to simply count the number of witnesses who testified at the hearing following the submission. A submission that prospectively appeared to be a slow plea may turn out to be part of a full-blown trial if counsel contested the sufficiency of evidence for those counts or presented another potentially meritorious legal argument against conviction. Conversely, a submission that did not appear to be a slow plea because the defendant reserved the right to testify and call witnesses or to argue the sufficiency of the evidence ( see People v. Guerra (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 534, 538 [98 Cal. Rptr. 627]) may turn out to be a slow plea if the defense presented no evidence or argument contesting guilt. [¶] If it appears on the whole that the defendant advanced a substantial defense, the submission cannot be considered to be tantamount to a plea of guilty. Sometimes, a defendant's best defense is weak. He may make a tactical decision to concede guilt as to one or more of several counts as part of an overall defense strategy. A submission under these circumstances is not a slow plea, and the trial court is not constitutionally compelled by Boykin and Tahl to administer the guilty-plea safeguards to assure that the tactical decision is voluntary and intelligent. (2b) The advisements and waivers in such a case are required only as a matter of the judicial policies that underlie our decision in Bunnell.  ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 496-497.) (1b) In the present case, defendant's submission on the preliminary hearing transcripts was not a slow plea. Defense counsel Toton conducted substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses during the preliminary hearing. Toton also called prosecution witnesses Hernandez and Detective Stratton to testify for the defense, and questioned Hernandez about whether he had agreed to testify against defendant with the intent of making a deal in his own case. In addition, following the close of the prosecution's guilt phase presentation, Toton renewed his motions to strike portions of the trial testimony of Maria Rodriguez, Detective Boggs, and William Freeman (the patrolman who seized two screwdrivers from defendant that had been stolen from the Bocanegra residence), and then moved for a judgment of acquittal of all the charges. In arguing the motion for acquittal, Toton asserted there was insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt of the robbery and murder charges, and that the People failed to charge properly the special circumstance allegations. In addition, Toton asserted that no physical evidence linked defendant to the Bocanegra murders. He argued that the prosecution presented no evidence of premeditation in those murders, and that defendant's hypothetical questions to Detective Stratton should not be used as evidence of murder. Toton also pointed out that defendant's incriminating statements to newsman Trihey implied knowledge of the crime, but not intent to kill, that there was no evidence that defendant robbed the Bocanegras or that defendant had the specific intent to kill either the Bocanegras or Tatman. Toton's closing argument following the guilt phase was equally extensive. He asserted there was insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the charged robberies and the Bocanegra murders because the testimony of Hernandez and Trihey was not credible. At best, he argued, the evidence in the Bocanegra murders supported a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. He also asserted that the prosecution had failed to prove the specific intent to kill necessary to support the special circumstance allegations. It therefore appears that defense counsel's cross-examination was substantial, and that he argued constantly that the facts as presented at the preliminary hearing should be viewed as not supporting first degree murder convictions. These facts support the People's assertion that defendant's submission on the preliminary hearing transcripts for the guilt and special circumstance phases of the trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea. ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 496.) For submissions not tantamount to a guilty plea, a trial court's failure to advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination is implicated only to the extent defendant surrendered the right. ( Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 592.) Through the submission stipulated to here, defendant never surrendered his self-incrimination privilege because he chose not to testify during the guilt phase proceedings. Because defendant never surrendered his right against self-incrimination, there was no requirement of a personal, on-the-record waiver. ( Ibid. )
(4) Defendant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to advise him that a conviction of guilt and special circumstances could lead to a death sentence. Without an understanding of the possible consequences of submitting the guilt and special circumstances on the preliminary hearing transcripts, defendant asserts, any waiver of constitutional rights is invalid. We find defendant's argument unavailing. On submission on a transcript of preliminary hearing, a defendant must be told of the potential maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment. ( People v. Dakin (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 1026, 1033 [248 Cal. Rptr. 206].) Nonetheless, a court's failure to comply with this rule requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in absence of the error. ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 495; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) We find no such prejudice. Defendant had been thoroughly advised by counsel of the consequences of pleading guilty and of the consequences of waiving his constitutional rights. He was well aware that he faced a possible death sentence, and, according to reporter Trihey, even asked for his own death. It is clear from the record that defendant would have waived his right to a jury trial and insisted on the submission of the guilt phase on the preliminary hearing transcripts even if he was specifically told by the court that he faced a possible death sentence.
(5) Defendant asserts that he was not told (1) of the legal ramifications of the agreement between Toton and Ryals to limit evidence to that presented at the preliminary hearing, and (2) of the absence of a defense to the Tatman robbery and the Tatman first degree felony-murder charges. Defendant especially notes that he was unaware the defense challenge to the charges would rest solely on the ground of insufficient evidence. Moreover, defendant claims, Toton never explained he limited his defense to rebuttal witnesses. The lack of any explanation as to the procedural aspects of submitting the case on the preliminary hearing transcripts, defendant asserts, renders his waiver and submission void. As to defendant's claims that he was unaware of the legal ramifications of his submission and waiver, and the probability of conviction, we conclude no such advisement was required in light of defendant's reservation of his right to present additional evidence and to contest his alleged guilt in argument to the court. As the People observe, Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, requires that a defendant be advised of the probability that his submission will result in a conviction of the offenses only [i]f a defendant does not reserve the right to present additional evidence and does not advise the court that he will contest his guilt in argument to the court.... ( Id., at p. 605.)