Opinion ID: 2148307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Tribe as an Indispensable Party

Text: The Tribe is not a party to this action. Although its interests are certainly affected by this litigation, the Tribe has chosen not to participate. Unless Congress provides otherwise, Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity against the judicial processes of states ( see e.g. Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 58 [1978]; United States v United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 US 506, 512 [1940]; Turner v United States, 248 US 354, 358 [1919]). As a result, New York courts cannot force the Tribe to participate in this lawsuit. The State claims that the Tribe's absence requires us to dismiss this action. We disagree. CPLR 1001 sets forth the rules governing when joinder of parties is necessary to continue an action affecting the rights of those parties. The statute directs that persons must be brought into the action when joinder is necessary to accord complete relief between the parties, or when the interests of the person might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action (CPLR 1001 [a]). Where a person who should be joined nevertheless cannot be joined, courts must decide whether the action can proceed without the necessary party. Parties who must be joined lest the action be dismissed are termed indispensable parties. CPLR 1001 (b) provides five factors for courts to consider in deciding whether to dismiss an action where, as here, jurisdiction over [the necessary party] can be obtained only by his consent or appearance: 1. Whether the plaintiff has another effective remedy in case the action is dismissed on account of the nonjoinder; 2. the prejudice which may accrue from the nonjoinder to the defendant or to the person not joined; 3. whether and by whom prejudice might have been avoided or may in the future be avoided; 4. the feasibility of a protective provision by order of the court or in the judgment; and 5. whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the absence of the person who is not joined (CPLR 1001 [b]). The State relies principally on paragraph (2), and argues that the prejudice to the Tribe caused by a judgment eviscerating the authority under which it operates the casino should be sufficient to dismiss the action. In contrast, plaintiffs rely on paragraph (1), arguing that there can be no remedy for the alleged constitutional violation if the Tribe's absence requires dismissal. Plaintiffs' arguments are on firmer ground. Not only will these plaintiffs be stripped of a remedy if we hold that the Tribe is an indispensable party, but no member of the public will ever be able to bring this constitutional challenge. In effect, the Executive could sign agreements with any entity beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, free of constitutional interdiction. The Executive's actions would thus be insulated from review, a prospect antithetical to our system of checks and balances. There are two principal purposes of requiring dismissal owing to the absence of an indispensable party. First, mandatory joinder prevents multiple, inconsistent judgments relating to the same controversy. Second, joinder protects the otherwise absent parties who would be embarrassed by judgments purporting to bind their rights or interests where they have had no opportunity to be heard ( First Natl. Bank v Shuler, 153 NY 163, 170 [1897]; see generally, 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 1001.01 [2002]). Neither purpose applies here. The Tribe has chosen to be absent. Nobody has denied it the opportunity to be heard; in fact, the Oneida Indian Nation, which operates the Turning Stone Casino, has appeared as amicus curiae making much the same arguments we would expect to be made by the Tribe had it chosen to participate. While sovereign immunity prevents the Tribe from being forced to participate in New York court proceedings, it does not require everyone else to forego the resolution of all disputes that could affect the Tribe ( see Keene v Chambers, 271 NY 326, 330 [1936]; Plaut v HGH Partnership, 59 AD2d 686 [1st Dept 1977]; 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 1001.10 [citing cases]). While we fully respect the sovereign prerogatives of the Indian tribes, we will not permit the Tribe's voluntary absence to deprive these plaintiffs (and in turn any member of the public) of their day in court. In balancing the CPLR 1001 factors, the Appellate Division concluded that the equities weighed against dismissal. That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. While in other cases sovereign immunity might support dismissal, [9] here the factors weigh toward allowing judicial review of this constitutional question ( see generally Siegel, NY Prac § 133 [Dismissal of the action for nonjoinder of a given person is a possibility under the CPLR, but it is only a last resort]). [10] We conclude that the alleged constitutional violation will be without remedy if this action is dismissed for the Tribe's nonjoinder. We further conclude that to the extent the Tribe is prejudiced by our adjudication of issues that affect its rights under the compact, the Tribe could have mitigated that prejudice by participating in the suit ( cf. United States ex rel. Steele v Turn Key Gaming, Inc., 135 F3d 1249, 1252 [8th Cir 1998]). The Tribe's nonjoinder is therefore excused, and we proceed to discuss the merits.