Opinion ID: 837290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Points of Departure From the Lead Opinion

Text: One alternative rationale that I find insupportable is the lead opinion's attempt to create substantive rights in a parent from federal statutes that do nothing more than impose a duty on the state. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq., was enacted under Congress's spending power [7] and provides federal funding for states that adopt a foster care plan that complies with various requirements. [8] If a state violates those requirements, it will be required to return a portion of its federal funding. [9] As noted in the lead opinion, our Legislature has enacted several statutes mirroring the federal act. [10] The lengthy analysis of the Title IV-E requirements provided in the lead opinion would be useful background information for intracourt training purposes in an effort to bring our system into conformance with the federal law to avoid having to return federal dollars. However, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the question of which provisions of Title IV-E might create substantive rights that might be enforced by a parent, [11] and that question has been the topic of much debate among lower federal courts. [12] Given that the provenance for using Title IV-E to convey substantive rights is uncertain, this Court should not advance a novel interpretation of federal law, especially when this case can easily and entirely be resolved on narrow state law grounds. [13] Accordingly, I disagree with part IV of the lead opinion. I also disagree with the lead opinion's extensive reliance on the current version of the DHS Childrens Foster Care Manual. This internal operating manual does not have the force of law, or even of an administrative rule. Moreover, this Court should not judge the conduct of the trial court and DHS workers on the basis of standards that were not imposed until after the events relevant to this case. Finally, I disagree with the lead opinion's consideration of the potential constitutional implications of the trial court's and the DHS's statutory and court rule violations. This Court has repeatedly held that it should not decide a case on constitutional grounds if the issues can be fully and adequately resolved on statutory grounds. [14] The numerous statutory and court rule violations, and the trial court's subsequent use of its own violations as grounds for terminating respondent's parental rights, are sufficiently egregious to require appellate relief. We should delve no further than the clear error analysis, which completely resolves this matter.