Opinion ID: 2505697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The Intention of the Parties

Text: Basic questions about the National Church's conduct as evidencing its intentions in this case include, but are not limited to, the following pertinent inquiries, all of which should be resolved by a jury: Did the National Church act as if it intended that any trust for the benefit of the National Church be established on the local church's property when it failed to ever notify the local church that it claimed a trust interest since its inception? Do the National Church's actions evidence its intent that there be a trust for its benefit on CCS's property? Did the National Church's conduct reveal any intention to unilaterally change the dictionary definition of the term canon to its own private definition of a trust when it asked agents of CCS to sign administrative forms prepared by the National Church in order to be able to claim that CCS's agent ratified or acceded to a trust on CCS's property? Why use such tactics to create a trust if the National Church claims it already had a trust? Did the National Church provide a new definition of the term canon to mean something entirely different than what various dictionaries say it means, that is, church dogma? Alternatively, did the National Church privately intend by its use of the term canon, to create a trust on CCS's property? Why did it do so if the National Church claimed it already had a trust? Did the National Church ever warn CCS that by signing an administrative form acceding to a canon, that the National Church actually intended for CCS to accede to a trust? Or was the National Church actually asking CCS to agree to a trust whereby the National Church would become the beneficiary of all of CCS's property and money without ever sharing its secret intention with CCS? Did the National Church ever display its intention to deny to the local church its legal rights under church documents to participate in the process of self-governance concerning the real property interests of the local church? Does such conduct evidence that the National Church recognized that it had no trust interest under Jones and so it needed to set out and get one by sleight of hand many years later? By what right should the National Church be permitted to keep a dossier of CCS's conduct from 1918 to when the dispute erupted without ever mentioning it to CCS, only to surprise CCS with this dossier years later? After carefully reviewing the facts of this case, I submit that the troubling conduct displayed by the National Church toward CCS can support only one conclusion, namely that the National Church did not claim any trust interest on CCS's property, and the National Church's claims to the contrary now are, at best, disingenuous. The National Church never openly communicated to CCS its intention to claim a trust interest on CCS's property. In defense of the National Church, it is likely that the National Church would justify its tactics as being in accordance with its theology, which views church property as sacred. Although the theology of the National Church may help explain its conduct, it does not justify the National Church's troubling efforts to take CCS's property through what appears to be deceptive means despite having no legally recognizable interest in that property. Insofar as the majority disagrees, a jury should be permitted to resolve these factual issues. One illustration of the National Church's allegedly troubling conduct relates to the period surrounding the enactment of the Dennis Canon. CCS claims that after the National Church decided to place the Dennis Canon on the agenda for the 1979 General Convention, the National Church made the deliberate decision to exclude CCS from being notified about the planned consideration of the Dennis Canon at the 1979 General Convention. As a result, CCS alleges that it did not know that the Dennis Canon was on the agenda at the 1979 General Convention and did not attend the 1979 General Convention. According to CCS, this deprived CCS of its right to vote against the Dennis Canon and its right to use its political influence and lobby other local churches to do the same. CCS also alleges that the National Church deprived CCS from knowing about the enactment of the Dennis Canon for approximately 20 years thereafter. Assuming that CCS's allegations are credible, CCS could have argued against the Dennis Canon and urged other local churches to vote against the Dennis Canon, if CCS were informed of the scheduled vote prior to the 1979 General Convention, for all of the reasons set forth in this dissent. Enacting the Dennis Canon was contrary to the laws of this state and presumably contrary to the laws of other states. If enacted and interpreted as the National Church does the Dennis Canon dangerously allows for one legal entity (the National Church) to create a trust on the property of others (CCS), for the benefit of the stranger to title (the National Church). This fact alone would have been a selling point that CCS could have used to get other local churches to vote against the Dennis Canonif CCS had been invited to attend, as it had a right to be, and as the National Church deceitfully engineered it that CCS would not attend. Contrary to the majority opinion, there is no evidence that Judge Brannenthe lay leader that allegedly attended the 1979 General Convention attended as an official representative of CCS or ever reported back to CCS that the National Church had created a trust on CCS's property. Indeed, CCS alleges that Judge Brannen did not attend the 1979 General Convention as its representative, but rather he attended as a representative of the diocese. Any failure of Judge Brannen to report this information back to CCS tends to establish that he did not attend as CCS's official representative and that the National Church did not intend to create a trust through the Dennis Canon. Another illustration of the National Church's allegedly troubling conduct that a jury could find relevant with regard to the National Church's intention is when CCS asked for and received the approval of the National Church regarding a loan in the amount of $950,000 to renovate a church building. The local church's real estate was and is collateral for that loan. Though the National Church gave its approval for the loan, the National Church never informed either CCS or the lender that the National Church claimed a trust interest for its own benefit on the subject property. If the lender had known that the National Church claimed a trust for its own benefit on this property, good banking practice would be for the lender to protect itself should the National Church ever foreclose the note surrounding the property. Keep in mind that the majority opinion excuses the National Church from utilizing a deed or other writing to transfer property to a trust and excuses the National Church from having to record any deed of trust in the appropriate records in order for all others (including the lender) to be on notice of the National Church's claimed trust interest in the property. As a result, the lender had no notice of the National Church's claimed trust interest when it took an interest in this property as security for the loan thinking that it took clear title to the property, only to find out that it was the National Church's property, even though the National Church had not obligated itself to pay the note. Nor did the lender know that today this Court would waive the requirement of a deed of trust being recorded and filed. Did the lender rely on the very law requiring the recording of a deed to create a trust, only to learn today that this statutory law was negated by the majority's judicial decree? Certainly, both the lender and CCS are harmed by the majority's decision. It appears that this Court is leaving the lender unprotected along with everyone else so as to grant privileges to the National Church from not having to obtain or record any deed in order to claim a trust interest. The loss of this church property certainly will impact the personal guarantees of CCS's members on this $950,000 note as well as the bank. Yet, the lender was not given any of this critical information concerning the National Church's claim of being the beneficiary of a trust interest on this property when the renovation loan was made so as to protect itself against this or other contingencies. If the National Church had been more forthcoming about its claim of a trust with either CCS or the lender, perhaps CCS would not have borrowed $950,000 to renovate property. I am beginning to see that either the National Church is blatantly and unabashedly deceitful to everybody including the lender whose loan it approved, or else (and this is for a jury) the National Church did not advise anyone of its claimed trust interest because it knew full well that under existing Georgia law it had no trust. The evidence of the National Church's intention regarding its claimed trust interest in the subject property needs to be interpreted by a jury. That is not a finding that this Court can make. Only a jury after reviewing all of the facts in evidence can make a determination about the parties' intentions regarding a trust. If the National Church intended no trust then certainly there is no trust. We already know that CCS did not intend any trust and never gave a valid deed, nor signed or had witnessed any document that would satisfy the requirements of a trust deed. Failure to advise the bank of a trust also should work to preclude the National Church from claiming a trust against CCS. If CCS had been informed by the National Church of its claimed trust, CCS could have and likely would have refused to guarantee the note to the bank to improve the National Church's property, leaving itself to pay that million dollar note after the National Church kicked CCS out. This represents another example of the National Church's questionable conduct by failing to be openly and fully communicative with it confidential relation CCS as required by various state statutes. Additionally, this represents another example of the privileges granted to the National Church against having to follow the law. This is nearly a $2,000,000 ($950,000 × 2 = 1,900,000) privilege to the National Church. This gift is in addition to the several million dollars of property value in the National Church's claimed trust. This harms CCS an additional $950,000 by its members having to pay the loan, yet lose the property. For the National Church to approve the bank taking this property as collateral and at the same time not tell the bank of its claimed trust interest arguably evidences the National Church's attempt to be deceitful with the bank. In the alternative, the National Church's conduct evidences that the National Church did not claim any trust interest. Plainly, the National Church knew about this loan since it had to sign off on it. However, the National Church's complete failure to let the bank or CCS know about its claimed trust endangered the bank's security interest in the property and disrupted CCS's right of use and enjoyment of the property. If CCS left the National Church, then the bank would have new owners of the property (the National Church) with no local owners who had an interest in the upkeep of the condition of the property and no interest in seeing that the note was paid. This impacted the lender's security interest as it impacted CCS's title. This Court cannot read the bank's mind as to what it would have done had the National Church been as honest and forthcoming with the bank as it should have been. The bank can speak for itself in this regard during a jury trial, but only if this Court permits it to do so. But it certainly seems that the bank in loaning $950,000 to CCS had a right to honest treatment and fair dealing from the National Church, which purports to hold a trust for its own benefit in the property used as collateral for the loan. Since this Court has held that the intentions of the parties are paramount, these examples of specific troubling conduct by the National Church that evidence the National Church's intent are highly relevant and should be presented for a jury to consider as evidence of the National Church's intentions regarding a trust. Myriad questions remain about the National Church's conduct and its intentions including: Did the National Church fail to ask CCS for a trust deed because it knew full well that it had no trust and so there was no need to try and get one? Did the National Church know that it could get a trust deed only if CCS would give it one, and so it elected to try to obtain CCS's land with a lawsuit? Is their failure to ever ask CCS for a deed evidence that the National Church never contended that it had a trust on CCS's property? On what basis did the National Church claim a trust? Does the National Church claim a trust in good faith? This Court is prohibited by law from granting summary judgment when so many fundamental fact issues are disputed, including the fact issue of intent that the majority opinion considers to be dispositive.