Opinion ID: 2595534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severability of Racial Restriction

Text: ¶ 13 Viking initially claims that the unenforceable racial restriction contained in the first two sentences of the covenant cannot be severed from the remainder, thereby rendering the covenant void in its entirety. It makes several arguments in support of this proposition. Our jurisprudence requires rejection of each.
¶ 14 A court's first objective in interpreting a restrictive covenant is ascertaining the intent of the original parties. Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash.2d 612, 621, 934 P.2d 669 (1997). Where enforceability is challenged, Washington courts have . . . held that restrictive covenants, being in derogation of the common law right to use land for all lawful purposes, will not be extended to any use not clearly expressed, and doubts must be resolved in favor of the free use of land. Id.; see also Burton v. Douglas County, 65 Wash.2d 619, 622, 399 P.2d 68 (1965); Jones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 591, 106 P. 166 (1910). ¶ 15 More recently, however, we have indicated that where construction of restrictive covenants is necessitated by a dispute not involving the maker of the covenants, but rather among homeowners in a subdivision governed by the restrictive covenants, rules of strict construction against the grantor or in favor of the free use of land are inapplicable. Riss, 131 Wash.2d at 623, 934 P.2d 669. This is because `[s]ubdivision covenants tend to enhance, not inhibit, the efficient use of land. . . . In the subdivision context, the premise [that covenants prevent land from moving to its most efficient use] generally is not valid.' Id. at 622, 934 P.2d 669 (emphasis omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Mains Farm, 121 Wash.2d at 816, 854 P.2d 1072). ¶ 16 As such, [t]he court's goal is to ascertain and give effect to those purposes intended by the covenants. Riss, 131 Wash.2d at 623, 934 P.2d 669. In ascertaining this intent, we give a covenant's language its ordinary and common use and will not read a covenant so as to defeat its plain and obvious meaning. Mains Farm, 121 Wash.2d at 815-16, 854 P.2d 1072. Moreover, [t]he court will place `special emphasis on arriving at an interpretation that protects the homeowners' collective interests.' Riss, 131 Wash.2d at 623-24, 934 P.2d 669 (quoting Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Witrak, 61 Wash.App. 177, 181, 810 P.2d 27 (1991)).
¶ 17 Here, the parties are all successors in interest. Thus, the rule of liberal interpretation should apply to protect all the property owners' interests. Viking disagrees, however, arguing that covenants should be construed liberally only when the covenant's purposes are in harmony with modern land use regulation. This argument fails for two reasons. ¶ 18 First, the only authority Viking cites in support of this contention is a law review article authored by University of Washington Professor William Stoebuck. Br. of Resp't at 13 (citing William B. Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 Wash. L.Rev. 861, 885-86, 904-05 (1977)). However, the cited article does not support Viking's argument, but rather undermines it. See Stoebuck, supra, at 886 (stating that the judicial tendency for some time has been toward favoring the existence of covenants. While covenants may theoretically encumber titles, as usually employed today they make land more marketable and improve its value.). [4] Moreover, Professor Stoebuck categorically rejects Viking's characterization of his writings (and its conclusions) in an amicus curiae brief submitted in this case. See Am. Br. of Stoebuck at 5-6, 9-11. ¶ 19 Second, Viking's contention fails to find support in our most recent jurisprudence addressing the construction of restrictive covenants. In particular, Mains Farm rebuts Viking's argument. In that case, a group of homeowners subject to a restrictive covenant sought an injunction to prevent another homeowner from operating an adult family home business. 121 Wash.2d at 813-14, 854 P.2d 1072. The covenant at issue provided that `[a]ll lots or tracts in MAINS FARM shall be designated as Residence Lots, and shall be used for single family residential purposes only[,]' and that `[n]o structure shall be erected, altered or placed on the plat of MAINS FARM which shall serve other than a single family dwelling unit. . . .' Id. (emphasis omitted). ¶ 20 The trial court issued an injunction enjoining the operation of the adult family home business and we affirmed, even though the legislature had provided by statute that adult family homes were to be considered residential for zoning purposes. Id. at 822, 854 P.2d 1072 (citing RCW 70.128.175(2)). This conclusion contravenes Viking's assertion that covenants are to be construed liberally only when they are in harmony with land use regulations. See also Riss, 131 Wash.2d at 622-24, 934 P.2d 669; Metzner v. Wojdyla, 125 Wash.2d 445, 450, 886 P.2d 154 (1994) (both concluding that the enforcement of residential restrictive covenants is favored in Washington, notwithstanding land use regulations). ¶ 21 Viking next claims the covenant is not severable on the grounds that if only the racial terms are excised, the covenant's meaning is radically distorted  thereby rendering the covenant invalid. This would be true only if we accepted Viking's exceptionally strained construction of the covenant's text. [5] But as explained above, principles of strict construction do not apply here, and we avoid forced or strained constructions that lead to absurd results. See, e.g., State v. Stannard, 109 Wash.2d 29, 36, 742 P.2d 1244 (1987); Eurick v. Pemco Ins. Co., 108 Wash.2d 338, 341, 738 P.2d 251 (1987). ¶ 22 Viking also asserts that because the covenant does not contain a severance clause, the drafter's intentions regarding severance cannot be known. However, intent is drawn from the ordinary and common meaning of a covenant's language. Riss, 131 Wash.2d at 621, 934 P.2d 669 (citing Metzner, 125 Wash.2d at 450, 886 P.2d 154; Mains Farm, 121 Wash.2d at 815, 854 P.2d 1072). Under this covenant's plain terms, it is clear that it was written with two logically distinct purposes: to exclude racial minorities from ownership or possession of the land, and to limit the number of principal dwellings to no more than one for every one-half acre. Not only are these purposes logically distinct, they are textually separate from each other, with the racial restriction contained in the first two sentences and the density limitation in the latter two. It reasonably follows that the racial restriction is severable from the remainder of the covenant. ¶ 23 Relevant legislation also supports this conclusion. The legislature did not declare in RCW 49.60.224 that every written instrument containing a racial restriction is void in its entirety. Rather, the legislature said that every  provision in a written instrument relating to real property which purports to forbid or restrict the conveyance or occupancy thereof is void. RCW 49.60.224 (emphasis added). The first two sentences of this covenant constitute such a racial provision and thus have long been unenforceable and void. See also Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836. ¶ 24 Quite separate from the racial restriction, the last two sentences provide that only one dwelling may be built on each one-half acre of land. Not only is this the logical, common-sense construction of the covenant's language, it is also the construction that best guards `the homeowners' collective interests.' Riss, 131 Wash.2d at 624, 934 P.2d 669 (quoting Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass'n, 61 Wash.App. at 181, 810 P.2d 27). It has been so understood for over 50 years. ¶ 25 Viking also contends that if any portion of the covenant remains valid, the valid elements impose no limitation on the number of dwellings that can be constructed on its property because the last sentence allows buildings other than the main residence. This contention lacks merit, however, as it disregards the important restricting term appurtenant. Appurtenant has a clear and long-established meaning: annexed or belonging legally to some more important thing . . . incident to and passing in possession with real estate. . . . Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 107 (2002). See also Black's Law Dictionary 111 (8th ed. 1999); [6] Webster's New International Dictionary 134 (2d ed. 1944); [7] Black's Law Dictionary 132 (3d ed. 1933). [8] ¶ 26 Despite this, Viking claims that nothing in the covenant prevents appurtenant buildings from being constructed and then separately conveyed. This claim fails because, the moment that such appurtenant structures were separately conveyed, they would no longer be appurtenant to the principal residence, thereby violating the covenant. See, e.g., Sandy Point Improvement Co. v. Huber, 26 Wash.App. 317, 320, 613 P.2d 160 (1980) (stating that structure on one lot could not be appurtenant to structure on an adjoining lot). ¶ 27 We conclude that the trial court erred when it ruled that the unenforceable racial restrictions could not be severed from the remainder. Allowing private property owners to protect their rights by entering into restrictive covenants has long been favored in this state. Pursuant to the plain and ordinary meaning of the instant covenant's text, the racial restriction is severable from the remainder of the covenant and the remainder imposes an enforceable density limitation of one dwelling per one-half acre.