Opinion ID: 1354921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Prescriptions Admitted into Evidence

Text: The appellant renews here his timely objection at trial to the admission into evidence of numerous prescriptions of Tylox issued by the appellant during the same period of time involved herein to three other patients (not Messrs. Gentry and Jones); these prescriptions were not the subject of any of the counts of the indictment. Prior to offering this evidence, the trial court conducted an in camera hearing on the admissibility of these other prescriptions. The trial court gave a limiting instruction on the purpose for the admission of these prescriptions prior to allowing the State to proceed and reiterated the limiting instruction when giving the other instructions to the jury at the close of all of the evidence. The trial court told the jury that this evidence of other acts of the appellant was not admitted to prove the character of the appellant in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Instead, it was admitted to prove intent, knowledge, etc., of the appellant. We believe this evidence was admissible upon the basis stated by the trial court. Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence authorizes the admission of the evidence in question. Quoting that rule, in its entirety, this Court held in syllabus point 1 of State v. Edward Charles L., ___ W.Va. ___, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b). See also syl. pt. 2, State v. Ferrell, ___ W.Va. ___, 399 S.E.2d 834 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2801, 115 L.Ed.2d 974 (1991), syl. pt. 1, State v. Robinette, ___ W.Va. ___, 383 S.E.2d 32 (1989). Other courts considering the admissibility of extraneous prescriptions in the prosecutions of registered practitioners under the Federal Controlled Substances Act or similar state legislation have upheld the admissibility of such prescriptions under that jurisdiction's rule identical to W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b), to show the defendant's intent or knowledge that the prescriptions which are the subject of the indictment were not issued for a legitimate purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834, 839-40 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Ellzey, 527 F.2d 1306, 1307 (6th Cir.1976); Commonwealth v. Comins, 371 Mass. 222, 235, 356 N.E.2d 241, 249 (1976) (testimony concerning extraneous prescriptions), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1582, 51 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977). The State's expert witness opined in essence that these extraneous prescriptions (involving patients other than Gentry and Jones) and the prescriptions involved in counts 2, 9 and 10, in light of the patients' charts, suggested that the appellant was engaged primarily in a prescription writing business. The trial court obviously weighed the probative value of the extraneous prescriptions as to the appellant's intent and knowledge against the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See W.Va.R.Evid. 403. The admissibility of such evidence, after Rule 403 balancing, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Hanna, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 378 S.E.2d 640, 649 (1989). See also syl. pt. 2, State v. Robinette, ___ W.Va. ___, 383 S.E.2d 32 (1989). We believe that the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in this regard.