Opinion ID: 2552228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substantive Offenses.

Text: On October 9, 1996, Josafat Terraza and Urbano Mendoza were shot and killed in their Maywood apartment. Jose Canela, Daniel Morales, and defendant Luis Miranda were charged with the crimes, and they were codefendants at a joint preliminary examination held on January 9, 1997. The evidence at this preliminary examination may be summarized as follows: Michael Moreno witnessed events concerning the shooting but was unable to identify anyone as a shooter. Moreno testified that on October 9, about 12:49 a.m., he was in his Maywood apartment and heard a scream and a gunshot coming from apartment No. 18, directly across from his apartment. He looked out his front door and saw two men scuffling in apartment 18, where Terraza and Mendoza lived. One man was standing over, and searching the pockets of, a second man who was on the floor. After the first man stopped searching, he raised up some object, and Moreno heard shots. The first man extended his arm at a right angle from his body. Moreno did not observe a gun in the first man's hand, but he heard two additional gunshots. During the scuffle, Moreno observed a third person, neither Terraza nor Mendoza, running up and down the stairs and in and out of apartment 18. After Moreno heard the two additional gunshots, the first man and the third person fled toward the street. Moreno later observed a small truck leave the scene with its tires screeching. (Police officers later took him to the truck, and he identified it.) After Moreno saw the truck leave, he went to apartment 18. Terraza, who had been shot, was on the floor; his face was covered with facial cream. Mendoza also had been shot. Moreno knew that Terraza and Mendoza sold drugs from their apartment, and he had seen handguns in that apartment on prior occasions. Moreno saw no handguns that night. He identified no one in court. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Detective Mark Lillienfeld testified that he went to the crime scene and found, in apartment 18, two .380-caliber bullets, one 9-millimeter bullet, two .380-caliber casings, one 9millimeter casing, and another bullet. Lillienfeld also observed a bullet mark on a refrigerator, a bullet hole in a window, and blood. Lillienfeld found narcotics, evidence of narcotics sales, and a wallet that held a California driver's license issued to Luis Miranda. The wallet was on the sidewalk directly outside the bedroom window of apartment 18. Lillienfeld also testified that he had been employed in law enforcement for 16 years; he was currently assigned as a detective in the homicide bureau; and he had been one of the investigating officers in the present case. He testified regarding statements Maywood Police Sergeant Gosnell made to him. According to Lillienfeld, Gosnell told him that while Gosnell was en route to the crime scene, he heard a broadcast of a suspect's description. He subsequently observed a man matching the description running down the street about a block from the crime scene. Gosnell detained him. The suspect had a loaded .380-caliber pistol. Gosnell identified the suspect to Lillienfeld as Jose Canela. Lillienfeld also testified regarding two statements Canela made to him. After Lillienfeld obtained a waiver of Canela's Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), Canela gave his first statement, which implicated only himself in the shootings of Terraza and Mendoza. According to Lillienfeld, Canela stated he went alone by bus to apartment 18 to buy marijuana. He was carrying his gun for protection. During the narcotics transaction, Terraza became upset, and Canela was afraid Terraza would hurt him. The men struggled for Canela's gun, and Canela shot Terraza, who had white cream on his face. As Canela fled the apartment, he thought Mendoza had a handgun. Canela, fearing he would be shot, fired a shot towards Mendoza. After interviewing Canela, Lillienfeld interviewed Moreno and learned there were additional suspects. Lillienfeld obtained another waiver of Canela's Miranda rights, and Canela gave a second statement. In it, Canela admitted lying to Lillienfeld during the first interview and provided a new version of events. In sum, Canela stated that the three codefendants, Morales, Miranda, and Canela, implemented a plan to rob drug dealers Terraza and Mendoza, and Morales acted as the getaway driver. After Canela and Miranda went to apartment 18 and confronted the victims, Miranda eventually shot or struck Mendoza, and Canela shot Mendoza. Canela subsequently shot Terraza. Canela was later outside apartment 18 when he heard a gunshot, ran to help Miranda, and saw him inside, leaning over Terraza and taking his money. According to Lillienfeld, Canela stated that Miranda first pulled out his Tec-9 machine pistol and demanded money of Terraza and Mendoza. As he did so, the pistol's magazine fell out. After Canela took out his own handgun, he and Mendoza struggled for it. At that time, Miranda shot or struck Mendoza in the head with Miranda's pistol. Canela got control of his weapon with Miranda's help and intentionally shot Mendoza. Canela and Mendoza fell, and Miranda helped Canela get away from Mendoza. After Canela shot Mendoza, and while Miranda was struggling with Terraza and trying to put the magazine back into his pistol, Canela shot Terraza. After the shootings, Canela ran down the stairs onto the driveway and then back again, trying to persuade Miranda to leave. At one point, Canela heard a gunshot while he was outside apartment 18, and he ran back to help Miranda. Miranda was leaning over Terraza's body and picking up money that Terraza had removed from his pocket. At some point, Miranda took Terraza's gun from his hand. Canela convinced Miranda that they should leave, and they did so, but they fled in separate directions. Miranda went toward Morales and the waiting truck. Canela went in the opposite direction, where Gosnell arrested him. Lillienfeld testified that he took the witness Moreno to the truck, which was registered to Canela's cousin, and that Moreno identified it. Lillienfeld also testified that, according to Canela, the truck was the one used during the crimes. Terraza and Mendoza died of their gunshot wounds. 2. Defendant's Objections and the Penal Code Section 871.5 Motion. At the joint preliminary examination, when the prosecutor first asked Lillienfeld what Canela told him, the following exchange occurred: [MIRANDA'S DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm going to object: hearsay as to my client. Ask that it be limited. [¶] [MORALES'S DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Join. [¶] THE COURT: Very well. The statements will be limited to the declarant only. The prosecutor protested the ruling, stating she was proffering Canela's statement under the provisions of Proposition 115, and she wanted to use it against Miranda and Morales as well as Canela. The magistrate opined the prosecutor had an  Aranda/Bruton problem (see People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265; Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476), the prosecutor disagreed, and the magistrate ruled, I'll take the motion subject to strike, and we'll proceed. Lillienfeld then testified as to Canela's first statement as outlined above. He also explained that about 12:10 a.m. on October 10, 1996, he conducted his second interview with Canela, who admitted he had lied during the first interview. Canela then affirmed he had not been alone but had been with two other men when the incident occurred. Counsel representing Miranda and Morales objected to this statement as being hearsay as to those codefendants. The magistrate noted the objection but did not then expressly rule on it, indicating some question existed as to whether the Aranda/Bruton rule applied, and stating, I'm taking it subject to a motion to strike. The magistrate directed the prosecutor to proceed. Lillienfeld then testified as to Canela's second statement as outlined above. The prosecution later rested subject to the motion to strike the testimony, and the preliminary examination was continued to January 10, 1997, to permit the magistrate to research the admissibility issues. Neither Miranda, Morales, nor Canela offered defense evidence. When the preliminary examination was resumed on January 10, 1997, the prosecutor again urged that Canela's statements were admissible against Miranda and Morales under the provisions of Proposition 115, as construed in Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262 ( Whitman) , and that neither the state hearsay rule nor the right to confrontation barred admission of a nontestifying accomplice's out-of-court statements at a preliminary examination. The magistrate ruled that, with respect to the statements that are being presented in court, the reason why, to my understanding, that the statement of one defendant cannot be used necessarily against another defendant, unless there is corroboration of the same, is because of the fact that the indicia [of] reliability is not there, and there's also a great issue as to whether or not the defendant making the statement is actually trying to reduce his culpability. The magistrate continued, In this case we know that Mr. Canela indicated he was actually the trigger man. He was the shooter. So we know that he is not attempting to reduce his culpability, per se, but there is still an issue of whether or not this rule would allow the use of evidence against one defendant towards the others and whether or not there is a denial effective cross-examination. The magistrate then further stated, I want my rulings to be very, very specific, that way the People can take this on appeal, and hopefully we would have case law which would clear up this issue. [11] I'm going to hold that the Aranda/Bruton rule does apply at the preliminary hearing stage; furthermore, that the statements made by Mr. Canela cannot be used against the defendant, Miranda, and it cannot be used against the defendant, Morales. The magistrate then concluded, Having stated that, with respect to the evidence presented and the motions to dismiss by, I would take it, Mr. Canela, that motion will be denied on all counts. As to the defendant, Miranda, and as to Defendant Morales, People, do you wish to be heard? [¶] [THE PROSECUTOR]: In light of the Court's ruling, I'll submit it. There was evidence linking both gentlemen independently to this incident. However, it's certainly not extremely strong, so I'll leave it up to the Court. [¶] THE COURT: Very well. The motion to dismiss by Defendant Miranda and by Defendant Morales are granted. The prosecution moved in superior court under Penal Code section 871.5 to reinstate the complaint against defendant Miranda, contending the magistrate erred in dismissing the action. (Under subdivision (b) of that section, The only ground for the motion shall be that, as a matter of law, the magistrate erroneously dismissed the action or a portion thereof.) The court denied the motion, and the prosecution appealed. As indicated, the Court of Appeal ruled that neither the state hearsay rule nor applicable federal confrontation or due process principles render inadmissible a qualified law enforcement officer's preliminary examination testimony relating a nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial confession incriminating the defendant. As will appear, we agree with the Court of Appeal.