Opinion ID: 421195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disestablishment

Text: 11 A federal treaty, statute, or agreement setting aside a reservation for the use and occupation of a tribe is necessarily preemptive of state jurisdiction over Indian hunting and fishing activity on the reservation. Getches, Federal Indian Law: Cases and Materials 618 (1978). Thus, when Congress established the Lower Brule Reservation in the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, the Lower Brule Sioux acquired the right to hunt and fish on the reservation free of state law. 12 The first issue presented here is whether the Big Bend Act and/or the Fort Randall Act disestablished or diminished 3 the boundaries of the Lower Brule Reservation. If no disestablishment occurred, the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty would continue to preempt the application of state hunting and fishing laws on the reservation, and the Tribe would retain jurisdiction over tribal hunting and fishing on the land in controversy, except to the extent that the Tribe's rights have been abrogated by subsequent congressional action. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975). If either Act disestablished the reservation boundaries, the application of state law on the land taken by that Act no longer would be preempted, and South Dakota would have jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by tribal members on that land absent federal law preserving the Indians' treaty hunting and fishing rights. See id.; Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968). 13 The Supreme Court and this Court have frequently addressed disestablishment questions. 4 Several principles developed in these cases control our inquiry in the present case. 14 Once Congress has established a reservation, all tracts included within the boundaries remain a part of the reservation until separated from it by Congress. DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra, 420 U.S. at 444, 95 S.Ct. at 1092-93. Congressional action removing certain reservation land from Indian ownership does not necessarily disestablish reservation boundaries. Disestablishment occurs only when Congress intends to create a smaller reservation with adjusted boundaries. United States v. Dupris, 612 F.2d 319, 320-322 (8th Cir.1979); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684, 687 (8th Cir.1973). It does not occur if Congress only intended to remove from Indian control certain land within the reservation boundaries while retaining its original exterior boundaries. Id. 15 Thus, congressional intent controls our analysis and we can find disestablishment only if Congress unmistakenly intended that result. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 430 U.S. at 603, 97 S.Ct. at 1371 (evidence leads us    to the firm conclusion that congressional intent was to exclude Gregory County from the Rosebud Reservation) (emphasis added); DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra, 420 U.S. at 445, 95 S.Ct. at 1093 (relevant factors all point unmistakenly to the conclusion that the Lake Traverse Reservation was terminated in 1891) (emphasis added). In DeCoteau, the Supreme Court stated: 16 This Court does not lightly conclude that an Indian reservation has been terminated. [W]hen Congress has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.    The congressional intent must be clear, to overcome the general rule that '[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the [Indians].'     Accordingly, the Court requires that the congressional determination to terminate    be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. 17 DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra, 420 U.S. at 444, 95 S.Ct. at 1092-93 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 18 With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of whether the Big Bend and Fort Randall Acts disestablished the boundaries of the Lower Brule Reservation. A. The Big Bend Act 19 The district court held that the Big Bend Act did not disestablish the boundaries of the Lower Brule Reservation. South Dakota contends that the district court erred because the face of the Act, as well as its legislative history and surrounding circumstances demonstrate that Congress intended to disestablish the reservation to the extent of the land taken in the Act. We disagree. 20 In United States v. Wounded Knee, 596 F.2d 790 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 2847, 61 L.Ed.2d 289 (1979), this Court faced the precise issue presented here, and held that Congress in the Big Bend Act did not intend to disestablish the reservation boundaries. 5 Although the land in issue in Wounded Knee was taken from the Crow Creek Sioux Reservation by the Big Bend Act, we are bound by that precedent. 6 21 Notwithstanding Wounded Knee, South Dakota--relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Rosebud Sioux v. Kneip, supra and DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra 7 --contends that language of the Big Bend Act is precisely suited to evince Congress' intent to disestablish reservation boundaries. We disagree. The Wounded Knee Court had the benefit of both Rosebud and DeCoteau, and yet found no clear expression of intent to disestablish. 22 Section 1(a) of the Big Bend Act provides in part that [t]he entire interest    [and] any interest the tribe or Indians may have within the bed of the Missouri River    are hereby taken by the United States for the Big Bend Dam and Reservoir Project on the Missouri River   . Pub.L. No. 87-734, § 1(a), 76 Stat. at 698. That section also provides that a sum certain be paid in settlement of all claims, rights, and demands of the tribe and individual Indians arising out of the taking under this Act. Id. 23 This language falls short of that utilized by Congress when it has unequivocally expressed its intent to disestablish a reservation's boundaries. 8 Indeed, in Rosebud and DeCoteau, the Supreme Court recognized that statutory provisions very similar to those employed in section 1(a) of the Big Bend Act did not constitute clear language of express termination, as is evident from the Court's heavy reliance on the legislative histories and surrounding circumstances of the acts in question to support its findings of disestablishment. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 430 U.S. at 589-615, 97 S.Ct. at 1364-1378; DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra, 420 U.S. at 431-449, 95 S.Ct. at 1086-1095. 24 Because a clear congressional intent to disestablish cannot be found on the face of the Big Bend Act, the necessary intent can be found only if there is operative statutory language that is precisely suited to the purpose of disestablishment and this purpose is confirmed by the Act's legislative history and surrounding circumstances. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra, 420 U.S. at 444-445, 95 S.Ct. at 1093. In Wounded Knee, we concluded that neither the legislative history nor surrounding circumstances of the Act demonstrate a clear intent to disestablish. 25 The legislative history is ambiguous. As we stated in Wounded Knee: 26 while there are a few stray phrases which could be interpreted as indicating both the presence and the absence of diminishment, we are mindful that [a] congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. at 505, 93 S.Ct. at 2258. [Emphasis included.] There is simply nothing in the legislative history which satisfies this requirement. 27 United States v. Wounded Knee, supra, 596 F.2d at 796 (footnote omitted). 28 Moreover, the Big Bend Act's surrounding circumstances suggest that Congress did not intend to disestablish the Lower Brule Reservation. One of the Act's principal purposes    [was] to provide for the improvement of the social and economic conditions of the members of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe. S.Rep. No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (June 28, 1962). As in Wounded Knee, however, the property taken for the Big Bend project included some of the most important reservation land. The report of the Senate Committee considering the Big Bend bill referred to the taken land as the Tribe's best bottom land and described at some length the land's value to the Indians: 29 Most of the Indians on the reservation live in the vicinity of the Missouri River and the tributary streams and creeks. These locations are accessible to water for domestic purposes. They contain the rich river bottom lands and the timbered area which supplies firewood and building material and provides shelter for livestock. They have been the habitat of the game and the prime source of the natural products on which Indians depend in part for subsistence. They have carried the livestock of the entire reservation in drought years. They have provided sheltered feeding areas essential to successful stock operations. 30 Id. at 3, 7. 31 An intent to remove this valuable river bottomland from the reservation would hardly be consistent with Congress' concern for promoting the economic development of the Tribe. 32 In addition, because the reservation land was taken in order to construct a dam and reservoir, continued Indian control of this land is not inconsistent with the federal government's purpose in acquiring the property, as might be the case if, for example, the reservation was acquired to permit settlement by non-Indians. See note 10, infra. In fact, subsequent to the construction of the Big Bend Dam and Reservoir Project, the members of the Lower Brule Tribe have continued to utilize the land and exploit its resources, and the Tribe has regulated hunting and fishing within the taken area. As we concluded in Wounded Knee, this jurisdictional history militates against a finding of disestablishment. United States v. Wounded Knee, supra, 596 F.2d at 790. 9 33 In summary, neither the language on the face of the Big Bend Act nor its legislative history and surrounding circumstances support a finding of disestablishment. 10 Accordingly, the district court's judgment with respect to the Big Bend Act is affirmed. B. The Fort Randall Act 34 The district court held that Congress intended to disestablish the Lower Brule Reservation to the extent of the area taken by the Fort Randall Act. Because we find that such an intent is not expressed on the face of the Act, nor clearly demonstrated by its legislative history and surrounding circumstances, we reverse. 35 The district court primarily based its Fort Randall holding on our decision in Wounded Knee and on Section 6 of the Fort Randall Act, which refers to the [reservation] boundaries as diminished. Pub.L. No. 85-923, § 6, 72 Stat. at 1774. In holding that the Big Bend Act did not disestablish the boundaries of the Crow Creek Reservation in Wounded Knee, we contrasted the omission of the phrase as diminished from the Big Bend Act with its inclusion in the Fort Randall Act and three other statutes authorizing takings for flood control projects in the Missouri River Basin Project. 36 In Wounded Knee, however, we did not conclude that Congress intended to disestablish reservation boundaries in the Fort Randall Act. 11 Instead, we cautioned that the reference to the as diminished phrase in the other taking statutes was merely to compare and contrast the earlier acts with P.L. 87-735 [Big Bend Act] in an attempt to divine the intent of Congress with regard to P.L. 87-735. United States v. Wounded Knee supra, 596 F.2d at 795 n. 8. Moreover, we stated that our comparison was based on the parties' assum[ption] here and in the district court that [the Fort Randall Act] diminished the [reservation] by taking a strip of land along the Missouri River. Id. The Crow Creek and Lower Brule Sioux Tribes were not parties to the Wounded Knee case. The only representatives before the district court in that case were the United States Attorney for South Dakota and counsel for a criminal defendant. 12 Id. at 791-793. Moreover, the Wounded Knee Court did not undertake any review of the legislative history or surrounding circumstances of the Fort Randall Act since the offense involved in the case had occurred on the Big Bend portion of the reservation. The reference was made as an index of comparison only and the required analysis was never performed regarding the Fort Randall Act. 37 In sum, the teaching of Wounded Knee lies in its holding and analysis that the Big Bend Act did not accomplish a disestablishment of the reservation. In approaching the issue of whether the Fort Randall Act disestablished the reservation, the same careful analysis must be employed. 38 The state first points to section 1 of the Fort Randall Act, which provides for a sum certain payment: 39 in settlement of all claims, rights and demands of said tribe and its members arising out of the construction of the Fort Randall Dam and Reservoir Project[.] 40 Pub.L. No. 85-923, § 1, 72 Stat. at 1773. 41 This language is virtually identical to that employed in section 1(a) of the Big Bend Act. See supra, at 816-817. We found no clear expression of an intent to disestablish in section 1(a) of the Big Bend Act, and we find none in section 1 of the Fort Randall Act. 42 Section 6 of the Fort Randall Act authorizes the federal government to purchase and sell certain lands either inside or outside the [reservation] boundaries as diminished. Pub.L. No. 85-923, § 6, 72 Stat. at 1774. There is no equivalent language in the Big Bend Act. This statutory language is consistent with a congressional intent to disestablish. Nonetheless, we believe that this as diminished phrase does not establish a congressional determination to disestablish which is expressed on the face of the statute. This isolated phrase in a section of the Fort Randall Act having nothing to do with the location of reservation boundaries falls short of clear language of express disestablishment. Mattz v. Arnett, supra, 412 U.S. at 504 & n. 22, 93 S.Ct. at 2258 & n. 22. See note 8 supra. A clear and unambiguous intent to disestablish cannot be found from isolated phrases in the statutory language. United States v. Dupris, supra, 612 F.2d at 332; United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, supra, 478 F.2d at 686-687. 43 Erickson is particularly instructive here. We held in that case that no disestablishment was effectuated by a provision in a 1908 statute involving the Cheyenne River Tribe which permitted allottees on the opened area of the reservation to select substitute lands on the reservation thus diminished. We stated: 44 In § 2 of the 1908 Act it is stated as a proviso that the Secretary may permit Indians who have received allotments in the area opened to settlement to relinquish such and receive a new allotment within the respective reservation thus diminished   . [Emphasis included.] This proviso is subject to two competing constructions. The reservation thus diminished, as contended by appellant, means a smaller reservation with adjusted boundaries. On the other hand, the reservation could have retained its original exterior boundaries even though the portion held by Indians was diminished by virtue of the sale of lands within the boundaries to outsiders. 45 United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, supra, 478 F.2d at 687 (emphasis added). 46 In discussing the relevant legislative history, we again emphasized the different constructions that might be given to the diminished language: 47 Both the House and Senate Committee reports are silent as to the 1908 Act's effect upon the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation. Appellant points out the various references in the reports and attached documents to a diminished reservation and a relinquishment of land by the Indians. [Emphasis included.] A reservation, however, as already pointed out, may be diminished in land size by sale of portions thereof to non-Indians without changing the reservation's boundaries. 48 Id. at 688 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 49 Here, as in Erickson, the statutory phrase as diminished, standing alone, is ambiguous and does not demonstrate a clear congressional intent to disestablish the reservation boundaries. Therefore, only clear legislative history and surrounding circumstances would support the district court's decision. We, however, can find nothing in the Fort Randall Act's legislative history and surrounding circumstances which is significantly different than that underlying the Big Bend Act. Thus, we must find that there is insufficient evidence of disestablishment to overcome the general rule that doubtful expressions of intent must be resolved in favor of the Indians. See supra, at 815-816. 50 The district court observed that [t]he legislative history of the acts provides little guidance concerning the [disestablishment issue]. With this statement we must agree. The history relevant to the question of reservation disestablishment in the taken area is sparse, and that which exists is ambiguous. In fact, there is nothing which significantly differentiates the legislative history of the Fort Randall Act from that of the Big Bend Act. Accordingly, while there are a few stray phrases which could be interpreted as indicating both the presence and the absence of diminishment,    [t]here is simply nothing in the legislative history which satisfies the requirement that the history clearly show an intent to disestablish when Congress has not expressed that purpose on the face of the statute. United States v. Wounded Knee, supra, 596 F.2d at 796. 51 Similarly, an intent to disestablish cannot be found in the surrounding circumstances of the Fort Randall Act. Again, these surrounding circumstances are virtually identical to those of the Big Bend Act. In both instances, the reservation lands were taken for flood control projects rather than for settlement. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribe over the land taken by the Acts is not inconsistent with the purpose of the authorized takings. The Lower Brule Sioux, in fact, have utilized the land taken and have sought to enforce their laws on it. Finally, these circumstances stand in sharp contrast to those present in Rosebud and DeCoteau which led the Supreme Court to conclude that the surrounding circumstances of the surplus land statutes in question showed a clear congressional intent to disestablish the Rosebud and Lake Traverse Reservations. See supra at 817-818 & n. 10. 52 In addition, the district court's conflicting conclusions on the disestablishment question with regard to the Fort Randall and Big Bend Acts imputes to Congress a very impractical and unlikely purpose with respect to flood control on the Missouri River. If the court below was correct, it would mean that in acquiring the land necessary for the comprehensive Missouri River Basin Project through the seven taking statutes, see note 1, supra, Congress in the first Act (1949 Fort Berthold Garrison Act) and the last two Acts (1962 Crow Creek and Lower Brule Big Bend Acts) preserved existing reservation boundaries, but in the middle four Acts (1954 Cheyenne River Oahe Act, 1958 Standing Rock Oahe Act, 1958 Crow Creek and Lower Brule Fort Randall Acts), by inclusion of the words as diminished, it did not do so. There simply is no indication that Congress intended to create such an unusual and impractical result. 53 Finally, in the Big Bend Act, which was enacted four years after the Fort Randall Act, Congress expressed its understanding that the lands taken by both Acts were within the Lower Brule Reservation. Section 11 of the Big Bend Act authorized the purchase of substitute lands for individuals holding allotments within the taking area of the Fort Randall or Big Bend projects, and provided that the land selected may be inside or outside the boundaries of the reservation. Pub.L. No. 87-734, § 11, 76 Stat. at 701. No reference was made to the reservation as diminished. Id. Moreover, there are repeated references in the legislative history of the Big Bend Act, by members of Congress and various government departments, to both taking areas as being within the reservation or on the reservation. See S.Rep. No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 16, 21 and 31 (June 28, 1962); H.Rep. No. 852, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 21, 26, 30 and 31 (Aug. 5, 1961). 13 These expressions confirm the apparent intent of Congress in 1954 when it directed the Corp of Engineers to negotiate with the Lower Brule Sioux to acquire the land necessary for the Fort Randall project and specifically referred to the area to be taken as within the reservation. Act of July 6, 1954, Pub.L. No. 83-478, § 2(c), 68 Stat. at 453. 14 54 In summary, neither the Big Bend Act nor the Fort Randall Act disestablished the boundaries of the Lower Brule Reservation. Nonetheless, even though the land taken for the two flood control projects remains in the reservation, the Lower Brule Sioux do not retain their treaty right to hunt and fish on the reservation free from state regulation if that right was abrogated by the Fort Randall and Big Bend Acts. We turn to that question now.