Opinion ID: 848642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of Statutory Language and Application

Text: As previously stated, M.C.L. § 500.3105(1) and M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a) impose two separate and distinct requirements for care, recovery, or rehabilitation expenses to be compensable under the no-fault act. First, such expenses must be  for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.... M.C.L. § 500.3105(1) (emphasis added). Second, these expenses must be reasonably necessary ... for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a). Defendant contends that M.C.L. § 500.3105(1) requires that allowable expenses be causally connected to a person's injury. We agree. In fact, M.C.L. § 500.3105(1) imposes two causation requirements for no-fault benefits. First, an insurer is liable only if benefits are for accidental bodily injury.... [F]or implies a causal connection. [6] [A]ccidental bodily injury therefore triggers an insurer's liability and defines the scope of that liability. Accordingly, a no-fault insurer is liable to pay benefits only to the extent that the claimed benefits are causally connected to the accidental bodily injury arising out of an automobile accident. Second, an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury only if those injuries aris[e] out of or are caused by the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.... It is not any bodily injury that triggers an insurer's liability under the no-fault act. Rather, it is only those injuries that are caused by the insured's use of a motor vehicle. In this case, it is uncontested that the insured's injuries arose out of his use of an automobile. Therefore, to the extent that the insured's injuries stem from an automobile accident, application of the second causal element noted above does not bar plaintiff's claim. The first causal element, however, poses a problem for plaintiff. Plaintiff does not claim that her husband's diet is different from that of an uninjured person, that his food expenses are part of his treatment plan, or that these costs are related in any way to his injuries. She claims instead that Griffith's insurer is liable for ordinary, everyday food expenses. As such, plaintiff has not established that these expenses are for accidental bodily injury .... [7] Even if ordinary food expenses were compensable under § 3105, an insurer would be liable for those expenses only if they were also allowable expenses under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a). This section provides that benefits are payable for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. In other words, an insurer is liable only for the cost of products, services and accommodations reasonably necessary for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. [8] There is no dispute that Griffith is an injured person. Thus, the question is whether food is reasonably necessary for his care, recovery, or rehabilitation as an injured person. It is not contended here that the food expenses at issue are a part of the insured's recovery or rehabilitation. Indeed, plaintiff does not allege that the food has special curative properties that might advance Griffith's recovery or rehabilitation. The key issue, therefore, is whether the food expenses are necessary for Griffith's care. Because care can have several meanings depending on the context in which it is used, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis is helpful in discerning the meaning of that term in this statute. This doctrine is premised on the notion that the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context. King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991). [9] Thus, under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, `a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.' Koontz, supra at 318, 645 N.W.2d 34 (citations omitted). As a general matter, words and clauses will not be divorced from those which precede and those which follow. Sanchick v. State Bd. of Optometry, 342 Mich. 555, 559, 70 N.W.2d 757 (1955). When construing a series of terms such as care, recovery, or rehabilitation, we are guided by the principle that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977). Generally, care means protection; charge, and to make provision. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Thus, taken in isolation, the word care can be broadly construed to encompass anything that is reasonably necessary to the provision of a person's protection or charge. But we have consistently held that [c]ourts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 466 Mich. 142, 146, 644 N.W.2d 715 (2002). Therefore, we must neither read care so broadly as to render nugatory recovery and rehabilitation nor construe care so narrowly that the term is mere surplusage. [10] Care must have a meaning that is related to, but distinct from, recovery and rehabilitation. [11] As an initial matter, it is important to note that the statute does not require compensation for any item that is reasonably necessary to a person's care in general. Instead, the statute specifically limits compensation to charges for products or services that are reasonably necessary for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. (Emphasis added.) This context suggests that care must be related to the insured's injuries. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the statute lists care together with recovery and rehabilitation. Recovery is defined as restoration or return to any former and better condition, esp. to health from sickness, injury, addiction, etc. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). Rehabilitate is defined as to restore or bring to a condition of good health, ability to work, or productive activity. Id. Both terms refer to restoring an injured person to the condition he was in before sustaining his injuries. Consequently, expenses for recovery or rehabilitation are costs expended in order to bring an insured to a condition of health or ability sufficient to resume his preinjury life. Because recovery and rehabilitation are necessary only when an insured has been injured, both terms refer to products, services, and accommodations that are necessary because of injuries sustained through the use of a motor vehicle. Care must have a meaning that is broader than recovery and rehabilitation but is not so broad as to render those terms nugatory. As noted above, both recovery and rehabilitation refer to an underlying injury; likewise, the statute as a whole applies only to an injured person. It follows that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the term care to expenses for those products, services, or accommodations whose provision is necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident. [12] Care is broader than recovery and rehabilitation because it may encompass expenses for products, services, and accommodations that are necessary because of the accident but that may not restore a person to his preinjury state. Griffith's food costs here are not related to his care, recovery, or rehabilitation. There has been no evidence introduced that he now requires different food than he did before sustaining his injuries as part of his treatment plan. While such expenses are no doubt necessary for his survival, they are not necessary for his recovery or rehabilitation from the injuries suffered in the accident, nor are they necessary for his care because of the injuries he sustained in the accident. Unlike prescription medications or nursing care, the food that Griffith consumes is simply an ordinary means of sustenance rather than a treatment for his care, recovery, or rehabilitation. In fact, if Griffith had never sustained, or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary needs would be no different than they are now. We conclude, therefore, that his food costs are completely unrelated to his care, recovery, or rehabilitation and are not allowable expenses under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a). [13] The parties focus on the distinction between food costs for hospital food and food costs for an insured receiving at-home care. Plaintiff contends that there is no distinction between such costs. We disagree. Food costs in an institutional setting are benefits for accidental bodily injury and are reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. That is, it is reasonably necessary for an insured to consume hospital food during in-patient treatment given the limited dining options available. Although an injured person would need to consume food regardless of his injuries, he would not need to eat that particular food or bear the cost associated with it. Thus, hospital food is analogous to a type of special diet or select diet necessary for an injured person's recovery. Because an insured in an institutional setting is required to eat hospital food, such food costs are necessary for an insured's care, recovery, or rehabilitation while in such a setting. Once an injured person leaves the institutional setting, however, he may resume eating a normal diet just as he would have had he not suffered any injury and is no longer required to bear the costs of hospital food, which are part of the unqualified unit cost of hospital treatment. [14] This reasoning can be taken a step further when considering the costs of items such as an injured person's clothing, toiletries, and even housing costs. Under plaintiff's reasoning, because a hospital provided Griffith with clothing while he was institutionalized, defendant should continue to pay for Griffith's clothing after he is released. The same can be said of Griffith's toiletry necessities and housing costs. While Griffith was institutionalized, defendant paid his housing costs. Should defendant therefore be obligated to pay Griffith's housing payment now that he has been released when Griffith's housing needs have not been affected by his injuries? Under plaintiff's reasoning, nothing would prevent no-fault insurers from being obligated to pay for any expenses that an injured person would otherwise be provided in an institutional setting as long as they are remotely related to the person's general care. Plaintiff's interpretation of M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a) stretches the language of the act too far and, incidentally, would largely obliterate cost containment for this mandatory coverage. We have always been cognizant of this potential problem [15] when interpreting the no-fault act, and we are no less so today. Moreover, in seeking reimbursement for food and other such quotidian expenses, plaintiff is essentially seeking a wage-loss benefit. Reimbursement for the value of lost wages, however, is specifically addressed elsewhere in the no-fault act. See M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(b). [16] See also Popma v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 446 Mich. 460, 463, 471, 521 N.W.2d 831 (1994). Plaintiff's construction of § 3107(1)(a) is strongly undermined by the Legislature's express provision for, and limitation on, wage-loss benefits in § 3107(1)(b). Under M.C.L. § 500.3105 and M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a), defendant is not required to reimburse plaintiff for the food expenses at issue in this case. Such expenses are not necessary for accidental bodily injury under M.C.L. § 500.3105. In addition, they are not allowable expenses under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a) because food is not necessary for Griffith's care, recovery, or rehabilitation under that subsection. Because the rule announced in Reed, supra, is contrary to the language of the above provisions, we overrule the Court of Appeals decision in Reed.