Opinion ID: 1619733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Principle of Finality

Text: Whereas the principle of de novo resentencing permits the application of new sentencing laws to reopened cases, the principle of finality prohibits retroactive application in most other circumstances. As we have explained, applying every new law to every old case would destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state . . . beyond any tolerable limit. Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 929-30 (Fla.1980). The principle of finality avoids those dire consequences by allowing retroactive application only when new rulings so drastically alter the substantive or procedural underpinnings of a final conviction and sentence that the machinery of postconviction relief is necessary to avoid individual instances of obvious injustice. Id. at 925. We have already evaluated Apprendi under the Witt standard and held that it does not apply retroactively. See Hughes, 901 So.2d at 837. It is safe to assume that Blakely, which appl[ied] the rule . . . in Apprendi, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531, will not apply retroactively, either. Thus, the defendant clearly has no right to retroactive relief under Apprendi or Blakely. The question here is whether applying those cases to a resentencing amounts to the same thing. The answer depends largely on when the principle of finality attaches. We have stated on several occasions that finality attaches when the defendant's conviction (not the sentence ) becomes final. See Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 407 (Fla.2005) (stating that once a conviction has been upheld on appeal, the State acquires a strong interest in finality); Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999) ([O]nce a conviction has been affirmed on direct appeal `a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.' (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993))). In fact, throughout our opinion in Hughes, we emphasized the affirmance of the conviction as the critical moment for retroactivity purposes. See 901 So.2d at 838 (In this case, we consider whether a decision of the United States Supreme Court applies to defendants whose convictions already were final when that case was decided.); id. at 839 (Once a conviction is final, . . . the State acquires an interest in the finality of the convictions.); id. at 840 ([T]he issue is whether such cases [as Apprendi ] can be applied to defendants whose convictions already were final when the decision was rendered.). [3] The district court took seriously this language from Hughes. See Galindez, 910 So.2d at 285 ( Hughes '[s] focus on the finality of the conviction is very important (quoting Isaac v. State, 911 So.2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (Kahn, J., dissenting))). Because the defendant's conviction became final before Apprendi and Blakely, and because he offered no legitimate basis for reopening it, the district court concluded that any application of those two decisions on resentencing would be impermissibly retroactive under the express language of Hughes. See id. at 285. The district court relied heavily on an earlier dissent by Judge Kahn, who observed that under our existing rules of criminal procedure the factual matters underlying the guidelines departure sentences may not be submitted to a jury. Isaac, 911 So.2d at 815 (Kahn, J., dissenting). Without a new jury, the district court reasoned, applying [ Apprendi and Blakely ] to this case would amount simply to a pardon of the defendant for an act he confessed to committing because the rules of the game were deemed to have changed after it was over. Galindez, 910 So.2d at 285. Certainly, if a sentencing jury can now be empaneled to decide the sentencing facts, then applying Apprendi and Blakely here would not implicate Galindez's conviction and would therefore not constitute a retroactive application of those cases. On the other hand, if a new jury cannot be empanelled at resentencing, then applying Apprendi or Blakely to defendants whose convictions already were final is retroactive and therefore violates Hughes. In fact, applying Apprendi and Blakely without a new jury is even more disruptive than most retroactive applications. It creates a bizarre paradox: the State is faulted for failing to prove sentence-enhancing facts to the jury at a time when it was not required to do so, yet is barred from proving those facts to a jury once such a requirement has been created. The result is that defendants will obtain relief (i.e., lighter sentences than their behavior warrants) because of defects in the process leading to their convictions, despite the continued finality of those convictions. That is the very essence of retroactive application. It violates the principle of finality that we so adamantly defended in Hughes and contradicts its express language. See 901 So.2d at 838 (describing the issue as whether Apprendi applies to defendants whose convictions already were final when that case was decided, and then answering no).