Opinion ID: 1185795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The order suppressing the testimony of the police officers was an order suppressing evidence under ORS 138.060 (3).

Text: ORS 138.020 limits appeals by the state in criminal cases to those allowed by ORS 138.060, which provides that: The state may take an appeal from the circuit court to the Court of Appeals from: (1) An order made prior to trial dismissing or setting aside the accusatory instrument; (2) An order arresting the judgment; (3) An order made prior to trial suppressing evidence; or (4) An order made prior to trial for the return or restoration of things seized. (Emphasis added) It is suggested that subsection (3) has application only to orders entered either in response to a motion to suppress, as provided by ORS 133.673, or after an omnibus hearing held, in accordance with ORS 135.037. Those contentions were considered by the Court of Appeals in State v. Hoare, 75 Adv.Sh. 699, 702-03, 20 Or. App. 439, 532 P.2d 240, 242 (1975), and rejected by it, holding that: Defendant's narrow interpretation of ORS 138.030(3)  founded on a distinction between `pretrial motions' and mere `preliminary objections'  is unwarranted. The state's right to appeal from `[a]n order made prior to trial suppressing evidence' is based on a statutory provision enacted some four years before ORS 133.673 and 135.037 were incorporated into the criminal code.       [F]or purposes of determining whether the state may appeal an order `suppressing'    evidence, the significant factor is whether the order has been made as the result of some pretrial action by the parties. When a defendant raises an objection to evidence in advance of trial, he takes the risk that the state may have an opportunity to obtain review of an adverse decision it would otherwise be deprived of if the objection were made during the course of the proceeding.    (Emphasis theirs) We agree with that statement. We also believe that the application of this rule is not limited to cases in which an order to suppress evidence has been the result of an objection by the defendant to evidence in advance of trial. As held by the Court of Appeals in State v. Robinson, 3 Or. App. 200, 210, 473 P.2d 152, 157 (1970):    The language of the statute in regard to orders `suppressing evidence' is clear and unambiguous.   For these reasons, we hold that the order suppressing the testimony of the two police officers in this case was an order suppressing evidence under ORS 138.060(3). It is contended by the defendant in this case, however, that any error in the entry of this order was at most invited error because it was the state's attorney who suggested to the trial court, after the two officers had refused to surrender their revolvers for a period of 30 days for testing, that the court enter such an order. Defendant also says that the state's attorney agreed in the trial court to be bound by the order suppressing the testimony of the two officers and thus should not be permitted to appeal from that order. Upon examination of the record we find it to be true that this order was entered upon the suggestion of the state's attorney, who also agreed that the state would be bound by it. Under ORS 135.835 there were other options available to the trial judge, from which the state would have had no right of appeal, when he was confronted with the refusal of the officers to produce their revolvers for inspection and testing for a period of 30 days, as previously ordered by the court. The trial judge might well have chosen some other option, except for the suggestion by the state's attorney that under ORS 135.835 the court could refuse to permit the police officers to testify and that the state would be bound by such an order. [2] Although the order suppressing the testimony of the two officers was an appealable order by the state within the meaning of ORS 138.060(3), to hold that the state was entitled to appeal from that order under the circumstances of this case would permit the state to appeal from all orders requiring it to produce evidence by first refusing to produce that evidence, then suggesting to the trial court that it enter a subsequent order suppressing other evidence to which no pretrial objection had been made by the defendant, agreeing to be bound by that order, and then appealing from that order. Under these circumstances we hold that the state was not entitled to appeal from the order suppressing the testimony of the two police officers. [3] In the ordinary case, upon holding that an appellant is not entitled to appeal, it then becomes unnecessary to consider the merits of the case and the appeal is then dismissed. Because, however, this case comes to us on petition for review from the Court of Appeals and because one of the two reasons why we accepted the petition for review was our concern whether the opinion by the Court of Appeals correctly states the law on the question whether the trial court properly ordered the production of the two guns, we shall next consider that question.