Opinion ID: 1662508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of Search (Plain View vs. Open View)

Text: In addressing the first question, we note that the state initially justified its warrantless search and seizure by arguing that the weapon was in plain view. The state has, however, confused the term plain view with what is properly termed open view. Petitioner and the trial and district courts have likewise confused the terms. The error is not uncommon. [2] Judge Charles Moylan of the Maryland Special Court of Appeals has properly defined and distinguished the terms: In this context, we studiously avoid the phraseology in plain view to avoid any implication that the so-called plain view doctrine is being invoked. That doctrine is not here applicable. Needless confusion is frequently engendered by the employment in many opinions of the same phrase  in plain view  to describe two visually similar but legally distinct situations. The plain view doctrine, as described in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, refers exclusively to the legal justification  the reasonableness  for the seizure of evidence which has not been particularly described in a warrant and which is inadvertently spotted in the course of a constitutional search already in progress or in the course of an otherwise justifiable intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. It has no applicability when the vantage point from which the plain view is made is not within a constitutionally protected area. It is, therefore literarily discreet to use for such latter situations some alternative phraseology such as [open view,] clearly visible, readily observable, open to public gaze, etc., rather than to employ the words in plain view in their purely descriptive capacity, lest the unwary reader read them in their other and talismanic capacity as an invocation of the doctrine of the same name in nonintrusive situations where it is not applicable. Scales v. State, 13 Md. App. 474, 477, n. 1, 284 A.2d 45, 47 n. 1 (1971). The term plain view has been misunderstood and misapplied because courts have made it applicable to three distinct factual situations. This has resulted in confusion of the elements of the plain view doctrine. To eliminate this confusion, we believe it appropriate to distinguish the true plain view doctrine as established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), from other situations where officers observe contraband. The first factual situation we identify as a prior valid intrusion. In this situation, an officer is legally inside, by warrant or warrant exception, a constitutionally protected area and inadvertently observes contraband also in the protected area. It is this situation for which the United States Supreme Court created the plain view doctrine in Coolidge and held that an officer could constitutionally seize the contraband in plain view from within this protected area. We emphasize that it is critical under this doctrine for the officer to be already within the constitutionally protected area when he inadvertently discovers the contraband. We identify the second factual situation as a non-intrusion. This situation occurs when both the officer and the contraband are in a non-constitutionally protected area. Because no protected area is involved, the resulting seizure has no fourth amendment ramifications, and, while the contraband could be defined as in plain view, it should not be so labeled to prevent any confusion with the Coolidge plain view doctrine. The third situation concerns a pre-intrusion. Here, the officer is located outside of a constitutionally protected area and is looking inside that area. If the officer observes contraband in this situation, it only furnishes him probable cause to seize the item. He must either obtain a warrant or have some exception to the warrant requirement before he may enter the protected area and seize the contraband. As with the non-intrusion situation, the term plain view should not be employed here to prevent confusion. For clarity, we label an observation in the latter two non- Coolidge situations as a legally permissive open view. We find that the instant facts fit properly into the third, pre-intrusion, category. The police officers had stopped the vehicle in which petitioner was a passenger pursuant to a valid traffic arrest. When one officer stepped forward to look into the vehicle, he stood outside the vehicle, a nonprotected area, and looked inside, a constitutionally protected area. It is clear at this point that, on seeing the firearm in open view through the open car door, the officer had probable cause to believe that the felony of possessing a concealed firearm was being committed in his presence. He then needed a warrant or warrant exception before he could enter the vehicle and seize the firearm. Under the facts, the officer was legally justified in seizing the firearm without a warrant under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the basis for warrantless entry being the exigency of a movable vehicle. Albo v. State, 379 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1980). See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (court stated that warrantless vehicle search is justified in part because of diminished expectation of privacy in automobile); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (same). The officer was additionally justified in retrieving the weapon for purposes of self-protection. Warren v. United States, 447 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.1971); United States v. Thompson, 420 F.2d 536 (3d Cir.1970). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). We hold therefore that the instant seizure was clearly reasonable.