Opinion ID: 1833936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Responsibility to Provide Police Protection.

Text: In seeking mandamus relief, the county attorney relies on section 372.4, which governs cities having the mayor-council form of government: The mayor ... shall appoint the marshal or chief of police except where an intergovernmental agreement makes other provisions for police protection or as otherwise provided in section 400.13 [civil service]. [1] The county attorney claims this statute requires that the mayor appoint a police chief if the city council has not otherwise provided for police protection. The mayor argues this interpretation is incorrect for two reasons. First, he contends the decision whether to provide any police protection at all is discretionary, and unless a city chooses to furnish such protection to its residents, the mayor has no duty to appoint a police chief. Alternatively, the mayor claims the decision on how to provide police services is left to the city council and section 372.4 addresses only the manner in which a police chief will be appointed, once the council has decided that is the way it will provide police protection. Because the Mingo city council has not approved the hiring of a police chief, the mayor submits he has no duty to appoint one. A. City's discretion to provide police protection to its residents. The issue of a city's discretion to provide or not provide police services is answered by examining the role of city government as envisioned by the legislature. Chapter 368 establishes procedures and conditions for the incorporation, consolidation or discontinuation of cities, and for annexation of territory to or severance of territory from an existing city. A petition requesting incorporation, discontinuance or boundary adjustment must include a [d]escription of existing municipal services, including but not limited to water supply, sewage disposal, and fire and police protection.  Iowa Code § 368.11 (emphasis added). Section 368.14 provides for the appointment of a committee to consider such petitions. This committee is precluded from approving an incorporation unless it finds that the city to be incorporated will be able to provide customary municipal services within a reasonable time. Id. § 368.17(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, the committee may not approve an annexation of land to an existing city unless the committee finds that the city will be able to provide to the territory substantial municipal services and benefits not previously enjoyed by such territory. Id. § 368.17(4) (emphasis added). Clearly, police protection is a municipal service as that phrase is used in chapter 368, and our cases reflect that fact. See Citizens of Rising Sun v. Rising Sun City Dev. Comm., 528 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1995) (discussing ability of proposed city to provide law enforcement services to meet requirement of section 368.17(1) to provide customary municipal services); Dickinson County v. City Dev. Comm., 521 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Iowa 1994) (analyzing city's compliance with section 368.17(4)'s requirement that city can provide territory to be annexed with substantial municipal services, including police protection); City of Decorah v. Peterson, 203 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1973) (discussing city's ability to provide police protection as municipal service in context of annexation proceeding). Thus, chapter 368 requires all cities to provide police protection as one of the municipal services extended to city residents. See Iowa Code § 362.9 (stating provisions of chapter 368 apply to all cities); see also id. § 362.8 (requiring court to liberally construe the city code, which includes chapters 368 and 372, to effectuate its purpose[ ] of providing for the public safety and welfare). It would be illogical to interpret chapter 368 to require a showing the city or proposed city can provide police protection to its residents as a condition of annexation or incorporation, but not to require that the city actually do so. See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Acker, 541 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Iowa 1995) (holding court will construe statutes in such a way as to avoid absurd and impractical results). Based on our interpretation of chapter 368, we reject the mayor's argument that the City of Mingo has discretion to forgo altogether any police protection for its residents. Giving the City such discretion would lead to absurd results, as a close examination of the mayor's rationale illustrates. The mayor argues the City can choose to provide no police services to its residents because the residents of Mingo, as taxpayers of Jasper County, are entitled to police protection from the County. If we were to adopt this reasoning, then the residents of Jasper County, as taxpayers of the State of Iowa, could refuse to hire a county sheriff and rely on the State to provide police protection. Similarly, the citizens of Iowa, as taxpayers of the federal government, could refuse to employ highway patrol officers and simply rely on the federal government for police services. Such a result is illogical and impractical. In summary, the decision to provide police protection is not discretionary with the City; police protection is one of the basic municipal services the City must provide to its residents to justify its existence under chapter 368. Therefore, it is the City's duty to provide the residents of Mingo with police protection; it is not the duty of Jasper County. We now turn to the role of the mayor in fulfilling the City's duty to provide police services to its residents. B. Officer or entity of city responsible for police services. Iowa Code section 364.2 provides that the power of a city is vested in the city council except as otherwise provided by a state law. Pursuant to this statute, the city council has the power to decide how to provide police protection to its residents, unless another statute has given that power to some other city official. Contrary to the suggestion of the county attorney, we do not think section 372.4 places this obligation on the mayor. In fact, it is implicit in the wording of section 372.4 that the obligation to choose the way in which police protection will be provided rests with the city council. Section 372.4 gives the mayor the duty to appoint the chief of police  except where an intergovernmental agreement makes other provisions for police protection or as otherwise provided in section 400.13 [civil service]. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the ability to enter into an intergovernmental agreement lies with the city council. See Iowa Code §§ 28E.4 (requiring appropriate action of the governing body before an intergovernmental agreement is effective), 364.2 (placing powers of city in city council). Similarly, it is the city council that has the option to adopt the civil service provisions of chapter 400. See id. § 400.3 (In cities having a population of less than eight thousand, the city council may, by ordinance, adopt the provisions of this chapter....). Under the county attorney's interpretation of section 372.4, the mayor would have the power to provide police protection through a police chief if the mayor acted before the city council furnished police services in some other manner. This result creates an unworkable situation. To divide the decision-making responsibility on how to provide police protection between the city council and the mayor only invites problems. For example, if a city council fails to act promptly to renew an intergovernmental agreement for police services before its expiration, can the mayor then appoint a police chief, even though the city council intends to contract for such services with another intergovernmental agreement? Does the mayor's appointment of a chief preclude the council from seeking an intergovernmental agreement? One can envision the confusion of such a decision-making process. Our interpretation of section 372.4 avoids such problems by keeping the decision on how to provide police protection with the city council. Only when the council has authorized the employment of a police chief is the mayor's duty to make the appointment triggered. The language of section 372.4 supports this conclusion. See State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997) (holding the fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislature's intent and construe statutes in such a way as to give effect to that intent); State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996) (stating evidence of legislature's intent is found in the language of the statute). Section 372.4 states the mayor  shall appoint the marshal or chief of police. (Emphasis added.) Chapter 362, which applies to chapter 372, defines the word shall as imposing a duty. Id. §§ 362.1, .2(23). In contrast, it also defines the word must as stating a requirement. Id. § 362.2(14). Significantly, the legislature, by using the word shall, imposed a duty rather than a requirement. Moreover, section 372.4 refers to the chief of police. As the mayor persuasively argues, the legislature's reference to the police chief implies that a decision to appoint a police chief has already been made. Compare Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2368 (1993) (defining the to mean a function word [used] to indicate that a following noun ... refers to someone or something previously mentioned or clearly understood from the context or the situation), with id. at 1 (defining a as a function word [used] before most singular nouns ... when the individual in question is undetermined, unidentified, or unspecified, esp. when the individual is being first mentioned or called to notice). We think if the legislature intended that the mayor was required to appoint a police chief, as the county attorney contends, it would have said that the mayor must appoint a police chief unless the council has entered into an intergovernmental agreement or has provided for civil service selection procedures. In summary, the manner in which police services are to be provided to a city's residents is left to the judgment of the city council. The options available to the city council under a council-mayor form of government are outlined in section 372.4. The council can enter into an intergovernmental agreement with another governmental entity to obtain police protection or it can choose to hire its own law enforcement officer. If the council decides to employ a police chief, it can do so pursuant to civil service procedures by simply adopting such procedures, or it can direct the mayor to make the appointment. Once the mayor is authorized by the council to appoint the police chief, the mayor has the obligation to do so.