Opinion ID: 724046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evaluation of Subjective Complaints

Text: 6 A claimant's subjective allegation of pain is not sufficient in itself to establish disability. Before the ALJ need even consider any subjective evidence of pain, the claimant must first prove by objective medical evidence the existence of a pain-producing impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Plaintiff met this initial burden here. X-rays of plaintiff's cervical spine taken in 1991 showed marked degenerative changes, and x-rays of his left shoulder showed degenerative changes and a narrowing of the AC joint. A CAT scan of plaintiff's cervical spine in the fall of 1991 revealed extensive osteoarthritis changes of the facet joints without evidence of [a] ruptured disk, Tr. at 206, and x-rays of plaintiff's lumbosacral spine showed moderate lipping of osteoarthritis, but no degenerative changes, id. at 213. The ALJ was then required to consider all the relevant objective and subjective evidence and decide whether he believe[d] the claimant's assertions of severe pain, Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir.1987). The ALJ found that plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were not credible to the extent they suggested he could not perform a full range of medium work. 7 Findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence.... Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir.1988). Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, [however,] and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence. Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir.1990). 8 Here, some of the reasons advanced by the ALJ for finding plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain incredible were not supported by substantial evidence. The most notable of these was the ALJ's determination that plaintiff had an incentive not to work. This finding was based entirely on the ALJ's speculation that the terms of plaintiff's pension might prohibit plaintiff from working. Conversely, the ALJ also failed to consider relevant factors that were supported by the record. The most notable of these was the possibility that psychological disorders combine with physical problems, Luna, 834 F.2d at 166. Dr. Spray, a clinical psychologist, diagnosed plaintiff with somatoform disorder, not otherwise specified. He found that plaintiff manifested an [u]nrealistic interpretation of physical signs or sensations associated with the preoccupation or belief that one has a serious disease or injury. Tr. at 266. Dr. Spray also noted that plaintiff was extremely somatically preoccupied, id. at 308, and that, even if plaintiff were given only simple job instructions, he would be likely to complain about somatic concerns, id. at 310. The ALJ, however, did not treat plaintiff's somatic preoccupation as a manifestation of his mental impairment or consider how that impairment, along with plaintiff's depression and anxiety disorder, affected his perception of pain. Instead, the ALJ discounted plaintiff's credibility based on his determination that claimant is bored and whiny and has [an] incentive not to work and to complain about problems. Id. at 37. Thus, the ALJ's evaluation of plaintiff's subjective complaints was flawed by his reliance on factors that were not supported by the record and by his failure to consider other factors that were supported by the record.