Opinion ID: 403838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reasonableness of routine document and safety inspections

Text: 45 We must decide whether a Coast Guard document and safety inspection of a 40-foot sailing vessel on the high seas after dark pursuant to an administrative plan but without even a founded suspicion of noncompliance violates the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that such routine stops are reasonable and do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 46 The Coast Guard's statutory authority to stop and inspect vessels in international waters is found in 14 U.S.C. § 89(a): 47 The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized. 48 This statute gives the Coast Guard plenary authority to stop vessels for document and safety inspections. However, like any other federal regulation, this statute is subject to constitutional limitations. (I)f a warrant requirement is imposed by the fourth amendment, no statute can dispose of it. United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922, 101 S.Ct. 322, 66 L.Ed.2d 150 (1980). (T)he Coast Guard's authority must be subject to the limitations imposed by the Fourth Amendment, because no act of congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution. United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952, 98 S.Ct. 1581, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978). 49 As already noted, the Fourth Amendment imposes a standard of reasonableness. This standard implies a balancing of the competing individual and governmental interests. To determine whether the law enforcement practice at issue is permissible, we must balance the instrusion on the defendants' Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (quoted supra at p. 767). We must consider both the objective and subjective intrusion, id. at 656, 99 S.Ct. at 1397, and we must evaluate the governmental interests in light of alternative mechanisms available, id. at 659, 99 S.Ct. at 1399. 50 Defendants do not deny that the government has strong, legitimate interests in securing compliance with document and safety regulations. Besides the obvious public interest in safety and the government's legitimate interest in preventing improper use of the United States flag by foreign vessels, international law requires the United States to regulate the operation of its flag vessels on the high seas. See Convention of the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, arts. 5 & 10, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, 2316, T.I.A.S. No. 5200. 51 Nor do defendants challenge the effectiveness of Coast Guard boardings in detecting violations of documentation and safety regulations. The hazards of safety violations and the effectiveness of Coast Guard boardings in detecting such violations are amply illustrated by U.S. Coast Guard Boating Statistics 1979 (Commandant Instruction M 16754.1A) and U. S. Coast Guard Office of Boating, Recreational Boating Safety Program Activities Report, Date Summary for Fiscal Years 1978-1979. The latter report indicates that deficiencies relating to equipment or documentation were noted in 31,792 out of 47,018 Coast Guard boardings conducted in 1979. The government further offered to prove (1) that safety violations were observed in approximately 80% of vessel boardings conducted by Commander Chapman during recent patrols out of Long Beach, and (2) that in 1980 the 2,275 boardings conducted by the entire Eleventh Coast Guard District resulted in 1,171 citations, of which 368 were on the high seas. This record of effectiveness contrasts sharply with the marginal contribution to law enforcement resulting from the random stops of automobiles at issue in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 7 52 Defendants have not shown any feasible, less intrusive means for policing compliance with safety and documentation regulations. A requirement that the Coast Guard have a founded suspicion of noncompliance before boarding would completely frustrate Coast Guard efforts to enforce compliance, simply because most documentation and safety violations cannot be detected without boarding. We have already noted the impracticality of annual dockside inspections. See Piner, 608 F.2d at 359-60 (9th Cir. 1979). Safety regulations apply to pleasure boats only when in use. 46 U.S.C. § 1461(c). Requiring compliance at all times would expose boat owners to considerable risk of dockside theft. Even if compliance were required at all times and the Coast Guard did conduct annual inspections, in light of the ease with which safety equipment and documentation can be removed, supplementary routine boarding checks probably still would be necessary to enforce compliance. 53 Roadblock-type stops obviously are not feasible on the high seas. Defendants argue that harbors can be blocked just as effectively as a highway, and that such harbor checkpoint inspections would be a more efficient, safe and effective method of enforcing safety and documentation laws. This argument overlooks the fact that many American vessels travelling in international waters only infrequently enter American ports. Inspection schemes limited to inspecting vessels in American ports would decrease the Coast Guard's ability to police all American flag vessels, particularly since such vessels may operate far from the shores of the United States, seldom calling on American ports. United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 132 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887, 101 S.Ct. 243, 66 L.Ed.2d 113 (1980). Thus, even if the Coast Guard were to institute harbor checkpoint stops, additional boardings, particularly on the high seas, probably would be necessary for effective enforcement procedures. Further, a prohibition on high seas boardings would unnecessarily limit the activities of Coast Guard vessels patrolling international waters for other legitimate purposes. 54 The impracticality and doubtful usefulness of restricting document and safety inspections on the high seas to daylight hours already has been discussed. See n. 5 and accompanying text. At least under the facts of this case, the distinction between daylight and darkness is irrelevant. 55 The government interests in enforcing compliance with documentation and safety laws must be balanced against the intrusion on defendants' Fourth Amendment interests. However, the boarding in this case involved minimal objective intrusion. A heavy odor of marijuana was noticed as soon as the boarding party entered the vessel's cabin. Almost simultaneously, Commander Chapman observed 40 to 50 boxes floating in the water at positions consistent with their having been jettisoned from the GLOBE TROTTER. 8 Further, the Coast Guard had taken steps to minimize any subjective intrusion. The stop did not involve an exercise of discretion by an officer in the field, but instead was conducted pursuant to an administrative plan. Radio contact was established more than twenty minutes before boarding, and stripe-lights were used to illuminate the Coast Guard vessel's seal and orange stripes. There is no evidence that unnecessary force, or any force, was employed to effect the stop. 56 We conclude that the modest Fourth Amendment interests implicated by the stop and boarding in this case are outweighed by the government's strong interests in securing compliance with document and safety regulations. 9 57 As further evidence of the reasonableness of the enforcement technique at issue, the statutory grant of authority in 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) can be traced to an enactment of the First Congress, the same Congress which proposed the Fourth Amendment. Section 31 of the Revenue Service Act provided: 58 That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors, and the officers of the revenue cutters ... to go on board of ships or vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States, whether in or out of their respective districts, for the purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examining and searching the said ships or vessels; and the said officers respectively shall have free access to the cabin, and every other part of a ship or vessel .... 59 1 Stat. 164 (1790). This original enactment is persuasive evidence that stops and searches of the sort involved here without a warrant and without even a founded suspicion are not unreasonable as that word is used in the Fourth Amendment. See generally United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1978-80, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, 6 S.Ct. 524, 528, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (in each case the Court relied on an enactment of the First Congress as persuasive evidence of the scope of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures). 10 60 All other circuits which have addressed this issue have reached the same conclusion that Coast Guard document and safety inspections without a warrant and without a founded suspicion of noncompliance do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887, 101 S.Ct. 243, 66 L.Ed.2d 113 (1980) (We believe the limited intrusion represented by a document and safety inspection on the high seas, even in the absence of a warrant or suspicion of wrongdoing, is reasonable under the fourth amendment.); United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887, 101 S.Ct. 243, 66 L.Ed.2d 113 (1980) (To require some particularized suspicion concerning individual vessels in order to carry out a systematic inspection of all vessels in some area of the sea would encourage outright flaunting of the navigation, safety and administrative laws of the United States at the expense of our government's sovereign obligation under international law to police its flag ships.); United States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 1520, 67 L.Ed.2d 818 (1981) (A United States vessel in international waters may be boarded for the purpose of conducting such (a document and safety) inspection without any particularized suspicion of a violation of the law .... (citations omitted)); United States v. Clark, 664 F.2d 1174, 1175 (11th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (The Coast Guard has plenary power under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) to stop and board American vessels on the high seas to inspect for safety, documentation, and obvious customs and narcotics violations. The fact that this authority is exercised without probable cause or reasonable suspicion does not violate the fourth amendment). No circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. 61 The decision of the district court is REVERSED.