Opinion ID: 1272426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to correct Mikles's perjured testimony

Text: At trial, the prosecutor asked Mikles whether anyonewhen I say `anyone,' I include sheriffs, police, District Attorneys; in other words, anyone in law enforcementdid anyone . . . promise you anything in exchange for your testifying about the conversation that Jackson had with you? Mikles responded, Just a lot of protection. The record amply demonstrates, however, that Mikles was offered much more than mere protection. Therefore, we agree with the California Supreme Court and the district court that Mikles's statement was false and misleading. The State contends that Napue did not require the prosecution to correct Mikles's perjury because the prosecutor himself was unaware of the promises made by the police and sheriff's department. Further, it argues that to hold Napue applicable in such a case would create a new rule barred by Teague. Again, we disagree with the State's analysis. Napue applies whenever a prosecution `knew or should have known that the testimony was false.' Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.2003)). As described above, the prosecutor has a clear Brady obligation to investigate whether the police have evidence favorable to the defendant. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ([A]ny argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 ([W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor.). If the prosecutor has a duty to investigate and disclose favorable evidence known only to the police, he should know when a witness testifies falsely about such evidence. Accordingly, we agree with the California Supreme Court's conclusion that the prosecution should have known of the false and misleading nature of the informants' testimony, and therefore the prosecution was under a constitutional obligation to correct that testimony. In re Jackson, 3 Cal.4th at 597, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371. The State's attempt to characterize this fundamental principle as a new rule is unavailing. In Napue itself, the Supreme Court made clear: [I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Further, in Giglio, the Court explicitly found a Napue violation when the prosecutor lacked personal knowledge of the perjury. As described above, Giglio involved one prosecutor's unknowing failure to correct false testimony that disavowed promises made by another prosecutor. 405 U.S. at 155, 92 S.Ct. 763. The Court emphasized that, The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government. Id. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763. The Court concluded that the due process requirements enunciated in Napue and the other cases cited earlier require a new trial. . . . Id. at 155. Napue and Giglio make perfectly clear that the constitutional prohibition on the knowing use of perjured testimony applies when any of the State's representatives would know the testimony was false. The California Supreme Court correctly concluded that Jackson's prosecutor should have known of Mikles's perjury and had a constitutional obligation to correct the false testimony. In re Jackson, 3 Cal.4th at 597, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371. In 1981, Napue and Giglio would have compelled the court to come to the same conclusion, so Teague is not implicated.