Opinion ID: 2497751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Standards of Review for Brady and Giglio Claims

Text: Franqui next contends that the State withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and knowingly presented false testimony in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), concerning witness Pablo Abreu. Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to the defense. Mordenti v. State, 894 So.2d 161, 168 (Fla.2004). [16] To demonstrate a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show (1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000). To meet the materiality prong of Brady, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). As with prejudice under Strickland, materiality under Brady requires a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Duest v. State, 12 So.3d 734, 744 (Fla.2009). The materiality inquiry is not satisfied by simply discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence and determining if the remaining evidence is sufficient. Rather, the question is whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)); see also Rivera v. State, 995 So.2d 191, 203 (Fla.2008) (same); Way, 760 So.2d at 913 (same). It is the net effect of the evidence that must be assessed. Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998). Although reviewing courts must give deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact, the ultimate question of whether evidence was material resulting in a due process violation is a mixed question of law and fact subject to independent appellate review. Way, 760 So.2d at 913. In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor is prohibited from knowingly presenting false testimony against the defendant. In order to prove a Giglio violation, a defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material. Tompkins v. State, 994 So.2d 1072, 1091 (Fla.2008) (quoting Rhodes v. State, 986 So.2d 501, 508-09 (Fla.2008)); accord Hurst v. State, 18 So.3d 975, 991 (Fla.2009). If the first two prongs are established, the false evidence is deemed material if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury's verdict. Tompkins, 994 So.2d at 1091. The State must then prove that the false testimony was not material by demonstrating it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Rhodes, 986 So.2d at 509). Under the harmless error test, the State must prove `there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.' Guzman v. State, 941 So.2d 1045, 1050 (Fla.2006) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla.1986)). Both Giglio and Brady claims present mixed questions of law and fact. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 785 (Fla.2004). Thus, as to findings of fact, we will defer to the lower court's findings if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See id. [T]his Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court. Hurst, 18 So.3d at 988 (quoting Lowe v. State, 2 So.3d 21, 30 (Fla.2008)). We review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Hurst, 18 So.3d at 988. It is within this framework that we now analyze Franqui's Brady and Giglio claims pertaining to the testimony of Pablo Abreu.