Opinion ID: 740411
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Act's Purpose

Text: 25 The Act's preamble sets forth a clearly secular purpose for the Act. The preamble indicates that the Georgia General Assembly felt that in today's hectic society there are few opportunities to engage in what the General Assembly felt would be beneficial quiet reflection. The preamble explains that the purpose of the Act is to provide students with an opportunity for a brief period of quiet reflection before beginning the day's activities. 26 The secular purpose explained in the preamble is repeated expressly in the language of the statute itself. Subsection (a) provides for a brief period of quiet reflection. 3 O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050(a) (1996). Subsection (b) further reveals that the Act's purpose is secular by explaining that the moment of quiet reflection ... is not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise but shall be considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050(b) (1996). Thus, subsection (b) expressly articulates a clear secular purpose and also expressly disclaims a religious purpose. By stating that the moment of quiet reflection shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise, the statute indicates that Georgia is not advocating the moment of quiet reflection as a time for religious activity. 4 Subsection (b) even provides a secular topic on which students may reflect: the anticipated activities of the day. Id. 27 Bown contends, however, that subsection (c) impermissibly infuses the Act with an improper religious purpose. Bown argues that subsection (c) authorizes voluntary, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing, student initiated prayer and thus shows that the Act has a religious purpose. However, an examination of the language of subsection (c) and its legislative history reveals that the most reasonable interpretation of subsection (c) is that it does not affirmatively authorize any activity at all, but rather merely rebuts any possible negative pregnant implied from the prohibition of religious activity in subsection (b). The explicit language of subsection (c) merely states that subsections (a) and (b) do not prevent certain activity which the legislature apparently believed was constitutional. 5 This interpretation is clear from the plain language of subsection (c): 28 The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section shall not prevent student initiated voluntary school prayers at schools or school related events which are nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature. 29 O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050(c) (1996) (emphasis added). No affirmative activity is authorized. Thus, subsection (c) merely clarifies that subsections (a) and (b) shall not prevent other activity that is constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment. 6 30 Several considerations lead us to reject Bown's argument that subsection (c) affirmatively authorizes religious activity at schools and school-related events. As noted above, the plain language of (c) indicates that it affirmatively authorizes nothing and is merely intended to guard against unintended interpretations of subsections (a) and (b). The overall structure of the Act further supports this view. The preamble clearly explains that the Act is focused on a moment of quiet reflection for secular purposes, not on the religious purpose suggested by Bown's interpretation. The secular moment of silence focus is also borne out by the title of the Act (Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools) and the caption for the Act as codified (Brief period of quiet reflection authorized; nature of period.). Finally, the severability clause further supports our interpretation that subsection (c) merely is intended to clarify subsections (a) and (b) and does not infuse the Act with a religious purpose. The severability clause provides that if any section of the Act is found to be unconstitutional, the other sections of the Act will remain in effect. Because of this severability clause, if subsection (c) were struck down, subsections (a) and (b) would remain, and the moment of quiet reflection would continue. The severability clause thus indicates that the Georgia legislators, regardless of the validity of subsection (c), wanted to provide for a moment of quiet reflection for Georgia's students and would be satisfied to have subsections (a) and (b) enforced even in the absence of subsection (c). 31 The Act's legislative history, although somewhat conflicting, is not inconsistent with the express statutory language articulating a clear secular purpose and disclaiming a religious purpose. The Act's primary sponsor, Senator Scott, stated that he introduced Senate Bill 396 as one way of addressing the problems of violence which Georgia's children face. He viewed the Act not as providing for school prayer, but rather as providing for a moment for students to collect their thoughts, focus on the upcoming day, and begin to develop self-respect and discipline. In the House debate, it is true that several representatives indicated a desire to reinstitute school prayer, and at least some apparently believed that the bill as amended in the House would do so. However, several legislators who supported the bill in the House indicated that they did not believe that the bill had anything to do with prayer. 32 Bown argues that the House debate with respect to subsection (c) 7 indicates a legislative purpose to restore prayer to the schools. As noted above, several representatives apparently believed that the amendment which ultimately survived as subsection (c) was a step toward returning prayer to schools. However, as also noted above, other legislators thought otherwise. There is also strong evidence indicating that subsection (c) was motivated by a Fifth Circuit decision which allowed voluntary, student initiated prayers at high school graduations if the prayers were nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967, 113 S.Ct. 2950, 124 L.Ed.2d 697 (1993). It is apparent that the legislators supporting the addition of subsection (c) were concerned that subsections (a) and (b) might be construed to prohibit activities (like those in Jones ) that the legislators believed to be constitutionally permissible. In other words, these legislators viewed subsection (c) merely as making it clear that subsections (a) and (b) do not prevent constitutionally permissible activity. 8 33 We are thus faced with legislative history that is much different from that in Jaffree. In Jaffree, the primary sponsor of the Alabama statute and the Governor of Alabama both explicitly conceded that the purpose of the Alabama statute was to return prayer to the Alabama schools, and Alabama failed to present any evidence of a secular purpose. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 57 & n. 44, 105 S.Ct. at 2490 & n. 44. In contrast, in this case, the primary sponsor of the Act indicated that the Act had a secular purpose. It is true, as Bown argues, that some legislators expressed the desire to return prayer to Georgia's schools and supported the Act for this reason. However, it is also true that other legislators felt that the Act did not involve school prayer. Furthermore, there is no evidence as to what the many other legislators who voted in favor of the Act believed the purpose of the Act was or why they voted for the Act. The plurality in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990), provides helpful guidance for a case such as this one in which the legislative history is conflicting. The Mergens plurality noted that [e]ven if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate the Act, because what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249, 110 S.Ct. at 2371 (plurality). Although some Georgia legislators expressed religious motives for voting for the Act, the fact remains that the language of the statute as enacted reveals a clearly secular legislative purpose: to provide students with a moment of quiet reflection to think about the upcoming day. 34 An overall assessment of the legislative history may well support a clear secular purpose, as the district court found. We need not so decide, however, because we readily conclude at the very least that the legislative history cannot be construed to override the express statutory language articulating a clear secular purpose and also disclaiming a religious purpose. 35 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Act has a clearly secular purpose. Because the Act's clearly secular purpose is sincere and not a sham, 9 we conclude that the Act satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test.