Opinion ID: 739321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellee Tessmer

Text: 40 Appellee Tessmer's primary argument is that he was without knowledge of any risk faced by Billups. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether a reasonable jury could have found that Tessmer had knowledge of the facts surrounding the assault on prisoner Barlow and the risk faced by Billups resulting from this assault. The answer to this question depends on whether Tessmer received the Vink Report and whether that report provided sufficient information concerning the risks faced by Billups. 41 Following the assault on Barlow, Tessmer ordered Prison Inspector Erik Vink to investigate the incident. Vink then conducted interviews with three prisoners who had knowledge of the assault. Vink never prepared an actual report from his discussions with the various prisoners; the Vink Report is merely the term used by the parties to describe the transcripts that resulted from Vink's interviews with each prisoner. Tessmer testified that he could not recall receiving the report, and that after a thorough search through his files, he could not find the report. J.A. at 488. However, Vink testified that what I did was send the report in to [Tessmer]. J.A. at 569. In addition, he stated that after he sent the report, he talked to Tessmer about the report, although he could not remember what was said. J.A. at 570. 42 We believe that Vink's testimony raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tessmer received and had knowledge of the contents of the report. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. at 1981 (Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence....). This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. The ultimate issue is not whether Tessmer had knowledge of the Vink Report but whether he had knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm facing Billups. To answer this question we must turn to the Vink Report itself to determine whether a reasonable jury could find that it discloses such a risk. 43 The first prisoner interviewed by Vink stated that he had witnessed the assault on Barlow and that on the day following that assault he himself was stabbed. J.A. at 657. He then stated that the tophead Melanics was kind of upset about the unauthorized assault and had a few words with Billups. J.A. at 658. Moreover, he gave an affirmative answer to the question [The Melanics] were mad at Billups because he had part in [the assault] against Barlow? J.A. at 658. The other two prisoners both stated that the first prisoner was stabbed in retaliation for his participation in the Barlow assault. J.A. at 683, 696. The Vink Report thus contains evidence that one of the prisoners participating with Billups in the Barlow assault was stabbed the following day by the tophead Melanics for his participation in the assault and that the topheads were angry at Billups as well. 44 Evidence also was admitted at trial suggesting that if Tessmer reviewed the Vink Report, he had a duty to take further action. Tessmer himself admitted that had the report been received, further investigation would have been warranted. J.A. at 493-94. In addition, appellant's expert witness, Dr. Mintzes, testified that, assuming Tessmer received the Vink Report, he had a duty to make that information available to SPSM because the report contained potentially critical information. J.A. at 524-25. 3 According to Dr. Mintzes, the violent nature of the Melanics, as well as their ability to communicate across prison lines, was well known. J.A. at 526, 529. And Dr. Mintzes viewed the stabbing of the first prisoner mentioned in the Vink Report as further evidence of the fact that if one got on the wrong side of the Melanics, ... one tended to incur the possibility of great physical jeopardy. J.A. at 527. 45 Tessmer contends the Vink Report was unreliable. He points to his testimony at trial that the report provided an insufficient basis for him to have taken specific action. J.A. at 493. In addition, Inspector Vink testified that two of the witnesses were not particularly credible. J.A. at 556, 562. Tessmer's interpretation of the Vink Report is not unreasonable. Parts of the report are murky and other parts focus on issues unrelated to Billups. Indeed, Tessmer's interpretation of the Vink Report ultimately may prove to be correct. We are not allowed, however, to weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses when reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law. O'Brien, 23 F.3d at 995. Given the substance of the Vink Report, Dr. Mintzes's testimony, and Tessmer's own admission, we believe a question of fact exists as to whether the Vink Report disclosed a substantial risk of serious harm to Billups. 46 Apart from the Vink Report, Tessmer contends that he was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm because when Billups met with him prior to Billups's transfer, Billups failed to disclose any risk of harm. Even assuming this assertion is true, warnings from the prisoner himself are not required when other evidence discloses a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848, 114 S.Ct. at 1984 ([T]he [prisoner's] failure to give advance notice [to prison officials] is not dispositive. Petitioner may establish respondents' awareness by reliance on any relevant evidence.). In this case, as we just concluded, other relevant evidence established a question of fact as to whether Tessmer received the Vink Report and whether that report disclosed a substantial risk of serious harm to Billups. 47 If the trier of fact resolves both of these questions of fact in favor of appellant, it still must determine whether Tessmer had actual knowledge of the risk facing Billups. The Court in Farmer emphasized the importance of the actual knowledge requirement: 48 Because ... prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment, it remains open to the officials to prove that they were unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety. That a trier of fact may infer knowledge from the obvious, in other words, does not mean that it must do so. Prison officials charged with deliberate indifference might show, for example, that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent. 49 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1982. Because we are in no position to discern Tessmer's state of mind from the record before us, a question of fact exists regarding this issue as well. 50 We recently stated in Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810 (6th Cir.1996), that summary judgment is inappropriate when there are issues of fact as to whether [a defendant in a § 1983/Eighth Amendment case] was 'aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]' and whether he actually 'dr[e]w the inference.'  Id. at 816 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979). Because questions of fact exist in the present case based on evidence admitted at trial as to whether Tessmer had knowledge of the Vink Report, whether that report disclosed that Billups faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and whether Tessmer actually drew the inference of that risk, we conclude that the district court improperly granted Tessmer's motion for judgment as a matter of law.