Opinion ID: 78335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Questions Regarding Parker's Statement

Text: Parker maintains that his attorneys failed to address either the temporal proximity between his first contact with the officers and his statement, or the effect of his intervening meeting with Fountain, who was very upset at that time. He also contends that his attorneys failed to address his impairment at the time of his statement. Parker arrived at the Sheriff's Department at 3:35 P.M. [A] few minutes after his arrival, he was interviewed by Hargett and began making a statement at 4:38 P.M. Exh. Vol. 2 at 203, 205. The interview stopped at 5:30 P.M. and Hargett left the room. Parker was then permitted to visit with Fountain for about three minutes. She had been interviewed by law enforcement officers and advised that she needed to cooperate if she wanted to see her baby again. During her visit with Parker, she had the baby with her and told Parker that the officers had advised her to tell him that they believed that she and Parker were involved in a murder, and that Smith and Williams were blaming everything on [Parker]. Id. at 236-37, 242-43. At 5:45 P.M., Parker was interviewed by May and, shortly thereafter, he made his second and inculpatory statement. During the suppression hearing, the prosecutor referenced Fountain's meeting with Parker in his summation and Parker's attorney responded by citing Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691-92, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667-68, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982). Although this issue was not specifically addressed on direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did state that it had reviewed the testimony from the suppression hearing and found no error in the trial judge's admission of his statement. Parker I, 587 So.2d at 1088. The question of whether a defendant's statement, given after an illegal arrest and Miranda warnings, is the product of a free will ... must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. The relevant factors in making the threshold determination of voluntariness include the Miranda warnings, [t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62 (internal citation and footnote omitted). The prosecution bears the burden of showing admissibility. Id. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. The temporal proximity factor is evaluated based on, inter alia, the length of time between the arrest and the confession and any intervening significant events. A statement made several days after an illegal arrest is too temporally distant to warrant admission. Id. at 605 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. at 2262 n. 11. Intervening significant events may include a lawful arraignment and the release from custody. See id. The admission of Miranda warnings alone; a short five to ten minute visitation with friends, one of whom was emotionally upset; or the issuance of an arrest warrant are not, individually or collectively, considered significant intervening events. See id. at 602, 95 S.Ct. at 2261 ( Miranda warnings alone); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691-92, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667-68, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) ( Miranda warnings, short visitation, arrest warrant). [33] Absent intervening significant events, statements given within two hours to six hours of an arrest have been suppressed. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05, 95 S.Ct. at 2262 (two hours with no intervening significant events); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 203 n. 2, 218-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2252 n. 2, 2260, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (less than an hour and no intervening significant events); Taylor, 457 U.S. at 691, 102 S.Ct. at 2667 (six hours and defendant was in police custody, unrepresented by counsel,... questioned on several occasions, fingerprinted, and subjected to a lineup). Exclusionary purpose and misconduct is demonstrated when the arrest was for investigatory reasons and was effected to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262 (investigatory arrest); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2260 (investigatory arrest not cured by police's lack of threats, and abuse, or protecti[on] of defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); Taylor 457 U.S. at 693, 102 S.Ct. at 2668-69 (investigatory arrest not cured by police's lack of physical abuse or defendant's voluntary confession). The state appellate court found that Parker's claims regarding his arrest at home and the intervening events between his arrest and his statement were irrelevant because probable cause was established by corroboration of the confidential informant's information. Exh. PC Vol. 16, Tab 61 at 2. It concluded that he failed to show prejudice arising out of his counsel's failure to challenge the temporal proximity or the impact of his meeting with Fountain and did not show that his attorney was ineffective. Id. The district court did not err in finding that state courts reasonably applied the law and that its determinations were not based on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts.