Opinion ID: 1155642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements made by the Panel Members

Text: When explaining their opinions, the sanity panel members referred to statements Appellant had made during her examination. Appellant claims that such testimony by the medical examiners violated HRS § 704-416 [3] and should not have been admissible at trial. She also relies on State v. Wallace, 71 Haw. 591, 593-94, 801 P.2d 27, 28 (1990), which held that if a statement is an admission of guilt, then it is not admissible, even on the issue of the defendant's mental or physical condition. The State argues that none of the statements made by the panel members constituted admissions of guilt and are therefore admissible. For example, Dr. Furukawa, one of the panel members, reported on direct examination that Appellant said: Then it all came to a head. She didn't care about me anymore. I just wanted the pain to  to go away. She had affairs with four or five other women in the facility. She said, I don't recall what I wanted to do, I just wanted the pain to stop. [She] said, [] after she died the pain has not gone away. Similarly, Mattoon testified that he did not speak with Appellant about the specifics of the offense. When he was cross-examined by the State, he acknowledged that, [s]he did speak about it in a general  very general term [sic] about how could she have done such a thing because [she] loved her so much. Mattoon also noted on direct examination that: In her written statement, she reviewed the turmoil that she was going through prior to the alleged offense and very close to the time of the alleged  alleged offense. Even that particular day she described the  almost a sense of calm detached disassociated type of feeling. In  not exactly her words, but to the effect that although there was a lot of activity around her with a lot of people, there didn't seem to be much noise, like she was in some kind of a dream state or trance-like state. After reviewing the transcript, we conclude that Appellant's statements to the experts were not admissions of guilt. Since Appellant previously admitted stabbing Agnes, the main issue was whether her mental condition negated criminal responsibility. The statements were admissible to determine her state of mind prior to and after the stabbing incident. This case is clearly distinguishable from Wallace. In Wallace, the defendant did not concede that he committed the burglary in question. However, the prosecutor asked the experts who examined defendant what he had told them about the burglary with which he was charged. [4] In this case, Appellant's statements to the experts did not amount to a confession of guilt. Assuming arguendo that Appellant's statements were admitted in violation of HRS § 704-416, a reversal would be necessary only if the erroneously introduced evidence did not constitute harmless error or there was a reasonable possibility that the erroneous admission of evidence may have contributed to the defendant's conviction of murder. See State v. Domingo, 69 Haw. 68, 71, 733 P.2d 690, 692 (1987). Appellant's statements were not prejudicial. The statements were elicited on the direct examination of Appellant's expert witnesses in order to demonstrate the extent of her relationship with Agnes, and the emotional turmoil Appellant experienced as a result of their break up. Furthermore, Appellant's counsel did not object to Mattoon's statement on cross-examination. Unlike Domingo, these statements were adduced for the purpose of enhancing Appellant's argument that she did not have complete control of her mental faculties at the time of the incident. Thus, Appellant herself offered statements to support her defense of mental irresponsibility.