Opinion ID: 2460196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of County Fiscal Court Members

Text: The Burns Estate argues that individual members of the fiscal court negligently failed to establish rules adequate to provide for the safe treatment of Burns pursuant to the authority of KRS 67.080(2)(d). The Burns Estate also claims that the fiscal court members are liable for the negligent acts of their agents and employees who dealt directly with him. Any action against fiscal court members in their official capacities is essentially an action against the county which is barred by sovereign immunity. Ky. Const. § 231. Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765 (6th Cir.1985). Although their pleading is imprecise, the Burns Estate also believes that fiscal court members are liable in their individual capacity. Public officials in Kentucky cannot be held individually liable for the negligence of their agents and employees unless they participated in or ratified the actions. The Estate complains that the fiscal court members negligently failed to establish adequate rules to provide for the safety of Burns. KRS 67.080(2)(d) states that the fiscal court provides for the incarceration of prisoners according to the provisions of KRS Chapter 441 which states that the county governing body shall prescribe rules for the government and cleanliness of the county jail and the comfort and treatment of prisoners provided such rules are consistent with state law. The Estate presents no allegation that the fiscal court enacted rules inconsistent with state law. The fiscal court had discretion to determine how to execute the mandate of KRS 441.045(1) to provide for the cleanliness and comfort of prisoners in the county jail, and the administration of such a policy is a discretionary function. See Thompson v. Huecker, Ky.App., 559 S.W.2d 488 (1977). The adoption of rules providing for the proper treatment of prisoners is a discretionary policy determination and thus a discretionary function. The fiscal court members are immune from a suit based on a failure to enact adequate rules in the absence of a claim of unconstitutional or illegal conduct. The doctrine of official immunity protects public officials from liability in certain instances when exercising a discretionary function. In such circumstances, a public official is entitled to absolute immunity from liability as long as the official acts are within the general scope of their authority. Huecker, supra ; Gould v. O'Bannon, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 220 (1989). The highest court of Kentucky has previously established the distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions. Commonwealth v. Frost, 295 Ky., 137, 172 S.W.2d 905 (1943), stated that courts will not under the pretense of finding a remedy for one believed to be wronged, assume to exercise a discretion which the people, acting through their legislature, have lodged in administrative officers and agencies. The essence of a discretionary power is that the person or persons exercising it may choose which of several courses will be followed. The power to exercise an honest discretion necessarily includes the power to make an honest mistake of judgment. Frost, supra ; citing Bancamerica-Blair Corp. v. State Highway Com'n, et al., 265 Ky. 100, 95 S.W.2d 1068 (1936). In Upchurch v. Clinton County, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 428 (1959), the predecessor to this Court stated: Discretionary or judicial duties are such as necessarily require the exercise of reason in the adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done or the course pursued. Discretion in the manner of the performance of an act arises when the act may be performed in one of two or more ways, either of which would be lawful and where it is left to the will or judgment of the performer to determine in which way it shall be performed. However, an act is not necessarily taken out of the class styled ministerial because the officer performing it is vested with a discretion respecting the means or method to be employed. The enactment of rules prescribing proper treatment of prisoners necessarily involves discretionary policy determinations and consequently such an act is clearly a discretionary function which entitles the members of the fiscal court to immunity from suit.