Opinion ID: 1127349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of defendant's Faretta motion.

Text: (12a) Defendant maintains that he unequivocally asserted before three judges his right to proceed in propria persona, and that in denying his requests the court violated his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525], among other rights guaranteed under the state and federal Constitutions. We conclude the record fails to support defendant's contention. `[I]n order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.' ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 409 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221], italics in the original; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 [137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187].) As will be shown, defendant did not assert his Faretta rights in an unequivocal and timely manner at any point in the proceedings. As set forth, ante, on October 11, 1983, at the time the court appointed Barrett, defendant asserted that in the event Stein were not appointed, he wished to represent himself. The court directed defendant to complete the necessary application to proceed in propria persona. On October 25, 1983, the court again advised defendant he could represent himself, but noted defendant had not completed the necessary written application. The court set a trial date of November 30, 1983. At a hearing on November 3, defense counsel expressed a doubt as to defendant's mental competence, thereby causing the court to appoint two physicians to examine him. At this time, defendant had not completed the in propria persona application. Prior to November 30, 1983, defendant requested that a bailiff inform the court he wished to proceed in propria persona. On November 30, after defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant's mental competency pursuant to section 1368, the court expressly acknowledged defendant's oral communication requesting to proceed in propria persona, but stated it declined to act upon that request. Defendant contends the trial court's response constituted a denial of his right to proceed in propria persona. We find no Faretta violation on this occasion, however. As a result of the doubt declared as to defendant's mental competency, the criminal proceedings were suspended (see People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340 [248 Cal. Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260]). Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to rule upon defendant's motion ( ibid. ) and accordingly properly declined to do so. The court scheduled a hearing on defendant's motion for self-representation for January 10, 1984, the same date scheduled for the hearing on defendant's mental competency. Defendant contends the trial court violated his Faretta rights at the hearing that went forward on that date. Again, the record fails to support his claim. After determining defendant was competent to stand trial, the court inquired of defendant whether he still desired to have the court rule upon his request for self-representation. Defendant unequivocally stated that he did not, and responded affirmatively when the court inquired whether he sought to withdraw his motion for in propria persona status. The trial court thereupon granted defendant's request to withdraw the motion. Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court at the January 10 hearing did not deny defendant's request for self-representation or otherwise abrogate his Faretta rights. Defendant contends the settled statement, reflecting the substance of his unreported conversation with Newton following the withdrawal of his motion for self-representation, reflects that his withdrawal was premised upon his assumption that Stein would be appointed as cocounsel, a condition that did not materialize. Again, the record lacks support for defendant's contention and establishes that defense counsel's unreported conference with defendant occurred subsequent to defendant's unconditional withdrawal of his request to proceed in propria persona. The settled statement relating to the ensuing conference reflects that Newton informed defendant that he would be seeking a 60-day continuance of trial for the purpose of filing a motion for the appointment of cocounsel, and that defendant believed that Stein would be appointed as cocounsel. Defendant's communication with his attorney pertaining to the unrelated matter of the appointment of cocounsel, which occurred after defendant had withdrawn his request for self-representation, however, does not provide a basis for his current assertion of a violation of his Faretta rights. Approximately two months after the January 10 hearing, defendant again asserted his Faretta rights. According to a settled statement of unreported proceedings, on March 23, 1984, the Honorable Robert Einstein met in chambers with defense counsel for the purpose of informing them that he had received a note from defendant indicating his desire to proceed in propria persona. Judge Einstein expressed concern regarding the consequences of defendant's self-representation in a complex capital case, and inquired of counsel whether they were aware of any matter that had prompted defendant's request. Newton responded that defendant appeared to have difficulty communicating with counsel, was anxious to ensure the protection of his rights, and desired access to a law library to assist with his defense. The prosecutor objected to granting defendant law library privileges, which generally are available only to defendants having in propria persona status. Judge Einstein indicated his belief that he had the authority to grant defendant law library privileges in the event defendant agreed to withdraw his motion to proceed in propria persona. Defense counsel agreed to discuss the matter with defendant. On March 27, 1984, at the hearing before Judge Einstein on defendant's motion to proceed in propria persona, Newton and Windon approached the bench and informed the court that defendant had agreed to withdraw his motion for in propria persona status, based upon the court's representation that he would be accorded law library privileges and counsel's representation that they would assist him in obtaining access to pertinent judicial decisions. Thereafter, defendant withdrew his request for in propria persona status, on the condition that he have law library privileges and the assistance of counsel in obtaining law books. As shown above, contrary to the assertion of defendant that Judge Einstein disregarded his Faretta rights, the record reflects that, in an attempt to safeguard defendant's rights incident to his defense, the court provided him an alternative to self-representation, and defendant voluntarily elected that alternative. No violation of defendant's Faretta rights has been shown. On January 18, 1985, the date scheduled for the commencement of trial, defendant again requested to proceed in propria persona after the trial court denied his Marsden motion. In denying this motion, the trial court found that defendant's actions demonstrated an attempt to manipulate the judicial process, to obstruct his prosecution, and to delay the trial. The court denied defendant's request to proceed in propria persona for this same reason, and additionally on the ground the request was untimely (having been asserted on the date scheduled for trial after numerous continuances). The court stated: Now, as far as I'm concerned, while you do have a right to represent yourself in propria persona, that right must be made in a timely and reasonable manner. You made an election agreeing to proceed with the counsel who are representing you now. And the Court finds that it is not timely at this late stage of the game, on the date of trial, to attempt to discharge your attorney by whatever means are available to you, by trying to create a conflict of interest by filing a complaint that is unfounded against them or by moving for pro per status. Although defendant maintained that he was not seeking a delay and was ready to proceed to trial, the court observed that defendant's law library privileges had been revoked (apparently due to an abuse of those privileges). The court expressly doubted defendant's ability to represent himself for more than one day without creating a basis for revocation of his in propria persona status. The trial court's denial of defendant's request to represent himself, made on the date scheduled for trial (shortly before the actual commencement of trial), after numerous continuances extending over a significant period of time and following defendant's prior assertion and withdrawal of similar requests, constituted a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. (13) In order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation, a defendant must assert that right within a reasonable time prior to trial. The latter requirement serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 409.) If the motion is untimely  i.e., not asserted within a reasonable time prior to trial  the defendant has the burden of justifying the delay. ( People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 854 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270].) [A] defendant should not be permitted to wait until the day preceding trial before he moves to represent himself and requests a continuance in order to prepare for trial without some showing of reasonable cause for the lateness of the request. In such a case the motion for self-representation is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.... ( People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, fn. 5.) (12b) The record amply supports the trial court's action in denying defendant's untimely request after finding a lack of any justification for the delay. The circumstances here are remarkably similar to those in People v. Williams (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 1165, 1170 [269 Cal. Rptr. 705], where the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's belated request for in propria persona status. The court explained that the defendant was able to delay trial for eight months by juggling his Faretta rights with his right to counsel interspersed with Marsden motions. He first asserted his right to represent himself and did so until the case was sent out for trial. He then persisted in an attempt to select counsel of his choice. His meritless Marsden motions and his civil suit against appointed trial counsel were devised to delay proceedings and allow personal selection of appointed counsel. [¶] Contrary to his assertion on appeal, he never made a timely and unequivocal request to represent himself after abandoning propria persona status when the case was sent out for trial. He was playing the ` Faretta game[.]' ( Ibid. ) For similar reasons, we conclude defendant's claims relating to an alleged violation of his Faretta rights have no merit.