Opinion ID: 3063358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Gil-Martínez's Sentencing Disparity Claim

Text: Gil-Martínez claims that he received a disparately higher sentence than co-defendant Vicente-Arias, even though there was no evidence of dissimilar conduct among them and they both had the same Criminal History Category (CHC).
The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a Guidelines sentencing range (GSR) for Gil-Martínez of 235 to 297 months of imprisonment.11 The PSR did not identify any 11 Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3D1.2(d) (2004) (U.S.S.G.), Counts One and Two were grouped together. These offenses resulted in a base offense level of thirty-eight, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Gil-Martínez had no previous criminal history and had a CHC of I. This yielded a GSR of 235 to 297 months of imprisonment. -32- information that would warrant a role adjustment or a departure. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered the PSR's recommended GSR and took into account Gil-Martínez's unfortunate rearing and upbringing. It considered that at times Gil-Martínez was unable to eat because his family could not afford food, he lived in a wooden house with a dirt floor, and he only had a fourth grade education because he left school at a young age to help support his family. Gil-Martínez argued that a within-theGuidelines sentence would be unreasonable when compared to VicenteArias's sentence of 130 months of imprisonment. He then requested to be sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment, the statutory minimum. He argued that sentencing him to a greater term of imprisonment would create a sentencing disparity. The district court considered Gil-Martínez's request for a sentence similar to that of Vicente-Arias, who received a minor role reduction. The government opposed Gil-Martínez's request for a downwardly variant sentence of 120 months, arguing that, while Vicente-Arias had received a minor role reduction, Gil-Martínez had a number of roles onboard the yola, which distinguished him from Vicente-Arias. The government pointed out that Gil-Martínez had admitted to operating and fueling the yola. The district court concluded that it did not have any information that would support granting Gil-Martínez a minor role reduction like that VicenteArias received or otherwise sentencing him to a term of -33- imprisonment the same as or similar to that of Vicente-Arias. The court also considered the sentences imposed on other co-defendants. It noted that, although Peña-Santo received the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months of imprisonment, Peña-Santo's characteristics were different from those of Gil-Martínez because Peña-Santo was facing serious health conditions and his life expectancy was less than six months. The district court noted that although Gil-Martínez compared himself only to Vicente-Arias and Peña-Santo, the district court had also sentenced another co-defendant who had pleaded guilty pursuant to a straight plea to 188 months of imprisonment. The district court then stated that, in sentencing each defendant, it had taken into consideration the particular situation of each and every one defendant and had individualized sentencing. After concluding that the court did not have any information to support a minor role reduction, and that Gil-Martínez was in good health, the district court imposed on Gil-Martínez a downwardly variant sentence of 192 months of imprisonment.
We review challenges to the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first consider whether the district court made any procedural errors, such as 'failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, -34- treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.' United States v. Maisonet-González, 785 F.3d 757, 762 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Rivera-Moreno, 613 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010)). If the district court has committed no procedural error, we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2013). When conducting this review, we take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines. Maisonet-González, 785 F.3d at 762 (quoting TrinidadAcosta, 773 F.3d at 309). A sentence will withstand a substantive reasonableness challenge so long as there is 'a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result.' Id. (quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008)). In fashioning a sentence, judges must consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Although this provision is primarily aimed at national disparities, rather than those between co-defendants, Martin, 520 F.3d at 94, we have also held that if 'identically situated defendants' receive significantly disparate sentences, red -35- flags may indeed be raised. United States v. Rivera-López, 736 F.3d 633, 636 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2006)).
We afford the district court wide discretion in sentencing because, after the court has calculated the GSR, sentencing becomes a judgment call, and a variant sentence may be constructed based on a complex of factors whose interplay and precise weight cannot even be precisely described. United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Martin, 520 F.3d at 92). Gil-Martínez does not allege that the district court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors -- including the need to avoid sentencing disparities -- or commit any other procedural error. Rather, his challenge goes to the weighing of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, specifically the factors establishing the need to avoid sentencing disparities and the history and characteristics of the defendant. As Gil-Martínez was sentenced below the applicable GSR, his challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence faces an uphill battle. See United States v. Joubert, 778 F.3d 247, 256 (1st Cir. 2015) (When, as in this case, a district court essays a substantial downward variance from a properly calculated guideline sentencing range, a defendant's claim of substantive unreasonableness will -36- generally fail. (quoting United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2014))). As the Government correctly contends, a district court's consideration of sentencing disparity aims primarily at the minimization of disparities among defendants nationally and, while avoidance of disparities among co-defendants may be considered, a defendant is not entitled to a lighter sentence merely because his co-defendants received lighter sentences. United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82, 97 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Marceau, 554 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2009)). Furthermore, contrary to Gil-Martínez's claim, he is not entitled to the same sentence as Vicente-Arias because they are not identically situated, inasmuch as Vicente-Arias received a minor role reduction12 and Gil-Martínez did not. See Rivera-López, 736 F.3d at 636; United States v. Rivera-González, 626 F.3d 639, 648 (1st Cir. 2010). At the sentencing hearing the district court stated that it would not grant Gil-Martínez a minor role reduction because it did not have any information supporting a minor role reduction, and, as the government argued, the information was to the contrary, with Gil-Martínez having admitted to operating and fueling the yola. The district court concluded that this information distinguished Gil-Martínez's role in the conspiracy from that of Vicente-Arias. Gil-Martínez has failed to show that these findings of fact 12 This resulted in Vicente-Arias having a lower GSR. -37- regarding his role in the conspiracy were clearly erroneous. See United States v. Torres-Landrúa, 783 F.3d 58, 66 n.10 (1st Cir. 2015). In addition, although Gil-Martínez selectively compares himself only to Vicente-Arias, the record shows that the district court did take into consideration the need to avoid sentencing disparities not only in relation to Vicente-Arias, but also in relation to his other co-defendants. It is clear from the record that the district court also took into consideration that another co-defendant, who had pleaded guilty pursuant to a straight plea, had received a sentence of 188 months of imprisonment, and that Peña-Santo, who was sentenced to the statutory minimum, received that sentence because he was sick and his life expectancy was less than six months. Because it is evident that the district court did consider the need to avoid sentencing disparities among defendants, as well as the other sentencing factors, sufficiently explained its chosen sentence, and arrived at a defensible result, Maisonet-González, 785 F.3d at 762, Gil-Martínez's challenge to the reasonableness of his downwardly variant sentence fails.