Opinion ID: 2626647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Issue 6: Response to jury question

Text: [¶ 44] As discussed above, Mr. Cramer's expert testified at trial about applicable MSHA regulations, but was precluded from offering an opinion that PRC had violated those regulations. At the end of the expert's testimony, the district court asked the jury if they had any questions for the witness. One juror submitted this written question: In your expert opinion, did the mine violate any MSHA rules that day? Outside the hearing of the jury, the parties repeated their positions on whether this opinion was admissible evidence. The district court also repeated its previous decision: The Court already ruled. He is not going to testify whether or not that was a violation. The jury was then informed as follows: Ladies and gentlemen, there was one question propounded by a juror, but as I think the instructions that I read to you [said], there are occasions when questions are put by jurors that cannot be asked for a legal reason, and this question falls into that category and will not be asked. [¶ 45] Mr. Cramer challenges that ruling on appeal, and reprises his argument that the expert should have been allowed to testify that PRC had violated the MSHA regulations. We have already concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the expert's opinion on this issue was inadmissible. Considering the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the district court to maintain that position even after a juror asked the question. The district court had ruled that neither of the party's experts would be allowed to answer that question. It had said that the regulations were understandable to a jury. It knew, as the jury did not, that the regulations would be quoted in the jury instructions. The district court also knew that the jury had heard, or would hear, extensive testimony about the actions of PRC's employees relating to the accident. There was a reasonable basis for the district court to conclude that the jury was capable of determining whether PRC had violated the applicable regulations without expert opinion testimony on that issue. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to remain consistent with its prior ruling that the expert's opinion was not admissible because it was not helpful to the jury.