Opinion ID: 1731270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: exclusion of mcneel's expert witnesses

Text: [11, 12] Our evidence rule governing expert opinion [25] is similar to the federal rule, [26] and in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, [27] we held prospectively that trial courts would be required to evaluate the admissibility of expert opinion testimony under the analytical framework first established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [28] As a principle of evidence, Daubert/Schafersman applies in a FELA case in the same manner as in other cases. As one federal court has explained in a FELA case involving alleged injuries from exposure to workplace chemicals: The standard of causation under FELA and the standards for admission of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence are distinct issues and do not affect one another. . . . It is true that under FELA the quantum of evidence sufficient to present a jury question of causation is less than it is in a common law tort action. . . . This does not mean, however, that FELA plaintiffs need make no showing of causation. Nor does it mean that in FELA cases courts must allow expert testimony that in other contexts would be inadmissible. It means only that in FELA cases the negligence of the defendant need not be the sole cause or whole cause of the plaintiff's injuries. . . . FELA plaintiffs still must demonstrate some causal connection between a defendant's negligence and their injuries. [29] Other circuits have reached the same conclusion, [30] and the Nebraska Court of Appeals has recently applied the Daubert/Schafersman analysis in a FELA case involving an injury allegedly caused by exposure to diesel exhaust fumes. [31] [13-16] Under the Daubert/Schafersman analytical framework, when a court is faced with a decision regarding the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, the trial judge must determine at the outset whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. [32] This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. [33] The first portion of the analysis establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. [34] The second inquiry, sometimes referred to as `fit,' assesses whether the scientific evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue by providing a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. [35] `Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.' [36] `Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes. [37] After examining the affidavits of McNeel's proffered experts Didriksen, Simon, and Rea, and the affidavits submitted by Union Pacific's experts challenging the scientific reliability of their opinions, the district court concluded that while ... there is foundation for their `shaky but admissible evidence', their opinions are not relevant, not linked by any evidence to a causative factor, and, therefore, inadmissible. McNeel assigns error to the determination of inadmissibility. In its cross-appeal, Union Pacific challenges the court's apparent determination of scientific reliability with respect to the experts' opinions. The cross-appeal raises a significant issue. A number of courts have determined that toxic encephalopathy, also known as multiple chemical sensitivity or idiopathic environmental intolerance, is a controversial diagnosis unsupported by sound scientific reasoning or methodology. [38] Some courts have specifically rejected or discredited the opinions of Rea and Didriksen on this subject. [39] However, we need not reach the issue presented by the cross-appeal because we conclude that the district court correctly concluded that even if considered scientifically reliable, the opinions of McNeel's experts did not fit the issues of this case because they did not identify any specific causative agent for the diagnosis of toxic encephalopathy. [17] Generally, `[s]cientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical plus knowledge that plaintiff was exposed to such quantities are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiff's burden in a toxic tort case.' [40] Because McNeel's experts could not identify any toxic substance which caused the symptoms they diagnosed as toxic encephalopathy, their reasoning on causation was reduced to nothing more than post hoc, ergo propter hoc, which, as we said in Schafersman, cannot be said to be helpful to the trier of fact under Neb. Evid. R. 702, even absent the application of a more stringent Frye [41] or Daubert analysis. [42] Didriksen admitted that this was her reasoning process. Rea testified that because McNeel experienced symptoms during and after his exposure to the unidentified fumes, the exposure caused the symptoms. At least one court has specifically held in a FELA case that a causation opinion based solely on a temporal relationship is not derived from the scientific method and is therefore insufficient to satisfy the requirements of rule 702. [43] In Carlson v. Okerstrom, [44] we noted that when a person develops symptoms after encountering an agent which is known to be capable of causing those symptoms, courts have been more willing to admit expert testimony relying on the temporal connection between the exposure and the onset of symptoms. But here, no one can identify to which agent, if any, McNeel was exposed on the date of his alleged injury. [18] Under the Daubert/Schafersman analysis, expert testimony lacks `fit' when `a large analytical leap must be made between the facts and the opinion.' [45] That is the case here. Assuming without deciding that the diagnosis of toxic encephalopathy was the product of scientifically reliable methodology, it is simply too great an analytical leap to conclude that it was caused by some act or omission on the part of Union Pacific, given that the experts could not identify any toxic agent. Due to this lack of fit, the opinions of McNeel's experts would not have assisted the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that they were inadmissible.