Opinion ID: 1967742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pertinent Statutory Background: Intrafamily Offenses

Text: In 1982, the Council of the District of Columbia, the District's legislature, determined that it was essential to strengthen the law regarding intrafamily offenses because [e]xisting remedies have been shown to be inadequate in aiding victims in preventing further abuse. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 4-195, THE PROCEEDINGS REGARDING INTRAFAMILY OFFENSES AMENDMENT ACT OF 1982, May 12, 1982, at 2. Consequently, the Council decided to fill in areas of need in the current District law. Id. Measures taken to fill in these areas of need included: (1) authorizing private rights of action whereby victims of intrafamily offenses may seek protective orders without necessarily going through the Office of the Corporation Counsel; [2] (2) expanding coverage of the current law . . .; and (3) authorizing civil protection cases to coexist legally along side criminal prosecutions against the same person by providing certain due process protections to the respondent. Id. at 2, 3. [3] Thus, the Council enhanced a distinct statutory scheme for handling intrafamily offenses and protecting victims against further abuse. The Council created a system under which enforcement of the statutory objectives could be accomplished not only through criminal charges brought by the United States Attorney's Office, but also through the right of a victim or complainant to seek a protective order and, concomitantly, to file a motion for contempt pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-1005 to enforce the CPO. See Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275, 1279 (D.C.1994); In re Peak, 759 A.2d 612, 620 n. 16 (D.C.2000) ( Green arose in the special context of `an intrafamily proceeding, conducted pursuant to local statutes and rules designed by the Council of the District of Columbia . . . to expedite the application and, if necessary, the enforcement of [Civil Protection Orders] in cases involving domestic violence.' Green, [] 642 A.2d at 1279). Our analysis of Mr. Robertson's arguments, as well as those of the United States and the District, proceeds in light of this pertinent statutory background. Arguments of the Parties and Standard of Review Mr. Robertson argues that the United States, not Ms. Watson, was the true party-in-interest to the contempt proceeding; that under D.C.Code § 16-1005(f), the action against him was maintained in the name of the relevant sovereign, . . . the United States; and that there is no such thing in our legal system as a criminal action maintained in the name of a private person. He asserts that in prosecuting [him] for criminal contempt for his alleged behavior on June 26, 1999, the United States breached the plea agreement it entered on July 28, 1999. Further, Mr. Robertson contends that [his] trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to dismiss the criminal contempt prosecution as violation of the plea agreement executed on July 28, 1999. Alternatively, Mr. Robertson asserts that his conviction for throwing the lye on Ms. Watson should be vacated because (1) the trial court's denial of his self-defense claim was based on an erroneous application of this jurisdiction's self-defense laws; and (2) the trial court erred in rejecting his demand for a jury trial on the ground that his contempt prosecution constituted a petty offense. The United States maintains that The criminal contempt prosecution in the present case was conducted as a private action brought in the name and interest of [Ms.] Watson, not as a public action brought in the name and interest of the United States or any other governmental entity. And the action was styled and prosecuted as one between Ms. Watson and Mr. Robertson, with the Corporation Counsel's office acting in a representative capacity on [Ms.] Watson's behalf, not on behalf of the United States government, the District of Columbia government, or any other governmental entity. Furthermore, the government contends that Mr. Robertson's plea agreement with the United States Attorney's Office could not reasonably be read as a promise that [Ms.] Watson would not bring a private action in her own name and interest seeking art adjudication of criminal contempt; nor could it properly be interpreted as a promise that [Mr.] Robertson would not be subject to prosecution for criminal contempt in the name of the District of Columbia. The District focuses, in part, on D.C.Code § 16-1002(c) in arguing that in addition to criminal charges filed by the United States Attorney, Ms. Watson had a right to enforce the CPO through a criminal contempt proceeding and the United States Attorney's Office had no authority to bargain away this right. In addition, the District asserts that the United States alone agreed not to pursue any charges against. Mr. Robertson, and since [t]he United States and the District of Columbia are separate entities with distinct legal existence[ ], the actions of one cannot bind the other. [4] The question as to whether the terms of the plea agreement between Mr. Robertson and the United States Attorney's Office bind Ms. Watson is a legal issue which we review de novo. Louis v. United States, 862 A.2d 925, 928 (D.C.2004) (the court interprets the terms of the plea agreement de novo and . . . reviews the [trial court's] factual findings regarding alleged breaches of the plea agreement for clear error.) . . . (quoting United States v. Gary, 351 U.S.App. D.C. 380, 383, 291 F.3d 30, 33 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).