Opinion ID: 2623207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Combination of functions

Text: The United States Supreme Court observed in In re Murchison [17] that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. An adjudicator's actual bias against a party is constitutionally unacceptable and, in some situations, an implied probability of bias constitutes a deprivation of due process. [18] In this case, Judge Mosley contends that the Commission's investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions have combined to deprive him of his right to due process. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. [19] As a predicate to determining whether a due process violation has occurred, we must first conclude that the contested state action impinges upon an interest in life, liberty, or property. Accordingly, we must first decide whether the interest at stake in this proceedingnamely, a commissioned judgeshipis constitutionally protected. While this court has never expressly held that state district court judges have property or liberty interests in their positions, we have implied that such is the case. [20] The majority of courts that have addressed the question have concluded that judges do possess such interests, especially when, as here, they serve for designated terms and have a continued expectation of office. [21] We approve of this authority and conclude that commissioned judges in this state have a protected interest in their judicial offices under the Fourteenth Amendment. We now consider whether the Commission's procedures withstand constitutional scrutiny. Judge Mosley urges us to conclude that the Commission's combination of functions is implicitly prejudicial to judges brought within the disciplinary process, thereby violating important due process rights. He cites language from Whitehead III, in which this court observed that the Judicial Discipline Commission is not just another administrative agency which can combine investigative, prosecutorial and judging functions. As this court held in Whitehead I, the Commission is a court of judicial performance, created by the Nevada Constitution as a part of the judicial branch of government. [22] We conclude that the language upon which Judge Mosley relies is not controlling. Whitehead III addressed the question of commingling functions in light of its determination that former NRS 1.450(2) [23] did not allow the Commission to employ the state attorney general as special counsel. [24] It reached this conclusion pursuant to the Nevada Constitution's express separation-of-powers doctrine [25] and disposed of the case on these grounds. The court did not address the question of whether any combination of functions inherently violated due process. Further, as noted in the margin above, the legislature successfully obtained an amendment to the Nevada Constitution's provisions governing judicial discipline in this state. Among other provisions, the procedural framework established after the four Whitehead decisions were handed down expressly requires the Commission to assign or appoint an investigator to conduct an investigation to determine whether the allegations [against a judge] have merit. [26] In addition, NRS 1.467(3)(a) provides that once the Commission makes the threshold probable cause determination, the Commission must then [d]esignate a prosecuting attorney to act in a formal disciplinary hearing. It seems clear then that the legislative intent manifested in the amendment process is that, although a court of judicial performance, the Commission may exercise, to a degree, a combination of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. Thus, having determined that the Nevada State Constitution contemplates a judicial discipline commission with combined functions, we turn to the issue of whether that combination violates Judge Mosley's rights of due process. We are persuaded that this case is governed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Withrow v. Larkin, [27] which held that the combination of prosecutorial, investigative, and adjudicative functions does not by itself violate due process. Although the Court's ruling concerned an administrative agency and not, as here, a court of judicial performance, we conclude that Withrow is otherwise indistinguishable and therefore dispositive. In Withrow, a licensed physician challenged the constitutionality of the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board, claiming that its combined investigative and adjudicative functions implicitly biased the adjudicators and therefore violated due process. Wisconsin law invested the board with the power to warn and reprimand, suspend physicians' licenses, and institute criminal action or action to revoke licenses after finding probable cause to proceed with discipline. [28] The Wisconsin Medical Examining Board was further empowered to investigate, adjudicate, and act upon alleged instances of physician misconduct. [29] The Court in Withrow held that a combination of functions did not per se violate the Constitution. The procedures and powers exercised by the medical board in Withrow and the Commission in this case are virtually identical. Both hire outside counsel to investigate charges, bifurcate probable cause determinations and adjudications on the merits, and permit hearings. The powers to discipline in both instances include more than mere recommendations; the powers in both instances include censure, suspension and removal. Certainly, a physician duly trained and licensed by state authority should enjoy no less protection than a commissioned judicial officer. The Withrow court also aptly draws an analogy to contempt proceedings. It observed that no authority stands for the principle that a judge before whom an alleged contempt is committed may not bring and preside over the ensuing contempt proceedings. The accepted rule is to the contrary. [30] Thus, the Court implicitly acknowledged that, even with regard to judicial proceedings, a combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions is not biased per se and does not, without more, violate due process. This court agreed in Matter of Davis, [31] which held in part that the Commission's combined duties of determining probable cause and adjudicating the merits of a complaint against a judge did not violate due process. In Davis, the court quoted Withrow 's recognition that constitutional due process does not bar a judge from making a preliminary determination of probable cause and then presiding over a criminal trial. [32] The court based its ultimate conclusion on language in Withrow (that the commissioners' dual responsibility to determine probable cause and sit in judgment did not violate due process). We conclude that Judge Mosley has failed to demonstrate that the commingling of functions in this case poses a risk of actual bias. Withrow provided that, to demonstrate such a risk, aggrieved parties must first overcome a presumption that the adjudicators are honest. Second, complainants must demonstrate that under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. [33] Judge Mosley offers no evidence suggesting that the Commission members are dishonest, biased, or prejudiced in any manner. Instead, he offers generalized allegations that Gang's ongoing involvement in this case presents a likelihood that the Commission's proceedings are slanted against him. We conclude on this record that Judge Mosley has failed to overcome the presumption that the commissioners are unbiased. We note in this regard that Gang is now retired from his positions with the Commission. In addition, we cannot conclude that under any appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, the Commission's combination of functions poses a risk of actual bias requiring our intervention. Without a showing to the contrary, state adjudicators `are assumed to be [people] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.' [34] Because Judge Mosley has failed to overcome this assumption and because there is no reason to believe that the Commission's structure poses any risk of bias, we conclude that Judge Mosley's rights to due process have not been infringed.