Opinion ID: 1229173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Excluded testimony of Attorney J. Michael Anderson

Text: Steven Hutsenpiller testified for the State under W.Va. Rule of Evidence 404(b). [4] As noted above, he testified of an episode in which the defendant injected him with morphine and the defendant's callous behavior when Hutsenpiller became severely ill and desired medical attention. Both parties agree that Hutsenpiller's testimony was very effective. At the close of the direct examination, Hutsenpiller testified to the following: State: Steven, you got arrested for DUI on February 7th of this year, didn't you? Hutsenpiller: Yeah. State: At [sic] that would be your third offense DUI; is that correct? Hutsenpiller: Yes. State: And that's a felony; do you understand that? Hutsenpiller: Yes, sir. State: And that charge is still pending; right? Hutsenpiller: Yes, sir. State: Have I made any promises to you about what would happen to that charge if you testified here today? Hutsenpiller: No, sir, you have not. On cross-examination, Hutsenpiller again denied the existence of any deal with the State and emphatically insisted that his testimony was motivated by humanitarian reasons. In response, the defendant called as a witness J. Michael Anderson, the attorney whom Hutsenpiller contacted concerning the DUI charge, to testify that there was a deal between the State and Hutsenpiller. The trial court held an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of Anderson's testimony. Anderson testified to the following in pertinent part: Defense Counsel: Mr. Anderson, to your knowledge did the State make a deal with Mr. Hutsenpiller to testify? Anderson: Yes, sirwell, to testify? Defense Counsel: Yes. Anderson: They made athey made a they made a deal, but it was toit was to cooperate. Court: What was it? Anderson: That they would not seek the third offense DUI felony if he would cooperate. It would be some type of misdemeanor. The specifics of whichwhat misdemeanor was not known to the prosecutor at that time because he didn't know if there had been any serious injury to the individual who was in the car accident which resulted in the third offense DUI. But there was no question in my mind thatthat there was that understanding. Court: I guess the next questionand you have the right to invoke the privilege. Did you communicate that to him? And the reason that privilege becomes importantbecause of the testimony of Mr. Hutsenpiller. Anderson: I would have to invoke that privilege, but state that he was present when that conversation took place with Mr. Burnette. Court: Well, I think he can testify as to what he just said, in that Hutsenpiller was there when the conversation took place. It is State: Judge, is he saying thatthat Hutsenpiller listened in on that conversation? I can't tell from his answer. Court: That was my understanding. State: Was it on a speaker phone? Anderson: No, no. No, no. It wasit was not on a speaker phone. It was my conversation with [prosecuting attorney] Burnette. Mr. Hutsenpiller was in the room. Andand then I had further conversation with Mr. Hutsenpiller after I finished talking to Mr. Burnette. The trial court appears to have excluded Anderson's testimony because it found that Anderson's alleged telephone conversation with the prosecuting attorney was not relevant as to whether Hutsenpiller had any understanding of an inducement from the State to testify. Further, because of Anderson's refusal to testify concerning any conversation he had with Hutsenpiller, the trial court found there was insufficient evidence to show that Hutsenpiller was made aware of any inducement from the State. The trial court concluded that any testimony offered by Anderson would not impeach Hutsenpiller's testimony. The defendant asserts that the trial court's exclusion of Anderson's testimony is reversible error for essentially three reasons. First, the defendant contends that the testimony he sought to elicit from Anderson is not protected by privilege because the testimony related solely to whether Anderson had advised Hutsenpiller of the offer made by the State. Citing United States v. Clemons, 676 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir.1982) ([a]n attorney's message to his client concerning the date of trial is not a privileged communication); United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.1975) (finding no attorney-client privilege where the attorney had advised the client of the court's order to appear); and United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir.1964) ([c]ommunications made in confidence by a client to his attorney are protected by the attorney-client privilege. It is the substance of the communications which is protected, however, not the fact that there have been communications.). Second, the defendant asserts that even if privilege exists under these facts, it is waived by the fairness doctrine. Basically, the defendant avers that when Hutsenpiller testified that there was no inducement, testimony which otherwise would have been privileged, he waived his right to assert attorney-client privilege as to other communications with his attorney. Citing Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F.Supp. 977, 979 (D.Del.1982), aff'd, 758 F.2d 668 (Fed.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066, 105 S.Ct. 2142, 85 L.Ed.2d 499 (1985) (A client ... may waive the privilege by deliberately injecting into the case the advice which he received from his attorney (citations omitted).); and In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.1987). Last, the defendant contends that the trial court was wrong as to the facts when it held that Hutsenpiller had not testified to anything that could be impeached by Anderson's testimony. According to the defendant, Anderson's testimony would have been a direct contradiction of Hutsenpiller's claim that no offer of a deal had been made. The venerable attorney-client privilege has as its principal object the promotion of full and frank discourse between attorney and client so as to insure sound legal advice or advocacy. Syllabus Point 11, in part, Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156, 366 S.E.2d 117 (1988). Thus, confidential communications made by a client or an attorney to one another are protected by the attorney-client privilege. State ex rel. United Hosp. v. Bedell, 199 W.Va. 316, 326, 484 S.E.2d 199, 209 (1997) (footnote and citation omitted). In order to assert an attorney-client privilege, three main elements must be present: (1) both parties must contemplate that the attorney-client relationship does or will exist; (2) the advice must be sought by the client from the attorney in his capacity as a legal advisor; (3) the communication between the attorney and client must be intended to be confidential. Syllabus Point 2, State v. Burton, 163 W.Va. 40, 254 S.E.2d 129 (1979). The defendant does not dispute the presence of these three criteria in the instant case. Rather, the issue is grounded upon whether the proffered testimony of Attorney Anderson consists of a privileged communication or the mere fact that a communication occurred. As noted by the defendant, [i]t is the substance of the communication that is protected and not the fact that there have been communications or the attorney's observations of the client's physical characteristics such as his demeanor, bearing, sobriety or dress. Scott v. Scott, 106 N.C.App. 606, 612, 417 S.E.2d 818, 822 (1992), aff'd, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994) (citations omitted). The general rule states that [a] party may refuse on the ground of privilege to state whether he communicated certain facts to his attorney [or vice versa], but the fact that the attorney communicated with his client, and the date of such communication, are not privileged. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283, p. 804 (1957). In applying the foregoing distinction, it has been held that, Communications between an attorney and his client are privileged, and hence the contents of a letter written by an attorney to his client is privileged. However, neither the fact that the attorney communicated with his client, nor that subsequently the client acted under advice of counsel, nor the date that the attorney communicated with such client, is excluded by reason of privilege. Consequently the postmark on the envelope which contained the letter from attorney to client, or the date of the letter itself, is admissible for the purpose of showing the day on which the communication was mailed and received. Syllabus Point 1, in part, Rylee v. Bank of Statham, 7 Ga.App. 489, 67 S.E. 383 (1910). In United States v. Bostic, 206 F.Supp. 855 (D.D.C.1962), aff'd, Bostic v. U.S., 317 F.2d 143 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court held that the testimony of the defendant's attorney at the defendant's lunacy inquisition that he was able to confer with the defendant during trial and prepare a defense from the information conveyed to him by the defendant was not barred by the attorney-client privilege. See also, United States v. Kendrick, supra . In United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.1969), cert. denied, Bourassa v. U.S., 396 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 235, 24 L.Ed.2d 192 (1969), the court held that the attorney-client privilege was not violated when the defendant's former attorney testified at the defendant's bail-jumping hearing that he notified the defendant to be present for his first trial. Similarly, in United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, Hall v. U.S., 382 U.S. 910, 86 S.Ct. 250, 15 L.Ed.2d 161 (1965), the court found that the defendant's attorney's testimony that he informed the defendant that his presence in court was required on every occasion his case appeared on the calendar was not barred by attorney-client privilege. The court stated, We find no invasion of the attorney-client privilege resulting from Mr. Londin's formal testimony that he conveyed to his client the Assistant United States Attorney's routine message that the accused's presence was required at each calender call. The relaying of this message is not in the nature of a confidential communication. Defense counsel served merely as a conduit for transmission of a message. Hall, 346 F.2d at 882. See also, United States v. Clemons, supra , and United States v. Freeman, supra . More relevant to the instant case is Barnes v. State, 460 So.2d 126 (Miss.1984). There, the defendant sought to offer evidence that the State's chief witness had agreed to testify in exchange for not being prosecuted on several pending charges. When the defendant called the witness's attorney to testify to such an agreement, however, the State objected on hearsay grounds, and the objection was sustained by the trial court. The trial record appeared to indicate that the testimony was excluded on either the basis of hearsay or because of the attorney-client privilege. The court found that the testimony was improperly excluded on either basis. Concerning the attorney-client privilege, the court found that the witness had stated in open court and quite unequivocally that he waived any right he might have under the attorney-client privilege to prevent his attorney... from testifying in the premises. Barnes, 460 So.2d at 129. The court explained: Only the client may invoke the privilege. Once the client has effectively waived the privilege, the attorney is competent as a witness regarding matters otherwise within the scope of the privilege. The attorney has no standing to invoke the privilege if the client does not wish to. The point is made by contrasting Young v. State, 425 So.2d 1022, 1028 (Miss.1983) with the case at bar. The facts of the two cases are on this issue legally identical except that in Young the co-felon-turned-state's-evidence did not waive the privilege. Young quite correctly excluded the proffered testimony of the attorney regarding a leniency/immunity agreement. Because [the State's witness] waived the privilege, the opposite result obtains here. Id., 460 So.2d at 131. We also find instructive the case of Morris v. Courts, 59 Ga.App. 666, 1 S.E.2d 687 (1939) in which the appellant complained that, the court erred in refusing to permit counsel for the plaintiff to ask the defendant... the following question: Have you ever had occasion to confer with your attorneys regarding the legal effect of the power of attorney that you spoke of having seen that the American Bond & Share Corporation was using? Morris, 59 Ga.App. at 674-675, 1 S.E.2d at 693. The court explained, It is contended that its exclusion was prejudicial, in that it tended to deprive the plaintiff of proof that the witness was aware of the contents of the document in question, having conferred with his attorney regarding it. The question was immaterial and idle, because it would not have been proper to elicit by a subsequent question the nature of the conversation between client and attorney, and a mere answer that a conference had taken place would not afford any evidence of the witness' knowledge of the contents or meaning of any document. Id., 59 Ga.App. at 675, 1 S.E.2d at 693. Examining the facts of the present case in light of these principles, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Hutsenpiller's attorney. Attorney Anderson's testimony was offered in order to impeach Hutsenpiller's adamant denial of any agreement with the State. For this testimony to be relevant, however, the mere fact that Attorney Anderson communicated with Hutsenpiller shortly after a phone call from Prosecutor Burnette does not suffice. Rather, the substance of any communication between Attorney Anderson and Hutsenpiller is necessary for the fact of the existence of the communication to be relevant. The substance of the communication and not merely the fact that a communication occurred is at issue here. This distinguishes the present case from those cited to us by the defendant. Any communication between Attorney Anderson and Hutsenpiller concerning the specific terms of an alleged proposed offer differs fundamentally from an attorney's message to his client relaying the date of a trial or the contents of a court order. In communicating the specific terms of an offer, an attorney informs his client of the offer as the attorney understands it. There are a number of factors and considerations involved in any proposed agreement. It is the role of an attorney to interpret the proposed agreement, explain it to his client, and counsel his client on the proper path to take. In this capacity, the attorney acts not as a mere messenger or conduit, but in a role that defines the heart of the attorney-client privilege, that of learned and confidential advisor. We conclude, therefore, that the proffered testimony of Attorney Anderson included privileged communications with his client and was properly excluded by the trial court. Further, we are not persuaded by the defendant's argument that Hutsenpiller waived the attorney-client privilege by testifying that there was no agreement with the State. Hutsenpiller did not testify of any conversations he had with Attorney Anderson or any advice he received from him. He did not deny any conversations allegedly engaged in between Prosecutor Burnette and Attorney Anderson concerning the offer of a deal. The fact of the existence or nonexistence of an agreement with the State, merely because such agreement may have been discussed in confidential communications with one's attorney, does not render the fact itself privileged. Therefore, when Hutsenpiller denied the existence of an agreement, he was not divulging privileged information. Accordingly, we conclude that any privileged conversations between Hutsenpiller and his attorney concerning an agreement with the State were not waived by the fairness doctrine. Finally, we find that the trial court did not err when it held that Hutsenpiller did not testify to anything that could be impeached by Attorney Anderson's testimony. Hutsenpiller's testimony was simply that the prosecutor had made no promise to him concerning his third offense DUI charge in exchange for his testimony. Attorney Anderson testified in camera to a conversation with the prosecutor concerning Anderson's understanding that if Hutsenpiller would cooperate, the State would not seek a third offense DUI felony conviction. The alleged conversation between Prosecutor Burnette and Attorney Anderson, as recounted during the in camera hearing, was general and somewhat vague. Absent Attorney Anderson's testimony concerning the specifics of any conversation he may have had with Hutsenpiller, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of Attorney Anderson's conversation with Prosecutor Burnette. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of Attorney Anderson. B.