Opinion ID: 2390138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Separation-of-Powers Provision

Text: Article III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution reads: The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution. The doctrine of separation of powers is a fundamental principle of our State government. The separation-of-powers article first appeared in substantially its present form in the New Jersey Constitution of 1844. It was designed to maintain the balance between the three branches of government, preserve their respective independence and integrity, and prevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch. David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 326, 212 A. 2d 345 (1965) (footnote and emphasis omitted). Despite the explicit constitutional mandate that contemplates that each branch of government will exercise fully its own powers without transgressing upon powers rightfully belonging to a cognate branch, Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 388, 431 A. 2d 833 (1981), we have always recognized that the doctrine requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government. General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 382, 448 A. 2d 438 (1982); Knight v. Margate, supra, 86 N.J. at 388, 431 A. 2d 833; Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11, 297 A. 2d 572 (1972). In one of the first cases to address the separation-of-powers doctrine under the 1947 Constitution, Chief Justice Vanderbilt recognized that a rigid and inflexible classification of the branches of government into mutually-exclusive, water-tight compartments would render government unworkable. Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 57, 71 A. 2d 327 (1950). More recently we expressed the same thought in In re Salaries for Probation Officers, 58 N.J. 422, 425, 278 A. 2d 417 (1971): The compartmentalization of governmental powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches has never been watertight. We understand that [i]nevitably some osmosis occurs when the branches touch one another; the powers of one branch sometimes take on the hue and characteristics of the powers of the others. Knight v. Margate, supra, 86 N.J. at 388, 431 A. 2d 833. The aim of the separation-of-powers doctrine is not to prevent such cooperative action, but to guarantee a system in which one branch cannot claim[] or receiv[e] an inordinate power. Brown v. Heymann, supra, 62 N.J. at 11, 297 A. 2d 572. The parties disagree on whether the Appropriations Act, as amended, encroaches on the Executive's power, and they present a parade of horribles that will result if the other's position prevails. CWA and the plaintiff legislators argue that to sustain the Governor's position will require them to give the Governor a blank check in the appropriations process. The Governor argues that to sustain the plaintiffs' position will allow the Legislature to micromanage the Executive branch. Both sides claim that their own layoff plan is efficient and effective, and that the adversary's plan will result in the chaotic disruption of government services. The executive branch contends that the Appropriations Amendments impermissibly intrude on the Governor's constitutional authority to administer appropriated funds, which includes the making of specific staffing and resource-allocation decisions. The Governor claims that if government is to operate efficiently and effectively, the selection and assignment of necessary personnel and the decisions concerning how best to effectuate a reduction in force must reside in the executive branch. The Legislature's attempt to control the order of layoffs both usurps and thwarts the Governor's duty to make staffing and resource allocations, which are an essential part of the Executive's day-to-day management of that branch of government. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that the amended Appropriations Act does not impermissibly intrude on the Governor's power because it does not unduly restrict his ability to choose the employees he will lay off. Plaintiffs allege that because the State has so many managers and the Act requires so few layoffs, the Governor has sufficient options under the amendment to function effectively. To determine whether in enacting Senate Bill 996 the Legislature impermissibly intruded on the Governor's authority, we first examine the power and authority given to the legislative and executive branches of government under the 1947 Constitution.