Opinion ID: 6345773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Harmless Error Ruling

Text: Ms. Davis maintains that the district court’s rejection of the Commissioner’s harmless error argument in the merits decision constituted a finding that the argument was not substantially justified. It follows, she contends, that the court’s fee decision that the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified “directly contradicts its original finding.” Aplt. Am. Opening Br. at 22; see also id. at 16 (“The district court’s first order in the case in chief found that the Commissioner’s . . . litigation [position] was not substantially [justified.]” (bolding and initial capitalization omitted)). This argument misunderstands both the district court’s rulings and the law. 5 Appellate Case: 21-3148 Document: 010110691354 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 6 In its merits decision, the district court concluded that Ms. Davis’s allegations and the friend’s statement were not so similar that the court could say the same evidence the ALJ considered in discounting Ms. Davis’s reported symptoms also discredited the friend’s statement. In its fee decision, the court concluded the Commissioner was substantially justified in arguing that Ms. Davis’s allegations and the friend’s statement were similar enough that the ALJ’s stated reasons for discounting the former also discredited the latter. These conclusions are not inconsistent. At the EAJA stage, the court found the Commissioner’s position to be substantially justified, not because the ALJ’s error was harmless, but because it was not unreasonable to argue that it was harmless. The court determined the Commissioner’s harmless error arguments drew support based on Evans, other unpublished Tenth Circuit decisions, and conflicting district court outcomes in cases in which the government advanced similar harmless error arguments. Ms. Davis conflates the district court’s merits analysis and its fee analysis. She urges that her victory at the merits stage compels the conclusion that the Commissioner’s litigation position was not substantially justified. But that is not the law. As we explained in Hadden, a standard that equates the merits inquiry with the substantial justification inquiry “would result in an automatic award of attorney’s fees in all social security cases in which the government was unsuccessful on the merits,” 851 F.2d at 1269, and “Congress never intended to adopt this standard,” id. at 1268. “The government’s success or failure on the merits . . . may be evidence of whether its position was substantially justified, but that success or failure alone is not 6 Appellate Case: 21-3148 Document: 010110691354 Date Filed: 06/01/2022 Page: 7 determinative of the issue.” Id. at 1267. We therefore reject Ms. Davis’s reliance on the merits decision to secure EAJA attorney fees.