Opinion ID: 787593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Preliminary Legal Issues

Text: 49 This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Vill. of East Hills, 320 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.2003).
50 In order to establish a violation of the Non-Intercourse Act, the Senecas are required to establish that: (1) they are an Indian tribe; (2) the land at issue was tribal land at the time of the conveyance; (3) the United States never approved the conveyance, and (4) the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe has not been terminated. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir.1994). Here, only the second requirement is in dispute. 51 The Senecas contend that the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua conferred them recognized title 15 to the Islands, and, therefore, the 1815 Purchase was subject to the Non-Intercourse Act. Alternatively, they argue that the Act applied because they held aboriginal title in 1815. New York denies that the Senecas held aboriginal title to the Islands. As a consequence, New York inherited title to the Islands from the British. Further, New York maintains that even if the Senecas held aboriginal title at some point, it was extinguished prior to the Treaty of Canandaigua by either of two events—the 1764 treaties between Great Britain and the Senecas, or the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Either transaction would have resulted in title vesting in the State of New York, and the Treaty of Canandaigua did not divest the state of that title. Thus, the argument goes, the 1815 Purchase did not violate the Non-Intercourse Act because no land was, in fact, purchased from the Senecas since New York already owned it.
52 Generally, treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements and the history, negotiations, and practical construction adopted by the parties are all relevant to treaty interpretation. Moreover, Indian treaties are to be construed, so far as possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood them. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L.Ed. 877 (1943); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999). In particular, they should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit. Oneida I, 470 U.S. at 247, 105 S.Ct. 1245. 53 An important qualification to these rules of interpretation exists. Specifically, the rule of generous construction [of Indian treaties] has not been applied to divest a state of land it has acquired, where the intention to divest is not shown in the treaty with such certainty as to put it beyond reasonable question. Oneida II, 860 F.2d at 1163-64 (quoting United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 209, 46 S.Ct. 298, 70 L.Ed. 539 (1926)).