Opinion ID: 160150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analyzing Compulsion

Text: 22 Determining whether the challenged policy or action is compulsory for Fifth Amendment purposes is a difficult task that depends upon consideration of many factors. There is no single test or factor that is dispositive, so we begin by examining Defendants' arguments. 23
24 Defendants argue that no compulsion exists because the adverse consequences present in this case implicate no protected liberty interest. Specifically, they claim that the Fifth Amendment is not violated because the consequences that would be imposed on Plaintiff as a result of his refusal to admit responsibility and disclose his past sex offenses do not constitute atypical and significant hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 25 In Sandin, the Supreme Court addressed liberty interests in prison in the context of a procedural due process claim. The Court held that, despite the mandatory language of the applicable prison regulation, a constitutionally protected liberty interest will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 484 (citations omitted). Applying this test, the Court held that being placed in disciplinary segregation for thirty days did not impose an atypical and significant hardship, and therefore the inmate had no protected liberty interest which required due process. See id. at 486. Relying on earlier Supreme Court precedent, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976), this court recognized that, under the Due Process Clause, a change in an inmate's prison classification ordinarily does not deprive him of liberty[] because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison. Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994). 26 However, nowhere in the relevant jurisprudence does the Supreme Court even hint that an individual attempting to show a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege must have a protected liberty interest for compulsion to occur. 7 See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285-88 (1998) (evaluating Fifth Amendment claim without any reference to liberty analysis and applying liberty interest analysis to due process claim only). From our review of the cases, Sandin has not been expressly used to analyze any kind of constitutional right claimed by a prisoner other than a due process violation. Moreover, nothing in either Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent expressly rule[s] out a challenge to a [prison policy] . . . on the ground that it violate[s] constitutional rights other than the right to procedural due process. Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 1979) (explaining that Supreme Court precedent allows that a prisoner's confinement could violate the constitution even if it did not implicate a liberty interest or violate due process); see also Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 561 (10th Cir. 1990) (surveying circuit court decisions and holding that Meachum addressed only the due process clause). This reasoning is equally applicable to a challenge to a sex offender treatment program based on a Fifth Amendment violation. Cf. Chambers v. Bachicha, 39 F.3d 1191, 1994 WL 596702 (10th Cir. 1994) (Table) (rejecting equal protection and due process claims because plaintiff challenging Colorado sex offender treatment program had no protected liberty interest in good-time or earned-time credit under discretionary Colorado statute, but not addressing liberty question with respect to Fifth Amendment claim); Colman v. Lahouse, 976 F.2d 724, 1992 WL 235534,  (1st Cir. 1992) (relying on Furtado to state that Fifth Amendment claim challenging sex offender treatment program has an arguable legal basis because no liberty interest is required). 27 Accordingly, we agree with the district court's assessment that by grafting a protected liberty interest to a finding of compulsion, the standard is set too high. Lile, 24 F. Supp.2d at 1159. Compulsion can be established by hardships that may not be atypical and that do not constitute enforceable liberty interests. The Supreme Court has indeed articulated several different types of penalties that constitute impermissible compulsion, none of which are explicitly characterized as deprivations of protected liberty interests. These include the threat of disbarment, damage to professional reputation, or loss of income, see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (describing such penalties as powerful forms of compulsion), economic penalties such as the loss of employment, see Turley, 414 U.S. at 82 (ruling that cancellation of contracts and five-year disqualification to contract constituted impermissible economic compulsion); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-85 (1968) (holding that discharge for invoking and refusing to waive constitutional right against self-incrimination impaired Fifth Amendment privilege); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that penalty of discharge for reliance on right to remain silent compelled policemen's incriminating testimony because it foreclosed a free choice to remain silent, and right against self-incrimination prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office), and the loss of the right to participate in political associations, see Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808-09 (depriving attorney of position as an unpaid political party officer would impinge on his right to participate in private political associations). See also Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968) (reversing policeman's dismissal which was based solely on his refusal to waive immunity to which he would be entitled under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). There is nothing in our precedent that says a challenger must demonstrate a liberty interest to prevail on a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination claim. 8 But cf. Tedder, 1991 WL 65497, at  (holding that Oregon sex offender program did not violate plaintiff's right against self-incrimination in part because he has no constitutional right to discretionary parole before the expiration of his sentence); Guilkey v. Holden, 865 F.2d 258, 1988 WL 134526 (6th Cir. 1988) (Table) (affirming district court determination that Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated because plaintiff had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in discretionary parole). It is clear that the compulsion element of a Fifth Amendment claim can be established by penalties which do not constitute a deprivation of protected liberty interests under the due process clause. 9 28
29 The next critical question is whether the consequences imposed constitute penalties that are sufficiently potent and substantial to implicate the Fifth Amendment. See Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 805. Defendants argue that the prison's privileges and incentives program does not employ sanctions or penalties within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. We are not so persuaded. 30 As noted above, Plaintiff's refusal to admit responsibility and disclose his sexual history would result in a transfer from medium security prison to maximum security. This transfer goes hand in hand with a reduction in the inmate's classification, from Level III to Level I, which would result in the loss and restrictions of many privileges. These include the loss of participation in prison organizations and activities, including the IMPP; the loss of personal TV; substantially restricted access to the yard area and gym; substantially restricted visitation rights; significantly restricted purchasing rights at the canteen in terms of the amount of dollars the inmate is permitted to spend per payroll period; reduction in incentive pay and corresponding job opportunities; and restricted ability to retain personal property. See App. at 29; Supp. App. at 100-01; see also Supp. App. at 66-68 (describing how much more dangerous maximum security is). In addition, the Warden of the Lansing Correctional Facility and the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Corrections confirmed by their deposition testimony that these and other restrictions would occur with the transfer of an inmate from Level III to Level I. See Supp. App. at 72 (admitting reduction in open yard schedule); Supp. App. at 80 (explaining movement from two-person cell in medium security to four-person cell or dorm in maximum security); Supp. App. at 81 (describing restrictions); Supp. App. at 103 (describing the greater potential for violence in maximum security); Supp. App. at 285 (explaining consequences for refusal to participate in program agreement). 31 We conclude that these deprivations and changes in environment are penalties sufficient to implicate the Fifth Amendment because they have substantial or potent effects on the inmate. Cf. Brooker v. Warden, No. 98-466, 1999 WL 813893,  (D.N.H. June 22, 1999) (recognizing coercive effect of a requirement that an inmate satisfactorily participate in a sex offender treatment program as a prerequisite to parole, but finding no compulsion because inmate voluntarily participated in program and because he could choose not to participate without increasing the hardship of his incarceration since he was not subject to any additional punishment for refusing to participate). 32 The Supreme Court's decision in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), also illustrates how the consequences in this case constitute penalties within the Fifth Amendment. Mr. Palmigiano was an inmate of the Rhode Island Correctional Institution serving a life sentence for murder. He was charged with a disciplinary infraction, and, during his disciplinary hearing, he was told that he had a right to remain silent but that if he remained silent his silence would be held against him. Id. at 312. The Court held that an adverse inference may be drawn from a defendant's decision to remain silent at a prison disciplinary hearing without violating the prisoner's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 320. The Court reasoned that a prison inmate in Rhode Island electing to remain silent during his disciplinary hearing . . . is not . . . automatically found guilty of the infraction with which he has been charged because of his silence. Id. at 317. Thus, because an inmate's silence in and of itself is insufficient to support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary Board, the court determined that the case was very different from the circumstances before the court in the Garrity-Lefkowitz decisions, where refusal to submit to the interrogation and to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege, standing alone and without regard to other evidence, resulted in loss of employment. Id. at 318. 33 The consequences at issue in this case are more like those in the Garrity-Lefkowitz decisions than in Baxter. Here, unlike in Baxter, Plaintiff's refusal to submit to the interrogation to disclose the required information about his sexual history standing alone, would certainly result in the transfer to Level I and the corresponding loss and restriction of many privileges. As a result, we think the substantial penalties imposed in this case rise above the threshold limit of consequences set forth in Baxter which are acceptable and do not violate the Fifth Amendment. 34
35 Defendants also claim that the adverse consequences imposed in this case are not compulsory because Plaintiff could choose not to participate in the SATP. In other words, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's participation in the SATP is voluntary. 36 The record offers differing evidence concerning whether participation in the SATP is officially required by Department regulations. It appears that the program was required when Plaintiff was first recommended for it in 1994. The policy has since been amended such that, officially, inmates may volunteer to enter the SATP. However, even if participation in the SATP is not officially required of every sex offender, the policy of imposing certain administrative consequences upon an inmate in the event that he refuses to participate lends an element of compulsion. In light of the fact that the Department would impose sanctions solely because Plaintiff wishes to remain silent and invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, we cannot see how his participation in the SATP is truly voluntary. 37 In addition, we think this case is distinguishable from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272. In Woodard, the Court characterized the inquiry as whether giving inmates the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process violates an inmate's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 276. Mr. Woodard, a death row inmate, argued that because there was only one guaranteed clemency review and because his answers could have been used against him the interview was not truly voluntary and therefore it violated the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 285. The Court rejected this claim, concluding that the interview was voluntary and, as a result, Mr. Woodard was not compelled to speak. See id. at 286. Because Mr. Woodard retained the choice whether to provid[e] information to the [Parole] Authority at the risk of damaging his case for clemency or for postconviction relief or . . . [to] remain[] silent[,] . . . [t]he pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview compelled. Id. at 287-88. 38 This case is distinguishable from Woodard for the simple reason that Mr. Woodard was not punished for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. Rather, the clemency interview was voluntary and Mr. Woodard's eligibility for clemency did not depend on his participation in the interview. Though his participation in the clemency interview may have affected his chances for clemency, no separate and distinct substantial or potent consequences were imposed for his refusal to participate in the interview. Plaintiff in this case, however, is punished for refusing to participate in the SATP and invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. Unlike the situation in Woodard, Plaintiff is not even eligible for the SATP without disclosing the requisite information about his sexual history, and his refusal to disclose is met with very specific, potent, and substantial consequences. 10 39 This case also differs from the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420. In that case, the Supreme Court addressed the Fifth Amendment privilege in a probation setting. Mr. Murphy was charged with criminal sexual conduct, pleaded guilty to a reduced charge, was placed on probation, and was required to participate in a sexual offender treatment program. In the course of the program, Mr. Murphy, without claiming his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, admitted to an earlier rape and murder for which he was subsequently prosecuted. Bringing a § 1983 action, he argued that the confession was inadmissible because he was compelled to admit the crimes or face revocation of probation. See id. at 434. 40 Relying on Cunningham, Turley, and other precedent, the Court observed that there was a substantial basis for concluding that an express or implied threat to revoke a convicted defendant's probation because he legitimately invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege would create the classic penalty situation . . . and the probationer's answers would be deemed compelled. Id. at 435. Despite these pronouncements, the Court held that, although the state conditioned probation on the giving of truthful answers in the therapy program, it did not violate the Fifth Amendment because it had not attempt[ed] to take the extra, impermissible step of compelling the answers. Id. at 436; see also id. at 437. Thus, because Mr. Murphy was not required to disclose specific incriminating statements but merely was required to be truthful to his probation officer, and because he was not threatened with a penalty for invoking the privilege, the Court held that the state did not violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 437, 440. 41 It is significant that Mr. Murphy was not required to disclose any specific information, nor was he penalized or punished for invoking his constitutional right. In short, other than the normal consequences flowing from his confession, Mr. Murphy was not punished or penalized solely for choosing to remain silent. However, that is exactly what would happen to Plaintiff here. Defendants' policy would respond to his refusal to admit responsibility and disclose his sexual history by transferring him to a higher level of security and substantially restricting the privileges that he had earned in the lower level of security. 42
43 Two additional considerations may generally be helpful in determining whether state action constitutes impermissible compulsion. The first is a distinction drawn between a privilege and a penalty. Defendants argue that a transfer from medium to maximum security housing and the attendant loss of privileges for refusing to participate in a prisoner treatment program do not constitute a penalty or punishment. Rather, these consequences are merely part of the Department's system of privileges and incentives utilized to encourage inmates to participate in programs. In other words, the State argues that punishment only occurs in response to a wrongful act taken by a prisoner. 44 This circuit has held that the characterization of state action as either withdrawing a privilege or imposing a penalty is indicative of whether the action constitutes compulsion. In United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the court held that the denial of a downward adjustment under § 3E1.1 does not constitute a penalty or an enhancement of sentence for purpose of the Fifth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, we explained: 45 There is a difference between increasing the severity of a sentence for failure to demonstrate remorse and refusing to grant a reduction from the prescribed offense level. 'It is one thing to extend leniency to a defendant who is willing to cooperate with the government; it is quite another thing to administer additional punishment to a defendant who by his silence has committed no additional offense.' 46 Id. at 982-83 (citations omitted). 47 We do not believe that the distinction between a penalty and a privilege should be used as an absolute test for compulsion, but we believe that the distinction may be helpful in determining whether the government has sought to compel self-incriminating testimony. 11 Though it would be inappropriate to find compulsion in a situation where the state has unquestionably imposed a penalty but that penalty is so de minimis in nature as to have no compulsive effect, that is not the situation here. In this case, Plaintiff was placed in medium security housing before prison staff recommended that he participate in the SATP. His participation in the SATP was not part of his sentence or court-ordered. As noted by the district court, the consequences attendant to an inmate's refusal to participate in the SATP under IMPP 11-101 are exactly the same as those punishments automatically imposed upon a prisoner for termination from a work assignment for cause, offenses for which felony charges are filed by a state prosecutor, or disciplinary convictions for offenses such as theft, drunkenness, use of narcotics, sodomy, riot, arson, assault, sexual activity, a relationship with staff, and possession of contraband. See App., Vol. I at 24-25; Lile, 24 F. Supp.2d at 1155 n.3. Thus, it appears that in this case the Department's transfer action and the resulting loss of privileges are properly characterized as imposing penalties. This serves to buttress our conclusion that the loss and restriction of the earned privileges corresponding to Level III status solely for refusing to provide incriminating information constitute potent and substantial penalties that would likely cause Plaintiff to feel that he has no choice other than to incriminate himself. 48 The second consideration that bears on whether the government has sought to compel self-incrimination is the automaticity of the penalty. The district court found that the prison administrative sanctions attendant to [P]laintiff's refusal, automatically imposed by operation of IMPP 11-101, Lile, 24 F. Supp.2d at 1158, are impermissibly coercive because they present a costly burden to [P]laintiff's exercise of his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1159. In several Supreme Court cases which all deal with attempts by prisoners or parolees to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege and which hold that no constitutional violation occurred, none of the prisoners or parolees were automatically penalized for asserting the privilege. See, e.g., Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, Murphy, 465 U.S. 429, and Baxter, 425 U.S. 308. We believe that the distinction between an automatic and a conditional consequence is helpful in determining whether government action rises to the level of compulsion. See Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808 n.5 (distinguishing Baxter on the ground that the penalty in that case was not imposed automatically). That said, the automaticity of a consequence is not dispositive in our determination because it fails to take into account the severity of the penalty. It remains worth noting that, unlike the consequences at issue in Woodard, Murphy, and Baxter, the adverse consequences in this case would be imposed on Plaintiff automatically once he refused to admit responsibility and disclose his sexual history and thereby refused to participate in the SATP. See App., Vol. 1 at 24 (An inmate shall be automatically reduced to Level I for . . . [r]efusal to participate in the recommended programs at the time of placement. (IMPP 11-101, pt. IV.B.2.)).