Opinion ID: 874771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State Improperly Commented on Mr. Ellington's Post-Arrest Silence

Text: Mr. Ellington argues that the prosecutor acted improperly in allegedly commenting on Mr. Ellington's post-arrest silence through the questioning of a detective witness during the State's case-in-chief. On direct examination of the State's witness Sergeant Brad Maskell of the Kootenai County Sherriff's Department, when asking about Sergeant Maskell's arrival at the location on Scarcello Road where Mr. Ellington was apprehended after the incident, the prosecutor proceeded with the following line of questioning: Q. At the time that you got there and he was in the back of that patrol car, was he under arrest? A. Yes. Q. And so you did not interview him? A. I attempted to. Mr. Ellington alleges that this was an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's post-arrest silence. The State argues that the prosecutor specifically asked the question, And so you did not interview him in a leading way, to avoid any comment on silence and therefore there was no improper comment by the prosecutor himself. In denying Mr. Ellington's motion for mistrial that was made immediately following this line of questioning, the district court found that [i]n this particular case I don't think there is a sufficient showing to satisfy the court that it was the government's manifest intention to do that which has occurred here in terms of any inference that could be drawn, and as a result there was no misconduct. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the right not to be compelled to testify against himself. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right also to bar the prosecution from commenting on a defendant's invocation of that right. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1232-33, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 108-09 (1965). In the case of post-arrest silence, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance as to when and how that silence can and cannot be used by the State at trial. First, because of the promise present in a Miranda warning, [7] a prosecutor may not use evidence of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence for either impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98 (1976), or as substantive evidence of guilt in the State's case-in-chief, Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S.Ct. 634, 639, 88 L.Ed.2d 623, 630-31 (1986). A prosecutor may use evidence of pre- Miranda silence, either pre- or post-arrest, for impeachment of the defendant. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628-29, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1716-17, 123 L.Ed.2d 353, 366-67 (1993) (pre-arrest, pre- Miranda silence may be used for impeachment); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1312, 71 L.Ed.2d 490, 494 (1982) (post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence may be used for impeachment). The U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken as to whether post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence may be used as evidence of substantive guilt, and the federal Circuits are currently split on the issue. [8] However, this Court has held that a defendant's right to remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or interrogation, and thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt in its case-in-chief. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820-21, 965 P.2d 174, 180-81 (1998). From the record, it is unclear whether Mr. Ellington was Mirandized at the time Sergeant Maskell attempted to interview him. However, from Sergeant Maskell's testimony, he was certainly in custody and under arrest at that time, and thus under this Court's holding in Moore, his right to silence was protected. This Court also held in Moore that [t]he constitutional right against self-incrimination is not absolute ... and applies only when the silence is used solely for the purpose of implying guilt. Moore, 131 Idaho at 821, 965 P.2d at 181; see also State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 701, 132 P.3d 455, 458 (Ct.App. 2005) (A defendant's decision to exercise his or her right to remain silent, whether before or after arrest and Miranda warnings, cannot be used for the purpose of inferring guilt.); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 959, 231 P.3d 1047, 1056 (Ct.App.2010) (A defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent concerning an alleged offense may not be used by the State at trial in order to raise an inference of guilt.); accord Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3108, 97 L.Ed.2d 618, 630 (1987) (The fact of Miller's postarrest silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference, and thus no Doyle violation occurred in this case.). Because defense counsel moved for a mistrial immediately after Sergeant Maskell's answer here, it is unclear what the prosecutor's line of questioning regarding the fact that Mr. Ellington was not interviewed at that time was being used to establish. However, the jury was likely to infer that the reason Sergeant Maskell only attempted to interview Mr. Ellington rather than actually interviewing him was because he chose to invoke his right to remain silent once he was put under arrest. The prosecutor represented to the district court that he phrased the question to Sergeant Maskell in a leading way in order to avoid a comment on Mr. Ellington's silence. However, the State cannot provide any reason why it was at all relevant to ask the question to Sergeant Maskell to begin with, whether it was crafted in a leading way or not. The fact that Mr. Ellington was not interviewed by the police was simply unnecessary testimony, and the only conclusion this Court can come to is that the prosecutor or Sergeant Maskell was attempting to, and did, draw attention to Mr. Ellington's post-arrest silence. Further, the State's argument that it was Sergeant Maskell that commented on Mr. Ellington's silence, and therefore the prosecutor was not responsible for what Sergeant Maskell said, is unavailing. Sergeant Maskell is an officer with the Kootenai County Sherriff's Department, and therefore a representative of the State. To hold that a prosecutor may elicit prejudicial answers or comments on a defendant's silence from State officers acting as witnesses by later claiming that the officer and not the prosecutor himself supplied the prejudicial answer, would undermine the purpose of the rules barring misconduct during trial by superficially allowing the prosecutor to shift the blame to the State's own representative. As a representative of the State, Sergeant Maskell had the same duty as the prosecutor not to improperly comment on Mr. Ellington's silence. Even more, when an officer of the State gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the defendant, that testimony will be imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct. Sergeant Maskell's comment on Mr. Ellington's silence may not have been specifically solicited by the prosecutor, but it was undoubtedly both gratuitous and prejudicial to Mr. Ellington. Further, there was absolutely no reason for the prosecutor to engage in this line of questioning in the first place, particularly given that he clearly knew the line of questioning would create a high risk of an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's silence. Therefore, we hold that there was misconduct.