Opinion ID: 809418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Electrochemical Sensor”

Text: The parties’ primary dispute centers on whether the broadest reasonable construction of “electrochemical sensor” includes external cables and wires connecting the sensor to its control unit. Abbott argues that the Board improperly relied on language in its patents that was directed to the failings of the prior-art devices—failings that the claimed invention attempts to overcome. Abbott notes that all descriptions of the claimed electrochemical sensor in the specification are devoid of any mention of external cables or wires for connecting to the sensor control unit. Abbott further contends that the plain language of the claims—“contact pads” on the electrochemical sensor “coupl[ed]” to the “conductive contacts” of the sensor control unit’s housing in the ’752 patent, or having the transcutaneous electrochemical sensor “receiv[ed]” by the sensor control unit in the ’509 patent— does not support an embodiment with external cables or wires attached to the sensors. The PTO argues that the specification acknowledges, albeit when disparaging the prior art, that sensors can include external cables or wires. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“In general, statements about the difficulties and failures in the prior art, without more, do not act to disclaim claim scope.”). The PTO further contends that neither the claims nor the specification explicitly require the term “electrochemical sensor” to exclude sensors that IN RE ABBOTT DIABETES 12 have external cables or wires. According to the PTO, Abbott was required to make a “clear disavowal” or an “express disclaimer” of claim scope. See Am. Acad. Sci., 367 F.3d at 1363 (“[A] patentee ‘may demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.’”) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Absent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim the broader definition.”). The PTO also notes that the specification describes an embodiment of the “sensor control unit 44” that “usually includes no additional cables or wires to other electronic components or other devices.” ’752 patent col.29 ll.65-67; ’509 patent col.29 ll.60-63. Relying on this statement, the PTO argues that if the patentees had intended to disclaim an electrochemical sensor with cables or wires, they should have made a similar disclaimer with respect to the electrochemical sensor—although the PTO acknowledges that the term “usually” is less than precise. But in any event, the PTO asserts that Abbott had “the opportunity and responsibility to remove any ambiguity in claim term meaning by amending” the claims during reexamination, yet failed to do so. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1324. We agree with Abbott that the Board’s construction of “electrochemical sensor” is unreasonable and inconsistent with the language of the claims and the specification. As a preliminary matter, the claims themselves suggest connectivity without the inclusion of cables or wires: an “electrochemical sensor” having “contact pads” that are 13 IN RE ABBOTT DIABETES “coupl[ed]” to “conductive contacts” (in the ’752 patent), or a “transcutaneous electrochemical sensor” that is “receiv[ed]” by the sensor control unit (in the ’509 patent). That suggestion is only reinforced by the specification. “Although the PTO emphasizes that it was required to give all claims their broadest reasonable construction, . . . this court has instructed that any such construction be consistent with the specification, and that claim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the specification contains only disparaging remarks with respect to the external cables and wires of the prior-art sensors: “[t]he size of the sensor guides and presence of cables and wires hinders the convenient use of these devices for everyday applications.” ’752 patent col.1 ll.5759; ’509 patent col.1 ll.61-63. In fact, the primary purpose of the invention was to provide “a small, compact device that can operate the sensor and provide signals to an analyzer without substantially restricting the movements and activities of the patient.” ’752 patent col.1 ll.60-63; ’509 patent col.1 ll.64-67. Even more to the point, every embodiment disclosed in the specification shows an electrochemical sensor without external cables or wires. Indeed, the only mention of a sensor with external cables or wires in Abbott’s patents is a single statement addressing the primary deficiency of the prior art. It is true that the specification IN RE ABBOTT DIABETES 14 does not contain an explicit statement disclaiming electrochemical sensors with external cables or wires. But this is not an instance where the specification would necessarily have to disavow an embodiment that would otherwise be covered by the plain language of the claims—rather, claim terms like “coupl[ed]” and “receiv[ed]” are entirely consistent with and even support the specification’s exclusive depiction of an electrochemical sensor without external cables or wires. We have held that “[e]ven when guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format, the specification may define claim terms by implication such that the meaning may be found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” Iredeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Abbott’s patents “repeatedly, consistently, and exclusively” depict an electrochemical sensor without external cables or wires while simultaneously disparaging sensors with external cables or wires. Id. at 1303. While Abbott’s patents define the electrochemical sensor’s connectivity by implication, the PTO argues that our case law still requires an explicit disclaimer of external cables or wires. But the PTO’s reliance on cases like Amercan Academy of Science and Retractable Technologies is misplaced. Although the patentee in Amercan Academy of Science argued that it had disparaged and therefore disclaimed the use of “multi-user computers such as mainframes” in the background of the invention section of its patent, that same background section and the “specification as whole” actually supported configurations that included multi-user computers. 367 F.3d at 1367. And in Retractable Technologies, the patentee’s supposed disclaimer of “cutting” in the background of the invention was undermined by an embodiment in the 15 IN RE ABBOTT DIABETES specification that indicated that some forms of cutting fell within the scope of the claimed invention. 653 F.3d at 1306. In the case before us, however, nothing suggests or even hints that the claimed electrochemical sensor can include external cables or wires. Instead, Abbott’s patents consistently show the opposite. To be sure, the Board noted that Abbott’s patents acknowledge that the “sensor control unit 44 usually includes no additional cables or wires.” The PTO argues that a similar statement would be required to disclaim an electrochemical sensor with external cables or wires. This particular statement, however, refers to a specific embodiment where the transmission of data from the sensor control unit (44) to the receiver/display unit (46) “may also be performed using methods other than rf transmission, including optical or wire transmission.” ’752 patent col.52 ll.56-65; ’509 patent col.52 ll.56-65. Instead of being an explicit disclaimer, the statement is actually an explicit acknowledgment that at least some embodiments of the sensor control unit can include external cables or wires. Tellingly, the specification does not contain a similar acknowledgment with respect to the electrochemical sensor. We conclude, therefore, that under the broadest reasonable construction, “electrochemical sensor” is properly interpreted to mean a discrete electrochemical sensor devoid of external connection cables or wires to connect to a sensor control unit. Accordingly, we vacate the Board’s decisions as to the patentability of Abbott’s independent IN RE ABBOTT DIABETES 16 claims at issue 2 and remand for the Board to apply the correct claim construction.