Opinion ID: 1671742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting the state's batson motion.

Text: ¶ 11. In selecting the first twelve jurors during jury selection, the defense exercised peremptory challenges on four jurors, all of whom were white. The State then made the following Batson challenge: MR. EMFINGER: Your Honor, pursuant to Georgia v. McCollum and the State case after that, as we recall the defendant has used all of his preemptory [sic] challenges here against white jurors, and we would call upon him to exercise or show some reason other than race as to why they were struck. THE COURT: All right, what's the first  MR. EMFINGER: Janet McCarstle. MR. SWEET: We'd like to lodge a, on the issue the defendant believes, Your Honor, we submit he doesn't have to justify any challenges, but I understand the Court is asking us to, and I'll be happy to. Janet McCarstle, Your Honor, she was juror number 1; she said she had read about the case; she was aware of the prior case in the newspaper, that she had heard about the challenge to the election, that she had followed the challenge on the election. And, Your Honor, she on every case  we questioned her about either hearing about the prior case, challenge, the investigation; she answered in the affirmative on every one of those. Now, Your Honor, it was hard to go over it with her in front of all the jurors and prejudice them with what she had heard, but the extent and the fact that she had heard something on each of them and challenged and said she followed the challenge is the basis of our strike. THE COURT: What says the State? MR. EMFINGER: Your Honor, the questions were asked repeatedly from the Court, from both the State and the defense about people's level of knowledge. Some jurors were questioned seemingly at random or not necessarily at random about details of it, but all of the jurors indicated similar knowledge following, the whole stack of them out there to have similar knowledge after being inquired into. MR. SWEET: Your Honor, all jurors did not respond. For instance, Rose Etta Harris, Juror Number 16 that they struck did not respond that she had heard anything; and Annie Mattire did not respond; Victoria James did not respond; James E. Brown did not respond. There were several on there, Your Honor  Edith Conrad did not respond. THE COURT: All right, we're not going into any more detail. Are the four jurors that were stricken by the defendant all white? MR. SWEET: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: The Court recalls questioning this juror in detail; she had read the newspaper account, and the Court finds as a fact that this is a rural county, and as to Janet McCarstle, the Court is going to reinstate her as a juror. The entire county has read it. Upon the defense's explanation, the trial court allowed the other three peremptory strikes to stand. McFarland argues that the trial court erred in granting the State's Batson motion as to juror Janet McCarstle. ¶ 12. McFarland first contends that in a Batson evaluation of peremptory strikes against white jurors, the court must conduct an equal protection analysis. Because whites are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes, McFarland argues, the State bears a heavy burden to establish invidious racial motivation in challenging a defendant's peremptory strikes against white jurors, for which proposition he cites two Florida cases, Rome v. State, 627 So.2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) and McClain v. Florida, 596 So.2d 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). McFarland argues that the trial court erred in failing to apply this heavier burden, and that even under the traditional Batson analysis, the court erred in granting the State's motion. The State argues that McFarland's cited proposition is peculiar to the First District Court of Appeals of Florida and is inconsistent with the Batson line of cases both in the Supreme Court and in this State, and that under the proper Batson analysis, the trial court committed no error. We agree with the State. ¶ 13. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the prosecution was prohibited from racially discriminating through its exercise of peremptory strikes. In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2359, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), the Court extended this prohibition to forbid the defendant as well from engaging in intentional discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Accordingly, in Griffin v. State, 610 So.2d 354, 356 (Miss. 1992), we upheld the State's successful Batson challenge to the defendant's use of peremptory strikes against white jurors on the basis of race. The determinative issue, therefore, is not whether whites are a suspect class, but whether race is a suspect classification, which it certainly is. Where the State has challenged a defendant's peremptory strikes on the basis of race, regardless of whether the struck jurors were black or white, the court should use the same Batson analysis. ¶ 14. Under Batson, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must first make a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the peremptory strike. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 557 (Miss. 1995). The burden then shifts to the party exercising the challenge to offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the potential juror. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24; Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724; Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. ¶ 15. In the case sub judice, the State satisfied the first prong of the three-step analysis by pointing out that McFarland used all of his peremptory strikes against white jurors, thereby giving rise to a reasonable inference of purposeful discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (stating that pattern of strikes may suffice for prima facie showing). The defense then met its burden by offering a race-neutral reason for striking McCarstle, i.e., she had read newspaper accounts of the case and the election challenge. Our determination of this issue, therefore, turns on whether the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the defense's race-neutral explanation was pre-textual and that McCarstle was stuck because of her race. ¶ 16. We accord great deference to the trial court in determining whether the offered explanation under the unique circumstances of the case is truly a race-neutral reason. Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. We will not reverse a trial judge's factual findings on this issue unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. (quoting Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1350 (Miss. 1987)). One of the reasons for this is because the demeanor of the attorney using the strike is often the best evidence on the issue of race-neutrality. Stewart, 662 So.2d at 559 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). In addition to the demeanor of the attorney, the trial court must consider all other relevant circumstances, such as the way prior peremptory strikes have been used and the nature of the questions on voir dire. Stewart, 662 So.2d at 559. ¶ 17. In the case sub judice, McFarland used all of his peremptory strikes on white jurors. As the State pointed out to the trial judge, virtually all of the jurors  both black and white  had prior knowledge of the case. As the Fifth Circuit stated in U.S. v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (5th Cir.1993), a party may attempt to refute the other party's race-neutral reason by pointing out that similar claims can be made about non-excluded jurors. After considering the voir dire examination of McCarstle, the trial judge reinstated her as a juror, apparently not believing McFarland's explanation for striking her in light of the fact that [t]he entire county has read it. We shall defer to the trial judge's discretion under these circumstances, and thus he did not err in granting the State's Batson motion.