Opinion ID: 853428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the Defendant's Consent to Joint Representation

Text: Relying on Hanna, the Court of Appeals concluded that Latta had not waived her right to object to joint representation because the trial court had not sufficiently performed its duty of ensuring Latta's right to a fair trial in accordance with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Latta, 722 N.E.2d at 393 n. 3. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue principally in terms of waiver. However, Hanna also noted that the court has an independent interest in ensuring a fair trial and may, in some circumstances, properly refuse a defendant's waiver of his right to conflict-free representation. 714 N.E.2d at 1164-65 (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (`[W]here a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver, and insist that defendants be separately represented.')). As Wheat noted, this is true of both an actual and a serious potential for conflict. 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Even if we were to conclude that Latta's waiver of Studtmann's conflict was knowing and voluntary, the issue remains whether her initial waiver may serve to waive all future conflicts and any ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on these conflicts. Justice Marshall, concurring and dissenting in Cuyler, thought it impossible to waive all potential conflicts, especially where a waiver is obtained in the early stages of trial before it is feasible to contemplate all of the possible conflicts. 446 U.S. at 354 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1708. But the United States Supreme Court has given us no further clear guidance on this point. Hanna observed that the State has an independent interest in a fair trial, 714 N.E.2d at 1164-65, but that cannot override the defendant's right to proceed pro se, which is surely also a hazardous choice. Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Ind.1999) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). Wheat also cited the institutional interest in a fair proceeding. Arguably the proper inference from Wheat is that this institutional interest justifies overriding the defendant's choice of joint counsel but still permits a waiver to preclude a later claim of ineffective assistance. Wheat itself expressly reserved this issue for another day, as it noted, without passing judgment on, the apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals to entertain ineffective-assistance claims from defendants who have specifically waived the right to conflict-free counsel. 486 U.S. at 161-62, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The post- Wheat federal circuit decisions have split on the question of whether a waiver eliminates further claims based on conflict. Compare United States v. Hall, 200 F.3d 962, 965-67 (6th Cir.2000) (reversing conviction on direct appeal because of ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest even though the trial court had repeatedly warned defendant of conflict, and stating that the defendant's waiver does not bind the courts), and United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042, 1049 (4th Cir.1992) (a waiver obtained pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), which places a duty on the trial court to inform defendant of potential conflicts where defendant is jointly represented, may not serve to waive all conflicts of interest that arise throughout the course of that defendant's criminal proceedings), with United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 63-64 (7th Cir.1992) (any ineffective assistance claim based on conflict of interest is barred where defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives conflict).