Opinion ID: 2216436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Account Placement Fee

Text: 3% of Gross Sales on placement of all approved products and accounts. Accounts for Walker to sell to: 1. Chase 2. Citibank 3. TWA 4. Colorado National 5. J.C. Penny's [sic] 6. Bank of America Any additional accounts can be negotiated at a later date. D.D.M. will assist in all above mentioned accounts. Placement fee to be paid on a quarterly basis. /s/ Patrick H. Mueller Signed in Agreement 10-19-87 Date /s/ Steven R. Dean Signed in Agreement 10-19-87 Date /s/ D.P. Walker Signed in Agreement 10-19-87 Date The district court concluded that the amended commission agreement was void for lack of definiteness. However, before we reach that issue, we first must determine whether the statute of frauds, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 36-202 (Reissue 1993), barred enforcement of the amended commission agreement. Section 36-202 provides in relevant part: In the following cases every agreement shall be void, unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: (1) Every agreement that, by its terms, is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof. The amended commission agreement clearly was not to be performed within 1 year; the agreement's terms provided for payment over a 40-month period, or 3 years. Furthermore, the parties to be charged, Mueller and Dean, had not signed the agreementat least not at the requisite time and not with the requisite intent. Although Mueller and Dean had signed the agreement, they signed it on October 19, 1987; however, in the case at bar, Walker is attempting to enforce an amended commission agreement allegedly entered into on November 27. Under Nebraska law, a signature on a contract, to satisfy the statute of frauds, must be made with the present intent to authenticate the writing. Prigge v. Olson, 154 Neb. 131, 47 N.W.2d 344 (1951). Furthermore, although the signature requirement of the statute of frauds may be satisfied by the parties to be bound in adopting their signatures on an old contract to authenticate a new agreement, there is no evidence in the record to establish that Mueller and Dean either adopted or intended to be bound by their prior signatures on the commission agreement to be used in the DDM transaction. See id. Walker's first assignment of error is therefore without merit. Walker's second assignment of error is that the district court erred in failing to reform all the documents executed January 1 and December 8, 1988. The parties executed the following documents dated January 1: stock purchase agreement, consulting agreement, noncompetition agreement, and stockholder agreement. The parties executed the following documents dated December 8: stock redemption agreement and consulting agreement. A court may reform an agreement when there has been either a mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake caused by fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the party against whom reformation is sought. Records v. Christensen, 246 Neb. 912, 524 N.W.2d 757 (1994); Jelsma v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 233 Neb. 556, 446 N.W.2d 725 (1989); Ridenour v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 221 Neb. 353, 377 N.W.2d 101 (1985). To overcome the presumption that the agreement correctly expresses the parties' intent and to obtain reformation, the party seeking reformation must offer clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Records, supra ; Jelsma, supra ; Ridenour, supra . However, before we reach the issue of whether the district court erred in failing to reform the January 1 and December 8, 1988, agreements, we first note that a party's right to reformation of an agreement depends on whether the agreement reflects the parties' intent. See, Records, supra ; Jelsma, supra ; Ridenour, supra . Walker claims that the agreements he entered into with Mueller and Dean on both January 1 and December 8, 1988, do not represent the parties' intent, thereby necessitating reformation of the parties' agreements. However, Walker's contention is perplexing in light of the evidence adduced at trial, particularly Walker's own testimony. The bill of exceptions reveals the following exchange: [Defendants' attorney:] Did you ... [sign] this Consulting Agreement without reading it? [Walker:] Yes. Q. Did you sign all of the agreements [dated January 1, 1988] without reading them? A. Yes. .... Q. Did you sign all of the agreements [dated December 8, 1988] without reading them? A. Yes. It is well-settled law in Nebraska that one who signs an instrument without reading it, when he or she can read and has the opportunity to do so, cannot avoid the effect of his or her signature merely because he or she was not informed of the contents of the instrument. Five Points Bank v. White, 231 Neb. 568, 437 N.W.2d 460 (1989); Meek v. Gratzfeld, 223 Neb. 306, 389 N.W.2d 300 (1986). In the case at bar, Walker was represented by counsel at the time all the January 1 and December 8, 1988, documents were signed. Consequently, because Walker failed to read the documents before signing them, he cannot now claim that he is entitled to reformation because the documents do not reflect his, or the parties', intent. Walker's second assignment of error is therefore without merit. Walker's third assignment of error is that the district court erred in concluding that Walker was in violation of the noncompetition agreement. The noncompetition agreement provides in relevant part: For a period of five years from the date of this Agreement, Walker agrees that he will not, directly or indirectly, as a sole proprietor, member of a partnership, officer, director, employee, agent or consultant to or as more than five percent stockholder in a corporation, other than in connection with Walker Enterprises, Inc. (WEI) ... (i) solicit any business of the type engaged in by [WEI] or its affiliates (defined as the sale of merchandise and services, through solo mailings or insert solicitation or bangtail envelopes in monthly credit card or account statements) from any clients, customers, former customers or clients, or prospects of WEI or its affiliates (defined as financial institutions, oil companies or retail stores) who were solicited directly by Walker or where Walker supervised or participated in, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, the solicitation activities related to any such persons; or (ii) solicit any employee of WEI or its affiliates to terminate his/her employment. As used [herein], affiliate shall mean any person, firm or corporation that, directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, WEI, whether such control is through stock ownership, contract or otherwise. The district court concluded that Walker was in breach of the noncompetition agreement due to his affiliation with CardMember Publishing. We agree. The noncompetition agreement explicitly precludes Walker from solicit[ing] any business of the type engaged in by [WEI] or its affiliates. The noncompetition agreement defines the type of business engaged in by WEI as the sale of merchandise and services, through solo mailings or insert solicitation or bang-tail envelopes in monthly credit card or account statements. Both WEI and CardMember Publishing sold merchandise. Additionally, during his testimony at trial, Walker admitted that CardMember Publishing was engaged in the type of business expressly proscribed by the noncompetition agreement: [Plaintiff's attorney:] Does your business use any kind of mailing of any sort to go into credit card billing statements? A. [Walker:] Yes. Q. What do you use? A. Well, when requested, we will produce an insert, a bangtail envelope for a solo mailing piece when requested. Walker's third assignment of error is therefore without merit. In their cross-appeal, Mueller and Dean's first assignment of error is that the district court erred in determining that the amended commission agreement was valid and binding. The district court concluded that the amended commission agreement was valid and binding and awarded Walker $11,000 under it; thereafter, in its order denying Walker's motion for a new trial, the district court awarded Walker an additional $3,000 under the amended commission agreement. We agree with Mueller and Dean. As discussed previously, the amended commission agreement is void for failure to satisfy the statute of frauds, § 36-202. Because Mueller and Dean, the parties against whom Walker sought to enforce the amended commission agreement, did not sign the agreement with the present intent to authenticate the writing and therefore bring it within the statute of frauds, the amended commission agreement is void. Consequently, the district court erred in awarding Walker $14,000 under the amended commission agreement. Finally, Mueller and Dean's second assignment of error is that the district court erred in entering judgment against Mueller and Dean personally on the January 1, 1988, consulting agreement. The recital provides: THIS CONSULTING AGREEMENT (`Agreement') [is] made this 1st day of January, 1988, between Walker Enterprises, Inc. (`WEI') and Patrick H. Mueller and Steven R. Dean (`Mueller/Dean') and Dennis P. Walker (`Walker'). (Emphasis supplied.) Walker contends that the insertion of the conjunction and in the recital means that Mueller and Dean, in addition to WEI and himself, also are parties to this agreement. However, Mueller's and Dean's signatures appeared on the agreement as follows: