Opinion ID: 2974916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Allegedly Impermissible Promises

Text: This Court has expressly held that “[i]t is an unfair labor practice, however, to solicit employee grievances where the solicitation is accompanied by the employer’s express or implied suggestion that the grievance will be resolved or acted upon only if the employees reject union representation.” V & S Schuler Eng’g, 309 F.3d at 371. We have determined that a promise is no more lawful than coercion, and a promise will be presumed impermissibly influential unless the company can present a legitimate business reason for the timing of its guarantee. See NLRB v. 19 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 Bailey Co., 180 F.2d 278, 279 (6th Cir. 1950). Accordingly, the finding that a promise was made by a member of management that certain problems will be resolved if a union is defeated amounts to a violation of the N.L.R.A. In the present case, Dawkins told employees: I am forbidden by law to tell you today that I am going to make changes. But I can assure you that I recognize that there are changes that need to be made. It would be foolish for me not to address these issues. In fact it would be quite probable that significant changes would be made long before a contract is ratified. (J.A. at 8). It is clear to this Court that this statement meets the V & S Schuler Eng’g standard of impliedly suggesting that these grievances would be resolved if the union was defeated. V & S Schuler Eng’g, 309 F.3d at 371. DynCorp emphasizes that the preface that he is “forbidden by law” to make a promise negates any indication that what followed was a promise. We are unconvinced and, in fact, that phrase reads as a rhetorical device that simply makes it more obvious that he was making a promise. Further, he goes on to say it is “quite probable” that changes will be made and that it would be “foolish” not to do so. Taken together with the fact that this speech was given so close to the election, it is clear that a promise was implied in this language. Thus, the Board had substantial evidence to conclude as it did and we, therefore, affirm its findings. II. There was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that DynCorp did not violate § 8(a)(1) or (a)(3) of the N.L.R.A. by terminating Grant Turner A. Standard of Review As stated above, we review decisions of the Board under the highly deferential substantial evidence standard. Kamtech, Inc., 314 F.3d at 807. Thus, “where the evidence supports two 20 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 conflicting views, we may not disturb the Board’s findings and its order must be enforced.” Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d at 793. B. Analysis An employer violates § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) when it discharges an employee because of that employee’s union activity or support of unionization. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 (1983). To determine if a discharge was improperly motivated by union activity, this Court has embraced the Wright Line test. The Wright Line test, which was so named for Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980) and was approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), requires “the general counsel of the N.L.R.B. to make a showing sufficient to support the inference that the protected conduct was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision. At that point, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the adverse action would have taken place in the absence of the protected conduct, in the nature of an affirmative defense.” Arrow Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 155 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation and footnote omitted). Importantly, “circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a finding of unlawful motivation.” Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d at 541. Ultimately, an employer’s motivation is a question of fact, and, accordingly, this Court will not set aside the Board’s finding in this regard if there is substantial evidence to support it. The Wright Line test initially requires the N.L.R.B. to make a prima facie case “by putting forth evidence that supports an inference that the employee’s protected activities were a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.” NLRB v. Gen. Fabrications Corp., 222 F.3d 218, 226 (6th Cir. 2000). This consists of showing that “the employee was engaged in protected activity; that the 21 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 employer knew of the employee’s protected activity; and that ‘an adverse employment action resulted in whole or in part from anti-union animus, or that the employee’s protected conduct was a motivating factor in the adverse action.’” Id. (quoting ITT Auto. v. NLRB, 188 F.3d 375, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Once this is shown, the company must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have taken the same action absent the protected activity. Id. In the present case, the Board found that the General Counsel made its prima facie case. Even so, the Board ultimately determined that there was no violation because DynCorp was able to show that but for the protected activity, Turner would still have been fired. The Board pointed out that Turner’s productivity levels had, in fact, dropped and this drop coincided with the threat of discipline. Additionally, when Turner was confronted with his low levels of productivity, he responded by taking credit for work he did not do, which is fraudulent and against the policy of DynCorp. The Board noted that Dawkins credibly testified that he was not aware that work-product sharing was a common practice, and there was insufficient evidence to impute such knowledge to him. The only supervisor who was willing to admit to encouraging the practice was Wolfe, who had left DynCorp sometime after the election and before Turner’s dismissal. No supervisors who were employed at the time of Turner’s dismissal corroborated Wolfe’s assertion that the practice was encouraged by the supervisors. Thus, the Board characterized Wolfe’s behavior as “rogue” and declined to impute Wolfe’s knowledge of the practice to the rest of management. (J.A. at 51-52). Finally, the Board was persuaded by the fact that when Turner was asked whether he engaged in this practice, he lied to Dawkins, which is a valid reason for dismissal. Further, the Board also found that 22 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 Dawkins credibly testified that he did not see Turner’s letter stating his intentions to begin the union campaign again until November 7, 2000, which was after Turner had already been discharged. Thus, the Board was unconvinced that Turner was fired because he was active in the union campaign and instead held that the termination was based upon legitimate reasons and was, therefore, lawful. This issue presents a close case, as there are several facts that weigh strongly in favor of the argument that Turner was fired because of his participation in the union campaign. First, even though there was evidence that at least one supervisor had encouraged employees to share work product, no other employee had ever been disciplined, let alone fired, for this practice. Further, Turner was fired immediately after the incident occurred, while the other workers who shared their work product with Turner were fired four days later. If the impetus for the terminations was involvement in the work-product sharing, there is no reason that Turner should have been fired before anyone else. However, if the reason Turner was fired immediately was his dishonesty, it is not clear why the other employees, who were truthful about engaging in this practice, were fired at all. Indeed it raises suspicions that the other employees were fired only as an afterthought to avoid the appearance that Turner was being singled out. Coupled with the fact that Turner had been mistakenly given notices of discipline only a month earlier for excessive absences that were later discovered to be mistaken, this indicates that Turner’s union participation may very well have been the motivation for these adverse actions. However, the existence of this evidence does not mean that substantial evidence does not also support the conclusion of the Board. Because the Board’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, even though this Court may have held differently, we will affirm the findings of the Board. As we have previously held, “where the evidence supports 23 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 two conflicting views, we may not disturb the Board's findings and its order must be enforced.” Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d at 793. III. There was substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that the March 8, 2000 election results should be vacated and a new election should be ordered A. Standard of Review For the same reasons stated above, we review decisions of the Board under the highly deferential substantial evidence standard. Kamtech, Inc., 314 F.3d at 807. B. Analysis The N.L.R.A. makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to bargain with a union that the employees have chosen. Section 8(a)(5) specifically states that it constitutes a violation of the Act for an employer to “refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his [or her] employees.” Because it is undisputed that the union won the second election that the Board ordered, DynCorp’s refusal to bargain constitutes a violation. DynCorp makes the sole argument that the Board erred in determining that a new election was necessary, and, accordingly, it is under no obligation to recognize the results of that election. Specifically, DynCorp contends that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard when determining that a second election was necessary. The Board counters that this argument is barred because DynCorp did not make the argument previously and cannot make it for the first time before this Court. As we have consistently held, any argument raised for the first time on appeal is deemed waived and may not be addressed by this Court. See, e.g.,United States v. Treadway, 328 F.3d 878, 883 (6th Cir. 2003). Not only did DynCorp fail to make this argument below, the portions of its brief 24 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 that purport to address the allegations of waiver are inexplicably missing. Thus, we decline to address this argument and conclude that because we affirm the findings of the Board that DynCorp violated the Act, substantial evidence existed to support its decision to order a new election. Thus, we will enforce the Board’s order.