Opinion ID: 716800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claims Against Michael Dezer.

Text: 19 During the first trial, at the close of ACI's evidence and again at the close of all evidence, Michael Dezer filed written motions for judgment as a matter of law (JAML). Those motions stated in conclusory fashion: Defendant moves the Court to instruct the jury that under the pleadings, the law, and the evidence, their verdict must be in favor of this defendant. Following the adverse jury verdict, the district court granted Dezer's renewed motion for JAML on the ground that ACI had contracted with Dezer/Reyes and had failed to pierce the corporate veil so as to impose liability on Dezer personally. ACI has preserved an appeal from that ruling. 20 ACI first argues that the district court's ruling was procedurally flawed. ACI posits that Dezer's conclusory pre-verdict motions failed to specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(2). Therefore, Dezer's post-verdict JAML motion was improperly granted on a ground not preserved prior to the verdict. See Diercks v. Durham, 959 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir.1992); 5A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 50.08 at 50-86 (2d ed. 1994). The district court acknowledged this principle but concluded that Dezer's pre-verdict motions sufficiently preserved his post-verdict attack on the sufficiency of ACI's evidence because the court had not permitted oral argument to flesh out the basis for the pre-verdict motions. 21 To apply the rule that a post-verdict JAML motion must be limited to grounds asserted prior to submission of the case to the jury, we must know what grounds were fairly raised by the pre-verdict motions. That is an issue committed to the district court's discretion. Exercise of that discretion must of course be informed by the purpose of the Rule 50(a)(2) requirement, namely, that the motion be made before the case is submitted to the jury, so that the responding party may seek to correct any overlooked deficiencies in the proof. Rule 50 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1991 Amendment to Subdivision (a). 22 Here, Dezer filed perfunctory written pre-verdict motions. We discourage motions of this type and note that, had his post-verdict motion been denied, Dezer would likely have failed to preserve any JAML issue for appeal. See Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Argo, 237 F.2d 649, 651-52 (8th Cir.1956). However, the district court construed the pre-verdict motions as adequate to challenge the sufficiency of ACI's evidence. Because ACI makes no showing that it lacked fair notice of the veil-piercing issue or an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in its proof, we have no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by considering the merits of Dezer's post-verdict JAML motion. 23 ACI next argues that the district court erred in holding that ACI must pierce the Dezer/Reyes corporate veil to recover damages from Dezer personally. We have concluded that ACI has no cause of action for conversion. Our focus now is on quantum meruit. ACI contracted with Dezer/Reyes. ACI dealt with Dezer only in his capacity as an officer and shareholder of Dezer/Reyes. Thus, ACI could not sue Dezer for breach of the Management Contract unless it could pierce that corporate veil. See, e.g., New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Keator, 199 A.D.2d 921, 606 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (1993). However, ACI correctly notes that the mere existence of a written contract governing the same subject matter does not preclude [quantum meruit] recovery from non parties so long as the other requirements for quasi contracts are met. Seiden Assocs., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 37, 40 (S.D.N.Y.1991). 24 The key to any quantum meruit recovery from a non-contracting party such as Dezer is proof that he unjustly received and retained an independent benefit from the plaintiff's contractual services. See Custer Builders v. Quaker Heritage, Inc., 41 A.D.2d 448, 344 N.Y.S.2d 606, 609 (1973). Here, ACI points only to financial benefits that accrued to Dezer from the Management Contract because Dezer/Reyes was a Subchapter S corporation for income tax purposes. Those are not independent benefits. They therefore provide no basis for imposing quantum meruit liability on Dezer personally when ACI agreed to do business with, and provided its contractual services to, a bona fide corporate entity, Dezer/Reyes. That the contracts proved to be unenforceable gives rise to a quantum meruit claim against the beneficiary of ACI's contract services, Dezer/Reyes, but provides no independent basis for such a claim against Dezer. Thus, the district court properly granted JAML in his favor. 25