Opinion ID: 1391168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: architectural design restrictions

Text: Under 8A, approval of preliminary site plans is made conditional, subject to Architectural Design Review procedures as set forth under General Provisions, Article 12, Section 12-13. That article requires the applicant to submit schematic architectural plans indicating accurate elevations of each facade, and sufficient detailing to indicate materials, colors, texture, light reflecting characteristics, and special features intended for the building. In deciding whether the proposed building is acceptable, the five-man Architectural Design Review Board is to be governed solely by the purposes of architectural design review. These purposes are: . . . to protect property values and to promote the general welfare by insuring buildings in good taste, proper proportion, in general and reasonable harmony with the existing buildings in the surrounding area, and to encourage architecture which shall be distinct from the Colonial Williamsburg architecture. Landowners assert that nothing in the enabling statutes delegates authority to local government to impose restrictions on architectural design. The Board relies upon Code § 15.1-489 which provides that ordinances shall be designed . . . to facilitate the creation of a convenient, attractive and harmonious community . . . A community in which all buildings are required to conform to a particular design, or one in which a particular design is forbidden to all buildings, may be convenient, attractive and harmonious. However, a county cannot limit or restrict the use which a person may make of his property under the guise of its police power where the exercise of such power would be justified solely on aesthetic considerations. Kenyon Peck v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 64, 168 S.E.2d 117, 120-21 (1969). While the fact that aesthetic considerations entered into the reasons for the passage of an ordinance will not invalidate it, it is valid only if other elements within the scope of police power are present. Id. The Board argues that the preservation of the commercial value of an area as a tourist attraction is within the police power of the local government. It is true that Code § 15.1-503.2(a) (Cum.Supp.1974) authorizes certain counties, including James City County to adopt an ordinance setting forth the historic landmarks within the county and to create one or more historic districts adjacent to such landmarks in which no building . . . shall be erected . . . unless the same is approved by the board of supervisors of such county as being architecturally compatible with the historic landmark. . . . However, for two reasons this statute does not give the Board the police power it claims. First, the statute expressly provides that [n]o such historic district shall extend further than one-quarter mile from the property line of the land pertaining to any such historic landmark, and, as the parties stipulated, the Board has never adopted any ordinance designating any historical landmark within one-quarter mile of the B-2 zone. Second, the only architectural design power delegated to the county is the power to require architectural design compatible with the historic landmark; here, the requirement is that architectural design be distinct from the landmark. Some jurisdictions have adopted the rule upholding architectural design regulations when it appears that the purpose of the ordinance was to protect property values within the zone. State v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo.1970); Reid v. Architectural Board of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); Saveland Park Holding Corporation v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841, 76 S.Ct. 81, 100 L.Ed. 750 (1955). We decline to follow this rule when, as here, it appears that the predominant purpose of the ordinance was to promote aesthetic values and the purpose recited in the ordinance to protect property values was merely an incidental goal. Finding nothing in the enabling statutes which delegates to the Board the power it claims, we hold that the Board was without authority to impose the architectural design restrictions incorporated in 8A and that, as the trial court ruled, 8A includes purposes and provisions not authorized by law. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to consider whether the standards governing the exercise of the legislative power delegated by the Board to the Architectural Design Review Board were unconstitutionally vague.