Opinion ID: 1179643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: legality of benefits to adams county contained in mitigation agreement

Text: OPAL next asks that we vacate the UUP because Adams County contracted with Waste Management to issue the UUP in exchange for promises of goods, services, and cash contained in the mitigation agreement (hereinafter the Agreement) without meeting the requirements of Washington's public procurement statutes. Specifically, OPAL argues that the Agreement was negotiated in violation of RCW 36.32.245, which requires competitive bidding for contracts for the purchase of materials, equipment, or supplies, and RCW 36.58.090(2), which requires publication of requests for proposals to provide solid waste services. The trial court rejected this argument, concluding that competitive bidding is not required for the acquisition of free goods and services. Washington's public procurement statute provides that [n]o contract for the purchase of materials, equipment, or supplies may be entered into by the county legislative authority... until after bids have been submitted to the county. RCW 36.32.245. The selection of entities to provide solid waste handling services is exempted from competitive bidding requirements. RCW 36.32.265. Contracts for the provision of solid waste services are instead covered by RCW 36.58.090, which requires county commissioners seeking to contract for solid waste services to publish notice of its requirements and request submission of qualifications statements or proposals. In support of its assertion that the agreement is a contract, and thus subject to public procurement laws, OPAL first notes Commissioner Judd's testimony that I'm frankly concerned that essentially what we did was sell a land use permit. Trial Transcript (August 15-16, 1994) at 131. Second, OPAL points to the Agreement's inclusion of an offer by Waste Management to dispose of all of the county's solid waste without charging a tipping fee and to pay for the cost of hauling the county's wastes from transfer stations to the landfill. Also, Waste Management agreed to donate a $40,000 community grant to Adams County and to pay the county a host fee on every ton of waste disposed of at the landfill. Last, the Agreement itself says that [p]ursuant to the terms of this Agreement, the Commissioners grant an unclassified use permit for the construction and operation of one non-hazardous solid waste landfill and recycling facility ... subject to all of the conditions contained in this Agreement. Admin.R. at 11705. First, we reject OPAL's contention that the Agreement constitutes a contract for which the county is required to seek competitive bids. The Agreement obligates Waste Management to pay host fees, a community grant, and to provide other benefits to the county, regardless of whether the county chooses to dispose of its own wastes at the landfill. The Agreement does not, however, obligate the county to purchase ... materials, equipment, or supplies as described by RCW 36.32.245. The package of benefits agreed to by Waste Management is simply not within the purview of the public procurement statute because it involves no expenditure on the part of the county. We also conclude that the public proposal requirements of RCW 36.58.090 do not apply to invalidate the offer by Waste Management to provide the county with free solid waste disposal. According to the terms of the statute, a county may enter a contract for the provision of solid waste services only after it publishes its requirements and requests submission of proposals. RCW 36.58.090(2). Here, contrary to OPAL's assertions, the county has not entered into a contract for solid waste services. The Agreement explicitly states that the county is under no obligation to accept Waste Management's offer: [T]he Parties acknowledge that the County is in the process of a procurement decision on how to handle the County's Authorized Solid Waste and is considering several options including transportation to and disposal at the Regional Landfill.... The firm offer by WMW [Waste Management]... has not, by approval of the Unclassified Use Permit and execution of this Agreement, been accepted by the County. Admin.R. at 11734. As Respondent argues, OPAL's procurement argument is not yet ripe because the county has not accepted the offer of solid waste services contained in the mitigation agreement. [4] Because the Agreement is not a contract for the provision of solid waste services entered into contrary-to-statutory requirements, the issuance of the UUP is not thereby invalidated. OPAL's final argument is that the UUP should be invalidated because its issuance was conditioned on an agreement by Waste Management to make various voluntary payments to the county, which do not satisfy the requirements for voluntary mitigation under either Washington's impact fee statute or SEPA. The trial court concluded that OPAL lacks standing to assert a violation of RCW 82.02.020 because it is not within the zone of interests intended to be protected by the statute. This court applies a two-part test to determine if an organization has standing to challenge governmental actions. Save a Valuable Env't v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash.2d 862, 866, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829-30, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). The first part of the test is that the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.... Save, 89 Wash.2d at 866, 576 P.2d 401. Under Washington's impact fee statute, counties are prohibited from imposing any tax, fee, or charge, either direct or indirect, on ... the development, subdivision, classification, or reclassification of land. RCW 82.02.020. The statute does not, however, prohibit voluntary agreements with counties... that allow a payment in lieu of a dedication of land or to mitigate a direct impact that has been identified as a consequence of a proposed development.... Id. The statute further provides that such payments must be kept in a reserve account, may only be expended to fund a capital improvement agreed upon by the parties to mitigate the identified, direct impact, must be spent within five years, and must be refunded to the property owners if not expended. RCW 82.02.020(1)-(3). OPAL and its individual members are not within the zone of interests to be protected by RCW 82.02.020. This statute seeks to protect developers from fees or taxes that are not reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development.... RCW 82.02.020. This court has accordingly held that fees imposed upon developers that do not comply with the requirements of the statute are unauthorized, constitute an illegal tax, fee or charge and result in an unjust enrichment to the City.... Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell, 124 Wash.2d 240, 244, 877 P.2d 176 (1994). OPAL argues that it meets the first prong of standing because the statute seeks to protect the community by providing strict limitations on how the voluntary fees may be expended. But the statute provides that payments that are not expended on projects to mitigate the identified, direct impact of development must be returned with interest to the developer. RCW 82.02.020(3). A plain reading of this provision in the context of the entire statute suggests that it serves the same purpose as the statute as a wholeto protect developers from a generalized tax on development by requiring that money be either expended to address a particular impact or returned. OPAL's argument as to its right to assert a SEPA violation fails for the same reasons the above argument failedthe cited provision of SEPA seeks to protect developers from general fees on development. SEPA provides that government action may be conditioned only to mitigate specific adverse environmental impacts which are identified in the environmental documents prepared under this chapter. RCW 43.21C.060. Because OPAL lacks standing to assert its claim regarding the validity of the voluntary payments agreement, we do not consider the merits of its argument that the UUP should be invalidated on this basis.