Opinion ID: 1156136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board Should Have Applied Subsection (3) of AS 23.30.220 Rather than Subsection (2) in Computing Brunke's Average Weekly Compensation Rate for Temporary Total Disability Benefits

Text: The Board relied in part on our decision in State v. Dupree, 664 P.2d 562 (Alaska 1983), in refusing to adjust Brunke's compensation rate. The Board did not have the benefit of our decisions in State v. Gronroos, 697 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1985); Deuser v. State, 697 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1985); or Johnson v. RCA-OMS, Inc., 681 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1984) when issuing its decision on February 29, 1984. Those decisions have substantially altered Dupree's outline of the scope of the Board's discretion under subsection (3). Dupree was the first case to determine under what circumstances the Board should use its discretion to calculate the appropriate average weekly wage. There the Board had utilized its discretion under subsection (3) to calculate a compensation rate closer to the claimant's earnings at the time of injury. Dupree, 664 P.2d at 564. We held that the Board could not use its discretion to disregard the employee's documented past earnings merely because the Board felt that the employee was unlikely to match those earnings in the future. Id. at 566. We based much of our reasoning in Dupree on the legislative history of the federal counterpart to subsection (3). 33 U.S.C. § 910. We stated: Review of the legislative history of the federal analogue to subsection (3) indicates that the subsection was designed to permit discretionary computation only when the claimant was involved in seasonal, intermittent, or part time employment. Id. at 566 n. 6 (emphasis in original). In Dupree, we also reviewed the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. [6] We determined that in writing subsection (2), the legislature intended to give the benefit of past earnings history to the employee. Id. at 565. In Johnson we backed away from such a narrow interpretation of the Board's discretion under subsection (3). 681 P.2d 905. Johnson had retired after 20 years in the military, with a final preretirement salary of approximately $20,000. Id. at 906. He then began working for RCA-OMS, Inc. at $42,000 per year. He was injured while working for RCA. The Board used Johnson's military salary to compute his average weekly wage under subsection (2). Id. We disapproved of the Board's use of subsection (2). We reasoned that [t]he objective of AS 23.30.220 is to formulate a fair approximation of a claimant's probable future earning capacity during the period in which compensation benefits are to be paid. Id. at 907 (emphasis added). We held that where subsection (2)'s application would not yield a fair calculation, the Board may use its discretion under subsection (3). Id. In Deuser, we followed Johnson. Deuser, an acting district court judge, was injured driving a snow machine while travelling on circuit. Deuser was a recent admittee to the Alaska bar and had a sporadic work record prior to his appointment as acting district court judge. 697 P.2d 647. The Board applied subsection (2). It used Deuser's 1979 earnings to calculate an average weekly compensation rate, reasoning that such a computation was not substantially unfair. Id. at 649. Applying the Johnson reasoning we reversed the Board's decision. We concluded that the Board should have calculated Deuser's average weekly wage under subsection (3). Id. We rejected the Board's reliance on the voluntariness of Deuser's absence from the job market and the temporary nature of his employment as a judge. Id. at 649-50. We stated: The fact that Deuser's job as an acting district court judge may have lasted for only one year cannot be regarded as a justification for discounting the temporary disability payments to be received during this period. Id. at 649 (emphasis added). In Gronroos, we again reversed the Board and remanded for application of subsection (3) in determining the average weekly compensation rate. 697 P.2d 1047. Gronroos had retired from the National Park Service with a final annual salary of $42,000. Id. at 1048. He subsequently took a permanent seasonal position with the State of Alaska, a job lasting approximately six months each year, at $2,000 per month. Id. The Board calculated his temporary total disability benefits under subsection (2). It thus gave him the benefit of his full-time work history during the three previous calendar years. Id. Relying on Deuser and Johnson, we held that subsection (3) should apply. Gronroos' part-time relationship to the labor market was clear; since there was no reason to suppose it will change in the future period into which disability extends, it was unrealistic to turn a part time disabled worker into a full time disabled worker. Gronroos, 697 P.2d at 1049 (emphasis in original, quoting Deuser, 697 P.2d at 650 n. 2). In Gronroos, we had determined that application of subsection (2) would result in a compensation wage base of over twice Johnson's wage base at the time of injury, a result that did not fairly reflect his probable future earning capacity. Gronroos, 697 P.2d at 1049 (discussing Johnson ). In Gronroos, we concluded that [i]t is entirely reasonable to focus upon probable future earnings during the period into which disability extends when the injured employee seeks temporary disability compensation. Id. (emphasis added). Brunke argues that under our holdings in Johnson, Deuser, and Gronroos, he is entitled to an average weekly wage determination under subsection (3). We agree. [7] Brunke's temporary disability has now ended. When he was released on March 6, 1983, he returned to his job at MAPCO. He worked at the same construction site, for the same hourly rate. But for the injury on October 29, 1982, Brunke would have worked for MAPCO at $24.00 an hour through at least March 6, 1983. On remand the Board should calculate Brunke's average weekly compensation rate under subsection (3). [8]