Opinion ID: 1960144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment in Favor of Carleton

Text: [¶ 11] If the evidence presented by a plaintiff who has the burden of proof on an essential element at trial is insufficient, and the defendant would thus be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that state of the evidence at a trial, the defendant is entitled to a summary judgment. Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160, ¶ 8, 759 A.2d 205, 209. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we examine the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. See also Burke v. Port Resort Realty Corp., 1998 ME 193, ¶ 7, 714 A.2d 837, 839-40. It is Johnson's burden to establish the elements of professional negligence: (1) that Carleton breached a duty he owed to Johnson to conform to a certain standard of conduct, and (2) that such breach proximately caused Johnson's loss. See Niehoff v. Shankman & Assocs., 2000 ME 214, ¶ 7, 763 A.2d 121. [¶ 12] The basis of the entry of the summary judgment was Johnson's failure to allege any facts to establish the necessary element of proximate causation. Proximate cause requires a showing that the evidence and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence indicate that the negligence played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing injury or damage and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence. Merriam v. Wanger, 2000 ME 159, ¶ 8, 757 A.2d 778, 780-81. Proximate cause is cause that is unbroken by an efficient intervening cause. Id. (quoting Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 20, 728 A.2d 1261, 1267). Johnson must show more than a mere possibility of proximate cause; evidence that requires speculation or conjecture by the factfinder entitles Carleton to judgment as a matter of law, thereby permitting a proper grant of a summary judgment. See id. [¶ 13] Johnson's statement of material facts offers only the conclusory statement: Had [the purchase and sale contract] been prepared in accordance with reasonable care, and reviewed with reasonable care by Mr. Carleton, the contract would have given Mr. Johnson the right to require Mr. Treamer's estate to sell him the home. For this proposition, Johnson cites only to a statement in Carleton's deposition that if Johnson was his client and if Johnson had asked for a specific performance provision, Carleton would have included it in drafting the contract. [¶ 14] Johnson does allege that an attorney client relationship existed between him and Carleton, that Johnson asked Carleton to draft a contract that preserved his right to specific performance, that Carleton failed to do so in violation of a reasonable standard of care, that Treamer was competent, and that Treamer would have signed such a contract. In an action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she would have achieved a more favorable result but for the defendant's alleged legal malpractice. Niehoff, 2000 ME 214, ¶ 9, 763 A.2d at 124. There is nothing in Johnson's Rule 7(d)(2) statement, however, sufficient to establish the necessary element of proximate cause  that the contract provision Johnson alleges should have been inserted in the contract would have resulted in a more favorable outcome in that Johnson would have been able to purchase Treamer's real estate and personal property for $75,300. In the circumstances of this case, expert evidence is necessary to prove that Carleton's failure to exercise reasonable care proximately caused the injuries his client Johnson alleges were suffered. Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 1999 ME 196, ¶ 13, 742 A.2d 933, 940. [¶ 15] Contracts are not self-enforcing. In order to achieve his purpose of forcing Treamer to sell him the property for the contract price, Johnson would have been required to bring a lawsuit to enforce the contract. Defenses such as Treamer's incompetence at the time of the contract and undue influence could have and would have been raised by the guardian. Without the benefit of expert legal testimony, the factfinder would be forced to engage in speculation as to the enforceability of a specific performance provision in Johnson's contract with Treamer and the applicability of defenses that would be raised. Because he was late in designating his expert witnesses, Johnson is unable to present such expert testimony. Accordingly, his legal malpractice claim fails for lack of the required element of proximate causation. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.