Opinion ID: 2631813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reenactment of the shooting on cross-examination.

Text: Next, we consider whether the prosecutor's reenactment of the shooting substantially prejudiced Leitner. On appeal, Leitner argues that the reenactment during cross-examination was improper because (1) it was outside the scope of direct examination; (2) it constituted a form of compelled testimony in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) because Halvorsen's actions in playing the role of Michael misstated the evidence.
At trial, counsel for Leitner objected once during the demonstration, but it was an objection on the basis that the question had been answered several times, not an objection to the demonstration itself. The erroneous admission of evidence may not be raised on appeal absent a timely objection to the evidence, so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection. K.S.A. 60-404. State v. Sutton, 256 Kan. 913, 924, 889 P.2d 755 (1995). Even if counsel for Leitner lodged an appropriate objection at trial, her argument that the reenactment exceeded the scope of direct examination would fail. Courtroom demonstrations upon cross-examination of a defendant were ruled permissible in Kansas courts under State v. Egbert, 227 Kan. 266, 270, 606 P.2d 1022 (1980). In Egbert, this court found that asking the defendant to demonstrate to the jury on cross-examination how he contended the victim was shot does not exceed the scope of direct examination. 227 Kan. at 270.
We next turn to Leitner's contention that the demonstration was a form of compelled testimony. Leitner cites Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L. Ed.2d 1178, 87 S. Ct. 1951 (1967), as authority for the proposition that the demonstration constituted an impermissible form of compelled self-incrimination. Because the reenactment was not purely testimonial in nature, no violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination occurred. The case cited by Leitner bears out this idea. In Gilbert, the Court noted that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only reaches compulsion of `an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers,' and not `compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of real or physical evidence ...' 388 U.S. at 266 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-764, 16 L. Ed.2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 [1966]). On this issue, Egbert is controlling. In that case, this court held that a reenactment by the defendant on cross-examination did not violate [defendant's] constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. 227 Kan. at 270. Thus, Leitner's argument fails.
Next, we consider whether the demonstration was improper because it misstated the evidence. Following the initial demonstration, a recess was held. Thereafter, the prosecutor turned to the subject of the reenactment and asked Leitner questions concerning where she stepped when she shot Michael for the second time. After a brief exchange, Leitner's counsel objected, stating: State's already gone over this. It's been asked and answered. The court responded: Well I think some clarification's in line. At that point, counsel for Leitner objected on the ground that the demonstration misstated the evidence because during the representation, Agent Halvorsen indicated that he fell forward. The evidence is that Mr. Leitner actually fell backwards.... The trial court overruled the objection, stating: Well, I understood the demonstration was to give her an opportunity to show exactly where he was and what happened, and if she allowed things to be out of place then you'll have to clarify that on redirect I guess. Leitner contends that misstating the facts in evidence is clearly improper under Pabst, 268 Kan. at 507. Pabst involved a prosecutor who gave his personal opinion of the defendant's credibility to the jury during closing argument. While it is true that a prosecutor cannot interject his opinion of the defendant's veracity, Leitner's argument on appeal fails to convince us that the courtroom demonstration in this case constituted a misstatement of the evidence by the prosecutor. Finally, we conclude that neither the prosecutor's conduct nor the reenactment during cross-examination substantially prejudiced Leitner's right to a fair trial.