Opinion ID: 779205
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether they regularly read the Oakland Press or Macomb Daily.

Text: 27 4. Whether they read, heard, or were told anything about the arrest of Khalid Shabazz or anything about any impropriety concerning the jury. The nature and substance of what they heard, identity of anyone they discussed it with, as well as the substance of those conversations. 28 5. Whether they read, observed, or heard anything about the two particular articles in the Oakland Press and Macomb Daily. 29 6. What discussions each juror had with, or in the presence of, Edward Kennedy in a van ride or elsewhere, regarding the problem with a jury ... [involving] some [Muslim] guy. 30 7. What they heard prior to or during deliberation concerning the arrest of Shabazz, the arrest of Paul Corrado, the subject of jury tampering, the subject of juror misconduct; what discussions they had, if any; and the identity of any other person or juror who mentioned this subject. 31 8. What discussion any juror had about Paul Corrado or any other defendant which did not relate to any testimony or exhibit. 32 9. Why juror Seltenright felt constrained to ... stay up with a gun in fear after [an investigator] attempted an interview. 33 .... 34 .... 35 10. What discussion, if any, there was amongst the jurors or with any third party following the three questions put to them by the Court concerning that inquiry or the perception of what may have been taking place. 36 11. Whether there was any mention of the movie The Juror ... or any similar type of movie, book, TV show, etc. 37 J.A. at 1013-14. The government objected to items 1-3 and 7-11, arguing that these questions went far beyond what was ordered by the Court of Appeals and are in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. J.A. at 1000. The government cited Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). 6 38 The Remmer hearing was held on October 10, 2000. The district court first ruled on two important threshold matters: (1) that the Remmer hearing would be held in open court, rather than in camera; and (2) that the questions to be asked by counsel would be strictly limited to ... whether there was any interaction with alternate juror Kennedy concerning... the approach made to him by Mr. Shabazz and the questions concerning whether news reports or other information concerning Mr. Shabazz's arrest and Defendant Corrado's involvement in that arrest came to the attention of any of the jurors. J.A. at 2033. The court continued: If and only if the former juror testifies that there was some interaction related to the Shabazz contact ... or that the arrest and the events surrounding the arrest of Mr. Shabazz came to the attention of any jurors, then the Court will allow follow-up questions concerning the impact if any of such conduct, interaction or information. J.A. at 2034. 39 The district court proposed to ask each juror the following questions, prior to allowing the government and defense counsel to ask their questions: 40 At any time prior to or during your deliberations... did you hear anything from alternate juror Edward Kennedy or any other person about someone desiring, through Mr. Kennedy or otherwise, to affect the deliberations of the jury in any way? 41 If there is any kind of an affirmative answer or an uncertain answer to that, if you did, what did you hear and from whom? 42 And at any time prior to deliberations or during your deliberations did you, through newspapers, television or any other media, hear about the arrest of a person Khalid Shabazz or anybody for attempting jury tampering, specifically, did you hear that the Defendant Paul Corrado was involved in the events surrounding the arrest of Mr. Shabazz? 43 If the answer to the first question is yes ... did you read or hear at any time prior to or during deliberations anything printed in either of the Oakland Press or the Macomb Daily concerning the events surrounding the arrest of Mr. Shabazz? 44 J.A. at 2037-38. Defense counsel objected, specifically noting that many of their eleven subject areas had been eliminated. The district court explained that, while it had not ruled specifically on the eleven areas, it would pursue these lines of questions as those permitted by law and required under our mandate. The district court also noted that, I don't think anything else is relevant. J.A. at 2044. 45 After additional objections were raised by defense counsel and discussed, the district court proceeded to call and question, under oath, all twelve deliberating jurors and the six alternate jurors, including alternate juror Edward Kennedy. The government and defense counsel were also given an opportunity to ask questions within the scope allowed by the court. Jurors 87, 178, 55, 58, 12, 157, 7, 41, and 122 answered the court's questions in the negative; these jurors also testified, in response to defense counsel's questions, that they did not recall discussing the jury tampering incident or news accounts of it with Kennedy or anyone else. 46 Juror 108 had suffered a grand mal seizure that caused memory loss; she testified that she did not recall any incidents or discussions regarding the Shabazz incident. 47 Juror 90 testified that he/she heard about the Shabazz incident, but he/she was not certain whether he/she heard about it before or after the trial concluded. Juror 90 had a great deal of difficulty remembering specifics. He/she did testify, however, that his/her verdict was not affected by any such information but was instead definitely based on ... what we heard during trial as far as ... all the evidence. J.A. at 2099. Juror 143 recalled something about somebody in a restaurant at one time, in response to the court's question regarding whether the juror had heard anything about Shabazz's arrest. J.A. at 2126. As with Juror 90, however, Juror 143 testified that this information did not impact his/her impartiality. 48 Jurors 90, 12, and 143 all testified that, at about the same time, the absence of another juror, alternate juror 130, Myron — who was, as it turns out, unable to attend the trial because of illness — caused them to wonder about events surrounding the trial. The district court, however, ruled that this line of questioning by defense counsel, i.e., the juror's absence and speculation related to it, was irrelevant to the purposes of the Remmer hearing. 49 The alternate jurors were questioned by counsel but were not asked the preliminary questions by the court. Alternate jurors 166 and 130 testified that they had heard nothing about these matters. Alternate juror 147 testified that he/she had heard of the Shabazz arrest, but that he/she had not associated that information with the trial. Alternate juror 126 also testified to having heard about the news article on possible jury tampering, but he/she also testified that the discussion was limited to the article and not to whether individual jurors had themselves been contacted. Similarly, alternate juror 151 testified that he suffered from anxiety because the trial involved alleged participants in organized crime. 50 Alternate juror Kennedy (alternate juror 62) was questioned last. He testified that he had never approached any other jurors with respect to Shabazz's offer and that he did not come forward with his information when the district judge asked the jury the three questions at trial because he knew Shabazz only by the nickname, D. Kennedy testified to overhearing jurors discuss the Shabazz incident in the van bringing the jurors to the courthouse, but one of the jurors he identified as having discussed the incident was Myron, the juror who was absent at that time because of illness. The other juror identified by Kennedy as participating in this discussion was Juror 7, Suzanne. 51 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court reinstated the Corrados' convictions, holding that there is a total absence of any credible evidence that the work of the jury in this case was in any way tainted by the events or contacts that... we ... were told to look into by the Sixth Circuit. J.A. at 2203.
52 We review the district court's decision on juror misconduct or its determination of prejudice for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552, 557 (6th Cir.1999) (misconduct calling into question jury impartiality); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir.1996) (determination of prejudice). The defendants bear the burden of showing prejudice. Branham, 97 F.3d at 855. [U]nder no circumstance will prejudice be presumed. Id. See also United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir.1984) ([T]he burden of proof rests upon a defendant to demonstrate that unauthorized communications with jurors resulted in actual partiality. Prejudice is not to be presumed.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985).
53 On appeal, Paul Corrado argues that the district court erred because (1) the faulty memories of jurors, due in large part to the passage of time, rendered the Remmer hearing on remand inadequate; (2) the district court unduly limited defense counsel's questioning of jurors; and (3) the district court should have presumed bias because the jurors were obviously less than candid at the hearing. Anthony Corrado argues that the district court erred because (1) there is at least a reasonable possibility that extrinsic evidence affected the jury's verdict in this case; (2) the district court unduly limited defense counsel's ability to question jurors; (3) and the proceedings were held in open court rather than in camera, which caused jurors to be less than candid regarding bias and/or the effect of extrinsic evidence on their verdict. 54 The defendants had the burden of demonstrating at the Remmer hearing that they were prejudiced by the jury-tampering incident and/or news accounts of that incident. We agree with the district court that the defendants failed to produce evidence sufficient to establish that the jury's verdict had been tainted by this extrinsic information. The defendants' arguments that this court should presume that the jury's verdict in the present case was tainted are contrary to binding precedent and thus must be rejected. See United States v. Orlando, 281 F.3d 586, 597-98 (6th Cir.2002) (reaffirming that the burden is on the party claiming juror bias and that a reasonable possibility of taint is insufficient to carry that burden). 55 Similarly, both Corrados argue that the jurors' testimony at the Remmer hearing was less than candid and that therefore the district court erred in reinstating their convictions. We have previously held, however, that a juror's testimony regarding his or her own impartiality should not be treated as `inherently suspect.' Pennell, 737 F.2d at 533 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)). See also United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir.1988) ([J]uror testimony at the ` Remmer hearing' is not inherently suspect.). In Pennell, we explicitly held that if a district court views juror assurances of continued impartiality to be credible, the court may rely upon such assurances in deciding whether a defendant has satisfied the burden of proving actual prejudice. 737 F.2d at 533. 56 In Pennell, five jurors had received threatening late-night, anonymous telephone calls regarding their verdict in the case; these jurors communicated the content of these telephone calls first to their fellow jurors, then to the court. See id. at 529. Upon learning this information, the court questioned the five jurors individually and out of the presence of the other jurors. Each of the five jurors stated that his or her impartiality had not been compromised and that he or she could continue to function as a juror. Other jurors noted, however, that Juror Saveski seemed particularly shaken by the incident. When the court questioned Juror Saveski, she stated four times in response to different questions that the telephone call had not affected her impartiality or her ability to decide the case on the basis of the testimony and exhibits. Id. The court then asked questions regarding impartiality and ability to render a verdict to the entire jury. When no juror expressed doubt with respect to these issues, the court ordered the jury to continue its deliberations. See id. at 529-30. 57 Shortly thereafter, however, the court received a note from the jury notifying it that another juror, Juror Lorenz, believed that the telephone calls would influence her decision in the case. 58 The court immediately summoned Juror Lorenz, who had not received a telephone call, back to the courtroom. In response to questions, Lorenz stated that listening to the other jurors had made her nervous and that she did not wish to receive a telephone call. Nevertheless, she twice indicated that the calls received by the others would not affect her verdict. In response to additional questioning, Lorenz stated three times that the calls would not affect her deliberations and further stated that she could still abide by her juror's oath. The court then asked Lorenz if she were concerned about possible safety, to which Lorenz responded by nodding her head. When asked whether her nervousness would prevent her from continuing deliberations, Lorenz responded I don't know. 59 Id. at 530. After another exchange, in which the court assured Lorenz that nothing would come of the telephone calls, the court concluded that Lorenz would be able to render an impartial verdict based on the evidence. The court further concluded that the entire jury would be able to render an impartial verdict. See id. 60 We held that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial. See id. at 534. The district court had held the required Remmer hearing, at which [t]he court thoroughly questioned the contacted jurors on an individual basis and concluded that their assertions of unimpaired impartiality were worthy of belief. Id. Pennell indicates that the district court's determination regarding the credibility of jurors' assurances should receive substantial deference on appeal. In that case, despite evidence in the record that at least two jurors experienced a great deal of anxiety as a result of the threatening telephone calls, we concluded that the defendant had not sustained his burden. The district court had questioned the jurors individually, and the jurors had given assurances to the court, albeit after some hesitation, that they could still be impartial. We held that the district court was within its discretion in concluding that these assurances were credible. 61 Given Pennell, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the present case. The district court questioned the jurors individually about the jury tampering incident and news coverage of it and determined that their negative responses to its questions were reliable. None of the deliberating jurors testified that their verdict was tainted by the jury tampering incident. Although the testimony of alternate juror Kennedy suggests that at least one juror (Suzanne) was less than completely honest in her testimony, Kennedy's own testimony is itself problematic. For example, Kennedy recalled that Suzanne had discussed the jury tampering incident with Myron, but the record showed that Myron was not present on the day that Kennedy testified Suzanne discussed the issue with him. In addition, there is reason to discount Kennedy's credibility given his past actions in the present case, i.e., his silence when the district judge asked the jury about the Shabazz incident prior to deliberations. 62 That the proceeding was held in open court, as opposed to in camera, does not change our analysis. The defendants argued that jurors would be more candid... if not forced to shed their anonymity by testifying in open court. Appellant's Br. (Anthony) at 5. The district court reasoned, however, that the jurors were familiar with the courtroom and that holding the proceeding in camera would make them uncomfortable, increase their anxiety level, and lead to less candor in their answers. Moreover, during the Remmer hearing the jurors were not identified by name but only by juror number, and thus steps were taken to protect their anonymity in open court. The district court thus held that the presumption that all court business will be conducted in public was not outweighed by any compelling interest. J.A. at 2031. Based on the facts of the present case, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in holding the Remmer hearing in open court. Closed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). The openness of the Remmer hearing clearly advanced the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system, id. at 508, 104 S.Ct. 819, in this high-profile case. 63 With respect to the effect of the passage of time, we think that jurors are likely to recall whether their verdict was tainted by extrinsic factors, even if they have trouble remembering the names of their fellow jurors, day-to-day happenings during the course of a lengthy trial, and the like. Thus, the mere passage of time is not sufficient to call into question the fairness of the hearing. With respect to both the passage of time as well as the juror with amnesia, we note that the party seeking to prove taint bears the burden in the Remmer hearing; to allow the passage of time, and the fading of memory, to enter the calculus would shift that burden to a considerable extent. The party with the burden, in effect, bears the risks of juror amnesia and faded memory because of the passage of time. 64 Both Anthony and Paul also argue that the district court inappropriately limited their ability to ask questions of the jurors at the hearing. To the extent the district court limited the asking of questions based on its determinations of relevance, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Nash, 175 F.3d 429, 434 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 888, 120 S.Ct. 210, 145 L.Ed.2d 176 (1999). The district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in limiting defense counsel's ability to ask questions about the movie, The Juror, or about the juror who slept with a handgun under his pillow after the conclusion of the trial. Similarly, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in limiting questions with respect to the conclusions the jurors drew from Myron's absence because of health problems. That Myron's absence coincided with the jury tampering incident does not make the juror's absence itself a source of juror bias or prejudice, and thus it was peripheral to the Remmer hearing, at best. The defense sought to make the Remmer hearing a full-scale inquiry into the jury's doubts and fears going into deliberation; the district court was within its discretion in preventing this. 65 Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) limits the admissibility of juror testimony in a hearing such as this, and the district court correctly concluded that some of the areas that the defense proposed to explore are off limits under that rule. As we noted in United States v. Gonzales, 227 F.3d 520, 525 (6th Cir.2000), Rule 606(b) explicitly disqualifies juror testimony regarding jurors' mental processes in connection with deliberations. Thus, areas 1-3 and 8, quoted supra, were not appropriate grounds for questions at the hearing, as they went to juror thought processes rather than the influence of the jury tampering incident. We hold that the district court appropriately limited discussion to conform with this rule.