Opinion ID: 223516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of the Childhood Sexual Abuse Claim Against Barrett

Text: Walker also argues that the district court erroneously determined that his childhood sexual abuse claim against Barrett was time-barred. Walker maintains that the court applied the wrong standard to determine when the statute of limitations accrued. According to Walker, while the court concluded that Walker had reasonably ascertained his injury at age 15, Missouri Revised Statutes § 537.046 states that the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers the injury. Under Missouri law, Walker argues, the discovery and ascertainment of injury standards are quite different because the discovery standard depends on the subjective experience of the Plaintiff. Walker contends that he only began to discover the injuries resulting from Barrett's sexual abuse in 2006. As a result, he maintains that, even under the 1990 version of § 537.046, his cause of action had not accrued  much less expired  by the time the Missouri legislature amended the statute in 2004. Therefore, Walker argues that Barrett did not have a vested right to be free from suit, see Doe, 862 S.W.2d at 341, and, thus, the court should have applied the 2004 version of § 537.046 to his claim. Under the 2004 version of § 537.046, Walker would have had until his 31st birthday before the statute of limitations would have expired. Because Walker filed his suit before that date, he contends that his claim was timely. The current version of Missouri Revised Statutes § 537.046.2, amended in 2004, states that a claim for childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within ten years of the plaintiff attaining the age of twenty-one or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse, whichever later occurs. (Emphasis added.) The previous version of § 537.046.2, enacted in 1990, reads the same, except that it required the plaintiff to bring the action no later than five years after the plaintiff's 18th birthday or three years after discovery of the injury. Contrary to Walker's assertion, the discovery standard in § 537.046, by incorporating a test for reasonableness, is not a purely subjective test. Missouri courts have recognized the literal distinction between the discovery standard, under § 537.046, and the capable of ascertainment standard used for other causes of action. See Harris v. Hollingsworth, 150 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Mo.Ct.App. 2004) (recognizing that the discovery test in § 537.046 is an alternative accrual test for childhood sexual abuse claims instead of the `capable of ascertainment' test); Straub, 128 S.W.3d at 162 (Rather than reiterate the `capable of ascertainment' standard set forth in [Mo.Rev.Stat. § ] 516.100, the legislature created a new `discovers or reasonably should have discovered' standard.). But, to date, Missouri courts have not addressed whether the discovery standard operates differently, in practice, than the capable-of-ascertainment standard. See Hehner v. Hehner, 918 S.W.2d 283, 284 n. 2 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (noting that the discovery provision of § 537.046 is worded differently than the `capable of ascertainment' language found in § 516.100 but noting that Missouri courts have not addressed [w]hether the provisions are different in fact). Indeed, some Missouri courts have apparently treated the standards as functional equivalents. See Dempsey, 299 S.W.3d at 706-07 & n. 3 (noting that the plaintiff's claims were governed by different statutes of limitations, including § 537.046, but concluding that all the claims were time-barred based on the date when the plaintiff's injuries or damages were capable of ascertainment); Ridder v. Hibsch, 94 S.W.3d 470, 472-73 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (concluding that the statute of limitations for the childhood sexual abuse claim expired at the same time as the statute of limitations for the other claims, which accrued at the time of the alleged abuse). Walker contends that the Missouri Court of Appeals's decision in Straub explains that `discovery' of injury differs from `ascertainment of injury.' In Straub, a daughter filed suit, alleging that her father had sexually abused her as a child by subjecting her to deviate sexual intercourse and sexual contact. 128 S.W.3d at 159. She asserted several tort claims and a claim for childhood sexual abuse, pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § 537.046. Id. Prior to trial, the trial court dismissed all of the daughter's claims as barred by the statute of limitations, except for her claim for childhood sexual abuse. Id. at 160. At the trial for her childhood sexual abuse claim, the daughter testified that she always remembered the acts of sexual abuse but did not connect her psychological injuries and her damage to her childhood sexual abuse until the end of 1998. Id. The father moved for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence, arguing that the daughter's childhood sexual abuse claim was barred by the statute of limitations in § 537.046. Id. at 160-61. The trial court denied the motion, explaining: [Section § 537.046] doesn't talk about the damage of the abuse itself. It talks about and defines injury as something separate from that. And so ... if I was going to say as a matter of law as a reasonable person did she know about her sexual abuse, no problem. But this is talking about a separate injury that's defined by statute that's different from the abuse itself. And I think there's nothing that I can show as a matter of law that she should have reasonably associated that back with the events that happened. Id. at 161 (emphasis added) (quoting the trial court). Thereafter, the father did not request a jury instruction on the statute-of-limitations question. Id. The jury found for the daughter, and the father appealed. Id. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Id. at 163. After concluding that the new accrual standard in § 537.046 applied to the daughter's claim, id. at 162-63, the court noted that the date when the daughter realized she might be suffering from her injuries brought her claim within the limitations period under § 537.046, id. at 163. Moreover, the court noted that the father had failed to seek a jury instruction and, thus, waived the factual issue of when any of the periods of limitations may have run. Id. Accordingly, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the daughter, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father's motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or new trial. Id. Contrary to Walker's assertion, Straub tells us very little about how the discovery standard may differ, in practice, from the capable-of-ascertainment standard. Because the daughter did not appeal the dismissal of her tort claims  governed by the capable-of-ascertainment standard  the Missouri Court of Appeals had no occasion to discuss the difference, if any, between the two accrual standards. At most, Straub suggests that where a plaintiff alleges only psychological injuries under § 537.046, she could discover  at some date well after the abusive conduct  that her psychological injuries were caused by the childhood sexual abuse at some later date. But Straub does not foreclose the possibility that a plaintiff could discover his physical or psychological injuries at the time the abusive conduct occurs. Moreover, the district court did not, as Walker suggests, apply the wrong accrual standard to his childhood sexual abuse claim against Barrett. The court explicitly concluded that Walker reasonably could have (and in fact did, according to his complaint) discover that his injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse before he turned 18. Although the court based its decision on its previous conclusion that [Walker's] damages were capable of ascertainment by his 18th birthday, the court did not err, under Missouri law, by equating the two standards. Dempsey, 299 S.W.3d at 706-07; Ridder, 94 S.W.3d at 472-73. And as we explained supra, in Part II.A.1, the district court correctly concluded that Walker's injuries were capable of ascertainment at the time of the alleged abuse. For the same reasons, we conclude that Walker reasonably could have discovered that his injuries were caused by Barrett's alleged childhood sexual abuse  namely, the forced fellatio  at the same time. Because Walker's complaint establishes that his claim for childhood sexual abuse accrued at the time of the abusive conduct, beginning in 1995, the version of § 537.046 in effect at that time required him to commence his action within five years of his 18th birthday, which was on November 22, 1995. Thus, as of November 22, 2000, Barrett acquired a vested right to be free from suit, and the 2004 amendment to § 537.046 could not revive Walker's claim. Doe, 862 S.W.2d at 341. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Walker's childhood sexual abuse claim against Barrett.