Opinion ID: 1937155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other State Law Claims

Text: Although Linn and Letter Carriers only involved preemption of state defamation claims, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all the plaintiffs' state law claims. The court reasoned that since the only complained of behavior was protected free speech, none of these claims could proceed to trial. On appeal, the plaintiffs do not urge a different analysis. Instead, the plaintiffs' arguments only attempt to show the content of the newsletters is not protected under the Letter Carriers analysis. Because we find the content of the newsletters is protected, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment against all the plaintiffs' state law claims. As one of our sister state supreme courts has pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has frequently applied traditional pre-emption principles to find state law barred on the basis of an actual conflict with § 7 [of the NLRA]. If employee conduct is protected under § 7, then state law which interferes with the exercise of these federally protected rights creates an actual conflict and is pre-empted by direct operation of the Supremacy Clause.... [I]n each case where it has recognized an exception..., the conduct underlying the action pending in state court was not protected by the [NLRA].... [The Court has permitted state tort actions such as trespass to proceed, but p]rior to granting any relief for the trespass, however, the [C]ourt noted the state court would have to decide that the trespass was not actually protected by federal law.... J.A. Croson Co. v. J.A. Guy, Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 346, 691 N.E.2d 655, 662, 663 (Ohio 1998) (quoting Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3185, 82 L.Ed.2d 373, 383 (1984)) (emphasis in original). In examining the plaintiffs' defamation claim, we have determined, in Part III.A of this opinion, that section 7 of the NLRA protects the content of the newsletters. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (codifying the right of employees to form, join, and assist labor organizations). Moreover, all of the plaintiffs' claims are predicated solely upon this protected conduct. If the state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law... pre-emption follows ... as a matter of substantive right. Croson, 691 N.E.2d at 664 (citations omitted). It appears, then, the district court rightly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all the plaintiffs' state law claims. Accord Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 305-06, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1066, 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 353 (1977) (in discussing a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which it ultimately concluded was not preempted, the Supreme Court stated The potential for undue interference with federal regulation would be intolerable if state tort recoveries could be based on the type of robust language and clash of strong personalities that may be commonplace in various labor contexts.). Looking at the matter somewhat differently, one lower federal court reasoned preemption analysis requires examining the substance of the state law claims rather than their form. In the first instance, courts consider the defendants' behavior itself and whether this behavior is regulated by federal law, rather than the state cause of action assigned to the behavior. Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 836 F.Supp. 1574, 1579 (S.D.Fla.1993) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1911, 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 215 (1985)). On this understanding of preemption analysis, although the form of the plaintiffs' petition alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, extortion, interference with contract, and a violation of Iowa's right-to-work law, all four claims are, in substance, rooted in a complaint about the defendant's speech, as expressed through the union newsletter. No other allegations are made; simply put, the only complaint regards the defendants' protected speech. See id.; cf. Capital Fund Ltd. P'ship v. Priority Sys., L.L.C., 670 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Iowa 2003) (refusing to apply summary remedy of forcible entry and detainer statute to what was, in truth, a contract dispute). This is not to say such claims could not go forward in all cases. Rather, it is only to say that on these facts the plaintiffs' state law claims cannot stand. To do otherwise would send the plaintiffs' four non-defamation claims back to the district court for a determination as to whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action; assuming, arguendo, the plaintiffs could withstand summary judgment in this respect, the court would once again be faced with the issue of whether these state law claims are preempted by federal lawin spite of the fact the plaintiffs allege no other tortious conduct than the speech deemed protected under Letter Carriers defamation analysis. Although the plaintiffs' petition may allege the defendants' newsletters amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress, extortion, etc., in truth the only complaint concerns the defendants' protected speech in the newsletters. Once we peer through the plaintiffs' legal characterizations of the wrongs the defendants have allegedly done them, such causes of action clearly cannot stand in light of federal law. The district court's grant of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' other state law claims was proper.