Opinion ID: 2981425
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of request to bump a less senior employee

Text: In evaluating whether Gulley established a prima facie case of discrimination based on Oakland County’s denial of her request to bump into an MEI position, the district court relied upon the analysis utilized in non-selection cases. In that analysis, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) that [s]he applied for, and did not receive, a job; (3) that [s]he was qualified for the job; and (4) that a similarly-situated person who was not in the plaintiff’s protected class received the job.”5 Seay v. TVA, 339 F.3d 454, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (analyzing termination pursuant to RIF and non-selection for vacant positions) (citing Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1996)). The district court found that the third element of this test was not met. The district court went on, however, to explain that even if Gulley had met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to permit her to bump a less senior employee, Oakland County met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying Gulley the position she desired and that Gulley failed to show the reason was a pretext for discrimination. 5 The court notes that this test is not directly applicable to the present facts because there was no position “available” here that was given to another person instead of Gulley. We need not address this issue because, as discussed below, Gulley fails to show that Oakland County’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying her request to bump into an MEI position was a pretext for impermissible discrimination. 9 Case No. 11-1611 Gulley v. County of Oakland Oakland County submits that it declined to permit Gulley to bump the less senior employee from the MEI position because it believed that she was not qualified for the position. (Aff. of Robert Gerds, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 18-2, ¶ 16; Aff. of Michael Zehnder,6 Dist. Ct. Docket No. 18-3, ¶ 13.) In turn, Gulley argues that she was qualified for the MEI position and submitted evidence to the district court of her work experience and professional education to support her position. Gulley asserts that the trial court improperly engaged in credibility determinations when it accepted Oakland County’s contention that she was unqualified for the MEI position over her contention and supporting evidence that she was qualified. Gulley’s argument, however, misapprehends Oakland County’s burden under the McDonnel Douglas analysis. That is, Oakland County “need not prove a nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting [Gulley], but need merely articulate a valid rationale” for its decision. Hartsel, 87 F.3d at 800 (emphasis in original) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 514). Oakland County “bears only the burden of production; the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times.” Weigel v. Baptist Hosp., 302 F.3d 367, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). Thus, the district court was not tasked with determining whether Oakland County’s contention that Gulley was not qualified for the MEI was more credible than her contention that she was qualified for the position. Instead, the district court needed only to determine whether Oakland County had met its burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying Gulley’s request to 6 Zehnder is the Director of Oakland County’s Public Services Department. (Aff. of Michael Zehnder, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 18-3, ¶ 1.) 10 Case No. 11-1611 Gulley v. County of Oakland bump into the MEI position. As to that question, the district court correctly found that Oakland County’s proffered reason, i.e., non-qualification, met that burden. The burden then shifts to Gulley to show that Oakland County’s stated reason “is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 378. “Under the law of our circuit, a plaintiff can show pretext in three interrelated ways: (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 460). “To carry her burden in opposing summary judgment, [Gulley] must produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject [Oakland County]’s explanation of why it” denied her request to bump into an MEI position. Id. at 400 (citing Mickey v. Zeidler Tool and Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2008). “Pretext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer [take the adverse action against] the employee for the stated reason or not? This requires a court to ask whether the plaintiff has produced evidence that casts doubt on the employer’s explanation, and, if so, how strong it is.” Id. at 400, n.4. Gulley argues that Oakland County’s claim that she was unqualified for the MEI position lacks credibility based upon the County’s alleged preferential treatment of two other County employees: Gretchen Ingram and Keith Batchelor. Although she does not specifically indicate, it appears that Gulley relies upon the third method articulated above, which attacks the credibility of the employer’s proffered reason and, ordinarily, consists of evidence that other employees were treated more favorably. See Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084 (“The third showing is also easily recognizable and, ordinarily, consists of evidence that other employees, particularly employees not in the protected 11 Case No. 11-1611 Gulley v. County of Oakland class, were not fired even though they engaged in substantially identical conduct to that which the employer contends motivated its discharge of the plaintiff.”). This type of rebuttal is a direct attack on the credibility of the employer’s proffered motivation for taking the adverse action against the plaintiff. Id.
Gulley asserts that Oakland County’s proffered reason for not permitting her to bump into the MEI position was pretextual because, “[w]hile arguing that Ms. Gulley did not have the requisite qualifications, Oakland County provided false documentation that Gretchen Ingram had the minimum qualifications.” (Gulley Br. at 18.) The “false documentation” to which Gulley refers is Ingram’s job application. During the discovery process in the instant action, Gulley deposed Ingram on April 26, 2010. (Dep. of Gretchen Ingram, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 22-24.) Ingram had been employed as an MEI for five years. Id. During the deposition, Ingram was questioned about her qualifications for the MEI position and whether she met the minimum qualifications for the job. Id. at 1–32. As Ingram testified, it became clear that she had not been entirely truthful on her application, and that if she had been truthful she would not have met the minimum qualifications for the MEI position. Id. Gulley concludes that Oakland County’s claim that it denied her request to bump into the MEI position is not credible because, “[t]he unrefuted and undeniable fact is that Oakland County employed Ms. Ingram and allowed her to work for over five years without the minimum qualifications.” (Gulley Br. at 19.) Gulley’s argument, however, misses the mark. 12 Case No. 11-1611 Gulley v. County of Oakland Leaving aside the inquiry as to whether Ingram is an appropriate comparator,7 it is not disputed that Oakland County was unaware that Ingram had lied on her application until that fact came to light in her April 2010 deposition. Ingram certified that the “statements made [on the application] were true, complete, and accurate to the best of [her] knowledge.” (Dep. of Gretchen Ingram, Dist. Ct. Docket 18-27, at 39: 3–12.) There is no evidence before us that would suggest that Oakland County had any reason not to believe Ingram and, once the County was informed of her testimony, it subpoenaed Ingram’s prior employment records, determined that she had in fact lied on her job application, and sought her termination. Oakland County was permitted to, and did, reasonably rely upon the particularized facts that were before it when it hired Ingram. Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 839 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Defendant can overcome Plaintiff’s claims of pretext if it is ‘able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.’”) (quoting Wright v. Murray Guard Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 707-08 (6th Cir. 2006)). Thus, we find that Oakland County easily overcomes Gulley’s claim of pretext related to Oakland County’s alleged preferential treatment of Ingram.
Again leaving aside the issue of whether Batchelor is similarly situated to Ingram for the purpose of this analysis, Gulley contends that when Batchelor’s MEI position was eliminated, he was 7 “In order to show that an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory explanation is pretext on the grounds that a similarly situated employee received disparate treatment for the same conduct, ‘the plaintiff and the employee with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare himself or herself must be similar in all of the relevant aspects.’” Weigel, 302 F.3d at 378–79 (quoting Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352). 13 Case No. 11-1611 Gulley v. County of Oakland permitted to transfer to another position at the exact same pay. Ultimately, Batchelor transferred back into the MEI position when one became available. This treatment, however, is the same treatment that was offered to Gulley. The only difference is that Gulley would have transferred to a position at a slightly lower salary. In light of all of the evidence before the court, no reasonable jury could rely upon this difference as sufficient to cast doubt on Oakland County’s proffered reason for denying Gulley’s request to bump into an MEI position.