Opinion ID: 196233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Theory. We turn next to the question of

Text: 2. Legal Theory. whether the instant case fits within the legal contours of 10It is of some significance that we are here not addressing generally nonobstructive activity at the perimeter of an employer's business situs, as in DeBartolo, but, rather, inherently obstructive activity (even if marginally expressive) conducted inside the establishments of secondary businesses activity which could unduly bring [these] neutral, secondary employers into a labor dispute in order to apply pressure on the primary employers, Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts After DeBartolo: Has the Supreme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New Weapon?, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 217, 233 (1989), and thereby undermine the prescriptive purpose of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 20 section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Having mulled the Regional Director's theory that the Union's group shopping amounted to an unlawfully coercive secondary boycott we conclude that it is sufficiently colorable. The legal significance of the practice of group shopping is a matter of first impression. But, the novelty of a Regional Director's legal theory should rarely, in and of itself, foreclose the availability of injunctive relief under section 10(l). Novelty does not necessarily signify insubstantiality. See, e.g., Hendrix, 592 F.2d at 442-43; Squillacote, 540 F.2d at 858; Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Etc., 479 F.2d 778, 790 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 607 n.13 (1st Cir. 1995) (It would be a peculiar rule of construction if a statute could not be applied in a certain manner unless it had already been applied in that manner in a previous case.), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3874 (U.S. May 26, 1995) (No. 94-1953). Thus, we hold that a novel legal theory may, if plausible, provide an appropriate foundation for a section 10(l) injunction. We have little difficulty in finding that the Union's group shopping plausibly could be deemed a coercion-based secondary boycott under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and, hence, that there is adequate legal substance behind the issuance of the injunction. The language of section 8(b)(4)(ii) is pragmatic in its application, looking to the coercive nature of the conduct, 21 not to the label which it bears. Local Union No. 25, 831 F.2d at 1153 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although group shopping, as conducted by the Union in this case, is a new twist and may not fit the traditional conception of a secondary boycott, see, e.g., Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 341 U.S. at 687 (describing a classic secondary boycott), this qualification mostly serves to earn the Union high marks for ingenuity. Coercion under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is a broad concept, and the NLRB has not hesitated to include varied forms of economic pressure within the conceptual ambit. See, e.g., International Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 304 N.L.R.B. 71, 72-73 (1991) (finding unlawful coercion where union members caused a disturbance at a motel housing striker replacements, reasoning that the motel was a neutral employer and the union activity could pressure it to terminate its relationship with the labor supply contractor in order to force the latter to cease doing business with the primary employer), enforced, 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Local No. 742, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 237 N.L.R.B. 564, 565-66 (1978) (finding that a union's quid pro quo request for premium pay from a neutral employer was unlawfully coercive because it was actually an effort to cause the modification of that employer's relationship with another employer); Service & Maintenance Employees Union, Local 399, 136 N.L.R.B. 431, 436-37 (1962) (holding that a union's generally nonexpressive marching around the main entrance of a sports arena, impeding public access, constituted unlawful 22 coercion). Here, though one can imagine more significant forms of economic pressure than associational shopping, we nonetheless believe that the Regional Director's legal theory is sufficiently substantial that the district court's approbatory conclusion must be left intact.11