Opinion ID: 198411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eleventh Amendment Basics.

Text: 10 At this juncture, some basic tenets of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence need to be articulated to give context to the proceedings in both the district court and on appeal. First, it is well established that the principles of the Eleventh Amendment are fully applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 888 F.2d 940, 942 (lst Cir.1989). The Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to any entity that is an arm of the state, id., and this court has ruled that the Tourism Company falls within that category, see id. at 943. Our starting place, therefore, is that--as the Tourism Company argued in its summary judgment motion--the Eleventh Amendment would bar a suit by a private individual against the Tourism Company, unless the Tourism Company agreed to be sued. See id. at 942; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671-73, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Neither party has argued that consent has been given in this case. 11 Congress, however, has the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment's immunity if two conditions are met. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). First, there must be a clear legislative statement of Congress's intent to do so. Id. Second, its attempt to abrogate must have been done under proper constitutional authority, which only has been held to exist under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1124-28. 3 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2162-72, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (clarifying Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-51, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966) (describing test for determining whether a statute is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause). 12 The first half of the Seminole Tribe test is easy to apply in the ADA context. As we have noted, see supra at note 1, the statute unquestionably includes a clear statement of intent. The second prong--Congress's power to abrogate--is the subject of some debate, although all but one of the circuits that have decided the issue have concluded that the ADA was properly enacted under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Compare Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1428 n. 1, 1433 (llth Cir.1998); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir.1998); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir.1997); Crawford v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir.1997) with Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.1999). 13 Several district courts also have reached the contrary conclusion, however, see, e.g., Garrett v. Board of Trustees, 989 F.Supp. 1409, 1410 (N.D.Ala.1998); Nihiser v. Ohio E.P.A., 979 F.Supp. 1168, 1176 (S.D.Ohio 1997), and the uncertainty on this issue is reflected in several other ways: the panels in Kimel, Coolbaugh and Brown were split, and an en banc rehearing in an Eighth Circuit case ended with an evenly divided vote of the court, see Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 157 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir.1998) (on rehearing of 140 F.3d 802 (8th Cir.1998)). 4 Finally, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Kimel. See --- U.S. ----, ----, 119 S.Ct. 901, 902, 142 L.Ed.2d 901, ---- (1999). 14 Also of relevance here is that the traditional waiver rules do not always apply in Eleventh Amendment cases. Because the Amendment deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain claims against states, the immunity may be raised at any point in a proceeding, including for the first time on appeal. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). The Tourism Company did not make reference to the Eleventh Amendment as a defense in its answer to the complaint, and raised the issue beyond the time period allotted for dispositive motions. Because of the Amendment's jurisdictional reach, however, it trumped ordinary procedural requirements. When the immunity was raised in the summary judgment motion, the district court should have addressed it. Instead, it rejected the defense on timeliness grounds. 15 Failure to raise the Eleventh Amendment at the outset of the case was not, however, the Tourism Company's only default. Despite the explicit statement of abrogation in the ADA and the percolating caselaw on Congress's authority to abrogate, neither party made reference to the abrogation provision in the district court. As noted supra, the plaintiffs argued in their motion for sanctions that Eleventh Amendment immunity was inapplicable based solely on the statute's definition of employer. The neglect continued on appeal. 16