Opinion ID: 1181141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ballot Pamphlet

Text: The foregoing conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history of the section, which supports respondents' assertion that a nomination is rejected if either house of the Legislature votes to reject the nominee within 90 days of the time the nomination is submitted by the Governor, and that the purpose of the second sentence is to prevent rejection by mere inaction. Section 2 of the 25th Amendment was added to the United States Constitution in 1967 to provide for filling a vacancy in the office of Vice President. It is strikingly similar to the first sentence of section 5(b). [11] In 1970, the Council of State Governments recommended that states adopt a similar provision to fill vacancies in the office of lieutenant governor, and such measures were adopted by a number of states in the years following. (Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation (1970) Model Exec. Art. 14-10-00, § 4, p. 5); Ind. Const., art. V, § 10, subd. (b), adopted 1978; La. Const., art. IV, § 15, adopted 1974; Md. Const., art. II, § 6, subd. (d), adopted 1970; S.D. Const., art. IV, § 6, adopted 1972; Wis. Const., art. XIII, § 10, subd. (2), adopted 1979.) [12] Section 5(b) of our Constitution, adopted by the voters as Proposition 9 at the General Election in 1976, was clearly a part of this movement, sparked by the 25th Amendment, to provide for the filling of vacancies in state offices. The ballot argument in favor of the measure informed the voters that it was modeled after the 25th Amendment, which provides that a nominee for the Office of Vice President must be approved by the Senate and House. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 1976), argument in favor of Prop. 9, p. 38 [hereafter ballot argument].) There can be no doubt that under the 25th Amendment and the constitutional provisions of the other jurisdictions cited, the requirement that both houses must confirm a nominee, embodied in the first sentence of section 5(b), means that an express refusal by one house to approve the nomination or the failure of either house to vote thereon results in rejection. Lungren's claim that the first sentence means only that the nominee might possibly take office sooner than if he had been rejected by one house is particularly unpersuasive in light of the close similarity between the first sentence of the section and the 25th Amendment, and the fact that the section was expressly modeled after the amendment which, the voters were told, requires confirmation by both houses of Congress. Indeed, the ballot pamphlet repeated at least half a dozen times that the measure requires confirmation by both houses. The point was made in the ballot title and the analysis by the Legislative Analyst, [13] and in the arguments to the voters. These statements are incompatible with the view that confirmation would result if one house rejected the nominee. But neither the 25th Amendment nor the constitutional provisions in the other jurisdictions referred to above include a provision similar to the second sentence of section 5(b). As just observed, in these jurisdictions the failure of either or both houses to vote on the nomination would result in rejection by inaction. (7) (See fn. 14.) The ballot title as well as the arguments to the voters by both the proponents and the opponents of Proposition 9 make it clear that the second sentence was intended to cover inaction by the Legislature and to prevent it from rejecting a nominee merely by failing to act on the nomination. [14] The ballot title explicitly stated that if the Legislature  does not act within 90 days of Governor's nomination ... appointees may take office as if confirmed. (P. 739, ante, fn. 13, italics added.) The argument against the measure, written by Assemblyman Antonovich, described the situation that would exist if the two houses could not agree on whether to confirm the nominee: Proposition 9 would also result in a political football game between the Legislature and the Governor. As the Governor would be subject to the whims of either the Senate or the Assembly, he could be rendered virtually powerless. The simple act of filling a vacancy could assume monstrous proportions if the Senate or Assembly could not reach agreement regarding a candidate that would be acceptable to both. Hence, the appointment could bounce back and forth between the Governor and Legislature, with each rejection involving more time wasted. In turn, the vacancy would remain unfilled and unproductive, while the Legislature becomes further embroiled in political maneuvering. (Ballot argument, p. 39, italics added.) The proponents, in response, impliedly acknowledged that the nomination would fail if the two houses did not agree, since they rebutted the foregoing argument with the statement that if there was a delay in filling the office because of a genuine disagreement on the qualification of a candidate the tasks of the vacant office [would be] performed by the appropriate deputy. ( Ibid. ) We do not see how it can be denied that the statements by both proponents and opponents advised the voters that disapproval by either house would result in rejection of the nomination, requiring the Governor to submit another nominee to fill the vacancy. Lungren argues that the ballot pamphlet is inconclusive as to the intention of the voters because some language in it supports his view as to the meaning of the section, and because it is impossible to know whether the voters accepted the arguments made by one side or the other in approving the measure. As to the first of these assertions, the portions of the pamphlet relied on by Lungren do not bear him out. For example, he cites a statement by the Legislative Analyst as follows: If the Senate and Assembly neither accept nor reject the person designated to the vacancy by the Governor within 90 days, the person automatically assumes office. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1976), analysis of Prop. 9 by Legislative Analyst, p. 36.) But as we make clear above, this language is subject to the construction advocated by respondents, i.e., that the reference to the Legislature's acceptance or rejection of the nominee relates only to its failure to act on the nomination. There was no such failure here. Lungren's second contention, that it cannot be determined whether the voters agreed with the argument of one side or the other in approving the measure, misses the point; whether one side or the other was more persuasive, the fact is that the proponents and the opponents both premised their arguments on an interpretation of the proposal that is inconsistent with Lungren's position, and that premise was communicated to the voters. Furthermore, Lungren's claim proves too much; the assertion that the voters' motivation cannot be determined from the ballot argument could be made in every case involving a measure adopted by vote of the people.