Opinion ID: 1734443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress Jacobs's videotaped statement in Texas.

Text: ¶ 9. The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination includes the right to counsel at custodial interrogations. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until the attorney is present. Jacobs argues that the interrogation was started despite the fact that he, his parents and the police knew that an attorney was being contacted. Defense counsel claims that the totality of the circumstances indicates that Jacobs did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights, free of implied promises of leniency, under Miranda. The implied promises of leniency that Jacobs is referring to are the statements by Wardlow on the videotape. Wardlow told Richard, If you are the one that pulled the trigger, there's probably a reason for it, and that can be entered, people can understand ... I mean, we can work with that. Moreover, Jacobs claims that when a young person is arrested for a serious crime, and the parent in the presence of law enforcement informs them that he is calling a lawyer, that should be enough to invoke the right to counsel. ¶ 10. The State avers that none of Jacobs's constitutional rights were violated. A confession is voluntary if, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice. Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 826 (Miss. 1998); Marshall v. State, 812 So.2d 1068, 1072 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). The circuit court sits as a fact finder when determining voluntariness of a confession, and its determination will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1204 (Miss.1996), overruled on other grounds by King v. State, 784 So.2d 884 (Miss.2001). Here, Jacobs testified at trial that he was not promised, threatened or coerced to give the videotaped statement in Texas. Jacobs further testified that he gave his statement on his own free will, even though his father told him not to speak to anyone until his lawyer arrived. Based on the totality of the circumstances in the present case, Jacobs's constitutional rights were not violated because his statement was given freely without coercion. ¶ 11. The State further asserts that Jacobs's constitutional rights were not violated when he gave his statement because he voluntarily waived his Miranda warnings. Jacobs contends that his age hindered his ability to knowingly waive these warnings. The State relies on Horne v. State, 825 So.2d 627 (Miss.2002), where a fourteen-year-old was convicted of aggravated assault and capital murder and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 20 years for aggravated assault and life imprisonment without parole for capital murder. This Court stated: We have held that, if the nature of the crime is one where the defendant could receive life imprisonment or death and if original jurisdiction in the case lies in the circuit court, it is not necessary that a minor have a parent present during interrogation. Blue, 674 So.2d at 1205. Horne's age has no special bearing on his ability to be questioned without a parent and voluntary waive his rights. Id. Horne, 825 So.2d at 639. In the present case, Jacobs's father told him that he was calling an attorney and not to speak to anyone. However, Jacobs testified at trial that despite his father's statement, he signed the Miranda warning card after his rights were read to him and gave his statement. He further testified that he was not forced or coerced into giving this statement. Moreover, Jacobs stated that once he asked for his attorney, the interview was stopped. The fact that Jacobs was eighteen years old at the time of the arrest has no bearing on his ability to comprehend the questions and waive his rights. The facts indicate that Jacobs did knowingly waive his rights, despite being told by his father not to speak without the presence of his attorney. We conclude that none of Jacobs's constitutional rights were violated and that the trial court did not err in denying Jacobs's motion to suppress the videotaped statements made in Texas.