Opinion ID: 1236383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Request for Ruling in Advance on Scope of Cross-examination of Defendant.

Text: (10) Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to rule on the scope of permissible cross-examination if he took the witness stand to testify on the Belvedere Park murders violated his right to testify on his own behalf. Before the defense rested its case, defense counsel told the court that defendant wished to testify about the Belvedere Park incident on October 14, 1984, but that he did not wish to testify about the Wells murders on October 31, 1984. Counsel asked the court to limit any cross-examination of defendant to the Belvedere Park charges. Counsel indicated that defendant would testify on the issue of self-defense but gave no further details as an offer of proof. Defense counsel argued that the two incidents were entirely separate and that the direct and cross-examination could therefore be limited to the Belvedere Park charges. The prosecution disagreed, asserting that there was evidentiary spillover regarding defendant's efforts to hide the beige and brown Monte Carlo in Verduzco's garage and Ray Wells's apparent knowledge of the transaction. The trial court refused to make a ruling in advance of defendant's actual testimony, stating whether a defendant can effectively limit the cross-examination depends upon the direct examination and may not be known until he testifies. The law is that a defendant cannot artificially limit the cross-examination and direct examination. Defendant has failed to show that the court's ruling was erroneous. None of the authorities cited is directly on point, and none would have required the ruling sought here. Indeed, there is authority supportive of the trial court's action. (See People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 410-513 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 912-913 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) The court acted well within its discretion.