Opinion ID: 1324615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Violations of Sixth Amendment

Text: The Appellant asserts that the two and one-half year delay between his arrest and his indictment constitutes a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. It has been consistently held that the Sixth Amendment attaches at arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first. As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial are not invoked until a citizen becomes an accused, either by arrest or indictment. 404 U.S. at 313, 92 S.Ct. 455. Likewise, with regard to violations of the Sixth Amendment by delays in prosecution, this Court, mirroring language utilized by the United States Supreme Court, has explained that [t]he Sixth Amendment speedy trial right begins with the actual arrest of the defendant and will also be initiated where there has been no arrest, but formal charges have been brought by way of an indictment or information. Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Drachman, 178 W.Va. 207, 358 S.E.2d 603 (1987); see also Hundley v. Ashworth, 181 W.Va. 379, 381, 382 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire, 223 W.Va. 594, 678 S.E.2d 847 (2009). In State v. Palmer, 726 S.W.2d 447 (Mo.App. S.D.1987), the Missouri court explained: `[T]he time for purposes of speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment begins to run from the time of the indictment or information or an arrest, whichever occurs first.' 726 S.W.2d at 448, quoting State v. Holmes, 643 S.W.2d 282, 285[3] (Mo.App. 1982); see also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696, (1982) (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975)) ([T]he period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim.). Thus, in the present case, the Sixth Amendment clearly attached when the Appellant was arrested, twenty-five days after the incident in question. The delay was post-accusatory, and the Sixth Amendment is therefore applicable. The methodology for assessing claims of Sixth Amendment violations was enunciated by this Court in State v. Foddrell, 171 W.Va. 54, 297 S.E.2d 829 (1982). Syllabus point two of Foddrell provides the following guidance: A determination of whether a defendant has been denied a trial without unreasonable delay requires consideration of four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his rights; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. The balancing of the conduct of the defendant against the conduct of the State should be made on a case-by-case basis and no one factor is either necessary or sufficient to support a finding that the defendant has been denied a speedy trial. In Foddrell, this Court held that a delay of almost six years between indictment and trial was not caused by neglect on the part of the investigating officers. The defendant had not attempted to assert his right to a speedy trial, and he had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay. As this Court opined, [t]here was no showing that the deceased witness would have testified or what exactly her testimony would have been had she testified. Even if we assume that her testimony would have supported the appellant's assertions at trial, there was no showing that such testimony was critical to the appellant's defense at trial. 171 W.Va. at 58, 297 S.E.2d at 833. This Court again addressed this issue in Drachman and recognized a distinction between Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims in syllabus point two, as follows: In those situations where there has been no arrest or indictment, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not implicated. Yet, the prosecution may have substantially delayed the institution of criminal proceedings causing prejudice to the defendant by way of loss of witnesses or other evidence. In this situation, the Fifth Amendment due process standard is utilized. In Drachman, this Court analyzed the appellant's allegations of delay, the reasons for the delay, the appellant's assertion of his rights, and the prejudice to the appellant. This Court found that the appellant had not presented sufficient evidence of prejudice and had not asserted his rights in a timely fashion. Thus, he was not entitled to relief. Similarly, in State v. Hinchman, 214 W.Va. 624, 591 S.E.2d 182 (2003), this Court found that the appellant had not been prejudiced by the almost four-year delay between the alleged crime and the indictment. We proceed to an evaluation of the pertinent facts of the present case, utilizing the four factors identified in Foddrell.

Because the length of the delay is easily ascertainable and undisputed, this Court will discuss the length of the delay and the reasons for such delay together. Two and one-half years elapsed between the arrest and the indictment. In explanation for this delay, the State asserts that the original officer, Jason Smith, left the police department, and another officer, Joe Smith, assumed responsibility for the investigation. The State also explains that there was either no file on the matter or it had been misplaced. Deputy Sheriff Joe Smith was therefore required to re-investigate the case. There was no evidence of intentional delay by the investigating officers or the police department. In the order denying the Appellant's pre-trial motion to dismiss based upon the delay, the trial court held as follows: Although the length of the delay was considerable the Court FINDS that the delay was justified due to the fact that Deputy Joe Smith had to start a new investigation when Deputy Jason Smith left the Sheriff's Department.
With regard to the Appellant's assertion of his rights to a speedy trial, the Appellant maintains, as a separate assignment of error, that he did not waive his right to a speedy trial as a result of his counsel's failure to move for speedy trial prior to the indictment. Because this issue is properly considered as the third factor of the Foddrell paradigm for evaluation the Sixth Amendment claims, it is more properly addressed as a portion of this Sixth Amendment discussion. A defendant's assertion of his right was considered as one of the factors in Drachman, wherein the defendant did not assert his right to speedy trial for fifteen months. Although he was involved in the legal process with sufficient regularity and adroitness to obtain four continuances of his trial date between his 1983 arrest and his 1985 trial, he did not raise the speedy trial issue during that time. This Court in Drachman found that there was not a timely assertion of the right. As noted in United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750 (7th Cir.1973), however, the weight to be given to the absence of a demand in cases where the delay is between arrest and indictment is substantially less than in cases of post-indictment delay. 486 F.2d at 753. Importantly, we cannot ignore the fact that a person who is arrested but not charged will always nourish the hope that the government will decide not to prosecute. State v. Foat, 442 So.2d 1146, 1154 (La.App.1983). As the Macino Court noted, we are not, therefore, inclined to force a prospective criminal defendant to seek his own prosecution. 486 F.2d at 753. The United States Supreme Court has also addressed the concept that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial waives that right. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Court explained as follows: We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right. This does not mean, however, that the defendant has no responsibility to assert his right. We think the better rule is that the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right. Such a formulation avoids the rigidities of the demand-waiver rule and the resulting possible unfairness in its application. It allows the trial court to exercise a judicial discretion based on the circumstances, including due consideration of any applicable formal procedural rule. It would permit, for example, a court to attach a different weight to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in which no counsel is appointed. It would also allow a court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection. 407 U.S. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182. In the present case, we do not find that the Appellant completely waived his right to assert a speedy trial violation by failing to formally request a speedy trial during the period which elapsed between his arrest and his indictment. Rather, as specified by this Court in Drachman, the issue of failure to request a speedy trial should be considered as one of the factors in determining whether a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred.
With regard to the final prong of the Foddrell factors, the Appellant's evidence of prejudice is extremely limited. The Appellant's primary assertion in this regard is that the delay prevented him from calling four witnesses on his behalf. Those witnesses, although they were not eyewitnesses to the incident in question, would allegedly have testified that the victim had been the aggressor in past encounters between the two men. Two of the potential witnesses, Paulette Patrick and Michael Hinkle, had died prior to trial. Two others, Kenneth Allen and Shannon Allen, had moved out of state. However, at least one of the out-of-state witnesses, Kenneth Allen, was eventually located and testified at trial on the Appellant's behalf. Moreover, the Appellant asserted the theory of self-defense at trial, and none of these four individuals was an eyewitness to the crime. They would only have been presented for the purpose of testifying regarding alleged provocations that occurred two months prior to the incident in question. When the Appellant presented this matter to the trial court in the form of a pre-trial motion to dismiss, the trial court found no prejudice. The trial court explained that the Appellant had additional witnesses who are available to testify on his behalf. The trial court further found that the affidavit that the Defendant submitted to the Court is self-serving. The trial court found no corroborative evidence that verifies what Paulette Patrick and Michael Hinkle would have said or that it would be relevant. Having evaluated the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the Appellant's assertion of his rights, and the prejudice to the Appellant, this Court finds that the Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial were not violated in this case.