Opinion ID: 1440004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Count I

Text: Penal Code section 165 states in relevant part: Every person ... [on] any common council, board of supervisors, or board of trustees of any county, city and county, city, or public corporation ... who receives, or offers or agrees to receive any bribe [5] upon any understanding that his official vote, opinion, judgment, or action shall be influenced thereby, or shall be given in any particular manner or upon any particular side of any question or matter, upon which he may be required to act in his official capacity, is punishable by imprisonment.... Thus, as far as the bribe-taker is concerned, the crime of bribery consists of three elements: (1) the person charged must be a member of one of the bodies specified in section 165, (2) that person must ask for, receive, or agree to receive something of value or advantage, present or prospective; and (3) the request, receipt or agreement to receive must be upon an understanding that his opinion, judgment or action upon any official matter on which he may be required to act will be influenced. With regard to count I, Diedrich contends generally that no understanding existed. Count I covers the period from January to April 1973. During that time several events occurred that could form the basis of an understanding: Rose, in Diedrich's presence, offered to sell his land to AHI apparently in exchange for Diedrich's vote on the agricultural preserve; Diedrich suggested that AHI hire Remington apparently in exchange for Diedrich's favorable vote on terminating the preserve. The offer of the Fullerton land was refused, but the suggestion to hire Remington was accepted and he was paid over $74,000 of which $55,000 was eventually given to Diedrich or used for his benefit. Diedrich contends that the jury could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he or Rose offered Rose's Fullerton land for $150,000 over its market price in exchange for Diedrich's help in terminating the agricultural preserve. The record belies this contention. There were four people present at the Jolly Fox when the disputed statement was allegedly made: Richard Owen, Grant's president, William Stark, AHI's president, Rose and Diedrich. Owen testified to the statement. Stark testified that he could not remember any of the conversation at the Jolly Fox, but did remember leaving the table. Rose and Diedrich denied that the statement was made. At trial, defense counsel introduced Owen's testimony at a pretrial hearing as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. At the earlier hearing, Owen testified that he was very suspicious of politicians, and ... just assumed that if they got [$]150,000, their cooperation would be there. (Italics added.) When questioned about the prior statement, Owen maintained that the connection between the purchase of the Fullerton land and releasing Anaheim Hills from the agricultural preserve, was, in fact, made explicit by the statement that the purchase would materially help getting Anaheim Hills out of the preserve. From this testimony a jury could, of course, have concluded that the statement alleged by Owen was made. Actually, even if the statement was not made, the jury could have concluded that a request for a bribe was implicit in the offer of grossly over-priced land at the time AHI was seeking Diedrich's support in removing Anaheim Hills from the agricultural preserve. The jury could also have concluded that even if the entire discussion of the Fullerton land had not taken place, Diedrich was guilty of accepting a bribe based on his suggestion that AHI hire Michael Remington and the financial transactions that took place after he was hired. Diedrich argues that Remington's hiring could not have been a bribe because every witness who testified as to the hiring of Remington, especially Owen, swore that he was hired on the merits as an attorney, not as part of a scheme to commit bribery. [6] While no direct testimony suggested that Remington was hired as a conduit for a bribe, Owen's motivations in hiring Remington are immaterial to the issue of whether an understanding existed. The terms agreement, and understanding as used in the bribery statutes are terms of art. In People v. Fitzpatrick (1926) 78 Cal. App. 37, 45 [247 P. 601], the court noted: The agreement referred to ... in section 165 of the Penal Code ... is not the kind of agreement contemplated by the civil law of contracts, under which there must be an actual meeting of the minds of contracting parties in order to form an agreement.... The terms of the statute are met if it is proven to the satisfaction of a jury that the defendants [i.e., the bribe-takers] have `agreed' or intended in their own minds to receive a bribe. Similarly, the court in People v. Gliksman (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 343, 350-351 [144 Cal. Rptr. 451] concluded: It is the state of mind of the actual or potential bribe-receiver that is determinative; a bilateral agreement is not necessary. (See also, People v. Squires (1893) 99 Cal. 327, 330 [33 P. 1092]; People v. Vollmann (1946) 73 Cal. App.2d 769, 788 [167 P.2d 545]; People v. Brigham (1945) 72 Cal. App.2d 1, 7 [163 P.2d 891]; People v. Kerns (1935) 9 Cal. App.2d 72, 75 [48 P.2d 750].) There was ample testimony regarding the Remington-Diedrich relationship from which the jury could have concluded that through Remington as his agent, Diedrich accepted money from AHI with the understanding that his official conduct would thereby be influenced. First, Diedrich was instrumental in setting up the agreement between AHI and Remington. It was he who suggested that Owen hire Remington, he who set Remington's fee by suggesting that the case was of the $100,000 variety, and he who instructed Remington to handle the case outside of his regular law practice. Clearly, Diedrich exercised considerable control over Remington's actions vis-a-vis AHI. Stark, the president of AHI, apparently viewed the arrangement as improper. He testified that after signing a $13,000 check to Remington, he refused to sign additional checks because he didn't like what [he] was feeling. He further testified, I didn't hire this gentleman. I felt uncomfortable for what I considered to be very large amounts of money for, in my view, or at least to my knowledge, very little work. And I didn't feel I could sign it and uphold my responsibilities to our Texaco partners. As noted, Remington produced two short documents for the $74,000 he was ultimately paid. Remington himself realized that the arrangement was improper, commenting to his office manager, Donna Doughty, that he was to be Diedrich's bagman. When Doughty asked what Remington meant, he explained that a bagman was a person who acted as a go-between for a politician and a company seeking a favor. Doughty also indicated that Remington had referred to the 17-page document he prepared for AHI as window dressing. Remington's failure to pursue the balance of his fee  over $25,000  owed to him by AHI further suggests that he did not view the payments as compensation for services rendered. Remington testified that after AHI became his client, Diedrich called him and told him that now that he had lots of money, he could lend some of it out where [Diedrich] wanted it. As noted, Remington complied, writing a $10,000 check to Ben Richman, repaying Diedrich's $30,000 debt to Bill Moore and writing a $25,000 check to Viking Mauna Loa Management Company, Diedrich's sole proprietorship. Remington told Doughty that for the books they would call the transactions loans. No formal papers were drawn up reflecting the loans. Remington testified that the loans were never repaid. These facts suggest that Diedrich had an expectation that the money paid to Remington would be his own. The prosecution relied on two facts which, it claimed, showed that Diedrich's official conduct was actually influenced by the money he received from AHI. The first was a meeting between Diedrich and representatives of the county counsel's office concerning the need for an environmental impact report (EIR) to be prepared in conjunction with removing Anaheim Hills from the agricultural preserve. John Allday, head of the environmental services division for Orange County, testified that he recommended the EIR cover the effects of both the conversion to agricultural zoning and the ultimate development of the land, since it was clear that development was to take place. Diedrich argued that the EIR should cover only the reversion from agricultural preserve to agricultural zoning. In addition, of course, the prosecution heavily relied on the March 6, 1974, resolution and agreement removing AHI from the agricultural preserve. The evidence easily supports the conviction on count I. In fact, as will be seen in part III of this opinion, it supports it once too often.