Opinion ID: 1303870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Issue Relating to the Court's Vacating its Summary Judgment.

Text: In its findings of fact and conclusions of law the trial court found, inter alia, that Parsons, on the night in question, was not an employee of the Speedway, but was employed by Keil at a different and separate business; that at the time of his injury Parsons was not working for pay at the Speedway; that Parsons was not barred from recovering against the Insurer by Exclusions (i) or (j); that the Insurer provided Keil with a waiver form to be signed by anyone authorized to go into the pit area of the Speedway; and that Parsons did not sign such a waiver and was thus not authorized by Keil for purposes of Exclusion (p) to go into the pit. It is our duty to take these findings of fact as binding upon the parties on appeal. We will disregard evidence unfavorable to the trial court's findings of fact, and consider only evidence favorable to those findings, for our function is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc. v. Terrel, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229 (1975); Tafoya v. Casa Vieja, Inc., 104 N.M. 775, 727 P.2d 83 (Ct.App. 1986). The Insurer argues that the trial court had no grounds for vacating Summary Judgment in its favor, because Parsons contradicted his earlier deposition testimony by his affidavit submitted in favor of his motion to vacate. The findings of fact submitted by the trial court and set forth above show that there was clearly a basis on which the court could have vacated its judgment  namely, the discovery by the court that it had either misconstrued or misunderstood Parsons' deposition testimony. The Insurer objects to the court's vacating its judgment because there appear to be no grounds for such an action in SCRA 1986, 1-060, the rule asserted in Parsons' motion to vacate. We will ordinarily not interfere with a trial court's setting aside a judgment in reliance on the cited rule, unless the court acted unreasonably or capriciously. It is within the trial court's discretion to vacate a judgment when justice will be better served by its doing so. United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 96 N.M. 65, 628 P.2d 310 (1981); Click v. Litho Supply Co., 95 N.M. 419, 622 P.2d 1039 (1981). The Insurer argues on appeal that Parsons did not refer specifically in his motion to vacate to that portion of the rule which applied to his case. The Insurer argues that the allegations in Parsons' affidavit constituted neither mistake, inadvertance, surprise, nor excusable neglect, nor newly discovered evidence, nor fraud on the part of the adverse party (Subsections (B)(1) through (5) of the rule,) nor was there any other reason (Subsection (B)(6)) for the trial court to vacate its judgment. We disagree. The court could have correctly vacated its judgment under either Subsection (B)(6), or arguably, under the preceding subsections, but since the Insurer in its brief on appeal argues that the court could have correctly relied only on Subsection (B)(6), if it was to rely on the rule at all, we will limit our holding to a discussion of that subsection. The policy behind Rule 60(b)(6), as it is commonly called, is to do justice and prevent injustice. Here the trial court found that it had committed an error in granting the Insurer's motion for summary judgment, and it moved to correct that error by allowing the parties to proceed to trial. As we have stated elsewhere, [R]ule 60(b)(6)    provides a reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a given case, but it is limited to instances where there is a showing of exceptional circumstances. Perez v. Perez, 75 N.M. 656, 660, 409 P.2d 804, 807. We believe such circumstances existed here, and thus hold that the trial court rightly vacated its earlier judgment in favor of the Insurer.