Opinion ID: 1142953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the offer of judgment

Text: After the master's report ($516.00) had been filed and the pleadings amended, the City of Anchorage submitted an offer of judgment for $581.47 to Mrs. Scavenius which she did not accept. The City argues that, since the offer was submitted in accordance with Civil Rule 68 [19] and since the judgment finally obtained was less favorable than the offer, it is entitled to costs incurred after the making of the offer of judgment. Much of what we have said in the previous section of this opinion applies to the applicability of Civil Rule 68. By Rule 72(k), provision has been made for the allowance of costs and attorney's fees in condemnation cases. Therefore, under Rule 72(a), [20] provisions in the other civil rules pertaining to costs and attorney's fees including Rule 68 would be inapplicable. The City itself recognizes that Rule 68 could not constitutionally be applied to the initial proceeding before the master. Otherwise, allowing the condemnor to make an offer of judgment at that stage could serve to prevent the property owner from risking even an initial adjudication of the amount of just compensation to which he is entitled because of fear of imposition of substantial costs and attorney's fees. Thus, it is clear that Rule 68 cannot apply in all cases. Moreover, in other circumstances, Rule 68 would be in conflict with Rule 72(k). For example, if a property owner were to appeal a master's award of $10,000 and thereafter refuse to accept an offer of judgment of $12,000, under Rule 68, the condemnor would be entitled to the award of costs and attorney's fees if the jury awarded $11,500. Yet the master's award would be increased by more than 10 percent entitling the property owner to costs and attorney's fees under Rule 72(k). It is true that in Miklautsch v. Dominick, [21] we held the provisions of Rule 68 applicable over the prevailing party concept of the general costs and attorney's fees provisions. But there we were not confronted with an exclusivity provision such as that contained in Rule 72(a) which renders inapplicable all other inconsistent procedural rules. [22] Here, the provisions of Rule 72(k) specifically apply to costs and attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings. It is only where a specific procedure is not provided by Rule 72 that the other civil rules may come into play. This is not such a situation, and the court did not err in denying costs and attorney's fees under the provisions of Rule 68.