Opinion ID: 2640093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The District Court Properly Ordered Mr. Burnett to Pay Interest on the Judgment from the Date of the February 2006 Judgment Until He Pays the Judgment in Full.

Text: [¶ 26] Mr. Burnett also claims the district court erred in ordering him to pay interest on the February 2006 judgment amount after May 1, 2007, the date when he offered to convey property by warranty deed to Ms. Steeley in satisfaction of the judgment. He contends that her rejection of his offer cannot be the basis for imposing additional interest payments on him. He cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102(a) (LexisNexis 2007) which provides that interest accrues from the time judgment is entered until paid. Citing Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520, 527 (Wyo.1995), he argues that the phrase until paid includes the tender of a payment due; it does not require the tender to be accepted. On that basis he contends that Ms. Steeley's rejection of his May 1, 2007, offer to transfer property by warranty deed tolled the accrual of statutory interest. [¶ 27] In Parker, judgment was entered against the defendant and statutory interest began to accrue as of that date. The defendant filed a motion for leave to deposit the judgment amount in court. In the motion, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs had refused to accept payment of the judgment pending a ruling on their post-trial motions and a possible appeal. Id. at 527. The district court allowed the defendant to deposit the judgment amount and tolled the accrual of statutory interest as of the deposit date. [¶ 28] On appeal, this Court held that the words until paid as used in § 1-16-102(a) do not require the payment of a judgment amount to be made and accepted by the prevailing party to toll the accrual of statutory interest. Id. at 528. By paying the judgment amount to the district court, i.e. surrendering control to the court of the sum necessary to discharge the debt, the defendant paid the judgment amount and stopped the accrual of statutory interest. [¶ 29] Unlike the situation in Parker, Mr. Burnett did not pay the judgment amount to the district court. Depositing quitclaim deeds for property to which he did not have clear title did not constitute payment to the district court of the judgment amount such as would stop the accrual of statutory interest, nor did his offer to convey property by warranty deed upon receipt of $43,000 from the judgment creditor. Neither of these acts constituted surrendering control to the court of the sum necessary to discharge the debt. Id. [¶ 30] The other difficulty with Mr. Burnett's argument is that, unlike the situation in Parker where the judgment debtor deposited the judgment amount with the district court, the record here does not establish that any of Mr. Burnett's efforts involved payment of the judgment amount. Mr. Burnett presented no evidence to support the conclusion that the quitclaim deeds he deposited with the court conveyed property valued at a price equal to the judgment amount. As for his subsequent offer to convey property by warranty deed, Ms. Steeley was under no obligation to accept it given that it came over a year after the judgment became final, came after she had begun enforcement proceedings, and included a contingency (the payment to him of $43,000) that Ms. Steeley testified she could not meet. Under the circumstances, Mr. Burnett's offer did not stop the accrual of statutory interest.