Opinion ID: 1926324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Direct Appeal Other Crimes Evidence

Text: In his direct appeal, Gaither argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, over objection, it allowed Pamela McGriff to testify that she observed Gaither and another individual chasing the decedent on September 9, 1987, the evening before the murder, with gun in hand, for the purpose of proving malice and premeditation in committing the murder the following night. Gaither argues that because malice and premeditation were uncontroverted, the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the testimony, relying on this court's holding in Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 423 (D.C. 1988) ([W]here intent is not controverted in any meaningful sense, evidence of other crimes to prove intent is so prejudicial per se that it is inadmissible as a matter of law.). Gaither argues that the Thompson holding applies to all state of mind rubrics, such as premeditation or malice. We need offer no opinion concerning this proposition, because even if admission of McGriff's testimony was error, the error was harmless. [8] The prejudice that inheres in the admission of Drew evidence is the likelihood that juries will draw from other crimes evidence an improper inference of criminal disposition. Drew, supra note 1, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 15, 331 F.2d at 89; Thompson, 546 A.2d at 424-25. Because Gaither's defense theory was that he was not the killer, the possible prejudice would result from the jury's use of McGriff's testimony concerning Gaither's activity the night previous to the murder to infer Gaither's identity as the murderer. The trial court instructed the jury, however, that it could only consider McGriff's testimony concerning Gaither's conduct on September 9, 1987, for the purpose of determining premeditation and malice, once it had determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Gaither was the murderer. [9] After the jury sent a note asking if it could consider Pamela McGriff's testimony as grounds to give credence to Gregory Fennel's testimony, the trial court responded by rereading its original instruction on the limited purpose for which it could consider McGriff's testimony, and added the further cautionary instruction, [y]ou may not use the testimony of Ms. McGriff in determining who shot Mr. Douglas. See supra part I.B. The jury is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. See Hairston v. United States, 497 A.2d 1097, 1102 (D.C. 1985). [T]his is a crucial assumption for our theory of trial depends on the jury's ability to do so. Thompson, 546 A.2d at 425 (citations omitted). As this court further noted in Thompson, concerning the applicability of this presumption to other crimes issues: [L]imiting instructions can and in some cases must be provided, and we are constrained to assume that when they contain realistic rather than theoretical distinctions, and when they are clearly and understandably delivered, they will reduce, if not dissipate, the danger of unfairness and prejudice. In weighing probative value against prejudicial effect, courts should inquire as to whether the risk of prejudice has been or can be meaningfully reduced by the trial judge's instructions. Id. at 426. Here, the jury twice was instructed in clear and easily understandable terms how it was to consider McGriff's testimony. In its deadlock note, the jury did not again question the proper use of McGriff's testimony, so we have no cause to be concerned about jury confusion. We are satisfied that the trial court's instructions meaningfully reduced the risk of prejudice to Gaither so that even if it was error to admit McGriff's testimony, the error was harmless.