Opinion ID: 3013397
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of Specific Instances of Conduct

Text: Valletto argues that Agent Grosfelt’s testimony constituted extrinsic evidence of specific instances supporting Lopa’s credibility, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). Under Fed. R. Evid. 608(a), opinion or reputation evidence of truthful character is admissible after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked. Extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness’s conduct, however, may not be introduced for the purpose of attacking or supporting that witness’s credibility. Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). Valletto concedes that Lopa’s reputation for truthfulness was attacked during a vigorous cross-examination by his counsel and that Agent Grosfeld was therefore entitled to give his opinion of Lopa’s credibility. Valletto claims that Agent Grosfelt’s testimony constituted extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct to support Lopa’s credibility, and was therefore introduced in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). We find no violation of the Rules of Evidence. The Government asked Agent Grosfelt to testify about his opinion of Lopa’s credibility, not to testify about specific instances of conduct. While it is true 5 that Agent Grosfelt did attempt to include in his answers examples of specific instances of conduct, on each occasion he was prevented from doing so, either by defense counsel or by the Court. Valletto’s reliance on United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997), is misplaced. In Murray, the witness was permitted by the District Court to testify that the informant had “‘made’ [provided evidence that ultimately resulted in an arrest] ‘in excess of 65’ cases and [that the Government] had obtained ‘numerous’ search warrants as a result of [the informant’s] services.” 103 F.3d at 315. In contrast, Agent Grosfelt was prevented from so testifying. The fact that Grosfelt was permitted to testify that Lopa had been a cooperating witness in six or seven other cases does not violate Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). As the Murray Court points out, testimony that the informant had been used on prior occasions “was necessary to establish that [the witness] had a basis on which to offer his opinion as to [the informant’s] character for truthfulness.” Id. at 322. Where the line was crossed, the Murray Court noted, was when the witness testified that the informant had ‘made’ several cases, as that “was more specific than can be justified as necessary to establish a foundation.” Id. That line was not crossed in this case, and Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) was not violated.3