Opinion ID: 394829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Identification Testimony

Text: 26 Part of Kearney's attack on Warren's testimony is based on a claim that he used narcotics; but even at the time of the trial the defense claimed to have such knowledge, i. e.: Defense counsel: ... We have information that he is a narcotics user. 420 F.2d at 172. The trial court did not preclude examination of the issue. All it did, as this court ruled, was to defer cross-examination pending establishment of a foundation for the questions. 420 F.2d at 174. 27 The claim of narcotics use and perjury are interwoven to attack Warren's identification testimony; but there is no allegation that the government knowingly used perjured testimony. In the absence of such a showing no relief can be granted on that ground. Elliott v. Beto, 474 F.2d 856, 857 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985, 93 S.Ct. 2284, 36 L.Ed.2d 963 (1973); Griffin v. United States, 258 F.2d 411, 412 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922, 78 S.Ct. 1363, 2 L.Ed.2d 1366 (1958). 28 The claim of perjury is a repetition of the claim made in the 1973 § 2255 proceeding. It essentially relies on the old affidavit with no new support. The strength of this claim has not improved with the passage of seven years and should be denied as a successive claim. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 9, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963). 5 The Federal Rule governing proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides: 29 a second or successive motion may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits. 30 The 1974 denial of Kearney's section 2255 proceeding which was based on Warren's affidavit stating he testified falsely, held the motions, pleadings, files and records conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief. Such decision was thus on the merits and could have been appealed by petitioner, but he did not do so. The decision thus became final and under the Rule cannot be successfully challenged now, seven years later, unless shown to be in the interests of justice. Subsequent analysis does not support such a finding. In Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2784, 37 L.Ed.2d 402 (1973), we held that for any ground of relief presented in a prior § 2255 action, and determined on the merits thereon, re-determination of that ground was dependent upon the judge's exercise of his sound discretion to find that the ends of justice would be served thereby. Accordingly, a reversal of such decision on such grounds must rest only upon a finding of abuse of that discretion. With respect to requiring a hearing we stated: (N)o hearing is required where the District Court finds that the files and records of the case conclusively determine the issues raised, or that the grounds for relief have been previously determined on the merits and the ends of justice do not require redetermination. 474 F.2d at 452. 31 In this case the trial court in the first § 2255 proceeding found that the files and records of the case conclusively determined the issues raised. Our opinion in Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 (D.C.Cir.1966), by Judge Leventhal, states: the normal and customary method of correcting trial errors, even as to constitutional questions, is by appeal, and (§ 2255) cannot serve as a substitute for the regular judicial process of trial and appeal in the absence of circumstances indicating collateral attack is needed to provide an effective means of preserving constitutional rights. Id. at 825-26. 32 It is also significant there is no claim that Warren was under the influence of narcotics at trial when he testified and identified Kearney. In the absence of a showing of specific facts to indicate serious incompetence of counsel, the relief requested to the extent it may involve a claim on that ground, is not justified. United States v. Decoster (Decoster III), 624 F.2d 196, 206 (D.C.Cir.1979) (en banc) (a direct appeal case); Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C.Cir.1970); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C.Cir.1967); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 81, 3 L.Ed.2d 86 (1958). 33 Finally, the record testimony of Warren, and that of Officer Crooke repeating the detailed dying declaration of Officer Silvia, is identical on so many intricate factual details of the offense, involving timing, movement, location, and even subjective causation for action, that the claim in Warren's affidavit, that he was not present when the murder was committed and did not see Kearney shoot Silvia as he told the police and testified in court, is completely destroyed. Warren and Crooke 6 gave identical testimony on the following details: 34 The time of the murder was between 10:30 and 10:45 p. m. on November 23, 1967 (Tr. 35); Kearney was in a red and white Chevrolet, mostly white when he waved to Warren as he was passing by (Tr. 36); Kearney was seated on the driver's side (Tr. 37) and Warren talked to him through a broken vent window on the passenger side of the car (Tr. 38); the police car was a white Plymouth (Tr. 38), located at 16th and Corcoran on the east side of the street (Tr. 39); (as Officer Silvia suspected), Warren did alert Kearney to the police presence (Silvia) in his car at 16th and Corcoran (Tr. 38-39 cf. 327) 7 the police car left 16th & Corcoran a few minutes after Warren first observed it (Tr. 41); Warren identified the Chevrolet by its Connecticut tags (Tr. 42); he saw the broken vent in the window on the passenger side (Tr. 43); Officer Silvia (the murdered officer) pulled his car around near the car in which Kearney was seated, got out and asked Kearney, who was behind the wheel of the Chevrolet, for his identification (Tr. 44); Officer Silvia got out of his car and pointed his flashlight at his wallet which he was carrying in his hand. The wallet contained his identification (Tr. 45-46); Officer Silvia then walked around behind the Chevrolet (Tr. 47) and Kearney slid over to the passenger side and got out of the car from that side and stood near the sidewalk (Tr. 48); shortly thereafter Kearney went into his pants, pulled the gun and shot Officer Silvia (Tr. 49); Warren then ran up Corcoran Street (they fled East on Corcoran Street) (Tr. 50, 328); Officer Silvia was wearing a white trench coat which was identified as exhibit 4 (Tr. 51). Compare with Officer Crooke's testimony (Tr. 324-328). 35 Transcript references are to Warren's testimony at trial. Cf. Tr. 953-955 to the same effect. 36 Warren's statement that Kearney shot Silvia from three to four feet away is also corroborated by the testimony of the FBI expert on firearms based on the analysis of the effect of the discharge of the gun on the all-type weather coat then being worn by Silvia. (Tr. 49, 453). The files and record were thus more than adequate five years after the shooting for the trial judge to refuse to credit Warren's belated claim of perjury in the face of the persuasive testimony identifying Kearney as the assailant, i. e.: the testimony as to the palm prints, the gun and slugs, the blood tests, the corroborated distance from which Silvia was shot, and the mosaic corroboration of Kearney's and Crooke's testimony of the finest details surrounding the shooting. Having been once denied on the merits by the judge who tried the case there was no necessity seven years later to grant a further hearing or to do other than deny the motion to the extent that it was based on matters previously raised and denied.