Opinion ID: 6112171
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Clark claims that his conviction for distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), must be reversed because the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to prove: (1) that the illegal images and videos traveled in interstate commerce; and (2) that Clark knowingly distributed the images and videos. The statute states, in pertinent part: No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 4 “Any person who . . . knowingly . . . distributes[] any visual depiction [that involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct] using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce . . . shall be punished as provided [herein].” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).1 A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2005). “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction and such evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” United States v. Vannerson, 786 F.2d 221, 225 (6th Cir. 1986). “This limited review bars courts from intrud[ing] on the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Farrad, 895 F.3d 859, 871 (6th Cir. 2018). The government devotes a substantial portion of its brief to arguing that Clark’s challenge is to the jury instructions, a challenge that he failed to preserve by not objecting to them in the district court. A careful review of Clark’s briefing, however, shows that he does not challenge the jury instructions. Rather, Clark takes issue with the sufficiency of the evidence. Because these are separate issues, Clark’s concessions regarding the jury instructions are 118 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) reads, in full, as follows:
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if-- (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; . . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 5 immaterial to his present claim. And to the extent that the government argues that Clark waived or forfeited his sufficiency claim, we find that he did not.2 1. “Means or Facility of Interstate Commerce” Element Clark challenges the interstate-commerce element of § 2252(a)(2).3 He claims that there is insufficient evidence of interstate travel because the illegal images and videos were transmitted purely intrastate between two computers located in Kentucky. In Clark’s view, the child pornography moved directly from his computer (located in Independence, Kentucky) to detective Kush’s computer (located in a neighboring county) through the internet in what is called a “single-source download.” The government argues that there was sufficient evidence because an internet transmission necessarily involves the interstate travel of data and, in any event, § 2252(a)(2) only requires distribution through a “means” of interstate commerce. Clark’s argument implicates important but relatively simple questions about what the interstate-commerce element of § 2252(a)(2) requires. Does it require evidence that the child pornography travelled across state lines? Or does § 2252(a)(2) merely require that a defendant used a means or facility of interstate commerce (such as the internet) to distribute the child pornography? We find that it requires the latter.4 2At the close of the government’s case, Clark moved for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29. He did not base the motion on specific grounds, and the district court understood the motion to argue, generally, that there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. Clark later renewed his Rule 29 motion after introducing evidence on his own behalf. Considering these general motions, we conclude that Clark did not waive or forfeit his sufficiency claim. United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 371 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a defendant preserved his sufficiency challenge because his Rule 29 motions “were general in nature” and were not construed [by the district court] as . . . based on specific grounds”); cf. United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728, 740 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Although specificity of grounds is not required in a Rule 29 motion, where a Rule 29 motion is made on specific grounds, all grounds not specified are waived.” (quotation omitted)). 3Clark also argues that, because there is insufficient evidence of the interstate-commerce element, this court is deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction. He is incorrect. The interstate-commerce element of an offense is jurisdictional only in the sense that it relates to the power of Congress to regulate the conduct. Whether or not the government has proven the interstate-commerce element in a particular case does not affect the court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction. United States v. Bacon, 884 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 536 (6th Cir. 2001). 4Although Clark’s brief makes passing references to “an unconstitutional expansion of federal power” and “a glaring evidentiary hole with constitutional implications” he falls well short of presenting a developed constitutional challenge to § 2252(a)(2). We, therefore, do not consider the constitutionality of § 2252(a)(2) under No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 6 We begin with the language of the statute. As noted, § 2252(a)(2), in relevant part, punishes “any person . . . who knowingly . . . distributes [child pornography] using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce.” Our analysis turns on the phrase “using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce.” A plain reading of that phrase shows that § 2252(a)(2) proscribes the distribution of child pornography provided that the distribution occurs using a means of interstate commerce. We do not read the statute to require actual transportation of child pornography across state lines. And we have held that the internet is a means of interstate commerce. United States v. Pina, 724 F. App’x 413, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Pers., 714 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2017); see United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2011). In 2008, Congress amended the jurisdictional provisions of several child-pornography laws, including § 2252(a)(2), to add the phrase “using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce.” Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110– 358, § 103, 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) (amending §§ 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2252A to include that phrase). Previously, § 2252(a)(2) required that the child pornography had been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.5 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006). We agree with other circuit courts that have interpreted this amendment as an “expan[sion]” of the statute’s “jurisdictional coverage.” United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 216 (1st Cir. 2009); see United States v. Crain, 877 F.3d 637, 646 & n.32 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that the “jurisdictional element” of 2252(a) was “expanded” by the 2008 amendment); United States v. Wasson, Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. See Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1063 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that an appellant abandons an argument by failing to “fully develop” it). 5The prior version of § 2252(a)(2) stated: (a) Any person who— . . . (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if –– (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; . . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (2006). No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 7 847 F. App’x 523, 525–26 (10th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing that Congress “reduce[d] the government’s burden on the interstate commerce element” when it amended a materially identical offense to include the words “using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce”) (interpreting § 2252A). That is to say, the interstate-commerce element of § 2252(a)(2) is satisfied when a defendant uses the internet to distribute child pornography, regardless of whether there is evidence that the data travelled interstate. Clark’s argument that his child pornography did not pass through interstate wires— though dubious considering the structure, complexity, and interconnectedness of the internet––is therefore inconsequential. By its terms, § 2252(a)(2) can reach a purely intrastate distribution of child pornography so long as that distribution occurred by the use of a means or facility of interstate commerce. Other circuit courts have reached the same conclusion when interpreting identical language in substantially similar statutes.6 See, e.g., United States v. Baum, 6 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (d) states: (a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed . . . . (d) (1) Any person who, in a circumstance described in paragraph (2), knowingly makes, prints, or publishes, or causes to be made, printed, or published, any notice or advertisement seeking or offering— (A) to receive, exchange, buy, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce, any visual depiction, if the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct; or . . . (2) The circumstance referred to in paragraph (1) is that— (A) such person knows or has reason to know that such notice or advertisement will be transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mailed; or (B) such notice or advertisement is transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mailed. No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 8 542 F. App’x 724, 726–27 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that, after § 2252A(a)(5)(B) was amended in 2008, the government was not required “to establish that the images themselves had crossed state lines”); United States v. Brown, 785 F.3d 1337, 1350–51 (9th Cir. 2015) (interpreting the 2008 amendments of §§ 2251(d)(1)(A) and 2252A(a)(1) to “not require evidence that the [child pornography] actually crossed state lines”); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 713 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[The defendant’s] use of the internet to access and download [child pornography] from [a website] is enough in this case to satisfy the interstate commerce nexus [of § 2252A(a)(5)(B)].”); see also United States v. Grzybowicz, 747 F.3d 1296, 1306 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The interstate commerce element[s] for [§§ 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(5)(B)] [are] satisfied by proof that the child pornography was transmitted using a facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer . . . .”). In this case, the government provided the jury with circumstantial evidence that Clark’s child pornography moved from his computer through the internet to the government agent’s computer. This is sufficient evidence of distribution using a means or facility of interstate commerce within the meaning of § 2252(a)(2). There are, however, two issues worth noting. First, some circuit courts do not distinguish between the current and prior versions of the child-pornography laws. In interpreting the preamendment versions of §§ 2251, 2252, and 2252A, those courts found that transmitting child pornography over the internet was tantamount to moving the pornography across state lines7— 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) states: (a) Any person who . . . (5) either — (A) in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or on any land or building owned by, leased to, or otherwise used by or under the control of the United States Government, or in the Indian country (as defined in section 1151), knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography; or (B) knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer .... 7 Lewis, 554 F.3d at 215 (“[W]e conclude that the government proved the images traveled interstate when it introduced evidence that [the defendant] received images that were transmitted over the Internet.”) (interpreting No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 9 which thereafter foreclosed arguments like Clark’s in those circuits, even after the 2008 amendment.8 On occasion, we have suggested that we agree that an internet transmission implicates interstate travel. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 706–10 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mellies, 329 F. App’x 592, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Napier, 787 F.3d 333, 346–47 (6th Cir. 2015); Pina, 724 F. App’x at 422–23. But because the current version of § 2252(a)(2) does not require interstate travel, we need not reach that issue in this case. Second, evidence of internet use is not the only method by which the government can prove the interstate-commerce element of § 2252(a)(2). Another way to satisfy the element is with evidence of actual interstate travel. See Napier, 787 F.3d at 344–46 (explaining that the government can satisfy the interstate-commerce element of § 2252(a)(2) in various ways, including with “proof that ‘the visual depiction or the production or transmission materials crossed a state line’”). But the government did not do that here, apart from proving that Clark used the internet. It did not introduce evidence of the interstate origin of the computer used in the commission of the offense,9 the origin of the visual depictions themselves, or the location of the internet servers involved. If it had, we would likely have had no difficulty affirming Clark’s conviction on this ground. See, e.g., id. at 345–47; United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (Tymkovich, J., concurring), overruled in part by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Most Internet cases, for example, include testimony regarding § 2252(a)(2)); United States v. Harris, 548 F. App’x 679, 682 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that “use of the Internet” supports a finding “that the child pornography had been ‘transported in interstate . . . commerce” under § 2252(a)(2));United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause of the very interstate nature of the Internet, once a user submits a connection request to a website server or an image is transmitted from the website server back to the user the data has traveled in interstate commerce.”) (interpreting § 2252A(a)(2)(B)); United States v. White, 2 F. App’x. 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the transmission of child pornography “by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving [it] across state lines” (quotation omitted)) (interpreting § 2252A(a)(5)(B)); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002) (same) (interpreting § 2251). 8 See, e.g., United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Clarke, 979 F.3d 82, 93 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Miltier, 882 F.3d 81, 87–88 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Bogomol, 623 F. App’x 219, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2015). 9 It appears that the government did, however, introduce Clark’s MacBook Pro into evidence at trial. Although it is quite likely that the computer had a label on the back of it that denoted its country or state of origin, the government failed to argue this point to us or the district court. No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 10 the location of the servers accessed by defendant, or some other evidence that reveals the interstate character of the particular transmissions at issue.”). Nevertheless, for the reasons previously stated, sufficient evidence exists to support the interstate-commerce element of Clark’s conviction under § 2252(a)(2). 2. “Knowing Distribution” Element Next, Clark challenges the “knowing distribution” element of § 2252(a)(2). He argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient because sharing was the default setting on his peer-topeer program and was not purposefully selected by him. This argument is without merit. We have repeatedly held that even passive distribution of known child pornography constitutes distribution under § 2252 where the files are knowingly made available to others through file-sharing software. See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 771 F. App’x 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Conner, 521 F. App’x 493, 500 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We agree with the government that knowing use of LimeWire, much like the posting of a file on a website, is sufficient [to find knowing distribution].”). In so holding, we have agreed with the First Circuit that “[w]hen an individual consciously makes files available for others to take and those files are in fact taken, distribution has occurred” and “[t]he fact that the defendant did not actively elect to transmit those files is irrelevant.” Moran, 771 F. App’x at 598 (quoting United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 282 (1st Cir. 2012)). We have also found support for this position in our application of USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), the sentencing enhancement for knowing distribution of child pornography. Id. In those cases, we have upheld use of the enhancement “when files are knowingly made available through file-sharing software” because the very “point of using a file-sharing program . . . ‘is to share.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Abbring, 788 F.3d 565, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2015)); see also Conner, 521 F. App’x at 500 (noting that “courts have not required the government to prove” that a defendant knew his computer was “equipped to distribute”); United States v. Dunning, 857 F.3d 342, 350 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Dunning’s knowing use of peer-to-peer software justifies the distribution enhancement.”). No. 20-5722 United States v. Clark Page 11 Clark does not dispute that he knowingly used peer-to-peer software or that the child pornography on his computer was in his shared folder. Absent “concrete evidence of [Clark’s] ignorance” that his program was set up to share, these concessions alone satisfy the knowingdistribution element of § 2252(a)(2). Dunning, 857 F.3d at 350 (quoting Abbring, 788 F.3d at 568); see Moran, 771 F. App’x at 598–99; United States v. Collard, 849 F. App’x 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2021). The fact-finder could have reasonably inferred that Clark knew that placing child pornography in his shared folder meant that it could be accessed and downloaded by others, including law enforcement. See Dunning, 857 F.3d at 350. Additionally, the government presented evidence that a user may turn off the program’s default sharing function and that Clark took no such steps. There was also evidence that Clark set up two “evidence destruction programs” on his MacBook computer to “run at [the computer’s] start.” Altogether, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that Clark knowingly distributed illegal images and videos when he placed them in an accessible public folder on a peer-to-peer network. Therefore, sufficient evidence supports the interstate-commerce element and the knowing-distribution element of Clark’s conviction.