Opinion ID: 1199729
Heading Depth: 3
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Heading: Protectible Property Interests

Text: The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of `property' generally. ( Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 90 [32 L.Ed.2d 556, 575-576, 92 S.Ct. 1983].) In interpreting this term, the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that due process concerns are implicated whenever the state acts to deprive an individual of an interest in the use of real or personal property, using that term in its colloquial sense. (See Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) p. 680.) For example, in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. (1950) 339 U.S. 594 [94 L.Ed. 1088, 70 S.Ct. 870], the court performed a due process analysis and impliedly found a property interest to exist in mislabeled food supplements seized under a provision of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. (See also Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 407 U.S. 67 [state seizure of household goods subject to repossession by seller].) The federal courts of appeals have found the existence of protectible property interests in personal possessions as undesirable as junk cars. (See, e.g., Propert v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir.1991) 948 F.2d 1327 [292 App.D.C. 219]; Price v. City of Junction, Texas (5th Cir.1983) 711 F.2d 582.) This court and the state's appellate courts have likewise recognized a protectible interest in tangible personal property, including property subject to seizure and/or destruction pursuant to local ordinance or statute. (See Kash Enterprises v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294 [138 Cal. Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302] [seizure of newsracks violating city ordinance]; Blair v. Pritchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258 [96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242, 45 A.L.R.3d 1206] [seizure of refrigerator under state's claim and delivery statute]; People v. Broad (1932) 216 Cal. 1 [12 P.2d 941] [seizure of car used to transport narcotics under civil forfeiture statute]; Bryte v. City of La Mesa (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 687 [255 Cal. Rptr. 64] [confiscation of mental patient's firearms and deadly weapons]; Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 774 [245 Cal. Rptr. 166] [seizure of crops treated with unauthorized chemical]; Phillips v. San Luis Obispo Dept. of Animal Regulation (1986) 183 Cal. App.3d 372 [228 Cal. Rptr. 101] [destruction of vicious dog]; Hughes v. Neth (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 952 [146 Cal. Rptr. 37] [destruction of motorcycle with illegally altered serial number].) (2) Consistent with this well-established due process doctrine, we find that a billboard constitutes a protectible property interest. The value of a billboard, and thus its potential for achieving protected property status, derives primarily from its use as an advertising medium. It is uncontradicted that a single billboard can generate several thousand dollars per month in advertising revenues. We also note that, aside from its value as an advertising medium, the billboard structure itself has inherent, pecuniary worth. For example, a billboard structure may have value on the open market or as salvage. Caltrans urges us to follow the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court in Department of Transportation v. Durden (Fla. 1985) 471 So.2d 1271 (hereafter Durden ). In that case, a billboard owner erected a billboard without first applying for a permit. ( Id. at p. 1272.) The court held that a protectible property interest does not arise when the government seeks to remove a billboard erected in knowing violation of the law. ( Ibid. ) Because we find that a billboard, in and of itself, constitutes a protectible property interest, we cannot agree with the Florida Supreme Court that a billboard erected in violation of the Act fails to implicate a protectible property interest. As the Supreme Court noted in Fuentes v. Shevin, supra , the relative weight of ... property interest[s] is relevant to the form of notice and hearing required by due process.... But some form of notice and hearing  formal or informal  is required before deprivation of a property interest.... ( Fuentes, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 90, fn. 21 [32 L.Ed.2d at pp. 575-576].) The fact that a billboard may be in violation of the Act is significant in determining what predeprivation procedures may be due, but not to the threshold question whether a protectible property interest exists. We do not question that Caltrans has the authority, under the state's legitimate police power, to remove and destroy any billboard found to be in violation of the Act. (See Adco Advertisers, supra, 35 Cal. App.3d at p. 512 [abatement under the Act is valid exercise of state's legitimate police power]; see also People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Golden Rule Church Assn. (1975) 49 Cal. App.3d 773, 777 [122 Cal. Rptr. 596]; People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Harris (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 264, 267 [180 Cal. Rptr. 148].) Nonetheless, this authority should not be used to abrogate the guarantees embodied in the due process clause. To the extent that the Florida court in Durden, supra, 471 So.2d 1271, deemed the state's exercise of its police power to subsume the protections of due process, we disagree with its analysis. (3) When the state acts to deprive an individual of an important interest, it may not do so without affording the procedural due process protection required by the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337, 342 [23 L.Ed.2d 349, 354, 89 S.Ct. 1820].) Once a permit has been issued, its continued possession becomes a significant factor in the billboard owner's legitimate pursuit of a livelihood. The revocation of a permit thus involves state action affecting important interests of its owner, and therefore cannot be accomplished without affording the procedural due process required by the Constitution. (See, e.g., Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 539 [29 L.Ed.2d 90, 94-95, 91 S.Ct. 1586] [suspension of driver's license invokes due process protections]; Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara (1948) 85 Cal. App.2d 776, 783-784, 797-798 [194 P.2d 148] [permit issued to oil company to drill particular well could not be revoked without due process].) The requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions. But the fair process of decision-making that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation of property. ( Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 81 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 570].) As we pointed out earlier, it is well established that the revocation of permits for, and the removal and destruction of, billboards authorized by section 5463 constitute a proper exercise of the police power of the state. Our finding of protectible property interests here does not alter the legitimacy of this authority. Instead, it merely acknowledges and affirms a basic principle of due process jurisprudence: that before Caltrans, as an agent of the state, may act to revoke a permit or to abate a billboard maintained in violation of the Act, notice and the opportunity to be heard must be provided. (See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313 [94 L.Ed. 865, 872-873, 70 S.Ct. 652]; Bell v. Burson, supra, 402 U.S. at pp. 539-543 [29 L.Ed.2d at pp. 94-95].) Adco contends that the due process clause of the California Constitution protects a wider range of interests than does the federal due process clause. (See People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 269 [158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622]; Smith v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 316, 327 [248 Cal. Rptr. 704].) Because we find that billboards and permits constitute property interests for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment due process protection, we need not undertake a separate due process analysis under our state Constitution.