Opinion ID: 894512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bland, in Proper Context

Text: In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court must consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555. That quote must be read in context. We noted that when a defendant challenges an organization's standing to sue, the organization must present evidence of its nature and purpose before it can pursue its claimsa burden that does not involve a significant inquiry into the substance of the claims. Id. at 554. Similarly, we observed that a challenge to personal jurisdiction may touch on the merits of the case, but is not aimed at whether the defendant may be liable as alleged. Id. at 555. That themethat a plaintiff is not required to litigate the merits to establish jurisdictionwas emphasized throughout our opinion. Id. at 554. We cautioned that the proper function of a dilatory plea does not authorize an inquiry so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs are required to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction. Id. I interpret Bland to mean that if a plea to the jurisdiction requires the trial court to wade deeply into the lawsuit's merits, it is not a valid plea. Yet today the Court immerses itself in the merits by reaching and deciding the ultimate issue in the case: ... the evidence in the record establishes that the Department was not grossly negligent and that the Mirandas have failed to raise a fact question regarding the Department's alleged gross negligence. 133 S.W.3d at 221 (emphasis added). This holding misapplies Bland because it permits a defendant, on painfully short notice and before evidence has been developed, to force the plaintiff either to present evidence on the ultimate issue in the lawsuit, or lose the right to a jury trial on the merits. The Court asserts that its standard mirrors that of a summary judgment.... 133 S.W.3d 228. It is a poor reflection. Our summary judgment rule, unlike the Court's standard, contains procedural safeguards to ensure that the merits are not determined before the nonmovant has had an adequate time for discovery and an opportunity to respond. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (Except on leave of court, with notice to opposing counsel, the motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for hearing. Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response.); 166a(i) (After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense....). As a uniform rule of procedure, the summary judgment rule leaves little to the imagination. A party whose claim is subject to adjudication on the merits is entitled to advance notice that it must present evidence and has an adequate opportunity to respond. [2] The procedure the Court adopts today, in contrast, will vary from county to county and from judge to judge. The Court cites a number of federal decisions holding that when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits, the trial court, in considering evidence, should either employ the standard applicable to a summary judgment or leave the jurisdictional determination to trial. 133 S.W.3d 228; see also 2 James Wm. Moore Et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.30[3], at 12-37 to 12-38 (3d ed.2003). I do not disagree with that proposition, but it does not answer a fundamental question. This Court must decide what procedure governs in Texas when a plea to the jurisdiction is treated like a motion for summary judgment. As Justice Brister observes, no procedural rule currently requires a trial court to advise the plaintiff that evidence may or must be presented in opposition to a plea to the jurisdiction, and no rule requires an adequate time for discovery before the court dismisses a case on the merits. 133 S.W.3d at 237. By default, then, trial courts will turn to Rule 21. Tex.R. Civ. P. 21. Presumably, if a trial court's ruling comports with Rule 21's minimum procedural requirements, a dismissal on the merits will survive any challenge based on an abuse of discretion standard. We should ask ourselves, then, whether the Rule's minimum requirements are adequate when the stakes are no less than a party's ability to present its case on the merits. Under Rule 21, a plea to the jurisdiction may be served three days before the time specified for the hearing unless otherwise provided by these rules or shortened by the court. Id. The rule does not mention an adverse party's right to present opposing evidence, which may explain why the Mirandas did not controvert the Department's plea with their own evidence. Compiling evidence of simple negligence on three days' noticeevidence that typically requires months of discoverywould be daunting in itself; but where, as here, a plaintiff must prove gross negligence, her ability to contest the Department's jurisdictional plea could be essentially non-existent. The Mirandas had no reason to suspect that a summary judgment standard applied, requiring them to controvert the Department's evidence, because the Department's plea to the jurisdiction was subject to Bland. 34 S.W.3d at 554-55 (trial court not authorized to inquire so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs are required to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction). At a minimum, I would hold that if a summary judgment standard applies, the trial court must so advise the parties and employ Rule 166a procedures. II