Opinion ID: 828424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: threshold question

Text: According to the majority, the “basic disagreement” between our respective analyses is that this dissent views LDA and quiet-title actions as sometimes “overlap[ping]” and in tension with each other, and thus concludes that it is necessary to harmonize the relevant statutes, while the majority views those actions as separate and distinct, and thus concludes that it is unnecessary to harmonize. Ante at 20 n 57. However, the disagreement between our opinions is even simpler and more fundamental, in my judgment. The question is simply whether plaintiffs’ quiet-title action seeks to 22 Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, the majority maintains that the “factual and legal differences that distinguish the instant matter from Martin compel the result of this case.” Ante at 17 n 53. Never mind that the supposed “factual differences” are nonexistent-- the Martin plaintiffs did not have a preexisting property right reflected in the plat, they did not have a deed that preexisted the filing of the plat, and their case did not concern the accuracy or scope of the plat-- both bench and bar are now left utterly without guidance as to how supposed “factual and legal differences” in future cases should be understood in characterizing these as either Martin or Beach cases. The majority’s legacy here is to leave property law murkier and increasingly subject to judicial discretion and arbitrariness. 33 “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat.” If answered in the affirmative, plaintiffs must file this action pursuant to the LDA, and only then would the statutes have to be harmonized. If answered in the negative, plaintiffs may proceed with their action as one to quiet title only, without the need to comply with the LDA. Thus, the critical question once again is whether this particular quiet-title action seeks to “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat.” On this note, it is worth reflecting again on the majority’s approach to answering this question. According to the majority, plaintiffs only seek to establish a substantive interest in property and are unconcerned with “vacat[ing], correct[ing], or revis[ing] the plat.” This analysis is straightforward, but straightforwardly wrong. A plaintiff’s subjective and self-characterized interest cannot be the determining factor in assessing whether an action seeks to “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat,” for, as discussed, other persons may also have affected property interests in the plat, and the fundamental premise of the LDA is that each of these is entitled to be heard in actions “vacat[ing], correct[ing], or revis[ing] the plat.” Each is entitled to notice, to participate fully in the lawsuit, and to have his or her interests accurately depicted on the plat. By focusing exclusively upon a plaintiff’s subjective and selfcharacterized interests, the majority: (1) fails to take other persons, and other interests, into account, as required by the LDA, (2) fails to adhere to the express language of the LDA, which requires that an LDA action be undertaken whenever the “vacat[ion], correct[ion], or revis[ion]” of a plat is sought-- not merely when it has been stated that it is sought-- and instead substitutes its own “crucial limitation,” limiting the LDA to cases in which the plaintiff has a property interest “traceable to the plat or the platting process,” 34 and (3) substantially undermines the LDA as a means for ensuring the accuracy of plats in this state.