Opinion ID: 3045669
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State Evidentiary Hearing

Text: On remand, the state trial court held a three-day evidentiary hearing in March 2003 on Reaves’ guilt phase ineffectiveness claim, during which Reaves called Kirschner, his counsel at the retrial, and six expert witnesses: Dr. Weitz, Dr. Richard Dudley, Dr. Barry Crown, Dr. Deborah Mash, Dr. Erwin Parsons, and Dr. Thomas Hyde. Kirschner testified that before the retrial he was aware of Reaves’ cocaine consumption and history of drug abuse and was certain that he had discussed the matter with Reaves, although he could not recall the specifics of their conversation, including whether they discussed a possible voluntary intoxication defense. Kirschner explained that, based on Dr. Weitz’s diagnosis of Vietnam Syndrome, the primary focus of his defense effort had been excusable homicide, though he did not completely ignore a voluntary intoxication defense. While Kirschner repeatedly insisted that he had no recollection of what his thought process had been more than ten years earlier, he speculated that he had requested a jury instruction 13 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 14 of 42 on voluntary intoxication “to leave that as an option for the jury, a fall-back position,” and added that “[s]ometimes there are defenses that you don’t suggest, that you let the jury reach through their own logic.” He also noted that, at the time of the retrial, “jurors were less accepting of the idea that voluntary intoxication excuses criminal conduct.” Still, Kirschner could not recall why he had elected not to actively pursue a defense of voluntary intoxication “other than the fact that I was thinking excusable homicide was the right fit for the defense in this case . . . and what I should be presenting to the jury.” Kirschner acknowledged that a defense of excusable homicide was not necessarily inconsistent with a voluntary intoxication defense, although he noted that there could be some tension between the two defenses, stated that presenting a variety of defenses could lead the jury to believe that defense counsel was being disingenuous, and pointed out that some of the statements Reaves made during his confession indicated that he knew what he was doing at the time of the murder. Kirschner also noted that Dr. Weitz did not advise him about how cocaine may have affected Reaves at the time of the shooting, though he conceded that he could not recall whether he had specifically asked Dr. Weitz about the interactive effects of Vietnam Syndrome and cocaine use. Kirschner further conceded that, while he questioned Reaves’ family and friends about his history of drug abuse, he did not ask them about Reaves’ drug use around the time of the shooting, did not request 14 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 15 of 42 the assistance of any other experts to help explain how drugs may have affected Reaves at the time, and did not request forensic drug testing on a marijuana cigarette and residue that were found at the home of Reaves’ girlfriend following the shooting. Dr. Weitz, who is not an attorney, testified that in his opinion Kirschner had pursued an excusable homicide defense that had been based on Dr. Weitz’s own findings and “psychological perception” of the events, including his opinion that Reaves’ military background had affected his behavior at the time. Dr. Weitz asserted that he could have testified in support of a voluntary intoxication defense at the retrial, but he had not been asked to evaluate whether Reaves was capable of forming the intent required for first-degree murder. In his opinion, Reaves had a “severe cocaine problem that would have impaired his ability to form specific intent,” particularly in conjunction with his Vietnam Syndrome. 6 Dr. Weitz explained that the beer and 1.75 grams of cocaine that Reaves told him he had consumed during “almost a 24-hour period” before the shooting would have intensified the symptoms of Vietnam Syndrome, increasing Reaves’ paranoia and suspiciousness, significantly distorting his perception and judgment, and enhancing 6 Dr. Weitz testified that while he could have described the independent effects of drug and alcohol on Reaves’ behavior and mental state, he believed the Vietnam Syndrome was a “critical factor” that helped explain Reaves’ actions at the time of the shooting. 15 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 16 of 42 his reactivity so as to render him unable to form the specific intent to commit murder. Although Dr. Weitz conceded that Reaves knew he was eliminating a threat when he fired at the deputy and admitted that Reaves’ actions after the killing were a clear attempt to avoid being caught by law enforcement, he believed that Reaves’ conduct during the shooting was a “conditioned reaction” to a distorted perception that his life was in mortal danger. He also testified that, while he was surprised by the detailed nature of Reaves’ confession to the police, such a high level of recall was not necessarily inconsistent with the lack of specific intent at the time of the shooting. According to Dr. Weitz, while cocaine and alcohol impair information processing, Reaves’ acuteness and sensitivity to detail would improve in a situation where he felt his life was at risk. When asked whether Reaves’ statement to the deputy, “One of us got to go,” was itself inconsistent with his opinion that Reaves lacked specific intent, Dr. Weitz answered: “After the fact, I think it’s very clear that he can say that he understood that he felt his life was threatened. That was exactly the situation, it was you or I, and I wasn’t going to die. I think that’s consistent with my opinion, not in contrast.” 7 7 The apparent premise of Dr. Weitz’s answer (“[a]fter the fact . . . he can say”) is that Reaves made the statement after the killing, but the undisputed evidence is that he made the statement to the deputy before he shot him. 16 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 17 of 42 Dr. Dudley, a clinical and forensic psychiatrist, diagnosed Reaves with polysubstance dependence and PTSD, and he believed that Reaves was “acutely intoxicated with cocaine” at the time of the murder. Dr. Dudley was of the opinion that the combined effect of PTSD and acute intoxication prevented Reaves from being able to form the intent to kill the deputy. He explained that cocaine would have accentuated the paranoia and hypervigilance characteristic of PTSD, causing Reaves to respond reflexively without making a conscious decision to kill. Dr. Dudley also testified that Reaves’ ability to recall the shooting with specificity was not inconsistent with the absence of intent, explaining that Reaves’ “escalating hypervigilance” would have made him remarkably observant. Dr. Dudley conceded, however, that he was unaware of Reaves’ statement, “One of us got to go,” and admitted that he simply did not “know what to make of that.” Dr. Crown, a neuropsychologist, conducted a battery of tests on Reaves and concluded that he suffered from organic brain damage in a neural region associated with understanding the long-term consequences of immediate behavior. He did not know the origin, cause, or timing of the brain damage. Dr. Crown was of the opinion that Reaves’ brain damage, aggravated by substance abuse, prevented him from forming the intent necessary for first-degree murder. He thought that the interaction between cocaine use and Reaves’ underlying brain damage would have resulted in a phenomenon called “cocaine kindling,” which causes a person to have 17 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 18 of 42 disrupted “reasoning, judgment, particularly short-term memory,” and to become impulsive and paranoid. Although Dr. Crown emphasized that Reaves’ cocaine use and brain damage, both individually and in tandem, would disrupt short-term memory, he would not concede that Reaves’ ability to vividly recall the details of the murder was inconsistent with his opinion and asserted instead that “the relationship between brain function and behavior is much like a lamp with a faulty switch, sometimes it goes on and sometimes it goes off.” Dr. Mash, a neuropharmacologist, testified that Reaves had a long history of substance abuse dating back to the Vietnam War and was using cocaine “every day, all day” around the time of the shooting, which left him in a near constant state of being “hyperaroused, completely paranoid, [and] completely wired.” In Dr. Mash’s opinion, because of a “severe amount of cocaine abuse,” Reaves was in a paranoid and “fully delusional” state of “cocaine psychosis” at the time of the shooting, which left him unable to accurately perceive the threat posed by the deputy, rationally react to the situation, or form the intent to commit first-degree murder. She believed that years of substance abuse had effectively “damaged” Reaves’ brain, disengaging the frontal lobes (i.e., the reasoning portions of the brain that delay reaction) and fully activating the limbic system, or “reptilian part of the brain,” which governs fight or flight responses. Dr. Mash also testified that cocaine exacerbates the symptoms of PTSD, including irritability and 18 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 19 of 42 hyperarousal, because both stimulate the same part of the brain, the amygdala. She said that, had she been asked in 1992, she would have testified that Reaves was in a “state of voluntary intoxication and would not have been able to form the intent to commit murder.” On cross-examination, Dr. Mash noted that Reaves told her that he ingested 10 grams of cocaine on the day of the shooting. She denied that there was anything unusual about Reaves’ detailed description of the shooting in his confession, though her various explanations were somewhat contradictory. She initially testified that cocaine, while shifting perceptions of reality, makes people alert and does not “obliterate memory the way alcohol blackouts do.” Yet, she also testified that short-term memory is “barred” when someone is hallucinating from the use of cocaine and, in her opinion, Reaves was hallucinating. Finally, Dr. Mash noted that clothing and hair taken from Reaves at the time of his arrest could be tested for the presence of drugs, but could not show the actual time that the drugs were used or in what quantities. When questioned about Reaves’ assertions in his confession that his actions were motivated by a desire to avoid returning to prison, as well as Hinton’s testimony about Reaves’ statements to the deputy, Dr. Mash testified that Reaves’ confession was an attempt to rationalize his behavior in order to “make sense of something that went very badly.” She did not, however, specifically explain the 19 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 20 of 42 significance of Reaves telling the deputy just before shooting him four times that one of them had to go. Dr. Parsons, a clinical psychologist, testified that Reaves was suffering from PTSD and had a history of chronic substance abuse. In his opinion, Reaves was experiencing “dissociation” at the time of the murder, and the combined effects of PTSD, substance abuse, and dissociation rendered him incapable of forming the specific intent to kill the deputy. While Dr. Parsons agreed that Reaves’ confession described the incident in “exquisite detail,” he believed that the level of recall did not demonstrate that Reaves was capable of forming specific intent because memory “becomes extremely sharp” in the “context of trauma.” When asked whether Reaves’ statements to the police regarding his motive for the shooting indicated that he made a conscious decision to kill the deputy, Dr. Parsons merely stated that there was a possible “different interpretation” of those statements. But he did not disclose what that different interpretation was. Dr. Hyde, a behavioral neurologist, testified that Reaves had a history of poly-substance abuse, particularly involving alcohol and cocaine; major recurring depression; strong elements of PTSD; and a head injury, which was either caused by prolonged substance abuse or sustained shortly after Reaves’ arrest as a result of an alleged police beating. He did not, however, give a specific opinion about Reaves’ mental state at the time of the shooting. He simply suggested that, if 20 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 21 of 42 Reaves’ head injury had preceded the shooting, it would have left Reaves disinhibited, impulsive, and prone to rash behaviors in combination with acute intoxication. Dr. Hyde acknowledged that Reaves’ confession to the police was “pretty exquisite” in terms of detail and was of the opinion that, if those details were accurate, it was unlikely that Reaves was confabulating. In response to Reaves’ expert witnesses, the State called psychiatrist Dr. McKinley Cheshire, who had testified during the penalty phase of Reaves’ 1992 retrial. Dr. Cheshire concluded that Reaves “knew what he was doing” at the time of the shooting and made a conscious decision to kill the deputy. In particular, he testified that Reaves’ statements to the police that he shot the deputy because he was facing a mandatory prison term for unlawfully possessing a firearm showed that Reaves was “thinking, calculating, considering the facts of the matter . . . and the outcome of his behavior.” Dr. Cheshire diagnosed Reaves with antisocial personality disorder, which was consistent with his calculated decision to murder the deputy in order avoid jail time. During the course of the remand proceedings, Reaves moved for forensic testing of the clothing and hairs recovered by the police to determine the presence and concentration of drugs. The State responded that forensic testing was unnecessary because Weitz’s unrebutted testimony from the time of trial was that Reaves had ingested 1.75 grams of cocaine before the shooting and “no one [was] 21 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 22 of 42 contesting that [Reaves] was a chronic drug user.” In denying Reaves’ request, the state trial court noted that “[t]he State has all but stipulated that [Reaves] ingested cocaine on the date of the incident” and that it was “uncontroverted that [Reaves] was a drug addict and ingested cocaine” before the shooting. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the state trial court rejected Reaves’ ineffective assistance claim, finding that counsel did not render constitutionally deficient performance in failing to actively pursue a voluntary intoxication defense and retain experts who could testify about the combined effects of Reaves’ substance abuse and mental conditions.