Opinion ID: 2224514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statutory Construction of Speedy-Trial Provisions

Text: The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Federal and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8). Under the constitutional analysis, whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated depends on such factors as the length of the delay in trial, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the speedy-trial right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by such delay. ( Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116-17.) This court has recognized that the statutory right to a speedy trial is not the precise equivalent of the constitutional right. ( E.g., Garrett, 136 Ill.2d at 223, 144 Ill.Dec. 234, 555 N.E.2d 353; People v. Stuckey (1966), 34 Ill.2d 521, 216 N.E.2d 785.) Proof of a violation of the statutory right requires only that the defendant has not been tried within the period set by statute and that defendant has not caused or contributed to the delays. ( People v. Richards (1980), 81 Ill.2d 454, 459, 43 Ill.Dec. 700, 410 N.E.2d 833.) Defendants who rely on the statutory right are not required to show prejudice resulting from the delay in trial or other factors that are part of the burden of establishing a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Illinois case law holds that when a statutory speedy-trial violation is alleged, the statute operates to prevent the constitutional issue from arising except in cases involving prolonged delay, or novel issues. People v. Stuckey (1966), 34 Ill.2d 521, 523, 216 N.E.2d 785; accord People v. Bivens (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 79, 1 Ill.Dec. 477, 356 N.E.2d 665; see also People v. Thomas (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 1, 102 Ill.Dec. 759, 500 N.E.2d 652. In the case at bar, defendant asserted a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. No constitutional issue has been raised. Therefore, the issue presented is one of statutory interpretation, which requires this court to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. ( People v. Garrett (1990), 136 Ill.2d 318, 329, 144 Ill.Dec. 234, 555 N.E.2d 353.) Although the cases subscribe to the principle that speedy-trial statutes implement constitutional rights and are to be liberally construed ( e.g., People v. Reimolds (1982), 92 Ill.2d 101, 106, 65 Ill.Dec. 17, 440 N.E.2d 872; People v. Christensen (1984), 102 Ill.2d 321, 80 Ill.Dec. 302, 465 N.E.2d 93), in the instant case, the threshold question is whether defendant's attempted demand for a speedy trial, made pursuant to the wrong statute, operated to start the running of the 160-day time period granted by section 3-8-10. See People v. Garrett (1990), 136 Ill.2d 318, 331, 144 Ill.Dec. 234, 555 N.E.2d 353 (recognizing rule of liberal construction but holding that in light of statutory scheme involving speedy-trial rights, courts are to effectuate legislative intent by applying express terms of pertinent statute). The State urges this court to reject the appellate court's holding that, under the circumstances of the case, defendant's attempted demand for a speedy trial was sufficient. In response, defendant contends that his demand should be deemed effective because the State knew where defendant was located and suffered no prejudice from his omission of the informational requirements of section 3-8-10, which are designed to facilitate the location and transfer of prisoners in the Department's system who have charges pending against them, particularly when multiple counties are involved. Defendant argues that because all of the pertinent events occurred in the same county and the prosecutors knew defendant's whereabouts in the Department's system, no meaningful purpose is served by requiring strict compliance with the statute in this case. The appellate court agreed with defendant, stating, [R]equiring defendant's jury demand to include the specified statement as to the circumstances of his incarceration and the charges against him would have been a meaningless formality. (236 Ill.App.3d 1032, 1035, 177 Ill.Dec. 47, 602 N.E.2d 942.) Other courts, however, have held that the State's knowledge of a defendant's whereabouts in the Department does not excuse the defendant from complying with the statutory requirements for making a speedy-trial demand pursuant to section 3-8-10. See People v. Davis (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 869, 48 Ill.Dec. 190, 416 N.E.2d 85; People v. Wentlent (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 291, 64 Ill.Dec. 744, 440 N.E.2d 296. We do not view as technical or meaningless the conditions that the legislature has attached to the speedy-trial right of section 3-8-10. Although the information required by that section may be for the administrative convenience of the State, the legislature placed the burden on defendants to affirmatively demand speedy trials pursuant to this section. When defendants are serving prison terms for existing convictions at the time they face trial on additional charges, they do not suffer a loss of liberty while awaiting trial on the pending charges. To exercise their statutory right to be tried within 160 days, they need only to comply with section 3-8-10. Defendant, in the case at bar, undisputably failed to invoke the applicable speedy-trial provision. In determining whether full compliance with section 3-8-10 is mandated by the intent of the legislature, decisions from our appellate court have held that if a person committed to a Department facility intends to make an effective demand for a speedy trial, he or she must make the demand pursuant to the applicable statute as a precondition to the running of the 160-day period. See People v. Willis (1992), 235 Ill.App.3d 1060, 176 Ill.Dec. 609, 601 N.E.2d 1307; People v. Jackson (1992), 235 Ill.App.3d 732, 176 Ill.Dec. 619, 601 N.E.2d 1317; see also People v. Davis (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 869, 48 Ill.Dec. 190, 416 N.E.2d 85; People v. Wentlent (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 291, 64 Ill.Dec. 744, 440 N.E.2d 296 (enactment of section 3-8-10 was a legislative decision to put the burden of making the speedy trial demand on the defendant); cf. People v. Howell (1983), 119 Ill.App.3d 1, 9, 74 Ill.Dec. 734, 456 N.E.2d 236 (demand for speedy trial under the interstate agreement on detainers, section3-8-10, must be clear and unequivocal). In Willis and Jackson, the defendants were each charged with mob action while incarcerated in a correctional facility. Both defendants failed to make a proper demand for speedy trials pursuant to section 3-8-10. Like the defendant in the case at bar, they filed speedy-trial demands pursuant to section 103-5(b) (Speedy Trial Act) instead of 3-8-10 (intrastate detainers statute). The opinions in both cases, written by the same Justice, are virtually identical. They hold that because codefendants' speedy-trial demands were not brought pursuant to the intrastate detainers statute, the 160-day period never began to run. Jackson, 235 Ill. App.3d at 736, 176 Ill.Dec. 619, 601 N.E.2d 1317; Willis, 235 Ill.App.3d at 1064, 176 Ill. Dec. 609, 601 N.E.2d 1307. The above authorities recognize that a defendant who claims a violation of a speedy-trial right cannot prevail if the demand for trial fails to comply with the terms of the governing speedy-trial provision. To treat the informational requirements of section 3-8-10 as surplusage would be to infringe on the legislative prerogative to set reasonable conditions on an incarcerated defendant's right to receive a trial within 160 days of the demand. As reflected by the statutes examined in the instant case, the legislature has seen fit to provide different time periods and demand requirements for offenders who are differently situated. In the case at bar, defendant failed to satisfy the applicable speedy-trial statute; accordingly, the 160-day period never began to run. We therefore hold that the appellate court erred in construing defendant's demand for jury trial as an effective demand for a speedy trial pursuant to section 3-8-10.