Opinion ID: 1269334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: General conduct of the trial

Text: The defendants next contend that by his interruptions during defendants' opening statements, comments during the course of trial, sua sponte rulings preventing answers to defendant's questions on cross-examination of State's witnesses, and disparity in the length of time devoted in his charge to recapitulation of the defendants' evidence as compared with that of the State, the trial judge expressed an opinion regarding the case in violation of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1222 (1983). The defendants first challenge the manner and extent to which the trial judge limited their opening statements to the jury. Only the opening statement of counsel for defendant Paige is set out in the record, however, and we consider only his assignment of error on this point. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1221(a)(4) (1983) provides that in a criminal jury trial [e]ach party must be given the opportunity to make a brief opening statement.... Nothing in the statute defines the scope of the opening statement. The official commentary to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1221 notes that the drafting commission determined that the initial speech by the judge telling the jurors about the case, under G.S. 15A-1213, plus opening statements of the parties would be a far superior method of telling the jurors about the case and what to look and listen for [than the previous method of reading the indictment and other pleadings.] Rule 9 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts also provides for an opening statement: At any time before the presentation of evidence counsel for each party may make an opening statement setting forth the grounds for his claim or defense. The parties may elect to waive opening statements. Opening statements shall be subject to such time and scope limitations as may be imposed by the court. This Rule limits the purpose of the statement to that of setting forth the grounds of a claim or defense, which we interpret to mean stating the evidence upon which the claim or defense is based. The State elected to waive its opening statement. Prior to the defendants' opening statements, the trial judge limited the statements as follows: You may only state what you contend your evidence will show. You may not comment on what the other party's evidence does or does not show. You may not characterize any witness. You may not comment on what the other lawyer may or may not argue. You may not argue the law, solely and simply what you contend your evidence will show. I'll limit it to five minutes per person. Counsel for defendant Paige introduced himself to the jury and stated: The fact that Mr. Paige has been accused, the Court will instruct you, is no evidence of guilt. The trial judge interrupted him and admonished him not to argue the law to them. Thereafter the trial judge interrupted defense counsel after almost every other sentence as defense counsel attempted to argue that the jurors were to decide the case beyond a reasonable doubt and would be required to make some findings of fact, that the defendant had no burden of proof and that the State had the burden of proof on the question of identification. This Court has not had occasion to construe N.C.G.S. § 15A-1221(a)(4) with respect to the scope of the statement authorized. In State v. Elliott, 69 N.C.App. 89, 93, 316 S.E.2d 632, 636, disc. rev. denied, appeal dismissed, 311 N.C. 765, 321 S.E.2d 148 (1984), our Court of Appeals said: While the exact scope and extent of an opening statement rest largely in the discretion of the trial judge, we believe the proper function of an opening statement is to allow the party to inform the court and jury of the nature of his case and the evidence he plans to offer in support of it. See generally, 23 A [sic] C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1086 (1961). It should not be permitted to become an argument on the case or an instruction as to the law of the case. This statement is consistent with the scope of the opening statement as it is generally understood. See Annot. Prosecutor's Opening Statement, 16 A.L.R. 4th 810 (1982); 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 204 (1974). Even if the defendant does not intend to offer evidence, he may in his opening statement point out to the jury facts which he reasonably expects to bring out on cross-examination. When counsel for defendant Paige limited his statement to expected testimony that the victim was unable to identify his client in pre-trial identification procedures, he was allowed to fully state his contentions. We feel that defense counsel should also have been allowed to state once without interruption that his client would rely on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. While this statement is one of legal presumption and proof, the simple statement that the defendant intends to rely on these basic aspects of a criminal prosecution would not amount to an argument on the law and may be necessary in order to apprise the jury of the defendant's only defense when he does not plan to offer evidence. While the trial judge in this case may have more strictly supervised the defendant's opening statement than is done in most trials, we are unable to say that the limitations he imposed sufficiently prejudiced the defendant's case to require reversal of his conviction. They were consistent with the trial judge's original admonition, and the number and frequency of the trial judge's interruptions to enforce his stated limitations were the result of counsel's violation of those limitations. The defendants also argue that the Court's numerous prejudicial comments had the effect of discrediting defense counsel to the prejudice of the defendants. The comments about which the defendants complain are illustrated by the following exchanges which occurred during cross-examination of the victim by defense counsel: A. I observed them standing there a few seconds out of the corner of my eye. Q. How long is a few seconds? OBJECTION. COURT: She said a few seconds. SUSTAINED. .... Q. The truth is, Miss McSwain, that you testified under oath in court that you looked at a photo lineup with 6 people in it and that you picked out two individuals, neither one of which was Mr. Paige or Mr. Lowery, is that the truth? OBJECTION. SUSTAINED. COURT: She's testified she said she did. The defendants especially emphasize the following occurrence during cross-examination of the victim as being unduly prejudicial to their case. Q. [Victim], did Mrs. Taylor also tell you to tell this jury that you were 5 foot 6 inches tall? A. No, she didn't (witness crying). I'm testifying to the best of my ability, the best I can do, and I'm telling the truth to the best of my ability. I have not been told what to say. I am saying what I know inside of me. COURT: All right. That's all right. We fail to see a basis for a claim that these comments or similar ones amounted to a prejudicial comment by the trial judge regarding the evidence in this case. See State v. Mansell, 192 N.C. 20, 133 S.E. 190 (1926); State v. Laxton, 78 N.C. 564 (1878); State v. Grant, 19 N.C.App. 401, 199 S.E.2d 14, appeal dismissed, 284 N.C. 256, 200 S.E.2d 656 (1973). Defendants next contend that the trial judge injected himself into the prosecution of the case by sustaining objections on his own initiative. In each instance when the trial judge excluded evidence sua sponte, the basis for his action was either that the examiner had already asked the same question and received an answer or that the inquiry was beyond the scope of permissible examination during re-cross. The trial judge has an obligation to see that needless time is not wasted in useless repetition in the presentation of evidence. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 197, 78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983). The number of times that a trial judge may find it necessary to prohibit answers without objection depends upon how often repetitious questions are asked and whether opposing counsel voices an objection. Therefore, the determination of prejudice must be made, not by counting occurrences, but by reviewing the record with an awareness of the appropriateness of the ruling and the likelihood that the judge's action created an appearance to the jury of partiality on the trial judge's part. We have reviewed the record and find that in each instance the trial judge was correct in his determination that the question posed amounted to needless repetition and that the trial judge's actions did not amount to an abuse of his discretion in exercising control over the conduct of the trial. In addition, under this assignment of error defendants contend that the disparity in the recitation of the evidence for the State as opposed to evidence for the defendants violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-1232. [2] This Court has pointed out that when a defendant offers no evidence or very little evidence at trial, recapitulation of the evidence for the State must necessarily take longer than recapitulation of evidence for the defendant and that such difference does not alone violate the trial judge's obligation under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1232 to not express an opinion whether a fact has been proved. State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 103 S.Ct. 474, 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982). We have reviewed the instructions of the trial judge and find that they fairly and accurately summarize the evidence and contentions of the parties. Finally, the defendants claim that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's rulings leaves but one impression, that is a judicial leaning toward the prosecution and an antagonistic attitude toward the defense. We have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that, although the trial judge may have ruled against the defense more often than against the prosecution, these rulings were the result of more frequent repetitive questioning on the part of defense counsel and their failure to comply with limitations on the conduct of the trial, limitations which the trial judge had the authority and responsibility to impose in the interest of expediting the trial. See State v. Anderson, 303 N.C. 185, 278 S.E.2d 238 (1981). This assignment of error is overruled.