Opinion ID: 2999644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Land Title Analysis

Text: TP&W contends that the STB erred in permitting KJRY to submit Mooty’s real estate appraisal for the first time on rebuttal. TP&W further submits that, because KJRY was permitted to submit Mooty’s analysis in an untimely fashion, the STB was required to offer TP&W an opportunity to rebut Mooty’s methodology and conclusions. According to TP&W, the STB therefore erred in excluding Gray and Borstein’s land title analysis, submitted by TP&W with its petition for reconsideration. TP&W’s argument that the STB erred in permitting KJRY to submit a new real estate analysis along with its reply brief has not been preserved properly for our review. At no time prior to the STB’s October 2004 decision did TP&W object to KJRY’s submissions; TP&W instead waited to raise the No. 05-1920 35 argument until the STB had issued an unfavorable decision. Although TP&W is correct that the rules do not permit the filing of a reply to a reply, see 49 C.F.R. § 1104.13(c), it could have filed a motion to strike Mooty’s appraisal,23 or petitioned the STB to respond to that appraisal. We therefore deem the argument waived. See Ester, 250 F.3d at 1072.24 23 TP&W appears to have been aware of the standards governing the supplementation of the record; indeed, it previously had requested that the STB allow the introduction of updated evidence and materials. See A.R. 210184 at 4 (petitioning the STB to supplement the record with updated steel prices and noting that the STB has discretion to allow the record to be supplemented when the information is “central to the petitioning party’s case” and other relevant requirements are met). Similarly, the STB previously had indicated its willingness to grant TP&W’s requests to supplement the record. At the very least, this suggests that TP&W knew that it could request permission from the STB to respond to Mooty’s analysis and to submit Gray and Borstein’s appraisal prior to the record’s closing. 24 TP&W contends that, because STB regulations require KJRY to provide an estimate of “ ‘NLV and GCV of the line’ ” in its “ ‘initial application,’ ” Petitioner’s Br. at 33 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1151.3), and because “KJRY submitted no real estate analysis, or evidence supporting such an analysis, in its opening application,” the STB was “bound to accept Cecil’s valuation because it was the only timely credible evidence before [it],” id. at 34. This is a mischaracterization of the proceedings. KJRY did submit with its initial application a real estate analysis, which was based on the best evidence available to it at that time; this analysis included a preliminary statement about TP&W’s land holdings, and noted that necessary documents, including TP&W’s deeds and valuation charts, had not been produced as requested, hindering its ability to perform a traditional real estate appraisal. (continued...) 36 No. 05-1920 We also cannot accept TP&W’s argument that the STB erred in excluding Gray and Borstein’s land title analysis, which was offered by TP&W along with its November 2004 petition for reconsideration. The STB held that this evidence was untimely filed and, because it was not based on “newly available evidence,” did not warrant reconsideration of its prior decision. Petitioner’s App., Ex.B at 5. We review the STB’s denial of a petition for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See Friends of the AtglenSusquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir. 2001). The STB did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Gray and Borstein’s land title analysis. As an initial matter, contrary to TP&W’s contention, the STB is not (...continued) As required by STB regulations, see 49 C.F.R. § 1151.2(d)(1), along with its feeder line application, KJRY therefore filed discovery requests, asking TP&W for copies of these documents. In submitting Mooty’s analysis on rebuttal after receiving the relevant materials, KJRY merely was updating its previouslysubmitted, incomplete analysis—a matter over which the STB retains substantial discretion. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 561 F.2d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[S]upplementation [of the record], in whatever form, is a matter entrusted to agency discretion.”). The STB was within its discretion in accepting this newly-submitted evidence; 49 C.F.R. § 1151.2(d)(1) allows the filing of an “incomplete application” and later supplementation of the record “[i]f [the] applicant . . . is unable to obtain required information that is primarily or exclusively within the personal knowledge of the owning carrier . . . if it files at the same time a request for discovery under 49 CFR part 1114 to obtain the needed information from the owning carrier.” No. 05-1920 37 constitutionally required to consider all evidence submitted prior to the date of taking, when that evidence is offered in an untimely fashion. See Petitioner’s Br. at 31 (maintaining that the STB must consider all evidence on the topic of the line’s constitutional value, “even if it cause[s] inconvenience to the Board”). Title 49 of the United States Code at § 722 requires the STB to grant “reconsideration of an action” only when there is “material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances.” 49 U.S.C. § 722(c)(2). As the STB has explained previously: [T]he Board generally does not consider new issues raised for the first time on reconsideration where those issues could have and should have been presented in the earlier stages of the proceeding. Moreover, the term “new evidence” refers to evidence that was not reasonably available to the party when the record was developed, and not simply newly raised. Nothing in the statute or the [STB’s] regulations obliges the agency to rethink its decisions whenever a party wishes to try out a new theory or finds new information at a late stage in the process. And if a party were free to reshape its case, so long as it did so within 20 days after a decision, the administrative process might never end. The agency is not expected to behave like Penelope, unraveling each day’s work to start the web again the next day. Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Burlington N. & Sante Fe R.R. Co., STB Docket No. 42056, 2004 WL 2619767, at  (Sept. 24, 2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co., Grand Trunk Corp., & Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc.—Control—Ill. Cent. Corp., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., Chicago, Cent. & Pac. R.R. Co., & Cedar River R.R. Co., STB Docket No. 33556, 2002 WL 1969505, at  (Aug. 23, 2002) (holding that, to be considered after the STB issues a final 38 No. 05-1920 decision, the offering party must demonstrate that the new evidence not only is “newly presented” but also is “evidence that could not have been foreseen or planned for at the time of the original proceeding”). TP&W does not contend that the Gray and Borstein land title analysis constitutes “evidence that could not have been foreseen or planned for at the time of the original proceeding.” Id. Gray and Borstein relied on the same evidence—deeds, real estate maps and other valuation documents—that Mooty had cited in his appraisal and that were submitted with TP&W’s real estate appraisal authored by Cecil and filed in a timely manner. Obviously, these documents were “reasonably available to the party when the record was developed,” Texas Mun. Power Agency, 2004 WL 2619767, at ; indeed, these documents were part of the record long before the record closed and the STB issued its final decision. Moreover, there is no valid reason why TP&W did not employ Gray and Borstein to perform a land title analysis while preparing its materials for its response brief, or, if not then, after KJRY submitted Mooty’s analysis but before the record closed. Because “evidence that was reasonably available to the parties before the proceeding is not new evidence for purposes of [49 U.S.C. § 722],” and because Gray and Borstein’s land title analysis raised before the STB “the same substance” as had and could have been raised earlier, we believe that the STB did not abuse its discretion in granting KJRY’s motion to strike this evidence. Friends of Sierra R.R., Inc. v. I.C.C., 881 F.2d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). No. 05-1920 39