Opinion ID: 2334050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Identity as a Police Officer

Text: Defendant moved before and at trial to exclude evidence that he was a police officer on the ground that the jury would hold him to a higher standard of conduct than an ordinary citizen. The motion was denied. Most of the witnesses in this case were police officers. The case was solved because Officer Guthrie knew the defendant. If the jurors had not been informed of defendant's employment, they would have been free to speculate about his connection to Guthrie. Whatever the jurors might have speculated about that relationship could have been just as damaging as the import of the defendant's occupation on the jury. It also can be argued that jurors tend to give greater credit to a police officer's testimony than to a lay person's. Whether and how the jury's awareness of defendant's occupation affected its deliberations is conjectural, and not a ground for reversal absent a showing of undue prejudice. A witness's employment is generally admissible as background information. In this case, the information was also relevant to explain how defendant was discovered as being the hit and run driver. There was no error in admitting evidence of defendant's employment. See In re Nash, 149 Vt. 63, 66, 539 A.2d 989, 991 (1987) (admissibility of evidence is addressed to discretion of trial judge). To guard against any unwarranted inference, the court instructed the jury at the close of the case that the law imposes no greater or lesser standard for off-duty police officers than it does for any other motorist. This was in keeping with a sound exercise of discretion. [1]