Opinion ID: 867274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress Statements Made to Police and the Polygrapher

Text: ¶10 Villalobos argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statements to the detectives and the polygrapher. We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress a confession for clear and manifest error, the equivalent of abuse of discretion. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 396 ¶ 22 & n. 6, 132 P.3d 833, 840 & n. 6 (2006).
¶11 After receiving Miranda warnings, Villalobos acknowledged that he understood his rights and answered all questions posed to him. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the State proved that Villalobos knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. See State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 286-87, 767 P.2d 5, 7-8 (1988). ¶12 Villalobos argues, however, that Miranda warnings should have been reissued before his subsequent encounters with the polygrapher and the second detective. Repeated Miranda warnings are required in circumstances suggesting that a suspect is not fully aware of his rights. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 14, 951 P.2d 869, 879 (1997). But this is not such a case. Villalobos not only received the required warnings before the initial interrogation, but also reviewed and signed a consent form reiterating his Miranda rights just before the polygraph examination began. Only three hours elapsed between the beginning of the interview and its conclusion, and Villalobos was aware at all times that he was speaking with police department employees. See id. (holding repeated warnings unnecessary for an interrogation that lasted over seven hours at three separate locations); State v. Gilreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 319, 487 P.2d 385, 386 (1971) (same regarding one twelve-hour gap and one thirty-six-hour gap between warnings).
¶13 Villalobos also argues that his statements were involuntary. The State must prove that a confession was freely and voluntarily made and was not the product of coercion. State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 335 ¶44, 185 P.3d 111, 121 (2008). The superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the State met that burden here. The interviewing detectives and polygrapher each testified that they did not threaten, coerce, or make any promises, and the record supports that testimony. ¶14 Villalobos contends the polygrapher coerced him into making inculpatory statements by telling him that an autopsy and DNA evidence could prove his guilt. These predictions, however, were accurate and, even if false, would not have rendered the confession involuntary. See, e.g., Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 15, 951 P.2d at 880 (holding that a deliberate falsehood by interrogators did not render a confession involuntary). The polygrapher's request that Villalobos tell the truth to get out of this hole was also permissible. See, e.g., State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 165, 800 P.2d 1260, 1273 (1990) (noting that police requests for a suspect to tell the truth without threat or promise are not inherently coercive). ¶15 When talking to the second detective, Villalobos worried that he would be imprisoned for life for killing Ashley. The detective responded: Not necessarily, not necessarily, there's going to come a day when you have a relationship with [your daughter]. The detective also told Villalobos that telling me the truth, and that's being, I didn't plan this, that makes it a lot better for you. After this exchange, Villalobos admitted he had hit Ashley with a closed fist before Verdugo's dinner break, and he later admitted to striking Ashley repeatedly. ¶16 Villalobos argues that the phrases not necessarily and that makes it a lot better for you were implied promises for leniency. Villalobos, however, had already admitted to striking Ashley before the detective made these statements. See State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131, 138, 847 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1992) (finding alleged inducement irrelevant when incriminating statement occurred beforehand). [3] More importantly, the detective did not promise leniency. See Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 165, 800 P.2d at 1273 (Mere advice from the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.); State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 579, 769 P.2d 1017, 1025 (1989) (finding statements by detective that defendant needed to tell the truth to give yourself a chance not coercive).