Opinion ID: 1576034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority to Sanction

Text: Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have, when deemed necessary, exercised the inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant. See, e.g., Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989); Fla. Bar v. Thompson, 979 So.2d 917 (Fla.2008); Hamilton v. State, 945 So.2d 1121 (Fla.2006); May v. Barthet, 934 So.2d 1184 (Fla.2006); Sibley v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, 973 So.2d 425 (Fla.2006); Armstead v. State, 817 So.2d 841 (Fla.2002); Peterson v. State, 817 So.2d 838 (Fla.2002); Jackson v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 790 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2001); Rivera v. State, 728 So.2d 1165 (Fla.1998); Attwood v. Singletary, 661 So.2d 1216 (Fla.1995). One justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to timely review of their legitimate filings. See Martin, 506 U.S. at 3, 113 S.Ct. 397 (imposing sanction where petitioner's filings for certiorari review had a deleterious effect on the Court's fair allocation of judicial resources); Sibley, 973 So.2d at 426. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, [e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184, 109 S.Ct. 993. In Sibley, after finding that an attorney had filed numerous meritless pro se filings related to his dissolution of marriage proceedings, the Court refused to accept any further filings from the attorney regarding his domestic disputes with his former wife unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar other than himself. In Jackson v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 790 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2001), the Court noted that such action did not violate the constitutional right of access to the courts: While on the one hand, we would like to say that the courts should never limit a person's ability to access the courts, on the other hand, there are a handful of petitioners who have so abused the system that failure to restrain them could deny or delay the right of access to courts for the rest of the populace. Id. at 401.