Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal for Cause (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants claim the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's motion to excuse a prospective juror, A.L., based on his views on capital punishment. The error allegedly violated defendants' right to an impartial sentencing jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject the claim. A prospective juror may be excused if his views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) Because this determination involves an assessment of the juror's demeanor and credibility, it is one peculiarly within a trial judge's province. ( Id. at p. 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, fn. omitted.) When applying these rules, the trial court's assessment of a prospective juror's state of mind will generally be binding on the reviewing court if the juror's responses are equivocal or conflicting. ( People v. Hayes (2000) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1285, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) In other words, the reviewing court generally must defer to the judge who sees and hears the prospective juror, and who has the definite impression that he is biased, despite a failure to express clear views. ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, at pp. 425-426, 105 S.Ct. 844.) A.L. admitted several past negative encounters with law enforcement, including a misdemeanor conviction and a gang fight in which he was hit with a police nightstick. A.L. indicated that intentional killers should never get death. However, in apparent self-contradiction, he also said the verdict might depend[ ] upon how the victims were killed. A.L. could see himself voting for life imprisonment even where the murder was brutal and aggravation outweighed mitigation. The prospective juror's views seemed to harden when the prosecutor asked how he would assess culpability and punishment where, as here, a shooter and nonshooter were both accused of the same crime. A.L. indicated that he would not convict anyone of an intentional killing, or impose death, unless he were the actual killer. A.L. said he would adhere to these views notwithstanding the evidence or instructions. At first, the trial court denied the motion to excuse A.L. for cause. Ultimately, however, the court granted the request. The prospective juror's answers were equivocal and conflicting. Those answers, in combination with the trial court's first-hand observations, could give rise to a definite impression that A.L.'s views on the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of his duties. We therefore defer to the court's ruling. [8]