Opinion ID: 1671742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: whether the trial judge should have recused himself from sitting in this trial.

Text: ¶ 51. McFarland argues that the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself from sitting in this trial, contending that because the judge was an elected official from Wilkinson County, he may have had an interest in the outcome as he had to run for office in the future from that district. McFarland points to the judge's voir dire comments complained of in Issue IV, presumably either the judge's two instances of asking a leading question or his comment, Don't make it a habit, made in response to defense counsel's request to approach the bench. McFarland also complains of the following comment made by the judge to defense counsel during the sentencing proceeding: I didn't quite understand your remarks as to whether it pointed at the Court or whether it pointed at the jury; you made some remarks in the record in the matter about the future. I don't think you intend to stand up to this Court and threaten this Court; did you? Although McFarland did not request a recusal either before or during the trial, he points out that Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoys the status of law such that we enforce it rigorously, notwithstanding the lack of a litigant's specific demand. Green v. State, 631 So.2d 167, 177 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 166 (Miss. 1989)). ¶ 52. Canon 3(C)(1) requires the disqualification of a judge when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party... . We review the determination of whether a judge should have disqualified himself under an objective standard. A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Green, 631 So.2d at 177 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 570 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss. 1990)). A presumption exists that the judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased, and where the judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion. Green, 631 So.2d at 177 (quoting Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 317 (Miss. 1985)). ¶ 53. The mere fact that a trial judge hears a case, even an election case, in a county where the judge may sometime in the future run for reelection, does not alone give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his impartiality. McFarland has cited no instances where the trial judge improperly admitted or excluded evidence as a result of his alleged bias. As for the judge's comments, [a]n occasional display of irritation, usually regretted as soon as made, does not suffice to show personal bias or prejudice, whether the irritation was justified or not. Middleton v. Evers, 515 So.2d 940, 942 (Miss. 1987). We find that a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would not doubt the judge's impartiality in this case. As no motion for recusal was before the judge, his failure to recuse himself sua sponte was not a manifest abuse of discretion. Finding no merit among McFarland's assignments of error, we affirm the circuit court judgment below. ¶ 54. COUNT I: CONVICTION OF VOTE FRAUD AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND PAYMENT OF A $1,000.00 FINE AFFIRMED. COUNT III: CONVICTION OF VOTE FRAUD AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) YEARS WHICH IS SUSPENDED AND PAYMENT OF A $1,000.00 FINE AFFIRMED. SENTENCE IN COUNT III SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH SENTENCE IN COUNT I. PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur. DAN LEE, C.J., concurs in result only. McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.