Opinion ID: 1677618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Period of Limitations

Text: The State filed its information against Hirsch on February 27, 1991, and alleged that he had sexually penetrated his daughter on or about the 25th day of August, 1986 through the 31st day of December, 1986.... Prior to August 25, 1989, the crime was subject to a 3-year period of limitations. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-110 (Reissue 1985). Through 1989 Neb.Laws, L.B. 211, codified as § 29-110 (Reissue 1989), the Legislature increased the period of limitations to 5 years, but said nothing about retroactive application. As the Legislature did not declare an emergency and adjourned on May 24, 1989, the new 5-year period of limitations became effective August 25, 1989. See Neb. Const. art. III, § 27. While we have not heretofore established a rule regarding the application of an extended statute of limitations in a criminal case, we have consistently held that the Legislature has the authority to change statutes prescribing the period of limitations to actions. See, Givens v. Anchor Packing, 237 Neb. 565, 466 N.W.2d 771 (1991); Cedars Corp. v. Swoboda, 210 Neb. 180, 313 N.W.2d 276 (1981); Grand Island School Dist. # 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979); Educational Service Unit No. 3 v. Mammel, O., S., H. & S., Inc., 192 Neb. 431, 222 N.W.2d 125 (1974). However, once an offense becomes barred, a later statute extending the period of limitations cannot revive the offense. For the state to assure a man that he has become safe from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its assurance, seems to most of us unfair and dishonest. But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to have it extended beyond the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forgives it. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir.1928), cert. denied 277 U.S. 590, 48 S.Ct. 528, 72 L.Ed. 1003. See, Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263 (Ala. 1981); Givens, supra ; United States v. Reina, 242 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied sub nom., Moccio v. United States, 354 U.S. 913, 77 S.Ct. 1294, 1 L.Ed.2d 1427, reh'g denied 355 U.S. 852, 78 S.Ct. 9, 2 L.Ed.2d 61; Grand Island School Dist. # 2, supra ; Educational Service Unit No. 3, supra ; Com. v. Guimento, 341 Pa.Super. 95, 491 A.2d 166 (1985). The rationale behind the rule is grounded upon the prohibition of ex post facto laws. See, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Neb. Const. art. I, § 16; State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987). An ex post facto law is one which alters the situation to the disadvantage of an accused. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); In re Estate of Rogers, 147 Neb. 1, 22 N.W.2d 297 (1946); State v. McCoy, 87 Neb. 385, 127 N.W. 137 (1910); Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N.W. 911 (1886). Application of a statute of limitations to revive a barred prosecution would disadvantage the accused who has acquired a vested right to be free from suit and, therefore, violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo.1993). However, extending a statute of limitations which has not yet run does not violate the ex post facto clause. State v. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1988); Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 Mass. 589, 524 N.E.2d 829 (1988); State v. Parker, 119 Or. App. 105, 849 P.2d 1157 (1993), review denied 317 Or. 584, 859 P.2d 541 (1993); State v. Dufort, 111 Or.App. 515, 827 P.2d 192 (1992); State v. Casaretto, 818 S.W.2d 313 (Mo.App. 1991); People v. Russo, 185 Mich.App. 422, 463 N.W.2d 138 (1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 439 Mich. 584, 487 N.W.2d 698 (1992); Scharfschwerdt v. Kanarek, 553 So.2d 218 (Fla.App.1989), review denied 563 So.2d 633 (Fla.1990); State v. Nagle, 226 N.J.Super. 513, 545 A.2d 182 (1988). Thus, the question is whether the prosecution of the sexual assaults alleged to have taken place between August 25 and December 31, 1986, was barred before the new 5-year period of limitations became effective. The period of time within which an act is to be done in any action or proceeding is to be computed by excluding the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated time begins to run. Neb.Rev. Stat. § 25-2221 (Reissue 1989); State v. Jones, 208 Neb. 641, 305 N.W.2d 355 (1981). The word year has been legislatively defined to mean calendar year. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 49-801 (Reissue 1988). Considering the 3-year period of limitations as a period of 3 calendar years, and excluding the first day of the assaults alleged to have taken place sometime from August 25 to December 31, 1986, the statute of limitations expired at the earliest on August 25, 1989, the same day as the amendment extending the period of limitations to 5 years became effective, and at the latest on December 31, 1989. See George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co. v. Dennis, 195 Neb. 221, 237 N.W.2d 418 (1976) (excluding September 5, 1969, the last day on which work was done, the last day of the 4-year period of limitations was September 5, 1973).