Opinion ID: 2121050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: substantive tort principles

Text: A fundamental principle of tort law is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the complained-of harm or injury; mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient proof. ( Schmidt v. Archer Iron Works, Inc. (1970), 44 Ill.2d 401, 405-06, 256 N.E.2d 6; M. Polelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law 422-23 (1985); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344, 1349 (1973) (it is obvious that to hold a producer, manufacturer, or seller liable for injury caused by a particular product, there must first be proof that the defendant produced, manufactured, sold, or was in some way responsible for the product).) In a negligence action this causation-in-fact requirement entails a reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered. (See Ney v. Yellow Cab Co. (1954), 2 Ill.2d 74, 79, 117 N.E.2d 74; W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 41, at 262 (5th ed. 1984).) The theory of strict liability is that one who sells a defective product unreasonably dangerous to the user is liable for the resulting injury. ( Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, 621, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).) Likewise, to recover under strict liability the plaintiff must establish some causal relationship between the defendant and the injury-producing agent. See M. Polelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law 581 (1985). In Schmidt v. Archer Iron Works, Inc. (1970), 44 Ill.2d 401, 256 N.E.2d 6, a defective pin used to attach a metal chute to a construction tower failed, allowing the chute to fall and strike the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Archer and evidence established that the defective pin was similar in color to the pins manufactured by defendant, but several other manufacturers produced similar pins. We affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, reasoning that: The plaintiffs' evidence failed to establish sufficient connection between the admittedly defective pin and Archer.    [The] evidence shows no more than that Archer was one of several possible manufacturers which could have supplied the pin. (44 Ill.2d at 405-06, 256 N.E.2d 6.) The identification element of causation in fact serves an important function in tort law. Besides assigning blame-worthiness to culpable parties, it also limits the scope of potential liability and thereby encourages useful activity that would otherwise be deterred if there were excessive exposure to liability. Fischer, Products LiabilityAn Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 Vand.L.Rev. 1623, 1628-29 (1981). The plaintiff before us alleges that after extensive discovery she has been unable to identify the manufacturer of the DES her mother ingested. A number of circumstances contribute to the barrier in establishing causation in fact in DES cases. The effects caused by prenatal exposure to DES usually do not manifest themselves until at least after the child reaches puberty, and more years may pass before the cancer is linked to DES. During this long lapse, whatever records the doctor, pharmacy or manufacturer maintained have often been lost or destroyed and the memories of the persons involved have faded. Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that during the 25 years that DES was used to treat pregnancy-related problems, as many as 300 companies manufactured the drug. The manufacturers were only required by law to maintain records for five years and many manufacturers have either gone out of business or destroyed their records or have only partial records available. Although proof of causation in fact is ordinarily an indispensable ingredient of a prima facie case, the plaintiff points out that competing tort interests have compelled courts to create exceptions to the causation requirement. These exceptions to the rule have allowed a plaintiff to shift to a defendant or a group of defendants the burden of proof on the causation issue. Included within the exceptions are enterprise liability, alternative liability and market share liability. In addition to market share liability, most plaintiffs in the DES cases have argued that enterprise liability or alternative liability, as well as a concert of action and a conspiracy theory, should apply to extend liability to a group of defendants. The criteria necessary for a cause of action based on enterprise liability have been summarized to include: (1) The injury-causing product was manufactured by one of a small number of defendants in an industry; (2) the defendants had joint knowledge of the risks inherent in the product and possessed a joint capacity to reduce those risks; and (3) each of them failed to take steps to reduce the risk but, rather, delegated this responsibility to a trade association. ( Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories (1985), 351 Pa.Super. 264, 285, 505 A.2d 973, 984; see also Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. (E.D.N.Y. 1972), 345 F.Supp. 353.) Alternative liability may apply when two or more defendants act tortiously toward a plaintiff who, through no fault of her own, cannot identify which one of the joined defendants caused the injury. The burden of proof shifts to each defendant to prove his innocence. (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(3), at 441-42 (1965); Summers v. Tice (1948), 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1.) Concert of action applies when a tortious act is done in concert with another or pursuant to a common design, or a party gives substantial assistance to another knowing that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty. (Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 876(a), (b), at 315 (1979).) A civil conspiracy involves two or more persons who combine for the purpose of accomplishing by concerted action either (1) a lawful purpose by unlawful means, or (2) an unlawful purpose by lawful means. M. Polelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law 389 (1985); see also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees of America (1948), 400 Ill. 38, 52, 79 N.E.2d 46. Though the market share liability theory has received some acceptance, in nearly every instance, the other theories have been soundly rejected. (See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co. (D.S.C.1981), 514 F.Supp. 1004 (civil conspiracy, concert of action, alternative liability and enterprise liability rejected); Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories (1985), 351 Pa.Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973 (no conspiracy, concert of action or enterprise liability): Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1984), 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (no conspiracy, concerted action, enterprise liability or alternative liability); Martin, 102 Wash.2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (concerted action, alternative liability and enterprise liability properly dismissed); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Mo.1984), 676 S.W.2d 241 (no alternative liability, concert of action or enterprise liability); Sindell, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132 (concert of action, enterprise liability and alternative liability rejected); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1982), 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (because DES manufacturer made no motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, concerted action theory became controlling law of case), overruled, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1989), 73 N.Y.2d 487, 508, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 948; contra Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1984), 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (allowed concert of action).) Plaintiff in our case either included these causes of action in her amended complaint or argued them in her briefs. The circuit court dismissed all but the market share liability theory, and the appellate court affirmed application of that theory. In this appeal, plaintiff has chosen not to cross-appeal the dismissal of the claims based on concert of action, civil conspiracy, enterprise liability and alternative liability. Instead, we have before us only the narrow legal issue of whether to adopt market share liability in negligence and strict liability actions filed by a DES daughter. Currently, four States have adopted some form of this theory when confronted with the issue of imposing liability on drug manufacturers for injuries caused to women whose mothers ingested DES while pregnant. However, none of these States agree on the remedy or its application.