Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Appointing the Same Experts for Both the Competency and Sanity Hearings

Text: Defendant contends the appointment of the same two psychiatrists to examine him to determine his competency to stand trial and, at the same time, to determine his sanity violated his federal constitutional right to a fair trial, to be free of compelled self-incrimination, and to a reliable penalty verdict. He also contends defense counsel's failure to object to (or otherwise attempt to exclude) testimony from these psychiatrists was constitutionally ineffective representation under both the state and federal Constitutions. Finally, he contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to appoint the two psychiatrists to examine him for sanity, both because a doubt had been declared as to his competence and because defendant had not, as yet, entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
On September 29, 1982, before defendant's arraignment, the following discussion occurred: MR. HUFFMAN: I would move at this time for a [Penal Code section] 1368 motion, allowing [defendant] to be examined by psychiatrists, and I would also THE COURT: And by personal appearance, by looking at him, I think we should suspend proceedings. MR. HUFFMAN: If psychiatrists are appointed, your Honor, I am also going to make the motion of not guilty byor enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Possibly they could examine him for that reason, also. THE COURT: For 1368, and what's the other section? MR. BRADSHAW [the prosecutor]: 1026, your Honor. That's sanity at the time of the act, and normally that is saves the taxpayers' money, to have both examinations on the 1368 and THE COURT: Yes. We'll have a request for both examinations. . . . THE CLERK: Two doctors or just one? MR. HUFFMAN: Two. And in a serious case, I think probably two is preferable. THE CLERK: Okay. Drs. Cutting and Criswell. THE COURT: Okay. Criminal proceedings are suspended pending the there is a present doubt in the Court's mind, based upon what Attorney Huffman has stated to me, and also by [defendant's] appearance, personal appearance. (Italics added.) The court then appointed two psychiatrists, Dr. Paul Cutting and Dr. Francis Criswell, to examine defendant and form an opinion on two topics: (1) Was defendant presently incompetent to stand trial? and (2) was he legally insane at the time of the crimes? After considering the reports from the two psychiatrists, the trial court found defendant was competent to stand trial and reconvened the proceedings. Thereafter, defendant initially pleaded not guilty to all charges, but later changed his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity. The People called both Dr. Cutting and Dr. Criswell as witnesses for the prosecution at the sanity phase. After Dr. Cutting testified but before Dr. Criswell took the stand, defense counsel raised the issue of the simultaneous competence/ sanity determination, asking the trial court why the two psychiatrists had evaluated defendant for sanity when the only issue at that time was defendant's competence to stand trial. MR. SHUMAKER [the prosecutor]: . . . I have heard no court policy as such, but just an informal discussion as a matter of economics. I think the clerk simply checked the different blocks on it when they were referred initially like that to evaluate for both so that somebody didn't have to be sent back. THE COURT: I do know I have had reports come back in other cases where the request has been for one kind of evaluation and the report comes back with two or three. MRS. HUFFMAN: Because there is a question of confidentiality. If there is a 1026 [18] they have been appointed to do, that has to be at the request of defense counsel on an insanity plea. [Section] 1368 simply does not encompass a 1026, and my understanding at the time that [Dr.] Criswell and Dr. Cutting were appointed by the court it was on motion of the court for a 1368 evaluation only, and I think there is a possibility of confidentiality if they went into a 1026 simply because the clerks decided it is a matter of economics, and I am very concerned about that. Despite her concern, defense counsel did not object. The trial court directed the parties to renew the discussion later, as an expert witness (Dr. Matychowiak) had been waiting to testify. The attorneys discussed the matter further a few days later, just before Dr. Criswell took the stand. Mrs. Huffman again expressed some dismay, but did not object or otherwise move to exclude Dr. Criswell's testimony.
In Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61, the Court of Appeal concluded a psychiatrist appointed to examine a defendant for competency could not testify later on the question of the defendant's sanity. The court reasoned that because a defendant may not invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination in an examination for competency, neither the statements of [the defendant] to the psychiatrists appointed under section 1369 nor the fruits of such statements may be used in trial of the issue of [the defendant's] guilt, under either the plea of not guilty or that of not guilty by reason of insanity. ( Id. at p. 470, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61.) Such judicially declared immunity was reasonably to be implied from the code provisions. The purpose of [an] inquiry [into competency] is not to determine guilt or innocence. It has no relation to the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Rather, the sole purpose . . . is the humanitarian desire to assure that one who is mentally unable to defend himself not be tried upon a criminal charge. This purpose is entirely unrelated to any element of guilt, and there is no indication of any legislative intent that any result of this inquiry into a wholly collateral matter be used in determining the issue of guilt. . . . Both humanitarian and practical considerations call for a judicially declared immunity. ( Id. at p. 469,122 Cal.Rptr. 61.) We cited Tarantino v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61, with approval in Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146, 137 Cal.Rptr. 14, 560 P.2d 1193, and then formally adopted its judicially declared rule of immunity in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338 ( Arcega ). [19] In Arcega, we expressly rejected the People's argument that Tarantino was incorrect, explaining the rule of immunity is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled examination. The rule also fosters honesty and lack of restraint on the accused's part at the examination and thus promotes accuracy in the psychiatric evaluation. Hence, the rule protects both an accused's privilege against self-incrimination and the public policy of not trying persons who are mentally incompetent. ( Arcega, supra, at p. 522, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338; see People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 934, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395 [noting the rule in Arcega ]; People v. Harris (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 943, 237 Cal.Rptr. 747 [following Tarantino and Arcega ].) Our decision in Arcega also described the federal constitutional dimension to the rule prohibiting a psychiatrist from testifying to statements made in a custodial mental competency examination. Not only was the admission of the testimony of [the examining psychiatrist] a violation of state law, but as a recent United States Supreme Court decision establishes, it violated the federal Constitution as well. ( Estelle v. Smith [ (1981) ] 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359.) In that case, the high court ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is generally applicable to custodial mental competency examinations, and specifically discussed the provision of immunity for statements made during such examinations. ( Estelle v. Smith, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 466-469 [101 S.Ct. 1866].) The court ruled that a state may not introduce at the penalty phase of a capital case, evidence of statements made by an accused at a custodial mental competency examination unless the accused has been informed of and has waived his Miranda [20] rights. In the absence of a valid waiver, the statements could only be used at the hearing on competency. ( Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 523, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338, fns. omitted.) It is thus clear that the testimony of Dr. Cutting and Dr. Criswell was not admissible at the sanity phase of trial because defendant was not permitted to invoke his constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination before he spoke to the doctors. But because defense counsel did not object on this ground, [21] the question of the admissibility at the sanity phase of the two psychiatrists' testimony was not properly preserved for appeal. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 49, 177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534 [failure to object waived evidentiary claim based on right against self-incrimination]; Evid. Code, § 353.) Nevertheless, defendant's fallback position that his defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object requires that we grapple with the issue. As we explain, the erroneous admission of the psychiatric testimony does not require reversal. As noted, ante, the question whether counsel is constitutionally ineffective comprises two inquiries: (1) Was counsel's performance deficient? and (2) was there prejudice? ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 357, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) We explained in People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1008, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248, however, that [i]f a defendant has failed to show that the challenged actions of counsel were prejudicial, a reviewing court may reject the claim on that ground without determining whether counsel's performance was deficient. That rule is applicable here, for defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice. Numerous expert witnesses testified at the sanity phase of trial and several of them (other than Dr. Cutting and Dr. Criswell) expressed the opinion that defendant was not insane or did not suffer from a mental disease or defect. Neither Dr. Cutting nor Dr. Criswell learned information from defendant during their competency examination that was not available to the other expert witnesses in their respective examinations of defendant. Although defendant argues it is easy to see how [the] corroborating testimony [of Drs. Cutting and Criswell] tipped the scales and hurt [defendant] irreparably at the sanity phase, the scales were not closely balanced, as evidenced by the fact the jury took less than one hour to find defendant had failed to carry his burden of demonstrating he was insane at the time of the crimes. The further revelation from Dr. Criswell that defendant posed a danger in the future was no doubt unsurprising to the jury given the facts of the case and was not the highly inflammatory information defendant claims it to be. Moreover, the testimony of Drs. Cutting and Criswell was not uniformly negative. Although Dr. Cutting concluded defendant was not insane, he testified defendant suffered from a schizoid personality disorder and that defendant probably did experience hearing voices in his head. Dr. Criswell testified defendant endured an extremely pathological family, which could have formed the basis of his developing a mental condition as an adult. We thus conclude that while permitting Dr. Cutting and Dr. Criswell to testify at the sanity phase was error, the error was not preserved for appeal, nor was counsel constitutionally ineffective for failing to object. (See People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 934, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395 [finding the same error harmless]; Williams v. Vasquez (E.D.Cal.1993) 817 F.Supp. 1443, 1466 [same].) Defendant further contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to appoint Drs. Cutting and Criswell to examine him for sanity because a doubt had been declared as to his competence, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with any other substantive matter until defendant's competence had been decided. ( People v. Marks, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1337, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260.) He also argues he did not forfeit this issue by failing to object because the claim relates to the trial court's jurisdiction, an issue that can be raised at any time. Even assuming for argument defendant is correct as to both these points, the most we may conclude is that the trial court should not have appointed the two psychiatrists for the purpose of examining defendant's sanity, and thus the information they acquired in their examination was not admissible at the sanity phase. As we explained, ante, however, permitting the doctors to testify at the sanity phase, if error, was harmless. Accordingly, even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to appoint Drs. Cutting and Criswell for purposes of a sanity examination, this fact provides no basis to reverse the sanity verdict. Defendant's further contention that the appointment of Drs. Cutting and Criswell to examine him for sanity was reversible error because he had not yet formally entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity likewise fails for lack of prejudice. To the extent defendant also claims counsel was ineffective for disclosing to the prosecutor, at the time a doubt was declared as to defendant's competence, that defendant had undergone a similar examination in an earlier trial, we reject the argument, for it seems extremely unlikely the prosecution was unaware of defendant's trial in Ventura County for similar crimes committed just months after the murders of Radford and Levoy. The record thus fails to demonstrate prejudice flowing from counsel's alleged mistake. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1008, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) Finally, to the extent defendant contends the erroneous dual appointment and testimony of Drs. Cutting and Criswell deprived him of a fair and reliable penalty phase verdict, we reject that claim as well because it is not reasonably possible that, in the absence of the jury's consideration of their testimony at the penalty phase, the jury would have reached a different verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.)