Opinion ID: 78305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualified Immunity for the Police Officers

Text: Appellant claims that Officers Shaw, Root, and Luke in restraining Lewis used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Appellant argues that Officers Maale and Dunn had a duty to intervene when witnessing the use of excessive force, and they failed to do so. She asserts that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the officers are liable for constitutional violations in their individual capacities. The officers dispute these assertions and claim exemption from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To receive qualified immunity, the officer must first show that he acted within his discretionary authority. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002). It is undisputed in this case that the officers were acting within their discretionary authority. Once discretionary authority is established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity should not apply. Id. In analyzing the applicability of qualified immunity, the Court has at its disposal a two-step process. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Traditionally, a court first determines whether the officer's conduct amounted to a constitutional violation. Id. Second, the court analyzes whether the right violated was clearly established at the time of the violation. Id. The intention is to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice that their conduct is unlawful. Id. at 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Thus, if the violated right was not clearly established, qualified immunity still applies. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The Supreme Court recently clarified the Saucier two-step process explaining that the order of the inquiry is fluid, providing the Court with the flexibility to focus on the determinative question. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The Supreme Court recognized that discussion of a constitutional violation may become unnecessary for qualified immunity purposes when the right was not clearly established. Id. It is therefore not mandated that the Court examine the potential constitutional violation under Saucier step one prior to analyzing whether the right was clearly established under step two. Id. Such analytical flexibility is certainly applicable here. Even if the officers' actions violated Lewis's Fourth Amendment rights, the appellant did not demonstrate that the officers' conduct was an intrusion on a clearly established right. A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right, Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 584 (11th Cir.2007); (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right, id. ; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law. Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, case law does not provide the necessary precedent, either specifically or through broad principles, to clearly establish the right. Thus, only if the officers' conduct was so egregious and unacceptable so as to have blatantly violated the Constitution would qualified immunity be unavailable to them. However, to come within this narrow exclusion, plaintiff must show that the official's conduct was so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force that the official had to know he was violating the Constitution even without case law on point. Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). This standard is met when every reasonable officer would conclude that the excessive force used was plainly unlawful. Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (11th Cir.2000). Appellant argues that because the officers further restrained Lewis with the hobble after the need for any use of force had passed and tightened it to form a hogtie, the officers' conduct rose to this level of egregiousness. This is not the case. Even though most of the officers in this case testified that Lewis was not a danger to them and was merely resisting arrest, he was, as the district court described, an agitated and uncooperative man with only a tenuous grasp on reality. Because of his refusal to sit upright and his inability to remain calm, Lewis remained a safety risk to himself and to others. As the district court observed, this was precisely the type of situation where the decisions of the officers confronted with circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving should not be second-guessed. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Unlike many of the cases cited by plaintiff, Lewis did not remain compliantly restrained. Cf. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir.2002) (qualified immunity denied to officer who was physically rough with arrestee despite any sort of threat or physical aggression on her part); Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir.2000) (qualified immunity denied to officer who ordered a dog attack on a passive suspect); Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir.1997) (qualified immunity denied on summary judgment to officer who broke arrestee's arm after he was passively under arrest). Even though he was not forcefully attacking the officers, Lewis continued to struggle. The application of the hobble may not have been entirely necessary; however, the officers' attempts to restrain Lewis were not so violent and harsh to be considered an egregious violation of a constitutional right, and they are not an obstacle to the application of qualified immunity. Despite the unfortunate result that night, qualified immunity insulates the officers from liability for Lewis's death.