Opinion ID: 842329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jones v. united states

Text: The Supreme Court next discussed sentencing factors in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). It addressed whether the federal carjacking statute [10] constituted three separate crimes or one crime with sentencing factors that increased the maximum penalty. Id. at 229, 119 S.Ct. 1215. The Court concluded that a fair reading of the statute required it to find three separate offenses. But it went on to discuss alternative reasons for requiring that the state must prove to a jury all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. They involve constitutional law. The Court's focus quickly centered on McMillan's discussion of an increase in the maximum penalty: The terms of the carjacking statute illustrate very well what is at stake. If serious bodily injury were merely a sentencing factor under [18 U.S.C. 2119(2)] (increasing the authorized penalty by two thirds, to 25 years), then death would presumably be nothing more than a sentencing factor under subsection (3) (increasing the penalty range to life). If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life on a nonjury determination, the jury's role would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping: in some cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sentence would merely open the door to a judicial finding sufficient for life imprisonment. [ Id. at 243-244, 119 S.Ct. 1215.] The reduction of the role of the jury greatly troubled the Supreme Court. In fact, it found the reduction inconsistent with the protections offered by the United States Constitution. It indicated that removal from the jury of control over the facts necessary for determining a statutory sentencing range would raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue. Id. at 248, 119 S.Ct. 1215. The Court stated that any doubt on the issue of statutory construction must be resolved in favor of avoiding such Sixth Amendment questions. Id. at 251, 119 S.Ct. 1215.