Opinion ID: 150480
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Barbara Modica

Text: Treesh asserts that Modica was actually biased against Treesh, given her predisposition in favor of the death penalty and her prior exposure to media coverage of the case. [I]t is beyond question that mere prior knowledge of the existence of the case, or familiarity with the issues involved, or even some preexisting opinion as to the merits, does not in and of itself raise a presumption of jury taint. DeLisle v. Rivers, 161 F.3d 370, 382 (6th Cir.1998) (en banc). Where pretrial publicity cannot be presumed prejudicial, [we] must then determine whether it rises to the level of actual prejudice. Foley v. Parker, 488 F.3d 377, 387 (6th Cir.2007). To assess actual prejudice, we review the voir dire of prospective jurors. Id. The relevant question is `did [the] juror swear that [she] could set aside any opinion [she] might hold and decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality have been believed.' Id. (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)). Modica swore she could set aside any prior opinion, and nothing in the record indicates that her prior exposure to the case via media coverage undermined her promise to be impartial. Similarly, Modica's statements regarding the death penalty do not demonstrate actual bias. [A] prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... [when] the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require [her] to do. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Nonetheless, after carefully reviewing the record, there is nothing to indicate that Modica's views on the death penalty would have prevented her from returning anything less than a death sentence. It is true that Modica initially indicated that she thought that anyone guilty of murder should not be up and walking around. However, when pressed to consider the issue further, she admitted that she did not believe that everyone who purposely murdered should be sentenced to death. She explained that such a sentence may not be warranted when the murder was the result of momentary passion, and indicated that she would consider factors such as why the defendant committed the murder, what the circumstances were, whether the defendant was mentally retarded or had developmental difficulties as a child, and whether he was using drugs at the time. These statements suggest that Modica would not automatically vote for the death penalty in every case, and demonstrate that she could take into consideration mitigating factors. Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that it was unlikely that Modica would have been excluded pursuant to a challenge for cause is not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.