Opinion ID: 3015153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Evidence Concerning The Absence Of Prior

Text: Gloss Calender Accidents Forrest argues that the District Court erred by permitting Beloit to introduce evidence concerning the alleged absence of prior accidents involving the Gloss Calender at the JeffersonSmurfitt mill. Beloit introduced this evidence through testimony extracted on cross-examination from former Jefferson-Smurfit employees William Brody and Edward Marshall, who had been employed at Jefferson-Smurfit (and its corporate predecessor CCA) for seventeen years and thirty-five years, respectively. They testified that the way Forrest attempted to thread the Gloss Calender on the night of the accident was the same as that used for years by other employees. Both Brody and Marshall also indicated that they were unaware of any prior similar accidents involving the Gloss Calender during their years at JeffersonSmurfit. Beloit invoked this testimony in its closing, arguing that “as far as the evidence is concerned, the only accident we 21 know of, in thirty-six years, on the Gloss Calender was Mr. Forrest’s.” The foregoing testimony came in over Forrest’s repeated objections, including a pretrial motion in limine. Forrest’s objections centered on Beloit’s alleged failure to establish an adequate foundation for introducing this testimony concerning the alleged absence of prior accidents involving the Gloss Calender at the Jefferson-Smurfitt mill. Forrest noted that George Wong, Beloit’s former chief engineer, had admitted in his deposition that Beloit kept no records relating to either safety complaints by Beloit customers or past accidents involving Beloit’s Gloss Calender machines. Invoking Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, Forrest argued that the lack of records precluded Beloit from satisfying the foundation-laying requirement traditionally imposed on a product liability defendant seeking to introduce testimony concerning the alleged absence of prior accidents involving its products. Forrest’s motion in limine argued that “[b]ecause Beloit cannot establish a foundation for the admissibility of evidence concerning an absence of prior substantially similar accidents, any reference to such alleged evidence . . . would be unfairly prejudicial to Forrest[.]” To assess Forrest’s challenge to the disputed evidence, we must first determine the applicable law. The parties and the District Court focused primarily on Pennsylvania law concerning this issue, and in particular, on the decision of the 22 Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Spino v. Tilley, 696 A.2d 1169 (Pa. 1997). While the well-reasoned decision in Spino provides useful guidance, the question presented is governed by federal rather than state law. The admissibility of the evidence ultimately turns on a balancing of its probative value versus its prejudicial effect, and we have held that in a federal court the Federal Rules of Evidence govern procedural issues of this nature. See, e.g., Diehl v. Blaw-Knox, 360 F.3d 426, 431 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating in product liability diversity action governed by Pennsylvania law that “assessment of the dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues are procedural matters that govern in a federal court notwithstanding a state policy to the contrary”) (emphasis added); Kelly v. Crown Equipment Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that relevancy provision in Federal Rules of Evidence is “arguably procedural” and therefore governs in diversity action notwithstanding contrary Pennsylvania law); Espeaignnette v. Tierney, 43 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (federal rather than state law governs admissibility of “no prior accident” evidence in a diversity action).7 7