Opinion ID: 1262728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: W.Va.Code 17C-5-2(i) [1986] provides:

Text: A person violating any provision of subsection (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) of this section shall, for the third or any subsequent offense under this section, be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than three years, and the court may, in its discretion, impose a fine of not less than three thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars. W.Va.Code 17C-5-2(j) [1986] provides in part: For purposes of subsections (h) and (i) of this section relating to second, third and subsequent offenses, the following types of convictions shall be regarded as convictions under this section; ... (3) Any conviction under a municipal ordinance of this state or any other state or a statute of the United States or of any other state of an offense which has the same elements as an offense described in this section, which offense occurred after June tenth, one thousand nine hundred eighty-three.... If we look back to the definition of what constitutes a crime under W.Va. Code 17C-5-2(d) [1986], we see that W.Va.Code 17C-5-2(d) [1986] provides: Any person who: (1) Drives a vehicle in this state while: (A) He is under the influence of alcohol, or (B) He is under the influence of any controlled substance, or (C) He is under the influence of any other drug, or (D) He is under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance or any other drug, or (E) He has an alcohol concentration in his blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight; and (2) Shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than one day nor more than six months, which jail term shall include actual confinement of not less than twenty-four hours, and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars. Until 1986, West Virginia law regarded a driver with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .10 of one percent or more by weight as prima facie intoxicated; however, driving with such a BAC was not itself a crime in West Virginia. It was possible, therefore, for a person caught driving with a BAC of.10 of one percent or more to be found not guilty at trial of driving under the influence of alcohol. In March, 1986, however, the legislature amended W.Va.Code 17C-5-2 to make the act of driving with a BAC of .10 of one percent or more by weight a crime per se. The legislature intended its 1986 amendment to W.Va.Code 17C-5-2 to add to the alternative forms of driving under the influence a separate offense of driving with a BAC of .10 of one percent or more by weight. Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1986, Chapter 57. The Ohio legislature structured Ohio's drunk driving statute in a manner similar to West Virginia's. The Ohio statute under which Mr. Beals was convicted in July, 1991, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4511.19(A)(3), makes it a crime per se to drive with a concentration of ten hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath. The statute also sets forth other means of detecting drunk driving, including driving with a BAC of .10 of one percent or more by weight. [1] An out-of-state DUI conviction can be used to enhance a repeat offender's sentence in West Virginia. W.Va.Code 17C-5-2(j)(3) [1986] quoted above, allows a DUI conviction in another state to be used for sentence enhancement in West Virginia if the out-of-state conviction has the same elements as an offense described in this section, and occurred after June tenth, one thousand nine hundred eighty-three. In its order granting Mr. Beals' motion to suppress, the circuit court held that because West Virginia has no statute making it a crime per se to drive with a concentration of .10 percent of one gram or more by weight of alcohol for 210 liters of breath, Mr. Beals' conviction under that subdivision of the Ohio statute could not be used to enhance the penalty for his latest West Virginia DUI conviction because the Ohio crime did not have the same elements as the West Virginia crime. The State concedes that the lower court was correct in assuming that Mr. Beals was convicted in Ohio under the breath alcohol subdivision, but the State argues correctly that because Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4511.19(A)(3), under which Mr. Beals was convicted, is functionally synonymous with W.Va.Code 17C-5-2(d)(1)(E), the circuit court's analysis is incorrect. The circuit court assumed, and Mr. Beals apparently conceded, that the Ohio DUI standard under which Mr. Beals was convicted is, pharmacologically, the same as the determination that the person has an alcohol concentration in his blood of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight. This fact is confirmed by Gordy and Grey in their widely recognized treatise Attorney's Textbook of Medicine which states: The blood/breath ratio is a means by which analysts determine the blood alcohol level through knowledge of the amount of alcohol evident on the breath and the relationship between this figure and the amount of alcohol in the blood. The exact value of this relationship has been the focus of much debate and research. The clinically accepted blood/ breath ratio has been recognized since 1972 when the U.S. National Safety Council determined that 2100 millimeters of expired alveolar air contain approximately the same quantity of alcohol as 1 millimeter of blood (Emerson, 1980). The blood/breath ratio is therefore 2100 to 1. 4 Gordy & Gray, Attorney's Textbook of Medicine, § 135.34(1) (1987) (Emphasis added). As this clinically accepted ratio demonstrates, the same amount of alcohol would render a person legally intoxicated under the Ohio standard used to convict Mr. Beals and the West Virginia standard set forth in W.Va.Code 17C-5-2(d)(1)(E). The West Virginia Legislature has codified this equivalence by declaring that measurement of BAC by breath analysis is sufficient to prove intoxication in West Virginia. W.Va.Code 17C-5-4 [1989] and 17C-5-8 [1983]. This Court has likewise recognized the validity of breath analysis as a means of measuring BAC. State v. Conrad, 187 W.Va. 658, 421 S.E.2d 41 (1992). Contrary to the circuit court's assertion, then, the elements of the Ohio statute under which Mr. Beals was convicted and W.Va.Code 17C-5-2(d)(1)(E) are the same elements, albeit expressed in slightly different language. The circuit court, therefore, exceeded his legitimate powers by determining that the Ohio conviction could not be used to enhance Mr. Beals' sentence should he now be convicted under W.Va. Code 17C-5-2(j)(3). Accordingly, because our review of the Ohio court documents leads us unequivocally to conclude that Mr. Beals pled guilty to the offense of drunk driving, and because Mr. Beals was charged with drunk driving under a pharmacologically equivalent definition of the crime as that used in W.Va. Code 17C-5-2(d)(1)(E) [1986], we conclude that the writ of prohibition prayed for should be awarded. Writ Awarded.