Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of discovery re arbitrary charging of special circumstances.

Text: Before trial, defendant sought extensive discovery about the capital-charging policies and practices of the San Francisco District Attorney's office, as applied in all cases handled by that office which met certain potentially capital criteria. Defendant's purpose was to obtain information allowing a challenge to the constitutionality of the special circumstance allegations against him on two grounds: (1) that the district attorney had no standards for deciding whether to charge special circumstances in an eligible case, and (2) that the prosecution was arbitrarily alleging special circumstances in this case. As grounds for the request, defendant's counsel declared (1) that special circumstances were not alleged against defendant until the third complaint was filed against him, (2) that Kelly, the codefendant, was not capitally charged, (3) on information and belief, that in other cases involving murder, burglary, and robbery, the district attorney had not alleged special circumstances, and (4) that so far as counsel was aware, the district attorney had no formal or informal standards for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this regard. The trial court denied the request for discovery, and defendant filed a petition for mandate in the Court of Appeal. There, his claim was rejected in a published opinion. ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 576 [177 Cal. Rptr. 841] ( Keenan I ).) That holding became law of the case. ( People v. Medina (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484, 491, fn. 7 [99 Cal. Rptr. 630, 492 P.2d 686].) Defendant nonetheless renews his objection to the denial of discovery. He urges that application of the law-of-the-case doctrine would create unjust results (see People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 845 [120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211]) since (1) this court has exclusive jurisdiction over capital issues, (2) Keenan I manifestly misapplied existing principles and failed to address all the issues, and (3) our attention to the problem of standardless charging discretion is required. None of these assertions is persuasive. Keenan I was correctly decided by a court with subject matter jurisdiction. (4) As the opinion noted, prosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought does not in and of itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious capital punishment system or offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual punishment. ( Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262, 274 [plur. opn.], 279 [conc. opn. of White, J.] [49 L.Ed.2d 929, 939-940, 942, 96 S.Ct. 2950]; Proffitt v. Florida (1976) 428 U.S. 242, 254 [plur. opn.], 261 [conc. opn. of White, J.] [49 L.Ed.2d 913, 924, 927-928, 96 S.Ct. 2960]; Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 199-200 [plur. opn.], 225-226 [conc. opn. of White, J.] [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 889-890, 903-904, 96 S.Ct. 2909]; see McClesky v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 292 [95 L.Ed.2d 262, 278, 291, 107 S.Ct. 1756]; see also cases cited in Keenan I, 126 Cal. App.3d at p. 584. [10] ) Many circumstances may affect the litigation of a case chargeable under the death penalty law. These include factual nuances, strength of evidence, and, in particular, the broad discretion to show leniency. Hence, one sentenced to death under a properly channeled death penalty scheme cannot prove a constitutional violation by showing that other persons whose crimes were superficially similar did not receive the death penalty. ( McClesky, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 307-308, and fn. 28 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 288]; Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 40-41, 104 S.Ct. 871].) The same reasoning applies to the prosecutor's decisions to pursue or withhold capital charges at the outset. (5) Defendant implies that prosecutors must develop fair standards for deciding when to seek the death penalty. But this contention undermines the basic premise of Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, and McClesky, all supra, that the requisite standards are those minimum standards set forth in a constitutional death penalty statute. By acceptably narrowing the circumstances under which capital punishment may be sought and imposed, such a law satisfies the constitutional prohibition against arbitrary and capricious exaction of the death penalty. When he acts under such a law, and [a]bsent a persuasive showing to the contrary, we must presume that the district attorney's decisions were legitimately founded on the complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law enforcement. [Citation.] ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 860 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776].) To require prosecutors to justify each capital-charging decision by reference to others would plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions on the use of capital punishment. ( Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 199, fn. 50 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 889]; see McClesky, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 296, and fn. 17 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 281].) (6) Of course, an accused may show by direct or circumstantial evidence that prosecutorial discretion was exercised with intentional and invidious discrimination in his case. ( Oyler v. Boles (1962) 368 U.S. 448, 456 [7 L.Ed.2d 446, 452-453, 82 S.Ct. 501]; Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 293-301 [124 Cal. Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44]; see McClesky, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 292-298 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 278-282].) In theory, he may also show a constitutionally unacceptable risk that an irrelevant and invidious consideration is systematically affecting the application of a facially valid capital-sentencing scheme. ( McClesky, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 299-319 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 283-296].) In light of the substantial discretion properly allowed decisionmakers in the capital-sentencing process, however, any statistical or comparative evidence presented for these purposes must demonstrate a significant, stark, and exceptionally clear pattern of invidious discrimination. ( Id., at pp. 293-297 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 279-281, 283-296].) As Keenan I observed, however, defendant made no allegation of purposeful, invidious discrimination here. (7) He merely asserted that capital charging by the San Francisco District Attorney's office appeared to be standardless, that capital charges against him were delayed, and that he sustained harsher charges than others whose crimes he deemed similar. These claims are patently insufficient to raise the issue of individual or systematic discrimination on invidious grounds. [11] Hence, they constituted no plausible justification for granting defendant's extensive discovery request, in whole or in part. (See Griffin v. Municipal Court (1977) 20 Cal.3d 300, 306-307 [142 Cal. Rptr. 286, 571 P.2d 997].) Keenan I reached the proper result, and the trial court properly denied defendant's application for discovery. [12] Defendant makes no other assertions of error at the guilt and special circumstance phase of his trial. We therefore affirm all the convictions and special circumstance findings.