Opinion ID: 709071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Two Threshold Issues.

Text: 8 Piper contends that we lack jurisdiction because Park Nicollet has appealed non-final orders, and that Park Nicollet lacks standing to challenge those orders. We disagree. 9
10 In Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 287-88, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1142-43, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988), the Supreme Court held that an order refusing to stay litigation pending the outcome of another proceeding, such as an arbitration, is not automatically appealable as a collateral order or an injunction. Congress responded by enacting Section 16 of the FAA, 3 which makes appealable an interlocutory order granting ... an injunction against an arbitration, Sec. 16(a)(2), and also an order refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of [the FAA], Sec. 16(a)(1)(A). 11 The district court's March 3 Order enjoined Park Nicollet from proceeding with its arbitration against Piper. The court's April 3 Order denied Park Nicollet's motion to stay the class action pending arbitration. Both orders are appealable under Sec. 16(a)(2) and Sec. 16(a)(1)(A). We reject Piper's contention that the orders should be non-appealable because they did not decide arbitrability and were not anti-arbitration. The plain language of the statute is controlling. 12
13 Piper argues that Park Nicollet lacks standing to challenge the district court's orders because it did not seek leave to intervene in the class action. Piper relies on Croyden Associates v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 1251, 122 L.Ed.2d 650 (1993), where we held that an unnamed class member must intervene before appealing the approval of a class settlement in which it will participate. This case is very different. Park Nicollet is not attacking the adequacy of the proposed settlement. Rather, it appeals injunctive orders interfering with its contractual right to reject the class action remedy and arbitrate. 14 Section 3 of the FAA provides for a stay of litigation pending arbitration on application of one of the parties. The term party includes a party to the arbitration agreement. See Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir.1971). Section 16 allows an appeal from an order refusing a Sec. 3 stay. To give proper effect to Sec. 16, the party denied the Sec. 3 stay, here Park Nicollet, must have standing to appeal. 15 A nonparty normally has standing to appeal when it is adversely affected by an injunction. See Thompson v. Freeman, 648 F.2d 1144, 1147 n. 5 (8th Cir.1981); Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25, 28-30 (7th Cir.1967), aff'd, 395 U.S. 100, 110, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1569-70, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). Equitable considerations clearly warrant giving standing to appeal to a nonparty that has been haled ... into district court despite [its] objections. S.E.C. v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 77, 93 L.Ed.2d 33 (1986). For these reasons, we conclude Park Nicollet has standing to appeal. 16