Opinion ID: 597201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's Cross-Appeal

Text: 28 Payne argues that the state trial court failed to comply with People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318 (1984), by failing to find that he had the requisite intent to kill. In announcing his verdict on the special circumstance allegation, the trial judge stated: 29 As to the third special circumstance alleged by the People, the court makes its finding that said special circumstance is true. 30 The court further finds that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted in the commission of murder in the first degree in that he intentionally and illegally restrained Michael Hynan by force and fear as Henry Lee Williams accomplished the first degree murder. 31 Payne argues that the trial judge only found that he intentionally restrained Michael Hynan, not that he intended to aid in the killing of Kathline Hynan. 32 Considered in the context which gave rise to them, the judge's words do not allow for this inference. The question, whether Payne intended to help Williams kill Mrs. Hynan, was put to the judge as the main issue in the case. The information specifically alleged that Payne intentionally aided and abetted first degree murder. Payne argued in his trial brief that he could not be found guilty of the special circumstance unless the court concluded that he intended to kill. During closing arguments, defense counsel pointed out that the court was required to find an intent to kill. The trial court concluded on the record that Payne intentionally aided and abetted in the commission of murder in the first degree. The defense moved to modify the verdict, arguing the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the special circumstance finding. The trial court again found the evidence sufficient, in the language quoted above. Regardless of how his words might be interpreted were there no context, it is plain under the circumstances that the state trial judge, after careful consideration, and again after plenary reconsideration, decided that Payne intended to aid in the killing. 33
34 Payne further argues that the judgment of the California courts should be reversed because the state appellate court used a constitutionally invalid presumption in deciding his appeal. In rejecting Payne's Beeman argument, the California Court of Appeal stated: we presume that the trial court knew the weight of authority upon which the Beeman holding was based and followed it. Payne argues that this conclusive presumption was unsupported in fact or law, denying him due process. 35 Payne mischaracterizes the court of appeal's statement. The court did not presume that the trial judge knew and followed Beeman, which was decided after Payne's conviction, but rather that the judge knew the weight of authority upon which the Beeman holding was based. Payne also takes the statement out of context, ignoring the court's previous conclusion that the trial court's finding 36 was the unambiguous equivalent of a finding that [Payne] intended to aid in the killing, as required by Carlos, and also by the subsequent decision in [Beeman ], defining the elements of aiding and abetting. In other words, the court found not only that [Payne] intentionally aided in the burglary, but also that when he restrained Mr. Hynan, he did so with the intent of aiding Williams in the killing of the victim. 37 [A] federal court on habeas review must give deference to a state appellate court's resolution of an ambiguity in a state trial court statement. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S.Ct. 731, 739, 112 L.Ed.2d 812, 825 (1991); accord Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 83-85, 104 S.Ct. 378, 381-82, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983). In context, the California Court of Appeal's presumption is no more than the unremarkable statement that the trial judge was presumed to have known the relevant law of California when he made his decision.CONCLUSION 38 Sufficient evidence supported the state trial court's conclusion that Payne intended to help Williams kill Kathline Hynan, and restrained Michael Hynan in order to accomplish that objective. The trial court made a sufficient finding of specific intent as required by the California Supreme Court in People v. Beeman, 674 P.2d 1318, 1325 (Cal.1984). 39 The district court judgment is AFFIRMED with regard to Payne's appeal, and REVERSED with regard to the State's appeal, and the matter is remanded for an order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 40