Opinion ID: 2636777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Default divorce decree

Text: Shinichi argues that, because he filed an answer and other pleadings and a pretrial memorandum, and since he appeared through his attorney, the district court's default divorce decree was improper. He further argues that the court should not have declared him defaulted for not appearing at the divorce hearing without a written application for a default judgment by Yoko, and without providing Shinichi three days' written notice, as required under the default judgment rule, NRCP 55(b)(2). He asserts that given his answer and countercomplaint, the divorce should have been decided on its merits, and he assigns error to the decree, which divided community property and awarded support and attorney fees based merely on Yoko's requests. Yoko responds that Shinichi's failure to appear at the divorce hearing is an adequate basis for a default judgment. She points out that his pleadings are not evidence and argues that the district court, in dividing property and deciding support and attorney fees issues, properly granted her the relief that she requested. According to Yoko, it was enough for the court to allow Shinichi to participate through his attorney's limited cross-examination of Yoko at trial. The general procedure governing defaults is set forth under NRCP 55(a), which provides, When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default. Then, a default judgment may be entered in accordance with NRCP 55(b), the relevant subsection of which requires three days' notice to the defaulted person if he has appeared in the action. NRCP 55(b)(2). Whether, under NRCP 55, a default judgment may be entered against a defendant who has answered and appeared through counsel at district court proceedings presents a legal question subject to de novo review. Moseley v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. ___, ___, 188 P.3d 1136, 1142 (2008) (acknowledging that this court applies a de novo standard of review to issues concerning a rule's construction); Settelmeyer & Sons v. Smith & Harmer, 124 Nev. ___, ___, 197 P.3d 1051, 1057 (2008) (pointing out that when the issue raised on appeal involves a purely legal question, that issue is reviewed de novo). Here, although Shinichi relies in part on NRCP 55(b)(2)'s notice requirement in asserting that the district court erred, that provision is irrelevant because NRCP 55 does not apply, since Shinichi answered the complaint and appeared at the divorce hearing through counsel. Thus, the district court erred in entering the default against him. See In Interest of M.M., 708 So.2d 990, 992 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (providing that a trial court's decision to enter a default judgment against parties for failing to appear at a hearing was improper because the parties `appear[ed]' through their counsel); Owen v. Healy, 896 A.2d 965, 967-68 (Me.2006) (pointing out that the fact that a person is a party to a civil action does not in itself impose a legal obligation upon that person to be present at trial, and thus, when a party does not personally appear at trial, but his or her attorney does appear, a default against that party is not appropriate); Rocky Produce, Inc. v. Frontera, 181 Mich.App. 516, 449 N.W.2d 916, 917 (1989) (reversing a default judgment entered based on a civil defendant's failure to personally appear at trial and holding that, absent a subpoena or order from the court to appear, a defendant in a civil case is not required to appear in person for a scheduled trial); In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 589 (R.I.2001) (defining an appearance as `[a] coming into court as party to a suit, either in person or by attorney') (quoting Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 1037, 1048 (R.I.1997)); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Tex.1989) (concluding that if a party is represented at trial by counsel, there is no default judgment even if the party does not personally appear); cf. State v. Sargent, 122 Nev. 210, 216, 128 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2006) (explaining, in the context of a criminal case proceeding in the justice court, that when the defendant files a waiver of his personal appearance and his counsel appears at the preliminary hearing on the date and time required, the defendant's lack of personal appearance does not constitute a failure to appear); Fritz Hansen a/s v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 650, 653, 6 P.3d 982, 983 (2000) (indicating that a party may make an appearance either in person or through his or her attorney). Although Shinichi did not appear personally at the hearing, and as the district court properly denied as untimely his request for a continuance, a hearing on the merits was required, which did not occur here. At the hearing, the district court repeatedly stated that it was required to award Yoko all of the community property and any support that she requested, even though Yoko did not specifically plead for such relief in her complaint, and the court essentially foreclosed any meaningful cross-examination as to the support issues and whether an inequitable property award was justified. See NRS 125.150(1)(b) (directing that the district court [s]hall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the community property, except that it may dispose of the community property unequally, in such proportions as it deems just, upon finding a compelling reason to do so, provided it sets forth in writing its reasons for the unequal distribution). Instead, Yoko was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children, with no visitation for Shinichi, all of the property, spousal and child support, and attorney fees and costs, despite a lack of evidence to support such requests and reasons to justify departing from the relief requested in the complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's default judgment and remand this matter to the district court for a decision on the merits. [10]