Opinion ID: 853837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Record the Proceedings

Text: Turpin also seeks reversal based on Indiana Code § 35-34-2-3(d), (footnote: 7) which provides in relevant part: The court shall supply a means for recording the evidence presented before the grand jury and all of the other proceedings that occur before the grand jury, except for the deliberations and voting of the grand jury and other discussions when the members of the grand jury are the only persons present in the grand jury room. The evidence and proceedings shall be recorded in the same manner as evidence and proceedings are recorded in the court that impaneled the grand jury. . . . The manner of recording evidence in trial courts is governed by Criminal Rule 5, which provides for the recording or stenographic reporting “of any and all oral evidence and testimony given in all cases and hearings, including both questions and answers, all rulings of the judge in respect to the admission and rejection of evidence and objections thereto, and any other oral matters occurring during the hearing in any proceeding.” Accepting at face value the prosecutor’s account of the procedures followed in the grand jury, we agree with Turpin that this statute was violated by the prosecutor’s discussion of potential questions with the grand jurors off the record before recalling witnesses to pose questions himself. The State again argues that Turpin has shown no prejudice from this error. We do not agree that a showing of prejudice is required for a failure to keep a record to warrant dismissal. Indiana Code § 35-34-1-7 provides that “[a]n indictment shall be dismissed upon motion when the grand jury proceeding which resulted in the indictment was conducted in violation of IC 35-34-2.” We agree that this does not require dismissal for immaterial irregularities. Here, however, because there are no transcripts of the conversations between the prosecutor and grand jurors, Turpin is foreclosed from establishing prejudice. This focuses the major problem with this procedure: the error itself renders it impossible for a reviewing court to evaluate what, if any, interference with or domination of the grand jurors occurred. A prosecutor exerts considerable control over a grand jury. Statistics show that grand juries issue “no-bills” in only a very small percentage of cases presented to them. See LaFave & Israel , supra §15.2 at 283. Some suggest this shows “an almost compete lack of grand jury independence.” Id. The legislature’s requirement that a record be kept of grand jury proceedings can only be designed to serve as an important check on the potential of prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury process. Moreover, the Code requires that transcripts of a witness’s testimony be disclosed to a defendant upon court order after a showing of particularized need. Ind. Code § 35-34-2-10(b) (1998). In Marion County transcripts of the “testimony of persons who the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial” must be disclosed to a defendant in the normal course of automatic discovery. See Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, Rule 7(2)(a)(3). Although there may be immaterial violations of the statute, failure to record the proceedings to permit evaluation of what occurred is not one of them. Unlike the interposition of the prosecutor between the grand jury and the witnesses, the failure to keep a record cannot be defended on the basis that no prejudice is shown. Despite the violation of Indiana Code § 35-34-2-3(d), reversal is not appropriate in this case. Turpin sought dismissal in the trial court on the ground that the grand jury proceedings were “fatally defective” because “the Grand Jurors in this case were forbidden to participate in the interrogation of witnesses . . . .” He further contended that the State’s actions “amounted to prosecutorial misconduct” because the grand jury was unable to serve its proper function of examining evidence, unable to serve its oath to diligently inquire, and unable to serve as the exclusive judge of the facts. (footnote: 8) It was not until his petition to transfer that Turpin argued for reversal under Indiana Code § 35-34-2-3(d), which was not cited to the trial court. (footnote: 9) It is well settled that a party may not raise one ground before the trial court and a different ground on appeal. See , e.g. , Malone v. State , 700 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. 1998); Willsey v. State , 698 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind. 1998). “The changing of theories is substantially indistinguishable from having never raised the issue in the first instance.” 4A Kenneth M. Stroud, Indiana Practice § 3.2 at 33 (1990). We can only speculate as to how this case would have unfolded if the statutory violation had been presented to the trial court. In this case, the trial court and Court of Appeals properly found no error on the grounds argued before them. The new grounds advanced in the petition for transfer do not warrant reversal at this stage.