Opinion ID: 3673405
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Heading: the effect of art. xiv, sec. 7, of the constitution:

Text: The Constitution, Art. XIV, sec. 7, provides: No person who shall hold any office or place of trust or profit under the United States, or any department thereof, or under this State, or under any other State or government, shall hold or exercise any other office or place of trust or profit under the authority of this State, or be eligible to a seat in either house of the General Assembly: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall extend to officers in the militia, justices of the peace, commissioners of public charities, or commissioners for special purposes. Under this section, which is intended and designed to prevent or inhibit double office-holding, except in certain instances, it is not permissible for one person to hold two offices at the same time. Groves v. Barden , 169 N.C. 8 , 84 S.E. 1042 ; Harris v. Watson , 201 N.C. 661 , 161 S.E. 215 ; Brigman v. Baley , 213 N.C. 119 , 195 S.E. 617 ; In re Barnes , 212 N.C. 735 , 194 S.E. 499 ; Doyle v. Raleigh , 89 N.C. 133 . It has been said, however, that where the second office is temporary, or the appointment thereto does not require continuous public service, no constitutional offense is thereby incurred. Grimes v. Holmes , 207 N.C. 293 , 176 S.E. 746 ; S. v. Wood , 175 N.C. 809 , 95 S.E. 1050 ; S. v. Smith , 145 N.C. 476 , 59 S.E. 649 . Such would seem to be the case here. Furthermore, it will be noted that officers in the militia are expressly excluded from the operation of this section. As all able-bodied male citizens of the State, between the ages of 21 and 40 years, who are citizens of the United States and who are not averse to bearing arms from religious scruples, are liable to duty in the militia, Const., Art. XII, it was evidently deemed unjust to single out State officials and require them to forfeit their offices if they accepted commissions in the militia while on active military duty in defense of the commonwealth. So it was provided that the inhibition against double office-holding should not extend to officers in the militia. And while this designation, strictly speaking, may or may not reach as far as temporary appointments as officers in the Army during the present emergency, the reason for the limitation of the operation of the section would seem to require that it not extend to such temporary officers in the Army. Certainly the spirit of the Constitution would envisage that it fall short of such operation. The meaning of a constitution is to be found, not in a slavish adherence to the letter, which sometimes killeth, but in the discovery of its spirit, which giveth life. Opinions of the Justices , 204 N.C. p. 813 , 172 S.E. 474 . If need be, the letter gives way to promote the equity of the spirit. An inhibition or prohibition usually extends no farther than the reason on which it is founded. Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex . Historically the `militia' or `militiamen' have been held to comprehend every temporary citizen-soldier who in time of war or emergency forsakes his civil pursuits to enter for the duration the active military service of his country — Douglas, J. , in S. v. Grayston , 349 Mo., 700 , 163 S.W.2d 335 . It will also be observed that the official on leave is to receive no salary during the period of his absence. Nor is he expected to perform any of the duties of his office while on leave. Thus, neither the spirit nor the reason for the constitutional inhibition against double office-holding is to be offended. The reason of the law is more potent in its interpretation that the language used to express it. Reason is its soul; language its outward form. Warrenton v. Warren County , 215 N.C. 342 , loc. cit. 348, 2 S.E.2d 463 . Moreover, the services in the Army of the officer on leave are to be temporary and not permanent. This saves the case from incompatibility, In re Martin, supra , which would undoubtedly result, if the services contemplated were those of the professional, permanent soldier, as distinguished from those of the temporary citizen-soldier. S. v. Grayston, supra; Annotations 26 A.L.R., 142, and 132 A.L.R., 254. The instant provision was never intended to discourage public officials from assuming military leadership in time of emergency. Critchlow v. Monson, supra . Officers in the militia are liable to be called out to suppress riots or insurrection, and to repel invasion. Const., Art. XII, sec. 3. Temporary officers in the Army are likewise subject to military duty to repel invasion during a war emergency. To say that one may serve as a private in the Army during war time and hold his State position, but if he accept a temporary officer's commission he must renounce his civil office, would be to impose an unequal sacrifice on State officials who seek promotion in the Army. It was the purpose of the proviso in this section to permit public officials to serve as officers in the militia without forfeiting their civil office, and it is reasonable to suppose that as the interdiction in the first part of the section was not intended to extend to civil officers serving as officers in the militia, for precisely the same reason it was not intended to extend to civil officers holding temporary commissions in the Army during a war emergency, as they both fall in the same category. Both would be temporarily engaged in bearing arms in defense of the commonwealth and in like positions. To declare otherwise would be to say that an unwarranted discrimination inheres in the Constitution, whereas the pervading principle of the organic law is equality of treatment. The thesis of the Constitution is that all similarly situated are entitled to like treatment from the government they support and defend. Leonard v. Maxwell , 216 N.C. 89 , 3 S.E.2d 316 . Equality and fair play are implicit in the Constitution. Such is its theme. A constitution should not receive a technical construction as if it were an ordinary instrument or statute. It should be interpreted so as to carry out the general principles of the government, and not defeat them — Brown, J. , in Jenkins v. Board of Elections , 180 N.C. 169 , 85 S.E. 289 . Substantially the same question as here presented has arisen in a number of the States having constitutional provisions in respect of dual office-holding, quite similar to ours, and yet with sufficient variations perhaps to render them distinguishable. At any rate, opposite conclusions have been reached in the different States with variant reasons assigned therefor. On the one side may be listed the States of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Smith , 343 Pa., 446 , 2 A.2d 440 ; Arizona, Perkins v. Manning , 59 Ariz. 60 , 122 P.2d 857 ; and Illinois, Fekete v. East St. Louis , 315 Ill. 58 , 145 N.E. 692 , 40 A.L.R., 650. On the other, may be designated the States of Florida, Re Advisory Opinion , 150 Fla. 556 , 8 So. 2d 26 , 140 A.L.R., 1481; California, McCoy v. Los Angeles County , 18 Cal. 2d 193 , 114 P.2d 569 ; Missouri, S. v. Grayston, supra ; Utah, Critchlow v. Monson, supra ; Texas, Carpenter v. Sheppard , 135 Tex. 413 , 145 S.W.2d 562 ; and West Virginia, S. ex rel. Thomas v. Wysong , ___ W. Va., ___, 24 S.E.2d 463 (decided 23 February, 1943). Most of the recent cases have been collected in Annotation 140 A.L.R., 1499. Thus, in its final analysis, we are left to apply our own Constitution to the facts in hand, and to say what it means. The authorities elsewhere, while enlightening, are not controlling. Accordingly, you are advised that the question first above propounded is answered in the affirmative. Respectfully, WALTER P. STACY, Chief Justice; MICHAEL SCHENCK, W. A. DEVIN, M. V. BARNHILL, J. WALLACE WINBORNE, A. A. F. SEAWELL, EMERY B. DENNY, Associate Justices .