Opinion ID: 2148307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: IGRA/Separation of Powers

Text: Our analysis of the merits starts with the Constitution's implied separation-of-powers doctrine which requires that the Legislature make the critical policy decisions, while the executive branch's responsibility is to implement those policies ( Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781, 784 [1995]). The distinction between legislative (policymaking) and executive (policy implementing) functions is not black and white. Rather, [i]t is only when the Executive acts inconsistently with the Legislature, or usurps its prerogatives, that the doctrine of separation is violated ( Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185, 189 [1985]; Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, 39 NY2d 641 [1976]). While the majority labels as critical policy choices various subjects related to the operation of gaming activities and includible in a tribal-state compact, what plaintiffs challenge in these cases is more fundamental; namely, the decision to authorize on-reservation class III Indian gaming. Any discussion of what critical policy choices were available to the Legislature on this score starts with the recognition that Indian commerce is an area under the exclusive control of the Federal Government ( Seminole Tribe of Fla. v Florida, 517 US 44, 72 [1996]). The traditional notions of Indian sovereignty provide a crucial `backdrop' against which any assertion of state authority must be assessed ( Gaming Corp. of Am. v Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F3d 536, 547 [8th Cir 1996], citing White Mtn. Apache Tribe v Bracker, 448 US 136, 143 [1980]). Faced with the question of whether a state could enforce its gambling laws on an Indian reservation, the United States Supreme Court in California v Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (480 US 202 [1987]) reiterated the long-established rule that Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory, and that tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States ( id. at 207 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Moreover, state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations [only] if Congress has expressly so provided ( id. ). In interpreting pre-IGRA law, the Supreme Court held that if a state merely regulates gambling (i.e., through its civil laws), tribes must be allowed to conduct gambling on their reservations free from the state's gambling regulations. If, however, a state prohibits gambling (i.e., through its criminal laws), tribes are forbidden from gambling and the state may enforce its laws. The most controversial aspects of IGRA, which codified Cabazon with important modifications and expressly preempt[ed] the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands (S Rep No. 100-446, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, at 6, reprinted in 1988 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 3071, 3076; see Gaming Corp., 88 F3d at 544-549), cover class III gaming activities. These include pari-mutuel horse race wagering, lotteries, banking card games such as baccarat, chemin de fer and blackjack, electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance, and slot machines (25 USC § 2703 [7] [B]; [8]; 25 CFR 502.4 [c], [d]). [8] IGRA continues the pro-Indian Cabazon holding by providing that class III gaming could be conducted in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity (25 USC § 2710 [d] [1] [B] [emphasis added]). IGRA also, however, pays heed to states' apprehensions over unregulated Indian gaming by directing that a tribe can conduct class III gaming only pursuant to a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State    that is in effect (25 USC § 2710 [d ] [1] [C]). Further, IGRA contains enforcement provisions to require that where a state permits class III gaming, it must negotiate in good faith with a tribe for a compact upon the tribe's request ( see Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v State of Conn., 913 F2d 1024 [2d Cir 1990], cert denied 499 US 975 [1991]). If negotiations prove fruitless, the tribe can sue the state in federal court. If the state invokes sovereign immunity, the Secretary has authority to mediate the dispute and impose compact terms. [9] In summary, IGRA mandates that, if a state allows any class III gaming by any person, a tribe may seek to conduct the same games on its lands. Moreover, the Second Circuit has firmly rejected the notion (unsuccessfully advanced by the State of Connecticut) that a state that allows only charities to engage in regulated casino-type gambling prohibits class III gaming activities for purposes of IGRA ( id. at 1031-1032). States that allow charities to conduct class III gaming must negotiate in good faith with a tribe wishing to do the same. New York has not outlawed all gambling for more than six decades. For better or worse, New Yorkers have adopted a public policy that permits considerable gambling, although regulated. This public policy is embodied in article I, § 9 of the Constitution, which contains statements purporting to ban gambling, butsignificantly, for purposes of IGRAexplicitly authorizes four exceptions: (1) pari-mutuel betting on horse racing; (2) a state-operated lottery for education; (3) bingo for certain nonprofit organizations; and (4) games of chance for these same organizations. Games of chance are defined in the Constitution as follows: games in which prizes are awarded on the basis of a winning number or numbers, color or colors, or symbol or symbols determined by chance from among those previously selected or played, whether determined as the result of the spinning of a wheel, a drawing or otherwise by chance. (Art I, § 9 [2].) The Games of Chance Licensing Law (General Municipal Law art 9-A) empowers the Racing and Wagering Board to [s]upervise the administration of the games of chance licensing law and to adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations governing the issuance and amendment of licenses thereunder and the conducting of games under such licenses (General Municipal Law § 188-a [1]). Section 186 (3) of the General Municipal Law defines games of chance to include and exclude specific types of games; and delegates to the Board the authority to add such other specific games to the list of approved games of chance as fall within the confines of what is allowed in the Constitution (i.e. games in which prizes are awarded on the basis of a designated winning number or numbers, color or colors, symbol or symbols determined by chance). To similar effect, 9 NYCRR 5620.1 lists Board-approved games, but also authorizes any other game of chance which has been approved in writing by the board. (Subd [u].) Finally, article 16 of the Tax Law (the New York State Lottery for Education Law) authorizes the Division of the Lottery, among other things, to determine the type of lottery to be conducted (Tax Law § 1604 [a] [1]). Plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of any of the 26 specific games of chance listed in the 1993 Compact. [10] Plaintiffs do not contend that any of the games listed in the 1993 Compact are not among the numerous class III games that are already being conducted by nonprofit organizations and others in the state. Nor do they dispute the State's evidence that, as of January 12, 2001, the Racing and Wagering Board had issued games-of-chance identification numbers to 6,840 organizations. According to the Board's records for calendar year 1999, 2,125 authorized organizations were licensed to conduct bell jar games of chance. These organizations had a total handle of $298,598,154 from which a net profit of $51,646,037 resulted. With respect to other types of games of chance, $1,443,957 in net profits were raised by casino-style gaming from a handle of $3,011,913. According to the Division of the Lottery's Annual Report, in FY 2002-2003 the Division awarded $3.1 billion in prizes. In short, while regulated by the Racing and Wagering Board and the Division of the Lottery, gambling is commonplace in New York notwithstanding article I, § 9's general condemnation of it. When Congress enacted IGRA pursuant to its plenary authority over Indian affairs, it legislated for all 50 states to allow sovereign nations (Indian tribes) to conduct class III gaming activities within states' borders. In this situation, the critical policy decision challenged by plaintiffsto authorize on-reservation class III Indian gamingderives from the unique interplay between IGRA and our State's Constitution and statutes. The Governor's recognition that class III Indian gaming is mandated in New York by federal law, given policy did not constitute policymaking. In executing the 1993 Compact, which regulates the Tribe's conduct of class III gaming at its on-reservation casino, the Governor was merely implementing preexisting federal and state policy choices. Whatever the case may be in other states, in New York, the Governor enjoys broad powers to enforce legislation and great flexibility in determining the methods of enforcement. For example, we have in recent years affirmed the Governor's authority to create entire new agencies with new duties for consumer advocacy based principally on a legislative policy as general as article 20 of the Executive Law, which empowers the Consumer Protection Board to promote and encourage the protection of the legitimate interests of consumers within the state ( Bourquin, 85 NY2d at 785-786; see also Clark, 66 NY2d at 190 [statute providing that State Board of Elections shall have the power and duty    to encourage the broadest possible voter participation in elections sufficiently articulated legislative policy to support Governor's creation of multi-agency voter-registration program]). The underlying legislative policy decisions here are more robust and detailed than were the legislative policy decisions implicated in Bourquin and Clark. On this record, we find no separation-of-powers violation.