Opinion ID: 543080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Arguments of Friedman and Hughes

Text: 45 In addition to relying on the effect of the Resolution, appellants Friedman and Hughes argue that the IBT Constitution bars the Administrator from hearing Charge I. Friedman and Hughes make three specific arguments. The first repeats the construction of Article XIX, section 3(d), of the IBT Constitution adopted in the Resolution. Under section 3(d), an IBT officer cannot be subject to discipline for alleged pre-election misconduct, unless the allegations were not known generally by the membership of the IBT Local. Friedman and Hughes maintain that as a result of their well-publicized criminal indictments in 1986, their alleged wrongdoing was known generally prior to their re-election in 1987. Appellants' second argument is that under Article XIX, section 6(a), of the IBT Constitution, an IBT officer cannot be subject to disciplinary hearings for conduct arising from a criminal conviction while the criminal appeal is pending. Finally, Friedman and Hughes maintain that the same section contains a one-year statute of limitations that bars the instant charges. 46 With regard to the first contention, the Administrator held that Article XIX, section 3(d), by its explicit terms, precludes disciplinary charges only for generally known pre-election activity, not mere allegations, and the district court agreed. The theory of these holdings was that because Friedman and Hughes were, at the start of their terms, vigorously denying that they had engaged in the activities and actions for which they were indicted (and subsequently convicted), they could not credibly claim that their criminal activity was known generally. With regard to the second contention, the Administrator and the district court held that paragraph 6 of the Consent Decree expressly authorizes the General President or the GEB to suspend officers during the pendency of civil or criminal charges, and the Administrator possesses these same disciplinary powers. As to the third contention, the Administrator and the district court ruled that the plain language of paragraph 5 of the Consent Decree eliminates any limitations period for disciplinary charges brought by the Investigations Officer and tried before the Administrator. 47 In each of these instances, taking into account the great deference to be given to the Administrator's rulings, we cannot say that the district court erred.
48 Friedman and Hughes next argue that the district court erred in allowing the Administrator to collaterally estop them from contesting issues determined adversely to them in the Ohio criminal case, in view of the pendency of the criminal appeals there. Citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31, 99 S.Ct. 645, 651, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), Friedman also argues that Hughes's unavailability to testify on Friedman's behalf in the prior criminal case made the Administrator's offensive use of collateral estoppel unfair. 49 We have recently pointed out that the pendency of a criminal appeal generally does not deprive a judgment of its preclusive effect. See United States v. All Right, Title & Interest in Real Property & Building Known as 303 West 116th Street, 901 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir.1990); cf. Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 F.Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (judgment may be final for purposes of collateral estoppel, despite the fact that an appeal from it has not been decided); Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 13 comment g (1982) (same). As Judge Edelstein recognized, if the convictions of Friedman and Hughes are reversed by the Sixth Circuit, they may seek from him relief from the orders now under attack. Thus, the situation of riedman and Hughes is not akin to that presented to this court in Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948, 107 S.Ct. 1608, 94 L.Ed.2d 794 (1987), on which appellants rely. There this court refused to preclude relitigation of an issue on which plaintiff earlier had been denied effective appellate review. Id. at 45. 50 In addition, Parklane does not require a different result. There the Court recognized that the offensive use of collateral estoppel, whereby a defendant is foreclosed from relitigating an issue that he has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party, could, in some circumstances, be unfair to a defendant. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651. Such unfairness might result, the Court indicated, where a defendant had little incentive to defend vigorously in the first action; where the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant; or where the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result. Id. at 330-31, 99 S.Ct. at 651. 51 None of these circumstances are present here. Friedman and Hughes had every incentive to litigate their criminal cases vigorously and there were no inconsistent judgments on the issues to which estoppel was applied. With regard to Hughes's failure to testify in the prior criminal case, it is true that he there exercised his Fifth Amendment right. Friedman claims that this prevented him from establishing his authorization defense, i.e., that the alleged ghost employee scheme was done at the direction of the FBI, and emphasizes that in view of Hughes's present willingness to testify on Friedman's behalf, the Administrator's refusal to allow him to do so was unfair. This court has recognized that the application of collateral estoppel could result in unfairness if 'without fault of his own' a party against whom collateral estoppel is sought was deprived of 'crucial' evidence or witnesses in the prior action whose outcome is said to bar a subsequent action. United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 920 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1445, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2564, 109 L.Ed.2d 747 (1990). Friedman, however, was not  'without fault of his own,'  since he never moved to sever Hughes as a co-defendant in the prior criminal trial to facilitate obtaining in that forum his co-defendant's purportedly exculpatory testimony. Moreover, we note that the testimony of Hughes was received by the Administrator as mitigation evidence. The Administrator rejected the testimony as not credible, because, while Hughes testified that in his presence the late Jackie Presser told Friedman to hire one of the allegedly ghost employees because the FBI wanted it done, Friedman could not with any certainty recall that this conversation took place. Hughes's testimony, even if admitted as proof going to Friedman's authorization defense, would not therefore have readily cause[d] a different result. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331, 99 S.Ct. at 651.