Opinion ID: 2035819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Active Efforts Element Must Be Proved by Clear and Convincing Evidence

Text: Before deciding whether the State met its burden in proving active efforts, we must first determine the standard of proof for this element. The language in § 43-1505(4) does not impose any particular standard of proof for the active efforts element. Section 43-1505(6), however, expressly requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child is likely to suffer serious emotional or physical harm if the parent retains custody. Martina contends that the proper standard for the active efforts element is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State urges us not to adopt the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Martina directs our attention to In re Interest of Phoenix L. [6] In that case, the mother argued that a Nebraska Juvenile Code section violated equal protection. She argued that the statute only required clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights in a case involving non-Indian children but that § 43-1505(6) of NICWA required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We concluded that the lower standard of proof under § 43-279.01(3) for the termination of parental rights to non-Indian children, as opposed to the higher standard of proof under the NICWA, does not violate the equal protection rights of parents of non-Indian children. [7] In discussing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, we cited only the serious emotional and physical damage element under § 43-1505(6) for terminating parental rights. And we did not mention the active efforts element or its standard of proof; that issue was not before the court. We decline to read In re Interest of Phoenix L. as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all elements of an ICWA case. Other jurisdictions are split on what standard should apply. For instance, the South Dakota Supreme Court assumed the burden to prove the serious emotional and physical damage elementbeyond a reasonable doubtwould apply to prove the active efforts element. [8] Other courts have declined to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the active efforts element. [9] We join this latter group. [4] Congress did not intend in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 to create a wholesale substitution of state juvenile proceedings for Indian children. Instead, in § 1912, Congress created additional elements that must be satisfied for some actions but did not require a uniform standard of proof for the separate elements. As discussed, Congress imposed a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for the serious emotional of physical damage element in parental rights termination cases under § 1912(f). Congress also imposed a clear and convincing standard of proof for the serious emotional or physical damage element in foster care placements under § 1912(e). The specified standards of proof in subsections § 1912(e) and (f) illustrate that if Congress had intended to impose a heightened standard of proof for the active efforts element in § 1912(d), it would have done so. Because it did not impose a heightened standard of proof, we decline to interpret § 1912(d)and its Nebraska counterpart, § 43-1505(4)as requiring the State to prove active efforts beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, we conclude that the element requires proof by clear and convincing evidence in parental rights termination casesthe standard required for terminating parental rights under Nebraska law.