Opinion ID: 3066255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to amend the pleadings

Text: We also apply regional circuit law to our review of the district court’s denial of BDI’s motion to amend the pleadings. See Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit reviews the denial of an untimely request to amend a pleading for an abuse of discretion. See Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2009). In High Point I, we instructed the district court to consider whether there was “good cause” under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules for allowing BDI to amend its pleadings after the scheduling order deadline. 730 F.3d at 1319–20; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent”). On remand, the district court denied the motion on grounds that BDI failed to show sufficient diligence to meet that standard. Remand Order, 2014 WL 1244558, at –9. The district court’s decision was based on its finding that High Point had notified BDI before the deadline that the trade dress claim was insufficiently pled. The district court found High Point had done so on two separate occasions before the March 16, 2012, deadline. On February 6, 2012, High Point submitted a reply to BDI’s counHIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. 19 terclaims and alleged that the “look and feel of [BDI’s Snoozies slippers] does not constitute protectable trade dress” and that BDI failed to state a claim. Id. at  (quoting A142 ¶¶ 17, 21). And on February 16, 2012, during the initial conference, High Point requested leave to file to file one or more motions dispositive of all claims on the face of the pleadings. Id. Given this notice, the district court found that BDI’s failure to amend by the March 16, 2012 deadline evidenced a lack of sufficient diligence to demonstrate good cause. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying BDI’s motion to amend. In assessing whether good cause exists “the primary consideration is whether the moving party can demonstrate diligence.” See id. at  (citing Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007)). We first disagree with BDI’s proposition that High Point was responsible for notifying it, prior to the deadline, that the trade dress claim was deficiently pled. We are aware of no such requirement in the Second Circuit, and BDI has not presented any compelling reason we should so hold here. As to “good cause,” BDI presents no persuasive explanation for why it could not have reasonably met the agreed-upon deadline. It is undisputed that BDI, as the manufacturer of the Snoozie slipper, at all times had in its possession the information necessary to properly plead the scope of its alleged trade dress protection. See Perfect Pearl Co. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (no good cause shown where “the proposed amendment rests on information that the party knew, or should have known, in advance of the deadline.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Likewise, BDI has no explanation for why it was unaware of the applicable Second Circuit pleading requirements for trade dress infringement, which were at all relevant times 20 HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. readily available. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint.