Opinion ID: 1903077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Method of Acquiring Possession of Foreclosed Property.

Text: The initial question before this Court is whether Empire pursued the correct procedure in its attempt to acquire actual possession of the property it purchased at foreclosure sale, the said sale having been subsequently ratified by the Circuit Court. In essence, Empire contends that there exists at least two available judicial means to acquire actual possession of property purchased in a foreclosure salepursuing a wrongful detainer action in the District Court under § 8-402.4 of the Real Property Article or filing a motion for possession in the Circuit Court under Maryland Rule 14-102(a). As we shall explain, the judicial route that Empire chose to assert a right to possession when the Hardys remained on the property subsequent to the ratification of the foreclosure sale in the Circuit Court, where the purchase price for the property has not been paid, the audit not approved and no conveyancing documents executed, delivered or recorded, i.e., a forcible entry and detainer action brought under § 8-402.4 of the Real Property Article, was incorrect and not available to gain actual possession of property purchased at a foreclosure sale. The method by which a purchaser at a foreclosure sale can seek to acquire actual possession of the property in the Circuit Court under the circumstances is made manifest in Maryland Rule 14-102(a), which states, in pertinent part: Rule 14-102. Judgment awarding possession. (a) Generally. Whenever the purchaser of an interest in real property at a sale conducted pursuant to these Rules is entitled to possession, and the person in actual possession fails or refuses to deliver possession, the purchaser may file a motion requesting the court to enter a judgment awarding possession of the property. For whatever reason, [2] Empire chose not to bring a motion under Maryland Rule 14-102(a) to the Circuit Court requesting that court to award it possession of the property it purchased at the foreclosure sale, instead attempting to acquire actual possession in the District Court via § 8-402.4 of the Real Property Article, which states, in pertinent part: § 8-402.4. Wrongful detainer. (a) `Wrongful detainer' defined. In this subtitle, `wrongful detainer' means to hold possession of a property without the right of possession. (b) Possession pursuant to entitlement under law. A person may not hold possession of property unless the person is entitled to possession of the property under the law. (c) Complaint; summons. (1) If a person other than a tenant holding over violates subsection (b) of this section, a person claiming possession may make complaint in writing to the District Court of the county in which the property is located. (2) On receipt of a complaint under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court shall summons immediately the person in possession to appear before the court on the day specified in the summons to show cause, if any, why restitution of the possession of the property to the person filing the complaint should not be made. . . . (e) Judgment of court; effect of personal service. (1) If the court determines that the complainant is legally entitled to possession, the court shall: (i) Give judgment for restitution of the possession of the property to the complainant; and (ii) Issue its warrant to the sheriff or constable commanding the sheriff or constable to deliver possession to the complainant. Empire argues that  § 8-402.4 [of the Real Property Article] gives the District Courts of Maryland the authority to grant possession of real property to the purchaser of property at the foreclosure sale upon ratification of the foreclosure sale, but prior to payment of the balance of the purchase price and execution of the Trustee's Deed. Determining whether Empire is correct requires this Court to examine the statute at issue. We commence our analysis of § 8-402.4 by attempting to ascertain the intent of the legislature. As we said in State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311(1998): We have said that `[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.' Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc. v. Mayor and City of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent. Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458; Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). . . . This Court recently stated that `statutory language is not read in isolation, but in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.' Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). To this end, `[w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed. . . . We may and often must consider other external manifestations or persuasive evidence, including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case.' `. . . [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d 51 (1987), . . . [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaningwhat Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as `the legislative scheme.' [ Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59. We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297. That context included, among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill. See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381, 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted). Id. at 717-19, 720 A.2d at 315-16 (some alterations in original); see also Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 115-17, 753 A.2d 41, 48-49 (2000); Riemer v. Columbia Medical Plan, 358 Md. 222, 235-36, 747 A.2d 677, 684-85 (2000); Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 357 Md. 586, 606-07, 745 A.2d 1054, 1065 (2000). Section 8-402.4 of the Real Property Article was enacted (as § 8-402.3) in 1999, by 1999 Md. Laws, Chap. 649. The law was passed as H.B. 605. The preamble paragraph in Chapter 649 [3] provides: AN ACT concerning Real PropertyLandlord-Tenant Actions FOR the purpose of revising provisions of law relating to landlords and tenants; clarifying the rent escrow procedures to be followed in certain landlord-tenant actions; providing miscellaneous requirements for lease option agreements, security deposits, landlords' receipts, and residential leases; clarifying the procedures to be followed in instances of retaliatory evictions; authorizing the court to award certain late fees and additional accruing installments of rent in certain summary ejectment actions; authorizing the court to enter judgments for unpaid rent under certain circumstances in certain tenant holding over actions; authorizing a tenant who has not been personally served with a summons to make a limited appearance in certain landlord-tenant actions without becoming subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court; providing that the acceptance of payment under certain circumstances shall not constitute a waiver of certain rights absent a specific written agreement to the contrary; defining certain terms; establishing procedures to be followed in wrongful detainer actions; establishing procedures to be followed where the title to real property is claimed to be disputed in a landlord-tenant action; clarifying the procedures to be followed when a party in certain landlord-tenant actions elects a trial by jury; authorizing the court to exercise injunctive powers in certain landlord-tenant actions, making technical and stylistic changes; and generally relating to the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants in actions involving landlords and tenants.  1999 Md. Laws, Chap. 649 (emphasis added). Chapter 649 makes it evident from the outset that the enactment primarily [4] concerns landlord-tenant actionsthe title Real PropertyLandlord-Tenant Actions was a part of the Act, moreover the Act provides that it was enacted FOR the purpose of revising provisions of law relating to landlords and tenants. . . . In the case sub judice, there is no allegation that Empire is acting in the capacity of a landlord and that those Empire seeks to remove from the purchased foreclosure property, the Hardys, exist as Empire's tenants on the property. Thus, here there existed no landlord-tenant relationship that could possibly have been subject to a forcible entry and detainer action brought under the purview of § 8-402.4 of the Real Property Article. Although the preamble paragraph of the enacted bill states, inter alia, that the statute at issue was enacted for the purpose of establishing procedures to be followed in wrongful detainer actions and the statute itself states that `wrongful detainer' means to hold possession of a property without the right of possession, § 8-402.4(a) of the Real Property Article, the statute primarily has effect in the context of a landlord-tenant relationship under the law. This is made even more obvious by the very existence of the aforementioned Maryland Rule 14-102, which speaks directly to the proper procedure an aggrieved purchaser at a foreclosure sale can take in the Circuit Court when the person in actual possession fails or refuses to deliver possession. . . . Maryland Rule 14-102(a). As we recently stated in Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 842 A.2d 773 (2004): When a mortgagor loses the right to possess foreclosed property but fails to vacate the premises, the purchaser of that property, in lieu of actually taking possession, may seek a court order to remove the holdover mortgagor. . . . Maryland Rule 14-102(a) provides the right to use judicial process to acquire actual possession of an occupied premises. . . . When the landowner receives such a judgment awarding possession, upon the landowner's request, the `clerk [of the court] shall issue a writ directing the sheriff to place [the landowner] in possession of the property.' Maryland Rule 3-647. Although this judicial process may be used to oust a mortgagor who no longer is entitled to possession, the use of the term `may' in Rule 14-102(a). . . reflects the fact that the ouster process is not mandatory to obtain possession of the purchased property. In other words, seeking the court's assistance in dispossessing the holdover mortgagor is only one option available to the purchaser to obtain possession from a holdover mortgagor. Failure to exercise that option does not undermine the mortgagee's ownership of the property nor the right to possession. Rather, a purchaser with the right to possess property may take possession of that property peacefully without the court's assistance. . . . The right of peaceable self-help, therefore, is a viable mechanism for a title owner of property to obtain actual possession of real property from a holdover mortgagor. Laney, 379 Md. at 541-43, 842 A.2d at 784-85 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Empire, in its brief, contends that Rule 14-102 does not require the purchaser to file a motion in the Circuit Court, but merely states that he may,  and that [t]his is entirely consistent with the right of a foreclosure purchaser to proceed concurrently in ejectment, and in the foreclosure case. It is pellucid that the method for a purchaser at a foreclosure sale to acquire actual possession from a holdover mortgagor prior to the approval of the audit, the payment of the purchase price and the delivery of the conveyancing documents, if the purchaser chooses to use the judicial process, is the method provided for in Maryland Rule 14-102 and not that of § 8-402.4 of the Real Property Article. We merely discussed in Laney (a criminal case addressing the Fourth Amendment implications of whether a holdover mortgagor, following a foreclosure, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises), that the use of the word may in the Rule indicates that, outside of the judicial process, peaceable self-help remedies can be pursued in order for a foreclosure sale purchaser to acquire actual possession. It does not mean, as Empire suggests, that alternate judicial means are available in the District Courts of this State wholly independent from Maryland Rule 14-102. Although Empire may seek to gain possession of the purchased property by filing a motion in the Circuit Court under Maryland Rule 14-102(a), it cannot under these circumstances seek the same result from the District Court under § 8-402.4 of the Real Property Article. [5]