Opinion ID: 2795014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application for a COA

Text: Ms. Neighbors must obtain a COA to pursue an appeal of the district court’s ruling on her motion to reconsider. See United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding a federal prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal a district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized second or successive motion under § 2255 for lack of jurisdiction); Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1218 (holding a COA is required to appeal the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in a habeas case). To obtain a COA, Ms. Neighbors must show both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Ms. Neighbors has not carried this burden. With respect to Ms. Neighbors’s claim that habeas counsel committed fraud in the habeas proceeding, the district court correctly treated this claim as a true Rule 60 claim. See Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1216 (holding that a motion asserting fraud or other defect in 5 the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding may constitute a true 60(b) motion). Once the district court construed Ms. Neighbors’s claim as a true Rule 60 claim, it had the authority to consider and reject it on the merits. See id. at 1217. We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60 claim for an abuse of discretion. See Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1342–43 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, Ms. Neighbors has not established that reasonable jurists would debate whether the district court’s decision to deny her Rule 60 claim of fraud by habeas counsel was an abuse of discretion. As the district court acknowledged, Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” or for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (b)(6). Likewise, Rule 60(d)(3) recognizes a court’s power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). The district court correctly rejected Ms. Neighbors’s claims under Rule 60(b) and (d) in this case. As the court correctly noted, the plain language of Rule 60(b)(3) requires that the fraud be committed by an opposing party, and there was nothing to indicate that habeas counsel’s conduct constituted an “extraordinary circumstance” that would otherwise justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (permitting a court to relieve a party from a final judgment where there is “fraud . . . by an opposing party”); Davis, 507 F.3d at 1248 (recognizing that relief “is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.”); cf. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1949) (concluding that relief was justified 6 under Rule 60(b)(6) where the petitioner was deprived of any reasonable opportunity to defend against the charges). The district court was also correct that Ms. Neighbors’s allegation that habeas counsel omitted certain claims from the memorandum of law does not constitute the type of fraud governed by Rule 60(d)(3). Even assuming habeas counsel’s filing of the memorandum was fraudulent, it was a fraud perpetrated on Ms. Neighbors, not the district court. See Buck, 281 F.3d at 1342 (“Fraud on the court . . . is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself . . . .”); Weese v. Shukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552–53 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[O]nly the most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated,” rises to the level of fraud on the court). Therefore, reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the district court’s resolution of Ms. Neighbors’s claims of fraud in the habeas proceeding and she is not entitled to a COA to appeal the district court’s decision on this issue. Likewise, Ms. Neighbors has not established that jurists of reason would debate that the district court properly dismissed Ms. Neighbors’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, speedy trial violations, the government’s failure to allege or establish net profits, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the loss amount, or fraud on the trial and appellate court. The district court correctly concluded that these claims are second or successive habeas claims because they all attacked the integrity of Ms. Neighbors’s underlying conviction and sentence rather than a procedural error in the habeas proceeding. See United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1147–49 (10th Cir. 2006) 7 (holding a Rule 60(b) motion is a second or successive § 2255 motion if it challenges the defendant’s conviction or sentence rather than a procedural error in the previous § 2255 proceeding). As the district court recognized, Ms. Neighbors’s motion to reconsider was devoted primarily to rearguing the underlying merits of these claims, and to the extent Ms. Neighbors also alleged government misconduct or fraud during the trial or on direct appeal, these claims also attack the integrity of the underlying criminal proceeding. See United States v. Baker, 718 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013) (“a motion alleging fraud on the court in a defendant’s criminal proceeding must be considered a second-orsuccessive collateral attack because it asserts or reasserts a challenge to the defendant’s underlying conviction”). Because the district court correctly construed these claims as second or successive habeas claims, it was required to dismiss them because it lacked the jurisdiction to consider them in the absence of certification from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (requiring a second or successive motion to be certified by the appropriate appellate court before it can be filed in the district court); Nelson, 465 F.3d at 1148 (“if the prisoner’s pleading must be treated as a second or successive § 2255 motion, the district court does not even have jurisdiction to deny the relief sought in the pleading”). For these reasons, Ms. Neighbors is not entitled to a COA to pursue her appeal challenging the district court’s denial in part and dismissal in part of her motion to reconsider. B. Application for Request to File a Second or Successive Petition Having decided Ms. Neighbors is not entitled to a COA to appeal the district court’s resolution of her motion to reconsider for lack of jurisdiction, we exercise our 8 discretion to treat her appeal as a petition for permission to file a second or successive petition. Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1219 n.8. In particular, we consider whether Ms. Neighbors should be permitted to pursue the following second or successive claims: (1) the government violated her right to a speedy trial and her appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue; (2) the government committed fraud on the trial and appellate court; (3) the government failed to establish net profits as an essential element of her money laundering conviction, and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the loss calculation used at sentencing. To receive authorization to file a successive application, Ms. Neighbors must show either (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Ms. Neighbors has failed to satisfy these requirements. With respect to her speedy trial and fraud on the trial and appellate court claims, Ms. Neighbors points to no newly discovered evidence that would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable jury would have found her guilty of the crimes charged, nor has she shown that either claim involves a new rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable to her case. Likewise, her loss calculation claim is targeted at the length of her sentence, not the validity of her conviction, and she has identified no 9 new rule of constitutional law that would retroactively apply here.4 Finally, Ms. Neighbors’s claim that the government failed to establish net profits as an essential element of her money laundering conviction does not present grounds to file a second or successive petition. As with her other claims, Ms. Neighbors directs our attention to no newly discovered evidence that would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found her guilty of money laundering. And the case to which she directs our attention, Santos, is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Santos was issued in 2008, prior to Ms. Neighbors’s conviction. In sum, even considering Ms. Neighbors’s combined opening brief and application for COA as a request for authorization to file a second or successive petition, we deny Ms. Neighbors permission to pursue these claims.