Opinion ID: 1129643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: is the controversy certified to this court justiciable?

Text: Closely related to the question of separation of powers is that of justiciability. The Supreme Court does not hear nonjusticiable controversies; nor should it give purely advisory opinions. Brehm v. Retail Food & Drug Clerks Union, 4 Wn.2d 98, 102 P.2d 685 (1940); Grill v. Meydenbauer Bay Yacht Club, 57 Wn.2d 800, 359 P.2d 1040 (1961); Hutchinson v. Port of Benton, 62 Wn.2d 451, 383 P.2d 500 (1963). Recently this court in State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn.2d 85, 436 P.2d 786 (1968), was asked to rule upon the constitutionality of a proposed initiative measure filed with the Secretary of State to call a state constitutional convention. Holding that, since the proposed measure had not yet been enacted by the people, the controversy thus posed was not justiciable and the decision sought would be an advisory opinion, we said: Ultimate questions as to the validity of the proposed initiative measure are not before us and should not come before us unless and until the people have enacted the measure into law, for the Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions. Even in National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wn.2d 14, 400 P.2d 778 (1965), and Deaconess Hosp. v. State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn.2d 378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965), where this court reviewed the first case after an intervening mootness and in the latter where a long and expensive trial had occurred in a county which some of the judges felt was without jurisdiction, the court asserted again that it does not render advisory opinions or decide purely theoretical controversies. There being before us no statute, or initiative measure enacted by the people, the proposed measure presents no justiciable controversy and we, therefore, do not pass upon its validity. Because the judicial power is reserved for judicial purposes only, the legislature cannot require of or impose upon the judiciary a duty to perform executive, administrative, legislative or political functions or to decide abstract questions of law. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 219. Therefore, if the statute brings nonjusticiable controversies before the court, it is unconstitutional as one imposing upon the court a function not embraced within but being clearly outside the judicial power. Likewise, a procedure which calls for decisions or pronouncements of academic, or theoretical, or philosophical, or, in some instances, possibly administrative and political questions, engenders nonjusticiable controversies and changes the function of this court from judicial to something else. Decisions falling within these realms belong to the executive and legislative branches of government and are thus outside the competence or jurisdiction of the judiciary. If the judgment of a court does not effectively operate upon or bind the parties to the action, or has only a theoretical rather than an actual effect upon them, or does not have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, it is not a justiciable controversy. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Dubuque, 68 Wn.2d 553, 413 P.2d 972 (1966). Nothing in the federal statutes, constitution or decisions has been brought to my attention which makes binding upon the federal courts our answer to their certified question. The district court remains free to apply our answer or to disregard it, or to apply it in part and to reject it in part. I do not suggest that the federal courts will abuse the certification procedure, or give our answer to the certified question other than the most careful and painstaking consideration, but this does not obscure the legal reality that the federal court may juridically regard our answer as neither binding upon it nor upon the parties to the action on trial. Nor do I know of any procedure whereby a litigant who, believing that a federal court had misapplied, misunderstood or declined to follow the answer to the certified question, can appeal to this court for a review or determination of those issues. I would not overlook either a probability in some instances that the moving party to a federal cause, having obtained a judicial opinion from this court, has the option to and will dismiss his case there, thus our opinion would be suspended in thin air, making of it a mere exercise in academics. It has long been the rule that, unless the Constitution of the United States or federal statutes otherwise require, The laws of the several states ... shall be regarded as the rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1 Stat. 73, 92, Sess. 1, ch. 20, § 34). Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 18 L.Ed.2d 886, 87 Sup. Ct. 1776 (1967). Judicial decisions are an integral part of the laws of the several states when announced by the highest state court ( Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 93 L.Ed. 1528, 69 Sup. Ct. 1221 (1949); King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 92 L.Ed. 608, 68 Sup. Ct. 488 (1948)), for the state's highest court is the best authority for state law. And, if there be no decision on the precise point in issue before the federal court, then, as the Supreme Court said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bosch, supra, citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 100 L.Ed. 199, 76 Sup. Ct. 273 (1956), federal authority must apply what it finds to be the state law after giving `proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court. These well-established rules, recognizing as they do the supremacy of state decisional law in state questions, do not, however, convert a federal case into a state case, nor would they make our answer determinative of the state question in the federal case. The Erie doctrine, in holding the decisions of the highest courts of the states to be binding upon the federal courts in civil cases, under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, does not thereby confer upon the state courts any fragment of jurisdiction or control over the parties to the federal action. Jurisdiction, under Erie, supra, thus cannot be said to be shared between the state and federal courts. Neither in a case involving diversity of citizenship in the federal courts nor under the present Certificate Procedure Act does this court have the power to intervene or render a final decision as to state law and make it binding upon the parties. Thus, I think the certificate procedure fails to present a justiciable controversy to this court within our constitutional requirements and would require of us an answer in the nature of an advisory opinion, for the judgment of this court becomes binding neither upon the federal court nor upon the parties to the action. Where a court entertains a legal question or determines a point of law without the requirements of justiciability, it is no longer, in my opinion, performing a judicial function, and I do not believe the legislature can, under our constitution, compel the courts to carry out nonjudicial functions.