Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Insufficiency of the Evidence for First Degree Murder

Text: Defendant contends his first degree murder conviction violates his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it is not supported by sufficient evidence. At trial, the prosecutor advanced two theories of first degree murder: premeditated and deliberate murder, and felony murder, with the further alternative for each theory that defendant was either a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor. Defendant contends the record contains insufficient evidence to support a conviction of first degree murder under any theory. As discussed below, we disagree.
Defendant argues the record contains insufficient evidence to convict him of first degree murder as the direct perpetrator. The relevant law is well established. ``[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceโthat is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valueโsuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'' ( People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 419.) The standard is the same under the state and federal due process clauses. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1082-1083 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].) We presume `in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.' ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015].) The prosecution's main evidence was Mercurio's testimony that defendant robbed and shot Gitmed. Defendant contends Mercurio's testimony of itself was insufficient to support his conviction as the direct perpetrator and that evidence of his actions after the shooting cannot support the conviction. Considered in isolation, he argues, his actions after the crime merely support the conclusion he was an accessory after the fact. We are not, however, limited to considering his postcrime actions in isolation. (7) In the context of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of premeditated and deliberate murder, we have noted that evidence of a defendant's attempts to conceal the crime by cleaning up the crime scene or telling false stories is highly probative of whether defendant committed the crime, but it does not bear upon the state of the defendant's mind at the time of the commission of the crime. ( People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 33 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942].) While our comment in Anderson thus warns against using evidence of a defendant's postcrime actions and statements as the sole support for upholding a finding of premeditated and deliberate murder, such postcrime actions and statements can support a finding that defendant committed a murder for which his specific mental state is established by his actions before and during the crime. In the week following the shooting, defendant, with Mercurio's help, methodically disposed of Gitmed's property. That defendant knew the location of and entry code to Gitmed's storage facility reasonably supports the inference he gained that information from Gitmed before the murder as part of a plan to obtain Gitmed's property after he killed him. Other postcrime evidence supports defendant's guilt as the actual perpetrator of the murder. Charlene Triplett saw defendant cleaning a gun, which supports the inference he had brought and used the gun that killed Gitmed. When after the shooting defendant returned to Michelle Keathley's house to retrieve his bicycle, he gave conflicting stories about Gitmed's whereabouts. When interviewed by the police on September 13, 1991, he acknowledged having met Gitmed at Michelle Keathley's house, but denied leaving the house with him. He told Barbara Triplett about a man floating in Canyon Lake who was not able to make decisions for himself, and boasted to Danny Dalton about leaving someone floating in the lake. Charlene Triplett heard defendant implore Mercurio to get Charlene and her family to go along with our story. Defendant's postcrime actions and statements clearly support the conclusion he was the direct perpetrator of the murder.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient that he premeditated Gitmed's murder because nothing in Mercurio's testimony established that he acted other than impulsively in shooting Gitmed. Defendant notes Mercurio testified he was surprised when he heard shots and, just before the shooting, defendant raised his voice in an increasing volume. Defendant contends the only reasonable conclusion this testimony supports is that he shot Gitmed in the anger of the moment. (8) We disagree. At best, defendant establishes only that, based on Mercurio's testimony, a reasonable jury could have concluded defendant shot the victim in anger and without premeditation. But as we have noted, [i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the reviewing court may not reverse the judgment merely because it believes that the circumstances might also support a contrary finding. ( People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55].) The evidence here reasonably supports a finding of premeditation. `Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. The test is not time, but reflection. `Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.'' ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 697 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640].) Mercurio testified that as defendant's voice grew louder and angrier, defendant was ordering Gitmed to take off his clothes. The jury reasonably could have inferred from these facts that, before shooting Gitmed, defendant had decided to rob him and, further, that he had decided to kill him after robbing him. Gitmed was killed by three gunshot wounds, one of which was immediately fatal. Mercurio testified defendant was just a few feet from Gitmed when he shot him. This manner of killing, a close-range shooting without any provocation or evidence of a struggle, reasonably supports an inference of premeditation and deliberation. ( People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 230 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222].) Other evidence at trial, moreover, reasonably supports the inference that defendant lured Gitmed to an isolated area to rob and kill him as part of a plan to obtain all his worldly possessions. Testimony at trial supports the inference that defendant had planned to kill Gitmed as early as when he convinced Gitmed to leave Michelle Keathley's house with him. Defendant had no car at that time and, as Eric Arias testified, defendant had previously offered Arias money to give him a ride to the Lake Elsinore area to collect a debt and mentioned he would be bringing a gun. After Arias backed out of the agreement, defendant made a similar offer to Gitmed, who accepted. A reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant, after persuading Gitmed to accompany him, planned to rob him and kill him for his car when the opportunity presented itself. A further reasonable inference is that defendant brought along the gun he had mentioned to Eric Arias. Testimony established that defendant persuaded Gitmed to drive to the Triplett compound, where Mercurio was staying. A reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant brought Gitmed to Mercurio, whom defendant had met in prison, in order to obtain Mercurio's assistance in committing the robbery and murder. Later that night, Mercurio drove defendant and Gitmed to an isolated area of Canyon Lake. A reasonable inference is that defendant had planned to get Gitmed to a remote area where he could carry out the robbery and murder without hindrance and without detection. (9) In sum, the record contains ample evidence to support defendant's conviction of first degree premeditated murder.
(10) One who unlawfully kills a human being during the commission of a robbery or an attempted robbery is guilty of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487]; งง 187, 189.) Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (ง 211.) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that, at the time of the shooting, Gitmed was in possession of any property or that defendant took any property from him. Defendant's argument ignores the substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the killing occurred during the commission of a robbery. Mercurio's testimony provided direct evidence that defendant took personal items from Gitmed before killing him. Mercurio testified that before the shooting defendant told Gitmed to take off his clothes, which he did, and that after the shooting defendant returned to the truck and threw some things into the back of it, including Gitmed's clothing and some small items that might have been Gitmed's wallet or some change. Gitmed's body was found with no shirt or jacket, which further supports the inference that personal items were taken from him. Defendant contends Mercurio's trial testimony establishing the robbery contradicted his testimony before the grand jury, which defense counsel read into the record as impeachment. However, Mercurio's grand jury testimony constituted, if anything, even stronger evidence that defendant had taken personal items from Gitmed. Before the grand jury, Mercurio testified that after defendant pointed a gun at Gitmed, Gitmed started taking off his clothes and removed items from his pockets, such as his wallet and change, and handed them to defendant, who placed them on the hood of the truck. Mercurio's grand jury testimony therefore did not conflict with his trial testimony; rather, it included some details (such as Gitmed's removing items from his pockets) that he did not recount at trial, but that were consistent with his trial testimony. Even if Mercurio's grand jury testimony was inconsistent, it was admitted for its truth. (See Evid. Code, ง 1235.) Therefore, whether the jury accepted Mercurio's trial testimony exclusively, his grand jury testimony exclusively, or a combination of both, the testimony provided substantial evidence that a robbery took place.
Defendant argues the record contains insufficient evidence to convict him as an aider and abettor to first degree murder on either a felony-murder or a premeditated-and-deliberate-murder theory. Because the jury found the allegation of personal gun use to be untrue, he contends, one or more jurors must have relied on an aider and abettor theory of liability, and the asserted insufficiency of the aider and abettor evidence therefore compels reversal. In the next part, we address and reject defendant's contentions about the significance of the jury's not true finding on the personal gun use allegation. In this part, we conclude the record discloses substantial evidence to support a conviction based on aider and abettor liability.
(11) Principals include those who aid and abet in the commission of a crime. (ง 31.) Aider and abettor liability is premised on the combined acts of all the principals, but on the aider and abettor's own mens rea. ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].) We have defined the required mental states and acts for aiding and abetting as: (a) the direct perpetrator's actus reusโa crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens reaโknowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor's actus reusโconduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime. ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 423, 113 P.3d 100].) Under the felony-murder rule, an accomplice is liable for killings occurring while the killer was acting in furtherance of a criminal purpose common to himself and the accomplice, or while the killer and the accomplice were jointly engaged in the felonious enterprise. ( People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 719 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d 1235].) In order to support defendant's conviction as an aider and abettor, therefore, the record must contain substantial evidence that (a) Mercurio committed the robbery (the perpetrator's actus reus), (b) defendant knew Mercurio's intent to rob and intended to assist in the robbery (the aider and abettor's mens rea), and (c) defendant engaged in acts that assisted the robbery (the aider and abettor's actus reus). As discussed above, the condition of Gitmed's body supports the inference a robbery took place. Mercurio's testimony stands as direct evidence that defendant committed the robbery, but it also provides circumstantial evidence that Mercurio could have committed the robbery, because it establishes that Mercurio was with Gitmed and defendant when Gitmed was robbed and killed. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Circumstantial Evidence, ง 2, p. 322 [testimony may be direct evidence of one fact, but also circumstantial evidence of another fact].) In his testimony, Mercurio cast himself in the best possible light, stating he was completely ignorant of defendant's plan to rob and kill and was shocked when it happened. But other evidence at trial supports the inference that Mercurio was an accomplice in the robbery and shooting. In their testimony, Danny Dalton and Charlene Triplett described Mercurio as an all-too-willing and apparently equal participant with defendant in obtaining and disposing of Gitmed's property after the shooting. Although their testimony does not speak to whether Mercurio was the shooter, it is consistent with the conclusion that Mercurio was more involved in the crime than he testified and that he may have been an accomplice with defendant in the robbery and murder. Defendant contends there is no such thing as aiding and abetting each other and, therefore, absent direct evidence Mercurio shot Gitmed, the evidence is insufficient to convict defendant as an aider and abettor. Defendant argues that even assuming Mercurio was the actual shooter, no evidence supports the conclusions that defendant knew Mercurio was going to rob Gitmed, that defendant himself harbored the intent to deprive Gitmed of his property, or that defendant did anything to aid Mercurio in accomplishing the robbery. We disagree. As we have stated, a sharp line does not always exist between the direct perpetrator and the aider and abettor: It is often an oversimplification to describe one person as the actual perpetrator and the other as the aider and abettor. When two or more persons commit a crime together, both may act in part as the actual perpetrator and in part as the aider and abettor of the other, who also acts in part as an actual perpetrator. . . . [O]ne person might lure the victim into a trap while another fires the gun; in a stabbing case, one person might restrain the victim while the other does the stabbing. In either case, both participants would be direct perpetrators as well as aiders and abettors of the other. The aider and abettor doctrine merely makes aiders and abettors liable for their accomplices' actions as well as their own. It obviates the necessity to decide who was the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each played which role. ( People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120.) The same evidence discussed above as supporting the conclusion that defendant premeditated the robbery and killing also supports the conclusion that defendant and Mercurio were coperpetrators in the robbery and killing. The evidence reasonably supports the inference that, after defendant brought Gitmed to the compound, Mercurio and defendant jointly maneuvered to bring him to an isolated spot at Canyon Lake where both participated in the robbery and murder. Regardless of whether one concludes the actual shooter was defendant or Mercurio, the evidence supports the conclusion the two were coperpetrators in the crimes. (See People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120.) And regardless of who was the actual shooter, the evidence reasonably supports the inference that defendant assisted the robbery and murder by providing the gun; as Eric Arias testified, defendant had said he was going to bring a gun and, as Charlene Triplett testified, defendant was cleaning a gun the day after the shooting.
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports his first degree murder conviction based on the theory he aided and abetted Mercurio in committing premeditated murder. Defendant contends the evidence shows, at most, that he willingly went along with Mercurio and Gitmed for a ride in the truck, but had no idea Mercurio intended to kill Gitmed. We disagree. The substantial evidence supporting defendant's guilt as an aider and abettor to premeditated murder is essentially the same as that supporting the theory he aided and abetted the felony murder. As discussed in detail in the previous part, the evidence reasonably supports the inference that defendant intentionally maneuvered Gitmed into going to an isolated area where defendant and Mercurio carried out their plan to rob and kill him. Assuming defendant was not the actual shooter, the evidence reasonably supports the inferences that he acted as an accomplice to a premeditated murder and that he supplied the gun used to commit the murder.
As noted, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, but found not true the personal gun use allegation. Defendant contends this split verdict shows that one or more jurors must have rejected his guilt as the actual shooter and instead found him guilty as an aider and abettor. Because there was insufficient evidence for the aider and abettor theory, he argues, his conviction must be reversed. In the previous part, we rejected defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict him as an aider and abettor. But even were we to assume the evidence was insufficient, the split verdict does not show that the jury relied on an aider and abettor theory. Where the jury considers both a factually sufficient and a factually insufficient ground for conviction, and it cannot be determined on which ground the jury relied, we affirm the conviction unless there is an affirmative indication that the jury relied on the invalid ground. ( People v. Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 233.) We review the entire record in determining whether there is such an affirmative indication. ( People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45].) In People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 884 P.2d 81], we considered what implications could be drawn from a split verdict in determining whether an issue had been necessarily decided for the purposes of collateral estoppel. ( Id. at p. 917.) In Santamaria, the defendant was charged with murder, a robbery-murder special circumstance, and the allegation that he had personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. The main witness was a companion who had been charged with and convicted of being an accessory to the murder. ( Id. at pp. 908-909.) The jury convicted the defendant of murder and robbery and found true the special circumstance, but found not true the personal knife use allegation. ( Id. at p. 909.) The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding prejudicial error in an 11-day continuance the trial court had granted during deliberations. The issue on retrial was whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented the prosecutor from proceeding again on the theory that the defendant was the direct perpetrator, since the first jury had found the personal knife use allegation to be untrue. ( Ibid. ) We held collateral estoppel did not preclude retrial on a direct perpetrator theory because the not true verdict on the personal knife use allegation was of far less significance than the defendant had contended. ( People v. Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 919.) We explained: It shows only that there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that defendant specifically used a knife. It does not show the reverse, that the jury specifically found defendant was an aider and abettor . . . . The jury may merely have believed, and most likely did believe, that defendant was guilty of murder as either a personal knife user or an aider and abettor but it may have been uncertain exactly which role defendant played. That, too, would fully explain, and necessitate, the split verdict. ( Ibid. ) Although defendant's claim does not involve collateral estoppel, our observations in Santamaria apply to his contention that the jury's failure to sustain the personal gun use allegation is an affirmative indication it relied on an aider and abettor theory to convict him of murder. As in Santamaria, the jury in defendant's case likely believed defendant was guilty of murder either as the actual shooter or as an aider and abettor, but may have been uncertain as to the exact role he played. As previously discussed, the evidence reasonably supports the inference that both Mercurio and defendant planned and carried out the robbery and murder. Mercurio placed all the blame on defendant, but from the other evidence presented at trial the jury could reasonably have inferred Mercurio was a coperpetrator in the crimes. The jury's uncertainty as to the exact roles each played could explain its failure to sustain the gun use allegation. The jury's finding on the gun use allegation does not necessarily demonstrate it based its murder verdict on an aider and abettor theory. ( People v. Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 233.)
In a claim related to his contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on an aider and abettor theory, defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting because the evidence supported a conviction only on a direct perpetrator theory. Because we reject defendant's contention the evidence was insufficient to convict him on an aider and abettor theory, we also reject this related argument.
(12) Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument by misstating the law and the evidence. A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal Constitution when they infect the trial with such `unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' ( Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464]; see People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 733 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. [Citation.] In order to preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for review. ( People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1328 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 433, 163 P.3d 118]; see People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673].) When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor's comments before the jury, `the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171].) Defendant acknowledges trial counsel failed to object to any of the asserted misconduct he now raises, and he fails to indicate why an admonition would not have cured the asserted harm. His claims therefore are forfeited for purposes of appeal. [14] Furthermore, as we conclude below, were we to excuse this forfeiture and address the substance of his claims, we would find them meritless because no misconduct occurred. Defendant complains of the prosecutor's statements regarding his culpability as an aider and abettor to felony murder, such as: All that needs to be proven is that the defendant was involved in a robbery and that someone was killed during the course of the robbery. Defendant contends the prosecutor's use of the term involved set a lower bar for his culpability and lightened the prosecutor's burden of proof. We disagree. The prosecutor did not purport to give the jury a definition of aiding and abetting that was different from the one the court had just given. The court had instructed that [a] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the crime, by act or advice, promotes, encourages, or instigates the commission of the crime. The court further instructed that [m]ere presence at the scene of the crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to aiding and abetting. Viewed within the context of his entire argument, the prosecutor's discussion of defendant's liability as an aider and abettor to felony murder was consistent with the instructions the trial court gave. There was no reasonable likelihood the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 960.) Defendant also contends the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence. In discussing the apparent senselessness of the murder, the prosecutor distinguished between understanding a motive for the murder and understanding why anyone would have committed such a cruel and senseless act. The prosecutor stated that defendant's apparent motive for the robbery was that he wanted Gitmed's possessions, such as the car and the duffel bag, but recognition of that apparent motive does not make the crime any less senseless. Defendant objects to the prosecutor's reference to the car and the bag, because these items were in defendant's possession after the shooting and no evidence established that he took either from Gitmed's immediate presence during the robbery. The prosecutor, however, was not arguing that the car and bag were items taken during the robbery but, rather, that defendant's apparent motive was his desire to take Gitmed's possessions, including those, such as the car and the bag, that were not on his person at the time of the robbery. As discussed above in connection with the sufficiency of the evidence to support premeditated murder, this was a reasonable characterization of the evidence.
In a contention related to his claim of insufficiency of the evidence, defendant argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to exclude evidence that police found a wallet in defendant's room during the September 25, 1991, search of his mother's house. Defendant contends evidence of the wallet was irrelevant under Evidence Code section 350 or was more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352 and, if defense counsel had moved to exclude it under these grounds, the trial court would have been compelled to grant the motion. (13) To establish a violation of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient when measured against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice to defendant in the sense that it `so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169], quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686.) Preliminarily, we note that rarely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267-268 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].) On this record we see none. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile motions. ( People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 843 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305].) Contrary to defendant's contention that the wallet was irrelevant because no evidence showed it belonged to Gitmed, Marc Brendlin, Thompson's son, provided testimony from which the jury could have inferred the wallet belonged to Gitmed. Brendlin testified that a wallet containing business cards but no identification was among the items defendant left at Thompson's house. Brendlin moved the items to Churder's house along with Gitmed's duffel bag and jacket. Because the jury could reasonably have inferred the wallet thus belonged to Gitmed, counsel was not remiss in failing to object to the wallet's admission into evidence.