Opinion ID: 211217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Regulatory Construction

Text: 17 Next, we turn to the proper construction of the regulation Gose is accused of violating. As a general rule, we must defer to an agency's interpretations of the regulations it promulgates, as long as the regulation is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation. See Gonzales v. Oregon, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 904, 914, 163 L.Ed.2d 748 (2006) (An administrative rule may receive substantial deference if it interprets the issuing agency's own ambiguous regulation. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997))); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (In Auer, we held that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference. But Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.) (citations omitted); Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410, 413-14, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945) ([In] an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. . . . Our only tools, therefore, are the plain words of the regulation and any relevant interpretations of the Administrator.); cf. Lacavera, 441 F.3d at 1383 (holding that `an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference and will be accepted unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.') (quoting Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2005)). 18 We defer even more broadly to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations than to its interpretation of statutes, because the agency, as the promulgator of the regulation, is particularly well suited to speak to its original intent in adopting the regulation. See Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363-64 (Fed.Cir.2005) ([I]t is well settled that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to broad deference from the courts. Deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is broader than deference to the agency's construction of a statute, because in the latter case the agency is addressing Congress's intentions, while in the former it is addressing its own.) (citations omitted); Am. Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that because we are not dealing with an agency's interpretation of a statute and issues of Chevron deference, but with the IRS's interpretation of an ambiguous term in its own Revenue Procedure . . . substantial deference is paid to an agency's interpretations reflected in informal rulings). 19 Consequently, deference is appropriate even if other interpretations of the regulation may accord somewhat better with the regulatory language than does the Secretary's interpretation. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (The Secretary's interpretation of the anti-redistribution principle is thus far more consistent with the regulation's unqualified language than the interpretation advanced by the petitioner. But even if this were not so, the Secretary's construction is, at the very least, a reasonable one, and we are required to afford it `controlling weight.' (citing Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215) (emphasis added)). 20 Deference is particularly appropriate when the agency interpretation has been consistently applied. See Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105, 91 S.Ct. 1319, 28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971) ([S]ince the meaning of the language [of the regulation] is not free from doubt, we are obligated to regard as controlling a reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation if the Government's be such. (citing Immigration Serv. v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72, 89 S.Ct. 1519, 23 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 276, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413-14, 65 S.Ct. 1215) (emphasis added))); see also Seminole Rock at 417-18, 65 S.Ct. 1215 (Any doubts concerning this interpretation of [the regulation] are removed by reference to the administrative construction. . . [as evidenced by] a bulletin issued by the Administrator concurrently with the . . . Regulation[,] . . . his First Quarterly Report to Congress . . . [and] in the countless explanations and interpretations given to inquirers affected by this type of maximum price determination.). 21 Conversely, an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is `entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view . . . . Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 515, 114 S.Ct. 2381 (emphasis added) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981))). Watt in turn cites General Electric Co. v. Gilbert; Gilbert provides a link to Skidmore deference. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976) (We have declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency. In short, while we do not wholly discount the weight to be given the 1972 guideline, it does not receive high marks when judged by the standards enunciated in Skidmore, supra.) (citations omitted) (referring to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). Just as an agency's inconsistent interpretation of its regulation detracts from the deference we owe to that interpretation, so does evidence that the proffered interpretation runs contrary to the intent of the agency at the time of enactment of the regulation. See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430, 108 S.Ct. 1306, 99 L.Ed.2d 515 (1988) ([W]hen it is the Secretary's regulation that we are construing, and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation. ) (emphases added). 22 Legitimate agency interpretations may be made even during the very administrative determination that has become the subject of review. See Cathedral Candle, 400 F.3d at 1364 (That generous degree of deference is due to an agency interpretation of its own regulations even when that interpretation is offered in the very litigation in which the argument in favor of deference is made. (citing Auer, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79)). However, the interpretation must truly be one that had been applied by the agency, either prior to or, at the latest, during the exercise of its administrative powers in the present matter. An interpretation is therefore not a position advanced by the agency for the first time before the Board or in a court of review. Such an interpretation is then no more than a litigation position to which no deference is due. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) ([W]e have declined to give deference to an agency counsel's interpretation of a statute where the agency itself has articulated no position on the question, on the ground that `Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.' (quoting Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971))); id. at 213, 109 S.Ct. 468 (Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.); Investment Co., 401 U.S. at 628, 91 S.Ct. 1091 (It is the administrative official and not appellate counsel who possesses the expertise that can enlighten and rationalize the search for the meaning and intent of Congress.); see also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962) (The courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action; Chenery requires that an agency's discretionary order be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself . . . . (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947))). Nonetheless, the standard for deference is often easily met. See, e.g., Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (finding that [t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation [offered by an agency in a legal brief] does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question). 23 Finally, the interpretation either has to be that of the Secretary or properly imputed to him in some way. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S at 517, 114 S.Ct. 2381 (implying that deference might be improper if the Secretary's fiscal intermediary had displayed a contrary understanding of the regulation and if petitioner could show that such [action] was approved by — or even brought to the attention of — the Secretary or her designate at the time).