Opinion ID: 2326772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Use of Blue Tinted Sunglasses and the Reference to a Blue Code of Silence

Text: We first address the defendant's claim regarding the state's attorney's use of the blue tinted sunglasses and his related reference to a blue code of silence. As we noted previously in this opinion, the state's attorney held up a pair of blue tinted sunglasses during his initial closing argument to symbolize what he believed to be the unwillingness of some of the police officers to report and to testify truthfully about what they had witnessed because to do so would criminally implicate the defendant, a fellow officer. In particular, the state's attorney asserted that those officers had viewed the defendant's misconduct through blue tinted [sun]glasses. A police officer has a code. Don't ask me why, but there's a code: avoid ratting on a brother officer. And some of them did that that night, either consciously or unconsciously. They didn't want to see what was going on behind the truck. The state's attorney also argued that only the rookie officers had testified truthfully about what they had observed because those officers, in contrast to the veteran officers, were not yet steeped in this blue code.... The state contends that the state's attorney's conduct was not improper. In support of its assertion, the state maintains that the state's attorney never suggested or implied that the blue tinted sunglasses actually were a part of the record and, moreover, the state's attorney's reference to the blue code of silence was tied to the evidence adduced at trial. With respect to the defendant's claim regarding the blue tinted sunglasses, we are not persuaded that the state's attorney's use of those sunglasses, standing alone, necessarily was improper. Of course, counsel must refrain from injecting into closing argument extraneous matters unsupported by the record, and counsel's use, during closing argument, of props that are not in evidence creates a risk of diverting the jury's attention to facts or issues not properly before it. Nevertheless, counsel is entitled to considerable leeway in deciding how best to highlight or to underscore the facts, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, for which there is adequate support in the record. We therefore never have categorically barred counsel's use of such rhetorical devices, be they linguistic or in the form of visual aids, as long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the particular device employed will confuse the jury or otherwise prejudice the opposing party. Indeed, to our knowledge, no court has erected a per se bar to the use of visual aids by counsel during closing arguments. On the contrary, the use of such aids is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 197-98, 515 S.E.2d 610 (1999) (trial court properly allowed prosecutor to use bag of sugar, which was not introduced into evidence, to demonstrate relatively small amount of force necessary to pull trigger of murder weapon); People v. Dowds, 253 Ill.App.3d 955, 956-58, 192 Ill.Dec. 723, 625 N.E.2d 878 (1993) (in drunk driving case, trial court properly allowed prosecutor to use beer mug and large pitcher, which were not admitted into evidence, to demonstrate, consistent with evidence adduced at trial, amount of beer that defendant allegedly had consumed); Commonwealth v. Nol, 39 Mass.App. 901, 901-902, 652 N.E.2d 898 (1995) (in robbery case, trial court properly allowed prosecutor to use his own handkerchief as mask during closing argument for purpose of rebutting defense counsel's contention that identification of defendant as masked perpetrator was necessarily unreliable); Commonwealth v. Twilley, 417 Pa.Super. 511, 518-19, 612 A.2d 1056 (1992) (trial court reasonably permitted prosecutor to display baseball bat and beer bottle during closing arguments, even though those two items had not been introduced into evidence, because evidence regarding manner in which alleged assault occurred demonstrated that defendant had used either baseball bat or beer bottle). Because there is nothing inherently prejudicial or unduly distracting about a pair of blue tinted sunglasses, and because the state's attorney did not purport to use those sunglasses for the purpose of filling an evidentiary gap in the state's case, we do not believe that the use of the sunglasses, without more, necessarily was improper, even though they had not been introduced into evidence. [27] We do not consider the propriety of the state's attorney's display of the blue tinted sunglasses in a vacuum, however. Rather, his use of the sunglasses was inextricably linked to his argument regarding the purported blue code of silence. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the comments of the state's attorney about the blue code of silence were improper. Inasmuch as the state's attorney's use of the blue tinted sunglasses served to highlight that improper argument, the use of the sunglasses in that context also was improper. Turning to the comments regarding the blue code of silence, we note that the state did not adduce any evidence at trial that such a code existed among police officers. Consequently, the state's attorney's assertion concerning the existence of such a code, as well as his contention that some of the police officers who had witnessed the defendant's alleged assault of Wilson had acted in conformity with that code, amounted to improper unsworn testimony. Statements as to facts that have not been proven amount to unsworn testimony, which is not the subject of proper closing argument. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 400, 832 A.2d 14 (2003). [W]hen a prosecutor suggests a fact not in evidence, there is a risk that the jury may conclude that he or she has independent knowledge of facts that could not be presented to the jury. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The state's attorney's reference to the blue code of silence, therefore, gave rise to an unacceptable risk that the jury would assume that the state's attorney had personal knowledge that such a code existed and, further, that the conduct and testimony of certain of the officers who were present at the scene were the product of that code. Moreover, as we have explained, the state's attorney's display of the blue tinted sunglasses served both to dramatize and to highlight the state's attorney's improper comments. The state contends that the comments about a blue code of silence were not improper because those comments were based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Specifically, the state maintains that it would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that several of the officers who arrived at the scene deliberately went to the front of Wilson's truck in a calculated effort to avoid seeing the beating that allegedly was taking place at the rear of the truck. We agree with the state that the evidence supported such an inference and, in fact, the state's attorney made that very argument in rebuttal. [28] In asserting the existence of a blue code of silence, however, the state's attorney did more than argue reasonable inferences from the facts: he explained the veteran officers' conduct in terms of a purported sociological phenomenon for which there was no evidentiary support. In light of that argument, there is a likelihood that the jury gave greater weight to the state's attorney's explanation than was warranted by the evidence. 2