Opinion ID: 1115282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the larrison-berry alternative tests generally used

Text: The majority decision abandons the historical standard followed by this court after adoption in Opie called the Berry rule [3] by creating in part a hybrid Berry concept and, in part, a mutation of Larrison, which this court has at least in recent years refused to accept. [4] Berry is identical with Opie and is generally differentiated by its criteria of probable effect on the jury verdict, while Larrison in that regard sets the criteria as  might have reached a different conclusion. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87. The examination perspective is different since Berry considers a future jury while Larrison contemplates what the prior jury might otherwise have done. At least within the scope of a multitude of succeeding cases, the overt difference is the might concept of Larrison compared to the probable concept of Berry. The system difference is fact finding: assumed by the trial court to determine the ultimate issue or retained for trial jury to resolve. This difference between Berry and Larrison does not, however, define what has occurred in the mutative hybrid now created by this court. There is what I would contend to be a preliminary examination required of the trial court to answer a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, whether recanted testimony or otherwise. Involved in first consideration is the circumstance and textual validity and credibility of the newly addressed evidence to justify first a hearing or then a new trial. Berry in itself did not establish an evidentiary or process standard within the criteria for a new trial except as to the conditions relating to the nature of the trial process, e.g., material, not accumulative or newly discovered; none of which really addressed the question of intrinsic credibility and validity. As Berry has developed, the concept emplaced has been reasonable credibility of the new testimony considering both circumstance and text. This criteria is especially applicable to recanted evidence because of the variant nature of perjury then, now or both times. Larrison to the contrary, although not directly stated, came to stand for a test of validity which directed itself to the original testimony  [that] the court [be] reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false. Comment, Gary Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 Emory L.J. 969, 975 (1986) (quoting Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87-88). An additional difference in the two standards is the extent of knowledge of the evidence which the judge must impute to the jury in determining whether to grant the new trial motion. It has been suggested that many cases implicitly recognize that in determining whether the Larrison might standard is met, a judge must consider whether a different verdict might result if the recanted testimony was eliminated altogether from the jury's consideration. In other words, the hypothetical jury to which the judge makes reference would have no knowledge whatsoever of the testimony which was later recanted. On the other hand, in determining whether the probability standard of Berry is met, the judge assumes that this hypothetical jury has before it both the original testimony and the later recantation. The distinction between the two tests apparently flows from the language used in Larrison's second requirement: [t]hat without it [the original testimony] the jury might have reached a different conclusion. This difference is a notable one, in that the Larrison test places full responsibility for the determination of the credibility of the witness's recantation with the judge rather than with the jury. While Berry suggests that the hypothetical jury would have before it precisely the same evidence, including the recantation, that is before the judge, and hence might choose to believe or disbelieve the witness, Larrison's elimination of all of the controverted testimony from the jury's consideration has the effect of taking the choice from the jury. Although the determination of credibility is traditionally left to the jury, Larrison thus places it entirely within the judge's province. Berry, on the other hand, leaves the final determination with the jury, but nonetheless requires the judge to make a preliminary evaluation of credibility, in that the motion is to be granted only if the judge finds it probable that the jury will reach a different result on retrial. Implicit in a ruling on that probability is a determination of whether the jury is likely to believe the witness. When the two tests are analyzed in this manner, it becomes evident that the greater leniency of the Larrison test may be more illusory than real. Larrison does provide a less demanding standard that does Berry  might versus probable  regarding the degree of certainty that a judge must have in the likelihood of a different result on retrial. But this easing of the standard is counterbalanced by Larrison's further requirement that the judge first be convinced of the truthfulness of the recantation. Berry, conversely, appears to require more certainty that a different result would ensue, but does not require that the judge be as sure of the truthfulness of the recantation. The tests seem equally exacting; the difference is that Berry is more demanding regarding the probative value of the recantation while Larrison emphasizes the credibility of the witness. Hence, the two tests in actuality may present nearly equivalent hurdles to a defendant requesting a new trial. Id. at 977-78 (footnotes omitted and emphasis in original). [5] In practical usage within the case law, and particularly so where the Larrison reasonably satisfied concept has now been converted as is in this case to an is true concept, is the emplaced function of court and jury in the decisional process. Credibility in Berry is not so far removed from the concept of summary judgment and directed verdict while the reasonably satisfied or is true concept of Larrison contemplates a subjective examination by the trial court to make a determinative finding of fact. With a somewhat reasonable equivalency in operation, although obviously differing in effect on specific factual circumstances, Berry defined credibility and probable effect and Larrison defined reasonably true and might effect. This court takes the probable effect from Berry and the trial court finding of true from Larrison as a hybrid. In result, the jury function is erased and for the new trial to be granted, the trial court has to determine contrary to the prior verdict that in fact the accused should be acquitted under the present status of newly presented evidence. In particular, in a recanted evidence case, the resulting effect is to deny any access, except in a millennium kind of case, for a right to a new trial based on perjured evidence. The boundaries of application are drawn to destroy the remedy which was explicitly provided by this court's rules of procedure. The present majority opinion is not a grant of new trial issue review, but instead constitutes a decision mandating automatic rejection of any application for a new trial. The reasonable opportunity of the jury to reassess guilt in the context of the recanted evidence is also foreclosed. Tiersma, The Language of Perjury: Literal Truth, Ambiguity, and the False Statement Requirement, 63 S.Cal.L.Rev. 373 (1990). The recanted cases have a particular nastiness because of the embedded perjury  one time or another. By the overreaching mistake now made, this majority attacks the entire concept of our rules for new trials, W.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) and 60(b) and W.R.Cr.P. 34, where contended injustice has occurred and particularly because of infliction of perjury into the process. By this action, the majority abandons its historical and constitutional requirement relating to the jury fact finding responsibility by the perversion of that power and responsibility through assignment instead to the trial court. In my personal persuasion, I would find this approach to also excuse and accommodate perjury which, by all expert analysis excluding only performance of counsel, stands as the most pervasive obstruction to the adequate operation of the justice delivery system. The case law on the subject of motions for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is astronomical, with some thirty or more Wyoming cases included. Wyoming, now for the first time in this case, posits itself almost totally alone or perhaps two other states where, with close examination, we find that the citations of authority in the majority neither fit into the body of national law nor accord with this state's historical precedent. Absolutely no prior Wyoming case utilized the test now adopted which is best characterized as a Larrison-Berry hybrid mutation.