Opinion ID: 606103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery of Stolen Computer Software During The Search

Text: Of The Hard Drive 7 Mr. Lyons claims that the discovery of the computer software was the product of an unreasonable search. Our analysis of this question raises but one issue: whether Mr. Lyons had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the hard drive. Although the district court did not base its denial of the motion to suppress on this ground, the facts as they pertain to this inquiry are uncontroverted and we consider this threshold inquiry de novo. See United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (10th Cir.1990). 8 After being seized by law enforcement authorities, the stolen hard disks along with other items of seized personal property were taken to the FBI evidence room. A few days later, a UNISYS employee, while performing an inventory of the items seized, searched the contents of the disks and discovered proprietary software. 9 Because Fourth Amendment rights are personal, Mr. Lyons, as the proponent of the motion to suppress, had the burden of proving that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search in question. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424-26, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1552-53 (10th Cir.1993). A search only violates a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights if a defendant demonstrates that he or she had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the property searched, and if the defendant establishes that society would recognize that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580-81, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). Because expectations of privacy derive in part from the right to exclude others from the property in question, lawful possession is an important consideration in determining whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, i.e. the hard disks. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430-31 n. 12; United States v. Abreu, 935 F.2d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 271, 116 L.Ed.2d 224 (1991). 10 Those portions of the record furnished by the parties in their appendices reflect that no attempt was made to show that Mr. Lyons had any rightful claim to the hard disks that were seized pursuant to the warrant. See United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir.1990) (although legal documentation of lawful possession not always required, proponent of motion to suppress must at least state that he gained possession from the owner or someone with the authority to grant possession), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1318, 113 L.Ed.2d 251 (1991). In the absence of any evidence of any right or interest in these items, Mr. Lyons has failed to meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating an expectation of privacy in the property searched. Under the circumstances presented, Mr. Lyons demonstrated no actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, in the absence of such a showing, we do not reach the issue of whether an expectation of privacy in the hard disks would have been objectively reasonable. See United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d 584, 587 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2037, 114 L.Ed.2d 121 (1991); United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788, 791 (10th Cir.1984). We affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. 11