Opinion ID: 524251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to Statutory Authority.

Text: 37 Petitioners' fundamental contention is that Section 201(c)(7) of the Act [e]clusively[ ] [p]rescibes earth station ownership qualifications, thereby precluding the FCC from licensing a transmit/receive earth station to any entity other than Comsat or another common carrier. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 19, 31, 35; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 19. Reuters contends that Section 201(c)(7) is addressed to only a limited type of earth station (e.g., multipurpose earth stations) and does not limit the Commission's Title III authority to license to non-common carriers earth stations providing IBS or INTELNET II service. 6 In the challenged ruling, the Commission advanced a similar theory: The Act addresses only large satellite terminal stations which would be built as part of the global satellite system and which would become an integral part of the terrestrial networks of the U.S. common carriers, and does not, nor was it intended to, address private stations, which Congress did not foresee as technically feasible. Declaratory Ruling, 3 FCC Rcd at 1587 para. 15, 1588 para. 17 (citation omitted). 38 To restate the familiar, our review of the Commission's construction of the Act, congressionally entrusted to its administration, requires that we first ask whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (footnote omitted). See also NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 413, 421, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 (1987) (when presented with a pure question of statutory construction, a court's first job is to try to determine congressional intent using 'traditional tools of statutory construction' ) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1221, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). We turn initially, as we must, to the Act's language. 39
40
41 Section 201(c)(7) requires the Commission to grant appropriate authorizations for the construction and operation of each satellite terminal station, either to the corporation or to one or more authorized carriers or to the corporation and one or more such carriers jointly, as will best serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 721(c)(7) (emphasis added). Section 103(2), in turn, defines satellite terminal station in relevant part as a complex of communication equipment ... operationally connected with one or more terrestrial communication systems, and capable of transmitting telecommunications to or receiving telecommunications from a communications satellite system. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 702(2) (emphasis added). Neither operationally connected nor terrestrial communications system is defined by the Act; nor for that matter was the language part of the version originally passed by the House, H.R. 11040, which defined satellite terminal station as the complex of communications equipment located on the earth's surface which receives from or transmits to terrestrial communication systems for relay via communications satellites. See H.Rep. No. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1962). The Senate Committee on Commerce added the language. Although it offered no explanation for the alteration, the Committee stated that operationally connected was intended to include connection by wire or radio between the terrestrial system, on the one hand, and the terminal station on the other hand, whether or not such terminal station is a fixed or mobile station. S.Rep. No. 1584, supra, at 14, 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2276. 42 The additional language invites the inference that Congress determined only the ownership rights to a certain class of earth station, namely those that were operationally connected with one or more terrestrial communication systems. Thus, the argument runs, Section 201(c)(7) does not apply to earth stations that are not operationally connected with one or more terrestrial communications systems. Stated otherwise, if Congress intended all earth stations to be owned only by Comsat or other common carriers the added language would be rendered superfluous. 43 The Commission adopted this position in the challenged ruling, concluding that the Commerce Committee Report made it clear that [terrestrial communications systems] was intended to refer to the 'domestic network of a common carrier.'  Declaratory Ruling, 3 FCC Rcd at 1587 para. 14 & 1589 n. 14 (citing S.Rep. No. 1584, supra, at 12, 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2274). The FCC noted that it had previously held that the phrase terrestrial communications systems as used in Section 103(2) refers to the networks of the then-existing U.S. international common carriers (AT & T and the [International Record Carriers]. Id. para. 14 (citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, Proposed Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, 2 F.C.C.2d 658, 663 (1966)). 44
45 Relying on the Act's legislative history, petitioners dispute the Commission's conclusion that Congress determined only the ownership rights of those earth stations that would be an integral part of a carrier's terrestrial network. They contend that Congress repudiated the Commission's view by rejecting the common carriers' claim that they should be the exclusive owners of the earth stations. To discern the merit of petitioners' argument, we resort to the Act's rather extensive legislative history. 46 On February 7, 1962, President Kennedy initiated the legislative process by submitting a proposal to the Congress for the creation of a privately owned communications satellite corporation. The Administration bill, S. 2814, introduced by Senators Kerr and Magnuson, proposed that the corporation exclusively own and operate the ground stations. See S.Rep. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1962). Throughout the Committee hearings the carriers argued that they were in the best position to own and operate the earth stations. Accordingly, the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences amended the bill so that the corporation was not to be the exclusive earth station owner Id. at 3. Rather, ownership eligibility was to be granted both to Comsat and to the carriers, and the Commission should encourage establishment of such stations by the carriers. Id. at 5. In so doing, the Committee rejected a proposal by Senator Kefauver and others that would have created the Communications Satellite Authority, an agency of the government that would exclusively own the U.S. portion of the satellite system, ground stations, and tracking system. 47 While the Senate was considering S. 2814, Representative Harris introduced H.R. 11040, which also provided that the satellite stations could be owned by Comsat, by the common carriers, or by both jointly, with no preference for one over the other. After the bill was passed by the House it was sent to the Senate and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee, which inserted in lieu of its text the text of S. 2814, as amended. The bill was thereafter favorably reported to the Senate floor (retaining the H.R. 11040 designation). See S.Rep. No. 1584, supra, at 9-10, 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2272. 48 It is at this point that the critical operationally connected language first appeared in the legislation. Petitioners offer no possible explanation for its insertion. Nor does our review of the legislative history reveal any congressional design. Indeed, we cannot find in the relevant debates and reports even a single reference to the language that occupies our attention. Rather, Congress's extensive consideration of the Satellite Act 7 focused on the following question: Should the United States participate in the global system through a publicly-owned company, a privately-owned company, the common carriers, or some combination thereof? 8 49 In a passage petitioners find critical, the Senate Commerce Committee summarized the controversy: 50 During the hearings on this legislation the question of whether the operation of satellite terminal stations by the corporation or the common carriers or a combination of both would best serve the public interest was the subject of extensive discussion. It was urged by some that the common carriers should establish and maintain the ground stations in the United States, as such facilities would be an integral part of the domestic network of a common carrier and that the common carriers were directly responsible for service to the public. To do otherwise, it was contended, would produce divided responsibility in making service available directly to the public. 51 Id. at 12, 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2274 (emphasis added). Congress ultimately opted for Comsat, carrier, or joint control, with the Commission showing no preference to either Comsat or the carriers and giv[ing] full consideration to all relevant technological, economic, and operating factors in determining what meets the public interest, convenience and necessity. Id. at 18, 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2280. 52 Petitioners argue that because Congress rejected the carriers' claim to exclusive ownership, it thereby rejected their premise that the earth stations would be an integral part of a common carrier network. We believe that this not only reads too much into Congress's rejection of the carriers' claim, but also ignores substantial--and unopposed--evidence in the legislative history that Congress did anticipate that the earth stations would only be operative if connected to the carriers' communications networks. For example, in arguing that the common carriers should not be excluded from owning and operating earth stations, the Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Representative Hemphill) expressed an unrebutted understanding of the operational interconnection between earth stations and the common carrier network: 53 The earth terminals are comparable to the long-distance telephone switching centers that serve each within the country.... [T]he earth terminals are switching centers which must be operated by crews of skilled people, experienced in the intricate job of switching telephone calls and other communications.... [The ground stations] will connect the satellite system with the existing communication networks of the carriers on land.... [I]f we take standard communications equipment, normal to the ordinary microwave carrier stations used in the overland communications network today, and add a special antenna and receiver you then have a satellite microwave ground station. 54 108 Cong.Rec. 7700-01 (1962) (emphasis added). Uncontradicted hearing testimony likewise indicated that the satellite terminal stations would be connected with the carriers' networks. See, e.g., Communications Satellite Legislation: Hearings on S. 2650 and S. 2814 Before the Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 215 (1962) (statement of Ralph O. Beck of Hawaiian Telephone Co.) (ground station would be merely an extension of our own terrestrial network of communication facilities); Communications Satellite Legislation: Hearings on S. 2814 Before the Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 177 (1962) (statement of James E. Dingman of American Telephone & Telegraph Co.) (usefulness of satellite systems depend[s] upon their proper integration ... in the vast complex of domestic and international common carrier facilities); id. at 183 (ground stations will be the key to the proper coordination of the communications satellite channels into the domestic network). 55 Relying on regulations promulgated in 1966, petitioners contend further that the Act does not require an operational connection to a carrier's communications network at all; rather, the Act requires only that the station be interconnected with a terrestrial communications system, which, they contend, can be either a carrier or non-carrier system. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 23. See 47 U.S.C. Sec. 702(2). In support of this proposition they cite 47 C.F.R. Sec. 25.103(e), which provides that [t]he communication-satellite earth station complex [defined in Section 25.103(d) ] interconnects with terminal equipment of common carriers or authorized entities at the interface. Petitioners point to the reference to authorized entities--i.e., non-carriers--and argue that this mak[es] clear that the earth station need not interconnect with a common carrier network--much less be an 'integral part' thereof--in order to be included within the regulatory definition of an earth station. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 23 (citation omitted). 56 This challenge is misdirected. The regulation in question does not purport to describe the operational connection of satellite terminal stations as defined by Sections 201(c)(7) or 103(2) of the Act. Rather, it describes the interconnection of communication-satellite earth station complex[es] defined in Section 25.103(d), or as petitioners tellingly put it: earth stations. The distinction is not insignificant. At oral argument, counsel for petitioners had no quarrel with the notion that there may be earth stations that are not satellite terminal stations within the meaning of Section 201(c)(7). Given this concession, we cannot conclude that because the regulation in question states that a communication-satellite earth complex might be operationally connected to an authorized user, the Commission thereby erred by concluding that a satellite terminal station must be operationally connected to a carrier's network to fall within the ambit of the Act. 57 To be sure, there are numerous instances in the voluminous legislative history where satellite terminal station and earth station were treated synonymously. For example, stray comments appear in the record debate of the original Administration bill, S. 2814 9 and in the discussion of H.R. 11040. 10 We believe it is critical that in none of the above-mentioned illustrations was the speaker purporting to speak to the operationally connected language to which we address ourselves. 11 For that matter, S. 2814 never included the critical language in its definition of satellite terminal station, so that any equation of satellite terminal station and earth station is of marginal relevance to our inquiry. More importantly, we must remember that here, [a]s always, our inquiry into legislative intent focuses primarily on the language of the statute.... It is, in short, the statute that constitutes law. Department of Defense Dependents Schools v. FLRA, 863 F.2d 988, 990 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citation omitted). Given that Section 103(2) would read quite sensibly without the phrase, petitioners' reading would render the operationally connected language a redundancy, an approach we have rejected in an analogous situation. See ITT World Communications Inc., 725 F.2d at 743 & n. 25 (Congress must have intended [the relevant phrase] to mean something....). To ignore the Act's express language by treating the phrase as surplusage would be particularly inappropriate where, as here, Congress deemed it important enough not only to include but to add as an amendment to the House version of the bill. As we have said before, the language of the Act is more than a mere launching pad for a wide-ranging interpretive enterprise by lawyers and judges. Department of Defense Dependents Schools, 863 F.2d at 990. True as this is anytime we are called upon to interpret statutory language, it follows a fortiori in our first step of Chevron review. 58 In sum, it appears to us upon reading the Act in light of its legislative history that Congress has not addressed the issue of ownership of earth stations not operationally connected with a terrestrial communication system. We therefore conclude that if Congress expressed a deliberate intent to create an exclusive group of earth station owners, and we stress that we need not decide this question, 12 it appears to have done so only with respect to a certain class of earth station, i.e., those that would be tied to the carriers' network. Petitioners have offered nothing to rebut the Commission's interpretation that Section 201(c)(7) is directed only at earth stations that would be tied to the carriers' domestic network, and not those of more limited size and carrier interconnection, such as those that provide IBS or INTELNET II service. 59 Petitioners ask us to find that Congress clearly, albeit silently, resolved the ownership rights of non-common carriers to a type of earth station that it did not explicitly consider. To state the proposition is to refute it. Their argument, relying on the force of the implication that arises from the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, must fail, given our determination that Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. Because we are unable to discern the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress, id., we may not simply impose [our] own construction of the statute, as we might properly do if no agency interpretation were in the picture. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, we now turn to Chevron 's second line of inquiry. 60
61 As we have determined that Congress has neither unambiguously defined satellite terminal station, nor precisely addressed the question of who may own and operate earth stations that are not operationally connected with one or more terrestrial systems, our responsibility shifts to ensuring that the Commission's construction of the Act is a reasonable one, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845, 104 S.Ct. at 2783, that is, one that is rational and consistent with the statute. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 421. In order to determine the reasonableness of its interpretation, we look both to the agency's textual analysis (broadly defined, including where appropriate resort to legislative history) and to the compatibility of that interpretation with the Congressional purposes informing the measure. Continental Air Lines v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C.Cir.1988). 62
63 In arguing that Congress intentionally provided in Section 201(c)(7) for the continued Title III licensing of stations that are not operationally connected with a carrier's terrestrial network, the Commission contends that the statute clearly contemplates [such a] category of earth station. Brief for Respondent at 20. Though it later admits that Congress could not in 1962 have envisioned the possibility of licensing small, private earth stations, id. at 24, it need not have contemplated precisely this circumstance. If Congress intended the operationally connected language to limit the scope of Section 201(c)(7), it need only to have contemplated the possibility that future technology might produce some sort of earth stations that were not operationally connected to a terrestrial communication systems. In that light, we inquire whether the Act will reasonably permit the resolution reached by the Commission. It appears to us that the Commission's reading of the statute, avoiding as it does the negation of the operationally connected language, is a wholly reasonable construction of the Act. Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (In construing a statute [courts] are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.). Given that the Commission's interpretation of the Act need not be the best or most natural in order to be sustained, we will not casually sweep aside the Commission's reasonable interpretation. 64 Petitioners maintain that to sustain the Commission's interpretation of the Act would be tantamount to remov[ing] Sec. 201(c)(7) from the Satellite Act by administrative fiat.... If Sec. 201(c)(7) had never been enacted, then the FCC would have had the same discretion it claims this section was intended to confer. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 31-32 (citation omitted). Although one isolated sentence in the ruling may lend support to petitioners' argument, 13 we must nevertheless disagree. We do not understand the ruling to affect the FCC's authority to license satellite terminal stations to Comsat and the other carriers or to determine whether that authority might extend to licensing to other entities. 14 65 Petitioners further argue that the Commission's construction of the statute is undermined by the 1978 Amendments to the Satellite Act pertaining to the International Maritime Satellite organization (INMARSAT). International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act of 1978, 47 U.S.C. Secs. 751-57 (1982). In that Act, which established United States participation in a separate international consortium encompassing maritime as opposed to land-based satellite communications, Congress explicitly vested in the FCC authority to license ownership of satellite earth terminal stations by persons other than the corporation at any time the Commission determined that such additional ownership will enhance the provision of maritime satellite services in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 752(f) (1982). Thus, argue petitioners, Congress consciously distinguishes between Inmarsat and Intelsat stations in authorizing non-carrier ownership of the former, but not the latter. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 38. Petitioners' argument simply assigns too great a negative implication to the amendment. Congress may have intended that distinction, or it may simply have been responding explicitly in the later Act to technological information not available in 1962. It may also have seen insufficient reason to amend the Satellite Act by adding an authority which its language did not preclude. Since, even read in the light most favorably to the petitioners' position, the INMARSAT amendments are at best ambiguous, if not silent, on the question before us, petitioners' argument here does nothing to shake the foundations of the Chevron analysis heretofore set forth, and the Commission's interpretation will stand. 15 66
67 In enacting the Satellite Act, Congress was quite forthright in promoting development of the then-nascent satellite telecommunications industry. Section 102 of the Act well expresses Congress's overriding goals: improved global communications responsive to public need, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 701(a), promotion of new and expanded services, id. Sec. 701(b), and the injection of maximum competition with the widest possible participation by private enterprise, id. Sec. 701(c). See also id. Sec. 721(c)(1) (FCC shall insure effective competition). Similar considerations are evident in Congress's decision to permit the carriers, along with Comsat, to own earth stations. Expressed most often were three fundamental aims: enhanced system-wide coordination, improved competition, and maximized FCC flexibility in questions of ownership. Congress believed that allowing the carriers to share in the ownership of earth stations would advance these objectives. 16 See S.Rep. No. 1584, supra, at 12-13, 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2274 (the FCC will take into account all relevant technological, economic, operating, and policy factors ... which are related to public interest ... in making its determination as to whom it will authorize to operate the ground stations). Cf. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 157 (It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public.). We cannot conclude that the injection of non-carrier ownership does violence to any of these congressional aims. 68 There is no doubting that Congress contemplated that these broad objectives would be carried out by the corporation and the common carriers. But the Declaratory Order noted, as have we, that [t]here is no indication that Congress conceived of the private, non-common carrier, transmit/receive earth stations under consideration here. Declaratory Order, 3 FCC Rcd at 1587 para. 17. It further observed that Congress likewise was unable to conceive of direct-to-user transmissions, or that earth stations might be small and inexpensive enough for use on customer premises. Id. at 1588. The Commission believed these considerations were crucial in determining the inapplicability of Section 201(c)(7). We cannot call this unreasonable. 69 In discerning the compatibility of the FCC's interpretation with congressional purposes, it is important to note that when, in 1962, Congress was considering the Satellite Act, there existed in the United States two operational earth stations, one owned by AT & T and another owned by IT & T. 17 Congress was advised that such earth stations could only be constructed at costs of as much as four to six million dollars. See Communications Satellite Legislation: Hearings on S. 2650 and S. 2814 Before the Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (1962) (statement of Henri G. Busignies of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.) (four to six million for high capacity earth stations; one to two million for hypothesized low capacity stations); id. at 66 (statement of Morton J. Stoller of the National Aeronautic and Space Administration) (completed earth station costs run over 5 million). We believe that deference is particularly apt in the present case, where the relative infancy of the satellite industry, together with the discretion vested by Congress in the Commission to grant licenses when warranted by public interest, convenience, and necessity, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 307, evidence a congressional delegation of interpretive authority to the FCC. See generally Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 Colum.L.Rev. 986, 998 (1987) (discussing factors to be considered in determining whether Congress has vested policymaking authority in agency). 70 Petitioners contend that the FCC's technology theory is belied by the legislative history's reference to mobile stations, which, petitioners correctly observe, did not exist in 1962. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 25. See S.Rep. No. 1584, supra, at 14, 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2275. We are unmoved. A representative of IT & T specifically informed Congress that it was presently developing and constructing two mobile ground stations. Communications Satellite Legislation: Hearings on S. 2650 and S. 2814 Before the Comm. on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 289 (1962) (statement of Henri G. Busignies of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.). Thus, Congress was aware of this emerging technology in 1962. The same cannot be said of the type of stations involved in the present case. 71
72 Petitioners contend that the FCC's interpretation is entitled to little or no deference because the agency has reversed a long-standing precedent without a reasoned analysis. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 16 (citations omitted). In determining the reasonableness of an agency's construction, the Supreme Court has identified the consistency with which an agency interpretation has been applied as a relevant consideration. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. at ---- n. 20, 108 S.Ct. at 421 n. 20. See also Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 646, 106 S.Ct. 2101, 2122, 90 L.Ed.2d 584 (1986) (The fact that the agency's interpretation 'has been neither consistent nor long-standing ... substantially diminishes the deference to be given [its] present interpretation of the statute.' ) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2370 n. 11, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)). In this regard, it is true, as petitioners point out, that the FCC has previously stated that [t]he Satellite Act limits the ownership of earth stations to the carriers and Comsat. Second Report and Order, Proposed Modification of the Commission's Authorized User Policy Concerning Access to the International Satellite Services of the Communications Satellite Corporation, 100 F.C.C.2d 177, 200 n. 39 (1985). Accord Memorandum Opinion and Statement of Policy, Authorized Entities and Authorized Users, 4 F.C.C.2d 421, 424 (1966). It is also true that in the past the Commission has equated earth station with satellite terminal station. See, e.g., Ownership and Operation of Earth Stations, 5 F.C.C.2d 812, 814 (1966); Receive Only, FCC 86-214, at 4 n. 6 (May 19, 1986). Given that the FCC has never been asked, nor purported to speak to the question of non-carrier earth station ownership, the statements were necessarily rendered in different contexts, and, accordingly, were dicta. Thus, petitioners are incorrect in their contention that the FCC has consistently held that an earth station operating with the Intelsat system could [not] be licensed to a non-carrier. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 8 (citation omitted). Far from so holding, the Commission has never before addressed the question. 73 Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the challenged ruling is fully consistent with its analogous Commission precedent. In International Relay, Inc., FCC 84-125 (April 11, 1984), J.A. at 31, for example, the Commission determined that its then-existing earth station ownership policy (which required joint Comsat-carrier ownership) was inapposite to the licensing of earth stations providing the newly devised IBS service, concluding that independent carrier ownership of IBS earth stations does not raise the same issues as raised by multipurpose earth stations. Id. at 8 n. 7, J.A. at 38 n. 7. The Commission clearly indicated that stations providing IBS and multipurpose services warrant differing treatment. The proliferation of IBS earth stations, the Commission concluded, does not raise the same concerns about fragmentation of responsibility and control that prompted our 1966 decision to adopt restrictions against U.S. carriers' individual ownership of U.S. INTELSAT earth stations. Id. at 8, J.A. at 40. The FCC also concluded that independent carrier licensing was consistent with previous Commission decisions favoring the introduction of new and innovative international services. Id. at 10, J.A. at 40 (citation omitted). 74 Petitioners maintain that the present ruling is inconsistent with International Relaybecause in that case the Commission concluded that IBS stations are, indeed, earth stations within the definition of the Satellite Act. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 27. Although the Commission licensed the station pursuant to the 1934 Act and Section 201(c) of the Satellite Act, nowhere is the question of applicability of Section 201(c)(7) discussed. See International Relay, supra. Because the applicant (International Relay, Inc.) was a common carrier, it is likely that the issue was not raised. Thus, an equally tenable interpretation is that the Commission ruled only that licensing the station to a carrier would not be inconsistent with Section 201(c)(7) of the Act. As we have stated earlier, we do not understand the challenged ruling to affect the Commission's authority to license earth stations to either Comsat or the carriers. See supra at note 14 and accompanying text. 18 75 The FCC's policy of distinguishing between earth stations that provide multipurpose service and those that do not was recently reaffirmed in its Receive Only ruling. FCC 86-214 (May 19, 1986). The Commission there ruled that the Satellite Act did not proscribe non-carrier ownership of earth stations that merely receive INTELNET I service. Id. at 6. There, as here, the Commission reasoned that Section 201(c)(7) addresses only substantial earth-station facilities, and concluded that Congress simply did not address services such as INTELNET I that are designed for direct-to-user transmission and which, accordingly, contemplate the use of small, receive-only earth stations such as those [being considered]. Id. at 10. 76 Undaunted, petitioners assert that Receive Only constitutes no agency precedent in the instant case, since the present case involves transmit/receive earth stations. Joint Brief of Petitioners at 27 n. 21. While this distinction is real, as far as it goes, nonetheless Receive Only is not without precedential value to the present case. Both International Relay and Receive Only demonstrate the Commission's consistent decisional path of treating earth stations that provide IBS services differently from those that provide multipurpose service, and of interpreting Section 201(c)(7) as governing only earth station facilities that are an integral part of a carrier's domestic network. See also Modification of Policy on Ownership and Operation of U.S. Earth Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d at 269 (distinguishing between technical concerns raised by earth stations providing IBS services and those providing multipurpose service). As such, the Commission's interpretation of the Act in the present ruling is consistent and entitled to deference. Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, 104 S.Ct. at 2791 (most recent of varying EPA interpretations of source is permissible and entitled to deference because the agency consistently interpreted it flexibly--not in a sterile textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and complex area). 77 In short, in the challenged Declaratory Ruling the FCC advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion that licensing earth stations to non-common carriers would serve the ... objectives [in question]. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, 104 S.Ct. at 2792. Because petitioners' challenge really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, id. at 866, 104 S.Ct. at 2793, their challenge to the Commission's statutory authority to grant licenses to non-common carriers earth stations that are not satellite stations within the meaning of Section 201(c)(7) of the Act must fail. 19 B. Reuters's Particular Circumstances. 78 As we noted earlier, in addition to declaring its statutory authority to license to non-common carriers earth stations that were not satellite stations as defined by Section 103(2) of the Act, the Commission also concluded that the private international earth station Reuters proposed is not a satellite terminal station within the meaning of Section 103(2) or 201(c)(7), and, hence, Reuters is not technically ineligible for earth station ownership. 3 FCC Rcd at 1587 para. 16. Reuters's utilization of AT & T private-line circuits would not, the Commission determined, alter the private nature of its satellite transmission, nor would it alone create the interconnection causing the station to constitute an integral part of the domestic network of a common carrier. Id. 1507 para. 16 & 1589 n. 20. The Commission declined to determine whether granting Reuters a license would be in the public interest, a necessary precondition to obtaining a radio license. 3 FCC Rcd 1588 para. 21. See 47 U.S.C. Sec. 307. 79 Petitioners challenge this aspect of the ruling on several fronts, most of which we have already addressed. We here consider petitioners' objection to the Commission's conclusion that Reuters would not be  'operationally connected'  with a terrestrial communications system because it will lease private-line circuits to connect its computer center with its proposed private earth station. Declaratory Ruling, 3 FCC Rcd at 1587 para. 16. Petitioners maintain that Reuters's  'private'  lines are owned by a common carrier and are an operational part of that carrier's communications network, Joint Brief of Petitioners at 10, and that Reuters actually admitted as much in a letter to the Commission, id. at 11, 20; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 17. 80 Preliminarily, the FCC contends that we should not reach this issue because Reuters' specific communications needs were not pertinent to the Commission's declaratory ruling. Brief for Respondent at 3 n. 2. The Commission argues that because it made no finding that the Reuters system would serve the public interest, any statement by the Commission to the effect that Section 201(c)(7) would not apply to [the Reuters] proposal was merely dictum. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). At oral argument, counsel for the Commission further contended that the discussion of Reuters's circumstances was only by way of example. 81 While we must concede that this aspect of the ruling partakes of two possible readings, it is beyond peradventure that the Commission not only explained its ruling on statutory authority with reference to Reuters's circumstances, but, in one respect, extended it. The Commission concluded not only that [t]he private international earth station proposed by Reuters is not a 'satellite terminal station' under Section 103(2) or 201(c)(7), 3 FCC Rcd at 1587 para. 16, it added the specific conclusion that a non-carrier would not be ineligible to own an earth station just because it would lease private-line circuits from a common carrier. See id. Notwithstanding the Commission's protestations, we will address ourselves to this aspect of the ruling. 82 The controversy focuses on an exchange of letters between the Commission and counsel for Reuters. While it was considering Reuters's request for the declaratory ruling, the FCC inquired as follows: Will Reuters' proposed private earth station be connected to a terrestrial common-carrier network (including a domestic or international private line provided by a U.S. common carrier) in any way? Letter from James L. Ball of FCC to Kenneth E. Hardman (Sept. 12, 1986) (discussing Reuters's request for declaratory ruling), J.A. at 254-55. Reuters responded that the earth station would be interconnected to its news bureaus and picture bureau in various U.S. cities via private line circuits leased from AT & T. Letter from Kenneth E. Hardman and John F. Noble to James L. Ball of FCC (Sept. 19, 1986), J.A. at 257. 83 On this basis petitioners challenge the Commission's conclusion that Reuters would not be operationally connected with a terrestrial communications system. We have already noted that the term terrestrial communications system is nowhere defined in the Act and have determined that the Commission could reasonably conclude that Congress intended to address only those earth stations that are operationally connected with a carrier's domestic network. The Commission, apparently drawing on the difference between private lines and exchange services (those through the public switched network), concluded that Reuters's use of a common carrier-supplied private-line to its proposed private earth station would not make that earth station an integral part of a carrier's domestic common carrier network, Declaratory Ruling, 3 FCC Rcd at 1589 n. 20, and thus, a satellite terminal station within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 1587 para. 16. This conclusion, in light of the Act's ambiguity, and for the reasons we have given above, is reasonable. Nor does it conflict with the Commission's precedent, which, since 1966, has defined the term as referring to the network used by the public. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Proposed Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, 2 F.C.C.2d 658, 663 (1966) (opining that the term includes the facilities of the terrestrial carriers which pick up traffic from the using public and carry it to the [earth station] and, conversely, receives traffic from the earth station operator for delivery to the public), denying reconsideration in pertinent part, 38 F.C.C. 1104 (1965). 20