Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Claims of Insufficient Evidence for First Degree Murder Convictions

Text: Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the first degree murder convictions for the Carter and Chavez killings. 1. Sufficiency of Evidence of Felony Murder of Carter (34a) Defendant contends that the jury had insufficient evidence of a violation or attempted violation of section 288 to convict him of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory for the Carter killing. He asserts that the resulting conviction violated his rights under state law and the due process clause of the federal Constitution. (35) To determine [the validity of a claim of insufficient] evidence, we must inquire whether a rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this process we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and presume in favor of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. To be sufficient, evidence of each of the essential elements of the crime must be substantial and we must resolve the question of sufficiency in light of the record as a whole. [Citations.] ( People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 38.) If we determine that a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the due process clause of the United States Constitution is satisfied ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573-574, 99 S.Ct. 2781]), as is the due process clause of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1083). (34b) We have held that a violation of section 288 occurs whenever, to gratify the child's or the actor's sexual desires, an actor touches a child under 14. ( People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 907 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712]; but cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 344, fn. 7 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040] [declining to decide whether the act must be patently `sexual' in nature as well as [in] intent....].) In his confession, defendant said he lured Carter to his apartment to photograph him in the nude. Once there he turned on some strobe lights, which seemed to mesmerize the young boy. After a few minutes Carter said he wanted to leave, which angered defendant who then choked him and tried to have sex with his body. The jury also received evidence of defendant's sexual interest in youths. These included pornographic magazines and photographs featuring young boys in the nude. In Memro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658, we rejected a claim that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy defendant's felony-murder conviction for Carter's killing. He urges a different conclusion now, but on the record here as on that of the prior trial, there is little doubt that [he] possessed the requisite lewd intent ( id. at p. 697) to commit a lewd or lascivious act with Carter, and that the `arrangement' of lights, pornographic materials and other paraphernalia in [his] apartment would suggest sufficient planning to enable [him] to commit lewd conduct once a willing participant came along. ( Id. at p. 699.) In addition to the assortment of magazines and photographs suggesting defendant's sexual interest in youths, the jury also had before it the confession in which he described wanting to photograph Carter and wanting to have sex with 12-year-old Scott Fowler before killing him in 1976. From this evidence, a rational jury could infer that he planned to act on his sexual interest in young boys by performing a lewd or lascivious act with Carter. That the jury did not hear the psychiatric testimony presented at the prior trial regarding defendant's sexual motivation to bring Carter to his apartment ( Memro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 693-694) altered the quantum of evidence, to be sure, but did not, in our view make the evidence insufficient as a matter of law. Even if, as he asserts, taking a photograph of a nude child was not a crime at the time (see § 311.3, enacted by Stats. 1981, ch. 1056, § 1, p. 4080), a rational trier of fact could infer that he intended to touch Carter with lewd or lascivious intent while alive, and took a direct if possibly ineffectual step toward that goal  in other words, he attempted to violate section 288. ( Memro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 697-698; see also § 21a, enacted by Stats. 1986, ch. 519, § 1, p. 1859 [later codifying rule].) Indeed, the trier of fact could infer from the evidence that defendant disrobed Carter while alive with lewd or lascivious intent. Such conduct and mental state would complete a violation of section 288. (See post, p. 871.) In sum, the evidence sufficed for a rational trier of fact to conclude that he attempted to violate, or did violate, section 288. The law required no more for a conviction of first degree murder on a felony-murder theory. (§ 189.) 2. Sufficiency of Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation in the Chavez and Carter Killings (36a) First degree murder may be found when the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor killed with malice aforethought, intent to kill, premeditation, and deliberation. (§§ 187, 189.) Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence that Carter and Chavez were killed with premeditation and deliberation. He is unpersuasive. (37) We have defined deliberate as `formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.' ( People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1123 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159].) We have defined premeditated as `considered beforehand.' ( Ibid. ) Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. The test is not time, but reflection. `Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.' ( People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 348 [233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].) (36b) The jury heard evidence that the bodies of Fowler and Chavez were found 178 feet apart. They also heard defendant's confession that he had no sexual interest in Chavez, whom he found fat and ugly; he killed him because he started screaming after Fowler was knifed. There was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation for a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant's actions satisfied those elements of first degree murder. The jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant decided he had to kill Chavez to prevent him from identifying him as Fowler's killer, a motive it could reasonably conclude was imbued with deliberation and premeditation. ( People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) Moreover, he had to run from Fowler's position to Chavez's. He then cut Chavez's throat from behind. A rational jury could conclude that he intended death and no other result, and that he considered his options as he ran toward Chavez. A rational jury could also have found Carter's killing premeditated and deliberate. It could have concluded that defendant used masking tape to tie Carter's hands behind his back and then strangled him. It could have concluded that these deeds required reflection and consumed some time. It could also have determined that Carter was killed to prevent him from later identifying defendant as his captor and sexual exploiter, a motive requiring calculation and reflection. Defendant relies on People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], which, to sustain a verdict of premeditated and deliberate murder, required (1) extremely strong evidence of planning, (2) evidence of motive in conjunction with evidence of planning or of a calculated manner of killing, or (3) evidence of all three indicia of premeditation and deliberation. But Anderson 's guidelines are descriptive, not normative ( People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125); its factors, while helpful ..., are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive. ( Ibid. ) For example, notwithstanding Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pages 26-27, the method of killing alone can sometimes support a conclusion that the evidence sufficed for a finding of premeditated, deliberate murder. ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 956-957 [42 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574].)