Opinion ID: 2302675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Process for the Approval of the Consent Decree

Text: [¶ 27] Artel also contends that it was unlawfully excluded from the process by which the consent decree was negotiated and that the court wrongly denied it an opportunity to present evidence in opposition to the decree before it was approved. [¶ 28] It is well established that a court may enter a consent decree over the objection of intervenors as long as the decree does not dispose of an intervenor's valid claims. Butler v. D/Wave Seafood, 2002 ME 41, ¶ 13, 791 A.2d 928. Thus, if an intervenor has brought no independent claims against the other parties to the action, its opposition alone is insufficient to prevent those parties from settling and thereby ending the litigation. See id. Whether a consent decree will dispose of an intervenor's independent claims is part of the overall inquiry into the lawfulness of the decree. Notwithstanding the objection of intervenors, if the court finds that each of the five elements identified above is met, it may approve the decree. [¶ 29] In its order granting Pike's motion for a nonevidentiary hearing regarding the entry of the consent decree, the court stated: [B]ecause the objections of Artel and Smiling Hill are sufficiently informed by the existing record evidence and the well-made arguments of the parties and the intervenors, ... an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. We discern no error in this conclusion. [¶ 30] The intervenors primarily wanted to introduce evidence regarding the manner in which the City negotiated and entered into the consent decree. As a party to litigation with the authority to compromise claims, the City had the discretion to determine its litigation strategy and engage in negotiations with Pike and IDEXX. It was not required to engage in settlement negotiations or share its litigation strategy with Artel. [T]he ability [of a municipality] to secure a settlement [in land use litigation] will often require that the groundwork be laid in private conversations between the initial decision and final settlement. R. Lisle Baker, Exploring How Municipal Boards Can Settle Appeals of Their Land Use Decisions Within the Framework of the Massachusetts Open Meeting Law, 44 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 455, 468 (2011); see also 1 M.R.S. § 405(6)(E) (2011) (permitting a government body to hold an executive session for consultation with its attorney regarding pending litigation and settlements). [¶ 31] The record demonstrates that Artel had ample opportunity to be heard in opposition to the proposed consent decree, both at meetings before the City Council prior to its approval of the consent decree and at the hearing conducted by the court. See Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 1999 ME 112, ¶ 20, 736 A.2d 241 (noting that the public's right to be heard in zoning matters pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4352(1) is not unlimited). Because Artel had an adequate opportunity to be heard and the relevance of the primary issue about which it wished to introduce additional evidence was marginal, the court acted within the bounds of its discretion in concluding that the additional presentation of evidence was unnecessary. See Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19, 2 A.3d 328.