Opinion ID: 780380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bass's prior conviction was a crime of violence

Text: 16 Turning to the issue of Bass's sentence, we next address his claim that the district court erred in calculating his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court determined that under § 2K2.1 of the Guidelines, Bass's base offense level was 26. In making this determination, the court decided that Bass's 1997 conviction pursuant to Tennessee Code § 39-15-401 was a crime of violence. Legal conclusions regarding application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines are reviewed de novo. United States v. Hover, 293 F.3d 930, 933 (6th Cir.2002) (emphasis omitted). 17 Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a) defines a crime of violence as 18 any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that — 19 (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or 20 (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 21 Tennessee Code § 39-15-401 criminalizes both child abuse and child neglect. Neither the text nor the commentary of Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 mentions these offenses. A violation of the Tennessee statute does not necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. In pertinent part, the statute provides that [a]ny person who knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury or neglects such a child so as to adversely affect the child's health and welfare commits the crime. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-401(a) (1997). The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained the statute as follows: 22 Tennessee's child abuse and neglect statute may be broken down into two classifications, abuse and neglect, each of which have [sic] both a conduct and a result element. Child abuse requires that: (1) a person knowingly treat in such a manner a child under eighteen years of age; and (2) the child sustains an injury. Child neglect requires that: (1) a person knowingly neglect a child under eighteen years of age; and (2) the child's health and welfare are adversely affected. 23 State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tenn. 2000). 24 A violation of the above statute would constitute a crime of violence if it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2). We apply a categorical approach to determine whether a particular offense creates a serious risk of physical injury to a person. United States v. Payne, 163 F.3d 371, 374 (6th Cir.1998). This approach generally requires that a determination as to whether an offense constitutes a `crime of violence' [be] based on the statutory definition of the crime. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (alteration in original). But when it is not clear from the elements of the offense alone whether the crime involved a serious risk of potential injury to another, the sentencing court may review the indictment for the specific conduct charged. Id. at 374 n. 2; accord United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that where the statutory definition blankets both violent and non-violent crimes, a court should assess which type of conduct the defendant was convicted of by looking at the charging papers and jury instructions). 25 The statutory definition alone provides an insufficient basis upon which to determine whether a prior conviction under Tennessee Code § 39-15-401 involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. As the Ducker court noted, the statute contains two different classifications. Although the elements for child abuse include injury to the child, the elements for child neglect do not. In describing Bass's 1997 conviction under Tennessee Code § 39-15-401, however, the Presentence Report states that he was originally charged with Aggravated Child Abuse. Bass failed to object to this statement. Aggravated child abuse clearly involves a serious risk of potential injury to another. We therefore agree with the district court's finding that Bass's prior conviction was for a crime a violence, since that determination can be reached from the record without having to examine the detailed facts of his offense. 26 C. The district court did not err in finding that Bass had used a firearm in connection with an aggravated assault 27 As his final issue on appeal, Bass questions whether the district court properly increased his offense level by four points because it found that he used a firearm in connection with an aggravated assault. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5) (providing for a four-level increase if the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense). Bass argues that there was no evidence before the district court that he fired his gun at anyone. Officer Ellis testified, however, that Bass admitted shooting at two men who had allegedly robbed him earlier in the evening. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Bass had used a firearm in connection with an aggravated assault. State v. Adams, 45 S.W.3d 46, 56 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault in a case where a witness testified that the defendant had fired a gun at an occupied vehicle).