Opinion ID: 2553473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reliance on the prosecutor's opening

Text: Appellant next argues he reasonably and detrimentally relied on the prosecutor's comments in opening in deciding to include, in his own opening, a summary of appellant's statement at the police station. He contends reversal is warranted under the reasoning we employed in Wilson v. United States, 606 A.2d 1017 (D.C.1992) (overruled on different grounds by Lyons v. United States, 683 A.2d 1066, 1067 (D.C. 1996)). In Wilson, the prosecutor made a pre-trial representation to the court, with defense counsel present, that the defendant had no impeachable convictions. Id. at 1019. We held that this representation was an implicit promise not to impeach the defendant if he elected to testify. Id. at 1020. The prosecutor then broke this promise mid-trial by announcing his intention to impeach the defendant with his convictions. Id. at 1019. Because the promise occurred at a pre-trial stage, it affected defense decisions about whether to go to trial or enter into a plea agreement, whether the defendant should testify if the case went to trial, and what questions to pose to the jury panel during voir dire. Id. at 1025. These considerations meant the promise affected the defendant's rights to effective assistance of counsel and to maintain his privilege against self-incrimination. Wilson, however, is distinguishable from the present case. Unlike in Wilson, the government's opening statement here was made at a time when appellant had already elected to go to trial instead of entering into a plea agreement, formulated a trial strategy (including arguing self-defense), and decided how to question potential jurors on voir dire. Therefore, the opening statement did not have the same impact on the decisions critical to the formulation of a defense that the pre-trial representation did in Wilson. Rather, the prosecutor's opening remarks in the present case affected, at most, the defense decision to mention a particular statement in its opening remarks that was consistent with appellant's self-defense theory. Tellingly, the reasoning in Wilson and the cases it relies on has not been applied to opening statements, but instead has thus far been limited to pre-trial representations. See Smith v. United States, 491 A.2d 1144 (D.C.1985); Rosser v. United States, 381 A.2d 598 (D.C. 1977). Appellant argues this court has characterized representations made during opening statements as promises, and that the reasoning of Wilson can therefore be applied to opening statements. It is true that we have referred to opening statements as promises. See, e.g., Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 418 (D.C. 2009); Dobson v. United States, 711 A.2d 78, 85 n. 14 (D.C.1998). Analogizing to promises in other contexts, one could conclude that when evidence the prosecutor alludes to in opening fails to materialize during the trial, the prosecutor can be said to have broken a promise. However, the analogy does not extend as far as appellant would have it. Our cases, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, illustrate that what is meant by the word promise in the context of an opening statement is that the party is making a promise to the jury, the breaking of which has the potential to prejudice that party with the jury. See Arthur, 986 A.2d at 418 (defendant's decision not to testify prejudiced defendant because it caused him to be unable to fulfill his promise to the jury in opening that he would testify); Dobson, 711 A.2d at 83 (in considering appellant's § 23-110 motion, trial court failed to consider prejudice from defense counsel's promise to the jury in opening statement to produce alibi witness and inability to deliver on that promise); see also Brisbon v. United States, 957 A.2d 931, 958 (D.C.2008) (counsel permitted to remind the jury in summation that opposing counsel has failed to live up to promises made in opening); Ginyard, 816 A.2d at 28 (same); Allen v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 351, 273 F.2d 85, 86 (1959) ([o]rdinarily, a prosecuting attorney's failure to prove an assertion he made in his opening statement is prejudicial to the Government, not the defendant); accord, United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.1979) (the Government's inability to produce evidence which it promised the jury would appear to harm the Government's case rather than the defense). Pre-trial inquiries are designed to promote the efficient administration of justice and to give both sides a fair warning of what issues might be raised at trial. Wilson, 606 A.2d at 1021, 1022. [T]he government is obligated to respond accurately and unambiguously to pretrial inquiries made by the court, and the defense and the court are entitled to rely on these responses. Id. at 1020, 1023; see also Smith, 491 A.2d at 1147 (in order to comply with discovery rules, government responses to pre-trial inquiries regarding statements made by appellant must be accurate and unambiguous). Opening statements serve a different purpose altogether. They are intended simply as a roadmap, to provide broad outlines of the case to enable the jury to comprehend it. Brown v. United States, 934 A.2d 930, 944 (D.C.2007) (quotations omitted); Owens, 497 A.2d at 1091. Further, as we have stated, the law does not require that opening trial statements be completely supported by evidence introduced during the trial. Owens, 497 A.2d at 1091; Robinson, 361 A.2d at 200. Given the important distinctions between the functions served by pre-trial representations and opening statements, we decline to apply the reasoning in Wilson to the present case. A contrary decision would not be in accord with the flexibility properly afforded attorneys in making decisions regarding opening statements. See Augburn, 514 A.2d at 454; Owens, 497 A.2d at 1091; Robinson, 361 A.2d at 200; see also Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 923 (D.C. 1993) (no prejudice to defendant from counsel's decision not to give opening statement); Fitzhugh v. United States, 415 A.2d 548, 551 n. 5 (D.C.1980) (defense may elect to reserve opening statement until after presentation of government case-in-chief); accord, United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1985) (timing of opening statement and decision of whether to make one are merely matters of trial tactics). Requiring pinpoint precision in opening statements would not only constitute a novel judicial approach, it would also add significantly to the already great stress facing parties and counsel beginning a criminal trial. Appellant argues his reliance was particularly reasonable in this case because our rule-of-completeness case law compelled that if the first statement appellant gave to police was admitted, the second statement would have to be admitted. Appellant also argues that the duty was on the government in the first instance to seek a pre-trial ruling on this issue before opening on it, since the government should have known it would be seeking a generous ruling from the court. We think the question was closer than appellant argues. Under the rule of completeness, a party is entitled, once a part of a document or recorded statement has been introduced into evidence, to seek admission of the remainder of the statement. Andrews v. United States, 922 A.2d 449, 458 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Henderson v. United States, 632 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C.1993)). The rule's underlying concern is fairness. Id. When a defendant makes one continuous statement, the prosecution may not seek to include only inculpatory portions of it, excluding exculpatory portions, so as to distort the meaning of the statement. Id.; Henderson, 632 A.2d at 426. [10] This court has applied the rule of completeness to continuous though interrupted statements. Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463, 475 n. 19 (D.C.1981) (where government entered inculpatory statement made by defendant at police station, defendant was entitled to present evidence of later, exculpatory statement also given at station). The two statements to police in this case, however, occurred in different locations, under different methods of interrogation, and after different facts and incentives were made known to appellant all facts that distinguish this case from Johns. See id. The trial court, in its discretion, could have seen these two statements not as parts of one continuous thought, as in the example from WIGMORE ( supra note 10), but rather as two discrete thoughts, not subject to the rule of completeness. See Henderson, 632 A.2d at 425 (key inquiry is whether statements together were intended to express one thought as a whole). Having said this, we recognize that Johns does lend some support to the rule-of-completeness argument the defense presented at trial, with which the trial court ultimately agreed. Given the closeness of the question, the prosecutor would have been well advised to request a pretrial ruling. However, saying the prosecutor should have sought a pretrial ruling does not mean the defense was entitled to rely on the contents of the government's opening statement in promising evidence of its own. As all parties seem to agree, the only evidentiary basis for the defense's presentation of the second statement to the jury would have been the government's presentation of the first statement. Even assuming the defense was correct in anticipating that if the first statement were admitted, the second one would also have to be admitted, this does not mean the defense was reasonable in being confident that the first statement would ultimately be presented. As is true of government counsel and the trial court, defense counsel also is charged with knowing the law. Wilson, 606 A.2d at 1023. Counsel can also be expected to recognize that a prosecutor's opening statement need only be an objective summary of the evidence which the prosecutor reasonably expected to produce[,] and that [m]any things might happen during the course of [a] trial which would prevent the presentation of all the evidence described in advance. [11] Frazier, 394 U.S. at 736, 89 S.Ct. 1420. Granting a mistrial is a severe remedya step to be avoided whenever possible, and one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor. Najafi, 886 A.2d at 107 (quoting Salmon v. United States, 719 A.2d 949, 956 (D.C.1997)). This is so because ordering a mistrial entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already taken place. Id. (quoting Salmon, 719 A.2d at 956). A missing evidence instruction, appellant's other requested remedyhere an instruction that would have informed the jury that it could infer from the government's choice not to introduce the statement that it would have been harmful to the governmentis also not without costs. We have recognized several dangers inherent in the use of a missing evidence instruction, since it represents a radical departure from the principle that the jury should decide the case by evaluating the evidence before it. Tyer v. United States, 912 A.2d 1150, 1164 (D.C.2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The adverse inference, which in effect creates evidence from nonevidence, may add a fictitious weight to one side of the case. . . . Dent v. United States, 404 A.2d 165, 170-71 (D.C.1979). Additionally, the inference is usually argued in summation when an evidentiary explanation for the absence of the [evidence] no longer can be presented to the jury. Id. at 171. In recognition of these and other dangers, trial courts have considerable discretion in determining whether to give the instruction. Tyer, 912 A.2d at 1164. On the facts of this case, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in failing to grant one of these remedies. [12] We are also satisfied that any error here would have been harmless. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). [13] It is significant that, aside from the stationhouse confession, defense counsel made numerous promises to the jury in opening that failed to materialize during trial. The jury never heard evidence, for instance, that Boyd was high on Crack cocaine, that he was drunk on alcohol, or that he was filled with rage. The evidence the jury heard instead was that Boyd was a little upset with appellant, that he didn't use any cocaine that day although his status as a routine user called the veracity of this statement into questionand that he had had two beers approximately four hours before the fight that he did not believe affected his perceptions. Similarly, the jury never heard evidence that Boyd was the one who pull[ed] out a knife; Boyd testified that he never had a knife and no witness testified to seeing Boyd with a weapon at any time. Likewise, the specifics of how the fight transpired and how appellant supposedly defended himself never materialized to anything approaching the degree the defense opening represented it would. Finally, the evidence never showed that appellant attacked only because he [knew] he ha[d] to do something or this man [would] kill him, nor did it reflect any of appellant's other thoughts, as represented in the defense opening. The failure of this evidence to materialize can be attributed, at least in large part, to the defendant's decision not to testify. The defendant certainly had an unqualified right to make this decision, whether it ended up reflecting wisdom or unwisdom. Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C.1991). In any event, it was not attributable to any action of the government: defense counsel represented to the court that the only portion of its opening that was affected by the government's opening was the addition of the statement to police at the station. As he said, everything else about [his] opening, the self defense and Mr. Evans' injuries and the witnesses, it all would have been exactly the same. We agree with the government that, to the extent appellant was prejudiced by his failure to carry a burden that he voluntarily assumed before the jury in opening statement, the prejudice created by his failure to present the statement made at the police station was far outweighed by the prejudiceundoubtedly self-createdoccasioned by his failure to present all of the other details of the attack he promised the jury they would hear. See Dobson, 711 A.2d at 83 ([t]he appearance that the defense has overstated its evidence, and cannot be trusted to keep its promises, may have a significant effect on the jury's evaluation of a case). We also doubt the severity of the impact of the omission at issue in the context of the trial as a whole. The defense evidence at issue, at the optimum, would have shown that at the station, once informed that the police had evidence that he was the man who had stabbed Boyd, and that a self-defense claim might be available, appellant changed his story to admit the stabbing and argue self-defense. This statement was at best corroborative of his trial theory and at worst showed he fabricated his self-defense claim upon learning he could no longer deny his involvement in the stabbing. It was not, by far, the only evidence on the subject of self-defense that appellant mentioned in his opening statement. Cf. Dobson, 711 A.2d at 83 (prejudice to defendant where his counsel failed altogether to provide evidence of defendant's alibi as promised in opening); Arthur, 986 A.2d at 418 (plain error where trial judge impermissibly dissuaded defendant from testifying, thereby completely depriving appellant of testimony crucial to his defense, regarding his version of the facts surrounding drug transaction). Further, the evidence as a whole tended to disprove appellant's self-defense theory. See Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 771 (D.C.2005) (burden on government to disprove self-defense, once claimed). The evidence showed that appellant stabbed Boyd ten times, including nine deep penetrating woundsas opposed to slashing woundsto his back. No witness testified that Boyd was armed, and Boyd himself gave the most detailed eyewitness account of the attack, which ran directly contrary to appellant's theory. Finally, the jury was instructed not once but three times that it was not to consider statements of counsel as evidence, which is usually a sufficient cure for any possible prejudice. Bailey v. United States, 831 A.2d 973, 981-82 (D.C.2003). Appellant has not shown substantial prejudice so as to warrant reversal of his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is hereby Affirmed. RUIZ, Associate Judge, concurring: I write separately because I do not agree with the majority's framing or analysis of the central issue in the case, one we have not previously addressed, concerning defense counsel's reasonable reliance on representations made by the prosecutor during opening statement. In particular, the question is what consequences and remedies flow when the prosecutor does not follow through on representations on which the defense has relied to its detriment, promising to the jury that the defense will introduce evidenceappellant's statement to the policecorroborating appellant's claim of self-defense. In this case, the trial court should have given a curative instruction to mitigate prejudice to the defense when the prosecutor's trial tactics departed from his initial representation, leaving defense counsel unable to fulfill his promise to present evidence of appellant's statement of self-defense. I concur in the result, however, as I agree that appellant's convictions should be affirmed because any error was harmless.