Opinion ID: 2463469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dale corum's testimony

Text: Appellant's third argument maintains that the court erred in allowing Corum's testimony regarding the attack upon him by Jackie Wickizer, defendant's brother. As noted earlier, the testimony in question indicates that while appellant was committing the alleged offenses of rape and sodomy, Corum was involved in an altercation with a group of persons that remained at the Shelter House. The altercation involved Dale being grabbed around the neck and drug across the back of the car and onto the ground by appellant's brother, while appellant's girl friend searched his car. Prior to trial, the admission of this testimony was the subject of heated discussion between counsel and judge. Over appellant's objection, the judge excluded the full details of the assault, particularly evidence regarding a cigarette being put out in Corum's eye, but nevertheless allowed Dale to testify to the occurrence of an altercation between these parties. The crux of appellant's argument asserts that the admission of this evidence was highly prejudicial and inflammatory, in that it implied that appellant was the member of a crowd engaged in some serious criminal activity. In response, respondent argues that the amount of evidence was not extensive, drawing attention to the fact that after making allowances for rulings of the court and objections, the testimony amounted to less than a page, and thus urges the court to view this as a harmless error. In support of his argument, appellant directs the court's attention to cases prohibiting the introduction of separate and distinct criminal activity for which the defendant is not standing trial. Although the rules of evidence regarding prior crimes of a defendant are closely related to the problem at hand, this controversy does not involve a question regarding crimes or acts performed by appellant, but rather the testimony in question deals with the acts between third parties. As such, appellant's objections deal with the rule of res inter alios acta. Generally, the evidence regarding the transactions between third persons is inadmissible as irrelevant. Such evidence is excluded as res inter alios acta, which means a thing done between third parties and strangers. As stated in 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 602, pp. 406-408: The rule res inter alios acta forbids the introduction of collateral facts which by their nature are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference as to the principal matter in dispute. Evidence as to acts, transactions, or occurrences to which accused is not a party, or as to other matters with which he is not shown to have any connection, being res inter alios acta, is inadmissible, unless it is so interwoven with other relevant evidence as to make it impossible to try the case without admitting it. Both the rule and the exception are consistent with the practice in this state. State v. Dupree, 477 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Mo.1972). Apparently, the key factors followed by the court include: whether the defendant was present at the alleged incident, whether he took part in the activity, whether there was proximity in time of the alleged crime and the collateral incident, and whether the defendant was in some manner connected with the third party and the incident. Dupree, supra (wherein the court held activities of defendant and third party accomplice were sufficiently interwoven where defendant was present at time of activities and activities of third party also involved defendant's activities). It is difficult to say, applying the rule to the case at hand, whether Corum's testimony should have been totally excluded. The testimony in question was the subject of extensive debate between the judge and counsel at the pre-trial hearings, and had previously served as the basis of a mistrial. On retrial, the court, however, apparently decided the event was interwoven with relevant evidence, and felt that by excluding the highly inflammatory evidence the remainder would be admissible. In response to appellant's position that the assault was irrelevant, the court stated that: I doubt it, because the trial will boil down to the question of consent or not. The trial is going to boil down to that, and I am afraid these other things we are talking about have a bearing on consent, the length of time involved that they were gone and what transpired and who was or wasn't there when they left and when they got back, all these things are too tied to the question of consent. Those are all collateral matters, quite honestly. On matters of relevancy and materiality, the trial court has broad discretion. State v. Martin, 530 S.W.2d 447, 452 (Mo.App.1975). Its decision will be overruled only if it has abused its discretion. We find no abuse of discretion. In light of the heinous nature of the crimes of rape and sodomy, the mere introduction of the altercation between Corum and the group was too insignificant to prejudice the jury's decision. The inflammatory portions of the incident (including the cigarette in the eye occurrence) were kept from the jury. Even if error was committed, it was harmless, and thus not grounds for reversal. State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 64 (Mo.banc 1972). Finding no reversible error, judgment is affirmed. RENDLEN, J., concurs. SIMEONE, J., concurs and concurs in separate concurring opinion of BARDGETT, J. BARDGETT, J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed. DONNELLY, J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed. SEILER, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed. FINCH, Senior Judge, not participating. WELLIVER, J., not participating because not a member of the court when cause was submitted. BARDGETT, Judge, concurring. The principal opinion asserts that appellant's attack upon the facial constitutionality of sec. 563.230, RSMo 1969, the sodomy statute, cannot be entertained because it was not preserved for appeal in the trial court. A similar contention was made by the state in State v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.banc 1978). In Mitchell we quoted with approval from Kansas City v. Hammer, 347 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.1961), as follows: This state is thoroughly committed to the proposition that the unconstitutionality of an ordinance or statute on which a prosecution is based cannot be waived. The invalidity of such an act on constitutional grounds goes to the subject matter of the prosecution and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even by a collateral attack after conviction. Ex parte Lerner, 281 Mo. 18, 218 S.W. 331; Ex parte Taft, 284 Mo. 531, 225 S.W. 457; Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 229, 36 S.W. 628, 33 L.R.A. 606; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398; and State v. Finley, 187 Mo.App. 72, 172 S.W. 1162. 563 S.W.2d 22-23. The point should be entertained and decided. Upon entertaining this point I would hold that the statute is not facially unconstitutional as an illegal invasion of appellant's privacy. I therefore concur in affirming the judgment. DONNELLY, Judge, concurring. The principal opinion applies the harmless error tests articulated in State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 64, 65 (Mo.banc 1972) and finds the error in this case harmless. I agree. However, from this day forward, I would abandon the Degraffenreid tests and would hold that error in the admission of evidence is presumptively harmful    where the life or liberty of the citizen is at stake, State v. Shipley, 174 Mo. 512, 516, 74 S.W. 612, 613 (1903), and will be reversible error unless we are able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). I concur. SEILER, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. My reason is that I believe the introduction of the evidence about the attack upon Dale Corum, the friend of the prosecutrix, by defendant's brother, prevented defendant from having a fair trial. In the atmosphere of this trial, involving motorcycles, smoking marijuana, young people chasing around aimlessly at night, drinking, gang action and general mindless violence, the attack by defendant's brother on the prosecutrix's date could not have done other than inflame the jury. The attack on one third party by another, at a time when the defendant was not present or in any way aiding and abetting in what was happening, was immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent and was highly prejudicial, especially in a case in which rape and sodomy were the charges. Defendant should have a new trial. On the issue of how we should deal with error in the admission of evidence, I agree with Judge Donnelly's views as expressed in his concurring opinion. On the issue of whether the attack upon the constitutionality of the statute must be entertained, I agree with Judge Bardgett's views as expressed in his concurring opinion.