Opinion ID: 4521334
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Similarly Situated Requirement

Text: The FLSA does not define the term similarly situated. The Supreme Court, analyzing the same similarly situated standard of § 216(b) that is incorporated into both the FLSA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the ADEA), has held that Congress's goal in granting employees the right to proceed as a collective was to provide them the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 170. This results in the efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged FLSA violation. See id. This result -- the efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged FLSA violation -- can only be achieved to the extent that named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs share one or more issues of law or fact that are material to the disposition of their FLSA claims. Thus, to be similarly situated means that named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs are alike with regard to some material aspect of their litigation. See Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018). That is, party plaintiffs are similarly situated, and may proceed in a collective, to the extent 28 they share a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims. 4 It follows that if named plaintiffs and party plaintiffs share legal or factual similarities material to the disposition of their claims, dissimilarities in other respects should not defeat collective treatment. Id. If the opt-in plaintiffs are similar to the named plaintiffs in some respects material to the disposition of their claims, collective treatment may be to that extent appropriate, as it may to that extent facilitate the collective litigation of the party plaintiffs' claims. 5 This similarly situated standard is consistent with that endorsed by our sister circuits as well as district courts within this circuit. See, e.g., Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1117 (holding that, at Step Two, [p]arty plaintiffs are similarly situated, and may proceed in a collective, to the extent they share a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims); Halle v. W. Penn 4 In contending that we have equat[ed] 'similarly situated' with 'any similarity,' Dissent at 2, the Dissent criticizes a standard that -- although helpful to the critique -- is nowhere to be found in our text. As clearly set forth above, we do not hold that the named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) when they share any similarity; rather, we hold that the standard is met when there is similarity with respect to an issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claim. Contrary to the Dissent's assertions, the standard established here is meaningfully circumscribed. 5 District courts are well equipped to manage cases in this way. For example, Rule 42 provides for the possibility of partial consolidation for trial, to the extent separate actions involve common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1). 29 Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 226 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that, at Step Two, [b]eing 'similarly situated' means that one is subjected to some common employer practice that, if proved, would help demonstrate a violation of the FLSA (internal quotation marks omitted)); McGlone v. Contract Callers, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 364, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that, at Step Two, named and opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the extent they were common victims of a FLSA violation pursuant to a systematically-applied company policy or practice such that there exist common questions of law and fact that justify representational litigation (quoting Pefanis v. Westway Diner, Inc., No. 08-cv7813, 2010 WL 3564426, at  (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010)); see also Newberg on Class Actions § 23:39 (5th ed. 2017) (noting that under § 216(b), the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have all been subjected to some common employer practice that, if proved, would help demonstrate a violation of the FLSA). 6 6 The Dissent goes to great lengths to distinguish these cases and argue that the standard we set forth today is newly minted. Dissent at 1. But providing clarity is not making something new. The standard we adopt here is plainly compelled by the statutory text and Supreme Court precedent and has been endorsed by courts outside of this circuit along with lower courts within this Circuit. In selectively quoting language from these opinions to argue that they nonetheless employ elements of the ad hoc test, see Dissent at 4-5, the Dissent only further underscores the absence of a clear standard, and the need for clear guidance from this Court. 30