Opinion ID: 2982315
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Executive Exemption Test

Text: The Department of Labor (“DOL”) has established a four-part test to determine whether or not an employee has been appropriately classified under the executive exemption. See 29 C.F.R. 541.100. An employee who is an exempt executive is one who is “(1) [c]ompensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week . . . ; (2) [w]hose primary duty is management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; (3) [w]ho customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees; and (4) [w]ho has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose -3- No. 13-1816, Jeffrey Bacon, et al. v. Eaton Corp., et al. suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.” Id. Plaintiffs concede that the first three prongs of the DOL’s four-part test have been satisfied in this case. Therefore, the only issue before this Court, as we determine whether or not Plaintiffs had sufficient influence over personnel decisions to qualify as exempt executives, is whether the fourth prong has also been satisfied. Plaintiffs contend that the fourth prong was not satisfied, and that Defendants did not give particular weight to Plaintiffs’ recommendations and suggestions as to personnel decisions. Defendants contend, conversely, that Plaintiffs did have significant influence over personnel decisions and are exempt under the FLSA. The DOL’s test is to be “narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert [the exemptions],” Douglas v. Argo-Tech Corp., 113 F.3d 67, 70 (6th Cir. 1997), and the “employer bears not only the burden of proof, but also the burden on each element of the claimed exemption. Id.; see also Beauchamp v. Flex-N-Gate LLC, 357 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 2005). Moreover, a plaintiff “is entitled to summary judgment unless the defendant can come forward with evidence at least creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff meets each and every element of the exemption.” Beauchamp, 357 F.Supp. 2d at 1013 (quoting Martin, 381 F.3d at 578).