Opinion ID: 2588599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Failure to voir dire expert witnesses.

Text: [¶ 40] Finally, the appellant argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the qualifications of certain witnesses who were, or allegedly could have been, considered experts. The appellant argues that trial counsel should have challenged the credentials of the Crisis Intervention Services director (CIS director), who testified about patterns of behavior in domestic violence. The appellant also argues that the person who transcribed the 911 call was not qualified to give expert opinion about certain sounds heard in the 911 call. [¶ 41] An attorney's failure or refusal to voir dire an expert witness is not per se ineffective performance. Saenz v. State, 103 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex.Ct.App.2003) ([N]either the rule nor the case law creates a presumption of error if counsel fails to request voir dire [of an expert witness].); see also Kimbrough v. State, 886 So.2d 965, 982 (Fla.2004). In order for the failure to voir dire an expert witness to constitute reversible ineffective assistance, the appellant bears the burden of showing the testimony would likely have been inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶¶ 23-26, 201 P.3d 434, 441-42 (Wyo.2009) [7] ; see also Wright v. State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Minn.2009). Therefore, in addressing this claim, we must first determine if the expert testimony is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs, and only if the evidence fails that test should we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that `but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Williamson v. State, 994 So.2d 1000, 1010-11 (Fla.2008) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2069). [¶ 42] When testifying, the CIS director explained her qualifications and experience, and then stated: Q. Have you had occasion also to testify about that in the courts of the State of Wyoming? A. Yes, I have. Q. Is that both civil and criminal cases? A. Yes, sir. Q. Have you testified for both the defense and the prosecution? A. Yes, sir. Q. In fact, have you been qualified as an expert witness in this area in this court? A. In Natrona County District Court with Judge Park, yes, sir. On appeal, the appellant undertakes no effort to demonstrate that the CIS director would not have qualified as an expert under Daubert , or to demonstrate how defense counsel's failure to object to the expert testimony resulted in prejudice. After our own review of the record, including the testimony as to the qualifications of the CIS director and the relevance of her testimony, we find that she was adequately qualified as an expert and that her testimony was such that it assisted the jury. Furthermore, we have previously recognized that the type of testimony offered by the CIS director is proper expert testimony under similar circumstances. See Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶¶ 21-23, 96 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo.2004). In short, the appellant has not shown that any effort by defense counsel to exclude the testimony of the CIS director would have been successful, and thus has not shown that defense counsel's failure to voir dire her constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. [¶ 43] The appellant's final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves the testimony of the individual who transcribed Ms. Randel's 911 call. In her testimony, the transcriptionist described what she surmised to be a hitting noise and speculated that the reason the victim's voice was muffled at one point in the recording was due to the phone [being] very close to the caller's face. The appellant claims that such subjective descriptions either approximated an expert opinionwhich the transcriptionist was allegedly unqualified to giveor invaded the province of the jury. Accordingly, the appellant now claims it was ineffective assistance when counsel failed either to move to have the witness disqualified as an expert or otherwise to move to exclude her testimony. This argument, however, ignores the actions that counsel did take. [¶ 44] The record reflects that trial counsel objected to the subjective statements in the transcript and the qualifications of the transcriptionist. Such actions by trial counsel demonstrate that he was trying, as best he could, to exclude the subjective statements in the transcript. As a compromise, the judge ruled that the transcript would be given to the jury only when the audio recording played and would be collected immediately after, so the jurors would not have access to it during their deliberations. The record shows the transcripts were collected when the witness was excused. Also, the judge specifically cautioned the jury that although the transcript was going to be provided while the jury listened to the recording, It is only to be an aid to you in your consideration of the evidence, and you need to rely upon your own hearing and your own perception of the 911 call in connection with your actual evaluation of your use of that evidence. Finally, trial counsel requested permission and was allowed to conduct a voir dire examination of the witness about what expertise enable[d] [her] to accurately say what's on a recording above that of anybody else and, later, extensively cross-examined her about the fact that her subjective statements merely reflected her interpretation of what certain recorded sounds conveyed, which was not the only possible interpretation. In such a circumstance, it is unclear what other actions the appellant wishes his trial counsel would have taken. He states that [c]ounsel failed to object to such testimony based upon a failure to vet expert witnesses through the Daubert process. On the contrary, trial counsel did question the transcriptionist about whether she had an ability to recognize the sounds on an audiotape beyond that possessed by anyone else and then renewed his objection to the admissibility of her transcription. [¶ 45] Considering all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the admission of the 911 call transcription, and in light of trial counsel's efforts to exclude admission of that evidence, we cannot say that trial counsel's performance was deficient; that is counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed [appellant] by the Sixth Amendment. Montez, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 3, 201 P.3d at 436 (quoting Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986)).