Opinion ID: 433759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evasion of Important Public Policies

Text: 77 Antisuit injunctions are also justified when necessary to prevent litigants' evasion of the forum's important public policies. 69 This principle is similar to the rule that a foreign judgment not entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution will not be enforced within the United States when contrary to the crucial public policies of the forum in which enforcement is requested. 70 Both rules recognize that a state is not required to give effect to foreign judicial proceedings grounded on policies which do violence to its own fundamental interests. 71 78 The standard for refusing to enforce judgments on public policy grounds is strict; defendants are rarely able to block judgments on these grounds. 72 Enjoining participation in a foreign lawsuit in order to preempt a potential judgment is a much greater interference with an independent country's judicial processes. It follows that an antisuit injunction will issue to preclude participation in the litigation only when the strongest equitable factors favor its use. 73 Both the importance to the forum of the law allegedly evaded, and the identity of the potentially evading party are relevant. 79 In this situation, the district court's injunction properly prevented appellants from attempting to escape application of the antitrust laws to their conduct of business here in the United States. KLM and Sabena seek to evade culpability under statutes of admitted economic importance to the United States 74 which are specifically applicable to their activities in the United States, and upon which Laker may have legitimately relied. 80 Whatever the merits of the British defendants' claims based upon the Bermuda II Treaty, 75 KLM and Sabena have no claim to antitrust immunity under their air service treaties. In fact, far from conferring any immunity, their treaties contain express language subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the United States over predatory pricing and abuse of monopoly power. Article Twelve of the United States-Belgium Air Transport Services Agreement provides, 81 (1) Each Party shall allow prices for air transportation to be established by each designated airline based upon commercial considerations in the marketplace. Intervention by the Parties shall be limited to: 82
83 (b) protection of consumers from prices that are unduly high or restrictive because of the abuse of a dominant position; and 84 (c) protection of airlines from prices that are artificially low because of direct or indirect governmental subsidy or support. 76 85 There is similar language in the United States-Netherlands air service agreement 77 and the United States-Germany 78 air service agreement. 86 These provisions were all negotiated recently, at a time when the countries could be expected to have been familiar with the United States' position regarding enforcement of its antitrust laws over foreign corporations operating in the United States. Significantly, in the face of these express treaty provisions appellants have not asserted before the United States courts any claim to immunity under the air service treaties. 87 In light of these treaty provisions, we find it offensive that KLM and Sabena attempt to ride on the coattails of the British airlines under the Bermuda II Treaty and the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, which were respectively intended to regulate British air carriage and to protect primarily the economic interests of British domestic corporations. We do not see how a suit by a British corporation against Dutch and Belgian corporations involving anticompetitive activities allegedly taken by the defendants to protect their United States-Dutch and United States-Belgian air markets adversely implicates British trading interests. British interests would be damaged only if a British corporation will have to pay the judgment. Conceivably, British trading interests may even be furthered by retaining KLM, Sabena, and the other non-British parties to the action, since a judgment against any one of them would contribute towards the full satisfaction of the creditors' claims against a British corporation in liquidation. 88 KLM and Sabena are not less properly enjoined from pursuing the British litigation by virtue of their status as foreign corporations. Because of the inherent interference of an antisuit injunction, injunctions are occasionally limited to restrain only residents of the forum state from pursuing foreign litigation, and do not necessarily run to all those who would be subject to the forum state's in personam jurisdiction. However, on occasion, circumstances have even permitted restraints on actions by foreign parties in other forums. 79 89 The propriety of such a restraint should be clear with respect to KLM and Sabena. Foreign corporations doing business in the enjoining forum are expected to abide by the forum's laws. We recognize that the British Government disputes the right of the United States to apply its antitrust laws to British air carriers operating in the United States. However, KLM and Sabena have not argued that their status as air carriers under their air service treaties guarantees them any special status in this regard. Indeed, their treaties permit signatory government intervention to redress predatory prices or abuse of dominant market position. In this situation, KLM and Sabena should be treated as any other resident or corporation operating within this country. They are not permitted to escape forum policies any more than other residents. 90 Sabena's argument that the district court's antisuit injunction compels Britain to acquiesce in conduct by its nationals that may violate its policies disfavoring international application of treble damages laws 80 is disengenuous. The district court's order does not compel Britain to do anything, but only preserves free access to United States courts. The British Government is free to pursue other sanctions against Laker. 81