Opinion ID: 6534253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the 2012 burglary conviction

Text: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a person's character and show the person acted in conformity therewith, but may be admissible as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. NRS 48.045(2). A presumption of inadmissibility attaches to all prior bad act evidence. Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252 , 259, 129 P.3d 671 , 677 (2006) (quoting Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184 , 195, 111 P.3d 690 , 697 (2005) ). To overcome the presumption of inadmissibility, the prosecution must demonstrate that: (1) the prior bad act is relevant to the crime charged and for a purpose other than proving the defendant's propensity, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. 108 , 117, 270 P.3d 1244 , 1250 (2012). The decision of whether to admit or exclude such evidence is within the district court's discretion and will not be overturned absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Rhymes v. State, 121 Nev. 17 , 21-22, 107 P.3d 1278 , 1281 (2005). Identification of an at-issue, nonpropensity purpose for admitting prior-bad-act evidence is a necessary first step of any NRS 48.045(2) analysis. Newman v. State , 129 Nev, 222 , 231, 298 P.3d 1171 , 1178 (2013) (citing United States v. Miller , 673 F.3d 688 , 697 (7th Cir. 2012) ). Because the issue on which we accepted review and directed supplemental briefing in this case pertains to intent and absence of mistake, we discuss each in turn.
Hubbard contends that every crime has an element of intent, and for that reason, unless intent is raised in substance or is at issue during trial, bad act evidence is inadmissible to prove it. Thus, Hubbard argues that since he denied being present at the residence that evening and asserted that he had been shot during an unrelated incident, he implicitly or practically conceded that he acted with intent if the jury found he committed the acts inside the residence, and thus, because intent was not at issue, evidence of the 2012 burglary was irrelevant. The State argues that intent is automatically at issue in specific intent crimes and it is not necessary for the defense to contest intent before the prosecution may address it. Our prior caselaw does not clearly address the admissibility of prior act evidence to prove intent for a specific intent crime, particularly where the defendant denies involvement in the crime. In Wallin v. State, this court held that prior bad act evidence was admissible where the defense placed intent at issue, but the case involved a prosecution for battery, a general intent crime. 93 Nev. 10 , 11, 558 P.2d 1143 , 1143-44 (1977) ; see NRS 200.481 (defining battery). Additionally, in Ford v. State , this court upheld the district court's decision to admit the defendant's five prior acts of burglary to prove the defendant's intent and/or absence of mistake when  he broke into the victim's residence. 122 Nev. 796 , 806, 138 P.3d 500 , 506-07 (2006). It is not clear from the Ford opinion, however, whether the defense theory at trial was that the defendant was not present and did not commit the crime, id. at 800 , 138 P.3d at 503 (Throughout the interview, Ford was handcuffed to a table and maintained that he was not in the neighborhood where [the victim] was murdered that day.), or whether the defense theory was mistake/lack of intent, id. at 799 , 138 P.3d at 502 (When [the victim] asked Ford why he was breaking into the house, Ford professed that he was only trying to use the restroom.). The prosecution has the burden to prove all elements of the charged offenses, and prior bad act evidence may be probative of an essential element of the criminal offense. See Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62 , 69, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Moreover, the prosecution's burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense. Id. Some federal circuit courts hold that when a defendant is charged with a specific intent crime, intent is an issue in the case regardless of whether the defendant had made it an issue, thereby permitting other acts evidence to prove intent. See, e.g. , United States v. Johnson , 27 F.3d 1186 , 1192 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that when the crime charged requires specific intent as an element, the prosecution may use other acts evidence to prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent notwithstanding any defense the defendant might raise). Other courts hold that when the defendant claims not to have engaged in the acts at all, evidence of prior bad acts may be inadmissible to prove intent. See, e.g., United States v. Jemal , 26 F.3d 1267 , 1273 (3d Cir. 1994) ([W]here a defendant has claimed that he did not distribute drugs at all rather than claiming that he distributed a substance that turned out to be drugs without knowledge that the substance was drugs, the Second Circuit has precluded the admission of prior crime evidence.); People v. Clark , 394 Ill.Dec. 91 , 35 N.E.3d 1060 , 1067-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (holding evidence that the defendant had stolen a bicycle previously was inadmissible to show intent because intent was not a contested issue where the eyewitness evidence left no doubt that the perpetrator intended to steal the bicycle and the defendant did not claim a lack of intent to steal (such as negligence or recklessness in taking the bicycle) but that he was not the perpetrator at all). We are persuaded by an alternative approach taken in United States v. Gomez , in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that although intent is at issue in specific intent crimes, the rule is not one of automatic admission. 763 F.3d 845 , 858-59 (7th Cir. 2014). In Gomez, the court explained that for general intent crimes, the defendant's intent can be inferred from the act itself, so intent is not necessarily at issue and other-act evidence is not admissible to show intent unless the defendant puts intent 'at issue' beyond a general denial of guilt. Id. at 858 ([U]nless the government has reason to believe that the defense will raise intent as an issue, evidence of other acts directed toward this issue should not be used in the government's case-in-chief and should not be admitted until the defendant raises the issue. (quoting United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 , 781 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Huddleston v. United States , 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) ) ). But for specific intent crimes, intent is automatically at issue as a material element to be proven by the government, and evidence of other acts may be admissible to prove intent. Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 . The court cautioned that the rule is not one of automatic admission; other-act evidence offered to prove intent can still be completely irrelevant to that issue, or relevant only in an impermissible way. Id. at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the other-act evidence must be relevant without relying on a propensity inference, and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Id. Furthermore, the degree to which the issue is actually contested may affect the probative value of the other-act evidence. Id. Here, the State charged Hubbard with burglary while in possession of a firearm when he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously entered the residence while possessing  a firearm with the intent to commit a larceny, felony, and/or robbery. The prosecution had the burden of proving a specific intent upon entering the residence. See NRS 205.060(1) ; Stowe v. State , 109 Nev. 743 , 745, 857 P.2d 15 , 17 (1993) (discussing the specific intent required for burglary). Under the facts of this case, however, we conclude that evidence of the 2012 burglary had little relevance to the issue of intent. See NRS 48.015 (defining relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence). The evidence showed that three unknown men barged into the house at night and ordered the occupants about, property was taken by the men at gunpoint, shots were fired, and the three men fled the residence. This evidence left little doubt that at the time the perpetrators entered the residence, they intended to commit a robbery, larceny, or other felony therein. See Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, 3 Jones on Evidence § 17:64 (7th ed. 2016). This is because [w]hen a person's conduct leaves no real doubts as to the actor's intent, it is difficult to see much need or justification for similar acts on that issue. When a man walks into a store, draws a gun, and orders the store clerk to empty the cash register into a sack, surely a jury needs no additional evidence as to the man's intent.... [T]he only real issue is not, why did the actor do what he or she did, but is the defendant in fact the person in question. Id. The evidence did not suggest that the perpetrator alleged to be Hubbard entered the residence for an innocent reason and then formed the intent to commit robbery or another felony after entry. Moreover, Hubbard denied participation in the act or being present at the scene in his statements to the police and his testimony at trial. Under these facts, evidence of Hubbard's 2012 burglary had little relevance to establishing Hubbard's intent at the time he entered the residence, and the minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice,
Hubbard contends that mistake is not an element of the offense and can only be at issue when the defendant raises it as a defense, such as admitting to the act but claiming a genuine mistake in the belief that the act was legal. Here, for example, mistake would have been at issue had Hubbard's defense been that he entered the home believing that he was attending a party or that he mistakenly went to the wrong home for dinner with friends. The State asserts that NRS 48.045 permits prior act evidence to prove absence of mistake or accident, and it is not necessary that the absence of mistake or accident occur on the part of the defendant. The State argues that absence of mistake was relevant because Hubbard claimed he was not present and was shot during an unrelated incident. For the absence of mistake or accident exception under NRS 48.045(2), we have stated that it applies when the evidence tends to show the defendant's knowledge of a fact material to the specific crime charged, such as knowledge of the controlled nature of a substance when such knowledge is an element of the charged offense. Cirillo v. State , 96 Nev. 489 , 492, 611 P.2d 1093 , 1095 (1980) ; cf. Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62 , 69-70, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (observing that evidence that the child had previously been injured was probative on the question of the actor's intent because it showed the child's death resulted from an intentional act by someone and not from an accident regardless of whether the defendant raised the defense of accidental death at trial). Prior act evidence can also be used to rebut a defense of mistake or accident. See Newman v. State , 129 Nev. 222 , 231, 298 P.3d 1171 , 1178 (2013) (observing that proof of prior injuries or abuse may tend to disprove accidental injury, a common defense to a child abuse charge). Thus, the absence of mistake or accident exception may be relevant to proving either the mens rea (the defendant concedes performing the act but claims to have done so mistakenly or with innocent intent) or the actus rea (the defendant concedes harm or loss but argues it resulted from an accident and not of his agency). See Edward J. Imwinkelried,  An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, the Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 419 , 422 (2006). Absence of mistake or accident is grounded in the law of probabilities. Innocent persons sometimes accidentally become enmeshed in suspicious circumstances, but it is objectively unlikely that will happen over and over again by random chance. Id. at 423 . In this case, evidence of the 2012 burglary would be relevant to proving that Hubbard entered the home with a felonious intent rather than by mistake, under some misapprehension, or as an innocent victim of the circumstances surrounding the robbery. But the State did not make that argument for admission of the evidence under this exception, and instead asserted that the evidence was relevant to prove Hubbard was the perpetrator who was shot during the robbery and did not receive the wound during some unrelated accident. 2 Used in this way, the State is essentially trying to prove that Hubbard was correctly identified as the perpetrator. See United States v. Merriweather , 78 F.3d 1070 , 1077 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that absence of mistake on behalf of the government in identifying the perpetrator is not a legitimate basis to admit other acts evidence). Thus, as with intent, the prior act had little relevance on the issue of absence of mistake or accident by Hubbard where he claims he was not present. Given the lack of relevance that the 2012 burglary has to either intent or lack of mistake, it becomes clear that the evidence was instead being used for an impermissible propensity purpose, i.e., if Hubbard committed a burglary before, he must have done so in this case. Thus, the low probative value was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice, and we conclude that the district court's admission of Davis' testimony regarding the 2012 burglary for purposes of proving intent or absence of mistake was a manifest abuse of discretion.