Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Immutability of the Group's Distinguishing Characteristic

Text: A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members of a class are entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes is whether the attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is immutable or otherwise beyond their control. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, supra, 483 U.S. at 602, 107 S.Ct. 3008. Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay persons from others and qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal ostracism, namely, their attraction to persons of the same sex. On a number of occasions, in connection with its consideration of a claim that a particular group is entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status, the United States Supreme Court has considered whether the group's distinguishing characteristic is immutable. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, supra, 427 U.S. at 505, 96 S.Ct. 2755 (illegitimacy is a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual); Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (plurality opinion) (since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities [on] the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility [internal quotation marks omitted]); cf. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 60 L.Ed.2d 269 (1979) (statute prohibiting father, who has failed to legitimate his illegitimate child, from suing for child's wrongful death does not create inherently suspect class based [on] certain . . . immutable human attributes); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (conscientious objectors do not constitute suspect class because, inter alia, they lack traditional indicia of suspect class, including immutable characteristic). Immutability has been deemed to be a relevant consideration because it make[s] discrimination more clearly unfair. High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, supra, 909 F.2d at 377 (Canby, J., dissenting). Immutability may be considered important because it would be pointless to try to deter membership in the immutable group, or because individual group members cannot be blamed for their status, or because immutability heightens the sense of stigma associated with membership. . . . Note, supra, 98 Harv. L.Rev. at 1302-1303. Put differently, [t]he degree to which an individual controls, or cannot avoid, the acquisition of a defining trait, and the relative ease or difficulty with which a trait can be changed, are relevant to whether a classification is `suspect' or `quasi-suspect' because this inquiry is one way of asking whether someone, rather than being victimized, has voluntarily joined a persecuted group and thereby invited the discrimination. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 346 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A number of courts that have considered this factor have rejected the claim that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic. [28] Other courts, however, as well as many, if not most, scholarly commentators, have reached a contrary conclusion. [29] Although we do not doubt that sexual orientationheterosexual or homosexual is highly resistant to change, it is not necessary for us to decide whether sexual orientation is immutable in the same way and to the same extent that race, national origin and gender are immutable, because, even if it is not, the plaintiffs nonetheless have established that they fully satisfy this consideration. Sexual intimacy is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to. . . the development of human personality.. . . Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that, because the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. . . [represents] an integral part of human freedom; Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 576-77, 123 S.Ct. 2472; individual decisions by consenting adults concerning the intimacies of their physical relationships are entitled to constitutional protection. See id., at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472. Indeed, it is indisputable that sexual orientation forms a significant part of a person's identity. Able v. United States, 968 F.Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir.1998); see also L. Tribe, supra, § 16-33, at p. 1616 (sexual orientation, whether homosexual or heterosexual, is central to personality of individual). It is equally apparent that, [b]ecause a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment. In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 842, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384; see also Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir.2000) ([s]exual orientation and sexual identity . . . are so fundamental to one's identity that a person should not be required to abandon them); Watkins v. United States Army, supra, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment) (Scientific proof aside, it [also] seems appropriate to ask whether heterosexuals feel capable of changing their sexual orientation. Would heterosexuals living in a city that passed an ordinance burdening those who engaged in or desired to engage in sex with persons of the opposite sex find it easy not only to abstain from heterosexual activity but also to shift the object of their sexual desires to persons of the same sex? . . . [T]he possibility of such a difficult and traumatic change does not make sexual orientation `mutable' for equal protection purposes. [Citations omitted; emphasis in original.]); Jantz v. Muci, supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1548 (to discriminate against individuals who accept their given sexual orientation and refuse to alter that orientation to conform to societal norms does significant violence to a central and defining character of those individuals). In view of the central role that sexual orientation plays in a person's fundamental right to self-determination, we fully agree with the plaintiffs that their sexual orientation represents the kind of distinguishing characteristic that defines them as a discrete group for purposes of determining whether that group should be afforded heightened protection under the equal protection provisions of the state constitution. This prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when, as in the present case, the identifying trait is so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it]. . . . Watkins v. United States Army, supra, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash.2d 1, 105 n. 78, 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (Bridge, J., concurring in the dissent) (Courts . . . should not conclude that homosexuality is mutable [for purposes of determining whether gay persons are entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status] because reasonable minds disagree about the causes of homosexuality or because some religious tenets forbid gay persons from `acting on' homosexual behavior. Instead, courts should ask whether the characteristic at issue is one governments have any business requiring a person to change. [Emphasis in original.]). In other words, gay persons, because they are characterized by a central, defining [trait] of personhood, which may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individual's sense of self; Jantz v. Muci, supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1548; are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteristic. See id.; see also note, supra, 98 Harv. L.Rev. at 1303 (sexual orientation, like race and sex, is one of only a handful of characteristics that ha[s] such a pervasive and profound impact on the [relevant] aspects of personhood). To decide otherwise would be to penalize someone for being unable or unwilling to change . . . a central aspect of individual and group identity; Watkins v. United States Army, supra, at 726 (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); a result repugnant to the values animating the constitutional ideal of equal protection of the laws. Id.