Opinion ID: 2286297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Representation of Marilyn McCall

Text: Marilyn McCall retained respondent to represent her against the seller of an automobile she had purchased which was defective. Respondent collected $500 from her, and indicated that an additional $500 would be required when the matter went to court. Subsequently, respondent asked for an additional $3000 to litigate her case, but Ms. McCall protested, and respondent agreed to handle the case on a contingency basis. He provided no contingent fee agreement. Respondent filed a complaint on her behalf, and the named defendants filed an answer and counterclaim, which respondent answered. Respondent rejected offers of settlement consisting of a return of her deposit less amounts paid for insurance and transportation expenses for the period she was without a car. The court dismissed the case when neither respondent nor his client appeared for a scheduling conference. Respondent did not notify his client of the court date, and he never informed her that the case had been dismissed. The Credit Acceptance Corporation filed an action against Ms. McCall in Maryland in connection with the retail installment contract and security agreement which she had signed when she purchased the car. Respondent failed to return her numerous calls, and she went to his office, and he assured her that the other case remained viable and that he would assist her with this new case. Respondent did not return her calls thereafter, and Ms. McCall did not go to court because she did not want to appear without her lawyer. The Maryland court entered judgment against her in the amount of $5720.35 plus costs and prejudgment interest and attorney's fees in the amount of $935.67. The order provided that she had until January 8, 1998, to file a motion to vacate the judgment, stating a factual and legal basis for a defense. Ms. McCall was unable to reach appellant, who had moved to another office, until January 7th, but he agreed to prepare the necessary papers which he told her to pick up the next day. She called the next day as instructed, but respondent was not available to take her calls, and the secretary had no knowledge of any documents for her. Respondent did not draft or file documents in the Maryland action, and the Credit Acceptance Corporation commenced garnishment proceedings against Ms. McCall. Not until she filed her ethical complaint did she learn that the action against the seller of the auto had been dismissed. Respondent admitted that he agreed to help Ms. McCall, but he contends that his failure to do so is not actionable because the case[ ] was not part of the contract she had with me. The Board agreed that respondent's violations of the following rules were established by the evidence in this matter: Rule 1.3(a) and (c) (failure to represent his client with diligence and zeal within the bounds of the law and/or failure to act with reasonable promptness in representing client); Rule 1.3(b) (intentional failure to seek lawful objectives of client and/or prejudice or damage to client in course of professional relationship); Rule 1.4(a) (failure to keep client reasonably informed about status of her matter and to comply promptly with requests for information); Rule 1.4(c) (failure to inform client promptly of offer of settlement); Rule 1.5(b) and (c) (failure to provide client a writing setting forth basis for fee before or within reasonable time after commencing representation or to provide written contingent-fee agreement stating method for determination of fee). The facts in the McCall matter, as found by the Hearing Committee and summarized above, establish the violations of the foregoing rules. The Hearing Committee determined, and the Board agreed, that the evidence established that respondent engaged in an impermissible conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7(b)(4), when he made unsolicited sexual advances toward Ms. McCall. Respondent contends that the court should discredit Ms. McCall's testimony concerning his improper sexual advances because she failed to raise them in her initial complaint to Bar Counsel. He contends that her charge constitutes a recent fabrication. However, a review of her complaint reveals that she did raise them when she first complained to Bar Counsel. He also points out reasons why her complaint in this regard is implausible ( e.g., she never alleged in her statement of complaint or at the hearing that she screamed). Assessing the credibility of the witness is for the factfinder, here the Hearing Committee. There is nothing inherently incredible about the witness' credibility such that this court can overturn it as a clearly erroneous finding. Accordingly, we must reject respondent's sole challenge to the charges arising out of the McCall matter.