Opinion ID: 1310247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: expectation of privacy at threshold of dwelling and requirement of reasonable suspicion to deploy canine to sniff for illegal drugs at threshold of dwelling

Text: It has been observed that the right of privacy associated with the home under the Fourth Amendment is one of the unique values of our civilization. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948). The U.S. Supreme Court recently noted: In 1604, an English court made the now-famous observation that `the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.' Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 195 (K.B.). Wilson v. Layne, ___ U.S.___, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). The Court continued: The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home. Id. The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of the home is substantial, and it has been said to be the `chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). In Nebraska, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. IV and Neb. Const. art. I, § 7. State v. Konfrst, 251 Neb. 214, 556 N.W.2d 250 (1996). The Fourth Amendment and Neb. Const. art. I, § 7, prohibit only unreasonable searches and seizures. These constitutional provisions do not protect citizens from all governmental intrusion, but only from unreasonable intrusions. State v. Ranson, 245 Neb. 71, 511 N.W.2d 97 (1994). The leading case regarding canine sniffs is United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), in which it was concluded that the evidence of cocaine involved therein should be suppressed. In Place, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the federal Fourth Amendment implications of the use of a drug detection dog to sniff luggage in an airport. After Place arrived at a New York airport, he refused to voluntarily allow police to search his two suitcases. The officers allowed Place to leave, but took his luggage to a separate location for a drug detection dog to sniff. The dog alerted aggressively to one of Place's suitcases. At this point, approximately 90 minutes had elapsed from the officers' initial contact with Place. It was a Friday afternoon, and rather than immediately seeking a search warrant, the officers held Place's suitcases over the weekend and applied for a search warrant the following Monday morning. When police executed the warrant and searched Place's suitcases, they found 1,125 grams of cocaine. The Court in Place stated that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Place observed that a canine sniff is sui generis in that the canine alert is limited to the existence of contraband and that the sniff is not highly intrusive. The Place Court determined that the canine sniff of the luggage did not, by itself, violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Place Court concluded, however, that because the police detained the luggage for a lengthy period and failed to diligently pursue the investigation, the cocaine discovered in Place's luggage pursuant to the search warrant should have been suppressed. In analyzing the facts of the case, the Place Court observed that a seizure of Place's luggage might be justified within the exception to the Fourth Amendment in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), where police possess a reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts that illegal narcotics are present and the investigative detention is properly limited in scope. The Place Court stated that the canine sniff was not a search under the Fourth Amendment, and we have similarly concluded in State v. Morrison, 243 Neb. 469, 500 N.W.2d 547 (1993), that a canine sniff of a package sent by express mail was not a search but was, nevertheless, proper because it was preceded by facts amounting to reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion, commonly required to support a seizure or detention, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), is a quantum of facts less than probable cause, commonly required to support a search, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). See, also, State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 589 N.W.2d 108 (1999). Where the police have reasonable suspicion, they may pursue their investigation either to confirm their suspicion or to dispel the suspicion that crime is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, supra . Following United States v. Place, supra , in canine sniff cases in a variety of settings such as canine sniffs of luggage, packages, and public warehouses, the majority of courts have approved of the admission of evidence gained by the use of a canine sniff if the canine sniff evidence was obtained based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion. See State v. Waz, 240 Conn. 365, 692 A.2d 1217 (1997) (cases collected). For example, in the context of a canine sniff of the corridor of a storage locker facility, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, referring to the canine sniff as a search under Pennsylvania's constitution, stated: We believe that there is a Fourth Amendment middle ground applicable to the investigations conducted by police handlers of narcotics detection dogs. On the one hand, much of the law enforcement utility of such dogs would be lost if full blown warrant procedures were required before a canine sniff could be used; but on the other, it is our view that a free society will not remain free if police may use this, or any other crime detection device, at random and without reason. Accordingly, we hold that a narcotics detection dog may be deployed to test for the presence of narcotics... where: (1) the police are able to articulate reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek to test; and (2) the police are lawfully present in the place where the canine sniff is conducted. Our holding is based in part, on considerations not dissimilar to those stated in United States v. Place : a canine sniff-search is inherently less intrusive upon an individual's privacy than other searches such as wiretapping or rummaging through one's luggage; it is unlikely to intrude except marginally upon innocent persons; and an individual's interest in being free from police harassment, annoyance, inconvenience and humiliation is reasonably certain of protection if the police must have a reason before they may ... utilize a narcotics detection dog. Com. v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 465-66, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (1987). With respect to canine sniffs in hallways adjoining residential quarters, the type of sniff which is the subject of the instant case, numerous courts have held that a canine sniff intrudes into an area where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy and that a canine sniff in a residential hallway must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts. Thus, for example, in People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 26, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 392 (1990), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1219, 111 S.Ct. 2830, 115 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1991), New York's highest court, in a case involving a warrantless canine sniff in an apartment hallway, concluded a canine sniff was a search under the state's constitution and stated as follows: Given the uniquely discriminate and nonintrusive nature of such an investigative device, as well as its significant utility to law enforcement authorities, we conclude that it may be used without a warrant or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a residence contains illicit contraband. The Dunn court added: To hold otherwise, we believe would raise the specter of the police roaming indiscriminately through the corridors of public housing projects with trained dogs in search of drugs.... Such an Orwellian notion would be repugnant under our State Constitution.... Id. at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392. The above-quoted material from People v. Dunn, supra , recognized that we cannot forgive the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the name of law enforcement [and] it is not asking too much that officers be required to comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one's home... are invaded. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). For the sake of completeness, we note that some courts have held that there is no legitimate privacy expectation in a residential apartment hallway and that thus, canine sniffs do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. U.S., 627 A.2d 499 (D.C.1993); State v. Taylor, 763 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have stated that there is a heightened expectation of privacy in a residential apartment hallway, United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, Fisher v. United States, 474 U.S. 819, 106 S.Ct. 66, 88 L.Ed.2d 54, reversed in part on other grounds 6 F.Supp.2d 254 (S.D.N.Y.1998), and thus a canine sniff may not proceed in the absence of probable cause. See, similarly, State v. Dearman, 92 Wash.App. 630, 962 P.2d 850 (1998) (holding that probable cause is required prior to canine sniff outside residential garage). We agree with the courts which conclude an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy interests may extend in a limited manner beyond the four walls of the home, depending on the facts, including some expectation of privacy to be free from police canine sniffs for illegal drugs in the hallway outside an apartment or at the threshold of a residence, and that a canine sniff under these circumstances must be based on no less than reasonable, articulable suspicion. As described more fully below, under the facts of this case, we conclude that, given the legitimate expectation of some measure of privacy in the hallway, the canine sniff for illegal drugs which lacked reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment and Neb. Const. art. I, § 7. Our reasoning is similar to that in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), in which the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that given the legitimate expectation of privacy in a telephone booth, the placement of a monitoring device on the outside thereof violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. See, similarly, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (reasoning that trespass by police officers into rooming house violated privacy of home, requiring suppression of seized evidence).