Opinion ID: 2551758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Arrest, Post- Miranda Silence

Text: In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 49 L. Ed.2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's silence at a time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The rule rests on the fundamental fairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 88 L. Ed.2d 623, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986). In Thompkins' first appeal, he claimed that the State had improperly introduced evidence of his post-arrest silence. Although this court reversed Thompkins' conviction on a separate issue, we addressed the issue of post-arrest silence, stating: During the State's direct examination of a police officer, the officer testified that he was assigned to interview Thompkins. He stated that he gave Thompkins the Miranda warnings. Then the officer was asked, `Did Mr. Thompkins make any statement to you at that time?' The officer replied, `A couple. I advised him of his rights and he told me he had nothing to say at that point.' Counsel immediately objected and moved for mistrial. After reviewing the record, we find that the State improperly introduced evidence that the defendant had invoked his right to silence. Unless a different factual situation exists in the next trial, the fact that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent should not be admitted into evidence. 263 Kan. at 621. During Thompkins' second trial, the prosecutor asked the arresting officer if he read Thompkins his Miranda rights. The officer stated that Thompkins was read his rights in the presence of officers. The prosecutor then asked if Thompkins made any statements while the officers were filling out their paperwork. The officer replied, Yes ma'am. The suspect began talking. At first he didn't want to say anything, we were asking him what his name was, his address, phone number, pertinent information for our reports, he didn't wanthe didn't tell us anything. And then we had found At that point, the defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the witness had introduced evidence of Thompkins' invocation of his right to silence. The issue was taken up outside the presence of the jury. At the conclusion of arguments, the judge ruled: The Court is going to find, first of all, that the officer's statement I think was inadvertent. I can tellwell, the record should reflect that I saw this coming as soon as that question was asked and I think his response was appropriate as to what took place and I don't think that this officer intended to comment on Mr. Thompkins' silence. I don't think the State intended to elicit the answer that came in the fashion in which it did come. But the Court is taking the position that because this was inadvertent, I'm not sure how significant that would be to any of the jurors in terms of what theyany significance they would put to that. I'm also taking into account the fact that the defense on opening statement basically indicated to the effect that we admit that Mr. Thompkins did kill his wife and so basically the issue is the degree of the homicide basically it's my understanding of what this case is all about here today. I have very briefly I should state reviewed Doyle v. Ohio , which is the United States Supreme Court decision dealing with post Miranda silence. I have looked at State v. Mims, which is our Kansas Supreme Court case which basically adopted the Doyle rule for Kansas, also briefly looked at United States Supreme Court case called Brecht v. Abrahamson and one other Kansas case whose name escapes me at this moment, but if either counsel want it, I'll provide it to you. And based on all of those cases an the purpose of the rule and how it's to be interpreted, the Court's going to find this was an inadvertent error. I don't think it was significant in the context of this particular case and I am very confident that Ms. Morehead is not going to comment upon that to the jury, and I think that we should proceed and I think we should proceed on the basis that Mr. Thompkins made some unsolicited statements. That's what you wanted to get to; is that correct? The trial court's ruling denying a mistrial was based, in part, on Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 123 L. Ed.2d 353, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), where the United States Supreme Court held that in determining whether habeas relief must be granted for the prosecution's use for impeachment purposes of the petitioner's post-Miranda silence, the standard is whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, rather than whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Brecht standard of review is limited to collateral attacks on a conviction. For direct appeals, the standard of review for federal constitutional trial errors remains whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed.2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). In State v. Edwards, 264 Kan. 177, 195, 955 P.2d 1276 (1998), this court stated: It is constitutionally impermissible for the State to elicit evidence at trial of an accused's post-Miranda silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 49 L. Ed.2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240, (1976); State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 685, 887 P.2d 88 (1994). A Doyle violation occurs when the State attempts to impeach a defendant's credibility at trial by arguing or by introducing evidence that the defendant did not avail himself or herself of the first opportunity to clear his or her name when confronted by police officers but instead invoked his or her constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Brinkley, 256 Kan. 808, 820, 888 P.2d 819 (1995). Thompkins contends that the arresting officer's testimony that he initially did not want to say anything in response to the officer's questions about his name, address, and phone number was an unfair comment on his choice to remain silent, in contravention of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and of this court's opinion following the first trial. The State argues that Thompkins' unresponsive answers to the arresting officer's questions were not relative to his Fifth Amendment right to not provide self-incriminating evidence but rather were unresponsiveness to routine biographical data questions, which are not protected by Miranda. The State asserts that under these circumstances, an accused does not hold a Fifth Amendment protection against refusing to answer questions as to his name, address, or phone number, and a comment in open court regarding his refusal to answer routine biographical data is not a constitutional violation. For authority the State relies on State v. Garcia, 233 Kan. 589, 664 P.2d 1343 (1983). In Garcia, the question was whether the taking of personal background information from an accused after he had asserted his right to counsel amounted to an interrogation in violation of his right to remain silent under Miranda until he had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer. The questions asked were routine police booking questions and did not relate to the crime charged. None of the questions could reasonably be construed as being likely to elicit an incriminating response from the accused. This court held that information obtained from a defendant to complete the personal history sheet following a request for counsel does not violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination and right to counsel under Miranda because personal background questions do not constitute an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. 233 Kan. at 607. Does testimony regarding the defendant's choice to remain silent that occurs in the context of answering background questions require reversal of the defendant's conviction? Here, Thompkins was read his Miranda rights and then, in response to routine biographical questions, made unsolicited incriminating statements. Whether the questions were routine biographical or investigatory, the testimony regarding Thompkins' silence coming immediately after testimony that Thompkins had been advised of his right to remain silent could not be construed by the jury as an indication of guilt.