Opinion ID: 2995202
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tortious Interference With Skrtic’s

Text: Employment Contract In disposing of 3M’s tortious interference claim, the district court stated that assuming that Skrtic had breached his employment contract with 3M by his actions in operating Accu-Tech, to suggest that he was induced to do so by the very corporation he created surely cannot follow. The court noted that Skrtic, as an officer and owner of Accu- Tech, was so intertwined with the company, that arguing the corporation induced his breach is like arguing that he induced himself to breach. Relying on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision in Wausau Medical Center, S.C. v. Asplund, 514 N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994), the court resolved that [t]he corporate fiction [could not] be stretched that far. 3M asserts that the district court’s reliance on Wausau was misplaced. While 3M acknowledges that a party to a contract cannot be held liable for tortiously inducing his or her own breach, see, e.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 225 (7th Cir. 1983), here, the company asserts that Accu-Tech is a legal entity separate and distinct from Skrtic the individual. Thus, according to 3M, it is possible that Accu-Tech, through Pribyl and Harvey, tortiously interfered with Skrtic’s 3M employment contract. Hence, it propounds, the district court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment on this claim. Whether it is possible for a corporate entity to have tortiously interfered with the employment contract of one of its founders may at times become an interesting inquiry./4 Tortious interference with a contract occurs when someone intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract. See Wausau, 514 N.W.2d at 44. Certainly, one could envision a scenario where, when a limited number of individuals form a corporate entity, that one of the individuals, while taking part in the formation, was still distinct from the entity formed (and ambivalent) so that a tortious interference claim could be viable. However, we need not dwell on such abstract inquiries at this time. While the district did hold that the corporate fiction could not be stretched as to allow a finding of distinctness be tween Skrtic and Accu-Tech, the court also provided an alternative basis for granting Accu-Tech summary judgment on the claim. As the court stated in addressing the suggestion that Accu-Tech had induced Skrtic to breach his contract with 3M, [t]his allegation is belied by the undisputed facts surrounding the formation of Accu-Tech. Skrtic and Pribyl conceived, created and own Accu-Tech for the purpose of conducting its present business with Skrtic as an officer and fiduciary . . . . The undisputed facts establish that Skrtic initiated his own actions and was not induced to do anything by the corporation he created. Though 3M argues that a tortious interference claim could legally have been maintained, it has not presented any evidence to suggest a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Accu-Tech actually caused Skrtic to breach his contract with 3M. Thus, even if such a cause of action could be viable against Accu-Tech, in this instance there was no evidence presented that would have properly allowed the claim to survive de fendants’ motion for summary judgment. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of 3M’s tortious interference with contract claim.