Opinion ID: 2435143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Procedural Posture on Appeal

Text: ¶ 13 This appeal is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss under section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006)), which challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its face. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 429, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (2006). Therefore, we review de novo an order granting or denying a section 2-615 motion, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Id. We also construe the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. A cause of action should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery. Id. ¶ 14 We note first that plaintiff's complaint alleged strict liability, willful and wanton conduct, and negligence. In both the circuit court and the appellate court, the parties did not distinguish the counts. Further, in their briefs to this court, the parties' arguments focus on whether the complaint established, on its face, the existence of a duty in the context of plaintiff's negligence claim. Accordingly, we limit our review to the question of whether plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to establish a duty for purposes of a complaint of negligence. To state a cause of action for negligence, a complaint must allege facts that establish the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach. Id. at 430, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048. The issue before us is whether a duty of care was owed by defendant to plaintiff in this case. Whether a duty exists in a particular case is a question of law for the court to decide. Id.