Opinion ID: 2977492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Elie Abboud’s Sentence

Text: Defendant Elie Abboud raises the same objections to the district court’s calculation of his offense level as Michel Abboud. For the same reasons, the district court did not err in determining that Defendant had an offense level of 30. As Defendant has raised no objections with his Criminal History Category, the district court did not err in determining that Defendant’s advisory Guidelines range was 97 to 121 months. Defendant argues that the district court erred in considering his post-remand conduct in determining an appropriate sentence. In sentencing Defendant, the district court considered Defendant’s failure to file tax returns and failure to cooperate with the probation department’s preparation of an updated presentence report in determining an appropriate sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As discussed above, it is inappropriate for a district court to consider a defendant’s postsentencing conduct on a Booker remand. Therefore, Defendant’s sentence was imposed based on an improper factor, and “it is clear that a ‘sentence based on an improper factor fails to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a) and may be unreasonable regardless of length.’” United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006)). The government argues that under these circumstances we should find an exception to the rule in Worley that district courts may not consider a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct after a Booker remand. In this case, the district court was attempting to verify Defendant’s financial condition. The district court was concerned about the inadequacies of Defendant’s financial information at the original sentencing hearing. However, the purpose of a Booker remand is not to resentence a defendant after obtaining information that would have been relevant at the original sentencing. Instead, it is to determine “whether the defendant would have received the same sentence had the Guidelines been advisory, rather than mandatory, at the time of the original sentencing.” Keller, 498 F.3d at 324. Obtaining Defendant’s financial information, even if relevant, was unnecessary given the nature of a Booker remand. The government argues that Defendant’s failure to file a tax return should be allowed to be taken into consideration when resentencing Defendant, because he was convicted of two counts of failure to file an income tax return. The government has made no argument for why the facts of this case should be an exception to the general rule concerning a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct, beyond the general assertion that the Defendant allegedly committed a similar act to one that led to his conviction. However, we are unpersuaded that these circumstances are the sort of unusual situation which might justify a district court’s consideration of post-sentencing conduct following a Booker remand. United States v. Lloyd, 498 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the government argues that the post-sentencing conduct should be taken into account because it occurred while Defendant was free on an appeal bond. However, the post-sentencing conduct considered by the district court was Defendant’s failure to cooperate in disclosing his financial information and his failure to file tax returns. Even if a district court could account for defendant’s conduct while on an appeal bond in determining a defendant’s sentence in some circumstances, it is not appropriate under the facts of this case. Defendant did not use his freedom while on bond to act in some manner. Instead, the district court considered Defendant’s failure to use his freedom while this matter was on appeal to aid the district court in determining Defendant’s financial condition. This is not the sort of abuse of trust while free on bond that could potentially justify an exception to Worley. The district court gave great weight to Defendant’s post-remand conduct when sentencing Defendant. When discussing Defendant’s post-sentencing conduct, the district court noted that “I will consider, of course, in exercising my discretion in imposing a sentence, and I make it very clear that it will be part and parcel of the court’s review in this matter.” The district court also noted that I will consider strongly the conduct of the defendants during the time that they were on bond as it relates to their various financial dealings and . . . lack of candor in disclosing information. And that will be very, very important to the court, as it has been made clear in this pre-sentence report. Sentences within the Guidelines range are afforded a presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). However, in this case the presumption of reasonableness is rebutted by the district court’s strong consideration of an impermissible factor. Because we cannot say that the district court would have given Defendant the same sentence had the district court not strongly considered Defendant’s post-sentencing conduct, we must remand this matter to the district court for resentencing. We have also reviewed Defendant’s remaining arguments, and find them to be without merit.