Opinion ID: 1753129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contractual Roots

Text: The original premise of the assumption of risk defense appears to have been contractual rather than delictual. Early assumption of risk cases were based on the theory that the plaintiff could not recover because he had actually consented to undertake the risk of injury posed by a given situation, and therefore could not be heard to complain when such an injury occurred. See generally, Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La.L.Rev. 5 (1961). The doctrine was described by the maxim volenti non fit injuria, meaning no wrong is done to one who is willing. W. Prosser & J. Wade, Cases and Materials on Torts 534 (5th ed. 1971). Thus, the defense appeared frequently in early common law cases which involved servants or employees who were injured while performing their employment duties. The right of such employees to recover damages from their employers was barred under the rationale that, as an implied provision of the employment contract, the servant assumed all risks incidental to his normal employment duties. See, e.g., Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685 (1887); Saxton v. Hawksworth, 26 L.T. 851, 853 (Ex.Ch.1872); Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 4 Metc. 49 (Mass.1842). See also Wade, supra, 22 La.L.Rev. at 8; V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 9.1 at 154-55 (1974). The philosophy of the defense, premised on the idea that a plaintiff who confronts a known danger necessarily must have chosen to do so, was a terse expression of the individualistic tendency of the common law, which regarded freedom of individual action as the keystone of the whole [legal] structure. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 Harv.L.Rev. 14, 14 (1906). Consequently, assumption of risk was thereafter extended in application far beyond the master-servant relationship. On the theory that [a] true contract may be indicated by conduct as well as by express language, courts presumed that plaintiffs in certain situations had agreed to accept the risk of injury, even though actual consent was a fiction. Wade, supra, 22 La.L.Rev. at 8. For example, a plaintiff who accepted an invitation to a party at the defendant's home could not recover for an injury he suffered on the premises because he was presumed to accept such generous entertainment with an understanding that he accommodates himself to the conditions of his host. Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 579, 189 N.E. 588, 589-90 (1934). Similarly, the baseball fan who purchased a ticket to a ballgame was usually presumed to have accepted responsibility for the risks inherent in watching a game, including the possibility of being struck by an errant ball. See Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105 Wash. 219, 181 P. 679 (1919). As this contractual doctrine began to acquire a separate identity as a tort defense, the need arose to distinguish the assumed risk concept from another tort defense, contributory negligence.