Opinion ID: 1058880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the Petition for Discipline.

Text: Henderson argues that the Board was without jurisdiction to conduct the hearing because the Board was not authorized to institute a disciplinary hearing absent his request, and he asserts that he had not requested a hearing. We disagree. Any attorney admitted to practice law in Tennessee is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court, the Board, the hearing committees, and the circuit and chancery court. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 1.1 (2001). It is Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 (2001) that governs the procedure by which attorney misconduct is investigated and disciplined. While the underlying proceedings in the case under submission resulted in a procedural quagmire, careful review of the Board's and chancery court's actions in light of the Rule reveals that the Board and chancery court both acted properly. Disciplinary Counsel investigated the complaint filed with the Board against Henderson and recommended a public censure. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 8.1 (2001) provides that in the event that Disciplinary Counsel recommends public censure, the Board shall review the recommendation and approve or modify it. A respondent-attorney is not entitled to appeal a public censure by the Board, but may, within twenty days of notice thereof, demand as of right that a formal proceeding be instituted before a hearing committee. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 8.1 (2001). In the event of such a demand, the public censure shall be withdrawn and the matter disposed of in the same manner as any other formal hearing instituted before a hearing committee. Id. Henderson received notice of the proposed disciplinary action on January 22, 1999. That notice informed him of his right to demand a hearing, and further stated that if he chose not to demand a hearing, the proposed discipline would be imposed. Henderson responded to this notice by letter dated February 26, 1999, in which he wrote to the Board: As I indicated to you during our conversation, I am opposed to further public censure by the Board, as I have not done anything wrong, other than inadvertantly [sic] failed to pay a civil penalty.... If the Board deems my negligence worthy of a private reprimand, I will be happy to accept that and move on. If there are any other terms you would like to add to the private reprimand, I will be most happy to discuss them.... The Board interpreted this letter as a rejection of a public censure and a demand for a formal hearing. To initiate the formal hearing, Disciplinary Counsel filed with the Board a petition for discipline on July 20, 1999. Henderson argues that the Board did not have jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Discipline because his letter of February 26, 1999, was not a demand for a hearing. The Board responds that it reasonably construed the letter to be a demand for a hearing because it specifically stated that Henderson disagreed with the proposed discipline. We find that the Board acted reasonably and properly. Under the confines of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 8.1 (2001), a respondent-attorney faced with a proposed public censure has two choiceshe or she may accept the discipline or may demand a formal hearing before the Board. The Rule specifically states that there is no appeal of a public censure. By sending his letter to the Board, Henderson clearly expressed his unwillingness to accept the proposed punishment. Because the rules do not provide for an appeal of a public censure, Henderson's refusal to accept the public censure was in effect a request for a hearing before the Board. Henderson also argues that because the letter was more than twenty days after his receipt of the notice, even if it was a demand, it was time barred and the public censure should have been final after the twenty days had passed. It is his position that once the twenty days ran, the hearing panel was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction. In response, the Board relies upon Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 23.2 (2001) which instructs that time limitations are administrative and not jurisdictional. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 23.2 provides: Except as is otherwise provided in these rules, time is directory and not jurisdictional. Time limitations are administrative, not jurisdictional. Failure to observe such directory time intervals may result in contempt of the agency having jurisdiction but will not justify abatement of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 23.2 (2001). Thus, failure to observe the twenty-day time limit will not justify vacating the order of the hearing panel. [3]