Opinion ID: 4445950
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: possesses, with intent to:

Text: (A) manufacture; (B) finance the manufacture of; (C) deliver; or (D) finance the delivery of; a controlled substance, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule I, II, or III, except mariju‐ ana, hash oil, or hashish; commits dealing in a schedule I, II, or III con‐ trolled substance …. Ind. Code § 35‐48‐4‐2(a) (2000). The schedule I, II, and III con‐ trolled substances are found at Indiana Code §§ 35‐48‐2‐4, 35‐ 48‐2‐6, and 35‐48‐2‐8, respectively. To demonstrate the overbreadth of the Indiana statute, Rush points to methamphetamine in schedule II. There, schedule II lists “[m]ethamphetamine, including its salts, iso‐ mers, and salts of its isomers.” Ind. Code § 35‐48‐2‐6(d)(2). The federal statute similarly controls “methamphetamine, in‐ cluding its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.” See 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule II(c), Schedule III(a)(3). A seeming match. But a closer look reveals otherwise. The federal Controlled Substances Act also specifically de‐ fines the term “isomer” to mean “the optical isomer,” except as used in schedule I(c) and schedule II(a)(4), where isomer Nos. 18‐2009, et al. 21 means “any optical, positional, or geometric isomer.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(14). Methamphetamine is not listed in sched‐ ule I(c) or schedule II(a)(4) and thus, for purposes of federal drug oﬀenses, methamphetamine includes only its optical isomers. The Indiana Code, on the other hand, does not define the term “isomer.” “In Indiana, the lodestar of statutory interpre‐ tation is legislative intent, and the plain language of the stat‐ ute is the ‘best evidence of ... [that] intent.’” Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 576 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cubel v. Cubel, 876 N.E.2d 1117, 1120 (Ind. 2007)); see also Johnson v. State, 87 N.E.3d 471, 472 (Ind. 2017) (“Our first task when in‐ terpreting a statute is to give its words their plain meaning by considering the text and structure of the statute.”). Ascertain‐ ing the “ordinary” meaning of isomer might be a fool’s er‐ rand, but it is not one we must undertake here. A statute “should be examined as a whole, avoiding both excessive re‐ liance on strict literal meaning and selective reading of indi‐ vidual words.” Estate of Moreland, 576 F.3d at 695 (quoting Cubel, 876 N.E.2d at 1120). The structure of Indiana’s Con‐ trolled Substances Act guides the conclusion in this case. When Indiana intended to limit the specific isomer for a drug, it expressly did so. Indiana’s schedule II controls “[a]mphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its op‐ tical isomers.” Ind. Code § 35‐48‐2‐6(d)(1) (2000). Elsewhere, schedule III lists certain stimulants and in the preamble notes that each substance “includ[es] its salts, isomers (whether op‐ tical, position, or geometric), and salts of such isomers.” Ind. Code § 35‐48‐2‐8(b) (2000). The Indiana legislature knew how to limit a listed drug to include only its optical isomers. It is a general rule of statutory construction that “when the 22 Nos. 18‐2009, et al. legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and diﬀerent language in another, the court assumes diﬀerent meanings were intended.” Sosa v. Alvarez‐Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 n.9 (2004). According to Rush, then, Indiana’s generic use of “isomer” in relation to methamphetamine must be broader than optical isomers. We agree. Because the federal definition of methamphetamine includes only its optical iso‐ mers whereas the Indiana definition includes something more than just optical isomers of methamphetamine, the mismatch renders the Indiana statute overbroad. The government does not contest that Indiana’s statute, on its face, is broader than federal law, but contends that geomet‐ ric isomers of methamphetamine do not exist in the real world, and thus the statutes actually mirror each other. The government’s argument suﬀers a few fatal flaws at this junc‐ ture. First, the government asks us to take judicial notice of two expert declarations from diﬀerent cases in diﬀerent courts that discuss the isomer forms of methamphetamine. These declarations were not before the district court and are not the proper subject of judicial notice. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit a court to take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it is “generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The isomeric nature of methampheta‐ mine is not “generally known,” at least to us. Nor are the dec‐ larations incontrovertible—the declarants were not subjected to Daubert challenges, cross‐examined, or tested with compet‐ ing expert testimony. None of the defendants had the ability Nos. 18‐2009, et al. 23 to challenge these declarations in the district court.5 Second, the declarations were crafted in other cases with an eye to‐ wards the issues at hand in those cases. It seems, for example, that the declarations are primarily focused on proving that geometric isomers of methamphetamine do not exist because the state statute specifically included both optical and geo‐ metric isomers of methamphetamine. For our purposes, the declarations do not tell us whether any other types of isomers of methamphetamine could possibly exist. That issue is the heart of the dispute here. In short, the content of the declara‐ tions is “arguably subject to reasonable dispute and therefore not a proper subject of judicial notice.” Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 648 (7th Cir. 2018). Finally, notwithstanding the declarations, we do not think that the government’s theoreti‐ cal challenges are pertinent here when the plain language chosen by the Indiana legislature dictates that the Indiana statute is categorically broader than the federal definition of felony drug oﬀense. No matter, our decision is not solely dependent on the def‐ inition of methamphetamine and which of its isomers do or do not exist. Indiana Code § 35‐48‐4‐2 reaches at least two other substances that are not included in § 802(44). Specifi‐ cally, Indiana lists “[p]arahexyl” as a schedule I drug and a “combination product containing tiletimine and zolazepam (Telazol)” as a schedule III drug. Ind. Code §§ 35‐48‐2‐ 4(d)(16), 35‐48‐2‐8(c)(12) (2000). Neither substance is covered 5 Granted, Rush and Chapman did not challenge their prior convic‐ tions below, which deprived the government of the opportunity to intro‐ duce this evidence in the district court. Our opinion takes no position on the scientific merits, nor should it be read as limiting the government’s ability to present such an argument in future proceedings. 24 Nos. 18‐2009, et al. under the definitions in § 802(44). To put it succinctly, Rush could have been convicted under § 35‐48‐4‐2 for dealing in a controlled substance that would not be a felony drug oﬀense under § 802(44). The Indiana law is categorically broader. Rush’s 2001 Indiana conviction for dealing in a schedule I, II, or III controlled substance cannot serve as a predicate fel‐ ony drug oﬀense under § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 802(44).