Opinion ID: 204952
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Chevron's Step One

Text: In this case, the step-one question is as follows: is § 1229b silent or ambiguous as to whether an expedited removal ends an alien's continuous physical presence in the United States? Vásquez argues that subpart (d)(1), which constitutes the first part of § 1229b(d), unambiguously precludes an expedited removal order, in and of itself, from interrupting an alien's continuous physical presence. Vásquez reasons that subpart (d)(1)'s specificity [7] evinces a congressional intent to create an exhaustive list of events that end continuous physical presence. Vásquez further bolsters his position by asserting that statutes pertaining to removal should be strictly construed in favor of the alien. We are unpersuaded. Despite its specificity, subpart (d)(1) does not state that these are the only circumstances in which continuous presence `shall be deemed to end'. See Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir.2003). In fact, nothing in the entirety of § 1229b expressly precludes expedited removal from ending an alien's continuous physical presence. As the Third Circuit has observed, The statute does not further define `continuous physical presence,' and it is silent as to whether there are additional circumstances under which continuous physical presence may be broken. Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 191. Further, Vásquez's argument ignores the second part of § 1229b(d): subpart (d)(2). Subpart (d)(2) specifies additional circumstances  specifically, departures from the United States that exceed a certain duration  that end continuous physical presence. The existence of subpart (d)(2) precludes any argument that subpart (d)(1) amounts to an exhaustive list of events that interrupt continuous physical presence. Mireles-Valdez, 349 F.3d at 218 ([S]ubpart (d)(1) cannot be exhaustive because ... subpart (d)(2) provides that certain absences, on the basis of their length, terminate continuous presence.); see also Tapia v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir.2005) (Congress did not explicitly specify when an alien absent for less than ninety days may continue to accrue time toward the continuous physical presence requirement and when the accrual of time is terminated. ...). Nor do we see any clear indication that subparts (d)(1) and (d)(2) together were meant to constitute an exclusive list. See Mireles-Valdez, 349 F.3d at 218; Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 192 ([T]he fact that Congress has declared [in subpart (d)(2)] that a departure of more than 90 days shall constitute a break in physical presence does not necessarily mean that departures of less than 90 days shall not constitute a break in physical presence.); see also Ascencio-Rodriguez v. Holder, 595 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.2010) ([A]lthough 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d) sets forth circumstances under which continuous physical presence must be deemed to have been broken, Congress has not spoken on whether other events can also operate to terminate an alien's period of continuous physical presence. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In short, § 1229b(d) does not unambiguously preclude unspecified occurrences, such as an expedited removal, from ending an alien's continuous physical presence in the United States. [8] Consequently, we turn to step two and ask whether the BIA's determination that an expedited removal does in fact interrupt continuous physical presence is a reasonable construction of the statute.