Opinion ID: 2364609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abandonment by Counsel (Sanders-Luleff Issue)

Text: On February 21, 1991, McDaris moved to vacate his 1991 convictions under Rule 24.035, alleging 10 grounds: ineffective assistance by first defense counsel (one); various forms of vindictive behavior by the prosecution (five); various reasons why one or more of the convictions were unconstitutional (two); enhancement provisions improperly included in amended information as punishment for seeking a jury trial (one); some prior convictions used for enhancement were invalid (one). On April 25, 199162 days after appointmentcounsel filed an amended motion. Besides incorporating all the pro se motion, the amended motion raised the six additional grounds discussed in Part B below. On April 26, 1991, the State moved to dismiss both motions. The court asked motion counsel the reason for the late filing of the amended motion. Counsel responded: There's no question we've had some problems getting the amended motion back from the penitentiary and filing it, but we filed it as soon as we could, as soon as we received it in the mail from Mr. McDaris. Based solely on this statement, the court found that the late filing was not due to abandonment by motion counsel, but rather due to the failure of McDaris to return the amended motion before April 21, 1991. As for the claims in the two motions, the court found them conclusory, refuted by the record, not cognizable in a Rule 24.035 motion, or insufficient to state a claim. Thus, the motion court denied McDaris's pro se motion.
McDaris alleges that motion counsel abandoned him by failing to file the amended motion on time, or at least that the trial court did not adequately investigate abandonment. To the contrary, the State alleges, and the motion court found, no abandonment. [1] This case can be resolved by examining whether the movant was prejudiced by the late filing. Pollard v. State, 807 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Mo. banc 1991). In this case, the amended motion did not raise anything beyond the pro se motion, except for claims clearly refuted by the record. No hearing is required where the record conclusively shows that movant is not entitled to relief. Rules 24.035(g) and 29.15(g). The record in this case clearly indicates that McDaris was not prejudiced by the failure to file the amended motion on time. Cf. Balow v. State, 796 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (Mo.App.1990) (remand not required when record refutes claims in post-conviction motion). To illustrate, McDaris first claims in the amended motion that counsel was ineffective by failing to explain the fact that he would be sentenced as a Class X offender, and the effect of such a classification. Even if true, any prejudice was preempted by the circuit court's meticulous explanation of his sentence before accepting his plea, and the circuit court's willingness to proceed to trial if McDaris changed his mind any time during the plea hearing. Thus, the record clearly refutes McDaris's claim of prejudicethat he would not have pled guilty if his counsel had properly explained his sentence. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). The associated claim of ineffectiveness in failing to contest his classification as a Class X offender was also raised and preserved in the pro se motion, and thus no prejudice comes from the alleged abandonment. Second, McDaris claims in the amended motion that plea counsel coerced and tricked him by falsely promising that his wife would receive only 120-days-incarceration. To the contrary, McDaris stated on the plea record that no promises other than those in the plea agreement were made. Additionally, this is corroborated by his statement in the plea hearing that he was not coerced into pleading guilty. Third, McDaris claims in the amended motion that plea counsel represented, on the date of the plea, that he was unprepared for trial. Numerous times during the plea, the trial court asked McDaris whether he was satisfied with plea counsel, whether plea counsel had done all that McDaris had asked, and whether McDaris needed more time to discuss his case with counsel. The record clearly refutes subsequent allegations that counsel was unprepared on the date of the plea hearing. Fourth, McDaris claims in the amended motion that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek reduced bond. The record shows that counsel requested bond reduction on April 13, 1990, and at several later times. Thus, the record refutes this point. McDaris also claims that he pled guilty to get proper medical treatmentallegedly unavailable in the county jail. However, the record clearly indicates that he was receiving treatment at the time of the plea hearing, and further shows that, but for the plea, trial would have begun thenas the plea judge noted: a jury [is] waiting now in the rotunda ready to try this lawsuit. Pleading guilty had no effect on his medical treatment. Fifth, McDaris claims in the amended motion that counsels were ineffective for failing to file several motions. With respect to the first counsel, Dean Price, these allegations appear in the pro se motion and are discussed in Part III.B. With respect to Clifford Saulter, the plea counsel, the allegations state only conclusionsthat he failed to consult with and interview five witnesses without naming them or describing any basis that they would know relevant and exculpatory information, and that Saulter failed to file motions without alleging any facts supporting those motions. Thus, McDaris has not alleged facts showing Saulter was ineffective with respect to these witnesses and motions. See Balow, 796 S.W.2d at 645 (post-conviction movants must allege facts, not conclusions which, if true, would warrant relief). In addition, these charges are clearly refuted by McDaris's affirmance during the plea hearing that Saulter did all that McDaris requested. Sixth, the amended motion attacks the constitutionality of § 195.214 RSMo Supp. 1989 an issue clearly raised in the pro se motion and discussed in Part III.D. below.