Opinion ID: 2292054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree assault charge

Text: Appellant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree assault charge. The Simpson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for first-degree assault under the theory that he acted intentionally. [1] On the first day of trial, the Commonwealth made a motion to amend the Indictment to charge Appellant with committing first-degree assault wantonly instead of intentionally. The trial court granted the motion. [2] The jury was ultimately instructed on first-degree assault committed through wanton conduct, KRS 508.010(1)(b), but not first-degree assault committed through intentional conduct, KRS 508.010(1)(a). KRS 508.010(1) states: (1) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (a) He intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or (b) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person. We will review the trial court's ruling on Appellant's motion for a directed verdict using the standard outlined in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991): On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Appellant argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the first-degree assault charge because the evidence presented at trial established only an intentional assault, not a wanton assault. Appellant bases this argument on Officer Brown's testimony that the assailant lifted Sorrells into the air several times and slammed her to the ground. Appellant argues that Officer Brown's testimony made it unreasonable for a juror to believe that the assailant's conduct was anything other than intentional because the repeated action indicated an intent to harm Sorrells. See Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 615 (Ky.1980) (overruled on other grounds by Dale v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 227 (Ky.1986)) (holding that a defendant who shot his victim five times in the back acted intentionally and thus it was error to provide a jury instruction based on wanton conduct). Thus, Appellant argues that a juror could not have reasonably believed he was guilty of first-degree assault committed wantonly and he was therefore entitled to a directed verdict on that charge. We disagree. KRS 501.020(3) defines wantonly as follows: A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto. (emphasis added). This definition was provided to the jury as Instruction No. 7. Sufficient evidence was presented to support a reasonable juror's belief that Appellant was intoxicated and therefore acted wantonly while assaulting Sorrells. This evidence included testimony that Appellant drank beer while talking with Sorrells, beer cans found at the crime scene, the arresting police officer's testimony that Appellant was drunk when arrested and was charged with alcohol intoxication, as well as Appellant's own statement that he did not think he assaulted Sorrells, but if I done it, I don't remember it. Further, sufficient evidence was presented to place Appellant at the scene of the assault, including his wallet which was found at the crime scene and his own admission he visited with Sorrells. Based on this evidence a reasonable juror could conclude that Appellant was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the assault and acted in a manner which created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of serious physical injury to Sorrells. Thus, reviewing the evidence as a whole, we cannot say it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt on the first-degree assault charge based on wanton conduct and the trial court correctly denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.