Opinion ID: 2303040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Petitioners' Cross-Appeal

Text: Finally, the petitioners challenge the trial court's denial of attorney's fees. Specifically, they maintain that they are entitled to attorney's fees because: (1) the Department acted in bad faith; (2) the Department intru[ded] upon the protection against retrospective laws; and (3) they conferred a substantial benefit on the public through this action. We disagree. We will not overturn the trial court's decision concerning attorney's fees absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Grenier v. Barclay Square Commercial Condo. Owners' Assoc., 150 N.H. 111, 115, 834 A.2d 238 (2003). To warrant reversal, the discretion must have been exercised for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable to the prejudice of the objecting party. Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694, 704, 846 A.2d 535 (2004). In evaluating the trial court's ruling on this issue, we acknowledge the tremendous deference given a trial court's decision regarding attorney's fees. Grenier, 150 N.H. at 116, 834 A.2d 238. If there is some support in the record for the trial court's determination, we will uphold it. Arcidi, 150 N.H. at 704, 846 A.2d 535. A prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees when that recovery is authorized by statute, an agreement between the parties, or an established judicial exception to the general rule that precludes recovery of such fees. Tulley v. Sheldon, 159 N.H. 269, 272, 982 A.2d 954 (2009) (quotation omitted). As to judicially-created exceptions, attorney's fees have been awarded in this State based upon two separate theories: bad faith litigation and substantial benefit. Bedard v. Town of Alexandria, 159 N.H. 740, 744, 992 A.2d 607 (2010) (quotations and ellipsis omitted). Under the bad faith litigation theory, an award of attorney's fees is appropriate where one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, where the litigant's conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action. Id. (quotations omitted). Under the substantial benefit theory[,] ... attorney's fees may be awarded when a litigant's actions confer a substantial benefit upon the general public. Id. (quotations omitted). Here, the trial court found that the petitioners met none of the standards warranting departure from the general rule. After review of the record, we agree and conclude that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion. First, the record supports the trial court's finding that the Department did not act in bad faith. The Department neither employed obstinate or unreasonable litigation tactics, nor did it seek burdensome discovery. Nevertheless, the petitioners contend that the trial court erred when it failed to consider, in its bad faith analysis, the Department's allegedly obstinate and unlawful pre-lawsuit conduct. In particular, the petitioners argue that litigation was unnecessary and was prompted only by their need to protect themselves against the Department's unconstitutional investigatory tactics and the disputed staff petition. We disagree. Despite the petitioners' representations to the contrary, the trial court did address their argument regarding the Department's investigatory tactics. The court ruled that the theory that the State's conduct in related criminal proceedings and issuing search warrants and administrative actions would authorize an award of attorney's fees ... [cannot] be sustained. Further, it rejected the petitioners' argument that an award of fees was supported by alleged flaws in the staff petition ( i.e., naming Frost individually, creating illusory charges by duplicating alleged misconduct, and threatening unconstitutional retroactive penalties). The trial court noted that [the Department] took a legal position which involved complex statutes and their application to a highly regulated industry. Thus, we find no merit in the petitioners' claim that the trial court failed to address the Department's pre-lawsuit conduct. Moreover, as the trial court noted, the complexity of the underlying suit suggests that the petitioners were not forced to litigate a clearly defined right. We agree that the rights at issue were not clearly defined, as is evidenced by the fact that the petitioners filed an expert report to aid the trial court in understanding the statutes involved in this case. Finally, the trial court did not err in finding the substantial benefit exception inapplicable. As the trial court noted, the exception is based on promotion of the public benefit, not the petitioners' own benefit. See Bedard, 159 N.H. at 746, 992 A.2d 607. Affirmed.