Opinion ID: 167728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Argo's Retaliation Claim

Text: 25 Finally, Mr. Argo argues that summary judgment was inappropriate on his retaliation claim, again invoking the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, 2 and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2414-15, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2006); Miller v. Auto. Club of N.M., Inc., 420 F.3d 1098, 1119 (10th Cir.2005). Notably, these requirements do not change when a plaintiff's underlying opposition is to reverse discrimination — for example, discrimination against men as a class. Title VII makes reverse discrimination unlawful, and employers have no more freedom to retaliate against those who oppose reverse discrimination than any other form of discrimination. 26 Mr. Argo easily satisfies the requirements of a prima facie case of retaliation. On January 6, 2003, he filed an internal grievance alleging sexual harassment by his female supervisor, which certainly qualifies as protected opposition to discrimination under Title VII. On January 30 he was fired, which obviously qualifies as materially adverse in the sense that it might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making the complaint. The close temporal proximity between the complaint and the termination — just 24 days — is sufficient to allow an inference that a causal connection existed between the internal grievance and the decision to terminate Mr. Argo. See Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.1999) (indicating that a period of six weeks gives rise to a rebuttable inference of a causal connection, but that a period of three months does not). 27 The burden therefore shifts to Blue Cross Blue Shield to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. The company offers two reasons. First, Mr. Argo's performance had steadily declined for nearly a year, as demonstrated by his failure to meet one or more performance goals for nine consecutive months as well as his annual goal for health policies in 2002. Second, Mr. Argo had received repeated warnings about his tardiness and attitude problems, but persisted in arriving late, misusing his time, and failing to perform work as directed. Both are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination, and the burden shifts back to Mr. Argo to demonstrate that the proffered explanation is a pretext for retaliation. 28 To show pretext, Mr. Argo must produce evidence of `such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.' Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir.1996)). Mr. Argo does not dispute that he missed a string of performance goals and had frequent disciplinary problems, especially tardiness. Instead, he emphasizes two facts: (1) the timing of his termination, just 24 days after he filed his grievance and 10 days after the internal investigation ended; and (2) the nature of his performance problems, which he characterizes as modest. 29 First, Mr. Argo contends that the timing of the termination, shortly after his filing of an internal complaint, allows a jury to infer that its reasons are pretextual. That argument has some force with respect to Blue Cross Blue Shield's declining-performance rationale. Although he had received warnings concerning his performance goals for months, as late as January 21 Ms. Oliva was inclined to give Mr. Argo more time for improvement: If you do not met [sic] your February and March monthly goal[s] you will be terminated from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas 3-7-03. App. 129. If there had been no intervening events, Blue Cross Blue Shield's decision to terminate Mr. Argo on January 30 instead of waiting until March 7 might indeed have suggested pretext. 30 The timing argument is undermined, however, by the fact that Mr. Argo arrived late for work on January 29, and once again failed to work on old leads as directed. Mr. Argo was fired the next morning, January 30. These intervening events defeat any inference of retaliation because the company's concerns about tardiness and attitude obviously predate Mr. Argo's internal complaint. Ms. Oliva's January 2 Performance memorandum issued a  last warning for tardiness, time utilization, [and] not following directives, and specifically threatened termination for future infractions. Id. at 138. Thus, the timing of the termination actually cuts against a finding of pretext by strongly suggesting that Blue Cross Blue Shield acted in response to specific and continuing disciplinary problems. 31 Second, Mr. Argo argues that his performance problems in fact were not serious. He concedes that he missed his health performance goal for 2002, but notes that he exceeded other performance goals, and calculates that he would have received at least an 83.75% overall evaluation on his 2002 annual review — within the expected range of overall performance levels. Br. of Appellant 22-24. Yet Title VII charges neither this Court nor the jury to act as a `super personnel department' that second guesses employers' business judgments. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir.1999). Blue Cross Blue Shield is free to conclude that a long series of missed goals in one area justifies termination, notwithstanding adequate or even strong performance in other areas. In any case, Mr. Argo has no answer to the charge that he repeatedly arrived late for work and failed to perform tasks as directed. 3 Such behavior immediately preceded his termination, and was cited by the company in internal documents describing the decision. Under the circumstances, no reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Argo's termination was retaliatory. 32 Because Mr. Argo has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Blue Cross Blue Shield's stated reasons for the termination are a pretext for retaliation, we affirm the decision of the district court.