Opinion ID: 2624191
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alaska Supreme Court precedents

Text: While the issue of resolution of church property disputes has never come squarely before us, and is thus an issue of first impression in Alaska, we have had the opportunity to address the proper role of civil courts in evaluating disputes between churches and church employees, and have adopted an approach similar to the neutral-principles approach. In Marshall v. Munro, we held that while this court did not have jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim because employment disputes within churches are core ecclesiastical concerns outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts, [37] we did have jurisdiction over defamation and intentional interference with contract claims against a minister because it was not necessary to involve ourselves in qualifications for the ministry when considering the elements of the defamation claim. [38] In McAdoo v. Diaz , we faced another defamation claim against a minister and, citing Marshall v. Munro, noted that we would allow claims against the minister for libel to proceed because they did not touch the merits of any core religious questions or present a religious question. [39] Considering our precedents, the superior court's analysis, the weight of authority favoring the neutral-principles approach, and the compelling logic of the opinion of the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Jones, we adopt the neutral-principles approach when resolving property disputes between religious organizations.