Opinion ID: 2780539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Proceed Pro Se

Text: In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Supreme Court held that although the Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to forgo counsel and represent himself, “the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo th[e] relinquished benefits [of counsel].” Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court stated: “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we have held that in order to ensure that the waiver of counsel is knowingly and intelligently made, the district court must consider various factors, including “the defendant’s age and education, and other background, experience, and conduct.” United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must also “ensure that the waiver is not the result of coercion or mistreatment of the defendant, and must be satisfied that the accused understands the nature of the charges, the consequences of the proceedings, and the practical meaning of the right he is waiving.” Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). However, this circuit “require[s] no sacrosanct litany for warning defendants against waiving the right to counsel.” Id. at 519. Rather, “[d]epending on the circumstances of the individual case, the district court must exercise its discretion in determining the precise nature of the warning.” Id.; see also United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Because of the vast differences from case to case, and defendant to defendant, a district court must 6 Case: 13-40703 Document: 00512940261 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 No. 13-40703 consider the totality-of-circumstances in determining whether a defendant has properly waived his right to counsel.”). 6 Herrod contends that the MJ failed to adequately advise him of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. 7 The MJ made the following statements to Herrod during the hearing: • “[T]here can be problems with self-representation.” • “You know, you’re not a lawyer. You may be a smart guy and, for all I know, a very smart guy, but the law is a different area and there can be certain legal obstacles, legal hurdles that you may encounter that would be detrimental to your case and would be advisable to have a lawyer.” • “I’m just establishing on the record that there are—that it’s dangerous.” • “I would appoint a lawyer for you, but you also have a right to represent yourself.” • “I use as an example all the time what Abraham Lincoln said: ‘He who represents himself has a fool for a client.’ I mean, you hear that from the first day of law school. I wouldn’t even represent myself in a case, even in a minor civil case. You get too caught up in the emotions and sometimes you lose sight of what’s real.” 6 The Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges, published by the Federal Judicial Center, provides proposed questions the district judge may ask in conducting this inquiry. However, this court “has approved warnings much less thorough than the guidelines presented in the bench book.” Jones, 421 F.3d at 363–64. 7 Herrod concedes that the MJ did not err by failing to inform him of “the nature of the charges” or “the consequences of the proceedings,” Davis, 269 F.3d at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted), given that Herrod acknowledged his understanding of this information at his earlier plea hearing. Herrod also does not argue that the MJ erred by failing to inquire into Herrod’s education and background during the colloquy. Indeed, the MJ had the opportunity to evaluate Herrod’s competence in person both at the Faretta hearing and at the prior hearing in relation to Herrod’s guilty plea. 7 Case: 13-40703 Document: 00512940261 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 No. 13-40703 Although this relatively sparse colloquy is considerably less than ideal, we conclude that it is not constitutionally defective under the particular circumstances of this case. As we have repeatedly stated, district courts need not “follow a script” while conducting Faretta hearings, as “[t]his court requires no sacrosanct litany for warning defendants against waiving the right to counsel.” Jones, 421 F.3d at 363 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Davis, 269 F.3d at 519; Virgil, 444 F.3d at 453. The colloquy here is comparable to the colloquy we approved of in Joseph: After expressing a desire to proceed pro se, the court explained to Joseph the disadvantages of self-representation. The court provided: “I seriously recommend to you that you allow Mr. Chaney and his assistant to represent you . . . because they are very good lawyers.” After informing Joseph that Mr. Chaney would remain as stand-by counsel, the court reiterated its warning: “It is my strong recommendation to you that you allow Mr. Chaney to do the questioning, that you allow him to do the cross-examination, and that you allow him to put on evidence if there is any evidence on your behalf.” After explaining that Joseph had shown no good cause for the appointment of a different defense counsel, the district court urged once again, “I am discouraging you from representing yourself.” Despite these warnings, Joseph proceeded pro se. Joseph, 333 F.3d at 590 (internal brackets omitted) (affirming the district court’s decision to allow the defendant to proceed pro se). Here, the MJ similarly recommended that Herrod proceed with counsel, repeatedly warning Herrod that he would face “legal obstacles” and other problems that could be “detrimental” to his case. Cf. United States v. Fulton, 131 F. App’x 441, 442– 43 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (determining that colloquy was sufficient where the district court “warned [the defendant] that his case was ‘complex,’ that it would involve ‘complex issues’ regarding wiretap evidence, that it was in [the defendant]’s ‘best interest’ to continue with appointed counsel, and that 8 Case: 13-40703 Document: 00512940261 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 No. 13-40703 he would have a ‘daunting task’ if he proceeded pro se at trial, where he would be faced with a ‘very capable prosecutor’”). Moreover, we have emphasized that both the “the stage of the proceedings and the setting in which the waiver is advanced” are relevant to this analysis. Virgil, 444 F.3d at 453. In Virgil, we favorably cited a case from the Third Circuit, id., concluding that the “distinction [between the guilt phase and the sentencing hearing] is clearly relevant to the content of the colloquy which the court must have with the defendant,” United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he inquiry at sentencing need only be tailored to that proceeding and the consequences that may flow from it.”). Here, Herrod moved to proceed pro se after an adjudication of his guilt, with only his sentence and his motion to withdraw his guilty plea (which Herrod filed concurrently with his motion to proceed pro se) left to be decided. Because Herrod was not facing the daunting task of conducting a criminal trial by himself on his own behalf, the colloquy here “need not be as exhaustive and searching as a similar inquiry before the conclusion of trial.” Id.; cf. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299–300 (1988) (“[W]e require a more searching or formal inquiry before permitting an accused to waive his right to counsel at trial than we require for a Sixth Amendment waiver during postindictment questioning . . . because the full dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation during questioning are less substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, although in a prior case this court deemed insufficient a relatively generic Faretta colloquy, the defendant in that case sought to proceed pro se on the eve of trial, see Jones, 421 F.3d at 362, when the risks of self-representation are at their highest, cf. Virgil, 444 F.3d at 454 (concluding that district court erred in allowing defendant to proceed pro se at sentencing stage where “[t]he government concede[d] that no Faretta colloquy took place”). 9 Case: 13-40703 Document: 00512940261 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 No. 13-40703 Other factors particular to this case support affirming the district court’s decision to allow Herrod to proceed pro se. First, Herrod has a lengthy criminal history—as evidenced in his PSR—including over a dozen criminal convictions. Although the present case appears to have been Herrod’s first experience in federal court, there can be little doubt that Herrod’s substantial experience with the criminal justice system apprised him of the role of an attorney, what an attorney adds to the process. See Davis, 269 F.3d at 518 (stating that the defendant’s background and experience are factors relevant to Faretta inquiry); Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the defendant’s “substantial experience with the criminal justice system . . . weighs in favor of a finding of effective waiver”). Herrod also recognized in his motion to proceed pro se that doing so could ultimately be “to his own detriment.” (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834). Moreover, Herrod’s repeated insistence on proceeding pro se—as evidenced in his motion and in the hearing transcript—supports the conclusion that his waiver of counsel was knowingly and voluntarily made. See United States v. Martin, 790 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding waiver knowing and voluntary where proceeding pro se “was [the defendant’s] apparent and stated intent before arraignment” and where “[i]t was his obvious intent before trial”). Although Herrod briefly stated during the Faretta hearing that he was “in the process of looking for another attorney,” he declined the MJ’s offer to have another attorney appointed for him. Indeed, Herrod had already gone through two attorneys during his case. It appears that Herrod, who was determined to file various (apparently frivolous) motions he had prepared, realized that the only way to accomplish this end was to proceed pro se and file the motions himself. Considering the totality of “the circumstances of th[is] individual case,” Davis, 269 F.3d at 519, we conclude that the MJ’s colloquy was constitutionally 10 Case: 13-40703 Document: 00512940261 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 No. 13-40703 adequate, and that Herrod knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.