Opinion ID: 2834098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Res Judicata and Claim Abandonment

Text: In the court of appeals, Citizens challenged the trial court’s class certification by arguing that because Daccach abandoned all claims but the Texas Securities Act claim, he was not an adequate representative of the class, common issues did not predominate over individual issues, a class action was not superior to other methods of adjudication, and Daccach improperly seeks to resolve a single issue instead of the entire controversy. The court of appeals rejected Citizens’ arguments, explaining that the Texas Securities Act claim was the entire controversy in itself and that certification was still appropriate even if other claims existed. 105 S.W.3d at 725. Specifically, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s certification order despite Daccach’s abandonment of numerous claims because “‘[c]lients who have claims not raised in this class action because the claims are unsuitable for class treatment can bring those claims on an individual basis, and res judicata will not bar those claims because absent class members had no opportunity to litigate those issues in this lawsuit.’” Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs. of Boston, Inc. , 79 F.R.D. 246, 265 (N.D. Cal. 1978)). Citizens contends this holding amounts to a special exception to established principles of claim preclusion, and therefore, contradicts our holdings in Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson , 22 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. 2000), and Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal , 22 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tex. 2000). Relying on Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe , Citizens adds that res judicata precludes litigation of previously abandoned class claims arising out of the same transaction, and therefore, defeats class certification because Daccach’s willingness to abandon claims to the detriment of absent class members undermines the prerequisites of predominance, superiority, typicality, and adequacy. See 102 S.W.3d 675, 695 (“[I]t is not clear that a class action is superior . . . if it necessitates that plaintiffs give up substantial rights, nor is it clear that the willingness . . . to forego consequential damages is typical of the other 20,000 class members.”). Daccach admits that for the class suit he abandoned all but the Texas Securities Act claim because the abandoned claims were not suitable for class treatment. Daccach contends, however, that because these claims were procedurally barred by Rule 42§s certification requirements, res judicata will not preclude subsequent litigation of the claims that cannot be litigated through diligence in this class action. See Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav. , 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992). For the following reasons, we agree with Citizens and conclude that the trial court erred in certifying the class without considering the adequacy of the class representative in light of the res judicata effect of the class representative’s decision to abandon claims.
Generally, res judicata prevents a plaintiff from abandoning claims and subsequently asserting them when the claims could have been litigated in the prior suit. Jeanes v. Henderson , 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1985); see also State & County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller , 52 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. 2001). For res judicata to apply, there must be: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first action. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp. , 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). The doctrine seeks to bring an end to litigation, prevent vexatious litigation, maintain stability of court decisions, promote judicial economy, and prevent double recovery. Barr , 837 S.W.2d at 629; Jeanes , 688 S.W.2d at 105. Under the transactional approach followed in Texas, a subsequent suit is barred if it arises out of the same subject matter as the prior suit, and that subject matter could have been litigated in the prior suit. Barr , 837 S.W.2d at 631. We explained in Barr that “a final judgment on an action extinguishes the right to bring suit on the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Id. at 631 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982)). Determining the scope of the “subject matter” or “transaction” of the prior suit requires “an analysis of the factual matters that make up the gist of the complaint, without regard to the form of action.” Id . at 630. This should be done pragmatically, “‘giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a trial unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.’” Id . at 631 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982)). “Any cause of action which arises out of those same facts should, if practicable, be litigated in the same lawsuit.” Id . at 630.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 was adopted in 1941 and patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon , 22 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2000). Rule 42 was fully revised in 1977 to conform to the 1966 federal amendments. Thus, we rely on our precedents and persuasive federal decisions and authorities interpreting current federal class action requirements. Id . (citing RSR Corp. v. Hayes , 673 S.W.2d 928, 931-32 (Tex. App. _ Dallas 1984, writ dism’d)). Rule 42 is a form of joinder, a procedural mechanism established to increase judicial economy and efficiency for suits with parties too numerous for conventional joinder. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon , 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1981) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); Hansberry v. Lee , 311 U.S. at 42-43 (“[t]he class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree [when parties are so numerous as to make joinder] in conformity to usual rules of procedure . . . impracticable”); see also Beeson , 22 S.W.3d at 404 (citing 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.02 (3d ed. 1999)); 7A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1751 (3d ed. 2005). Rule 42 is intended to eliminate or reduce the threat of repetitive litigation, prevent inconsistent resolution of similar cases, and provide an effective means of redress for individuals whose claims are too small to make it economically viable to pursue them in independent actions. Sheldon , 22 S.W.3d at 452 (citing The American Law Institute, Report: Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation 35 (1987)). Although intended to be an efficient device, “there is no right to litigate a claim as a class action.” Sheldon , 22 S.W.3d at 452-53. A Texas court may certify a class action only if the plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Rule 42. Id. at 453. Moreover, nothing mandates that a plaintiff pursue a remedy through the procedures of Rule 42. It is the plaintiff who chooses to resolve a claim through the class action mechanism. Though perhaps inefficient, every claim fit for class certification could be litigated outside the confines of Rule 42, just as every claim not suitable for class treatment must be. Thus, despite their unique procedural requirements, class actions provide no greater substantive rights than other procedural mechanisms of litigation. See Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 432 (“[O]ur procedural rules do not permit the form of the proceeding to determine whether substantive legal principles will control.”); see also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall not “abridge, enlarge or modify” preexisting rights). Class certification under Rule 42 was never meant to be an exception to res judicata, Beeson , 22 S.W.3d at 405, or to exist “in some sort of alternative universe outside our normal jurisprudence,” Bernal , 22 S.W.3d at 432. Basic principles of res judicata apply to class actions just as they do to any other form of litigation. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond , 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984); Bernal , 22 S.W.3d at 432; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein , 516 U.S. 367, 377-79 (1996). Accordingly, we hold that claims not pursued, or abandoned, in a class suit seeking damages that proceeds to final judgment on other claims arising from the same subject matter are subject to preclusion from relitigation by the principles of res judicata. Although it has not unequivocally decided the preclusive effect on subsequent actions of a final judgment in a class suit, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the same approach. In Hansberry and Ben-Hur, the Supreme Court indicated that a judgment in a class suit with an adequate representative may bind absent members of a class. See Hansberry v. Lee , 311 U.S. at 42 (holding that a prior decree in a class suit did not bind a class member because the named plaintiff did not adequately represent the interests of the class of property owners); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble , 255 U.S. 356, 363-67 (1921) (specifically holding that a federal district court had jurisdiction of a class action); see also Smith v. Swormstedt , 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853) (“[A] court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court.”); Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits , 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1925-26 (1998). The Court further stated that it is permissible to hold that a judgment rendered in a class suit would be res judicata as to members of the class, and the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel a different rule for conclusiveness of the judgments in class suits. Hansberry , 311 U.S. at 42. This approach has been challenged as unfair to absent class members who do not opt out and are bound by the final judgment. The argument continues that these absent members should be entitled to pursue individual claims in the same or other forums if their class claims are unsuccessful. We view the matter in a fundamentally different light, allowing individual choice by the plaintiffs with their consequent ramifications, to govern the litigation in class suits as in other suits. We do not dictate how litigants should structure their cases or which legitimate legal strategies they will pursue. We simply emphasize that legal consequences attach to tactical and strategic decisions in class actions as in other lawsuits. For instance, outside of class action suits, litigants tailor their actions to seek positive results from proceedings. Parties often decide to drop claims to achieve a desired objective: to enter a particular forum or venue, to avoid removal to federal court, to avoid expense for claims with little likelihood of success, to refrain from opening evidentiary doors harmful to client or case, or to focus the case on claims most likely to be successful. Similarly, a class may decide to pursue certain claims, abandon some, or not plead others. In the context of class actions this is not per se inappropriate, but a class representative must be aware that there are consequences associated with such a decision that could undermine certification. For example, a specific issue may involve too little commonality to allow for a class to survive the predominance requirements. See Bernal , 22 S.W.3d at 435. Having given putative class members the opportunity to choose, however, we will ordinarily hold class actions to the same res judicata standards as other forms of litigation, including enforcing the preclusion on abandoned claims which could have been litigated in the suit.
Daccach concedes that res judicata applies equally to class actions. He contends, however, that the claims he abandoned are procedurally barred from litigation in the class action by Rule 42, and therefore, res judicata cannot apply to preclude subsequent litigation of the claims that cannot be litigated through diligence in this class action suit. See Barr , 837 S.W.2d at 631 (“A subsequent suit will be barred if it arises out of the same subject matter of a previous suit and which through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit .” (emphasis added)). To achieve certification despite his abandonment of class claims, Daccach argues for a rule that would preclude later litigation of only those causes of action that could have been certified in the prior class action. For reasons we explain, we decline to adopt Daccach’s proposed rule. Most courts agree with Daccach’s concession that the basic principles of res judicata apply to class actions. See Cooper , 467 U.S. at 874 (and authorities cited therein); Hansberry , 311 U.S. at 42; Ben-Hur , 255 U.S. at 367; Beeson , 22 S.W.3d at 405. However, only a few cases can be read to support Daccach’s contention that only claims that could have been brought in a class action will be barred from subsequent litigation. One line of cases, followed by the court of appeals below and two other Texas courts of appeals, holds that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4), or identical Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(d), parties may bring or maintain a class action with respect to specific issues and will not suffer the preclusive effect of res judicata for those claims not actually litigated as unsuitable for class treatment. See, e.g. , Sullivan , 79 F.R.D. at 265 (holding that splitting claims that are amenable to class treatment is “perfectly appropriate” in order to realize the savings of resources of courts and parties that Rule 23 is designed to facilitate); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 79 S.W.3d 779, 793 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002), rev’d on other grounds , 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004); Microsoft Corp. v. Manning , 914 S.W.2d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, writ dism’d); see also 5 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions §16.22 (4th ed. 2002). The reasoning is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(A) and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(d)(1): “an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” Some commentators characterize this approach as a “sophisticated transactional approach” that limits the basic transactional approach of res judicata and “includes trial convenience in its calculus.” 18A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4455 (2d ed. 2002) (suggesting the approach is supported by Section 24(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which requires that a “transaction” must “be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit , and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations” (emphasis added)). Daccach suggests his proposed rule is consistent with Texas jurisprudence on res judicata, relying on some of our cases not involving class actions: Pustejovskey v. Rapid-Am. Corp. , 35 S.W.3d 643, 651 (Tex. 2000); Getty Oil v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 845 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1992). [10] These cases are factually and legally distinguishable. In Pustejovskey , we addressed “whether a plaintiff may bring separate actions for separate latent occupational diseases caused by exposure to asbestos.” 35 S.W.3d at 644. In addressing the single action rule as a species of res judicata, Justice Gonzales noted that “the transactional approach set out in Barr does not necessarily penalize a plaintiff for not bringing a claim arising out of the same facts that nonetheless could not have been litigated in the initial action.” Id . at 651. But one of the reasons we adopted a separate accrual rule in that case—and, by implication, the reason the claim could not have been litigated in the prior action—was that the damage-causing injury had not yet been discovered. Id . at 652. In this case we are not faced with latent injuries giving rise to claims that could not have been litigated in a prior action due to lack of discovery. The claims in this case were discovered or discoverable and then abandoned by Daccach to try to achieve class certification. In Getty Oil , we held that a third party’s claim against a tortfeasor’s insurers was not precluded by prior litigation against the tortfeasor because, under the “no action” clause of the insurance policy and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 38(c), the third party could not sue the insurer until there was a judgment against the tortfeasor. 845 S.W.2d at 801. Res judicata did not bar the second suit because the third party was contractually precluded from litigating the claim in the prior suit. No similar contractual agreement or rule governs in this case. Daccach also relies on the following statement made by the Fifth Circuit: “If the court rendering judgment lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim or if the procedural rules of the court made it impossible to raise a claim, then it is not precluded.” Browning v. Navarro , 887 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) (1982)); see also Montgomery v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex. Inc. , 923 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) (citing Browning , 887 F.2d at 558-59). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court cited the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which states that a second action arising from the same facts may be brought if “[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action . . . .” Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co. , 448 U.S. 261, 283 n.29 (1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61.2(c) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978)); see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc. , 348 F.3d 417, 432 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting contention that plaintiffs’ individual direct claims would be barred because a class action, “of course, is one of the recognized exceptions to the rule against claim-splitting”) (citing 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 131.40[3][e][iii] (3d ed. 1999)); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) (1982). We are not persuaded by this argument. First, the issue in Browning and Montgomery was whether the original decision-maker had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim sought to be relitigated in district court. In Browning , the court barred litigation of a subsequent fraud claim because the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim in the prior suit by the party. 887 F.2d at 558-59. In Montgomery , the plaintiff was not barred from litigating extra-contractual claims because the administrative agency that presided over the prior suit did not have jurisdiction to hear those claims. 923 S.W.2d at 150. These rulings turned on a lack of jurisdiction and do not inform our reasoning in this case because rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure does not affect a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Second, we do not believe section 26(1)(c) of the Restatement speaks to the class action context. Nothing forces plaintiffs seeking damages into a class suit. They may decide to opt out and pursue their claims individually with separate counsel or decide that the size of the claim does not justify the cost of pursuing it. On the other hand, plaintiffs may choose to litigate their claims under Rule 42 because it provides a more efficient and perhaps less expensive means of litigating certain claims. It is the class representative’s choice to seek certification, and the putative class members’ decision not to opt out of the class, that restricts their ability to rely on certain theories of recovery that are unsuitable for class treatment. Any restrictions that class action requirements place on a trial court’s ability to entertain specific theories of recovery in a class suit arise solely because of the choice to seek class certification. By this choice class members may put at risk their ability to litigate certain other claims not suitable for class treatment. These restrictions follow the individual decisions of the class members and are distinct from the jurisdictional restrictions that may be placed on a bankruptcy court or administrative agency, to which we believe section 26(1)(c) of the Restatements (Second) of Judgments more appropriately applies. We also are unpersuaded that an exception from res judicata principles for claims abandoned as unsuitable for class treatment is supported by the asserted precedent from the United States Supreme Court. In Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond , the Supreme Court announced that general principles of res judicata apply in class actions, but nevertheless determined that for the Title VII claims brought in a class suit under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, certain plaintiffs were not barred from subsequently bringing individual discrimination claims. 467 U.S. 867 (1984). Four employees sought certification of a class of employees alleged to have been discriminated against by a bank that engaged in “policies and practices” of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII Section 1981. Id . at 869-70. Upon receiving notice, six other employees joined the class. Id . at 870-71. After a trial in which all named plaintiffs testified, the district court found the bank had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination for certain levels of employees, but found as to other levels of employees that the discrimination was not pervasive enough to order relief. Id . at 870-72. The six joining class members moved to intervene to allege that each had been individually denied promotions for discriminatory reasons. Id . at 872. The motions were denied, and five of the six employees then filed a separate action against the Bank alleging violations of Section 1981. Id . On interlocutory appeal of the separate action, the federal circuit court concluded the doctrine of res judicata precluded the plaintiffs from maintaining their individual race discrimination claims because they were bound by the judgment in the class action. See EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond , 698 F. 2d 633, 674 (4th Cir. 1983). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court began by stating “[t]here is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation.” Cooper , 467 U.S. at 874. The holding that basic principles of res judicata apply to class actions was part of a lengthy discussion of the “crucial difference between an individual’s claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination.” Id . at 876. The suggestion is that a class claim for a pattern or practice of discrimination involves factual issues distinct from those in a class member’s individual discrimination lawsuit. Id . at 876-77. The Court also expressly noted that the district court “pointedly refused to decide the individual claims” of the plaintiffs now seeking adjudication of the claims in a separate action. Id . at 881. According to the Court, therefore, the court of appeals erred in attaching preclusive effect to the class action because it was not dispositive of the individual claims alleged in the separate action. Id . at 880. We read Cooper not as an exception to res judicata but as an application of its elements—a subsequent claim might not be barred if it does not involve the same factual issues that were litigated in the prior class action, a situation that can arise in the unique context of Title VII pattern and practice litigation. See, e.g. , Munoz v. Orr , 200 F.3d 291, 307 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We note that the failure of proof on the class claim does not bar all individual class members from bringing their own suits, provided that they do not base their claims solely on issues already adjudicated in this action and that they can show individualized proof of discrimination.”) (citing Cooper , 467 U.S. at 880); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. , 151 F.3d 402, 425 n.23 (5th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Cooper and stating that a subsequent disparate impact class action will be barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because it will inevitably contain the same factual issues as were litigated in the pattern or practice class action); see also Marshall v. Kirkland , 602 F.2d 1282, 1298 (8th Cir. 1979) (pre- Cooper case indicating that subsequent individual discrimination claims will not be precluded because the issues were not actually litigated in prior class action and there was no notice to the b(2) class that such claims might be waived); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation , 105 Colum. L. Rev. 717, 727 (2005) (arguing that the result in Cooper “may represent the correct rule in a Title VII class action, [but] it does not flow inevitably from an application of basic claim preclusion principles”). In addition, we find it significant that the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the district court’s pointed refusal to decide the plaintiff’s individual claims. Cooper , 467 U.S. at 881. It would hardly seem appropriate to bar subsequent litigation of a dispute that a prior court refused to decide. In this respect, we find Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(d) instructive. Rule 42(d) provides that “an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” The rule, like its federal counterpart, “is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the common issues for a class trial.” Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 84 F.3d 734, 746 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996). But, while we agree that Rule 42(d) allows a trial court to consider certifying a class whose representative has abandoned or split claims, we decline to take the further step of excepting a final judgment in such a class action from the principles of res judicata. Class members may be precluded from asserting those claims in subsequent individual litigation if they arose from the same transaction or subject matter and could have been litigated in the prior suit. See Barr , 837 S.W.2d at 631. Aggregation of claims in an appropriate class action is a more efficient way to resolve numerous disputes at once. However, efficiency is defeated if the tactfully structured dispute that is finally resolved in class suits may be relitigated in the same or other forums. We caution, also, that Rule 42(d) cannot be used to manufacture compliance with the certification prerequisites. See Castano , 84 F.3d at 745 n.21 (“A district court cannot manufacture predominance through the nimble use of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)].”). As explained below, the splitting or abandoning of certain claims may affect certification of the class in other ways.
The different procedural posture of the Cooper case raises another important issue. There the Court was faced with an interlocutory appeal of the actual subsequent claims being asserted, as opposed to this case in which we are asked to predetermine the preclusive effect of claims that may or may not be asserted in later litigation. In the only other case in which the United States Supreme Court has addressed res judicata in the class action context, a dissenting justice noted that “[a] court conducting an action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subsequent action.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein , 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 7B Charles Alan Wright et al ., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1789 (2d ed. 1986)). We generally agree with this maxim, but hasten to address a due process concern that this temporal distinction may raise. Some courts have applied the principles of res judicata, but refused to hold that subsequent claims would be precluded due to a lack of adequate notice to class members regarding the claims being litigated in the class action. See, e.g. , Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841,847 (4th Cir. 1989) (no preclusion because no notice); Aspinall v. Phillip Morris Cos. , 813 N.E.2d 476, 488-89 n.19 (Mass. 2004) (allowing member of class certified on economic damages theory to pursue individual claim for personal injury not suitable for certification in part because no “opt-out” provisions in state rules). The same reasoning has been the basis for court holdings that mandatory class actions for injunctive relief certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) cannot preclude subsequent individual claims for damages, even if based on the same events. See Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996); Fortner v. Thomas , 983 F.2d 1024, 1031 (11th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. , 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992); Norris v. Slothouber, 718 F.2d 1116, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that due process requires notice to absent class members before individual monetary damages could be barred and, though an absent class member could be bound by the res judicata effect of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action judgment as to injunctive or declaratory relief, he could not be barred from pursuing his individual monetary claim); Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 220 F.R.D. 64, 80-84 (M.D. Tenn. 2004); In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F.Supp. 869, 888-89 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Jahn ex rel. Jahn v. ORCR, Inc. , 92 P.3d 984, 985 (Colo. 2004) (en banc). Although we are not faced here with a b(2) class, notice and due process still demand our attention. To have preclusive effect a prior judgment cannot be “constitutionally infirm.” Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982). Due process requires “that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members,” as well as “notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation.” Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see also Tex. R. Civ. P . 42(a)(4); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor , 521 U.S. 591, 625‑26 (1997). We noted as much in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray , where we stated that due process may require that class members be given notice of the class action and an opportunity to opt out and preserve claims that a class representative has abandoned. 135 S.W.3d 657, 668 (Tex. 2004); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed , 916 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. 1996) (“The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that due process requires adequate representation of the interests of absentee class members that the judgment will bind.”). Although a certifying court cannot precisely predetermine the res judicata effect of a class action, it initially must protect the due process rights of absent class members by ensuring that the class representative adequately represents their interests. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc. , 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]bsent class members’ due process right to adequate representation is protected not by collateral review, but by the certifying court initially, and thereafter by appeal within the state system and by direct review in the United States Supreme Court.”). Some courts have reconciled the tension between the trial court’s inability to predetermine res judicata and its burden to protect class members’ due process rights by requiring the trial court to assess the “risk” that uncertified claims may be forever barred. See Clark v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. , No. Civ. A. 8:001217-24, 2001 WL 1946329, at  (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2001) (stating that offering only some claims for class certification when other, more lucrative claims could not be certified “defeats adequate representation since it places absent class members at the risk of having other claims forever barred by res judicata”); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (assessing the risk of abandoned monetary claims that members of the b(2) pattern-and-practice class may face in trying to bring later individual claims); Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 189 F.R.D. 544, 550-51 (D. Minn. 1999) (refusing to certify because the “possible prejudice to class members” resulting from claim preclusion in the future “is simply too great”); Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. , 535 F. Supp. 595, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to certify class action for economic losses where plaintiffs also had personal injury claims because of significant risks that class members would “later [be told] that they had impermissibly split a single cause of action”); Millett v. Atl. Richfield Co. , No. Civ. A. CV-98-555, 2000 WL 359979, at  (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000) (explaining that asserting claims for injunctive relief while leaving personal injury claims unraised places class members at risk of subsequent claim preclusion defense); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc. , 679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 601-02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (stating that paring down class claims to avoid certification problems creates impermissible “risk” of adverse preclusive effect). We agree with this approach. A class representative’s decision to abandon certain claims may be detrimental to absent class members for whom those claims could be more lucrative or valuable, assuming those class members do not opt out of the class. Abandoning such claims, or claims “reasonably expected” to be raised by class members, could undermine the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s representation of the class. See City of San Jose v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County , 525 P.2d 701, 711-13 (Cal. 1974). But see Regions Bank v. Lee , 905 So.2d 765, 772-73 (Ala. 2004) (rejecting adequacy challenge based on effect of res judicata because abandoned claims would involve a different cause of action against a different defendant than that involved in the class action). We hold, therefore, that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 requires the trial court, as part of its rigorous analysis, to consider the risk that a judgment in the class action may preclude subsequent litigation of claims not alleged, abandoned, or split from the class action. The trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider the preclusive effect of a judgment on abandoned claims, as res judicata could undermine the adequacy of representation requirement. See Wolff, 105 Colum. L. Rev at 722 (“[T]he preclusion inquiry would sometimes reveal significant obstacles to class certification . . . .”). A trial court could, however, determine that the risk of preclusion is not high enough to refuse certification. For instance, the abandoned claims may be insignificant, unlikely to succeed in any proceeding, or not valuable. Some abandoned claims may be alleged against different defendants or may not be ripe for litigation, in which case res judicata would not apply. But, because we hold class actions seeking damages to the same res judicata standards as other forms of litigation, including enforcing the preclusion on abandoned claims which could have been litigated in the suit, it is critical that putative class members be given adequate notice and an opportunity to exclude themselves from the class form of proceeding so that they may preserve individual claims that may otherwise be barred from subsequent litigation. See Richard A. Nagareda, Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action , 103 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 216 (2003) (contending that the ability to opt out respects the rights of class members to control their claims). [11] Under Rule 42, notice must be given to the class, and class members given an opportunity to opt out, before the trial court addresses the merits of the class claims. See Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson , 53 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. 2001) (Owen, J. dissenting); see also Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah , 414 U.S. 537, 548 (1974) (explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended to avoid “one‑way” intervention issue arising when class members were not identified before court made decisions going to merits). To properly protect absent class members, a trial court must rigorously analyze Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42’s prerequisites prior to sending any necessary class notice, as this analysis will likely affect the class definition and requisites for the notice. McAllen Med. Center, Inc. v. Cortez , 66 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2001). Rule 42 sets out the following requirements for notice in a b(3) class action: For any class certified under Rule 42(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded; and (vi) the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 42(c)(3). Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(2)(B). Ultimately, to certify a class in which the representatives have abandoned claims in favor of pursuing certain class claims, raising a risk of preclusion for absent class members, effective notice must be given to these absent members of an identified class regarding the preclusive effect that may attach to their individual claims. The unnamed members may then exercise independent judgment and chose to remain in the class or opt out.