Opinion ID: 2014162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: baron lease negotiation

Text: The facts and circumstances under which the Baron lease was negotiated, prepared and executed are the subject of considerable dispute. It is clear from the testimony of both parties that the instrument itself was prepared by defendant Crossroads both as to the mimeographed form and the typewritten insertions in the spaces provided. The parties had at least two conferences before the contract was signed. Both parties agree nothing was said about the meaning of the phrase whose principal business is the operation of a store selling fabric when the contract was approved in final form. Mr. Schoenfelter, Crossroads' president, states he had earlier discussed the meaning of these words with Mr. Baron: In this particular case, we explained that we would not enter into an additional lease, or any other lease, in the center with a tenant whose business would be the sale of fabrics as their principal business. Principal business being what they were leasing the space for and for really no other purpose other than incidentals. That was before signing. After signing I can't recollect any discussion about this lease until recent months. When we discuss the exclusive provision of this nature, we always point out the stores that are already in the business, or have a right to be in this business, or other stores that have a right to come into it as an incidental part of their business. Mr. Baron's version of the discussion of the Exclusive Operations portion of the lease is quite different. He testified: The only time other fabric business came up was in connection with other storesPenney's was mentioned; Woolworths, Sears and the possibility of Younkers. And Mr. Schoenfelter asked me if I was familiar with the fact that these businesses sell fabrics. I said I was; I had seen their operations. That is how it came up.   . In connection with the discussion of these four stores, there was no talk about there being any other stores to come later which would sell fabric, or would be competing with my business, or that they would be renting to other stores that incidentally sold fabrics. On cross-examination he stated: There is no doubt in my mind that this is understood to mean any store selling fabrics; otherwise I wouldn't be here today. Not `whole principal business is selling fabrics'; no. Mr. Grossman, Baron's attorney, said he was present at the conference when the terms were finally agreed upon. It was at that time he dictated the letter dated July 26, a portion of which we set out above. He too states there was no discussion of the meaning of the phrase whose principal business is the operation of a store selling fabrics. The phrase was in the lease when it was brought to him. He testified without objection: I looked on there at the exclusive operation and I saw typed in what we're going to give him exclusively, and typed in were the following words: `the operation of a store selling fabrics.' Now I thought that anything that restricts the shopping center from having a business in the operation of a store selling fabrics meant what it saidthat no store could open up that sold fabric. I felt that protected him. Much more was said by both parties. We think the above excerpts are sufficient to show the lessor and lessee differed in their interpretation of the language. The real factual conflict appears when Crossroads insists it explained to Baron its intention to allow competition by other subsequent tenants as an incidental part of such tenant's business. Baron denies this but admits he knew of and expected competition from the four large stores who already had leases or whose lease was being negotiated. (Younkers).