Opinion ID: 2164973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sandra JacksonSeverance

Text: Codefendants may be tried together if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. D.C.Code § 23-311 (1991). By allowing the trial court wide latitude in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for severance, King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 352 (D.C.1988), we accord a strong presumption that two defendants [when] charged with jointly committing a criminal offense will be jointly tried. Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 996 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1017, 112 S.Ct. 667, 116 L.Ed.2d 757 (1991). [5] This presumption may be rebutted where (1) there are `irreconcilable defenses so that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.' Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368 (D.C. 1979) (quoting Rhone v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 48, 365 F.2d 980, 981 (1966)), (2) one codefendant is seeking to call a codefendant as an exculpatory witness, id. at 367-68, or (3) where the evidence against one of the parties is de minimis. Russell v. United States, 586 A.2d 695, 698 (D.C.1991). Not only do none of these exceptions apply here, but also considering the undisputed testimony that Ms. Jackson cut Mr. Ball on the wrist, coupled with the jury's acquitting each of the defendants of murder, we are unpersuaded by appellant's argument that her conviction of assault with a deadly weapon was a result of the jury being inflamed by evidence of the cruel murder.