Opinion ID: 1925642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Act's Use of Conclusory Language

Text: TPC's primary challenge to the constitutionality of the quick-take statute centers on its contention that EDC is vested with the exclusive power to deem that a taking is for a public purpose. TPC alleges that this aspect of the statute renders it facially unconstitutional and creates an EDC fiat on the issue of public use by making its determination conclusive and unreviewable. We respectfully disagree. In reviewing the statute we are guided by the principle that legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of validity and constitutionality. In re Advisory Opinion to House of Representatives (Casino II), 885 A.2d 698, 702 (R.I.2005). The act must stand as valid, unless we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that it is contrary to a provision which is either expressly set forth in the State constitution or must, beyond a reasonable doubt, be necessarily implied from language expressly set forth therein. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino I), 856 A.2d 320, 327 (R.I.2004) (quoting In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d 550, 552 (R.I.1984)). The condemnation statute provides in relevant part: If, for any of the purposes of this chapter, the corporation shall find it necessary to acquire any real property, whether for immediate or future use, the corporation may find and determine that the property, whether a fee simple absolute or a lesser interest, is required for the acquisition, construction, or operation of a project, and upon that determination, the property shall be deemed to be required for public use until otherwise determined by the corporation   . Section 42-64-9(a) (emphasis added). This provision of the statute does not make EDC's determination that the property is required for public use conclusive or unreviewable; nor does it invade the judiciary's exclusive authority to answer the public use questions that may arise in a condemnation proceeding. Mindful that the question of whether property has been taken for a public use is reserved for the judiciary, this Court has addressed the issue of conclusory language in a statute that delegated eminent domain authority to a public agency. In In re Rhode Island Suburban Railway Co., 22 R.I. 455, 48 A. 590 (1901), the Court was confronted with a condemnation statute that provided the taking could be for corporate purposes rather than public purposes. In upholding its constitutionality, we held: If a legislature should say that a certain taking was for a public use, that would not make it so; for such a rule would enable a legislature to conclude the question of constitutionality by its own declaration. The true rule is that the statute will be held to apply only to public purposes, unless it shows the contrary, and the court will then determine whether the particular taking is for a public purpose.  Id. at 456, 48 A. at 591. (Emphasis added.) As this passage indicates, a legislative declaration of public use is instructive, and entitled to deference, but not conclusive. This point was further amplified in Opinion to the Governor, in which the Court stated: While the ultimate determination of the character of the use or purpose is a judicial and not a legislative question, yet where the legislature declares a particular use or purpose to be a `public use' such a declaration must be given weight and will control unless the use or purpose in question is obviously of a private character. Opinion to the Governor, 76 R.I. at 258, 69 A.2d at 535 (citing Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 50 R.I. at 298, 146 A. at 782). See also In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 113 R.I. 586, 593, 324 A.2d 641, 646 (1974) (When deciding if a condemnation comports with the Takings Clause, the self-serving recitation of a public purpose within a legislative enactment is not conclusive because the issue is reserved to the judiciary.). Therefore, a legislative determination on the issue of public use, as with any enactment of the General Assembly, will be accorded deference by this Court, but is not dispositive. In light of the rebuttable nature of the legislative determination of public use, when a property owner challenges the public use aspect of a condemnation proceeding, judicial review is in order.