Opinion ID: 2630520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Aggravating Factors

Text: ¶ 109 The court assistant argues that because the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over two of the eight crimes listed as aggravating factors, these two crimes may not be relied on to support the sentence. The State counters that these crimes were only used to determine the sentence for the four convictions of aggravated murder and may be used to determine Arguelles's inclinations. ¶ 110 We held in Lafferty that uncharged crimes may be considered in the penalty phase of capital cases if the elements of the crimes are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1259 (Utah 1988). Section 76-3-207(2)(a)(ii) also states that evidence concerning the defendant's character, background, [and] history may be considered. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(ii) (Supp.2001). ¶ 111 In accordance with Lafferty, the court stated during the sentencing hearing that each uncharged crime used as an aggravating factor was found to have occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the trial court stated that each uncharged crime was only relied upon in minor part. Because the uncharged crimes were relied upon minimally, and were determined to have been committed beyond a reasonable doubt, we are unwilling to conclude that the uncharged crimes were erroneously considered during the sentencing phase.
¶ 112 The court assistant argues that victim impact evidence was used inappropriately as an aggravating factor. Victim impact evidence and its constitutionality are discussed in section VI, infra. Contrary to the court assistant's assertion, the record does not show that victim impact evidence was cited as an aggravating factor. In the sentencing proceeding, the trial court listed eleven aggravating factors and four mitigating factors. These factors were weighed in order to determine whether the death penalty was justified. After citing those factors the court acknowledged the sorrow of the families and expressed its compassion and concern for them, but this acknowledgment was not part of the court's review of aggravating factors, and we decline to read it as such. The trial court stated, the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh, if not eclipse, the mitigating, and made no mention of the victim impact evidence until later.
¶ 113 The court assistant challenges the trial court's use of brutality as an aggravating factor in the sentencing proceeding. He claims that brutality as an aggravating factor fails to narrow the classification of defendants who are death eligible. He also claims that there is nothing in the evidence to justify the application of the heinousness aggravating factor to any of the murders. He further cites State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989), and Utah Code section 76-5-202(q) (Supp.2001) to establish that all murders are brutal and proof of serious abuse prior to death must be present in order for heinous acts to qualify as aggravating factors. The State argues that regardless of whether the aggravating factor considered meets the technical definition of heinousness, the court is permitted to consider the nature of the criminal acts in determining the sentence. ¶ 114 We find the trial court did not err in considering the brutality of Arguelles's acts. First, regardless of whether the level of brutality rose to the level of heinousness as outlined in Tuttle, brutality may be considered if relevant to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iv) (Supp.2001). Second, the court assistant's suggestion that the evidence does not reveal any heinous aggravating factors is unsupported by the record. The trial court stated during the sentencing proceeding that the defendant has shown an horrific brutality, particularly to Lisa Martinez. Contrary to the court assistant's assertion, this statement is not limited to Lisa Martinez and accurately describes the acts committed against the other victims as well. Even though the trial court did not specifically mention other victims, it references the heinous brutality committed against them, meeting the standard set forth in Wood and Tuttle. As in Tuttle, the murders here involved terrible physical abuse before death that evidenced an intent to cause wholly unnecessary suffering to the victims. [25] Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1218. The brutality of the crimes therefore met the threshold level of heinousness to warrant consideration as an aggravating factor.
¶ 115 The court assistant argues that the trial court counted the same aggravating factors multiple times in determining Arguelles's sentence. The State argues that the trial court did not double count, and that even if it had, the court assistant has failed to show that the double counting prejudiced Arguelles. ¶ 116 The trial court's discussion of aggravating and mitigating factors is somewhat unclear. On close analysis, the record indicates that some aggravating factors were referred to more than once and one factor was counted more than once by the trial court. For example, in discussing the number of victims killed, the court also makes reference to Arguelles's criminal history and the fact that Tuesday Roberts was killed to destroy her as a potential witness. The trial court later cites Arguelles's criminal record as an independent aggravating factor and the murder of a potential witness, i.e., Tuesday Roberts, as another independent aggravating factor. ¶ 117 While some aggravating factors appear to be referred to multiple times, only one aggravating factor appears to have been counted more than once. The trial court states that the fourth aggravating factor is that Arguelles's crimes involved heinous acts of terror to the victims, including actual physical violence. The court then refers to the horrific brutality of the murders as the eighth aggravating factor. To be constitutionally sound, the aggravating factor of heinousness must narrow the class of death eligible defendants. Once the definition of heinousness is narrowed, the difference between brutality and heinousness is small. In fact, to meet the heinousness requirement listed in Utah Code section 76-5-202(1)(p), we have stated that a brutal act must constitute battery or torture. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 86 (Utah 1982). Thus, the trial court's treatment of heinousness and brutality as two separate aggravating factors was duplicative. ¶ 118 The court assistant cites Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994), in support of his contention that aggravating factors may not be counted twice. In Parsons we held that a sentencer cannot be allowed the opportunity to doubly weigh the commission of the underlying felony and the motive behind [the] underlying felony as separate aggravators. Id. at 528 (quoting Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 681 (Miss.1991)). Since robbery will presumably always be based upon the motive of pecuniary gain, we held that the defendant's motive in committing a robbery could not be considered as an independent aggravating factor. Id. The current case is not parallel to Parsons since the underlying crime here, aggravated murder, may be the result of various motives, only some of which might be considered as aggravating factors. ¶ 119 While we are sympathetic to the argument that it is generally inappropriate to count the same aggravating factor more than once in a sentencing proceeding, we note that the sentencing process does not involve a mere comparison of the number of aggravating factors to the number of mitigating factors. Rather, [t]hese standards require that the sentencing body compare the totality of the mitigating against the totality of the aggravating factors, not in terms of the relative numbers of the aggravating and the mitigating factors, but in terms of their respective substantiality and persuasiveness. Wood, 648 P.2d at 83. Central to our inquiry then, is whether the trial court weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors correctly, as opposed to whether they were merely counted correctly. ¶ 120 The trial court did not err in its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Following Arguelles's guilty plea, the trial court convened a hearing to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors as outlined in Utah Code section 76-3-207(1)(a). The trial court then weighed the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors and determined that the aggravating circumstances outweigh, if not eclipse, the mitigating. The evidence justifying the death penalty is overwhelming. (Emphasis added.) Setting aside the technical double listing of one aggravating factor, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, any error stemming from the double reference was harmless.