Opinion ID: 806093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: The first issue that we must address is the appropriate standard of review to apply to Morgan’s appellate challenges. Sentences in criminal cases are reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Morgan’s arguments challenge only the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. See United States v. Lanning, 633 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[d]ouble-counting claims concern the procedural reasonableness of the defendant’s sentence”). But cf. id. at 474 (treating the question of whether the district court correctly imposed an upward departure as a substantive issue). “Procedural reasonableness requires that a district court must properly calculate the guidelines range, treat the guidelines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any variance from the guidelines range.” United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). No. 09-5828 United States v. Morgan Page 8 To be procedurally reasonable, the court’s sentence must also be based on a reasonable determination of the facts. United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010). Our sentencing review is generally conducted under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Novales, 589 F.3d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 2009). Under this standard, “[t]he district court’s legal interpretation[s] of the Guidelines are reviewed de novo, but its factual findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir. 2011). But “if a sentencing judge asks . . . whether there are any objections not previously raised, in compliance with . . . Bostic, 371 F.3d 865[,] and if the relevant party does not object, then plain-error review applies on appeal” to those procedural-reasonableness arguments that were not previously raised in the district court. United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)) (alterations omitted); see also United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the defendant generally forfeits the right to challenge on appeal any procedural errors to which he did not object at the time of sentencing”). But see United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a defendant is not obligated to reraise issues previously presented to the court). In determining whether a defendant has preserved or waived his appellate challenges, we employ this forfeiture rule as “a common-sense application of the plain error doctrine” and “with an eye to the realities of the facts and circumstances of each sentencing proceeding.” Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 580 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to the sentencing hearing, Morgan filed an objection to the PSR in which he argued against the application of the attempted-murder sentencing Guideline in favor of the lower Guideline for aggravated assault. Morgan raised this same concern prior to the district court’s decision on this issue, as well as in response to the Bostic question at the close of the hearing. Because this issue has been properly preserved for our review, we will apply the abuse-of-discretion standard. No. 09-5828 United States v. Morgan Page 9 In response to the Bostic question, defense counsel also stated: “And additionally our objection to a sentence under . . . the discharge of a firearm [count], which is 924(c)[,] in excess of the mandatory minimum.” The government argues that this statement was insufficient to preserve the double-counting challenge that Morgan now raises on appeal with respect to the upward departure. But we need not decide whether Morgan’s response was sufficient because the district court itself raised and addressed this issue during the course of the sentencing proceedings. See Simmons, 587 F.3d at 356 (explaining that the “justification for the Bostic question is to ensure the district court has an opportunity to correct any error ‘on the spot’”). Specifically, when the government requested an upward departure on the § 924(c) conviction (notably the same issue to which Morgan’s counsel later objected in response to the Bostic question), the district court asked: “Isn’t that incorporated in part, though, into the guideline calculation? We’ve just gone through this analysis of whether the guidelines should be enhanced because of attempted murder versus an assault issue.” The government ultimately allayed the court’s concerns by explaining its position that the court would not be double-counting Morgan’s conduct because the two counts were separate. Defense counsel commented in response that applying the upward departure in addition to the cross-reference to attempted murder “seems to me to be beating a dead horse.” Nonetheless, the court granted the government’s request, finding it to be “well thought out and well taken.” The record therefore reflects that the district court directly considered and ruled on the double-counting issue that Morgan now raises. See Simmons, 587 F.3d at 356. Because the court raised this issue on its own, forcing Morgan to reraise it in response to the Bostic question would serve no purpose under the circumstances. We will therefore apply the abuse-of-discretion standard—rather than the plain-error standard—to Morgan’s double-counting argument as it relates to the upward departure because the district court had the opportunity to consider this issue in the first instance. Finally, Morgan raises a challenge to the application of any firearm-related crossreference as a matter of law because he contends that his firearm-related conduct was No. 09-5828 United States v. Morgan Page 10 already taken into account in the § 924(c) charge. The government asserts on appeal that Morgan failed to object on this ground before the district court, but Morgan contends that he is presenting the issue as an alternative argument under his challenge to the application of the attempted-murder cross-reference. Because we conclude that Morgan has presented sufficient grounds in his first two challenges to justify a remand, we need not address the issues raised in his third challenge, and we therefore decline to do so. If the issue recurs on remand, Morgan may raise it then in the context of the specific cross-reference, if any, that the district court determines to be appropriate and in a manner consistent with this opinion.