Opinion ID: 365815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: daniel cavanaugh

Text: 32 Cavanaugh raises three contentions, the first of which is shared by Mills.
33 During its case-in-chief, the government called as a witness one Debbie Kenney whose testimony tended to incriminate both Mills and Cavanaugh. After she had testified, been cross-examined and dismissed, counsel for Cavanaugh and Mills requested a one-day continuance on the grounds she was a surprise witness and time was needed to obtain evidence to attack her credibility or to rebut her testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Cavanaugh and Mills both argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. 34 The trial court has great latitude in granting or denying continuances. The Supreme Court in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S.Ct. 321, 322, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940) stated: 35 In the course of trial, after due appointment of competent counsel, many procedural questions necessarily arise which must be decided by the trial judge in the light of facts then presented and conditions then existing. Disposition of a request for continuance is of this nature and is made in the discretion of the trial judge, the exercise of which will ordinarily not be reviewed. 36 There are, of course, rare occasions when the denial of a continuance could be an abuse of discretion, but a clear abuse would have to be found. See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 572 (9th Cir. 1978); Daut v. United States, 405 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1968), Cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945, 91 S.Ct. 1624, 29 L.Ed.2d 114 (1971); Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal § 832. There was no abuse of discretion in this case.
37 Cavanaugh argues that the trial court erred by failing to initiate a hearing on his competence to stand trial. 38 If the evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine doubt in the mind of a reasonable trial judge concerning the defendant's competence, due process requires the trial judge to hold a competency hearing on his own motion. Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 849, 98 S.Ct. 158, 54 L.Ed.2d 117 (1977); See 18 U.S.C. § 4244; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). The constitutional standard of competence is whether a defendant  'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him' . Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960); Bassett, 549 F.2d at 618. Bare assertions by defendant's counsel that defendant is not competent to stand trial generally are not sufficient to raise the requisite doubt. See De Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 982-83 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 815, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977); See also United States v. Ives, 574 F.2d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1978). 39 In this case, the record reveals that Cavanaugh was alert, rational and responsive throughout the trial. Cavanaugh testified, at a hearing on a motion to suppress, that during the month immediately preceding trial, and at Cavanaugh's request, jail officials had given Cavanaugh sedatives that made him drowsy. However, there is no evidence that he took any drugs at the time of his trial. The only other evidence of incompetence consisted of the unsupported assertions of Cavanaugh and his counsel that the discomfort of living in a jail cell had impaired Cavanaugh's mental ability to testify and to respond to cross-examination. 40 The evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine doubt about Cavanaugh's ability to communicate rationally with his lawyer and to understand the proceedings against him. The trial court was not required to hold a competency hearing on its own motion.
41 In sentencing Cavanaugh, the trial judge took particular note of Cavanaugh's history of drug abuse, his lengthy criminal record and his failure to achieve rehabilitation during prior prison terms. Cavanaugh complains that the trial court gave excessive consideration to his use of illegal drugs. 42 A federal judge is granted wide discretion in sentencing and may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); United States v. Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1978). We find no abuse of discretion.