Opinion ID: 2600609
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Request to Show Photographs of the Victim's Injuries During Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his request to show prospective jurors the photographs of Kesha's injuries as part of the defense's voir dire, and thereby violated his rights to a reliable verdict, to trial by jury, and to due process, under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and corresponding provisions of the California Constitution. [2] As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying his request. Through an in limine motion, defense counsel sought to exclude from the guilt phase photographs of Kesha's injuries. The trial court ruled that such photographs were admissible and that it would permit the prosecution to use several of them, while excluding several as cumulative. [3] Defense counsel then moved to allow the defense to show prospective jurors the photographs during voir dire. Defense counsel argued the photographs were so prejudicial that the defense could not determine whether prospective jurors could be fair unless it showed them the actual photographs and asked them whether they could render a fair and impartial decision at the penalty phase after having seen the photographs. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing it was unsupported by case law and, in essence, sought to have the jurors prejudge the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, but added it would allow counsel to question prospective jurors about the photographs, as long as there was no use of actual items of evidence. The court also stated it would personally voir dire prospective jurors to determine what effect the photographs might have on them. During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors if they would have difficulty in deciding a case that involve[d] some graphic photographs showing serious injuries. Two prospective jurors responded affirmatively, and the court excused both for cause. Subsequently, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors whether seeing graphic or gruesome photographs of a deceased child would cause them to presume that defendant was guilty or would cause them to feel that somebody should pay for the crime, regardless of the rest of the evidence in the case. None of the remaining jurors indicated they would be so affected. (1) We defer to the trial court's discretion regarding the manner of conducting voir dire. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182]; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) As we have stated, deathqualification voir dire must avoid two extremes: on the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties; on the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 47 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) `In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion.' ( Ibid. ) Here, the trial court expressly asked prospective jurors about the photographs, and defense counsel also made specific inquiries on the subject. Defendant presents no authority for the proposition that the trial court was required to allow the defense to show prospective jurors the actual photographs in connection with its questioning, and, on this record, we see no abuse of discretion.