Opinion ID: 2515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal for Refusal to Testify

Text: We proceed to consider the district court's related, yet analytically distinct decision to dismiss Lewis's case with prejudice in light of his refusal to testify in the absence of an adjournment and transfer. It is beyond dispute under our precedent that a district court may dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) when the plaintiff refuses to go forward with a properly scheduled trial. Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1990); see generally 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2370, at 389-95 & nn. 35-36 (3d ed. 2008) (An action may be dismissed under Federal Rule 41(b) if the plaintiff, without offering some explanation that is satisfactory to the court, is not ready to present his or her case at trial or if the plaintiff refuses to proceed at the trial.). Our sister circuits agree. One naturally expects the plaintiff to be present and ready to put on her case when the day of trial arrives. A litigant's day in court is the culmination of a lawsuit, and trial dates  particularly civil trial dates  are an increasingly precious commodity in our nation's courts. Moffitt v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 236 F.3d at 873. Thus, where a district court is confronted with a plaintiff's unwillingness to proceed on the date scheduled for trial, as opposed to the more typical failure to comply with her discovery obligations on time, or to meet some other pre-trial deadline, it is not unreasonable to consider treating such unwillingness more severely. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Knoll v. AT & T Co., 176 F.3d 359, 365 (6th Cir.1999) (Where a plaintiff does not appear at the trial date or, as in this case, is inexcusably unprepared to prosecute the case, Rule 41(b) dismissal is particularly appropriate. Indeed, such behavior constitutes the epitome of a `failure to prosecute.'); Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir.1993) (The remedy [of dismissal for failure to prosecute] is usually applied when the plaintiff is not ready for trial or fails to appear.); cf. Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.1986) (recognizing in context of Rule 55 that trial judge must have broad latitude to impose the sanction of default for non-attendance occurring after a trial has begun. (citations omitted)). [12] This reasoning applies with no less force where, as here, a party's expressed unwillingness to proceed to trial follows the denial of a request for a continuance. See, e.g., Knoll v. AT & T Co., 176 F.3d at 365 (affirming Rule 41(b) dismissal where attorney, inter alia, attempted to force the court to grant a continuance by refusing to proceed on the day of trial); Lopez v. Aransas County Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.1978) (holding that trial court's denial of plaintiff[s'] eleventh-hour oral motion for a continuance was well within its discretion and that, faced with ... plaintiffs' refusal to proceed, [district court] did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cause with prejudice for want of prosecution); Ali v. A & G Co., 542 F.2d 595, 596-97 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that Rule 41(b) dismissal was not abuse of discretion where court previously denied plaintiffs' request to delay trial due to incomplete discovery and plaintiffs and their attorney were not ready to proceed on day of trial); Hooper v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 325 F.2d 321, 322 (5th Cir.1963) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where case was dismissed with prejudice by the District Court when [plaintiff] declined to go to trial after denial of his motion for continuance). To the contrary, where a plaintiff refuses to proceed with trial following a district court's unfavorable ruling on a request for continuance or in limine motion, we have noted that a district court ha[s] no real choice but to dismiss the case. Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d at 140; see also Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d at 15 (observing that, upon denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss action without prejudice, plaintiff was obliged to go to trial, failing which involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute [was] appropriate (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)). [13] But see Merker v. Rice, 649 F.2d 171, 174-75 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing action following plaintiff's refusal to proceed without expert witness where such refusal was not arbitrary or unreasonable). The concerns underlying these decisions are only heightened once a civil jury has been selected and sworn. [T]he right to a jury trial is too precious to permit its effectiveness to be destroyed by non-utilization of jurors drawn caused by unnecessary delays in preparation, lack of attention to the case, or undue procrastination by party or counsel or both. Theilmann v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 455 F.2d at 856 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, where a party fails to appear or refuses to proceed with trial  after the jury ha[s] been drawn, dismissal with prejudice may be particularly appropriate. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Michelsen v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 394, 395-97 (2d Cir.1970) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where, after jury was selected, court denied renewed motion for continuance to obtain presence of plaintiff and expert, and dismissed case for failure to prosecute). See generally Judith S. Kaye, Jury Reform: A Work in Progress, 86 Judicature 147, 147 (2002) ([W]e must be concerned with the quality of the jury experience for each person summoned to serve. We want jurors to experience a court system that works well, respects their time and their lives, and values their performance of this most vital civic duty.). Again, we recognize that Lewis's refusal to testify without an adjournment and transfer was grounded in a professed concern for his personal safety if housed during trial at Great Meadow. We reiterate that such concerns warrant careful district court consideration. In this case, despite the fact that Lewis waited until a jury was empaneled before raising his detention concerns, the district court explored various options with the detaining officials and the parties, the most promising of which was Lewis's detention in the video-monitored Great Meadow SHU for the brief trial. The court took a number of recesses, the last of which afforded Lewis and his attorney an opportunity to consider the SHU option. While our review task would be easier if, upon receiving Lewis's refusal to accept the SHU option, the district court had provided a fuller explanation for its decision not to adjourn and transfer the casean option first identified by the court itselfand to order dismissal with prejudice, we nevertheless conclude that the decision manifests no abuse of discretion.