Opinion ID: 844257
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Habit

Text: Todd Wolf, like defendant, was a member of the New Wine Fellowship Church. Wolf testified that he and his wife took defendant into their home because he was living on the street, but later asked him to leave. The prosecutor asked Wolf why. Defense counsel objected the reason was irrelevant. The prosecutor responded it was relevant because it tended to establish defendant's habit of roaming about late at night. He said Wolf would testify that he asked defendant to leave because he stayed out late at night and ignored Wolf's requests that he not do so. Defense counsel argued it was, nevertheless, irrelevant because this occurred several months before the crimes on trial. The objection was overruled. Wolf testified he asked defendant to leave because, despite his requests to the contrary, defendant repeatedly stay[ed] out too late. (21) On appeal, defendant again contends that his habit of staying out late was irrelevant because he lived with the Wolfs months before these crimes were committed. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, § 210.) The trial court has broad latitude in determining the relevance of evidence. ( People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476].) We review such determinations for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 701 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657].) We find no abuse of discretion here. The fact that defendant tended to stay out late at night, and refused to modify his behavior on request, was relevant. This series of offenses was committed at night and some offenses continued into the early morning hours. The fact that the particular period about which Wolf testified predated the offenses was a factor going to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Defendant objects that this evidence, even if relevant, was more prejudicial than probative. (22) A trial court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time. (Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 290 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 187 P.3d 363] ( Riggs ).) `Prejudice as contemplated by [Evidence Code] section 352 is not so sweeping as to include any evidence the opponent finds inconvenient. Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because it undermines the opponent's position or shores up that of the proponent. The ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant. The code speaks in terms of undue prejudice. Unless the dangers of undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption `substantially outweigh' the probative value of relevant evidence, a section 352 objection should fail. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635].) `The prejudice referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. (23) In applying section 352, prejudicial is not synonymous with damaging.' [Citation.] ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) [¶] The prejudice that section 352 `is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.' [Citations.] `Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of prejudging a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704].) In other words, evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors' emotional reaction. In such a circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.' ( Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 998, 1008-1009 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 164].) ( People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 438-439 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11].) On appeal, we review the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. ( Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 290; People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 444-445 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 161 P.3d 3]; People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1171 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353].) No abuse occurred. That defendant stayed out late while living with the Wolfs was not unduly prejudicial. [30] Indeed, defendant made a much more damaging admission to the police in this regard: that he practiced his martial arts at night, in a ninja outfit, in the Riverside Canyon Crest area and Moreno Valley. Finally, the argument borders on the frivolous. The jury heard evidence that defendant broke into homes, repeatedly raped, threatened his victims with deadly weapons, stabbed one man, shot at another, and murdered a young woman. In light of this evidence, it defies logic that the jury would be pushed beyond its ability to dispassionately evaluate the evidence because it learned that defendant stayed out late.