Opinion ID: 2982747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hobart Is on Point and Controlling

Text: Given the similarities with Hobart, this case is relatively straightforward. In Hobart we held that an EPA settlement (the “Hobart Agreement”) was an administrative settlement that resolved liability to the United States. The contribution action seeking costs incurred under that settlement was thus subject to a three year statute of limitations running from the agreement’s effective date. We relied on four factors. Each is also present in the Settlement Agreement in this case. First, the Hobart parties included language in their agreement that stated their intent that the agreement be an administrative settlement: “‘The Parties agree that this Settlement Agreement constitutes an administrative settlement for purposes of Section 113(f)(3)(B) of CERCLA . . . pursuant to which [Appellants] have, as of the Effective Date, resolved their liability 34 See Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., 202 F.3d 862, 865 (6th Cir. 2000). 35 In re Trailer Source, Inc., 555 F.3d 231, 245 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Easley v. Pettibone Mich. Corp., 990 F.2d 905, 912 (6th Cir. 1993)). -9- No. 14-5730, LWD PRP Group v. Alcan Corp. et al. to the United States for the Work, and Future Response Costs.’”36 The Settlement Agreement in the present case says exactly the same thing.37 Second, the Hobart Agreement provided that its settling parties were “‘entitled, as of the Effective Date, to protection from contribution actions or claims as provided by Sections 113(f)(2) and 122(h)(4) of CERCLA.’”38 As we explained, “[f]or this paragraph to have any meaning and Appellants to receive any protection from contribution actions, the [Hobart Agreement] must be an administrative agreement under § 113(f).”39 The Settlement Agreement in the present case includes identical language.40 Third, we noted in Hobart that “the parties titled the [Hobart Agreement] an “‘Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent.’”41 “In doing so,” we observed, “the parties precisely matched the statutory language in § 113(f)(3)(B).”42 Similarly, the Settlement Agreement in this case is titled “Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent for Removal Action.”43 36 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 768-69 (quoting the Hobart Agreement) (emphasis added in Hobart) (alteration and omission in original). 37 R. 776-3 at 25 (Settlement Agreement at 25). 38 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 769 (quoting the Hobart Agreement). 39 Id. (citation omitted). 40 R. 776-3 at 25 (Settlement Agreement at 25). 41 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 769 (quoting the Hobart Agreement) (emphasis added in Hobart). The full title of the Hobart Agreement was “Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent for Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study.” Hobart Agreement at 1, Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., No. 3:10-00195 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2010), ECF No. 1-1. 42 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 769. 43 R. 776-3 at 1 (Settlement Agreement at 1). -10- No. 14-5730, LWD PRP Group v. Alcan Corp. et al. And fourth, the Hobart agreement contained a covenant from the EPA “‘not to sue or take administrative action against [Appellants] pursuant to Sections 106 and 107(a) of CERCLA . . . for the Work and Future Response Costs.’”44 The Settlement Agreement in the present case contains the same provision with almost identical language.45 In sum, all of the factors that led us to conclude that the Hobart Agreement qualified as an administrative settlement that could support a contribution action are present in the Settlement Agreement in this case. Further, we concluded that the Hobart Agreement was a CERCLA § 122(a) settlement, a type of settlement not expressly mentioned in CERCLA’s Contribution Limitations Provision, rather than a § 122(h) settlement, a type that is mentioned.46 We then concluded that because the claims in Hobart, like the ones at issue here, were for contribution towards costs incurred under an administrative settlement that resolved liability to the United States, the three year statute of limitations for contribution actions nonetheless applied.47 In the absence of a triggering event, we 44 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 769 (quoting the Hobart Agreement) (alteration and omission in original). 45 R. 776-3 at 22 (Settlement Agreement at 22). 46 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 774-75. Some of the aspects of the Hobart Agreement that led us to conclude it was a § 122(a) agreement apply here as well. For example, the Settlement Agreement was not published in the Federal Register, and in listing statutory authority, the Settlement Agreement references only § 122 generally, rather than specifically mentioning § 122(h). Appellee’s Brief at 1920 (stating that the Settlement Agreement was not published in the Federal Register); R. 776-3 at 3 (Settlement Agreement at 3) (citing § 122 generally, not § 122(h) specifically); see Hobart, 758 F.3d at 774. On the other hand, some of the language in the Hobart Agreement that contributed to our conclusion that that agreement was a § 122(a) settlement by directly referencing § 122(a), Hobart, 758 F.3d at 774 (quoting the Hobart Agreement), does not appear in the Settlement Agreement in the current case. We need not resolve whether the Settlement Agreement in the present case is a § 122(a) or § 122(h) settlement because Hobart dictates that in either case, the applicable statute of limitations is three years measured from the Settlement Agreement’s effective date. 47 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 774-75. -11- No. 14-5730, LWD PRP Group v. Alcan Corp. et al. “borrowed” the most analogous triggering event. We then found the effective date of the Settlement Agreement the most analogous starting point.48