Opinion ID: 1322149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defenses of appellees relating to sanctions

Text: Both appellants dispute the assertions of the appellees on appeal that they acted willfully, in bad faith or were otherwise at fault when they failed to answer the interrogatories pursuant to the circuit court's orders. The appellants claim that their counsel failed to inform them that interrogatories had been served upon them or that orders had been entered compelling their answers. [3] The appellants contend that if they had known about the interrogatories or the orders compelling discovery they would have answered the interrogatories because they had what they assert are meritorious defenses to the actions and would not, therefore, have risked liability with judgments by default. Confronted with a similar argument, the court in Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. stated: Considerations of fair play may dictate that courts eschew the harshest sanctions provided by Rule 37 where failure to comply is due to a mere oversight of counsel amounting to no more than simple negligence, Affanato, supra, 547 F.2d at 141; see SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 521 F.2d 585 (2d Cir.1975) (dictum). But where gross professional negligence has been foundthat is, where counsel clearly should have understood his duty to the courtthe full range of sanctions may be marshalled. Indeed, in this day of burgeoning, costly and protracted litigation courts should not shrink from imposing harsh sanctions where, as in this case, they are clearly warranted. A litigant chooses counsel at his peril, Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386; 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962), and here, as in countless other contexts, counsel's disregard of his professional responsibilities can lead to extinction of his client's claim. 602 F.2d at 1068. In Corchado v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., supra at 413, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reaching a similar conclusion, noted: We realize that we are visiting the sins of the attorneys upon the client, but this is an unavoidable side effect of the adversary system. [4] We agree with the above reasoning and hold that where a party's counsel intentionally or with gross negligence fails to obey an order of a circuit court to provide or permit discovery, the full range of sanctions under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) are available to the court and the party represented by that counsel must bear the consequences of counsel's actions. The relative responsibilities of the disobedient party and its counsel in accordance with the foregoing standards is an issue to be raised by the appropriate party before a circuit court when considering a motion for the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(b). We now turn to an examination of the individual cases. This Court held in syllabus point 1 of Intercity Realty Co. v. Gibson, 154 W.Va. 369, 175 S.E.2d 452 (1970): A default judgment obtained in accordance with the provisions of Rule 55(b), West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, is a valid and enforceable judgment and a motion to set aside such judgment will not be granted unless the movant shows good cause therefor as prescribed in Rule 60(b) of the aforesaid Rules of Civil Procedure. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 55(c); see also syl. pt. 3, Coury v. Tsapis, W.Va., 304 S.E.2d 7 (1983); syl. pt. 1, Cordell v. Jarrett, W.Va., 301 S.E.2d 227 (1982); syl. pt. 1, Hamilton Watch Co. v. Atlas Container, Inc., 156 W.Va. 52, 190 S.E.2d 779 (1972). We further held in syllabus point 3 of Intercity Realty Co. v. Gibson, supra : A motion to vacate a default judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court's ruling on such motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse of such discretion. See syl. pt. 3, McDaniel v. Romano, 155 W.Va. 875, 190 S.E.2d 8 (1972); see also syl. pt. 5, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W.Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974) (a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the court). The records are clear in both cases that due process was satisfied when Inland Mutual and Camden Fire were afforded opportunities for evidentiary hearings upon the appellees' motions for sanctions under Rule 37(b). The records are silent, however, as to whether either of the appellants requested such hearings. The records of both cases reveal that the circuit court heard argument of counsel. In the action involving Inland Mutual there appears to have been no attempt by the appellant to preserve a record regarding the asserted error of the circuit court on this issue. Inland Mutual, by counsel, objected to the entry of the default judgment but it failed to develop at an evidentiary hearing the circumstances of that default judgment or otherwise preserve a record of the proceedings before the court. The record before us is clear that the appellants' counsel appeared at all hearings before the circuit court. Furthermore, unlike Camden Fire, Inland Mutual failed to seek relief from the default judgment through a Rule 60(b) motion in accordance with the well established standards set forth above. As we noted in N.C. v. W.R.C., W.Va., 317 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1984): The primary vehicle by which a party may seek relief from a judgment or order in a circuit court is contained in Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. By utilizing Rule 60(b), Inland Mutual could have developed a record on the reasons for the failure to answer the interrogatories. It is axiomatic that this Court can consider only those matters in the record in determining whether the court abused its discretion. Evans v. Huntington Publishing Inc., W.Va., 283 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1981); see also Thornton v. C.A.M.C., W.Va., 305 S.E.2d 316, 320-21 (1983); Hylton v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 159 W.Va. 728, 226 S.E.2d 453 (1976). Based upon the record before us, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it rendered the default judgment as a result of Inland Mutual's failure to comply with the court's order compelling discovery; nor was there an abuse of discretion on the refusal to set the default judgment aside. [5] In the action involving Camden Fire, the appellant moved the circuit court to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) and requested, inter alia, an evidentiary hearing to determine the propriety of the default judgment. We believe that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied Camden Fire an opportunity to develop a record in that regard. We, therefore, reverse the Circuit Court of McDowell County on this issue and remand this case to that court for a hearing to develop the facts surrounding the rendering of the default judgment against Camden Fire consistent with this opinion. There are additional matters from the individual cases that remain to be resolved. We will first discuss other assignments of error from the action involving Inland Mutual.