Opinion ID: 884422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying the State's motion for summary judgment and for a directed verdict?

Text: The State moved for summary judgment in March of 1995, contending that Corliss' criminal acts of shooting Kimberly and April were unforeseeable as a matter of law. It argued that Starkenburg could not establish proximate causation in this case because Corliss' acts constituted an intervening, superseding cause of Kimberly's injuries and death and April's injuries. The District Court denied the motion. After presentation of Starkenburg's case-in-chief, the State moved for a directed verdict on the same basis and the court denied that motion as well. Although the District Court did not specifically state its rationale for denying the State's motions for summary judgment and for a directed verdict, the court's conclusion that Corliss' criminal acts of shooting Kimberly and April were not unforeseeable as a matter of law was implicit in the denials. We review a district court's conclusion of law to determine if the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Werre v. David (1996), 275 Mont. 376, 385, 913 P.2d 625, 631. The State's argument that Corliss' criminal acts were unforeseeable as a matter of law is premised primarily on its underlying contention that the intentionally wrongful acts of third parties are simply not viewed as foreseeable, so as to give rise to the imposition of liability upon the State. We recently clarified, after the trial and briefing on appeal in this case, that the intervening criminal act of a third party may be foreseeable and that, in such cases, the factfinder should decide causation in the same manner as in any other intervening causation case. Estate of Strever v. Cline (1996), 278 Mont. 165, ___ - ___, 924 P.2d 666, 673-74, 53 St.Rep. 576, 582. In Estate of Strever, Tom Susanj (Susanj) left his unlocked pickup truck on a street in Billings while he visited his father. A radar detector, cassette recorder, jumper cables, binoculars, fishing rod, tapes, tool box and camera were left in the pickup's cab; in addition, a handgun and ammunition were under the seat of the pickup in a white bag. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 668. Three young boysRobert Strever (Strever), Steven Cline (Cline) and Bowen Racine (Racine) entered Susanj's pickup and stole several items. Cline had been smoking marijuana earlier in the night. Teenager Thomas Morris (Morris) joined the three boys after seeing them near Susanj's pickup. Morris removed the handgun and ammunition from beneath the seat in the pickup. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 668. Cline subsequently gained control of the gun and waived it around with his finger on the trigger. While examining it, Cline ejected a live shell from the chamber. He was trying to remove the ammunition clip from the gun when the gun discharged. The bullet struck Strever in the head and Strever died. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 668. Strever's estate sued Susanj, as well as Cline, Morris and Racine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Susanj and Strever's estate appealed. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 668. On appeal, we addressed at length the issue of foreseeability insofar as it relates to the causation element of a negligence case involving intervening criminal acts by third parties. See Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 672-74. There, Susanj was neither aware, nor had reason to be aware, of any crime problem in the neighborhood where he left his pickup unlocked. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 668. We observed that the record reflected two intervening criminal acts by the boys (the two thefts from Susanj's pickup) and grossly negligent intervening acts by Cline (waving the stolen gun around with his finger on the trigger, while high on marijuana, and then trying to unload it). Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674. We concluded that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion that the series of intervening acts was reasonably unforeseeable and, therefore, Susanj was not liable for Strever's death as a matter of law. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674. Accordingly, we held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Susanj because any negligence by Susanj was superseded by the independent intervening criminal and grossly negligent acts of Cline, Strever, Morris, and Racine. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674. Notwithstanding our ultimate holding in Estate of Strever, we emphasized that cases involving intervening superseding acts ordinarily present questions of fact properly left to the trier of fact to resolve. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674. If, under the facts of a given case, an intervening criminal act is one which the defendant might reasonably foresee, then there is no reason why the fact finder should not decide causation the same as with any other intervening causation case. .... [T]rial courts must continue to carefully review each fact situation involving intervening criminal acts on a case-by-case basis, and it is only where reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, that this issue is properly disposed of as a matter of law. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674. Thus, contrary to the State's assertion in the present case, intervening criminal acts of third persons are not automatically unforeseeable as a matter of law. Rather, such acts must be addressed in the foreseeability context on a case-by-case basis. Here, numerous facts relating to the foreseeability of Corliss' criminal acts during the relevant time period of his parole were before the District Court at the time of the summary judgment proceedings. Under both travel permits issued by Robbins, Corliss remained in Washington beyond the time allowed and Robbins took no corrective action. When Robbins issued the April 13, 1990, permit, he ordered Corliss to visit a parole officer while in Washington. Corliss failed to do so and, notwithstanding Robbins' knowledge of Corliss' failure to comply, Robbins took no action. In addition, Robbins knew that Corliss had a girlfriend, Farrington, who had obtained a TRO against Corliss in July of 1990. Robbins did not attempt to obtain a copy of the TRO or investigate the circumstances surrounding the TRO. Robbins' deposition testimony established that he could have obtained the Farrington TRO, but he never thought about gaining access to it. Had Robbins obtained a copy of the TRO, he would have learned that Farrington alleged that Corliss was violent toward her on numerous occasions and had threatened to kill her and her family and friends. In late July of 1990, Corliss alerted Robbins that an altercation had occurred between himself and Betty, during which Betty retrieved a gun from a bedroom of their home. Robbins received a copy of a TRO obtained by Corliss against Betty which contained a statement to the same effect. Even though Corliss was subject to a parole condition which prohibited the possession of a firearm, Robbins neither confronted Corliss about the possible firearm possession nor investigated the presence of a gun in the Corliss household. Faced with the foregoing facts, the District Court implicitly concluded that Corliss' criminal acts were not unforeseeable as a matter of law. As discussed above, such a conclusion will be correct in the usual case; a determination to the contrarythat intervening criminal acts were unforeseeable as a matter of lawis appropriate only where reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion regarding foreseeability. See Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674. Unlike Estate of Strever, the issue of causation in the present case is not susceptible to determination as a matter of law. There, the record was devoid of any facts from which a jury could determine that Susanj should have foreseen the series of intervening criminal and grossly negligent acts of the minor boys. Here, however, Robbins was confronted with facts that indicated that Corliss a convicted execution-style murderer may have had a .38 pistol in his home. Moreover, Robbins had access to Farrington's TRO which contained allegations of violence by Corliss against Farrington, as well as threats against Farrington and her family and friends. Based on the facts of this case, a jury properly could find that Robbins could reasonably have foreseen criminal acts of violence against Farrington and her friends. Therefore, the Strever test for unforeseeability of intervening criminal acts as a matter of lawthat reasonable minds could come to but one conclusionwas not met here and the issue of proximate causation properly was left for the jury. In support of its unforeseeability as a matter of law argument and its contention that the District Court erred in this regard, the State relies on VanLuchene v. State (1990), 244 Mont. 397, 797 P.2d 932; Kiger v. State (1990), 245 Mont. 457, 802 P.2d 1248; U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Camp (1991), 253 Mont. 64, 831 P.2d 586; and King v. State (1993), 259 Mont. 393, 856 P.2d 954. We discussed and distinguished these cases in Estate of Strever which, as mentioned above, was not available to the State when briefing the present case for appeal. The cases are equally distinguishable from the present case and do not support a determination that Corliss' criminal acts were unforeseeable as a matter of law. We review them only briefly below. In VanLuchene, Robert Hornback was released from prison after serving his entire sentence for felony sexual assault. VanLuchene, 797 P.2d at 933. Several months later, he sexually assaulted and killed eight-year-old Ryan VanLuchene. VanLuchene's family sued the State, alleging that it negligently failed to satisfy its statutory duty of rehabilitating Hornback. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and the plaintiffs appealed. VanLuchene, 797 P.2d at 933-34. Like the present case, VanLuchene involved intervening criminal acts by a third party. We concluded, however, that the State did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs because, once Hornback served his entire sentence, the State was required to release him. See VanLuchene, 797 P.2d at 936. Accordingly, we did not analyze Hornback's intervening acts in the context of causation on appeal. Thus, VanLuchene is not applicable here. In Kiger, Danny Arledge shot and critically injured Katrina Kiger while trying to steal her car approximately eighteen days after being paroled from prison. Prison authorities had miscalculated when Arledge would be eligible for parole and, as a result, he still should have been in prison on the day of the shooting. Kiger, 802 P.2d at 1249. Kiger sued the State for negligence and the district court granted summary judgment to the State. Kiger, 802 P.2d at 1249. The foreseeability of Arledge's criminal act of shooting Kiger was at issue on appeal. Kiger, 802 P.2d at 1249-51. We noted that, in order for the State's negligence in prematurely paroling Arledge to be the proximate cause of Kiger's injuries, the State must have been able to reasonably foresee the consequences of its negligence. Kiger, 802 P.2d at 1251 (citation omitted). Under the facts before us, we concluded that there were too many what ifs that were superseding events, breaking the chain of causation between the State's miscalculation and Kiger's injuries. Kiger, 802 P.2d at 1251. Our decision in Kiger was premised on the specific facts of that case. Unlike the present case, the record before us in Kiger was devoid of evidence indicating that Arledge's criminal acts were reasonably foreseeable by the State. See Kiger, 802 P.2d at 1250-51. In Camp, Randall Broadbrooks pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, fourth offense, and driving while a habitual traffic offender. He was sentenced to one year in the county jail and participated in a work release program under which he was released from jail from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. each weekday. Camp, 831 P.2d at 587. On a Friday evening, Broadbrooks went to his apartment instead of returning to jail and the police were unable to locate him. He apparently fell asleep while smoking a cigarette. The cigarette fell and ignited a couch, resulting in a fire which damaged the apartment building. The insurer for the owners of the apartment building sued the Phillips County Sheriff, Mike Camp, for negligence, attempting to recover money paid to its insureds as a result of the fire. The district court granted Camp's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. Camp, 831 P.2d at 587-88. On appeal, we noted that Camp could be held liable only if Broadbrooks' act of falling asleep while smoking a cigarette in his apartment was reasonably foreseeable. We concluded that it was not and, therefore, that Broadbrooks' act was a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Camp, 831 P.2d at 590. The record before us in Camp did not contain any evidence forewarning that Broadbrooks might accidently start a fire at his apartment. In the present case, however, the record contains sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury as to whether Corliss' criminal acts against Farrington and her friends were foreseeable. In King, Victor Buddell was involuntarily committed to Warm Springs for a three-month term. A recommitment hearing was held several months later and the district court determined that, while Buddell was a danger to himself, the least restrictive environment for him was a conditional release to the community. The State did not appeal the release order. Less than a month after his release, Buddell killed David King. King, 856 P.2d at 955. King's parents sued the State for negligence and the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that the State did not have a duty to appeal the release order. King, 856 P.2d at 955. On appeal, we noted that a statute permitted the State to appeal, but that the statute was not mandatory. On that basis, we concluded that the State did not have a duty to appeal the release order. We also concluded that Buddell's act was not reasonably foreseeable by the State and stated that, when an injury is caused by a third party's intervening act, the defendant's negligent actions cannot be the proximate cause of the injury. King, 856 P.2d at 956-57. In the present case, the State relies on our statement in King that, if a plaintiff's injury is caused by the intervening act of a third-party, the defendant's actions cannot be viewed as the proximate cause of that injury. See King, 856 P.2d at 956 (citing Graham v. Montana State Univ. (1988), 235 Mont. 284, 289-90, 767 P.2d 301, 304) (emphasis added). We overruled that statement from King in Estate of Strever, however, noting that Graham did not support our use of the word cannot regarding intervening acts of third parties. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 673. The State's reliance on VanLuchene, Kiger, Camp, and King is misplaced. Based on the record in this case, we hold that the District Court was correct in implicitly concluding that Corliss' criminal acts of shooting Kimberly and April were not unforeseeable as a matter of law and in denying the State's motion for summary judgment. As set forth above, the State renewed its unforeseeable as a matter of law argument at the close of Starkenburg's case-in-chief via a motion for a directed verdict. The District Court denied the motion. A directed verdict is proper only when there is a complete absence of any evidence which would justify submitting an issue to a jury. Werre, 913 P.2d at 630. Here, our conclusion that the facts in this case would support a finding that Robbins could reasonably have foreseen criminal acts of violence by Corliss against Farrington and her friends establishes that there was evidence to justify submitting the causation issue to the jury. On that basis, we hold that the District Court properly denied the State's motion for a directed verdict.