Opinion ID: 2148928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jury instruction on clarkson west's negligence

Text: The special administrator assigns error by the district court in failing to instruct the jury that it could return a verdict against Clarkson West for its negligence. The record includes a stipulation that following the instruction conference, the trial court submitted to counsel jury forms which it proposed to submit, at which time counsel for the special administrator objected to the court's failure to include a jury form on which the jury could find solely against Clarkson West for its separate negligence. The proposed verdict form is not itself in the record. The verdict forms given to the jury permitted a verdict only for or against the Defendants. On appeal, the special administrator argues that the failure to give the separate form to the jury was error. The record does not reflect that the special administrator requested a specific jury instruction regarding negligence on the part of Clarkson West independent of that alleged on the part of Menolascino. In his proposed instruction, which included the statement of the case, the special administrator asserted his claim that the defendants were negligent in one or more of eight particulars. The statement of the case instruction given by the court utilized substantially similar introductory language, but included only five of the eight particulars. The special administrator did not make a specific objection to this instruction, but when asked if he had any proposed corrections or additions, counsel replied, Only as were set out in the instructions that I've offered the Court. On appeal, he does not specifically argue that the jury instructions given were erroneous. The special administrator also requested the following instruction, based upon NJI2d Civ. 6.30, the essential substance of which was given by the court: Professional corporation can act only through its employees or agents. A corporation is bound by the knowledge possessed by its employees and agents. It is also bound by the acts and omissions of its employees performed within the scope of their employment. At the time of treatment rendered to Tina Karel, Dr. Scott Menolascino was acting within the scope of his duties with Clarkson West Emergi[C]are. That means that if you find that Dr. Menolascino is liable to the estate of Tina Karel. . . then you must also find that Clarkson West EmergiCare and Nebraska Health Systems doing business as Clarkson West EmergiCare are also liable to the estate of Tina Karel . . . . Thus, the jury was instructed as to the defendants' alleged negligence exactly in the manner proposed by the special administrator, except for the deletion of three specifications of negligence in the statement of the case. The first of these involved the claim that Clarkson West held itself out as an emergency room capable of handling sudden or life threatening injuries or illness and capable of providing CT scans on site. As we have noted above, this allegation does not relate specifically to the medical care provided to Karel, and to the extent it is asserted as a negligent misrepresentation claim, it is unsupported by the record. The second of the negligence specifications included in the proposed statement of the case instruction but deleted from the instruction given was a claim that defendants were negligent [i]n failing to properly investigate, monitor and ascertain that its employees possessed the requisite knowledge, skill and training to work in an emergency room setting with patients like Tina Karel who would present with life threatening conditions. This claim presumes that Clarkson West employees did not possess such knowledge, skill, and training, and is therefore subsumed within the specific claims of negligence directed at Menolascino, the only Clarkson West employee who is specifically alleged to have been negligent in providing medical care to Karel. The third specification of negligence requested by the special administrator but not included in the court's statement of the case instruction was an alleged failure to adequately staff the facility so that when a determination of hospitalization was made the transfer could be facilitated in an efficient and prompt manner. This is simply a restatement of the claim submitted to the jury that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide timely transfer from Clarkson West EmergiCare to the hospital. A court does not err in failing to give an instruction if the substance of the proposed instruction is contained in those instructions actually given. [11] In reviewing a claim of prejudice from jury instructions given or refused, an appellate court must read the instructions together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and evidence, there is no prejudicial error. [12] Applying this standard to the record before us, we conclude that there was no prejudicial error with respect to the jury instructions and verdict forms given by the district court.