Opinion ID: 8312407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendant agustin's motion to inspect grand jury minutes

Text: Both defendants previously unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Count Two of the Indictment charging a firearm offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c), as not applying extraterritorially and for being facially defective. See Apodaca II , --- F.Supp.3d at ---- - ----, 2017 WL 3575655 , at -19, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131617 , at  (denying defendants' motions to dismiss Count Two and finding that  § 924(c) also applies extraterritorially and adequately informs the defendants of the § 924(c) offenses with which they are charged). Undeterred, Agustin now raises a new challenge to Count Two and moves for an in camera inspection of the grand jury minutes to determine what specific evidence was presented concerning the possession of a firearm charged in Count Two of the Indictment, and what legal instructions were provided to the grand jurors concerning Count Two's 'aiding and abetting' theory. Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection at 1. 25 In particular, Agustin suspects that, first, the government's trial evidence may constructively amend the Indictment, and, second, the grand jury was not properly instructed about controlling law requiring that an aider and abettor had 'actual knowledge' that a firearm would be used in the commission of the offense, and failure to provide such instruction would undermine the validity of the Indictment. Id. (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States , 487 U.S. 250 , 256, 108 S.Ct. 2369 , 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) ). The government objects, contending that this defendant has not met his burden to overcome the presumption of regularity surrounding grand jury proceedings. Gov't's Opp'n Def.'s Mot. In Camera Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes (Gov't's Opp'n Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection) at 1, ECF No. 131. As explained below, the Court agrees with the government. In evaluating this motion, the charge itself and the government's proffered evidence are first reviewed, before turning to analysis of whether either of Agustin's arguments warrant inspection of the grand jury minutes. Count Two charges, in relevant part, that the defendant, [f]rom in or about July 2010, and continuing thereafter, up to and including May 2012, ... did knowingly and intentionally use, carry, and brandish a firearm, during and in relation to one or more drug trafficking crimes, to wit: the crimes charged in Count One, and ... possess a firearm in furtherance of such drug trafficking crimes. Agustin's  Indictment, United States v. Agustin Flores Apodaca , Crim. No. 12-116 (BAH) at 1-3 (D.D.C. May 2, 2012), ECF No. 1. The government has proffered as evidence for this charge that: (1) cooperating witnesses will testify about Agustin's possession of firearms in the course of the drug trafficking activities charged in Count One of the Indictment; (2) in about December 2009, in El Burrion in Sinaloa, Mexico, Agustin carried firearms during a violent shoot-out; (3) in September 2010, Agustin attempted to trade drugs for .50 caliber machine guns for use against a rival drug cartel; and (4) in October 2013, in Santa Maria del Oro in the state of Nayarit, Mexico, co-defendant Panfilo and co-conspirators possessed weapons while fleeing from, and being involved in a shoot-out with, Mexican Marines. Apodaca II , --- F.Supp.3d at ----, 2017 WL 3575655 , at , 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131617 , at .
With respect to the first proffered basis for inspection of the grand jury minutes, Agustin denies that he is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury, Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection at 5; see Def.'s Reply Supp. Mot. In Camera Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes (Def.'s Reply Mot. GJ Inspection) at 1, ECF No. 132, but requests only that the Court inspect  what evidence was presented ... and take appropriate steps to ensure that the charge is not constructively amended at trial ..., Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection at 5 (emphasis in original). He points out that: the last three alleged events do not support Count Two, since the December, 2009 evidence falls outside the two-year date range of the firearms charge; the September 2010 evidence amounts to an attempt, which is a theory that is not included in the Indictment; and the October 2013 evidence occurred after the Indictment had been returned on May 2, 2012. Id. at 4-5. Agustin concedes that more generalized testimony from cooperating witnesses about his possession of firearms in the course of drug trafficking activities would be sufficient to support the charge, but nonetheless urges inspection of the grand jury minutes apparently to ensure that such generalized evidence was, in fact, provided and to assess whether some undefined appropriate steps must be taken to avoid constructive amendment of the indictment at trial, with the concomitant risk of infecting the trial with reversible error, id. at 5, by supplement[ing] the factual basis of criminal liability at the trial, Def.'s Reply Mot. GJ Inspection at 2. At the outset, the government's response lacks any specific assurances about the evidence presented to the grand jury to support Count Two. Id. at 1 (noting that Government has [not] even offered an informal 'proffer' as to the evidentiary predicate for Count Two presented to the grand jury). Nevertheless, as Agustin concedes, the government had cooperating witnesses' testimony available in some form to present to the grand jury, and such evidence would be sufficient to support Count Two. Thus, despite his denial that he is challenging the sufficiency of the grand jury evidence, Agustin's request for in camera review of grand jury minutes to ascertain what evidence was presented to support the grand jury's finding of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the firearms offense charged, amounts to the same thing. Yet, the law is well-established that challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury are not permitted. See, e.g., United States v. Williams , 504 U.S. 36 , 54-66, 112 S.Ct. 1735 , 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) ([I]t would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution' to permit an indictment to be challenged 'on the ground  that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury.) (quoting Costello v. United States , 350 U.S. 359 , 363-364, 76 S.Ct. 406 , 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) ); Bank of Nova Scotia , 487 U.S. at 261 , 108 S.Ct. 2369 (explaining a challenge to the reliability or competence of evidence presented to the grand jury will not be heard, and the mere fact that evidence itself is unreliable is not sufficient to require a dismissal of the indictment). This law reflects a long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts, United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. , 356 U.S. 677 , 681, 78 S.Ct. 983 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), and a presumption of regularity, with respect to grand jury proceedings, which generally may be dispelled only upon particularized proof of irregularities in the grand jury process, United States v. Mechanik , 475 U.S. 66 , 75, 106 S.Ct. 938 , 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986). Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e), grand jury materials are subject to disclosure when the defendant succeeds in carrying the heavy burden of showing that a particularized need exists that outweighs the policy of secrecy. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States , 360 U.S. 395 , 400, 79 S.Ct. 1237 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 399 , 79 S.Ct. 1237 (Petitioners concede, as they must, that any disclosure of grand jury minutes is covered by [ FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) ].) The Supreme Court has found this burden met where the Government concedes that the importance of preserving the secrecy of the grand jury minutes is minimal and also admits the persuasiveness of the arguments advanced in favor of disclosure. Dennis v. United States , 384 U.S. 855 , 871-72, 86 S.Ct. 1840 , 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) ; see also De Binder v. United States , 292 F.2d 737 , 739 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (determining that defendant met burden for inspection of grand jury minutes where ample ground existed for suspicion of inconsistencies between grand jury and trial testimony of prosecution's sole, key, eyewitness). By contrast, where a defendant fails to provide a discrete reason, and instead relies on speculation or unsupported assumptions, courts have made clear that disclosure of grand jury minutes is not warranted. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble , 356 U.S. at 682-83 , 78 S.Ct. 983 (noting that defendants' showings fall short of proof that without the [grand jury] transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that without reference to it an injustice would be done, and thus the case was not one of those cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly); Jackson v. United States , 297 F.2d 195 , 197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (explaining, after finding not the slightest evidence of inconsistency between witness's trial and grand jury testimony, that [i]f defendant's position is correct ... defense counsel in every case [might] be allowed to go upon a fishing expedition in the hope of developing something favorable to the defense); United States v. Borda , 905 F.Supp.2d 201 , 205 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding defendants did not demonstrate particular need for inspection of grand jury minutes where their assertions about misleading evidence were completely speculative and relied on a tenuous connection between an affidavit and testimony presented to the grand jury); United States v. Hernandez , No. CR-14-0120 EMC, 2015 WL 4498084 at , 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96402 at  (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (finding, where [i]ndictment is sufficiently factually specific, defendants have no particularized need ... to obtain the grand jury transcripts so that they can 'confirm' that the grand jury did not pass on the factual allegations the Government intends to prove at trial).  Only in exceedingly rare cases are defendants able to make a factually based showing of particularized need for the production and inspection of grand jury materials. United States v. Naegele , 474 F.Supp.2d 9 , 10-11 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing inspection of grand jury minutes because government misled the grand jury about the existence of a page of a document that had been the basis for [a]t least five counts of the original eleven-count indictment). In this case, Agustin contends that the grand jury minutes should be inspected to guard against any constructive amendment of the indictment stemming from variance between the evidence considered by the grand jury and the anticipated proof at trial. He speculates about what evidence was presented to the grand jury to raise a very real possibility that constructive amendment of the Indictment may occur. Def.'s Reply Mot. GJ Inspection at 1-2. While constructive amendment of an indictment violates the Fifth Amendment's presentment clause where substantial variance exists between the charging terms of the indictment left unaltered and evidence offered at trial prov[ing] facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment, Gaither v. United States , 413 F.2d 1061 , 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; see also Stirone v. United States , 361 U.S. 212 , 218, 80 S.Ct. 270 , 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) ([T]he basic protection the grand jury was designed to afford is defeated by a device or method which subjects the defendant to prosecution for [an offense] which the grand jury did not charge.), Agustin has not presented any sufficient reason, let alone a particularized need, to overcome the presumption against disclosure of the grand jury materials. Even if Agustin is correct that all of the evidence regarding the firearms charge that the government intends to introduce at trial was not presented to the grand jury, this does not amount to an improper variance of proof or demonstrate a particularized need for inspection of the evidence presented to the grand jury. As long as the defendant is on notice of the charges against him and the trial evidence does not alter an essential element of the charge, the law permits some variance in proof between the grand jury and at trial. United States v. Hitt , 249 F.3d 1010 , 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (permitting flexibility in proof at trial, where the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial. (quoting Berger , 224 F.3d 107 , 117 (2d Cir. 2000) ); see United States v. Sitzmann , 74 F.Supp.3d 96 , 122 (D.D.C. 2014) ([W]here 'a generally framed indictment encompasses the specific legal theory or evidence used at trial, there is no constructive amendment.' ) (quoting United States v. Rigas , 490 F.3d 208 , 228 (2d Cr. 2007) ); accord United States v. Dowdell , 595 F.3d 50 , 68 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that, given notice of charge given to defendant, any variance in proof would have been a harmless one and not in violation of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Wiley , 29 F.3d 345 , 352 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding where defendant was on notice before trial that the government intended to present certain evidence, any variance did not affect his substantial rights or cause actual prejudice). For instance, [t]here is no constructive amendment when a court 'admit[s] evidence of other criminal conduct that is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense or that completes the story of the charged offense.'  McClurge v. United States , No. 04 C 3628 , 2004 WL 2870072 at , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25108 at  (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. King , 126 F.3d 987 , 995 (7th Cir. 1997) ). Thus, to the extent Agustin is concerned that the government will present at trial other crimes or intrinsic  evidence supporting Count Two that was not previously submitted to the grand jury, this additional proof does not amount to an improper variance and consequently does not warrant inspection of the grand jury minutes. Given the adequate notice of the firearms charge afforded to the defendants, see Apodaca II , --- F.Supp.3d at ----, 2017 WL 3575655 at , 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131617 at , and Agustin's failure to provide any actual particularized need for disclosure of grand jury materials, especially in light of his concession that cooperating witnesses may provide sufficient support for the charge against him, the first basis of his motion for inspection of grand jury minutes fails.
The second basis for Agustin's motion for in camera inspection of the grand jury minutes is to check whether the grand jury was properly instructed on the law regarding aiding and abetting liability. In this regard, Agustin is correct that criminal liability for aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) requires that the defendant has actual knowledge of the use of a firearm by the principal. See Rosemond v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1240 , 1243, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014) (We hold that the Government makes its case by proving that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime's commission.); United States v. Slatten , 865 F.3d 767 , 793 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Rosemond , and finding sufficient evidence to support [ ] convictions under an aiding-and-abetting theory where defendant at issue actively participated in a gunbattle in which victims were killed and the gunfire of each shooter hindered potential escape, leaving victims exposed to the others' bullets); United States v. Powell , 929 F.2d 724 , 729 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring proof that aider and abettor knew to a practical certainty that his drug-peddling associates would be carrying a gun in connection with their joint venture); United States v. García-Ortiz , 792 F.3d 184 , 189-90 (1st Cir. 2015) (stating requirement that an aider and abettor of a § 924(c) crime have advance knowledge of the principal's intent to use a weapon). Citing a single paragraph in the prosecutor's extradition request, which Agustin claims provides an incomplete statement of the law applicable to aiding and abetting, he contends this provides good reason to believe that any instructions [to the grand jury] were incomplete. Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection at 7-8. With this argument, Agustin again fails to meet his burden for demonstrating a particularized need to overcome the presumption of secrecy and regularity that materials from grand jury proceedings enjoy. See Procter & Gamble , 356 U.S. at 683 , 78 S.Ct. 983 ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass , 360 U.S. at 400 , 79 S.Ct. 1237 . His argument essentially relies on what is missing in the extradition request, which, as the government points out, is governed by treaty and does not require a complete set of jury instructions. Gov't's' Opp'n Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection at 7-8. Moreover, as discussed above, the indictment has already been deemed facially valid, which undermines Agustin's theory that the grand jury instructions may have been incomplete. See United States v. Espy , 23 F.Supp.2d 1 , 10 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying motion for disclosure of grand jury materials where facially valid indictment undermines any 'particularized need' the alleged grand jury instructions demonstrate for disclosure of the grand jury transcripts); see also United States v. Singhal , 876 F.Supp.2d 82 , 99 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting disclosure of grand jury materials where  [d]efendants are unable to identify any portion of the Indictment that suggests that any charge to the grand jury was legally erroneous, and resorts to speculation about what the grand jury was instructed based on what is not stated in the Indictment) (emphasis in original); United States v. Trie , 23 F.Supp.2d 55 , 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding where the indictment is facially valid that the mere suspicion that the grand jury may not have been properly instructed ... is insufficient to establish that [the defendant] is entitled either to dismissal of the indictment or to disclosure of grand jury materials). For these reasons, Agustin has failed to show any particularized need for inspection of the instructions to the grand jury about Count Two, and his attempt to relitigate his earlier challenge to this charge in the indictment must be rejected. Accordingly, Agustin's motion for an in camera review of the grand jury minutes is DENIED.