Opinion ID: 1932472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rulings Concerning Jurors During Trial

Text: Weber's second argument on appeal relates to three separate issues that were raised during his trial involving three separate jurors. When a juror begins his term of service, he is given a copy of a Handbook for Petit Jurors, which provides, in part: Jurors must not talk about the case with others not on the jury and must not read about the case in the newspapers. They should avoid radio and television broadcasts that might mention the case. The jury's verdict must be based on nothing else but the evidence before the Court. A Handbook for Petit Jurors Serving in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware 21 (1971), quoted in Smith v. State, Del.Supr., 317 A.2d 20, 23 (1974). This Court has held that the trial judge should, at the end of each day, caution the trial jury collectively about avoiding accounts of the proceeding which may appear in the news media, including newspapers, radio and television. Id. (footnote omitted). As a corollary to the foregoing instruction at the end of each trial, this Court has held that at the commencement of each trial day, the court should inquire of the jury, collectively, as to whether any member has in any way been exposed to accounts of the case in the news media. Id. On the second day of Weber's trial, in response to an inquiry from the trial judge about compliance with the court's daily instruction, one juror reported that he had read a newspaper article. The juror told the trial judge that the newspaper was in the jury room. In this case, after the newspaper was removed from the jury room and the other jurors were taken out of the courtroom, the trial judge conducted a voir dire of the individual juror. This Court has held that when a juror responds affirmatively about exposure to the news media, the trial judge should, out of the presence of the remaining jurors, inquire into the nature and extent of the exposure. Smith v. State, 317 A.2d at 23. This is exactly what the trial judge did in Weber's case. The voir dire disclosed that the article which the juror read reported that Weber had been convicted in 1981 of second degree murder. According to the juror, he had not discussed the story with any of the other jurors. This juror was discharged, and an alternate was designated to replace him. Neither Weber's attorney nor the prosecutor requested additional voir dire of the jury panel. Weber now challenges the trial judge's decision not to conduct further voir dire of other members of the jury panel about exposure to the newspaper article. Since Weber did not request individual voir dire of each juror at trial, he must demonstrate from the record that the trial judge committed plain error. See Wainwright v. State, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (en banc) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 236, 93 L.Ed.2d 161 (1986); Supr.Ct.R. 8. This Court has held that the trial judge has broad discretion in examining jurors about their exposure to newspaper articles during the course of a trial. Smith v. State, Del.Supr., 317 A.2d 20, 22-24 (1974). There may be situations when a collective voir dire of the jury panel about newspaper publicity is inadequate. Hughes v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1040-48 (1985). However, in Smith, this Court found no abuse of discretion, when the trial judge only questioned the jurors collectively. Smith, 317 A.2d at 24. The events in Smith are similar to those that occurred at Weber's trial. A newspaper story that appeared during Smith's trial recounted his criminal record. The defense in Smith requested individual voir dire of the jurors to ascertain if any of them had read the story. The trial judge decided to question the jurors collectively. One juror in Smith disclosed that he had read the story but had not discussed it with anyone. Id. at 22-23. In this case, Weber offers no reason as to why the collective inquiry of the jury was inadequate. The fact that one juror responded affirmatively gives credence to the efficacy of the inquiry. See Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir.1984). Under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of discretion. The second incident involving a juror during Weber's trial occurred during a luncheon recess. Weber's father was eating in the cafeteria of the courthouse. The jury foreman, unaware of the identity of Weber's father, sat at the same table to eat his lunch. The two men started to converse about various topics. The jury foreman mentioned that he was serving as a juror in a particular courtroom. Weber's father responded that his son was on trial in that courtroom and asked that they not discuss the case. This incident was promptly reported to the trial judge. The trial judge interviewed the jury foreman and Weber's father separately in the presence of counsel. The trial judge ascertained the nature of the contact, its duration, and the absence of any discussion about the case. See Smith v. State, 317 A.2d at 23-24. The trial judge concluded that the jury foreman's ability to render an impartial verdict had not been compromised. Neither Weber's attorney nor the prosecution sought the foreman's discharge from the jury. Weber's attorney specifically stated that he was satisfied with the foreman. Weber now argues that the trial court's voir dire of the foreman should have been more thorough. The determination of a juror's impartiality is the responsibility of the trial judge who has the opportunity to question the juror, observe his or her demeanor, and evaluate the ability of the juror to render a fair verdict. Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d at 1041. A decision not to discharge a juror, particularly in the absence of a request from either party following voir dire into an incident, will not be overturned without a showing of a prejudicial abuse of discretion amounting to plain error. See Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 953 (1980). We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, and, hence, did not commit plain error by not sua sponte discharging the foreman from the jury. See Williams v. State, Del.Supr., 494 A.2d 1237, 1243 (1985). Weber's third claim relating to an incident involving a juror is that the trial judge erred in not discharging a female juror. During the trial, it was disclosed that the juror knew one of the secretaries who worked for the prosecutor in the witness room of the courthouse. The juror stated that she did not know the secretary very well and that her acquaintance with the secretary would not affect her in judging Weber's case. The same juror also acknowledged that she was currently employed in the criminal division of the Prothonotary's Office. She stated that she had not heard or seen anything about the Weber case in the course of her employment and that she remained impartial. Neither the prosecutor nor Weber's attorney asked to have the juror excused. Therefore, once again, Weber has the burden of demonstrating that it was plain error not to discharge this juror. See, e.g., Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d at 1100; Supr.Ct.R. 8. This Court has held that a casual acquaintance with a witness is not a basis for automatic disqualification. See Holmes v. State, Del.Supr., 422 A.2d 338, 342 (1980). The juror stated that she was not well acquainted with the witness room secretary. The juror also stated that, despite her employment in the Prothonotary's Office, she had had no contact with Weber's case and that she would be able to be impartial. This Court has held that it is not an abuse of discretion to empanel jurors with a law enforcement affiliation when the jurors indicate an ability to be impartial. See Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 158, 165-66, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867, 104 S.Ct. 205, 78 L.Ed.2d 178 (1983). In view of the juror's responses to the trial judge's questions, and in the absence of an objection from Weber's attorney, we find that the trial judge did not commit plain error.