Opinion ID: 514627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Introduction of Videotaped Confession.

Text: 44 Lastly, Gilmore contends that the district court erred in rejecting his claim that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because during the sentencing phase of the trial the jury was permitted to view a videotaped confession in which Gilmore admitted killing an elderly couple. Gilmore argues that the confession was introduced solely for the purpose of inflaming the jury, and that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. 45 As a matter of federal constitutional law, the trial court committed no error in allowing the introduction of the confession. The Supreme Court has held that a wide scope of evidence and argument is admissible during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, provided that such evidence is not constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). This broad use of evidence has been sanctioned because it helps prevent arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty by channelling the jury to focus upon each individual homicide and individual defendant, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), and because it is desirable for the jury to have as much information as possible when it makes the sentencing decision. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2939, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). 46 The admission of Gilmore's confession was not constitutionally impermissible; it did not authorize the jury to draw adverse inferences from a constitutionally protected activity. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 885, 103 S.Ct. at 2747. Furthermore, the confession was relevant to the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. See Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 565.006 (in a capital sentencing proceeding, the judge or jury shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty, or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and pleas) (repealed 1983); State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667, 675 (Mo.) (en banc) (admission of evidence of prior conviction is permissible in Missouri in penalty phase of capital murder trial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 239, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197, 203-04, 96 S.Ct. at 2939-40 (evidence of prior crimes, permitted under Georgia statute, does not violate the Constitution but focuses inquiry upon characteristics of the individual defendant). In these circumstances, although we recognize that adverse evidence is always somewhat prejudicial, we cannot say that the admission of Gilmore's confession was impermissibly so. Accordingly, we agree with the Missouri Supreme Court's conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the confession, see State v. Gilmore, 661 S.W.2d at 524, and with the district court's determination that the admission of the confession did not offend Gilmore's constitutional rights. See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 681 F.Supp. at 640-41. Consequently, we conclude that Gilmore's final claim is without merit.