Opinion ID: 1274318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inspection Warrant Finding of Probable Cause.

Text: Under section 8 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 657, the secretary of labor is authorized to conduct health and safety inspections of workplaces within the Act's jurisdiction. Section 8(a) gives the secretary the general power to enter and inspect workplaces to carry out the purposes of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a). Section 8(f)(1) specifically requires the secretary to conduct a special inspection as soon as practicable whenever the secretary receives a written employee complaint that leads the secretary reasonably to believe that a violation exists at the workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1). Neither provision expressly states that the secretary must secure a warrant before conducting a search. In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court held that an administrative search by municipal health and safety inspectors without a search warrant lacked the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual. 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 938 (1967). To determine the existence of probable cause to issue an inspection warrant, the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of [the] reasonable goals of code enforcement. Id. at 535, 87 S.Ct. at 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d at 939. Probable cause must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular building. Id. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1736, 18 L.Ed.2d at 941. In addressing the propriety of warrantless nonconsensual inspections under section 8(a) of OSHA, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires an administrative search warrant be obtained prior to such inspections. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1819, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 310 (1978). Similarly, the Court indicated that the Constitution requires the secretary to obtain such a warrant for a section 8(f) inspection. Id. at 320 n. 16, 98 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 16, 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 n. 16. The Court held that OSHA was unconstitutional insofar as it purported to authorize inspections without a warrant or its equivalent. Id. at 325, 98 S.Ct. at 1827, 56 L.Ed.2d at 319. In a footnote, the Barlow's opinion stated that a regulation expressly providing that the Secretary could proceed ex parte to seek a warrant or its equivalent would appear to be ... within the Secretary's power.... Id. at 320 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 15, 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 n. 15. The Court's approval of such procedures meant that they passed the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Rockford Drop Forge Co. v. Donovan, 672 F.2d 626, 630 (7th Cir.1982). Shortly after Barlow's was decided, the secretary amended its compulsory process regulation by defining compulsory process to mean the institution of any appropriate action, including ex parte application for an inspection warrant or its equivalent. Id. The IOSH Act mirrors the federal OSHA. Compare Iowa Code § 88.6(1) (1997), with 29 U.S.C. § 657(a); Iowa Code § 88.6(5) and Iowa Admin. Code r. 875  3.7, with 29 U.S.C. § 657(f). Therefore, federal law interpreting the OSHA provisions is persuasive authority. Stromberg Hatchery v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm'n, 239 Iowa 1047, 1050-51, 33 N.W.2d 498, 500-01 (1948) (federal decisions construing federal Social Security Act entitled to unusual respect and deference where Iowa statute used identical language). Iowa has an IOSH Act regulation regarding compulsory process similar to the federal regulation. Compare Iowa Admin. Code r. 875  3.2(3), with 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(d). The Iowa regulation provides: For purposes of this rule, the term compulsory process shall mean the institution of any appropriate action, including ex parte application for an inspection warrant or its equivalent. Ex parte inspection warrants shall be the preferred form of compulsory process in all circumstances where compulsory process is relied upon to seek entry to a workplace under this rule. Iowa Admin. Code r. 8753.2(3). In addition, Iowa has a statute authorizing courts to issue administrative search warrants: The courts and other appropriate agencies of the judicial branch of the government of this state may issue administrative search warrants, in accordance with the statutory and common law requirements for the issuance of such warrants, to all governmental agencies or bodies expressly or impliedly provided with statutory or constitutional home rule authority for inspections to the extent necessary for the agency or body to carry out such authority, to be executed or otherwise carried out by an officer or employer of the agency or body. Iowa Code § 808.14.
In Barlow's, the Supreme Court explained that the secretary of labor's entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause in the criminal sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1824, 56 L.Ed.2d at 316 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1736, 18 L.Ed.2d at 941). For a period of time after Barlow's, there was some discrepancy over whether the administrative probable cause standard applied to issuance of administrative search warrants based on specific evidence of an existing violation, i.e., OSHA inspections based on employee complaints. The Supreme Court cleared up the discrepancy, holding the standard did apply. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507, 511-12, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 1951, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, 496-97, 500 (1978) (administrative probable cause is the standard for obtaining a warrant when probable cause is based on specific evidence, i.e., proof that a fire has occurred); Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1318 n. 6 (7th Cir.1980) (citing cases). Thus, administrative probable cause justifying the issuance of an OSHA inspection warrant may be based either on (1) specific evidence of an existing violation; or (2) a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment. We apply these same standards to any administrative search warrant authorized under Iowa Code section 808.14. We do so because such warrants must pass constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which is made binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2135, 124 L.Ed.2d 334, 343 (1993); State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Iowa 1997). See U.S. Const. amend. IV (providing that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause).
In this case, the administrative search warrant stands or falls on the first showing: specific evidence of an existing violation. Although Barlow's made clear that an administrative search warrant could issue upon such a showing, the Court did not specify the quantum of specific evidence that must be presented to establish the reasonableness of the inspection. However, in fashioning a proper test, one court has recognized two important considerations underlying the reasonableness standard that provide guidance. West Point-Pepperell, Inc., v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 957 (11th Cir.1982). First, administrative searches involve less of an intrusion on privacy than criminal searches. Accordingly, administrative search warrants may be obtained upon a lesser showing of probable cause than is required for criminal search warrants, for which the affiant need show the probability and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. Id. at 957-58 (quoting United States v. Melancon, 462 F.2d 82, 89 (5th Cir.1972)) (citations omitted). The second consideration is that a showing of administrative probable cause must satisfy the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Id. at 958 (quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 312, 98 S.Ct. at 1820, 56 L.Ed.2d at 311). As applied to administrative searches, this principle requires that persons not be subject to the unbridled discretion of `executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search.' Id. (quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1826, 56 L.Ed.2d at 317-18). Therefore, the evidence of a specific violation necessary to establish administrative probable cause, while less than that needed to show a probability of a violation, must at least show that the proposed inspection is based upon a reasonable belief that a violation has been or is being committed and not upon a desire to harass the target of the inspection. This requirement is met by a showing of specific evidence sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation. Id.; accord Matter of Inspection of Workplace Located at 526 Catalan Street, St. Louis, Missouri, 741 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1984). More specifically, there must be some plausible basis for believing that a violation is likely to be found. Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 102 (10th Cir.1981). We have recognized in the criminal context that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show criminal probable cause. State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001) (holding that information provided during cellular telephone call by anonymous citizen informant was sufficiently reliable and provided police officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct Terry stop of defendant's automobile). The question then becomes: How much and what kind of specific evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation in this case? The answer centers on the statutory provision authorizing inspections of worksites by the labor commissioner or his representatives. It provides in relevant part: 5. Special inspections. Any employees or authorized employee representative who believes that a violation of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the commissioner or the commissioner's authorized representative of such violation or danger. Any such notice shall be reduced to writing, shall set forth with reasonable particularity the grounds for the notice, and shall be signed by the employees or authorized employee representative, and a copy shall be provided the employer or the employer's agent no later than at the time of inspection, except that upon the request of the person giving such notice the person's name and the names of individual employees referred to therein shall not appear in such copy or on any record published, released, or made available pursuant to this section. If, upon receipt of such notification, the commissioner determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists, the commissioner shall make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as soon as practicable, to determine if such violation or danger exists. If the commissioner determines that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or danger exists, the commissioner shall notify the employees or authorized employee representative in writing of such determination. Iowa Code § 88.6(5); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 875  3.7 (implementing section 88.6). Thus, before applying for an administrative warrant to inspect, the commissioner must receive a request for an inspection from an employee or authorized employee representative. The complainant must believe that a violation of a safety or health standard that threatens physical harm exists, or that an imminent danger exists. The notice must be in writing and signed, and must set forth with reasonable particularity the grounds for the notice. Upon receiving the notice, the commissioner shall proceed to inspect if he or she determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists. We think affidavits in support of an application for an administrative search warrant to inspect should contain information showing substantial compliance with these requirements. The information before the district court at the time it issued the inspection warrant included the following: (1) the application; (2) the affidavit of Mary Bryant, IOSHA administrator; and (3) the affidavit of Joe Sawyer, IOSHA compliance safety and health officer. The application signed by the deputy labor commissioner stated, among other things, the following: The division of labor received a complaint on March 19, 1999, meeting the requirements of Iowa Code section 88.6(5). The complaint was from John A. Peno, representative of Titan employees. The signed complaint alleged that at the time of filing, the hazards alleged in the complaint existed at the Titan plant. Mary L. Bryant, IOSHA administrator, determined there were reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or violations of safety and health standards may exist at the Titan plant, which threaten physical harm to the employees. Management at Titan denied Joe Sawyer, compliance safety and health officer for the division of labor, admission to the plant to conduct a safety inspection pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 88. The application for a safety inspection warrant was being made pursuant to Iowa Code sections 88.6 and 808.14, and Barlow's. Bryant's affidavit, attached to the application, stated essentially the same thing as the application. In addition, Bryant attached a copy of the complaint to her affidavit and incorporated it by reference. Bryant stated that she assigned Joe Sawyer to conduct a safety inspection at the Titan plant during regular working hours. The complaint attached to Bryant's affidavit was entitled Notice of Alleged Safety or Health Hazards. It was dated March 19, 1999, and gave the complainant's name as John A. Peno, an authorized representative of employees affected by the complaint. The complaint indicated that Peno believes that a violation of an Occupational Safety or Health standard exists which is a job safety or health hazard at the [Titan plant]. Nineteen violations were listed. Some dealt with absence of electrical guards on electrical equipment. Others dealt with absence of guards on machinery. Additionally, the complaint alleged that a list of safety items needing correction has been given to the Safety Director, but was `shelved' with no action being taken. Sawyer's affidavit, also attached to the application, stated that he went to the Titan plant during regular working hours to conduct an inspection but was denied admission by management. The Eleventh Circuit described the appropriate standards for reviewing a magistrate's finding of probable cause: The standards for reviewing a magistrate's finding of probable cause are the same for both administrative and criminal warrants. In passing on the validity of a warrant, the role of the reviewing court is limited. A magistrate's probable cause determination is entitled to great deference, and is conclusive in the absence of arbitrariness. Moreover, judicial review of the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a warrant must be strictly confined to the information brought to the magistrate's attention. Except in those situations [where a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) is warranted], a reviewing court should not conduct a probable cause hearing in which it considers evidence not presented to the magistrate. West Point-Pepperell, 689 F.2d at 959 (citations omitted). Other federal courts also indicate that the review of an administrative search warrant should be confined to the four corners of the application, in the absence of intentional or grossly negligent false statements made to the issuing magistrate. Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 583 F.Supp. 773, 776 (W.D.Okla.1984); accord Martin v. Int'l Matex Tank Terminals  Bayonne, 928 F.2d 614, 620 (3d Cir.1991) (Subject to a narrow exception not at issue here, the reviewing court may consider only evidence within the four corners of the warrant application to the magistrate.); Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d at 104 (In ruling on the validity of a search warrant, the reviewing court may only consider the information provided the issuing magistrate or judge.); see also State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997) (review of probable cause determination for criminal search warrant is limited to consideration of only that information, reduced to writing, which was actually presented to the judge at the time the application for warrant was made). We agree with those federal authorities which hold that the standards of review for criminal search warrants apply to administrative search warrants. Because the standards of review for criminal probable cause and administrative probable cause are the same, our review of the district court's determination regarding the statutory sufficiency of the search warrant is for correction of errors at law. State v. Myers, 570 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1997). Our review of the district court's ruling regarding probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant is de novo because the probable cause determination is a constitutional issue. Id.; State v. Green, 540 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1995) (review of probable-cause-to-search finding is de novo). A judge issuing the warrant is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, probable cause exists. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 363 (citations omitted). In making that decision, the judge may rely on reasonable, common sense inferences from the information presented. Id. In reviewing that decision, the affidavit of probable cause is to be interpreted in a common sense rather than a hypertechnical manner. Id. at 364. In addition, we draw all reasonable inferences to support the judge's finding of probable cause. Id. We decide close cases in favor of upholding the validity of the warrant. Id. With these principles in mind, we review the application and affidavits to determine whether they were sufficient to support a finding of administrative probable cause. For reasons that follow we think they were. The application here is not unrelieved boilerplate. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir.1979). Nor is it merely a conclusory statement ... that employee complaints have been received by OSHA, without more.... Burkart Randall, 625 F.2d at 1319. Bryant, the IOSHA administrator, attached Peno's complaint to her affidavit. She averred the alleged hazards existed at the time Peno, an authorized representative of Titan employees, filed his complaint. The complaint supports Bryant's statement because it too states that the alleged hazards existed at the time the complaint was filed. See Matter of Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1340 (7th Cir.1979) (The district judge could correctly assume, therefore, that the information contained [in the warrant application, which incorporated the sworn affidavit of an OSHA compliance officer] was true and correct.). Bryant's affidavit and the attached list of nineteen hazards submitted by Peno to IOSHA supports a reasonable suspicion of a violation. In reaching our conclusion, we reject Titan's insistence that Bryant's affidavit was deficient because it did not indicate whether IOSHA performed a sufficient investigation to confirm the validity of the complaint and the reasonableness of the warrant request. Neither the federal statute nor the Iowa statute explicitly requires such an investigation. We are concerned as to whether the information was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation, a much lesser standard than a criminal probable cause determination. As mentioned, the application supported by the affidavits with the attached complaint was sufficient to raise such suspicion. These documents clearly informed Judge Huscher of the substance of the complaint, thus allowing him to make an independent determination as to whether the inspection was justified based on the complaint.
As a fall-back position, Titan contends the information in the complaint was stale. In support of this contention, Titan relies on Iowa Code section 88.7, which provides in relevant part:
a. If, upon inspection or investigation, the commissioner or the commissioner's authorized representative believes that an employer has violated the requirements of section 88.4, of any standard, rule or rules promulgated pursuant to section 88.5, or of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, the commissioner shall with reasonable promptness issue a citation to the employer.... .... 3. Statute of limitations. No citation may be issued under this section after the expiration of six months following the occurrence of any violation. Iowa Code § 88.7. Titan contends that if IOSHA cannot issue a citation for violations more than six months old pursuant to section 88.7(3), it cannot search based on allegations of violations that are more than six months old. Titan points out that because Peno had not been in the Titan plant since April 30, 1998, the information he provided was stale. This argument fails in two respects. First, Peno's information was based on alleged existing violations at the Titan plant. His complaint and Bryant's affidavit stated the violations existed at the time of the complaint. Judge Huscher, the judge who issued the warrant, could correctly assume the information in Bryant's affidavit was true and correct. See Gilbert & Bennett Mfg., 589 F.2d at 1340. Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected a similar argument in In the Matter of Establishment Inspection of Microcosm, 951 F.2d 121, 125 (7th Cir.1991). In that case, the company argued the warrant was untimely, citing 29 U.S.C. § 658(c) (which is identical to Iowa Code section 88.7), because the employee complaint was filed more than six months following the occurrence of any violation. Id. In rejecting this argument, the court stated: [The company] has misread the statute, for the statute refers to issuing a citation for an OSHA violation within six months of the inspection revealing the violation. The section is unrelated to the time period from the filing of a complaint with OSHA to the time when OSHA responds. Id. Similarly, the time period in section 88.7 is unrelated to the time period between when the alleged violation occurs and when IOSHA responds to a complaint. The occurrence of a violation can only be determined upon inspection. To require IOSHA to determine exactly when the violation originally occurred would be an absurd result. It would mean that, even after an inspection reveals an existing violation, IOSHA could not issue a citation unless it could determine that violation had only been going on for less than six months. We adopt the interpretation in Microcosm and reject the one Titan suggests. See State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990) (the court seeks a reasonable interpretation that will best effect the legislative purpose and avoid absurd results). In Burkart Randall, the employer argued that the information in the warrant application was stale because OSHA received it five and six months, respectively, before the issuance of the warrant. 625 F.2d at 1322. In rejecting the argument, the Seventh Circuit said: In this case, the conditions alleged in the employee complaints are not of a type that will likely disappear through mere passage of time; affirmative action to correct them appears necessary. We therefore agree with the district court that the nature of the alleged conditions makes reasonable the conclusion that violations of the Act remained on Burkart's premises at the time of the warrant application. The information contained in the application is thus not stale. Id. Likewise, here, the conditions alleged were not of a type that would likely disappear through the mere passage of time. It was reasonable therefore for Judge Huscher to conclude that violations of the IOSH Act remained on the Titan premises at the time of the warrant application.