Opinion ID: 583625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury's Consideration of the Possibility of Parole

Text: 15 During the jury's deliberations at the punishment phase of trial, Drew contends, jurors speculated that a life sentence would probably result in parole for Drew and agreed that Drew should never be paroled. Drew submitted an affidavit to the state habeas court in support of this claim. The affidavit, executed by Peter Fleury, a private investigator assisting Drew's attorney, related the content of a telephone conversation Fleury had with Alvin Eisenberg, the foreman of the jury. Fleury averred that Eisenberg told him that the jury felt that Drew should never be paroled and agreed that they did not want Drew roaming our streets. 16 Drew argues that his sentence violated his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because jurors discussed whether Drew would be eligible for parole should they sentence him to life imprisonment. Drew asserts that had the jurors not made this impermissible consideration, they would have returned a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. 17 We directly considered whether a Texas jury improperly considered parole law during capital sentencing deliberations in De La Rosa v. Texas, 743 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1065, 105 S.Ct. 1781, 84 L.Ed.2d 840 (1985). We indicated that while the mention of parole law amounts to misconduct, [o]nly jury misconduct that deprives the defendant of a fair and impartial trial warrants granting of a new trial. Id. at 306, cited in Monroe v. Collins, 951 F.2d 49, 52 (5th Cir.1992). In Monroe, we relied on California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), to hold that, 18 [b]ecause it is not repugnant to the federal constitution for a state to accurately instruct the jury on parole procedures, it follows that a state trial juror's accurate comments about parole law do not offend the federal constitutional rights of the defendant. 19 Id. at 53. Furthermore, 20 we have distinguished between jury panels tainted by outside influence, such as publicity or direct appeals from third parties, and panels on which one or more of the jurors themselves have violated an instruction of the court. In the former case, a presumption of prejudice arises when the outside influence is brought to the attention of the trial court, and it is incumbent upon the Government to rebut that presumption at a hearing. 21 United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 338 (5th Cir.1984) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 2030, 60 L.Ed.2d 395 (1979)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 2340, 85 L.Ed.2d 855 (1985). In the latter case, however, no such presumption arises, and the defendant must demonstrate that jury misconduct prejudiced his constitutional right to a fair trial. 1 See id. at 338-39. Since Drew does not allege any outside influence on the jury, he cannot avail himself of the presumption of prejudice. 22 In response to Fleury's affidavit, the State furnished the state habeas court with an affidavit executed personally by Eisenberg. In his affidavit, Eisenberg stated that [t]he fact that Drew might or might not one day receive parole if he received a life sentence did not influence our answers. Based on this evidence and the record, the state habeas court found that [a]lthough the jury was generally aware that a life sentence might result in eventual parole for [Drew], the jury's answers to the special issues were based solely on the evidence and the jury's belief that there was, beyond a reasonable doubt, a probability that [Drew] would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Ex parte Drew, No. 13,998-02, at 411. The court also found that [t]he evidence presented does not demonstrate that there was a misstatement of law, asserted as a fact by one professing to know the law that was relied upon by other jurors who, for that reason, changed their vote to a harsher punishment for [Drew]. Id. 2 Because the record fairly supports these findings, we accord them a presumption of correctness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432, 103 S.Ct. 843, 849-50, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983); Loyd v. Smith, 899 F.2d 1416, 1425 (5th Cir.1990). Drew does not present evidence to support his allegation of jury prejudice. As such, he fails to show a constitutional violation on this ground.