Opinion ID: 1058794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attorney as client

Text: Barrett claims that the three-judge court erred in finding him in violation of Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.4(j), and 4.4 because these Rules apply only when a lawyer is representing a client, not when a lawyer represents himself in a proceeding. Barrett argues that the language of Rules 1.1, 3.4(j) and 4.4 specifically limit their application to actions an attorney takes while representing clients. Those Rules state in pertinent part: Rule 1:1 A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Rule 3.4 (j) A lawyer shall not: . . . assert a position. . . or take other action on behalf of a client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. Rule 4.4 In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person. . . . Barrett also maintains that Rule 3.1, although not explicitly referring to representation of a client, was intended to apply only in the course of such representation based on the commentary to that Rule. Rules of statutory construction provide that language should not be given a literal interpretation if doing so would result in a manifest absurdity. Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 524, 528, 621 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2005). Applying these Rules in the manner Barrett suggests would result in such an absurdity. The Rules of Professional Conduct are designed to insure the integrity and fairness of the legal process. It would be a manifest absurdity and a distortion of these Rules if a lawyer representing himself commits an act that violates the Rules but is able to escape accountability for such violation solely because the lawyer is representing himself. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 565 A.2d 660, 668 (1989) (intent and purpose of Maryland's version of Rule 4.4 served only by applying construction that lawyer is representing client when he represents self); Montgomery County Bar Ass'n v. Hecht, 456 Pa. 13, 317 A.2d 597, 601-02 (1974) (anomalous to condemn lawyer's knowing participation in introduction of perjured testimony by client and condone giving such testimony by lawyer himself). Furthermore, an attorney who represents himself in a proceeding acts as both lawyer and client. He takes some actions as an attorney, such as filing pleadings, making motions, and examining witnesses, and undertakes others as a client, such as providing testimonial or documentary evidence. See In re Glass, 309 Or. 218, 784 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1990) (lawyer appearing in proceeding pro se is own client); In re Morton Allan Segall, 117 Ill.2d 1, 109 Ill.Dec. 149, 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1987) (attorney who is himself a party to the litigation represents himself when he contacts an opposing party); Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 578 A.2d 1075, 1079 (1990) (restriction on attorneys contacting represented parties limited to instances where attorney is representing client, not where attorney represents himself). The three Rules at issue here address acts Barrett took while functioning as an attorney and thus the three-judge panel correctly held that such acts are subject to disciplinary action.