Opinion ID: 857180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Illegal Search and Seizure Claim

Text: The plaintiffs claim that the NPS Rangers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against illegal searches and seizures when the NPS Rangers pulled them over on a road in Big Bend National Park after receiving a BOLO for Davila’s car, a red Kia. The NPS Rangers assert that the BOLO contained the correct license plate of Davila’s car, and stated that the car was connected with Tocho Davila-Luna, a fugitive. The government did not produce a copy of the BOLO. Plaintiffs do not assert that the BOLO contained incorrect information about the car or license plate, or that Tocho was no longer a fugitive at the time of the stop. Rather, they contend that an agent issued the BOLO without first researching whether Tocho was still associated with the car, and assert that Tocho had not been associated with the car for several months. The plaintiffs also allege that the NPS Rangers were unjustified in both the scope and duration of the search of the car. “[P]olice officers may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes if they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). “Under [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)], we determine the reasonableness of an investigative stop by examining: (1) whether the officer’s action of stopping the vehicle was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the officer’s actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” United States v. Rains, 615 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 244 (5th Cir. 2007)). The police officer must have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop, which requires “the police 11 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 officer . . . to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” United States v. Rodriguez, 564 F.3d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). This standard “requires more than merely an unparticularized hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1999)). We assess the reasonableness of the stop “by conducting a fact-intensive, totality-ofthe circumstances inquiry,” id., and considering the “information available to the officer[s] at the time of the decision to stop a person.” United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1992). “[A]n alert or BOLO report may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop.” Rodriguez, 564 F.3d at 742 (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 672). “Whether a particular . . . BOLO report provides a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop may depend upon . . . the specificity of the information contained in the . . . report, the extent to which the information in the . . . report can be verified by officers in the field, and whether the . . . report concerns active or recent activity, or has instead gone stale.” Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 672. During an investigatory stop, officers may make protective sweeps of the immediate area “as a precautionary matter,” but a search beyond that requires “articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). These searches must be “aimed at protecting the arresting officers” and “last[] no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” Id. at 335-36. Although such sweeps generally “may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found,” id. at 335, a protective 12 Case: 12-50044 Document: 00512196353 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/03/2013 No. 12-50044 sweep for weapons during a traffic stop is justified where the officers reasonably believe that someone within police custody might gain access to weapons, either during the traffic stop or once they are returned to their vehicles. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1983); United States v. Wallen, 388 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2004). The plaintiffs have not shown that the officers violated any clearly established constitutional rights of the plaintiffs in conducting the search of Davila’s vehicle. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. The BOLO stated that a fugitive was wanted for assaulting Border Patrol agents. The NPS Rangers also saw that the car was not far from the national border and heading in a southbound direction. See United States v. RangelPortillo, 586 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that, while proximity to the border does not alone constitute reasonable suspicion to stop and search a vehicle, it “is afforded great weight in this Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis”). In reviewing the information available to the NPS Rangers at the time of the search, we conclude that they had reasonable suspicion that a fleeing felon might be hidden in the vehicle or have weapons in the vehicle, and were justified in conducting a protective sweep of the car. Therefore, they did not violate any of the plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the NPS Rangers on the basis of qualified immunity for the illegal search and seizure claims arising out of the Big Bend traffic stop.