Opinion ID: 3037195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limitation on Mr. Berry’s Speech with Clients

Text: [1] The district court applied the Pickering balancing test to the Department’s limitation of Mr. Berry’s speech with clients. The Court in Pickering commenced with the recognition that teachers as public employees do not relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens.3 391 U.S at 568. The Court, however, also recognized that a 3 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized public employees’ rights under the First Amendment. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (“[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (“For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”). BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES 4887 “State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Id. It held that the reconciliation of these competing interests requires “a balance between the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. The Supreme Court in 2004 reaffirmed the use of the Pickering balancing test “[t]o reconcile the employee’s right to engage in speech and the government employer’s right to protect its own legitimate interests in performing its mission.” City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004). Mr. Berry, however, argues that we should apply a stricter test instead of a balancing test because the Department’s restrictions on his religious speech to clients violate his rights under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment. Mr. Berry reasons that this is consistent with such cases as Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993), and Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).4 We decline Mr. Berry’s proposal because it does not take into consideration the employer’s interests that led the Supreme Court to adopt the Pickering balancing test in the first place.5 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Our rejection of the 4 Neither of these cases are directly applicable as they concerned government restrictions on citizen activities — the sacrifice of an animal as part of a religious ceremony in Church of Lukumi Babalu, and the use of peyote as part of a religious ceremony in Smith — rather than a public employer’s limitation on an employee’s speech. 5 It is true that in Smith, the Court discusses the “application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action” which implicates “the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.” 494 U.S. at 881. The Court, however, recognized that its discussion 4888 BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES use of a stricter test is supported by the Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion in Roe, which again applied the Pickering balancing test to limitations on employee speech. 543 U.S. at 82. Moreover, the Supreme Court clarified that not all employer limitations on an employee’s speech warrant judicial review even under a balancing test, but only those restrictions that raise some credible constitutional concern. Id. The Court in Roe explained “Pickering did not hold that any and all statements by a public employee are entitled to balancing. To require Pickering balancing in every case where speech by a public employee is at issue, no matter the content of the speech, could compromise the proper functioning of government offices.” 543 U.S. at 82. See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).6 Accordingly, we decline to subject the of “hybrid” situations was dicta. Id. at 882 (“The present case does not present such a hybrid situation[.]”); see also Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“Appellants’ reliance on Smith is misplaced, as the language relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court.”). Furthermore, the Court noted that it had rarely applied the stricter test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), by which “governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. 6 After reviewing the evolution of the law from the time when the “unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the term of employment,” 461 U.S. at 143, to the Court’s decision in Pickering, the Court wrote in Connick: Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to conclude that if [the employee’s] questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge. When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. Perhaps the government employer’s dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable. 461 U.S. at 146 (footnote omitted). BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES 4889 Department’s restrictions on Mr. Berry’s speech to a stricter test. Instead, we adhere to our practice of applying a balancing test when confronted with constitutional challenges to restrictions on public employee speech in the workplace. In Tucker v. State of California Department of Education, 97 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996), we rejected a similar contention that we should apply a stricter test, and instead reviewed a public employer’s limitations on an employee’s religious speech pursuant to the “applicable doctrine, which is found in the case law governing employee speech in the workplace.” Id. at 1209-10. In a prior case concerning a high school teacher’s challenge to a restriction barring him from discussing religion with students, we held that the school district’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation trumped the teacher’s right to talk to students. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994). [2] The balancing test we applied in Tucker and Peloza, and which we apply in this case, is a slight variation on the Pickering balancing test. In Roe, the Supreme Court stated that the Pickering balancing test: requires a court evaluating restraints on a public employee’s speech to balance “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon mat- ters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Roe, 543 U.S. at 82 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). Here, Mr. Berry contends that his speech is protected under the First Amendment as religious speech, rather than as comments upon matters of public concern. Nonetheless, we conclude that the Pickering balancing approach applies regardless of the reason an employee believes his or her speech is consti4890 BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES tutionally protected.7 Mr. Berry, of course, is entitled to seek the greatest latitude possible for expressing his religious beliefs at work. The Department, however, must run the gauntlet of either being sued for not respecting an employee’s rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment or being sued for violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by appearing to endorse its employee’s religious expression. The Pickering balancing test recognizes these important, but sometimes competing, concerns and allows a public employer to navigate a safe course. [3] Applying the Pickering test to the Department’s restriction on Mr. Berry’s speech with clients, we determine that the restriction is reasonable. The Supreme Court has reiterated that avoiding an Establishment Clause violation may be a compelling state interest. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (remarking that “the interest of the State in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation ‘may be [a] compelling’ one justifying an abridgment of free speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment” (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (“We have said that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation ‘may be characterized as compelling,’ and therefore may justify contentbased discrimination.” (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271)). [4] Moreover, unlike the situations presented in Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club, the Department’s concern with an Establishment Clause violation is well taken. The Department’s clients seek assistance from Mr. Berry in his capacity as an agent of the state. Accordingly, they may be motivated to seek ways of ingratiating themselves with Mr. Berry, or conversely, they may seek reasons to explain a perceived fail- 7 The Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. Knight, 275 F.3d at 167. BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES 4891 ure to assist them. It follows that any discussion by Mr. Berry of his religion runs a real danger of entangling the Department with religion. This danger is heightened by Mr. Berry’s admission that unless restricted, he will share his faith with others and pray with them.8 Although Mr. Berry states he will only do so “when appropriate,” he does not explain how he determines when sharing his religion is appropriate. Furthermore, any legal consequences from Mr. Berry’s discussion of religion with clients will fall upon the Department, as much as, if not more than, on Mr. Berry. We conclude that under the balancing test, the Department’s need to avoid possible violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment outweighs the restriction’s curtailment of Mr. Berry’s religious speech on the job.