Opinion ID: 508497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of insanity

Text: 10 In ascertaining criminal intent, Georgia recognizes two forms of insanity: the right-wrong test and the delusional compulsion test. Fulghum raised a delusional compulsion defense at trial. Fulghum sought to show that his murder of Pirnie resulted from a delusional compulsion ... which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime. O.C.G.A. Sec. 16-3-3. To satisfy the delusional compulsion test, a defendant must prove that (1) he labored under the delusion; (2) the crime was connected to the delusion; and (3) the delusion would have justified the act. Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986) (husband's murder of wife justified by delusion of battling Satan). 11 As an affirmative defense in Georgia, proof of insanity is a burden borne by the defendant. Proof of sanity is explicitly not an element of the prosecution's case. Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984). A Georgia jury may accept or reject lay or expert witness testimony on insanity even if uncontradicted, Murray v. State, 253 Ga. 90, 317 S.E.2d 193 (1984), or even in the absence of testimony of sanity, Brooks v. State, 247 Ga. 744, 279 S.E.2d 649 (1981). Brooks explicitly overruled Handspike v. State, 203 Ga. 115, 45 S.E.2d 662 (1947), thus clearly allowing the jury to rely on the state's presumption of sanity to reach a verdict of guilt. 12 Fulghum argues that the evidence of his insanity is so overwhelming as to rebut the presumption of sanity and to cause a reasonable doubt about his specific intent to murder Pirnie. The state argues that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found Fulghum sane at the time of the murder. Crucial to the resolution of this issue is a determination of the proper standard of review. 13 Fulghum would have this Court review his insanity defense in accordance with the four prongs of Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir.1984). Strickland found evidence of incompetency to stand trial on the basis of four factors: (1) the correctness or adequacy of the factual assumptions on which the expert opinion is based; (2) possible bias in the expert's appraisal of the defendant's condition; (3) inconsistencies in the expert's testimony or material variations between experts; and (4) the relevance and strength of the contrary lay testimony. 738 F.2d at 1552. Strickland is, however, not the right mold for this case. 14 Strickland relied on Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), which held that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial. Strickland also relied on Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), which required state evidentiary hearings whenever there was a bona fide doubt about competence. Ultimately Strickland relied on the due process clause in crafting a standard that would vigilantly assure competency to stand trial. 15 Admittedly, Strickland has a surface resemblance to this case. Competency to stand trial and the insanity defense both focus on the defendant's state of mind. Proof of insanity in a Georgia criminal trial is, however, governed by a different due process threshold, one articulated in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208-10, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2326-27, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977): 16 Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.... To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue.... We thus decline to adopt a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of the accused. 17 Recognition of state-designated affirmative defenses is, however, not automatic. [T]here are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go [in labeling affirmative defenses]. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. at 2327. A clear limit is that, in accordance with the defendant's presumption of innocence, the state must carry the burden of proving every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Thus our due process concern in this case is to assure that the affirmative defense of insanity by delusion compulsion is not only nominally but also substantively a nonessential element of Georgia murder. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1889, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). 18 The propriety of presuming sanity has been previously addressed. The Supreme Court's first imprimatur for affirmative defenses of insanity was given in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). In Patterson, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that Winship and Mullaney had overruled Leland. Instead, the Supreme Court repeated the principle that [o]nce the facts constituting a crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence including the evidence of the defendant's mental state, the State may refuse to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. 432 U.S. at 206, 97 S.Ct. at 2325. A more recent articulation by our predecessor Court of the constitutional propriety of bestowing defendants with the burden of proving insanity appears in Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 635 (5th Cir.1980). In the course of invalidating Georgia's practice of placing the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant, Holloway presented Georgia's insanity defense as a valid counterexample. 19 Fulghum asserts that we are bound by the proposition in Brock v. United States, 387 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir.1967), that once a presumption of insanity is rebutted, [s]anity then becomes an element of the offense charged and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But Brock has been overtaken. Brock relied on Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895), which was effectively overruled by Patterson in upholding Leland. Given that federal habeas claims must be gauged in the light of the applicable [state] law defining the element, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), we see no constitutional due process deficiency that would hinder our recognition of Georgia's presumption of sanity. 20 By Georgia law, therefore, our review of Fulghum's delusional compulsion defense is a review of the evidence supporting an affirmative defense. Given Georgia's presumption of sanity, we consider whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime. Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 295 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1982); cf. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2791, ([w]hether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). 21 The state offers the following evidence of sanity: Fulghum asked for an ambulance, Fulghum said something bad happened, an expert testified that Fulghum may not have committed the murder if police had been present, Fulghum was intelligent enough to feign mental illness, and two jailers testified that Fulghum behaved normally while incarcerated. 1 In accordance with our standard of review, we take the facts in a light most favorable to the state. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Fulghum did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his will was so overmastered that he was unable to refrain from committing the murder.