Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Warrantless Searches of Defendant's Residence and Vehicle

Text: Defendant contends the police engaged in four warrantless searches of his apartment between the late afternoon of Saturday, November 20, 1994 and Sunday, November 21. [23] He alleges further that, in this same time frame, the police engaged in two warrantless searches of his vehicle. When reviewing a ruling on an unsuccessful motion to exclude evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, upholding them if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we then independently review the court's determination that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 846, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) The first entry into defendant's apartment, unit 122, occurred sometime after 5:30 p.m. on November 20. Around 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., as part of a door-to-door search of the apartment complex, Officer Ruth Barnes and her partner knocked at the door of defendant's apartment and received no response, but she observed the television was on. She went back a second time at roughly 5:30 p.m. and knocked again. There was no response but she observed the television set was now off. A neighbor told her that a woman and a young man in his 20's lived in the apartment. Barnes reported her information to Sergeant Patton. Patton had independently learned that Nicole had been observed speaking to a male occupant of unit 122. Based on this information, Patton obtained a key from the manager and he and Barnes and two other officers entered the apartment to look for Nicole. The search lasted between 5 and 15 minutes. The officers checked the rooms upstairs and downstairs. Officer Barnes testified she did not search closets or look under beds while Sergeant Patton testified he checked closets. When they did not find Nicole, they left and the manager of the complex locked the door. The trial court concluded the search was justified by exigent circumstances. A long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists when `exigent circumstances' make necessary the conduct of a warrantless search.... `[E]xigent circumstances means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers.' ( People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1017, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342, quoting People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 276, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333; People v. Duncan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 91, 97-98, 227 Cal.Rptr. 654, 720 P.2d 2 [`As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer's conduct is dependent upon the existence of facts available to him at the moment of the search or seizure which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate'], quoting People v. Block (1971) 6 Cal.3d 239, 244, 103 Cal.Rptr. 281, 499 P.2d 961.) Among the factors the trial court cited in applying the exigent circumstances exception was that Nicole had been missing for several hours, the only lead the police had was that she had been seen talking to a male occupant of defendant's apartment, and a neighbor told Barnes a young male lived in defendant's apartment. The trial court also cited Officer Barnes's observations about the television having been on and off, which indicated someone may have been in the apartment, the fact that the person missing was a child, which heightened the exigency because, aside from being a victim of a crime, she might have been injured or unable to extricate herself, and the fact that the search consisted of a cursory search of obvious places where a child might be found. We agree that the first entry into defendant's residence fell within the exception to the warrant requirement for exigent circumstances. Defendant does no more than assert the trial court's ruling was in error. His cursory argument is not persuasive â as even he seems to recognize â because, elsewhere in his brief, he acknowledges the initial search was arguably justified by the exception. He contends, however, that in addition to exigent circumstances, the police were required to have had probable cause to believe Nicole was in the apartment. We conclude that the circumstances known to Sergeant Patton sufficiently establish probable cause for the brief entry into defendant's apartment. [24] Moreover, as defendant concedes in his reply brief, no evidence was collected by police during their first entry into his apartment and, therefore, even if the entry was unjustified, there was nothing to suppress. (See People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 850-851, 268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983 [purpose of the suppression statute is to exclude evidence obtained in violation of defendant's state and/or federal (Fourth Amendment) right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure].) The trial court concluded that the second and third entries by police into defendant's residence were with the consent of his mother, Mehri Monfared. It is settled that when voluntary consent to search has been given by the individual whose property is searched, the requirement of a search warrant is excused. ( People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 846-847, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing supports application of this exception to the second and third entries. When Ms. Monfared returned to the complex in the early evening of November 20, Officer Barnes approached her in the parking lot and asked her about defendant's whereabouts. She told Barnes defendant was at work. Barnes asked Ms. Monfared if she would phone him and allow Barnes to talk to him. Monfared agreed. She unlocked the door to her apartment and Barnes followed her in. Monfared called defendant, spoke to him, then gave the phone to Barnes, who also spoke to defendant. She then returned the phone to Monfared and left the apartment. Later that evening, Ms. Monfared spoke to Ahmad Seihoon. Monfared told him police were looking for the man who had spoken to Nicole. Seihoon returned to defendant's apartment. In response to a call from Monfared, three or four police entered her apartment to speak to Seihoon. He was briefly interviewed in the dining room about his conversation with Nicole. Defendant contends there was neither express nor implied consent from Ms. Monfared for the police to enter the apartment. Not so. The entry by Officer Barnes to speak to defendant on the phone was plainly with the implied consent of Ms. Monfared. ( People v. Martino (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 777, 791, 212 Cal.Rptr. 45 [Consent to enter a residence may be given nonverbally].) The second entry by police to interview Seihoon was at Monfared's express invitation. Defendant asserts Ms. Monfared's consent was the product of coercion but cites nothing in the record to support this assertion. He also claims that while one police officer interviewed Seihoon, other police officers searched defendant's room. Again, the record does not support this assertion. While Seihoon testified that other police were in the apartment while he was interviewed, there was no testimony that they searched defendant's room or any other part of the apartment. The fourth search of defendant's residence took place on the morning of November 21, when a number of police officers, including Detectives Burris, Navarro and Peloquin, entered the apartment. Prior to the search, Burris and Navarro went to the police station where they learned that a police officer was at the apartment of defendant's former girlfriend, Rauni Campbell, that defendant had attempted to commit suicide but fled when police arrived, and that he was a resident of the apartment complex from which Nicole had disappeared. Burris learned that defendant might have been involved in Nicole's disappearance and obtained the unit number of defendant's apartment from Navarro. Burris led the search of defendant's apartment to find Nicole. He instructed the other officers involved to look in places where she might be hidden or hiding. He did not instruct his fellow officers to gather evidence of any kind. Burris terminated the search after 10 to 15 minutes. The trial court found that this entry was also justified by the exigent circumstances exception. The court concluded the exigency had not dissipated between the first entry and this one but became heightened because it was not until this point that police had their first concrete evidence that Nicole's disappearance involved a crime, rather than an accident, and that defendant was involved. We agree with the trial court's analysis. This search involved different officers than those who conducted the first search and it was based on different and even more detailed information clearly raising the possibility that Nicole may have been in the apartment. Defendant argues the passage of time between the first entry and the fourth entry, the police presence at the apartment complex during that period, and indications that Nicole was dead terminated any exigency. Not so. Less than 24 hours had passed between the arrival of police at the apartment complex and the Sunday morning search. The police could still reasonably have believed Nicole was alive notwithstanding defendant's statement to Rauni Campbell that Nicole was not alive. Defendant did not tell Campbell why he believed Nicole was dead, nor provide any details of her death. Police, meanwhile, had found bloodstained knives and bloodstains in defendant's car. The police could reasonably have believed that defendant had stabbed Nicole or inflicted some other serious, but not yet fatal, injury despite his statement to Campbell. While they had no definitive evidence Nicole was dead, they did know, beyond doubt, that she was the victim of some kind of criminal activity. We therefore agree with the trial court that the information police received regarding defendant's possible involvement in Nicole's disappearance heightened the exigent circumstances and that the fourth entry was justified on this ground. [25] Defendant argues that Burris waited an hour and a half after learning of the information about defendant's possible participation in Nicole's disappearance before going to defendant's apartment, thus undermining the claim of exigency. The record reveals, however, that Burris testified he arrived at the police station at 10:15 a.m. and was at defendant's apartment by 10:40 a.m. Defendant also challenges two searches of his vehicle. Detective Burris testified that, after he terminated the search of defendant's apartment, he went to Campbell's apartment complex. There he learned that Campbell had identified a black BMW as belonging to defendant, and that the car was registered to defendant's mother. He and Sergeant Mascola examined the car. The outside of the car was dirty and muddy. They both observed what appeared to be blood on the front seat. Mascola also saw two knives inside the car, one of which was bloodstained, and a cord-type wire protruding from the trunk. Based on these observations, Burris formed the belief that Nicole might be in the trunk and had it pried open. Nicole was not found. A bloodstained notebook was then removed from the front seat of the car and examined by Burris and Mascola, who thought there might be something in it pertaining to Nicole's where-abouts. The vehicle was impounded and removed to a tow yard where it was examined by a criminalist, Robert Monson, accompanied by Detective Peloquin. After a visual inspection of the exterior of the vehicle, Monson collected evidence from the interior, including the bloodstained notebook, a bloodstained knife, and bloodstains from front and rear seats. In rejecting defendant's challenge to the vehicle searches, the trial court concluded that the first search was justified by exigent circumstances and both searches were justified by probable cause. We agree. Based on the circumstances known to Detective Burris and Sergeant Mascola, and their observations of apparent bloodstains in the car, knives, and a cord protruding from the truck that could have been used for binding, their belief that Nicole might be found in the trunk justified their search of the trunk, and their belief that the notebook might contain information regarding her whereabouts justified their inspection of it. [26] Moreover, the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement also applies to the initial search. ( United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572; People v. Chavers (1983) 33 Cal.3d 462, 466, 189 Cal.Rptr. 169, 658 P.2d 96 [under Ross, police officers who lawfully stop a vehicle, having probable cause to believe that contraband is located or concealed ... or somewhere therein, may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle that is as thorough (as to location and type of container searched) as that which a magistrate could authorize by warrant].) The probable cause to search had not dissipated even after the vehicle had been impounded. ( Florida v. Meyers (1984) 466 U.S. 380, 382, 104 S.Ct. 1852, 80 L.Ed.2d 381, quoting Michigan v. Thomas (1982) 458 U.S. 259, 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 [`the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized'].) Furthermore, as defendant concedes, the second search of his car did not uncover evidence that connected him to Nicole's murder.