Opinion ID: 775040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Claim With Respect to Prison Conditions

Text: 11 The PLRA requires administrative exhaustion of any prisoner claim with respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a). Larkin argues that the phrase with respect to prison conditions should not be interpreted to include complaints about individual acts of excessive force. This argument, unfortunately, runs headlong into our recent decision in Smith, which applied Booth to exactly this kind of claim. Booth itself took a broad view of the exhaustion requirement set forth in sec. 1997e(a), insofar as it held that exhaustion is required even if the prison's administrative process is incapable of giving the inmate the kind of remedial measure he or she has requested--in particular, monetary damages. See Booth, 121 S. Ct. at 1825. And while the parties in Booth both agreed that exhaustion would not be required if the relevant administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever in response to a complaint, id. at 1822, the Court went on to discuss approvingly the government's argument that the very fact of being heard and prompting administrative change can mollify passions even when nothing ends up in the pocket. Id. at 1823. 12 Larkin's argument, like that of the inmate in Smith, focuses less on the type of relief that might be granted and more on the difference between a single violent act or incident and the broader concept of prison conditions. We do not disagree that this is a possible distinction, but for now it is one that this circuit has rejected in Smith. To similar effect, our later decision in Johnson rejects the idea that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to acts of individual officers. Johnson, [slip op. at 4]. This may or may not be the ultimate conclusion the Supreme Court reaches: we acknowledge that the Court has granted certiorari in Porter v. Nussle, 121 S. Ct. 2213 (2001), to review the Second Circuit's decision in Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2000), which held that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to allegations of particular instances of excessive force or assault by prison employees. 224 F.3d at 97. But, just as we said in Johnson, until the Supreme Court speaks we are bound in this circuit to follow Smith.