Opinion ID: 221339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disparity Among Sentences of Co-Defendants

Text: Erwin argues that “the district court abused its discretion and imposed an unreasonable sentence by sentencing [him] to 12 years of incarceration when it sentenced Mr. Holloway and the other co-defendants to less . . . . It is further unreasonable because it contravenes 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and the mandate to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity.” (Def.’s Br. at 16.) In response to Erwin’s latter argument, the government counters, correctly, that “‘[a] district judge is not required to consider the disparity between the sentences of co-defendants.’” (Pl.’s Br. at 14 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 803 (6th Cir. 2010).) Responding to Erwin’s argument that the district court generally abused its discretion in imposing disparate sentences among the co-defendants, the government asserts that “the question is not whether Defendant’s sentence is in fact disproportionate to that of Alonzo Holloway, but only whether the district court considered Defendant’s argument that he should not receive a longer sentence than Holloway.” (Id. at 15.) The government, again, takes the correct position. A district court’s consideration of disparity amongst co-defendants’ sentences is completely discretionary. See United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2007). Because Erwin raised the issue of the disparity between his and Holloway’s sentences before the district court, the court was obligated to consider the argument if it felt that it was not frivolous. See, e.g., United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 939-40 (6th Cir. 2006). But “discretionary factors are not even appealable when discretion is requested and 12 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 the judge refused or did not depart as far as the defendant wanted so long as the judge appreciated his discretion to downwardly depart.” Simmons, 501 F.3d at 624.6 A review of the sentencing transcript shows that the district court did consider that it was imposing upon Erwin a sentence “12 months longer than Mr. Holloway’s.” (Erwin Sent. Tr. at 68.) The district court described, at some length, its rationale in imposing a longer sentence upon Erwin than on other co-defendants, including Holloway: Things that are instrumental in the Court’s mind are, number 1, that multiple parties have indicated in their presentence report proffers that both Mr. Erwin and for that matter Mr. Holloway did act as supervisors on the trips they took. Paragraph 77 and 78 [of the PSR] talks about Mr. Erwin getting money on those trips. And in fact Mr. Holloway in that particular paragraph or set of paragraphs, I think it’s 78, indicates that the money would be turned over to Mr. Erwin on the return trip. More than that, paragraph 82 indicates that Mr. Erwin was paid separately for documents. It was simply a fee for documents, if you will, which . . . [is] unique among the codefendants. .... And similarly it appears that Mr. Erwin was the person who had the inside source, Ms. Aldridge, at Bank of America. Those documents and the inside source were critical, essential elements to this crime. It could not have been done without it. . . . I put both [Holloway and Erwin] in the same tier of what the government has characterized in its briefing as tier 1. But I do think that Mr. Erwin’s participation was still incrementally more aggravating within the meaning of the guidelines as an organizer or leader because he had access to two critical bits of information, two critical things, without which this could not have happened. . . . He had the source on the inside, and he had the ability and wherewithal to make the phony documents. 6 While Erwin frames this as a substantive reasonableness challenge, it is instead a challenge to the district court’s procedural reasonableness, as the claim goes to “the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.” United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005). 13 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 (Id. at 40-41.)7 Erwin offers no reason why the district court, having considered the relative roles of all coconspirators and found that Erwin’s role was more significant and integral to the scheme than that of any of his co-defendants, should not have sentenced him in the manner that it did. Because “[c]onsidering uniformity between co-defendants’ sentences . . . is not required by the Sentencing Guidelines or the § 3553(a) factors,” Simmons, 501 F.3d at 623, and because the district court considered the disparity between co-defendants’ and Erwin’s sentences, and presented a reasonable rationale therefor, the district court did not abuse its discretion.