Opinion ID: 1571939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rigterink was Questioned in a Small Interrogation Room for Several Hours by a Group of Detectives who Repeatedly Accused him of Lying Concerning His Activities and Whereabouts on the Day of the Murders

Text: The second Ramirez factor is the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation. 739 So.2d at 574. This factor is, of course, a multifaceted factor which encompasses the circumstances . . . in which the interrogation is conducted. State v. Pitts, 936 So.2d 1111, 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The detectives' purpose for requesting that Rigterink accompany them to the BCI was two-fold: (1) to secure his elimination prints; and (2) to speak with him regarding his activities and whereabouts on the day of the murders. The questioning was conducted in a small, sound-insulated polygraph room, where a group of at least four investigators rotated in and out of the room to question Rigterink (Detectives Connolly, Raczynski, Rench, and Major Martin). At least two detectives were with Rigterink at all times. The six-by-eight foot room contained three chairs and a small desk. In total, the interrogation continued for at least four hours and for perhaps as much as 6.5 hours (there was no specific testimony with regard to how much time elapsed between the close of questioning and when Rigterink was arrested at 5:30 p.m.). The first 3.5 hours of questioning were not recorded. It is clear that Detective Connolly only turned on the recording device after he was certain that Rigterink would inculpate himself. Importantly, the detectives repeatedly accused Rigterink of lying with the goal of obtaining a factual summary that explained the evidence and explained the crime scene and explained Rigterink's actions as far as his unusual behavior. That is the information law enforcement was seeking. While the questioning of a suspect within the confines of a police station does not necessarily convert a voluntary interview into custodial interrogation, [29] the manner in which these detectives conducted Rigterink's questioningwhich included repeated accusations and confrontations over several hours that he was lying and was somehow involved in these murders (including confrontation with inculpatory evidence)militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable person in Rigterink's position would not have believed that he or she was free to leave the BCI office or to terminate questioning. Many Florida decisions that have determined the defendant was not in custody have emphasized that the interviewing detectives did not directly contradict the defendant's story or accuse the defendant of lying. See, e.g., Meredith v. State, 964 So.2d 247, 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); Pitts, 936 So.2d at 1128). This is not such a case. Furthermore, while lower-court case law has recently focused on the absence of force during voluntary police interviews, [30] Miranda itself deemphasized the importance of this consideration: Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before, Since Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227[, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716], this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206[, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242] (1960). Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis supplied). Thus, this renewed focus on the lack of physical compulsion or force is overemphasized, and actually overlooks one of the central premises of Miranda official compulsion is often psychological, not physical. Hopefully, our civilized society has progressed far beyond the use of physical mistreatment in connection with the investigative endeavors of law enforcement. The presence of force would certainly indicate custody, but its absence does not necessarilyor even oftenindicate that a reasonable person would feel free to simply get up and leave the interview room. See, e.g., Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 644 (Fla.2000); Caso v. State, 524 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla.1988) (each decision held that the defendant was in custody without ever mentioning or analyzing the absence of physical force). Further, we doubt that the State would ever contend that a suspect was not in custody if a law-enforcement officer physically compelled the suspect's incriminating statements (not to mention that this would raise traditional Fifth Amendment voluntariness concerns even if Miranda had never been decided). In sum, the purpose, place, and manner of Rigterink's interrogation indicate that a reasonable person would not have felt that he or she was free to simply terminate questioning and leave the premises. A four-plus-hour-long interview or interrogation, which included repeated accusations of lying and dissembling, and confrontation with incriminating evidence, all of which took place in a small sound-insulated interview room, with a closed door, in the presence of at least two interrogating detectives, is not conducive to a finding that the defendant was free to terminate the questioning process and leave the station house or that a reasonable person would have felt free to simply walk out.