Opinion ID: 2559945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Fourth Amendment Claims

Text: Also properly before us for review are defendant's Fourth Amendment claims. After conducting a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence, the trial justice issued a detailed bench ruling on March 27, 2008, granting in part and denying in part the various suppression motions. [16] On appeal, defendant argues that it was error to deny his motions to suppress (1) evidence obtained during an initial post-arrest, warrantless search of Mr. Goulet's property, and (2) evidence that was later seized during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. This Court accords deference to a trial justice's findings of fact when it assesses a decision denying a motion to suppress evidence and refrains from overturning such findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1129 (R.I.2006) (citing State v. Aponte, 800 A.2d 420, 424 (R.I.2002)); State v. Foster, 842 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 2004). On the other hand, [w]hen reviewing an alleged violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, this Court `must make an independent examination of the record to determine if [the defendant's] rights have been violated.' State v. Abdullah, 730 A.2d 1074, 1076 (R.I.1999) (quoting In re John N., 463 A.2d 174, 176 (R.I.1983)). In the course of this independent examination, we view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the state. In re Armand, 454 A.2d 1216, 1218 (R.I.1983) (citing State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23, 30 (R.I.1979)). Furthermore, [w]e review a trial justice's determination of the existence or nonexistence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion on a de novo basis. Abdullah, 730 A.2d at 1076 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 889-90 (R.I.1997); State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564, 569 (R.I.1997)). At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Joyce Comstock, a twenty-three year veteran of the South Kingstown Police Department, testified that she was dispatched to the home of the defendant based on a neighbor complaining that her neighbor was shooting at his dog. When she arrived, Sgt. Comstock saw defendant standing in his driveway. Sergeant Comstock told him that she was investigating a complaint from neighbors that someone was shooting at a dog. Sergeant Comstock testified that defendant responded saying, they should mind their own business. After she obtained defendant's name and date of birth, Sgt. Comstock returned to her police cruiser to check for outstanding warrants against the defendant. While she was busy with that task, Officer Kevin Andrews arrived. In testimony found to be credible by the trial justice, Officer Andrews, a thirty-four year veteran of the department, testified that he arrived at defendant's home because there was a report of a man with a firearm chasing his dog. He testified that by the time he arrived at defendant's address, he knew the identity of the 911 complainant, defendant's next-door neighbor, Sari Eklund. Officer Andrews got out of his car and approached defendant, who still was standing in the driveway. Officer Andrews testified that he told defendant that [he] was responding to a report of a man chasing a dog in their yard with a firearm and then asked defendant if he shot at his dog. According to Officer Andrews, defendant said no before adding that he had a lot of dogs and he had a lot of guns. Officer Andrews then asked defendant if he killed his dog. The testimony continued: [STATE]: Did he respond to you? [OFFICER ANDREWS]: He said yes. [STATE]: Did you ask him another question? [OFFICER ANDREWS]: I asked him where is the dog now.    [STATE]: What did he say? [OFFICER ANDREWS]: He said it's gone, and then he grinned at me and said you'll never find it. [STATE]: What did you do at that point? [OFFICER ANDREWS]: At that point I felt threatened because of his demeanor and that he said that he had a lot of guns and I patted him down and placed him in handcuffs. Subsequently, Officer Andrews secured defendant in the back of his patrol car. [17] He then visited the neighbors' home and spoke with Sari Eklund and her daughter. Officer Andrews testified that he learned from those neighbors that Mr. Goulet[ ] was chasing his dog in his yard with a firearm and said if he caught it he would kill it and that it was a dog that didn't obey, shouldn't live. He further testified that [t]he Eklunds had told me that they had heard a gunshot and they heard Mr. Goulet's backhoe start up. When he returned to defendant's property, Officer Andrews observed a fresh dig excavation   . Sergeant Comstock and Officer Andrews conducted a cursory walk of the property. During that walk they found a dog collar on top of the freshly dug earth and a .22-caliber rifle in a shed. When he reviewed the admissibility of evidence harvested as a result of the officers' walk of the property, the trial justice first made a preliminary determination that the area searched was part of the curtilage of the home, and therefore was subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. [18] Having so found, and after analyzing the facts, the trial justice ruled that a warrantless search of the curtilageand the seizure of evidence found during that searchwas permissible under the emergency doctrine and plain-view exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. In so doing, the trial justice cited to this Court's opinion in State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 366 (R.I.1983), where we said: One of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the existence of exigent circumstances. In certain cases, `the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1978).    `The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 (1978) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963)). During the course of such an `emergency' search, police may seize any evidence that is in plain view.