Opinion ID: 3170368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CIT Proceedings

Text: In February 2013, the CIT remanded to Commerce so that the agency could address various arguments that Nan Ya raised for the first time in the litigation. Nan Ya I, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. The CIT noted that Nan Ya’s rate changed between the preliminary and Final Results, such that Nan Ya’s first opportunity to challenge the revised margin arose in the litigation. Id. at 1354. It also directed Commerce to further explain whether the corroboration requirement under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) applied to Shinkong’s information obtained during the subject review in light of this court’s opinion in F.lli De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 6 Id. at 1354–55. On remand, Commerce rejected Nan Ya’s arguments and continued to apply the 74.34% adverse facts available rate. S.A. 117–25. Commerce determined that, under the second step in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984), a permissible construction of “any other information placed on the record” in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4) permits it to use 6 In relevant part, De Cecco explains that “Con- gress’s imposition of the corroboration requirement in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) [demonstrates] that it intended for an adverse facts available rate [based on secondary information] to be a reasonably accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to non-compliance.” 216 F.3d at 1032. NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 9 the highest transaction-specific margin from the subject review. S.A. 110–14. It also found that it need not corroborate Shinkong’s information and that § 1677e(c)’s corroboration requirement did not apply because the information that it used as adverse facts available came from the record of the subject review, rather than from a separate segment of the proceeding. S.A. 108–10 & n.2. It also found that De Cecco “highlights [the] distinction requiring corroboration of only secondary information.” S.A. 110 n.3. The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce’s remand redetermination. Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1371. As to the corroboration requirement of § 1677e(c), the CIT observed that “Commerce makes a fairly airtight argument” under “a straightforward Chevron step one interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning” of the corroboration requirement as set forth in § 1677e(c). Id. at 1367. Nevertheless, it observed that in the Final Results and in its remand redetermination “Commerce did not simply select Shinkong’s highest transaction specific margin in setting Nan Ya’s rate, and leave it at that. Commerce went further and measured the rate’s appropriateness by analyzing Nan Ya’s own prior transactionspecific data.” Id. (citations omitted). Because Commerce “followed its standard corroboration playbook to tie the selected [adverse facts available] rate . . . to . . . Nan Ya,” the CIT held that the corroboration requirement of § 1677e(c) and De Cecco’s reasonableness requirement “appl[y] after all.” Id. at 1367–68 (citations omitted). Although the CIT regarded Nan Ya’s arguments as “hav[ing] some merit,” it held that “they do not render Commerce’s use of [the 74.34% rate] unreasonable because other competing record information suggests that the [rate] was not aberrational.” Id. at 1369. It held that substantial evidence supported Commerce’s selection of the 74.34% rate, including the fact that the transaction underlying that rate “involved a larger quantity than 10 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES many of Shinkong’s other sales and differed from other models in ‘the least important physical characteristics.’” Id. (citation omitted). It also considered significant the fact that Shinkong did not ask Commerce to exclude the transaction as aberrational. Id. Finally, the CIT found that Nan Ya applied its arguments only to Shinkong’s information, “leav[ing] unchallenged Commerce’s corroborative justification for the reasonableness of the 74.34[%] rate: ‘Nan Ya was capable of dumping at’ 74.34[%] as evidenced by Nan Ya’s own data” from the immediatelypreceding review. Id. at 1370 (citation omitted). Nan Ya appeals the CIT’s final judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012).