Opinion ID: 2625297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right To Collaterally Attack Prior Convictions Is Strictly Limited.

Text: Appellant contends that, even when not expunged, reversed, or set aside, prior convictions used to establish guilt or enhance punishment must be disregarded if, upon collateral attack, they are determined to have been unconstitutionally obtained. We, therefore, examine whether a defendant has the right to collaterally attack prior convictions in the context of trial proceedings for a subsequent offense. For purposes of this analysis, the term collateral attack refers to Appellant's attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such judgment or decree. [7] State v. Grindling, 96 Hawai'i 402, 405, 31 P.3d 915, 918 (2001) (citation omitted); see also Kapiolani Estate v. Atcherly, 14 Haw. 651, 661 (Terr.1903), rev'd on other grounds, 238 U.S. 119, 35 S.Ct. 832, 59 L.Ed. 1229 (1915) (if the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and contemplates some other relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important or even necessary to its success, then the attack upon the judgment is collateral) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Appellant does not dispute that, [a]s a general rule, a collateral attack may not be made upon a judgment or order rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Grindling, 96 Hawai'i at 405, 31 P.3d at 918. Neither does he argue that HRS § 291-4.4 confers such a right. Instead, he relies for authority on a line of cases emanating from Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). In Burgett, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of a defendant to collaterally attack predicate prior convictions alleged to have been obtained in violation of the right to counsel. Id. at 114-15, 88 S.Ct. 258. With rare exceptions, which are not relevant to this case, see, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), the Court has held that it would be unconstitutional [t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainright[, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963),] to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense[.] Id. at 115, 83 S.Ct. 792 (emphasis added). This language has been construed as rendering the Burgett rule equally applicable to proceedings in which the existence of the predicate prior convictions is necessary to establish an element of an offense as well as proceedings in which the existence of prior convictions may be a factor in sentencing. Consistent with this federal constitutional mandate, we have recognized a similar right under our state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 638-39, 548 P.2d 632, 639 (1976) (trial court erred in relying on prior uncounseled conviction to determine that defendant was a multiple offender and that extended sentence was appropriate); State v. Vares, 71 Haw. 617, 621, 801 P.2d 555, 557 (1990) (prior uncounseled DUI conviction could not be used to convict defendant as a third-time DUI offender); see also State v. Sinagoga, 81 Hawai'i 421, 443 n. 19, 918 P.2d 228, 250 n. 19 (App.1996) (noting that, in Hawai'i, all uncounseled convictions are invalid and outlining procedure whereby a defendant may challenge the use of prior uncounseled convictions to impose or enhance any sentence.)
The outcome of this case depends in large part on whether we accept Appellant's premise that, within the context of trial proceedings on a subsequent offense, defendants have a right to collaterally attack prior convictions that are the result of allegedly invalid pleas. The federal constitution recognizes no such right. In Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994), the United States Supreme Court made it clear that the right to mount a collateral attack did not extend beyond situations where the prior convictions were obtained in violation of the right to counsel. Id. at 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732. Custis involved a charge under a federal statute that subjected a defendant, found to have been in unlawful possession of a firearm, to an increased penalty whenever [the] defendant was [also] found to have suffered `three previous convictions' of the type specified. Id. at 491, 114 S.Ct. 1732. Custis challenged his predicate convictions claiming, inter alia, that they were obtained as the result of invalid guilty pleas. Id. at 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732. The Court declined to extend its holding in Burgett, emphasizing that the failure to appoint counsel was a unique constitutional defect because it rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect[.] Id. at 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732. The Court held that a conviction obtained as the result of an involuntary guilty plea was not similarly defective from a jurisdictional standpoint and, thus, could not be collaterally attacked in a separate proceeding. Id. The Court highlighted the following considerations in support of its holding limiting collateral attacks to those involving a violation of the right to counsel: Ease of administration also supports the distinction. As revealed in a number of the cases cited in this opinion, failure to appoint counsel at all will generally appear from the judgment roll itself, or from an accompanying minute order. But determination of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure to assure that a guilty plea was voluntary, would require sentencing courts to rummage through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain state-court transcripts or records that may date from another era, and may come from any one of the 50 States. The interest in promoting the finality of judgments provides additional support for our constitutional conclusion. As we have explained, [i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures and inevitably delay and impair the orderly administration of justice. We later noted in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), that principles of finality associated with habeas corpus actions apply with at least equal force when a defendant seeks to attack a previous conviction used for sentencing. By challenging the previous conviction, the defendant is asking a district court to deprive [the] [state-court judgment] of [its] normal force and effect in a proceeding that ha[s] an independent purpose other than to overturn the prior judgmen[t]. Id. at 30 [113 S.Ct. 517]. These principles bear extra weight in cases in which the prior convictions, such as one challenged by Custis, are based on guilty pleas, because when a guilty plea is at issue, the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979) (footnote omitted). Id. at 497, 114 S.Ct. 1732 (some internal citations omitted) (brackets in original) (emphasis added). Of course, the fact that the federal constitution recognizes only a limited right to collaterally attack prior convictions does not mean that similar limitations need be imposed under our state constitution. State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai'i 433, 445, 896 P.2d 889, 901 (1995) ([I]t is well-established that[,] as long as we afford defendants the minimum protection required by the federal constitution, we are free to provide broader protection under our state constitution. (Citations omitted.)). A survey of case law from other jurisdictions indicates that various states addressing this issue have found Custis persuasive. As a result, they have declined to extend the right to collaterally attack prior convictions beyond what is mandated by the federal constitution or specifically provided for by statute. For example, in State v. Chiles, 260 Kan. 75, 917 P.2d 866 (1996), the Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that, if a defendant is allowed under the Constitution to collaterally attack the underlying felony when charged with [a crime that requires the presence of a prior conviction as an element for the offense], then the court ruling on [that crime] would be required to look behind the underlying conviction, which could have occurred in any other state, and determine if it was valid. This does not make good policy. Instead the time for a defendant to attack the underlying conviction is on an appeal when originally convicted of the underlying crime or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 870. Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after initially extending the Burgett rule to encompass collateral attacks on prior convictions alleged to have been obtained as the result of involuntary guilty pleas, has limited the availability of collateral attacks on prior convictions. See State v. Hahn, 238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, 531 (2000). In Hahn, which involved a recidivist statute that provided for mandatory life imprisonment for third-time offenders of specified criminal statutes, the court analyzed whether it should, as a matter of judicial administration rather than as a matter of federal constitutional right, allow an offender to challenge a [predicate] prior state conviction in an enhanced sentence proceeding on grounds other than an alleged violation of the constitutional right to a lawyer, or whether [it] should require an offender to use [other] available procedures... to challenge a prior conviction. Id. at 534. After reviewing the policy considerations articulated in Custis and deeming them equally relevant to state court proceedings, the Wisconsin court limited a defendant's ability to collaterally attack prior convictions in proceedings related to a subsequent offense by concluding that an offender may use whatever means [are] available under state law to challenge the validity of a prior conviction on other grounds in a forum other than the enhanced sentence proceeding. If successful, the offender may seek to reopen the enhanced sentence. Id. at 535. Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions without the benefit of the reasoning articulated in Custis. For example, a year before Custis was announced, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted an analogous approach in Fairbanks v. State, 331 Md. 482, 629 A.2d 63 (1993). In limiting a defendant's ability to collaterally attack prior convictions in the context of proceedings on a subsequent offense, the Maryland court concluded that there were significant benefits to requiring that a defendant seeking to challenge a facially valid prior conviction utilize established procedures[,] such as a writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis, to have the judgment vacated or set aside. Id. at 65. For example, in the context of post-conviction proceedings, a defendant would be required to allege with specificity the claimed deficiencies, thus allowing the State a reasonable opportunity to investigate, respond, and prepare a defense. Prior proceedings, including any direct appeals and previous collateral challenges, can be explored, with concomitant opportunity to determine whether the issues have been previously litigated, waived, or are otherwise barred by prior proceedings. See, e.g., [provision of Maryland code], providing that a person may not file more than two petitions arising out of each trial for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. Because a facially valid conviction is entitled to a strong presumption of regularity, this procedure clearly places the burden of proof where it should beupon the defendant attacking the conviction.... Requiring that a collateral attack of this type be brought in accordance with established procedures offers an additional benefit: if the defendant is successful in having a conviction overturned, the trial judge may grant full relief by ordering a new trial [where it would be constitutionally permissible to do so]. Id. at 65-66. The court emphasized, however, that: A defendant who is prevented from challenging the constitutionality of a prior conviction at trial or during a sentencing proceeding is not thereby divested of an opportunity for relief. That defendant may thereafter mount a ... challenge by any means that remain available, including post-conviction procedures, habeas corpus, error coram nobis, or other statutory or common law remedies. If successful, the defendant may possibly then challenge the conviction or sentence affected by the use of the constitutionally infirm conviction. Id. at 68. Similarly, in Williams v. State, 431 N.E.2d 793 (Ind.1982), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 2191, 95 L.Ed.2d 846 (1987), the Indiana Supreme Court held that: The issues of a defendant's guilt or innocence of prior crimes of which he has been convicted are not before the trial court in an habitual criminal hearing. That is not the proper forum to contest the legality of those prior sentences by way of collateral attack. The only issue before the trial court is whether or not appellant has, in fact, been found guilty and sentenced as required under the statute of prior offenses. Id. at 795-96 (citations omitted). We are persuaded by the reasoning of the aforementioned decisions and, therefore, hold that a defendant may not collaterally attack prior counseled DUI convictions on the basis that they were obtained as the result of allegedly invalid guilty pleas. [8] Challenges to the constitutional validity of prior convictions alleged to have been obtained as the result of invalid guilty pleas must be raised either through a direct attack or pursuant to HRPP Rule 40, which encompasses all common law and statutory procedures for post-conviction relief, and not in proceedings related to a subsequent habitual DUI offense. [9] Where a defendant succeeds in having a prior conviction expunged, reversed, or set aside, its use in connection with proceedings relating to subsequent offenses will be limited. Similarly, a defendant who succeeds in having prior convictions expunged, reversed, or set aside after they have been used to support guilt or enhance punishment in subsequent proceedings may have a basis for attacking that subsequent conviction or enhanced punishment. See, e.g., Hahn, 618 N.W.2d at 535 (If the offender succeeds [in challenging the validity of a prior conviction in an appropriate forum], the offender may seek to reopen a sentence imposed as a persistent repeater under [the Wisconsin recidivist statute] if that sentence was based on the vacated conviction.). Finally, we note that, because the trial court had no authority to entertain a collateral attack on the prior convictions, its findings will have no preclusive effect should Appellant seek to have his prior convictions reviewed in a proper forum and in accordance with the proper procedures.