Opinion ID: 6105184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Attorney Fee Award

Text: [¶29] GBT also contends that F&W failed to meet its burden to prove the requested fees were reasonable, as required under the prompt payment statute. Specifically, GBT argues that the court erred in finding in F&W’s favor on the eighth Johnson factor and in failing to find that F&W did not exercise billing judgment, and thus that the court abused its discretion in awarding all of F&W’s requested fees. [¶30] We review the court’s award for an abuse of discretion, “mindful that the trial court ‘is in the best position’” to view “‘the litigation as it relates to a request for attorney fees,’” Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 2017 ME 128, ¶ 12, 165 A.3d 357 (quoting Lee, 2003 ME 78, ¶ 20, 828 A.2d 210); Sweet, 2019 Although the removal of the subcontractor claims may have saved the court and the parties 16 time, and reduced GBT’s exposure to attorney fees and interest, courts are not authorized to award fees on this basis. See Baker v. Manter, 2001 ME 26, ¶ 17, 765 A.2d 583; Soley v. Karll, 2004 ME 89, ¶¶ 10-11, 15, 853 A.2d 755 (vacating award and remanding, explaining that “Maine follows the American rule that litigants bear their own attorney fees,” absent statutory authority, contractual provision, or egregious conduct). 20 ME 18, ¶ 23, 201 A.3d 1215, and will affirm the court’s factual findings with respect to the award unless clearly erroneous, Poussard, 479 A.2d at 884. [¶31] Here, the court took into account “the 12 factors set out by the Law Court in deciding whether and how much to award for fees” and applied those factors on which the parties had created a record, see supra n.10. The court “undert[ook] a review of the [a]pplications submitted, with the numerous attachments,” and addressed each of the factors it found applicable to the case. GBT does not dispute the court’s findings with respect to these factors except for the eighth factor—namely, the amount involved and the results obtained, described in Sweet as “the degree of success.” 2019 ME 18, ¶ 25 n.4, 201 A.3d 1215 (quotation marks omitted). [¶32] As GBT concedes, however, no single factor is dispositive. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989). Furthermore, we have stated that the result obtained in the litigation is “[t]he most important of the Johnson factors.” Wyman v. Sec’y of State, 625 A.2d 307, 312 (Me. 1993); see also Wyman, 464 A.2d 181, 186 (Me. 1983) (“Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435)). Here, the court found that “the results obtained were quite favorable for [F&W] overall,” a finding that our prior decision in this matter 21 supports. See Fortney & Weygandt, Inc., 2019 ME 175, ¶¶ 1, 10, 222 A.3d 613. The court also found that it was appropriate for F&W to retain its usual litigation firm, local counsel, and separate counsel.17 The court thoughtfully considered the applicable factors, and its determination was not an abuse of discretion but instead was “within the bounds of reasonableness.” Homeward Residential, Inc., 2017 ME 128, ¶ 15, 165 A.3d 357 (quotation marks omitted).18 [¶33] GBT also argues that the court erred in failing to find that F&W did not exercise billing judgment. The court concluded, however, that F&W “met its burden of proving that it is entitled to the award requested, that the work was performed as documented, and that the fees are reasonable.” It found “after reviewing the fee entries that they are sufficiently detailed, even when 17 GBT argues that the court failed to “weigh the[] results against the overall amount of fees,” to “engage in the analysis required by Hensley or Wyman, or [to] consider F&W’s success with respect to the PPA claims versus GBT’s counterclaims and withholding, or consider success with respect to the subcontractor claims.” GBT failed to move for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and thus “pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), we will infer that the trial court made any necessary findings that would be supported by evidence in the record to support its ultimate conclusion.” Doe v. Tierney, 2018 ME 101, ¶ 15, 189 A.3d 756; see Estate of Sheltra, 2020 ME 108, ¶ 24, 238 A.3d 234; see also Advanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 2006 ME 84, ¶ 34, 901 A.2d 189 (“We assume that in reaching its determination of the fee amount, the court took into consideration both the relatedness of the fee and non-fee claims and the result that the Pileckis obtained from the lawsuit.”). 18 GBT also faults the court for failing to “make any findings concerning the expenses at all.” Yet, GBT failed to move for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue. Other than the expenses incurred in connection with the subcontractor claims, the award of which we vacate for the reasons discussed above, we therefore assume that the court made the findings necessary to support its award of expenses related to the litigation, see Doe, 2018 ME 101, ¶ 15, 189 A.3d 756, and we are satisfied that the record supports those inferred findings. 22 redacted . . . and that the hours were actually expended.” Given the broad discretion afforded to courts in determining the reasonableness of fees, we affirm the court’s determination.19 See Poussard, 479 A.2d at 886. D. Determination of Fees and Expenses for this Appeal [¶34] Finally, we remand to the court to determine whether F&W is entitled to attorney fees and expenses for this appeal and, if so, the amount of any such award.