Opinion ID: 4521111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Division of the Property

Text: [¶6] Strand first contends that he was entitled to a greater share of the property because Velandry’s interest as a tenant in common was conditioned 2 The complaint set out three additional counts that are not at issue in this appeal. 4 on her agreement to pay him half of the property’s purchase price, and that the court erred in finding that the Statute of Frauds barred this claim. The Statute of Frauds provides that “[n]o action shall be maintained . . . [u]pon any contract for the sale of lands . . . or of any interest in or concerning them . . . unless the promise, contract or agreement on which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto lawfully authorized.” 33 M.R.S. § 51(4) (2018). Its purpose is “to prevent actions based on false claims.” Brown Dev. Corp. v. Hemond, 2008 ME 146, ¶ 11, 956 A.2d 104. [¶7] Here, Strand admitted that there was no writing memorializing Velandry’s alleged promise to pay him $125,000 for her interest in the property. Rather, Strand asserts that the Statute of Frauds did not foreclose the court’s consideration of his payment of the entire purchase price as an indicator of the parties’ intent that Velandry be an equal contributor. He argues that the court erred by failing to consider this payment when it divided the property. [¶8] We need not decide whether the Statute of Frauds bars Strand’s claim as a matter of law because we have long held that “[t]enants in common . . . are presumed to own equal shares.” Bradford v. Dumond, 675 A.2d 957, 961 (Me. 1996). Although “this presumption may be overcome by evidence, such as 5 evidence of unequal initial contributions, establishing an intention to have unequal shares,” id. (emphasis added), Strand fails to overcome the presumption in this case because the trial court made a factual finding that “[Strand’s] assertion that [Velandry’s] tenancy in common status was conditioned on her paying 50% of the purchase price is simply not credible.” That finding is supported by Velandry’s testimony that there was no discussion of such a payment until Strand raised the subject a year after the closing. In making that finding, the trial court was entitled to credit Velandry’s testimony and reject Strand’s contrary testimony. See Plourde, 2019 ME 109, ¶ 8, 211 A.3d 1153. [¶9] Additionally, the court supportably found that “[Strand] is well versed in finance and real estate” and thus “understands how to protect his interest in real estate transactions.” The court noted that in this case Strand could have ensured that Velandry paid half of the purchase price by withholding the deed until she paid her share; obtaining a note and mortgage from her; or having her sign an IOU. Because Strand did not do any of those things, the court inferred that the lack of a writing stating that Velandry’s interest was conditional was evidence of Strand’s intent to give Velandry an unconditional interest in the property when he included her on the deed. 6 [¶10] In sum, because the court found that Velandry did not promise to pay Strand $125,000 in return for her interest as a tenant in common, and because no writing or other evidence beyond Stand’s initial contribution of the purchase price was admitted to indicate that Strand intended that Velandry’s interest be so conditioned, the court did not err in applying the presumption of equal ownership and entering judgment accordingly. See Bradford, 675 A.2d at 961.