Opinion ID: 1174573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues pertinent to the guilt phase

Text: As noted, the essence of appellant's defense at the guilt phase was misidentification. In his cross-examination of Rochelle Kinnamon, appellant challenged the validity of her eyewitness identification of himself as the killer. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, appellant proposed an instruction specifically discussing the factors pertinent to the evaluation of eyewitness identification testimony. The district court refused the instruction, and appellant contends that this was error. We disagree. Some courts have held that at least in certain circumstances, specific instructions on eyewitness testimony should be given. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.Cir.1972); People v. Whalen, 451 N.E.2d 212 (N.Y.1983). We adhere to the accepted view, however, that specific eyewitness identification instructions need not be given, and are duplicitous of the general instructions on credibility of witnesses and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 2231, 48 L.Ed.2d 833 (1976); Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 604 P.2d 802 (1980). [4] See also United States v. Sambrano, 505 F.2d 284 (9th Cir.1974). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by refusing to give appellant's proposed instruction. Appellant also argues that the district court erred by refusing to give an instruction that voluntary intoxication negated the specific intent to kill. See NRS 193.220. Appellant's argument ignores the fact that the jury could have predicated first degree murder liability on a felony murder theory, based in turn on the general intent felony of robbery. See Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503, 634 P.2d 1226 (1981). Thus, an instruction speaking to the negation of a specific intent to kill might not have affected the outcome of the guilt phase. Assuming arguendo that the jury focused on a theory of a premeditated killing performed with specific intent, we conclude that the failure to give the instruction was not error. It is true that voluntary intoxication may negate specific intent, and an accused is entitled to an instruction to that effect if there is some evidence in support of his defense theory of intoxication. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 665 P.2d 260 (1983). Here, however, there was no evidence presented at the guilt phase to the effect that appellant was intoxicated at the time of the killing. The evidence showed only that he consumed intoxicants: David Nevius testified that the four men had a bottle of wine with them before the burglary, and that appellant had smoked marijuana. In order for a defendant to obtain an instruction on voluntary intoxication as negating specific intent, the evidence must show not only the defendant's consumption of intoxicants, but also the intoxicating effect of the substances imbibed and the resultant effect on the mental state pertinent to the proceedings. See State v. Bourdlais, 70 Nev. 233, 265 P.2d 761 (1954) (decided under precursor of NRS 193.220); State v. Boyles, 112 Ariz. 63, 537 P.2d 933 (1975); see also People v. Harris, 28 Cal.3d 935, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240 (Cal.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 365, 70 L.Ed.2d 192 (1981). The instruction on voluntary intoxication was properly refused. We have considered appellant's contention regarding the alleged ambiguity of the charging language of the indictment, and have found it to be without merit. Appellant's remaining issue pertinent to the guilt phase has been voluntarily withdrawn from our consideration.