Opinion ID: 1947466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: mafrige and its progeny

Text: Before Mafrige, courts determined summary judgment finality by reviewing the live pleadings, the summary judgment motion, and the summary judgment order. Harris County v. Nash, 22 S.W.3d 46, 49-50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. filed); Kaigler v. General Elec. Ins. Mortgage Corp., 961 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). A summary judgment was deemed final and appealable only if it expressly disposed of all parties and issues or if it was severed from the remainder of the suit. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959) ([A] summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court.). With Mafrige, this Court attempted to simplify this process by holding that the magic language of a Mother Hubbard or similar finality clause conclusively transforms an interlocutory summary judgment into a final, appealable order. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592. We have twice revisited Mafrige to clarify its scope. See Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex.1997) (holding that the Mafrige rule applies even when neither party appeals the erroneous summary judgment); Bandera Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tex.1997) (explaining that when the Mafrige rule renders a partial summary judgment final for purposes of appeal, the appellate court should reverse and remand only the erroneously disposed claims). Unfortunately, Mafrige did little towards alleviating the lower courts' confusionand Inglish and Bandera only compounded it. The Court's opinion suffers the same problem. Namely, its slightly-modified Mafrige rule falls far short of remedying the myriad of problems the Mafrige fiction and its progeny created.
One source of confusion under Mafrige has been uncertainty about what language triggers its finality rule. In Mafrige, we held that a partial summary judgment is treated as final for appeal purposes when the order contains a Mother Hubbard clause stating that all relief not expressly granted is denied or other language purporting to dispose of all claims or parties. 866 S.W.2d at 590 & n. 1, 592. We further clarified that other finality language includes a statement that the summary judgment is granted as to all claims asserted by the plaintiff, or a statement that the plaintiff takes nothing against defendant. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 590 n. 1.; see also Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811 (holding statement that [d]efendant is entitled to summary judgment in this case, and that plaintiff should take nothing on account of his lawsuit rendered partial summary judgment final for purposes of appeal); Springer v. Spruiell, 866 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex.1993) (holding that summary judgment order reciting plaintiffs have and recover nothing purported to dispose of all parties and issues). Despite these examples, some lower courts have refused to hold orders containing this exact language final for purposes of appeal. E.g., Carey v. Dimidjian, 982 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1998, no pet.) (holding that order containing Mother Hubbard clause was not final and appealable where the motion was labeled Partial Summary Judgment and the parties treated the order as interlocutory); Hinojosa v. Hinojosa, 866 S.W.2d 67, 69-70 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no writ) (holding that order containing Mother Hubbard clause did not render judgment final because it did not dispose of counterclaim). Other courts have struggled with what other language purports to render a judgment finaloften reaching opposite conclusions about identical clauses. Compare Postive Feed, Inc. v. Guthmann, 4 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that order granting defendant's summary judgment in all things purported to be final), with St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Mefford, No. 05-96-01581-CV, 1998 WL 821537 (Tex.App.-Dallas Nov. 30, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 1998 WL 821537, at  [2] (holding that order granting defendant's summary judgment in all things did not purport to be final). While the Court recognizes that the routine inclusion of [a Mother Hubbard clause] in otherwise plainly interlocutory orders and its ambiguity in many contexts have rendered it inapt for determining finality, 39 S.W.3d at 192, it ignores the obvious problems courts have faced interpreting other language purporting to dispose of all claims or parties. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592. In fact, despite the Court's extensive analysis and discussion, its holding represents but a minor departure from Mafrige. Its modified rule has two parts. The first represents no change in Texas law. It simply reiterates that a summary judgment order that actually disposes of all parties and issues is final for purposes of appeal. 39 S.W.3d at 192. The second part provides that a Mother Hubbard clause is no longer enough to invoke the fiction that an otherwise interlocutory order is treated as final for purposes of appeal. Instead, to invoke the Mafrige fiction, an interlocutory order must now clearly and unequivocally state[ ] that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. 39 S.W.3d at 205. The Court further explains that the statements plaintiff take nothing by his claims in the case and [t]his judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable clearly and unequivocally state that an order is final. 39 S.W.3d at 205. In essence, the Court's rule does no more than replace one set of magic language with anotherwhile ignoring the reality that courts will likely face the same challenges deciding what language clearly and unequivocally states that an order is final, 39 S.W.3d at 205, as they did deciding what other language clearly purport[s] to dispose of all claims or parties under Mafrige. 866 S.W.2d at 592.
Applying Mafrige to omitted parties, like those in both Lehmann and Harris, has also troubled the lower courts. Specifically, they have struggled with deciding when finality language operates to render a summary judgment final against omitted parties. This issue often surfaces when both the summary judgment motion and the resulting order omit any specific reference to one or more parties. [3] In this situation, several courts have held that Mafrige applies, reasoning that issues and parties are co-extensive and thus if an order disposes of all issues in a case, then it necessarily disposes of all parties to a case, and vice versa. Kaigler, 961 S.W.2d at 276; see also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 988 S.W.2d 415, 416-17 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. granted); Harper v. Newton, 910 S.W.2d 9, 12 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Waco), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Dallas County v. Harper, 913 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.1995). In contrast, other courts have interpreted Mafrige more narrowly, reasoning that an order that explicitly grants a summary judgment in favor of less than all the defendants does not clearly evidence an intent to dispose of all claims against all defendants, especially those against whom summary judgment was not sought, regardless of the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause. Lowe v. Teator, 1 S.W.3d 819, 823-24 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. filed); see also Midkiff v. Hancock E. Tex. Sanitation, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1999, no pet.); Vanderwiele v. Llano Trucks, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ). Here the Court summarily dismisses this omitted parties problem: Nothing in the order in Lehmann indicates that it is a final judgment, and it did not dispose of all pending claims and parties. The order in Harris states that plaintiff take nothing as to one of the defendants, but that language does not suggest that all of the plaintiffs' claims were denied. As the order recites and as the record demonstrates, the defendant named in the order was not the only defendant remaining in the case. Thus, we conclude that a final appealable judgment was not rendered in either case. 39 S.W.3d at 206. Despite the presence of a Mother Hubbard clause, the trial court and parties in Lehmann continued treating the order as interlocutory-even in the face of this Court's admonishment that a Mother Hubbard clause indicates finality. [4] 988 S.W.2d at 416. The Court now holds that the order did not purport to be final based solely on its new rule discounting the dispositive effect of Mother Hubbard clauses. However, the Court's resolution merely sidesteps the real problem. What happens in the next case when, on facts identical to Lehmann, a trial court signs an interlocutory summary judgment with the Court's new magic language rather than a Mother Hubbard clause? We are right back where we started. Substituting one magic phrase for another leads nowhere. The reality is simply that omitted parties oftentimes do not believe that a summary judgment order that they have not seen, that does not mention them, and that results from a hearing in which they did not participate will operate to dispose of them or their claims. But, under the Court's standard, if these parties do not perfect a timely appeal from the erroneous judgment, their right to appeal is forever lost. This result elevates form over substance and hinders parties' rights to have the merits of their claims considered. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. NBC Bank, 5 S.W.3d 756, 763 n. 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (recognizing this Court's express goal of reaching the merits of a cause of action, instead of dismissing actions on procedural technicalities).
The courts of appeals have also treated omitted cross-claims and counterclaims inconsistentlydespite our holding in Bandera. In Bandera, the trial court signed an order with a Mother Hubbard clause that did not mention the defendant's counterclaims. 946 S.W.2d at 337. This Court explained that [b]ecause the order contained a Mother Hubbard clause denying all other relief, it also purported to dispose of [the defendant's] counterclaims. Bandera, 946 S.W.2d at 337. But several courts have refused to apply Mafrige in this situation, maintaining that a summary judgment that does not mention counterclaims or cross-claims cannot purport to be final-regardless of whether it contains finality language. E.g., Sommers v. Concepcion, 20 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Hervey v. Flores, 975 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Tex. App.El Paso 1998, pet. denied); cf. Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentier, 10 S.W.3d 430, 433 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.). Other courts have followed Bandera 's mandate, holding that finality languagesuch as plaintiff takes nothing renders a judgment final for appeal purposes, despite omission of any reference to defendant's counterclaims. In re Monroe, No. 05-99-01758-CV, 2000 WL 378519 (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar.31, 2000, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication), 2000 WL 378519, at -2; see also Kaigler, 961 S.W.2d at 275-76. The Court's rule does not provide a satisfactory remedy for this situation either. The Court states: An order that adjudicates only the plaintiff's claims against the defendant does not adjudicate a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, nor does an order adjudicating claims like the latter dispose of the plaintiff's claims. An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs or against one of multiple defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. An order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled final, or because the word final appears elsewhere in the order, or even because it awards costs. Nor does an order completely dispose of a case merely because it states that it is appealable, since even interlocutory orders may sometimes be appealable. Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. 39 S.W.3d at 205. Under its modified finality rule, the lower courts' disagreement in this area will continue because too many questions are left unanswered. For example, should a final summary judgment order stating that defendant is granted summary judgment in all things dispose of a cross-claim by another defendant as well as the claim by the plaintiff that brought the original claim? In this situation, there is no doubt that the order is unambiguous. However, it is likewise clear, but not from the order, that the third party's claim against the defendant was never considered. Should an order granting summary judgment for a plaintiff that recites it is a final and appealable order be final for counterclaims not mentioned in the motion or order? The order unequivocally states that it is a final, appealable order. Nonetheless there is a counterclaim that has not been considered. The Court states that a summary judgment granted for a plaintiff does not adjudicate a counterclaim and then goes on to say that to make the order final there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. 39 S.W.3d at 205. In the example above, does the additional statement that this is a final, appealable order provide this other clear indication? These very issues are repeatedly raised in the courts of appeals, and the Court's modified rule simply does not resolve them.
Differing philosophies about the effect the trial courts' and parties' intent should have on how Mafrige applies has created the most confusion and inconsistency. The courts of appeals have taken three approaches. Some courts apply a bright-line test, holding that a Mother Hubbard clause or other finality language always renders an order final for appeal purposes, regardless of any evidence of contrary intent. E.g., Preston v. American Eagle Ins. Co., 948 S.W.2d 18, 20-21 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no writ) (holding that summary judgment purported to be final despite fact it was entitled partial summary judgment); cf. In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding) (As Mafrige and Inglish make clear, the intent of the trial court is not the controlling consideration in determining whether a judgment is final.). Other courts modify this approach, looking only within the four corners of the order and giving effect to any evidence of contrary intent found there. E.g., Rodriguez, 5 S.W.3d at 763-64 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (Looking within the four corners of the summary judgment order, the plain language of the Mother Hubbard clause did not, and could not, purport to grant or deny any more relief than the relief which [the defendant] sought.); Midkiff, 996 S.W.2d at 416 (looking to order as a whole to conclude that summary judgment order containing Mother Hubbard clause did not purport to be final). Finally, despite our holding in Inglish that the trial court's intent is irrelevant in this context, other courts still refuse to apply Mafrige if there is evidence of contrary intent anywhere in the record. This usually occurs when the parties and court treat an order as interlocutory by continuing with the litigation rather than appealing the erroneous order. E.g., Lowe, 1 S.W.3d at 823-24 (holding that summary judgment could not be final where the record reflected that there were parties who did not participate in the summary judgment proceeding); Carey, 982 S.W.2d at 558 (relying, in part, on court's and parties' treatment of order containing Mother Hubbard clause as interlocutory to conclude judgment was not final). The Court's solution to this problem is as confusing as the rule it seeks to supplant. It appears to reject the bright-line approach Mafrige espouses and instead adopt a rule combining the second and third approaches. First, the Court notes that an order is final for appeal purposes if it unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable. 39 S.W.3d at 205. It also explains that [i]f the language of the order is clear and unequivocal, it must be given effect despite any other indications that one or more parties did not intend for the judgment to be final. 39 S.W.3d at 206. From these statements, the Court's new rule walks and talks a lot like a bright-line Mafrige rule, with magic language establishing finality. However, the Court also states that [t]o determine whether an order disposes of all pending claims and parties, it may of course be necessary for the appellate court to look to the record in the case. 39 S.W.3d at 205. This sounds more like a pre- Mafrige rule, where a court must look to the record and the order to determine if an order actually disposes of all pending parties and issues. Because of the lower courts' confusion and disagreement about the role of intent in determining finality, I am convinced that the Court has not provided a workable rule that clearly defines that role as it applies to determining summary judgment finality.
Finally, the question of whether Mafrige applies outside the summary judgment context has confused the lower courts. Courts of appeals have applied Mafrige to a plea to the jurisdiction, Webb v. HCM Mgmt. Corp., No. 07-96-0369-CV, 1998 WL 16033 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Jan. 12, 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) 1998 WL 16033, at ; an agreed judgment, In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d at 315-16; a directed verdict, e.g., Polley v. Odom, 957 S.W.2d 932, 943 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997, judgm't vacated); and a severance order, Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Adam, 988 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. filed). In contrast, at least one court has declined to apply Mafrige to a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. In re Tejas, Nos. 01-98-00688-CV, 01-98-00689-CV, 01-98-00690-CV, 1998 WL 394562 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 1998, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication), 1998 WL 394562, at  n. 1. And another has expressly refused to extend Mafrige to any order that is not a summary judgment. Biltmore Swim & Racquet Club Recreational Ass'n v. McAbee, No. 05-98-00252-CV, 1998 WL 459819 (Tex.App.-Dallas Aug.10, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 1998 WL 459819, at . In Aldridge, this Court held that a presumption of finality exists when an order is signed following a traditional trial on the merits. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 897-98. But we specifically noted that such a finality presumption would not be appropriate in other contexts. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 897. Then in Mafrige we carved out an exception to what we had said in Aldridge by holding that an irrebuttable finality presumption applies to summary judgments containing a Mother Hubbard or similar finality clause. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592. Here again, just as we had limited Aldridge to conventional trials on the merits, we expressly limited Mafrige to summary judgments. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 591 ([T]he issue is whether ... a summary judgment, which purports to be final by the inclusion of Mother Hubbard language or its equivalent, should be treated as final for purposes of appeal.). Unfortunately, several courts of appeals have erroneously applied Mafrige in other contexts, causing confusion over how to determine finality of various other types of orders. Mafrige and its progeny are limited to summary judgments with good reason. No good can come of interjecting additional uncertainty into (1) conventional trials on the merits, to which the majority acknowledges the Aldridge presumption has proved a fairly workable rule, 39 S.W.3d at 200, or (2) numerous other types of orders, when even the majority acknowledges that the ordinary expectation supporting a finality presumption simply does not exist when some form of judgment is rendered without such a trial because it is quite possible, perhaps even probable these days ... that any judgment rendered prior to a full-blown trial is intended to dispose of only part of the case. 39 S.W.3d at 200. However, the Court's opinion here implicates finality of all judgments. This expansion into issues not before the Court today can only cause mischief in areas already plagued by confusion. If the Court persists in adhering to Mafrige's principles, it should at least limit its holding, as we did in Mafrige, to summary judgments.