Opinion ID: 209728
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Writing Requirement for Exclusive Licenses

Text: 35 U.S.C. § 261 states in relevant part: Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States. (emphasis added). We have concluded that both assignments and “virtual assignments” (i.e., exclusive license agreements that convey all substantial rights) must be in writing for a party to have standing to sue in its own name. Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This court has also concluded that an exclusive license need not be in writing for the exclusive licensee to have standing to sue with the patentee as a co-plaintiff. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“To be an exclusive licensee for standing written license agreement did not grant Aspex an exclusive license as to the ’054 and ’811 patents. In that case, we declined to reach Aspex’s argument that it received an exclusive license through an implied or oral license because Aspex had not properly raised that argument below. Id. at 497. In this appeal, Aspex no longer argues that the written license agreement granted it an exclusive license. Thus, we focus only on whether Aspex has standing based on an oral or implied license. 5 Altair also argues that Chic never received an exclusive license to the ’811 patent from Contour and thus could not have granted Aspex an exclusive license. Because we affirm the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement as to the ’811 and ’896 patents, we need not determine whether the district court was correct in denying Altair’s motion for summary judgment that Aspex lacked standing to pursue infringement claims as to those patents. 14 2007-1380, -1407 purposes, a party must have received, not only the right to practice the invention within a given territory, but also the patentee’s express or implied promise that others shall be excluded from practicing the invention within that territory as well.”) (emphasis added); Weinar v. Rollform, Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 806-07 (Fed. Cir. 1984). While Altair is correct that none of these cases expressly analyzes the “in like manner” language in Section 261, we are bound to follow our precedent, and thus we hold that an exclusive license need not be in writing for the licensee to have standing if the patentee or assignee is also joined, as Contour was here. 2. Aspex’s Evidence of an Oral or Implied Exclusive License The district court denied summary judgment finding that Aspex had raised at least a genuinely disputed issue of material fact that it had an implied or oral exclusive license. The court based its conclusion on the following findings: • Chic and Aspex are both owned by members of the same family and have a close business relationship. • Aspex has operated as an exclusive licensee, distributing products made pursuant to the patents-in-suit and seeking to enforce its rights under the patents. • Thierry Ifergan, a member of the family that owns both Chic and Aspex, testified that oral and implied agreements exist that grant Aspex an exclusive license to the patents-in-suit. We agree that this evidence, along with other evidence in the record, is sufficient to establish a genuinely disputed issue of material fact as to whether Aspex had an oral or implied exclusive license. In addition to the above, Nonu Ifergan, another member of the family that owned both Chic and Aspex, testified that both companies believed the written license agreement conferred an exclusive license to the patents-in-suit and operated consistent with that understanding. Altair’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient simply call into question the credibility of the Ifergans’ testimony; since the 15 2007-1380, -1407 district court simply denied summary judgment, however, credibility is not before us, only whether there was a disputed issue of material fact. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying summary judgment for lack of standing.