Opinion ID: 1740433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Reversible-Error Analysis

Text: To constitute reversible error in a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence must unfairly prejudice a substantial right of a litigant complaining about evidence admitted or excluded. Koehler v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 252 Neb. 712, 566 N.W.2d 750 (1997). Testimony objected to which is substantially similar to evidence admitted without objection results in no prejudicial error. Id. In the present case, exhibits 17 and 18 were the only evidence that established a correlation between Jackson's failure to provide a urine sample and the condition of prostatitis, the side effects of Effexor, and indigestion. Although other evidence at trial indicated that Jackson had been diagnosed with prostatitis, no other evidence established a causal connection between the failure to provide a urine sample for the BNSF drug test and this condition. The office notes of Dr. Robert Graves, a urologist, were in evidence. He examined Jackson and diagnosed him with prostatitis a week after the BNSF drug test, but the notes do not state that prostatitis caused (or could have caused) Jackson to be incapable of providing a urine sample. In fact, in a letter to Jackson dated January 23, 2003, Graves was unable to give a medical explanation for [Jackson's] inability to give a urine specimen during the three-hour period on January 2. Graves wrote that the inability to give the urine specimen would be more related to dehydration rather than from the prostatitis itself, and he encouraged Jackson to drink several glasses of water the next time he was required to provide his employer a urine sample. Evidence regarding the side effects of Effexor was presented to the jury only through exhibits 17 and 18. When Jackson attempted to testify at trial about the drug's side effects, the district court sustained the objection as to lack of foundation. As to indigestion, Jackson was permitted to testify that he sometimes got indigestion if he drank liquids after eating a large meal; however, a scientific explanation for indigestion (the `dilut[ion]' of `enzymes') came in only through exhibits 17 and 18. Finally, the jury was presented with the results of the March 2003 drug tests only in exhibits 17 and 18. Accordingly, the evidence contained in exhibits 17 and 18 was not merely cumulative. The Fund argues that the admission of exhibits 17 and 18 was presumptively prejudicial because the Fund was unable to cross-examine or rebut Jackson's unqualified opinions and documents contained therein and because the record does not disclose whether the evidence influenced the jury verdict. Error in the admission of evidence is presumed to be prejudicial when the evidence admitted may have influenced the verdict or affected unfavorably the party against whom it was admitted. Kvamme v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 267 Neb. 703, 677 N.W.2d 122 (2004). Where it cannot be gleaned from the record that evidence wrongfully admitted did not affect the result of the trial unfavorably to the party against whom such evidence was admitted, reception of that evidence must be considered prejudicial error. Id. In considering what effect the admission of exhibits 17 and 18 may have had on the jury, we note that the jury's attention was directed to the BNSF investigative hearing and the information submitted therein. References to the hearing were made throughout trial. Jackson testified that exhibit 17 contained all the documents submitted at the hearing and that exhibit 18 was the complete transcript of the hearing. Moreover, although Jackson was not permitted to testify about the side effects of Effexor, the jury was essentially told that it could find information about these side effects in exhibit 17. The following colloquy transpired during the redirect examination of Jackson: Q[:] Were you aware that [E]ffexor has side effects which would affect urination? [Counsel for the Fund]: I'll object to the form, object on hearsay, and foundation and form of the question. THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Q[:] . . . Jackson, you provided the [Fund] and [its] attorney the book of exhibits, correct? A[:] Yes, I did. Q[:] It's been received by the Court. Didn't you provide them the side effects of urination for [E]ffexor? A[:] Yes. Q[:] How did you get that? A[:] I wrote the manufacture[r] of the drug . . . I was taking. Q[:] Did they respond to you and send you back something that listed the side effects? A[:] Yes. Q[:] Did it indicate it can affect urination? [Counsel for the Fund]: I'll object on foundation. At this point, the parties approached the bench and an off-the-record discussion was had between the parties and the court. The overall issue at trial was whether Jackson was entitled to benefits pursuant to the Fund's constitution. In order to make such a finding, the jury had to determine that Jackson did not willful[ly] or intentional[ly] violate any order, rule, or regulation of his employer, BNSF. The BNSF alcohol and drug policy authorized a 9-month suspension for an employee who failed to provide a urine sample for a drug test without a valid medical reason. Thus, the key question for the jury was whether Jackson simply refused to provide a urine sample for the drug test or whether he was physically incapable of urinating at that time. The admission of exhibits 17 and 18 into evidence could have unfairly prejudiced the Fund in a number of ways. The jury could have accepted as fact Jackson's unqualified opinions relating to possible medical reasons for his alleged inability to urinate on January 2, 2003. The jury could have read the material submitted at the BNSF hearing and concluded that prostatitis and the taking of Effexor contributed to Jackson's failure to provide a urine sample. The results of the March 2003 drug tests were susceptible to being used by the jury as proof that Jackson had nothing to hide in the BNSF drug test and therefore that he must have been physically incapable of providing a urine sample. Because we are unable to determine that exhibits 17 and 18 did not affect the result of the trial unfavorably to the Fund, we conclude that reception of that evidence was prejudicial and reversible error.