Opinion ID: 1530733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney's Fees Statutory Authorization

Text: Brice's first argument is that the phrase otherwise make employees whole in Section 5931 vests the Board with statutory authority to award attorney's fees to every successful employee. The statutory exception to the American Rule requires either specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees or clear support in the legislative history of that intent. Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 726, 102 S.Ct. 2112, 2117, 72 L.Ed.2d 511 (1982) and Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1623, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). In Summit Valley Industries, the United States Supreme Court assumed, arguendo, that `Congress plainly intended Section 303 [of the Labor Management Relations Act] to be fully remedial and to restore to the victimized employer all ... losses.' Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. at 724, 102 S.Ct. at 2116 (citation omitted). It then concluded this justification alone is not sufficient to create an exception to the American Rule in the absence of express congressional authority. Id. Thus, the United States Supreme Court held that an implicit make whole remedy in a statute did not constitute a specific statutory authorization to sustain an award of attorney's fees. Id. at 725, 102 S.Ct. at 2116-17. The Delaware Code is replete with statutes that provide for an explicit award of attorney's fees [1] or counsel fees, [2] either as a matter of right or as an exercise of discretion. The Delaware General Assembly did not include the specific words attorney's fees or counsel fees in Section 5931. Consequently, we hold that the make whole remedy in Section 5931 does not constitute a specific statutory authorization for the routine award of attorney's fees to successful employees, either as a matter of right or an exercise of discretion.