Opinion ID: 77253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Massey Actions Were a Material Hindrance

Text: 21 Massey additionally claims that her actions did not result in a material hindrance to the official investigation or prosecution of the offense. While often argued interchangeably, Massey appears to make two separate arguments when discussing this issue. The first argument is that the recovery of the drugs was inevitable, since Massey could not leave the hospital until the objects were extracted. Thus, she argues that the attempted concealment was futile and therefore not material. In Massey's view, the only question was when the objects would be extracted. The second argument is that the government already knew all the necessary information about the objects from the x-rays and other relevant evidence prior to the actual extraction of the objects. Because Massey made these arguments in her objection to the PSI and at sentencing, it merits clear error review. 22 With regard to the first argument, Massey suggests that the actual hindrance test in Application Note 4(d) to Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 is controlling. See United States v. Garcia, 208 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.2000), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Garcia v. United States, 531 U.S. 1062, 121 S.Ct. 750, 148 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), reinstated by United States v. Garcia No. 97-3222, slip. op. at 2, 251 F.3d 160 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2001) (per curiam); see also United States v. Rowlett, 23 F.3d 300, 306 (10th Cir.1994) (noting that there must be an actual hindrance to an official investigation or prosecution when the conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Goff, 314 F.3d 1248, 1249-50 (10th Cir.2003). The Note includes the following conduct as willful obstructions: 23 destroying or concealing . . . evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding . . . or attempting to do so; however, if such conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest (e.g., attempting to swallow or throw away a controlled substance), it shall not, standing alone, be sufficient to warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it resulted in a material hindrance to the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense or the sentencing of the offender[.] 24 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(d). Citing United States v. Shriver, 967 F.2d 572, 575 (11th Cir.1992), Massey argues further that there must be a significant hindrance to the investigation, an even greater requirement than the material hindrance found in Application Note 4(d). See id. (applying what is now U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(g) and concluding that [o]ther circuits which have addressed this issue have held that section 3C1.1 requires the false statement to effect significantly the investigation before imposing an enhanced sentence). 25 Massey's first argument on this issue does not withstand clear error review. The material hindrance language after the semicolon in Application Note 4(d), or the actual hindrance test, applies when the conduct occurs contemporaneously with the arrest. Garcia, 208 F.3d at 1262. Massey has conceded that her arrest occurred before she was taken to the hospital. Since the concealment occurred at the hospital, this was not contemporaneous with the arrest. Thus, only the first part of Application Note 4(d) is applicable. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(d) (destroying or concealing . . . evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding. . . or attempting to do so ) (emphasis added). 26 Shriver is inapposite because it concerns Application Note 4(g), which addresses false statements. While Application Note 4(g) has a requirement that the materially false statement significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, Application Note 4(d), which is on point and governs the physical concealment of evidence, contains no such language. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(d), (g). 27 Under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, the threshold for materiality is conspicuously low. United States v. Dedeker, 961 F.2d 164, 167 (11th Cir.1992); see also U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6 ('Material' evidence, fact, statement, or information, as used in this section, means evidence, fact, statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.). Under this low standard, Massey's attempts to conceal the heroin against her were material. It is self-evident that illegal drugs are material to any drug investigation or prosecution. Massey intended to destroy the most incriminating evidence against her. The fact that she was unsuccessful, or even that the concealment was destined to fail, which is debatable, is irrelevant. 28 Even accepting that Massey attempted to hide material evidence, if the government knew beforehand all the relevant information or did not otherwise need the evidence in its prosecution or investigation of the offense, then § 3C1.1 will not apply. With regard to this second argument, Massey posits that United States v. Savard, 964 F.2d 1075 (11th Cir.1992) is on point. In Savard, customs agents boarded a marijuana laden sailboat. Id. at 1076. They questioned the three men aboard the boat about their trip. The stories the men told were lies. In the shoe of one of the sailors, agents found a slip that showed that, contrary to his story, the sailboat had been boarded by the Coast Guard in the Yucatan area. Id. at 1077. That defendant's sentence was enhanced by 2 levels for obstruction of the administration of justice for hiding the slip of paper in his shoe. We reversed the enhancement and remanded for resentencing because, at the time of the defendant's arrest, the agents already knew all the information contained on the slip of paper (e.g., that the boat had been boarded in the Yucatan). Id. at 1078-79. 29 Massey's second argument likewise fails clear error review. Savard is inapposite because, unlike the information on the slip hidden in the sailor's shoe, the government in this case did not know beforehand all the information about the objects that Massey had hidden. See Savard, 964 F.2d at 1076. Without possession of all the heroin, the government did not have all of the information or proof necessary to bring the appropriate charges. Furthermore, the calculation by the district court of Massey's sentence under the advisory Guidelines was dependent on an accurate assessment of the weight of drugs she and her codefendants had conspired to import. The heroin seized from Massey had a net weight of 147.3 grams. The total weight of heroin seized from all three defendants was 549.1 grams. Section 2D1.1(c)(6) of the Guidelines provides that an offense involving the importation of at least 400 grams but less than 700 grams of heroin has a base offense level of 28. With a range of only 300 grams within that base level, the weight of heroin (147.3 grams) seized from Massey was critical to a fair and accurate calculation of her sentence (notwithstanding the fact that, in hindsight, the base offense level would have remained the same without the inclusion of the 147.3 grams). Furthermore, cocaine and other drugs have different base offense levels at the same weight. For instance, the base offense level for 400 grams of cocaine is 24, as opposed to 28 for the equivalent amount of heroin. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6), (8). Importantly, at the time Massey hid the two objects inside her pillow, the government did not know with certainty the type or weight of the drug she and her codefendants possessed. It is not a foregone conclusion that Massey would have admitted to the type and weight of the drug if the objects had not been discovered or if the remaining object inside her had not burst. Without these discoveries, it is even conceivable that Massey might have argued that she possessed a different drug, or denied that she possessed any illegal drugs at all.