Opinion ID: 1199801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Substitute Attorneys

Text: On September 11, 1987, Charles J. Soria was appointed as counsel to defendant. On April 6, 1988, George W. Peterson was appointed cocounsel. On December 15, 1987  after Soria's appointment but before Peterson's  defendant orally moved the court to relieve Soria and appoint new counsel in his place: I would like another attorney appointed to me.... Because I don't feel comfortable with the attorney that I have. The court responded: Well, you don't have a right to be comfortable with him, sir. Defendant: ... I feel I have a right to change lawyers if I want to. I don't feel comfortable with the man. [¶] And I'm looking at the death penalty and he's going to tell me that I don't have the right to change lawyers? The court: That's exactly what I'm telling you. If it's simply a matter of being comfortable with him. Defendant: There is a reason why I don't feel comfortable with him. The court set a hearing for December 17 pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44], in order to afford defendant an opportunity to state his reason. On December 17, 1987, the court held a hearing in camera on defendant's motion, with only defendant, Soria, and court personnel present. The court inquired as to the grounds of the motion. Defendant stated: [D]uring our preliminary hearing I asked him to bring a witness in for me and he didn't. He failed to do that. He gave me some excuse I really can't remember. The court determined that this ground was insufficient: [T]actically it is generally an accepted practice for the defense not to put on any evidence at the time of the preliminary hearing. The court continued its inquiry. Defendant stated: He's talking about my case to other inmates in the jail. One inmate told me that he said he feels that I've done this crime and the reason why he's holding onto this case is because he has to. Like  you know, like he's not determined to win this case or fight it, just had to do it. Allowed to respond, Soria said that he had indeed asked other inmates how Mr. Berryman was doing, but had never said to any inmate that I believe that Mr. Berryman has done this. The court impliedly determined that this ground was unsupported. The court went on with its inquiry. Defendant stated: He's holding conversations with Lisa Green  who was the deputy district attorney then assigned to the case. And I think that these two have something going on together that's  instead of him defending me, trying to convict me with her. Soria volunteered an explanation for the various acts and omissions of which defendant complained. He then commented: He has not liked me from the start. Maybe it's because he's  even though he is born and raised in Delano, for some extent, the last few years of his life, he's been in Los Angeles. His people are in Los Angeles. They desperately wish to have a Los Angeles attorney or someone from down there. They don't have the money. In this case I will [need his cooperation]. And if he's not going to place his confidence in me  the trial is set May 2nd. There's adequate enough time for new counsel. I don't know if Mr. Berryman will have the same disagreements with new counsel, but I don't believe our relationship is ever going to get any better. And I'll leave it up to the Court. The court determined that this ground was unsupported as well: We have appointed counsel to represent you, Mr. Berryman.... I have seen nothing that you've offered today that indicates that Mr. Soria is doing anything short of a journeyman job for you. [¶] I'm confident that your suspicions not only are not well founded based on what you've told me, but my experience with both Mrs. Green and Mr. Soria is there certainly is no underlying conspiracy between them that is working to your disadvantage and no underlying conspiracy between them in any way. Thereupon, the court denied defendant's motion. You've not shown grounds that would justify me granting that motion. [¶] I will urge you to cooperate with Mr. Soria in the preparation of your defense. Your failure to cooperate with him will only be to your undoing and not to Mr. Soria's. And if you do fail to cooperate with him that is an unfortunate situation that you may find yourself in later on. [¶] But it's not the doing of Mr. Soria and certainly not the doing of the Court. And it's inappropriate simply for whatever reason to keep changing attorneys until you find one that you feel that you like.... Your motion will be denied. (1) Defendant contends that the court erred by denying his motion to relieve Soria and appoint new counsel in his place. The applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) No abuse appears. It was not at all unreasonable for the court to decline defendant's request for substitution: it determined  soundly, in our view  that each of the grounds on which he relied was either insufficient or unsupported. Certainly, it was not required to appoint an attorney whom defendant might like. Defendant argues to the contrary. He fails to establish the merit of his position. To be sure, a defendant may be entitled to an order substituting appointed counsel if he shows that, in its absence, his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel would be denied or substantially impaired. (See, e.g., People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) Defendant did not make the requisite showing in his motion. Notwithstanding his present assertion, he and Soria were not embroiled in [such an] irreconcilable conflict that ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment was likely to result. True, defendant claimed a lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, Soria. ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 860 [251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423] (lead opn. by Kaufman, J.).) That was not enough. [I]f a defendant's claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law. ( Ibid. ) Defendant maintains that Soria admitted an irreconcilable conflict of the kind that compels substitution. That is not the case. Indeed, Soria stated: I agree with the Court there are probably no grounds before it to rule in defendant's favor. (2) Defendant may not attempt to make up for what was lacking in his motion by relying on matters subsequent to its denial. A reviewing court focuses on the ruling itself and the record on which it was made. It does not look to subsequent matters.... ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 542 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In any event, the matters on which defendant relies are without significance for present purposes. To the extent that he may be understood to assert that the court erred by denying a similar motion he made on May 5, 1988, he is not persuasive. [1]