Opinion ID: 769753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing and Abstention

Text: 21 Before examining the merits of VRLC's constitutional challenge, we must first determine whether the district court correctly concluded that VRLC has standing to challenge the statutory provisions at issue and whether the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.
22 Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution restricts federal courts to deciding Cases and Controversies. From this has emerged the doctrine of constitutional standing. Federal courts must determine at the threshold of every case whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); United States v. Cambio Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1999). It would violate principles of separation of powers for us to hear a matter that was not a case or controversy and therefore not delegated to the [federal] judiciary under Article III. Id. at 527; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 23 We review legal questions relating to standing de novo and factual findings for clear error. See Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 787 (2d Cir. 1994); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1994). Applying this standard of review, we agree with the district court that VRLC has standing to challenge §§2881, 2882 and 2883. 24 [A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.' Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). The threat of suit under the questioned statute may be injury enough. A plaintiff bringing a pre-enforcement facial challenge against a statute need not demonstrate to a certainty that it will be prosecuted under the statute to show injury, but only that it has an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against it. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988). 25 When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. 26 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)). [T]he alleged danger of th[e] statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution. American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 393. 1 27 That VRLC faces the possibility of civil litigation rather than criminal prosecution here is of no moment. The fear of civil penalties can be as inhibiting of speech as can trepidation in the face of threatened criminal prosecution. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964). VRLC is at risk of a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each infraction of the Vermont election law. That penalty's deterrence of VRLC's speech is palpable enough. 28 We turn then to the question of whether VRLC faces a credible threat, Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, of being penalized for its speech. The State argues that any such fear is unreasonable because, as it interprets §§2881, 2882 and 2883, the statute does not reach the expressive activities in which VRLC wishes to engage.
29 VRLC contends that it is at risk of penalties under §§2881 and 2882 because it is not in compliance with §2882's requirement that political advertisements clearly designate the name of the candidate, party or political committee by or on whose behalf the same is published or broadcast. VRLC does not expressly advocate the election or defeat of particular candidates other than through its internal political committee, whose activities are not a subject of this litigation. Relying on the definition of behalf contained in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1984), however, VRLC argues that because its communications benefit, advantage[], and interest[] certain candidates, political committees and parties that adhere to the views contained in the VRLC communications, they may be said to be disseminated on... behalf of those candidates, committees and parties and therefore subject to the requirements of this provision. 30 The district court decided that under the literal interpretation of the phrase on whose behalf propounded by VRLC, §§2881 and 2882 could apply to any of a number of types of communication that implicitly or impliedly advocate for the success or defeat of a candidate and are published in the interest of a candidate, political party or political committee and therefore could be applied to VRLC's described activities. Vermont Right to Life, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 211. Accordingly, the court concluded that VRLC had standing to challenge those provisions of the law. We agree. VRLC's publication of an advertisement, particularly at election time, supporting a viewpoint with which a candidate is associated or with which his or her opponent takes issue could easily be construed as having been published on behalf of the candidate. 31 The State and the Intervenors argue that the district court should have followed the plain meaning of on behalf of as meaning as the agent or representative of. But while there may be other, perhaps even better, definitions of on whose behalf, VRLC's is reasonable enough that it may legitimately fear that it will face enforcement of the statute by the State brandishing the definition proffered by VRLC. 32 The State also argues that VRLC's fear of suit could not possibly be well-founded because the State has no intention of suing VRLC for its activities. While that may be so, there is nothing that prevents the State from changing its mind. It is not forever bound, by estoppel or otherwise, to the view of the law that it asserts in this litigation. See Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999) (doctrine of judicial estoppel which prevents party from taking mutually exclusive positions in different litigation under some circumstances applies to assertions of factual positions); Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir.) (there is no rule that requires us to accept representations from [the prosecution's] counsel (emphasis omitted)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1121 (1995); Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 1990) (interpretation of statute offered by Attorney General is not binding because he may change his mind...and he may be replaced in office). But cf. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183, 1185 (7th Cir.) (finding no well-founded fear to support standing where present state attorney general, and every past attorney general since 1976, had adhered to same interpretation of statute), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 873 (1998). In light of this uncertainty, the State's representation cannot remove VRLC's reasonable fear that it will be subjected to penalties for its planned expressive activities. If we held otherwise, we would be placing VRLC's asserted First Amendment rights at the sufferance of Vermont's Attorney General. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, U.S. 120 S. Ct. 2597,2614-15, L.Ed.2d (2000). American Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 395 (1988) ([A]s the Attorney General does not bind the state courts or local law enforcement authorities, we are unable to accept her interpretation of the law as authoritative.); North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 710 (declining in absence of agency rule to rely on State's litigation position that it does not interpret statute to apply to issue advocacy). But cf. Graham v. Butterworth, 5 F.3d 496, 499 (11th Cir. 1993) (dismissing First Amendment challenge to state statute as moot after defendants withdrew initial determination that plaintiffs' conduct violated statute and informed plaintiffs that their intended campaign conduct would not be prosecuted).
33 VRLC also claims that it has standing to challenge §2883, which imposes reporting requirements on expenditures of $500 or more on mass media activities conducted within 30 days of an election. VRLC asserts that, inter alia, its distribution of literature and display of posters at county-fair booths is subject to the reporting requirements of §2883 when these materials contain the name or likeness of a candidate. The district court agreed, and thus determined that VRLC had standing to challenge §2883. We also agree. 34 Section 2883(a) defines mass media activities by way of example: For purposes of this section, 'mass media activities' includes television commercials, radio commercials, mass mailings, literature drops and central telephone banks which include the name or likeness of a candidate for office. The State and the Intervenors argue that the one essential characteristic shared by all of these examples is that they all involve communications widely disseminated to the general public. VRLC's fair-booth activities share that characteristic. The district court found that in 1997, 306,600 people attended the Champlain Valley Fair in Chittenden County, where VRLC had a booth at which it distributed copies of its voting guide and most recent newsletter. See Vermont Right to Life, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 211 n.5. This, the district court noted, is more than twice Chittenden County's total population, which the district court placed at approximately 132,000. See id. at 211 n.5. Assuming that VRLC's communications at the Champlain Valley Fair reach only a small percentage of the number of people who attend it, that is still sufficient for VRLC reasonably to fear that its communications will be held to constitute mass media activity. 35 The State also argues that VRLC's fair-booth activities, even if they are mass media activities, do not meet §2883's provision that only expenditures of at least $500 are subject to its reporting requirements. VRLC has offered uncontradicted evidence, however, that it spent in excess of $600 in disseminating written material at the 1997 Champlain Valley Fair. VRLC thus has standing to challenge §2883.
36 In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), the Supreme Court counseled federal courts to 'abstain from decision when difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided.' Alliance of American Insurers v. Cuomo, 854 F.2d 591, 601 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)). We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision not to abstain, bearing in mind that there is little or no discretion to abstain in a case which does not meet traditional abstention requirements, Bethpage Lutheran Serv., Inc. v. Weicker, 965 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that [t]he underlying legal questions . . . are subject to plenary review, In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965) (district court's decision not to abstain reviewed for abuse of discretion). 37 Abstention under the Pullman doctrine may be appropriate when three conditions are met: (1) an unclear state statute is at issue; (2) resolution of the federal constitutional issue depends on the interpretation of the state law; and (3) the law is susceptible to an interpretation by a state court that would avoid or modify the federal constitutional issue. Greater New York Metro. Food Council v. McGuire, 6 F.3d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Satisfaction of all three criteria does not automatically require abstention, however. The doctrine of abstention...is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)); Alliance of American Insurers, 854 F.2d at 599 ([W]hen federal jurisdiction is proper, abstention is the exception, not the rule.) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813). 38 Thus, [t]he abstention doctrine is not an automatic rule applied whenever a federal court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law; it rather involves a discretionary exercise of a court's equity powers. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); see also Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1993); Moe v. Dinkins, 635 F.2d 1045, 1046 (2d Cir. 1980) (abstention should be utilized with strict circumspection). In deciding how to exercise this discretion, federal courts are instructed to engage in 'a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.' Young v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983)). We have said that important federal rights can outweigh[] the interests underlying the Pullman doctrine. United Fence & Guard Rail Corp. v. Cuomo, 878 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1989). 39 In this case, the district court relied on several factors in declining to abstain. At the outset, it determined that two of the Pullman doctrine's three prerequisites had not been satisfied, because the statutory provisions at issue were not unclear and any interpretation given them by the Vermont state courts would not avoid the constitutional questions raised. And it based its ruling from the bench at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and again in its opinion disposing of the parties' summary judgment motions, in part on the lack of a certification procedure in Vermont, the delay that would result from abstention, the absence of a pending state action, and the swift approach of an election season. Vermont Right to Life, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.6. We agree with the district court that abstention is not warranted, although for somewhat different reasons. 40 We recognized in Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1998), that district courts must exercise particular caution before abstaining where a plaintiff has raised a facial constitutional challenge to a statute and the attendant delay would work to inhibit exercise of the First Amendment freedoms injured by the statute's existence. In the context of First Amendment claims, Pullman abstention has generally been disfavored where state statutes have been subjected to facial challenges. Id. at 94; see also City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) ([W]e have been particularly reluctant to abstain in cases involving facial challenges based on the First Amendment.); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489 490 (1965) ([A]bstention... is inappropriate for cases [where]... statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression.). [T]o force the plaintiff who has commenced a federal action to suffer the delay of state court proceedings might itself effect the impermissible chilling of the very constitutional right he seeks to protect. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967). Given the importance and immediacy of the problem, and the delay inherent in referring questions of state law to state tribunals, it is evident that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain. Harman, 380 U.S. at 537 (footnote omitted). 41 The costs of delay may be somewhat attenuated in situations where a state action is already pending. But no case involving §§2881, 2882, or 2883 is or has been pending in state court. VRLC has already stopped producing political advertisements that it reasonably believes fall within the disclosure requirements of §2882; VRLC's executive director has testified that since Act No. 64 became effective VRLC has ceased identifying any candidates in any way in [its] newsletter to the best of [its] ability, and has not published the results of any floor votes, as [it] normally would have done. And any further delay would result in the inhibition of mass media activities as defined by §2883 that VRLC may be considering for the coming election season. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exercise its jurisdiction in this case. 42