Opinion ID: 60402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reasonable jurists would find the District Court's assessment of the Batson claims debatable

Text: Haynes requests this court to grant a COA for his claim that the state prosecution based its use of peremptory challenges in jury selection on impermissible racial characteristics in violation of equal protection as articulated in Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Three steps are involved in a Batson challenge: The Supreme Court has outlined a three-step process for determining whether peremptory strikes have been applied in a discriminatory manner. First, the claimant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges have been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if this requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party accused of discrimination to articulate race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the claimant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1373 (5th Cir.1993). The State does not dispute that, in respect to four prospective jurors, the defendant made a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges had been exercised on the basis of race. However, the State contends that after succeeding in the first Batson step, the defendant's claim falters. Accordingly, our analysis proceeds directly to Batson's second and third steps regarding those four prospective jurors. At the outset, however, it should be noted, that two different state trial judges took turns in presiding over the jury selection process in this case. Judge Wallace presided at the beginning of the jury selection process when the jurors were addressed and questioned as a group; Judge Harper presided during the next stage in which the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually; and Judge Wallace presided again during the final stage in which peremptory challenges were exercised and when Batson challenges were made, considered and ruled upon. Thus, Judge Wallace, who ruled upon the Batson challenges was not presiding when the prosecutor determined the demeanor of the prospective jurors in responding to individual questioning. [4] Haynes is African-American. Of the fifty people in the venire, six of the seven African-Americans appeared for voir dire. Of those six, the prosecution struck four, and the defense struck one. One African-American juror was seated on the jury. The four African-Americans peremptorily challenged by the prosecution were: Twanna Kirkling, Melba Goodman, L.V. McQueen, and Betty Owens. For each strike, the prosecution offered an explanation. For Twanna Kirlking, the prosecution stated that during her interview, she said capital punishment was a last resort, meaning several times she hesitated in responding to the questions about the death penalty. The prosecution also added that she looked at capital punishment... as a necessary evil and avoided giving any direct position on capital punishment that it was a viable object for the State and, furthermore, she stated that life, 40 [years], is a justifiable punishment. The defense counsel objected noting that other jurors also articulated the necessary evil view. For Melba Goodman, the prosecutor said that from his impression of the interview, he thought [s]he opposed death punishment [and] [s]he refused to answer questions about capital punishment. The prosecution added, [s]he reluctantly agree[d] that capital punishment for [the murder of] police officers should be available [and][s]he also demonstrated through her demeanor that she was very anti-capital punishment. The defense did not dispute this explanation at that time. For L.V. McQueen, the prosecution said, when questioned, M[r]. McQueen would give me all the indications that in responses to my questions by the language of demeanor that he was very weak on the death punishment ... and stated that there were some cases that I could not give a death sentence even if the law permitted such. The defense counsel indicated that in McQueen's jury questionnaire, he had showed support for the death penalty. For Betty Owens, the prosecution stated that this lady's demeanor was ... somewhat humorous [and][s]he never did really take on a serious attitude during the interview. The prosecution added, [s]he would say one thing but her body language would indicate that this is not her true feeling. The prosecutor also indicated that he thought because the defendant's trial counsel spent little time with her, the trial counsel was pleased with her and, therefore, she would certainly be leaning toward a life sentence. Defense counsel objected noting that Owens's jury questionnaire suggested that she would favor the prosecution and her answers indicated impartiality. Regarding the second step of the Batson analysis, Judge Wallace accepted each of these explanations as race-neutral without any specific findings. Because Judge Wallace was not present when the prospective jurors were individually questioned at voir dire, it arguably follows that he was not able to credit the prosecutor's assertions that his peremptory challenges were based on the jurors' demeanor during individual voir dire rather than their race. In an analogous context in Snyder v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207-09, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008), the Supreme Court rejected the State's argument that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge was validly based on a prospective juror's nervousness for the reason that the record did not reflect whether the trial court, in allowing the challenge, had noted, recalled or made a determination as to the juror's demeanor. Because the trial court in Snyder simply accepted the explanation as race-neutral and allowed the challenge without stating any reason, the Supreme Court discounted the possibility that the trial court could have based its race-neutral determination on the prosecution's demeanor explanation even under a highly deferential clear error standard. Id. The Supreme Court explained: With respect to the [demeanor] reason, the Louisiana Supreme Court was correct that nervousness cannot be shown from a cold transcript, which is why ... the [trial] judge's evaluation must be given much deference. 942 So.2d, at 496.... [D]eference is especially appropriate where a trial judge has made a finding that an attorney credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a strike. Here, however, the record does not show that the trial judge actually made a determination concerning [prospective juror] Mr. Brooks' demeanor. The trial judge was given two explanations for the strike. Rather than making a specific finding on the record concerning Mr. Brooks' demeanor, the trial judge simply allowed the challenge without explanation. It is possible that the judge did not have any impression one way or the other concerning Mr. Brooks' demeanor. Mr. Brooks was not challenged until the day after he was questioned, and by that time dozens of other jurors had been questioned. Thus, the trial judge may not have recalled Mr. Brooks' demeanor. Or, the trial judge may have found it unnecessary to consider Mr. Brooks' demeanor, instead basing his ruling completely on the second proffered justification for the strike. For these reasons, we cannot presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor's assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous. Id. at 1209. Under Snyder's application of Batson, therefore, an appellate court applying Batson arguably should find clear error when the record reflects that the trial court was not able to verify the aspect of the juror's demeanor upon which the prosecutor based his or her peremptory challenge. Consequently, we conclude that the district court arguably erred in finding that the state courts properly relied upon the prosecution's demeanor explanations for its peremptory challenges of jurors McQueen and Owens. Acknowledging the lack of support in the written record for finding that McQueen was biased against the prosecution or the death penalty, the district court found that the prosecution's justification for striking [McQueen] ... focused on his demeanor ... suggesting that the record possibly belies his feelings as manifested through his in-court deportment. Haynes, 2007 WL 268374, at  n. 9. Further, in respect to Owens, the district court deferred to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' reliance on the prosecutor's allusion to Owens's demeanor as the sole justification for finding that the prosecution's peremptory challenge of her was race neutral. Haynes, 2007 WL 268374, at ; see also Haynes v. Texas, No. 73, 685, slip. op. at 16 (Tex.Crim.App. Oct. 10, 2001) (relying solely on demeanor in determining if the trial judge's acceptance of the State's explanation as race-neutral for striking Owens was not clearly erroneous). However, Judge Wallace, the state trial judge who upheld the peremptory challenges of McQueen and Owens, could not have possibly credited the prosecutor's assertion that they were struck because of their demeanor during individual questioning; Judge Wallace did not preside during the individual examination of the jurors. Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1209. Further, the district court did not find another credible non-racial explanation that could justify the state courts' determination that the peremptory challenge of Owens and McQueen was race-neutral. Thus, arguably, the State has failed to satisfy Batson's second step. Accordingly, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Snyder, which applied its understanding of Batson to a similar factual issue, reasonable jurists may debate whether the district court could have resolved Haynes's Batson claims in respect to Owens and McQueen differently. See Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir.2008) (using Snyder as guidance for how to apply Batson in state habeas case). Furthermore, as this is a capital case, doubts about granting a COA should be strongly resolved in favor of the petitioner. ShisInday, 511 F.3d at 520 (Any doubt regarding whether to grant a COA is resolved in favor of the petitioner, and the severity of the penalty may be considered in making this determination.). The district court and the state courts' analyses of the prosecutor's explanations for challenging the other two potential African-American jurors (Goodman and Kirkling) did not rely on demeanor. Instead, the State's explanations focused on their reluctance to impose the death penalty in their on-the-record answers to individual questioning at voir dire. Unlike the demeanor explanation, these explanations can be verified by the written record. In respect to Goodman, we do not find the district court's determination to be debatable. In United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (5th Cir.1993), we noted that a district court can accept the prosecution's race-neutral explanation if the explanation is facially valid and the defendant did not object below. By failing to dispute the Government's explanations, [defendants] appeared to acquiesce in them. As a result, there was no need for the district judge to make a ruling. Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.1990)). Likewise, since the defendant similarly acquiesced in the present case, the district court could properly accept the state trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's explanation as race-neutral. Moreover, the record supports the determination that the explanation was race-neutral. Goodman did waffle on whether she considered the murder of a police officer to be a capital offense. Furthermore, the district court's decision in respect to Goodman is supported by the same reasons we assign and explain more fully regarding Kirkling below. Prospective juror Kirkling stated during voir dire that she thought to sentence someone to death is a last resort and that the sentence of death would be applied if there is not a possibility of redemption, of improvement on that person. She also admitted to hesitation in imposing the death penalty. As the prosecution presents a valid and acceptable race-neutral explanation, i.e., answers evincing a reluctance to impose the death penalty, the question presented at the third stage of the Batson inquiry is `whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.' Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1212 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 277, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) ( Miller-El II )). As evidence of discrimination, Haynes alleges the disparate treatment of jurors of different races. He contends the non-African American jurors were primarily asked only yes and no narrative questions while the four African-American jurors were asked more probing questions. The alleged disparate questioning is not reflected in the record. [5] Even assuming arguendo the prosecutors' questioning was inconsistent, [petitioner] did not show that the State's individualized reasons for peremptorily striking each African-American venireperson at issue were actually a pretext for racial discrimination or that any alleged disparate questioning did not result from reasons other than race. Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427, 438 (5th Cir.2005). Difference in treatment between jurors of different races may be one factor but is not dispositive of pre-text and racial discrimination. See United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 350 (5th Cir.1998) (noting that [the jurors] had different combinations of qualities, and some had more government-desired qualities than did the jurors the government preempted.). The record evinces Kirkling's acknowledged hesitation with regards to using the death penalty. This is not a case in which [t]he State's attempt at a race-neutral rationalization thus simply fails to explain what the prosecutors did. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 260, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Based on the review of Haynes' allegations as to Kirkling, without any direct evidence of discrimination inherent in the explanation, there is no debate that we must take the explanation as to Kirkling as race-neutral without purposeful discrimination: Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Petitioner does not point to anything said by the prosecutor in the prosecutor's justification of the challenged strikes that even hints at an inherent discriminatory intent. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir.2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Unlike Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 345-46, 123 S.Ct. 1029, Haynes does not assert any persuasive evidence to suspect the explanation as to Kirkling is a pretext for racial discrimination, such as procedural irregularities, e.g., jury shuffling, a history of discrimination, or any similar evidence. Moreover, all that a prosecutor need offer is a facially valid explanation .... Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral .... Accordingly, a legitimate reason is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. In the instant case, the prosecutor articulated specific conduct on the part of the potential jurors which the district court found legitimate. We do not intend to disturb such a finding. United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 606-07 (5th Cir.1998). No reasonable jurists would debate the district court's findings as to Kirkling and Goodman. However, as noted earlier, in light of Snyder, reasonable jurists may debate whether the district court's conclusions as to McQueen and Owens are correct and whether the state courts' applications of Batson as to those two jurors were unreasonable. `[T]he Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1208 (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994)).