Opinion ID: 1377307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of Sindell

Text: (5a) Plaintiff's major argument, which was summarily rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeal, is that our landmark decision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588, constituted the fact that activated the statute. Plaintiff does not dispute the general rule that ignorance of the identity of the defendant does not affect the statute of limitations. (See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 39 Cal.3d 892, 899; Neal v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 194 [98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421]; Gale v. McDaniel (1887) 72 Cal. 334 [13 P. 871]; Snow v. A.H. Robins Co. (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 120, 127 [211 Cal. Rptr. 271]; Baker v. Hughes Aircraft Corp. (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 315, 321 [114 Cal. Rptr. 171, 91 A.L.R.3d 981].) However, she asserts that the rule does not apply to the facts of her case. Plaintiff contends that prior to Sindell, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588, the defective product was defined as the specific DES pills her mother ingested. Consequently, plaintiff could not establish a causal link between any particular manufacturer and her injury. She argues that Sindell redefined the defective product as generic DES, making all manufacturers of DES contributors to her injury. Thus, now she is able to establish a causal link between the harm suffered and defendants. Defendants reply that this was not the intended effect of Sindell. They argue that Sindell merely shifted from plaintiff to defendants the burden of proving which manufacturer's drug caused plaintiff's injury. There is merit in both contentions. Sindell is more than a mere burden shifting case. Although based in part on Summers v. Tice (1943) 33 Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91], Sindell went beyond that precedent. [14] In Sindell we noted that all DES manufacturers presumptively contributed to the alleged injury in that DES was a generic drug, manufactured from an agreed formula. Hence, all DES manufacturers shared in the alleged societal wrong. We held that between an innocent plaintiff and a group of allegedly negligent defendants, one of whom probably caused the injury, the latter should bear the costs of the harm, and we were willing to fashion a new remedy to meet that goal. Therefore, we imposed liability on defendants even though there was a significant possibility that the manufacturer of the particular pills ingested by a plaintiff's mother was not a party to the suit. (26 Cal.3d at pp. 610-612.) At the same time, we did not create an entirely new tort, nor identify a new product. Sindell merely bridged the causal gap between DES manufacturers as a group and plaintiff's injury. Where the actual manufacturer of the ingested DES is unknown, causation by joined manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES that a plaintiff's mother might have taken would be presumed, subject, of course, to each drug manufacturer's ability to rebut the presumption by proving that the actual pills in question were not its product. We noted in Sindell that the trial court properly dismissed a drug company that did not manufacture any DES during the relevant time. ( Id. at p. 612.) Plaintiff interprets this as merely establishing that the dismissed defendant engaged in no wrongful conduct during the relevant period and, hence, shares no liability. This interpretation is incorrect. A defendant who manufactured only capsules in a case where tablets were ingested would be similarly dismissed. Such a result would make no sense if Sindell were based on a new theory of wrongful conduct  a capsule manufacturer's conduct would be equally culpable. In addition, under plaintiff's theory carried to its logical extreme all drug companies would be liable even if plaintiff knew the actual manufacturer of the drug. Yet that clearly is not the law. [15] From the foregoing, it is clear that Sindell did not provide plaintiff with the critical fact that started the limitations period. Nor did it create a new tort with an independent starting date for purposes of the statute of limitations. Rather, Sindell demonstrated the legal significance of facts already known to plaintiff. The statute had started to run for plaintiff well before Sindell was decided. At a less legalistic but more fundamental level, plaintiff argues, with some persuasive force, that prior to Sindell she could not have prevailed on her suit. She notes that during the time that defendants argue her action would have been timely, McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 87 Cal. App.3d 77 (overruled by Sindell, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588), effectively barred her claim. In McCreery, the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff who could not identify the precise manufacturer of the pills ingested by her mother did not allege a cause of action. Plaintiff undoubtedly fell into this group. (6a), (5b) The response to plaintiff's contention is that a change in the law, either by statute or by case law, does not revive claims otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. The seminal case on point is Monroe v. Trustees of the California State Colleges (1971) 6 Cal.3d 399 [99 Cal. Rptr. 129, 491 P.2d 1105]. Professor Monroe was fired from the California State College system for failing to take a loyalty oath. The statute requiring the oath was held constitutional in Pockman v. Leonard (1952) 39 Cal.2d 676 [249 P.2d 267]. In view of that case, Professor Monroe did not seek judicial review of the state's action within the statutory period. We overruled Pockman in Vogel v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 68 Cal.2d 18 [64 Cal. Rptr. 409, 434 P.2d 961], and declared the statute unconstitutional. Shortly thereafter, Professor Monroe brought suit in part for back wages. We held that this portion of Professor Monroe's suit was untimely because a change in the law applied only to timely filed claims; the change could not revive claims already barred by the statute of limitations. ( Monroe, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 406-407.) Although prior to Vogel Professor Monroe was effectively precluded from bringing his claim, it was not impossible for him to do so. We held that no legal obstacle barred a judicial challenge to [his] initial discharge and that the mere existence of a contrary precedent has never been considered sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. ( Id. at p. 408, fn. 5.) (Accord, Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62 [95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 485 P.2d 785] [ability of Soviet residents to inherit a portion of a Californian's estate]; Bartman v. Estate of Bartman (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 780 [148 Cal. Rptr. 207] [guest statute]; Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 614 [146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 17 A.L.R.4th 1118] [duty of psychiatrist after Tarasoff v. Board of Regents (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166]]; Priola v. Paulino (1977) 72 Cal. App.3d 380 [140 Cal. Rptr. 186] [loss of consortium]; Shelton v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal. App.3d 66 [128 Cal. Rptr. 454] [loss of consortium]; Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal. App.3d 526 [124 Cal. Rptr. 370] [spousal suit statute]; Lopa v. Superior Court (1975) 46 Cal. App.3d 382 [120 Cal. Rptr. 445] [guest statute].) Precedent is in unanimous accord with this rule. (6b) In all of the above-cited cases, the court recognized that the rule may work a harsh result. Nonetheless, it is justified in three ways. First, the rule encourages people to bring suit to change a rule of law with which they disagree, fostering growth and preventing legal stagnation. Second, the statute of limitations is not solely a punishment for slow plaintiffs. It serves the important function of repose by allowing defendants to be free from stale litigation, especially in cases where evidence might be hard to gather due to the passage of time. Third, to hold otherwise would allow virtually unlimited litigation every time precedent changed. For example, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393], this court held that contributory negligence was not a total bar to recovery. There were undoubtedly thousands of potential plaintiffs through the years who had been reasonably advised to the contrary by competent counsel and so failed to bring suit. Nevertheless, allowing them all to sue within a year after the Li decision would have been untenable. Courts simply are not equipped to handle cases dating back many years, eventually brought because the law has changed. This prohibition against revival of claims can obviously create a hardship on such unfortunate plaintiffs (and a windfall to fortunate defendants). However, the hardship is no greater than that incurred by plaintiffs who received an adverse final judgment based on the old law and are barred from relitigating their case by res judicata. Plaintiff seeks to avoid application of the rule that contrary precedent does not toll the statute of limitations by noting that prior to each of the aforementioned cases there had been a decided policy that barred plaintiffs from the courts. Here, in contrast, no legislative or judicial policy was expressed to preclude DES victims who could not identify the manufacturer of the ingested drug from bringing suit. Plaintiff's distinction is accurate, but irrelevant. Such a policy has never been articulated as a reason to enforce statutes of limitation following changes in the law, nor does this difference justify creating retroactivity reaching back to claims barred by res judicata or the statute of limitations. Moreover, in early 1978, plaintiff's legal situation was not as dismal as it initially appears. First, she was in no worse a position than Judith Sindell, who ultimately prevailed in changing the law. Second, there were other, more traditional theories available on which plaintiff could base her lawsuit, such as civil conspiracy or joint liability under Summers v. Tice, supra, 33 Cal.2d 80. While it is true that these theories were not clearly meritorious (indeed they were ultimately rejected by us in Sindell, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588), they did provide plaintiff with a nonfrivolous cause of action. Although in the latter part of 1978, McCreery, supra, 87 Cal. App.3d 77, appeared to foreclose such a suit, that case was an intermediate appellate court decision. In this regard, the last word on the subject had not been spoken, and other Courts of Appeal were free to disregard that case. Therefore, plaintiff was not entirely forestalled, even as a practical matter, from bringing a timely suit. Finally, even without using any of the above theories, plaintiff could have filed a timely complaint under section 474, which allows suit to be filed against a Doe party. From the time such a complaint is filed, the plaintiff has three years to identify and serve the defendant. (See Altman v. Morris Plan Co. (1976) 58 Cal. App.3d 951, 962-963 [130 Cal. Rptr. 397]; Staples v. Zoph (1935) 9 Cal. App.2d 369, 370 [49 P.2d 1131].) Hence, in the instant case, plaintiff could have brought a timely Doe action, effectively enlarging the statute of limitations period for three years. Had she done so, her complaint would have been pending when Sindell, supra, 26 Cal.3d 588, was decided. (5c) In sum, plaintiff's argument that Sindell created or revived her cause of action must fail.