Opinion ID: 2621091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Violation of Due Process

Text: Otto further contends that even if the Legislature intended to authorize the admission of multiple hearsay that does not fall within any previously established hearsay exception, reliance on such evidence violates his due process right to confrontation and concomitant right to be convicted only if the prosecution proves its case by reliable evidence. Because civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVP proceeding is entitled to due process protections. ( Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437.) A defendant challenging the statute on due process grounds carries a heavy burden. Courts have a `duty to uphold a statute unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity.' ( People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211, 1219, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 824 P.2d 694.) Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due. ( Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484.) We have identified four relevant factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (4) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official. ( Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 383, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244.) Applying these factors to reliance on the victims' hearsay statements in this case, we consider first that the private interests that will be affected by the official action are the significant limitations on Otto's liberty, the stigma of being classified as a sexually violent predator, and subjection to unwanted treatment. (See Vitek v. Jones (1980) 445 U.S. 480, 495, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552.) Second, we consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Here, the parties agree the victim hearsay statements must contain special indicia of reliability to satisfy due process. (See In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1247-1248, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56, 998 P.2d 1019 ( Lucero L. ); id. at pp. 1250-1251, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 56, 998 P.2d 1019 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.) [out-of-court statements of a child who is subject to a jurisdictional hearing and disqualified as a witness because of the lack of capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood at the time of testifying may not form the sole basis for a jurisdictional finding unless they show special indicia of reliability].) We agree. As Otto notes, the hearsay at issue in this case permeates not only the substantial sexual conduct component of the prior crime determination, but also the psychological experts'conclusion that [Otto] was and remained a pedophile ... likely to reoffend. (See Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 429, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 [factual issues resolved in commitment proceeding represent only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists].) Thus, if these facts are unreliable, a significant portion of the foundation of the resulting SVP finding is suspect. Moreover, while the current SVP commitment is for only two years, Otto raises an arguable concern he will be estopped by the finding below from relitigating the issue of whether the prior crimes involved substantial sexual conduct at any future SVP proceedings. In evaluating the reliability of hearsay statements in a presentence report, a court may consider numerous factors, including the context in which the statements appear. The presentence report is written by a court officer regarding a crime to which the defendant either pled or was found guilty. Transcripts from any preliminary hearing or trial held regarding the predicate conviction are also pertinent, as well as any indicia the defendant challenged the accuracy of the hearsay statements at the underlying criminal proceeding. Relevant factors further include the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, if known, such as spontaneity and consistent repetition, the mental state of the declarant, use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age, lack of motive to fabricate, and whether the hearsay statement was corroborated. (Cf. Lucero L, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1239, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56, 998 P.2d 1019.) Not surprisingly, the parties disagree as to whether the victims' hearsay statements here were reliable. We conclude the victims' hearsay statements possess sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy due process. The most critical factor demonstrating the reliability of the victim hearsay statements is that Otto was convicted of the crimes to which the statements relate. This factor will nearly always be present in an SVP proceeding because the SVPA requires conviction of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims. (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, a prerequisite to considering the presentence report is a conviction for the crime to which the hearsay statements relate. As a result of such a conviction, some portion, if not all, of the alleged conduct will have been already either admitted in a plea or found true by a trier of fact after trial. Here, Otto pled no contest to the prior crimes. In so doing, he stated the factual basis for his plea was contained in the police reports. Thus, unlike the typical scenario in a dependency proceeding in which a parent disputes the factual allegations, such as in Lucero L., Otto's plea admitted the truth of the victims' statements. Otto asserts that one can violate Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) by any touching committed with lewd intent. ( People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 451-452, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037.) Thus, he contends, his no contest plea admits only this conduct, not the substantial sexual conduct described in the presentence report. ( People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 178, 136 Cal. Rptr. 496 [Inquiry into the factual basis for the plea ensures that the defendant actually committed a crime at least as serious as the one to which he is willing to plead].) Our review of the presentence report indicates little, if any, innocent touching made culpable solely by lewd intent. Nor does Otto contend the presentence report omitted acts by Otto against the victims, as described in the underlying police report, that would constitute lewd behavior based solely on his wrongful intent. Moreover, taking Otto's argument to its logical conclusion, while Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) is listed as a predicate offense in the SVPA, it would never so qualify when the defendant pled guilty or no contest prior to the preliminary hearing because the offense may be committed by an otherwise innocuous touching coupled with lewd intent. In addition, consideration of hearsay statements contained in presentence reports is not unique to the SVPA. A probation report is required following every felony conviction in this state. (Pen.Code, § 1203c.) Rule 4.411.5 details the contents of presentence reports, and contemplates that police reports will be used to prepare crime summaries contained therein. (Rule 4.411.5(a)(7)(i).) Defendants are required by statute to have an opportunity to review and challenge inaccuracies in the presentence report. (Pen.Code, §§ 1170, subd. (b), 1203, subd. (b)(2)(D), 1203d; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437(e); see People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350-351, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040.) Otto does not contend he failed to receive such an opportunity in the underlying criminal prosecution. Superior courts consider and rely upon hearsay statements contained in a presentence report to determine whether to place a defendant on probation, and to evaluate his level of culpability when selecting an appropriate sentence. (Pen.Code, § 1203, subd. (b)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.411(d).) This includes the court's assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, such as whether the crime involved great bodily harm or other act disclosing a high degree of viciousness, cruelty, or callousness, whether the victim was particularly vulnerable, whether the crime was carried out with sophistication, whether the defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence, whether the defendant played a minor role in the crime, whether the victim participated in the incident and, if so, under what circumstances, and whether the defendant exercised caution to avoid harm or damage. (Rules 4.420(b), 4.421(a)(1), (3), (8), (11), 4.423(a)(1), (2), (6).) Thus, courts routinely rely upon hearsay statements contained in probation reports to make factual findings concerning the details of the crime. These findings, in turn, guide the court's sentencing decisiona decision which has a great impact on the defendant's liberty interest. Indeed, the range of sentences available in a case involving one of the sex offenses enumerated in section 6600, subdivision (b) commonly exceeds the two-year liberty interest at issue here. As one Court of Appeal has stated, In every felony proceeding in the State of California, a probation report is required and must be read and considered by the sentencing judge. [Citation.] The Legislature does not require trial court judges to read and consider `unreliable' documents as a prerequisite to the imposition of sentence. ( People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 918, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 423.) Moreover, other than Otto's broad denials that no molestation occurred, which were inconsistent with his no contest plea, he never specifically challenged the accuracy of the victims' statements in the underlying criminal proceeding. Indeed, Otto admitted to Dr. Steen he touched K.W. under her pants, tickling her buttocks and private areas, and told the probation officer he tickled K.W. on her bottom under her panties. Otto asserts that because he pled no contest in 1991, he had little motivation to challenge the accuracy of the victims' statements at the time of sentencing for the underlying crimes. Of course, since the 1996 amendment to section 6600, subdivision (a), defendants have been on notice that [t]he details underlying the commission of an offense that led to a prior conviction ... may be shown by documentary evidence, including ... probation and sentencing reports. [5] Even here, at the time of sentencing, Otto was presumably aware that should he reoffend, a trial court would consider the details of his earlier crimes in sentencing him for any future offenses. (See Rules 4.411.5(a)(3) [presentence report includes a summary of the defendant's record of prior criminal conduct], 4.414(b)(1) [criteria affecting the decision to grant or deny probation include defendant's prior record of criminal conduct, and whether the record indicates a pattern of regular or increasingly serious criminal conduct], 4.421(b)(2) [circumstances in aggravation for purposes of sentencing include whether defendant's prior convictions are numerous or of increasing seriousness].) Moreover, by the time of the SVP proceeding, Otto was fully aware of the statements' potential significance. Nevertheless, Otto's own expert opined Otto had been convicted of sexually violent predatory offenses against two or more victims. As the trial court stated, [t]here has been really no substantial dispute that the criteria regarding the predicate prior convictions were met in this matter. Implicit in the above discussion are other factors (in addition to the reliability of the victims' hearsay statements) that diminish the risk of an erroneous deprivation of rights as a result of reliance on the hearsay statements, and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Otto had the opportunity to present the opinions of two psychological experts, and cross-examine any prosecution witness who testified. Moreover, the trial court retained discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude unreliable hearsay, which acted as a further safeguard against any due process violation. Nor does reliance on the victims' hearsay statements deny Otto any right of confrontation. There is no right to confrontation under the state and federal confrontation clause in civil proceedings, but such a right does exist under the due process clause. ( Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 383, fn. 16, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244 [both the federal and state Constitutions confine the express right of confrontation to criminal defendants].) Here, Otto had the opportunity to cross-examine any prosecution witness who testified. Because he did not attempt to call any witnesses other than a psychological expert, we need not decide in this case whether he had a due process right to call witnesses such as the victims or other percipient witnesses. We note, however, Otto had the opportunity to confront these witnesses at the time the underlying charges were filed, but instead chose to accept a plea bargain. According to his reply brief, one of the purposes of this bargain was to spare the victims' having to testify. For these reasons we also reject Otto's related argument that admission of and reliance on the victims' hearsay statements shifts the burden of proof. Rather, it simply reflects the view that such evidence is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact and the evaluating psychological experts. Third, we consider the government's interest, including the function involved, and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. The express purpose of the SVPA articulates the strong government interest in protecting the public from those who are dangerous and mentally ill. Requiring the government to adduce live testimony from the victims could potentially impede this purpose. The SVP proceeding occurs at the end of the defendant's sentence, which may be years after the events in question. As one Court of Appeal has observed, if the People can obtain civil commitment of sexually violent predators only in cases where the conviction record was extensive, and included victim testimony ... as to the details of the sexually violent offense, in those cases where the defendant pled guilty before the preliminary hearing, or the victims' testimony was not sufficient to establish the details of the offense as required by the SVP Act, the state would never be able to meet its burden. ( People v. Superior Court (Howard), supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 155, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 [concluding victim hearsay statements contained in a probation report admissible at SVP probable cause hearing].) Fourth, as delineated above, reliance on the hearsay evidence does not impede Otto's dignitary interest in being informed of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the SVP commitment proceeding, or disable him from presenting his side of the story before a responsible government official.