Opinion ID: 195970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cause of Environmental Contamination

Text: 15 The Mobil cross-appeal asserts two related challenges to the district court ruling on liability. First, it contends that there is no record support for the finding that the actual cause of the soil contamination at the Four Corners service station remained unclear. Four Corners I, slip op. at 14. Mobil notes that Four Corners was the only gas station in the vicinity of the contamination; Four Corners had sole responsibility for maintaining the storage tanks and was the sole target of the DEQE notice of responsibility; Four Corners concededly did not comply with environmental statutes and regulations requiring periodic testing of its storage tanks for leakage, see Mass.Gen.L.Ann. ch. 148, Sec. 10 (1994); Mass.Regs.Code tit. 527, Secs. 5.05, 9.01 to 9.24 (1983); and noticeable wet spots were found on the outer shell of the storage tanks upon excavation. If Four Corners caused the contamination, Mobil argues, nonrenewal was not beyond Four Corners' reasonable control. 16 We review the district court factual finding on reasonable control and its subsidiary findings on causation only for clear error. See, e.g., Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., 740 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir.1984) (legislative history of PMPA suggests that Congress intended to favor franchisees by treating reasonableness determination as an issue of fact); Serianni v. Gulf Oil Corp., 662 F.Supp. 1020, 1024 (E.D.Pa.1986); cf. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir.1992) (causation in environmental context is question of fact subject to clear error review). Reversal is warranted only if, after considering the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1122, 1129 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 17 Significantly, the burden of proof on reasonable control lay with Mobil, not Four Corners. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2805(c). On appeal, Mobil must point to evidence that fairly compelled a finding that Four Corners--and Four Corners alone--caused the contamination. See Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188 (1st Cir.1994) ( 'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.' ) (citations omitted). Since it has not done so, we find no clear error. 18 First, DEQE found no holes in the tanks. Nor did the wet spots constitute conclusive evidence of tank leakage, since they could have been caused by contamination emanating outside the tanks. Four Corners cited a United States Environmental Protection Agency document which suggests that gasoline spills by oil transporters during gasoline delivery are among the most common causes of soil contamination at service stations. See 53 Fed.Reg. 37087, 37090, 37133 (1988). Finally, the notice of responsibility issued by DEQE rested on Four Corners' legal status as the current owner/operator of the service station facility for strict liability purposes only. It did not purport to represent a determination that Four Corners caused the contamination. 19 Likewise, the record evidence does not compel a finding that Four Corners might have averted the bulk of the soil contamination by more diligent testing of its tanks. Mobil neither produced evidence as to when the contamination occurred, nor asserted that the environmental detection statutes and regulations of the 1980s were retroactive. Further, there was no evidence which would exclude leakage from other pumping system components (pumps, hoses, pipes); that is, leakage which could not have been detected by testing the tanks. Finally, since there was no evidence that Mobil investigated any of these matters before it decided not to renew the Four Corners franchise, the district court might well have treated this contention as a post hoc rationalization. See Desfosses v. Wallace Energy, Inc., 836 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir.1987) (noting that PMPA notification requirements ensure that franchisor cannot invent after-the-fact justifications for termination or nonrenewal). As Mobil failed to meet its burden of proof on the factual issues underlying the district court ruling on reasonable control, the finding stands.