Opinion ID: 6499669
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Duggan’s Motive

Text: Turning to the comparator ﬁrst, recall that another employee, Barwan, refused to work the “A yard” the day before Lesiv refused to work the RIP track. (Both of those assignments entail heavy repairs on railcars.) Barwan, however, was not suspended for his insubordination. Lesiv contends this disparity in treatment supports a reasonable inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of Duggan. We disagree. Evidence that a “similarly situated employee[]” whose close contact did not engage in protected conduct was “treated diﬀerently may furnish circumstantial evidence of retaliation or other unlawful motive.” Donley v. Stryker Sales Corp., 906 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2018). Whether a comparator is similarly situated is often a question for the jury. Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 895 (7th Cir. 2018). We ask whether the two employees are situated similarly enough for a reasonable comparison. Id., citing Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2012). In a case challenging disciplinary action, the plaintiﬀ and comparator ordinarily must have “dealt with the same supervisor, [been] subject to the same standards, and ha[ve] engaged in similar conduct without such diﬀerentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Donley, 906 F.3d at 639 (alterations in original). The congruence need not be perfect. Id. Some similarities between Lesiv and Barwan are easy to see. The two engaged in similar conduct: Both refused a work assignment and both dealt with the same supervisor: Duggan. And the supervisor, as the decision-maker, treated the two diﬀerently: Duggan suspended Lesiv but not Barwan. Lesiv thus asserts that the divergent treatment between the two 24 No. 21-2496 would support a reasonable inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of Duggan. 10 To justify the diﬀerent treatment of Lesiv and Barwan, Illinois Central argues ﬁrst that the two engaged in diﬀerent conduct. One of its arguments is persuasive while the other is not. To start, Illinois Central eﬀectively contends that “this was Barwan being Barwan,” whereas Lesiv’s reaction was out of the ordinary for him and hostile, so that the relief supervisor and presumably Duggan correctly viewed their behaviors diﬀerently. That argument might be oﬀered at trial, but “it is not a winner on summary judgment.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 851. Courts are not in the business of distinguishing comparators in discipline cases by deciding on summary judgment whether one person was joking around and the other was not. “[A]t the summary judgment stage, the employer cannot defeat a plaintiﬀ’s prima facie case of discrimination on the theory that it applied its ‘no tolerance’ policy on threats to some workers while dismissing dangerous acts of others as mere ‘horseplay.’” Id. We reiterate: “Such fact issues are the province of the jury.” Id. 10At oral argument, Illinois Central disputed whether Lesiv and Barwan had the same decision-maker. It argued that the relief supervisor interacted with Barwan in the moment, whereas Duggan communicated with Lesiv, so the two were subject to different supervisors. The distinction is not persuasive, at least as a matter of law on summary judgment. Both employees told the relief supervisor they were refusing to work their assignments. Duggan was made aware of Lesiv’s refusal immediately and learned of Barwan’s later. Duggan decided to suspend Lesiv but not Barwan. The different treatment occurred when Duggan learned of Barwan’s actions and did not impose a similar penalty. For purposes of summary judgment, we treat Lesiv and Barwan as subject to the same decisionmaker. No. 21-2496 25 Illinois Central’s second argument is a winner, however, and defeats the comparator here. It is true that Barwan and Lesiv both refused a work assignment, but Lesiv’s actions went further. The stated reasons for Lesiv’s suspension were because of his attitude toward the relief supervisor in refusing the RIP track assignment and his tone with Duggan during their phone conversation. Barwan was not insubordinate toward Duggan. Even viewing the facts most reasonably favorable to Lesiv, the altercation is a diﬀerentiating circumstance that distinguishes Barwan and Lesiv and Duggan’s treatment of them. Donley, 906 F.3d at 639. Thus, Lesiv’s comparator evidence could not support a ﬁnding that Duggan acted with a retaliatory motive. If we had any doubts on that score, they are assuaged by the other undisputed evidence in the record, which weighs decisively against Lesiv here. Take, for instance, the timing of the suspension. Duggan suspended Lesiv two and a half years after Lyubomir ﬁled a charge of discrimination and retaliation and nearly a year after Lyubomir ﬁled his lawsuit in state court. While suspicious timing can support an inference of a retaliatory motive, such a long gap between the protected activity and adverse action “can weaken and eventually break an inference of causation.” Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Lalvani v. Cook County, 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (“As the time separating the protected conduct and the adverse employment action grows, the causal inference weakens and eventually time becomes the plaintiﬀ’s enemy.”). A two-and-a-half-year gap and near oneyear gap between the respective protected activities and materially adverse actions strongly suggest that the timing was not suspicious and cast serious doubts on whether a jury could ﬁnd a retaliatory motive here. See id. (one-and-a-half26 No. 21-2496 year gap was “well beyond the time that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that [the materially adverse action] was causally related to [the protected activity]”). Lesiv points out correctly that a plaintiﬀ can sometimes establish causation despite a substantial delay between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Baines, 863 F.3d at 665 (“[A] long gap will [not] undermine a causal connection that is otherwise supported by suﬃcient circumstantial evidence.”). In such cases, we typically see evidence of prolonged antagonism against the plaintiﬀ, evidence that, despite a long gap, the alleged retaliation was the ﬁrst opportunity for retaliation, or something similar. See Carlson, 758 F.3d at 829 (reversing dismissal; despite long gap between adverse actions and protected activity, evidence of constant antagonism supported inference of retaliatory motive); Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 559–60 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment; long gap was not fatal to retaliation claim when evidence indicated defendant “had a long memory,” repeatedly retaliated against plaintiﬀ by denying her promotions, and then eﬀectively demoted her when ﬁrst given the opportunity). Lesiv has not produced comparable evidence to support a jury verdict here. 11 11 Lesiv points to affidavits from co-workers saying that management monitored him more closely and targeted him after the brother filed his lawsuit. Plaintiffs are, of course, entitled to submit affidavits that contain information based on witnesses’ personal knowledge and experiences. See Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2013). These affidavits, however, are conclusory and do not offer evidence to support their conclusions, and some are not related to Lesiv’s or his brother’s protected activities: “I believe Illinois Central placed a target upon the entire Lesiv family due to the disciplinary issues related to Lyubomir,” and “I believe Illinois Central placed a ‘bullseye’ on [Lesiv’s] … back as retaliation for No. 21-2496 27 Nonetheless, Lesiv asserts that the timing is suspicious and supports an inference of retaliation because Lyubomir’s state lawsuit was still pending. In addition, Duggan had been contacted about scheduling a deposition in that lawsuit roughly two weeks before the adverse action against Lesiv. Lesiv contends that Lyubomir’s lawsuit might have been on Duggan’s mind when he suspended Lesiv, supporting an inference of retaliatory motive. In the absence of other evidence supporting the inference, this is too speculative. See, e.g., Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 960 (aﬃrming summary judgment on retaliation claim and rejecting arguments based on layers of “impermissible speculation”). Even viewing the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to Lesiv, the adverse actions here came immediately after heated confrontations between Lesiv and his supervisors, providing a ready explanation that had nothing to do with his brother’s lawsuit. At bottom, there simply is no evidence that Duggan was responding to his brother’s protected activity by suspending Lesiv. The record does not contain suﬃcient evidence to permit a reasonable fact ﬁnder to conclude that a retaliatory motive caused the materially adverse action here, even on summary judgment. Lesiv’s refusal to work the RIP track alone.” They do not include factual details of Duggan’s motivations or actions toward Lesiv leading up to the suspension to support those beliefs and that would lend support to an inference of retaliation. These affidavits thus do not present a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Accord, Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Discrimination law would be unmanageable if disgruntled employees—the friends of the plaintiff and often people in the same legal position as the plaintiff—could defeat summary judgment by affidavits speculating about the defendant’s motives.”). 28 No. 21-2496