Opinion ID: 2557478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the AWIKWA Convictions

Text: The jury found appellant guilty of three counts of AWIKWA, one count as to Djordjevic, and the other two counts as to Palmer and Davaan, the waitresses who were not injured but who were seated at a table near the front entrance of the club. Appellant contends, as to each of those individuals, that the evidence showed only an intent to burn and destroy some of the club's premises and was insufficient to establish that appellant had the specific intent to kill anyone. In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support the AWIKWA convictions, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if it was sufficient to permit reasonable jurors to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 148 (D.C. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [I]t is only where the government has produced no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that this court can reverse a conviction. Id. (citation omitted). To prove AWIKWA, the government must prove that a defendant acted with the specific intent to kill. Id. The standard jury instructions do not permit conviction upon proof only that a defendant acted with conscious disregard of the risk of death or serious injury. See Boykins v. United States, 702 A.2d 1242, 1246 n. 1 (D.C.1997) (describing instruction to jury that [f]or assault with intent to kill[,] ... you must find specific intent to kill, not `conscious disregard'). Regarding Djordjevic, appellant points out that there was no evidence of animosity towards him and no evidence that a particularly vulnerable area of his body was targeted. There was, however, evidence that appellant became angry and violent when he was ejected from the club  he yelled obscenities at Lazorchack, and he smashed his beer glass to the ground. Further, the evidence showed that, having returned to the club with a gasoline can, appellant had to wrestle with Djordjevic, who sought to thwart appellant's efforts to spread gasoline. Appellant responded by pouring gasoline all over Djordjevic  so much gasoline that the fire inspector identified Djordjevic as an area of origin of the fire. Appellant's lethal intent toward Djordjevic could be inferred from the circumstances of appellant's igniting his lighter when the gasoline-soaked Djordjevic was in close range. See Gray v. United States, 585 A.2d 164, 165 (D.C. 1991) (Intent can rarely be proved directly, and must often be discerned from the surrounding circumstances.). We have no trouble concluding that the jury could infer from appellant's actions in pouring gasoline on Djordjevic and igniting a lighter that he intended to kill Djordjevic by inflicting the much more severe wounds, much deeper wounds that a gasoline-fueled fire produces. Although the evidence that appellant had a specific intent to kill Palmer and Davaan is not quite as overwhelming, we conclude that it was sufficient to support the convictions. We note first that, to prove that appellant had the specific intent to kill Palmer and Davaan, the government was not required to show that he actually wounded them. Bedney v. United States, 471 A.2d 1022, 1024 (D.C.1984) ([A] lethal intent can be demonstrated without showing that the assailant succeeded in wounding his intended victim.). We also are guided by the principle that the evidence need not exclude every hypothesis inconsistent with an intent to kill  i.e., [t]he evidence need not compel a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Gray, 585 A.2d at 165 (emphasis in original). Palmer and Davaan were seated a mere eight feet from where appellant, struggling with Djordjevic, poured gasoline wherever he could reach. The jury could infer that appellant could see the two women, especially in light of the evidence that, while wrestling with Djordjevic, appellant came close enough to the women to hit chairs in the area where they were seated. Appellant spread gasoline across the front width of the club, even reaching the wall paneling, with the result that the ensuing fire blocked the front exit, the quickest path out for Palmer and Davaan. The fire was amazingly huge, spreading from floor to ceiling and wall to wall; the gasoline accelerant caused it to spread fast; it charred chairs and a table in the area where the two women were seated; and it burned so hot that Palmer felt like her hair was on fire. Lazorchack testified that the whole front end of the club was burned down. TVs and the ATM located in that section of the club were melted, [e]very bit of wood that was on the walls was black, and menus were burnt up. Together, this evidence permitted the jury to infer that, by his actions, appellant was bound to place in peril the lives of Palmer and Davaan, id., and thus that he had the specific intent to kill them. It was not necessary for the evidence to show, or for the jury to find, that appellant bore any specific animus toward either of them. Fletcher v. United States, 335 A.2d 248, 251 n. 5 (D.C.1975) (holding that jury could infer that defendant acted with specific intent to kill police officers where he fired at them at very close range before they drew their guns). [21]