Opinion ID: 1969619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Satellite Tracking System

Text: Among the items seized from Fast Horse's hotel room by California authorities was a satellite tracking system reportedly stolen from Telescan. Fast Horse justified possession asserting that Dale had mailed the item to him. State sought to introduce Fast Horse's possession of the tracking system as proof that he had stolen other items from Telescan. To prevent cumulative prejudice against his client, Stonefield wisely filed a motion in limine to prohibit State from mentioning other items found in the hotel room. The trial court granted the motion concerning the tracking system only. Although Fast Horse does not contend that this trial tactic was in error, he does complain that Stonefield failed to investigate his claim that Dale had mailed the tracking system to him in California. The reasonableness of a decision not to investigate is to be judged according to the circumstances of each case with great deference given to the attorney's decision. Beans v. Black, 757 F.2d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066). At the habeas hearing, Stonefield acknowledged the plausibility of Fast Horse's theory that, if they could prove Dale mailed the tracking system, such would tend to discredit Dale's claim that Fast Horse had stolen the camcorder. Based on Fast Horse's fluctuating stories and Dale's claim that the tracking system also was stolen, Stonefield opted to prohibit the tracking system evidence rather than risk its prejudicial effect. It was a trial tactic. A difference of trial tactics does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Nickson, 120 Mich.App. 681, 327 N.W.2d 333 (1982). When reviewing trial counsel's performance, it is not our function to second guess the decisions of experienced trial attorneys regarding matters of tactics. Roden, 431 N.W.2d at 667 (quoting Walker, 287 N.W.2d at 707). There is a strong presumption that counsel was competent. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2583, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Phyle, 491 N.W.2d at 432. So, although Stonefield's strategy may appear unwise to some, it may just as easily appear sound to others. Myrick v. Maschner, 799 F.2d 642, 647 (10th Cir.1986). Counsel's representation did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness set forth by Strickland. The result of the proceeding was neither fundamentally unfair nor unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). In Fast Horse's chronicle of the camcorder, he testified that he wanted to purchase the camcorder, but he offered it to Joann Thunderhawk so she could purchase it for the Oglala Sioux Tribe. When the Tribe did not buy it, he claims he offered it to Harold Salway, who denies Fast Horse ever contacted him about the camcorder. Although Fast Horse wanted to buy it for his son, he also testified that he gave it to Patricia's son for Christmas. Patricia's son stayed behind in South Dakota, but the alleged Christmas gift went with Fast Horse to California. Patricia, unaware of this claimed gift to her child, believed that the camcorder was for Fast Horse's child, who was also back in South Dakota. In the end, Fast Horse wants us to believe that his new girlfriend, Vicki, more than a month after Christmas, paid for his ex-girlfriend's son's gift, a camcorder that has never been recovered. As noted above, Fast Horse could not keep his story straight concerning the camcorder. He also had trouble with the simple question of occupation. He claimed he was with public relations with the Tribe; that representation was false. At the same time, he said he was unemployed. He also testified that he had just left a job with a television station in North Dakota. [] He would not even concede the undisputed fact that his airline tickets were one way. His self-destructive testimony did not survive the jury's critique. Additional alleged favorable testimony does not establish any reasonable probability that the jury would have obtained a different result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. As the habeas court concluded, Any oversight on his part is not the serious oversight that the first prong [of Strickland] requires or that would have constituted the deficient performance such as to change the verdict. We agree. Stonefield exercised his good faith judgment thereon. On direct appeal, this Court concluded that we are convinced... the jury would have returned a guilty verdict. The same holds true again. Affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. SABERS, J., concurs in result.