Opinion ID: 2631141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The MDO Act

Text: Historically, the states have exercised a power of involuntary civil commitment involving the care and treatment of dangerous mentally disordered individuals. While some of these schemes operate in a manner largely independent of the criminal justice system, others are triggered only after criminal charges have been filed. Some criminal defendants receive a mental health commitment in lieu of conviction and punishment. Other mentally ill defendants are committed upon completion of their prison terms. ( Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, fns. omitted.) In this case, we are concerned largely with the last groupthose mentally disordered defendants subject to the MDO Act who are civilly committed as a condition of parole. (§ 2960 et seq.) In 1985, the Legislature enacted the MDO Act to respond to the state's dilemma caused by the determinate sentencing system. It explained: To maintain a determinate system will inevitably cause the release of some mentally ill inmates who constitute a significant threat to public safety. This commitment will provide a mechanism for placing these mentally ill inmates in the mental health system for appropriate treatment which will increase the protection of the public. (Dept. of Mental Health, enrolled bill Rep., Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 27, 1985, p. 4.) [3] Senate Bill No. 1054 identified its purpose `to protect society by providing both a means for isolating these offenders and treatment for the underlying cause of their criminality.' (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1054 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 30, 1985, p. 2.) As the Act's findings and declarations further explained, the Legislature found that in order to protect the public from those persons it is necessary to provide mental health treatment until the severe mental disorder which was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the person's prior criminal behavior is in remission and can be kept in remission. [¶] ... [S]everely mentally disordered prisoners should be provided with an appropriate level of mental health treatment while in prison and when returned to the community. (§ 2960.) In adopting such procedures, the Legislature highlighted the danger to society and the state's compelling interest in protecting the public. (Ibid.) Like other involuntary civil commitment schemes, the MDO Act's comprehensive statutory schemewhich itself took three bills to enact (see ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 127, fn. 3, 164 P.3d at p. 560, fn. 3) represents a delicate balancing of countervailing public and individual interests. Among these interests is obviously the public's right to be safe and protected from identified dangerous and mentally ill ex-prisoners, who themselves are statutorily required to receive mental health treatment to keep their severe mental disorder in remission after being released on parole. (2962.) Thus, we are aware that the balancing here involves factors not readily susceptible to quantification, and we must keep a broader perspective in mind to fashion a sufficient solution. (See People v. Dias (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 756, 763, 216 Cal.Rptr. 295 [though petition for extended commitment under 1026.5 did not comply with mandatory deadline, defendant continues to present a substantial danger of bodily harm to others, neither defendant nor the public would benefit by defendant's release at this time].) As the high court has pronounced, states must ensure due process protections and safeguard liberty interests when a person is civilly committed. ( Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (Addington) ; In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 127-128, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305 [civil commitment for persons under control of former California Youth Authority under Welf. Inst.Code, 1800].) [C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. [Citations.] Moreover, it is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phenomena `stigma' or choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual. ( Addington, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 425-26, 99 S.Ct. 1804.) Nevertheless, `[s]tates have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.' ( Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 357 [117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501] (Hendricks) .) The high court has `consistently upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. [Citations.] It thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty.' (Ibid.) ( In re Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 128, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305.)
With this backdrop, we turn to the procedural requirements necessary to civilly recommit an MDO under the Act. As a condition of parole, a prisoner may be designated and civilly committed as an MDO for involuntary treatment of a severe mental disorder [4] if certain conditions are met. (§§ 2962, 2966; see also In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 23, 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 780, 81 P.3d 224; People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 444, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (Williams) .) Section 2962 provides that a prisoner is subject to the MDO Act if: (a) The prisoner has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; (b) The severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the commission of the crime for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison; (c) The prisoner has been in treatment for the severe mental disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the prisoner's parole or release; (d) a mental health professional evaluated the prisoner and concluded that criteria (a), (b) and (c) above have been met, and that due to the severe mental disorder, the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others; (e) the prisoner received a determinate sentence for the crime referenced in subdivision (b), and the crime is one of the enumerated crimes in subdivision (e). (§ 2962, subds.(a)-(e).) If such are found to exist, the prisoner may request a de novo hearing before the Board of Prison Terms. (§ 2966.) If the Board of Prison Terms concludes that the criteria are met, the prisoner may request a jury trial in the superior court. (Ibid.) The standard of proof shall be beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the trial is by jury, the jury shall be unanimous in its verdict. (§ 2966, subd. (b); see Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444, 458, fn. 10, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) Before an MDO's current commitment period expires, the district attorney may petition to extend that commitment by one year. (§ 2970.) To do so, the medical director of the state hospital, the community program director, or the Director of Corrections first shall submit to the district attorney a written evaluation of the prisoner [n]to later than 180 days before the prisoner's termination of parole or release, unless good cause is shown for delay. (Ibid.) If the district attorney files a petition for continued involuntary treatment for one year (ibid.), the trial court will hold a hearing on the petition, and the trial shall commence no later than 30 calendar days before the time the prisoner would have been released, unless the time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown. (§ 2972, subd. (a).) If the MDO's commitment is continued (§ 2972, subd. (c)), the district attorney may file subsequent petitions to extend the MDO's commitment in one-year increments. (§§ 2970, 2972(e).) The recommitment proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section. (§ 2972(e).) At issue here, section 2972(e) provides: Prior to the termination of a commitment under this section, a petition for recommitment may be filed to determine whether the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and whether by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (Italics added.) Unlike sections 2970 and 2972, subdivision (a), section 2972(e) does not provide for a waiver and/or good cause exception. Section 2972(e) also does not specify the number of days prior to expiration of the commitment in which the petition must be filed by the district attorney. ( Zachary, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 532.) Moreover, the MDO Act, including section 2972(e), does not expressly provide for any type of sanction, such as dismissal, for untimely recommitment petitions. After acknowledging guiding principles on the directory-mandatory distinction, which we discuss further below (see post, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 130-131, 164 P.3d at pp. 562-563), the Court of Appeal majority ultimately concluded that section 2972(e)'s time limit was mandatory because it was a matter of substance rather than one of convenience. (See Francis v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 19, 28, 43 P.2d 300 (Francis) .) While the 180-day and 30-day time limits (§§ 2970, 2972, subd. (a)), are intended to expedite resolution of pending recommitment petitions, the majority concluded that section 2972(e)'s requirement that a petition to extend a commitment be filed, thereby initiating an action, before the commitment terminates is a matter of substance which, in our view, must be deemed mandatory. The majority discussed several decisions, that arguably supported a contrary conclusion. (See, e.g., Zachary, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th 1026, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 532; see also People v. Fernandez (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 117, 129, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 469 (Fernandez ).) It also found decisions interpreting other statutory schemes inapposite. Allen urges us to adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeal majority. While we do not necessarily agree with all of the majority's reasoning, we do agree with the majority and Allen that the time restriction of this section is mandatory. In this case, there is no question that the district attorney failed to comply with section 2972(e)'s mandatory time deadline-he filed a recommitment petition on January 21, 2004, over three months after Allen's commitment ended on October 14, 2003. His petition does not provide any explanation for the delay. As discussed above, we must decide the consequences of failing to comply with section 2972(e). Echoing the Court of Appeal majority, Allen argues that because section 2972(e) is mandatory, the district attorney's failure to file a timely petition precluded the trial court from extending his commitment. The Attorney General disagrees the section is mandatory; instead, the court has authority to extend an MDO's commitment after it has expired because section 2972(e)'s time requirement is directory. The Attorney General also claims this statutory interpretation furthers important public policy interests, such as public safety. We first explain the directory-mandatory distinction, and the significance of each.