Opinion ID: 1728586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In his first argument, Thomas contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged. Indeed, the proof at trial consisted primarily of Thomas's own taped statements, given to police after his apprehension. It is Thomas's contention that nothing he said to the officers could be considered sufficient evidence that he had acted with the purpose of furthering a homicide. However, Thomas's sufficiency argument was not preserved for appeal. He made a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case and then called his own witnesses. A defendant who goes forward with the production of additional evidence after a directed verdict motion is overruled waives any further reliance upon the former motion. Crawford v. State, 309 Ark. 54, 827 S.W.2d 134 (1992); Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992). At the conclusion of the case for the defense, Thomas's attorney introduced a stipulation concerning expert testimony about blood on a jacket and tee-shirt. The State called a rebuttal witness, and, after her appearance, Thomas's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis that the State had violated the rule of sequestration of witnesses. The court agreed to consider the motion if it could be shown that the prosecutor had access to information regarding the rebuttal testimony in the police case file. The State rested its rebuttal, and both the prosecutor and the defense counsel indicated that they were ready for the court to instruct the jury. Following the delivery of instructions, closing arguments were made. The jury then retired to consider its verdict. At that point, defense counsel developed the objection made earlier in relation to the testimony of the State's rebuttal witness. A police report was read into the record by Thomas's attorney as a proffer of the reporting officer's testimony in an effort to point to other potential suspects. Only then did the subject of the renewal of the motion for directed verdict arise. The following exchange occurred between the trial judge and the defense counsel: THE COURT: I think you also wanted to put on the record that you had renewed your motion for directed verdict. MS. O'KELLEY: Correct, and renew all of our previous motions. Discussion then immediately returned to the proffered testimony of the police officer. The reference to a motion for directed verdict was rather parenthetical in nature, suggesting an afterthought on the part of court and counsel. Nothing in the record suggests that an unrecorded renewed motion had been lodged earlier. Instead, it appears that the prompting of the trial court was required to nudge Thomas's attorney to make a belated renewal of the motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the State's case-in-chief. But by that time, the jury was well into the course of its deliberations, and it was too late for renewal. This court has repeatedly and emphatically held that, in order to preserve for appeal the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the appellant must move for a directed verdict both at the close of the State's case and at the close of the whole case. Hayes v. State, 312 Ark. 349, 849 S.W.2d 501 (1993); Collins v. State, 308 Ark. 536, 826 S.W.2d 231 (1992); DeWitt v. State, 306 Ark. 559, 815 S.W.2d 942 (1991). In Henry v. State, 309 Ark. 1, 828 S.W.2d 346 (1992), the appellant had moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case but failed to renew the motion at the end of all the evidence as required by Ark. R.Crim.P. 36.21(b)the same as in this case. We held that the rule is strictly construed and that, accordingly, Henry's argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence could not be considered. See also Miller v. State, 309 Ark. 117, 827 S.W.2d 149 (1992). This case presents a different, somewhat novel, twist. With a suggestion from the trial court, the defense attorney signaled her desire to renew her motion for a directed verdict. Yet the whole case had long since closed, and the jury had long since retired. Thomas contends that such a practice is common in the Second Division of Pulaski County Circuit Court and amounts to procedural housekeeping. But a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the case is something more than a matter of mere form: it goes to the substance of the evidence arrayed against the criminal defendant. It is not a technicality subject to tidying up in chambers. This court has had occasion, in Hayes v. State, supra , to address another curious set of circumstances. There, Hayes failed altogether to move for a directed verdict but did move, at the conclusion of a discussion of instructions prior to the jury's return to the courtroom, for a dismissal for lack of evidence. Even if we were to equate the dismissal motion with one for a directed verdict, we declared, we would not consider it because of failure to make the motion at the conclusion of the prosecutor's case.... We observe ... that the Rule is stated in the conjunctive, clearly requiring the motion to be made in both instances.... 312 Ark. at 352, 849 S.W.2d 501. The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence has not been properly preserved, and we will not address it.