Opinion ID: 790004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Instructions on Scienter

Text: 32 Mr. Turcotte next alleges that the district court improperly instructed the jury that they could convict him under § 841(a) even if he did not know that GBL was an illegal controlled substance analogue. In proceedings below, the district court gave the following instruction: 33 To sustain the charge in Court Five of possessing with intent to distribute mixtures containing a controlled substance, the government must prove the following propositions: First, the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed mixtures containing GBL; Second, the defendant possessed mixtures containing GBL with the intent to deliver it to another person; and Third, that mixtures containing GBL are an analogue of GHB, a Schedule I Controlled Substance. It does not matter whether the defendant knew the substance was a controlled substance, only that it was a mixture containing GBL. 34 (District Court Jury Instruction, ER 105 (emphasis added).) We review de novo a district court's denial of a requested jury instruction. See Slater, 348 F.3d 666. 35 The district court and the government argue for application of the time honored maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. They contend that § 841(a) does not require knowledge that the substance in question is a controlled substance — a defendant must merely know the identity of the substance being possessed and distributed. See 286 F.Supp.2d at 951. The district court expresses some doubt about this conclusion however, conceding [p]erhaps that goes too far, as it might, possibly, in other circumstances, ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct. Id. Nonetheless, the government and the district court stand firm, maintaining that even if knowledge of a substance's illegality is required under the Act, the special jury forms used in this case resolve the issue, as they indicate the jury found that Turcotte represented or intended that GBL had physiological effects substantially similar to or greater than GHB, a controlled substance in Schedule I. 36 Such a position is extremely problematic, however, since the Analogue Provision imposes criminal liability through the more general provisions of the CSA, 18 U.S.C. § 841(a), which implicate a well-established scienter requirement. This Court has previously held — on multiple occasions — that as a prerequisite to liability for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute under § 841(a), defendants must know that the substance in question is a controlled substance. United States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir.2002) (Section 841(a) requires only that defendant know that he possesses a controlled substance; it does not require that he know the type of controlled substance he possesses.); Lanier v. United States, 220 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir.2000) (requiring knowledge that [the drug] is a controlled substance); U.S. v. Jones, 248 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Lanier for the same rule). In fact the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions articulate the same standard: It is sufficient that the defendant knew that the substance was some kind of prohibited drug. It does not matter whether the defendant knew the substance was [a specific drug]. STAR Modern Federal Jury Instructions — Criminal, § 7-202-03, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2004). 37 Yet these precedents read awkwardly in the context of the present case, since they assume the paradigmatic drug case in which the substances involved are per se illegal — substances such as cocaine, heroin and the like. All of the aforecited Seventh Circuit cases involve prosecutions for per se illegal drugs like cocaine base ( Barlow ), marijuana ( Lanier ) and crack cocaine ( Jones ). In such cases, knowledge of the specific substance involved will usually automatically imply knowledge that the substance is controlled. 2 Or, even if the distributor of the substance does not know its specific identity, he or she is at least aware that it is a controlled substance. See, e.g., Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1012. Here, and in other analogue cases under § 802(32)(A), the opposite is true — many newly engineered and relatively unknown substances may be involved such that knowledge of the substance's identity does not automatically imply knowledge of its status as a controlled substance. Indeed new designer drugs are often created as alternatives to known illegal drugs precisely because they may be sold with an appearance of legality. Unable to keep its controlled substance schedules current in the face of accelerating innovations in drug technology, Congress enacted the Analogue Provision to target distribution of just such substances. 38 And therein lies the rub. The CSA requires a showing of scienter, but the exact contours of this requirement are not obvious in the context of the Analogue Provision. At least one court has ruled that the definition of controlled substance analogue does not require any scienter — a defendant does not have to `know' that a substance has a substantially similar chemical structure to an illegal drug. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. at 238. See also United States v. Carlson, 87 F.3d 440, 443 n. 3 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Forbes and noting the absence of a scienter requirement in the Analogue Act). Other courts have applied the more general scienter requirement of the CSA, 18 U.S.C. § 841(a), holding that the Analogue Provision requires the Government to show that the defendants knew that they possessed a controlled substance. Roberts, 363 F.3d at 123 n. 1. Under this construction, defendants need not know the exact nature of the drug; it is sufficient that they be aware that they possessed `some controlled substance.' Id. (citing United States v. Morales, 577 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir.1978)). Neither of these approaches seems especially satisfying. 39 In this particular context, applying the standard requirement that a defendant must know the substance in question is a controlled substance is nonsensical since controlled substance analogues are, by definition, not controlled substances — their distribution is criminalized, despite their omission from the government's controlled substances schedules, because they have similar chemical structures and either actually or purportedly similar physiological effects to controlled substances. A substance's legal status as a controlled substance analogue is not a fact that a defendant can know conclusively ex ante; it is a fact that the jury must find at trial (applying the three clauses of the Analogue Provision). 3 Direct and literal application of the scienter requirement applicable to § 841(a), in other words, would threaten to eviscerate the Analogue Provisions of § 802(32)(A) at one stroke. 40 On the other hand, doing away with the scienter requirement altogether could, as the district court realized, ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct. See 286 F.Supp.2d at 951. Such a construction also would make the Analogue Provision more vulnerable to vagueness challenges. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) ([A] scienter requirement [in a criminal statute] may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct was proscribed.); Roberts, 363 F.3d at 123 (Because the statute at issue here contains a scienter requirement... the defendants' vagueness challenge must be met with some measure of skepticism). Discarding the scienter requirement would essentially mean that individuals deal in narcotics substitutes at their own risk, removing a primary mens rea element of possession and distribution offenses. 41 In light of all these considerations, we feel that our precedents demand a showing that the defendant knew the substance in question was a controlled substance analogue. That is, the defendant must know that the substance at issue meets the definition of a controlled substance analogue set forth in § 802(32)(A): A defendant must know that the substance at issue has a chemical structure substantially similar to that of a controlled substance, and he or she must either know that it has similar physiological effects or intend or represent that it has such effects. We recognize that requiring the government to prove scienter as to these criteria may impose a significant prosecutorial burden in some cases. The question of similar chemical structure is particularly nettlesome since, even if such chemical similarities exist, and even if the defendant is aware of these similarities, the intricacies of chemical science may render it extremely difficult to prove that a defendant had such knowledge. As a provisional remedy for this problem, we prescribe that, in such cases, if the scienter requirement is met with regard to the second part of the analogue definition (knowledge or representation of similar physiological effects), the jury is permitted — but not required — to infer that the defendant also had knowledge of the relevant chemical similarities. 4 42 This approach is justified since, as a practical matter, defendants who know or represent to others that the substance in question has physiological effects similar to a controlled substance are likely to be aware of basic chemical similarities as well, even if that fact is difficult to prove conclusively. This approach also dovetails with the commonsense recognition that, in selling or purchasing such substances, all parties to the transaction are primarily interested (perhaps solely interested) in the substance's physiological effects. Yet at the same time, if the defendant truly had no knowledge of the substance's chemical character, or if, under the circumstances, chemical complexities make such knowledge extremely unlikely, an avenue should be left open for defendants to refute such an inference. In any case, our well-established jurisprudence regarding the scienter requirements of controlled substances violations require that juries confront these questions of knowledge squarely. 43 The district court, while acknowledging that the scienter requirement implied by its own jury instruction [p]erhaps goes too far, maintains that its jury instructions were non-prejudicial since the jury specifically determined that Turcotte represented or intended that GBL had physiological effects similar to GHB. 286 F.Supp.2d at 951. However, as just discussed, while such a determination suffices to demonstrate scienter with respect to the second prong of the analogue definition (actual or intended similar physiological effect), it is not equivalent to finding knowledge of actual chemical similarity. One could represent to others (earnestly or not) that a substance has physiological effects similar to a controlled substance despite being totally ignorant of its actual chemical properties. Turcotte's representations as to the physiological effects of GBL do create a presumption that such knowledge existed, but the jury did not confront this question directly below. Given the evidence adduced at trial, it appears a jury certainly could have determined that Turcotte had the requisite knowledge to trigger liability under § 802(32)(A) (though the evidence does not compel such a conclusion). 5 However, the jury was specifically instructed to forego this determination. The district court's instructions as to scienter were thus, at best, incomplete and, at worst, highly misleading as to the prerequisites for liability under the Analogue Provision. 44 Ordinarily such shortcomings might amount to reversible error, but in the present case we find any deficiencies in the district court's scienter instructions harmless. The jury specifically found that Turcotte knew the substance he possessed contained GBL, and unlike many other potential controlled substance analogues, Congress has specifically identified GBL as an analogue of GHB. See United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.2004) (GBL is one of the substances that the statute actually identifies as a potential controlled substance analogue.); United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d at 1336 (noting that statements found in Public Law 106-172 and the DEA's Final Rules indicate that both Congress and the DEA considered GBL to be an analogue of GHB.). 45 In amending the Controlled Substances Act to include GHB, Congress declared that [i]f taken for human consumption, common industrial chemicals such as gamma butyrolactone [GBL] and 1,4-butanediol [BD] are swiftly converted by the body into GHB. Illicit use of these and other GHB analogues and precursor chemicals is a significant and growing law enforcement problem. Pub. Law No. 106-172, § 2(4) (2000) (emphasis added). DEA regulations also specify that GBL and 1,4-butanediol are structurally and pharmacologically similar to GHB and are often substituted for GHB. Under certain circumstances they may satisfy the definition of a controlled substance analogue. Placement of Gamma-Butyrolactone in List I of the Controlled Substances Act, 65 Fed.Reg. 21,645-47 (April 24, 2000) (emphasis added). As the Second Circuit asserted in Ansaldi, [r]egardless of any other ways in which the laws governing controlled substance[s] might be vague, there is one thing they make perfectly clear — the sale of GBL for human consumption is illegal. 372 F.3d at 122. Cf. United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that these Congressional pronouncements also confirm BD's status as a controlled substance analogue). 46 In our view such pronouncements are sufficient to put any drug merchant on notice that GBL qualifies as a controlled substance analogue. 6 Thus having acknowledged that he knew he was selling substances containing GBL, Turcotte cannot then turn around and claim that he had no knowledge of GBL's status as an analogue of GHB. 7 As with other known controlled substances (including GHB), knowledge of the substance's specific identity implies knowledge of the substance's legal status. Ignorance of the relevant legal provisions is no defense. See Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 128 (holding that defendants' belief that they were breaking no law by selling GBL does not constitute a defense); United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir.1989) (similar holding). 47 Applied to any other controlled substance analogue, an instruction such as the one given here might well warrant reversal of a conviction. However, given the clear Congressional and regulatory pronouncements of the status of GBL, any error in the district court's scienter instructions were harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court on this issue.