Opinion ID: 2454706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I told the clerk he needed to call 911, somebody was trying to kill me and locked myself in the manager's office.

Text: The front desk employee, whose testimony was admitted without objection, gave a similar account of the events of that night: Q. All right. And do you recall being asked to contact the 911number [sic] that night? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right. And how did that come about? A. At that time there was this person who rushed into the front desk. He had nohe had no shirt, and he was only wearing his pants, and he rushed in. And he is yelling, help. And he rushed into my boss's office. Q. And what did he do in there? A. So I rushed in, and told him to get out of that office, or I am going to call the police. Q. Did he reply? A. Yes, sir. He said, yes, call the police, someone [sic] trying to kill me and my mom. . . . . Q. Now, you have described his appearance. You said he was bloody? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where on his body was he bloody? A. His nose. I saw some blood on his nose and in his mouth. There was some blood coming out of his mouth, and all over, like maybe he wiped it from. So and also see, I also wiped some blood from my boss's office from the metalwas that cabinets, so it is all over his body. [¶ 19] The first and second elements, relating to the shocking or startling nature of the event and the declarant's physical manifestation of excitement, favor admission. In applying these two elements, we look to a factually similar case. In Kelly v. State, 694 P.2d 126 (Wyo.1985), the defendant engaged in a physical altercation with his girlfriend. Id. at 129. A friend attempted to intervene and the defendant began assaulting the friend. Id. The girlfriend ran to a neighbor's house and called the police. Id. At trial, the neighbor repeated statements made by the girlfriend regarding the incident. Id. at 129-30. The defendant objected, arguing that the statements were hearsay. Id. On appeal, we found that the statements satisfied the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule inasmuch as the girlfriend had just witnessed, and been involved in, a violent scene, and that the statements were made after she ran screaming across the street `bursting' into her neighbor's residence. . . . Id. at 130. In the present case, after the victim had been severely beaten and had jumped out a hotel room window, he rushed into the hotel lobby yelling help, locked himself in the office, and told the clerk people were trying to kill him. In light of our holding in Kelly, it is clear that these facts favor admission under the first two factors listed above. [¶ 20] The third factor, the victim's age, is neutral in these circumstances. The fourth factor, the lapse between the event and the hearsay statement, favors admission. Although the record does not reflect the exact time between the startling event (being beaten and subsequent escape from the hotel room) and the statement, it is not disputed that the appellant went directly to the office, told the clerk that people were trying to kill him, and asked the clerk to call 911. We find this to be a short enough time period that the victim's statements were spontaneous, excited or impulsive and not the product of reflection and deliberation. See Sanchez, 2011 WY 77, ¶ 23, 253 P.3d at 143 (still under stress of excitement approximately one hour after being severely beaten); Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 927 (Wyo.1999) (under stress of excitement 45 minutes after startling event); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir.1980) (under the stress of excitement 45 to 75 minutes after startling event). [¶ 21] Finally, to address the fifth factor, we must determine whether the victim's statements were in response to an inquiry. Although the 911 operator asked the victim questions, it was the victim who initiated the statements. The fact that some of his statements were responses to the 911 operator's inquiries is not sufficient, under these circumstances, to take the statement outside the excited utterance exception. See Boykin, 2005 WY 15, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d at 484 (excited utterance admissible even though made in response to question, Are you all right?). [¶ 22] We conclude that the victim's statements here fall within the requirements of the excited utterance exception of W.R.E. 803(2). Therefore, we find that they were properly admitted into evidence.