Opinion ID: 2327093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Effect of the Release and the Judgment Satisfied Order

Text: We next turn to the somewhat Byzantine issues that are implicated by Travelers' contention on appeal that, regardless of the applicability of Asermely and the rejected settlement offer statute in multiple claimant cases, in the instant case any claims that Mr. DeMarco might have had against it were extinguished (1) when he executed a document releasing its insureds from liability in exchange for an assignment of their rights against Travelers; and/or (2) when the trial justice in the personal injury action entered an order stating that the judgment in that case had been satisfied. 1. The Release Travelers argues that the hearing justice erred in not granting its cross-motion for summary judgment that was predicated on the fact that Travelers was able to eliminate all liability faced by its insureds for the amount of the judgment awarded to Mr. DeMarco in excess of the policy limits. Travelers asserts that its rejection of the DeMarcos' demand for the $1 million policy limit did not harm its insureds because Travelers obtained releases for [Mr.] Doire and Virginia Transportation from the two claimants in exchange for its payment of the policy limit; Travelers points out that, as a result, the insureds did not have to make any payments to the claimants from their own funds. Accordingly, Travelers argues that any possible rights or causes of action (including claims under Asermely and under the rejected settlement offer statute) that its insureds might have had against their insurer due to its rejection of Mr. DeMarco's settlement demands ceased to exist once the insureds were released from liability by Mr. DeMarco and Mr. Woscynasince, Travelers contends, the signing of those releases meant that, as of that instant, the insureds no longer suffered any harm that could form the basis of a claim against the insurer. Travelers essentially argues that what it describes as its insureds' purported assignment of rights to Mr. DeMarco in fact assigned him nothing at alland, because in Travelers' view Mr. DeMarco possessed no rights against it independent of those formerly held by the insureds, his claims should therefore have been dismissed. More specifically, Travelers points to the fact that Mr. DeMarco executed a general release of the insureds as opposed to a covenant or promise not to execute upon the judgment against them   . Travelers submits that a number of jurisdictions outside Rhode Island have determined that a release and a covenant not to execute have different legal effects. Generally, such jurisdictions have held that a general release fully discharges an insured from liability; by contrast, a covenant not to execute on a judgment does not discharge the insured's underlying liability, and the insured therefore retains rights against the insurer that may properly be assigned. [48] Although this Court has never addressed the issue of whether in this state there should be a meaningful legal distinction between a release and a covenant not to execute on a judgment in a context such as the present one, Travelers argues that we (1) should enforce the release executed by Mr. DeMarco according to its plain terms and (2) thereby hold that the release fully extinguished its insureds' liability for the judgment entered against them in the DeMarco personal injury action such that they no longer had any rights or claims against Travelers with respect to that judgment that they could assign to plaintiff. Travelers also asserts that enforcing the terms of the release would work no injustice because, in Travelers' view, plaintiff was under no compulsion to provide [Mr.] Doire and Virginia Transportation with a general release, as opposed to a covenant or agreement not to execute on the judgment. Travelers contends that the choice of a general release was the product of an arm's-length negotiation between plaintiff and the insureds, each independently represented by counsel; Travelers further contends that the clear language of the General Release drafted by the DeMarcos' counsel reflects that the DeMarcos received what they bargained for. In response, Mr. DeMarco argues that Travelers did not, in fact, obtain a release for its insureds in exchange for the payment of policy proceeds to Mr. DeMarco. Rather, Mr. DeMarco contends that Travelers had no involvement whatsoever in procuring this general release, which was part and parcel of a larger settlement agreement that also included an assignment of the insureds' rights and claims against Travelers and the legal malpractice claim to DeMarco. Mr. DeMarco asserts that the settlement between Travelers' insureds and him was reached irrespective of Travelers' gratuitous partial payment to him of $550,000 from the policy proceeds; he further asserts that he would have released the insureds solely in exchange for an assignment of rights against Travelers. Mr. DeMarco also notes that, prior to the November 17, 2006 mediation (at which time Travelers agreed to pay the policy proceeds to Mr. Woscyna and him), Travelers had been informed that the insureds and he were already in extrajudicial settlement negotiations concerning an assignment of claims to him without any monetary contribution from Travelers. Mr. DeMarco contends that the only reason Travelers paid him the $550,000 (the amount that remained after settling Mr. Woscyna's claim for $450,000) was to exhaust the policy limits so that its declaratory judgment action in federal court would be ripe. Mr. DeMarco further argues that drawing a distinction between a general release and a covenant not to execute in this case would be to advance technical legal arguments relative to the form of documents over the true substance, spirit and intent of the parties in executing those documents   . Mr. DeMarco asserts that the execution of a general release was absolutely necessary to facilitate the assignment and allow Virginia [Transportation] to remain in business   . He notes that Virginia Transportation was not a judgment-proof defendant with the luxury of allowing the excess judgment to linger and remain in place under a covenant not to execute while this litigation pressed on for many more years; rather, he argues, in order to avoid bankruptcy, Virginia Transportation needed to satisfy its lenders that the settlement with DeMarco eliminated the event of default caused by the excess judgment itself   . Mr. DeMarco further contends that the release executed by him was the sole reason that Travelers' insureds (Mr. Doire and Virginia Transportation) were saved from certain corporate and personal financial ruin. Mr. DeMarco states that he and the insureds structured the settlement documents in order to specifically preserve any and all claims against Travelers and in order to prevent the excess judgment from forcing Virginia [Transportation] into bankruptcy. He also argues that, if the assignment of claims were to be held to be invalid due to the existence of the release document, he would be forced to pursue further litigation against the insureds under the theory that the settlement agreement failed for lack of consideration. This case does not require us to address the hypothetical question as to what, in other factual contexts, might be the differential effect of a general release as opposed to a covenant not to sue or execute on a judgmentbecause in the instant case it is clear that the release document, when read together with the virtually simultaneous assignment of rights document, does not fit neatly into either category, especially in view of the rather unusual circumstances surrounding the execution of those documents. The fact that the release and assignment documents were executed contemporaneously, [49] the fact that there is explicit language in the release document indicating that Travelers was not being released from liability, and the evidence tending to show that the insureds would not have been released but for the assignment of rights, all distinguish the instant case from the more typical situation in which an assignment of rights is alleged to be effective in spite of a general release of an insured from liability. Bearing in mind the case-specific factors that are summarized in the previous paragraph, we proceed next to analyze the actual legal effect of the release and assignment documents. In conducting this analysis, we shall seek guidance from our own case law as well as that of other jurisdictions. This Court has upheld as being generally permissible an assignment of rights in a situation similar to that which the instant case presents. In Mello v. General Insurance Co. of America, 525 A.2d 1304 (R.I. 1987), we upheld an assignment where (1) judgment had entered against an insured in excess of the policy limits and (2) the insured assigned its claim against the insurer for bad faith failure to settle in exchange for an agreement by the injured plaintiff not to levy execution against the insured. Id. at 1305-06. Notably, in Mello we drew on reasoning found in this Court's earlier opinion in Etheridge v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 480 A.2d 1341 (R.I.1984), which involved insureds covered under policies provided by two different insurers. In that case, the insureds had entered into a structured settlement agreement with the injured party and one of the insurers, and they assigned to that insurer the claims that they had against the second insurer. The second insurer argued that the settlement agreement involved an unenforceable assignment of a personal injury claim because the injured party had been fully satisfied and all rights that he had with respect to his claim were extinguished. Id. at 1343. We upheld the assignment, stating (in words that we consider to have considerable relevance to the case at bar) that [i]n examining such an agreement, we shall look to substance rather than to form.  Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned as follows: Such agreements ought not to be rendered void or impeded by the simplistic maxim that the common-law assignments of personal-injury claims were unenforceable.    We simply cannot allow a salutary rule to be applied in a context in which it has no meaning and thereby obstruct an appropriate device for the payment of a claim by an insurance carrier that has an obligation to its insured to absolve him of liability without depriving itself of the right to pursue action against another insurance carrier that it considers to be wholly or partly liable for the loss. Id. The Court in Mello found this reasoning in the Etheridge opinion applicable to the situation before it, holding that an insured could assign to an injured claimant a bad faith claim against the insurer for the limited purpose of recovering the difference between the judgment received against the insured and the insurance-policy limits. Mello, 525 A.2d at 1306. [50] In view of the fact that this Court has not previously had occasion to decide what, if any, legal distinction there may be between a release and a covenant not to execute in a context such as the instant case presents, Mr. DeMarco points to the case of Campione v. Wilson, 422 Mass. 185, 661 N.E.2d 658 (1996), decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in support of his argument that the release document that he signed did not render nugatory the insureds' assignment of claims. In Campione, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld an insured's assignment of excess liability claims to a third party; the Massachusetts court further specifically held that the assignment was not invalidated by a release executed by the third party in favor of the insured. In the Campione case, the plaintiffs had brought an action against the insured for wrongful death and other claims resulting from a motor vehicle accident. Id. at 660. Prior to trial, the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby (1) judgment would enter for the plaintiffs and (2) the insured assigned to the plaintiffs his claims against his insurance brokers for negligent failure to obtain adequate insurance. Id. In exchange for the assignment of claims, the plaintiffs agreed not to seek satisfaction from the insured for the judgment amount, and they also released the insured from any and all claims arising out of the underlying accident and death; the release was expressly conditioned on the insured's agreeing to cooperate with the plaintiffs in their pursuit of any claims brought in connection with the assignment. Id. at 660-61. The plaintiffs then brought a negligence action against the insurance brokers pursuant to the assignment of rights, but the trial court ordered that the plaintiffs' negligence action should be dismissed because the insured had not suffered any tangible damages attributable to the defendants' alleged negligence, and, thus, had no assignable claim. Campione, 661 N.E.2d at 661. The trial judge reasoned that, due to the fact that the plaintiffs had released the insured from liability at the time that judgment entered, the insured was never liable for damages in excess of the policy limits and accordingly had no claim that could be assigned. Id. The plaintiffs appealed, and in due course the Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion vacating the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court observed that there was a split in authority as to whether a tortfeasor who has been released from the legal obligation to pay has any right against an allegedly negligent insurer which could be assigned to an injured party. Campione, 661 N.E.2d at 662. The court went on to state that the majority rule was that entry of an excess judgment coupled with a release (or a covenant not to execute) in favor of the insured, does not invalidate an accompanying assignment of the right to sue the insurer for negligence. Id. (parenthetical language in the original). The court then observed that the conflict among various jurisdictions reflected a balancing of policy considerationsincluding the risk of collusion between the insured and the injured party. Id. It noted that other courts were concerned about the opportunity for collusion where the insured assigns its rights to the injured party in exchange for a release insulating the insured from liability prior to the entry of judgment against the insured in the underlying action, due to the fact that under such circumstances the insured would lose the incentive to contest liability or the extent of damages during subsequent negotiations or at trial. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court in Campione then proceeded to examine the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Gray v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co., 871 F.2d 1128 (D.C.Cir.1989), noting that the Gray court had rejected the risk of collusion as a basis for deciding whether an assignment accompanied by a release was effective. Campione, 661 N.E.2d at 662. In Gray, the injured party had brought a personal injury action against the insured in connection with a motor vehicle accident. Gray, 871 F.2d at 1129. The injured party offered to settle the case for the insured's policy limits, but the insurance company did not respond to that offer, nor did it take any steps to defend the insured against the lawsuit brought by the injured party. Id. A default judgment was eventually entered against the insured for an amount more than $300,000 in excess of his insurance policy limits. Id. Thereafter, the insured agreed to assign his claim against the insurance company to the injured party; the insured did so in exchange for [the injured party] releasing [the insured] of any obligation to pay the judgment. The injured party then brought suit against the insurance company for the judgment amount. Id. In response, the insurance company argued that its only duty was to indemnify the insured and that, because the insured had been released from liability, the company's liability to the insured was also extinguished. Id. If this were true, the Gray court observed, then it would follow that that which [the insured] assigned to [the injured party] was worthless upon transfer. Id. at 1132. The Supreme Judicial Court in Campione specifically noted that the District of Columbia Circuit in Gray had not been particularly impressed with what it [ i.e., the D.C. Circuit] termed the `somewhat metaphysical contention'    that the legal basis for the claim against the insurer disappeared when the insured became insulated from liability due to a release or a covenant not to execute. Campione, 661 N.E.2d at 662 (quoting Gray, 871 F.2d at 1132-33) (emphasis added). The court in Campione then noted that the D.C. Circuit in Gray had determined that when the insurance policy, the assignment, and the release executed by the parties were considered together, the assignment was effective   . Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial Court stated that it considered the reasoning in Gray to be persuasive and that it could discern no compelling reason not to recognize the assignment of the negligence claims. Id. Rather, the court in Campione observed: It is appropriate to give effect to agreements which have led to a carefully negotiated and detailed settlement, in which the plaintiffs have voluntarily assumed the burden of proving any claims that [the insured] might have against the [insurance broker], in a situation where [the insured's] liability for the accident is reasonably clear, the primary insurer has paid the full limits of its policy, and damages are substantial. Id. at 663. The court stated that it was reluctant to foreclose the possibility of such a settlement agreement whereby the insured was given the benefit of being free from personal liability amounts beyond its certain insurance limits in exchange for [the insured's] cooperation in assisting the plaintiffs in their efforts to assert [the insured's] claims against the [insurance broker]. Id. at 662, 663. It is also our view that the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of Pinto v. Allstate Insurance Co., 221 F.3d 394 (2nd Cir.2000), sets forth an analysis that is particularly helpful in deciding the issues before us. In that case, the court upheld an assignment of rights given in exchange for a general release where an injured plaintiff received a judgment in excess of policy limits against an insured, who then assigned his right to proceed against his insurer for bad faith in refusing to settle. Id. at 398. The assignment was made in consideration of a general release discharging the insured's personal liability to the plaintiff for the excess judgment. Id. The insurer argued (1) that the release made the excess judgment unenforceable against its insured and (2) that, therefore, the insured could no longer pursue a bad faith claim against the insurer and so had no rights to assign to the injured plaintiff. Id. at 403. In considering this argument, the Second Circuit first noted that an assignment of a bad faith claim to the plaintiff in a personal injury suit is the ordinary mechanism for pursuing such [a] claim against the insurer, although such an assignment was usually in exchange for a covenant not to execute on the judgment. Id. The Second Circuit in Pinto next turned to the question of whether the use of a release instead of a covenant not to execute (or not to sue or to forbear) as consideration for the assignment rendered the excess judgment unenforceable. Pinto, 221 F.3d at 403 (parenthetical language in the original). The court in Pinto observed that a release like any contract must be construed to give force and effect to the intention of the parties. Id. at 404. In support of the latter statement, the Second Circuit quoted approvingly from the Restatement (Second) Contracts § 284, cmt. c. (1981), which states: The principal purpose of the obligee is given great weight if it can be ascertained   . If a literal interpretation of a writing that purports to be a release would frustrate that purpose, the writing may be interpreted as a contract not to sue. Pinto, 221 F.3d at 404. The Second Circuit determined that, in the case before it, the parties intended to preserve the bad faith claim and allow the injured plaintiff to pursue the claim as the assignee of the insured. The court based that conclusion on (1) the fact that the language of the assignment recited that it was being made [i]n consideration of a general release from the injured plaintiff and (2) the fact that the release document stated that it was in consideration of the assignment of the bad faith cause of action. Id. In straightforward language, the Second Circuit in Pinto made the following statement about a key aspect of that case: It defies common sense to believe that [the injured plaintiff] contemplated receiving as consideration for her release of [the insured] a right of [the insured] that no longer existed. Id. The court further observed that, although the parties may not have chosen the ideal form to execute their intention, courts have ignored the formal distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue in order to avoid an unjust result. Id. While noting that it was conscious that more careful drafting would have avoided this issue by using the more conventional form of consideration for the assignment, the court determined that the exchange of a general release for an assignment of a bad faith claim operates to preserve the bad faith claim, as if the parties had executed a covenant not to sue, and it accordingly upheld the validity of the assignment of rights to the injured plaintiff. Id. We deem the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court in Campione, the D.C. Circuit in Gray, and the just-summarized reasoning of the Second Circuit in Pinto to be highly persuasive with respect to the instant case. As was the case in Pinto, Mr. DeMarco and the insureds may not have chosen the ideal form when, in exchange for the assignment of rights, a general release document (rather than a covenant not to sue or execute on the judgment document) was contemporaneously executed. However, after reviewing the relevant documents ( viz., the general release and the assignment document), it is our opinion that the release document should not be construed as depriving the assignment document of meaningfulness; in our judgment, to so interpret the release document would certainly lead to an unjust result under the somewhat unusual factual circumstances of this case. See Pinto, 221 F.3d at 404. We first note that a release is a contractual agreement and that the rules of interpretation generally applicable to contracts are also applicable to writings that purport to be releases. See Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553, 558 (R.I.2009) (A release is a contractual agreement, and the various principles of the law of contracts govern the judicial approach to a controversy concerning the meaning of a particular release.); see also Restatement (Second) Contracts § 284, cmt. c. (1981); 29 Williston on Contracts § 73:7 (4th ed.2003). In the instant case, rather than narrowly focusing on the release instrument, we shall look to the intention of the parties as expressed in the two contemporaneously executed written documents to determine whether the release document is to be understood as being in effect a covenant not to sue. See 29 Williston on Contracts § 73:8 at 27 (Whether a particular writing is to be construed as a release or as a covenant not to sue is determined by the manifested intention of the parties, not by the form of the instrument.); see also Pinto, 221 F.3d at 404. As this Court stated in examining the assignment of rights at issue in Etheridge, in a context such as this we shall look to substance rather than to form. See Etheridge, 480 A.2d at 1345. Accordingly, in determining the intention of the parties as expressed in the release document, we examine that document together with the assignment document, which was executed contemporaneously with the release and as part of the same settlement agreement between Mr. DeMarco and the insureds. We have previously expressly stated that, as a general rule, instruments executed at the same time, for the same purpose and in the course of the same transaction    are to be considered as one instrument and are to be read and construed together. Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I. 1996) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Coffey and Martinelli, Ltd., 821 A.2d 222, 226 (R.I.2003); Maderios v. Savino, 418 A.2d 839, 842 (R.I.1980); Old Kentucky Distributing Corp. v. Morin, 50 R.I. 163, 165, 146 A. 403, 404 (1929). Because the release and assignment documents were executed contemporaneously on November 17, 2006, it is clear to us that those documents should be construed together. It is clear from an examination of the language of the release and assignment documents in the case at bar that the contracting parties sought to make it possible for Mr. DeMarco to pursue claims against Travelers, including claims under Asermely and for bad faith. Mr. DeMarco, in a separate paragraph in his release document, unequivocally stated: This General Release shall not in any way be construed, nor is it intended, to release Travelers    from any and all claims that Releasors may have against Travelers in any way arising from the Litigation or any aspect thereof. The same are specifically reserved by Releasors. (Emphasis added.) Even though the document was entitled General Release, Mr. DeMarco took care to expressly carve out Travelers from the reach of the release document. Further, as was the case with the assignment document at issue in the Pinto case in the Second Circuit, the document whereby the rights of Virginia Transportation and Mr. Doire were assigned in the instant case expressly states that it was executed  in consideration of the General Release executed contemporaneously herewith   . (Emphasis added.) Although the release executed by Mr. DeMarco does not explicitly state that it was made in consideration of the assignment, we do not consider that omission to be an Achilles' heelbecause we consider it mandatory to read the two contemporaneous documents together, and the assignment document clearly states that it was executed in consideration of the General Release   . [51] In view of the fact that the release document was executed contemporaneously with the assignment document, which does explicitly refer to the release, we are satisfied that both parties sought to enable Mr. DeMarco to pursue claims against Travelers by means of the assignment. The assignment document specifically provides that Virginia Transportation and Mr. Doire agree to cooperate fully in good faith as a material part of this Assignment with Mr. DeMarco and his attorney in their exercise of the assignment rights and any rights against parties not released.  (Emphasis added.) It is evident to us, when we read these contemporaneously executed documents as two parts of a larger whole, that the parties sought to make it possible for Mr. DeMarco to pursue the assigned claims against Travelers (a party he specifically excluded from the reach of the release document) and against the retained attorney and his firmbecause the insureds explicitly agreed as a material part of the assignment to assist Mr. DeMarco in pursuing such claims. Reading these contemporaneously executed documents together, we believe it is clear from their language and the care that Mr. DeMarco and his attorneys took to preserve claims against Travelers that plaintiff would not have released Travelers' insureds if he did not expressly make it part of the overall transaction that he would be free to pursue the claims assigned to him against the insurer. [52] See Pinto, 221 F.3d at 404 (It defies common sense to believe that [the injured plaintiff] contemplated receiving as consideration for her release of [the insured] a right of [the insured] that no longer existed.). In summary, it is our opinion that the release document executed by Mr. DeMarco, when read in conjunction with the contemporaneously executed assignment document (as it should be read), did not extinguish Mr. DeMarco's right to pursue claims against Travelers as an assignee of Virginia Transportation and Mr. Doire. Accordingly, we shall give effect to the expressed intention of the parties as evidenced by the DeMarco release document and the contemporaneous assignment document. In doing so, we make note of the particular factual circumstances that are presented in this case. First, the release and the assignment were executed contemporaneously, and explicit reference is made to one document being in consideration of the other. Next, Mr. DeMarco clearly executed the release with the understanding that he would be able to pursue rights against Travelers as an assignee of the insureds, and there is evidence that tends to support the conclusion that Mr. DeMarco would not have released the insureds if he had not obtained an assignment of their rights. Finally, Travelers had been informed by counsel for its insureds that Mr. DeMarco would release its insureds from liability specifically in exchange for an assignment of rights so that he could pursue claims against Travelers, Travelers admitted at oral argument to having reviewed the release document, and there is no evidence that Travelers objected to the agreement. [53] Further, in the rather unusual factual circumstances of this case, it was the alleged unreasonableness of Travelers' failure to settle with Mr. DeMarco that led to an enormous excess judgment against Travelers' insureds. There is evidence that tends to support the conclusion that the only way that Travelers' insureds could avoid further harm and that Mr. DeMarco could receive compensation was to release the insureds from liability viz., the letters in the record to Travelers from independent counsel for Mr. Doire and Virginia Transportation and counsel for Mr. DeMarco. Accordingly, it is our view that Travelers should not now be able to avoid having to deal with Mr. DeMarco's suit for excess damages by claiming that it obtained a release for its insuredsand that therefore the insureds had no claims to assign to Mr. DeMarcowhen the only reason the insureds were released from liability was that they assigned to Mr. DeMarco the very rights that he is now seeking to assert against Travelers. Finally, we would note that, from a public policy perspective, an assignment of rights in a case such as this is a valuable means by which the insured may obtain protection from his insurance and by which the third party may obtain compensation   . Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions, Liability and Damages, § 7:18 at 7-68 (1997); cf. Etheridge, 480 A.2d at 1345 (stating, with respect to a public policy issue, that a company that pays the loss and absolves the insured from liability, except for the right to proceed against the other carrier, has performed a function that furthers rather than impedes public policy). In the narrow circumstances of this case, the only way in which the insured could be protected and the third party compensated, in view of the perceived imminence of bankruptcy, was for a general release to be executed in exchange for the assignment. The dissent accurately observes that most jurisdictions which have determined that a general release obviates an assignment of claims have weighed serious public policy considerations regarding the potential for collusion, citing Campione and cases from several other jurisdictions. However, we note that, in all of those cases, the courts were addressing the risk of collusion where the assignment and release took place before judgment had entered against the insured. The Supreme Judicial Court in Campione specifically noted that the split in authority among other jurisdictions with respect to whether a tortfeasor who had been released has any rights that can be assigned to the injured party reflect a balancing of policy considerations, and it noted that the primary rationale of courts such as the Eighth Circuit which concluded that an insured did not have an assignable claim is concern about the risk of collusion when an insured is protected from liability by an agreement not to execute prior to entry of judgment because, in such circumstances, the insured loses the incentive to contest his [or her] liability or the extent of the injured party's damages either in negotiations or at trial. Campione, 661 N.E.2d at 662 (quoting Freeman v. Schmidt Real Estate & Insurance, Inc., 755 F.2d 135, 139 (8th Cir.1985) (emphasis added)). The Campione case itself involved an agreement for judgment in favor of the injured party prior to trial, and the court observed that, because judgment had not entered against the insured after litigation of the plaintiffs' underlying claims, [n]either the existence of claims against [the insured], nor their value, therefore ha[d] been established and tested in full adversary proceedings.  Campione, 661 N.E.2d at 662 (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial Court in Campione went on to state: We do not ignore the risk that, when a prejudgment settlement is combined with a release and covenant not to execute in favor of the tortfeasor, collusion may exist between the injured party and the tortfeasor. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). It was due to the fact that the parties had agreed to a judgment prior to trial that the court then felt it necessary to look at other factors, including the seriousness of the accident, the existence of liability, and the probability that a fact finder will find that damages exceeded any existing insurance coverage, to determine that the risk of collusion in the case before it was low. Id. The other cases cited by the dissent similarly involved a discussion of the risk of collusion and the need to look to additional factors in determining the level of such risk, all in the context of settlement agreements reached prior to entry of judgment. See Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524, 533 (Iowa 1995) ( Prejudgment assignmentslike the one herein return for covenants not to execute are not inherently collusive or fraudulent.    [B]ecause insurers have available to them a variety of defensesfor example, coverage, fraud, and collusionwe fail to see why legally it should make any difference who sues the insurerthe insured or the insured's assignee.) (emphasis added); Stateline Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Shields, 150 N.H. 332, 837 A.2d 285, 287, 288, 289 (2003) (noting that chief among policy considerations of other jurisdictions is concern about the risk of collusion when an insured is protected from liability    before entry of judgment,  but upholding the validity of an assignment that was part of a settlement agreement in which the insured had stipulated to liability for a substantial judgment because the court determined that the risk of collusion was low due to the fact that the stipulated judgment in that case likely reflected actual damages); Kobbeman v. Oleson, 574 N.W.2d 633, 634-36 (S.D.1998) (holding that a settlement agreement reached prior to the entry of judgment was not intrinsically collusive due to the fact that, inter alia, the assignees in that case were required to prove their damages in court). In our view, the possibility for the type of collusion about which most other jurisdictions have expressed concern simply did not exist in this case because the judgment against Mr. Doire was the result of a full adversarial proceeding, rather than a prejudgment settlement agreement. We are consequently satisfied that the risk of collusion was sufficiently low in the case at bar that upholding the validity of the assignment does not contravene public policy. 2. The Judgment Satisfied Order On appeal, Travelers also contends that Mr. DeMarco's claims were extinguished by what the parties refer to as a judgment satisfied order that was entered in the underlying personal injury case ( see footnote 29, supra ). In support of this contention, Travelers has endeavored to persuade us of the existence of a linkage between the judgment satisfied order of January 3, 2007 and the language employed by the hearing justice in rendering her decision of September 23, 2008 granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. In the just-referenced September 23, 2008 ruling on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, the hearing justice indicated that Travelers was liable for the judgment in the underlying personal injury case to the extent that judgment remains unsatisfied. (Emphasis added.) The January 3, 2007 order in the underlying personal injury case states in pertinent part: Said judgment is satisfied in full. [54] It is Travelers' contention on appeal that, by September 23, 2008 (when the decision on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was rendered), the judgment in the underlying personal injury case had already been deemed satisfied in full for over a year and that therefore Travelers' exposure to liability had been extinguished. A meticulous review of Travelers' summary judgment papers and the arguments advanced before the hearing justice, however, reveals that at no point in the summary judgment process did Travelers raise the issue of the effect of (or even the existence of) the judgment satisfied order. This Court has repeatedly indicated that it adheres to what is commonly called the raise or waive rule i.e., we do not consider issues on appeal which were not raised and properly presented during proceedings in the court below. [55] See Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 184-85 (R.I.2008) (Pursuant to our well-established raise-or-waive rule, this Court will not address arguments raised on appeal that were not presented to the trial justice for review.); Pollard v. Acer Group, 870 A.2d 429, 432 (R.I.2005) (describing the raise or waive rule as one of our most well-established principles); see also Resendes v. Brown, 966 A.2d 1249, 1254 (R.I.2009); DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274, 1280 (R.I.2007). [56] Accordingly, due to the fact that the issue of the effect of the judgment satisfied order was not raised below, it is not properly before us on appeal. We expressly abstain from expressing any view as to the possible effect of that order on future proceedings in this case after remand.