Opinion ID: 808185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NMFS complied with the MSA.

Text: communities. Section 1853a(c) of the MSA, entitled “Requirements for limited access privileges,” contains various provisions related to fishing communities. Among other things, to be eligible to participate in a limited access program, fishing communities must “meet criteria developed by the relevant Council [and] approved by the Secretary” and “develop and submit a community sustainability plan.” 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(3)(A)(I). In developing participation criteria, the Pacific Council must consider factors such as traditional fishing practices, the “cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery,” economic barriers to access, and economic and social impacts from the limited access program on fishery-dependent persons and businesses. Id. § 1853a(c)(3)(B). [1] Section 1853a(c) also requires NMFS to “establish procedures to ensure fair and equitable initial allocations” of privileges. Such procedures must “include consideration of” current and past harvests, employment in the harvesting and processing sectors, investments in and dependent on the fishery, and “the current and historical participation of fishing communities.” Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(A). In addition, NMFS must (B) consider the basic cultural and social framework of the fishery, especially through—
the sustained participation of small owner- operated fishing vessels and fishing com- munities that depend on the fisheries . . . ; and PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10763
excessive geographic or other consolidation in the harvesting or processing sectors of the fishery. Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(B). NMFS also must include measures to assist, when necessary and appropriate, entry-level and small vessel owneroperators, captains, crew, and fishing communities through set-asides of harvesting allocations, including providing privileges, which may include set- asides or allocations of harvesting privileges, or economic assistance in the purchase of limited access privileges. Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(C). Finally, NMFS must “ensure that limited access privilege holders do not acquire an excessive share of the total limited access privileges in the program” by establishing a maximum share and “any other limitations or measures necessary,” and must “authorize” privileges “to be held, acquired, used by, or issued under the system to persons who substantially participate in the fishery.” Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(D)- (E). The plaintiffs argue that the preceding provisions required NMFS to (1) develop criteria for ensuring that quota shares are distributed to fishing communities, and (2) adopt “other measures and policies” to ensure the sustained participation of fishing communities. NMFS responds that § 1853a(c) only required it to consider the sustained participation of fishing communities against other objectives, including by developing optional participation criteria or other measures, and that in any event Amendments 20 and 21 adequately serve to protect fishing communities. [2] NMFS is correct. The allocation provisions of § 1853a(c)(5) require NMFS, in developing “procedures to 10764 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK ensure fair and equitable initial allocations” of quota shares, to “includ[e] consideration of” four specific factors and to “consider” the “basic cultural and social framework of the fishery.” Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(A)-(B). These provisions do not require that fishing communities receive an allocation of quota or, as the district court explained, “even be made eligible to do so.” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n, 2011 WL 3443533, . Similarly, the plain language of § 1853a(c)(3) says that fishing communities must do certain things “[t]o be eligible” to participate in a fishery, including comply with “participation criteria for eligible communities” that NMFS develops. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(3)(A)-(B). But this language does not mandate that NMFS actually develop participation criteria. In short, § 1853a requires NMFS to take fishing communities into account in fashioning a limited access program (something NMFS did; see infra); it does not require NMFS to guarantee communities any particular role in that program. Congress could have taken any number of steps to guarantee fishing communities a specific role, but it did not.6 The plaintiffs rely on § 1853a(c)’s legislative history to supply mandatory requirements not found within the MSA itself. Although there is “no reason to resort to legislative history” where, as here, the statute is clear, United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997); see also Am. Rivers v. FERC, 201 F.3d 1186, 1204 (9th Cir. 1999), legislative history nonetheless can be “instructive,” Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, § 1853a(c)’s legislative history actually underscores the fact that NMFS 6 For example, Congress could have: (1) added requirements pertaining to participation criteria or allocations in the eleven requirements for limited access programs listed in § 1853a(c)(1); (2) imposed requirements on NMFS or the Pacific Council, not just on fishing communities, in subsection (c)(3); (3) used a word stronger than “consider” in subsection (c)(5); or (4) required an allocation to fishing communities in subsection (c)(5) in the same way it prohibited an allocation to regional fishery associations in subsection (c)(4). PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10765 was required only to consider fishing communities in developing a limited access program, not guarantee them a certain type or level of participation in it. For example, the House Report on the bill that eventually would become § 1853a states that the bill “creates a discretionary authority and criteria for the allocation of shares to fishing communities and regional fishery associations.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-567, at 32 (2006). In keeping with this permissive language, the Senate Report for the corresponding Senate bill states that the bill “contains specific provisions that would authorize the issuance of quota to fishing communities.” S. Rep. No. 109-229, at 25 (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. at 8 (explaining that limited access programs would be “expanded to allow allocation of harvesting privileges to fishing communities . . . .” (emphasis added)).7 The plaintiffs alternatively argue that Amendments 20 and 21 “defy[ ] the National Standard 8 policy of fostering community participation in the fishery.” But that standard requires only that conservation and management measures “take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities by utilizing [the best available] economic and social data.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8) (emphasis added). As we have explained, “[t]he National Standards do not require any particular outcome with respect to allocations; rather, they provide a framework for the Council’s analysis. There is nothing in the MSA that guarantees [a particular group] a directed . . . fishery.” Fishermen’s Finest, Inc. v. Locke, 593 F.3d 886, 896 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 50 C.F.R. § 600.345(b)(2) (“[National] [S]tandard [8] does not constitute a basis for allo- 7 Senator Daniel Inouye, one of the bill’s sponsors, talked about his intent to reduce overcapacity but also “sustain thriving fishing communities” by “promot[ing] access to residents of our coastal communities.” 152 Cong. Rec. S. 11,701, at 11,700 (Dec. 8, 2006). But even Senator Inouye referred only to the need to “consider” and “take into account” limited access programs’ social and economic implications. Id. 10766 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK cating resources to a specific fishing community nor for providing preferential treatment based on residence in a fishing community.”). [3] The question remains whether NMFS met its obligations to consider fishing communities in fashioning Amendments 20 and 21. It did. NMFS recognized that fishing communities must be considered under the MSA; surveyed the current status of fishing communities (including observing that many are “faltering” under the status quo); described the effects of quota programs and other management tools on those communities; and explained how communities participated in the Pacific Council’s decisions. In addition, NMFS proposed, and the Council adopted, various measures to mitigate the impacts of trawl rationalization on fishing communities, including, among other things: an adaptive management program under which up to ten percent of quota shares would be reserved for communities; a two-year moratorium on share transfers; a five-year review that includes a community advisory committee; and limits on the accumulation of shares by single entities. These measures will provide an “equitable initial allocation” of quota shares, “assist” entry-level participants and fishing communities, and prevent a single share holder from acquiring “excessive” shares. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(5)(A), (C)-(D). It is true that, despite these measures, Amendments 20 and 21 may weaken at least some fishing communities. Yet NMFS was aware of the potential implications of approving Amendments 20 and 21. For example, NMFS explained in its final rule adopting the Amendments: While the trawl rationalization program would move the fishery toward some of its most important goals and objectives, in order for the program to realize those benefits, a large amount of consolidation would have to occur, resulting in fewer people employed in the fishery. The Council acknowledged PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10767 and expressed concern about the expected consolidation and its impacts, and noted the need to attend to the potential for disproportionate impacts on some communities. . . . The Council also expressed an interest in maintaining the character of the fleet and a diversified industry. Balancing the need for consolidation to generate adequate levels of benefit with the potential adverse impacts of consolidation was a major challenge. At the same time, continuation of status quo would have its own impacts, with both the buyback program and cumulative limits having caused significant consolidation in the fleet and a redistribution of vessels along the coast. Because of the high degree of concern about impacts on communities and maintaining some sharing of benefits (both among harvesters and between harvesters, processors, and others dependent on the fishery) the Council made a number of tradeoffs in the trawl rationalization program that may prevent the program from reaching the full degree of eco- nomic efficiency that might otherwise be achievable through rationalization. For example, accumulation limits would help disperse fishery benefits, but would inhibit consolidation. Additionally, some [quota] was set aside for use in an [adaptive management program] to address such objectives as community and processor stability, new entry, conservation, and other unidentified/unforeseen adverse consequences. A number of other measures were also con- sidered as the Council struggled to find a balance among sectors, states, vessels, ports, conservation obligations, and its responsibility to try to develop a regime that maximizes economic benefits while simultaneously realizing, recognizing, and honoring the social effects of its decisions. 75 Fed. Reg. at 60,872. 10768 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK [4] In arguing that NMFS was required to adopt a policy that better protects the historic role of non-trawl fishing communities in the groundfish fishery, the plaintiffs seek relief the MSA does not require and this court is not empowered to grant. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“[A] reviewing court may not set aside an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors and within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the statute . . . . The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”).
to those who “substantially participate” in the fishery. Section 1853a(c) provides: (1) In general. Any limited access privilege program to harvest fish submitted by a Council or approved by the Secretary under this section shall— .... (D) prohibit any person other than a United States citizen, a corporation, partnership, or other entity established under the laws of the United States or any State, or a perma- nent resident alien, that meets the eligibility and participation requirements established in the program from acquiring a privilege to harvest fish, including any person that acquires a limited access privilege solely for the purpose of perfecting or realizing on a security interest in such privilege; .... PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10769 (5) Allocation. In developing a limited access privilege program to harvest fish a Council or the Secretary shall— .... (E) authorize limited access privileges to harvest fish to be held, acquired, used by, or issued under the system to persons who substantially participate in the fishery, including in a specific sector of such fish- ery, as specified by the Council. .... (7) Transferability. In establishing a limited access privilege program, a Council shall— (A) establish a policy and criteria for the transferability of limited access privileges (through sale or lease), that is consistent with the policies adopted by the Council for the fishery under paragraph (5) . . . . 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c). The plaintiffs argue that § 1853a(c)(5) and (c)(7) require NMFS to restrict the authority to receive and hold quota shares to those who “substantially participate” in the fishery. NMFS, however, construes § 1853a(c)(1)(D) to be the sole provision setting forth who is excluded from acquiring quota shares, and § 1853a(c)(5)(E) to mean “that those who substantially participate in the fishery must be among those eligible to acquire [shares], but are not the only entities or person[s] who can receive [shares].” 75 Fed. Reg. at 78,353. [5] NMFS has the better argument, for three reasons. First, reading § 1853a(c)(5) and (c)(7) as the plaintiffs do requires 10770 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK inserting the word “only” or “solely” into subsection (c)(5). The courts, however, “ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009); see also Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the court “lack[s the] power” to “read into the statute words not explicitly inserted by Congress”). Second, while the MSA refers to “persons who substantially participate in the fishery” in § 1853a(c)(5), that phrase is not found in § 1853a(c)(1)(D), which is the only provision that specifies who may not acquire quota shares—i.e., “any person other than” an American citizen, lawful permanent resident, or legal entity who meets “the eligibility and participation requirements established in the program.” 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(1)(D). “It is a general principle of statutory construction that when one statutory section includes particular language that is omitted in another section of the same Act, it is presumed that Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [6] Third, limiting quota shares to those who “substantially participate” in the fishery would conflict with other parts of § 1853a(c). See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986) (“[W]here possible, provisions of a statute should be read so as not to create a conflict.”). Section 1853a(c)(1)(D) allows a quota share (which is, once again, a type of “privilege”) to be held by “any person that acquires a limited access privilege solely for the purpose of perfecting or realizing on a security interest in such privilege.” 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(1)(D). This allowance is inconsistent with limiting shares to “substantial participants” in the fishery. Similarly, § 1853a(c)(5)(C) directs NMFS to “include measures to assist, when necessary and appropriate, entry-level . . . owneroperators, captains, crew, and fishing communities through set-asides of harvest allocations, including providing priviPACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10771 leges.” Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(C) (emphasis added). “Entry-level” persons and communities are, by definition, persons and communities who do not yet “substantially participate” in the fishery. Though the plaintiffs are correct that entry-level persons may join through community and regional fishing associations, nothing in the MSA limits them to those avenues.8 [7] Despite this commonsense reading of the MSA, the plaintiffs proffer four reasons why NMFS is obligated to limit quota shares to those who “substantially participate” in the fishery. First, the plaintiffs say it is “significant[ ]” that § 1853a(c)(1)(D) refers to “the eligibility and participation requirements established in the program.” The implication is that NMFS was required to adopt eligibility criteria that accord with how the plaintiffs read the MSA. However, as the district court explained, the plaintiffs seek to “graft[ ] a requirement for agency action onto an authorization for agency action.” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n, 2011 WL 3443533,  (emphasis added). That is, § 1853a(c)(1)(D) does not require, but rather simply contemplates, that “eligibility and participation requirements” may be “established in the program.” Moreover, even if NMFS were required to establish eligibility criteria beyond those in the MSA, there is no mandate that those criteria screen out everyone who does not “substantially participate” in the fishery.9 Second, the plaintiffs point to certain statements in § 1853a(c)’s legislative history. Again, legislative history is 8 Throughout most of NMFS’s decisionmaking process, fishing communities expressed little or no interest in receiving an initial allocation of quota shares. Accordingly, NMFS developed other mechanisms (adaptive management, transferability and accumulation limits, etc.) to address the impacts of Amendments 20 and 21 on fishing communities. 9 To the extent the plaintiffs argue that § 1853a(c)(5)(E) itself sets forth the “eligibility and participation requirements” referred to in § 1853a(c)(1)(D), that argument fails; § 1853a(c)(1)(D) plainly contemplates requirements “established in the program” by NMFS, not by the MSA. 10772 PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK irrelevant where, as here, the statute is clear. Am. Rivers, 201 F.3d at 1204. In any event, the best history the plaintiffs can point to is a Senate Report that states: “[S]ection [1853a] restricts the holding, acquisition, use, or issuance of [privileges] only to persons who substantially participate in a fishery.” S. Rep. No. 109-229, at 26 (2006) (emphasis added). However, this statement, when read in context, plainly is concerned not with whether those who have not historically participated in the fishery should receive privileges, but with the possibility a person might obtain a privilege and then fail to use it, thereby effectively reducing the total allowable catch. See id.10 Moreover, the corresponding House Report states that a very similar provision to § 1853a(c)(5) “authorize[s] all those who substantially participate in the fishery to hold a limited access privilege”—it does not say that the provision restricts privileges to that group.11 H.R. Rep. No. 109-567, at 32 (July 17, 2006) (emphasis added). Third, the plaintiffs refer to a November 2007 NMFS technical memorandum the Pacific Council considered when developing Amendments 20 and 21. The memorandum explains: 10 The full paragraph reads: “[Privileges] are not intended to be used as a mechanism to reduce harvests through refinement of catch quota by those who are not fishery participants. Total quota available for harvest is established separately under the conservation requirements of the Act. Therefore, this section restricts the holding, acquisition, use, or issuance of [privileges] only to persons who substantially participate in a fishery.” 11 The plaintiffs also cite an individual representative’s statement that the then-bill “protects small fishermen from those who would like to consolidate fisheries. The privileges are to be held by fishermen who are actively engaged and substantially participate in the fishery.” 152 Cong. Rec. E2243-02 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Rahall). Even if this statement could be read to support the plaintiffs’ argument, “[t]he floor statements of an individual member of Congress who did not sponsor the bill . . . have limited value in interpreting congressional intent.” Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1996). PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION v. BLANK 10773 The MSA does put some constraints on what the Councils can choose to do. As previously discussed, [§ 1853(c)(5)(E)] links privileges to be acquired or held by persons to those who substantially participate in the fishery. .... While the Councils have some latitude in determining who may or may not acquire harvesting privi- leges, it is certainly more restrictive than the “anybody can own” criterion mentioned above, because of the citizenship requirements and the “substantially participate in the fishery” clause. (Emphasis added.) However, even this excerpt stands only for the proposition that privileges and participation are and must be “link[ed],” a requirement NMFS has satisfied by making substantial participants eligible to receive quota shares. The plaintiffs’ final argument is one of policy: allowing persons who do not substantially participate in the fishery to acquire and hold quota shares leads to “liberal transferability,” which in turn can result in “extreme or excessive fleet consolidation, regional shifts in fishing commerce, loss of fishing-related employment[,]” and other effects. However, as discussed above, NMFS was aware of these effects but decided to partially prioritize economic efficiency and fleet consolidation over the protection of existing fishery participants, a choice that required fewer restrictions on who could acquire and hold quota shares. The MSA did not preclude NMFS from making that choice.