Opinion ID: 2804365
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicability of Rosemond

Text: If the dissent were to reach the Rosemond issue, it would still affirm Encarnación's conviction. The dissent contends that, because Encarnación admitted to engaging in sexual acts with KMV, Rosemond does not require that the government prove that he had advance knowledge that KMV was a minor to be convicted of aiding and abetting the production of child pornography. The dissent argues that under Rosemond's principles . . . the aider and abettor only needs to know that he is assisting or facilitating the filming of sexually explicit activity, not that one of the participants was a minor, and, in this case, Encarnación obviously knew he was facilitating the filming of sexually explicit activity by appearing on camera with KMV. The dissent's argument is unavailing. Pursuant to Rosemond, an aider and abettor must have full awareness of [the] scope of the crime of producing child pornography. 134 S. Ct. at 1249. If the dissent were correct, the aider and abettor would have knowledge of no crime at all, because, as mentioned above, producing non-obscene adult pornography is not a crime, and, under the First Amendment, could not be a crime. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 234; Hilton, 386 F.3d at 14. -30- The dissent also argues that Rosemond is inapposite because Encarnación had a realistic opportunity to quit the crime before he engaged in sexually explicit conduct with [KMV] before a camera on more than one occasion. Again, the dissent fails to recognize that engaging in sexually explicit conduct before a camera is not a crime. Encarnación argues that he believed he had sexual relations with an adult, and, therefore, had no realistic opportunity to quit the crime of producing child pornography because he only became aware that KMV was a minor after appearing on camera with her. Finally, the dissent contends that Encarnación is not entitled to a mistake of age defense because he was a present, participating aider and abettor and not a non-present, nonparticipant one. This argument is also unavailing. Federal aiding and abetting law makes no distinction between present and non-present aiders and abettors.12 See 18 U.S.C. § 2; United 12 The dissent's argument echoes the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Harris, 904 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). Harris concluded that knowledge of the victim's age is not necessary to convict a present joint venturer — Massachusetts' term for an accomplice — of statutory rape. Harris is inapposite here because its holding is based on the unique nature of joint venture liability under Massachusetts law. In Massachusetts, the government can proceed against a joint venturer under two distinct theories: a presence theory and a nonpresence theory. Id. at 484-85. The court held that only under a presence theory is knowledge of the victim's age not required because a present joint venturer has the same opportunity as the principal to make judgments about age from the child's appearance and other circumstances attending the encounter between the child and the principal. Id. at 485. In doing so, -31- States v. George, 761 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that a culpable aider and abetter need not perform the substantive offense, be present when it is performed, or be aware of the details of its execution (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under Rosemond, the government has the burden to prove an aider and abettor to a § 2251(a) offense had advance knowledge that the victim was a minor regardless of whether that aider and abettor was a participant or non-participant.13 the court recognized that joint venturer liability is different from aiding and abetting liability found in the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, in part because it does not distinguish between present and nonpresent accomplices. See id. at 484-85 & n.4. 13 At times, Encarnación has mischaracterized his appeal as requesting a mistake of age affirmative defense, which Encarnación would have the burden to prove. See Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8. Because proof of knowledge that the victim was a minor is, pursuant to Rosemond, necessary to satisfy the mens rea element for aiding and abetting the production of child pornography, it must be proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt — as with all elements of a crime. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); cf. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1254 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(asserting that the majority has convert[ed] what has up to now been an affirmative defense into a part of the required mens rea, plac[ing] a strange and difficult burden on the prosecution). For this reason, the dissent is mistaken to rely on cases recognizing that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on an affirmative defense only when the evidence supports that defense. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). Because the burden of proof is on the government to establish that an aider and abettor knew the victim was a minor, Encarnación has no need to raise an affirmative defense on this issue. -32-