Opinion ID: 2026617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Probation Violation

Text: Having rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we briefly address whether the evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient to prove that defendant violated his probation. Defendant argues that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to demonstrate that the item he dropped was firearm ammunition as defined by section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Act) (430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2002)). Specifically, defendant contends that Sergeant Glynn's testimony about finding an ammunition clip containing 9-millimeter rounds was insufficient to prove that the clip actually contained live 9-millimeter rounds. Defendant posits that the cartridges might have been blanks, and that none of the evidence presented by the State rules out this possibility. The State maintains that the evidence was sufficient to show by a preponderance that defendant was in possession of firearm ammunition as a felon. According to the State, it is clear that the credible testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a defendant's conviction, even if that testimony is contradicted by the defendant. Here, Sergeant Glynn's testimony that he observed defendant in possession of a black, semiautomatic pistol, and that he recovered an ammunition clip containing nine-millimeter rounds, was sufficient to establish that defendant was in possession of firearm ammunition. The State emphasizes that Sergeant Glynn was an 18-year veteran of the Chicago police department at the time of the offense, and that his testimony was neither impeached nor discredited. Section 24-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides, in pertinent part: It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person    any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2002). Section 2-7.1 of the Code defines firearm ammunition as having the meaning ascribed to it in section 1.1 of the FOID Act (720 ILCS 5/2-7.1 (West 2002)). Section 1.1, in turn, provides that [f]irearm ammunition means: [A]ny self-contained cartridge or shotgun shell, by whatever name known, which is designed to be used or adaptable to use in a firearm; excluding, however: (1) any ammunition exclusively designed for use with a device used exclusively for signalling or safety and required or recommended by the United States Coast Guard or the Interstate Commerce Commission; and (2) any ammunition designed exclusively for use with a stud or rivet driver or other similar industrial ammunition. 430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2002). The State must prove a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2002). One condition of probation is that a person on probation not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(a)(1) (West 2002). In the State's petition to revoke defendant's probation, the State alleged that defendant violated his probation by committing the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Defendant's information specified that he committed the offense by knowingly possess[ing] on or about his person any firearm ammunition, to wit: bullets, after having been previously convicted of the felony offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Accordingly, to demonstrate that defendant violated a condition of his probation, the State had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that, while on probation, defendant knowingly possessed firearm ammunition as a felon. Defendant does not dispute that, on April 19, 2004, the date of his alleged probation violation, he was on probation and was a felon. Defendant also does not dispute that he was in knowing possession of the item that Sergeant Glynn saw him drop in the alley and subsequently recovered. Defendant argues only that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance that the item in question was, in fact, firearm ammunition as defined by section 1.1 of the FOID Act. We note that defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence assumes that, as a matter of law, blank ammunition does not qualify as firearm ammunition for purposes of section 1.1 of the FOID Act. We need not address the validity of this assumption, as defendant has made no attempt to justify it through argument or citation to relevant authority. See 210 Ill.2d R. 341(h)(7) (argument portion of brief shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on    [and] [p]oints not argued are waived); Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill.2d 50, 56 n. 2, 255 Ill.Dec. 464, 749 N.E.2d 946 (2001) (declining to address party's challenge to ruling barring his attorney fees as element of damages in his malicious prosecution claim where brief contained insufficient discussion of issue). Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that blanks do not qualify as firearm ammunition within the meaning of the relevant statutory definition, the evidence presented to the trial court provided it with a sufficient basis for inferring that the clip in defendant's possession contained live 9-millimeter rounds, not blanks. When the trial court finds that a violation of probation has been proved, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the type asserted by defendant will succeed only if the trial court's finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Houston, 118 Ill.2d 194, 199, 113 Ill.Dec. 77, 514 N.E.2d 989 (1987); People v. Cooper, 66 Ill.2d 509, 514, 6 Ill.Dec. 870, 363 N.E.2d 817 (1977); People v. Crowell, 53 Ill.2d 447, 451-52, 292 N.E.2d 721 (1973). In the instant case, Sergeant Glynn's testimony established that he was an 18-year veteran of the Chicago police department, that he clearly observed defendant in possession of a black, semiautomatic pistol, and that he recovered a magazine from that pistol containing 9-millimeter rounds. As the State points out, Sergeant Glynn's testimony was not contradicted or impeached in any way, and there is no indication in the record before us that the cartridges he identified were blanks. Therefore, the trial court could reasonably have inferred that the ammunition in defendant's possession was live ammunition, and the court's finding that defendant violated his probation by committing the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accord People v. Lee, 48 Ill.2d 272, 281, 269 N.E.2d 488 (1971) (rejecting defendants' argument that, by failing to prove that shotgun shells introduced into evidence were live shells, the State failed to meet its burden of proving defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful possession of firearm ammunition, because whether shells were capable of being discharged was for trier of fact to decide, and nothing in record suggested shells were not, in fact, live).