Opinion ID: 8407616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Similarly-Situated Plan Participants

Text: When the district court granted relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) and ordered the Trustees to reform the Plan retroactively to 1976, McDonald requested that the court also order the recalculation of the pensions of a class of purportedly similarly situated participants. With regard to McDonald’s successful claim that ERISA invalidated pre-ERISA break-in-service provisions for the purposes of benefit accrual, however, the complaint expressly sought only individual relief. The district court denied McDonald’s motion for class certification for the reason that “while plaintiff might have brought such a claim, he did not.” McDonald II, 2001 WL 1154630, at , 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534, at . McDonald, however, contends that class-wide relief is essentially automatic under ERISA § 502(a)(3), which provides that a civil action may be brought: by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). McDonald argues that because § 502(a)(3) pertains to a general category of wrongs, the redress also must be general and must “remedy the injuries suffered by all participants affected by the wrongful ‘act or practice.’ ” (Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant’s Br., at 14 (emphasis in original)). McDonald reads too much into § ’502(a)(3). It does not require district courts to grant particular relief; rather, it affords district courts the discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief—relief that may or may not benefit non-party beneficiaries. Nothing in this section requires class-based relief or expressly supersedes the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.. See, e.g., Yoon v. Fordham Univ, Faculty & Admin. Ret. Plan, 263 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.2001). The district court recognized the tension generated by McDonald’s late request, finding his “attempt to transform what was clearly an individual claim into a class claim after a favorable decision on the merits troubling.” McDonald II, 2001 WL 1154630, at , 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15534, at . These misgivings were understandable; Rule 23(c)(1) contemplates consideration of class certification “[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action.” While relief to other beneficiaries may sometimes be appropriate under § 502(a)(3), it is clear to us that in this case the district court’s decisions neither to certify a class nor to afford relief to beneficiaries who were not parties involved no abuse of discretion. The rationale behind early attention to the universe of potential beneficiaries “is plain: fundamental fairness requires that a defendant named in a suit be told promptly the number of parties to whom it may ultimately be liable for money damages.” Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, 47 F.3d 498, 503 (2d Cir.1995).