Opinion ID: 874858
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Discretion

Text: Alternatively, Schoger argues that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to pursue a claim that the district court lacked the discretion to reject her Alford plea. The State argues that Schoger was not prejudiced by appellate counsel's decision not to pursue the lack of discretion claim because the argument would not have been successful on appeal. Thus, this Court must analyze whether there is a reasonable probability that Schoger would have prevailed with a lack of discretion challenge on appeal. See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). At the outset, it is clear that Alford does not establish the right of a criminal defendant to have a guilty plea accepted, as Alford itself recognized that there is no constitutional right to plead guilty. 400 U.S. at 38 n. 11, 91 S.Ct. at 168 n. 11, 27 L.Ed.2d at 172 n. 11. The Alford opinion recognized that under the U.S. Constitution, acceptance of pleas is within the court's discretion, and that a state might establish such a right by statute or might bar [its] courts from accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence. Id. Thus, the inquiry must focus upon state law to determine whether Idaho has imposed any particular duty on its courts to accept guilty pleas, or alternatively, whether it instead reposes discretion in them. Here, Schoger argues that Idaho Criminal Rule 11 required the district court to accept her Alford plea. Rule 11(a) states in relevant part: (a) Alternatives. (1) In General. A defendant may plead guilty or not guilty. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall direct the entry of a plea of not guilty. (2) Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review any specified adverse ruling.... Idaho Crim. R. 11(a). Schoger argues that because Rule 11(a)(2) has a provision requiring the approval of the court to accept conditional guilty pleas, but Rule 11(a)(1) does not contain a requirement that the court approve of an unconditional guilty plea, under the statutory construction principle of inclusion unius est alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another), the rule necessarily requires the defendant to have a statutory right to plead guilty. See Koon v. Bottolfsen, 66 Idaho 771, 775, 169 P.2d 345, 346 (1946). Additionally, Schoger argues that the word may in Rule 11(a)(1) should be construed to confer a statutory right under the principle that the word may in a statute or rule should be construed as mandatory when the public interest or individual rights so require. See Dana, Larson, Roubal & Assocs. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 124 Idaho 794, 801, 864 P.2d 632, 639 (1993). Lastly, Schoger argues that the language of Rule 11 is identical or analogous to the language in other state statutes that courts have found to confer a statutory right to plead guilty. The State, on the other hand, argues that while other jurisdictions may have granted credence to similar arguments, the law is not fully articulated or established in Idaho, and thus appellate counsel's failure to raise the argument does not constitute deficient performance. Schoger's claims are subject to the same standards set forth in Strickland. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file or pursue certain motions, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 512, 988 P.2d 1170, 1186 (1999). However, this Court will generally not find deficient performance where counsel fails to argue a novel theory in an undeveloped area of law. Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91-92, 190 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Ct.App.2008). Other jurisdictions similarly hold that the failure to advance a novel theory will not result in ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. See, e.g., Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 420 (6th Cir.1999) (stating that only in a very rare case will counsel's performance be determined to be ineffective for failing to make an objection that would have been overruled under then-prevailing law); Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1125 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that there is no general duty on behalf of counsel to anticipate changes in the law and that counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a claim that courts have repeatedly rejected); Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 448 (Ky.2001); Alvord v. State, 396 So.2d 184, 191 (Fl.1981) (holding that the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel cannot be based upon the failure of counsel to assert a theory of law which was not at the time of appeal fully articulated or established in the law). In Idaho, the current state of the law is reflected in Jones, which noted that a district court's decision whether to accept an Alford plea is discretionary. 129 Idaho at 474, 926 P.2d at 1321 (citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n. 11, 91 S.Ct. at 168 n. 11, 27 L.Ed.2d at 172 n. 11). While there is disagreement between the parties as to whether the assertion in Jones is dicta, at bottom, the case either indicates that the court has discretion, or alternatively, that the law is not fully articulated or established in Idaho. We hereby remove all doubt by holding that no provision of Idaho law, including I.C.R. 11, requires a court to accept a guilty plea. Acceptance of such a plea is specifically within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, appellate counsel here did not perform deficiently by failing to advance a contrary argument.