Opinion ID: 2049141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rhode Island Contract Interpretation Doctrines

Text: Last term, this Court expressed Rhode Island's long-standing contract interpretation doctrines in Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553 (R.I.2009), and today, less than one year later, the majority departs from these venerable doctrines. The first step of contract interpretation is to determine whether the writing is clear or ambiguous. A contract is ambiguous when it is `reasonably susceptible of different constructions.' Young, 973 A.2d at 558 n. 6 (quoting Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dial Media, Inc., 122 R.I. 571, 579, 410 A.2d 986, 991 (1980)). In determining whether or not a particular contract is ambiguous, the court should read the contract `in its entirety, giving words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.' Id. at 558 (quoting Mallane v. Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem, 658 A.2d 18, 20 (R.I.1995)); see also Irene Realty Corp. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, 973 A.2d 1118, 1122-23 (R.I.2009). Importantly, we have oft said that while carrying out this task, the court should `refrain from engaging in mental gymnastics or from stretching the imagination to read ambiguity    where none is present.' Young, 973 A.2d at 559 (quoting Mallane, 658 A.2d at 20); see also Paul v. Paul, 986 A.2d 989, 993 (R.I.2010) (recognizing that to a skilled advocate, ambiguity lurks in every word, sentence, and paragraph    [so] the question is not whether there is an ambiguity in the metaphysical sense, but whether the language has only one reasonable meaning when construed    in an ordinary, common sense manner) (quoting Garden City Treatment Center, Inc. v. Coordinated Health Partners, Inc., 852 A.2d 535, 542 (R.I.2004)). In Young, this Court was faced with interpreting an insurance release document. The document provided that the plaintiff, in exchange for monetary compensation, would release the defendant from injuries and damages  in any way growing out of any personal injuries, whether known or unknown to me at the present time resulting or to result from any and all incidents or injuries occurring during my employment [.] Young, 973 A.2d at 556. This Court stated that, [the release] is replete with such straightforward English words as `any' and `all.' Id. at 559. In view of our conclusion as to the unambiguous nature of the release language, there is no reason not to accept the release document and apply it at face value. Id. We properly recognized that [i]f the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is at an end for the terms will be applied as written. Id. (quoting Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I.2004)); see also Monahan v. Girouard, 911 A.2d 666, 672 (R.I.2006) (recognizing same). We acknowledged that while the plaintiff had the right to assert her position: the mere fact that parties differ as to the meaning of an agreement does not necessarily mean that the agreement is in fact ambiguous. See City Investing Company Liquidating Trust v. Continental Casualty Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198 (Del.1993) (`[T]he language of an agreement    is not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties in litigation differ concerning its meaning.'). Young, 973 A.2d at 560. Ultimately, we refused to give credence to the plaintiff's version of what the written contract meant because when we are confronted with unambiguous contractual words, what is claimed to have been the subjective intent of the parties is of no moment. Young, 973 A.2d at 560 (citing Vincent Co. v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 683 A.2d 361, 363 (R.I.1996)). In my opinion, that is the case currently before us  we are asked to consider and then elect between the subjective intent of the parties. Most importantly to the case at bar, this Court acknowledged that [i]n situations in which the language of a contractual agreement is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. Young, 973 A.2d at 560 (quoting Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc./Franki Foundation Co. v. Gill, 652 A.2d 440, 443 (R.I.1994)); see also National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 972 (R.I. 2008) (recognizing that [b]ecause this contract language is clear and unambiguous, reference to extrinsic evidence is not necessary).