Opinion ID: 118306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FSLMRS provides, in relevant part,

Text: (2) An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the opportunity to be represented at. . . . . (B) any examination of an employee in the unit by a representative of the agency in connection with an investigation if (i) the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action against the employee; and (ii) the employee requests representation. 5 U. S. C. § 7114(a). In this case it is undisputed that the employee reasonably believed the investigation could result in discipline against him, that he requested union representation, that NASA is the relevant agency, and that, if the provision applies, a violation of § 7114(a)(2)(B) occurred. The contested issue is whether a NASAOIG investigator can be considered a representative of NASA when conducting an employee examination covered by § 7114(a)(2)(B). NASA and its OIG argue that, when § 7114(a)(2)(B) is read in context and compared with the similar right to union representation protected in the private sector by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the term representative refers only to a representative of agency management  i. e., the entity that has a collective bargaining relationship with the employee's union. Brief for Petitioners 13. Neither NASA nor NASAOIG has such a relationship with the employee's union at the Huntsville facility, see 5 U. S. C. § 7112(b)(7) (excluding certain agency investigators and auditors from appropriate bargaining units), and so the investigator in this case could not have been a representative of the relevant entity. By its terms, § 7114(a)(2)(B) is not limited to investigations conducted by certain entit[ies] within the agency in question. It simply refers to representatives of the agency, which, all agree, means NASA. Cf. § 7114(a)(2) (referring to employees in the unit and an exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency). Thus, relying on prior rulings, the Authority found no basis in the FSLMRS or its legislative history to support the limited reading advocated by NASA and its OIG. The Authority reasoned that adopting their proposal might erode the right by encouraging the use of investigative conduits outside the employee's bargaining unit, and would otherwise frustrate Congress' apparent policy of protecting certain federal employees when they are examined and justifiably fear disciplinary action. 50 F. L. R. A., at 615, and n. 12. That is, the risk to the employee is not necessarily related to which component of an agency conducts the examination. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a (information obtained by NASAOIG is referred to agency officials for administrative or disciplinary action). In resolving this issue, the Authority was interpreting the statute Congress directed it to implement and administer. 5 U. S. C. § 7105. The Authority's conclusion is certainly consistent with the FSLMRS and, to the extent the statute and congressional intent are unclear, we may rely on the Authority's reasonable judgment. See Federal Employees v. Department of Interior, 526 U. S. 86, 98-100 (1999); Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495 U. S. 641, 644-645 (1990). Despite the text of the statute and the Authority's views, NASA and NASAOIG advance three reasons for their narrow reading. First, the language at issue is contained in a larger section addressing rights and duties related to collective bargaining; indeed, 5 U. S. C. § 7114 is entitled Representation rights and duties. Thus, other subsections define the union's right to exclusive representation of employees in the bargaining unit, § 7114(a)(1); its right to participate in grievance proceedings, § 7114(a)(2)(A); and its right and duty to engage in good-faith collective bargaining with the agency, §§ 7114(a)(4), (b). That context helps explain why the right granted in § 7114(a)(2)(B) is limited to situations in which the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary actiona condition restricting the right to union presence or participation in investigatory examinations that do not threaten the witness' employment. We find nothing in this context, however, suggesting that an examination that obviously presents the risk of employee discipline is nevertheless outside the coverage of the section because it is conducted by an investigator housed in one office of NASA rather than another. On this point, NASA's internal organization is irrelevant. Second, the phrase representative of the agency is used in two other places in the FSLMRS where it may refer to representatives of agency management acting in their capacity as actual or prospective parties to a collectivebargaining agreement. One reference pertains to grievances, § 7114(a)(2)(A), and the other to the bargaining process itself, § 7103(a)(12) (defining collective bargaining). NASA and NASAOIG submit that the phrase at issue should ordinarily retain the same meaning wherever used in the same statute, and we agree. But even accepting NASA's and NASAOIG's characterization of §§ 7114(a)(2)(A) and 7103(a)(12), the fact that some representative[s] of the agency may perform functions relating to grievances and bargaining does not mean that other personnel who conduct examinations covered by § 7114(a)(2)(B) are not also fairly characterized as agency representative[s]. As an organization, an agency must rely on a variety of representatives to carry out its functions and, though acting in different capacities, each may be acting for, and on behalf of, the agency. Third, NASA and NASAOIG assert that their narrow construction is supported by the history and purpose of § 7114(a)(2)(B). As is evident from statements by the author of the provision [1] as well as similar text in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251 (1975), this section of the FSLMRS was patterned after that decision. In Weingarten, we upheld the National Labor Relations Board's conclusion that an employer's denial of an employee's request to have a union representative present at an investigatory interview, which the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action, was an unfair labor practice. Id., at 252-253, 256. We reasoned that the Board's position was consistent with the employee's right under § 7 of the NLRA to engage in concerted activities. Id., at 260. Given that history, NASA and its OIG contend that the comparable provision in the FSLMRS should be limited to investigations by representatives of that part of agency management with responsibility for collectively bargaining with the employee's union. This argument ignores the important difference between the text of the NLRA and the text of the FSLMRS. That the general protection afforded to employees by § 7 of the NLRA provided a sufficient basis for the Board's recognition of a novel right in the private sector, see id., at 260-262, 266-267, does not justify the conclusion that the text of the FSLMRSwhich expressly grants a comparable right to employees in the public sectorshould be narrowly construed to cover some, but not all, interviews conducted by agency representatives that have a disciplinary potential. Congress' specific endorsement of a Government employee's right to union representation by incorporating it in the text of the FSLMRS gives that right a different foundation than if it were merely the product of an agency's attempt to elaborate on a more general provision in light of broad statutory purposes. [2] The basis for the right to union representation in this context cannot compel the uncodified limitation proposed by NASA and its OIG. Employing ordinary tools of statutory construction, in combination with the Authority's position on the matter, we have no difficulty concluding that § 7114(a)(2)(B) is not limited to agency investigators representing an entity that collectively bargains with the employee's union.