Opinion ID: 198940
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearing and speaking

Text: 23 Santiago has not provided evidence sufficient to demonstrate that her claimed impairment substantially interfered with hearing or speaking. The Supreme Court recently emphasized that a court must determine on a case-by-case basis whether an individual has offered sufficient evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of [her] own experience . . . is substantial. Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2169. As the EEOC regulations instruct, we examine the evidence of the duration, severity, and long-term impact of Santiago's alleged limitations. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2). 24 As for duration, it is undisputed that Santiago's auditory problems were temporary and that her hearing is now normal. Beginning in November, 1995, Santiago underwent subjective tests. These reflected a hearing loss in her right ear. 3 By November, 1997, objective tests showed that her hearing was normal in both ears and there is no evidence of hearing loss beyond that time. Hence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, at most, Santiago experienced moderate to severe hearing loss in one ear for approximately two years. 25 It is true, as the district court acknowledged, that the temporary nature of an impairment does not necessarily preclude it from constituting a disability under the ADA: 26 Although short-term, temporary restrictions generally are not substantially limiting, an impairment does not necessarily have to be permanent to rise to the level of a disability. Some conditions may be long-term or potentially long-term, in that their duration is indefinite and unknowable or is expected to be at least several months. Such conditions, if severe, may constitute disabilities. 27 Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual, Interpretations (CCH) §§ 902.4, ¶¶ 6884, p. 5319 (1995)) (emphasis supplied). 28 It is debatable whether Santiago's treating physicians considered her ear-related impairment to be permanent, long-term or potentially long-term. For example, in March, 1996, Dr. Gonzaalez recommended that Santiago not fly until her condition improved, and Dr. Murphy stated that Santiago should be temporarily removed from flying duties until her condition stabilized. 29 Even assuming that Santiago's impairment was potentially long-term, however, there is no evidence that the temporary diminution in her right-ear hearing had a severe impact on her functional ability to hear. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i). The record at most supports a possible finding that Santiago's hearing loss was moderate to severe in one ear only. An audiological evaluation summary dated March 3, 1997, states that Counseling [was] provided relative to impairments associated with the unilateral hearing loss, namely, the inability to perform sound localization, and difficulty with speech discrimination in noisy environments. No evidence, however, identifies the overall functional degree of loss suffered by Santiago. See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2169 (fact that plaintiff suffered monocular vision was, without more, insufficient to establish disability). Nor is there evidence that the hearing loss actually affected Santiago's activities in some specific way. See Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 52 (5th Cir. 1997) (where plaintiff offered no evidence that he is unable to engage in any usual activity because of blindness in one eye, major life activity of seeing is not substantially limited). Given her normal hearing in one ear and the existence of some residual hearing in the other, there is insufficient basis, without more, for assuming a substantial loss in overall hearing ability. In short, Santiago has not adduced sufficient evidence that, compared to the average person in the general population, she was significantly restricted in her hearing. See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2168-69; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1). 30 The same is even more true with regard to the major life activity of speaking. The record contains at most some evidence suggesting that Santiago's tone of voice may have been affected by her impairment. This is inadequate, without more and in light of the record discussed supra, for a reasonable jury to conclude that her impairment substantially limited her speaking. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 1998) (where there was no evidence that disorder affected plaintiff's ability to communicate generally, there was no substantial interference with her ability to speak). Moreover, Santiago points to no evidence of the actual or expected long-term impact of her temporary hearing impairment. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(iii). 31 In sum, under the fact-specific analysis of the duration, severity, and long-term impact of Santiago's hearing impairment mandated by the ADA, see Katz, 87 F.3d at 32, we conclude that it cannot be reasonably construed to have substantially limited her major life activities of hearing and speaking. 4