Opinion ID: 1998602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Prior Sexual Misconduct

Text: The defendant first argues that the trial justice erred in permitting the state to introduce the testimony of Joseph and Roger. He asserts that the testimony did not fall within any of the exceptions to inadmissible character evidence contained in Rule 404(b) because the previous incidents were so dissimilar and remote in time from the charged offense that the jury improperly could have viewed the evidence as showing that defendant had a propensity to commit sexual offenses. The issue initially arose before trial when the state filed a motion in limine requesting permission to present the testimony of Joseph and Roger. After hearing oral arguments from both parties, the trial justice permitted the testimony under Rule 404(b) notwithstanding defendant's objection. Rule 404(b) sets forth various exceptions to the general exclusionary rule    that prohibits the use of prior-bad-acts evidence to prove conduct in conformity with character. State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000). Rule 404(b) states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable. In interpreting Rule 404(b) in the context of a molestation or sexual assault case, this Court has said that evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct cannot be admitted to prove that `defendant is a bad man, and that he has a propensity toward sexual offenses and, therefore, probably committed the offenses with which he is charged.' State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 806 (R.I.2005) (quoting State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 886 (R.I.1996)). When prior sexual misconduct evidence is offered concerning the defendant and someone other than the complainant under Rule 404(b), [5] this Court has indicated that those prior instances must be nonremote and similar to the charged offense to be admissible. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d at 806 (quoting State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 627, 382 A.2d 526, 533 (1978)). This means that the alleged incidents must be closely related in time, place, age, family relationships of the victims, and the form of the sexual acts. Id. (quoting State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043, 1045 (R.I.1994)). In addition, the evidence is admissible `only when [the] exception is relevant to proving the charge lodged against the defendant,' and `only when reasonably necessary.' Id. (quoting Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533). Finally, the trial justice must instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence may be considered. Id. Turning to the issue presented herein, we initially note that the admissibility of this type of Rule 404(b) evidence, as well as all evidence, is a decision entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not interfere with the trial justice's decision unless a clear abuse of discretion is apparent. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d at 805 (quoting State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 504 (R.I.2004)). Applying our deferential standard, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the prior-acts evidence was admissible to show a common scheme, plan, or modus operandi to molest young boys. First, the trial justice properly considered the remoteness of the prior incidents involving Joseph and Roger. In this respect, he specifically cited State v. Hopkins, 698 A.2d 183 (R.I.1997), which he felt was most on point with this particular case. In Hopkins, this Court affirmed the admission of evidence of prior sexual misconduct perpetrated against boys of a similar age to the victim, even though the incidents of abuse occurred ten years apart, because the incidents were committed in a like manner against boys who were under [defendant's] control or influence. Id. at 185, 186. Here, although the incidents with Joseph and Roger occurred seven and eleven years before the incident with Robert, respectively, the trial justice specifically found that the remoteness of the prior acts was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. [6] It is our opinion that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in so ruling. Second, the trial justice properly considered the similarity of the prior allegations to the charged crime in making his ruling. He noted that, like the complainant, the proposed Rule 404(b) witnesses were young boys at the time of the misconduct who were in the location of defendant's home and that they were under defendant's influence, supervision, or control when he took advantage of that authoritative position. [7] Although Roger was slightly older than the other two boys at the time of his encounter with defendant, all three boys were at what may be considered a vulnerable age that would possibly make them less resistant to defendant's unwelcome advances and less likely to report the incidents to the authorities. See Mohapatra, 880 A.2d at 808 (stating the same reasoning for admitting the Rule 404(b) testimony of a young woman even though there was a meaningful difference between her age and that of the adolescent female complainant). In addition, Joseph, like the complainant, said that defendant asked to photograph him. Based on these similarities, we cannot say that the trial justice abused his discretion in finding that the prior acts were sufficiently similar to the charged acts. Next, the evidence must be relevant to the crime charged and reasonably necessary. Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533. To be found guilty of second-degree child molestation sexual assault, defendant's contact with Robert had to be done for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault. G.L.1956 §§ 11-37-1(7) and 11-37-8.3. This Court has held that evidence of a defendant's prior sexual misconduct may be necessary for the state to show that the defendant's intent in touching the victim was for sexual gratification and to disprove that the improper touching was accidental or innocent. See State v. Davis, 670 A.2d 786, 789 (R.I. 1996). In the present case, the jury could infer, from the evidence of similar incidents involving two other young boys, that defendant's intent in touching Robert was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. In deciding that the testimony was admissible, the trial justice properly made the observation that the state may have been unable to sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt concerning the sexual gratification element of the crime without the Rule 404(b) testimony. The trial justice therefore did not abuse his discretion in ruling that Joseph's and Roger's testimony was relevant and reasonably necessary to prove the crime charged. Finally, the trial justice instructed the jury in considerable detail, after both Joseph and Roger testified and again in his final instructions, that the testimony could be used only for the limited purposes provided by Rule 404(b) and not as a basis for inferring that defendant had a propensity to commit sexual offenses. He designated with particularity in all three instructions that the specific exception to which the evidence was relevant was the common scheme or plan exception. These instructions properly informed the jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence could be used. [8] Therefore, given the trial justice's compliance with all the relevant restrictions on admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, we conclude that the admission of Joseph's and Roger's testimony was a sustainable exercise of his discretion.