Opinion ID: 799599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Communication or Conduct on the Basis of Sex

Text: To establish the second element of his hostile work environment claim, Kalich needed to show that  but for the fact of [his] sex, [he] would not have been the object of harassment. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 163). This element is derived from the language in section 37.2202(1)(a) of ELCRA which prohibits discrimination because of . . . sex. Id. at 308, 664 N.W.2d 129. Stated differently, a plaintiff must show that the harassment was gender-based. See Barbour v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 198 Mich.App. 183, 497 N.W.2d 216, 218 (1993) (per curiam). A plaintiff can make this showing with evidence that members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)). Harassment or discrimination because of a person's sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation is not prohibited conduct under ELCRA. Barbour, 497 N.W.2d at 217-18. In Vickers, we evaluated a male plaintiff's claim of same-gender sexual harassment utilizing the Supreme Court's approach in Oncale. [1] We identified three ways a male plaintiff could establish the because of sex element of a hostile work environment claim based on same-gender sexual harassment: (1) by showing that the harasser making sexual advances acted out of a sexual desire; (2) by showing that the harasser was motivated by general hostility to the presence of men in the workplace; or (3) by offering direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 765 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81, 118 S.Ct. 998). The district court properly concluded that Kalich failed to establish that Rich's conduct towards him was because of his gender. In his deposition, Kalich admitted that Rich made no apparent sexual advances toward him, nor indicated any sexual interest in him. Kalich did not present any evidence that Rich had a general hostility to men in the workplace, and Kalich did not offer comparative evidence that Rich generally treated women in the workplace more favorably than men. In fact, Kalich stated in his deposition that Rich was rude, aggressive and generally unapproachable towards all employees. Kalich even recounted a specific instance in which one of his colleaguesa female manager at another store locationcalled Kalich in tears after a meeting in which Rich yelled and screamed at her. By all accounts, Kalich established that Rich created very unpleasant working conditions for the employees that were in Rich's chain-of-command. While Kalich seemed to be the primary target of Rich's campaign of teasing and name-calling, there is no evidence that Rich singled Kalich out because of his gender. In fact, Kalich acknowledged in his deposition that he believed Rich made the derogatory comments because he knew or suspected that Kalich was gay. Under Michigan law, as under Title VII, sexual orientation is not a protected classification. Barbour, 497 N.W.2d at 217-18. Thus, harassment or discrimination based upon a person's sexual orientation cannot form the basis of a cognizable claim. Id. Moreover, teasing and name-calling, while inappropriate in a professional environment, are insufficient to state a claim for sexual harassment. See Schemansky v. California Pizza Kitchen, Inc., 122 F.Supp.2d 761, 775-76 (E.D.Mich.2000); Quinto v. Cross and Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358, 547 N.W.2d 314, 320-21 (1996) (noting that conduct that is demeaning or humiliating but that does not evidence hostility towards a protected class is not actionable under ELCRA). In sum, the district court properly concluded that Kalich did not present sufficient evidence on this element of his claim to withstand summary judgment.