Opinion ID: 1161100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Tort of Outrage and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: Plaintiffs Hyde and Yarbrough allege tort of outrage and negligent infliction of emotional distress. [3] Summary judgment was granted in favor of the County and Plaintiffs Hyde and Yarbrough seek review of the superior court's determination of these issues.
Outrageous conduct is conduct which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim `Outrageous!' Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wash.2d 440, 448, 341 P.2d 859 (1959) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 46(g) (Supp.1948)). See also Dunn v. Moto Photo, Inc., 828 S.W.2d 747, 753 (Tenn. App.1991). That, however, is not the test for a tort of outrage claim. To establish a tort of outrage claim, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) severe emotional distress on the part of the plaintiff. Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash.2d 612, 630, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989) (citing Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wash.2d 48, 61, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987)). In Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 530 P.2d 291, 77 A.L.R.3d 436 (1975), we described what is required by these three elements: First, the emotional distress must be inflicted intentionally or recklessly; mere negligence is not enough. Second, the conduct of the defendant must be outrageous and extreme .... Liability exists only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. (Italics ours.) ... Clearly, a case-by-case approach will be necessary to define the precise limits of such conduct. Nevertheless, among the factors a jury or court should consider are the position occupied by the defendant (comment e ), whether plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress and defendant's knowledge of this fact (comment f ), and whether defendant's conduct may have been privileged under the circumstances (comment g ). Third, the conduct must result in severe emotional distress to the plaintiff (comment j ). Resulting bodily harm would, of course, be an indication of severe emotional distress, but a showing of bodily harm is not necessary. Fourth, the plaintiff must be an immediate family member of the person who is the object of the defendant's actions, and he must be present at the time of such conduct (comment 1 ). Grimsby, 85 Wash.2d at 59-60, 530 P.2d 291 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) and comments thereto). Plaintiffs Hyde and Yarbrough concede they were not present when County employees appropriated and displayed photographs of the corpses of their deceased relatives. They argue, however, that the presence element is inapplicable because the actions of the County employees were directed toward them. Plaintiffs Hyde and Yarbrough ask us to reconsider whether the benefits of the `presence' element outweigh the cost of denying [Plaintiffs'] claim, Br. of Appellant (Yarbrough) at 47, and assert we should recognize an exception to the presence requirement for cases where the Defendants used deceptive and unconscionable means to preclude the third party's presence. Br. of Appellant (Yarbrough) at 48-49. The County argues the presence element is required at all times and because Plaintiffs were not present during any of the conduct, summary judgment was appropriate. The County relies on our previous decisions in Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash.2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972) and Lund v. Caple, 100 Wash.2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 (1984), where we affirmed the presence requirement. We agree with the County and hold that because Plaintiffs Hyde and Yarbrough were not present when the conduct occurred, they may not maintain tort of outrage actions. In Schurk, we held a mother could not maintain a tort of outrage action as a result of the molestation of her daughter, in part because the mother was not near the scene of the molestations; she did not observe these injuries occurring to her daughter, and learned of the occurrences at a later date from a third person. Schurk, 80 Wash.2d at 656-57, 497 P.2d 937. In Lund, we affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs tort of outrage complaint based on a sexual relationship between plaintiffs wife and the pastor of the church the plaintiff and his wife attended. In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, we stated, [t]he fatal flaw in appellant's outrage theory is that he was not present when the alleged outrageous conduct occurred, and did not even learn of the conduct until several months later. Since appellant was not present, he has not established the tort of outrage. Lund, 100 Wash.2d at 742, 675 P.2d 226 (emphasis added). While the conduct complained of in the cases before us is the type that would cause a reasonable person to exclaim, outrageous, Plaintiffs Hyde and Yarbrough were simply not present when the conduct occurred. Even if we were inclined to find the tort of outrage available to Plaintiffs, we would be required to overlook the presence element. We find no support for such a holding in either the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the comments thereto, as we adopted in Grimsby, or our previous cases. As such, we hold summary judgment in favor of the County was proper as to Plaintiffs' claims on the tort of outrage.
Plaintiffs also claim negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash.2d 424,435-36, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976), we recognized the tort Of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Where a plaintiff alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress, his or her claim is tested against the established concepts of duty, breach, proximate cause, and damage or injury. Hunsley, 87 Wash.2d at 434, 553 P.2d 1096. Similar to the tort of outrage, we have limited recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, holding that mental suffering by a relative who is not present at the scene of the injury-causing event is unforeseeable as a matter of law. Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash.2d 254, 260, 787 P.2d 553 (1990). Plaintiffs and the County present identical arguments to those discussed in the tort of outrage section above. For the reasons discussed in that section, we hold the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the County. None of the Plaintiffs were present at the scene where the tortious action occurred and, therefore, are not entitled to maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.