Opinion ID: 1194950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: To What Relief Is Defendant Entitled?

Text: In holding that the case must be remanded to give the trial court an opportunity to exercise its discretion, the Court of Appeal was correct. Our decision in Romero, as we expressly held therein, is fully retroactive. (13 Cal.4th at p. 530, fn. 13.) Accordingly, as we also held, [a] defendant serving a sentence under the Three Strikes law ... imposed by a court that misunderstood the scope of its discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385(a), may raise the issue on appeal.... ( Ibid. ) Because the record in this case shows the trial judge erroneously believed he had no such discretion, defendant has a remedy on appeal. Our recent decision in People v. Fuhrman, supra, 16 Cal.4th 930, is not to the contrary. In Fuhrman we withheld relief on appeal in so-called silent record cases, i.e., cases in which the record does not show the trial court misunderstood the law. At the same time, however, we emphasized that relief continues to be available in cases such as the one before us now. We wrote: Romero establishes that where the record affirmatively discloses that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to impose sentence with full awareness of its discretion as clarified in Romero.  ( People v. Fuhrman, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 944.) The People do not argue to the contrary. Accordingly, the only question before us concerns the procedure to be followed on remand. (1) Under the procedure contemplated by the Court of Appeal, defendant would have an opportunity to appear with counsel before the trial court only if the court decides in advance to rule in defendant's favor. (See ante, p. 256.) Defendant argues such a procedure would violate his statutory and constitutional rights to be present with counsel at sentencing and pronouncement of judgment, a critical stage of the criminal prosecution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 1193; In re Perez (1966) 65 Cal.2d 224, 229 [53 Cal. Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6]; see also U.S. Const., Amends. VI, XIV; Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128 [88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336].) The People, in response, do not dispute that a defendant has an absolute right to be present at a sentence modification hearing and imposition of sentence. The People do not, however, concede that the procedure contemplated by the Court of Appeal amounts to sentencing or pronouncement of judgment. According to the People, if the trial court on remand determines not to strike a prior felony conviction finding, no sentencing occurs, judgment is not pronounced, and defendant's right to be present is not implicated. We may assume that a reviewing court has the power, when a trial court has made a mistake in sentencing, to remand with directions that do not inevitably require all of the procedural steps involved in arraignment for judgment and sentencing. Section 1260, which sets out the permissible dispositions of a cause on appeal, permits the reviewing court to remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances. We have exercised this power, for example, by directing a trial court to determine an unresolved factual issue affecting eligibility for probation, when the court had erroneously assumed the defendant was not eligible. ( People v. Southack (1952) 39 Cal.2d 578, 591 [248 P.2d 12].) Thus, it appears we may properly remand to permit the trial court to make the threshold determination of whether to exercise its discretion in defendant's favor without necessarily requiring resentencing unless the court does act favorably. It does not follow, however, that defendant's presence at the time the court makes the threshold determination serves no useful purpose. Under the statute authorizing us to remand with directions, we must remand for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances. (§ 1260, italics added.) This, then, is the dispositive inquiry: Is it just under the circumstances to require the presence of defendant and his counsel on remand, at the first occasion on which the trial judge will consider whether to exercise his sentencing discretion in defendant's favor? The People, who would have us answer the question in the negative, contend that the trial court can make an informed decision regarding its exercise of discretion without further argument by the parties. Indeed, from the record the court is able to glean the nature of the defendant's criminal history via the probation officer's report as well as the nature of the current offenses from the trial transcript. [L]ittle would be served, the People submit, by allowing the parties to make superfluous arguments prior to the trial court making an initial decision relating to its inclination to strik[e] the prior convictions. We disagree. The evidence and arguments that might be presented on remand cannot justly be considered superfluous, because defendant and his counsel have never enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to marshal and present the case supporting a favorable exercise of discretion. As defendant reasonably observes, [i]t would have been a waste of the court's time for [defendant] to have attempted to present evidence which might convince the court to strike a `strike' at a time when the court believed that it had no discretion to do so. Next, the People argue that to require a hearing in defendant's presence would be inefficient. Due process, the People assert, does not require thousands of defendants subjected to Romero remand be transported from state prison to the superior court in order to be present when the superior court determines not to exercise its discretion to strike.... This court has been solicitous of the People's concern for efficiency. That concern played an important role in the court's decision in People v. Fuhrman, supra, 16 Cal.4th 930, that relief on appeal would not be available in silent record cases. As the court explained, in silent record cases the question of striking one or more prior convictions under section 1385 may not have been mentioned at sentencing by either the trial court or defense counsel because all those involved in the proceeding recognized that, in view of the defendant's background and the circumstances of the current offense, the exercise of such discretion in the defendant's favor was not a realistic possibility. ( Id. at p. 945.) Faced with this doubt regarding the existence of prejudicial error, the court decided that to compel a new sentencing hearing in every pre- Romero [silent record] case appeared inconsistent with the interests of the administration of justice throughout the state.... ( Id. at pp. 945-946.) In contrast, the record before us affirmatively indicates the trial judge did misunderstand the scope of his sentencing discretion. Moreover, nothing in the record excludes the possibility the judge might have exercised his discretion in defendant's favor. Thus, we are not free to surmise, as in Fuhrman, that the exercise of ... discretion in the defendant's favor was not a realistic possibility ( id. at p. 945), or that to permit defendant to present, in person and with the assistance of counsel, his case for a favorable exercise of discretion would be an inefficient use of judicial resources. Finally, the People maintain defendant's presence should not be required because defendant has no statutory right to move to strike a prior. The right to make such a motion, the People observe, belongs exclusively to the prosecutor and to the court, acting sua sponte. (§ 1385, subd. (a).) [3] Because (to conclude the argument) defendant has no formal right to request such an order, he could not be heard to complain on appeal about the court's refusal to act sua sponte; [4] thus, he need not be present when the court does so refuse. The answer to this argument is that the question of appealability does not control the question of the need for defendant's presence. In the ordinary case decided after Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, a trial judge who decides not to exercise his or her discretion in the defendant's favor makes that decision at a hearing attended by the defendant and his counsel. Even if nothing is said on the subject and no arguments for a favorable exercise of discretion are presented, still no unfairness results because the defendant and his counsel are present in the courtroom at the relevant time and free to advance such arguments if they choose. To require defendant's presence on remand in this case merely affords him the same opportunity to invoke Romero, a fully retroactive decision (13 Cal.4th at p. 530, fn. 13), as is enjoyed by all defendants sentenced after that decision. Our power to order a limited remand, as mentioned, includes the authority to direct the trial court to conduct such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances. (§ 1260, italics added.) Because to permit the trial court to decide how to exercise its discretion under section 1385 without affording defendant and his counsel an opportunity to address the subject would be manifestly unfair, section 1260 provides sufficient authority to require defendant's presence on remand. A defendant, of course, has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the criminal prosecution, i.e., all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819, fn. 15 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562]), or whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge ( Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-106 [54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575]). But in view of section 1260 we need not rest our decision on constitutional grounds. [5] On remand, the superior court should conduct a hearing in the presence of defendant, his counsel, and the People to determine whether to dismiss one or more prior felony conviction findings pursuant to section 1385. If the court decides to dismiss one or more findings, the court should proceed to resentence defendant. If the court decides not to dismiss a finding, the court should remand defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of his term.