Opinion ID: 449779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MPEP Sec. 2286

Text: 66 MPEP Sec. 2286 provides that the PTO will not stay its reexamination of a patent that is in litigation unless trial has commenced. As discussed ante, Gould asserts that this practice is directly contrary to the legislative purpose of providing an expeditious alternative to the entire process of litigation. Gould argues that in his case Congress' intention was defeated by the PTO's refusal to stay reexamination. He asserts that MPEP Sec. 2286, whereby the PTO proceeded with reexamination of Gould's patents, is contrary to statutory authority and invalid, and reexamination of Gould's patents should be vacated. 67 The Commissioner responds that it is not for the PTO to decide whether trial will continue or be stayed, and takes issue with Gould's statement that the completion of pre-trial procedures is a sufficient assurance of imminent trial as to require the PTO to refrain from proceeding with a request for reexamination, even if proceeding with such request would delay the trial, as occurred in Gould's situation. The PTO also argues that the rule is in accord with the statute. 68 Essentially, Gould argues that the PTO should be required to exercise discretion on whether to proceed with reexamination in view of imminent trial, and that the failure to authorize and to exercise such discretion is a critical flaw in PTO practice, which alone or with other flaws requires us to vacate the reexamination process that Gould's patents are undergoing. 69 We find no merit in Gould's analogy to reissue practice, for we observe that PTO procedures are identical for both reissue and reexamination applications where a court has stayed litigation, see MPEP Sec. 1442.03, suggested Form Paragraph 14.07: 70 While there is concurrent litigation related to this reissue application, action in this reissue application will NOT be stayed because a stay of that litigation is in effect for the purpose of awaiting the outcome of these reissue proceedings. 71 See also 37 C.F.R. 1.565(b). 72 Even if PTO discretion to stay reexamination were authorized it could not affect Gould's situation. The Florida district court did not invite the PTO to exercise discretion on whether to consider Control Laser's reexamination request, and did not defer to the PTO to decide whether reexamination or trial should proceed first. The Florida court itself stayed the trial in order for reexamination to be pursued. (The stay of pending litigation to enable PTO review of contested patents was one of the specified purposes of the reexamination legislation.) The court never relinquished control of its right to proceed with the trial; and the PTO never was granted the right to decide whether or when trial would proceed. 73 On these facts, the PTO did not have the opportunity to exercise the discretion that Gould complains MPEP Sec. 2286 prevents it from exercising. Whatever deprivation Gould may be experiencing due to the ongoing reexamination is not due to this administrative procedure, and we find no due process question raised thereby. Nor do we find in Sec. 2286 a derogation of the statutory purpose nor an undue extension of statutory authority. We affirm the district court on this issue. 74