Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admonishments to Jurors During Voir Dire

Text: Invited to address the prospective jurors, the prosecutor, after some preliminary remarks, said: My sole question is[,] are you sure that if we reach [a penalty phase] of this trial you can then give equal weight to the two separate penalties? That is going to be my question. [¶] ... [¶] Has anyone, during the time  even during this questioning since the time you filled out these questionnaires  there is nothing wrong with saying it. If you feel comfortable outside of the presence of this group, you can say it in that manner. If you want to just say it now, if you have changed your mind, do you all promise me that you will let the court know before you are sworn in as a juror, before we try this case and you hear all the evidence? And then we reach a certain verdict and at the penalty phase as a prosecutor I am standing and talking to a group of jurors and someone says, you know, now that I am here at the door ... I don't want it, I can't, I have a conscientious objection to doing this. Will all of you promise me if you change your mind before you are sworn in as a juror, if you decide you cannot make that decision, will you notify the court? Does everyone agree to that? (Italics added.) All the prospective jurors answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor continued: Has anyone changed their mind? Do they feel that if we get to the penalty phase of this trial and you have to go into that jury room and sit with people and you have to make two choices, you can't say, well, my card says reserve, I could go for the lesser, I could go for that life without thing. You have to give the weight to the evidence as the penalty phase goes. Does any [juror] here feel maybe that they cannot, they have a conscientious objection to voting for death? Does anyone? (Italics added.) The jurors answered in the negative. But everybody does promise me if you change your mind between now and the time you are actually sworn in, you will notify the court that you have given this some thought? Everybody promises that? The jurors answered in the affirmative. The trial court then added: Let me reiterate that last point and I want you to promise me if you change your mind and get to the point where you say I can't be a juror who can choose, as I said at the beginning, let me know. Defendant contends that, by these comments, the prosecutor improperly extracted a one-sided promise from the jurors to notify the trial court if, after being selected to serve, any juror decided he or she could not vote for the death penalty, but did not similarly ask the jurors to notify the court if anyone decided he or she could not vote for life imprisonment. Defendant further contends the trial court revealed its lack of impartiality by supporting the prosecutor's statement. We disagree. It is, of course, well settled that the examination of prospective jurors should not be used to educate the jury panel to the particular facts of the case, to compel the jurors to commit themselves to vote a particular way, to prejudice the jury for or against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate the jury, or to instruct the jury in matters of law.' ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 209, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302, quoting People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 408, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869.) At the threshold, we find defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 47-48, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388 [failure to object forfeited challenge to prosecutorial questioning during voir dire].) To the extent defendant characterizes his claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct, we reach the same conclusion. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) [3] Although defendant correctly argues this court retains inherent discretion to entertain the issue despite this forfeiture (see People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429), he presents no persuasive reason to do so. Were we to address the merits of the claim, we would find no error. The prosecutor merely asked the jurors to inform the trial court if, after having filled out the juror questionnaires and undergoing voir dire, they developed a conscientious objection to the death penalty or found they could not weigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He did not attempt to indoctrinate the jury or slant its perception of the appropriate penalty for the case. The prosecutor's comments were no different than defense counsel's comments, asking each prospective juror to affirm they could vote for life imprisonment if they found the mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence. We addressed a similar issue in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708. In that case, during final stages of jury selection, the court asked the entire remaining jury panel whether anyone's `attitude has changed toward serving on a panel that may be called upon to assess a penalty in this case.' One of the two jurors raised her hand. The second sent the court a note saying, `After long, careful thought, I know that I could not vote for the death penalty.' Over defense objection, the court and parties requestioned both individually. The court excused them for cause because of their newly expressed views on the death penalty. ( Id. at p. 358, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) We found no error, explaining that much time had passed from the initial voir dire and it was reasonable to ask if anyone's views had changed. ( Ibid. ) We find the situation in this case similar to that in Carpenter and accordingly find the prosecutor did not improperly indoctrinate the jury. To the extent defendant contends the prosecutor's pretrial address to the jury constituted misconduct, we reject that claim as well. `The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. `A prosecutor's ... intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.' [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; see People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 951, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736.) Here, there was nothing deceptive, reprehensible or unfair about the prosecutor's comments to the jury, nor did he attempt to get the jury to commit to vote for the death penalty before hearing all the evidence. We conclude the prosecutor did not commit misconduct when he addressed the jury before trial. Defendant also argues he was deprived of his constitutional rights to a fair trial, an impartial judge and appropriate punishment under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the court's comment reiterat[ing] the prosecutor's comments betrayed the court's bias in favor of the death penalty. Defendant failed to preserve a claim of judicial bias by making a timely objection ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 346, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545), nor was this the type of situation in which an objection would have been futile ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673), as the court could have clarified its remarks in response to a defense objection. In any event, as illustrated by our discussion of the issue in People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 358, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, the claim is baseless because the trial court's comments cannot reasonably be construed either as expressing a bias in favor of the death penalty or as expecting the jury to return a death verdict.