Opinion ID: 2633688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appointment of the GAL as Guardian Designee

Text: As a separate ground for vacating the probate court's order, the court of appeals determined that the probate court improperly appointed itself as guardian, and the GAL as guardian designee, of J.C.T. In re J.C.T., 155 P.3d at 456. The court of appeals found that this improper appointment potentially left J.C.T. within the definition of a neglected or dependent child under section 19-3-102(1)(e), C.R.S. (2007), divesting the probate court of jurisdiction and vesting jurisdiction with the juvenile court. We reject the appellate court's reasoning and hold that the appointment of the probate court as guardian was not improper under the facts of this case. The Colorado Children's Code provides that, in addition to adoption actions, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings [c]oncerning any child who is neglected or dependent. § 19-1-104(1)(b). Under section 19-3-102(1)(e), in relevant part, a child is considered neglected or dependent if: (c) [t]he child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; [or] (e) [t]he child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian. In this case, upon concluding that J.C.T. was not domiciled with a parent, and that neither the probate court nor the GAL could serve as an authorized legal guardian for J.C.T., the court of appeals held that these were grounds to refer the matter to the juvenile court, which has the authority to assume jurisdiction and after an adjudicatory hearing, . . . to determine whether [J.C.T.] is a neglected or dependent child . . . In re J.C.T., 155 P.3d at 456. Before discussing whether the probate court's actions divested it of jurisdiction and vested jurisdiction in the juvenile court, we first evaluate whether the court properly appointed itself as guardian, and the GAL as guardian designee, of J.C.T. Following the guardianship hearing in March 2005, the probate court issued its order terminating Guardian 3's appointment as temporary substitute guardian, and stating, [t]he court is taking Guardianship of [J.C.T.] temporarily and [the GAL] is appointed as the Guardian Designee. Moreover, the court explained that [J.C.T.] will be temporarily staying with the Guardian ad Litem as he has in the past when necessary. [7] [J.C.T.'s] transfer to the Guardian ad Litem is part of the natural transition in this case. Then, in its April 2005 order denying Guardian 1's petition for guardianship, the court stated that it would continue its guardianship of [J.C.T.] until the proposed adoptive family's guardianship petition [could] be heard. The court of appeals held that these actions by the probate court were in error. Under the Colorado Probate Code, a guardian is defined as an individual at least twenty-one years of age, resident or non-resident, Who has qualified as a guardian of a minor or incapacitated person pursuant to appointment by a parent or by the court. The term includes a limited, emergency, and temporary substitute guardian but not a guardian ad litem.  § 15-14-102(4), C.R.S. (2007) (emphasis added). Guardian 1 first argues that the probate court could not appoint itself as a guardian because the court is not an individual. The GAL and the Tribes, however, ask this court to follow the statutory analysis set forth in In re Estate of Morgan, 160 P.3d 356 (Colo.App.2007). Morgan addressed a trial court order appointing the El Paso County Department of Human Services as the permanent guardian for an incapacitated ward. Id. at 357. In that case, the court of appeals held that the appointment was proper under the definition of guardian in section 15-14-102(4). We find its analysis in reaching that conclusion to be persuasive, and now apply its reasoning to the case at hand. Although section 15-14-102(4) provides that a guardian means an individual, our reading of the guardianship provisions as a whole leads us to conclude that the probate court as a government entity may serve as a guardian. See Morgan, 160 P.3d at 358-59 (interpreting guardianship statutes and upholding the appointment of a government agency as the permanent guardian for an incapacitated ward). Section 15-14-310(1), C.R.S. (2007), requires the probate court in appointing a guardian to consider persons otherwise qualified in the following order of priority and then sets forth eight categories of persons. Under section 15-14-310(3), the probate court, for good cause shown, may decline to appoint a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower priority or no priority. As the Morgan court recognized, the legislature in these provisions used the word person. Morgan, 160 P.3d at 359. Section 15-14-102(10) defines a person as an individual, . . . government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity. The probate court therefore constitutes a person under the terms of the statute and thus, could appoint itself for good cause to serve as J.C.T.'s temporary guardian. We also find that it was not improper for the court to appoint the GAL as guardian designee. The term guardian designee does not appear in any provision of either the Probate Code or the Children's Code, nor can it be found in Colorado case law. In fact, our review of case law across the country reveals only one case in which the phrase guardian-designee was used: In re Estate of Gustafson, 308 A.D.2d 305, 764 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2003). The Gustafson court reversed a trial court's order, removing a relative as guardian of an incapacitated person and appointing an independent attorney as the new guardian. Id. at 308, 764 N.Y.S.2d 46. While the reversal was based on the specific facts in that case, as well as the strong preference in New York for appointing a relative as guardian, it is worth noting that the court referred to the new guardian as the guardian-designee. Id. at 307-09, 764 N.Y.S.2d 46. The court did not discuss this title in its opinion, but seemed to treat the independent attorney as any other guardian for purposes of its analysis. See id. Aside from this case, the term guardian designee only appears in two state statutes, both of which seem to deal with a situation, such as this, where a public agency is the guardian. See Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law, § 14-404(a)(1)(iii) (West 2007) (establishing a file review requirement for each guardianship that a public agency has held for more than a year, based on a report to the review board with information including the dates of most recent visits of the guardian's designee); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(v) (2007) (limiting liability of guardian or the public guardian's designee in providing necessary medical care to an incapacitated ward). During oral argument in this case, the GAL maintained that in practice, in some guardianship cases in juvenile court, DHS is referred to as the child's guardian, with the department social worker being referenced as the guardian designee. [8] The GAL explained that the social worker as guardian designee takes direction from the head of DHS, just as the GAL as guardian designee in this case took direction from the probate court. In addition, counsel for the Tribes speculated that the probate court in this case intended its guardianship to be very temporary, and possibly used the term guardian designee to describe the GAL as a sort of placeholder as opposed to a full guardian. Despite this reasoning, the court of appeals rejected the appointment of the GAL as guardian designee as improper under the definition of guardian in section 15-14-102. More specifically, the court of appeals relied on the last sentence of the guardian definition in section 15-14-102(4): The term includes a limited, emergency, and temporary substitute guardian but not a guardian ad litem. See In re J.C.T., 155 P.3d at 456 (emphasis in original). The court interpreted this language to mean that a guardian ad litem could not also serve as a guardian. The Petitioners, however, contend' that this sentence is merely intended to distinguish between the two roles, not to prohibit a dual appointment. We agree that the sentence was simply meant to distinguish the role of a guardian from that of a guardian ad litem. The language specifically separates a guardian ad litem from types of probate guardianships provided by statute, specifically, limited, emergency, and temporary substitute guardians. See § 15-14-102(4). [9] Unlike these other listed positions, a guardian ad litem is not a type of guardianship under the Probate Code. He or she is not responsible for the minor ward's support, care, education, health, and welfare, as if he or she were a parent to the minor. See § 15-14-208(1). Instead, the GAL has a separate and distinguishable role. Under the Probate Code, a court may appoint a guardian ad litem if the court determines that representation of the interest otherwise would be inadequate. § 15-14-115, C.R.S. (2007). While a guardian is charged with the duty of taking care of [a ward], it is the universally acknowledged responsibility of guardians ad litem . . . `to represent the best interests' of children who are involved in litigation. Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents: Implications for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 Fordham L.Rev. 1785, 1785-86 (1996) (discussing role of GAL) (citations omitted). The wording of the guardian definition itself highlights the difference of these `two, roles by stating that the term guardian does not include the term guardian ad litem. In order words, the two roles are not one and the same. The definitional language does not, however, prohibit a person from serving as both guardian and guardian ad litem to the same minor ward. By contrast, section 15-14-310(4) specifically excludes [a]n owner, operator, or employee of a long-term-care provider from which the respondent is receiving care from serving as a guardian unless related to the respondent by blood, marriage, or adoption. Thus, if the legislature had intended to prevent guardians ad litem from serving as guardians, it surely could have established a similar exclusion; yet, it did not. We find, therefore, that the dual appointment of a person as guardian and guardian ad litem of a minor ward is not per se improper under the statute. In rejecting the appointment of the GAL as guardian designee of J.C.T., the court of appeals also recognized, without any discussion, an inherent conflict of interest between the GAL and the child's guardian. In re J.C.T., 155 P.3d at 456. While we acknowledge that there may be scenarios where an actual conflict of interest exists, thus preventing the dual appointment, we hold that there is no inherent conflict between the two positions. As we consider the issue of inherent conflict, we seek guidance from both the Chief Justice Directive on appointments of child representatives, as well as the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. Chief Justice Directive 04-06 sets forth the authority and responsibilities of the Office of the Child's Representative, the duties of attorneys appointed as child's representatives, the duties of judges and magistrates in cases involving children, and the procedures for complaints and sanctions. Court Appointments Through the Office of the Child's Representative, Chief Justice Directive 04-06 (amended July 2006). Nothing in directive 04-06 indicates that it would be an inherent conflict of interest for a GAL to also serve as a child's legal guardian. Directive 04-06 does state, however, that an attorney appointed as a GAL shall be subject to all of the rules and standards of the legal profession, including the additional responsibilities set forth by Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14. Id. Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14 delineates a lawyer's ethical duties when dealing with a client under a disability, which includes minority. While the rule itself does not address temporary guardianships, the comment to Rule 1.14 explains that [i]f the person [under a disability] has no guardian or legal representative, the lawyer must often act as a de facto guardian. By acknowledging the possibility that an attorney might assume two roles in dealing with a client under a disability, this comment suggests the lack of an inherent conflict of interest between the GAL role and the guardian role. Moreover, the ethical rules concerning conflicts of interest do not preclude the dual appointment. See Colo. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7-1.9 (2007). Asking this court to uphold the court of appeals' finding of a conflict of interest, Guardian 1 explains that the GAL, whose role is to look out for the best interests of J.C.T., was not in a position to evaluate herself and determine whether she would be a proper guardian for J.C.T. At first glance, ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 96-404 seems to support this conclusion. It cautions that a lawyer should not act as or seek to have himself appointed guardian except in the most exigent of circumstances, that is, where immediate and irreparable harm will result from the slightest delay. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (distinguishing between seeking the appointment of a guardian for a client and seeking to be the guardian). As an example of the latter situation, the Committee describes a lawyer needing to take action on behalf of his or her incapacitated client, who is about to be evicted, so as to prevent or delay the eviction. Id. While recognizing the need for immediate action in such a case, the Committee advises that the lawyer shall seek the appointment of an alternative formal guardian as soon as possible. Id. The case at hand presented a similar need for immediate action by the GAL to prevent the irreparable harm to J.C.T. that could have resulted from delay. Despite Guardian 1's claims to the contrary, the exigent circumstance in this case was not that the potential adoptive family could be lost; rather, it was the lack of any ready and available guardian. The probate court determined that Guardian 3 was no longer an appropriate guardian for J.C.T., that Guardian 2 was not capable of caring for J.C.T., and that J.C.T.'s prior placement with Guardian 1 had not been successful. After seven years of probate court supervision with three different guardianship placements, the court recognized that J.C.T. would be irreparably harmed, mentally and emotionally, by being placed with yet another stranger. Thus, even under the ABA Committee's narrow exception to dual appointments provided in Formal Opinion 96-404, the, probate court's appointment of the GAL as J.C.T.'s guardian designee was not improper. In addition, the dual appointment in this case did not present an actual conflict of interest. Here, both the probate court and the GAL knew that their guardianship appointments would be temporary. In fact, in her order denying Guardian 1's guardianship petition, the probate court judge stated that the court's guardianship would continue only until the potential adoptive family's guardianship petition could be heard. The court did not appoint itself and the GAL without a time frame and only then start considering options for J.C.T. These appointments were made with this specific family in mind as a possible successor guardian. The court and the GAL intended to be placeholders, preserving J.C.T.'s status quo in the sense that he was already extensively familiar with the GAL. Guardian 1 correctly asserts that the temporary duration of a guardianship placement does not ameliorate any conflicts of interest. Here, however, the interests of the GAL as a guardian were in line with those of J.C.T. Both as a guardian and as a GAL, she was acting to further J.C.T.'s best interests. Moreover, she had no desire to serve as J.C.T.'s permanent guardian. [10] While an actual conflict of interest may exist in some scenarios and thus prevent a dual appointment, we find that no such conflict existed in this case. [11] While the temporary guardianship appointments, both that of the probate court itself and of the GAL, were not ideal or even favored, the appointments were not prohibited by statute or rules of professional conduct. Both the probate court and the GAL were authorized to serve as J.C.T.'s temporary successor guardian. Because there was no period when J.C.T. was not domiciled with a guardian (or guardian designee), we conclude that J.C.T. was not a neglected or dependent child as defined by section 19-3-102(1)(e), and thus, not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court as provided by section 19-1-104(1). We find that, in making these appointments, the probate court was properly exercising its jurisdiction over the administration of guardianships. See § 19-3-103(1)(f); § 15-10-302, We also take issue with the argument that the probate court simply should have transferred the case to the juvenile court. While section 19-1-104(4)(b) provides that the probate court may request the juvenile court to make recommendations pertaining to guardianship, it does not establish a means for a case transfer, particularly where the case merely involves the appointment of a successor guardian for a minor ward. The probate court is only required to certify questions of legal custody to the juvenile court where the juvenile court has a petition regarding the same child already pending or if the court has continuing jurisdiction over the child. § 19-1-104(4)(a). Because that was not the situation here, there was not a means by which the probate court could order the juvenile court to take the case. Generally, the juvenile court process begins with a report of abuse or neglect, followed by a petition by the state claiming that a child is dependent or neglected. L.L., 10 P.3d at 1275 (explaining the juvenile court process); see also § 19-3-501 (discussing the petition initiation and preliminary investigation in juvenile court proceedings). Once the juvenile court adjudicates the child dependent or neglected, the court has the jurisdiction to place the child with a guardian, with the county department of social services, or in a foster home, among other placements. Id. Here, as discussed above, we find that J.C.T. was not neglected or dependent at the time of the court's appointment of itself as guardian. We have no indication from the record whether DHS would seek involvement and ask the juvenile court to take further action. In her 1998 report to the probate court, the GAL explained that DHS refused to step in because a guardian was caring for J.C.T. and there was a forum in which the guardian, as well as J.C.T.'s mother, could seek court orders. This remains the case today. In sum, we find that the probate court did not act improperly in appointing itself as temporary guardian of J.C.T., or in appointing the GAL as guardian designee. Further, the probate court has maintained its jurisdiction over J.C.T.'s guardianship.