Opinion ID: 767022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Race-Based Claims Under Section 1983 and Section 1985(3)3

Text: 24 The plaintiffs-appellants also contend that the district court erred in dismissing their constitutional claims based on racial discrimination under Section 1983 and Section 1985(3). The district court determined that these claims, like the sex-based claims brought under Section 1983, were preempted by the availability of a Title IX claim. The court reasoned that Title IX was the exclusive means Congress provided for the redress of sex discrimination at federally-funded institutions, and that this exclusivity precluded any claim under Section 1983 and Section 1985(3) even in regard to claims based on racial discrimination. While we agree with the district court in regard to sex-based claims, its reasoning as to the race-based claims does not take into consideration that Title IX should serve as the exclusive source of claims against federally-funded institutions only when sex-based discrimination is alleged; when the discrimination at issue is race-based, Title IX preemption does not apply. 25 Nevertheless, the district court came to the correct result. The proper means of asserting claims based on allegations of racial discrimination by the University is Title VI, which prohibits discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance based on race, color, or national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000d. The plaintiffs- appellants made a Title VI claim alleging race discrimination before the district court, and the court resolved that claim against the plaintiffs- appellants on summary judgment. 4 We have previously held that the availability of this claim precludes resort to a Section 1983 claim based on the same allegations of race discrimination. Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985) ([W]e hold that private actions based on Title VI may not be brought under sec. 1983.). Our logic in Alexander was based on our understanding that where a statute provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme that scheme may not be bypassed by pleading an underlying violation of the statute and bringing suit directly under sec. 1983. Id. This logic applies equally to Section 1985(3) claims, because pleading under that statute would also allow plaintiffs to circumvent the comprehensive structure Congress created to address the problem of racial discrimination at federally-funded institutions. See Great Am. Federal S. & L. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 336, 378 (1974) (holding that Title VII may not be bypassed through resort to Section 1985(3)). Where Congress has set up an enforcement mechanism with full remedies, as it has with Title VI, that regulatory structure may not be bypassed by resort to laws of more general applicability like Section 1983 and Section 1985(3). See National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20; see also Waid, 91 F.3d at 862-63 (arguing that access to the full panoply of judicial remedies is an indication that Congress intended a statutory regime to be exclusive).