Opinion ID: 2284813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delay as a Due Process Violation

Text: As to the first point, which is actually a due process claim, an appellant ordinarily must establish prejudice from the delay to obtain a reversal. See Knuckles v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Ky.2010). There was no indication of actual prejudice here. The court individually questioned each juror whether he or she had been affected in any way by the delay and no problems were reported. In the absence of proof of actual prejudice, this Court recently enumerated several considerations to help determine whether prejudice should be presumed. See id. at 323. Those considerations are the length of the delay, whether there was a good reason for the delay, whether the trial court properly admonished the jurors against communicating about the case with others prior to the separation, whether the case was so complex that a prolonged interruption would have a significant effect on the jurors' ability to remember complicated facts, whether alternatives to delaying the trial existed, and the extent of publicity surrounding the case. Id. When applied to the delay at issue here, these considerations support the trial court's decision to deny a mistrial. First, the delay in jury deliberations lasted six days, less than half as long as the fourteen-day delay this Court upheld in Knuckles. Second, there was certainly a good reason for the delay when two jurors needed to be hospitalized for treatment. Third, the trial court specifically and repeatedly admonished the jurors against communicating about the case with others prior to the separation during the delay. Fourth, this trial did not involve particularly complex factual issues that would easily have been confused after a six-day hiatus. On the contrary, the only real factual dispute revolved around the reasonableness of maintaining a standard delivery schedule in light of heightened blood pressure in the mother. Additionally, the court noted the jurors had taken copious notes during trial and that if any problems recollecting testimony did occur, those notes would be satisfactory to assist them. Fifth, there was no alternative to delaying the trial because a circuit court jury cannot consist of less than twelve jurors absent a stipulation thereto by the parties. See Ky. Const. § 248; CR 48. Nothing in the record indicates any offer by the parties to do so. Sixth, the trial court reasonably presumed that there would not be significant publicity surrounding the trial such that the jurors would be easily solicited. Neither party was a public figure nor was the medical malpractice case one of particularly great public importance. It is true that prejudice is much more likely to be presumed where the delay occurs after jury deliberations have begun. Knuckles, 315 S.W.3d at 323. That jury deliberations have begun, however, does not require a presumption of prejudice. Only in situations where a long delay occurs for no good reason, does the fact that it came in the midst of jury deliberations caution heavily in favor of a mistrial. See People v. Santamaria, 229 Cal.App.3d 269, 280 Cal.Rptr. 43 (1991), cited with approval in Knuckles, 315 S.W.3d at 323. Where, as here, all or most of the factors counsel against presuming prejudice, a mistrial should not be ordered regardless of the stage at which the delay occurred.