Opinion ID: 2570429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Claim Against Dr. Reckling

Text: [¶ 19] The Smyths claim the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Kaufman to present argument and evidence that Dr. Reckling was originally named as a defendant but was no longer a party to the lawsuit. The Smyths also claim the trial court erred in allowing the defense to present portions of the deposition testimony of the expert witness they retained to testify against Dr. Reckling while not allowing them to read into the record the written expert designation upon which the expert relied for a portion of his testimony. The effect of these combined errors, the Smyths contend, was to prevent a fair trial, to make it impossible for the jury to properly apply the Wyoming comparative fault statute, and to allow the very type of abuse W.R.E. 408 was designed to prevent. [¶ 20] The record discloses the following facts relevant to this issue. The Smyths settled their claims against Dr. Reckling before trial. At the final pretrial conference on June 15, 2001, Dr. Kaufman's counsel indicated he intended to introduce evidence that the Smyths originally filed a claim against Dr. Reckling alleging he negligently treated Mrs. Smyth, Dr. Reckling was no longer a party to the lawsuit, the Smyths were now flip-flopping and pointing the finger at Drs. Kaufman and Kellam, and the Smyths' own expert witnessAnthony Alter, M.D.concluded Dr. Reckling breached the standard of care in treating Mrs. Smyth. [1] In response to defense counsel's statement that he did not intend to offer evidence of the settlement but would offer evidence that Dr. Reckling had been but was no longer a defendant, the trial court stated that evidence of the settlement was out of bounds. The Smyths argued that, if the court intended to allow evidence that Dr. Reckling was sued, evidence of the settlement, but not the settlement amount, also ought to be allowed. The court indicated that, in its view, evidence of the settlement was irrelevant. The trial court ruled the doctors would be allowed to show the Smyths had sued Dr. Reckling and he was no longer a party. Crucial to the trial court's ruling was its concern that unfairness would result if it appeared to the jury that Drs. Kaufman and Kellam were pointing the finger at Dr. Reckling rather than that the Smyths had sued him for negligence. [¶ 21] Despite the trial court's ruling and defense counsel's stated intent to tell the jury in opening statement that Dr. Reckling had been a defendant, the Smyths' counsel made no mention in his opening statement of the fact that Dr. Reckling, in addition to Drs. Kaufman and Kellam, was named as a defendant in the original complaint. Dr. Kaufman's counsel, however, made the following comments during his opening statement: Well, one of the things that plaintiffs' counsel have not yet told you is that over a year ago when they filed this lawsuit against Dr. Kellam and Dr. Kaufman they also filed a lawsuit against Dr. Reckling, the orthopedic surgeon; and they sued Dr. Reckling. He was a defendant in this lawsuit until just recently. They claimed they hired an expert by the name of Dr. Alter, plaintiffs did, an orthopedic surgeon from Beverly Hills, Los Angeles. We went out to Beverly Hills and took his deposition. He testified that Dr. Reckling was negligent for not referring the patient on Friday, the 3rd, and that he was negligent for not taking the patient off Cafergot, ... to order a patient could be on Cafergot while in the hospital. Ladies and gentlemen, those are the claims of the plaintiffs, not Dr. Kaufman and not Dr. Kellam. Neither Dr. Kaufman nor Dr. Kellam assert that Dr. Reckling was negligent. But now the plaintiffs assert only the negligence of Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Kellam. The Smyths did not object at the time the comments were made but objected on the basis of relevancy out of the presence of the jury following opening statements. [¶ 22] On the third day of trial, the Smyths called Dr. Reckling to the witness stand. During direct examination, they made no mention of the fact that Dr. Reckling had been a defendant, nor did they mention it at any time during the trial. During cross-examination of Dr. Reckling by Dr. Kaufman's counsel, however, the following exchange occurred: Q. But plaintiffs have not always been so willing to be supportive of your care in this case, have they? In fact you were a defendant in this lawsuit once; is that correct? A. I was. Q. And in fact they alleged, through an expert witness, that you should not have hadkept the patient on Cafergot, correct? That was one of their allegations? A. That is correct. Q. And they alleged that you should have made a referral to a vascular surgeon earlier than you did; is that correct? A. That allegation was made. Q. And they alleged that you should not have allowed the Cafergot to be in the orders in the hospital, they made that allegation? A. That is correct. After Dr. Reckling's testimony, the trial court asked counsel to approach the bench and informed them the following question had been received from one of the jurors: Why is Dr. Reckling no longer a defendant in this case? The Smyths objected to the admission of evidence of their claims against Dr. Reckling. The trial court overruled the objection, letting stand its prior ruling that Dr. Reckling's former status as a defendant was admissible. [¶ 23] The next day, the trial court read the following instruction to the jury: Wyoming law requires the jury to consider the conduct of those individuals, whether or not parties, who may have contributed to the damages sustained by plaintiff. So you may be called upon to judge the conduct not only of Dr. Kaufman, Dr. Kellam, and Mrs. Smyth, but also Dr. Reckling and possibly others. How you do this will be explained at the close of the evidence by further instruction. You have heard evidence that Dr. Reckling was, but no longer is, a defendant. That evidence was admitted for a limited purposeto show that plaintiffs and not the defendant physicians, Drs. Kaufman and Kellam, were initially critical of Dr. Reckling's care. Your task is difficult enough, and you must focus upon the conduct of those individuals who may have contributed to the Smyths' damages and not be concerned about why Dr. Reckling is no longer a party. The reason that Dr. Reckling is no longer a defendant is not an issue for you to consider, and you should draw no inference from it concerning Dr. Reckling's medical care of Mrs. Smyth. The fact that Dr. Reckling was joined as a defendant and now is no longer a party does not mean that his care was below acceptable standards. That question must be resolved solely by reference to expert medical testimony which may be offered in the trial. A copy of the instruction was provided to the jury at the close of the evidence as part of the jury instruction packet. The Smyths objected to the instruction on the following basis: [I]t directs the jury to make an inference. And that is an inference that if we bring a party in, Your Honor, and settle them out for any purpose, whether it be $1, $100, or a million dollars, that they are now to infer from that they were critical and thereby make an assumption that he was negligent. And under our pleading laws, our rule on pleadings, you're entitled to plead in the alternative. You're entitled to bring parties in and dismiss them. In the absence of telling the jury that there was a settlement and why there was a settlement the jury should be not permitted to assume, to make inferences from the fact that parties were named and dismissed at any time. The trial court overruled the objection and adhered to its earlier ruling. During closing argument, Dr. Kaufman's counsel reiterated his earlier statements concerning the Smyths' claims against Dr. Reckling. [¶ 24] With this factual background in mind, we turn to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence that Dr. Reckling had been, but was no longer, a defendant in the Smyths' lawsuit. It is well established that evidence of settlement is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of a claim or its amount. W.R.E. 408; Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 713 (Wyo.1993). It is also well established, however, that, under Wyoming's comparative fault scheme, a jury is entitled to apportion the fault of all those whose acts proximately caused injury to the claimantparties and nonparties alike. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (LexisNexis 2001). We must decide where on this continuum the admission of evidence of Dr. Reckling's former party status lies; that is, did it raise the inference of settlement such that it ought to have been excluded for the reasons underlying W.R.E. 408, or was it properly admissible under the comparative fault scheme as probative of any relevant fact such as bias or prejudice of a witness? [¶ 25] We consider first the applicability of W.R.E. 408 (emphasis added), which provides as follows: Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. Thus, W.R.E. 408 prohibits evidence of the settlement of disputed claims for the purpose of proving liability. [¶ 26] In Haderlie, this court addressed very nearly the same issue we are asked to decide in this case. The plaintiff in that case originally named four defendants, two of whom settled prior to trial. 866 P.2d at 707. The remaining defendants sought to introduce the pleadings and settlement agreements showing the plaintiff originally claimed others were negligent. With respect to the settlement agreements, this court quoted from 2 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 408[05] at 408 (1991): `The almost unavoidable impact of the disclosure of such evidence is that the jury will consider the offer or agreement as evidence of a concession of liability.' 866 P.2d at 713. This court also said: Because of the potential prejudice, `when the issue is doubtful, the better practice is to exclude evidence of compromises or compromise offers.' Id. (quoting Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir.1987)). Addressing the issue of the admissibility of the pleadings, this court quoted with approval Whatley v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 861 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir.1988): [R]eliance on the pleadings was not proper because the pleadings `provide little real evidence of the liability of the settling defendants, [and] they provide no evidence upon which a jury could determine the percentage or extent of liability.' Id. at 714. Holding neither the settlement agreements nor the pleadings were admissible, we said: [T]he ... attempts to introduce the pleadings into evidence were in reality an attempt to allude to the settlement agreements which were inadmissible. The trial court properly refused admission of the settlement agreements and pleadings. Id. [¶ 27] To the extent Dr. Reckling's prior party status was introduced to prove his liability, the same result is mandated here. Evidence that the Smyths initially claimed Dr. Reckling was negligent was not probative of his liability. It had no tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W.R.E. 401. Like the pleadings in Haderlie, evidence that the Smyths initially brought a negligence claim against Dr. Reckling provided no real evidence of his liability and provided no evidence upon which a jury could determine the percentage or extent of his liability. Haderlie, 866 P.2d at 714. Particularly in a medical malpractice case, where expert opinion testimony is required in order to prove the claim, Siebert v. Fowler, 637 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo.1981), the plaintiff's lay opinion that a doctor was negligent has no relevance. We hold, therefore, that, to the extent the evidence was introduced to prove Dr. Reckling's liability, the trial court erred in admitting it. [¶ 28] While disallowing evidence of settlement to prove liability, W.R.E. 408 does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice. Thus, evidence that Dr. Reckling had been but was no longer a defendant would have been admissible if offered to prove his testimony at trial was biased or prejudiced. [2] However, from the testimony elicited from Dr. Reckling concerning the Smyths' claims against him, it does not appear the evidence was presented for that purpose. Counsel limited his questions to the fact that Dr. Reckling had been a defendant and the Smyths claimed he should have discontinued the Cafergot and not allowed the drug to appear on the hospital orders. These questions appear to address Dr. Reckling's liability, not bias or prejudice. They were, therefore, improper, and the testimony they elicited was inadmissible. We hold, however, in light of the other evidence presented, the error in allowing the evidence was harmless. W.R.C.P. 61; W.R.E. 103; W.R.A.P. 9.04. [¶ 29] Even when this court determines that the trial court erred in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we disregard errors which are harmless. Rudy v. Bossard, 997 P.2d 480, 483 (Wyo.2000). An error warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights. Id. For error to be regarded as harmful and reversible, there must be a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been different. TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1210 (Wyo.1990). Where the disputed evidence is a small part of the case, the trial is lengthy and complicated, and there is substantial evidence supporting the result, we are not inclined to find harmful error in the admission of evidence. Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing Company, 675 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Wyo.1984). [¶ 30] The trial of this matter lasted ten days. The jury heard the testimony of four lay witnesses, fourteen medical doctors, and two other expert witnesses. From this testimony, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that neither Dr. Kaufman nor Dr. Kellam caused Mrs. Smyth's injuries. [¶ 31] Dr. Kellam testified he was called in on Saturday, April 4, 1998, to perform an angiogram, assess the blood supply to Mrs. Smyth's leg, and report back to Dr. Reckling. He testified he concluded from the angiogram that her symptoms were consistent with a blood clot or atherosclerosis and did not see anything suggesting vasospasms. After reporting back to Dr. Reckling on Sunday, April 5, 1998, Dr. Kellam had no further involvement with Mrs. Smyth. Charles Seibert, M.D., the expert witness called on Dr. Kellam's behalf, testified he agreed with Dr. Kellam's diagnosis of atherosclerosis, did not see evidence of vasospasms on the angiogram, and believed Dr. Kellam met the standard of care for an interventional radiologist in his diagnosis and treatment of Mrs. Smyth. [¶ 32] Dr. Kaufman testified he was called in by Dr. Reckling to see Mrs. Smyth on Monday, April 6, 1998, for the purpose of determining whether surgery could be done to restore circulation to her left leg. After reviewing the angiograms, examining Mrs. Smyth, and consulting with Dr. Kellam, Dr. Kaufman concluded Mrs. Smyth was suffering from atherosclerosis and a blood clot. He did not see vasospasms on the angiogram. He further concluded that nothing could be done surgically to resolve Mrs. Smyth's problem and amputation might be necessary. He discussed his findings with Dr. Reckling and had no further involvement with Mrs. Smyth. The testimony from Dr. Kaufman and his expert was that, by the time he was consulted, it was too late to save Mrs. Smyth's leg. The pathologist testified the pathology report confirmed the limb was dead on April 6, 1998. James Anderson, M.D., the expert witness called on Dr. Kaufman's behalf, testified that, in his opinion, Dr. Kaufman's treatment and diagnosis met the standard of care for vascular surgeons. [¶ 33] In addition to this testimony, there was evidence that Mrs. Smyth was in poor health, had a complex medical history, was taking numerous medications, had been taking Cafergot for approximately twenty years, had been a heavy smoker for many years, was inactive, and had undergone two recent left leg surgeries leaving her even more inactive. There was testimony that, one week before the April 1998 hospital admission, Mrs. Smyth was taken to the emergency room because of hallucinations possibly associated with taking more Cafergot than the recommended dosage. The medical records also reflect that, prior to her discharge on that occasion, her physician discontinued several of her medications, including Cafergot. The medical records further reflect she did not have Cafergot again until it was administered to her in the hospital on April 7, 1998. A medical toxicologist testified the vasospactic effects of Cafergot typically begin to resolve in one to three days after the patient stops taking the drug, meaning blood flow to her left leg should have returned prior to the April admission if Cafergot was the cause. Expert testimony indicated the leading cause of ischemic legs and limb loss is smoking. There also was evidence that knee surgery can cause blood clots to form and block blood supply to the lower leg. There also was properly admitted deposition testimony from Dr. Alter, as well as live testimony from other expert witnesses, that Dr. Reckling's treatment of Mrs. Smyth fell below the standard of care. [¶ 34] A thorough review of the record leads to the conclusion that substantial evidence was presented from which the jury could reasonably conclude factors other than any acts or omissions of Drs. Kaufman or Kellam caused Mrs. Smyth's injuries. We, therefore, are unable to conclude a reasonable probability existed that the verdict might have been different in the absence of evidence that Dr. Reckling was sued. Given the substantial evidence of other likely causes, including properly admitted expert testimony that Dr. Reckling was negligent in his treatment of Mrs. Smyth, we simply see no connection between the erroneously admitted evidence and the jury's finding of no causation by Drs. Kaufman and Kellam. We conclude, therefore, that admission of the evidence was harmless. [¶ 35] In reaching this conclusion, we also note the trial court's instruction to the jury adequately apprised the jurors of their responsibility under Wyoming law to consider the fault of all individuals whose conduct contributed to Mrs. Smyth's injuriesincluding Dr. Reckling, of the limited purpose for which the evidence that he had been but was no longer a defendant was admitted, and that they should not concern themselves with or draw any inferences from the fact that he was no longer a defendant. The instruction also informed the jury that the fact that Dr. Reckling was a defendant did not mean his care was below acceptable standards. We assume the jury followed the court's corrective instruction. Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27, 36 (Wyo.1983). [¶ 36] The Smyths also claim the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Kaufman to present deposition testimony of Dr. Alter, the expert witness they retained to testify that Dr. Reckling breached the standard of care, while precluding them from reading into the record a portion of the expert designation upon which he relied for part of his testimony. The expert designation stated in pertinent part as follows: (3) Dr. Reckling was reasonable in relying on the opinions of the interventional radiologist, Dr. Kellam and the physician called for a vascular consult, Dr. Kaufman, in evaluating the etiology of symptoms and designing a treatment plan for Ms. Smyth. If there was doubt about the ability to diagnose the patient's source of symptoms from angiography, it was incumbent on Drs. Kellam and/or Dr. Kaufman to suggest referral to another facility for definitive diagnosis before irreversible amputation was performed. During the deposition of Dr. Alter, a copy of the designation was marked for identification as an exhibit but was retained by the Smyths' counsel. It was not read into the record or made part of the deposition transcript. Dr. Alter was questioned about the designation during the deposition as follows: Q. Your third opinion is about Dr. Reckling relying upon Dr. Kellam and Dr. Kaufman, which seems fairly straightforward to me. A. You are referring to Q. To No. 3. A. In? Q. In your designation. A. In comments or conclusions? Q. In your designations. A. I'm sorry. Go ahead. Q. It refers to Dr. Reckling relying upon the opinions of Dr. Kellam and Dr. Kaufman. Is that opinion as straightforward as it appeared in the designation? A. May I read the designation? Q. Sure. A. That's correct. [¶ 37] Prior to trial, the Smyths moved to have the deposition of Dr. Alter excluded or, in the alternative, to allow only those portions read which were within their expert designation. At the pretrial conference, the trial court ruled that Dr. Alter's deposition could be read by the defense. During trial, the Smyths filed a motion in part asking the trial court to allow the expert designation read and relied upon by Dr. Alter during his deposition to be read to the jury when the deposition was read. The trial court ruled that they would not be allowed to supplement sworn testimony [with] unsworn testimony. [¶ 38] With regard to exhibits used during the deposition of a witness, W.R.C.P. 30(f)(1) (emphasis added) provides in relevant part: Documents and things produced for inspection during the examination of the witness shall, upon the request of a party, be marked for identification and annexed to the deposition ... except that if the person producing the materials desires to retain them the person may: (A) offer copies to be marked for identification and annexed to the deposition and to serve thereafter as originals ...; or (B) offer the originals to be marked for identification, after giving to each party an opportunity to inspect and copy them, in which event the materials may then be used in the same manner as if annexed to the deposition. Pursuant to this rule, the fact that the exhibit was not attached to the deposition is not grounds for excluding it at trial. Rather, the Smyths' counsel was entitled to retain the original expert designation after having it marked for identification and giving defense counsel an opportunity to inspect it. It could then be used in the same manner as any other exhibit annexed to the deposition. [¶ 39] Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 32(a), any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used at trial in accordance with specified criteria. The expert designation the Smyths sought to have read to the jury was prepared by their attorney, not by Dr. Alter. It was a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. As such, it was inadmissible hearsay and was properly excluded. W.R.E. 801(c). Moreover, even assuming reading of the designation was improperly denied, there were other options available to the Smyths to supplement or refute Dr. Alter's deposition testimony of which they chose not to avail themselves. Presumably, since Dr. Alter was their expert, they could have arranged for him to appear at the trial and had him read or testify to his designated opinions in person, including his opinion that Dr. Reckling was entitled to rely on the opinions of Drs. Kaufman and Kellam. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the Smyths' request to read the designation into the record. In reaching this result, we note also that there was testimony from expert witnesses other than Dr. Alter concerning Dr. Reckling's negligence. In light of this testimony and all the evidence presented, we are not convinced the trial court's ruling concerning the designation had any real effect on the outcome.