Opinion ID: 4198315
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Estelle Violation

Text: In Estelle, Dr. James Grigson was appointed by a Texas trial court to examine capital defendant Ernest Smith to determine his competency to stand trial. Grigson examined Smith for about ninety minutes and determined that he was competent. Grigson gave no Miranda warning to Smith during the course of the examination. At the time of the examination, Smith’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. Grigson did not notify Smith’s attorney that he would examine his client. Dr. Grigson testified, over objection, during the penalty phase of Smith’s trial as to his future dangerousness. He testified that Smith was “a very severe sociopath”; that Smith “will continue his previous behavior”; that Smith’s sociopathic condition will “only get worse”; and that there “is no treatment, no medicine . . . that in any way at all modifies or changes this behavior.” 451 U.S. at 459–60 (alteration in 30 PETROCELLI V. BAKER original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court held that Dr. Grigson’s testimony violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied, and that Miranda warnings were required because “Dr. Grigson’s prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on statements [Smith] made . . . in reciting the details of the crime.” Id. at 464. “When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent’s future dangerousness, his role . . . became essentially like that of an agent of the State.” Id. at 467. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied because “adversary judicial proceedings” had been initiated against Smith, and that Grigson’s interview was a “critical stage” of the proceedings. Id. at 469–70. “[Smith] was denied the assistance of his attorneys in making the significant decision of whether to submit to the examination and to what end the psychiatrists’s findings could be employed.” Id. at 471. Estelle was decided in May 1981. Dr. Gerow interviewed Petrocelli in Washoe County Jail almost a year later, in April 1982. Petrocelli’s trial took place during the last week of July and first week of August 1982. In addressing Petrocelli’s third petition for postconviction relief, the state district court heard testimony from Dr. Gerow and from defense counsel Wishart, and received into evidence the Washoe County Jail visitors’ log and Gerow’s April 27 letter to Prosecutor Laxalt. In rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court made PETROCELLI V. BAKER 31 factual findings directly relevant to Petrocelli’s Estelle claim. The court wrote: The sequence of events appears to be as follows: Petitioner sought a psychiatrist on April 20, 1982. Laxalt briefed Gerow on April 21, and on that date, [Gerow] interviewed the Petitioner. Defense Attorney Wishart and Investigator Ford also interviewed Petitioner on April 21, 1982 subsequent to an appointment in the justice court on that date. It is not clear as to whether the doctor or the lawyer arrived at the jail first. The court wrote, further, “Dr. Gerow and Prosecutor Laxalt are not entirely clear nor consistent about the purpose for which the doctor was hired. However, Gerow makes it clear that he informed Petitioner that the interview was not confidential and that he would see Petitioner again on an asneeded basis.” The court concluded: Dr. Gerow’s understanding of his engagement was to determine Petitioner’s competency and to render some further treatment. . . . No reasonably effective trial or appellate counsel would conclude from this record that Dr. Gerow was a court-authorized psychiatrist nor an agent for the prosecutor. The state district court’s findings are “not fairly supported by the record” and thus are not entitled to a presumption of correctness. Silva, 279 F.3d at 835 (quoting former 28 U.S.C. 32 PETROCELLI V. BAKER § 2254(d)(8)). Indeed, its findings are demonstrably wrong in nearly every particular. First, it is not true that counsel for Petrocelli was appointed on April 21, the day of Dr. Gerow’s interview. Rather, the appointment was made the day before, on April 20. Second, it not true that there is an ambiguity “as to whether the doctor or the lawyer arrived at the jail first.” The visitors’ log at the Washoe County Jail is unambiguous. Defense attorney Wishart and investigator Ford signed the visitors’ log at about 1:50 pm. They left at about 2:20 pm. Dr. Gerow signed the visitors’ log at about 3:50 pm. Third, it is not true that “[n]o reasonably effective . . . counsel would conclude . . . that Dr. Gerow was . . . an agent for the prosecutor.” Gerow wrote “D.A.” in the “relationship” box of the visitors’ log. Wishart knew Gerow well. He testified in post-conviction proceedings that Gerow had a “prosecution bias,” and that he never would have hired him. Fourth, it is not true that Dr. Gerow “ma[de] clear that he informed Petitioner . . . that he would see Petitioner again on an as-needed basis.” Gerow informed Prosecutor Laxalt in his April 27 letter that he would see Petrocelli on an “‘as needed’ basis.” Gerow testified in state court post-conviction proceedings that he meant “as needed by Mr. Laxalt.” Fifth, it is not true that “Dr. Gerow’s understanding of his engagement was . . . to render some further treatment.” Gerow never had any understanding that he would provide treatment to Petrocelli. Petrocelli was under the illusion that PETROCELLI V. BAKER 33 Gerow had come to see him in response to his request for psychiatric counseling, but Gerow was under no such illusion. The facts are that Prosecutor Laxalt asked Dr. Gerow to visit Petrocelli in the Washoe County Jail to determine his competency to stand trial. Gerow interviewed Petrocelli in the jail in the late afternoon of April 21, shortly after defense attorney Wishart and investigator Ford had visited him. The Reno Justice Court had appointed the Washoe County Public Defender’s office as counsel for Petrocelli the day before, on April 20. Wishart and Ford’s names and signatures were on line three of the visitors’ log of the jail, with the notation “WCPD/ATT.” Gerow signed in as a visitor on line four of the same page with the notation “D.A.” Wishart’s name and capacity would have been easily visible to Gerow when he signed in. Gerow never sought permission from Wishart to evaluate Petrocelli. Laxalt never asked Gerow to provide treatment to Petrocelli, and Gerow never provided any. On April 27, Gerow wrote a letter to Laxalt reporting that he believed Petrocelli to be competent, and volunteered to provide further assistance to Laxalt “as needed.” Gerow testified during the penalty phase of Petrocelli’s capital trial. He testified, based on his interview with Petrocelli on April 21, that Petrocelli was dangerous and not treatable. Gerow’s final words during direct examination were, “There is no cure.” The parallels between Estelle and this case are striking. Dr. Grigson, like Dr. Gerow in this case, visited the defendant in jail to determine his competency to stand trial. Grigson, like Gerow, failed to provide Miranda warnings. Grigson, like Gerow, was acting as an agent of the state. Indeed, the case against Gerow’s testimony is even stronger than against Grigson’s, for Grigson was appointed by the court, whereas 34 PETROCELLI V. BAKER Gerow was acting at the request of the prosecutor. The defendant in Estelle, like Petrocelli, already had appointed counsel. Grigson, like Gerow, did not seek or obtain permission from defendant’s counsel to visit or evaluate his client. Grigson, like Gerow, testified during the penalty phase of defendant’s trial that the defendant was incurable. We conclude from the foregoing that the admission of Dr. Gerow’s testimony during the penalty phase of Petrocelli’s trial was a flagrant violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Estelle.1