Opinion ID: 1436616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misrepresentation of evidence by the prosecutor.

Text: It is elementary . . . that counsel may not premise arguments on evidence which has not been admitted. ( George ) Johnson v. United States, 121 U.S.App. D.C. 19, 21, 347 F.2d 803, 805 (1965); see also United States v. Jenkins, 140 U.S.App. D.C. 392, 397, 436 F.2d 140, 145 (1970) (quoting ( George) Johnson.) The applicable principles were summarized in some detail in Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App. D.C. 154, 413 F.2d 1061 (1969): The federal courts generally, and this court in particular, have strictly enforced the obligation of the prosecutor to avoid making statements of fact to the jury not supported by proper evidence introduced during trial. This rigor is based on the Supreme Court's observation in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), that the interest of the Government in a criminal prosecution `is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done,' and that `the average jury has confidence that these obligations (of fairness and accuracy) will be faithfully observed.' We have found error in prosecutorial misstatements even where, as here, they were apparently made in good faith. We have not regarded the standard judicial caution that the jury's recollection controls as a cure-all for such errors. We have noticed such errors where they were not objected to at trial, or even on appeal. Thus here, where timely objection was made and pressed on appeal, we must carefully examine the error committed to determine whether it sufficiently prejudiced appellants to call for reversal. 134 U.S.App. D.C. at 172, 413 F.2d at 1079 (emphasis added; footnotes and ellipsis omitted). The court's analysis in Gaither leaves no doubt regarding where the obligation to be fair and accurate lies. It is incumbent upon the prosecutor to take care to ensure that statements made in opening and closing arguments are supported by evidence introduced at trial. United States v. Small, 316 U.S.App. D.C. 15, 19, 74 F.3d 1276, 1280 (1996) (emphasis added) (citing Gaither ); United States v. Williams-Davis, 319 U.S.App. D.C. 267, 284, 90 F.3d 490, 507 (1996) (same). Thus, although we are not prepared to treat the isolated (but most unfortunate) [misstatement] by the prosecutor as a deliberate falsehood, Lee, 668 A.2d at 831, the prosecutor had an obligation to know, and she should have known, that her description of Ms. Jackson's testimony was untrue. As Anthony's attorney has argued in the trial court and in this court, the prosecutor's remarks here at issue were made in her rebuttal argument. Under somewhat comparable circumstances, we concluded in Lee that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence, and . . . the opening of his rebuttal argument was improper. E.g., Coreas v. United States, 565 A.2d 594, 602-03 (D.C.1989) ( Coreas I ). Moreover, [i]mproper prosecutorial comments are looked upon with special disfavor when they appear in the rebuttal because at that point defense counsel has no opportunity to contest or clarify what the prosecutor has said. Id. at 605 (quoting Hall v. United States, 540 A.2d 442, 448 (D.C.1988)). Lee, 668 A.2d at 830. Further, in this case (unlike in Lee ), the improper argument was repeated following a bench conference precipitated by the initial defense objection, a circumstance which created a potential danger that the jury would view the argument as having the judge's approval.