Opinion ID: 2156906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: j.w.j.

Text: The essence of plaintiff's theory of liability pursuant to Restatement § 343 is that plaintiff was injured on account of a condition on the land, a dirt mound over which J.W.J. could exercise control. Defendants, however, contend that the dirt mound was not a condition of the land, but rather a construction means or method created by plaintiff's employer, Mahl, to facilitate its work. [4] We agree with defendants. The trial court concluded that plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, establish that the dirt mound was a condition on the land under § 343. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the court erred because the mound's dirt was a part of the landeven though the result of an artificial alteration of the land's topography. Plaintiff cites Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290, 590 N.Y.S.2d 55, 604 N.E.2d 117 (1992), to support his argument, but we agree with defendants' assessment that Lombardi supports rather than discredits the trial court's analysis. In Lombardi, the plaintiff, an employee of a general contractor, was injured when an inattentive co-worker failed to hold a rope with the result that the tree branch the plaintiff was cutting swung out and struck the ladder on which the worker was standing. The plaintiff sued the landowner, contending that his injuries had been caused by a dangerous condition on the land and not by the coworker's negligence. The New York Court of Appeals rejected this contention, stating: It is settled law that where the alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from the contractor's methods and the owner exercises no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attaches to the owner under the common law. . . . Id., 590 N.Y.S.2d 55, 604 N.E.2d at 119. From this, plaintiff argues that the owner would have been liable had the injury been caused by a dangerous condition of the premises over which the owner had control. See Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82, 88 (1993); Ogle v. Shell Oil Co., 913 F.Supp. 490, 493 (E.D.Tex. 1995). We fail to see the relevance of the fact that the mound was composed of dirt from J.W.J.'s property to an analysis of the applicability of § 343. Here, the record contains ample evidence establishing that Mahl constructed the mound itself and decided, of its own accord, to use the dirt mound ramp to access its trailer. There is no evidence to indicate, nor does plaintiff argue, that J.W.J. exercised any supervisory control or input over any part of the ramp's construction. See Lombardi, 590 N.Y.S.2d 55, 604 N.E.2d at 119 ([T]here is no evidence that defendant [landowner] exercised supervisory control or had any input into how the branch was to be removed.). Nor is this a situation where the landowner has altered the natural condition of the premises to create liability for damages resulting from any negligence. See W. Keeton, supra, § 57, at 390-91. The dirt mound ramp can be analogized to a wooden staircase that alternatively might have provided access to Mahl's trailer. In fact, plaintiff testified that Mahl had used wooden stairs on this same trailer on another job. Moreover, plaintiff testified that at some point Mahl used wooden stairs to provide access to its trailer on the Saturn project in question, but that Mahl had plaintiff remove the stairs so it could move the trailer. Clearly, such a staircase would not fall under § 343's definition of a condition on the land, even if the boards used to construct the staircase were made from trees felled on J.W.J.'s land. See Lombardi, 590 N.Y.S.2d 55, 604 N.E.2d at 119 (Plaintiff's account of the accident establishes that there was no dangerous condition on the premises which caused the accident, but rather that it was caused by the manner in which removal of the branch was undertaken.). The dirt mound was merely a means or method chosen exclusively by Mahl to access its trailer, not a condition on the land under the meaning of § 343. Plaintiff's evidence and proffered testimony were insufficient as a matter of law to prove his theory of liability. See Green v. Unity School of Christianity, 991 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Mo.Ct.App.1999) (Since Appellants cannot prove that there was a condition on the land that caused the harm to the decedents, there can be no liability under § 343.). V.R.C.P. 50 authorizes judgment as a matter of law when `it is apparent that either party is unable to carry a burden of proof that is essential to that party's case.' Reporter's Notes, V.R.C.P. 50 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 Advisory Committee's Note). We therefore affirm the superior court's grant of judgment as a matter of law.