Opinion ID: 1475250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Victims of the Crime

Text: Section 11-601 of the Criminal Procedure Article defines victim as a person who suffers personal injury or property damage or loss as a direct result of a crime. . . . Md.Code (2001, 2004 Supp.), § 11-601(j)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article. Mr. Goff argues that because the victim of the assault (Mr. Hadley) is a tenant and not the owner of the apartment, § 11-603 does not permit the court to order payment of restitution to Mr. Hadley for the repair of the shower, in connection with the assault conviction. In his brief, Mr. Goff argues that the property owner was the party who truly suffered the loss via any property damages, and [Mr. Goff] was not convicted of any crime wherein the landlord/property owner . . . was the victim. Thus, the restitution award to Mr. Hadley . . . for the property damage/loss suffered by the landlord. . . was inappropriate under § 11-603. As previously discussed, § 11-603 permits a court to order a defendant to make restitution if as a direct result of the crime . . . property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed. . . . Md.Code (2001, 2004 Supp.), § 11-603(a)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article (emphasis added). While it is true that Mr. Hadley does not own the apartment in which he lives, it is equally true that as a tenant he has a property interest in the nature of a possessory property right in the apartment. [12] The fact that the landlord also suffered a loss to his property does not change the fact that the tenant suffered a loss to his possessory property right, for which restitution may properly be granted pursuant to § 11-603. [13] We strive to give statutes their most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used. Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997). To interpret the term property of the victim so narrowly as to discount the property rights of tenants vis-a-vis restitution in a criminal case such as this one is not in accord with logic and common sense. Moreover, our interpretation is supported by the underlying purposes of restitution; namely, rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. Grey, 363 Md. at 459, 769 A.2d at 899. [14] Mr. Hadley testified that he was responsible for repairing the shower and that his landlord expected him to repair it. Mr. Goff presented no evidence to refute that assertion. Consequently, the court did not err by deciding that Mr. Hadley was the proper victim for purposes of § 11-603. [15] This case is not like Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985), in which we determined that the trial court erred by ordering Walczak to pay restitution to the victim of a robbery of which he was not convicted. Walczak, 302 Md. at 430, 488 A.2d at 953. We stated that restitution is punishment for the crime of which the defendant has been convicted. Restitution depends on the existence of that crime, and the statute authorizes the court to order restitution only where the court is otherwise authorized to impose punishment. Walczak, 302 Md. at 429, 488 A.2d at 952. In the present case, the court ordered Mr. Goff to pay restitution as punishment for the crime of which he was convicted  assault, which resulted in damage to Mr. Hadley's person and property. Concluding our discussion of this issue, we note that during oral argument, counsel for Mr. Goff raised a number of concerns about what might happen civilly if Mr. Hadley takes the restitution money and fails to repair the shower. We decline to respond to those questions because an answer is not necessary for us to decide the present case. We re-emphasize, however, that restitution is a criminal sanction, not a civil remedy. Grey, 363 Md. at 451, 769 A.2d at 895. Furthermore, we remind the parties that, [t]he order of restitution, even when entered as a civil judgment, concludes only the matters that were raised or that could have been raised, in the criminal proceeding. Although it may be enforced in the manner that a civil judgment may be enforced, it does not, and cannot, establish civil liability for anything beyond the matters it concludes. Id.