Opinion ID: 3172171
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contribution to the Marital Estate

Text: [¶26] Simpson first argues that in the referee’s recommended property division, she failed to consider his contribution to the marital estate of the family home and $90,000 in cash, which were his nonmarital assets. Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(A), “[t]he contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property” must be considered when creating an equitable division of the marital estate. [¶27] Contrary to Simpson’s contentions, the referee adequately considered his contribution of nonmarital property to the marital estate. The referee found that before the marriage, Simpson had purchased what became the family home for $550,000 and that he conveyed the house to himself and Wechsler as joint tenants in 2011, when it was appraised at $690,000.4 The referee also acknowledged that 4 Simpson acknowledges, as he must, that because he conveyed the house to himself and Wechsler jointly during the marriage, he no longer owns a nonmarital interest in it, even though he purchased the house with separate funds before the marriage. See Burrow v. Burrow, 2014 ME 111, ¶ 14, 100 A.3d 1104 (“[W]hen real estate owned by one spouse before the marriage [is] placed into joint title 15 Simpson had $90,000 in cash when the parties married and that the entire amount had been spent during the course of the marriage.5 Although the referee did not analyze these contributions in detail, her reference to the premarital value of the home and the consumption of the $90,000 in cash are sufficient to demonstrate that in her overall analysis, she considered Simpson’s contribution of these assets. [¶28] Similarly, the referee found that Wechsler’s contributions toward the acquisition of marital property during the marriage exceeded Simpson’s, which is a second way the referee acknowledged that Simpson had made a contribution. This finding was supported by competent evidence in the record, including Wechsler’s testimony that she paid “the lion’s share” of household expenses and Simpson’s acknowledgement that he contributed less overall. The referee’s recognitions of Simpson’s contributions of his separate property to the marital estate, and her treatment of it when she recommended a property division to the court, do not constitute an abuse of discretion. [¶29] Simpson further contends that in comparison to his interests, the referee gave more favorable treatment to Wechsler’s contributions of nonmarital by that spouse, the real estate [is] marital . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). It is therefore clear that all of the equity in the house is marital in nature. 5 Simpson does not argue that the use of his nonmarital cash to acquire property during the course of the marriage renders those items nonmarital, see Levy, Maine Family Law § 7.6[4][b][i] at 7-38 to 7-39 (8th ed. 2013), and in any event the record does not clearly reveal how that cash was spent. Rather, he argues that the division of the marital estate does not sufficiently account for the beneficial effect arising from the disposition of his nonmarital cash. 16 assets to the marital estate. Specifically, Simpson notes that the referee “careful[ly]” set apart the premarital portion of Wechsler’s USAA savings account as her nonmarital property, but did not engage in the same analysis with respect to the marital residence or the $90,000 in cash that Simpson brought to the marriage. Wechsler, however, maintained the USAA savings account in her name throughout the marriage, and she further testified that while the parties were married the value of that account did not fall below its balance as of the date of the marriage. As a result, there was sufficient evidence for the referee to conclude that the premarital balance in the account was never converted into marital property.6 See Levy, Maine Family Law § 7.6[2] at 7-28 to 7-30 (8th ed. 2013); cf. Spooner v. Spooner, 2004 ME 69, ¶ 29, 850 A.2d 354. By adopting this finding, the court was therefore required to set that portion of the account aside to Wechsler as her separate property. See Long v. Long, 1997 ME 171, ¶ 9, 697 A.2d 1317. In contrast, Simpson conveyed the house to himself and Wechsler as joint tenants, thereby transmuting the entire asset into marital property. See Burrow v. Burrow, 2014 ME 111, ¶ 14, 100 A.3d 1104. Simpson also concedes that $90,000 in cash 6 The referee appropriately classified as marital property the entire increase in value of Wechsler’s USAA savings account that accrued over the course of the marriage, see 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2)(E)(2)(b) (2015), and awarded Simpson $100,000 of that amount, whereas Wechsler only received approximately $64,000. 17 that he had before the marriage had been spent, leaving nothing for the referee to set aside to him as nonmarital property. [¶30] Therefore, the referee’s categorizations of marital and nonmarital property do not suggest that the referee placed greater emphasis on Wechsler’s contributions to the marital estate than Simpson’s, and her analysis does not reveal error. 2. Property Set Apart to Each Spouse and Economic Circumstances [¶31] Simpson argues that the referee’s recommended property division was inequitable because she failed to account for the significant amount of the debt assigned to him. Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)(B)-(C), when creating a “just” division of marital property, a court, and therefore a referee, must consider “[t]he value of the property set apart to each spouse” and each spouse’s “economic circumstances . . . at the time the division of property is to become effective.” [¶32] Contrary to Simpson’s contentions, the referee’s recommended property division implemented her stated objective to award Simpson more than half of the value of the marital estate, even considering the debt assigned to him. The net value of the marital property awarded to Simpson exceeds $462,000. In contrast, the value of the marital property allocated to Wechsler, although it did not include any debt, is less than $362,000. Therefore, the property division was 18 actually favorable to Simpson by more than $100,000 and, under the circumstances in this case, was not unjust. [¶33] Simpson further argues that the referee failed to consider his individual “economic circumstances,” id. § 953(1)(C), because he will be unable to make payments toward or refinance the $351,492 mortgage on the marital residence based on his imputed annual income of $30,000. As the trial court observed, however, when it denied Simpson’s objection to the referee’s report, he has the option to sell the house—which is the most significant marital asset and was his to begin with—to gain “access [to] its significant equity.” The award of the house to him therefore did not place him in an untenable financial situation and does not represent an abuse of discretion. [¶34] Because the referee’s findings were not clearly erroneous and addressed all factors relevant to the equitable distribution of the marital estate, the recommended property division was within the bounds of her discretion.