Opinion ID: 2590389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: The Commercial Development Petition addresses matters of statewide concern. Under the fourth guideline, this petition is administrative in character.

Text: Appellants urge that the Commercial Development Petition is a matter of only local concern because the restrictions have no impact on state policy. They also argue the statutes giving cities eminent domain powers are merely enabling statutes and do not establish legislative policy nor prescribe comprehensive legislation. The City argues the petition restricts the City's delegated authority in a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The City contends there is a complex interplay of numerous statutes that grant, restrict, and regulate its authority to condemn, zone, or rezone property. As to this guideline, we will look first to restrictions imposed on the City and then to the City's obligation to not allow eminent domain or condemnation by any other entity. Eminent domain is an inherent power vested exclusively in the State, and that power is limited only by constitutional restrictions. Concerned Citizens, United, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 215 Kan. 218, 226, 523 P.2d 755 (1974). The State has authority to delegate eminent domain authority through legislative action. 215 Kan. at 226, 523 P.2d 755. In K.S.A.2008 Supp. 26-201, eminent domain authority is broadly granted to cities [w]henever it shall be deemed necessary by the governing body of any city. This language shows the legislature's intent to delegate this power to the City's governing body and not to its electors. In addition, the statute limits the manner in which a city may exercise this eminent domain power by requiring that cities conform to the Eminent Domain Procedure Act, K.S.A. 26-501 et. seq. The Eminent Domain Procedure Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme outlining the procedures and circumstances in which a city may use its eminent domain authority. See K.S.A. 26-503; K.S.A.2008 Supp. 26-504; and K.S.A.2008 Supp. 26-507. These statutes are analogous to the Industrial Revenue Bond Act discussed in Rauh. In that case, this court noted the legislature had enacted broad general provisions and policies and then delegated to the city the administrative function of filling in the details under the reasonable and definite standards contained in the act itself. Rauh, 223 Kan. at 521, 575 P.2d 517. Similarly, the legislature has delegated the administrative functions of filling in the details to cities under the Eminent Domain Procedure Act. We find this Act to be more than simply an enabling statute such as the law authorizing cities to acquire buildings, as discussed above. As to the Commercial Development Petition's restrictions on the City's zoning authority, those are similar to the ones discussed in City of Wichita v. Fitzgerald, 22 Kan.App.2d 428, 916 P.2d 1301 (1996), which the Court of Appeals determined gave the proposed ordinance in that case its administrative character. 22 Kan.App.2d at 429, 433, 916 P.2d 1301. The Fitzgerald court held: [W]here a comprehensive zoning ordinance has been passed and the power to change certain zoning or grant exemptions has been committed to the mayor or city council, the zoning of particular property is an administrative matter. [Citation omitted.] Conversely, the passing of the general comprehensive zoning plan is typically legislative. [Citations omitted.] 22 Kan. App.2d at 434, 916 P.2d 1301. We agree. As mentioned by the City, the proposed ordinance would functionally repeal several provisions in the City's existing procedures under the City's comprehensive zoning plan. The proposed ordinance also would encumber or abolish rights of individual citizens in the existing City code by preventing those individuals from requesting rezoning of their private, residential property. We find the proposed ordinance's restrictions on the City's zoning authority would intrude into a matter of statewide concern given the comprehensive nature of the zoning statutes and the legislature's delegation of that authority to the cities. Under Rauh, this weighs in favor of determining the proposed ordinance to be administrative in nature. But beyond this, when we review the proposed ordinance's literal obligations requiring that the City not allow rezoning, eminent domain use, or condemnation in the restricted locations by anyone, it underscores how this measure intrudes into a matter of statewide concern. In the eminent domain area, the legislature has seen fit to grant many different entities authority to condemn property for specific purposes. See K.S.A. 55-1205 (authorizing natural gas public utilities to exercise power of eminent domain); K.S.A. 66-911 (authorizing railway companies to exercise power of eminent domain); K.S.A. 68-1903 (authorizing highway authorities to acquire private or public property through condemnation); K.S.A.2008 Supp. 72-8212a (authorizing unified school districts to exercise eminent domain power); and K.S.A.2008 Supp. 74-99d08 (authorizing the Kansas Electric Transmission Authority to exercise eminent domain powers on behalf of corporations constructing, upgrading, or repairing electric transmission facilities). To the extent the proposed ordinance may be read to require the City to take action to not allow those other entities to invoke the statutory authority granted them by the legislature, the ordinance may only be seen as an attempt to interfere with legislative delegations of authority. These are matters of statewide concern. This, too, makes the proposed ordinance administrative in character.