Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing dr. maggio to testify in rebuttal at the sentencing phase thereby violating evans' fifth and sixth amendment rights.

Text: ś 324. Upon the request of Evans' attorney, Fred Lusk, Dr. Henry Maggio was appointed by the federal district court in 1991 to conduct a competency evaluation in conjunction with Evans' guilty plea to federal kidnapping charges. During this initial examination, Maggio testified that he examined Evans for a three and a half hours, however, Maggio conceded that much of this time he simply observed Evans speaking with his attorney. Maggio made no formal diagnosis, but concluded that Evans was competent. ś 325. On August 6, 1993, the trial court appointed Dr. Maggio to conduct a forensic examination of Evans for the purposes of determining his competency to stand trial on state charges. In the order, the trial court noted defense counsel's objection to the appointment of Dr. Maggio. Moreover, the trial court specifically stated that nothing contained herein shall be construed as authorizing the State to use such information at sentencing. The trial court sealed Maggio's report, the result of which would be made available only if the defense elected to proceed with a determination of competency. ś 326. Maggio testified that prior to his examination he received copies of Evans' mental health records from the Veterans Administration and the Texas Department of Corrections. On August 6, 1993, Dr. Maggio attempted to examine Evans at the Harrison County Detention Center. Evans, however, was on the telephone with his attorney, Bill Boyd. ś 327. Evans recognized Maggio and asked to see the court order. Evans refused to speak with Maggio further and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. Maggio continued to observe Evans while he was on the telephone with Boyd and left after Evans refused to speak with him for the third time. ś 328. During the motion to determine habitual status, the State informed Evans that Dr. Maggio might be called to testify as a rebuttal witness if Evans called Dr. Zimmerman. However, the State indicated that out of an abundance of caution Dr. Maggio would not testify to his observations on August 6, 1993, because Evans was not accompanied by counsel. ś 329. During the sentencing phase, Evans chose to call Dr. Zimmerman to testify as to mitigation and the State called Maggio in rebuttal. During his rebuttal testimony, Maggio relied on the following bases for his conclusions and opinions: the competency examination conducted during August, 1991 in conjunction with the federal guilty plea [11] ; his evaluation of Evans' prior mental health records; and his observations of Evans during the competency hearing on August 9-11, 1993. From these sources, Maggio testified that, in his opinion, Evans did not suffer from schizophrenia, but did have an antisocial personality disorder, with paranoid, dependent, and manipulative features. ś 330. Evans now argues that the trial court erroneously allowed Maggio's rebuttal testimony which was based on his observations of Evans during the competency hearing on August 9-11, 1993, and the use of psychiatric records provided to Maggio for purposes of the competency determination. On cross-examination, Dr. Maggio testified that observation is a part of a psychiatric evaluation. Evans now claims that Maggio's testimony was based upon an examination conducted in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
ś 331. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the testimony at the sentencing phase of a capital trial of a psychiatrist who conducted an evaluation of the defendant for purposes of determining whether he was competent to stand trial was error and a violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when the evaluation was conducted without notice to defense counsel and without advising the defendant that he had the right to remain silent. ś 332. In Estelle, the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered a psychiatric evaluation for the limited, neutral purpose of determining his competency to stand trial. At trial, the defendant introduced no psychiatric evidence, nor had he indicated that he might do so. The State, however, offered information obtained from the competency examination as affirmative evidence during the sentencing phase to prove future dangerousness [12] . Id. at 466, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. After review, the Court held that a capital defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding. 451 U.S. at 468, 101 S.Ct. at 1876. The Court specifically held that the fact that Smith's statements were uttered in the context of a psychiatric examination did not remove them from the reach of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. Moreover, the Court held if the application of the Dr. Grigson's findings had been confined to [use at a competency hearing], no Fifth Amendment issue would have arisen. Id. However, the State used the respondent's own statements, unwittingly made without an awareness that he was assisting the State's efforts to obtain the death penalty. Id. The Court concluded that the statements could have been used during the penalty phase only if respondent had been appraised of his rights and had knowingly decided to waive them. Id. at 469, 101 S.Ct. at 1876. ś 333. There are several distinctions between Estelle and the case sub judice. First, unlike Estelle, Evans was not compelled to respond to Dr. Maggio. At no time did Dr. Maggio question Evans or initiate contact with Evans, but simply observed Evans' participation. There was no interview or discussion. Moreover, Dr. Maggio's testimony was based on observations of Evans during the competency hearing and the evaluation of prior medical reports. ś 334. Therefore, the initial inquiry before this Court is whether the Fifth Amendment is implicated. In Estelle, the Court concluded that the [psychiatrist's] diagnosis, as detailed in his testimony, was not based simply on his observation of [Smith.] Id. at 463, 101 S.Ct. at 1873. There, the Court held that the prognosis for future dangerousness rested on statements the respondent made, and remarks he omitted, in reciting the details of the crime. Id. Moreover, the psychiatrist specifically testified that his findings were based on his discussion with Smith. Id. at n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at n. 9. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment was implicated because the State used as evidence ... the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination. Id. at 464-65, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. ś 335. Here, however, Evans objects to the admission of testimony based upon observations. Dr. Maggio conceded on cross-examination that he had no one-on-one contact with Mr. Evans. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2643-44, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), the Supreme Court extensively discussed the appropriate subject matter of the Fifth Amendment. There, the Court stated that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)). In order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a witness against himself. Id. (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210, 108 S.Ct. 2341, 2347, 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988)). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court acknowledged that both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stand, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. (emphasis added). ś 336. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the Court held that requiring a suspect's presence and speech at a lineup reflected a compulsion to exhibit physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. Here, it appears that Maggio's courtroom observations focused only on Evans' appearance, demeanor, and participation in the competency hearing. The Fifth Amendment, therefore, is not implicated because Evans was simply displaying physical, not testimonial evidence. ś 337. Moreover, Estelle may be distinguished on another basis. Here, unlike the defendant in Estelle, Evans offered psychiatric evidence at trial. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2917, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), the Supreme Court noted that in Estelle the finding that the Fifth Amendment was implicated was a result of the distinct circumstances of that case [where] ... the trial court had ordered, sua sponte, the psychiatric examination and Smith neither had asserted an insanity defense nor had offered psychiatric evidence at trial. In Estelle, the Court stated that a different situation arises where a defendant intends to introduce psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase. 451 U.S. at 471, 101 S.Ct. at 1877. The Buchanan Court recognized that in other situations the State may have an interest in introducing psychiatric evidence to rebut a petitioner's defense. ś 338. In Buchanan, defense counsel joined a motion to determine competency. There, the petitioner's entire defense strategy was to establish the mental status defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The sole witness for the defense was a social worker formerly assigned to the petitioner's case who read from various psychological reports. The defendant did not take the stand. There, the Court held that the Commonwealth could not respond to this defense unless it presented other psychological evidence. Id. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 2918. As a result, the Commonwealth asked the social worker to read excerpts of a psychological report wherein the psychiatrist had set forth general observations about the mental state of petitioner but had not described any statements by the petitioner dealing with the crimes for which he was charged. The Buchanan Court concluded that the introduction of such a report for this limited rebuttal purpose did not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. ś 339. Evans offered psychiatric evidence through the testimony of Dr. Zimmerman during the sentencing phase. As a result, the State called Dr. Maggio in rebuttal. As in Buchanan, the defendant did not testify, and therefore there was no other way for the prosecution to rebut the psychological testimony. Moreover, Evans was on notice that the State would call Dr. Maggio if Dr. Zimmerman testified. ś 340. Evans also argues that the Fifth Amendment was violated because he was not advised that Dr. Maggio would be using his prior mental health records during the sentencing phase. Evans, however, sought the admission of these documents during the sentencing phase as evidence of mitigation and Dr. Zimmerman testified that he also relied upon these medical records. The trial court overruled the State's objection and admitted the records into evidence. In rebuttal, Dr. Maggio testified that he also relied upon Evans' records as a basis for his opinion. By placing Evans' mental status in issue during the sentencing phase and introducing the medical reports as evidence of mitigation, the State was clearly entitled to allow its expert to rebut this evidence.
ś 341. Evans likewise argues that Dr. Maggio's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Evans again relies on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), where the Court held that the Sixth Amendment had been violated because defense counsel were not notified in advance that the psychiatric examination would encompass the issue of their client's future dangerousness, and respondent was denied the assistance of his attorneys in making the significant decision of whether to submit to the examination and to what end the psychiatrist's findings could be employed. Id. at 471, 101 S.Ct. at 1877. ś 342. Evans argues that his counsel was not notified that Dr. Maggio would be observing during the competency hearing for purposes of a psychiatric examination or that this examination would encompass sentencing-phase issues. Again, Evans, unlike the defendant in Estelle, requested that a competency evaluation be conducted. ś 343. Here, however, it is not clear that defense counsel knew Maggio would be observing the competency hearing. Moreover, Evans' counsel did not appear to have notice that the competency evaluation would be used for sentencing phase issues. As a matter of fact, the Order appointing Dr. Maggio to conduct the examination specifically prohibited any use of the information during the sentencing phase. In Buchanan, the Supreme Court held in order for a consultation with counsel to be effective it must be based on counsel's being informed about the scope and nature of the proceeding. 483 U.S. at 425, 107 S.Ct. at 2919. The Buchanan Court further held [g]iven our decision in Smith, however, counsel was certainly on notice that if, as appears to be the case, he intended to put on a mental status defense for petitioner, he would have to anticipate the use of psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal. Id. If such circumstances existed, the Court concluded that there was no Sixth Amendment violation. ś 344. In Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 685, 109 S.Ct. 3146, 3150, 106 L.Ed.2d 551 (1989), the Court held that defense counsel in Buchanan knew what the scope of the examination would be before it took place. In Powell, however, the Supreme Court reversed because defense counsel did not know that the examination would involve sentencing-phase evidence regarding future dangerousness. 492 U.S. at 685, 109 S.Ct. at 3150. However, the Powell Court did not disturb the pronouncement in Estelle that ... a different situation arises where a defendant intends to introduce psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase. 451 U.S. at 472, 101 S.Ct. at 1878. ś 345. Given the language in the trial court's order, defense counsel was not aware that sentencing-phase testimony would result from Dr. Maggio's evaluation. However, Evans intended to and did introduce psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase. Clearly, he would anticipate the use of psychological evidence by the prosecution. Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 425, 107 S.Ct. at 2919. ś 346. In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1797-98, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the harmless error rule applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith.  In Satterwhite, however, the Court declined to hold that the error was harmless where the testimony offered in violation of the Sixth Amendment stood out both because of his qualifications as a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry and because of the powerful content of his message. 486 U.S. at 259, 108 S.Ct. at 1799. ś 347. Dr. Maggio's testimony was purely in rebuttal. Moreover, the defense was on notice that if Dr. Zimmerman testified during the sentencing phase, the State would call Dr. Maggio. Evans intended to and did introduce psychiatric testimony. As a result, the State was clearly entitled to rebut this testimony. This issue is without merit.