Opinion ID: 395194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction and Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 23 Appellants argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case because there was no evidence to establish that either the agreement to conspire or an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed within the United States. In the context of 21 U.S.C. § 963, we have previously held that (t)he fact that appellants intended the conspiracy to be consummated within territorial boundaries satisfies jurisdictional requisites. United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271, quoting United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir. 1980). See United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1980) (Congress intended the crime of attempting to import a controlled substance into the United States, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963, to reach exclusively extra-territorial conduct.).
24 Appellants assert that the evidence was insufficient to establish that they intended to import marijuana into the United States. The standard of review in a criminal case when the issue is sufficiency of the evidence is whether a reasonable minded jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt under the evidence. United States v. Slone, 601 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1979). In evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence according to this standard, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), resolving reasonable inferences and credibility choices in support of the jury's verdict, United States v. Henderson, 588 F.2d 157, 161 (5th Cir. 1979). 25 Specifically, appellants argue that DeWeese's testimony that the COWBOY's destination was a point 13-14 miles off the coast of Mexico was not refuted beyond a reasonable doubt by the government's evidence. We disagree. 26 The government presented two witnesses to show that the COWBOY's destination was the United States. First, Travis Kuykendall, Staff Coordinator for the Mexican and Central American Division of Enforcement for the DEA, testified that in his experience he had never heard of Colombian marijuana being imported into Mexico. Agent Kuykendall supported his conclusion by a discussion of the economics of marijuana. He explained that a pound of Mexican marijuana sells for $50 in Mexico and $150 in the United States and that Mexico annually exports 2000 to 3000 tons of marijuana to the States. Furthermore, he testified that Colombian marijuana sells for $350 a pound in the United States. Based on the above factors, Kuykendall concluded that there is no market for Colombian marijuana in Mexico. 27 Second, Commander Howard Gehring of the Coast Guard, who was qualified as an expert in navigation and oceanography, concluded that the COWBOY was en route to a United States port. Gehring's opinion was based on the assumption that a prudent mariner would take advantage of ocean currents, weather, bottom topography, and tides. The COWBOY had maintained two headings: 290 to 300 degrees, or northwest, and 340 degrees, or north-northwest. Gehring found that a vessel maintaining such headings in the Straits of Yucatan was positioned to take advantage of currents which would carry it north to the United States. The COWBOY's headings would not have favored a destination of Mexico, Cuba, or the Bahamas. 28 Gehring also analyzed the navigational charts discovered aboard the COWBOY. He concluded that only the charts for Mobile Bay, Alabama and the west coast of Florida, primarily Tampa Bay and Tarpon Springs, provided sufficient detail for a safe entry into port. It was noted that the only tidal tables on board the COWBOY were for Tarpon Springs. Gehring stated that the absence of detailed charts for Mexico, Cuba, the Bahamas, or anywhere outside of Mobile and west coast of Florida, would have prevented the COWBOY from safely entering foreign ports. 29 Based on the testimony of Agent Kuykendall and Commander Gehring, a reasonable jury could have rejected DeWeese's testimony and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the COWBOY's destination was an American port.
30 In United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1967, 68 L.Ed.2d 290 (1981), we relied explicitly on United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1980), in holding that 31 ... the probable length of the voyage, the large quantity of marijuana on board, and the necessarily close relationship between the captain and his crew were factors from which the jury could reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 32 Id. at 1273; see United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 1980). 33 Here we have (1) the same lengthy voyage (10 days); (2) the same large quantity of marijuana (41,000 pounds); and (3) the same close relationship between captain and crew inferable from the length of the voyage and the size of the vessel. Furthermore, the jury was entitled to consider DeWeese's inculpatory statements about the crew even though they rejected his exculpatory statements on their behalf. Based on DeWeese's testimony, the jury knew that there was, in fact, a close relationship between captain and crew. Furthermore, DeWeese made clear that the four appellants were well aware of the presence of marijuana aboard the COWBOY. In sum, the three Alfrey-DeWeese factors alone would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy to import. 1 Here, the inferences to be drawn from those factors were buttressed by DeWeese's testimony. 34 Appellants contend that mere presence and association is insufficient to convict them of conspiracy. The simple response to this argument is that a ten day voyage on a vessel that was bulging with 41,000 pounds of marijuana constitutes much more than mere presence or mere association as those terms have been used by this court. See United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). We can do no better than to repeat the analysis in United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1980): 35 Appellant Haight relies on decisions of this court holding that mere presence in an area where drugs are discovered is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession. United States v. Rojas, 537 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed.2d 777; United States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1974). These cases do not aid appellants because more than mere presence has been established in the instant case. In United States v. Ferg, supra, we held that evidence that the accused was a passenger in an automobile which had marijuana hidden in it was insufficient to support a criminal conviction. Clearly a member of a three man crew on a long ocean voyage in a small vessel packed with tons of marijuana is different from the passenger in Ferg or the person whose fingerprints were found on envelopes containing drugs in United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1978), or the person found crouched by a rock near a house containing marijuana in United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 492 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1974). In this case the probable length of the voyage, inferable from the proximity of the border and the documentary evidence, the large quantity of marijuana on board, which made it indisputable that Alfrey and Haight had knowledge of the marijuana, and the necessarily close relationship between the captain of the trawler and his two man crew were factors from which the jury could reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 36 Id. at 556.