Opinion ID: 2150490
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Necessity of Consent. Margaret is the natural mother of these children and she objects to the adoption. Is her consent essential?

Text: Whether, as a policy matter, a parent's consent to adoption should be essential is a much mooted question in family law. Compare majority and minority opinions in the case of In re Adoption of Moriarty, 260 Iowa 1279, 152 N.W.2d 218. At common law adoption was unknown, and under Iowa statutes from 1858 to 1927, consent was the way adoption was effected, for adoption was by deed. 7 G.A. ch. 67; Code, 1924, ch. 473. Since 1927, in Iowa and generally, adoption procedure has undergone substantial change, and the legal aspects of it now constitute a court proceeding rather than a mere conveyance. The matter of parental consent has been examined during this change in adoption law. The basic contentions are these. On the one hand, the plea is made that no person should be deprived of parenthood of his own offspring over his objection unless the parent-child relationship has been previously terminated because of his unfitness to be a parent. This view is reflected in § 5, Uniform Adoption Act. 9 Uniform Laws Ann. at 30-32 (1957). Support for that view may be found in hardship cases in which an indigent parent not having custody, such as a poverty-stricken mother, loses a child through adoption in a jurisdiction which has relaxed consent requirements. Comment, 53 Iowa L.Rev. 751. On the other hand, the contention is advanced that giving a parent complete veto power over adoption places the parent's desires for himself ahead of the welfare of the child; although adoption may be much better for the child, the parent can arbitrarily block it for light and transitory reasons. Thus it has been said, The power of an absolute veto of an adoption petition by a parent should be recognized only under extraordinary circumstances, for to allow such a power in many cases might prevent the court from providing for the best interests of the child. Note, 33 Iowa L. Rev. 679, 685. In three states the only requirement is that the adoption serve the child's best interests. Fla.Stat., §§ 63.081, 63.131 (1967); Md.Ann.Code, art. 16, § 74 (1966); S.C.Code, § 10-2584 (1962). Certainly if the consent requirement is relaxed, much attention must be given in practice to the other major issuethe wisdom of the particular adoption. In amending the Iowa adoption statute from time to time, our legislature eliminated the requirement of parental consent in a variety of situations. Code, 1966, § 600.3; Adoption in Iowa, 40 Iowa L.Rev. 228, 240-42. Since adoption is statutory, this court is not called upon to say, as a policy matter, when consent should or should not be essential except in cases falling between two statutory clauses. It is in such cases that the basic considerations are confronted which sometimes give rise to split decisions. The commonest of these interstitial cases is the kind now before usstepparent adoption proceedings in which the natural parent not having custody does not consent. Admittedly, the strong policy undercurrents in such situations have resulted in decisions which are not always easy to reconcile with each other. Rubendall v. Bisterfelt, 227 Iowa 1388, 291 N.W. 401; In re Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 931, 14 N. W.2d 742; In re Adoption of Karns, 236 Iowa 932, 20 N.W.2d 474; In re Adoption of Chinn, 238 Iowa 4, 25 N.W.2d 735; In re Adoption of Perkins, 242 Iowa 1374, 49 N.W.2d 248; Burrell v. Burrell, 256 Iowa 490, 127 N.W.2d 78; In re Adoption of Ellis, 260 Iowa 508, 149 N.W.2d 804; In re Adoption of Moriarty, 260 Iowa 1279, 152 N.W.2d 218. These decisions fall between the clause of the statute which normally requires parental consent (The consent of both parents shall be given to such adoption) and the clause which is claimed to be applicable here (If not married to each other, the parent having the care and providing for the wants of the child may give consent). Code, 1966, § 600.3. The problem in such cases usually is, when does a divorced parent not having custody have enough care and provide enough wants under the second clause to necessitate his consent under the first clause? Rather refined distinctions have been drawn, but a couple threads run through the cases. One is that the right of visitation, as distinguished from responsibility for supporting the child, is not enough to give power to veto adoption. In re Adoption of Chinn, 238 Iowa 4, 7, 25 N.W.2d 735, 737 (However, the agreement and decree did not require that the husband exercise any of the parental privileges given him.). The other thread is that for the parent out of custody to have veto power, he must be materially providing for the child's wants. In re Adoption of Moriarty, 260 Iowa 1279, 1286, 152 N.W.2d 218, 222 (materially provided for the children); see also In re Adoption of Ellis, 260 Iowa 508, 149 N.W.2d 804. We think the present case is quite similar to In re Adoption of Chinn, 238 Iowa 4, 5, 8, 25 N.W.2d 735, 736, 737. There the divorce decree provided that the father shall have the right to visit said child at all reasonable times, and shall further have the right to take said child to his home in Marcus for periods not exceeding one week in length and not oftener than once every three months. This court held, The rights given the father to visit the child and to take her to his home for one week in each three months did not give him the care of the child within the meaning of the statute. Here, similarly, Margaret has the right to visit at holidays and for a month each summer. But that does not give her the care of the children within the meaning of the statute. We think the case is also similar to In re Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 931, 14 N. W.2d 742. There, as here, the custodial parent was awarded the family's assets in the divorce decree. Notwithstanding, the noncustodial parent was held not to be providing the children's needs. Thus the decisions indicate Margaret has no absolute veto here. Moreover, we are convinced the basic position previously quoted is sound: the veto power of parents ought not be extended by a narrow reading of the adoption statute. Note, 33 Iowa L.Rev. 678, 685. Statutory development over the past 50 years in the area of child welfare evinces growing public concern for children. We repeat, therefore, what the court has previously indicated: when the natural parents are not married to each other, the noncustodial parent does not possess power to veto adoption because he possesses visitation rights; nor does he have veto power unless he materially provides the child's needs. In re Adoption of Moriarty, supra, 260 Iowa at 1286, 152 N.W.2d at 222. Measured by that standard, Margaret's consent is not essential here. II. Wisdom of the Adoption. The conclusion just reached makes the case much more difficult to decide, for now we must approach the issue whether the proposed adoption is a wise one. An adoption is not decreed merely because essential consents have been obtained. Rather, when those consents have been given, adoption is decreed If    the court shall be satisfied    that the petition should be granted.    Code, 1966, § 600.5. On this major issue the general principle is that The welfare of the child is ordinarily a controlling consideration   . In re Adoption of Karns, 236 Iowa 932, 940, 20 N.W.2d 474, 478. See also In re Adoption of Perkins, 242 Iowa 1374, 49 N.W.2d 248. The principle is general, but we are unable to devise a more specific one. We think, however, that the children's welfare, while vital, is not the only consideration. Here, for example, we cannot ignore Margaret's ties to the children. Note, 33 Iowa L.Rev. 678, 682 (the immediate best interests of the child, while of great importance, are not the sole consideration). Adoption is drastic, and if this adoption is granted, Margaret's visitations will be wholly at Clarks' sufferance. We fully realize that Margaret has wronged these children. Although we do not know what kind of husband Walter was and although Margaret did try to get custody of the children, she should not have left the children and placed them in their present situation. We thoroughly disapprove of her conduct. Yet she seems now to have stabilized her life. Is she to be damned forever for her past misdeeds, even to the extent of having her last legal tie to her children cut off? We are not prepared to go that far. This is not a case in which a parent, after leaving his children, showed little or no heed for them. Margaret is interested in the children, tried to get custody of them, and has clamored to see them. Indeed, her persistent effort to visit the children is one of Clarks' main complaints. Granting adoption here would mean that numerous divorced, noncustodial parents might have their tie to their children jeopardized. Surely adoptions are not to be granted wholesale over parents' objections under facts no stronger than these. If Margaret's visitation rights need to be altered, the change should not be effected by cutting off parentage but by modifying the divorce decree. Of course, we intimate no opinion on that subject. Furthermore, we are not at all clear that adoption would promote the best interests of these children. Margaret and the children know each other and she has something to give their lives that no one else possesses. Possibly the long range welfare of the children would be served if they had but one home and one set of parents, but not even Walter and Sandra propose that. Realizing the children love their own mother, Walter and Sandra agree the children should visit Margaret after adoption. In such circumstances, would not an ambiguous situation exist for the children? If Sandra is de facto and de jure mother, then who would Margaret be in the children's eyes? Are not these adults going to have to face up to the realities of the situation? Since the children are to see their own mother at all events, will not their interests be subserved by the adults' living their real roles: Walter as father, Sandra as stepmother, and Margaret as natural mother? The visitations have caused some disturbance but do not appear to have been seriously upsetting. Visitations not infrequently ruffle the waters, but that seems an incident of some divorces. No easy solutions exist when families are divided. Sometimes the trouble does not arise because the children are upset but because the adults are upset. Walter, Sandra, and Margaret can reduce upsetting experiences for these children by acting maturely themselves. The trial court observed and heard the case first-hand and decreed that the parent-child relationship between Margaret and the children should not be severed. Upon balancing the various interests, we have concluded to abide that decree. Affirmed.