Opinion ID: 2612481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: majority case law diversion case

Text: The majority inaccurately cites a number of cases involving modern diversion procedures where discretion of the prosecutor has been favored for authority to justify prosecutorial veto of a sentencing statute. The cases do not fit! [16] The pretrial diversion programs of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida, Tennessee, Colorado, Oregon and Kansas do not provide authority for application to the similar Wyoming sentencing statute existent here since 1909 which is triggered only by a guilty plea or a jury verdict. The idea of pretrial diversion is appealing. It represents an attempt to structure and make visible the informal prosecutorial practices of noncriminal disposition. It also makes possible the early delivery of rehabilitation services on a formal rather than impromptu basis. And it offers the prosecution an alternative to its standard options of full criminal processing or informal screening-out without follow-up supervision.       Pretrial diversion, which began six years ago with two pilot programs, has become today a reform movement well on its way to institutionalization. It is predicted that by 1987 there will be 150 programs diverting annually 150,000 persons before trial. But continued proliferation of pretrial diversion programs at this time is hard to justify. Existing programs must first meet the burden of showing that their promises have been or could be delivered. Otherwise, the practice of pretrial diversion, like almost everything we do in the criminal field, is on the basis of faith. Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 Yale L.J. 827, 852-54 (1974) (quoting Zaloom, in 4 Crim.Justice Newsletter, October 15, 1973, at 4 and Vorenberg & Vorenberg, Early Diversion From the Criminal Justice System, 1972 (unpublished paper, Harvard Law School). Principles of the diversion process case law originated very recently and principally from New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The New Jersey Supreme Court established the diversion program and then provided the character of its exercise involving both prosecutorial and sentencing court responsibilities. After the program was in place, the state legislature adopted the structure by enacted statute. In State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976), reh'g 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) ( Leonardis I ), the pretrial intervention program (PTI) was established by the New Jersey Supreme Court to represent a procedural alternative to the traditional system of prosecuting and incarcerating criminal suspects. The court noted that PTI was developed within the last decade. Various studies recognize the desirability of alternative means for the disposition of criminal cases. Id. 363 A.2d at 325. The system was to provide prosecutorial options. Id. at 325. As such, the prosecutor's participation and discretion was confirmed. State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) ( Leonardis II ) addressed the exercise of that discretion in the PTI program. Considering that the pretrial diversion program was functionally a quasi judicial decision tailored to provide options to the prosecutor, the court in Leonardis II discerned the character of supervised discretion of the prosecutor by judicial oversight. The Leonardis cases were followed by State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 432 A.2d 74 (1981) which addressed the development of a legislatively enacted statewide program of pretrial intervention as part of the New Jersey criminal code. The court recognized that judicial review of a prosecutor's decision whether or not to suspend criminal charges infringes on both the Legislature's power to define crimes and the Executive's responsibility to enforce the laws and therefore must be performed with sensitivity. Since the Legislature has established a PTI program with judicial review, the trial court correctly concluded that the problem of judicial interference with legislative authority has been eliminated. Id. 432 A.2d at 79. The New Jersey program did not involve a predicate of an adverse verdict or a guilty plea before participation was considered. The program was an alternative predating plea or trial. The succeeding case, State v. Collins, 180 N.J. Super. 190, 434 A.2d 628 (1981), aff'd 90 N.J. 449, 448 A.2d 977 (1982), addressed various procedural and differentiating features within New Jersey law and determined the prosecutor's exercise of discretion to deny pretrial diversion was not abused and that the accused's case would be then pursued to trial. The difference between pretrial diversion and post-conviction sentencing is clear. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise established an accelerated rehabilitation disposition program (ARD) which provides a means of suspension of formal criminal proceedings before conviction on the condition that the accused will do something in return, such as make restitution, participate in a rehabilitation program, under psychiatric treatment, hold certain employment, or otherwise modify his behavior. The ARD rules provide that after a defendant is held for court by an issuing authority or after an information or indictment, the district attorney sua sponte or at the request of defendant's attorney, may move that the case be considered for ARD. The district attorney has the discretion to refuse to ask for ARD and to insist on prosecuting the defendant for the offense. Com. v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99, 371 A.2d 1346, 1347 (1977) (quoting Shade v. Com. of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Transp., 394 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (M.D.Pa. 1975)). The Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court addressed constitutional activity of the supreme court as a supervisory power in the establishment of the ARD program. Unquestionably, the ARD program is a diversion without conviction process and provides no informative authority for a separation of powers inquiry as is presented here. See likewise Com. v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 495 A.2d 928 (1985). The similar inquiry into the proper exercise of discretion by the prosecutor for the ARD program was presented as the subject of Com. v. Ebert, 369 Pa.Super. 318, 535 A.2d 178 (1987). The program was described as a pretrial disposition of certain cases through which the defendant can earn dismissal of the charges against him if he successfully completes a rehabilitation program. Id. 535 A.2d at 179. Florida has a statutory pretrial intervention program and the issue presented in State v. Cleveland, 390 So.2d 364 (Fla.App. 1980) was control or supervision of exercised discretion of the prosecutor before trial. The court noted: The system is one of balancing. If the prosecutor takes the case to trial and the defendant is found guilty, the trial judge has the discretion under the law to sentence the defendant in whatever fashion the trial court sees fit. Id. at 367. Obviously, the discretion of the prosecutor was to permit diversion or to proceed with prosecution. The Florida Supreme Court, in considering the same case, reiterated: The pretrial diversion is essentially a conditional decision not to prosecute similar to the nolle prosequi situation postulated by [ State v.] Jogan, [388 So.2d 322 (Fla.3d DCA 1980)]. It is a pretrial decision and does not divest the state attorney of the right to institute proceedings if the conditions are not met. The pretrial intervention program is merely an alternative to prosecution and should remain in the prosecutor's discretion. Cleveland v. State, 417 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982). The court noted that the Florida system was different than the California program, citing People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405 (1974). A special intervention program in the Cleveland municipal court was instituted to provide a form of rehabilitation in lieu of conviction and sentence. City of Cleveland v. Mosquito, 10 Ohio App.3d 239, 461 N.E.2d 924 (1983). The program was based on a statutory authorization for prosecuting attorneys to establish the program with cooperation between the court and the executive agency. The program retained the prosecutorial discretion of whether to continue with prosecution or utilize the diversion program. The activity and status demonstrated in the case essentially conforms to New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Florida pre-conviction diversion arrangements. The specific issue in Mosquito, 461 N.E.2d at 927 was the prosecutor's place to deny the opportunity of Mosquito to enter the program and escape trial. The constitutionality of the Tennessee pretrial diversion program was similarly considered in Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978). The Tennessee system involved a memorandum of understanding between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant without effect until trial court approval. The case confirmed the authority of the court to supervise the exercise of discretion and found the statute constitutional. The special concurrence is of particular interest in recognizing the three-stage process involving nolle prosequi or pretrial diversion, and, if neither, then verdict. The essential characteristic of the Tennessee system was premised on the agreement of the defendant and the prosecutor to be incorporated pretrial in the memorandum of understanding. The Colorado court in People, By and Through Vanmeveren v. District Court In and For Larimer County, 186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50 (1974) applied the same principle to the same kind of a deferred prosecution statute as a recognition of the prosecutor's charging discretion. Oregon statutes established a prosecutorial based pretrial diversion authority. The Oregon courts considered the exercise of discretion in State ex rel. Anderson v. Haas, 43 Or. App. 169, 602 P.2d 346 (1979) and the character of a hearing, if any, to terminate upon decision of the prosecutor in State ex rel. Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752, 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) and found that the charged defendant had no right to choose treatment as an alternative to prosecution in State v. Graves, 58 Or. App. 286, 648 P.2d 866 (1982). The thesis of the statute and the case law resulting is the well-established principle of prosecutorial discretion to prosecute. The program is structured in Oregon on an agreement between the prosecution and the defendant and little supervision is provided the court to require that the prosecutor enter into the agreement. Kansas patterned its statute after the law enacted in Oregon. The Kansas court in State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 620 P.2d 1132 (1980) recognized the same picture of a function in exercising discretion to enter into an agreement by the prosecutor while perceiving that the statute itself was largely a recognition of a prior practice of diverted or delayed prosecution. The court noted: The control [of the prosecutor] is minimal and the overall effect is merely to make the process of diversion more formal by establishing a few procedural standards and establishing some degree of uniformity in procedure. The ultimate decision remains with the prosecutor. Id. 620 P.2d at 1137-38. The court did note that the prosecutor, although possessing wide discretion, is not immune from judicial review of the exercise of that discretion for arbitrariness. Id. at 1139.