Opinion ID: 1423312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Thompson's Petition and Supporting Documents

Text: To support his claim of incompetence in this case, Thompson attached to his petition eighteen exhibits, consisting of records detailing Thompson's history of mental illness while in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder of Brenda Lane; materials regarding the appointment and later termination of a conservator to supervise Thompson's medication; affidavits from Thompson's attorney and investigator in the federal proceedings; and the reports and curricula vitae of three mental health professionals, who have examined Thompson within the last three months and opine that he is incompetent to be executed. Many of the exhibits, particularly the records relating Thompson's history of mental illness, are stale and thus not relevant to the issue of present competency. See Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 269. Nevertheless, Thompson asserts that these records reflect delusional beliefs about his personal identity (he is God and in control of the world and he is a wealthy songwriter), about the State's ability to carry out his death sentence (he believes, despite his death sentence, that he will be released from prison . . . because Big Bird or God is on his side) and/or the likelihood that his execution will occur (he will be released from prison . . . simply because that is what is going to happen), and demonstrate that he lacks the mental capacity to be executed. We disagree. Approximately eight months ago, at the request of Thompson's current counsel, the Davidson County Probate Court terminated a conservatorship for Thompson that had been in place since March 2001. In terminating the conservatorship, then Probate Court Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr., found that Thompson has some insight into his mental illness, that he voluntarily takes his medication, and that he is not in need of the supervision or assistance of a conservator. [10] Judge Clement stated as follows at the conclusion of the termination hearing: [I]n the two plus years that Frank Freemon has been conservator I'm extremely pleased that he was there, but he's basically been unnecessary, which is pretty compelling in itself. . . . I'm impressed with the fact that, as Mr. Freemon indicated today, they hand him [Thompson] his meds . . . and he takes them voluntarily. With that in mind, I believe the conservator is unnecessary. Moreover, review of the exhibits that are prison records relating to Thompson's mental health history illustrates that Thompson remains aware that he has been sentenced to death for the murder of Brenda Lane. For example, on September 24, 1998, Thompson was interviewed by a prison psychiatrist. During the interview, Thompson recounted that he had seen a psychiatrist while in the Navy. According to the prison psychiatrist, Mr. Thompson [said] `the psychiatrist he saw in the military should have done more tests and he would not have ended up on death row .' (Emphasis added.) According to a prison nurse, Thompson claimed, on January 20, 2001, that an officer at the prison is actually a woman he is suppose [sic] to have murdered. That she is that person, right age, right build, right hair `not many people have black-red hair.' Inmate relates that since she is alive and working here he could not have murdered her and he should not be on death row for something he didn't do . (Emphasis added.) Again, on September 6, 2002, Thompson questioned a prison psychiatrist, I'd like to know when I'm getting out of here. When the psychiatrist asked, How long is your sentence Greg? Thompson answered,  Death.  (Emphasis added.) Contrary to Thompson's assertions, therefore, records from the conservatorship proceeding and from the prison do not establish a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding his competency to be executed. Thompson also submitted the reports of three mental health experts who opined that he presently is not competent to be executed. Although all of these reports indicate that Thompson is suffering from mental illness, described as schizophrenia, chronic undifferentiated type, the reports do not present facts indicating that Thompson is unaware of his impending execution and the reason for it. In fact, as the State points out, parts of these reports support the opposite conclusion, that Thompson presently meets the standard of competency for execution. Although each of the experts ultimately opines that Thompson is presently incompetent to be executed, these opinions, standing alone with no underlying factual bases, are not sufficient to give rise to a genuine issue regarding Thompson's present competency. Significantly, the reports of all three experts either explicitly, or as part of the factual bases underlying their opinions, illustrate that Thompson presently is aware of the fact of his impending execution for the murder of Brenda Lane. In a report dated January 28, 2004, Dr. John S. Rabun, a psychiatrist, states that, when questioned about the reason for his incarceration, Thompson readily admitted that he `killed Brenda Lane.' Thompson further discussed his trial in Coffee County with Dr. Rabun, stating that he had been convicted of first-degree murder and, during the second phase, had been sentenced to death. Dr. Rabun includes in`his report four factors that suggest Thompson is competent to be executed: (1) Mr. Thompson told the examiner that executions in Tennessee are by lethal injection or the electric chair, suggesting that he understands how the death penalty is carried out; (2) Mr. Thompson told the examiner that he was convicted in 1985 of killing the victim of the instant matter, suggesting that he understands the reason for his death sentence; (3) Mr. Thompson told the examiner that he received the death penalty during the second phase of his trial, suggesting that he understands the penalty he received; and (4) Although Mr. Thompson did not know anything about the current appeal process in his case, he said that he knew the State of Tennessee was seeking to execute him. Dr. Rabun's ultimate opinion of incompetence is based upon Thompson's alleged delusional beliefs about: (1) his personal status and identity; [11] (2) the State's ability to carry out the death sentence; [12] (3) the likelihood that the sentence will actually be carried out; [13] and, (4) what will happen to him upon execution. [14] This Court previously rejected a prisoner's reliance on such delusional or unorthodox beliefs as irrelevant to the question of competency for execution. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 220-22 (declining to overturn the trial court's decision finding Coe competent despite Coe's belief that at his execution he would be in another place in the same body, would visit his ex-wife and child, and would perhaps temporarily be a ball of fire that speaks to people). Moreover, Dr. Rabun's report, recounting the substance of an interview with Thompson as recently as January 19, 2004, clearly demonstrates Thompson's awareness of the details of the murder of Brenda Lane, the trial and sentencing proceedings resulting in his current death sentence, and further, that he accepts full responsibility for his actions. The report states as follows: Committing Offense: Mr. Thompson was questioned about the reason for his incarceration. Mr. Thompson readily admitted that he killed Brenda Lane. He noted that he and a female friend had an idea to go to Tennessee. He was then living in Georgia, estimating that he returned to Georgia in 1984. He told the examiner that he and his female friend drove to Tennessee, and he kidnapped Brenda Lane who worked at a Methodist newspaper. He again reported that he killed Brenda Lane. In other words, he accepted responsibility for his actions. At no point in either interview with the examiner did he try and claim he was innocent or allege that another party committed the offense. Subsequently, he discussed his trial in Coffee County, Tennessee. He indicated that he was convicted of First Degree Murder and during the second phase was sentenced to death. In short, Dr. Rabun's report fails to satisfy the threshold showing for a hearing on competency. Indeed, its detailed description of Thompson's awareness of the murder of Brenda Lane, his sentence of death, and his impending execution, undercuts, rather than supports, his claim of incompetence. See Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 221-222 (The appellant's comments asserting his innocence and contending that the purpose of his execution is to prevent the truth from coming out actually demonstrate that he understands the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it.); Cf. Schornhorst ex rel. Fleenor v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d 944, 955 (S.D.Ind. 1999) (stating that the prisoner considered his execution unfair, but finding that the prisoner had failed to make a threshold showing of incompetency). The next report is that of Dr. George W. Woods, Jr., a psychiatrist, who evaluated Thompson on February 17, 2004, for three hours. In a report dated February 27, 2004, Dr.Woods diagnoses Thompson as suffering from schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, and opines that Thompson is currently incompetent to be executed. Dr. Woods reported that Thompson suffers from bizarre delusions and perceptual disorders such as auditory hallucinations and that Thompson believes he cannot die and will stay alive for two years even if he is executed. Thompson also told Dr. Woods that, once it is acknowledged that he is a lieutenant in the Navy, he will receive a trial before a military tribunal and be exonerated. According to Dr. Woods, Thompson also claims that he has a fortune in gold bullion buried in his hometown in Georgia, denies that he will die from electrocution, and says that he has been electrocuted before and plans to go either to Gangster's Paradise or to Hawaii after his death. Dr. Woods concluded that, although not mentally retarded, Thompson's mental state is analogous to that of mental retardation and that the same reasons given by the United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, (2002), to explain why execution of the mentally retarded is unconstitutional, apply equally to Thompson. Although Dr. Woods relates Thompson's delusional beliefs, his report fails to address directly the critical inquiry under Van Tran whether Thompson is aware of the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it. [15] To the contrary, Dr. Woods's report indicates that Thompson is aware of the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it. For example, the report states: Mr. Thompson believes that he can not die, and there will be a two year period in which he will stay alive, even if he were executed . He also believes that he will not be executed since he was a lieutenant in the navy, and once this information is acknowledged, his current conviction will be thrown out and he will receive a military tribunal which will exonerate him. Thompson further relates that the electric chair is his method of choice. (Emphasis added.) Again, Thompson's beliefs about what will occur after his death or dissatisfaction with his conviction and sentence do not raise genuine issues regarding his competency for execution unless those beliefs preclude Thompson from being aware of the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it. Dr. Woods's report fails to illustrate that Thompson's beliefs pose such an impediment and therefore fails to establish a genuine issue under Van Tran regarding Thompson's present competency. The third report was provided by Dr. Faye E. Sultan, a psychologist, who examined Thompson on January 28, 2004. Dr. Sultan stated that in a non-medicated state, Mr. Thompson is floridly psychotic and unaware of his surroundings. Dr. Sultan opined that Thompson is not competent to be executed in a non-medicated state. Currently, however, as Dr. Sultan acknowledges, Thompson participates in a regular regimen of medications. Dr. Sultan admits that Thompson knows he has been sentenced to death, but she points out that Thompson holds the delusional beliefs that it is impossible for him to be executed or for the execution to occur. Thompson instead talks about leaving prison and returning to Hawaii or to his family. At best, Dr. Sultan's affidavit establishes that Thompson may become incompetent at some point in the future if he deviates from his current medication regimen, an allegation that has been rejected by this Court on more than one occasion as insufficient to trigger competency proceedings under Van Tran . See Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 221 n. 5 (stating that the issue in a Van Tran proceeding is the prisoner's present competency to be executed); see also Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman v. State, No. M1988-00026-SC-DPE-PD, Order (Tenn. filed Jan. 15, 2002) (stating that allegations of future incompetency are insufficient to delay execution date or obtain hearing on competency to be executed); State v. Sedley Alley, No. M1991-00019-SC-DPE-DD, Order (Tenn. filed Jan. 16, 2004) (finding allegation that prisoner will become incompetent at or around the time of execution insufficient to trigger Van Tran proceedings). Thus, like the reports of Dr. Rabun and Dr. Woods, Dr. Sultan's report is insufficient to raise a genuine issue regarding Thompson's present competency to be executed. The expert reports indicate, rather, that Thompson is aware of the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it. The final exhibits attached to Thompson's petition are affidavits of Dana C. Hansen Chavis, an attorney with the Federal Defenders Services of Eastern Tennessee, Incorporated, (Federal Defender Services), who has represented Thompson in the past, [16] and Michael R. Chavis, an investigator with Federal Defender Services. These affidavits recount conversations Dana C. Hansen Chavis and Michael R. Chavis had with Thompson on January 22, 2004, and February 27, 2004, respectively. The affidavit of Dana C. Hansen Chavis relates that, when she advised Thompson the State had filed a motion to set his execution date, Thompson responded: Don't worry. God told me yesterday I'm not going to die.... I'm either going to Hawaii or I'm going back home. Michael R. Chavis's affidavit relates that when he informed Thompson that his execution date had been set by the order of February 25, 2004, Thompson replied: It's more important than ever that you find my money and uniform. Both Dana C. Hansen Chavis and Michael Chavis opined that Thompson currently is not competent to be executed. While Thompson's petition and supporting exhibits establish that he is mentally ill, these filings do not raise a genuine issue regarding Thompson's competency. In fact, the petition and supporting exhibits undercut Thompson's claim that he currently is not competent to be executed. Under Van Tran and Coe , Thompson need only understand or be aware of the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 266; Coe 17 S.W.3d at 220 (emphasis added). The reports of Thompson's mental health experts show that, despite any delusions, Thompson understands that he is going to be executed for murdering Brenda Lane. As previously stated, the fact that a prisoner may suffer from a mental disease or disorder does not automatically equate to a finding of incompetency to be executed. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 221. Furthermore, while Thompson professes unorthodox beliefs about what will happen after his execution, these beliefs do not vitiate Thompson's awareness of the fact of his execution and the reason for it. As previously stated, a prisoner's delusional or unorthodox beliefs about what may occur upon death or the prisoner's irrational beliefs about the legal processes and/or the ability of the State to carry out the execution are not pertinent to the question of competency because they do not impede the prisoner's ability to understand the fact of the impending execution and the reason for it. See Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 221-22 (citing Weeks v. Jones, 100 F.3d 124, 125 n. 3 (11th Cir.1996) (finding that the prisoner's belief that he would be transformed into a giant tortoise upon his death and rule the universe did not render him incompetent to be executed); Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir.1992) (finding the prisoner competent to be executed despite his belief that his deceased aunt would save him through supernatural intervention)). The trial court did not err in concluding that Thompson failed to meet the threshold showing for an evidentiary hearing by establishing that there are genuine issues regarding his present competency to be executed. Furthermore, Thompson's assertion that the trial court misapplied the law in making its determination is without merit. Thompson points to the trial court's reference to the high threshold for obtaining an evidentiary hearing, which he says conflicts with Van Tran's simple threshold showing. Relying upon this language, Thompson claims that the trial court imposed a higher burden than contemplated by Van Tran . However, we are convinced that the trial court applied the proper standard in denying Thompson's request for a hearing. Moreover, this Court certainly has applied the proper standard in reviewing de novo Thompson's petition and supporting exhibits and reaches the same conclusion, that Thompson failed to make the required threshold showing. This issue therefore is without merit. Thompson also argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard for competence by omitting the mental capacity component of Van Tran . He contends that the appropriate standard for competence requires that a prisoner have both a rational and factual understanding of the punishment he is about to suffer and the reason for it. According to Thompson, the prisoner must understand that he will die in the near future (and what it means to die), and that the reason the State will kill him is to punish him for what he did. In addition, Thompson faults the trial court for not applying the more rigorous common law assistance standard for competence articulated in Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1911), and argues that this Court should hold that a prisoner is not competent to be executed unless the prisoner is aware of the penalty and its purpose [and possesses the ability] to assist in his or her own defense. Initially we note that this Court expressly rejected the more stringent Jordan assistance test as the standard for competency to be executed, observing that neither the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor precedent of this Court requires the stricter standard. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 266 (We agree with Justice Powell that in a proceeding to determine competency to be executed, only those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and the reason they are to suffer it are entitled to a reprieve). Moreover, in Coe , this Court refused to engraft upon the term awareness, a highly technical meaning. Pointing to the prisoner's delusional beliefs about what would happen at the moment of his death (he will just simply be in another place in the same body, will visit his ex-wife and child and when he is given the needle . . . he will then be out of prison and he will be walking around), Coe argued that, although he had an awareness of his impending execution, he lacked an understanding of it. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 219-20. This Court instructed, however, that for purposes of determining competency, the terms awareness and understanding should be given their ordinary, common meanings, not the technical meanings these words may have in the field of psychology or psychiatry. Thus, we concluded that the requirements of Van Tran were satisfied because the record clearly reflected Coe knows that he was sentenced to death for murdering a young girl. Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 221. Simply put, a prisoner need only be aware of the fact of his or her impending execution and the reason for it to satisfy the competency required for execution of the death sentence. Id. at 220 (emphasis added). The trial court and this Court on de novo review have properly applied this standard in concluding that Thompson failed to establish a genuine issue regarding his competency and in denying his petition without a hearing.