Opinion ID: 3134614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Seized Evidence under the Good-Faith

Text: Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Although we hold that anticipatory search warrants are constitutionally valid, it is undisputed that the anticipatory search warrant in this case was statutorily invalid under our decision in Ross . Consequently, we must determine whether the evidence seized from defendant’s residence pursuant to a statutorily invalid anticipatory search warrant is admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The United States Supreme Court first articulated the good- faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). In Leon , the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not bar evidence obtained by a police officer who reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, but later found to be unsupported by probable cause. Leon , 468 U.S. at 919-22, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696-98, 104 S. Ct. at 3418-20. The Court in Leon noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges. Leon , 468 U.S. at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 3417. The exclusionary rule cannot deter a police officer who reasonably believes in good faith that he possesses a valid search warrant from conducting a search pursuant to this warrant. Leon , 468 U.S. at 918-21, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696-97, 104 S. Ct. at 3418-19. This court adopted the Leon good-faith exception for Illinois in People v. Stewart , 104 Ill. 2d 463, 477 (1984). See also 725 ILCS 5/114–12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1996) (codifying Leon ). Later, in Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987), the United States Supreme Court extended the Leon good-faith exception. The Court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not bar evidence seized by a police officer who reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a statute that authorized a warrantless administrative search, where the statute is later held unconstitutional. Krull , 480 U.S. at 349-50, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 375, 107 S. Ct. at 1167. The Krull majority concluded that application of the exclusionary rule in situations where police officers conducted a search in objective good faith reliance on a statute, which is only later declared unconstitutional, would not deter future police misconduct. Krull , 480 U.S. at 347- 49, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 373-75, 107 S. Ct. at 1165-67. This court in People v. Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d 60, 73-74 (1996), however, determined that the Krull good-faith exception is not compatible with the exclusionary rule arising out of the Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6). After declaring unconstitutional section 108–8(b)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/108–8(b)(2) (West 1994) (allowing police to make “no-knock” entries under certain circumstances when executing a search warrant)), we held that evidence seized by virtue of an unconstitutional statute is not admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 70. Our opinion in Krueger discussed at length Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Krull . See Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 72-73. Justice O’Connor explained that the extended good-faith exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, as recognized by the Krull majority, provides a “ ‘grace period’ ” for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during which time the State can “ ‘violate constitutional requirements with impunity.’ ” Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 72, quoting Krull , 480 U.S. at 361, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 382, 107 S. Ct. at 1173 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). Justice O’Connor then distinguished Leon from the situation in Krull on the ground that there is a “ ‘powerful historical basis for the exclusion of evidence gathered pursuant to a search authorized by an unconstitutional statute. ’ ” Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 72, quoting Krull , 480 U.S. at 362, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 383, 107 S. Ct. at 1173 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). “Not only were such statutes ‘the core concern of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,’ the exclusionary rule had regularly been applied to suppress evidence gathered under unconstitutional statutes.” Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 72, quoting Krull , 480 U.S. at 362-63, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 383-84, 107 S. Ct. at 1173-74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). Based on reasoning similar to the reasoning in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, this court in Krueger declined to interpret our state constitution in lockstep with the Krull majority. Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 73-74. We explained that our state exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence seized under the authority of an unconstitutional statute, and that to adopt Krull ’s extended good-faith exception would drastically change this state’s constitutional law. Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 74-75, citing People v. Brocamp , 307 Ill. 448 (1923). We then set forth the central basis for our rejection of Krull ’s extended good-faith exception: “We are not willing to recognize an exception to our state exclusionary rule that will provide a grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during which time our citizens’ prized constitutional rights can be violated with impunity. We are particularly disturbed by the fact that such a grace period could last for several years and affect large numbers of people. This is simply too high a price for our citizens to pay.” Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 75. Significantly, however, we explicitly noted in Krueger that our decision to reject the Krull extended good-faith exception “does not impact the Leon good-faith exception.” Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 76. Defendant argues that the Krueger rationale should be extended to apply to the instant case. Alluding to language in Krueger and in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Krull , defendant reasons that an invalid warrant resulting from a judicial error affects only one individual, whereas Ross ’s declaration that anticipatory search warrants are statutorily invalid affects numerous individuals, including defendant. Defendant asserts that, since the reason for the invalidity of the warrant in her case resulted from legislative action, the evidence seized pursuant to this warrant should not be admissible under the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Defendant’s argument is without merit. Most importantly, application of the Leon good-faith exception in the instant case does not present the threat to our citizens’ constitutional rights that was present in Krueger . Both Krueger and Krull involved searches that were based on statutes later declared unconstitutional. Conversely, the instant case involves a search that was based on a constitutional anticipatory search warrant. This court in Ross found anticipatory search warrants to be statutorily invalid, not constitutionally invalid. Illinois citizens were never subjected to a grace period during which their constitutional rights could be violated with impunity–the fundamental concern set forth by this court in Krueger . Furthermore, defendant’s argument rests upon two inaccurate premises. First, defendant asserts that the warrant in her case was invalid as a result of legislative action. This is not correct. Anticipatory search warrants were declared invalid in Ross because the legislature had never approved of their use. This is best described as legislative inaction . Certainly the legislature did nothing to threaten the constitutional rights of Illinois citizens in this regard. Second, defendant contends that Krueger ’s rationale should apply here because large numbers of people may be affected by the holding in Ross . We disagree. The mere fact that large numbers of people may be affected was not dispositive in Krueger . Our concern in Krueger was that large numbers of people would be subjected to unconstitutional searches and seizures without any recourse. Defendant’s argument must therefore be rejected. We note that, if we were to accept defendant’s position, we would implicitly be using Krueger ’s rationale to swallow the Leon good-faith exception. In fact, defendant contended at oral argument that we should reject Leon entirely. We decline to do so. In Krueger , this court explicitly stated that our decision had no impact on Leon . Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d at 76. Defendant offers no persuasive reason why we should depart from our previous adherence to the Leon good-faith exception. Consequently, the Leon good-faith exception remains valid. We therefore apply the Leon good-faith exception to the facts here. The Illinois legislature codified the Leon good-faith exception in sections 114–12(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/114–12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1996)). Section 114–12(b)(1) provides that a court should not suppress otherwise admissible evidence if a police officer seized the evidence in good faith. Section 114–12(b)(2)(i) sets forth the definition of “good faith” applicable to the case at bar: “ ‘Good faith’ means whenever a peace officer obtains evidence: (i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and detached judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors in preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the State, and the officer reasonably believed the warrant to be valid[.]” 725 ILCS 5/114–12(b)(2)(i) (West 1996). The actions of the police in this case meet this definition of good faith. The record reveals that the police obtained the anticipatory search warrant from a neutral and detached judge; the warrant was free from obvious defects; the warrant contained no material misrepresentations; and the police could have reasonably believed the warrant to be valid. That the anticipatory search warrant was issued pursuant to the former section 108–3(a)(1) does not change our conclusion that the police acted in objective good-faith reliance on that warrant. At the time the police obtained the warrant, no Illinois case law held that anticipatory search warrants were statutorily or constitutionally invalid. Although this court in Ross ultimately concluded that the language of the former section 108–3(a)(1) did not authorize anticipatory search warrants, we specifically stated that this statutory provision was subject to “evenly plausible but divergent interpretations” as to whether it allowed anticipatory search warrants. Ross , 168 Ill. 2d at 352. Therefore, the police could have reasonably believed that section 108–3(a)(1) specifically authorized the anticipatory search warrant that they executed. Defendant nonetheless argues that the police could not have reasonably relied on the anticipatory search warrant because the warrant “was in fact not even an anticipatory warrant, listing no conditions whatsoever to limit the timing of its execution, in effect authorizing a search without probable cause and resulting in a facially invalid warrant.” Defendant has cited no legal authority in support of this one-sentence argument. We therefore find the argument waived. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. Felella , 131 Ill. 2d 525, 540 (1989). In sum, we hold that anticipatory search warrants are valid under both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution. We further hold that the evidence seized in this case pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant issued and executed prior to our decision in Ross is admissible pursuant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in suppressing the evidence obtained pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant.