Opinion ID: 194928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Give a Maniego Instruction

Text: 155 In United States v. Maniego, 710 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.1983), the Second Circuit approved the trial court's jury instruction that an attorney is not held to a higher standard of conduct, or legal obligation, to verify independently the truth of the information given by a client. In United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39 (1st Cir.1986), we held that the district court properly refused the defendant's request for a Maniego instruction because the government does not try to raise an inference that Lucid should be held to a higher standard than normal, nor did its questions have the effect of raising such an inference. Id. at 46. Lucid, an attorney, was convicted of aiding and abetting Picciandra in evading income taxes. He argued that a Maniego instruction was required because the government had suggested that Lucid was culpable in not going beyond what his client had told him. 156 Cassiere and Pezzullo did not request a Maniego instruction at trial and claim on appeal that the court committed plain error in not giving such an instruction. They apparently interpret the Maniego instruction as required whenever the government seeks to raise an inference that the defendant should be held to a standard higher than normal because of his status as a lawyer and his position as a former prosecutor. The Maniego instruction, however, is more limited; it deals with the question whether a lawyer is to be held to a higher standard of conduct to verify independently the truth of the information given by a client. Maniego, 710 F.2d at 28. 157 In the present case, the charges against Cassiere and Pezzullo were not that they failed to check further on information their clients (the lenders) had given them, but that they defrauded their clients by failing to disclose the land flips that inflated the sales prices of the mortgaged properties. The district court cannot be faulted, and certainly did not commit plain error, because, in a case involving a significantly different issue from Maniego, it failed to give a Maniego instruction that the defendants had not requested. 158 In any event, the record does not show that the government sought to hold Cassiere or Pezzullo to higher standards because of their status as attorneys. Rather, the government introduced evidence of Cassiere's and Pezzullo's services as attorneys representing the lending institutions and the fiduciary duty they owed to those lenders because those facts were central to understanding their roles in the scheme. See United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 683 (1st Cir.1987) (Maniego instruction not required where the prosecutor did not attempt to create the impression that [the attorney] should be held to a higher standard of care and where comments during trial about the defendant's status as an attorney were directed towards [defendant's] role (as a lawyer) which was central to the scheme), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907, 108 S.Ct. 1080, 99 L.Ed.2d 239 (1988); Picciandra, 788 F.2d at 46. 159 As noted, the court instructed the jury that it is not a crime simply to be careless or sloppy in discharging your duties as an attorney or an appraiser. That may be malpractice, but it's not a crime. There was no plain error in the district court's failure to give a Maniego instruction.VI. The district court's refusal to give Dolber a 160 downward adjustment under the Sentencing Guidelines 161 United States Sentencing Guideline Section 3B1.2(b) provides that if the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, the offense level should be decreased by two levels. Dolber contends that the district court improperly refused to give her such a downward adjustment. 162 We review the trial court's determination of role in the offense only for clear error. United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 261 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Diaz v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 220, 121 L.Ed.2d 158 (1992). Since a ruling on a downward adjustment is highly fact specific, we give great deference to the trial court's action. United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir.1990). 163 At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained: How do I justify calling her a minor participant when the evidence seems fairly clear that she knew what she was doing and she knew she was acting inappropriately here repetitively?.... She seems key to the successful operation of this fraudulent scheme, just like an attorney is. The lenders relied on her inflated appraisals in making their mortgage loans, and without those appraisals the scheme might not have succeeded. Although DeNunzio, Monteiro, and Cassiere were more culpable than Dolber, the straw buyers who were Dolber's co-defendants were relatively minor cogs in the scheme to defraud the lenders. Thus, Dolber was not less culpable than most other participants. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2, comment. (n. 3). The court's denial of a downward adjustment was not clear error. 164 Affirmed.