Opinion ID: 437695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hans' Conviction for Interstate Transportation of Forged Securities.

Text: 34 In July, 1973, Hans was convicted of violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314 (interstate transportation of forged securities). Holding this to be a crimen falsi, the trial judge allowed the prosecution to use this conviction to impeach Hans on cross-examination. 35 The Federal Rules of Evidence allow impeachment of witnesses by evidence of prior convictions in two different ways. If the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year (a felony), then the trial judge may admit it if he determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence of conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1). If, on the other hand, the crime involves dishonesty or false statement, the trial judge has no discretion and must admit it even if it was a misdemeanor. Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Normally such evidence is admissible only if either the conviction or the witness' release from prison occurred within 10 years of the trial. Fed.R.Evid. 609(b). 36 Hans argues that evidence of his interstate transportation conviction was inadmissible under either 609(a)(1) or (2). He contends, first of all, that the prosecution failed to prove that he was convicted of a felony. This argument is frivolous. Section 2314 states that anyone convicted under that section may be fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for up to 10 years or both. The trial court therefore properly concluded that Hans had been convicted of a felony. 37 Having determined that both this conviction and one for assault with intent to commit armed robbery were felonies, the trial judge then properly applied the balancing test that Rule 609(a)(1) mandates in order to determine whether the probative value of the convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect to Hans. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir.1982). The trial judge concluded that, although the interstate transportation issue was admissible, the assault conviction was not. He considered this to be too similar to the charge of bank robbery and therefore potentially prejudicial to Hans. Given the fact that the trial judge explicitly weighed the probative value of the convictions against the danger that their introduction would unfairly prejudice Hans, we find no abuse of discretion and therefore decline to reverse on the basis of Rule 609(a)(1). 38 Nevertheless, even if the interstate transportation conviction was inadmissible under 609(a)(1), it would be admissible under (a)(2). This court recently held that a district court has no discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction under Rule 609(a)(2). United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir.1983). If a witness has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, he may be impeached through the conviction, even if it was not a felony. 39 Thus, once the trial judge determines that a crime involves dishonesty or false statement, evidence of conviction of that crime automatically becomes admissible for impeachment purposes. 40 For the jury to have convicted Hans of interstate transportation, it must have believed him guilty of transporting forged securities ... knowing the same to have been ... forged. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314. The trial judge focused on the requirement of knowledge and held that interstate transportation is a crimen falsi. He therefore ruled that the prosecution could use the conviction to impeach Hans on cross-examination. The only circuit which has examined this question has concluded that the interstate transportation of forged securities encompasses precisely the kind of dishonesty which makes it admissible for impeachment purposes. United States v. Jackson, 680 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.1982). We agree with the Eighth Circuit and find no error on this issue. 41