Opinion ID: 169172
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Springer III

Text: In Springer III, Springer requested declaratory and injunctive relief based on the public protection provision of the PRA, which he claimed precluded the IRS from collecting any penalties arising from his failure to file a federal income tax return for calendar years 1982 through 2006. Exercising de novo review, see Karr v. Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (question of statutory construction reviewed de novo), we affirm the district court on the ground that the PRA creates a defense, not a private right of action, and therefore we need not reach the alternate basis for the district court’s disposition, that the AIA barred the action. 5 In view of our jurisdictional disposition, we do not reach the merits of Springer I and Springer II. But we note that res judicata, which we may raise sua sponte, w ould bar those actions to the extent Springer challenges the fact of his liability for income taxes, interest, and penalties for 1990-1995. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (holding that sua sponte application of res judicata is appropriate in “special circumstances,” including when court is on notice that it has previously decided a matter); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 433 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that res judicata is a doctrine adopted by the courts to prevent litigants from unduly consuming the time of the courts by seeking to relitigate matters already decided); M ACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2005) (setting forth test for application of res judicata). Springer’s barred challenge to his tax liability for 1990-1995, which has unduly consumed judicial resources, lends further support for the filing restrictions we propose below. -11- The PRA’s public protection provision is 44 U .S.C. § 3512. It states: (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information that is subject to this subchapter if-- (1) the collection of information does not display a valid control number assigned by the Director [of the OM B] in accordance with this subchapter; or (2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to the collection of information that such person is not required to respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid control number. (b) The protection provided by this section may be raised in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto. 44 U.S.C. § 3512. The question is whether subsection (b) of the statute provides a right of action or only a defense. The Ninth Circuit has stated that it “is apparent from subsection (b)” that the PRA “authorizes its protections to be used as a defense. [It] does not authorize a private right of action.” Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph M ed. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 1999). W e agree. In subsection (b), the meaning of the phrase “defense, bar, or otherwise” is the pivotal consideration. Applying the statutory canon of ejusdem generis, we readily conclude that “or otherwise” in § 3512(b) embraces only procedural devices similar to complete defenses or bars; the phrase does not function to expand subsection (b) into a right of action. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adam s, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001) (explaining that ejusdem generis is “the -12- statutory canon that where general words follow specific w ords in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words”) (quotation and alteration omitted). Our conclusion is supported by the language that follows “defense, bar, or otherwise.” Although, as Springer points out, that language permits the defense to be raised “at any time,” it may only be raised at any time “during the agency administrative process” or in a “judicial action applicable” to that process. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(b). Thus, § 3512 may only be invoked as a defense “at any time during ongoing proceedings.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Adm in., 244 F.3d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. F.C.C., 133 F.3d 25, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Springer did not raise the PRA as a defense or in a judicial action applicable to any agency administrative process. Rather, he raised it as a claim in an independent action, a fact that is underscored by the relief sought under the PRA— an injunction against conduct alleged to have occurred in connection with other pending civil actions and criminal investigations. Because § 3512(b) does not provide a right of action, the district court properly dismissed the case. -13-