Opinion ID: 1262094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpreting 3624

Text: Only the Ninth Circuit has addressed the exact issue of whether pretrial detention counts as imprisoned in connection with a conviction and, therefore, tolls the period of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit concluded that pretrial detention did not trigger a tolling of the period of supervised release: A plain reading of this language [of § 3624(e) ] suggests that there must be an imprisonment resulting from or otherwise triggered by a criminal conviction. Pretrial detention does not fit this definition, because a person in pretrial detention has not yet been convicted and might never be convicted. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105. As the above-quoted language indicates, the Ninth Circuit's primary ground for its holding was that it believed that the phrase in connection with a conviction means that a conviction must occur before any confinement can count as imprisonment. To bolster this view, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish between the words imprisonment and detention, claiming that Congress uses imprisonment only to refer to a penalty or sentence, whereas `detention' is used to describe a mechanism to insure a defendant's appearance and the safety of the community. Id. We respectfully decline to adopt the Ninth Circuit's interpretation. When considering the meaning of § 3624(e), we must apply the plain meaning of the statute if the statute is not ambiguous. United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir.2005). The Supreme Court, in United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000), has previously considered the meaning of the word release in § 3624(e), and the Court's approach guides ours. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant whose prison term was shortened by a favorable Supreme Court ruling, such that he had already served two-and-a-half years too many, could not claim that his term of supervised release started running at the time when he should have been released from prison. See id. at 54, 120 S.Ct. 1114. In analyzing the statute, the Supreme Court stated: The quoted language directs that a supervised release term does not commence until an individual `is released from imprisonment.' There can be little question about the meaning of the word `release' in the context of imprisonment. Id. at 57, 120 S.Ct. 1114. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the language did not permit consideration of some fictitious or constructive earlier time, but instead required application of a strict temporal interpretation. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has steadfastly directed us to apply the plain meaning of § 3624(e). We have similarly bound ourselves to a close reading of the statute when interpreting the related provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3583. In our recent en banc opinion, we rejected significant policy arguments in favor of the plain meaning that the statute provided: The parties raised a number of policybased arguments in support of their respective positions. These arguments centered around whether the goals of supervised release are better realized through tolling and whether tolling provides an unjustified administrative burden on the United States Probation Office. We think it best to leave the resolution of these policy questions to Congress. If Congress determines that the goals of supervised release are better realized by giving district courts discretion to issue these types of tolling orders, then Congress is free to amend the legislation to provide district courts this authority. United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 537, 544-45 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc) (concluding that tolling of supervised release is not a condition of supervised release under § 3583(d)). It is apparent, therefore, that we must apply the plain meaning of § 3624, even in the face of substantial policy arguments. With this in mind, we first note that never before have we clearly addressed the question of whether in connection with a conviction in § 3624(e) requires a preceding conviction or whether pretrial detention before a conviction might also be in connection with a conviction. The only attempt that we have made previously to interpret this provision was in an unpublished opinion addressing whether time served pursuant to a state parole revocation counted as an imprisonment in connection with a conviction. In Sturdivant we concluded that it did. We reached that holding by suggesting that the reason why Congress said in connection with rather than simply for was specifically to cover the scenario of a revocation of parole. Sturdivant, 1999 WL 1204689, at . Although Sturdivant might seem to indicate that in connection with a conviction merely expands the statute to cover both terms of imprisonment that flow directly from a conviction for substantive offenses and terms of imprisonment that are reinstated after a conviction for a parole violation, nothing in Sturdivant indicates that in connection with a conviction could not also include pretrial detention. In any event, Sturdivant is not precedential and did not resolve the issue now before us. Similarly, the Supreme Court also has never addressed the exact question before us. In Johnson the Supreme Court focused primarily on the first two sentences in § 3624(e) and not the third sentence, which is at issue in this case. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 57-58, 120 S.Ct. 1114. The Court, however, did reference the third sentence: The statute does provide for concurrent running of supervised release in specific cases. After the operative phrase released from imprisonment, § 3624(e) requires the concurrent running of a term of supervised release with terms of probation, parole, or with other, separate terms of supervised release. The statute instructs that concurrency is permitted not for prison sentences but only for those other types of sentences given specific mention. The next sentence in the statute does address a prison term and does allow concurrent counting, but only for prison terms less than 30 days in length. When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have authority to create others. The proper inference, and the one we adopt here, is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth. Id. at 57-58, 120 S.Ct. 1114. By phrasing its discussion in terms of an exception, the Court may be suggesting that the default rule is that the period of supervised release is always tolled while a defendant is imprisoned, with only limited exceptions. That said, the Court's use of the phrase prison term could mean that § 3624(e) applies only to those who have been convicted and sentenced to prison, or it could simply mean that the Court was ruling on only the limited question of whether all prison terms of longer than thirty days fall under the statute while not even reaching the question of whether pretrial detention would come within § 3624(e). The Court's mention of this particular language, however, did not resolve the issue before us. Thus, we must engage in our own review of § 3624(e). As previously discussed, the Ninth Circuit's primary ground for its conclusion that § 3624(e) does not toll the supervised-release period during pretrial detentions was its distinction between imprisonment and detention. See Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105. If the Ninth Circuit were correct that Congress uses imprisonment only when it wishes to refer to a confinement that is the result of a penalty or sentence, then the phrase in connection with a conviction becomes entirely superfluous; imprisonment, according to the Ninth Circuit's definition, would already mean that the confinement is the result of a conviction. We are, therefore, hesitant to credit the Ninth Circuit's distinction between imprisonment and detention because [w]hen interpreting the plain language of a statute, we `make[e] every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.' United States v. Ninety-Three Firearms, 330 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir.2003) (second alteration in original) (quoting Cafarelli v. Yancy, 226 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir.2000)). Furthermore, we conclude that the plain meaning of imprison calls into doubt the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that imprison inherently refers to a penalty or sentence. It seems that imprison includes not only confinements as a result of a conviction, but any time the state detains an individual. The Oxford English Dictionary defines imprison as Rio put into prison, to confine in a prison or other place of confinement; to detain in custody, to keep in close confinement; to incarcerate. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). In this definition, detain in custody, id., would certainly encompass pretrial detention. Similarly, Miriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines imprison as to put in or as if in prison: CONFINE. MIRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2005). Black's Law Dictionary is less clear on the matter. It defines imprison as [t]o confine (a person) in prison, and defines prison as [a] state or federal facility of confinement for convicted criminals. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Somewhat contradictorily, however, Black's Law Dictionary defines imprisonment as 1. The act of confining a person, esp. in a prison. . . . 2. The state of being confined; a period of confinement. . . . Id. Although Black's Law Dictionary's definition of imprison aligns more with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, under Black's Law Dictionary's definition of imprisonment, pretrial detention is just as much the state of being confined, id., as is post-trial incarceration. Although Black's Law Dictionary's definition of imprison does not support our conclusion, it appears that the one contradictory definition is the exception to an otherwise clear rule that associates imprison with confine, and confine encompasses pretrial detention. Because Congress's use of the word imprisoned does not exclude pretrial detention from the scope of § 3624(e), we must decide whether imprisoned in connection with a conviction includes those held in pretrial detention. We conclude that the phrase imprisoned in connection with a conviction plainly includes persons whose pretrial detentions are later connected to a conviction. Support for this conclusion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides for credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time [the defendant] has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed. . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). This statute itself creates a connection between pretrial detention and a later conviction. Thus, where credit is given for pretrial detention, the pretrial detention is clearly in connection with a conviction. The Ninth Circuit, however, disagrees with our conclusion. The Ninth Circuit observes that § 3585(b) operates only once the detainee is convicted; therefore, a connection between pretrial detention and a conviction can only be observed well after the pretrial detention has ended. See Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105. Based upon that, the Ninth Circuit concludes that [t]his proposed construction is not supported by the statutory language, which gives no indication that Congress ever contemplated the type of backward-looking analysis suggested. Id. Although we agree that our interpretation does require a backward-looking analysis, id., we conclude that nothing in the statute suggests that only forward-looking analysis is appropriate. Instead, it appears that the phrase imprisoned in connection with a conviction eschews any temporal limitations. To understand why imprisoned in connection with a conviction appears to lack any temporal limitation, it is instructive to consider Goins's claim that tolling for pretrial detention would violate the Supreme Court's strict temporal approach in Johnson. We reject Goins's temporal argument because Goins ignores what created the strict temporal interpretation for the Supreme Court: the specific language of the statute. The Supreme Court in Johnson found itself bound to a strict temporal interpretation because the statute itself used the phrase on the day the person is released, a phrase that limited the court to a certain temporal perspective. § 3624(e); Johnson, 529 U.S. at 57, 120 S.Ct. 1114. In stark contrast, the very next sentence in § 3624(e), imprisoned in connection with a conviction, does not make reference to any temporal perspective. Thus, despite its backward-looking approach, a pretrial detention that leads to a conviction, and is later credited as time served, is in connection with a conviction. [1] The final reason offered by the Ninth Circuit in reaching the opposite conclusion than the one we reach today is that tolling periods of supervised release during pretrial detention, but only when that pretrial detention is later connected to a conviction, creates a potential problem for judges seeking to establish whether they have jurisdiction to revoke supervised release. As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, A judge attempting to determine jurisdiction based upon tolling due to pretrial detention would be unable to make the required determination in any case in which a judgment of conviction had not yet been entered. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105 (footnote omitted). To avoid this problem, Goins advocates that we engage in a strict temporal interpretation, Johnson, 529 U.S. at 57, 120 S.Ct. 1114, and not link pretrial detention to uncertain future events. We recognize that uncertainty may pose a real problem, yet we believe that the severity of this problem is likely overstated. The only time when such indeterminacy would exist is when a judge must determine whether jurisdiction for the revocation of supervised release exists and the defendant is between the period of his pretrial detention and the conclusion of his trial. In most cases, the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 would ensure that this zone of indeterminacy is quite short. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . .); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b) (requiring the filing of an indictment or information within thirty days of arrest or summons); 3161(c)(1) (requiring commencement of the trial within seventy days from the later of the filing of the indictment or date of appearance). In the rare case where a judge finds herself in that zone of indeterminacy, there is no reason why the judge who is asked to determine jurisdiction over the revocation of supervised release could not continue the proceedings until a conviction or an acquittal is rendered in the other case. In Goins's case, however, such indeterminacy was never an issue; by the time the Northern District of Ohio was assessing its jurisdiction, Georgia had already convicted Goins and his pretrial detention was clearly in connection with a conviction. Adoption of Goins's interpretation would reward him for absconding. Because the government does not argue that Goins's absconding itself tolled his period of supervised release, if we adopted Goins's interpretation, Goins will have evaded a violation of supervised release by virtue of the fact that he absconded so that Georgia could not convict him. Whether Goins's interpretation would create an incentive for other releasees to abscond is an open question. First, most absconders, by absconding and failing to report to their probation officers, would find themselves the subject of a warrant for arrest for a Violation of the conditions of their supervised release. It is likely such a warrant would have been issued here had the Northern District of Ohio and the Western District of Kentucky not so completely failed in their monitoring of Goins. Thus, whether other releasees would be encouraged to abscond under Goins's interpretation would, in part, depend on how often such failures of monitoring occur. Second, Goins's interpretation would reward absconders if absconding does not, by itself, toll periods of supervised release. It is not clear whether absconding does toll the period of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit tolls periods of supervised release while a defendant is in fugitive status, see United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.1992), but we could find no comparable case in the Sixth Circuit. Because the government in this case has not advocated tolling of the period of supervised release on the basis of absconding, we decline to address whether absconding can, by itself, trigger tolling. We emphasize, however, that adopting Goins's interpretation would reward him for absconding while requiring us to address these difficult questions; in contrast, our interpretation, despite its indeterminacy, creates only a rare and remediable problem. For these reasons, we hold that, pursuant to § 3624(e), pretrial detention lasting thirty or more days does toll the period of supervised release when the pretrial detention is later credited as time served in connection with a subsequent conviction. Once Goins was finally apprehended and convicted in Georgia, his sixty-three days of pretrial detention were credited as time served on his state sentence. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that his period of supervised release had tolled during the pretrial detention in connection with the Georgia conviction, and the Northern District of Ohio had jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release.