Opinion ID: 1089778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Analysis of Green v. Austin

Text: We have not overlooked the fact that the conclusion we have reached is inconsistent with the holding and rationale of Green v. Austin, 425 So.2d 411 (Ala.1982). In Green, we rejected the defendant's contention that Amendment 344 exempted the provisions of Act No. 81-642, 1981 Ala. Acts 1059, and Act No. 81-643, 1981 Ala. Acts 1060, from the application of §§ 96 and 105 of the constitution. [7] Those acts authorized the courts of Blount County to levy additional charges to be applied to expenses relating to service of process by the sheriff's department and to expenses incurred in the maintenance of the county jail building. Holding that Amendment 344 did not exempt the challenged acts from the application of §§ 96 and 105, this Court stated: At this juncture, it is important to note that Ala. Const. amend. § 344 appears to exempt Blount County from the application of the above mentioned constitutional provisions. Amendment 344 provides in pertinent part: `The legislature may, from time to time, by general or local laws applicable to or operative in Blount county and approved by a majority of the qualified electors of Blount county at a referendum election, fix, regulate, and alter the costs and charges of courts and the fees, commissions, allowances and salaries, including the method and basis of their compensation, to be charged or received by the probate judge, tax assessor, and the tax collector of Blount county....' Ala. Const. amend. 344. In order to effect a change in the manner of the compensation of public officials from a `fee basis' to a fixed salary, it was necessary to amend our Constitution. Accordingly, amendments of this kind were used to effectuate the change to place public officials on a basis of compensation not related to nor dependent upon the costs and charges of courts. Amendment 344 only authorizes the Legislature to change, through local legislation, the costs and charges of court as the same relate to the fees, commissions, and allowances to be charged or received by the Blount County probate judge, tax assessor, and tax collector. The circuit clerk and the register are state, rather than county, officials and their basic compensation has been established by general law on a salary basis and is paid by the state. See Code 1975, § 12-17-92. Accordingly, amendment 344 does not exempt Blount County from the provisions of § 96. Green, 425 So.2d at 414 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This Court's construction of Amendment 344 is perhaps best understood in the context of the opinion offered to the litigants in Green by the Administrative Director of Courts regarding the constitutionality of Acts No. 81-642 and 81-643: [8] This section [96] is intended to prohibit the legislature from enacting any law which regulates the charges and costs of courts unless such law is applicable to all counties. Even though Amendment 344 to the Constitution provides, `The legislature may, from time to time, by general or local laws applicable to or operative in Blount County ..., fix, regulate, and alter the costs and charges of courts ... to be charged or received by the probate judge, tax assessor, and the tax collector of Blount County;' it is my opinion that this amendment is not broad enough to exempt Blount County from the provisions of Section 96, supra. The reason being that Amendment 344 only authorizes the legislature to change those costs and charges to be charged or received by the probate judge, the tax assessor, and the tax collector of Blount County through local legislation. Because the circuit clerk and the register [are] state rather than county officer [s], and because most court costs are charged and received by the circuit clerk and register, Amendment 344 does not effectively exempt Blount County from the prohibition against local legislation regulating court costs. (Emphasis added.) The holding in Green represented a departure from a number of this Court's pronouncements regarding the scope of Type I amendments of which Amendments 137 and 344 are representative. In oral argument, counsel for the appellant defended the result in Green by arguing that Amendment 328 had, in effect, superseded or repealed Amendment 137 and pre-1973 case law, such as that interpreting Amendment 2 and similar amendments. This argument, however, is contrary to established rules of constitutional and statutory construction. In Vaughan v. Moore, 379 So.2d 1240, 1241 (Ala.1979), this Court explained the rule as follows: When provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to provisions of a previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, passage of the general law does not operate to repeal the special law, either in whole or in part, unless repeal is provided for by express words or arises by necessary implication. Connor v. State, 275 Ala. 230, 153 So.2d 787 (1963), quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 298b, c; Reid v. Wallace, 27 Ala.App. 199, 168 So. 900 (1936); Tucker v. McLendon, 210 Ala. 562, 98 So. 797 (1924). (Emphasis added.) This rule proceeds from the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Baker, 17 Ala.App. 188, 189, 84 So. 480, 481, cert. denied, 203 Ala. 696, 84 So. 924 (1919), that is, [g]eneral words do not derogate from special. Black's Law Dictionary 616 (5th ed. 1979). Amendment 328 was ratified December 27, 1973. Of its purpose, the amendment states: (a) Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in a unified judicial system which shall consist of a supreme court, a court of criminal appeals, a court of civil appeals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the district court, a probate court and such municipal courts as may be provided by law. Amendment 328, § 6.01 (emphasis added). The application of the amendment, as evidenced, inter alia, by the phrase unified judicial system, is clearly general and statewide. See Cowin Equip. Co. v. Robison Mining Co., 342 So.2d 910 (Ala.1977). Because Amendment 328 nowhere refers expressly to costs and charges of court, if it supersedes or repeals Amendment 137 or pre-1973 case law, it does so only by necessary implication. Vaughan v. Moore supra. [R]epeal by implication is not favored in the law. It is only when two laws are so repugnant to or in conflict with each other that it must be presumed that the Legislature intended that the latter should repeal the former. Davis v. Browder, 231 Ala. 332, 334-35, 165 So. 89, 91 (1935). The substantive text of Amendment 328, § 6.01, begins with the exclusionary clause: Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution.... Section 6.01 thus contains a clause expressly excepting from the operation of Amendment 328 certain provisions of the constitution not clearly within the purview of the framers of that amendment. Also, the phrase unified judicial system has been interpreted as referring only to the establishment of a system of appellate, circuit, district, probate, and municipal courts. It did not extend, for example, to the procedures used to strike juries in the various counties. Liptroth v. State, 335 So.2d 683 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 335 So.2d 688 (Ala.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963, 97 S.Ct. 393, 50 L.Ed.2d 332 (1976); Colston v. State, 57 Ala.App. 4, 325 So.2d 520 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 398, 325 So.2d 531 (1976). Moreover, it is interesting to note that in the 18 years since the ratification of Amendment 328, the legislature has proposed and the people of Alabama have ratified no less than 35 amendments authorizing the regulation of costs and charges of courts, or fees, commissions or allowances of public officers through local legislation. See, e.g., Ala. Const. amends. 331, 332, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 353, 359, 360, 362, 367, 372, 380, 391, 403, 412, 414, 416, 418, 424, 433, 434, 476, 478, 479, 480, 481, 485, 487, 496, 504, 507, 522, and 524. No less than 20 of these amendments expressly authorize local legislation regulating costs and charges of courts. See Ala. Const. amends. 331, 332, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 353, 359, 360, 367, 380, 391, 403, 412, 416, 418, 424, 434, and 478. These numbers are especially striking when it is considered that only 33 such amendments were ratified during the 61 years from the ratification of Amendment 2 in 1912 to Amendment 328 in 1973. Even more significant, however, is the fact that Amendments 328, 331, and 332 were proposed as Act No. 1051, 1973 Ala. Acts 1676; Act No. 556, 1973 Ala. Acts 811; and Act No. 557, 1973 Ala. Acts 812, respectively, in the same legislative session. Thus, the same legislature that proposed to create a unified judicial system through Amendment 328, simultaneously proposed to authorize the legislature to regulate by local act the costs and charges of court in Cleburne and Bibb Counties. These facts are inconsistent with the argument that Amendment 328, by necessary implication, repealed Amendment 137 and pre-1973 case law. See Davis v. Browder, 231 Ala. 332, 165 So. 89 (1936) (acts considered by the same legislature are presumed not to conflict, and a field of operation will be given each if consistent with clear intent). In short, the rationale of Green v. Austin cannot be defended by reference to Amendment 328. Green's construction of Amendment 344, which was unnecessarily narrow, is inconsistent with the two cardinal separation of powers principles as stated in Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945): (1) a presumption and intendment in favor of [a statute's] validity exists; and (2) the judiciary's duty is to adopt the construction which would uphold a statute rather than strike it down. Similarly, Green interpreted the phrase costs and charges of courts in a sophisticated and technical manner, one that is unsuited for the construction of constitutional provisions. See Realty Investment Co., 181 Ala. at 187, 61 So. at 249; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 235 (1859). To the extent that Green construed the phrase costs and charges of court as referring only to the fees, commissions, and allowances to be charged or received by designated county officials, that opinion is expressly disapproved and we decline to follow it. We hold, therefore, that Act No. 86-113, by virtue of Amendment 137, does not offend § 96 of the Constitution.