Opinion ID: 2353279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Review of the Sentence Imposed on Keene

Text: [¶ 27] The statutory maximum for each of Keene's offenses, pursuant to Schofield, was twenty years. Keene was not sentenced to more than twenty years for either crime. He received a cumulative term of thirty-six years, less than the forty-year aggregate of the two maximum possible sentences. The court imposed the consecutive terms based both on Keene's probationary status, which Keene does not dispute, and the serious nature of his crime. Although the question of whether a crime was particularly serious is one of fact, Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 22, 895 A.2d at 933, Apprendi does not bar the court from making a factual finding to determine whether consecutive sentences should be imposed. [¶ 28] In sum, we conclude that the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine whether the State has proved each element of a crime necessary to expose the defendant to the sentence imposed for that crime is not implicated by judicial determinations regarding the sequence by which multiple sentences are to be served, provided that each individual sentence falls within its statutory maximum. Judicial factfinding does not, on its own, violate the Sixth Amendment, even when that factfinding is the basis for enhancing a defendant's sentence. Fifield, 432 F.3d at 1066. [¶ 29] Because Apprendi does not render the imposition of Keene's consecutive sentences unconstitutional, we affirm the court's sentence pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1256. The entry is: Judgment and sentence affirmed. CALKINS, J., dissenting. [¶ 30] I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court was required to impose concurrent sentences on Keene unless a jury found, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, one of the required elements set forth in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2) (1983 & Supp.2003). [11] Under the sentencing structure of section 1256(2), a court cannot impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds facts in addition to those facts that led to the convictions. In this case, the sentencing court relied on two additional facts to justify consecutive sentences: (1) Keene was on probation, and (2) the seriousness of his conduct and his record require consideration of and a sentence in excess of the maximum available for the most serious offense. [12] [¶ 31] Because this additional fact-finding is required under section 1256(2) before a defendant can be sentenced to a longer period of incarceration than would be permitted for concurrent sentences, the recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and this Court mandates that those additional facts be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and before a jury, unless waived by the defendant. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶¶ 20-21, 895 A.2d 927, 933. [¶ 32] Section 1256(2) implicates Apprendi, Blakely, and Schofield because of its presumption that sentences are concurrent unless additional facts are found. Section 1256(2) means that the statutory maximum sentence, for Apprendi, Blakely, and Schofield purposes, is the maximum sentence that could be imposed on the individual convictions. Keene was convicted of two offenses that are classified as Class A offenses, and at the time the offenses carried maximum sentences of twenty years, unless a jury made the additional finding that those offenses were most heinous and violent. See Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 9, 895 A.2d at 930. As the Court notes, the State did not plead or prove most heinous and violent, and therefore, twenty years was the maximum sentence that could be imposed on each offense. The impact of section 1256(2) is that twenty years is the maximum total for the two offenses because the sentences must be imposed as concurrent sentences unless an additional element in section 1256(2) is proved. Keene was sentenced to a total of thirty-six years, and, therefore, his sentence exceeds by sixteen years the maximum sentence that section 1256(2) allows without additional fact-finding. [¶ 33] Because it is the presumption of concurrent sentences in section 1256(2) that implicates the Apprendi line of cases, many of the cases cited by the Court are not on point. Most of the jurisdictions cited do not have a sentencing scheme providing that sentences are concurrent and allowing consecutive sentences only when certain additional facts are found. The federal Sentencing Guidelines do not create a presumption of concurrent sentences. See United States v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 857, 124 S.Ct. 158, 157 L.Ed.2d 104 (2003) ([T]he Supreme Court has recognized that there is a presumption that, when Congress creates two distinct offenses, it intends to permit cumulative sentences.); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2(d) (2006). [¶ 34] Similarly, many of the state cases upholding consecutive sentences that were challenged as violating Apprendi involve sentencing statutes that do not mandate that the sentences be concurrent unless certain facts are found. See, e.g., State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Iowa 2001); State v. Bramlett, 273 Kan. 67, 41 P.3d 796, 797-98 (2002). Some courts, however, conclude that Apprendi is not violated even when the sentencing statute presumes concurrent sentences. See, e.g., State v. Wagener, 196 Ill.2d 269, 256 Ill. Dec. 550, 752 N.E.2d 430, 438, 441-42 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1011, 122 S.Ct. 498, 151 L.Ed.2d 408 (2001); State v. Tanner, 210 Or.App. 70, 150 P.3d 31, 32-33, 39-40 (2006). [¶ 35] At least two jurisdictions have held that consecutive sentences violate the Sixth Amendment because additional facts have to be found before the sentences can be imposed to run consecutively. The Ohio statute at issue in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 845 N.E.2d 470, 490-91 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 442, 166 L.Ed.2d 314 (2006), is similar to our statute in that a court must make factual determinations before imposing consecutive sentences. Likewise, the Washington statute for nonserious violent felonies requires that the sentences be concurrent unless the court finds additional facts, and the Washington Supreme Court thus held that Blakely applies to consecutive sentences. In re VanDelft, 158 Wash.2d 731, 147 P.3d 573, 578-79 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 2876, 167 L.Ed.2d 1172 (2007). In my view, the Ohio and Washington courts ruled correctly. I would join this minority view. [¶ 36] When, as here, a court is considering the imposition of consecutive sentences based in whole or in part on the factor of section 1256(2)(D) regarding whether the seriousness of the offense or the criminal record warrants a sentence in excess of the maximum, the defendant must be given the opportunity to have that fact decided by a jury. Furthermore, the fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.