Opinion ID: 1347595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: downward departure from standard range is legally justified

Text: Second, we examine whether each factual finding constitutes a substantial and compelling reason for departing from the standard range as a matter of law. RCW 9.94A.210(4)(a); RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Allert, 117 Wn.2d 156, 168, 815 P.2d 752 (1991). We conclude the first two reasons (an extraordinarily small amount of a controlled substance; and a defendant's low level of involvement in committing the crime) may each be properly advanced by a trial court as a substantial and compelling reason for departure, but the third (a defendant's peripheral participation in the drug hierarchy) may not. In an effort to assist trial courts, which make the initial determination whether a factual finding may support downward departure from the standard sentence range, the Legislature has provided in RCW 9.94A.390(1) a list of expressly nonexclusive factors justifying downward departures. Because none of the statutorily defined reasons identified as legitimate reasons for downward departure by RCW 9.94A.390 is at issue in this case, we must determine judicially whether the reasons justify departure. [2] The trial court held that because RCW 9.94A.390(2) permits exceptional sentences upward for crimes involving quantities of drugs substantially greater than for personal use, a high degree of sophistication, or a defendant in a high position in the drug hierarchy, then [b]y logical corollary a very small amount of drugs, a low degree of involvement or sophistication, and a defendant's very low position in the drug hierarchy are justifications for a sentence below the standard range. [12] We agree with the Court of Appeals which rejected this reasoning on the ground [t]he lack of an aggravating circumstance does not create a mitigating circumstance. Alexander, 70 Wn. App. at 613 (citing State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547, 551, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986)). However, it is nevertheless possible that another theory supports treatment of the three reasons under review as substantial and compelling reasons for departure. See RCW 9.94A.390 (statutory list of mitigating circumstances is illustrative only and not exclusive). [3] All of the reasons currently under review are related to the execution of the crime itself. [13] The Legislature's recognition that not all exceptional fact patterns can be anticipated informs our inquiry as to whether a fact which is specific to the commission of a crime may constitute a judicially recognized substantial and compelling reason for departure from the standard range. State v. McAlpin, 108 Wn.2d 458, 465, 740 P.2d 824 (1987) (citing Washington Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Implementation Manual § 9.94A.390 cmt. (1984)). As one commentator has suggested, while factors which truly distinguish the crime from others of the same statutory category may justify an exception, those which are inherent in that class of crimes and do not distinguish the defendant's behavior from that inherent in all crimes of that classification may not. David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 9.6, at 9-13 (1985). Accordingly, in determining whether a factor legally supports departure from the standard sentence range, we employ a 2-part test: First, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range. Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category. State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 57, 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 215-16, 813 P.2d 1238 (1991)). [14] We examine in turn whether each of the three challenged reasons may be provided by a trial court as a legitimate justification for a downward departure from the standard sentence range under the framework just elaborated. A