Opinion ID: 2194268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: matter of d.m.

Text: ¶ 14. Counts V through VIII of the complaint involved allegations of misconduct with respect to the matter of D.M. The referee concluded that Attorney Backes did not commit misconduct in his handling of the D.M. matter, and the OLR did not appeal that conclusion. Therefore, these facts and conclusions are not in dispute, but are discussed herein for reference because Attorney Backes contends this matter was wrongly considered by the referee in her decision to recommend a public reprimand. ¶ 15. D.M. was convicted of one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child in 1993. His motion for plea withdrawal was denied and the matter affirmed on appeal. ¶ 16. In May 1996, D.M. met with Thomas Russell, another lawyer at Backes' law firm, to discuss filing a possible postconviction motion. D.M. signed a fee agreement with this attorney. ¶ 17. A short time later, D.M. met with Attorney Backes and executed a new written fee agreement, for post judgment matters in which he agreed that the initial retainer would be $2500. The agreement provided: This fee is a minimum and non refundable fee and is to be paid as follows: $1500.00 Down, Bal. 45 Days. The agreement goes on to discuss the possibility of a higher fee if an appeal is required. D.M. paid Attorney Russell $1500 when he signed the fee agreement. ¶ 18. D.M. then effectively disappeared. From May 1996 to May 1997, he neither initiated contact with Attorney Backes nor responded to Attorney Backes' attempts to contact him. In September 1997, D.M. reappeared and requested legal action from Attorney Backes on a matter apparently unrelated to the earlier fee agreement. ¶ 19. On September 18, 1997, Attorney Russell provided Attorney Backes with a written analysis of D.M.'s case, concluding that there was no good-faith basis upon which a postconviction motion could be filed. At this point, the $1000 balance on the fee agreement was still due and owing. ¶ 20. In October 1997, Attorney Backes wrote to D.M. and asked for the additional $1000 to proceed with the case. The complaint indicates that [t]hereafter, for over a year [D.M.] was unable to obtain $1,000.00 to pay [Attorney Backes]. In December 1998, D.M. gave Attorney Backes $1000 to proceed. ¶ 21. In a letter dated January 18, 1999, after some additional review of the file, Attorney Backes informed D.M. that there were no grounds upon which to proceed with a postconviction motion. Correspondence between the two ensued. It appears that D.M. was unwilling to accept Attorney Backes' conclusion, and repeatedly insisted some motion be filed. Attorney Backes declined to file a motion and declined to refund the $1000 payment, asserting that this fee was earned. ¶ 22. On March 21, 2002, four months after D.M. filed a grievance against him, Attorney Backes refunded D.M. $1000. ¶ 23. The OLR complaint alleged that Attorney Backes' conduct with respect to the D.M. matter violated SCR 20:1.3 (reasonable diligence), SCR 20:1.4(b) (failure to adequately explain matter), SCR 20:1.16(d) (failure to refund unearned payment), and the most serious charge levied against Attorney Backes, SCR 20:8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). ¶ 24. The referee, however, concluded that Attorney Backes did not commit misconduct with respect to his handling of the D.M. matter, noting that a fixed fee agreement is not a per se violation of rules of professional conduct, so long as the fee is reasonable in relation to the work performed. The referee observed that there was no evidence that the fee here was unreasonable. The referee noted further that there was no indication that D.M. objected to the delay or to the fee until after he was told that ... nothing could be done to reopen the case.