Opinion ID: 77840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Background on RLUIPA

Text: RLUIPA is the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). The statute's origins stem from the Supreme Court's decisions in two cases, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court had employed a compelling interest standard for testing the constitutional validity of laws of general applicability that affected religious practices; government actions that burdened religious practices had to be justified by a compelling government interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1792-94, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 566 (5th Cir.2004) (discussing the pre- Smith landscape). In Smith, however, the Supreme Court held that laws of general applicability that only incidentally burden religious conduct do not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1600. Congress responded to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), in which it sought to reinstate the pre- Smith compelling interest standard for laws of general applicability burdening a person's religious practices. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714-15, 125 S.Ct. at 2118. RFRA had universal coverage, applying to all state and federal laws, and purportedly was passed pursuant to Congress' enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-17, 117 S.Ct. at 2162; see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715, 125 S.Ct. at 2118 (stating that RFRA lacked a Commerce Clause or Spending Clause underpinning). In City of Boerne, however, the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states, holding that the statute exceeded Congress' remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. 521 U.S. at 535-36, 117 S.Ct. at 2172. Congress again responded, this time by enacting RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2000cc-5. Less sweeping than RFRA, and invoking federal authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715, 125 S.Ct. at 2118, RLUIPA targets only two narrow areas for protection: land use (section 2 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) and the religious exercise of institutionalized persons (section 3 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1). The latter section, which is at issue in the present appeal, states that [n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Section 3 of RLUIPA thereby affords to prison inmates a heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, by requiring that the government demonstrate that the substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise is justified by a compelling, rather than merely a legitimate, governmental interest. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). In doing so, section 3 affords confined persons greater protection of religious exercise than what the Constitution itself affords. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 186 (4th Cir.2006). Section 3 applies whenever the substantial burden on religious exercise is imposed in a program or activity that receives federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1).