Opinion ID: 1580987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: is express advocacy required?

Text: The Osterbergs argue that under Buckley, the Election Code cannot require expenditures to be reported unless they are for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court narrowed the definition of expenditures that the federal election laws required to be reported. The federal statute defined expenditure as the use of money or other valuable assets for the purpose of ... influencing the nomination or election of candidates for federal office. Id. at 77, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court worried that the phrase had the potential to encompass the general discussion of issues in addition to advocacy of a particular political result. Id. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612. If a communication only discusses issues, and is funded by individuals or groups that are not candidates or political committees, the Court was concerned that the relation of the information sought to the purposes of the Act may be too remote. Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. To insure that the federal reporting requirements' scope was not unconstitutionally broad or vague, the Supreme Court construed an expenditure by an individual for the purpose of influencing a candidate nomination or election to include only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. Id. (footnote omitted). Responding to similar concerns, Buckley also construed another provision that used the words relative to a candidate to mean in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 44, 96 S.Ct. 612. Since Buckley, a number of state courts have narrowly construed their statutory definitions of campaign expenditures or contributions to avoid the vagueness or overbreadth problems that Buckley identified. See, e.g., State v. Proto, 203 Conn. 682, 526 A.2d 1297, 1310-11 (1987); Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929, 933 (Fla.1998); State ex rel. Crumpton v. Keisling, 160 Or.App. 406, 982 P.2d 3, 9, 11 (1999); Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 256 Va. 151, 500 S.E.2d 814, 817-18 (1998); see also Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 510 (7th Cir.1998) (certifying the question of whether Indiana's definition of political action committee is limited to groups that make contributions or expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for office or the victory or defeat of a public question). Applied to an individual making expenditures, the Texas Election Code is vulnerable to the same constitutional attacks that Buckley 's narrowing construction avoided. As described above, the Osterbergs were required to report direct campaign expenditures. The Election Code states that direct campaign expenditures are campaign expenditures that are not campaign contributions. Tex. Elec.Code § 251.001(8). The Election Code defines a campaign expenditure as an expenditure made by any person in connection with a campaign for elective office or on a measure. Tex. Elec.Code § 251.001(7). Like the federal provision's language that Buckley construed, the phrase, in connection with a campaign for elective office, is vague. [25] It necessarily has different meanings that depend on whether the spender is a candidate, a political committee, or an individual. More problematical, it could be read to include general issue advocacy or the general discussion of candidates. With regard to an individual, the relation of this information to the purposes of the Act may be too remote. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, we should, if possible, interpret statutes in a manner to avoid constitutional infirmities. In re Bay Area Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, 982 S.W.2d 371, 380 (Tex.1998). And the phrase in connection with a campaign for elective office does not compel an impermissibly broad construction. In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986), the Supreme Court narrowly construed similar language in a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act. The provision prohibited corporations from using their treasury funds to make expenditures in connection with any election. Id. at 248, 107 S.Ct. 616. The Court held that this provision incorporated Buckley 's requirement that a communication expressly advocate the election of candidates. Id. at 248-49, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Org. for Women, 713 F.Supp. 428, 433 (D.D.C.1989) (From Buckley through MCFL, it is clear that the standard `in connection with an election' is not distinct from `express advocacy.'). Relying on Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Texas Ethics Commission has interpreted the Election Code's definition of campaign expenditure to be limited to expenditures for a communication that `expressly advocates' the defeat or election of an identified candidate, as that term has been used by the United States Supreme Court. Op. Tex. Ethics Comm'n No. 198 (1994). The Ethics Commission enforces the Election Code's expenditure reporting requirements. See Tex. Elec.Code §§ 253.134, 254.042. A reasonable construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight. State v. Public Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex.1994); Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex.1994). Consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Ethics Commission's reasonable interpretation, and the rule that statutes are to be construed to avoid constitutional infirmities, we hold that a direct campaign expenditure by an individual in a candidate election includes only those expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of an identified candidate. We therefore consider whether the Osterbergs' advertisement expressly advocated Biel's election or Peca's defeat. B