Opinion ID: 2554806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prior Litigation and Settlement Agreement

Text: [¶ 13] In November 2005, Muther and Woods complained against the Association, Leslie Connolly, and Beth Hess, [8] seeking, among other remedies, a declaratory judgment to establish that Association members did not have a legal right to use the easement over Lot J-46 and that the walkway easement was appurtenant only to the J-Lots. Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Ass'n, 2009 ME 37, ¶ 2, 968 A.2d 539, 540. In response, the Association asserted prescriptive rights to the easement. [¶ 14] During this prior litigation, some of the J-Lot owners were not members of the Association. However, many of the J-Lot owners each contributed between $500 and $750 to a legal defense fund created by the Association. [¶ 15] At a judicial settlement conference in November 2006, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and they read the terms of the agreement into the record at the conclusion of the settlement conference. Of the J-Lot owners, only Beth Hess attended the settlement conference. At the hearing held at the conclusion of the settlement conference, the Association's attorney represented on the record that he had full authority on behalf of the Association and assented to a statement that the settlement was binding on all of the Association's members. [¶ 16] By the terms of the settlement read into the record, Muther and Woods would install a locking gate on the easement and Association members would have access to the easement through an electronic key card system. Muther and Woods would control distribution and activation of the key cards. The Association was to charge its members a $150 annual beach access fee to pay for and maintain the gate, but the fee would be waived for the J-Lot owners. The Association also agreed to indemnify [Muther and Woods] if they are sued for an act or omission arising out of the conduct of the [Association]. Additionally, in connection with a nondisturbance clause, the attorney for Hess and Connolly stated on the record, there's been a lot of controversy with respect to particularly Mr. Woods's approach to various easement holders and that they anticipate that part of nondisturbance includes the fact that peaceful users of the access are not gonna be photographed, approached, or questioned while they're using the easement. [¶ 17] Although the parties agreed to reduce the agreement to a stipulated judgment, they were unable to do so. Muther and Woods amended their complaint to include a count for breach of the settlement agreement, and the court later entered a summary judgment in favor of Muther and Woods on that count, concluding that the terms of the settlement agreement as reflected in the record constituted an enforceable agreement. In its judgment, the court wrote, the agreement reached at the settlement conference ... shall be binding upon all the parties to this suit. [¶ 18] Several of the J-Lot owners moved to intervene. The court denied the motions to intervene, reiterating that the settlement agreement shall be binding upon all the parties to this suit,  including the J-Lot owners who were Association members. However, the court added: While the settlement agreement affects the rights of J-Lot owners ... derived from their membership in the Association, it does not affect any individually-deeded rights of any J-Lot owners not a party to this suit. The individual J-Lot owners, except for [Beth] Hess, were not named as defendants to this suit and any rights they may have separate from those derived from the Association are not affected by this suit or the resulting settlement agreement. Emphasizing the finality of the judgment, the court stated, Any disputes about the meaning of the terms of the settlement agreement or who is bound thereby are to be brought in a separate action. We subsequently affirmed the judgment in all respects, concluding: [T]he transcript of the settlement agreement, without more, conclusively establishes the existence of a binding settlement agreement as a matter of law, and subsequent disputes that arose while attempting to reduce the settlement to a stipulated judgment did not affect the authority of the court to enforce the agreement through the entry of a judgment incorporating the terms previously stipulated to by the parties. Id. ¶ 8, 968 A.2d at 542.