Opinion ID: 2803111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sonia Flores-Rivera's Arguments

Text: Like Ramos, Sonia moved for a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence against her at the close of the government's case and post-trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Once again, we review the district court's denial of her Rule 29 motion de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See Appolon, 695 F.3d at 55. In order to sustain a conviction for the drug conspiracy counts, the evidence must show that: (1) [the] conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Maryea, 704 F.3d 55, 73 (1st Cir. -42- 2013).18 Here, the facially plausible trial testimony of Sonia's admitted co-conspirators provided sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. See Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d at 14. Sonia was identified by both Delgado and Xiomara as a runner for Ramos's organization. Delgado also testified that he personally saw Sonia tallying drug proceeds at her apartment, and that he saw her take money from another conspirator and stash it until another member of the conspiracy retrieved the money. Based on this testimony, the jury was entitled to conclude that Sonia, too, conspired to further the organization's objectives.
Sonia also argues that even if the evidence was sufficient to prove her participation in the organization's drug trafficking at the Victor Berríos housing project, there was insufficient evidence tying her to the larger conspiracy charged in the indictment. She points out that the indictment alleged a conspiracy taking place in Yabucoa, Caguas, and elsewhere in Puerto Rico, but the evidence of her direct participation was localized to Victor Berríos in Yabucoa.19 18 Sonia's opening brief did not include any argument on the aiding and abetting counts, and her reply brief simply claims that should the conspiracy convictions fall, so too will the aiding and abetting convictions. We find her argument as to the aiding and abetting convictions waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1990). 19 The trial testimony showed that Ramos's employees operated in at least the cities of Aguas Buenas, Caguas, and Yabucoa. -43- We interpret Sonia's brief to argue that there was a prejudicial variance between the indictment and the trial evidence against her. She groups this claim together with her sufficiency of the evidence argument, but she failed to alert the district court that she was claiming a distinct prejudicial variance error. Since we have previously stated that a prejudicial variance claim is often a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, see United States v. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2002), we give Sonia the benefit of the doubt and assume without deciding that she preserved this argument by making her Rule 29 motions below, because here the standard of review does not change the outcome. Cf. United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 716 (1st Cir. 2014). Our review is therefore de novo, taking all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See Maryea, 704 F.3d at 73; Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d at 113. A prejudicial variance occurs when (1) the facts proved at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment; and (2) the error affects the defendant's substantive rights. Maryea, 704 F.3d at 73. Sonia is unable to satisfy either prong of our inquiry. With regard to the first prong, in order to be convicted of participating in a conspiracy, each coconspirator need not know of or have contact with all other members, nor must they know all of the details of the conspiracy or participate in every act in -44- furtherance of it. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d at 113. Furthermore, [t]he jury may infer an agreement circumstantially by evidence of, inter alia, a common purpose (such as a purpose to sell illicit drugs), overlap of participants, and interdependence of various elements in the overall plan. Id. at 113—14. The evidence before the jury showed not only that the drugs flowed from Ramos's inventory to multiple housing projects in different cities, but that Ramos's lieutenants enforced organizational discipline, punished thieves, and sought to exclude competitors at Ramos's various drug points. Runners and lieutenants traveling from Caguas to Victor Berríos did not merely deliver drugs, but also checked on supply at each point of sale. Moreover, at least one witness--Andy--testified that he worked at multiple drug points owned by Ramos during his employment for the organization. See Rodriguez, 525 F.3d at 103 (fact that different drug point owners used the same runners and sellers was evidence of a single conspiracy); cf. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d at 114 (In a case where a common supplier is the sole link between diverse distributors, it may be more difficult to sustain a finding of common agreement, although even then one could be inferred by additional evidence--e.g., a finding that the various distributors depended on one another for the health of their own drug business. (internal citations omitted)). -45- Sonia also offers no coherent explanation for why she sustained any prejudice (prong two) due to her claimed lack of involvement in the organization's activities outside of the Victor Berríos drug point. Simply put, the jury easily could have convicted her for having the precise role charged in the indictment--running drugs and serving as an accountant for drug sales--without any consideration of events at other locations. See United States v. Twitty, 72 F.3d 228, 231 (1st Cir. 1995) ([S]o long as the statutory violation remains the same, the jury can convict even if the facts found are somewhat different than those charged--so long as the difference does not cause unfair prejudice.). Sonia does not, for example, contend that some of the drug types in the indictment related only to trafficking by others that occurred outside of Victor Berríos, or that sales made outside of that housing project were needed to achieve the charged quantity thresholds. Cf. United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 124 (1st Cir. 2011) (evidence failed to show that defendants participated in a conspiracy to sell marijuana and cocaine, as opposed to solely cocaine). Nor could she, since, as discussed in Part I, supra, the vast majority of the evidence presented at trial--including evidence of all four types of drugs--related to the organization's activities at Victor Berríos. Absent any showing of prejudice, we are unable to assign plain error to the alleged variance. -46-
Sonia next argues that the district court erred by admitting testimony that should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. That rule provides: The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Since her trial counsel failed to raise an objection to any of the testimony she now claims was wrongfully admitted under this Rule, she must show that the district court's failure to exclude such evidence amounted to plain error. See Rodriguez, 525 F.3d at 98 (assessing newly-unveiled Rule 403 claim for plain error). This she cannot do.
On direct examination, Delgado began testifying about a shooting he attempted to carry out against another co-conspirator when Delgado was still working for the Nazario brothers. The district court interrupted the testimony and then stated in open court that it saw no relationship to this case. Counsel requested no mistrial, nor was this remotely cause for a mistrial. In short, there was no error, much less plain error. -47-
Andy testified about a threat Ramos made to spill the blood of a competitor at a drug point in Aguas Buenas if the competitor did not cease selling drugs there.20 Sonia makes a onesentence argument that this testimony was clearly more prejudicial than relevant, and unfairly distracted the jury from whether Appellant agreed to join a conspiracy with Ramos' enterprises in Caguas and Aguas Buenas, to how dangerous its members were. She therefore appears to premise her argument on her belief that the organization's activities outside of Yabucoa constituted a separate conspiracy, and were thus irrelevant to her. That premise is faulty, since, as we explained in addressing her prejudicial variance argument, the trial testimony from Andy showed evidence of interdependence and a common supply chain between the organization's various drug points. Ramos's attempts to maintain control over his drug points, rather than being a distraction, were certainly relevant to proving the conspiracy's existence. The fact that Sonia did not directly participate in this event does not-- taken alone--deem the evidence unduly prejudicial with respect to 20 Ramos's counsel objected to this testimony, but Sonia's did not join in the objection. We decline to deem the argument preserved for Sonia, particularly because the evidence pertained to Ramos, and the district court did not have an opportunity to evaluate its admissibility with regard to Sonia. Her argument is therefore forfeited and reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d 179, 189 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting an undeveloped argument that co-defendants may piggyback on one another's objections). -48- her conviction. Cf. Maryea, 704 F.3d at 73 (explaining, in responding to a prejudicial variance argument, that while knowledge of the broader conspiracy's existence is critical, the government need not prove that the defendant had knowledge of every other participant, or of the details of the conspiracy). Further, any potential prejudice against Sonia was diminished by the fact that Ramos never carried out the threat, and the incident did not involve her. 3. Shootout Between Sandra and Diana Flores-Rivera We have already described Andy's testimony related to Sandra and Diana's domestic dispute. Sonia also challenges this evidence, but on Rule 403 rather Rule 404(b) grounds. Her claim of undue prejudice with respect to the domestic dispute evidence is even weaker than Sandra's 404(b) argument, because Sonia was not involved in the alleged shooting at all. Sonia attempts to bridge this gap by claiming the story constituted evidence of guilt by association that served to suggest that because [Sonia] was a member of this family, she must also be guilty. But given the evidence's obvious probative value in illustrating the organization's disciplinary system, in addition to her failure to object below, this is a bridge too far. Having rejected each of her Rule 403-based arguments, we proceed to Sonia's next category of claimed evidentiary errors. -49-
On direct examination, Xiomara testified that the notation M.I. in one of the drug ledgers written by coconspirator Sandra Fernandez-Espinosa21 could have referred to either Mimi (Sonia's nickname) or another co-conspirator, Miguelito. Sonia claims on appeal that this testimony was admitted in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 602 because Xiomara lacked sufficient personal knowledge to connect the ledger notation to Sonia. Rule 602 provides: A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness's own testimony. We have previously stated that under Rule 602, testimony is inadmissible only if in the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion it finds that the witness could not have actually perceived or observed what he testified to. United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2012). Personal knowledge can include inferences and opinions, so long as they are grounded in personal observations and experiences. United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 The ledgers were seized by the agents and had previously been admitted into evidence without objection. -50- As a threshold matter, Sonia and the government dispute whether Sonia's trial counsel made a contemporaneous objection to this testimony at trial. We need not definitively decide whether her claim of error is preserved because, even under the less deferential standard of review for preserved claims of error, Sonia fails to show that the admission of the ledger testimony constituted reversible error. Simply put, the jury was entitled to hear Xiomara's testimony and afford it the proper amount of weight. Xiomara testified that she personally tallied the drugs with FernandezEspinosa, and that she watched Fernandez-Espinosa make recordings in the ledger. Given Xiomara's role in the conspiracy, and her testimony that Sonia acted as a runner, Xiomara could have fairly inferred that the notation referred to one of the two coconspirators she named. See Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 144. Moreover, considering Xiomara, Delgado, and Andy's other testimony about Sonia's involvement, any error caused by the introduction of the evidence was harmless. See United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Sonia makes a similar Rule 602 argument, this one indisputably raised for the first time on appeal, about Xiomara's testimony that she saw Sonia carrying bags containing drugs while acting as a runner for the organization. We find no plain error in the district court's decision to admit this unobjected-to -51- testimony. Xiomara's belief that the bags contained drugs were based on what everybody knew. Absent an objection, the district court lacked an opportunity to determine whether Xiomara meant that co-conspirators had told her what was in the bags, in which case the evidence may have been admissible under the co-conspirator hearsay exception, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E),22 or whether her statement was based on unsupported speculation. We thus decline the invitation to disturb the district court's judgment based on the cold appellate record. Cf. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1297 (1st Cir. 1996). Finally, Sonia makes a two-sentence argument that Delgado lacked personal knowledge to testify that Sonia stored the organization's drug trafficking proceeds. She claims that the testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay--statements by coconspirator Zavala-Martí–-but her argument is based upon a misreading of the trial transcript. When asked how he knew that the drug money was given to Sonia, Delgado testified that he saw her. There was no contemporaneous objection to this testimony at trial. Of course, personally viewing Sonia procure the money was 22 Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement offered against a party that is made by that party's co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay. -52- a sufficient basis for Delgado to conclude that Sonia served in that role.23
Sonia claims in a parenthetical of her opening brief that the district court's failure to instruct the jury that it must determine the guilt of each defendant on each count separately amounted to a distinct and serious plain error. There was no objection to this instruction at trial. We decline to construct Sonia's arguments for her, and we thus deem this assignment of error waived. See United States v. Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F.3d 1, 13—14 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that [a]rguments raised in only a perfunctory and undeveloped manner are deemed waived on appeal). 23 After Delgado stated how he knew Sonia stored the funds, he was asked by the prosecutor how he knew where the money ended up after leaving [Sonia's] hands. Ramos's trial counsel lodged an objection at this point (Objection, if he doesn't know), but Sonia's did not. Delgado then explained the basis for his personal knowledge: Zavala-Martí, an undisputed leader of the organization, told Delgado that Diana Flores-Rivera picked up the money from Sonia and delivered it to Zavala-Martí. Zavala-Martí's statements themselves--made by a conspirator for the purpose of informing another conspirator what happened to the money--may have been admissible under the co-conspirator hearsay exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The application of the co-conspirator exception is complicated by Delgado's testimony that Zavala-Martí told him this information because, in Delgado's words, I worked with the organization and we told each other, I mean, like as friends. So, arguably, Zavala-Martí did not tell Delgado the information in furtherance of the conspiracy itself, as would be required by that exception. In any event, there was no objection to Zavala-Martí's second-hand remarks, and we find no plain error in the district court allowing the jury to find out what happened to the money after Sonia took it. -53-
During its deliberation, the jury sent a note to the trial judge that read, in relevant part: We would like to hear the transcripts from Harry's and Xiomara's testimony that make reference to Sonia Flores (Mimi). The judge, while in chambers with the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court reporter, instructed the court reporter to read both the direct and crossexamination for those two witnesses. The judge also explained the restricted nature of the read-back procedure: You are there as a stone, the judge told the court reporter. The court reporter could read the transcripts, and repeat anything the jury requested to be repeated. However, the jury was not permitted to ask the court reporter any other questions, nor was it allowed to make any comments in the court reporter's presence. The judge then asked the attorneys, Do you want me to bring them out in court? Ramos and Sonia's attorneys responded that we prefer in open court. So the judge summoned the jury into the courtroom, reiterated the instructions and the limited nature of the read-back procedure, and confirmed that the jurors understood the applicable restrictions. The jury foreperson expressed a preference to do the read-back in the jury room, which