Opinion ID: 2582501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Class Certification Was Proper.

Text: The superior court certified the class finding that the requirements of Civil Rule 23(a) and (b)(1) were met, or in the alternative, that under Rule 23(b)(2) the department had acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class thus making declaratory and/or injunctive relief appropriate to the class. The state argues that class certification was improper because, in addition to the need for individual exhaustion of administrative remedies, the class did not meet the requirements of the class action rule. The state also contends that where constitutionality is at issue, class certification is unnecessary because the court's ruling on an appeal of an administrative decision would affect similarly situated persons in the same manner. [26] The class argues that the issue to be resolved by the superior court for class purposes was not individual class members' ultimate eligibility for a PFD in any given year; rather, the class sought declaratory and injunctive relief as to a threshold question of eligibility that exists based on the federally imposed immigration status of the class members. The threshold requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and protection of class interests by the representative were met in this case. [27] First, the superior court found that the class was so numerous that joinder would be impracticable. There are at least twenty named plaintiffs. In addition, counsel for the class asserts that there are potentially hundreds of others who are either similarly situated or will be affected by the case. Second, resolution of the constitutional issues is a concern common to the class members. [28] In its action for declaratory/injunctive relief, the class claims that the department systematically discriminated in favor of certain categories of legal aliens and that this practice is unconstitutional. The class was certified to consist of lawful residents of Alaska who were denied or deemed ineligible to receive a PFD because of their alienage (or their parents' alienage). The questions presented predominate over any individual claims and are common to the class. Third, the superior court found the claims of the representative parties to be typical of the class members. This finding is supported by the record. And fourth, the superior court found that the representative parties would fairly and adequately represent the class members. The state argues that [w]here the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, the need for a class action loses vitality, citing to State v. Alex. [29] But Alex did not hold that the concern for adequate representation disappears when the class action challenges the constitutionality of a statute. It merely accorded less weight to that factor in these circumstances. And it did note that failure to proceed on a class action basis would mean that the named plaintiffs would be burdened with the expenses of the suit without reimbursement from a class recovery. The effect on the defendants and the rest of the class is the same whether the suit is brought as a class or as an individual action. [30] The superior court's finding that the Andrades' representation was adequate for this constitutional challenge was not clearly erroneous, and was entitled to some weight in class certification. Thus, the Rule 23(a) class certification requirements were satisfied. The state contends that the sole reason the class attorneys brought the class action was to generate additional attorney's fees and that this is not an appropriate reason to certify a class. There is no evidence that the court certified the class because it would generate plaintiffs' attorney's fees. However, certification of the class does change the landscape with regard to the calculation of attorney's fees because of the possibility of higher fee awards than in an individual action. Factors considered in determining the compensable value of class counsel's services include the need to promote the efficient use of court resources through the use of class action litigation, and the potential difficulty of attracting capable counsel. [31] These factors adequately protect against the possibility of abusing the class action mechanism to generate attorney's fees, and thus, we reject the state's argument. Additionally, declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate in this case because the department refused to address the constitutional claims of the Andrade family. [32] There is no general prohibition against bringing a class action to declare a statute unconstitutional, and we do not find one in this case. We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the class.