Opinion ID: 1474523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: As to the Application of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States by Implementation Under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Text: As to the second ground raised by Johnson the court below stated, There is evidence that Johnson received cruel treatment after he had been convicted of murder and while he was serving his sentence therefor. However, such treatment would not entitle him to his liberty as it does not constitute a custody of relator in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 453. The 8th Amendment is not a limitation upon the States. Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 503, 510, 511, 35 S.Ct. 649, 59 L.Ed. 1071. We deem the first sentence quoted in this paragraph to constitute a finding by the court below that Johnson had been subjected to cruel treatment following his conviction. It is obvious also that in using the phrase cruel treatment the court below was referring to the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment. Without regard for minutiae of conclusion in the trial court's opinion, we think it misinterpreted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Collins v. Johnston, supra. While it is true that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States limits and was intended to limit federal action, it is the modern view, and, we feel, the correct one, that where the right protected and guaranteed under the Bill of Rights (Amendments I to VIII) of the United States Constitution is basic and fundamental to the rights of life and liberty, recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, then the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from abridging or denying the right in question. In so holding, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly declined to adopt the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make secure against state invasion all the rights, privileges and immunities protected from federal violation by the Bill of Rights. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-236, note 8, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; see also e. g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-99, 114, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97, Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, dissent 605, 606, 20 S.Ct. 448, 44 L.Ed. 597; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423. But in numerous cases the Supreme Court has held that where the right invaded by the state is a basic and fundamental one, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment include by implementation those guarantees of the Bill of Rights. E. g. freedom of speech, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574; freedom of religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-509, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265; freedom of the press, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949; freedom of speech and assembly, Hague v. C.I.O., supra; the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions of those individuals, who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity, are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature, Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647; and see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1256, 86 L.Ed. 1595; [8] Palko v. Connecticut, supra, 302 U.S. at pages 324-325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 151, 82 L.Ed. 288; [9] and in particular see State of La. ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463, 67 S.Ct. 374, 384, 91 L.Ed. 422, where the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Reed indicated, without expressly deciding, that violation of the principles of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments as to double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment would be violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [10] We are not called on to decide, nor do we decide, whether the clauses of the Eighth Amendment relating to imposition of excessive bail, or excessive fines, fall within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we entertain no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by a state. State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra. Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793, 19 Ann.Cas. 705; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519. We are of the opinion that the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of a State is as basic and fundamental a one as the right of freedom of speech or freedom of religion. And it should be pointed out that actions of the employees of the prison system of Georgia must be deemed to be those of the State of Georgia. The fact that a state officer acts illegally cannot relieve a state of responsibility for his acts. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330. We come then to the question as to whether the actions of Georgia prison authorities described by Johnson and his witnesses constituted cruel and unusual punishment. It will be remembered that the court below found that there was evidence that Johnson received cruel treatment after he had been convicted of murder and while he was serving his sentence   . The learned trial judge did not expressly state that he found this evidence to be credible though, as we have said, the statement made by the court below in its opinion and heretofore referred to constituted a finding that Johnson had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment following his conviction. [11] In any event upon appeal in a habeas corpus case all questions of law or fact arising upon the record, including the evidence, are open to consideration by the appellate court and the trial court has no authority to make conclusive findings of fact as in the ordinary action, Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 15 S.Ct. 773, 39 L.Ed. 914, and we are not bound by the conclusions of the trial court, Carruthers v. Reed, 8 Cir., 102 F.2d 933, 937. The hearing before this court is technically de novo. It is our conclusion upon careful consideration of the record in the court below that Johnson was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment following his sentence and that this holding is in accordance, and not at variance, with that of the court below. Indeed no other conclusion would be possible in view of the known facts concerning the working of the Georgia penal system at the time of the petitioner's sentence and in consideration of the circumstance that the State of Georgia offered no testimony whatsoever in contradiction to that given by Johnson and his witnesses. Our conclusion that Johnson was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment is buttressed by the decision of the Supreme Court in In re Kemmler and Weems v. United States, supra. Weems, under Section 56 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, Act of July 1, 1902, had been guilty and had been sentenced inter alia to the penalty of fifteen years of cadena together with the accessories of Section 56 of the [Philippine] Penal Code   . The cadena consisted of a chain at the ankle hanging from the wrists to be worn at all times. The accessories of Section 56 would have deprived Weems almost completely of personal and familial rights and subjected him to constant surveillance by the authorities. The Supreme Court of the United States, by Mr. Justice McKenna, decided that the punishment was a cruel and unusual one. Accordingly the judgment was reversed and the trial court was directed to dismiss the proceedings. Though the Supreme Court has not set down any precise standard as to what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-136, 25 L. Ed. 345, we conclude without hesitation that if Johnson was treated by the prison authorities of Georgia in the manner which he alleges, [12] he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by the State of Georgia. We know of no way in which degrees of cruelty may be measured coldly as if upon an altimeter, so much for the heights of cruelty, so much for the depths thereof. The obligation of a State to treat its convicts with decency and humanity is an absolute one and a federal court will not overlook a breach of that duty. The Supreme Court so held in effect in the Weems case though the punishment of the cadena had been imposed by a Territorial Court of the Philippines. The obligation not to inflict cruel and unusual punishment laid upon a State by the Constitution of the United States must be deemed to be positive and binding. In the Weems case cruel and unusual punishment reasonably was to be anticipated under the sentence. In the instant case, cruel and unusual punishment already has been inflicted on Johnson as the court below and we ourselves have found. History is as potent a force as anticipation. It follows, therefore, that Johnson must be set at liberty for the State of Georgia has failed signally in its duty as one of the sovereign States of the United States to treat a convict with decency and humanity. It must be pointed out also that she has failed also to observe the explicit mandates of her own Constitution [13] which pointedly, as if the very evil here under consideration was in mind, go as far, if not farther, than those of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.