Opinion ID: 77178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grisel Arias

Text: Grisel Arias argues that her conviction should be reversed because: (1) the 5 Five additional co-defendants were tried jointly with the Appellants. The jury acquitted four: Reinaldo Landrove, an officer of a DME company; Janeide Regueiro, who worked at South Beach Pharmacy; and Azubueze Ikejiani and Magnus Ogbenna, the co-owners of Maz Pharmacy (with Michael Iheagwara). The fifth, Vincente Bouza, a doctor, was convicted but did not appeal. 6 Marco Burgos did not individually submit a brief, and instead adopted the arguments of the other Appellants. Other Appellants have variously adopted the arguments of their coAppellants, as well. Because the only two arguments in which we find merit affect only the individuals who made them, there is no need for us to detail the parties’ adoption of arguments, and we do not do so. 6 evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction; (2) her Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the court refused to permit her to re-call a government witness who pled guilty to an unrelated drug charge subsequent to testifying in this case; (3) the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (4) the district court erred in denying her requested continuance when a superseding indictment was issued one month before trial; and (5) the court erroneously refused to give a requested jury instruction pertaining to the evidence that she had acted in “good faith” and not with fraudulent intent. She also argues that her sentence should be vacated because in calculating her guideline sentence, the district court incorrectly calculated the loss attributable to her. We have carefully considered the record and find no merit to any of these contentions. First, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support her conviction. Without cataloguing each piece of evidence against Grisel Arias, we note that the government submitted documents establishing that Grisel Arias was the original president and incorporator of two DME companies involved in the fraud scheme, Bird Road Medical Services and, subsequently, New Advanced Medical Equipment Corporation; on the evidence presented, the jury could have concluded that these companies were not conducting any legitimate transactions. Grisel authorized Medicare provider application forms for both these DME companies. 7 Although she alleged that some signatures were forged, the jury was entitled to determine that the documents were authentic. Additionally, Carlos Amador, a La Moderna pharmacy technician who pled guilty to the conspiracy, testified that Grisel would come to the La Moderna facility “[a]t least once a month” during the year he worked there, and that she picked up half-filled prescriptions of aerosol medications from him at the pharmacy.7 Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the recall of Amador or the introduction of documents relating to the drug charge against him. The sole purpose in seeking further testimony from Amador was impeachment, the questioning would have been cumulative of that already permitted during cross examination, and Amador had represented that he would simply invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege if recalled.8 Third, Grisel Arias did not have a valid Brady claim, because when viewed in context, the purported contradictions between Jose Arias’ sentencing testimony and the prosecution’s 7 This evidence supporting Grisel Arias’ conviction on the conspiracy charge was also sufficient to support her conviction on the “kickback” counts. Under the Pinkerton theory of vicarious liability, Grisel could be convicted for the kickback offenses even without proof of her direct involvement, because the kickbacks were reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Mothersill, 87 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1996). 8 Ordinarily, drug use is not a valid subject for impeachment. See United States v. Clemons, 32 F.3d 1504, 1511 (11th Cir. 1994) (“This circuit has long adhered to the proposition that a witness's use of drugs may not be used to attack his general credibility, but only his ability to perceive the underlying events and to testify lucidly at trial.”). Thus, had the government not opened the door to the subject of Amador’s drug use during direct examination, questions relating to Amador’s drug use would clearly have been impermissible. 8 pretrial letter describing his statements are not material. Fourth, in this complex multi-defendant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Grisel a continuance after the second superseding indictment included additional details concerning the DME New Advanced Medical Equipment Corporation; the government had previously disclosed New Advanced materials during discovery, and the superseding indictment did not add new charges or alter the theory of prosecution. Fifth, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Grisel’s request for a “good faith” instruction, as there is no foundation in the evidence for such an instruction.9 Finally, the district court did not err in calculating the amount of loss attributable to Grisel – in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, each defendant is responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).