Opinion ID: 2291751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wrongful Death Claims Against the Supervisory Defendants

Text: In Phase II of the trial the court directed a verdict in favor of the supervisory defendants Concannon, Zitnay and Scarlata on the wrongful death claims against them by the plaintiff George Miller, as a personal representative. We reject the plaintiff's cross-appeal from that directed verdict on the separate ground that, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C) (1980 & Supp.1987), [8] those defendants are immune from liability in the circumstances here presented. In Phase II, the theory of liability against the supervisory defendants for Mrs. Miller's wrongful death was that they improperly hired, retained and supervised Szelenyi with knowledge of the foreseeable risk that Szelenyi posed to those subject to his treatment at Pineland. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the Superior Court, finding that the plaintiff's evidence could not sustain a jury verdict, directed a verdict for the defendants. Immunity under section 8111(1)(C) is an affirmative defense. Cunningham v. Haza, 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me.1988); MacKerron v. Madura, 474 A.2d 166, 167 (Me. 1984); see also Robinson v. Washington County, 529 A.2d 1357, 1360-61 (Me.1987) (governmental immunity is an affirmative defense). We review the evidence, including every justifiable inference therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether a jury verdict for the plaintiff could be sustained. See Baker v. Mid Maine Medical Center, 499 A.2d 464, 466 (Me.1985); see also Ward v. Cumberland County Power & Light Co., 134 Me. 430, 432-33, 187 A. 527, 528 (1936) (upholding directed verdict in favor of defendant's affirmative defense). State employees are protected by section 8111(1)(C) if they have been legislatively authorized to perform a discretionary function or duty, and if they have acted, or failed to act, pursuant to that authorization. Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421, 425 (Me.1987); True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 260 (Me.1986). Discretionary function immunity requires that the contested actions must be essential to the realization or accomplishment of a basic governmental policy, program or objective. Darling, 535 A.2d at 426; see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427, 1441 (1953) (Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion); cf. Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 791-97 (8th Cir.1982) (selection and supervision of federally protected witness is discretionary function under Federal Tort Claims Act); Taxay v. United States, 345 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.D.C.1972) (decision not to recertify plaintiff as Aviation Medical Examiner is discretionary function under F.T.C.A.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C.Cir.1973). Under 34 M.R.S.A. § 1 (1978) [9] Commissioner Concannon was charged with  general supervision, management and control of the ... officers and employees... of the ... Pineland Center. (emphasis added). [10] Similarly, Superintendent Zitnay was charged with  direct supervision, management and control of the ... employees of Pineland Center, subject to the approval of the commissioner. 34 M.R.S.A. § 2632(4)(C) (1978) (emphasis added). [11] Simply put, proper supervision and control of all the employees at the Pineland Center required the exercise of discretion. Moreover, the Pineland Center was created to facilitate the care and treatment of mentally retarded persons. 34 M.R.S.A. § 2631 (1978). [12] Thus, the discretion required to supervise and manage Pineland employees must be guided by an effort to realize a basic state policy, namely, the proper care and treatment of the mentally retarded patients at Pineland. The evidence at the trial discloses that both Concannon and Zitnay were acting pursuant to legislative authorization. Commissioner Concannon received reports from Superintendent Zitnay at least once a month. The subject matter of these reports did not come into evidence; indeed, there was no evidence whatsoever showing that Concannon took any action at all related to the events of this case. [13] However, to the extent that Commissioner Concannon is deemed to have constructive knowledge of Szelenyi's supervision by virtue of his statutory responsibility of general supervision of Pineland employees, there was no evidence that he acted outside the scope of his authorized discretion. Superintendent Zitnay testified that he had ultimate authority to hire and fire Szelenyi. Indeed, he signed Szelenyi's one-year contract for services as an on-call physician. Moreover, Zitnay was directly involved in Szelenyi's supervision. Zitnay testified that he received a complaint six months prior to Mrs. Miller's death concerning Szelenyi's treatment of a Pineland patient. After discussing the complaint with defendant Scarlata, Zitnay determined that no disciplinary or other action was necessary. [14] Zitnay's decision both to hire Szelenyi and to retain and supervise him were discretionary judgments made pursuant to the legislature's decision to place direct supervision of Pineland employees in the hands of the Pineland Superintendent. Defendant Scarlata also falls under the discretionary immunity provisions of the MTCA. Those who assist or participate in a decision or other action protected by the discretionary immunity provisions are themselves immune to the extent of their assistance or participation. Darling, 535 A.2d at 429. Scarlata testified that he was the immediate medical supervisor of the physician staff at Pineland and that he reported directly to Zitnay. In performing this delegated duty, Scarlata was effectively assisting Zitnay, who had direct supervision, management and control of the ... employees of Pineland Center. 34 M.R.S. A. § 2632(4)(C) (1978). We affirm the trial court's granting of a directed verdict in favor of the defendant Welch on the basis of a complete lack of evidence of any causal connection between Welch and the hiring or supervision of Szelenyi. As the Director of the Bureau of Mental Retardation, Welch was responsible for carry[ing] out the purposes of the bureau (34 M.R.S.A. § 2612 (1978)), which was then responsible for [t]he planning, promotion, coordination and development of a complete and integrated statewide system of mental retardation services. Id. § 2611(3). [15] Although Superintendent Zitnay met with Director Welch approximately once a month, their discussions included neither the supervision or review of Pineland physicians, nor any internal Pineland policy relating to employee health. Indeed, there was no evidence that Director Welch was aware of Szelenyi's employment at Pineland prior to Mrs. Miller's death.