Opinion ID: 1229173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of the Felony Murder Statute

Text: The defendant raises two separate arguments regarding the failure of the State to prove its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the defendant contends that the State's evidence was insufficient to trigger application of the felony murder statute. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the felony murder statute does not apply in drug overdose cases. After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the defendant failed to raise this specific issue below. As noted above, the defendant's specific argument here is that the felony murder statute is not applicable to the facts of this case. At the end of the State's evidence, the defendant's counsel made a motion for acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, counsel stated: Defense would movemake a motion for acquittal, that the defense states that the State has not carried its burden in this case. And the key elements of this offense as alleged is that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Randall Burge died of morphine poisoning as delivered by Johnny Rodoussakis. The State has failed to meet its burden of proving that Randall Burge died of morphine, and that their expert witness, the pathologist who was the only person who is licensed and able to determine cause of death, clearly stated in his cross-examination that the cause of death was multiple intoxication as indicated by hismultiple drug intoxication as indicated by his report that he had filed. And therefore the State has not met its burden and we ask that this matter be acquitted. The defendant also made a written post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal which was, again, based on insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, the defendant argued that there was not sufficient proof that morphine caused Burge's death. At no time, however, did the defendant raise the argument that the felony murder statute does not apply to drug overdose cases. It is axiomatic in this Court that, To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must articulate it with such sufficient distinctiveness to alert a circuit court to the nature of the claimed defect. The rule in West Virginia is that parties must speak clearly in the circuit court, on pain that, if they forget their lines, they will likely be bound forever to hold their peace.... It must be emphasized that the contours for appeal are shaped at the circuit court level by setting forth with particularity and at the appropriate time the legal ground upon which the parties intend to rely. State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W.Va. 208, 216, 470 S.E.2d 162, 170 (1996). The trial court was never alerted to the defendant's argument concerning the applicability of the felony murder statute and, therefore, never had the opportunity to consider it. Normally, [t]his Court will not pass on a nonjurisdictional question which has not been decided by the trial court in the first instance. Syllabus Point 2, Sands v. Security Trust Co., 143 W.Va. 522, 102 S.E.2d 733 (1958). However, this is an issue of first impression in this Court. Also, it concerns the interpretation of a statute. Therefore, we deem it important to address this issue in order to clarify the law. W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 (1991) states: Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, breaking and entering, escape from lawful custody, or a felony offense of manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance as defined in article four [§ 60A-4-401 et seq.], chapter sixty-a of this code, is murder of the first degree. All other murder is murder of the second degree. In an indictment for murder and manslaughter, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in every such indictment to charge that the defendant did feloniously, willfully, maliciously, deliberately and unlawfully slay, kill and murder the deceased. This Court has long held that [w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute. Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Fox v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund of the City of Bluefield, et al., 148 W.Va. 369, 135 S.E.2d 262 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Booth v. Sims, 193 W.Va. 323, 456 S.E.2d 167 (1995). The language of W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 is clear and unambiguous. It states that murder in the commission of a felony offense of manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance as defined in W.Va.Code § 60A-4-401 et seq. is murder of the first degree. By using such straightforward language, the Legislature made its intent plain that W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 includes drug overdose cases. [3] Therefore, it is our duty to apply the statute. We note also that the felony murder statutes of several states include death by drug overdose. See e.g., Ingleton v. State, 700 So.2d 735 (Fla.App.1997), rev. denied, 717 So.2d 532 (Fla.1998); State v. Whitted, 232 N.J.Super. 384, 389, 557 A.2d 327, 330 (N.J.Super.A.D.1989) (holding that New Jersey's Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986 established a new first degree offense which would hold drug distributors strictly liable for any deaths proximately resulting from their illegal distribution activities, even if those deaths were due to accidental drug overdoses.); Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (Va.1984); and Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852 (1983) (in view of legislative intent behind murder and involuntary manslaughter statutes, the court recognized second-degree felony-murder rule in fact-specific context of case where defendant allegedly sold and participated in administration of drugs, leading to fatal overdose by recipient). Therefore, in light of the clear and unambiguous language of W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 and the plain intent of the Legislature in enacting that statute, we hold that pursuant to W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 (1991), death resulting from an overdose of a controlled substance as defined in W.Va.Code § 60A-4-401 et seq. and occurring in the commission of or attempt to commit a felony offense of manufacturing or delivering such controlled substance, subjects the manufacturer or deliverer of the controlled substance to the felony murder rule. Accordingly, we find that W.Va.Code § 61-2-1 was properly applied in the instant case. B.