Opinion ID: 2441961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Felony Assault and Significant Bodily Injury

Text: The trial court stated in its findings that appellant's conviction for felony assault was based on (1) his participation in the assault when he kicked the victim to the ground, and (2) aiding and abetting the group of juveniles who collectively caused her injury. Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because Stover suffered what he terms only a minor injury to her ear that did not require hospitalization or immediate medical attention. D.C.Code § 22-404 was amended by statute in 2006, adding subsection (a)(2), which created an intermediate assault offense. Section (a)(2) provides: Whoever unlawfully assaults, or threatens another in a menacing manner, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes significant bodily injury to another shall be fined not more than $3,000 or be imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term significant bodily injury means an injury that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention. Prior to 2006, the range of assault charges was limited to simple assault, which carries a maximum penalty of 180 days imprisonment and a one thousand dollar ($1,000) fine, and aggravated assault, which carries a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment and a ten thousand dollar ($10,000) fine. See D.C.Code §§ 22-404, -404.01 (2001 & 2007 Supp.). The serious bodily injury requirement under the aggravated assault statute creates a high threshold of injury. In Swinton v. United States, 902 A.2d 772 (D.C. 2006), we described the severity of the injuries that met this threshold: The injuries in these cases usually were life-threatening or disabling. The victims typically required urgent and continuing medical treatment (and, often, surgery), carried visible and long-lasting (if not permanent) scars, and suffered other consequential damage, such as significant impairment of their faculties. In short, these cases have been horrific. Id. at 775. In contrast to the high threshold of injury required and the substantial penalty incurred under an aggravated assault conviction, the charge of simple assault requires no injury and provides a maximum prison term of 180 days. D.C.Code § 22-404(a)(1) (2010 Supp.). We noted in Jackson v. United States that the D.C. Council had endorsed this court's strict construction of the `serious bodily injury' requirement in the aggravated assault statute when it amended D.C.Code § 22-404 by adding the intermediate felony assault offense to `fill the gap between aggravated assault and simple assault.' Jackson v. United States, 940 A.2d 981, 986-87 (D.C. 2008) (citing D.C. COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 16-247, at 6 (Apr. 28, 2006)). The original draft of the bill used the language bodily injury, not significant bodily injury. See OMNIBUS PUBLIC SAFETY ACT OF 2005, at 9, enclosed with LETTER FROM MAYOR ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS TO D.C. COUNCIL CHAIRMAN CROPP (Apr. 6, 2005). A letter commenting on the bill from the Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia addressed to the Judiciary Committee of the Council of the District of Columbia states that the bodily injury language was too minimal a requirement because it would make slapping or pushing a three-year felony offense. See LETTER OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TO CHAIRMAN MENDELSON OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, at 12 (July 14, 2005). This letter recommended that the language be changed to significant bodily injury, or something similar, that would be more serious than mere `bodily injury' but less serious than `serious bodily injury.' See id. The Council apparently incorporated this suggestion into the final bill, and in its April 28, 2006 report, noted that enhanced assault was intended to provide a penalty for assault that results in significant (but not grave) bodily injury[.] See supra REPORT ON BILL 16-247, at 5-6. The D.C. Attorney General also addressed the injury threshold in his testimony at a public hearing on the bill, in which he described the need for an intermediary felony assault to cover the many assault cases involv[ing] a victim who has been seriously beaten, sometimes leaving the victim with black eyes, lacerations, broken bones, or serious bruising all over the body. See TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. SPAGNOLETTI, ATTORNEY GENERAL, PUBLIC HEARING ON B16-247 THE OMNIBUS PUBLIC SAFETY ACT OF 2005, at 15 (May 31, 2005). The statute contains a definition of significant bodily injury as one that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention. D.C.Code § 22-404(a)(2) (2010 Supp.). We have not hitherto had occasion to consider that definition in the context of the facts of a particular case. However, the very trial judge presiding in the case before us previously addressed that issue in a felony assault trial where the victim suffered a fractured nose with a deep gash and profuse bleeding with severe pain and a shoulder injury. See In re R.P., 136 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 549 (D.C.Super.Ct. Feb. 19, 2008). In an extensive and careful discussion, Judge Byrd took note of the relatively moderate increase from simple assault to felony assault in fine ($1,000 to $3,000) and maximum term of imprisonment (180 days to 3 years), as compared to the much larger increase to aggravated assault with a fine of $10,000 and a ten-year term. See id. at 552. He concluded that an individual suffers significant bodily injury: where there is an injury to the body ... that necessitates the individual being taken to the hospital or receiving medical treatment shortly after the injury was inflicted. Hospitalization or medical treatment is required where it is necessary to preserve the health and well being of the individual, e.g., to prevent long-term physical damage, possible disability, disfigurement, or severe pain. Id. We think this standard is a fair exposition of the Council's intent. Otherwise put, the threshold for significant bodily injury is markedly less severe than that required for aggravated assault. The fact that the injury here was not so grave as to require transport by ambulance to a hospital is not determinative. Indeed, the fact that the treatment happened to be administered at a hospital is not determinative whether hospitalization itself was required, [3] nor is a decision by the injured party not to seek immediate medical attention determinative as to whether the injury in fact called for such attention. The focus, instead, must be on the nature of the injury itself and the practical need in the ordinary course of events for prompt medical attention. Here, where the injury to the ear required four to six stitches and left a scar and where treatment was sought and administered with reasonable promptness, we have no difficulty in sustaining the trial court's conclusion that the injury met the requirement of the felony assault statute. [4]