Opinion ID: 2521334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court's Findings Are Insufficient To Determine Whether Snyder or His Predecessor Acquired Title Through Adverse Possession.

Text: Snyder claims that his father gained title through adverse possession under the previous version of AS 09.10.030, which was in effect at the pertinent times. It stated: A person may not bring an action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession of it unless the action is commenced within 10 years. An action may not be maintained for the recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, an ancestor, a predecessor, or the grantor of the plaintiff was seized or possessed of the premises in question within 10 years before the commencement of the action. [8] In order to acquire title by adverse possession, [Snyder] must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, ... that for the statutory period his [father's] use of the land was continuous, open and notorious, exclusive and hostile to the true owner. [9] Glover and Douglass primarily argue that Dan Snyder, Sr.'s possession of the parcel was not hostile to Glover's interest. They do not directly contest the other requirements. Hostile possession does not imply that the adverse possessor bore ill will or aggression toward the true owner; it only means that the adverse possessor held the land in such a way that his interest in the property was incompatible with the record owner's interest. [10] If the adverse possessor holds the land as a tenant or otherwise with the record owner's permission, his claim is subordinate to the title of the true owner and is therefore not hostile. [11] If the adverse possessor, without the true owner's permission, acted toward the land as if he owned it, then his claim is hostile. [12] When one assumes possession of another's property, there is a presumption that he does so with the rightful owner's permission and in subordination to his title. [13] The adverse claimant thus bears the burden of proving that his claim is hostile. The superior court found that Dan Snyder, Sr. took possession of the land with Mary Johnson's permission. The court specifically declined to find whether the permissive arrangement was a sale or a lease. Snyder does not claim on appeal that he acquired title to the property by purchasing it from Mary Johnson, nor does he rely on the possibility that the transaction was a sale to bolster his adverse possession claim. For the purposes of this decision, we therefore interpret the arrangement as a lease, with the food he delivered serving as rent. The superior court went on to hold that the transfer of the property to Rotman Stores eliminated the permissive nature of his occupation because the new owner was not a party to the agreement that created it in the first place. But when possession begins with the true owner's permission, it cannot become hostile unless the presumption of permission is rebutted `by proof of a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner of the property.' [14] And a transfer does not alter the burden on the claimant [15] or the standard he must meet. [16] To show that his permissive occupation turned hostile, Snyder must prove that he made a distinct and positive assertion of his claim, regardless of whether the transfer to Rotman Stores was legitimate or was, as Glover and Douglass argue, a mistake that should be disregarded. [17] Similarly, the fact that no rent was paid after 1982, at the latest, cannot defeat the permissive nature of the Snyder family's possession. Nonpayment of rent does not establish hostility. [18] The passive failure to make payments is not a distinct and positive assertion of ownership. If nonpayment terminated the lease, it only turned Snyder's interest in the land into a tenancy at sufferance. An estate at sufferance is an interest in land which exists when a person who had a possessory interest in land by virtue of an effective conveyance, wrongfully continues in the possession of the land after the termination of such interest, but without asserting a claim to a superior title. [19] A tenancy at sufferance is a permissive interest and cannot be the basis for adverse possession. [20] Furthermore, we decline to establish a rule that gives tenants an incentive to stop paying rent in the hope of establishing an adverse possession claim. [21] To become an adverse possessor, any tenant, including a tenant at sufferance, must openly and explicitly disclaim and disavow any and all holding under his former landlord; and, furthermore, he must unreservedly and steadily assert that he himself is the owner of the true title. [22] This repudiationa form of the distinct and positive assertion required to turn any permissive occupancy into a hostile one-must provide at least constructive notice to the landlord and true owner that the tenant has repudiated his leasehold interest and claims the land as his own. [23] Some courts require only that the adverse claimant meet the usual requirements for adverse possessionas long as the claimant occupies the land openly and notoriously and acts as if he owns it, repudiation of the owner's superior claim may be inferred. [24] Other courts, generally reasoning in the analogous context of a tenant in common making an adverse claim against his co-tenant, have held that a tenant ... does not, merely by exclusive possession, gain title by adverse possession. [25] Instead, stronger evidence is required to prove such adverse possession than in similar claims by strangers to the title. [26] We adopt this view. Our case law makes clear that when a claimant started out occupying land permissively, it is essential that his new, hostile interest in the property be made clear to the true owner. [27] The behavior of a tenant and an owner will often be indistinguishable; if a tenant merely acts as he always did, the owner will not be on notice of his new, hostile claim. In almost every case, only a distinct and positive assertion of the new claimor a repudiation of the owner's interestwill provide proper notice. An adverse claimant who entered land as a tenant must usually show some distinct act, like an open announcement of his claim or a change in his use of the land, sufficient to serve as a distinct and positive assertion of his claim to own the property. [28] This is more than is required of other adverse possessors, who may establish a claim simply by acting toward the land as if they owned it, without a particular assertion. Some cases, however, may require an exception to this heightened requirement. While [n]ot every undisturbed occupancy by a [former tenant] will result in a finding of ownership by adverse possession[,] ... when the acts of ownership are overt and unambiguous [29] and the exclusive possession is long held, a factfinder may infer that the tenant has repudiated his landlord's claim of ownership and asserted his own. [30] The long occupation, with its unambiguous hallmarks of ownership, serves as the distinct and positive assertion of the claimant's interest and the repudiation of the true owner's interest. For example, in Adams v. Johnson, [31] the Supreme Court of Minnesota faced a claim by a joint tenant that he had gained full title to a piece of property, divesting his co-tenant of any interest. In general, establishing an adverse possession claim against a co-tenant requires the ouster of the co-tenant by the same sort of act required for the repudiation of a landlord's interest. [32] The claimant and his predecessor in interest had occupied the land for almost 50 years as sole owners, paying all taxes and insurance and retaining all profits. [33] They had also made many improvements to the property, putting up farm buildings and a house, and repairing fences. [34] Each of these acts was within their rights as tenants in common and could not on its own oust the co-tenant. But taken together, over the course of a half-century occupation whose character was fully understood by the co-tenant, they added up to an ouster. [35] It is important to note that such cases are rare and extreme. [36] But the Minnesota case shows that this exception is important, as it preserves the possibility that those claimants who look the most like adverse possessors may acquire title. When former tenants who have spent undisturbed years acting as if they owned their land or home face a sudden, surprising challenge to their rights, equity demands that courts closely consider whether they have gained title through adverse possession, even without the overt act usually required. The superior court's findings suggest that Snyder or his father may have made a distinct and positive assertion of their claim to the land, and a repudiation of the interest of Mary Johnson and her successors. The superior court found that Snyder built an addition onto the house, that his father kept dogs on the property, and that a fence was built [a]t some time. If the fence, addition, or dog yard were beyond what Dan Snyder, Sr.'s agreement with Mary Johnson allowed, one or all of them may have demonstrated the family's repudiation of her successors' ownership of the land. Snyder may have made a repudiation by words or conduct aimed directly at the true owner. The question of the legitimacy of the transfer to Rotman Stores would then become important because this type of repudiation could only be effective if it were made to the true owner. Alternatively, the repudiation may have been communicated to the community at large, as with an overt change in the use of the land. In this case, the identity of the true owner would not matter, because any record owner would be deemed to be on notice of it. [37] A third possibility is that the Snyders' occupation may have been long enough and their acts of ownership overt and unambiguous enough that the court could infer from their exclusive possession over the years that the family was repudiating the true owner's interest. In this scenario, the identity of the true owner would be similarly immaterial. We therefore remand the case to the superior court for the necessary findings. That court, at its discretion, may choose to review the existing record in light of these principles, or it may decide to take new evidence before making its determination.