Opinion ID: 1381947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Right to testify at post-conviction hearing

Text: Edwards' fifth point on appeal is that the motion court did not allow him to testify at the Rule 29.15 hearing. At the beginning of the Rule 29.15 hearing, the motion court denied Edwards' handwritten motion for a continuance based on his request for new attorneys, finding that Edwards had received excellent representation. When Mildred's testimony during the Rule 29.15 hearing conflicted with her trial testimony, Edwards interrupted to complain that she was lying. The motion court responded, Mr. Edwards, you'll have the opportunity to make your statements. At the close of the evidentiary hearing, Edwards' post-conviction counsel notified the court that they still had two depositions to take before submitting the case. The motion court entered an order permitting the depositions to be taken. The following exchange then took place: [Mr. Edwards]: Your honor, do I get to say anything on the stand or off the stand? I'd like to testify here today or some time soon, if I can. The Court: Not at this point. You'll have ample time to discuss whatever you want with your attorneys. Okay. [Mr. Edwards]: I won't be allowed to testify at all? The Court: That's not up to me to say. That's between you and your attorneys. [Mr. Edwards]: I'd like to let the Court know I would like to testify. The Court: I suggest you convey that thought to your attorneys. [Mr. Edwards]: I did and they haven't responded in six months. The Court: I'm sure they'll address that issue with you. Nearly five months after this exchange, Edwards' counsel notified the motion court that their presentation of evidence had concluded. At that time, the record was closed. Edwards relies on Rule 29.15(i), which states, At any [Rule 29.15] hearing ordered by the court the movant need not be present. The court may order that testimony of movant shall be received by deposition.... Edwards asserts that this rule provides an absolute right to testify, giving the trial court discretion only as to whether to require that testimony by deposition. The plain language of Rule 29.15(i) does not provide the movant the right to testify. Edwards contends that State v. Athanasiades, 857 S.W.2d 337 (Mo.App.1993), holds that the rule provides the absolute right to testify. In that case, the motion court granted a hearing on issues related to ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but limited the witnesses so that only trial counsel could be called. The movant had originally been listed as a potential witness. The court of appeals found that [t]he motion court abused its discretion in limiting defendant's evidence to the testimony of the attorney that defendant claimed to be ineffective. Defendant should have been permitted to present his own testimony either in person or possibly by deposition. Id. at 341. Athanasiades does not recognize the absolute right that Edwards advocates and is factually distinguishable. Here, the motion court did not restrict the witnesses that Edwards could call. The motion court also did not refuse to allow Edwards to testify. Rather, the motion court recognized that this was a matter for post-conviction counsel to work out with Edwards. A Rule 29.15 claim is a civil proceeding and is governed by the rules of civil procedure. Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Mo. banc 1992); Rule 29.15(a). Even when a hearing is granted, not all rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant at trial are extended to the Rule 29.15 hearing. There is no right to effective assistance of counsel at a Rule 29.15 hearing. Winfield v. State, 93 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Mo. banc 2002). There is no right to confrontation at a post-conviction hearing. Leisure, 828 S.W.2d at 878. Edwards does not cite any case law recognizing a constitutional right to testify at a post-conviction hearing. Whether or not to call the defendant to testify at a post-conviction hearing is a matter of trial strategy. In a post-conviction proceeding, unlike a criminal trial, the defendant's choice on this issue does not override counsel's choice. Counsel here appears to have made a strategic decision not to call Edwards to testify. The motion court did not clearly err in closing the hearing upon receiving notification from Edwards' counsel that they were done presenting evidence.