Opinion ID: 2975764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witholding of Removal and Relief under CAT

Text: This Court has jurisdiction over Sall’s appeal of the BIA’s denial of his requests for withholding of removal and relief under CAT. Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 544-52 (reviewing withholding of removal and CAT requests despite lack of jurisdiction to review timeliness of asylum application). As above, because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s decision directly. Yu, 364 F.3d at 702. An alien seeking withholding of removal must demonstrate “that there is a clear probability that he will be subject to persecution if forced to return to the country of removal.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 951 (6th Cir. 2004)). To be eligible for CAT relief, an alien must show that it is “more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). The IJ’s determination must be upheld unless “manifestly contrary to the law,” and any “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). In order to reverse a factual determination, this Court “must find that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it.” Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992). -5- No. 06-3952 Sall v. Gonzales Here, the IJ denied the withholding of removal and relief under CAT for the same reason he found that Sall would not be entitled to asylum even if his application had been timely. He found that Sall was not credible, and that he therefore had not established a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (listing factors that can be considered in reaching credibility determinations for asylum applications). Credibility determinations are considered findings of fact and are thus subject to the deferential standard of review set forth in § 1252(b)(4). Yu, 364 F.3d at 702. Although an adverse credibility finding is afforded substantial deference, the finding must be supported by specific reasons and an “adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004)).1 The IJ has stated specific reasons to support his finding that Sall’s testimony is not credible. He notes that while Sall claimed to be a farmer in Mauritania, Sall did not know the Mauritanian words for the different types of land, or which type of land his farm was. The IJ stated that it was “not possible that a farmer in Mauritania would not be aware of that unless [Sall] either . . . was not a farmer, or possibly that he was not from Mauritania.” The IJ reported that while Sall claims to have been a local leader of the U.F.D. party, Sall initially did not know the name of the party leader, 1 The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, changed the standard governing credibility determinations, stating that those determinations may be made “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” Amir, 467 F.3d at 925 n.4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). This provision, however, applies only to those aliens who applied for asylum, withholding of removal, or other relief on or after May 11, 2005, the effective date of this provision of the Act. Id. (citing Pub. L. 109-13, div. B., § 101(h)(2), 119 Stat. 231 at 305). Because Sall applied for relief in September 2003, this provision of the REAL ID Act does not apply to this Court’s review of his claims. -6- No. 06-3952 Sall v. Gonzales one of the most important political figures in Mauritania, or that the party had been banned by the government three years prior to Sall’s alleged departure from Mauritania. The IJ explained that “[i]t would be pretty hard for a Party member to not know that the Party was banned, since what was legal had suddenly become illegal, and he became subject to being arrested if he engaged in U.F.D. activities.” In addition, the IJ detailed skepticism regarding Sall’s omission of important events during early conversations with asylum officers, including information about the death of his sister, grandparents, and two uncles. The IJ pointed out a discrepancy regarding Sall’s testimony that he was shot in the eye with a rubber or plastic bullet, noting that the medical report stated that Sall had two pieces of metal in or near his eye, rather than plastic. He also recorded that Sal failed to mention that he had been shot or blinded on his asylum application or to the asylum officer, all of which led the IJ “to believe that [Sall] may have been blinded in an entirely different time.” The IJ listed reasons for finding Sall’s support documents to be false. He explained that the two letters from Sall’s mother appeared to be intended for Court use; that the first did “not read like one from a mother to her son telling him that his father was killed” and that the second letter simply “restates his asylum claim by listing all the family members that had problems.” The IJ reiterated his belief that the documents purportedly from the Mauritanian government were of questionable authenticity. On appeal, Sall asks this court to reverse the credibility determination. He argues that the inconsistencies do not go to the heart of the application and that the omission of details could be explained by cultural differences and translation difficulties. Sall argues that although the U.F.D. was banned in 2000, he only learned of the banning in 2003. He states that whether the bullet was -7- No. 06-3952 Sall v. Gonzales metal or rubber is immaterial, but that he was shot and injured due to his political activities. Finally, Sall explains that there is no inconsistency between his asylum application, his interview with the asylum officer, and his testimony. Under the substantial evidence standard, findings of fact, including credibility determinations, are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). The IJ’s determination meets this standard, as he has detailed his reasons and at least some of them go to the heart of Sall’s application, including his lack of knowledge of farming terms and details of the U.F.D. party. There is not sufficient evidence to compel a finding of credibility, which is the standard for reversal by this Court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). Because the IJ’s findings were sufficient to reject Sall’s petition under the less stringent standards for petition of asylum, the IJ’s findings were also sufficient to reject Sall’s petition based on the more exacting standards used for withholding of removal and CAT. Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “an applicant who fails to meet the statutory eligibility requirements for asylum must necessarily fail to meet the requirements for withholding of removal,” and reaching the same conclusion with respect to relief under CAT); Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 1998). -8- No. 06-3952 Sall v. Gonzales