Opinion ID: 182614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prudential Standing Doctrine

Text: We review de novo the district court's determinations regarding subject matter jurisdiction. Kane County, 562 F.3d at 1085 (10th Cir.2009); Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 571 (10th Cir.2000). For federal courts to have jurisdiction over an action, the party bringing the suit must establish standing. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004); see also Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake County, 566 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir.2009). For purposes of standing, we must assume the Plaintiffs' claim has legal validity. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir.2006) (en banc). The Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement,. . . and prudential standing which embodies `judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.' Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). To have Article III standing, [t]he plaintiff must show that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an `injury in fact' that a favorable judgment will redress. Id. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301. The prudential standing doctrine encompasses various limitations, including the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. [T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Without such limitationsclosely related to [Article] III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governancethe courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights. Id. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197. The question of prudential standing is often resolved by the nature and source of the claim. Id. Essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief. Id. In some situations, an implied right of action may exist. Id. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Moreover, Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Id. The Supreme Court has held that a federal court has jurisdiction in a suit for injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute, which by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). The Court has yet to weigh in, however, on whether the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action. Neither do we need to do so today as a court sitting en banc. It is true that our prior panel decisions have concluded that when it comes to a Supremacy Clause challenge, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the preemptive federal statute creates a private right of action. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 756 n. 13 (10th Cir.2010); Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir.2004). In Chamber of Commerce, we reasoned that even if 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit a preemption claim, the plaintiffs could proceed under the Supremacy Clause in claiming that various measures enacted by Oklahoma were preempted by federal immigration law. 594 F.3d at 756 n. 13. Nor does there appear to be any requirement that the preemptive federal statute create substantive rights in favor of a party arguing for preemption. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643-44, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002); Indep. Living Ctr., 543 F.3d at 1059-62. In Qwest, we relied upon Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth., 817 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir.1987), which distinguished between a Supremacy Clause challenge and a private right of action. The former involves a claim that the local authority lacks the power to regulate given the supremacy of federal law, while the latter seeks to enforce the substantive provisions of a federal law. Western Air Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d at 225-26. For purposes of today's holding, we as an en banc court can simply assume without deciding that the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of actionwhether one exists or not, the prudential standing doctrine still bars TWS's claims.