Opinion ID: 449688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Wrongful Death Awards

Text: 37 We next consider Mintec's contention that the jury awards to Walters' survivors under the Virgin Islands wrongful death statute, 5 V.I.C. Sec. 76, were contrary to the evidence and excessive. The jury awarded $250,000 to each of Walters' minor children and $10,000 to the estate of Walters' mother. 38 Mintec moved for a new trial before the district court, contending essentially that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the amount of the jury verdicts. In denying Mintec's motion for a new trial, the district court necessarily ruled that the awards were not contrary to the evidence. Therefore, Mintec contends, the district court a fortiori ruled that the awards were not excessive. 5 39 Our scope of review on appeal is exceedingly narrow. We may reverse the district court and grant either a new trial or a remittitur only if the verdict is 'so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience.'  Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc. CIE. Chambon, 562 F.2d 215, 226 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 767, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978) (quoting Russell v. Monongahela Railway Co., 262 F.2d 349, 352 (3d Cir.1958)). It is not enough that an award is extremely generous, Walther v. Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas, Inc., 433 F.2d 935, 936 (3d Cir.1970), or that we would have found the damages to be considerably less had that task been ours. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir.1979). Rather, we must uphold an award so long as it is rationally based. David v. Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas, Inc., 740 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.1984). With these guideliness in mind, we turn our attention to the record in this case.
40 The jury necessarily found that Royston Roy Elmington and Vivien Yvonne Ricketts were the children of the deceased, St. Claire Walters. The record indicates that the children lived with their mother in England and had not seen their father since his departure from that country in approximately 1971. The childrens' mother, Helen Ebanks, testified that Walters provided financial support for the children in the amount of $100 per month. In addition, Walters would occasionally send them clothing. The monthly payments and sporadic gifts of clothing represented the sole support and services provided by Walters. 41 The jury was instructed that the children could recover for loss of support and services during the period of their minority. 6 App. at 961. At the time of Walters' death, Vivien and Royston were ten and twelve years old respectively. Thus, the younger child was eight years from attaining her majority. The pecuniary detriment suffered collectively by the children was, at most, approximately $9600 ($100 per month for eight years), plus some additional amount representing the valu eof the clothing or other gifts which would have been provided by the decedent. 42 Since the pecuniary losses suffered by the children were relatively slight, the jury verdict was almost entirely an award for lost parental companionship and guidance and for mental pain and suffering. 7 Mintec maintains that the district court should have instructed the jury that damages for non-pecuniary losses are limited to the period of a child's minority. It did not do so. 8 We need not decide whether the Virgin Islands wrongful death statute mandates such a limitation. Even assuming that a surviving minor child may be compensated for losses suffered in adulthood, Royston Elmington and Vivien Ricketts have not presented any evidence to indicate that they are at all likely to suffer such losses in the future. 43 The record indicates that Walters wrote periodic letters to his children. However, the content of such letters was not disclosed and hence, the record is barren of any evidence that Walters provided parental instruction or guidance. Plaintiffs make much of the fact that Royston would no longer be able to participate in outings with his father. Yet it is undisputed that the children had not seen their father for many years prior to his death. Thus, Royston and his sister were denied the pleasure of parental companionship more by the fact of their geographic separation than than by their father's death. 44 Similarly, there is little evidence to establish the children's mental pain and suffering. Their mother testified that Royston had difficulty concentrating on his schoolwork following the death of his father. A psychiatrist testified that Royston would cry at the mention of his father. The only evidence relating to Vivien's mental state was a rather conclusory statement by the psychiatrist that the children hurt a lot, and ... are reacting to the loss of their father. App. at 379. Vivien herself testified that she had no memory of her father. 45 Admittedly, [e]vidence of pain and suffering is particularly ill-suited to review upon only a written record. Edynak, supra, 562 F.2d at 227 n. 16. Nevertheless, we must conclude that there is no rational basis in the present record for the amount of the jury verdicts. The only evidence presented at trial indicated that the children would collectively sustain approximately $10,000 in lost support and services. The remainder of the awards, $245,000 for each child, must therefore be attributable to lost companionship and guidance and mental pain and suffering. Given the unique circumstances of their family situation, the magnitude of these awards is indeed shocking to our judicial conscience. See id. at 226. Our review of record indicates that the children could not possibly recover for lost companionship and guidance since there was virtually no evidence that the decedent had provided such support during his lifetime. Furthermore, the evidence of present pain and suffering was, at best, minimal, and we presume that any element of damages based upon such losses would tend to dissipate over time. Hence, we must conclude that it was not reasonably certain that the children would suffer any future pain and suffering and that any award for such damages was purely speculative. 46 We therefore believe that it was not consistent with the sound exercise of discretion for the district court to deny Mintec's motion for a new trial based essentially on the excessiveness of the damages. Additionally, we feel compelled by the facts of this case to note that a district court should be alert to its responsibility to see that jury awards do not extend beyond all reasonable bounds. 47 Mintec has suggested that an appropriate award for each of the children would be in the amount of $25,000. In making this suggestion, we assume that Mintec did not intend that this amount would be further reduced by the 10 percent figure that was originally attributed to the liability of Shepard Niles. We agree that under the circumstances such an award would fairly compensate the children for the wrongful death of their father. Accordingly, we will direct the district court to order a new trial as to the children's claims unless the children elect to file a remittitur of each of their damages in excess of $25,000. 48 In the event that the children elect not to file a remittitur, we must determine the scope of the new trial that will be ordered. A limited or partial new trial may be granted when it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 515, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1931). We believe that this is an appropriate case for a partial new trial. The excessiveness of the jury verdict as to the children's claims did not in any manner implicate the jury's liability finding. See Wagner v. Reading Co., 428 F.2d 289 (3d Cir.1970) (ordering partial retrial on damages in personal injury action brought pursuant to F.E.L.A.). For this reason, we conclude that the new trial, should one be required, may be limited to the issue of the extent of damages sustained by Walters' children.
49 Finally, Mintec asserts that the award to the estate of Ethel Walters, the decedent's mother, is irrational and contrary to law. It argues that because Ethel Walters died prior to the entry of judgment she was not a survivor within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. We find this argument to be without merit. The statute explicitly defines survivors to include the parents of the deceased. More importantly, V.I.Code Ann. tit. 5, Sec. 76(h) provides that 50 [a] survivor's death before final judgment shall limit the survivor's recovery to lost support and services to the date of his death. The personal representative [of the decedent] shall pay the amount to the personal representative of the deceased survivor. 51 Mintec does not contend that Ethel Walters did not survive her son, nor does it allege that she was not financially dependent upon her son prior to his death. Finally, Mintec does not suggest that the award was otherwise excessive. Because we are satisfied that Ethel Walters was a survivor under the Virgin Islands wrongful death statute, we will uphold the award.III. 52 The judgment of the district court in favor of Royston Roy Elmington and Vivien Yvonne Ricketts will be vacated, and the case will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed in all other respects. One-tenth of the costs of this appeal shall be taxed against each of Walters' children; the remainder shall be taxed against Mintec.