Opinion ID: 2575723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Public Purpose in the Context of Eminent Domain

Text: ¶ 11 In determining whether economic development alone [11] constitutes a public purpose within the meaning of 27 O.S. § 5, as a starting point, we are guided by the longstanding general rule of strict statutory construction of eminent domain statutes. See City of Cushing v. Gillespie, 1953 OK 121, 256 P.2d 418. Further, as a general rule, we construe our state constitutional eminent domain provisions strictly in favor of the owner and against the condemning party. Stinchcomb v. Oklahoma City, 1921 OK 154, 198 P. 508, 508 (First Syllabus by the Court). Additionally, Oklahoma eminent domain statutes must conform to the restrictions placed on the exercise of such power by the Oklahoma constitutional eminent domain provisions. See Allen v. Transok Pipe Line Co., 1976 OK 53, 552 P.2d 375. Since we must strictly construe the term public purpose as set forth in the applicable eminent domain statute, we acknowledge the distinction of our construction of that term outside the context of eminent domain and specifically in the context of constitutional provisions restricting the use of public funds to expenditures for public purpose. See State ex rel. Brown v. City of Warr Acres, 1997 OK 117, ¶ 18, 946 P.2d 1140, 1144 (determining the term public purpose should not be construed `in a narrow or restrictive sense.') (citations omitted). [12] We adhere to the strict construction of eminent domain statutes in keeping with our precedent, mindful of the critical importance of the protection of individual private property rights as recognized by the framers of both the U.S. Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution. If we were to construe public purpose so broadly as to include economic development within those terms, then we would effectively abandon a basic limitation on government power by wash[ing] out any distinction between private and public use of propertyand thereby effectively delet[ing] the words `for public use' from [the constitutional provisions limiting governmental power of eminent domain.] Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2671, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In our view, the power of eminent domain should be exercised with restraint [13] and we therefore construe the term public purpose narrowly specifically in this context.