Opinion ID: 8407617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Peters ’s Rehabilitation Act claim

Text: The Rehabilitation Act provides, “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Act protects from discrimination not only those who in fact suffer from a disability, but also those who are perceived by their employers as suffering from a disability, even if the perception is incorrect. Id. § 705(20)(B); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir.1997). Peters contends she comes within the protection of the Act because she was perceived by her employer as having “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). The evidence she submitted at trial was adequate to show that her employer perceived her as suffering from a mental illness that made her suicidal and in imminent danger of taking her life with her husband’s revolver.. To determine whether her employer’s alleged perception brought Peters under the protection of the Rehabilitation Act, we must determine whether the condition she was perceived as having was an “impairment” and whether that impairment would “substantially limit” a major life activity. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). 2 “[Emotional or mental illness” is a recognized impairment under the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 32.3(b)(l)(ii). Nonetheless, the district court dismissed Peters’s case because it found that she had not made a showing that the defendants “perceived her to be incapable of working in a broad range of jobs suitable for a person of her age, experience and training.” Trial transcript at 569. We need not consider whether the district court was correct in this conclusion, because we find that Peters presented sufficient evidence of a different limitation-—one relating to her ability to care for herself. The ability to care for oneself is a major life activity recognized under the Rehabilitation Act; it “encompasses normal activities of daily living; including feeding oneself, driving, grooming, and cleaning [one’s] home.” Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir.1995)). A mental illness that impels one to suicide can be viewed as a paradigmatic instance of inability to care for oneself. It therefore constitutes a protected disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Defendants argue that Peters’s Rehabilitation Act claim must fail because the evidence establishes that she was terminated because of her poor performance, and because she falsified school records in an effort to cover up her mistakes. A review of the trial record showá, however, that there are unresolved factual disputes on these issues. The trial record does not compel a finding in the employer’s fávor. We conclude that Peters presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact. We must therefore vacate the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on Peters’s Rehabilitation Act claim.