Opinion ID: 1592017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Elizabeth Pennison

Text: The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in granting the state's cause challenge to prospective juror, Elizabeth Pennison, because her voir dire responses showed she could follow Louisiana law and consider both a life sentence and the death penalty. The record shows that Ms. Pennison was questioned in the seventh pre-qualification panel. [152] When asked her views on capital punishment, the following colloquy occurred: Prosecutor: Ms. Pennison, do you think it's the proper function of the State to have a death penalty? Ms. Pennison: Yes. Prosecutor: Do you have a problem with the State seeking the death penalty in this particular case? Ms. Pennison: No. Prosecutor: And we kind of know a little bit about what you all put [on the questionnaires]. On your questionnaire that you filled out you indicated that you opposed the death penalty. Can you explain that to me? Ms. Pennison: Okay, I thought you said if the State wants to impose the death penalty. What I mean by that is, I don't like to sentence anyone to death. I don't think I'm God to do that. Prosecutor: And I understand that's a hard decision. Ms. Pennison: Yes, it's a hard decision to make and I would rather not make it. Prosecutor: My question to you is: Could you consider imposing a death sentence in any circumstances? Are there circumstances where you can consider imposing a death penalty? Ms. Pennison: I would rather see the person go to life in prison than death. Prosecutor: Is that some believe {sic} you've had for some time? Ms. Pennison: Uh-huh (Affirmative response) Prosecutor: Based on your position on this issue, do you feel like you would be in a position to vote automatically for a life sentence because of your views? Ms. Pennison: Right. I would not vote for death. Prosecutor: So you can't think of circumstances where you would consider a death sentence? Ms. Pennison: Uh-uh (Negative response). [153] When the defense was afforded the opportunity to question the panel, trial defense counsel posed the following questions to Ms. Pennison: Defense counsel: . . . Ms. Pennison, you indicated that you would rather a life sentence if that option was available to you? Ms. Pennison: Uh-huh (Affirmative response). Defense counsel: Okay. And just to step back a few steps, the goal of what we are doing is trying to find twelve impartial and fair jurors. And that means someone who can accept Louisiana law, who can look at all of the evidence and the circumstances, and make a fair and impartial decision in this case. Okay? So just because you rather life doesn't necessarily make you unfair. The question is: Could you follow Louisiana law and consider the death penalty? Ms. Pennison: Yeah. In that case, yeah. [154] When the prosecutor asked Ms. Pennison about her inconsistent responses, she responded as follows: Prosecutor: I have just two brief questions for Ms. Pennison. Ms. Pennison, you indicated to [defense counsel] that you could consider both, but you had indicated to us, even if you did that, you would automatically vote for life. Is that your position? Ms. Pennison: Is that what I said? Prosecutor: I believe you indicated in my question to you is that you would automatically vote for a life sentence based upon your position, the way you feel about the death penalty. Ms. Pennison: I would have to hear all of the evidence before I could actually say. Prosecutor: Are there any circumstances under which you can consider imposing a death penalty? Ms. Pennison: Uh-uh (Negative response.) [155] When the trial court asked counsel for their cause challenges for this panel based on their pre-qualification responses, the state sought to remove Ms. Pennison on the basis that she would automatically vote for a life sentence. [156] The trial court granted the state's challenge, which drew an objection from defense counsel, who argued that when she questioned Ms. Pennison, she said she could consider the death penalty. [157] The trial court explained its ruling with the following observation: Yes, when anyone questioned her, she followed their questioning, their line of questioning, which indicates to the Court that she doesn't know where she is and would not be appropriate as a juror in this case. [158] The record supports the trial court's determination. Upon initial questioning, Ms. Pennison stated that, while she had no objection to the state's role in authorizing the death penalty or its imposition of this sentence, she could not personally sentence anyone to death. When subsequently asked a question by defense counsel which equated her ability to consider a death sentence with her ability to follow the law and be fair, Ms. Pennison then stated that she could consider a death sentence. Upon further questioning by the prosecutor, Ms. Pennison re-affirmed that she could not consider imposing a sentence of death. The totality of her responses shows that Ms. Pennison was not an impartial juror under La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(b) in that her attitude toward the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her from making an impartial decision as a juror in accordance with her instructions and her oath. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's granting of the state's cause challenge as to this prospective juror. Alida Martin The defendant argues that prospective juror, Alida Martin, stated she would be willing to follow the law and consider imposing both the death penalty and life imprisonment. Thus, the defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state's cause challenge as to this prospective juror. The record shows that Ms. Martin was questioned in the fifth pre-qualification panel. [159] In response to the prosecutor's questioning regarding her view of capital punishment, Ms. Martin responded as follows: Prosecutor: Okay, Ms. Martin. I think you may have indicated something similar to [another prospective juror in the panel, who believed that the death penalty was an easy way out [160] ] in your questionnaire. Is that's accurate, if you recall? I know it's been some time since y'all filled them out. Ms. Martin: Oh, it definitely has. Prosecutor: Well, let me just start off by asking you the question: do you think it's the proper function of the State to have a death penalty here in Louisiana? Ms. Martin: I would say-I don't recall how I answered, but in my right mind now, I would have to answer the question yes. Prosecutor: Okay. Understanding the procedures, I, but, do you recall, you don't recall how you answered? Ms. Martin: I don't recall because it's been, I think I got it-the day I got it I answered it. The next day and I send {sic} it off and it's been what? Three months ago, four months ago? Prosecutor: Okay. Ms. Martin: But I would say yes, should have the death penalty. Prosecutor: Okay. Do you think you could impose the death penalty in this type of case or a type of case that we're talking about? Ms. Martin: I really can't say because who am I to take someone's else {sic} life when they've done wrong. So why should I, I mean, it's almost to the point of taking someone's life would be, that had taken somebody's {sic} else, would be yes, in one way and then in another it would be no. Prosecutor: Okay. Ms. Martin: Because I feel as though you, you hurt, you hurt somebody's family and I think you to feel the pain, you need to feel the hurt that you had put upon somebody else. Prosecutor: So do you kind of lend towards like [the other prospective juror] said you would, want to see them have a hard labor sentence for the rest of their life? I think that's what you indicated in your questionnaire. Ms. Martin: Yes. Prosecutor: Okay. So we need to understand and we need to delve into that a little bit more. Are you in a position where you would automatically vote against the imposition of the death sentence and vote for a life sentence given your position? Ms. Martin: I would say so. Prosecutor: So you think you would be one to automatically vote for life because you have a problem with the death penalty? Ms. Martin: Yes. Prosecutor: Okay. And then the second question that I would like to pose to you about given your attitude toward the death penalty and, you know-we're glad that you're being honest with us, Ms. Martin-would you feel like your attitude toward the death penalty would impair you from being impartial to the State if we're in fact seeking the death penalty? Ms. Martin: No. Prosecutor: Okay. That, that-I don't really understand the answer to that question given your answer to the prior question in the sense that you indicated previously that you would probably or you would be the one inclined to automatically vote for a life sentence. Is that right? Ms. Martin: Yes, that's correct. I feel as though you should suffer. Prosecutor: Okay. Ms. Martin: For you, taking someone else's life. Prosecutor: So you would  Ms. Martin: Honestly? I think just going, being, maybe we are confusing. Just giving you an injection to die is an easy way out. Prosecutor: Okay. Ms. Martin: That's a cop-out. I think you need to sit back and think about what you done over the years and, you know, live yourself in misery. Prosecutor: So you, again, would be in a position where you'd automatically vote against the imposition of a death penalty, given those beliefs? Ms. Martin: Right. [161] When the defense questioned this panel, Ms. Martin responded as follows to the questions posed by trial defense counsel: Defense counsel: . . . You said that you would automatically vote for a life sentence. I'll ask you the same question I asked [another prospective juror in the panel], are there any circumstances at all that you think you could consider a death sentence? Ms. Martin: Depending on the situation, what the circumstances are, I probably could. For example, if it was my child or whatever, I'd probably kill that man. Defense counsel: So you could consider all of the evidence and all of the circumstances and consider it. Ms. Martin: I probably would if it would interfere with me. But, I mean, it goes back to I think one should be punished for what he's done. And I'm not going to say death is always the circumstance there to show punishment because, just `cause [you] take somebody else [`s] life, I mean what [are] you getting out of it. It's just like they're gone just like your family. I feel as though they need to suffer. Defense counsel: All right. And what I'm trying to be clear on is, are you saying that you would automatically vote for life or would you take into account all of the circumstances and everything surrounding this particular case and consider whether the penalty should be death or life? Ms. Martin: (NO RESPONSE) Defense counsel: I'm not asking you to commit that you would vote for a death penalty. I'm asking you if you could consider a death penalty. Ms. Martin: Could I consider it. It would-I would have to go back to the answer considering in the evidence. Defense counsel: Right. So you would consider the evidence and consider the penalty. Ms. Martin: Evidence-I mean then I could make a decision on it. I mean I can't, I could sit up here right now and I don't really know nothing {sic} about [the] case. Defense counsel: Right. Ms. Martin: But I really can't. It's kind of hard to say I want death. Defense counsel: Right. I mean that would be hard for anybody. I, I think [another prospective juror], you would agree a sentence of death would be difficult, right? Ms. Martin: My decision would be more to sway to life than death. Defense counsel: And I understand that. I'm just asking is that an automatic sway or is the death penalty something that you would be willing to consider based on the evidence. And I think you've said you would consider the evidence so that's saying you would consider the penalty. Ms. Martin: Right. [162] After being called in individually to ascertain if she had any knowledge of the case which would prevent her from being an impartial juror, Ms. Martin answered further questions from the prosecutor about her death penalty views: Prosecutor: We had kinda gotten a few different answers from you at one point. And I understand it's difficult to talk about this, but you indicated at one point that a life sentence would be automatic regardless of the evidence because you think it's the easy way out to give the death penalty. Is that you {sic} position? Ms. Martin: Yes, it is. Prosecutor: Okay. And then you indicated the only one circumstance where you could consider the death penalty was if somebody killed your child. Is that the only circumstance, I think that's the only circumstance  Ms. Martin: Well. Prosecutor:  you came up with. Ms. Martin: Well, I mean in other situation there'll probably be other reasons that I would consider the death penalty, but I mean, I know specifically I would consider the death penalty if something happen {sic} to one of my children. Prosecutor: Right. But we need to know the answer to this question clearly; would you consider the imposition of the death penalty in this case under any circumstances? Ms. Martin: (NO RESPONSE) Court: Could you rephrase the question in the sense adding under the circumstances of Louisiana law. Prosecutor: Okay. Prosecutor: Would you consider, could you consider the imposition of the death penalty in this case based on Louisiana law that you've been talk, that we've been talking about? Ms. Martin: After [I] heard the evidence, I mean it's possible. Possible that I could depending on once the evidence is issued to me. Prosecutor: Uh-huh (Indicating affirmatively). Ms. Martin: I mean, but it's kind of  I hate to say yes right for sure because I haven't heard the evidence. Prosecutor: Okay. So you're not sure you could even consider the death penalty in this particular case. Is that what you're saying? Ms. Martin: I mean. Prosecutor: Given your beliefs about you think it's the easy way out. Ms. Martin: Honestly, I think it's the easy way out. [163] The state subsequently challenged Ms. Martin for cause, stating as its reasons: Judge, the State would challenge for cause. She initially indicated that she thought the death penalty was an easy way out and she would always oppose the death penalty. When asked about what circumstances, under what circumstances she could consider a death sentence, she indicated if her child was taken. And in the last round of questioning she again reiterated that her vote would be automatic for life and that she could not, could not say for sure whether she would even consider a death sentence in this particular case. [164] The trial court granted the state's cause challenge, which drew an objection from trial defense counsel. [165] We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in granting the state's cause challenge. Ms. Martin's responses showed she had much more than a strong leaning in favor of life imprisonment. Her responses revealed that she would not consider a death penalty unless the victim was her child or the killing affected her personally. She did not indicate any other circumstance which would allow her to consider a sentence of death. In addition, she firmly stated her belief that a death sentence was the easy way out and implied that a death penalty would not result in sufficient suffering for a guilty defendant. In her last responses, she indicated she would not know if she could even consider a death sentence until she knew the facts and circumstances of the case. Ms. Martin's voir dire responses show that her attitude toward the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her from making an impartial decision as a juror in accordance with her instructions and her oath. La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(b). Thus, she was properly excused upon the state's cause challenge. [166] Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court did not apply the law evenhandedly in its rulings on cause challenges by the state and by the defense. The defendant complains that the trial court granted state cause challenges on the ground that the juror appeared to the court to be equivocal but denied the defense cause challenges to prospective jurors which the defense claims exhibited the same vacillation in their responses. Our review of the record fails to reveal disparate treatment on the part of the trial judge in his determination of the parties' cause challenges. Each of his rulings noted supra is supported by the record. In addition, we note the deference afforded to a trial court's first-hand observation of tone of voice, body language, facial expression, eye contact, or juror attention. This court has previously held [s]ignificantly, it is in the determination of substantial impairment that the trial judge's broad discretion plays the critical role. Lucky, XXXX-XXXX p. 7, 755 So.2d at 850. The record does not support the defendant's argument of disparate treatment.