Opinion ID: 2823186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miranda and “The Confusion Doctrine”

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to exclude any evidence obtained after he invoked his Miranda rights. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to State v. Goding, 128 N.H. 267 (1986), “a reading of the ALS form and conducting breath, blood, urine or physical tests are not interrogation for purposes of” Miranda. The court, therefore, concluded that “it was appropriate for the officer to continue with the ALS and Field Sobriety tests despite the fact that the Defendant had invoked his right to counsel.” In Goding, we addressed whether the defendant’s post-arrest, preMiranda admissions, given in response to implied consent law questioning, should have been suppressed. Goding, 128 N.H. at 273. We held that implied consent law questioning is not “interrogation,” which must be preceded by Miranda warnings, and that “voluntary admissions, comments, or explanations spoken in response to implied consent law questioning are admissible as evidence in criminal trials.” Id. at 274; see also State v. Lescard, 128 N.H. 495, 496-97 (1986). The defendant argues that Goding is distinguishable because, in that case, the defendant was questioned about submitting to breathalyzer and blood alcohol testing before he had been advised of his Miranda rights, see Goding, 128 N.H. at 269, while in this case, the defendant was questioned about submitting to testing after he had been advised of, and had invoked, his Miranda rights. This distinction is immaterial. As we recognized in Goding, in the context of an arrest for driving under the influence, “a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.” Id. at 274 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Geasley, 619 N.E.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“Police instructions on a state’s implied consent law do not fall within [the] definition of ‘interrogation.’”); State v. Blouin, 716 A.2d 826, 829-30 (Vt. 1998). This is so because instructing a suspect about the state’s implied consent law involves a process that is “highly regulated by State law, and is presented in virtually the 7 same words to all suspects.” Goding, 128 N.H. at 274. “It is similar to a police request to submit to fingerprinting or photography.” Id. (quotation omitted). A police inquiry about whether a suspect will submit to testing in this context does not become “interrogation” merely because the inquiry is made after the suspect has been advised of, and has invoked, his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that it was proper for the officer to continue with the ALS and field sobriety tests despite the fact that the defendant had invoked his Miranda rights. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 604-05 (1990) (finding no interrogation for Miranda purposes when officer provided defendant with relevant information about breathalyzer test and implied consent law and asked defendant whether he understood the information and wished to submit to test, notwithstanding that defendant responded by commenting on his state of inebriation). The defendant maintains, however, that we should adopt the “confusion doctrine,” and find that the officer induced confusion by failing to explain to the defendant precisely why he was under arrest and that Miranda rights do not apply to implied consent procedures. Some “jurisdictions apply the ‘confusion doctrine’ to situations in which a defendant might be misled by the interplay between Miranda rights and the lack of right to counsel under implied consent laws.” State v. Reitter, 595 N.W.2d 646, 654 (Wis. 1999); see also State v. Colosimo, No. 13-1066, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 946, at  (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014) (noting that “confusion doctrine” is “recognized in a minority of states”). “Under the ‘confusion doctrine,’ a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test will be excused if the defendant believed he or she had the right to invoke counsel before taking the test.” Reitter, 595 N.W.2d at 654; see also Kurecka v. State, 67 So. 3d 1052, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that, under “confusion doctrine,” “a licensee’s refusal to submit to a breath test will be excused if, due to a prior administration of the Miranda warnings, the licensee believes that he or she had the right to consult with counsel prior to taking a breath test” (quotation and brackets omitted)). “A defendant’s access to the ‘confusion doctrine,’ however, is premised on a reading of Miranda rights and a showing that the defendant actually was ‘confused.’” Reitter, 595 N.W.2d at 654. Thus, [s]ome jurisdictions have held that when a motorist is confused by the two warnings concerning assistance of counsel — one warning (Miranda) according the assistance of counsel, the other (breath test refusal) not according assistance of counsel — and then refuses to take the breath test in the mistaken belief that the refusal is privileged, the motorist should not suffer the consequences of confusion and not be penalized for the refusal. State v. Leavitt, 527 A.2d 403, 406 (N.J. 1987) (citing cases); see also Kurecka, 67 So. 3d at 1056-57. 8 Here, the defendant did not refuse to submit to either the field sobriety tests or the breath test. Nor does he allege that he was confused as to his entitlement to counsel before taking the tests. This is not the situation that the “confusion doctrine” contemplates. See Kurecka, 67 So. 3d at 1056-57; Leavitt, 527 A.2d at 406; Reitter, 595 N.W.2d at 654. We, therefore, decline the defendant’s invitation to adopt the “confusion doctrine.” See Colosimo, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 946, at -21 (declining to recognize the “confusion doctrine” and upholding trial court’s ruling that there was “no evidence in the record that the Defendant specifically was confused” (quotation omitted)); Leavitt, 527 A.2d at 408 (concluding that “confusion doctrine” could not be asserted by defendant because defendant “was not confused with respect to the exercise of his rights”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the State to admit the ALS form and the ensuing test results. Nonetheless, although we decline to adopt the “confusion doctrine” under the circumstances of this case, we note that to avoid potential confusion, it would be better for officers to simply advise suspects that they do not have the right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to consent to testing because the right to consult with an attorney before giving any oral or written statement does not apply in the ALS context. See Leavitt, 527 A.2d at 407; see also Reitter, 595 N.W.2d at 655 (“[W]e see no harm in allowing the officer to state briefly that the right to counsel does not attach to the implied consent setting.”). Therefore, we encourage the legislature and the New Hampshire Department of Safety to consider whether to include a provision in the ALS form advising suspects that there is no right to speak with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to the requested ALS tests. See McKenna v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 72 A.3d 294, 296 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 79 (Pa. 2013); see also Leavitt, 527 A.2d at 407-08.