Opinion ID: 1117027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mississippi's Position

Text: In the early consortium case, Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., this Court noted that [t]here is practically an unbroken line of authority to the effect that an adjudication unfavorable to the [husband] in an action for personal injuries is no bar to an action by the [wife] for loss of ... consortium arising out of the same injuries. 213 Miss. 611, 620, 57 So.2d 476, 476 (1952). Nearly four decades later, this Court seemed to be moving away from the antiquated Palmer position. In the consortium case of Choctaw v. Wichner , this Court cited with approval the Arkansas Supreme Court's long-standing position: [O]ur neighbor Arkansas... reasoned that the husband's right to such damages for loss of consortium was derivative, and that it was only logical that since the husband's cause of action was derivative he could have no better standing in court than his wife had.  521 So.2d 878, 881 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added). This Court now follows Choctaw's lead [3] and adopts the American Law Institute's (ALI) recommended approach: (1) When a loss resulting from injury to a person may be recovered by either the injured person or another person [ e.g., for loss of consortium]: (a) A judgment for or against the injured party has preclusive effects on any such other person's claim for the loss to the same extent as upon the injured person. (b) A judgment for or against any such other person precludes recovery by or on behalf of the injured person of any loss that could have been recovered in the first action. (2) When a person with a family relationship to one suffering personal injury has a claim for loss to himself resulting from the injury, the determination of issues in an action by the injured person to recover for his injuries is preclusive against the family member, unless the judgment was based on a defense that is unavailable against the family member in the second action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (1982). The ALI explains that, by declaring that the supplemental (consortium) claim should stand or fall with the injured person's claim, its approach promotes the purposes of the collateral-estoppel doctrine. See id. comment a, at 32; id. Reporter's Note, at 32-33. Notably, the ALI concedes that its approach is second-best and that the matter is better dealt with by rules of compulsory joinder. [4] See MISS.R.CIV.P. 20 (providing for permissive joinder of parties). With all the foregoing in mind, collateral estoppel must be applied cautiously on a ad hoc basis in order to preserve the critical component of due process  i.e., the requirement that every party have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate an issue. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 & comment (1982). More specifically, the facts of each case should be perused in order to determine whether the issue  of which a party seeks to collaterally estop relitigation  was fully and fairly tried in the personal-injury action.