Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Governing Principles

Text: 132 As regards the first source of claimed prejudice, the tenuous connection between the Ellsberg-Fielding break-in and the Watergate cover-up, we find evidence introduced at the instant trial which could well have allowed the jury to find a definite link between the two events. It could be concluded from the Hunt Memorandum, Tr. 7554-58, and the payment of money thereafter that concealing responsibility for the Ellsberg break-in was part of the motivation for the payment of money to those involved in Watergate. 151 The desire on the part of appellants to conceal the Ellsberg break-in was clearly indicative of a motive to conceal the identities of higher-ups involved in the Watergate break-in as charged in Count 1, paragraph 11 of the indictment 152 because some of those who participated in the former operation were also in the latter and any reasonable person would suspect that if the names of the participants in either venture were discovered, such fact might lead investigators to the identities of those persons participating in the planning, execution, or concealment of the other crime. 133 Evidence of the Ellsberg-Fielding break-in also casts light upon the meaning of Hunt's threat to reveal the seamy things he had done for the White House if he were not paid certain sums of money. This incident came about during Hunt's conversation with co-conspirator Colson, which was generally referred to in Overt Act 22 of the indictment. 134 In addition, the evidence of Ehrlichman's connection to the Ellsberg break-in was also probative on the issue of whether he had consistently urged full disclosure about Watergate as he contended. 153 Thus, far from requiring the jury to reach highly speculative inferential and deductive conclusions, Ehrlichman br. at 46, the Ellsberg-Fielding break-in evidence was tied directly to the Watergate cover-up by the statements and defenses which were placed before the jury of the co-conspirators themselves. 135 Second, Ehrlichman asserts that the prosecution presented an  avalanche of evidence concerning the Ellsberg operation which in effect resulted in his retrial and reconviction on the Ellsberg charges. 154 We find such allegations to be a very substantial overstatement of the record. Actually the testimony concerning the Ellsberg matter was rather limited. It was confined to two Government witnesses, Hunt and Krogh. Hunt answered only four questions which referred to the surreptitious entry at Dr. Fielding's office, and at no time mentioned Ehrlichman. Krogh's direct testimony was relatively minimal, Tr. 7653-7681, with only a part referring to the Special Investigations Unit and the Ellsberg matter. Furthermore, the testimony only went to Ehrlichman's connection with the event and did not concern Ehrlichman's conviction of a crime in connection therewith. 155 It is also noteworthy that appellants did not request a limiting instruction and objected to the court giving the cautionary instruction suggested by the Government. Tr. 7745-7747, 7847, 7863-7870. See 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 216 (3d ed. 1940). 136 Third, we find no impropriety in the introduction and reading of the August 11 memorandum from Krogh to Ehrlichman to the jury. Tr. 7668-7672. Given that there was evidence linking the Ellsberg-Fielding break-in to the Watergate cover-up, it was certainly appropriate to introduce the one piece of documentary evidence which clearly tied Ehrlichman, who was accused of the cover-up, to the California break-in. It is exactly because the memorandum went to the very heart of the Government's (Ellsberg break-in) case and was one of the principal instruments employed to bring about Mr. Ehrlichman's conviction, Ehrlichman br. at 53, that its use was so apposite. The alternative would have been the use of more speculative and less probative evidence which would undoubtedly have prejudiced appellants far more. 137 Finally, we reject the argument that our holding in Bailey,supra, was violated. 156 Here, unlike Bailey, both the court and the defendants were warned in advance by Count 1, paragraph 13 of the indictment and paragraph B(1) of the Bill of Particulars 157 and the Government's Trial Memorandum 158 that this evidence would be offered. In fact, prior to the opening statement, Ehrlichman did object on double jeopardy grounds to the use of the Ellsberg break-in evidence, and this objection was denied. 159 Moreover, even if reference in the opening statement to the evidence would be held to be improper, the error would be harmless here because, as we have observed above, in this case the evidence was admissible. (L)ater government efforts to introduce evidence of the prior offenses were not unavailing in this case. Bailey, supra, 164 U.S.App.D.C. at 313, 505 F.2d at 420. No harm was thus done to appellants by its inclusion in the opening remarks, even if Bailey could be read to bar such mention. 138 We therefore conclude that the probative value of the Ellsberg-Fielding break-in evidence far outweighed its prejudicial effect, 160 and we hold that evidence of Ehrlichman's relation to that venture was properly admitted into evidence. 139