Opinion ID: 1224606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Excluding Evidence of Furukawa's Emotional Distress.

Text: Furukawa further claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of his emotional distress. The trial court held that the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute, HRS § 386-5 (1993), [6] barred Furukawa from making a claim for emotional distress under either HRS § 368-17 (1993) [7] or HRS § 378-5 (1993). [8] In Ross, this court assumed, for the sake of argument, that HRS § 368-17(a) permits a court to award compensatory and punitive damages in civil actions brought under Part I of HRS Chapter 378. 76 Hawai`i at 463, 879 P.2d at 1046. That question is now squarely presented. The Commission provides the mechanism for enforcement of discrimination law in Hawai`i. See HRS Chapter 368; HRS § 378-4 (Supp.1996). As a remedial statute designed to enforce civil rights protections and remedy the effects of discrimination, Chapter 368 should be liberally construed in order to accomplish that purpose. See, e.g., Flores v. United Air Lines, 70 Haw. 1, 757 P.2d 641 (1988). Section 368-17 provides in part: (a) The remedies ordered by the commission or the court under this chapter may include compensatory and punitive damages and legal and equitable relief, including, but not limited to: ... (8) Payment to the complainant of damages for an injury or loss caused by a violation of ... part I of chapter 378[.] (b) Section 386-5 notwithstanding, a workers' compensation claim or remedy does not bar relief on claims filed with the commission. (Emphases added.) See also HRS § 368-3(5) (1993) (The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: ... (5) To order appropriate legal and equitable relief[.]). The Commission and the courts clearly have the power to award compensatory damages, including damages for emotional distress, pursuant to these statutes. The workers' compensation law covers employees who suffer personal injury either by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment or by disease proximately caused by or resulting from the nature of the employment[.] HRS § 386-3 (Supp.1996). [9] Section 386-5 provides that the rights and remedies made available under the workers' compensation statute shall exclude all other liability of the employer to the employee ... on account of the injury[.] See supra note 6. Faced with the interpretation of this provision to bar civil actions premised on sexual harassment or sexual assault in the employment context, see, e.g., Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Hawai`i), 634 F.Supp. 684 (D.Haw.1986), the legislature amended the exclusivity provision in 1992 to exclude such actions from its coverage, adding the following language to HRS § 386-5: except for sexual harassment or sexual assault ... in which case a civil action may also be brought. The legislative history provides no support for the argument that this change was intended to affect the scope of remedies under Chapter 378. See Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 21, in 1992 House Journal, at 678-80, 799 (The purpose of this bill is to amend Chapters 378 and 386 ... to enable employees to file civil actions premised on sexual harassment or sexual assault arising out of and in the course of employment.). The Society and amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce assert that this specific exclusion mandates that all other physical and emotional damages resulting from work-related injuries and accidents are barred by the workers' compensation scheme. Furukawa and his amici, the Commission and the National Employment Lawyers Association, counter that such a reading would render HRS § 368-17 meaningless. We agree with the Society that the workers' compensation scheme serves to bar a civil action for physical and emotional damages resulting from work-related injuries and accidents. However, Furukawa's claims are not based on any such accident, but rather on the alleged intentional conduct of members of the Society. Cf. Wharton v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 80 Hawai`i 120, 123 n. 2, 906 P.2d 127, 130 n. 2 (1995) (affirming denial of workers compensation stress claim because injury arose out of worker's suspension for misconduct, but noting that [i]f an employer's actions constitute unlawful discrimination..., an injured employee may invoke rights in other forums. See, e.g., HRS §§ 378-2 and 378-32.). Most states recognize that all or virtually all intentionally tortious acts committed by an employer against an employee in the course of employment are excluded from the workers' compensation system. Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 701, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 21, 872 P.2d 559, 562 (1994); see also Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 315, 318 (Alaska 1989); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.1996). Compensatory and punitive damages are generally available in employment discrimination cases, as remedies from a court or an agency, or both. Larson, 6 Employment Discrimination § 114.08 (1996). Furukawa properly filed his discrimination complaint with the commission within 180 days, pursuant to HRS § 368-11(c). As provided for under HRS § 368-12 (1993), [10] Furukawa requested and received a Notice of Dismissal and Right to Sue from the commission. Furukawa then brought his complaint in circuit court. The law is explicit that a workers' compensation claim or remedy does not bar relief on claims filed with the commission. HRS § 368-17(b). The Commission points out that the 1992 amendment was responding to concerns that victims of sexual harassment were often so traumatized by the occurrence that they might fail to file with the commission within 180 days. The legislature at the same time added HRS § 378-3(10), which excepts victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault from having to file discrimination complaints with the commission under HRS § 378-4. Because the exemption in HRS § 368-17(b) would no longer apply to these cases, as no complaint would have been filed with the commission, the legislature amended HRS § 386-5 to make clear that such claims were not barred by the workers' compensation law. It would indeed be an awkward result to interpret the amendment to HRS § 386-5 to have effected a repeal of the provision it sought to implement. Furthermore, when the legislature passed the 1992 amendment to the workers' compensation exclusivity exemption, it did not repeal HRS § 368-17(b). To rule that the 1992 amendment effectively bars compensatory and punitive damages for all discrimination complaints filed with the commission would serve implicitly to repeal that section. Repeals by implication are disfavored. International Savings & Loan, Ltd. v. Wiig, 82 Hawai`i 197, 200, 921 P.2d 117, 120 (1996).