Opinion ID: 1838958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Decision to mechanize as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.

Text: Whether or not the decision to mechanize is a mandatory bargaining subject is clearly an issue of law. There are standards which govern the scope of the court's review of an agency's conclusions of law. In view of the importance and newness of the issue at bar, it is appropriate to reiterate the reviewing standards before considering the merits. In Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm. (1969), 43 Wis. 2d 596, 600, 601, 168 N. W. 2d 809, the topic was summarized as follows: In Pabst v. Department of Taxation (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 313, 120 N. W. 2d 77, 5 A. L. R. 3d 594, this court pointed out that there are two methods of reviewing an administrative agency's application of a statute to certain facts. The first method is the analytical approach whereby the court decides which part of the agency's determination presents a question of fact and which part a question of law. The second method is the practical or policy approach which avoids allocating labels of `fact' or `law' to the agency's determinations. When the practical approach is used, judicial review is exhausted if there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body. `We believe that pars. (b) and (d) of sec. 227.20 (1), Stats., require Wisconsin courts to employ the analytical approach when reviewing agency decisions. Nevertheless, in fields in which an agency has particular competence or expertise, the courts should not substitute their judgment for the agency's application of a particular statute to the found facts if a rational basis exists in law for the agency's interpretation and it does not conflict with the statute's legislative history, prior decisions of this court, or constitutional prohibitions.' Pabst v. Department of Taxation, supra, at pages 323 and 324. There can be no doubt that the question presented in this case is one of `law.' In decisions even more recent than the Pabst Case, this court has further discussed its obligation in reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of questions of law. `The supreme court is not bound by an administrative agency's construction of a statute....' National Amusement Co. v. Department of Revenue (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 261, 274, 163 N. W. 2d 625. See also: Johnson v. Chemical Supply Co. (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 194, 156 N. W. 2d 455. However, `... the construction and interpretation of a statute adopted by the administrative agency charged with the duty of applying the law is entitled to great weight....' Cook v. Industrial Comm. (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 232, 240, 142 N. W. 2d 827. See also: National Amusement Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra ; Chevrolet Division, General Motors Corporation v. Industrial Comm. (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 481, 143 N. W. 2d 532. This court does not independently redetermine every conclusion of law made by an administrative agency. `... If several rules, or several applications of a rule are equally consistent with the purpose of the statute, the court will accept the agency's formulation and application of the standard.' Milwaukee Transformer Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1964), 22 Wis. 2d 502, 510, 126 N. W. 2d 6. The WERC's conclusion that respondent was required to bargain about its decision before it made its decision cannot be sustained if respondent had no duty to bargain about its decision at any time. In early Nineteenth century England a group of workingmen, known as the Luddites, attempted to prevent the use of mechanical labor-saving devices by destroying them. Since that time, as technology has marched unyieldingly forward, there have been numerous clashes over the idea of replacing men with machines. In view of this, it is quite remarkable that there appears to be no case on the point of issue disputed in the case at bar. In deciding what should or should not be included in mandatory bargaining the court must weigh the relative value of two very significant but conflicting public policies. On the one hand, it is necessary to preserve the freedom of private enterprise to manage its business as it sees fit. At the same time though the court is bound to effectuate the purposes of the Employment Peace Act. The act declares that industrial peace, regular and adequate income for employees and uninterrupted production of goods and services are goals to be achieved in employment relations. Sec. 111.01 (2), Stats. The WERC states that the issue is whether the decision affects terms and conditions of employment. We think that this is not an accurate statement. Any management decision may affect terms and conditions of employment. Not all management decisions are bargainable. In Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board (1964), 379 U. S. 203, 85 Sup. Ct. 398, 13 L. Ed. 2d 233, a leading case in the field, the employer decided it could effect a cost savings by contracting out the maintenance work being performed by its own union employees. The court held, at page 209, that: ... on the facts of this case, the `contracting out' of the work previously performed by members of an existing bargaining unit is a subject about which the National Labor Relations Act requires employers and the representatives of their employees to bargain collectively. ... (Emphasis supplied.) The court pointedly limited its decision to the facts of the case.