Opinion ID: 780729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of the Natales' Medical Malpractice Claim

Text: 8 We review de novo the dismissal of the Natales' New Jersey malpractice claim. Island Insteel Sys. Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir.2002). The Natales argue that because the issue of negligence in this case was one that could be resolved from the jury's common knowledge without expert testimony, there was no need for an affidavit of merit, citing to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's recent decision in Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 774 A.2d 495, 499-500 (2001) (holding that no affidavit of merit need be filed in common knowledge malpractice cases). 9 A successful malpractice claim requires a plaintiff to show, inter alia, that a duty of care existed and that the defendant breached that duty. 3 Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371, 374 (1985). In the typical malpractice case, the duty of care, or the standard of practice to which the defendant-practitioner failed to adhere[,] must be established by expert testimony. Id. (quoting Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625, 628 (1961)). But where the jurors' common knowledge as lay persons is sufficient to enable them, using ordinary understanding and experience, to determine a defendant's negligence without the benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts, Estate of Chin v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., 160 N.J. 454, 734 A.2d 778, 785 (1999), the jury itself is allowed `to supply the applicable standard of care and thus to obviate the necessity for expert testimony relative thereto.' Rosenberg, 492 A.2d at 374 (quoting Sanzari, 167 A.2d at 632). The factual predicate for a common knowledge case is one where `the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience.' Estate of Chin, 734 A.2d at 785-86 (quoting Rosenberg, 492 A.2d at 375). 10 The New Jersey legislature enacted the affidavit of merit statute as part of a tort reform package designed to strike a fair balance between preserving a person's right to sue and controlling nuisance suits. Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 774 A.2d 501, 505 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute requires the plaintiff in a malpractice action to file an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person [stating] that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27. The penalty for not following the statute is severe: absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances, the failure to file the affidavit within sixty days of the filing of the answer shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of action. § 2A:53A-29. This requirement curtail[s] frivolous litigation without preventing access to the courts for meritorious claims. Palanque, 774 A.2d at 505. 11 Where, however, common knowledge makes apparent a claim's merit, an expert's affidavit is unnecessary. Hubbard, 774 A.2d at 499-500. In these cases, the threshold of merit should be readily apparent from a reading of the plaintiff's complaint ... [and] an expert is no more qualified to attest to the merits of a plaintiff's claim than a non-expert. Id. at 500. The District Court concluded that in this case the crucial issue is whether defendant failed to timely administer medication to Mr. Natale, an insulin-dependent diabetic, and that [t]he acceptable professional standard for treating an insulin-dependent diabetic is not within a lay person's common knowledge such that PHS's negligence can be determined without the benefit of the specialized knowledge of experts. 12 We disagree. A reasonable jury could conclude that PHS personnel were negligent absent expert testimony. PHS personnel failed to call Natale's treating physician to determine how often he needed insulin to be administered. They didn't even ask Natale. When defendant's careless acts are quite obvious, Palanque, 774 A.2d at 506, no affidavit of merit is required. While laypersons are unlikely to know how often insulin-dependent diabetics need insulin, common sense — the judgment imparted by human experience — would tell a layperson that medical personnel charged with caring for an insulin-dependent diabetic should determine how often the diabetic needs insulin. No special expertise or expert testimony is needed to show, at the outset of a case, that the claim is not frivolous. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard supports this view; thus no affidavit of merit need be filed. The District Court's decision to dismiss the Natales' malpractice claim for failure to file such an affidavit was therefore erroneous, and we reverse.