Opinion ID: 2827110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lack of a Causal Nexus Between the

Text: Plaintiffs’ Claims and a Federal Officer’s Directions VSE contends that removal was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) because there was a causal nexus between the work it performed at the direction of the United States and the plaintiffs’ claims. VSE maintains that the United States contractually delegated authority to VSE and that there was a causal connection between VSE’s performance of federal duties and the plaintiffs’ claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1):
is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”). CABALCE V. VSE CORP. 17 Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue. “[T]he federal officer removal statute authorizes removal of a civil action brought against any person acting under an officer of the United States for or relating to any act under color of such office.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation, footnote reference, and internal quotation marks omitted). “To invoke the statute, [VSE] must show that (1) it is a person within the meaning of the statute, (2) a causal nexus exists between plaintiffs’ claims and the actions [VSE] took pursuant to a federal officer’s direction, and (3) it has a colorable federal defense to plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). VSE faces a steep hurdle in demonstrating the requisite causal nexus between the plaintiffs’ claims and a federal officer’s direction because VSE did not challenge the district court’s factual findings supporting its dismissal of VSE’s third-party complaint against the United States.2 As the Supreme Court has articulated: The relevant relationship is that of a private person “acting under” a federal “officer” or “agency.” In this context, the word “under” must refer to what has been described as a relationship that involves “acting in a certain capacity, considered in relation to one holding a superior position or office.” That 2 VSE’s counsel represented before the district court that he would not “argue with the law of the case” concerning the district court’s prior finding that VSE did not act at the direction of the federal government. 18 CABALCE V. VSE CORP. relationship typically involves “subjection, guidance, or control.”. . . Watson v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 151 (2007) (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). In dismissing VSE’s third-party complaint, the district court determined that “[n]either the Complaints nor the Third-Party Complaints allege (and the record contains no such evidence) that any government employee or agency controlled or substantially supervised the day-to-day destruction of the fireworks. . . .” The district court also concluded that “[t]he record is undisputed that Donaldson . . . prepared the destruction plan for VSE, and that VSE obtained government approval only after Donaldson obtained the necessary permit. VSE and Donaldson provided the government with detailed safety parameters as part of the plan, not the other way around. . . .” Thus, a significant flaw in VSE’s argument that the federal government directed its work is the lack of any evidence of the requisite federal control or supervision over the handling of the seized fireworks. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1122 (articulating that the party invoking federal officer removal “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the colorable federal defense and causal nexus requirements for removal jurisdiction have been met”) (citation and footnote reference omitted); see also Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005) (“With a 12(b)(1) motion, a court may weigh the evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction. . . .”) (citation omitted). The record is bereft of any factual support for VSE’s assertion that its conduct was causally connected to the federal government’s “subjection, guidance, or control.” Watson, 551 U.S. at 151. Notably missing is any evidence reflecting that Donaldson and VSE operated under federal supervision CABALCE V. VSE CORP. 19 or control in developing the destruction plan itself. Rather, “[t]he government was relying on the expertise of [VSE] and not vice versa.” In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008), as amended. VSE also relies extensively on its contractual duties to handle, store, and destroy the seized fireworks. However, the contract defines VSE’s duties in handling hazardous and dangerous materials in general terms and VSE points to no contractual provisions or specifications from a federal officer relevant to its destruction of the seized fireworks. Moreover, VSE’s reliance on contractual generalities to shield it from liability completely excises provisions establishing the nature of VSE’s contractual relationship with the federal government. In particular, the contract unambiguously provides: The Contractor is an Independent Contractor and shall obtain all necessary insurance to protect Project Personnel from liability arising out of the Contract. The Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify and hold the Government and its employees harmless in connection with any loss or liability from damage to or destruction of property, or from injuries to or death of persons (including the agents and employees of both parties) if such damage, destruction, injury, or death arises out of, or is caused by, performance of work under the Contract, unless such damage, destruction, injury, or death is caused solely by the active negligence of the Government or its employees. The Contractor agrees to include this clause, appropriately modified, in all 20 CABALCE V. VSE CORP. subcontracts to be performed under the Contract. The contract provides with respect to safety precautions that: The Contractor shall be responsible for all damages to persons or property that occurs as a result of its, its subcontractors, or any of its or its or its [sic] subcontractor’s employee’s fault or negligence. The Contractor shall take proper safety and health precautions to protect the work, the workers, the public and property of others. The Contractor shall also be responsible for all materials delivered and work performed until completion and acceptance of the service. VSE’s parsing of the contract in an attempt to support federal officer removal is unavailing. Fundamentally, VSE challenges the district court’s reliance on VSE’s status as an independent contractor. Independent contractors may be afforded the benefits of federal officer removal in theory, see Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505 (1988), and the district court’s analysis was not inconsistent with that theory. Rather than holding that VSE was precluded as a matter of law from seeking federal officer removal as an independent contractor, the district court considered VSE’s independent contractor status as a component of its analysis that VSE could not demonstrate the requisite causal nexus for federal officer removal. In particular, the district court referenced VSE’s independent contractor status, other contract provisions, and Donaldson’s and VSE’s independent development of the CABALCE V. VSE CORP. 21 destruction plan, to support its conclusion that “VSE and Donaldson were not acting under direct orders or comprehensive and detailed regulations of the government.” Cabalce, 922 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Given the paucity of evidence presented by VSE, the district court determined that VSE, as an independent contractor, simply could not “exclude the possibility that the removed action was based on acts or conduct of VSE not justified by VSE’s federal duty.” Id. at 1123 (citation and alteration omitted). The district court concluded that acts “occurr[ing] under the general auspices of federal direction” were not acts of a government agency or official. Id. at 1122–23. This conclusion was not erroneous.3 3 VSE contends that the district court in Anchorage v. Integrated Concepts & Research Corp., No. 3:13-cv-00063-SLG, 2013 WL 6118485 (D. Alaska 2013) rejected the Cabalce district court’s holding that an independent contractor is not eligible for federal officer removal. However, the district court in Integrated Concepts merely observed that “whether a federal contractor is termed an independent contractor is not dispositive of section 1442 removal. The focus for this inquiry is instead whether the contractor assisted or helped the government, and performed duties that the government would otherwise have to perform. . . .” Id. at  (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed, the district court in Cabalce did not simply label VSE an independent contractor and conclude that VSE was thereby barred from seeking federal officer removal. Instead, the district court considered VSE’s independent contractor status, particularly given VSE’s contract-based assertions, as one component of its analysis; and VSE’s failure to proffer any evidence that it operated under the federal government’s guidance, control, and supervision as another component of its analysis. See Cabalce, 922 F.Supp.2d at 1122–23. Moreover, the district court in Integrated Concepts distinguished Cabalce on the basis that, unlike in Integrated Concepts, the government did not exercise extensive day-to-day control over the contractors in Cabalce. See Integrated Concepts, 2013 WL 6118485, at . 22 CABALCE V. VSE CORP. Finally, VSE faults the district court for not following its prior decision in Leite v. Crane Co., 868 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D. Haw. 2012), which we recently affirmed. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1124. However, as reflected in our decision, Leite is entirely distinguishable from the present appeal. The defendant in Leite, a military contractor, was sued for failing to warn about asbestos in military equipment. The contractor demonstrated that federal officer removal was warranted by producing extensive evidence of federal control, including “detailed specifications governing the form and content of all warnings that equipment manufacturers were required to provide, both on the equipment itself and in accompanying technical manuals.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1123 (emphasis added). Additionally, “the Navy was directly involved in preparing the manuals, which included safety information about equipment operation . . . [E]quipment manufacturers could not include warnings beyond those specifically required and approved by the Navy, and . . . the Navy’s specifications did not require equipment manufacturers to include warnings about asbestos hazards. . . .” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast to the persuasive showing by the Defendant in Leite, VSE failed to provide any evidence of federal control or supervision over the planned destruction of the fireworks. If anything, Leite bolsters our conclusion that VSE did not meet its “burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the colorable federal defense and causal nexus requirements for removal jurisdiction have been met.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1122 (citation and footnote reference omitted).4 4 VSE’s reliance on Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076 (6th Cir. 2010) and Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008) is misplaced. Unlike VSE, the defendants in Bennett and Isaacson amply demonstrated the requisite federal supervision, control, and direction. In Bennett, a case involving mold remediation firms hired by the Federal CABALCE V. VSE CORP. 23