Opinion ID: 1430387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: relation back of the amendment adding nabors

Text: Civil Rule 15(c) [8] provides that an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading so that amendments are not barred by a statute of limitations. When the amendment adds a claim, the rule provides that the claim must have arisen out of the same transaction as the original pleading. When the amendment changes a party against whom a claim is asserted, the rule is more restrictive. It provides that, within the period provided by law for commencing the action, the party to be added have such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits. This court has not yet directly decided a case where a plaintiff seeks to add a party defendant. Jakoski v. Holland, 520 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1974), held it proper to add an additional party plaintiff after the limitations period if the defendant would have known of the underlying facts of the transaction. But as noted in McCracken v. Davis, 560 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1977), this is a different situation from adding a defendant. We stated in McCracken that [w]hile the defendant may have been aware of a law suit, he was not necessarily documenting evidence for his defense, nor had he hired counsel to represent him since he was not a party to the action. Nothing in the Jakoski case supports the appellant's interpretation, which would in effect allow unqualified joinder limited only by a showing of party prejudice. 560 P.2d at 777. Despite allowing liberal additions of claims, the federal courts have interpreted the federal analog to Civil Rule 15(c) restrictively when a plaintiff has sought to add a new defendant. In Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987, 90 S.Ct. 483, 24 L.Ed.2d 451 (1969), the court held that action as used in Rule 15(c) means a lawsuit and not the incident giving rise to a lawsuit. [9] Under this interpretation, any knowledge that Nabors may have had concerning Adkins' injury is irrelevant. Adkins must prove that Nabors actually knew of his suit against Standard prior to the limitations period. Adkins filed suit on July 20, 1977. The limitations period expired on August 9, 1977. In order for the amendment to relate back, Nabors must have learned of the lawsuit during this twenty-day period. Nabors submitted the affidavit of James Taylor, its president, which stated that Nabors had no knowledge of the lawsuit commenced against Standard. Adkins' contention that the affidavit of Taylor is not truthful because of a purported conflict between his affidavit and the affidavit of Norton Goff is without merit, as Goff had prior information about Adkins' injury and not of the lawsuit. Likewise, Adkins' contention that Nabors had constructive notice of the lawsuit based on the form drilling contract signed by Nabors and Standard is without merit. Although the contract may have obligated Nabors to insure Standard, there is no evidence to suggest that Standard ever actually attempted to force Nabors to defend the claim, or even notified Nabors that an action was pending until well after the running of the statute of limitations. To imply notice in these circumstances does not have any legal or factual basis. Finally, Adkins' contention that notice to Nabors may be found under the Identity of Interest Doctrine is meritless. Federal cases under Civil Rule 15(c) have recognized an exception to the notice requirement where there is an especially close relation between two parties. Where such a relationship exists, a court may find that notice to one party serves as notice to the other. Typically, the identity of interest doctrine has been used between an old corporation and its successor, a subsidiary and its parent, or two subsidiaries with a common parent. In these circumstances there is likely to be an overlap of officers and directors so that in fact the same people would be notified despite a different corporate name. [10] The relationship between two contracting parties such as Nabors and Standard is far too remote to support the doctrine.