Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror F.M.

Text: When questioned by the trial court, Juror F.M. affirmed his ability to vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if, based on all the facts, it was the appropriate penalty. He could also vote for the death penalty. When questioned by cocounsel for the defense, Donnalee Huffman, however, Juror F.M. stated that if a person's life is taken and he is found guilty, then he should be sentenced to death. When asked whether every murder conviction should be given the death penalty, Juror F.M. replied, Well, I think so, yes, murder conviction, yes. He admitted he was death penalty prone and that he believed the death penalty was the proper punishment in almost every situation. He also stated, however, that he could consider sympathy and mercy and that to vote for a life sentence, he would look for mitigating factors such as medical and psychiatric testimony. He several times averred he would have to hear the evidence from the entire case before making up his mind. Mr. Shumaker explained to the juror the penalty phase process, including the necessity of weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence, and asked him whether, [i]f the Court tells you that that's the law and the instruction you are to follow in this case, do you feel that you could do that? He replied, Yes, life without parole, yes. He also affirmed that he could judge both sides of the issue by the same standard. As with Juror B.M, the record indicates that although Juror F.M. initially asserted that he would automatically vote for the death penalty, he modified his view when informed by the prosecutor of the penalty phase process. He then affirmed his willingness and ability to follow the trial court's instructions to weigh all the evidence before coming to a penalty decision. We cannot say the trial court's decision to credit these statements was made in the absence of substantial evidence, or that its decision to deny the challenge for cause was an abuse of discretion. In the alternative, defendant argues the trial court's erroneous denial of his two challenges for cause forced him to excuse Jurors B.M. and F.M. by exercising two of his peremptory challenges, thereby infringing on his federal constitutional right to a state-created liberty interest in his full statutory complement of peremptory challenges. He claims he should not be forced to surrender one constitutional right (his asserted state-created liberty interest in a full complement of peremptory challenges) to vindicate another constitutional right (his right to a jury free from biased jurors). We rejected this argument in People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1248, footnote 4, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251, [4] and defendant does not convince us we should reconsider that decision. We conclude defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal, and that even if the issue were properly before us, he does not demonstrate the trial court abused its wide discretion when it denied his challenge to Jurors B.M. and F.M. for cause. Moreover, because neither prospective juror actually sat on defendant's jury, he was not deprived of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. ( Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80.)