Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consultation Between the Attorney General's Office and the District Attorney's Office Following the Recusal

Text: (21) Defendant argues that the trial court erred by modifying the recusal order to permit consultation and assistance by the district attorney's office to the Attorney General's office. Briefly, these modifications permitted (1) the district attorney's office to provide clerical and logistical support to the Attorney General, and (2) the Attorney General to consult with Robert Hickok (Hickok), the deputy district attorney who prosecuted the case prior to the recusal. The court specifically prohibited any direct participation by Hickok in the trial and any communication concerning the case between Hickok and Massini. We find no grounds upon which defendant would be entitled to relief. The decision to recuse the Mendocino County District Attorney's Office is not challenged on appeal. That decision is governed by section 1424 and requires a showing that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. The issue on appeal is limited to the effect of continuing contacts between the district attorney's office and the Attorney General's office following recusal. We conclude that the recusal was not undermined by the modifications to the order. While defendant has not specified any purported harm flowing from the continuing contacts between the district attorney's office and the Attorney General's office, we assume that his objections are premised upon the possibility that confidential information was made known to the prosecution. We find no support for such a claim. First, the modifications to the protective order incorporated safeguards protecting defendant's confidential information. The first two modifications to the recusal order provided for consultation with Hickok to end prior to the time that Massini was scheduled to assume her new office. The order as finally modified incorporated an ethical wall around Massini for purposes of this case by prohibiting Massini from discussing the case with Hickok and limiting the areas of consultation between Hickok and the Attorney General to events that occurred prior to Massini's election. These safeguards were sufficient to protect defendant's interests in the confidentiality of the communications between defendant and Massini. (See People v. Hernandez (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 674, 680 [286 Cal. Rptr. 652]; People v. Lopez (1984) 155 Cal. App.3d 813, 827 [202 Cal. Rptr. 333].) Second, no support exists for an inference that Massini actually violated the court's orders by breaching her ethical duties to defendant. Defendant acknowledged, by virtue of his stipulation to the recusal order as finally modified, that Massini would not violate her professional obligations by revealing his confidences or strategy or otherwise cooperating in his prosecution. (Cf. People v. Chadwick (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 108, 116 [164 Cal. Rptr. 864].) The trial judge, who knew both Massini and Hickok, expressed his confidence in their professional integrity and ethical judgment. That assessment, made from a vantage point close to the circumstances and people involved, is entitled to our deference. ( People v. Lopez, supra, 155 Cal. App.3d at p. 827, citing People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149 [193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5].)