Opinion ID: 4531835
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A lessor of land is subject to liability for a

Text: nuisance caused by an activity carried on upon the land while the lease continues and the lessor continues as owner, if the lessor would be liable if he had carried on the activity himself, and
the activity or knows or has reason to know that it will be carried on, and
necessarily involve or is causing the nuisance. 6 Restatement 2d of Torts § 356 comment (a) provides: When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the lease as equivalent to a sale of land for the term of the lease. The lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time being the owner and occupier, subject to all of the liabilities of one in possession, both to those who enter the land and to those outside of it . . . . [I]t is the general rule that the lessor is not liable to the lessee, or to others on the land, even though such injuries resulted from a dangerous condition existing at the time of the transfer. 5  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  could only be held liable for nuisance on its leased land if it possessed the land when the nuisance occurred or (1) would be liable if it carried on the alleged nuisance; (2) consented to such activity; and (3) knew that such activity would “necessarily result in” the nuisance. Chung Partners argued that although Hawai‘i case law was silent on applying Restatement § 837, “ample case law” from other jurisdictions supported its application.7 And, citing Hao v. Campbell Estate, 76 Hawai‘i 77, 869 P.2d 216 (1994), Chung Partners argued that Hawai‘i cases had recognized Restatement § 356’s general rule that “landowner[s were] not liable for injuries occurring after a lessee takes possession of the land.” Chung Partners submitted a declaration of one of its principals, Sung Hun Chung, stating that Chung Partners did not know that Allied allowed people to reside in storage units, and 7 Chung cited to the following cases for support: City of Los Angeles v. Star Sand & Gravel Co., 12 P.2d 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932) (holding that owner of premises leased for purpose attainable without creating nuisance was held not liable for creation of nuisance without owner’s knowledge or notice); Silverman v. Unsen, 147 A. 421 (Me. 1929) (holding that lessor of shooting gallery was not liable to third person for injury resulting from lessee’s negligence); Meloy v City of Santa Monica, 12 P.2d 1072 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932) (holding that in order to charge landlord with liability, nuisance must necessarily result from tenant’s ordinary use of premises, or from purposes for which premises were let); Wasilewski v. McGuire Art Shop, 187 A. 530 (N.J. 1936) (holding that landlord renting entire store premises to tenant who undertook to make repairs was not liable for pedestrian’s injury when caused by tenant’s negligence); Midland Oil Co. v. Thigpen, 4 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1924) (holding that a tenant, not a landlord, will be “owner” so far as negligent injuries to third parties are concerned). 6  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  furthermore, that Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to even allege such information. Accordingly, Chung Partners concluded that it could not be held liable for public nuisance. Chung Partners next argued that, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, it had no “duty not to maintain” a nuisance on Allied’s property. Chung Partners explained that under Hawai‘i case law, “courts are reluctant to impose a duty on owners and occupiers of land to protect others against the criminal act[s] of third parties.” And, because Hawai‘i follows Restatement § 315,8 only a “special relationship” between Chung Partners and Plaintiffs could require Chung Partners to protect them from harm by Haas. In the instant case, Chung Partners argued, there was no special relationship between it and Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Chung Partners concluded that it could not have been required to control Haas’ conduct. 8 Restatement § 315 provides: There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless: (a) A special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) A special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection. 7  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  In Chung Partners’ second Motion for Summary Judgment, it noted that Restatement § 821B construed public nuisances as unreasonable conduct of a certain nature.9 Second, Chung Partners pointed out that in Littleton v. State, 66 Haw. 55, 67, 656 P.2d 1336, 1344-45 (1982), this court held that for behavior to be a public nuisance, the act or use of the property at issue must have been in a public place or somewhere the public frequently congregated. Chung Partners further maintained that people could not be nuisances; only their unreasonable conduct could be a nuisance if it interfered with a common right. And even if Allied created a nuisance, it did not create an unreasonable interference with any right common to the general public or to 9 Restatement § 821B provides: (1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.