Opinion ID: 1401421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: montane's issues on cross-appeal

Text: Montane asserts that it was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1) because, according to Montane, the Binghams pleaded $25,000 or less. The district judge held that attorney fees were not properly awarded under this section because the Binghams pled an amount over the minimal jurisdictional limit of the court as compensation for damages incurred. Idaho Code § 12-120(1) states in pertinent part that: Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in any action where the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees. In Pancoast v. Indian Cove Irrigation District, 121 Idaho 984, 985, 829 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1992), this Court held that fees were not appropriately awarded under I.C. § 12-120(1) where the amount pleaded was an amount in excess of $10,000. We stated that the statute does not authorize a trial court to award attorney fees unless the amount pleaded is $25,000 or less and despite the fact that proof submitted at trial was for damages of less than $25,000, the statute did not authorize the substitution of `the amount proved' for `the amount pleaded.' Id. This Court noted that other statutes enacted by the legislature demonstrate that the legislature understands the meaning of the words pleaded and plead in the procedural sense in which I.C. § 12-120(1) refers to `the amount pleaded.' Id. We declined to construe the statute to refer to something different from what the legislature specified. Id. In this case, the Binghams pled an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court and clearly did not plead $25,000 or less. Thus, the district judge properly denied fees to Montane under I.C. § 12-120(1).
Montane asserts for the first time on appeal a right to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(2) based on the counterclaim for attorney fees included in its amended answer. However, Montane made no argument below in its briefing or at the hearing for attorney fees under subsection two of I.C. § 12-120; rather, Montane argued in its Memorandum of Costs for an award under I.C. § 12-120(1), 12-120(3) and 12-121. On appeal, this Court cannot consider issues which were not raised before the district court. Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46, 49, 867 P.2d 920, 923 (1993). It is not sufficient that Montane made a claim for attorney fees based on I.C. § 12-120 generally because the various subsections of that statute require different showings. The district judge had no opportunity to consider whether I.C. § 12-120(2) applied to this case and the Binghams had no opportunity to present arguments against the award. As such, we decline to address Montane's claim on appeal.
Montane contends that the district judge erred in denying it attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). The district judge determined in ruling on the motion that the Binghams' action was to challenge the validity of the loggers' lien and to quiet title and that there was no contractual or commercial relationship between the parties although there may have been between Montane and the Binghams['] predecessors, the Green[es]. The district judge then noted that the transaction between Montane and the Greenes was not the gravamen of the Binghams' action. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) states in pertinent part that: In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. A court is not required to award reasonable attorney fees every time a commercial transaction is connected with a case. Ervin Construction Co., v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993). The critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. Id. Here, while Montane's original contractual arrangement with the Greenes and the Jacobsens may have been characterized as a commercial transaction, the gravamen of the Binghams' lawsuit did not involve a commercial transaction. Rather, the thrust of the Binghams' lawsuit was that title to the logs and real property should be quieted in them because the loggers' lien Montane obtained against the logs was invalid. At no point were Montane and the Binghams involved in a commercial transaction, nor was that the basis for the complaint filed by the Binghams. Accordingly, the district judge properly denied attorney fees to Montane under I.C. § 12-120(3) and we affirm the judge's decision in that respect.
Montane argues that the district judge abused his discretion in denying attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121. In ruling on Montane's claim for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121, the district judge held that: Montane is not entitled to [a]ttorney fees under I.C. 12-121 because its claim was not frivolous.... While this suit was eventually settled on summary judgment, this Court denied a motion to dismiss. Further, it appears that there was a dispute settled as to whether the logger's lien attached to the real property. Thus, this Court finds that some of the Binghams' claims were not frivolous. Attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Moreover, [a]ttorney fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e) unless all claims brought ... are frivolous and without foundation. Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 119 Idaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d 487, 491 (1991). The decision whether to award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will only be reversed where there is an abuse of discretion. Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 664, 962 P.2d 1041, 1048 (1998). In reviewing an exercise of discretion, this Court must consider (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). There is no question that the district judge perceived the issue as one of discretion. In addition, the district judge correctly set out and applied the standard for an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121, thus acting within the outer boundaries of his discretion. Last, the district judge reached his decision by an exercise of reason illustrated by his determination that not all of the Binghams' claims were frivolous because he had denied a motion to dismiss earlier in the case and because Montane and the Binghams had settled a dispute during the proceedings regarding whether the loggers' lien attached to the real property. In sum, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Montane's request for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and the decision is therefore affirmed.