Opinion ID: 2569537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Dismiss a Prospective Juror for Cause

Text: A juror may be challenged for cause when the juror's state of mind with reference to the case or any of the parties to the case is such that the court determines there is doubt that the juror can act impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party. A trial judge's ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Heath, 264 Kan. 557, Syl. ¶ 16, 957 P.2d 449 (1998). Doyle contends that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to strike for cause one prospective juror whom defense counsel passed for cause. During voir dire, the following exchange took place between Mr. Anderson, the defense counsel, and the panel: [Mr. Anderson:] Are there any persons on the panel that believe thatthe best way to describe it would be, Where there is smoke there must be fire,' in other words, somebody has been charged so she or he must somehow be guilty of something? Are there any persons that believe that? MR. NUNNICK: Yes, sir. .... MR. ANDERSON: Would you please tell me a little about that. MR. NUNNICK: I believe the defendant was caught red-handed, from what I read, you know. He was in the residence. THE COURT: Wait just a moment. I don't think that is responsive to the question. Do you remember me earlier talking about being circumspect if you express an opinion about what you've read? MR. NUNNICK: Okay. THE COURT: Are you saying that you've formed that opinion and it is going to affect your ability to keep an open mind? MR. NUNNICK: Not necessarily, Your Honor. What I know is what I've read in the paper, you know, like everybody has probably read on this case. THE COURT: I think that that is really the basis of the question, what you read in the paper is not fact. MR. NUNNICK: Well THE COURT: I'm not going to get into a debate about it. I'm simply saying that is what he is asking, if you can deal with the facts, not the opinions or the statements in the paper. I think at least you were aiming towards that area. MR. ANDERSON: That was kind of what I was hoping to get, but I think that I got something different than that. That is a pretty strong statement. He has indicated, I think, a fairly strong belief at this point in time. Do you believe, simply, Mr. Doyle is guilty based upon what you read? MR. NUNNICK: No, not at all. MR. ANDERSON: I asked if you thought thatwho might think, `Where there is smoke there is fire,' and you raised your hand, and I asked you to tell me about that. Can you expound a little more? MR. NUNNICK: I don't know exactly how to put this. You said, Do I have a preconceived notion? Just from what I've read in the media. However, the way that you stated it, you said, I can't remember the term that you used, `But if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck ....' MR. ANDERSON: `Where there is smoke there is fire'? MR. NUNNICK: Right. MR. ANDERSON: Yeah. MR. NUNNICK: From whatI don't want to say this again, but from what I've read, I don't want to put too much credence on that, but it seems to me that there is so much in the paper, intimate details that, I don't have a preconceived notion, but it is in the back of my head. I'm trying to be honest MR. ANDERSON: Yes, sir. MR. NUNNICK:and it couldn't possibly be to where I could hold up the proceeding by my beliefs, but I MR. ANDERSON: I appreciate your honesty. MR. NUNNICK: That's just it. I don't want to make it sound like I believe that the man is guilty or not, but, you know, you do have kind of a preconceived notion after reading some of the press coverage. The defense attorney challenged prospective juror Nunnick for cause, and the trial court refused to strike the juror for cause. The defense attorney then struck the juror with a peremptory strike. On appeal, Doyle argues that the trial court had a duty to insure a fair panel regardless of whether he could use one of his peremptory challenges to remove Mr. Nunnick from the panel, and the failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. The failure to excuse a juror for cause does not constitute a ground for reversal unless the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Peremptory challenges are means to achieve the end of an impartial jury, and so long as the jury that ultimately sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Heath, 264 Kan. 557, Syl. ¶ 17. Doyle does not cite any actual prejudice resulting from the failure to excuse the juror for cause. This issue is without merit.