Opinion ID: 204153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Derivative Works

Text: The Copyright Act also grants artists the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). A derivative work is defined as one based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, fictionalization, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. 17 U.S.C. § 101. A derivative work includes any work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship. Id. Büchel brought two claims based on this provision, asserting that MASS MoCA created unauthorized derivative works based on the installation itself and on the work's models and plans. The district court ruled that, [e]ven assuming that the stumbling, and eventually abandoned, process of collaboration during 2006 produced an original work of art subject to copyright protection, which is highly doubtful, clearly no `derivative' work of art was created by MASS MoCA's attempt (however flawed) to play its part in this process. 565 F.Supp.2d at 261. It further rejected Büchel's argument that, by placing tarpaulins over the unfinished installation, the Museum created a separate, unauthorized derivative work. Id. On appeal, Büchel summarily argues that what the Museum displayed in Building 5, both with and without the yellow tarpaulins, recast or transformed the work that he had originally set out in his plans and left behind in December 2006, thus creating derivative works under the Copyright Act. [25] In response, MASS MoCA again argues that its staff was following Büchel's instructions when working on Training Ground in his absence, and that the Museum therefore was merely executing Büchel's vision rather than exercising its own artistic judgment to create a new, derivative artwork. A derivative work within the meaning of the Copyright Act consists of a contribution of original material to a pre-existing work so as to recast, transform or adapt the pre-existing work, and the variation from the original must be sufficient to render the derivative work distinguishable from its prior work in any meaningful manner. Nimmer, supra, § 3.03[A]; see also Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 520-21 (7th Cir.2009); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 990 (2d Cir.1995). As we have held, Büchel's contention that his work was modified without his permission and to his detriment gives rise to a right-of-integrity claim under VARA. Every modification of a work of art does not, however, result in the creation of a derivative work. In Büchel's 52-page opening brief, there is one paragraph that purports to analyze the derivative work claim, and that paragraph itself is largely descriptive rather than analytical. Büchel cites no cases and does not explain how the modified Training Ground was sufficiently original and distinctive within the meaning of the Copyright Act to qualify as a derivative work. His reply brief adds another paragraph, citing cases, but he again asserts in summary fashion that the modifications resulted in a derivative work. He states that the degree of creativity needed for a derivative work is minimal, but does not explain how the Museum's alterations create a new work that, as a whole, meets the Copyright Act's originality requirement. The law applicable to derivative work claims, particularly as it intersects with VARA's protection for works of visual art, is complex. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir.1997); Henry Hansmann, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. Legal Stud. 95, 114-116 (1997). Büchel's undeveloped argument is so perfunctory that we deem the claim waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (stating that, on appeal, issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived).