Opinion ID: 2378787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: any controversy as to arbitrability is moot

Text: In their reply brief, the appellants retreated from their initial claim that the chancellor was in error in directing the parties to arbitrate and conceded that the provisions of the contract between the parties encompassed the matter in dispute in the instant case. [5] Appellants' remaining contention concerning arbitrability (a claim which they repeated in oral argument) was that the only agreement to arbitrate is set forth in paragraph 24 of the contract between Maietta and Security. In oral argument, appellees' counsel insisted that paragraph 16 of the same contract would have to be taken into account by the arbitrators. Section 16 covers situations that arise if the subcontractor refuses or neglects to supply sufficient skilled workmen or materials of proper quality, or becomes insolvent or refuses to follow plans or specifications or fails in any respect to comply with the terms of the contract. However, at oral argument, counsel for Maietta and Security both agreed that the interpretation of paragraph 16, like any of the other provisions of the contract, is a matter for the arbitrators in the first instance. Their belated agreement concerning the authority of the arbitrators is in accord with the rule in Maryland and in other jurisdictions. Nelley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 224 Md. 1, 166 A.2d 234 (1960); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep't., Inc. v. Button & Goode, Inc., 242 Md. 509, 516, 219 A.2d 801 (1966); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). Thus, it appears that the parties now agree that (1) the dispute between them is subject to arbitration, and (2) that all of the provisions of the contract, including paragraph 16, are covered by the arbitration clause and constitute matters which lie initially within the competence of the arbitrators to interpret and decide. The case then is moot. It is axiomatic that appellate courts do not sit for the purpose of giving opinions on moot questions and an appeal which, like this one, presents nothing else for decision must be dismissed as a matter of course. Potts v. Governor of Maryland, 255 Md. 445, 449, 258 A.2d 180 (1969); State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18 (1967). Despite all this, during oral argument both sides urged that we expressly advise the chancellor that the arbitration authorized by paragraph 24 of the contract includes the interpretation of paragraph 16 of the same contract. As we have indicated, that proposition is clear and now not disputed by either side. If the parties need further assistance in clarifying the obvious, they can direct their concerns to the chancellor. We are confident, however, that if such an unnecessary inquiry were put to him, the trial judge would reassure the parties, as we have attempted to do, that the interpretation of all of the provisions of the contract between Maietta and Security, including paragraph 16, is a function which falls within the initial jurisdiction of the arbitrators pursuant to the agreement between the parties.