Opinion ID: 223516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Counts 3 through 9

Text: Walker contends that the district court erred in dismissing Counts 3 through 9. First, he maintains that the court incorrectly concluded that his state-law claims (Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9) were time-barred. Walker asserts that, under Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576, 584-85 (Mo.2006) (en banc), the statute of limitations does not accrue at the moment of the technical wrong but from the time that substantial injury has occurred and is capable of ascertainment. In other words, he contends that the issue depends on whether the plaintiff's damages  not the wrongful act itself  were objectively capable of ascertainment. According to Walker, this inquiry is fact intensive and should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss, especially here, where Walker argues that he assimilated the abuse as something else and could not ascertain his damages until shortly before he filed the lawsuit. Second, Walker contends that the court incorrectly concluded that his federal claims, under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts 5 and 6), were time-barred. He asserts that the statute of limitations for these claims should be governed by the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations, which, according to him, is the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.046. Under this statute, for the reasons Walker argues infra, in Part II.B, he maintains that his claims were timely. Alternatively, even under the shorter limitations period provided by Missouri Revised Statutes § 516.120.4, he argues that his damages were not capable of ascertainment until shortly before he filed this lawsuit. We review de novo the district court's dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). O'Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 503 (8th Cir.2009). In reviewing a dismissal, [w]e accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, but the allegations must supply sufficient `facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss, [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Bar by a statute of limitation is typically an affirmative defense, which the defendant must plead and prove. Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 713 n. 2 (8th Cir.2008). A defendant does not render a complaint defective by pleading an affirmative defense. Id. Thus, [a]s a general rule, `the possible existence of a statute of limitations defense is not ordinarily a ground for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal unless the complaint itself establishes the defense.' Joyce v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, 635 F.3d 364, 367 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Jessie, 516 F.3d at 713 n. 2). We apply Missouri law to Walker's state-law claims, which the district court accepted under supplemental jurisdiction. Rau v. Roberts, 640 F.3d 324, 327-28 (8th Cir.2011). When construing Missouri law, we are bound by the decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court regarding issues of substantive state law. Bockelman v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 403 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir.2005). If the Missouri Supreme Court has not spoken on an issue, we may consider opinions from the Missouri Court of Appeals as particularly relevant and must follow them when those opinions provide the best evidence of Missouri law. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
The five-year statute of limitations contained in Missouri Revised Statutes § 516.120(4) applies to Walker's state-law claims for breach of a fiduciary/confidential relationship, negligent failure to supervise children, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and premises liability. [3] A claim governed by this statute of limitations accrues not when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.100. If the cause of action accrues before the plaintiff reaches the age of 21, however, the statute of limitations is automatically tolled until the plaintiff turns 21. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.170. In Powel, the Missouri Supreme Court described the capable of ascertainment test as objective. 197 S.W.3d at 584. The court explained an injury is objectively capable of ascertainment when a reasonable person would have been put on notice that an injury and substantial damages may have occurred and would have undertaken to ascertain the extent of the damages. Id. Powel also recognized that, in cases involving sexual abuse, the capable of ascertainment standard has special application to cases of repressed memory  of the sexually abusive conduct. Id. (emphasis added). In cases involving sexual abuse since Powel, however, Missouri courts have held that, absent repressed memory of the sexually abusive conduct, an injury was objectively capable of ascertainment, as a matter of law, at the time of the abusive conduct itself. In State ex rel. Marianist Province of U.S. v. Ross, the plaintiff admit[ted] that he remembers, and has always remembered, that ... [the defendant] had Plaintiff hyperventilate to the point of unconsciousness, asked Plaintiff to strip to his underwear, blindfolded him, and held a knife to his throat. 258 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Mo.2008) (en banc). As a result, the Missouri Supreme Court held that [e]ven though Plaintiff alleges he did not remember the sexual details of these incidents, the conduct that he always remembered was sufficient to `place a reasonably prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury.' Id. (quoting Powel, 197 S.W.3d at 584). Similarly, in Dempsey v. Johnston, the plaintiff alleged that he had been a victim of two incidents of sexual abuse, involving masturbation and oral sex. 299 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Mo. Ct.App.2009). The plaintiff conceded that he always remembered the abuse and knew it was wrong but argued that he did not know [until sometime later that] he had suffered substantial injuries as a result. Id. at 706. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that, absent an allegation of repressed memory, Plaintiff's memories of the sexual abuse were sufficient to place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry notice of a potentially actionable injury. Id. at 706-07. Here, Barrett's sexually abusive conduct, as alleged in Walker's complaint, was sufficient to place a reasonably prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury at the time the abuse occurred. As in Marianist Province and Dempsey, Walker has not alleged, or even argued, that he repressed the memories of Barrett's abuse. In fact, Walker has never disputed that he has always remembered the abusive conduct, which included fellatio, forced fellatio, fondling[,] and masturbation. Admittedly, the alleged abuse is not as extreme or violent as the abuse in Marianist Province, 258 S.W.3d at 811, nor has Walker explicitly conceded that he always understood the abuse to be wrong, as in Dempsey, 299 S.W.3d at 706. Nonetheless, his complaint alleges  forced fellatio (emphasis added), which implies some degree of involuntariness, or even resistance, on Walker's part. This, in turn, implies that Walker, like the plaintiff in Dempsey, understood Barrett's abuse to be wrong at the time it occurred. In other words, the sexually abusive conduct, namely the forced fellatio, was sufficient to place a reasonably prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury at the time it occurred. Nevertheless, Walker argues that his injuries were not capable of ascertainment because he had assimilated the abuse as something else, thereby preventing him from understanding the wrongfulness of the abusive conduct. Powel notes that the capable of ascertainment standard has special application to cases of repressed memory. 197 S.W.3d at 584. To date, no Missouri case has stated that the capable-of-ascertainment standard also has special application in cases where the plaintiff argues that he has assimilated the abuse. In essence, Walker asks this court, interpreting Missouri law, to recognize a new exception to Missouri's objective capable-of-ascertainment standard. We decline to do so. Instead, we hold that under Marianist Province and Dempsey, Barrett's abusive conduct was sufficient to place a reasonably prudent person on notice of potentially actionable injury at the time it occurred. Accordingly, Walker's complaint establishes that his cause of action accrued in 1992, when he was 15 years old. The statute of limitations was tolled until Walker's 21 st birthday, on November 22, 1998. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.170. Beginning from that date, Walker had five years  until November 22, 2003  to file his complaint. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.100. He did not file the present action until 2008. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 were time-barred.
Walker's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX are also time-barred. Neither § 1983 nor Title IX contains its own statute of limitation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims accruing within a particular state should be governed by that state's statute of limitations governing personal-injury claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 379-80, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004). Similarly, this court has held that Title IX claims are also governed by the state's personal injury statute of limitations. Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 617-18 (8th Cir.1995). Missouri imposes a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120.4 (governing an action for ... any other injury to the person or rights of another). Thus, for the same reason Walker's state-law claims are time-barred by § 516.120.4, Walker's claims under § 1983 and Title IX are also time-barred.