Opinion ID: 746455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scheme to Defraud Federal Government of Contracts

Text: 13 The main theory of the prosecution is that the professor defendants provided each student defendant with written materials and help from FWG employees so that the student could complete his or her thesis or dissertation, and therefore receive an advanced degree, through significant plagiarism and with a minimum of effort. In return for this benefit, the student defendant would abuse his or her position with the government in order to secure for FWG, and through it the professor defendants, lucrative government research contracts, or modifications of contracts. By pursuing this scheme, the professor defendants obtained property from the federal government which they otherwise would not have received, and the student defendants obtained advanced degrees from the University of Tennessee without having done the necessary work. 14 The government argues that defendants repeatedly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the mail fraud statute, by pursuing this degrees-for-contracts scheme. Section 1341 provides: 15 Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, ... or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 16 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 17 Counts Two through Seven, Nine through Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, and Sixteen in the Superseding Indictment rested on the degrees-for-contracts scheme. Although the indictment charged Frost and Turner with all of these counts, it charged Congo only with Counts Two through Seven, Potter with Counts Nine through Twelve, and Faulkner with Counts Thirteen, Fourteen, and Sixteen. 18 Ultimately, the prosecution relies upon the following general evidentiary theory. In 1985, Dan Berlinrut, an engineer for the Air Force and a Ph.D candidate under Frost from 1983 to 1986, discussed with Frost his proposed dissertation topic. Frost, copying verbatim large portions of Berlinrut's dissertation, turned the topic into a proposal for a contract with the Air Force. The Air Force rejected the proposal. Frost thereafter instructed Berlinrut to call Turner, who told Berlinrut that he should award FWG a contract on his dissertation topic when he got to his next duty station. Turner also told Berlinrut that Frost would then write [his] dissertation guaranteeing it would be accepted, and that this was done all the time at NASA, and it is OK. Rather than accepting this invitation, Berlinrut instead reported this incident to the authorities. He eventually failed to graduate. 19 The government contends that, several years later, the student defendants, who were both students at UTSI and government employees, cheated with the help of Frost and Turner on their thesis or dissertation. Further, each student defendant had an alleged role in the award or modification of a government contract to FWG. Accordingly, the government argues, we may infer that defendants entered into the same kind of agreement which Turner unsuccessfully proposed to Berlinrut, acting with the intent to defraud the government of its property. 20 Every defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting these convictions. When determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we decide whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Ellerbee, 73 F.3d 105, 107 (6th Cir.1996)(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). Further, circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict, id. at n. 2 (quoting United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984)), and we will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Oldfield, 859 F.2d 392, 399 (6th Cir.1988). 21 A conviction for mail fraud requires proof of the following three elements: 22 (1) devising or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts); 23 (2) involving a use of the mails; and 24 (3) for the purpose of executing the scheme or attempting to do so. 25 Id. at 400. A defendant does not commit mail fraud unless he possesses the specific intent to deceive or defraud, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 119, 121-22 (6th Cir.1994); a scheme to defraud must involve '[i]ntentional fraud, consisting in deception intentionally practiced to induce another to part with property or to surrender some legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed.'  American Eagle Credit Corp. v. Gaskins, 920 F.2d 352, 353 (6th Cir.1990)(quoting Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir.1984)(quoting Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 765 (6th Cir.1949)))(emphasis deleted). 26 A defendant may commit mail fraud even if he personally has not used the mails. See United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir.1994). A mail fraud conviction requires only a showing that the defendant acted with knowledge that use of the mails would follow in the ordinary course of business, or that a reasonable person would have foreseen use of the mails. See Oldfield, 859 F.2d at 400. Accordingly, the government does not have to show that the defendant actually intended to cause the mails to be used. See id. Further, [t]he mailings may be innocent or even legally necessary. Id. (quoting United States v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir.1986)). In sum, the 'mailing need only be closely related to the scheme and reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's actions.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 760 (1st Cir.1987)). 27 We agree with defendants that there is insufficient evidence to uphold the counts that rest upon an alleged scheme to defraud the federal government of property in the form of contract awards. These convictions therefore differ from other mail fraud convictions in this case which, although also relating to allegations of academic impropriety, instead charge that defendants defrauded either the University of Tennessee of the honest services of its employees Frost and Turner, or the federal government of tuition money provided to the student defendants. Further, these convictions do not rest upon an allegation that defendants deprived either the public of its intangible right to the honest services of its public servants, or the government of its intangible right to the honest services of its employees. See infra Section II.C (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1346). Although each defendant happened to be a state or federal government employee, these convictions depend upon a showing that defendants intended to defraud the government, as a business entity, of a property right.
28 In 1986, Faulkner began to work as a civilian electronics engineer at CROSSBOW, an office within the Department of the Army and located at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. His responsibilities included acting as a Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) for various government contracts. As a COTR, Faulkner helped to identify the need for contractor assistance, select a qualified contractor, review estimates, monitor performance quality and timeliness, and review progress in relation to expenditures. As a COTR with the Army, he did not control contract money. 29 Faulkner enrolled in UTSI in the spring of 1987 and selected Frost as his major professor. In the middle of 1987, he began the process of writing a dissertation of the topic of False Targeting Effects of Turbulent Eddies in Millimeter Frequencies. After almost two years of effort, Faulkner completed an initial draft of the dissertation. In August or September of 1989, however, he discovered that his dissertation was relying upon classified data. After consultations with Frost and a government official, Faulkner later learned that, because the University of Tennessee had a policy prohibiting classified projects for advanced degrees, he had to select a new topic and begin working on another dissertation. 30 On November 30, 1987, Joe Durham, the immediate supervisor of Faulkner at CROSSBOW, responded to a proposal from FWG by issuing a letter indicating that CROSSBOW intended to contract with FWG to analyze classified threat simulator radar systems. This proposed contract eventually would become the Miscellaneous Defense Activities (MDA) contract. Although Faulkner did not select FWG for the contract or participate in the negotiations process, he did prepare sometime in 1988 a memorandum which justified the granting of a sole-source, as opposed to a bid or competitive, contract to FWG. Within the memorandum, Faulkner referred to an informal market survey which he had conducted earlier that year. Faulkner stated in the memorandum that defense contractors other than FWG were unsuitable to perform the MDA contract because they would not sign a hardware waiver. It is undisputed that formal or written market surveys were not required for government contracts worth under a million dollars, such as the MDA contract. Further, Durham testified that competitive defense contracts may pose security risks because they involve the exposure of classified information, and that CROSSBOW did not maintain a single competitive contract during his tenure as a supervisor from 1985 to 1993. 31 On January 31, 1989, CROSSBOW issued a sole-source letter contract providing that FWG would perform the MDA contract from the date of the letter until July, 1990 in return for $937,248. Faulkner acted as the COTR for the MDA contract during this time. 32 In the fall of 1989, and shortly after Faulkner learned that he could not complete his first dissertation topic, Frost gave Faulkner three unpublished reports completed by FWG in the mid-1980s and instructed him to produce a new dissertation by combining them. Faulkner completed a rough draft of his new dissertation in early 1990, and a final draft in mid-March of 1990. Faulkner sent copies of the final draft to Frost and the other four members of the academic committee before which Faulkner would defend his dissertation. During his oral defense in late March of 1990, Faulkner told the committee that his topic was substantially related to his previous topic and was based upon three FWG studies in which Frost had participated. After Faulkner made the changes suggested by committee members, the committee approved his dissertation and he graduated with a doctor in philosophy degree. 33 The government introduced evidence that at least ninety-two percent of Faulkner's second dissertation was plagiarized from the three FWG reports given to him by Frost, and from a conference paper presented by Frost. Although many pages, including the conclusion, represented verbatim excerpts from the FWG reports, they did not contain quotation marks or any citations to the reports. 34 Frost gave the dissertation to his secretary at FWG, Martha Craddock, to type. Craddock, who spent about three months working occasionally on the project, testified that part of [typing the dissertation] was cut and paste and pages from other documents that were cut and rearranged and reworded, and that she recognized some of the dissertation as reports she previously had typed. 35 As noted, the prosecution alleges that Faulkner committed mail fraud by participating in a scheme to defraud the government by helping to procure the MDA contract for FWG in return for a free dissertation. The mailings upon which the degree-for-contract convictions of Faulkner are based are vouchers for the MDA contract mailed from FWG to the government on January 15, February 12, and March 15, 1990. The prosecution cites the testimony of David Baker, an Army policeman, who stated that Faulkner told him during the investigation of these matters that Faulkner never had contacted any companies when conducting his market survey in 1988, but instead had concluded on the basis of his personal knowledge of the industry that contractors other than FWG would be unwilling to sign a hardware waiver. Baker therefore concluded that the 1988 memorandum compiled by Faulkner was false, because when you say a company will not sign [a waiver], that means that you have ... talked to somebody that can speak for that company. You can't just, you know, make that decision for the company. Contrary to the opinion of Baker, however, significant evidence indicates that CROSSBOW frequently did not contact other companies directly when conducting informal market surveys for contracts worth less than one million dollars if the contracts involved classified material. 36 Regardless of whether it was improper not to contact other companies directly, or whether Faulkner falsely suggested that he had done otherwise, these convictions lack an evidentiary basis simply because Faulkner performed and memorialized the market survey in 1988. From 1987 until 1989, however, he was working on his first dissertation, and there is no dispute that he was the only person to work on that dissertation, or that the scheme to concoct a second plagiarized dissertation did not arise until the fall of 1989. The record therefore fails to contain sufficient proof that Faulkner, with the intent to defraud the government, performed and relied upon an improper market survey in order to reward Frost and Turner for bestowing an illegitimate dissertation. 37 The prosecution presents an alternative argument. The MDA contract was extended twice: it received an initial extension from July, 1990 to September, 1990, and then again was extended until September, 1991. These extensions raised the total value of the contract to $1,896,501.29. The prosecution asserts that documents entitled program identification documents submitted by CROSSBOW employees on March 16 and April 3, 1990 led to these extensions. The prosecution attempts to link Faulkner with the first of these documents, arguing that even as Faulkner was cutting and pasting Frost's reports together for his dissertation, he was recommending in March 1990 that FWG get an extension on the contract. 1 38 Although the evidence does indicate that Faulkner was passing off a plagiarized dissertation with the help of Frost in March, 1990, it does not suggest that Faulkner was responsible for extending the MDA contract. Lawrence Duncan, who works for a support organization for the Department of Defense and who served as a contracting officer for the MDA contract until mid-1990, testified for the prosecution. His direct testimony established only that somebody asked to extend the MDA contract in March, 1990, and that Faulkner was the COTR for the MDA contract at that time. The prosecution argues that this testimony during redirect examination shows that Faulkner instigated the extension: 39 Q. Okay. But when that extension was requested in March of 1990, the COTR at that time getting the ball rolling to get that extension started was Dennis Faulkner, wasn't it? 40 A. Yes, sir. 41 Examination of this exchange and the testimony preceding it reveals that Duncan reaffirmed that Faulkner was the COTR for the MDA contract when an extension was requested. The only material in the record suggesting that Faulkner got the ball rolling on the extension was the question posed by the prosecution. The fact that the prosecution attempts to rely solely upon evidence created through the phrasing of its own question is highlighted by the fact that Duncan testified during cross-examination that three specific individuals other than Faulkner prepared and signed the March, 1990 program identification document. Duncan further testified that another COTR, Ken McCormick, performed the technical evaluation for the proposed extension, and that the contracting officer who replaced Duncan on the MDA contract, Michael Corbis, proceeded to do the work on the major contract extension, which was issued by him on the 28th of September of 1990. The record does not support the assertion that the status of Faulkner as a COTR, standing alone, allows for the inference that he recommended an extension. 42 Because the record provides insufficient evidence for Faulkner's convictions for Counts Thirteen, Fourteen, and Sixteen, we do not address the claim by Faulkner that we must reverse these convictions because the prosecution failed to disclose that a government officer who oversaw the MDA contract informed the prosecution that Faulkner had no role in extending the contract. See infra Section IV.A, discussing Brady claim raised by Frost. Because the prosecution's case against Frost and Turner on these counts is based solely upon the acts of Faulkner, there is insufficient evidence to support their convictions of Counts Thirteen, Fourteen, and Sixteen.
43 Potter worked at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of NASA in Huntsville, Alabama for more than twenty-five years. In 1987, she became a manager in the MSFC Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, which sought to identify opportunities in NASA in which small companies and minority firms could participate. Although her bachelor's degree was in business management, she entered a master's degree program at UTSI in engineering science under Frost in 1988. 44 After Potter had informed Frost that she was having difficulty deciding upon a topic for her thesis, he had Turner deliver to Potter a FWG report on a cancelled project concerning a tower and wind study. Either Frost or Turner then gave a diskette containing a copy of the report to Craddock, Frost's secretary at FWG, who then spent about two days retyping it into a more presentable format. Evidence at trial indicated that Potter's thesis and the tower and wind study report were ninety-five percent identical. 45 Before orally defending her thesis before a committee, Potter studied the document which she was submitting in order to be able to express a degree of understanding during her defense. The committee consisted of Frost, Turner, and a Dr. Kenneth Kimble. Although Potter told the committee that she had used material from a report given to her, she presented the thesis as her own work. After the University approved her thesis, Potter graduated in December, 1989. Although Potter admitted at trial that she neither wrote her thesis nor did any research, she claimed that Frost had led her to believe that she could satisfy her degree requirements merely by studying, checking, and finalizing the report. 46 In early 1990, Potter retained control over about $55,000 of an original grant of $110,000 in government funds for an SBIR workshop project. Potter claims that she had difficulty finding individuals or firms willing to perform any workshops for only $55,000, and that, under NASA rules, any funds which had not been committed by September, 1990 would expire and no longer be available to NASA. Accordingly, Potter asserts that she was interested when Frost approached her after she had graduated and informed her that FWG was interested in submitting a proposal to perform such workshops for as little as $50,000. Due to procedural difficulties with obtaining or accessing government funds, however, Potter decided to accept a suggestion made by either Frost or Turner: merely attempt to transfer the $55,000 in remaining funds to the winds measurement contract, an existing contract between FWG and NASA, in order to avoid the unwanted process of lengthy negotiations over a new contract, as well as termination of the funds before approval of the workshop proposal submitted by FWG. Kelly Hill, who had been a defendant in these prosecutions but who died before trial, was the COTR for the winds measurement contract. 47 On April 18, 1990, Potter submitted a procurement request designed to transfer the $55,000 in SBIR funds to the winds measurement contract. On May 9, 1990, Hill submitted a technical evaluation which approved of the proposed addition of funds. The evaluation indicated that the funds were targeted for workshops, and that the initial date of the procurement process had been January 2, 1990. Potter's superiors in the SBIR program never approved the proposal by FWG to perform the workshops, and the added $55,000 was withdrawn from the winds measurement contract. 48 The prosecution alleges that Potter committed mail fraud by helping to increase the value of the winds measurement contract by $55,000 in return for her thesis. The prosecution apparently claims that the effort to transfer the funds was a fraudulent scheme because the documentation submitted by Hill in May, 1990 deceptively implied that the additional funding was related specifically to the research being performed under the contract (which would have been a proper contract modification), rather than to a business program (which was an improper modification). 49 The mailings upon which these convictions are based are vouchers for the winds measurement contract mailed from FWG to the government on January 15, February 13, March 15, and April 12, 1990 for work done on the original contract. Potter claims that these vouchers cannot support her convictions because they were unrelated to, and therefore did not further, the fraudulent scheme charged. Even assuming that the jury could infer that Potter intended to defraud the government on the basis of the documentation submitted by Hill, we agree with her that these vouchers were unrelated to the scheme at issue. 50 The prosecution argues that the vouchers may support the convictions of Potter because 1) the object of the scheme at issue was to enrich Frost and Turner through government contract money; 2) money received as a result of the vouchers at issue did enrich Frost and Turner; 3) therefore, these vouchers furthered the scheme. This argument, however, cannot withstand scrutiny. 51 The federal mail fraud statute does not purport to reach all frauds, but only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud.... United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir.1995)(quoting Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95, 65 S.Ct. 148, 151, 89 L.Ed. 88 (1944)). The mails therefore must serve the purpose of executing or furthering the accomplishment of the scheme. See United States v. Koen, 982 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Downs, 870 F.2d 613, 615 (11th Cir.1989)(completion of scheme must depend in some way upon mailing); United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453, 1461 n. 11 (7th Cir.1987)(success of scheme must be linked causally to mailings). Although the use of the mails does not have to be an essential part of the scheme, it does have to be incident to an essential part of the scheme. See Altman, 48 F.3d at 102; see also Oldfield, 859 F.2d at 400 (mailing must be closely related to the scheme). 52 In this case, the vouchers relied upon by the prosecution charged only for work performed by FWG up until March, 1990 on the unmodified winds measurement contract. The jury, however, did not convict Potter of fraudulently procuring the unmodified winds measurement contract; Potter had no role in procuring the original winds measurement contract. Regardless of whether Hill or Potter initiated the attempted modification of the contract in January or April, 1990, the vouchers have no relationship to the $55,000 associated with the SBIR program or to the modification, and therefore no relationship to the specific scheme of which Potter was convicted. Although the prosecution argues that because defendants selected [the winds measurement] contract as the vehicle to get Frost the $55,000, mailings furthering this contract were necessary to the scheme, the winds measurement contract would continue to exist, and therefore remain a viable vehicle for future fraud, regardless of whether FWG had sent the vouchers. Although the vouchers did allow FWG to receive payments for work already done under the original contract, the payments had nothing to do with extending the contract. They simply did not advance the accomplishment of any scheme to increase the value of the contract. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence for the convictions of Potter of Counts Nine through Twelve. Because Frost's and Turner's convictions of these counts depend upon the same mailings, they also must be vacated.
53 In the spring of 1987, Turner convinced Congo, a NASA chemist and Ph.D student, to transfer from Auburn to UTSI. During his diagnostic exam, at which UTSI faculty assessed his competency for the doctoral program, Congo explained that his work at NASA involved the assessment of risks posed by incompatible chemicals on the space station project of NASA. That summer, Frost requested Congo to review an informal research project proposal regarding a computer modeling program designed to assess the hazards posed by incompatible chemicals on the space station project of NASA. Shortly thereafter, Frost, on behalf of FWG, submitted to Congo a formal unsolicited proposal for such a research project with NASA. In November of 1987, Congo initiated the procurement process for the proposed project, documented the justification for awarding FWG a sole-source contract, and submitted a favorable technical evaluation summary of the proposal. On March 10, 1988, Congo submitted a formal procurement request for the project, and submitted a procurement request for additional funding on June 23, 1988. By August, 1988, NASA had approved the proposal and awarded FWG a $300,000 contract, for which Congo served as the COTR. 54 Congo claims that he began to work on his dissertation in August, 1988. Frost was his major professor. The topic of his dissertation was extremely similar to the topic of the chemical hazards contract between NASA and FWG. The government introduced evidence that Turner told Karen Seiser, an FWG employee, to help Congo with his dissertation. Seiser testified that she spent over two eighty-hour weeks in February, 1990 writing about two-thirds of the dissertation, and that Congo treated her like an employee. After she worked on the dissertation, Seiser prepared a report for FWG on the progress of the chemical hazards contract, using many of the sections which she had written for the dissertation. Congo admitted that, as COTR for the contract, he rejected the report because it looked too much like his dissertation. Two other FWG employees also worked on the dissertation, one of whom implemented changes during a period of several days at the direction of Congo. 55 Congo submitted his dissertation on February 26, 1990. Frost, Turner, and three other professors sat on the committee before which Congo orally defended his dissertation. Neither Congo nor Frost nor Turner disclosed the work done by Seiser on the paper. The committee approved the dissertation and Congo graduated. 56 The prosecution argues that Congo committed mail fraud by participating in a scheme to defraud the government by helping to procure the chemical hazards contract for FWG in return for his dissertation. The mailings upon which the degree-for-contract convictions of Congo are based are vouchers for the chemical hazards contract mailed from FWG to NASA on April 2, May 8, June 11, July 11, August 10, and September 11, 1990. 57 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the similarities between the circumstances of Congo and Berlinrut, the student whom Turner unsuccessfully requested to provide a contract in exchange for a dissertation, would allow a rational jury to find that Frost, Turner, and Congo agreed in 1987 that Congo would help procure a contract for FWG in exchange for Frost and Turner eventually providing him with a dissertation. Like Berlinrut, Congo informed Frost and Turner of his specific area of interest. As with Berlinrut, Frost and Turner sought to submit through the student a contract proposal on that very topic to the government agency for which the student worked. Congo also took the same action requested of Berlinrut: helping to provide FWG with a contract involving the topic of his future dissertation. Finally, just as they had offered to do for Berlinrut, Frost and Turner took the very unusual step of having much of Congo's dissertation written for him. Although there is no direct evidence that Frost and Turner propositioned Congo as they had Berlinrut, the jury still could have inferred from these facts that defendants entered into an arrangement similar to that which Berlinrut had refused. 58 Nonetheless, the evidence cannot support the convictions for Counts Two through Seven. A mail fraud conviction must rest upon proof of some fraudulent scheme or act. The only deception with which Congo is charged in relation to the government, however, is a failure to disclose his relationship with FWG to his superiors and colleagues at NASA. 2 The circumstances relating to Congo therefore differ from those of Potter and Faulkner because the record does not suggest that he committed any deception when helping to secure the chemical hazards contract, other than not disclosing a conflict of interest. Although Congo deceived the University by submitting a dissertation written primarily by other people, the prosecution cannot rely upon this deception in order to convict Congo of a scheme to defraud the government of property. We note that the federal circuits are split as to whether a defendant may be convicted of mail fraud for deceiving only persons other than the intended victims of a scheme. Compare United States v. Blumeyer, 114 F.3d 758, 767-68 (8th Cir.1997)(noting split and following United States v. Cosentino, 869 F.2d 301, 307 (7th Cir.1989), to hold that defendant commits mail fraud by deceiving regulatory agency in order to forestall regulatory action which would impede scheme to obtain property from others) with United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 734 n. 18 (1st Cir.1996)(intended victims of scheme must be the ones defrauded); McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 794 (1st Cir.1990)(scheme to defraud cannot rest upon deception of one party which causes deprivation to another); United States v. Utz, 886 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.1989)(defendant must intend to obtain money or property from victim of deceit). We do not have to resolve this split, however, because even the cases which have held that convictions may rest upon the deceit of a person other than the ultimate victim contemplated that the deception was causally related to the scheme to obtain property from the victim. See Blumeyer, 114 F.3d at 767-68; Cosentino, 869 F.2d at 307. In this case, the fact that the benefit received by Congo from Frost and Turner involved academic deception is a fortuity. The acts of plagiarism were irrelevant to the success of the scheme to obtain a government contract; whether Congo received from FWG a bogus dissertation or something as mundane as money did not affect, and was not intended to affect, his ability to help FWG obtain the chemical hazards contract. 59 Accordingly, the convictions can rest only upon a failure by Congo to disclose his conflict of interest. Many opinions repeat the maxim that a breach of fiduciary duty alone, without the 'something more' of fraudulent intent, cannot constitute mail fraud. E.g., Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir.1989). In United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208 (2d Cir.1994), the Second Circuit helped to define what this something more is. Rejecting the claim of the prosecution that the defendant had violated § 1341 merely because his failure to disclose a conflict of interest had prevented the victim from making a fully informed economic decision, 3 the Mittelstaedt court explained: 60 Where an individual standing in a fiduciary relation to another conceals material information that the fiduciary is legally obliged to disclose, that non-disclosure does not give rise to mail fraud liability unless the omission can or does result in some tangible harm. However, lack of information that might have an impact on the decision regarding where [the victim's] money is spent, without more, is not a tangible harm and therefore does not constitute a deprivation of section 1341 property. 61 To be material, the information withheld either must be of some independent value or must bear on the ultimate value of the transaction. To convict, the government had to establish that the omission caused (or was intended to cause) actual harm to the [victim] of a pecuniary nature or that the [victim] could have negotiated a better deal for itself if it had not been deceived. 62 Id. at 1217 (citations and emphasis omitted); see also Emery v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir.1995)(fiduciary commits mail fraud through misleading omission intended to induce action to disadvantage of misled); United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1987)(deceit must be accompanied by contemplation of harm to victim which affects very nature of alleged bargain between defendant and victim). The Mittelstaedt court further indicated that proof that a victim, acting solely on the basis of general principles, would have refused to contract if the defendant had disclosed his conflict does not demonstrate a mail fraud violation under § 1341. See Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d at 1218. We agree with this analysis and note that it accords with old precedent existing in this circuit. See Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754 (6th Cir.1949). The Epstein court, although recognizing that actual loss to the victim is unnecessary, held that fiduciaries who had not disclosed a conflict of interest did not have the intent to defraud when the evidence showed only that the contracts induced by the defendants were entirely beneficial and fair to the entity denied the disclosures. See id. at 764-69. 63 In order for the jury to convict Congo, the evidence at trial therefore must have permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that Congo intended to inflict a tangible injury upon NASA. We hold that it did not. The sole witness relied upon by the prosecution, Salvadore Caruso, the direct supervisor of Congo at NASA, testified that FWG performed necessary and needed work under the chemical hazards contract, and that NASA was very concerned about the issue of incompatible materials on the space station project. Caruso also testified that he had no reason to believe that FWG had not performed the terms of the contract, or that there had been any complaints regarding the ability of FWG to fulfill the project requirements. There is no evidence in this case that NASA would have had to pay less money or would have received more services if Congo had disclosed his conflict of interest. Cf. United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir.1993)(upholding mail fraud conviction because, although defendant did not commit mail fraud simply by profiting from breach of fiduciary duty to victim, evidence showed that victim had to pay higher prices for goods received under contract because provider of goods was paying kickbacks to defendant). Finally, Caruso testified that nothing about the documentation submitted by Congo was misleading. The record contains no evidence to the contrary of the above. 64 We therefore hold that, even though the evidence allows a finding that Congo agreed to trade a contract for a dissertation, there was insufficient evidence that he intended to defraud NASA by not disclosing his conflict of interest. Although Congo intended the government to transfer money to FWG, there is no evidence that he intended that the government would not receive in return a necessary service, performed adequately and for a fair price. Because the evidence showed that FWG, and therefore Frost and Turner, fairly and adequately performed a necessary contract not secured through any misrepresentations, we likewise vacate the convictions of Frost and Turner of Counts Two through Seven. 65 The holding in United States v. Fischl, 797 F.2d 306 (6th Cir.1986), does not compel a different result. The defendant in Fischl, who contracted with the State of Michigan to procure a tug boat, received a kickback from the manufacturer of the engine of the boat. See id. at 308. Although the kickback did not injure the State monetarily because the defendant was performing the contract for a fixed price, the State would have cancelled the contract if it had known about the scheme. See id. at 309-11. Further, the defendant submitted deceptive accounting documents to the State and lied when a State senator asked him about a possible kickback scheme, which, if true, would have jeopardized continued funding of the tug boat project by the State. See id. 66 The Fischl court rejected the claim of the defendant that he had not committed mail fraud because the lack of an injury to the victim revealed that he never had intended to harm the State. See id. at 311. Unlike this case, however, the evidence in Fischl was not that the defendant merely had failed to disclose a conflict of interest, but that he had made several false statements to further his scheme. See id. Further, the Fischl court often invoked the intangible rights of the public when justifying its holding. See id. at 311-12; see also United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248, 252-53 (6th Cir.1988)(distinguishing Fischl by describing the right of the State of Michigan to complete information as an intangible right). As previously explained, however, the convictions now at issue rest upon the specific claim that defendants intended to deprive the government, acting as a business, of its property. 67