Opinion ID: 781039
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Eze's False Statements in his Citizenship Application

Text: 94 Eze argues that his counsel failed to act with reasonable competence by neglecting to object to the prosecution's questioning regarding his withdrawn citizenship application. In 1990, Eze filed an application for United States citizenship in which he claimed to be residing with his wife for a three-year period. Eze, however, subsequently withdrew his citizenship application after his estranged wife filed an affidavit stating, in effect, that he had lied on the application about whether they were living together. According to Eze's wife, Eze moved out in December 1987 and they had not lived together since. 95 The prosecution cross-examined Eze extensively on his withdrawn citizenship application in an attempt to impeach his credibility and trustworthiness. 10 In the course of the questioning, Eze testified that he had moved out for a while after he and his wife had an argument, but he subsequently returned and they continued to live together. The prosecutor then had Eze identify his wife's affidavit and asked, isn't it true that your wife told the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the day you moved out in December of 1987, you never lived together again after that? After Eze claimed that his wife's statements in the affidavit were untrue, the prosecutor asked whether he withdrew his application because he knew charges were going to be filed against him for filing false statements with the INS. Defense counsel did not object to any of these questions. The prosecutor, without objection, also discussed Eze's prior bad act of filing a false INS application during his summation. 96 It appears to us that Eze's counsel should have objected to the prosecution's use of his wife's affidavit to impeach his credibility. Pursuant to New York evidentiary rules, the party who is cross-examining a witness cannot introduce extrinsic documentary evidence ... solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness's credibility. People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1983); see People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808, 816 (1987) (The general rule is that a party may not introduce extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter solely to impeach credibility.). When impeaching a witness on collateral matters, the cross-examining attorney is bound by the answers of the witness to questions concerning collateral matters inquired into solely to affect credibility. Pavao, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d at 219 (citation and quotation marks omitted). It therefore seems improper for the prosecutor to have impeached Eze with his wife's affidavit after he stated that he had moved out for awhile, but returned. See Superior Sales & Salvage, Inc. v. Time Release Sciences, Inc., 227 A.D.2d 987, 643 N.Y.S.2d 291, 291 (4th Dep't 1996) (holding that the trial court properly precluded the party from using another person's affidavit to impeach the witness's credibility and noting the affidavit was extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter). Further, the evidence contained in the affidavit was not material to this case, and only served the purpose of impeaching Eze's credibility. See People v. Mink, 267 A.D.2d 501, 699 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (3d Dep't 1999) (holding that the general rule is not applied where the issue to which the evidence relates is not a material one, that is, one that the jury must decide). 97 The District Court concluded that, although the form of the prosecutor's questions was improper, it was unclear that an objection would or could have prevented the prosecutor from engaging in the line of questioning. 11 We disagree. The impeachment came entirely from Eze's wife's affidavit; it therefore is unclear to us how the prosecution could have impeached Eze without using extrinsic evidence. On the other hand, it very well may have been the case, as the District Court noted, 12 that the defense's failure to object was grounded in strategic considerations. See Seehan v. Iowa, 72 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir.1995) (finding that defense counsel's decision not to object was grounded in trial strategy and thus did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland ), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1173, 116 S.Ct. 1578, 134 L.Ed.2d 676 (1996). From the record before us, however, we cannot conclude with any certainty that this decision was grounded in trial strategy and, if so, what that strategy was. 98