Opinion ID: 794470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ITTC's Claims

Text: 47 The district court properly dismissed ITTC's defamation, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy claims on the grounds that Breuer's statements were not of and concerning ITTC and that ITTC had failed to state harm cognizable under tortious interference law.
48 It is essential in making out a prima facie case in libel to prove that the matter is published of and concerning the plaintiff. Julian v. Am. Bus. Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 17, 137 N.E.2d 1, 17, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1, 16 (1956); see also Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980) ([P]laintiffs in defamation proceedings bear the burden of demonstrating that the libel designates the plaintiff in such a way as to let those who knew her understand that she was the person meant. (internal quotation indication and citation omitted; alteration incorporated)). 49 ITTC is entirely separate from, and structurally independent of, KirchGroup. Breuer's comments were not about ITTC. They were about KirchGroup and its cash flow problem. We know of no principle of defamation law that permits someone to recover for a defamation of another solely because the communication contains an allegedly false implication that the person bringing suit is at risk of loss. See, e.g, AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir.1990) (affirming dismissal of defamation claims brought by individual investors when the allegedly defamatory statements were made about an enterprise in which they invested and did not mention the individual investors); McBride v. Crowell-Collier Publ'g Co., 196 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir.1952) (holding that stockholder cannot recover for allegedly defamatory statements about business); Cardone v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 884 F.Supp. 838, 847 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (concluding that saying something defamatory of a subordinate does not defame a chief executive of a corporation); Afftrex, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 555 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905, 161 A.D.2d 855, 856 (3d Dep't 1990) (concluding that allegedly defamatory statement about the owner of a company did not defame the company); Cohn v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 67 A.D.2d 140, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1st Dep't 1979) (deciding that it is not defamatory of a law firm to say something defamatory about one of its partners), aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 885, 408 N.E.2d 672, 430 N.Y.S.2d 265, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1022, 101 S.Ct. 590, 66 L.Ed.2d 484 (1980). 2 A false disparaging statement about IBM, for example, would not, we think, ordinarily be a defamatory statement of and concerning all of IBM's suppliers, employees and dealers, however much they may be injured as a result. 50 There are indeed cases, as ITTC points out, where a statement was held to be of and concerning the plaintiff even though on its face it was aimed at another person or entity. Yet, in each such case, the statement, though not naming the plaintiff, could have been understood by a reasonable reader as being, in substance, actually about him or her. 51 Geisler, for example, was a classic libel by fiction case presenting the question whether the plaintiff, after whom a fictional character was apparently modeled, was similar enough to the fictional character that defamatory statements in the fictional work might be found by a trier of fact actually to be about — of and concerning — the plaintiff. See Geisler, 616 F.2d at 639. There is no similar allegation here that anyone who read Breuer's statement that [a]ll that you can hear and read about this is that the financial sector is not willing to provide further debt or equity [to Kirch] under current conditions, thought or might reasonably have thought that Breuer was suggesting that the financial sector was not willing to provide further debt or equity to ITTC. 52 Similarly, in Golden Bear Distributing Systems v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.1983), the Fifth Circuit concluded, applying Texas law, that where the plaintiff company's business was selling a third-party company's products using the third-party company's name as its own, the communication in issue that defamed the third-party company also defamed the plaintiff. Here, there is no similar allegation that the persons who read Breuer's comments were misled into thinking that Breuer was talking about ITTC when he made statements about the financial condition of Kirch or KirchGroup. 53 Caudle v. Thomason, 942 F.Supp. 635 (D.D.C.1996), is not to the contrary. There the plaintiff was the president and chief executive officer of a corporation. Caudle alleged that he was defamed by allegations of fraud and corrupt practices made about actions taken by the corporation. The district court concluded that he had stated a claim of defamation. According to the complaint, which the court was required to accept as true for the purposes of the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff `made all business decisions regarding corporate actions which are the subject matter of [the] lawsuit.' Id. at 638. The court was therefore unable to say that a reasonable listener . . . would not infer that [the plaintiff] was responsible for or involved with the alleged wrongdoings. Id. The allegations of fraud and corruption were, in other words, not only about the plaintiff's company, but also about the individual plaintiff. 54 And in Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915 (La.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 1134, 103 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989), the Louisiana appellate court concluded that the Marvin Gorman Ministries could bring suit about allegations that the eponymous Marvin Gorman had acted immorally because the reputations of the man and his church were inextricably intertwined. However, the court explicitly relied on [t]he unusual nature of this relationship to distinguish the case from those to which the general rule that an action for defamation is personal to the one defamed and cannot be asserted by one only indirectly affected applies. Id. at 919 (emphasis in original). Even if New York law is similar to Louisiana's, we see no ground for relying on such an exception based on the business relationship between ITTC and KirchGroup. 55 The of and concerning requirement stands as a significant limitation on those who may seek a legal remedy for communications they think to be false and defamatory and to have injured them. 3 We see no basis for concluding that the statements at issue here were of and concerning ITTC. 56
57 The district court also correctly concluded that whether or not the other plaintiffs adequately pleaded tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, ITTC did not do so because it did not state a cognizable injury under New York tortious-interference law. 4 58 Under New York law, to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, the plaintiff must allege that (1) it had a business relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) the defendant acted solely out of malice, or used dishonest, unfair, or improper means; and (4) the defendant's interference caused injury to the relationship. Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 17 (2d Cir.2003). 59 The complaint alleges that ITTC was in negotiations with various American movie studios on behalf of KirchGroup to restructure KirchGroup's television content distribution deals. Am. Compl. ¶ 53. According to the complaint, ITTC was conducting such negotiations as an agent for KirchGroup. Id. ¶ 6 (alleging that ITTC served as KirchGroup's exclusive agent in North America). In New York, agents or brokers cannot recover on the basis of interference with the transactions or business relationships for which they are serving as an agent or broker. See Maruki, Inc. v. Lefrak Fifth Ave. Corp., 161 A.D.2d 264, 268, 555 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 (1st Dep't 1990) ([T]he law is well settled that tortious interference with contract does not extend to a broker who is a stranger to the contract purportedly interfered with.); Williamson, Picket, Gross, Inc. v. 400 Park Ave. Co., 63 A.D.2d 880, 881, 405 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (1st Dep't 1978) (holding that a broker could not state a claim for tortious interference against a landlord on the basis of the landlord's efforts to prevent a sublessor from leasing to a sublessee, whom the plaintiff-broker represented, on the ground that [i]f there was actionable interference it was directed against the proposed sublease, not the brokerage agreement); I.R.V. Merchandising Corp. v. Jay Ward Prods., 856 F.Supp. 168, 174 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (As a matter of law, the relationship between [the plaintiff] and prospective licensees cannot be construed as the sort of contractual business relationship protected by the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage. [The plaintiff] has failed to allege any relationship with these licensees other than acting solely as the agent for [the defendant].). 60 Nevertheless, ITTC argues that its business is so intertwined with that of KirchGroup that the defendants' conduct directly interfered with its business as well. It relies mainly on Brown v. AXA RE., 2004 WL 941959, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7624 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2004), and TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F.Supp.2d 366 (S.D.N.Y.2003), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.2005). Both of these cases dealt with business relationships far closer than that between KirchGroup and ITTC. In Brown, the court concluded that even though their names did not appear on the face of the contract, two film producers who had negotiated with an insurance company to finance the production of their film had a cause of action for tortious interference against the insurance company for breaching the contract guaranteeing such financing. Brown, 2004 WL 941959, at , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7624, at -. Similarly, in TVT, the court found that a wholly owned subsidiary of a company whose copyrights the defendants had infringed could pursue an action for tortious interference against the defendants. TVT, 279 F.Supp.2d at 383-84. 61 Here no such close relationship was alleged. ITTC does not assert that it is owned by KirchGroup or that the two companies share senior management. ITTC alleges only that it was known as the face of KirchGroup in North America and that it served as its exclusive agent in the United States. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. ITTC's alleged injury is thus derivative, resulting from the harm KirchGroup suffered. See id. ¶ 76 (alleging KirchGroup's insolvency caused ITTC to lose virtually its entire business). This is too attenuated to state a cause of action against the defendants. See Kirch, 2004 WL 2181383 at  n. 26, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19228, at  n. 26. 5
62 New York does not recognize an independent tort of conspiracy. See Alexander & Alexander of New York, Inc. v. Fritzen, 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969, 503 N.E.2d 102, 102, 510 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (1986) (mem.) ([A]s we long ago held, a mere conspiracy to commit a tort is never of itself a cause of action. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration incorporated)). Therefore, since ITTC fails to state causes of action for either of the torts underlying the alleged conspiracy, defamation or tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, it necessarily fails to state an actionable claim for civil conspiracy. The district court thus properly dismissed all of ITTC's claims.