Opinion ID: 3035213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Means has exhausted his tribal court remedies regarding jurisdiction, but he has still not been tried for the alleged threats and battery. Nonetheless, Means remains subject to conditions of pretrial release. Means cannot have any contact 5 See McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 2002); Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 790-92 (9th Cir. 2001). 16248 MEANS v. NAVAJO NATION with his former father-in-law or go within 100 yards of his former father-in-law’s home. Means also must appear as ordered by the Navajo trial court or face re-arrest and additional punishment for any failure to appear. The district court therefore concluded that Means was in custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction under Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon6 and Hensley v. Municipal Court.7 The parties have not challenged that conclusion before us, and, although we are required to examine jurisdiction sua sponte,8 we agree with the district court. The charges against Means remain pending in the Navajo Nation trial court, and although the Navajo Nation and Means have stipulated to a stay in the trial court until this appeal is decided, the Navajo Nation states that it fully intends to prosecute Means if jurisdiction is resolved in its favor. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. II. The 1990 Amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,9 the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.10 In Oliphant, the Suquamish Tribe had prosecuted two non-Indians, one for racing down a highway and colliding with a tribal police car, and another for assaulting an officer and resisting arrest.11 The tribe did not claim that Congress had given it authority to exercise jurisdiction, but rather that the tribe had an inherent sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over incidents that occurred on its reservation — an authority that Congress had never taken 6 Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300-02 (1984). 7 Hensley v. Mun. Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County, 411 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1973). 8 See Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 10 Id. at 194. 11 Id. MEANS v. NAVAJO NATION 16249 away.12 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that, although Indian tribes enjoy some sovereign powers, their “domestic, dependent”13 nature distinguishes them from the governments of foreign countries.14 It also held that citizens of the United States who are not Indians cannot be subjected to Indian tribal sovereignty for criminal purposes.15 [1] Following Oliphant, the Supreme Court suggested in United States v. Wheeler16 that the inherent sovereignty of a tribe might extend only to its own enrolled members.17 Then, in Duro v. Reina,18 the Court explicitly held that “the retained sovereignty of the tribe as a political and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the authority to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own membership.”19 Duro reasoned that, as American citizens,20 Indians were entitled not to be subjected to the criminal authority of sovereigns of which they were not and could not become full members.21 [2] In 1990 Congress responded to Indian tribes’ concerns about the holding in Duro by amending22 the Indian Civil Rights Act23 to say that the “powers of self-government” of Indian tribes “means the inherent power of Indian tribes, 12 Id. at 195-96. 13 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 14 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211; see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886). 15 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. 16 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 17 Id. at 323, 326-29. 18 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 19 Id. at 679. 20 See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b). 21 Duro, 495 U.S. at 692-93. 22 See Pub. L. 101-511, Title VIII, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1892 (1990). 23 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303. 16250 MEANS v. NAVAJO NATION hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”24 “All Indians” plainly includes Indians who are not enrolled members of the particular tribe exercising jurisdiction. It is significant for the equal protection discussion below, however, that the 1990 Amendments do not cover all persons who may be ethnically Indian. In addition to extending tribal criminal jurisdiction to “all” Indians, the 1990 Amendments make it plain that the definition of “Indian” is the same as “Indian” in the Major Crimes Act.25 The 1990 Amendments define “Indian” as “any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, Title 18, if that person were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian country to which that section applies.”26 The statute referred to, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (the Major Crimes Act), says it applies to “[a]ny Indian.”27 In United States v. Antelope,28 enrolled Indians prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act argued that they were denied equal protection of the laws, because, had they not been Indians, they would have been prosecuted under more favorable state law. The Court described the federal scheme as one in which “[e]xcept for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction of tribal courts.” The Court rejected the Equal Protection challenge because “respondents were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they were of the Indian race but because they were enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.”29 The Court pointed out that “federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act does not apply 24 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). 25 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 26 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4). 27 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). 28 United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 29 Id. At 646. MEANS v. NAVAJO NATION 16251 to ‘many individuals who are racially to be classified as “Indians.” ’ ”30 The Court noted in dictum that lower courts had held that enrollment was not an “absolute” requirement for federal jurisdiction in some circumstances, but because respondents were enrolled, the Court was “not called upon to decide” whether enrollment was an absolute requirement and “therefore intimate[d] no views on the matter.”31 [3] Taken together, the 1990 Amendments, the Major Crimes Act, and Antelope mean that the criminal jurisdiction of tribes over “all Indians” recognized by the 1990 Amendments means all of Indian ancestry who are also Indians by political affiliation, not all who are racially Indians. For that reason, subjecting Means to tribal court jurisdiction but not non-Indians, is, as we explain further below, not a racial classification. Means argues that the 1990 Amendments were outside the powers of Congress because they were an unconstitutional delegation of federal governmental authority and because they went beyond the congressional power authorized under the Indian Commerce32 and Treaty33 Clauses. Indian tribes are not bound by the United States Constitution in the exercise of their powers, including their judicial powers,34 so federal judicial power over nonmembers could not be delegated to them.35 Following the 1990 Amendments, Means’s theory was tested in other cases. Double jeopardy cases examined whether the statutory language, “recogniz[ing] and affirm- [ing]” the power of tribes over nonmember Indians rather than 30 Id. at 646 n.7 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974)). 31 Id. At 646-47, n. 7. 32 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 33 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 34 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-85 (1896). 35 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 686. 16252 MEANS v. NAVAJO NATION “delegating” it, avoided double jeopardy problems when both a tribe and the federal government punished someone for the same conduct. If the tribe was exercising its inherent sovereign authority, an Indian defendant could be punished in both the tribal court as well as in federal district court under the “dual sovereignty” doctrine.36 If the tribe was exercising delegated federal power, then the federal government would be punishing the Indian twice for the same conduct, which it could not do under the double jeopardy clause.37 More broadly, after the Supreme Court in Duro had concluded that the tribe had not retained sovereign power over nonmember Indians,38 the question was whether Congress even had the ability to “recognize” an inherent power.39 [4] These questions raised by Means’s statutory argument40 have, subsequent to the original briefing in this case, been definitively answered by the Supreme Court. United States v. Lara41 holds that “Congress does possess the constitutional power to lift the restrictions on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians as the statute seeks to do.”42 As for whether the tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction was a delegated power or an inherent sovereign power, the Court held, with certain reservations, that “the Constitution permits tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”43 Thus, except for the questions 36 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 675 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 37 See Enas, 255 F.3d at 667. 38 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 679. 39 See Enas, 255 F.3d at 667-75. 40 Cf. Enas, 255 F.3d at 665; Means v. N. Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941, 942 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled in part, Enas, 255 F.3d at 675 n.8. 41 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 42 Id. at 200. 43 Id. at 210. MEANS v. NAVAJO NATION 16253 reserved in Lara,44 it is settled law that, pursuant to the 1990 amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act, an Indian tribe may exercise inherent sovereign judicial power in criminal cases against nonmember Indians for crimes committed on the tribe’s reservation.