Opinion ID: 778631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Case of Obviousness and Claim 1

Text: 38 To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, the Board must, inter alia, show some objective teaching in the prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would lead that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed.Cir.1988). The motivation, suggestion or teaching may come explicitly from statements in the prior art, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some cases the nature of the problem to be solved. Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1370, 55 USPQ2d at 1317. 39 The Board agreed that the examiner had satisfied his burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness with respect to claim 1. Decision on Appeal at 5. The Board explained: 40 With respect to independent claim 1, the Examiner, as the basis for the obviousness rejection, proposes to modify the disclosed Hypermedia structured expert system of Stefanopoulos which, in the Examiner's view, discloses the claimed invention except for the speech user agent. To address this deficiency, the Examiner turns to Schmandt which discloses the use of speech input to navigate through a multiple window based computer system display. In the Examiner's analysis ... the skilled artisan would have been motivated and found it obvious to incorporate the speech input and speech recognition techniques taught by Schmandt into the expert system [i.e., here the browser software system] of Stefanopoulos in order to reduce the need for less user friendly manual keyboard and mouse click inputs. 41 ... In our view the Examiner's analysis is sufficiently reasonable that we find that the Examiner has at least satisfied the burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. 42 Decision on Appeal at 4-5 (emphasis added). 43 Appellants appear to concede that Stefanopoulos discloses all of the limitations of the claimed invention except the speech user agent. However, appellants urge that Schmandt does not disclose a speech user agent. Appellants define a speech user agent as an agent that  dynamically creates the vocabulary, grammar and actions that are possible for the user to use in a given situation. Appellants' Br. at 35 (emphasis added). 44 When examining claims for patentability, claims are interpreted as broadly as is reasonable and consistent with the specification. See, e.g., In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 USPQ2d 1664, 1667 (Fed.Cir.2000). Because claim 1 uses the general term speech user agent without any modifiers, appellants' limiting interpretation of this phrase is inappropriate, particularly in light of the grammar-creation capability separately recited in claims 11 and 14. Instead, we interpret the phrase speech user agent consistent with its plain meaning: an interface that allows the user to interact with the system by speaking. See IBM Dictionary of Computing 638 (10th ed.1994) (defining speech recognition as [t]he recognition of voice communication as a series of words or sentences); Van Nostrand Reinhold Dictionary of Information Technology 473 (3d ed.1989) (defining speech recognizer as [i]n man-machine interfaces, a system that receives spoken word inputs and identifies the message. The system output can then be used to initiate appropriate actions or responses.); Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed.Cir.1999) (The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning.). Although an applicant may be his own lexicographer, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1330 (Fed.Cir.1995) ( en banc ), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), nothing in the specification defines the phrase speech user agent differently from its ordinary meaning. Applying the above definition, Schmandt clearly discloses a speech user agent because the reference specifically describes Xspeak, a speech interface with the windows environment. 45 Appellants also argue that even if Schmandt discloses a speech user agent, there is no suggestion or motivation to combine Schmandt and Stefanopoulos. Recently, in In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed.Cir.2002), we held that the Board's reliance on common knowledge and common sense did not fulfill the agency's obligation to cite references to support its conclusions. Id. at 1344, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d at 1434. Instead, the Board must document its reasoning on the record to allow accountability. Id. at 1345, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d at 1435. This documentation also allows effective judicial review. Id. 46 In the present case, the reasoning articulated by the Board is exactly the type of reasoning required by In re Lee. Both the examiner and the Board clearly identified a motivation to combine the references, stating that the skilled artisan would have found it obvious to incorporate the speech input and speech recognition techniques taught by Schmandt into the expert system of Stefanopoulos in order to reduce the need for less user friendly manual keyboard and mouse click inputs. Decision on Appeal at 5; accord Aug. 7, 1996 Office Action at 3. The motivation to combine the references is present in the text of each reference. The Schmandt reference itself verifies this motivation, stating that allowing users to remain focused on the screen and keyboard, instead of fumbling for the mouse, would be beneficial in a workstation environment. Schmandt at 51. Stefanopoulos itself, while not expressly disclosing the use of speech recognition, sets forth the motivation to combine the references, stating that there are alternative means to select the buttons, including ... voice-activated transfer means, which may be readily adapted for use with the present invention by those skilled in the art. '237 patent, col. 4, ll. 34-38. 47 Appellants also argue that Schmandt discloses only a pre-programmed grammar. Because the construction of speech user agent does not require an agent that dynamically changes grammar and vocabulary, but only an agent that allows the user to interact with the system by speaking, we conclude that Schmandt adequately discloses a speech user agent as required by claim 1 of the '229 application. Appellants further urge that Schmandt's invention is directed to navigation in a windows system, not the web-browsing environment of the present invention. However, the Board properly concluded that the present invention is not limited to a web-browsing environment, stating that the language of the appealed claims reveals only a recitation of a `computer network' with no recitation of any remote accessing of a database or any limitation as to database complexity or the internet. Decision on Appeal at 8. Appellants also argue that the prior art references revealed no reasonable expectation of success in carrying out the invention; however, the Board found that this issue had not been properly raised. Finally, we are not persuaded that Schmandt does not suggest the combination because it only refers to speech recognition as substituting for the mouse and not the keyboard. Accordingly, the Board's conclusion that the invention recited in claim 1 was obvious is well supported. 48 For these reasons, we affirm the Board's decision as to independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2-10. 49