Opinion ID: 197705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Unfair Trade Practices Claim Under Chapter 93A

Text: 18 Finally, Lyle contends, since Chapter 223A grants jurisdiction over a cause of action ... arising from [a defendant's] ... causing tortious injury by an act or omission in [Massachusetts] ... [,] Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(c), the federal district court possessed personal jurisdiction over Ashworth in relation to the unfair trade practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. For present purposes we shall assume, without deciding, that a Chapter 93A violation would constitute a tortious injury under Chapter 223A. Cf. Burtner v. Burnham, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 158, 430 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (1982) (Whether a violation of ... chapter [93A] constitutes a 'tortious injury' within the meaning of c. 223A, § 3(c) may be open to some doubt.). 19 Lyle alleges that Ashworth attempted to conceal the tardiness of its nonrenewal notice by backdating its untimely termination letter to Lyle, see supra p. 112, and that the alleged deception was designed to prevent Lyle from pursuing a contract action for wrongful termination of the Agreement. Assuming as much, we nonetheless conclude that Lyle cannot prevail on its Chapter 93A claim. 20 Chapter 93A, section 11, provides that [a]ny person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person who engages in any trade or commerce of an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice ... may ... bring an action in the superior court .... (emphasis added). Thus, in order to state a chapter 93A claim, Lyle was required to demonstrate a loss of money or property. Yet it alleged no such loss. Instead, it asserted a breach of contract by virtue of Ashworth's failure to provide timely notice of termination as required by the Agreement. In addition, Lyle alleged that Ashworth violated chapter 93A by engaging in the deceptive act of backdating the notice of termination. As to the latter allegation, however, Lyle claimed no injury apart from that caused by the alleged breach of contract. Consequently, Lyle failed to allege a loss of money or property ... as a result of [Ashworth's] use or employment ... of [a] ... deceptive act ... [,] as required by chapter 93A, section 11. Finally, a breach-of-contract claim, without more, cannot be converted into a tort claim. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 557 F.Supp. 230, 238 (D.Mass.1983). 21 Affirmed.