Opinion ID: 2634399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Improperly Limited Opinion Evidence Regarding Imposition of the Death Penalty

Text: Defendant's former girlfriend, Tina Lott, with whom he resided for a period of approximately one year, testified briefly on behalf of the prosecution regarding an incident that occurred in September 1987, approximately three years before she last saw defendant (and approximately five years prior to trial). She recalled that defendant became angry at her when she indicated she would return a borrowed VCR to a coworker, the dispute escalated, and according to her testimony she and defendant had a confrontation inside the lobby [of Lott's employer's business] and he punched me to the side of the ribs.... Over the prosecution's objection that the defense was inviting error, defense counsel on recross-examination inquired of Lott why she was testifying, asking her whether you would like to see [defendant] killed ... and [w]hat type of man is Dexter Williams? Defense counsel argued that the sought-after testimony constituted character evidence at a penalty phase, citing section 190.3, factor (k). [32] The trial court rejected defense counsel's position, describing as irrelevant Lott's opinion whether defendant should be executed. The trial court observed: [Lott's] opinion is not relevant on that issue. Victim impact evidence is. The type of trauma she had. How she dealt with the trauma.... [ถ] She is not a juror in this case and her opinion as to [whether defendant should be executed] is irrelevant. You can parade a hundred witnesses up here all saying whether or not they feel [defendant] should get the death penalty. I know of no case, and I have read a lot of them, that permits that question. The court further observed that counsel had not laid a foundation for establishing that Lott was a family member, and in the absence of such a foundation, eliciting her opinion would be improper. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony that could be elicited from Lott, and that the asserted error violated defendant's constitutional rights to due process of law, trial by jury, and to a reliable penalty determination. Specifically, defendant argues that the court's limitations on the questions that could be posed to Lott improperly limited his presentation of evidence in mitigation and also precluded defendant's friends and family from making pleas for mercy. In support, he relies upon People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506, in which we discussed a claim that testimony from a witness with whom [the] defendant assertedly had a significant relationship, that [the] defendant deserves to live, is proper mitigating evidence as `indirect evidence of the defendant's character.' ( Id. at p. 102, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; see also People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 194, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 194, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) On the other hand, the view that a crime victim takes of the defendant's proper punishment has no bearing on the defendant's character or record or any circumstance of the offense. [Citation.] Hence, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not compel admission of those views. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 622, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) In the present case, Lott was both a victim of defendant's past criminal conduct within the meaning of People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 581, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302, and, according to defendant, someone with whom defendant had a significant relationship within the meaning of People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506. Emphasizing the former close relationship between Lott and defendant, defendant contends the trial court erred in limiting the scope of the questions posed by defense counsel to Lott. We need not determine whether Lottโa former girlfriend who had not seen defendant for several years prior to trialโin fact was someone whose relationship with defendant was sufficiently close to permit her to testify regarding the impact defendant's execution might have upon her, or whether, by contrast, Lott should be viewed as one of defendant's victims. Nor do we need to determine whether the trial court erred in directing counsel to lay a further foundation to establish the nature of Lott's relationship with defendant. Even if we were to assume error, defendant clearly suffered no prejudice. Upon inquiring of Lott outside the jury's presence whether the execution of defendant would have any impact upon her, and learning that it would not, defense counsel elected not to elicit further testimony from Lott. Had counsel asked such a question of Lott and received the same response during the testimony she gave in the presence of the jury, such testimony at best would have been of no help to defendant and more likely would have harmed his case. [33] Defendant asserts that the trial court's ruling reached beyond Lott's testimony, categorically barring the defense from presenting any plea for mercy from defendant's family and friends. As noted, prior cases establish that the defense may elicit testimony from a defendant's family member or close friend stating the witness's opinion that the defendant deserves to live, because such opinion evidence reflects indirectly upon the defendant's character. ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 622-623, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) We do not read the record as reflecting a broad ruling concerning all potential mitigating testimony from defendant's family and friends. The court was asked to determine the relevance of Lott's opinion, and its statement that [y]ou can parade a hundred witnesses up here all saying whether or not they feel [defendant] should get the death penalty did not constitute consideration of, or a ruling upon, the relevance of testimony from defendant's relatives or close friends, whose desire that defendant not be executed would reflect upon his character. The court also invited defense counsel to present additional evidence of Lott's relationship with defendant. Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention that the court believed and instructed counsel that only relatives, but not persons standing in a significant relationship with the defendant, could provide the contested type of opinion testimony, defendant's friend of 18 years was permitted to testify that he would feel sad and hurt if defendant were executed. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that, when defense counsel examined the defense character witnesses, counsel felt constrained by the court's remarks to avoid questions concerning the witnesses' opinion whether defendant should be given the death penalty. Even assuming without deciding that the court's ruling limiting counsel's questions was error, it clearly was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1058, 47 Cal. Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775 [setting forth standard of review]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 826, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481 [same].) The defense in fact called defendant's mother, stepfather, aunt, uncle, and two cousins, all of whom testified concerning the grief defendant's execution would cause themโand all without objection from the prosecution. As noted, a friend who was not a family member gave similar testimony. The jury clearly would have inferred from the testimony of these witnesses that they did not want defendant to be sentenced to death. ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 826, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.)