Opinion ID: 6337432
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: OSHA’s Multi-Employer Doctrine

Text: Hoping to expand the scope of Makar’s duty, plaintiffs contend that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) “multiemployer doctrine” supports the existence of a Louisiana-law duty that Makar owed to all on-site personnel, including Donahue.25 Under the multiemployer doctrine, OSHA may issue citations to “creating,” “exposing,” “correcting,” and “controlling” employers for a violation of “occupational circumstances like this case. Moreover, finding that these duties apply would conflict with existing Louisiana jurisprudence. See Lafont, 593 So. 2d at 420-21; Ortego, 316 So. 2d at 829. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not engage in impermissible fact finding when it rejected these specific duties. Rather, as a purely legal issue, the court appropriately limited the scope of Makar’s duty based on its lack of control over the fan and the working conditions at the time of Donahue’s injury. 24 Lafont, 593 So. 2d at 420-21; Ortego, 316 So. 2d at 829. 25 See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., CPL 02-00-124, Multi-Employer Citation Policy (1999), [hereinafter “Multi-Employer Citation Policy”]; see also Occupational Safety & Health Admin., CPL 02-00-160, Field Operations Manual 4-5 (2016). 8 Case: 21-30212 Document: 00516304400 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 No. 21-30212 safety and health standards”26 at a multi-employer worksite, even if the employer’s direct employees are not exposed to the hazard.27 For decades, this Court rejected the multi-employer doctrine. Instead, in Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,28 and its progeny, this Court held that OSHA obligations existed only between an employer and its direct employees.29 But in Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Construction Co., this Court overruled that precedent and partially recognized the validity of the multiemployer doctrine.30 In Acosta, we held that OSHA may cite a “controlling employer” for a violation occurring at a multi-employer worksite, even though its own employees were not exposed to the violative condition.31 But the reasoning and holding in Acosta is limited to “controlling employers,”32 and this Court has not yet recognized OSHA’s authority to cite “creating,” “exposing,” or 26 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (“[E]ach employer . . . shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act.”); 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (“The term ‘occupational safety and health standard’ means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.”). An “exposing employer” can also be cited under the “general duty clause,” § 654(a)(1), which provides that “[e]ach employer . . . shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (emphasis added); Multi-Employer Citation Policy at § X.A.1. 27 See Multi-Employer Citation Policy at § X.A; Acosta v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 909 F.3d 723, 728 (5th Cir. 2018). 28 659 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981). 29 See Acosta, 909 F.3d at 727. 30 Id. at 743. 31 Id. 32 Id. at 732-43. 9 Case: 21-30212 Document: 00516304400 Page: 10 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 No. 21-30212 “correcting” employers. Plaintiffs argue that we should (1) extend Acosta to these sorts of employers and (2) recognize that Louisiana law imports an obligation on contractors to comply with OSHA’s multi-employer doctrine. Assuming without deciding that that plaintiffs are correct on both arguments, their claim still fails because any duty Makar had under OSHA’s multi-employer doctrine is materially identical to the “general duty” recognized by Louisiana courts. Plaintiffs argue that Makar was an “exposing,” “correcting,” and “creating” employer. But Makar’s purported role as an “exposing employer”33 is irrelevant here: OSHA’s policy statement makes clear that an “exposing employer[’s]” duties are the same as a “creating employer” when it creates the hazard.34 And, plaintiffs’ characterization notwithstanding,35 there is no evidence that Makar was a “correcting employer,” i.e., “[a]n employer who is engaged in a common undertaking, on the same worksite, as the exposing employer and is responsible for correcting a hazard.”36 Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence showing that Makar had the “responsib[ility] for correcting” the hazard created by the unguarded fan. Instead, uncontroverted evidence 33 An “exposing employer” is “[a]n employer whose own employees are exposed to the hazard.” Multi-Employer Citation Policy at § X.C.1. 34 Id. at § X.C.2. When an “exposing employer” does not create the violative condition, its obligations are limited to its own employees. Id. at § X.C.2. 35 Plaintiffs’ expert, Douglas Moore, opined that Makar was a correcting employer “by virtue of a prior injury to one of its employees.” But Moore also acknowledges that it was Republic, not Makar, who had “responsibility to remove the fan . . . or assure that it was locked and tagged out while personnel were working in the area.” Thus, Moore’s determination that Makar was a “correcting employer” is merely a “conclusory statement,” that does not create a genuine fact dispute. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Conclusory statements are not competent evidence to defeat summary judgment.”). 36 Multi-Employer Citation Policy at § X.D.1. 10 Case: 21-30212 Document: 00516304400 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 No. 21-30212 demonstrates that Makar exercised no control over the fan itself or had the authority to implement corrective measures. That leaves Makar’s role as a “creating employer,” defined as an entity that “caused a hazardous condition that violates an OSHA standard.”37 Similar to the previously discussed “general duty to refrain from creating a hazard,” the obligation owed by a “creating employer” is to not “create violative conditions.”38 Further, just as Louisiana courts have limited the “general duty,” OSHA will not automatically cite every employer that creates a violative condition. Rather, as an example in the policy statement makes clear, an employer that “caused a hazardous condition” and “lack[s] authority to fix” the condition cannot be cited when it takes “immediate and effective steps to keep all employees away from the hazard and notifie[s] the controlling employer of the hazard.”39 Ultimately, plaintiffs’ arguments about OSHA’s multi-employer doctrine make no difference in this lawsuit. To the extent the doctrine supports the existence of a duty Makar owed, Louisiana jurisprudence already recognizes that duty.