Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Discharge Juror During Trial

Text: During the guilt trial, Juror No. 3 three times asked, through the bailiff, if the jury could see photographs of the two victims while alive. After the third request, the juror was asked to appear before court and counsel, outside the presence of the other jurors. Asked by the court his reason for wanting such photographs, the juror responded, It's just because dreams and stuff. I have no faces to put on the girls. All I have is just blackened after she had been strangled, and the other one I have never seen her face because it's in the back of the seat. On further questioning, he explained that he had had a few dreams since this trial started, and like I said, I have two girls without faces that are in there, and just for my own peace of mind he wanted something to put together with the testimony about the victims and the crime scene and autopsy photos. The juror denied the dreams had had any adverse effect on him, that he had any question whether he might be acquainted with the victims, or that the lack of live photos would have any bearing which way I would vote or anything else. He agreed with the court's characterization of his desire as one for completion of the entire picture involving this case. The court told the juror, I would assume that you haven't discussed this desire on your part with any of the other jurors, to which the juror answered, No, but the court did not at that time expressly instruct him not to do so. After this first interview, the prosecutor noted that he did have photographs of both victims when alive, but was not sure he would be offering them in evidence. The court said that all it could do was to rule upon the admissibility at the time it arises. Defense counsel made no comment and did not seek to discharge the juror. With agreement of both counsel, the court then instructed the entire jury that only evidence that is relevant and admissible under the Evidence Code could be presented to them; that the evidence is presented by the parties, subject to rulings by the court; and that in their eventual deliberations the jurors were not to discuss matters that had not been introduced into evidence. During the next court session, an alternate juror revealed that after his interview with court and counsel, Juror No. 3 had mentioned his request to her, saying, I thought it was a reasonable request. No other jurors or alternates were present, and the alternate ended the conversation by saying, I think that would have to be submitted as evidence, and walking away. Outside the alternate's presence, the prosecutor remarked that even if Juror No. 3 had not been expressly admonished not to discuss the subject with other jurors, such a prohibition was implied by the court's question at the end of the first interview. Defense counsel agreed, One might have thought that would be implicit, but evidently not. Again questioned by the court, Juror No. 3 said he understood he was not supposed to talk about the case with other jurors. He apologized, denied he was dissatisfied with the court's previous ruling and instructions, and explained that after his first interview, they asked me what I had asked for, and I just mentioned that I had asked to see pictures of the girls. I didn't figure that was talking about it or anything else. The court asked the juror whether even though we may not . . . satisfy that desire on your part, whether you could put that out of your mind and still be a fair juror in this case and not let that affect you in any way in your decision making. The juror responded, Yes. Asked whether he had discussed his request with many of the jurors, Juror No. 3 said it was three or four of them standing there when they asked me what I had come in for. I mentioned that I had asked to see pictures. It wasn't no discussion on it. He said he now understood he should [s]ay nothing. After Juror No. 3 left, defense counsel did not move for his discharge or make any comment on the just completed interview. When the entire jury reentered, the court, without any objection, admonished all of them that if, during trial, it is necessary that the Court occasionally talk to an individual juror alone, please don't ask that particular juror what it is that he or she is sharing with us at that point. That would be talking about this case, and it's something that you're not to. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury in failing to discharge Juror No. 3 after the second interview. We conclude, however, that defendant forfeited this issue by failing to seek the juror's excusal or otherwise object to the court's course of action. ( People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 428, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137; People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 188, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169; People v. McIntyre (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 899, 906, 176 Cal.Rptr. 3; People v. Wilson (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 266, 281, 45 Cal.Rptr. 267.) [H]ad [defendant] made the request at this time [after the juror was examined] when there was a suggestion of misconduct on the record, the court could have formally ruled on the matter . . . and cured the problem, if any, by excusing the juror and substituting an alternate. ( People v. McIntyre, supra, at p. 906, 176 Cal.Rptr. 3.) Having expressed no desire to have the juror discharged at the time, and indeed no concern the juror had engaged in prejudicial misconduct, defendant is not privileged to make that argument now for the first time on appeal. ( Ibid. ) Nor does the record establish the court abused its discretion or deprived defendant of an impartial jury by leaving Juror No. 3 on the panel. (See § 1089 [juror may be discharged if unable to perform his or her duty].) The trial court's decision whether or not to discharge a juror under section 1089 is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence; to warrant discharge the juror's bias or other disability must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 489, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) A juror's misconduct creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, but reversal is required only if there is a substantial likelihood one or more jurors were improperly influenced by bias. ( In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 118-119, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466; People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 950-951, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Defendant does not contend the juror's experience of dreams about the victims, in itself, made him unable to serve; rather, he argues the juror exhibited two forms of misconduct: First, in discussing the case with [the alternate juror], he violated his oath and the admonition not to so do. . . . Second[ ], [Juror No. 3] attempted to conceal his misconduct by asserting, completely contrary to [the alternate's] representation, that he did not approach anyone about this, but was asked himself. This misconduct, defendant asserts, demonstrates the juror's bias against him. True, the jurors were several times admonished not to discuss this case with outsiders or, until beginning deliberations, even among themselves; Juror No. 3 was further impliedly told, in the first interview, not to discuss his desire for live pictures of the victims with other jurors. But the juror indicated, in his second interview, that he had not thought answering the other jurors' question about the reason for his first interview violated these admonitions because he did not see answering the question as talking about or discuss[ing] these matters. There was then the following exchange: THE COURT: Okay. Fine. They ask you why I brought you in this morning, don't discuss  JUROR [NO. 3]: Say nothing. THE COURT: Okay. All right. And I think I'll cover that generally speaking when I bring in the rest of the jurors on that subject. As previously noted, the court did then admonish the entire jury not to ask about or discuss the subject of any interview an individual juror might have with court and counsel. The trial court, with an opportunity to observe the juror's demeanor, could reasonably have believed from this sequence of events that no deliberate disobedience to its admonitions had occurred and that its more specific admonition after the second interview would prevent any further misunderstanding. Counsel were apparently also of that view, as they made no suggestion that any deliberate misconduct had occurred. Nor was it clear that Juror No. 3 was misrepresenting or concealing events in indicating that he had responded to other jurors' queries about his first interview. While the alternate juror had said no other jurors were present when Juror No. 3 remarked to her, I thought it was a reasonable request, it is possible that remark followed the interchange with other jurors that Juror No. 3 recounted. The two accounts, therefore, are not necessarily inconsistent. From the transcript, it appears Juror No. 3 might have been somewhat frustrated at the prospect that his request would go unanswered and at the court's insistence that he not talk about it. The court probed his feelings in that regard to see if they were so strong as to interfere with his ability to serve, asking whether Juror No. 3 could still be a fair juror in this case and not let that affect you in any way in your decision making. The juror responded affirmatively, and the court, which, again, had the opportunity to observe his tone and demeanor, was apparently satisfied with that response. Again, the attorneys  who were also present and observed the juror  apparently also were not concerned that Juror No. 3 might be too resentful to serve impartially, as none of them suggested such a possibility to the court. In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court's implicit determination that Juror No. 3 was still able to serve impartially as a juror, and no inability appears as a demonstrable reality in the record; the court's failure to discharge him was therefore not an abuse of discretion. As to reversal for juror misconduct, the record does not reflect a substantial likelihood the juror was influenced by bias against defendant; we have no basis to conclude, therefore, that defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.