Opinion ID: 628682
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The reasonable number of hours

Text: 18 The next step in the computation of the lodestar is the ascertainment of reasonable hours. The party seeking attorney fees begins by submitting evidence of the hours worked. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. The district court should then exclude (1) excessive or otherwise unnecessary hours, (2) redundant hours, and (3) hours spent on discrete and unsuccessful claims. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301-02. As we explained in Norman, excessive or otherwise unnecessary hours are those hours that would be unreasonable to bill a client, irrespective of the skill, reputation, or experience of counsel. Id. at 1301 (emphasis in original). Where the court believes that the attorney seeking fees is inefficient or unskilled, the court should adjust the hourly rate, not reduce the time billed. Perkins v. Mobile Housing Bd., 847 F.2d 735, 738 (11th Cir.1988). 19 Ray sought reimbursement for 2907 hours. In support of those hours, Ray submitted an 80-page typed summary of the hours spent on this case and the related state litigation as well as copies of his contemporaneous handwritten time sheets. The district allowed only 560 hours. In making that reduction, the court first found that a review of the movant's time sheets reflects a total of approximately 800 allowable hours devoted to this particular case. This statement fails to comply with the requirement set forth in Norman that the district court explain which hours are disallowed and show why an award of those hours would be improper. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1304. By failing to satisfy this requirement, the district court abused its discretion. 4 See Gilmere, 931 F.2d at 815 (remanding award that reduced claimed hours because those hours were excessive); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir.1989) (remanding award that reduced claimed hours because those hours were unreasonable); Perkins, 847 F.2d at 738 (remanding award that reduced hours claimed because those hours were excessive). 20 In this case, however, the district court's ability to explain its disallowance of hours was severely hampered by Ray's failure to submit his request in a form which would enable the court to determine how much time was spent on the federal litigation and how much time was spent on the state litigation and other matters. When the request for attorney fees does not permit easy division between compensable and non-compensable hours, the district court should require the party seeking fees to refashion its request. See King v. McCord, 707 F.2d 466, 468 (11th Cir.1983) (burden on party seeking fees to provide sufficient evidence for party to make correct division). Thus, rather that simply slashing Ray's requested fees as excessive, the district court should have required Ray to resubmit his request in a form which allowed the court to clearly delineate between the federal and state litigation.