Opinion ID: 769328
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Co-defendant's Life Sentence as Mitigating

Text: 33 Paul next argues that his rights under the FDPA and the Constitution were violated because the jury failed to unanimously find and consider as a relevant mitigating factor that Ingle only received a life sentence. 6 He argues that under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (requiring sentencer be able to give independent mitigating weight to aspects of defendant's circumstances), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (relevant mitigating evidence must not be excluded from consideration), no rational trier of fact could have concluded that Paul was more culpable than Ingle, who received a life sentence. Neither the FDPA nor Lockett and Eddings require a capital jury to give mitigating effect or weight to any particular evidence. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (holding that the Constitution requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant). There is only a constitutional violation if there exists a reasonable likelihood that the jurors believed themselves precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence. See id. at 386. Here, the jury was certainly allowed to consider Ingle's life sentence, because this evidence was introduced at the penalty phase of the trial. Further we find support for the finding that Paul was more culpable than Ingle, because there was evidence that Paul, and not Ingle, shot Williams. Although there was also evidence that Ingle shot Williams, the jury was not required to credit this evidence. Accordingly, we find no error.