Opinion ID: 183973
Heading Depth: 3
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Heading: Detention during Execution of Warrant under Summers

Text: For many of the same reasons outlined above, Bullock's detention was also justified under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). The Court in Summers extended Terry beyond the momentary, on-the-street detention to the detainment of a resident or occupant who is on the premises while a search pursuant to a warrant is conducted. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700-05, 101 S.Ct. 2587. A detention under Summers is analogous in certain respects to a Terry stop. See United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir.1995) (While detention during the execution of a search warrant is not a traditional Terry stop, it is sufficiently analogous for us to conclude that, in the usual case, Miranda warnings are not required.). The Court in Summers held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587. The detention of an occupant is warranted because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-05, 101 S.Ct. 2587) (observing that an officer's authority to detain incident to a search is categorical). The Court indicated three legitimate law enforcement justifications for detention during execution of a search warrant: (1) to prevent flight in the event incriminating evidence is discovered; (2) to minimize the risk of harm to the officers; and (3) to facilitate the orderly completion of the search. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587. In Summers, police officers were about to execute a warrant to search a house for narcotics when they encountered the defendant descending the front steps. Id. at 693, 101 S.Ct. 2587. The officers detained the defendant, who was the resident of the premises, during the search. The Court found that defendant's detention in his home was surely less intrusive than the search itself[,] because it could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search . . . and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station. Id. at 701-02, 101 S.Ct. 2587. The Court further reasoned that once [a] judicial officer has determined that police have probable cause to believe that someone in the home is committing a crime[,] . . . [t]he connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant. Id. at 703-04, 101 S.Ct. 2587. We have extended the rationale of Summers to visitors of a home. See United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1239 (7th Cir.1990) (reasoning that defendants' connection as visitors to the condominium gave the officers `an easily identifiable and certain basis' for detaining them during the search) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-04, 101 S.Ct. 2587); see also United States v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815, 818-19 (7th Cir.2008) (relying on Summers to find lawful the brief detainment of defendant who had entered security perimeter surrounding targeted apartment where narcotics search was underway). The issue here is whether the reasoning in Summers should be extended to an individual who has left the residence before execution of the search warrant, is pulled over a few blocks away, and is detained during the search. Under the particular facts of this case, we find that it should. Bullock's detention was reasonable given his suspected criminal activity in connection with the residence, his risk of flight, and the potential danger he posed to officers if not detained. He was detained for thirty or forty minutes at a residence he had just left and had visited on multiple occasions; the officers' interests in detaining him during the search were not outweighed by this rather limited intrusion on his freedom. Other circuits have extended Summers in similar circumstances. In United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1991), police officers went to the defendant's residence to execute a search warrant and observed the defendant leaving the premises. Id. Officers did not want to forcibly enter the premises knowing that there was a guard dog inside. Id. Accordingly, the officers stopped the defendant shortly after he exited the premises and requested assistance in entering the house. Id. The court, relying on Summers, found that his detention was reasonable. Id. at 339. The court explained that  Summers does not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity (i.e., defendant must be detained while still on his premises); rather, the focus is upon police performance, that is, whether the police detained defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his residence. Id. The Fifth Circuit similarly extended Summers. In United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 708 (5th Cir.2002), officers were conducting surveillance of a residence in preparation of executing a search warrant. The defendant and two others left the residence in a truck, pulled up closely to the officers' vehicle and peered inside. Id. The truck drove away and the officers followed. Id. The truck then made a U-turn, approached the officers, and crossed over into the officers' lane, creating a standoff. Id. Both vehicles stopped, and the officers exited their vehicle with guns drawn. Id. The officers took defendant back to the residence and detained him during the search. Id. The court in Cavazos found the officers' actions lawful under Summers. Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711. The defendant's connection to the residence gave officers an `easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifie[d] a detention of that occupant.' Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-04, 101 S.Ct. 2587). The officers also had reason to believe that he was performing some type of counter-surveillance when he drove the truck toward them in a threatening manner. Id. This conduct warranted the belief that [the defendant] would have fled or alerted the other occupants of the residence about the agents nearby if he were released immediately after the stop and frisk. Id. The court noted that while [t]he proximity between an occupant of a residence and the residence itself may be relevant in deciding whether to apply Summers, . . . it is by no means controlling. Id. at 712. Other circuits have declined to extend Summers to a resident or occupant who has left the residence to be searched. In United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 345 (8th Cir. 1994), officers obtained a search warrant based on reliable information that defendant was dealing drugs from his residence. Id. Before execution of the warrant, the defendant left the premises and officers stopped him a block away, informed him that they had the warrant, and detained him during the search. Id. Officers handcuffed him, read him his rights, and took him back to the residence. Id. at 345-46. The court found that Summers did not apply because the defendant had already left the premises, so the intrusiveness of the officers' stop and detention on the street was much greater. Id. at 346. Further, although the defendant helped the officers conduct the search, when they stopped defendant, they did not have any interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search's risk because the defendant had left the area and was unaware of the warrant. Id. In United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 91 (10th Cir.1996), police prepared to execute a search warrant of a suspected drug house. The defendant, an ex-convict in a drug rehabilitation program, was a frequent visitor of the house. Before the search, police observed the defendant leave the house. They pulled him over, suspecting that the vehicle contained drugs and that he might be armed and dangerous. Id. The defendant was detained street-side for forty-five minutes, during which time officers drew their guns and handcuffed him. Id. The officers did not find contraband or drugs on him or in the vehicle, but he did have keys to the house. Id. at 91-92. The forty-five minute detention, the court found, was unreasonable because by the conclusion of the search of the house, the officers no longer possessed the reasonable suspicion that initially justified the stop. Id. at 93. The court also declined to extend Summers because prior to the stop the defendant was unaware that a warrant was being executed so he had no reason to flee. Id. at 94. Further, the defendant did not pose a risk of harm to the officers and his detention played no part in facilitating the orderly completion of the search. Id. Unlike in Sherrill and Edwards, the particular facts of this case warrant extension of Summers. The officers had probable cause to pull Wilhelm over for driving on a suspended license. Although they pulled her over ten to fifteen blocks from the residence, Greenlee testified that he had to radio uniformed officers to make the stop and there is nothing to suggest that the vehicle was not pulled over as soon as practicable. During the stop, officers reasonably informed Wilhelm of the search warrant, at which point Bullock became aware of the warrant. Once aware of the warrant, he became a flight risk and a potential risk to the officers' safety in executing the warrant given his suspected illegal association with the residence. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (recognizing the execution of a warrant to search for drugs may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence). Bullock's detention was not unreasonably prolonged. He was at the traffic stop scene for ten to twenty minutes before he was taken to the residence and by the time he returned to the residence, the search was underway. See, e.g., Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (finding two- to three-hour detainment of occupant in handcuffs reasonable while police searched premises because such restraints did not outweigh government's continuing safety interests). Officers did not exploit the detention by trying to obtain additional evidence from Bullock during execution of the search warrant. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 701, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (stating that detaining an occupant during execution of a search warrant is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the detention); see also Pace, 898 F.2d at 1239 (finding detention of visitors in home during execution of search warrant reasonable in part because the police did not exploit the detentions to obtain information or search them except for performing a pat-down). Further, the use of handcuffs was reasonable. Inherent in Summers' authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-99, 125 S.Ct. 1465. While a roadside detention followed by handcuffs and placement in a squad car certainly carries more stigma than a detention in one's home, the facts in this case warranted the additional intrusions for the limited time to execute the search warrant.