Opinion ID: 2487736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Lost or Destroyed Evidence

Text: Once the trial court found that the evidence had not been tampered with, the trial court categorized the missing fragment as lost or destroyed evidence and found that the remaining fragment was admissible under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) ([U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith by the police on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.). Youngblood explained that the presence or absence of bad faith for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. 488 U.S. at 56 n. , 109 S.Ct. 333; see also Guzman v. State, 868 So.2d 498, 509 (Fla.2003). In the instant case, the trial court found that the failure to preserve the missing fragment was not indicative of bad faith. This Court has previously recognized, [B]ad faith exists only when law enforcement officers intentionally destroy evidence they believe would exonerate a defendant. Id. Here, Armstrong has not shown that the projectile exonerated him or that the State ever believed it might. The testimony presented below does not indicate that the prosecutors or police in this case believed the bullet fragments were exculpatory or had any tendency to exonerate Armstrong. Nor does the record reveal that the fragments were destroyed. It does not logically follow that anyone who sought to destroy the evidence would remove one tiny fragment, but leave the larger fragment intact. Therefore, any claim of bad faith destruction or loss of the evidence fails. Furthermore, as the State repeatedly explained throughout its brief, Armstrong's offered mitigation involved claims that he was not the shooter and that if Armstrong had any involvement it was minor and under duress. Given that the instant jury had not heard the original guilt phase presentation, but was there merely for resentencing, it was necessary for the State to show the circumstances surrounding the crime and facts that established Armstrong's guilt to prove aggravation. Likewise, the State was permitted to rebut the offered mitigation. The bullet fragments supported Armstrong's guilt and his volitional and intimate involvement in the robbery, the shooting of Sallustio, and the first-degree murder of Greeney. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the remaining projectile fragment during Armstrong's new penalty phase trial.
Third, Armstrong contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to instruct the jury that Armstrong was not guaranteed parole at or after 25 years. Instructions given by a trial court during jury deliberations are subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Green v. State, 907 So.2d 489, 498 (citing Perriman v. State, 731 So.2d 1243, 1246 (Fla.1999)); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.410. Discretion is abused only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. White v. State, 817 So.2d 799, 806 (Fla.2002). However, the court should not give instructions which are confusing, contradictory, or misleading. Butler v. State, 493 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla.1986) (citing Finch v. State, 116 Fla. 437, 156 So. 489 (1934)). In the present case, the trial court considered this Court's decisions in Downs, 572 So.2d at 900 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in only instructing the jury that the defendant would received credit for time served); Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1332-33 (Fla.1997) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the defendant would receive credit for time served and in instructing the jury to rely on their recollection of the evidence when asked when parole would occur on the defendant's other life sentences); and Green v. State, 907 So.2d 489, 497 (Fla.2005) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that the defendant would be entitled to credit for time served, but that parole at or after twenty-five years was not guaranteed). As the State correctly contends, this Court's decision in Green does not require that a jury be instructed on the eligibility of parole. Although the circumstances surrounding the jury question and the trial court's jury instruction in a case may give rise to an abuse of discretion, we have never held that a trial court is required, or per se abuses its discretion in failing, to instruct a jury that parole is not guaranteed. Notably, the standard jury instruction does not apprise a jury of whether a defendant will be guaranteed parole. The jury instruction below was not confusing, misleading, or contradictory. Nor was it a misstatement of the law. The record reveals that the jury was repeatedly informed that parole was only a possibility. Moreover, the jury was aware that Armstrong had been convicted of other crimesthe State presented evidence that Armstrong was convicted of the related violent felonies and an armed robbery that occurred on February 4, 1990. Thus, the jury was aware that Armstrong was serving other sentences in addition to the life sentence that serves as the basis for this issue. The trial court provided the jury with an accurate instruction when it limited the jury instruction to the specific jury question that was asked. The jury asked whether Armstrong would be entitled to credit for time served, and the trial court instructed the jury that he would be entitled to credit for time served. As Armstrong correctly points out, the State's reliance on Waterhouse v. State, 596 So.2d 1008 (Fla.1992), is misplaced because there, the trial court refused to answer the jury question and instead informed the jury that it would have to depend on the evidence and the instructions. Id. at 1015. Additionally, the instant case does not contain the peculiar facts that were present in Hitchcock v. State, 673 So.2d 859, 863 (Fla.1996) (concluding that the State's argument that Hitchcock would be eligible for parole after twenty-five years was misleading and prejudicial due to the close proximity of the expiration of his sentence and his resentencing). Furthermore, even if the trial court abused its discretion, it would be of no consequence, because any error is harmless. Armstrong had already been convicted of the crime. It cannot be said that this instruction would have caused the jury to arrive at a conclusion they would not have otherwise reached as there is substantial aggravation in the instant case that provides independent support for the jury recommendation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion below.
Fourth, Armstrong contends that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial and undermines confidence in the result of his capital proceedings. We have repeatedly held that where the alleged errors, when viewed individually, are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also necessarily fails. Israel v. State, 985 So.2d 510, 520 (Fla.2008) (quoting Parker v. State, 904 So.2d 370, 380 (Fla.2005)). Moreover, during Armstrong's second penalty phase, ample evidence in support of the aggravating factors and sentence of death was introduced independent of the allegedly erroneous evidence. Because Armstrong has failed to demonstrate that any of his claims amounted to error, we deny his claim of cumulative error.
In determining whether death is a proportionate punishment, this Court is required to compare the totality of the circumstances of Armstrong's case to the circumstances of similar cases in which the Court has affirmed sentences of death. See Simmons v. State, 934 So.2d 1100, 1122 (Fla.2006) (citing Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 417 (Fla.1998)). This Court conducts a two-pronged inquiry, comparing the instant case to other cases to determine [whether] the crime falls within the category of both (1) the most aggravated, and (2) the least mitigated of murders. Almeida v. State, 748 So.2d 922, 933 (Fla. 1999). This entails `a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.' Offord v. State, 959 So.2d 187, 191 (Fla.2007) (quoting Urbin, 714 So.2d at 416). In the instant case, the jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three. The trial court found three aggravators: (1) prior violent felony based on two underlying felonies; (2) the murder was committed during a robbery; and (3) the victim in this capital case was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties. Each aggravating factor was accorded great weight. The trial court found one statutory mitigator: (1) the existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty. Finally, the trial court found the existence of one nonstatutory mitigator: (1) Armstrong had problems growing up because he was biracial (little weight). After weighing the aggravation and mitigation, the trial court stated that the aggravating circumstances in this case far outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstances in this case are overwhelming. Then, the trial court sentenced Armstrong to death. We have previously affirmed the death penalty in a single-aggravator case where the single aggravator was a prior violent felony. See Bevel v. State, 983 So.2d 505, 524 (Fla.2008) (citing Ferrell v. State, 680 So.2d 390 (Fla.1996)); see also Lindsey v. State, 636 So.2d 1327, 1329 (Fla.1994). We have repeatedly explained that the prior violent felony conviction aggravator is one of the most weighty in Florida's sentencing scheme. Sireci v. Moore, 825 So.2d 882, 887 (Fla.2002). Given the presence of this aggravator, which is based on the contemporaneous attempted murder of Sallustio and on an armed robbery that Armstrong committed 13 days prior to the murder of Greeney, and the scant mitigation present in this case, it appears that Armstrong's death sentence remains proportionate. Moreover, we have upheld the imposition of the death penalty as proportionate where there was similar aggravation and more mitigation. See Wheeler v. State, 4 So.3d 599, 603 (Fla.2009) (concluding that the death sentence was proportionate where there were four aggravators, two statutory mitigators, and eleven nonstatutory mitigators). Accordingly, we conclude that when compared with other capital cases, the death sentence in Armstrong's case is proportionate. It is so ordered. LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority's reasoning as to all issues on appeal except for the trial judge's answer to a question from the jury regarding sentencing options. I would reverse for a new penalty phase. In this case, by giving the jurors a brief answer that Armstrong would receive credit for time served, the trial court did not provide a complete and full answer to the jurors' question, but in fact reinforced the jurors' idea that Armstrong's sentence for murder would be completed within a mere eight years. The crime in this case took place in 1990, and by 2007 when Armstrong received a new penalty phase, he had already served seventeen years in prison. The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they could either recommend death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. [8] After deliberations began, the jury asked, Will the 17 years he served be included in his sentence?  The judge answered that the defendant will receive credit for the time served. It is apparent on the face of the jury's inquiry that the jurors had a very logical question regarding the effect of a recommendation of life and wanted to know in advance how such a recommendation would work in this case, since the defendant had already served seventeen years of any sentence to be imposed. Obviously, the implication that the defendant would be eligible for parole in eight years would work against him significantly. Moreover, the question also reflects a potential misunderstanding that the jurors believed that if they voted for life, his sentence would be limited to only twenty-five years, as opposed to a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the first twenty-five years. I conclude that by not answering the question to explain that the twenty-five years was not the defendant's actual sentence, but rather the minimum length of a sentence of life, and that there was no guarantee of parole at or after twenty-five years, the court gave the jurors a confusing and incomplete answer, leading them to believe that he would be released in another eight years. Rather, under the circumstances of this case, where Armstrong would be merely eligible for parole in only eight years, the proper instruction would have been a variation of that given by the trial judge in Green v. State, 907 So.2d 489, 496 (Fla.2005): The defendant, if sentenced to life without possibility for parole for 25 years, would be entitled to credit for all time jail served [sic] against a life sentence. However, there is no guarantee that the defendant would be granted parole at or after 25 years. (Emphasis added.) In my view, this case is similar to Hitchcock v. State, 673 So.2d 859, 863 (Fla.1996), in which this Court explicitly held that it was unfairly prejudicial to permit the State to argue that a defendant was eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years in a case where the defendant had already served seventeen out of the twenty-five years at the time of resentencing. Specifically, in that case, the defendant raised two related claims on appeal: (1) he was prejudiced by the State's argument that if given a life sentence, he would be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years; and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that his time served would be credited toward his sentence. Id. at 863, 860 n. 1. As the Court had already determined that Hitchcock was entitled to resentencing based on an unrelated claim, the Court did not need to address either of these arguments. Regardless, the Court reviewed the claim pertaining to the State's argument in order to provide guidance during the next resentencing and explicitly directed the State to refrain from making such arguments again during the resentencing because the arguments unfairly prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 863. Although this Court did not address the claim regarding whether the trial court erred as to its instructions to the jury, the Court expressly held that the State improperly argued that Hitchcock would be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years because  the resentencing occurred so close to the expiration of the twenty-five-year sentence. Id. (emphasis added); see also Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1333 (Fla.1997) (In Hitchcock, the State argued in a resentencing proceeding that the defendant would be eligible for parole after twenty-five years if given a life sentence. We held this argument to be improper and unfairly prejudicial because the resentencing occurred so close in time to the expiration of the twenty-five-year period. In contrast, the State in the present case did not make any such argument, nor was Gore close to meeting the expiration of the twenty-five-year minimum mandatory.). As in Hitchcock, here, Armstrong had served seventeen years and had only eight years remaining until he was eligible for parole. Moreover, both in Hitchcock and in this case, the jury was apprised that parole was only a possibilitynot a guarantee. The majority summarily asserts that this case does not contain the peculiar facts that were established in Hitchcock, but fails to discuss what peculiar facts differentiate Hitchcock from the instant case. Both cases involve a defendant who was a mere eight years away from being eligible for parole, and both cases involve the jury being apprised that parole was not a guarantee. However, in the decision now pending before the Court, the majority permits the trial court to inform the jury on the very issue that this Court previously held that the State may not argue during closing. In Hitchcock, this Court stated that even permitting the prosecutor to make the argument would be unfairly prejudicial. In this case, while the court had discretion in determining whether to answer the question posed, if the court chose to answer the question, the defendant was entitled to a complete answer. The trial court's incomplete response gave the impression that the defendant would be out in society in a mere eight years. This may have ultimately played a critical role in the jury's decision not to recommend consecutive life sentences. Such an error cannot be considered harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Another troubling aspect of this case is that the defendant was given consecutive life sentences, so in reality he could not possibly have been released from prison in any event after twenty-five years. Although in Gore, 706 So.2d at 1332-33, we stated that it was not error for the trial court to fail to discuss the other life sentences where there was no mandatory minimum sentence for any of the life sentences, it seems to me that when the date of a defendant's possible release is critical to whether a jury recommends a life sentence, the jury should have the complete facts in order to make an informed decision. The jury in a capital penalty-phase proceeding is in a unique position that does not occur in the context of any other jury matter. The jury is a cosentencer, and its sentencing recommendation is entitled to great weight. See Snelgrove v. State, 921 So.2d 560, 571 (Fla.2005) ([I]n Florida, the judge and jury are considered cosentencers, and a recommendation of life must be accorded great weight by the sentencing judge. (citation omitted)). However, unlike the trial judge, the jury has no working knowledge of the actual length of the sentence that a defendant is facing if it recommends the option of life without the possibility of parole for 25 years. Therefore, to the extent that its vote for life or death may hinge on concerns that the defendant may be released from prison, the jury should be informed of all relevant information that bears upon the ultimate length of the prison sentence. In this context, the jury is solely dependent upon the instructions from the trial court and the answers to questions regarding the actual sentence. For the reasons addressed above, I dissent as to the sentence and would remand for resentencing. However, I would urge the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases to propose a standard instruction to address situations where a defendant has been serving a lengthy prison sentence and the jury in resentencing has a question as to the effect of the sentence on his eligibility for parole. The answer to the question, while now guided by the abuse of discretion standard, may literally be the difference between life and death; that is, a jury may be more inclined to recommend a life sentence if it is not under the misapprehension that the defendant would be released shortly. LABARGA, J., concurs.