Opinion ID: 1796226
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Heading: Vicarious Liability Under the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior

Text: The law in Alabama is well settled that an employer is not liable for the intentional acts of its employee unless the acts were committed within the scope of the employee's employment or were done to further the interests of the employer. Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 477 So.2d 364, 365 (Ala.1985). East Alabama argues that the trial court should not have submitted the issue of vicarious liability to the jury because, as a matter of law, Whitchard's actions were beyond her scope of employment. Further, East Alabama argues that under Alabama law, sexual misconduct by an employee is never vicariously attributable to the employer. The Chanceys contend that East Alabama is liable under the theory of respondeat superior because, they say, Whitchard failed to inform Phillip about transference phenomenon when he first expressed romantic feelings for Whitchard. During her trial testimony, Whitchard defined transference as a social construct that describes when a patient has feelings based on past, family, social, etc., etc., experiences that they project on a therapist. The Chanceys argue that the duty to inform Phillip of the existence of such a phenomenon was within the scope of Whitchard's employment. In Solmica of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Braggs, 285 Ala. 396, 232 So.2d 638 (1970), this Court articulated the test by which to determine whether an employer should by held liable for the actions of an employee: `The test is the service in which the employee is engaged. The rule which has been approved for determining whether certain conduct of an employee is within the line and scope of his employment is substantially that if an employee is engaged to perform a certain service, whatever he does to that end, or in furtherance of the employment, is deemed by law to be an act done within the scope of the employment....' The conduct of the employee, to come within the rule, must not be impelled by motives that are wholly personal, or to gratify his own feelings or resentment, but should be in promotion of the business of his employment. 285 Ala. at 401, 232 So.2d at 642-43 (citations omitted). This Court discussed this test and how it relates to an employee's sexual misconduct in Doe v. Swift, 570 So.2d 1209 (Ala.1990). The plaintiff in Swift had been sexually assaulted by a psychologist employed by a State-run hospital. Subsequently, the plaintiff won a judgment against the psychologist in a federal court. The State refused to pay the judgment out of the State Employees' Liability Trust Fund because it believed that the psychologist's actions were outside of the scope of his employment. The plaintiff filed an action in state court, seeking to compel the payment of the judgment from the Fund. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. This Court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the sexual misconduct was wholly outside of the scope of the employment because it was not done in furtherance of the employer's business, but rather it was done for the psychologist's personal gratification. [1] Swift, 570 So.2d at 1213. The instant case is similar to Swift. Whitchard's affair with Phillip was not a function of her employment at East Alabama. Furthermore, East Alabama had nothing to gain from the affair. It is undisputed that East Alabama instructed Whitchard to end her relationship with Phillip immediately upon Sweeney and Beacham's accidental discovery of Phillip's infatuation with Whitchard. The Chanceys presented evidence acknowledging that Whitchard's actions were personal to her and were not condoned by her profession. The Chanceys' expert witness, Dr. Barry Burkhardt, testified that [Whitchard] didn't take care of [Phillip]. In fact, what she did instead was form a personal relationship with him, and in the context of that personal relationship, gratified [her] needs at the expense of Mr. Chancey's well-being. Whitchard's affair with Phillip was not undertaken to further East Alabama's business of providing psychiatric treatment to its patients; rather, it was done to satisfy Whitchard's personal needs. Under Alabama law, an employer is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior when the employee acts for his or her own personal gain and not in furtherance of the employee's business; therefore, East Alabama should not be held liable for the actions of Whitchard. See Swift, 570 So.2d at 1213; Solmica, 285 Ala. at 401, 232 So.2d at 642-43. Relying upon Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1986), the Chanceys assert that East Alabama should be held liable because Whitchard failed to explain the theory of transference to Phillip. In Simmons, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government was liable for the sexual misconduct of a psychiatrist employed by the Indian Health Service, a federal agency. The psychiatrist had been treating the patient for five years when she expressed her feelings of attraction for him. The psychiatrist encouraged her to act upon these feelings, and he failed to inform her about transference phenomenon. Simmons, however, does not govern this case. In Simmons, the Ninth Circuit applied what it considered to be the law of the State of Washington regarding vicarious liability, citing a case involving an automobile collision. However, in Swift, we listed Simmons among cases that stood for the proposition that `sexual acts can be in the line and scope of one's employment.' 570 So.2d at 1212. This Court then stated, We are not persuaded by the holdings in these cases. A Washington court has subsequently criticized Simmons. See Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 71 Wash.App. 548, 553, 860 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1993). After noting that the court in Simmons had held that an employer could be liable for a sexual relationship conducted in conjunction with other acts within the scope of the employee's duties, the Thompson court rejected that holding and stated: We hold the better view to be that of Kuehn [v. White, 24 Wash.App. 274, 600 P.2d 679 (1979)], which states: `Where the servant's intentionally tortious or criminal acts are not performed in furtherance of the master's business, the master will not be held liable as a matter of law even though the employment situation provided the opportunity for the servant's wrongful acts or the means for carrying them out. ' (Emphasis added [in Thompson ].) Kuehn, 24 Wash.App. at 278, 600 P.2d 679. This rule sets forth that a tort committed by an agent, even if committed while engaged in the employment of the principal, is not attributable to the principal if it emanated from a wholly personal motive of the agent and was done to gratify solely personal objectives or desires of the agent. 71 Wash.App. at 553, 860 P.2d at 1058. Several other federal and state courts, in addition to the Washington court, have distinguished or declined to follow the holding in Simmons. See K.E.S. v. United States, 38 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir.1994); Mansfield v. Watson, 990 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.1993); Reed v. Barnes, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.1993); Lopez v. United States, 998 F.Supp. 1239 (D.N.M.1998); Benavidez v. United States, 998 F.Supp. 1225 (D.N.M.1997); Shirley v. United States, 832 F.Supp. 1324 (D.Minn.1993); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.1991); Wood v. United States, 760 F.Supp. 952 (D.Mass.1991); John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal.3d 438, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948 (1989); Doe v. Madison Ctr. Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 101 (Ind.App.1995); P.W.P. v. L.S., 266 Kan. 417, 969 P.2d 896 (1998); Gray v. Johnson & Johnson Med., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 9 (2001) (not reported in N.E.2d); Bratton v. Calkins, 73 Wash. App. 492, 870 P.2d 981 (1994); Washington Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Hicks, 49 Wash.App. 623, 744 P.2d 625 (1987). Alabama has also carved out an exception to vicarious liability that precludes recovery from an employer when the employee acts on wholly personal motives that would not reasonably further the employer's business. Prosser v. Glass, 481 So.2d 365, 368 (Ala.1985). Alabama courts, as well as other courts, have held that sexual misconduct is personal to the employee and is outside of the scope of employment. See Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir.1984)(holding that the seduction of a patient by a physician's assistant was outside of the scope of the assistant's employment); Joyner, 477 So.2d 364 (holding that a manager's attempt to force other employees to perform sexual acts was not in furtherance of the company's business); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lantrip, 26 Ala.App. 79, 153 So. 296 (1934) (holding that a store clerk's sexual advances toward a customer were entirely personal). Particularly instructive on the absence of a basis for vicarious liability on the part of East Alabama is Perkins v. Dean, 570 So.2d 1217 (Ala.1990). In Perkins, Roberta Perkins and her husband sought individual and family counseling from Northwest Alabama Regional Mental Health Center (Northwest), and Almus Larry Dean was assigned to counsel them. During one of the sessions, Perkins told Dean that she wanted to have an affair with him. Dean explained transference phenomenon to her, but he told her to check back with me [Dean] later and we'll see how it is between my wife and [me] and you and your husband. 570 So.2d at 1218. Dean later resigned from Northwest, but he continued to have contact with the Perkinses. Three months after Dean's resignation, he and Perkins began a sexual affair. After the affair ended, the Perkinses filed a malpractice action against Dean and Northwest. This Court held that because the sexual relationship occurred after the professional relationship between Dean and Perkins had ended, there was no basis on which to sustain a malpractice claim against Northwest. See Perkins, 570 So.2d at 1219 (When Dean had sex with Roberta Perkins, he was not employed by or associated with Northwest in such a way that a master/servant relationship existed ( Perfection Mattress & Spring Co. v. Windham, 236 Ala. 239, 182 So. 6 (1938), as cited in Scott v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 338 F.2d 661, 662 (5th Cir.1964) (applying Alabama law)), nor did the intercourse take place within the line or scope of Dean's employment with Northwest.). Because the affair between Dean and Perkins was deemed purely social and not within Dean's scope of employment with Northwest, Northwest could not be held vicariously liable for any actions taken by Dean in engaging in the sexual relationship. Likewise, the Chanceys' allegations concerning sexual activity occurring after the professional relationship between Whitchard and Phillip had ended cannot serve as the basis for vicarious liability on the part of East Alabama, because those actions did not occur within the scope of Whitchard's employment with East Alabama. We therefore reject the Chanceys' contention that Whitchard's failure to inform Phillip about transference phenomenon fell within the scope of Whitchard's employment. [2]