Opinion ID: 401092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Present Antitrust Action

Text: 8 Hydro-Tech bases its present antitrust claim against Sundstrand on the action previously brought by Sundstrand against Hydro-Tech for misappropriation of trade secrets. In its first claim for relief in the present case, Hydro-Tech alleged that Sundstrand instituted the earlier action between the parties for the purpose of eliminating competition and perpetuating Sundstrand's monopoly in the centrifugal pump business, and that the earlier action was instituted without probable cause. 9 Concerning damages, Hydro-Tech alleged that it had expended the sum of $37,547.13 in defending the earlier action brought against it by Sundstrand, and also that as a result of the earlier action, it had been forced out of business and that Onal had been compelled to find other employment. Accordingly, Hydro-Tech and Onal each asked for actual damages in the sum of $10,000,000, which sum should be trebled, and they also sought punitive damages in the sum of $10,000,000. 10 The district judge in the antitrust case, by coincidence or otherwise, was Judge Finesilver, the judge who heard the earlier misappropriation of trade secrets suit brought by Sundstrand against Hydro-Tech. Be that as it may, the trial judge in the present proceeding dismissed Hydro-Tech's first claim on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. More specifically, in his memorandum opinion the trial judge held that Sundstrand's misappropriation of trade secrets action against Hydro-Tech could not form the basis for an antitrust action by Hydro-Tech against Sundstrand, citing Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); and Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 97 S.Ct. 2881, 53 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1977). We note that these cases set forth the general rule, known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, that attempts to influence the government, including petitions to the courts, are exempt from attack under the Sherman Act. 11 Recognizing that Noerr-Pennington, and their progeny also enunciated a so-called sham exception to the general rule, the district judge expressed doubt that the allegations in the first claim of Hydro-Tech's complaint were sufficient to bring it within the sham exception, citing Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (10th Cir. 1972), where we indicated that the term sham connoted fraud, corruption or misuse of the state processes. The trial judge, however, went on to hold, and we believe this to be his real holding, that, even granting that Sundstrand's earlier lawsuit against Hydro-Tech was a sham, a single sham suit of this nature could not form the basis for Hydro-Tech's antitrust claim against Sundstrand. 4 12 In this Court, Hydro-Tech argues that: (1) a single sham lawsuit brought for the purpose of directly interfering with the business of a competitor is actionable under the Sherman Act; and (2) a suit brought without probable cause and for the purpose of directly interfering with the business of a competitor meets the requirements for the sham exception. We shall consider the latter matter first. 13 Although it is not dispositive of the matter, we do note that nowhere in the entire complaint did Hydro-Tech allege that Sundstrand's earlier action against Hydro-Tech was a sham. Indeed, the recitals in the complaint of the protracted business dealings between Onal and Sundstrand tend themselves to negate the proposition that Sundstrand's suit against Hydro-Tech and Onal was a sham. Be that as it may, Hydro-Tech's position in this Court is that the allegations in its antitrust claim, that the earlier misappropriation of trade secrets action was instituted without probable cause and with an anti-competitive purpose and intent, are sufficient to bring the instant case within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington rule of antitrust immunity. We think not. 14 The mere fact that Sundstrand may have instituted its prior action against Hydro-Tech with an anti-competitive intent, i.e., with an intent to gain a business advantage over Hydro-Tech, does not, of itself, bring Hydro-Tech's first claim for relief within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This principle was established in both Noerr and Pennington. In Noerr, the Court held that the railroads' publicity campaign was immune from antitrust liability even though the trial court had found that its sole purpose was anticompetitive. The Court found the sham exception inapplicable because the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforcement practices. 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. at 533. Likewise, in Pennington, the Court held that petitioning activity is protected regardless of intent or purpose. 381 U.S. at 670, 85 S.Ct. at 1593. 15 It cannot be said, therefore, that the filing of a lawsuit is transformed into a sham merely because the primary intent of the lawsuit's instigator is to do harm to the business of a competitor. To reiterate, the sham exception ... is limited to situations where the defendant is not seeking official action by a governmental body, so that the activities complained of are 'nothing more' than an attempt to interfere with the business relationships of a competitor. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 1571, 51 L.Ed.2d 787 (1977). 16 Our particular inquiry thus narrows to the question of whether the allegation in the instant complaint, that Sundstrand initiated its earlier action against Hydro-Tech without probable cause, is sufficient to bring the claim within the sham exception. 17 Hydro-Tech, in its first claim for relief, did not allege a pattern of baseless actions by Sundstrand, nor did it allege bribery, perjury, denial of access to the courts, or the like, as those several matters are referred to in California Motor Transport. Rather, it is Hydro-Tech's position here that a mere absence of probable cause on the part of Sundstrand in instituting the misappropriation of trade secrets action against Hydro-Tech is sufficient to bring the present case within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington rule. We do not agree. 18 In California Motor Transport, the United States Supreme Court applied the sham exception to litigation activities where there was a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims and where the litigation resulted in barring competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals. 404 U.S. 508, 509-16, 92 S.Ct. 609, 611-14, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). Although we do not believe that these two requirements are necessarily the sine qua non for application of the sham exception to litigation activities, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether litigation activity in the context of one lawsuit, filed without probable cause, is conduct subject to the sham exception. 19 The question of the applicability of the sham exception to a single lawsuit was considered by some members of the Court in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 97 S.Ct. 2881, 53 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1977). 5 In analyzing this decision, several courts have concluded that a majority of the Court would hold that one vexatious or baseless suit would be sufficient to state a cause of action under the Sherman Act. E.g., Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 124, 127-28 (E.D.Wis.1979); Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476 F.Supp. 373, 378 (D.Colo.1979); Cyborg Sys. Inc. v. Management Science America, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. P 61,927 (N.D.Ill.1978). 20 In our view, Vendo did not address the specific issue with which we are confronted. Although it can be said that some members of the Court indicated that the quantity of the lawsuits forming the basis of an antitrust claim should not be determinative, nothing was said about the quality of the lawsuit forming the basis of the antitrust claim. Nothing in Vendo causes us to alter our firm belief that California Motor Transport suggests that the term sham is something more than a mere absence of probable cause. 6 As we previously noted in Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (10th Cir. 1972), the term sham means misuse or corruption of the judicial process. 7 The filing of a lawsuit without probable cause and with an anticompetitive intent simply does not come up to this standard set by the Supreme Court in California Motor Transport. 21 In its brief in this Court, Hydro-Tech asserts that Sundstrand's misappropriation of trade secrets action was brought with knowledge that its claims were spurious. We find no such allegation in Hydro-Tech's complaint in the instant case. To us, such terms as vexatious and spurious are much more onerous than without probable cause. We are disinclined to hold that merely by bringing an action without probable cause, such determination to be made, of course, on a hindsight basis, the instigator of such action renders itself open to the maintenance of an antitrust suit seeking treble damages. We believe the Noerr-Pennington rule of antitrust immunity, as applied in California Motor Transport, supports our holding. 22 In short, Hydro-Tech's pleadings are inadequate to state a cause of action under the antitrust laws. The facts set forth in the complaint, taken as true, do not support a conclusion that Sundstrand's prior lawsuit constituted a sham. 8 A sham action is one which tends to be abusive of the judicial processes and, therefore, is something more than an action instituted without probable cause. 23 Having determined that Hydro-Tech's first claim for relief is insufficient to bring the present case within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington rule, we need not address ourselves here to the further question as to whether a single sham lawsuit is sufficient basis for a subsequent antitrust action against the instigator of the sham. 24 Judgment affirmed.