Opinion ID: 402152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: RICO Counts.

Text: 48 All of the original 22 defendants were indicted under count two for violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Additionally, each defendant was charged in count one with conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The indictment charged that each of the 22 defendants were employed by or associated with an enterprise, to wit, a group of individuals associated in fact to offer and sell securities of corporations organized as agricultural cooperatives in order to obtain money and property by fraudulent means from residents of the states of Missouri, Oklahoma and Arkansas, which enterprise was engaged in, and the activities of which affected, interstate commerce. Each defendant was charged with having willfully and knowingly conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The Government incorporated all of the original 159 substantive counts of mail and securities fraud as predicate acts constituting the pattern of racketeering alleged in count two. 49 RICO makes it a crime for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The Act defines enterprise to include any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The Act defines a pattern of racketeering activity as the commission of any two of a specified number of federal and state crimes, including mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and security fraud under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), within 10 years of each other. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) and (D). 50 Phillips, Bledsoe, and Cloninger do not now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence from which the jury found them guilty of the substantive crimes charged in counts three and four nor do any of the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of their commission of the alleged predicate acts of racketeering. We must recognize, however, that even if some of the defendants were guilty of securities fraud as charged in counts three and four or as predicate acts in count two, each was also charged with and convicted of a more serious crime under RICO. The maximum penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) is five years and $1,000. The maximum punishment for security fraud is five years and $10,000. 15 U.S.C. § 77x. By comparison, the maximum penalty under RICO is 20 years and $25,000 as well as potential criminal forfeitures. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). If, in fact, the Government did not prove the defendants violated RICO, then it is fundamental to fair process of law, regardless of how much we condemn their wrongful conduct, that they cannot be convicted under the Act. 51 We are satisfied that RICO was not designed to serve as a recidivist statute, imposing heavier sentences for crimes which are already punishable under other statutes. The Act was not intended to be a catchall reaching all concerted action of two or more criminals involving two or more of the designated crimes. 52 The inclusion of the RICO and conspiracy counts allowed the Government to join all of the original 22 defendants in the indictment even though not all of the defendants were involved in the formation and sale of securities of all of the various cooperatives. The vehicle which the Government used to connect the five appellants, as well as the other 17 charged, and which enabled the Government to utilize evidence of fraud involving all of the co-ops was RICO and the broad tentacles of the conspiracy charge. Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b), the Government was required to allege some type of overall scheme involving each of the defendants and all the fraud charges in order to join them under one indictment. This allegation of participation in an all-encompassing RICO enterprise was necessary even after the number of defendants was reduced to the present five. Without the broad allegation, the Government could not have introduced evidence of all of the 209 alleged predicate acts of racketeering and 93 alleged overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, some of which related to only one of the defendants. The Government concedes that had it alleged that the enterprise was a single cooperative, only evidence of mail and security fraud relating to that cooperative would have been admissible. More significantly, only those defendants who participated in the affairs of that co-op through a pattern of racketeering activity would have been susceptible to joint trial. 53 The Government must and does now assert that the RICO counts allege an enterprise consisting of a multistate association of all of the 22 original defendants. The Government specifically conceded at trial and now on appeal that the indictment does not charge that the enterprise through which the pattern of racketeering activities took place was PFA or any of the other agricultural cooperatives organized by the defendants. As the Government repeatedly stated in its closing argument, It's the people and not the co-ops that constitute the enterprise. This concession was acknowledged by the trial court. 5 54 Although a co-op, as a legal entity, could clearly qualify as an enterprise under RICO, the Government does not and cannot now argue that the enterprise was one or more of the cooperatives since the case was not tried on that theory. As we noted in United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1362 n.4 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 1351, 67 L.Ed.2d 336 (1981), (quoting United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 568 (9th Cir. 1978)), Criminal sanctions cannot rest on what an appellate court thinks the jury would have done had the issues put to it been framed differently. Because the Government did not present such a theory at trial, we need not even consider the serious problems of variance which such a contention would raise. In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), the Supreme Court held: 55 (V)ariation between pleading and proof ... destroyed the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. Deprivation of such a basic right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless error. 56 Id. at 217, 80 S.Ct. at 273. 57 See also United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1301 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 154-57 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus the convictions can only be sustained if we find sufficient evidence of a single enterprise composed of the various individual defendants associated in fact and distinct from the co-ops. 58
59 The Government argues, citing United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978), that RICO was passed to obviate the difficulty of proving a conspiracy. It urges that all those who participate in the affairs of an enterprise need not enter into an agreement encompassing all of its affairs. Cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (describing requisite proof of conspiracy). Once an enterprise is formed, the Government argues, any person who becomes associated with or employed by the enterprise and carries out its affairs through a pattern of racketeering can be convicted under RICO. The Government asserts that defendants need not be aware of one another's activities, of the overall scope of the enterprise, or even of the existence of the enterprise. The argument is that conviction is predicated solely on defendants' relationship to the enterprise and commission of the predicate acts of racketeering. 6 60 This construction of the requirements that a defendant be employed by or associated with an enterprise and that he or she conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering has some support in the case law. Courts have held that predicate crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (defining pattern of racketeering activity as two acts of racketeering within ten years of each other) need not be related in any manner other than that they were perpetrated through an enterprise. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 780 (1980). Some courts have interpreted the statutory language requiring that a person be employed by or associated with an enterprise and conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs to require nothing more than any association with the individuals constituting the enterprise. In Elliott, the Fifth Circuit wrote: 61 The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to insiders and outsiders-those merely associated with an enterprise-who participate directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Cf. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977). Thus, the RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise. 62 571 F.2d at 903. 63 But see United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961, 100 S.Ct. 1647, 64 L.Ed.2d 236 (1980) (operation or management of enterprise required); United States v. Forsythe, 429 F.Supp. 715, 725 (W.D.Pa.) (employment or similar relationship required), rev'd, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3rd Cir. 1977). Courts have also held that participation in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity does not involve any degree of scienter greater than that necessary to commit the crimes constituting the pattern of racketeering. United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S.Ct. 103, 66 L.Ed.2d 38 (1980). We express grave doubts as to the propriety of the holdings in these cases, but given this loose conception of what it means to be employed by or associated with an enterprise and to conduct or participate in its affairs, it is more crucial for us to determine in this case what forms of organization or association in fact constitute an enterprise. 64 The Government argues that any association of individuals can be an enterprise. Under this theory, in any security or mail fraud case wherein a conspiracy of two or more persons is formed and two or more overt acts of fraud occur, defendants may be prosecuted under RICO with its heightened punishment. Similarly, under the Government's argument, any confederation, no matter how loose or temporary, of two or more individuals committing two or more sporadic crimes which are predicate crimes under RICO provides a basis for prosecution under the Act. Cf. United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 780 (1980) (two defendants convicted under RICO after committing three home burglaries). Although several courts have accepted this loose construction of RICO, we believe that the legislative history of the statute and an analysis of the statute itself as well as the surrounding criminal law indicates that such a broad construction is not warranted. 65 The primary intent of Congress in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) was to prevent organized crime from infiltrating businesses and other legitimate economic entities. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2532, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969 states that 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (title IX of the act) has as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce. S.Rep.No. 91-617; 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). See also Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30, and related proposals Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1970) (statement of primary sponsor Senator McClellan); Id. at 170 (comments of Justice Department); 116 Cong.Rec. 602 (1970) (statement of cosponsor Senator Hruska). When directed against infiltration of legitimate enterprises, the provisions have a relatively well defined scope of application. Legitimate businesses and other legitimate organizations tend to have a definite structure and clear boundaries which limit the applicability of a criminal statute aimed at the infiltration of criminal elements into these entities. Infiltration of legitimate entities also warrants the Act's severe sanctions. The Act's drafters perceived a distinct threat to the free market in organized criminal groups gaining control of enterprises operating in that market. These congressmen thought that organized criminal elements exert a monopoly-like power in the legitimate economic sphere. Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30, and related proposals Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1970) (statement of Senator McClellan). The bill's sponsors also believed that such infiltration was a source of power and protection for organized crime and gave it a permanent base from which it was more likely to perpetrate a continuing pattern of criminal acts. 66 But Congress did not draft the statute to apply solely to infiltration of legitimate enterprises. The statute also reaches wholly criminal organizations. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246. 7 However, the Act was not intended to reach any criminals who merely associate together and perpetrate two of the specified crimes, rather it was aimed at organized crime. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 2531-32. 8 In Turkette, the Court upheld a RICO conviction of individuals who participated in a criminal enterprise which evidence revealed was of a professional nature and executed a number of distinct criminal acts. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 2527. The indictment described the enterprise as: 67 (A) group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence the outcome of state court proceedings. 68 Id. 101 S.Ct. at 2526. 69 Obviously, no statute could and this statute was not intended to require direct proof that individuals are engaged in something as ill defined as organized crime. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 777, 46 L.Ed.2d 638 (1976); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F.Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y.1979). The statute is an attack on organized crime, but it utilizes a per se approach. Thus Senator McClellan, the bill's principal sponsor, stated that the crimes enumerated in the definition of racketeering activity are not committed only by participants in organized crime, but argued that they are characteristic of organized crime. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 Notre Dame Law. 55, 142-43 (1970). McClellan observes: 70 The danger that a commission of such offenses by other individuals would subject them to proceedings under title IX is (small) ... since commission of a crime listed under title IX provides only one element of title IX's prohibitions. Unless an individual not only commits such a crime but engages in a pattern of such violations, and uses that pattern to obtain or operate an interest in an interstate business, he is not made subject to proceedings under title IX. 71 Id. at 144. 72 Each element of the crime, that is, the predicate acts, the pattern of such acts, and the enterprise requirement, was designed to limit the applicability of the statute and separate individuals engaged in organized crime from ordinary criminals. The enterprise requirement must be interpreted in this light. 73 The crime defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) involves two modes of association with an enterprise. 9 In order to violate the provision, an individual must be employed by or associated with an enterprise and must participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Construing the statute to give effect to all its words, it requires an association with an enterprise which is distinct from participation in the conduct of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. In order for such association, for example, formal membership in or employment by a legitimate organization or their equivalent in a criminal group, to exist, the enterprise must be more than an informal group created to perpetrate the acts of racketeering. 74 The Supreme Court, in Turkette, 101 S.Ct. at 2528-29, stated, The 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity'; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate entity which must be proved by the Government. This court, in Anderson, wrote, The term 'enterprise' must signify an association that is substantially different from the acts which form the 'pattern of racketeering activity.' A contrary interpretation would alter the essential elements of the offense as determined by Congress. 626 F.2d at 1365. 75 The word enterprise ordinarily means an undertaking or project or a unit of organization established to perform any such undertaking or project. 10 However, under RICO, an enterprise cannot simply be the undertaking of the acts of racketeering, neither can it be the minimal association which surrounds these acts. Any two criminal acts will necessarily be surrounded by some degree of organization and no two individuals will ever jointly perpetrate a crime without some degree of association apart from the commission of the crime itself. Thus unless the inclusion of the enterprise element requires proof of some structure separate from the racketeering activity and distinct from the organization which is a necessary incident to the racketeering, the Act simply punishes the commission of two of the specified crimes within a 10-year period. Congress clearly did not intend such an application of the Act. 76 A comparison of the severe penalties authorized by RICO with those for conspiracy indicates that the Act must have been directed at participation in enterprises consisting of more than simple conspiracies to perpetrate the predicate acts of racketeering. Violation of RICO may be punished by a fine of up to $25,000 or imprisonment for up to 20 years or both, while conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States carries a maximum penalty of a $10,000 fine and five years imprisonment. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 371. If the enterprise element is satisfied by proof of conspiracy or looser associations not characterized by conspiratorial consent, the heightened punishment can only be justified by the requirement of two acts of racketeering and thus the Act is merely a recidivist statute. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1367-68. RICO provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act could not have been intended to punish recidivism because the Act explicitly provided for such punishment in the following title (title X), now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3575, which provides for heightened punishment of repeat offenders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1). 77 Because RICO does not require proof of a single agreement as in a conspiracy case, it creates a danger of guilt by association. See United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981). The individuality of guilt is assured by requiring proof that the enterprise with which individuals associated had certain distinct characteristics. As the Fourth Circuit wrote in Griffin: 78 Proof of the existence of an associated-in-fact enterprise requires proof of a common purpose animating its associates, and this may be done by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, of those associates in which they function as a continuing unit. (Turkette,) 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. at 2528. The ties between the individual associates that are implied by these concepts of continuity, unity, shared purpose and identifiable structure operate precisely to guard against the danger that guilt will be adjudged solely by virtue of associations not so related. They define the line between concerted action through group association for criminal purpose, for which combination in crime may constitutionally be proscribed, Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (81 S.Ct. 321, 325, 5 L.Ed.2d 312) (1961) and less clearly related conduct that may not be so proscribed and prosecuted. 79 660 F.2d at 1000. 80 Although commonality of purpose may be the sine qua non of a criminal enterprise, in many cases this singular test fails to distinguish enterprises from individuals merely associated together for the commission of sporadic crime. Any two wrongdoers who through concerted action commit two or more crimes share a purpose. This suggests that an enterprise must exhibit each of three basic characteristics. 81 In addition to having a common or shared purpose which animates those associated with it, it is fundamental that the enterprise function as a continuing unit. In Turkette, the Supreme Court stated that an enterprise is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 2528 (emphasis added). This does not mean the scope of the enterprise cannot change as it engages in diverse forms of activity nor does it mean that the participants in the enterprise cannot vary with different individuals managing its affairs at different times and in different places. What is essential, however, is that there is some continuity of both structure and personality. For example, the operatives in a prostitution ring may change through time, but the various roles which the old and new individuals perform remain the same. But if an entirely new set of people begin to operate the ring, it is not the same enterprise as it was before. 82 Finally, an enterprise must have an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372. This distinct structure might be demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or that it has an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes. The command system of a Mafia family is an example of this type of structure as is the hierarchy, planning, and division of profits within a prostitution ring. See, e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1067-71 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 743, 54 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978) (describing structure of prostitution ring). 83
84 During the summer of 1972, Gibson and Phillips met to discuss the sale of securities through an agricultural cooperative. Although Cloninger was present at several of these meetings, he was not party to the agreement between Gibson and Phillips which resulted in the formation of UFA-Mo. in October of 1972. A management company, Midwest Investment Group, was used to divert funds from UFA-Mo. to Phillips and Gibson. The only identifiable association of individuals distinct from the pattern of racketeering in the operation of UFA-Mo. was the agreement between Gibson and Phillips to share the co-op's profits. This association arguably exhibits a distinct structure and the common purpose of Gibson and Phillips. However, the difficulty with the assertion that it represents the beginning of the charged enterprise is that this enterprise had a short life. 85 In April of 1973, Gibson and Phillips had a misunderstanding and dissolved their arrangement. Gibson stayed on and operated UFA-Mo. Moffitt became a salesman for UFA-Mo. In May of 1973, Phillips independently formed PFA. At this point in time, no entity existed which encompassed both UFA-Mo. and PFA. Although they were operated in a similar manner, the only continuity between the original UFA-Mo. and PFA was Phillips' participation in both co-ops. The common purpose originally shared by Gibson and Phillips had broken down. An enterprise can grow and evolve, but it must be shown to have some continuity of structure and personality and the participants must maintain their common purpose. 86 Cloninger came to PFA sometime in the spring or summer of 1973. In November 1973, Phillips and Cloninger hired Bledsoe and Burks to manage PFA's security sales. Burks became president of PFA. The evidence shows that thereafter Phillips, Bledsoe, Burks, and Cloninger made an agreement to evenly share all profits derived from PFA. Moffitt and Stafford joined PFA as salesmen in the fall of 1973. Thus there is evidence of association among the five defendants in operating PFA and a shared purpose to profit from the fraudulent sale of PFA securities. Furthermore, the Government argues, The secrecy of the agreement among Phillips, Cloninger, Burks and Bledsoe proved the existence of an association separate from the PFA cooperative. However, this external association did not include Moffitt and Stafford. But even assuming this agreement was the basis of an enterprise, the enterprise was unrelated to UFA-Mo. which, until June of 1975, was operated by Gibson using Moffitt as a salesman (Stafford also signed a UFA-Mo. salesman's contract, but made no sales). 87 At best, the Government has shown two separate associations of individuals without any overarching structure or common control. The evidence demonstrates only that the two schemes were conducted using the same modus operandi, that Phillips initiated both schemes, and that Moffitt and Stafford had some connection with both PFA and UFA-Mo. 88 The Government charges that the purpose of the alleged enterprise was to sell securities of agricultural cooperatives by fraudulent means in several states. On this basis, proof of fraudulent sales in both Oklahoma and Arkansas was admitted into evidence. It is conceded that Bledsoe did not participate in the planning or operation and may not even have had any knowledge of the Oklahoma or Arkansas co-ops. Stafford was a salesman for UFA-Ok., but had no connection with the activities of CFA in Arkansas. Thus, in order to argue that all defendants were implicated in the fraudulent acts in Oklahoma and Arkansas, it was essential for the Government to demonstrate the existence of an enterprise operating UFA-Ok. and CFA as well as UFA-Mo. and PFA in Missouri. 89 This court fails to find evidence of any association in fact exhibiting the requisite features which embraces the activities of all the co-ops. As in 1972, Phillips initiated the plan to organize co-ops in other states. Again, he returned to his old confederate, Gibson. Around this same time, UFA-Mo. became defunct. Gibson still had nothing to do with PFA in Missouri. Phillips discussed the plan with Gibson and the two of them formed a partnership to organize co-ops in other states. Thereafter, Gibson prevailed on Moffitt and Paul Canaday to form UFA-Ok. and share the proceeds. Unknown to Moffitt, Gibson had agreed to share his one-third interest with Phillips, his secret partner. Moffitt evidently had a falling out with Phillips and refused to participate in the new venture if Phillips had anything to do with UFA-Ok. The evidence shows that Cloninger's participation in UFA-Ok. amounted to his presence at one meeting with two officers of UFA-Ok. and Phillips at which the co-op's accounting procedures were discussed. There is no evidence indicating he participated in the operation of the co-op or received any of its profits. 90 In November of 1975, Gibson and another defendant charged in the indictment, Ron Elia, agreed to share profits earned by an Arkansas cooperative. Gibson once again agreed to share his profits with Phillips. Consumer-Farmers Association was thus incorporated on January 23, 1976, as an Arkansas agricultural cooperative. There is evidence that Moffitt sold CFA securities. 91 The only association which embraced the Arkansas and Oklahoma operations was the agreement between Gibson and Phillips. This agreement is temporally disjunct from their original agreement. The other defendants did not participate in this association except through their roles in the individual cooperatives. The new agreement did not relate to the operation of UFA-Mo. or PFA. There simply was no structured association, apart from the individual coops, which exhibited any degree of continuity over the period between 1972 and 1977 and which was concerned with the operation of all four co-ops. 92 Although many of the defendants played various roles in UFA-Mo., PFA, UFA-Ok., and CFA, these roles cannot be seen as constituent elements of a larger structure. Apart from the individual co-ops, the evidence reveals loose and discontinuous patterns of associations and agreements, primarily between Phillips and Gibson, contemplating the illegal use of the co-ops. We find no real evidence of a structure, a pattern of authority or control, or of continuity in the pattern of association or the common purpose of all of the defendants. At best, there is proof of various ventures initiated by Phillips and sometimes Phillips and Gibson in which many of the defendants from time to time participated. This evidence is not sufficient to support conviction under RICO. 11 Thus we conclude the evidence in this case does not support the allegation that a single enterprise existed which was distinct from the individual co-ops, which operated in Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, and which continued to exist from mid-1972 until the spring of 1977. 12 93 On this basis, we reverse the convictions of all defendants under counts one and two. 94