Opinion ID: 1690126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the trial court commit reversible error concerning the reports of the defendant's psychiatrists?

Text: ś 51. At a pre-trial telephonic conference, Jordan requested appointment of a psychiatrist to explore possible mental health issues as mitigating factors in his defense. The trial court, over defense objection, ordered that a copy of the report be provided to the prosecution. Dr. Maggio concluded that Jordan had an antisocial personality disorder. Specifically, Dr. Maggio referenced a 1976 report generated by another psychiatrist, Clifton Davis, M.D., [2] who had been asked to determine Jordan's competency to stand trial in 1976. Dr. Maggio relied on Dr. Davis' report as follows: Review of the previous intake interview and psychiatric evaluation reveals a consistency of some of the history; however, there are moments of inconsistency in which Mr. Jordan previously acknowledged that he had always been a good con man. He had done a number of illegal activities but had not been caught except on one or two occasions; that he had been fired or asked to resign because of embezzlement if [sic] $43,000.00; that while he was under financial pressures he wrote bad checks and then was searching for a way for quick money at which he considered bank robbery with kidnaping [sic] and extortion and had worked out the plan himself. He then readily blames the F.B.I. more or less for the woman's death shrugging it off by saying better luck next time. He apparently displayed little remorse, held the F.B.I. responsible, no overt sadness. The review also shows that he joined the Army in 1964 and had been charged with check forgery and agreed to join the Army so the charges would be dropped. He was also court martialed [sic] in 1970 for falsification of official documents and sentenced to 9 months in Levenworth. He received a Dishonorable Discharge from the Army in 1971. All of this is in contrast and contradiction to what he told me when he denied having any difficulty with authority figures, having an Honorable Discharge from the military and being a good guy prior to this murder and has been a good guy since then while he's been in prison. ś 52. In his report (which was never admitted into evidence), Dr. Maggio concluded that Jordan's antisocial personality disorder manifested itself in a failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, deceitfulness and conning others for personal pleasure or profit, impulsivity, irritability and aggressiveness, reckless disregard for the safety of others, irresponsibility in failure to maintain consistent work behavior and honor financial obligations, and lack of remorse for his behavior. ś 53. Jordan alleges that he had no intention of offering the expert testimony of Dr. Maggio, and that, therefore, it was error for the trial judge to order that a copy of Dr. Maggio's report be given to the prosecution. Jordan relies on Rule 9.04 of the Mississippi Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules, which provides that the prosecution should be provided with any expert reports that the defendant may offer into evidence. The State contends that, when the order was made by the trial judge, Jordan's clear intention was to use the psychiatric evaluation as mitigation evidence. ś 54. Even though Jordan claims his right to due process was violated, the issue, at its basis, implicates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the guarantee against self-incrimination. Jordan did not want the State to have copies of the psychiatric reports because they included statements made by Jordan and opinions based thereon which may have been damaging to his defense. Therefore, if it is determined that Jordan's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated, he has no due process claim. ś 55. A short synopsis of relevant cases is helpful. First, in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 324, 326, 329, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 1313, 1314, 1315, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment remains in full force and effect during sentencing proceedings even though a defendant's guilt has been adjudicated or a plea of guilty has been entered. ś 56. The Supreme Court has also held that a capital defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated when a state psychiatrist testified that, based on statements made at a competency hearing ordered by the court sua sponte, the defendant was a severe sociopath whose condition could not be remedied: The essence of this basic constitutional principle is the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1872, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 368 (1981). The basis of Jordan's claim is that the psychiatrist formed opinions harmful to Jordan's case from Jordan's statements, in effect, forcing incriminating words from Jordan's own lips. ś 57. Estelle deals with a court-ordered mental examination. However, in Jordan's case, the defense requested that a court-appointed psychiatrist examine Jordan, and Jordan voluntarily subjected himself to a mental examination. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2917-18, 97 L.Ed.2d 336, 355 (1987), the defendant requested a psychological examination. At trial, he attempted to substantiate his defense of extreme emotional disturbance by having a social worker read excerpts from reports of his psychological examination. In response, the State requested the social worker read from other psychological reports which reflected the defendant's composed, manipulative character. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated: [I]f a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychological evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. ś 58. In Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.1988), Schneider's counsel moved for a psychiatric examination to determine whether Schneider was fit to stand trial. A psychiatrist subsequently determined that Schneider was sane and competent to stand trial. At the sentencing phase, Schneider presented three witnessesâ a drug abuse counselor, an employee in the jail's rehabilitation program, and a jail chaplainâ to demonstrate his sincere desire to overcome his drug addiction. Cross examination of these witnesses revealed that their opinions were based solely on what Schneider had told them. None of the witnesses conducted any type of psychological exam or background behavioral study. In response, the State called a psychiatrist who had previously examined Schneider. The psychiatrist testified that Schneider had a sociopathic personality disorder, no feelings of guilt or remorse, and no prospect of rehabilitation. ś 59. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Schneider claimed that the psychiatrist's rebuttal testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Fifth Circuit held, [T]he defendant must introduce mental-status evidence that may fairly be characterized as expert before the prosecution may respond with the results of a psychiatric examination. However, Schneider's three witnesses, although not formally qualified as expert, had experienced backgrounds in assessing drug users' propensity to reform. Also, the issue at handâ the probability of reformationâ could be determined without highly specialized knowledge. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that Schneider had introduce[d] mental-status evidence that may fairly be characterized as expert. Id. at 576. ś 60. In Brown v. Butler, 876 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.1989), the Fifth Circuit ruled that the State's use on rebuttal of a criminal defendant's non-Mirandized statements to a forensic psychiatrist who examined the defendant pursuant to a court order violated the defendant's constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The defendant's defense was insanity, and, in his case-in-chief, the defendant attempted to prove his insanity through the observations of three witnessesâ two jailers and a physician. The State put the forensic psychiatrist on as rebuttal to the defendant's three witnesses' testimony. The Fifth Circuit held that the two jailers' testimony could be readily dismissed as a source of expert mental-status evidence. The jailers appeared to have no more knowledge than lay witnesses on the highly technical and elusive subjects of psychology and psychiatry. The physician's testimony related solely to his treatment of the defendant's seizures based on the jailers' lay description of Brown's symptoms. He did not attempt to suggest that the seizures reflected a psychotic condition. The Fifth Circuit held that the doctor's testimony was not so technical as to warrant the State's use of overwhelmingly more specialized testimony from a psychiatrist and could not be characterized as expert mental-status evidence. Such rebuttal evidence violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. ś 61. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the constitutional violation was harmless error. If the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict, the error was harmless and the verdict may stand. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Brown did not seriously contest the fact that he committed the acts underlying the armed robbery charge and, instead, presented a defense of insanity. The Fifth Circuit stated that, because he failed to prove a necessary element of the insanity defense, the constitutional error was harmless. ś 62. And finally, we, in Willie v. State, 585 So.2d at 678, held that if a defendant does not raise his sanity as a mitigating factor, a state psychiatrist should not be allowed to testify. But, because the defendant did proffer evidence showing that he had family members who had some mental instability and that he had socialization problems, we deferred to the trial court's discretion in allowing the psychiatrist to give her opinion that the defendant was not psychotic. ś 63. In the case at bar, during the sentencing hearing, Jordan called as a character witness Richard Luther King, a telephone company employee who, after retirement, worked as a security guard and telecommunications assistant at Mississippi College. King testified that he had known Jordan since he was a child. He lost contact with Jordan after graduation from high school, but he began to visit Jordan at Parchman once or twice a month in 1982. They also wrote each other and talked on the telephone. Sometimes he took his wife and three children to visit Jordan. Jordan helped his two older children with school work. He stated: In my heart I don't feel like the man would be a danger to anybody anywhere for anything. I don't. If the man was out he would be welcomed in my house. If there's anything that I can do to help him or if he could help me I think he would. The man, to my knowledge, has not done anything at Parchman that has been derogatory or detrimental or out of the way. He's not been in trouble. His attitude to me is a lot better than mine would be. He accepts that he's there. I think I would be frustrated, but I've never seen him frustrated. I've never heard him say a cuss word. He doesn't smoke, you know. So I think he would beâ he's okay. I don't see anything would be detrimental anywhere. I just don't see it. ś 64. On cross-examination, the State asked King if he knew that Jordan blamed the FBI for the victim's death; if King knew that Jordan said that he was sorry that the victim was killed, but then he shrugged his shoulders and said, Better luck next time; if he knew why Jordan entered the military, why he was discharged from the military, and why Jordan left his employment with the fertilizer company in Louisiana; and if King considered Jordan to be a danger to others. The basis of the State's questions was Dr. Davis' psychiatric report which was introduced into evidence when Dr. Davis testified during the guilt phase. See Jordan v. State, 365 So.2d 1198, 1203 (Miss.1978). The report was marked for identification purposes only during a hearing on Jordan's motion in limine held on April 22, 1998. The report, which was never introduced into evidence at trial or read to the jury during the sentencing trial sub judice, indicated that the reason Jordan left the fertilizer plant was because he embezzled some of the company's funds;' the reason Jordan joined the military was to avoid prosecution for embezzlement, and that he was dishonorably discharged from the military. Jordan made the statements concerning the killing during the examination. The State asked King to read parts of the psychiatric report before he responded to the questions. King stated that he had no knowledge of these incidents. ś 65. In Harris v. State, 777 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Okla.Cr.1989), Harris' special education teacher testified as a character and an expert witness, opining that Harris was psychologically incapable of committing the crimes charged. On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to impeach her testimony by using an evaluation of Harris prepared by a clinical psychologist. Upon objection, the court permitted the witness to read silently that part of the evaluation which contradicted her testimony. Cross-examination based upon the report was allowed when its substantive contents were not revealed to the jury. Harris argued that the trial court's ruling improperly admitted hearsay and was prejudicial. ś 66. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that cross-examination was permissible into matters affecting the credibility of the witness: The trial court should allow cross-examination into matters which tend to explain, contradict, or discredit any testimony given by a witness or which tests his accuracy, memory, veracity or credibility. The prosecutor used the psychological evaluation to cross-examine and contradict Ms. Brock as to the extent of appellant's mental capacity to commit the crime. Since the trial court ruled the substantive contents of the psychological evaluation were not to be disclosed to the jury and limited its use to impeachment of the witness, we find no error. Id. at 1362 (citations omitted). ś 67. We find that the State's cross-examination of King did not violate Jordan's privilege against self-incrimination. King testified that he had known Jordan most of his life; therefore it was reasonable for the State to ask King about Jordan's employment and his military career. King testified that he did not consider Jordan to be dangerous and that he had exhibited good behavior during his tenure at Parchman; therefore it was reasonable for the State to ask King about statements made by Jordan about the killing. Moreover, as in Harris, King merely silently read the psychiatric report and the jury was not apprized of the substantive contents of the report. ś 68. This issue is without merit.