Opinion ID: 2194743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Surprise and Prejudice

Text: At his de bene esse deposition, Dr. Bechamp gave opinions about the standards of care governing Dr. Townsend's performance of the bowel inspection and his failure to consult with another doctor in a timely fashion. Dr. Townsend's primary complaint is that the Hospital's Rule 26(b)(4) statement indicated that Dr. Bechamp would testify only as to the issues of causation and damages, and thus, he argues, the standard of care testimony was outside the scope indicated and therefore should have been excluded. This argument is unsupported by the record. The Hospital's Supplemental and Amended Rule 26(b)(4) statement set out the following anticipated testimony from Dr. Bechamp: He is further expected to testify that the small bowel cannot be visually inspected for damage in its entirety by means of a laparoscopy, and that the standard of care requires a laparotomy so that the bowels can be handled or visually inspected. He is further expected to testify that in connection with the plaintiff's readmission to Sibley Hospital, Dr. Townsend should have told Dr. DeRosa that he had removed some yellow tissue, believed to be fat, at the time the uterus was perforated, and he will comment on how this may have influenced the patient's management. Dr. Beauchamp [sic] will be asked to respond to and rebut at trial the specific opinions of the experts of other parties hereto. (Emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Dr. Townsend's claims, the Hospital's Rule 26(b)(4) statement did disclose that Dr. Bechamp was expected to testify on standard of care issues, [13] the plaintiff's readmission to the Hospital, and Dr. Townsend's consultation with Dr. DeRosa. While the Rule 26(b)(4) statement leaves room for testimony on these issues, even assuming that [the Hospital's] Rule 26(b)(4) statement was defective in this respect, we find no basis for reversal because the circumstances presented here satisfy the Weiner test. Kling v. Peters, 564 A.2d 708, 714 (D.C.1989) (affirming a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony on causation where the relevant Rule 26(b)(4) statement said only that he [would] focus upon the failure of the defendant . . . to render appropriate and adequate medical care and treatment). [14] Dr. Bechamp's testimony did not unduly surprise Dr. Townsend. The Hospital disclosed in the Joint Pretrial Statement that Dr. Bechamp is expected to render opinion testimony consistent with [the Hospital's] Rule 26(b)(4) Statement and his deposition. (Emphasis added). At his discovery deposition, Dr. Bechamp had testified repeatedly about standard of care issues. See id. at 714-15. Moreover, as Dr. Townsend concedes in his brief, the adversarial nature of the two defendants during trial alerted him that the Hospital might solicit expert testimony that he had violated the standard of care. In any event, a trial judge is not required to enforce the strict letter of a pretrial statement or 26(b)(4) statement as long as it determines that allowing expert testimony will not constitute unfair surprise at trial. See Bushong v. Park, 837 A.2d 49, 54 (D.C.2003) (Regardless of what the pretrial statement might or might not say about the expected testimony of an expert witness . . . the witness' testimony is properly admitted, notwithstanding any failure to mention certain words in the pretrial documents, if the actual testimony does not surprise the opposing party.). [15] Given Dr. Bechamp's prior statements addressing standard of care issues and the adversarial nature of the co-defendants at trial, we conclude that the admission of this testimony should not have unduly surprised Dr. Townsend. Furthermore, Dr. Townsend was not unduly prejudiced by Dr. Bechamp's testimony. Ms. Donaldson had cross-designated Dr. Bechamp as her expert and had listed him in the Joint Pretrial Statementa document signed by Dr. Townsend's counselas one of her witnesses. She described him as an expert witness for Defendant Sibley Memorial Hospital [who] may be called to testify on [the] breach of the standard of care as to both Defendants, as well as causation and damage issues. Thus, even if the trial court had not permitted the Hospital to ask Dr. Bechamp about the standard of care, Ms. Donaldson could have done so in accordance with her designation of him as a witness. Dr. Townsend argues specifically that the trial court's ruling prejudiced him because the court had previously precluded one of his experts, Dr. Fitzpatrick, from giving standard of care testimony regarding hospitalization. Even assuming this is true, Dr. Townsend has waived that argument because he failed to ask the trial judge for permission to recall Dr. Fitzpatrick in order to mitigate the harm. See 2101 Wisconsin Assocs. v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 586 A.2d 1221, 1225 (D.C.1991) (Petitioner never sought to recall claimant as a witness, and hence cannot claim prejudice from the examiner's restrictions.). See generally Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C. 1986) (As a general rule, matters not properly presented to a trial court will not be resolved on appeal.). Dr. Townsend asserts that recalling Dr. Fitzpatrick would have prejudiced him with the jury by extending the trial into the holidays, and cites the First Circuit case of Alberty-Vélez v. Corporación de Puerto Rico para la Difusión Pública, 242 F.3d 418, 426 (1st Cir.2001). [16] But at the time of the testimony at issue, Christmas was still over a week away and Dr. Fitzpatrick's office was nearby in Baltimore. Moreover, by not making the request, he foreclosed the possibility that the trial court could have fashioned an alternative solution. A party who fails to seek permission to recall a witness is on weak ground when he later asserts prejudice. Therefore, because we conclude that Dr. Bechamp's testimony did not incurably surprise Dr. Townsend, and that he did not preserve his claim of prejudice with respect to Dr. Fitzpatrick, [17] the first prong of the Weiner test is satisfied.