Opinion ID: 1948864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Insanity Defense

Text: Appellant asserts that the trial court's failure to sua sponte obtain a waiver of the insanity defense, or to explore the option of imposing an insanity defense upon appellant, constituted error. We affirm on the basis that the evidence did not raise a substantial question of appellant's sanity at the time of the offense, and thus the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by failing to conduct a Frendak inquiry. [T]he law presumes that every one charged with crime is sane, Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895), so the defendant has the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Patton v. United States, 782 A.2d 305, 311 (D.C. 2001) (citing D.C.Code § 24-301(j)). To establish a prima facie case of insanity, the defendant must present sufficient evidence to show that `at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.' Id. at 312 (quoting Pegues v. United States, 415 A.2d 1374, 1378 (D.C.1980)). The existence of mental illness alone does not suffice, as a defendant must establish a causal relationship between the criminal conduct and his mental disease. Pegues, 415 A.2d at 1378. However, whenever the evidence suggests a substantial question of the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, the trial court is required to conduct an inquiry which is designed to assure that the defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends the consequences of failing to assert the defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the defense. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 380 (D.C. 1979). Frendak instructed trial courts to make a three-part inquiry whenever the defendant's mental condition at the times of the trial and the crime, respectively, is at issue: (1) whether the defendant is presently competent to stand trial; (2) if so, whether based on present mental capacity, the defendant can intelligently and voluntarily waive the insanity defense and has done so; or, if not, (3) whether the court sua sponte should impose the insanity defense based on evidence of the defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged crime. Phenis, 909 A.2d at 154 (citing Anderson v. Sorrell, 481 A.2d 766, 769 (D.C.1984)). The second prong is known as a Frendak inquiry, which is triggered by the circumstances of each individual case. Phenis, 909 A.2d at 154-55 (citing Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380). The obligation to conduct a Frendak inquiry was not triggered here because 1) there was an uncontested, thorough productivity report which found appellant criminally responsible for the offense, and there was no other strong countervailing evidence to call the report into question; and 2) there was no causal link established between appellant's diagnosis of schizophrenia, catatonic type, and the crime. The primary evidence of criminal responsibility was an uncontested productivity report issued on April 6, 2005 by Dr. Sweda, appellant's treating psychologist at St. Elizabeths Hospital, who had participated in appellant's examinations, diagnosis, and treatment since he was initially admitted in April 2004, a year prior to the issuance of the productivity report. We have held that the trial court's obligation to conduct a Frendak inquiry is not triggered where there is a productivity examination in which an expert psychiatrist ha[s] rendered his opinion that [the defendant] was not insane at the time of the alleged offenses. Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964, 967 (D.C.1989). This is true even where, as in Robinson, there was countervailing evidence that the defendant may have been insane at the time of the offense, including expert opinion that the defendant was suffering from a long-term paranoid disorder, the defendant's disruptive behavior at the jail and hospital, and two reports indicating that he was not competent to stand trial. See id. To be sure, in Phenis we held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a Frendak inquiry despite the existence of a productivity report finding Phenis criminally responsible. See 909 A.2d at 157. We distinguished Phenis from Robinson by noting the key factual difference: the reliability of the productivity report. We found that the Phenis productivity report was conclusory, as it did not indicate how much time the psychiatrist spent with appellant; what documents or records (including appellant's medical history, for example) were reviewed or considered, if any; or what was the basis for the conclusion that appellant was criminally responsible. Id. at 157. Furthermore, the report was internally inconsistent, claiming both that Phenis did and did not suffer from a mental illness. See id. at 157. This case is analogous to Robinson rather than Phenis in that the trial judge relied on a thorough, well-founded productivity report that did not suffer from the deficiencies we noted in Phenis. Here, the productivity report is not conclusory; it sets out the factual grounds for its findings and is based on a large amount of information obtained from multiple sources, including appellant's actions during the crime and his own statements at the time of his productivity evaluation demonstrating that he understood the wrongfulness of his act at the time of the offense; [3] the circumstances of the crime; [4] and appellant's overall diagnosis. Significantly, while in Phenis there was no indication of how much time the reporting psychiatrist spent with the defendant, in this case, Dr. Sweda had served as appellant's treating psychologist at St. Elizabeths Hospital for a year and was highly involved in his examinations, diagnosis, and treatment. Furthermore, the trial judge, based on his personal observations of appellant in the courtroom and the proceedings, [5] had no reason to question the productivity report where neither appellant's behavior nor other evidence raised a substantial question of his sanity at the time of the offense. See Wallace, 936 A.2d at 774 ([W]e accord great deference to [a trial judge's] personal observations and conversations with appellant....) Moreover, there was no obligation to conduct a Frendak inquiry in this case because there was no causal linkage between the mental illness with which appellant was diagnosed  schizophrenia, catatonic type  and the crime that would have caused the judge to have a substantial question whether appellant was criminally insane at the time of the offense. The insanity defense requires a showing of a causal relationship between the criminal conduct and his mental disease. Pegues, 415 A.2d at 1378. In the productivity report, Dr. Sweda found that although appellant was mentally disordered, he did not meet the linkage criterion of the insanity defense because his illness was not linked to his behavior during the carjacking. According to Dr. Sweda, the symptoms of appellant's illness are mutism and non-responsivity to environmental stimuli and waxy flexibility (doll-like positioning of the body). In his opinion, appellant was certainly not catatonic at the time of the offense. Dr. Sweda's report also specifically addressed the second prong of the definition of insanity, whether the defendant is able to recognize the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Patton, 782 A.2d at 312. In his report, he concluded: [Appellant] understood that the carjacking was wrong. His behavior at the time of the offense indicates he attempted to elude police pursuing him with activated emergency signals, and he continued to attempt to elude police on foot after he crashed the vehicle. This indicates he knew his behavior was criminal at the time of the offense. Further, during this evaluation he also acknowledged that he would have known that a carjacking was illegal at the time of the offense. He stated I know the law. I know what's right and wrong. I'm not saying I did it no matter what. I'm not guilty. Common sense would say it's wrong. I just came out of prison. But I got nothing to explain. I know they got evidence but I'll take it to trial. Thus, the patient is simply denying involvement in the offense, rather than saying the behavior was somehow linked to his mental disorder. In light of the productivity report and the absence of a causal relationship between appellant's mental illness and the offense, there was no substantial question of appellant's insanity, and the obligation to conduct a Frendak inquiry was never triggered.