Opinion ID: 2453735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the requested documents fell within the statutory privilege protections of NRS 439.875(5)

Text: Although we conclude that Valley Health has waived its NRS 439.875 protection argument, writ relief would not be warranted even if the argument was not waived. NRS 439.875(5) provides that [t]he proceedings and records of a patient safety committee are subject to the same privilege and protection from discovery as the proceedings and records described in NRS 49.265. NRS 49.265(1) provides that proceedings and records of [o]rganized committees of hospitals responsible for the evaluation and improvement of the quality of care and peer review committees are not subject to discovery. [9] While we have not previously addressed the scope of the privilege under NRS 439.875(5), given that NRS 439.875(5) explicitly references the privilege in NRS 49.265, we conclude that NRS 439.875(5)'s privilege has the same scope and application as NRS 49.265. We addressed the scope of the privilege under NRS 49.265 in Columbia/HCA Healthcare v. Dist. Ct., 113 Nev. 521, 936 P.2d 844 (1997). In that case, plaintiffs sought occurrence reports arising out of the medical malpractice at issue. Id. at 523-24, 936 P.2d at 845-46. Those occurrence reports were reports generated by hospital staff when unusual circumstances occurred during treatment of patients. Id. at 524 n. 3, 936 P.2d at 846 n. 3. The hospital argued that the reports were privileged under NRS 49.265. Id. at 524, 936 P.2d at 846. In resolving this issue, we held that the privilege under NRS 49.265 is extremely limited and does not protect occurrence reports from discovery. Id. at 531, 936 P.2d at 851. A narrow interpretation of NRS 49.265 was supported by legislative history. Id. at 529-31, 936 P.2d at 849-50. Under this narrow interpretation, the reports were not protected because they were not generated by the medical review committee or produced during its review process. Id. Such a result was additionally necessary, we held, because a hospital may attempt to immunize itself from discovery by submitting the records and documents to the committee if the privilege is construed to include records and documents not produced by the committee but only submitted to the committee, which is contrary to public policy. See id. at 529, 936 P.2d at 849 (citing Lipschultz v. Superior Court, Etc., 128 Ariz. 16, 623 P.2d 805, 808 (1981); May v. Wood River Tp. Hosp., 257 Ill.App.3d 969, 195 Ill.Dec. 862, 629 N.E.2d 170, 174 (1994)). We find the rationale stated in Columbia/HCA to be equally applicable to NRS 439.875. Therefore, we hold that NRS 439.875(5)'s privilege only applies to protect internal documents and records of the patient safety committee from discovery. As Cagnina is not seeking documents and records of the patient safety committee, the information she seeks is not privileged. Based on the foregoing, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. [10] We concur: CHERRY, SAITTA, GIBBONS, PICKERING, HARDESTY, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.