Opinion ID: 544332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Modification and Revocation of Supervised Release.

Text: 10 Section 3583 of title 18 delineates the actions that a district court may take to modify or revoke a person's supervised release. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583. The section states that a court may terminate supervised release after one year if the court is satisfied that the person no longer requires supervision. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e)(1). The court may modify both the length and the terms of supervised release at any time before the term of supervised release has expired. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e)(2). Finally, the court may revoke a person's supervised release and require the person to spend all or part of the release term in prison if the person has violated a condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e)(3). Similarly, if a person has violated a condition of supervised release, the Sentencing Guidelines permit a court to either revoke supervised release or extend the term of supervised release and/or modify the conditions.... U.S.S.G. Sec. 7A1.3(b). 11 Shayesteh argues that because both section 3583 and Guidelines Sec. 7A1.3 are written in the disjunctive, the district court was constrained to choose only one of the several alternatives. He asserts that the court could not choose part of one alternative and part of another alternative. The government counters that we should not read strictly the sections but should interpret them so that a district court is given the flexibility to tailor its punishment of a person who has violated supervised release. 12 Shayesteh raises an issue of first impression in this circuit. Furthermore, it appears that no other circuit has yet decided this issue. We are guided by this circuit's general rules of statutory construction. When we construe a statute, we first look to its language. If the language is unclear, then we may look to the legislative history of the statute. Batista v. Sullivan, 882 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir.1989); Wang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 622 F.2d 1341, 1347 n. 6 (9th Cir.1980), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 139, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981). Furthermore, we generally construe a statute written in the disjunctive as setting out separate and distinct alternatives. Azure v. Morton, 514 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir.1975) ([T]he use of a disjunctive in a statute indicates alternatives and requires that they be treated separately.); accord Batista, 882 F.2d at 1483; Wang, 622 F.2d at 1347 n. 6. As the Tenth Circuit has noted, any ambiguity about a disjunctive phrase in a criminal statute usually requires a court to strictly interpret or as disjunctive because to do otherwise would generally have the effect of increasing a person's punishment. United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589, 598 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 1207, 89 L.Ed.2d 320 (1986). 13 Given the above rules of statutory construction, we interpret both section 3583 and Guidelines Sec. 7A1.3 as setting out distinct alternatives from which a district court can choose. If a district court finds that a person has violated a condition of supervised release, then the court may either revoke the term of supervised release and incarcerate the person [18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e)(3) ], or the court may take the actions specified in section 3583(e)(2). However, a district court is not permitted to revoke a person's supervised release, order a term of incarceration and then order another term of supervised release. 1 14 Furthermore, we have reviewed the legislative history of section 3583. We do not find anything in that history to contradict our interpretation. See S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 122, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3182, 3305-08. The report notes only that a court will have some ability to modify the terms of supervised release. 2 In other words, there is nothing that would suggest that we should give the word or anything but its natural meaning. 15 The government argues that it would be logical for a court to be able to revoke a term of supervised release, impose a term of incarceration and then impose another term of supervised release. The government is correct since it is rational to believe that a person who has violated a condition of supervised release may only need a short reminder that incarceration is unpleasant but may still need supervised release in order to refrain from further criminal activities. However, Congress has enacted an unambiguous statute that does not provide courts with that option. We would exceed our authority were we to judicially rewrite that legislation. 16 Had Congress wished to give a district court more discretion when revoking supervised release, it could have said so in section 3583. That point is highlighted by the fact that Congress did provide courts with greater flexibility to create terms of punishment for violations of probation. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3565. Under section 3565, a court may revoke a sentence of probation if it finds that a person has violated the conditions of probation. The court may then impose any other sentence that was available ... at the time of the initial sentencing. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3565(a)(2). Therefore, when a court revokes probation, it has the flexibility to structure a new sentence that may include probation, incarceration, fines and supervised release. Section 3565 shows that Congress knew how to give a court flexibility when Congress intended that a court have flexibility. 17