Opinion ID: 2647451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court’s Remaining Findings

Text: Dillon also argues that the District Court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Br. of Appellant at 29-43. A trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to a presumption that they are correct, see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984), and we will displace them only if (1) the findings are “without substantial evidentiary support or . . . induced by an erroneous application of the law”; or if (2) “on the entire evidence [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quotations and citations omitted). See generally EDWARDS, ELLIOTT & LEVY, supra, ch. II. 23 Dillon’s principal contention, it appears, is a two-step challenge to the District Court’s finding under the second Sell factor – i.e., that medication is substantially likely to restore his competency and substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere with his ability to assist in his defense. First, Dillon asserts that his diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder is erroneous and that he instead suffers from Delusional Disorder, as Dr. Ross opined. Br. of Appellant at 33-37, 42. Second, he argues that the success rate for treating Delusional Disorder is too low to warrant forced medication, i.e., that the medication is not substantially likely to restore his competency. Id. at 38-41. We find no merit in either argument. The District Court reasonably credited the Grant-Volin diagnosis over the previous two because Drs. Grant and Volin observed Dillon for a longer period than did the other doctors, and because they had more information at their disposal. 2013 WL 1859289, at  n.13. None of the arguments raised by Dillon – including that the diagnostic criteria have changed – cause us to question the validity of Drs. Grant and Volin’s professional judgment that Dillon suffers from Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type. To the contrary, there is ample evidence that Dillon is afflicted by a mood disorder, which offers a basis to diagnose Dillon with Schizoaffective Disorder instead of with Delusional Disorder. See, e.g., Tr. of Hr’g (Apr. 17, 2013) at 17, 21, 30, reprinted in J.A. 74, 78, 87. Even if Dillon were correct that he suffers from Delusional Disorder, the District Court’s finding of a substantial likelihood of restored competency would not be clear error. The Cochrane Study found that 73.3% of defendants with Delusional Order were restored to competency. Cochrane, supra, at 7 tbl. 4, reprinted in J.A. 24 285. And, more importantly, the competency restoration study found that Dillon would respond well to antipsychotic medication in part because “his psychotic symptoms have responded favorably to medication in the past.” 2013 WL 1859289, at  (quoting Drs. Grant and Volin’s competency restoration study at 31). Finally, there is no merit to the claim that the District Court erred in finding that the medication was substantially unlikely to have side effects that would interfere with Dillon’s trial defense. This claim is based on Dillon’s testimony that medication he took during a prior hospitalization made him depressed. Br. of Appellant at 42 & n.18. But as the District Court observed, “Dr. Volin testified that any sadness or depression that defendant experienced was a symptom of his mental illness, not a side effect of antipsychotic medication.” 2013 WL 1859289, at  (emphasis added) (citing Tr. of Hr’g (Apr. 17, 2013) at 86-88, reprinted in J.A. 143-45).