Opinion ID: 456033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: attorney fees computation

Text: 9 In computing the initial lodestar part of the fee award, the district court accepted Hall's figures concerning hours spent by counsel and suggested hourly fee rates. Apparently believing that the lodestar calculation should be based upon a consideration of the twelve factors listed in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied sub nom. Perkins v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976), the district court factored into its lodestar not only the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel and reasonable hourly rates, but also other factors such as the complexity of the case and the contingent nature of the fee. It then adjusted the lodestar upward by 50% because the case was taken on a contingency fee basis and the results obtained ... were excellent. Included was a summary recitation of the benefits obtained by Hall in the settlement agreement. 10 The law in this area has grown so fast and become so complex that it has baffled the efforts of courts and lawyers to comprehend and apply it. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 11 (D.C.Cir.1984) (quoting Cutler, Forward to 1 M. Derfner & A. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees vii (1983) ), petition for cert. filed, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3488, 87 L.Ed.2d 622 (1985). 11 The Supreme Court has attempted in two recent opinions to impose some coherence on the diaspora of case law. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). Although these two cases concerned fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, their reasoning applies to the awards in the present case, which are authorized under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(b) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 n. 7 (The standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party.' ); see also Jones v. Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services, 689 F.2d 724, 730 n. 8 (7th Cir.1982) (Section 794a fee awards are governed by the same considerations controlling in Sec. 1988 actions.). 12 We vacate the district court's award of attorney fees and remand for reconsideration in light of Hensley, Blum, and those recent decisions which have construed these authorities. We also emphasize that [i]t remains important ... for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. 13 The district court should recompute the lodestar portion of the award and provide a more detailed account of how it arrives at appropriate figures for the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate. Blum, 465 U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 1544. 14 The upward adjustment (the multiplier) should also be reconsidered by the district court. If a fee enhancement is granted, the court should explain with particularity its reasons for finding that there are factors, not already subsumed within the initial lodestar calculation, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1940 n. 9, which support a conclusion that Hall has achieved the exceptional success which makes hers one of the rare case[s] in which an upward adjustment to the presumptively reasonable fee of rate times hours is appropriate.... Blum, 465 U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 1548, 1550 n. 18.