Opinion ID: 889474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of Scheffer's Right-to-Counsel Claim

Text: ¶ 25 Initially, we note that there is no dispute that the McDermott-Scheffer interview constituted a custodial interrogation and, consequently, that Scheffer had the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment and Article II, Section 25. The State contends, however, that he did not adequately assert this right and that the right, therefore, was not violated. Alternatively, the State contends that even if the right was violated, the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence of criminal conduct (here, Scheffer's attempting to tamper with physical evidence on his fingers) committed in response to a claimed constitutional violation. [5] Scheffer disputes the State's arguments on both points; however, because we agree with the State's first argument, we do not reach the second. ¶ 26 If a suspect knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings (as Scheffer concedes he did here), law enforcement officers are free to question him. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). But if the suspect later requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning regarding any offense unless an attorney is actually present or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation. Id. at 458, 114 S.Ct. at 2354-55. The question here is whether Scheffer actually invoked his right to counsel after initially waiving it. This is an objective inquiry, id. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, and the Supreme Court has said that in this situation (i.e., after the suspect has waived the Miranda rights), a request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous, id. at 459, 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, 2356. Of course, he need not `speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.' Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. As we have noted before, laypeople are not learned in constitutional principle or legal nicety, and to require that precise words be uttered would elevate form over substance. State v. Morrisey, 2009 MT 201, ¶ 40, 351 Mont. 144, 214 P.3d 708. But, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. If the suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the officer is not required to cease questioning. Id. It is good police practice, however, for the interviewing officer to clarify whether or not the suspect actually wants an attorney. See id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356; Morrisey, ¶ 41 n. 8. Indeed, custodial officers who press on with questioning assuming that a suspect's statements or conduct are not indications of the suspect's desire to retain his Fifth Amendment rights do so at the risk of suppression of the suspect's subsequent statements. United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2009); see also Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356 (Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel.). ¶ 27 These principles, of course, are based on the Fifth Amendment. With respect to invoking the Article II, Section 25 right to counsel in custodial interrogations, this Court has stated that we refuse to `march lock-step' with the United States Supreme Court when the provisions of the Montana Constitution call for greater protection of an individual's rights than that guaranteed by the United States Constitution. State v. Spang, 2002 MT 120, ¶ 22, 310 Mont. 52, 48 P.3d 727 (citing State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 512, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1986)); see also State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶¶ 45-48, 331 Mont. 517, 134 P.3d 53 (clarifying that Spang and Johnson involved the right to counsel under Article II, Section 25, not Article II, Section 24, and stating that invocation of this right depends on the evident purpose of the suspect's statement, as viewed in light of the circumstances and in light of the rule that requests for counsel must be construed broadly). In Spang, we declined to accept the State's analysis based on Davis and instead purported to rely on Article II, Section 25 in concluding that the defendant had adequately invoked his right to counsel. See Spang, ¶¶ 19, 22-25. In the present case, however, while Scheffer cites Article II, Section 25, he offers no argument that his alleged assertion of his right to counsel under this provision, even if inadequate under Davis, was still adequate under Johnson, Spang, and Buck. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the standards set forth in Davis and recited above. ¶ 28 It is appropriate at this juncture to lay out the relevant portions of the colloquy between Detective McDermott and Scheffer. At the outset of the interview, McDermott introduced himself and asked, What's going on tonight? Scheffer responded, I don't [expletive] know what the deal is here. Scheffer then proceeded to explain that he knew H.K., her family, and her fiancé. McDermott interrupted, however, in order to read Scheffer the Miranda warnings. The following exchange occurred: McDermott: Hold on real quick, though, okay? Scheffer: Sure. McDermott: There's a form that I just need to go over with you real quick Scheffer: Sure. No problem. McDermott:just uh Scheffer: You bet. No problem. McDermott:before we get started. It's just Scheffer: I don't care. I mean, I don't need an attorney or nothing. [Inaudible.] Read me my rights. I don't care. McDermott: I just have a form, you know? Scheffer: Sure. No problem. You bet. McDermott: That way, my boss will be happy. So Scheffer: Yeah, yeah. McDermott: Let me just read this for you, okay? Scheffer: Sure. Go ahead. McDermott: Just kind of a standard deal. Scheffer: But could you do something for me? At this point, Scheffer asked McDermott to bring H.K. to the stationhouse in order to clear everything up. Scheffer claimed that H.K. presently was with a guy doing drugs and that Scheffer knew how to reach her. McDermott responded, Okay. Well, let me get through this, then we'll talk about that. The dialogue continued: McDermott: So, anyway, these are your Miranda warnings. Scheffer: Sure. No problem. McDermott: They state you have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. Scheffer: So should I remain silent, or should I stand up for myself? McDermott: Tommy, let me get through this, okay, then I'll answer any questions for you. Just let me read through this first. Scheffer: Okay. McDermott: So again, you do have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to a lawyer and have your lawyer present before this interview proceeds. If you are unable to pay for a lawyer, the court will appoint one for you at public expense before this interview continues. And should you decide to cooperate in this interview, you still have the right to stop at any time, okay, and then request to have a lawyer present with you before you participate any further. So, do you understand your rights? Scheffer: Yes. McDermott: Okay. So if you could just sign here, this is just a record. It protects you, it protects me, that I did my job and treated you right. Can you date it for me? Just put the 25th. I just want to make sure I treat you right tonight, okay? So, I do not know much about what's going on. I'll certainly look into some of these other things you have, but let's just start with what happened tonight. That's probably the best Scheffer: Let me start here. Am I under arrest? McDermott: At this point, you're being detained, and at the end of this Scheffer: Where's she at? McDermott:investigation Scheffer: Where's she at? McDermott: Tommy, listen to me. Scheffer: I'm listening. McDermott: At this point Scheffer: Maybe I should call my lawyer. McDermott: Maybe you're not listening to me, Tommy. Scheffer: Maybe I should call him. McDermott: Listen, I'm trying to treat you right. I'm trying Scheffer: I've done nothing but try to help people tonight McDermott: Okay. Scheffer:and this is bullshit. McDermott: Tommy, at this point we're doing an investigation. You're gonna be detained. Sounds like you cooperated. You wanted to sit and talk to me Scheffer: Let's get, let's get my lawyer here. McDermott: Okay. Scheffer: Yeah. Let's get Bobby here, her fiancé here. Tell him what really happened. McDermott: Okay. But don't you think it'd be wiser if I talked to you first so that I know the story? Scheffer: No, not really. McDermott: Okay. Scheffer: Let's get my lawyer here. This is, I mean, I'm, this is, you guys should never have brought me down here. I've done nothing but found her purse. She gave her car to a friend. I wasn't gonna let her car get wrecked. I talked her into going to get her car. I found her [purse], and she freaked out because she didn't have Bobby and hers credit cards. [Inaudible] people she didn't know. I went and got that, gave it to, I did nothing but help her. And she wanted to fuck, she wanted to do this. She'd been on drugs all night last night. Find her, I can take you to my house and show you the guy she's with right now, who she did drugs with all night last night. You can call that number. I'll guarantee that's who she's with now. That's what she wanted to go do. She said she was going to go see him. McDermott: Okay. Scheffer: This is bullshit. I am not at fault here. She wants to lay me at fault for why, for Bobby, why she's going, not getting married, this is bullshit. I never touched her. Get her, look, take her to the hospital, get her tested, vaginal. I never have touched [H.K.]. Ever. This is bullshit. I should not be here. McDermott: Okay. Well, Tommy, the question is you need to decide if you want to talk to me about this or Scheffer: What do you wanna talk, what do you wanna ask me? McDermott:if you want to talk to a lawyer. Scheffer: What do you, am I under arrest? What do you wanna ask me, and I'll just tell you what I wanna, if I wanna talk to a lawyer or not, `cause I should not be here. McDermott: Okay. Scheffer: I should be home in bed sleeping with my kids right now. McDermott: Okay. Well, do you understand your rights? Scheffer: Yes I do. McDermott: Okay. Do you want to talk to me a little bit about it, and you can still stop Scheffer: Ask me, you, you ask me what you want you wanna ask me. The conversation proceeded from here into a discussion of the evening's events. ¶ 29 Scheffer argues that he made an unambiguous request for counsel when he said let's get my lawyer here. In fact, he claims he made multiple invocations of this right. Yet, while Scheffer did indeed mention a lawyer several times, we cannot agree that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood his statements to be a request for an attorney (in the sense that he wanted to deal with McDermott only through counsel). In this regard, while Scheffer isolates specific passages from the transcript, it is important to note that our analysis does not end with words alone;... we also consider the circumstances in which the statement was made. United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815, 819 (7th Cir.2009). Doing so, we agree with the District Court's assessment: [Scheffer] here had no intention to invoke his right to counsel, but rather had an overwhelming desire to explain his version of what happened no matter what. It appears to the Court that [Scheffer] believed he could talk his way out of the situation and very much wanted the chance to do so. As a part of this course of action, the mention of a lawyer was a part of [Scheffer's] early-on suggestion to the officer that he immediately assemble everybody that might have any relationship to the matter under investigation, including his lawyer, and get to the bottom of it right then and there. In the face of [Scheffer's] eagerness to talk[,] Detective McDermott showed much restraint in trying to slow him down and doing exactly what the Montana and United States Supreme Courts require. He clarified if [Scheffer's] equivocal statements were a request for a lawyer. They were not. ¶ 30 We addressed a similar scenario in State v. Maestas, 2006 MT 101, 332 Mont. 140, 136 P.3d 514. The defendant (Maestas), immediately after demanding an attorney, and without interruption, told the detective to question another witness about the events in question: Now, give me a fucking lawyer `cause I don't have to sit here and fucking put up with this bullshit, `cause I ain't done nothin'. You can ask Jim, the owner, what time we left. The detective immediately instructed Maestas to stop talking and tell him whether he wished to have counsel present before proceeding. He asked Maestas at least six times whether he wanted an attorney, and Maestas repeatedly told him that he did not. See Maestas, ¶¶ 6, 18. We concluded under these circumstances that Maestas' requests for a lawyer were equivocal and that it was appropriate for the detective to determine what Maestas truly wanted. Maestas, ¶¶ 18-19. ¶ 31 In the present case, while Scheffer asserts that his supposed requests for counsel were met with coercive responses and interview tactics, the fact is that McDermott was simply attempting to respond to Scheffer's various questions and suggestionsobviously a difficult task, given Scheffer's repeated interruptions. Moreover, Scheffer's references to a lawyer were equivocal at best, given his initial statement that I don't need an attorney or nothing, followed closely thereafter by his remarks that Maybe I should call my lawyer and his suggestions that they bring various people (including his lawyer) down to the stationhouse to clear everything up. Cf. Davis, 512 U.S. at 462, 114 S.Ct. at 2357 (Maybe I should talk to a lawyer is not an unambiguous request for counsel). As noted, if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal, in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the officer is not required to cease questioning. The prudent course of action, though, is for the officer to clarify whether the suspect actually wants an attorney. And that is what McDermott did. He told Scheffer: Well, Tommy, the question is you need to decide if you want to talk to me about this or if you want to talk to a lawyer. Scheffer responded: What do you wanna ask me, and I'll just tell you what I wanna, if I wanna talk to a lawyer or not.... The conversation proceeded from there, without Scheffer ever stating that he wanted to talk to a lawyer. He later engaged in the conduct that formed the basis of the attempted-tampering charge. ¶ 32 We accordingly hold that Scheffer did not make an unambiguous request for counsel. Hence, the District Court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. ¶ 33 Issue 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Scheffer's motion to dismiss the Amended Information? ¶ 34 We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision whether to allow the amendment of an information. State v. Wilson, 2007 MT 327, ¶ 19, 340 Mont. 191, 172 P.3d 1264. A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Derbyshire, 2009 MT 27, ¶ 19, 349 Mont. 114, 201 P.3d 811. ¶ 35 As noted, the State charged Scheffer in the Information filed September 11, 2007, with tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, a felony, in violation of § 45-7-207, MCA (2005). On May 21, 2008, the State requested leave to file an Amended Information changing this charge to attempted tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, a felony, in violation of §§ 45-4-103 and 45-7-207, MCA. [6] The reason for this amendment was that the testing of the swabs of Scheffer's fingers by the crime lab, which had not been completed at the time the original Information was filed, had since been completed and revealed the presence of both Scheffer's DNA and H.K.'s DNA, thus indicating that Scheffer had not destroyed this evidence (by sticking his fingers in his mouth during the interrogation), but rather had unsuccessfully attempted to do so. The prosecutor sought to conform [the charge] to the evidence in the case. ¶ 36 Scheffer moved to dismiss the tampering and attempted-tampering charges. As to the former, he reasoned that the State's amendment constituted a tacit admission that it could not prove he had actually tampered with physical evidence. As to the latter, he argued that the Amended Information was untimely under § 46-11-205(1), MCA, which states that the trial court may allow an information to be amended in matters of substance at any time, but not less than 5 days before trial. The District Court denied Scheffer's motion, concluding that the Amended Information was filed in a timely manner and that Scheffer had not been prejudiced by the amendment of the charge. ¶ 37 On appeal, Scheffer argues that the District Court erred in its determination that the Amended Information was timely filed. In this regard, both he and the State dispute which time-computation rule governs calculations under § 46-11-205(1), MCA. We need not resolve this dispute, however, because we agree with the State that the amendment was one of form, not substance, and as such was permissible under § 46-11-205(3), MCA. ¶ 38 An information is a written accusation of criminal conduct prepared by a prosecutor in the name of the State. Wilson, ¶ 25. The information must reasonably apprise the accused of the charges against him, so that he may have the opportunity to prepare and present his defense. Wilson, ¶ 25. The court may permit an information to be amended as to form at any time before a verdict or finding is issued if no additional or different offense is charged and if the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. Section 46-11-205(3), MCA. An amendment is one of form when the same crime is charged, the elements of the crime and the proof required remain the same, and the defendant is informed of the charges against him. Wilson, ¶ 26. To differentiate amendments of form and substance, we examine whether an amendment to an information or complaint alters the nature of the offense, the essential elements of the crime, the proofs, or the defenses. Wilson, ¶ 26. ¶ 39 In the present case, the nature of the offense was the same, the essential elements of the crime remained the same, and there is no indication that the proofs or the defenses changed in response to the amendment. The alleged facts underlying the tampering and attempted-tampering charges were identical: Scheffer first penetrated H.K.'s vagina with his fingers; he later stuck his fingers in his mouth and wiped them on his jeans at the stationhouse, prior to their being swabbed for DNA. The only difference in the State's proof following the amendment was that the swabs revealed the presence of both Scheffer's DNA and H.K.'s DNA, instead of inconclusive results or no DNA at all, thus indicating that he did not actually alter, destroy, conceal, or remove the evidence, see § 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA, but only attempted to do so. There were no new allegations of additional or different instances of criminal conduct. Cf. City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 2002 MT 89, ¶¶ 15-16, 309 Mont. 330, 46 P.3d 602. The amended charge was identical to the original charge except that the phrase altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed in the original charge was replaced with the phrase attempted to alter, destroy, conceal, or remove in the amended charge. Cf. State v. Matson, 227 Mont. 36, 43, 736 P.2d 971, 975 (1987) (insertion of the word serious before the phrase bodily injury to describe the charge of aggravated assault was an amendment of form); State v. Clark, 1998 MT 221, ¶ 52, 290 Mont. 479, 964 P.2d 766 (change from possession of methamphetamine to possession of amphetamine was an amendment of form). ¶ 40 Furthermore, while Scheffer claims the amendment was greatly injurious to his substantive rights and drastically interfered with his ability to prepare a defense, he proffers nothing concrete in support of these bald assertions. He speculates that had he been afforded adequate opportunity to prepare a defense to the `attempt' charge, defense counsel may have theorized during cross-examination and closing that Scheffer could not have attempted to tamper with physical evidence of a crime he did not commit. We fail to see, however, how he was precluded from making this argument. A plausible change in his defense is suggested in the attempt statute itself, which states that [a] person shall not be liable under this section if, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, he avoided the commission of the offense attempted by abandoning his criminal effort. Section 45-4-103(4), MCA. But again, there is no indication that Scheffer was precluded in any way from presenting such evidence and making this argument at trial. Finally, the State points out that Scheffer was not exposed to any greater punishment as a result of the amendment, given that tampering and attempted-tampering convictions lead to the same possible punishment. See § 45-4-103(3), MCA; cf. State v. Gardipee, 2004 MT 250, ¶ 9, 323 Mont. 59, 98 P.3d 305 (defendant's substantial rights were not prejudiced by amendment of the information on the morning of trial from misdemeanor partner or family member assault to felony partner or family member assault, since the amendment merely reflected the statutorily mandated sentencing range for a repeat offender). ¶ 41 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the amendment of the tampering charge to an attempted-tampering charge was a timely amendment as to form and that Scheffer's substantial rights were not prejudiced by this amendment. Section 46-11-205(3), MCA. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scheffer's motion to dismiss the Amended Information. ¶ 42 Issue 3. Must Scheffer's conviction of attempted tampering with or fabricating physical evidence be vacated as irrationally inconsistent with his acquittal of sexual intercourse without consent? ¶ 43 Scheffer claims his conviction of attempted tampering with or fabricating physical evidence must be set aside because it is irrationally inconsistent with his acquittal of sexual intercourse without consent. He contends that the verdict of not guilty on the rape charge means that the alleged rape never occurred, and from this he reasons that it was a practical impossibility for Scheffer to tamper with or attempt to tamper with any evidence of a non-existent rape and, thus, that the jury could not have logically concluded that Scheffer attempted to tamper with evidence related to a rape that never occurred. ¶ 44 As the State points out, however, this argument is inconsistent with the elements of the attempted-tampering offense. The State had to prove that Scheffer, believing that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted, attempted to alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any thing (specifically, DNA evidence) with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation. See §§ 45-4-103, 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA (2005). The State was not required to prove that the official proceeding or investigation actually resulted in the conviction of a crime; rather, it had to prove that Scheffer believed that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted and that Scheffer's purpose was to impair the verity or availability of the evidence in such proceeding or investigationevidence which, it should be noted, Detective McDermott had specifically requested for purposes of his investigation into H.K.'s allegations. ¶ 45 Furthermore, even if an actual rape never occurred, it does not necessarily follow that it was a practical impossibility for Scheffer to attempt to tamper with evidence of the events and acts in question. To convict on the rape charge, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Scheffer knowingly had sexual intercourse without consent with H.K., see § 45-5-503(1), MCA, which here means that he penetrated her vulva with his finger or fingers (presumably for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification), see § 45-2-101(68), MCA, and that H.K. was compelled to submit by force or was incapable of consent, see § 45-5-501(1), MCA. Scheffer admitted at trial that he put his fingers into H.K.'s vagina. Thus, he now observes on appeal that [t]he rape acquittal inherently suggests that any contact between Scheffer and [H.K.] was found to be consensual. In other words, while the evidence established that Scheffer penetrated H.K.'s vulva, the State failed to prove that this was without consent. Yet, the DNA evidence on his fingers did not go to the element of consent; rather, it went to prove penetration, which indisputably did occur. Thus, the fact that the jury apparently determined that the penetration was consensual does not negate the fact that the DNA evidence was evidence of the charged offense, nor does it negate the fact that Scheffer attempted to tamper with this evidence by sticking his fingers into his mouth. ¶ 46 We conclude that Scheffer's conviction of attempting to alter, destroy, conceal, or remove physical evidence relating to a pending official proceeding or investigation into his alleged sexual intercourse without consent with H.K. is not irrationally inconsistent with his ultimate acquittal of that underlying charge.