Opinion ID: 2380071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Separate Contractors or All Other Subcontractors

Text: [¶ 23] The waiver of subrogation applies to the Church and Knowles, as well as to separate contractors and all other subcontractors. The parties disagree whether the chemical defendants  manufacturers and suppliers of the paint stripper used by Knowles  constitute separate contractors or all other subcontractors and, thus, whether the waiver of subrogation applies to them. [¶ 24] When interpreting a contractual provision, we first determine whether the provision is ambiguous. See Villas by the Sea Owners Ass'n v. Garrity, 2000 ME 48, ¶ 9, 748 A.2d 457, 461. A contractual provision is ambiguous if it is reasonably possible to give that provision at least two different meanings. Id. Interpretation of an unambiguous provision is a matter of law, and the provision is given its plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning. Id. Construction of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact determined by the fact-finder and reviewed for clear error. Id. We avoid interpretations that would render any particular contractual provision meaningless, SC Testing Tech., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 688 A.2d 421, 424 (Me.1996), and examine the contract in its entirety to determine whether an apparent ambiguity is resolved elsewhere in the document, Guilford Transp. Indus. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2000 ME 31, ¶ 18, 746 A.2d 910, 915. [¶ 25] Although the waiver of subrogation makes no reference to product manufacturers, distributors, or suppliers, other provisions of the contract distinguish between subcontractors and suppliers. [4] Reliance argues that the fact that other provisions of the contract draw such a distinction makes it clear that the chemical defendants do not fall within the waiver's definitions of separate contractors or all other subcontractors. Reliance asserts that this conclusion is supported by commonly accepted distinctions between the terms subcontractor and supplier or materialman. Alternatively, Reliance urges that, at a minimum, the contract language is ambiguous and is a question of fact that cannot be resolved by summary judgment. [¶ 26] We are not persuaded by Reliance's arguments. The broad scope of the waiver  i.e., usage of the terms separate contractors and all other subcontractors  suggests that it was intended to apply to a broad range of parties. See Crow-Williams, I v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 683 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tex.App.1984). This view is consistent with that taken by other courts that have concluded, with respect to waivers of subrogation, product manufacturers or suppliers, in addition to those who furnish labor, fall within the definitions of subcontractor or separate contractors. [5] See, e.g., S. Tippecanoe Sch. Bldg. Corp. v. Shambaugh & Son, Inc., 182 Ind.App. 350, 395 N.E.2d 320, 333 (1979); Crow-Williams, 683 S.W.2d at 524; Anderson Hay & Grain Co. v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 119 Wash.App. 249, 76 P.3d 1205, 1208 (2003). The fact that other sections of the contract distinguish between suppliers and subcontractors has little bearing because the waiver of subrogation has a broader purpose than those sections. See Willis Realty Assocs. v. Cimino Constr. Co., 623 A.2d 1287, 1288 (Me.1993) (noting that courts have liberally construed waivers of subrogation). Finally, holding that waivers of subrogation do not apply to product suppliers and manufacturers would render their protection illusory. If insurers can bring claims against product suppliers and manufacturers, then suppliers and manufacturers should be expected, in turn, to bring contribution claims against the parties to the waiver. [6] [¶ 27] Therefore, we conclude that the waiver's use of the terms separate contractors and all other subcontractors is unambiguous and, by its very terms, includes the chemical defendants in this case. [7]