Opinion ID: 894854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discovery from Testifying Experts

Text: Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(e), which defines the scope of permissible discovery from experts, provides in pertinent part as follows: A party may discover the following information regarding a testifying expert . . . :    (3) the facts known by the expert that relate to or form the basis of the expert's mental impressions and opinions formed or made in connection with the case in which the discovery is sought, regardless of when and how the factual information was acquired; (4) the expert's mental impressions and opinions formed or made in connection with the case in which discovery is sought, and any methods used to derive them; (5) any bias of the witness; (6) all documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of a testifying expert's testimony; . . . . TEX.R. CIV. P. 192.3(e) (emphasis added). We must first decide whether this rule applies to the Northcutt documents; if it does not, the documents retain their privileged nature and may be recovered pursuant to Rule 193.3(d)'s snap-back feature. Rule 192.3(e)(6) was promulgated in 1999 to replace former Rule 166b, which permitted discovery of only those documents . . . prepared by an expert or for an expert in anticipation of the expert's trial and deposition testimony. TEX.R. CIV. P. 166b(2)(e)(2) (repealed). Under this former rule, privileged work product lost its protected status if the material provided to the expert was, in fact, relied upon by the expert as the basis for his or her testimony. See D.N.S. v. Schattman, 937 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, orig. proceeding) (noting that privilege is waived when an expert relies on a privileged document as the basis for the expert's opinion); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Blackmon, 810 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, orig. proceeding) (holding that an expert witness's possession of documents did not automatically waive attorney-client and work-product privileges). Thus, under the pre-amendment rule, if an expert did not rely on a privileged document, it was not discoverable. To avoid the discovery disputes that frequently arose over what material an expert may or may not have relied upon, the rule was amended in 1999 to include more expansive language. In addition to documents prepared by or for the expert, the rule now mandates discovery of documents that have been provided to, [or] reviewed by a testifying expert. TEX.R. CIV. P. 192.3(e)(6). The Hospital's argument that the Northcutt documents were prepared by or for the Hospital rather than by or for the expert, and that Menzies did not read them in any event, erroneously ignores the rule's disjunctive language. Whether or not the documents were actually read by or prepared for Menzies, they were clearly provided to the Hospital's testifying expert and thus fall within Rule 192.3(e)(6)'s plain language. It is true, as the Hospital claims and Palmer does not dispute, that the Northcutt documents constitute work product under Rule 192.5, and that work product is carefully protected from discovery under our rules. TEX.R. CIV. P. 192.5(a)(1), (2). However, Rule 192.5(c)(1) specifically states that work product loses its protected status when it is provided to a testifying expert: (c) Even if made or prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the following is not work product protected from discovery: (1) information discoverable under Rule 192.3 concerning experts. . . . TEX.R. CIV. P. 192.5(c)(1). Because the Northcutt documents were provided to the Hospital's testifying expert, the work-product privilege does not protect them unless the snap-back provision requires their return.