Opinion ID: 2516409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The evidence of the paramedic's prior inconsistent statements

Text: In several pretrial interviews, paramedic Giddens stated that the victim did not tell her anything while she treated him, but these prior statements were completely contrary to her trial testimony. This is undisputed. There is also no question that these prior inconsistent statements were favorable to the defense and material because they could have been used to impeach the credibility of a key witness for the State. Giddens was key because she appeared to be the one disinterested witness who could identify Lay, albeit indirectly, as the shooter. If Giddens had been impeached with evidence of her prior inconsistent statements, it may be that Lay still would have been convicted, and there still would have been sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction. But the proper test to determine a Brady violation is not a showing that the evidence would have been insufficient or an acquittal would have resulted if the withheld evidence had been disclosed: the question is whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result if the defense had known of Giddens's prior inconsistent statements. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The three witnesses who identified Lay as the shooter or as the driver of the stolen car were all friends of the victim or even affiliated with a gang at odds with Lay's. The two who testified that Lay was the shooter originally said that they could not identify the shooter, and the one who testified that Lay was the driver did not come forward with this information for a year. Other than testimony by Giddens of the victim's dying declaration, the only apparently neutral evidence linking Lay to the crime was his fingerprints on the stolen car. (The evidence that around the time of the crime Lay was with several other men at his home and had a rifle, shotgun, or pistol while consistent with his guilt does little to prove that he committed the murder.) Thus, if the defense had been able to confront Giddens with her original account that the victim said nothing and the way in which she had changed that account, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that one or more jurors would not have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Lay committed first-degree murder. The remaining question is whether the defense was given this information. Without citing any specific facts, the district court's order stated the defense was informed that Giddens had previously related that the victim did not say anything. In concluding that the State had not violated any discovery requirements, the order also referred to defense counsel's admissions that they had received all the information. We have held that [a] district court's determinations of fact will not be set aside if they are supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. State, 113 Nev. 454, 470, 937 P.2d 55, 65 (1997). We conclude that these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. The only evidence that suggests that the defense was informed of Giddens's prior inconsistent statements came at the evidentiary hearing. Brookins said that the defense already had that information because I had had to prepare a document, and I believe it was already filed with the court, and it already listed the witnesses and a summary of their testimony. Q. And is it your testimony that you prepared something saying that Miss Giddens had said previously that she [sic] could not speak because people A. You know, I don't remember specifically. I haven't seen the document in five years, I don't remember specifically. But whatever she had said to me and what her testimony was going to be would have been in that document. (Emphasis added.) This evidence is equivocal. Brookins did not remember whether the summary of Giddens's statements specifically included the information that the victim had said nothing to her. It would not be surprising if a summary of what her testimony was going to be did not affirmatively include what was, in effect, noninformation noninformation which did not really become significant until Giddens changed her account. The clear weight of the evidence is that the defense was not told about either Giddens's original account that the victim said nothing in her presence or her later account that he did. Lucherini conceded that the defense was not told about the latter, i.e., that Giddens would testify about a dying declaration by the victim. And, contrary to the district court's finding, defense counsel did not say that they had received all the information. Both Schieck and Hatcher stated under oath they were never informed that Giddens would testify that the victim identified Lay as his killer or that Giddens had first stated several times that the dying man had said nothing. Nor, if defense counsel had been informed of the prior inconsistent statements, does it make sense that they failed to use them to impeach Giddens once she testified differently. Schieck and Hatcher would certainly have known to do so; they repeatedly impeached other defense witnesses with their prior inconsistent statements and failure to speak to authorities. Also, as discussed above, Lucherini admitted that he did not find it necessary to inform the defense that a person other than Lay had been identified as a shooter; therefore, it seems likely he would have felt the same way about Giddens's inconsistent statements. At the evidentiary hearing he declared that exculpatory evidence is evidence that explains away the crime. This is a constricted and incorrect view of Brady material. Due process does not require simply the disclosure of `exculpatory' evidence. Evidence also must be disclosed if it provides grounds for the defense to attack the reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation, to impeach the credibility of the state's witnesses, or to bolster the defense case against prosecutorial attacks. Mazzan, 116 Nev. at ___, 993 P.2d at 37. The proper question is whether evidence is `favorable'to the defense. Id. at ___, 993 P.2d at 39 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439, 115 S.Ct. 1555). Furthermore, at the evidentiary hearing Brookins assumed that the document she had prepared, summarizing the expected testimony of witnesses, had been filed with the district court and thus provided to the defense. However, the record plainly shows that neither the court nor the defense ever received such a document. Well into the trial, the district court [2] addressed Lucherini: [Y]ou are going to have witnesses testify who are not known to the defense. Any witness you're going to have testify at that time ... if there is a written statement for them I'd like to have you give it to the defense at the time they're testifying. And if you do not have a written statement [for] them, please have your office make a brief synopsis of what they're going to say. (Emphasis added.) Lucherini replied, Judge, I'm obviously unprepared because I've never heard of a case that says we have to do that. I'm not familiar with a statute that says we have to do that. (Emphasis added.) The court responded: [T]he defense is entitled to anything [State witnesses] may have said. There is no way they can cross-examine it to find out whether or not this statement is now in conflict with a previous statement or not, because they have no previous statement, they have nothing at all. Somewhere in someone's notes there should be a synopsis of what the witness is going to state, otherwise you wouldn't be calling him. (Emphasis added.) After a brief recess, the court asked: [M]ost of those witnesses have not been reduced down to any statement, is that correct? Mr. Lucherini: Judge, the State intends to call about four witnesses that were not given to the defendant. The Court: To the best of your knowledge have there been any written statements made by them? Mr. Lucherini: The second of the four has a written statement. I do not believe that it was ever given to the police department.... This person is the paramedic. ... At this time the State has given a copy of the paramedic report to defense counsel for them to review and to look at. And I believe if they'll review they'll find out that nothing in that statement is of any investigatory nature at all. (Emphasis added.) Thus, Lucherini never provided the defense with a synopsis of expected testimony for Giddens or several other witnesses. After the trial was under way and after the court insisted, Lucherini handed over Giddens's paramedic report. But he still provided no summary of her expected testimony, which, unlike the paramedic report, would have contained critical information of an investigatory nature the victim's dying declarationas well as Giddens's prior inconsistent statements. We conclude that the district court manifestly erred in finding that the defense was informed of Giddens's prior inconsistent statements. [3] We also conclude that the information withheld was favorable to the defense and material under Brady. [4]