Opinion ID: 19557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Insufficiency of Count 2

Text: 12 An indictment is sufficient if (1) it contains the elements of the offense charged, (2) it 'fairly informs' the defendant of the charge he must meet, and (3) there is no risk of future prosecutions for the same offense. United States v. Arlen, 947 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986)). Lankford asserts that the indictment was insufficient because it did not include all the elements of the crime with which he was charged. 13 Whether an indictment is sufficient is a question of law we review de novo. See United States v. Cabera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1999). Although challenges based on the failure to charge an offense may be made at any time, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2); United States v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1996), if made for the first time on appeal, a court should read the indictment with maximum liberality and find it sufficient unless it is so defective that by any reasonable construction, it fails to charge the offense for which the defendant is convicted. Id. (footnote omitted). The maximum liberality standard is appropriate where, as here, the appellant does not assert that he had no notice of the crime he was accused on committing. See id. at 221 & n.1. In assessing the sufficiency of an indictment, we focus on practical, not technical, considerations. See Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959) (Convictions are no longer reversed because of minor and technical deficiencies which did not prejudice the accused.); United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437, 446 (5th Cir. 1992). 14 In order to obtain a conviction under 1201(a)(1), the government must prove (1) the transportation in interstate commerce; (2) of an unconsenting person who is; (3) held for ransom, reward, or otherwise, and (4) the acts were done knowingly and willingly. United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 100 (5th Cir. 1995). Count 2 of the indictment alleged that Lankford, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), 15 did willfully transport in interstate commerce from Wichita Falls, Texas to Lawton, Oklahoma, Joanie Lankford, who had been seized, confined, kidnaped, abducted, and carried away for ransom,reward, and otherwise, to wit, the defendant's sexual gratification. 16 Lankford's challenge rests on the absence of the words and held between carried away and for ransom, an omission he asserts resulted in the indictment being insufficient. We must decide whether this omission results in an indictment that, by any reasonable construction, fails to charge that Lankford was detaining his wife when he crossed state lines. 17 We find that the indictment is sufficient. Lankford was charged with transporting his wife from Wichita Falls, Texas to Lawton, Oklahoma, a distance of over fifty miles. Given the location of Wichita Falls relative to the Texas-Oklahoma border, the two would have had to travel a distance before crossing into Oklahoma. Cf. United States v. Lewis, 662 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1981)(finding that an indictment's statement that appellant transported the victim from Virginia to the District of Columbia alleged a holding); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 1969) (finding that an indictment's charge that appellant transported the victim from Virginia to Pennsylvania alleged a holding at the time state lines were crossed for the second time). The indictment also charged Lankford with having seized, confined, kidnaped, abducted, and carried away his wife for ransom, reward, and otherwise, to wit, the defendant's sexual gratification. We think Lankford's indictment adequately alleges his detention, at the time he crossed the Texas-Oklahoma border, of an unconsenting person for purposes of his receiving some benefit. Because we find Count 2 sufficient, Lankford's arguments regarding the possibility that his conviction on Counts 1 and 3 were based on legally inadequate grounds must fail. 18