Opinion ID: 1918099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appointment

Text: This Court often is required to consider matters that are riddled with complexity, the result of which, although consistent with the law, members of this Court would not prefer. In those situations, the Court cannot, and should not, avoid its responsibility to ensure that the questions are resolved in full accordance with the law. It may not, therefore, adopt simple solutions that do not enjoy legal support, or stretch logic to the breaking point, for the sake of reaching a preferred resolution. Sadly, that is precisely what the majority does today. This case presents the question of the division of labor between the courts and the local OPD, with regard to assuring legal representation to indigent individuals. Office of the Public Defender v. State, 413 Md. 411, 429, 993 A.2d 55, 66 (2010). The majority, after a careful manipulation of legal principles and relevant, indeed controlling case law, holds: the Circuit Court for Cecil County did not exceed its authority when it appointed John K. Northrop (`Northrop'), the Deputy District Public Defender for Cecil County, or a member of his office or a panel attorney, to represent Jason Flynn Stinnett (`Stinnett'), a criminal defendant whom the Circuit Court found qualified as indigent under the Maryland Code, but to whom representation had been denied previously and wrongfully by the local OPD. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 415, 993 A.2d at 57. This holding is contrary to the statutory language governing the OPD, namely Article 27A §§ 4(a) (placing the primary duty on the OPD to provide indigent representation) and 6(f) (preserving in certain enumerated courts the authority to appoint counsel when the OPD cannot or does not do so) and to this Court's previous holdings, both of which inform the trial courts with regard to their responsibility when the OPD declines, properly or improperly, to provide representation. Together, they teach that the courts do not have oversight over the eligibility determination decisions of the OPD. The majority's disregard of precedent and statutory pronouncements not only is troubling, but it tramples on the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court previously has addressed the juxtaposition of appointment responsibility between the OPD and the State's trial courts in Thompson v. State, 284 Md. 113, 394 A.2d 1190 (1978). Accordingly, and indeed, Thompson and its progeny control the result of this case. In Thompson, the defendant had been convicted in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, of shoplifting and assault and battery. 284 Md. at 114, 394 A.2d at 1191. He appealed that conviction to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Although represented by the OPD in the District Court, he posted bond pending appeal and appeared without counsel in the Circuit Court. Id. at 116, 394 A.2d at 1191. The OPD determined that he did not qualify for the services of the OPD, id. at 118, 394 A.2d at 1192-93, and the trial court, having refused the invitation by the OPD to leave it up to the Court as to whether or not the Court wanted [it] to appoint a lawyer on his behalf, id. at 118, 394 A.2d at 1193, advised the defendant to get counsel and of the consequences of not doing so. Id. at 119, 394 A.2d at 1193. After some delay occasioned by the defendant's expressed intent, but unsuccessful attempt, to get private counsel, the case proceeded to trial and sentence with the defendant unrepresented. Id. at 121-122, 394 A.2d at 1194. Although there were three issues presented in Thompson, the dispositive one, namely, [d]id the trial court err in not fully complying with the mandate of Rule 723 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure by not properly advising ... Thompson of his rights and obligations as contained therein?, [7] id. at 114, 394 A.2d at 1191, related to the advice required by Rule 723 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure (1978) to be given to a defendant, by the court, upon his or her appearance in court not represented by counsel and before accepting or finding a waiver of counsel. Maryland Rule 723, AppearanceProvision for or Waiver of Counsel, [8] after requiring in § (a) that a defendant appear in court at the time and place specified in the summons or other writ when a charging document is filed against him or her, prescribed the inquiry requirements for several scenarios in which the defendant appeared without counsel: when the defendant appeared without counsel, § (b) [9] ; when the defendant appeared without counsel and indicated that he or she does not want representation, § (c), [10] and when the defendant appeared without counsel subsequent to his initial appearance, § (d). We concluded that the trial judge violated Rule 723 in three particulars, by failing to advis[e] Thompson pursuant to § (b), in not conducting the waiver inquiry required by § (c), and in not making a determination upon proper considerations whether Thompson was eligible to have it appoint counsel upon the refusal of the Public Defender to provide representation, id. at 130-31, 394 A.2d at 1199, either one of which constituted reversible error. Id. at 130, 394 A.2d at 1199. It is the latter that is of interest in this case. As to Rule 723(c), which implements the right to counsel, including appointed counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Thompson, 284 Md. at 122-23, 394 A.2d at 1194-95, The inquiry required to be made and the test to be met under § c before the court may accept a waiver of counsel applies not only to a defendant's appearance pursuant to § a but also to any proceeding at which he appears without counsel thereafter. In such event, the court is prohibited from proceeding before determining whether the defendant at that time desires to waive counsel or has waived counsel. § d 2. By § e, there must be a record of compliance with respect to §§ b, c and d. (footnotes omitted). Id. at 126, 394 A.2d at 1196, citing Maryland Rule 723 § (d)(2) (If the defendant appears in court without counsel, at any proceeding after his appearance pursuant to section a of this Rule, the court may not proceed before determining whether the defendant at that time desires to waive counsel, or has waived counsel, either affirmatively or by neglecting or refusing to obtain counsel.). Thus, compliance with § (c), the Court pointed out, was a prerequisite to proceeding, whenever the defendant appeared in court without counsel. One of the requirements of § (c) was subsection 4, which mandated that the court advise the defendant that, if he or she were found to be financially unable to retain private counsel, the Public Defender or the court would, if the defendant wishes, provide counsel to represent him [or her]. Pursuant to this requirement, both the court and the OPD have a responsibility to provide an indigent defendant with representation. This Court concluded, with regard to the OPD, that, were a defendant indigent, it was the duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation for him [or her]. 284 Md. at 127, 394 A.2d at 1197. Informing that decision, it pointed out, are the questions whether the crime charged is a serious one, citing Article 27A, § 4(b)(2) [11] , whether the defendant is indigent as defined by Article 27A, § 2(f), [12] and whether he or she is otherwise eligible, applying the criteria of Article 27A, § 7(a) and (b). [13] The court's responsibility is similar, to determin[e] whether to appoint counsel under Code, art. 27A, § 6(f). [14] We observed, in that regard: there is the clear duty imposed on the court, in order to decide whether it should appoint counsel, upon the Public Defender declining to do so, to make its own independent determination whether a defendant is indigent and otherwise eligible to have counsel provided. It could not properly fulfill this duty without considering facts material and relevant to the issue. 284 Md. at 129, 394 A.2d at 1198. In Thompson, more than merely acknowledging that both the OPD and the courts have a responsibility to ensure that indigent defendants are afforded representation, this Court recognized, even if it did not state it expressly, that the responsibility was a separate responsibility, its discharge entrusted fully to the OPD and the court, as required, and that the responsibility, or its discharge, of one neither infringed nor superseded the responsibility or discharge of the other. So it was that the Court observed and instructed: The Public Defender wanted to leave it up to the court, making clear that if the court so ordered he would provide representation. The court refused to so order, properly we believe, on the ground that the question whether the Public Defender represented a particular defendant was for the Public Defender and not for the court. Id. at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197. That also was the message being conveyed by this Court's discussion of the trial court's approach to the defendant's right to representation [15] : The record before us does not show what investigation was made by the Office of the Public Defender and all that was considered by it with respect to Thompson's eligibility vel non. It seems, however, that the primary reason for declining to represent him was that a surety bond had been posted for him. As we have seen, the Public Defender raised this specter at the first hearing on 10 February 1978 when he mentioned the bond after stating that Thompson was `technically' eligible for the services of the Public Defender. Whereupon, Thompson flatly declared that the Public Defender had told him that `if I had somebody to post the money out on bond, I should get my own lawyer. That's what he told me.' The judge then presiding expressly did not dispute that the Public Defender had so stated. Assistant State's Attorney Dean represented to the court at the hearing on 19 April that `[t]he amount of the bond that [Thompson] made indicated to the Public Defender's Office that he wasn't really as indigent as expected, whereas he represented.' The judge originally in the case was completely content with the Public Defender's conclusion, whatever it may have been based upon, that Thompson was not entitled to have representation provided`you tell me he is not eligible and that is good enough for me.' This view governed the court's action in the face of an utter lack of the data contemplated by art. 27A, § 7, the absence of any expression by the Office of the Public Defender of the reasons why it declined to provide representation, and the fact that the Public Defender had represented Thompson in the District Court.... The judge made no attempt to determine whether the refusal of the Office of the Public Defender to provide representation was despite Thompson's eligibility to have counsel provided. Neither judge thereafter involved in the case took any steps to determine whether Thompson was in fact an indigent person entitled to representation. The court was obligated to make that determination in the circumstances. As we have indicated, if Thompson were indigent and otherwise entitled to assistance of counsel, the law, implemented by statute and our rules of procedure, required the court to appoint an attorney when the Office of the Public Defender declined to provide counsel. The failure of the court to determine whether Thompson was eligible to have counsel provided was reversible error. (footnotes omitted). 284 Md. at 129-30, 394 A.2d at 1198-99. The message was received. [16] See Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 114 n. 16, 532 A.2d 1066, 1080 n. 16 (1987); Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232, 242, 443 A.2d 103, 108 (1982); Davis v. State, 100 Md.App. 369, 380-81, 641 A.2d 941, 947 (1994); Baldwin v. State, 51 Md.App. 538, 552-553, 444 A.2d 1058, 1067-68 (1982). See also Miller v. Smith, Attorney General of State, 115 F.3d 1136, 1142 (4th Cir.1997). In Baldwin, Judge Alan Wilner, for the Court of Special Appeals, explicating Thompson, stated expressly: In Thompson v. State, 284 Md. 113, 394 A.2d 1190 (1978), the Court of Appeals seemed to hold that if the Public Defender declines to represent a defendanteven on grounds of non-eligibility (as opposed to a potential conflict of interest)the court has no authority to order him to provide representation. Upon that premise, the question before us is not whether the Public Defender erred in declining representation but whether the court was derelict in discharging its own responsibility to assure compliance with appellant's Constitutional right of counsel, in accordance with its authority under § 6(f) of art. 27A. 51 Md.App. at 552-553, 444 A.2d at 1067. The intermediate appellate court stated the reasoning underlying that statement: noting the Thompson Court's approval of the rejection by the trial court of the OPD's invitation to the court to order it to provide representation and the basis for that approval, it concluded, by logical extension, that, although the court may appoint any other qualified counsel to represent an indigent defendant, it may not appoint the Public Defender against his wish. Id. at 553 n. 11, 444 A.2d at 1067 n. 11. In Davis, the Court of Special Appeals again opined: In Maryland, there are two options available to defendants in criminal cases who are financially unable to retain their own counsel. The first option is representation by the Public Defender's Office as authorized by Maryland Annotated Code, Article 27A, § 4 (1993 Repl. Vol.). If the Public Defender's Office determines it is unable to represent a defendant due to his or her income, the court must conduct its own inquiry as to whether the defendant qualifies for a court-appointed counsel. Md.Code Ann. Art. 27A, § 6(f) (1993 Repl. Vol.); Baldwin v. State, 51 Md.App. 538, 553, 444 A.2d 1058 (1982). cert. denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218 (1984). The necessity for this independent court evaluation stems from the judiciary's role as the `ultimate protector' of the rights awarded under the Constitution, including the right to counsel. Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d 1058. 100 Md.App. at 380-81, 641 A.2d at 947. The majority does not agree that the appointment responsibilities of the court and the OPD are separate and distinct and that the court does not review the OPD's determination of ineligibility. Indeed, characterizing this Court's statement in Thompson as dicta, but without clearly saying why, it expressly holds that the trial court's responsibility extends to inquiring into the correctness of the OPD's indigency, and thus representation, decision: the OPD and the Dissent rely heavily on the above quoted language, [17] and other dicta in Thompson and Baldwin, ... to support their contentions that, where the OPD declines representation, a reviewing court is powerless to correct a manifest error in the local OPD's determination of eligibility by appointing the local OPD as counsel for the indigent defendant.... Such dicta is wholly unpersuasive, particularly in light of the statutory scheme designed by the General Assembly to govern the respective responsibilities of the OPD and the courts in determining whether a criminal defendant qualifies as indigent and whether such individual is entitled to representation paid for by the taxpayers. (footnotes omitted). OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 430-31, 993 A.2d at 67. I disagree with the majority. Before explaining why the majority is wrong, however, it is necessary to address its assertion that statements in Thompson and Baldwin indicating that the appointment responsibilities of the court and the OPD are separate and distinct and that the court may not appoint the OPD are dicta. Distinguishing between what is dicta and what is the court's holding can be challenging. Without understanding what dicta is, it is not possible to know or appreciate the difference. This Court considered the meaning of dicta in Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488, 52 A. 601 (1902). There, concerned with whether the Court's discussion in Monticello Distilling Co. v. Baltimore City, 90 Md. 416, 45 A. 210 (1900), interpreting the Act of 1892, was dicta or holding, the Court rejected the argument that Monticello was decided on one sole ground and that the expression of opinion upon any other point was not involved in the decisive objection on which the judgment was reversed, and was therefore `obiter dictum,'  Carstairs, 95 Md. at 499, 52 A. at 601, explaining: We cannot agree that the expression of opinion referred to was an obiter dictum. ... It may be difficult to frame a concise definition of an obiter dictum applicable to every such expression of opinion, and some Courts incline to the rule that the most deliberate expression of opinion, upon a question distinctly raised in the record, and fully argued by counsel, may nevertheless be regarded as a dictum, unless essential to the actual disposition made of the case. But as Bouvier well says: `It is difficult to see why, in a philosophic point of view, the opinion of the Court is not as persuasive on all the points which were so involved in the cause that it was the duty of counsel to argue them, and which were deliberately passed on by the Court, as if the decision had hung upon but one point;' and in Maryland the rule is in accord with this view. In Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471 [1854], it is said: `All that is necessary in Maryland to render the decision of the Court of Appeals authoritative on any point decided, is to show that there was an application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged;' and in Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239 [1867], it was said that a decision there cited, could not be said to be obiter dictum, `as the question was directly involved in the issues of law raised by the demurrer to the bill, and the mind of the Court was directly drawn to, and distinctly expressed upon the subject.' Carstairs, 95 Md. at 499-500, 52 A. at 601-02. These principles concerning dicta were recently reiterated by in Schmidt v. Prince George's Hospital, 366 Md. 535, 551-52, 784 A.2d 1112, 1121 (2001). Before citing to the Carstairs language above, Judge Harrell, writing for the Court noted: When a question of law is raised properly by the issues in a case and the Court supplies a deliberate expression of its opinion upon that question, such opinion is not to be regarded as obiter dictum, although the final judgment in the case may be rooted in another point also raised by the record. See Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 256, 465 A.2d 1126, 1137 (1983) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting); Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488, 499, 52 A. 601, 601 (1902) (citing Monticello Distilling Co. v. City of Baltimore, 90 Md. 416, 45 A. 210 (1900)). Id. at 551, 784 A.2d at 1121. Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary notes that obiter dictum, which is Latin for something said in passing is defined as: a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive). 1177, (9th ed. 2009). Inconsistent with this Court's interpretation and the plain meaning of dicta, the majority opines: Regarding the OPD's representation to the court that it would represent the defendant if the court so ordered, we stated, in dicta and without citation to authority, that `[t]he court refused to so order, properly we believe, on the ground that the question whether the Public Defender represented a particular defendant was for the Public Defender and not for the court.' [ Thompson, 284 Md.] at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197. Four years after our decision in Thompson, the Court of Special Appeals, in Baldwin, observed, also in dicta, that Thompson `seemed to hold that if the Public Defender declines to represent a defendanteven on grounds of non-eligibility (as opposed to a potential conflict of interest)the court has no authority to order him to provide representation.' Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067.... This question, however, was not at the core of Baldwin.  OPD, 413 Md. at 430, 992 A.2d at 66-67. The majority is wrong for several reasons. The question the Thompson Court was asked to resolve and the analysis it employed to resolve it make clear that the identified statement was not dicta. Indeed, it required the Court to define the role and the duty of the trial court in the process. The issue in Thompson related to Rule 723, the whole of it, not just certain provisions. Thompson, 284 Md. at 114, 394 A.2d at 1191 (The issue posed by the second question, `[d]id the trial court err in not fully complying with the mandate of Rule 723 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure by not properly advising ... Thompson of his rights and obligations as contained therein?'). As we have seen, the Thompson Court recognized that its shared responsibility, acknowledged by Rule 723(c)(4), to provide counsel to indigent defendants, was grounded in Art. 27A § 6(f), which it construed as imposing on the court not simply the responsibility of appointing counsel when the OPD declined to do so, but also required, as a prerequisite to doing so, that it independently determine the defendant's indigency. It was in explaining this responsibility that the Court said, The Public Defender wanted to leave it up to the court, making clear that if the court so ordered he would provide representation. The court refused to so order, properly we believe, on the ground that the question whether the Public Defender represented a particular defendant was for the Public Defender and not for the court, id. at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197 (emphasis added), thus, approving of the court's rejection of the OPD's offer to follow its order. The disputed language, therefore, is not dicta. The majority also overlooks the inescapable relationship between Rule 723 and Art. 27A § 6(f) that Thompson recognizes: When a defendant appears pursuant to § a of Rule 723, § b 6 requires the court to [a]dvise the defendant that if the Public Defender declines to provide representation, the defendant should immediately notify the clerk of the court so that the court can determine whether it should appoint counsel pursuant to Article 27A, section 6(f) of the Maryland Code. Id. at 128-29, 394 A.2d at 1198. Viewed in context with Rule 723 and Art. 27A § 6(f), the statement was not just relevant, but essential to the Thompson holding. Maryland courts have acknowledged that Thompson stood for the proposition now being dismissed as dicta. Considering the question whether the `trial court abused its discretion, and thus denied [the defendant] rights secured ... by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Md.Code Ann., Article 27A, § 6(f),' Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 545, 444 A.2d at 1063, the Court of Special Appeals held: By declining to appoint counsel, the court failed to discharge its responsibility under § 6(f) of art. 27A, proceeded to trial in contravention of Maryland Rule 723, and thus effectively denied appellant his Federal and State Constitutional right to counsel. Id. at 556, 444 A.2d at 1069. In reaching its holding, the court referenced the Thompson precedent, which it interpreted as holding that a trial court could not appoint the Public Defender against his wish. Id. at 552, n. 11, 444 A.2d at 1067. It then stated: Upon that premise, the question before us is not whether the Public Defender erred in declining representation but whether the court was derelict in discharging its own responsibility to assure compliance with appellant's Constitutional right of counsel, in accordance with its authority under § 6(f) of art. 27A. Id. at 552-53, 444 A.2d at 1067. It is clear and apparent, by the intermediate appellate court's reference, in Baldwin, that it understood Thompson to stand for the proposition that a trial court could not appoint the OPD to represent an individual it had declined to represent. That proposition was understood to be at the core of the decision, it was holding, not dicta.
The majority's holding is contrary to the Public Defender Statute. In fact, the majority's analysis proceeds on faulty premises. First, noting that: [a]t the outset, it is clear to this Court, as it was to the Circuit Court in the proceedings below, that the local OPD denied erroneously representation to Stinnett.... Rather than apply the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining indigency provided by Art. 27A, § 7(a), the local OPD, in denying representation to Stinnett on this record, relied solely on certain language contained in COMAR 14.06.03.05A and D(2).... [18] [T]he local OPD applied the incorrect standard for determining indigency of applicants and erred, both legally and factually, in concluding that Stinnett did not qualify for representation by its attorneys, OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 424-26, 992 A.2d at 63-64 (footnote omitted), the majority reasons that this error validated the trial court appointment of the OPD. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 428-29, 992 A.2d at 66. Moreover, relying on Baldwin, it reasons that the OPD's indigency determination is only initial, not final, because the courts must, of necessity, be the ultimate protector of those underpinnings[.] OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 67-68 (quoting Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067). The third faulty premise is that Article 27A, § 6(f), by requiring trial courts to make an independent determination as to whether a defendant is indigent, OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 68 and despite not specifying] either the procedure or the standard to be employed by the court, id. at 432, 992 A.2d at 68, provides a clear oversight and corrective role for the courts in the indigency determination and appointed-counsel process. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 68. Finally, the majority emphasizes that Art. 27A, § 6(f) contains no language indicating a legislative intent to prohibit the appointment of an attorney from the local OPD by a trial court, [19]  OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432-33, 992 A.2d at 68, arguing that, to deny the trial court the authority to appoint the OPD, would require this Court to read `other than the local OPD' into the statute, in violation of sound canons of statutory interpretation. Id. at 433, 992 A.2d at 68. [20]
The majority's holding runs contrary to the mandates under the Public Defender Statute. In enacting this statute, the Legislature clearly announced its purpose and, subject to the right of local governments to opt out and provide their own public defender system, [21] to whom it was entrusting implementation: It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland to provide for the realization of the constitutional guarantees of counsel in the representation of indigents, including related necessary services and facilities, in criminal and juvenile proceedings within the State, and to assure effective assistance and continuity of counsel to indigent accused taken into custody and indigent defendants in criminal and juvenile proceedings before the courts of the State of Maryland, and to authorize the Office of Public Defender to administer and assure enforcement of the provisions of this article in accordance with its terms. § 1. It accordingly established the OPD and designated the Public Defender as its head. § 3. To the Public Defender was committed the primary duty ... to provide legal representation for any indigent defendant eligible for services, to be provided in certain enumerated proceedings, § 4(a) and (b), and the general responsibility for the operation of the Office of the Public Defender and all district offices, § 5(1), including such powers and duties, § 5(2)-(8), as will effectuate the purposes of the statute and promote the efficient conduct of the work and general administration of the office, its professional staff and other employees. § 5(3). The Office of the Public Defender was charged with determining the eligibility for services of any person seeking legal representation, which it was required to do on the basis of that person's need, as defined in § 7(a). To make that determination, it was empowered to make such investigation of the financial status of each defendant at such time or times as the circumstances shall warrant, and in connection therewith the office shall have the authority to require a defendant to execute and deliver such written requests or authorizations as may be necessary under applicable law to provide the office with access to records of public or private sources, otherwise confidential, as may be needed to evaluate eligibility. § 7(b). In addition, the Legislature provided a comprehensive scheme whereby the Public Defender could obtain reimbursement from defendants later found able to pay for part or all of his services. Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 551, 444 A.2d at 1066-67, citing and quoting § 7(c)-(f). The Legislature also acknowledged that certain courts had a role to play, in certain circumstances, in the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. See § 6(f), n. 3 supra. That acknowledgment was made after it had extensively treated panel attorneys, their appointment, § 6(b), duties, § 6(c), compensation, § 6(d), and entitlement to staffing. § 6(e). The intent of the Legislature in enacting this statutory scheme can, must, be discerned by reading the various provisions together, giving effect to each, see Gordon Family P'ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997); Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 41, 641 A.2d 870, 880-81 (1994); Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins., Co., 333 Md. 136, 148, 634 A.2d 28, 34 (1993); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131-132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993); Cicoria v. State, 332 Md. 21, 33, 629 A.2d 742 (1993), and constru[ing them] according to their ordinary and natural import. Foley v. K. Hovnanian at Kent Island, LLC, 410 Md. 128, 152, 978 A.2d 222, 236, (2009) (quoting Lanzaron v. Anne Arundel County, 402 Md. 140, 149, 935 A.2d 689, 694 (2007)) (quoting Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 359, 643 A.2d 906, 909 (1994)). In pursuing that intent, this Court will: neither add words to, nor delete words from, a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use, and we do not engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning. In re Gloria H., 410 Md. 562, 581, 979 A.2d 710, 720 (2009); see also Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006). Instead, each word will be given effect, so that no word, clause, sentences or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Foley, 410 Md. at 152, 978 A.2d at 237. And a statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense. In re Gloria H., 410 Md. at 581, 979 A.2d at 721. Applying these principles to the construction of the Public Defender Statute, it is clear that the OPD, not the designated courts, has been entrusted by the Legislature with both the initial, as the majority emphasizes, OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 431-34, 992 A.2d at 67-69, and the primary, as § 4(a) provides, responsibility for insuring that indigent defendants receive the legal representation to which they constitutionally are entitled. Indeed, § 4(a) says as much: It shall be the primary duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation for any indigent defendant eligible for services under this article. To be sure, there is a role reserved for the trial courts. That role was prescribed in § 6(f). It is telling that the only reference to a court role in the appointment of counsel process simply provides Nothing in this article shall be construed to deprive [a circuit court] of its authority to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent person ... where the Office of the Public Defender declines to provide representation to an indigent person entitled to representation under this article, and does not characterize the court as having corrective responsibilities for the OPD or prescribe a review regime for its eligibility determinations. This is perfectly consistent with the interpretation given it by both Thompson and Baldwin: that the appointment authority of the courts was simply supplemental and a failsafe; as the court in Baldwin put it, the role reserved to the courts to appoint counsel is [i]n obvious recognition of the fact that the whole system has Constitutional underpinnings and that the courts must, of necessity, be the ultimate protector of those underpinnings. 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067, explicating § 6(f). All of the other provisions that address eligibility or appointment refer to the OPD and prescribe the procedures and standards that the OPD must apply and/or the authority that the OPD has. I repeat, there simply is no provision, expressly or otherwise, calling for, never mind requiring, court review of the appointment or eligibility determinations made by the OPD.
The Public Defender statute does not provide for a corrective role by which trial judges may review the OPD's eligibility determinations, erroneous or otherwise. When the OPD declined representation, the trial court, to be sure, was required independently to determine whether it found the defendant to be indigent. When, as a result of that determination, it concluded that the OPD had misapplied its governing statute, as the ultimate protector of those [Constitutional] underpinnings, Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067, the trial court, in accordance with our holdings, could have, and should have, pursuant to the statutory authority prescribed in § 6(f), appointed an attorney. Not so, says the majority. It reasons: Under Art. 27A, § 7, the ` initial determination, under the law, is to be made by the Public Defender,' based upon the criteria enumerated in the statute for determining indigency. Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 551, 444 A.2d at 1066 (emphasis added). The OPD's initial determination of indigency is not final, however, because [i]n obvious recognition of the fact that the whole system has Constitutional underpinnings and that the courts must, of necessity, be the ultimate protector of those underpinnings, id. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067[.]' .... OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 67-68. The majority further concludes that: the General Assembly provided in Art. 27A, § 6(f), a clear oversight and corrective role for the courts in the indigency determination and appointed-counsel process. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 68. It is true, of course, that the initial determination of a defendant's eligibility for appointive counsel generally will be made by the OPD. It is also true that, when it has a conflict or when it declines representation, the OPD may not, and likely will not, make the final determination; indigent individuals are entitled to representation even when the OPD cannot, or will not, provide it. Section § 6(f) recognizes this to be so and, thus, addresses those situations. With regard to the situation sub judice, it makes clear that the trial courts may appoint when the OPD has refused to. Giving courts that authority, in that circumstance, is a far cry from giving them a corrective role over the OPD, which, by express statutory provision, see § 4(a), is the primary player in the process. Neither this Court nor the Court of Special Appeals has ever held that § 6(f) prescribes a corrective role for trial courts and § 6(f), by its express terms, do not purport to give trial courts such a role, as it pertains to the indigency determination and appointed-counsel process. The majority all but concedes this point when it acknowledges, as it must, that § 6(f) does not specify either the procedure or the standard to be employed by the court. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 68. Nevertheless, relying on Thompson's pronouncement that courts must make their own independent indigency determination, id., and the absence of prohibitory language[n]o appellate court in this State has held previously that the attorneys in the local OPD are ineligible from appointment by a circuit court following the local OPD's factually and legally erroneous rejection of representation of an indigent defendant OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 436, 992 A.2d at 70, it reads into that section an affirmative corrective role. The lift is too heavy. Requiring trial courts to make an independent assessment of the indigency of a defendant turned down by the OPD is a far cry from investing those courts with a corrective role. It must be remembered that the Court that imposed the independent assessment requirement on trial courts, the Thompson Court, rejected the notion being espoused by the majority, Thompson, 284 Md. at 129, 394 A.2d at 1198, that it had a responsibility, a role to play in directing or correcting the OPD. That Court was clear in holding that there was no such role. Nor is the absence of appellate decisions holding the OPD, who has declined representation, immune to appointment by a circuit court persuasive. The converse is equally true. There are an equal dearth of appellate opinions holding the OPD eligiblethat the OPD can be forced to represent an individualfor appointment. I reject the assertion that appointing the OPD is necessary in order to prevent the court from being rendered powerless to correct a manifest error. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 431, 992 A.2d at 67. The goal of the Public Defender statute is to ensure a defendant's right to counsel. A manifest injustice would occur if the defendant were wrongly denied counsel. The OPD is entrusted with the primary responsibility to provide counsel and, in discharging that responsibility, is required to make eligibility determinations. Section 6(f) addresses the situation when the OPD's determination is to deny representation; its purpose and effect are to ensure that an indigent individual is provided representation. The trial court, in that event, is authorized to determine for itself whether the defendant is eligible and, if so, to appoint counsel. Thus, the trial court is not powerless to correct a manifest injustice. As the ultimate arbiter of the constitutional mandate, it is empowered, as, where appropriate, it may, and is expected, to appoint counsel. Denying the trial court the ability to appoint the OPD simply does not have the effect the majority posits and supposes.
The canons of statutory construction demand that no word in the statutory text is interpreted in a way which makes it meaningless. Foley, 410 Md. at 152, 978 A.2d at 237. That is exactly what the majority does here; it completely ignores this canon. Sections 7 and 6(f) give the OPD the ability to determine the eligibility of defendants for appointed counsel, which includes the authority to decline representation. Nevertheless, the majority holds that, despite the statutory authority given the OPD to decline representation, the OPD may be forced to represent individuals whom it has rejected, that it does not actually possess the power to decline representation. According to the majority, the OPD's determination to decline representation is subject to review by the court and, should the court determine that it misapplied its statute, reversal of that decision, which, worse yet, will take the form of being appointed to represent the individual it had previously rejected. This flies in the face of § 6(f), which does not provide for such review. Moreover, to read § 6(f) as the majority does, requires that you read out of § 6(f) the OPD's right to decline representation and make it subject and subordinate to the court's eligibility decision, rendering that portion of the statute completely meaningless. Foley, 410 Md. at 152, 978 A.2d at 237. This result conflicts with the language of the statute and, thus, with what the Legislature intended.
The majority's holds that the court has the authority to appoint the OPD as an attorney, upon finding that the OPD's determination was arbitrary or capricious. It states: Of course, where the local OPD rejects representation based on its own consideration of the indigency criteria provided by Art. 27A § 7, its determination is entitled to deference, and the court will interfere only when that decision is arbitrary or capricious. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 435, 992 A.2d at 69-70. It is not clear what the source of this review standard is. That it is novel, not previously applied, and is reminiscent of, but not identical to, that applicable to administrative cases comes to mind. The OPD is not an administrative agency. Nevertheless, I will test it under the administrative umbrella.
If OPD were an administrative agency, we would have to look to § 6(f) to determine whether the court had jurisdiction to review its decisions. [I]n order for an administrative agency's action properly to be before this Court (or any court) for [statutory] judicial review, there generally must be a legislative grant of the right to seek judicial review. See Appleton Reg'l Cmty. Alliance v. County Comm'rs, 404 Md. 92, 98-99, 945 A.2d 648, 651 (2008), quoting Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 273, 884 A.2d 1171, 1189 (2005). Section 6(f) contains no language from which a grant of judicial review of the OPD's eligibility determinations can be discerned. If that section sufficed, it would be a far cry from the language the Legislature customarily uses to grant judicial review. See Rogers v. Eastport Yachting Ctr., LLC., 408 Md. 722, 732, 971 A.2d 322, 328 (2009). Administrative agencies can have quasi-judicial functions. This Court has stressed that, while the courts have the ability to review administrative decisions, its role in reviewing an administrative agency['s] adjudicatory decision is narrow. Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005); see Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 529, 836 A.2d 655, 666-67 (2003); Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439, 450, 800 A.2d 768, 774 (2002). The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-222 of the State Government Article [22] , delineates the procedure for judicial review of a decision of a State agency. Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. at 528-529, 836 A.2d at 666; see Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439, 450, 800 A.2d 768, 774 (2002). This Court in Anne Arundel County v. Halle Development, Inc., recently discussed the boundaries between administrative agencies and the judiciary: `the role of the courts in regard to these administrative agency functions is to see that these responsibilities were properly empowered to the agency and have been performed within the confines of the traditional standards of procedural and substantive fair play. In order to perform this essential duty, the courts may be provided with specific authorization to do so by the Legislature through statutory provision, but, even absent such authority, the judiciary has an undeniable constitutionally-inherent power to review, within limits, the decisions of these administrative agencies.' `This power of review, whether authorized by statute or assumed inherently, cannot be a substitution of the court's judgment for that of the agency' and is limited to determining whether the contested quasi-judicial decision `was rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent manner.' 408 Md. 539, 556, 971 A.2d 214, 224 (2009) (internal citations omitted). When conducting this review, the court: `must review the agency's decision in the light most favorable to it,' and `the agency's decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid[.]' [ Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v.] Banks, 354 Md. [59,] [ ] 68, 729 A.2d [376,] [ ] 381 [1999].... In addition, the agency's interpretations and applications of statutory or regulatory provisions `which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.' [ Id. ]. Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected.' Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 573, n. 3, 873 A.2d 1145, 1155 n. 3. If the court determines that the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious, it may then remand the matter to the administrative agency. It cannot, as this Court has made clear, substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. On this point, this Court has stated: `Generally, when an administrative agency utilizes an erroneous standard and some evidence exists, however minimal, that could be considered appropriately under the correct standard, the case should be remanded so the agency can reconsider the evidence using the correct standard.' The reviewing court must remand the matter so that it will not usurp an administrative function: `It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken. This principle underlies the rule that if an administrative function remains to be performed after a reviewing court has determined that an administrative agency has made an error of law, the court ordinarily may not modify the agency order. Under such circumstances, the court should remand the matter to the administrative agency without modification[.]...' Finally, if an administrative function remains to be performed, a reviewing court may not modify the administrative agency's action even when a statute provides that the court may `affirm, modify or set aside' because a court may not usurp administrative functions.' Halle Dev., Inc., 408 Md. at 557, 971 A.2d at 224-25 (citation and footnote omitted); see also Bell Atl. of Md., Inc. v. Intercom Sys. Corp., 366 Md. 1, 21, 782 A.2d 791, 803 (2001) (citing Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. McQuaid, 220 Md. 373, 382, 152 A.2d 825, 829-30 (1959)) (stating judicial scrutiny is limited to finding whether there was illegality or unreasonableness in the Commission's action); see Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 581, 759 A.2d 249, 282 (2000) (Cathell, J., dissenting) (Thus, in regard to administrative agencies, which, while often functioning as fact-finding bodies, perform essentially nonjudicial duties, a Maryland court's `inquiry is [almost always] limited to finding whether there was illegality or unreasonableness in the ... actionwhen that inquiry is finished, judicial scrutiny ends....') (quoting Baltimore Gas Co., 220 Md. at 382, 152 A.2d at 830). [J]udicial review of the actions of an administrative agency is restricted primarily because of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers as set forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution. Sadler, 378 Md. at 530, 836 A.2d at 667-68 (footnote omitted). We recognize, of course, that the three branches are not `wholly separate and unmixed,' Getty v. Carroll County Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 731, 926 A.2d 216, 229 (2007) (quoting Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (1829)), but the doctrine cannot be stretched to a point where, in effect, there no longer exists a separation of governmental power.... Dep't of Natural Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 220, 334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975). The doctrine is in place to `preserve [] to one branch of government its essential functions and prohibit [ ] any other branch from interfering with it or usurping those functions.' McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 283, 701 A.2d 99, 104 (1997) (quoting O'Hara v. Kovens, 92 Md.App. 9, 22-23, 606 A.2d 286, 292, cert. denied 328 Md. 93, 612 A.2d 1316 (1992)). Art. § 6(f) is not a judicial review statute. The heading is not Judicial Review, but, in relevant part courts not deprived of authority to appoint counsel in certain situations. At the most, this section, as described in detail above, gives the court the ability to appoint an attorney. Neither section § 6(f) nor any other provision of Art. 27A contains language providing the courts with the authority to review the OPD's indigency determinations, not to mention permitting it to correct them. The statute is specific. It grants the court the authority to appoint an attorney when, inter alia, the OPD declines representation. Section 6(f) very pointedly and expressly does not grant the courts the power to review or appoint the OPD.