Opinion ID: 2446605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: post-adjournment powers of the general assembly and the lrc

Text: Two major legal questions dominate this area: (1) can the General Assembly delegate its authority to legislate to the LRC and (2) can the General Assembly legislate through its agent, the LRC, while the General Assembly is in adjournment? The answers to these legal questions are inextricably intertwined and relate to the nature and role of the LRC. We premise this discussion on our previous conclusion that the LRC is part and parcel of the General Assembly and is under its control. It must also be remembered that the LRC is a service agency of the General Assembly. Its functions are limited. Its nature, role and authority do not change our form of government from a tripod into a quadrapod. (1) Can the General Assembly Delegate its Authority to Legislate to the LRC? Ky. Const. Sec. 29 reads: The legislative power shall be vested in a House of Representatives and a Senate, which, together, shall be styled the `General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.' Ky. Const. Sec. 60 provides: No law . . . shall be enacted to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the general assembly. While this is not a precise, written constitutional prohibition preventing the General Assembly from delegating its legislative powers to another entity, we have spoken many times on the subject. In Bloemer v. Turner, Ky., 281 Ky. 832, 137 S.W.2d 387, 390 (1940), we declared that the Kentucky Constitution . . . made sure that the legislature may not in any degree abdicate its power. Further firming up its position, the Court in Bloemer said: It is an accepted principle that  the legislative department has no right to deputize to others the power to perform its governing functions.  137 S.W.2d at 391. (Emphasis added.) Recognizing there are practical limitations to the hard and fast rule announced, particularly when it involves the implementation of legislative will, we stated: But, obviously the legislature cannot deal with subordinate rules or cover the details of administration and execution in its regulatory enactments. Perforce, these must be left to those upon whom the duty of carrying out the legislative will devolves. However, the legislature must lay down policies and establish standards. Ibid. Under Bloemer , the General Assembly cannot delegate its power to make a law. It can, however, establish standards for administration and delegate authority to implement a law. As in so many instances, the principle is easy to state. Its application is difficult. [10] The practical modification or exception developed in Bloemer was further explained and expanded in Commonwealth v. Associated Industries of Kentucky, Ky., 370 S.W.2d 584 (1963). The rule of that case is that Ky. Const. Sec. 29 does not absolutely prohibit the General Assembly's delegation of legislative power. A more recent statement of the applicable principles is found in Holsclaw v. Stephens, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 462 (1974). In that case we stated: . . . when we say that the legislature may not delegate its powers, we mean that it may not delegate the exercise of its discretion as to what the law shall be, but not that it may not confer discretion in the administration of the law itself . . . Generally speaking a delegation of discretion is not unlawful if sufficient standards controlling the exercise of that discretion are found in the act . . . such as procedural safeguards and the right of the delegating authority to withdraw the delegation. 507 S.W.2d at 471. (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the aforementioned cases that delegation, of legislative power, to be lawful, must not include the exercise of discretion as to what the law shall be. In addition, such delegation must have standards controlling the exercise of administrative discretion. Finally, the delegating authority must have the right to withdraw the delegation. Therefore, we conclude that the General Assembly, which constitutionally holds legislative power, cannot delegate that power to the LRC. (2) While in Adjournment Can the General Assembly Legislate Through its Agent, the LRC? We begin by reiterating that under Ky. Const. Sec. 29 the General Assembly is the sole legislative branch of government and that its powers, procedures and limitations are set forth in Sections 29 through 68 of that Constitution. The Kentucky General Assembly is not one of continuous session and a necessary corollary thereto is that it cannot legislate after it has adjourned sine die. A legislative body ceases to exist at the moment of its adjournment. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) 204, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). As we have concluded above, the General Assembly may not delegate its authority to legislate. It follows, therefore, that given the inability to delegate said authority, the General Assembly may not bestow upon its agent, the LRC, nor can the LRC seize for itself, the power to legislate. [11] With the preceding background we move on to analyze the challenged statutes. In each instance, one or more legal questions have been raised. We shall apply the law stated above, to each statute and determine its validity. Since certain additional legal issues have been raised, we shall discuss those where appropriate.