Opinion ID: 474596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 4 In November, 1977, the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the Company. The agreement established the terms and conditions of employment including the wage rate and all other wage related payments. It also contained an arbitration clause to resolve all differences and disputes regarding the application and construction of the agreement. The contract expired in July 1982. However, the parties continued to bargain until they reached impass in March 1983. The Union claims that, during these negotiations, it first discovered that the Company had not paid the employees the rate established by the agreement. Rather than submitting the dispute to arbitration, the Union waited until August 1, 1984 and then filed suit under section 301 of the LMRA. 1 In its complaint, the Union alleged that the Company had violated the collective-bargaining agreement, and sought specific performance and damages for breach of contract. It did not petition to compel arbitration. 5 On July 12, 1985, the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The district court decided that the six-month statute of limitations in section 10(b) of the NLRA 2 was the period most conducive to federal labor policy and most applicable to the section 301 suit in this case. International Union of Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 613 F.Supp. 253, 255 (S.D.Ind.1985). Application of the federal statute of limitations, the court concluded, was also consistent with a desire to establish a uniform limitations period for all section 301 suits. Id. at 256. The district court concluded that Hoosier Cardinal did not control because, unlike the situation in this case, the agreement in Hoosier Cardinal did not contain an arbitration clause. Id. at 255. However, on appeal, the Union argues that the facts in this case are not materially different from those in Hoosier Cardinal, and that therefore the district court should have applied the state statute of limitations most analogous to this section 301 claim. II