Opinion ID: 2517590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Retaliatory Eviction Claim

Text: DeNardo asserted a retaliatory eviction claim against his landlord on the theory it evicted him for engaging in conductcomplaining about Corneloup's smoking and suing Corneloup and the landlordprotected by the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). [23] He argues that he should be allowed to proceed with that claim on remand. [24] The landlord urges us to affirm the summary judgment rejecting DeNardo's retaliatory eviction claim, and contends that it lawfully evicted DeNardo because he failed to pay rent. Retaliatory eviction is prohibited by AS 34.03.310. That statute is part of the URLTA, [25] which is to be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. [26] Per AS 34.03.310(a), a residential landlord may not retaliate against a tenant for engaging in conduct protected by the URLTA. Subsection .310(a) describes retaliation as increasing rent or decreasing services or . . . bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession. Tenant conduct specifically protected by subsection .310(a) from retaliation includes complaining to landlords about AS 34.03.100 violations, seeking enforcement of URLTA rights and remedies, organizing or joining a tenant's union or similar organization, and complaining to a governmental agency that enforces housing, wage, price, or rent controls. [27] Subsection .310(c)(1)-(7) sets out seven specific circumstances in which landlords, notwithstanding subsections .310(a) and (b), may bring actions for possession. [28] Relevant to this case, subsection .310(c)(1) permits an action for possession if the tenant is in default in rent. [29] Thus, if the tenant is in default in rent, subsection .310(c)(1) permits a landlord to seek possession even if the tenant has engaged in conduct otherwise protected by subsection .310(a). The superior court granted the landlord summary judgment on DeNardo's retaliatory eviction claim because it concluded that retaliatory eviction is only a defense and does not confer a right or remedy to the tenant. This conclusion is not entirely correct. Certainly tenants who are victims of retaliation have, by statute, a defense in an action for possession. [30] But subsection .310(b) also gives them the remedies provided in AS 34.03.210: tenants subjected to retaliation may terminate the lease, sue for possession, and recover up to one and one-half times any actual damages. [31] Even though it was incorrect to conclude that retaliatory eviction may not be the basis for an affirmative remedy, we may still affirm the superior court's summary judgment grant if an alternative ground to do so exists. [32] The landlord argues that it was entitled to evict DeNardo because, it claims, DeNardo was indisputably in default in rent. If DeNardo was in default in rent, the landlord could seek possession regardless of whether DeNardo engaged in protected conduct. DeNardo's appellate briefs seem to imply, but do not expressly contend, that there is a genuine factual dispute that precludes summary judgment for the landlord on his retaliation claim. DeNardo is pro se, so we judge his performance by a less demanding standard. [33] By arguing that the Foreman's Properties retaliated against him for engaging in protected conduct and by requesting a remand for a jury trial, DeNardo has made it sufficiently clear that he believes there is a genuine factual dispute about whether he was in default in rent. The phrase in default in rent is not defined by statute or case law in Alaska. We assume here that it means that the tenant is not current on rent, i.e., has not paid the full amount due on the due date, and has no legally cognizable excuse for not being current. On June 12, 2002, when DeNardo was given notice to quit, he owed $492.73 in rent. On June 24, when he was served with the FED summons and complaint, he still owed at least that amount. Thus, unless there is a genuine factual dispute about whether DeNardo was excused from having to pay the full amount of his rent, he was in default in rent. DeNardo advances two theories why he was not in default in rent, i.e., why he was excused from having to pay the full amount of rent due. First he asserts that he was entitled to withhold rent because secondhand smoke rendered the apartment not habitable. Second, he asserts in his reply brief that he had an oral agreement with Helen Foreman that allowed him to delay paying his rent. The viability of his first theory turns on statutory interpretation, and requires us to determine whether DeNardo had a right to withhold rent under the circumstances alleged here.
The URLTA gives tenants the self-help remedy of rent withholding in specific, limited circumstances. The most prominent example is found in AS 34.03.180. If a landlord deliberately or negligently fails to provide an essential service, AS 34.03.180(a) authorizes the tenant to withhold rent and use the withheld rent to obtain those services or substitute housing. [34] But the tenant's rights under subsection .180(a) do not arise . . . until the tenant has given written notice to the landlord. [35] DeNardo does not rely on section .180, and he does not claim that he used withheld rent to obtain replacement services or substitute housing. The URLTA also excuses tenants from paying rent or permits them to reduce rent payments for various reasons associated with a landlord's failure to deliver possession or with a termination at the tenant's option, or upon constructive total or partial eviction following fire or casualty. Thus, per AS 34.03.160(a), if the landlord fails to materially comply with the rental agreement or AS 34.03.100 in a way that materially affects health and safety, the tenant may choose to terminate the rental agreement, but only after giving written notice. [36] Per AS 34.03.170, if the landlord at commencement of the term fails to deliver possession to the tenant, rent abates until possession is delivered. [37] Per AS 34.03.200(b), the tenant may, after giving notice, terminate the lease if the premises are damaged or destroyed by fire or casualty. But these provisions do not expressly or impliedly allow a tenant in possession to withhold rent and several contemplate or require prior written notice. Alaska Statute 34.03.200(a)(2) is an exception. Per that subsection, if the premises are so damaged by fire or casualty that enjoyment of the dwelling unit is substantially impaired but continued occupancy of part of the unit is lawful, the tenant's rent is proportionally reduced by the diminution in the unit's rental value as of the date of the casualty. That subsection arguably allows a tenant in possession to reduce the rent without giving prior written notice, but there seems to be little danger in that circumstance that the landlord would not have ample prior notice of the event that proportionally excuses rent. DeNardo generally asserts that he made an oral habitability complaint under AS 34.03.100 on March 8 and that the landlord retaliated against him for making that complaint. Alaska Statute 34.03.160(b) allows a tenant to recover damages and injunctive relief for a landlord's noncompliance with section .100. [38] But those remedies do not include the self-help remedy of rent withholding, even though they may result in the tenant defeating a possession claim or obtaining compensatory damages. The only URLTA provision that expressly addresses rent withholding, section .180, requires prior written notice. There is no dispute that DeNardo did not, before he was given the notice to quit, give his landlord prior written notice that there was any defect or condition that affected the apartment's habitability. It is also undisputed that he gave his landlord no prior notice, oral or written, that he was withholding rent for any purpose. DeNardo contends on appeal that he gave the landlord prior oral notice of secondhand smoke before he was given the quit notice and before he was served with the FED summons and complaint. We assume, for purposes of reviewing the summary judgment, that he did so. We must therefore decide whether prior oral notice would suffice to excuse a tenant from being in default in rent for purposes of section .310 if the tenant claims that defects or conditions render his apartment uninhabitable. No provision in the URLTA states that prior oral notice is sufficient to allow the tenant to exercise the self-help remedy of rent withholding. As noted above, the only passage in the URLTA that allows rent reduction without written notice is for a tenant who remains in possession after fire or casualty damage. [39] The only URLTA section specifically permitting rent withholding is AS 34.03.180(a), and per AS 34.03.180(c), subsection .180(a) relief requires prior written notice. We think it is significant that the legislature chose to require the tenant to provide the landlord prior written notice of its failure to provide essential services before the tenant is entitled to relief under AS 34.03.180. Based on the briefing in this case, we are unwilling to conclude that oral notice of infiltration of secondhand cigarette smoke from a neighbor's apartment is sufficient to excuse a tenant from being in default in rent for the purposes of subsection .310(c). As we have seen, the URLTA only grants the remedy of rent withholding for a tenant in possession in limited circumstances, and then only after prior written notice. [40] We are reluctant to read URLTA more expansively absent more comprehensive briefing on the respective rights of landlords and tenants. Moreover, DeNardo only contends that he gave oral notice that the premises were uninhabitable, not that he gave notice that he was withholding rent as a result of the alleged uninhabitability. We decline here, on the basis of the briefing in this case, to hold that a landlord may be liable for damages on a retaliatory eviction claim if the tenant gives the landlord no notice that rent is being withheld as a result of the premises's condition. Potentially distinguishable from the section .310 rights and remedies are the rights and remedies provided tenants by AS 34.03.190(a). Under that provision, a tenant responding in a landlord's action for possession based on nonpayment of rent may counterclaim for amounts recoverable under the rental agreement or the URLTA, and a court may order the rent reduced to reflect the unit's diminution in value during the period of noncompliance. [41] Those are not self-help remedies. The URLTA appears to distinguish between a claim of retaliatory eviction under section .310 (which gives a tenant section .210 enhanced remedies beyond possession) and a counterclaim under section .190. The latter section permits the tenant to counterclaim for any amount under the rental agreement or the URLTA and to offset this counterclaim against rent owed. That section also permits the court to award possession to the tenant if the tenant pays back rent into the court such that he or she is no longer in arrears. We are reluctant based on the briefing in this case to expose a landlord to the enhanced remedies of section .210 on a retaliatory eviction claim simply for evicting a tenant who was undisputedly not current on rent, absent notice that the tenant has a statutory right to reduced rent (e.g., per subsection .200(a)(2)) or is entitled to reduced rent if the tenant makes repairs or obtains substitute housing (e.g., per subsection .180(a)). In short, we decline in this case to interpret the term in default in rent to contain an exception for a tenant who, without giving prior written notice, withholds rent because he is bothered by migration of a neighbor's secondhand cigarette smoke.
DeNardo asserts in his reply brief that he and Helen Foreman had an oral agreement regarding payment of back rent. He did not advance this contention in his opening appellate brief. In his superior court motion for reconsideration, he argued that he had an oral contract with Helen Foreman that gave him until September of 2002 to pay the back rent he owed, but he later waived that contention in the lower court. We assume that a tenant who, by agreement with his landlord, is excused from paying rent would not be in default in rent. But because DeNardo waived the issue below and did not raise the issue on appeal until his reply brief, it is waived for the purposes of appeal. We therefore affirm the summary judgment on his retaliatory eviction claim.