Opinion ID: 4425842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Imputing an Agent’s Discriminatory Intent

Text: Although Menaker relied principally on Doe v. Columbia in arguing for the sufficiency of his complaint,76 he argues, additionally, that the facts he has pleaded also lend themselves to analysis under what is essentially a “cat’s paw” theory.77 On remand, the District Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures In Wonderland, 154 (Broadview Press, Ed. 75 Richard Kelly 2004) (1865). 76While arguments not presented to the district court “generally will not be considered for the first time on appeal,” we have broad discretion to consider such arguments “because our waiver and forfeiture doctrine is entirely prudential.” United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2017) (brackets omitted). 77See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011) (“The term ‘cat’s paw’ derives from a fable conceived by Aesop, put into verse by La Fontaine in 1679, and injected into United States employment discrimination law by Judge Posner in 1990.”). 28 Court should consider Menaker’s allegations under such a theory as well. At its core, a “cat’s paw” case simply reflects a slight variation on the standard principles of vicarious liability.78 In the Title VII context, it is well‐settled that employers may be held vicariously liable for the conduct of their agents.79 In such cases, the plaintiff generally must establish (1) that the employer’s agent (a) was motivated by the requisite discriminatory intent, and (b) effected the relevant adverse employment action;80 and (2) that the agent’s conduct is imputable to the employer under general agency principles.81 78See Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., 835 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2016) (construing Title VII); see also Staub, 562 U.S. at 419 (construing the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act). 79Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (“[T]he term ‘employer’ is defined under Title VII to include ’agents.’” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b))). 80 Vega, 801 F.3d at 85. 81 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754–55 (“Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles . . . . We rely on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these terms.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Such common law agency principles provide for liability in circumstances where “the servant . . . was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation,” or where “the master was negligent or reckless.” Id. at 758 (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)). Thus, when a supervisor fires an employee because of her sex (including for a failure to respond to a request for sexual favors), the employer is liable because “the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation.” Id. at 761–62. Similarly, when an employer negligently permits an employee to create an actionable hostile work environment, such conduct may be imputed to the employer because of this negligence. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 446 29 In a “cat’s paw” case, by contrast, only the intent of the agent is imputed to the employer.82 Meanwhile, the employer ultimately accomplishes or effects the adverse employment action. In other words, the agent “manipulates an employer into acting as a mere conduit for his [discriminatory] intent.”83 In such cases, so long as the agent intended and was the proximate cause of the adverse result, the agent’s discriminatory intent may be imputed to the employer under traditional agency principles.84 These principles provide for liability where the employer was negligent because it acted at the agent’s behest when it knew or should have known of the agent’s discriminatory motivation.85 (2013) (“[A]n employer will always be liable when its negligence leads to the creation or continuation of a hostile work environment.”). 82 To establish a claim through a “cat’s paw” theory, a plaintiff must establish the agent’s “intent” in two respects: (1) intent to discriminate, and (2) intent that the adverse action occur. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 419. 83 Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 274–75 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that a Title VII plaintiff can succeed “even absent evidence of illegitimate bias on the part of the ultimate decision maker, so long as the individual shown to have the impermissible bias played a meaningful role in the [decision‐making] process” (citation omitted)); Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that “the impermissible bias of a single individual at any stage of the promoting process may taint the ultimate employment decision in violation of Title VII . . . so long as the individual shown to have the impermissible bias played a meaningful role in the promotion process”). 84 Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 273–74. 85 Id. at 273. 30 Here, Menaker has alleged facts from which it may plausibly be inferred that Hofstra served as a conduit for Kaplan’s discriminatory intent and that this intent may be imputed to Hofstra. First, it is plausible that Kaplan’s accusations were motivated, at least in part, by Menaker’s sex. While Kaplan’s primary motivation may have been financial or vindictive, Title VII requires that we look beyond primary motivations. Indeed, courts must determine whether sex was a motivating factor, i.e., whether an adverse employment action was based, even “in part,” on sex discrimination.86 Here, Kaplan did not accuse Menaker of just any misconduct; she accused him of sexual misconduct. That choice is significant, and it suggests that Menaker’s sex played a part in her allegations.87 A rational finder of fact could therefore infer that such an accusation was based, at least in part, on Menaker’s sex.88 86 Walsh, 828 F.3d at 75. 87Cf. Cox v. Onondaga Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing that “false statements . . . intended . . . to establish a claim of racial harassment . . . could be viewed by a reasonable observer as themselves racial harassment”). 88 As with sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII, courts may find it easy to draw an inference of sex discrimination “in most male‐female” scenarios of malicious allegations of sexual harassment. This is so because “it is reasonable to assume those [allegations] would not have been made [concerning] someone of the same sex.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). As with sexual harassment, however, such an inference is not inevitable. If the allegations would have been leveled regardless of the plaintiff’s sex, no sex discrimination has occurred. See Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, 192 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]n environment which is equally harsh for both men and women . . . does 31 Second, drawing all inferences in Menaker’s favor, Kaplan’s intent may be imputed to Hofstra. We have previously held in the Title VII context that the conduct of certain non‐employees may be imputed to the employer where (1) the employer exercises a “high degree of control over the behavior” of the non‐employee, and (2) the employer’s “own negligence” permits or facilitates that non‐ employee’s discrimination.89 Thus, in Summa v. Hofstra University, we held that the harassing conduct of student‐athletes could, in principle, be imputed to the university under agency principles because the university exercised “a high degree of control over the behavior of its student football players.”90 In Summa, however, we concluded that the university did not act negligently, but instead took appropriate remedial action. These same agency principles govern the “cat’s paw theory.” Accordingly, the discriminatory intent of a student‐athlete may also be imputed to a university where that university exercises a “high degree of control over the behavior” of the student‐athlete and negligently permits her discriminatory conduct or effectuates her discriminatory intent. not constitute a hostile working environment under the civil rights statutes.”); Brown v. Henderson, 115 F. Supp. 2d 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Put bluntly, the equal opportunity harasser escapes the purview of Title VII liability.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 89 Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2013). 90 Id. 32 Here, Menaker’s allegations suggest that Hofstra exercised the requisite degree of control over Kaplan. Hofstra controlled not only Kaplan’s academic enrollment and athletic scholarship, but also the very complaint process by which she sought to effectuate her allegedly discriminatory intent. Indeed, Hofstra officials specifically referenced Kaplan’s accusations in the course of terminating Menaker, thereby acknowledging that she had “played a meaningful role in the decision.”91 Accordingly, insofar as Hofstra negligently or recklessly implemented Kaplan’s discriminatory design, her intent may be imputed to Hofstra. Here, in light of the procedural irregularities discussed above92 (as well as Hofstra’s knowledge of the scholarship dispute, the phone call from Kaplan’s father, and the falsity of at least some of the accusations), a district court could plausibly conclude that Hofstra was negligent or reckless in acting on Kaplan’s allegations. While the facts alleged suggest that Hofstra might be liable under such a theory, further proceedings, of course, are necessary to establish whether there is evidence to support Menaker’s allegations.