Opinion ID: 168868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denning and Traxler’s M otion to Suppress

Text: W hen reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a question of law , so we review de novo the district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Id. 2 (...continued) agents jumped out of their vehicles with guns drawn, stopped the Traxler/Ladue truck and the green car, and arrested the suspects at gun point.” Vol. I, Doc. 58 at 3 (emphasis added). The court nevertheless went on to analyze the stop not as an arrest but as an investigatory detention under Terry. Id. at 6. Our conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest when they stopped the cars renders the confusion in terms inconsequential. Although it is obvious the district court believed the stop was merely an investigative detention, we are willing to assume Traxler and Denning were arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes the moment officers stopped their cars at gunpoint. -6- The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest must be supported by probable cause. Cortez v. M cCauley, — F.3d — , No. 04-2062, 2007 W L 503819 (10th Cir., Feb. 16, 2007). Officers may, however, make an investigatory stop short of arrest based on a reasonable suspicion that a crime is afoot. Id. (relying on Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2000)). Traxler and Denning argued law enforcement officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they stopped their cars for two alternative reasons: (1) the stop was an arrest for which law enforcement lacked probable cause, or (2) the stop was an investigatory detention for which law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion. W e reject both arguments because we conclude law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest Traxler and Denning when they stopped the two cars. Probable cause exists w hen under the totality of the circumstances there is a reasonable probability that a crime is being committed. United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir. 1999). The “‘totality of the circumstances’ test does not depend on whether any particular factor is innocent when considered in isolation, but on whether, taken as a whole, the facts observed by the law enforcement officers indicate a fair probability” of criminal activity. United States v. Concepcion-Ledesm a, 447 F.3d 1307, 1316 (10th Cir. 2006). “Even where a particular factor, considered in isolation, is of ‘limited significance’ . . . , it nonetheless may affect the Fourth Amendment analysis when combined with -7- other indicia of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2004)). “[N]o single factor is determinative, and we view the circumstances in their totality rather than individually.” Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 2004)). A confidential informant’s tip can factor into the totality of the circumstances supporting probable cause w hen the tip is corroborated by officers’ investigations. United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2004). For example, in Artez we found probable cause when police observed that several consecutive visitors to a residence each stayed only for a short period of time, which corroborated an informant’s tip that drug transactions were occurring. Under the totality of the circumstances test, any deficiency in one aspect of an informant’s tip may be compensated for by other indicia of reliability. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983)). Officers in this case had probable cause to conclude a crime was being comm itted. First of all, a number of facts corroborated the material aspects of the informant’s tip, including (1) the arrival in New M exico of Traxler and Ladue, (2) the make and model of their pickup truck, and (3) the rendezvous with a car registered in Arizona to a man named Dennis. Law enforcement was in contemporaneous communication with the informant, who told them the transaction was still “on” even though it did not take place in M ayhill as -8- originally expected. Secondly, when the informant’s strongly corroborated information is combined with officers’ observations of evasive driving techniques consistent with an imminent drug transaction, further weight must be given to the conclusion that a drug transaction was at play. All of these facts together easily amount to a fair probability that a crime was being committed. Given the weight of these circumstances, a minor inconsistency in the informant’s tip— the truck was white instead of black— does not defeat a finding of probable cause. Accordingly, probable cause arose prior to the stop, and the evidence was properly admitted.