Opinion ID: 626848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standards of Review and Discussion

Text: “We review de novo the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010). “‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)) (further quotation omitted). Likewise, “[w]e review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.” Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 660 (10th Cir. 2012) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “In conducting the analysis, we view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Id. (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[f]or dispositive issues on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, he must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case in order to survive summary judgment.” Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). -5-
The district court concluded that Mr. Allen failed to state a claim against Officer Reynolds for deprivation of property without due process because Mr. Allen had an adequate post-deprivation remedy through the prison grievance system. The court noted that Mr. Allen had alleged that he had filed a grievance but that he had not alleged facts, as he must, to show that the process was faulty or unresponsive. See R., Vol. 1, at 88-89 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 536 n.15 (1984), and Freeman v. Dep’t of Corr., 949 F.2d 360, 362 (10th Cir. 1991)). We agree with the district court’s analysis. Mr. Allen’s argument on appeal that he gained no relief through the grievance process is insufficient to show that the process was unavailable or inadequate to him.
The district court noted that Mr. Allen’s prayer for $50,000 in compensatory damages was only for alleged seizure of a book holding his grandfather’s obituary and 68 family photographs. The court concluded that the PLRA bars this damages request because Mr. Allen sued for emotional damages and failed to allege physical injury. Id. at 89-90. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” The district court -6- recognized that we have interpreted this statute to limit a prisoner’s remedies “‘if the only injuries are mental or emotional.’” R., Vol. 1, at 90 (quoting Searles v. VanBebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001)). Mr. Allen’s argument that his request for $50,000 was not for emotional damages is no more than an assertion. He claimed at the district court that the photos were “priceless and irreplac[e]able” because he had “not seen [his] family in a decade” and he kept his grandfather’s obituary because his grandfather was “dear” to him. R., Vol. 1, at 12, 17. He points to no other form of injury, physical or otherwise. His $50,000 request appears to be in whole or in large part for emotional damages and lacks any basis in physical injury, which appears to run afoul of the PLRA. Even if part of his request for $50,000 includes damages for loss of property, our affirmance of the dismissal of all of his claims includes dismissal of his prayer for damages, irrespective of the PLRA.
The district court concluded that Mr. Allen failed to state a claim against Warden Leyba and Major Filer because the complaint did not allege their personal participation in unconstitutional conduct or an affirmative link to a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. See id. at 91-92 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948, and Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006)). The court rejected Mr. Allen’s argument that he alleged their participation by averring that -7- he sent them a “declaration” concerning his dispute with Officer Reynolds. Id. The court noted that such an assertion is insufficient under Tenth Circuit law. Id. (citing Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009)). Mr. Allen makes the same argument again on appeal. We agree with the district court that it lacks merit. D. Summary Judgment Properly Entered on First Amendment Retaliation Claim The district court “affirmed” the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant summary judgment on Mr. Allen’s First Amendment retaliation claim in favor of Officer Reynolds. Id. at 361, 367. The court concluded that Mr. Allen failed to present evidence creating a triable factual issue as to whether Officer Reynolds’ alleged retaliatory motive was the but-for cause of the disappearance of his 68 photographs. Id. at 363-66. Although the district court cited an unpublished decision from this court as authority for this legal standard, that decision was based on a published case stating that an inmate “must prove that ‘but for’ the retaliatory motive, the incidents to which he refers . . . would not have taken place.” Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court cited Officer Reynolds’ “sworn and notarized” affidavits, R., Vol. 1, at 366, in which he averred “that he packed up [Mr. Allen’s] belongings when [Mr. Allen] was transferred to another facility and turned them -8- over to the property sergeant,” id. at 363-64. Mr. Allen failed to present evidence showing that retaliation motivated by the exercise of his First Amendment rights was the but-for cause of the loss of his photographs. See id. at 366 (citing Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1996)). Mr. Allen offers nothing on appeal except his continuing conjecture that Officer Reynolds stole his photographs to retaliate against him. He stresses the district court’s statement that the evidence showed that the property sergeant seized 38 of the photographs because they were contained in an album for which Mr. Allen could not produce a property receipt, id. at 363, and that the court did not address the whereabouts of the other 30 photographs. Officer Reynolds swore in his second affidavit that he “did not throw away, confiscate, or dispose of any of Mr. Allen’s photographs . . . [and] did not give the property Sergeant any directions regarding the handling and disposition of Mr. Allen’s property.” R., Vol. 1, at 289. Mr. Allen failed to present any rebuttal evidence showing that Officer Reynolds took any of his photographs, much less took them with a retaliatory motive. The evidence showed that Mr. Allen was not present when Officer Reynolds packed up his belongings or when Officer Reynolds gave them to the property sergeant. Mr. Allen’s failure to offer any evidence to rebut Officer Reynolds’ affidavit on summary judgment, as he must do under Cardoso v. Calbone, is fatal to his claim. Although the district court focused on 38 photographs, Officer Reynolds’ affidavit addressed all of -9- them, and “we may affirm on any grounds that are sufficiently supported by the record to allow for a conclusion as a matter of law.” Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009). E. Timing of Summary Judgment Proper Finally, Mr. Allen’s argument that the district court may have erred by ruling on the motion for summary judgment before Officer Reynolds answered Mr. Allen’s amended complaint has no record support.