Opinion ID: 2977328
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Browning’s testimony

Text: We now turn to Pivnick’s final argument, which concerns the calling of a defense witness out of order. At trial, the district court permitted WGM’s witness Browning to testify before Pivnick put on his case because Browning had a scheduling conflict. Pivnick argues that the district court abused its discretion in doing so. He further contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied Pivnick’s motion for a mistrial following Browning’s testimony. Pivnick claims in his appellate brief that WGM made “misleading statements” when requesting that the district court allow Browning to testify out of turn, and that this “outrageous conduct of counsel” caused him “extreme prejudice.” We review the district court’s rulings on trial motions under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Pugh, 405 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2005). The record shows that WGM’s counsel initially planned to use deposition testimony rather than live witnesses, but then decided to call Browning as a live witness the day before the trial was scheduled to begin. Over Pivnick’s objections, the trial court granted the request. Based on these facts, Pivnick essentially accused WGM of procuring Browning’s unavailability (except on the first day of trial) in bad faith. WGM, however, counters that Browning’s name was submitted as a potential live witness in the parties’ joint pretrial order, while his deposition was simultaneously designated to be read. No. 07-4304 Pivnick v. White, Getgey & Meyer Co. et al. Page 12 Counsel for WGM explained that they had designated Browning’s deposition to be read due to uncertainty that he would be available to testify as a live witness. Browning himself had discussed his scheduling conflict at his deposition. Moreover, the trial transcript shows that, contrary to Pivnick’s claims, his counsel learned at least one week prior to trial that WGM might call Browning as a live witness. The district court’s decision to allow Browning to testify out of turn was not an abuse of discretion under these facts. “[A] district court abuses its discretion only when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139 (6th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Pivnick does not point to any law that the district court erroneously applied. His only argument is that the district court’s decisions to allow Browning to testify out of turn and to deny Pivnick’s motion for a mistrial were based on misleading statements made by WGM. The record does not support such a factual finding. Moreover, Pivnick cannot show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of Browning’s testimony. He had ample opportunity during trial to cross-examine Browning and to counteract any alleged “coloring of the case” or “extreme prejudice” that resulted from Browning testifying out of order. We thus find no reversible error on this issue. No. 07-4304 Pivnick v. White, Getgey & Meyer Co. et al. Page 13