Opinion ID: 2145100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: claimed estoppel

Text: In the third and final assignment of error, Inner Harbour claims that the district court erred in failing to find that the department's actions estopped it from denying reimbursement under the program. It is true that the state or one of its political subdivisions may be subject to the doctrine of equitable estoppel under compelling circumstances where right and justice so demand in the interest of preventing a manifest injustice. Jennings v. Dunning, 232 Neb. 366, 440 N.W.2d 671 (1989). The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies where, as a result of conduct of a party upon which another person has in good faith relied to one's detriment, the acting party is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might have otherwise existed. Friehe v. Schaad, 249 Neb. 825, 545 N.W.2d 740 (1996). The elements of equitable estoppel are, as to the party estopped: (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or at least which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As to the other party, the elements are: (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to one's injury, detriment, or prejudice. Hullinger v. Board of Regents, 249 Neb. 868, 546 N.W.2d 779 (1996). The program requirements for inpatient hospital psychiatric services are set out in federal statutes and were, or should have been, well known to Inner Harbour. Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Inner Harbour should be charged with the knowledge that the type of treatment was not covered. When reviewing an order of a district court under the Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Rainbolt v. State, 250 Neb. 567, 550 N.W.2d 341 (1996). Thus, Inner Harbour clearly fails in at least one of the elements to establish equitable estoppel, namely, the lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question prong.