Opinion ID: 2202658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: BZA Proceedings

Text: The BZA properly placed the burden of persuasion on petitioner Brown, the party who moved for disqualification, and petitioner presented evidence to support his allegations that the matter before the Board was substantially related to the two earlier matters. To rebut petitioner's argument, intervenors presented seven witnesses, a number of sworn affidavits, and numerous documentary exhibits. Moreover, although petitioner has argued both to the BZA and to this court that he was denied access to certain materials and that information relevant to his case was not placed before the Board, the record does not reflect that petitioner was improperly denied discovery of any information for which he made a timely request, or that he attempted to call any witness or introduce any evidence that was improperly excluded. Accordingly, we conclude that the factual findings of the BZA after this hearing must stand if supported by substantial evidence. Although Oliver T. Carr's property in the West End CR Zone is the setting for each transaction, the BZA found that [n]either the same facts, events, nor transactions were at issue in the three proceedings, and that the issues presented by the special exception are in no way connected to the height litigation or the opinion concerning the air rights condominium. [19] The BZA, moreover, spoke directly to the critical concern of the substantially related test  as we expressed it on remand of Brown I, supra note 16  finding no information present in the two earlier proceedings which would have aided the applicant in the subject [special exception] cases before the Board. Decision, January 7, 1981, supra note 19; see Westinghouse Electric Corp., 588 F.2d at 225; Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1247-48 n. 1 (Mansfield, J., concurring). The dissenters would discard the BZA ruling substantially because, they say, the last sentence of finding/conclusion 25  Nor does any common core of relevant facts or principles render the matter identical  applies the wrong ultimate legal test. Post at 66. We disagree. In the first place, that statement does not negate the other BZA factual findings, see supra note 19, supported by substantial evidence, that are relevant to applying the substantially related test; at worst it is superfluous. Second, on appellate review, application of the law to the facts, using the substantially related test, is ultimately for this court, not for the BZA. The dissenters do not dispute that. Finally, it is unfair, as well as irrelevant, to fault the BZA for saying in one sentence, amidst pages of findings, that the matters at issue are not identical. On remand, without referring to the substantially related test, this court in Brown I, 413 A.2d at 1282, asked the BZA to determine whether the special exception proceeding was the same matter as the two previous ones. In fact, we used that terminology throughout the opinion. Id. at 1281-84. In findings 25-27 the BZA, too, consistently used that terminology. More than likely, in reviewing our opinion and following our remand order, the BZA intended the concepts of same or identical matter to be synonymous, embracing the traditional, substantially related test that is embedded in the caselaw (cited in the division opinion) and applied here. But, even if the BZA did not apply the substantially related test, its findings are explicit enough and sufficiently supported by record evidence to permit this court to do so. In short, we perceive no basis for rejecting the BZA's factual findings because of one sentence that arguably clouds the BZA's legal conclusion  a conclusion that is ultimately for this court to make.