Opinion ID: 2608557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury instructions on the law of assault with a dangerous weapon.

Text: Coleman objected to the following instruction which was submitted to the jury: A person commits the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon who engages in conduct with a dangerous weapon which places another person in reasonable apprehension of receiving bodily harm. Coleman argues that this instruction is an incorrect statement of the law in this jurisdiction, in that it omits the requirement that some physical gesture of force or an actual attempted battery occur to constitute assault with a deadly weapon under AS 11.15.220. We disagree. The elements of assault with a deadly weapon were not defined in AS 11.15.220 or any other statute in effect in Alaska at the time Coleman's crime allegedly occurred. [11] However, a review of Alaska case law shows that the above instruction adequately delineates the essential elements of the offense. It is true that in this jurisdiction some physical gesture of force reflecting an immediate ability to inflict injury is required to constitute an assault. [12] However, any conduct with a dangerous weapon sufficiently threatening to create a reasonable apprehension of receiving bodily harm satisfies this requirement. Merely pointing a loaded, but uncocked, gun at another within range is sufficient, even if unaccompanied by threatening words. See Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473, 484 (9th Cir.1900); Hobbs v. State, 363 P.2d 357, 359 (Alaska 1961); State v. Godfrey, 20 P. 625, 627-28 (Or. 1889). Most recently, this court approved a jury instruction defining assault with a dangerous weapon to include merely threatening another person with the weapon in a menacing manner, in a case holding that an intent to cause fear was sufficient to provide the requisite mens rea in an assault. Silas v. State, 595 P.2d 651 (Alaska 1979). If there was any deficiency in the questioned instruction, we believe it was harmless error. [13] Coleman's acts went beyond merely picking up a rock. He forced B.E. back to the ground, positioned her head as if to strike her with the stone as he held it in his hand, and told her he did not want her to inform anyone about the rape. This conduct is clearly within the realm of threatening physical action held to constitute assault with a dangerous weapon in the cases noted. Further, the jury was presented with other instructions which informed them that the act must be committed with the intent to use the weapon as a means of offering or attempting bodily injury, coupled with the actual ability to inflict injury.