Opinion ID: 544250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unilateral Change in the Reinstatement Procedure.

Text: 21 It is settled law that where an employer bargains in good faith to impasse, as Emhart did here, it may implement unilateral changes in working conditions so long as the changes are reasonably comprehended within its pre-impasse proposals to the union. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), enf'd, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C.Cir.1968). The employer need not implement all of its pre-impasse proposals, but the changes must be in line with or    no more favorable than those offered prior to impasse. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59 (1964). In other words, the company's changes must be consistent with its offers which the union has rejected, 1 C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 634-35 (1983); NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729, 734 (1st Cir.1964), and must be within the ambit of proposals already made and rejected. American Fed. of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 629 (D.C.Cir.1968). See generally R. Gorman, Labor Law 445-46 (1976) (discussing unilateral changes following impasse). 22 Here the board held that the plant-wide seniority system implemented by Emhart was not reasonably encompassed within its pre-impasse proposals because the system reflected only a relatively small part of the November 1983 proposal. The board also found that the change failed to include use of the 'recall selection form' agreed on by the parties in December [1983]. Therefore, the board held, the February 1984 change differed significantly from both [Emhart's] own proposal and its agreement with the union. 23 To begin with, Emhart's formal proposal of November 1983 may not have been its final pre-impasse proposal to the union. Although the parties had clearly reached impasse on or before February 10, 1984, neither the ALJ nor the board identified precisely when the impasse occurred. Impasse may have occurred when the union rejected the November 1983 proposal, but it may instead have occurred only after the union rejected Emhart's subsequent offers to use plant-wide seniority for rehires at the Bloomfield plant (i.e., on December 22, 1983, or February 1, 1984). While there is support for both conclusions in the record, the evidence tends to suggest that true impasse did not take place until the later period, particularly since the parties corresponded, met, and, according to the board, agreed to use a recall selection form, all after the union had rejected the company's formal eight-point proposal. If impasse did not occur until one of these later dates, our decision would be a simple one, because Emhart would have fully implemented its final pre-impasse proposal to the union, rather than having implemented only a portion of its November 1983 proposal. 24 We do not need to resolve this question, however, because even assuming that impasse occurred in November 1983, we conclude that the board's finding is not supported by the record. Once an employer bargains in good faith to impasse, its duty to bargain further is suspended, and it is free to impose all--or part--of its pre-impasse proposals, provided its actions were reasonably comprehended within its earlier offers to the union. In this case, reinstatement by plant-wide seniority was surely reasonably comprehended within Emhart's November 1983 proposal, even if other aspects of that proposal were not also implemented. Indeed, Emhart's reinstatement procedure was an explicit part of the November proposal. 25 This case thus differs significantly from cases in which an employer unlawfully institutes a change that was not included in its pre-impasse proposals, see Peerless Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 734 (9th Cir.1981), or imposes a wage increase higher or lower than one previously offered. See Katz, 369 U.S. at 745, 82 S.Ct. at 1112; NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 224-25, 69 S.Ct. 960, 963-64, 93 L.Ed. 1320 (1949); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 575 F.2d 1107 (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978). Instead, the case bears greater similarity to one in which an employer lawfully implemented the wage portions, but not the benefits portions, of its final pre-impasse offer. In view of the nature of an impasse, the board held in that case, there is no requirement that an employer who implements some of his proposals, must implement his entire proposal. Presto Casting Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 346 (1982), enforced in part and denied in part on other grounds, 708 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994, 104 S.Ct. 489, 78 L.Ed.2d 684 (1983); see also Financial Institution Employees of America, Local 1182 v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (no violation where employer implements portions of pre-impasse offer). 26 Based on our review of the record, the board's emphasis on the recall selection form is puzzling, if not inexplicable. This form had apparently been used before the strike in recalling laid off workers, and there was some testimony that the parties had agreed to reinstitute its use in December 1983. The board reasoned that because the company may have stopped using the recall form in February 1984, the procedure instituted at that time differed significantly from    [Emhart's December 1983] agreement with the Union. But aside from stating that the recall form allowed certain employees    to designate jobs to which they preferred to be recalled, the board did not explain why the form was significant to the parties, and we cannot independently ascertain its importance from the record. Surely, it is not apparent from the face of the form. The only testimony on this issue appears to be Wheeler's statement that the company agreed to a couple of proposals in December 1983, and that he believe[d] that the recall selection form was one of these proposals. But there was no testimony that the recall form was ever used after December 1983, or that its use, if any, was discontinued in February 1984. Such slim, ambiguous evidence, without any explanation of its significance, does not constitute substantial evidence of an unfair labor practice. 27 Finally, we note that the only legal authorities cited in the board's order lend no support whatsoever to its position. In Tampa Sheet Metal Co., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1988), an employer unilaterally discontinued payments to a union pension fund after offering to continue such payments. Thus, the case stands for the uncontroversial proposition that an employer may not offer to do one thing before impasse, and then do the opposite once impasse has been reached. The decision certainly does not support the idea advanced by the board here--that an employer may not unilaterally impose only a part of its pre-impasse proposal. The other case cited in the board's order, Sierra Publishing Co., 291 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1988), involved unilateral action before impasse, and thus provides no meaningful guidance as to what an employer may or may not do after impasse. The board's reliance on the case is peculiar, to say the least. 28