Opinion ID: 2213607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the essential elements of tampering with a witness

Text: The information [1] charged Boutchee with two counts of tampering with a witness in violation of SDCL 22-11-19(2). It specifically alleged that Boutchee threatened to injure McCloskey in order to induce him to withhold testimony or information. SDCL 22-11-19 provides in full: Tampering with a witness. A person who threatens to injure any person or property, or with intent to influence a witness, offers, confers or agrees to confer any benefit on a witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding to induce the witness to: (1) Testify falsely; (2) Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing; (3) Elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply evidence; or (4) Absent himself from an official proceeding to which he has been legally summoned, is guilty of tampering with a witness. Tampering with a witness is a Class 4 felony. The trial court submitted instruction # 16 to the jury which provided in full as follows: The essential elements of the crime charged in each count of the information each of which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are: (1) That on or about the 27th day of March, 1986, in this county and state, the defendant threatened to injure David John McCloskey; and (2) that the defendant did so with the specific intent to induce Mr. McCloskey to withhold testimony or information. You are instructed that under the State's version of the facts the threat alleged in Count I occurred at [Heritage] Park and the threat alleged in Count II occurred at a private residence. During the settling of jury instructions, Boutchee objected to instruction # 16 based on the trial court's failure to include the statutory language in an official proceeding. The court responded that the State did not charge Boutchee with the language in an official proceeding but that Boutchee may have an argument that the information was defective. The court declined to rule on the sufficiency of the information, stating that, if there was an adverse verdict, Boutchee could attack the information and the court would then consider it. The record shows that Boutchee failed to object to the sufficiency of the information after the guilty verdict. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appeal. The appellant must affirmatively establish a record that shows error and that the trial court was given an opportunity to correct it. Cooper v. Cooper, 299 N.W.2d 798, 800 (S.D.1980); Estate of Assmus, 254 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1977). Nevertheless, consideration of the sufficiency of the information is necessary to determine the sufficiency of jury instruction # 16. SDCL 23A-6-7 provides in part: An indictment or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom:       (5) That the offense charged is designated in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. An information is sufficient if it appraises the accused of the nature of the accusation against him with reasonable certainty so that he may prepare a defense and be protected from double jeopardy. [2] SDCL 23A-6-14 provides: No indictment or information is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected, by reason of a defect or imperfection in its form, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. This information expressly alleged that Boutchee threatened to injure McCloskey in order to induce him to withhold testimony or information in violation of SDCL 22-11-19(2). Boutchee was present at the preliminary hearing and heard McCloskey testify against him. The case was bound over for trial and McCloskey was expected to testify in the upcoming proceeding. This evidence was before the jury. The information advised him of the charge against him with reasonable certainty, cited the appropriate statute and subsection, and contained the material elements of the offense: the intent to induce a witness to withhold testimony or information by use of threats. It follows that the existence of the official proceeding,the Chasing Bear trial which was pending as of March 27, 1986was implicit but not essential. Although it would appear to be better practice to include the language in an official proceeding in an information and instruction under SDCL 22-11-19(2), this information met the requirements of SDCL 23A-6-7. The omission did not prevent or hinder the preparation of Boutchee's defense or deny him protection against double jeopardy. Nor did it prejudice Boutchee's substantial rights under SDCL 23A-6-14. Therefore, instruction # 16 was also sufficient to properly instruct the jury under SDCL 22-11-19(2). Boutchee also contends that the State had a duty to show precisely what official proceeding he induced the witness to withhold testimony from, and that the State could not sustain this burden because the Chasing Bear trial was not scheduled at the time of the March 27th contact. He further argues that McCloskey was not subpoenaed to testify in an official proceeding at that time. In United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.1985), the court stated that a witness under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 [3] is one who knows or is expected to know material facts and is expected to testify to them or to be called on to testify. The Davis court wrote that witness status depends, not on whether the witness himself expects to testify or expects to be called, but on whether the defendant knows or should expect that the witness will be called on to testify. Id. at 973-974. Similarly, in Hunt v. United States, 400 F.2d 306, 307-308 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 629, 21 L.Ed.2d 566 (1969), the court held that a person who had given information to the government which resulted in the filing of a complaint, and who was expected to testify in future legal proceedings, was a witness within the meaning of section 1503 during the period between the preliminary hearing and the convening of a grand jury. Here, the evidence shows that Boutchee knew that McCloskey would testify or was expected to testify in the Chasing Bear trial at the time of the March 27th incident. Davis, supra . The fact that the contact occurred between the preliminary hearing and the commencement of trial is immaterial. Hunt, supra . Boutchee's attempt to condition McCloskey's status as a witness upon whether he had been summoned to court is misplaced. The State specifically charged him with a violation of subsection (2) (withholding testimony or information), not subsection (4) (absenting the witness from an official proceeding to which he has been legally summoned). The prior issuance of a subpoena to McCloskey was not an element of the charge under SDCL 22-11-19(2). Since Boutchee was charged only with subsection (2), the fact that McCloskey was not subpoenaed when the March 27th contact occurred is immaterial. The State had no duty to show that he was summoned to testify at that time.