Opinion ID: 3053286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Henderson II and III

Text: On October 16, 2003, six PERS members challenged the Board’s use of updated life expectancy tables by filing a new action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (“Henderson II”). In Henderson II, the PERS members moved to reopen Henderson I and to hold the Board in civil contempt for violating the terms of the consent decree. They argued that the consent decree requires the Board “to provide all PERS members, retiring thereafter, a ‘refund annuity’ allowance based upon the actuarial life expectancy tables in effect for males on July 1, 1978.” At oral argument on June 10, 2004, the district court issued a minute order denying both the motion to reopen and the motion for civil contempt.3 The Henderson II plaintiffs appealed that minute order to this court. On September 16, 2004, six PERS members (including two Henderson II plaintiffs) filed another action in the United 2 Stunk also sustained two constitutional challenges to the Reform Legislation. Strunk, 108 P.3d at 1064. Those challenges, however, are not at issue here. 3 The district court did not interpret the meaning of the consent decree in its minute order. Instead, the district court stated at oral argument that the decree lacked “sufficient clarity” to determine that it created “a floor of rates or benefits that would make the reform legislation in violation of the decree.” 13126 EBNER v. OREGON States District Court for the District of Oregon (“Henderson III”). They sought to reopen Henderson I and requested a different remedy, a “declaration that the September 20, 1978 injunction requires [the Board] to adopt and use refund annuity tables which grant benefits not less than those benefits which were in effect for male members of [PERS] on July 1, 1978.” On October 25, 2004, the district court issued a minute order denying the motion to reopen and denying as moot the motion for declaratory judgment. The Henderson III plaintiffs also appealed that minute order to this court. Henderson II and III were consolidated on appeal. On October 20, 2006, we issued a disposition addressing the issues raised in Henderson II and Henderson III. Henderson v. Oregon, 203 Fed. Appx. 45, 49-50 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished memorandum disposition).4 We held that the district court had not abused its discretion when it denied the motion for civil contempt filed in Henderson II because “viewing the language in the Henderson consent decree in favor of [the Board] . . . the consent decree is not sufficiently specific to give notice to [the Board] that it would violate the consent decree by updating the actuarial tables.” Id. at 50. We further held that the motions to reopen were properly denied because the motions were not needed to invoke the district court’s continuing jurisdiction over the Henderson I consent decree. Id. at 52. However, we also held that the district court had improperly denied as moot the motion for declaratory judgment filed in Henderson III because the district court had never actually interpreted the language of the consent decree. Id. at 50-51. Accordingly, the panel remanded the Henderson litigation to the district court for a ruling on the meaning of the consent decree. 4 The 2006 memorandum disposition refers to the Henderson II plaintiffs as the Santacroce-Appellants and the Henderson III plaintiffs as the Ebner-Appellants. EBNER v. OREGON 13127