Opinion ID: 200995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grace's Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

Text: 19 In 1998, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) to preserve a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence for any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, ... in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.... Pub.L. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). This amendment responded to Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), in which the Supreme Court held that under the prior version of the statute, the Government must show that the defendant actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime. 4 The current version of the statute, therefore, does not require defendants to have actively employed the firearm in furtherance of the drug crime; however, they must have possessed the gun to further the drug crime: 20 The government must clearly show that a firearm was possessed to advance or promote the commission of the underlying offense. The mere presence of a firearm in an area where a criminal act occurs is not a sufficient basis for imposing this particular mandatory sentence. Rather, the government must illustrate through specific facts, which tie the defendant to the firearm, that the firearm was possessed to advance or promote the criminal activity. 21 United States v. Lawrence, 308 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 105-344, at 12); see also United States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 509 (1st Cir.2003) ([M]erely determining that [the defendant] was in possession of a sidearm is not enough to support the conviction; we must also consider whether the weapon was possessed ` in furtherance of ... a drug-trafficking crime.') (emphasis in original). 22 In United States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2003), we concluded that a defendant's possession of a firearm to protect drugs and drug proceeds provides the required nexus between the drugs and the firearm. We relied on evidence that the defendant stored firearms in a crawlspace with heroin to conclude that he used those firearms to protect the drugs, and that this evidence provided a sufficient basis to trigger section 924 liability. Id. at 6. Similarly, in United States v. Garner, 338 F.3d 78 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1084, 124 S.Ct. 948, 157 L.Ed.2d 761 (2003), a case in which the police found drugs and a gun hidden in a hole in the defendant's basement wall, we concluded: 23 When guns and drugs are found together and a defendant has been convicted of possession with intent to distribute, the gun, whether kept for protection from robbery of drug-sale proceeds, or to enforce payment for drugs, may reasonably be considered to be possessed in furtherance of an ongoing drug-trafficking crime. Id. at 81. 5 24 Although this case is closer than Luciano and Garner, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Grace possessed the .38 caliber firearm to protect her drug supply and the proceeds of her drug sales. Grace had not owned a firearm for approximately a decade prior to her purchase of the .38, which she purchased after the room in which she stored her drugs was burglarized. In light of the testimony of Agent Duquette, the court was entitled to disbelieve Grace's claim at trial that no drugs were stolen during the first robbery, and to conclude that she purchased the handgun specifically to prevent such robberies of drugs and drug proceeds in the future. Indeed, Grace had good reason to fear such robberies. She routinely kept thousands of dollars of cash and drugs in her computer room and sold drugs in the adjoining room. Furthermore, she suspected that one of her main drug suppliers was responsible for at least one of the robberies. 25 To counter the conclusion that she possessed the gun to protect her drugs and drug proceeds, Grace derides as fanciful the notion that she could have used an unloaded gun to protect herself and her drugs. Unfortunately for Grace, our own precedents and those of other circuits demonstrate that a gun does not even have to be operational, let alone loaded, to qualify as a firearm for section 924 purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Kirvan 997 F.2d 963, 966 (1st Cir.1993) (It is common ground that the gun need not be proved to be loaded or operable in order to convict....); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir.1995) (relying on Kirvan to state that a firearm does not need to be loaded or operational and concluding that the prosecution satisfies its burden simply by showing that the gun is a gun); see also United States v. Hunter, 101 F.3d 82, 85 (9th Cir.1996) (Congress intended the ten-year penalty to apply to unloaded and inoperable semiautomatic weapons as well.); United States v. Coburn, 876 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir.1989) (The fact that a firearm is `unloaded' or `inoperable' does not insulate the defendant from the reach of section 924(c).). Even an unloaded firearm can intimidate others and help to further the defendant's drug-related activities. See Hunter, 101 F.3d at 86 ([I]ntimidation will be caused by a semiautomatic assault weapon whether the gun is loaded and operable or not.); United States v. Martinez 912 F.2d 419, 421 (10th Cir.1990) (Unloaded firearms have the same effect on victims and observers when pointed or displayed, tending to intimidate, and also increase the risk of violence by others who may respond to the perceived danger represented by the (presumably) loaded gun.). Although the unloaded gun is arguably helpful evidence for Grace, see, e.g., Lawrence, 308 F.3d at 630-31 (considering the fact that the defendant's firearm was unloaded as one piece of evidence demonstrating that the defendant did not possess the gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime), it did not require the judge to acquit her. 6