Opinion ID: 766011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cooperation Agreement

Text: 8 We turn first to petitioner's argument that the district court should have enforced the cooperation agreement that allegedly guaranteed petitioner that he would not be extradited if he assisted Canadian authorities. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court held that plea bargains are generally binding upon the government: [W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. This logic has been extended to immunity agreements, see United States v. Fitch, 964 F.2d 571, 574 (6th Cir. 1992) (government bound by agreement unless it can show material breach by defendant), and to cooperation agreements, United States v. Streebing, 987 F.2d 368, 372 (6th Cir. 1993) (cooperation agreements binding if government agent is authorized to make the agreement and defendant relies upon it to his detriment). Such agreements are analogous to contracts and thus reviewing courts are governed by normal contract law standards. Fitch, 964 F.2d at 574 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Furthermore, breach of an immunity agreement entered into by the United States with a defendant has been held sufficient reason to grant habeas relief in the face of a request for extradition. See United States v. Plaster, 720 F.2d 340, 350 (4th Cir. 1983). 9 Petitioner contends that his cooperation agreement represents just such a contract and that it was breached by Canadian authorities with the willful assistance of United States government officials. The district court rejected this argument by focusing upon the role of the United States: 10 The enforceability of such agreements . . . is subject to the condition that the participating government agent be authorized to make the promises contained in the agreement. This authority must be particularly clear as to promises regarding extradition: 11 [T]he extradition power, as it involves issues of foreign affairs, must be preserved within the Executive's discretion to the extent permitted by constitutional limitations. We thus conclude that the mere claim to such authority by a government official is insufficient to create apparent authority, and that defense counsel must be charged with that knowledge. Instead, the official must have some articulable indication that authority was delegated to him by the President or the Secretary of State. 12 Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 354 (4th Cir. 1983). 13 The purported agreement stems from Inspector Williams' alleged promise that Petitioner would not be subject to further proceedings in Canada if he cooperated. The record is devoid of evidence of involvement of a United States official, or that Inspector Williams was authorized to act on behalf of the United States. Petitioner argues the United States in effect brokered the agreement by permitting Inspector Williams to visit Petitioner in Trumbull County jail. Such alleged involvement, indirect as it is, is not an articulable indication that any Trumbull County official received authority from the President or Secretary of State to make promises with respect to Petitioner's extradition. 14 Memorandum Opinion at 4. 15 Petitioner makes the same argument to this court: first, that the Ohio Attorney General, through state prison officials, brokered the agreement by permitting Williams to interview petitioner; second, by lodging a warrant against him, these officials facilitated the breach of the agreement by the Canadians. 16 The weakness in petitioner's argument is his inability to show either that the United States was a party to the alleged cooperation agreement or that Williams acted under the authority of the United States. While Ohio governmental officials permitted Williams to visit petitioner in the county jail, there is nothing in the attorney's affidavit or elsewhere to indicate that they knew about the substance of the discussions between the two. 3 Simply filing a warrant or a complaint for extradition at the request of Canadian authorities does not make Ohio or the United States party to the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, it strikes us that the appropriate place to raise a defense based upon the cooperation agreement would be in any subsequent Canadian proceeding. 17 Because there is nothing to support a conclusion that the United States was party to, or in any way authorized the alleged cooperation agreement, its existence would not entitle petitioner to habeas relief.