Opinion ID: 1469238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The statutory presumption.

Text: The statutory presumption of compensability, see page 4, supra, plays a significant role in worker's compensation cases. Indeed, we have characterized the presumption as the starting point of the analysis, and we have held the agency must apply it first. Baker v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 611 A.2d 548, 551 (D.C.1992). We have indicated that at least initially, the presumption defines the legal lens, Whittaker v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 668 A.2d 844, 847 (D.C.1995), or prism, cf. In re Baby Boy C, 581 A.2d 1141, 1182 (D.C.1990) (per curiam) (Ferren, J., concurring), through which the record must be viewed. Indeed, failure to consider the presumption may skew the calculus applicable to this type of proceeding. See, generally, Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987) ( Ferreira I ). In Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. District of Columbia Dept' of Employment Servs., 744 A.2d 992, 996-97 (D.C.2000), we recently had occasion to discuss in some detail the character and extent of the presumption: Under the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), once an employee offers evidence demonstrating that an injury was potentially caused or aggravated by work-related activity, a presumption arises that the injury is work-related and therefore compensable under the Act. See D.C.Code § 36-321(1). This presumption serves to effectuate the humanitarian purpose of the statute [and] reflects a `strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.' Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987) ( Ferreira I ) (citing Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App. D.C. 177, 183, 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc)); accord, e.g., Brown v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 700 A.2d 787, 791 (D.C.1997). In order to benefit from the presumption, an employee need only present some evidence of two things: (1) a disability, and (2) a work-related event, activity, or requirement which has the potential of resulting in or contributing to the ... disability. Ferreira I, 531 A.2d at 655 (emphasis in original); accord, e.g., Parodi v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 560 A.2d 524, 526 (D.C.1989). The presumption then operates to establish a causal connection between the disability and the work-related event, activity, or requirement. Ferreira I, 531 A.2d at 655; accord, e.g., Davis-Dodson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services, 697 A.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C.1997). To rebut the presumption the employer must show by substantial evidence that the disability did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. Baker, supra, 611 A.2d at 550. [T]he statutory presumption may be dispelled by circumstantial evidence specific and comprehensive enough to sever the potential connection between a particular injury and a job-related event. Ferreira I, supra, 531 A.2d at 655 (citations omitted). Where such specific and comprehensive rebuttal evidence has been presented, the claimant ultimately has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her disability was caused by the work injury. Upchurch v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 783 A.2d 623, 628 (D.C.2001). In the present case, the examiner found, on the basis of ample evidence, that the cause of Ms. Waugh's back condition was pre-existing disc disease in her back. This finding could arguably be viewed as sufficiently specific and comprehensive to rebut any presumption that Ms. Waugh's back condition was caused by events related to her employment, and it might to that extent render harmless the examiner's failure to articulate the presumption. The examiner's finding regarding pre-existing disc disease does not, however, entirely dispose of the claim, for Ms. Waugh's condition was potentially aggravated by the cumulative trauma of which she complained. It is well established in this jurisdiction that a disability resulting from the aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable under the WCA. Washington Hosp. Ctr., supra, 744 A.2d at 997 (citations omitted). Moreover, the presumption of compensability arises where an injury or condition was potentially caused or aggravated by work-related activity. Id. at 996 (emphasis added). Indeed, the employer has not challenged, before the agency or before this court, the applicability of the presumption to Ms. Waugh's cumulative trauma claim. Rather, the employer contends that the examiner implicitly applied the presumption, but that the employer successfully rebutted it. The employer's position was upheld by the Director, who found that the examiner's decision  clearly indicates that the presumption of compensability was indeed applied. (Emphasis added.) But clarity, like beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the beholder. It is undisputed that the examiner made no explicit mention of Ms. Waugh's claim that her condition was aggravated by the work injury. The examiner simply rejected the cumulative impact theory because Ms. Waugh was suffering degenerative changes from a pre-existing condition that were not causally related to her work injury. Indeed, the examiner did not address at all the critical question suggested by this record, namely, whether, with the presumption of compensability included in the initial calculus, the record established that Ms. Waugh's activities on the job aggravated the condition from which she was previously suffering. In this case, the examiner's silence on the aggravation theory provides no assurance that he considered it and applied the presumption of compensability, in conformity with the principles subsequently enunciated in Whittaker and in later cases, to reach the aggravation of a pre-existing condition. See, e.g., Washington Hosp. Ctr., supra, 744 A.2d at 997; Short v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 850-51 (D.C.1998). This is not to say that every compensation order must contain certain magic words in order to demonstrate that the examiner followed the statutory procedures. Washington Hosp. Ctr., supra, 744 A.2d at 997. On the contrary, we stated in that case that [t]he relevant question is not whether the examiner said he applied the statutory presumption, but whether in fact he properly did so. Id. The present record, however, is unlike that in Washington Hosp. Ctr., for there is nothing in the compensation order to suggest that the examiner considered the aggravation claim and looked at the record through the lens, as it were, of the statutory presumption, as interpreted in Whittaker, supra, 668 A.2d at 847. Accordingly, without reaching any question not addressed herein, we vacate the decision of the Director and remand the case for further proceedings before the examiner consistent with this opinion. See Marie Clark v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 772 A.2d 198, 199 (D.C.2001) (remanding for consideration of aggravation claim). So ordered. [6]