Opinion ID: 2441888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The trial judge abused his discretion, even if voir dire is a meaningful trial proceeding.

Text: Even if the majority's premise that voir dire is the start of meaningful trial proceedings were correct, I believe that reversal of the trial court judgment nevertheless is required. It is true that, once the trial judge determines that meaningful trial proceedings have begun, Md. Rule 4-215 need not be complied with strictly. Brown, 342 Md. at 426, 676 A.2d at 524. In that event, it is the trial judge's exercise of discretion in addressing the defendant's request to discharge counsel that is the focus. In that sense, however, the defendant's right to change counsel still exists, but is subject to a different test. This only means, as Brown makes clear, that the trial judge's obligations and duties with regard to such requests are not defined by rule. That they exist and must be discharged can not be denied. The difference is that the question whether they have been discharged is judged by whether there has been compliance with the constitutional standard. Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938)). In Brown, this Court held that, although strict compliance with Md. Rule 4-215 is not necessary once meaningful trial proceedings are underway, the trial court's discretion is not limitless. 342 Md. at 428, 676 A.2d at 525. It pointed out, in that regard, that the court must conduct an inquiry to assess whether the defendant's reason for dismissal of counsel justifies any resulting disruption. This inquiry must meet constitutional standards. Brown, 342 Md. at 428, 676 A.2d at 525 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, 82 L.Ed. at 1466). Then, acknowledging that there is little to guide the trial judge in the exercise of this discretion, we noted: in future proceedings, we suggest that the trial judge consider the following factors in deciding whether to permit discharge of counsel during trial: (1) the merit of the reason for discharge; (2) the quality of counsel's representation prior to the request; (3) the disruptive effect, if any, that discharge would have on the proceedings; (4) the timing of the request; (5) the complexity and stage of the proceedings; and (6) any prior requests by the defendant to discharge counsel. See Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir.1976); People v. Cummings, 4 Cal.4th 1233, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1, 57 (1993), cert. denied, [511] U.S. [1046], 114 S.Ct. 1576, 128 L.Ed.2d 219 (1994); People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848, 98 S.Ct. 157, 54 L.Ed.2d 116 (1977). Generally, the longer the defendant waits to request discharge of counsel, the stronger the rationale must be to warrant counsel's dismissal. Id. at 428-29, 676 A.2d at 525; see also Campbell, 385 Md. at 632-33, 870 A.2d at 226 (In the exercise of discretion, the judge is required to `conduct an inquiry to assess whether the defendant's reason for dismissal of counsel justifies any resulting disruption,' [ Brown, 342 Md.] at 428, 676 A.2d at 525, through consideration of the... factors.). The Court made clear that although the trial judge need not engage in a full-scale inquiry pursuant to Rule 4-215, the judge must at least consider the defendant's reason for requesting dismissal before rendering a decision. Brown, 342 Md. at 431, 676 A.2d at 526; see also Campbell, 385 Md. at 636, 870 A.2d at 228. The majority's take on this issue is particularly disturbing, especially its all but dispositive emphasis on the defendant's ability and opportunity to state the reasons for desiring discharge and the trial court's broad discretion, Maj. op. at 628, 4 A.3d at 917, which, under the majority's formulation, is essentially unreviewable. Id. According to the majority, the court's burden, once the defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, is to provide the defendant the opportunity to explain his or her reasons for making the request; in other words, the court need not do any more than supply the forum in which the defendant may tender this explanation. Id. [11] Once the forum has been provided and, presumably, the explanation givenit asserts, the request is left almost entirely to the court's `sound discretion.' [12] Id. at 629, 4 A.3d at 918 (quoting Brown, 342 Md. at 426, 676 A.2d at 524). To be sure, the majority acknowledges that this Court, in Brown, formulated factors to be used by future courts faced with a discharge issue that has arisen after meaningful trial proceedings have begun as a guide for deciding those issues and, indeed, recognizes what we said on the subject, that the court should consider [the] six [ Brown ] factors in exercising its discretion. Maj. op. at 629, 4 A.3d at 918. Contradictorily, however, it holds that trial courts abuse their discretion when they fail to allow a defendant any opportunity to explain his or her request at all, thus making it impossible to consider the six factors in Brown.  Id. at 629-30, 4 A.3d at 918. Interestingly, it states that these factors may be considered in a brief exchange between the court and the defendant, id. at 629, 4 A.3d at 918; significantly, the majority does not, because it cannot, say that the trial court considered those factors. [13] To it, it is sufficient that there was an opportunity, however brief, in which they could have been considered and, of course, that the defendant was permitted to explain the basis of his dissatisfaction. In short, the majority holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the defendant was able to explain his reasons and was not order[ed] to silence ... before continuing with the trial, Maj. op. at 630, 4 A.3d at 918-19, thus fulfilling its duty. This is not, and cannot be, the standard. First, it does not comply with our decision in Brown and the requirements it imposed. As we have seen, the Court formulated and set out factors to guide trial courts in their decision-making when faced with late discharge of counsel requests. One of these factors is the merit of the reason for discharge. Why else would factors be formulated and offered for guidance if they were not expected or intended to be used? In addition, we indicated clearly that the exercise of discretion was not limitless another reason for factors to guide its exercise. Finally, we indicated, again clearly, that review of the exercise of discretion should be possible. See Brown, 342 Md. at 428, 431, 676 A.2d at 525, 526. The majority simply ignores these Brown teachings. The holding in this case simply does not make sense and it does nothing to protect or facilitate a defendant's right to effective counsel or to proceed pro se. All it does is permit the court passively to listen to a defendant's complaint or request without any obligation to consider or address it or its ramifications. This holding effectively instructs the trial courts simply to provide a forum where a defendant may vent, just to allow him or her to explain his or her dissatisfaction with counsel, and nothing more. Other than providing a forum, nothing more is required of the court; it need not, as the trial court did not do in this case, consider the Brown factors or respond in any way to the reasons offered or the complaints made by the defendant. Indeed, all this holding encourages is inaction, not the exercise of discretion. In fact, what the trial court did in this case was the very antithesis of exercising discretion on a request to discharge counsel. In addition, the majority would subjugate a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and, therefore, a fair trial, clearly substantive matters, to judicial convenience and to when a complaint about counsel is made, purely procedural or matters of form. But the right to a fair trial, even when the issue at the center of the controversy is whether counsel is effective, is not subject to curtailment because of timing or judicial convenience. Whenever that issue is properly and timely presented and whenever it is a viable question, a court must address it. Brown, 342 Md. at 431, 676 A.2d at 526. I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that superficial inquir[ies], Brown, 342 Md. at 429, 676 A.2d at 525, will not do. Similar to Brown, the trial judge did not determine whether defendant was attempting to assert his right to proceed pro se or asking the court to appoint substitute counsel. [14] Brown, 342 Md. at 430, 676 A.2d at 526. That Court made clear that the trial court must afford the defendant an opportunity to explain the reasons for his request, Brown, 342 Md. at 430, 676 A.2d at 526, and more important, rather than implicitly, expressly requiring that the request be considered, and, in context, resolved. Id. at 431, 676 A.2d at 526. At first glance, Brown may seem more egregious than the case sub judice, because, in Brown, the court did not give the defendant the opportunity to address the court. The situation sub judice is, however, I submit, no less egregious. The inquiry conducted in this case was entirely and especially meaningless. To be meaningful, an inquiry must be more than an academic exercise, it must accomplish more than provide a rationale to excuse a trial court's actions or inaction. Instead, it must be such as to recognize and vindicate the serious impact that the subject of the inquiry has on the defendant's right to counsel and to proceed pro se. See generally Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833, 95 S.Ct. at 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d at 580 ([I]t is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. The value of state-appointed counsel was not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them.). Therefore, matters affecting a defendant's liberty cannot be taken lightly. See generally Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821, 95 S.Ct. at 2534, 45 L.Ed.2d at 573-74 (An unwanted counsel `represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.). Thus, a trial court's inquiry in response to a request to discharge can not be a superficial inquiry. Here, to the extent the trial court inquired at all, it was superficialhe made no real attempt to determine the merits of the defendant's complaints. He was too busy trying to persuade the defendant to keep counsel, and that his reasons for dissatisfaction were not valid ones against a good attorney working in his interest. Campbell is instructive. There, after the State presented its case-in-chief, the defendant, requested new counsel. 385 Md. at 623-24, 870 A.2d at 221. The trial court denied that request, but only after [b]alancing the Brown factors against the countervailing considerations of permitting Campbell to discharge counsel. Id. at 635, 870 A.2d at 228. This Court held that meaningful trial proceedings had begun, therefore precluding the need for strict compliance with Rule 4-215. Id. at 634, 870 A.2d at 227. Nevertheless, we recognized that more was required of the trial judge than a simple recognition that Rule 4-215 does not apply. Id. at 632-33, 870 A.2d at 226. Accordingly, in affirming that ruling by the trial court, we noted how it appropriately had addressed and balanced each of the Brown factors and the impact discharge of counsel would have had on the trial. Id. at 635-36, 870 A.2d at 228. Here, the majority, like the trial court, failed to apply the Brown factors. The defendant advised the trial court that he was thinking about changing [his] attorney or something, proffering two bases for that thinking. To the first, that his attorney was unprepared, having spent a very limited amount of time consulting with him about the case, the trial judge expressed disbelief and then, when counsel's rebuttal did not substantially dispute the defendant's account, failed to follow up. To the second, the defendant's belief that counsel did not believe in him and, thus, was urging him to take time for a crime he did not commit, the court rationalized counsel's actions in urging the plea, stating that she has got to ... ethically ask him to take time for an act the defendant persisted in insisting he did not do. It also vouched for defense counsel's competence, telling the defendant: She's a good lawyer.... She's going to work hard for you.... She's only doing what anybody else does. This vouching survived voir dire, when the trial court added [t]o be quite honest ... she's only giving her ... opinion based on what she has seen me do to people involved in violent offenses with any record. She's just giving you her ... honest opinion. [15] By contrast, the record reflects no comparable attention paid to the factors this Court indicated should be considered. As noted already, the court did not follow up to determine the merits of the defendant's complaints, nor did it put the request into a time sequence. A fair reading of this record is that the court wanted very much to continue with the trial and that it was more concerned with that than with constitutional niceties. In so proceeding and by disregarding, in effect, if not intentionally, Brown, the court erred. The Court of Special Appeals got it right. I would affirm its judgment. Judge GREENE joins the views herein expressed and Judge ADKINS joins Part III of this opinion. ADKINS, J., Concurring and Dissenting. I agree with the majority that there should be a bright-line test, and that the commencement of voir dire is the appropriate demarcation for the commencement of meaningful trial proceedings in a jury trial. Thus, I join Part IV, A and B, of the Majority opinion. I respectfully dissent, however, from the balance of the Majority opinion for the reasons set forth in Section III of the Dissent of Chief Judge Bell, which I join. I agree with him that even without the dictates of Rule 4-215, the trial court failed to make a proper inquiry about Hardy's claim that his counsel was inadequate. See State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 676 A.2d 513 (1996).