Opinion ID: 2621923
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extreme Emotional Distress Manslaughter Instruction

Text: ¶36 We next consider whether the district court properly included the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction over Low's objection. We conclude that it was error for the court to include the instruction. ¶37 The State argues that the jury instruction was proper because there was evidence that defendant may have killed Hirschey while suffering extreme emotional distress. The State points to testimony from Low, McCall, and Touchette that Hirschey had teased, manhandled, and assaulted Low. This evidence, the State argues, raises the question of whether Low was suffering from extreme emotional distress when he shot Hirschey. We disagree. ¶38 Although there was evidence presented by both the prosecution and by Low that Hirschey had mistreated Low throughout the evening of the shooting, there was no evidence that Low was experiencing extreme emotional distress as a result of the mistreatment. Low never testified that he was angered or upset by the mistreatment. And the other witnesses testified that Hirschey's mistreatment did not cause Low to become angry or emotionally distressed. Touchette testified that Low took the mistreatment in stride and was not angry. McCall testified that Low just kind of shrugged it off and that, mere seconds before the shooting happened, Low did not appear mad at Hirschey. ¶39 By including the instruction over Low's objection, the district court foisted upon Low the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress, which Low did not wish to assert. Because Low did not introduce any evidence of extreme emotional distress, it was error for the district court to include a jury instruction for extreme emotional distress manslaughter. ¶40 We find support for our decision in the case of People v. Bradley, 669 N.E.2d 815 (N.Y. 1996). In Bradley, a defendant charged with second degree murder asserted the affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of a mental disease or defect. Id. at 816. The State asked the trial court to provide a first degree manslaughter instruction based on extreme emotional disturbance, and the court included the instruction over the defendant's objection. Id. The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. Id. The Court of Appeals of New York held that it was error for the trial court to include the manslaughter instruction because the defendant's position at trial was that he suffered from a progressive mental illness that prevented him from appreciating the moral and legal import of his actions, not that he suffered a temporary loss of control. Id. The appellate court concluded that the defendant's right to chart his own defense had been infringed when the trial court instructed the jury regarding the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance over the defendant's objection and reversed the conviction. Id. ¶41 In this case, Low's consistent position at trial was that he acted out of self-defense. Low did not present any evidence that his actions were due to a temporary loss of control caused by extreme emotional distress. It was therefore error for the district court to submit a jury instruction regarding extreme emotional distress, an affirmative defense that Low did not raise. This error satisfies the first prong of the plain error standard.