Opinion ID: 1163582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: date variance

Text: As a further ground for reversal, the appellant contends that: The Court erred in allowing the trial to proceed after the Court discovered that evidence had been received concerning a crime for which the defendant has not been convicted and was not then being tried. During the trial of this case the witnesses, the court, and counsel became confused on the question of which day the purported illegal sale took place. The 6th of January, 1973, was a Saturday, and the 7th was a Sunday. The buy of hashish was actually transacted on Saturday, the 6th, while some of the testimony of the witnesses and certain evidence came into the record as though it took place on Sunday, the 7th. Most of the discussion directed at straightening out the dilemma was outside the presence of the jury, although not all of it as appellee contends and the majority opinion assumes. [5] Examples of testimony and evidence heard and seen by the jury, are the following: Laabs testified that the hash was purchased by Janski on the 7th, but he said on cross-examination that he was not sure whether it was Saturday or Sunday. He said he went to Janski's house on the 7th. In speaking about when he was at Janski's house, he said that other boys in the house were watching TV, and then counsel asked: Q This was a Saturday, wasn't it, or was it? A I am not sure, it was a Sunday. The State's witness, Officer Fields, testified that he (Fields) was employed on the 7th by the Casper Police Department; and he responded affirmatively to the following question: Q And on or about that date did you have an opportunity to see Mr. Robert Laabs in relation to the purchase of narcotics from Gary Janski? Fields also identified State's Exhibit No. 1, tinfoil-wrapped marihuana, which was the purported drug sold by Janski to Laabs, and in so identifying it indicated that the exhibit was received by him from Laabs on 1-6-73. Laabs had testified that he went right to Fields' home after the buy. There may be much in the contention of the appellant when he says that the jury may well have been unduly prejudiced concerning the requisite lack of predisposition (referring to the entrapment problem) and it may, as counsel says, have influenced the minds of the jurors in reaching their verdict. I tend to agree that this quandary might well have had a prejudicial effect in the area of entrapment. If, because of all this mix-up as to dates, it is reasonable to assume that the jury received the impression that there was more than one buy and, therefore, a course of criminal conduct was indicated, thereby establishing predisposition to commit this crime  the error would indeed have been fatal. The entrapment feature is, however, the only basis upon which the date variance was prejudicial to the defendant. Otherwise, I am of the opinion that any rights which the defendant might have had because of the date confusion were waived by counsel's refusal to accept the State's offer to continue the case when the problem became apparent. A continuance would have been the proper relief if it had been necessary. People v. Cook, 136 Cal. App.2d 442, 288 P.2d 602, 606: But if appellant had considered such variance of importance, it was his duty to subpoena witnesses with knowledge of his whereabouts on the new day and, if necessary, to ask for a recess of the trial to enable him to prepare his defense against the new day. To the same effect, see State v. Christian, 154 La. 915, 98 So. 418, 419 (1923). In support of the appellant's contention that the exact date of the crime was material, and proof should have been limited to that particular offense, counsel relies on Esquibel v. State, Wyo., 399 P.2d 395 (1965). Esquibel, supra, was a rape case and the defense was an alibi for the date charged in the information. This court, in Esquibel, at 399 P.2d, page 399, said: There is abundant authority holding that where a defense of alibi is interposed the time of the act of sexual intercourse upon which the State relies for conviction does become material. (Citing cases) Where, however, the exact date is not critical to the defense, I reiterate what was said in State v. Koch, 64 Wyo. 175, 189 P.2d 162, 166: ... . if the transaction relied upon by the state for conviction can be and is identified in a manner other than by stating the exact date that is sufficient. (Citing State v. Slane, 48 Wyo. 1, 41 P.2d 269) The weight of authority supports the proposition that a court must require the state to prove a specific date only when the time element is shown to be essential to the defense. I do not find that the exact date was critical to the defendant's receiving a fair trial and agree with the majority on this point.