Opinion ID: 2222248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Harris is Entitled to a New Trial

Text: Next, we must determine whether Harris is entitled to a new trial because the judicial officer lacked authority to preside over his trial. Harris did not raise the issue of the judicial officer's authority until this appeal. The state urges us to apply plain error analysis and uphold the conviction. [5] Harris, on the other hand, maintains that the judgment is void where the court lacks jurisdiction. We decline to adopt either of these analyses. Ordinarily we limit our review of errors to which the defendant did not object at trial to those constituting plain error affecting substantial rights. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn.1998); Minn. R.Crim. P. 31.02. In a case involving a fundamental question of judicial authority, however, we believe that plain error analysis is inappropriate. Under similar circumstances, the United States Supreme Court recently concluded that plain error analysis did not apply where the question was whether the participation of a non-Article III judge on an appeals panel invalidated the panel's judgment. Nguyen v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 156 L.Ed.2d 64 (2003). The Solicitor General conceded that the panel of the Court of Appeals was improperly constituted, yet urged the court to apply plain error analysis because petitioners had failed to object to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision. Id. at 2135. The Nguyen court declined to apply plain error analysis because to ignore the violation of the designation statute in these cases would incorrectly suggest that some action (or inaction) on petitioners' part could create authority Congress has quite carefully withheld. Id. at 2137. The court explained that the composition of the panel violated a statutory provision that embodies weighty congressional policy concerning the proper organization of the federal courts and that [e]ven if the parties had expressly stipulated to the participation of a non-Article III judge in the consideration of their appeals, no matter how distinguished and well qualified the judge might be, such a stipulation would not have cured the plain defect in the composition of the panel. Id.; cf. N. Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn.1977) (stating that parties cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court by consent). Even more substantial issues are present here, because this case involves the unconstitutional delegation of authority to a judicial officer to preside over a complex felony trial. We cannot discount the constitutional defect in the authority of the judicial officer simply because Harris failed to raise the issue at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that Harris is entitled to a new trial before a district court judge. Although we look with disfavor upon Harris's delay in raising the issue of the judicial officer's lack of authority until after his conviction, we nonetheless believe that it would be unjust not to consider his claim on direct appeal. We are mindful, however, of the potential consequences of our ruling on other felony trials over which a judicial officer has presided. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt. d (1982) (stating that in the context of collateral attacks on jurisdiction, the interests at stake are governmental and societal, not those of the parties, and the question is whether the public interest is sufficiently strong to permit a possibly superfluous vindication of the rule by a litigant who is undeserving of the accompanying benefit that will redound to him). In deciding whether to give our ruling retroactive effect, public interest considerations are paramount. For example, we have approved the de facto existence of a municipal court to protect the public and to prevent confusion, uncertainty, and disorder, even though the act establishing the court was held unconstitutional. Marckel Co. v. Zitzow, 218 Minn. 305, 310, 15 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1944). Similarly, in nullifying the administrative child support process created by the legislature, we gave our ruling prospective application, concluding that retroactive application would be very disruptive without advancing the constitutional principle. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 727; see also State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn. 2002) (providing reasons that prospective application of holding is appropriate in a criminal case). Accordingly, because of the reliance by the parties and courts on this judicial officer's authority in other cases, and the potentially disruptive effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice, we limit application of our holding to this case and to pending and future cases. Reversed and remanded. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, GILBERT, J. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., and HANSON, JJ.