Opinion ID: 1163470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the Hawai`i Penal Code

Text: In 1972, the legislature enacted the Hawai`i Penal Code (HPC), HRS Title 37, chs. 701 through 712, of which HRS § 708-823 is a part. 1972 Haw.Sess.L.Act 9, § 1 at 32-142. The HPC, as originally enacted, took effect on January 1, 1973. 1972 Haw.Sess. L.Act 9, § 3 at 142. HRS § 701-117 (1985), entitled [p]rima facie evidence, provided that [p]rima facie evidence of a fact is evidence which, if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the fact, provided that no evidence negativing the fact, which raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact, is introduced. [8] The commentary on HRS § 701-117 [9] provides in relevant part: In drafting the [HPC], we have substituted the concept of prima facie evidence for presumptions, which appear to create insurmountable difficulties for lawyers, courts, and juries. Often it is desirable to enable the prosecution to get to the [trier of fact] on something less than positive proof of a fact which may be almost solely within the knowledge of the defendant.... Thus, the prima facie evidence rule helps the prosecution to get its case to the [trier of fact] without necessarily meeting its burden of persuasion. This is consistent with modern rules of evidence. (Emphasis added.) With the advent of the HPC, this court was confronted with the distinction between legal presumptions, which improperly shifted the prosecution's burden of proof, and permissible inferences, which did not. In State v. Dwyer, 57 Haw. 526, 560 P.2d 110 (1977), this court reviewed a conviction of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument in violation of HRS § 708-857 (1985). [10] Pursuant to the statute, a person commits the offense of negotiating a worthless negotiable instrument if he or she intentionally issues or negotiates a negotiable instrument knowing that it will not be honored by the maker or drawee. HRS § 708-857(1). On appeal, the defendant asserted that the prosecution had failed to adduce substantial evidence that he had signed the check ( i.e., negotiable instrument) in question knowing that it would not be honored by his bank. Dwyer, 57 Haw. at 527, 560 P.2d at 111. The gravamen of the offense being the issuance of a check knowing at that time that it will not be honored, the prosecution ... had the burden of proving the existence of [the defendant's] knowledge on the day he signed and delivered the check to a third party. Id. at 527-28, 560 P.2d at 111. At trial, the prosecution had sought to discharge its burden by relying on HRS § 708-857(2)(b), which provides that: (1) when a check is dishonored due to lack of funds; (2) upon presentation within a reasonable time; (3) and the drawer fails to make the check good within ten days of receiving actual notice of dishonor; (4) the foregoing facts constitute prima facie evidence that the drawer knew when he or she issued the check that it would not be honored upon presentation. Id. at 528, 560 P.2d at 111-12. Having reviewed the record before it, the Dwyer court observed that [t]he facts required by the statute are present in this case, but aside from these facts and any inferences which may properly be drawn therefrom the record contains no direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge. Id. at 528, 560 P.2d at 112. Thus, the Dwyer court concluded that we are left with only the prima facie evidence provided by HRS § 708-857(2)(b) to support the conviction. Id. The Dwyer court therefore reversed the defendant's conviction based on the following analysis: Wigmore points out that the designation of certain facts as prima facie evidence of an ultimate fact may be viewed either as creating a presumption which shifts the burden of proof or as merely creating a permissible inference of fact. In the first sense[,] the statute imposes on the accused the burden of overcoming the presumption by evidence, in default of which the presumption requires that guilt be found. In the second sense, the trier of fact is permitted but not compelled to draw an inference of guilt from the circumstances which constitute a prima facie case, and it is for the trier of fact to determine whether a reasonable doubt of guilt exists despite the permitted inference, whether or not the accused has offered any evidence. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 1940). Also, see McCormick, Evidence § 342 (2d ed. 1972). We have held invalid a statutory presumption which requires the accused to disprove the existence of any element of the offense. State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971). It is apparent from the commentary to HRS § 701-117 that the draftsmen intended that the statute be read in the second sense, as permitting but not compelling the inference of guilt, and we conclude that it should be given this effect. . . . But a constitutional question still remains. The requirements of due process impose limitations on the power of the legislature to authorize inferences of fact to be drawn. For this purpose, it does not matter whether the statute treats the evidence as making out a prima facie case or as creating a presumption. Whichever characterization is used, the statute may authorize the inference only if there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the facts proven and the ultimate fact which the statute authorizes to be found. The constitutional validity of such a statutory rule of evidence is to be tested as follows: A statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed, if the inference of one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of a lack of connection between the two in common experience. ( Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 [63 S.Ct. 1241, 1245, 87 L.Ed. 1519] (1943)). Id. at 529-30, 560 P.2d at 112-13 (emphasis added) (some citations omitted). See also Bumanglag, 63 Haw. at 618, 634 P.2d at 94. This court revisited the legal presumption/permissible inference dichotomy in State v. Brighter, 61 Haw. 99, 595 P.2d 1072 (1979). Brighter was convicted of promoting a detrimental drug in the second degree. He appealed on the basis that the trial court had erroneously given a jury instruction (State's Requested Instruction No. 2) relating to the statutory inference set out in HRS § 712-1251(1) (1985), [11] which he contended had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense, thereby violating his due process right to be convicted only upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brighter, 61 Haw. at 100, 102, 595 P.2d at 1073, 1075. State's Requested Instruction No. 2, as given, advised the jury that [t]he presence of a detrimental drug in a motor vehicle, other than a public omnibus, is prima facie evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in the vehicle at the time the drug was found. Id. at 102 n. 6, 595 P.2d at 1075 n. 6. For reasons not relevant to our analysis, the Brighter court salvaged the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1251 by construing it narrowly and thus found no impropriety per se in the content of State's Requested Instruction No. 2 as given. Id. at 109-10, 595 P.2d at 1079. However, the following discussion regarding prima facie evidence and the character of permissive inferences is germane: The phrase prima facie evidence, defined in HRS § 701-117 ..., constitutes a permissive inference, thus permitting  but not compelling  the inference of guilt. In Dwyer, supra, this Court stated that a statute may authorize an inference only if there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the facts proven and the ultimate fact which the statute authorizes to be found. [Brighter] urges, however, that an inference may be sustained only where the fact inferred follows beyond a reasonable doubt from the fact proven. Absent such a relationship between the fact inferred and the fact proven, it cannot, [Brighter] asserts, be said that a defendant has been convicted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the offense. Although courts have acknowledged the ability of legislatures to provide that a jury may infer from one fact another fact essential to a finding of guilt, see Tot v. United States , 319 U.S. [at] 467 [63 S.Ct. at 1244]..., much debate has centered around the strength of the relationship which must exist between the fact proven and the fact inferred. In Tot v. United States, supra , the Supreme Court declared that a rational connection must exist between the fact proven and the fact inferred in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. This rational connection test was followed in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 [85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658] ... (1965), and in United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 [86 S.Ct. 279, 15 L.Ed.2d 210]... (1965). Later, in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 [89 S.Ct. 1532, 1548, 23 L.Ed.2d 57] ... (1969), the Supreme Court determined that a criminal statutory inference is unconstitutional unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. However, because the Court in Leary found the statute in question to be unconstitutional under the more likely than not standard, it went on to state that we need not reach the question whether a criminal presumption [inference] which passes muster when so judged must also satisfy the criminal reasonable doubt standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof depends upon its use. 395 U.S. at 36 n. 64 [89 S.Ct. at 1548 n. 64]. . . . In Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 [90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610] ... (1970), the Court utilized both the more likely than not and the reasonable doubt standards to assess the validity of four statutory inferences relating to possession of heroin and cocaine. In deciding that the inferences relating to heroin were valid under either standard, the Court ... refrained from expressing a preference for the use of one test over the other. Finally, in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 [93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380]. . . (1973), the Court again reserved judgment as to the determinative standard by which the validity of statutory inferences are to be assessed. After acknowledging that Gainey, Romano, Leary, and Turner fail to resolve the issue, the Court in Barnes merely concluded that if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process. 412 U.S. at 843 [93 S.Ct. at 2361-62].... . . . . ... [W]e find no need to resolve the question whether an inference satisfying the more likely than not requirement must also comply with the criminal reasonable doubt standard. . . . Id. at 103-05, 109, 595 P.2d at 1075-76, 1078 (citations, footnotes, and some internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis and some brackets in original). Notwithstanding that the Brighter court deemed State's Requested Instruction No. 2, as given, to set forth a legitimate permissible inference, it nevertheless expressly disapproved the giving of State's Requested Instruction No. 4, which provided that [p]rima facie evidence of a fact is evidence which if accepted in its entirety by the trier of fact, is sufficient to prove the fact, provided that no evidence negativing the fact, which raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact, is introduced. Id. at 110, 595 P.2d at 1079. Reversing Brighter's conviction, this court ruled that the giving of State's Requested Instruction No. 4 ... served to shift the burden of proof to [Brighter]. The instruction charged that proof of the underlying facts is sufficient to prove the fact of knowing possession, provided that no contrary evidence amounting to a reasonable doubt is introduced. Although the instruction faithfully tracked the language of HRS § 701-117 ..., we are not fully convinced that the jurors could not have been misled into thinking that they were required to find the element of knowing possession in the absence of defense evidence amounting to a reasonable doubt. In view of our holding that only permissive inferences may arise under HRS § 701-117 . . ., State v. Dwyer, supra , the jury should have been given a clarifying instruction to the effect that it could  but was not required to  find the element of knowing possession upon proof of the underlying facts. Accordingly we hold the giving of State's Requested Instruction No. 4 without such a clarifying instruction so infected the entire trial that [Brighter's] resulting conviction does not comport with due process. Id. at 111-12, 595 P.2d at 1079-80 (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). See also State v. Pimentel, 61 Haw. 308, 603 P.2d 141 (1979) (defendant deprived of due process when trial court gave instruction that shifted to defendant burden of proving lack of knowledge that substance was heroin, with result that prosecution was not required to prove every element of offense of promoting dangerous drug in second degree beyond reasonable doubt; instruction likewise deficient for failing clearly to indicate that any inference that could have been drawn was merely permissive).