Opinion ID: 1372750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Background and Procedural Posture

Text: Before their retirement, the Retiree Plaintiffs worked at the Point Pleasant Polyester Plant (the Plant) in Apple Grove, West Virginia. At that location, Plaintiff USW, or its predecessor union, bargained on behalf of the Plant's employees. The Plant has changed ownership several times, and M & G now owns the plant. In December 2006, M & G announced that it would begin requiring retirees to contribute to the cost of their health-care benefits. After Defendant M & G's announcement, Retiree Plaintiffs, as putative class representatives, and USW sued under § 301 of the LMRA and under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) §§ 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Following the district court's dismissal, the Plaintiffs appealed separately, with USW challenging the district court's ruling on § 301 and the Retiree Plaintiffs challenging the ruling on both § 301 and ERISA §§ 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(1)(B). The appeals were consolidated for submission to this Court. In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs pointed to language in the November 6, 2000 CBA between M & G and USW that governed retirees' entitlement to health-care benefits: Employees who retire on or after January 1, 1996 and who are eligible for and receiving a monthly pension under the 1993 Pension Plan ... whose full years of attained age and full years of attained continuous service ... at the time of retirement equals 95 or more points will receive a full Company contribution towards the cost of [health-care] benefits. ... Employees who have less than 95 points at the time of retirement will receive a reduced Company contribution. The Company contribution will be reduced by 2% for every point less than 95. Employees will be required to pay the balance of the health care contribution, as estimated by the Company annually in advance, for the [health care] benefits.... Failure to pay the required medical contribution will result in cancellation of coverage. (emphasis added). According to the Plaintiffs, this full Company contribution language shows a vested right to health-care benefits: those employees meeting the age and term-of-service qualifications are entitled to fully-covered health care benefits and those falling below these qualifications would receive reductions from full coverage as set out in the plan. The Retiree Plaintiffs also sought to represent surviving spouses whose benefits were affected by Defendants' alleged breach. The Plaintiffs said that the Defendants unilaterally set the contribution at a level below full coverage violating the above-quoted language. The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Defendants argued that, § 301, which confers subject-matter jurisdiction in federal district courts in [s]uits for violation of contracts, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), required that a plaintiff show a violation before a district court could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, the Defendants moved to dismiss saying that the language quoted by the Plaintiffs did not establish a vested right to health-care benefits. In moving to dismiss, the Defendants submitted evidence of several side letter agreements. Defendants said that these side letters were incorporated by reference into the CBA that the Plaintiffs sued under and that the side letters cap the amount of the employer's contribution to the cost of health-care benefits. Responding, the Plaintiffs said that these side cap letters were not part of the collective bargaining agreement that the Plaintiffs sued under. Resolution of this disputed issue, however, required consideration of materials extrinsic to the pleadings. [1] The Defendants said that the district court could consider this extrinsic material under Rule 12(b)(1) because the court found a lack of a violation, which was a jurisdictional prerequisite. The district court agreed with the Defendants and held that the showing of a collective bargaining agreement violation was a prerequisite to jurisdiction: Absent a breach by Defendants, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the § 301 claim. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, LLC., 523 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (S.D.Ohio 2007). The court then admitted and weighed the extrinsic evidence on the side letters to decide whether M & G breached the collective bargaining agreement. [2] Id., at 690. Ultimately, the district court concluded that the Defendants did not breach the CBA, and that it lacked jurisdiction. As an alternative to its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the district court then assumed for argument purposes that it had jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims for relief and addressed the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Because the LRMA § 301 and the ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claims both turned on whether the Plaintiffs' benefits were vested, the district court considered these claims together and held that the full Company contribution language did not plausibly state a claim for vested health-care benefits. The district court additionally granted the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion directed at the Plaintiffs' ERISA fiduciary claim, holding that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts supporting this claim. Id. at 696.