Opinion ID: 886164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Common Scheme

Text: ¶ 12 Under Rule 404(a), M.R.Evid., evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. The purpose of this rule is to prevent convictions that are merely based on a jury finding that someone has a propensity to do certain things. Sweeney, ¶ 35. The rule furthers the purpose to inform the defendant of the charges against him, Just, 184 Mont. at 273, 602 P.2d at 963; prevents convictions based on finding the defendant is a bad person, State v. Tiedemann (1961), 139 Mont. 237, 242, 362 P.2d 529, 531; and prevents convictions for one crime based on evidence of another, Matt, 249 Mont. at 143, 814 P.2d at 56 (requiring jury instruction to emphasize that the defendant is not being tried and may not be convicted for any offense except that charged); see also State v. Sanders (1971), 158 Mont. 113, 119, 489 P.2d 371, 374. Further, in order to uphold the intent of the rule, exceptions to this rule must be clearly justified and carefully limited. Sweeney, ¶ 16. ¶ 13 Exceptions are allowed by Rule 404, M.R.Evid., when character is in issue or when past acts that may have character implications nonetheless serve as independent proof of a material issue. Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid., allows admission when other crimes, wrongs or acts prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or, as discussed here, when other crimes prove defendant's plan. ¶ 14 Plan, though referred to in Rule 404(b), is not a defined term of art in the context of Title 45. Notwithstanding, a plan is nothing more than a method for achieving an end. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 889 (10th ed.1997). This definition of plan is encompassed within the definition of common scheme under § 45-2-101(7), MCA. Under § 45-2-101(7), MCA, common scheme is defined as: a series of acts or omissions motivated by a purpose to accomplish a single criminal objective or by a common purpose or plan that results in the repeated commission of the same offense or that affects the same person or the same persons or the property of the same person or persons. [1] ¶ 15 While we usually discuss the statutory definition of common scheme in cases involving theft or forgery where the charging information specifically cites the statute, for Rule 404(b) purposes, our prior case law, nonetheless, typically uses the phrase common scheme in conjunction with and interchangeably with the word plan. See for example State v. Rogers, 1999 MT 305, ¶ 39, 297 Mont. 188, ¶ 39, 992 P.2d 229, ¶ 39. ¶ 16 Accordingly, where the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs or acts is at issue under Rule 404(b), we now hold that, in the context of criminal cases and for purposes of the Just/Matt test, plan and common scheme are synonymous. ¶ 17 Whether there is a common scheme involves a case by case analysis of the defendant's actions. Rogers, ¶ 39. Turning, then, to the statutory definition, the evidence of the prior crimes admitted under the Just rule in this case did not involve the same person or the same persons or the property of the same person or persons. Aakre's prior offenseinvolving two other stepdaughtersdid not involve the same person or persons in the current charge, namely, A.S. See Just, 184 Mont. at 269, 602 P.2d at 961 (prior acts involved the same victim); State v. Medina (1990), 245 Mont. 25, 31, 798 P.2d 1032, 1036 overruled on other grounds by State v. Olson (1997), 286 Mont. 364, 951 P.2d 571; State v. Gilpin (1988), 232 Mont. 56, 756 P.2d 445; see also State v. Henderson (1996), 278 Mont. 376, 382, 925 P.2d 475, 479 (father manipulating sons to perform sexual acts with daughter was evidence of common scheme in father's trial of sexual intercourse without consent against daughter); State v. Murray (1987), 228 Mont. 125, 134, 741 P.2d 759, 764-65 (prior disciplinary acts of mother against daughter in trial of beating death were admissible as common scheme). ¶ 18 Further, the evidence of the prior crimes admitted in the case at bar did not prove that Aakre was motivated by a purpose to accomplish a single criminal objective. This part of the common scheme definition contemplates the demonstration of an overall plan with interrelated or sequential crimes that require overlapping proof and where commission of one crime depends on the commission of another. See State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 23-24, 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 23-24, 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 23-24 (counts of kidnaping, burglary, theft, and sexual intercourse without consent were part of a common scheme); State v. Davis (1992), 253 Mont. 50, 59, 830 P.2d 1309, 1315-16 (tampering with evidence from another crime during investigation of sexual assault made proof overlap on tampering charge, so other crime was admissible); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve the Dispute over the Meaning of the Term Plan in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. Kan. L.Rev. 1005 (discussing interpretations of the word plan in Rule 404(b), Fed.R.Evid.) (hereinafter Imwinkelried). Here, the other crimes evidence did not show that Aakre's commission of the current charge was part of an overall plan involving interrelated or sequential crimes that require overlapping proof or where the commission of one crime depends on the commission of another. ¶ 19 Rather, under the definition of common scheme applicable here, it was the burden of the State to show that the other crimes evidence went to prove that Aakre was motivated by a common purpose or plan that results in the repeated commission of the same offense. ¶ 20 With regard to this part of the statutory definition of common scheme, we have held that a common scheme exists where a defendant employs distinctive or idiosyncratic methods to lure victims into vulnerable positions that enable sexual assault. See State v. Martin (1996), 279 Mont. 185, 195, 926 P.2d 1380, 1386-87 (defendant asked each minor victim to help with work at his cabin, gave each victim excessive alcohol); State v. Brooks (1993), 260 Mont. 79, 81, 857 P.2d 734, 735 (systematic plan to entertain boys in recreational pool setting in which they feel comfortable while basically unclothed, then catching them off-guard with sexual assault constituted common scheme); State v. Norris (1984), 212 Mont. 427, 431-32, 689 P.2d 243, 245 (luring victims to motel by asking them to babysit his kids, then sexually assaulting them established common scheme); State v. Jensen (1969), 153 Mont. 233, 238-39, 455 P.2d 631, 634 (testimony of twelve other witnesses concerning sexual advances of defendant was properly admitted because it established three year continuous pattern in which chiropractor sexually assaulted patients in his office); see also State v. Powers (1982), 198 Mont. 289, 299, 645 P.2d 1357, 1363 (unusually harsh discipline by other church members against other children is admissible to show common design of punishment policy of the church); State v. Riley (1982), 199 Mont. 413, 426, 649 P.2d 1273, 1280. ¶ 21 This distinctive methods application of the common scheme or plan definition is essentially the same as the test we articulated under Sweeney for the admission of other crimes to prove identity. Sweeney, ¶ 31 (other crime or act must be sufficiently distinctive to warrant an inference that the person who committed the act also committed the offense at issue.) ¶ 22 In other cases discussing common scheme, we have held that similarity between the prior crime and the alleged crime on trial is sufficient for admissibility, especially in the context of sex crimes. State v. Tecca (1986), 220 Mont. 168, 173, 714 P.2d 136, 139 (nine years of continuous molestation of various minor girls in the same household, which ceased only during the years defendant was away in the military, was evidence of common scheme and therefore admissible at trial involving only one of the victims); State v. Wurtz (1981), 195 Mont. 226, 236, 636 P.2d 246, 251 (driving by women and calling obscenities and threats to them showed a common scheme to achieve intended result of intimidation) overruled on other grounds by State v. Lance (1986), 222 Mont. 92, 721 P.2d 1258; State v. Eiler (1988), 234 Mont. 38, 50, 762 P.2d 210, 217-18 (common scheme shown by tendency to have sexual interest in and parental control over young girls; prior act of defendant against previous stepdaughter was held admissible); State v. Gambrel (1990), 246 Mont. 84, 90, 803 P.2d 1071, 1075 (prior acts of defendant against three other live-in partners over four years showed that after he had been drinking, his course of conduct included death threats, sexual assaults and beatings, which showed a common scheme with murder of victim in case at trial); State v. Long (1986), 223 Mont. 502, 507, 726 P.2d 1364, 1367 (due to subtle nature of child abuse, evidence of prior act of rubbing minor's bottom is similar enough to alleged acts of pulling down pants of other minors and touching their vaginas to justify its admission as common scheme); see also cases with similar facts where common scheme was not discussed; State v. McKnight (1991), 250 Mont. 457, 463-64, 820 P.2d 1279, 1283 (although defendant asserted merely similar acts of sexual advances on other children could not constitute common scheme, Court did not discuss common scheme and held prior acts were admissible as evidence of motive or intent prior to the holding in Sweeney ); Whitlow, 285 Mont. 430, 949 P.2d 239; Sweeney, ¶ 7, 15; State v. Crist (1992), 253 Mont. 442, 446, 833 P.2d 1052, 1055. ¶ 23 In contrast, we have also held that mere similarity is insufficient to show common scheme. See Rogers, ¶ 41 (defendant's acts of sexual aggression following barroom encounters are dictated by his character and the situation at hand; they do not reflect a systematic plan); State v. Hansen (1980), 187 Mont. 91, 98, 608 P.2d 1083, 1087 (barroom pickups, powered by the urge, and consummated in automobiles, are too common to show scheme); State v. Sauter (1951), 125 Mont. 109, 112, 232 P.2d 731, 732; State v. Adams (1980), 190 Mont. 233, 236, 620 P.2d 856, 858 (two similar thefts of coins from jukeboxes were not part of a common scheme because the offenses were linked by similarity and nothing more). ¶ 24 As part of this discussion, it is worth noting that prior to our adoption of the current Just/Matt rule, we addressed other crimes evidence in the context of common scheme or plan in State v. Merritt (1960), 138 Mont. 546, 357 P.2d 683. In that case, we stated: Thus in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 688, p. 1109, et seq., it is said: As a general rule, evidence of other crimes than that charged is competent when it tends to establish a common scheme, plan, system, design, or course of conduct, at least where such other crimes are similar to, and closely connected with, the one charged, and were committed at about the same time or at a time not too remote. Another statement is that evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove the crime charged when it tends to establish a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related that proof of one tends to establish the other or others. Merritt, 138 Mont. at 548-49, 357 P.2d at 684. ¶ 25 This discussion illustrates that the first two elements of the modified Just rulei.e., similarity of crimes and nearness in time between the crimeswere, prior to the adoption of our current rule, considered part and parcel of the determination of whether a common scheme existed. In other words, in the context of determining whether there existed a common scheme or plan for the purpose of other crimes evidence prior to the adoption of Rule 404(b), it was necessary to consider similarity and nearness in time together rather than as independent elements. See Jensen, 153 Mont. at 239, 455 P.2d at 634 (citing Merritt ). Merritt has never been overruled and remains good law. ¶ 26 While remoteness in time is a separate prong under the current modified Just rule, Merritt demonstrates that where common scheme or plan is at issue, it is necessary to consider the similarity of crimes and nearness in time between the crimes as part and parcel of the analysis. Indeed, for Rule 404(b) purposes we conclude that proof of mere similarity of crimes is insufficient, on a stand alone basis, to demonstrate a common purpose or plan that results in the repeated commission of the same offense. Rather, application of this definition of common scheme also requires showing that the crimes occurred within a time frame that supports the conclusion that the similar offenses were committed to achieve a common purpose or plan related to the commission of the current charge. To conclude otherwise would allow a common scheme to be proven by the simple expedient of aggregating similar criminal acts without regard to the time frame within which those acts occurred and without regard to whether those acts were actually part of a common purpose or plan to commit the offense at issue. In short, the limited purpose for allowing common scheme evidence under Rule 404(b) would be effectively nullified. ¶ 27 Indeed, we have previously considered the time element crucial to common scheme analysis. For example, we held that writing almost 200 bad checks over a period of a year and half constituted common scheme in part because acts which closely follow one another evidenc[e] a continuing criminal design. State v. Fleming (1987), 225 Mont. 48, 51, 730 P.2d 1178, 1180; see also State v. McHugh (1985), 215 Mont. 296, 301, 697 P.2d 466, 470. ¶ 28 Furthermore, considering nearness in time as a part of common scheme is consistent with the overall purpose of Rule 404, M.R.Evid.to prevent the admission of other crimes simply to show a defendant's character and action in conformity with that character. See State v. Ray (1994), 267 Mont. 128, 132-34, 882 P.2d 1013, 1015-16 (prior sexual assault 16 years earlier was too remote to the charged conduct and consequently unjustly prejudicial to defendant). ¶ 29 Notwithstanding that the cases cited in ¶ 22 did not factor time frame analysis into common scheme or plan, we now make that a requirement in this and future cases. ¶ 30 Turning then to the case at bar, here the District Court found that the other crimes evidence was not too remote in time under the second prong of the Just rule because Aakre supposedly did not have an opportunity between his two marriages to sexually assault a stepchild. We disagree with the trial court's determination in the following respect. We conclude that the 16 year time span between Aakre's prior acts and the offenses on trial were simply too remote to constitute a common scheme or plan such that Aakre's acts resulted in the repeated commission of the same offense. There was no demonstration by the State that Aakre's conduct 16 years ago was committed as part of a common purpose or plan to commit the charged offenses. Aakre's conduct then and now may be similar, but that, on a stand alone basis, does not prove a common scheme or plan in the legal sense where 16 years separates the prior acts from the current charges. ¶ 31 Like the arguments in Sweeney, the State's argument here boils down to one that Aakre is a sexual predator and that Aakre's acts of sexual aggression are dictated by his character and the situation at hand. That may well be true, but Rule 404(a) requires that Aakre be convicted of the crimes with which he is charged on the basis of evidence that proves more than simply his bad character. More to the point, on the facts here, Rule 404(b), specifically common scheme or plan, does not provide the exception to Rule 404(a) which the State seeks. [2] ¶ 32 Finally, in the majority opinion in In re C.R.O., 2002 MT 50, 309 Mont. 48, 43 P.3d 913, the author, Justice Rice, makes an observation that is applicable to his dissent in the case at bar: The dissent[ ] offer[s] arguments which tug at the heart, but miss[es] the law. C.R.O., ¶ 23. ¶ 33 The dissent contends that the majority has not cited authority for equating the terms plan and common scheme. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Court's opinion do precisely that. To the contrary, it is the dissent that fails to provide authority for the conclusion that `plan' is different and narrower than `common scheme.' ¶ 34 Furthermore, rather than emasculating Rule 404(b) as the dissent suggests (again without analysis or reference to any particular cases), Sweeney and our Opinion here attempt to honor the plain language and intended historical purposes of the Rule. These purposes include protecting the presumption of innocence; limiting the trial evidence to the act alleged; fostering efficiency at trial by avoiding mini-trials on the uncharged conduct, see Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 185-86; and, preventing the admission of uncharged conduct as circumstantial proof of charged conduct except where the uncharged conduct possesses independent or special probative value relevant to a non-character theory. Imwinkelried, at 1007. More simply, read together, Rules 404(a) and (b) prohibit the prosecutor from urging the jury to reason simplistically, `He did it once; therefore, he did it again.' Imwinkelried, at 1006. ¶ 35 Worse, the dissent's preference for enlarging the use of other crimes evidence under the guise of plan runs directly counter to the Rule's intended purpose and historical application that the dissent seemingly seeks to preserve. As noted by Professors Mendez and Imwinkelried: In recent years, the plan doctrine has proven to be one of the most controversial theories for admitting uncharged misconduct. Some critics have charged that by irresponsibly invoking the theory without careful analysis, many courts have converted plan into a euphemism for bad character, and have allowed the theory to degenerate into a dumping ground for inadmissible bad character evidence. Miguel A. Mendez and Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court's About Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LOY. L.A. L.REV. 473, 478-79. ¶ 36 There is no legitimate reason for this Court to travel a similar route, as suggested by the dissent. If other crimes, wrongs or acts are to be admitted as proof of the common scheme or plan at issue, then the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that the prior crimes, wrongs or acts were, in fact, part and parcel of the accused's common purpose or plan to commit the current charge. Put another way, the government must prove that the prior crimes, wrongs or acts and the charged offense are linked as integral components of the defendant's common purpose or plan to commit the current charge. ¶ 37 Indeed, to hold otherwise allows the plan exception of Rule 404(b) to swallow the general rule expressed in Rule 404(a) and exposes the accused to the very real likelihood that the jury will determine guilt, not on the basis of the State's evidence of the current offense, but, rather, on the basis of the jury's belief that the defendant's past character is an accurate predictor of his present conduct. This, historically, was precisely what Rule 404(b) was adopted to prevent. ¶ 38 We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Aakre's motion for a new trial and, accordingly, affirm as to this issue.