Opinion ID: 1959182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voir Dire Inquiry on Racial Prejudice

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court limited inquiry into potential jurors' racial attitudes to a single oblique question that failed to reveal prejudice. That ruling, defendant maintains, interfered with the intelligent exercise of excusals for cause and peremptory challenges and created an impermissible risk that racial prejudice infected the proceedings. The voir dire procedure in this case developed as follows. First, the trial court read the indictment and briefly instructed the venire panels regarding the law and procedures in a death penalty case. The venirepersons then completed a written questionnaire that covered a broad range of general topics such as their residential, marital and employment history, and prior exposure to the criminal process. The court, the prosecution, and the defense counsel then asked supplemental questions. The court substantially used defense counsel's previously proposed questionnaire and list of questions. One such proposed question was: Do you know of any reason, such as prejudice, bias, or other opinion, that you can think of that would prevent you from serving as a completely impartial juror in this case? Although the court posed the above question to several of the first venirepersons, it soon modified the question. The question became: Do you have any feelings within you that would prevent you from being a fair and impartial juror in this case? Prosecution and defense counsel were afforded substantial freedom in terms of degree and subject matter of direct questioning. Although much of the defense counsel's questioning focused on death qualification, the attorney was given free rein to delve into the potential jurors' racial attitudes. Defense counsel does not deny that he was unhampered in his questioning about racial prejudice or that he made no objection to the court's modification of his proposed question. Nonetheless, the defense claims the ultimate responsibility for the virtual absence of inquiry into this area remains with the trial court. Thus defense counsel asserts that the trial court was required to ask more pointed questions about racial prejudice so that he would be put on notice of the need for follow-up on this issue. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have addressed the issue of voir dire on racial prejudice. The Supreme Court has held that the federal constitution mandates an inquiry into racial prejudice of prospective jurors only in cases in which racial issues are woven into the very fabric of the case and trial. In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed. 2d 46 (1973), an African-American civil-rights activist claimed that white law-enforcement officers had framed him in retaliation for his political activities. The Court held that when an African-American requests an inquiry into the racial prejudices of potential jurors, the request should be granted. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates such an inquiry when racial prejudice threatens to infect trial proceedings. The Court refused to encroach, however, on a trial court's discretion in conducting such an inquiry or the number of questions on the subject of racial prejudice necessary to effectuate the goal of a trial free of racial bias. The Supreme Court elaborated on its brief holding in Ham in subsequent cases. In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed. 2d 258 (1976), the Court upheld the trial court's refusal to inquire, during voir dire, into the racial attitudes of prospective jurors. The Court explained that Ham had not ordered trial courts to inquire into racial attitudes any time that a minority defendant requests it. Instead, due process mandates an inquiry only when [r]acial issues [] were inextrically bound up with the conduct of the trial. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at 597, 96 S.Ct. at 1021, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 264. The mere fact that the defendant in Ross was of a different race from that of his victim, did not prove that the trial would involve issues of racial prejudice. Id. at 598, 96 S.Ct. at 1022, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 265. Similarly, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed. 2d 22 (1981), a Mexican-American was tried in federal court for importing illegal aliens. The trial court asked prospective jurors whether they had any feelings about aliens or had other reasons that could prevent them from being fair and impartial. The trial court denied defense counsel's requests for more specific questions concerning racial or ethnic prejudice. The Court upheld the trial court's denial on the ground that the federal constitution requires trial courts to grant requests for voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice only where there is substantial indication that racial or ethnic prejudice will play a role in the case. 451 U.S. at 189, 101 S.Ct. at 1637, 68 L.Ed. 2d at 29. More recently, in Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed. 2d 27 (1986), a majority of the Court agreed to overturn a death sentence based on the trial court's refusal to ask prospective jurors about their racial attitudes. The Court held that a defendant in a capital case involving an interracial crime was constitutionally entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and to be questioned on racial bias. Id. at 36-7, 106 S.Ct. at 1688-89, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 37. A plurality of the Court expressed the view that the fact that the crime charged involved interracial violence does not alone entitle a defendant to have prospective jurors questioned about racial bias. What tilted the scale in that instance was the broad discretion given the jury in a death penalty hearing and the grave consequences of improper sentencing in a capital case. The Court, however, stated that a defendant may not complain about the trial court's failure to inquire about racial bias unless the defendant requested such an inquiry. Id. at 37, 106 S.Ct. at 1689, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 37. This Court has also considered the extent to which a defendant is entitled to an inquiry into racial bias of the prospective jurors. Even in cases with no interracial crime or obvious racial overtones, this Court has stated that it prefers a searching inquiry into racial bias, if so requested by defendant. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 247-48, 524 A. 2d 188. In State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988), we explained that even in cases in which there are no obvious racial issues, a voir dire that includes an inquiry into racial bias may sometimes be appropriate: Racial prejudice may be either blatant and easy to detect or subtle and therefore more difficult to discern. A probing voir dire that elicits more than a yes or no response will aid the trial court in excusing prospective jurors for cause and will assist the defense in exercising its preemptory challenges. When the defendant is a member of a cognizable minority group, a more searching voir dire should be conducted, if requested. [ Id. at 428, 550 A. 2d 1172.] Our view of the voir dire process acknowledges the fact that jurors may be racially or ethnically biased against the defendant, even in the absence of an explicitly racially divisive factual situation. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 247, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). (We are sensitive to the reality of racial prejudice, and to the possibility that jurors may prejudge a defendant because of his or her race, even in the absence of an interracial crime.) We have recommended that trial courts inquire into racial bias whenever defendant requests it, but have also recognized the broad discretion trial courts should have to determine the voir dire process in ambiguous situations. Based on this review of the relevant law, we reject defendant's challenge to the voir dire procedure. The crime at issue was not of an interracial nature. It concerned an African-American defendant and African-American victims. The trial court allowed an expanded voir dire into the issue of racial bias. Defense counsel informed the Court that he would deal with the issue of racial attitudes directly and was unhampered by the Court in doing so. The trial court asked the jurors whether they knew of any reason (sometimes the court specified the reason as prejudice or bias) that would prevent them from serving as completely impartial jurors in the case. Defense counsel made no objection to that modified question. After the court had asked the jurors that question, it allowed defense counsel full freedom to inquire into the jurors' racial beliefs. Because the trial court permitted defense counsel's full and unrestricted inquiry, sufficient to unearth any relevant racial bias that could have compromised the integrity of the trial proceedings, we find that the trial court's voir dire procedure did not deprive defendant of an impartial jury or a fair trial.