Opinion ID: 1166357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard of Review in District Court.

Text: The majority holds that the prosecutor had cause to bring a second criminal complaint against Stockwell based upon his good faith belief that the magistrate erred and his self-serving statement that he was not magistrate-shopping. It can be conceded that many are the Idaho prosecutors who have entertained the good faith belief that a magistrate has erred in reducing a criminal complaint from murder to manslaughter. It might equally be noted that many are the prosecutors who have entertained the good faith belief that a district court has erred in granting a defendant's motion for directed verdict or in meting out unduly lenient sentences. But while good faith on the part of the prosecutor is necessary, [7] it by no means follows that that high quality alone justifies a prosecutor's motion to overturn the magistrate's determination. On the contrary, the standard which has long governed district court review of magistrate commitment orders in Idaho reads as follows: A wide discretion must be given to a committing magistrate in binding over, and in order to vacate and nullify his action in this regard, it must be shown that such action was a plain case of abuse of discretion. (Emphasis added.) State v. Layman, 22 Idaho 387, 390, 125 P. 1042 (1922). And see, State v. O'Mealey, supra, 95 Idaho at 204; In re Levy, 8 Idaho 53, 66 P. 806 (1901). In short, the Idaho magistrate is given wide discretion in his decision to bind over; his is the determination as to what offense has been committed. The prosecutor who claims an abuse of magistrate discretion must state in writing his reasons for challenging that decision; his is the burden of showing that there has been a plain abuse of discretion. The prosecutor's reasons, along with the record which was before the magistrate, form the basis of district court review. District court review, under I.C. § 19-3504, is limited to a determination as to whether or not the magistrate has plainly abused his discretion. The same standard of review has been elaborated in detail by the Michigan Supreme Court in the recent, well-reasoned case of Genesee County Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 215 N.W.2d 145 (1974). Michigan retains a prosecutorial right of nolle prosequi, and with that context in mind, the state's highest court has instructed its district courts that they must review, ... the action of the magistrate and prosecuting attorney on the record  the record made before the magistrate at the preliminary examination, and the prosecutor's statement of reasons and `the evidence filed in the case.' Such review is a judicial review, searching the record to determine whether the magistrate's or prosecutor's decision is in accord with the law, facts and reasons of the matter... . [A district judge] ... may reverse a magistrate's decision only for abuse of discretion. He may not properly substitute his judgment for that of the magistrate or prosecuting attorney as if he were reviewing the magistrate's decision de novo or acting in a supervisory capacity with respect to the prosecuting attorney. He may reverse or revise their decisions only if it appears on the record that they have abused the power confided in them. 215 N.W.2d at 147. In this case, not only was this standard of review not met, but in essence there was no review at all. The magistrate's commitment order was filed at 2:00 o'clock p.m. on October 30, 1975, several hours after the preliminary hearing was held. Even before the order was filed, however, the prosecutor, together with a Pocatello police officer, went to the office of the district judge with a Motion to Dismiss. Judge Hargraves, as he later stated in the habeas action, expressed misgivings and asked if the prosecutor had legal authority to proceed in this manner. He suggested that the prosecutor research the matter and that if he then still wished the Order signed, he would be accommodated. Later that same afternoon, between 4:30 and 4:45, the prosecutor telephoned the court and said that he did want the Order signed and handed to the clerk for filing. This was done, the Order was filed at 5:02 p.m., and Stockwell was served with a new complaint charging him with second degree murder. The prosecutor failed to make any showing to challenge the outcome of the proceedings in magistrate's court. Contrary to what the casual reader would glean from the majority's hindsight scrutiny of the preliminary hearing transcript, no record of the proceedings in magistrate court was given to Judge Hargraves. In fact no record was available. The hearing, if such it could be called, was held in the absence of the only other party likely to give a balanced account of what had transpired. The district judge did not consider, let alone determine, whether the magistrate had abused his discretion because, as the record shows, it was not even alleged that the magistrate had abused his discretion. Indeed, the prosecutor himself stated that, ... after we had rested, I had asked the court for permission to reopen if he felt that additional evidence was necessary, and of course it was within his discretion to deny me that opportunity. To grant a dismissal, under such circumstances, makes a nullity of the Idaho Constitutional protections. It justifies the cynicism of those members of the Constitutional Convention who predicted that the constitutional protections would come to naught because with most magistrates it seems that the dictum of the district attorney is the end of the law. State v. McGreevey, supra, 17 Idaho at 458, 66 P. 806. Such conduct is unacceptable in magistrate court. It is even less acceptable on appeal in district court. District court review in a case such as this must be under the statute; a dismissal should be granted only if the record shows a plain abuse of discretion on the part of the examining magistrate. Here, there was only the bare oral assertion by the prosecutor that we had felt we had put on ample evidence to bind the defendant over as charged, and the request for permission to reopen in order to produce additional testimony. The district judge's evaluation of such a request, belatedly announced at the habeas corpus hearing, is the response he should have made at the earlier dismissal hearing: A person charged with Murder in the Second Degree is, in the words of the southern sheriff, `in a heap of trouble.' Homicide, in any form, is very serious business. This Court, at least, believes a prosecuting attorney, presenting evidence at a preliminary hearing involving homicide in any degree must go into court with a fully loaded gun. He is under a duty to those he represents to present the best and most persuasive evidence he has. He may not withhold evidence in the vain hope the magistrate may guess or through Divinity or extra-sensory perception know what additional evidence the prosecutor may have available. In accordance with the law the magistrate must make his finding based upon SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; not upon speculation or conjecture. A prosecutor, of course, is not obliged to show his whole case at the preliminary hearing. Neither can he be coy and withhold evidence, in hope of later tactical advantage, if such evidence is necessary to convince the magistrate that a suspect should be bound over on the highest offense charged. See, Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). To allow a dismissal and refiling every time the prosecutor miscalculates the quantum of evidence needed to gain the desired commitment, as Judge Hargraves later ruled, ... would not only do violence to the due process rights of this Petitioner but would establish a very dangerous precedent which could adversely affect numerous other persons charged with crime. If the prosecutor could do this once, why not twice, ten times, or innumerable times? Conceivably a defendant could spend months in jail, not being able to make bond, and remaining always at the preliminary hearing stage with never a hope for an early trial on the merits of the case, unless the prosecutor happened upon a magistrate who would not `have in mind doing something different than what [the prosecutor] wanted done.' The criterion is not what the prosecutor wants done but rather what should be done by an impartial, neutral tribunal based upon substantial evidence. The magistrate is not expected to be a rubber stamping puppet either for the prosecutor or for the defendant. (Emphasis added.) Had the district judge used this criterion when dismissal was requested by the prosecutor, he would not have granted the motion to dismiss, and this case would long ago have ended in a plea, or gone to trial. To his credit, Judge Hargraves tacitly admitted at the habeas proceeding that he had erred in granting an ex parte dismissal of the first action in violation of Stockwell's due process rights and in violation of his own obligation to accord wide discretion to the committing magistrate and to reverse that determination only when it was shown to be a plain case of abuse of discretion. State v. Layman, supra . After such a candid admission by the district judge regarding the inadequacy of his own decision, it is strange indeed to find this Court sua sponte shoring up that decision by references to a record which was not available to the district judge. Once it is demonstrated that the district court failed to make the review mandated by this state's constitution, statutes and case law, this Court's review should be at an end. Our task, after all, is to review the decision the district judge actually made, not one he might have made had he been presented with a proper motion and a full record.