Opinion ID: 432005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: References to Organized Crime

Text: 18 Gigante contends in general and in two specific instances that he was prejudiced by the government's references at trial to Gigante's alleged ties to organized crime. He claims that immediately after a side-bar conference, during which he asserts that the trial court limited the admissibility of references to organized crime, the prosecutor deliberately asked the following leading and loaded question (Gigante Brief on appeal at 31): Now did there come a time when you met this loanshark connected to organized crime, Mario? Gigante's attorney objected to the form of the question, the objection was sustained, and the prosecutor rephrased the question to omit the term loanshark and the reference to organized crime. On the following day the court instructed the jury that evidence that Vodola had told Sirabella that certain persons were members of organized crime was received in evidence not to prove that those persons were in fact members of organized crime but only to show (a) Vodola's intent in his dealings with Sirabella and (b) Sirabella's state of mind. This instruction was plainly correct. 19 Section 892(b)(3), concerning the making of extortionate extensions of credit, specifically contemplates that the trial court may admit evidence that [a]t the time the extension of credit was made, the debtor reasonably believed either (1) that his creditor had collected or attempted to collect extensions of credit by extortionate means or had punished nonpayment by extortionate means, or (2) that the creditor had a reputation for using extortionate means to collect extensions of credit or to punish nonpayment. Evidence that the debtor believed the loanshark was connected to organized crime is admissible to show the debtor's belief that the loanshark would use, or had a reputation for using, extortionate means to collect extensions of credit. E.g., United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 435, 62 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979); United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1405 (2d Cir.1972). 20 Given the court's proper instruction as to the purpose for which the organized crime references could be used, and given the context of the question to Sirabella, we see no prejudice to Gigante from such references. The form of the question was successfully challenged. The substance of the question was closely related to the prior--unobjected to--testimony of Sirabella to the effect that Vodola had told him that a man named Mario who was connected to organized crime would lend Sirabella money. The record does not support Gigante's contention that the substance of such a question had been barred by the court during the side-bar conference. And any possible adverse effect from the improper form of the stricken question was dispelled by the court's curative instruction. 21 Nor do we find any merit in Gigante's contention that the prosecutor's summation was unfairly prejudicial because it referred to Sirabella's knowledge that Gigante was connected to organized crime, and thus suggested that Gigante was in fact a member of organized crime, rather than referring more properly to Sirabella's belief or state of mind. The trial court found that, given its limiting instruction on use of references to organized crime, the jury would understand that the prosecutor was referring to Sirabella's state of mind. Having reviewed the court's instructions and the prosecutor's remarks in context, we conclude that the trial court's evaluation was not incorrect and that no error occurred. 22