Opinion ID: 526041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the admissibility of petitioner's statement in the

Text: PROSECUTOR'S CASE IN CHIEF 48 We think that the issue presented by the admission of petitioner's statement is essentially the same as those addressed in cases defining the boundaries for prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. These decisions control the issue despite several distinguishing facts in the instant case. Although the statement at issue in this case came in through police testimony and not through a comment by the prosecution, it is nonetheless evidence that came before the jury through the efforts and design of the prosecution. And while the trooper's testimony does not relate to a failure to testify or to post-Miranda silence, the disclosure of the words petitioner used to claim his privilege results in the same dilemma addressed in the comment cases: how to accommodate a search for the truth without undermining the purpose of the fifth amendment. 49 The broad rule of law we take from the line of cases beginning with Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926), is that where a defendant does not testify at trial it is impermissible to refer to any fifth amendment rights that defendant has exercised. Raffel involved a second trial. The question was: Was it error to require the defendant, Raffel, offering himself as a witness upon the second trial, to disclose that he had not testified as a witness in his own behalf upon the first trial. Id. at 496, 46 S.Ct. at 567. The Court held that since a defendant takes the stand, he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-examined as to the facts in issue. Id. at 497, 46 S.Ct. at 567-68. The Court concluded by stating: The safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who do not wish to become witnesses in their own behalf and not for those who do. Id. at 499, 46 S.Ct. at 568. 50 In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), it was held that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. 51 This circuit has been vigilant in enforcing this rule. See United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 535-40 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 45 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 745-46 (1st Cir.1985); Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225, 226-27 (1st Cir.1965). 52 The Court held in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), that a statement made by defendant to police that was inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief because of lack of procedural safeguards required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), could be used on cross-examination to impeach defendant's credibility. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated: Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Id. 401 U.S. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 645. 53 The next case is one which the New Hampshire Supreme Court referred to in its opinion, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Doyle proscribed the use of defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach on cross-examination his exculpatory story told for the first time at trial. The Court concluded that use of the defendant's post-arrest silence in this manner violates due process.... Id. at 611, 96 S.Ct. at 2241. Doyle, strictly speaking, does not directly involve the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We include it because it has some bearing on the issue before us and because of the New Hampshire court's reference to it, and its partial quote from the sentence: Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested. Id. at 617, 96 S.Ct. at 2244 (emphasis added). 54 We have already discussed Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, and only repeat the holding: We hold that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 240, 100 S.Ct. at 2126 (emphasis added). Even if the word silence is construed to mean a spoken invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, which was not at all involved in the case, Jenkins speaks only to the use of prearrest silence for impeachment. 55 We have found no cases by the United States Supreme Court holding or suggesting that a prearrest statement by a suspect during police interrogation that he is not going to confess can be used by the prosecutor in his case in chief. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has cited no cases standing for the proposition that prearrest silence or an invocation of the privilege can be used by the prosecutor in his case in chief. 56 In the case at bar, petitioner stated that he was not going to confess. He followed this with a statement that he would not answer any questions without a lawyer present. He did not later take the stand and offer an exculpatory story which his statement would impeach. Petitioner relied on the protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment from the first police interrogation through trial. Petitioner's constitutional rights were violated by the use of his statement in the prosecutor's case in chief. The next and final issue is whether the use of the statement was harmless error.HARMLESS ERROR 57 Our harmless error analysis is made in accord with the teachings of the Court: Since Chapman, [Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ] the Court has consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations, see, e.g., Brown, supra, [411 U.S. 223] at 230-232, [93 S.Ct. 1565, 1569-1570, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973) ]; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). 58 We summarize the evidence. The victim was unable to make a courtroom identification of petitioner because it was too dark, and I didn't have any glasses on. She gave the following description of her assailant: he was a lean man about five foot five in height; he was not Anglo-Saxon, maybe Puerto Rican or French or something; his hair was thick, dark and curly; he had about a day's growth of beard on his face; I believe he had a mustache; he had hair on his chest; his hands felt unclean; he was wearing a poplin-type jacket and as he left it sounded as if he had on heavy leather boots; there was a smell of cigarettes and alcohol on his breath. 59 A friend of petitioner's and a police officer who spoke with petitioner the night of the crime testified that this description fit petitioner. 60 The police officer also noticed what appeared to be a new Band-Aid on petitioner's left index finger. When asked about it, petitioner said that he had cut his hand earlier working on his car. The officer also observed that petitioner's hands were clean but with a grease residue. 61 The victim testified that she saw a small dark-colored car parked across the street from her house. It was a moonlit night. Petitioner left Manchester at about 11:15 p.m. to drive home to Barnstead. The crime took place in Epsom, New Hampshire, which is between Manchester and Barnstead. He was driving his burgundy Saab which he had worked on earlier that day. At 12:52 a.m. a police officer on his way to the scene of the crime saw a small burgundy car heading north on Route 28. The officer noticed that the driver had a mustache. He also noticed that the first three digits of the license plate was 300. The license plate number on petitioner's Saab was 300342. When the police went to petitioner's house in Barnstead at about 2:30 a.m., the hood of the Saab was still warm. 62 According to the victim, she had gone to bed about 11:20 p.m. She was wakened by a thump on the front door at 12:14 a.m. Her assailant entered the house, dragged her into the bedroom, tore her clothes off, took his clothes partially off and raped her. She estimated that the assailant was in the house 30 to 40 minutes. 63 An expert in serology, Kevin B. McMahon, testified that 32% of the adult population of the country, male and female, can be classified as A Secretors. This means that their body fluid secretions fall into this category. Body fluid secretions are found, inter alia, in semen and blood. An examination of the semen taken from the vagina of the victim showed that it was from an A Secretor. An examination of a blood sample taken from petitioner showed that he was an A Secretor. 64 Three jail inmates who met petitioner during his pretrial detention testified for the state. Donald McConnell testified that petitioner told me that the night that it happened he kicked down a door and he went in and he grabbed the lady and he threw her down. And he was armed with a M-16 rifle. He further testified: Well I asked him at one point if he was, in fact, admitting committing the rape of the victim. He never told me that he did. The only thing that he did mention was 'What did I have to lose?' And that was the extent of it. The state says in its brief at page 21 that McConnell received no favorable treatment or promises from the state as a result of his testimony. (Tr. p. 550). We have read the transcript carefully, and there is no evidence to support this statement at page 550 or 551. On page 542, McConnell testified that his attorney had worked out a plea bargain on the charge facing him (escape from jail) and that there would be a hearing on the plea bargain on November 10, which was subsequent to his testimony at petitioner's trial. On page 546 of the transcript, McConnell testified that no promises were made to him by the prosecutor for testifying. 65 Inmate James Torrence testified: Well, he said he broke the window with his hand, cut his hand (inaudible), grabbed the lady by the blouse and ripped it open and her tits fell out. Torrence was asked if he was getting anything in return for testifying and he answered No. 66 On direct examination, inmate William Clapper testified as follows: 67 Q What did he tell you he was charged with? 68 A Rape. 69 Q And did he tell you about the facts of the charge? 70 A Yes. 71 Q What did he say? 72 A He told me that a guy owed him some money. And he went to pick it up (inaudible). 73 Q He said that was the facts of the charge pending against him? 74 A He said that's what he did. 75 .... 76 Q And did he tell you what time of day it happened? 77 A It happened about 1:00 o'clock at night. 78 Q And what else did he tell you about it? 79 A That his car--that a maroon subcompact car was seen across the road and that he has one. And he was seen a little while later on the Webster Road a little while after it happened, that--by a Pittsfield police officer. 80 .... 81 Q Did he talk about his shoes? 82 A One time we had been talking about boots they took from him for evidence (inaudible). He said he had a pair of them just like them, took them to work with him, put them in the car, and (inaudible). 83 On cross-examination Clapper testified in greater detail as to what petitioner told him: Petitioner was running cocaine to some people in Epsom (the scene of the crime) who were fronting it for him. Clapper explained that this means that petitioner was delivering cocaine to retailers and the retailers did not pay for it until after they sold it. The victim was one of those fronting cocaine for the petitioner and she owed him seventy thousand dollars. Petitioner went to her house on the night in question armed with an M-16 rifle. The victim's boyfriend was there. Petitioner went after the boyfriend for the money and in the process pushed or threw the victim out of the way. Clapper was emphatic that he did not tell the state trooper who questioned him at the jail that petitioner had said he had raped the woman; petitioner told Clapper only that he had pushed or threw her aside in an effort to get at her boyfriend. 84 It must be explained here that Clapper had made a statement to one of the jail officials that was tape recorded. Although the record does not state so explicitly, it is clear that defense counsel had been given a copy of the statement. It can be fairly concluded that Clapper's cross-examination testimony tracked his recorded statement. 85 At the time Clapper gave his statement to the jail official he had decided to plead guilty to seven burglary charges. His attorney had negotiated a plea bargain, or was in the process of trying to negotiate one, under which the state would recommend a two-year sentence to be served in the house of correction. Clapper testified that this meant he would be incarcerated for 16 months. At the time Clapper testified, the plea agreement had not been approved by the court. Clapper further testified that the prosecutor had told him that he would not be getting any reward for testifying. When asked by the prosecutor why he was testifying, Clapper replied: Because I want to be a good citizen. 86 The defense adduced testimony by a Richard Horan who is in the business of repairing, selling and servicing foreign cars that at the time of the crime petitioner's car was leaking about a quart of transmission fluid a day. There was testimony by Sergeant Sparks of the State Police that he had examined the area where petitioner's car had been allegedly parked during the crime and found nothing unusual. Sparks made the examination shortly after he had arrived at the victim's house in response to her telephone call reporting the crime. 87 An analysis of the hair found at the scene showed that it all came from the victim. No fingerprint evidence was introduced. 88 Petitioner was not arrested until six weeks after the crime. His arrest was prompted by a telephone call from the victim to a state trooper stating he's come back. The trooper immediately went to the victim's house. He found footprints in the snow. The footprints led to the front door, then to a spare bedroom window, back to the front of the house and then to a window in the living room area. The trooper estimated the shoe size of the person making the prints to be eight and a half, the trooper's own shoe size. Petitioner wears size eight shoes. 89 Although the harmless error question is close, we cannot conclude that the admission of petitioner's statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824. Our review of the record, leaving aside the statement, does not make it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 510-11, 103 S.Ct. at 1981. This is certainly not a case of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. at 377, 92 S.Ct. at 2177-78. The testimony of the three jail inmates raises serious questions of credibility. There are gaps in the identification evidence, not large, to be sure, but large enough to raise a reasonable doubt. There is no conclusive evidence that ties petitioner tightly to the crime. Based upon the evidence without the statement, it is probable that petitioner committed the crime. But that is not the test. We do not know what role petitioner's statement played in the jury's deliberations. The statement may have been the clincher; it was, therefore, not harmless. 90 The decision of the district court is reversed. The writ shall issue unless the State of New Hampshire, within sixty days, shall take the necessary steps to retry petitioner.