Opinion ID: 1248805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Right to Prohibit Firearms on Premises

Text: The Appellant also contends that the lower court abused its discretion in failing to provide the Appellant's offered instruction on the right of a landowner, or in this case a land manager, to prohibit firearms on the premises. As quoted above, West Virginia Code § 61-7-14 permits any owner or person charged with the care of real property to prohibit the carrying openly or concealing of any firearm or deadly weapon on the property. The Appellant contends that, as the individual charged with the control and management of the Bell Farm, he had the statutory right to approach the hunters and inform them that they were not permitted to hunt on the property under his control. The Appellant's primary contention appears to be that a jury instruction regarding such right should have been provided to explain the context of his concerns, rather than as an exoneration for any subsequent behavior which may have constituted brandishing or wanton endangerment. The Appellant testified that he sought to stop and question the hunters regarding their presence on the property. He contends that the requested instruction would have permitted the jury to place his actions within the context of statutorily-permissible behavior. The Appellant further contends that refusal of such instruction limited his ability to fully elaborate upon his contention that he was exercising the legitimate function of protecting the property under his control. In response, the State contends that the issue of whether the Appellant had the right to prohibit the carrying of firearms on the property is irrelevant since the crime occurred off the immediate premises of the Bell Farm and involved Mr. Bell's use of a firearm. [7] The State maintains that there is no theory of the case which would require the requested instruction. In syllabus point three of State v. Miller, 184 W.Va. 492, 401 S.E.2d 237 (1990), this Court explained: `In this jurisdiction where there is competent evidence tending to support a pertinent theory of a case, it is error for the trial court to refuse a proper instruction, presenting such theory, when so requested. Syllabus, Point 4, State v. Hayes, 136 W.Va. 199 [67 S.E.2d 9] [1951].' Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Smith, 156 W.Va. 385, 193 S.E.2d 550 (1972). The requested instruction, taken from the language of the statute, was obviously a correct statement of law, and it was not covered by the other instructions. The statute upon which the instruction is based is clearly a part of the legislative scheme related to the open carrying of firearms and vests in property owners and those charged with the responsibility for safeguarding real property the clear right to require third parties not to carry or display firearms on such property. As such, the statute and the requested instruction provided a lawful premise for the Appellant's demand that the Eggletons not carry arms on the subject property and constituted a proper means of informing the jury of that lawful premise. The Appellant does not claim, nor would this Court, that the Appellant is entitled to this instruction as an excuse or justification for violation of the criminal statutes prohibiting the brandishing and/or wanton endangerment which allegedly occurred during the confrontation. Rather, the instruction provides the Appellant a means of demonstrating the legality and propriety of prohibiting persons from entering onto property while carrying firearms, supportive of the Appellant's contention that he was performing a duty of his employment. As such, the instruction appears to be germane to the Appellant's theory of defense. Upon any retrial of this cause occasioned by our decision to reverse the conviction for failure to instruct on the matter of a lesser included offense, the trial court should consider whether this instruction, if offered, is again justified by the evidence and theory or theories of defense.