Opinion ID: 2061992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forbearance of Prosecution

Text: St. John asserts that the State threatened to prosecute Kegeris if she did not testify and that this inducement should have been revealed to the defense. St. John argues that this failure deprived him of due process, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and due course of law, Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 12. The prosecution's suppression of requested evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). While this court has applied the Brady rule, Birkla v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 37, 323 N.E.2d 645, we have done so on the basis of the federal Constitution. St. John provides no authority or argument for a separate and independent standard under the Indiana Constitution. Thus, the state due course of law issue is waived. Indiana has interpreted Brady and other federal cases to require that the State reveal the use of promises and offers of immunity, leniency, money or other benefit made by the prosecution to induce cooperation from a State's witness. See Schmanski v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 14. If such evidence is withheld in the face of a specific pre-trial request, the conviction must be reversed if the evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Richard v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 607, 612, 382 N.E.2d 899, 903, (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 350 (1976)). In two separate motions, St. John requested that the State disclose any promises or representations of non-prosecution. At a hearing on pre-trial motions, defense counsel specified that St. John was particularly interested in any oral agreements. At the hearing on the motion to correct error, St. John presented evidence that the State had been unable to serve Kegeris with a subpoena. In fact, Kegeris left Indianapolis and was living in Bunker Hill to avoid service of process. Kegeris still had not been served on the first day of trial, and the prosecutor spoke with Carmack and Eldridge about obtaining her presence at trial. Prosecutor Randy Hainlen described the discussion: A: I made them aware that charges had not been filed against her and that there was a significant period of statute of limitations period [sic] that was still present and that if we felt that she was trying to avoid service of process, we would take that into consideration in any further dealings of how to handle her in regard to the case. Q: So, the meaning or the import of your message was that if she didn't come to trial it was possible those charges would still be filed against her? A: Yes. It's still possible. As a result of this conversation with the prosecutor, Eldridge told Kegeris that charges could be filed against her but if she cooperated and testified at trial it could affect that situation. The threshold question is whether the prosecutor's implied threat of prosecution communicated to the witness through a third party is an inducement requiring disclosure. This court has required disclosure only when an actual agreement has been reached between the State and the witness. See Carey v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 321, 416 N.E.2d 1252 (state required to reveal agreement between federal agents and informant, but failure to disclose did not require reversal because jury heard evidence of agreement); Newman v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684 (state's failure to reveal plea agreement between third party prosecutor and witness' attorney merits reversal). Without concrete evidence of an agreement or understanding, we have not required disclosure. See Burgin v. State (1985), Ind., 475 N.E.2d 1155 (disclosure not required when witness charged with crime but not yet tried; no evidence of any transaction between prosecutor and witness); Asbell v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 845 (disclosure not required when witness not arrested or charged; no concrete evidence of an understanding); Campbell v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 88, 409 N.E.2d 568 (disclosure not required when witness pled guilty two weeks after testifying; no evidence an agreement was reached before trial); Turczi v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 329, 392 N.E.2d 481 (disclosure not required when information against two witnesses dismissed after grand jury failed to return indictments; no evidence that dismissal was result of agreement). Here, though there was evidence of a communication from the prosecutor to Kegeris, no understanding or agreement existed. The evidence does not lead to an inference of a secret agreement between the State and the witness. Had the State chosen to prosecute Kegeris following the trial, she would not have had any promise of forbearance to enforce. The transaction here does not rise to the level of an inducement requiring disclosure. Kegeris' credibility was thoroughly challenged in cross-examination. In addition, Kokomo police officer David Kellar testified that Kegeris had not been charged for her role in the robbery and that charges could still be brought. The threat of prosecution was obvious to the defense and to the jury. The fact that the prosecutor reminded Kegeris of this possibility adds little. St. John also alleges that he was denied his right to cross-examine Kegeris because he did not know of the State's threat, citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In Davis, the trial court foreclosed defense counsel from questioning a witness about his status as a probationer at the time he witnessed the crime. The Supreme Court recognized that the exposure of a witness' biases, prejudices and ulterior motives is an important function of the right of cross-examination. Id. at 317, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 354. In this case, St. John was not foreclosed from examining Kegeris on the subject of her possible biases. In fact, counsel conducted an extensive and effective cross-examination regarding Kegeris' relationships with the other participants and her possible interest in and motive for casting the blame on St. John. The jury was also aware of her possible interest in avoiding charges for her own involvement. St. John was not denied his right of cross-examination.