Opinion ID: 1239238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Townsend's Eighth Amendment claim against Sergeant Allen

Text: Townsend next challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment for Sergeant Allen. According to Townsend, he proffered evidence before the district court showing that Allen had actual knowledge that his health was jeopardized by sleeping on the wet and moldy mattress. That evidence, Townsend asserts, created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Allen exhibited deliberate indifference to the unsanitary conditions in his cell. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment as requiring a minimum standard for the treatment of inmates by prison officials: the prison conditions must not, among other things, involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); see also Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir.2004). Accordingly, an inmate's constitutional challenge to prison conditions requires us to undertake a two-part examination. See Whitman, 368 F.3d at 934. First, we must determine whether the conditions at issue were sufficiently serious so that a prison official's act or omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (internal quotations omitted); see also Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493. If the inmate successfully establishes that the conditions were sufficiently serious, we then examine whether prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to the conditions in question. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); Whitman, 368 F.3d at 934. Deliberate indifference, in turn, means that the official knew that the inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and yet disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to address it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970; see also Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir.1995). As such, it is not enough for the inmate to show that the official acted negligently or that he or she should have known about the risk. See Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir.2004); Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 641 (7th Cir.1996). Instead, the inmate must show that the official received information from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk existed, and that the official actually drew the inference. See Pierson, 391 F.3d at 902; Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir.2002). Based on the parties' dearth of input on the matter, it appears that they assume that Townsend endured a prison condition sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The parties' assumption might be incorrect if Townsend himself contributed to the mattress's foul state by, say, failing to place it on top of the bed while he or his cell-mate showered, and until the floor had dried. See Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir.2006) (concluding that prisoner's starvation was self-inflicted when prison deprived meals because of his refusal to abide by prison's meal-time rules). However, Sergeant Allen forfeited the point on appeal by failing to raise it in his brief. See Williams v. REP Corp., 302 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir.2002). And even if Allen had raised the point, on this record we cannot say for certain that he would have prevailed. The party opposing summary judgment receives the benefit of reasonable inferences, see Vinning-El, 482 F.3d at 924, and it is possible that there was some reason why Townsend could not have placed his mattress on top of his cell-mate's bunk, so that both mattresses stayed dry. Indeed, at oral argument Townsend's attorney stated that Townsend attempted to move his mattress to keep it from getting wet when the shower was turned on, but to no avail. If Townsend was, in fact, unable to move his mattress to a dry area, then we would be hard-pressed to fault him and his cell-mate for refusing to abstain from bathing for his entire 59-day stint in TLU, just so Townsend could have had a dry place to sleep. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir.1980) ([A] state must provide . . . reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, [and] hygienic materials. . . .). But that aside, we must assess the parties' shared assumption against the record as it is currently developed. And, in that light, the parties' assumption seems sound. See McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 846-47 (5th Cir.1991) (finding Eighth Amendment violation where inmates were provided mattresses at night which were placed on the sometimes flooded floors of the cells . . . [where they] `either had to stand up all night or sleep on a wet mattress on the floor'). We have stated that a lack of sanitary conditions, including clean bedding, may qualify as a denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Gillis, 468 F.3d at 494; see also McCord, 927 F.2d at 846-47; Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating confinement in isolation without adequate clothing or bedding supports Eighth Amendment claim); Ramos, 639 F.2d at 568. We therefore turn our attention to whether Townsend proffered evidence establishing that Sergeant Allen was deliberately indifferent to the unsanitary conditions in his cell. The district court concluded that Townsend proffered no such evidence; as the court explained, Townsend proposed no facts showing that he complained about his mattress to Allen. But the district court did not properly characterize the evidence when reaching this conclusion, and, more importantly, did not view the evidence in a light most favorable to Townsend. See Vinning-El, 482 F.3d at 924. Specifically, Townsend submitted an affidavit and provided deposition testimony, in which he stated that he personally complained about his mattress to Allen and requested a new, clean mattress for his cell. Townsend further related that Allen denied his request without explanation, and that he later learned that his request was denied on the basis that if he received a mattress, everyone else in TLU would also have to receive one. Allen initially disputed Townsend's version of events in an affidavit of his own, and for a time during the summary-judgment proceedings, both men stood by their respective stories and asserted that their version of eventsand only their versionwas true. But then Allen's story wavered. Allen stated in proposed findings of fact that Townsend complained to him about the state of his mattress and requested a new one. Allen further admitted that he did not provide Townsend with a new mattress even though the prison had clean mattresses available, and that he also understood that an individual could develop health problems if he was forced to sleep on a wet and moldy mattress. In other words, neither Townsend, nor Sergeant Allen, proffered evidence beyond their own testimony that either directly corroborated their respective stories, or completely refuted the competing version of events. Thus, the dispute over whether Allen knew about Townsend's cell conditions comes down to a good old-fashioned swearing contest that can be resolved only by assessing the credibility of the two men. Credibility determinations, however, lie exclusively within the fact-finder's domain and are not appropriate for a district court to make at the summary judgment stage, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir.2001); Freeman v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir.2000), particularly when the moving party's version of the facts changed over time to eventually support the non-moving party's position, see Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir.2001) (Summary judgment is warranted only if `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.') (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Therefore, when we view the record in the light most favorable to Townsend, we see a material dispute over whether Sergeant Allen knew that Townsend was forced to sleep on the wet and moldy mattress while he was in TLU. See Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir.2003) ([W]e have warned before of falling for the trap of weighing conflicting evidence during a summary judgment proceeding.). And whether Allen knew about the substantial risk of serious harm created by the unsanitary cell conditions speaks directly to whether he exhibited deliberate indifference to Townsend's plight. See Pierson, 391 F.3d at 902; Proffitt, 279 F.3d at 506. The district court accordingly was wrong to grant summary judgment for Allen.