Opinion ID: 4214415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Monell Liability and Choctaw County

Text: Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of their officials. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692– 93, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036–37 (1978). Direct liability is instead required. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010). “Proof of municipal liability sufficient to satisfy Monell requires: (1) an official policy (or custom), of which 9 While we find that Jauch’s Sixth and Eighth Amendment challenges are left, the complained-of delays relating to provision of counsel and bail are directly attributable to the indefinite detention procedure we find unconstitutional. 14 Case: 16-60690 Document: 00514207740 Page: 15 Date Filed: 10/24/2017 No. 16-60690 (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).” Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). The district court found that Choctaw County was not liable under Monell. It erred. Jauch challenges the indefinite detention procedure. Accordingly, the first and second elements of our inquiry reduce to one question: Is the challenged procedure “an official policy” that was “promulgated by the municipal policymaker?” Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)). It is. There is no dispute that Sheriff Halford is the relevant policymaker. See Brooks, 84 F.3d at 165 (“Sheriffs in Mississippi are final policymakers with respect to all law enforcement decisions made within their counties.”). And, both prior to and during this litigation, Sheriff Halford and Choctaw County have cleaved to the indefinite detention procedure. Their position is that indefinite detention is and must be the policy in Choctaw County. Accordingly, resolution of the first and second elements is as clear as ever it could be. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”). It is also obvious that the indefinite detention procedure caused the due process violation Jauch complains of—indefinite detention. “Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so,” the causation determination “is straightforward.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997). The policy Jauch challenges cannot be separated from the procedure that we have found constitutionally deficient. They are one and the 15 Case: 16-60690 Document: 00514207740 Page: 16 Date Filed: 10/24/2017 No. 16-60690 same. In cases like this one, where “fault and causation” are “obvious,” “proof that the municipality’s decision was unconstitutional” establishes “that the municipality itself was liable for the plaintiff’s constitutional injury.” Id. at 406, 117 S.Ct. at 1389. While courts must be careful not to “blur[] the distinction between § 1983 cases that present no difficult questions of fault and causation and those that do,” id. at 405, 117 S.Ct. at 1389, we have no trouble concluding that this is an obvious case. Choctaw County’s relevant policymaker instituted a policy whereby certain arrestees were indefinitely detained without access to courts or the benefit of basic constitutional rights. This unconstitutional policy was “the moving force” behind Jauch’s constitutional injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2038. Under Monell and its progeny, Choctaw County is liable.