Opinion ID: 1060657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: limitation of chambers and green

Text: The majority holds that the defendant was denied the opportunity to present a defense pursuant to Chambers because hearsay evidence relating to an element of the State's case was excluded. The majority, however, fails to recognize the limited application of Chambers articulated in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996), a plurality of the Court noted the limited application of Chambers by stating: the holding of Chambers-if one can be discerned from such a fact-intensive case-is certainly not that a defendant is denied a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations whenever critical evidence favorable to him is excluded, but rather that erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to a level of a due process violation. Id. at 53, 116 S.Ct. 2013. The limitation on Chambers was subsequently confirmed by an eight-Justice majority, excluding Justice Stevens, in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). In Scheffer, eight Justices agreed that  Chambers specifically confined its holding to the `facts and circumstances' presented in that case. 118 S.Ct. at 1268. Both state and federal courts that have been confronted with Chambers have explicitly limited Chambers and Green to the facts of those cases. See Welcome v. Vincent, 549 F.2d 853, 857 (2nd Cir.1977); Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855 (5th Cir.1998) (In Montana v. Egelhoff , the Supreme Court explained, `[T]he holding of Chambers-if one can be discerned from such a fact-intensive case ...'); Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir.1983) (We think that Green is limited to its facts....); Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir.1975) (recognizing factual limits on Chambers holding); McGinnis v. Johnson, 181 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir.1999); Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 316 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that Chambers was based on addressing antiquated rules of evidence that precluded admission of a third party's confession); Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 524 (Fla.1998) (noting that Chambers was limited to its facts due to the peculiarities of Mississippi evidence law which did not recognize a hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest.); Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953, 965 (Fla.1997) (limiting Chambers to its facts due to the peculiarities of Mississippi evidence law which did not recognize a hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest.); State v. Bunyan, 154 N.J. 261, 712 A.2d 1091, 1095 (1998). Because it is clear that the application of both Chambers and Green should be limited to the facts of those cases when applied to issues involving hearsay evidence, this Court should have examined the facts of those cases. Both Chambers and Green involved: (1) declarations against a penal interest; (2) hearsay statements in which the declarant was unavailable to testify; (3) third-party confessions to a crime that were substantially corroborated with direct evidence; (4) hearsay statements in which the veracity or reliability of the statement was not questionable; and (5) situations in which the defendant would otherwise absolutely have been precluded from introducing the evidence. I read factor (5) as being the key consideration by the Court in both Chambers and Green . See also Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 316 (7th Cir.1993) (noting challenge would lie if evidentiary rules were to blot out a substantial defense and direct evidence of the defense was unavailable). While both Chambers and Green are readily distinguishable from the case now before us because direct evidence was available to the defendant to establish the defense, I will also address the applicability of each of the remaining factors.