Opinion ID: 4528750
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: PCRA Court’s Authority to Provide Relief

Text: Turning to the question at the heart of this case, we now consider whether the PCRA vests PCRA courts with the authority to remedy appellate-level constitutional [J-78-2019] - 13 violations in the form of a new appeal to the appellate court, if warranted by the factual development of the case. 7 Our legislature has determined that the PCRA provides the sole means of obtaining collateral relief in Pennsylvania, encompassing “all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999) (“By its own language, and by judicial decisions interpreting such language, the PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining state collateral relief.”). We therefore construe the PCRA and its eligibility requirements broadly, inasmuch as narrowly confining the PCRA to the enumerated areas of review would undermine the legislative intent that the PCRA is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007). As we observed in our 2016 remand order, the courts of common pleas, serving as PCRA courts, are the repositories for petitions filed pursuant to the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(a). The PCRA provides the procedural framework for vindicating a convicted criminal defendant’s rights in limited circumstances. To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish, inter alia, that the conviction or sentence resulted from one of several enumerated bases for relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). One of these requires the petitioner to establish that the conviction or sentence resulted from “[a] violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth- 7 The question is not, as the dissent characterizes it, whether a lower court can “order” a higher court to act. Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 6. Rather, the question is whether a PCRA court, vested with jurisdiction over a cognizable claim, has the authority to grant a well-established form of relief to remedy a constitutional deprivation that has been proven on the merits. [J-78-2019] - 14 determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Id. § 9543(a)(2)(i). As this author recently observed in the Opinion in Support of Reversal (“OISR”) in Taylor, “[i]f an error of constitutional magnitude occurs during the appellate process, the PCRA is the sole means of collaterally attacking the final judgment on that basis.” Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1280 (OISR). Contrary to the PCRA court’s belief, there is no suggestion in either the text of the PCRA nor in this Court’s precedent “that alleged errors occurring in the appellate process are immune from collateral attack, or that only an appellate court can redress appellate errors.” Id. There is nothing novel in recognizing that constitutional claims relating to the appellate process are cognizable under the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 569-70 (Pa. 1999), for example, this Court held that post-conviction claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness related to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal were cognizable under the PCRA, and, indeed, “the PCRA provides the exclusive remedy for post-conviction claims seeking restoration of appellate rights due to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal.” Id. at 569-70. It is axiomatic that, if a claim is cognizable, a PCRA court is empowered to remedy it. In Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 123536 (Pa. 2001), the question was whether the request for a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, premised upon counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to appeal, is a claim that is cognizable under the PCRA. We concluded that “[t]he answer unquestionably is yes.” Id. at 1235. We have likewise held that claims premised upon the ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel are cognizable under the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 181-87 (Pa. 2016), the post-conviction petitioner filed an untimely PCRA petition alleging that counsel who represented him during the litigation of his first PCRA [J-78-2019] - 15 petition was ineffective, and asserting that the right to post-conviction counsel encompasses the right to effective post-conviction counsel. In resolving this appeal, this Court discussed the means by which a PCRA petitioner may raise a timely claim premised upon the ineffective assistance of prior PCRA counsel, before holding that the petitioner’s claim was not timely. Although the petitioner in Robinson was not entitled to relief, we recognized the cognizability of claims challenging the effectiveness of PCRA counsel and the availability of relief through the PCRA to remedy deprivations occurring in prior proceedings. See also Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2003) (holding that a claim challenging counsel’s effectiveness on direct appeal for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is cognizable under the PCRA). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 851 A.2d 870, 875 (Pa. 2004), we held that due process entitled a post-conviction petitioner to relief on the same grounds for which a co-defendant was granted relief. The petitioner’s co-defendant obtained relief in this Court from her conviction and sentence premised upon an illegal search. See Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996). The petitioner had filed a petition for allowance of appeal to challenge the same search. Although this Court initially granted review, we later dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently granted. When we later provided relief to the petitioner’s co-defendant for the same search that the petitioner had challenged, the petitioner filed a PCRA petition raising a due process claim premised upon the disparate treatment afforded to the petitioner and his co-defendant by this Court. The PCRA court denied relief, and this Court reversed. We agreed with the petitioner that there were “insufficient reasons to support the contrary treatment of [Cruz] and Melendez in the course of this Court’s discretionary review and thereafter.” Cruz, 851 A.2d at 877. See also id. at 881 (Castille, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “this case involves a candidly and cogently forwarded claim that this Court committed error of [J-78-2019] - 16 constitutional magnitude in its handling of appellant’s direct appeal” (emphasis omitted)). Cruz confirmed that the PCRA provides the vehicle to remedy errors of constitutional magnitude occurring in a prior proceeding in this Court. A claim asserting alleged judicial bias in an appellate court is no different from claims that we already have held fall within the ambit of the PCRA. An issue challenging the impartiality of an appellate judge, like an issue challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel, constitutionally relates directly to the validity of the decision upholding the underlying conviction and sentence. It is an attack upon the truth-determining process, a process that logically includes collateral attacks on the judgment of sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“The PCRA process, although not directly related to an adjudication of guilt, is part of the truthdetermining process; otherwise, claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness would not be cognizable under the PCRA.”). “Due process demands the absence of judicial bias.” Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1280 (OISR). And a litigant’s due process rights are violated if a biased appellate judge decides the fate of the litigant’s appeal. Id.; see also Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016). Consequently, a due process challenge to the impartiality of an appellate jurist is cognizable under Section 9543(a)(2)(i) of the PCRA. 8 8 Contemplating the award of a nunc pro tunc appeal to remedy a constitutional deprivation occurring in a prior appeal is not, as the dissent characterizes it, meddling in the administrative and supervisory functions of this Court. Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 1, 29. It is, rather, a well-established form of relief by which a lower court corrects an error occurring in the prior appeal. The arguments that a claim for relief premised upon the conduct of a jurist in a prior appeal may subject former or sitting jurists to post-hoc accusations of wrongdoing or unwarranted ridicule, or somehow implicates consideration of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 1, are red herrings, straw men erected to distract from the straightforward question in this case: whether the reinstatement of appellate rights nunc pro tunc is an appropriate remedy to correct a constitutional deprivation that occurred in a prior appeal. The collateral consequences of adjudicating this claim are irrelevant. [J-78-2019] - 17 Nor is it a novel development to seek the reinstatement of one’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Rather, if the petition is timely, nunc pro tunc relief is a deeply established means of remedying a breakdown in the prior process caused by an error of constitutional magnitude. An award of nunc pro tunc relief is intended to put the petitioner in the same position he or she was in just prior to the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Commonwealth v. Stock, 679 A.2d 760, 764 (Pa.1996) (“the appeal nunc pro tunc is intended to remedy certain extraordinary situations wherein the right of appeal was denied”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“nunc pro tunc” is Latin for “now for then”). For instance, a nunc pro tunc appeal unquestionably is available to remedy the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. In Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255 (Pa. 2015), a PCRA petitioner sought and obtained reinstatement of her right to file a nunc pro tunc direct appeal to this Court. The petitioner appealed, and this Court resolved her appeal. We observed that, if there is a timely PCRA petition vesting the PCRA court with jurisdiction, then the PCRA court may reinstate the petitioner’s direct appeal rights. Id. at 260 n.5. See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1233 (Pa. 2001) (“The PCRA was available to appellee and it is the exclusive vehicle for claims, such as the nunc pro tunc appeal claim he raised, that are cognizable under the PCRA.”). Reinstatement of appellate rights nunc pro tunc will also remedy the deprivation of effective PCRA counsel. Commonwealth v. Bennet, 930 A.2d 1264, 1273 (Pa. 2007) (vacating and remanding for consideration of whether the petitioner was entitled to the reinstatement of his PCRA appeal rights nunc pro tunc in a second PCRA petition when his original PCRA appeal was dismissed because of PCRA counsel’s failure to file a brief, and reasoning that “due process requires that the post conviction process be fundamentally fair”); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1160-61 (Pa. 2003); [J-78-2019] - 18 see also Stock, 679 A.2d at 761 (holding that an appeal nunc pro tunc should be granted to a defendant in a summary criminal case where his privately retained attorney failed to perfect a timely appeal to the court of common pleas). The dissent draws a distinction between claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness and claims of appellate-level judicial bias, and asserts that a new appeal is appropriate to remedy the former but not the latter. See Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 33-34, n.12. Whether it is a defendant’s right to appeal or the due process protection against an unconstitutional potential for bias that is infringed, both scenarios present errors of constitutional magnitude occurring on appeal. A new appeal will vindicate both types of constitutional deprivation. There is no need to fashion a new remedy out of whole cloth when an established remedy will cure the constitutional defect. As this author recently opined in the OISR in Taylor: To avoid rendering the Due Process Clause meaningless in the context of an unconstitutional potential for appellate-level judicial bias, Section 9543(a)(2)(i) of the PCRA vindicates constitutional errors that occur at the appellate level. The PCRA requires in Section 9543(a)(2)(i) that the petitioner prove that the conviction or sentence resulted from a constitutional violation which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” A claim that an appellate jurist harbored an unconstitutional potential for bias during a prior proceeding calls into question the constitutionality of that proceeding and undermines the truth-determining process that resulted in that appellate decision. The unconstitutional potential for bias of an appellate court judge presents a claim no different in any substantive way from one based upon unconstitutionally deficient representation by appellate counsel. Both are errors of constitutional magnitude that occur at the appellate level. This Court has embraced the PCRA as the sole means of seeking redress for the latter, holding that unconstitutionally deficient representation by appellate counsel may undermine the truth-determining process. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630, 635-36 ([Pa.] 2003). If a claim based upon the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal is cognizable under the PCRA, there is no basis to hold that a claim of appellate-level judicial bias pursuant to the Due Process Clause is not. A [J-78-2019] - 19 constitutional violation occurring at the appellate level may undermine the truth-determining process, whatever its source. Taylor, 218 A.3d at 1281–82 (OISR). To rule that a claim of appellate level judicial bias is not cognizable under the PCRA would effectively hold that there is no remedy for this potential due process violation. 9 As a constitutional matter, this is a nonstarter. To strip the Due Process Clause of all remedies to address that clause’s violation is to eliminate the underlying right itself. Ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy). 10 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a new appeal will remedy the denial of the due process right to an impartial tribunal. Williams, 136 S.Ct. 1909-10. In Williams, the PCRA petitioner filed a successive petition premised upon newly discovered facts. During discovery, the petitioner learned that then-District Attorney Ronald Castille had signed the sentencing memorandum authorizing the Commonwealth to pursue the death penalty. The PCRA court granted relief. The Commonwealth sought emergency relief in this Court. In the meantime, Ronald Castille had been elected to this Court and was serving as Chief Justice. This Court ultimately vacated the PCRA court’s grant of relief and reinstated the death sentence. Upon further appeal, the United States 9 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a constitutional right ceases to be “something real” when its violation is not remedied) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 361 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 10 Ubi jus, ibi remedium translates to: “Where there is a right, there is a remedy.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (11th ed. 2019). The right to a remedy is, itself, a right protected by due process. See, e.g., United States v. Loughrey, 172 U.S. 206, 232 (1898) (“The maxim, ‘Ubi jus, ibi remedium,’ lies at the very foundation of all systems of law.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded. . . . [F]or it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.” (quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries)). The right to a remedy is a core component of ordered liberty. Id. [J-78-2019] - 20 Supreme Court reversed this Court, holding “that under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case.” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1905. The High Court vacated this Court’s decision and remanded for de novo appellate review in an unburdened court. Id. at 1909-10. The due process right to an impartial tribunal was vindicated in Williams with the award of a new, de novo appeal, If Koehler proves the merits of his due process claim (a matter not before us and one as to which we offer no opinion), such constitutional deprivation would likewise require a remedy. Like Williams, Koehler would then be entitled to an opportunity to present his appeal to a court “unburdened by any ‘possible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.’” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1910 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). To the extent that the dissent believes that the precedential effect of Williams is only that a higher court can direct a lower court to award a new appeal, see Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 27-28, n.10, this reading is not supported by the text of Williams. Williams’ claim was premised upon a due process violation resulting from an unconstitutional likelihood of bias. The relief Williams sought and obtained was a new appeal unburdened by that unconstitutional likelihood of bias. Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1910. As in Williams, the remedy for demonstrating that an appellate tribunal included a jurist with an unconstitutional likelihood of bias would be a new appeal to that tribunal without the participation of the partial jurist. Other defendants raising due process claims resulting from an unconstitutional likelihood of bias would, if warranted on the merits, also be entitled to this relief. Pursuant to the dissent’s characterization of Williams, however, only Williams was entitled to a new appeal. All other defendants who raise the same type of claim and request the same [J-78-2019] - 21 relief afforded to Williams would not, according to the dissent, be entitled to that relief, unless they, like Williams, obtained discretionary review in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court afforded them a new appeal. This narrow reading of Williams would render Williams precedential only for Williams, who has already obtained relief. There is nothing in the opinion of the High Court suggesting that the rule of law it announced therein, and the remedy the Court afforded, was available only when the High Court granted certiorari and ruled in the case for the defendant. Rather, the nature of precedential opinions is that they create rules of law that extend beyond the case and the parties therein, to afford protections to other similarly situated litigants. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–253 (1998) (decisions of the High Court remain binding precedent “until we see fit to reconsider them”); Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. 1996) (explaining that a majority opinion is binding precedent on the courts of this Commonwealth as to different parties in cases involving substantially similar facts pursuant to the rule of stare decisis). The dissent’s revisionist construction of Williams would amount to this Court telling the High Court that the constitutional right it recognized therein did not reach beyond the parties to that case. In Williams, the Supreme Court held that “Chief Justice Castille's significant, personal involvement in a critical decision in Williams’s case gave rise to an unacceptable risk of actual bias. This risk so endangered the appearance of neutrality that his participation in the case ‘must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1908–09 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Any other defendant who can establish an unacceptable risk of actual bias in his or her case would be entitled to the same relief the High Court deemed appropriate in Williams. As the High Court explained, “[a]llowing an appellate panel to reconsider a case without the participation of the interested member will permit judges to [J-78-2019] - 22 probe lines of analysis or engage in discussions they may have felt constrained to avoid in their first deliberations.” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1910. Nothing in Williams suggests that this relief was limited to Williams, and nothing in the Court’s opinion supports the dissent’s interpretation of it. Were this Court to hold to the contrary, affirming the PCRA court’s lack of authority to grant relief to remedy a purported due process violation committed by an appellate court, we would be closing the door to PCRA relief for any constitutional error occurring in the appellate process. There is no logical basis to distinguish between claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness and claims of judicial bias in the appellate courts, or to hold that the former are cognizable under the PCRA because they undermine the truthdetermining process, while the latter are not. Make no mistake: a ruling that claims of appellate-level judicial bias are not cognizable under the PCRA eventually would sound the death knell to all claims of constitutional magnitude that occur in the appellate process, including claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness. The PCRA court found itself precluded from granting relief to Koehler, believing it was powerless to impose discipline upon a judicial officer or to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dissent shares this belief. Concurring and Dissenting Op. at 2330. But these are irrelevancies. Clearly, the PCRA court had no ability to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct against Justice Eakin. Reilly by Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1298 (acknowledging this Court’s exclusive right to supervise the conduct of officers of the judicial branch of government pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution). This Court’s supervisory authority over the conduct of judges pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c) of our Constitution is unchallenged and is not implicated in this case. Not only is this settled authority unthreatened by the relief that Koehler sought, but [J-78-2019] - 23 it is also unrelated to any remedy for the alleged constitutional violation of which Koehler complained. The PCRA court’s reasoning and that of the dissent reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the relief that Koehler sought. Koehler did not ask the PCRA court to impose discipline against Justice Eakin or to enforce the Code of Judicial Conduct as if it were a disciplinary board. Rather, Koehler asked for the opportunity to prove his due process violation and, if he prevailed on the merits, to obtain reinstatement of his PCRA appellate rights nunc pro tunc. A PCRA petitioner’s ability to vindicate the deprivation of constitutional rights does not disappear when the conduct at issue may also implicate the Code of Judicial Conduct. It is of no comfort to a petitioner who has directly suffered the harm of a substantiated constitutional deprivation that this Court has the authority to police the conduct of jurists. To mean anything, the violation of individual rights requires individualized remedies. If, as the PCRA court held and the dissent would have it, Reilly precludes a petitioner from raising any issue that implicates consideration of a jurist’s conduct because of the applicability of the Code of Judicial Conduct, then the same rationale necessarily would preclude a petitioner from challenging the effectiveness of counsel because of the applicability of the Code of Professional Conduct. Such is not the case, as neither the Code of Judicial Conduct nor the Code of Professional Conduct are instruments to enforce individual rights. Courts undeniably possess the authority to grant relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of an impartial tribunal, and to remedy due process violations that occur during appellate proceedings, notwithstanding the obligations created in the separately enforced codes of conduct. The dissent believes that, by awarding relief in this case, the PCRA court would