Opinion ID: 717617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MHRA Claims.

Text: 22 The MHRA requires that claimants exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.075(1); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 863 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Mo.App.1993). If the agency takes no action on the charge, the claimant may sue within ninety days of the agency's right-to-sue letter but no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.111(1). Failure to meet these deadlines bars the claim. See Hill v. John Chezik Imports, 797 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Mo.App.1990); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 606 S.W.2d 496, 502 (Mo.App.1980). 23 In cases construing the analogous requirements of Title VII, federal courts have concluded that a discrete, adverse employment action, such as a discharge, layoff, or failure to promote, constitutes a completed act at the time it occurred. Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 976 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir.1992). The time for filing an administrative charge or commencing a lawsuit runs from the date of such a discriminatory act, even if its effects on the injured employee are long-lasting. See Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc). Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257, 101 S.Ct. 498, 504, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). Thus, if such an act is not timely challenged, the right to relief expires: 24 A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences. 25 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977), quoted favorably in Missouri Pac. R.R., 606 S.W.2d at 501. 26 Applying this principle, we agree with the district court that Gipson's challenges to discrete, adverse employment actions are time-barred under the MHRA. His claim for denied raises is barred because the denials occurred more than 180 days before he filed his Charge. The claim for the alleged discriminatory demotion and assignment to a rural sales territory is barred because these actions occurred in March 1989, more than two years before he filed this lawsuit. The claim for denied promotions was properly dismissed because Gipson's summary judgment submission provided no factual support for this claim. 27 On the other hand, Gipson also pleaded a hostile work environment claim, alleging that he was the victim of continuing racial harassment by Brank. To be properly exhausted, that claim must be separately raised in the administrative charge, because it is not reasonably related to a claim of a discrete act of discrimination, such as demotion. See Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir.1994). Here, Gipson's Charge and supporting affidavit--which we must read liberally, Williams, 21 F.3d at 223--clearly alleged a continuing pattern of workplace harassment by Brank sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370-71, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). 28 A hostile work environment is an ongoing nightmare for the employee victim, in legal parlance, a continuing violation. For this type of violation, the statute of limitations runs from the last occurrence of discrimination. Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 101, 3 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir.1993). [T]he critical question is whether any present violation exists. Satz v. ITT Fin. Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 744 (8th Cir.1980), quoting UAL v. Evans, 431 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 1889 (emphasis in original). In his Charge of Discrimination, Gipson alleged that he had been continually harassed by my immediate supervisor. Because this allegation is sufficient to plead a hostile work environment violation on the date of his Charge, July 31, 1989, that claim was not time-barred when he commenced this action on July 27, 1991, less than two years later. In addition, Gipson's complaint and summary judgment response alleged that KAS's racial harassment continued until Brank left the company in February 1991. These post-Charge allegations are reasonably related to the racial harassment portion of the Charge and therefore must be deemed exhausted. See Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d 145, 147-48 (8th Cir.1986); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1279 (8th Cir.1985). Thus, the district court erred in dismissing Gipson's hostile work environment claim under the MHRA. 29 Gipson further argues that, if he proves a pattern of racial harassment constituting a hostile work environment, he may recover damages for the entire period that this violation occurred, including any portion that occurred more than 180 days before he filed his Charge of Discrimination, or more than two years before he filed this lawsuit. We disagree. This argument was rejected in our recent en banc decision in Ashley, 66 F.3d at 167-68: 30 When an employer is accused of an ongoing practice that began prior to the statute of limitations period, the claim may nonetheless be timely under the continuing violation doctrine. The employee may challenge ongoing discriminatory acts even if similar illegal acts could have been challenged earlier and are thus time-barred.... Relief back to the beginning of the limitations period strikes a reasonable balance between permitting redress of an ongoing wrong and imposing liability for conduct long past. 31 (Emphasis added; citations omitted); accord Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 581 (11th Cir.1994) (Where a continuing violation is found, the plaintiffs can recover for any violations for which the statute of limitations has not expired). 3 We conclude that the Missouri Supreme Court would apply this principle to continuing violation claims under the MHRA. See Davis v. Laclede Gas Co., 603 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. banc 1980). Thus, if Gipson proves his hostile work environment claim on remand, he may recover damages incurred after July 27, 1989. 32