Opinion ID: 2792043
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: damian mays

Text: In sentencing Damian, the district court imposed enhancements for possession of a firearm, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1); reckless endangerment during flight, see id. § 3C1.2; and 10 obstruction of justice, see id. § 3C1.1. Damian challenges all three enhancements. Aplt. (Damian 14-3117) Br. at 6.
The district court concluded that there were “three different avenues” for imposing the firearm-possession enhancement. R. (Damian 14-3117), Vol. 2 at 84. One avenue the court relied on was “the testimony of Mr. Sykes who noted Mr. Damian Mays’ possession of a firearm at various drug transactions.” Id. at 84. Because we can affirm on the basis of this testimony, we do not address the other avenues. Sykes testified at the sentencing hearing that Damian came to his uncle’s house at 2269 Russell at least 10 times to purchase cocaine from them and that he sometimes brought pistols with him. Sykes said that Damian carried firearms because “[h]e had quite a few enemies” and that “his family had been . . . in battle . . . with another [wellknown drug-trafficking] family.” Id. at 20. Damian apparently concedes that he possessed a weapon during these transactions but argues that “[his] possession of a weapon was not done in furtherance of a drug conspiracy.” Aplt. (Damian 14-3117) Br. at 7. He contends that “the familial relationship between [him] and his uncle [Verdell] renders it unlikely that the weapons were part and parcel of drug activities,” id. at 7–8, and that “[t]he mere fact that guns were present when drug transactions occurred does not necessarily prove that the guns were possessed in connection with the drug conspiracy,” id. at 8. 11 But the guidelines do not require the gun possession to be “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” The government must prove only that the gun “was present or possessed either during the charged offense or during other drug trafficking activity that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” Shippley, 690 F.3d at 1199 (internal quotation marks omitted). The government met its burden here. We see no relevance to the fact that he carried the guns while purchasing drugs from his uncle rather than a nonrelative.
A sentencing court may impose a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” USSG § 3C1.2. The district court imposed the enhancement after finding that Damian fled from police officers at a high rate of speed on two separate occasions in the weeks before his arrest. Damian does not appear to dispute that the incidents amounted to reckless endangerment but argues that “[t]he government failed to identify [him] as the driver.” Aplt. (Damian 14-3117) Br. at 6. We disagree. Officers began their attempts to find and arrest Damian in December 2012. On December 4 they contacted several of his family members, and “a male at an address that Damian Mays was known to frequent” told officers that Damian was aware of the arrest warrant and officers would never find him. R. (Damian 14-3117), Vol. 2 at 58–59. 12 Officer William VonWolf testified about the first fleeing episode at the sentencing hearing. In late January 2013, police officers attempted to stop a black Chevy Impala to check the car for a suspected fugitive. When they activated their emergency lights and sirens, the car drove away at a speed estimated by VonWolf to be twice the 25- to 35mile-per-hour speed limit. The area it drove through was a residential area with singlefamily houses, and the episode was in the afternoon after school had let out. Because of the danger to the public, the officers did not pursue the car. But VonWolf testified that before officers tried to stop the Impala, he observed in the driver’s seat a black male whom he could not identify. He recognized the same car, however, when Damian was arrested the following week; and he identified the car as the one shown in photos of Damian’s car because both cars had a Kansas temporary tag with a cover over it and the same tinting on the windows. The second occasion was on February 4, 2013. Sergeant Mark Mosbacher testified that he tried to stop a black Chevy Impala that fled at an estimated 90 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone. Mosbacher identified photos of Damian’s car as showing the same car; he pointed to the Kansas temporary tag with a thick plastic cover and the unusual tinting on the windows. The police apprehended Damian on February 7, 2013, at a motel in Kansas City, Missouri. A black Chevy Impala was parked there. In it, officers found a bag of marijuana with Damian’s fingerprints. A woman in the room with him at the time of his arrest admitted to officers that Damian had given her the Impala’s keys and told her not 13 to give them to the police. After the arrest Detective Daneff questioned Damian. When he asked Damian about the two prior pursuits, Damian indicated that Daneff “may have been making . . . some of it up.” Id. at 57. But when Daneff provided details about the pursuits and asked Damian “if [he] was making that up,” he responded, “I know you’re not making it up.” Id. at 57–58. In light of the evidence presented, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that Damian was the driver who fled the police. See Shippley, 690 F.3d at 1199–1200 (“It is not enough that the finding is possibly or even probably wrong; the error must be pellucid to any objective observer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the enhancement.
The district court imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1 because Damian refused to provide a voice exemplar following a court order. Damian refused to provide an exemplar on two occasions, initially requesting the presence of counsel but later refusing to provide the exemplar when counsel was present. Even after a hearing on the Government’s motion to hold him in contempt, he refused to provide the exemplar, and the court held him in contempt. Damian argues that the district court erred in imposing the enhancement because he eventually pleaded guilty and therefore “his decision not to provide a voice exemplar had no bearing on the prosecution.” Aplt. (Damian 14-3117) Br. at 6. But the enhancement clearly applies to attempts. The guidelines require that “the defendant 14 willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” USSG. § 3C1.1 (2013) (emphasis added). Other circuits agree that the obstruction of justice need not be successful. See United States v. Maccado, 225 F.3d 766, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“the conclusion that a plea could erase an actual obstruction of justice would be inconsistent with § 3C1.1’s inclusion of attempts”); United States v. Greer, 158 F.3d 228, 238 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Carter, 510 F.3d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Yusufu, 63 F.3d 505, 515 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1083, 1084 (9th Cir 1990). Damian also argues that if he had gone to trial, “the government would have been entitled to introduce his refusal to provide the exemplar into evidence,” which “would have made the government’s point, and likely more forcefully.” Aplt. (Damian 14-3117) Br. at 11. But even if “the government eventually managed to find a way around” his obstruction, the enhancement would apply. United States v. Taylor, 88 F.3d 938, 944 (11th Cir. 1996).