Opinion ID: 2000415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the emergence of a speedy trial standard

Text: The individual's right to a speedy trial is secured by Const 1963, art 1, § 20: In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial     and US Const, Am VI: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial   . However, the people of the state have an equal concern in a speedy trial to act as a deterrent to potential criminals. The Michigan Legislature has enacted: The people of this state and persons charged with crime are entitled to and shall have a speedy trial   . MCLA 768.1; MSA 28.1024. The complementary nature of the individual right and the state concern was well said in 57 Colum L Rev 846 (1957): The importance of prompt trial of criminal offenses in a democratic society derives from the needs of maintaining public order and preserving individual freedom. The social interest in security demands speedy trial, for this facilitates both effective prosecution of criminals and greater deterrence to potential criminals. At the same time, society, in its concern for freedom and for the individual life, seeks to prevent prolonged prosecutions which may develop into persecutions. [4] The parameters of this right have until recently not been too fully spelled out by the United States Supreme Court or this Court. Prior to Barker, the United States Supreme Court in Beavers v Haubert, 198 US 77, 87; 25 S Ct 573, 576; 49 L Ed 950, 954 (1905) stated that: The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice. These circumstances were defined and limited by a later opinion, Pollard v United States, 352 US 354, 361; 77 S Ct 481, 486; 1 L Ed 2d 393, 399 (1957) to purposeful and oppressive delays. The United States Supreme Court in Smith v United States, 360 US 1, 10; 79 S Ct 991, 997; 3 L Ed 2d 1041, 1048 (1959) stated that the essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed. In United States v Ewell, 383 US 116, 120; 86 S Ct 773, 776; 15 L Ed 2d 627, 631 (1966) the Court denied that a 19-month delay was unconstitutional per se and stated that the right to a speedy trial was relative. And in United States v Marion, 404 US 307, 325; 92 S Ct 455, 465-466; 30 L Ed 2d 468, 481 (1971) the Court stated that: To accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights of the defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case. The Court in Dickey v Florida, 398 US 30; 90 S Ct 1564; 26 L Ed 2d 26 (1970) found a violation of the right where no reason was found for delaying trial for 7 years in light of defendant's diligent and repeated efforts to secure a prompt trial. There was also evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant in the death of two potential witnesses, unavailability of another, and the loss of police records. Mr. Justice Brennan concurring in Dickey set out at length the factors to be considered in determining whether the speedy trial right had been violated. [5] Justice Brennan concluded his remarks by leaving the door ajar for further action by the United States Supreme Court. He stated: These comments provide no definitive answers. I make them only to indicate that many  if not most  of the basic questions about the scope and context of the speedy-trial guarantee remain to be resolved. 398 US 30, 56. The United States Supreme Court responded to Justice Brennan's remarks by giving careful consideration to the speedy trial problem in Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972). Here, petitioner Barker was not brought to trial for more than five years (including ten months in jail) after he had been arrested. The prosecution obtained numerous continuances for such reasons as the brief illness of the ex-sheriff who was in charge of the investigation, trial of Barker's alleged accomplice, and illness of a key prosecution witness. Barker made no objections to the continuances until 3-1/2 years after the arrest. He was eventually convicted of murder. The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction held: A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial on an ad hoc basis.    Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant. 407 US 514, 530. On balance the United States Supreme Court stated that though the length of delay and reason for the delay weighed in Barker's favor, these factors were outweighed by the facts that he had suffered no serious prejudice and had failed to make a prompt and strenuous demand for a speedy trial. The United States Supreme Court concluded that Barker was a man who did not want a speedy trial. [6] In Grimmett, this Court recognized that the rule in Barker v Wingo, supra , quoted in the first paragraph of this opinion is the present and definitive test in this area.