Opinion ID: 742623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Intent

Text: 21 We review sufficiency of evidence determinations de novo. United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 328, 136 L.Ed.2d 241 (1996). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of evidence must persuade the court that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, ... no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1333 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 771, 136 L.Ed.2d 717 (1997). To prove a violation of the bank fraud statute, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to defraud the bank. See United States v. Chandler, 98 F.3d 711, 715 (2d Cir.1996). 22 Matt argues that his testimony that he believed that he had an overdraft line of credit, coupled with the brochure explaining that an available feature of his SLB account was overdraft protection, the testimony of his accountant and expert that he had an overdraft line of credit, and the fact that SLB paid an overdraft in 1990, preclude the possibility that any rational juror could have concluded that he had the requisite intent to defraud the bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Given the other evidence at trial, however, defendant's argument collapses. 23 First, while SLB did issue an FMA account brochure describing overdraft protection as an available feature, SLB sent Matt a letter in 1987 indicating that the overdraft line of credit feature was no longer available on FMA accounts. Second, Matt's expert witness opined that, through a course of dealing, SLB provided Matt with a line of credit. This course of dealing apparently included SLB's practice of calling Matt to tell him he had insufficient funds and providing him with an opportunity to cover those accounts. A rational juror could have concluded that the telephone calls to Matt were performed as a courtesy, and did not constitute the extension of a line of credit. Finally, Matt's claim that SLB once covered an overdraft for him in September 1990 should not change the result. First, it is unclear whether in fact it was an overdraft, because Matt's own notations on the bank statement indicated that he deposited sufficient funds in the account two days before the negative balance appeared on his bank statement. Furthermore, even if the Bank did pay an overdraft, a rational juror could have concluded that it should not have raised Matt's expectations to such a level that he believed he had a constant line of credit. Matt argues, in short, that the Bank's policies and practices allowed him to do what he did, and that what he did therefore cannot be check kiting. But a check kiter does not necessarily achieve the illegal end by violating bank policy or practice; a check kiter may also take note of the limitations to each bank's indulgence and then stay within those limits, as a way to keep the scheme in play long enough to build up the undetected credit. Drawing all inferences in favor of the government, a rational jury could have found the intent element of the bank fraud statute beyond a reasonable doubt.