Opinion ID: 2087446
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identical Parties

Text: Clearly, the commissioner does not act in his individual capacity in an implied consent proceeding, but only in his official capacity as a member of the executive branch of state government, and thus as an officer and agent for the state. The state, although a legal person for most purposes, can only act through its officers and agents. The only apparent reason that the implied consent statute specified that the commissioner must be named as the respondent in a petition for judicial review is that the commissioner provides the prior administrative review. Compare Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 1 (2006) [2] ([A] person may request in writing a review of the order of revocation or disqualification by the commissioner   .), with Minn.Stat. § 169A.53 subd. 2(b)(1) (2006) (noting the petition must be captioned in the full name of the person making the petition as petitioner and the commissioner as respondent). In this sense, the commissioner is the nominal party, and the state is the real party. In fact, the implied consent statute recognizes that the state is the real party in both the implied consent and the DWI proceedings by providing that the implied consent hearing may be conducted at the same time and in the same manner as hearings upon pretrial motions in the criminal [DWI] prosecution. Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (2006). This identity between officers and the government they serve was recognized years ago by the United States Supreme Court in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940), where the Court stated: Where the issues in separate suits are the same, the fact that the parties are not precisely identical is not necessarily fatal. As stated in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 620, 46 S.Ct. 420, 70 L.Ed. 757, Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance. Parties nominally the same may be, in legal effect, different, . . . and parties nominally different may be, in legal effect, the same. A judgment is res judicata in a second action upon the same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195. There is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government. The crucial point is whether or not in the earlier litigation the representative of the United States had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy. (Citations omitted.) The reference to the representative in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. means the governmental agency, not its counsel. In other words, because two agencies are in privity with one another and are representatives of the same government, the only question is whether the agency that was the nominal party in the first proceeding had authority to represent the government in that proceeding. As applied here, the question is whether the commissioner had authority to represent the state in the implied consent proceeding. If the commissioner did, then the interests of the state were adequately represented in the implied consent proceeding and any judgment is binding on the state or any of its other agencies. The Supreme Court of Alaska relied on Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. to conclude that there was an identity of parties between the state and its department of public safety so that a suppression order entered against the state in a DWI preliminary hearing, determining that the results of a breathalyzer test could not be used because of the failure to preserve a sample, collaterally estopped the department from relitigating the admissibility of the test results in the license revocation proceeding. Briggs v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 732 P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Alaska 1987). The court in Briggs stated: The suppression issue decided by the district court was fully litigated by the prosecution at the suppression hearing. The interests of the Department of Public Safety in litigating this issue were thus adequately represented. We therefore conclude that all the requirements for collateral estoppel have been met, and the state is therefore barred from relitigating the suppression issue. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court was even more direct in finding identity between the state and its bureau of motor vehicles, stating: The state argues essentially that privity does not exist between the parties because it is the [Registrar of Motor Vehicles] whose interest is represented at the [administrative driver's license suspension] appeal and it is the state whose interest is represented at the criminal proceeding. We find this argument to be unpersuasive. The state acts through its various agencies and entities, and the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is an agency of the state. We conclude that the state of Ohio is the real party in interest in both proceedings and the requirement of privity as an element of issue preclusion is satisfied. State v. Williams, 76 Ohio St.3d 290, 667 N.E.2d 932, 936 (1996). The fact that one proceeding is civil in nature and the other is criminal in nature does not alter the identity of the state as a party to each. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Thompson , we said: We agree with appellants that the judgment of conviction in the criminal case is conclusive as to the result of the civil action before us to determine respondent's rights to the proceeds of the insurance policies on the life of his deceased wife. We are constrained to the view that to permit a retrial of the facts and issues [in a civil proceeding that were] already determined in the criminal proceeding would be an imposition on the courts and only tend to embarrass or bring into disrepute the judicial process. 281 Minn. 547, 555, 163 N.W.2d 289, 294 (1968). Of course, the application of collateral estoppel between criminal and civil cases may run afoul of another element, the need that the issues be identical. See Willems, 333 N.W.2d at 621. A finding of fact against the driver in a civil case, to a fair preponderance of the evidence, would not be identical to the issue in the criminal case, where the same fact must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And conversely, the findings of fact inherent in a not-guilty verdict in a criminal case would not be the identical issue when the same facts are presented in a civil case, where they need only be proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence. But, as the majority agrees, those differences in burden of proof are not implicated here because the fact question decided in the implied consent hearing  that the deputy had no particularized basis to stop Lemmer  is precisely the same fact issue that is presented (and is to be determined under the same standard of proof) in the DWI proceeding. The majority relies on State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. House for the conclusion that the state and the commissioner are not identical parties. 291 Minn. 424, 192 N.W.2d 93 (1971). That reliance is misplaced because House focused not on the parties but on the attorneys  a fact that is wholly irrelevant for collateral estoppel purposes. Although House arose from an implied consent proceeding, and involved the impact on that proceeding of actions taken in the DWI prosecution, it did not involve a prior judgment of the court in either proceeding and thus did not present any collateral estoppel issue. Instead, it only involved the scope of the authority of the attorney in the DWI proceeding to negotiate a plea that included the dismissal of the implied consent proceeding. Id. at 424-25, 192 N.W.2d at 94. We focused on the statutes that authorize the county attorneys to represent the state in DWI proceedings and the attorney general to represent the commissioner in implied consent proceedings, holding narrowly: We accordingly hold that the county attorney acted beyond his authority in attempting to bargain for dismissal of these proceedings, the responsibility for which is vested in the commissioner of public safety. Id. at 426, 192 N.W.2d at 95. The Alaska Supreme Court, when it applied collateral estoppel in a license revocation proceeding to the judgment of the court in a DWI proceeding, distinguished the circumstances of its case from those similar to those presented in House: The instant case is distinguishable from situations where the differing interests of the prosecutor and the administrative agency might justify a refusal to apply collateral estoppel. For example, this is unlike a case in which the defendant is seeking estoppel effect from a prosecutor's dismissal of charges or stipulation of facts. There the prosecutor's decision to dismiss or to stipulate might reflect interests not shared by the administrative agency and thus should not be used against the agency, which was not entitled to appear at the criminal proceeding. Likewise, this is not a case where the defendant attempts to use a criminal acquittal for estoppel effect at the administrative proceeding. There the differing burdens of proof would justify refusal to give collateral estoppel effect. Briggs, 732 P.2d at 1083 n. 9 (emphasis added). Because it was unnecessary in House to decide whether the parties were identical, any statements we made about the relationship between the parties was necessarily dicta. And, perhaps because that was not the focus of the case, our statements about the parties were actually contradictory. We did make the broad statement, relied on by the majority, that the parties to the proceedings are not the same, but we later contradicted that statement when we equated the state with the commissioner, stating [n]o authority is given for the county attorney to deal with civil cases [i.e., implied consent proceedings] in which the state, rather than the county, is a party.  House, 291 Minn. at 425, 192 N.W.2d at 95 (emphasis added). Accordingly, House is of no guidance in this case. Moreover, the question of whether the state and the commissioner are the same party should not depend on who their attorneys are. [3] The state, like any other party, is free to select its attorney. The state has selected its attorneys by enacting statutes that designate the attorney general's office to be the primary attorney in implied consent proceedings and the county attorney to be the primary attorney in DWI proceedings. See Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (The commissioner shall appear and be represented by the attorney general or through the prosecuting authority for the jurisdiction involved.); Minn.Stat. § 388.051, subd. 1(c) (2006) (stating the county attorney shall: prosecute felonies, including the drawing of indictments found by the grand jury, and, to the extent prescribed by law, gross misdemeanors, misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors.). But those assignments are not made exclusive. Thus, the county attorney may request that the attorney general represent the state in DWI proceedings. See Minn.Stat. § 8.01 (2006). And the county attorney may act either as alternative counsel in the implied consent proceeding, see Minn.Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3 (permitting representation by the prosecuting authority for the jurisdiction involved), or may be designated, on the attorney general's request, to represent the commissioner in implied consent proceedings, see Minn.Stat. § 8.06 (2006) (When requested by the attorney general, it shall be the duty of any county attorney of the state to appear within the county and act as attorney for any    officer in any court of such county.). [4] In other words, the selection of counsel is an internal matter for the state and should not alter the rights of third persons with whom the state litigates. Nothing in the statutes prevents the county attorneys and the attorney general from communicating with one another and coordinating common issues that can be expected to arise in these two proceedings. And nothing in the statutes prevents them from agreeing about how they will allocate the issues between them. To the contrary, the statutes actually encourage such cooperation and provide the mechanism for the attorney general and the county attorneys to be interchangeable. These mechanisms assure that the state has a full and fair opportunity to be heard in both the implied consent and the DWI proceeding. It has chosen which counsel it will primarily use in each proceeding, and it has authorized primary counsel to coordinate and even switch roles where appropriate. Because the commissioner is merely a nominal party in implied consent proceedings, and the real party is the state, whose interests the commissioner represents, I would conclude that the parties in an implied consent proceeding and those in the parallel DWI proceeding are identical for collateral estoppel purposes.