Opinion ID: 65057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cavazos’s Closing Remark

Text: As to Cavazos’s closing statement, the Supreme Court has stated that “if the prosecutor’s remarks were ‘invited,’ and did no more than respond substantially in order to ‘right the scale,’ such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1985). This court has recognized this rule on multiple occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The prosecutor’s response will not necessarily warrant reversal, so long as it is designed merely to right the scale.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Vaccaro, 115 F.3d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e may consider the invitation in judging whether the prosecutor’s invited response unfairly prejudiced the defendants.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689, 697 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The defendant’s comments clearly invited the prosecutor’s reply.”). In the present case, the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it ruled that the closing remark did not constitute prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. Ramon’s attorney stated in his closing remarks: “Chad Hainley was concerned. That’s why he called. We’ve got other—we’ve got other semen. Is this a case of economics trying to win over 9 truth and justice?” During her closing argument, Cavazos remarked: “Chad Hainley called me to see if we were going to submit any other samples, not because he was concerned.” Defense counsel’s comment appears to have “invited” Cavazos to “right the scale” regarding the DNA evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals thereby did not unreasonably apply clearly established law when it determined that Cavazos’s “reference to Dr. Hainley during closing argument could be interpreted as a reference to Dr. Hainley’s testimony when he was recalled, rather than to the prosecutor’s own testimony.” Ramon points us to United States v. Gracia, a case in which this court ruled that a prosecutor’s closing remark was an error constituting prejudicial misconduct. 522 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 2008) (prosecutor admonished the jurors that an acquittal of defendant would mean that they believed the agents “got out of bed” on the day they arrested Gracia and decided this was “the day that [they] were going to start [a] conspiracy to wrongfully convict Mr. Gracia.”). However, Gracia was decided on direct appeal, not on a petition for federal habeas relief under AEDPA’s narrower standard of review. Furthermore, even if we were to consider Cavazos’s misconduct directly, as opposed to through the AEDPA lens, her actions would not rise to the level of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. Other cases in this court’s direct appeal jurisprudence are illustrative of prosecutors’ comments that either were not improper or were improper but not prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Larraga, 517 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Why would [the agents] get up here and try to make up lies or make up suggestions and so forth? They were there. They’re telling you what they saw, so it’s a question whether you believe these agents or not.”); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 360 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A] lot of people have fallen for that con [referring to the defendant].”); Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d at 873 (“Do the agents have any reason? Do they have a reason to throw away their career, to say, . . . I’m going to give up my twenty-year law enforcement career, because I 10 really care that two people get convicted. They’re there to testify to the truth. They enforce the laws and they’re going to honor it. And they’re going to say, these are the facts.”); Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d at 319 (“[D]o you think that agents for the federal government and a prosecutor for the federal government, for the United States of America, are going to risk their career and get on the stand and . . . commit perjury and risk their career. It’s not going to happen, ladies and gentlemen.”). The state court’s adjudication therefore did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it ruled that the prosecutor’s statement in her closing argument was not prejudicial.