Opinion ID: 1095462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: ethics commission suit

Text: On December 2, 1985, the Mississippi Ethics Commission (the Commission), as a state agency, and its seven members [12] filed a complaint in the same chancery court against Logan, Nunnally, Knox, Killebrew, Anderson and Purvis seeking declaratory relief as against these defendants as sought by the Attorney General in his action against Frazier and Knox. The complaint contained a separate count as to each defendant embracing the conduct of each, and as to Logan, Nunnally, Killebrew and Anderson, stated that insofar as Miss. Code Ann. § 24-4-105(3)(h) (Supp. 1985) purported to authorize such conduct, it violated Section 109 and was unenforceable. Therefore, each of their employment contracts was in violation of Section 109. As to Knox, essentially the same allegations was made as in the suit by the Attorney General. [13] As to Purvis, the complaint stated that insofar as Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3)(b) (Supp. 1985) purported to authorize P.I.A.'s contract with the Tombigbee River Valley Water Management District, it violated Section 109, and that the insurance contract violated Section 109. On December 16, 1985, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which sought restitution from all defendants except Purvis of all funds received thereafter under their contracts, and as to Purvis that the court order restitution of all funds received then or thereafter by P.I.A., Inc. Each of the defendants in motions to dismiss challenged the authority of the Commission to file suit. The motions alleged the Commission was a nullity under our decision in Alexander v. State, ex rel. Allain, 441 So.2d 1329 (Miss. 1983), because two members were appointed each by the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Legislature, and the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, that the Attorney general had not given his consent to file the suit, that the Commission had no authority to seek a declaratory judgment under Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-19(f), that the commission had no statutory authority to bring this type of action, and that venue was improper. In response to a motion filed by the Commission to consolidate the two actions (and later withdrawn), the Attorney General challenged the authority of the Commission to bring the suit, alleging his office had the exclusive authority to bring such a suit, and at no time had his office refused to bring any action requested by the Commission. The Attorney General finally moved the chancery court to dismiss the action of the Commission. In an oral opinion on January 28, 1986, the chancellor announced he was overruling the motions to dismiss because of the public importance in having a judicial resolution to the questions raised in the Ethics Commission action. On February 3 the chancellor entered an order overruling the motions to dismiss. The defendants who had not already done so then filed answers. On March 31 the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment against all defendants. Various defendants filed counter-motions for summary judgment. On April 7 the chancellor conducted a hearing on the motions for summary judgment as to all parties except Nunnally, and announced he was overruling the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and sustained plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment to the extent of granting declaratory relief. While he had previously overruled the motions to dismiss, the chancellor expressed reservations as to the validity of the Commission because of the method of appointing its Members. (Vol. III, 389) As to restitution, the chancellor was of the view that under this Court's decision in Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So.2d 906 (1943), the defendants would be bound to pay restitution for monies received under proscribed conditions from and after the court's judgment became final. In an amended answer filed March 13, Purvis stated a willingness to refund the entire commission P.I.A., Inc., had received under the insurance contract should the court hold there was a violation of Section 109. The chancellor conducted a hearing as to Nunnally on June 16. On June 27 he filed his written findings of fact and conclusions of law, which we deem appropriate to set forth in some detail. He found factually: The action sought restitution, declaratory and injunctive relief against these defendants for conduct allegedly in violation of Section 109. Plaintiffs were members of the Mississippi Ethics Commission, an agency of the State, and the seven members who appeared in their official positions and individually as Mississippi citizens and taxpayers. Section 109 prohibited public officers, including legislators, from having a financial interest in any contract with the State of its political subdivisions when that contract was authorized by a law passed or order made by a public body of which the officer was a member, during or within one year after his term of office. The Legislature in 1983 enacted the Standards of Conduct Act (the Act), Miss. Code Ann. §§ 25-4-101 to -4-117 (Supp. 1985) prohibiting certain activities through which public officials could derive pecuniary benefit by use of their official positions, defining the prohibited activities and establishing penalties for violation, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 25-4-105(2) and -4-109 (Supp. 1985). The Act also contained exceptions Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (h), which had the effect of authorizing activities which would otherwise violate the Act's prohibitions. These exceptions permitted: (a) certain public servants to contract with certain state, county or local governmental entities if such contract was let pursuant to competitive bidding or if the goods or services involved were reasonably available from less than three sources; (b) Legislators and other public officers to be employed by or receive compensation from certain state, county or local governmental entities. The chancellor found the statutory exceptions permitted such contracts or employment whether or not the contracts were authorized by the public body of which the officer was a member. [14] The Commission was an agency of the State, created in 1979 by the Legislature to insure the independence, integrity and impartiality of public officials, without regard to political considerations, and to promote public confidence in governmental integrity. The Commission was composed of eight members appointed by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Legislature and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to four-year terms, and had been given the specific independent authority to issue advisory opinions, conduct investigations, and bring civil actions through an attorney of its choice. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 25-4-5, 25-4-17, 25-4-19(f), (g). The Commission had determined these defendants, while falling with one or more exceptions under the Act, apparently violated Section 109. Following investigations and conferences with the Attorney General, the Commission filed this action, even though the Attorney General had filed a complaint, because of a determination by the Commission that a greater variety of potential violations of Section 109 should be presented for adjudication than encompassed in the Attorney General's action. The court then found the facts as to each of the defendants essentially as have been recited in this opinion. His conclusions of law were: The court had jurisdiction, and proper venue was with that court. The Commission had authority to bring the action, under Miss.Code ann. § 11-45-11 (1972), and our holding in Grenada Municipal Separate School District v. Jesco, Inc., 449 So.2d 226 (Miss. 1984), and that it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether the commissioners in their individual capacities had standing to file the suit. The chancellor further found, however, that the commissioners had authority to bring the action as individuals, citing several authorities from this Court. (Vol. III, 455) That while this was a type of case normally maintained by the Attorney General, and while the Attorney General had the right to direct the flow of litigation, his office could not frustrate lawful legislative purpose or block a lawful state agency from performing the lawful duties it was created to perform, and that this suit was properly before the court. That the Commission officials' action in bringing suit against the defendants was valid, regardless of the constitutionality of their appointment (Vol. III, 457) citing decisions of this Court. While the defendants argued the Commission was unconstitutionally composed under Alexander v. State, by and through Allain , supra, the defendants did not contend the establishment of the Commission itself was beyond the power of the Legislature, or that the powers conferred upon the Commission should be removed by virtue of the source of their appointment. Therefore the Commission was a properly created and functioning state agency. The court remained concerned whether the members of the Commission could be appointed by other branches of government, but in deciding the narrow legal issue of whether the Commission officials' action was valid in bringing suit, longstanding principles of law prohibited the defendants from collaterally attacking the Commission's members. The defendants were public officers, and in determining whether a violation of Section 109 had occurred, good faith and honest motives were not relevant, again citing decisions of this Court. (Vol. III, 458) Regarding the conduct of the defendants, the chancellor made the following findings: Logan. Citing Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1367 (Miss. 1981), Logan's salary was a teacher was paid by ad valorem taxes levied as a result of orders entered by the city board, and therefore his contract was authorized by the city board of which he was a member. This was in violation of Section 109. Nunnally. The appropriation bill enacted while Nunnally was in the Legislature authorized his and his wife's contracts of employment as school teachers. These constituted conflicts of interest in violation of Section 109 and of Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(2) (Supp. 1985). Anderson. As with Nunnally, the appropriation bill enacted while Anderson was in the Legislature authorized his contract of employment with Jackson State University, and violated Section 109. Purvis. The appropriations to the Tombigbee River Valley Water Management District authorized the contract of insurance with P.I.A., Inc., and the District. As president and shareholder in P.I.A., this violated Section 109. Killebrew. As with Logan, Killebrew's salary as a teacher in Quitman County was paid by ad valorem taxes levied as a result of orders entered by the Board of Supervisors of which he was a member, and his employment contract was likewise authorized by the board of which he was a member. This was in violation of Section 109. To the extent the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3) undertook to provide exceptions to Section 109 for these defendants, it was unconstitutional and void. The court granted the following in regard to remedies: Restitution as prayed for by the plaintiffs was denied, under Golden v. Thompson, supra . A declaratory judgment would be entered holding that each defendant was in violation of Section 109, and to the extent that Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3)(a), (b) and (h) attempted to provide exceptions for public officers and members of the Legislature, these statutes were unconstitutional and void. The court declined to enjoin the defendants from divesting themselves of any contractual interest, or resigning from public office, because the choice would obviously have to be made when the judgment became final. A final judgment in accordance with this opinion was entered on July 22, 1986. Purvis has perfected no appeal. The remaining defendants have appealed. The Commission has cross-appealed the denial of restitution.