Opinion ID: 2514148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of unrelated assault evidence

Text: On appeal, Defendant contended that MM's statement regarding Ashley's sexual assault, if proven to be false, was relevant to MM's credibility and, specifically, the truthfulness of her allegation against Defendant. The prosecution countered that MM's statement fell within the scope of HRE Rule 412, also known as Hawaii's rape-shield statute, [7] and that Defendant had not followed appropriate procedures for introducing such evidence. After stating that MM's allegation of molestation by Ashley would have no relevance to her credibility unless it was indeed false, West, 95 Hawaii at 497, 24 P.3d at 693, the ICA question[ed] the trial court's conclusion that there was no evidence of falsity, id., and concluded that, on the basis of defense counsel's offer of proof, the trial court should have concluded the evidence was relevant. Id. Then, in a footnote, the ICA cited HRE Rule 104(b), suggesting that the ICA believed that the determination of falsity should have been made by the jury. Id. at 26 n. 30. Based on that apparent belief, the ICA reversed. In its application for certiorari, the prosecution appears to accept the proposition that unrelated false allegations may be relevant to a complainant's credibility. However, the prosecution contends that there was no basis for determining the falsity of MM's unrelated allegation because defense counsel: (1) did not have a good faith basis to assert falsity; (2) failed to comply with the rules for introducing such evidence; and (3) failed to provide an adequate offer of proof. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the ICA's determination that MM's statement regarding Ashley would have no relevance to her credibility unless it was indeed false. West, 95 Hawaii at 497, 24 P.3d at 693. However, we disagree that the falsity of MM's allegations was established or that the question should have been submitted to the jury.
This court has never previously considered how a trial court should respond when a defendant, on trial for a sexual offense, seeks to admit evidence purportedly demonstrating that the complainant has made other allegedly false statements to the effect that he or she has been the victim of a separate sexual assault. [8] Courts that have addressed the admissibility of statements by complainants of unrelated sexual assaults in which the complainant was a victim [9] have uniformly held that evidence of false statements of unrelated sex assaults are not excluded by the rape shield statute because they are not evidence of sexual conduct. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 105 Nev. 497, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (1989); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264 (1988); cf. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. at 521, 849 P.2d at 77 (stating that evidence that a cognitively-challenged complainant fantasized about sex would not be barred by Hawaii's rape shield statute because sexual fantasizing is not sexual conduct). [F]abricated accusations of sexual abuse or sex assault are highly probative of a [complainant's] credibility concerning sexual assault charges. Miller, 779 P.2d at 89 (citing Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind.Ct.App.1980)). Under HRE Rule 608(b), evidence of specific acts, if probative of truthfulness, may be introduced for the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness. Of course, the probative value of the evidence must always be weighed against the risk of prejudice, confusion, embarrassment, or undue delay. See HRE Rule 403. Clinebell, Miller, and Little, supra, were among the cases cited by the ICA for the proposition that false allegations of unrelated sexual assaults are not excluded by the rape shield statute. See West, 95 Hawaii 494, n. 17, 24 P.3d at 690, n. 17. With this proposition, there can be no dispute. More importantly, however, and apparently overlooked by the ICA, each of these cases clearly recognizes that the admissibility of such statements is dependent upon its falsity and that, therefore, a threshold determination by the court that the statement regarding the unrelated sexual assault is false is required. See Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 266; Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643; Miller, 779 P.2d at 90. In Clinebell, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court held that [a] complaining witness' prior accusations are admissible . . . only if a court makes a threshold determination that a reasonable probability of falsity exists. 368 S.E.2d at 266 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Little, the Court of Appeals of Indiana outlined the following analysis for determining the admissibility of an allegedly false accusation of sexual misconduct: The focus is the falsity of the accusations. We believe that evidence of false accusations of similar sexual misconduct is admissible on the issue of the victim's credibility. The allegations, however, must be demonstrably false. As stated in State v. Nab [,] 245 Or. 454, 421 P.2d 388, 391 [(Ore.1966)]: It should be observed that the rule . . . does not permit the trial to stray from the central issue of the guilt or innocence of the defendant into a full-scale investigation of charges made by the prosecutrix against other persons. That would be intolerable. The rule is limited to the reception of evidence that the prosecutrix has admitted the falsity of the charges or they had been disproved. 413 N.E.2d at 643 (ellipsis in original) (emphases added). Finally, in Miller, the Nevada Supreme Court explained that, [a]s a prerequisite to admitting a complaining witness' prior sexual assault and sexual abuse accusations and corroborative extrinsic evidence proving the falsity thereof, a threshold inquiry must establish both the fact of the accusations and the falsity thereof even before defense counsel launches into cross-examination. See Covington v. Alaska, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska [App.]1985); Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 266. Thus, if a defendant in a sexual assault case proposes to cross-examine the complaining witness about prior false sexual assault or sexual abuse allegations and introduce corroborative evidence, he must, prior to such questioning, file written notice of his intent. The trial court must then order a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to determine the propriety of such questioning and the admissibility of corroborative evidence. 779 P.2d at 90 (emphasis added). In fact, nearly every jurisdiction addressing this question has consistently required a preliminary determination of falsity prior to the admission of allegedly false statements of unrelated sexual assaults. See Peeples v. State, 681 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1995) (reiterating the rule in Alabama that demonstrated falsity is the sine qua non of admissibility of. . . evidence [of a victim's prior false allegations of sexual misconduct].), reh'g denied, 681 So.2d 236 (1996); Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985) (adopting the rule from a majority of other courts that evidence of false accusations by complainant is only permitted if the defendant makes a showing out of the presence of the jury that the witness' prior allegations of sexual assault were false, as, for example, where the charges somehow had been disproved or where the witness had conceded their falsity); accord State v. Hutchinson, 141 Ariz. 583, 688 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Ariz.App.1984); State v. Sullivan, 244 Conn. 640, 712 A.2d 919, 923 (1998); People v. Mason, 219 Ill. App.3d 76, 161 Ill.Dec. 705, 578 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (1991); People v. Williams, 191 Mich. App. 269, 477 N.W.2d 877, 879 (1991); State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. App.1993); State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court of the Montana Fourth Judicial District, 277 Mont. 349, 922 P.2d 474, 479 (1996); People v. Passenger, 175 A.D.2d 944, 946, 572 N.Y.S.2d 972 (N.Y.App.Div.1991); State v. LeClair, 83 Or.App. 121, 730 P.2d 609, 615 (Or.App.1986); State v. Chamley, 568 N.W.2d 607, 616 (S.D.1997); Tinlin v. State, 983 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex.App.1998); State v. Quinn, 200 W.Va. 432, 490 S.E.2d 34, 40 (1997), cert. denied, Quinn v. West Virginia, 522 U.S. 1004, 118 S.Ct. 577, 139 L.Ed.2d 416 (1997). Furthermore, as some courts have explained, where the truth or falsity of a statement regarding an unrelated sexual assault is unknown, it falls within the purview of the rape shield statute and must be analyzed accordingly. See, e.g., Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643; Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at 40; Booker v. State, 334 Ark. 434, 976 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1998) (holding that, where no evidence was presented to show whether the allegation evidence was true or false, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it). [T]o permit reception of evidence which may be true or false would allow circumvention of the [r]ape [s]hield [statute], Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643, because the jury may be tempted to consider evidence about an alleged victim's sexual conduct in order to determine the victim's credibility. Id. A juror's consideration of an alleged victim's sexual conduct for the purpose of determining the victim's credibility is precisely the circumstance that the rape shield statutes are designed to guard against. Based on the foregoing wealth of authority, we agree with the West Virginia Supreme Court that [m]ost if not all jurisdictions which have considered the applicability of rape shield laws to other statements evidence have answered this question by concluding that rape shield laws apply to such evidence unless the defendant makes a threshold showing to the trial judge outside the presence of the jury based on substantial proof that the other statements made by the alleged victim are false. Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at 39 (emphasis added). As with any preliminary determination regarding admissibility, if an objection as to admissibility of testimony is made, counsel seeking to introduce the testimony may make a specific offer of what is expected to be proved by the testimony. See Haw.R.Civ.P.Rule 43(c) (2000). If the offer of proof is sufficient to establish falsity, the court, at an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury, should determine the threshold issue. Notwithstanding the uniformity with which the cases require a preliminary determination of falsity, courts have varied widely with respect to the standard of proof required. See, e.g., State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis.2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600, 606-07 (1990) (requiring an offer of proof from which the jury could reasonably conclude the statement was false); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978) (requiring some factual basis of falsity); Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 266 (requiring a reasonable probability of falsity); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1981) (requiring that it be convincingly [shown] that the other charge was false); Miller, 779 P.2d at 90 (requiring that falsity be established by a preponderance of the evidence); Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643 (requiring that the prior charges be demonstrably false); Covington, 703 P.2d at 442 (requiring proof of falsity, such as disproving charges or showing witness conceded falsity). In Hawai`i, we have previously determined that, [w]here the facts necessary to admissibility are disputed, the offering party has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Gano, 92 Hawai`i at 172, 988 P.2d at 1164 (citing State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai`i 148, 157, 871 P.2d 782, 791 (1994) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987))) (ellipsis and brackets omitted). We see no reason to depart from this rule in this context. Accordingly, we hold that, where a defendant seeks to admit allegedly false statements made by a complainant regarding an unrelated sexual assault, the trial court must make a preliminary determination based on a preponderance of the evidence that the statements are false. Correlatively, where the trial court is unable to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement is false, the defendant has failed to meet his or her burden, and the evidence may be properly excluded. We now turn to the facts of this case.
In this case, the defense alleged that MM had made up the sexual assault by Ashley. In its offer of proof, the defense contended that, during the videotaped interview regarding the instant case with the investigator, MM stated that, when she was six years old and living with her grandmother, she was sexually molested in her mother's presence by Ashley. [10] Defense counsel argued that,  if [MM was] making up allegations [against Ashley], then allegations that she made against [D]efendant are equally suspect[.] Defense counsel twice conceded to the court that she had no idea whether MM's statements regarding Ashley were true or false. Defense counsel merely stated that she assume[d] that law enforcement did not believe [that the events involving Ashley] occurred because they didn't follow up on them. Later, defense counsel stated that MM's mother could contradict MM's statement regarding Ashley by testifying that she had never witnessed the occasion of which MM spoke. The prosecution, however, argued that MM never said her mother was present during the assault by Ashley. As previously explained, the trial court requested a copy of MM's statement; however, defense counsel informed the court that the statement was contained in a videotaped interview, which defense counsel was unable to transcribe because the audio [was] so bad. The court instructed defense counsel to write down what was said so that the court could consider the issue. Based on counsel's offers of proof and the arguments presented on the issue, the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection on three separate occasions before finally determining that defense counsel had failed to offer any evidence that MM's statements were false. [11] In its opinion, the ICA question[ed] the trial court's conclusion that there was no evidence of falsity. West, 95 Hawaii at 497, 24 P.3d at 693. The ICA then went on to scrutinize defense counsel's offers of proof and concluded that, [o]n [the] basis [of defense counsel's offer of proof], we believe the trial court should have concluded the evidence was relevant. Id. We agree that, had the trial court determined that the statements were false, the evidence would have been relevant; however, as previously articulated, the ICA's conclusion of relevancy is based on its erroneous assumption that the question regarding the falsity of the statements in the first instance was a matter for determination by the jury. Notwithstanding its erroneous assumption, the ICA clearly and summarily disregarded the trial court's determination that there was no evidence of falsity. We take this opportunity to reiterate that fact-finding is the fundamental responsibility of the judge of the facts at trial. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 91 L.Ed.2d 110 (1986). As [the United States Supreme Court] frequently has emphasized, appellate courts are not to decide factual questions de novo, reversing any findings they would have made differently. Id. (citations omitted). Rather, the trial court's determination of preliminary factual issues concerning the admission of evidence will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction in reviewing the entire evidence that a mistake has been committed. McGriff, 76 Hawai`i at 157, 871 P.2d at 791 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We now examine the evidence of falsity adduced to determine whether the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous. At trial, defense counsel put forth law enforcement's failure to follow up on MM's disclosure regarding Ashley as proof of the falsity of MM's statements. Despite the fact that defense counsel provided no basis for her assumption that MM's statements regarding Ashley had not been investigated, [12] the failure to investigate or prosecute does not establish the falsity of the statements. See Peeples, 681 So.2d at 238 (stating that the mere showing that a nolle prosequi had been entered as to the collateral allegations did not establish falsity (citation omitted)); Hutchinson, 688 P.2d at 212-13 (determining that dismissal of a prior unrelated sex assault case for lack of probable cause does not establish the falsity of the accusation for admissibility purposes); Hughes, 641 F.2d at 792 (stating that [t]he fact that the district attorney chose not to prosecute, in itself, could mean no more than that he decided he did not have sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction); accord Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225-26 (Tex. Crim.App.2000). Defense counsel's next basis for admission was that MM's mother, if allowed to testify, would contradict MM's statement that her mother witnessed the assault. However, due to the lack of a transcript and the inability of counsel to agree on what was actually stated, there was no evidence that MM had actually alleged that her mother was present during the alleged molestation by Ashley. Finally, by defense counsel's own repeated admissions, it was unknown whether MM's statement that she was assaulted by Ashley was false. When considering the whole of the offer of proof submitted by Defendant on the falsity of MM's statement, we believe  as did the trial court  that Defendant, at most, established that the falsity of MM's allegation regarding Ashley was unknown. Therefore, Defendant failed to meet his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that MM's statements were false, and we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in excluding any evidence of MM's statement. Accordingly, we hold that the ICA erroneously reversed the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of MM's statement regarding the alleged unrelated sexual assault.