Opinion ID: 751714
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coverage under the Broadened Coverage--Garages Endorsement

Text: 59 Koenig further contends that Massachusetts Bay was obligated to defend it against claims for personal injuries, which the parties' Broadened Coverage--Garages endorsement 9 defines as: 60 injury, other than bodily injury, arising out of one or more of the following offenses: 61 a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment; 62 b. Malicious prosecution; 63 c. Wrongful entry into, or eviction of a person from, a room, dwelling or premises that the person occupies; 64 d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services; or 65 e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of privacy. 66 (Appellee's Br., Supp.App., Broadened Coverage-Garages, at 16 (emphasis added)). In so doing, it asserts that the Film House complaint alleges facts which could potentially constitute an action for wrongful entry, slander, and/or invasion of privacy, thereby invoking the policy's coverage. We, however, are of the opinion that Koenig is not entitled to a defense under this provision. 1. Slander 67 Under Tennessee law, [t]o establish a claim for [slander] the plaintiff must prove that the defendant communicated a false and defamatory statement to the person of another, and that as a result thereof the plaintiffs suffered actual damages. 10 Shipley v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 1991 WL 77540, at  5 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) (citing Emerson v. Garner, 732 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987)). Koenig urges that Film House potentially pleaded these three requisite elements by alleging that Koenig: (1) falsely claimed Film House owed $6,000 on the BMW; (2) communicated false statements that it was going to take the car one way or another ... in the parking lot of insurer's office; and (3) caused significant damage as a result thereof. We find Koenig's argument to be unpersuasive. Giving Koenig the benefit of the doubt and assuming the fact that Film House owed $6,000 on the leased vehicle was false, Koenig nevertheless does not suggest that this particular statement was communicated to other individuals. Rather, it tells us that another declaration--[we are] going to take the car one way or another--was made in the parking lot of insurer's office, and no falsity inheres this statement. Moreover, Koenig relies on statements excerpted from a document entitled, Memorandum of Law and Facts on Behalf of Plaintiff Film House, which explains that Film House should receive compensatory damage because of the humiliation it suffered during and following the repossession, to demonstrate that Film House suffered damages as a result of Koenig's purported slanderous conduct. This proposition is thus extracted not from the complaint, but from an extrinsic document beyond the scope of our inquiry. See Drexel Chemical Co., 933 S.W.2d at 480 (explaining that the obligation of a liability insurance company to defend an action brought against the insured by a third party is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint in that action). For these reasons, Koenig's claim that Film House's complaint made out a cause of action for slander is without merit. 2. Invasion of Privacy 68 Koenig's assertion that the facts in the complaint potentially alleged an invasion of privacy is likewise unpersuasive. While there exists more than one branch of liability under the invasion of privacy cause of action, see Stein v. Davidson Hotel Company, 1996 WL 230196, at  7 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996), Koenig fails to identify the specific theory pursuant to which relief was allegedly sought in Film House's complaint (i.e., intrusion into seclusion, disclosing private information, etc.). 11 More significant, however, is the fact that Koenig once again mistakenly references documents other than the Film House complaint in its attempt to craft a claim which would otherwise fall under the Massachusetts Bay insurance policy's coverage. We hasten to point out that this information is not within the purview of our inquiry. See Drexel Chemical Co., 933 S.W.2d at 480 (the duty to defend is determined solely by the factual allegations of the complaint in relation to the language of the insurance policy). Hence, we need not waste valuable judicial resources and devote effort to addressing the substantive merits of its invasion of privacy argument. 3. Wrongful Entry 69 Koenig also claims that the Film House complaint's allegation which reads, [the] conversion was committed through a breach of the peace whereby defendants entered onto plaintiff's property, evidences a wrongful entry, a cause of action for which the Broadened Coverage--Garages endorsement provides coverage. Towards this end, Koenig cites McCall v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991), for the proposition that when a repossession breaches the peace as Film House alleged in its complaint, the repossessor may be liable for trespass. (Appellant's Br. at 10 (emphasis added)). We believe that this argument effectively extends us an invitation to create Tennessee law, a course of action that we are in no position to follow. That is, as Koenig points out, McCall explicitly addressed the tort of trespass in a vehicle repossession context, whereas the Massachusetts Bay policy insures against Koenig's wrongful entry into the premises of another. Koenig does not refer us to a single Tennessee case that sets forth the elements of a wrongful entry action, and for good reason, as none exist to our knowledge. We could, of course, equate wrongful entry with trespass, and proceed to consider Koenig's argument vis-a-vis Tennessee trespass principles. Such an analysis certainly would not prove novel to this Court, for we have previously drawn upon Missouri's and Illinois' trespass laws to interpret an insurance policy's definition of wrongful entry. See Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire, 976 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.1992). But the predominant reason for having done so-because Missouri and Illinois courts recognize that wrongful entry is substantially similar to trespass, id. at 1041, is inapplicable to the case at bar. Tennessee courts simply have not been called upon to compare and contrast the two causes of action, and it would be imprudent for us to do so in their stead. It is not our province as a reviewing federal appellate body to make federal law, much less state law.