Opinion ID: 2037674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: march term

Text: At a meeting of the General Term of the Superior and Circuit Court of Marion County, met pursuant to notice and adopted the following schedule of service for the respective Judges during the summer vacation. SCHEDULE FOR THE COURTS FOR THE SUMMER 1956 SUPERIOR COURT ROOM 3 JUDGE BRENNAN JULY 2 - 6 incl. JULY 9 - 13 incl. SUPERIOR COURT ROOM 2 JUDGE PIKE JULY 16 - 20 incl. SUPERIOR COURT ROOM 4 JUDGE PRITCHARD JULY 23 - 27 incl. JULY 30 - AUG 3 incl. CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE CLAYCOMBE AUGUST 6 - 10 incl. SUPERIOR COURT ROOM 1 JUDGE NIBLACK AUGUST 13 - 17 incl. SUPERIOR COURT ROOM 5 JUDGE CLARK AUGUST 20 - 24 incl. AUGUST 27 - 31 incl. Hearings on interlocutory orders for Room ONE, TWO, AND THREE SHALL BE HEARD ON TUESDAYS: FOR ROOMS FOUR, FIVE AND CIRCUIT COURT ON WEDNESDAYS: INSANITIES AND BIRTH CERTIFICATES ON THURSDAYS: During vacation period emergency matters only shall be heard, not including citations exclusively for non-payment of attorney's fees. Court shall be open each morning from Monday thru Friday. Only in extreme emergencies shall hearings be had for modification of orders as to custody, as the Judge who heard evidence as to the original order is better qualified to pass upon modification, unless such emergency exists. (Signed) JUDGE JOHN L. NIBLACK, SUPERIOR 1 (Signed) JUDGE WALTER PRITCHARD, SUPERIOR 4 (Signed) JUDGE HEZZIE B. PIKE, SUPERIOR 2 (Signed) JUDGE PAUL B. CLARK, SUPERIOR 5 (Signed) JUDGE NORMAN E. BRENNAN, SUPERIOR 3 (Signed) JUDGE LLOYD D. CLAYCOMBE, CIRCUIT COURT (Signed) JUDGE WALTER PRITCHARD, JUDGE PRESIDING GENERAL TERM The pertinent statute cited by respondent for the appointment of judges pro tempore (Burns' § 4-402, 1946 Replacement) is as follows: Judges pro tempore  Appointment, oath, power and authority.  When, from any cause, any judge of any superior court in the state of Indiana shall be unable to attend and preside at any term of said court, or during any day or days, or during any part of any term, such judge may appoint in writing, any attorney eligible to the office of such judge, or any other judge of a court of record in this state, to preside at such term, or day or days, or part of such term. Such written appointment shall be entered of record in said court, and if such appointee is not a judge of a court of record, he shall take the same oath required by law of judges of superior courts, and such appointee shall conduct the business of such court in the same manner and shall have the same power and authority during the continuance of his appointment as a regularly elected judge of such court. (Acts 1929, ch. 170, § 1, p. 533.) It is readily apparent that no part of this entry of March 5, 1956, constitutes a written appointment of said Lloyd D. Claycombe as judge pro tem of respondent court required by the statute to be entered of record. It merely attempts to fix the schedule of the various courts and it signifies only that Judge Claycombe was to serve in Circuit Court from August 6 to August 10. It does not connect Judge Claycombe with respondent court, nor does it appoint him as a judge thereof. Before considering the effect of relators' motion to dismiss in the lower court attacking the jurisdiction of respondent court, we should make reference to the three sections of the statute [2] governing the taking of certiorari proceedings. Burns' Statutes, § 53-783, heretofore cited, states The petition [for certiorari of a person aggrieved by any decision of the board of zoning appeals] shall be presented to the court within thirty [30] days [from the date of the decision] ... of the board of zoning appeals.... The next section, to-wit, Burns' § 53-784, provides that  On filing a petition for ... certiorari with the clerk of the circuit or superior court ... the petitioner shall cause a notice to be issued and served ... upon the adverse parties.... The third section, to-wit, Burns' § 53-785, provides that  Upon presentation of a petition for ... certiorari, the circuit or superior court ... or a judge thereof in vacation shall direct the board of zoning appeals within twenty [20] days from the date of such citation to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue. (Emphasis supplied.) Relators have not made complaint of any non-compliance with the above statutes by the petitioners for certiorari in the lower court, save and except that the petition was not presented to the court because the judge pro tempore thereof was not qualified to act. The rule is of course well settled that the authority of one who acts as a judge de facto under color of right cannot be collaterally attacked. Rogers v. Beauchamp et al. (1885), 102 Ind. 33, 1 N.E. 185. And as stated in Parker et al. v. The State ex rel. Powell (1892), 133 Ind. 178, 200, 32 N.E. 836, 843: The rule that the acts of an officer de facto, performed before ouster, are, as to the public, as valid as the acts of an officer de jure, is too familiar to the profession to need the citation of authority. The public is not to suffer because those discharging the functions of an officer may have a defective title, or no title at all. Case v. State, 69 Ind. 46; Blackman v. State, 12 Ind. 556; Bansemer v. Mace, 18 Ind. 27; Mowbray v. State, 88 Ind. 324. Also, see note to State, P.R.R. Co. et al. v. Iroq. Cons. Dist. Ct. et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 353, 367, 133 N.E.2d 848, 855. In this case relators' motion to dismiss was filed before respondent (the regular judge) on September 4, 1956, attacking the previous action taken by the pro tempore judge on August 10, 1956. While relators could properly on direct attack question the authority of the presiding judge to act, if seasonably made, we do not believe they could properly attack the previous proceedings of a prior judge taken in the cause at an earlier time. The authorities are numerous that an attack upon the authority of a judge pro tempore, although his appointment is defective, must be seasonably made, or it is waived. See: Carger v. Fee (1889), 119 Ind. 536, 21 N.E. 1080, and cases therein cited. We therefore hold that petitioners' certiorari proceedings were timely filed in the court below in accordance with the statutes, and any lack of authority on the part of the judge pro tempore to act for the various reasons asserted by relators, was inconsequential and that respondent court had jurisdiction of the certiorari proceedings below. It is unnecessary to consider the other questions raised by the parties in the proceedings before us. The alternative writ of mandate and prohibition is accordingly dissolved. Arterburn, C.J., and Achor, Bobbitt and Emmert, JJ., concur. NOTE.  Reported in 146 N.E.2d 88.