Opinion ID: 1203210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court err in limiting the scope of appellant's attack on the ordinance?

Text: In its order granting the city's motion for summary judgment, the trial court expressly declined to address any issues other than the validity of the rate schedule contained in § 23-133(a) of the city ordinance. The court stated: This is Quality's sole ground in its Complaint alleging a conflict between the ordinance and state law. The Complaint, in fact, specifically narrowed Quality's objection to the ordinance to the one issue of the rate schedule. Appellant argues the trial court erred in limiting its scope of attack on the ordinance to the issue of the rate schedule. We agree. Pleadings are to be liberally construed to do substantial justice to all parties. Rule 8(f), SCRCP; Hughes v. Water World Water Slide, Inc., 314 S.C. 211, 442 S.E.2d 584 (1994). Appellant's complaint, while focusing primarily on the rate schedule, gave notice that appellant wished to challenge the maximum amount that can be charged for the towing of vehicles from private property and the manner in which vehicles may be towed from private property. (emphasis added). Moreover, appellant argued the invalidity of other portions of the ordinance in its memorandum in opposition to the city's motion for summary judgment and at the motion hearing. We conclude appellant challenged the validity of the ordinance as a whole, and not just the rate schedule in subsection (d).