Opinion ID: 71999
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Potential Comment on Parole

Text: 72 Cargill's most vehement objection is to the following remarks of the prosecutor: 73 His salvation and what Almighty God does to him for what he's done does not concern us, for society has a right to demand that he pay a price for the events that he has done. Is the appropriate price life imprisonment, and 10 years or 15 years or ever how long it is, seven years or five years, when a bunch of little boys are sitting around the Christmas table thinking, Is that all that jury thought of my mama and daddy because that man is sitting off somewhere eating Christmas turkey dinner? 74 Cargill argues that [t]he clear insinuation of these comments was that the jury could not count upon a life sentence resulting in imprisonment for life. According to Cargill, the prosecutor intentionally and pointedly argued to the jury that its choice was not between life imprisonment and death, but rather between perhaps as few as five years' imprisonment and death. Thus, Cargill believes, the prosecutor improperly commented on the possibility of parole, and this comment was misleading because under O.C.G.A. § 42-9-39(c) consecutive life sentences for each of his four felonies would have rendered him ineligible for parole for at least thirty years. 22 75 We reject Cargill's interpretation of these remarks for several reasons. 23 First, the prosecutor's remarks were not an inaccurate comment on the applicable state law. As the state habeas corpus court found, Cargill had been charged with two counts of murder and two counts of armed robbery. The minimum sentence allowed by law for armed robbery in Georgia is five years imprisonment. O.C.G.A. Sec. 16-8-41(b). Therefore, as the court further determined, a life sentence for murder and from 15 to five years in prison would not be an inaccurate statement of the law. 24 That is, of course, exactly what the prosecutor said--Is the appropriate price life imprisonment, and 10 years or 15 years or ever how long it is, seven years or five years ... ? We are not at liberty to challenge this state court determination of state law. McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 972 (11th Cir.) (en banc ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 990, 115 S.Ct. 489, 130 L.Ed.2d 401 (1994). 76 Moreover, a fair reading of the challenged remarks reveals that the prosecutor was attempting to convey the gravity of the crime and its consequences--the murder of the Williamses left four young boys without parents--to convince the jury that life imprisonment, i.e., allowing Cargill to continue to live, would be too lenient a sentence. The proportionality argument was a consistent theme throughout the prosecutor's closing. Later in his speech, for example, he stated: 77 If you have to show some compassion, show some compassion for a family that has lost two members for absolutely no reason. If your heart has to go out to somebody, let it go out to a society that you represent that demands that this defendant receive that appropriate punishment and not that he be given, compared to the crime he committed, what amounts to more than a judicial slap on the wrist, a sentence of life imprisonment. A sentence of life is a sentence of life. There's no difference between this one and one that's done an armed robbery that has not taken life, to a rapist, to any--to a murderer who has not shown a mind so depraved as this one. 78 Here the prosecutor made an argument comparable to the remarks Cargill challenges--that the gravity of the offense warrants a death sentence; a sentence of life imprisonment, i.e., letting Cargill live, is too light. We also note that the prosecutor made another remark in his closing--I'm not telling you that a life sentence in a Georgia penitentiary is any piece of cake--that appears to contravene Cargill's thesis. We remain mindful of the guideline adopted in Brooks that ambiguous prosecutorial remarks must be viewed with lenity. 762 F.2d at 1400. 25 79 In addition, we note that Cargill's counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to the challenged remarks. Instead, defense counsel waited to object and move for a mistrial until after the prosecutor had finished his closing argument, defense counsel had given his closing argument, the court had rendered its jury instructions and the jury had retired to deliberate. Furthermore, the closing argument of Cargill's counsel was ameliorative: 80 The district attorney, as you heard, stated that David Cargill showed no mercy; so no mercy on him. And I submit to you that a sentence of life imprisonment is not showing mercy. It is a sentence of imprisonment for the rest of his life. When he first was arrested, he was tan and robust. You have heard from the testimony that he has changed dramatically. As you can see now, he's a bleached and worn shadow of what he previously was, even being here in the county jail. Being sentenced to the penitentiary, as even the district attorney in the way he characterized it, is no bed of roses. It's a very harsh and severe penalty; and if such a sentence is voted by you, that does accomplish what the district attorney is asking, and that is that he has forfeited his right to be among us. That is, he will be, by your verdict of life imprisonment, placed in prison for the remainder of his natural life. You would accomplish that goal which the district attorney has asked you to. 81 See Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1509 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc ), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986) (prosecutor's improper argument that parole board would release defendant prematurely was effectively countered by defense counsel's argument that [the defendant] would probably never be released again). Finally, the court instructed the jury concerning life imprisonment as follows: 82 Now, members of the jury, you may return any one of two verdicts as to penalty in this case. Life imprisonment, you may return a verdict which reads, We, the jury, fix the penalty at life imprisonment, in which event the defendant would be sentenced to serve the remainder of his life in the penitentiary. 83 Accordingly, we do not agree with Cargill's assertion that none of the factors that minimize prejudice exists here. Indeed, after a thorough review of the full context of the sentencing proceeding, we conclude that the prosecutorial remarks at issue were not prejudicial. 26 84