Opinion ID: 771084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Applicability of Equitable Tolling to the Limitations on Motions to Reopen

Text: 18 A statute of limitations may be tolled as necessary to avoid inequitable circumstances. See Bowers v. Transportation Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 901 F.2d 258, 264 (2d Cir. 1990). Equitable tolling applies as a matter of fairness where a [party] has been prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights. Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 Not all time limitations are subject to equitable tolling. If Congress enacts a jurisdictional bar to untimely claims, equitable tolling will not apply. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). If the time limit is contained in an ordinary statute of limitations, however, it is assumed that it is subject to equitable tolling. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). The basic question to be answered in determining whether . . . a statute of limitations is to be tolled, is one of legislative intent. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 426 (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Because Congress ordinarily does not explicitly state whether a limitations period is jurisdictional, the nature of a limitations period is a matter of statutory construction. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-54 (1997). This inquiry begins by asking, Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply? Id. at 350. Here, as in other situations, the silence of Congress may express a clear legislative intent. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (noting the traditional presumption that statutes will not be held to have retroactive effect absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result). 21 In Brockamp, for example, the Supreme Court found that a tax statute setting forth a limitation in unusually emphatic form, expressly stating that time-barred actions shall be considered erroneous, did not permit equitable tolling. Id. at 350-51. The Court noted that the statute's detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken together, indicate . . . that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote. Id. at 352. See also United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224, 229 (1960) (finding former federal rules of criminal procedure governing appeals were mandatory and jurisdictional when, in addition to imposing time limits, the rules stated that the court may not enlarge . . . the period for taking an appeal) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 Thus, to determine whether the limitations imposed on motions to reopen in deportation proceedings are jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable tolling, we examine the text, structure, legislative history, and purpose of Congress's 1990 amendment to the INA. 4 There we find no indication, either explicit or implicit, that Congress intended that this limitations period not be equitably tolled. Our conclusion is supported by the Department of Justice's own interpretation of its rule making mandate from Congress, and the BIA's view of the rules that were promulgated. In the only other case to rule on this issue, the Ninth Circuit arrived at the same result. Varela v. INS, 204 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2000) (permitting tolling of filing deadline for motions to reopen after legal assistant incorrectly assured alien he did not have to leave the United States before nine-month voluntary departure deadline). 5 23
24 Before the promulgation of the 1996 regulations, an alien in deportation proceedings could submit an unlimited number of motions to reopen or reconsider at any time after a decision by an IJ or the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1995). In practice, this generous policy permitted an alien who had clearly disobeyed a deportation or voluntary departure order of the Immigration Court thereafter to remain in the United States illegally, and later to reopen proceedings to take advantage of some form of relief for which the alien had not previously been eligible. See, e.g. Stepehen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and Policy 528 (1992) (stating that motions to reopen had been viewed by the INS and BIA as procedural devices calculated primarily to buy aliens additional time in the United States); Richard D. Steel, Steel on Immigration Law § 14:57 at 468 (1985) (noting the prior availability of motions to reopen after the entry of an initial or subsequent order of deportation . . . involv[ing] a request for relief that was not previously relevant or available). 25
26 In 1990, in amending the INA, Congress instructed the Attorney General to issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which motions to reopen and to reconsider may be offered in deportation proceedings, which regulations [shall] include a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(d), 104 Stat. 4978, 5066 (1990). This change appeared to be aimed at eliminating the prior practice under which an alien could ignore a deportation or voluntary departure order, and years later, attempt to reopen the proceedings without any adverse consequences. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 400 (1995) (noting that the Immigration Act of 1990 took . . . steps to reduce [the] abuses of successive and frivolous administrative appeals and motions). 27 The legislative history of this provision indicates, however, that while Congress sought to impose general limits on motions to reopen, these limits were not intended to be inflexible. In explaining these new limitations, the House Conference Committee directed that, [t]he Attorney General . . . shall consider exceptions in the interest of justice. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, at 133 (1990). The Committee explicitly mentioned one such exception, for asylum claims which arise due to a change in circumstances in the country of the alien's nationality after the initiation of the deportation proceedings. Id. 28 The Department of Justice responded to this congressional mandate by issuing rules that, while clearly establishing that only one motion to reopen would be permitted and that it must be filed within 90 days, also offered mechanisms whereby otherwise untimely motions could still be considered when the circumstances so required. Under the new regulations, the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen do not apply to a motion to reopen agreed upon by the parties [i.e., the INS and the alien] and jointly filed. 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(4)(iv) (2000). Moreover, an IJ or the BIA are permitted to reopen a proceeding, upon their own motions, at any time. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1) (2000) (An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at any time . . . reopen . . . any case in which he or she has made a decision . . . .); 8 C.F.R. §3.2(a) (2000) (The [BIA] may at any time reopen . . . on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.). In explaining the exercise of this authority, the BIA has stated that, [t]he regulations governing motions . . . give the Board clear authority to reopen and remand cases without regard to other regulatory provisions. . . . It would therefore appear that this Board has the ability to reopen or remand proceedings when appropriate, such as for good cause, fairness, or reasons of administrative economy, and that technical deficiencies alone would not preclude such action. In re Yewondwosen, Interim Dec. 3327, at 3 (BIA Sept. 9, 1997) (en banc). 29 These exceptions to the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen imposed by the new rule appear to respond precisely to Congress' desire to provide for certain cases, in the interest of justice, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, at 133 (1990), that would otherwise be excluded by such limits. The Department of Justice highlighted the availability of such exceptions by stating, in response to criticism of the unbending nature of the new rule, that 30 [t]he Department does not agree with commenters' suggestions that a good cause exception would be an appropriate procedural mechanism for addressing exceptional cases that fall beyond this rule's time and number limitations. Instead, section 3.2(a) of the rule provides a mechanism that allows the Board to reopen or reconsider sua sponte and provides the procedural vehicle for the consideration of cases with exceptional circumstances. 31 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,902 (1996). This kind of accommodation for exceptional cases is irreconcilable, however, with the strict application that would be required of a jurisdictional limitation. See, e.g. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 53, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal of summary judgment as untimely despite the consent of the parties and the approval of the district court to extend the filing deadline when the time limitation was mandatory and jurisdictional). 32 The authority of an IJ or the BIA to accommodate special cases has survived a subsequent statutory codification of the limits on motions to reopen that, on its face, admits to no such exceptions, further demonstrating that the Department of Justice, in its application of these limits, does not consider them to be jurisdictional. A few months after the Department of Justice promulgated the final rule limiting motions to reopen, Congress established new removal proceeding to replace the former deportation or exclusion proceedings, and in so doing, provided in the same statute limits on the reopening of proceedings. Compare 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900 (promulgating administrative rule on April 29, 1996) with Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304(a)(3), 100 Stat. 3009-593 (enacting statutory rules on Sept. 30, 1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)). The statutory provision follows the administrative rule in limiting an alien to one motion to reopen proceedings, that shall be filed within 90 days of the date of the entry of a final administrative order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (C)(i). The administrative regulations continue to provide, nevertheless, for sua sponte reopening by an IJ or the BIA, or reopening by agreement of the parities at any time, despite the fact that no such exceptions are found in the more recent statutory provisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1), (b)(4)(iv); 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a) (2000). Whether in the form of specific limits, or the authority for the Department of Justice to impose such limits, the flexibility with which IJs and the BIA have applied these congressional restrictions on motions to reopen confirms that they are not jurisdictional. 33 In sum, nothing in the 1990 statute that directed the Department of Justice to limit the timing and number of motions to reopen convinces us that these limitations were intended to be jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. 34
35 The government argues that because Congress has delegated to the Department of Justice the authority to administer the statute in question that we must defer to the BIA's policy of not applying equitable tolling in the case of ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. 36 In deciding whether to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute, we must first consider whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If it has, that is the end of the matter. Id. Judging whether Congress has spoken is a matter of statutory construction over which [t]he judiciary is the final authority . . . and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. Id. at 843 n.9. Courts may employ the traditional tools of statutory construction in determining legislative intent for purposes of this inquiry. INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (calling for the examination of the statute or its legislative history) (internal quotation marks omitted). 37 Because the issue of whether a limitations period creates a jurisdictional bar to untimely claims is itself a question purely of statutory construction, it fits squarely within the initial step in the Chevron analysis. When, as here, we are called upon to engage only in an exercise of statutory interpretation, we avoid the danger of venturing into areas of special agency expertise, concerning which courts owe special deference under the Chevron doctrine. See Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1996) (A statute of limitations is not a matter within the particular expertise of the INS. Rather, we consider this a clearly legal issue that courts are better equipped to handle.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 127 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that the validity of the BIA's retroactive application of an immigration statute may be viewed as a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide, a question that is quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply [statutory] standards to a particular set of facts which involves the agency's particular expertise) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 38 As we have already noted, the text of the 1990 statute, its legislative history and purpose, and a subsequent legislative enactment all demonstrate that the general limits Congress imposed on motions to reopen were not intended to bar the accommodation of exceptional cases in which a motion would otherwise be untimely. 39 Even if we were not satisfied that the intent of Congress was clear, we would nonetheless reject the BIA's interpretation of the regulations. When Congress has not directly addressed an issue, our review is not merely for minimum rationality but requires that the administrative agency articulate a logical basis for its judgment. Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the agencies charged with administrating our immigration laws have offered no evidence whatsoever that Congress intended the limits on motions to reopen to establish a jurisdictional bar. The government's own interpretation of the statute, both in its administrative rule making and in its discussion of the rule in other BIA case law, itself supports our conclusion that exceptional cases are not subject to the general limitations imposed on motions to reopen, and therefore such limitations are not jurisdictional. 40 Failing to present any evidence to support its claim, the government argues that because Congress delegated to the agency the task of setting the exact duration of congressionally mandated filing deadlines, Congress necessarily conferred upon the agency the additional task of determining whether such deadlines were jurisdictional. See Respondent's brief at 24. We reject this contention. The power to establish jurisdictional bars resides with Congress and every indication points to the fact that Congress did not intend to create a jurisdictional bar for untimely motions to reopen.