Opinion ID: 303011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction and laches

Text: 8 Before turning to appellants' claims, we dispose of two obstacles put in their path by appellees. First, Appellee Fugate, Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Highways, claims that he is not subject to federal jurisdiction. Because the challenged activities of his department-condemnation of right-of-way and eviction of the landowners-are authorized by state law and could be carried out independently of the Arlington I-66 project, he claims that no federal question exists with respect to these activities. 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1331(a). We disagree, because these activities would not in fact be independent of this project. See Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department, 446 F.2d 1013, 1028 (5th Cir. 1971); Morning-side-Lenox Park Association v. Volpe, 334 F.Supp. 132, 146 (N.D.Ga.1971). Appellee Fugate does not suggest that the Commonwealth of Virginia no longer seeks to build this highway with federal funds. If we were to find-as we do-that federal law requires that the proposed route for Arlington I-66 be reconsidered, acquisition by the state of right-of-way along the proposed route during the reconsideration would make proceeding with the proposed route increasingly easier and, therefore, a decision to alter or abandon the route increasingly undesirable. Thus the challeged activities of the state highway department would make a sham of the reconsideration required by federal law. 1 Action of a state highway department, challenged because furthering a project that under federal law allegedly must be reconsidered, is a matter in controversy arising under the laws of the United States. Federal jurisdiction over such state action is essential to preserve federal question jurisdiction in the application of federal statutes. It is a form of pendent jurisdiction, but based upon necessity rather than convenience and limited to preventing emasculation of remedy clearly available against the federal respondents. 9 Secondly, appellees claim that appellants' suit should be barred by laches. Appellees as representatives of the general public and specific interest groups will be prejudiced by appellants' delay in bringing suit if the proposed route for Arlington I-66 is altered or abandoned. Most of the right-of-way for the proposed route has been acquired; Arlington County's planning with respect to zoning, traffic, and location of utilities has been based upon the route; and the location of numerous businesses has been chosen in reliance upon the route. Appellants could have brought suit earlier to minimize or avoid this harm; all of the relevant statutes were in effect by January 1, 1970, but appellants did not file suit until February 19, 1971. Nevertheless, we decline to invoke laches against appellants because of the public interest status accorded ecology preservation by the Congress. 2 We believe that Arlington I-66 has not progressed to the point where the costs of altering or abandoning the proposed route would certainly outweigh the benefits that might accrue therefrom to the general public. In their reconsideration of the proposed route, the Secretary of Transportation and the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Highways may decide, of course, that the costs do outweigh the benefits. If the opposite conclusion is a reasonable possibility, however, as it is here, the congressional declaration of policy in the relevant statutes of the importance of the benefits that might accrue demands that the merits of the question be considered by the appropriate agencies. 10