Opinion ID: 77991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Sufficient evidence supports Defendants' convictions.

Text: A conviction for conspiracy to distribute drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 requires evidence that persuades the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) a conspiracy (or agreement) existed between Defendants or between Defendants and others; (2) Defendants knew the essential objects of the conspiracy, which are to do either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means; and (3) Defendants knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. See United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 n. 3 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir.2005). We have previously acknowledged that because a conspiracy is predominantly mental in composition, circumstantial evidence is frequently resorted to in order to prove its elements. Toler, 144 F.3d at 1426 (internal quotation marks omitted). A conspiracy may be inferred from a concert of action. United States v. Guerra, 293 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.2002). See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (Participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a 'development and collocation of circumstances.'); United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir.1983) (A conspiracy conviction will be upheld . . . when the circumstances surrounding a person's presence at the scene of conspiratorial activity are so obvious that knowledge of its character can fairly be attributed to him.). The government asserts that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances between March 1998 and June 30, 2005. We agree. The trial testimony of several Co-Defendants, drug purchasers, and law enforcement (39 witnesses in over five days of trial), and the audio recordings, audio and video CDs, and audio and video DVDs of drug transactions, show a long-standing conspiracy involving the distribution of drugs (morphine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, hydromorphine, methadone, and 50 grams or more of cocaine), among an assortment of family members and associates of Lucious in and around the Clay Street home, 456 and 459 Maple Street, and at the Boykin Towers apartment. This conspiracy, the various acts of distribution at these several locations performed by numerous interrelated individuals, survived several attempts by local law enforcement, several state arrests and sentences served by its members, several search warrants that uncovered the presence of drugs and guns, all over a period of years, until the June 30, 2005 arrests on federal charges precipitated the charging documents filed in this case. The testimony and evidence squarely place Defendants as knowing members of the conspiracy. Carter and Woodyard, in particular, challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting the existence of a conspiracy, pointing to testimony and evidence suggesting a high degree of competitiveness among members to effectuate the sale of drugs. Consistent with the notion of competition, and hence, the lack of an agreement, Woodyard asserts that the evidence, at best, shows him to have been a street dealer who took the opportunity to make sales to individuals who were destined to make their purchases at the Clay Street home, but who were intercepted by Woodyard before reaching their destination. Other courts have considered and rejected this defense of we were not in a conspiracy, because the evidence showed we were competitors for drugs or customers. In United States v. Johnson, the court made an observation that applies equally in the present case: While the record demonstrates that the principals, including Appellants, shared many sources, distributors, and customers, the fact that drug dealers `may sometimes, or even always, compete for supplies or customers in serving that market does not on that account alone disprove . . . the existence of a single conspiracy to achieve the overall results of their several efforts.' 54 F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir.1993)). In Banks the court identified a more significant consideration than competition in determining the membership of actors in a drug conspiracy to be whether the actor `demonstrated a substantial level of commitment to the conspiracy, [for example] by engaging in a consistent series of smaller transactions' that furthered its ultimate object of supplying the consumer demand of the market. Banks, 10 F.3d at 1054 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1991)). We agree with the reasoning of Johnson and Banks. While admittedly several of the conspirators were shown, through testimony and the audio and video surveillance, to have competed with each other in the sale of drugs and the procurement of customers, their combined efforts produced a haven for the illegal distribution of drugs at the Clay Street home, 456 and 459 Maple Street, and the Boykin Towers Apartment, among an assortment of Lucious' family members and associates. The evidence showed their interrelatedness; how one member would retrieve drugs for the sale by another. The existence of healthy competition, as evidenced by Woodyard achieving sales in the vicinity of the Clay Street home and waylaying purchasers destined for the home, does not negate the ultimate object of all the participants: supplying the consumers' demands in and around the property. Indeed, the more sellers of drugs there were, the more activity in and around the locations. Hinton argues the evidence against him only showed him to be a bystander at an apartment where drug activities occurred, not a member of the charged conspiracy. As to Hinton's argument, we are similarly not persuaded. First, mere presence `is material, highly probative, and not to be discounted.' United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 1 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov.1981)). Second, here the evidence showed more than Hinton's mere presence. It showed him to be an active participant in Officer McKean's undercover buy on November 16, 2002, accepting a cash payment from the officer to cover the expense of having traveled to obtain the oxycontin Westry sold to the officer, in Hinton's presence. This evidence, coupled with Hinton's association with Westry and residence at the Boykin Towers apartment, where drug transactions were shown to have taken place, and the testimony of other co-conspirators placing Hinton at the Clay Street home and related locations, could give `rise to a permissible inference' by the jury of Hinton's participation in the conspiracy. Id. (quoting Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1326). The jury plainly credited the testimony and evidence presented, and it is not for us to re-weigh the factfinder's credibility choices. United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). When measured against the governing standards, we are persuaded that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the conspiracy convictions, and accordingly affirm the district court's denial of the motions for judgment of acquittal.
Carter timely objected when the prosecutor asked Michael Carpenter about the events surrounding Johns' death. The following exchange took place: Q. And when you left, what was going on there at the house? A. He was waiting, he said he was waiting on somebody to come with some cocaine, that he had  waiting on some cocaine to come in. Q. And do you know who?    Q. Do you know who he was waiting on? A. Bip, he said.    Q. And when you left, had Bip arrived? A. Yeah. He was just coming in, and they went to the back. Carter maintains the district court erred in allowing the government to elicit information about the source of the cocaine Johns used, and without the objectionable answers containing the words Johns spoke to Carpenter, there would have been no other evidence presented concerning the source of the controlled substances that caused or contributed to Johns' death. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Appellant must demonstrate that `the district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.' United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir.2005)). The government agrees that Carpenter's statements concerning what Johns told him are hearsay statements admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, presumptively inadmissible under Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R.Evid. 802. Nonetheless, the government suggests several hearsay exceptions apply, most notably the Rule 804(b)(3) exception. Rule 804(b)(3) permits admission of a hearsay statement which [ ] at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). To be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), a statement must satisfy three elements: `(1) the declarant [must be] unavailable; (2) the statement so far tends to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) the statement is corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.' United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d 1073, 1077 (11th Cir.1994) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Harrell, 788 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). While a determination of whether a statement is against the declarant's penal interest is purely a question of law subject to de novo review, see Costa, 31 F.3d at 1077, consideration of a statement's trustworthiness requires a review of findings of fact and a review of the trial court's application of a legal standard to the facts. See United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir.1976). Because the trial court made no finding regarding the applicability of the statement against penal interest exception, or any other hearsay exception, we `determine whether any reasonable view of the evidence,' United States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 907 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Bagley, 537 F.2d at 167), supports the trustworthiness of Johns' statements. The first element is easily satisfied, as Johns was unavailable to testify at trial. The second element, whether the statements were against Johns' penal interest, we also resolve in the affirmative, although not without some explanation. For a statement to be against penal interest, it must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. Harrell, 788 F.2d at 1527. Initially, given Johns' close relationship to Carpenter, it would appear that Johns would not have believed his statements would subject him to criminal liability. However, it is unnecessary that the declarant know he was speaking to a person who could cause his prosecution. Id. Thus, for example, courts have held that the mere fact that the recipient of the information was a confidante of the declarant does not rule out admissibility of a statement as against interest. See Bagley, 537 F.2d at 165 (The fact that the statement was made to a friend and cellmate has no relevance to the determination whether the statement was against the declarant's penal interest.); United States v. Mock, 640 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.1981) (fact that the statement was made to his former wife does not destroy its credibility); Harrell, 788 F.2d at 1527 (refusing to engraft onto the second element of the Rule a requirement that appellants must know that they were being recorded and that they must know that they were speaking with persons who could have caused their prosecution); Costa, 31 F.3d at 1078-79 (distinguishing custodial statements implicating self and others from spontaneous declarations made to acquaintances, friends and confederates; the latter being more trustworthy) (citations omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, we do not think a reasonable man would falsely admit to waiting for cocaine at the Clay Street home, a serious crime, knowing there was a chance, albeit slight, that the admission could be used to subject him to severe penalties. See Harrell, 788 F.2d at 1527; United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir.1978) (fact that statement was made to friend and cellmate not relevant to whether statement was against declarant's penal interest). The last element to consider, then, is whether the statements are corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating their trustworthiness. Prior to the admission of the statements, the government had elicited testimony from Carpenter that he and his cousin Johns used drugs together from about 1998 until Johns' death in 2001, and that they usually obtained their drugs at the Clay Street home. Carpenter had explained he and Johns were injecting methadone in a back room of the Clay Street home before Carpenter left, before Johns stated he would wait on somebody to come with some cocaine, and that the somebody was Bip or Carter. Sufficient corroborating circumstances were presented to satisfy the trustworthiness element, and thus we conclude the statements were admissible as statements against Johns' penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3), Federal Rules of Evidence.
Westry assigns error to the trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction on withdrawal from the conspiracy. Testimony was presented that after Westry pled guilty to a state court indictment, and returned to the Clay Street home on probation, he was no longer involved in the federal offenses charged in Counts Thirty-One and Thirty-Two. Carter submits the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that it must determine the amount of controlled substances that was foreseeable to Carter within the scope of his participation in the conspiracy, and if the death of Johns was caused by controlled substances foreseeable to Carter within the scope of his participation in the conspiracy. A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction requested by the defense is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Dulcio, 441 F.3d at 1275 (citation omitted). To constitute reversible error, a defendant must show that the requested jury instruction `(1) was a correct statement of the law; (2) was not adequately covered in the instructions given to the jury; (3) concerned an issue so substantive that its omission impaired the accused's ability to present a defense; and (4) dealt with an issue properly before the jury.' Id. (quoting United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1139 (11th Cir.1997)). Westry claims the following testimony of Shannon Jones supports his claimed withdrawal from the conspiracy, and consequently, supports his requested charge on withdrawal: [6] Q. Do you remember about when it was that he [Westry] moved back to Clay Street? A. It was a little while after the State had indicted us the first time. Q. Okay. And would that have been sometime around the end of 2003, later? A. Perhaps, yes. Q. After Calvin moved back to Clay Street, did you ever see whether or not he was involved with the distribution of drugs? A. He really didn't  no, he wasn't involved there, you know. He was on probation. Basically, he just said, enough. Under governing law, the foregoing exchange, without more, is insufficient to support Westry's requested instruction. We begin with the very language of the instruction: [I]n order for you to decide that a Defendant withdrew from a conspiracy you must find that the Defendant took affirmative action to disavow or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy. . . . Offense Instruction 13.4. As the comments to the Instruction make clear, withdrawal is an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden to prove. We have held that a defendant must prove he undertook affirmative steps, inconsistent with the objects of the conspiracy, to disavow or to defeat the conspiratorial objectives, and either communicated those acts in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his co-conspirators or disclosed the illegal scheme to law enforcement authorities. United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 589 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1571 (11th Cir.1994). The defendant's burden to establish the defense is substantial; hence, mere cessation of activity in the conspiracy is not sufficient to establish withdrawal. Finestone, 816 F.2d at 589 (citations omitted). Jones' testimony is insufficient to satisfy Westry's burden of showing withdrawal. At best, her testimony could support a mere cessation of activity. [7] Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Westry's requested instruction, as the issue was not properly before the jury on the record developed. Carter proposed two instructions concerning foreseeability of the drug amounts involved in the conspiracy and the death enhancement. [8] The trial court declined to give the requested instructions, finding that the combination of the special verdict form and the charges, including a Pinkerton [9] charge, sufficiently covered the issues sought to be addressed in Carter's requested instructions. The trial court instead instructed as follows on the issues of foreseeability: If you find any defendant guilty as to Count One, you will then be asked to specify on the verdict form your unanimous finding concerning the weight of the mixture or substance containing cocaine base that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt. You will not be required to determine the exact amount; rather, the verdict form requests that you determine the drug amount by ranges. For instance, you may indicate by range, that is, less than five grams, five grams or more but less than 50 grams, or 50 grams or more. Such amounts must be proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. The Pinkerton instruction stated, in part, that if a defendant was found guilty of the conspiracy offense, the jury could find the defendant guilty of the substantive offense(s): even though such Defendant did not personally participate in such offense if you find beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that the offense charged in such count was committed by a conspirator during the existence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of its objects; second, that the Defendant under consideration was a knowing and willful member of the conspiracy at the time of the commission of such offenses; and third, that the commission of such offense by a co-conspirator was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. We agree with the trial court that the foregoing combination of instructions properly and sufficiently instructed the jury in its consideration of the foreseeability of the drug amount and Johns' death, two of the applicable enhancements. See United States v. Dohan, 508 F.3d 989, 993 (11th Cir.2007) ([T]his court will reverse the district court only if we are left with a substantial, ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations in this regard.) (citation omitted). We similarly find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the requested instructions, which duplicated the information already provided in the Pinkerton instruction given.
Appellants raise several challenges to their sentences, including enhancements applied and the reasonableness of their sentences. The government has conceded error in several instances. We review the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Watkins, 477 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir.2007). We review de novo the legality of a sentence. See United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1025 (11th Cir.2005). As to a challenge for reasonableness, we review the sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Defendants were sentenced as follows. On Count One, Conspiracy, all Defendants received sentences of life imprisonment. On the substantive offenses, Defendants were each sentenced to life sentences (Westry on Counts Eleven and Twelve; Woodyard on Counts Four and Five; and Hinton on Count Ten), with the exception of Carter, who was sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment on each of Counts Fifteen and Twenty-Four, to run concurrently. Defendants received the maximum possible offense level under the Guidelines on the bases that they had prior similar convictions [10] and a death resulted from the conspiracy, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(1) (the death enhancement). Defendants' offense levels were also enhanced based on possession of a firearm, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). With the exception of Carter's convictions on the two substantive counts, all sentences were enhanced to life on the basis that a death resulted from the offense and Defendants each had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(C). Defendants challenge application of the death enhancement to the conspiracy convictions (Count One), and Westry, Woodyard and Hinton challenge application of the death enhancement to the substantive offenses. Carter asserts the drugs that killed Johns did not come from the conspiracy, and that he did not have a prior conviction for a similar offense. Hinton and Westry also maintain Johns' death was not reasonably foreseeable. Woodyard asserts he was not a member of the conspiracy when Johns died, and that Johns' death was not a reasonably foreseeable act or omission done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carter and Westry assert the district court erred by applying the firearm enhancement, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) to increase their base offense levels. Woodyard claims his sentences are grossly disproportionate, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Lastly, Carter claims the relevant conduct pertaining to the conspiracy count should not have been considered in calculating his guideline range, and that his sentence, too, is unreasonable.