Opinion ID: 678865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Out-of-Court Information

Text: 13 King first argues that the trial court erred in permitting Special Agent Bohan to testify that prior to conducting surveillance he received information that a man named Bill was selling cocaine from 4044-A McRee while possessing a handgun. King contends that this evidence is inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, prejudicial prior bad acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and that its admission violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 2 The government argues that the statements were not hearsay because they were offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a police investigation was undertaken and not for the truth of the matter asserted. The government also argues that Rule 404(b) is inapplicable because these statements were not offered for their truth and, therefore, had no substantive effect on the jury's deliberations and, in any event, at trial King's objection was that he was not provided notice that 404(b) evidence would be used, not that the evidence was improper 404(b) evidence.
14 Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). However, an out-of-court statement is not considered hearsay if it is admitted not for its truth but for the limited purpose of explaining to the jury why a police investigation was undertaken. United States v. Collins, 996 F.2d 950, 953 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 412, 126 L.Ed.2d 359 (1993); United States v. Watson, 952 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1694, 118 L.Ed.2d 406 (1992). 3 We review the trial court's admission of evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 936, 942 (8th Cir.1991). 15 King acknowledges the above authority but contends that the statements offered in this case fall within the ambit of those we condemned in United States v. Azure, 845 F.2d 1503 (8th Cir.1988). We find Azure to be sufficiently distinguishable from the facts at hand. In Azure, a victim of sexual abuse informed a social worker that Azure was the perpetrator of her injury. Id. at 1506. The social worker was allowed to testify that the victim identified Azure as her abuser. Id. The government contended that the victim's out-of-court statements to the social worker were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but merely to explain why the investigation focussed on Azure. Id. at 1507. We held that this testimony was erroneously admitted because [t]he only possible relevance of [the victim's] identification of Azure and of the government's subsequent investigation of him is that he in fact was the person who abused her. Id. at 1507. 16 In the case at bar, the trial judge stated in a proceeding held while the jury was out of the courtroom that the information was simply background information laying the basis for the obtaining of the search warrant, and that it was appropriate for the jury to consider as information which could have led to the request by the agent for the search warrant and the subsequent issuance of the search warrant by Magistrate Perry. I further indicated to counsel [at the unreported sidebar conference held when the defense counsel first objected to the recitation of the evidence during the prosecutor's opening statement] that I would receive the information, not for the truthfulness of it, but to explain the actions of the agent with respect to the warrant itself. (Trial Tr. at 162-63.) No instruction was given to the jury that they were not to consider the evidence for the truth of the matter asserted nor that they were to limit its use to the purposes for which the trial court admitted it. 17 While we are concerned that the jury's use of this evidence was not appropriately limited by an instruction from the court and it therefore could have considered the out-of-court statements about Bill to be true with respect to the defendant's guilt or innocence, we are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining initially to admit the evidence for the nonhearsay reasons it stated on the record. 18 Because King alleges a violation of his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, we apply the harmless error standard from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828-29, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Under Chapman, before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. No objection to the court's failure to give a limiting instruction was made. Our careful review convinces us that even if the court committed error, plain or otherwise, in either admitting the evidence or in failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 The other evidence offered against King was overwhelming. First, King himself drafted a written confession in which he admitted not only to throwing the gun out of the window on the day the search warrant was executed, but possessing the gun in his drug trade. Agent Bohan testified that King admitted to him prior to drafting the written confession that he tried to throw the gun out of the window the day the search warrant was executed. King acknowledged under cross examination that he knew that it was illegal to possess a weapon when dealing drugs. Agent Bohan observed King throw drugs out of the house and, upon a subsequent search of the residence, a loaded Derringer was discovered in a windowsill by a window where a screen was installed which prevented the Derringer from exiting the premises in a manner similar to the cocaine. King told the jury in his own direct examination that he had previously been twice convicted of drug trafficking in crack cocaine, of possession of cocaine, and of carrying a concealed weapon. The jury was well able to assess the credibility of his version of the events on the day in question, determine whose version, or if neither version, was true, and find the facts accordingly. Even if we choose to believe the testimony of Charlene Riley concerning her ownership of the weapon, the weapon was moved from above her bed to the living room windowsill at a time when King, aware that the gun was in the house and aware that a search warrant was being executed at 4044A-McRee, was getting rid of incriminating evidence. Any error in the admission of Agent Bohan's disputed testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore does not require us to reverse King's conviction. 4
20 King also contends that the admission of Special Agent Bohan's testimony about Bill violates Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The government contends that King's argument must be reviewed for plain error because King's objection at trial focused on the notice aspect of 404(b) and not on admission of such evidence. We have held that evidence of acts other than those charged in the indictment is admissible ... if it completes the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context. United States v. Ulland, 643 F.2d 537, 540 (8th Cir.1981). However, we need not resolve the 404(b) issue because we believe, for the same reasons set forth in Part II.A.1. of this opinion, that any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless. 5