Opinion ID: 2163475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the proposed investigation of sexual abuse

Text: In her emergency motion filed on July 17, 1998, the mother asked the judge, inter alia, to order an investigation and report regarding the circumstances of [D.M.'s] possible sexual abuse, her pregnancy, and paternity. In a supporting legal memorandum, the mother's counsel elaborated: No formal reliable investigation or report regarding [D.M.'s] possible sexual abuse or sexual history has been provided to this court. Thus, the court is fully unaware of whether [D.M.] was sexually abused, and if so by whom and when. It is also fully unaware of the history of her sexual activity and the psychological implications of either sexual abuse or sexual involvement, including maternity at age 12, on [D.M.]. Accordingly, the court is also unaware as to what DHS and the GAL [guardian ad litem ] knew or should have known regarding [D.M.]. The court also does not know per scientific paternity tests the identity of the baby's father. Equally important, the Court should know the circumstances surrounding recommendation of a surgical [procedure] in the sixth month of the pregnancy. It appears that closer scrutiny of this case must be had. The record as to [D.M.] confirms that DHS has been less than vigilant in the exercise of supervision over her and that even after learning of her pregnancy, their judgments continue in that vein. This court can not at this time invest confidence in their decision making process regarding permanency absent a sound and complete record which answers the above stated and other questions. The judge dealt with the mother's request in summary fashion, and she denied the requested relief: The [c]ourt finds that there is no evidence of sexual abuse in this instance to warrant an investigation. The Respondent, an articulate and mature 13-year-old, has expressly said that the events surrounding her impregnation were consensual with a young male in her age range. The [c]ourt finds the Respondent's statements to be credible and does not find it incredible that the events that occurred were sexual experimentation, rather than sexual abuse. Therefore, the [c]ourt finds further investigation regarding the circumstances of the Respondent's sexual activity and pregnancy is not supported. In Appeal No. 98-FS-1547, the mother challenges the foregoing ruling. Although our analysis differs from that of the trial judge, we find no basis for reversal. The question whether the judge's refusal to order the proposed investigation constituted an appealable order is a novel one. The judge did, in fact, interview D.M., and it is not clear what additional investigation the court (as distinguished from executive agencies such as the DHS or the police) was requested to make or had the resources to conduct. In any event, we have stated that [i]n common law adversarial jurisdictions, the development of the facts is a task primarily assigned to counsel. Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 782 (D.C.1990). [U]nder our system of laws, a judge is not an investigator; the investigative function belongs to the parties and their agents. Davis v. United States, 567 A.2d 36, 42 (D.C.1989) (per curiam). These principles are deeply embedded in the warp and woof of our law. In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 475 (D.C.1996). At least in conventional adversarial litigation, the task that the mother asked the judge to undertake thus would not fall within the conventional judicial role. The present case implicates the judge's responsibility, as parens patriae, to act on behalf of the child, and somewhat more active judicial participation in the development of the facts may arguably be permissible. Nevertheless, requests for generalized judicial investigations are rare, and no precedent involving such a request has been cited to us by any of the parties. [9] As we understand the mother's position, she does not contend that the judge's refusal to order an investigation should be viewed as a final order disposing of the entire case on the merits. In her submission to the trial judge quoted on pages 368-369, supra, the mother suggested that the proposed investigation might undermine the court's confidence in [DHS'] decision making process regarding permanency. The investigation was thus viewed by the mother's counsel as a means for challenging DHS' judgment and, perhaps, for reopening issues previously decided, e.g., reunification and visitation. Counsel did not regard an order directing the requested investigation, had one been issued, as constituting the ultimate disposition of the case. At oral argument, the mother's attorney conceded that the judge's refusal to order the sexual abuse investigation was interlocutory. Counsel sought to invoke the Death Knell exception to the finality requirement. That exception has been invoked to justify an immediate appeal from a trial judge's refusal to certify a class action, where the plaintiff seeking certification has such a small monetary or other interest to be vindicated that [if a class action was not authorized] it would not be worth the plaintiff's time to continue the action. Kanelos v. District of Columbia, 346 A.2d 247, 249 (D.C.1975) (citation, internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). In other words, this exception applies where, if class action status is denied, the plaintiff will, as a practical matter, be unable to proceed with the litigation, so that the otherwise interlocutory ruling represents a Death Knell to the plaintiff's case. We perceive no similarity between Kanelos and the present appeal. Here, the mother remains free to contest a motion for TPR, or a petition to adopt D.M., whether or not the judge orders and supervises an investigation. We therefore conclude that the judge's refusal to order the proposed investigation was neither a Death Knell to the mother's claims nor an appealable order. It is true that, at the time the trial judge entered the order from which these appeals were taken, no motion to terminate the mother's parental rights was pending, and no adoption proceeding had been initiated. Thus, from the mother's perspective, if an immediate appeal could not be taken from the no investigation ruling, then, as a practical matter, that ruling might never become appealable. We agree that, where, as here, significant rights are at issue, the requirement of finality is not to be used to prevent a party from obtaining appellate review indefinitely or forever. For purposes of the present case, however, the problem with this reasoning is that the mother was free to move the court to grant her substantive relief  e.g., to award her custody of D.M. If she filed such a motion, and if this relief were denied, the mother's challenge to the court's refusal to order an investigation would merge into an appeal from the denial of her motion for custody, see Trilon Plaza, supra, 399 A.2d at 37, and could therefore be entertained at that point. But even if we were to conclude, notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, that the judge's refusal to order the proposed investigation was immediately appealable, the mother still cannot prevail. On the merits, the judge did interview D.M. in chambers, and we are satisfied that the judge did not err by declining to undertake any additional investigative responsibility. Cf. A.R., supra, 679 A.2d at 475-76. Moreover, by the time that the investigation was requested, D.M. was no longer living in the foster home at which the events leading to her unfortunate pregnancy had occurred. If the proposed investigation had been conducted, and if it had disclosed wrongdoing or negligence at that foster home, the logical remedy would have been to remove D.M. from that home. This removal having already been effectuated before the investigation was requested, the principal reason for conducting such an investigation had been significantly undermined in advance. The mother has not suggested any further resources or other relief that could reasonably have been forthcoming if the court had conducted the proposed investigation. There was no error.