Opinion ID: 2834621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subsequent Lessees

Text: Having concluded that section 85.321 creates a private cause of action, we examine whether Emerald’s status as a subsequent lessee impacts its standing to bring a cause of action under section 85.321. The Legislature gave the right to a private cause of action to a person who “owns an interest . . . that may be damaged by another party violating the provisions of this chapter . . . .” Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 85.321. Exxon argues that “violating” is a present tense term that indicates an injury concurrent with ownership, whereas Emerald maintains that “violating” would include any party that had violated the statute at some point in time. The plain language is unclear as to whether concurrent ownership is required or whether subsequent interest owners could also maintain a cause of action. The participle phrase “violating the provisions of this chapter” could indicate a continuous action: a party who has violated, continues to violate, or is violating the provision, which would open the cause of action to a wider range of interest owners. Id. The statute could also be interpreted as another party who is violating the provisions of this chapter, which suggests a temporal limitation on the private cause of action. Because the text itself is unclear, we look to section 85.321’s statutory predecessor and the surrounding context for guidance. See Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs ., L.P. v. Johnson , 209 S.W.3d 644, 651–52 (Tex. 2006). Section 85.321’s statutory predecessor, section 13 of article 6049c, preserved common law standards: Nothing herein contained or authorized and no suit by or against the [Railroad] Commission shall impair or abridge or delay any cause of action for damages, or other relief, any owner of any land or any producer of crude petroleum oil or natural gas, or any other party at interest, may have . . . . Act effective August 12, 1931, 42nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch . 26, § 13, 1931 Tex. Gen. Law 46, 53, repealed by Act effective September 1, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch . 871, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Law 2345, 2527. Thus, part of the stated purpose of Chapter 26 was to prevent the Railroad Commission from infringing on existing causes of action under the common law. The language in sections 85.321 and 85.322 comes directly from section 13 of article 6049c. For more than 100 years, this Court has recognized that a cause of action for injury to real property accrues when the injury is committed. See Houston Water-Works Co. v. Kennedy , 8 S.W. 36, 37 (Tex. 1888). The right to sue is a personal right that belongs to the person who owns the property at the time of the injury, and the right to sue does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property unless there is an express assignment of the cause of action. Abbott v. City of Princeton , 721 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e .). “Accordingly, a mere subsequent purchaser [of the property] cannot recover for an injury committed before his purchase.” Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co. , 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ . App.—Austin 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e .); see also Vann v. Bowie Sewerage Co. , 90 S.W.2d 561, 562–63 (Tex. 1936) (holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land, and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages). Therefore, under Texas common law, absent a conveyance of the cause of action, a subsequent owner cannot sue a prior owner for injury to realty before the subsequent owner acquired his interest. See Vann , 90 S.W.2d at 562–63; see also Haire v. Nathan Watson Co. , 221 S.W.3d 293, 298 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Cook v. Exxon Corp. , 145 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.); Exxon Corp. v. Pluff , 94 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, pet. denied); Senn v. Texaco, Inc. , 55 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied). Similarly, a subsequent lessee, like Emerald, can stand in no better shoes than a subsequent owner. If the Legislature intended to change this common law principle, it could have done so in the statute. Were we to interpret section 85.321 to allow Emerald to sue Exxon as a prior lessee, we would expand the class of potential claimants beyond that allowed by common law and subsumed in the statute. Without explicit direction from the Legislature, we hesitate to adopt an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.023(5); McIntyre , 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon’s alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g. , Tooke v. City of Mexia , 197 S.W.3d 325, 342–43 (Tex. 2006) (holding that Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 51.075 abrogated City of Texarkana v. City of New Boston , 141 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2004)).