Opinion ID: 696239
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute's Plain Meaning

Text: 31 We are not the first court to acknowledge the confusing nature of the language and structure of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1605. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 1478, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993) (criticizing the Act's inadequate definition of commercial activity); United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir.1994) (describing direct effect clause as hopelessly ambiguous), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 904, 130 L.Ed.2d 787 (1995); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir.1985); Gregorian, 658 F.Supp. at 1235. Fully aware of this statutory complexity, we still have no choice but to 'begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.'  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2389, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (quoting Park'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S.Ct. 658, 661, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985)); Straub v. A P Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 452 (9th Cir.1994). 32 The clear statutory language of section 1605(a)(5) indicates that both this exception and the restrictions upon this exception are intended to apply only to torts not otherwise encompassed in [section 1605(a)(2) ]. Joseph v. Office of Consulate General of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir.1987), (stating that [t]he tortious activity exception provides jurisdiction over tort actions not encompassed in the commercial activity exception), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880, 105 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984); See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439, 441, 109 S.Ct. 683, 691, 692, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989) (referring to section 1605(a)(5) as the noncommercial torts exception); Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 714 (same); Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 780, 782 (9th Cir.1991) (same); see also H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6619 [hereinafter House Report with citations to U.S.C.C.A.N.] (classifying section 1605(a)(5) as Noncommercial torts). Similarly, the phrase that establishes the two sets of restrictions on the waiver of sovereign immunity established by section 1650(a)(5) (subsection (A) for discretionary functions and subsection (B) for enumerated torts) states that in those cases this paragraph shall not apply. Thus, by its plain and unambiguous terms, section 1605(a)(5) limits the reach of those restrictions only to noncommercial torts. 33 Established canons of statutory construction state that [g]enerally an exception is considered a limitation only upon the matter which directly precedes it. 6 and exceptions are not to be implied. An exception cannot be created by construction. Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Stat. Const. Sec. 47.11 (5th ed. 1992). In addition, there is a presumption that Congress would not enumerate specific exemptions in section 1605(a)(5) but leave the exemptions in another section of the same statute to judicial identification. Henry C. Black, Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws Secs. 27, 32 (2d ed. West 1911); Sutherland, supra Sec. 47.23 (The force of the maxim ['expressio unius est exclusio alterius'] is strengthened where a thing is provided in one part of a statute and omitted in another.). 34 The district court in Gregorian looked to the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) to inform its interpretation that Sec. 1605(a)(5)(B) applies to commercial activities. 7 Consistent application of that court's logic would require that clause section 1605(a)(5)(A), which restores sovereign immunity for discretionary functions of foreign state actors, would also apply beyond the clearly expressed limits of that subsection to a foreign state's commercial activities, since that clause is on an equal structural footing with section 1605(a)(5)(B). Thus, any commercial activity in which the foreign state actor engaged in a discretionary function would also be immune, 8 effectively rendering section 1605(a)(2) a hollow shell. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392, 99 S.Ct. 675, 684, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (stating that [it is an] elementary cannon of construction that a statute should not be interpreted so as to render one part inoperative.), overruled in part on other grounds, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989). Thus, there is no compelling reason to construe the FSIA in a way that departs from the Act's plain language. See Sutherland, supra, Sec. 47.11 (Supp.1995) (stating that only where the construction of a statute would lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the statute, it is to be presumed that some exception or qualification was intended by the legislature). 35