Opinion ID: 1200964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conduct of the prosecutor [2]

Text: Defendant claims the court erred in failing to grant any of his motions for mistrial, which were based upon certain remarks by the prosecutor during voir dire, cross-examination, and closing argument, and alleged to have deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant's claimed support in Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.1990), is misplaced in that Mahorney is a federal habeas corpus proceeding. In New Mexico, the granting of a mistrial lies within the discretion of the trial court and review is for abuse of that discretion. State v. Perez, 95 N.M. 262, 265, 620 P.2d 1287, 1290 (1980). We address defendant's individual allegations as follows. 1. During voir dire, a discussion developed on the standard of proof required by the jury to find defendant guilty. The prosecutor, responding to a juror's comment, attempted to distinguish reasonable doubt and possible doubt by stating: The law presumes the Defendant to be innocent unless and until you're satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. The burden is always on the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not required that the State prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. Defendant claims the prosecutor's remarks were misleading and confused the jury by suggesting that the jury could convict Defendant even if they had doubts about the case. The prosecutor's remarks parallel the language of our jury instruction on presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and burden of proof, which was given as Instruction No. 2. See SCRA 1986, 14-5060. During one of several bench conferences held shortly thereafter, the court advised the prosecutor to go no further so as to not get into the area of instructing the jury [as] that's the Court's job. The court believed the jury was not confused, and reminded defense counsel that he would have an opportunity to address any questions presented by the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt. The discussion concluded with the state asking if any member of the venire felt as if they could not follow the particular instruction. The court's action in controlling this portion of voir dire and in denying defendant's motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. 2. Defendant claims the state attempted to shift the burden of proof during closing argument when the prosecutor stated that if the jury believed beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was only a bystander, they should find him not guilty. No objection was made, however, nor was the statement claimed as the basis for any of defendant's motions for mistrial. Unless a prosecutor's remark constitutes fundamental error, review by an appellate court must be predicated upon a timely objection by a defendant. See State v. McGuire, 110 N.M. 304, 313, 795 P.2d 996, 1005 (1990). Here, we find the comment fails to rise to a level of fundamental error. At most, the comment was a harmless misstatement of the law in light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant. See State v. Hoxsie, 101 N.M. 7, 10, 677 P.2d 620, 623 (1984) (although substantial evidence may exist to support the verdict, prosecutorial misconduct cannot be deemed harmless unless the evidence is so overwhelming that there is no reasonable probability that the misconduct contributed to the conviction). 3. Defendant objected to the state's comment during the rebuttal portion of its closing argument, on defendant's failure to call specific witnesses to testify. Defendant alleged the state improperly commented on his right to call witnesses, and made this claim the subject of one of his motions for mistrial. Defendant further contends that because the comment came in during the state's rebuttal, defendant was deprived of the opportunity to address it with the jury. Comment during closing argument concerning the failure to call a witness is permitted. State v. Vallejos, 98 N.M. 798, 653 P.2d 174 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982). It is for the jury to estimate the value of an attorney's argument, thus counsel should be allowed considerable latitude of speech so long as extraneous facts are not injected or improper language used. State v. Ennis, 99 N.M. 117, 120, 654 P.2d 570, 573 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982). The state's remarks were a permissible response to defendant's closing argument and no error was committed. 4. Defendant claims he was unfairly prejudiced by the state's references to witness Chavez as defendant's puppet and witnesses Chavez and Casaus as his running buddies, and the comments regarding Chavez's memory loss on the witness stand. No objections were made to these comments at trial, nor do they rise to the level of fundamental error. See Escamilla, 107 N.M. at 516, 760 P.2d at 1282 (doctrine of fundamental error applied to excuse failure to make proper objection below only if innocence of defendant appears indisputable or if question of guilt is so doubtful that it would shock conscience to permit conviction to stand). Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant's contention. 5. Defendant objected to references made about Kathy Chavez and the manner of her death during closing argument. The curative instruction given by the trial court that argument of the attorneys is not evidence was sufficient to cure any prejudice from the remarks under these circumstances. See State v. Simonson, 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983). Moreover, the trial court's ruling on the relevancy of the evidence regarding Kathy Chavez, excluding all photographs of her body, was proper in light of the impossibility of separation of the evidence of one victim's death from that of the other. Defendant was able to present his theory that, although he was present when victim Grogg was killed, he did not participate in the murder. In order for the state to establish its case  that it was impossible for Ortega to have committed the murders without defendant's assistance  the state was permitted to introduce evidence of each victim's physical size and strength as well as the circumstances surrounding the events. Given the theories of the prosecution and defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. 6. During cross examination, the prosecutor questioned defendant regarding his probation, which stemmed from an unrelated charge. The prosecutor stated that the purpose behind the questioning was to show a motive for defendant's desire to leave the state, an issue first brought up on direct examination when defendant was asked if he wanted to go to California. Defense counsel's objection to questions concerning revocation of the probation was sustained, with the court limiting questions to issues of behavior and conditions of probation. Defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by this line of questioning is without merit.