Opinion ID: 1801948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Challenges to death penalty statute

Text: Defendant attacks the constitutionality of California's death penalty statute on a number of grounds. We have in the past rejected each of these contentions. Thus, we have concluded: Section 190.2 adequately narrows the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty in conformance with Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements. ( People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1429 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368, 157 P.3d 973]; People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 892.) Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in determining whether to impose the death penalty, is not unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary or capricious. (see People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1429; accord, People v. Curl, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 362.) `The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require that a jury unanimously find the existence of aggravating factors or that it make written findings regarding aggravating factors.' [Citations.] `[N]either the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances exist or that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or that death is the appropriate penalty. [Citations.]' ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 893.) Moreover, the statute `is not unconstitutional because it does not contain a requirement that the jury be given burden of proof or standard of proof instructions for finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination.' ( People v. Curl, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 362.) On the other hand, the trial court is not required to instruct the jury that neither party bears the burden of proof. ( People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1429.) Nothing in the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee (e.g., Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428]; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348]) compels a different answer to these questions. ( People v. Curl, supra, at p. 362; People v. Rogers, supra, at p. 893.) Further, Evidence Code section 520, establishing that a party `claiming that a person is guilty of crime or wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that issue,' does not apply to the normative decision on penalty that is performed by the trier of fact at the penalty phase of a capital trial. ( People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 814; see People v. Leonard, supra, at p. 1429.) The failure to require intercase proportionality review does not violate due process, equal protection or the Eighth Amendment. ( People v. Curl, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 362; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 538.) The use of unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating factor at the penalty phase is not unconstitutional. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 507 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 & fn. 32 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) And the use of restrictive adjectives such as extreme, reasonabl[e] belie[f], and impaired in section 190.3, factors (d), (f), (g) and (h) does not prevent the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 893, 895; see People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) The jury need not be instructed that section 190.3, factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (j) are relevant only as possible mitigators. ( People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1430.) Nor is the trial court required to instruct that the absence of a particular mitigating factor is not aggravating. ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 897.) In any event, the jury here was instructed that [t]he absence of mitigation does not amount to the presence of aggravation. The availability of certain procedural protections in noncapital sentencingsuch as a burden of proof, written findings, jury unanimity and disparate sentence reviewwhen those same protections are unavailable in capital sentencing, does not signify that California's death penalty statute violates Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles. ( People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1430; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 754.) The death penalty, when applied in accord with state and federal statutory and constitutional requirements, does not violate international law. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 539.) International norms of human decency do not render the death penalty, applied as a regular form of punishment, violative of the Eighth Amendment. ( People v. Curl, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 362-363; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 538.)