Opinion ID: 4541097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Procedural Issues

Text: A draft presentence investigation report (“PSR”) was filed with the court and provided to the parties. Two aspects of the PSR form the basis for Cramer’s first contention on appeal. They are distinct and will be separately summarized. A. First, Paragraph 25 of the PSR recommended that Cramer be assessed a two-level increase under USSG § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) based upon facts alleged in Paragraphs 8 and 9: 8. On April 16, 2017, the Cass County Sheriff’s Office was contacted by Sandra Clark, who reported that her 17-yearold daughter (T.B.) had been forced to perform sex acts on a 45-year-old male, Grant Cramer, who was living with -3- them in rural Cass County, Iowa. Cramer had been living at the Clark residence for approximately four years. 9. When interviewed by law enforcement, T.B. reported that she was left at home on a regular basis with Cramer as Clark worked two jobs and wasn’t home a great deal, particularly in the evenings. T.B. reported that in order to go out with her friends or to use her school computer, she was required to perform oral sex on Cramer. Cramer’s written objections to Paragraphs 8 and 9 stated, “Defendant denies any sex act took place between him and T.B.” He did not object to Paragraph 25. The probation officer’s Addendum stated that the information in Paragraphs 8 and 9 was gleaned from law enforcement records and the government’s offense conduct statement. “This issue is unresolved.” Prior to sentencing, Cramer submitted a Sentencing Memorandum reiterating that he denies “T.B. performed sex acts on defendant” but conceding “that even if the court sustained all of defendant’s objections, the recommended guideline range would be in excess of 120 months, the statutory maximum.” Cramer argued against imposing the recommended conditions of supervised release, arguing “punishment will be sufficient” and the recommended conditions “have simply become boilerplate for any sex offense.” The government’s Response argued for the statutory maximum 120-month sentence and in favor of the recommended supervised release conditions. The government also submitted transcripts of the grand jury testimony of T.B. and forensic investigator Darin Morrissey to support the sexual act and distribution allegations contested by Cramer. At the start of the sentencing hearing, the government stated that it was submitting the grand jury testimony but was not calling live witnesses because Cramer “doesn’t object to the whole paragraphs, he just objects to part of it.” -4- Defense counsel advised that Cramer would not offer additional evidence, conceding “that even if the Court were to sustain Defendant’s objections, it would not change the guideline recommendation.” The district court then found: “based on the matters contained in the grand jury transcripts, Exhibits 1 and 2, that the behavior in . . . paragraphs 8 and 9 of the presentence report occurred” and the specific offense characteristic found in paragraph 25 was appropriately applied. Cramer did not object. In arguing against the recommended conditions of supervised release, defense counsel stated, “we are expecting that the Court will impose a statutory maximum, which is ten years. . . . What Mr. Cramer did was criminal. . . . He’s going to receive a substantial sentence for it, and we think the sentence itself is appropriate.” On appeal, represented by a different Assistant Federal Public Defender, Cramer argues for the first time that the district court committed procedural error by basing the sentence on an unproven fact -- that Cramer forced T.B. to perform oral sex. The two-level increase in USSG § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) applies if the offense involved “the commission of a sexual act or sexual contact,” terms the guideline defines in Application Note 2 by cross references to 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) and (3). Forced oral sex would obviously meet that definition. Cramer argues the only question and answer in T.B.’s grand jury testimony that could even arguably support that finding was too vague to establish the physical touching that is required to prove a sexual act or sexual contact: Q: When Mr. Cramer was there, did he use the fact that you wanted to do things that your mom wouldn’t allow to have you do sexual things with him? A: Yes. We reject this contention because it was not properly preserved before being raised for the first time on appeal. Before sentencing, the defense received the PSR, the government’s offense conduct report, and T.B.’s grand jury testimony. Thus, the -5- defense knew that both T.B. and her mother initially reported that Cramer forced T.B. to perform “oral sex.” In his written objections, Cramer denied that happened but did not challenge the recitals in paragraphs 8 and 9 that oral sex was reported to the Cass County Sheriff’s Department. The defense had access to the “law enforcement records” referred to in the probation officer’s Response to his objections which doubtless contained written report(s) of the Clark and T.B. interviews. Thus, the district court was entitled to treat the fact of oral sex reports as established. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A); United States v. Lindsey, 827 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 413 (2016); United States v. Dokes, 872 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Unless a party objects with specificity and clarity to fact statements in the PSR, the district court may accept those facts as true.”) (quotation omitted). T.B. was present at sentencing, and the district court heard the prosecutor read her victim impact statement in which she stated: “I would like [Cramer] to go away for the maximum years possible, not to be allowed early release, and no contact at all with me or my family. He is manipulative and an awful person.” Defense counsel knew from the record that the prosecutor’s reference to “sexual things” in the grand jury testimony meant the oral sex Clark and T.B. had reported, and knew that if Cramer raised this issue to the district court, the district court would allow the government to call T.B. as a witness to clarify any ambiguity and might grant a continuance of the hearing so that Clark and/or the Sheriff’s Department interviewer could be called to erase any doubt what Cramer had been accused of. And of course, even if this futile inquiry had resulted in eliminating the § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement, defense counsel knew Cramer’s advisory guidelines range would still be well above the statutory maximum ten year sentence that counsel expected the court to impose. In these circumstances, counsel’s failure to raise the issue to the district court arguably waived the issue first raised on appeal. See United States v. Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 2002) (Plain error review “only applies when a defendant inadvertently fails to raise an objection in the district court.”). -6- Finally, T.B.’s grand jury testimony gave the district court a sound basis to construe the reference to “sexual things” as a less embarrassing way to convey to the grand jury the oral sex T.B. had reported to the Sheriff’s Department. Immediately after T.B. confirmed that Cramer forced her to do sexual things “with” him, she was asked whether Cramer “also” helped her create sexually explicit pictures, juxtaposing sexually explicit pictures as separate from doing “sexual things with [Cramer].” Thus, whether Cramer’s failure to raise this new contention to the district court is viewed as waiver, or a forfeiture requiring plain error review, the district court did not err in finding that the facts described in Paragraphs 8 and 9 “occurred” and in imposing the § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement. See United States v. Trevino, 829 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[I]t cannot be error, plain or otherwise, for the district court to adopt facts in the PSR to which the defendant has not objected.”). B. Second, Paragraph 26 of the PSR recommended that Cramer be assessed a two-level increase under USSG § 2G2.1(b)(3) for knowingly engaging in the distribution of child pornography based upon facts alleged in Paragraphs 12, 16, 17, and 19. Cramer’s written objections stated: Regarding paragraphs 12, 17, and 19, the defendant denies that he was trying to receive money for videos of T.B. on the Internet or that he was otherwise sharing images on the Internet. Cramer therefore objected to the enhancement in Paragraph 26 being based on the distribution of T.B. images on the Internet but conceded “that the two-level enhancement for distribution probably applies and paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 probably support the enhancement.” Cramer did not address this issue in his Sentencing Memorandum or at the sentencing hearing. On appeal, Cramer argues for the first time that the district court clearly erred in finding that he shared depictions of T.B. on the Internet. Cramer admits that the -7- Skype messages on the laptop and the handwritten note T.B. found in his room are evidence that “someone” at the house was sharing depictions of T.B. And he acknowledges that T.B. in her grand jury testimony recalled that the note contained names, “lists of what they liked,” abbreviations, and prices. However, Cramer argues, this evidence does not establish that he distributed images of T.B. Rather, it could have been T.B., who admitted sending sexually explicit images of herself to high school classmates. Like his new objection to the oral sex finding, this contention was not properly preserved. Cramer conceded in his PSR objections that the two-level distribution enhancement “probably applies” and then did not raise the issue to the district court at sentencing. In any event, the contention is without merit because considerable evidence supports the district court’s finding that the “someone” distributing images of T.B. on the Internet was Cramer. Clark entrusted Cramer with control over all electronic devices capable of communication. Law enforcement found Cramer in his locked room with several devices, including the laptop with the incriminating Skype messages, and T.B. later found the note listing names and prices in his room. Investigator Morrissey testified that Cramer used the four devices containing sexually explicit depictions of T.B. found in his room and had moved images between the devices. These facts provide ample evidence that Cramer knowingly distributed child pornography. The distribution enhancement was appropriately applied.