Opinion ID: 2585381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Public Use Required

Text: We conclude that a right of first refusal in the hands of the Park Owners is a fundamental attribute of ownership and a valuable property right, and that the forced transfer of this right under chapter 59.23 RCW constitutes a taking. We next consider whether the proposed use of the property is constitutionally permitted. Both the state and federal constitutions give citizens the guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V; Wash. Const. art. I, § 16 (amend.9). The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). While the eminent domain provision of the Washington State Constitution similarly recognizes the requirement of just compensation when private property is taken for a public use, this constitutional provision also expressly provides that Private property shall not be taken for private use.... Const. art I, § 16 (amend.9). Thus, unless a private use falls within article I, section 16's specifically articulated exceptions, the Washington State Constitution explicitly prohibits taking private property solely for a private usewith or without compensation. See generally Evans, 136 Wash.2d at 825-32, 966 P.2d 1252. (Sanders, J., dissenting). The State argues that even if Chapter 59.23 RCW takes the Park Owners' private property, this taking is for a public use, requiring payment of just compensation for any resulting damage and not automatic invalidation of the statute. According to the State, chapter 59.23 RCW achieves a valid public use by maintaining a significant source of low income and elderly housing. Br. of Resp't at 36. The State thus contends that even though a right of first refusal benefits private mobile home park tenants, an important public use is involved because the Legislature found that mobile home parks provide `a significant' but increasingly insecure source of homeownership for `many Washington residents.' Br. of Resp't at 36 (quoting RCW 59.23.005). In short, the State argues that it has used its police power for a valid public use of preserving dwindling housing stocks for an important and particularly vulnerable segment of society. Br. of Resp't at 38. The State, apparently assuming public purpose and public use are always the same thing under existing Washington law, argues that preserving a declining housing resource so greatly benefits the public that RCW 59.23 plainly converts the private use to a public use. It does not. Washington courts have a long history of restricting governmental takings of private property under eminent domain by literally defining private use. This court has often held that a beneficial use is not necessarily a public use. In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash.2d 616, 627, 638 P.2d 549 (1981) (citing State ex rel. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 651, 657-58, 286 P. 33 (1930) and Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash.2d 799, 825, 831, 837-38, 341 P.2d 171 (1959)). In re Seattle, for example, addressed the City of Seattle's ordinance implementing a large urban improvement project designed to guard against urban decay. The project required Seattle to acquire all properties necessary for the project and then transfer large portions of the property to private retailers. Recognizing that impeding urban decay and providing shopping areas, owned by private individuals but used by the general public, provide substantial benefits to the public, this court stated: [i]t may be conceded that the Westlake Project is in `the public interest'. However, the fact that the public interest may require it is insufficient if the use is not really public. In re Seattle, 96 Wash.2d at 627, 638 P.2d 549. This court further stated that [i]f a private use is combined with a public use in such a way that the two cannot be separated, the right of eminent domain cannot be invoked. [13] In re Seattle, 96 Wash.2d at 627, 638 P.2d 549. As Justice Dunbar, a convention delegate and member of the Judicial Department responsible for the final proposal of article I, section 16 to the convention stated, the use under consideration must be either a use by the public, or by some agency which is quasi public, and not simply a use which may incidentally or indirectly promote the public interest or general prosperity of the state. Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 509, 74 P. 681 (1903). This court has often followed a similar line of reasoning. In Hogue, for example, this court concluded it is the duty of the courts to uphold the rights of private property owners against the inroads of public bodies who seek to acquire it for private purposes which they honestly believe to be essential for the public good. Hogue, 54 Wash.2d at 838, 341 P.2d 171. Chapter 59.23 RCW authorizes the State to take from the park owner the right to sell to anyone of choice, at any time, and gives tenants a right to preempt the owner's sale to another and to substitute themselves as buyers. Then, after a mobile home park has been forcibly sold to a qualified tenant organization, no member of the public can use the park. In fact, only the park tenants can freely use it. Although preserving dwindling housing stocks for a particularly vulnerable segment of society provides a public benefit, this public benefit does not constitute a public use. See In re Seattle, 96 Wash.2d at 638, 638 P.2d 549; Hogue, 54 Wash.2d at 825, 341 P.2d 171; Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 155 Wash. at 657-58, 286 P. 33. The conclusion that chapter 59.23 RCW results solely in a private use is further supported by the Legislature's silence concerning public entitlement to occupy and use the park after the private tenants buy it. To the contrary, RCW 59.23 would vest ownership (and, by extension the new owners' and former tenants' right to possess, exclude others, and dispose of it) in a qualified tenant organization with membership requiring (a) Payment of reasonable dues; and (b) being a tenant in the park. RCW 59.23.020(3). On the face of the Act, the public would not be entitled to use the park if a qualified tenant organization became the owner. Although White Bros. & Crum Co. v. Watson, 64 Wash. 666, 671, 117 P. 497 (1911), is factually distinct from this case, the late Judge Ellis very clearly and persuasively set out the dangers inherent in the reasoning argued by the State: If it is something in which he has the actual right of property there is no rule of law nor principle of equity which would warrant a court in taking it from him against his will for the benefit of another. No amount of hardship in a given case would justify the establishment of such a precedent. The next step in the invasion of the right of property would be to invite the courts to measure the comparative needs of private parties, and compel a transfer to the one most needing and who might best utilize the property. If a man may be required to surrender what is his own, because he does not need it and cannot use it, and because another does need it and can use it, then there is no reason why he may not be required to surrender what he needs but little because another needs it much. A doctrine so insidiously dangerous should never find lodgment in the body of the law through judicial declaration.