Opinion ID: 3030794
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The University is considered an arm of the state

Text: under Iowa state law The second Fitchik factor requires that we focus on whether the State itself considers the entity an arm of the state. Under the second factor, we look to how state law treats the entity generally; whether the entity can sue or be sued in its own right, whether the entity is separately incorporated, and whether the entity is immune from state taxation. Febres, 445 F.3d at 230. This second factor clearly weighs in favor of immunity. The University was created under the Iowa state constitution, it is the only constitutionally created university in the State, and it 47 has not been separately incorporated by the State.27 The Iowa Constitution further provides that the “educational and school funds and lands[] shall be under the control and management of the General Assembly of this State.” Iowa Const. Art. IX, 2d. § 1. University real estate is owned in the State’s name and the University is unable to buy or transfer real estate without the express permission of a State Executive Council. Iowa Code § 262.9. Most importantly, Iowa state law considers the University to be a state agency. Sindlinger v. Iowa St. Bd. of Regents, 503 N.W. 2d 387 (Iowa 1993). Compare Febres, 445 F.3d at 233 (noting that N.J. state law generally treated school boards as separate political subdivisions) with Benn, 426 F.3d at 233 (stating that under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state constitution, county judicial districts are state entities). In addition, although the University may bring suit in its own name, it may do so only through the State Attorney General’s Office, which also is obligated to defend the University from suit. Iowa Code § 13.2. Furthermore, unlike New Jersey’s tort claims act, which applies to New Jersey counties and municipalities as well, see Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663, Iowa has separate tort claims acts for the State (Iowa Code ch. 699) and political subdivisions (Iowa Code ch. 670). 27 Article IX, Section 11 of the Iowa Constitution states that “The State University shall be established at one place without branches at any other place, and the University fund shall be applied to that Institution and no else.” Iowa Const. Art. IX, § 11. 48 These facts sufficiently establish that the University of Iowa is considered an arm of the state by the State of Iowa. 3. The University’s autonomy is constrained by state authority The final Fitchik factor focuses on the degree of independence from state control an entity exercises. The Board of Regents of the University of Iowa is tightly constrained by state authority. The Board of Regents, which governs the University of Iowa and all other state universities, consists of nine members, each appointed by the governor for a six-year term (with the restriction that no more than five may be from the same political party). Iowa Code. § 262.1, .2, .7. The governor of Iowa is entitled to remove a member of the board for cause with the approval of a majority of the senate, Iowa Code § 262.5, and the governor may suspend a board member when the general assembly is not in session. Iowa Code § 262.5. Board expenses are reimbursed by the state director of revenue, Iowa Code § 262.29, who must report to the governor the amount paid in services and expenses of officers and employees of the board. Iowa Code § 262.22. The Board’s powers are further regulated by Iowa Code § 262.9, which governs, inter alia, the Board’s procurement specifications of certain types of materials (e.g., the department of natural resources must review the Board’s procurement specifications to ensure that the Board purchases recyclable materials and soybean-based inks), the University’s acquisition and disposal of real estate, the University’s ability to accept and administer trusts, and the number of University meetings and locations that may be held. The Board may only acquire or transfer real estate with the approval of the State Executive Council, which consists of the 49 Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Agriculture. Iowa Code § 262.9(7). Contra Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663 (noting that under New Jersey law the New Jersey Transit was able to purchase and sell property without any state governmental oversight). The Board is authorized to secure patents and copyrights from students, instructors and officials, but they must become the property of the State. Iowa Code § 262.9(11). Biennially, the Board is required to give an expenditures report to the governor and the legislature and to submit a biennial budget. Iowa Code § 262.26. In addition, the University is required to hire a budget analyst to serve as a liaison between the State Department of Management and the University in preparing the budget, Iowa Code § 8.29, and is required to report monthly expenditures and receipts of funds to the state director of revenue and finance. In light of these facts, is it apparent that the University of Iowa is tightly controlled by the State of Iowa.28 Therefore, we find the autonomy factor weighs in favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 4. Weighing the factors Summing up, the first Fitchik factor weighs slightly against immunity, while the second and third factors weigh 28 By contrast, in Kovats, the New Jersey governor had the power to appoint some of the board members to Rutgers, and there were only two limitations on the board’s operation of University: the board had to comply with (1) state budget appropriations; and (2) with state laws and regulations. Kovats, 822 F.2d at 1312. 50 heavily in favor of immunity. The District Court placed great emphasis on the funding prong in accordance with our pre-Doe jurisprudence. Under current precedent, however, we are required to consider each of the factors equally when determining whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Benn, 426 F.3d at 233. In this case, we believe the overwhelming degree of state involvement in the University of Iowa warrants a finding that the University is an arm of the state. While the State of Iowa is not clearly obligated by statute to increase expenditures to the University as a result of an adverse judgment, there is a high degree of state involvement in the affairs of the Board of Regents and the University in general. In addition, under Iowa law the University is clearly considered an arm of the State. Accordingly, we find that the University of Iowa is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Bowers’ state law tort claims. E. Congress validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Having determined that the University of Iowa is entitled to sovereign immunity, we are required to consider the applicability of that doctrine to Title II of the ADA. The United States, as intervenor, reminds us that judicial restraint requires us to “avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988). In order to avoid the constitutional question in this case, the United States suggests we in effect prune away Bowers’ Title II claim, as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides nearly identical 51 protection. While we do not disagree that the protections afforded by Title II and Section 504 are substantially similar, see Doe v. Cty. of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 447 (3d Cir. 2001), we do not believe that prudence in the form of constitutional avoidance warrants abrogating Bowers’ right to bring a claim under Title II. As our reversal of the District Court’s order of summary judgment has revived Bowers’ Title II claim, we are squarely presented with the constitutional question regarding that statute’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity. Thus, prudential concerns notwithstanding, we feel obliged to enter the fray. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (passing on a constitutional question is “a necessity in the determination of [a] real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals”). In order for Congress to validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, Congress must: (1) unequivocally express its intent to abrogate that immunity; and (2) act pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). The first prong of this test is easily satisfied in this case, as Title II of the ADA provides that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4); see generally Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (finding that the above statutory provision was an unequivocal expression of Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Title II). Our task then in this case is to determine whether Congress exceeded its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Title II of the ADA with respect to public education. 52 “Congress can abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the substantive guarantees of that Amendment.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004). Under this “broad enforcement power,” id., Congress may “enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.” Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003) (concluding that the Family Medical Leave Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s § 5 power to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination). “When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 520. Thus, Congress’s § 5 authority can sweep in conduct that may possibly be constitutional. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (“Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into the ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’”) (citation omitted). Although Congressional authority under § 5 is broad, it is not unlimited. Lane, 541 U.S. at 520. The key limitation is that Congressional action must not work “a substantial change in the governing law.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. In this respect, the Supreme Court has established a “congruence and proportionality” test: “Section 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits ‘a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 53 prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’” Lane, 541 U.S. at 520 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520). The Court has enacted a three-step inquiry to determine whether a particular statute satisfies the congruence and proportionality test, which requires the parties to identify: (1) with some precision the constitutional right at issue; (2) whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States against the disabled; and (3) whether the rights and remedies created by the statute are congruent and proportional to the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and the record of constitutional violations adduced by Congress. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 368, 372-73. For example, the purported abrogation of Title I of the ADA failed that test in Garrett, in which the Court held that there was not a pattern of constitutional violations with respect to public employment. Congressional findings had focused on discrimination in the private sector, and Title I’s broad remedial scheme was insufficiently targeted to remedy unconstitutional discrimination in public employment. See id. at 368-374. Thus, the Court in Garrett held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA. The Court explicitly left open the question of whether similar suits could be brought for money damages under Title II of the ADA.29 29 The Court has also sustained other challenges to overly broad and disproportional legislation that went beyond the scope of § 5. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (finding that Congress exceeded its § 5 authority in enacting Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); Florida Prepaid 54 That question was answered, to some degree, in Lane, 541 U.S. 509. Lane involved a suit by two paraplegic plaintiffs who claimed that they were denied access to the state courts by reason of their disabilities. In that case, the Court explained that Title II was enacted “against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.” Id. at 524. The Court referenced the numerous hearings held by Congress in connection with enacting the ADA, which revealed “that many individuals, in many States across the country, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities.” Id. at 527. This evidence led Congress to make an explicit finding that disability-based discrimination persisted in access to public services and public facilities. Id. at 529. The Court then reviewed whether Title II was valid § 5 legislation with respect to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services.30 As to that conduct, the Court concluded that Title II was a congruent and proportional response to remedy discrimination against disabled individuals Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (concluding that the Patent Remedy Act implicated Article I concerns, not enforcement of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment). 30 The Court reviewed the congruence and proportionality of Title II as applied to access to judicial services, not the congruence and proportionality of Title II as a whole. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. 55 in the administration of judicial services. Congress chose a limited remedy to enforce Title II with respect to access to the courts. States are required to take “reasonable measures” to remove architectural and other barriers to accessibility, and, in the case of older facilities in which structural changes would be more difficult, states are able to adopt a variety of less costly measures to ensure access to judicial services. Id. at 532. As a result, the Court concluded that Title II’s affirmative obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the administration of justice was a reasonable prophylactic measure targeted to a legitimate end. Lane, however, revealed disagreement amongst members of the Court as to whether Title II may subject States to money damages for conduct that may in fact be constitutional. While the majority opinion recognizes that Congress’s prophylactic powers under § 5 may proscribe some conduct that is facially constitutional to “prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct,” Lane, 541 U.S. at 529, the dissenting Justices forcefully argued that Congress’s § 5 powers extend only to remedy actual constitutional violations. See id. at 547 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in § 5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or “remedy,” conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (emphasis in original). But see Constantine v. The Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 490 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he question is not whether Title II exceeds the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment, but by how much.”) (emphasis in original). 56 This dispute was held in abeyance in the Court’s decision in United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). In Georgia, a disabled inmate in a state prison brought a pro se action under Title II of the ADA seeking money damages. The inmate alleged that he was confined within a small cell 23 to 24 hours per day, that he was unable to turn his wheelchair around in his cell, and that he was not afforded adequate facilities to use the toilet and shower without assistance, which often was denied. In addition, he claimed that he was denied a number of essential prison services as a result of his disability. Id. at 879. The Court examined whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to the inmate’s claims. It noted that the same conduct allegedly established the inmate’s claims under both the Eighth Amendment and Title II. In this respect, the Court agreed that “insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Id. at 882 (emphasis in original). Because it was unclear as to what extent the conduct underlying the inmate’s constitutional claims also violated Title II, the Court ordered the case remanded back to the District Court for the inmate to amend his complaint. Id. at 882. The Court directed the lower court to (1) identify which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) identify to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, determine whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. Id. 57 Thus, we are required to determine in the first instance if any aspect of the University’s alleged conduct forms the basis for a Title II claim.31 In this case, the University allegedly violated Title II when it refused to offer Bowers a scholarship on the basis that he would not meet NCAA initial eligibility standards. Title II prohibits a “qualified individual with a disability” from being “excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity” because of the individual’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Bowers argues that the University of Iowa discriminated against him because of his learning disability: but for the fact that his learning disability precluded him from taking the requisite number of core classes in high school, he would have been given a scholarship by the University. Bowers thus essentially states a claim under Title II that he was denied access to a program at a public education institution because of his disability.32 31 In Georgia, the Court remanded to the District Court for this determination. 126 S. Ct. at 882. However, given the procedural posture of this case, we find we are well situated to make this determination ourselves. See Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 32 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[A]s this analysis simply requires a legal determination under the standard set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and because a remand would further prolong the lengthy course of this litigation, we will address these questions.”). 32 To succeed on a claim under Title II, Bowers must demonstrate: (1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a 58 Under Georgia, we are required next to determine whether the alleged misconduct in this case, denying a student athlete eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics, also violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly, since the Supreme Court has held that there is no fundamental right to public education, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), there is no fundamental right to participate in intercollegiate athletics, a component of public education. Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that the disabled are not a suspect class for purposes of an equal protection challenge. City of Cleburne v. City of Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).33 Accordingly, we apply rational basis review to the Defendants’ application of the NCAA rule to Bowers. The NCAA rule (and the universities’ adoption and application of the NCAA rule) easily passes muster under rational basis review as the rule is designed to ensure that incoming student athletes can handle the rigors of college academia while engaging in intercollegiate athletics. See Bowers I, 974 F. Supp. at 461 (noting the NCAA’s view that the requirements “are disability; (3) he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability. Bowers III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 510. 33 In the context of public education, the due process clause may be implicated if a student is suspended or expelled without notice or an opportunity to be heard. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). In this case, however, Bowers’ claims do not raise any procedural due process concerns. 59 designed to assure proper emphasis on educational objectives, to promote competitive equity among institutions and to prevent exploitation of student athletes”). The NCAA rule – requiring student athletes to participate in certain basic core classes in high school – is rationally related to the end it attempts to achieve – ensuring that incoming student athletes are prepared to balance academics and athletics. The rule does not target disabled individuals per se, but rather also targets those student athletes who have failed to satisfy their core course requirements for other reasons, including sheer lack of effort. Consequently, the rule does not create a caste system in which learning disabled students can never qualify as student athletes. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (finding that zoning legislation failed rational basis review because it demonstrated irrational prejudice directed solely against the mentally retarded). Thus, the NCAA rule and the university Defendants’ application of that rule do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Toledo, 454 F.3d at 33-34 (finding that a university’s actions in failing to accommodate disabled student by allowing him, inter alia, to arrive late to class and to extend deadlines for work, did not establish constitutional violations). Having determined that the alleged misconduct in this case states a claim for violation of Title II but not the Fourteenth Amendment, we arrive at the final step of Georgia’s tripartite test. This step requires to determine whether Congress’s purported abrogation of state sovereign immunity is nevertheless valid.34 The right at issue in this case, as in Lane, is the right to 34 As already stated, in making this determination we seek to identify: (1) with some precision the constitutional right at 60 be free from irrational disability discrimination. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522. The Court in Lane concluded that Congress had clearly identified a history and pattern of disability discrimination with respect to public services. Id. at 526.35 Therefore there is only issue; (2) whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States against the disabled with respect to public services; and (3) whether the rights and remedies created by the statute are congruent and proportional to the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and the record of constitutional violations adduced by Congress. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 368, 372-73. 35 The Court considered evidence of disability discrimination in a variety of public services, not just limited to access to the courts. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 523-26 (referencing voting, serving as jurors, unjustified commitment, abuse and neglect of young persons committed to state mental hospitals, and irrational discrimination in zoning decisions). The Court concluded that there was a documented “pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, programs, and activities, including the penal system, public education, and voting.” Id. at 525 (emphasis added). Subsequent decisions of the courts of appeals have recognized that the second prong of the Boerne test was conclusively established with respect to Title II by the Lane Court. See Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Constantine v. The Rectors and Visitors of George Mason University, 411 F.3d 474, 487 (4th Cir. 2005) (“After Lane it is settled that Title II was enacted in response to a pattern of unconstitutional disability discrimination by States and nonstate 61 government entities with respect to the provision of public services.”); Assoc. for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2005). But see Toledo, 454 F.3d at 35 (“We believe the sounder approach is to focus the entire City of Boerne test on the particular conduct of state conduct at issue.”). Disability discrimination has clearly been identified in the context of public education. As the Government documents extensively in its brief, there had been a long and sad history of discrimination against students with learning disabilities prior to the adoption of Title II of the ADA. (See Gov’ts Br. at 23-34.) See also Lane, 541 U.S. at 525 n.12 (citing examples of statesanctioned public school discrimination); State ex rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Antigo, 172 N.W. 153 (Wis. 1919) (justifying the exclusion of a child with cerebral palsy from public school because he would “produc[e] a depressing and nauseating effect” on other children). In concluding that Congress was justified in enacting Title II with respect to public education, the First Circuit stated the following: In sum, the thirty years preceding the enactment of the ADA evidence a widespread pattern of states unconstitutionally excluding disabled children from public education and irrationally discriminating against disabled students within schools. Faced with this record of persistent unconstitutional state action, coupled with the inability of earlier federal legislation to solve this “difficult and intractable problem,” Congress was justified in enacting prophylactic § 5 legislation in response. 62 one difficult issue left at this point in the inquiry: the congruence and proportionality of Title II with respect to public education. We agree with the United States that “[a]s applied to education, Title II is a congruent and proportional means of preventing and remedying the unconstitutional discrimination that Congress found to exist both in education and in other areas of governmental services, many of which implicate fundamental rights.” Br. for the United States at 36-37. The remedy chosen by Congress in Title II in the area of public education is a narrow one: access to education. Qualified individuals with a disability may not be excluded from participating in public education on the basis of their disability. Thus, states are free to enact a myriad of laws relating to public education, including laws that may negatively impact disabled students, so long as those laws do not discriminate against students because of their disabilities. Congress enacted Title II against the backdrop of our regrettable national history in educating students with disabilities. See infra note 35. As pointed out correctly by the United States in its brief, our national history in educating students with disabilities leaves much to be desired. In many past instances, States have made educational decisions on the basis of irrational misconceptions and stereotypes held about disabled students. See Gov’ts Br. at 27-32 (documenting various instances of exclusion and segregation of disabled students). Given this regrettable past history, Title II is a justifiable prophylactic measure to avoid the risk of unconstitutional treatment of disabled students. Toledo, 454 F.3d at 39 (citing Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735). 63 Reported cases from the courts of appeals since the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia have likewise found that Congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity with respect to public education was valid. As the Fourth Circuit observed in Constantine, Congress limited the scope of Title II in several respects. First, the statute only protects “qualified individuals with a disability.” Second, Title II permits States to limit participation in their programs and activities for all other lawful reasons. Third, Title II only requires States to make “reasonable modifications” to accommodate the disabled, thus protecting the States from having to compromise essential eligibility criteria for public programs. Finally, States are able to make available other accommodations if structural modifications of physical structures are too burdensome. 411 F.3d at 488-89. For those reasons, and against the backdrop of discrimination against disabled students, the Constantine court concluded that Title II was valid legislation as applied to public education. Id. at 490. See also Toledo, 454 F.3d at 40 (“Title II’s prophylactic measures are justified by the persistent pattern of exclusion and irrational treatment of disabled students in public education, coupled with the gravity of the harm worked by such discrimination.”); Assoc. for Disabled Americans, Inc., 405 F.3d at 959 (“Discrimination against disabled students in education affects disabled persons’ future ability to exercise and participate in the most basic rights and responsibilities of citizenship, such as voting and participation in public programs and services. The relief available under Title II of the ADA is congruent and proportional to the injury and the means adopted to remedy the injury.”). 64 Accordingly, we join several sister circuits in holding that Congress acted within its Constitutional authority in abrogating sovereign immunity under Title II of the ADA.