Opinion ID: 1779410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: referee's findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt

Text: A referee's findings of fact regarding guilt carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record. Fla. Bar v. Wohl, 842 So.2d 811, 814 (Fla.2003) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Sweeney, 730 So.2d 1269, 1271 (Fla.1998)). Absent such a showing, this Court is precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the referee. Id. (quoting Sweeney, 730 So.2d at 1271). Brown first asserts that the referee erred in finding that he possessed the requisite intent to support a violation of rule 4-8.4(c) because the referee failed to examine his intent at the time he pledged the second security interest in the certificate, and instead merely focused on Pioneer's subsequent financial loss. Brown is correct that in order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent. See Fla. Bar v. Lanford, 691 So.2d 480, 480-81 (Fla.1997) (In order to find that an attorney acted with dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud, the Bar must show the necessary element of intent.). The intent element can be satisfied, however, merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing. Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So.2d 1249, 1252 (Fla.1999); see also Fla. Bar v. Smith, 866 So.2d 41, 46 (Fla.2004) (recognizing that the motive behind the attorney's action was not the determinative factor but instead the issue was whether the attorney deliberately or knowingly engaged in the activity in question). In the instant case, the record supports the referee's findings as to this element. Further, contrary to Brown's characterization of the referee's report, the referee did not simply focus on Pioneer's subsequent financial loss. The basis for the referee's recommendation that Brown be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(c) was Brown's conduct in representing to Pioneer that he would obtain a certificate of deposit to serve as full cash collateral for the bond and then a week later, pledging this same security to his own law firmconduct which the referee found Brown knew was contrary to honesty and justice. Moreover, the security agreement with the law firm explicitly stated that Hillview was the sole owner and that the certificate of deposit was free and clear of any claims. In addition, the security agreement with his law firm purported to give his law firm priority over any other claim or interest. Although Brown and his law partners attempted to excuse this clear misrepresentation by testifying that Brown failed to read the agreement and that the contract was based on boilerplate language, the referee found such testimony unworthy of belief. Other testimony presented at the hearing indicated that Brown was a detail-oriented attorney who was always prepared. We defer to the referee's assessment in this regard. See Fla. Bar v. Batista, 846 So.2d 479, 483 (Fla.2003) (Because the referee is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we defer to the referee's assessment and his resolution of the conflicting testimony.). Brown next contends that his conduct in this matter was not dishonest for several reasons. First, he essentially argues that his conduct in double pledging the certificate of deposit was not dishonest because the final written agreement between Hillview and Pioneer did not prohibit subsequent security interests. Second, he argues that his conduct was not dishonest because BC & W was a junior secured creditor and Pioneer was a senior secured creditor, and it was actually Pioneer's fault, because it failed to properly protect its interest, that a significant portion of the certificate of deposit's proceeds were ultimately distributed to BC & W. We disagree. An attorney's ethical obligation of honesty is not bounded by contractual duties. Thus, although the parties' written agreement did not expressly prohibit subsequent security interests, Brown was not free to simply disregard the affirmative oral and written representations he initially made which induced Pioneer to agree to issue the bond in the first place. Additionally, contrary to Brown's statements, BC & W was not given a junior security interest. Instead, as recognized by the referee, the law firm's agreement explicitly provided that Hillview intended for BC & W's security interest in the certificate of deposit to have priority over all other claims or interests to the certificate of deposit by any other creditors of HILLVIEW whatsoever. Moreover, the agreement further stated that Brown personally represented that the certificate of deposit was clear of any other claims at the time of the contract, despite the fact that Brown himself already pledged the certificate of deposit to Pioneer as full cash collateral. This is clearly sufficient support in the record for the referee's findings that the double pledge was dishonest under these circumstances. Next, Brown contends that the referee erred in finding that he violated ethical rules by not advising Pioneer that he pledged Hillview's security to his law firm. Brown's arguments in this regard miss the point. First, the referee did not find that Brown violated the relevant rules only because he failed to inform Pioneer about the second pledge to his own law firm. The referee looked to this circumstance in determining Brown's general intent regarding the double pledging. This does not equate to a finding that this act alone violated Brown's ethical obligations. The referee's finding that Brown committed a knowing misrepresentation was based upon Brown's conduct in initially representing to Pioneer that the certificate of deposit would serve as full cash collateral for the bond and then, within a week, making a second pledge of the certificate of deposit. The fact that Brown deliberately kept this from Pioneer supports the referee's finding that this was a knowing misrepresentation. Finally, Brown asserts that the referee's recommendation that he be found guilty of attorney misconduct violates the Equal Protection Clause and Florida's constitutional right of access to the courts because it prohibits him from litigating private contractual disputes on behalf of a corporation in the same manner as other non-attorney citizens. In DeBock v. State, 512 So.2d 164 (Fla.1987), this Court heard and rejected a similar challenge. In that case, attorney DeBock was subpoenaed for testimony in connection with criminal charges pending against attorney Richard F. Rendina for offering unlawful compensation to DeBock while DeBock was an assistant state attorney. DeBock asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer questions at a deposition, contending that the statutory immunity to which he was entitled was insufficient to immunize him from bar disciplinary proceedings and that he was thus entitled to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege unless this Court granted him immunity from bar disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 165. The trial court agreed, but the district court reversed, holding that a witness cannot invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to testify in a criminal case because of the potentially adverse use of his testimony in bar disciplinary proceedings. Id. (quoting State v. Rendina, 467 So.2d 734, 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)). DeBock sought this Court's review, contending that equal protection demands that an attorney witness who is granted statutory immunity be treated the same as an immunized non-attorney witness. The Court rejected this challenge, holding that the protection of the public served as a rational basis for holding attorneys to different standards since the unique role of attorneys as officers of the court mandates that attorneys be held to the highest of ethical standards. Id. at 168. In this matter, the same rationale applies. An attorney's ethical obligations are separate and distinct from any contractual obligations by which he or she may be bound. Additionally, attorneys must be and are held to the highest of ethical standards and, unlike non-attorney citizens, are subject to discipline for a breach of those standards. Accordingly, we reject Brown's constitutional challenges and approve the referee's recommendation that he be found guilty of violating rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(c).