Opinion ID: 1868913
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Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Riesen's Prima Facie Case

Text: To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, an employee must show that he or she participated in a protected activity, that the employer took an adverse employment action against him or her, and that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Fraternal Order of Police v. County of Douglas, 270 Neb. 118, 699 N.W.2d 820 (2005). The burden of proof for a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim is on the employee. See 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 104.07[3] (2005). See, e.g., Rebarchek, supra ; Buckner, supra . In Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634 (2003), this court did not address what elements are necessary to establish a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim. In the present case, the trial court asserted that to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim, Riesen had to establish the following elements: (1) that he filed a workers' compensation claim, (2) that he was terminated from employment, and (3) that a causal link existed between the termination and the workers' compensation claim. The three elements utilized by the trial court fairly summarize the most common articulations of the prima facie case in such actions. See Jean C. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers' Compensation Claim: The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 Hastings L.J. 551 (1986). See, also, Webner v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 267 F.3d 828 (8th Cir.2001) (applying Iowa law); Gonzalez v. City of Minneapolis, 267 F.Supp.2d 1004 (D.Minn.2003) (applying Minnesota law); Hinton v. Designer Ensembles, Inc., 343 S.C. 236, 540 S.E.2d 94 (2000). Those elements also parallel this court's established elements for unlawful retaliation actions in general. See Fraternal Order of Police, supra . We find that the trial court's articulation of the elements of a prima facie case applicable to this case was correct. There is no dispute that Riesen satisfied the first two elements of a prima facie case. First, Riesen established that he filed a workers' compensation claim arising from an injury sustained on May 8, 2001, in the course and scope of his employment. That claim, in fact, was being litigated when he was fired. Second, Riesen established that Irwin Industrial fired him on April 30, 2002. The trial court found that Riesen had failed to establish a prima facie case of workers' compensation retaliatory discharge because he had not met the third elementa causal nexus. The court stated that Riesen's evidence fail[ed] to establish that Irwin [Industrial] was motivated by retaliation. . . . Ordinarily the prima facie case must, in the nature of things, be shown by circumstantial evidence, since the employer is not apt to announce retaliation as its motive. 6 Larson & Larson, supra at 104-65. Accord, Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator, 272 Kan. 546, 35 P.3d 892 (2001); Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum, 118 Wash.2d 46, 821 P.2d 18 (1991). One court has opined that [c]ircumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a causal link between termination and filing a compensation claim includes: (1) knowledge of the compensation claim by those making the decision on termination; (2) expression of a negative attitude toward the employee's injured condition; (3) failure to adhere to established company policies; (4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated employees; and (5) evidence that the stated reason for the discharge was false. Continental Coffee Products v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Tex.1996). Riesen injured his right shoulder at work on May 8, 2001. No dispute exists between the parties that Riesen had a valid workers' compensation claim as a result of that injury. Not only had he pursued his right to benefits, he had received substantial benefits and was seeking unknown future benefits. Riesen was fired on April 30, 2002, the same day on which Summers received Riesen's answers to interrogatories in the workers' compensation action. In its brief, Irwin Industrial emphasizes that almost 1 year had elapsed between the date of Riesen's compensable injury and his termination of employment. Irwin Industrial argues that [o]ne year is too long a time period to generate any inference of retaliatory intent based on temporal proximity. Replacement brief for appellee at 11. This argument ignores the fact that Riesen's claim was still pending. As such, the nature and extent of the injuries he claimed to have received had not yet been determined. The record before us includes Riesen's answers to interrogatories, which Summers received on April 30, 2002, just prior to Riesen's dismissal. These answers show that Riesen and Irwin Industrial were in some sort of dispute over his right to recovery. They indicate that both parties were anticipating further litigation. In these answers, Riesen claimed that he had not reached maximum medical improvement and that he was reserving his right to claim benefits for vocational rehabilitation, further medical expenses, and temporary and permanent disability. This situation is clearly distinguishable from one in which a discharged employee had filed a workers' compensation claim that had been settled and satisfied without serious dispute. Proximity in time between the claim and discharge is a typical beginning point for proof of a causal connection. Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator, 272 Kan. 546, 555, 35 P.3d 892, 899 (2001). A plaintiff supports an assertion of retaliatory motive by demonstrating proximity in time between the workers' compensation claim and the firing, along with evidence of satisfactory work performance and supervisory evaluations. See 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 104.07[3] (2005). In the present case, Riesen had received several positive work performance reviews and pay increases from his employer. He was fired just 2 days after he notified Irwin Industrial's human resource department that after nearly 12 months of medical treatment and accompanying workers' compensation benefits, he needed more surgery on his shoulder. The temporal proximity of 2 days between Riesen's notice that he needed additional surgery and the termination of his employment, coupled with evidence of his satisfactory work performance, created a causal nexus sufficient to satisfy the third prima facie element. In cases involving retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim, a claimant's `prima facie case is not an onerous burden under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme.' See Rebarchek, 272 Kan. at 557, 35 P.3d at 901, quoting Robinson v. Wilson Concrete Co., 913 F.Supp. 1476 (D.Kan.1996). We conclude that Riesen met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim.