Opinion ID: 2184403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegation as to Necessity of Repairs

Text: The word `necessary' must be considered in the connection in which it is used, as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It may import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the end sought.    It    may express mere convenience or that which is indispensable   .    (I)ts force and meaning must be determined with relation to the particular object sought, and is a relative and comparative term, depending upon its application to the object sought,   . Kay County Excise Board v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 185 Okl. 327, 91 P. 2d 1087, 1088 (1939). To the same effect Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Fox et al., 402 Ill. 617, 85 N.E.2d 43, 51 [12, 13] (1949); and as illustrated in Cushing v. Gay, 23 Me. 9, 16 (indispensable); Sullivan v. Maine Central Railroad Company, 82 Me. 196, 198, 19 A. 169, 8 L.R.A. 427 (proper); Buck v. Biddeford, 82 Me. 433, 437, 19 A. 912 (appropriate); Cleveland v. Bangor, 87 Me. 259, 266, 32 A. 892 (propriety); Eaton v. Atlas Accident Insurance Company, 89 Me. 570, 573, 36 A. 1048 (suitable); State v. Conwell, Jr., 96 Me. 172, 173, 51 A. 873 (conducive to the end sought); State v. Beaudette, 122 Me. 44, 46, 118 A. 719 (indispensable), and in Webster et al. v. Seekamp et al., 4 Barn. & Ald. 352 such repairs as a prudent owner would order. See also Webster's Third New International Dictionary and 65 C.J.S. Necessary p. 266. The mere expression of an opinion which is understood to be only an opinion (emphasis added) does not ordinarily render the person expressing it liable    for obtaining property by false pretenses, at least where the opinion expressed is upon a matter concerning which a difference of opinion is likely to arise.    But, if one knows an opinion to be erroneous, the matter is as to him, not an opinion, but a subsisting fact; and, if he makes a statement contrary to what he knows to be the fact, he should not be allowed to escape the consequences on the theory that his statement concerns a matter of opinion. (Emphasis added.) 22 Am.Jur., False Pretenses, § 15. See also State v. Grady, 147 Miss. 446, 111 So. 148, 149 [2-4] (1927); Whatley v. State, 249 Ala. 355, 31 So.2d 664, 666 [2, 3], 174 A.L.R. 169 (1947) dictum; People v. Gordon, 71 Cal.App.2d 606, 163 P.2d 110, 123 [26-31] (1945); and Williams v. State, 77 Ohio St. 468, 83 N.E. 802, 14 L.R.A., N.S., 1197 (1908). In Thompson v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 75 Me. 55, 61, a case of deceit, the distinction is made between the falsehood of stating one opinion when the speaker held another and putting a statement in the form of an opinion when the speaker had positive knowledge to the contrary, the latter being actionable. Further if a seller    possesses or assumes to possess superior knowledge of the property and asserts it to his vendee who has not had equal opportunity to gain such knowledge, his asserted opinion may be equivalent to an affirmation of fact and therefore actionable fraud. Gordon, supra 163 P.2d at p. 124 [26-31]. For the allegation that repairs were necessary on the Durell roof to be held inadequate as a false pretense it would require determination that the statement was expressed as an opinion and subject it to the law recited above, or hold that the statement that repairs were necessary on the Durell roof was, as a matter of law, an expression of opinion. We have no basis for finding that the statement of necessity was expressed as an opinion,In our opinion repairs are necessary on your roof. If such statement as was made were not an opinion in its express terms, the word necessary could have meant one of many things,that repairs were indispensable, proper, appropriate or conducive to good husbandry, and that such statement represented that the condition of the Durell roof was factually such that repairs were demanded by a requirement ranging from prudence to indispensability, which condition is negated. It can be inferred from the indictment that someone, or all, of the respondents had already been or done work on the Durell roof, that they were in a position to know the conditions which then and there existed and in whatever sense they used the word necessary the indictment charges a false statement of condition, quality, of existing fact. State v. Stanley, 64 Me. 157, 159. It cannot be held that the challenged statement was by its nature an expression of opinion as a matter of law. Where one represents as true a thing which he knows not to be true, such a representation falls within the statute, even though in some situations the truth or untruth of the statement might be a matter of opinion. 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 11. See People v. Staver, 115 Cal.App.2d 711, 252 P.2d 700, 704 [4, 5] (1953); and Holton v. State, 109 Ga. 127, 34 S.E. 358, 360 (Col. 1) (1899). Whether the statement were an expression of opinion, by its nature or under the circumstances peculiar to this case rather than its specific phrasing, is a jury question. There is a point at which mere opinion ends and fact begins.    Plainly the test must be the common sense of judge and jury, applied to the special facts of the case. Bishop, supra § 429, ¶ 10. It is so held in the companion field of civil deceit Thompson, supra 75 Me. at p. 60; Hotchkiss v. Bon Air Coal & Iron Company, 108 Me. 34, 44, 78 A. 1108; Ross v. Reynolds, 112 Me. 223, 226, 91 A. 952; and Shine, supra 130 Me. at p. 444, 157 A. at pp. 319-320. And generally the sense in which they (the representations) were used is for the jury. People v. Blanchard, 90 N.Y. 314, 320 (1882). The jury question on this issue has been resolved by the plea of guilty.