Opinion ID: 750120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Federal Jurisdiction Over Jamie Key

Text: 54 Juveniles may not be tried for federal crimes until they are transferred to adult status pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42. A transfer is approved in four steps. First, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 requires the Attorney General to certify that one of three factors compels transfer: 55 (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence.... 56 Second, the Attorney General must also certify that, in addition to the existence of one of these three factors, there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. Third, section 5032 requires the Government to submit the juvenile's court records (or a court clerk's certification of the unavailability or nonexistence of such records) as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a transfer proceeding: 57 A juvenile shall not be transferred to adult prosecution nor shall a hearing be held under section 5037 (disposition after a finding of juvenile delinquency) until any prior juvenile court records of such juvenile have been received by the court, or the clerk of the juvenile court has certified in writing that the juvenile has no prior record, or that the juvenile's record is unavailable and why it is unavailable. 58 If the Government fails to submit these records to the district court or make the proper certifications, the court lacks jurisdiction to engage in the ultimate inquiry regarding the suitability of transferring the juvenile. See, e.g., United States v. John Doe, 13 F.3d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1993). 59 Once the Government meets the three jurisdictional requirements for transfer, the district court must decide whether the juvenile's transfer to adult status is in the interest of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. A juvenile, therefore, can be transferred to adult status only if both the Attorney General and a district court judge deem it appropriate. Section 5032 prescribes a detailed series of factors that a district court must consider; the statute requires courts to make factual findings on the following matters: 60 The age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems. 61 An appellate court reviews a district court's transfer decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.1992). The Government's proffer of any prior juvenile court records enables the district court to make an informed assessment of factors such as the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record and the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts. The statute requires a complete records proffer as a jurisdictional matter in recognition of the records' crucial role in illuminating the district court's discretionary transfer decision. 62 Appellant Key raises three independent challenges to the district court's jurisdiction under the Act. First, he argues that the Government improperly charged him with crimes that were not cognizable under the Act. Second, Key claims that the Government failed to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of providing the district court with his complete juvenile records. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Without complete records, he argues, the district court was not entitled to assess his potential for rehabilitation in the state's juvenile justice system. Finally, he contends that a substantial federal interest did not support his transfer to federal court as required by § 5032. We hold that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction over Key's prosecution.
63 Key's first jurisdictional challenge proceeds from a faulty foundation. He points out that, as a limitation on his transfer to federal court, the Act precluded the Government from charging him with conspiracy or aiding and abetting in connection with his drug violations; the Government could only charge him (as it did) with possession of heroin with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Key claims on appeal that the evidence adduced at trial failed to show that he actually possessed drugs or money, and that the jury must have therefore convicted him of accountability crimes outside the purview of the Act. 64 This ersatz sufficiency challenge is without merit. As discussed earlier, the Government introduced a number of recorded phone conversations into evidence showing Key in possession of drugs or drug proceeds on a consistent basis; many of these calls captured Key asking other members of the conspiracy to bring him more drugs to sell on the street. Key was charged and indicted only on possession charges pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841; these charges were dependent on a jury finding of direct or constructive possession by Key alone. Furthermore, the Government never presented an accountability theory to the jury and, in fact, suggested that Judge Coar specifically disavow any such notion in the jury instructions. As a result, Judge Coar instructed the jury that it could only convict Key on the relevant possession counts if it could find that he possessed or constructively possessed with the intent to distribute the controlled substances as charged in the indictment. We have no reason to doubt that the jury followed these instructions. See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 2139, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979) (noting that [a] critical assumption underlying [the system of trial by jury] is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge). 65
66 -Juvenile Records 67 Key argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a transfer proceeding because the Government failed to submit all of his juvenile records to the court before the transfer hearing. Contrary to Key's suggestions, though, the Government complied with the dictates of § 5032. The Government provided the district court with a set of documents certified by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County in the motion to transfer Key to adult status in federal court. These papers showed that Key pleaded guilty to a charge of controlled substance possession, that the circuit court adjudged him to be a delinquent, and that the court sentenced him to ten days at a juvenile detention center (with consideration of time already served). This was Key's only juvenile adjudication or conviction. Based on this information, the district court granted the Government's motion to transfer Key to adult status. 68 On appeal, Key does not challenge the district court's ultimate determination that his transfer was in the interest of justice. Instead, he argues that the Government's proffer of his juvenile records was inadequate and, therefore, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the Government's motion. Key does not, however, point to any specific records that the Government omitted from its motion. Perhaps he refers to the records surrounding his other brushes with the law that did not result in convictions. Beginning in April 1993, officers of the Chicago Police Department arrested Key for a number of criminal offenses, including criminal trespass to a vehicle (twice), criminal trespass to state land, battery, aggravated criminal sexual assault, possession of cannabis (twice), mob action, and possession of fifteen grams of heroin. Key's presentence investigation report showed that these arrests resulted in either unknown dispositions or dismissals with leave to reinstate; none of them led to a conviction or punishment. The closest thing to another conviction in his juvenile records was a criminal charge entitled Mob from December 1994, which showed a bond forfeiture and the issuance of a warrant. 69 We do not regard the records of these arrests as the sort of juvenile court records which the Government must submit to the district court pursuant to § 5032. Key never explains how the introduction of these unadjudicated arrests would have been relevant or helpful to the district court's ruling on the Government's motion to transfer. The Government submitted certified documentation of Key's lone conviction and the resulting attempt at rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. Appellant Key, in fact, used his short juvenile court record as an argument against his transfer to adult status; he claimed that the state's juvenile justice system did not yet have an adequate opportunity to rehabilitate him. The district court, however, deemed Key fit for trial as an adult in federal court. Admitting Key's numerous prior arrests could only have strengthened the Government's case for transfer. 70 The Government's action in this case does not resemble the types of omissions found in successful challenges under § 5032. At least four circuits have invalidated federal jurisdiction over juveniles based on noncompliance with this provision. In two cases, the Government failed to submit any of the juveniles' prior court records even though a subsequent investigation revealed the existence of such records. United States v. M.I.M., 932 F.2d 1016, 1019 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 222-23 (10th Cir.1990). The court in a third case did not allude to the existence of any records but dismissed the prosecution because the Government failed to submit either records or a clerk's certification of their nonexistence or unavailability. United States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 620 (8th Cir.1991). Finally, in a fourth case, the Ninth Circuit held that the Government failed to meet the record certification requirement by submitting the defendant's records two months after the juvenile was transferred to adult status. United States v. Doe, 13 F.3d 302, 304 (9th Cir.1993) (dismissing the prosecution also because the tardy records were certified by an Assistant U.S. Attorney rather than by a clerk of the juvenile court). In Key's case, by contrast, the Government submitted properly-certified court records from his only conviction and sentence. There were no other court records and, thus, no certification of unavailability or nonexistence that needed to be filed. See generally United States v. N.J.B., 104 F.3d 630, 636 (4th Cir.) (holding that § 5032 requires the Government to submit a juvenile's complete court records but does not require the Government to certify formally that the records are complete), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1722, 137 L.Ed.2d 844 (1997). 71 As stated earlier, Key does not attack the substantive accuracy of the district court's transfer decision. Indeed, it is difficult to envision a way that Key's additional arrests would have dissuaded the district court from granting the Government's motion to transfer; if anything, the additional arrests only would have served to buttress the court's conclusion that the State has had ample opportunity to engage in rehabilitative activity and apparently has either failed to do so or failed to do so effectively.... We are careful to note, though, that a proffer of records could satisfy § 5032' § standard of completeness, yet nevertheless omit data that would have significantly impacted the district court's transfer determination. In that hypothetical case, it would be possible for an appellate court to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in approving the juvenile's transfer. Jurisdiction in that case would be unimpeachable based on the records' completeness, but the ultimate decision would still be open to challenge. That case is not before us today. Thus, we hold that the Government's proffer in this case complied with the requirements of § 5032 and properly conferred jurisdiction on the district court to transfer Jamie Key to adult status.
72 -Substantial Federal Interest 73 Key finds a second jurisdictional defect in the Attorney General's certification--also pursuant to § 5032--that a substantial federal interest warrants the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. As discussed earlier, section 5032 allows a district court to transfer a juvenile to adult status only after the Attorney General certifies that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense. This power has been delegated to the United States Attorneys, 28 C.F.R. § 0.57, and the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois (on behalf of the Attorney General) certified that a substantial federal interest in this case counseled in favor of a federal prosecution. Key claims that his illegal conduct here does not rise to such a lofty level of national importance. The Government, on the other hand, argues that the substance of the Attorney General's certification here is unreviewable by courts and, even were it reviewable, that Key's prosecution is indeed justified by the substantial federal interest in eradicating large-scale drug trafficking operations. We agree with the Government, as well as with the majority of courts to consider this question, that we cannot substantively review the Attorney General's certification of a substantial federal interest. See Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730 (3rd Cir.1997); United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 432, 139 L.Ed.2d 332 (1997); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 305, 139 L.Ed.2d 235 (1997). But see United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir.1996). Key's second jurisdictional challenge, therefore, must fail. 74 The language of the statute unambiguously vests this discretionary certification with the Attorney General. Section 5032 provides that there shall be no federal proceedings against a juvenile unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies ... that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. The statute does not condition federal proceedings against a juvenile on the actual existence of a substantial federal interest; rather, the only jurisdictional requirement is that the Attorney General certify that such an interest exists. Section 5032, therefore, makes the test a subjective one--whether the Attorney General's investigation reveals to him/her a substantial federal interest--rather than an objective one. There is no congressional invitation for the courts to make a separate assessment. 75 It is true that courts generally are reluctant to abdicate the power of review. For this reason, the Supreme Court has stated time and again that judicial review of executive action 'will not be cut off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.'  Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 424, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 2231, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). We conclude that § 5032 exhibits the requisite persuasive signs that Congress did not envision judicial oversight of the Attorney General's certification decisions. Judicial review is not usually conditioned on the existence of a specific statutory license to that effect. An absence of such a provision, however, becomes important when the same statute does expressly authorize judicial review of another matter. Certification by the executive branch is a threshold requirement in the transfer process, but a transfer ultimately may be granted only if [a] court finds, after hearing, such transfer would be in the interest of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. We believe that this framework evinces Congress's intent to assign different responsibilities to different actors in the transfer process. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) ( '[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972)). 76 This presumption receives further support from the different instructions given to the actors in the transfer process. Section 5032 provides no definitions or standards by which to assess a substantial Federal interest. By contrast, the same section elaborates six detailed factors by which courts should determine whether a transfer to adult status would be in the interest of justice. Furthermore, the section emphasizes that those factors shall be considered and that findings with regard to each factor shall be made. Id. (emphases added). Section 5032 specifically prescribes the judicial role in determining the propriety of a transfer and directs the course of the judicial inquiry in painstaking detail. The level of specific instruction to judges in this area stands in stark contrast to the statute's silence on any standards to guide or by which to evaluate an Attorney General's certification decision. 77 The certification decision is no different than several other determinations committed solely to a prosecutor's discretion. Obviously, first and foremost among this genre is the ultimate decision to prosecute someone in federal court (unless motivated by unconstitutional bad faith). Other decisions of this sort include a U.S. Attorney's certification that an interlocutory appeal in certain classes of cases is undertaken to secure the use of substantial, material evidence rather than for the purpose of delay. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731; United States v. Comiskey, 460 F.2d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.1972). A federal prosecutor also has unreviewable power to decide that the public interest demands granting immunity to a witness in order to compel that witness's testimony. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431-34, 76 S.Ct. 497, 502-04, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956). The certification requirement, therefore, is just another decision in this mold and may be reviewed--like these other determinations--only for the aforementioned unconstitutional bad faith and technical compliance. 78 The substantial Federal interest standard, without any further explanation, might seem an odd phrase to courts, but it is a term of art with which executive officials are very familiar. The term is used throughout the United States Attorneys' Manual as the touchstone of all exercises of federal prosecutorial discretion. See Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305-06. For instance, the Manual advises U.S. Attorneys to abstain from initiating proceedings if [n]o substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220. This is a decision federal prosecutors must make in every single case. The Manual goes on to discuss some of the factors that should govern this determination: 79 In determining whether prosecution should be declined because no substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant considerations, including: 80
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87 Id. § 9-27.230. In a passage relevant to a juvenile's challenge to the Attorney General's certification under § 5032, the Manual advises against commencing a federal prosecution based on the same acts involved in a prior state proceeding unless the matter involves a substantial federal interest. Id. § 9-2.142. 88 The Attorney General's certification, thus, is essentially a perfunctory corollary to the decision to prosecute itself. The Supreme Court has spoken on the reasons why these type of decisions should be insulated from judicial review: 89 [T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plans are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. 90 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). This decision is administrative in nature, made after a studied assessment of the Government's policy visions and priorities, as well as practical considerations like budgetary constraints, the effectiveness of prior enforcement efforts in a particular area, and the strategic advantages and disadvantages of proceeding in federal court. In short, it is precisely the type of task assigned to a political branch rather than to our government's neutral arbiters. Courts are inherently reactive bodies and an attempt to second-guess the executive branch's prosecutorial discretion in this regard would expand the bounds of our delegated authority and commit us to an inappropriate role in the criminal justice system. 91 As a final matter, we note that our conclusion takes into account the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995). In that case, the Court considered a provision of the Westfall Act that empowers the Attorney General to certify that a federal employee sued for negligence was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Once the Attorney General makes this certification, the United States Government takes the place of the employee as the defendant and the governing law becomes the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The plaintiffs in Lamagno urged the district court to review the Attorney General's certification in their case because the FTCA would have required dismissal of their claims. The Court held that judges could review the substantive accuracy of the Attorney General's certification for two main reasons: (1) the Attorney General had an overwhelming incentive to make this certification in order to avoid liability, Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 427, 115 S.Ct. at 2233, and (2) courts traditionally have reviewed a government official's determination of factual matters that are dispositive of court controversies, id. at 429-30, 115 S.Ct. at 2233-34. 92 Those two concerns are not implicated in § 5032. The statute does not deprive any injured parties of a remedy at tort--one of the factors fueling the Court's decision in Lamagno. Furthermore, there is no hint that the Attorney General would (or could) have a conflict of interest in deciding whether a prosecution was justified by a substantial federal interest. The decision to prosecute results in expenditures and diversion of resources from other tasks rather than an immunity that safeguards governmental funds. Finally, a certification of the existence of a substantial federal interest is not outcome-determinative in the same way that the certification can be in the FTCA context. Under § 5032, the district court still makes the ultimate determination of whether a transfer to adult status is appropriate and does not merely rubber-stamp the Attorney General's decision on the matter. 93 We join the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that courts cannot review the substantive basis of the Attorney General's certification of a substantial Federal interest under 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Defendants can challenge technical aspects of the Government's compliance with the certification requirement (e.g., whether the certifying party was a proper agent of the Attorney General, whether the certifying party actually made the unreviewable statement that a substantial federal interest existed, whether the certification was filed in a timely manner, etc.). Defendants also remain free to raise constitutional challenges to certifications that are made in bad faith and/or that constitute selective prosecution. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531. Appellant Key, however, does not raise a challenge that is cognizable in the federal courts.