Opinion ID: 168427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ex Post Facto and Due Process Objections

Text: 46 The Ex Post Facto Clause encompasses [e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. Calder v. Bull, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). While the prohibition on laws with retroactive effect is generally a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977), the Supreme Court has acknowledged ex post facto limitations on judicial decision making. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). Limits on ex post facto judicial decisions are based upon the core due process concepts of notice, [forseeability], and, in particular the right to fair warning. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693. 47 Portillo-Quezada's argument is that retroactive application of Booker allowed the district court to inflict greater punishment for his conspiracy than it otherwise could have. This argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir.2005), in which we concluded that retroactive application of the advisory Guidelines regime does not violate the ex post facto component of the Due Process Clause. 4 We offer a few additional thoughts pertinent to this case. 48 At the time Portillo-Quezada engaged in the conspiracy for which he was convicted the statutory maximum sentence was life in prison. As it happens, were Portillo-Quezada sentenced after Blakely, but prior to Booker, the Guidelines regime in effect at the time may have resulted in a sentence below the statutory maximum. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and Booker did nothing to alter the statutory maximum sentence, and therefore did not alter Portillo-Quezada's exposure to punishment. Thus, the sentence imposed in accordance with Booker does not offend ex post facto principles. 49 In addition, every other circuit to consider this issue has agreed with us. See, e.g., United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting argument that due process prohibits the retroactive application of Booker on grounds that the defendants had fair warning of the statutory maximum in the pre- Booker environment); United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir.2005) (rejecting ex post facto claim to post- Booker sentencing); United States v. Jamison, 416 F.3d 538 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting ex post facto claim on reasoning that Booker affects only punishment, not guilt or innocence); United States v. Wade, 435 F.3d 829 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting argument because defendant would have reasonable expectations of judicial factfinding in pre- Blakely environment when crime was committed); United States v. Dupas, 417 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.2005), amended by 419 F.3d 916 (9th Cir.2005) (rejecting ex post facto claim on fair warning grounds); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that Booker does not act to impermissibly increase the authorized sentence of a defendant where the defendant's ultimate exposure did not change); United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331 (D.C.Cir.2006) (rejecting argument on grounds that defendant had fair warning of statutory maximum in pre- Booker environment). 50 We agree with these cases that where a defendant's exposure to punishment has not changed, sentencing under Booker does not amount to ex post facto judicial decision making in violation of the Due Process Clause. 51