Opinion ID: 2675604
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a government agent specifically targeted

Text: the defendant in order to induce him to commit illegal conduct; (2) the agent acted through the middleman after other government attempts at inducing the defendant had failed; (3) the government agent requested, encouraged, or instructed the middleman to employ a specified inducement, which could be found improper, against the targeted defendant; (4) the agent's actions led the middleman to do what the government sought, even if the government did not use improper means to influence the middleman; and (5) as a result of the middleman's inducement, the targeted defendant in fact engaged in the illegal conduct. Id. at 55. Both Luisi and Bradley contemplate that, to establish a derivative defense, the government must actually pressure the defendant to commit a crime, even if it applies that pressure through the medium of a government-instructed middleman. See Luisi, 482 F.3d at 56, 58 (concluding that derivative entrapment instruction is proper where a jury can find that the government was responsible for the pressure brought to bear on the defendant); Bradley, 820 F.2d at 8 (requiring a defendant seeking to present a derivative entrapment defense to show, at least, that pressure had been put upon him by the intermediary at the instruction of the government agent). Thus, in Luisi, the derivative entrapment defense was viable where a government agent targeted the defendant by having his superior, a criminal gang -15- lord, instruct him to commit a crime, while in Bradley, the defense was not viable because there was no evidence that the government had sought to pressure the defendant at all. Diaz-Castro cannot show that the government was responsible for pressuring him to commit a crime, since he has not shown that he was pressured at all. To be sure, the government agents asked Kento to recruit another officer into the scheme; but they did not ask Kento to target Diaz-Castro, nor did they ask him or reasonably expect him to apply pressure of any sort in recruiting a confederate. Without any evidence of improper pressure exerted upon him by Kento, Diaz-Castro cannot make out a derivative entrapment claim. Because none of the asserted defenses were viable, the motion in limine was properly granted and the request for a jury instruction was properly denied. C. Government's Comments at Closing Argument Diaz-Castro next argues that the prosecution's comments during closing argument were improper for two reasons: first, because they improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the defense, and second, because they highlighted the risk of danger associated with the undercover agent's job. We analyze de novo whether the comments were improper. United States v. Glover, 558 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2009). If we conclude that they were -16- improper, we then review for harmless error, because Diaz-Castro preserved his objections. See id. 1. Burden of Proof Comments The following exchange took place during the closing argument by Diaz-Castro's attorney, Ms. Sandoval: [MS. SANDOVAL:] What informant, what undercover agent contacted Javier Diaz-Castro and urged him to bring another police officer, to make sure that he had a weapon? You know the answer to that question. And there were informants in those DVDs. There were informants in those DVDs. . . . Why weren't those informants brought into this courtroom so you could look at them in the eyes, look at them sitting in that chair, and let me interrogate and cross-examine them? MR. GIBSON: Objection. She could have brought any one of them in here any time she wanted to. MS. SANDOVAL: Objection, Your Honor. This is highly irregular. THE COURT: Continue, Counsel. MS. SANDOVAL: Highly irregular. In whose control were these informants? In response to what my colleague just said, I'm going to ask you -- I'm going to ask you to remember what the Honorable Judge Gelpi said. My client is presumed innocent. He doesn't have to put on one shred of evidence. I could have painted my nails throughout this trial and done nothing, and the Government would still have the burden of proving my client beyond a reasonable doubt. The ones who had the duty to bring those informants and put them on the stand -- MR. GIBSON: Objection, Objection. THE COURT: Counsel, approach. MS. SANDOVAL: I'll withdraw. I'll move on. MR. GIBSON: No, Your Honor. I think we need to approach. -17- Diaz-Castro points to the comment made during the first objection -- [s]he could have brought any one of them in here any time she wanted to -- and argues that this comment improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the defendant. In response, the government argues that the comments were not improper because they responded to the discussion by Diaz-Castro's attorney of the government's decision not to present certain witnesses. In fact, the court had previously instructed the parties that it would not allow an argument about missing witnesses. Sandoval violated that instruction first. At a sidebar following the above exchange, the court explained: Ms. Sandoval, the mention that the Government had to put informants on the stand or bring them, that goes against the instructions I gave. I know you had submitted that instruction that I give. Now, I have to give the jury a curative instruction because they did not have to bring those informants. They can choose who their witnesses are going to be. After hearing from the parties, the court ultimately gave two curative instructions to the jury, stating: Okay. Before the Government presents a rebuttal, let me inform the members of the jury the Government is entitled to present a short rebuttal argument in a criminal case and that is because the Government carries the heavy burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. So before we hear from the prosecutor, let me explain something. When Ms. Sandoval did her closing, she mentioned that the Government did not bring some particular witnesses to testify. The Government is not -18- required by the law or the constitution to present every witness that may be available. The witnesses and the evidence that you will consider is only the evidence that was presented here in court. On the same token, the defendant, Mr. Diaz-Castro, does not have to bring any evidence nor present any witnesses. So you only decide the case based on the evidence that was presented here in court and not what was not presented. You only consider what was presented here in court. So having said that, Mr. Gibson, if you want to present a short rebuttal argument, please go ahead. Contrary to the government's contention, its comments were improper: made in the context of a speaking objection before the jury and entailing an incomplete statement of the law, they suggested to the jury that the defense had to call any witnesses it felt were missing. See United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1015 (1st Cir. 1997) (vacating conviction for plain error where, in part, prosecutor had said to jury, the defendant has the same responsibility [as the government] and that is to present a compelling case). Nonetheless, we are satisfied that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike the situation in Roberts, the district court here considered both the prosecution's error and the defense's error that had prompted the objection and gave instructions that directly addressed both. The jury was explicitly reminded that the burden -- a heavy one -- belongs solely to the government, and that the defense's decision not to call witnesses was irrelevant. Diaz-Castro does not argue that he -19- was still prejudiced despite that instruction. In the context of this trial, it is evident that the instruction was enough to render harmless any defect that the prosecution's comments caused. Cf. United States v. Ferrera, 746 F.2d 908, 910-11 (1st Cir. 1984) (discussing factors relevant to harmlessness, including contemporaneous curative instruction). 2. Comments on Risk to Undercover Agent Diaz-Castro also argues that the prosecution's comments regarding the risks that the undercover agent (Germán Vázquez) faced were improper. Specifically, the prosecutor explained in closing argument that Vázquez had received threats against his family and ultimately had to move to Florida as a result of his undercover work on Operation Guard Shack. Diaz-Castro argues that this comment was improper under United States v. Ayala-García, 574 F.3d 5, 17-22 (1st Cir. 2009), which, he says, prohibits a prosecutor from bolstering a witness's testimony or credibility by pointing to the public service the witness has performed or the danger he faced.7 In context, the prosecutor's comments were not improper. The prosecutor was not suggesting that the mere fact that Vázquez's work was dangerous made his testimony important, or that DiazCastro was too dangerous to acquit. Instead, the prosecutor 7 Diaz-Castro does not argue that the statements about the risks Vázquez faced were unsupported by the record -- in fact, he admits that they were based on Vázquez's trial testimony. -20- mentioned the threats against Vázquez's family and his need to relocate to Florida in direct response to Diaz-Castro's argument, as he frames it on appeal, that Vázquez was a manipulative and greedy man who had handled the FBI much better than they had handled him. Diaz-Castro had tried to discredit Vázquez's testimony by showing that he had used his role as an FBI informant for significant personal gain; the government then rebutted that argument by showing the risks and losses that Vázquez faced as a result of his work in the operation. That is a valid response, based on trial evidence, to the defense's attempt to damage the witness's credibility. See United States v. Gentles, 619 F.3d 75, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2010). As such, those comments were not improper. D. Multiplicity Challenges Diaz-Castro argues he should have been convicted and sentenced for only one conspiracy because both drug transactions were part of a single, larger conspiracy. He argues that the conspiracy counts, Counts 8 and 14, were artificially divided by the government. He further argues that because there was only one conspiracy, there can be only one firearms charge, so the 25-year mandatory minimum on the second firearms charge cannot apply.8 These two claims were preserved and thus are subject to de novo 8 The firearms provision under which Diaz-Castro was convicted and sentenced for Counts 10 and 16, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), provides a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for a first offense and 25 years for a second or subsequent offense. -21- review. See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2010). 1. Division of Conspiracy Diaz-Castro argues that whether there was one conspiracy or two is a jury question and that he was entitled to an instruction on that topic. The district court did not err because it is clear that no reasonable jury could find that only a single conspiracy existed. The actors in the two conspiracies were completely different, with Diaz-Castro as the only overlapping member, and no activity took place for more than a month after the first drug deal. See United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35, 52 & n.11 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that government agents cannot be members of a conspiracy). Diaz-Castro was invited to the second drug deal by an unnamed confidential informant with whom he had apparently had no prior direct contact. He then recruited Benítez-Falcon, who had not previously been involved in any Operation Guard Shack deals. In fact, the agreement with Benítez-Falcon is what triggered the second conspiracy charge. The evidence does not show in any way that the second drug deal was related to the first aside from the fact that both were sting deals in Operation Guard Shack and involved the same undercover agent. -22- 2. Multiple Firearms Charges Diaz-Castro argues that his convictions and sentences for the firearms charges were improperly multiplicitous. That argument fails. The statute under which Diaz-Castro was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), explicitly states that it applies with respect to each crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Here, DiazCastro engaged in two separate drug trafficking crimes, as charged in Counts 9 and 15. These offenses were distinct: they were separate deals, more than a month apart, involving different people, and at different locations. Diaz-Castro was properly convicted and sentenced on two separate counts under § 924(c) when he violated that provision on two separate occasions.9 United States v. Peña-Lora, 225 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2000), is not to the contrary. In Peña-Lora, we held that a set of consecutive sentences imposed under § 924(c) must instead run concurrently where a single crime of violence (an incident of 9 Diaz-Castro also attempts to reframe his multiplicity argument as an argument under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). He argues that, in order to sentence him to a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for his second conviction under § 924(c), the district court needed to refer the question of whether the conviction on Count 16 was a second or subsequent conviction to the jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is frivolous. The jury found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on two separate § 924(c) charges. Even if that verdict itself were not enough to show that the conviction on Count 16 was a second or subsequent conviction, Alleyne explicitly does not require jury findings for the fact of a prior conviction. See id. at 2160 n.1. -23- hostage-taking) involved the use of multiple firearms and the defendant was charged separately for each weapon. Id. at 32. The facts are readily distinguishable from this case, in which two completely distinct drug trafficking crimes involved the possession of firearms and the defendant was charged separately based on each underlying drug crime.10