Opinion ID: 2353935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Coerced Confession Claim

Text: Snyder insists that four coerced confessions were admitted into evidence at his trial: (1) an oral statement, the notes of which were read at trial; (2) a written, signed statement (Commonwealth's Exhibit 35); (3) testimony as to a re-enactment of the crime performed by appellant and several police officers; and (4) appellant's own trial testimony. Since we have decided that these coerced confession allegations cannot be raised for the first time collaterally, we will not question appellant's classification of the latter two events as confessions. The record, combined with an affidavit filed by appellant's trial counsel, supports Snyder's assertion that the first two of the four confessions were obtained under circumstances violative of the rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964). However, the United States Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966) that both the Miranda and Escobedo decisions would be denied retroactive application  the Miranda rules would be applied only to persons whose trials had not begun as of June 13, 1966 and the Escobedo decision to trials commenced after June 22, 1964. See Commonwealth v. Senk, 423 Pa. 129, 223 A. 2d 97 (1966). Trial in the instant case commenced more than three years before June 22, 1964 so that appellant cannot avail himself of these two landmark decisions, at least to the extent that they hold that failure to give an accused opportunity to consult with counsel or absence of police attempts to advise the accused of his constitutional rights per se constitute a due process deprivation. The nonretroactivity announced in Johnson was to an uncertain extent mitigated by the Supreme Court's pronouncement that police failure to comply with the doctrines of Escobedo and Miranda could form the basis of a claim that the accused's confession was involuntary: Thus while Escobedo and Miranda provide important new safeguards against the use of unreliable statements at trial, the nonretroactivity of these decisions will not preclude persons whose trials have already been completed from invoking the same safeguards as part of an involuntariness claim. 384 U.S. at 730, 86 S. Ct. at 1779. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966). Based primarily upon this statement, appellant contends that he is entitled to a hearing on his involuntariness allegations under the doctrine of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). We disagree and hold that appellant has waived [1] any coerced confession claim and has deliberately bypassed state procedures available to litigate this allegation. Beginning with Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A. 2d 810 (1965), as amplified by Commonwealth ex rel. Mullenaux v. Myers, 421 Pa. 61, 217 A. 2d 730 (1966), this Court has consistently held that failure to raise at trial the issue of voluntariness precludes later, collateral attempts challenging the voluntariness of the accused's confession. We need not detail here, as we did in Fox and Mullenaux, the reasons supporting our insistence upon a contemporaneous objection to the admission of an allegedly involuntary confession other than to note our continuing judgment that a requirement of contemporaneous objection [2] is vital to the orderly administration of criminal trials and clearly serves a legitimate state interest. The record in the instant case is barren of any conduct by either counsel or appellant indicating that the voluntariness of the confessions was challenged. [3] Implicit in our decision in Fox, as demonstrated by our reliance upon Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S. Ct. 564 (1965), was a realization that, although we might find that the accused's failure to object constituted a waiver of his federal claim, [4] in any collateral federal proceeding the federal court would examine whether the habeas applicant had deliberately bypassed state procedures. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849 (1963). Henry was convicted partially on the basis of evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; his counsel failed to object when the evidence was admitted, though he did assert this alleged constitutional error as the basis for his directed verdict motion. Finding that the state had not yet had an opportunity to establish the presence of a waiver, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the state courts with full recognition that petitioner might still pursue vindication of his federal claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which the procedural default will not alone preclude consideration of his claim, at least unless it is shown that petitioner deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts. Henry v. Mississippi, supra at 452, 85 S. Ct. at 570. The clear import of Henry is that, where the state courts make no attempt to resolve the deliberate bypass issue, a federal court will do so. We accept the opportunity. [5] The deliberate bypass concept has its origin in the following statement found in Fay v. Noia, supra at 439, 83 S. Ct. at 849: If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits  though of course only after the federal court has satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts bearing upon the applicant's default. [Citation omitted.] At all events we wish it clearly understood that the standard here put forth depends on the considered choice of the petitioner. [Citations omitted.] A choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar relief. Nor does a state court's finding of waiver bar independent determination of the question by the federal courts on habeas, for waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question. (Emphasis supplied.) Noia had been convicted of murder on the basis of a coerced confession and sentenced to life imprisonment; no appeal was taken. After his co-conspirators' confessions were found constitutionally infirm, Noia filed a collateral, coram nobis proceeding in a New York state court. The state petition was unsuccessful as was Noia's federal district court habeas petition  both state and federal district court found that Noia's failure to appeal waived his federal claim. The United States Supreme Court granted relief for it found no deliberate bypass of state procedure. Characterizing Noia's choice, whether to accept a life sentence or, if his appeal was successful, retrial and a possible death sentence, as grisly, [6] the Court found neither a tactical litigation choice nor a deliberate bypass. [7] Snyder's choice  attacking his confession and thus possibly alienating the jury or permitting its admission without objection  was by no means grisly. The absence of any objection in the instant case is most easily explained in terms of counsel's tactical decision. See footnote 3, supra. Furthermore, although the practice followed for attacking the voluntariness of a confession in this Commonwealth at the time of appellant's trial was unconstitutional in light of Jackson v. Denno, supra, [8] Pennsylvania procedure did nevertheless afford a mechanism for attacking the confession. Upon request counsel could obtain a preliminary determination regarding the confession's admissibility, but if the court decided that the question of the voluntary nature of the confession was one of fact, this factual issue was resolved by the same jury that determined the question of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. 2d 389 (1941); Commonwealth v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 122 Atl. 161 (1923); Laub, Pennsylvania Trial Guide § 81.2 (1959). [9] Appellant or his counsel could therefore have interposed an objection to the admission of the now challenged confessions and, if the trial judge chose to leave the matter for the jury, have pursued the matter no further. Such a procedure would have served to alert the court and thus satisfied the contemporaneous objection requirement. We need not rest, however, on a comparison between the situations confronting Snyder and Noia, for the Supreme Court in Henry has placed its own gloss on deliberate bypass. Thus Henry affords explicit sanction for the proposition that, absent exceptional circumstances, counsel's strategic decision will bind his client: Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims, see Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F. 2d 496 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1964), we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case. 379 U.S. at 451-52, 85 S. Ct. at 569. To the extent that Whitus is emblematic of exceptional circumstances, certainly there were none present in the instant case. Counsel in Whitus was faced with a choice of challenging the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the juries of the trial county, thereby further antagonizing a community already incensed by the killing of a white farmer, or foregoing attack on the jury's composition hopeful that no further antagonism would be generated  a choice, to use the terminology of Fay v. Noia , which can readily be classified as grisly. Counsel in the instant case, as demonstrated above, faced no such choice. We therefore conclude that counsel deliberately bypassed available state procedures for raising the issue of voluntariness. One further inquiry is necessary  may counsel's deliberate bypass be imputed to appellant for purposes of foreclosing subsequent assertion of his involuntariness claim? We hold that, absent a showing of incompetency or the presence of exceptional circumstances, counsel's decision not to attack the confession binds his client. Our conclusion is premised not only upon the particular circumstances of this case, i.e., a confession which in great part was exculpatory and of aid to the defense, but also upon the peculiar considerations counsel must evaluate to decide whether an attack on his client's confession should be launched. The line between a voluntary and an involuntary confession is one composed of subtle gradations, see Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 599-601, 229 A. 2d 922, 925-27 (1967); compounding this difficulty is the congeries of reasons why counsel might choose not to attack the confession  a desire to make defendant appear cooperative, a hope that police testimony can be shaken on cross-examination or, perhaps, a belief that the version of the crime offered in the confession can be used to defendant's advantage. A coupling of these two variables produces a complex decision which a layman is unequipped to make. Of necessity, the decision is one which must be made by counsel  a decision, once made, which binds the client. [10] Our conclusion finds support in federal cases. Stressing that counsel must be the manager of the law suit, the court in Nelson v. California, 346 F. 2d 73, 81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964, 86 S. Ct. 452 (1965) found that strategic reasons prompting counsel not to challenge either an arrest or search resulted in a deliberate bypass binding upon his client. See Williams v. Beto, 354 F. 2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965) (counsel's failure to move to quash indictment, to make an opening statement, to object to certain testimony and to request specific charges held binding on client); compare Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245 (1966) (counsel's entry of guilty plea contrary to client's expressed desire held not binding). Without attempting an exhaustive list of those trial decisions which are so fundamental that counsel's bypass will not foreclose later attack, we hold that counsel's decision not to object to admission of an allegedly coerced confession under the circumstances of the instant case defeats appellant's present collateral attack.