Opinion ID: 1253206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of Rights Under W.Va.Code, 49-5-8(d)

Text: The defendant argues the police violated the statutory prompt presentment requirement and interrogated him without the presence of his parents or counsel. W.Va. Code, 49-5-8(d) (1982), [3] details a juvenile standard for prompt presentment that is similar to the adult prompt presentment requirement. [4] Although the two standards are similar, it is important to underscore the fact that the juvenile prompt presentment requirement is more rigorous than the general criminal standard for prompt presentment of an adult under W.Va.Code, 62-1-5 (1965); W.Va.R.Crim.P. 5(a). See State v. Ellsworth J.R., 175 W.Va. 64, 331 S.E.2d 503 (1985) (noting the strict requirement for juvenile presentment); State v. Moss, 180 W.Va. 363, 376 S.E.2d 569 (1988) (same). In Ellsworth J.R., we recognized that the primary purpose for the additional juvenile protection is the likelihood that a juvenile who commits a serious crime may be transferred to the adult jurisdiction of the circuit court[,] ... there is a need to ensure that [a juvenile defendant's] constitutional rights are preserved[.] 175 W.Va. at 69, 331 S.E.2d at 508. If it appears that the primary purpose of the delay was to obtain a confession from the juvenile[,] the confession is inadmissible. Syl. pt. 9, in part, State v. Moss, supra . See also State v. Ellsworth J.R., supra . The only evidence presented at the suppression hearing regarding the arrest and the immediate circumstances after the defendant was taken into custody came from the police and the defendant's parents. The defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing or at the trial. The parents of the defendant merely confirmed the date and time the police contacted them and their subsequent efforts to determine the whereabouts of the defendant. Uncontradicted evidence reveals the defendant indicated he wanted to talk to the police and wanted neither a lawyer nor his parents present at the time he discussed the case with the police. Based on this evidence, the trial judge ultimately found the defendant's statement admissible. The defendant argued at the suppression hearing, as he does before this Court, that the statement should be excluded because of the prompt presentment delay, the parental notification delay, and police interrogation without the presence of a parent or counsel. These contentions collapse in the wake of precedent and the facts of this case. The record indicates the defendant arrived at the police station shortly before 10:00 p.m. on the night of the robbery and indicated he wanted to talk to the police. When advised of his opportunity to call his parents, the defendant refused indicating he did not want a lawyer or his parents present. A Miranda waiver of rights form was signed at 10:36 p.m. An officer started recording the defendant's statement at 10:50 p.m., and the defendant signed off on a transcribed copy of his statement at 12:45 a.m. The defendant was not presented to the magistrate until 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. The State asserts that the defendant's immediate desire to confess upon his arrival at the police station justified the time lag and interrogation by the officers. This Court has recognized that a confession otherwise proper is not necessarily invalid even though the confession was obtained prior to the juvenile's presentment to a magistrate. State v. Ellsworth J.R., 175 W.Va. at 70, 331 S.E.2d at 508. Certain delays such as delays in the transportation of a defendant to the police station, completion of booking and administrative procedures, recordation and transcription of a statement, [5] and the transportation of a defendant to the magistrate do not offend the prompt presentment requirement. See State v. Ellsworth J.R., supra . See also State v. Persinger, 169 W.Va. 121, 286 S.E.2d 261 (1982). [6] Here, however, the uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendant asked to talk to the police before there was an opportunity to book him and to present him to the magistrate. Thus, the initial delay was attributable to the defendant, and the remaining delay was a result of recording and transcribing the defendant's statement. [7] The more difficult issue is whether the defendant's waiver of his rights was knowing and voluntary. As noted in Moss, the issue of voluntariness must be addressed separately from that of prompt presentment. 180 W.Va. at 375, 376 S.E.2d at 581 (compliance with the juvenile prompt present requirement is examined separately from the determination of voluntariness). The defendant contends any statement given by a minor as the result of interrogation by the police without the presence of a parent or counsel is per se invalid. On the other hand, the State contends there is no requirement that [defendant's] parents be present prior to his giving his statement. We agree with the prosecution. We believe the argument made by the defendant has been essentially foreclosed by Ellsworth J.R. where we found a minor may waive his Miranda rights without the presence of parents or counsel. [8] We know of no law which provides that a minor over the age of sixteen is conclusively presumed to be incapable of waiving his constitutional and statutory rights without the consent of his parents. Thus, we must determine whether the statement in this case was freely and voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances analysis. When reduced to its essence, the defendant on appeal contends that a juvenile whose personal liberty is at stake is entitled to the presence and counsel of his parents prior to being interrogated, much as an adult is entitled to the presence of legal counsel in the same circumstances. As such, he suggests, his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid and the admission of his statement into evidence was a violation of his statutory right to have his parents present during interrogation. We first note that under both federal and West Virginia law, an adult may waive his right to counsel. We find that under the circumstances of this case, the defendant waived his Miranda rights and his right to have his parents present during interrogation. Emanating from In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), a number of basic changes in this State's juvenile practice have flowed from the abandonment of the previous parens patriae concept. One such change is that a juvenile must be provided at least the same rights given to adults during interrogation. Thus, when a constitutional right is at stake, its waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Although some of the rights allegedly waived in this instance are statutory and not constitutional, we assume, without deciding, that their waiver must satisfy the same test. We shall examine the criteria used in the constitutional arena to determine if the juvenile's waiver was intelligent and knowing absent the presence and consent of his parents. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), is instructive. It held that a juvenile who was sixteen and one-half years old and suspected of a serious crime might waive his rights without any consultation with or the presence of an adult even though he requested the presence of his probation officer. In Fare, the Supreme Court held the totality of the circumstances approach used in determining the validity of an adult waiver applied even when the interrogation of a juvenile is involved: We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach permitsindeed, it mandatesinquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, back-ground, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d at 212. The majority of jurisdictions, including West Virginia, rely on the totality of the circumstances test in deciding whether statements by a juvenile were given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v. Laws, 162 W.Va. 359, 362, 251 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1978) [9] ; In re Kean, 520 A.2d 1271, 1274-75 (R.I.1987) (case citations omitted). What was implicit in Laws we now make explicit. We adopt the rationale expressed by the majority of jurisdictions and hold that the validity of a juvenile's waiver of his or her rights should be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver, and the presence or absence of the parents is but one factor to be considered in reaching this determination. [10] In adopting the totality of the circumstances standard, we do so in the belief that circuit courts are equipped with the expertise and experience to make competent evaluations of the special circumstances involved in a juvenile's waiver of rights and should be allowed the discretion to do so. Requiring the presence of parents in every case in which a juvenile is in custody and informed of his rights would be overly protective; would exclude from evidence juvenile statements that are, in fact, knowingly and voluntarily given; and would restrict law enforcement unnecessarily. In re Kean, 520 A.2d at 1275. This Court should not and will not ignore the fact that juvenile crime is as serious a menace to society as those crimes committed by adults. To the victims of crime, the age of the perpetrator is inconsequential. Under today's decision, a juvenile can make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver after he is properly apprised of his constitutional and statutory rights. See State v. Kilmer, 190 W.Va. 617, 439 S.E.2d 881 (1993); State v. Randolph, 179 W.Va. 546, 370 S.E.2d 741 (1988) (defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda rights because he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him); State v. McDonough, 178 W.Va. 1, 357 S.E.2d 34 (1987). However, the prosecution has a heavy burden in establishing that a waiver is knowing and intelligent especially when there is a possibility that the juvenile has some sort of mental incapacity. State v. Boyd, 167 W.Va. 385, 280 S.E.2d 669 (1981). We agree also that a juvenile's youth and experience are highly relevant factors for consideration under Fare 's and Laws 's totality of the circumstances test and that confessions or admissions of a juvenile require special scrutiny. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600, 68 S.Ct. 302, 303-04, 92 L.Ed. 224, 228-29 (1948); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 1212-13, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, 328-29 (1962). Thus, a juvenile's purported waiver is accorded special consideration. See also State v. Laws, 162 W.Va. at 362, 251 S.E.2d at 772 (juvenile rights should be guarded with a greater zeal than adult rights). Where neither legal counsel nor the parents are present, the greatest care must be taken by the trial court to assure that the statement of the juvenile is voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair. Several factors weigh against a voluntary and knowing waiver of Miranda rights in this case. For example, the defendant was a minor at the time of his arrest and had some experience with the juvenile court system. The first time the defendant was orally given his Miranda warnings was under rather dramatic circumstances considering the officers gave the defendant his Miranda warnings while he was face down on the ground, thus raising the possibility that the defendant was not in the position to truly appreciate his constitutional rights. Furthermore, the defendant had no previous charges as an adult for any crime and only one prior misdemeanor conviction as a juvenile. The defendant reads below a third-grade level, [11] and the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses conflicts with prior testimony under oath as to whether the defendant was actually read the Miranda waiver of rights form. [12] On the other hand, there are also a number of factors that suggest the defendant did give a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. These include the following: (1) the defendant did have some prior experience with the police; (2) the Miranda rights were indisputably read to the defendant at least one time; and (3) there was a signed waiver of rights form with the defendant's initials by each right. More significantly, the defendant was encouraged to call his parents once he indicated his desire to talk to the police, but he decided he did not want either an attorney or his parents to be present. The defendant argues another factor that should be considered is the language of the waiver of rights form. The form contains the following contested language: We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you if you wish, if and when you go to court. Although admittedly the waiver form in question is somewhat confusing, the United States Supreme Court has upheld confessions premised on waiver forms with almost identical language. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (the language of the warning in its entirety sufficiently informed the defendant of his constitutional rights). We have not dealt specifically with the exact language of the present waiver form. We hold that a form with ambiguous language of this nature may not alone compel exclusion of a statement, but in combination with the special circumstances of a case may constitute a compelling factor bearing against a knowing and intelligent waiver. All these facts were before the trial court at the time it ruled on the motion to suppress. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded after a full evidentiary hearing that given the totality of the evidence, I find that the South Charleston Police Department did, in fact, bring him before a legal authority at the earliest possible time. In reference to the Miranda waiver, the trial judge found the Miranda rights were given, the waiver of rights form was signed intelligibly. On review, this Court will not overturn the factual findings of a trial court on a motion to suppress unless they are clearly erroneous. As stated in Syllabus Point 1, in part, of State v. Farley, ___ W.Va. ___, 452 S.E.2d 50 (1994), a trial court's factual findings regarding the voluntariness of a confession will not be set aside unless they are plainly wrong or clearly against the weight of the evidence. We find the evidence in the record amply supports the trial judge's findings in this case and the findings are sufficient to justify the trial court's decision. B.