Opinion ID: 427079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: exhaustion of state administrative remedies

Text: 23 Appellants argue on appeal that the district court's exercise of pendent jurisdiction in this case was improper because appellees failed to exhaust their state administrative remedies. They claim that the district court was therefore acting as a state court in a manner in which a state court faced with a similar case would not have been able to act. We conclude that under California law appellees were not required to exhaust any administrative remedies before filing this action. 4 24 Appellants note that the California Government Code gives any interested person the power to petition a state agency to adopt, amend, or repeal a regulation. Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 11347 (West 1980). They argue that appellees were required to pursue that remedy before seeking judicial relief. We disagree. 25 A California court did on one occasion state in dictum ten years ago that section 11347 [then section 11426] provided a remedy that parties were ordinarily required to exhaust before challenging a regulation in court. See California Medical Association v. Brian, 30 Cal.App.3d 637, 656, 106 Cal.Rptr. 555, 568 (1973). But even assuming that that was an accurate statement of California law as it then stood, 5 a conclusion that appellees are presently required, under current California law, to pursue their section 11347 remedy before seeking judicial relief is wholly unwarranted. 26 Appellants inexplicably failed, in their briefs, to mention section 11350(a) of the Government Code and the recent amendments thereto. That section allows any interested person to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of any regulation and provides that a regulation may be declared invalid for substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the APA. Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 11350(a) (West 1980). In 1981 and 1982, clearly rejecting the Brian dictum, the California legislature amended section 11350(a) to provide specifically that [t]he right to judicial determination shall not be affected by the failure either to petition or to seek reconsideration of a petition filed pursuant to section 11347.1. 6 Thus, section 11350(a) now makes it plain that persons wishing to challenge the validity of a regulation in court are not required first to petition the administrative agency to repeal the regulation. 27 In response to the court's inquiry as to why the California Attorney General failed to advise us of section 11350(a), appellants suggested that while the section may have entitled appellees to a declaratory judgment without filing a petition under section 11347, the inmates were nevertheless required to file such a petition in order to obtain injunctive relief. We find this argument wholly without merit. It would have made no sense for California to have dispensed with an exhaustion requirement for plaintiffs seeking a declaration of invalidity but not for plaintiffs seeking a declaration of invalidity and an injunction against enforcement of the invalid regulations. Such an interpretation of California law--leaving courts powerless, in most cases, to enjoin enforcement of regulations they find invalid--would render the amendments to section 11350(a) largely ineffective. We have no doubt that the 1981 and 1982 amendments made any prior exhaustion requirement inapplicable not only to suits for declaratory relief also but to suits for both declaratory and injunctive relief. 28 Our construction of section 11350(a) is in accord with the practice of the California courts, which have commonly granted both declaratory and injunctive relief in cases brought under that section and its predecessor. See, e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 241 Cal.App.2d 229, 50 Cal.Rptr. 489 (1966) (awarding declaration and injunction pursuant to former Cal. Gov't Code Sec. 11440, predecessor to Sec. 11350), Ford Dealers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal.3d 347, 185 Cal.Rptr. 453, 650 P.2d 328 (1982) (same). Indeed, since enactment of the amendments dispensing with the exhaustion of remedies requirement, a California court has granted declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus in a case remarkably similar to this one. See Stoneham v. Rushen, 137 Cal.App.3d at 729, 188 Cal.Rptr. 130 (1982) (suit by two prison inmates to halt implementation of newly adopted inmate classification system until Director of Corrections complied with notice and hearing requirements of the APA). Although the procedural history of the case is set forth in full in the Stoneham opinion, there is no indication that the inmates sought repeal of the regulation involved before filing their suit for judicial relief. 29 Furthermore, California law excuses a party from exhausting his administrative remedies when he can positively state what the administrative agency's decision in his particular case would be. See Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance, 37 Cal.App.3d 830, 834, 112 Cal.Rptr. 761, 763 (1974). We find that appellees have met that burden here. The record indicates that appellants refused to comply with the APA procedures despite requests that they do so. The district court found that appellants were insisten[t] on putting revised [Chapter 4600] into effect without delay. It even noted evidence that appellants attempted to implement revised Chapter 4600 after entry of the temporary restraining order. In view of the foregoing, we find that, had appellees petitioned the Department of Corrections under Government Code Section 11347 to repeal revised Chapter 4600, they would positively have received an adverse decision. 7 V. TENTH AMENDMENT 30 Appellants argue that the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the federal courts from exercising pendent jurisdiction in the context of state prison litigation because the power to operate state prison systems is not delegated to the United States by the Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. X. That argument is frivolous. The Constitution does delegate to the federal courts judicial power over cases ... arising under ... the laws of the United States. U.S. Const. art. III, Sec. 2, cl. 1. That power includes judicial power over state-law issues in such cases. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The judicial power over the state-law issues is properly exercised even if resolution of the state-law issues obviates the need to address the federal issues. See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 29 S.Ct. 451, 454, 53 L.Ed. 753 (1909). As the Constitution has been read to extend the judicial power of the United States to state-law issues in cases arising under the laws of the United States, the tenth amendment adds nothing to appellants' argument.