Opinion ID: 1310401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Cherry

Text: In Cherry, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule. The evidence established that he was in the process of robbing a store when the murder was committed. At the sentencing stage, the jury found these statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) Defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(3). (2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(5). (3) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. G.S. 15A-2000(e)(6). The jury answered negatively the following questions posed with respect to aggravating circumstances: (1) Was the murder especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel? G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9). (2) Did the defendant knowingly create a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person? G.S. 15A-2000(e)(10). The jury found none of the four submitted mitigating circumstances: (1) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance. G.S. 15A-2000(f)(2). (2) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired. G.S. 15A-2000(f)(6). (3) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. G.S. 15A-2000(f)(7). (4) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value. G.S. 15A-2000(f)(9). Again, the holding in Cherry is narrow. Specifically, the majority holds that a new sentencing hearing is necessary when the trial court erroneously submits to the jury at the sentencing phase of the trial the aggravating circumstance concerning the underlying felony pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000(e)(5), when that underlying felony has already been used to establish the offense as a capital felony at the guilt phase of trial. The rule would not apply, of course, as in Goodman, when the defendant is convicted of first degree murder as a result of premeditation and deliberation as well as the felony-murder rule. This formalizes the guideline presented in Goodman discussed supra. With respect to whether the assigned error was harmless, I join the majority for the limited reasons stated in the discussion of Goodman, supra. However, and also for the same reasons stated in Goodman, I am unwilling to say that such error will always constitute prejudicial error. Here, the jury found two other aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. I join with the majority in finding that the underlying felony should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance at the sentencing stage for the felony murder. However, I am concerned that this holding might be construed too broadly. We are not holding that the jury is to ignore the crime for which the defendant was convicted. Obviously, the underlying felony may be, and should be, considered by the jury in the sentencing phase. G.S. 15A-2000(a)(3) provides in part that it is unnecessary to resubmit evidence at the sentencing stage which was presented during the guilt determination phase unless a new jury is impaneled, but all such evidence is competent for the jury's consideration in passing on punishment. (Emphasis added.) It is clear, therefore, that the jury may consider the underlying robbery or other felony in the sentencing phase. What our holding here prohibits is simply that the underlying felony cannot be submitted to the jury as an aggravating circumstance. This is so for the reasons clearly explained in the majority opinion: It would be patently unfair for a defendant convicted of first degree murder by virtue of the felony-murder rule to start with one aggravating circumstance against him while a defendant convicted on the basis of premeditation and deliberation would start with no aggravating circumstances against him. Again, however, we ought to note that the legislature has attached special significance to murder committed in the course of commission of robbery and other felonies and the jury is surely allowed to consider that fact in making their sentencing recommendation.