Opinion ID: 6317138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Imposition

Text: The PFO/penalty phase of the case was held October 19, 2018. Again, Lang waived his right to a jury. The Commonwealth requested the maximum twenty-year sentence and Lang requested the minimum ten-year sentence. The trial court asked the Commonwealth to prepare a proposed judgment for its consideration. A few weeks later, without Lang’s presence and apparently without notice otherwise, the trial court entered its judgment imposing the twenty-year sentence.15 Lang argues that the trial court sentenced him in abstentia, violating his due process rights and RCr 8.28. He requests palpable error review. The presence of the defendant is generally recognized as affording the defendant the opportunity to speak on his own behalf and to appeal to the trial court’s discretion when imposing sentence by offering mitigating factors, an explanation of his conduct, or other factual and relevant information favorable to his position. See United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 165 (1963); Green 15 Following the entry of judgment on December 3, 2018, an amended judgment was entered December 17, 2018. 15 v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961).16 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987), generally supports Lang’s argument that he had a constitutional right to be present when his sentence was imposed. Dealing with whether a defendant’s rights were violated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by his exclusion from a competency hearing, the United States Supreme Court stated: The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due process right “to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105–106, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332, 78 L. Ed. 674 (1934). Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow,” id., at 106–107, 54 S. Ct., at 332, due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be present “to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,” id., at 108, 54 S. Ct., at 333. Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. Id. RCr 8.28(1) reflects the notion that sentencing is critical to the outcome of the criminal proceeding and that the defendant’s presence at sentencing contributes to the fairness of the procedure. RCr 8.28(1) provides that “[t]he defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every critical stage of the trial 16 Kentucky’s statutory presentence procedure likewise potentially aids the defendant in that regard. Pursuant to KRS 532.050, a presentence investigation report (PSI)—a report providing comprehensive background information about the defendant—is prepared to help the trial court in determining an appropriate sentence for the convicted felon. With the trial court giving due consideration of the PSI contents, the defendant, or his attorney, traditionally uses his presence at sentencing to exercise his statutory right to controvert the PSI’s factual content and conclusions. 16 including the empaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of the sentence.” The Commonwealth does not dispute that Lang had a right to be present when his final sentence was entered. The Commonwealth instead argues that Lang waived his right to be present or otherwise invited the error by failing to raise an objection, agreeing with the trial court’s issuance of the judgment of conviction at a later date. RCr 8.28 addresses the defendant’s intentional refusal to appear at sentencing as waiver of the right to be present. RCr 8.28(1) states: “Upon a hearing and finding by the trial court, that a defendant in custody on any charge, including a felony, intentionally refuses to appear for any proceeding, including trial, short of physical force, such refusal shall be deemed a waiver of the defendant’s right to appear at that proceeding.” In support of the argument that Lang waived his right, the Commonwealth points to opportunities which Lang and his counsel did not use to object to the trial court entering final judgment without his presence. As described by the Commonwealth, the opportunities included the hearing of the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the judgment of conviction and Lang’s pro se motions, including his motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We do not find the Commonwealth’s arguments persuasive. Because there is nothing in the record to show that Lang relinquished the right to be present at sentencing, we conclude the trial court made a plain, fundamental error by imposing Lang’s sentence without his presence. Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006); Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 17 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006). However, under RCr 10.26, manifest injustice must have resulted from the error in order for this Court to grant appropriate relief. We cannot conclude manifest injustice occurred here. Ultimately, “[m]anifest injustice is found if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.” Kingrey v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 824, 831 (Ky. 2013) (quoting McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 100, 112 (Ky. 2012)). Lang made a plea for leniency at the close of the penalty hearing and the trial court imposed the twenty-year sentence requested by the Commonwealth. Lang makes no attempt to show, and the record does not otherwise disclose, how his presence at the hearing would have resulted in a different sentencing outcome. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857, 866 (Ky. 2013); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001). Palpable error relief is not available to Lang.