Opinion ID: 277859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proof Required for Recovery Under Strict Liability

Text: 14 The doctrine of strict liability only removes the requirement of privity of contract' it does not prove Appellee's case. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, 840 (1966). Since there was no direct evidence of an identifiable defect, we must decide the meaning of a rational inference in a products liability case which rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. The breach of duty which the jury would have had to infer was that the New Blue Bleach and L'Oreal were unreasonably dangerous for their intended use. As stated, in order to justify that finding the jury must have concluded that the products were so dangerous that a prudent maker would never have marketed the products had he known of their condition. Such a conclusion would be reasonable only if the jury could have concluded that the mixture was defective; that the products were intended to be mixed; that the application by Mrs. Henderen comported with professional standards; and, finally, that Appellee's scalp was not hypersensitive. We have not considered the issue urged by Mrs. Pruitt that she was inadequately warned of danger. The jury found that the warnings to Appellee for use were inadequate, but that this failure was not the proximate cause of the injuries. Since Appellee failed to move for a directed verdict in the trial court, she cannot now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. See 2B Barron & Holtzoff, supra at 424. 15
16 First, we consider the proof offered by Appellee on the dangerous qualities of the mixture. Appellee elicited testimony that the directions accompanying the Helene Curtis bleach were followed. 8 Most important is the fact that Mrs. Hendren checked Appellee's scalp and found no cuts, eruptions, abrasions, or other abnormal conditions which rendered the hair unsuited for bleaching; that the hair had not been shampooed, brushed or massaged in the twenty-four hours prior to treatment; that a preliminary strand test showed no harmful effects to the hair by the mixture; and that the proper proportions of the products were used. Appellee also had evidence about the nature of the bleaching process. It was shown that the mixture of the two products produced a liberation of oxygen from the hydrogen peroxide. This process burned the hair pigment until it was colorless. It also had the potential for causing harm if the mixture was too toxic or left on the hair too long. Mr. Anderson, an analytical chemist, testified about the chemical qualities of the mixture. He had conducted experiments on the products to ascertain the active ingredients. 9 He admitted that there was a chemical burn, but he was unable to say what caused the burn. He did testify that the mixture would have had to be much stronger than the ones he tested to cause Appellee's burn. His conclusions were based on the fact that the concentration of the peroxide, which he thought was the dangerous ingredient, was normal. Finally, he stated that he did not think a bobby pin or cut on the head could have increased the activity of the products enough to cause this burn. 17 Appellee also obtained the statement from Mr. Dieter, a cosmetic chemist for Helene, that in order to produce such a burn the products either had to be defective or the directions not followed. Dr. Majors, Appellee's personal physician, testified that in his opinion the burn happened suddenly. By this statement he meant about fifteen minutes. It was shown that the solution was on Mrs. Pruitt's head about fifteen to twenty minutes before the burning started. Dr. Majors also testified that he did not believe a cut could produce this burn. His subsequent testimony is the most interesting. He stated that he thought one of two things happened: There was either some mislabeling of one of the bottles so that the solution or the powder was not what was usually in the products, or the directions were not followed properly. He concluded that it was his opinion that this 'chemical burn was produced by the application of the bleaching substance she told me she used on her scalp.' 18 On the basis of this testimony, Appellee asserts that the defect in the mixture speaks for iteslf. Although the trend has certainly been to allow more and more circumstantial evidence to serve as the basis for liability, we believe that in this instance a finding of a defect was unwarranted. The evidence about the character of the mixture and its propensities for harm does not suggest a defect. The cornerstone rule in products liability is that proof of mere injury furnishes no rational basis for inferring that the product was defective for its intended use. 10 Appellee has attempted to skirt that principle by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Certainly this doctrine has produced the most situations in which the jury has been allowed to infer negligence from an unexplained accident. Several elements must be present before the doctrine is applicable: The accident must be one which would not ordinarily occur without the presence of negligence; the plaintiff must show that the product was properly handled after it left the maker's possession; and, finally, plaintiff must prove that the product has not been substantially altered after leaving the maker's control. 11 Generally, the plaintiff is required to exclude these other causes by a preponderance of the evidence. Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., 5th Cir. 1960, 272 F.2d 76; Ozark v. Wichita Manor, Inc., 5th Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 671. This preponderance-of-the-evidence test was employed because the courts looked to state law for the applicability of the doctrine. Since this state rule conflicts with the federal test, this Court will no longer rely solely on state law to determine the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. See 2B Barron & Holtzoff, supra, at 18. All that is in issue is the sufficiency of the evidence to infer a defect in a product. 12 The factors considered in deciding whether the doctrine applies are still relevant; the only thing that has changed is the quantum of proof necessary to negate the other explanations of the injury. 13 19 We agree with Appellants' assertion that when circumstantial evidence is the only proof, courts have infrequently inferred negligence (here a defect) simply from the accident and proof of careful conduct by the plaintiff, and then only in instances where the accident is the type which, standing alone, points an accusing finger at the maker. Furthermore, in all these cases the chance of mishandling is improbable. 14 It is a matter of common knowledge that cosmetics can never be made completely safe for all users and can cause injuries for many reasons other than a defect in the product. Since injuries can be caused by the toxicity of the chemicals, contact with other products, the method of application, or an allergic condition, the circumstances do not point an accusing finger at the manufacturer. See Ravo v. Lido, 17 A.D.2d 476, 236 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1962). 20 In the instant case Appellee has failed to prove that it was the toxicity of the products which caused the injury rather than the other factors just enumerated. The testimony about the burning quality of the products is patently inadequate. This burning quality resulted from the oxidation process which occurred when the bleach and peroxide were mixed. No liability can be based on this burning potentiality since the very process of bleaching hair involves a chemical reaction or oxidation process by which the color in the hair is destroyed. It takes a powerful chemical to accomplish the decolorization. As one court observed, the sale as a bleaching fluid of a product that did not bleach would itself constitute a breach of warranty. Thus the very ingredient and quality which makes the fluid harmful if improperly used is the ingredient and quality which makes it fit for the purposes for which it was purchased. Landers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 172 Or. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943). When products contain dangerous ingredients which are natural or inherent, courts have usually held that the product is not defective. Zorger v. Hillman's, 287 Ill.App. 357, 4 N.E.2d 900 (1936). It is only when the manufacturer could not reasonably expect the consumer to discover the natural substance in the final product that liability has resulted. Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525, 26 A.L.R.2d 958 (1951); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis.2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). In the instant case we cannot say that Appellee did not know that the bleaching process and its natural ingredients were intended to decolor her hair. 21 The other proof on the character of the mixture is just as equivocal. See e.g., Rexall Drug Co. v. Nihill, 9th Cir. 1960, 276 F.2d 637; Benavides v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 346 Mass. 154, 190 N.E.2d 894 (1963). The two statements that the products were either defective or misapplied do nothing to exclude each other. Dr. Major's statement that the 'application of the bleaching solution' caused the burn is the most interesting. In Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Peet Co., 8 A.D.2d 304, 187 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1959), the plaintiff obtained a similar statement from a doctor to show that the aluminum sulfate in Veto deodorant was harmful. The court held that the statement amounted to no evidence of the fact that some ingredient in the product was harmful. Of course the application of the bleaching solution in the instant case caused the injury. The only circumstance in which this statement could conceivably support recovery would be one in which res ipsa loquitur was applicable. Here, however, it provides no basis for the inference that it was the nature of the mixture rather than the method of the applier which caused the burn. Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955). 22 Nor do all the statements stand alone. We present the following discussion as additional support for our holding that as a matter of law these products were not in a defective condition which was unreasonably dangerous for their intended use. Appellee's problem is that she has not presented enough facts to constitute a cause of action in strict liability. Cf. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Funel, 5th Cir. 1967, 383 F.2d 42. In all the other cases considered, the proof presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to make out a cause of action, despite conflicting evidence. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1959, 359 U.S. 437, 79 S.Ct. 921, 3 L.Ed.2d 935; Berry v. United States, 1941, 312 U.S. 450, 61 S.Ct. 637, 85 L.Ed. 945. Our approach does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses; we simply assert that the evidence about the characteristics of the mixture is not sufficient to constitute a cause of action in strict liability. 23
24 In the first place, Mrs. Pruitt has not established a cause of action because she has not shown that the mixture of these products was intended. This fact had to be established because a product is not defective unless injury occurred during an intended use. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 5th Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 19; Spruille v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 4th Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 79. The directions on each package suggest that the mixture was not intended. The 'New Blue Bleach' said: 'Do not mix Helene Curtis New Blue Bleach with anything except Helene Curtis Creme Developer (or a good-grade or fresh 20 volume hydrogen peroxide).' It is undisputed that Cosmair peroxide is a cream rather than hydrogen peroxide. The label on the Cosmair bottle said: 'For tinting or bleaching, use Oreor exactly as you would use 20-volume peroxide with Imedia Petite, Imedia Petite Excellence, Imedia Creme, Super Blue Creme Oil Lightener.' It is undisputed that Helene's product is none of the above. 25 Mr. Dieter, the cosmetic chemist for Helene, compared the peroxides. He stated that hydrogen peroxide has the viscosity of water while the cream peroxide is similar to hand lotion. The cream peroxide contains additives which thicken the product and also provide some emollients or conditioning actions when used on the hair. He stated further that there was definitely a physical difference between the products, but his company had no way of ascertaining the chemical differences since the formula for the Cosmair product was a trade secret. Because of the uniqueness of cream peroxide, Mr. Dieter stated that Helene recommended that a hydrogen peroxide be used when Helene's own Cream Developer was not used, since there is nothing unique about a hydrogen peroxide. Cosmair's expert agreed that the trade secrets made it impossible to know about the products' compatibility; that the directions were meant to be followed; and that he did not recommend that the products be used together. Appellee has suggested that these directions serve both commercial and safety ends. Although they may have a dual nature, the decisions demonstrate that a failure to follow directions cannot support a finding of a defect. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, 824 (1966). Indeed, instructions accompanying cosmetics are an integral part of the warranty and are to be strictly followed. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 8th Cir. 1934, 73 F.2d 26. This principle is particularly applicable to a bleaching product which has the inherent danger of burning the scalp or hair if misapplied in any way. Furthermore, directions become more important when products are to be mixed. All the relevant decisions presented evince a hesitancy to hold the maker responsible when mixtures are involved. No doubt many of the plaintiffs' problems in these cases stem from the requirement that the other possible causes be negated by a preponderance of the evidence. But aside from the preponderance-of-the-evidence approach, which we have rejected, these decisions reflect the valid policy concern for the potential abuses of jury speculation when mixtures are the cause of injury. What these decisions justifiably demand is that there be a rational basis in the record from which the jury can make a selective choice between the products before the manufacturer can be held responsible for the harm caused by his product or the mixture. See Bathory v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., 6th Cir. 1962, 306 F.2d 22; Sheptur v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., 6th Cir. 1958, 261 F.2d 221; Harrod et al. v. Edward E. Tower Co., 346 Mass. 532, 194 N.E.2d 392 (1963). This requirement is all the more warranted when the products involved were never meant to be used together. Unlike the case of Ozark v. Wichita Manor, Inc., 5th Cir. 1958, 252 F.2d 671, in which component parts were used to produce a final product, it is clear in the instant case that the products involved were not marketed for that purpose. 26 Nor can it be said that Appellants should have foreseen the mixture, since the trade secrets of one maker prevented any safety tests on the product of the other. Manufacturers cannot be responsible for a combination which they did not recommend and which they had no way of guarding against at the manufacturing stage. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 5th Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 19. Moreover, the mixing of these products amounted to an abnormal handling or substantial alteration which, because it was uintended and unforeseen, excuses the makers from responsibility for any harm. Noel, Manufacturers Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816 (1962); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966). 27
28 Appellee has argued that she did not know the difference between hydrogen and cream peroxide. This argument reveals her second misconception about proof of a defect. Mrs. Pruitt has assumed that this product was made for her use and has argued that the directions were inadequate for the ordinary consumer. The uncontradicted evidence, as subsequently shown, confirms, however, that these products were intended to be used by a professional beautician. Since the decisions indicate that the maker is liable only to those whom it can reasonably expect to use its product, Mrs. Pruitt cannot recover. Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 10th Cir. 1956, 235 F.2d 893; Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135 N.W.2d 388 (Mich.1965). 29 Appellee's counter argument reveals the final fallacy in her position. Mrs. Pruitt asserts that a professional beautician in Terrell had mixed these two products and that the professional beautician who testified had done the same. Before these facts can become important, Appellee must show that Mrs. Hendren's method of application met professional standards. Our requirement that Appellee prove that Mrs. Hendren applied the mixture as a professional is justified by the conclusion that these were not over-the-counter products, nor was Mrs. Pruitt the intended user. Accordingly, evidence which shows that harm was suffered when the products were used by a layman does not necessarily demonstrate that the products would have been defective if applied by a professional. Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735, 741 (1959). This proposition is valid since it is well settled that a product cannot be deemed defective if proper application would eliminate the possible dangers. 30 Mrs. Hendren had seen the 'FOR PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY-- NOT FOR PUBLIC SALE' language on the Helene bleach. Her understanding of this language was that if you did not know how to use these products you had better leave them alone. (R. 184) She admitted that she had no professional training. However, she had once lived near a beautician student and had used her books and practiced on her. She said she had used the mixture in question on two previous occasions. She related the following events concerning the accident: Before applying the solution she had checked the scalp and found no cuts or abrasions. She admitted that the solution touched the ears but contended there was no way to avoid the contact. Furthermore, she had tried to wipe off the solution whenever it touched the skin. The solution was first applied to the outer parts of the hair. At that time she tested the hair and decided it was not bleaching very fast, so she went to fix some iced tea. Mrs. Hendren finished her tea and then proceeded to apply the solution down to an inch of the scalp. It was during this final application that Mrs. Pruitt complained of a burning sensation. Mrs. Hendren immediately washed off the solution and called Dr. Majors. 31 On the basis of this testimony, the jury concluded that Appellee and Mrs. Hendren followed the directions contained on the products when mixing and applying them. The uncontradicted testimony of a professional beautician, however, was that a professional would have taken precautions in addition to those prescribed by directions. This evidence was elicited from Mrs. Nickerson, an instructor at Bud's Hall Beauty College. This witness' conception of a 'professional application' is far different from the picture drawn by Mrs. Hendren of two friends reading the directions from only the Helene package and drinking iced tea as the solution was applied. In order to acquire a license, a beautician must complete a course of one thousand hours, 475 of which are related to the process of bleaching hair. According to the professional witness, burning is the most common danger and one must therefore take precautions against leaving the solution on too long. A professional never depends on the customer's complaints and constantly surveys the hair to detect burning. This burning can be detected by holding the hand over the head. Burning can also be seen when the solution starts to move away from the scalp or bubble. The professional would also have taken a strand test every five minutes to determine whether the hair and the solution were reacting favorably. On a virgin head, like Mrs. Pruitt's, the solution should be removed and a new application used before the mixture is applied next to the scalp. In order to prevent the mixture from touching the ears, cotton could be packed around them. Finally, the theory book used by Mrs. Nickerson provided that a patch test should always be taken of a virgin head to determine whether the customer might be allergic to the product. 32 These additional safety precautions would have materially lessened the chance of injury. It is this uncontradicted testimony which nullifies the statements that the products were either defective or misapplied. Moreover, these additional safety precautions illustrate that written directions do not give all of the safety procedures which the intended user would have applied. Appellants were justified in anticipating these professional methods, since it is well settled that a manufacturer has the right to expect that his product will be used in the normal and customary fashion. McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 10th Cir. 1959, 272 F.2d 700; Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951). When these products were marketed, the makers could only foresee that they would be applied by a trained beautician. Therefore, the directions had to be adequate only for the professional's use. Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770, 775, 76 A.L.R.2d 1 (1958). It is also clear that the maker must give directions which will be adequate in light of the intended users' training, Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 301, 370 P.2d 116 (1962), and does not have to warn against dangers which are generally known. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 1957, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 247 F.2d 23; Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1951). Thus, Mrs. Hendren's methods amount to the conduct of an atypical user and render the finding of a defect in the products irrational. This abnormal handling could not have been foreseen, and it was a substantial alteration of the method of application. 33 Finally, the problem of allergic users and hypersensitive people is a recurring one in the area of strict liability for cosmetics. As one commentator has asserted, products which involve chemical reaction never have any tests which can guarantee absolute safety to all the consuming public. Whitemore, Allergies and Other Reactions Due to Drugs and Cosmetics, 19 Sw.L.J. 76 (1965). Oklahoma law indicates that an allergic plaintiff cannot invoke strict liability. Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corporation, 10th Cir. 1956,235 F.2d 893; John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton, 391 P.2d 259 (Okl.1964). Appellee has attempted to show that her skin is normal. None of her evidence was connected to the prior use of these products. Some courts indulge in a presumption that the skin is normal. Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958). Although this presumption would usually be reasonable, it cannot apply here. As admitted by Dr. Majors, the only way of ascertaining whether Mrs. Pruitt was allergic to this particular Mixture would be a test using these products. This is the function of the patch test which the professional would have performed. In such a situation, to presume that the skin is normal would be contrary to common sense. This conclusion is reinforced by the additional factors that the products were mixed contrary to directions and applied by a novice. Therefore, it cannot be said that Appellee has established any rational basis for excluding the possibility of a hypersensitive reaction. 34 On the basis of the foregoing factors, we hold that Appellee has established no legitimate basis from which the jury could rationally infer that Mrs. Pruitt negated the other possible causes of injury. Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135 N.W.2d 388 (1965); John A. Brown Co. V. Shelton, 391 P.2d 259 (Okl.1964). A federal court does not function as a mere automaton in protecting seventh-amendment rights. Instead, its paramount function is to see that justice is done. Reuter v. Eastern Air Lines, 5th Cir. 1955, 226 F.2d 443. Pursuant to that policy, we feel justified in holding that the evidence produced by Appellee would allow jury speculation beyond the limits envisioned by Planters. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Funel, 5th Cir. 1967, 383 F.2d 42; McPherson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 5th Cir. 1967, 383 F.2d 527; Huffstutler v. Hercules Powder Co., 5th Cir. 1962, 305 F.2d 292; Thomas v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 5th Cir. 1955, 223 F.2d 1; McMeekin v. Gimble Brothers, Inc., W.D.Pa. 1963, 223 F.Supp. 896. 35