Opinion ID: 779203
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due process demands predeprivation process

Text: 44 It is well-established that possessory interests in property invoke procedural due process protections. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). Due process generally requires notice and a hearing prior to eviction. 10 Id. at 82, 92 S.Ct. 1983; Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir.2000) (When a plaintiff has a protected property interest, a predeprivation hearing of some sort is generally required to satisfy the dictates of due process.); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) (The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's command of due process.). 45 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that extraordinary situations, where a valid governmental interest exists, may justify postponement of such a hearing until after eviction. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80-81, 92 S.Ct. 1983. A prior hearing is not constitutionally required where there is a special need for very prompt action to secure an important public interest and where a governmental official is responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in a particular instance. Flatford, 17 F.3d at 167 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91, 92 S.Ct. 1983). In Flatford, we rejected a due process claim alleging a lack of predeprivation process in connection with the emergency evacuation of tenants. We held that, although an emergency eviction from one's home is a significant intrusion, where the need to protect lives is the basis for such an intrusion, government officials should not be made to hesitate in performing their duties, particularly where postdeprivation remedies can immediately correct any errors in judgment. Flatford, 17 F.3d at 168. However, we emphasized that tenants are generally entitled to pre-eviction judicial oversight in the absence of emergency circumstances. Id. at 170. 46 In the case at bar, Defendants have neither claimed, nor have they pointed to any evidence that would tend to prove, that exigent circumstances existed to justify Plaintiffs' eviction. Yet, the officers unceremoniously dispossessed Plaintiffs of their place of residence without affording them an opportunity to be heard at any type of predeprivation hearing. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 62, 113 S.Ct. 538. It is extraordinary here that the plaintiffs were put to such an indignity utterly without cause or reason, and [D]efendants have not even attempted to suggest a governmental or private interest amounting to `exigent circumstances.' Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors, Inc., 998 F.Supp. 612, 619-20 (D.Md. 1998). Thus, it seems that Plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process have been violated. See Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1307 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that, absent exigent circumstances, no-notice evictions violate due process). However, Defendants dispute this result for several reasons, each of which we find meritless. 47 Defendants contend that Good Real Prop. and Flatford are inapplicable to the instant case because in those cases, the government was attempting to assert its own interest in property via civil forfeiture and condemnation proceedings, while in the instant case the shelter manager was asserting the shelter's right to control its property. Yet, they cite no reason why this Court should analyze the instant context any differently. Defendants also argue that, as government actors, they were neither bound by Kentucky's prohibition on self-help evictions, nor were they authorized under that statute to resolve the dispute through predeprivation judicial process. However, this does not mean that the officers could have done through means of government authority what Laura Zinious could not have done absent a judicial eviction order. Officers should at least be expected to refrain from actively participating in breaking the law. See Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that a plaintiff had a valid procedural due process claim under similar circumstances). 48