Opinion ID: 199098
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Individual Counts of Wire and Mail Fraud

Text: 55 The individual counts of wire and mail fraud then only need be communications designed to effect a scheme under either the property theory or the honest services theory. Again, the communications need not be fraudulent on their face. See United States v. Green, 786 F.2d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962)). We examine each count in turn to determine if a rational jury might have plausibly concluded that they were used to effect one of the two possible schemes to defraud. 56 Martin claims that the e-mails on which counts 7 and 8 are based (Camp's offer to send him x-Chek software and his affirmative response) cannot be communications designed to effect a scheme to defraud because he had no knowledge that the software was not free. As previously pointed out, the record belies this claim. In any event, Camp certainly knew that she was only supposed to send x-Chek to customers; Martin was clearly not a customer. Thus her x-Chek offer could be construed as part of a scheme to defraud IDEXX of her honest services. In other words, a reasonable jury could conclude that Camp's offer to send x-Chek to Martin breached her fiduciary duty to IDEXX and caused IDEXX harm. As a reasonable jury could also find that Martin aided and abetted this breach, see supra, the evidence is sufficient to convict on counts 7 and 8. Furthermore, a jury could reasonably have found that Martin knew that he was not entitled to a free copy of x-Chek. If so, Martin would have obtained the software through false pretenses, and thus satisfied the alternative prong of the wire fraud test with his affirmative response. 57 Martin admits that his e-mail on which count 9 is based, asking Camp to absorb as much physically and intellectually as you can, could be construed as requesting . . . non-confidential public information, Appellant Brief 38, but only if read in isolation. Martin argues that as a non-competitor, he had no use for confidential information, and that the words as you can incorporated previous guidelines of confidentiality. Id. at 39. However, it is not our task to determine if alternate interpretations of the evidence were available to the jury, but rather if the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reach a reasonable interpretation upon which it could convict. See, e.g.,United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1991). Certainly the request made by Martin in this particular e-mail is highly suggestive of a request for information which he knew was confidential and would require Camp's spying to unearth. A reasonable jury could have interpreted his request in this manner, and thus found that this communication was made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. 58 Martin claims that because Camp's July 21 e-mail (on which count 10 is based) denies any use of confidential information, that it could not be part of the scheme to defraud. However, this e-mail alerted Martin to the delivery of seven binders (which included information marked specifically as confidential), provided further information about IDEXX procedures and methods, and noted that Camp had found a jackpot. Despite Camp's denial, we have found above that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that a scheme to defraud existed and that Martin received confidential information in connection with this scheme. Given that evidence, this communication - among other things, notifying Martin that she had sent documents to him - clearly furthered the scheme. 59 With respect to the mail fraud counts (11 and 12), Martin claims that, because Camp mailed items to Martin on her own initiative, Martin could not be guilty of aiding and abetting mail fraud on these counts. Again, defense counsel confuses what Martin is guilty of aiding and abetting - the scheme to defraud, not the individual mailing. Again, the jury had sufficient evidence to find Martin guilty of aiding and abetting the scheme to defraud, either through deprivation of property under false pretenses or via honest services fraud. Camp's mailing of the packages to Martin was in furtherance of the scheme: either because it finalized the property removal from IDEXX or provided the final pieces to Martin's future competition with IDEXX. Thus sufficient evidence existed to convict Martin on either count. Moreover, § 1341 itself criminalizes the act of causing another to deposit items in the mails that further a scheme to defraud. Especially with respect to the second mail fraud count, based on the package that included the IDEXX software, a reasonable jury could have found that Martin's request caused Camp to send him those materials, and found him guilty of violating § 1341 without relying on aiding and abetting liability.