Opinion ID: 2307522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Delaware Family Court Ruling

Text: In its October 15, 1997 decision, the Delaware Family Court, inter alia, ruled that the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order was properly before it for enforcement. [7] Mr. Linn contends that the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1950) (as amended in 1952 and 1958) (URESA) [8] controls this action because the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1992) (UIFSA) had not been enacted in Delaware on May 1, 1995 when the Minnesota Arrearages Order was issued. The Family Court found that on March 1, 1995, when the Minnesota Court entered its Arrearages Order, Minnesota had adopted section 205(a) of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1992) (UIFSA) and that Delaware enacted it effective July 1, 1995. [9] The Family Court, therefore, found that in January 1997 when the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order was forwarded to the Delaware Family Court on behalf of Ms. Toman, section 205(a) of the UIFSA (1992) [10] was in effect in Delaware and therefore it correctly applied UIFSA (1992) to this proceeding. [11] It is undisputed that when the Minnesota Court entered its 1995 Arrearages Order, Minnesota was not the residence of the obligor (Mr. Linn), the individual obligee (Ms. Toman), nor the children for whose benefit the support order was issued. And none of the individual parties had filed a written consent with Minnesota for a tribunal of another state to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction so as to be able to modify the order. Nor had any other state assumed continuing jurisdiction over the child support order. The Family Court found that the Minnesota Court had continuing subject matter jurisdiction when it entered its 1995 Arrearages Order despite that Mr. Linn, Ms. Toman, and the children no longer resided in Minnesota. [12] The Delaware Family Court relied on section 205(a) of UIFSA (1992) (quoted hereafter) and held that under it the Minnesota Court retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its original 1983 Child Support Order, despite the departure of all the parties from Minnesota because Mr. Linn and Ms. Toman had not filed a written consent for a tribunal in another state to assume jurisdiction as provided in section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA (1992). [13] The Family Court also found that the Minnesota Court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Linn when it entered the 1995 Arrearages Order. That holding was not contested in this appeal. [14] The Delaware Family Court also held that it could not consider what payments were made under the 1983 Minnesota Support Order before the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order was entered, but it could consider what payments were made after the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order was entered in Delaware. [15] The Family Court also held it could not consider the alleged oral agreement between Mr. Linn and Ms. Toman to reduce the support payments that were required under the 1983 Minnesota Support Order and it could not consider the issue of whether any interest is due under the two Minnesota Orders. [16] Finding the Delaware litigation was unnecessary, the Family Court awarded Ms. Toman counsel fees. [17]