Opinion ID: 2979444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Funding for Expert Witness

Text: Bunke challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to appoint Dr. Harvey Shulman as an expert witness to testify about how several people who witness the same event can perceive it differently. A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 620 (6th Cir. 2001). “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert . . . may - 12 - United States v. Bunke No. 09-3311 testify thereto.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Courts use a two-pronged analysis to determine the admissibility of expert testimony: First, the court must determine whether the expert’s testimony reflects “scientific knowledge,” that is, the court must make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Second, the court must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is relevant to the task at hand and will serve to aid the trier of fact. United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting & citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993)). This Court has often acknowledged the increasing use and reliability of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, as well as its potential significance for criminal defendants. See, e.g., Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 478, 481-83 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing the “near-universal acceptance of the reliability of” such testimony). In Langan, the Court observed that “such testimony has been allowed in with increasing frequency where the circumstances include ‘crossracial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after observation under stress, and [such] psychological phenomena as . . . unconscious transference.’” 263 F.3d at 621 (quoting United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1993)) (alteration and omission in Langan). The Court has also indicated that “expert testimony should be admitted . . . when there is no other inculpatory evidence presented against the Defendant with the exception of a small number of eyewitness identifications.” Smithers, 212 F.3d at 317. Despite its favorable disposition towards expert testimony on eyewitness identification, this Court does not permit such evidence to be admitted in every case. In Smithers, the Court identified - 13 - United States v. Bunke No. 09-3311 several factors that can weigh against admissibility, for example: “whether this type of testimony touched on the ‘ultimate issue’ in the case and therefore usurped the jury’s role; whether there was other evidence against the defendant; and whether the jury could more properly evaluate the reliability of eyewitness testimony through cross-examination.” Id. at 314. The Court noted that “[w]here identification rests on testimony by someone who knew the defendant well and was in a good position to see the crime, or where the identification seems strongly established for other reasons (like physical evidence connecting defendant to the crime), there is little reason to admit such testimony.” Id. at 317 n.4 (quoting Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence, § 6.37, at 601 (1995)). The Court also emphasized the importance of assessing whether the testimony in question will actually help the jury or add to its confusion. Id. at 314; Langan, 263 F.3d at 624. In this case, the district court held that Dr. Shulman’s testimony was inadmissible under the second Daubert prong.13 The court observed that none of the circumstances identified in Langan were present and that the proposed witnesses were co-workers who knew Bunke relatively well. The court also noted that “[e]valuating issues related to the memory and recall by an individual known to the eyewitness is well within the normal experiences and capabilities of a lay juror.” Order Denying Mot. to Appoint Expert Witness 2-3 (Sept. 22, 2008). Lastly, the court pointed out that it 13 The first prong of Daubert is not at issue here. Dr. Shulman frequently testifies as an expert on issues of eyewitness identification and this Court has previously found that certain defendants were prejudiced when their requests to have Dr. Shulman testify were denied. See, e.g., Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 480. - 14 - United States v. Bunke No. 09-3311 would instruct the jury on how to deal with eyewitness testimony and that the Government planned to offer other evidence that did not rely solely on eyewitness identification. Bunke objects that he did not intend for Dr. Shulman to address the issue of identification. Bunke asserts that his objective was “to have an expert explain how multiple people can see the same event and report it differently, doing so out of confusion rather than dishonesty.” He argues that, without this explanation, the jury had to decide whether the corrections officers who testified against him were lying or telling the truth. Bunke appears to suggest that, had Dr. Shulman been able to testify, the jury could have found that the incident was so confusing that, despite their sincere efforts, the witnesses were unable to describe it accurately. This Court’s case law neither supports nor rules out admitting expert testimony for this purpose. Existing cases (including those on which Bunke relies) deal exclusively with the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. There may indeed be cases where a jury would genuinely benefit from expert testimony on how different witnesses can have varying perceptions of the same event. But Bunke offers no particular reason why witnesses to this incident could have perceived it differently, except that it was confusing and happened quickly. Moreover, it is within the ordinary knowledge of lay jurors that a fast-developing and confusing event is more likely to be perceived differently by observers than a simple, slow-occurring incident. This fact was underscored by the inconsistent testimonies of the corrections officers at trial. In addition, the testimony against Bunke was not limited to what occurred in the multipurpose room. Several witnesses observed that Bunke had blood on his boots after the incident. There was also testimony that Bunke told others “I can’t - 15 - United States v. Bunke No. 09-3311 believe I kicked him” and announced that he “kicked an inmate’s ass” over a prison intercom. This supplemental evidence allowed the jury to parse contradictions in the different testimonies and come to a reasonable conclusion as to what actually happened. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint Bunke’s expert.