Opinion ID: 70274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: consultation with the advisory council

Text: 41 The Manufactured Housing Act requires that HUD consult with the Advisory Council to the extent feasible when amending manufactured home standards. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5404(b) (West 1983). 3 In anticipation of having the rules in effect before the next hurricane season, HUD initially took the position that it was not feasible for it to meet with the Advisory Council; however, after the expedited schedule was relaxed, the agency convened the Advisory Council for a two-day session in July 1993. The Advisory Council adopted a resolution, recommending among other things that further studies be conducted, and that the Advisory Council be reconvened in the future to review public comments about HUD's analysis of the further studies the Council had recommended. HUD published the Final Rule in January 1994 without reconvening the Advisory Council. HUD explained that it had considered the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Council and did not believe there is any significant advantage in, or that the public interest would be served by, reconvening the Advisory Council. Final Rule, 59 Fed.Reg. at 2456. 42 The manufacturers claim that HUD erred in interpreting the provision for consultation to the extent feasible to permit it to refuse to convene the Advisory Council for a second time, particularly since six months had elapsed between the consultation in July 1993 and the January 1994 publication of the Final Rule. The manufacturers argue that the failure to reconvene the Council denied it an opportunity to comment on the modified final standards and on the data on which those standards were based. Under these circumstances, they contend, HUD's failure to request further consultation was an error of law. HUD responds that it complied with the Act by convening the Advisory Council once and by carefully considering its comments. Although it disagreed with many of the Advisory Council's recommendations, the agency did make some modifications in its proposed standards based in part on the Council's recommendations. In addition to withdrawing the proposed regulations for Wind Zone I and expanding the size of that zone, the following five requirements that had been included in the proposed rules were left out of the final standards: 43 (1) Maximum dimension of 12' for roof overhangs; 44 (2) Lower load duration factor than provided in the 1991 National Design Specification for Wood Construction (NDS); 45 (3) Requirement for a 1.5 safety factor to calculate a resistance of anchoring and foundation systems to higher design forces in Wind Zones II and III; 46 (4) Manufacturer's design and details for a permanent foundations system (certified by a registered professional engineer or architect) applicable to each manufactured home design; and 47 (5) Shortened period for implementation of the standards after publication. 48 Final Rule, 59 Fed.Reg. at 2457. In view of the changes it made, HUD asserts that the manufacturers have confused a requirement of consultation with one of 100% adoption.Congress did not indicate exactly what it meant when it required HUD to consult with the Advisory Council to the extent feasible. Thus, we cannot decide this statutory interpretation question under the first prong of Chevron. Instead, we move on to the second prong, which requires us to determine whether HUD's single consultation with the Advisory Council under the circumstances of this rulemaking process comported with a reasonable interpretation of the requirements of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5404(b). We hold that it did. 49 As we have discussed, based upon its consultation with the Advisory Council, HUD did make some modifications to the proposed standards, with the result that they became less stringent. The Advisory Council wanted more modifications, more studies, and more consultation, but HUD is the decisionmaker and the process must end sometime. If we were to require reconsultation whenever the Advisory Council demanded it, the process might never end. Further delay in this instance would have resulted in the continuation of standards that even the manufacturers concede were inadequate and needed revision. The manufacturers' brief states that they have never disputed the need for some strengthening of manufactured home standards to conform with those generally accepted for site-built housing .... Although HUD abandoned its goal of having the rules in place by the 1993 hurricane season, there was still a vital interest in not postponing the effective date of the amended rules too far into the future. Public safety was involved, and it is no exaggeration to say that too much delay could have resulted in the loss of life. We hold that it was reasonable for the agency to interpret the feasibility language in Sec. 5404(b) as not requiring it to reconvene the Advisory Council under these circumstances. 50 The manufacturers rely on National Constructors Ass'n v. Marshal, 581 F.2d 960 (D.C.Cir.1978), but that case is distinguishable. In it, an order by the Secretary of Labor was remanded, because the department had issued its rule without adequately consulting with an advisory committee as required by statute and regulation. Id. at 971-72. However, in that case the operative language directed that the agency shall consult, without limiting that duty to the extent feasible, id. at 964 n. 4, 967, which is a significant qualifying phrase in the statutory language before us. Moreover, in Marshal, the advisory committee was consulted on one proposed standard, but was not consulted at all about a subsequently developed standard that was fundamentally differ[ent] from the first. Id. at 970 n. 27. Because the second standard was not a logical outgrowth of the proposal originally presented to the committee, the Marshal court held that the mandatory consultation requirement had not been met. Id. at 970-71 & n. 27. In this case, we do not believe that the final standards were so substantively different that they cannot be considered a logical outgrowth of the proposed standards upon which the Advisory Committee was consulted. 4 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the final rules were less, not more, rigorous than the proposed rules. The statutory requirements and rulemaking history in this case are simply not analogous to those involved in the Marshal decision. 51 The statute requires HUD to consult with the Advisory Council, and the agency did so. Even if HUD could have reconvened the Advisory Council in the six months between the Council's only meeting and publication of the Final Rule, under the facts of this case, it was reasonable not to do so. We therefore conclude that the agency's determination of non-feasibility under the facts of this case was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782.B. THE MEANING OF COST 52 As discussed on p. 1569 above, the Manufactured Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5403(f), sets out five specific requirements for HUD to follow when establishing manufactured housing standards. The fourth such criterion directs HUD to consider the probable effect of such standard[s] on the cost of the manufactured home to the public. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5403(f) (West 1983). The manufacturers argue that this factor refers solely to the consumer purchase price of manufactured homes and that HUD has misinterpreted the meaning of cost by giving it a much broader definition. The manufacturers point to a statement made by HUD in its denial of the manufacturers' Application for Stay in which the agency stated that the meaning of cost is not limited to [a manufactured home's] purchase price but includes the potential costs to the public if the home is involved in a disaster. 53 According to the manufacturers, this interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of cost and thus the standards were not promulgated in accordance with the law. Instead of simply considering consumer costs, they contend, HUD merged the consumer cost factor into a cost-benefit analysis and concluded that the benefits to society outweighed any price increases. The manufacturers argue that when the price increases were subsumed into a more general weighing of societal costs and benefits, the true impact of price increases was minimized because they were offset by general benefits to the government and public at large, as distinguished from the public referred to in Sec. 5403(f)(4), which the manufacturers contend means only those members of the general public who live in manufactured homes. Thus, they argue, HUD's interpretation denied consumer price increases their proper consideration as an independent factor. 54 We need not determine the meaning of cost or public in Sec. 5403(f)(4), because we find that HUD has complied with the Act even under the limited meaning the manufacturers would give those two terms. The manufacturers acknowledge that HUD has considered the effect of the regulations on consumer purchase prices; in fact, they contest HUD's purchase price impact figures in a separate argument. See infra at Part IV.C.1. The crux of their claim is that HUD has erred by merging cost into a general cost-benefit analysis, instead of considering it as a separate, independent criterion. Although this claim may have some semantic appeal, there is no statutory support for it. The Act requires that the agency consider cost, which the manufacturers concede was done, but the Act does not indicate precisely how HUD is to consider this factor, or how much weight the agency should give cost in weighing it against other factors. When it prescribed the factors HUD should consider, Congress did not establish a strict algebraic formula in which the agency simply plugs in the numbers, as the manufacturers seem to suggest. As this Court recently stated: we decline the ... invitation to require an agency to accord greater weight to aspects of a policy question than the agency's enabling statute itself assigns to those considerations. Hussion, 950 F.2d at 1554. As long as the agency gives fair consideration to the relevant factors mandated by law, the importance and weight to be ascribed to those factors is the type of judgment that courts are not in a position to make. Instead, that judgment is for the agency: 55 While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices--resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 56 When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges--who have no constituency--have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. 57 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66, 104 S.Ct. at 2793. 58 Moreover, the fifth requirement under Sec. 5403(f) mandates that the agency consider the purposes of this chapter, which are defined as reducing injuries, deaths, insurance costs, and property damages, see 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5401 (West 1983). As HUD points out, even if the definition of cost under Sec. 5403(f)(4) does not include a consideration of general societal costs other than purchase price increases, Sec. 5403(f)(5) certainly does. Not only is it permissible for HUD to balance the cost to the general public of wind damage to manufactured housing against price increases, Sec. 5403 requires the agency to do so. Whether the agency does so under its consideration of Sec. 5403(f)(4) or Sec. 5403(f)(5) is immaterial. Even if we accept the manufacturers' definition of cost and public in Sec. 5403(f)(4), the agency complied with the Act. 59 C. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW OF THE NEW STANDARDS 60 The manufacturers contend that the new wind standards are arbitrary and capricious in four different respects. We consider each of these arguments separately. 61
62 In the Final Rule, HUD acknowledged that the new regulations would increase costs to consumers, but justified those increases on the grounds that the stricter standards would reduce losses from wind damage to manufactured housing occupants and the general public, and because they would help to avoid the inestimable costs of devastation to people's lives and emotional health and to the communities caused by severe hurricanes. Final Rule, 59 Fed.Reg. at 2457-58. HUD explained that its statutory mandate required it to look at more than economic considerations in promulgating regulations. It also concluded that the new regulations were in the optimal societal interest because the savings in storm damage repair, loss of personal property, and potential personal injury or loss of life, in addition to other expected benefits, exceeds the cost differential for the new wind standards. Id. at 2461-62. 63 HUD quantified these costs and benefits in its Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). Using data from the damage caused by Hurricane Andrew, the RIA delineated three types of benefits that would result from the new standards: (1) reductions in property damage borne by residents and insurers; (2) reductions in federal disaster relief expenditures; and (3) reductions in deaths and injuries. According to the RIA, the new standards would reduce 75% of the property damage sustained by manufactured housing during severe wind events in Wind Zone II, and 83% of the damage in Wind Zone III. Balanced against these benefits were increased costs of production caused by compliance with the new standards, although HUD determined that only a portion of the increased costs would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. 5 HUD concluded in the RIA that the new standards would produce an annual benefit of $83.8 million and an annual cost of $51.7 million, resulting in an annual net benefit of $32.1 million. 64 After the Final Rule and the RIA were issued, the manufacturers submitted their Application for Stay to HUD, requesting that the agency stay the effective date of the new regulations pending judicial review. The manufacturers contended that two reports submitted with the Application for Stay (the Meeks Report and the De Alessi Report) demonstrated that the data and methodology HUD used to calculate the costs and benefits were fundamentally flawed. HUD rejected the manufacturers' arguments and denied the Application for Stay. 65 Before this Court, the manufacturers again challenge HUD's determination in the Final Rule and the RIA that the new wind standards would produce a net economic benefit, and claim that HUD has not adequately addressed the arguments made in the Application for Stay and the Meeks and De Alessi Reports. The manufacturers do not contend that the Act requires the agency to undertake a cost-benefit analysis before promulgating new regulations; in fact, as discussed in the preceding section, they argue that HUD as a matter of law should not subsume consumer costs into a general analysis of societal costs and benefits. However, to the extent that HUD relied on projections indicating that the benefits of the new standards will outweigh the costs as the primary basis for issuing the new standards, the manufacturers assert that these figures relied upon are flawed, making adoption of the new regulations arbitrary and capricious. 66 Before considering the manufacturers' challenge, we address the dispute between the parties as to what materials are properly included in the rulemaking record. HUD argues that the Meeks and De Alessi Reports and the arguments first made by the manufacturers in their Application for Stay should not be considered by this Court on appeal because the studies and arguments were submitted after HUD issued its Final Rule. HUD also contends that the RIA is not an appropriate object of attack because it was undertaken pursuant to an Executive Order 6 solely as an internal managerial tool for the federal government. In response, the manufacturers argue that the Application for Stay and the accompanying reports should be included in the rulemaking record because the economic data and analysis used by HUD to support the new wind standards were not disclosed to the public until the Final Rule and the RIA were issued. They also state that the RIA should be open to challenge because it was cited by HUD in the Final Rule to demonstrate that the agency had considered consumer costs as mandated by the Act. 67 We need not resolve this dispute about the rulemaking record, because HUD's reliance on its cost and benefit figures as support for the new wind standards is not arbitrary and capricious, even assuming that the manufacturers' Application for Stay and the two economic reports accompanying it are included as part of the rulemaking record. Because we assume for the manufacturers that the studies and arguments contained in their Application for Stay are part of the record, we must also assume that HUD's denial of the Application for Stay, which responded to these studies and arguments, is part of the record, too. With these twin assumptions, we proceed to explain why the agency's cost and benefit analysis was not arbitrary and capricious. 68 In the Application for Stay, the manufacturers first challenged the RIA's projections of the cost increases associated with the new standards. Using estimates from an industry study instead of the figures calculated by HUD, the manufacturers argued that the cost of producing manufactured houses complying with the new wind regulations would be double that of HUD's predictions. Moreover, they asserted that the RIA underestimated the amount of the cost increases that would be passed on to consumers as higher prices. According to the De Alessi Report, the latter error resulted from HUD's use of the national housing market, instead of the individual manufactured housing submarkets of Wind Zones II and III, to measure the elasticity of supply of the manufactured housing industry. The elasticity of supply measures how the market supply will respond to changes in price and is an important factor in forecasting how much consumer prices will rise when production costs are increased. 69 Arguing that the RIA overstated the extent of losses inflicted on manufactured housing by Hurricane Andrew, the manufacturers also contended that HUD's estimates of the benefits accruing from the new standards were significantly exaggerated. Specifically, the Meeks Report criticized HUD's estimate of insured losses from Hurricane Andrew, because more recent data indicated that the actual amount of insurance payments caused by that storm was almost half the figure used by HUD. In addition, the manufacturers argued that HUD's projections of uninsured losses and federal disaster relief expenditures caused by Hurricane Andrew were incorrectly calculated. Because the only available data on uninsured losses and federal relief payments induced by Hurricane Andrew were for all types of housing, HUD estimated the amounts directly attributable to manufactured housing by multiplying the total figure by the ratio of the number of destroyed manufactured houses to the number of all destroyed houses. The manufacturers claimed that that ratio was methodologically unsound, because the median cost of a manufactured house is only 37% of the median cost of conventional housing. Accordingly, they asserted, the actual amount of uninsured losses and federal relief payments attributable to manufactured housing should have been much smaller than that projected by HUD. 70 Applying their adjusted cost and benefit calculations, the manufacturers contended in the Application for Stay that the new standards would result in a net loss to society of $61.3 million per year. On appeal, they argue that because there will be a net societal loss rather than gain as a result of the new standards--and because HUD's regulations were justified by its determination that the standards would be economically beneficial--the new wind standards are arbitrary and capricious and should be set aside. 71 We disagree. We believe that HUD has given a logical explanation for the cost and benefit figures it relied on in promulgating the new wind standards, and that it provided in the Final Rule and the denial of the Application for Stay a reasoned response to the manufacturers' comments and criticisms. Specifically, we conclude that HUD is entitled to rely on the cost estimates calculated by its own engineering staff rather than the figures submitted by the industry's trade association, because our review of the record does not indicate that the agency's projections are either flawed or unreasonable. See North Buckhead, 903 F.2d at 1539 (When specialists express contrary views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive. (citation and quotation marks omitted)). The record also demonstrates that HUD's estimate of the amount of cost increases that will be passed on to consumers is based on rational economic analysis. 72 In addition, we find that HUD has justified its reliance on the public and private benefits cited in the RIA. For example, in response to the manufacturers' attack on the ratio used to calculate the uninsured losses of and federal relief payments to manufactured housing owners caused by Hurricane Andrew, HUD's explanation included the fact that even though manufactured houses have a lower value on average than other housing, manufactured houses generally suffer a higher level of damage. Moreover, although the manufacturers are correct that more recent data suggest that insurance payments for property damage did not reach the levels originally projected by HUD, there is still a net societal benefit even if the updated insurance figures are substituted into the analysis. 73 Simply put, the manufacturers have not convinced us that HUD's explanation runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2867. The role of this Court is not to decide whether HUD or the manufacturers used the better technical data and methodologies; instead, our task is to determine whether HUD's explanation of its administrative action demonstrates that it has considered the appropriate factors required by law and that it is free from clear errors of judgment. Id. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2866-67. 74 Our conclusion that HUD's cost and benefit projections are not arbitrary and capricious is bolstered by two additional, but related, considerations. First, the manufacturers' projection of a net annual loss does not take into account their own concession that the wind standards needed to be amended, at least to some extent. Thus, the manufacturers' claim of a $61.3 million net loss loses some of its force, because both parties agree that the preamendment status quo is not a viable option. 75 Second, we agree with HUD that it is not confined by the Act to promulgating new wind standards that will produce a net economic gain. HUD did assert in the Final Rule and the RIA that the projected economic benefits of the amendments would outweigh the economic costs. In addition, however, HUD explained that the need to increase safety and prevent future devastation to communities, such as that caused by Hurricane Andrew, justified increasing consumer prices for manufactured housing. This explanation is consistent with the agency's statutory mandate. Congress has required HUD to consider, in addition to consumer cost, the purposes of the Act--which include reducing injuries, deaths, insurance costs, and property damage. 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 5401, 5403(f) (West 1983). Our review of the rulemaking record as a whole convinces us that HUD, in determining that the necessity of improving the safety of manufactured housing made the attendant cost increases acceptable, used its best judgment in balancing the substantive issues. North Buckhead, 903 F.2d at 1539. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Id.
76 Because wind damage to structures is affected by natural topography and man-made construction, the ASCE 7-88 standard, which the agency adopted as the basis for the new regulations, establishes four terrain exposure categories to reflect the surrounding terrain in which a structure is to be sited. These exposure categories can be briefly described as follows: Exposure A: large city centers; Exposure B: urban, suburban, and wooded areas; Exposure C: open terrain with scattered obstructions; and Exposure D: flat areas exposed to wind approaching over large bodies of water. 77 The manufacturers argue that the new wind regulations are arbitrary and capricious because they impose on all manufactured homes, regardless of the actual exposure category in which the homes may be located, standards that are based on Exposure C areas. For example, they say that even though 80% of the area in Dade and Broward Counties in Florida qualifies as Exposure B, manufactured homes located there must meet the stricter requirements for the Exposure C category. Thus, the manufacturers argue, the wind regulations are arbitrary and capricious because they ignore the statutory criterion that the standards be reasonable for the geographic region for which [they are] prescribed. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5403(f)(3) (West 1983). 78 HUD has provided a sensible explanation for adopting a single exposure level for the new wind standards. It chose Exposure C in the reasonable expectation that most of the manufactured housing will be located in Exposure C conditions. Although HUD could have permitted homes located in Exposure B areas to have somewhat more lenient standards and could have required homes located in Exposure D areas to have somewhat more stringent standards, we cannot conclude that it was unreasonable to choose an intermediate exposure category that provides reasonable protection for all areas in Wind Zones II and III. 7 HUD explained that it chose a single exposure category so that dealers could stock inventories, and would not be required to order each home based on the individual customer's location. Because HUD neither refused to consider the appropriate factors nor committed a clear error of judgment, the agency's decision to adopt Exposure C wind standards for all Wind Zone II and III areas was not arbitrary and capricious. 79
80 The manufacturers next contend that the new wind standards are arbitrary and capricious because they cannot achieve the stated purpose of the regulations: preventing manufactured housing damage from another Hurricane Andrew. According to the manufacturers, since Andrew's 145 miles-per-hour winds would cause damage even to manufactured homes built according to the revised standards, the cost increases associated with the new standards are not justified. 81 Of course, the manufacturers previously argued that the new standards are arbitrary and capricious because they go too far, and now they contend that the regulations are arbitrary and capricious because they do not go far enough. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the stated purpose of the wind standards is to prevent damage from another Hurricane Andrew. Although Hurricane Andrew was the catalyst behind strengthening the standards, which even the manufacturers admit are too lax, the purpose of the changes according to the Final Rule is simply to increase safety in areas where wind-induced damage is a particular hazard and risk. Final Rule, 59 Fed.Reg. at 2456. That they do. 82 Even if the standards were promulgated in order to prevent a reoccurrence of damage of the extent caused by Hurricane Andrew, we still would not find that these standards are arbitrary and capricious. We agree with HUD that the regulations are not invalid merely because they fail to solve every weather-related problem and cannot completely prevent damage from another storm of the ferocity of Hurricane Andrew. Like most regulations of this nature, the utility of the revised wind standards is measured not in terms of absolutes, but in increments of improved safety. According to HUD, estimates of Hurricane Andrew's maximum wind speeds indicated that approximately three percent of the storm area experienced wind speeds of 140 miles per hour or more. Even if manufactured homes constructed under the new regulations would not have been able to survive Hurricane Andrew's peak winds, the new wind standards would have helped to prevent significant damage to the manufactured homes located outside of those areas hit by the storm's strongest winds. That may be the most that can be hoped for. It is enough to convince us to reject the manufacturers' all or nothing contention.
83 In a related argument, the manufacturers contend that because hurricane risks cannot be eliminated completely, consumers must be given the informed option to sacrifice some hurricane protection in exchange for lower housing costs. According to the manufacturers, by including cost and geographic reasonableness criteria in the Manufactured Housing Act, Congress indicated that consumer choice should be accommodated. Citing Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir.1972), the manufacturers analogize the new wind standards to the regulation of convertibles and sports cars under the automobile safety standards of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. In Chrysler, the Sixth Circuit observed that soft top convertible cars were inherently incapable of meeting certain safety standards, such as rollover requirements, imposed on the automobile industry by that legislation. Finding that the legislation was not intended to eliminate sports cars and convertibles from the market, the court remanded the case to the agency for reconsideration of the safety standard. Id. at 679-80. The Chrysler decision, the manufacturers assert, means that HUD should be prevented from the kind of governmental paternalism that denies consumers the ability to choose to live more cheaply and less safely. Because the new standards foreclose the cheap and dangerous option, they are arbitrary and capricious, the argument goes. 84 We find this argument unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the Manufactured Housing Act is not analogous to the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, because the safety standards at issue under the two acts have different purposes. The regulations under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act that were challenged in Chrysler concerned passive restraint devices designed to protect occupants of an automobile. Id. at 664. In contrast, the wind standards promulgated under the Manufactured Housing Act are designed to protect not only the occupants of manufactured homes, but also other members of the public who could be affected by flying debris during high winds. See Final Rule, 59 Fed.Reg. at 2457-58. HUD quoted in the Final Rule a Federal Emergency Management Agency study that found the disintegration of siding and roofs of manufactured homes  'contributed significantly to the generation of airborne debris'  during Hurricane Andrew. Id. at 2462. Potential victims of flying debris from manufactured housing, unlike the purchasers of convertibles, do not have the opportunity to choose between cost and safety. What the manufacturers propose would be the equivalent of allowing automobile purchasers to buy at a discount automobiles with unsafe brakes, a consumer choice option that would sacrifice the safety of innocent people who would be given no choice in the matter. 85 A second difference between the Chrysler decision and this case is that convertibles and sports cars were found to be inherently incapable of complying with some of the requirements in the Motor Vehicle Act that hard top vehicles could meet. Chrysler, 472 F.2d at 679. There is no suggestion in this case that the technology does not exist for the industry to comply with the Manufactured Housing Act. In the Chrysler decision, a convertible could not comply with the automobile rollover standard and still remain a convertible. In this case, a manufactured home that conforms to the new wind standards is still a manufactured home, albeit a safer and more expensive one. 86 Finally, and most fundamentally, the consumer's right to choose is not a criterion for decisionmaking under the Manufactured Housing Act. Allowing consumers to knowingly assume the risk of unsafe housing may or may not be a good idea, but it is not one Congress included in the statutory scheme. If the manufacturers want the statutory criteria for promulgating manufactured home standards changed, they should direct their arguments to Congress.