Opinion ID: 3135034
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other relevant facts and circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115–7.3 (West 1998).

Text: Several principles of statutory interpretation are relevant to this case. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder , 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language. When possible, the court should interpret the statute according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. Paris , 179 Ill. 2d at 177. In giving effect to legislative intent, the court should consider, in addition to the statutory language, the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought. People v. Haywood , 118 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1987). A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations. People v. Holloway , 177 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1997). The court can consult interpretive aids when construing an ambiguous statute. People v. Whitney , 188 Ill. 2d 91, 97-98 (1999). The interpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo . Paris , 179 Ill. 2d at 177-78. In evaluating whether section 115–7.3 allows the trial court to admit other-crimes evidence to show defendant’s propensity to commit certain sex offenses, we focus our inquiry on language from subsection (b): “evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense  may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” 725 ILCS 5/115–7.3(b) (West 1998). Other-crimes evidence is admissible “(if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence).” 725 ILCS 5/115–7.3(b) (West 1998). This first phrase seems to reaffirm the application of established evidence rules, including the common law prohibition of other-crimes evidence subject to the exceptions. Other-crimes evidence “may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” 725 ILCS 5/115–7.3(b) (West 1998). This second phrase, in contrast, seems to allow consideration of other-crimes evidence for any matter, including propensity, so long as the evidence is relevant. Attempts to read these two phrases together generates several reasonable interpretations. One would permit admission of other-crimes evidence subject to the traditional rules and would view the latter phrase simply as reemphasizing that evidence must be considered only about relevant issues. Another would allow admission of other-crimes evidence beyond the exceptions, including to show propensity, so long as the evidence is relevant. This interpretation would view the former phrase as confirming the applicability of other-evidence rules such as the hearsay rule. A third would approve admission of other-crimes evidence under the exceptions, but once admitted, would allow the evidence to be considered for any relevant matter, including propensity. Because this statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. See Holloway , 177 Ill. 2d at 8. We turn to legislative history as an aid in interpreting this ambiguous provision. See Whitney , 188 Ill. 2d at 97-98. Both parties quote statements from the legislative debates to justify their interpretations of section 115–7.3. We acknowledge that certain portions of the debates support both positions, but we conclude that the legislative history more strongly favors the State’s interpretation. See Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Ass’n v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n , 55 Ill. 2d 205, 219 (1973); Dennis v. Old Republic Insurance Co. , 218 Ill. App. 3d 637, 644 (1991). Senator Radogno, the initial sponsor of Senate Bill 5, which included section 115–7.3, stated: “[The bill] would allow the introduction of evidence of prior sex crimes into a trial of any of the sex offenses which are enumerated in the bill. It allows the court to determine exactly what evidence is admissible. This legislation, which is unique to sex offenders, recognizes the propensity of sex offenders to repeat their crimes, and it allows the court to use this evidence in order to help protect society. It’s patterned after the federal rules of evidence.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 19, 1997, at 56-57 (statements of Senator Radogno). Several portions of this statement are instructive. First, Senator Radogno emphasized that this legislation is unique to sex offenders, which undercuts defendant’s argument that the statute merely codifies the common law. Instead, this supports the interpretation that section 115–7.3 implemented a change to the common law rule specifically in sex offense cases. Senator Radogno also explained that courts can use other-crimes evidence to protect society against sex offenders who have a propensity to repeat their crimes. This acknowledgment of recidivism by sex offenders explains why the legislature chose to change the common law rule in this narrow class of crimes. The problems to be remedied by legislation is a factor the court should consider in determining legislative intent. Haywood , 118 Ill. 2d at 271. This is not the first time the legislature acknowledged and responded to increases in sexual assault and sexual abuse cases through legislation. People v. Adams , 144 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1991) (discussing legislative history when evaluating the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 221 through 230, now codified at 730 ILCS 150/1 through 10 (West 2000))). Second, Senator Radogno specified that the statute is patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence also generally prohibit admission of other-crimes evidence to demonstrate propensity and allow its admission to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Effective July 10, 1995, Congress enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 413, “Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases,” and 414, “Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases.” Fed. Rs. Evid. 413, 414. These rules have been interpreted by the federal courts to permit the introduction of other-crimes evidence to show defendant’s propensity to commit sexual assault or child molestation. See, e.g. , United States v. LeMay , 260 F.3d 1018, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. McHorse , 179 F.3d 889, 896 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Senator Radogno was explaining that section 115–7.3 is modeled after Federal Evidence Rules 413 and 414, which allow admission of other-crimes evidence to establish defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses. Many commentators have criticized Federal Evidence Rules 413 and 414 because of the longstanding prohibition on admitting other-crimes evidence to show propensity. S. Scott, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials , 35 Hous. L. Rev. 1729, 1735 (1999). In addition, only four states have added a propensity exception in sexual offense cases by statute or court rule. Alaska R. Evid. 404(b); Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c); Cal. Evid. Code §1108 (West 2002); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 38.37 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (when victim is a minor). However, courts in 25 additional states have broadened the exceptions to the ban on other-crimes evidence in sexual offense cases. Some states allow admission of such evidence to show lustful disposition or tendency toward sexual predation. State v. Rary , 228 Ga. App. 414, 415, 491 S.E.2d 861, 863 (1997); State v. Zeliadt , 541 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa App. 1995); In re Care & Treatment of Hay , 263 Kan. 822, 838, 953 P.2d 666, 678 (1998); State v. Lagrange , 702 So. 2d 1005, 1012-13 (La. App. 1997); State v. Reeder , 105 N.C. App. 343, 349, 413 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1992); State v. Tobin , 602 A.2d 528, 532 (R.I. 1992); In re Young , 122 Wash. 2d 1, 53, 857 P.2d 989, 1015 (1993). Other states limit this lustful disposition exception to cases involving the same victim ( Acuna v. State , 332 Md. 65, 72, 629 A.2d 1233, 1236 (1993); Commonwealth v. Barrett , 418 Mass. 788, 794, 641 N.E.2d 1302, 1307 (1994); Hicks v. State , 441 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Miss. 1983); State v. Young , 661 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Mo. App. 1983); State v. Di Giosia , 3 N.J. 413, 419-20, 70 A.2d 756, 759-60 (1950); State v. Landers , 115 N.M. 514, 518, 853 P.2d 1270, 1274 (App. 1992); Hawkins v. State , 782 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); State v. McKay , 309 Or. 305, 308, 787 P.2d 479, 480 (1990); Commonwealth v. Knowles , 431 Pa. Super. 574, 578, 637 A.2d 331, 333 (1994)), to cases in which the victim is a minor ( Turner v. State , 59 Ark. App. 249, 251, 956 S.W.2d 870, 871 (1997); State v. Edward Charles L. , 183 W. Va. 641, 649, 398 S.E.2d 123, 131 (1990)), or to incest cases ( Johnson v. State , 288 Ark. 101, 103, 702 S.W.2d 2, 4 (1986); State v. Beckwith , 158 Me. 174, 177, 180 A.2d 605, 607 (1962); Garza v. State , 828 S.W.2d 432, 439 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Moore v. Commonwealth , 222 Va. 72, 77, 278 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1981)). Some states are otherwise more liberal in their admission of other-crimes evidence in sexual offense cases. Ex Parte Register , 680 So. 2d 225, 227 (Ala. 1994); Thacker v. Commonwealth , 816 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Ky. App. 1991); State v. Stephens , 237 Neb. 551, 556, 466 N.W.2d 781, 785 (1991); State v. Davidson , 236 Wis. 2d 537, 559-60, 613 N.W.2d 606, 617 (2000); Gezzi v. State , 780 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 1989). This extensive case law demonstrates that jurisdictions across the country are recognizing the validity of admitting other-crimes evidence in sexual offense cases beyond the exceptions. In light of its legislative history, we find that the legislature enacted section 115–7.3 to enable courts to admit evidence of other crimes to show defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses if the requirements of section 115–7.3 are met.