Opinion ID: 2540605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Points Raised By Nunley

Text: In his first point relied on, Nunley argues: This Court should recall its mandate and set aside Nunley's sentence of death in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 2003), because, pursuant to said intervening authorities, Nunley has a constitutional right to have a jury determine the necessary facts to impose a sentence of death, and Nunley was deprived of this right in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Art. I, §§ 2, 10, 18(a) & 21 of the Missouri Constitution, in that a judge, rather than a jury, made the requisite factual determinations and sentenced him to death. In Ring, a jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. In the sentencing phase, the trial judge alone determined that aggravating factors existed that allowed for the imposition of the death penalty. 536 U.S. at 588, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Supreme Court, relying on its prior decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), reasoned that [c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Supreme Court held that a defendant has the right to have a jury find the statutory aggravating circumstances necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. This Court subsequently held that the principles articulated in Ring apply retroactively to defendants who did not waive jury trials and whose cases became final prior to the Supreme Court's ruling. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 268-69. Since Whitfield, Ring has been retroactively applied in nine cases. State ex rel. Lyons v. Lombardi, 303 S.W.3d 523, 525 n. 2 (Mo. banc 2010); Ervin v. Purkett, 2007 WL 2782332 (E.D.Mo.2007) at ; State v. Thompson, 134 S.W.3d 32, 33 (Mo. banc 2004); State ex rel. Baker v. Kendrick, 136 S.W.3d 491, 494 (Mo. banc 2004); State ex rel. Mayes v. Wiggins, 150 S.W.3d 290, 291 (Mo. banc 2004); State v. Buchanan, 115 S.W.3d 841, 842 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Smith, No. SC77337, order entered October 28, 2003; State v. Richardson, No. SC76059, order entered October 29, 2003; State v. Morrow, No. SC79112, order entered October 29, 2003. None of these cases, however, involved a situation where a defendant strategically pled guilty and waived jury sentencing because he was afraid a jury would sentence him to death, as Nunley did in this case. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 649-52 (Mo. banc 2011) ( Whitfield 's retroactivity holding is limited to the identified similar collateral review cases where the jury was convened but was unable to reach a verdict and then the sentence was imposed by the judge. Id. at 651). Nunley waived jury sentencing when he pled guilty at his original plea hearing in 1991. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d at 923. At his plea hearing, the trial judge explained to Nunley that by pleading guilty he was waiving several constitutional rights, including jury sentencing. Nunley testified that he understood his waiver: Q: Do you understand that by pleading guilty today you're waiving or giving up a certain number of constitutional rights that you would have if you went to trial? A: Yes. Q: Do you understand that at that trial you would have the right to a trial by a judge or a jury? A: Yes. ... Q: Do you understand that if you went to trial and you were found guilty of these charges that you would then start the second phase of the trial, which would be the sentencing phase by the jury; do you understand that? A: Yes. Q: By waiving that, you're not going to be sentenced by a jury. Do you understand that? A: Yes. ... Q: It is still your desire to plead guilty today? A: Yes, it is. (Emphasis added). Nunley waived jury sentencing because he wanted a judge to sentence him. As he testified in his hearing to withdraw his guilty plea, he thought a jury would likely sentence him to death: Q: And you knew you had the right to a jury trial? A: Yes, sir. ... Q: And you were explained how the State would present aggravating circumstances and your attorneys would be presenting mitigating circumstances, correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And when you talked about this with your attorneys before you entered your plea, it was brought out the fact that a jury who saw this evidence would be outraged, wasn't it? A: Yes, my attorney did mention that. Q: And, in fact, you yourself were afraid that if you went before a jury, they very well may sentence you to death, weren't you? A: Well, I really made the decision on the advice of my attorneys. Q: Well let me ask you this, sir, based upon the discussions you had with your attorneys, your review of all the evidence, and the fact that you were guilty, you understood there was a strong likelihood that if you went before a jury, they were going to sentence you to death, weren't you, sir? A: Yes, sir. Q: And so then you started discussing your other options. You said, well, one option would be to go before a judge, right? A: Yes. Q: But in order to go before a judge, you would have to waive all of your constitutional rights and you would have to plead guilty and that judge would sentence you, correct? A: Yes. (Emphasis added). In Missouri, the general rule is that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including statutory and constitutional guarantees. Feldhaus v. State, 311 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Mo. banc 2010); Ross v. State, 335 S.W.3d 479, 481 (Mo. banc 2011) (a guilty plea `voluntarily and understandably made waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses'). Specifically, Ring does not apply to defendants who plead guilty and waive their right to jury sentencing, as Nunley did here. Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 473 (2002) ( Ring is not applicable to [a defendant's] case [when], unlike Ring, [the defendant pleads] guilty and waive[s] his right to a jury trial.); Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ind.2002) (By pleading guilty, defendant forfeited his right to have a jury recommend to the trial court whether or not a death penalty should be imposed...); South Carolina v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 604 S.E.2d 377, 380 (2004) ( Ring did not involve jury-trial waivers and is not implicated when a defendant pleads guilty.); State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 806-807 (S.D.2006) (The  Ring analysis is inapplicable when a defendant waives the right to jury sentencing.); Sanchez v. Superior Court, 102 Cal.App.4th 1266, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 (2002) (after Ring, a defendant may validly waive his or her right to have the jury determine the degree of murder). Nunley's reasons for waiving jury sentencing were clearly strategic. They also were absolute. He did not want a jury to sentence him because of the strong likelihood that . . . they were going to sentence [him] to death. This case is factually inapposite to Ring and Whitfield. See State ex rel. Taylor, at 648-49 (Because the record clearly shows that Taylor strategically waived jury sentencing after weighing the costs and benefits of facing a jury, his case is distinguishable from Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, Whitfield, and their progeny.). Nunley raises two further arguments. First, Nunley asserts that his initial waiver of jury sentencing did not remain valid after his case was remanded for re-sentencing. Second, he argues that section 565.006.2 is unconstitutional because he alleges it requires a defendant who pleads guilty to waive jury sentencing.
Nunley argues that he should have had a fresh slate after his case was remanded for re-sentencing, thus making his original guilty plea and jury waiver ineffective. Nunley's accomplice, Michael Taylor, made a similar argument that was rejected by this Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Like Nunley, Taylor pled guilty in front of one judge, but after reversal on appeal the original judge recused, and a different judge again sentenced him to death upon remand. This Court held that the original guilty plea and jury waiver remained valid upon remand. State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 215-216 (Mo. banc 1996). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld Taylor's guilty plea and held that the defendant had no substantial and legitimate expectation of being sentenced by the judge to whom he pled guilty under Missouri law and no independent federal right to be sentenced by the same judge who took the plea. Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 968-969 (8th Cir.2003). In addition, this Court has already ruled that Nunley's original guilty plea and waiver remained effective after remand. In Nunley, the defendant argued that it is unfair and unjust for him to be sentenced by any judge other than the original trial judge to whom he entered his guilty plea because he purposefully chose to plead guilty and be sentenced by the original judge. . . 923 S.W.2d at 919-20. This Court stated that a defendant should not be permitted under all circumstances to withdraw a guilty plea when the original judge is unavailable for sentencing. The dispositive factor should be whether the sentencing judge is familiar with the prior proceedings to permit an informed sentencing decision. Id. at 921. This Court held that the record reflected that Judge O'Malley was familiar with the prior proceedings, so not permitting defendant to withdraw his plea does not result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 922. In addition, this Court noted that the order to remand the case did not reverse the plea. This is demonstrated by this Court specifically remanding for a new penalty hearing and imposition of sentence but not a new plea hearing. Id. at 919. The original plea and jury waiver remained valid after the remand. Other jurisdictions support that a waiver of a right through a guilty plea remains valid after the case is remanded. State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant's guilty plea and waiver of a jury trial remained valid after his case was remanded for re-sentencing); People v. Sofia, 62 A.D.3d 1159, 881 N.Y.S.2d 185 (N.Y.App.Div. 3d Dept.2009) (defendant's original waiver of appeal precluded him from challenging the sentence imposed at re-sentencing).
Under section 565.006.2, [n]o defendant who pleads guilty to a homicide offense . . . shall be permitted a trial by jury on the issue of the punishment to be imposed, except by agreement of the state. Nunley argues that section 565.006.2 is unconstitutional under Ring because it precludes his right to have a jury determine the requisite facts to impose the death penalty. Nunley argues that if section 565.006.2 is unconstitutional, then his original guilty plea and waiver was invalid. In support, the defendant cites Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253. Whitfield does not apply to this case. In Whitfield, this Court invalidated a portion of section 565.030.4 that allowed a judge to make the necessary findings required for the death penalty whenever a jury deadlocked on punishment. Id. at 261-62. Unlike the defendant in Whitfield, Nunley pled guilty and waived his right to jury sentencing. See State ex rel. Taylor, at 649-50 (distinguishing the defendant in Whitfield from a defendant who strategically pled guilty to avoid jury sentencing). In addition, other courts hold that guilty pleas and waivers are valid even if the underlying sentencing scheme explicitly and unequivocally precludes the defendant from receiving a jury sentence. State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d at 807 (S.D. 2006); Colwell, 59 P.3d at 473 (the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a statutory scheme that unequivocally eliminated the right to a jury at sentencing because the defendant pled guilty and validly waived his right to a jury trial); Moore, 771 N.E.2d at 49 (the Indiana Supreme Court upheld state statutes that unequivocally foreclosed the right to jury sentencing after a guilty plea because the guilty plea waived any entitlement to argue the statutory scheme violated the federal and state constitutions by depriving the defendant of a jury determination of the aggravating circumstances). Section 565.006.2 is constitutional. Even if section 565.006.2 were unconstitutional as applied to others, it is constitutional as applied to Nunley. If a statute can be applied constitutionally to an individual, that person will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Mo. banc 2005). At his initial plea hearing, Nunley testified that he understood his right to be tried by a jury and his right to jury sentencing. Nunley could have gone to trial and been sentenced by a jury if he wanted, but he pled guilty in order to avoid jury sentencing. He chose to be sentenced by a judge because he felt that a jury would likely sentence him to death. Nunley cannot claim that the State deprived him of a jury when he strategically pled guilty in order to avoid jury sentencing. Section 565.006.2 is constitutional as applied to Nunley. Because Nunley's guilty plea and waiver remained valid, neither Ring nor Whitfield applies here.
Other than citing to Mo. Const. art. I secs. 2, 10, 18(a), and 21 in his point relied on heading, Nunley never mentions these sections of the Missouri Constitution or explains how his rights under these sections were violated. Rule 84.04(d) requires that each point shall . . . explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error. Arguments raised in the points relied on portion of an appellate brief that are not supported in the argument portion of the brief are deemed abandoned and preserve nothing for appellate review. Coleman v. Gilyard, 969 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Mo.App.1998). Because Nunley provides no support in his argument, claims in Point I relating to a violation of the Missouri Constitution fail.
Ring and Whitfield do not apply to Nunley because he pled guilty and knowingly waived a jury trial and jury sentencing, choosing instead, for strategic reasons, to be sentenced by a judge. Nunley's challenges to the validity of his waiver fail for two reasons. First, his original waiver remained valid after his case was remanded for sentencing. Second, section 565.006.2 is constitutional at least as to Nunley because he knew he could be sentenced by a jury, but he strategically pled guilty in order to avoid jury sentencing. Because Ring and Whitfield do not apply, Nunley's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated. In addition, Nunley provides no support for his claim that his Missouri constitutional rights were violated; any claim in Point I regarding these rights fails.
In his second point relied on, Nunley argues: This Court should recall its mandate in light of its intervening decision in State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527 (Mo. banc 2010), and thereafter set aside Nunley's sentence of death because § 565.035.3 requires this Court to conduct proportionality review by comparing a defendant's sentence of death to similar cases, including those that resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment without probation or parole, and Nunley was deprived of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, §§ 2, 10, 18(a) & 21 of the Missouri Constitution in that his sentence of death was reviewed by only comparing it to similar cases where the defendant was sentenced to death, and a comparison of Nunley's case with all similar cases, including those resulting in a life sentence, demonstrate that Nunley's sentence is excessive and disproportionate. Section 565.035.3 states that this Court must review [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant. In Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 555 (J. Stith concurring), and State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 544-45 (Mo. banc 2010) (J. Breckenridge concurring), a majority of this Court held that the proportionality review mandated by section 565.035.3 requires consideration of all factually similar cases in which the death penalty was submitted to the jury, including those resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole. In State v. Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648, 659 (Mo. banc 2010), this Court clarified that the concurring opinions in Deck and Anderson state the applicable law with regard to proportionality review. Nunley now claims that his due process rights under the United States and Missouri Constitutions were violated because his death sentence was reviewed only by comparing it to similar death sentence cases, not life sentence cases. The United States Supreme Court has held that a state supreme court is not constitutionally compelled to make retroactive its new construction of a state statute. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23-24, 94 S.Ct. 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 179 (1973). A state in defining the limits or adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. Id. In State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 146 (Mo. banc 1998), this Court conducted proportionality review by comparing Clay's case only to other similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed. Clay filed a motion to recall the mandate or, in the alternative, a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court overruled Clay's motion and explained that Clay received proportionality review in the manner provided by law at the time of that review and that proportionality review as provided in the recent Dorsey decision is not to be applied retrospectively. State v. Clay , No. SC78373 (order entered December 9, 2010); Clay v. Bowersox, 628 F.3d 996 (8th Cir.2011). The law regarding proportionality review in the concurring opinions in Deck and Anderson, which this Court in Dorsey stated was the applicable law in Missouri, is not to be applied retroactively. This Court did not violate Nunley's federal or Missouri constitutional rights by limiting its proportionality review to similar death sentence cases.