Opinion ID: 37901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for Bill of Particulars

Text: 36 Id., United States v. Daniels, 247 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2001). In Daniels, we concluded that there is nothing “inherently vague in the notion of a general anti-fraud statute.” Id. 19 We review denial of a motion for a bill of particulars for abuse of discretion.37 Only defendant Murphy moved for a bill of particulars, however, so our review as to defendant Kirkham is for plain error.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to apprise a defendant of the charges against him with enough detail to allow him to prepare his defense.38 A criminal defendant must demonstrate that he was actually surprised at trial, and thereby prejudiced in his substantial rights, before we will reverse a conviction based on a district court’s denial of a motion for a bill of particulars.39 As we concluded above, the indictment returned against Kirkham and Murphy was duplicitous; nevertheless, it gave defendants adequate notice of the charges against them. The language of the indictment clearly describes the essential elements of the crime and charges that defendants “knowingly and willfully executed, and attempted to execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud health care benefit programs. . .” This tracks the language of § 1347, which 37 United States v. Lavergne, 805 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1986). 38 United States v. Montemayor, 703 F.2d 109, 117 (5th Cir. 1983). 39 Lavergne, 805 F.2d at 521 (“The fact that the indictments are only thus decipherable falls short of the precision desirable in an indictment. But a finding that no bill of particulars was needed also rests on the fact appellants have not made the requisite showing of surprise. . .”). 20 states “whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice to defraud any health care benefit program,”40 and makes clear which subsection of the statute defendants were being charged with violating. The indictment goes on to name six insurance companies that defendants allegedly defrauded, and, in seven paragraphs under Part B, the specific scheme or artifice by which defendants allegedly defrauded them. The time frame of the scheme, August 1996 through 2000, is also included. Part C of the indictment lists 13 allegedly fraudulent medical claims, including dates and the names of insurance providers, doctors, and patients, submitted by defendants in their execution of the scheme.41 The government obviously provided enough information to the defendants to give them notice of the charges against them. In any event, Murphy (and, for that matter, Kirkham) was neither surprised nor prejudiced at trial by the court’s failure to grant his motion for a bill of particulars. The government provided both defendants with voluminous discovery, including the testimony and exhibits eventually introduced against them at 40 18 U.S.C. § 1347(1). 41 Five of these claims listed Lostetter as the doctor who allegedly provided services to the patient; as noted infra, Lostetter was originally indicted along with Kirkham and Murphy but did not go to trial with them. Therefore, the government did not present evidence as to these transactions. 21 trial.42 Moreover, even if the indictment had not furnished adequate information about the charges brought against defendants, the government’s providing them with the necessary information in another satisfactory form obviated the need for a bill of particulars.43 We are convinced that defendants were not actually taken by surprise at trial, so the trial court’s denial of the bill of particulars did not prejudice them.44