Opinion ID: 596577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of evidence of Miller's gun

Text: 8 Spencer contends that the trial judge should have admitted police reports detailing Miller's arrest and the seizure of a gun from the car that Miller was driving. Fed.R.Evid. 403 provides that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We review the district court's evidentiary decision under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hooten, 662 F.2d 628, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004, 102 S.Ct. 1640, 71 L.Ed.2d 873 (1981). We give the district courts wide latitude when they balance the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its probative value. United States v. Kinslow, 860 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir.1988). See also United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1402 (9th Cir.1988) (considerable deference given Rule 403 evidentiary decision), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046, 109 S.Ct. 1178, 103 L.Ed.2d 244 (1989). 9 As an initial matter, however, Spencer disputes the district court's reliance upon Rule 403 as a basis for excluding the arrest report made in Miller's case, citing several decisions of this and other circuits involving the exclusion of testimony describing the identity of a suspect in a crime. Spencer's argument is not persuasive. 10 Spencer does not dispute that he was in the car where the Ruger pistol was found; he merely alleges that he did not know it was there. Spencer's defense is therefore properly characterized as one based on the prosecution's failure to prove the knowledge element of the offense. Thus, the cases cited by Spencer are inapplicable to the facts of this case, because they involved the defense of mistaken identity. See United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Moore, 556 F.2d 479, 485 (10th Cir.1977); United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110, 112-113 (2d Cir.1976); Holt v. United States, 342 F.2d 163, 164-65 (5th Cir.1965). 11 Even if these mistaken identity cases did apply here, they do not preclude application of the Rule 403 balancing test. In Armstrong, we held that the defendant was prejudiced by the trial judge's exclusion of testimony that a man other than the defendant had used bait money stolen during the robbery at issue to buy a car. However, we also explained that this ruling cast no doubt on a district court's freedom to exclude cumulative evidence and to insure orderly presentation of a case. 621 F.2d at 953. 12 Spencer futilely contends that Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 405(b) dictate that the evidence of Miller's arrest be admitted. Rule 405(b) allows introduction of specific prior instances of conduct when that conduct is probative of character or a trait of character and the defendant's character, or a character trait, is an essential element of his defense. Here Spencer has not raised character as an element of his defense; he claims that he did not know that the gun was under the seat. 13 Rule 404(b) authorizes a party to introduce evidence of prior bad acts when necessary to demonstrate opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. In this case, Spencer sought to establish that Miller was the person who most likely knew that the Ruger was under the seat of the car. But Rule 404(b) deals with the prior bad acts of the party opposing introduction of the proffered acts, not the prior bad acts of a different person tending to show that that person, as opposed to the person offering the evidence in a completely separate case, had knowledge or intent to commit a crime. 1 14 We find no abuse of discretion in declining to admit the evidence of the arrest reports. We have previously held that Fed.R.Evid. 403 supports an evidentiary decision quite similar to this one. 2 See Hooten, 662 F.2d at 636 (affirming exclusion of testimony about the level of gun trading typically engaged in by hobbyist collectors where defendant charged with dealing in firearms without a license). 15