Opinion ID: 596480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review on Petition for Mandamus

Text: 19 While transfer orders are not appealable as a general rule, this rule does not foreclose all review of such orders in the transferor circuit. Pursuant to the All Writs Act, this court may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction, including the writ of mandamus. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The Supreme Court has admonished that the remedy of mandamus is drastic, and should be invoked only in extraordinary situations. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34, 101 S.Ct. 188, 189-90, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the writ is available to prevent abuses of a district court's authority to transfer a case. In re Chatman-Bey, 718 F.2d 484, 486 (D.C.Cir.1983). This court has entertained petitions for mandamus to review section 1404(a) transfer orders upon a variety of allegations, including, for example, that the district court lacked power to transfer the case to a court of improper venue, see In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 719-20 (D.C.Cir.1983); Relf v. Gasch, 511 F.2d 804, 808 (D.C.Cir.1975), failed to consider the applicable statutory criteria, see Wiren, 194 F.2d at 875, or transferred the case without providing a hearing, see Fine v. McGuire, 433 F.2d 499, 501-02 (D.C.Cir.1970). 20 In this case, Ukiah alleges that the District Court was properly vested with jurisdiction to hear this action; thus, according to Ukiah, the court had no authority to order the transfer, because a section 1631 transfer may only be made if the court lacks jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631; Town of N. Bonneville v. United States Dist. Court, 732 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1984) (section 1631 transfer may be reviewed under All Writs Act where petitioner alleges that district court has jurisdiction over action). We therefore consider the alleged abuse of judicial authority on Ukiah's petition for mandamus. 6 21 [299 U.S.App.D.C. 60] Turning to the merits of the transfer, 7 we find that the District Court has not even remotely approached committing the sort of abuse of its authority that would warrant granting a petition for mandamus. There are three elements to a section 1631 transfer: (1) there must be a lack of jurisdiction in the district court, see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. United States, 780 F.2d 74, 80 (D.C.Cir.1985); (2) the transfer must be in the interest of justice, see id.; and (3) the transfer can be made only to a court in which the action could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, see Town of N. Bonneville, 732 F.2d at 750. The District Court's decision in this case satisfies all three requirements, and we therefore find that the court acted well within its authority in transferring the instant action to the Ninth Circuit. 22 First, the court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action under this court's decision in TRAC. In TRAC, we held that where a statute commits review of agency action to the Court of Appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court's future jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of the Court of Appeals. 750 F.2d at 75 (footnote omitted). This case meets the criteria set out in TRAC for exclusive circuit court jurisdiction. It is undisputed that review of FTC cease and desist orders is committed to the courts of appeals pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 21(c), (d). 8 See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 743 (D.C.Cir.1987) (opinion of Edwards, J.). Moreover, the District Court's disposition of this case might affect the Circuit Court's future jurisdiction, TRAC, 750 F.2d at 75, for if the District Court enjoins the FTC proceeding against Ukiah as requested, the statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals to review [the FTC's order] on the merits may be defeated.... Id. at 76. The District Court therefore properly found that under TRAC, it was divested of jurisdiction to entertain Ukiah's claim. 23 Ukiah suggests that TRAC does not prohibit parties to FTC proceedings from petitioning district courts for review of challenges to the FTC's jurisdiction, so long as those jurisdictional challenges present purely legal questions, as opposed to mixed questions of law and fact. 9 In making this argument, Ukiah seeks to skirt our broadly worded statement in TRAC that, [b]y lodging review of agency action in the Court of Appeals, Congress manifested an intent that the appellate court exercise sole jurisdiction over the class of claims covered by the statutory grant of review power. Id. at 77. Ukiah responds that jurisdictional challenges of the sort it mounts are not within the class of claims which are covered by the review power conferred on the circuit courts by 15 U.S.C. § 21(c), (d). We reject this argument. 24 To be sure, the question of what constitutes the class of claims reserved solely for appellate review under TRAC has not been entirely resolved. In the case of FTC [299 U.S.App.D.C. 61] action, the class of claims is unquestionably not limited, as Ukiah suggests, to final cease and desist orders. If it were so limited, the entire holding and purpose of TRAC would be eviscerated, for TRAC seeks to identify those claims, in addition to claims regarding final agency action, over which the courts of appeals exercise exclusive jurisdiction. TRAC-type cases have tended to focus on one category of nonfinal agency action--unreasonable agency delay. See, e.g., In re Monroe Communications Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 945 (D.C.Cir.1988); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1985). But neither the language nor rationale of [TRAC ] indicates that its reach is limited to such claims. Ticor, 814 F.2d at 757 (opinion of Joyce Hens Green, J.). Indeed, the TRAC opinion suggested that its holding would apply, for example, to constitutional claims of agency bias and prejudgment. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 74-75 & n. 23, 77 & n. 30. 25 We find that Ukiah's jurisdictional challenge to the FTC proceeding in this case falls within the class of claims reserved solely for the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. In reaching this determination, we are guided by language in the TRAC opinion that Ukiah fails to discuss. We suggested in TRAC that a claim for relief relating to nonfinal agency action would fall within the general federal question jurisdiction of the district courts, only where a denial of review in the District Court will truly foreclose all judicial review.... 750 F.2d at 78. As an example of a situation where a district court might exercise its original jurisdiction over nonfinal agency action, we pointed to Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958), where the Supreme Court held that a district court could entertain a claim that the National Labor Relations Board had violated an express statutory command, because the plaintiff had no other means of obtaining review of the agency action. That is not the case here. Ukiah will be free to mount a challenge to the FTC's jurisdiction on review of any final cease and desist order the FTC might issue, and, therefore, denial of review in a district court will not foreclose all judicial review. We thus conclude that a jurisdictional challenge to an ongoing agency proceeding falls within the class of claims exclusively vested in the courts of appeals under TRAC. 26 Seeking to avoid the conclusion that TRAC applies to its claim, Ukiah likens its jurisdictional challenge in this action to a constitutional attack on the FTC's enabling statute in an ongoing proceeding, a claim which at least one district court in this circuit found within its jurisdiction under TRAC. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 625 F.Supp. 747, 749 (D.D.C.1986), aff'd on other grounds, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C.Cir.1987). Ukiah insists that this case, like the constitutional challenge in Ticor, involves a purely legal question that does not, like more fact-intensive agency disputes, require deference to appellate expertise. Ukiah reasons that since the rule in TRAC was grounded in part on the fact that the courts of appeals have developed expertise in review of administrative action, those claims that do not require such expertise for their resolution should not fall within the class of claims exclusively vested in the courts of appeals. We find Ukiah's argument unconvincing. Although we intimate no view on whether a constitutional challenge such as that in Ticor would be committed exclusively to the courts of appeals under TRAC, 10 we conclude that a challenge, as here, to the FTC's jurisdiction on statutory grounds does not belong to the small category of cases, TRAC, 750 F.2d at 78, seeking relief from nonfinal agency action that falls within a district court's general federal question jurisdiction. 27 Our conclusion is supported by compelling policy concerns. Allowing questions of jurisdiction to be carved out of ongoing [299 U.S.App.D.C. 62] agency proceedings and challenged in district courts would create an unmanageable body of litigation in the federal courts. By establishing an agency jurisdiction exception to the TRAC rule, we would invite an endless stream of suits filed in district courts, followed by appeals to this court, by parties seeking to stall or foreclose agency action. Ukiah's proffered distinction between purely legal and mixed law and fact jurisdictional questions only exacerbates this concern. Ukiah asks us to draw a line where no line may be drawn--or, just as accurately, where any line may be drawn. As any observer familiar with administrative law knows, the courts have proven notoriously inconsistent in attempting to draw distinctions between questions of fact and law. See generally 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.9, at 365-69 (2d ed. 1984) (describing broad outlines of problem). Even were we to find it easy to draw the suggested distinction in this particular case, we can imagine no reason for adopting such a rule. We therefore hold that all challenges to an agency's jurisdiction in the context of nonfinal agency action lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of appeals under TRAC. 28 Second, although the District Court did not make an explicit finding on the point, it seems plain that the transfer--in lieu of dismissal--was in the interest of justice. As we recently noted, [i]n applying TRAC to a case lodged in the wrong court, the appropriate course, normally, is to transfer.... American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Baker, 895 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C.Cir.1990); see TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79 n. 37. 29 Finally, we conclude that the District Court correctly determined that the Ninth Circuit was a court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.... 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Under 15 U.S.C. § 21(c), any person who has received a cease and desist order from the FTC may obtain review of the order in the court of appeals ... for any circuit within which [a] violation [of section 7 of the Clayton Act] occurred or within which such person resides or carries on business.... Since the alleged violation of section 7 occurred in California, and since appellants acknowledge that both Ukiah Valley Medical Center and AHS/West are California not-for-profit corporations, any final FTC cease and desist order will only be reviewable in the Ninth Circuit. Since the Ninth Circuit court of appeals has exclusive prospective jurisdiction over the FTC proceeding, it is the only court of appeals, under TRAC, that may review Ukiah's challenge to the FTC's jurisdiction in an ongoing agency proceeding. 11 In sum, we find that the District Court properly transferred the case to the Ninth Circuit, and has not, by any measure, committed an abuse of authority that would necessitate issuing a writ of mandamus.