Opinion ID: 1183500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: metro's duty to accommodate

Text: [1] An employer has an obligation to reasonably accommodate a handicapped employee. Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 583 P.2d 621 (1978); RCW 49.60.180(1); WAC 162-22-080. Failure to reasonably accommodate a handicapped employee constitutes discrimination under RCW 49.60.180. [A]ppellant was required by the terms of RCW 49.60 to make reasonable accommodation for handicapped employees.... ... RCW 49.60.180 is part of a comprehensive law by which the legislature declared it is an individual's civil right to be free from various types of discrimination ... [a]nd the legislature has directed liberal construction of the provisions of RCW 49.60 in order to accomplish its purpose.... ... ... When, in 1973, the legislature chose to make this policy applicable to discrimination against the handicapped, we believe it is clear it mandated positive steps to be taken. An interpretation to the contrary would not work to eliminate discrimination. It would instead maintain the status quo wherein work environments and job functions are constructed in such a way that handicaps are often intensified because some employees are not physically identical to the ideal employee. (Some italics omitted.) Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d at 387-89. In the Holland case, an employer chose to transfer a handicapped employee from a job he could perform well to another position which he was unable to acceptably perform due to his handicap. The opinion found that Boeing had failed to exercise several options it had available to accommodate Holland. Holland, 90 Wn.2d at 391. The court found further support for its requirement of definitive relief in WAC 162-22-080. The Washington Human Rights Commission has promulgated WAC 162-22-080(3) which offers guidance to employers in fulfilling their obligations to handicapped employees. It reads: The cost of accommodating an able handicapped worker will be considered to be an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business only if it is unreasonably high in view of the size of the employer's business, the value of the employee's work, whether the cost can be included in planned remodeling or maintenance, the requirements of other laws and contracts, and other appropriate considerations. Metro does not challenge this regulation. The approach of the Oregon legislature to this problem gives some perspective to the duty imposed on the employer. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 280 Or. 163, 570 P.2d 76 (1977), we find: It is our conclusion that the legislature intended by the statutory language to impose upon an employer the obligation not to reject a prospective employee because of a physical or mental handicap unless there is, because of the defect, a probability either that the employee cannot do the job in a satisfactory manner or that he can do so only at the risk of incapacitating himself. The fullest possible participation in the    economic life of the state and the reasonable demands of the position would seem to require no less a standard. Montgomery Ward, 280 Or. at 168-69, quoting from Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.40. See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 42 Or. App. 159, 600 P.2d 452 (1979).
Metro argues that the trial court's failure to give its proposed jury instructions misled the jury as to Metro's duty to reasonably accommodate Dean. Metro proposed the following jury instructions: An employer is not required to create a position to accommodate a handicapped worker. An employer is not required under the law to give preference to a handicapped worker over someone who is more qualified. Metro contends that the court's failure to give these instructions permitted the jury to conclude that Metro had an obligation to create a job for Dean or that Metro's duty to reasonably accommodate required the hiring of a less qualified handicapped employee over a more qualified handicapped employee. We agree that Metro had no duty to create a job for Dean or to hire him in preference to a more qualified employee. We do not agree that the failure to give the proposed instructions constituted error. [2] Jury instructions must be considered in their entirety. They are sufficient if they permit each party to argue his theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole, properly inform the jury of the applicable law. Brown v. Spokane Cy. Fire Protec. Dist. 1, 100 Wn.2d 188, 194, 668 P.2d 571 (1983). The instructions to the jury explained the provisions of the laws against discriminating against the handicapped and their applicability to Metro. An instruction stated: You are instructed that the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle is an employer subject to the provisions of the Washington State Law Against Discrimination. Supervisors, managers and other employees acting in the interest of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle are agents of defendant and, therefore, an act or omission of these agents is an act or omission of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle. The defendant as a metropolitan municipal corporation, is required by law to operate a personnel system based solely on merit and fitness. The law requires that defendant make reasonable accommodation to handicapped employees. Based on that instruction, Metro was able to argue that it was not required to hire a less qualified handicapped employee over a more qualified employee. Another instruction summarized Dean's claim against Metro and Metro's answer to the charge of discrimination as follows: The plaintiff claims that the defendant discriminated against him in employment in violation of the State law against discrimination by not accommodating his handicap, in one or more of the following respects: (a) It failed or refused to process job applications or to notify plaintiff of job openings, which the plaintiff was qualified to fill; (b) It hired others for jobs, which plaintiff was qualified to fill; and (c) It forced plaintiff to terminate his employment by failing or refusing to provide him with any job alternatives. The defendant answers that defendant did not discriminate against plaintiff because of his handicap. Defendant claims, instead: (a) The plaintiff rejected the only jobs he was qualified to fill; (b) The plaintiff was not qualified for other job openings of the defendant; (c) The plaintiff voluntarily terminated his employment with defendant; (d) The plaintiff failed to disclose information which defendant needed to evaluate plaintiff's qualifications. The foregoing is merely a summary of the claims of the parties. You are not to take the same as proof of the matters claimed and you are to consider only those matters which are established by the evidence. These claims have been outlined solely to aid you in understanding the issues. A further instruction set forth Metro's duty to reasonably accommodate a handicapped worker and the factors to be considered when evaluating whether an accommodation would create an undue hardship on an employer, stating: State law requires employers to make reasonable accommodation to the known sensory, physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. State law provides that accommodating an able handicapped worker will be considered to be an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business if it is unreasonable in view of the size of the employer's business, the type of the employer's business including the composition and structure of the employer's work force, the value of the employee's work, the nature and cost of the accommodation needed, the requirements of other laws and contracts and other appropriate considerations. Metro did not take exception to these instructions. They permitted Metro to argue that it had no obligation to create a new job for Dean. Dean never claimed that Metro had a duty to create a new job for him. It was his position that Metro failed to accommodate him by refusing to notify him of or consider him for jobs for which he was qualified. Evidence was introduced at the trial of job openings for which Dean met the qualifications. The jury could have decided on the basis of that evidence that Metro failed to accommodate Dean without believing either that Metro should have created a new job for him or hired him over a more qualified employee. There was substantial testimony to support the positions of both the employer and the employee and, consequently, the verdict of the jury.
Metro asserts that the trial court should have dismissed the action, claiming that Dean failed to make a prima facie case that he had been discriminated against. Glasgow v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 103 Wn.2d 401, 693 P.2d 708 (1985) stated that federal law may be considered instructive with regard to the interpretation of our state discrimination laws. Metro asks that we apply the 4-part test announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973) to hold that Dean had not presented a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas involved rejection of employment of a black worker who had protested his discharge as racially motivated. He challenged the company's failure to rehire him under Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1974. The opinion held that for the claimant to make a prima facie showing of race discrimination in a failure to hire case he had to show (a) qualification for the job the employer was seeking to fill; (b) rejection despite qualifications; (c) that the position remained open; and (d) that the employer continued to seek applicants with plaintiff's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra at 802. McDonnell Douglas allocates the burden of proof as follows: (1) the worker must make a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the burden is then upon the employer to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged act; and (c) the burden then is upon the worker to show that the employer's claimed reasons are pretext. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra at 802-04. Texas Dep't of Comm'ty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981), continuing to apply the test, recognized that factors may vary depending on the individual case. The opinion states in part: We have stated consistently that the employee's prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.... ... ... When the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Burdine, at 257, 260. [3] The situation before us involves not a failure to hire, however, but a failure to reasonably accommodate a handicap which developed while in the employ of the employer. It was the duty of Metro to reasonably accommodate Dean by informing him of job openings for which he might be qualified. It was correspondingly the duty of Dean to cooperate with the employer in the hunt for other suitable work by making the employer aware of his qualifications, by applying for all jobs which might fit his abilities and by accepting reasonably compensatory work he could perform. As observed in Stieler v. Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 88 Wn.2d 68, 558 P.2d 198 (1977), at page 74: There is no civil rights violation in denying a job to a person who is not qualified to perform it. Since the respondent has not shown that she was qualified to fill any of the positions in the new administration, her claim that she was a victim of .. . discrimination is without merit. See also Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir.1975); Laws v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. Commw. 424, 412 A.2d 1381 (1980); Comment, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litigation, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 553 (1982). When the Legislature passed RCW 49.60 it included the following: 49.60.020 Construction of chapter  Election of other remedies. The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. In keeping with this provision, and to promote the statute's recognition that the right to be free from discrimination because of physical handicap is a civil right which includes the right to hold employment without discrimination, we hold that Dean needed only to prove, as one alternative, that he was qualified for available positions for which he applied. See Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.1979). Metro could in its turn prove he was less qualified than those hired to fill those existing vacancies. Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 458 A.2d 1225 (Me. 1983). Dean was able to produce proof of application for five positions. The trial court admitted evidence regarding other jobs for which Dean was qualified and had applied, but could not prove that he had done so. Discrimination against the handicapped differs from discrimination on the basis of race, age, creed or sex in that the statute requires that the employer affirmatively assist the employee who becomes handicapped on the job. Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d at 389. It is an unfair practice for an employer to fail or refuse to make reasonable accommodations to the sensory, mental, or physical limitations of employees, unless the employer can demonstrate ... an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. WAC 162-22-080(1). Metro failed to make reasonable accommodations to Dean's handicap when he informed it of his illness in that Metro treated him as any other job applicant, did not determine the extent of his disability, did not call him into the office to assist him in applying for other positions but left the initiative to him. He received no special attention from the personnel office when he tried to find another position within Metro. In addition, Metro acknowledged having job openings that Dean could not have discovered on his own. Metro personnel made themselves available to Dean but took no affirmative steps to help him find another position. This was required of them as reasonable accommodation. In order to make a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, Dean was required to prove that he had the qualifications for positions which Metro was seeking to fill and that Metro did not take appropriate affirmative steps to help him find an alternative position within the company. The evidence supports the jury's verdict that Dean carried his burden of persuasion and that Metro did not convince them that it had discharged its responsibility. We hold that to make a prima facie case of handicap discrimination an employee plaintiff must prove that he or she is handicapped, that he or she had the qualification required to fill vacant positions and that the employer failed to take affirmative measures to make known such job opportunities to the employee and to determine whether the employee was in fact qualified for those positions.