Opinion ID: 884336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Did the court err in refusing Goulet's offered instructions on negligent homicide? Goulet contends that because mental state must be inferred and the mental states of negligently, knowingly, and purposely are on a continuum, he was entitled to a jury instruction on the mental state of negligently. He argues that he was entitled to a jury instruction on negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of deliberate homicide. A criminal defendant is entitled to a requested lesser included offense instruction when, based upon the evidence, the jury rationally could be warranted in convicting on the lesser offense and acquitting on the greater offense. See § 46-16-607, MCA. In this case, the only evidence remotely arguable as evidence of negligence was Goulet's statement that as he repeatedly stabbed Running Crane in the stomach, chest, and back, he was hoping that he was not seriously hurting him. In light of Goulet's own admissions, Nelson's testimony, and the evidence of the severity of Running Crane's injuries, this bare assertion by Goulet deserves little credence. We conclude that the District Court was within its discretion in ruling that the evidence of negligence was insufficient to allow the jury rationally to convict Goulet of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Goulet's offered instructions on negligent homicide.