Opinion ID: 3134373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 82, par. 9. Thus, before 1976, a

Text: defendant could assert its lien by answer. See, e.g., Rochelle Bldg. Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank, 121 Ill. App. 2d 274, 277 (1970). In 1976, the statute was amended and the portions of the statute allowing enforcement of a lien by answer were deleted. The amended language of the statute provides that a defendant may enforce a lien by counterclaim. Accordingly, the amended statute contemplates that a defendant will assert its lien by counterclaim, rather than by answer. We further note that section 12 of the Act expressly provides that the circuit court should generally use the same pleading procedure in a mechanic's lien proceeding as is used in other civil actions. Section 12 provides: The court shall permit amendments to any part of the pleadings, and may issue process, make all orders, requiring parties to appear, and requiring notice to be given, that are or may be authorized in other civil actions and shall have the same power and jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, and the rules of practice and proceedings in such cases shall be the same as in other civil cases, except as is otherwise provided in this act. 770 ILCS 60/12 (West 1992). The rules of civil procedure ordinarily apply to mechanic's lien cases, as in other civil cases. Barnard did not follow the proper civil pleading procedure in asserting its lien. In civil cases, a counterclaim should be used by a defendant to make a claim against another defendant. 735 ILCS 5/2--608(a) (West 1992). A counterclaim differs from an answer or affirmative defense. A counterclaim is used when seeking affirmative relief, while an answer or affirmative defense seeks to defeat a plaintiff's claim. Section 2--608(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that [t]he counterclaim shall be a part of the answer, and shall be designated as a counterclaim. 735 ILCS 5/2-- 608(b) (West 1992). In its pleading, Barnard should have formally asserted its lien as a counterclaim. In support of its position, Barnard emphasizes certain language of the statute to argue that the legislature changed the rules of pleadings with respect to mechanic's liens. The statute provides that all lien claimants not made parties thereto [to the complaint] may upon filing a petition to intervene become defendants and enforce their liens by counterclaim . 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 1992). Barnard argues that the statute only requires that intervening claimants file counterclaims. Barnard argues that the statute does not require it to file a counterclaim because it was an original party to the suit, and therefore, it may assert its lien in an answer. We disagree. The statute provides that claimants who are not involved in the original proceeding may intervene to assert their liens. It expressly gives these claimants the right to become involved in the proceeding. The statute, as amended, does not alter the rules of civil procedure in connection with claimants who are already parties to the proceeding. Additionally, Barnard notes that section 9 provides that [t]he plaintiff and all defendants to such complaint may contest each other's right without any formal issue of record made up between them other than that shown upon the original complaint . 770 ILCS 60/9 (West 1992). Barnard contends that this language establishes a simplified pleading procedure. Barnard argues that this language eliminates the need for the filing of counterclaims entirely. We also reject this argument. Although the statute provides that the parties may contest each other's right without any formal issue of record, it still contemplates that they will assert their claims as in other civil cases. Mechanic's lien litigation often involves a number of counterclaims by claimants and by other parties claiming an interest in the property. This provision simply makes it easier to challenge the liens asserted by others. It does not affect how liens should be asserted in the first place.