Opinion ID: 2160038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Pollack's Standing to Appeal

Text: Appellees contend that Jane Pollack has no standing to maintain this appeal because she was not officially a party to the proceeding in the probate court. Judge Christian, the argument goes, merely determined that it was in Ms. Orshansky's best interest to grant Ms. Pollack permission to participate in the proceeding, as allowed by D.C.Code §§ 21-2041(i) and 21-2054(f) and Superior Court Probate Rule 303. While Super. Ct. Prob. R. 303(c) provides that the Court may confer the status of party on any participant it deems appropriate, Ms. Pollack did not seek party designation and Judge Christian did not confer it upon her. The general rule that one must have been a party to the trial court proceeding in order to appeal the trial court's ruling is subject to a number of well-recognized exceptions. One such exception is that [a]ppeals by those who participated as if parties are frequently entertained despite a failure to achieve formal status as a party. 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 3902.1 (2d ed.1992). Most of these appeals involve persons who participate in trial court proceedings as if they had intervened, and who seem to have been treated on all sides as de facto parties. Id. (citations omitted). See, e.g., SEC v. Forex Asset Mgmt. LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 329-330 (5th Cir.2001) (applying a three-part test to decide whether a non-party may appeal, and inquiring whether (1) the non-party actually participated in the proceedings, (2) the equities weigh in favor of hearing the appeal, and (3) the non-party has a personal stake in the outcome). Cf. Devlin v. Scardelletti, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 2013, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that nonnamed class members who are bound by class action settlement to which they objected at the fairness hearing may appeal the approval of the settlement even though they did not intervene and become named parties). If Ms. Pollack was not a party to the intervention proceeding in name, she was a party by any other measure. Through her counsel, Ms. Pollack made motions and arguments, presented evidence and cross-examined the other witnesses, all without objection. The court directed its orders at Ms. Pollack by name and informed Ms. Pollack that she could appeal. By virtue of her relationship to Ms. Orshansky, not to mention being subject to the court's decrees, Ms. Pollack had a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding. Cf. In re Phy. W., 722 A.2d 1263, 1264 (D.C.1998) (holding that foster parent has standing as a party aggrieved to appeal from order granting natural parent's motion for reunification). Given that stake, and because appellees and the probate court treated Ms. Pollack as a de facto party and no party is unfairly prejudiced by treating her as one for purposes of appeal, we hold that Ms. Pollack has standing to appeal.