Opinion ID: 1624163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: People v. Banks and People v. Tucker

Text: Banks and Tucker initially argue that their respective sentencing judges erred in imposing consecutive sentences because conspiracy to commit an enumerated drug offense does not constitute another felony as used in § 7401(3), especially because they committed both the enumerated drug offense and the other felony in the same criminal transaction. We reject defendants' arguments without further analysis because this Court in Morris, supra, held that another felony includes any other felony violation for which a defendant is being sentenced, id. at 328, 537 N.W.2d 842 (emphasis added), regardless of whether the offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or in different and distinct transactions. Id. at 338, 537 N.W.2d 842. Defendants also argue that consecutive sentences for an enumerated drug offense and for conspiracy to commit the enumerated drug offense, committed in the same criminal transaction, violate the protection against double jeopardy. This alternative argument proffered by Banks and Tucker is an issue of first impression. It was left unresolved by Morris. [15] We address that issue today, and, for the reasons that follow, find no double jeopardy violation. [16]
The guarantee against double jeopardy protects against multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. [17] At issue in the cases before us is whether a drug offense enumerated in § 7401(3) and conspiracy to commit that enumerated drug offense, when committed in the same criminal transaction, constitutes the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The intent of the Legislature is the determining factor under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, 485, 355 N.W.2d 592 (1984). Therefore, the issue, stated more precisely, is whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments at a single trial for persons who commit, in the same criminal transaction, a drug offense enumerated in § 7401(3) and conspiracy to commit that drug offense. [18] The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the test enumerated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), is to be used to determine legislative intent in analyzing the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution: For over half a century we have determined whether a defendant has been punished twice for the same offense by applying the rule set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). If the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Ibid. In subsequent applications of the test, we have often concluded that two different statutes define the same offense, typically because one is a lesser included offense of the other. [ Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S.___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 1245, 134 L.Ed.2d 419, 426 (1996).] If the Blockburger test is satisfied, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to punish the defendant under both statutes. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-692, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-1438, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). This presumption is rebutted, however, by a clear indication that the Legislature intended punishment under both statutes. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1142-1143, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-369, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679-680, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). This Court has rejected the Blockburger test in analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan Constitution, and instead uses traditional means to determine the intent of the Legislature, such as the subject, language, and history of the statutes. Robideau, supra at 486-487, 355 N.W.2d 592. In Robideau, supra at 487-488, 355 N.W.2d 592, we provided some guidance in furtherance of this task: Statutes prohibiting conduct that is violative of distinct social norms can generally be viewed as separate and amenable to permitting multiple punishments. A court must identify the type of harm the Legislature intended to prevent. Where two statutes prohibit violations of the same social norm, albeit in a somewhat different manner, as a general principle it can be concluded that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishments. For example, the crimes of larceny over $100, M.C.L. § 750.356; MSA 28.588, and larceny in a building, M.C.L. § 750.360; MSA 28.592, although having separate elements, are aimed at conduct too similar to conclude that multiple punishment was intended. A further source of legislative intent can be found in the amount of punishment expressly authorized by the Legislature. Our criminal statutes often build upon one another. Where one statute incorporates most of the elements of a base statute and then increases the penalty as compared to the base statute, it is evidence that the Legislature did not intend punishment under both statutes. The Legislature has taken conduct from the base statute, decided that aggravating conduct deserves additional punishment, and imposed it accordingly, instead of imposing dual convictions. We do not intend these principles to be an exclusive list. Whatever sources of legislative intent exist should be considered. If no conclusive evidence of legislative intent can be discerned, the rule of lenity requires the conclusion that separate punishments were not intended.[ [19] ] In analyzing the intent of the Legislature, it must be remembered that the Legislature's authority to define a single criminal `act' or `offense' is not diminished by the Double Jeopardy Clause. People v. Wakeford, 418 Mich. 95, 108, 341 N.W.2d 68 (1983). The Legislature is free to determine what activity constitutes a criminal offense subject to criminal penalty. Id.; Robideau, supra at 485, 355 N.W.2d 592. The Double Jeopardy Clauses restrict the courts from imposing more punishment than that intended by the Legislature. Wakeford, supra at 108, 341 N.W.2d 68; Robideau, supra at 469, 355 N.W.2d 592. Thus, if the Legislature desires, it may specifically authorize penalties for what would otherwise be the same offense. People v. Sturgis, 427 Mich. 392, 403, 397 N.W.2d 783 (1986). [C]umulative punishment of the same conduct under two different statutes in a single trial does not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause in either the federal or state system. Id.
Turning to the cases now before us, we conclude that the trial courts' imposition of consecutive sentences for Banks' and Tucker's conspiracy and drug convictions did not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States or Michigan Constitution. Under both federal and state analyses, it is clear that the Legislature intended to separately punish a defendant convicted both of conspiracy to commit a drug offense and of the substantive offenses in the same criminal With regard to the double jeopardy clause of the united states constitution, Banks' and Tucker's conspiracy and drug offenses do not constitute the same offense under the Blockburger test because conspiracy requires a combination or agreement and the drug offenses require possession of an illegal drug. Accordingly, defendants' consecutive sentences, imposed pursuant to § 7401(3), do not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3) also does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan Constitution. Focusing on the first source of legislative intent enumerated in Robideau, supra at 487-488, 355 N.W.2d 592, harm to society, the crimes of conspiracy and drug possession violate distinct social norms. The crime of conspiracy is a continuing offense; it is presumed to continue until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal, or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Castro, 972 F.2d 1107, 1112 (C.A.9, 1992). Accordingly, the crime of conspiracy poses a greater threat to society than the substantive crime forming the object of the conspiracy because each day's acts bring a renewed threat of the substantive evil [the legislature] sought to prevent. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 122, 90 S.Ct. 858, 864, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970). [20] As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained: The [drug] conspiracy evidenced continuing and prolonged, rather than episodic, involvement in crime. The object of the conspiracy constituted a direct threat to society, as well as the indirect, albeit real, harm to persons who eventually would be mired in drugs. [ In re Goldberg, 105 N.J. 278, 283, 520 A.2d 1147 (1987).] In contrast to the overreaching and perpetual harm to society caused by the crime of conspiracy, the specific aim of the Legislature in enacting § 7401 was to curb drug trafficking. As indicated in the legislative analysis: Some persons claim that the state has failed to stem drug traffic because the penalties for drug dealing are not severe enough, and law enforcement tools are inadequate. They contend that the potential for profit in drug dealing is so great that Michigan's present penalties pose little or no deterrent to would-be violators, with lenient probation and parole policies weakening the threat of imprisonment still further. [ People v. Fields, 448 Mich. 58, 64, 528 N.W.2d 176 (1995), quoting House Legislative Analysis, HB 4190, Third Analysis, May 17, 1978.] Another distinction between conspiracy and the substantive drug offense is that the conspiracy statute punishes the planning of the offense and the drug statute punishes the actual commission of the crime. Carter, supra at 586, 330 N.W.2d 314. The second source of legislative intent enumerated in Robideau, supra at 487-488, 355 N.W.2d 592, the amount of punishment expressly authorized by the Legislature, is not relevant to the cases now before us because the conspiracy statute does not incorporate most of the elements of the drug statute. See id. at 487, 355 N.W.2d 592. We note, however, that the conspiracy statute provides for punishment equal to the substantive crime; it does not impose a hierarchial, harsher penalty based on the presence of aggravating factors. [21] Finally, the fact that Banks and Tucker committed the conspiracy and the substantive drug offense in the same criminal transaction is of no consequence. We have repeatedly held that conspiracy is a crime that is separate and distinct from the substantive crime that is its object. Carter, supra at 569, 330 N.W.2d 314; People v. Tinskey, 394 Mich. 108, 228 N.W.2d 782 (1975); People v. Chambers, 279 Mich. 73, 271 N.W. 556 (1937). Furthermore, the crime of conspiracy does not merge into the offense committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. MCL 768.4; MSA 28.1027 (abolishing the merger doctrine); People v. Causley, 299 Mich. 340, 300 N.W. 111 (1941). Therefore, we hold, on the basis of the intent of the Legislature, that it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the United States or Michigan Constitution to sentence a defendant to consecutive prison terms for conspiracy to commit an enumerated drug offense in § 7401(3) and conspiracy to commit that offense, even if committed in the same criminal transaction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial courts' imposition of consecutive sentences. [22]
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision in People v. Denio holding that the trial court was without authority to impose consecutive sentences pursuant to § 7401(3). Consecutive sentences were proper. Furthermore, we affirm the Court of Appeals decisions in People v. Banks and People v. Tucker. Contrary to defendants' arguments, their consecutive sentences, imposed pursuant to § 7401(3), did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the United States or Michigan Constitution.