Opinion ID: 2633564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the right to assistance of counsel

Text: ¶ 25 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants the right to counsel in felony proceedings. [10] As the United States Supreme Court articulated in Powell v. Alabama, The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. [11] ¶ 26 Defendants also have the right to waive their right to counsel. The United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California [12] held that the Sixth Amendment implicitly guarantees criminal defendants the ability to waive their right to the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. Before permitting a defendant to do so, however, a trial court should ensure that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. [13] A defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing. [14] ¶ 27 Courts have recognized three methods pursuant to which a defendant may give up his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel: waiver, forfeiture, and waiver by conduct. [15] We outline the elements of each.
¶ 28 True waiver is the most common method by which defendants forsake their right to counsel. True waiver typically occurs when a defendant affirmatively requests permission to proceed pro se. [16] In State v. Bakalov, we required that defendants clearly and unequivocally request self-representation in order to waive their right to counsel. [17] ¶ 29 When a defendant requests to proceed pro se, his waiver will be valid only if he acts knowingly and intelligently, being aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation. [18] The most reliable way for a trial court to determine whether a defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation is to engage in a colloquy on the record. At times, however, we have found a waiver of the right to counsel absent a colloquy. For example, in State v. Frampton , we found that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel when he affirmatively requested to proceed pro se despite the fact that the trial court had not engaged in a colloquy. [19] We reasoned that the defendant should have realized the value of counsel because he was represented by counsel in a prior trial. [20] Additionally, we concluded that he must have realized the seriousness of the charges filed against him because the judge had appointed standby counsel over his objection [21] and the judge had explained the charges, including the maximum penalty associated therewith, in two prior trials involving the same charges. [22] ¶ 30 True waiver does not apply in this case because Pedockie never expressed a desire to represent himself. To the contrary, the record is replete with instances of Pedockie insisting that he want[ed] adequate counsel and that he was not going to represent [himself].
¶ 31 While waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture occupies the opposite end of the spectrum. Unlike waiver, forfeiture results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right. [23] ¶ 32 In United States v. Goldberg , the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that a defendant may be deemed to have forfeited his right to counsel when he engages in extremely dilatory conduct or abusive behavior, such as physically assaulting counsel. [24] When circumstances are egregious enough to constitute forfeiture, a court need not determine whether a defendant understands the risks of self-representation or warn him that he will lose his right to counsel. But because of its drastic nature, a defendant must engage in extreme conduct before forfeiture may be imposed. [25] We find no basis for imposing forfeiture under the facts presented here.
¶ 33 Waiver by conduct, often referred to as implied waiver, combines elements of both true waiver and forfeiture. [26] Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se and thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel. [27] The conduct required to give rise to an implied waiver does not have to be as extreme as that required for forfeiture. And unlike the situation in cases of true waiver, a defendant need not intend to relinquish the right to counsel. [28] But the defendant must have been warned that continuation of the unacceptable conduct will result in a waiver of the right to counsel. As is the case in a true waiver situation, the waiver also must be knowing and intelligent. In other words, the defendant must have also possessed an awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the time of the implied waiver. [29] ¶ 34 While the United States Supreme Court has never specifically addressed whether a defendant may waive the right to counsel through inappropriate conduct, [30] it has recognized that a defendant may lose the constitutional right to be present at trial because of such conduct. [31] In Illinois v. Allen , the trial court had warned the defendant that he would lose his right to be present at his trial because of his disruptive behavior, yet he continued in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial [could not] be carried on with him in the courtroom. [32] Consequently, he lost the constitutional right to be present, even though he did not affirmatively relinquish it. [33] Thus, Allen suggests that a defendant can lose constitutional rights because of his conduct so long as he is  aware of the consequences of his actions. [34] ¶ 35 In United States v. Weninger, [35] the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied analogous analysis in holding that the defendant had waived his right to counsel by failing to secure an attorney for trial. The defendant was given ample time and was warned to obtain an attorney, but he strategically and stubbornly failed to do so. [36] The Tenth Circuit held that this dilatory conduct should be treated as a request to proceed pro se. [37] ¶ 36 In summary, before we will find an implied waiver of the right to counsel based on a defendant's conduct, two requirements must be satisfied. First, the implied waiver must be voluntary. Second, the waiver must have been made knowingly and intelligently. ¶ 37 For an implied waiver to be voluntary, the trial court must warn the defendant of the specific conduct that will give rise to the waiver of his right to counsel. In other words, when a trial court believes that a defendant's conduct is unacceptable and will result in a waiver of his right to counsel, the court must warn the defendant that continuation of the unacceptable conduct will be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel. [38] This warning must be explicit so that a defendant clearly understands both the nature of the unacceptable conduct and the implications of any such future conduct. ¶ 38 For an implied waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The court should explain the consequences of a decision to proceed pro se and, at a minimum, must ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself, including the expectation that the defendant will comply with technical rules and the recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story; and . . . ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. [39] ¶ 39 Trial courts generally evaluate a defendant's understanding and intelligence by conducting a colloquy on the record. In those cases where a defendant continues to insist on his right to counsel, it may seem awkward for a trial court to engage in a typical colloquy regarding the inherent dangers of self-representation. But we still strongly encourage trial courts to do so as a means to ensure that a defendant is aware of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation. [40]