Opinion ID: 1375948
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Hearsay Evidence at Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in excluding hearsay evidence of mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. A.R.S. § 13-703(C) provides that [a]ny information relevant to any mitigating circumstances ... may be presented by either the prosecution or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded testimony from a defense investigator and that this error was fundamental in preventing the court from considering all mitigating factors prior to sentencing. We disagree. Defendant called a Mohave County Public Defender's Office investigator to testify regarding his interview with a witness. The investigator testified to the witness' statements that Defendant received $500 from his father in March 1989, approximately three months before the murder. R.T., May 15, 1990, at 137-38. Defense counsel then asked the investigator, Now, even after that particular date, had [the witness] at times paid David Hill money to do work for her? R.T., May 15, 1990, at 138. The trial court then sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objection. The trial court arguably erred in excluding potentially mitigating information. Defense counsel, however, failed to make an offer of proof after the objection. When an objection to the introduction of evidence is sustained, in order to assert error on appeal it is ordinarily necessary to make an offer of proof. Law of Evidence § 13, at 20 (footnote omitted). One purpose of this rule is to enable an appellate court to determine whether any error was harmful in the context of the case. Id. at 21. Rule 103(a)(2), Ariz.R.Evid., provides: Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which ... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27; Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 145 Ariz. 121, 129, 700 P.2d 819, 827, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948, 106 S.Ct. 314, 88 L.Ed.2d 295 (1985). In this case, we cannot know what the proffered testimony would have shown  whether and when the witness had paid Defendant and, if so, in any significant amount. We cannot speculate from the record that such testimony would have been significant or favorable to Defendant and therefore cannot reverse the trial court's ruling. See Jones, 145 Ariz. at 130-31, 700 P.2d at 828-29; Musgrave v. Karis, 63 Ariz. 417, 419, 163 P.2d 278, 279 (1945).