Opinion ID: 2173281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court's Comments on the Evidence

Text: Article VI, section 9 of our state constitution prohibits trial judges from commenting on the evidence in a case. [1] Judges must be careful in expressing or intimating an opinion regarding disputed questions of fact. Kanbi v. Sousa, 26 S.W.3d 495, 498-99 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). They must also refrain from making statements that may reflect on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses or that might influence the jury concerning the facts. State v. Suttles, 767 S.W.2d 403, 406-07 (Tenn.1989). The party complaining of an improper comment by a judge must show that the comment more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b); Kanbi, 26 S.W.3d at 499. If the complaining party is unable to show unfair prejudice, then the trial court's comments will not be construed as reversible error. Kanbi, 26 S.W.3d at 499. At trial, Moore's lawyer was asked by Johnson if he was aware of an offset provision in Moore's policy providing that Moore was prevented from recovering his UM limits if he first received Johnson's liability limits. Moore's lawyer answered, I don't know how that could be. The trial judge stated, incorrectly, I hold that's not what the policy provides. Let's move on. The trial court's comment was clearly an improper characterization of the evidence. However, the trial court's comment was brief and was made early in the course of a three-day trial. After this comment, testimony was offered concerning the actual existence and applicability of the provision. In fact, both parties relied upon the existence of the provision and the entire policy was entered as an exhibit. We therefore hold that the trial court's erroneous comment did not more probably than not affect the judgment or result in prejudice to the judicial process. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b). The trial court also erroneously commented about the role of Buxton, the attorney hired by Tennessee Farmers to represent Johnson in the action brought by Moore. The trial court twice commented in the presence of the jury that everybody knew that Tennessee Farmers hired Buxton. The trial court then stated, Everybody knew he [Buxton] was representing Tennessee Farmers. Buxton was actually representing Johnson, not Tennessee Farmers, and the trial court misstated Buxton's position. The proof, however, clearly and repeatedly demonstrated Buxton's role in representing Johnson and also Buxton's duty to investigate and report his findings to Tennessee Farmers. The jury charge also correctly stated Buxton's role. The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part: Mr. Buxton was the attorney for Mr. Robert Johnson. Tennessee Farmers did not have the right to control the details of Mr. Buxton's performance, the attending strategy or tactics he employed, or limit his professional discretion in regard to the representation. And I therefore charge you that Tennessee Farmers would not be liable for any negligence of Mr. Buxton as Mr. Johnson's attorney. However, Mr. Buxton also had a duty to report to Tennessee Farmers as to the investigation, evaluation, and representations as to the liability claim against Mr. Johnson. The jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 346. Therefore, we hold that this comment by the trial court, although error, did not more probably than not affect the judgment or result in prejudice to the judicial process. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b).