Opinion ID: 1058084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Rationale of Hearsay Exclusion From Closing Argument at Guilt Phase

Text: During closing argument of the guilt phase, defense counsel attempted to explain to the jury the suspect nature of hearsay testimony. The State objected to this line of argument. The trial court advised counsel that it was not proper argument to get into a legal explanation of those sorts of things and then have the State come back and respond and go back.... The trial court then sustained the State's objection and instructed defense counsel to refrain from any sort of history of the hearsay exception. Appellant now contends that the trial court erred in limiting his closing argument by preventing him from discussing the limitations of hearsay evidence. Closing argument is a valuable privilege for both parties and the trial courts generally allow wide latitude to counsel in arguing their cases to the jury and will only be reversed upon an abuse of discretion. Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tenn. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1023, 122 S.Ct. 553, 151 L.Ed.2d 428 (2001); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 809 (Tenn.1994) (citations omitted). It is settled law in this state that the courts are the proper source from which [the jury is] to get the law. Dale v. State, 18 Tenn. 551, 555 (1837). It is the court's duty to charge the law relative to the case and the jury's duty to consider the evidence under the law as given by the court. See Cordell v. State, 207 Tenn. 231, 338 S.W.2d 615, 618 (1960); see also Tenn. Const. art. I, sect. 19. It is the function of the trial court, and not that of counsel, to instruct or advise the jury as to matters of law. In the present case, the trial court ruled, out of the presence of the jury, that several statements made by the victim fell within valid exceptions to the hearsay rule and were sufficiently reliable to warrant admission. For defense counsel to argue that hearsay statements are inherently unreliable and easily manufactured would essentially undermine the rulings of the trial court. Moreover, it is conceivable that statements regarding the nature of hearsay testimony had the potential to confuse the jury. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from discussing the basic principles and theories regarding the general exclusion of hearsay testimony. No abuse of discretion is found.