Opinion ID: 2722149
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction Regarding OSHA Regulations

Text: Reed next argues the district court erroneously instructed the jury regarding OSHA regulations. Reed raises two objections to Instruction 15, which instructed the jury that a violation of a statute or regulation could be considered evidence of negligence. Using the format of Arkansas Model Instruction 601, the district court instructed the jury: FINAL INSTRUCTION NO. 15 VIOLATION OF STATUTE OR REGULATION AS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE There was in force in the United States of America, at the time of the occurrence, a statute that provided: 29 U.S.C. § 654 Duties of Employers and Employees (a) Each employer shall comply with OSHA standards. (b) Each employee shall comply with OSHA standards which are applicable to his own actions and conduct. There was also in force in the United States of America, at the time of the occurrence, regulations that provided: First: 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501 Duty to Have Fall Protection Protection from falling objects. When an employee is exposed to falling objects, the employer shall have each employee wear a hard hat and shall implement one of the following measures: (1) Erect toeboards, screens, guardrail systems to prevent objects from falling from higher levels; or, -10- (2) Erect a canopy structure and keep potential fall objects far enough from the edge of the higher level so that those objects would not go over the edge if they were accidentally displaced; or, (3) Barricade the area to which objects could fall, prohibit employees from entering the barricaded area, and keep objects that may fall far enough away from the edge of a higher level so that those objects would not go over the edge if they were accidentally displaced. Second: 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2) Safety Training and Education The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. A violation of this statute or one or more of these regulations, although not necessarily negligence, is evidence of negligence to be considered by you along with all of the other facts and circumstances in the case. Reed proffered a jury instruction based on 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(h)(2), the scaffold regulation. Instead, the court instructed the jury on 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501, the general falling object regulation. Reed contends his proffered instruction was more appropriate than the instruction given because § 1926.451 applies to scaffolds, which includes scissor lifts. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.450(b). In determining which regulation to use as the basis for the jury instruction, the district court examined the language and OSHA interpretations of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451, the scaffold regulation. From these sources, the district court concluded the scaffold regulation applied to objects falling from a scaffold and to employees on a scaffold. Because there was no evidence that anything fell from the scissor lift, the district court concluded the general falling object protection requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501 were more applicable to the facts of the case. -11- Reed asserts he was prejudiced by the court’s decision to give the general falling object instruction rather than his proffered scaffold instruction. We disagree. Here, both instructions advised there was a regulation that required employees to be protected from falling objects and listed measures to be taken to provide that protection, such as toeboards, guardrails, and barricades.7 Reed’s proposed instruction added measures that seem more appropriate to protect people below from tools, materials, or equipment falling from inside the scissor lift itself.8 Reed does not dispute his instruction included protections for objects falling from inside the scissor lift but argues his instruction was appropriate because there was evidence of tools and other objects on the platform of the scissor lift, which could have fallen on people below. However, that is not what happened in this case. There is no allegation tools—or anything else from inside the scissor lift—fell out. Rather, an object located outside the scissor lift fell and hit Reed. The trial court is not required to instruct on issues not supported by the evidence. McCoy, 593 F.3d at 744 (quotation omitted). Nor is a party entitled to a particularly worded instruction. Retz, 741 F.3d at 919 (quotation omitted). The district court’s instruction told the jury there was an OSHA regulation requiring fall protection. The instruction further informed the jury that violating this regulation is evidence of negligence, to be considered along with the other facts and circumstances of the case. The court’s instruction included the safety measures 7 We note Reed does not dispute the scissor lift involved had toeboards and guardrails. 8 Reed’s instruction outlined required safety measures when “tools, materials, or equipment are piled to a height higher than the top edge of the toeboard” on a scissor lift, including the installation of (1) “paneling or screening,” (2) “[a] guardrail system . . . with openings small enough to prevent passage of potential falling objects,” or (3) “[a] canopy structure, debris net, or catch platform strong enough to withstand the impact forces of the potential falling objects.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(h)(2). -12- applicable to the evidence presented. The instruction “fairly and adequately present[ed] the evidence and law to the jury given the issues in the case.” Id. Moreover, Reed asserted in closing arguments Malone had a duty to follow OSHA regulations. The district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting this jury instruction. Reed next asserts the district court erred in refusing his requested jury instruction based on the OSHA Multi-Employer citation policy (Multi-Employer Policy). This policy outlines factors OSHA considers in determining which employer at a multi-employer construction site can be cited for OSHA violations. Reed requested the following language be included in Instruction 15: In a worksite where more than one employer is present, the OSHA Regulations that I have instructed you about created a specific duty of compliance by all employers for the good of all employees on the worksite. After the court rejected Reed’s proffered language, Reed requested the following instruction be given: In regards to the regulation I just read to you, when more than one employer is involved at a particular work site, more than one employer may be responsible for complying with the above regulation for the safety of all employees at the work site. The court declined this instruction as well. Reed argues his instruction was a correct statement of the applicable law according to Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2009), and that he was prejudiced by the court not giving it. We disagree. As we recently stated, “[t]hough a violation of an OSHA regulation may be relevant evidence of whether [Malone] breached a duty it may have owed the plaintiffs, see Dunn v. Brimer, 259 Ark. 855, 537 S.W.2d 164, 165—66 (1976), the regulations do not independently create private rights of action or impose -13- alternate duties on defendants.” Chew v. Am. Greetings Corp., 754 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Solis, 558 F.3d at 828–29). Instruction 15 summarized the statute on which the multi-employer policy is based—29 U.S.C. § 654—and told the jury that violation of that statute may be considered evidence of negligence. Because the instruction is a correct statement of the law, we find no abuse of discretion.