Opinion ID: 2823797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Unique Circumstances of This Case Warrant Reversal as to the Remaining Two Counts.

Text: Â¶42Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â These circumstances are unique in this case. Together, these circumstances significantly increased the likelihood that the jury did not limit its consideration of the 404(b) evidence and instead allowed the evidence to substantially influence its verdict as to the two remaining counts. First, it was less likely that the jury could compartmentalize the evidence of Perezâs incidents with O.D. to just the enticement count because all of the counts included similar elements of sexual conduct that occurred during the limited timeframe of Perezâs encounter with C.B. Second, the prosecutorâs characterizations in his opening statement and closing argument went beyond the limited scope of intent for the enticement count. His comments increased the likelihood that the jury misconstrued how it could consider the improper evidence because these characterizations implied that the evidence pertained to all three counts. Thus, the unfairly prejudicial nature of the 404(b) evidence permeated all aspects of the trial. Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because all three counts for which Perez was convicted include a similar element regarding sexual conduct, and the prosecutorâs statements and arguments repeatedly urged the jury to consider the 404(b) evidence beyond its limited scope and implied that it was relevant to all counts, we cannot conclude that the trial courtâs limiting instructions cured the courtâs erroneous admission of the 404(b) evidence. â[T]he jury instruction[s] did nothing to alleviate the potential for prejudice in this case.â Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 469 (Colo. 2009) (noting that the prior act evidence was irrelevantÂ for its proffered purpose and therefore the court should not have instructed the jury as to this purpose). Rather, the instructions highlighted the evidence to the jury by instructing it to consider the 404(b) evidence to show that Perez intended to sexually assault C.B. for the enticement count. It was unreasonable to expect a jury to consider that evidence for Perezâs intent to sexually assault C.B. for the enticement count but not for whether he knowingly subjected her to sexual contact for the count of sexual assault on a child or whether he committed a sexual offense on her for the count of second-degree kidnapping. Therefore, this caseâs circumstances caused the 404(b) evidence to substantially affect the fairness of the proceedings as to all three counts. We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, under these circumstances, the admission into evidence of Perezâs prior incidents with O.D. contributed to his convictions for sexual assault on a child and second-degree kidnapping. Therefore, the error was not harmless as to the two remaining convictions.