Opinion ID: 6546
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Age-Related Remarks

Text: Morris made the excluded age-related statements over the four year period during which he was the District Manager in charge of Mitte's territory. The excluded testimony (heard by the district court outside of the presence of the jury) was that Morris remarked that Mitte was incapable; that he was old and inflexible; that Morris had bragged about how he jumped that old man about smoking his pipe; that he pulled down Mitte's hat and said old man hat. The plaintiffs offered additional testimony, also excluded from the jury's consideration, that the above remarks exemplified the general tone of Morris' statements on the subject of age. The precise reason why the lower court determined that this evidence should be excluded is not clear. We may not disturb the district court's exclusion of the evidence, however, if that ruling can be upheld on other grounds, regardless of whether the court relied on those grounds. Metallurgical Industries, Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1207 (5th Cir.1986). We will therefore uphold the exclusion if the evidence is excludable on any defensible ground. The possible bases for excluding the evidence are limited. We note that [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible in a jury trial, F.R.Evid. 402, unless its probative value is outweighed by, for example, the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues, F.R.Evid. 403. Davidson Oil, 908 F.2d at 1244. The issue in this case, therefore, is whether Mo rris' age-related remarks were excludable as irrelevant or as causative of undue prejudice. The standard for relevance is a liberal one.  Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. There can be no question that the excluded statements meet this standard. They are obviously relevant to a showing of age bias on the part of a key figure in the decision to terminate Mitte and as such are admissible. The defendant's argument, construed in its best light, is that the evidence was not relevant because the remarks were made over a four year period and because the plaintiffs failed to assign a date certain to their utterance. In addition, Manville argues that the statements were not relevant because they were not made by the person who was ultimately responsible for deciding to terminate Mitte. We cannot agree with either contention.2 The long period of time over which the remarks were made does not suggest that the evidence is not relevant. To the contrary, t he long time period may indicate a pattern of discriminatory comments and as such are directly relevant to showing the existence of discriminatory motive on the 2 The cases cited by Manville are not to the contrary. In all the stray remark cases referred to in the defendant's brief, the court merely held that remarks remote in time or made by those down the employer's hierarchy are alone insufficient to establish age discrimination. See Atkin v. Lincoln Property Co., 991 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir.1993) (evidence that employer told employee that the employee was getting up there in years and that it would be good idea for him to retire is, without more, insufficient to allow a jury to find age discrimination); Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir.1993) (mere stray remarks, with nothing more, are insufficient to establish a claim of age discrimination.). Manville's cases are distinguishable from the instant decision in that they are sufficiency of the evidence cases that did not address the question of admissibility of stray remark evidence. Importantly, these cases did admit the stray remarks as relevant. The only remaining question for the court was whether the stray remarks supported a finding of discrimination. This is a question of fact and by excluding the evidence of stray remarks as a matter of law, the trial court improperly usurped the role of the fact finder. The cases cited by Manville, therefore, do not support the district court's decision to exclude the stray remarks in the case before us today. part of Manville. The amount of time that had passed since their utterance is only pertinent to the weight to be assigned the evidence. This decision is for the finder of fact alone. The defendant's other contention, that Morris was not a decisionmaker, simply contradicts the facts of this case. Manville argues that Morris' sole involvement in Mitte's separation was his recommendation to Bruntrager that certain sales territory be eliminated. That this is a blatant misstatement of the record is demonstrated by a memorandum from Morris to Bruntrager which advocates the elimination of territories and specifies that regrettably, I recommend that we offer Charles Mitte early retirement.... I regret having to force early retirement on anyone. Bruntrager acknowledged considering Morris' recommendations and independently performing only a perfunctory analysis of the various employees in making the decision to terminate Mitte. Although it is true that Morris did not formally make the final decision to discharge Mitte, the evidence makes clear that Morris recommended his discharge and that Bruntrager relied, to some degree, on that recommendation in making his decision. In Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., we held that age-related comments by various supervisors of the plaint iff would support a finding of discrimination even though a higher level official made the final decision to terminate him. 939 F.2d 1138, 1146 (5th Cir.1991). Thus, the argument that the evidence is irrelevant because Morris was not a decisionmaker must also fail since it is clear that, regardless of his final authority, Morris was a significant participant in the decision to terminate Mitte. Manville also asserts that the evidence was properly excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. F.R.Evid. 403.3 Manville has, however, failed to make any showing of prejudice or confusion that could arise out of the admission of evidence of Morris' age-related remarks. Merely because the testimony is adverse t o the opposing party does not mean it is unfairly prejudicial. 3 Fed.R.Evid. 403 reads in full: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Davidson Oil, 908 F.2d at 1245 (emphasis in original). We therefore find that Rule 403 cannot provide a basis for excluding Morris' remarks. Having determined that the age-related remarks were improperly excluded, we must now address whether the exclusion effected the substantial rights of the plaintiffs. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 277, 116 L.Ed.2d 229 (1991) ([C]ourts of appeals should not reverse on the basis of erroneous evidentiary rulings unless a party's substantial right' is affected.). This circuit has stated repeatedly that [a]n error is harmless if the court is sure, after reviewing the entire record, that the error did not influence the jury or had but a very slight effect on its verdict.'  Id. at 573 (quoting Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 762 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir.1985)). The excluded remarks in this case are directly relevant to Mitte's age discrimination claim. Their exclusion from the jury's consideration could directly impact the ability of Mitte to enforce his rights in this trial. In fact, the exclusion of this testimony would be a potent weapon possessed by employers intent on the destruction of the program posited and supported by the ADEA. The plaintiffs' presented evidence that the excluded remarks, including Morris' use of the term old man, and comments that Mitte was old and inflexible, were reflective of the overall negative tone Morris employed in speaking about age. It is not necessary that the plaintiffs present videotapes of explicit exclamations that we don't want old people in our company to prove age discrimination. Evidence of vocalizations and verbalizations of the anti-age based feelings of a supervisor can be, and often are, used to prove unlawful discrimination. In Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., this court held that with regards to various stray remarks made by the employer, we are unwilling to assume that indirect comments about [plaintiff's] age and adaptability are not possibly probative of an unlawful discriminatory intent. 851 F.2d 1503, 1507 (5th Cir.1988). Because t his sort of remark evidence can be highly probative of unlawful discriminatory intent, we cannot say with conviction that this evidence would not have affected the jury's determination. The decision to exclude testimony as to these remarks affected the plaintiffs' substantial rights and was an abuse of discretion that requires us to reverse the judgment of the trial court. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 469 (5th Cir.1985).