Opinion ID: 2019471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Legal Title Being Vested in Trust for Benefit of a Benevolent Association.

Text: The affidavit of Norman R. Karow, an assistant cashier of the Harris Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago, avers that to his personal knowledge the plaintiff purchased the Stone Manor property in 1945, on behalf of the Annie Merner Pfeiffer Foundation, Inc., as its fiduciary agent to carry out the purposes of the Foundation. The affidavits of Carol W. Lingott and Eun Taik Yi, the latter an ordained minister of the Korean Methodist Church in Chicago for twenty-five years, are to the same effect. The Karow affidavit also states that the plaintiff was unable to transfer title to the Foundation, not only because of litigation involving title to the premises, but also because of litigation pending between the executors of the Annie Merner Pfeiffer estate and the Foundation. These affidavits tend to establish that while legal title was vested in the plaintiff, he was in fact holding the same in trust for the Foundation so that the beneficial ownership was in the latter. It is the contention of the defendants that this in itself prevents the property from being exempt under sec. 70.11 (4), Stats., because the property is not owned by the Foundation. This precise issue apparently has not been directly passed upon heretofore by this court. The issue was raised in Katzer v. Milwaukee (1899), 104 Wis. 16, 79 N. W. 745, 80 N. W. 41, but the court found it unnecessary to there decide it because it was determined that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he held title to the property in question for a religious association. However, in Ritchie v. Green Bay (1934), 215 Wis. 433, 254 N. W. 113, a vendee under a land contract, where legal title remained vested in the vendor, was held to be the owner under this same exemption statute on the ground that such a vendee is the owner for all practical purposes. In commenting upon the Katzer Case, the court in the Ritchie Case stated (p. 436): In the Katzer Case it is intimated that a cestui, in cases where its control over the use and title of the property was sufficiently complete to constitute practical ownership, might be treated as owner for purposes of exemption. 84 C. J. S., Taxation, p. 448, sec. 231, lays down the rule that, where the title is held in trust, its right to exemption is determined by the nature of the beneficial interest. Cases which support such text are National Bank of Burlington v. Huneke (1959), 250 Iowa 1030, 98 N. W. (2d) 7, 12, and Estate of Cooper (1940), 229 Iowa 921, 295 N. W. 448, 451. It is our conclusion that an educational and benevolent association, such as the affidavits establish the Foundation to be, which is the cestui of the trust, may be an owner of property within the meaning of sec. 70.11 (4), Stats., although legal title is vested in the trustee. Whether such a cestui is such an owner will depend on whether control over the use and title of the property by the association is sufficiently complete to constitute practical ownership by it. Katzer v. Milwaukee, supra, page 24.