Opinion ID: 3063172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Flores’s Suppression Motion

Text: Flores argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment following his arrest, claiming that a protective sweep search of his apartment was unlawful, and that there was no valid independent source of probable cause to support the subsequent warrant. “Because rulings on motions to suppress involve mixed questions of fact and law, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its application of the law to the facts de novo. Further, when considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Searches and seizures inside a home without a search warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 1262-63 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1388, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). Under the independent source doctrine, however, the evidence seized is admissible if it was obtained from a lawful source, independent of the unreasonable or unlawful search. United States 8 v. Davis, 313 F.3d 1300, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding subsequent warrant was supported by probable cause, and not based on any information learned during prior unlawful search); cf. United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 692-93 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding sufficient probable cause established for warrant, discounting information learned during prior unlawful search). “Probable cause to search a residence exists when there is a fair probability that contraband of evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The nexus between the objects to be seized and the premises searched can be established from the particular circumstances involved and need not rest on direct observation.” United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and quotations omitted). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, the district court’s denial of Flores’s motion to suppress was not erroneous. Having found that the sweep search of Flores’s apartment was unlawful, the district court resolved the suppression dispute under the independent source doctrine. As noted by the district court, no material information learned during the prior search was used to support the subsequent search warrant, because the warrant application was supported largely by information known to the officers prior to the warrantless entry. 9 Prior to Flores’s arrest, officers knew that their confidential source had set up a cocaine purchase with persons located at this apartment. They also knew that the transaction was originally to involve 7 kilograms of cocaine, but only 4 kilograms were offered for sale when the transaction location was changed to a public shopping center. Officers observed Flores’s codefendants arrive at this apartment, and all four depart (Martinez carrying a green box) to consummate the drug transaction as agreed with the informant. When officers arrested Flores and his codefendants at the shopping center, cocaine was discovered in the green box, and two small baggies containing cocaine were found on Flores. While Paragraph 8 of the affidavit used to obtain the warrant could be read as revealing certain information that was learned during the sweep search, e.g., that Flores leased the apartment, this information was de minimus, and probable cause was present absent this evidence. See Chaves, 169 F.3d at 692-93 (sufficient probable cause established for warrant, discounting information learned during prior unlawful search). Based on the above, Flores has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Fuentes and Flores Appellants Fuentes and Flores argue that the evidence was insufficient to 10 support their respective convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. We review sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor. United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We will not overturn a conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence unless no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, our Court must accept a jury’s inferences and determinations of witness credibility.”) (citations and quotations omitted). “Reasonable inferences, and not mere speculation, must support the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994). To convict a defendant of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, the government must demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in an agreement between himself and at least one other individual to commit the crime. United States v. Obregon, 893 F.2d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The government need not prove that each alleged conspirator knew all the details of the conspiracy. The government provides sufficient proof of knowledge by demonstrating the conspirator knew of the essential purpose of 11 the conspiracy.”). “A person may also be found guilty of a conspiracy even if he plays only a minor role in the total scheme.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). To convict a defendant of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the government must prove knowledge, possession, and intent to distribute. United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1076 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 954 (2009). Fuentes The jury was presented with trial testimony and other evidence tending to show that Fuentes was one of the suppliers of the 4 kilograms of cocaine used in the transaction with the cooperating source and that he performed countersurveillance at the transaction. For example, the jury heard on several occasions that the cocaine Martinez was selling was supplied by two individuals, referred to as the “Brujeros” or “Santeros.” Testimony was also introduced showing that Martinez had Fuentes’s name and phone number in the “contacts” section of his cell phone, and that there were multiple calls between Martinez and Fuentes on the date of the drug transaction – most of which were immediately before or after calls between Martinez and Ruiz, the cooperating source. Testimony and surveillance video were also introduced showing that Fuentes (with Flores) followed Martinez and Reyes to the drug transaction, parking nearby 12 to conduct counter-surveillance. Further, the post-arrest search of Flores’s apartment, which Fuentes had been in immediately prior to the drug transaction, yielded a significant quantity of cocaine and various drug paraphernalia in plain view. When all inferences and credibility determinations are viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and the jury’s findings similarly credited, there was sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuentes was guilty on both the conspiracy count and the substantive drug count. Wright, 392 F.3d at 1273. Flores The jury was likewise presented with trial testimony and other evidence showing that Flores was one of the suppliers of the cocaine used in the transaction with the cooperating source, and that he performed counter-surveillance at the transaction. For example, Flores’s apartment was identified by Martinez as the location of the “Brujeros” or “Santeros,” who were supplying the cocaine to be bought by the cooperating source, and items associated with Santeria were found inside and outside of Flores’s apartment. Also, the jury heard evidence that Martinez went to Flores’s apartment to get the 4 kilograms that were to be sold to the cooperating source. 13 Testimony and surveillance video was introduced showing that Flores and Fuentes followed Martinez and Reyes to the drug transaction, parking nearby to conduct counter-surveillance, and the post-arrest search of Flores’s apartment yielded a significant quantity of cocaine and various drug paraphernalia. When all inferences and credibility determinations are viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and the jury’s findings similarly credited, there was sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Flores was guilty on both the conspiracy count and the substantive drug count. Wright, 392 F.3d at 1273. V. Conduct of the Trial Judge In an argument adopted by Fuentes, Reyes asserts that the trial was not fair because the trial judge repeatedly interfered in the conduct of the trial, purportedly to speed up the proceedings. Neither Reyes nor Fuentes raised any objection regarding the trial judge’s conduct below, and Reyes’s argument encompasses interruptions of the prosecution as well as other defense counsel. A defendant seeking reversal based on comments or questions by the trial judge must demonstrate an abuse of discretion and prejudice. United States v. DeLaughter, 453 F.2d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1972) (no reversible error where trial judge asked questions “pertinent and generally related to a valid inquiry into 14 material facts,” which did not solely benefit the prosecution); see also United States v. Bertram, 805 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Only when the judge’s conduct strays from neutrality is the defendant thereby denied a constitutionally fair trial.”) (citations and footnote omitted). Where the claim was not preserved, however, we review only for plain error. United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1668 (2009). Under plain error review, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. For an error to affect substantial rights, ‘in most cases it means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’ United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The defendant has the burden of persuasion as to prejudice. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). Id. at 1269. The record does not support the claim that Reyes and Fuentes were denied a fair trial as a result of the trial judge’s conduct, or that the trial judge lacked neutrality. By their own admission, the trial judge interrupted “virtually every direct and cross examination,” not just those conducted by defense counsel. The record also reflects that the trial judge corrected the questioning methods of the government’s counsel as well as defense counsel, and interposed his own 15 objections during each side’s presentations. The questioning and other interruptions cited by Reyes and Fuentes were generally intended to maintain the pace of the trial. Reyes specifically highlights the trial judge’s colloquy with her counsel regarding some apparent confusion over whether certain trial exhibits had been disclosed in advance of trial. The trial record simply does not support Reyes’s assertion that her counsel was subjected to “ridicule” by the judge in this regard. Finally, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury not to draw any assumptions about the evidence from his questions or actions. Based on this record, Reyes and Fuentes have not demonstrated that they were denied a fair trial conducted by a neutral judge, and have not demonstrated plain error.