Opinion ID: 1401400
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wasserman made a sufficient offer of proof with respect to Officer Bartholomew's and Trooper Mann's testimony.

Text: The City of Fairbanks argues in its supplemental briefing that Wasserman failed to make a sufficient offer of proof that Officer Bartholomew and Trooper Manns's testimony would corroborate Delacruz's testimony. We disagree. A party must generally make an offer of proof to preserve error based on a trial court's ruling excluding evidence. [19] The party must show that the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. [20] We believe Wasserman made this showing with respect to the officers' testimony. Wasserman made the substance of Bartholomew and Manns's proposed testimony known to the court on several occasions. At the original trial, Wasserman's expert on police tactics referred in his testimony to portions of both officers' depositions in which they described Trooper Roberts's alleged neck hold on Wasserman. Specifically, the expert noted Bartholomew's statement that Roberts used a choke hold [21] and explained his reliance on Manns's deposition in forming his professional opinion: Trooper Manns, who was with Trooper Roberts, says that [Roberts's] arm was between [Wasserman's] shoulders and his chin, and the only thing that's there is a neck, so ... That's the conclusion I reached: that he'dwas using a choke hold. And in the post-remand proceedings, Wasserman's attorney requested that the court allow the officers to testify after Ms. Delacruz: [T]he offer I would make, would be to call both Manns and Bartholomew ... to testify, because if there is any implication that Mrs. Delacruz has been less than honest or biased, I would, by way of offer of proof, [state] that Mr. Manns and Mr. Bartholomew will testify the same thing happened... that they saw. (Emphasis added.) The fact that the superior court knew enough about the content of the officers' testimony to label it cumulative suggests that the court understood the substance of the testimony. Additionally, with respect to Trooper Manns, the State actually called Manns as a witness at trial. Manns stated that he was about six feet from the officers and that he could hear what was being said and see the altercation. This testimony, albeit limited, alerted the court to the substance of Manns's testimony concerning Wasserman's interactions with the officers. And after notifying the court in the first trial that he might want to call Manns as a rebuttal witness, Wasserman's attorney, William Satterberg, explained the relevance of Manns's testimony: Satterberg: I may want to call Trooper Manns as my witness on rebuttal, [since] I have been so limited by the scope [of] his testimony by the court and Mr. Olsen. So, I may have to call him and ask some questions. Court: Well, I don'tlet's address that specifically. Because you were not limited to the extent you didn't get to make your points. Satterberg: The only point that I would've brought out as well, Your Honor, which has been brought out in testimony previously in the case, was how Manns saw Trooper Roberts take downtake down Mr. Wasserman.... [R]ecognizing that they're apparently call[ing] Mr. Hanson and Mr. McCormick[,] ... I may have to ask Trooper Manns[,] ... What did you see happen? The court asked Satterberg whether Manns's deposition addressed new facts and advised him to offer only portions of Manns's deposition. But Satterberg insisted that Manns's testimony does address, again, the issue of the neck hold and ... goes to counter what was testified to by Trooper Roberts. The court denied the request as cumulative. The court noted to Satterberg that [W]e know your offer of proof, because it's pages 42, 43 and 44 of Trooper Manns'[s] deposition. That portion of Manns's deposition discusses Roberts's grabbing Wasserman. After reviewing the record, we conclude that Wasserman's representations as to the content of the officers' testimony were more than sufficient to constitute a proper offer of proof for both Office Bartholomew and Trooper Manns's testimony.