Opinion ID: 1893318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The restriction of the cross-examination of the complaining witness.

Text: During her testimony, Ms. Johnson vehemently denied that she assaulted Thomas with the bowl of hot liquid; on the contrary, she testified that the defendant assaulted her. Ms. Johnson likewise denied that she was using crack cocaine at the time of the scalding incident. Thomas claims that the trial judge committed reversible error by precluding the defense from cross-examining Ms. Johnson regarding two alleged reasons for her to lie: apprehension that she would go to prison if she admitted assaulting Thomas or using unlawful drugs, [10] and fear of adverse consequences with respect to her retention of custody of three of her children and the return to her of two other children if she made such an admission. [11] While exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the Sixth Amendment does not prevent a judge from `imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the prejudicial bias of a prosecution witness.' Ray v. United States, 620 A.2d 860, 862 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). The trial court may restrict bias cross-examination to avoid such problems as harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues ... or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.... [or] where the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence outweighs its probative value. Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Confrontation Clause is violated... only when the trial court precludes a meaningful degree of cross-examination to establish bias. Grayton v. United States, 745 A.2d 274, 279 (D.C.2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). After sufficient cross-examination has been allowed to satisfy constitutional requirements, the trial court retains broad discretion to determine the scope and extent of cross-examination. Velasquez v. United States, 801 A.2d 72, 79 (D.C.2002) (citation omitted). The extent of cross-examination with respect to a witness' motive to lie is confided to the trial judge's sound discretion. Brown v. United States, 683 A.2d 118, 126 (D.C.1996). Although some cross-examination with respect to a separate theory of bias must generally be permitted, [12] the trial court may, in its discretion, preclude such cross-examination altogether if its probative value is slight, if it would be only marginally useful to show bias, and if the proposed line of questioning is substantially prejudicial or tends to divert the jury's attention from the issue at hand. Coles v. United States, 808 A.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.2002) (citations omitted). In the present case, Ms. Johnson's underlying motive to lie was, in my opinion, surely obvious to any reasonably intelligent juror. If Ms. Johnson had acknowledged assaulting Thomas or using crack cocaine, or both, she would have admitted criminal conduct for which she could have been incarcerated. Indeed, the defense so argued to the jury without objection. Moreover, from prison, it would plainly have been difficult, if not impossible, for Ms. Johnson to maintain custody of the children who were living with her, or to regain custody of other children who may have been removed from her home. Indeed, incarceration would drastically alter all aspects of her life, including her relationship with her children. With the dominant motive so obvious, I perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's preclusion of further cross-examination regarding any incremental motivation that could have been provided by inquiring into the situation of Ms. Johnson's children, especially since, as the judge reasonably concluded, the proposed cross-examination was likely to further dirty [Ms. Johnson]as someone whose children the state had been forced to remove from her custodyand make her less sympathetic. See, e.g., Grayton, 745 A.2d at 279; Burgess v. United States, 608 A.2d 733, 736 (D.C.1992). [13] In this regard, I disagree with my colleagues' contrary conclusion, and the discussion in this paragraph is not a part of the opinion of the court.