Opinion ID: 2381990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Order of Argument

Text: Closing arguments were made following testimony by the last defense witness and Harris's allocution. The State presented argument first and the defense followed. After the defense concluded its argument, the court, over Harris's objection, permitted the State to present rebuttal argument. Harris contends that since he bore the burden of proof as to a critical issue, i.e., the presence of mitigating factors, he should have been given the last word at closing argument. In support of his position, Harris points out that there was only one aggravating circumstance: the fact that the murder took place during the commission of a felony. Harris argues that since he conceded this point, the critical determination at sentencing involved the existence of mitigating factors, as to which he bore the burden of proof. Therefore, he contends, since a failure on his part to sustain the burden of proof meant mandatory imposition of the death penalty, he bore the ultimate burden of proof and should have been allowed to close argument. We disagree. The general rule in Maryland is that the party holding the affirmative of the issue ... has the right to begin and reply, both in the introduction of evidence and in the argument to the jury. Kenly v. Washington County R.R. Co., 129 Md. 1, 6, 98 A. 232, 234 (1916). In more contemporary terms we might say that one factor bearing on which side should have the advantage of opening and closing argument is which party has the burden of persuasion. 5 L. McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland Evidence, § 300.2 (1987) (hereinafter McLain). The burden of persuasion refers to the standard of proof by which a party must satisfy the fact-finder in order to win a verdict.... McLain, supra, § 300.1 at 132. The burden of persuasion is one of three elements which together make up the burden of proof. The other two are the burden of pleading (the allocation between parties as to who must plead what in order to (1) avoid an adverse judgment on the pleadings and (2) make an issue a proper subject of proof at trial) and the burden of production (the allocation between parties as to who must come forward with evidence in order to avoid an adverse judgment at the close of the evidence). Id. Cf. Commodities Reserve Corp. v. Belt's Wharf, 310 Md. 365, 368 n. 2, 529 A.2d 822, 823 n. 2 (1987). Putting aside the burden of pleading, which is not at issue here, it is clear that in a criminal case the prosecution ordinarily bears the burden of persuasion and the burden of production and thus usually has the right to the first and last word in the trial. McLain, § 300.2 at 139. This is also true at a capital sentencing proceeding. The imposition of a death sentence involves a three-step process. First, the sentencing authority must find that at least one aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As to aggravating circumstances the State bears the risk of both nonproduction and nonpersuasion. See § 413(f) and Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 730, 415 A.2d 830, 848 (1980). The second step requires the sentencing authority to consider whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, a mitigating circumstance exists. Id. See also § 413(g) and Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 361, 473 A.2d 903, 918, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984). Finally, the prosecution is assigned the burden of persuading the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See § 413(h) and Tichnell, 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848-849. It is true that in Stebbing we said that the defendant has the burden of proving ... the existence of a mitigating circumstance. 299 Md. at 361, 473 A.2d at 918. But what we meant by this was that the State is not required to prove the non-existence of mitigating circumstances. Tichnell, 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848. Harris is incorrect in insisting that he had, in the traditional sense, the burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances. Although he had the risk of nonproduction and of nonpersuasion, a court could not have directed the jury to find against him on this issue, even if he produced no specific evidence at all, and even if he failed to argue it. [R]egardless of what evidence a defendant himself may or may not produce, or regardless of any mitigation argument he may or may not advance, if the jury perceives from the case a fact or circumstance concerning the crime or the defendant, which the jury deems to be mitigating, it may treat it as such. As to mitigation, it is only the risk of nonproduction or nonpersuasion which the defendant bears. Foster v. State, 304 Md. at 474, 499 A.2d at 1254. The short of it is that at a capital sentencing proceeding the State has the ultimate burden of persuading the jury to impose a death sentence. See McLain, § 300.6 (Of course the prosecution will bear the burden of persuasion of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Thus, under the normal Maryland rule, the State was entitled to open and close. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY IMPOSING A DEATH SENTENCE VACATED. CASED REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW SENTENCING PROCEEDING IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY. [14] Concurring opinion by COLE, J. Concurring opinion by McAULIFFE, J., in which BLACKWELL, J., joins in Part I only. COLE, Judge, concurring. I concur in the judgment vacating the death penalty. However, I do not agree with the majority's reasoning in Part IV D of the opinion. The majority holds that the new sentencer should be able to consider Harris's robbery and related sentences as mitigating factors when weighing the possibility of a death sentence. I disagree. It is impossible to divine the judge's rationale for imposing the specific sentences and the new sentencer should not be influenced as to the appropriateness of the death penalty based upon the disposition the judge made in the other related crimes. I believe the new sentencing jury should be in substantially the same situation as the old sentencing jury. Stated another way, the evidence produced before the new sentencer should be evidence that would have been admissible in the first sentencing proceeding or evidence of misconduct (otherwise admissible) that occurred subsequent to the former proceeding. As I see it, the sentences for the related crimes for which the defendant is on trial are irrelevant to the death sentence procedure as having no additional bearing on the facts of the crime or the defendant's character, prior record, or redemptive qualities. The jury already knows of the conduct leading to his convictions and the introduction of these sentences can only confuse and distract the jury. In Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 495 A.2d 1 (1985), this Court recognized the United States Supreme Court's teachings that a proper death penalty statute confines and directs the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular crime and to `the characteristics of the person who committed the crime.' 303 Md. at 527, 495 A.2d at 21, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111, 102 S.Ct. 869, 875, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 9 (1982). Instead of confining the jury's attention to the circumstances of the crime and the defendant's characteristics, allowing evidence of Harris's robbery and related sentences improperly focuses the jury's attention upon how the trial judge thought the defendant should be punished. In sum, to allow the sentencing jury to draw any inference from the robbery and related sentences is to approve an entirely unpredictable and conjectural process, which is the antithesis of the well-reasoned decision-making process required of a death penalty proceeding. In a death sentencing procedure the defendant should be protected against his own frustration. Therefore, to ensure fairness, the defendant should not be allowed to introduce this disconcerting evidence into the jury's deliberative process. McAULIFFE, Judge, concurring in part and concurring in judgment. BLACKWELL, Judge, joins in Part I only. I concur in the result, but write separately to express my disagreement with part IV-D (Exclusion of Sentences for Related Offenses) and with the dictum relating to a defendant's burden of proof which appears in part IV-F (Order of Argument).