Opinion ID: 1436385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor's Challenge of Juror M.C.

Text: The prosecutor provided three reasons for his decision to strike M.C. First, he stated that he was concerned that M.C.'s judgment and objectivity as a juror might be adversely affected by the fact that her daughter had been the victim of an attempted molestation by the daughter's half-brother. Second, he said that he excused M.C. because she had indicated that anything less than professional and respectful[ ] conduct on the part of the attorneys might affect her view of the case. He explained that although it was reasonable for her to expect the attorneys to act professionally, he was concerned that she would react negatively to aggressive crossexamination. Finally, the prosecutor asserted that he struck M.C. because she had said that she might have trouble sitting in judgment of others due to her Christian faith. Without evaluating each of these justifications individually or performing comparative juror analysis, the California Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence support[s] the trial court's finding that the peremptory challenge[ ][of M.C. was] exercised without discriminatory purpose. The district court, however, did evaluate each of the proffered justifications one at a time and conducted comparative juror analysis. It found that such an analysis largely, although not entirely, undermined the prosecutor's first justification and wholly failed to support the second. At the same time, the court concluded that a comparative analysis buttressed the prosecutor's third explanation and that, on balance, Ali had not shown that the prosecutor's removal of M.C. was motivated by purposeful discrimination. Our own review of the record convinces us that each of the prosecutor's justifications is logically implausible, undermined by a comparative juror analysis, and otherwise unsupported by the record. As we held in Kesser, where an evaluation of the voir dire transcript and juror questionnaires clearly and convincingly refutes each of the prosecutor's nonracial grounds, we are compell[ed][to conclude] that his actual and only reason for striking [the relevant juror] was her race. Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360. Such a conclusion is compelled in this case. The California Court of Appeal's contrary finding was not only incorrect, but an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
On her juror questionnaire, M.C. indicated that she had had contact with law enforcement when [there] was an attempt of molestation of my daughter. M.C. then discussed this response during private voir dire. The discussion transpired as follows: COURT: [On your questionnaire, you wrote] private, When there was an attempt of molestation of my daughter. That's the area you would like to explore privately, right? M.C.: Uh-huh. COURT: How old was your daughter? M.C.: My daughter was 14. COURT: How old is she now? M.C.: She is 22. COURT: This is about eight years ago? M.C.: Yes. COURT: Who was the supposed molester? M.C.: Her brother. COURT: Was he living at home with you as well? M.C.: No. It's a child by another lady that was visiting in our home. Because he had been having problems with where he lived with his mom, and he was staying with us. COURT: Was your significant other or your husband the father of this boy? M.C.: Yes. COURT: I'm sorry? M.C.: Yes. COURT: So he was at some other home having problems there, and I take it that you agreed and your husband wanted to help him out by having him live with you? M.C.: Yes. COURT: How long was he in the home before this happened? M.C.: I would say about three months. COURT: Was it reported to the authorities? M.C.: Yes. COURT: In this county or elsewhere? M.C.: In this county. COURT: What happened? By the way, how old was he when this happened? M.C.: He was about 17 years old. COURT: So what happened? M.C.: There was an incident, my daughter came to our room and reported it to us, and I called the police department, and the police came and they arrested the young man and took him to Juvenile Hall. Because he resided, his home residence was in Santa Clara County, they took him from San Mateo County to Santa Clara County, and he was in Juvenile Hall until we hadI call it a trial, court, whatever. And we went to court, and then they put him on a probation where he couldn't be in contact with her for, you know, x number of years. COURT: Did your daughter testify in that court hearing? M.C.: Yes. In a private chamber. COURT: Is that the only incident that you were asking to have us discuss privately? M.C.: Yes. COURT: That's the only time that that molestation occurred was that one incident? M.C.: Yes. COURT: How do you think that incident and all of its ramifications, going to court and all of that, might influence you in this case? M.C.: I really don't thinkI don't think it would have any bearing. I don't know. I don't think it would. My daughter is 22 years old. She didn't have to havewe all had to do family counseling. COURT: Did family counseling help her deal with the molestation? M.C.: Yes. I know that it does still affect her even though she is 22 years old, and we have discussed it recently, before I was called to jury duty. It still has an effect on her. However, I didn't want it to be discussed in open court COURT: Don't worry about it. M.C.:in open session, so I thought I would put it out there. COURT: You don't have to apologize for putting private on there. That's why we have these processes. Was it the East Palo Alto Police Department or was it the sheriff's office that did the investigation? M.C.: I believe it was the sheriff's department. COURT: Do you remember who the investigating officer was? M.C.: No. COURT: Anything about their the law enforcement angle, the local police department, whether it was the police or the sheriff, did you feel that they treated you with respect and your daughter with respect as a result of all of this? M.C.: Yes. COURT: Did you think it was a fair process that you had to go through and your daughter had to go through? M.C.: Yes. COURT: Would there be any lasting effect on either the defense or the prosecution in this case as a result of your experiences or knowledge about that? M.C.: No. COURT: Mr. Morales, any questions? DEFENSE: No questions. COURT: Mr. [Prosecutor]? PROSECUTION: No. According to the prosecutor, this exchange provided the first race-neutral reason for his dismissal of M.C. He described that reason as follows: M.C.yesterday, I exercised my challenge there for the following reasons: We had an out-of-the-presence-of-the-jurors discussion with her about private matters wherein she talked about family members and the discussion with those involving the molestation of one child by another child, the involvement in the system. The way she described that, she ultimately told the Court she thought that that would not play a role, would not affect her judgment. Her words were that she doesn't think it will affect her judgment in this case. She did not say it won't. She said she doesn't think on that. It did involve family members within the system. That was, level one, a concern that I had. I have exercised challenges to other jurors for that same reason. The district court perceived this explanation as revealing not one, but two concerns that the prosecutor had with M.C. as a juror. The prosecutor's first concern, according to the district court, was that M.C.'s equivocal initial response to the trial court's question about how the child molestation incident might influence her ability to sit as a juror in Ali's case indicated that she might not be able to judge the case objectively. The district court described the prosecutor's second qualm as a concern with [M.C.'s] involvement in the criminal justice system.... In evaluating these two expressed bases for striking M.C., the district court concluded that a comparative juror analysis undermined the prosecutor's first purported concern but supported the second, because the prosecutor's concern with a potential juror's, including M.C.'s, involvement in the system was legitimate and consistently applied without apparent discriminatory purpose. As explained below, we agree with the district court's conclusion that a comparative juror analysis, as well as other evidence in the record, thoroughly undermines the prosecutor's alleged first concern with M.C.'s objectivity. We disagree, however, with the court's determination that the prosecutor was legitimately troubled by M.C.'s involvement in the system. As to the second concern, contrary to the district court's assertion, a comparative juror analysis reveals that the prosecutor did not consistently strike jurors who had experience with the criminal justice system. In fact, he accepted at least two white jurors who had more problematic experiences than M.C. Thus, even if we assume, like the district court, that the prosecutor's first explanation for his strike of M.C. conveyed two distinct concerns, a review of the record, including comparative juror analysis, compels the conclusion that both the alleged justifications were pretextual make-weights.