Opinion ID: 2546480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err by Failing to Instruct the Jury to Consider With Caution the Testimony of an Accomplice?

Text: Next, Buehler-May argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider with caution the testimony of accomplices Alisha Gray and Michael Dressler. Buehler-May acknowledges he did not request such an instruction and that this court should reverse only if it finds the failure to give the instruction was clearly erroneous. See State v. Crume, 271 Kan. 87, 93, 22 P.3d 1057 (2001). The failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous only if the appellate court reaches a firm conviction that, had the instruction been given, there was a real possibility the jury would have returned a different verdict. State v. Boone, 277 Kan. 208, 220, 83 P.3d 195 (2004). According to Buehler-May, both Gray and Dressler had incentives to downplay their own involvement in the crime and overstate Buehler-May's involvement. He argues the jury should have been instructed consistent with PIK Crim. 3d 52.18, which provides: An accomplice witness is one who testifies that (he)(she) was involved in the commission of the crime with which the defendant is charged. You should consider with caution the testimony of an accomplice. In determining whether prejudicial error has occurred in the failure to give an accomplice instruction, courts generally look to the extent and importance of the accomplice testimony, as well as any corroborating testimony. State v. DePriest, 258 Kan. 596, 605, 907 P.2d 868 (1995). Other than Buehler-May, Gray was the only person to testify who was present during the entire incident. She described the events leading up to the murder, the relationships of the parties, and the participation of Buehler-May, Cavaness, and Goldenburg in the murder. Although she did not actually see any of the men hit Wheeler, Gray's testimony was an important part of the State's case. Dressler, the next-door neighbor who brought wire over to the house to bind the victim, saw the injured Wheeler lying on the floor. While Dressler was in the bedroom with Gray, he heard Buehler-May go into the living room to quiet up Wheeler. Dressler's testimony was also important, though less so than Gray's. Although both Gray and Dressler were important witnesses, the most damning evidence came from Buehler-May himself in the form of his videotaped statement to police. In that statement, Buehler-May corroborated the testimony of both Gray and Dressler. Buehler-May admitted that he had participated along with Cavaness and Goldenburg in beating the victim both outside and inside the house. He also admitted helping to tie up the victim and placing plastic bags over the victim's head to hasten his death. In addition, both Gray and Dressler were questioned about their plea bargain arrangements in front of the jury. Gray testified that she was charged with aiding a felon and pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of attempting to aid a felon in exchange for her testimony against Cavaness and Buehler-May. Dressler testified that he was charged with and pleaded guilty to aiding a felon for his participation in the murder. His parole was also revoked and he was in custody at the time he testified. Defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine both Gray and Dressler about their motives for testifying. Furthermore, [t]he failure to give an accomplice instruction is not reversible error if the defendant's guilt is plain, [citation omitted], or if the judge provided another instruction which cautioned the jury about the weight to be accorded testimonial evidence. Crume, 271 Kan. at 94-95. Here, as in Crume, the jury was instructed consistent with PIK Crim. 3d 52.09: It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each witness. You have a right to use common knowledge and experience in regard to the matter about which a witness has testified. Given Buehler-May's corroborating statement, defense counsel's cross-examination of Gray and Dressler about their plea bargain arrangements and motivation for testifying, and the trial court's instruction on witness credibility, the trial court's failure to give an accomplice instruction was not clearly erroneous.