Opinion ID: 2022254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Malpractice Action

Text: GIE and the County brought this legal malpractice action against Judge individually and his law firm and successor law firm, and Dickson individually and her law firm. In their ultimate complaint, plaintiffs pled the requisite elements. Plaintiffs pled the element of duty. Plaintiffs alleged that they had an attorney-client relationship with defendants regarding the underlying case, whereby defendants had a duty to represent Plaintiffs with the reasonable care, skill and diligence possessed by attorneys who, in the case of defendants, held themselves out to the public as having specialized experience in the handling of trial, post-trial matters and appeal of civil cases such as the underlying case. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants agreed to continue representing the interests of Plaintiffs including, but not limited to, taking the steps necessary to overturn the adverse judgment in    Wittenmyer    including, but not limited to, pursuing an appeal on the merits. Plaintiffs pled breach of the duty. Plaintiffs alleged that, for the reasons expressed by the appellate court in its December 14, 1999, Rule 23 order, defendants breached their duties owed to plaintiffs and failed to properly preserve Kendall County's appellate rights concerning the adverse judgment in the underlying case. Further, defendants' conduct constituted a breach of [defendants'] duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence on behalf of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs pled the elements of proximate cause and damages. Plaintiffs alleged: But for the negligence of [defendants], the appeal in    Wittenmyer    would have been successful, and the judgment against Kendall County would have been overturned. Plaintiffs also alleged that as a result of defendants' negligence, plaintiffs sustained damages including: payment of the judgment and accrued interest entered against the County, the lost time and value of the monies paid by plaintiffs in satisfaction of the judgment, and plaintiffs' legal expenses for preparation of an appeal that the County was denied the opportunity to pursue. According to plaintiffs, the damages they had sustained were proximately caused by the breach of duties by [defendants], as set forth above. Discovery ensued. In an interrogatory, defendants asked plaintiffs to state the legal grounds plaintiffs were alleging that the appellate court would have reversed the judgment against the County in the underlying case. Plaintiffs answered that, had the underlying appeal been perfected, the meritorious ground for reversal would have been what defendant Judge had advised plaintiffs, i.e., governmental tort immunity pursuant to several sections of the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of duty and breach of duty. Plaintiffs contended that the circuit court could determine defendants' breach of duty as a matter of law based solely on the appellate court's order in Wittenmyer v. Gesell, No. 2-99-0041, 308 Ill.App.3d 1101, 261 Ill.Dec. 903, 764 N.E.2d 194 (December 14, 1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendants responded and filed a joint cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that the issue of breach of duty was one of fact for the jury, which must generally be established through expert testimony. At the close of a hearing on March 20, 2003, the circuit court found that the record in the underlying case, including the appellate court's dismissal of the underlying appeal in Wittenmyer v. Gesell, No. 2-99-0041, 308 Ill.App.3d 1101, 261 Ill.Dec. 903, 764 N.E.2d 194 (December 14, 1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), established the factual record upon which the court could rule. The circuit court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The court found that defendants owed plaintiffs a duty to perfect the appeal and that defendants' failure to do so constituted a breach of that duty. The court then scheduled further proceedings on the issues of proximate cause and damages. Defendants subsequently filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the issues of proximate cause and damages. Defendants contended that, regardless of whether they had perfected the appeal in the underlying case, the appeal would not have been successful. Defendants argued that, had the appellate court in the underlying case reviewed the County's appeal on the merits, the court would not have reversed the judgment in the underlying case. Defendants also contended that the circuit court, and not a jury, should decide the question of whether the appeal of the underlying case would have been successful. Opposing the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs contended that the tort immunity arguments defendants asserted on behalf of the County in the underlying case were correct and, had defendants competently perfected the underlying appeal, the appellate court would have reversed the judgment entered against the County. Plaintiffs also contended that the circuit court should deny defendants' motion for summary judgment because the question of the hypothetical outcome of the County's dismissed appeal was a question of fact for a jury. At the close of a hearing, the circuit court ruled that the issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action is a question of law that should be decided by the court. The parties then agreed that the circuit court would set the case for an appellate-style oral argument, and that the circuit court would confine its review to the trial court record and the appellate briefs in the underlying case. The circuit court held a hearing in which the parties argued the governmental tort immunity issue that was briefed to the appellate court in the underlying case. In a written order, the circuit court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the appellate court in the underlying case would not have reversed the judgment based on the immunity issue. The circuit court's analysis focused on section 3-104 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-104 (West 1994)). The circuit court interpreted section 3-104 as immunizing only the failure to initially provide traffic control devices, and not the incorrect placement of those devices. The court reasoned that if the county had failed to stripe Galena Road at all, it would have been immunized under section 3-104. However, according to the circuit court, the County initially acted by installing the passing-permitted zone in 1978. Further, when the County restriped the road in 1993, the County was obliged to do so in compliance with the Illinois Manual but failed to do so. Therefore, according to the circuit court, the trial court in the underlying case was correct to deny the County's motion for summary judgment based on section 3-104 immunity. Consequently, the circuit court concluded that the appellate court would have affirmed the trial court's decision regarding governmental tort immunity and would not have reversed the judgment against the County in the underlying case. Plaintiffs appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the proximate cause issue. The Judge defendants and the Dickson defendants not only defended the summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause, but also raised alternative grounds for affirming the judgment. A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of proximate cause. 356 Ill.App.3d 264, 292 Ill. Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729. Initially, the appellate court held that the proximate cause issue was an issue of law for a court to decide and not a question of fact for a jury. 356 Ill.App.3d at 270-72, 292 Ill. Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729. The court next held that section 3-104 of the Tort Immunity Act did not immunize the County in the underlying case. The court reasoned that the 1993 restriping of Galena Road did not constitute an initial failure to place a traffic control device, which section 3-104 immunizes, but rather an improper placement of a traffic control device, which section 3-104 does not immunize. Consequently, the appellate court agreed with the circuit court that, in the underlying case, the trial court correctly rejected the County's assertion of section 3-104 immunity, and the appellate court would have affirmed the judgment. Therefore, in the legal malpractice action, the appellate court upheld the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the issue of proximate cause. 356 Ill. App.3d at 273-77, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729. Presiding Justice Cook dissented solely on the issue of section 3-104 immunity. 356 Ill.App.3d at 277, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729 (Cook, P.J., dissenting). The dissenting justice disagreed with the majority's characterization of the County's action as the improper placement of a passing zone. Rather, the dissenting justice viewed the County's action as failing to initially provide a no-passing zone. Presiding Justice Cook reasoned: It is incorrect to say that a broken yellow line is a passing zone. Rather, the absence of a solid yellow line is a passing zone. Even a roadway without a centerline is a passing zone.    The absence of the solid yellow line does not interfere with the integrity of the broken yellow line. 356 Ill.App.3d at 277-78, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729 (Cook, P.J., dissenting). The dissenting justice opined that the failure to initially place this traffic roadway marking, i.e., the solid yellow line, was immunized under section 3-104. 356 Ill. App.3d at 278-79, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729 (Cook, P.J., dissenting). Neither the appellate court majority nor the dissent mentioned defendants' alternative grounds for affirming the circuit court judgment. We allowed GIE and the County's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a). We subsequently granted leave to the following to file amicus curiae briefs in support of GIE and the County: Illinois Association of County Engineers, Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, and Cook County. We also granted leave to the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants. See 155 Ill.2d R. 345. Additional pertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysis of the issues.