Opinion ID: 2400598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inferred Intent

Text: Here, the court decided that there was no coverage under the policy for any insured because the inferred intent rule precluded a finding of an occurrence. As we explain below, this was error. Whether or not an insured should expect injury from an intentional act is generally a question of fact to be determined from all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Some actions, however, are so likely to result in injury that, as a matter of law, the court will find that the injury did not result from an accident regardless of the actor's subjective intent or expectations. Under the so-called inferred-intent rule, courts conclusively presume intent to harm as a matter of law based on the nature and character of the insured's alleged acts, regardless of whether the insured asserts that he or she had no subjective intent to injure. Ordinarily, sexual molestation of a minor by an adult falls within this category of cases. We applied the inferred-intent rule in TBH v. Meyer, 168 Vt. 149, 151-52, 716 A.2d 31, 33 (1998): [F]or cases involving child sexual abuse, an insured's conduct may fall within that class of conduct that is excluded from coverage if we apply the inferred-intent rule to an insured's actions. Applying the inferred-intent rule in cases where an adult sexually abuses a minor `reflects our enhanced concern for the protection and well-being of minors and the gravity we attach to crimes involving the exploitation of minors.' Id. at 152, 716 A.2d at 33 (quoting State v. Searles, 159 Vt. 525, 528, 621 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1993)). The trial court applied the inferred-intent rule in this case, where a minor is accused of sexually abusing another minor, and held as a matter of law that Kyle intended to harm Jesse and Augustin by his actions. [9] On this holding, the court found no occurrence and thus, no coverage. While an overwhelming majority of courts in other jurisdictions have applied the inferred-intent rule in cases where an adult insured sexually abused a minor, the courts are evenly split with respect to the extension of this inference to minors. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F.Supp. 1270, 1282 (D.Utah 1995) (citing cases); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 298 Ill. App.3d 495, 232 Ill.Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d 271, 276 (1998) (citing cases). Courts that have applied the inferred intent rule in cases where a minor is accused of sexually abusing another minor do so based on the conclusion that, because the act itself is so inherently harmful to the victim, and because subjective intent is irrelevant in cases involving adult alleged perpetrators, the age of the alleged perpetrator is irrelevant. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1996); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Watters, 268 Ill.App.3d 501, 205 Ill.Dec. 936, 644 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1994); Hagan, 232 Ill. Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d at 276. Other courts have found that, based on minors' relative lack of experience in sexual matters, it is improper to infer an intent to injure in cases where a minor sexually abuses another minor. See, e.g., Hagan, 232 Ill.Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d at 277; United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. DeValencia, 190 Ariz. 436, 949 P.2d 525, 529 (1997). These courts generally note that criminal statutes serve to protect minors from sexual conduct based on a presumption that they are unable to understand the nature and consequences of sexual acts. Hagan, 232 Ill.Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d at 277. Therefore, these courts reason, if minors cannot understand the nature and consequences of sexual acts for purposes of criminal law, they cannot be presumed to understand the nature and consequences of sexual acts for purposes of civil law. We agree with those courts that have held that the inferred-intent rule does not apply when the alleged perpetrator is a minor, and that whether a minor who molests another minor intends injury should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Our conclusion is consistent with the treatment of minors in many related contexts. While it is difficult to imagine a predaceous youngster capable of such a thing, a child age ten can be prosecuted for sexual assault under our laws. See 33 V.S.A. §§ 5502(a), 5506(a)(10). However, before that child can have his or her case transferred to criminal court, the juvenile court judge must make findings concerning the child's intent, considering such factors as the maturity of the child and whether the alleged offense was committed in a premeditated or willful manner. The potential for an intention to harm is there, but every child cannot be presumed to have it. The law also protects minors from themselves and their own poor choices. See 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3) (person who engages in sexual act with person under age of sixteen guilty of sexual assault); id. §§ 2822-2823 (proscribing use of child in sexual performance). In State v. Barlow, 160 Vt. 527, 530, 630 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1993), a case that presented a challenge to 13 V.S.A. § 3252, we noted that, underlying criminal statutes that serve to protect minors from sexual conduct, is the fact that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979)). Accordingly, the state has an obligation to protect its children from others and from themselves. Id. at 528, 630 A.2d at 1300. Furthermore, in cases of statutory rape, consent by a minor is not legally possible. State v. Thompson, 150 Vt. 640, 644, 556 A.2d 95, 98 (1989). This Court recently held that, where the alleged perpetrator is also a victim under the age of consent, § 3252(a)(3) is inapplicable. See In re G.T., 170 Vt. 507, 518, 758 A.2d 301, 309 (2000) ([T]he statute is intended as a shield for minors and not a sword against them.). Thus, if minors cannot appreciate the nature and consequences of, and therefore lack the ability to consent to, sexual activity for purposes of Vermont criminal law, it would be inconsistent to hold that, for purposes of Vermont civil law, when minors engage in sexual acts, as a matter of law, they intend the consequences of their acts. Indeed, courts cannot seek to protect naive [minors] on the one hand, while inferring the most degrading and unnatural thoughts to them on the other hand. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jack S., 709 F.Supp. 963, 966 (D.Nev.1989) (holding that inferred-intent rule does not apply where a minor sexually abuses another minor); see also Patterson, 904 F.Supp. at 1282 (The reason a child lacks the capacity to consent to sexual activity is because the child cannot fully appreciate the consequences of such activity. But if a child cannot fully appreciate the consequences of sexual activity, that is reason not to hold the child perpetrator to the same standard as an adult.); DeValencia, 949 P.2d at 529 (It is contradictory for the law to attribute to minors a presumptive sexual naivety on the one hand, and to presume their sexual sophistication on the other hand.). Furthermore, it is inconsistent to rely on the age of the victim in inferring intent, yet ignore the age of the perpetrator. Hagan, 232 Ill.Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d at 277; see also In re G.T., 170 Vt. at 507, 758 A.2d at 302 (statutory rape law does not apply to minor who engaged in sexual intercourse with another minor). Applying the inferred-intent rule to minors who engage in sexual conduct with other minors would also be inconsistent with Vermont's law on contributory and comparative negligence of minors, set forth in Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R.R., 93 Vt. 132, 106 A. 682 (1919). There we stated that, in some cases, a child may be so young that she or he is conclusively presumed incapable of judgment and discretion. Id. at 140, 106 A. at 685. In other cases, a child may be so mature in age and intelligence that the court should say as [a]matter of law that he is capable of exercising some degree of care for his own safety under circumstances like those in question. Id. However, [l]ying between these limits, necessarily undefined as to age, are the cases where the contributory and comparative negligence of a minor is a question of fact that depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, especially the mental development and previous training and experience of the child. Id. Thus, Vermont law recognizes that children do not always appreciate dangers as adults do. Patterson, 904 F.Supp. at 1283. Moreover, as the Illinois appeals court noted, extending a blanket presumption of intent to all minor perpetrators will lead to absurd results in some cases. For example, if we were to apply the inferred-intent standard to minors, a six-year-old who engages in sexual experimentation with a peer would be deemed to have intended the same injury foreseen and caused by an adult who sexually molests a child. Hagan, 232 Ill.Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d at 277. Finally, because the alleged perpetrator is a minor, we do not believe that the policy considerations discussed in Meyer are the same. There we recognized that application of the inferred-intent rule [would deny the plaintiff] a potential source of compensation for her injuries, 168 Vt. at 154, 716 A.2d at 35, but concluded that [e]nsuring compensation of the victim ... is outweighed by precisely fixing both moral and economic liability on defendant. Id. However, [d]epriving a minor perpetrator of insurance coverage can have little deterrent effect on a minor who likely has little understanding of the ramifications of his conduct, much less insurance coverage. Hagan, 232 Ill.Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d at 278; see also Patterson, 904 F.Supp. at 1287 (there is no evidence that the juvenile insureds even knew of the policies or of their terms). We conclude, therefore, that the inferred-intent rule is inapplicable in cases where it is alleged that a minor has sexually abused another minor. Rather, the trier of fact should examine the facts and circumstances of the case before it, including the circumstances surrounding the sexual conduct, as well as the minor's age, ability, intelligence, and experience, Hagan, 232 Ill.Dec. 433, 698 N.E.2d at 277, to determine whether the minor alleged perpetrator expected or intended his or her actions to result in harm to the victim. By declining to apply the inferred-intent standard, we do not require insurers to defend and provide coverage whenever a minor sexually abuses another minor. We merely require that the minor perpetrator's intent be determined on a case-by-case basis. Coverage will be required only when a trier of fact determines, based on the particular characteristics and experience of the minor, that the minor did not intend to injure by his actions. [10] Therefore, the matter must be remanded for a factual inquiry and determination of whether the allegations meet the definition of occurrence. without reliance on the inferred-intent rule. [11]