Opinion ID: 1482375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Homestead Real Estate

Text: In counts I and II, Bernard in part sought damages and imposition of a constructive trust for the allegedly fraudulent inter vivos transfer of the Plimptons' homestead to Gerrard. The court determined that to maintain such an action, the proponent must first establish beneficial rights under the will. Absent that showing, the court concluded that Bernard lacked standing to assert the claims in both counts. We disagree. In Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me.1979), we recognized an independent cause of action for wrongful interference with an expected legacy or gift under a will. [2] The cause of action for tortious interference with an intended bequest is available when the defendant tortiously prevents the testator from making a will favorable to the plaintiff, or prevents the testator from revoking a will, or, as alleged in this case, tortiously causes the testator to revoke or alter a will, or unlawfully causes the testator to convey inter vivos that which would have passed under the will. Cyr, 396 A.2d at 1018. See generally Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Liability in Damages for Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift, 22 A.L.R.4th 1229 (1983). Under any of the foregoing circumstances, an action for damages or a constructive trust may be brought. Cyr, 396 A.2d at 1018. The tort based on an expectancy of inheritance does not require proof that one is in fact named as a beneficiary in the will or that one has been devised the particular property at issue. See Harmon v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Me.1979). That requirement would defeat the purpose of an expectancy claim. [T]here can be recovery only for an inheritance or gift that the other would have received but for the tortious interference of the actor. This means that, as in other cases involving recovery for loss of expectancies... there must be proof amounting to a reasonable degree of certainty that the bequest or devise would have been in effect at the time of the death of the testator or that the gift would have been made inter vivos if there had been no such interference. In many cases this can be shown with complete certainty, as when a will is suppressed or altered after the death or incompetence of the testator. In many others, as when a will is made, revoked or changed during his lifetime, complete certainty is impossible. It is not required. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B cmt. d (1979). It is only the expectation that one will receive some interest that gives rise to a cause of action. Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1023; Cyr, 396 A.2d at 1018. Consistent with that rule, we have previously recognized that an action for tortious interference exists even before the testator has died. Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1025. The possibility that a testator may ultimately revise the will has no relevance to the existence of the tort claim. Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1024; Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So.2d 825, 828-829 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1966). Bernard's complaint alleges that Gerrard's wrongful interference induced the Plimptons, in their lifetimes, to transfer to Gerrard the real estate that Bernard expected to receive under their respective wills. He could have brought his cause of action alleging loss of the expectancy before the deaths of his parents. See Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1025. Bringing his claim after their death does not change the nature of the claim or the quantum of proof necessary to prevail, and it does not affect his standing to bring the claim. Having established Bernard's standing to assert the tort claim to the real estate, we must consider which forum has jurisdiction to consider such a claim. Bernard argues that the Superior Court has jurisdiction to address his claim because the Probate Court is unable to provide an adequate remedy. Gerrard contends that Bernard had an obligation to exhaust his Probate Court remedies. They are both wrong. In support of his argument, Gerrard points to a rule, adopted in several jurisdictions, which requires plaintiffs to exhaust probate remedies before pursuing actions for tortious interference with an expected legacy, provided that the probate remedies are adequate to compensate them for their damages. See, e.g., Moore v. Graybeal, 843 F.2d 706 (3rd Cir.1988) (precluding plaintiffs from maintaining an action for tortious interference with inheritance because they failed to pursue exclusive statutory remedy of contesting probate of the decedent's will); McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F.Supp. 848 (D.Colo.1951), aff'd, 201 F.2d 528 (10th Cir.1953) (holding that before a person who has been wrongfully deprived by another of his just bequest under a will can seek relief in a tribunal other than probate court, that party must have tried to probate the will which is alleged to give rise to his claim); Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello, 97 Ill.2d 174, 73 Ill.Dec. 428, 454 N.E.2d 288 (1983) (holding that a claim of tortious interference with an expected inheritance does not lie where a party has failed to contest the will under the provisions of the Probate Act); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216 (Fla.1981) (holding that exhaustion of probate remedies is necessary before a party can bring a claim for tortious interference with a testamentary expectancy); Johnson v. Stevenson, 269 N.C. 200, 152 S.E.2d 214 (1967) (a plaintiff who could not show that she was prevented from litigating the issue of fraud or undue influence in prior probate proceedings was barred from bringing a claim for tortious interference with an expectancy to inherit); Brignati v. Medenwald, 315 Mass. 636, 53 N.E.2d 673 (1944) (plaintiff could not bring a claim of undue influence where the plaintiff was the only heir and could have taken intestate by proving her claim of undue influence to defeat the will at probate). Gerrard is correct that Bernard theoretically has an adequate remedy in the Probate Court for his challenge to the inter vivos transfer. Bernard could first contest Axel's 1989 will and have it declared invalid. He could then obtain the appointment of a personal representative (perhaps himself) who could sue Gerrard on behalf of Axel's estate to have a constructive trust imposed on the homestead for the benefit of the estate. See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 3-105 (1981). [3] With the homestead back in Axel's estate, Axel's 1971 will naming Bernard as sole beneficiary could be reinstated and probated and thus Bernard would receive all of his father's estate, or, failing that, he would receive everything in the estate by operation of intestacy laws. The theoretical possibility of adequate relief in the Probate Court does not compel Bernard to go there to pursue his tortious interference claim. The law provides concurrent jurisdiction in the Probate Court and the Superior Court for Bernard's claim of undue influence in the inter vivos transfer (though the Probate Court action could only be filed by the personal representative). The very concept of concurrent jurisdiction is inconsistent with a preference for one jurisdiction over another. Moreover, Bernard seeks alternative relief in the form of damages for Gerrard's alleged interference with his expectancy to inherit his parents' homestead real estate. In civil cases in which damages are sought, a plaintiff has the right to a jury trial. Me. Const. art. I, § 20. Bernard cannot get a jury trial in the Probate Court. See, 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-306(a) (1981).