Opinion ID: 186894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rawlings

Text: 10 In Rawlings the Supreme Court held the police may search a suspect whom they have probable cause to arrest if the formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search, 448 U.S. at 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556. The Court was quite clear in stating that, assuming such proximity in time, it is not particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa. Id. This court applied the Supreme Court's clear teaching in United States v. Riley, 351 F.3d 1265, 1269 (D.C.Cir.2003) (where police had probable cause to arrest before search, it was of no import that the search came before the actual arrest). So, too, did the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir.2004) (So long as an arrest that follows a search is supported by probable cause independent of the fruits of the search, the precise timing of the search is not critical (citations omitted)), and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1003 (10th Cir.1999) (A legitimate `search incident to arrest' need not take place after the arrest (citation omitted)). Indeed, every circuit that has considered the question— save one—has concluded that a search incident to arrest may precede the arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 217 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir.2006); United States v. Hernandez, 825 F.2d 846, 852 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Montgomery, 377 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Ilazi, 730 F.2d 1120, 1126-27 (8th Cir.1984); Smith, 389 F.3d at 951; Lugo, 170 F.3d at 1003; United States v. Banshee, 91 F.3d 99, 102 (11th Cir.1996). Only the Seventh Circuit has held that a Belton search may not precede a custodial arrest, but it did so in an opinion that, like the briefs then before it, betrayed no awareness of the Supreme Court's holding in Rawlings. See Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir.2003). 11 Applying the teaching of Rawlings to the facts of this case, we must uphold Officer Jones's search of the car. Powell acknowledges the officers had probable cause to arrest him and his companion for urinating in public before they searched his car. See D.C.Code § 22-1321 (2001); Scott v. United States, 878 A.2d 486, 488 (D.C.2005). Indeed, Officer Jones testified that the officers detain[ed] the two men because they were going to be placed under arrest for [u]rinating in public. Immediately following the search, the two were indeed handcuffed and formally placed under arrest for public urination as well as for the firearms violation brought to light by the search. As in Rawlings, that is, the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search. 448 U.S. at 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556. Therefore, as in Riley, because the police had probable cause to arrest [before the search], the search was valid as one incident to arrest. 351 F.3d at 1269.