Opinion ID: 622593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction

Text: Life Investors appeals the order of the district court denying Life Investors's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction issued on March 8, 2008. Life Investors contends that this court has jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Our interlocutory jurisdiction extends to appeals from district court orders continuing, modifying, ... or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). [2] We do not have interlocutory jurisdiction to review a district court order denying a request for reconsideration of a previously granted preliminary injunction. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Luigino's, Inc., 423 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (An order reconsidering or interpreting a preliminary injunction ... is not appealable because § 1292(a)(1) omits such orders.); see also Cherokee Express, Inc. v. Cherokee Express, Inc., 924 F.2d 603, 606 (6th Cir.1991) (An appeal of right under [28 U.S.C.] § 1292(a)(1) must be taken from the order granting or denying injunctive relief, not from a motion for reconsideration.) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether an order falls within one of the 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) categories, or in the alternative is an unappealable motion for reconsideration, we `look beyond the motion's caption to its substance.' Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 337 (3d Cir.1993)); see also Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1005 (6th Cir.2006) (looking to substance to distinguish temporary restraining orders from injunctions). The power to modify or dissolve injunctions springs from the court's authority to relieve inequities that arise after the original order. Credit Suisse, 400 F.3d at 1124. Where significant changes in the law or circumstances threaten to convert a previously proper injunction into an `instrument of wrong,' the law recognizes that judicial intervention may be necessary to prevent inequities. Salazar v. Buono, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1803, 1816, 176 L.Ed.2d 634 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2961 (2d ed. 1996) (hereinafter Wright & Miller)). However, such judicial intervention is guarded carefully: To obtain modification or dissolution of an injunction, a movant must demonstrate significant changes in fact, law, or circumstance since the previous ruling. Gill v. Monroe Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 873 F.2d 647, 648-49 (2d Cir.1989); see also Int'l Union, UAW v. Baretz, Nos. 97-1763, 97-1936, 1998 WL 449688, at  (6th Cir. July 22, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (citing Twp. of Franklin Sewerage Auth. v. Middlesex Cnty. Utils. Auth., 787 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 109, 93 L.Ed.2d 57 (1986)). [N]ewly discovered evidence can be the basis for a motion to modify, 11A Wright & Miller, supra, § 2961; however, the law of this Circuit is clear that to so qualify, the new evidence must not have been in existence before the original injunction was issued, Denley v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 733 F.2d 39, 43 (6th Cir.1984), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Arnold v. Arnold Corp.-Printed Commc'ns for Bus., 920 F.2d 1269, 1275 n. 5 (6th Cir.1990). It is not enough that the party was merely previously unaware of evidence's existence; the evidence must not have been reasonably discoverable by due diligence during the original proceeding. 11 A Wright & Miller, supra, § 2961 (citing Bigelow v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 199 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir.1952)). [3] These principles guide the accurate classification of a motion and, therefore, they inform the question whether a party can file an interlocutory appeal of an order ruling on the motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Thus, in determining whether a motion is a proper request for dissolution and, therefore, immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we consider whether the movant identified changes, either in law or fact, that occurred between entry of the injunction and the filing of the motion that would render the continuance of the injunction in its original form inequitable. Favia, 7 F.3d at 337; Credit Suisse, 400 F.3d at 1124 (requiring that the new evidence be based on new circumstances that have arisen after the district court granted the injunction); Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass'n 117 v. Jefferson Cnty., 290 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir.2002) (permitting appeal [o]nly if [the motion] contends that changes over time justify the dissolution of the injunction). Where the movant is merely a losing litigant seeking to attack the [district] court's decree collaterally, 11 A Wright & Miller, supra, § 2961 (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932)), by revisit[ing] the initial injunction decision, or resurrect[ing] an expired time for appeal, 16 Wright & Miller, supra, § 3924.2, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court order. The previous panel recognized that Life Investors's motion to dissolve ... purports to be based on `newly discovered evidence' that would tend to show that Gooch is not facing financial hardship and has submitted false and fraudulent insurance claims. In re Life Investors, 589 F.3d at 326-27 n. 7 (emphasis added). Because the question was not before us, [4] we did not decide whether the motion was actually based on new evidence, much less whether the motion was based on new evidenceevidence not in existence before the original injunction was issued. That question is now before us, and we conclude that Life Investors's motion is not based on new evidence and, therefore, is not a proper motion for dissolution. The evidence that Life Investors presents in support of the motionGooch's assets, ongoing business activities, and his wife's salarywas in existence prior to the issuance of the injunction and therefore does not constitute a change in fact. Life Investors does not assert that Gooch's previously undisclosed assetscars and homesare in fact new assets. Reply Br. at 2 (citing R. 239). Moreover, Life Investors admits that Gooch's firearm business has been in existence since December 2000, concedes that Gooch's wife has been employed with the same company since 1996, and makes no allegations that her salary substantially increased since the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Thus, rather than arguing that circumstances have changed, Life Investors is asserting that evidence previously in existence, but not previously considered by the district court, significantly impacts the preliminary injunction analysis. [5] We acknowledge that Life Investors is frustrated by the district court's pre-injunction limitations on discovery. However, pre-injunction limitations on discovery cannot transform prior existing, but undiscovered, facts into new evidence. To contest the limitations on discovery, Life Investors should have immediately appealed from the order that granted the preliminary injunction. Having failed to do so, Life Investors's opportunity to contest the merits and circumstances surrounding the preliminary injunction's issuance has passed. This is even more true given that the previously unknown facts were not actively concealed from Life Investors and reason would have independently counseled in favor of further investigation. [6] In conclusion, the district court order denying Life Investors's motion, which was styled as a request for dissolution of the preliminary injunction in light of changed circumstances, is in fact an order denying a request for reconsideration of the district court's March 2008 order granting the preliminary injunction. [7] We lack jurisdiction over the appeal from that order because 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) does not create a statutory basis for jurisdiction over [a]n order reconsidering or interpreting a preliminary injunction. Weight Watchers, 423 F.3d at 141; see also Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 797 n. 5 (6th Cir.1998) ( Kerr restricts an interlocutory appeal when a party successively asks for the same relief based on the same facts, then files an appeal that should have been filed at the time of the first decision.). Accordingly, we dismiss Life Investors's appeal from the district court's order denying the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction.