Opinion ID: 5130886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Expert Testimony

Text: In October 2016, in Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 4 this court abandoned the Dyas/Frye “general acceptance” test governing the admissibility of expert testimony. 5 In its stead, we adopted the reliability-based standards of admissibility set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 6 Rule 702 imposes five distinct conditions on the admission of expert testimony. The trial judge must be satisfied that (1) the witness is qualified as an 4 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016) (en banc). 5 See Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 6 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 16 expert; (2) the witness’s expertise “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” 7; (3) the witness’s testimony is “based on sufficient facts or data” 8; (4) “the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods” 9; and (5) “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” 10 The Rule thus elevates the trial judge’s role as gatekeeper; it essentially provides that “when a party proffers expert scientific testimony, the trial court must make ‘a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.’” 11 The objective of this requirement “is to make certain that an expert . . . employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” 12 The gatekeeping role is not intended “to displace the normal tools of the 7 Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). 8 Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). 9 Fed. R. Evid. 702(c). 10 Fed. R. Evid. 702(d). 11 Motorola, 147 A.3d at 754 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). The same general requirements apply to non-scientific expert testimony. Id. at 755 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) and Rule 702(a)). 12 Id. (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). 17 adversary system,” in which “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” 13 Both the preliminary reliability determination and the manner in which it is made are committed to the trial judge’s discretion, reviewable for abuse. 14 At appellant’s first trial, which was held before our decision in Motorola, he objected (unsuccessfully) to the admission of McCarthy’s testimony under the thenapplicable Dyas/Frye test. 15 Prior to his second, post-Motorola trial, appellant moved for a pretrial evidentiary hearing (commonly called a “Daubert hearing”) to evaluate the reliability of the testing that McCarthy had performed. The judge denied this request; after reviewing the transcript of McCarthy’s testimony at the first trial, he deemed an evidentiary hearing unnecessary and was satisfied the testimony would be admissible under Rule 702. Thereafter, at trial, appellant moved to strike McCarthy’s testimony for failure to meet the Rule’s reliability 13 Id. at 754 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596). 14 Id. at 755 (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158). 15 Appellant argued that McCarthy’s testimony would not aid the jury in determining the facts at issue, and that it would be more prejudicial than probative. 18 requirements. The judge denied this motion, concluding inter alia that appellant’s objections went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Appellant now argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting McCarthy’s expert opinion testimony at his retrial. He identifies four overlapping respects in which, he contends, the court erred. First, appellant argues, the court erred in declining his request for a pretrial Daubert hearing. Second, appellant contends McCarthy’s experiments were not applied reliably to the facts of this case, as Rule 702(d) requires. Third, appellant further argues that McCarthy’s experiments were not relevant to whether the fire was intentionally set, and that even if relevant, their probative value was minimal and outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fourth, appellant asserts the court also erred by permitting McCarthy to opine on the ultimate issue of appellant’s intent. There is no question that appellant preserved the first two of these claims by raising them in timely fashion in the trial court in connection with his second trial. The parties disagree over whether appellant preserved the third claim, which reprises objections he lodged unsuccessfully at his first trial. However, the trial judge expressed his own understanding that appellant was objecting on relevance grounds and specifically cited Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (which requires the judge to weigh probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice). We therefore treat appellant’s third 19 objection as preserved. Appellant raises his fourth objection to McCarthy’s testimony for the first time in this appeal, though, so he must establish plain error to prevail on it here. Addressing each of appellant’s objections in turn, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting McCarthy’s expert testimony. 1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Declining to Hold a Pre-Trial Daubert Hearing. As we reiterated in Motorola, Rule 702 allows trial courts “broad latitude” and “considerable leeway” in deciding how to go about making the preliminary assessment of the reliability of proffered expert testimony. 16 “[T]here is no particular procedure that the trial court is required to follow in executing its gatekeeping function under Daubert,” 17 and the court has the discretion “to avoid unnecessary reliability proceedings.” 18 Rule 702 and Daubert do not require a pretrial evidentiary hearing as long as the trial court has a sufficient evidentiary basis 16 Id. at 755 (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141-42, 152). 17 United States v. Diaz, 300 F.3d 66, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2002). 18 Motorola, 147 A.3d at 758 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments and Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). 20 without it for its decision. 19 In Kumho Tire, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a reliability determination based on the trial court’s review of the proposed expert’s deposition testimony. 20 Here, the trial judge reviewed the transcript of McCarthy’s expert testimony at appellant’s first trial to make the threshold reliability determination required by Rule 702. This was neither unreasonable nor unfair to appellant. In the first trial, McCarthy fully described his testing principles and methodology and their application to the evidence in this case, and appellant had and exercised the opportunity to challenge his expert opinion testimony by cross-examination and 19 See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold a pre-trial evidentiary Daubert hearing because the challenged testimony did not involve any new scientific theories); Kirstein v. Parks Corp., 159 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir.1998) (holding the trial judge “had a sufficient basis for her decision without holding a hearing” and further explaining that “[w]e have not required that the Daubert inquiry take any specific form and have, in fact, upheld a judge’s sua sponte consideration of the admissibility of expert testimony”); 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.02[2] (2d ed. 2000) (“The admissibility of expert testimony is often decided after a separate hearing. However, the trial judge is not required to hold a hearing on the admissibility of expert evidence.”). 20 526 U.S. at 142, 145-46, 152. See also Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2000) (in limine hearing unnecessary where trial court could make preliminary reliability determination based on expert’s deposition testimony and reports, and where opponents of admission did not show the record was incomplete or that they had new or additional information to present). 21 argument. McCarthy’s testimony at the retrial did not materially diverge from his earlier testimony. 21 The judge found it “clear” from the transcript that McCarthy reached his conclusions in this case by applying scientific principles of fire origin and causation (along with his own “vast” experience) in tests designed to cover the range of possible conditions under which the fire occurred. 22 The judge also specifically considered factors identified in Daubert as potentially bearing on reliability of McCarthy’s methods and their applicability in this case. 23 Among other 21 At the first trial, McCarthy did not note the possibility that the fire had multiple points of origin in the basement. Although he did acknowledge that possibility at the second trial, he did not affirmatively opine that there were multiple points of origin, nor did he rely on that possibility in formulating and presenting his conclusions. We therefore do not view this as a material deviation from his previous testimony. 22 Cf. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36 (“The general methodology NFPA 921 recommends for investigating the cause of a fire is essentially the well-known ‘scientific method’ of generating and testing hypotheses [citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593]. . . . Because the methodology described in NFPA 921 has been peer reviewed, is generally accepted in the field of fire investigation, and incorporates the classic scientific methodology . . . , the methodology is reliable within the meaning of Rule 702 . . . and Daubert.” (citing cases)). 23 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; Motorola, 147 A.3d at 754. The judge found some of these factors, such as the known or potential error rate of the test procedure, to be inapplicable to McCarthy’s tests. We perceive no error in that finding. Cf. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“While a known error rate is also a factor to be considered in a Daubert analysis, a known error rate is not strictly required under Daubert. 509 U.S. at 593-94 (emphasizing that the Daubert factors are not a ‘definitive checklist,’ and that ‘the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one’)”). 22 things, the judge noted that McCarthy employed “principles that are longstanding principles for use in the field” and invoked “a number of national studies . . . as a basis for some of the conclusions that he reache[d]”; that McCarthy evaluated alternative possible explanations for the fire; that McCarthy explained how and why the evidence supported his conclusions; and that McCarthy was not “extrapolating from a premise to an unfounded conclusion.” Because the trial judge was able to make a preliminary reliability determination based on the evidentiary record from appellant’s first trial, we conclude the judge did not abuse his discretion by denying appellant’s request for a pretrial Daubert hearing. Such a hearing was not necessary to comply with Rule 702. 2. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Finding That McCarthy’s Experiments Were Reliably Applied to the Facts of This Case. Rule 702(d) requires a determination that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Appellant asserts that the experiments McCarthy performed to determine the likelihood that a cigarette ignited the fire in the mattress, and how long it would have taken to do so, were not reliably applied to the facts of this case, because the test conditions were not substantially similar to the conditions in appellant’s basement at the time of the fire. Specifically, 23 appellant emphasizes that witnesses could not specify, and therefore McCarthy did not know, the specific type and material of the bedding on appellant’s mattress, if any, on the morning of the fire. The appropriateness of scientifically valid experiments to test hypotheses of fire causation is not in question. “Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. ‘Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.’” 24 Courts have excluded fire expert testimony because the experts failed to test their hypotheses as to the causes of fires. 25 24 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citation omitted). 25 See, e.g., Atl. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Porter, Inc., No. CV 15-570, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145415, at - (E.D. La. Oct. 20, 2016), aff’d, 742 F. App’x 850 (5th Cir. 2018) (expert testimony held inadmissible where the expert “never did any testing to confirm his hypothesis” as to cause of fire); Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The failure of Pride’s experts to test their hypotheses in a timely and reliable manner or to validate their hypotheses by reference to generally accepted scientific principles as applied to the facts of this case renders their testimony on the cause and origin of the fire unreliable and therefore inadmissible under Daubert and Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 104.”); Comer v. Am. Elec. Power, 63 F. Supp. 2d 927, 938 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (excluding electrical engineering expert’s testimony in fire case in part because the expert never did “any testing to 24 For an experiment meant to demonstrate what actually happened to be reliably applied to the relevant facts, its conditions must be “substantially similar to those of the alleged occurrence.” 26 This “does not require an identity of conditions but only that degree of similarity which will insure that the results of the experiment are probative.” 27 We recognize that “[n]o event can be perfectly reenacted . . . and dissimilarities that are neither material nor misleading do not bar admission of experimental evidence.” 28 Possible dissimilarities and uncertainties can be taken into account and “adjusted for or explained so that their effect on the results of experiments can be understood by the jury” and jurors can assess the probative value of those results. 29 The initial evidentiary determination of whether experiments are substantially similar to the facts at issue “may not always be capable of a mechanical solution . . . . [and] [f]requently common sense provides a good guide to whether a determine how many volts it would actually take” to start the fire in the manner the expert hypothesized). 26 Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407, 414 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C.1995)). 27 Id. at 414-15 (quoting Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 627 (Alaska 1969)). 28 Id. at 415 (quoting State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 812 (Minn. 1999)). 29 Id. (quoting Taylor, 661 A.2d at 644). 25 factor entering into an evidentiary determination is substantial or merely unimportant.” 30 In Butts, for example, the defendant, impaired by alcohol, had driven at twenty-five miles per hour down a city street on “a dark and rainy night” and had struck and killed a pedestrian there. 31 At her trial for negligent homicide, a prosecution expert in accident reconstruction testified about a visibility study he had performed. “The study was conducted at night, while it was raining, on a wet roadway, in the same model car as the one [the defendant] was driving, traveling at the same speed as [the defendant], with a mannequin dressed in dark clothing” positioned at the site of the collision.32 By photographing the mannequin from the car at various distances, the expert concluded that an unimpaired driver could have detected the pedestrian from a distance of 300 feet and had ample time to react and avoid hitting him. 33 The defendant argued that certain conditions of the study so differed from the conditions on the night of the accident that the study lacked 30 Id. (quoting Love, 457 P.2d at 628). 31 Id. at 412. 32 Id. at 415. 33 Id. at 414. 26 probative value. In particular, the study used a mannequin that had a lighter complexion than the pedestrian who was hit, it ignored the adverse effects on visibility of same-lane traffic and spray from other vehicles in the rain, and the street light above the point of impact was lit during the study but may not have been on the night in question. 34 Nonetheless, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert’s testimony. “Common sense tells us,” the court explained, that “all substantial conditions from the night of the accident were adequately re-created during the visibility study, and that the dissimilarities . . . were slight in comparison.” 35 “Moreover,” we said, “the dissimilarities [were] of the type that could easily be, and in fact were, explained to the jury for it to consider when assessing the weight of the evidence.” 36 In this case, we reach the same conclusions. The exact conditions of the mattress and its possible bedding at the time of the fire could not be known with certainty. But there were limits to the area and range of uncertainty, because the witnesses were able to provide some relevant information. The make of the mattress 34 See id. at 412 n.3, 414, and 415 n.6. 35 Id. at 415. 36 Id. 27 itself was known — it was a Sealy Posturepedic purchased in 2010. Appellant’s bedding was described as a fleece blanket and a “basic” sheet. (We note that in one of his recorded conversations, appellant himself referred to the material that caught fire as “cotton.”) There was no evidence of any additional bedding or other flammable items on the mattress, or of any unusual conditions that might have had a bearing on how the fire erupted. The residual uncertainties mainly related to the particular composition of the blanket and sheet, how they were configured on the mattress at the time of the fire, and whether air currents in the basement affected the fire’s growth. McCarthy identified these uncertainties and accounted for them by performing over a thousand tests covering a range of possibilities. He designed those tests in light of the available evidence, his research in the fire investigation literature, and his consultation with his ATF peers. McCarthy tested sheets and fleece blankets composed of 100% cotton, 100% synthetic material, and a 50/50 cotton and synthetic blend. He arranged the bedding in different configurations and employed forced air to see how the variations affected the outcome of the experiments. By these means, we are satisfied the trial judge could find that McCarthy reliably applied his methodology to the facts of this case and ensured that his tests would be probative and not misleading to the jury. To the extent there remained possible dissimilarities between the test conditions and the conditions existing at the 28 scene of the fire, they were fodder for cross-examination and the presentation of contrary expert testimony, but they were not substantial enough to bar admission of McCarthy’s testimony. 37 3. McCarthy’s Experiments Were Relevant and Their Probative Value Was Not Substantially Outweighed by the Danger of Unfair Prejudice. Appellant claims that McCarthy’s experiments were not relevant to prove a fact in issue, because appellant never denied that the mattress caught fire, only that he intentionally set it on fire. Alternatively, appellant asserts that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed whatever probative value the experiments had. Neither contention is persuasive. 37 Cf. United States v. Santiago, 202 F. App’x 399, 401-02 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding admission of arson investigator’s experiments to recreate the scene of a fire, which involved “attempts to use cigarettes in different positions and later an open flame to ignite cardboard, plastic wrap, bags, and tape,” where “the trial court appropriately determined that any differences in conditions between the warehouse and [the investigator’s] laboratory were negligible”); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Joseph Daniel Const., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 423, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding expert’s testimony on origin and cause of a fire to be reliable and admissible, where the expert analyzed the data and developed his hypothesis, “relied on deductive reasoning, a method recognized as ‘scientific,’ . . . identified all of the potential ignition scenarios,” and eliminated certain causes, including “careless disposal of cigarettes, . . . based on a reasonable analysis of the circumstances”). 29 “[T]he evaluation and weighing of evidence for relevance and potential prejudice is quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and we owe a great degree of deference to its decision.” 38 We perceive no abuse of that discretion here. “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” 39 This relevance standard applies to expert testimony as much as to other evidence; it is inherent in the requirement of Rule 702(a) that expert testimony “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” The test for relevancy is not a stringent one. “Ordinarily, any evidence which is logically probative of some fact in issue is admissible and if the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in controversy, it should go to the jury.” 40 38 Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1095 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). Plummer v. United States, 813 A.2d 182, 188 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Street 39 v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1992)). Id. at 188-89 (brackets omitted; quoting Dockery v. United States, 746 A.2d 40 303, 306 (D.C. 2000)). 30 McCarthy’s experiments were probative of a material and contested issue in this case. As he explained, the experiments showed that if a dropped cigarette caused the fire in appellant’s mattress, it likely would have taken long enough to ignite the bedding that anyone watching would have had ample time to extinguish the fire before it got out of control. (Alternatively, if the fire was set with a match or other flame, that implied someone deliberately held it to the flammable material of the bedding.) The experiments therefore provided evidence tending to establish that the fire was incendiary, i.e., intentionally maintained, a disputed fact material to whether appellant had the mens rea for both first-degree cruelty to children and murder. 41 The experiments unquestionably were relevant. Nor has appellant shown that their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 42 In this context, “unfair prejudice” 41 To prove first-degree cruelty to children, the government had to show that appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of bodily harm to a child. D.C. Code § 22-1101(a). The same mens rea is incorporated in the first-degree felony murder charge predicated on first-degree cruelty to children and in second-degree murder. 42 See Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1099 (adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and holding that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice). “The ‘substantially outweighs’ approach is apparently the product of the general federal policy promoting the admission of as much relevant evidence as reasonably possible.” Id. 31 means “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” 43 Appellant has made no showing of any likelihood of such prejudice from McCarthy’s testimony. In his brief on appeal, appellant argues that the jurors might have over-valued McCarthy’s opinion on “the central question before them” because they “were aware McCarthy had participated in the investigation of this case as an ATF agent and was privy to much information not disclosed to the jury (such as witness statements; appellant’s statement to police; thousands of photographs).” 44 This is utter speculation. It lacks record support, and it is untethered to the issue of whether the trial judge should have excluded McCarthy’s specific testimony about the experiments he performed. We attach no weight to appellant’s imaginary scenario of prejudice. 43 Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1184 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (“The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”). 44 Brief for Appellant at 34-35. 32 4. The Trial Court Did Not Plainly Err by Allowing McCarthy to Opine on Whether Appellant Caused the Fire Intentionally. Appellant claims, for the first time on appeal, that McCarthy should not have been allowed to opine on whether appellant “did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense,” 45 as such opinion testimony is specifically prohibited in federal criminal cases by Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Since appellant did not object at trial to McCarthy’s testimony on this ground, he must, to prevail, show “plain error” – meaning a clear or obvious error that affected appellant’s substantial rights and that, if left uncorrected, would permit a miscarriage of justice to stand or otherwise compromise the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 46 Appellant has not shown the trial judge clearly erred in allowing McCarthy to opine that the fire was incendiary in nature. This court has not adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). It “has noted multiple times that Rule 704(b) did not disrupt our ‘local law of evidence . . . which 45 Id. at 31-32. 46 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 738 & n.7 (D.C. 2019) (rejecting unpreserved challenge to erroneous admission of expert opinion testimony for failure to satisfy all the requirements of plain error). See generally Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1189-90 (D.C. 2008). 33 does not prohibit expert witnesses from stating opinions on ultimate facts or issues to be resolved by the jury.” 47 Thus, “in conflict with Rule 704(b), D.C. [law] allows an expert in criminal cases to testify to a defendant’s ‘mental state or condition.’” 48 Moreover, McCarthy did not express an opinion as to appellant’s mental state or condition. Rather, he testified only that his experiments, by showing how long it likely would have taken an accidentally dropped cigarette to ignite the mattress, supported a conclusion that the fire was incendiary, i.e., intentionally set by someone. He did not opine that appellant in particular intentionally set the fire. While “[a]n expert’s opinion that a specific defendant had the ‘intentions’ [constituting an element of the crime charged] might be thought a determination prohibited by Rule 704(b),” expert testimony that only addresses “the intentions of a hypothetical individual, not [the defendant] in particular” has been held not to run afoul of that Rule. 49 Be that as it may, given that our local law allows expert 47 Jackson v. United States, 76 A.3d 920, 940 (D.C. 2013) (holding that expert may testify as to defendant’s mental state in an insanity case) (quoting Blaize v. United States, 21 A.3d 78, 84 n.8 (D.C. 2011); brackets omitted). 48 Hon. Steffen W. Graae, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, & Hon. Henry F. Greene, The Law of Evidence in the District of Columbia § 704.01[2] (6th ed. 2020). 49 United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d 1463, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 449 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Rule 704(b) not violated where expert witness only testified about “drug organizations in general” and “never offered an opinion regarding the mental state of the defendants”); United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating expert “testimony 34 witnesses to state opinions on ultimate issues, including a defendant’s mental state, the trial judge did not plainly err by allowing McCarthy’s testimony in this case. B. Appellant’s Request for a Civil Negligence Instruction Appellant asserts the trial judge erred in denying his request for an instruction on civil negligence. In seeking the instruction, appellant’s counsel argued that negligence was “a key part of the defense” and there was a “very significant factual foundation” that the fire “was negligently set.” He clarified, however, that he did not want the negligence instruction to be included in the instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case, “because we’re not conceding that the defendant acted in any way whatsoever.” Rather, he explained, “negligence can mean a lot of different things to a lot of different people,” and “it’s best that [the jurors] get . . . their definition directly from the Court.” When the judge asked counsel if he was should not be excluded under Rule 704(b) as long as it is made clear . . . that the opinion is based on the expert’s knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant’s mental processes”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392, 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding admission of fire expert’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, where expert “only testified that in his opinion fire was not accidental,” “included a detailed rationale for his opinion that the fire was purposefully set,” and “never testified that Lundy or anyone else in particular caused the fire”). 35 “committing . . . to argue” negligence, counsel responded, “No, definitely not.” The government opposed the request. The prosecutor argued that “negligence has no place in the instructions” because “[t]his is a criminal matter” and the offense instructions already cover the subject by requiring proof that the defendant acted intentionally or consciously disregarded an extreme risk. In declining to instruct the jury on civil negligence, the judge reasoned that the instruction would “create[] confusion,” “it would be difficult for the jurors to . . . separate out what the [offense] elements are and then look at a very different standard for negligence,” and the criminal “instructions adequately spell out the necessary mental state” for the charged offenses. We review a trial court’s decision on whether to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion, viewing the instructions as a whole, and considering the record in the light most favorable to the requesting party. 50 “When a defendant requests an instruction on a theory of the case that negates his guilt of the crime charged, and that instruction is supported by any evidence, however weak, 50 Washington v. United States, 111 A.3d 16, 23 (D.C. 2015) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give missing evidence instruction). 36 an instruction stating the substance of the defendant’s theory must be given.” 51 However, “the instruction need not be framed in the exact language proposed by the defendant.” 52 The instruction that appellant specifically requested, Instruction 5-2 of the Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia (2014 ed.), stated that “[n]egligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care,” i.e. “to use the same caution, attention or skill that a reasonable person would use under similar circumstances.” 53 Although appellant’s counsel strongly indicated he did not intend to make a negligence argument, we presume he wished to rely in some way on Instruction 5-2 to inform the jury it could not find appellant criminally liable unless it found him more than merely negligent, i.e., that the fire was not due to his mere failure to exercise ordinary care. We are not persuaded there was evidence at appellant’s trial supporting a “simple negligence” theory of the fire’s origin. But 51 Gray v. United States, 549 A.2d 347, 349 (D.C. 1988). 52 Id. 53 Instruction 5-2 went on to say, “It is negligent to do something that a person using ordinary care would not do. It is also negligent to fail to do something that a person using ordinary care would do.” 37 even if there was, an instruction on that theory would have been superfluous at best, if not, indeed, confusing and misleading. That is so for three reasons. First, the offense instructions given by the judge did not employ the term “negligence,” so appellant’s expressed concern that the jury needed to be instructed on its proper legal definition was unfounded. And the definition of negligence that appellant proposed, “failure to exercise ordinary care,” was, without more, too broad to be useful to the jury, as that definition encompasses failures that are reckless or intentional as well as failures we think of as merely careless. Second, negligence was not a defense to the charges in this case (nor did appellant claim he intended to argue negligence as the theory of his defense). 54 54 As the Supreme Court of Indiana explained in a case holding that a defendant convicted of criminal recklessness in the discharge of a firearm was not entitled to an instruction on negligence, Negligence, as used by Defendant here, is an argument, not a legal defense. Defendant’s legal defense was and is that he is not guilty of criminal recklessness because his actions did not meet the legal requirements of recklessness. The jury was properly instructed that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had acted “in plain, conscious and unjustified disregard of the harm that might result therefrom, and the disregard involved a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Defendant was free to and did argue that he did no more than fail “to exercise reasonable or ordinary care.” As the trial court accurately observed, 38 Third, the judge made it crystal clear that the charges in this case all required proof of more than negligence. The charge of first-degree cruelty to children requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engaged in conduct creating a grave risk of bodily harm to a child and causing bodily harm. 55 The same degree of culpability is required to prove both first-degree felony murder based on first-degree cruelty to children 56 and the (lesser included) offense of second-degree murder. 57 The trial judge accurately and explicitly instructed the jury it would need to find such heightened culpability to convict appellant of each Defendant’s negligence argument is simply a statement that State failed to prove that he was reckless. No additional instruction to the jury on this point was required. Springer v. State, 798 N.E.2d 431, 435 (Ind. 2003). 55 See D.C. Code § 22-1101(a). 56 See Kitt v. United States, 904 A.2d 348, 355 (D.C. 2006) (“The only intent required to be guilty of [first-degree felony murder based on an enumerated felony] is the intent to commit the underlying felony.” (citing Lee v. United States, 699 A.2d 373, 385 (D.C. 1997))). 57 See Robinson v. United States, 928 A.2d 717, 728 (D.C. 2007) (Second degree murder requires proof that “(1) the defendant caused the death of the victim; (2) the defendant had the specific intent to kill or commit serious bodily injury on the victim, or acted with conscious disregard [of] an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to the decedent; and (3) there were no mitigating circumstances.” (citing Williams v. United States, 858 A.2d 984, 993 n.11 (D.C. 2004))). 39 offense. “Intentionally,” the judge elaborated, “means that [appellant] acted voluntarily and on purpose. Not by mistake or accident.” 58 “Recklessly,” the judge instructed, “means that [appellant] was aware of and disregarded the grave risk of bodily harm his conduct created.” 59 As the instructions manifestly required a finding of more than negligence, and did not even mention the term, we conclude the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining appellant’s request for an instruction defining negligence. We see no reason to suppose the jury could have been confused on this point. 60 58 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 813 A.2d 220, 225 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that the words “intentionally or knowingly. . . . refer[] to an act that ‘was deliberate or on purpose, not accidental.’” (quoting Campos v. United States, 617 A.2d 185, 189 (D.C. 1992))). 59 See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 690 A.2d 479, 482-83 (D.C. 1997) (“Because the defendant’s state of mind must be wrongful, . . . we must not permit the adjective ‘reckless’ . . . to become a synonym for ‘negligent.’. . . A defendant is therefore ‘reckless’ only if he intentionally does an act with a willful disregard of its potential consequences.” (cleaned up)). 60 We do not mean to say that a criminal defendant could never be entitled to an instruction explaining the difference between criminal recklessness and noncriminal negligence. For example, in Springer the Supreme Court of Indiana acknowledged that such an instruction may be required to guide the jury in cases involving “conduct that can be undertaken with due care” (e.g., driving a car) and a genuine issue as to whether the defendant’s failure to exercise due care was negligent or reckless. Springer, 798 N.E.2d at 436; see also New v. State, 135 N.E.3d 619, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). But this is not such a case. 40 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant asserts the evidence in its entirety was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly set the fire that killed S.M.J. However, viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict, 61 we disagree. We readily conclude there was more than sufficient evidence allowing the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally set the fire to burn down his house and recklessly endangered the lives of all its other occupants. This evidence included: (1) the eyewitness and expert testimony establishing that the fire emanated from appellant’s room, originated on his mattress there, and was incendiary in origin; (2) the video and other evidence establishing that appellant (alone) was present in the basement and active in the early morning hours leading up to the fire; (3) the eyewitnesses’ accounts of appellant’s strange and unconcerned behavior after the fire erupted; (4) the half-used book of matches found in appellant’s pocket when he was arrested; and (5) 61 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 650 A.2d 680, 683 (D.C. 1994). 41 appellant’s admission that he set the fire (“what I’m burning”) and was “literally watching what [he was] burning.” 62 Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he knew he was creating an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to S.M.J. by setting the fire. This argument, too, is unavailing. Starting an uncontrolled fire in the middle of the night in a house where a young child is known to be sleeping, and doing nothing to alert anyone or protect that child, “constitutes at least reckless behavior creating a grave risk of bodily injury to the child.” 63 D. Motion for a New Trial Appellant asserts the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial, in which he argued that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We have already disposed of the latter ground. As to the former, appellant principally argues that by acquitting him of arson, the 62 In addition, the evidence that appellant was in financial difficulties and connived with a friend to submit an inflated insurance claim for the fire damage supplied a possible pecuniary motive for him to set the fire. 63 Phenis v. United States, 909 A.2d 138, 164 (D.C. 2006). 42 jury found he did not intentionally set his house on fire. In rejecting this argument, the trial court noted that “juries are permitted to return inconsistent verdicts.” 64 A “trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. We will not reverse if the denial is reasonable and supported by the record.” 65 A “new trial will be ordered in the interest of justice only when, after considering the evidence, the court can find that ‘exceptional circumstances’ prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial.” 66 Such exceptional circumstances are absent here, and we perceive no abuse of discretion or other error on the part of the trial judge in denying appellant’s motion. As we have said, the proof at trial amply supported the jury’s guilty verdicts, and it is well-settled that “a not guilty verdict to one count of an indictment that is inconsistent with a guilty verdict to another count cannot invalidate the guilty verdict so long as the guilty 64 Citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974). 65 Green v. United States, 164 A.3d 86, 90 (D.C. 2017). 66 Tyer v. United States, 912 A.2d 1150, 1167 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Huggins v. United States, 333 A.2d 385, 387 (D.C. 1975)). 43 verdict is based upon sufficient evidence.” 67 The trial judge properly abided by that rule. 68