Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Kathryn R.

Text: Kathryn R. stated she believed a person who deliberately killed should be put to death, in spite of any background or mitigating evidence that might be presented. She had a sister whose boyfriend had been beaten to death with a crowbar during a gas station robbery. She stated that this incident might have an effect on her because the person who committed the offense was only lightly punished and she was displeased with that outcome. At one point she stated she was unsure whether she could set aside her personal views concerning the death penalty. After the law and the procedures were explained to her, however, she indicated she would want to know the defendant's background and would hope she could keep an open mind and listen to all the evidence. She could vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if it was really strong evidence. She explained she did not believe drug and alcohol use would constitute such evidence, but a brutal childhood might hold more weight. It would be difficult but she would attempt to put aside her personal feelings concerning the death penalty. Defense counsel challenged her for cause, but the trial court properly disallowed the challenge. Although her answers were equivocal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding she would be willing to follow the law and consider both possible penalties. 5. Implied bias Defendant additionally contends that the trial court erred in denying challenges for cause to four prospective jurors  three of those discussed above (Gary M., Harley R., and Kathryn R.) and a fourth, Gary Mc. [5]  based on their asserted implied bias. Gary M. had been the victim of a robbery and shooting. Harley R.'s brother had been the victim of a robbery, during which the brother was seriously injured. Kathryn R.'s sister had a boyfriend who was beaten to death during a gas station robbery. Gary Mc. had two friends in law enforcement who were killed on the job. We apply the same standard of review to challenges for cause based upon a prospective juror's bias as we do to challenges based on the juror's views concerning the death penalty. If the prospective juror's statements are conflicting or equivocal, the court's determination of the actual state of mind is binding. If the statements are consistent, the court's ruling will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 896-897, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228.) Jurors Gary M., Harley R., and Kathryn R. were challenged during the Hovey voir dire, and all of the circumstances indicate that the challenges were based upon their views concerning the death penalty  including the impact of their personal experiences on those views  and not on any alleged inability to be impartial regarding guilt or innocence. Thus, the challenges to these jurors have been fully addressed above. Defense counsel did challenge Gary Mc. for cause based upon his relationship with law enforcement. Gary Mc. had been a deputy sheriff. He had been the victim of a violent assault when he worked as a park ranger and had two friends in law enforcement who had been murdered. He stated he did not believe that experience would have any effect upon his ability to consider fairly the appropriate penalty in this case. During the general voir dire, when defense counsel questioned him extensively about his relationship with law enforcement and whether he could be fair if questions were raised regarding the credibility or performance of a police officer, Gary Mc. insisted he would maintain an open mind. He stated he could be impartial and listen to the testimony of all witnesses fairly and would not be prejudiced for or against any officer. This record supports the trial court's conclusion that Gary Mc. could be a fair juror. [6] As he did in relation to the challenge to juror Peter W., discussed above, defendant argues that bias should be presumed on the basis of these jurors' experiences with violent crime, relying upon federal cases concluding that bias may be implied or presumed from the potential for substantial emotional involvement inherent in certain relationships. (See, e.g., United States v. Allsup, supra, 566 F.2d at p. 71; see also Fields v. Woodford, supra, 309 F.3d 1095; United States v. Eubanks, supra, 591 F.2d 513.) Even assuming, as discussed above, that such decisions are persuasive, these four potential jurors' experiences with violent crime were unconnected to the present case and were not sufficiently similar to create the type of emotional involvement that these cases viewed as a ground for disqualification. 6. Exclusion of jurors from guilt phase under Witt Defendant argues he was deprived of due process by the exclusion of jurors from the guilt phase of his trial because of their stated inability to impose the death penalty. He invites us to reconsider our contrary conclusion in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680. We continue to adhere to that decision, in which we held that the exclusion of jurors who could not consider imposing the death penalty from serving on the guilt phase of a capital trial was justified by the interest of the state in maintaining a unitary jury for both phases of the trial. ( Id. at p. 353, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680; see People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80.) 7. Batson-Wheeler issues Defendant contends the prosecutor employed peremptory challenges to excuse Hispanic jurors on the basis of race, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. (See People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.) After the prosecutor employed one of his few remaining peremptory challenges to excuse a Hispanic-surnamed juror, defense counsel objected on the ground the prosecutor was exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race. After asking for and receiving the prosecutor's explanation for excusing that juror and four other Hispanic jurors, the trial court ruled that each reason given by the prosecutor was sufficient. Defendant contends the trial court erred in so concluding and that the prosecutor's reasons for excusing Prospective Jurors Norma R., Jimmy B., Frank F., and Irene H. were contrived. The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated the applicable legal standards. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416, 162 L.Ed.2d 129, fn. omitted.) This court gives great deference to the trial court in distinguishing bona fide reasons from sham excuses. ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) As explained below, the record supports the trial court's conclusions that each of the jurors at issue was excused for valid, race-neutral reasons.