Opinion ID: 1992635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Use of the Property

Text: The defendants contend that they are not prohibited by the enactment of the 1965 zoning ordinance from allowing the property to be used for the operation of a junkyard since their enterprise qualifies as a legal nonconforming use. In support of their position defendants invite our attention to § 45-24-10 which reads as follows: Pre-existing uses saved.  No ordinance enacted under the authority of this chapter shall prevent or be construed to prevent the continuance of the use of any building or improvement for any purpose to which such building or improvement is lawfully devoted at the time of the enactment of such ordinance. The Scituate zoning ordinance embodies a similar provision. The town argues that defendants cannot bring themselves within the sheltering classification of a nonconforming use since their failure to apply for and acquire a junkyard license rendered unlawful the use of the properties in question; the town maintains that such an unlawful use of property cannot mature into a valid nonconforming use. In countering the town's assertion, defendants claim that the Scituate ordinance which requires an automobile junkyard to be licensed is a regulatory enactment which governs only the activities conducted on their land and does not appertain to the use to which a parcel of land may be employed. In taking this position, they rely on two New Jersey cases, Scavone v. Mayor and Council, 49 N.J. Super. 423, 140 A.2d 238, and Township of Andover v. Lake, 89 N.J. Super. 313, 214 A.2d 870. In essence both cases hold that a failure to secure a license designed to regulate a certain activity will not adversely affect the status of the land upon which such an activity is being conducted from being classified as a legal nonconforming use. As further support of their position, defendants cite the following passage from 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning (3d ed.), p. 58-17: But where the invalidity of the use prior to the effective date of the zoning restriction lies in failure to secure a license required by an ordinance adopted pursuant to the general police power, other than a zoning ordinance or an ordinance regulating use of the land as distinguished from regulation of an activity upon land in general, it is generally held that such an invalidity does not preclude acquisition of a nonconforming use protected as against the operation of the subsequent zoning restriction. We note that there is, however, a significant division of judicial opinion over the theory espoused in the New Jersey cases and in Rathkopf. See Eggert v. Board of Appeals, 29 Ill.2d 591, 195 N.E.2d 164. A nonconforming use is a particular use which does not conform to the zoning restrictions applicable to certain property but which use is protected against the restrictions because it existed lawfully prior to the effective date of the zoning ordinance and has continued unabated since that time. 2 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (3d ed.), § 16-2, pp. 211-13; Rhyne, Municipal Law, § 32-26, pp. 903-04. The diversity of opinion arises as to just what renders a pre-existing use unlawful. Rathkopf, as we have observed, is of the opinion that only a noncompliance with an ordinance which regulates the use of land will disqualify an individual's property from attaining the status of a legal nonconforming use. On the other hand, Yokley theorizes that any prior use of land in an unauthorized character or any business endeavor carried on in contravention of an ordinance unrelated to zoning is sufficient to disqualify a property owner from acquiring a legal nonconforming use. 2 Yokley, id. Here we have before us an ordinance which in our opinion regulates both the use of land and the activities conducted thereon. This being so, this court is not confronted with, nor do we decide, whether the noncompliance with an ordinance unrelated to the use of land would prevent a nonconforming use from coming to fruition. Our finding that the Scituate junkyard ordinance regulates both the use of property and the activities conducted thereon is based upon the mandates which are set forth in the enabling act [2] and incorporated in the ordinance. Among other things, the ordinance provides that no junkyard can be licensed unless it is a specific distance from a state highway or school. Moreover, the ordinance further dictates that not only must a junkyard be located more than 300 feet from any park, bathing beach, school, church or cemetery and not within ordinary view therefrom but such a commercial enterprise must also be screened from view by natural objects or fences of at least six feet in height. These restrictions, as the trial justice correctly observed, so meaningfully curtail the use to which land may be employed for junkyard purposes as to be deemed the equivalent of an ordinance which regulates the utilization of land. In fact, the use of land is controlled to such an extent by the Scituate junkyard act that it could well be designated as a quasi-zoning ordinance. The defendants' failure to comply with the requirements of the Scituate junkyard ordinance, in our opinion, precludes them from acquiring the protective status of a valid nonconforming use. For a nonconforming use to be sanctioned, it must be lawfully established prior to the implementation of the zoning restriction or regulation. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. rev.), § 25-186, pp. 483-84. Compare David A. Ulrich, Inc. v. Town of Saukville, 7 Wis.2d 173, 96 N.W.2d 612. Clearly, therefore, having failed to comply with the requirements of an ordinance regulating the use as well as the activities conducted upon their land, defendants could never have acquired a lawful nonconforming use which would entitle them to protection against the restrictions of the 1965 Scituate zoning ordinance.