Opinion ID: 4512196
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: matters subject to section 502 of this ti-

Text: tle; ... (4) matters covered by chapter 72 of this ti- tle[, which provides for review in this court of decisions by the Court of Appeals for Vet- erans Claims (“Veterans Court”)]. Id. § 511(b) (emphasis added). Section 511 thus provides only two potential paths for judicial review of a discontinuance “decision by the Secretary”: (1) directly in this court for matters subject to section 502 (which, as we have concluded, Ashford’s challenge is not), 38 U.S.C. § 511(b)(1); and (2) a review of a decision of the Veterans Court, id. §§ 511(b)(4), 7292. The second path of review involves both the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) and the Veterans Court. Section 511(a)’s general preclusion language—that “the decision of the Secretary [of the VA] . . . may not be reviewed . . . by any court”—merely channels review of these “decision[s]” through the Board and the Veterans Court. See Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Ass’n, Inc. v. Case: 18-1213 Document: 66 Page: 15 Filed: 03/03/2020 ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS 15 AFFAIRS McDonald, 830 F.3d 570, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that section 511(a) divests district courts of jurisdiction over APA challenges to “decision[s] of the Secretary”). The legislative history of section 511 is consistent with this understanding: Congress found a “specialized review process” desirable “both because it avoided overburdening the district court system [with APA review] and because the district courts lacked the necessary expertise” for review. Bates v. Nicholson, 398 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We conclude that the system of Board review is applicable to the VA’s actions in question. The Veterans Court has “exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.” 38 U.S.C. § 7252. 6 And the Board has jurisdiction to review “[a]ll questions in a matter which under section 511(a) of this title is subject to decision by the Secretary [of the VA].” 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Section 7104(a) is implemented by 38 C.F.R. § 20.104(a), which provides in relevant part that: All questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans or their dependents or survivors are subject to review on appeal to the Secretary. Decisions in such appeals are made by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Examples of the issues over which the Board has jurisdiction include, but are not limited to, the following: ... 6 For example, the Veterans Court is authorized to: “hold unlawful and set aside decisions . . . issued or adopted by . . . the Board of Veterans’ Appeals . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 38 U.S.C. § 7261. Case: 18-1213 Document: 66 Page: 16 Filed: 03/03/2020 16 ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (8) Veterans’ Educational Assistance (38 U.S.C. chapter 34). (emphasis added). The benefits provided here are “Veterans’ Educational Assistance” under chapter 34. Accordingly, Ashford may appeal “a decision of the Secretary” on suspension or discontinuance of benefits to the Board, the Board’s decision to the Veterans Court, and the Veterans Court’s decision to this court. Ashford appears to agree that a veteran denied educational assistance could seek review through the Board process. But Ashford contends that the Board would lack jurisdiction over any appeal from Ashford, stating that it is “unaware . . . of any instance in which the Board has entertained an appeal brought by anyone other than a beneficiary [i.e., a veteran] or representative of a beneficiary.” Ashford Supp. Br. 4 n.1. However, our decision in Bates is to the contrary. In Bates, we held that an attorney’s challenge to the VA’s cancellation of his accreditation was a “decision . . . under a law that affects the provision of benefits . . . to veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans” and so must be heard by the Board. 398 F.3d at 1359, 1362 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 551(a)). We explained that although attorney accreditation did not, in itself, “affect[] the provision of benefits,” the word “law” in the statute meant a “single statutory enactment bearing a Public Law number.” Id. at 1361. Since the Public Law that included the VA attorney accreditation provisions (the Veterans Act of 1936) also included other provisions that affected the provision of benefits, the plaintiff’s challenge met Section 511’s “under a law” clause. Id. at 1362. Here, the discontinuance of funding to Ashford is under a statutory section and subsection—38 U.S.C. § 3690(b)— that itself “affects the provision of benefits . . . to veterans”; the subsection provides that “[t]he Secretary [of the VA] may discontinue the educational assistance allowance of Case: 18-1213 Document: 66 Page: 17 Filed: 03/03/2020 ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS 17 AFFAIRS any eligible veteran.” See id. § 3690(b)(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, section 3690 was enacted as part of a Public Law (the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-540 § 1790, 86 Stat. 1074, 1088) that broadly affects the provision of benefits to veterans. Therefore, like the attorney in Bates, Ashford is within section 511(a)’s “provision of benefits” language and can appeal to the Board upon a “decision of the Secretary.” Ashford nonetheless contends that the Board would lack jurisdiction over an appeal by Ashford because Ashford is not a natural person. Ashford notes 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(2)(A), providing that review at the Board is to be initiated by a “claimant,” and 38 U.S.C. § 5100, defining a “claimant” as an “individual applying for, or submitting a claim for, any benefit under the laws administered by the Secretary.” Ashford contends that the word “‘individual’ ordinarily means ‘[a] human being,’” and therefore Ashford would not be a “claimant” that may initiate Board review. Ashford Supp. Br. 2 (quoting Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454 (2012) (quoting 7 Oxford English Dictionary 880 (2d ed. 1989)) (alteration in original))). But the word “individual,” when read in the context of a statutory scheme, can include both natural persons and other entities. Thus, for example, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 (1998) held that “in the context of the [relevant statutory] section[,] Congress undoubtedly intended the word ‘individual’ to be construed as synonymous with the word ‘person’” (i.e., including both “natural persons” and other entities). The Supreme Court decision upon which Ashford relies, Mohamad, is not to the contrary. While it concluded that an “individual” is normally a natural person, citing Clinton, it stated that “the word ‘individual’ [does not] invariably mean[] ‘natural person’ when used in a statute. Congress remains free, as always, to give the word a broader or different meaning.” Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 455. Case: 18-1213 Document: 66 Page: 18 Filed: 03/03/2020 18 ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS Here, construing “claimant” to only include “individual[s]” that are “natural person[s]” would prevent any entity other than an individual veteran from challenging any “decision of the Secretary” denying benefits. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). We do not think Congress intended such a result, which would be contrary to the presumption of judicial review. This result is also supported by the design of the statutory scheme. Congress clearly provided that veterans denied educational benefits could and should resort to the Board appeals process. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Congress could not have intended that veterans denied educational assistance benefits secure relief through the Board process but deny such review to educational institutions that receive such benefits on the veterans’ behalf. To be sure, the Board process has often been slow to process claims. See Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2017). But we are confident that—because of the large number of veterans affected and the need for prompt resolution in view of the effect of a discontinuance on the conduct of both veterans and educational institutions—the Board will process such complaints expeditiously. Thus, we read “claimant” in 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(2)(A) to include legal entities like Ashford. 7 In summary, we conclude that while neither APA nor section 502 review is available with respect to the agency 7 For similar reasons, we find unavailing Ashford’s reliance on certain implementing regulations and forms that presuppose that only a veteran may appeal to the Board. See Ashford Supp. Br. 3 (noting form that “requires submission of the ‘veteran’s name,’ ‘veteran’s social security number,’ ‘veteran’s VA file number,’ and ‘veteran’s date of birth’”). Case: 18-1213 Document: 66 Page: 19 Filed: 03/03/2020 ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS 19 AFFAIRS action challenged here, the action may be reviewable pursuant to section 511(b)(4).