Opinion ID: 2172304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: due processregularity of proceedingsallocution

Text: In the courtroom on the morning of July 7th the Presiding Justice ordered a mistrial in the case of Doughty v. Anderson and explained to the jurors his reason for doing so. He then addressed the petitioner stating his reasons for concluding that the petitioner's conduct was contemptuous and could not go unpunished. Petitioner calls our attention to M.R.Crim.P. Rule 32(a) which reads, in part:    Before imposing sentence the court shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he desires to be heard prior to the imposition of sentence. The defendant may be heard personally or by counsel or both. Failure of the court to so address the defendant shall not constitute grounds for relief under Rule 35 (b) of these rules, unless the defendant shows that he has been prejudiced thereby. Although this matter must go back for resentence where he will doubtless be offered opportunity for allocution this issue merits brief discussion. While the type of offense of which the petitioner was adjudged to be guilty is classified as criminal contempt committed in the presence of the Court, it seems clear that not all the procedural rules relating to the ordinary criminal offense are applicable. It is an offense sui generis. Cheff v. Schnachenberg, supra. For example, there is no right to notice, a written charge, hearing, and to present witnesses. However, more desirable practice would permit allocution in open court before sentence. We do not find that petitioner was prejudiced. Counsel met with the Justice in chambers before going into Court the morning of July 7th. There petitioner urged upon the Court that a mistrial should be ordered to protect his client from the effects of his conduct. He said, during their discussion: I am responsible for it, there is no question about that. You may deal with me any way you should, I'm willing to accept it but I don't think my client should be penalized.        I regret that incident yesterday and again I say I'm willing to accept whatever you feel I deserve.        I don't feel instructions from the Court could correct the animosity that they [the jurors] must feel toward me.        I regret having said that. This discussion between counsel and Court in chambers was an extended one. In our view the petitioner was fully heard in chambers, on the record, and there was no requirement that he be heard again in the courtroom. He had in effect acknowledged the contempt and expressed his regrets and he had indicated that he was willing to accept whatever punishment the Court felt it should give. Immediately after sentence petitioner was given an opportunity to speak and he did so at length acknowledging his bad conduct and offering his apologies to both the jury and the Court. Petitioner then requested permission to speak to the Court in chambers and there sought unsuccessfully to purge himself of the confinement part of the sentence. In our view the petitioner had adequate opportunity to be heard and was not prejudiced. Petitioner also argues that the Presiding Justice's remarks in chambers following sentence demonstrates that he was prejudiced and that he considered matters not of his personal knowledge in arriving at his judgment of contempt. MR. ALEXANDER: Judge, I openly ask you if there is any way I can perhaps purge myself of this confinement? It obviously will work its hardship in terms of, you know, my practice and that sort of thing. THE COURT: I'm afraid not, Grover. I am not very proud of myself for what I have done and it's the most difficult thing I have had to do in my life. I have made up my mind this is the only way I could bring to your attention what I think you have done. We have had some experience before but I have never had occasion to get upset. But I'm not the only one, and without attempting to justify anything I just say to you that your reputation with all of the judges, or most of the judges in this particular area makes this no particular surprise. I mean, I think you have had it coming. MR. ALEXANDER: You really do. THE COURT: If you didn't have it coming I wouldn't have done it to you. The accusation which the petitioner made in open court was clearly contemptuous and we see nothing in the quoted remarks which suggests to us that the Justice found it so because he was already prejudiced against the petitioner.