Opinion ID: 78192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Enhancement Based on a Prior Conviction

Text: We review constitutional sentencing issues de novo. United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946, 948 (11th Cir.2005). In the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) reaffirm[ed] [its] holding in Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)]: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The prior-conviction exception derived from the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which held that the government need not allege in its indictment and need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence. United States v. Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir.2004). In United States v. Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11th Cir.2006), the defendant argued that the prior-conviction exception in Almendarez-Torres was of questionable force based on the Supreme Court's subsequent criticism of the decision. However, we observed that  Booker simply restated the rule set forth in Apprendi, including the prior-conviction exception, and, therefore, we were bound to follow Almendarez-Torres until the Supreme Court overruled it. Id. at 1246-47 (Though wounded, Almendarez-Torres still marches on and we are ordered to follow. We will join the funeral procession only after the Supreme Court has decided to bury it.); accord United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir.2006) (As we have said several times, unless and until the Supreme Court specifically overrules Almendarez-Torres, we will continue to follow it.). The defendant in Gibson also argued that, even if we followed Almendarez-Torres, the jury was nonetheless still required to find that his prior convictions were controlled substance offenses for purposes of the career offender enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Id. at 1247. We also rejected that argument, holding that whether Gibson's prior convictions were felonies involving a controlled substance is a question of law to be answered by the court, not a question of fact to be found by the jury. Id. In this case, Osgood's sentence was enhanced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), providing for a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months' imprisonment where, inter alia, the defendant is convicted of a controlled substance offense involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana and has been previously convicted of a felony drug offense. [15] 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The district court adopted the probation officer's finding that Osgood was convicted of a felony drug offense in 2003, and Osgood did not challenge that factual finding at sentencing. Instead, Osgood argued, as he does on appeal, that this prior conviction was not pled or proven at trial and, therefore, could not trigger an enhanced sentence under § 841(b)(1)(B). This argument, however, is foreclosed by our holding in Gibson that the prior-conviction exception of Almendarez-Torres remains binding precedent. 434 F.3d at 1246-47. Osgood also argues on appeal that a jury was required to find that his prior conviction constituted a felony drug offense within the meaning of § 841(b)(1)(B). However, this argument is again foreclosed by Gibson, which held that it is a question of law for a judge as to whether a prior conviction triggers a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 1247. Finally, Osgood's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) is misplaced because that decision did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1307, 1316 n. 3 (11th Cir.2005) (Although recent decisions, including Shepard ..., may arguably cast doubt on the future prospects of Almendarez-Torres 's holding regarding prior convictions, the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Almendarez-Torres. As a result, we must follow Almendarez-Torres. ). Accordingly, we reject Osgood's sentencing argument.