Opinion ID: 3008595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kay Thomas's Testimony and Harmless Error

Text: The majority agrees that much of Thomas's testimony was improper and exceeded the scope of allowable humanizing evidence. This means it was victim impact testimony which could not properly be given in the Commonwealth's case in chief, if at all, because Thomas did not qualify to give such testimony as she was not among the statutorily eligible witnesses for victim impact testimony. Additionally, the record indicates that much of her testimony was given even though the trial court. had expressly ruled that she could not testify on those issues. Yet the majority concludes that. this erroneous testimony-which included describing an international card campaign expressing outrage over the crime ; saying that the victim had met the devil at the hands of the appellants ; graphically describing his injuries and how she sat and held his hand ; describing conversations with the victim's exwife; and saying that his brown eyes turned blue on the day he died, among other non-substantive comments-was harmless because the evidence ot'guilt, was otherwise overwhelming, meaning that the erroneous testimony had no influence on the verdict. I cannot join this conclusion . Over the years, we have struggled with how to apply the harmless error rule, RCr 9.24, to non-constitutional errors.l l At times, we have employed a guilt-based test that focuses on whether the result would have been different absent the error, usually by looking at whether the evidence other than that erroneously admitted was overwhelming (and in some outliers, merely sufficient for a guilty verdict) . See, e.a., Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 313, 324-25 (Ky. 2006) ; Taylor v. Commonwealth , 175 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Ky. 2005); Abernathy v. Commonwealth , 439 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Ky. 1969) . In other cases, we have looked at whether the error had any effect on, or 11The standard for constitutional errors has been set by the United States Supreme Court. See Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Because such errors are always serious business, the bar for such errors to be found harmless is set rather high, requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 23-24. The beneficiary in criminal cases will almost inevitably be the Commonwealth . The error here, however, does not have a constitutional dimension, as it is an evidentiary error. 43 contributed to, the verdict returned by the jury. See Morgan v. Commonwealth , 189 S .W.3d 99, 108 n.27 (Ky. 2006) ; Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S .W.2d 466, 471 (Ky . 1998) . In recent years, the debate, at least as to the larger issue of different result versus effect on the verdict, appears to have been settled, with the effect-on-the-verdict test being the correct standard. See Harp v. Commonwealth , 266 S .W.3d 8 13, 818 (Ky. 2008), Monroe v. Commonwealth , 244 S.W.3d 69, 78 (Ky. 2008) ; Emerson v. Commonwealth, 230 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Ky. 2007) ; Vau hn v. Commonwealth, 230 S.W.3d 559, 561 (Ky. 2007) . The weight of critical opinion supports this shift. See, e.g. , Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless : When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated? , 70 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 1 167 (1995) (arguing in favor of an effect-on-the verdict test) ; Roger J . Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970) (same) . Deciding on effect on the verdict over different result alone does not answer all questions related to the harmless error doctrine, however. For example, how much effect must the error have had on the verdict before the error is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal? Is any effect enough or must there be a substantial effect? These are difficult questions to which we have unfortunately provided inconsistent answers. Though the general focus on effects on the verdict has been steady in our recent decisions, the exact formulations of the standard to be applied have differed, sometimes substantially. See Harp, 266 S.W.3d at 818 (explaining the test as simply whether an error affected the verdict.) ; Monroe, 244 S. W.3d at 78 (describing the test as whether an error had a reasonable probability affecting the verdict) ; Emerson, 230 S.W.3d at 570 (applying a test of whether there was a reasonable possibility, that [the error] affected the verdict) ; Vau -hn, 230 S.W.3d at 561 (employing a test of whether the error possibl[y] . . . had an effect on the verdict). Though these tests arguably differ little, and despite a proper core concern for the impact of an error on a jury's verdict, they are inconsistent. Rather than continuing to muddle through the muck and trying to invent the wheel anew, our most recent cases have sought guidance from the federal courts . Specifically ; we have adopted the harmless-error standard announced in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) . See Crossland v. Commonwealth , 291 S.W.3d 223, 233 (Ky. 2009) (applying Kotteakos as the harmless error standard for non-constitutional errors) ; Winstead v. Commonwealth , 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009) (The Kotteakos standard is the appropriate standard for non-constitutional errors.) . The standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in that case requires that a non-constitutional error have a substantial effect on the verdict before reversal is merited: If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not aff(,(-.I(--(I- `Ilic i ot be increlv whether there was etjough. to sul?j)ort tl'w__tLesult_, apart from the. phase yQd by the error . _IL_ i s nat 1-1 11 ct li e r t 1.ip e, rrolitself had substantial influence . 11'so, or it` ow'. is left ill grave doubt, the conviction cannot. stand . Id. at 764-65 (1946) (emphasis added) . Restated if) sim' .P'l(,st- terms, a v 60H_ constitutional evidentiary error must fmvc 11,'Id 'I SUbstai-itial effect, on the verdict actually returned by the jury or the _J udgmcn t entered by the court. i n order to require reversal . Though we have finally, adopted what . I consider to he the proper standard for evaluating harmless error, we still have not engaged in a thoughtful discussion of why it is the correct standard in a published decision, . having instead simply declared it to be the appropriate standard, despite the fact that it represents a clear departure from some of our earlier precedent. And even as the articulation of the rule has changed, we have failed even to admit in a published decision that the rule has changed or that the various standards we have articulated are different. Yet, that this new standard is different and how it is different are important going forward, as the harmless error standard goes to the heart of what. we do when we review a criminal jury trial. Because the standard is different, it means that the results in some cases will be different, meaning that we cannot simply plug the correct standard into- an opinion -without demonstrating how it applies-or doesntwhich is what the majority has failed to do here. The inescapable conclusion is that the standard and the policy behind it matter. We must still think long and hard on the issue of harmless error so that we can properly apply the new standard . Ultimately, I think that the majority is wrong in its harmless error determination in this case . Why this is the case, however, requires a candid discussion about harmless error that acknowledges it is a difficult and subtle proposition, and not just a rule to preserve convictions for heinous crimes in the face of error. In explaining why I disagree with the majority's application, I hope to focus on what must: be considered . To begin with, I agree with our decisions designating Kotteakos as the appropriate standard for non-constitutional errors. Such errors are likely to be less serious than constitutional errors, and by their very nature, they rarely touch on those fundamental concerns and guarantees that lie at the heart of the criminal justice system and are more likely to be merely technical or relatively minor. This distinction between the various types of errors is anticipated by the harmless error rule itself, which focuses on substantial justice and the substantial rights of the parties. RCr 9 .24 . Kotteakos , by offering a lesser standard than that required for constitutional errors, also recognizes the distinction . My foremost concern is that the majority, in focusing on whether the properly admitted evidence in this case was overwhelming, has effectively applied the old different-result approach to harmless error rather than the effect-on-the-verdict approach under Kotteakos. The different-result approach required that an appellate court. look at all the evidence, minus that which was improperly admitted, and determine whether a jury would have returned a guilty verdict. This is different from a situation where an appellate court looks at sufficiency of the evidence and must determine whether the evidence is such that. a reasonable jury could return a guilty verdict. This latter analysis is a way of looking at what the jury in the case actually did and evaluating whether it was reasonable. The former requires postulating a new, entirely hypothetical verdict, one that was not returned by the jury that actually heard the case, since that jury heard the improper evidence . Looking at the evidence and deciding a different result would not have occurred is tantamount to directing a verdict for the Commonwealth after the fact. Thus, the policy underlying the different-result approach is a dangerous one that threatens to undermine our rules concerning who gets to find the facts in a case . Beyond the policy concerns, however, are substantial constitutional concerns about the different-result approach . Here, special concern exists that judicial toleration of harmless error is not a. license for judicial invasion of the issue-resolving province constitutionally reserved for the jury. Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 Sup . Ct. Rev. 196, 200 (1989) . The postulation of a non-existent jury verdict absent the error lies at the heart of the different-result test. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, such an approach runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee: Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, . . .the reviewing court [is] to consider . . . not. what effect the . . . error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it. had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand . Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict. The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to support: that verdict might. be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee. . . . The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal . . . . Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993) (emphasis added, quotation marks and citations omitted) . Any approach to harmless error that focuses on whether the result, would have been different, including whether the other evidence in the case was ovenwdlelnling, is suspect for these reasons. - _ _ r ~. ~_ _ _ _ r 11L 1 is possIUlc  L, A-1L ,-, i- L11Q1, -I- 1- .. ..,. Liteie ivi.i1u bc 114 1,. substantial, even overwhelming, evidence of guilt in a case, and yet a piece of improper evidence could also have been admitted that substantially influenced the jury. This is, in fact, what I think happened in this case. Instead of looking at whether the other evidence was overwhelming, we should instead focus on what effect the erroneous testimony had on jury's verdict in this case. Otherwise, we return to the old standard, albeit under a different name. Having said my piece about the harmless error standard, the remaining task is to apply it to the facts of this case. When the effect-on-the-verdict, test is applied to this case, I conclude that the introduction of Kaye Thomas's testimony could not be harmless . Most of Ms. Thomas's testimony was not about the victim's life, but. was instead about her and the community's reaction to his attack. While Thomas's testimony was no doubt heartfelt and motivated by a desire to do good, it was particularly prejudicial to the appellants. Thomas was emotional on the stand, breaking into tears at one point. She was condemnatory of the appellants, testifying that she started her card campaign to protest against the violence that had been done to the victim and stated that he had met the devil. Ultimately, Thomas served as a proxy for the entire community to express outrage against the appellants . I can only conclude that such testimony, as emotional and echoing with community anger as it was, had a substant=ial effect on the guilty verdict in this case . Moreover, we have consistently disapproved of evidence which serves little or no legitimate evidentiary purpose other than to engender sympathy for the victim . Coulthard v. Commonwealth, 230 S.W.3d 572, 578 (Ky. 2007) ; Ice v. Commonwealth , 667 S.W .2d 671, 676 (Ky. 1984) (Evidence to engender sympathy for the victim . . .violate[s] the rule excluding evidence where its probative value is slight and far outweighed by its inflammatory nature.) . As the majority notes, Thomas's testimony was not the sort of humanizing evidence allowed by Kentucky law; instead, it was akin to victim impact testimony. [T]he introduction of victim impact. evidence during the guilt. phase is reversible error. Ernst, 160 S.W.3d at 763 (emphasis added) ; see also Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 542 (Ky. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Hudson V. Commonwealth, 202 S .W.3d 17 (Ky. 2006) ([I]t is improper for the jury to base its decision on guilt or innocence, or on the appropriate punishment, on who is the victim.). I have no doubt that the crime in this case is among the most heinous and barbaric ever committed. I have no doubt that Ms. Thomas is a loving, humanitarian person, who acted only with best of intentions and an innocent heart in testifying on behalf of the victim . But I also have no doubt that her inflammatory testimony was improper under the law of this Commonwealth and that it laid an inexorable taint on the jury's verdict.