Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Consideration of Invalid Special Circumstances

Text: (68) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider the invalid special-circumstance findings as to multiple murder and intentional murder for financial gain. (See pts. III.A. & III.B., ante. ) Error did indeed occur. But reversal is not required. Certainly, the error here is not prejudicial per se, but rather is subject to harmless-error analysis. Whether it violates state law only or implicates the United States Constitution as well is immaterial. It is harmless under both the `reasonable possibility' test of People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135], and the `reasonable doubt' test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]. `Although we presume that the jurors [followed their instructions and] considered the invalid special-circumstance findings independent of their underlying facts, we cannot conclude that they could reasonably have given them any significant independent weight.' ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 793.) Indeed, in his summation the prosecutor himself strongly argued that the findings carried no force apart from the facts. Any reasonable juror would have been persuaded.