Opinion ID: 1301855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Behrendt's Negligence Claim

Text: ¶ 112 The negligence claim Behrendt pled can be viewed as being based both on an affirmative act negligently undertaken and on a failure to act. For example, Behrendt alleged that Silvan was negligent in the manner in which the tank was manufactured and in failing to issue proper warnings and instructions. [8] Presumably, the claim of negligent manufacturing arises from the allegation that the tank was manufactured as a side job under Silvan's policy that permitted side jobs. This contention is based on the implicit allegation that Silvan's creation of a policy that permitted side jobs was an affirmative act negligently undertaken. ¶ 113 The majority opinion focuses on the allegation that the tank was negligently manufactured because of Silvan's policy that permitted side jobs. [9] Therefore, the majority opinion is analyzing an affirmative act, i.e., the creation of the policy permitting side jobs. ¶ 114 That the majority opinion's focus is on an affirmative act is shown by its decision to employ Section 7 of the Third Restatement of Torts as the framework for much of its discussion. [10] Section 7 of that Restatement addresses the element of duty for negligence claims. It provides: An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 7(a) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). Section 7's discussion of duty is limited to affirmative acts; it does not address the element of duty based on an alleged failure to act. As the Restatement explains: Relationship with affirmative duties to act. The general duty rule contained in this Section is conditioned on the actor's having engaged in conduct that creates a risk of physical harm. Section 37 [11] states the obverse of this rule: In the absence of conduct creating a risk of harm to others, an actor ordinarily has no duty of care to another. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 cmt. l (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). Accordingly, because of the manner in which the majority opinion has shaped its discussion, I conclude that it presumes an affirmative act based on Silvan's policy of permitting side jobs. ¶ 115 It is important for the reader to be aware of whether the claim analyzed is one of an affirmative act negligently undertaken or an alleged failure to act, in order to fully understand the decision. Here, it is an affirmative act, the creation of Silvan's policy permitting side jobs, that was alleged to be negligently undertaken. Behrendt has not presented to us a negligence claim based on an alleged failure to act. ¶ 116 Even though the majority opinion employs § 7's discussion of duty as a framework, it focuses its discussion of liability on the second element of a negligence claim, breach. [12] It concludes that Silvan was not negligent because it did not breach its duty of ordinary care under the circumstance. [13] ¶ 117 With regard to Silvan's creation of its side job policy, I agree that Silvan did not breach its duty of ordinary care under the circumstances. Silvan acted affirmatively when it created the side job policy. Accordingly, Silvan's policy must have evidenced the exercise of reasonable care, Johnson v. Seipel, 152 Wis.2d 636, 644, 449 N.W.2d 66 (Ct.App.1989), which we have also characterized as ordinary care under the circumstances, Totsky v. Riteway Bus Service, Inc., 2000 WI 29, ¶ 57, 233 Wis.2d 371, 607 N.W.2d 637. ¶ 118 It is undisputed that Silvan's policy precluded the manufacturing of pressure vessels as side jobs. I conclude that the policy forbidding the manufacture of pressure vessels was reasonable, and Behrendt does not contend that Silvan's preclusion of the manufacturing of pressure vessels as a side job was unreasonable or that it violated Silvan's duty of ordinary care under the circumstances. Furthermore, Silvan's policy was followed on this side job because holes were cut into the tank so that it could not have been used as a pressure vessel when it left Silvan's control. Therefore, Silvan did not breach its duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. ¶ 119 Furthermore, the tank that left Silvan did not cause Behrendt's injuries. It was the actions of third parties unaffiliated with Silvan that created the tank to which air pressure could be applied, which tank caused Behrendt's injuries. III. CONCLUSION ¶ 120 In conclusion, the negligence claim that was argued to us is based on the allegation of an affirmative act negligently undertaken. It is not based on an alleged failure to act. Therefore, the majority's analysis relying on the determination of breach, rather than duty, is appropriate in this instance. ¶ 121 Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the majority opinion.