Opinion ID: 201049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Discerned Standard.

Text: 40 This brings us to the final leg of our journey. Having concluded that the district court appropriately resorted to the traditional four-part standard for preliminary injunctive relief en route to its alternative holding, the question reduces to the supportability of the court's determination that C-H failed to achieve that benchmark. Upon close perlustration, we find no fault with that determination. 41 Under the accepted framework, the four elements that a district court faced with a motion for a preliminary injunction must assess are the following: 42 (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no injunction issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the court's ruling on the public interest. 43 Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 15. In conjunction with the use of this standard, trial courts have wide discretion in making judgments regarding the appropriateness vel non of preliminary injunctive relief. Id. at 16. 44 In most cases — and the case at hand is no outlier — irreparable harm constitutes a necessary threshold showing for an award of preliminary injunctive relief. Matos v. Clinton Sch. Dist., 367 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir.2004); accord Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 217 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2000) (describing irreparable harm as an essential prerequisite for receiving such redress). The burden of demonstrating that a denial of interim relief is likely to cause irreparable harm rests squarely upon the movant. Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 18. 45 In this case, the district court found that C-H had failed to carry that burden. This finding draws substantial comfort from the record. A finding of irreparable harm must be grounded on something more than conjecture, surmise, or a party's unsubstantiated fears of what the future may have in store. Regan v. Vinick & Young ( In re Rare Coin Galleries of Am., Inc. ), 862 F.2d 896, 902 (1st Cir.1988). Here, we have been unable to discern anything resembling a realistic prospect of irreparable harm. 46 Irreparable harm most often exists where a party has no adequate remedy at law. See Rosario-Urdaz, 350 F.3d at 221. In this case, C-H ultimately seeks an award of pecuniary damages (and, in a best case scenario, that is all it will be entitled to receive). Such an award will make it whole. 5 Accordingly, its legal remedy is adequate. 47 To escape the ineluctable conclusion that it cannot show a meaningful risk of irreparable harm, C-H asserts that a denial of preliminary injunctive relief will allow BTG to enjoy the fruits of [C-H's] investment in the company without any reciprocal obligations. Appellants' Reply Br. at 22. This assertion begs the question. At any rate, it is more properly viewed in addressing the likelihood of success on the merits (an issue that we need not reach). C-H has not yet proven its mettle. If and when it does (by prevailing on the merits of its claim), it will be entitled to execute upon the judgment entered against BTG. Unless and until that happens, C-H must identify some independent reason why it will be irreparably harmed without the imposition of interim relief. 48 In a second offer to show irreparable harm, C-H posits that it is not able to monitor its admittedly substantial investment and that, therefore, it face[s] the risk that [it] will be left with nothing at the end of the day. Appellants' Reply Br. at 22. That sort of statement can be made by virtually every person who sues another for money damages. Its very ubiquity indicates why it cannot conceivably be enough to justify the issuance of a prejudgment injunction of this nature. The case law so holds. See, e.g., In re Rare Coin Galleries, 862 F.3d at 902; Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Town of W. Newbury, 835 F.2d 380, 383 (1st Cir.1987); see also Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 19 (explaining that a tenuous or overly speculative forecast of anticipated harm does not possess the substance required to show irreparable injury). 49 Two further points seem worthy of mention. First, C-H's cries of urgency are sharply undercut by its own rather leisurely approach to the question of preliminary injunctive relief. It waited more than a year after the commencement of the action to seek an injunction. That chronology has evidentiary significance: delay between the institution of an action and the filing of a motion for preliminary injunction, not attributable to intervening events, detracts from the movant's claim of irreparable harm. See JSC Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 295 F.Supp.2d 366, 390 (S.D.N.Y.2003). The longer the delay, the more pervasive the doubt. 50 Second, even assuming that there is a risk that BTG will be unable to pay a future judgment — a conclusion that has utterly no footing in the record — the Agreement granted C-H a security interest in all of BTG's property. C-H's counsel conceded at oral argument that this security interest has been perfected. Thus, C-H — unlike an ordinary plaintiff — has an alternative means for ensuring payment of any judgment that it eventually might obtain. The existence of this anchor to windward further undermines C-H's argument that it is facing an intolerable risk of irreparable harm. 51 A preliminary injunction is a potent weapon that should be used only when necessary to safeguard a litigant's legitimate interests. The instant record reflects no basis for a reasoned belief that such an order is necessary. Accordingly, we hold that the district court acted well within the encincture of its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction on the ground that C-H had failed to make the requisite showing of irreparable harm. 6 Cf. Ross-Simons I, 102 F.3d at 19 (noting that, in appeals relating to preliminary injunctions, battles over the quality and quantity of the harm alleged most often will be won or lost in the trial court).