Opinion ID: 2059329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mental Health Act Confidentiality Privilege

Text: The Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act provides that any record kept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a recipient and any communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient, including information which indicates that a person is a recipient, shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act. 740 ILCS 110/2, 3(a) (West 2000). Subsequent sections of the Act identify the persons entitled to inspect and copy a recipient's mental health record and delineate when and how disclosure to other persons or agencies may be accomplished. The Confidentiality Act is carefully drawn to maintain the confidentiality of mental health records except in the specific circumstances explicitly enumerated. Sassali v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 296 Ill.App.3d 80, 84-85, 230 Ill.Dec. 536, 693 N.E.2d 1287 (1998). In each instance where disclosure is allowed under the Act, the legislature has been careful to restrict disclosure to that which is necessary to accomplish a particular purpose. Exceptions to the Act are narrowly crafted. Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 191 Ill.App.3d 388, 402, 138 Ill.Dec. 658, 547 N.E.2d 1279 (1989). When viewed as a whole, the Act constitutes a strong statement by the General Assembly about the importance of keeping mental health records confidential. Mandziara v. Canulli, 299 Ill.App.3d 593, 599, 233 Ill.Dec. 484, 701 N.E.2d 127 (1998). That a high value is placed on privacy is evidenced by the fact that the privilege afforded a recipient of mental health treatment continues even after the recipient's death. See 740 ILCS 110/5(e) (West 2000). The statutory scheme regulating the disclosure of mental health information is appropriately rigorous. As the United States Supreme Court noted: Effective psychotherapy    depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1928, 135 L.Ed.2d 337, 345 (1996). All 50 states, the District of Columbia and the federal courts recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege, either by statute or common law. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12, 116 S.Ct. at 1929, 135 L.Ed.2d at 346. Clearly, this reflects an understanding that people will increasingly avail themselves of needed treatment if they are confident that their privacy will be protected. It is in the public interest, then, that we zealously guard against erosion of the confidentiality privilege. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11, 116 S.Ct. at 1929, 135 L.Ed.2d at 345-46 (The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance); Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill.2d 272, 233 Ill.Dec. 310, 700 N.E.2d 1018 (1998). Consequently, anyone seeking the nonconsensual release of mental health information faces a formidable challenge and must show that disclosure is authorized by the Act. In the present case, it is undisputed that records and communications concerning mental health treatment Steven may have received are subject to the privilege provided by the Mental Health Act and that Steven has not consented to its release. Furthermore, since the term communications includes any communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist    in connection with providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient, Steven's lack of consent also prevents his parents from disclosing their conversations with therapists in relation to Steven's mental health treatment. [3] Plaintiff, however, contends that she is entitled to discovery of this information because Steven has waived the privilege in the present proceedings by: (1) raising an insanity defense in his criminal trial, (2) revealing mental health information to Dr. Markos at his fitness examinations, and (3) providing mental health information to school officials, a probation officer, and others. We shall consider each claim of waiver individually.