Opinion ID: 362303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the continuing nature of the discrimination alleged

Text: 9 At the outset, we must examine the contention that the assertedly discriminatory acts against appellants took place prior to the effective date of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, and the further contention that since no administrative or judicial complaints were pending at that time, 18 their claims are not cognizable thereunder. These arguments, we think, may easily be dismissed. 10 Appellants challenge as discriminatory not only the incidents antedating the convening of the trial boards but also the trial board proceedings themselves and the punitive measures ensuing therefrom, which allegedly were precipitated by the earlier incidents. Each claim in suit encompasses not an assortment of unrelated happenings, but a chain of connected events continuing over a considerable time span a chain in which pre-1972 episodes were foremost and seminal links. In no instance could this type of discrimination become consummated until the particular adverse personnel action attained finality. 19 11 For Bethel, that occurred in 1974 as a result of the Mayor's decision to suspend him without pay for 35 months; until then, under District of Columbia law, the trial board's decision was simply a recommendation. 20 And the Mayor has yet to reach a final decision on the recommendation of Hemby's last trial board. On the other hand, the personnel actions taken by Hemby's first two trial boards apparently did achieve finality before Title VII was expanded to cover employees such as Hemby, but this should not conclude judicial inquiry. There remains the question whether the entire series of events pre-1972 as well as post-1972 comprised a concerted and continuing course of discrimination against Hemby enduring well past 1972. 21 We intimate no view in this regard, and leave this aspect of Hemby's case for possible exploration in the District Court on remand. 22