Opinion ID: 1175468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Number of Convictions

Text: (1b) Defendant renews his argument that multiple digital penetrations, committed during a brief continuous assault upon a struggling victim, constitute only a single violation of section 289. In effect, he suggests that, under such circumstances, the statutory offense extends from the initial penetration through final withdrawal, even though multiple penetrations have actually occurred in the interim. As we shall explain, this claim is belied by the plain meaning of section 289, and by the consistent interpretation of sister statutes which use materially similar language. Preliminarily, we note that since its origin in 1872, the Penal Code has defined and prescribed punishment for the crimes of rape (§§ 261, 263, 264) [4] and sodomy (§§ 286, 287). [5] The predecessor to the current section governing oral copulation was enacted in 1915, and completes a basic trilogy of sex crimes. (§ 288a.) [6] However, before 1979, there was no felony proscription per se against nonconsensual contact with, or penetration of, another person's genitals or anus through the use of an instrument or body part other than the mouth or penis. Such conduct (assuming it did not invoke the various statutes relating to sexual conduct with minors) presumably would have been prosecuted as a battery. Absent serious bodily injury, it could have been punished as a misdemeanor. (See §§ 242, 243, subds. (a), (d); cf. § 243.4 [defining sexual battery, added by Stats. 1982, ch. 1111, § 1, p. 4024].) Apparently perceiving a deficiency in its treatment of sexually assaultive behavior, the Legislature enacted section 289. (Stats. 1978, ch. 1313, § 1, p. 4300; see also, People v. Kusumoto (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 487, 491 [215 Cal. Rptr. 347]; Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation, Crimes (1979) 10 Pacific L.J. 392.) Since its original enactment, the statute has been greatly expanded in scope. [7] However, section 289 has always made clear that the crime is committed simply by causing a proscribed penetration, however slight.  (Italics added.) From this language, we can only conclude that, assuming all other elements of the offense are present, a violation is complete the moment such penetration occurs. Using materially similar language, the Legislature has explicitly so provided in the statutes governing rape and sodomy. The section which describes the basic elements and circumstances attending the crime of rape (§ 261) is modified by companion language in section 263, which states, in part: Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime. (Italics added.) Identical language in section 287 accompanies the sodomy statute (§ 286):  Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy. (Italics added.) Except for minor word changes not pertinent here, sections 263 and 287 have remained unchanged since their enactment. Both were in existence long before section 289 became law, and both relate to the same subject matter  unlawful penetrations of the genitals and anus. Since the origin of the rape and sodomy statutes, the courts have strictly adhered to the statutory principle that a penetration, however slight, completes the crime. ( People v. Chavez (1894) 103 Cal. 407, 408 [37 P. 389]; People v. Martinez (1986) 188 Cal. App.3d 19, 22-25 [232 Cal. Rptr. 736]; People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 224, 232-233 [182 Cal. Rptr. 406] [disapproved on other grounds in People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal. Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165], fn. 8]; People v. Esposti (1947) 82 Cal. App.2d 76, 77-78 [185 P.2d 866]; People v. Singh (1923) 62 Cal. App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121]; People v. Marino (1917) 33 Cal. App. 448, 451 [165 P. 564].) (3) The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. ( People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897 [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) Where a statute is framed in language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analogous subject, and that enactment has been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted that construction. ( Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935) 2 Cal.2d 727, 734-735 [43 P.2d 291, 98 A.L.R. 1499].) (1c) Thus, in using identical words to define the analogous act in section 289, the Legislature undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning. As with rape and sodomy, a violation of section 289 is complete the instant slight penetration of the proscribed nature occurs. It follows logically that a new and separate violation of section 289 is completed each time a new and separate penetration, however slight occurs. Here, defendant does not dispute that his finger actually penetrated the victim's vagina against her will three separate times; that each penetration was accomplished with the statutorily prescribed intent; that the requisite degree of force or fear preceded, and was used to accomplish, each penetration; or that a finger is a foreign object within the meaning of the statute. (See generally, People v. Wilcox (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal. Rptr. 170]; CALJIC No. 10.60 (1985 rev.).) Accordingly, all the elements of three completed violations of section 289 were present. Defendant acknowledges that section 289 has always defined the crime in terms of penetration[s]. He suggests, however, that this language was only intended to distinguish between a completed offense and other offenses, such as an attempt, assault with intent to commit the crime, or a battery. We disagree. Obviously, one purpose of the slight penetration language used throughout this family of sex-offense statutes is to make clear that prolonged or deep insertion, or emission or orgasm, is unnecessary to complete the crime. (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 47, 53-56 [225 Cal. Rptr. 277]; People v. Karsai, supra, 131 Cal. App.3d at pp. 232-233.) However, the plain meaning of the phrase does not limit it to that purpose, and we find no other indication it should be so confined. As section 263 notes with regard to the sufficiency of penetration in rape cases, the essential guilt of sex offenses lies in the outrage to the person and feelings of the victim.... The slight penetration language confirms that this peculiar outrage is deemed to occur each time the victim endures a new, unconsented sexual insertion. The Legislature, by devising a distinctly harsh sentencing scheme, has emphasized the seriousness with which society views each separate unconsented sexual act, even when all are committed on a single occasion. (See, e.g., § 667.6, subd. (c).) We find no merit in defendant's limited construction. Indeed, defendant concedes that where the acts are of an entirely different nature, they may result in multiple convictions even if committed in rapid succession. Courts have long assumed that no minimum amount of time must separate such acts, nor must they be punctuated by any other significant nonsexual activity. (See, e.g., People v. Slobodion (1948) 31 Cal.2d 555, 557, 563 [191 P.2d 1] [lewd touching of vagina with penis, followed immediately by oral copulation]; People v. Phillips (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 632, 635, 642 [215 Cal. Rptr. 394] [digital vaginal penetration followed after a brief interruption by rape]; People v. Boyce (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 850, 854, 860 [180 Cal. Rptr. 573] [oral copulation followed immediately by rape]; People v. Rance (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 245, 249-250, 255 [164 Cal. Rptr. 822] [rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, all apparently committed in uninterrupted succession]; People v. Gay (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 102, 103-105 [40 Cal. Rptr. 778] [rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, all apparently committed in uninterrupted succession]; People v. Mills (1943) 58 Cal. App.2d 608, 609-610 [137 P.2d 698] [rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, all apparently committed in uninterrupted succession].) Multiple convictions have also been upheld where several identical sex crimes are accompanied by commission of a different one. In some of these cases, the offenses have been separated by some break in time and/or movement of the victim to a new location. (See, e.g., People v. Reeder (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 900, 915-917 [200 Cal. Rptr. 479] [ two sets of oral copulation and rape over a short period of time, where victim was allowed to have a cigarette in between each pair of crimes]; People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 718, 726, 728 [182 Cal. Rptr. 671] [ two rapes in car separated by an act of oral copulation, two car trips, and violence over three- to four-hour period]; People v. Brown (1973) 35 Cal. App.3d 317, 321 [110 Cal. Rptr. 854] [rape followed by defendant leaving the room for a short time to commit attempted rape on another victim, and returning to commit rape and sodomy on first victim].) In other cases, it was never questioned that alternating offenses may follow one another in quick, uninterrupted succession. (See, e.g., People v. Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 548-549 [rape, sodomy, and two oral copulation convictions, committed during a continuous 45-to-60-minute attack]; In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal.2d 685, 687-688 [58 Cal. Rptr. 561, 427 P.2d 161] [one oral copulation and two rape convictions, apparently committed in uninterrupted succession]; People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 1405, 1407-1408 [229 Cal. Rptr. 550] [rape and sodomy, prefaced by two consecutive acts of oral copulation committed within a few moments and feet of each other].) Although defendant deemphasizes the point, cases involving wholly identical sexual acts follow the same pattern. In some of these cases, no issue was raised that the defendant could not be separately convicted for each act. ( People v. Martinez (1984) 150 Cal. App.3d 579, 586 [198 Cal. Rptr. 565] [two defendants convicted of four forcible rapes in concert; the first three rapes were committed consecutively by one defendant over the course of an hour, after which the other defendant committed the fourth rape]; People v. Iverson (1972) 26 Cal. App.3d 598, 600-601 [102 Cal. Rptr. 913], disapproved on other grounds in In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 130 [120 Cal. Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721], fn. 11 [victim testified to three acts of sexual intercourse committed consecutively in car; defendant was convicted of two of them].) Other same crime cases specifically hold that separate convictions are appropriate, finding support in the statutory language deeming the offense complete upon penetration. In People v. Clem (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 337 [163 Cal. Rptr. 553], the court rejected defendant's claim that he could not be separately sentenced for five rape convictions involving one victim. The court cited sections 261 and 263; noted that the evidence indisputedly established five consecutive vaginal penetrations during an approximate two and one-half hour assault; and concluded that [i]t can no longer be argued that where there are multiple sex acts performed upon a single victim, albeit within a short space of time, that each act does not comprise a distinct and separate violation and punishment. ( Id., at pp. 346-347, italics added.) More to the point is People v. Marks (1986) 184 Cal. App.3d 458 [229 Cal. Rptr. 107]. There, defendant urged reversal of one of two sodomy convictions, claiming that his two anal contacts with the victim were so close in time as to constitute a single offense. ( Id., at p. 464.) However, the court affirmed both counts, finding ample evidence of two separate anal penetrations  defendant inserted his penis in the victim's anus, withdrew, forced her across the room, repositioned her, and anally repenetrated her. ( Id., at pp. 464-467, & fn. 8.) A third case, People v. Vela (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 237, 243 [218 Cal. Rptr. 161], contains compatible dictum: If a female initially consents to an act of sexual intercourse but thereafter withdraws her consent, each subsequent act of sexual penetration accomplished by force or fear will constitutes a separate and distinct act of rape.  (Italics added.) Cases such as Clem, supra, 104 Cal. App.3d at page 337, Marks, supra, 184 Cal. App.3d at page 458, and Vela, supra, 172 Cal. App.3d at page 237, expose an inescapable truth. Multiple violations of section 289 are no less separate or offensive when they occur in sequence than when they are punctuated by violations of other statutes. Here, however, defendant relies upon People v. Hammon (1987) 191 Cal. App.3d 1084, 1097 [236 Cal. Rptr. 822], which denounced the Clem-Marks-Vela analysis. Hammon's 11 lewd conduct convictions (§ 288, subd. (a)) were based on photographs, some of which apparently were taken moments apart, depicting defendant and a female infant engaged in oral copulation, sexual intercourse, and other lewd acts. Although defendant raised a section 654 sentencing claim, the Court of Appeal reversed four of his convictions on the basis of a new test for determining when a sex offense is completed: [I]dentical sexual acts constitute separate and discrete crimes when they are separated (1) by the commission of a different sexual offense, (2) by sexual climax, (3) by an appreciable passage of time, or (4) by a reasonable opportunity for reflection. ( Id., at p. 1099.) An initial observation is that Hammon failed to analyze the sufficiency of the evidence in terms of the particular statutory violations at issue. Although only a few of the charges in that case required proof of penetration, the court was troubled by certain sentencing disparities it believed this concept generated under section 654. (See 191 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1097-1098.) Saving all sentencing questions for later (see Discussion, part B, post ), we conclude that Hammon erred by inserting irrelevant factors into the definition of a sex offense. (See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 463 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] [court is not to sit as a super-legislature altering criminal definitions].) The first factor  presence of an intervening different sexual offense  is based upon facts in cases which refused to apply section 654 to preclude multiple sentences for multiple convictions. Nothing in these cases can be read as restricting the number of violations which may occur. ( Hammon, supra, 191 Cal. App.3d at p. 1096, citing Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 552; People v. Reeder, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d at pp. 916-917.) And, as already indicated, Hammon 's second factor  sexual climax  has never been dispositive in determining whether a sex offense is statutorily completed. The last two items  appreciable passage of time and reasonable opportunity for reflection  were based on language in section 667.6, subdivision (d), which concerns imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences upon certain sex offenders. [8] Nothing on the face of this section purports to affect the manner in which various sex crimes are to be defined in the first instance. Further, we agree with that portion of Presiding Justice Kremer's opinion for the Court of Appeal in this case which highlights commonsense problems in the Hammon test ( supra, 191 Cal. App.3d 1084): Examined closely, [the] four criteria ... actually resolve to but one. The first criterion, ... separat[ion] by a different sexual offense[,] is always irrelevant to the problem presented since, by definition, one is considering a series of identical offenses not punctuated by others. The next two criteria, sexual climax and an appreciable passage of time[,] are actually factual circumstances from which one may conclude that the fourth criterion has occurred, a reasonable opportunity for reflection. Hammon then stands for the proposition [that] a series of identical sexual offenses may be said to be separate when ... one may reasonably conclude that the perpetrator has had a reasonable opportunity for reflection. However, as we noted earlier, this fourth factor was attributed to section 667.6, subdivision (d), where it helps determine whether consecutive sentences shall be imposed on defendants convicted of enumerated crimes, not whether separate crimes were committed. From a logical standpoint, the fact that only some multiple sex offenders must receive consecutive terms on the basis of a reasonable opportunity for reflection test suggests that others may at least be convicted of multiple sex offenses even in the absence of this factor. (4) (See fn. 9.), (1d) We find the Hammon rationale unconvincing. [9] Finally, we note that despite its continuous recent activity in the area of sex offenses, including the addition of expansive amendments to section 289 (see fn. 7, ante ), the Legislature has expressed no discernible objection to the steady increase in cases upholding multiple convictions based upon rapid, identical sex acts. For this and other reasons explained above, we find no support for defendant's contention that multiple, nonconsensual sex acts of an identical nature, committed in short succession against a single victim, constitute a single offense. We hold that each of the digital penetrations committed in the course of defendant's assault upon Virginia N., and highlighted by intervening acts of force, constituted a separate violation of section 289, subdivision (a). (5) (See fn. 10.), (1e) Defendant thus properly sustained three separate convictions under that statute. [10] Hammon, supra, 191 Cal. App.3d 1084, is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with our analysis here.