Opinion ID: 2159495
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourth Amendment Protection From DUI Roadblocks Under Martin

Text: The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. Nevertheless, its decisions in several closely related cases have indicated strongly that such seizures would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment, leading some state courts to uphold sobriety checkpoints on that constitutional ground. See, e.g., People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 292-93, 93 Ill.Dec. 347, 350, 486 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 542, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 504, 479 A.2d 903, 912 (1984); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J.Super. 575, 584, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (1980); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 529, 473 N.E.2d 1, 6, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1984). But see State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla.Crim.App.1984); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D.1976). In Martin, this Court adopted the position of those state courts which had held that DUI roadblocks are not per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Martin, 145 Vt. at 567, 496 A.2d at 446. The Court stated in Martin that the constitutionality of a DUI roadblock under the Fourth Amendment will depend upon the reasonableness of the seizure, determined by weighing the public interest in the seizure against the degree of intrusion into personal privacy occasioned by the particular DUI roadblock. Id. at 568, 496 A.2d at 446. After recognizing the substantial public interest in the control of drunk driving, the Court reasoned that since the nature of the public interest to be served by a DUI roadblock is unlikely to vary substantially from case to case, the reasonableness of such a seizure will generally turn on the degree of intrusion caused by the seizure. Id. at 570, 496 A.2d at 448. Since the degree of intrusion is directly related to the procedural characteristics of a particular DUI roadblock, the reasonableness of the roadblock turns essentially on the adequacy of procedural limitations imposed on officer discretion in the operation of the roadblock. [4] Under the Fourth Amendment analysis applied in Martin, therefore, the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint depends on a balancing of public against private interests; a balance which is implemented by an analysis of the extent to which a particular roadblock meets the generalized criteria of a reasonable roadblock set forth in Martin. [5] This Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness is dependent on and derives from two tenets of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that are, contrary to the majority's assumption, not necessarily consistent with Article Eleven: first, that a balancing test is an appropriate method of testing the constitutionality of a seizure that is less intrusive than a tradiarrest, and second, that neutral and objective limitations on police discretion in the conduct of the seizure, without more, can justify the intrusion caused by the seizure. These tenets are the product of a succession of cases decided over the last three decades that reached a salient point with Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). In Brown, [6] the Court stated that [t]he reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends `on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.' [7] Id. at 50, 99 S.Ct. at 2640 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). A necessary corollary to this principle, of course, is that all intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest are not subject to the traditional [8] warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The less demanding and more fluid test of general reasonableness, implemented by a balancing of competing interests, is applied, according to Brown, primarily because the intrusions involved are less severe than that associated with an arrest. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 880, 95 S.Ct. at 2580. The second tenet of Fourth Amendment law established by Brown relates to the justification necessary to make a limited intrusion reasonable. On this subject, the Court stated that: the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640-41 (emphasis added). On its face, this language suggests that these two types of justification are independently sufficient, and more significantly, that a seizure carried out pursuant to the type of plan described can be justified without more. In Martin, our adherence to these principles was in accordance with our duty to follow and apply the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In that case, it was not our role to examine whether the principles upon which the Fourth Amendment balancing test is based comport with this Court's view of the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, however, our task is different. In order to discharge its duty to enforce the fundamental law of Vermont, Badger, 141 Vt. at 449, 450 A.2d at 347, this Court must analyze whether the Martin balancing test and its constitutional underpinnings are consistent with Article Eleven's command. The majority's failure to do so is the essential flaw of its analysis.