Opinion ID: 1379313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: absence of instruction requiring unanimous agreement on factual basis for conviction

Text: (8a) Defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the jury on its own motion that there was evidence of more than one act on which a conviction of murdering Patty could be based, and that although defendant could be convicted of that murder by proof of any one or more of such acts, all jurors must agree that he committed the same act or acts. (See CALJIC No. 17.01.) (There is no such contention with respect to the murder of Stacy.) The prosecutor argued that defendant should be convicted of the murder of Patty because he fired the fatal shot with intent to kill her, but that even if defendant was not the actual killer because she was already dead, or defendant's intent to kill was negated by a belief that she was already dead, defendant should be convicted of her murder as an aider and abettor. Defendant claims the jurors should have been told not to convict him of the murder unless they agreed unanimously either that he was the actual killer or that he was an aider and abettor. (9) A requirement of jury unanimity typically applies to acts that could have been charged as separate offenses. (E.g., People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 280-283 [182 Cal. Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971] [multiple acts of bribery; single bribery charge]; People v. Crawford (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 591 [182 Cal. Rptr. 536] [conviction of possession of firearm by ex-felon; four guns found separately in defendant's home]; People v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 212 [171 Cal. Rptr. 897] [conviction of forcible oral copulation; evidence of multiple acts].) A jury may convict a defendant of first degree murder, however, without making a unanimous choice of one or more of several theories proposed by the prosecution, e.g., that the murder was deliberate and premeditated or that it was committed in the course of a felony. [I]t is sufficient that each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder as that offense is defined by the statute. ( People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 195 [107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956]; accord People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 386 [220 Cal. Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252].) Pursuant to the latter rule, it was held in People v. Forbes (1985) 175 Cal. App.3d 807, 816-817 [221 Cal. Rptr. 275], that a conviction of second degree murder did not require unanimous agreement by the jurors on whether the accused was the actual perpetrator or was an aider and abettor. (8b) Defendant urges us to reject the Forbes holding. He argues that the decision whether to convict a defendant as the actual perpetrator or as an aider and abettor is not just a selection of legal theories but is a determination of which acts were committed by the defendant. He relies on People v. Dellinger (1984) 163 Cal. App.3d 284, 300-302 [209 Cal. Rptr. 503], where a first degree murder conviction was reversed on the ground that the trial court should have instructed the jury on its own motion that a conviction required their unanimous agreement on whether the defendant killed the two-year-old victim by giving her cocaine or killed her by inflicting a fatal blow to her head. The Dellinger holding does not apply here. (10) A unanimity instruction is required only if the jurors could otherwise disagree which act a defendant committed and yet convict him of the crime charged. ( People v. Gonzales (1983) 141 Cal. App.3d 786, 791 [190 Cal. Rptr. 554]; accord People v. Burns (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 1440, 1458 [242 Cal. Rptr. 573].) [W]here the acts were substantially identical in nature, so that any juror believing one act took place would inexorably believe all acts took place, the instruction is not necessary to the jury's understanding of the case. ( People v. Crawford, supra, 131 Cal. App.3d 591, 599; see People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875 [251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423] [lead opn. of Kaufman, J.].) (8c) Here, there was no prosecutorial contention that defendant committed multiple independent acts, any of which could have led to Patty's death. Instead, the two theories, that he was the actual perpetrator and that he was an aider and abettor, were based on a single course of conduct. It was undisputed that defendant allowed Patty to be lured to his apartment; helped take her to a deserted roadside with the understanding that she was to be killed; loaded the shotgun for Forrester, who shot her twice; and then shot her himself. Defendant claimed he was not the actual perpetrator because either (1) Patty was in fact killed by Forrester before defendant shot her, or (2) defendant believed she had been killed by Forrester and therefore did not shoot her with intent to kill. But even if some jurors concluded that defendant was the actual perpetrator and others concluded he was only an aider and abettor, there is no possibility that they disagreed on the facts necessary to support the aiding and abetting theory. The jurors who concluded that defendant intentionally killed Patty with premeditation and deliberation necessarily would have believed that if he was not the actual killer, he intentionally encouraged and facilitated the actual killer's perpetration of first degree murder. Since the jury had to agree unanimously at least on the facts required for conviction as an aider and abettor, and for application of the special circumstance findings to a person who was not the actual killer (§ 190.2, subd. (b)), no further unanimity was required, and the unanimity instruction was not necessary.