Opinion ID: 1057972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: County's Assignments of Error

Text: On appeal, the County does not make a facial challenge to Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1, as it did below. It does not argue that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 443, 453, 666 S.E.2d 303, 308 (2008). Rather, the County confines its challenge under Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia to the constitutionality of the statute's application to the facts of this case. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Smit, 279 Va. 327, 336, 689 S.E.2d 679, 684 (2010) (addressing as-applied constitutional challenges). The County here argues that the circuit court erred by upholding the constitutionality of Code § 33.1-221.1:1.1 in authorizing DRPT to grant funds to Norfolk Southern for the development of the Montgomery County rail/highway intermodal facility under the terms of the Agreement. According to the County, the Commonwealth was expressly prohibited from entering into such an agreement under the restrictions of both the internal improvements clause and the credit clause contained in Article X, Section 10. The County asserts the circuit court erred because: (i) under the Agreement, DRPT will be a party to and have an interest in a privately owned and operated railroad terminal in violation of the internal improvements clause; (ii) development of the terminal is not a governmental function excepting it from the internal improvements clause; and (iii) under the Agreement, the Commonwealth will grant its credit to a private railroad company for the development of the terminal in violation of the credit clause. [4]