Opinion ID: 2518798
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Glenn's motion for discovery

Text: Glenn separately argues that the superior court erred in denying his discovery motion. He claims that he was entitled to discovery both under Civil Rule 26(b)(1), which generally allows discovery of any relevant information, [20] and under Rule 90.3(e), which specifically requires parties to a child-support proceeding to produce statements of income with verifying documentation. [21] Glenn asserts that he was entitled to this discovery in order to pursue an argument under Rule 90.3(c)(1) that unusual circumstances justified varying Marian's imputed income as originally determined under Rule 90.3(a)(4). [22] As we have seen, however, Glenn did not move to modify his support on this basis, and, indeed, before moving for discovery on this theory, he had disavowed reliance on Rule 90.3(c)(1)'s unusual circumstances exception. Given these circumstances, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow Glenn to raise this new theory in the proceedings involving Glenn's pending motion for modification after the court had already ruled on and correctly denied that motion under the theory that Glenn had originally pled. As the superior court observed in refusing to order discovery, Glenn's motion for discovery on this unpled theory was at best, premature. [23] We thus uphold the superior court's discovery ruling.