Opinion ID: 2118900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the legal standard of fair representation

Text: A union has a statutory duty of fair representation under sec. 8 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, a breach of which entitles the aggrieved employee(s) to relief in the courts at law as well as before the National Labor Relations Board. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L. Ed.2d 842 (1967). In that leading case the Court circumscribed the duty, however, by stating that a breach occurs `only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.' Id. at 190, 87 S. Ct. at 916. Not every breach resulting in unfairness, then, is remediable; it must have an additional element to it. Thus, for example, in the grievance context a union may not `arbitrarily ignore' a meritorious grievance or process it `perfunctor[ily],' but the employee does not have `an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration.' Id. at 191, 87 S. Ct. at 917. `[A]rbitrary or bad-faith conduct,' id. at 193, 87 S. Ct. 903, or `substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct,' Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348, 84 S. Ct. 363, 371, 11 L. Ed.2d 370 (1964), is required to show a breach of the duty of fair representation. See Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299, 91 S. Ct. 1909, 29 L. Ed.2d 473 (1971). This court has refined these concepts to stand for the proposition that, at least in negotiating and implementing a contract, a union may breach the statutory duty by arbitrary or irrational conduct, even in the absence of bad faith or hostility in the form of ill will or common law malitia; but although the employee may challenge actions other than those involving anti-minority animus or malice, nevertheless `the union has broad discretion to adjust the demands of competing groups within its constituency as long as it does not act arbitrarily.' Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974). We are not necessarily left with shifting ad hoc standards to be fashioned anew in each case, but we do have broad parameters of judgment that necessarily vary from context to context. See also Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978), discussed later. We adopted the Vaca test in Mahnke v. WERC, 66 Wis.2d 524, 533, 225 N.W.2d 617 (1975), and held that the issue of whether the union breached its duty of fair representation to the employee is a question of fact. See also Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis.2d 264, 272, 99 N.W.2d 132, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1959). Coleman's complaint alleges conduct by the Union which if proved could be found to violate the duty of fair representation. The Union denied the conduct. Accordingly, the complaint states a claim and the pleadings show there are disputed facts. We must examine the material on file to determine whether there are disputed material facts sufficient to entitle the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to a trial. The evidentiary material upon which the defendants' motions for summary judgment were based was contained in seven exhibits, the contents of which we shall briefly describe. [5] Exhibits A and B are summaries of Steps 3 and 4 (respectively) of the grievance proceedings. Exhibit A states that in the Step 3 grievance hearing the Union argued, to excuse Coleman's job performance, that he had just returned from sick leave; that the machine was running improperly; that he did not know the machine had been running improperly; that he should have been given the usual opportunity to rework the parts. Outboard decided to suspend Coleman for two weeks, despite Union requests to reduce the suspension to one week. The Union expressed Coleman's unhappiness with the decision; Outboard responded by converting the suspension to a termination. The Union demanded a fourth step hearing. Exhibit B, which summarizes the step 4 hearing, states that Coleman demanded back pay and that his record be cleared because he felt he was unjustly disciplined, although he admitted I probably should have seen the parts. It was an oversight on my part. After Coleman left the room, Outboard set forth its proposal: Coleman would be reinstated in his old job without back pay or the clearing of his record. According to the summary, Outboard stated that If he does not return on July 14, 1975 for his shift, he will be removing himself from our rolls. The Union's representative responded: This is agreeable. We will inform the employee. Exhibit C is an excerpt of Coleman's answers to Outboard's Interrogatories: Coleman stated that Union representatives had told him that his grievance procedure was a waste of time and money; that on July 14, 1975, he advised the Union representatives (but not Outboard) of his rejection of the step 4 decision; and that he told the Union that he wanted to proceed to arbitration, the fifth step. Coleman asserted that he was told Okay, Coleman, it's your bed, you sleep in it. Go and do what you want. We'll be in touch but it might be weeks because we have a lot of grievance meetings coming up and we can't spend all our time on you. In answer to one of the questions in the interrogatory Coleman asserted that he was never told or led to believe that any settlement had been reached at the step 4 hearing and that he thought the step 4 decision was merely an offer. Coleman stated in the interrogatories: The first time I heard the word settlement was during a proceeding before the Unemployment Compensation held November 3, 1975. Coleman also stated that he and the foreman had disagreements in their working relationship. Exhibits D and E are excerpts from Coleman's deposition taken by the defendants on September 10, 1976. Coleman stated that he informed the Union that he was accepting part of the offer and rejecting part of the offer (referring to the step 4 decision). The Union representative told him he had an option of taking or leaving the whole thing. Coleman said he interpreted this statement as meaning that the Union just didn't care what I did. Coleman said that he asked the Union representative what the Union's position was, and the Union representative responded that we don't know right now where we stand. Coleman asserted he was feeling lousy, on the day he misworked the pieces and he conceded that although he tried to inspect each piece, there was room for improvement in his inspection operation. To the best of his recollection he failed to inspect 150 to 200 pieces as he was supposed to do. Exhibit F is the decision of the Appeal Tribunal of the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations Commission, which denied Coleman's unemployment claim. The evidence upon which the Tribunal based its decision is not part of the exhibit. The Tribunal found that Coleman had produced unacceptable parts and that Coleman's allegation that the parts frequently had dents did not justify his acceptance of the parts in question. The Tribunal concluded that Coleman's actions in failing to meet the employer's [parts] tolerances together with his failure to return to work on July 14, 1975, evinced a willful, intentional, and substantial disregard of the employer's interests. Exhibit G are documents relating to Coleman's charges before the National Labor Relations Board against Outboard for discriminating against him because of his union activities and against the Union for unfair representation. On the basis of its investigation (which is not set forth in the exhibit) the Regional Director of the NLRB refused to issue a complaint against Outboard, because it appeared that Outboard terminated Coleman because of poor workmanship and refusal to return to work; the charge against the Union was dismissed because it appears that the Union acted within the wide range of reasonableness accorded a statutory bargaining representative in the administration of a collective bargaining agreement in refusing to take his grievance to arbitration. On the basis of these exhibits the circuit court, relying on Powell v. Globe Industries, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977), granted defendants' motions for summary judgment holding that Coleman brought forth no material issue of fact which even approached the high standard necessary to prove a breach in the statutory duty of fair representation. In Powell, the employee was terminated, and the union pursued the grievance through step 4. The union's affidavit submitted on the motion for summary judgment averred that its decision to accept the company's settlement offer and not to process the grievance to step 5 arbitration was based on its determination that the offer was the best possible relief that could be secured. In response to this affidavit the employee averred only that the union's decision not to take the grievance to arbitration was arbitrary, perfunctory, discriminatory and in bad faith. The employee did not set forth any facts which would support such a claim. The district court concluded that conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to maintain an action against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, stating: As the Union's decision not to take the plaintiff's grievance to arbitration was based on their considered judgment that Globe's settlement offer was the best they could do for the plaintiff, and as it does not appear that their handling of the plaintiff's grievance was arbitrary, perfunctory, or in bad faith, the Court will grant the Union's motion for summary judgment. Powell v. Globe Industries, Inc., supra, 431 F. Supp. at 1099-1100. As in Powell, the documents submitted by the defendants in the instant case attempted to show that Outboard had cause to suspend or terminate the employee and that the Union proceeded through step 4 and obtained as good a settlement as it could for Coleman. However, the instant case is distinguishable from Powell. Coleman's complaint alleges specific acts which Coleman asserts violated the duty of fair representation, namely Coleman's complaint asserts that the Union breached its duty to represent him fairly by failing to tell him that a settlement between the Union and Outboard had been reached at step 4, that his rejection of the offer of settlement would mean termination of his job, and that the Union had decided not to proceed to arbitration. Also, unlike Powell, in the case at bar the exhibits, which we previously summarized, supply evidentiary facts to support the complaint and show that there is a dispute as to whether the Union advised Coleman that the Union and Outboard had agreed upon a final settlement offer and that the Union would not go to arbitration. We view these disputed facts as significant in determining whether the Union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit was reasonable and fair or was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. In Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978) the court of appeals held that if the employee could prove that she did not know (or that she should not have known) that the union would not arbitrate the grievance, the trier of fact could find that the union's failure to inform her of its position, if intentional, had no rational basis and was arbitrary, or if unintentional was so egregious as to be arbitrary. The court of appeals concluded that while mere negligence is not enough to breach the duty of fair representation, arbitrary conduct is not limited to intentional conduct; acts of omission not intended to harm a member may be so egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee and so unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary. The court of appeals continued by stating, it is clear that unintentional acts or omissions by union officials may be arbitrary if they reflect reckless disregard for the rights of the individual employee . . . they severely prejudice the injured employee . . . and the policies underlying the duty of fair representation [ability to screen meritless grievances and allocate union resources] would not be served by shielding the union from liability in the circumstances of the particular case. . . . Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Ness v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 598 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1979). [7] We conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact, and the Union's motion for summary judgment should not be granted. Because the circuit court concluded that a summary judgment should be granted to the Union, it granted summary judgment to Outboard without ruling on the question whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact in regard to Coleman's claim against Outboard that it breached the collective bargaining agreement when it suspended or terminated him. On appeal Outboard argues that even if the order granting summary judgment to the Union is overruled, summary judgment in favor of Outboard should be affirmed, because Coleman's suspension and termination was not a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement provides that Outboard could suspend or discharge an employee for proper cause, and that the issue of proper cause is subject to the five-step grievance procedure. [6] In the instant case Coleman was terminated at step 4. The documents submitted by Outboard raise a material issue of fact whether the suspension or termination was for proper cause or was contrary to the collective bargaining agreement. Coleman did admit that he produced defective pieces; he had previously been suspended for poor workmanship. However, the exhibits also show a dispute as to facts which might be considered in determining whether the suspension or termination was for proper cause: was the machine faulty; was Coleman ill; did Outboard have a practice of allowing employees to rework defective pieces; was Coleman unfairly denied the opportunity to rework the pieces; was the foreman who suspended Coleman biased against him. We conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact, and Outboard's motion for summary judgment should not be granted. [8] Accordingly, the orders granting summary judgment and denying the motion to vacate the summary judgment should be vacated, and the judgment dismissing the complaint should be reversed. By the Court. Orders vacated, judgment reversed, and cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.