Opinion ID: 1835424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Striking the Sole Black Juror.

Text: Defendant's third contention is that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the State's use of a peremptory challenge against the sole black juror on the panel. Knox claims that the strike violated his sixth amendment rights. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (a due process case), a defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the jury panel. He may establish a prima facie case by showing that the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the government excluded prospective jurors on the basis of their race. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88. In determining whether a defendant has established the requisite showing of purposeful discrimination, the court should consider all relevant circumstances including, but not limited to, a pattern of strikes against black jurors, as well as the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the state has the burden of articulating a clear and reasonably specific and neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. Because the trial judge's finding whether purposeful discrimination exists will largely turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. Id. at 98 n.21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.21, 90 L.Ed.2d at 89 n.21. In the present case, Knox argues that the necessary inference was raised sufficiently by the State's exclusion of the sole black juror. We find defendant's argument without merit. Merely showing that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude this juror falls short of raising an inference of purposeful discrimination. See United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S.Ct. 262, 98 L.Ed.2d 220; 484 U.S. 928, 108 S.Ct. 295, 98 L.Ed.2d 255 (1987) (state's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the only two black jurors did not establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination); see also United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1521 (6th Cir.1988) (fact prosecutor used all its peremptory challenges against blacks, standing alone, does not raise the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination). If the underrepresentation of a class is obvious based on empirical evidence, this alone may be a sufficient for prima facie case, cf. State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 411, 414-15 (Iowa 1990) (sixth amendment challenge to composition of jury panel), however, that is not the case here. Even assuming that a prima facie case had been established, the State established a neutral, reasonable basis for challenging the juror. At trial, the prosecutor stated that the prospective juror was struck because she knew defense counsel and had actually worked with him on a board. The juror also knew two of defense counsel's partners. This is the kind of race-neutral reason which Batson left available to litigants in choosing their juries. In this case, the State's challenge of a nonblack juror who indicated he knew a partner of defense counsel supports the conclusion that the State's decision was neutral. We find defendant's sixth amendment claim to be without merit.