Opinion ID: 1984499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: arson third degree as a lesser included offense

Text: Both Appellants argue the trial court committed palpable error when it failed to incorporate, sua sponte, an instruction on the lesser included offense of third degree arson within the jury instructions. Appellants concede they made no request for such an instruction to the trial court below, but assert that manifest injustice resulted from its omission because the evidence presented would have allowed the jury to conclude that they intentionally started a fire inside the Jenkins home, but that they did not intend to damage or destroy the building. [34] We find that the trial court properly decided not to instruct the jury regarding the lesser included offense of third degree arson. When a defendant denies any involvement in the crime alleged, and the evidence presented does not otherwise suggest reasonable doubt regarding the degree of an offense, trial courts need not instruct regarding lesser included offenses. [35] Although Appellants suggest a jury could have believed they intentionally started a fire inside Jenkins's home in an attempt to destroy some of the victim's personal possessions, but speculate that they started the fire without an intent to damage the house itself, we do not find evidentiary support in the record for such conjecture. This Court has recognized that [i]ntent may be inferred from actions because a person is presumed to intend the logical and probable consequences of his conduct and a person's state of mind may be inferred from actions preceding and following the charged offense. [36] The evidence in this case supports only the inference that the appellants intended to carry out Lawson's invitation to hoodoo that punk and get him while he ain't home by damaging or destroying his house. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding only the indicted offense of second degree arson.