Opinion ID: 1316209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Comments About the Defense

Text: Defendant seeks reversal of the guilt judgment based on the manner in which the prosecutor referred in closing argument to defense counsel and counsel's guilt phase strategy. The challenged remarks purportedly constituted misconduct under state law and violated defendant's federal constitutional rights to present a defense, to due process, and to a reliable penalty determination. We reject the claims. Closing guilt phase argument began on Wednesday afternoon. During this session, the prosecutor observed that in opening remarks at the guilt phase, defense counsel had said defendant `does not wear size 13 shoes' and could not have left size 13 shoe prints at the crime scene. Reference was then made to the various means by which defense counsel's statement was contradicted at trial, e.g., evidence that defendant wore a pair of size 13 shoes given to him by Patterson, evidence that other size 13 shoes were found in defendant's car, and testimony by defendant that he can wear size 13 shoes. The prosecutor commented, Gone is the argument that my client really does have size 11 feet. [¶] ... This argument that my client doesn't have size 13 feet or wear size 13 shoes kind of starts to unravel a bit.... [¶] ... Now we're going to have to focus on some other defense. Have to admit he does have size 13 feet. Next, the prosecutor discussed the observations of witnesses near the liquor store shortly before the crime occurred. In so doing, he continued the theme he had used in discussing defendant's shoe size. So we have defense two.... My client's car wasn't at the crime scene. The prosecutor proceeded to highlight testimony by Cardwell and Verdugo, indicating that they saw a car like defendant's parked in front of, and then behind, the liquor store at the critical time. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor made the following remark: Then there was another change. [¶] ... My client does have size 13 feet. Okay, my client's car was at the crime scene[,] but my client wasn't in it. He was doing his version of Marco Polo, wandering all over El Cajon after pulling [the Wherehouse] robbery [from which] he had no means of escap[e]. At this point, court was adjourned for the evening. The next morning, Thursday, the prosecutor did not resume his discussion of defendant's version of events between the time the Wherehouse and Aztec crimes occurred. Instead, after reviewing evidence placing defendant's car near the liquor store, the prosecutor reconstructed the murder based on bloodstain and autopsy evidence, linked defendant to the knives that were likely used in the crime, and discussed incriminating conduct and statements attributed to defendant afterwards. Following a midmorning recess, the prosecutor returned to a subject he had discussed the previous day  the size 13 Puma shoes worn by both defendant and the killer: [Patterson] gave them away and he gave them to Terry Bemore, who also happens to wear, despite his attorney's previous denials, he does wear size 13 shoes. Immediately after the last comment was made, defense counsel requested and received a conference outside the hearing of the jury. Counsel complained that, for the third time, the prosecutor had committed misconduct by accusing counsel of changing defenses, and by implying that some sort of dirty trick was being played on the jury. Counsel also claimed that he had never denied defendant wore size 13 shoes, and that the prosecutor was wrong insofar as he said the contrary was true. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court overruled the objection. Based on all transcript references quoted in the preceding paragraphs, defendant claims the prosecutor improperly impugned the integrity of opposing counsel and undermined the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. According to defendant, the prosecutor accused counsel of concocting various defenses as evidence unfolded at trial, and implied counsel knew such shifting defenses were untrue. Defendant also suggests that, aside from denigrating counsel, the prosecutor falsely insinuated the jury had witnessed a midtrial change in the defense theory of the case. Such arguments have not been preserved by timely, contemporaneous objection in the trial court. ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 753, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) Almost all of the comments challenged here occurred over the course of an afternoon session in which no objection by defense counsel was raised. Not until midmorning the next day  after jurors contemplated the disputed remarks overnight, and after the prosecutor repeated earlier comments about defendant's shoe size  was an objection on grounds of misconduct made. Under the circumstances, the trial court had no opportunity to consider the objection and give appropriate admonitions when the alleged misconduct first occurred, or to prevent additional remarks of a similar nature from being made. Hence, the issue has been waived on appeal. (See People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 187 & fn. 31, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290 [defendant waited too long to contest victim impact evidence where two witnesses gave such testimony one day, and where no objection was made until a third witness was prepared to give similar testimony the next day].) In any event, no misconduct occurred. It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense ( People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 789-790, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-847, 97 Cal.Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538, 262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129). Such attacks on counsel's credibility risk focusing the jury's attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. ( People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 183-184, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862, citing People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 112, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37.) Nevertheless, the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel's tactics and factual account. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 [no misconduct where prosecutor accused counsel of making an `irresponsible'  third party culpability claim]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 759, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 [no misconduct where prosecutor said counsel can `twist [and] poke [and] try to draw some speculation, try to get you to buy something'].) In so doing, the prosecutor may highlight the discrepancies between counsel's opening statement and the evidence. (E.g., People v. Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1217, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) Misconduct claims also have been rejected where the prosecutor anticipates the flaws likely to appear in counsel's closing argument based on evidence that was introduced (e.g., People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d 86, 113, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37), and where the prosecutor criticizes the defense theory of the case because it lacks evidentiary support (e.g., People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 212 & fn. 9, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302). Here, the prosecutor did not misrepresent events witnessed by the jury in open court. At the start of the guilt phase, defense counsel made the statement later attributed to him by the prosecutor, to wit, defendant does not wear size 13 shoes. Defense counsel also said in his opening statement that the suspicious vehicle seen near Aztec Liquor Store shortly before the crime wasn't [defendant's] car. Moreover, the prosecutor argued accurately that both assertions were contradicted by evidence adduced at trial. Testimony from several witnesses, including defendant, established that he owned and wore size 13 shoes, while neighbors such as Cardwell placed defendant's car near the crime scene at the critical time. Hence, the record supports the prosecutor's suggestion in closing argument that counsel could not reasonably adhere to prior claims concerning defendant's shoe size and car, and that incriminating evidence introduced at trial on both topics had undermined the defense's original theories. The prosecutor also did not accuse counsel of dishonesty in presenting a defense. Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the prosecutor never stated or implied that defense counsel knowingly made false statements or promises in his opening remarks. Overall, the prosecutor's theme was simply that he had proven defendant's identity as the killer beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the alibi and related evidence offered by the defense were not persuasive. By referring to counsel in the first person and alluding to defenses not supported by the evidence, the prosecutor simply employed a rhetorical device calculated to focus the jury's attention on strong circumstantial evidence of guilt and on any corresponding weaknesses in the defense case. No improper attack on counsel's personal integrity or professional tactics could reasonably be gleaned from such remarks.