Opinion ID: 3023754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant Mensah’s Claim

Text: Mr. Mensah argues that the District Court erred when it instructed the jury on the theory of “willful blindness” or “conscious avoidance” with regard to the conspiracy charges. Mr. Mensah argues that this case should be distinguished from those where we have upheld the giving of such an instruction, such as United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2000). He contends that “there was no factual predicate for the instruction, for neither defendant [denied] knowledge; they were instead denying participation.” Mensah Br. at 21. Mr. Mensah also attacks the instruction as “legally imprecise verbal characterizations.” Id. The Government argues that (a) the instruction was proper, and (b) even if the evidence had not warranted a “willful blindness instruction” for Mr. Mensah, it was entitled to make such an argument for Mr. Oppong and to give the instruction in such a way that would “‘not turn the spotlight on a single defendant.’” Government-Appellee’s Brief at 67 (quoting United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 453 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that a general instruction of “willful blindness” was acceptable in multi-defendant case where it might only apply to one defendant)). We have acknowledged that “willful blindness” may apply to conspiracy charges. See, e.g., Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 255 n.3 (rejecting the notion that it is “logically impossible” to be willfully blind to a conspiracy charge). Mr. Mensah does not 13 meaningfully distinguish his case from others where this instruction was properly given. This court in Wert-Ruiz allowed a willful blindness instruction where, as here, the jury might have found actual, knowing participation in the conspiracy. During Mr. Mensah’s and Mr. Oppong’s trial, the Government presented evidence of their ongoing knowledge and participation in the drug conspiracy. Mr. Mensah and Mr. Oppong admitted to some knowledge and participation in the conspiracy prior to their alleged respective withdrawals in January and April of 1997 (i.e., outside of the limitations period). The defendants did not, however, admit various facts alleged by the Government, pertaining to the relevant time period––for example, they testified that they were present at certain events (such as cocaine deliveries) but did not know these events were connected to the conspiracy; they testified to a variety of “innocent contacts” with co-conspirators after their supposed withdrawal. See, e.g., Trial Tr., App. at 3903-05, 3926-29. Since a jury might credit or discredit the Government’s evidence, and might believe the defendants’ testimony that they were unaware of various facts, there were some questions as to the defendants’ knowledge; therefore there was a predicate for a willful blindness charge. Finally, the wording of the jury instructions was adequate. The court duplicated the language used in previous Third Circuit cases––United States v. Titchell, 261 F.3d 348, 351 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 14 1985)––and satisfied the standard set out in Wert-Ruiz.5 In Wert-Ruiz, we warned that willful blindness instructions “must be tailored . . . to avoid the implication that a defendant may be convicted simply because he or she should have known of facts of which he or she was unaware.” 228 F.3d at 255. Indeed, we noted that the instructions “‘must make clear that the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have been aware of the probability.’” Id. (quoting Caminos, 770 F.2d at 365). In this case, the judge extensively instructed the jury as to the requirements for finding 5 The District Court here instructed: [T]he element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences from the proof that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him. In other words, you may find such knowledge established if you find that the defendant was aware of the high probability of the existence of a fact and failed to take action to determine whether or not it was true. The defendant cannot be convicted for being stupid, negligent, or mistaken. More is required than that. The defendant’s knowledge of a fact may be inferred from willful blindness to the existence of fact which indicate that there is a high probability that some forbidden or illegal activity is occurring. You may treat such deliberate avoidance . . . as the equivalent of knowledge. In short, if the evidence shows that the defendant did not know, then he must be acquitted. If the evidence indicates that he was very stupid in the actions that the took or ignorant, then he cannot be convicted. But if the evidence shows that there was a high probability that the defendant himself knew something was amiss and that he acted with deliberate disregard for a high probability that illegal activity was occurring, then you may find that the defendant had guilty knowledge which is required for the conviction of the offense charged. Trial Tr., App. at 4737-38. Mr. Mensah argues that the final sentence of this instruction improperly diluted the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and permitted the jury to convict Mr. Mensah merely for knowing that “something was amiss.” Similar wording was used in earlier cases affirmed by this court. See Titchell, 261 F.3d at 351 (“deliberate disregard of the truth”); Caminos, 770 F.2d at 366 (“high probability that he knew something was amiss”). 15 knowing participation in the conspiracy. The jury instructions delivered by the District Court clearly and properly directed the jury that knowledge could not be premised on mere stupidity or negligence. Furthermore, the District Court properly focused on the defendants’ subjective awareness. We find no basis for rejecting either the propriety of the District Court’s instruction of willful blindness or its particular wording in this case.