Opinion ID: 2547459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do Carter's Claims Impose a Higher Requirement

Text: BIC argues that Carter's manufacturing defect claim effectively imposes a higher child-resistant standard than the CPSC standard because (1) the CPSC standard applies only to children under age five while Jonas was over age five and (2) the CPSC standards do not apply to children such as Jonas who are five years old or older, even if they suffer developmental delays. We disagree with the argument. Carter's manufacturing defect claim is not based on whether the lighter would be child resistant as to older children in general, or even older children with developmental delays. Her claim is that BIC failed to manufacture the lighter to the specifications BIC submitted to the CPSC, the resulting manufacturing defect lessened the force required to operate the Subject Lighter, and the lighter was unreasonably dangerous because the defect reduced the force required to operate the lighter. Thus, her claim that Jonas would not have been able to light the Subject lighter if BIC had manufactured it according to the specifications submitted to the CPSC does not add to the federal requirements for child resistant status. BIC also asserts that the jury charge allowed the jury to decidecontrary to federal lawthat no child of any age should be able to operate a lighter. BIC points to Carter's counsel's arguments during trial such as if the cigarette lighter is supposed to be child-resistant, how was he able to use it, and claims that the jury was allowed to impose liability merely because a 62-month old child was able to operate the Subject Lighter. BIC's argument has traction. However, we believe the argument does not implicate preemption; rather, it is directed toward the evidence and the jury instruction defining unreasonably dangerous product to which BIC did not object. BIC also submits that the court of appeals held that the jury was entitled to assume the lighter deviated from BIC's internal specifications, which were more strict than specifications it submitted to the CPSC and, based on that assumption, the jury could have concluded that deviations from BIC's internal specifications resulted in a manufacturing defect. BIC asserts this conflicts with federal law by holding BIC liable for failing to meet internal goals that exceeded specifications it submitted to the CPSC. We do not agree. The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence adduced for the jury to have concluded that the 1995 [CPSC-submitted] specifications applied and that the Subject Lighter deviated from those specifications. 346 S.W.3d at 580. Although the court went on to discuss whether BIC failed to comply with its internal manufacturing specifications, the court noted that evidence of BIC's failure to comply with its internal specifications was an alternative basis for the jury to have found liability. Carter's claim is not preempted simply because the court of appeals found an alternative ground for liability, and we need not determine whether a claim based solely on BIC's failure to comply with its internal specifications would be preempted. BIC next asserts that in order for Carter's claim not to have been preempted, she was required to prove that the lighter failed to meet BIC's specifications to the extent it would not pass the eighty-five percent CPSC child testing protocol. BIC argues that imposing liability without such a showing would allow recovery for a variance from manufacturing specifications even if the lighter exceeded the performance-based CPSC mandated testing. This argument also fails. Under the court's charge, Carter was required to prove that a manufacturing variance was of such degree that it was a defect as defined in the jury charge, not that the lighter was child resistant. Defect was defined as dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user of the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics. Finally, BIC claims that Carter's use of data regarding one particular surrogate lighter (surrogate 5) that was used by sixteen children in the J-26 testing is inconsistent with federal standards that require testing of 100 children. BIC asserts that to the extent Carter's claim is supported by this data, it obstructs the federal objectives and is preempted. But Carter presented the surrogate 5 data to demonstrate the effect of low force requirements on the ability of children to operate the J-26. A state law claim is preempted under the obstruction of federal objectives aspect of preemption analysis when state law imposes duties that conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. BIC Pen, 251 S.W.3d at 509. Carter's use of the surrogate 5 data was not an attempt to impose a duty inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme, and her use of the data does not form a basis for holding the manufacturing defect claim was preempted. We conclude that Carter's manufacturing defect claim was not preempted and next address BIC's challenge to the jury's finding that there was a manufacturing defect in the Subject Lighter.