Opinion ID: 2598484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: plaintiff's expert on standard of care

Text: K.S.A. 60-3412 provides: In any medical malpractice liability action, as defined in K.S.A. 60-3401 and amendments thereto, in which the standard of care given by a practitioner of the healing arts is at issue, no person shall qualify as an expert witness on such issue unless at least 50% of such person's professional time within the two-year period preceding the incident giving rise to the action is devoted to actual clinical practice in the same profession in which the defendant is licensed. The statute is intended to prevent the use of `professional witnesses.' That is, practitioners of healing arts who spend less than 50 percent of their professional time in actual clinical practice in their profession are considered to be `professional witnesses' rather than practitioners of their profession. Wisker v. Hart, 244 Kan. 36, 43-44, 766 P.2d 168 (1988). If, as here, the district court's decision to admit expert testimony is based upon an interpretation of the statute, the court has de novo review. Endorf v. Bohlender, 26 Kan. App. 2d 855, 860, 995 P.2d 896, rev. denied 269 Kan. 932 (2000). In a written Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court concluded that under K.S.A. 60-3412 Dr. Simon was not qualified to testify on the standard of care because he spent less than 50% of his professional time during the 1993 to 1995 time period in actual clinical practice. The district court looked to Endorf for the meaning of actual clinical practice. In that case, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that administrative and academic pursuits and research would satisfy the statutory requirement of actual clinical practice. The Court of Appeals concluded: `Actual clinical practice' means patient care. However, patient care should not be limited to a physical presence or bedside requirement. For example, here, Dr. Bohlender was criticized by Dr. Barish for failing to call Poison Control. Had such a call been placed, the physician in Poison Control advising the emergency room doctor on patient care would be engaged in patient care and thus in actual clinical practice. In this technological age of video teleconferencing, and the like, the practitioner of healing arts advising on, or addressing care for, a distant patient is engaged in actual clinical practice. 26 Kan. App. 2d at 865. The district court's conclusion that Dr. Simon spent less than 50% of his professional time during the 1993 to 1995 period in patient care was based on Dr. Simon's deposition testimony, which was given in January 2000. When asked if he agreed that at the time of the deposition he spent less than half his time in actual clinical practice, as defined by defendants' counsel, Dr. Simon answered affirmatively. When asked about 1993 to 1995, Dr. Simon said that it was [p]robably true then too. Dawson contends on appeal, as she did in the district court, that Dr. Simon's answers would have satisfied the statutory requirement if defendants' counsel had not defined actual clinical practice too narrowly. The district court considered and rejected the argument: The crux of Plaintiff's argument is that Dr. Simon was misled in that Defendant limited Dr. Simon's response to `patient care' meaning `direct work with treating patients.' However, although Defendants' counsel made such initial statement, it is clear that Dr. Simon included in his figure the amount of time spent on advising on and addressing patient care needs and other peripheral duties relating to actual patient care. . . . Defendants' counsel continually clarified what was actual clinical practice and gave Dr. Simon many opportunities to explain everything he does so there would be no guessing game on what portion of Dr. Simon's time is spent on clinical practice. As an example of the broad range of patient related activities included in the time Dr. Simon figured as actual clinical practice, the following colloquy took place between Dr. Simon and Defendants' counsel: `Q. . . . All Right. Now, again talking about actual clinical practice and I have a loosely defined that as actual patient care  `A. Let me ask you this if I may, counsel, I also consult to Suburban's outreach program to the social workers that go out and follow up on patients who have been admitted and discharged from Suburban, both psychiatric and non-psychiatric; it's in regard to their emotional needs. I do consultation on that. I don't know if you want to consider that direct patient care or not, but I do, do that as well. `Q. Sure. What I want from you, really, doctor, is describe your clinical practice in terms of patient care and `A. That would qualify I think. `Q. Can you give me a sense of the hours? `A. Of that? `Q. Yes. `A. That would only be one hour a month, yeah. `Q. Okay. `A. I do some inpatient supervision. That's about an hour a month as well.' In addition, on various occasions Dr. Simon was asked the percentage of time he spends on clinical practice now and in the 1993-1995 time period and responded, for example as follows: `Q. Is it fair to say that you spend less than half your time currently treating outpatients? `A. That's true. `Q. All right. Now in '93, '95 is it fair to say that you spent less than half your time treating outpatients? `A. Yeah, I think that's correct. `Q. Okay. Now, I used the term actual clinical practice and defined that as patient care earlier? `A. Yes. `Q. Would you agree that you spend less than half your time now in actual clinical care as I have defined it? `A. Yes. `Q. And what about in '93, '95? `A. Probably true then too.' Again, although Plaintiff had counsel present at the deposition which could have attempted to clarify any testimony, it was Defense counsel who attempted to make certain the testimony of Dr. Simon was clear and accurate, asking: `Q. Let me do the proverbial one more question, which is to go back to when I asked about how you split up your work and how much time was spent on different things. `A. I know what you are going to ask me now. `Q. Not necessarily. `A. I do. `Q. We talked about actual clinical practice, meaning actual patient care, and you gave me some figures on what you did with outpatients and then also your writing and research and scholarship and university work and all. I believe your testimony was that, with your outpatient care today and then also back in 1993, '95, the period at issue in this lawsuit, that less than half your time was spent in clinical outpatient care? `A. Right. `Q. My question is was less than half your time spent with patient care now and back then? `A. Was  `Q. Do you spend less than half of your time today `A. Yes. `Q.  on patient care? `A. Yes. `Q. What about '93, '95? `A. Yes. `Q. Less than half your time  `A. Yes. `Q.  was spent on patient care? `A. Yes. `Q. As we have defined it? `A. Right. `Q. The reason I ask you again, quite frankly, is that we have talked about outpatient care you have provided in what you described in your office over here, and I wanted to broaden that if you are talking about other patients because you said you were in hospitals and you described a number of other contexts. Even in those other contexts, back in '93 and '95 and today, it's your testimony that less than half of your time is spent with patient care? `A. Unless I have four or five admissions on a unit. Then it's 10, 15 hours, 20 hours per admission, but that hasn't happened for a while. If you get a bunch of hospital admissions, then your hours go up. `Q. Or they don't and they go down? `A. And don't, and you don't have them. `Q. On the average? `A. Right, is less. `Q. Both now, January 2000, and also back in '93 to '95? `A. Yes, I think that's accurate. `Q. Less than 50 percent? `A. Right.' It is clear Dr. Simon included in patient care the time spent consulting, supervising, admitting patients, and other various duties associated with patient care. In addition, it is clear the definition provided by Defendants' counsel was not limited to outpatient care as Plaintiff contends. After consideration of the deposition as a whole, and the fact that Plaintiff had counsel present who could have cross-examined Dr. Simon or clarified the issue, and the fact Dr. Simon did not provide corrections on his errata sheet, the Court finds Dr. Simon testified that his time spent in actual clinical practice, or patient care under the meaning discussed in Endorf, is not at least 50% as is required by K.S.A. 60-3412, and as such [he is] not qualified to testify as an expert on the standard of care in this matter. On appeal, Dawson reiterates the position she took in the district court. In particular, she complains that the definition defendants' counsel used in questioning Dr. Simon excluded indirect patient care from actual clinical practice. As the district court observed, although defendant's counsel focused on direct patient care, he also told the witness that indirect patient care, such as consulting with social workers who follow up with patients discharged from Suburban Hospital, qualified as actual clinical practice. Examination of Dr. Simon's testimony about his professional activities shows that he included indirect patient care in his computation of time spent in patient care. The only period of Dr. Simon's activities that is relevant under K.S.A. 60-3412 is the period 1993 to 1995, but the deposition contains a more thorough discussion of the range of Simon's professional activities in 2000. In consequence, the testimony about 1993 to 1995 is more readily understood in light of the testimony about 2000. For this reason only, the testimony about Simon's professional activities in 2000 is set out here. With regard to his activities in January 2000, Dr. Simon testified that he engaged in the following types of direct and indirect patient care: outpatient care 5-10 hours/week group therapist/partial hospitalization 2-3 hours/week emergency room on call 2-4 times/month  no estimate of time federal government consulting no estimate of time consult with social workers 1 hour/month inpatient supervisio 1 hour/month Dr. Simon testified that he devoted at least 10 hours per week to writing and editing and approximately 20 hours per week to legal consulting. Simon did not estimate the time he spent in his other January 2000 professional activities that did not involve patient care  his directorship of the program of psychiatry and law at Georgetown and his involvement with professional organizations and committees. Thus, in January 2000, for those activities that Simon estimated time spent, he did direct and indirect patient care less than 15 hours per week and nonpatient pursuits approximately 30 hours per week. For the period 1993 to 1995, the 2 years preceding the incident giving rise to the action, Dr. Simon testified that he spent approximately 20 hours, perhaps more, per week in outpatient care. He stated that, unlike in January 2000, in the earlier period he was not taking emergency room on-call duty, he was not doing group therapy/partial hospitalization work, he was doing less consulting with the hospital, and he was doing less inpatient and partial hospitalization supervision. He did not mention federal government consulting during the 1993 to 1995 period. Hence, in the earlier period, Dr. Simon did not engage in the types of indirect patient care that took the greatest amount of his time in January 2000. In the earlier period, according to his testimony, his indirect patient care activities consisted only of consulting with the hospital and inpatient and partial hospitalization supervision. Dr. Simon's only testimony about the amount of time spent in those activities was that it was less than at the time of the deposition. His estimate of the time he spent in those activities at the time of the deposition appears to be approximately 2 hours per month. Fewer than 2 hours per month in indirect patient care does not meaningfully affect the computation of Dr. Simon's professional activities for purposes of K.S.A. 60-3412. Thus, contrary to Dawson's contention, when defendants' counsel asked Simon what percentage of his professional time he spent in 1993 to 1995 in outpatient care, the question did not significantly narrow the scope of the witness' actual clinical practice activities. Dr. Simon estimated the percentage of his time with outpatients in 1993 to 1995 at probably 30 to 40 percent. As noted by the district court, each time Simon was asked about the fraction or percentage of his professional time spent in 1993 to 1995 in actual clinical practice or patient care, he testified that it was less than half his time or less than 50%. Twenty hours per week is 50% of a 40-hour workweek. When Dr. Simon stated that 20 hours per week of outpatient care amounted to approximately 30 to 40% of his professional time, he was not calculating the percentage on a standard 40-hour week. If 20 hours of outpatient care was 30% of his professional time, his workweek would be 67 hours (20/.3 = 66.6666). If 20 hours was 40%, his work week would be 50 hours (20/.4 = 50). Dr. Simon was asked, You said 20 hours, a 40-, 50-hour week? He answered, Maybe it was more. Dawson directs the court's attention to similar statutory schemes in four other states that qualify standard of care witnesses on the ground that a certain portion of time is spent in clinical practice. She notes that [d]espite the simple elegance of these statutes each of these states have had questions arise in construing their statutes, including the way to count hours to assess the percentage of time the experts spent in their clinical practice. We note two cases, one from Michigan and one from North Carolina, that when compared to the present case, would seem to have anomalous results In Estate of Gawel ex rel. Gawel v. Schatten, 109 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Mich. 2000), plaintiff designated as expert witness a Dr. Shapiro who had retired from the active clinical practice of medicine to teach 8 to 10 hours per week at a university of applied health services. Defendant urged the court to interpret the statutory phrase, a majority of his or her professional time, as requiring full-time employment. 109 F. Supp. 2d at 722. The district court declined to do so on several grounds. First, requiring full-time employment would not serve the legislative purpose of banishing hired guns. Second, requiring full-time employment would be contrary to the rule of statutory construction that prescribes the broad interpretation of statutory requirements that constrain access to the courts. Third, the number of hours a medical expert spends on his or her profession goes to credibility rather than qualification. 109 F. Supp. 2d at 723-24. In Coffman v. Roberson, 153 N.C. App. 618, 571 S.E.2d 255 (2002), it was noted that the North Carolina evidentiary rule requires a medical expert witness, in the year immediately preceding the occurrence, to have devoted a majority of his or her professional time to active clinical practice or the instruction of students. The court held that a retired physician who, as a volunteer, taught in an accredited medical school was qualified to testify because, even though he spent little time teaching, his teaching time constituted 100% of the time he devoted to professional pursuits. Even though the experts in these two cases apparently devoted less than half the number of hours to legislatively-approved activities that Dr. Simon spent in this case, they were qualified to testify as experts and Dr. Simon was not. However, just as in Michigan and North Carolina, if it were shown that Dr. Simon devoted 8 to 10 hours per week to actual clinical practice and that constituted at least 50% of his professional time, he would have been qualified to testify under K.S.A. 60-3412. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. Stated another way, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in it. State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001) (citing In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 [1998]). It might be argued that our construction of the statute leads to unreasonable results. The legislature is presumed to intend that a statute be given a reasonable construction, so as to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. Bennett v. Van Doren Industries, Inc., 262 Kan. 426, 433, 939 P.2d 874 (1997). However, ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning, and a statute should not be so read as to add that which is not readily found therein or to read out what as a matter of ordinary English language is in it. GT, Kansas, L.L.C. v. Riley County Register of Deeds, 271 Kan. 311, 316, 22 P.3d 600 (2001). If, for example, we were to conclude that 20 hours represents 50% of a 40-hour workweek, Dr. Simon would be qualified to testify under the statute. But we would be adding something to the statute as written, and that is a legislative function. Under the clear and unambiguous wording of K.S.A. 60-3412, Dr. Simon did not spend at least 50% of his professional time devoted to actual clinical practice in the 2-year period preceding the incident giving rise to the present action and was not qualified to testify on the standard of care.