Opinion ID: 2180253
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eligibility Based on Section 9-1(b)(6) for Joshua's Murder

Text: We hold that defendant's eligibility may be upheld based on the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor predicated on Joshua's murder. `[W]here a defendant is found eligible based upon two or more statutory aggravating factors, the fact that one of those factors may later be invalidated will not generally impair the eligibility finding as long as a separate, valid aggravating factor supported eligibility.' People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 64, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391 (1998), quoting People v. Brown, 169 Ill.2d 132, 165, 214 Ill.Dec. 433, 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996). The Illinois death penalty statute does not place special emphasis on any single aggravating factor and gives no added significance to multiple aggravating factors as opposed to a single factor. People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998). The purpose of finding a statutory aggravating factor at the first stage of sentencing is to narrow the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty. People v. Hampton, 149 Ill.2d 71, 90-91, 171 Ill.Dec. 439, 594 N.E.2d 291 (1992). [O]nce one such factor is proved, the defendant is eligible for death regardless of whether other factors exist as well. Hampton, 149 Ill.2d at 91, 171 Ill.Dec. 439, 594 N.E.2d 291. The only challenge defendant makes to the finding of eligibility based on defendant's murder of Joshua during an aggravated kidnapping is that the verdict form was defective under this court's decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill.2d 525, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (1995), because it omitted certain elements required for eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6). Among the elements for eligibility under the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor are requirements that the murdered individual    received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable and that the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(a)(ii), (b)(6)(b) (West 1994). The felony-murder eligibility verdict form premised on Joshua's murder provided: We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Jacqueline Annette Williams is eligible for a death sentence under the law. We unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that: the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time of the murder of Joshua Evans for which she was convicted in this case; and the following statutory aggravating factor exists: that Joshua Evans was killed in the course of an Aggravated Kidnapping as set forth in paragraph [2] of the second proposition concerning the First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans. According to defendant, this verdict form was defective because it omitted the statutory requirements that the defendant actually kill or inflict injuries to the murdered individual and did not require a finding that defendant intended to kill or knew her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Defendant contends that there was no actual verdict for eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6) because the verdict form did not contain a complete statement of the necessary elements for eligibility under this aggravating factor. The State responds that defendant cannot raise this issue on appeal because she failed to object to the verdict form, failed to tender an alternative verdict form, and failed to include the issue in her post-trial motion. Alternatively, the State argues that the verdict form was not defective. We find that defendant has waived this issue for review for the reasons advanced by the State. See People v. Redd, 173 Ill.2d 1, 41, 218 Ill.Dec. 861, 670 N.E.2d 583 (1996); Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. Defendant asserts, however, that the defective verdict form constituted plain error under Rules 451(c) and 615(a). We hold that the challenged verdict form did not omit the required elements for eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6) and, therefore, find no plain error. See generally Keene, 169 Ill.2d at 17, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901. In People v. Mack, 167 Ill.2d 525, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (1995), this court reversed the jury's finding of eligibility because of a defective verdict form. As in the instant case, the defendant's eligibility in Mack was based on section 9-1(b)(6). The verdict form at issue in Mack provided: We, the jury, unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder: Larry Mack killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery. See Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 529-30, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. The Mack court found that this verdict form was improper. It explained, where the verdict purports to set out the elements of the offense as specific findings, it must do so completely or be held insufficient. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 538, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. The Mack court concluded that the verdict form at issue was defective because it attempted to set forth a statutory aggravating factor but did so incompletely by omitting the mental state element under section 9-1(b)(6). In evaluating the effect of this omission, the Mack court noted that [t]he test of the sufficiency of a verdict is whether the jury's intention can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the language used. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 537, 212 Ill. Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. In addition, all parts of the record will be searched and interpreted together in determining the meaning of a verdict. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 537, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. The Mack court rejected, however, the State's argument that the presence of the mental state requirement in the jury instructions cured any error resulting from the absence of this element from the verdict form. The Mack court stated that it could not lightly discount the possibility that the jury was confused as a result of the discrepancy between the jury instructions and the verdict form. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 535, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. In addition, to conclude that the jury found the existence of the mental state under section 9-1(b)(6), when this element was missing from the verdict form, would be a speculative attempt to reconstruct the jury's deliberations and divine its unexpressed conclusions. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 536-37, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. For these reasons, the Mack court reversed the eligibility verdict and remanded the cause for resentencing. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 538-39, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437; see also, e.g., Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 225, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (finding the eligibility verdict forms legally insufficient). We disagree with defendant's argument that the verdict form relating to her eligibility for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6) for Joshua's murder is invalid under Mack. Instead, we find that the verdict form is like those this court upheld in People v. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d 335, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841 (1997). In McNeal, this court rejected a defendant's Mack challenge to the six jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder. The defendant had been charged under three different theories of first degree murder for the murder of two victims. The verdict forms described the different theories in parentheticals. For example, one form stated, `We, the jury, find the defendant, Aldwin McNeal, Guilty of the offense of first degree murder (was committing the offense of robbery) of Corey Gerlach.' McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 359, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. Another stated, `We, the jury, find the defendant, Aldwin McNeal, Guilty of the offense of first degree murder (intended to kill) of Perry Austin.' McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 360, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. The defendant in McNeal argued that these verdict forms were invalid under Mack because they failed to require a finding that the defendant performed the acts that caused the victims' deaths or a finding that the defendant possessed the mental state when he performed these acts. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 360, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. This court found no Mack violation. It observed that the jury had been properly instructed as to the elements of the different theories of first degree murder. In addition, unlike Mack, there was no discrepancy between the jury instructions and the verdict forms. The parenthetical material referred to theories of first degree murder under which defendant was charged and conformed with the description of these theories in the instructions. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 362, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. Based on this reasoning, the McNeal court found that the verdict forms were proper. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d at 362, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841. As in McNeal, the verdict form and the record in this case permit us to conclude with reasonable certainty that the jury found the existence of the elements required for eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6). There is no discrepancy between the jury instructions and the felony-murder verdict forms in defendant's case. Instead, the felony-murder eligibility verdict form relating to Joshua's murder contains an express reference to portions of the jury instructions. These instructions contained a complete statement of the necessary elements for eligibility under section 9-1(b)(6). The jury instruction relating to defendant's eligibility for the death penalty as a result of Joshua Evans' murder provided in relevant part: Before the defendant may be found eligible for a death sentence under the law for the first degree murder of Joshua Evans, the State must prove the following propositions: First Proposition: That the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time of the commission of the murder of Joshua Evans of which she was found guilty at the trial of this case; and Second Proposition: That one or more of the following statutory aggravating factors exist       [2] Joshua Evans was killed in the course of Aggravated Kidnapping and Joshua Evans received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or other persons for whose conduct she is legally responsible caused the death of Joshua Evans; and in performing the acts which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on Joshua Evans substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible, the defendant acted with the intent to kill Joshua Evans or with the knowledge that her acts created a strong probability of death to Joshua Evans. By referring to paragraph [2] of the second proposition concerning the First Degree Murder of Joshua Evans, the felony-murder eligibility verdict forms in defendant's case incorporated the necessary elements under section 9-1(b)(6), including the required mental state and defendant's infliction of injuries on the decedent. As a result, unlike Mack, a conclusion in defendant's case that the jury found the necessary elements under section 9-1(b)(6) need not be based on speculation. When we consider the verdict forms in the context of the record in defendant's case, we can conclude with reasonable certainty that the jury found these elements. Accordingly, we hold that defendant was properly found eligible for the death penalty based on the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor premised on Joshua's murder. As a consequence of this holding, we need not decide the merits of defendant's challenge to the eligibility verdict under section 9-1(b)(6) for Debra's murder or her challenges to the eligibility verdicts based on section 9-1(b)(3), 9-1(b)(7), or 9-1(b)(8). Defendant was independently eligible for the death penalty on the ground that she murdered Joshua during an aggravated kidnapping. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 181 Ill.2d 297, 320-21, 229 Ill. Dec. 898, 692 N.E.2d 1109 (1998); People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d 258, 268, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993); Hampton, 149 Ill.2d at 90, 171 Ill.Dec. 439, 594 N.E.2d 291. Thus, the jury's reliance on any other aggravating factors did not affect its finding that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. See People v. Coleman, 129 Ill.2d 321, 345, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330 (1989).