Opinion ID: 2335720
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellants' Open Meetings Act Claims Are Moot, But We Reach Them To Resolve The Question Of Prevailing Party Status.

Text: In its Sua Sponte Order of Clarification, the superior court observed that Gold Country's Open Meetings Act claims were rendered moot by the finding that the Planning Commission had performed substantial reconsideration of the challenged action. However, the superior court went on to observe that questions about ... the Open Meetings Act are matters of public importance such that a finding on the question should be made without regard to it being moot. The court concluded that there was adequate notice of the site visit and therefore no Open Meetings Act violation. We agree that Gold Country's Open Meetings Act claims should be addressed even though they are moot. But in light of our recent decision in Mullins v. Local Boundary Commission, [13] we reach this conclusion for different reasons than those cited by the superior court. [14] We have held that [a] claim is moot `if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy' or `if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if it prevails.' [15] In Mullins, the plaintiff filed an appeal in superior court challenging the Local Boundary Commission's decision to approve a petition for incorporation of the Deltana Borough. [16] The plaintiff sought to stay the election in which voters would decide whether to incorporate the proposed borough. [17] The superior court denied the plaintiff's motion to stay the election, and when the voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposal, the superior court dismissed the plaintiff's lawsuit as moot. [18] On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Local Boundary Commission had violated the Open Meetings Act. [19] We held that [t]he vote against incorporation voided the approval decision and provided the principal relief that [the appellant] sought in her appeal to the superior court, thus rendering the appellant's claims under the Open Meetings Act moot. [20] We distinguished the situation in Mullins from the circumstances of Alaska Community Colleges' Federation of Teachers, Local No. 2404 v. University of Alaska (ACCFT). [21] In that case, we held that Open Meetings Act claims should be reached even where a subsequent meeting cured previous violations because [t]he issues surrounding the first meeting [were] of sufficient public importance that prosecution of a declaratory action should be allowed, even assuming technical mootness. [22] But we declined to apply this principle in Mullins: Unlike in ACCFT, the [Local Boundary Commission's] approval decision was not reaffirmed at a curative meeting, and it is not still in effect. Mullins, unlike the plaintiff in ACCFT, cannot obtain the substantive relief she seeks because the [Local Boundary Commission's] decision allegedly made in violation of the [Open Meetings Act] has been voided by subsequent events.[ [23] ] We held in Mullins that [w]here a decision is no longer in effect ... a court should conduct a standard mootness analysis to determine whether to address the [Open Meetings Act] claim. [24] Here, the superior court granted summary judgment against the Kniffens, declaring that the Gold Country Estates covenant restricting lots to residential use was enforceable to [the] extent the lots are not to be used to create driveways to other subdivisions. The superior court's ruling provided the primary relief sought by Gold Country, and Gold Country's claim has lost its character as a present, live controversy. [25] Gold Country would not be entitled to further relief even if it prevailed because the superior court's separate ruling established that Gold Country's covenants do not permit the use of the Kniffens' lot as a driveway. Although Gold Country's Open Meetings Act claims are moot, we will hear an otherwise moot case to determine who is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney's fees. [26] Thus, where the outcome of an otherwise moot claim may change[ ] the status of the prevailing party and thus an award of attorneys' fees, [27] we reach the merits of that claim. Reversal of the superior court's ruling on Gold Country's Open Meetings Act claims would likely deprive the Borough of prevailing party status. This possibility requires us to reach the merits of Gold Country's moot Open Meetings Act claims.