Opinion ID: 581376
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Failure to Comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j).

Text: 21 Rule 43(a) of the Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York provides that a proceeding to adjudicate a person in civil contempt of court ... shall be commenced by the service of a notice of motion or order to show cause. Where the alleged contemnor has not yet appeared in the action, service shall be made personally, in the manner provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of a summons. Id. 22 Respondents-appellants, upon whom service of orders to show cause was made as required by Rule 43(a), contend that they should be regarded as the unknown John Doe(s) and Mary Doe(s) named in plaintiffs-appellees' complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a); i.e., as defendants presently unknown to plaintiffs, said fictitious names being intended to designate organizations or persons who are members of defendant organizations, and others acting in concert with any of the defendants who are engaging in, or intend to engage in, the conduct complained of herein. They accordingly claim status as defendants, rather than respondents, in this case. 23 It follows, they argue, that service of the orders to show cause was required to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j), which provides in pertinent part: 24 If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. 25 Because they were not served with the orders to show cause within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, or (as they alternatively contend in their reply brief) within 120 days of the demonstrations for which they were adjudged in contempt, respondents-appellants contend that plaintiffs-appellees must begin their entire injunction case afresh against the Respondents, not having served them in time to participate in the case against the four known defendants. 26 Respondents-appellants cite Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir.1988), and Rankel v. Greenburgh, 117 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y.1987), in support of this position, but these cases are not on point. Napier's only mention of Rule 4(j) was in relation to the improper service of named, not fictitious, parties. See 855 F.2d at 1088 n. 4. Similarly, Rankel involved a motion to dismiss a named, not fictitious, party, and that motion was denied. See 117 F.R.D. at 54-55 & n. 6. 27 We agree with the district court that it is absurd to suggest that plaintiffs are forced to do the impossible: foretell which individuals will subsequently act in concert with defendants in violation of an injunctive order of the Court and serve them within 120 days of filing the complaint. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F.Supp. at 403. We conclude that the time constraints of Rule 4(j) do not apply to service in connection with a contempt proceeding arising out of violation of injunctions validly issued pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). We next address respondents-appellants' claim that the injunctive orders in this case were not so issued. 28