Opinion ID: 2614563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Alleged Misconduct

Text: In this case, Rogan contends that the deputy prosecutor's statement that it is every mother's nightmare [to find] ... some black, military guy on top of your daughter constituted an impermissible appeal to racial prejudice. We agree.
This court has repeatedly noted that [t]he prosecution has a duty to seek justice, to exercise the highest good faith in the interest of the public and to avoid even the appearance of unfair advantage over the accused. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 136 n. 19, 938 P.2d at 567 n. 19 (quoting State v. Moriwaki, 71 Haw. 347, 354, 791 P.2d 392, 396 (1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Pemberton, 71 Haw. 466, 476, 796 P.2d 80, 85 (1990). The American Bar Association (ABA) Prosecution Function Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed.1993) states that [t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. With regard to the prosecution's closing argument, a prosecutor is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and wide latitude is allowed in discussing the evidence. It is also within the bounds of legitimate argument for prosecutors to state, discuss, and comment on the evidence as well as to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 145, 938 P.2d at 576 (quoting State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 304, 926 P.2d 194, 209, reconsideration denied, 83 Hawai`i 545, 928 P.2d 39 (1996) (citations omitted)). In other words, closing argument affords the prosecution (as well as the defense) the opportunity to persuade the jury that its theory of the case is valid, based upon the evidence adduced and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 145, 938 P.2d at 576. In this regard, ABA Prosecution Function Standard 3-5.8(a) (1993) states: In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw. The commentary on Standard 3-5.8 aptly emphasizes: The prosecutor's argument is likely to have significant persuasive force with the jury. Accordingly, the scope of argument must be consistent with the evidence and marked by the fairness that should characterize all of the prosecutor's conduct. Prosecutorial conduct in argument is a matter of special concern because of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor's office, but also because of the fact-finding facilities presumably available to the office.
Given these principles, we now focus on appeals to racial prejudice during closing argument. ABA Prosecution Function Standard 3-5.8(c) (3d ed.1993) states in relevant part that prosecutors should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. The 1979 commentary to that section states: Arguments that rely on racial, religious, ethnic, political, economic, or other prejudices of the jurors introduce into the trial elements of irrelevance and irrationality that cannot be tolerated. Of course, the mere mention of the status of the accused as shown by the record may not be improper if it has a legitimate bearing on some issue in the case, such as identification by race. But where the jury's predisposition against some particular segment of society is exploited to stigmatize the accused or the accused witnesses, such argument clearly trespasses the bounds of reasonable inference of fair comment on the evidence. Accordingly, many courts have denounced such appeals to prejudice as inconsistent with the requirement that the defendant be judged solely on the evidence. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, courts throughout the country have consistently condemned appeals to racial prejudice during closing argument. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1503 (8th Cir.1996) (reversing conviction where prosecutor twice called African-American defendants bad people and drew attention to the fact they were not from the locality); Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 124-25 (6th Cir.1979) (holding improper prosecutor's statement that [n]ot one white witness has been produced in this case that contradicts [the victim's] position in this case where black defendant charged with interstate kidnapping); Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir.1975) (reversing rape conviction of black defendant because during closing argument the prosecutor told the jury to [t]hink about the consequences of letting a guilty man . . . go free . . . [b]ecause maybe the next time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of the track); Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 708 (4th Cir.1978) (finding error in the prosecution's blatant appeal to racial prejudice in the assertion that no white woman would consent to sexual intercourse with a black man); Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1413 (11th Cir.1985) ( en banc ), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3337, 92 L.Ed.2d 742 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the United States Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107 S.Ct. 3199, 96 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed: Federal courts have long condemned racially inflammatory remarks during governmental summation.... Racial fairness of the trial is an indispensable ingredient of due process and racial equality a hallmark of justice. Appeals to racial passion can distort the search for the truth and drastically affect a juror's impartiality. We speak of course, only of racial comments beyond the pale of legally acceptable modes of proof. An unembellished reference to evidence of race simply as a factor bolstering an eyewitness identification of a culprit, for example, poses no threat to purity of the trial. The line of demarcation is crossed, however, when the argument shifts its emphasis from evidence to emotion. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24-25 (D.C.Cir.1990); see also United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir.1973) (Racial prejudice can violently affect a juror's impartiality and must be removed from the courtroom proceeding to the fullest extent possible.); United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir.1989) (noting that race-conscious arguments draw the jury's attention to a characteristic the federal constitution generally demands the that jury ignore).
In this case, the deputy prosecutor's reference to Rogan as a black, military guy was clearly inflammatory inasmuch as it raised the issue of and cast attention to Rogan's race. Because there was no dispute as to the identity of the perpetrator in this case, Rogan's race was not a legitimate area of inquiry inasmuch as race was irrelevant to the determination of whether Rogan committed the acts charged. The prosecution concedes that the deputy prosecutor's comment was ill-advised. Indeed, the deputy prosecutor's comment had the potential of distracting the jury from considering only the evidence presented at trial. It is therefore inescapable that the deputy prosecutor's reference to Rogan as a black, military guy was an improper emotional appeal that could foreseeably have inflamed the jury. The deputy prosecutor's inflammatory reference to Rogan's race was further compounded by the statement that the incident was every mother's nightmare, which was a blatantly improper plea to evoke sympathy for the Complainant's mother and represented an implied invitation to the jury to put themselves in her position. Like the deputy prosecutor's reference to Rogan's race, the every mother's nightmare comment was not relevant for purposes of considering whether Rogan committed the acts charged. In response, the prosecution argues that the deputy prosecutor's comments were in rebuttal to defense counsel's closing argument that it was the Complainant's parents alone who wanted Rogan convicted. We disagree. As Rogan argues, the deputy prosecutor's comments do not rebut defense counsel's argument that it was the Complainant's parents alone who wanted Rogan convicted. Instead, the deputy prosecutor's comment that finding some black, military guy on top of your daughter is every mother's nightmare supports the theory that it was the Complainant's parents alone who wanted Rogan convicted. Indeed, the deputy prosecutor said, Yeah, you can bet the parents wanted a conviction. Under these circumstances, we cannot excuse the deputy prosecutor's reference to Rogan as some black, military guy on the basis that the comment was made to rebut the defense counsel's theory that it was the Complainant's parents alone who wanted Rogan convicted. In light of the foregoing, we note that arguments by the prosecution contrived to stimulate racial prejudice represent a brazen attempt to subvert a criminal defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by both the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Such arguments foster jury bias through racial stereotypes and group predilections, thereby promoting an atmosphere that is inimical to the consideration of the evidence adduced at trial. Moreover, such an appeal to racial prejudice threatens our multicultural society and constitutional values. We must therefore recognize that [o]ur government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Accordingly, appeals to racial prejudice lack the professionalism and decorum required of attorneys who practice before the bar of the courts of Hawai`i and will not be tolerated. For this reason, we further hold that references to race that do not have an objectively legitimate purpose constitute a particularly egregious form of prosecutorial misconduct.