Opinion ID: 2349621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Serious Bodily Injury

Text: Finally, appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Butler had suffered serious bodily injury consistent with the requirements of the aggravated assault statute. [13] On a claim of insufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the government and deferring to the jury's province to determine credibility and weigh evidence. Owens v. United States, 688 A.2d 399, 402-403 (D.C.1996). It is only where the government has produced no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that this court can reverse a conviction. Zanders v. United States, 678 A.2d 556, 563 (D.C.1996) (citations omitted). For aggravated assault, [s]erious bodily injury means bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 915 n. 3 (D.C.2000) (quoting D.C.Code § 22-4101(7) (1996)). A jury may infer from a description of the nature and extent of injuries that an individual has suffered serious bodily injury as defined. Gathy, 754 A.2d at 918-19. In Gathy, this court found that the government presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim had suffered serious bodily injuries involving: I) a substantial risk of unconsciousness because the victim testified to being `semi-unconscious,' `in total shock,' and `[not] totally coherent' and ii) extreme physical pain because although he never described [his pain] in terms that would indicate it was `extreme' ... a reasonable juror could infer from the nature of his injuries, and from his reaction to them, that the pain was extreme. Id.; compare with Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 150-51 (D.C.) (holding the government did not provide sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated assault due to the absence of testimony from [the victims], or from health professionals who treated them, or medical records detailing the nature and extent of their injuries), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 899, 120 S.Ct. 233, 145 L.Ed.2d 196 (1999). The evidence presented regarding the stabbing included Ms. Butler's testimony that she felt the knife, that It was burning. It was very painful.  Her physician, Dr. Norma Smalls, testified that Ms. Butler was in pain when she came to the hospital, characterizing that pain as significant. Ms. Butler was taken immediately to surgery because the knife had gone through [her] kidney. The surgery resulted in a six to eleven inch scar on Ms. Butler's belly, and, in order to respond to complications resulting from the first surgery, Ms. Butler was required to undergo a second surgery. As to the serious bodily injury resulting from the shod foot, Ms. Butler testified that the appellant started jumping on my face with both his feet so I'm trying to cover up my face. Dr. Norma Smalls testified that Ms. Butler's nose was broken and the sinus ... below the left eye was also broken ... correction, right. Noting that a broken nose and sinus bone were injuries consistent with someone stomping on another's face, Dr. Smalls opined that each injury sustained to Ms. Butler's face, the swollen forehead, the broken nose, and the broken sinus bone, would cause pain as broken bones are painful. Dr. Smalls also indicated the potential long term effects of such injuries include sinus infections and sinusitis ... those can be very painful, kind of debilitating ... Finally, Ms. Butler was prescribed pain medication [b]ecause of the broken bones and she'd recently had surgery and the face injury. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, the government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Ms. Butler suffered serious bodily injury from stabbing in her side and the stomping on her face. Although Ms. Butler never described [her pain]...[as] `extreme'... a reasonable juror could infer from the nature of [her] injuries, and from [her] reaction to them, that the pain was extreme. See Gathy, 754 A.2d at 918. Ms. Butler testified the stabbing was very painful and her doctor indicated such an injury would cause significant pain. The stabbing resulted in surgery and the provision of pain medication. Her doctor testified that each of her facial injuries, including broken bones, would be painful and that medicine was prescribed to alleviate such pain. Therefore, the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Butler suffered extreme pain from both the stabbing assault and the shod foot assault. In sum, we find no grounds for reversal in any of appellant's arguments on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is Affirmed. SCHWELB, Associate Judge, concurring: I concur in the judgment and join the court's opinion. Nevertheless, I continue to adhere to the views I expressed in my separate opinion in Daniels v. United States, 613 A.2d 342, 349-50 (D.C.1992). A proffer is a statement of counsel. A statement of counsel is not evidence. Therefore, a proffer is not and cannot be clear and convincing evidence. The explanation that a prosecutor's proffer as to what the evidence will show is itself clear and convincing evidence if it is credited reminds me of a dog chasing its own tail. Evidence is credited because it is convincing; if it is not convincing, the trier of fact will not believe it. Our current doctrine, on the other hand, supposes that a proffer is convincing (and clear too) if believed. Maj. op. at ___ (quoting Daniels, 613 A.2d at 347). Apparently, as a very able colleague told me about another case soon after I joined this court, common sense has nothing to do with it. I was of the opinion twelve years ago, when Daniels was decided, that we should conform our jurisprudence to Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), and that we should stop pretending that a proffer is clear and convincing evidence when it obviously is not. Nothing in the intervening twelve years has persuaded me that our illogical handling of this issue is superior to the straightforward approach adopted by all nine Justices in Huddleston.