Opinion ID: 339970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure of the Prosecution to Correct False Testimony

Text: 24 Joseph Oddo testified that his attorney was not present during the negotiations with the Government which resulted in Oddo's decision to testify. He also stated that he had consulted with his attorney concerning this decision but that his attorney had asked to be excused after he had decided to testify. Violet Cheramie testified that she had no knowledge of Oddo's agreement with the Government at the time she decided to testify. After this testimony, but prior to the close of the case, the Assistant United States Attorney advised defense counsel in a letter that it was his recollection that Oddo's attorney was present during the negotiations, but had excused himself before Oddo gave his statement. Cheramie's testimony was also incorrect in that she and Oddo had discussed his decision to testify prior to reaching her decision. 25 Relying on Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), appellants question whether the disclosure of the incorrect testimony to the defense after the witness was off the stand but while still subject to recall comported with due process. While we cannot say that, had the testimony of these two witnesses been entirely impeached, the verdict may not have been affected, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); United States v. Fannon, 491 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 332, 42 L.Ed.2d 286, we hold that the Government fulfilled its duty of disclosure by supplying appellants with its recollection of the true circumstances of the negotiations with the witnesses at a time when recall and further exploration of these matters was still possible. United States v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1170-71 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 193. Moreover, in view of the fact that Oddo's agreement was fully disclosed to the jury and the subject of extensive cross-examination, any error would in our opinion be harmless. See United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hildebrand, 506 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 968, 95 S.Ct. 1961, 44 L.Ed.2d 457. 26 We have examined the other contentions of the appellants and find them all to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm these convictions on all counts.