Opinion ID: 4028382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

Text: Nicosia moved for a preliminary injunction requesting that: (1) remedial notices be sent to past purchasers of products containing sibutramine; and (2) measures be put in place to prevent Amazon from unwittingly selling other products containing sibutramine. The district court concluded that Nicosia lacked standing for an injunction because he ʺfailed to plead facts that would permit the plausible inference that [he is] in danger of being wronged again.ʺ Special App. 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Although ʺthe making of the arbitration agreement . . . [is] in issue,ʺ no ʺtrialʺ is required at this time because neither side has ʺpetition[ed] . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed.ʺ 9 U.S.C. § 4; see Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175 (ʺThe present case does not fall squarely under section 4 of the FAA or the cases interpreting it because the [defendants] never cross‐moved to compel arbitration, and the FAA does not provide for petitions (such as [plaintiff]ʹs) brought by the party seeking to stay arbitration.ʺ). 7 Nicosia appeals the district courtʹs determination that challenges on the basis of contract illegality ab initio are subject to arbitration. As we have decided that factual questions remain as to the formation of the agreement to arbitrate, we need not reach that question. ‐ 35 ‐
A Appllicable Law w Geneerally, ʺcou urts should d consider the meritss of a requ uested prelimin nary injun nction even n where th derlying claims will b he validity of the und be determiined in arb bitration.ʺ Am. Expreess. Fin. Addvisors Inc. v. Thorleyy, 147 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation o omitted); see also Ben ihana, Inc. v. Benihan na of Tokyo,, 7, 894‐95 (2 LLC, 784 F.3d 887 2d Cir. 2015 5) (ʺWheree the partiees have ag greed to arbitratte a disputee, a districct court hass jurisdictiion to issuee a prelimiinary pending arrbitration.ʺ). ʺ[T]he expectatio injunctiion to presserve the sttatus quo p on of speedy arbitration n does nott absolve th he district court of itts responsiibility to decide rrequests fo or prelimin nary injunctions on tthe merits.. Nor is th his duty affected d by the prro‐arbitratiion policy manifested in the FA AA.ʺ Thorrley, 147 F.33d at 231. We genera ally review w the denia al of a prelliminary in njunction ffor abuse o of discretion. Lusk v v. Vill. of Coold Spring, 475 F.3d 4480, 484 (2d Cir. 20077). A distrrict buses its d court ab discretion w when its deecision ressts on an errror of law w or clearly y erroneo ous finding g of fact. S Shain v. Elliison, 356 F F.3d 211, 2114 (2d Cir. 2004). ʺTh he existencce of stand ding is a qu uestion of llaw that w we review dde novo.ʺ IId. Articcle III limitts federal ju udicial pow wer to thee resolution n of ʺCasessʺ and ʺCo ontroversiees.ʺ U.S. C Const. art. III, § 2. To o satisfy th his jurisdicctional ‐ 36 ‐ requirement, ʺ(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury‐in‐fact; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct at issue; and (3) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.ʺ Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 778 F.3d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Cooper v. USPS, 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir. 2009)). For each form of relief sought, a plaintiff ʺmust demonstrate standing separately.ʺ Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). A plaintiff seeking to represent a class must personally have standing. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996). Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief where they are unable to establish a ʺreal or immediate threatʺ of injury. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111‐12 (1983); Shain, 356 F.3d at 215‐16. Although past injuries may provide a basis for standing to seek money damages, they do not confer standing to seek injunctive relief unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that she is likely to be harmed again in the future in a similar way. See DeShawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344‐45 (2d Cir. 1998). While ʺenhanced riskʺ of future injury may constitute injury‐in‐fact in certain circumstances, such injuries are only cognizable where the plaintiff alleges actual future exposure to that ‐ 37 ‐ increaseed risk. Seee Baur v. V Veneman, 352 F.3d 6225, 633‐35, 640‐42 (2d d Cir. 2003)) (holding that plaiintiff has sttanding to o seek injun nction to sstop defend dants from m butcherring non‐am mbulatory nhanced rissk of mad cow y cows because of plaaintiffʹs en disease as a consu umer of beeef); LaFleu ur v. Whitm man, 300 F.33d 256, 2700 (2d Cir. 2002) (cconcluding g that likeliihood of ex xposure to o additionaal sulfur d dioxide emissio ons qualifiees as injury y‐in‐fact).
B Appllication agree with the districct court thaat Nicosia did not esstablish a We a likeliho ood of futu ure or contiinuing harrm. Even aassuming h his past pu urchases o of 1 Day Dieet resulted in injury a and that hee may con ntinue to su uffer conseequences aas a result, h he has not shown tha at he is likeely to be su ubjected to o further ssales by Amazon n of produ ucts contain ning sibuttramine. A Amazon haas ceased sselling 1 D Day Diet on its websitee, and Niccosia has fa ailed to alleege that hee intends tto use n in the fu Amazon uture to buy any prod ducts, let aalone food or drug prroducts generallly or weig ght loss pro oducts in p particular. See Comp pl. ¶ 15, EC CF No. 1; cf cf. Baur, 35 52 F.3d at 6 640 (conclu uding plain ntiff established a ʺppresent, imm mediate risk k of exposurreʺ by virtu ue of alleg ging to be a a regular cconsumer o of beef pro oducts). ‐ 38 ‐ Nicosiaʹs remaining arguments are meritless. The district court was correct in concluding that the private cause of action provided by the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2073, is unable to confer standing to enforce provisions in the Poison Prevention Packaging Act (the ʺPPPAʺ) relating to child‐proof packaging requirements for controlled drugs. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(5)(H) (excluding ʺdrugs, devices, or cosmeticsʺ from the definition of ʺconsumer productʺ in the CPSA), with 16 C.F.R. § 1700.14(a)(4), (10) (requiring child‐proof packaging for ʺControlled drugsʺ and ʺPrescription drugsʺ under the PPPA).