Opinion ID: 8704897
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Claims Against Sgt. Jefferson

Text: Ms. Konah brings claims under District of Columbia law against Sgt. Jefferson: Count V, assault and battery — two distinct causes of action, see Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948, 955 (D.C.1980)— and Count VI, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Judge Urbina, in his opinion denying in part the District and Sgt. Jefferson’s motion to dismiss, exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims because those claims and Ms. Konah’s federal claims arose from a “common nucleus of operative fact.” Konah, 815 F.Supp.2d at 78-79 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). The Court will retain supplemental jurisdiction at this juncture, given the clarity of the applicable law and the developed nature of the record. District of Columbia law on these three common law torts is clear, and it is clear in a way fatal to Ms. Konah’s claims: all three torts require proof of intent on the part of Sgt. Jefferson. “An assault is an intentional and unlawful attempt or threat, either by words or acts, to do physical harm to the plaintiff.” Smith v. District of Columbia, 882 A.2d 778, 787 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). “A battery is an intentional act that causes a harmful or offensive bodily contact.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires “extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which intentionally or recklessly causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Kotsch v. District of Columbia, 924 A.2d 1040, 1045 (D.C.2007) (internal quotations and numbering of elements omitted; emphasis added). Ms. Konah simply has not adduced any credible evidence tending to show that Sgt. Jefferson delayed opening the gate intending that Ms. Konah suffer an assault, a battery, or emotional distress. Her best argument on this point is that “Defendant Jefferson caused the offensive contact on Plaintiff because he refused to open the back gate for her to exit, ultimately causing unwanted contact at the hands of the inmates.” PI. Jefferson Opp. at 23. Likewise, her best evidence on the point is her own deposition testimony: Q: So other than ... not opening the gate upon your request before the inmate touched you, what did the District of Columbia or — and/or Robert Jefferson do that caused you the injury that you are claiming? A: He did not open the gate to let me out as I asked him before the inmate came and touched me. Q: What else — what else did the District of Columbia or Robert Jefferson do other than not opening the gate? A: He just did not open the gate. That’s all he did. He stood there, look at me. Konah Dep. at 227-28. The trouble is that there is nothing in the record — even in Ms. Konah’s sometimes self-serving deposition testimony— suggesting that Sgt. Jefferson delayed opening the gate with the intention that Ms. Konah suffer an assault, a battery, or emotional distress. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18, cmt. e (“It is not enough to make the act intentional that the actor realize that it involves any degree of probability of a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension of such contact, less than a substantial certainty that it will so result.”). That deficit might not be fatal to Ms. Konah’s claims if the case were in a different posture; “subjective intent can rarely be proven directly” and often “must be inferred.” See Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1077 (D.C.1980). However, the record is not bare, and the pending motion is for summary judgment, not to dismiss. The time for Ms. Konah to provide circumstantial evidence of intent is now. Even her deposition, viewed in the light most favorable to her and setting aside the many inconsistencies and memory gaps, does not tend to show that Sgt. Jefferson “just did not open the gate” for any reason other than that there were inmates in the sally port who would have been able to escape confinement. The record also includes Sgt. Jefferson’s deposition, Dr. Kargbo’s deposition, the video recordings, and a plethora of documentary evidence, all demonstrating that Sgt. Jefferson delayed opening the front gate for Ms. Konah due to security reasons, not because he wished to see harm befall her. See Jefferson Dep. at 93-101 (“I was waiting for an officer to come, because I had inmates inside the sally port.”); Kargbo Dep. at 18. On the basis of this evidence, there is no genuine dispute of material fact, because the evidence does not suggest that Sgt. Jefferson acted intentionally, that he acted recklessly, or that his actions were otherwise “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” 14 Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 308 (D.C.2000) (quoting Jackson, 412 A.2d at 957); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 32(1) (“The actor must have intended to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the other or to have put the other in apprehension of such contact.”). The Court will, therefore, grant summary judgment in favor of Sgt. Jefferson on Ms. Konah’s claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 15