Opinion ID: 891705
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unrelated questions permitted when supported by reasonable suspicion, including for police safety, or during consensual encounter.

Text: {23} Even if a court determines that questioning unreasonably prolonged the length of the stop, the questioning still may be constitutionally permissible. An officer may expand the scope of a traffic stop beyond the initial reason for the stop and prolong the detention if the driver's responses and the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity unrelated to the stop is afoot. United States v. Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir.2008). Reasonable suspicion must consist of more than an officer's hunch that something is amiss; it requires objectively reasonable indications of criminal activity. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 576-77 (D.C.Cir.2009) (finding reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk and car search existed based on the defendant's furtive movement under the car seat, unlikely explanation of the movement, and nervousness in a high crime area). Courts defer to the training and experience of the officer when determining whether particularized and objective indicia of criminal activity existed. State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 16, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830. Suspicion of criminal activity need not necessarily be of a specific crime. See Pack, 612 F.3d at 355-56 (holding, and compiling cases in support of, the reasonable suspicion required to expand an investigation is that a criminal activity is afoot and that the suspicion need not be directed to a specific crime requirement). {24} Although the scope of a stop may be expanded without violating the Fourth Amendment when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous or that other criminal activity is afoot, we underscore that the requirement of reasonable suspicion demands objective and articulable observations that indicate further police action is necessary. This does not mean that an officer must be certain that weapons are present, but rather that a reasonable, well-trained officer would have made the [same] judgment. . . . Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 23, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts must require articulable facts indicating reasonable suspicion. We find instructive the caution of Judge Richard Posner, describing the testimony of the arresting officer in a suppression hearing: Gilding the lily, the officer testified that he was additionally suspicious because when he drove by [the defendant] . . . he noticed that [the defendant] was staring straight ahead. Had [the defendant] instead glanced around him, the officer would doubtless have testified that [the defendant] seemed nervous or, the preferred term because of its vagueness, furtive. Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited. United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir.2005) (original bracket omitted) (holding that reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant existed); see also Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (rejecting an argument that reasonable suspicion existed when the circumstances smack more of the type of conjecture and hunch we have rejected in the past as insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion). {25} An officer may conduct a protective search of a stopped vehicle for reasons of officer safety during a traffic stop because traffic stops are `especially fraught with danger to police officers.' Johnson, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). A protective search is not a search for evidence. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 33, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. Such a search must be based upon the objectively reasonable belief that the individuals stopped pose a threat to officer safety, and the search must be limited to its purpose of protecting the officers, and the public, during the stop. See id. ¶ 22; Holt, 264 F.3d at 1225 (We emphasize also that the balance does not depend on whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist. Subjective intentions rarely play a role in Fourth Amendment analysis. (footnote omitted)). During traffic stops, movements by the vehicle's occupants, consistent with hiding an object, generally give rise to reasonable safety concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 876 F.2d 1359, 1361 (7th Cir.1989) (finding that a limited search for weapons in the car was permitted because the officer could reasonably be concerned about his safety after noticing a furtive gesture by the defendant as the officer approached and the defendant had a jacket awkwardly arranged over his lap and the floor); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 146-47 (Colo.1997) (en banc) (finding that the officers acted reasonably in searching the stopped vehicle for weapons after observing the defendant bend over in his seat and make motions toward the bottom of his seat and limiting the search to the area near the seat); State v. Ashbrook, 586 N.W.2d 503, 508-09 (S.D.1998) (holding that a protective sweep for weapons of a car during a legitimate traffic stop was permitted when the officer observed the defendant make furtive movements during the time between the activation of the emergency lights and pulling over). [3] {26} Questions asked for purposes of ensuring officer safety during a stop generally are proper because [w]hen these measures are not too intrusive, the government's strong interest in officer safety outweighs the motorist's interests. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221. Questions directed toward officer safety, therefore, do not bespeak a lack of diligence. Everett, 601 F.3d at 495. {27} A police officer may also pose questions after the time needed to reasonably conduct the investigation into the initial reason for the stop if the stop has ended and a consensual encounter developed. A detention for a traffic citation can turn into a consensual encounter after the trooper has returned the driver his documentation so long as a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe he was free to leave or disregard the officer's request for information. United States v. Guerrero-Espinoza, 462 F.3d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the police officer has reasonably conveyed to the citizen that the stop has ended, any further questioning does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (finding that questioning of a passenger who was unaware that the stop of the driver had been terminated was an unreasonable detention and the evidence discovered as a result of those questions must be suppressed). [4] {28} Under these rationales, the holdings of cases we have decided under Duran, and Duran itself, remain valid. The questions posed by the officer in Duran either were asked during the time it took to reasonably complete the initial traffic investigation, were a de minimis extension thereof, or were supported by independent reasonable suspicion. 2005-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 37-38, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836; accord Morlock, 218 P.3d at 807, 811 (finding questions asked constitutionally permissible because they either occurred during the legitimate stop or were supported by reasonable suspicion). In Funderburg, we held that the officer's minimal detention of the defendant based on the presence of reasonable suspicion about the contents of the car, to ask a single question about other criminal activity in the car before asking for consent to search, was reasonable. 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 33, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922; see also Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 16, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830 (Because the detention took no longer than necessary and because the officer's questions arose from a reasonable suspicion, we hold that both the duration and scope of the detention were reasonable under the circumstances). {29} Based on the preceding discussion, our Fourth Amendment analysis requires us to determine whether the contraband and consent questions were asked of Leyva during the time it took to complete the initial lawful investigation. If the questions measurably extended Leyva's detention, Officer Hash was required to have had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or concern for police safety to support further questioning, or the interaction must have evolved into a consensual encounter.