Opinion ID: 2169710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Theta's Status as a Special Employer

Text: Urena argues that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case because Theta was unable to establish that it had paid Worker's Mania for its services. He says that this is a material fact that precludes summary judgment because, according to him, Theta did not qualify as a special employer and was not immune from suit in the absence of such payment. Section 28-29-20 provides that an injured employee's workers' compensation benefits are an exclusive remedy in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise against an employer. The practical effect of this provision is that an employer is immune from suit when an injured employee is entitled to recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act. Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128-29 (R.I.1994). This provision, however, does not prevent an injured employee from seeking recovery from an entity that is not immune from suit under § 28-29-20. Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 128. The language of § 28-29-20 applies to employer[s]. In Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 131, we held that the Legislature intended this term to include both general employers and special employers, the former term referring to temporary worker agencies, and the latter term referring to the companies that use their services. Section 28-29-2(6) of the Workers' Compensation Act defines these terms as follows: (i) `General employer' includes but is not limited to temporary help companies and employee leasing companies and means a person who for consideration and as the regular course of its business supplies an employee with or without vehicle to another person. (ii) `Special employer' means a person who contracts for services with a general employer for the use of an employee, a vehicle, or both. (iii) Whenever there is a general employer and special employer wherein the general employer supplies to the special employer an employee and the general employer pays or is obligated to pay the wages or salaries of the supplied employee, then, notwithstanding the fact that direction and control is in the special employer and not the general employer, the general employer, if it is subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act or has accepted that Act, shall be deemed to be the employer as set forth in subdivision (5) of this section and both the general and special employer shall be the employer for purposes of §§ 28-29-17 and 28-29-18. The appellant contends that Theta does not meet the definition of a special employer because there is no evidence that it paid Worker's Mania for its services. He therefore maintains that Theta is not immune from suit. This argument, however, fails to recognize that there is nothing in the language of § 28-29-2 that requires proof of payment to establish one's status as a special employer. On the contrary, the plain language of § 28-29-2 says that one's status as a special employer arises by virtue of a contract with the general employer for the use of an employee. Section 28-29-2(6)(ii). Moreover, there is nothing in our holding in Sorenson that requires proof of payment to establish one's status as a special employer. In that case, the injured employee, Sorenson, worked for Temp Pro, a temporary employment agency, and he was injured while working for Colibri Corporation during a temporary work assignment. We stated that it must be presumed that Colibri paid Temp Pro a higher rate for Sorenson's services than Temp Pro, in turn, paid to Sorenson. Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 130. We further presumed that a portion of this higher rate was used to cover the cost of workers' compensation insurance, and therefore Sorenson [was] suing the party that paid for his workers' compensation benefits. Id. We see no discernible difference between the facts leading to our holding in Sorenson and the case presently before us. In his memorandum, Urena quotes Sorenson to support his argument that Colibri's status as a special employer hinged on the fact that it paid for [the employee's] workers' compensation benefits. Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 130. However, this quote is completely out of context; the significance of payment in Sorenson was not that proof of payment is required to qualify as a special employer. Rather, our discussion of payment simply was intended to underscore our concern that allowing a party to bring suit against an employer when he is covered by workers' compensation is contrary to legislative intent. This rationale applies with equal force in the present case, with or without proof of payment. Notwithstanding our conclusion that one's status as a special employer is not contingent upon proof of payment to the general employer, it is significant to note that a sworn affidavit from Theta's president states that he is the person most knowledgeable of Pablo Urena's employment at Theta, and that Theta paid Worker's Mania for plaintiff's services. This affidavit is competent evidence that Theta had contracted with Worker's Mania for Urena's services, thus bringing Theta within the statutory definition of special employer. Section 28-29-2(6)(ii). Urena has failed to rebut this evidence, and we therefore hold that he has failed to sustain his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. See Ardente v. Horan, 117 R.I. 254, 257-58, 366 A.2d 162, 164 (1976) (party opposing summary judgment has affirmative duty to demonstrate genuine issue of fact and cannot rest upon conclusory allegations).