Opinion ID: 2786368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct-Threat Instruction

Text: Beverage Distributors argues that the direct-threat instruction constituted reversible error. We agree, concluding that the instruction inaccurately conveyed the direct-threat standard. 3
We first consider whether the direct-threat instruction is erroneous. In doing so, we review the entire instruction de novo 1 to determine whether it accurately states the governing law. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 816 (10th Cir. 1996).
The direct-threat defense stems from the Americans with Disabilities Act. Under the Act, an employer cannot discriminate on the basis of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). But, an employer may decide not to hire disabled individuals if they pose a “direct threat to the health or safety” of themselves or others. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2). A “direct threat” involves “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the [person] or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The existence of a direct threat is an affirmative defense to a statutory claim of discrimination. McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1353-54 (10th Cir. 2004). For this defense, Beverage Distributors had to 1 The EEOC urges an abuse-of-discretion standard. We disagree. That standard is appropriate only when we are reviewing a district court’s decision to give (or not to give) a specific instruction. See Lederman v. Frontier Fire Prot., Inc., 685 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that appellate courts “review a district court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion”). Here, we are reviewing the legal sufficiency of an instruction, which is a question we review de novo. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 2002); Sherouse v. Ratchner, 573 F.3d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 2009). 4 show that it reasonably determined that Mr. Sungaila had posed a direct threat. See Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that “the fact-finder does not independently assess whether it believes that the employee posed a direct threat,” but “determine[s] [instead] whether the employer’s decision was objectively reasonable”). In sum, Beverage Distributors could avoid liability by showing that it reasonably determined: 1. Mr. Sungaila posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of himself or others, and 2. that risk could not be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.
We consider these elements to determine whether the district court correctly instructed the jury. Doing so, we conclude that the instruction did not accurately convey the direct-threat standard. The direct-threat instruction contained two parts. The first part explained what Beverage Distributors had to “prove” to establish the defense: To establish this defense, Beverage Distributors must prove both of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
position posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of Mr. Sungaila and/or other employees; and 5 2. Such a risk could not have been eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. Appellant’s App. at 78. The second part of the instruction elaborated on the standard: The determination that a direct threat exists must have been based on a specific personal assessment of Mr. Sungaila’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment of Mr. Sungaila’s ability must have been based on either a reasonable medical judgment that relied on medical knowledge [or best objective evidence] available at the time of assessment . . . . An employer’s subjective belief that a direct threat exists, even if maintained in good faith, is not sufficient unless it is objectively reasonable. . . . . In determining whether Beverage Distributors acted objectively reasonably when it determined that Mr. Sungaila was a direct threat, you must consider the following factors: (a) the duration of the risk; (b) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (c) the likelihood that the potential harm would occur; and (d) the imminence of the potential harm. Id. The instruction did not accurately convey the direct-threat standard. The first part of the instruction required Beverage Distributors to prove more than what was legally necessary. According to the first part, Beverage Distributors had to prove that Mr. Sungaila posed a direct threat. That was not accurate under our case law. Beverage Distributors should have avoided liability if it had reasonably believed the job would entail a direct threat; proof of an actual threat should have been unnecessary. See Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact-finder does not independently assess whether it believes that the employee posed 6 a direct threat.”). Thus, the instruction overstated Beverage Distributors’ burden. See Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1470-71 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding that jury instructions were erroneous because they confused the burden of proof). The second part of the instruction did not cure the error. This part stated that the jury was to consider the reasonableness of Beverage Distributors’ belief regarding the existence of a direct threat. But, the jury was never told why it was to consider the reasonableness of what Beverage Distributors thought. Thus, the error was not cured by a reference in the instruction to the reasonableness of the company’s subjective belief. 2 In sum, the instruction was erroneous. The first part of the instruction inaccurately stated that Beverage Distributors had to prove that Mr. Sungaila posed a direct threat. And the second part of the instruction did not cure the error by directing the jury, without explanation, to consider the reasonableness of Beverage Distributors’ belief. 2 The EEOC suggests that the instruction directed the jury to consider Beverage Distributors’ subjective determination by referring to that determination in the past tense. For instance, the instruction stated that “[t]he determination that a direct threat exist[ed] must have been based on a specific personal assessment of Mr. Sungaila’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Appellant’s App. at 78 (emphasis added). We reject this argument. Even if the instruction had directed the jury to consider Beverage Distributors’ determination, that determination was about the “existence” of a direct threat, not the objective reasonableness of the determination. 7
We must reverse if the jury might have relied on an erroneous jury instruction. Level 3 Commc’n, LLC v. Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1158 (10th Cir. 2008). Thus, reversal is warranted even if it is “very unlikely” that the jury relied on the erroneous standard. Id. We conclude that the jury might have relied on the erroneous directthreat standard; thus, reversal is warranted. The inaccurate standard appeared prominently in the instruction, and the verdict form directed the jury to consider that erroneous standard. See Appellant’s App. at 91 (“Did Defendant Beverage Distributors prove . . . both elements of its affirmative defense that Mr. Sungaila’s employment in the Night Warehouse position posed a direct threat to himself or other employees . . . ?” (emphasis added)). Because the instruction and verdict form could have misled the jury on the standard, we must reverse.