Opinion ID: 1366472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the aggregation of negligence

Text: I would affirm the trial court's aggregation of the negligence of the two party defendants, Coast and Coleman, and adopt the unit rule or combined comparison of negligence approach when comparing the plaintiff's negligence to that of the defendants under Idaho's comparative negligence system. In so doing, I would overrule that portion of our opinion in Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 624 P.2d 383 (1980), where we adopted the individual rule requiring that, when comparing percentages of negligence, the negligence of the plaintiff must be compared against each individual defendant in determining whether the plaintiff may recover. [1] In Odenwalt, we stated our rationale for adopting the individual rule as being, in part, to comport with Wisconsin's interpretation of its identical comparative negligence statute and, in part, because of our perception that the unit rule frequently achieves a harsh and unjust result. Id. 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d 383. Specifically, we cited the following example: It would be incongruous to suggest that where there is one defendant and one plaintiff, and both are found to be equally negligent (50%), the plaintiff recovers nothing; but where there are two defendants and one plaintiff, and all three are found to be equally negligent (33 1/3%), the plaintiff may recover 66 2/3% of his damages from either defendant. 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d 383. This hypothetical posited in Odenwalt reflects not just consternation with the unit rule, but more specifically reflects a profound and fundamental disagreement with the entire concept of joint and several liability. The unit rule generally limits a defendant's liability to his proportionate negligent causation of plaintiff's total damage. It is only when one defendant is insolvent that any harshness or injustice to another defendant might ensue. [2] In that case, another defendant may be called upon to assume the obligation of the other. It is not the unit rule which mandates such a result, but the age-old concept of joint and several liability. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated: Any unfairness that results when a tortfeasor cannot be made to pay his proportionate share of the damages is a product of the joint and several liability doctrine. It does not result from applying the combined comparison [unit] rule. Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, 515 A.2d 517, 525 (1986). Finally, given that instances where one defendant is forced to pay disproportionately are remote, it seems more harsh and unjust to deny recovery to many plaintiffs who, unfortunately, are injured by more than one defendant. Indeed, the commentators routinely favor the unit rule or combined comparison/aggregate approach, on the ground that plaintiff's chance of recovery is not jeopardized by the fact that several tortfeasors happen to be involved. V. Schwartz Comparative Negligence 2nd Edition, ง 16.6, p. 271. See also, Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich.L.Rev. 465, 507 (1953). See, Marier v. Memorial Rescue Service, Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1973), wherein defendant driver of a highway department truck directed the defendant driver of an ambulance to turn left, whereupon the ambulance collided with plaintiff. The jury found all three parties thirty-three-and-one-third percent negligent and, under the individual rule, the court held that plaintiff had no right to recover. Because there were two defendants, rather than one, a plaintiff whose negligence was less than fifty percent of the cause of his own damage was denied a recovery in tort. For the above reasons, a substantial majority of states have, either through statute or case law, adopted the unit rule. See, Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962), Ark.Stat.Ann. ง 27-1765; Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ง 52-572h; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, ง 8132; Hawaii Rev.Stat. ง 663-31(a), Wong v. Hawaiian Scenic Tours, Ltd., 64 Hawaii 401, 642 P.2d 930 (1982); Ind. Code ง 34-4-33-4; Iowa Code, ง 668.3(1); Kans.Stat.Ann. ง 60-258a(a); Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.1983) (applying Kansas law); Negley v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 229 Kan. 465, 625 P.2d 472 (1981); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, ง 85; Nev.Rev.Stat. ง 41.141(1); Hurley v. Public Service Co., 123 N.H. 750, 465 A.2d 1217 (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. ง 2A: 15-5.1; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ง 2315.19 A(1); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, ง 13; Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978); Oregon Rev.Stat. ง 18.470; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, ง 7102; Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, 515 A.2d 517 (1986); Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, ง 1036; Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979); North v. Bunday, 735 P.2d 270 (Mont. 1987). The most recent state to adopt the unit or combined comparison rule, Montana, did so in North v. Bunday, 735 P.2d 270 (Mont. 1987). The court considered several factors, including interpretation of its comparative negligence statutes, the policy of the state in comparative negligence cases and the concept of fundamental fairness. Specifically, the court in North noted language in its negligence statute which provides that contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action ... if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought... . M.C.A. ง 27-1-702. The court then noted M.C.A. ง 1-2-105 which provides: The following rules apply in this code: ... (3) The singular includes the plural and the plural the singular. The North court then cited to Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983) to reach its determination that the wording of its negligence statute did not compel the use of the individual rule. If the general assembly truly intended the phrase the person to exclude the plural, then it could have unambiguously provided for that result by using the phrase each individual person. 660 P.2d at 886. See also, Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1984). Finally, having concluded that the individual rule was not statutorily mandated, the North court found the unit rule more in keeping with the standard purposes behind legislative enactment of a comparative negligence system (i.e., to ameliorate the harshness of the system of contributory negligence) as well as more in keeping with fundamental notions of fairness. In his dissenting opinion in Odenwalt, Justice Bistline employed a similar approach in analyzing the Idaho legislature's intent in enacting our comparative negligence system. Idaho Code ง 6-801, as it read prior to 1987, was substantially similar to M.C.A. ง 27-1-702. Additionally, Idaho has a provision identical to M.C.A. ง 1-2-105, mandating that unless otherwise defined for purposes of a specific statute ... a singular number includes the plural and the plural the singular... . I.C. ง 73-114. [3] Because our analysis in Odenwalt misperceived the unit rule as incongruous, because the unit rule is, in fact, a less harsh and more just method of applying our comparative negligence laws and furthers the intent behind enacting such a system, and because the unit rule more closely fulfills our statutory scheme (prior to July 1987), I would now adopt the unit rule. Accordingly, as defendants' negligence, taken together, is greater than plaintiff's, they are jointly and severally liable for the amount of damage they caused. Specifically, Coast is liable for 10% of the total damage award, or $266,237.60, and Coleman is liable for 5% of the total damage award, or $133,118.80.