Opinion ID: 2538261
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Heading: The Zepuda and Ma Decisions

Text: Two appellate cases have expressed somewhat conflicting views regarding the reach of section 1799.107, and the liability of public agencies providing emergency rescue services. (See Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 488, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544; Zepeda v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 232, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635 ( Zepeda ).) We believe the following review of these cases demonstrates that Zepeda more correctly interprets section 1799.107. In Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 232, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635, the plaintiffs' decedent had been shot in the neck, but city paramedics who were summoned to the scene allegedly refused to render medical aid until the police arrived. After the decedent died of his wounds, the plaintiffs sued the city for wrongful death damages but the trial court sustained its demurrer and dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The appellate court affirmed, observing that [a]s a general rule, one has no duty to come to the aid of another, absent some special relationship between the parties. ( Id. at p. 235, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635, citing, e.g., Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137; Rest.2d Torts, § 323; see also Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1129, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171.) According to Zepeda, these principles likewise apply to law enforcement and emergency rescue personnel employed by public entities: Therefore, recovery has been denied for injuries caused by the failure to investigate or respond to requests for assistance where the police had not induced reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide protection. [Citations.] ( Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 235, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635.) Zepeda rejected the argument that Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 establishes a mandatory duty (see Gov.Code, § 815.6) on the part of public agencies to provide emergency services to the public. Instead, in Zepeda 's view, this section provides a qualified immunity for public agencies and their emergency rescue personnel by limiting their liability to acts of gross negligence or bad faith. As Zepeda states, the statute does not impose a general duty upon emergency personnel to provide assistance whenever and wherever summoned. Subdivision ( b)  [of section 1799.107] merely defines the level of negligence that will result in the imposition of liability once assistance is rendered.... Had the Legislature desired to impose upon emergency personnel the mandatory duty to render aid, it could easily have said so. ( Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 237, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635.) Thus, Zepeda concluded that because the defendant city owed no mandatory statutory duty to the plaintiffs, and its paramedics had no statutory or common law duty to provide assistance, the trial court properly sustained the city's demurrer. Zepeda, if correct, strongly supports defendants' argument here that they are entitled to a qualified immunity from plaintiffs' action. The Ma decision, on the other hand, would support a theory of potential liability to plaintiffs in this case. Finding Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 inapplicable to 911 dispatchers, the Ma court nonetheless held that a public agency and its dispatchers owe the public a mandatory duty of care arising from the common law duty to act with reasonable care that is embodied in Civil Code section 1714. We disagree. As will appear, section 1714, standing alone, fails to provide the requisite statutory basis for public entity liability required by Government Code sections 815 and 815.6. We further conclude that Ma erred in holding Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 inapplicable to 911 dispatchers and their public employers. In our view, Zepeda correctly held that the section indeed applies, and provides a qualified or limited immunity to such persons. In Ma, the plaintiffs' decedent Chan experienced difficulty in breathing from an asthma attack. Her family drove her to a nearby hospital, which unfortunately could not provide emergency medical services. A hospital security guard called defendant city's 911 medical emergency number to report Chan's distress and breathing difficulty. Perhaps due to language differences or confusion as to whether Chan was reacting to drug overdose, but in any event allegedly violating the city's dispatching protocols, the 911 dispatcher merely summoned police officers to the scene, and they then called for paramedics. Although the total elapsed time between the 911 call and the arrival of medical assistance was only 20 minutes, Chan died before the paramedics could reach her. (See Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 495-501, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544.) The Ma plaintiffs sued the city for damages, but the trial court granted the city summary judgment, concluding that it owed the plaintiffs no duty of care and, in any event, it was entitled to the discretionary act immunity in Government Code section 820.2. On appeal, the Ma court disagreed with both holdings. Without acknowledging the provisions of Government Code section 815, requiring a statutory basis for direct public entity liability, the Ma court, employing a traditional common law duty analysis, held that the city owed its citizens the general duty of ordinary care embodied in Civil Code section 1714. ( Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 502, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544.) Using traditional tort analysis (i.e., balancing the factors enumerated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, including the foreseeability and certainty of harm, the close connection with and moral blame of the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, etc.), the Ma court concluded that all the individual Rowland factors favor duty overwhelmingly. ( Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 511, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544.) As for the city's possible qualified immunity under section 1799.107, the Ma  court found the section inapplicable to 911 emergency dispatchers. Contrary to the assumptions of both parties in Ma, the appellate court concluded that the legislative history of section 1799.107, including that relating to subsequent attempts to amend the section, leads us to conclude that the limited immunity codified in section 1799.107 does not extend to 911 dispatching. ( Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 513, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544.) The court focused on the statutory definition of emergency rescue personnel in section 1799.107, subdivision (d), namely, persons who are employed by a federal, state, or municipal fire department, fire protection, or firefighting agency while actually engaged in providing emergency services as defined in subdivision (e). In Ma 's view, 911 dispatchers are not persons providing such emergency services. Instead, Ma found that the provision was enacted specifically to shield from potential liability firefighters engaged in rescue operations not involving fire suppression activities.... ( Ma, supra, at p. 516, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, italics added; see Lewis v. Mendocino Fire Protection Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 345, 346-347, 190 Cal.Rptr. 883.) Having found a mandatory duty to the plaintiffs arising from Civil Code section 1714, and having concluded that Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 was inapplicable to 911 dispatching, Ma reversed a summary judgment in the city's favor and remanded the case for trial. ( Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 520, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544.) If Ma were correct, plaintiffs would be entitled to similar relief here.