Opinion ID: 1225852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: An alien qualifies for asylum if he can demonstrate by credible evidence that he is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). The INA defines a refugee as a person who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country [of nationality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). If an alien establishes past persecution, there is a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. To still deport the alien, the government must then show that country conditions have changed, meaning the past persecutors are no longer able to persecute. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). In the instant case, the lower courts found Xiao and Jiang not credible. An adverse credibility finding, if sustained, is fatal to an application for asylum. Xiao and Jiang argue that the BIA's adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Where, as here, the BIA does not expressly adopt the IJ's findings but rather issues its own opinion, we review the BIA's decision alone. Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2007). We will uphold the BIA decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, and will overturn it only if the record compels a contrary result. Mabasa v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir.2006). Pre-Real ID Act credibility determinations must be based on specific cogent reasons that have a legitimate nexus to the finding and that go to the heart of the applicant's claim. Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir.2006); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th Cir.2004). The Court will not overturn adverse credibility determinations simply because the evidence might support an alternate finding. Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336, 341 (7th Cir.2005). Credibility determinations should be disturbed only under extraordinary circumstances. Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir.2007). The BIA based its decision upholding the adverse credibility finding of the IJ in part on Xiao's failure to disclose her purported forced abortion during her airport arrival interview and her credible fear interview. According to Seventh Circuit case law, in making a determination, an adjudicator may properly consider statements made at an airport interview as long as they are reliable. Jamal-Daoud v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir.2005); Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 504-05 (7th Cir.2004). In the instant case, the interviews were found to be reliable because there was a translator present and Xiao seems to have understood the questions. Xiao claims that she did not mention forced abortion in Miami because she was ashamed that she had become pregnant before marriage. While this may be so, this explanation cannot overcome the high level of deference that we give to the lower courts. The BIA concluded that Xiao's inconsistent statements regarding her reasons for fleeing China adversely affect her credibility, and we cannot say that the record compels a contrary result. These inconsistencies are specific, cogent reasons to make an adverse credibility finding, and they go to the heart of the applicant's claim. This single discrepancy is enough to find petitioners' entire testimony not credible. We have held that the addition of new factual assertions that were not originally set forth can be viewed as inconsistencies providing substantial evidence that the applicant is not a reliable or truthful witness. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir.2003); see also Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 942, 945-47 (7th Cir.2006) (upholding adverse credibility determination based on a single significant inconsistency); Chen v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 707, 710 ([s]ignificant discrepancies among different versions of an alien's statement are generally a permissible basis for an adverse credibility decision.). In upholding the adverse credibility finding, the BIA cited other inconsistencies as well. It stated that the divergent statements about the circumstances under which Jiang argued with family planning officials and received a fine notice on the same day that the abortion took place adversely affected the petitioners' credibility. It also found incredible the submission of an abortion certificate into evidence when a country report indicated abortion certificates were only given for voluntary abortions. Xiao and Jiang claim that this finding over-relied on the State Department report. While we are careful to not treat State Department reports as Holy Writ, see Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir.2000), we defer to State Department reports in the absence of a contradictory, highly credible independent source of expert knowledge. Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir.1997). Moreover, in another case this Court found credible a petitioner's testimony that she did not have an abortion certificate because the abortion was involuntary, and certificates are only given for voluntary abortions. Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 753-54 (7th Cir.2004). In evaluating these reasons for the adverse credibility finding, we cannot say that the record compels a contrary result. We uphold the adverse credibility finding. This finding is fatal to petitioners' entire asylum claim. We need not address whether, absent an adverse credibility finding, petitioners' claims would have supported a well-founded fear of persecution.