Opinion ID: 170577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Primary Sentence Issued by the District Court Addressed in Part II of the Majority Opinion

Text: The district court must  for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter  rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B). Nevertheless, [a]rguments that challenge the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts and not the facts themselves do not trigger any obligation on the part of the district court to make specific findings. United States v. Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir.2007) (quotation, alteration omitted); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir.2006), citing cases, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1338, 167 L.Ed.2d 134 (2007); United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir.2006). [T]o invoke the district court's Rule 32 fact-finding obligation, the defendant is required to make specific allegations of factual inaccuracy. Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F.3d at 1214, 1215-16 (quotation omitted). Here, although Defendant-Appellee Louiz Pena-Hermosillo clearly challenged the application of two guidelines offense-level enhancements  the three-level enhancement for being a manager or supervisor and the two-level enhancement for using a minor in his criminal activities  he never disputed any of the historical facts contained in the presentence report (PSR), either in his written objections to the PSR as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(f)(1) or during the sentencing proceeding itself. Therefore, Rule 32(i)(3)(B)'s requirement that the district court resolve factual disputes concerning historical facts was never triggered. [1] See Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d at 1248, 1253-54 (holding defendant's objection that he was not an organizer or leader of the criminal activity, which did not challenge the historical facts included in the PSR, did not trigger district court's fact-finding obligation under Rule 32(i)(3)(B)); cf. United States v. Tovar, 27 F.3d 497, 499-500 (10th Cir.1994) (applying prior version of Rule 32, Rule 32(c)(3)(D), and holding that contesting PSR's assertion that defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor, without identifying any inaccuracies in PSR, did not require district court to make specific factual findings). The district court, in sentencing Pena-Hermosillo, could rely upon any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact, Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(A), and was required to consider those historical facts carefully, see United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2890, 167 L.Ed.2d 1162 (2007). The district court never expressly rejected or found incredible any fact contained in the PSR. Further, by not previously objecting to the PSR's historical facts, Pena-Hermosillo has waived any opportunity to challenge those facts on remand. Cf. United States v. Kay, 961 F.2d 1505, 1507 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that defendant's failure to object, before the district court, to the PSR's factual inaccuracies waives that issue for appeal). This court, too, can rely upon the PSR's undisputed historical facts to review the district court's determination that neither of the challenged enhancements apply in this case. [2] See Wolfe, 435 F.3d at 1299; cf. Mateo, 471 F.3d at 1167 (noting that [i]t is well established that the sentencing court is entitled to rely on uncontested facts contained in the PSR for certain sentencing purposes); Harris, 447 F.3d at 1306 (noting that defendant's failure to object to the PSR created a factual basis for the court to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act). Based upon the undisputed historical facts contained in the PSR, I would conclude that the district court erred in refusing to apply either of the two challenged enhancements in this case.