Opinion ID: 2676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether JOLs May Appeal from the Settlement Order

Text: The JOLs assert that they have standing to appeal the bankruptcy court order on behalf of Sphinx. It is settled law, the JOLs argue, that a liquidator has standing to bring an action on a company's behalf. JOLs Br. at 27. We agree. But the JOLs may only bring an action on behalf of the company that the company could have brought itself. The JOLs have correctly noted that, [a]s Cayman Islands court-appointed liquidators of Sphinx and its affiliates, the JOLs stand in the shoes of Sphinx. JOLs Resp. to Summ. Affirmance at 2 (emphasis added). Sphinx consented to the Settlement. Indeed, without Sphinx's consent, the Settlement Agreement would never have been presented to the bankruptcy court for approval. Having consented to the Settlement below, Sphinx is bound by it on appeal, for it is well-established that a party to a consent judgment is thereby deemed to waive any objections it has to matters within the scope of the judgment. Coughlin v. Regan, 768 F.2d 468, 469-70 (1st Cir.1985) (citations omitted). Appeal from a consent judgment is generally unavailable on the ground that the parties are deemed to have waived any objections to matters within the scope of the judgment. New York ex rel. Vacco v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, 80 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 526 (10th Cir.1992); Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1280 (6th Cir.1991); Dorse v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1372, 1375 (11th Cir.1986). Clearly, as a party to the Settlement Agreement, Sphinx is precluded from appealing the bankruptcy court's order. The JOLs, standing in the shoes of Sphinx, are, ipso facto, similarly precluded.