Opinion ID: 169420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Chosen Counsel

Text: 70 Due to Defendant's bankruptcy, he received appointed counsel on December 9, 2003. Because trial was set to begin January 12, 2004, Defendant's counsel moved for a pro forma continuance in order to allow additional time for preparation. This continuance was granted, and trial was rescheduled for April 12, 2004. 71 On April 2, 2004, Defendant met in camera with the district court. At this meeting, Defendant explained that he wished to terminate his court-appointed attorney because he believed counsel's strained schedule prevented counsel from adequately preparing for trial. Defendant also informed the district court that he was attempting to retain private counsel, but that his bankruptcy proceedings and divorce proceedings complicated his ability to do so. He stated that he had petitioned the Colorado divorce court to release marital estate funds for that purpose and that he had an attorney lined up to begin working on the defense as soon as those funds were approved. The district court interpreted Defendant's request as a second motion for a continuance and denied that motion. 72 At an April 9, 2004 hearing, however, the district court disqualified Mr. Solomon's counsel. That required rescheduling trial for June 14, 2004. Then, on April 23, 2004, Mr. Solomon was deemed incompetent to stand trial. This led to a lengthy trial delay, which the district court admonished both parties' counsel to use in preparing for trial. The prosecution did not file a superseding indictment eliminating the conspiracy charges until February 16, 2005; apparently the prosecution was waiting to see if the forced administration of psychotropic drugs would return Mr. Solomon to competency. Defendant's trial was set for April 11, 2005. 73 On March 15, 2005, the Colorado divorce court finally approved Defendant's request for marital estate funds, but did not release those funds until March 29, 2005. Earlier on March 29, 2005, Defendant filed what the court interpreted to be Defendant's third motion for a continuance. This request was predicated on the need for further discovery, as the prosecution previously had failed to turn over certain discovery materials. On March 31, 2005, Defendant advised the court of the change in his financial status. 74 The district court conducted a hearing on April 4, 2005, to examine the continuance issue. It then denied the continuance, citing the age of the case and the substantial likelihood that Defendant would make an eleventh-hour plea for another continuance. (App. at 241.) The district court ordered Defendant's court-appointed counsel to remain as defense counsel alongside Defendant's newly hired counsel. Defendant sought reconsideration of the district court's ruling on April 5, 2005, and this motion was promptly denied. 75 Defendant argues that the district court's refusal to grant the third continuance constituted an abuse of discretion that violated his Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of his choice. 76 Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), the only question facing this court is whether the district court wrongly denied the continuance that would have permitted sole representation by Defendant's hired counsel. Id. at 2563; accord United States v. Zangwill, 197 Fed.Appx. 888, 891 n. 1 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (In order for the automatic rule of Gonzalez-Lopez to apply, in other words, it must first be shown that the trial court `wrongly' or `erroneously' denied the defendant his choice of counsel.); United States v. Hickey, No. 97-0218, 2006 WL 1867708, at  (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2006) ([A]s a threshold matter for the Gonzalez-Lopez rule to apply, a court must have `wrongly' denied defendant's choice of counsel.). We review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 663 (10th Cir.2005), balancing the defendant's `constitutional right to retain counsel of . . . choice against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process and the orderly administration of justice,' United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1015 (10th Cir.1992) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 626 (10th Cir.1990)). In striking that balance, we consider whether: 1) the continuance would inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; 2) other continuances have been granted; 3) legitimate reasons warrant a delay; 4) the defendant's actions contributed to the delay; 5) other competent counsel is prepared to try the case; 6) rejecting the request would materially prejudice or substantially harm the defendant's case; 7) the case is complex; and 8) any other case-specific factors necessitate or weigh against further delay. Id. at 1015. 77 There is no evidence that the district court's denial was due to unreasonable or arbitrary concerns. Although we question whether the district court could entirely fault Defendant for the numerous delays in bringing this case to trial, that was not the only reason provided. The age of the case was a serious concern. While not a particularly complex case, it involved multiple instances of fraud. Thus, it required testimony of numerous witnesses. Due to the scheduling burdens of the district courts, assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time necessitates that broad discretion . . . be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (quotation omitted); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S.Ct. at 2565-66 (recognizing a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and against the demands of its calendar) (citation omitted). 78 While the Supreme Court has stated that those without the means to hire counsel have no cognizable complaint in the face of adequate court-appointed representation, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989), the right to hire preferred counsel derives from a defendant's right to determine the type of defense he wishes to present. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1014. Defendant, however, fails to argue on appeal how the denial of the continuance affected trial preparation or defense strategy, or how the hybrid representation foisted upon him by the district court negatively impacted his defense. Even if Defendant had made such an argument, the record would not support it. Defendant received notice that funds would be released more than one week before trial. Defendant had contacted his hired attorney nearly one year before, and it was understood that the attorney would begin working on the case as soon as it became clear that funds would be available. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that hired and appointed counsel differed in their approach to the case. The district court noted its respect for appointed counsel's ability on several occasions, and appointed counsel in turn observed that hired counsel was a highly experienced criminal defense attorney. Although Defendant expressed dissatisfaction with what he perceived to be a lack of preparedness on the part of appointed counsel at the April 2, 2004 in camera meeting, there is no evidence that Defendant's opinion persisted, especially after the lengthy continuance caused by Mr. Solomon's incompetency and the prosecution's subsequent delay in filing a superseding indictment. 79 For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to say that the district court's denial of Defendant's third motion for a continuance on the eve of trial constituted an abuse of discretion.