Opinion ID: 4644353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing as to Counts 1 and 2

Text: Our analysis begins with the district court’s conclusions that plaintiffs-appellants lack standing as to Counts 1 and 2. “To reach the merits of a case, an Article III court must have jurisdiction.” Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019). “One essential aspect of this requirement is that any person invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing to do so.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013). To establish standing, “the plaintiff must allege an injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant’s conduct and redressable by a favorable judicial decision.” Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). “Foremost among these requirements is injury in fact—a plaintiff’s pleading and proof that he has suffered the ‘invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized,’ i.e., which ‘affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 & n.1)). The allegations in a complaint must establish that the plaintiff has “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” id. at 1929 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)), rather than a “generalized grievance about the conduct of government,” id. at 1931 (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007)). “In determining at the pleadings stage whether the plaintiff’s showing of standing passes muster, we accept as true the pleaded factual matter and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Democratic Party of Wis. v. Vos, 966 F.3d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 2020). 12 Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724
We turn first to plaintiffs-appellants’ challenge to the annual recertification election requirement in Count 1. As a preliminary issue, Daley contends that our consideration on appeal of plaintiffs-appellants’ standing is limited to the allegations contained in the filed complaint, rather than the additional allegations plaintiffs-appellants submitted to the district court in their supplemental brief. We disagree. While the district court’s local rules required plaintiffs-appellants to formally move to amend their complaint, see E.D. Wis. Civ. R. 15, the district court acted within its discretion to consider the allegations in the supplemental brief, see Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We have consistently and repeatedly upheld a district court’s discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules … .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, federal courts “have an independent obligation to confirm our jurisdiction before adjudicating a case.” Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 2020). Having determined it required more information to fulfill this obligation, the district court requested supplemental briefing regarding standing. The court then based its decision to dismiss Count 1 and deny leave to amend on futility grounds, at least in part, on the allegations in plaintiffs-appellants’ supplemental brief. Therefore, we may appropriately consider these additional allegations on appeal. Count 1 focuses on whether Act 10 impermissibly compels speech from public employees who wish to remain silent. Specifically, it alleges that Act 10’s recertification requirement infringes on plaintiffs-appellants’ First Amendment right not to engage in speech because it effectively provides that Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724 13 nonvotes in the recertification election will be counted as votes against union representation, rather than not being counted at all. In its initial dismissal order requesting supplemental briefing as to Count 1, the district court explained that only the individual plaintiffs, and not Local 139, could have standing to sue because the right to vote is “individual and personal in nature.” See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929. Plaintiffs-appellants then explained in their supplemental brief that they could amend their complaint to allege that Act 10’s recertification provision unconstitutionally compelled Erickson—who supported Local 139’s recertification and whose intent in abstaining from voting “was to accept the will of those who chose to vote”— to engage in speech she did not support by converting her nonvote into a “no” vote. They also stated that an amended complaint would allege that the recertification provision diluted Hanrahan’s vote in favor of Local 139 by compelling speech from those who abstained from voting, thus reversing the results of the election. They also asserted that these alleged injuries gave Local 139 associational standing to sue on the individual plaintiffs’ behalf. Plaintiffs-appellants argue that these allegations satisfy Article III’s standing requirements. We disagree. Regardless of whether plaintiffs-appellants have sufficiently alleged a constitutional injury in fact as to Erickson and Hanrahan, they have not pleaded “a causal connection between the injury and the challenged action.” United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400, 795 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the individual plaintiffs’ injuries—compelled speech and vote dilution—are traceable to Act 10’s treatment of nonvotes. The chain of causation between those purported 14 Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724 injuries and Act 10 depends, however, on “the independent action of some third part[ies] not before the court,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)), specifically, the decisions of union members who favored recertification not to vote in the recertification election. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has explained, “Act 10’s certification election provisions merely specify the statutory requirements a certified representative must satisfy in order to exclusively negotiate on behalf of the general employees in its bargaining unit.” Madison Teachers, 2014 WI 99, ¶ 65. Nothing in Act 10 impedes members’ ability to vote or requires or directs them how to vote. Stated differently, the individual plaintiffs’ injuries depend on fewer than 51% of members choosing to participate in the election. That fact alone undermines plaintiffs-appellants’ ability to satisfy the requirement that any injury in fact be fairly traceable to Act 10’s recertification provision. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013) (expressing “reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors”). Moreover, as the district court observed, if Erickson and the other nonvoting members freely decided to abstain despite having presumed knowledge of Act 10’s absolutemajority requirement, then plaintiffs-appellants’ injuries “would be fairly traceable to their fellow union members,” not Act 10 or Daley. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (explaining that the common law presumes that “every person kn[ows] the law.”). In sum, plaintiffs-appellants’ allegations regarding Count 1 in their complaint and supplemental briefing do not establish that the claimed injuries to Erickson or Hanrahan are Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724 15 fairly traceable to Act 10’s recertification provision. The individual plaintiffs-appellants thus do not have standing. Furthermore, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that amendment as to Count 1 would be futile. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs courts to “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” courts may deny a proposed amended pleading if the amendment would be futile. Here, the fact that plaintiffs-appellants have not alleged standing to sue, despite receiving instruction from the district court and an opportunity to file supplemental briefing, indicates the futility of granting further leave to amend. We also conclude that Local 139 lacks standing as to Count 1. The only theory of standing plaintiffs-appellants assert for Local 139 is associational standing on behalf of its members. Associational standing requires an organization’s “members … [to] have standing to sue in their own right.” Vos, 966 F.3d at 586. Because we determine that no member of Local 139 has standing to challenge this provision, Local 139 does not have standing to sue on their behalf. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 2. Count 2: The Collective-Bargaining Limitation Regarding Count 2, plaintiffs-appellants allege that Daley’s interpretation of Act 10’s collective-bargaining limitation wrongfully prohibits all agreements between unions and municipal employers regarding nonwage issues, even if not collectively bargained. They assert that this wrongful interpretation injured Local 139 by precluding it from “entering into agreements that are fully consistent with Act 10.” Relying on our decision in Laborers, the district court held that plaintiffs-appellants lacked standing because Act 10 did not infringe their First Amendment rights. On appeal, 16 Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724 plaintiffs-appellants acknowledge Laborers but contend that the district court erred in dismissing Count 2 for lack of standing because Daley’s interpretation goes beyond the statutory text to “prevent[] the giving and receiving of speech (i.e., a back and forth conversation), which is not prohibited by Wis. Stat. [§] 111.70(a)(1) or Act 10 generally.” In Laborers, the plaintiff unions argued that Act 10’s collective-bargaining limitation3 violated their First Amendment petition clause rights because it “bars Wisconsin public employers from voluntarily entering into binding negotiations with a group of employees,” even if they want to bargain outside of MERA’s statutory framework, 749 F.3d at 633, 636, essentially the same argument that plaintiffsappellants make here. We rejected that claim, concluding that Act 10’s collective-bargaining limitation “does not proscribe any conduct by the unions themselves.” Id. at 634. It “does not prohibit the unions from forming,” “meeting,” or “advocating on behalf of their members in any way they see fit.” Id. Furthermore, “[n]othing in … Act 10 generally[] precludes the unions or their members from expressing their views to their municipal employer or from trying to persuade the employer to adopt a particular policy.” Id. at 636. “Instead, the collective-bargaining restriction acts upon government employers. The statute tells these employers that they may not enter into binding agreements with their employees on a 3 The specific provision at issue in Laborers provides that except as stated under Wis. Stat. § 111.70 et seq. “no local governmental unit may collectively bargain with its employees.” Wis. Stat. § 66.0508(1m). The challenged provision here, Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(mb)1., prohibits municipal employers, a local governmental unit, from collectively bargaining with employees about anything except total base wages. Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724 17 collective basis about anything other than base wages.” Id. at 634–35. Thus, “general employees remain free to associate and represented employees and their unions remain free to speak; municipal employers are simply not allowed to listen.” Id. at 635 (citation omitted); see also WEAC, 705 F.3d at 646 (“Act 10 places no limitations on the speech of general employee unions, which may continue speaking on any topic or subject.”). Plaintiffs-appellants have not pleaded a constitutional injury under Laborers. They alleged in the complaint and argue on appeal that municipal employers “approached Local 139 to provide services relating to training, temporary staffing and health benefits.” They also argue that the “same municipalities declined to enter into agreements with Local 139 based on advice they received from WERC that such agreements would violate Act 10.” Under plaintiffs-appellants’ view, then, they could otherwise freely discuss certain topics with municipal employers, but Act 10 restricted the municipal employers from entering into agreements regarding those topics. That situation is fully consistent with Laborers. Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellants have suffered no invasion of their First Amendment rights from Daley’s interpretation and application of Act 10’s collective-bargaining limitation because they retain their rights to speak and associate freely. Moreover, to the extent they allege that Act 10, as applied, is unconstitutional because Daley interprets it to preclude municipal employers from listening to the union’s speech, we agree with the district court that “the injury would run to the municipal employers, not to the union.” Perhaps anticipating this conclusion, as a backstop plaintiffs-appellants encourage us to revisit our 18 Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724 determination in Laborers that Act 10’s collective-bargaining limitation is constitutional because it does not restrict the ability of unions and their members to speak, only the ability of municipal employers to listen. They assert that the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus recognized that the right of unions and their members to speak on topics of public concern, whether through collective bargaining or otherwise, includes “the right to have a meaningful interaction when a municipality is willing.” Therefore, they are “troubled by the rationale” we espoused in Laborers. We decline to reconsider our precedent. Our holding in Laborers relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (per curiam), and Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). Those cases held that the First Amendment does not entitle public employees to an audience with the government. See Smith, 441 U.S. at 465 (“[T]he First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it.”); Knight, 465 U.S. at 285, 286–87 (“Nothing in the First Amendment or in this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public issues.”). While plaintiffs-appellants argue that in light of Janus “there is every reason to believe the Supreme Court would be open to righting this historical wrong to the extent Smith and Knight bar Plaintiffs’ claim on this issue,” Smith and Knight remain good law; Janus did not address either case, and plaintiffs-appellants provide no meaningful explanation as to why or how Janus affects Smith and Knight. “No lower federal court can overrule a Supreme Nos. 20-1672 & 20-1724 19 Court precedent.” Foreman v. Wadsworth, 844 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2016). Therefore, Laborers dictates the outcome here. See De Leon Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that “it would take compelling circumstances, or an intervening on-point Supreme Court decision, to disturb” settled circuit precedent). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs-appellants lack standing to bring their Count 2 challenge to Act 10’s collective-bargaining limitation.