Opinion ID: 6335137
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Participation

Text: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits a district court from participating in plea negotiations. The Rule provides: “An attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney . . . may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1).1 We have “stringently” interpreted and enforced that prohibition. United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 765 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993). Classic examples of prohibited judicial participation are when a district court attempts to “rewrite the plea agreement from the bench,” 1 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were revised in 2002. Prior to that revision, Rule 11(e)(1) contained the prohibition against judicial participation in plea negotiations. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 605 n.3 (2013). No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 8 Fleming, 239 F.3d at 765, or endeavors to “facilitate a plea,” United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193, 196 (6th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597 (2013). Rule 11 does, however, allow the district court to be involved in the acceptance or rejection of certain plea agreements. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(2), (c)(3)(A). But in those circumstances, the court’s role is limited to evaluating the plea agreement once it has been finalized by the parties and disclosed to the court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)–(5); United States v. Harris, 635 F.2d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Markin, 263 F.3d 491, 496– 98 (6th Cir. 2001) (comparing cases in which judicial involvement occurred after the completion of the plea agreement with those in which the involvement occurred during plea negotiations— noting that the latter “clearly would have violated [Rule 11]”). Accordingly, when a district court expresses its preference for or against certain plea-bargaining terms in an unfinalized or hypothetical plea agreement, the court impermissibly participates in plea negotiations in violation of Rule 11. The district court here did just that. Rather than wait to consider a finalized plea agreement, the court initiated substantive plea-related discussions. More specifically, during a pretrial hearing, the court expressed to the parties its preference—calling it a “practice”—that plea agreements not include sentencing-appeal and collateral-review waivers. The court then warned the parties to “keep [the court’s position] in mind as [they] engage[d] in . . . discussions.” The court implicitly affirmed its position in a subsequent email when it informed the parties that the plea agreement would be rejected as written. At best, this conduct strongly suggested that the parties should not include those terms in their plea agreement. At worst, it conditioned the court’s approval of a future plea agreement on the absence of those terms. Either way, this left the parties with the legally insupportable impression that no defendant could waive his or her appellate rights in a plea agreement before that judge. See United States v. Milliron, 984 F.3d 1188, 1192 (6th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that a defendant may waive his right to appeal by means of a plea agreement); United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775–76 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Any right, even a constitutional right, may be surrendered in a plea agreement if that waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.”). No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 9 That the court made those comments while plea negotiations were ongoing is crucial. That is precisely the type of judicial participation most clearly prohibited by Rule 11. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). And for good reason. Judicial participation of any kind is “inherently coercive,” United States v. Ushery, 785 F.3d 210, 219 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted), and it is particularly so when the district court cautions the parties to “keep [its position] in mind” while they negotiate. See Harris, 635 F.2d at 529 (“If the court puts its imprimatur on a plea offer, the defendant might be coerced into taking it . . . .”). Judicial participation also undermines fairness and judicial neutrality. Barrett, 982 F.2d at 195–96. Here, the district court does not meaningfully defend its actions in its appellate brief. But its written opinion rejecting the plea agreement cites United States v. Rankin, 94 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), for the proposition that no judicial participation occurs where the court does not comment on the defendant’s “case, any aspect of sentencing, or [the defendant’s] possible guilt or innocence.” We are unpersuaded. There is no indication that our decision in Rankin was meant to provide an exhaustive list of possible Rule 11 violations. We considered a similar claim of judicial participation in Ushery, 785 F.3d at 219–21. In that case, the district court allowed the parties to negotiate a plea agreement in its presence, and after the court “commented on a proposed plea that [the defendant] had not yet agreed to, . . . the specific items that the court raised became the focal points . . . of the continued negotiation.” Id. at 220. We observed that the district court “may” have violated Rule 11(c)(1) but refrained from deciding the issue because the defendant’s “substantial rights” were not affected. Id. at 218, 220–21. We now make it clear that Rule 11 absolutely prohibits judicial involvement of any form in plea negotiations, an interpretation that is widely held among circuit courts. Barrett, 982 F.2d at 195; see, e.g., United States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d 1122, 1132 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1139 (5th Cir. 1993). In this context that means that while plea negotiations are ongoing a district court is prohibited from commenting on a hypothetical plea agreement that it would or would not accept. Other circuit courts, again, agree. In re Benvin, 791 F.3d at 1103 (granting mandamus and finding that “the court’s suggestion that the parties add a particular term to the plea agreement constitutes impermissible involvement”); United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) No. 21-1318 In re United States Page 10 (finding a Rule 11 violation because a court’s pre-plea agreement suggestions are improper “indications of what the judge will accept” (quotations omitted)); United States v. Pena, 720 F.3d 561, 570–73 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that a court’s comments on a hypothetical plea agreement violated Rule 11). Because Rule 11 “means what it says,” Barrett, 982 F.2d at 195, once a district court has gone beyond its role in accepting or rejecting a finalized plea agreement, Rule 11 has been violated. While the district court’s conduct may have been motivated in good faith by its concern for defendants, there is “no good motives exception” to Rule 11. Ushery, 785 F.3d at 220 (quoting Harrell, 751 F.3d at 1240). Therefore, the district court’s involvement violated Rule 11’s prohibition on judicial participation.