Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Murder, sodomy and sodomymurder special circumstance

Text: Defendant contends his convictions for murder and forcible sodomy and the sodomy-murder special-circumstance finding must be reversed for insufficient evidence because they are based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of codefendant Vieyra, an accomplice. Section 1111 provides: A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof, [¶] An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. Accordingly, the jury was instructed: You cannot find a defendant guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense. The jury was further instructed: To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice as to the guilt of a codefendant, there must be evidence of some act or fact related to the crime which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged. [¶] However, it is not necessary that the evidence of corroboration be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the crime charged or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies. The instructions accurately reflect the applicable law. The corroborating evidence may be circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone, and it must tend to implicate the defendant by relating to an act that is an element of the crime. The corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every element of the crime, but it must, without aid from the accomplice's testimony, tend to connect the defendant with the crime. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1128, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) The trier of fact's determination on the issue of corroboration is binding on the reviewing court unless the corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or does not reasonably tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 986, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 628, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) Thus, to the extent defendant argues that evidence corroborating Vieyra's testimony must be substantial, he is mistaken. There is no doubt the victim was sodomized and killed. Vieyra testified he was with defendant when defendant fought with the victim. He claimed he opened the door and saw defendant straddling his mother on the floor and saw a white cloth around her neck. A few minutes later, defendant emerged from the bedroom and told Vieyra estuvo (it is done). The two of them then took several items from the victim's room, loaded them into her car and went to sell them. Vieyra claimed that, prior to the crime, he heard defendant express his desire to kill his mother because she had given him up to be raised by someone else when he was a child. Although defendant concedes the victim was sodomized and killed, he contends that apart from Vieyra's uncorroborated testimony, there was no evidence identifying him as the assailant. We disagree. All the critical aspects of Vieyra's testimony were corroborated. Police found the victim with a white sock wrapped tightly around her neck. Chachi, one of victim Loza's children who lived with her, testified that on the evening of March 15, 1996, defendant and Vieyra came to see Loza. Chachi heard defendant and Loza arguing and heard Loza scream. Later, he heard someone start Loza's car and drive off. Both Candina Bravo and Gabriel Arce testified that, in the days before the murder, they heard defendant state he wished to kill the victim. This evidence corroborates Vieyra's testimony on the issue of the killer's identity. The authorities defendant cites in support are distinguishable. In People v. Martinez (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 119, 133, 183 Cal.Rptr. 256, the purported corroborating evidence did nothing more than show `the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.' Similarly, in both People v. Valardi (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 98, 49 Cal.Rptr. 339 and People v. Lloyd (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 236, 61 Cal. Rptr. 138, the only evidence tending to corroborate an accomplice's testimony was proof the defendants were present at the scene. By contrast, evidence aside from Vieyra's testimony established more than defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crime. The evidence showed he fought and argued with the victim, the manner of killing (the sock), and his preexisting desire to kill the victim. This evidence  all obtained from sources other than Vieyra  tends to prove, directly or circumstantially, that defendant was the person who sodomized and killed the victim. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the corroborating evidence need not independently establish the identity of the victim's assailant. ( People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 986, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874 [corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every element of the crime].) There being ample evidence corroborating Vieyra's testimony, we find his testimony was properly admitted and provided substantial evidence identifying defendant as the person who committed the murder and sodomy. We thus reject the claim there was insufficient evidence of murder, sodomy or the sodomy-murder special circumstance.