Opinion ID: 1463880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Hold Competency Hearing

Text: Moussaoui's next claim is that the district court erred when concluding that his plea was knowing and voluntary because the court failed to hold a competency hearing before accepting his plea. Before a court may accept a guilty plea, it must ensure that the defendant is competent to enter the plea. United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 564 (4th Cir.1999). The standard for competence to plead guilty is the same as that for competence to stand trial: whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (applying standard to guilty plea context). The district court should hold a competency hearing when it has reasonable cause to believe that a defendant may suffer from a mental disease or defect that interferes with his ability to understand the nature and consequences of entering a plea of guilty. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(a) (West Supp.2008). To prevail, the defendant must establish that the trial court ignored facts raising a bona fide doubt regarding [his] competency to stand trial. Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 459 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court should examine all of the record evidence pertaining to the defendant's competence, including: (1) any history of irrational behavior; (2) the defendant's demeanor at and prior to sentencing; and (3) prior medical opinions on competency. United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 397 (4th Cir.2002). However, there are no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed. Walton, 321 F.3d at 459 (internal quotations omitted). A district court's decisions on competency, as well as its denial of requests for further competency evaluations, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir.2007); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995). Moussaoui's counsel first requested a competency evaluation in April 2002, in connection with Moussaoui's request to proceed pro se. Counsel acknowledged that they had not planned to ask for an evaluation for purposes of the defense but felt it was warranted for purposes of the request to proceed pro se. The district court observed that Moussaoui was obviously a very smart man, J.A. 262, and appear[ed] to know and understand what [he was] doing, J.A. 263. However, the district court agreed to order an evaluation out of an abundance of caution and held Moussaoui's motion to proceed pro se in abeyance pending the results. J.A. 514. Dr. Raymond Patterson was appointed to perform the competency evaluation. When Moussaoui refused to cooperate, the district court advised Moussaoui that his refusal was merely frustrating his own goal of representing himself and that his meeting with Dr. Patterson [was] necessary before any decision [could] be made on his pending motion. 2 Supp. J.A. 11. Moussaoui was also advised that [i]f [he] continue[d] to refuse to meet with Dr. Patterson, he may be sent to the Federal Correctional Center at Butner, North Carolina, the federal facility specializing in forensic psychiatric evaluations, for evaluation. 2 Supp. J.A. 11. Moussaoui thereafter agreed to an interview with Dr. Patterson. Dr. Patterson concluded that there [did] not appear to be a history or current symptoms consistent with a mental disease or defect that would interfere with [Moussaoui's] voluntary, intelligent, and knowing appreciation of the potential consequences of waiving counsel. J.A. 5758. Defense counsel retained two mental health experts, neither of whom met with or personally interacted with Moussaoui, who presented contrary opinions based upon reports of a family history of mental illness, a report that Moussaoui had been deemed ineligible for military service in France because of psychiatric issues noted during his medical examination, Moussaoui's pro se filings, and Moussaoui's solitary confinement. The defense experts also critiqued Dr. Patterson's conclusions and opined that further evaluation was needed. On June 13, 2002, the district court reviewed the mental health reports and denied defense counsel's request for further evaluations of Moussaoui, noting the following: [I]t was out of an abundance of caution that I decided to have the mental evaluation performed of Mr. Moussaoui, because although his style, his writing style may be a bit more dramatic that would a lawyer's style be, ..., Mr. Moussaoui does come from a different culture where things are done differently than we, and he is, in fact, in a much smaller section of that culture than even that culture itself as a whole. Cultural differences may appear irrational to different cultures. It doesn't mean the person is insane from a psychological standpoint. I think it's ... very significant that the day-to-day observations of the people in the Alexandria Jail consistently negate any question about there being any serious mental illness or disease from Mr. Moussaoui. J.A. 514. The district court also considered the potential impact of solitary confinement but noted that Moussaoui had been dressed appropriately with proper hygiene when observed by others and that the jailers had provided no evidence of decompensation caused by the restrictions. Additionally, the court noted, I've certainly seen Mr. Moussaoui now two or three times in court and read all of his papers. And as I said, I don't see any basis to prolong this issue. I am comfortable in deciding the competency issue based upon the quantum of information that is before me. J.A. 516. Among other things, the court also noted that Moussaoui understood and complied when he was informed that he might be sent to Butner for a competency evaluation if he did not cooperate with Dr. Patterson. The court ruled that Moussaoui had sufficient present ability to consult with his attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and rationally functioning understanding of the proceedings against him, and that he was competent to proceed pro se under the Dusky standard. J.A. 518. On several occasions over the next four years, the district court addressed renewed challenges to Moussaoui's competency, each time in conjunction with proceedings in which the court personally observed and interacted with Moussaoui. In July 2002, when Moussaoui first decided to plead guilty, defense counsel again raised the question of his competency to do so and submitted additional reports of the two defense experts, along with a third expert. Counsel also requested that the district court order access to Moussaoui for themselves and a mental health expert. The district court ruled that there was no new evidence to support a claim that Moussaoui was not competent and that forcing Moussaoui to receive standby counsel and their mental health expert would deprive Moussaoui of the limited privacy to which he had insisted and further damage the relationship between Moussaoui and defense counsel. At the Rule 11 hearing, the district court ruled as follows: I have carefully considered the materials that were submitted by standby defense counsel as well as their doctor reports, but I am satisfied that Mr. Moussaoui is not presently suffering from a mental defect or disease of such a degree as to render him incompetent to represent himself or, assuming he answers the questions appropriately, to enter a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to any one or all six of the charges. I am particularly impressed with the fact that although Mr. Moussaoui had filed numerous repetitive motions, at the hearing last week, when I advised him that he was not to file any more repetitive motions and if he did so, he might lose his pro se status, Mr. Moussaoui obviously understood the Court's admonition, because we have not received a single writing from him in a week, which is a record. But that indicates to the Court that Mr. Moussaoui is perfectly capable of understanding the Court's directions, and when he chooses to, he can follow those directions. That was similar to earlier in the case, when he was refusing to meet with Dr. Patterson, and I warned him in an order that continued refusal would result in the Court not being able to decide his pro se status. He thereafter met with Dr. Patterson. So although the defendant's pleadings are somewhat confrontational and somewhat unusual, they do not give the Court sufficient basis to make any kind of a finding that this man is not competent to go forward with a guilty plea if that is his desire, and there clearly is no basis in this record at this time to continue or postpone these proceedings for a custodial, for a mental health forensic evaluation. J.A. 993-94. When Moussaoui pled guilty in April 2005, Moussaoui's counsel again challenged entry of the plea without further competency evaluations but did not ask for a full evaluation at Butner. The district court again rejected the challenge, reiterating that: despite the fact that we may disagree about things, this defendant has always struck this Court as articulate, intelligent, fully understanding the proceedings, and although his world view may be significantly different from ours and therefore at times perhaps difficult to understand, in my view, that does not... make a basis for arguing that he is incompetent. 2 Supp. J.A. 51. In addition, Yamamoto, the only defense counsel with whom Moussaoui would communicate, did not directly call into question Moussaoui's competency to plead guilty. Yamamoto stated that his discussions with [Moussaoui had] been calm, rational. He knows what we're talking about. All thatthose things are, are as the Court indicates. Whether or not there's some ... mental health issues other than his ability to relate to me, I don't know. 2 Supp. J.A. 55. The district court also rejected the claim that Moussaoui's confinement had affected his ability to proceed, noting that any human being locked up under the conditions in which he has been housed would naturally at times [get] frustrated and angry. That again does not equate to incompetence. 2 Supp. J.A. 51. The district court was satisfied that Moussaoui was competent to enter a guilty plea and scheduled the Rule 11 proceeding. At the public Rule 11 proceeding, the district court noted its previous determination, adding that it was fully satisfied that Mr. Moussaoui is completely competent to enter his guilty pleas today. The defendant has acted against the advice of his counsel, but he has clearly exhibited both today and earlier this week a complete understanding of the ramifications of his guilty pleas. J.A. 1435; see also 2 Supp. J.A. 67 (noting that [a] defendant in our system has an absolute right to reject [advice of counsel] and [i]t does not make him incompetent [or] unwise.). Yamamoto confirmed that Moussaoui, in discussing the plea, had responded appropriately when I've spoken to him. He has had disagreements with me with respect to certain items. Those disagreements were appropriate disagreements. J.A. 1434. Given this extensive record, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that Moussaoui was competent to proceed with his guilty plea and that further evaluations were unnecessary. The district court had the benefit of multiple reports of evaluating and consulting mental health specialists regarding Moussaoui's competency to proceed over the years and, at the time of the plea, Yamamoto confirmed that Moussaoui's interactions with him had been calm, rational, and appropriate. Most compelling, however, is that the district court had the unique benefit of extensive personal interactions with Moussaoui over the years leading up to his plea, most of which occurred while Moussaoui was representing and speaking for himself. In addition, the district court had the opportunity to observe Moussaoui represent himself at the Rule 15 deposition of a JI operative, during which Moussaoui conducted himself rationally and intelligently, conducted cross-examination of the witness, and made cogent objections, many of which were sustained by the district court. We also find significant the extensive discussion regarding Moussaoui's waiver of appellate rights, during which Moussaoui confirmed his understanding that a guilty plea precluded his raising constitutional arguments on appeal: What is certain, okay, is I've listened to their advice, read ... the Blackledge v. Perry case [they sent] with the statement of the Supreme Court, who made absolutely clear that once you have pled guilty, you cannot raise anyyou cannot raise claim relating to deprivation of constitutional rights ... that occur prior to the entry of the guilty plea. This is the word of the Supreme Court. 2 Supp. J.A. 59. Clearly, Moussaoui ha[d] sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted by the district court, Moussaoui has a view that is significantly and culturally different from ours, but there is nothing to indicate that the district court's observations should have reasonably caused it to believe that Moussaoui was suffering from a mental disease or defect that interfered with his ability to understand the nature and consequences of entering a plea of guilty. See Banks, 482 F.3d at 743 (noting that [w]e defer ... to the district court because it is in a superior position to adjudge the presence of indicia of incompetency constituting reasonable cause to initiate a hearing); United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 285 n. 1 (4th Cir.1989) (finding no abuse of discretion where district court, having observed and talked with [defendant] at numerous prior hearings, found no reasonable cause to believe he was unfit to stand trial and, thus, denied motion to determine mental competence).