Opinion ID: 2831207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Right to jury trial in Circuit Court under TPPA

Text: Having determined that the TPPA is an independent statutory scheme and not subject to the procedural requirements of the GTLA, we now turn to the second part of the inquiry: whether there is a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial in circuit court for TPPA claims. Mr. Young alleges that he has a constitutional right to a jury trial on his TPPA claim and relies for this assertion upon article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution. The City asserts that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury on TPPA claims and also that there is no statutory right to trial by jury in circuit court similar to the statutory right to trial by jury in chancery court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 21-1-103. may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney‟s fees.”). -9-
The Tennessee Constitution provides “[t]hat the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and no religious or political test shall ever be required as a qualification for jurors.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 6. Although this language is broad, article I, section 6 does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in every case. Helms v. Tenn. Dep‟t of Safety, 987 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1999). Rather, it guarantees the right to “trial by jury as it existed at common law . . . „under the laws and constitution of North Carolina at the time of the adoption of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796.‟” Id. (quoting Patten v. State, 426 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tenn. 1968)). The constitutional guarantee of a jury does not apply to cases that could have been tried without a jury prior to 1796. Newport Hous. Auth. v. Ballard, 839 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tenn. 1992). “In the classic common law system of courts, matters inherently legal in nature were tried in the law courts by a jury while matters inherently equitable were tried by the Chancellor without a jury. Therefore, there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in a matter inherently equitable.” Smith Cnty. Educ. Ass‟n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328, 336 (Tenn. 1984) (emphasis added). Additionally, the constitutional right to trial by jury does not apply to statutory rights and remedies created after the adoption of the 1796 Constitution. Helms, 987 S.W.2d at 547. For such statutory rights and remedies, the Legislature is free either to dispense with the right of trial by jury, id. (citing Ballard, 839 S.W.2d at 88), or provide for it, Anderson, 676 S.W.2d at 335-37. The TPPA was enacted by the Tennessee Legislature in 1990, almost two hundred years after the adoption of the first Tennessee Constitution. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 1990). Furthermore, even the common law tort of retaliatory discharge was only recognized by Tennessee courts in the 1980‟s. See Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556-57. Mr. Young has not cited, nor have we found, any authority supporting the assertion that retaliatory discharge in any form existed “‟under the laws and constitution of North Carolina at the time of the adoption of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796.‟” Helms, 987 S.W.2d at 547 (quoting Patten, 426 S.W2d at 506). Quite simply, the TPPA is a statutory remedy created long after the 1796 Constitution, and thus, if parties asserting or defending against such claims are to enjoy the right to trial by jury, the onus is upon the Legislature to provide for the right specifically by statute.
The TPPA, similar to the THRA, neither explicitly provides for nor prohibits jury trials. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101 (2011), 50-1-304 (2008 & Supp. 2009); see also Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 30 (“The THRA does not expressly grant the right to trial by jury.”). In Sneed, we held that Tennessee Code Annotated section 21-1-103, a statute of -10- general application, affords the right to jury trial in chancery court. 8 Id. at 32. No similar statute of general application affords Mr. Young a right to trial by jury on the claim he filed in circuit court.9 While Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 38.01 provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or existing laws of the state of Tennessee shall be preserved to the parties inviolate,” this rule of civil procedure is merely descriptive of the constitutional right to a jury trial and does not itself confer an independent right to trial by jury. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 38.01 advisory commission cmt. (“The procedures described in this Rule for demanding a trial by jury were not intended or designed to abridge any constitutional or statutory right to jury trial, the Committee deeming such rights to be a matter of substantive law and not merely procedural.”); see also Ashe v. State ex rel. Shriver, 518 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Tenn. 1975). Consequently, there is no statutory analog to Tennessee Code Annotated section 21-1-103 creating a general statutory right to jury trial for claims brought in circuit court. We recognize that the result of our analysis, which confirms a statutory right to jury trial for TPPA claims in chancery court but not in circuit court, may seem counterintuitive. However, creating new statutory rights and remedies that do not have an accompanying right to jury trial is a power within the purview of the Legislature. See Jones v. Greene, 946 S.W.2d 817, 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“The Tennessee Constitution vests in the General Assembly the power to enact legislation to protect the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens, and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 6 does not limit the General Assembly‟s power to establish new claims and remedies that do not require a trial by jury.”). By enacting the TPPA, but choosing not to provide explicitly for the right to trial by jury within the TPPA, the Legislature exercised its authority to effectively preclude the right to a jury trial, at least with respect to TPPA claims brought in circuit court. Any expansion of the statutory right to jury trial must emanate from the Legislature. 8 Plaintiff‟s reliance on footnote 13 in Sneed as support for his assertion of a right to trial by jury in circuit court is misplaced. First, the footnote addressed a 2014 statute that does not apply to this case. Second, the 2014 statute, even if applicable, did not create a right to trial by jury but merely described the procedure that applies where such a right exists. In Sneed, the right to jury trial existed in chancery court by virtue of a separate statute. There is no similar statute granting a right to trial by jury in circuit court. 9 Although we have a limited scope of review in this interlocutory appeal, we note that as a result of our decision that the TPPA is an independent statutory scheme, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-307, which requires GTLA claims to be filed in circuit court, is not applicable and did not prevent Mr. Young from filing his claim initially in chancery court. In fact, Mr. Young filed another action in chancery court based upon the same facts, and litigated that case first. See City of LaFollette II, 353 S.W.3d 121, perm. app. denied (Sept. 21, 2011). -11- Thus, we conclude that Mr. Young is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial on his TPPA claim because his claim did not exist at common law. Mr. Young also has no statutory right to trial by jury in circuit court on his TPPA claim.