Opinion ID: 2744274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elements of Constitutional Standing

Text: Constitutional standing involves three elements: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Citizen Center can pursue its claims only if its members would have standing to sue in their own right. Hunt v. Wash. 15 State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Thus, we must consider whether the members could sue on their own.
The Secretary of State challenges the ability of any members to sue, arguing that Citizen Center failed to identify a single member who was harmed. Sec’y of State’s Br. at 20. The district court did not address this challenge. Nonetheless, we can affirm the dismissal on any ground supported by the record. See Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1178 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). Thus, we will address the Secretary of State’s challenge involving identification of the Citizen Center members. For purposes of argument, we can assume that Citizen Center bore an obligation to identify at least some of the members who were harmed. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009). Even with this assumption, we would conclude that Citizen Center has satisfied its obligation by identifying members being harmed. In addressing this issue, we can review the entire record to assess Citizen Center’s standing. See N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). In the record on appeal, Citizen Center presented affidavits identifying eleven individuals harmed by the use of traceable ballots. R. vol. 2, at 250-57; R. vol. 3, at 394-415. And these affidavits were in the district court’s record at the time of the ruling 16 on the motion to dismiss. Thus, we conclude that Citizen Center has sufficiently identified its individual members for purposes of standing. Because the affected members are sufficiently identified, we address whether Citizen Center has adequately alleged the constitutional elements of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
Injury in fact involves invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S, 555, 560-61 (1992); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). An imminent or “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and . . . allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Clapper, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court determined that no injury in fact existed because absolute anonymity in voting is not a “legally protected federal interest.” R. vol. 3, at 474-75. The clerks defend this conclusion. Clerks’ Br. at 16 (quoting R. vol. 3, at 472). We reject the court’s rationale because it conflates standing with the merits. “For purposes of standing, the question cannot be whether the Constitution, properly interpreted, extends protection to the plaintiff’s asserted right or interest. If that were the test, every losing claim would be dismissed for want of standing.” Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. 17 Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Rather, we must assume for purposes of the standing inquiry that each claim is legally valid. Id. Though we do not consider the merits in connection with standing, we do consider whether the plaintiffs have a legal right to do what is allegedly being impeded. Id. at 1093. For example, a plaintiff lacks standing to complain about his inability to commit crimes because no one has a right to commit a crime. Id. We must apply these principles to Citizen Center’s theories of injury, analyzing the allegations in the amended complaint to determine if they would constitute a concrete, particularized invasion of a right held by members.
Citizen Center alleges injury to members based on their ● desire to freely vote their consciences and ● fears that government officials might learn how members voted by tracing their ballots. R. vol. 1, at 38-45. This claim suggests two potential injuries: 1. the risk that election officials might determine how a member voted; and 2. a chilling effect on the members considering whether to vote. 18 Citizen Ctr.’s Opening Br. at 16-19. These alleged injuries do not support standing. i. Risk that Election Officials Might Determine How a Member Voted Citizen Center alleges an injury in fact from the risk that election officials could determine how a member voted. Id. at 18. This allegation does not involve an injury in fact. To address this allegation, we must consider how this risk would be affected by the use of traceable ballots. Citizen Center does not assert an “abstract, freestanding right” to an untraceable ballot. Instead, Citizen Center claims that the clerks’ use of traceable ballots burdens other rights (the right to vote, engage in free speech, exercise the right to a secret ballot, enjoy equal protection, and enjoy due process). Each of these rights would allegedly be affected because of the risk that an election official might trace a ballot and discover how a member voted. But that risk is speculative because of existing safeguards in the Colorado Constitution. For example, that constitution forbids election officials from inquiring about how a person voted. Colo. Const. art. VII, § 8. Citizen Center alleges that these safeguards might not prevent election officials from tracing ballots and learning how members voted. See R. vol. 1, at 28-31, 33-34. According to Citizen Center, this 19 possibility is real because election officials occasionally traced the ballots of public officials and the Jefferson County Clerk once disclosed the electoral choices of 30 unnamed, but identifiable, voters. Id. at 26, 28, 3031. This possibility is speculative, for Citizen Center does not allege that ● its members were among those whose ballots were traced, or ● election officials are likely to trace any of the members’ ballots. In the absence of these allegations, Citizen Center simply suggests that election officials might trace ballots and violate the Colorado Constitution by investigating the electoral choices of particular individuals. This sort of speculation does not suffice for standing. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (standing cannot be based on speculation that the plaintiff might be subjected to an illegal chokehold by a police officer); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496-97 (1974) (speculative risk of arrest is not an injury in fact). Thus, an injury in fact cannot come from the risk that officials might trace a ballot. Relying on two cases from other circuits, Citizen Center argues that an injury in fact arises from the risk that election officials might trace ballots and disclose how a member voted. Citizen Ctr.’s Opening Br. at 16; see Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 854 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated, 20 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (per curiam); Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1352 (4th Cir. 1993). The two cases are distinguishable. In Greidinger v. Davis, the state conditioned registration to vote on disclosure of the voter’s social security number. Id. at 1345. The court did not expressly address standing, and the burden on the Greidinger plaintiff differs from the burden on Citizen Center’s members. The Greidinger plaintiff refused to supply his social security number to election officials, who then denied his application for voter registration. 988 F.3d at 1345-46. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the state’s requirement provided a condition on the plaintiff’s right to vote. Id. at 1352. Our case is different. In Greidinger, the plaintiff was not allowed to vote. Id. at 1345-46. Here, none of the Citizen Center members have been told that they cannot vote. Instead, Citizen Center argues only that the use of traceable ballots discourages voting. With the difference in circumstances and absence of any discussion of standing, Greidinger provides little guidance for our determination of standing. The injury in Stewart v. Blackwell stemmed from deficiencies in voting equipment. Stewart, 444 F.3d at 846. A Sixth Circuit Court panel concluded that the plaintiffs had standing because the deficiencies made it 21 “inevitable” that mistakes had taken place and would continue. Id. 6 Here, the Citizen Center members cannot plausibly argue that their votes will inevitably be traced. Instead, the members can only speculate about this possibility. Unlike the injuries at issue in Greidinger and Stewart, the alleged injury here may never take place. For this risk of injury to take place, three things would need to occur: 1. At least one member would vote. 2. One of the clerks would trace that member’s ballot. 3. The clerk would inquire into (and possibly reveal) the electoral choices after tracing the ballot. This series of possibilities is too speculative to confer Article III standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))). Consequently, Citizen Center lacks standing based on the potential for election officials to determine how a member voted. 6 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated the panel opinion because the case had become moot. Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692