Opinion ID: 1916395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the contradictions

Text: The Weathersby rule is unavailable if defendant's version is unreasonable, or substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or witnesses for the state, or by the physical facts, or facts of common knowledge. The defendant's version is contradicted in the following respects: 1. The wife of deceased testified that when the defendant asked her husband to go with him to get some whiskey, Browning refused, but defendant insisted until he agreed. It was defendant, not Browning, who started the argument. Defendant became intoxicated, and Browning asked him to leave. Defendant insisted that Browning admit that he remembered something they were arguing about, and Browning insisted that he did not remember. Whereupon defendant told Browning, Don't say that you don't remember, or I might kill you. 2. The daughter of the deceased stated that the defendant persisted in needling Browning and that when defendant got up from the table where he and Browning had been drinking, he staggered, had trouble speaking, and in her opinion was drunk. 3. J.B. Torrence, Sheriff of Rankin County, testified that when he saw the defendant at his office the defendant was drunk. Two days after the shooting, defendant told Torrence that he hated that he had to kill the man but that Browning was standing at the dining room table reaching for his gun when he shot him. 4. Jack Smith, an investigator for the Highway Patrol, stated that when defendant came to the Rankin County Jail he said, Are you bastards going to carry me to a doctor or hospital? The defendant was intoxicated at that time. Two days after the incident, defendant told Smith that he hated to shoot the man after he was down but that he was attempting to load the shotgun when defendant shot him. Defendant told Smith that he and Browning were sitting at the table in the dining room, which is at the opposite end of the trailer from the bedroom. When defendant got up to go to the bathroom and when he emerged from the bathroom, Browning was still at the dining room table and fired the shotgun at him. 5. A.B. Martin, a deputy sheriff of Rankin County, testified that when defendant came to the jail after the shooting, he was drunk. 6. Ken Dickerson, a deputy sheriff of Rankin County, testified that when he saw defendant after the shooting, the defendant was drunk. After defendant went to the hospital, defendant told him that he hated to shoot the man while he was down but that Browning was trying to reload the gun. 7. Kenneth Warren, deputy sheriff of Rankin County, testified that while at the hospital following the shooting, defendant said, I hated to shoot him while he was down, but he kept trying to get up and reload the gun. 8. Mrs. Margaret Ainsworth, a registered nurse at the Rankin General Hospital, who was on duty when Clingon was brought to the emergency room, testified that defendant was in an intoxicated condition and asked her if she would like to climb upon the stretcher with him. She stated that defendant said that he hated to shoot the man when he was down, but that he had gone for his gun. The foregoing contradictions involved material particulars and were made by credible witnesses for the State. Defendant went to the home of deceased armed with a loaded pistol. The jury was justified in finding that he became drunk and precipitated the argument with the deceased; that he gave three different versions of the shooting: (1) that Browning was in the dining room when Browning shot at him with the shotgun (obviously not true from the physical facts), (2) that he shot Browning when Browning was down, and (3) that he shot Browning when Browning was standing in the bedroom. Considering all of the evidence, including the contradictions noted herein, we hold that the Weathersby rule is not available to the defendant in this case and that the question of his guilt was for the jury. Cowart v. State, 270 So.2d 350 (Miss. 1972). Defendant assigns as error the giving on behalf of the state of instruction No. 6, which is similar to the one given in Patterson v. State, 289 So.2d 685 (Miss. 1974). This instruction is concerned with malice aforethought, which is an element of murder but not of manslaughter. Defendant was not convicted of murder, and, therefore, the giving of the instruction is not reversible error insofar as the question of malice aforethought is concerned. The instruction in question does not have the vices that resulted in the reversal of Nicholson v. State, 243 So.2d 552 (Miss. 1971), because in Nicholson the state's instruction was focused on the plea of self-defense. The instruction in the case at bar uses the phrase and not in necessary self-defense, real or apparent, not in a manner to advise the jury concerning that defense, but merely to avoid cutting off that defense. The defendant received ample instructions setting out his claim to self-defense, perhaps considerably more liberal than he was entitled to under the law. Therefore, we find no reversible error in the giving of state's instruction No. 6. The next question raised is the contention that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. The thrust of defendant's argument is that he acted in necessary self-defense, and that there is no evidence to the contrary. This is discussed in the first question raised, and we find no merit in this assignment of error. Finally, defendant says that the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce pictures depicting the body of the deceased, because such pictures served no other purpose than to prejudice and inflame the jury. The pictures show the location of the wounds in a manner that would be difficult to describe orally. We are of the opinion that these photographs served a useful evidentiary purpose in this case. Moreover, the introduction of such evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Ford v. State, 227 So.2d 454 (Miss. 1969). Affirmed. PATTERSON, INZER, SUGG and BROOM, JJ., concur.