Opinion ID: 4107550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to consider Eddie’s stress.

Text: Dr. Roseman’s report also cannot be considered substantial evidence because he did not consider Eddie’s heightened anxiety as a contributing factor to his death. According to Dr. Roseman, Eddie’s stress was irrelevant for two reasons: it was not related to a physical injury; and it Was “a chronic issue . . . not . . . related to [Eddie’s] occupation, but . . . intrinsic to [his] personality.” These conclusions were based on Dr. Roseman’s incorrect interpretation of KRS 342.0011(1]. We address each of Dr. Roseman’s faulty interpretations separately below. KRS 342.0011(1) defines injury as: [A]ny work-related traumatic event or series of traumatic events, including cumulative trauma, arising out of and in the course of employment which is the proximate cause producing a harmful change in the human organism evidenced by objective medical findings. “Injury” does not include the effects of the natural aging process, and does not include any communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the nature of the employment “Injury” when used generally, unless the context indicates otherwise, shall include an occupational disease and damage to a prosthetic appliance, but shall not include a psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related change in the human organism, unless it is a direct result of a physical injury. As noted above, Dr. Roseman interpreted KRS 342.0011(1) as excluding any consideration of stress because Eddie’s stress was not the result of a physical injury. However, as this Court held in McCowan v. Matsushita 14 Appliance Co., 95 S.W.3d 30, 32-33 (Ky. 2002), KRS 342.0011(1) excludes compensation for “mental-mental” claims but not for “mental-physical” claims. In McCowan, the claimant became involved in a heated argument with a supervisor and subsequently suffered a heart attack. Id. at 31. The Court found that the claim was compensable because, While the trauma the claimant suffered Was emotional, the harmful change for which she sought benefits was physical. Id. at 33. Had the claimant been seeking compensation for a purely mental condition, her claim would have been disallowed absent some physically traumatic event. Id. The Estate, like the claimant in McCowan, filed a claim for benefits based on a physically harmful change that resulted in part from emotional trauma, Thus, contrary to Dr. Roseman’s assertion, Eddie’s stress is not excluded from consideration by the exclusion of mental-mental claims in KRS 342.0011(1). It also appears that Dr. Roseman excluded any consideration of Eddie’s stress because he deemed it a pre-existing active condition. This interpretation is faulty for three reasons. First, as noted above, Eddie’s stress, by itself, was not compensable - whether it Was active or dormant - and the Estate was not seeking compensation based on that stress. Second, Eddie’s stress on the date of his death was greater than he had ever exhibited, and it is that increased stress, not the underlying always present lower-level stress, that was at issue. Third, the increased stress was the result of what was taking place at work. Dr. Roseman’s failure to consider Eddie’s stress level is significant As noted above, Dr. Roseman opined that Eddie’s ischemia caused a decrease in 15 blood flow, which caused angina, which caused a fatal arrhythmia. ln his report, Dr. Roseman stated that angina “is typically aggravated by exertion and emotional stress . . . .” Thus, Dr. Roseman’s opinion regarding causation lacks substance because he ignored a key factor that contributed to Eddie’s death.