Opinion ID: 622319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The statute of limitations instruction

Text: Finally, Jiten argues that the district court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the 300-day statute of limitations under Chapter 151B. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5. Diaz argues that Jiten did not adequately object to the court's failure to provide the instruction at trial and that we should therefore review for plain error.4 See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't, 660 F.3d at 503. Because we find that the standard of review does not 4 Jiten proposed a jury instruction on the Chapter 151B statute of limitations in writing before trial. Immediately after the close of the evidence, the district court held a jury charge conference, during which Jiten did not mention the statute of limitations instruction. Several days later, the district court instructed the jury. During a sidebar conference that followed the instructions, Jiten stated, there's been no instruction on the statute of limitations. The court asked Jiten why such an instruction was necessary, and Jiten replied that Diaz had not made any claim that a discriminatory act occurred specifically within the 300-day period before she filed with the MCAD in August 2006. The district court responded that it was undisputed that Diaz was denied a raise in 2006 -- a potentially discriminatory act that fell within the statute of limitations -- and declined to give the instruction. Jiten then said nothing, dropping the issue without objecting on the record or attempting to explain why the instruction was in fact necessary (despite the court's clear directive during the jury charge conference that any objections to the court's instructions had be specific). We have serious doubts as to whether Jiten's request constituted an objection stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(1). See, e.g., Linn v. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989) (If there is a problem with the instructions, the judge must be told precisely what the problem is, and as importantly, what the attorney would consider a satisfactory cure.) (emphasis in original). -13- alter the outcome, we will assume for the sake of argument that Jiten properly preserved the objection and review the claim de novo. Id. We need not address whether the district court committed an error under Massachusetts law by failing to instruct the jury on the applicable statute of limitations. Even assuming that the court erred by omitting the instruction, Jiten has not convinced us that the error was prejudicial based on a review of the record as a whole. Id. (quoting Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary, 552 F.3d at 72). Under Massachusetts law, where a plaintiff alleges a pattern of discriminatory conduct, as Diaz did here, the continuing violation doctrine applies. Pelletier v. Town of Somerset, 939 N.E.2d 717, 731 (Mass. 2010). That doctrine permits a person to seek damages for alleged discrimination occurring outside the usual statute of limitations period if the alleged events are part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination, and there is a discrete violation within the statute of limitations period to anchor the earlier claims. Id. Diaz filed with the MCAD on August 7, 2006. Thus, in order to recover for discriminatory acts that occurred outside of the statute of limitations period, she needed to demonstrate that: (1) at least one discriminatory act occurred no more than 300 days before August 7, 2006 (that is to say, on or after October 11, 2005); (2) the alleged timely act or acts had a substantial relationship to the alleged untimely act or acts; and -14- (3) any discriminatory acts that occurred outside of the statute of limitations period did not trigger Diaz's awareness and duty to assert her rights. See, e.g., Windross v. Barton Protective Servs., Inc., 586 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 2009).5 Jiten only raises the first prong of the continuing violation test on appeal, arguing that the jury did not find at least one discriminatory act that took place after October 11, 2005 and thus that the district court's failure to provide the instruction was prejudicial. Jiten premises its argument on an assumption that [t]he only reasonable reading of the jury's [$7,650.00] verdict is that it awarded Ms. Diaz seven percent (7%) raises for the years 2004 and 2005, when Mitch Patel was her supervisor, and thus that the last discriminatory act accepted by the jury was the denial of Ms. Diaz's raise in April of 2005, six months too distant in time to support a claim of continuing violation. However, the verdict form did not require the jury to specify how it was allocating damages between Diaz's disparate treatment claim and her hostile work environment claim, nor did it ask the jury to differentiate between damages related to lost wages and those related to emotional distress. Jiten's claims are thus 5 Even if Diaz failed to make that showing, she could still use events that occurred prior to October 11, 2005 as background evidence of a hostile work environment, though she could not recover damages for those time-barred events. Pelletier, 939 N.E.2d at 731 n.33. -15- purely speculative and draw too many conclusions from the jury's verdict. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 396 (1st Cir. 2002). Furthermore, as the district court noted in rejecting the proposed instruction, Jiten admitted that Diaz was denied a raise in May 2006, which the jury reasonably could have concluded was a discriminatory act and which fell well within the 300-day statutory period. See Pelletier, 939 N.E.2d at 731. Thus, even if the district court erred by omitting the statute of limitations instruction, that error was not prejudicial, and reversal is not warranted. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 660 F.3d at 503.6