Opinion ID: 2607459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expungement of Prior Felony Conviction

Text: (34a) As noted, defendant forcibly raped Gloria G. shortly before his 18th birthday. He was charged as an adult, pled guilty in 1972, and was committed to the Youth Authority. He eventually received an honorable discharge. At trial and on appeal, the parties assume the conviction was formally set aside under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1772, which purports to remove all penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction and commitment. [19] Defendant argues here, as he did before the start of the penalty trial, that the statute precluded use of the prior conviction against him for any purpose, including aggravation at the penalty phase. He is mistaken. (35) It is settled that Welfare and Institutions Code section 1772 does not eradicate a conviction for all purposes. (See, e.g., People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 542-546 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) The Youth Authority Act is intended to benefit the public by providing youthful offenders with rehabilitative programs such as education, vocational training, work furloughs, and supervised parole. ( Bell, supra, at pp. 543-544.) Expungement of the criminal record rewards an honorable discharge, encourages continued success, and protects a rehabilitated adult from the lifelong stigma of a youthful mistake. However, such rehabilitative goals are not at stake in a subsequent criminal proceeding. As a result, convictions otherwise forgiven or expunged under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1772 may be used to enhance a sentence imposed for a subsequent criminal offense. ( People v. Shields (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 1239, 1243 [279 Cal. Rptr. 403], review denied June 19, 1991; People v. Jacob (1985) 174 Cal. App.3d 1166, 1171-1172 [220 Cal. Rptr. 520].) [T]he enhancement is not an added punishment for the prior serious felony conviction, but instead `is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one.' [Citations.] ( Jacob, supra, at p. 1172.) (34b) Analogous reasoning applies here. The penalty jury was entitled to know that defendant committed the capital crime undeterred by a prior successful felony prosecution. (See People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 202.) Such propensity for criminal conduct is relevant even where Welfare and Institutions Code section 1772 applies to the prior offense. We therefore conclude defendant's prior felony conviction was admissible as such under section 190.3, factor (c). It was also admissible under factor (b) as proof that defendant committed other violent criminal activity, namely, forcible rape. No error occurred.