Opinion ID: 2818270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miranda and the Written Confessions

Text: Garcia requests a COA for his claim that the admission into evidence of his two written confessions violated the requirements set out by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona. 29 The state trial court found that “[t]here is no evidence that [Garcia] was compelled in any way to give a confession or that his will was overborne by the police officers in any way.” 30 We presume the correctness of this finding. 31 Garcia has not offered clear and convincing evidence to rebut it and he thus fails to make a substantial showing that the admission of his confessions violated a constitutional right. 27 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). 28 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 29 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 30 4 CR (1992) at 128. 31 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 9 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035
As an initial matter, Garcia urges that the merits of his Miranda claim are fairly debatable by reasonable jurists because the CCA initially overturned his conviction on grounds that one of the written confessions violated a Texas statute that operationalizes Miranda. 32 Garcia argues in essence that the CCA’s reversal necessarily indicates that jurists have disagreed about the merits of his Miranda claim. This argument is misplaced, as “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” 33 The relevant question before this court is not whether reasonable jurists could disagree about whether the written confessions complied with a Texas statute. Rather, we must consider whether reasonable jurists could disagree about whether the admission of the statements violated the Constitution. 34
Miranda requires that prior to a custodial interrogation an accused person must be warned: (1) that he has a right to remain silent; (2) that any statement he makes can and will be used as evidence against him in court; (3) that he has a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning; (4) that he has a right to have counsel present during any questioning; and (5) that if he cannot afford an attorney a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 35 “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to [invoke any of these rights], the interrogation must cease.” 36 32 See Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (reversing and remanding on original submission; affirming on rehearing); see supra Part I. 33 Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)). 34 See Miller-El I, 537 at 328 (requiring “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”); Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993) (“To obtain review of a state court judgment under [section] 2254, a [petitioner] must assert a violation of a federal constitutional right.”). 35 Id. at 468-74. 36 Id. at 473-74. 10 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 Although an accused “may waive effectuation of the rights conveyed in [these] warnings,” 37 the Supreme Court has held that statements made “during a custodial interrogation [are] inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused ‘in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights’ when making the statement.” 38 This is a two-part inquiry, considered under the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” 39 First, the waiver must have been “the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” 40 Second, “the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” 41 The trial court found that Garcia “was twice read his Miranda warnings” orally and “did not invoke his right to remain silent or his right to counsel,” nor did he “indicate in any manner that he desired to do so.” 42 This in addition to the fact that Garcia placed his initials beside language tracking Miranda on the face of each written confession. 43 Garcia does not dispute that he received a proper Miranda warning before offering his confessions and that he did not invoke any Miranda right. He contends only that a reasonable jurist could conclude that Garcia did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances. In support, Garcia cites the following factual circumstances: “Garcia was only four months past his 18th birthday, with moderate education, interrogated by experienced police[,] exhausted, 37Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 38Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010) (alterations omitted) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). 39 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 4 CR (1992) at 128. 43 75 RR (1991) at 111-12 (State’s Ex. No. 3); 75 RR (1991) at 107-09 (State’s Ex. No. 2). 11 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 hungover, lacking his glasses, and unable to read adequately the statements written for him.” 44 Garcia also cites two cases: Mincey v. Arizona 45 and United States v. Murphy. 46 The factual circumstances of these cases are easily distinguished from the circumstances surrounding Garcia’s confessions. In Mincey, the Supreme Court held that a confession was involuntary where the accused: “had been seriously wounded just a few hours” before confessing; was in “unbearable” pain; was “in the intensive care unit . . . lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, needles, and [a] breathing apparatus;” was “confused and unable to think clearly about either the events . . . or the circumstances of his interrogation;” gave incoherent answers; and even “[in] his debilitated and helpless condition . . . clearly expressed his wish not to be interrogated.” 47 In Murphy, the Second Circuit held that a waiver was not knowing where the interrogating officer had given an “incomprehensible instruction” that “strongly suggest[ed] that the [accused] should talk if they wished to exercise their rights—or, put another way, that they would waive their rights if they remained silent.” 48 The factual circumstances to which Garcia points fall short of the egregious conditions present in Mincey and Murphy. By contrast to these cases, Garcia was given multiple correct Miranda warnings before confessing. Even assuming that Garcia was young, exhausted, and without his glasses, Garcia cannot show that he failed to understand the warnings or that he attempted to invoke his rights in any way. Garcia’s Miranda claim is without merit. “[A] suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda 44 Application for COA at 18. 45 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 46 703 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012). 47 437 U.S. at 398-401 (emphasis added). 48 703 F.3d at 193. 12 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.” 49 Moreover, “waivers may be direct or, in some instances, they may ‘be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.’” 50 “Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.” 51 No reasonable jurist could conclude that the evidence Garcia offers clearly and convincingly rebuts the state habeas court’s finding that Garcia received, understood, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.