Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ROSS v. MOFFITT: THE OUTER BOUNDARY DEFINED

Text: In Ross, the Court was presented with the opportunity to decide the essential question left open in Douglas, whether the right to appointed counsel would extend to discretionary appeals following an appeal of right. The Court was actually presented with two distinct discretionary appellate routes for which counsel was sought, one for assistance in seeking to appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the other for assistance in seeking certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. Following two separate forgery convictions, the respondent, while represented by appointed counsel, appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. That court affirmed his convictions. Afterward, the defendant was denied counsel in his quest to seek review before both the North Carolina and the United States Supreme Courts. Appeal to the latter Court, of course, is available in this context only by way of an entirely discretionary grant of certiorari. Likewise, appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court was also discretionary and available only by leave of court. In determining which cases to grant leave, the North Carolina Supreme Court, much as our Court does, followed particular rules that embodied concepts beyond the mere correctness of the result in a particular case. In North Carolina, the court had the discretion to grant leave if it found that the application satisfied the applicable statute. To grant, the court had to find (1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court. Ross, supra at 613-614, 94 S.Ct. 2437, quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-31(c). These rules bear a close resemblance to our own rules for granting leave, in our case delineated by MCR 7.302(B). [6] Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist began with a review of the Court's past cases addressing indigent appeals. Referencing Griffin, Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963), Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961), and Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959), Justice Rehnquist noted that the decisions discussed above stand for the proposition that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons. Ross, supra at 607, 94 S.Ct. 2437. From this rule, he then noted that Douglas departed somewhat from the limited doctrine of the transcript and fee cases and undertook an examination of whether an indigent's access to the appellate system was adequate. Id. He reasoned further: The Court in Douglas concluded that a State does not fulfill its responsibility toward indigent defendants merely by waiving its own requirements that a convicted defendant procure a transcript or pay a fee in order to appeal, and held that the State must go further and provide counsel for the indigent on his first appeal as of right. [ Id. ] Discussing Douglas, Justice Rehnquist also noted the key distinction discussed above: that under this system an indigent's case was initially reviewed on the merits without the benefit of any organization or argument by counsel. By contrast, persons of greater means were not faced with the preliminary ex parte examination of the record, but had their arguments presented to the court in fully briefed form. [ Id. at 608, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (internal citations omitted).] As the Court stated, the [t]he precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. Id. at 608-609, 94 S.Ct. 2437. Justice Rehnquist, though first recognizing the viability of a Due Process Clause analysis, nonetheless found that such a path would not lead to appointing counsel in the case before the Court, focusing on the differences between trial and appellate situations. The fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way. Id. at 611, 94 S.Ct. 2437. Justice Rehnquist then noted that [l]anguage involving equal protection notions is prominent in both Douglas and in other cases treating the rights of indigents on appeal. [7] Although the states cannot adopt procedures which leave an indigent defendant `entirely cut off from any appeal at all,' by virtue of his indigency, id. at 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, quoting Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963), or extend to such indigent defendants merely a `meaningless ritual' while others in better economic circumstances have a `meaningful appeal,' id., quoting Douglas, supra at 358, 83 S.Ct. 814, [t]he question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees. Id. Thus, it appears that, although Douglas clearly represented a level of disparate treatment that could not be tolerated by the Court, other situations, in some way degrees apart, but less invidious than the procedure in Douglas, might be acceptable. Rather than an absolute rule, Douglas instead offers a stick against which other procedures must be measured. [8] The Douglas Court itself, in its exercise of restraint, spoke only of the situation before it, offering little insight into such degrees. Thus, we turn to the rationale of the Ross Court for tools to evaluate and measure this question of degree. In approaching this question, Justice Rehnquist first offered an in-depth review of the procedure of the North Carolina Supreme Court, previously noted. These procedures are similar to those of our own Court. [9] The question to be answered in determining whether the North Carolina Supreme Court would grant discretionary review was not the correctness of the result or the rationale evidenced below, but rather the importance of the case to the state's jurisprudence. Indeed, though our own court rule specifically recognizes clear error and manifest injustice as potential bases supporting intervention, no equivalent provision was found for the North Carolina Supreme Court. [10] Accordingly, the North Carolina Supreme Court was confined to the importance of the legal principles present in a case, rather than the particular merits of the case itself. This distinction was soon to be persuasive for Ross. Before returning to the function of North Carolina's discretionary review, however, Justice Rehnquist came to the determination required under Douglas: whether the degree of restriction imposed on a defendant by the denial of counsel for a discretionary review would leave the indigent defendant with only a meaningless ritual, though a moneyed defendant would have a meaningful appeal. [11] If so, then an unconstitutional line would have been drawn. On the other hand, as also recited by Justice Rehnquist, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Ross, supra at 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, quoting San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Likewise, the state is not required to equalize economic conditions, id., quoting Griffin, supra at 23, 76 S.Ct. 585 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), nor to be free from unreasoned distinctions. [12] Thus, the question of degree requires measurement. To determine where the difference between the counseled application of a moneyed defendant and the uncounselled application of the indigent lies, Justice Rehnquist turned to the question most important to an appellate court, and one it is well positioned to answer. That is, whether the materials in the uncounselled application are sufficient to be helpful to the Court in reaching a decision. The facts show that respondent, in connection with his Mecklenburg County conviction, received the benefit of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in preparing an appellate brief on his behalf for the state Court of Appeals. Thus, prior to seeking discretionary review in the state Supreme Court, his claims had once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We do not believe it can be said, therefore, that a defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court. At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of the trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review. [ Ross, supra at 614-615, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).] Therefore, the Ross Court's focus was, and hence ours must be, whether the materials available to an indigent defendant, without the benefit of counsel, would be adequate to allow a court to determine whether to grant further review. We must compare the situation in Ross to what could come to be in the instant case, and what has come to be under the scheme imposed by the majority. In the instant case, an indigent defendant is faced, by law, with only the ability to apply for leave to our Court of Appeals, and is now required to do so without the benefit of appointed counsel. He will have a transcript of the trial court proceedings. This is not all that he must have to offer our Court of Appeals, however; more is required for that Court's basis for its decision to grant or deny review. Id. at 615, 94 S.Ct. 2437. Return to the language above from Ross, and in particular, its italicized portions. Applying the dictates of our Supreme Court to the facts of the instant case, we need add but one word to describe the instant defendant's situation, which we shall bracket: At that stage he will [not] have, at the very least, ... a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. [ [13] ] Thus, rather than being comparable to the situation in Ross, the question before us presents a situation almost completely inapposite. Our Court of Appeals will have no brief, or even an identification of issues, by any counsel for the defendant. It will have, in nearly all instances, nothing in the way of an opinion of the court below on any substantive matter. [14] Thus our Court of Appeals will have only the record before it, along with whatever submissions respondent might make pro se.... [15] It may well have, however, an offering in opposition from the prosecutor, who is free to muster all the resources of the prosecutor's office to oppose the application. [16] This question of degrees between the instant case and Douglas, which Ross requires us to ask, instead becomes a vain search for distinctions between the instant case and Douglas. [17] The degrees separating a meaningless ritual from a meaningful appeal are substantial, and the degrees separating the tools approved in Ross and those present in the instant case are equally substantial. Most importantly, though, in answer to the question of degrees Ross asks, which determines the constitutionality of the procedure before us, the degrees separating the meaningfulness of an indigent defendant's appeal from that of a moneyed defendant are immense. Applying the analysis in Ross, we can ably conclude that the scheme imposed by the majority is unconstitutional under Ross because of its failure to separate itself from the gulf that existed between indigent defendants and moneyed defendants in Douglas. Even before we depart from Ross, though, we can comfort ourselves that we are indeed correct in our determination by turning to the factors on which the Ross Court fortified its conclusion: We are fortified in this conclusion by our understanding of the function served by discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme Court. The critical issue in that court, as we perceive it, is not whether there has been a correct adjudication of guilt in every individual case, see Griffin v. Illinois , but rather whether the subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or whether the cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or whether the decision below is in probable conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may deny certiorari even though it believes that the decision of the Court of Appeals was incorrect, since a decision which appears incorrect may nevertheless fail to satisfy any of the criteria discussed above. Once a defendant's claims of error are organized and presented in a lawyerlike fashion to the Court of Appeals, the justices of the Supreme Court of North Carolina who make the decision to grant or deny discretionary review should be able to ascertain whether his case satisfies the standards established by the legislature for such review. [ Ross, supra at 615, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (citations omitted; emphasis added).] Once again, we have added emphasis not only to aid the reader, but also as a tool for analyzing the stark contrast between the system underlying Ross and what now exists in our state under the majority decision. Turning to the first italicized section, with but a single modification, I offer the Ross logic as it now applies to indigent defendants seeking leave in the Court of Appeals: The critical issue in that court, as we perceive it, is [ ] whether there has been a correct adjudication of guilt in every individual case, see Griffin v. Illinois .... Recall above the Supreme Court's detailed analysis of the jurisdiction and practices of the North Carolina Supreme Court. Consider as well how it compared to the jurisdiction of this Court and MCR 7.302(B). Now, compare it to the jurisdiction and practice of our Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(B) is applicable only to this Court. The rules applicable to our Court of Appeals are found in subchapter 7.200 of our court rules. MCR 7.203(B) governs the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for appeal by leave: (B) Appeal by leave. The Court may grant leave to appeal from: (1) a judgment or order of the circuit court, court of claims, and recorder's court which is not a final judgment appealable of right; (2) a final judgment entered by the circuit court or the recorder's court on appeal from any other court; (3) a final order of an administrative agency or tribunal which by law is appealable to or reviewable by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; (4) any other judgment or order appealable to the Court of Appeals by law or rule; (5) any judgment or order when an appeal of right could have been taken but was not timely filed. Appeal by leave in guilty-plea cases is provided by M.C.L. ง 770.3(1)(e); MSA 28.1100(1)(e): Subject to the limitations imposed by section 12 of this chapter, an aggrieved party shall have a right to appeal from a final judgment or trial as follows: