Opinion ID: 202730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the stern report

Text: 19 Fryar further contended in his brief that the district court abused its discretion by precluding admission of the Stern Report, both in Fryar's case-in-chief and for impeachment purposes. At oral argument, Fryar's counsel clarified that he is not challenging the district court's ruling on the use of the Stern Report in his case-in-chief. Instead, Fryar's counsel focused on the district court's decision not to allow Fryar to use the Stern Report to contradict Superintendent Horgan's testimony regarding the training of corrections officers and the conditions at SCHOC. Fryar's counsel points to authority that when the defense opens the door to impeachment through testimony on direct, the opposing party may try to establish that this testimony is false through the introduction of evidence, including otherwise inadmissible evidence, that contradicts the direct testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Morla-Trinidad, 100 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1996). Therefore, although Fryar concedes, as he must, that the district court permitted him to cross-examine Horgan, Fryar contends that the value of his right to cross-examine Horgan was substantially diminished by being precluded from referencing the Stern Report. 20 As this Court has repeatedly observed, however, a party may not present extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by contradiction on a collateral matter. United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). As relevant to this case, Beauchamp provides the following definition of collateral evidence: 21 A matter is considered collateral if the matter itself is not relevant in the litigation to establish a fact of consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness. 1 McCormack on Evidence § 45, at 169. Stated another way, extrinsic evidence to disprove a fact testified to by a witness is admissible when it satisfies the Rule 403 balancing test and is not barred by any other rule of evidence. See United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1409 (D.C.Cir.[1988]) (The `specific contradiction' rule . . . is a particular instance of the trial court's general power under Fed.R.Evid. 403 to exclude evidence `if its probative value is substantially outweighed . . . by considerations of undue delay, [or] waste of time.'). 22 Id. at 4. 23 This case involved, as the district court put it, one plaintiff, Mr. William Fryar, who complains that one corrections officer, Mr. Curtis, violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, it is, at best, a close question whether additional evidence regarding the training of officers or the conditions at SCHOC would have assisted the jury. It seems more likely that such evidence would have resulted in confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and the undue consumption of time, as the district court evidently surmised. See Fed. R.Evid. 403. 24 Even assuming that evidence of Curtis' training and acts of impropriety by other personnel at SCHOC were facts of consequence to the question of Curtis' conduct on June 14, 1998, but see, e.g., Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 3 (finding evidence that defendant lied about his address excludable), we need not reach the question of whether generalized extrinsic evidence of conditions at a prison is relevant to alleged physical abuse by one of its corrections officers of an inmate. Whether or not it was error to exclude the Stern Report for use for impeachment, any error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case. McDonough, 452 F.3d at 19-20. 25 Although Fryar's counsel was not permitted to make use of the Stern Report on cross-examination, Horgan was extensively cross-examined. More significantly, Horgan's testimony did not involve direct observation of the events alleged and, as the district court noted, was of questionable relevance, especially given the parties' agreement that the only issue before the jury was Curtis' treatment of Fryar on June 14, 1998. Therefore, even if the district court abused its discretion by excluding the Stern Report and limiting cross-examination on that subject, the error was harmless.