Opinion ID: 751140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 3M's Summary Judgment Motion

Text: 11 Mr. and Mrs. Drake each argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against them on all of their claims. They argue that their claims were inappropriately dismissed at the summary judgment stage because they presented evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each of their claims. We review a summary judgment de novo, and we will consider the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidentiary record indicates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). We apply this standard with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, in which intent and credibility are crucial issues. See Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir.1994); Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir.1993). Because evidence directly supporting a claim of intentional discrimination is rare, affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination. Courtney, 42 F.3d at 418.
12 The Drakes' complaints alleged that they were subjected to a hostile work environment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 2000e-2(a)(1), 2 due to their association with their black co-workers. 3M concedes that an employee can bring an associational race discrimination claim under Title VII and § 1981, so long as the employee can establish the requisite level of association. However, most of the cases cited by 3M in support of this proposition, including the two opinions of this Court, addressed retaliation claims. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1316 (7th Cir.1989) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (discussing, prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, whether a retaliation claim could be stated under § 1981); Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir.1982) (Title VII retaliation case); see also Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir.1988) (Title VII and § 1981 retaliation case). These precedents provide little guidance with respect to discrimination claims, as Title VII's retaliation provision forbids an employer to retaliate against an employee because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 13 Other cited cases support the proposition of an associational race discrimination claim. See, e.g., Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F.Supp. 244, 267 (N.D.Ind.1985), overruled on other grounds by Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 644 F.Supp. 983 (N.D.Ind.1986); Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F.Supp. 1442, 1444-45 (N.D.Ga.1984). Those cases both emphasize, however, that the alleged discrimination was because of the employee's race, as § 2000e-2(a) requires, in conjunction with the employee's association with an individual of another race. See Moffett, 621 F.Supp. at 267; Gresham, 586 F.Supp. at 1444-45. Although we need not decide this issue because 3M has conceded it, we must address 3M's argument that some objectively quantifiable degree of association is required in order to state an associational claim. In this context, we note that employment discrimination claims are available to employees of all races, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976), so long as the discrimination is because of such individual's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Accordingly, we believe that the key inquiries should be whether the employee has been discriminated against and whether that discrimination was because of the employee's race. 3 Contrary to 3M's assertions, we do not believe that an objective degree of association is relevant to this inquiry. 14 Reviewing the evidence in the record, we conclude that neither of the Drakes established an inference that they were subjected to a hostile work environment because of their race. With respect to Mr. Drake, he has not established an inference that any harassment to which he was subjected was based on his race, in conjunction with his association with Hawkins and Anthony. Although Mr. Drake had been friends with Hawkins and Anthony since the Spring of 1993, he stated at his deposition that the first instance of harassment allegedly based upon his friendship with Hawkins and Anthony was his August 30th altercation with Glancy. Mr. Drake acknowledged that Glancy was angry at him for filing a grievance against him, and that Glancy went off on him like a madman as a result. Mr. Drake introduced no evidence that the subsequent treatment he received from his co-workers was a result of his race. In fact, the evidence in the record suggests that his problems resulted from filing the grievance against Glancy. Mrs. Drake admitted in her deposition testimony that, during her tenure of over thirty years at the 3M plant, she could not recall a single other instance in which an employee had filed a grievance against a co-worker when the filing employee had no personal stake in the dispute. Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Drake, we are unable to conclude that he has established an inference that he was harassed because of his race. 15 Moreover, the single statement made by Glancy to Mr. Drake does not establish an inference of a hostile environment. We have previously noted that isolated and innocuous incidents will not support a hostile environment claim. McKenzie v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir.1996). Although not innocuous, the comment was an isolated incident. Thus, summary judgment was appropriate with respect to Mr. Drake's hostile environment claim. 16 With respect to Mrs. Drake's hostile environment claim, the evidence does not establish an inference that she was subjected to a hostile environment actionable under the antidiscrimination laws. For the harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and to create an abusive working atmosphere. Id. at 479. Because Title VII is not directed against unpleasantness per se but only ... against discrimination in the conditions of employment, Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine, 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir.1994), we consider the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 371, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). 17 Given the above considerations, we conclude that Mrs. Drake has not established an inference of a hostile environment in either the subjective or objective sense. Mrs. Drake talked with Dean Coleman regarding the treatment that she was receiving, and informed him that her performance at work was not suffering. Moreover, even assuming that any inappropriate treatment directed towards Mrs. Drake was because of her race, we cannot hold that the treatment directed towards her was so severe that it unreasonably interfered with her work environment. 4
18 The Drakes also claim that 3M retaliated against them in a number of ways. As indicated previously, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that he suffered an adverse action by his employer; and (3) that there was a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. See, e.g., McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir.1997). While we have defined adverse employment actions quite broadly, see McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 258-59 (7th Cir.1996), it remains true that the adverse action must be material. See Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir.1996). [N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Otherwise, minor and even trivial employment actions that 'an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.'  Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.1996)). 19 With respect to Mr. Drake's retaliation claim, only his comments printed in the local newspaper regarding race relations at the 3M plant can be characterized as protected expression. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir.1982) (noting that an employee's good faith belief that he was opposing discrimination, even if that belief was incorrect, triggers Title VII's retaliation provisions). Although Mr. Drake argues that the aid he gave Hawkins in filing grievances also constituted protected expression, see McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 262 (recognizing that an employee's endeavors to obtain his employer's compliance with Title VII can form the basis of a retaliation claim), our conclusion that any shunning of Mr. Drake by his co-workers was not because of his race also applies here. The evidence does not create an inference that the shunning was the result of the assistance that he provided his friends. Therefore, since the shunning is not actionable as retaliation, the only allegedly retaliatory adverse actions to which Mr. Drake can point are the three phone calls that he received and the paperwork that was missing from his locker. 5 These unfortunate occurrences, particularly the paperwork that was lost from Mr. Drake's locker, do not rise above the level of minor and are not the sort of employee grievances with which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the federal courts should be burdened. See Williams, 85 F.3d at 274. Moreover, Mr. Drake has presented no evidence indicating that 3M bears any responsibility for the three obscene telephone calls that he received. See Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334-35 (7th Cir.1996). 20 With respect to Mrs. Drake, we do not believe that the spiritual guidance and friendship that she provided to Hawkins and Anthony constitutes protected activity. However, we will assume that she is protected from retaliation based on her husband's protected activities, as well. See McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 262 (holding that victims of collective punishment who are genuinely retaliated against should be protected under Title VII's retaliation provision). Mrs. Drake argues that the shunning she received is an actionable form of retaliation. Although retaliation can take the form of a hostile work environment, see Knox at 1334-35, we have already held that the terms and conditions of her employment were not affected by the shunning. With respect to her decision to leave the 3M plant on the advice of a co-worker who feared for her safety, she has introduced no evidence that connects 3M to this incident. See id. at 1334 (requiring the plaintiff to establish the right link between the employer and the coworkers, so that the employer can be held responsible for their actions). Thus, summary judgment on the Drakes' retaliation claims was appropriate.
21 Mr. and Mrs. Drake also argue that they were constructively discharged from their jobs. To state a claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff needs to show that his working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have been compelled to resign. Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir.1996). Not only must conditions be intolerable; for a Title VII constructive discharge claim to succeed, they must be intolerable because of unlawful discrimination. See Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1005 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001, 115 S.Ct. 512, 130 L.Ed.2d 419 (1994). More than ordinary discrimination is necessary to establish a constructive discharge claim; in the ordinary case, an employee is expected to remain employed while seeking redress. See Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir.1997). 22 Both of the Drake's allegations fall well short of this high standard. At most, the shunning that each of the Drakes received suggests that their experience in the workplace was unpleasant; nothing suggests that this treatment was so intolerable that it should have caused either of them to resign. The fact that Mr. Drake felt compelled to resign after being shunned for a few days does not demonstrate that a reasonable employee would have acted similarly. While Mrs. Drake suggests that she retired out of fears for her safety, she has presented no evidence to suggest that this fear was reasonable. More significantly, she has not presented evidence suggesting that this fear was the result of discrimination by 3M. In fact, the record indicates that on the only occasion in which Mrs. Drake discussed her shunning with 3M management, she told Dean Coleman, the Human Resources manager, that she did not want him to intervene. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropriately granted on the Drakes' constructive discharge claims. 23 4. The Magistrate Judge's Exclusion of Evidence 24 Mr. and Mrs. Drake also argue that the magistrate judge erred in disregarding portions of affidavits that they submitted in opposition to summary judgment and that this evidence, if admitted, would have gone even further in establishing genuine issues of material fact. The affidavits in question were those of Dave Shevely, Hawkins, and Hamilton, three of the Drakes' co-workers. 3M argues that the district court correctly ignored portions of these affidavits because the affiants' statements lack the factual foundation and personal knowledge required by Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits offered in opposition to summary judgment be made on personal knowledge, ... set[ting] forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and ... show[ing] affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Although personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions, those inferences must be substantiated by specific facts. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Chicago, 841 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir.1988). 25 The district court was correct to strike these portions of the affidavits. While we will not delve into each statement individually, the portion of the Shevely affidavit that was stricken stated that: Management, especially Dean Coleman, took a scapegoat approach in dealing with employee problems and generally tended to cover up matters. Similarly, Hawkins stated that: Every time I, or any other African American employee went to Dean Coleman with a problem involving another employee, who was white, Dean Coleman would never conduct an investigation or take any action against that white employee. These are exactly the type of conclusory allegations that Rule 56 counsels should be disregarded on summary judgment. Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted. Hadley v. County of Du Page, 715 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006, 104 S.Ct. 1000, 79 L.Ed.2d 232 (1984). 26 While the Drakes argue that Shevely's long tenure at 3M's plant qualifies him to make the assertions contained in his affidavit, this argument misapprehends Rule 56(e)'s requirements. Instead, Sheveley's affidavit should have recounted factual instances, based upon Sheveley's personal knowledge, that demonstrated Dean Coleman's tendency to cover up matters. Without these substantiating facts, under Rule 56 we cannot make the reasonable inferences that the Drakes assert militate against summary judgment. See Davis, 841 F.2d at 189 (Because Davis substantiates his allegations of a longstanding custom or policy solely on the basis of his one conclusory sentence in his affidavit, we cannot reasonably infer that such a custom did indeed exist without more.). The district court correctly disregarded these conclusory statements in deciding whether to grant summary judgment.