Opinion ID: 2336629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Administrative Officer[4]

Text: The Conservation Association contends that the County Commissioners did not act as an administrative official because its determination of the DRRA's contents was a fundamentally legislative, rather than an administrative act. In particular, the Conservation Association points to the DRRA's description of the conditions, terms, restrictions or other requirements determined by the governing body of the local jurisdiction to be necessary to ensure the public health, safety, or welfare, as being the heart and soul of the agreement. Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01(f)(ix). The Conservation Association concludes that a determination by the governing body of the local jurisdiction as to what terms, conditions, restrictions or other requirements are necessary to ensure the public health is the very essence of the legislative function performed by local elected officials. We disagree with this analysis for two reasons. First, the negotiation of terms protective of public health, safety, or welfare, in a contract entered into by a local government body is a discretionary executive act, not a legislative one. See Montgomery County v. Revere Nat'l Corp., Inc., 341 Md. 366, 390, 671 A.2d 1, 12 (1996) (When the executive branch of the county government, in carrying out the laws and functions of government, enters into a contract, such action constitutes the exercise of executive discretion.). A DRRA is not an ordinance or legislation as those terms are commonly understood; rather, it is a contract whose purpose is to vest rights under zoning laws and regulations, in consideration of enhanced public benefits. Second, the public principal, not the governing body, has the principal responsibility and authority under the DRRA statute to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01. As we shall explain, the County Commissioners was acting as the public principal, i.e., acting in its executive and administrative capacities, when it approved and executed the DRRA in this case. As a general matter, it long has been recognized in Maryland that County Commissioners in much of their functioning act as administrators or in an executive capacity. City of Bowie v. County Comm'rs for Prince George's County, 258 Md. 454, 461, 267 A.2d 172, 176 (1970). It is recognized that the protean nature of a board of county commissioners makes it a unique body and somewhat of a hybrid. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Washington County v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 60 Md.App. 133, 142, 481 A.2d 513, 518 (1984). We have noted that: County Commissioners are outgrowths of the old Levy Courts originally established by the Act of 1794, Chapter 53. These courts were composed of the Justices of the Peace of the several counties. Their duties were to meet and to adjust the ordinary and necessary expenses of their counties, and to impose an assessment or rate on property to defray county charges. During the course of the succeeding fifty years the name County Commissioners came into existence. It was first recognized in the underlying law of the state in the Constitution of 1851, Article 7, Section 8. In that constitution it was provided that the commissioners should exercise only such powers and duties as the legislature should from time to time prescribe. When the present Constitution of 1867 was adopted, Article VII, Section I, provided that the power and duties of County Commissioners should be such as now or may be hereafter prescribed by Law. Until the constitution of 1867, County Commissioners were simply administrative officers in charge of county finances, and taking care of the public roads. After the constitution of 1867 these powers could be broadened by legislative authority. Cox v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Anne Arundel County, 181 Md. 428, 433-34, 31 A.2d 179, 182 (1943) (citations omitted). A board of county commissioners functions as the county government and is the county body politic. In performing its various functions, it exercises legislative, quasi-legislative, executive, and quasi-judicial authority, sometimes in combination. H. Manny Holtz, 60 Md.App. at 144, 481 A.2d at 518. A board of county commissioners can, for example, control county property and roads, enact county ordinances, enforce building codes, borrow money and issue bonds  all in addition to their authority under Art. 66B of the Maryland Code to enact, administer, and enforce zoning and land use laws. H. Manny Holtz, 60 Md.App. at 143, 481 A.2d at 518. As the present case illustrates, the County Commissioners' particular exercise of its distinct roles in a given situation determines the appeal rights of those affected. We have held, for example, that a statute that authorized appeal to a circuit court from an assessment made by the county commissioners did not authorize an appeal from a tax valuation by a board of county commissioners sitting as the county board of control and review. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 116 Md. 220, 226, 81 A. 520, 522 (1911). Although the same individuals composed the two boards, we reasoned that their duties are as separate and distinct in the respective capacities in which they act, as if they were different individuals. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 116 Md. at 225, 81 A. at 522. As regards DRRAs in particular, Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, § 13.01(a)(4) defines the public principal as the governmental entity of a local jurisdiction that has been granted the authority to enter agreements under a local ordinance. The County Commissioners in Queen Anne's County exercise the administrative authority of the public principal with respect to DRRAs. QACC § 18-1302. [5] Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, § 13.01 enables the public principal to perform a series of essentially administrative tasks that include: § 13.01 (c) (accepting the petition of a property owner or its representatives for a DRRA); § 13.01(d) (holding a hearing on the petition); §§ 13.01(b)(2) and 13.01(e) (executing the DRRA after obtaining the local planning commission's approval); § 13.01(h) (amending the DRRA, if desired, by mutual consent and after public hearing); § 13.01(i) (either terminating the DRRA by mutual consent or, if essential to ensure the public health, safety, or welfare, suspending or terminating the DRRA after a public hearing). The Queen Anne's County Code, tracking Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, § 13.01, assigns this same series of administrative functions of the public principal to the County Commissioners: QACC § 18-1303 (accepting the petition of a property owner for a DRRA); § 18-1306 (holding a hearing on the petition); §§ 18-1302 and 18-1305 (executing the DRRA after obtaining the local planning commission's approval); §§ 18-1307(a) (amending the DRRA, if desired, by mutual consent and after public hearing); and § 18-1308 (either terminating the DRRA by mutual consent or, if essential to ensure the public health, safety, welfare, suspending or terminating the DRRA after a public hearing). Subsection (b) of Article 66B, § 13.01 divides authority for the creation of DRRAs into two parts. Under Article 66B, § 13.01(b)(1), the governing body of a county (in the present case the County Commissioners) is given power to: (i) By ordinance, establish procedures and requirements for the consideration and execution of agreements; and (ii) Delegate all or part of the authority established under the ordinance to a public principal within the jurisdiction of the governing body. These powers of the governing body are circumscribed by statutory direction that the powers of the governing body are Subject to subsections (c) through ( l ) of this section. Under Article 66B, § 13.01(b)(2), a public principal is given power to: (i) Execute agreements for real property located within the jurisdiction of the governing body with a person having a legal or equitable interest in the real property; and (ii) Include a federal, State, or local government or unit as an additional party to the agreement. The distinction between the legislative powers of the governing body and the executive and administrative powers of the public principal is important. The governing body has no power with respect to the actual operation of the statute. Aside from those matters listed in § 13.01(b)(2) above, the governing body may only and co-extensively with the public principal, after a public hearing ... suspend or terminate an agreement upon determination that such is `essential to ensure the public health, safety, or welfare.' Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01(j). Otherwise, the governing body has no authority with respect to any particular DRRA. The public principal, on the other hand, is defined as the governmental entity of a jurisdiction that has been granted the authority to enter agreements under ... this section. Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01(a)(5). Sole power to negotiate, execute, and enforce agreements lies with the public principal. Petitions to enter into agreements are made to the public principal; and the required public hearing is conducted by the public principal. In any particular case, the only limitations on the public principal's authority is to follow general procedures adopted by the governing body and a requirement  unrelated to the governing body or its legislative functions  that all agreements be determined by the Planning Commission to be consistent with the plan of the jurisdiction. Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01(e). Further evidence of the distinction, and the autonomy of the public principal, lies in Article 66B, § 13.01(m) which states, this section does not require the adoption of an ordinance by a governing body. This can only be read as applying to agreements, because an earlier provision, specifically requires that procedures be established by ordinance. Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66B, § 13.01(b)(1)(i) The County Commissioners in the present case successively wore two different hats and performed a legislative action followed by an administrative/executive action. The test to determine when action is legislative and when executive or administrative is whether the [action] is one making a new law  an enactment of general application prescribing a new plan or policy  or is one which merely looks to or facilitates the administration, execution or implementation of a law already in force and effect. City of Bowie, 258 Md. at 463-64, 267 A.2d at 177 (citations omitted). Initially, the County Commissioners acted legislatively, as a governing body under Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, § 13.01(b)(1), by authorizing DRRAs in Queen Anne's County through enactment of Subtitle 13 of the Land Use and Development Title of the Queen Anne's County Code. In enacting Subtitle 13, the County Commissioners reserved to themselves the role of the public principal under Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Article 66B, § 13.01, with its concomitant powers to conduct hearings on, enter into, execute, and enforce DRRAs. Subsequently, the County Commissioners signed off on the DRRA in its administrative and executive role as the public principal. The County Commissioners' approval was the act of an administrative officer or administrative official under the Maryland and County Codes, respectively, because the term `administrative official' is most reasonably read as embracing whatever administrative mechanism a local jurisdiction in Maryland sets up to enforce its planning and zoning laws and ordinances, including a multi-member member body.... See Wharf at Handy's Point, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 92 Md.App. 659, 672, 610 A.2d 314, 320 (1992) (holding that the term an administrative official in § 4.07 (d) includes the Kent County Planning Commission) (citation omitted); Howard Research & Dev. Corp. v. Concerned Citizens for Columbia Concept, 297 Md. 357, 366-67, 466 A.2d 31, 35-36 (1983) (holding that a five-member Planning Board constituted the administrative official whose decisions were subject to appeal to the Howard County Board of Appeals); see also Md.Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.), Art. 1, § 8 (stating the rule of construction when interpreting the Code is that the singular always includes the plural, and vice versa, except where such construction would be unreasonable.).