Opinion ID: 751602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: scope of the choi-u.s. surgical license

Text: 52 Questions of patent ownership are distinct from questions of inventorship. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248, 26 USPQ2d 1572, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1993). In accordance with this principle, this court has nonetheless noted that an invention presumptively belongs to its creator. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 406, 38 USPQ2d 1695, 1697 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 513, 136 L.Ed.2d 402 (1996). 53 Indeed, in the context of joint inventorship, each co-inventor presumptively 5 owns a pro rata undivided interest in the entire patent, no matter what their respective contributions. Several provisions of the Patent Act combine to dictate this rule. 35 U.S.C. § 116, as amended in 1984, 6 states that a joint inventor need not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent. In amending section 116 as to joint inventorship, Congress did not make corresponding modifications as to joint ownership. For example, section 261 continues to provide that patents shall have the attributes of personal property. This provision suggests that property rights, including ownership, attach to patents as a whole, not individual claims. Moreover, section 262 continues to speak of joint owners of a patent, not joint owners of a claim. Thus, a joint inventor as to even one claim enjoys a presumption of ownership in the entire patent. 54 This rule presents the prospect that a co-inventor of only one claim might gain entitlement to ownership of a patent with dozens of claims. As noted, the Patent Act accounts for that occurrence: Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though ... each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (emphasis added). Thus, where inventors choose to cooperate in the inventive process, their joint inventions may become joint property without some express agreement to the contrary. In this case, Yoon must now effectively share with Choi ownership of all the claims, even those which he invented by himself. Thus, Choi had the power to license rights in the entire patent. 55 This court next examines the extent to which Choi exercised that power. This court reviews the interpretation of contractual language, including license agreements, as a question of law. See Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1569, 27 USPQ2d 1136, 1138 (Fed.Cir.1993). State law, in this case Connecticut law, controls in matters of contract interpretation. Thus, in making its review, this court adopts the ordinary and common meaning of contract terms whenever possible. See Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 463 A.2d 527, 532 (1983). 56 The license which Choi granted to U.S. Surgical states: 57 Choi hereby grants to U.S. Surgical an exclusive, worldwide right and license to make, have made, use, market and sell Choi's trocar related inventions, including trocars having shields and those described and/or claimed in the '773 patent. This license is retroactive to the date on which the '773 patent issued. 58 U.S. Surgical reads this language to cover all trocars described and/or claimed in the '773 patent, encompassing the entire '773 patent and more. Ethicon reads the same language as limited to Choi's trocar related inventions, which comprise only his contributions to claims 33 and 47 of the '773 patent. 59 The meaning of the phrase including trocars ... described and/or claimed in the '773 patent depends on the meaning of the word including. If construed to merely clarify the meaning of trocar related inventions, the phrase it modifies, then including could limit the scope of Choi's grant. Including, however, can also operate as a phrase of addition. Under this broader reading, the phrase trocar related inventions covers more than just the material specified in the including phrase. 60 If possible, this court must view a single provision of a contract in the way that gives meaning to--and provides internal harmony among--all parts of the contract. See Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 570 A.2d 690, 696 (1990). Read in context, the including phrase is a phrase of addition, not a limitation on the scope of trocar related inventions. For example, the agreement states that Choi has not ... and shall not, grant to any other person ... any right or license to make, use or sell any of his trocar related inventions or any device described or within the scope of any of the claims of the '773 patent. (emphasis added). In addition, the agreement states, Choi hereby grants to [U.S. Surgical] the sole right to sue any infringer of the '773 patent.... If the scope of the license did not encompass all of Choi's rights as a joint owner of the '773 patent, these supplementary provisions were inexplicably much too broad. Rather, in context, Choi's grant meant to license all of his rights as a joint owner under the '773 patent. 61 Thus, the district court's interpretation of the Choi license was correct as a matter of law.