Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interference with matters of religious doctrine and internal church governance

Text: Catholic Charities contends the WCEA impermissibly interferes with matters of religious doctrine and internal church governance. In support of the contention, Catholic Charities invokes the rule that the state must accept the decision of appropriate church authorities on such matters. This is the rule of the so-called church property cases. (E.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 708-709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151; Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440, 445-449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658; Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1960) 363 U.S. 190, 191, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1952) 344 U.S. 94, 109-121, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120; Gonzalez v. Archbishop (1929) 280 U.S. 1, 16-17, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131; Watson v. Jones (1871) 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666.) That rule does not dispose of this case. The first church property case to reach the United States Supreme Court, Watson v. Jones, supra, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679 ( Watson ), articulates the rule and illustrates its proper application. The case arose from a schism in the Presbyterian Church during the Civil War. When the church's national governing body, the General Assembly, expressed its opposition to slavery, various congregations responded by declaring the General Assembly's view heretical and renouncing that body's authority. The General Assembly, in turn, dissolved the schismatic congregations. Civil disputes ensued between rival congregations, each asserting a religious claim to be the only true congregation entitled to use certain local church property. The high court resolved the competing religious claims by deferring to the decision of the General Assembly, thus adopting the rule still in effect today: [W]henever ... questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them. ( Id., at p. 727.) The rule's modern formulation is similar. ( Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372.) The high court in Watson, supra, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679, offered two reasons for deferring to religious authorities on religious questions. The first justification was that civil courts are simply incompetent to decide matters of faith and doctrine. ( Id., at p. 732.) Courts have no expertise in religious matters, and courts so unwise as to attempt to decide them would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt.... ( Ibid.; see also Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696, 714-715 & fn. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2372.) The second reason was that the members of a church, by joining, implictly consent to the church's governance in religious matters; for civil courts to review the church's judgments would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church laws ( Watson, at pp. 733-734; see also id., at pp. 728-729) and, thus, impair the right to form voluntary religious organizations ( id., at pp. 728-729; cf. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, at pp. 724-725, 96 S.Ct. 2372). Because Watson, supra, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679, preceded the First Amendment's incorporation into the Fourteenth, the court did not base its decision on the Constitution. In subsequent cases, however, the court described Watson's reasoning as having a `clear constitutional ring' ( Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. 696, 710, 96 S.Ct. 2372, quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. 440, 446, 89 S.Ct. 601; cf. Watson, at pp. 728-729) and Watson's holding as compelled by the religion clauses of the First Amendment ( Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, at pp. 724-725, 96 S.Ct. 2372; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344 U.S. 94, 115-116, 73 S.Ct. 143; see also Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595). The high court has also held that legislatures are bound by the same constitutional limitations Watson articulated for the courts. ( Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, supra, at pp. 117-121, 73 S.Ct. 143.) Catholic Charities asserts that the Legislature, in enacting the WCEA, violated the rule of church property cases by interfering with matters of internal church governance and by rejecting the Catholic Church's decision that prescription contraceptives are sinful. These assertions are incorrect. This case does not implicate internal church governance; it implicates the relationship between a nonprofit public benefit corporation and its employees, most of whom do not belong to the Catholic Church. Only those who join a church impliedly consent to its religious governance on matters of faith and discipline. ( Watson, supra, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679, 729.) Certainly the WCEA conflicts with Catholic Charities' religious beliefs, but this does not mean the Legislature has decided a religious question. Congress has created, and the high court has resolved, similar conflicts between employment law and religious beliefs without deciding religious questions and without reference to the church property cases. (E.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec'y of Labor (1985) 471 U.S. 290, 303-306, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 [religious organization must comply with federal minimum wage laws]; United States v. Lee (1982) 455 U.S. 252, 256-261, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 [Amish employer must pay Social Security and unemployment taxes].) Neither does this case require us to decide any religious questions. Instead, we need only apply the usual rules for assessing whether state-imposed burdens on religious exercise are constitutional. (See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 531-533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472; Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872, 876-882, 110 S.Ct. 1595.) This we do below, in the context of Catholic Charities' separate claims under the free exercise clause. (See 10 Cal.Rptr.3d p. 299, 85 P.3d p. 81 et seq., post. ) Catholic Charities also argues the Legislature, by enacting the WCEA, deliberately intervened in a conflict within the Catholic Church on the side of those who disagree with the Church's teachings on contraception. In support of the argument, Catholic Charities notes that one of WCEA's sponsors cited, on the floor of the state Senate, a New York Times poll suggesting that not all Catholic women accept the Church's teachings on contraception, and that someone who practices artificial birth control can still be a good Catholic. Commenting on the poll, the senator said, I agree with that. I think it's time to do the right thing. Certainly the state may not lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.... ( Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595.) However, the Legislature's motivation cannot reliably be inferred from a single senator's remarks. Other legislators who voted to enact the WCEA might well have done so because they wished to reduce the inequitable financial burden of health care on women, without regard to any religious dispute over the propriety of artificial contraception. While the church property cases thus do not invalidate the WCEA, the constitutional principles that underlie those cases may place an outer limit on the statute's constitutional application. Relying on the church property cases, lower federal courts have held that the First Amendment bars courts from reviewing employment decisions by religious organizations affecting employees with the religious duties of ministers. ( McClure v. Salvation Army (5th Cir.1972) 460 F.2d 553, 558-561; see also Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church (11th Cir.2000) 203 F.3d 1299, 1301-1304; Combs v. Cen Tx. Ann Conf. United Methodist Church (5th Cir.1999) 173 F.3d 343, 345-350.) The rule that emerges from these decisions is sometimes called the ministerial exception, because it operates as a nonstatutory, constitutionally compelled exception to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., hereafter titlE VII.) The Fifth Circuit first recognized the ministerial exception in McClure v. Salvation Army, supra, 460 F.2d 553. The plaintiff, a former officer of the Salvation Army, alleged that her termination was motivated by sex discrimination violating title VII. To avoid doubts about title VII's constitutionality as applied to religious organizations, the court construed the law as not governing the relationship between a church and its ministers. Judicial review of a minister's salary and duties, the court reasoned, would intrude upon matters of church administration and government which have so many times before been proclaimed to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical concern. ( McClure v. Salvation Army, supra, at p. 560.) Although the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the ministerial exception, the lower federal courts have widely embraced it, applying it both to ministers and to a variety of nonordained employees with duties functionally equivalent to those of ministers. (E.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (7th Cir.2003) 320 F.3d 698, 700-704 [Hispanic communications manager for Archdiocese of Chicago, responsible for shaping the message that the Church presented to the Hispanic community]; E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, NC (4th Cir.2000) 213 F.3d 795, 802-805 [cathedral choir director required to assist in planning liturgies]; E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America (D.C.Cir.1996) 83 F.3d 455, 461 [professor of canon law at religious university].) Because the case before us does not involve title VII, the ministerial exception as currently articulated does not apply. Although the constitutional reasoning underlying the ministerial exception might bar the State from applying the WCEA to ministers or clergy employed by a bona fide religious organization that for whatever reason did not qualify under the act's exemption for religious organizations (Health & Saf.Code, § 1367.25, subd. (b); cf. Schmoll v. Chapman University (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1438-1444, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 [recognizing a ministerial exception to the Cal. Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.]), we need not decide the question because Catholic Charities does not claim that any of its employees have the religious duties of ministers. Indeed, as noted above, most are not even members of the Catholic Church. In short, the ministerial exception does not dispose of this case. Catholic Charities acknowledges as much.