Opinion ID: 739321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Michigan

Text: Evidence 6 Appellant alleges that the district court erred by excluding various parts of the record, including documents and exhibits, from the ongoing case of United States v. Michigan. We review the district court's exclusion of this evidence for abuse of discretion. See Muzquiz v. W.A. Foote Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir.1995). 7 The Michigan case began in 1984, when the United States Department of Justice sued the State of Michigan and various state officials in their official capacities pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994). The complaint challenged numerous prison conditions in the Michigan system. Contemporaneous with the filing of the complaint, the United States filed a motion to dismiss and to enter a proposed consent decree that it had agreed upon with the State of Michigan. The consent decree was subsequently entered by the district court. Since then, that case has continued because of various disputes regarding the consent decree and has, in fact, reached the Sixth Circuit numerous times. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, No. 90-1701, 1996 WL 382238 (6th Cir. July 3, 1996); United States v. Michigan, Nos. 94-2391, 95-1258, 1995 WL 469430 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 1995); United States v. Michigan, 18 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 925, 115 S.Ct. 312, 130 L.Ed.2d 275 (1994); United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.1991). 8 Appellant cites to several portions of the record from Michigan that she feels should have been admitted in her case against Appellee Jabe. She contends that this evidence suggests that there were unconstitutional conditions at SPSM's 6-Block and that Jabe disregarded these conditions. Although the district court did not cite a specific rule when it excluded the evidence, its remarks, which focused on the possible confusion and unfair prejudice that could result from its admittance, see J.A. at 362-63, suggest that the court relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. That rule provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FED.R.EVID. 403. 9 In one of the Michigan appeals, this circuit stated: 10 Michigan denied the allegations [in the United States' complaint] and the issues were never adjudicated. Consequently the record fails to disclose the existence, scope, or degree, if any, of the asserted constitutional infringements.... The consent decree, as approved by the trial court, was intended to be in resolution of all claims asserted and relief sought, and without a finding of liability or other determination on the merits. 11 940 F.2d at 155 (quoting the consent decree). 12 Given the nature of the Michigan case, if parts of the record from that dispute had been admitted in this case, the jury might have given that evidence more weight than it deserved. Moreover, the complaint in Michigan was filed three years before Jabe became the warden at SPSM, and the remaining portion of the case revolved around the implementation of the consent decree. It would be a daunting enough task for the district court (and possibly a jury) to determine from this material which deficiencies in the Michigan system were attributable to leadership after 1987, let alone to determine which of this material indicates that Jabe was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. Because the Michigan material was likely to be confusing and unfairly prejudicial, and because there are no allegations that the district court otherwise restricted the evidence that could be introduced to show the risks at SPSM, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding all material from the Michigan litigation.