Opinion ID: 2096052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Intent to Kill

Text: Landress claims that there was not sufficient evidence of her intent to kill necessary to impose the death penalty. We agree. Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on review, this Court neither reweighs the evidence nor determines the credibility of witnesses. Green v. State (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 1314, 1315. Instead, we look to the evidence most favorable to the verdict together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. We then determine whether there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact might reasonably have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Landress was originally charged with a knowing or intentional murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). The information was amended in December, 1988, by the addition of a count which sought the death penalty pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 for an intentional killing during a robbery. In February 1989, a count for felony murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) was added. On May 15, 1989, the day trial began, the State moved to dismiss the count charging a knowing or intentional murder. That dismissal left only the charge of felony murder in the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, during the guilt phase, the State was not required to prove that Landress had any intent to kill the victim, but only that Landress intended to rob and that the victim was killed during the robbery. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) and Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. The jury properly was instructed during the guilt phase that Landress was criminally responsible for the actions of Lewellen which were a probable and natural consequence of their common plan even though not intended as part of the original plan. She was convicted and the jury was reconvened to consider a recommendation of death. The burden of proof on the issue of intent changed dramatically during the penalty phase of the trial. In that portion of the trial, the State was required to prove Landress had the intent to kill, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G); her confederate's intent could not be imputed to her. Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140. The defendant in Enmund was the driver of a getaway car whose confederates robbed and killed an elderly farm couple. During the robbery, the defendant remained in the car, and was not present when the victims were actually confronted and killed. The defendant was sentenced to death under Florida statutes. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the death penalty could not be imposed on one who never intended to kill. Noting that because there was no evidence that the defendant intended to participate in or facilitate a murder, the Supreme Court held that to punish the defendant and his confederates alike by making the defendant vulnerable to the death penalty on account of his confederates' actions, would violate the Eighth Amendment. 458 U.S. at 799, 102 S.Ct. at 3377, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1158. This Court discussed Enmund in Resnover v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 922, cert. den. 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 231, 83 L.Ed.2d 160. There, we stated that Enmund dictates the rule that although vicarious liability for crimes perpetrated by one's confederates can justify one's conviction for said crimes, the imposition of death upon a vicariously guilty defendant must be based on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims for [the United States Supreme Court] insist[s] on individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence. 460 N.E.2d at 935 (citations omitted). Here, during the guilt phase of the trial, the jury was instructed that the actions and intent of Lewellen could be imputed to her for purposes of conviction for felony murder. This is, of course, proper. Such is not the case, however, during the penalty phase. As Resnover and its progeny tell us, during the penalty phase when a defendant is facing the death penalty, the factfinder's focus must be on that particular defendant's participation and culpability. Landress claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the conclusion that she formed the requisite intent to kill. We agree. Intent to kill need not be established by direct evidence; circumstantial evidence is sufficient. Corbin v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 86, 88. Landress' statement the night before the killing that she and Lewellen were going rolling evidenced her intent to rob, not to kill. Direct evidence of her intent came from her own testimony in which she denied having had any such intent to kill, and denied having stabbed Fowler. She testified that Lewellen and the victim were fighting face to face. The physical evidence is consistent with this testimony, because the fatal stab wound was inflicted from the front. There was no direct evidence that Landress intended to kill and, therefore, we must rely on inferences to find the requisite intent. The evidence showed that the victim's blood was found on the knife blade which Landress had retrieved from the kitchen. From this fact, the State contends that an inference of intent to kill may be inferred. The State correctly notes that the law allows such an inference to be drawn from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily injury. Corbin, 563 N.E.2d at 88. Where there is substantial evidence in the record from which the trier of fact could find that the mortal wound was inflicted upon the victim by a deadly weapon in the hands of the defendant, intent can be inferred. Brown v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 629, 633. Here, however, there is no direct evidence that Landress either inflicted a mortal wound or even used the knife in a manner likely to cause great bodily injury or death. We agree with the State that the jury could reasonably have inferred from the evidence that Landress' knife cut the victim. Having taken that inferential step, the State argues that such inferred fact can, in turn, support a second inference of Landress' intent to kill. Thus, from the State's own argument, it is clear that in order for the jury to have found that Landress acted with intent to kill, the jury must first have inferred that she used the knife on the victim, and then inferred that she used it in a manner likely to cause death. The basis of inferences to support a presumption of fact is probability. Serrano v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 126, 131, 360 N.E.2d 1257, 1260. Thus, the jury must have determined the probability that Landress used the knife, then determined the probability that she used the knife in a manner likely to cause death, then determined the probability that she intended to kill. The probability of the second proposition being true is directly related to the probability of the first proposition being true, and so on. Thus, the probability of a given inference being accurate decreases with each inferential building block. The rule has been announced that an essential element of an offense necessary in the proof of the offense and to sustain a verdict of guilty may not be proved by an inference which is founded solely and wholly upon another inference. Smith v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 411, 414, 164 N.E. 268, 269 (citations omitted). In a death penalty case, where the defendant has been assessed the ultimate penalty, we carefully examine the evidence to determine whether the penalty is appropriate to the offender and to the crime. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(h); Ind. Appellate Rule 17. Having reviewed the record in this case, we conclude that the death penalty is too final to permit it to be applied where, as here, intent to kill necessarily has been inferred solely and wholly upon another inference. We therefore hold that the State failed to meet its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Landress intended to kill the victim. A term of years is the appropriate punishment.