Opinion ID: 3153557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Necessity Instruction

Text: At trial, Hernandez tendered the following instruction: The defense of necessity is an issue in this case. The defense of necessity applies when: (1) the act charged as criminal was the result of an emergency and was done to prevent a significant harm; (2) there was no adequate alternative to the commission of the act; (3) the harm caused by the act was not disproportionate to the harm avoided; (4) the Defendant had a good-faith belief that his/her act was necessary to prevent greater harm; (5) the Defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances of the case; and (6) the Defendant did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency. The State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting out of necessity, and may do so by disproving any one of the above facts. (App. at 58.) The parties do not dispute that the tendered instruction is an accurate statement of the law or whether the substance of the instruction was covered by another instruction. As such, we must only determine whether there was evidence in the record to support giving the necessity instruction. In evaluating whether the evidence supports a necessity instruction, the six factors provided in Hernandez’s offered instruction substantially recites the factors set out in Toops. These six factors must be present in order to establish a necessity defense. See Toops, 643 N.E.2d at 390; See also Patton v. State, 760 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). As such, if Hernandez 6 presented some evidence that could support finding each of the six factors, it was error for the trial court to refuse the necessity instruction. Our review of the record demonstrates that the testimony presented at trial provided at least some evidence of each of the six Toops factors. First, throughout Hernandez’s testimony he repeatedly expressed the danger he believed was present when Gray told him to take the gun, which provides some evidence of the first, fourth, and fifth factors. Specifically, Hernandez explained multiple times why he felt threatened by Gray and that he believed Gray was capable of harming him and others, including the police initiating the traffic stop. When Hernandez was asked why he took possession of the gun instead of refusing or trying to give it back he explained, “I didn’t know what [Gray] was going to do with it, I didn’t know if [Gray] was going to shot [sic] his way out or just start to shoot people. I know that at least if it was in my pocket that nobody would get hurt.” (Tr. at 101.) Hernandez believed that “[a]nybody that was around” was potentially in danger, and that Gray was the last person he would want to have a gun so he “put it in [his] pocket so nobody would get hurt.” (Tr. at 109.) This testimony indicates that Hernandez believed he was in a serious, even possibly an emergent, situation and that he needed to comply with taking the gun to avoid harm to himself or others. Given Gray’s insistence that he was not going to go back to jail, his nervous demeanor while he was trying to give Hernandez the gun, and Hernandez’s knowledge that Gray had a violent criminal history, Hernandez’s subjective beliefs could have been seen as reasonable. Hernandez also provided testimony to support the second factor, that there was no adequate alternative to taking possession of the gun. Hernandez and Gray were the only two individuals in the vehicle when the police initiated the traffic stop. Gray specifically told Hernandez that he did not want to go back to jail and for Hernandez to put the gun in his pocket “or else.” (Tr. at 99.) Hernandez believed that if he did not take the gun Gray would shoot him. Moreover, when Hernandez attempted to put the gun under the seat, rather than hold it on his person, Gray would not allow him and told him again to the put the gun in his pocket. Hernandez also did not have the opportunity to simply walk away, as the vehicle was moving at the time of Gray’s demand. 7 Third, there was little to no harm caused by Hernandez’s brief possession of the gun. Gray handed Hernandez the gun just before the vehicle was pulled over. Upon being asked to exit the vehicle, Hernandez immediately informed police that he had a gun in his pocket, raised his hands, and placed them on the vehicle so the police could take the gun. The police were able to safely recover the hangun without any disruptions. This certainly seems less dangerous than leaving the gun in the possession of Gray, who had just told Hernandez that he refused to go back to jail, and if he does go back, he will be in jail for fourteen years to life. Finally, Hernandez’s testimony also provided some support for the proposition that he did not substantially contribute to the emergency situation. Hernandez explained that he had only been walking to the store when Gray pulled up next to him and insisted upon giving him a ride. (Tr. at 97.) The traffic stop then occurred due to Gray’s vehicle not having the license plate properly displayed. Other than agreeing to get into the car with Gray, Hernandez seemingly did little else to contribute to the resulting emergency of Gray attempting to get rid of a handgun in his possession during a traffic stop. Thus, after reviewing the record, it appears that there is at least some evidence supporting each element of a necessity defense. Even if there is only a “scintilla” of evidence in support of a criminal defendant’s proposed defense instruction, it should be left to the province of the jury to determine whether that evidence is believable or unbelievable. Howard, 755 N.E.2d at 247-48. In the present case, it likewise should be left to the jury to determine whether Hernandez unlawfully possessed the handgun out of necessity. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to give the final instruction of necessity to the jury. Moreover, we also conclude that the failure to give such an instruction burdened Hernandez’s substantial rights. “In determining whether the refusal [to give a tendered instruction] warrants reversal, we must assess whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give the instruction.” Burton, 978 N.E.2d at 526. In this instance, we liken the failure to give 8 an instruction on a lawful defense with the giving of an erroneous instruction. Both circumstances present the same risk that the failure to properly instruct the jury impacted the jury’s ultimate decision. “A conviction must be reversed if instructions are inconsistent and calculated to mislead the jury or leave it in doubt as to the law.” Harrington v. State, 413 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Brewer v. State, 253 Ind. 154, 252 N.E.2d 429 (1969)). As such, “[r]eversal is required if the jury’s decision may have been based upon an erroneous instruction.” Harrington, 413 N.E.2d at 626 (internal citation omitted). Here, the failure to give an instruction on the defense of necessity may have impacted the jury’s decision on Hernandez’s guilt or innocence. To demonstrate this potential impact, even if the jury believed that Hernandez: (1) took possession of the gun due to an emergency situation and only to avoid substantial danger; (2) had no adequate alternative to taking possession of the gun; (3) the harm caused by Hernandez’s possession of the gun was less than the harm potentially avoided; (4) Hernandez subjectively believed that taking possession of the gun would prevent a greater harm; (5) that belief was objectively reasonable; and (6) Hernandez did not substantially contribute to the situation which led to this emergency, the jury could have found Hernandez guilty of possessing a handgun without a license. The guilty verdict would have then been entered despite Hernandez’s lawful defense of necessity. As such, the trial court’s error was not harmless. See, e.g., Burton, 978 N.E.2d at 52627 (holding that the failure to give jury instruction on excessive force by a police officer was not harmless error where evidence in the record supported giving the instruction and “[w]ithout the instructions, the jurors were permitted to find [the defendant] guilty of resisting law enforcement even if they believed [the defendant’s] claim that he lawfully used reasonable force to protect himself from the threat of great bodily harm”).