Opinion ID: 1762045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inapplicability of Sixty-Day Limitations Period

Text: Because neither the General Assembly nor TDOC has acted on earlier judicial requests to address this problem, we accepted this appeal to clarify, in the absence of legislative action, the limitations period that applies to a complaint for declaratory judgment following an agency's refusal to convene a contested case hearing upon receipt of a petition for a declaratory order. We hold that a letter of denial from TDOC in response to a petition for a declaratory order that is issued without the benefit of a hearing is not the equivalent of a final order as that term is used in section 4-5-322(b)(1) of the Act, even if the letter purports to deny the petitioner's claims on the merits. [3] We arrive at this conclusion for two reasons. First, section 4-5-223(a)(1) of the Act affords judicial review under section 4-5-322 only after a contested case hearing has been convened and a declaratory order has been issued. That did not happen in this case. Rather, when TDOC summarily declines to issue a declaratory order, even after undertaking some research and analysis of the petitioner's grounds for seeking same, TDOC is acting under section 4-5-223(a)(2), and its refusal to issue a declaratory order denies the petitioner any opportunity for a contested case hearing. When, as it did here, TDOC responds to a petition for a declaratory order by declining to hold a hearing and summarily denying the petition, TDOC deprives the petitioner of the right to judicial review in the manner provided for the review of decisions in contested cases. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-223(a)(1) (1998). Second, the Act mandates that a final order arising from a contested case shall include conclusions of law, the policy reasons therefor, and findings of fact for all aspects of the order, including the remedy prescribed. . . . Findings of fact, if set forth in language that is no more than mere repetition or paraphrase of the relevant provision of law, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record to support the findings. The final order . . . must also include a statement of the available procedures and time limits for seeking reconsideration or other administrative relief and the time limits for seeking judicial review of the final order. Id. § 4-5-314(c) (1998) (emphasis added). Even if we were to determine in some way that TDOC's response to Hughley's petition for a declaratory order somehow constituted a contested case hearing, the letter it sent to Hughley contains none of the information required in a final order. A letter of denial, even if it contains the reasons for the summary refusal, cannot, therefore, equate to a final decision arising from a contested case hearing. In short, the provisions of the statute for judicial review of contested cases, set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, simply do not apply to the proceeding before us. Rather, the provisions of section 4-5-225, setting forth the procedure for seeking a judicial determination of the claims made in a petition for declaratory order after the agency refuses under section 4-5-223(a)(2) to issue the requested order, apply. The provisions of each statute are not interchangeable.