Opinion ID: 3014233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Affinito’s Ineffective Assistance of

Text: deferential. Id. at 689. Counsel Claim It is all too tempting for a Affinito alleges a violation of his defendant to second-guess Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel’s assistance after assistance of counsel. Although a number convic tion or advers e of issues are raised, Affinito essentially sentence, and it is all too argues that Russell provided ineffective easy for a court, examining assistance because he decided to use counsel’s defense after it Ferretti as the defense expert witness has proved unsuccessful, to rather than Portnow and failed to provide conclude that a particular Ferretti with all relevant discovery act or omission of counsel documents. We conclude that Russell’s was unreasonable. A fair performance was deficient. Nonetheless, assessment of attorney this does not require a contrary outcome, performance requires that even in the face of an erroneous jury every effort be made to instruction relating to diminished capacity. eliminate the distorting A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel effects of hindsight, to Standard reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s The Sixth Amendment right to challenged conduct, and to effective assistance of counsel is not evaluate the conduct from intended “to improve the quality of legal counsel’s perspective at the representation, although that is a goal of time. considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure Id. (internal citation omitted). Therefore, that criminal defendants receive a fair a court “must indulge a strong trial.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 668, 689 (1984). In Strickland, the within the wide range of reasonable Supreme Court established a two-prong professional assistance.” Id. test to determine when a defense counsel’s The second Strickland prong is representation was so inadequate as to reached only when the first exists. If so, a warrant reversal of a conviction. defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable A defendant first must establish his probability that, but for counsel’s c o u n s e l ’ s r e p r e se n t at io n wa s unprofessional errors, the result of the constitutionally deficient. Id. at 687. This proceeding would have been different.” 7 Id. at 694. In adopting this standard, the At the outset, we are unpersuaded Strickland Court determined that a that Ferretti was inherently unqualified as defendant must show more than “that the an expert witness or that hiring him was errors had some conceivable effect on the unreasonable. Strickland provides that outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. counsel has wide latitude in making While a defendant need not show the error strategic and tactical decisions. 466 U.S. “more likely than not altered the outcome at 669. Determining which psychiatric in the case,” id. at 693, it nonetheless must expert to consult is such a decision, be it be “sufficient to undermine confidence in strategic or tactical.6 See United States v. the outcome.” Id. at 694. Kirsh, 54 F.3d 1062, 1072 (2d Cir. 1995). B. Application of the Strickland In order to circumvent the Standard teachings of Strickland, Affinito attempts to paint Ferretti as incompetent by Affinito argues the District Court isolating a single statement from his direct erred in concluding that the New Jersey testimony. Answering a question on Courts reasonably applied Strickland. As Affinito’s mental capacity, Ferretti stated stated previously, each individual that Affinito “was not acting with mature argument derives from Russell’s decision decision-making capacity and good to use Ferretti as an expert witness and judgment, [and] therefore had diminished failure to provide him with all relevant capacity.” Affinito claims this discovery documents. First, Affinito demonstrates Ferretti lacked an alleges Ferretti was not qualified to testify understanding of the legal definition of in support of a diminished capacity diminished capacity — a mental disease or defense and that Portnow’s prior defect that negates the relevant state of evaluation should not have been ignored. Affinito also claims it was unreasonable to have Ferretti testify when he had spent 6 Affinito argues that, because only fifty-five minutes interviewing Portnow refused to testify until he was Affinito, reviewed “no documents,” paid, the decision to retain Ferretti was a including Affinito’s “medical and mental financial, not strategic, one. Regardless health history,” and supported his whether financial considerations played testimony with the unknown diagnosis of some part in Russell’s decision, his choice “vulnerable brain.” Finally, Affinito remained a strategic one. (Affinito uses contends that Russell’s failure to provide “strategic” throughout his briefing, though Ferretti with Affinito’s statements to one could argue that the decision to use police fell below any objective standard of Ferretti, as opposed to Portnow, was a reasonableness. tactical means of carrying out the strategy 1) Was the Performance of Affinito’s of rebutting the prosecution’s case. In this Counsel Constitutionally Deficient? context, we use the words interchangeably.) 8 mind required for an offense (here intent). Affinito’s claim of no review is incorrect. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:4-2; State v. Ferretti admitted that he had no written Galloway, 628 A.2d 735, 743 (N.J. 1993). background information at the time of his examination. He testified, however, that But in answering the very next he reviewed “background material later question, Ferretti stated that — in light of on, and that involves virtually every aspect Affinito’s medical history, his intoxication of [Affinito’s] life, medical history, work at the time of the crime and the stress of a history, legal history and family history.” fight — Affinito lacked the capacity “to This background material, Ferretti opined, knowingly and by design perpetrate a supported his independent conclusions. murder.” This demonstrates Ferretti did understand the diminished capacity Further, selecting Ferretti to testify defense. In fact, Ferretti’s uncontroverted was a reasonable tactical decision because testimony establishes him as an expert his and Portnow’s evaluations, while not qualified in the field of psychiatry who has identical, are similar. Both noted Affinito testified in “several hundred” court cases. had seizures in the past and a personality In this context, retaining him was disorder that lowered his impulse control. reasonable. Both stated Affinito was an alcoholic and long-time abuser of various drugs. Both In addition, Ferretti’s examination based their conclusions on the fact that, on of Affinito was sufficient based on the the night of the murder, Affinito was record before us. One complaint of suffering from a convulsive disorder, was Affinito’s is that Ferretti interviewed him highly intoxicated and was attempting to for only fifty-five minutes. While Ferretti thwart a perceived homosexual advance may have interviewed Affinito for a from Cupsie. In addition, Ferretti’s use of shorter period of time than either Portnow the phrase “vulnerable brain” is not that or the State’s psychiatric expert, Affinito dissimilar from Portnow’s report does not state why, or even if, a fifty-five describing Affinito as a “congenitally minute interview is insufficient or contrary damaged individual” and a “central to professional standards. And as just nervous system damaged individual.” One stated, Ferretti’s uncontroverted testimony could take issue with Ferretti’s choice of establishes him as a psychiatric expert. words, but this does not demonstrate that While a short interview suggests the Russell’s reliance on Ferretti’s expert possibility of a less than thorough opinion was unreasonable. evaluation and an unprepared expert witness, Affinito fails to make a We conclude, however, that persuasive case that, even at this low Russell’s failure to provide Ferretti with threshold, his counsel was ineffective. Affinito’s statements to the police fell below any constitutionally required As for whether Ferretti reviewed standard of reasonable representation. any medical or personal documents, Affinito’s statement to the police differed 9 in several respects from the version of the mental health expert should be familiar. It incident told to Ferretti. Specifically, is almost inconceivable that Ferretti could Affinito failed to mention the second take the witness stand without knowing strangling at the junkyard. On cross- Affinito engaged in a second struggle with examination, Ferretti was asked a series of Cupsie at the junkyard and strangled him hypothetical questions to determine if his again. This was not a trial tactic, it was diagnosis of diminished capacity would gross incompetence. Even assuming the change, including the following: decision not to provide Ferretti these statements was deliberate, it satisfies the [I]f Affinito further threw first prong of Strickland. See United [the victim] in the trunk, States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 586 (8th drove him several blocks Cir. 1983) (stating that some “defense away from that location in a strategies may be so ill-chosen that they deserted area, opened the m a y r e n d e r c o u n s e l ’ s o v e r al l trunk and [the victim] was representation constitutionally deficient”).7 still alive and tried to get Any intimation to the contrary by the New out of the trunk and Affinito Jersey Courts is an unreasonable beat him and strangled him application of Strickland. and killed him at that spot, how about those factors? 2) Did Affinito Suffer Prejudice Because of His Counsel’s Error? Unbeknownst to Ferretti, this hypothetical mirrored the actual facts of the case. Having concluded that Russell’s Ferretti replied that, under those facts, he failure to provide Affinito’s statements to “would not apply diminished capacity at Ferretti was constitutionally deficient, we that point because I would think he examine whether this error satisfies the formulated intent.” second, or prejudice, prong of Strickland. To constitute prejudice, Russell’s error When the key issue in a criminal must undermine our confidence in the case is whether the defendant suffered outcome of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. from diminished capacity, we can think of at 694. Admittedly, this error (leading to nothing more critical than ensuring that Ferretti’s reversal of opinion on cross- the defense’s psychiatric expert has as examination) de facto prevented Affinito complete and accurate a description of the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime as possible. The decision not to 7 avail Ferretti of Affinito’s statements All of this, of course, begs the defies logic. A defendant’s own question of why Russell did not simply tell statements to the police have to be some of Ferretti all the pertinent facts surrounding the most, if at times not the most, crucial Cupsie’s murder. This alone underscores documents with which an evaluating Russell’s lack of adequate assistance to Affinito. 10 from presenting any diminished capacity Portnow’s written report contained defense. many omissions and inconsistencies when compared to Perez’s eyewitness testimony. In the New Jersey Courts and In Portnow’s report, Affinito is quoted as before us, Affinito points to Portnow’s stating that Perez took out a pipe, put evaluation, made with full knowledge of white powder into it, and smoked it. But the facts of the case, as strong evidence Perez testified Affinito had pulled out a supporting his diminished capacity defense pipe and pretended to fill it with and undermining his conviction. In marijuana. Affinito is also quoted as response, the Appellate Division of the saying that Cupsie started “to climb out of Superior Court concluded on PCRA appeal his seat to get in the back with me.” Once that, had Portnow been called to testify, again, Perez testified that Affinito was “his conclusion would have been subject unprovoked and grabbed Cupsie unaware to a similarly damaging cross-examination from behind. Portnow’s report also fails to as was” Ferretti’s. Therefore, Affinito had address any of the specific facts that not demonstrated “a reasonable likelihood provide the context for Cupsie’s death — that a different result would have been such as Affinito’s expressed desire to take reached.” Under AEDPA, it is not for us the car, his talk of being able to render to determine whether we agree with, or Cupsie unconscious with a sleeper hold, would rule identically to, the New Jersey lulling Cupsie into a vulnerable position Courts. Our only inquiry is whether their with the ruse of smoking marijuna, the application of Strickland was objectively statement (when Cupsie was already unreasonable. It was not, even assuming bloody and unconscious) that Cupsie had that Portnow would have testified with full to be killed, the decision to dispose of the knowledge of the facts and would not have body in a junkyard, and the second abandoned the diminished capacity strangling upon discovering that Cupsie defense as Ferretti did.8 was not, in fact, dead. Unlike our dissenting colleague, we 8 We reject as unreasonable the believe these omissions and Appellate Division of the Superior Court’s inconsistencies terminally undermine conclusion on direct appeal that “it must A f f i n ito’ s def ens e. First, the be assumed that Dr. Portnow’s opinion is not based upon a complete recitation of the facts.” Portnow’s written report states have significantly discredited Portnow’s that Affinito’s and Perez’s statements to testimony), it is unreasonable nonetheless the police were a source of information. to assume Portnow had no knowledge of While it is certainly ironic that Portnow’s the information contained in these report omitted mention of the effect of statements, or that he would have those statements (and, as noted below, abandoned his diminished capacity cross-examination on this point would diagnosis as Ferretti did. 11 inconsistencies noted in the preceding the overwhelmingly one-sided nature of paragraph involve physical actions (who the evidence in this case and the failure of did what), not Affinito’s alleged auditory Portnow’s report to address this evidence hallucinations (who said what). (Per adequately, Affinito has failed to meet his Portnow’s report, Affinitio “denies visual demanding burden to demonstrate that the hallucinations and paranoid ideation.”) PCRA Court unreasonably applied Further, Portnow premised his opinion on Strickland. Cupsie initiating the altercation, writing in C. Erroneous Jury Instruction the “Conclusions” section of his report that “Cupsie made a physical advance towards On direct appeal, the prosecution Affinito which sparked off a seizure like conceded that Affinito was erroneously rage in Affinito.” But as just discussed, required to prove diminished capacity by a Perez testified that Cupsie made no preponderance of the evidence, violating physical advances in the car and was the his due process right to have the victim of an unprovoked attack. Because prosecution prove intent beyond a Affinito admittedly was not suffering from reasonable doubt. See Humanik v. Beyer, visual hallucinations, the lynchpin of 871 F.2d 432, 443 (3d Cir. 1989).10 The Portnow’s entire analysis is suspect. In Superior Court found harmless error, addition, Perez’s testimony is internally largely based on Ferretti’s admission on consistent, painting the story of a joyriding cross-examination that the actual facts of plan gone horribly wrong. Portnow’s the case were inconsistent with diminished report makes little attempt to put the capacity. But this only covers one events of the evening in context. cons titutional error (the incorrect Affinito had the opportunity to call Portnow, or another psychological expert, appropriate records . . . , it would have had to testify at the PCRA hearing, but failed a significant [e]ffect on the jury.” Yet the to do so (for whatever reason). In this preceding discussion demonstrates that context, we will not speculate on the Portnow’s report leaves much to be outcome of th eoretical testimony, desired. As Affinito had the opportunity especially when many of Affinito’s to put the opinion of a second expert in arguments on appeal are based on the play, we decline to offer him a third bite at supposed thoroughness and quality of the apple. We are not, however, Portnow’s evaluation and report. 9 Given unsympathetic to Affinito’s position. Were other psychological evidence favorable to Affinito in the record, our 9 For example, Affinito argues in conclusion might have been different. his brief that “had counsel . . . called an 10 expert witness, like Dr. Portnow, who was As noted by the Superior Court, capable and qualified to support the Affinito did not object to the jury defense and who had been provided with instruction at trial. 12 instruction) with another (the failure to (1946)).12 Overwhelming evidence that a provide Ferretti with all the facts of the defendant acted with intent may also case). Indeed, our dissenting colleague render an erroneous jury instruction argues that “[h]ad a properly prepared harmless. See id. at 118. expert testified, Affinito would have Based on the strong evidence in the obtained a new trial based on the record, and with scant evidence putting a erroneous diminished capacity instructions contrary outcome in play, we conclude that that infected his first trial.” the trial court’s erroneous instruction did This interrelating (some might say not have a substantial and injurious effect compounding) of errors, however, is on the jury’s verdict (even absent Ferretti ultimately harmless.11 “Humanik does not giving up Affinito’s diminished capacity compel or even permit us to grant [a writ defense). As detailed in the previous of habeas corpus] without considering section, the written report of Dr. Portnow whether the error was harmful. A contrary c o n t a in ed ma ny, a n d m a j o r, holding would violate well-settled inconsistencies and omissions when Supreme Cou rt precedent that ‘a compared to Perez’s uncontroverted constitutional error does not automatically eyewitness testimony. require reversal of a conviction.’” Further, the testimony of Dr. Perr, Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 110, 115 (3d the State’s psychological expert, was Cir. 1994) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, comprehensive.13 Based upon extensive 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). An error is harmless unless it “had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 12 As we recognized in Kontakis, the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting Kotteakos the Supreme Court has ruled that in a v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 habeas case, as opposed to a direct appeal, federal courts should apply the Kotteakos “substantial and injurious effect” test as opposed to the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), “beyond a reasonable 11 Despite AEDPA, we conduct an doubt” test used by the Superior Court. independent harmless error analysis See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, because the Superior Court’s analysis was 637-38 (1993). based on an improper consideration — i.e., 13 Ferretti’s cross-examination testimony. While the record does not contain See Cone v. Bell, No. 99-5279, 2004 U.S. Dr. Perr’s written evaluation, his trial App. LEXIS 3882 at -34, 359 F.3d testimony covers seventy-five pages in the 785 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2004) (concluding record. Contrary to our dissenting the AEDPA standard of review did not colleague’s assertion, we believe this apply when no state court had considered testimony covers broadly, and at times in the particular issue to be decided). depth, Affinito’s medical health history. 13 testing and evaluation, Dr. Perr concluded IV. Conclusion that Affinito was of normal intelligence, Despite the two constitutional had issues with impulse control, and had errors before us, we nonetheless conclude an anti-social personality. Perr concluded, that the evidence of diminished capacity however, that Affinito did not suffer from was so threadbare, and the evidence of brain damage of any kind or from any knowing and purposeful intent to murder disorder that prevented him from forming so strong, that the jury’s guilty verdict was the requisite intent to commit knowing or not undermined. The errors — slipshod as purposeful murder. In addition, Perr noted they were and normally requiring a new that Affinito was not an epileptic per se, trial — in the circumstances of this unique had suffered only one possible seizure in case were harmless. Accordingly, we the seven years prior to the murder, and affirm the District Court’s denial of was not more susceptible to the influence Affinito’s petition for a writ of habeas of drugs and/or alcohol as a result of his corpus. past seizures. Finally, this conclusion was not in any way based upon the second strangling.14