Opinion ID: 1248471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ratliff-White's Challenges to the Purported Admission of Bad Acts Evidence

Text: On appeal, for the first time, Ratliff-White argues that her convictions are the result of the prosecution's introduction of improper propensity evidence in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, she contends that the prosecution revealed bad acts evidence when it asked Dr. McInerney whether she would have reached a different opinion of Ratliff-White had she known that Ratliff-White's medical history was not as represented. For instance, the prosecution asked whether it would alter Dr. McInerney's opinion to know that the defendant had not actually undergone reconstructive surgery after a violent assault, as she had claimed. Further, Ratliff-White takes issue with the prosecution's questioning Rio about Ratliff-White's prior requests for VA funding. Rio revealed that Ratliff-White had once asked the VA to pay for her to travel to Arlington for her fiancé's burial, and that the VA could not find anyone matching the alleged fiancé's description. According to Ratliff-White, both lines of questioning portrayed her as a liar in violation of Rule 404(b), which provides that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. Before addressing the merits of Ratliff-White's argument, we consider the standard of review governing these evidentiary issues. Although Ratliff-White did not timely object on Rule 404(b) grounds to the lines of questioning at issue today, she nonetheless argues for something other than plain error review. See United States v. Curtis, 280 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir.2002) (when a defendant fails to timely object at trial to the admission of evidence, plain error review applies on appeal). Ratliff-White contends that the prosecution violated its Rule 404(b) duty to provide her with advanced notice of its intent to proffer bad act evidence. Cf. United States v. Carrasco, 381 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (reversing a defendant's conviction because the prosecution's failure to give the required Rule 404(b) notice before offering evidence of the defendant's prior drug deals prejudiced [the defendant]'s ability to defend himself). The prosecution does not dispute that it had a duty to disclose Rule 404(b) evidence or that it failed to satisfy that duty. Ratliff-White argues that as a consequence of the government's nondisclosure, the government should be prevented from calling for plain error review and her failure to object should be excused. [6] Even if we were to accept her novel argument and review for abuse of discretion, which we do not, her claims would still fail. See United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir.2000) (We review rulings determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion.). Whether the district court erred in allowing this questioning is immaterial because any error was harmless. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a); United States v. Ortiz, 474 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir.2007) (Errors do not merit reversal when the government proves that they are harmless, that is, that they did not affect the outcome of the trial.). The evidence offered in support of Ratliff-White's wire fraud was substantial. Norwood's testimony revealed that Ratliff-White conceived of and directed the fraudulent scheme; recruited others, including Norwood and Norwood's daughter to assist; and prepared all the false time sheets and invoices. Rio and another VA employee testified that Ratliff-White hounded them to make payments to CHHS. Officials involved in the October 2002 search of Ratliff-White's apartment testified about the CHHS time sheets and tax information found in her home and on her personal computer. Merculief testified regarding the standard procedure by which vendor payments were processed by the VA, which included the transmission of payment instructions from Hyattsville, Maryland and Dallas, Texas. Ratliff-White gave us no reason to doubt that the standard procedure was followed on August 15, 2002, and all evidence shows that the standard procedure was followed on that day, as alleged in Count Two. Although evidence exists that there was a deviation from standard practice on July 16, 2002, there is ample evidence of the other wire transmissions charged in the indictment  the deposits totaling $32,100. Indeed, Merculief authenticated documents reflecting the electronic deposit of $22,470 on July 16, 2002, and of $9,150 on August 15, 2002; and Ratliff-White acknowledged that those deposits occurred. Given the ample evidence of wire fraud, we find that any error due to the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence was harmless. The defendant, however, likens this case to United States v. Meeker, 558 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.1977), where we found that questions posed by the prosecution were sufficient to deprive a defendant accused of failing to report income on his tax returns of a fair trial. Id. at 388. That case presented a unique circumstance: (1) the prosecutor's questions invited the jury to convict Meeker on facts outside the record, some of which were patently untrue, and others of which were not admissible at trial; (2) the questions gave the jury the false impression that the defendant had in the past committed the very crime for which he stood trial; and (3) the prosecutor's misconduct was pronounced and persistent. . . . Id. at 389-90 (quotation marks and citations omitted). This case is distinguishable from Meeker in several important respects. The defendant does not suggest that there was no factual basis for the questions asked of Dr. McInerney or that any of the questions suggested facts that were patently untrue. Rio's testimony reveals that there was a factual basis for the questions posed to him. Also, in this instance, the prosecution's alleged misconduct was not repeated. The prosecution did not ignore any warning regarding its questioning of Dr. McInerney, and the defendant only objected to one of the questions asked of Dr. McInerney. After the court sustained that objection, the government refrained from asking objectionable questions. Neither the defendant nor the court expressed any concern regarding the questions posed to Rio. Finally, with respect to Dr. McInerney, it seems clear that the defense put Ratliff-White's assault history in issue by asking Dr. McInerney questions regarding Ratliff-White's accounts of abuse, which opened the door for the government to ask questions about that assault history. Therefore, the defendant's reliance on United States v. Meeker is not persuasive.