Opinion ID: 2453092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process And Inmate Disciplinary Proceedings.

Text: Inmates are afforded due process protections in relation to prison disciplinary proceedings. [14] We have adopted the United States Supreme Court's seminal decision in Wolff v. McDonnell , which established that in the context of a prison disciplinary proceeding: [D]ue process requires giving the inmate at least twenty-four hour advance written notice of the alleged violation; supplying the inmate with a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; allowing the inmate facing disciplinary action to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence on his behalf when to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and allowing an illiterate inmate, or an inmate facing a complex issue, to have assistance in marshalling and presenting evidence and in comprehending the issues of the case.[ [15] ] Beyond federal due process, we have interpreted the due process guarantee under the Alaska Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the identical provision of the United States Constitution. [16] In McGinnis v. Stevens, we held that in addition to the protections required in Wolff, under the Alaska Constitution a prisoner has a due process right to call witnesses and produce documentary evidence in his favor, subject to some limitations; to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and to have the entire hearing recorded for purposes of administrative appeal and potential further appeal to the superior court. [17] Because the due process protections enumerated in McGinnis are guaranteed to inmates facing major disciplinary proceedings, [18] we must first determine whether James's situation constituted a major disciplinary proceeding. We recognized in McGinnis that prisoners may be disciplined for either minor disciplinary matters or major disciplinary determinations and that [a]ttempts to draw a hard and fast distinction between [the two] might well prove illusory. [19] But we went on to explain that [w]hether a disciplinary determination is major or minor will ordinarily revolve around two factors: the relative gravity of the offense and the nature of the consequences that may result. [20] DOC relies on McGinnis 's mention that in 1975 the Department of Corrections defined a minor infraction to include an infraction... which does not constitute a direct danger to person or property, and is not punishable in a court of law. [21] DOC maintains that James's alleged statement that he was going to put a hit on a former state legislator did not constitute a direct danger to [that person]. But DOC's reading of McGinnis is incorrect in light of our subsequent interpretations of that case, along with our later conclusions that major disciplinary proceedings include disciplinary proceedings regarding low-moderate offenses that subject inmates to serious punishment such as solitary confinement and loss of good time credit. For example, we concluded in Abruska v. State, Department of Corrections, that allegations that a prisoner had committed a low-moderate offense under 22 AAC 05.400(d)(1)exposing himself to a female corrections officertriggered McGinnis due process protections. [22] And we recognized in Department of Corrections v. Kraus that a punishment of loss of good time for the low[-]moderate infraction of lying to a prison official amounted to a major disciplinary proceeding in the sense of the term employed in McGinnis  [23] because the punishment imposed was among the most severe. [24] Along with revocation of good time credit, McGinnis identified solitary confinement as one of the most severe punishments inmates face in disciplinary proceedings. [25] Indeed, in Abruska, even being restricted to a living module for seven days as punishment for a low-moderate infraction was sufficiently severe to amount to a major disciplinary proceeding. [26] Here, James was punished with 20 days of punitive segregation for the low-moderate infraction of threatening another person with future bodily harm. Based on the seriousness of the charge and the severity of the punishment, we conclude that James faced a major disciplinary proceeding and was entitled to the due process protections set forth in McGinnis.