Opinion ID: 874426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The statutory framework for VSP designation in Idaho presents significant constitutional shortcomings.

Text: Designation as a VSP is based on the provisions of Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right to Know Act (the Act or SOR Act). I.C. §§ 18-8301, et seq.; Lightner v. State, 142 Idaho 324, 325, 127 P.3d 227, 228 (Ct.App.2005). Only offenders convicted of certain specified crimes are eligible for designation as VSPs. [2] The Board is charged with the duty of considering for VSP designation those inmates scheduled for release who have been referred by the department of correction or the parole commission. I.C. § 18-8314(1); IDAPA 57.01.01.031.02. Smith was such an inmate. [3] A VSP designation is based upon the Board's determination that the offender continues to pose a high risk of committing an offense or engaging in predatory sexual conduct. I.C. § 18-8303(15). The Board's rules provide that [a] sexual offender shall be designated as a VSP if his risk of re-offending sexually or threat of violence is of sufficient concern to warrant the designation for the safety of the community. IDAPA 57.01.01.171. In reaching this decision, the Board is required to assess how biological, psychological, and situational factors, may cause or contribute to the offender's sexual behavior. IDAPA 57.01.01.170. Once the Board determines whether to designate the offender as a VSP, it must make written findings that include a risk assessment of the offender, the reasons upon which the risk assessment is based, the Board's determination whether the offender should be designated, and the reasons upon which the determination is based. I.C. § 18-8314(7); IDAPA 57.01.01.173. Apart from submitting to a mandatory [4] psychosexual evaluation required by I.C. § 18-8317, the offender has no opportunity to provide input to the Board. The Board and the evaluator conducting the psychosexual evaluation may have access to and may review all obtainable records on the sexual offender to conduct the VSP designation assessment. IDAPA 57.01.01.153. The offender is not given notice of the information being considered by the Board, much less an opportunity to be heard as to the reliability of that information. If the Board determines that the offender is to be designated as a VSP, the offender is notified of the Board's decision by way of a copy of the Board's written findings. I.C. § 18-8319(1). If the Board makes a VSP designation, the offender has 14 days from receipt of the notice to seek judicial review. I.C. § 18-8319(3)(b). An offender designated a VSP is only entitled to challenge the designation on two grounds: (a) The offender may introduce evidence that the calculation that led to the designation as a violent sexual predator was incorrectly performed either because of a factual error, because the offender disputes a prior offense, because the variable factors were improperly determined, or for similar reasons; [5] and (b) The offender may introduce evidence at the hearing that the designation as a violent sexual predator does not properly encapsulate the specific case, i.e., the offender may maintain that the case falls outside the typical case of this kind and, therefore, that the offender should not be designated as a violent sexual predator. [6] I.C. § 18-8321(12). The scope of judicial review is limited to a summary, in camera review proceeding, in which the court decides only whether to affirm or reverse the board's designation of the offender as a violent sexual predator. I.C. § 18-8321(4). Thus, the Act contemplates that judicial review will ordinarily occur without the offender having the opportunity to address the basis of the Board's decision. The Act does provide that [w]here the proof, whether in the form of reliable hearsay, affidavits, or offers of live testimony, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the offender is a violent sexual predator, the court should convene a fact-finding hearing and permit live testimony. I.C. § 18-8321(9). At the hearing, the State bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case justifying the Board's designation. I.C. § 18-8321(10). Despite this threshold burden of production, the offender ultimately bears the burden of proof, as Idaho Code § 18-8321(11) provides that [t]he court shall affirm the board's determination unless persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that it does not conform to the law or the guidelines.
The oddity lies herein: while both parties may introduce evidence, neither party is provided with the record utilized by the Board to make its determination, except for a written summary of information relied upon by the Board and documents that are available to the parties by other means. I.C. § 18-8321(3). All records that contain witness or victim names or statements, reports prepared in making parole determinations, or other confidential records are withheld from disclosure to the offender, his attorney, and even the prosecutor, and are available only to the district court for the purpose of reviewing the Board's determination. Id. The rules of evidence do not apply. I.C. § 18-8321(6). In our view, there are significant constitutional shortcomings in the statutory procedure as a result of the lack of procedural due process afforded an offender. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515, 519 (1971). [C]ertainly where the State attaches `a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play. Id. (holding that state's designation of an individual as habitual drunkard attaches a badge of infamy, requiring the state to provide due process protections before applying such an unsavory label) (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191, 73 S.Ct. 215, 219, 97 L.Ed. 216, 222 (1952)). We take it as a given that the label of violent sexual predator is a badge of infamy that necessitates due process protections. The high court of New York has recognized that an individual's private interest, his liberty interest in not being stigmatized as a sexually violent predator, is substantial. The ramifications of being classified and having that information disseminated fall squarely within those cases that recognize a liberty interest where there is some stigma to one's good name, reputation or integrity, coupled with some more tangible interest that is affected or a legal right that is altered. More than name calling by public officials, the sexually violent predator label is a determination of status that can have a considerable adverse impact on an individual's ability to live in a community and obtain or maintain employment. People v. David W., 95 N.Y.2d 130, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134, 733 N.E.2d 206, 210-11 (2000) (citations omitted); see also People v. Bell, 3 Misc.3d 773, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837, 843 (N.Y.Sup. Ct.2003). The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue. State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (Utah 2008). That court concluded that the provision of Utah's sex offender registration statute which requires the Utah Department of Corrections to identify an offender's primary and secondary targets implies that the offender is currently dangerous and violates his right to procedural due process unless the offender is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard as to whether he is currently dangerous. Id. at 937-38. The court reasoned: By including information implying that the offender is currently dangerous, Utah's registry damages the offender's reputation and changes his legal status, depriving him of a protected liberty interest in reputation. Like the list of those who drank excessively in Constantineau, the statutorily mandated designation of currently dangerous changes the legal status of listed offenders. The registry attaches a badge of infamy, officially designating listed offenders as prone to future criminality. Id. at 944-45. Idaho provides a computerized sex offender registry that is accessible to the public via the internet complete with photos of all sex offenders, along with their personal information including name, address, date of birth, and offense history. I.C. § 18-8323. Furthermore, there is a special link for those sex offenders designated as VSPs. This Court has recognized the fact that registration brings notoriety to a person convicted of a sexual offense ... prolong[s] the stigma attached to such convictions. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d 931, 936 (1999). Designation as a VSP results in consequences beyond simply requiring the designee to register as a sex offender. Sex offenders need only update their information and photographs in the registry annually, while VSPs must do so every ninety days. I.C. §§ 18-8307; 18-8308. Non-VSP offenders may petition a court for relief from the duty to register after a period of ten years. I.C. § 18-8310(1). On the other hand, a VSP has no right to such relief. Thus, for an offender designated as a VSP, the scarlet letters are indelible. While the duty to register as a sex offender is triggered simply by reason of conviction for a specified crime, classification as a VSP is based upon a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., that the offender poses a high risk of committing an offense or engaging in predatory sexual conduct. I.C. § 18-8314. This distinguishes Idaho's VSP system from a sex offender registry based solely on the fact of conviction of a predicate offense. As to the latter, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that sex offender registration laws do not violate the offender's procedural due process rights, noting the offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest the charge. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 L.Ed.2d 98, 105 (2003); see also Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.2004). In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized that Connecticut's registry requirement is based on the fact of previous conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness.... [i]ndeed, the public registry explicitly states that officials have not determined that any registrant is currently dangerous. 538 U.S. at 4, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98, 103. Under Constantineau and its progeny, procedural due process is a constitutional prerequisite to the state's ability to designate an individual a VSP. Only when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be prevented. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437, 91 S.Ct. at 510, 27 L.Ed.2d at 519. This Court has stated: Procedural due process basically requires that a person, whose protected rights are being adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely manner. There must be notice and the opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Inv., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 371, 179 P.3d 323, 334 (2008) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967, 969, 703 P.2d 1342, 1344 (1985); Cowan v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 512, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006); Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999)). In spite of the existence of well-established standards of procedural due process, Idaho's statutory scheme for VSP designation minimizes, at every turn, the possibility that an offender has the constitutionally required notice and opportunity to be heard. The offender is not provided notice or opportunity to be heard before the Board. At the district court level, the offender is provided only a summary of the information considered by the Board, presenting little meaningful opportunity to respond to specific information considered by the Board. The offender is given his first opportunity to be heard only if he can persuade the district court that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether he is a VSP. In the event that the offender clears this threshold hurdle, he then bears the burden of disproving the propriety of the designation, all the while being denied access to many of the documents upon which the designation may have been based. In People v. David W., supra , the New York high court considered whether a sex offender had been improperly classified as a sexually violent predator. As is the case with Idaho's scheme, the offender was not notified of the information being relied upon, given a hearing or any opportunity to be heard prior to designation. Unlike Idaho, which imposes a burden on the offender to demonstrate error by a preponderance of the evidence, New York law placed the burden on the offender to demonstrate to a reviewing court, by clear and convincing evidence, that the designation was erroneous. The court concluded: The right to petition the sentencing court is not a substitute for an initial due process hearing because the defendant bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that his risk level should be modified. Due process requires that the State bear the burden of proving, at some meaningful time, that a defendant deserves the classification assigned. Here, the State did not bear the burden of proof at any proceeding before a neutral fact finder. Defendant may or may not deserve a [sexually violent predator] classification, but without any notice and an opportunity to be heard before a determination is made, the risk level determination made below failed to comport with minimum State and Federal constitutional requirements of due process. 733 N.E.2d at 213 (emphasis added, citation omitted). We do not question the legitimate state interest in identifying those offenders who pose a high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct. However, the United States Constitution prohibits the state from doing so without affording the offender due process. In our view, Idaho's statutory scheme violates an offender's right to procedural due process by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner and by placing the burden of proof on the offender [7] at the only hearing in which he is permitted to appear. This conclusion does not end our analysis. Rather, we must consider whether the manner in which the district court handled the judicial review proceedings afforded Smith the due process which he was previously denied. We must further determine whether Smith has preserved his claims for appeal or is otherwise entitled to present these claims before this Court.