Opinion ID: 1111426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicable Statutory Requirements

Text: K.S.A. 20-1201 divides contempts of court into two classes, direct and indirect, to be proceeded against only as hereinafter prescribed. K.S.A. 20-1202 defines direct and indirect contempts: [C]ontempts committed during the sitting of the court or of a judge at chambers, in its or his presence, are direct contempts. All others are indirect contempts. K.S.A. 20-1203, the direct contempt statute, provides: [A] direct contempt may be punished summarily, without written accusation against the person arraigned, but if the court or judge in chambers shall adjudge him guilty thereof a judgment shall be entered of record, in which shall be specified the conduct constituting such contempt, with a statement of whatever defense or extenuation the accused offered thereto, and the sentence of the court thereon. We discussed the distinction between direct and indirect contempt in Pondexter: To constitute direct criminal contempt of a court there must be some open and intended disrespect to the judge or the court officers in the presence of the judge, or such conduct in or near the court as to interrupt or interfere with court proceedings then in progress. 225 Kan. at 429. We said: [W]here direct criminal contempt occurs when the contemner is either a party or an attorney for a party in a criminal trial proceeding any disruptive, recalcitrant and disagreeable act should be punished summarily to forestall additional contemptuous conduct. 225 Kan. at 433. Different statutory procedures apply, depending on whether the contempt is direct or indirect. If Johnson's alleged conduct is treated as a direct contempt, then K.S.A. 20-1203 applies. K.S.A. 20-1203 provides for summary punishment, but requires that a written judgment be entered, specifying the contemptuous conduct, defense or extenuating circumstances, and the sentence imposed. Failure to comply with 20-1203 is jurisdictional. See In re Gambrell, 160 Kan. 620, 623, 164 P.2d 122 (1945), reh. denied 161 Kan. 4, 165 P.2d 760 (1946). The first order entered by Judge Buchele describes Johnson's conduct, the defenses he offered, and the fine imposed. Direct contempt orders have been held void for either failure to specify the conduct constituting the contempt or to state any defense or extenuation offered by the accused. See, e.g., State v. Flanagan, 19 Kan. App.2d 528, 533, 873 P.2d 195 (1994). If we were to characterize Johnson's alleged conduct as an indirect contempt, then K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 20-1204a would apply. The procedure for holding a party in indirect contempt ... is set forth by statute and must be strictly construed against the movant. Cyr, 249 Kan. 94, Syl. ¶ 5. Under K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 20-1204a(a), a motion requesting an order to appear and show cause why the contemner should not be held in contempt, accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the facts constituting the alleged violation, must be filed. The sheriff must serve the order on the alleged contemner, along with a copy of the affidavit. The order must state the time and place of the hearing. K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 20-1204a(b). Johnson's contempt was not indirect. K.S.A. 20-1205 provides for appeals of judgments of conviction of contempt and requires that testimony taken on the trial of any accusation of contempt shall be preserved. See McPherson, 208 Kan. at 518 (Under the provisions of K.S.A. 20-1205 the taking of testimony and the preservation thereof is mandatory and a requisite of jurisdiction.). The record contains the transcript of the verbal exchange between Judge Buchele and Johnson. We consider this verbal exchange an instanter contempt hearing, which Johnson requested.