Opinion ID: 774294
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Title VII Claims

Text: 29 Although plaintiff alleged race discrimination and retaliation claims reaching back to the start of his employment with KUB, the district court found that Title VII claims arising more than 300 days before plaintiff's filing of the third EEOC charge on August 14, 1997, were time barred. Claims based on earlier conduct were barred because plaintiff failed to file an action within 90 days after receiving either the first or the second right-to-sue letter. The first EEOC determination addressed plaintiff's claims of racial harassment, the initial failure to promote him to a third-year lineman apprentice position, and the later ADA-transfer into the meter tester apprentice program. The second right-to-sue letter pertained to plaintiff's charges of retaliation. Since plaintiff was on disability leave beginning in late March 1995, he cannot claim he was subjected to a hostile work environment during the relevant time period. Thus, all plaintiff's race and retaliation claims were time barred, except for claims based on KUB's decision to terminate plaintiff's employment and the post-termination response to Boeing's reference check. 30 Plaintiff sought to resurrect the earlier claims under a continuing violation theory, which the district court properly rejected. As we have explained, the continuing violation doctrine may serve to toll the statutory period within which to file a complaint with the EEOC. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1991). The continuing violation doctrine, however, does not relieve a plaintiff of the need to file an action within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter. See Clark v. Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp. U.S.A., No. 97-5956, 1998 WL 786892, at  (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 1998) (unpublished decision) (citing Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff has abandoned the continuing violation argument on appeal. 31 The district court nonetheless recognized that the 90-day filing requirement is not jurisdictional and may be subject to equitable tolling in exceptional circumstances. See Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 646-47 (6th Cir. 1998). After considering the relevant factors, the district court concluded that equitable tolling would not be appropriate in this case. Plaintiff does not challenge this finding on appeal. Instead, plaintiff amplifies a tolling argument raised by counsel during the hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment. 32 Plaintiff argues that the time for filing suit after his receipt of the second right-to-sue letter in April 1997 should be tolled because he was on disability leave from March 1995 until his discharge. This, plaintiff contends, raises at least a question of fact under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106, which serves to toll the statute of limitations when a person entitled to commence an action is of unsound mind at the time the cause of action accrued. This tolling provision has no application to the Title VII claims, however, as we have held that state law tolling or savings provisions do not apply to the limitations periods expressly set forth in Title VII. See Clark, 1998 WL 786892, at  (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 489 F.2d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 1973) (rejecting application of Tennessee savings statute to 90-day period under Title VII)). 5