Opinion ID: 1245562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Termination of Dispositional Order.

Text: Iowa Code section 232.103 (1999) governs the termination of a dispositional order in a CINA case prior to its expiration. See In re Guardianship of Murphy, 397 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1986); In re H.J.E., 359 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 1984); In re G.R., 348 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 1984). The specific section that governs termination and release of a child is section 232.103(4), which states The court may terminate an order and release the child if the court finds that the purposes of the order have been accomplished and the child is no longer in need of supervision, care or treatment. Iowa Code § 232.103(4) (emphasis added). Thus, a juvenile court is authorized to terminate a dispositional order only if the purposes of the [dispositional] order have been accomplished and the child is no longer in need of supervision, care, or treatment. H.G., 601 N.W.2d at 86 (citation omitted); In re R.G., 450 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Iowa 1990). In this case, the juvenile court did not make the requisite statutory findings prior to dismissing the case. To the contrary, the reasons articulated by the court for dismissing the action were in direct contravention to the mandates of section 232.103(4). The court essentially admitted the purposes of the original dispositional order had not been accomplished. In addition, in noting K.N. still remained at risk, the court recognized K.N. was still in need of supervision, care, and treatment. Furthermore, the court noted that the services it had offered the children kept them safe at times and that the children responded well to placement at times. Although we have not before considered the authority of the juvenile court to dismiss a CINA petition in the context of this case, we have consistently observed that a juvenile court may not terminate CINA adjudication status unless the purposes of the original dispositional order have been fulfilled and the child is `no longer in need of supervision, care or treatment.' A.B. v. M.B., 569 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Iowa 1997) (citation omitted); see H.G., 601 N.W.2d at 86; R.G., 450 N.W.2d at 825. Under the statutory standard applicable to this case, dismissal was improper. See R.G., 450 N.W.2d at 825; Guardianship of Murphy, 397 N.W.2d at 689. The State advances two arguments in support of its position urging us to uphold the juvenile court's decision. First, the State argues section 232.103(4) cannot be applied to this case because K.N. was a runaway at the time of the proceedings and not within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Second, the State asserts dismissal was appropriate under the inherent powers of the court because no relief was available until K.N. was found, and a new CINA petition could be filed in the future. Although K.N. may not have been within the jurisdictional borders of the state at the time of the review hearing, her absence would not deprive the court of its jurisdiction over her person. The law is clear that once a court obtains jurisdiction over a person and the subject matter of a case, it retains jurisdiction until a final disposition has been made. H.G., 601 N.W.2d at 86 (citing Jensen v. Jensen, 260 Iowa 371, 377, 147 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1967)). We recognize courts have some degree of inherent authority to ensure the orderly, efficient, and fair administration of justice. City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis.2d 738, 595 N.W.2d 635, 641 (1999). However, this authority may not necessarily extend to the dismissal of a case. See Motz v. Motz, 207 N.W.2d 580, 581 (Iowa 1973); see also Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600-01 (Iowa 1998) (Lavorato, J., dissenting). Moreover, any inherent authority to dismiss a case could not be exercised to circumvent the expressed legislative policies woven into the law. The role of courts is only to interpret statutes, not second-guess the underlying policies. See State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000); Allen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 582 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Iowa 1998); H & Z Vending v. Iowa Dep't of Inspections & Appeals, 511 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Iowa 1994). When a statute authorizes the dismissal of an action, the grounds delineated in that statute are controlling. 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § 49, at 276 (1999). The legislature provided specific guidelines for construing chapter 232 in enacting the juvenile justice code. In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1984); G.R., 348 N.W.2d at 631. Each child within the juvenile court's jurisdiction must receive the care, guidance and control that will best serve the child's welfare and the best interest of the state. Iowa Code § 232.1 (the rule of construction for chapter 232). The purpose of the juvenile process in general has always been to care for, educate, and train the children adjudged in need of assistance, not to punish them. In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111, 117 (Iowa 1972); see G.R., 348 N.W.2d at 631; State v. Visser, 249 Iowa 763, 764, 88 N.W.2d 925, 926 (1958). Thus, the legislature clearly expressed the underlying policy of chapter 232 to be [t]he welfare and best interests of the children. J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d at 317; see H.G., 601 N.W.2d at 87-88; In re Welcher, 243 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1976); In re C.D., 509 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa Ct.App.1993). Additionally, once a child is placed outside the home, the policy of the law generally requires that reasonable efforts be made to safely return a child home or to consider permanency. See Iowa Code § 232.102(7), (10). We have also observed that it is the State's duty, as parens patriae, to ensure that the aims of the juvenile justice code are applied to each child in need of the code's assistance. See Welcher, 243 N.W.2d at 843-44. We believe the law unequivocally expresses the policy that no child should be left behind. Nevertheless, the State, as well as the parents, suggest that the policy of the state can be best achieved by permitting courts to dismiss cases which are proceeding on a dead-end path so that the limited resources of the state can be put to better use on families which have a better chance of success. This position, however, implies that some families are more deserving of the services provided under chapter 232 than others. Not only is this contradictory to the policies of our juvenile system, it also creates a potential situation where the courts and DHS are permitted to hand pick families for services. We find no legislative support in our statutes for such a policy. We conclude that a juvenile court can only dismiss a CINA action prior to expiration if the grounds specified in section 232.103(4) are present. See H.G., 601 N.W.2d at 86. The legislature did not carve out any exceptions to this termination provision, and section 232.103(4) is the only means of terminating a dispositional order in a CINA proceeding before expiration. Moreover, juvenile courts have no inherent authority to dismiss a CINA action when such authority would contravene the clearly spoken policy of the law. We recognize the job of the juvenile court can be extremely difficult, and, at times, frustrating. This frustration is clearly compounded when the resources devoted to one family over a significant period of time seem to result in no improvement, while other needy families remain on a waiting list for those same services. At the same time, the rewards that can result from the intervention by the juvenile court can be immeasurable. Unfortunately, the measure of success too often comes in very small increments, and, at times, is almost imperceptible. Yet, success cannot always be measured from day-to-day or even year-to-year, and it may not be until long after the court's intervention is complete, and the child has grown into an adult, that the caring hand of those judges and service workers begins to be felt, and success may be found. Our system recognizes this, and it inheres in the mandate of section 232.104. [1] The law provides for a variety of options in this case, but dismissal is not one of them. We remand the case to the juvenile court to consider other dispositions short of dismissal.