Opinion ID: 2355918
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Dangerous Condition Created by an Employee of a Public Entity?

Text: The commission argues that Cain fails to meet the statutory exception to sovereign immunity because Fitzpatrick is not an employee of a public entity for purposes of section 537.600.1(2). The statute does not define employee of a public entity but the phrase has a commonly understood meaning. An employee is one employed by another . . . usually for wages. Websters Third New International Dictionary 743 (1976). A public entity encompasses any state agency. Stacy v. Truman Medical Center, 836 S.W.2d 911, 917-921 (Mo. banc 1992). Fitzpatrick, Cain, and Korte were employees of a public entity because they performed services for the state for which they were paid. Bowman v. State, 763 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo.App.1988). Specifically, Fitzpatrick cut the tree at the direction of Perkins, the MoDOT supervisor. The other inmates were told to stay at the base of the tree. Perkins, and therefore the commission, controlled the details of how the work was done. Though Fitzpatrick was an inmate of a state correctional institution, she was in this setting performing services for the state and, thus, was an employee of a public entity for purposes of section 537.600. Since both Cain and Fitzpatrick are employees of a public entity for purposes of section 537.600, it may be questioned why Cain may recover in tort rather than under workers' compensation. Inmate workers are specifically exempt from workers' compensation. Section 287.090.1(3). Since Cain is not covered by the workers' compensation statute, she is not limited to its exclusive remedy provisions.