Opinion ID: 6109941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Effect of the Circuit Court's Rulings

Text: The circuit court entered its first judgment on June 22, dismissing the State's claims with prejudice for want of standing. One month later, on July 22, the State timely filed an authorized after-trial motion in which it requested the court amend its judgment by vacating it. 3 Under Rule 81.05(a)(2)(A), the circuit court had 90 days to rule on the State's motion. Otherwise, it would be deemed overruled as a matter of law. On October 11-81 days after the State filed its motion and nine days before a ruling was due under Rule 81.05-the circuit court ruled on the State's motion. 4 The court created a docket entry labeled Order to Vacate/Set Aside. The accompanying order specifically stated, Judgment set aside. To set aside means to annul or vacate. Black's Law Dictionary 1580 (10th ed. 2014). This action was a proper exercise of the circuit court's authority under Rule 81.05 as the court granted all and only the relief requested by the State, which was essentially to vacate the judgment and allow the case to proceed, and it did so within its 90-day limitation. As such, the State's motion was sustained by the October 11 order. See Rule 81.05(a)(2); see also Massman , 914 S.W.2d at 802-03 . According to the dissent, the October 11 order did not grant the relief requested by the State but instead set[ ] a timetable for the parties to submit proposed amended judgments, with Respondent's proposal due on October 25 and the State's response due 10 days later. Op. at 34. Indeed, there was some future action to be  taken after the October 11 order, as the order indicated a revised judgment [was] due 10/25/16 and scheduled a case status review weeks after that. And as the dissent acknowledges, the parties complied with that order. Pilot filed a proposed amended judgment on October 25, and the State responded to this proposal three days later. With this continuing litigation, it is evident the parties understood the October 11 order constituted a ruling on the State's motion, as it vacated the June 22 judgment. Had the circuit court not done so, there would have been no further action for the parties or the court to take. The State's motion would have been overruled by operation of law on October 20, 90 days after the State's motion, and the June 22 judgment would have become the final judgment. To be sure, the Rule 81.05 window created by the State's motion did not expire because the October 11 order vacated the first judgment. 5 At that point, the 90-day time limit imposed by Rule 81.05 ceased to exist. There was no further action to be taken on the June 22 judgment because, after the October 11 order, the June 22 judgment did not exist. In fact, no judgment existed until the circuit court entered its second judgment in January. Contrary to Pilot's suggestion, the June 22 judgment never became final, and the circuit court never lost jurisdiction over the matter. See State v. Schierhoff , 103 Mo. 47 , 15 S.W. 151 , 152 (Mo. 1891) (A court does not lose jurisdiction of a case till final judgment be rendered.). As such, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to enter the eventual January 24 judgment. This is not to say, however, that the procedural posture of this case is without missteps. After the circuit court entered its first judgment on June 22, the State filed a motion to amend the judgment by vacating it. The circuit court timely ruled on the motion in its October 11 order, which granted the full relief requested by the State and provided the circuit court would later enter a revised judgment. When the circuit court entered the second, amended judgment of dismissal on January 24, it was 186 days after the State filed its after-trial motion. This attempted ruling was well outside the 90-day window set out in Rule 78.06. 6 Simply put, though the circuit court retained jurisdiction over the case, it was not authorized to rule on the State's after-trial motion when it entered its January 24 judgment. That judgment, therefore, is voidable: [When] the power of the court to act is subject to certain limitations, named, then the judgment of the court rendered in violation of the things stated, or contrary to the limitations named, then such order or judgment of the court is not  void for want of jurisdiction, but voidable only.... Smith v. Black , 231 Mo. 681 , 132 S.W. 1129 , 1132-33 (Mo. 1910), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Staggs , 266 Mo. 449 , 181 S.W. 116 (Mo. banc 1915). [A] judgment which is voidable is capable of confirmation or ratification, and until superseded, reversed, or vacated, it is binding and enforceable. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 24 (2018). As such, the circuit court's second judgment, though entered without authority, is nevertheless the operative final judgment unless its validity was properly challenged. Failure to challenge a court's authority to take some action waives a party's right to challenge that action. Hightower v. Myers , 304 S.W.3d 727 , 733 (Mo. banc 2010). By neglecting to challenge in the circuit court the court's authority to enter the second judgment, Pilot waived any available challenge to the judgment's validity, and the second judgment became the final judgment from which the State could appeal. 7 The State timely did so, and the case is properly before this Court.