Opinion ID: 2511701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis

Text: [¶ 23] The State agrees that the incidents alleged by Sweet to be error are clear on the record as is evident from the above and foregoing references. The parties part company, however, on the second requirement of the plain error standard. Sweet maintains that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious way. In his appellate brief, he states: This Court has a long-standing rule that an expert may not vouch for the truthfulness or credibility of a victim, or any other witnesses. Dean v. State, 2008 WY 124, ¶ 15, 194 P.3d 299, 304 (Wyo.2008), citing, Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 19, 76 P.3d 805, 814 (Wyo.2003). Otherwise, evidentiary issues are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and this Court will not reverse unless it finds a clear abuse of discretion. Solis v. State, [9]81 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999). Further, it is improper for one witness to comment that another witness is lying. The admonition against asking the appellant whether other witnesses lied applies equally to asking any witness whether another witness has lied. State v. Manning, 270 Kan. 674, 19 P.3d 84, 100-01 (2001). That is because such questions invade the province of the jury to determine witness credibility. Id.  Profitt [Proffit] v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 16, 193 P.3d 228, 236 (Wyo. 2008)....     This Court has examined vouching-type testimony, evidence and argument in a number of contexts. See Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 17, 197 P.3d 156, 162 (Wyo. 2008) (prosecutor's remark in opening statement that witness was a pretty honest man was error, but not prejudicial); Drury v. State, 2008 WY 130, ¶ 10, 194 P.3d [1017] 1020, 1021 (Wyo.2008) (police officer testified as lay witness, and tried to interject opinions as to credibility of those interviewed; harmless error found); Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶¶ 20-22, 184 P.3d 687, 694 (Wyo.2008) (prosecutor's statements that he stood behind law enforcement constituted improper vouching, but no prejudice found); and numerous other cases. [¶ 24] In addition to the authority cited by Sweet, we are mindful of this Court's additional authority, from earlier to more recent times. See Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1198-99, 1200 (Wyo.1977) (not error for trial court to reject psychologist's testimony concerning defendant's propensity to tell the truth as such testimony invades the province of the jury; expert witness, cloaked in garb of expertise, cannot testify as to the truthfulness of the defendant's version in that it assumes the function of the jury); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 360, 362 (Wyo.1988) (well established in Wyoming that an expert witness cannot vouch for the truthfulness or credibility of an alleged victim; a clear and unequivocal rule of law exists concerning this type of testimony: [t]he credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the jury and may not be the subject of expert testimony); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 67-68 (Wyo.1989), overruled on other grounds by Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, 177 P.3d 807 (Wyo.2008) (error to permit a witness, lay or expert, to articulate an opinion as to accused's guilt and error to permit expert to vouch for the truth of the victim who did testify; such testimony encourages jury to abdicate its responsibility); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881-82 (Wyo.1990) (error for investigating officer to state opinion that defendant was drug dealer and guilty because it invades jury's function); Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1337-1341 (Wyo.1992) (investigating deputy sheriff's direct examination testimony that he listened to alleged victim and determined she had been raped was inferential vouching for truth of alleged victim's testimony which invaded jury's function); Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 15-19, 74 P.3d 699, 708-09 (Wyo.2003) (error to admit evidence vouching for alleged victim's credibility as it invades jury's function to assess credibility issues); Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶¶ 18-29, 76 P.3d 805, 812-18 (Wyo.2003) (forensic interviewer and investigating detective both improperly vouched for credibility of alleged victim who also testified at trial); Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶¶ 9-25, 98 P.3d 143, 146-51 (Wyo.2004) (same forensic interviewer in Seward and Wilde improperly vouched for credibility of alleged victim who also testified at trial); Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶¶ 10-12, 153 P.3d 256, 260-61 (Wyo.2007) (State concedes violation of clear and unequivocal rule of law that prohibits were-they-lying questions in examination of witness); and Schreibvogel, ¶¶ 41-43, 228 P.3d at 888 (State concedes violation of clear and unequivocal rules of law that prohibit a witness's comment on the truthfulness or veracity of another witness and prohibit were-they-lying questions in examination of witness as violation invades province of jury). [¶ 25] Although the State concedes our abundant authority prohibiting vouching, it maintains that no decision from this Court addresses the ultimate question of whether the introduction of a police interview, in which officers employed such accepted interviewing techniques as expressing disbelief of an interviewee's story, actually and unequivocally constitutes vouching. Moreover, the State canvasses ten decisions from eight other jurisdictions to demonstrate that various conclusions have been drawn by courts as to whether police statements made in an interrogation or interview should be considered vouching or commenting upon an individual's guilt when referenced at trial. [3] [¶ 26] Both Sweet and the State recognize that in Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, 180 P.3d 212 (Wyo.2008), we considered a factual situation somewhat similar to the instant situation. In that case, Pendleton, who did not object at trial to, but advocated for the admissibility of, a three-hour recorded police interview which was played to the jury, claimed on appeal that in a short excerpt from that recorded interview the officers expressed opinions of guilt and implicitly vouched for the credibility of the State's witnesses when they accused Pendleton of lying. Id., ¶ 10, 180 P.3d at 216. Instead of addressing the first two requirements of the plain error standardthe incident is clear on the record and the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of lawthis Court only analyzed whether prejudice resulted when the jury heard the short excerpt about which Pendleton complained. Id., ¶ 11, 180 P.3d at 216. We found no prejudice because Pendleton had advocated for the admissibility of the recording; Pendleton's opening statement and closing argument repeatedly referred to the short excerpt in question and emphasized to the jury to listen to the entire recording as a whole; it was apparent that Pendleton intended to use the recorded interview as a means of presenting her version of the events without testifying in open court; the recorded interview appeared to have been an integral part of Pendleton's trial strategy; and the jury instruction that it was for the jury to determine the credibility of all witnesses and the evidence mitigated any adverse effect that the alleged improper statements might have had on the jury. Id., ¶¶ 13-19, 180 P.3d at 217-18. [¶ 27] Sweet distinguishes Pendleton from his situation by noting that he, unlike Pendleton, did not advocate for the admissibility of the recorded interview; rather, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the interview, albeit on involuntariness grounds. For its part, the State argues that in Pendleton we made no finding and did not discuss whether the short excerpt in question actually constituted the giving of vouching testimony. We disagree. Implicit in our review were our determinations that the record clearly showed the incident and a clear and unequivocal rule of law had been violated. Had that not been implicit, we would not have gone directly to the prejudice requirement. [¶ 28] We have carefully considered the contending arguments and must hold that Deputy Peyrot's numerous statements in both the recorded interview and his trial testimony, as identified by Sweet in his argument and as identified in our recounting of his trial testimony, violated in a clear and obvious way this Court's long-standing rules prohibiting a witness to express opinions about the accused's mendacity and guilt and about the alleged victim's truthfulness and credibility; such statements invade the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence. [¶ 29] With regard to prejudice, the third requirement of the plain error standard, Sweet emphasizes that the prosecution rested entirely upon the hotly contested credibility of SM, as there was no physical evidence that the alleged abuse had occurred. He points out that his cross-examination revealed numerous inconsistencies in her testimony and interview statements. He argues there was an implication that SM's motive in her accusation was to leave her mother's household and live with her father. He notes that the recorded interview was played to the jury twice, during the prosecution's direct examination of Deputy Peyrot and again in the prosecution's closing argument. He argues that because the prosecution's case rested entirely on the inconsistent and suspect word of SM, the overwhelming amount of improper vouching ensured that prejudice existed. [¶ 30] In response, the State argues that Sweet has failed to show he was prejudiced by the recorded interview. The State notes that Sweet relied heavily upon the recorded interview in his closing argument, pointing out that he never admitted to any wrongdoing and that he stated at least twenty-five times that he did not do what SM accused him of. The State also reminds us that the jury was instructed about its exclusive role in determining witness credibility and that we presume the jury follows this instruction. According to the State, it is likely the jury understood that Deputy Peyrot's statements during the recorded interview were part of an interrogation technique. We think that unlikely since there is no evidence that the deputy explained that in his trial testimony. In its brief, the State claimed that nothing in Deputy Peyrot's trial testimony came remotely close to resembling vouching for SM; however, we commend the State for correcting that claim in oral argument. In that particular instance, one finds in the deputy's testimony on direct examination this statement: I've had just a lot of success talking with kids over my career. I think that's both related to the training, the fact that I'm a dad, the fact I'm pretty empathetic. [SM] and I talked for that 40 minutes. I felt like she was comfortable talking to me. I felt like she was truthful talking to me. I felt like she wasthe things she was saying to me, relating to me as facts, fit the situation as I observed them, you know; as you can compare facts being stated to you to the environment and to the feeling you're getting as you're talking to the person. Finally, the State points to the prosecutor's closing argument in which he reminded the jury that it was for the jury alone to decide what the evidence was and the weight to be given each person's testimony and the evidence. [¶ 31] Under plain error analysis, to establish material prejudice an appellant must show a reasonable possibility that he would have received a more favorable verdict in the absence of the error. Zabel, 765 P.2d at 362. Our examination takes into account the entire record. Pendleton, ¶ 11, 180 P.3d at 216; Talley, ¶ 14, 153 P.3d at 261. When the error concerns the admission of improper evidence, among the considerations are: (1) whether the evidence furnished important corroboration of other testimony; (2) whether it related to a material, consequential fact; (3) whether counsel relied on the evidence in argument; (4) whether the evidence was cumulative; and (5) the effect of any instructions given to the jury. 1 Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 103[06] (1986). Zabel, 765 P.2d at 362. We have recognized that perhaps the single most significant factor in weighing whether an error was harmful is the strength of the case against the defendant. Id. (quoting 3B Charles A. Wright, Nancy J. King, Susan R. Klein & Peter J. Henning, Federal Practice and Procedure § 854 at 305 (2d ed.1982)). [¶ 32] In this case the State's evidence of Sweet's guilt was not overwhelming; the State provided no physical evidence as there was none; it relied solely on testimonial evidence. A close factual dispute existed between SM's testimony and Sweet's statements contained in the recorded interview. In the State's opening statement to the jury, it told the jury that the recorded interview was significant evidence on which it needed to concentrate and that it would hear on the recording that Sweet believed SM was truthful. In the State's case-in-chief, the prosecution presented Deputy Peyrot as an expert forensic interviewer and the deputy testified that, during his interview of SM, he asked her if she knew the difference between the truth and a lie. Under the prosecutor's questioning, the deputy testified as to his opinion of SM's mannerisms and demeanor during her interview with him and her testimony at trial; he testified I felt like she was truthful talking to me. The prosecutor played the recorded interview between the deputy and Sweet during the deputy's trial testimony and again during the prosecution's closing argument. [¶ 33] During the prosecutor's closing argument, he asked the jury to remember that Deputy Peyrot found it very interesting, very surprising in his interview with Sweet that SM would be able to describe Sweet's penis; the prosecutor asked the jury to think about that very carefully and told the jury I think you should find that very interesting, too. Our impression is that the prosecutor relied on the deputy's interview statements and trial testimony to paint Sweet in an unfavorable light and his accuser in a favorable light. [¶ 34] While Sweet relied on the recorded interview to show his repeated denials of the deputy's accusations, he had little choice since the court had denied his suppression motion. In that respect, this case is distinguishable from Pendleton in which the defendant advocated for the admissibility of the recorded interview. [¶ 35] Although the jury instructions correctly informed the jury of its role in determining credibility, we are concerned that no cautionary instructions were given to the effect that the deputy's statements were not to be considered as evidence. [¶ 36] Credibility was the pervasive issue for the jury in this trial. In our view, a reasonable possibility exists that in the absence of the deputy's statements in the recorded interview and in his trial testimony which commented on the alleged victim's truthfulness and the accused's mendacity and guilt the verdict might have been more favorable to Sweet. Consequently, we reverse and remand for a new trial in which these errors will not be repeated.