Opinion ID: 1060912
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time to Prepare

Text: The appellant claims that his counsel was not afforded adequate time to prepare for trial. Primarily, he contends that co-counsel (i.e. the public defender) was not appointed until less than two months prior to trial, that lead counsel and co-counsel were unable to sufficiently discuss the case, that lead counsel planned a vacation the week before the trial, and that counsel did not have time to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial. The granting or denial of a continuance is a matter left to the sole discretion of the trial court. State v. Morgan, 825 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1992). An appellate court may reverse a conviction only if the denial of the continuance was an abuse of discretion, and a different result might reasonably have been reached had the continuance been granted. State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 257 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1990). We can find nothing in the record which suggests that the trial court abused its discretion, thereby prejudicing the appellant. Although the court denied three motions by defense counsel for continuances just prior to trial, he had earlier granted several such motions. As already noted, although the trial was originally scheduled for November 30, 1993, it began on May 31, 1994. In other words, the trial court postponed the trial date by approximately six months. With respect to the appellant's argument that co-counsel did not have adequate time to prepare for trial, we note that lead counsel had been representing the appellant since August, 1993. Thus, by the time co-counsel was appointed, lead counsel had invested well over seven months in the case. This scenario is quite similar to the one presented in State v. Dillingham, 03C01-9110-CR-319, 1993 WL 22155 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1993). In Dillingham , the public defender was only afforded one month to prepare for a case with which a previous attorney had been involved. Id. Finding no abuse of discretion, this court declined to interfere with the trial court's denial of the motion for continuance, because the public defender had the benefit of prior counsel's preparations and efforts. Id. Co-counsel in the instant case was appointed in early April, 1994, somewhat less than two months before trial. [13] Although a capital case will clearly require more preparation by defense counsel than a non-capital case, we conclude that co-counsel was afforded adequate time to familiarize himself with the facts and assist in the appellant's defense. The appellant also argues that lead counsel and co-counsel did not have sufficient opportunities to meet and discuss the case. On this same note, the appellant argues that lead counsel's pre-planned vacation interfered with counsel's trial preparations. The trial court is not responsible for counsel's time management. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record indicating that just under two months was not adequate time for the attorneys to meet and prepare for trial. As counsel acknowledged during pre-trial hearings, the more important aspect of this particular trial was the sentencing phase. The appellant argues that he was not appointed expert services in time to adequately prepare a mitigation case. However, the record reflects that the court authorized investigative services on January 28, 1994, and, again, on April 8, 1994. [14] Moreover, although the trial court did not authorize funding for a pathologist until a little over a week before trial, time limitations apparently did not impede that expert's testimony in any way. This witness was able to testify that, in his opinion, the initial blows to the victim's head probably rendered her unconscious. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse his discretion nor was the appellant prejudiced by the denial of additional continuances. This issue is without merit.