Opinion ID: 1185776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second Cause of Complaint

Text: The Bar originally took the position that Canon 9 was violated: A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. We find it to be clear that the accused's motive in enrolling in the rather fundamental, law-related courses named above was primarily financial; nevertheless, both the college and the VA were fully advised by the accused of his educational background, and both approved his enrolling in those courses for credit. Such conduct is clearly not within any of the three specific situations described in DR 9-101(A), (B), or (C) and, therefore, does not violate Canon 9. In re Ainsworth, 289 Or. 479, 493, 614 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1980). See also, In re Sidman, 289 Or. 495, 499, 614 P.2d 1135, 1136 (1980), and In re Smith, 289 Or. 501, 510, 614 P.2d 1136, 1141 (1980). The Bar now concedes there is no violation of Canon 9 as limited in scope by those three cases. Although that concession is not binding upon this court, we concur and find the accused not guilty on the second cause of complaint. We find the Oregon State Bar to be the prevailing party and therefore award judgment to the Oregon State Bar against the accused for the Bar's actual and necessary costs and disbursements incurred in these disciplinary proceedings. Finally, we must determine what action the court will take with respect to the accused's unethical conduct. It appears that some notoriety in the area where the accused practices has already obtained and that perhaps the accused has lost a chance for gubernatorial appointment to a judicial position by reason of this matter. Accused asserts that in these circumstances he has already been sufficiently punished [6] and this court should not further heap coals. This court is always mindful of the fact that notoriety may attend upon unethical behavior and that disciplinary proceedings are very probably humiliating to a member of a learned profession. That has not prevented us in the past from imposing sanctions. See, for example, In re Bartlett, 283 Or. 487, 584 P.2d 296 (1978), and In re Maurice C. Corcoran, 201 Or. 371, 270 P.2d 158 (1954). The Disciplinary Review Board recommended that the accused be reprimanded, but we believe that to be an insufficient sanction. We have found that the accused was at least dishonest in his dealings with the VA and by reason of that dishonesty obtained money to which he was not entitled. [7] We find and hold that suspension from practice for a period of 30 days is appropriate. The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a period of 30 days from the date of the entry of the mandate herein. Judgment is hereby awarded in favor of the Oregon State Bar and against the accused for the amount of the actual and necessary costs and disbursements of the Oregon State Bar incurred in this entire disciplinary proceeding.