Opinion ID: 28760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sabine Pilot Criteria

Text: 34 In application to a Sabine Pilot claim, the trial court determines as a matter of law whether the provision at issue makes its violation a criminal offense, while the jury decides whether the employee's conduct would have been an illegal act. Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex.1985); TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES — BUSINESS, CONSUMER & EMPLOYMENT PJC 107.3 (2000 ed.). The majority opinion rests on affirming the district court's reversal of the second of these steps. Although the majority concedes that a jury could have reasonably found that Klumpe was fired for not getting Escamilla's release, 1 the majority affirms the district court's finding that there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that seeking Escamilla's release would have been an illegal act had Klumpe tried. I disagree that the standard of review for a JMOL has been met on this pivotal issue. I would reverse the district court's grant of a JMOL and would reinstate the jury verdict. 2 35 Klumpe bases his Sabine Pilot claim on section 32.46 of the Texas Penal Code, which states in relevant part that a person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by deception... causes another to sign or execute any document affecting property ... or the pecuniary interest of any person. Thus, in order to find that Klumpe would have committed an illegal act had he sought Escamilla's release, the facts presented at trial must have been sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that such an act would have necessarily involved deception. 36 As amended effective May 21, 1997, section 32.46 adopts the definition of deception contained in Texas Penal Code § 31.01, which states in relevant part: 37 (1) Deception means: 38 (A) creating or confirming by words or conduct a false impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, and that the actor does not believe to be true; [or] 39 (B) failing to correct a false impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, that the actor previously created or confirmed by words or conduct, and that the actor does not now believe to be true[.] (emphasis added). No evidence at trial supported a finding of deception under Texas Penal Code § 31.01(1)(B). 3 Under Texas Penal Code § 31.01(1)(A), however, the jury could have reasonably found that Klumpe would have been guilty of deception had he tried to obtain Escamilla's waiver. IBP claims that the statute requires affirmative deception on Klumpe's part. The plain meaning of the statute, however, does not contain this requirement. On its face, the statute merely requires creating or confirming by words or actions.  (emphasis added). TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.01(1)(A). For a finding of deception — and thus potential criminal liability — by seeking Escamilla's release Klumpe would have had to confirm by words or actions the representations made by IBP in the orientation script and the Summary Plan Description concerning the WISP program, and those representations must have actually existed and been known by Klumpe to be deceptive.