Opinion ID: 3049683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: count 8 – fabrication of evidence and press

Text: STATEMENTS AGAINST BURKE Count 8 is against only Burke. Rehberg alleges Burke violated his suspect. See United States v. Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 99 (11th Cir. 1994). No § 1983 liability can attach merely because the government initiated a criminal investigation. 39 “constitutional rights” by (1) “participat[ing] in fabricating evidence”; (2) presenting Paulk’s perjured testimony to the grand jury; and (3) making defamatory statements to the media which “damaged Mr. Rehberg’s reputation.”25 As a special prosecutor appointed to stand in for Hodges, Burke receives the full scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity and is absolutely immune for Rehberg’s claims of malicious prosecution and the presentation of perjured testimony to a grand jury. For the same reasons explained above, Burke also is absolutely immune for participating in the conspiracy to fabricate Paulk’s grand jury testimony against Rehberg. Burke’s statements to the media, however, are not cloaked in absolute immunity because “[c]omments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial process just because they are made by a prosecutor,” and they are not part of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate of the State. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277-78, 113 S. Ct. at 2618 (“The conduct of a press conference does not involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case in court, or actions preparatory for these functions”); Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009). Burke’s immunity for the alleged press statements must arise, if at all, through qualified immunity. 25 Burke is not alleged to have participated in subpoenaing Rehberg’s telephone and Internet providers. 40 A tort claim, such as Rehberg’s defamation allegation in Count 8, does not give rise to a § 1983 due process claim unless there is an additional constitutional injury alleged. Cypress Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F.3d 1435, 1438 (11th Cir. 1998). “The Supreme Court . . . held that injury to reputation, by itself, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160-61 (1976)).26 Damages to a plaintiff’s reputation “are only recoverable in a section 1983 action if those damages were incurred as a result of government action significantly altering the plaintiff’s constitutionally recognized legal rights.” Cypress, 144 F.3d at 1438. This doctrine is known as the “stigma-plus” test, Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001), and requires the plaintiff to show both a valid defamation claim (the stigma) and “the violation of some more tangible interest” (the plus). Behrens, 422 F.3d at 1260 (quotation marks omitted). “To establish a liberty interest sufficient to implicate the fourteenth amendment safeguards, the individual must be not only stigmatized but also stigmatized in 26 Rehberg does not specifically identify what constitutional provision Burke’s media statements violated. We assume Rehberg asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 712, 96 S. Ct. at 1165-66; Cypress, 144 F.3d at 1436. Rehberg does not identify another constitutional theory that might support a § 1983 action for false statements to the media. 41 connection with . . . [a] government official’s conduct [that] deprived the plaintiff of a previously recognized property or liberty interest in addition to damaging the plaintiff’s reputation.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).27 The “stigmaplus” test requires not only allegations stating a common-law defamation claim, but also an additional constitutional injury, tied to a previously recognized constitutional property or liberty interest, flowing from the defamation. Cypress, 144 F.3d at 1436-37. Rehberg’s complaint alleges damage to his reputation but does not allege the required deprivation of any previously recognized constitutional property or liberty interest. The only factual allegations Rehberg makes regarding Burke’s media statements are these: “Mr. Rehberg . . . was subjected to extensive publicity in the media where he was identified as being charged with multiple felonies and misdemeanors, and publicly identified by the acting District Attorney as having committed an assault and burglary. The damage of three indictments on his public 27 “While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the ‘stigma’ which may result from defamation by the government in a variety of contexts, this line of cases does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, 96 S. Ct. at 1160-61; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1794 (1991) (“Most defamation plaintiffs attempt to show some sort of special damage and out-of-pocket loss which flows from the injury to their reputation. But so long as such damage flows from injury caused by the defendant to a plaintiff’s reputation, it may be recoverable under state tort law but it is not recoverable in a Bivens action.”). 42 record will remain with him and his wife and children for the rest of their lives.” He continues by alleging, “[t]hese wrongful indictments will always be associated with his name and have caused and will cause significant personal, professional and economic damages to Mr. Rehberg.” Rehberg alleges Burke’s media statements “wrongfully damaged [his] reputation.” In short, Rehberg’s defamation allegations are too generalized to show a previously recognized constitutional deprivation flowing from Burke’s alleged defamatory statements. Damage to reputation alone is insufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Cypress, 144 F.3d at 1437-38 (“Indeed, [in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991)] the [Supreme] Court specifically rejected the notion that defamation by a government actor that causes injury to professional reputation violates procedural due process”). The district court averted this settled law by connecting Burke’s media statements to “the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation alleged by Plaintiff, i.e., violation of his right to be free from prosecution based upon false evidence/charges.” This was error. The “stigma-plus” test requires the plaintiff to show deprivation of a previously recognized Fourteenth Amendment property or liberty interest “in connection with” the claimed defamation. Even liberally 43 construed, Rehberg’s complaint does not allege a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994). Rehberg does not allege Dougherty County or the individual defendants denied him the constitutionally required procedures necessary to challenge his indictments and arrest. Indeed, Rehberg’s successful challenges to the three indictments show otherwise. And, under the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution without probable cause. Id. at 274, 114 S. Ct. at 813. A malicious prosecution claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, not Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. Therefore, the only remaining “plus” Rehberg identifies is the right to be free from malicious prosecution and unreasonable detention under the Fourth Amendment. However, Rehberg’s complaint does not allege that Burke’s media statements caused Rehberg’s indictments and arrest.28 For example, there is no allegation that the grand jury relied on Burke’s press statements in indicting Rehberg or that the Defendants relied on Burke’s media statements as probable cause to arrest Rehberg. Paul’s “stigma-plus” test is not satisfied by simply 28 The complaint does not clearly state whether Burke made his media statements before Rehberg was indicted or after, but the complaint also does not allege any fact showing that Burke’s media statements caused Rehberg to be indicted. 44 alleging a constitutional violation somewhere in the case. The constitutional violation must itself flow from the alleged defamation.29 In any event, Rehberg cannot use the prosecution itself (the indictment and arrest) as the basis for constitutional injury supporting a § 1983 defamation claim. The Seventh Circuit considered this precise situation, concluding the plaintiff must point to some constitutional wrong, other than the indictment and related events, in order to support a § 1983 constitutional claim based on defamation. “Identifying the arrest and imprisonment as the loss of liberty does not assist [the plaintiff], however, because [the prosecutor] has absolute immunity from damages for these events.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1085, 115 S. Ct. 740 (1995) (rejecting plaintiff’s arrest as a sufficient “plus” under the stigma-plus test). The Seventh Circuit explained that, “the Supreme Court [] adopt[ed] a strict separation between the prosecutor’s role as advocate and the ancillary events (such as press conferences) surrounding the prosecution. It would be incongruous to treat the press conference and the prosecution as distinct for purposes of immunity but not for purposes of defining 29 The district court cited Riley v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 104 F.3d at 1253, for the proposition that fabricating evidence violates an accused’s constitutional rights, and thus since Rehberg alleges fabrication in this case, he satisfied Paul’s “stigma-plus” test. Even assuming evidence was fabricated and that this fabrication was a constitutional violation, nothing in the complaint connects Hodges’s and Paulk’s alleged evidence fabrication to Burke’s press statements. 45 the actionable wrong.” Id. at 797-98. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, “a plaintiff who uses a ‘stigma plus’ approach to avoid Paul and Siegert must identify a ‘plus’ other than the indictment, trial, and related events for which the defendants possess absolute prosecutorial immunity.” Id. at 798. Therefore Rehberg failed to satisfy Paul’s “stigma-plus” test and fails to allege a constitutional claim based on the press statements. This lack of a constitutional claim means Burke receives qualified immunity for his press statements. The district court erred by not finding Burke immune for the allegations in Count 8.