Opinion ID: 2680033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Right of Confrontation

Text: [¶17] “We review constitutional interpretations de novo.” State v. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 41, 4 A.3d 478. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Me. Const. art. I, § 6. 9 [¶18] In specific circumstances, when two or more defendants are being tried together, a nontestifying co-defendant’s redacted confession3 may be admitted in a joint trial. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). Such a confession is admissible against that co-defendant because it is not hearsay as to the co-defendant. See M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (providing that a statement is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against a party and is the party’s own statement”). In addition, because the statement is the co-defendant’s own statement, there are no Confrontation Clause concerns. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. [¶19] A nontestifying co-defendant’s confession is not admissible against the nondeclarant defendant, however, even in a joint trial. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211; Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-37.4 The redaction undertaken in a joint trial is specifically designed to ensure that the content of that confession relates only to the defendant who made the confession. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211. Accordingly, even if redacted, a confession of a witness who invokes the Fifth 3 To be admissible in a joint trial, the court must provide a limiting instruction, and the confession must be carefully redacted to remove not only any identification of the jointly tried nondeclarant defendant but also any reference to that person’s existence. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). The redaction in these instances cannot be obvious or suggestive to the jury; substituting the defendant’s name with the word “deleted,” for instance, too strongly implicates a defendant. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192-95 (1998); see also State v. Boucher, 1998 ME 209, ¶¶ 15-16, 718 A.2d 1092. 4 As the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Bruton v. United States, a hearsay statement inculpating a defendant is not ordinarily admissible pursuant to traditional rules of evidence. 391 U.S. 123, 128 n.3 (1968). Thus, the problem created by the admission of such a statement will arise only when the government offers the statement in a joint trial against the co-defendant who made the statement. Id. 10 Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to testify is ordinarily inadmissible as evidence of the nondeclarant defendant’s guilt when that defendant is tried alone. Cf. id. [¶20] In the matter before us, Larsen was tried alone. Thus, contrary to the State’s assertion, the Bruton analysis and the rule of redaction adopted in Richardson have no application in the matter. To the extent that we earlier held that a nontestifying accomplice’s redacted out-of-court statement is admissible against a defendant who was tried alone, see Platt, 1997 ME 229, ¶¶ 3-6, 704 A.2d 370, we overrule that holding. [¶21] Moreover, as the Supreme Court clarified in Crawford v. Washington, statements such as those made by Larsen’s son during police interrogation well after the events that led to the burglary and theft charges are testimonial statements for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, and such testimonial statements of an unavailable declarant cannot be admitted in evidence of a defendant’s guilt unless the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine that declarant. 541 U.S. 36, 51-52, 59, 65, 68-69 (2004); see also State v. Mangos, 2008 ME 150, ¶ 11, 957 A.2d 89. The redacted testimonial statements of Larsen’s son could not be admitted because Larsen’s son refused to testify and Larsen lacked the opportunity for cross-examination either at trial or in any earlier proceeding. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 68-69. 11 [¶22] Having determined that the trial court erred in admitting the statements of Larsen’s son based on both the Rules of Evidence and the United States Constitution, we will vacate the judgment entered against Larsen unless the error in admitting the evidence is harmless.