Opinion ID: 1821943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duration of Disability Payments Under Prior Order of the Industrial Commissioner.

Text: While appellants treat the first issue on appeal as one relating to the commutation order, we believe that in fact it is governed by the earlier decision fixing the extent and duration of respondent's benefits. The payments which were ordered at that time were payable during the period of the employee's disability, as provided in Iowa Code section 85.34(3) (1981). As both parties agree, the length of that period of disability is a determinative factor in computing the proper amount of the lump sum commutation award. See, e.g., Diamond v. The Parsons Co., 256 Iowa 915, 919, 129 N.W.2d 608, 611 (1964); Iowa Code §§ 85.45,.47 (1981). The extent of respondent's entitlement to benefits under section 85.34(3), if he had not sought commutation, establishes the period of the employee's disability for purposes of effecting a lump sum commutation. Appellants urge that the order which the commissioner entered in 1981 granting respondent weekly benefits during the period of the employee's disability, did not establish benefits for life. Rather, they urge that that order should be interpreted as limiting payment of weekly benefits to respondent's work-life expectancy. We find nothing in either the wording or history of section 85.34(3) which suggests such a limitation on the duration for which permanent total disability benefits are payable. Appellants urge that the proposed interpretation is consistent with the policy of our workers' compensation laws that compensation is awarded for industrial disability. This principle, they suggest, requires that benefits be paid only for the duration of that period during which the injured employee might have been expected to continue working. We have recognized that, in determining the extent of disability in workers' compensation cases, the proper measure is industrial disability rather than functional disability. We have said that age, education, qualification, experience and inability, due to injury, to engage in the employment for which the claimant is fitted are factors to be considered. E.g., Doerfer Division of CCA v. Nicol, 359 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Iowa 1984); McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1980). We have never suggested, however, that the period during which benefits are to be paid is to be determined by fixing the period of the injured employee's work-life expectancy. In 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 57.21 (1983), the author recognizes the concept of injury-produced unavailability for work as a central theme of workers' compensation laws. In the same volume, however, it is recognized that in the case of permanent disabilities this ordinarily means lasting the rest of claimant's life. Id. § 57.13, at 10-25. In Stovall v. Williams, 675 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Ky. Ct.App.1984), the court agreed with this conclusion stating: [It is] incontrovertibly established that an award for so long as the claimant is disabled means that the award is for the claimant's occupational life and that occupational life is synonymous with physical life. We do not find our own statutes to be inconsistent with this premise. Iowa Code section 85.45(4) provides: When a person seeking a commutation is a widow or widower, a permanently and totally disabled employee, or a dependent who is entitled to benefits as provided in section 85.31, subsection 1, paragraphs  c  and  d , the future payments which may be commuted shall not exceed the number of weeks which shall be indicated by probability tables designated by the industrial commissioner for death and remarriage, subject to the provisions of chapter 17A. Both appellees and appellants place reliance on this statute in urging their respective positions. Appellee asserts that, because the statute provides for the use of mortality tables in commutation of benefits, it recognizes life expectancy as the period of disability in cases of permanent total disability. Appellants, on the other hand, point out that under the statute life expectancy is stated to be the maximum period of disability which may be considered, thereby implying that a shorter period may be utilized in appropriate cases. Although a casual examination of section 85.45(4) suggests some applicability to the present controversy, further analysis suggests that this statute is intended to deal with a different problem. Prior to its enactment, we had suggested in Diamond, 256 Iowa at 923, 129 N.W.2d at 613 that, where weekly disability payments have been ordered for a fixed period of time, that period shall be used to compute the lump sum award in commutation cases even in those instances where life expectancy tables indicate that the claimant will not live to the end of the benefit period. We believe that subsection 4 of section 85.45, enacted in 1973, is aimed at reversing the import of the Diamond decision in situations where it is probable that death or remarriage will shorten the length of time benefits are payable. [1] This statute does not purport to establish the criteria under which the length of the benefit period is to be fixed in the first instance nor do we believe that it suggests, even by implication, a legislative recognition of appellants' work-life theory. Appellants' proposal for the determination of work-life expectancy is a principle which has only indirect application to commutation cases. Its direct application would be to establish the length of time for which benefits are payable in all cases of permanent total disability. Implementation of this principle would appear to require a separate determination of work-life expectancy in each case of permanent total disability. This would not be a simple matter. [2] Although the thrust of appellants' arguments in support of adopting such a theory are based on the effects of age on earning ability, there are other variables which have to be considered. Industry practices of the employer in whose work the claimant is injured, although a significant factor in such determinations, will not provide a dispositive answer to work-life expectancy because upon termination of employment in one industry, different employment might be available in other industries or occupations depending upon the claimant's skills and physical condition at some unknown future time. Because the concept is complex, difficult to assess, and raises numerous policy considerations upon which the legislature has not expressed itself, we decline appellants' invitation to adopt the concept of work-life expectancy by judicial decision. We find no basis for disturbing the commutation ordered by the commissioner on the ground that he did not properly determine the period during which compensation is payable. To the extent that appellants separately argue that as a matter of law such period is not capable of being definitely determined, we find that argument to be inconsistent with the legislature's approval of the use of mortality tables in making such determinations.