Opinion ID: 78287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: St. Cyr and Impermissible Retroactivity

Text: The outcome of this case turns largely on our interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr. Therefore, we begin by recounting St. Cyr. Because the circuit courts are divided on this issue, we examine their approaches as well. We then examine what we have said, albeit in dicta, about St. Cyr. Lastly, we apply the law to Ferguson.
INS v. St. Cyr addressed the way that two statutory amendments to the INA  namely, AEDPA and IIRIRA  impacted § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). [11] Before AEDPA and IIRIRA, § 212(c) authorized the Attorney General, in her discretion, to waive an alien's deportation if the alien was a lawful permanent resident who had lived in the United States continuously for seven years. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). [12] Congress first began tinkering with § 212(c) relief with the Immigration Act of 1990. See Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (IMMACT-90). That Act amended § 212(c) to preclude from discretionary relief anyone convicted of an aggravated felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297, 121 S.Ct. 2271. In 1996, Congress amended § 212(c) two more times. See Chuang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 382 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2004) (summarizing impact of AEDPA and IIRIRA on § 212(c)). First, it passed AEDPA. Section 440(d) of that statute bars § 212(c) relief for aliens who committed a broad set of offenses, including a controlled substances offense. See 110 Stat. 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)). And in September of 1996, IIRIRA repealed § 212(c) relief altogether. See § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597. In its place, Congress created a cancellation of removal procedure. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (citing IIRIRA § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-594) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). [13] IIRIRA § 304(b) stripped the Attorney General's authority to waive deportation, now called removal, for any alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. St. Cyr addressed whether an alien who was convicted of a deportable offense was still eligible for § 212(c) relief where (1) he was convicted of an aggravated felony in March of 1996, (2) deportation proceedings did not begin until April 10, 1997 (after both IIRIRA and AEDPA went into effect), and (3) he was otherwise eligible to apply for § 212(c) relief but for the retroactive application of IIRIRA and AEDPA. 533 U.S. at 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Put differently, the question was whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) relief had an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens whose convictions were obtained through guilty pleas, notwithstanding the fact that they were eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time they pled guilty. The Supreme Court said yes. Drawing on Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the Supreme Court held that IIRIRA had an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Supreme Court first explained that [r]etroactive statutes raise special concerns. Id. at 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271. It reasoned that the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Id. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quotation marks omitted). And it warned that retroactive legislation has the power to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individual consideration and raises the specter that Congress may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals. Id. at 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Although Congress has the power to enact laws with retroactive effect, Congress must clearly indicate that it intended such a result. Id. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Accordingly, `congressional enactments... will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.' Id. at 315-16, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (omission in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988)). Therefore, the first step in the impermissible-retroactive-effect determination is to ascertain whether Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be applied retrospectively. Id. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Supreme Court held that IIRIRA failed that test. Id. at 319-20, 121 S.Ct. 2271. But the absence of clear intent did not end the Supreme Court's Landgraf analysis. Rather, the Supreme Court instructed that even if Congress has not spoken clearly, courts must proceed to a second step to determine whether depriving removable aliens of consideration for § 212(c) relief produced an impermissible retroactive effect for aliens convicted pursuant to a guilty plea. Id. at 320, 121 S.Ct. 2271. This second inquiry into whether a statute operates retroactively requires courts to make a commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Id. at 321, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A statute has retroactive effect when it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.  Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court did not stop there. It added that the judgment whether a particular statute acts retroactively `should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.' Id. (quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483)) (emphasis added). Applying this framework to those who entered into plea agreements with the expectation that they would be eligible for [§ 212(c)] relief, the Supreme Court in St. Cyr first determined that IIRIRA's repeal of any possibility of § 212(c) relief ... clearly attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Id. (quotations marks and citations omitted). To demonstrate a new disability to a past transaction or consideration, the Supreme Court explained that aliens reasonably rely on the possibility of obtaining § 212(c) relief in considering whether to waive their right to trial and plead guilty: Plea agreements involve a quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and the government. In exchange for some perceived benefit, defendants waive several of their constitutional rights (including the right to a trial) and grant the government numerous tangible benefits, such as promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial resources. There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial. Id. at 321-22, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The key transaction or consideration already past was the alien's decision to abandon his constitutional right to trial and plead guilty in reliance on the old § 212(c). Id. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Because respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood in deciding whether to forgo their right to a trial, the elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by IIRIRA has an obvious and severe retroactive effect. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that § 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like respondent, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. Id. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Supreme Court did not directly address whether an alien who pled guilty had to show individualized reliance on § 212(c) in entering a guilty plea or whether the class of aliens who pled guilty reasonably relied on § 212(c). But the tenor of St. Cyr as a whole appears to treat aliens who pled guilty before IIRIRA as a group of similarly-situated applicants eligible for such relief. Id. at 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.); id. at 325-26, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (concluding that St. Cyr and other aliens like him remain eligible for § 212(c) relief); id. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Because respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood in deciding whether to forego their right to a trial ....); id. at 323, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.). [14] As noted earlier, Ferguson did not plead guilty, and she asks us to extend St. Cyr outside of the guilty plea context.
The circuits are split on how to apply St. Cyr to aliens outside of the guilty plea context. The majority of circuits to address the issue have held that IIRIRA does not have an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who relied on § 212(c) relief in deciding to go to trial. See Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir.2006); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1036-37 (7th Cir.2004); Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2003); Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290-93 (4th Cir.2002); Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir.2002) ([A]pplication of the new statutory limitations on discretionary relief does not have an impermissible retroactive effect on those aliens who would have been eligible for discretionary relief when they were convicted of a felony after trial.); see also Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2499, 171 L.Ed.2d 785 (2008) (indicating that, [i]n our circuit, we have generally limited St. Cyr to the factual context of a guilty plea, and [o]utside of the plea bargain context ... we have declined to invalidate retroactive elimination of § 212(c) relief); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that unlike aliens who pled guilty, aliens who elected a jury trial cannot plausibly claim that they would have acted any differently if they had known about [AEDPA's] § 440(d)). [15] [A]liens who chose to go to trial are in a different position with respect to IIRIRA than aliens like St. Cyr who chose to plead guilty because none of [them] detrimentally changed his position in reliance on continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 99. Such aliens have pointed to no conduct on their part that reflects an intention to preserve their eligibility for relief under § 212(c) by going to trial. Id. at 100; Hernandez-Castillo, 436 F.3d at 520 (quoting Rankine ); [16] Chambers, 307 F.3d at 291 ([I]n contrast to aliens who plead guilty, Chambers [in proceeding to trial] made no decision that adversely impacted his immigration status.). As the [Supreme] Court made clear, it was that reliance, and the consequent change of immigration status, that produced the impermissible retroactive effect of IIRIRA. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 100; see Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290 (The key event in terms of St.Cyr 's analysis ... was the alien's decision to abandon his constitutional right to a trial and plead guilty to a deportable offense in reliance on prior law.); Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037 (But this exception does not apply to aliens like Montenegro who chose to go to trial; such aliens did not abandon any rights or admit guilt in reliance on continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief.); [17] Mbea v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2007) (We held that IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) did not produce an impermissibly retroactive effect as applied to an alien convicted after trial.). [18] As noted, the Second Circuit has expressly refused to extend St. Cyr to aliens who proceeded to trial. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 102 (Because we have not found a persuasive argument that the holding in St. Cyr can be extended to cover those aliens who were convicted at trial rather than pursuant to a plea, we conclude that the repeal of § 212(c) relief does not have an impermissibly retroactive effect when applied to petitioners.); Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290-93. Subsequently, in Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit fine-tuned its St. Cyr-Rankine jurisprudence and held that under certain limited circumstances, an alien-defendant who was convicted pursuant to a jury trial prior to the enactment of AEDPA could still potentially be eligible for § 212(c) relief. See Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir.2006). In Restrepo, the Second Circuit concluded that an alien may show detrimental reliance when he decides to forgo the immediate filing of a 212(c) application based on the considered and reasonable expectation that he would be permitted to file a stronger application for 212(c) relief at a later time. 369 F.3d at 634-35. The Second Circuit noted that the undermining of this settled expectation represents a prototypical case of retroactivity. Just like the aliens in St. Cyr, who sacrificed something of valuetheir right to a jury trial, at which they could obtain outright acquittalin the expectation that their guilty pleas would leave them eligible for 212(c) relief, an alien like Petitioner also sacrificed somethingthe shot at obtaining 212(c) relief by immediately filing an applicationin order to increase his chances of obtaining such relief later on. Such an alien conformed his or her conduct according to the availability of relief, and therefore had settled expectations that would be severely upset, were the AEDPA to be applied retroactively. Id. (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). In other words, aliens in the Second Circuit can prove detrimental reliance, under the St. Cyr framework, by showing that they affirmatively chose to forego filing their § 212(c) application for discretionary relief in order to build up a better record and boost the odds that their applications would be granted. Id. In Restrepo, the Second Circuit remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance: (1) whether Restrepo must make an individualized showing of reliance instead of reaping the benefit of a categorical presumption of reliance; and (2) if so, whether Restrepo could make that showing. Id. at 638-39. Since Restrepo, the Second Circuit has required an individualized showing of reliance to prove such claims. Wilson, 471 F.3d at 122. Merely knowing of the continued availability of § 212(c) relief is not the equivalent to affirmative reliance in its continued availability. Id. The Fifth Circuit follows the Restrepo approach. See Carranza-De Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 200, 208-09 (5th Cir. 2007) (We find the reasoning of the Restrepo Court persuasive and see no need to create a circuit split on this issue.). But outside of the guilty plea context, the Fifth Circuit, like the Second, requires a showing of individualized reliance as opposed to a categorical presumption of reliance. Id. at 205 (After Hernandez-Castillo, this circuit requires an applicant who alleges continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief to demonstrate actual, subjective reliance on the pre-IIRIRA state of the law to be eligible for relief from its retroactive application.). Under this approach, [b]ecause the reliance demonstrated must be actual, the determination of retroactive effect is made as to the individual applicant, not as to a group of similarly-situated applicants. Id. The Tenth Circuit extends St. Cyr beyond the guilty plea context and rejects a requirement of actual, subjective reliance. See Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir.2006). In Hem, the Tenth Circuit found that an alien shows objectively reasonable reliance on § 212(c) relief where she gives up her right to appeal her criminal conviction. [19] Id. But its approach is not limited to those who gave up their appeals. Its general approach is to determine whether the class of persons affected by retroactive application of a statute had an objectively reasonable interest in the previous state of the law. Id. at 1200. Aliens, like Hem, who were in a position in which the availability of § 212(c) relief would reasonably inform their decision to forego a constitutional right, would suffer `new legal consequences to events completed before [the statute's] enactment,' Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 114 S.Ct. 1483, under IIRIRA § 304(b). Id. at 1200-01. [20] Therefore, such aliens are eligible for § 212(c) relief. The Third Circuit, on the other hand, does not require aliens to show reliance or a reliance interesteither objective or subjectiveon § 212(c) relief and has concluded that IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) is impermissibly retroactive in that it attaches new legal consequences to an alien's criminal conviction. See Atkinson v. Att'y Gen., 479 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir.2007). Because the Third Circuit's approach substantially differs from that of the other circuits, and because Ferguson urges us to adopt it, we discuss it in some detail. In the Third Circuit's view, the Supreme Court has never held that reliance on the prior law is an element required to make the determination that a statute may be applied retroactively. Id. at 227-28. [R]eliance is but one consideration in assessing whether a statute attaches new legal consequences to past events. Id. at 231. The Third Circuit reads Supreme Court precedent not as requiring that the alien must have relied on the old § 212(c), but rather as undertaking a general analysis of the impact of the amendment, finding retroactivity improper because the amendment instituted a legal change that attached a new legal burden to the proscribed conduct. Id. at 228. Impermissible retroactivity, as defined in Landgraf, does not require that those affected by the change in law have relied on the prior state of the law. Id. at 229. Therefore, based on its interpretation of St. Cyr and Landgraf, the Third Circuit phrased the relevant question as only: Does applying IIRIRA to eliminate the availability of discretionary relief under former section 212(c) attach new legal consequences to events completed before the repeal? Id. at 230. It answered that question by using Atkinson's conviction as the event completed, noting that Atkinson's case presents a straightforward application of the retroactive effect test. IIRIRA has plainly attached new legal consequences to Atkinson's conviction. Prior to IIRIRA's enactment, Atkinson remained free to apply for a waiver under section 212(c) despite his conviction of an aggravated felony. After IIRIRA, he lost that right; applying basic principles of retroactivity, IIRIRA attached a new legal consequence to Atkinson's conviction: the certaintyrather than the possibilityof deportation. Such a change in legal consequences based on events completed before IIRIRA's enactment constitutes an impermissible retroactive effect. Id. (citation omitted). [21] While the law of the circuits is not uniform, none of the other circuits has adopted the Third Circuit's approach.
Although our Court has not squarely decided the retroactivity issue splitting the circuits, we have come close to doing so on two occasions. We have all but said that St. Cyr 's retroactivity analysis does not apply to aliens who were convicted after a trialas opposed to a guilty pleaand that § 212(c) relief is, therefore, not available to such aliens. Here, we examine our two prior decisions. In Alexandre v. United States Attorney General, 452 F.3d 1204, 1205 (11th Cir. 2006), this Court addressed the BIA's denial of Alexandre's motion to reopen his deportation proceedings in order to permit him to apply for relief under former INA § 212(c). The BIA denied the motion and concluded that Alexandre was ineligible for § 212(c) relief. Id. Alexandre (1) had been convicted of drug charges (considered an aggravated felony), (2) following a 1989 jury trial, and (3) had served five years of his sentence. Id. Relying on the five-year bar in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (IMMACT-90), [22] the BIA determined that Alexandre was precluded from seeking § 212(c) relief. Id. at 207. This Court denied Alexandre's petition for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen. Id. at 1207. We noted that Alexandre was convicted in 1989 and that when deportation proceedings began in 1994 he had served at least 5 years of his sentence. Id. We stated that the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr does not apply to IMMACT-90. Id. Thus, at the time of his deportation proceedings, [Alexandre] was ineligible for § 212(c) relief because of the five-year bar. Id. Citing federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(a) we also stated that § 212(c) relief is not available to aliens who were convicted after a trial instead of on a guilty plea. Id. Although Alexandre argued that IMMACT-90's five-year bar produced an impermissible retroactive effect because he committed his crime before the statute including [the bar] was passed, this Court determined that his argument was resolved in [his] initial appeal before the BIA, and for that reason it [was] not properly before us  in the petition for review of the denial of his motion to reopen. Id. (emphasis added). We also noted, albeit in dictum, that [e]ven if the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr did apply to IMMACT-90, it would not apply to Alexandre because he did not plead guilty to his drug trafficking charges, but instead proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury. Id. [23] Alexandre is instructive. But it does not squarely resolve the issue presented in this petition. Alexandre involved a different statute that did not repeal all of § 212(c). And we stated quite clearly, the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr does not apply to IMMACT-90. Id. Admittedly, Alexandre did state that § 212(c) relief is not available to aliens who were convicted after a trial instead of on a guilty plea. Id. However, our comments on the retroactivity issue and the scope of St. Cyr were classic dicta because we explicitly noted that the retroactivity issue was not properly before us. Id. As we noted earlier, the same retroactivity issue was presented in Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2002), but a jurisdictional bar, now removed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), prevented us from resolving it. [24] 283 F.3d at 1271-73. Although Brooks does not control the discrete retroactivity issue now before us, it also sheds light on our interpretation of St. Cyr. In Brooks, we addressed and rejected two constitutional challenges-under the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause-to applying IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) to aliens, like Brooks, who were convicted before IIRIRA's effective date. First, Brooks argued that applying IIRIRA would impermissibly penalize him for exercising his Sixth Amendment rights. Brooks argued that since St. Cyr authorized those who pled guilty to apply for § 212(c) relief, applying it to an alien convicted after a trial necessarily penalized him for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to trial. Id. This Court rejected Brooks's Sixth Amendment challenge. Nothing in St. Cyr changed the fact that Brooks was given the opportunity to be heard, the right to examine witnesses against him, the right to offer testimony, and the right to be represented by counsel. Id. We were thus hard-pressed to see how his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Id. We quoted St. Cyr for the proposition that alien defendants are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. Id. at 1274 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271). We concluded that Brooks weighed his options and was given a full trial, and was thus accorded his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. This Court also rejected Brooks's Equal Protection challenge. Id. Brooks argued that it violates the Equal Protection Clause to apply IIRIRA § 304(b) retroactively to aliens whose convictions preceded the enactment of IIRIRA, but yet preventing such retroactive application against aliens who pled guilty as in St. Cyr.  Id. But we found that there was a rational basis for distinguishing between the two groups. Id. And we quoted approvingly St. Cyr 's explanation of why plea agreements involve a quid pro quo, tit-for-tat exchange, between a criminal defendant and the government. Therefore, we concluded that Brooks's Equal Protection claim had no merit. Id. Nonetheless, Brooks did not directly address whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) had an impermissible retroactive effect-the question that Ferguson raises here.
Ferguson argues that the BIA erred by limiting St. Cyr exclusively to guilty pleas and urges us to reject any reliance requirement for the purpose of determining whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) impermissibly applies retroactively to aliens like herself. [25] Ferguson argues that because IIRIRA impermissibly attached new legal consequences and inflicted new legal disabilities on her past conviction, she is still eligible to apply for § 212(c) relief. And she asks us to adopt an approach akin to the Third Circuit's. The government, on the other hand, asks that we narrowly interpret the St. Cyr retroactivity shield as only applicable to aliens who pled guilty. It points out that the Executive Office for Immigration Review has promulgated regulations consistent with this narrow interpretation of St. Cyr. [26] The government contends that only those aliens who pled guilty can show reliance interests strong enough to warrant tempering the retroactive effects of IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c). We decline to adopt the approach urged by Ferguson. In our view, reliance is a core component of St. Cyr 's retroactivity analysis as it applies to aliens challenging the application of IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c). For starters, we do not write on a blank slate. In Alexandre, we interpreted the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr  as inapplicable where the alien did not plead guilty to his drug trafficking charge, but instead proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury. 452 F.3d at 1207. Although this dictum is not binding, we recognize it as a persuasive reason to reject Ferguson's argument that reliance should not bear on a retroactivity analysis in this context. Second, our reading of St. Cyr bolsters our conclusion. To take an alternate view would render the Supreme Court's reasoning and analytical approachexplained in St. Cyr superfluous by half. Were Ferguson correct, the Supreme Court's discussion of reliance in St. Cyr was a wholly unnecessary and gratuitous academic exercise. And the notion that IIRIRA plainly attached new legal consequences to [Ferguson's] conviction, Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 230, was so plain that it was lost on the Supreme Court. The fact that it is possible to advance a retroactivity claim in some circumstances without a showing of reliance does not give us carte blanche to discard the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the matter. Even if reliance is not the only basis for determining whether a statute is impermissibly retroactive, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 n. 46, 121 S.Ct. 2271, the retroactivity analysis is still informed and guided by considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations, id. That is, just because an alien is not required to demonstrate reliance does not mean that she may exclusively rely on other portions of the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence and pretend reliance is irrelevant. [27] We recognize the Supreme Court has refused to adopt a rigid, single test for determining whether a statute has an impermissible retroactive effect. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 n. 46, 121 S.Ct. 2271. However, it strikes us as more reasonable to focus on the reliance elements, as laid out in St. Cyr, than other elements of a retroactivity analysis, put forth in cases such as Landgraf. St. Cyr confronted the exact statutory provision at issue here § 212(c)and laid out a sensible framework for deciding whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) relief has an impermissible retroactive effect. In our view, the St. Cyr approach is entitled to more weight than a decision concerning the retroactivity analysis of a completely different statute. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 250, 114 S.Ct. 1483; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U.S. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.). We therefore hold that reliance is a component of the retroactivity analysis as it applies to aliens, deportable for criminal offenses, who wish to show that IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) has an impermissible retroactive effect. Here, Ferguson did not plead guilty but was convicted by a jury. And aside from her decision to go to trial, she points to no other transactions or considerations already past on which she relied. Joining the majority of circuits, we decline to extend St. Cyr to aliens who were convicted after a trial because such aliens' decisions to go to trial do not satisfy St. Cyr 's reliance requirement. Therefore, § 212(c) relief is not available to such aliens. [28] See Hernandez-Castillo, 436 F.3d at 520; Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037; Rankine, 319 F.3d at 102; Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290-93; Dias, 311 F.3d at 458; see also Saravia-Paguada, 488 F.3d at 1131; Armendariz-Montoya, 291 F.3d at 1121. Accordingly, Ferguson's petition for relief is DENIED.