Opinion ID: 2973902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Myers’s Disability-Discrimination Claim

Text: Myers originally alleged that she was disabled by depression and that Cuyahoga County failed to make a reasonable accommodation by refusing to grant her a job transfer to a different position with the Department of Health and Human Services. Myers requested to be transferred to another location three times — in the fall of 1998, March or April 1999, and November 1999 — but did not state that her requests for a transfer were related to her depression. J.A. at 244-45 (Myers Dep. at 114-15).1 In its motion for summary judgment, Cuyahoga County argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Myers’s disability claim, because two written statements from Myers’s own doctors stated in June 1999 that Myers was not suffering from depression and was able to work. One of Myers’s treating physicians stated that she “has no medical condition that would render her unable to work,” J.A. at 456 (Allsop Letter), and the physician who was treating her for depression stated that Myers’s depressive symptoms were “well-controlled with medication” and that Myers “should be able to tolerate usual levels of job-related stresses.” J.A. at 457 (Pallas Letter). Myers was also examined by Dr. Mary Louise Miller in August 1999 at Cuyahoga County’s request in order to determine her fitness for duty and possible workplace accommodations. Miller 1 Myers admitted in her deposition that she had three reasons for wanting the transfer: (1) the building where she was working was in bad condition and in an unsafe neighborhood; (2) she did not wish to be supervised by Caraballo; and (3) she wished to work in a location more convenient to her home. J.A. at 246-47 (Myers Dep. at 116-17). 5 concluded that Myers’s depression was in remission, a fact that Cuyahoga County also relied upon in its summary judgment motion. In her memorandum opposing summary judgment, Myers admitted that she could not state a depression-based ADA claim, but moved to amend her complaint to assert an ADA claim on the basis of her Adjustment Disorder-unspecified diagnosis, which was an additional diagnosis made by Dr. Miller. Myers also argued that Dr. Miller’s statement that she believed “it would be helpful to Ms. Myers mental functioning for her to be granted the reasonable accommodation of reassignment to a different location and supervisor” required the district court to deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment on her ADA claim. J.A. at 455 (Miller Report at 6). Although the district court granted Myers’s motion to amend in order to allow her to assert an ADA claim based upon the Adjustment Disorder diagnosis, the court granted summary judgment to Cuyahoga County because it concluded that Myers had not shown that the Adjustment Disorder is a disability as defined by the ADA. Upon review of this issue, we conclude that Myers has failed to show that she is disabled as defined by the ADA. In order to establish a prima facie of disability discrimination under the ADA for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) she is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) her employer knew or had reason to know about her disability; (4) she requested an accommodation; and (5) the employer failed to provide the necessary accommodation. See DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 419 (6th Cir. 2004).2 We use the same analysis for claims of disability discrimination under Ohio law. 2 Although DiCarlo dealt with a disability discrimination claim by a federal employee and therefore was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, this court has held that analysis of claims brought under the ADA “roughly parallels” those brought under the Rehabilitation Act. 6 Brenneman v. Medcentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 2004). Once an ADA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, “the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the employee cannot reasonably be accommodated, because the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its programs.” DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted). A “disability” under the ADA is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual,” “a record of such an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “Major [l]ife [a]ctivities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Myers “bears the burden of establishing as an element of her prima facie case the existence of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.” Doren v. Battle Creek Health Sys., 187 F.3d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1999). The district court is correct that in her memorandum in opposition to Cuyahoga County’s motion for summary judgment, Myers did not address whether her Adjustment Disorder substantially limits one or more major life activity, an omission she repeats on appeal. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Myers, we infer that Myers is claiming that her Adjustment Disorder substantially limits her ability to work. However, Myers has not produced any evidence that she was substantially limited in her ability to work because of her Adjustment Disorder. Instead, she points only to Dr. Miller’s statements that she “may have [had] intermittent irritability” if she remained in her current location and that her Adjustment Disorder was Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996). 7 “impacting on her current abilities in the present work environment.” J.A. at 455 (Miller Report at 6). The possibility of intermittent irritability from her Adjustment Disorder is insufficient to establish the first step of Myers’s prima facie burden. “[T]he word ‘substantial’ clearly . . . precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of [the major life activity] from qualifying as disabilities.” Black v. Roadway Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (second alteration in original)). The intermittent irritability that Myers might have experienced from her Adjustment Disorder if she remained in her existing employment location appears to be exactly the sort of minor interference with a major life activity that the Supreme Court views as falling short of the definition of a disability under the ADA. Furthermore, the Court stated that it is insufficient for individuals attempting to establish that they are disabled under the ADA “to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those claiming the Act’s protection . . . to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience . . . is substantial.” Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). Myers misguidedly attempts to rely upon her Adjustment Disorder diagnosis alone as the basis for her claim that she is disabled under the ADA, and therefore allegedly entitled the reasonable accommodation of a job transfer. Myers has not offered any evidence about the limitations on her ability to work caused by her Adjustment Disorder, let alone that the impairment’s effects were substantial. We AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that Myers has failed to establish that she 8 is disabled as defined by the ADA, and therefore she is unable to defeat Cuyahoga County’s motion for summary judgment on her ADA claim.