Opinion ID: 1662813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness and Good Cause of the Order

Text: Defendant contends that the order, if authorized, was unreasonable because of plaintiff's failure to show good cause as required by the article. The resolution of the issue of good cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court. A per curiam of the judges of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania used the following language in Gibson v. International Freighting Corp., supra, to describe their authority: The opinion filed in this case may well have given the defendant the impression that the sole reason for making the order heretofore entered was that the plaintiff was without funds. To correct this impression we take this occasion to say that that fact is not to be deemed controlling in applications of this kind, but is merely one of the circumstances which may be taken into consideration by the judge to whom the application is made. We repeat, that the matter is entirely within the Court's discretion, to be exercised with regard to the particular circumstances of each case. Without intending to state a rule upon the subject, it may be said that where one party proposes to take the deposition of a witness at a place far distant from the place of trial, not as discovery but to be offered as evidence in the case, the testimony being for his sole benefit and not sought by the other party, it would ordinarily seem fair that he should bear the cost of taking it. If it appears to the Court that the testimony is of such nature that it warrants the presence at the taking of the deposition of the attorney who is to try the case, it would also seem proper to include the traveling expenses of such attorney. (8 F.R.D. at 488). [2] In a situation similar to the instant case, a federal district court awarded expenses pursuant to a local rule of the district court. The case involved a boatswain who sued his employer for damages sustained when he was injured while employed aboard defendant's vessel. Defendant sought to examine by written interrogatories the vessel's chief mate, who was no longer employed by defendant. Plaintiff objected, contending the witness would be examined on matters central to the litigation and that he should be deposed on oral examination at defendant's expense. The trial court agreed and concluded that: If defendant desires to take the deposition of this former employee in San Francisco on the eve of trial on the matters specified in its interrogatories, it may not do so except upon oral examination with full oral cross-examination by plaintiff. Prior to taking such examination defendant must also pay to plaintiff in advance a sum sufficient to meet the expenses of plaintiff's attorney in traveling from New York to San Francisco and return, and of his hotel bills while in San Francisco, plus a counsel fee of $200. Amounts so paid may be taxed as part of the costs in the event that defendant ultimately prevails in the action. If defendant wishes to proceed with the deposition upon these conditions it should be held as soon as reasonably can be arranged by the attorneys for the respective parties at a date to be fixed in the order. (Vareltzis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., 20 F.R.D. 383, 384 (S.D.N.Y.1956). [3] In Louisiana the broad discretion granted trial courts by article 1452 to fashion protective orders has been recognized. [4] See, e. g., Bianchi v. Pattison Pontiac Co., 258 So.2d 388 (La.App.1972); Alford v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 229 So.2d 372 (La.App.1970), writ refused, 255 La. 478, 231 So.2d 394 (1970); Dawson v. Lindsey, 143 So.2d 150 (La.App.1962). We conclude that the trial court's finding of good cause for the issuance of its protective order was not an abuse of its broad discretion granted by article 1452. Defendant does not, even before us, contest the allegations in the motion for a protective order. Those allegations establish good cause for the issuance of the order; the trial judge heard arguments on the motion, and there is no showing that he abused his discretion. Defendant's principal arguments before us are: (1) if courts force defendants to pay plaintiffs' lawyers' travel costs for depositions, plaintiffs might also have to pay defendants' costs in some cases; (2) plaintiff's attorneys might abuse the order. The arguments are not substantial. (1) Of course the trial judge will be guided by the same principles, whether the protective order is sought by defendants or plaintiffs. (2) Abuse is hardly possible. The order, in general terms, relies on the good sense of both counsel; defendant's counsel will surely not advance more than reasonably ascertainable sums for the travel expenses of another attorney; exorbitant demands will be subject to summary review by the trial judge. Finally, we note that these costs for the reasonable travel and lodging expenses for plaintiff's and intervenor's attorneys will be taxed as costs under the provisions of Louisiana C.C.P. arts. 1920 and 5188. All costs of this appeal are taxed against defendant Travelers Insurance Company. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and vacated, and the judgment of the trial court reinstated.