Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence of prior criminal history during penalty phase

Text: Clark argues the trial court erred by allowing the state to introduce evidence of facts surrounding his 1988 conviction for unlawful imprisonmentevidence the trial court ruled was inadmissible in the guilt phase. Specifically, the state was allowed to present evidence to the jury that the victim of the unlawful imprisonment was a four-year-old girl, in fact Clark's neighbor. Clark contends this evidence is plainly inadmissible in the special sentencing hearing under State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash.2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982) ( Bartholomew I), vacated on other grounds by 463 U.S. 1203, 103 S.Ct. 3530, 77 L.Ed.2d 1383 (1983), aff'd on remand, 101 Wash.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) ( Bartholomew II ), because it was unfairly prejudicial to Clark. The state argues it only sought to evince a few basic facts surrounding the 1988 conviction and that, under State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 669-70, 904 P.2d 245 (1995), such underlying information would be admissible. Alternatively, the state invites us to overrule Bartholomew II on the ground that the mode of constitutional analysis set forth in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986) and subsequent federal constitutional developments have rendered our holding obsolete. We do not accept the state's invitation to overrule Bartholomew II. We will overrule prior decisions only upon a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful. State v. Berlin, 133 Wash.2d 541, 547, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). Although we have added texture to the Bartholomew II framework in subsequent death penalty cases, Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 889-92, 822 P.2d 177; Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 602-23, 888 P.2d 1105, we have recognized the rule without casting doubt on its continued validity. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 622-23 n. 78, 888 P.2d 1105; see also Elmore, 139 Wash.2d at 287-88, 985 P.2d 289; State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 622, 940 P.2d 546 (1997); Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 663-71, 904 P.2d 245; State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 182-85, 892 P.2d 29 (1995); In re Personal Restraint of Lord, 123 Wash.2d 296, 320-23, 868 P.2d 835, 870 P.2d 964 (1994) ( Lord II ); State v. Furman, 122 Wash.2d 440, 470, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993) (Utter, J., concurring); State v. Gonzalez, 110 Wash.2d 738, 751, 757 P.2d 925 (1988); State v. Rice, 110 Wash.2d 577, 609, 757 P.2d 889 (1988); State v. Rupe, 108 Wash.2d 734, 760-62, 743 P.2d 210 (1987) ( Rupe II ); State v. Kwan Fai Mak, 105 Wash.2d 692, 717-18, 718 P.2d 407 (1986); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.2d at 416, 717 P.2d 722; State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 28, 691 P.2d 929 (1984); ( Rupe I, 101 Wash.2d at 691, 683 P.2d 571). Despite the state's Gunwall analysis to the contrary, Br. of Resp't at 107-17, it is far from clear that Bartholomew II has been incorrect or harmful. We decline the invitation to deploy such a fundamental change[ ] in the jurisprudence of capital sentencing law in this state, and adhere to the rule we recognized in Bartholomew II and subsequent cases. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 623, 888 P.2d 1105. RCW 10.95.070, entitled Special sentencing proceedingFactors which jury may consider in deciding whether leniency merited, provides: In deciding the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4), the jury, or the court if a jury is waived, may consider any relevant factors, including but not limited to the following: (1) Whether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, either as a juvenile or an adult, of prior criminal activity; .... (Emphasis added.) In Bartholomew II, then, we held the due process and cruel punishment provisions of this state's constitution are offended ... in any case involving capital punishment by (1) allowing the introduction of any evidence regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, including hearsay evidence, and (2) by allowing evidence of defendant's prior criminal activity regardless of whether defendant was charged or convicted as a result of such activity. Bartholomew II, 101 Wash.2d at 640, 683 P.2d 1079. We explained our rationale as follows: Since the death penalty is the ultimate punishment, due process under this state's constitution requires stringent procedural safeguards so that a fundamentally fair proceeding is provided. Where the trial which results in imposition of the death penalty lacks fundamental fairness, the punishment violates article 1, section 14 of the state constitution. We deem particularly offensive to the concept of fairness a proceeding in which evidence is allowed which lacks reliability. The rules of this court concerning admissibility of evidence are premised on allowing evidence which is trustworthy, reliable, and not unreasonably prejudicial. See ER 403. The purpose of the rules of evidence is to afford any litigant a fair proceeding. See ER 102. Bartholomew II, 101 Wash.2d at 640, 683 P.2d 1079. Part and parcel of that constitutional guarantee of fairness, we explained, was the requirement that the statutory mandates under RCW 10.95.060(3) to admit any relevant evidence during the special sentencing proceeding, and under RCW 10.95.070 for the jury to consider any relevant factors must be limited to mitigating factors. The admission by the court and consideration by the jury of aggravating factors, on the other hand must be restricted to meet the evidentiary, and state and federal constitutional standards we have articulated. Specifically, evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors must be limited to defendant's criminal record, evidence that would have been admissible at the guilt phase, and evidence to rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant. Bartholomew II, 101 Wash.2d at 642, 683 P.2d 1079. By criminal record we meant in Bartholomew I that only the defendant's record of convictions would be admissible. Bartholomew I, 98 Wash.2d at 197, 654 P.2d 1170; see also Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 622, 940 P.2d 546 (prior conviction evidence constitutionally permissible when limited to record of convictions). On its face this holding would not allow evidence of facts underlying the convictions, but only evidence of the convictions themselves. In Lord II we distinguished between admissible evidence of convictions as used in the Bartholomew opinions from inadmissible allegations of criminal activity. 123 Wash.2d at 322, 868 P.2d 835. Thus we allowed in the penalty phase evidence of a finding of guilt in juvenile court even though it wasn't technically a conviction. Id. The issue of just how much evidence beyond the adjudication we would countenance did not surface. In Gentry we allowed the admission of a certified copy of a prior conviction and sentence, over the defense's objection that the sentence exceeded the scope of Bartholomew II as Gentry received an exceptional sentence. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 637-38, 888 P.2d 1105. Gentry argued that the fact he was sentenced to a longer sentence than statutorily required for his prior conviction was prejudicial. We dispelled this argument, noting that [e]vidence is not excluded because it is `prejudicial' but because it is unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 637, 888 P.2d 1105 (citing In re Personal Restraint of Lord, 117 Wash.2d 829, 891, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) ( Lord I )). We believed the nature of the sentence went to the nature and extent of the conviction, and as such was not unfairly prejudicial under Bartholomew II or Lord I. In Pirtle we were faced with the issue, as present here, of exactly how much data about a prior conviction [are] admissible in the State's penalty phase case. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 670, 904 P.2d 245. The state sought to admit evidence of a prior conviction for assault by way of a certified copy of the information charging the prior crime. [5] The information established the assault was accomplished by use of a `weapon, namely, a glass, by hitting Chris Mabrey in the face with the glass causing severe lacerations to his face.' Id. (quoting State's Ex. 191). We asked whether admission of these additional facts contained in the information caused Pirtle undue prejudice. We determined they did not, stating the information may have more probative value as the defendant's criminal history when there are alternative means of committing the same crime, because it shows what means were actually used by the defendant. Assault, the crime at issue here, can be committed in a number of different ways. The information here did little more than to inform the jury that this assault resulted in substantial bodily harm and involved the use of a deadly weapon.... [The information] simply stated the particular elements of the crime which was the basis for the conviction. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 670-71, 904 P.2d 245. Thus we concluded It is difficult to see how an information setting forth the name and elements of a charged crime is inherently more prejudicial to the Defendant than the judgment and sentence normally admitted.... .... Bartholomew does not prohibit the introduction of this information, which simply stated the particular elements of the crime which was the basis for the conviction. Id. What happened in the case at bar was quite different. Not only was a certified copy of the judgment and sentence for the conviction entered, RP (Apr. 16, 1997) at 5566-67, but a police officer from the Everett Police Department was permitted to testify from a police statement that the victim of the unlawful imprisonment was a four-year-old girl who was a neighbor to Clark. RP (Apr. 16, 1997) at 5625 (penalty phase). This testimony was offered to prove more than the fact of a conviction and more than the elements of the offense. This evidence, presented during the state's case in chiefand therefore not in rebuttal went beyond the Bartholomew II boundaries, even as widened in Pirtle. Pirtle dealt with an information that was deemed not unfairly prejudicial because it merely set forth the elements of the assault convictionthe attack which caused substantial bodily harm and the use of a deadly weapon. The trial court erred by admitting this testimony for two reasons. First, it was inadmissible on its face because it went beyond the scope of the statute we have construed to allow introduction of only the record of conviction. If we allow narrative testimony of this kind there would be no foreseeable end to these trials within a trial. Second, it should have been excluded from evidence even if otherwise admissible because it was unduly prejudicial under the quasi 403 analysis Bartholomew II engenders. Bartholomew II, 101 Wash.2d at 640, 683 P.2d 1079. Evidence of the unlawful imprisonment victim's tender age and relationship to Clark did not go to the elements of unlawful imprisonment the knowing restraint of another person. RCW 9A.40.040. One need not imprison a child, or be an acquaintance of the victim, in order to commit the crime of unlawful imprisonment. The age and relationship vis-à-vis Clark to the victim are not relevant. The prejudice is apparent when one recalls the predicate offense for which Clark was sentenced to death. On the face of it, this may have been the most prejudicial evidence entered in the sentencing phase against Clark, a bit of evidence which the jury could not have possibly disregarded. Perhaps that is why the trial court did not allow the evidence to come out during the guilt phase, before paradoxically changing its position in the penalty phase. The prejudice of its admission became clear in the state's closing argument during the penalty phase, that this defendant preys on the vulnerable and the weak and the small. RP (Apr. 17, 1997) at 5821 (penalty phase). We fear such evidence was too likely to short-circuit the jurors' reasoning and inflame their passions. We therefore hold the admission of the police statement concerning the previous false imprisonment conviction, over and above the mere judgment and sentence for that crime, violated the Bartholomew II rule, was unfairly prejudicial, and requires vacating Clark's death sentence and remanding for a new special sentencing proceeding. Given this disposition it is unnecessary to comment on other assignments of error relating to the penalty phase.