Opinion ID: 1894142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial court erred in sustaining state's objection to a question regarding defendant's mental health treatment.

Text: Albright claims that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's objection to a question to Albright regarding his previous mental health treatment. Albright argues he had the right to present relevant evidence to the jury to help them determine the reliability of the confession. During direct examination of Albright, the following testimony occurred. Q Okay. Over the years, have you had some counseling or treatment for mental health problems? A Yes. For mental health and for alcohol and drug abuse. Q Okay. Where have you had your mental health treatment? MR. BLOOMBERG: I'm going to object to this line of questioning as being irrelevant. THE COURT: Sustained. No further questioning regarding mental health was attempted by counsel. We agree that questions of credibility in regard to confessions are for the jury and that the requirement that the court make a pretrial voluntariness determination does not undercut the defendant's traditional prerogative to challenge the confession's reliability during the course of trial. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2145, 90 L.Ed.2d 636, 643 (1986) (citations omitted). Once the trial court has determined that a confession is voluntary and admissible, the jury must determine the weight to be given to the confession and the truthfulness of the person relating the confession. See State v. Aschmeller, 87 S.D. 367, 209 N.W.2d 369 (1973). From the above quoted direct examination of Albright, it is clear that the question called for irrelevant testimony, namely the places of Albright's prior mental health treatment. However, the objection, which was sustained by the trial court, went to this line of questioning. Since there was no offer of proof or further record made to demonstrate the relevance, we are not certain whether the trial court was ruling as irrelevant the line of questioning dealing with the various places of Albright's prior mental health treatment, or whether it was ruling as irrelevant the entire issue of Albright's prior treatment and counseling for mental health and alcohol and drug abuse. As stated earlier, the trial court's ruling was correct if its intent was to exclude the places of treatment. However, it may have erred if it was excluding the fact of and details concerning the actual mental health illness treatments. State v. Winfrey, 221 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1974); State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1972); State v. Faught, 254 Iowa 1124, 120 N.W.2d 426 (1963). (It must be remembered that the trial court did not prevent Albright from explaining his side of all of the circumstances surrounding his conduct and statements at the time of the search or his later confession to Deputy Charles. First, Albright did testify about his actions during the search. However, he was asked no questions about the confession on direct examination.) Our next inquiry, then, is whether such claimed error would be prejudicial here. As stated by Justice Sabers in State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 818 (S.D.1987): `Prejudicial error' is error which in all probability must have produced some effect upon the jury's verdict and is harmful to the substantial rights of the party assigning it. State v. Dokken, 385 N.W.2d 493, 498 (S.D.1986); State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 396, 125 N.W. 2d 58, 62 (1963).... SDCL 23A-44-14 defines harmless error as `[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights[.]' In Michalek, we followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) cert. denied 469 U.S. 1218, 105 S.Ct. 1200, 84 L.Ed.2d 343 (1985), which adopted a suggested inquiry that the appellate court must ask itself in reviewing error to determine its prejudicial affect, namely: Absent [the alleged error] ... is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty? Michalek, supra at 819 citing 416 U.S. at 510-11, 103 S.Ct. at 1981, 76 L.Ed.2d at 107. We have asked that question of ourselves and answer it in the affirmative. From a review of the record, it is abundantly clear that the evidence against Albright was overwhelming. Considering all the facts and the instructions of the court [5] we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty irrespective of the claimed error. Therefore, the claimed error was harmless. Affirmed. MORGAN and HENDERSON, JJ., concur. WUEST, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur in result.