Opinion ID: 2632369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Objectively Reasonable Justification for Search

Text: Glossbrener finally asserts that Trevino did not have an objectively reasonable basis for searching his vehicle because of the time and events that followed Glossbrener's furtive movement. Specifically, he refers to Trevino's allowing Glossbrener to remain in the vehicle while he checked for outstanding warrants, Glossbrener's revealing a plausible reason for the furtive movement, Trevino's frisk of Glossbrener, and Glossbrener's full cooperation during the course of the investigation. The State responds that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Glossbrener's furtive movement along with his unsatisfactory answer gave rise to a valid concern for officer safety justifying the search of the passenger area of the vehicle. State's Suppl. Br. at 16. The court in Kennedy did not clearly articulate what standard would be applied in determining whether an officer was justified in conducting a search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle based on officer safety. However, the court did indicate that the same concerns for safety that justify a frisk under the Fourth Amendment would justify a limited search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle under article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Kennedy, 107 Wash.2d at 10-11, 726 P.2d 445. In the context of a general Terry frisk, we have stated that a reasonable safety concern exists, and a protective frisk for weapons is justified, when an officer can point to `specific and articulable facts' which create an objectively reasonable belief that a suspect is `armed and presently dangerous.' State v. Collins, 121 Wash.2d 168, 173, 847 P.2d 919 (1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-24, 88 S.Ct. 1868). See also State v. Horrace, 144 Wash.2d 386, 399-400, 28 P.3d 753 (2001) (frisk of vehicle passenger justified under article 1, section 7 only where the officer is able to point to specific, articulable facts giving rise to an objectively reasonable belief that the passenger could be armed and dangerous). In the context of a protective search of a car based on officer safety concerns, the Court of Appeals has held that a ` Terry stop and frisk may extend into the car if there is a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon in the vehicle.' State v. Terrazas, 71 Wash.App. 873, 879, 863 P.2d 75 (1993) (quoting State v. Mcintosh, 42 Wash.App. 573, 578-79, 712 P.2d 319 (1986)). In Larson, the court indicated that a protective search for weapons must be objectively reasonable, though based on the officer's subjective perception of events. 88 Wash.App. at 53-54, 943 P.2d 1153 (citing State v. Henry, 80 Wash.App. 544, 552, 910 P.2d 1290 (1995)). Applying this standard to Glossbrener's case, we conclude that although Trevino may have had a reasonable belief that Glossbrener was armed and dangerous when he first observed the furtive movement, any such belief was no longer objectively reasonable at the time he actually conducted the search because of the intervening actions of both Trevino and Glossbrener. First, Trevino articulated only two reasons justifying his belief that Glossbrener was armed and dangerous: (1) Glossbrener's furtive movement prior to coming to a stop and (2) Glossbrener's initial explanation for leaning towards the passenger side of the vehicle. [8] However, after being challenged, Glossbrener admitted that he had been attempting to hide an open container of alcohol, a traffic infraction. [9] In all other respects, Glossbrener cooperated with Trevino's investigation, including submitting to a field sobriety test and a frisk of his person. Trevino failed to articulate any other action by Glossbrener during the course of the investigation that made him suspect that Glossbrener was armed and dangerous. Second, after initially questioning Glossbrener, Trevino allowed Glossbrener to sit in his car while he checked for warrants. It would seem that if Trevino were truly concerned for his safety, he would not have allowed Glossbrener to remain in his car while he conducted this part of his investigation. Cf. Larson, 88 Wash.App. at 851, 946 P.2d 1212 (officer had driver immediately exit from truck and remain outside truck while he conducted limited search of cab of truck). Third, Trevino did not find any weapons on Glossbrener's person when he did the pat-down search. Finally, it was not until Trevino had completed his investigation and determined that Glossbrener was not legally intoxicated that he decided to call for backup in order to search the passenger area of Glossbrener's vehicle where he had seen Glossbrener reach. [10] At this point in the investigation, the only thing left was for Glossbrener to leave. [11] Under these circumstances, we find Trevino did not have an objectively reasonable belief that he was in danger. Although the cases relied on by the State to support the reasonableness of the search in this case involved furtive movements by either the driver or a passenger of the vehicle, they are otherwise distinguishable. In Horrace, 144 Wash.2d at 388, 28 P.3d 753, State v. Watkins, 76 Wash.App. 726, 728, 887 P.2d 492 (1995), and State v. Wilkinson, 56 Wash.App. 812, 813, 785 P.2d 1139 (1990), there was more than one person in the vehicle when it was pulled over. Both Horrace and Wilkinson specifically address the reasonableness of the officer's frisk of the suspect, an issue not contested in this case, not the search of the vehicle. Horrace, 144 Wash.2d at 388, 28 P.3d 753; Wilkinson, 56 Wash.App. at 813, 785 P.2d 1139. Furthermore, in Horrace and Wilkinson, the officers articulated reasons in addition to the furtive movements for their suspicion that the passengers might be armed and dangerous. Horrace, 144 Wash.2d at 389, 28 P.3d 753 (time of day and fact that passenger was wearing bulky jacket); Wilkinson, 56 Wash. App. at 814, 785 P.2d 1139 (driver's failure to pull over right away and officer's prior knowledge of criminal activity on the part of two of the vehicle occupants). In Watkins, the specific question addressed by the court was whether the continued investigation was justified, not whether the search was justified, because the officer had seen the butt of a revolver in plain view once the suspect stepped out of the vehicle. 76 Wash.App. at 729-31, 887 P.2d 492. Most significantly, the searches in those cases were conducted at the first opportunity after the officer observed the furtive movement. Horrace, 144 Wash.2d at 389, 28 P.3d 753 (officer observed furtive movements by driver in area of passenger while checking whether driver had any outstanding warrants; pat-down of passenger conducted once officer had arrested driver for outstanding warrant and placed him in patrol car); Watkins, 76 Wash.App. at 728, 887 P.2d 492 (officers witnessed furtive movements as vehicle was stopping; officers approached vehicle and asked for identification from passenger; passenger asked to exit vehicle immediately after providing evasive answer as to his identity); Wilkinson, 56 Wash.App. at 814, 785 P.2d 1139 (search of passenger conducted immediately after officer approached vehicle for first time based on officer's observations of passenger's furtive movements before vehicle stopped). Although Larson is more similar to this case than Horrace, Watkins, or Wilkinson, it is also distinguishable. As in this case, the officer in Larson observed the driver make furtive movements before coming to a stop. 88 Wash.App.at 851, 946 P.2d 1212. However, the driver in Larson did not immediately stop when he was signaled but instead continued to drive for some distance. Id. As in Horrace, Watkins, and Wilkinson, the search was conducted at the first opportunity following the events giving rise to the officer's concern for safety. Id. (officer, upon his initial contact with driver, immediately asked him to get out of his truck, patted him down for weapons, and then had driver remain outside of truck while officer conducted a visual of the cab of truck). In this case, Trevino had several opportunities to search Glossbrener's car prior to the time the search was actually done, including the time at which Trevino initially approached the car and before conducting the field sobriety tests. More importantly, in upholding the search in Larson, the court specifically relied on the fact that Larson would have to return to his vehicle to obtain his registration in order to carry out the traffic stop, which in turn would give him access to any weapon he may have concealed inside the truck. Id. at 857, 946 P.2d 1212. In Glossbrener's case, Trevino's investigation was complete. There was no need for Glossbrener to produce any additional documentation from the vehicle in order for Trevino to have cited him for either the open container or headlight infraction, which was not done in this case.