Opinion ID: 411288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Habeas Proceedings in District Court

Text: 15 Having exhausted his state remedies, Washington sought habeas corpus relief from the district court below. 7 Again, the petition attacked Tunkey's preparation for the sentencing phase of Washington's trial. 16 Petitioner called Tunkey as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. Tunkey testified that after Washington confessed to the Pridgen and Birk murders, he experienced a feeling of hopelessness regarding the case, and that he believed there was little chance of Washington avoiding the death penalty. His strategy at that point was to introduce evidence of Washington's emotional distress only during Washington's plea colloquy with Judge Fuller, and thereafter to rely primarily upon an attempt to convince the judge of Washington's sincerity and frankness in pleading guilty. 8 Tunkey believed that this strategy might succeed in avoiding the death penalty because Judge Fuller had in other cases acknowledged his respect for people who unqualifiedly admitted their responsibility. 17 Tunkey also testified that he made little attempt to develop evidence of Washington's emotional distress apart from conversations with Washington in connection with his plea colloquy. Specifically, Tunkey did not follow up on initial telephone conversations with Washington's wife and mother after they had failed to keep appointments with him. Additionally, he did not request a presentence report or a psychiatric investigation because he anticipated that they might reveal information more harmful than helpful to his client. 18 The state called Judge Fuller as a witness. Over the strenuous objection of Washington's counsel, the judge testified that evidence of the type contained in petitioner's fourteen affidavits and two psychiatric reports would not have altered his determination that Washington deserved the death penalty. 19 The district court stated that the central issue raised by the allegations is the assertion by petitioner that an adequate independent investigation by trial counsel would have revealed information and witnesses relevant to circumstances which may have mitigated the death sentence imposed. 9 Relying upon the decision of the former fifth circuit in Beavers v. Balkcom, 636 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir.1981), the court held that defense counsel in a capital case has a duty to investigate mitigating evidence irrespective of whether counsel's strategy at trial would require the use of such evidence. The court therefore found that Tunkey had made an error in judgment by failing to conduct such an investigation thoroughly. It stopped short, however, of finding that Tunkey was ineffective, stating that the Constitution does not require errorless counsel. Rather than deciding vel non whether Tunkey was ineffective, the court found that Washington was not prejudiced by Tunkey's error. In reaching that conclusion, the court held that Judge Fuller's testimony demonstrated that there was no likelihood that counsel's inaction affected the outcome of the sentence (citing United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C.Cir.1979) (en banc)). 10