Opinion ID: 1770840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the attorney certifying the petition was disqualified.

Text: ¶ 10. Upton also alleged in his motion to dismiss that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter because McKenzie failed to obtain proper certification for her petition to the circuit court. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 (1990) provides that an election contestant may seek judicial review of the action of a county executive committee by filing a petition in the circuit court of the county involved. In pertinent part, the statute provides: But such petition for a judicial review shall not be filed unless it bear the certificate of two (2) practicing attorneys that they and each of them have fully made an independent investigation into the matters of fact and of law upon which the protest and petition are based and that after such investigation they verily believe that the said protest and petition should be sustained and that the relief therein prayed should be granted.... Id. The purpose of the certification requirement is to prevent, or at least to minimize, the bringing before the courts of captious or unsubstantial political contests of primary elections.... Harris v. Stewart, 187 Miss. 489, 506, 193 So. 339, 343 (1940). The affidavits prevent persons declared party nominees from being harassed with trivial applications for judicial review thereof, and contemplates, as the word `independent' connotes, a certificate by lawyers who are without bias or prejudice. Pittman v. Forbes, 186 Miss. 783, 789, 191 So. 490, 490 (1939). ¶ 11. One of the attorneys certifying McKenzie's petition to the circuit court was Joseph M. Shepard. Shepard served as attorney for the Marion County Board of Supervisors before and after the death of Billy Ray McKenzie. Again, Elaine McKenzie served the unexpired term of Billy Ray McKenzie. Upton argues that Shepard's serving as attorney to a board on which Elaine McKenzie was a member and to which she sought election created a conflict of interest, resulting in the disqualification of Shepard as a certifying attorney. Because the certification requirement is jurisdictional, Upton contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. See Pearson v. Jordan, 186 Miss. 789, 792, 192 So. 39, 40 (1939) (noting that where the certification requirement is not met, the lower court is without jurisdiction to hear the case, and this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal). ¶ 12. This Court has stated that [t]he only facts which would disqualify a certifying attorney are: Employment of the attorney, past, present, contingent or prospective, by or for the contestant as his attorney in respect to the matter involved in the contest, or such facts as would disqualify a judge under Section 165, Constitution 1890. Harris, 187 Miss. at 504-05, 193 So. at 343. This Court has addressed the first prong of this testattorneys who are in fact representing the contestant with respect to the election contestnumerous times. In Harris, this Court found that an attorney who was a close friend of the petitioner's attorney whom he sometimes associated as counsel on cases and whose offices happened to be on the same floor of the building in which both worked, was not disqualified from serving as a certifying attorney in the petitioner's case. In McDaniel v. Beane, 515 So.2d 949 (Miss.1987), this Court found that a member of the law firm representing a contestant is not eligible to make the certification required by § 23-15-927. This Court held in Esco v. Scott, 735 So.2d 1002 (Miss.1999), that an attorney who is of counsel to the firm in which the petitioner's attorney is a partner is not eligible to make the certification. Shepard does not represent McKenzie in respect to the election contest, nor is there any indication that he is in any way associated with McKenzie's counsel. Thus, Shepard is not disqualified under the first prong of the Harris test. ¶ 13. Though certainly a close issue, this Court concludes that Upton has also failed to demonstrate that the certification by Shepard violates the second prong of the Harris test, that is, the existence of facts which would disqualify a judge under Article 6, Section 165 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Article 6, Section 165 provides: No judge of any court shall preside on the trial of any cause, where the parties or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties.... Section 165 does not prohibit Shepard from acting as certifying attorney. Upton does not allege that Shepard is connected to either of the parties by affinity or consanguinity, or that he has a pecuniary or property interest in the outcome of the contest, or an interest affecting his individual rights. See McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So. 821, 823 (1939) (citing Ferguson v. Brown, 75 Miss. 214, 227, 21 So. 603 (1897); Cashin v. Murphy, 138 Miss. 853, 866, 103 So. 787 (1925) (noting that only such interests disqualify a judge under Section 165)). ¶ 14. Since its 1940 decision in Harris, this Court has adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, a judge may be disqualified under Section 165 of the Mississippi Constitution as well as under Canon 3 C of the Code of Judicial Conduct. [1] This Court has not heretofore analyzed the disqualification of a certifying attorney under the Code of Judicial Conduct. However, because the Code of Judicial Conduct did not exist at the time the Harris test was promulgated, we find that it is appropriate to graft such an analysis into the Harris test. This Court has stated, When the conduct of a judge is being examined according to the dictates of a canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct, `the Canon enjoys the status of law....' Jenkins v. State, 570 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss.1990) (quoting Collins v. Dixie Transp., Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 166 (Miss. 1989)). ¶ 15. A judge is presumed qualified and unbiased. Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 774 (Miss.1997); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss. 1990). This presumption may be overcome only by evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or not qualified. Id. This Court has adopted an objective test in determining whether a judge should have disqualified himself or herself under Canon 3 C: If a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would doubt the judge's impartiality, the judge is required to recuse him or herself from the case. Jenkins, 570 So.2d at 1192 (quoting Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 16. Canon 3 C of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in pertinent part: (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; [or] (b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it.... It should be noted that Canon 3 C(1) states a general standard and that subparagraphs (a) and (b) are but illustrations which do not exhaust the field. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892, 896 (Miss. 1991). And again, the question is not whether the judge, in fact, was impartial, but whether a fair-minded person, knowing all of the facts, might reasonably question the judge's impartiality. Id. ¶ 17. Canon 3 C(1)(b) is inapplicable as Shepard does not represent McKenzie in the election contest. However, Shepard does represent the board to which McKenzie sought electiona board on which she has served the remainder of her husband's term. Thus, the remaining question is whether Canon 3 C(1)(a) precludes Shepard from serving as certifying attorney. Certainly, McKenzie, in the exercise of caution, should have sought a certifying attorney with a lesser connection to the proceedings at hand. Nevertheless, we conclude that Shepard's employment as attorney for the board of supervisors does not disqualify him from serving as certifying attorney. Neither Shepard, nor the body which he represents, have an effect on or a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the present contest. Upton alleges no facts indicating that Shepard has a personal interest or bias in the matter, save the assertion that Shepard would have jeopardized his employment had he denied McKenzie the certification. This claim, however, is unsubstantiated. In McFarland v. State, 707 So.2d 166 (Miss. 1997), this Court stated, The mere fact that a trial judge hears a case, even an election case, in a county where the judge may sometime in the future run for reelection, does not alone give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his impartiality. Id. at 180 (analyzing the impartiality of a trial judge under Canon 3 C(1)). Likewise, Shepard would not be disqualified from serving as trial judge in the election contest at hand, even where Shepard's employment contract presumably must be renewed or discontinued sometime in the future. The facts alleged alone do not mandate disqualification under Canon 3 C.