Opinion ID: 77840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Merits of Smith's RLUIPA Claims

Text: To establish a prima facie case under section 3 of RLUIPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate 1) that he engaged in a religious exercise; and 2) that the religious exercise was substantially burdened. See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The plaintiff bear[s] the burden of persuasion on whether the . . . government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). If the plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating a prima facie case, the government must then demonstrate that the challenged government action is is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b). In contrast, if the plaintiff fails to present evidence to support a prima facie case under RLUIPA, the court need not inquire into whether the governmental interest at stake was compelling. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir.2004). Thus, to withstand summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim, Smith bore the burden of first presenting evidence to demonstrate that his observance of Odinism constituted a religious exercise under the statute. See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567. A religious exercise is broadly defined under RLUIPA as any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). In light of that definition, we conclude that Smith's practice of Odinism constitutes a religious exercise for purposes of a RLUIPA claim. As to the second stepthe issue of a substantial burden on that religious practiceSmith claims that the following decisions of the Committee effectuated a substantial burden on his observance of Odinism: (1) the Committee's decision to deny his request for a small quartz crystal; (2) the Committee's decision to deny Smith's request for a designated area of worship in the open area of the prison; and (3) the Committee's decision to deny Smith's request for a small fire pit, approximately 9 in diameter and 9 deep. R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 2. We address each of these allegations in turn.
The Committee denied Smith the possession of a quartz crystal after reviewing his written request, as well as a number of background materials on Odinism, because there was a lack of supporting materials validating a need for this item. R2-98, Exh. M at 1. Smith contends that this decision substantially burdened his observance of Odinism. We have previously defined a substantial burden as being significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. More pertinent to the present action, we have made clear that, in order to constitute a substantial burden on religious practice, the government's action must be more than . . . incidental and must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise. Id. (citation omitted). That is, to constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA, the governmental action must significantly hamper one's religious practice. Here, Smith contends that the fact that the quartz crystal was denied outright should be sufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate that his religious practice was substantially burdened. The Committee's denial alone, however, does not necessarily establish a substantial burden. Rather, in reviewing the entirety of the record evidence, we find that Smith has failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate how, if at all, the ADOC's denial of a small quartz crystal constituted a substantial burden on his practice of Odinism. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The decision to ultimately deny Smith's request for a quartz crystal was reached after the Committee undertook a probing and thorough review of Smith's religious requests. The ADOC Chaplain personally met with Smith to discuss his request, including the need for the crystal; reviewed documentation on Odinism submitted by Smith's non-incarcerated friend; conducted independent research on the tenets of Odinism; held discussions with Chaplains in other prisons on the religion's doctrines; and encouraged Smith to submit as much evidence as he could in support of his request. In conducting his review, the Chaplain found that the evidence in support of Smith's request for a small quartz crystal was incomplete and sketchy. R2-63, Exh. K at 3. After gather[ing] more informative sources on [his] own and research[ing] the [credibility] of each of Smith's requested items, id., the Chaplain found that there were no supporting materials validating [the] need for a crystal in connection with Smith's practice of Odinism, and, accordingly, the Committee denied that item. R2-98, Exh. M at 1. [13] In challenging that decision on appeal, Smith has presented no evidence to demonstrate that a small quartz crystal was fundamental to his practice of Odinism, such that the denial of the crystal effectuated any more than an inconvenience on [his] religious exercise. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. Indeed, Smith has failed to establish the relevance of the crystal to his practice of Odinism, as he was obligated to do in order to demonstrate that the denial of that item would significantly hamper his religious observance. Smith's request states only that the crystal was essential because it allows communication with the netherworld. R1-20, Exh. K. Similarly, the sources on Odinsim that were submitted by Smith stated, in rather general terms, that [q]uartz crystals are used in shamanism around the world, that they are used in many prehistoric religions, such as Old world alchemy, witchcraft, and magic, and that they are still in use in many traditional societies. R2-61. There is no mention in these third party sources of Odinism, nor is there any indication that a small, quartz crystal is necessary to observe the rites of Odinism. In short, neither Smith's request, nor the outside sources that he submitted in connection with it, demonstrate the need for a quartz crystal in order to practice Odinism. While it is true that courts are not to inquire into the centrality of a particular religious tenet in undertaking the substantial burden analysis, Adkins, 393 F.3d at 559, at a minimum the substantial burden test requires that a RLUIPA plaintiff demonstrate that the government's denial of a particular religious item or observance was more than an inconvenience to one's religious practice. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. On appeal, Smith argues that a substantial burden can be found based on the simple fact that (1) he asked for the crystal to use in Odinism; (2) the request was based on Smith's sincer[e] religious beliefs; and (3) the Committee flatly denied that request. Br. Of Appellant at 47. Smith contends that this evidence should be enough, standing alone, to demonstrate that his religious exercise was substantially burdened under RLUIPA. Such an expansive reading of section 3, however, would require us to find a substantial burden whenever any request in connection with a sincere religious belief was denied by a state prison. If the word substantial in the statutory phrase substantial burden, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), is to retain any meaning, it must, at a minimum, be construed as requiring something more than solely the denial of a request that is sincere. An alternate approach, like the one advocated by Smith, would result in the word substantial in § 2000cc-1(a) as being mere surplusage, since every governmental action denying a requested item to be used in religious observance would give rise to a prima facie RLUIPA claim. We decline to adopt such an expansive reading of section 3 of RLUIPA. Put simply, we are not convincedand there is no evidence, other than Smith's own assertion and his scant sources, to establishthat the Committee's decision denying Smith a small, quartz crystal place[d] more than an inconvenience on [his] religious exercise. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. If anything, the denial of the crystal strikes us as an incidental burden on Smith's Odinism, which, we have held, is not sufficient to meet the threshold of a substantial burden under RLUIPA. See id. Because Smith did not present evidence to demonstrate a substantial burden on his Odinist observances by the denial of the crystal, he failed to establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA, and the defendants-appellees are entitled to summary judgment on Smith's RLUIPA claim. See id. at 1228 (summary judgment is appropriate if the RLUIPA plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, and the court need not inquire into whether the government interest asserted is compelling). See also Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1243 (summary judgment is appropriate if the party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial) (quotations and citation omitted).
Smith also argues that the ADOC's decision to deny his request to be granted a designated area of worship in an open area of the prison effectuated a substantial burden on his practice of Odinism. The Committee denied Smith's request for a designated area of worship, due to its concerns that permitting Odinist rites to be performed in a public area of the prison, before all the inmates, could pose security problems. The Committee's decision stated that The Asatru/Odinism religion draws and embraces certain members of the Aryan Nations and Neo-Nazis, which combined with a potentially hostile inmate population and the prevalence of prison gangs, would be detrimental to security and [pose] a strong potential for harm. R2-98, Exh. M at 2. The Committee did grant Smith a secure location to practice his Odinist rites, stating that when a secure place of worship was required, the Warden and Chaplain would designate a suitable location for Smith to engage in his observances. Upon review, we find that Smith has failed to establish that this decisionto allow Smith to practice his religion freely in a secure location while declining to allow his observances in the general prison areasignificantly hampered his religious exercise. As discussed in the previous section, a substantial burden must place more than an inconvenience on [one's] religious exercise. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. Here, there is no evidence that the ADOC's decision to limit Smith's religious practices to a secure location placed more than an incidental burden on his practice of the Odinist faith. See id. On the contrary, Smith remained free to engage in his religious observances under the Committee's 2003's decision, albeit limited to a secure, rather than an open, area of the prison. In addition, as with the quartz crystal, Smith has failed to demonstrate on appeal how, if it all, the decision to deny Smith a designated worship area, in the open area of the prison, effectuated a substantial burden on his individual practice of Odinism. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). In fact, the outside sources that Smith submitted in connection with his request did not make any mention of the need for a designated worship area in connection with the practice of Odinism. See generally R2-61. Because Smith failed to submit evidence to establish his prima facie case, the defendants-appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Smith's RLUIPA claim based on the denial of a designated worship spot. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1228.
Finally, Smith challenges the ADOC Committee's decision to deny his request for a small fire pit. Smith's original request sought a small fire pit, approximately 9 in diameter and 9 deep, in which he would be able to light a pine fire. R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 2. The Committee granted this request only in part, allowing Smith possession of a small candle to be used in connection with his Odinist exercises. Smith contends that this decision effectuated a substantial burden on his religious exercise under section 3 of RLUIPA. We disagree. As with Smith's request for a crystal, Smith failed to present record evidence to establish the need for, or relevance of, a 9 by 9 fire pit in connection with his Odinist practices, such that the denial of this item would effectuate a substantial burden his religious observance. As noted, the ADOC did grant Smith a candle to use in his cell in his observance of Odinism. On appeal, Smith has failed to demonstrate how, if at all, the decision to limit him to a candle, rather than to a full-blown fire pit, significantly hampered his practice of Odinism. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. As with the ADOC decision on a secure worship spot, the record demonstrates that Smith remained free to engage in his religious observance under the ADOC 2003 decision, albeit limited to a candle rather than a pine fire. Moreover, like the first two requests, Smith has failed to demonstrate how the ADOC's decision to limit him to a small candle effectuated a substantial burden on his religious practice. The sources that he submitted in connection with this request alluded to the Kenaz rune being representative of the pine fire of purification. R2-63, Exh. K-1, but there was no mention of the need for a pine fire in connection with the practice of Odinism. See id.; see also R1-20, Exh. M (discussing in general how the rune symbolizes a pine tree giving heat and light); R2-61 (stating that the rune refers to the sacredness of the hearth and ritual cleansing by fire). The Chaplain found, and we agree, that the sources that Smith submitted did not show[] the necessity of [a pine] fire in connection with the Odinist rites. See R1-20, Exh. C. Failing such evidence, we are unable to find how, if at all, the denial of a pine fire pit effectuated a substantial burden on his observance of Odinism. Because Smith failed to submit evidence to establish a prima facie RLUIPA case based on the denial of the pine fire pit, the defendants-appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Smith's claim. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1228. In summary, having reviewed Smith's claims for injunctive relief and nominal damages under RLUIPAbased on the ADOC's denial of a crystal, a worship area, and a fire pitwe conclude that none of the three violations was sufficient to establish a prima facie claim under RLUIPA. Nor can we conclude that the Committee's disposition of Smith's three requests, taken collectively, was sufficient to establish that Smith's religious practice was significantly hampered, so as to give rise to a prima facie RLUIPA case. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants-appellees were entitled to summary judgment. And although the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to the defendant may have been reached on the basis of qualified immunity, we may affirm the district court's decision on any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court actually relied. Parks, 43 F.3d at 613 (citation omitted). Because we conclude that summary judgment was properly entered for the defendants-appellees, we affirm the district court's summary judgment order on Smith's RLUIPA claims.