Opinion ID: 2328929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The availability of punitive damages under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act

Text: Young argues that punitive damages are not available under the DCHRA. Whether punitive damages may be awarded under the DCHRA is an issue of first impression in this court. [33] Young contends that since the DCHRA is modeled on Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, which does not allow punitive damages, this court should therefore hold that the DCHRA likewise does not permit an award of punitive damages. The premise of this argument is only partially correct; Title VII is not the only source of the DCHRA. We conclude that the Council of the District of Columbia, in enacting the DCHRA, intended to include punitive damages in the arsenal of available remedies for discrimination. We look first at the DCHRA itself. A person suffering discrimination may either pursue administrative remedies before the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (OHR), D.C.Code § 1-2544, or bring a private action in court, D.C.Code § 1-2556. [34] If the person elects to file a claim with the OHR, the OHR may award compensatory damages and attorneys' fees, but not punitive damages. D.C.Code § 1-2553(a). [35] If the person files a private civil action in the Superior Court, however, the court may grant such relief as it deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, such relief as is provided in § 1-2553(a). D.C.Code § 1-2556(b) (emphasis added). The italicized language makes clear that the Council intended to allow the courts of this jurisdiction to grant broader relief under the DCHRA than the OHR was authorized to grant. The legislative history of the DCHRA supports the view that the Council intended that plaintiffs bringing civil actions under the DCHRA be allowed to recover punitive damages in appropriate cases. The DCHRA was enacted by the Council in September 1977 and took effect on December 13, 1977, as D.C.Law 2-38. See 24 D.C.Reg. 6038 (1978). Its purpose was to enact as a statute the then-existing Title 34 of the District of Columbia Rules and Regulations (DCRR). COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, REPORT ON BILL No. 2-179, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 1977, at 1 (1977) (bill makes no substantive changes in the text of present Title 34 of the D.C.Rules and Regulations.... Its sole effect is to enact that law as a statute and thus make it a permanent part of the District of Columbia Code). Thus the current DCHRA is, almost word for word, the text originally adopted as Title 34 of the DCRR. We therefore turn to the legislative history of Title 34. Title 34 was passed by the District of Columbia City Council (the predecessor of the current Council of the District of Columbia) as the Human Rights Law, Regulation No. 73-22, on November 17, 1973. See 20 D.C.Reg. 345 (1973). Section 35.2(b) of Title 34, which is identical to the present D.C.Code § 1-2556(b), provided that the court hearing a private cause of action under the Human Rights Law may grant such relief as it deems appropriate.... 34 DCRR § 35.2, 20 D.C.Reg. 363 (1973). In enacting Title 34, the City Council looked beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, to other civil rights legislation enacted by Congress more than 100 years ago: In patterning specificity, we have looked to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968. In our resolve to provide flexibility, we have looked to one of the earliest, and perhaps still the most expansive [pieces of] Congressional civil rights legislation, an 1866 law that states simply that all persons shall enjoy the same property rights as any white citizen. We have considered our prerogative to legislate broadly, as did the Congress in 1866. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CITY COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LABOR AND MANPOWER, REPORT ON TITLE 34, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, at 2 (1973) (emphasis in original). The 1866 law to which the City Council referred was the Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, now codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988). Congress re-enacted portions of the 1866 act in 1870 and added new provisions to it. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144. One of the new provisions was section 16, the predecessor of what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). We conclude from the Council's stated goal of legislat[ing] broadly, as well as the specific reference to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, that the 1973 City Council intended the Human Rights Law to encompass all of the remedies available under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. Section 1981 affords individuals a remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). A plaintiff pursuing employment discrimination claims under section 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory damages and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages. Id. Since Title VII and section 1981 are not mutually exclusive, the unavailability of punitive damages under the former does not preclude an award of punitive damages under the latter. See id. at 459, 95 S.Ct. at 1720. Given the broad statutory language allowing the court to award such relief as it deems appropriate, D.C.Code § 1-2556(b), read in light of the legislative history which specifically embraces the Civil Rights Act of 1866, we are satisfied that the Council intended to permit punitive damages in cases where they might be appropriate. We therefore hold that punitive damages are available in civil actions under the DCHRA, subject only to the general principles governing any award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 906-908 (D.C.1988).