Opinion ID: 380341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Witness's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment.

Text: 17 Barham believed that James Crews, a co-conspirator, would testify that he had obtained a quantity of counterfeit from Charles Fowler. Fowler, one of Barham's primary accusers, had testified that he did not distribute counterfeit but merely printed it. When Barham sought to impeach Fowler with Crews' testimony, however, Crews refused to answer questions about the source of the counterfeit, claiming his fifth amendment privilege. The court upheld the voir dire assertion of the privilege, ordered Barham not to ask questions in front of the jury that would require Crews to invoke the privilege, and refused to instruct the jury that Crews' invocation of the privilege prevented Barham from questioning him about Fowler. 18 Barham urges that the trial court's upholding of the privilege was erroneous because Crews had already been convicted on counterfeiting charges. Alternatively, the court could have upheld the privilege, but limited questioning to the $104,000 in counterfeit in Crews' possession when he was arrested, or it could have required that the government request use immunity in order to compel Crews' testimony. The failure of the court to do any of these things, Barham contends, denied Barham his fifth and sixth amendment rights and requires reversal of the conviction. 19 The trial court correctly allowed Crews to invoke the privilege, for although he had been convicted of possessing, distribution, and conspiring to make, possess, and distribute counterfeit, he had not been charged with receiving counterfeit money. Testimony concerning receipt of the counterfeit could therefore be self-incriminating. Cf. United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1978) (guilty plea on passing and uttering offenses does not waive privilege to refuse to testify about a source or acquisition of counterfeit). Limitations on the scope of cross-examination are within the discretion of the trial court. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). Having correctly sustained the privilege, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering counsel not to ask questions in front of the jury that they knew in advance would cause Crews to invoke the privilege. United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826, 96 S.Ct. 41, 46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975). 20 Finally, Barham asserts, almost as an afterthought, that the court should have ordered the government to request use immunity for Crews in order that he could testify for the defendant. Barham relies on a Third Circuit holding that in certain cases, due process may require that the prosecution grant use immunity to a defense witness, if prosecutorial overreaching has so impaired the defendant's ability to present his defense that he has been denied a fair trial. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976). This circuit has not yet had occasion either to accept or to reject Morrison and we need not do so today. Barham admits that the prosecutor did not engage in bad-faith conduct in the third trial, nor did Barham request use immunity at trial. Moreover, the testimony sought was not exculpatory, but merely impeaching on a collateral issue. Crews did in fact offer directly exculpatory testimony. In the presence of the jury, he identified Barham and stated that to his knowledge, Barham had nothing to do with the counterfeit currency. Therefore, the court did not err in refusing to depart from the usual rule that defendants have no general constitutional right to demand immunity for their witnesses. See United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1977). 21 APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.