Opinion ID: 2973286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Department of Education’s

Text: Regulation and Interpretation The DOE, the federal agency charged with promulgating regulations for the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1406, agrees that § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) state the same limitations period. In its regulations following the 2004 reenactment, the DOE simply reproduced both subsections verbatim. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), and 1415(f)(3)(C), with 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(2), and 300.511(e). In its Analysis of Comments and Changes to those regulations, however, the DOE reported that commenters were confused and sought guidance, “because the statute of limitations is mentioned twice and implies that the timeline for filing a complaint and filing a request for a due process hearing are different.” Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities & Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006). It responded that “[t]he statute of limitations in section [1415(b)(6)(B)] of the Act is the same as the statute of limitations in section [1415(f)(3)(C)] of the Act.” Id. In this appeal, at our request, the DOE also submitted an amicus letter brief in which it reiterated its position that the 40 subsections are, in fact, referencing a single statute of limitations.17 We afford the DOE’s interpretation of its regulation and its position before us here “‘respect’ . . . to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade,’” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see id. at 256-57 (holding that an agency’s interpretation of regulations that merely parrot the statute are accorded Skidmore deference, rather than the higher deference generally accorded to interpretive guidance under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). Here, we find the DOE’s position persuasive because it accords with the language, structure and purpose of the statute, and it is yet one more voice in a harmonious chorus that § 1415(b)(6)(B) was intended to reiterate § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s two-year statute of limitations. 17 The IDEA also tasks the DOE with promulgating a model notice of procedural safeguards. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(e). In that model notice, it again repeated the language of § 1415(b)(6), but cautioned states that if they “established a specific timeframe for requesting a hearing under the IDEA that is different than two years (either shorter or longer), revise the above statement to reflect that timeframe.” United States Department of Education, Part B Procedural Safeguards Notice, 17 (2009), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/modelformsafeguards.doc. Again, such a caution to revise the limitations notice shorter or longer based on a state’s statute of limitations only makes sense if § 1415(b)(6)(B) is, in fact, a statute of limitations. 41 To the extent there remains any doubt about this conclusion, it is put to rest by the legislative history, to which we next turn.