Opinion ID: 2594624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Same Set of Operative Facts

Text: Observing that Deloza provides no guidance as to the meaning of the phrase same set of operative facts, the Court of Appeal majority below concluded these offenses did arise from the same set of operative facts. The court characterized the aggravated assault upon LaVastida as an escape attempt which immediately followed the theft from the market. The court went on to reason: The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. CD-ROM) provides the relevant definition of the word `set': `A number of things connected in temporal or spatial succession or by natural production or formation.' Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1981) at page 2078 defines `set' as: `A number of things naturally connected by location or order in time.' These definitions show that `set' as used in the phrase `same set of operative facts' imports the same concepts of closeness in time and location as the phrase `same occasion,' and also adds an implication of `natural connection' between the facts of several crimes. Thus the definitions of the words used in section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7), suggest that consecutive sentences are not required where the several current crimes occurred close together in space and time, and had some connection between them.  (Italics added.) We cannot agree with the Court of Appeal's construction of the term same set of operative facts, nor with its conclusion that these offenses fell within the meaning of that phrase. In construing the relevant provisions of subdivision (c)(6), as with any statute, we strive to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's intent. ( People v. Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 8, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313.) Because statutory language generally provides the most reliable indicator of that intent ( Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 891 P.2d 804), we turn to the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meanings and construing them in context. ( People v. Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 9, 69 Cal. Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313). `If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, ... the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs.' ( Ibid. ) We do not disagree with the Court of Appeal's understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of the words same set found in subdivision (c)(6). Given the definitions provided, we agree it appears reasonable to conclude those words import the same concepts of closeness in time and space as the phrase same occasion found in subdivision (c)(6). But the Court of Appeal failed to attach any significance whatsoever to the modifier operative which also appears in the phrase same set of operative facts. The relevant definition of the term operative from Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993) is producing an appropriate or designed effect; exerting force or influence. ( Id. at p. 1581.) Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.1989) defines operative as active in producing, or having the power to produce, effects; exerting force, energy, or influence. ( Id. at p. 850.) The ordinary and common definition of operativeproducing an appropriate or desired effect; exerting force or influenceis consistent with prior judicial constructions of that term finding it refers to the facts of a case which prove the underlying current charged offense. As the court in People v. Durant (1999) 68 Cal. App.4th 1393, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 ( Durant ) explained: the phrase `the same set of operative facts' has been judicially interpreted in collateral estoppel and election of remedies cases to refer to those facts which prove a criminal or civil defendant's liability for a particular wrongful act. ( People v. Nunez (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 214, 221, 228 Cal.Rptr. 64; General Ins. Co. v. Mammoth Vista Owners' Assn. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 810, 828, 220 Cal. Rptr. 291; People v. Superior Court ( Jackson ) (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 494, 502, 118 Cal.Rptr. 702.) Generally, `[w]here the language of a statute uses terms that have been judicially construed, `the presumption is almost irresistible' that the terms have been used `in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts.' [Citations.] This principle applies to legislation adopted through the initiative process. [Citation.]' ( People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 845-846, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.) While we have not found this exact phrase construed in other statutes, it has often been used by courts to refer to the facts of a case which prove the underlying act upon which a defendant had been found guilty. This meaning comports with the finding made by the court in People v. Martin (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 656, 663-664, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, disapproved on another point in People v. Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 600, footnote 10, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945, that although `... the term operative facts has not always been used in precisely the same way [citations], [the court] believe[d] that in section 667, subdivision (c)(6) [such term] relates to the facts underlying the current charged offenses.' ( People v. Martin, supra, [32 Cal.App.4th] at pp. 663-664 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 776].) We agree and thus believe that consistent with its common usage the enactors of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12 used the phrase `the same set of operative facts' with such general meaning in mind. ( Durant, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1405, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 207.) In Durant, the defendant was convicted of burglary and two counts of attempted burglary, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences for the three current convictions under the same occasion/same operative facts exception to the mandatory consecutive-sentencing requirement of the three strikes law. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding the trial court had imposed an unlawful sentence because the three crimes did not come within the same occasion/same operative facts exception despite the fact that defendant had committed all the offenses at the same general location (a housing complex), against what arguably might be deemed the same group of victims (persons in the housing complex whom he burglarized or attempted to burglarize), and although the offenses occurred in succession without intervening events. The Durant court emphasized that the two attempted burglaries, by their nature and elements, were completed before defendant committed the completed burglary, and that the crimes did not occur on the same occasion as that term is commonly understood. Nor did the duration of the crimes overlap, each being distinct and completed when defendant attempted to enter or successfully entered a residence and then left to go burglarize another residence. ( Durant, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1396-1400, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 207.) The Durant court, applying the above described definition of same set of operative facts to the facts before it, reasoned that In applying this definition to any particular case, the nature and elements of the current charged offense becomes highly relevant. For example, when a robbery is charged, its continuous nature, its elements and the facts used to support those elements are the `operative facts' underlying the commission of that crime. If another offense is committed while the facts underlying that robbery are unfolding, it will necessarily arise from the same set of operative facts as the original robbery. However, where the elements of the original crime have been satisfied, any crime subsequently committed will not arise from the same set of operative facts underlying the completed crime; rather such crime is necessarily committed at a different time. For instance, with the crime of burglary, where the offense is complete when there is an entry into a structure with felonious intent, `regardless of whether the felony or theft committed is different from that contemplated at the time of entry, or whether any felony or theft actually is committed' ( People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041-1042, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903), the commission after the first burglary of a crime or burglary of another structure necessarily will arise out of different operative facts than those underlying the original offense. ( Durant, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1405-1406, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 207.) We find the rationale of Durant instructive on the meaning and probable intent behind use of the phrase same set of operative facts in section 667, subdivision (c)(6). We read the mandatory consecutive-sentencing provision of the three strikes law as follows: If there are two or more current felony convictions not committed on the same occasion, i.e., not committed within close temporal and spacial proximity of one another, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, i.e., not sharing common acts or criminal conduct that serves to establish the elements of the current felony offenses of which defendant stands convicted, then the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision (c)(6). Conversely, where a sentencing court determines that two or more current felony convictions were either committed on the same occasion or aris[e] from the same set of operative facts as we have construed those terms in Deloza and the instant case, consecutive sentencing is not required under the three strikes law, but is permissible in the trial court's sound discretion. In concluding in Deloza that the four robberies of which the defendant was convicted were all committed on the same occasion, we acknowledged that additional factors may be found relevant in defining the precise parameters of this phrase in future cases. ( Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 596, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945, fn. omitted.) Similar words of caution are in order respecting our interpretation of the phrase same set of operative facts herein. Durant suggests that the nature and elements of the current charged offensesfor example, the extent to which common acts and elements of such offenses unfold together or overlap, and the extent to which the elements of one offense have been satisfied, rendering that offense completed in the eyes of the law before the commission of further criminal acts constituting additional and separately chargeable crimesare additional factors the court must consider in determining whether multiple current crimes arose from the same set of operative facts when the offenses are committed more than seconds apart. ( Durant, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 207.) There may be others. Returning to the facts of this case, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeal majority that defendant's current offenses [arose] from the same set of operative facts. Defendant's initial crime was the shoplifting theft of a bottle of brandy from a market. Although still in flight from the crime scene, he thereafter chose to commit new and different offenses: the trespass into the Rojas/LaVastida backyard, and the ensuing assaults against Rojas and LaVastida. The first crime involved an act of theft directed at one group of victims, the second involved assaultive conduct directed at an unrelated pair of victims. The two criminal episodes were separated spatially by at least one to three city blocks, and temporally by two to three or more minutes (from the time defendant stole the brandy from the market until the point he committed the aggravated assault upon LaVastida after having fled from the first crime scene, trespassed into the Rojas/LaVastida backyard, and fled again, chased by Rojas out of the yard and down a long driveway to the street, where he hit LaVastida with the bottle before being subdued). On these facts we conclude that defendant's felony assault upon LaVastida did not arise out of the same set of operative facts as the theft from the market. Because defendant's multiple current felony convictions neither were committed on the same occasion within the meaning of Deloza nor arose from the same set of operative facts, the trial court correctly concluded it was mandated by subdivision (c)(6) to sentence consecutively.