Opinion ID: 2345415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Richardson's Employment Agreement

Text: [¶ 9] The issue of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. Whalen v. Down East Cmty. Hosp., 2009 ME 99, ¶ 15, 980 A.2d 1252, 1256. Contract language is only ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible [to] different interpretations. Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 989, 993 (quotation marks omitted). When a contract is unambiguous, its construction is also a question of law. Id. We will interpret a contract according to the plain meaning of its language, id., and will avoid any interpretation that renders a provision meaningless. Ackerman v. Yates, 2004 ME 56, ¶ 10, 847 A.2d 418, 422. [¶ 10] In this case, Richardson argues that the Contract permits unlimited accrual of vacation time by the use of the word accumulated in provision 8.2. Therefore, he argues, he should be paid for all 178 days of vacation time that he accumulated because, pursuant to section 626, vacation time is to be treated like wages earned, which must be paid in full. 26 M.R.S. § 626. Richardson contends that Rowell does not apply to him since, unlike the Rowell plaintiffs, he satisfied the Contract's terms for earning vacation time. [¶ 11] On the issue of vacation pay at retirement, the Contract is unambiguous. Despite Richardson's contentions, the plain language of provision 8.2 clearly limits his entitlement to vacation pay upon retirement to thirty days. Richardson's argument to the contrary would read provision 8.2 out of the Contract. The court, therefore, did not err in finding that Richardson was not entitled to any further payments. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.