Opinion ID: 624962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Award of Attorney's Costs Under the Settlement Agreement

Text: Finally, Hilton argues that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and a number of cases interpreting that statute, he is entitled to recover the reasonable expenses of the litigation. The defendants argue that the provisions of the Settlement Agreement displaced Section 1988 to the extent that it would otherwise apply. [9] We agree, as a plain reading of the Settlement Agreement favors this interpretation. After providing for Hilton's lawyers' (Class Counsel) full reimbursement for fees and costs up until the Agreement was signed, it states in relevant part: Class Counsel will further be paid at a rate of $160 an hour for attorney time and $80 an hour for paralegal time for hours incurred during the two year monitoring period described herein. Fees for the herein described monitoring period will capped [sic] at $20,000. Class Counsel reserves the right to seek Court intervention to enlarge this limit upon a showing that such enlargement is reasonable to enforce the terms of this Agreement. Although Hilton argues that the parties contracted only as to fees and not costs, the language of the Agreement shows an intent to cap all reimbursement at $20,000 subject to the district court's discretion to enlarge the limit. The Section 1988 jurisprudence relied upon by Hilton in his claim for out-of-pocket costs actually buttresses this interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. Under that statute, the term Attorney's Fees includes reasonable litigation expenses. See, e.g., U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir.1989); Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P. C., 818 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir.1987). Moreover, there is no question that the Settlement Agreement covered paralegal fees. Hilton concedes that a substantial portion of the out-of-pocket costs was for paralegal work that, if billed at the Settlement Agreement's rate, would far exceed the $20,000 cap. Hilton's repackaging of the paralegal work as out-of-pocket at cost, rather than at the higher agreed upon paralegal rate, is insufficient to circumvent the terms of the Agreement. Insofar as the district court seems to have interpreted the Agreement to affirmatively preclude recovery of such costs, we find no support for this position in the language of the Agreement. Thus, to the extent that out-of-pocket costs combined with attorney's fees exceeded the Agreement's $20,000 limit, the district court has discretion to raise the limit. As it does not appear that the court exercised this discretion, we remand for further consideration of the issue of Hilton's out-of-pocket expenses and instruct the district court to consider whether such costs should be awarded pursuant to paragraph six of the Settlement Agreement.