Opinion ID: 4468212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff’s Claim Under California Labor Code

Text: Section 1102.5. In California, decisions by administrative agencies typically have preclusive effect, provided that they have a sufficiently “judicial character” and that the elements of 8 BAHRA V. CTY. OF SAN BERNARDINO claim or issue preclusion are satisfied. Murray v. Alaska Airlines, 237 P.3d 565, 568–69 (Cal. 2010); Runyon v. Bd. of Trs., 229 P.3d 985, 994 (Cal. 2010). But courts will not afford preclusive effect to an administrative decision if doing so would contravene the intent of the California legislature. Fahlen v. Sutter Cent. Valley Hosps., 318 P.3d 833, 845–46 (Cal. 2014); see also State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs v. Superior Ct, 201 P.3d 457, 464 (Cal. 2009) (California courts do not give preclusive effect to the results of agency proceedings “if doing so is contrary to the intent of the legislative body that established the proceeding in which [preclusion] is urged.” (quoting Pac. Lumber Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 126 P.3d 1040, 1055 (Cal. 2006))). The California Court of Appeal recently applied the legislative-intent exception and held that administrative findings by a state agency do not preclude claims for retaliation brought under section 1102.5. Taswell v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 643 (Ct. App. 2018). Accordingly, unless we are “convinced” that the California Supreme Court would disagree with Taswell, we are bound by its holding. Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1036 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994)). The California Supreme Court’s decision in Murray does not convince us to deviate from Taswell. In Murray, the California Supreme Court considered the preclusive effect of a federal agency’s investigative findings when the plaintiff had elected not to pursue a formal adjudicatory hearing or subsequent judicial review. 237 P.3d at 566. The court held that the plaintiff’s retaliation claim was precluded. Id. at 568. But Murray does not require us to give preclusive effect here BAHRA V. CTY. OF SAN BERNARDINO 9 to the Commission’s order with respect to Plaintiff’s section 1102.5 claim, for several reasons. First, the California Supreme Court expressly limited the scope of its holding in Murray. The court held that preclusion applied there in light of “the particular factual and procedural circumstances of this case, and the particular provision of the . . . statutory scheme here at issue.” Id. Murray does not stand for the proposition that all administrative agency findings preclude claimants from asserting section 1102.5 claims in civil actions. Additionally, Murray involved concerns for “comity and federalism,” id. at 577, that are wholly inapposite to this case. Most significantly, Murray applied a different test than the test applied in Taswell. Murray considered whether the federal administrative proceeding possessed a “sufficiently judicial character.” Id. at 568. Taswell considered the legislative intent of section 1102.5. 232 Cal. Rptr. at 643. Both tests apply in analyzing whether preclusion applies. Pac. Lumber, 126 P.3d at 1055–56. In other words, Taswell and Murray assessed different legal questions. Thus, they are not inconsistent. Moreover, Defendants have not persuaded us that the Taswell court misapplied California law such that the California Supreme Court would disagree with its reasoning or its conclusion. Taswell applied principles derived from California Supreme Court precedents to resolve the question whether preclusion applied to the plaintiff’s section 1102.5 claims. Those precedents include Fahlen, which post-dates Murray. Significantly, Fahlen recognized the intent of the California legislature to create “distinct fora and procedures” for retaliation claims, separate and apart from administrative 10 BAHRA V. CTY. OF SAN BERNARDINO procedures that address adverse employment actions. 318 P.3d at 846 & n.10. Because we conclude that the California Supreme Court likely would agree with Taswell, we hold that the Commission’s order does not preclude Plaintiff’s section 1102.5 claim. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s ruling to the contrary.