Opinion ID: 2084660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Standard of Review and Argument of the Parties

Text: In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if proved, would entitle him or her to relief. See Arfaa v. Martino, 404 Md. 364, 380-81, 946 A.2d 995, 1004-05 (2008). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a reviewing court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint, as well as all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from them. Id. at 380, 946 A.2d at 1004. A dismissal is proper only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff. Id. at 380-81, 946 A.2d at 1005. The court must view all well-pleaded facts and the inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 380, 946 A.2d at 1004-05. Before this Court, Pittway and Ryland argue that this Court should affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court because, as a matter of law, they did not proximately cause the plaintiffs' injuries. They argue that the injuries occurred because, in violation of the Gaithersburg City rental ordinances, the children were sleeping in windowless basement bedrooms that lacked emergency egress. In addition, the injuries occurred because the Lis, the landlords, had modified the original, unfinished basement, on two occasions to include windowless bedrooms, and five years after the house was built, the owners did not follow code provisions that required the installation of new, dual-powered smoke detectors outside the bedrooms. Finally, Pittway and Ryland argue that the injuries occurred because the children went to sleep, leaving lit candles, in the windowless basement rooms, without emergency egress and without adult supervision. Petitioners assert that the Court of Special Appeals misconstrued their argument, misapplied longstanding principles of Maryland law, and confused the different components of proximate cause, in deciding the case as though they had argued the absence of causation-in-fact, which petitioners had not done, while conducting no analysis of legal causation and superseding cause, which had been the entire focus of petitioners' motions. Petitioners complain that the Court of Special Appeals improperly considered matters beyond the four corners of the Complaint in deciding the motion to dismiss. In sum, petitioners argue that the correct legal analysis leads to the conclusion that, as the Circuit Court ruled, as a matter of law, Ryland and Pittway did not proximately cause plaintiffs' damages because they could not have reasonably foreseen, in 1989, the intervening negligent and illegal acts, when, in compliance with all applicable code provisions, they manufactured and installed a single-powered smoke detector in the unfinished basement. They ask this Court to hold that, as a matter of law, the intervening acts of others broke any chain of causation running from their alleged acts or omissions to the injuries that occurred nine years later. Ryland concedes that the Court of Special Appeals recognized, correctly, that the issue on appeal related solely to issues of superseding causes and to the absence of causation. Ryland quotes from the appellate opinion that the court recognized the proper standard, i.e., that the proper focus is only on the four corners of the Complaint. Ryland concedes also that the court enunciated the correct legal principles pertaining to proximate cause. The gravamen of Ryland's Complaint with the Court of Special Appeals opinion is that although the court articulated the guiding principles correctly, the court misapplied the correctly stated principles by failing to focus on the issue of legal causation and instead focusing on causation-in-fact, or a but for cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Ryland states in its brief the following argument: But although the court seemed to grasp the correct legal principles and the correct scope of review, it proceeded to decide the case on an entirely different set of principles and to base its decision on materials well beyond `the four corners of the complaint.' Specifically, rather than focus on the issue of legal causation i.e., the issue of whether the Lis' and Chapmans' wrongful acts were so unforeseeable as to constitute superseding causes and to break the chain running from Ryland's alleged acts or omissionsthe court focused on whether the absence of a functioning smoke detector did or did not represent a cause-in-fact or but-for cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. Moreover, rather than review the well-pleaded factual allegations of the plaintiffs' actual complaint, the court based its decision on testimony from depositions that were taken before Ryland (or the manufacturers) had even become parties to the case. Brief of Ryland at 29. While Pittway does not concede as readily that the Court of Special Appeals recognized the proper standard for superseding causation, it echoed Ryland's contention that the Court of Special Appeals erred in conflating cause-in-fact with legal cause. Pittway contended that the Court of Special Appeals focused on whether its negligence was a substantial factor in causing respondents' injuries rather than on a determination of proximate cause. Pittway stated as follows: [T]he doctrine of `superseding cause relieves the actor from liability, irrespective of whether his antecedent negligence was or was not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. ' Courts must assume that the first actor's alleged negligence was a substantial cause, or cause-in-fact, of the plaintiff's injuries before even considering the question of superseding cause. While the `substantial factor' inquiry is largely fact driven, the superseding cause analysis is legal in nature, subject to `considerations of fairness and social policy.' None of the `fact issues' identified by the Court of Special Appeals has any bearing on the superseding cause analysis. Correctly following the legal standards discussed above and for considering a motion to dismiss, the circuit court assumed that the Manufacturer Appellants' alleged negligence did, in fact, contribute to the plaintiffs' injuries. The court then applied the superseding cause analysis to determine whether the Manufacturer Appellants could not have proximately caused the injuries under the law of proximate causation. The `fact issues' identified by the Court of Special Appeals relate exclusively to that which the circuit court properly assumed in accordance with this Court's prior holdings, i.e., that the Manufacturer Appellants' negligence was a substantial factor. Brief of Pittway at 26-27.