Opinion ID: 1916716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: definition of intent

Text: The defendant acknowledges that this claim of error was not properly preserved in the court below. See Practice Book §§852, 854, 3063. This unpreserved error, however, is reviewable under State v. Evans, supra, because it falls under the exceptional circumstances therein contemplated. State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 558, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982). One of the elements of murder under General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) is that the accused act with intent to cause the death of another person. The state is required to prove all of the elements of the charge, including the element of intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 162-63, 397 A.2d 89 (1978). The court was required to instruct the jury as to the essential elements of the crime and the criminal intent necessary to commit the offenses charged. State v. Sumner, 178 Conn. 163, 170, 422 A.2d 299 (1979). Jury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate, so long as they are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury. Castaldo v. D'Eramo, 140 Conn. 88, 94, 98 A.2d 664 (1953); see Messina v. Iannucci, 174 Conn. 275, 278, 386 A.2d 241 (1978); State v. Sawicki, 173 Conn. 389, 396, 377 A.2d 1103 (1977); Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 76. This court considers a charge in its entirety. An error in instructions in a criminal case is reversible error when it is shown that it is reasonably possible for errors of constitutional dimension or reasonably probable for nonconstitutional errors that the jury were misled. State v. Ruiz, 171 Conn. 264, 273-74, 368 A.2d 222 (1976); State v. Rose, 169 Conn. 683, 687-88, 363 A.2d 1077 (1975). To provide adequate instructions to the jury on an element of an offense, the trial court must explain what the element means and, in the appropriate context, provide the jury with guidelines for determining whether the element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case there is no claim that the trial court failed to give adequate guidelines on how the jury should evaluate the defendant's intent. [7] Cf. State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 571-72, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (Speziale, C. J., dissenting). It is claimed, however, that the trial court failed to explain adequately what is meant by intent, because the court did not read the jury the applicable statutory definition. Section 53a-3 (11) of the General Statutes [8] expressly states the definition of the word intentionally and is, therefore, directly applicable to the charge against the defendant. [9] The defendant maintains that the trial court failed to define intent adequately and, consequently, he was prejudiced. We have considered, however, the entire charge and find that the trial court's instructions on intent were adequate to explain the meaning of intent to the jury. Although it would have been preferable for the court to have read § 53a-3 (11) to the jury, the record indicates that on five occasions during the course of the instructions the court referred not just to intent but to the accused's purpose or intent. [10] The court made it clear that intent was synonymous with purpose, thereby adequately explaining that intent, as defined by § 53a-3 (11), means conscious objective or purpose. The jury could not have been misled with such an instruction. There was, therefore, no error in the trial court's explanation of intent. There is no error.