Opinion ID: 2248448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the two part standard of review:

Text: A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient-performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland, supra at 2064. Appellant's first premise is that counsel failed to present the trial court's denial of his motion for change of venue as an issue on appeal. Appellant, a white man, was married to a black woman. He desired a change of venue because he believed that he could not receive a fair trial in Morgan County due to alleged racial prejudice. The transcript of the venue hearing shows that his trial counsel entered two affidavits, media documentation, and a cassette of a radio broadcast in order to persuade the trial court to grant the motion. However, to be entitled to a change of venue from a county, the defense is required to show that jurors were unable to set aside their preconceived notions of guilt and to render a verdict based upon the evidence. Robinson v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1287. His trial counsel pointed out in the post-conviction hearing that the trial record held little or no hope of meeting this legal standard. Furthermore, his trial counsel stated that appellant's case was not prejudiced. Counsel's performance was not deficient and appellant suffered no resulting harm. Appellant's second premise is that counsel failed to object to lay testimony which expressed opinions on his sanity. As was mentioned in issue I, the lay testimony was properly admitted. Furthermore, counsel did object the first time that State's witness, Michael Goins, was asked to give an opinion. Counsel's decision not to continue objecting was sound trial strategy and was not deficient. The trial court's denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur. HUNTER, J., not participating.