Opinion ID: 3017097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones and the Interstate Commerce Element

Text: of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) As we have noted, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) makes it a federal crime to “maliciously damage[] or destroy[], or attempt[] to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. . . .” Id. (emphasis added). In Jones, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not “evoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause” in 19 enacting § 844(i) and that the “key” words here are “the qualifying words ‘used in’ a commerce-affecting activity.” Jones, 529 U.S. at 854. By its terms, the statute applies only to property that is ‘used’ in interstate commerce or in an activity that affects interstate commerce. This “used in” qualification, the Court concluded, “is most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce. . . .” Id. at 855 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the “proper inquiry . . . ‘is into the function of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce.’” Id. at 854 (quoting from United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In this context, it is of course “clear . . . that only businessrelated activities constitute ‘commerce.’” United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1981); see Jones, 529 U.S. at 854-55 n.6 (endorsing Mennuti in relevant part). “Interstate commerce” is defined as “commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 841(b). Applying this interpretation of the statute to the facts before it, the Jones Court held that “an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property ‘used in’ commerce or commerce affecting activity.” Jones, 529 U.S. at 850-51. The owners’ securing natural gas, a mortgage, and an insurance policy from out of state was found not to constitute “use” of the property in a commerce or commerce-affecting activity. In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that if nothing more than these de minimis connections to interstate commerce were required to come within the scope of § 844(i), 20 “hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute’s domain.” Id. at 857. This fact required adoption of the petitioner’s narrower construction “[g]iven the [constitutional] concerns brought to the fore in Lopez” regarding the power of Congress “to render the ‘traditionally local criminal conduct’ in which petitioner Jones engaged ‘a matter for federal enforcement.’” Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)). Section 844(i), the Court concluded, is not “soundly read to make virtually every arson in the country a federal offense.” Jones, 529 U.S. at 859. The text–“used in interstate commerce . . . or in any activity affecting interstate . . . commerce”–“suggests two methods by which a building can fall within section 844(i)’s interstate commerce element: the commercial function of the property could directly inject it into the stream of interstate . . . commerce and/or the building’s functions could cause it to be used in an activity affecting interstate commerce.” United States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952, 961 (8th Cir. 2002). We do not understand the Government to contend that the church Davies burned was directly in the stream of interstate commerce. It does insist, however, that the church building was used in activities affecting interstate commerce. We know from Jones, however, that for a building to be in that category it must be “active[ly] employ[ed] for commercial purposes.” Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether, at the time of the fire, the Calvary Baptist Church building was so employed.