Opinion ID: 3068429
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ceballos

Text: Ceballos also contends that the district court erred in applying a two-level increase for obstruction of justice. In essence, Ceballos argues that the district court’s application of the enhancement deprives a defendant of his right to assert a defense. In United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 88-89 (1993), the Supreme Court addressed the issue “whether the Constitution permits a court to enhance a defendant’s sentence under [§ 3C1.1], if the court finds the defendant 14 Case: 10-50940 Document: 00511825406 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/17/2012 No. 10-50940 committed perjury at trial.” The Court held that “[u]pon a proper determination that the accused has committed perjury at trial, an enhancement of sentence is required by the Sentencing Guidelines . . . [and] [t]hat requirement . . . is not in contravention of the privilege of an accused to testify in her own behalf.” Id. at 98. In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that an enhanced sentence for perjury undermines the right to testify and distorts the decision whether to remain silent. Id. at 96 (noting that the right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury). Ceballos acknowledges the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dunnigan but maintains that the decision was wrongly decided. As such, Ceballos’s argument is foreclosed.3