Opinion ID: 3037281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Malicious Prosecution

Text: In assessing the United States’ liability under the FTCA, we are required to apply the law of the state in which the alleged tort occurred. Trenouth v. United States, 764 F.2d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, Conrad’s malicious prosecution claim is for actions and events occurring in California. Thus, California law applies. [11] To prove a claim of malicious prosecution in California, the plaintiff must prove that the underlying prosecution: “(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 501 (Cal. 1989). In this case, our analysis of the district court’s probable cause determination is dispositive of the entire claim. “The question of probable cause is one of law, but if there is a dispute concerning the defendant’s knowledge of facts on which [the initial prosecution was] based, the [trier of fact] must resolve that threshold question.” Sierra Club Found. v. Graham, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Here, a question of fact existed as to whether Agent Osuna knowingly lied in her affidavit and grand jury testimony. CONRAD v. UNITED STATES 5291 Thus, the district court, as the trier of fact, had to resolve that question before making a legal conclusion as to probable cause. To resolve the dispute, the district court held a trial and heard the testimony of a number of the parties involved in the criminal prosecution, including Conrad and Agent Osuna. After hearing Agent Osuna’s testimony, which was not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, the district court credited her version of events and found that she did not knowingly lie in her affidavit or grand jury testimony. This was particularly true, according to the district court, because it would have been impossible for Agent Osuna to have lied in her affidavit and grand jury testimony unless three other investigators and the AUSA were complicit in the lie. [12] We review the district court’s finding on this point only for clear error and, therefore, must affirm unless we are firmly convinced an error has been made. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). “If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, [we] may not reverse it even though convinced that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. at 573-74. “[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding . . . can virtually never be clear error.” Id. at 575. To determine whether probable cause existed after finding the necessary facts, the district court had to “make an objective determination of the ‘reasonableness’ of [Agent Osuna’s] conduct, i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to [Agent Osuna], the institution of the prior action was legally tenable.” Sheldon Appel, 765 P.2d at 506. “When . . . the claim of malicious prosecution is based upon the initiation of a criminal prosecution, the question of probable cause 5292 CONRAD v. UNITED STATES is whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendant . . . to suspect the plaintiff . . . had committed a crime.” Ecker v. Raging Waters Group, Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320, 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). In a federal criminal prosecution, a grand jury finds probable cause. McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987). And, under California tort law, a grand jury indictment creates a presumption in favor of the malicious-prosecution defendant that probable cause existed for the underlying prosecution. Williams v. Hartford Ins. Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 448, 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The plaintiff can rebut the presumption, however, by demonstrating that the indictment was procured on the basis of false testimony. Id. “[I]f [the] defendant knows that the facts he or she is asserting are not true, then [the] defendant’s knowledge of facts which would justify initiating suit is zero, and probable cause is nonexistent.” Sierra Club, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737. [13] In this case, Conrad’s indictment was handed down by a grand jury, establishing a rebuttable presumption of probable cause. See Williams, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 452. In an attempt to rebut this presumption, Conrad alleged that his indictment was secured using Agent Osuna’s false testimony. As noted above, however, the district court’s finding with respect to Agent Osuna’s truthfulness was not clearly erroneous and cannot be reversed. The district court’s finding conclusively establishes that Conrad’s grand jury indictment was proper. Because we conclude that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, we affirm the district court’s judgment that Conrad failed to rebut the presumption of probable cause and that his malicious prosecution claim therefore must fail. Sheldon Appel, 765 P.2d at 504 (“If the court determines that there was probable cause to institute the prior action, the malicious prosecution action fails, whether or not there is evidence that the prior suit was maliciously motivated.”). The district court did not err by granting judgment in favor of the United States. CONRAD v. UNITED STATES 5293