Opinion ID: 4222972
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proportionality in light of prior cases

Text: The concept that the penalty decided upon by the CJD should be subject to a proportionality requirement is not without some appeal. In some jurisdictions where, as with the pre-1993 JIRB-based framework, the commission makes a recommendation to be acted on de novo by the state supreme court, that court expressly takes precedent into account. See, e.g., Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boone, 60 So. 3d 172, 185 (Miss. 2011) (reciting that the appropriateness of the sanction recommended by the judicial performance commission is assessed with reference to six factors, including whether there is any case law on point). The difficulty for Appellant is that no such mandate is contained, or even suggested, in Article V, Sections 18(c)(2) and 18(d)(1). For us to forge a path along the lines suggested by Appellant, we would have to overlay upon those provisions a comparative-sanctions regime that cannot fairly be gleaned from their text.11 We would additionally do violence to the clear implication, arising from the 1993 amendments, that this Court’s review of the ultimate sanction imposed by the CJD is highly restricted. As explained, our review is only for lawfulness. Compare In re Merlo, 619 Pa. 1, 24, 58 A.3d 1, 15 (2012) (observing that Article V, Section 18 “sets forth removal as an available sanction for bringing disrepute upon the judicial office”), with In re Melograne, 11 Appellant’s brief does not include a claim that the application of this aspect of our state charter is limited by any provision of the United States Constitution. For its part, the dissent suggests that our explanation of the appropriate standard of appellate review “is patently violative of the United States Constitution.” Dissenting Opinion, slip op. at 26. However, to be lawful, the sanction issued by the CJD clearly must comport with the federal Constitution. As noted, there simply are no such issues raised in this appeal. [J-49A-2017] - 17 571 Pa. 490, 499, 812 A.2d 1164, 1169 (2002) (holding that the CJD’s disbarring of a former judge from the practice of law was unlawful because this Court has exclusive disbarment authority). See generally Berkhimer, 593 Pa. at 374-75, 930 A.2d at 1259 (noting that this Court reviews sanctions for lawfulness and does not re-weigh the penalty against aggravating and mitigating circumstances). In light of this constricted review and the lack of constitutional language tending to limit or guide the CJD in arriving at the appropriate discipline, the CJD has wide discretion to fashion the appropriate penalty once it finds a predicate violation. See, e.g., Merlo, 619 Pa. at 24, 58 A.3d at 15 (rejecting an argument similar to Appellant’s, namely, that the sanctions imposed were “unlawful because they are greater than those imposed in other cases”). Moreover, this Court has clarified that “[s]imilarity of misconduct does not require identicality of sanction, for there are other factors that bear on that decision, including mitigating and aggravating considerations and how a particular jurist’s misconduct undermines public confidence in the judiciary.” Id. at 24, 58 A.3d at 14-15 (quoting In re Lokuta, 608 Pa. 223, 262, 11 A.3d 427, 450 (2011)).12 We acknowledge Appellant’s belief that it appears unfair for her to be removed from office when earlier instances of judicial corruption, which she views as similar, were met with a lesser penalty. However, it is difficult to draw an equivalence among distinct cases of judicial misconduct, as the factors involved in each instance will naturally vary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has elaborated on this point: Past judicial misconduct cases . . . are of limited usefulness in setting the sanction appropriate for this case, which involves unique circumstances. We have not established, nor will we here, a “bright line” standard when, 12 Under Section 18(b)(5), the sanction must be “warranted by the record.” PA. CONST. art. V, §18(b)(5). Notably, that provision focuses on the record of the case at hand, and not the discipline meted out in earlier cases involving different judges. The interplay between Section 18(b)(5) and our review for lawfulness is addressed below. [J-49A-2017] - 18 for example, reprimand or censure is warranted as opposed to suspension. Each case is different, and is considered on the basis of its own facts. In re Crawford, 629 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Wis. 2001); accord Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 734 (Cal. 1998) (“Proportionality review based on discipline imposed in other cases . . . is neither required nor determinative. The factual variations from case to case are simply too great to permit a meaningful comparison in many instances.”). See generally Cynthia Gray, A Study of State Judicial Discipline Sanctions 81-82 (Am. Judicature Soc’y 2002) (enumerating 39 factors which courts have identified as relevant to the selection of an appropriate sanction, divided into the following categories: the nature of the misconduct; the extent of the misconduct; the judge’s culpability; the judge’s conduct in response to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings; and the judge’s record). It follows from the discretionary nature of the CJD’s discipline determination that some degree of variance is inevitable. The CJD will always be guided by its institutional obligation to protect citizens from improper judicial behavior, deter future judicial misconduct, protect the integrity of the Commonwealth’s judicial system, and reestablish the probity of, and public trust in, the court affected by the misconduct in question. This Court has repeatedly stated that imposition of discipline “not only punishes the wrongdoer, but also repairs the damaged public trust and provides guidance to other members of the judiciary regarding their conduct.” Berkhimer, 593 Pa. at 375, 930 A.2d at 1260 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As well, a judge who commits misconduct after other judges have been sanctioned for similar misconduct has the benefit of the CJD’s earlier decisions. As a result, “it is not unreasonable for the second, third, or fourth judge who commits a particular type of misconduct to receive a more severe sanction than the first judge who did so.” Gray, A Study of State Judicial Discipline Sanctions 66; see also id. at 66-67 [J-49A-2017] - 19 (documenting a trend by the Mississippi Supreme Court of increasingly severe discipline for ticket fixing, culminating in the removal of a jurist after the court’s “prior attempts to send a strong message to judges concerning ticket-fixing had ‘fallen on deaf ears’” (quoting Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Chinn, 611 So. 2d 849, 857 (Miss. 1992))); accord In re Waddick, 605 N.W.2d 861, 866 (Wis. 2000) (per curiam) (indicating that a harsher sanction was appropriate than in a prior case involving similar misconduct, in part, because the judge had the benefit of the court’s prior decision “to appreciate how seriously the court views” that type of misconduct). Therefore, the CJD’s view of the appropriate sanction for a particular type of misconduct may be adjusted as time and experience help to shape that tribunal’s understanding of the measures which are necessary to achieve its institutional purposes as delineated above. Thus, while the CJD is certainly capable of consulting prior decisions as a guide to the proper discipline for a given jurist, neither the Pennsylvania Constitution nor any other legal authority which has been brought to our attention requires it to impose sanctions which are proportional to the punishment meted out in earlier cases involving similar misconduct. C. Lawfulness in light of the record Appellant also argues that removal is “extremely harsh” and “unwarranted under the facts of this case.” Brief for Appellant at 50, 58. Although she does not reference Article V, Section 18(b)(5) as such, her contention implicates that paragraph’s indication that the CJD may “order removal from office, suspension, censure, or other discipline as authorized by this section and as warranted by the record.” PA. CONST. art. V, §18(b)(5) (emphasis added). Because the CJD may lawfully impose discipline warranted by the record, the unavoidable corollary is that a sanction which is not warranted by the record is not lawful and, as such, may be disapproved by this Court. [J-49A-2017] - 20 We view this as a limitation on the concept that we must so limit our review that the only question we address, in terms of the sanction, is whether it falls into a category which is theoretically “available” to the CJD. See, e.g., Berkhimer, 593 Pa. at 375, 930 A.2d at 1260 (indicating that removal was a lawful sanction because the Constitution “sets forth removal as an available sanction for bringing disrepute upon the judicial office”). The “available” litmus, standing alone, would be very broad, particularly in view of the open-ended categorization of the forms of discipline that the CJD may mete out. See PA. CONST. art. V, §18(d)(1) (stating that a jurist who commits misconduct may be suspended, removed from office, “or otherwise disciplined”); id. §18(b)(5) (containing similar language couched in terms of any “other discipline” authorized by Section 18). Hence, under the warranted-by-the-record prerequisite, this Court is able to perform a final check in cases of an infraction met with an unreasonably harsh penalty completely out of proportion to the misconduct involved. With the above principles in mind – and regardless of whether we would have removed Appellant from office if we were deciding on the appropriate sanction in the first instance – we ultimately reject Appellant’s contention that her removal from office was unwarranted by the record in this case. As the CJD pointed out, although Appellant at first only sought procedural advice from Waters, via ex parte communications she eventually solicited and accepted the assistance of both Waters and Segal to obtain special consideration for her son’s court case – consideration which other litigants would not have had available. In the context of this controversy it is uncontested that Appellant’s actions prejudiced the proper administration of justice and brought the judicial office into disrepute. Against such backdrop it was not unreasonable for the CJD to conclude that Appellant’s removal from the bench was an appropriate sanction in light of all of the facts of the case. [J-49A-2017] - 21 D. The dissent’s common law argument