Opinion ID: 1678008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the court erred in denying the appellants' motion for mistrial after the admission of evidence which had been excluded in limine.

Text: ¶ 7. A crack pipe was found at the scene of Cox and Shorty's arrest. On motion in limine of the defendants, the circuit court ruled that the prosecution could not introduce evidence of the pipe at trial. At trial, an officer testified that he saw a crack pipe in the car. Defense counsel objected, and the judge took the attorneys into chambers. In chambers the prosecutor said that he forgot to tell the officer not to mention the pipe. The judge proceeded with the trial and admonished the jury that it must disregard the pipe because it might have belonged to anybody. He then asked each juror if mention of the pipe would affect them, and each responded negatively. ¶ 8. Cox cites Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289 (Miss.1994), and Watts v. State, 635 So.2d 1364 (Miss.1994) (reversed for failing to give proper limiting instruction), for the propositions that robbery has its own motive and that the introduction of other crimes constitutes reversible error. These cases are distinguishable because they all relate to other crimes that were actually introduced into evidence under M.R.E. 404(b) to prove motive for the crime. ¶ 9. In Mack, we specifically held that prosecutors and trial courts alike should approach with caution any evidence of other crimes offered for the purpose of proving motive for a robbery. Robbery has its own motivethe attainment of something of value. 650 So.2d at 1313. We went on to hold that the admission into evidence of Mack smoking crack before and after the crime was harmless error due to the close connection of a specific monetary objective and because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. ¶ 10. Likewise, in Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452 (Miss.1997), cited by Shorty, the trial court admitted under Rule 404(b) evidence of crack use by Snelson long after the robbery was committed. We held that to be reversible error because there was no showing that Snelson's primary motivation was to purchase crack cocaine. This case is also distinguishable, as the trial judge in the instant case excluded evidence of the crack pipe and admonished the jury to disregard it when it was mentioned by the witness. ¶ 11. In Estes v. State, 533 So.2d 437, 439 (Miss.1988), the trial court granted a motion in limine to exclude other crimes as they related to Estes. The victim was being cross-examined and made reference to other crimes. The trial judge sustained the objection and struck the reference. The court also told the jury to disregard the testimony. We held this to be harmless error. It is well settled that when the trial judge sustains an objection to testimony and he directs the jury to disregard it, prejudicial error does not result. Id. (citing Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 810 (Miss.1987); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 783 (Miss.1984); Shelby v. State, 402 So.2d 338, 340 (Miss.1981)). On re-direct examination, the victim once again made a similar reference. We held this to be harmless error because [i]t is presumed that when a trial judge sustains an objection the jury understands that the trial court disapproves of the testimony. Id. (citing Davis v. State, 472 So.2d 428, 433 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 12. In the case at bar, the judge sustained the objection and ordered the jury to disregard testimony regarding the pipe. We have held that [t]he trial judge is in the best position for determining the prejudicial effect of an objectionable remark by either the prosecutor or a witness. Perkins v. State, 600 So.2d 938, 940 (Miss.1992). Where serious and irreparable damage has not resulted, the judge should admonish the jury then and there to disregard the impropriety. Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1178 (Miss.1990). The jury is presumed to have followed the admonition of the trial judge to disregard the remark. Dennis v. State, 555 So.2d 679, 682-83 (Miss.1989). Under the facts at bar, it cannot be said that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for mistrial.