Opinion ID: 2093466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Theft Versus Use of Property

Text: Defendant also argues that he cannot be prosecuted under section 16-1 for the theft by deception of the use of a hotel room because that offense is codified at section 16-3(a) (720 ILCS 5/16-3 (West 2000)) and must be charged as such. Section 16-3(a) provides: A person commits theft when he obtains the temporary use of property, labor or services of another which are available only for hire, by means of threat or deception or knowing that such use is without the consent of the person providing the property, labor or services. 720 ILCS 5/16-3 (West 2000). Violation of this section is punishable as a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/16-3(c) (West 2000). The question of law which we must answer is whether the two offenses are mutually exclusive, or whether under the facts of this case, the State properly charged defendant under section 16-1. We begin with a comparison of the elements of the two crimes. Section 16-1(a)(2)(A) requires that the defendant: (1) knowingly obtain control, (2) over the property of the owner, (3) by deception, (4) with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the property. The State must also prove (5) the value of the stolen property in order to establish the grade of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b) (West 2000). Section 16-3(a) requires that he (1) obtain the temporary use of property, (2) that is available only for hire, (3) by threat or deception or knowing that the owner has not consented. 720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2000). Each offense requires proof of one or more elements not required of the other. To convict a defendant of section 16-1 theft, the State need not prove that the property is available only for hire. To convict a defendant of section 16-3 theft, the State need not prove either the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the property or the value of the property. Nevertheless, defendant argues that the use of deception to obtain the temporary use of property that is available only for hire, such as a hotel suite, may be prosecuted only under section 16-3. He asserts that section 16-3 is directed at precisely the sort of conduct in which he allegedly engaged and that the legislature intended such conduct to be punished as a Class A misdemeanor. See Davis, 203 Ill.App.3d at 844, 148 Ill.Dec. 859, 561 N.E.2d 165 (holding that section 16-3 did not apply to the defendants' conduct of diverting the labor of city employees to their own purposes because section 16-3 is intended to protect businesses from the unscrupulous practices of prospective customers). Defendant also calls our attention to the comment of the drafters of section 16-3: This section codifies the `temporary use' aspect of sections 300 (now ch. 71, § 31) (hotels), 404b (customers list), 438 (commercial vehicle) and 439 (motor vehicle) of Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38. Ill. Ann.Stat., ch. 38, par. 16-3, Committee Comments  1961, at 218 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (Revised in 1970 by Charles H. Bowman). The section[ ] 300 referenced above was the first section of An Act to define and punish frauds upon hotel, inn, boarding and eating-house keepers. The act was approved in 1889. That section provided: [A]ny person who shall obtain food, lodging or other accommodation at any hotel, inn, boarding or eating house, with intent to defraud the owner or keeper thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars or imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding thirty days. See Ill. Rev. Stat 1933, ch. 38, par. 300. Defendant also points to the provisions of the Innkeeper Protection Act, which, although contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, parallels the language of section 16-3 of the Criminal Code: Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall obtain lodging, food, money, property or other accommodations at a hotel, inn, boarding house or lodging house without paying therefor shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. In case of a second conviction of the offense described, the punishment shall be that provided for a Class 4 felony. 740 ILCS 90/5 (West 2000). The Innkeeper Protection Act was in effect in Illinois as early as 1889 (1889 Ill. Laws 167). It was amended as recently as 1972 (Pub. Act 77-2529, § 1, eff. January 1, 1973). The State responds that sections 16-1 and 16-3 are not mutually exclusive, pointing to the drafters' comment that: `Because of the special characteristics of the stolen commodity, and the practical problems of knowledge and intent involved, the theft of lost or mislaid property, and of labor, services or the use of property, are dealt with separately in sections 16-2 and 16-3. However it should be noted that these offenses are also Theft. All other forms of theft are included in section 16-1 except the special deceptive practices proscribed by Article 17.' McCarty, 94 Ill.2d at 34, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 445 N.E.2d 298, quoting Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 38, art. 16, Committee Comments  1961, at 18 (Smith-Hurd 1977). Thus, the State argues, if it can prove the elements of a section 16-1 theft, it may prosecute under that section, even if the property is available for hire and the defendant's conduct might otherwise meet the elements of section 16-3. We conclude, for several reasons, that the State has the better argument. First, although the Innkeeper Protection Act and the forerunners of section 16-3 have been the law in Illinois for many decades, the legislature has not expressed any intent that these statutes are intended to be the exclusive basis for the prosecution of theft by deception of the use of a hotel room. Second, the prosecutor has broad discretion in determining whether to charge an individual with a criminal offense and the nature of the offense to be charged. Lyons v. Ryan, 201 Ill.2d 529, 539, 269 Ill.Dec. 374, 780 N.E.2d 1098 (2002). Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that the prosecutor has the discretion to decide which of two offenses to charge where two different statutes prohibit the same criminal conduct but prescribe different punishments. People v. McCollough, 57 Ill.2d 440, 443-44, 313 N.E.2d 462 (1974) (same set of facts may constitute separate offenses under different statutes); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L.Ed.2d 755, 764 (1979) (when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants). Where, as here, proof of theft under section 16-1 requires proof of elements not required under section 16-3, it is clear that the prosecutor has the exclusive discretion to decide which charge to bring. People v. Jamison, 197 Ill.2d 135, 161-62, 258 Ill. Dec. 514, 756 N.E.2d 788 (2001); see also People v. Barlow, 58 Ill.2d 41, 44, 317 N.E.2d 49 (1974) (when conduct violates more than one statute and the statutes require different proof or provide different defenses, a defendant is not denied equal protection of the law if he is prosecuted under the statute that provides the greater penalty). Third, the structure of section 16-1 evinces a clear legislative intent that the theft of property of greater value is deserving of greater punishment than the theft of less valuable property. Thus, the person who, through deception, steals one night's occupancy at a discount motel is less culpable than the person who steals one night's occupancy in a penthouse suite at a four-star hotel. The person who, through deception, steals one night's stay at a hotel is less culpable than the person who stays for three months. We note that under section 16-1(b)(1), [t]heft of property not from the person and not exceeding $300 in value is a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1) (West 2000). Similarly, any section 16-3 theft is a Class A misdemeanor. If the value of the hotel stay is under $300, both statutes yield the same result and the State may choose, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, to proceed under 16-3 because this charge is more easily proven. On the other hand, if the value of the hotel stay is greater than $300, and if the State can prove the additional elements, it may choose to proceed under section 16-1.