Opinion ID: 2323810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutionality of texas long arm statute

Text: Appellant next contends that application of the long arm statute is unconstitutional because she did not have the minimum contacts with Texas essential to satisfy the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Initially, we note that the Hearne and Atkins cases, supra, as well as the Gray case, supra n. 7, have all held that a state's assumption of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in fact situations similar to the present case met the requirements of due process. In both Atkins and Gray the contacts of the nonresident defendant with the respective forums were fortuitous, while in the case before us the contacts of appellant with the Texas forum were sought and established intentionally. Yet, in Atkins the Minnesota Supreme Court held: It seems only fair to permit one who has suffered a wrong at the hands of a resident of a foreign state to sue in his own state irrespective of whether he can show multiple transactions or not, quoting from its earlier decision in Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670, 677 (1959). The Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), ruled that application of the minimum contacts rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. There has been, over recent years, a clearly discernible trend toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over nonresidents. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). However slight or heavy may be the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has the minimal contacts. We are satisfied that under the facts of the present case appellant possessed the prerequisite minimal contacts for a valid exercise by the Texas trial court of personal jurisdiction over her. We are also convinced that for the Texas court to assume jurisdiction over appellant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, as laid down in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. Of her own choice and upon her own initiative appellant advertised her services in a publication designed for general circulation only in Texas. But for that advertisement, appellee might never have been in communication with appellant. All representations forming the basis for the suit were addressed to a Texas resident. All appellant's essential business purposes were carried on in Texas as fully as if she had been present in the state. The fact that the record of the Texas court does not show a continuous course of business transactions between appellant and numerous other Texas residents does not prevent either Texas or this court from finding the necessary minimum contacts. [8]