Opinion ID: 398311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellants' proposed jury instructions

Text: 17 The Berns assign error to the district court's failure to render their proffered instructions regarding (1) prejudgment interest and (2) recovery for heirs who have reached the age of majority.
18 At trial the Berns requested an instruction which would authorize the jurors to award interest on the appellants' recovery from the date of their parents' death. On appeal they maintain that Judge Ward's refusal to render this prejudgment interest instruction provides grounds for reversal. 19 The discretionary award of prejudgment interest on damages in actions other than contract is authorized by section 3288 of the California Civil Code. 1 This section, which permits an award of prejudgment interest for unliquidated tort claims, provides that: 20 In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury. 21 Cal.Civil Code § 3288; see, Greater Westchester Homeowners' Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.3d 86, 102-103, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 77, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). 22 In Bullis v. Security Pacific National Bank, 21 Cal.3d 801, 148 Cal.Rptr. 22, 582 P.2d 109 (1978), the Supreme Court of California affirmed an award of prejudgment interest in an action brought by a co-executor of an estate against a bank for damages flowing from the improper withdrawal of funds from the estate checking account by the other co-executor. The Court reasoned that both the amount of the loss suffered and the date on which the loss was suffered were readily ascertainable and that, therefore, the trial court's award of prejudgment interest did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Subsequently, in Greater Westchester Homeowners' Association v. City of Los Angeles, supra, (Greater Westchester), the Court disallowed the award of prejudgment interest on damages for mental and emotional injury in a nuisance action. The Court, in explaining and distinguishing Bullis, set forth a test for determining whether or not prejudgment interest is recoverable under § 3288: 23 In Bullis, we characterize prejudgment interest as awarded to compensate a party for the loss of his or her property. (Citations). The award of such interest represents the accretion of wealth which money or particular property could have produced during a period of loss. Using recognized and established techniques a fact finder can usually compute with fair accuracy the interest on a specific sum of money, or on property subject to specific valuation. Furthermore, the date of loss of the property is usually ascertainable, thus permitting an accurate interest computation. (Bullis, supra at p. 815 (148 Cal.Rptr. 22, 582 P.2d 109) ). However, damages for the intangible non-economic aspects of mental and emotional injury (involved in the nuisance action before the court) are of a different nature. They are inherently non-pecuniary, unliquidated and not readily subject to precise calculation. The amount of such damages is necessarily left to the subjective discretion of the trier of fact. Retroactive interest on such damages adds uncertain conjecture to speculation. 24 26 Cal.3d at 103, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329. 25 Applying the test set forth in Greater Westchester, we conclude that prejudgment interest is not recoverable in the Berns' wrongful death action because their damages were not subject to precise calculation. Unlike the situation in Bullis, the Berns were not deprived of the use of a readily ascertainable sum of money during the period from the decedent's death to the date of judgment. Here, as in Greater Westchester, the amount of the Berns' damages is, in large measure, a matter of jury discretion. 2 We believe the California Supreme Court's admonition in Greater Westchester is equally applicable to this wrongful death case: Retroactive interest on such damages adds uncertain conjecture to speculation. 26 Cal.3d at 103, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329.
26 The Berns secondly maintain that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to render an instruction regarding the pecuniary interest of children in their parents' assets and earnings after they reach the age of majority. Such an instruction would presumably authorize the jury to award damages for a time beyond the appellants' respective ages of majority. 3 The Berns compare their proffered instruction with one approved by the California Supreme Court in Redfield v. Oakland C.S.R. Co., 110 Cal. 277, 288, 42 P. 822 (1895), mod. and reh. denied, 42 P. 1063 (1896). 4 In contrast to the permissive language approved in Redfield, the Berns offered an instruction which referred to a child's right to enjoy parental benevolence after such child attained the age of majority. 5 The proffered instruction approaches a mandatory directive to award such damages whereas the instruction in Redfield permitted jurors to award damages past the age of majority if they found a basis to justify such an award. 27 Since the Berns' instruction was not synonymous with the instruction approved in Redfield, the court was not compelled to include it at the trial herein. Even in the absence of this discrepancy, the approval of the instruction in Redfield did not necessarily thereafter compel the rendering of a comparable instruction in all wrongful death actions. Finally, even if the failure to give such an instruction constituted error, the Berns have failed to demonstrate how its absence served to prejudice their interests. The general instruction regarding compensation for the value of all probable future benefits that each child would be reasonably certain to lose in the future adequately encompassed the scope of appellants' recoverable loss.