Opinion ID: 1657574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: it was error for the trial court to permit the prosecution to put into evidence matters beyond the scope of the two aggravating circumstances.

Text: Russell combines these two assignments of error in his brief and they will be discussed jointly in this opinion. Russell contends here that the lower court erred in modifying its February 22, 1993, motion in limine which prohibited the prosecution from offering any evidence of aggravating circumstances other than: (1) The capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; and (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Russell argues that the lower court's decision to allow the prosecution to put on evidence of the actual killing denied him due process because the prosecution was allowed to put on evidence to show that the murder was especially atrocious, heinous or cruel. Notwithstanding Russell's argument, the jury was not instructed as to the especially atrocious, heinous or cruel aggravator. Nor did the prosecution argue that the murder was especially atrocious, heinous or cruel. Russell argues that the second sentencing jury should not have been informed of any of the details of Cotton's murder. The lower court's decision to allow the prosecution to put on testimony from the guilt phase of the trial, Russell argues, put the especially atrocious, heinous or cruel aggravator before the sentencing jury in violation of the February 25, 1993, Order Sustaining Defendant's Motion In Limine. Therefore, Russell argues, his death sentence must be vacated. Russell relies on Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991), to support the proposition that he was denied due process when the trial judge allowed the prosecution to submit evidence of the actual murder to the second sentencing jury. We disagree and find that Russell's reliance on Lankford, is misplaced. The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Lankford was whether, at the time of petitioners's sentencing hearing, he and his counsel had adequate notice that the trial judge might sentence him to death. 500 U.S. at 111, 111 S.Ct. at 1724-25. In Lankford, the prosecution was required to notify the court and the petitioner whether the State would seek the death penalty, and if so, to file a statement of the aggravating circumstances on which it intended to rely. Id. at 114, 111 S.Ct. at 1726. The prosecution notified Lankford that it would not seek the death penalty. A fortiori, Lankford was not apprised of any aggravating factors that the State would attempt to prove. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor introduced a transcript from the guilt phase of the trial but did not offer any evidence of aggravators. Thereafter, the prosecutor recommended to the judge that Lankford be sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence. Id. at 116, 111 S.Ct. at 1727. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial judge indicated that Lankford should receive a more severe punishment than that requested by the State. Then, the trial judge found five aggravating factors and sentenced Lankford to death. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed Lankford's death sentence and held that he had been denied due process of law because he had not been informed by the State that it would seek the death penalty and because he had not received notice of any of the five aggravators that the trial judge found, thus, depriving him of the ability to rebut or defend against those aggravators. Id. at 122, 111 S.Ct. at 1730. The factual situation in the case sub judice is clearly different than that facing the Court in Lankford. In Lankford, the defendant went into the sentencing hearing thinking that he could not receive the death penalty. In addition, Lankford was not apprised of any aggravating circumstances that the State would attempt to prove at the sentencing. In the case sub judice, Russell entered the sentencing hearing knowing that the prosecution was seeking the death penalty and that the State would there attempt to prove two aggravators and the proof associated with each, i.e., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-19-101(5)(a), 99-19-101(5)(b). Also, we find that the following pre-trial exchange indicates that Russell was apprised that the jury would be informed of the facts surrounding the murder and that Russell did not object: BY THE COURT: Well, I think they are entitled to know what the facts of the crime are, but I think it's a question of how much depth-how much emphasis you can put on those facts, and I will just have to reserve ruling on that until that evidence is presented. I don't know what we are talking about, but I think that the jury has to understand some basic facts other than just a mere stipulation, and I think it would be better to just put on some proof that that is the way it was just so they can understand the facts. BY MR. MOUNGER: Sort of a prima facie showing? I'm just talking here. That phrase just came to my mind. BY THE COURT: Well, I don't think  I think particularly in light of the agreement to limit the aggravating circumstances that I can't allow a great deal of emphasis to be put on the heinousness, atrociousness, and cruelty of the crime, but I think they are entitled to understand the factual situation. BY MR. STUCKEY: Okay, we don't have any objection to that. BY THE COURT: And I'm just not going to allow  I would agree, in light of the motion in limine, not to let the State just to dwell on anything that may be heinous, atrocious, and cruel concerning the thing, but I think they are entitled to present the facts concerning the crime and what happened so the jury can have a general understanding of what's going on-or what went on, why they are being asked to impose a death sentence. I think it would be treating the case and the jury lightly to do otherwise. BY MR. STUCKEY: Yes, sir. This may be skipping around a little bit, but I would like to just ask Hallie Gail without making a motion; do you intend to, through the classification lady, and I forgot her name, or maybe Chris Epps; either one of them; to mention that he's on death row? We find that this assignment of error is without merit and is an attempt to lead this Court into a discussion of whether Russell's killing of Cotton was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(h). Here, the jury was not instructed that they could find that the murder was such, nor did the prosecution argue that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The evidence of the actual murder was submitted, not to prove the especially heinous aggravator, but was submitted so that the jury could find the existence of the Enmund factors. The State has the right and requirement, in death penalty resentencing cases, to put on evidence impacting on the Enmund factors. Accordingly, Russell's reliance on Lankford, supra, is without merit. Russell also contends that language in Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640, 648 (Miss. 1979), and Leatherwood v. State, 539 So.2d 1378, 1383 (Miss. 1989), prevent the prosecution, in the sentencing phase, from introducing evidence of the crime except for that evidence which is relevant to one or more of the eight enumerated aggravating circumstances. We disagree. Coleman and Leatherwood are legally distinguishable from the case at bar and thus, are not dispositive to the case sub judice. In Coleman, this Court interpreting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1) and (5) (Supp. 1978), stated: Subsection (5) of § 99-19-101 plainly states that the aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the eight aggravating circumstances listed. Read in conjunction with subsection (1), the State is limited to introducing evidence relevant to one or more of the eight enumerated aggravating circumstances. 378 So.2d at 648. It is important to note that this Court, in Coleman, interpreted Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1978). The 1978 version of § 99-19-101 did not require that the jury find the Enmund factors set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1983). Prior to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), the capital sentencing jury in Mississippi was not required to find the four Enmund factors. In White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207, 1219 (Miss. 1988), this Court recognized that [s]ection 99-19-101(7) was enacted in 1983 in obvious response to Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). In Leatherwood, we relied upon the analysis found in Coleman and stated: [i]n Coleman, this Court held in clear and unambiguous language that, during sentencing, the State is limited only to presenting evidence relevant to one or more of the eight enumerated aggravating circumstances in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1988). Leatherwood, 539 So.2d at 1383. Unlike Russell, neither Leatherwood nor Coleman was tried and sentenced to death under a version of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 that required the jury make the Enmund findings and therein lies the difference between the case at bar and Coleman and Leatherwood. See Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 648 (Miss. 1983). Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1), provides in part: If, through impossibility or inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trial judge may summon a jury to determine the imposition of the penalty... . In the [penalty phase] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. (emphasis added). The Mississippi Rules of Evidence 401 define relevant evidence as: evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) requires that the jury sentencing the defendant to death make a written finding of one or more of the following: (a) The defendant actually killed; (b) The defendant attempted to kill; (c) The defendant intended that a killing take place; (d) The defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed. At least one of these Enmund factors must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant can be sentenced to death. White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207, 1222 (Miss. 1988). Accordingly, applying the logic and rationale employed in Coleman, 378 So.2d at 648, and relied upon by this Court in Leatherwood, 539 So.2d at 1383, to the case sub judice, when we read subsection (1) of § 99-19-101 in conjunction with subsections (5) and (7), we hold that the State, in its case-in-chief, is permitted to introduce evidence relevant to one or more of the eight aggravating circumstances along with evidence from the guilt phase relevant to the Enmund factors. In the case at bar, the testimony dealing with Cotton's murder was offered not to prove that the murder was especially atrocious, heinous or cruel, but was offered to give this second sentencing jury evidence of the specific facts surrounding the murder. Thus, evidence of the murder submitted to the sentencing jury was not only relevant to the sentence but was required in order for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the factor(s) required in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). Accordingly, Russell merits no relief on this assignment of error.