Opinion ID: 2615788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Statement of Facts and Reasons

Text: Under this headline we approach the last and ultimate question to be decided. 5, 6. Holding as we do that the prime objective of the charter provision is a brake upon inconsiderate legislative action and in no event can become the basis for a judicial review challenging the wisdom or expediency which persuaded the lawmaking body in its determination of the existence of an emergency or the necessity for an immediately-effective enactment, it becomes obvious that there is less occasion for an extended statement of facts and reasons than might otherwise be appropriate if Oregon were not a conclusive state. The mandatory recital is not to prove that the council is right so much as it is to demonstrate that the ordinance was conceived in an atmosphere of proper legislative deliberation.  7. The words, specify with distinctness the facts and reasons constituting such emergency when the same cannot become a basis for a judicial evaluation of the facts and reasons so specified, do not call for a protracted narration of factual detail nor the precise argumentative reasoning which produced the final legislative judgment. The charter phrase contemplates quality rather than quantity of content. 8. In our opinion, the charter provision imposes no greater burden than to report the ultimate fact or facts or the ultimate reason or reasons which impelled the ordinance's emergent character. In so saying, we adopt as our definition of ultimate fact that found in Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Or 349, 355, 184 P 487:    An ultimate fact is the final resulting effect which is reached by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts   . It is sometimes called a mere conclusion of fact. We revert again to Morris v. Goss, supra, 83 A2d 556, 563, where the Maine Supreme Court referred to its previous decision in Payne v. Graham, supra, 107 Atl 709, so stressed in respondent's brief, and find therein this statement in line with our conclusions here: It is true that Payne v. Graham, supra [118 Me. 251, 107 A. 710], is authority for the proposition that the provision of the Constitution requiring that `the facts constituting the emergency shall be expressed in the preamble of the act' is not satisfied by the recital of a mere conclusion instead of facts. However, that constitutional requirement is satisfied by the expression in the preamble of an ultimate fact or facts which constitute an emergency without a recital of all of the separate facts evidencing the existence of such ultimate fact. (Italics ours.) 9. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, the court will presume that in the enactment of an ordinance,  all necessary requirements have been complied with. Young v. Galloway, 177 Or 617, 624, 164 P2d 427; Woodward v. Pearson, 165 Or 40, 44, 103 P2d 737; Boyd v. Olcott et al., 102 Or 327, 360, 202 P 431; Emmons v. Southern Pac. Co., 97 Or 263, 274, 191 P 333. 10, 11. The rule that every intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of a statute and, if there is doubt respecting its constitutionality, the statute must be upheld unless it is clearly repugnant to some provision of the constitution, is equally applicable to municipal ordinances. In City of Portland v. Stevens, 180 Or 514, 527, 178 P2d 175, it is said:    If the ordinance may be sustained only in the event that circumstances exist which justify its adoption as a reasonable exercise of the police power, the existence of such circumstances will be presumed   . The foregoing doctrine has been applied to emergency legislation when, as here, a statement of facts is required to be included in the enactment. An excellent example of this is found in Davis v. Los Angeles County, 12 Cal2d 412, 84 P2d 1034, 1040, another case brought to our attention by the respondent and where the court holds:    If there is any doubt as to whether the facts do or do not state a case of immediate necessity, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the legislative declaration (Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581, 585, 74 A.L.R. 1189); or, as it has otherwise been stated, `if fair-minded and intelligent men might reasonably differ as to the sufficiency and truth of the fact assigned for placing the act in effect immediately upon its passage, the courts are concluded by the finding' (Jumper v. McCollum, 179 Ark. 837, 18 S.W.2d 359, 361, and cases referred to); or, if the legislature `states facts constituting an emergency so that its action cannot be said to be arbitrary, courts cannot say that it  has not performed its constitutional duty, even though they might disagree with the legislature as to the sufficiency of declared facts to constitute a sufficient reason for immediate action.' Baker v. Hill, 180 Ark. 387, 21 S.W.2d 867, 868. 12. In our opinion, the statement of facts and reasons in this matter does not conjure up doubts requiring recourse to rules of presumption or construction but, to the contrary, is clear and constitutes a substantial compliance with the provisions of § 2-131 of the charter. We think that the phrase found in § 1 of the ordinance reading, due to the police problems presented by such punchboards, constitutes a sufficient and distinct statement of an ultimate fact and that the further phrase, which is a part of § 2, reading, In order that the police problems caused by punchboards may be relieved without delay, is an equally distinct and sufficient statement of the reason for the emergent provision. Although our final conclusion is not dependent upon the phrase police problems as variously employed in ordinance No. 94552, we think its presence as there used has a greater significance than the plaintiff is willing to concede. A police problem is potentially a serious problem in the area of law enforcement which, in common parlance, connotes a pressing element of emergency arising from impending danger to the community wherein the police problem exists and of a character demanding urgent attention to abate or avoid it. The words, when used in conjunction with some existing thing or condition suggesting the presence of gambling, immediately imply the present or prospective happening, directly or indirectly, of one or more events which are or should be proscribed by penalty or restraint under the laws of the community.  This case was evidently brought to test this ordinance in the interest of the whole community. Because of the ostensible general interest therein, neither party will recover costs. The decree is reversed and the suit dismissed. ROSSMAN, J., specially concurring. As stated in the opinion written by Mr. Justice WARNER, this case was decided May 14, 1952, and the announcement of our holding indicated that we would later give the reasons which prompted the decision. I cannot say that the well-written opinion of Mr. Justice WARNER expresses the reasons which persuaded me, May 14, to believe that the circuit court's decree was erroneous. Portland's charter provides that the council of that city, in adopting emergency ordinances, must specify with distinctness the facts and reasons constituting such emergency. When I concurred in the action taken May 14, I believed, and still do, that such a material distinction exists between civil and criminal measures that it may affect the specification by the council of the facts and reasons constituting such emergency. Civil legislation which concerns an emergency may not reveal by its own phraseology the emergency with which it is intended to cope. Therefore, it may be necessary to append to the measure a clause which delineates the emergency. Upon the other hand, criminal legislation always deals with conduct which is so evil that the lawmaker is authorized, not only to prohibit it, but to prescribe penalties for those who engage in it. Thus, penal legislation sometimes deals with self-evident emergencies. If an act stated that cattle stealing had become prevalent and that the theft of cattle was, therefore, rendered a felony, one  could readily infer from those terms themselves that the act was concerned with an emergency. The ordinance under scrutiny states that punchboards were in use in the city and that the council believed that their continued use was such an evil that it should be made a punishable offense. Going on, it prohibited the use of punchboards and declared that an emergency existed. May 14, when I voted to reverse the circuit court, I believed that the facts which I have just reviewed constituted a specification of the facts and reasons which constituted the emergency. The latter was not expressed as well as good draftsmanship could have done, but, nevertheless, the specification constituted substantial compliance with the charter's requirements. In short, I believe that when conduct is made penal by an emergency enactment and when the latter states that the conduct is being commonly employed, those recitals suffice to comply with the charter's requirements. The above are the reasons which prompted my action. LATOURETTE, J., dissenting. It is axiomatic that the charter of a city is in effect the constitution of the city, and, if the provisions of an ordinance conflict with the provisions of the charter, that part, at least, of the ordinance must fall. Keeping in mind this principle, I now approach the simple question involved in this appeal: whether or not the ordinance in question complies with the charter of the city of Portland in the respect that it does `specify with distinctness the facts and reasons constituting such emergency.' The emergency clause of the ordinance is as follows: `Section 2. Inasmuch as this ordinance is necessary for the immediate preservation of the  public health, peace and safety of the City of Portland in this: In order that the police problems caused by punchboards may be relieved without delay; therefore an emergency hereby is declared to exist and this ordinance shall be in force and effect from and after its passage by the Council.' From the foregoing, we see that the claimed emergency is created by police problems. It is my opinion that police problems is a mere conclusion and is not a distinct statement of the facts and reasons for the claimed emergency and certainly is not specific. The word, specify, is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed) as: To mention or name in a specific or explicit manner; to tell or state precisely or in detail;   . In Herrin v. Erickson, 90 Mont 259, 2 P2d 296, 300, it is found that the constitution required the legislature, in creating a debt, to specify the purpose to which the funds so raised shall be applied. The court, in defining specify, said: `To specify means to mention specifically; state in full and explicit terms; name expressly or particularly. Standard Dictionary; Peters v. Banta, 120 Ind. 416, 22 N.E. 95, 23 N.E. 84, 85. It is an ordinary word used in common speech and generally understood; it must be given the understanding which the people who voted for the Constitution would give it. Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 434, 117 A. 440. Specific is the very opposite of general. Smith v. McColle, 5 Kan. App. 713, 46 P. 988, 989. This act of assembly is anything but specific; it is general in its terms.   .' In Independent Highway Dist. No. 2 v. Ada County, 24 Idaho 416, 134 P 542, 545, we find the following definition: `Specify' is defined to mean: To mention  specifically; to state in full and explicit terms; to point out; to particularize, or to designate by words one thing from another. In A.M. Dillow & Co. v. City of Monticello, 145 Iowa 424, 124 NW 186, 189, we read:    `Specify,' according to the lexicographers, means to mention specifically or explicitly, to state in full and explicit terms or explicitly and in detail, name expressly distinctly and particularly. In Stewart v. Jacques, 77 Ga. 365, 3 S.E. 283, 4 Am. St. Rep. 86, it is said to mean `to point out, to particularize, to designate by words one thing from another.' Adverting to the language of the charter, I find that the ordinance must specify, among other things, the reasons for the emergency. In McKenna v. White, 287 Mass 495, 192 NE 84, 85, where a statute required that a statement of the reason or reasons for the removal of civil service officers be given, the court held that the statement, `for the good of the service', was an inadequate statement of the reason or reasons therefor, saying: A statement of the reason or reasons for removal must be somewhat definite and detailed. In the case of Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., 124 Or 36, 39, 42, 263 P 893, an ordinance of the city of Astoria was under consideration. An emergency clause was attached, based on the following: `the objects of this ordinance will be of great benefit to the people of the City of Astoria.' The charter of Astoria contained the following provision: `An emergency ordinance may be enacted upon the day of its introduction, providing it shall contain the statement that an emergency exists, and specify the reason constituting such emergency.'  In nullifying the ordinance, we said:    The mere fact that a law will be of great benefit states no urgent reason for its going into effect immediately, as every valid law or ordinance is presumed to be passed because of its prospective benefit to the community. Likewise, every ordinance passed by a city under the police power, such as is the ordinance under consideration, presupposes a police problem, and the insertion in the emergency clause of the ordinance of police problems, adds nothing to that which is already presumed. It will be observed that the charter of the city of Portland goes much further than the charter of the city of Astoria by requiring the ordinance to specify with distinctness the facts and reasons constituting such emergency., while the Astoria charter merely requires the ordinance to specify the reason constituting such emergency. The principal involved in the instant case is one of paramount importance to the people of Oregon. They labored and pioneered the Home Rule amendment to the constitution. The electors of the city of Portland, in enacting the charter granting to them the right of referendum, placed certain safeguards in the charter. They permitted an emergency clause to be attached to an ordinance but only under certain specific conditions. I do not believe that such conditions were inserted to keep the city officials morally honest. The presumption is, of course, that official duty will be legally and properly performed. Such limitations were inserted for the benefit of the people and for the people alone. When an emergency clause is to be attached to an ordinance, the people want to know precisely the reasons  for the emergency and the facts supporting such reasons. If the prevailing opinion is permitted to stand, the right to an ordinance referendum has been to all intents and purposes destroyed, and the Home Rule amendment to the constitution emasculated. Whether a case involves pinballs or pincushions, to prevent a referendum, it will only be necessary for the city fathers to insert willy-nilly in the emergency clause of an ordinance that the ordinance involves police problems. In my opinion, the charter in the case at bar has not been complied with. For the above reasons, I dissent.