Opinion ID: 442950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Material False Statement Issue

Text: 9 Palzer argues that the government cannot retry him under Count I of the indictment because the evidence introduced below was insufficient to support his conviction. Although we agree with Palzer's assertion that double jeopardy would bar his reprosecution under Count I of the indictment if the government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence on this count in the trial below, see supra note 4, we conclude that the government's evidence was sufficient. 10 Count I of the indictment charged Palzer with making a material false statement on Customs Form 6059-B, when he answered no to question 11, and thus represented that he was not carrying more than $5,000. His actions were clearly in violation of the language of the statute charged in the indictment: 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001. 7 However, Palzer argues that under judicial limitations on the operation of Sec. 1001, in particular the exculpatory no doctrine, he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 11 The exculpatory no doctrine, as it applies to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, and in particular to a defendant's alleged false representation on Customs Form 6059-B, was well-explained by this court in United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B): 8 12 The exculpatory no doctrine developed because this court believed that Congress intended section 1001 to punish only positive false statements that would pervert governmental functions. See Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 201-095 (5th Cir.1962). In addition, this court was motivated by a latent distaste for an application of the statute that is uncomfortably close to the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n. 4 (5th Cir.1974). Consequently, we have held that section 1001 may not be used to punish people who make negative false statements to government investigators in an effort to exculpate themselves from an act they believe to be illegal. This doctrine was applied to the fact pattern present in this case in Schnaiderman [United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir.1978) ] and Granda [United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.1978) ]. In both of those cases we held that, unless the individual knows it is permissible to bring more than $5,000 into the country, a lie to customs agents to avoid expected retribution under currency laws will not lead to section 1001 punishment. See also United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 889-90 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980). Unless customs officials disabuse travelers of the belief that bringing currency into the country is illegal, solicitude for fifth amendment values prevents us from attaching section 1001 liability to this sort of conduct. E.g., United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d at 1214 & n. 12. 13 Id. at 409. 14 In this context, the exculpatory no doctrine creates an additional element of the government's case under Sec. 1001; the government must show that the defendant knew that it was permissible or legal to bring more than $5,000 in currency into the country before a prosecution for a defendant's false representation that he was not carrying more than $5,000 can be sustained. In the posture of the instant case, we must determine whether the government offered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that Palzer knew it was not illegal to transport more than $5,000 into the country. 9 Pursuant to this method of review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.) (Unit B en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). 15 The most persuasive proof on the issue of the defendant's knowledge is the type of direct evidence involved in Anderez. In Anderez, the defendant was expressly told by Customs officials that it was not illegal to carry more than $5,000 into the country, but that carrying that amount or greater required him to fill out additional forms. 661 F.2d at 408-09. 10 Similarly, a modified version of the form that Palzer filled out states expressly in question 11 that it is not illegal to carry more than $5,000 into the country. See supra note 5. Proof that the false statement occurred on the modified form would directly support a finding on the defendant's knowledge. But the government is not limited to these direct means of proof in meeting its burden on the exculpatory no doctrine. Circumstantial and indirect proof also can support a finding that the defendant knew it was not illegal to transport more than $5,000 into the country. Cf. United States v. Satterfield, 644 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B) 11 (in prosecution under Sec. 1001 for falsely representing to Customs officer that he was not transporting more than $5,000, defendant argued that he had no knowledge of the currency reporting requirement; the court held that government's proof that appellant had gained knowledge eight months previously when informed of the requirement by a Customs officer during the prior entry into the country was sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant's knowledge to support conviction). 16 From the evidence introduced at trial, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to support a reasonable finding that Palzer knew it was not illegal to transport more than $5,000 into the country. First, the government showed that seven months prior to his arrest, while returning to the country from travels abroad, Palzer had been presented with and filled out the modified version of Customs Form 6059-B, which included the notice that it was not illegal to transport money in excess of $5000. See supra note 5. A reasonable jury could infer that Palzer read and understood that form. See United States v. Satterfield, 644 F.2d at 1094-95. 12 Second, Palzer's own statement to Customs officers after the discovery of the $200,000--What's the big deal anyway? ... [G]ive me the form right now and I'll fill it out--supports a reasonable inference that he did not believe that carrying the money into the country was against the law. 13 These two factors viewed in the light most favorable to the government, were sufficient to meet the government's burden of proof on the element of Palzer's knowledge. 17 Because the government introduced sufficient proof to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that Palzer knew it was not illegal to bring more than $5,000 into the country, Palzer was not entitled to an acquittal on the basis of the exculpatory no doctrine. Accordingly, we conclude that it would not violate double jeopardy if the government chooses to retry him on Count I of the indictment.