Opinion ID: 183279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motion to withdraw plea of guilty

Text: We review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). “A court has abused its discretion if its decision ‘is guided by erroneous legal principles’ or ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.’” Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999)). 11
“There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 424. The movant bears the burden of showing a just reason for withdrawal, and courts consider multiple factors including: (1) Whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or otherwise involuntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay between entry of the plea and filing of the motion; (4) whether the defendant has had close assistance of counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and (6) whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. Id.; United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). In Ubakanma, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea of guilty to a wire fraud offense. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 424. This Court found that the district court’s extensive Rule 11 hearing conducted prior to the district court’s acceptance of the defendant’s plea of guilty included the defendant’s acknowledgement under oath that he was not coerced, that he was guilty of the specified wire fraud offense, and that he understood the terms of his plea agreement. Id. These factors necessitated that this Court find the plea was knowing and voluntary. Id. Further, this Court discarded the defendant’s conclusory assertion of innocence and his claim that he was coerced by his attorney in light of his counsel’s aggressively 12 negotiated, favorable plea agreement, and the defendant’s sworn statements that he reviewed the plea agreement and voluntarily agreed to its terms. Id. at 424-25. Accordingly, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Similarly, in Moore, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea where six weeks elapsed between the filing of the motion and entry of the plea, nothing in the plea agreement supported the defendant’s claim of unconscionability, the defendant was ably represented by counsel, and minor quibbles with the government’s version of events did not make the defendant’s claim of innocence credible. Moore, 931 F.2d at 249-50. Edgerton contends that he was “not in his right mind,” that he was pressured to plead guilty by his attorney throughout the case, and that he is innocent. J.A. 75. The district court found that his contentions lacked credibility since he stated under oath during the plea colloquy that he was guilty. The district court found that he did not appear to lack intelligence and he appeared well-informed. Review of the record demonstrates that Edgerton was given additional time to review the superseding indictment before the plea colloquy. J.A. 29. When Edgerton argued to withdraw his plea at his sentencing hearing, he stated that he did not possess the four firearms 13 taken from his father’s Cavalier and that he was forced to plead guilty. J.A. 29. These statements do not erase his sworn statements during the plea colloquy that he did possess the four firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking, as charged in Count Five of the superseding indictment, nor do they erase his sworn assertion that no one threatened him or forced him to plead guilty. J.A. 33, 38. Edgerton made sworn statements indicating that he was not coerced to plead guilty, that he reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel and understood its terms, that he understood the charges in the superseding indictment and that he committed the offenses charged in Counts One, Two, and Five. J.A. 31-38. Thus, he simply cannot meet his burden to demonstrate that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he did not have close assistance of counsel or was threatened. His belated claims of innocence simply are not credible. The precedential cases Ubakanma and Moore, and the record, therefore establish that no sufficient basis exists for this Court to find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Edgerton’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.