Opinion ID: 1956134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statutes of Limitations Applicable.

Text: With the discovery rule and continuous tort theories extinguished, we must then look to the applicable statutes of limitations. As the disabilities of minority age and alleged mental illness coexisted until Shippen's eighteenth birthday on July 21, 1982, SDCL 15-2-22 permits a tolling of the statute for a maximum of five years, or until July 21, 1987. However, claims which arose after the eighteenth birthday, but during the mental illness, must be challenged within five years of the tort or within one year after the disability ceases, whichever is earlier. According to the trial court, the suppression and repression had been sufficiently lifted by March 1987. Thus, Shippen had until March of 1988 to take action against Parrott for those torts occurring during the previous five years of his claimed mental illness. This action did not commence until January 3, 1989. Therefore, we need not consider the accuracy and validity of the applications of these extensions, as the suit was filed beyond their respective statutory periods. Although the circumstances presented by Parrott's actions are egregious, his defense predicated upon the statute of limitations is meritorious and is not to be disregarded with disfavor by this court. Merkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 54 (S.D.1985). Under 15-2-15(1), only those assaults and batteries occurring two years prior to filing are actionable. A three-year limitations period is possible for IIED. SDCL 15-2-14(3). Sexual contacts between Parrott and Shippen ceased in 1984, well outside the applicable limitations period, and did not resume until 1987. Hence, no claims occurring prior to January 3, 1986 under an IIED theoryJanuary 3, 1987 for assault and batteryare actionable, i.e., only those sexual contacts occurring during May and June of 1987 fall inside the statutory period.