Opinion ID: 1318050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: The facts in this case are not in dispute. On March 14, 1974, defendant district notified plaintiffs, probationary teachers employed by the district, that the school board had decided not to reemploy them for the upcoming 1974-1975 school year. The notice that plaintiffs received explained that the school board anticipated financial difficulties in balancing its budget for the following school year due to several factors, including a decline in student enrollment and a return of several teachers who were then on leave; the notice also indicated that the board was contemplating reducing certain other kinds of service presently provided by the district. On the basis of these circumstances, the board had decided not to reemploy seven probationary employees. Although the notice clearly indicated that plaintiffs were not being laid off for misconduct or professional incompetency of any kind, it specified that the district, in effecting the layoff, was purporting to act under the authority of section 13443(d), the dismissal for cause provision, rather than under section 13447, which specifically authorizes dismissals relating to a district's reduction in its workforce. [1] After receiving this notice of the district's intention not to rehire them, plaintiffs requested a hearing as authorized by statute. (Ed. Code, § 13443, subd. (b).) The district superintendent thereafter prepared and served plaintiffs with a formal accusation (Ed. Code, § 13443, subd. (c); Gov. Code, § 11503) which largely repeated the grounds for termination contained in the earlier notice. In explaining the legal basis for such termination, the accusation stated, inter alia, that if the district is to stay within the limits of the income and revenue which the district will receive in 1974-1975, as required by Article XIII, section 40 [now Article XVI, section 18] of the State Constitution, it has been recommended and is in the best interest of the school district to reduce its staff of certified personnel. The accusation, like the earlier notice, specified that the district's action was taken pursuant to section 13443, rather than under section 13447, and that the district contended that its economic situation constituted cause for dismissal within the meaning of section 13443(d). At the administrative hearing, held shortly thereafter, the school district's counsel confirmed that the district's recommendation of termination was not attributable to any alleged deficiency in the teachers' performance, but rested solely on the district's financial condition. At the hearing, defendant's counsel also formally stipulated that the district was not acting pursuant to section 13447, but was contending that the terminations were justified as terminations for cause under section 13443(d). With one minor exception not relevant to the instant appeal, [2] plaintiff teachers did not challenge the district's factual allegations with respect to the reasons for the termination or the financial situation of the district, but contended simply that the stated grounds for termination did not constitute cause for termination within the meaning of section 13443(d). A week after the administrative hearing concluded, the hearing officer issued his proposed decision. Although finding that from currently available estimates of revenue and proposed expenditures the district did face financial difficulties in the upcoming year, the hearing officer concluded that such difficulties did not amount to cause for dismissal under section 13443(d). The hearing officer accordingly recommended that the pending accusation be dismissed. On May 8, 1974, the school board met to consider the hearing officer's decision and recommendation. After hearing legal arguments from their own counsel and the teacher's counsel, the board voted to accept the hearing officer's findings of fact, but to reject his conclusions of law. Accordingly, the board concluded that its anticipated financial difficulties did constitute sufficient cause for termination... pursuant to section 13443, and determined that plaintiffs would be terminated on that basis. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant petitions for writ of mandate, seeking orders compelling the district to set aside its decision terminating their employment and requiring the district to reemploy them for the 1974-1975 school year. In addition, plaintiffs prayed for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Government Code section 800, contending that the district's action in the matter was arbitrary and capricious. In its answer, the district defended the legality of its action and also contended that the action should be dismissed as moot since the district, in the interim, had offered employment to all of the plaintiffs. After reviewing the administrative record and listening to oral argument, the superior court determined initially that the action should not be dismissed as moot, [3] and then concluded, on the merits, that the anticipated financial problems of the school district did not amount to cause for termination within the meaning of section 13443(d). The court accordingly granted judgment in favor of plaintiffs, issuing the requested writ of mandate. At the same time, however, the court ruled that the district's action could not be characterized as arbitrary or capricious and it denied plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees. Defendant school district now appeals from the issuance of the peremptory writ and plaintiffs cross-appeal on the issue of attorney's fees. We turn first to defendant's contention.