Opinion ID: 2736831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adams’s Sentence

Text: Adams also contends that his 210-month term of imprisonment is “per se unreasonable” and, alternatively, that it violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because, given the severity of his heart condition, it represents a death sentence. The government argues that the appeal waiver contained in Adams’s Plea Agreement forecloses any challenge to his sentence. Even assuming that the waiver is unenforceable and that we may reach the merits of Adams’s challenge, we would affirm the judgment of the district court. We review sentences for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “Procedural error occurs when, for example, the district court improperly calculates the applicable Guidelines range, fails to consider the sentencing factors articulated in 18 U.S.C. 3 We note there is also evidence that Adams may have deliberately attempted to aggravate his medical condition in an effort to receive a below-Guidelines sentence. 8 § 3553(a), or neglects to explain the reasons for its chosen sentence.” United States v. Kerr, 752 F.3d 206, 222 (2d Cir. 2014). A district court’s substantive determination as to the proper sentence will be set aside “only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)). To the extent Adams argues that the district court erred by failing to depart downward from the 210 to 262-month Guideline range of incarceration on account of his illness, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, that argument is without merit. The district court noted correctly that the Guidelines range was advisory and that the court had authority to impose a sentence below that range. Moreover, it expressly considered Adams’s medical condition when deciding to impose a Guidelines sentence. See App’x at 109–11. It is evident, therefore, that the district court did not misapprehend its authority to depart from the Guidelines range, and its decision not to do so is unreviewable absent such a misapprehension. See United States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] refusal to downwardly depart is generally not appealable” unless “a sentencing court misapprehended the scope of its authority to depart or the sentence was otherwise illegal.”); see also United States v. Sero, 520 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). Adams’s attack on the substantive reasonableness of his sentence is similarly unavailing. Sentences are substantively unreasonable only if they are “so shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law that allowing them to stand would damage the administration of justice.” United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 259 (2d 9 Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this “particularly deferential standard,” id., we conclude that Adams’s sentence falls within the range of permissible decisions. In imposing the 210-month Guidelines sentence, the district court fully credited the evidence regarding Adams’s “serious health problems, including a heart condition.” App’x at 110. The court then carefully weighed that set of factors, which it found “legitimately b[ore] on sentencing,” id. at 109, against the seriousness of Adams’s criminal conduct, which included his leadership of the large-scale marijuana smuggling operation and his multiple attempts to obstruct justice, id. at 109–10. The court further observed that Adams had engaged in this criminal conduct “while those health conditions were persisting.” Id. at 110. Based on all of these considerations, the court concluded that a 210-month sentence—the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range—was appropriate. Id. at 111. It is beyond cavil that the district court carefully considered all of the relevant mitigating and aggravating sentencing factors, and it is not the place of the appellate court to “consider what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor.” Thavaraja, 740 F.3d at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given all of the circumstances, we conclude that allowing Adams’s sentence to stand would not “damage the administration of justice.” Id. at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Lengthy prison sentences, [moreover,] even those that exceed any conceivable life expectancy of a convicted defendant, do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 10 against cruel and unusual punishment when based on a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines or statutorily mandated consecutive terms.” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir. 2003). We have also recognized that, “in a noncapital case, it is exceedingly rare to uphold a claim that a sentence within the statutory limits is disproportionately severe.” United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 44 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Adams’s sentence, therefore, is not substantively unreasonable nor does it violate the Eighth Amendment.