Opinion ID: 1604129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Judge Erred in Denying Scott's Motion to Suppress His Written Confession.

Text: ¶ 22. This Court can reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress only: if the incorrect legal principle was applied; if there was no substantial evidence to support a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights; and if the denial was a result of manifest error. Chim v. State, 972 So.2d 601, 604-05 (Miss. 2008). The standard of manifest error is high, and this Court cannot reverse unless the trial judge's ruling has gone against the substantial weight of the evidence. Id. at 605. ¶ 23. The trial judge must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession was voluntary and knowing and that the defendant was given his Miranda rights prior to any custodial interrogation. Armstead v. State, 978 So.2d 642, 646 (Miss.2008). Here, a signed Miranda waiver and a signed and initialed confession were admitted into evidence. In addition, the officers who Mirandized Scott and took his confession were available to (and ultimately did) testify. ¶ 24. The burden lies with the State to prove that a confession is voluntary. Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss.1966). However, this Court has held that the burden is met by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Bell v. State, 963 So.2d 1124, 1134 (Miss.2007) (citing Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 89 (Miss.1996) (further citing Agee, 185 So.2d at 673)). This makes out a prima facie case for the State on the question of voluntariness. Id. The accused is entitled to offer testimony to the contrary, at which point the State must offer the testimony of the officers who witnessed the confession. Id. ¶ 25. The record shows that the officers were available to testify, which left the decision of whether the confession was voluntary to the trial judge's discretion. This Court consistently has held that it will not reverse [the] trial court on conflicting testimony as to whether coercion [was] used to obtain [a] confession. Bell, 963 So.2d at 1134 (citing Veal v. State, 585 So.2d 693, 697 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 26. The trial judge allowed the written confession into evidence, which we hold to be within her discretion and substantiated by sufficient evidence in the record. The signed Miranda waiver is evidence of a knowing and voluntary confession. See Martin, 854 So.2d at 1007 (Miss. 2003). The judge must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if a defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Id. ¶ 27. Here, the trial judge inquired as to whether Scott had been aware of his Miranda rights when he was taken into custody. Scott acknowledged that he was aware of them. The judge further inquired as to Scott's intelligence, his ability to read and write, his education, his mental state at the time of the waiver and confession, whether he had slept prior to the confession, and whether he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Scott's answers to the judge's questions support the trial judge's finding that the confession was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. ¶ 28. The record indicates that Scott had attended at least one year of college, which reflects at least an average level of intellect, and that Scott had been convicted of conspiracy to embezzle, which resulted in some familiarity with the criminal justice system. Scott said he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol; he was not physically threatened or coerced; he knew his Miranda rights; and he was aware he had the right to remain silent or have counsel appointed prior to his confession. All of these factors indicate a person who was aware of his rights and the nature of the charges against him. Martin v. State, 871 So.2d 693, 701 (Miss.2004) (citing Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 755 (Miss. 1984)). ¶ 29. Scott has alleged that the officers showed him a photograph of a lethal-injection gurney in an effort to get him to cooperate. The police officers deny this allegation. However, even if this allegation is true, the totality of the circumstances weighs heavily against Scott and toward admission of the confession for the jury to weigh. ¶ 30. All of this evidence indicates that the trial judge undertook a thorough examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the confession was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. Scott was free to attempt to impeach the confession to the satisfaction of the jury. ¶ 31. This Court has held that, even if a confession is in violation of a defendant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, (which we do not so hold herein) that confession may be used for impeachment purposes. Sipp v. State, 936 So.2d 326, 331 (Miss. 2006). Further, this Court has stated that when a defendant takes the stand and testifies, he may be impeached by his own statementseven if those statements were taken in violation of his Miranda rights. Id. (citing Bogard v. State, 624 So.2d 1313, 1318-19 (Miss.1993)). ¶ 32. In order for this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, there must be a lack of credible or substantial evidence to support the denial. Because we find the admission to be based on the appropriate principles of law and to be well-supported in the record, we cannot reverse. Armstead, 978 So.2d at 646 citing Chim, 972 at 604 (further citing Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 860 (Miss. 1991)). ¶ 33. Here, this Court finds the signed Miranda waiver, the signed and initialed written confession, and the availability of the police officers who took the confession all support allowing the confession into evidence for the jury to weigh as the ultimate trier of fact. Since the evidence supports the trial judge's denial to suppress the confession, an appellate court cannot reverse. We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial judge's ruling that the confession met the legal standard required of it for admission.