Opinion ID: 2457938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the appellant's prosecution for attempted kidnapping barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy due to his earlier guilty plea to battery?

Text: [¶ 5] This Court reviews de novo the question of whether a defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy has been violated. Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 859, 862 (Wyo.2008). In that review, we consider the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by article 1, section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution to be equivalent. Id. at ¶ 8, at 862. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is the precept that the double jeopardy clause prohibits prosecution of a defendant for a greater offense when he has been previously convicted of the lesser included offense. Id. [¶ 6] The constitutional principle, on its face, is simple: no person may be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same criminal offense. The word jeopardy refers to the risk of conviction and punishment. Black's Law Dictionary 912 (9th ed. 2009). This simplicity, however, has been illusory; see, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Federal double jeopardy law appears to have been settled in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), with the Supreme Court's holding that [i]n both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the `same-elements' test, the double jeopardy bar applies. The inquiry under the same-elements test is whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the `same offence' and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. Id. Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court recognizes and follows the same-elements test. See, e.g., Granzer v. State, 2010 WY 130, ¶ 13, 239 P.3d 640, 645 (Wyo.2010); Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 505, 510 (Wyo. 2009); and Najera v. State, 2009 WY 105, ¶ 11, 214 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo.2009). [¶ 7] The two offenses at issue in the present case are misdemeanor battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) (LexisNexis 2011) and attempted kidnapping, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a) and 6-2-201(a)(iii) and (d) (LexisNexis 2011). The statutory elements of battery, as charged in this case, are: 1. On or about August 3, 2009. 2. In Laramie County, Wyoming. 3. The appellant. 4. Intentionally. 5. Caused bodily injury to the victim. 6. By use of physical force. On the other hand, the statutory elements of attempted kidnapping, as charged in this case, are: 1. On or about August 3, 2009. 2. In Laramie County, Wyoming. 3. The appellant. 4. With the intent to commit the crime of kidnapping. 5. Did an act which is a substantial step towards commission of the crime of kidnapping. [¶ 8] It is clear that each of these statutes contains an element not contained in the other. Battery requires both the use of physical force and resultant bodily injury, neither of which element is contained in the crime of attempted kidnapping. Attempted kidnapping requires the intent to commit the crime of kidnapping, and a substantial step toward commission of that crimewhich substantial step logically may or may not involve physical force or bodily injuryneither of which element is contained in the crime of battery. In cases such as this, where two crimes each contain elements not contained in the other, there is no preclusive effect, and the subsequent prosecution does not violate double jeopardy. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704-09, 113 S.Ct. at 2860-63; Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 501-02, 104 S.Ct. at 2542; State v. King, 2002 WY 93, ¶¶ 18-20, 48 P.3d 396, 404-05 (Wyo.2002).