Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct in Guilt Phase Argument

Text: Coffman contends the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of misconduct during his guilt phase summation by misstating the law, impugning the integrity of defense counsel, and arguing that evidence of other bad acts by Coffman, indicating her criminal disposition, proved her guilt of the present charges. The misconduct, she asserts, denied her due process, a fair trial and a reliable determination of the facts in a capital trial in violation of her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and their state constitutional analogues. The claim is, in substance, one of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. A prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. ( People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 18 P.3d 11; accord, Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431.) In other words, the misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. ( United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 [addressing prosecutorial duty of disclosure].) A prosecutor's conduct `that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair' violates California law `only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.'' ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 167, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) Turning to the specific claims of misconduct, we note that, at trial, Coffman failed to object or seek an admonition with respect to four of the five instances of improper argument she cites in her brief. As to those four instances, she therefore has forfeited her claims for purposes of this appeal. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) She asserts, however, that counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance. In any event, we find no prejudicial misconduct. First, Coffman claims the prosecutor misstated the law of robbery in arguing he had proven defendants guilty of murder committed in the course of that crime. Responding to defendants' arguments that Novis was killed after the underlying felonies were completed, the prosecutor sought to convey that the evidence sufficed for a finding that defendants had formed the intent to commit those felonies, as required for the special circumstances alleged in this case, before the murder. As the prosecutor argued: The essence of these special circumstances is that the murder itself must be to facilitate the underlying crimes of burglary, robbery, kidnapping, but it doesn't have to happen simultaneously. [ļ] If the decision was in the mind of the perpetrator of the crimes that it would help them get away with the crime by murdering this person, the special circumstances is [ sic ] satisfied. It doesn't matter when they are murdered. The prosecutor proceeded to give a hypothetical example of a murder committed during the course of a robbery and went on to argue: If you determine, as the evidence makes abundantly clear, that Corinna Novis was killed to eliminate her as a witness, to kidnap for robbery[,] for burglary and for sodomy, that is a murder during the course of those crimes. [ļ] Pure and simple. You can't have a purer example of killing somebody to facilitate the commission of the crime. [ļ] ... [ļ] We had kind of an example of that in this case and it related to Corinna Novis's checks. [ļ] From the evidence, when Corinna is kidnapped they probably take her purse with the checks in them pretty quickly. You can assume the checks were in her purse. [ļ] Corinna gets killed the night they take her. But when is the robbery involving the checks actually completed? Isn't it actually completed days later when the checks are forged and they pass the checks to get the money? That is what they really want. [ļ] You see, here is a case where they have killed Corinna a couple of days before they actually complete that part of the robbery they were intending. But because the thought was we are going to take all of her money, it doesn't matter they killed her a couple of days before the checks were cashed. Same principle applies to the burglary. The prosecutor's remarks, taken in context, somewhat inartfully urged the jury to find that defendants formed the intent to rob Novis before killing her, even though they did not obtain all the fruits of the crime until after the killing. The jury, moreover, was correctly instructed with the elements of robbery and with the proposition that any statement by an attorney inconsistent with the court's instructions as to the law must be disregarded. Consequently, there was no reasonable likelihood any juror would have applied the prosecutor's comments erroneously. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Next, Coffman complains the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to categorically refuse to consider defendants' testimony and to summarily convict them because their respective testimony was mutually irreconcilable. She further contends the prosecutor's argument for conviction illogically relied on admissions contained in the very testimony he was urging the jury to disregard. Contrary to Coffman's argument, no misconduct appears, as the prosecutor was merely asking the jury to conclude that both defendants had been willfully false in a material part of their testimony and therefore the jury should reject their conflicting testimony and rely on the objective evidence supporting a determination of their guilt of the charged offenses. We see no reasonable likelihood any juror would have misunderstood the argument in the manner Coffman suggests. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; see CALJIC No. 2.21.2.) Coffman further argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by urging conviction based on defendants' other bad acts, as reflected in the uncharged Kentucky and Orange County killings. [28] Both she and Marlow objected to the prosecutor's reference to the other crimes on the basis the evidence of those crimes had been admitted, and the jury had been instructed to consider it, only as it related to Coffman's defense of coercion. Marlow moved for a mistrial; Coffman joined in the motion, which the court denied, reasoning: The only use of argument was for the purpose of showing the relationship between the two parties and how they worked together, rather than one under the influence of the other. [ļ] That was the purpose for which that evidence was introduced. The argument was appropriate. As the trial court reasoned, the prosecutor's remarks, in context, did not urge a finding of guilt based on defendants' other bad acts or criminal disposition, but instead properly suggested that each defendant bore responsibility for the crimes because neither acted under the other's coercion. Coffman additionally cites as misconduct the prosecutor's reference to the testimony of the Taco Bell employee who testified Coffman had reacted violently when told the restaurant was closed; the prosecutor commented that Coffman on that occasion appeared mad, angry, violent, pushy. Contrary to Coffman's argument, the quoted characterization of her behavior hardly amounts to an implication that she was of a criminal disposition. And the prosecutor's reference to Coffman's antisocial conduct before she met Marlow (carrying a gun and trying to run down Doug Huntley while living in Arizona) clearly comprised part of his argument that she was not the sort who is dominated by any man as she's suggesting. [ļ] She can take care of herself. Because there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have misapplied the prosecutor's argument in the manner Coffman contends, no misconduct appears. Coffman also asserts the prosecutor impugned the integrity of defense counsel by depicting the duress and battered woman syndrome defense as manufactured by defense counsel together with the defense expert, Dr. Walker. The prosecutor commented: If you look at statements to the police, all of Miss Coffman's conduct before Mr. Jordan [her defense counsel] and Dr. Walker come on the case, you just don't see the picture of this battered woman, desperately battered woman. [ļ] Once Dr. Walker and Mr. Jordan come on the case â .... That's when Miss Coffman decides she is the battered woman. Respondent argues, to the contrary, the prosecutor's point was that Coffman, on her own, amplified her claims of abuse when she learned in the course of preparing a defense that it would be advantageous to do so. In our view, the prosecutor's argument is susceptible of either interpretation. Nevertheless, were we to address the merits of the contention despite the want of an objection below, we would conclude any misconduct was harmless, given the fleeting nature of the comment and the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Coffman. Coffman additionally argues the prosecutor misstated to the jury crucial items of evidence. Specifically, she complains, the prosecutor attributed planning activity, including donning attractive clothing before going to the Redlands Mall to abduct Novis and securing a gun and handcuffs from the Koppers residence and Paul Koppers's truck, to both Coffman and Marlow although, Coffman asserts, it was Marlow alone who engaged in or directed that activity. The prosecutor also allegedly misstated the evidence when he asserted, in support of the burglary special circumstance, that defendants intended to burglarize Novis's apartment before they killed her when, according to Coffman, no evidence supported the assertion. The prosecutor further allegedly misstated the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Reiber, in urging the jury to conclude that three hands were needed to strangle Novis and inaccurately stated they (inferentially, both defendants) participated in burying Novis, when the only evidence in the record bearing on the point was Marlow's statement to detectives that he had done so. A prosecutor engages in misconduct by misstating facts or referring to facts not in evidence, but he or she enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including urging the jury to make reasonable inferences and deductions therefrom. ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 819, 823, 827-828, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) In our view, the challenged comments generally fall within the permitted range of fair comment on the evidence. The thrust of the prosecutor's argument was that defendants jointly engaged in the offenses against Corinna Novis, regardless of whose idea it was to dress up or procure a gun and handcuffs. Although Coffman characterizes the burglary of Novis's apartment as an afterthought that arose when defendants' efforts to obtain cash from her bank account initially proved unavailing, the jury was entitled to infer that defendants entertained a broader purpose in abducting and murdering her. Dr. Reiber's testimony supported the prosecutor's argument that both defendants participated in the act of strangling Novis; the prosecutor's suggestion that defendants acted together in covering Novis's grave, even if unsupported by the testimony, could not have prejudiced Coffman in view of the relatively insignificant nature of the comment and the overwhelming weight of the evidence against her. Consequently, Coffman is not entitled to reversal of her conviction on this basis. Because any possible misconduct was harmless on this record, Coffman's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel lacks merit.