Opinion ID: 28760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict

Text: 49 Because a Sabine Pilot cause of action will always involve an unconsummated crime, any testimony about what Escamilla would have done, and why he would have done it, had Klumpe asked him to sign the waiver inevitably would be speculative. Moreover, if done with the intent to defraud by deception, any attempt Klumpe would have made to secure Escamilla's signature on the waiver would have subjected Klumpe to criminal liability, whether or not that attempt ultimately proved successful. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.01(1)(A). Klumpe meets his Sabine Pilot burden only if he showed that IBP required him to commit a criminal violation in order to keep his job; a showing that Klumpe had a good-faith belief that the required conduct would constitute a violation of criminal law will not suffice. 8 Williams v. Enserch Corp., 2000 WL 31802 at  (Tex.App. — Dallas, Jan. 18, 2000). 50 Contrary to the district court's holding that [t]he record in this case is devoid of evidence that those omissions or discrepancies were likely to affect the judgment of Escamilla in the case before this Court, the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that, if asked by Klumpe, Escamilla would have signed the waiver in reliance on misrepresentations made by IBP. 9 The testimony of the person who signed the relevant document is not required to prove a violation of section 32.46. Smith v. State, 681 S.W.2d at 74. The testimony of another person who, based on his personal knowledge, is competent to testify about the state of mind of the signor, is legally sufficient to support a conviction. Id. In the instant case, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Klumpe had personal knowledge of Escamilla's state of mind after the injury, as Escamilla was Klumpe's stepson. Klumpe testified that no one with Escamilla's injury would have signed the waiver if the benefits actually available under WISP and the restricted duty program had been known to that person, and that Escamilla, having had the available benefits misrepresented to him, would have signed the waiver if Klumpe had asked him to do so. 51 Furthermore, the inconsistencies between the orientation materials and actual plan benefits adduced by Klumpe are sufficiently material to support an inference of reliance. Although the availability of lifetime benefits for total permanent disability arguably would not have influenced Escamilla's decision regarding the waiver due to the nature of his injury, 10 whether arbitration would have been binding if any dispute over Escamilla's benefits under WISP arose is an issue that cuts across all covered injuries. The jury reasonably could have inferred that an individual with an injury as serious as Escamilla's would have found this latter fact material to his decision whether to accept WISP benefits. 52 In addition, based on Estrada's testimony regarding his experience with the Restricted Duty Program, the jury also could have inferred that the misrepresentations regarding that program would have been material to Escamilla's decision. The majority opinion counters that the Restricted Duty Program is separate from the WISP, and that signing the waiver is not an agreement to participate in restricted duty. But by signing the waiver, Escamilla would have relinquished his right to seek damages for future lost earnings after maximum medical improvement if he could not secure a placement within the program's time limitations. Escamilla had not been informed of those time limitations, and did not understand how they might have affected the amount of his future lost earnings. Accordingly, IBP's misrepresentations about the benefit actually available under the Restricted Duty Program reasonably could be believed to have a direct impact on Escamilla's willingness to sign the waiver. VI. The Roles of Jurors and Judges 53 In conclusion, the evidence presented at trial does not meet the standard for a JMOL. Rather, the jury had enough legally sufficient evidentiary support to reasonably find in Klumpe's favor. Assessing credibility and making factual determinations are uniquely within the province of the jury. The jury hears and sees witnesses and evidence first hand — a privilege that is forever lost when trial ends. Thus, when the majority writes that the only evidence we found of an IBP employee having admitted to misrepresentation came from Klumpe's own testimony 11 (a proposition I reject), it fails to explain why Klumpe's testimony would not be sufficient for the jury. The jury can reasonably decide who to believe, and who to disbelieve. If judges are willing to set aside jury verdicts as readily as was done in this case, the entire rationale for the civil jury system is sharply attenuated. At a practical level, trial judges can no longer be credible in explaining to jurors that — although their service comes at a significant personal cost to them, their families, and their co-workers — the contribution they make is indispensable. 54 This case is peculiarly ill-suited to have judges substitute their opinions in place of the jurors' verdict. We can leave aside for the moment the fact that the jury listened to nine days of testimony and deliberated for one more day. We can likewise discount the obvious fact that all jurors were able to judge the demeanor of the witnesses and then had the opportunity to compare their reactions. The key point is even more fundamental. Whether an employer's explanation of specific employee benefits is or is not deceptive is something that should be determined by men and women who are chosen from the community in which the conduct occurred and who likely have had relevant and diverse experiences in receiving explanations of employment benefits and subsequently trying to realize those benefits. In other words, such a determination is one for which a jury is quintessentially appropriate. Conversely, if any group is uniquely inappropriate to make such a determination, surely it is Article III federal judges who enjoy the otherwise almost unheard of luxury of lifetime job tenure and employee benefits many of which are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. 55 A jury's verdict should be disturbed only when the stringent requirements of JMOL are met. They are decidedly not met in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, and would reverse the district court's decision and reinstate the jury verdict. Notes: 1 The majority also concedes that the jury could have reasonably decided that IBP's purported reason for Klumpe's termination — the removal of the crewing guidelines — was pretextual, that IBP attempted to put pressure on Klumpe to obtain Escamilla's waiver, and that IBP was motivated to get Escamilla's release by any means necessary 2 Although I would reinstate the jury's verdict, I would review the amount of punitive damages and possibly reduce them to more closely established precedent. In view of the majority's opinion, I feel it unnecessary to analyze further the punitive damages issue, or to consider IBP's ERISA preemption argument in this dissenting opinion 3 The majority's opinion correctly states that Klumpe could have possibly faced liability under the Texas Penal Code § 31.01(1)(B) definition of deception had the jury been instructed on accomplice liability. Under Texas law, however, the jury is not free to find the defendant guilty as an accomplice unless the court's instructions authorize it to so and include the essential elements of proof for making such a finding. Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). While such an instruction would have benefited Klumpe by providing an alternative basis for criminal liability under the statute, as discussed above it is not dispositive on the issue of liability as accomplicity is not required under 31.01(1)(A). TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.01(1)(A). 4 These documents included the orientation script, the SPD, and the WISP legal document 5 In fact, the orientation script states that because the appeal process [to a neutral arbitrator] is fairly simple, an attorney's service is usually not needed unless you want to hire one. The help of an attorney would almost certainly be needed if IBP appealed an arbitrator's decision. This kind of statement in the orientation script only adds to the list of evidence the jury could have used in determining the SPD and orientation script were deceptive 6 In order to illustrate how the program affected an employee who sustained an injury, Klumpe presented the testimony of Andres Estrada, an IBP employee who suffered an injury very similar to Escamilla's approximately two years prior to Escamilla's accident. After his injury, Estrada signed a waiver, and ultimately received approximately $77,000 in compensation from IBP. Escamilla, in contrast, received approximately $1.9 million from IBP in settlement of his personal injury suit. Estrada also testified regarding the difficulties he encountered returning to work at IBP after his injury, specifically as a result the time deadlines and placement limitations of IBP's restricted duty program. Estrada's experience under WISP and the restricted duty program demonstrated the limitations of those benefits for an individual with Escamilla's injury, particularly when considered in light of the significantly greater recovery obtained by Escamilla as a result of his personal injury suit 7 Suther, in his testimony, admitted that IBP's orientation and SPD materials were false if IBP was seeking to vacate the arbitrator's decision in the Glover case, which the record reflects as true 8 Because the Sabine Pilot standard is an objective one, i.e. did the employer require the employee to commit a crime or face termination, the suggestion running through IBP's pleadings and the district court's opinion that Klumpe's claim is somehow tainted because his true motivation was loyalty to his stepson, not fear or criminal prosecution, is irrelevant. Even if such a factual inference were consistent with the jury's verdict and thus could be considered by the Court, Klumpe's subjective motivation for refusing to obtain Escamilla's signature does not affect his Sabine Pilot claim. 9 IBP itself cites the following exchange from the record: Q: Do you believe if you had gone to Chris and asked him to sign the waiver that we would have signed it? A: Sure he would have. In the context of Klumpe's testimony in its entirety, this statement does not necessitate an inference that Escamilla would have signed the waiver, irrespective of the misrepresentations allegedly made to him, simply because his stepfather asked him to do so. However, when viewed in the light most favorable to Klumpe's case, it does seem to indicate, misrepresentations having previously been made by others, that Klumpe simply would have had to maintain his silence — knowing of the misrepresentations — and that Escamilla would have signed the form upon being asked to do so by his stepfather. 10 For example, despite the severity of Estrada's injury, almost identical to the one suffered by Escamilla, he did return to work. Further testimony by Estrada revealed, however, that he had to eventually terminate his employment with IBP because of an inability to find suitable work there following his injury. Thus, although the availability of lifetime benefits for total permanent disability arguably would not have influenced Escamilla under the definition of qualifying injuries provided in the complete WISP document, it is conceivable that Estrada's experience could have lead Escamilla to question his ability to find work after such an injury 11 Klumpe testified that in his meeting with Suther following Escamilla's injury, James Crow, another IBP supervisor, told Klumpe that IBP would f ___ him over just like we do everyone else.