Opinion ID: 165446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Punitive Damages

Text: 17 T & B next argues insufficient evidence exists to support the jury's award of punitive damages under Title VII. Punitive damages are available under Title VII if the plaintiff proves an employer engaged in intentional discrimination with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Malice or recklessness exists if a plaintiff proves an employer discriminated in the face of a perceived risk that its actions [would] violate federal law. Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999).
18 T & B and Marrujo first argue the district court erroneously instructed the jury on Title VII punitive damages. Specifically, T & B claims that, although the district court properly instructed the jury that it must find malice or recklessness, the court failed to instruct that T & B must have discriminated in the face of a perceived risk that its actions [would] violate federal law. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118. The Court reviews jury instructions as a whole de novo to determine whether the jury may have been mislead, upholding the judgment in the absence of substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided. Beaudry v. Corrections Corp. of America, 331 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 19 Although the jury instruction in this case did not utilize the exact language from Kolstad, the jury was still fairly guided as to the law. The jury instruction given by the court clearly required the jury to find the acts of the defendants were with a wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, or that the acts were reckless, or oppressive, or maliciously intentional, in order to award punitive damages. (Jury Inst. No. 40). We can see little difference between a wanton disregard and a reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights. See Black's Law Dictionary 1093 (6th ed.1991) (defining wanton as recklessly disregardful of the rights... of others.). Further, we can reasonably infer that the jury assumed plaintiff's rights included Plaintiff's federal rights and state rights. Lastly, if the jury had any doubt as to which rights were in question, the jury verdict form clearly required the jury to find that T & B failed to make a good faith effort to comply with Title VII before imposing punitive damages.
20 Sufficient evidence also exists to support the jury's finding that T & B acted in the face of a perceived risk it would violate federal law. The evidence at trial showed T & B was fully aware of Title VII's prohibitions against sexual harassment. In fact, T & B's own sexual harassment policy prohibited unwelcome advances or propositions, verbal abuse of a sexual nature, unwelcome touching of an individual, graphic or verbal commentaries about an individual's body, sexually degrading words used to describe an individual ..., sexually explicit or offensive jokes, or physical assault. T & B posted its sexual harassment policy on bulletin boards throughout its facility. 21 Despite this policy, Plaintiff presented evidence showing T & B did not respond to her complaints after it became aware of serious harassment. In particular, Plaintiff testified that T & B supervisors were often around when Marrujo harassed her but would not do anything or report Marrujo's conduct. In fact, Roxanne Mussleman, a T & B supervisor, was working in front of Plaintiff when Marrujo pulled open Plaintiff's pants exposing her underwear to coworkers. Mussleman failed to intervene or to report the incident to anyone at T & B. Barbara Garcia also testified she complained to T & B's human resource department that Marrujo was very hostile towards women, but T & B failed to do anything to remedy the situation. 22 Plaintiff further testified she complained about Marrujo's conduct to T & B supervisors, production managers, the human resource department, and the plant manager to no avail. Although T & B's human resource department promised Plaintiff they would conduct an investigation, T & B did not conduct any credible investigation until months later. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10th Cir.1999) (noting Title VII punitive damages proper when the defendant conducted a sham investigation to appease plaintiff), abrogated on other grounds by Boyer v. Cordant Tech., Inc., 316 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir.2003). Moreover, Plaintiff introduced two memoranda into evidence written by Bob Romo, a T & B production supervisor, that clearly warned T & B management Marrujo's conduct was unacceptable and that her continuance in [a] supervisory position would only be detrimental to our facility and to the well being of our future. (Plaintiff's Ex. 44). Despite these, and other warnings, T & B did not discipline or reprimand Marrujo. In fact, T & B apparently told Plaintiff it could not discipline Marrujo because no proof of any misconduct existed. 23 Based on the foregoing, and, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could have found that T & B was aware of Marrujo's conduct, failed to adequately respond to Plaintiff's complaints, and acted recklessly and with disregard for Plaintiff's federally protected rights under Title VII. Accordingly, punitive damages were appropriate.