Opinion ID: 795431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cooper Industries

Text: 32 In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court significantly altered this understanding. The Court held that the plain language of § 113(f)(1) ( i.e., Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section [107] of this title, during or following any civil action under section [106] of this title or under section [107] of this title.) required a pre-existing civil action (either pending or completed) against the PRP under § 106 or § 107 before the PRP could seek contribution from other PRPs. The Court concluded that, if § 113(f)(1) were read to authorize contribution actions at any time, regardless of the existence of a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action, then Congress need not have included the explicit `during or following' condition in § 113(f)(1). Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166, 125 S.Ct. 577. Thus, a PRP may only seek contribution under § 113(f)(1) if it is the subject of a § 106 or § 107 civil action or has been adjudged liable as a result of such an action. Id. 9 33 The Court also considered the so-called saving clause of § 113(f)(1) (Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section [106] of this title or section [107] of this title.). We relied on this sentence in Reading when we said that § 113(f)(1) specifically permits a PRP to seek contribution from other PRPs without a pre-existing action under § 106 or § 107. 115 F.3d at 1120. Insofar as this statement implied that § 113(f)(1) permitted such an action, the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that [t]he sole function of the [saving clause] is to clarify that § 113(f)(1) does nothing to `diminish' any cause(s) of action for contribution that may exist independently of § 113(f)(1). Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166, 125 S.Ct. 577 (emphasis added). As the Court explained, 34 the sentence [ i.e., the saving clause] rebuts any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling clause [in § 113(f)(1)] is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP. The sentence, however, does not itself establish a cause of action; nor does it expand § 113(f)(1) to authorize contribution actions not brought during or following a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action; nor does it specify what causes of action for contribution, if any, exist outside § 113(f)(1). Reading the saving clause to authorize § 113(f)(1) contribution actions not just during or following a civil action, but also before such an action, would again violate the settled rule that we must, if possible, construe a statute to give every word some operative effect. 35 Id. at 166-67, 125 S.Ct. 577. 36 The Court left open the questions of whether a PRP may seek cost recovery under § 107, and whether that section includes an implied cause of action for contribution on which a PRP may rely independently of § 113. With respect to the former question, the Court noted that numerous decisions from the Courts of Appeals, including this Court's decision in New Castle County, had held that a § 107(a) cost recovery action is only available to an innocent party, and concluded that the question had not been briefed to the Supreme Court and thus it was more prudent to withhold judgment on these matters. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 169-70, 125 S.Ct. 577. While the Court did not reach the latter issue as well, it drew the litigants' attention to those cases in which this Court has visited the subject of implied rights of contribution before, id. at 170-71, 125 S.Ct. 577 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638-47, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981), and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 90-99, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981)). It noted further that, in enacting § 113(f)(1), Congress explicitly recognized a particular set (claims `during or following' the specified civil actions) of the contribution rights previously implied by courts from provisions of CERCLA and the common law. Id. at 171, 125 S.Ct. 577. 10