Opinion ID: 1442039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Holman Assault

Text: Defendant had been charged with assault with intent to commit rape regarding Ms. Holman. He pleaded guilty, however, to the lesser offense of battery with serious bodily injury. At the penalty phase the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence to prove that the assault on Ms. Holman was with intent to commit rape. This evidence consisted of defendant's statement to a police officer that he had been stabbed by a prostitute whom he had kissed. Defendant objected to the evidence on grounds of relevance and Evidence Code section 352. The court overruled the objection. (13) Defendant contends the court erred in overruling his objection. He argues that the alleged intent to commit rape was irrelevant to section 190.3, factor (b), which focuses on the violence of criminal activity. He also argues that his plea of guilty to a lesser included offense constituted an acquittal of the charged offense of assault with intent to commit rape and thus was inadmissible pursuant to section 190.3's prohibition against evidence of violent criminal activity for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted. We have previously rejected arguments such as the present one. In People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 755, we rejected a contention that prior criminal activity that was the subject of a plea bargain should be inadmissible at a subsequent penalty trial. We stated there: A bargained conviction or dismissal is not an `acquittal' as described in section 190.3. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 192-193 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629], we held that the rule of People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 [159 Cal. Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396], prohibiting reliance on facts underlying a dismissed count to fix the sentence in the very case for which the plea bargain was executed, did not preclude the use of such facts in the penalty phase of a later, separate trial for murder with special circumstances.... (45 Cal.3d at p. 193.) In People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 566-568 [250 Cal. Rptr. 530, 758 P.2d 1060], we rejected the defendant's argument that the dismissal of a charge of involuntary sexual battery and his plea of guilty to lewd, lascivious and indecent assault upon a child precluded introduction of the underlying facts of the case because his plea was to a nonviolent crime. We are unpersuaded by defendant's attempt to distinguish his case from Melton, Heishman, and McDowell. For the reasons stated in those cases, we find no error in the trial court's ruling.