Opinion ID: 348544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: impeachment by a prior jury verdict

Text: 13 The trial in the instant case began on March 4, 1975. Earlier the same day the jury in another case before a different judge returned a verdict of guilty against Klein on a separate indictment charging him with conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana. 4 No judgment or sentence was entered on that jury verdict during the pendency of the instant trial. When Klein indicated, against the advice of counsel, that he wished to testify in his own defense, his counsel asked the district court to rule on whether Klein could be impeached with evidence of this jury verdict if he took the stand. The court, citing United States v. Franicevich, 471 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1973), noted that a witness can be impeached with evidence of a prior conviction even when an appeal of that conviction is pending. By analogy, the court reasoned, a witness could be impeached with evidence of a guilty verdict where no judgment had been entered, as long as he has the opportunity to show the status of the matter in mitigation. (T.R. 414) As a result of this ruling, Klein did not take the stand. He now argues that the court's ruling constitutes reversible error. We are not persuaded by his argument. 14 It is a well settled rule of law that only previous convictions, and not previous acts of misconduct not resulting in conviction, can be used for impeachment purposes. United States v. Turner, 497 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 848, 96 S.Ct. 90, 46, L.Ed.2d 71 (1975). Accord: Brown v. Coating Specialists, Inc., 465 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1971). This rule has spawned controversy where the conviction sought to be used for impeachment purposes lacks finality, either because judgment and sentence have not yet been entered on a jury verdict or guilty plea, or because an appeal is pending. Until the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated, the Circuits were split on the issue of the admissibility of convictions on appeal at the time of the subsequent trial. Courts holding against admission reasoned that (i)f the judgment of conviction is later reversed, the defendant has suffered, unjustly and irreparably, the prejudice, if any, caused by disclosure of the former conviction. Campbell v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 135, 176 F.2d 45, 47 (1949). On the other hand, as we explained in United States v. Franicevich, supra, at 429: 15 We apprehend the better rule in such a situation to be that the prior conviction, yet unreversed, may be shown by way of impeachment. The witness may, of course, explain to the extent of showing that the conviction is pending on appeal, and the jury may then give it such weight as it wishes, its prerogative in any case. 16 Our position has since been adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provide as follows: 17 The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 18 Fed.R.Evid. 609(e). 19 It follows that if a jury can comprehend that a prior conviction on appeal may be reversed, it can also comprehend that a jury verdict of guilty may be set aside upon a motion for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), a motion for a new trial, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33, or a motion in arrest of judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 34. 5 Thus, we can perceive no logical distinction, for purposes of impeachment, between a conviction on appeal and a jury verdict of guilty where judgment and sentence have not yet been entered, so long as the defendant has the opportunity to explain to the jury the legal status of the conviction. 20 We hold only that a verdict of guilty where judgment and sentence have not been entered is admissible for impeachment purposes where it otherwise meets the requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 609. In so holding, we do not suggest that a guilty verdict is for all purposes the equivalent of a conviction or that a mere plea of guilty may in all cases be used for impeachment purposes. 21 We recognize the general rule that it takes the judgment of the court on the plea or verdict to constitute a conviction. Crawford v. United States, 41 F.2d 979, 980 (D.C.Cir. 1930). See also Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 464, 56 S.Ct. 760, 762, 80 L.Ed. 1283 (1936). Indeed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that (a) judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence . . . The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1). 22 In some contexts, such as where prior conviction of a specific offense is an element of the crime charged, 6 the distinction between verdict and conviction is quintessential. Where the guilty verdict is introduced for impeachment purposes, however, it can be distinguished from a conviction only on the basis of a procedural requirement which is nothing more than a ministerial act. United States v. Canaday, 466 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1972). There is no significant difference between the jury's finding of guilt and the entry of judgment thereon as far as probative value for impeachment purposes. United States v. Rose, 526 F.2d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 905, 96 S.Ct. 1497, 47 L.Ed.2d 755 (1976). A jury's verdict of guilty prior to entry of judgment is no less final than a conviction during the pendency of an appeal. In both cases the finding of guilt should be competent as impeachment evidence subject to an explanation by counsel that the finding may be set aside at a later date. 23 By this holding we intimate no view as to the admissibility for impeachment purposes of pleas of guilty standing alone without a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence. At least one circuit has held that a guilty plea is a confession of guilt and amounts to a conviction for impeachment purposes, United States v. Turner, supra, 497 F.2d at 407, while two circuits have held otherwise. United States v. Lee, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 509 F.2d 405 (1974); United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1970). 24 We emphasize that our holding here leaves open the question of the admission of proof of guilty pleas in similar circumstances. A plea of guilty is distinguishable from a jury's verdict of guilty and should be separately considered. A jury does not deliberate until it has been presented with evidence upon which a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can be based; a guilty plea may lack the evidentiary basis which gives the verdict at least a surface guarantee of trustworthiness. Although both a plea of guilty and a verdict of guilty may be altered before guilt is adjudged, the verdict carries a greater assurance of finality. Because the judgment of a jury is favored in our law, a court may not lightly disturb a jury's verdict. On the other hand, the rule allowing a defendant, upon leave of court, to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. United States v. Presley, 478 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1973). We point out these distinctions not to forecast our decision in a future case but simply to emphasize that we do not decide today whether guilty pleas prior to judgment and sentence are admissible as impeachment evidence. 25 The trial court did not err when it held that evidence of the prior verdict of guilty against Klein was admissible to impeach his credibility if he elected to testify.