Opinion ID: 2410348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The right of access

Text: In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978), the Supreme Court addressed the common law right of access to court proceedings and records. While it is not an absolute right, the Court stated, It is clear the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. at 1312. The Court conceded, however, It is difficult to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a comprehensive definition of what is referred to as the common-law right of access or to identify all factors to be weighed in determining whether access is appropriate. Id., at 599, 98 S.Ct. at 1312. In Arkansas Dep't of Human Services v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119, 871 S.W.2d 352 (1994), we addressed the public's right of access to a court's final order. The Department of Human Services brought a paternity suit. After a hearing, the Chancellor filed a final order containing his ruling and then filed a second order stating the first order was sealed. We found the Chancellor erred in sealing the order, stating: The foregoing issue came about because the chancellor sealed the final order, and, contrary to the arguments of both parties, we know of no authority for the sealing of a final order. One of the basic principles of a democracy is the people have a right to know what is done in their courts. Correlative of this principle is the vital function of the press to subject the judicial process to extensive public scrutiny and comment. See Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152, 662 S.W.2d 174 (1983). Secret final orders could defeat this synergy of the peoples' right and the press's function, especially in cases in which the State is a party, as in this case. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), the Supreme Court wrote that when public court business is conducted in private, it becomes impossible to expose corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism. For this reason traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence distrusts secrecy in judicial proceedings and favors a policy of maximum public access to proceedings and records of judicial tribunals. We have no hesitancy in holding the final order in this case should not have been sealed. It is difficult to distinguish the Hardy case from this one. The pronouncements we made in the Hardy case with respect to the right of access are based on cases from other jurisdictions which had declared and emphasized the common law right of the public to access to court proceedings, and they are relevant to this decision. The other judgment lurking in the same shadows as the settlement agreement is apparently a significant decision by the Trial Court. While it may not be a final order like the one sealed in the Hardy case, the same rationale applies. A review of cases from other jurisdictions indicates support for a strong presumption in favor of the right of access. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., supra ; Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, 800 F.2d 339 (3rd Cir.1986); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861 (2nd Cir.1985); Holland v. Eads, supra ; R.W. v. Hampe, M.D., 426 Pa.Super. 305, 626 A.2d 1218 (1993); In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill.App.3d 1068, 174 Ill.Dec. 209, 598 N.E.2d 406 (1992); Zukerman v. Piper Pools, supra . Each of these cases, however, also states the presumption is not absolute. In the Hardy case we too recognized the inherent authority of a trial court to issue appropriate protective orders to control court records, and, thus, the right to inspect public records is not absolute. The Supreme Court's opinion in the Nixon case held the right of access was a matter subject to the Trial Court's discretion based on the facts and circumstances. Other courts have not expressed the same degree of deference. See, e.g., Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, supra ; United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3rd Cir.1981). A trial court's discretion to invoke inherent authority denying access to judicial documents must be balanced against the strong presumption in favor of access, but in our view, entrance to a trial court's discretion to secret its actions must lie beyond a formidable threshold. In the Hardy case we noted several statutes which provide for closing judicial proceedings under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Ark.Code Ann. § 4-75-605 (Repl.1991) (suits involving trade secrets); Ark.Code Ann. § 9-9-217 (Repl.1993) (adoption proceedings records shall be closed, only to be open as provided by law or for good cause); Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-325 (Repl.1993) (juvenile proceedings); Ark.Code Ann. § 16-13-318 (1987) (domestic relation cases). In addition, Ark.R.Sup.Ct. 6-3 allows for anonymity in certain appellate proceedings, and as discussed above, Ark.R.Civ.P. 26(c) allows a trial court to enter protective orders related to discovery requests. These statutes and rules provide a range of subjects in which a trial court can seal judicial documents or proceedings. The range is similar to the limitations of access to judicial proceedings in other jurisdictions. In Holland v. Eads, supra , the Alabama Supreme Court, noting an absence of similar rules and statutes in that State, created a guideline for sealing court records. It held that a trial court can only seal court records upon a written finding that clear and convincing evidence indicates the document sought to be sealed (1) contains a trade secret, (2) is a matter of national security, (3) promotes scandal or defamation, (4) pertains wholly to private family matters, such as divorce, (5) poses a serious threat of harassment, exploitation or other harm to the parties to the actions, or (6) poses the potential for harm to third persons not parties to the litigation. A less structured approach was taken in In re Marriage of Johnson, supra , in which the Illinois appellate court stated, Once documents are subject to the right of access, only a compelling reason, accompanied by specific factual findings, can justify keeping them from public view. 174 Ill.Dec. at 214, 598 N.E.2d at 411. We are persuaded to adopt an approach similar to that taken in R.W. v. Hampe, M.D., supra, in which a Pennsylvania Superior Court refused a plaintiff's request to seal court records containing her name in a malpractice suit against her psychiatrist. The Court agreed the information which would be produced in a trial of the plaintiff's complaint would indeed be embarrassing to her. The Court reviewed Pennsylvania's statutes and court rules that provided for sealing court records and concluded that the issue presented was clearly distinguishable from the limited circumstances in which a trial court could seal court records. We agree with the sense of the opinion that, beyond the instances described in the statutes or rules, the inherent authority of a trial court to seal court records must be very limited in view of the strong common law right of access. ABC argues the information contained in the settlement between GECC and McKane and Robbins is relevant and necessary to the New York litigation. We regard that argument as unnecessary. The right of access belongs to the public, not just the parties to a lawsuit. More important, we are not persuaded by the counter-argument that GECC and McKane and Robbins have relied on the sealing order in reaching their settlement agreement. We agree with the statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, supra , that mere encouragement of settlement is not a sufficient basis to overcome the public's right of access. If the parties to a law suit wish to enter an agreement and keep it secret, they may do so. All they need do is file a motion to dismiss litigation between them once the settlement of it is agreed upon. It remains their private business. If, however, they wish to make the settlement a court record and seek the imprimatur of a court, as was done in this case, it becomes the public's business. We do not close the door to the possibility of sealing court records in instances other than those provided by statute or rule of court. We do, however, suggest that we will look long and hard at any other sealing, and we require a trial court entering such an order to spell out in some detail the reasons for sealing the record. During oral argument of this case the question of remand for a redetermination by the Chancellor was raised, the reason being that the Chancellor did not have the advantage of our opinion in the Hardy case when deciding to seal the documents. Neither party has asked for such a remand, and neither responded favorably to the suggestion during the oral argument. As shown in the citations to the Nixon and other cases cited above, there is nothing new about the strong right of public access to court records. Nor have we been cited to any reason in support of the sealing which we would have found acceptable had it been stated by the Chancellor. We therefore decline to remand the case other than for an order consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. GLAZE, J., dissents.