Opinion ID: 2066555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PCRA Court's Denial of Evidentiary Hearing on Certain Ineffectiveness Claims

Text: Appellant next claims that the PCRA court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing with respect to certain other claims of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel. [12] In death penalty cases, a PCRA court is required to allow a petitioner to develop the record with respect to any genuine issues concerning any material fact. Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B). Where the PCRA court determines that a hearing is required as to some, but not all, of the issues raised in a petition, the hearing may be limited to those issues. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 578 Pa. 284, 851 A.2d 883, 899 (2004).
In his first underlying issue based on the PCRA court's denial of an evidentiary hearing, appellant claims that the PCRA court should have allowed him to develop the record regarding prior counsel's failure to challenge the trial court's admission of a statement provided to the police by Kevin Cofer, as well as testimony Cofer gave at a preliminary hearing, both of which implicated appellant in Graves' murder. Appellant argues that the police statement and preliminary hearing testimony were inadmissible at trial because appellant was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Cofer about them, either at the preliminary hearing or at trial, where, appellant states, after disavowing the prior statement and testimony, Cofer invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify further. Appellant contends that he was substantially prejudiced by the admission of Cofer's prior statement and testimony because they comprised the Commonwealth's only evidence that directly implicated Mr. Collins. Appellant's Brief at 54. [13] The Commonwealth responds that the instant claim is frivolous. Citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) for the proposition that when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements, the Commonwealth first emphasizes that appellant was free to face and cross-examine [Cofer] at [trial]. Commonwealth's Brief at 58. The Commonwealth specifically disputes appellant's representation that Cofer invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, noting that Cofer merely attempted to invoke it, after which the trial court properly compelled him to continue to testify. As an independent reason why the instant underlying claim fails, the Commonwealth cites Pa.R.E. 803.1(1) (Inconsistent statement of witness), noting that Cofer's preliminary hearing testimony was given under oath at a formal legal proceeding and that his police statement was reduced to a writing, which Cofer signed and adopted. The PCRA court determined that both Cofer's preliminary hearing testimony and his police statement were admissible at trial. PCRA Ct. Op. at 25 (applying Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992)). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803.1(1) provides as follows: Rule 803.1. Hearsay exceptions; testimony of declarant necessary The following statements, as hereinafter defined, are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement: (1) Inconsistent statement of witness. A statement by a declarant that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and (a) was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (b) is a writing signed and adopted by the declarant, or (c) is a verbatim contemporaneous recording of an oral statement. Pa.R.E. 803.1(1). Although Rule 803.1 was adopted subsequent to appellant's trial, it merely codifies decisions of this Court announced prior thereto. See, e.g., Lively, 610 A.2d at 10. On July 14, 1992, the day after Graves' murder, Cofer was interviewed by homicide detectives. After initially denying that he was present at Graves' murder, Cofer informed the detectives that he, in fact, witnessed the shooting and that appellant was the shooter. Cofer provided a written statement to the detectives to this effect and signed each page of the statement. On August 5, 1992, Cofer testified at a preliminary hearing consistently with his July 14th police statement. On Friday, May 7, 1993, the Commonwealth called Cofer to testify at appellant's trial. Although Cofer acknowledged during direct examination that he had told the detectives all the details contained in the statement, N.T., 5/7/93, at 124-67, Cofer also testified at trial that the police statement was essentially untrue i.e., that he did not witness Graves' murder and was not even present at the time, id. at 137-46. Later during direct examination, Cofer acknowledged that his testimony at the preliminary hearing was under oath and in the presence of appellant and appellant's trial counsel. Id. at 172-73. Cofer subsequently testified, however, that he had lied at the preliminary hearing when testifying that he saw appellant shoot Graves. Id. at 177-85. Cofer further testified at trial that both his police statement and his preliminary hearing testimony were coerced by detectives and that he feared he would be charged with Graves' murder if he did not provide information inculpating appellant. Id. at 116-17, 163, 203, 218-19. Appellant's trial recessed for the day before the end of Cofer's direct examination. When the prosecutor resumed direct examination of Cofer on Monday, May 10, 1993, Cofer immediately attempted to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. N.T., 5/10/93, at 227. The trial court, however, instructed Cofer to continue testifying, which he did. Id. at 231. Cofer's direct examination concluded shortly thereafter, whereupon defense counsel began cross-examination. Defense counsel questioned Cofer extensively concerning the nature and circumstances of Cofer's July 14, 1992 police statement. For example, during cross-examination, defense counsel elicited the following testimony from Cofer: that he did not remember having been read his Miranda [14] warnings before he was questioned by detectives, N.T., 5/10/93, at 253; that the detectives told him they were going to give [him] a homicide, id.; that he had initially told detectives that he was not present at Graves' murder and that this initial version of events was true, id. at 254; and that the detectives told him that appellant was in another room telling them that [Cofer] had killed [Graves] and that [Assistant District Attorney] David Webb and [then-Judge] Lynn[e] Abraham would see to it that [Cofer] got the homicide if [Cofer] didn't cooperate, id. at 255. Defense counsel also cross-examined Cofer extensively concerning the nature and circumstances of Cofer's August 5, 1992 preliminary hearing testimony. For example, defense counsel elicited testimony from Cofer that, shortly before the preliminary hearing, the trial prosecutor told Cofer, Maybe you ought to tell them that you seen a gun, id. at 257, and that Cofer had testified falsely at the preliminary hearing out of fear of get[ting] the homicide [him]self because the detectives who interviewed him said they would get a homicide on [him] if [he] didn't cooperate, id. at 258. Therefore, the record thoroughly belies appellant's contention that Cofer was not subject to cross-examination concerning [his prior] statement[s] as required by Pa.R.E. 803.1. As the PCRA court determined, the additional prerequisites for admitting Cofer's July 14, 1992 police statement were clearly satisfied, see Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(a); Lively, supra, as were the additional requirements for admitting his August 5, 1992 preliminary hearing testimony, see Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(b); Lively. There was no basis for trial counsel to object. Accordingly, because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to this underlying claim of trial court error, appellant's derivative ineffectiveness claim did not warrant an evidentiary hearing in the PCRA court.
Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in refusing to hold a hearing on appellant's claim that prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's failure to issue a corrupt source instruction to the jury in connection with Cofer's testimony. Appellant argues that the jury could have reasonably inferred that Cofer was an accomplice in Graves' murder (or actually committed it) based on Cofer's conduct at trial as well as his testimony that the police considered him a suspect in the murder (Appellant's Brief at 56) and that detectives threatened to arrest him for the murder and told him that appellant had implicated him in the crime. Appellant contends that, had the trial court instructed the jury that Cofer was a corrupt and polluted source, there is a reasonable likelihood that appellant would have been acquitted. In response, the Commonwealth first argues that a corrupt source charge would have been inconsistent with appellant's defense that he played no role in Graves' killing. In any event, the Commonwealth adds, appellant would not have been entitled to a corrupt source charge in connection with Cofer's testimony because there was no evidence at all that Cofer was an accomplice to Graves' murder, much less sufficient evidence to warrant such a charge. The PCRA court determined that there was no arguable merit to the underlying corrupt source instruction claim, finding that there was no evidence presented that Kevin Cofer participated in the murder of Andre Graves. PCRA Ct. Op. at 12. A corrupt source instruction advises the jury that if it finds that a certain witness who testified against the defendant was an accomplice of the defendant in a crime for which he is being tried, then the jury should deem that witness a corrupt and polluted source whose testimony should be considered with caution. Commonwealth v. (Roy) Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167, 1181 (1999); accord Commonwealth v. Hackett, 534 Pa. 210, 627 A.2d 719, 724 (1993). The instruction is warranted only in cases in which there is sufficient evidence to present a jury question with respect to whether the witness is an accomplice. ( Roy) Williams, 732 A.2d at 1181; Hackett, 627 A.2d at 724. Section 306(c) of the Crimes Code defines accomplice liability as follows: (c) Accomplice defined.A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c). Accordingly, accomplice liability requires evidence that the person: (1) intended to aid or promote the substantive offense; and (2) actively participated in that offense by soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal. Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1014 (2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1879, 170 L.Ed.2d 755 (2008). One merely present at the crime scene is not an accomplice, id., nor is one who merely helps an offender try to escape arrest or punishment an accomplice, Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 627 A.2d 1176, 1183 (1993); Hackett, 627 A.2d at 725. As evidence that Cofer was an accomplice in Graves' murder, appellant cites the following: (1) Cofer's testimony that the police considered him a suspect in the murder; (2) Cofer's claim that detectives told him that they would arrest him for the murder and that appellant had implicated him in the crime; (3) Cofer's temporary refusal to continue testifying at trial; and (4) defense counsel's argument at trial that Cofer was the shooter. Appellant's Brief at 56. Appellant does no more than baldly assert that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that Cofer was an accomplice in Graves' murder; in fact, appellant fails even to mention the definition of an accomplice. Appellant's failure to even attempt to show that the requirements of accomplice liability were met by actual evidence here is not surprising. To begin with, notwithstanding appellant's contention to the contrary, Cofer himself, in fact, testified that the detectives told him that they did not believe appellant's out-of-court accusation that Cofer was the shooter, N.T., 5/7/93, at 120, and when asked whether Cofer was ever told by detectives that he was a suspect in the case, Cofer said, No, N.T., 5/10/93, at 253. The fact that, during the police investigation, appellant attempted to shift the blame from himself to Cofer, the only person other than himself and Graves who was present in the Taurus when Graves was killed, was not evidence either that Cofer intended to aid in Graves' murder or that Cofer actively participated in the crime. Cofer's sudden refusal to continue testifying at the end of his direct examination when trial resumed on Monday, May 10, 1993 after a weekend recess reflects, at most, his own subjective fear of prosecution, but that conduct was not evidence of his participation in the murder. Moreover, appellant cites no evidence to suggest that such supposed fear was objectively reasonable. In fact, in light of Cofer's recantation of his preliminary hearing testimony and his police statement implicating appellant, Cofer's subjective fear was more likely of retaliation by appellant, or of prosecution for perjury. See N.T., 5/7/93, at 168-69 (Cofer's testimony as to his current fear of being killed in prison); Commonwealth v. (Rodney) Collins, 549 Pa. 593, 702 A.2d 540, 543 (1997) (noting admission at trial of two letters written by appellant to Cofer press[ing] Cofer to recant or risk being branded a `snitch'). Finally, defense counsel's attempt to cast suspicion on Cofer at trial is unhelpful to appellant's underlying corrupt source instruction claim, as it is well-settled that arguments of counsel are not evidence, Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 280 (Pa.2008). Therefore, appellant has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this underlying ineffectiveness claim, and the PCRA court did not err in denying a hearing thereon.
Appellant next claims that the PCRA court erred in denying a hearing on his claim that prior counsel were ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court improperly instructed the jury concerning reasonable doubt. Appellant contends that, by instructing the jury that a reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would restrain a reasonable man or woman from acting in a matter of importance to himself (Appellant's Brief at 59 (quoting N.T., 5/17/93, at 797) (emphasis appellant's)), the trial court improperly diminished the Commonwealth's burden of proof and infringed upon the presumption of innocence ( id. at 58). Appellant submits that the trial court was required to instruct, as per PA. STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.01(3), that [a] reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to hesitate before acting upon a matter of importance in his own affairs. Appellant's Brief at 59. The Commonwealth briefly counterargues that this underlying claim is based on a merely semantical distinction and is identical to a claim this Court rejected in Commonwealth v. Porter, 556 Pa. 301, 728 A.2d 890 (1999). The PCRA court deemed the claim lacking in arguable merit, noting that this Court had repeatedly refused to require the word hesitate over restrain in reasonable doubt instructions. We rejected this identical claim as recently as last year in our decision in Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 920 A.2d 790 (2007). In Rios, in denying relief on the claim that a trial court's use of the word `restrain' rather than `hesitate' set[ ] the bar for reasonable doubt higher and infringed upon the presumption of innocence, id. at 806, this Court quoted our holding in Porter, supra, that the distinction between hesitate and restrain before acting is de minimis and that such a subtle variation in phrasing would not be an abuse of the trial court's discretion, 728 A.2d at 899 (deeming claim hyper-technical and semantical). See also Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 913 A.2d 220, 255 (2006) (quoting Porter holding in denying relief on identical claim); Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274, 368 A.2d 626, 634 (1976) (denying relief on identical claim); Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401, 311 A.2d 576, 581 (1973) (same). Moreover, beginning decades before appellant's trial, we have repeatedly expressed our approval of definitions of reasonable doubt in terms of a doubt that would restrain a reasonable man (or woman) from acting. . . . Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694, 697 (1954); Commonwealth v. Sauders, 390 Pa. 379, 134 A.2d 890, 895 (1957); Commonwealth v. Burns, 409 Pa. 619, 187 A.2d 552, 561 (1963); Commonwealth v. Butler, 442 Pa. 30, 272 A.2d 916, 920 (1971); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 317 A.2d 258, 261-62 (1974); Commonwealth v. (Thomas) Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292, 301-02 (2001). In light of this copious authority in existence at the time of appellant's trial, the notion that prior counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the court's approved reasonable doubt instruction is frivolous. Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
Appellant next claims that the PCRA court erred in denying a hearing on his claim that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in admitting, without properly authenticating, two letters that appellant wrote to Cofer, imploring Cofer not to testify against him. Appellant submits that, after the prosecution introduced the letters at trial, Cofer denied having read or received them and appellant provided a handwriting exemplar that allegedly confirmed that appellant was not the author of the letters. Citing Pa.R.E. 901, the Commonwealth counterargues that the letters were authenticated by their distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances of the case, as having been written by [appellant]. Commonwealth's Brief at 64-65. In particular, the Commonwealth notes that the letters: were mailed from the prison in which appellant was incarcerated; contained appellant's unique seven-digit prison identification number; urged a course of conduct that would benefit appellant and only appellant; and identified appellant's trial counsel by name. Citing our direct appeal opinion in this case, the Commonwealth further argues that, in any event, the letters were admitted not as evidence of appellant's consciousness of guilt but to explain Cofer's recantation of his prior statements implicating appellant. Id. at 65-66 (citing ( Rodney) Collins, 702 A.2d at 544). Thus, the Commonwealth explains, the letters did not need to be authenticated as actually written by appellant but, rather, merely as purporting to have been written by appellant because even the latter would serve as persuasive evidence to explain Cofer's recantation. In denying relief on this claim, the PCRA court noted numerous circumstances that together served to authenticate the letters, including, inter alia: that appellant's name and address were on the return address of both envelopes; that both letters addressed Cofer as Kabir/Kev, which Cofer testified were his nicknames; and that the contents of the letters mentioned appellant's trial counsel by name and otherwise connected the letters to appellant. The admission of evidence is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the decision to admit certain evidence will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. E.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 588 Pa. 151, 903 A.2d 1139, 1156 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2030, 167 L.Ed.2d 772 (2007). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification (a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. (b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:     (4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.