Opinion ID: 4503181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Jenkins’s claims

Text: Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(a). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo[.]” Perkins v. District of Columbia, 146 A.3d 80, 84 (D.C. 2016). Mr. Jenkins asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were “no undisputed facts indicating that Mr. Jenkins had a knife” on the date of the alleged offense and “an abundance of evidence indicating that [he] did not.” As to the first of these points, the short answer is that the issue in this case is not whether Mr. Jenkins actually committed the offense of ADW or possessed a pocketknife on the date in question. “[T]he relevant inquiry in a false arrest defense is not what the actual facts may be but rather what the officers could 8 reasonably conclude from what they were told and what they saw on the scene.” Enders v. District of Columbia, 4 A.3d 457, 470-71 (D.C. 2010); see also Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he constitutional validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed any crime.”). The issue in this case is whether, at the time of Mr. Jenkins’s arrest and based on the facts (undisputedly) known to Officer Davis and the other officers at the scene, there was probable cause to believe that Mr. Jenkins had committed a criminal offense (specifically, ADW). See Bradshaw v. District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 318, 323 (D.C. 2012) (“A police officer may justify an arrest [and defeat a wrongful arrest claim brought under §1983 and a common-law false arrest claim] by showing that he or she had probable cause, in the constitutional sense, to make the arrest.”). “Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the police officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man or woman of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Butler v. United States, 102 A.3d 736, 739 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (explaining that probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal 9 activity, not an actual showing of such activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (Probable cause “requires only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people . . . act.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “When facts support a ‘fair probability’ that a suspect has committed a crime, probable cause to arrest exists.” Bridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)); see also Crowe v. County of San Diego, 593 F.3d 841, 867 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In determining whether there was probable cause to arrest, we look to the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, to determine if a prudent person would have concluded there was a fair probability that the defendant had committed a crime.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Probable cause doesn’t require proof that something is more likely true than false. It requires only a fair probability, a standard understood to mean something more than a bare suspicion but less than a preponderance of the evidence at hand.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to Mr. Jenkins’s point about the “abundance of evidence indicating that [he] did not” display a knife during the encounter with the complainant, the short answer is that probable cause may exist even when there are “statements and 10 circumstantial indicators on both sides of the issue . . . .” Pendergrast v. United States, 416 F.2d 776, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also id. at 783–84 (concluding that the circumstances preceding arrest “amply possessed th[e] capability” of “warrant[ing] a man of reasonable caution in the belief of [the suspect’s] guilt” despite the facts that the complainant who identified the suspect-stranger as one of his assailants “had recently been drinking,” and that the suspect gave an innocent explanation for his presence on the street and “promptly denied complicity” when confronted with the complainant’s accusation) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). For probable cause to exist, “[t]he indicia of guilt need not be absolute, or even fully consistent; they may leave some room for doubt, and even for error.” Id. at 784 (footnotes omitted). “[T]he [probable cause] standard does not require that officers correctly resolve conflicting evidence or that their determinations of credibility, were, in retrospect, accurate.” Wright, 409 F.3d at 603. As one district court has observed, “[t]he inference of the suspect’s guilt need not be the most likely scenario, or even more likely true than not, for a reasonable officer to have probable cause to arrest.” Hyung Seok Koh v. Graf, 307 F. Supp. 3d 827, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citing Kaley and Wesby). The overarching issue before us is whether Mr. Jenkins was entitled to have a jury decide whether there was probable cause for his arrest. It is clear under our 11 case law that “where the facts that might establish probable cause are in dispute, their existence is for the determination of the jury.” May Dep’t Stores Co. v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767, 771 (D.C. 1973). Here, the material facts, recited above are not in dispute; that is, there were no factual issues that precluded summary judgment. This court has said, however, in a number of cases, that “[t]he issue of probable cause in a [wrongful] arrest case is a mixed question of law and fact that the trial court should ordinarily leave to the jury.” Bradshaw, 43 A.3d at 324; Enders, 4 A.3d at 469; District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34, 37 (D.C. 1993); see also, e.g., Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[I]t will usually be appropriate for a jury to determine whether probable cause existed.”); Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he issue of probable cause in a damages suit . . . generally is a jury question[.]”). But we have also explained that “where the facts are undisputed or clearly established . . . probable cause becomes a question of law for the court.” Enders, 4 A.3d at 469; Smith v. Tucker, 304 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C. 1973) (explaining that “[w]here the facts are in dispute, the existence of the facts [is] for the jury, but their effect, when found is a question for the determination of the court”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Prieto v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 216 A.2d 577, 578 (D.C. 1966) (false arrest case stating that “[w]here the facts are not in dispute the question of probable cause is one of law to be decided by the court.”); see Stewart 12 v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 (1878) (“Whether the circumstances alleged to show [probable cause] are true, and existed, is a matter of fact; but whether, supposing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law.”). In answering that question of law, we apply the standard that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in a wrongful arrest case if the evidence relevant to probable cause is “so clear that reasonable men could reach but one conclusion.” Bradshaw, 43 A.3d at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted); Enders, 4 A.3d at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The existence of probable cause is a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination that is possible.”); Booker, 94 F.3d at 1058 (“[T]he court appropriately may conclude that probable cause existed as a matter of law ‘when there is no room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.’”) (quoting SheikAbdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1246 (7th Cir. 1994))5; DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 5 In Booker, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant police officers in a § 1983 unlawful arrest case, concluding that the defendant officers had probable cause to arrest Booker for murder even though, in the related criminal proceeding, the Illinois state appellate court had found no probable cause to arrest Booker and reversed his conviction. See 94 F.3d at 1054, 1058. In Sheik-Abdi, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers in an unlawful arrest suit, concluding that where police (continued…) 13 F.2d 618, 623 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing authority that “where the issue [of probable cause] arises in a damage suit, it is . . . a proper issue for the jury if there is room for a difference of opinion”). This is a case in which there may have been more than one reasonable inference available to the police officers about what actually occurred in the Wharf parking lot. We conclude, however, on the summary judgment record before us that this is a case in which there is no room for a difference of opinion — and a reasonable jury could reach but one conclusion — regarding probable cause: to wit, that a prudent officer would have believed that there was at least a fair probability that Mr. Jenkins committed the crime alleged, and therefore that Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest Mr. Jenkins. In reaching this (…continued) arrested Sheik-Abdi after a witness told them he saw Sheik-Abdi strike his wife, “[t]he officers’ decision to arrest Sheik-Abdi for battery easily [fell] within the zone of probable cause” even though his wife “denied that the striking had occurred” and “bore no contemporary markings of bodily harm[.]” 37 F.3d at 1246–48. By contrast, in Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendants, explaining that there was “a substantial question as to whether a prudent police officer would have probable cause to believe that [plaintiff] Maxwell [who was six inches taller and almost 100 pounds heavier than indicated in the description of fugitive Moore in an America’s Most Wanted notice and was missing the tip of his left middle finger rather than, as indicated in the notice, the tip of the left index finger] was Moore.” 14 conclusion, we are instructed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wesby, which concretely demonstrates that “[p]robable cause is not a high bar,” 138 S. Ct. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted); that police are entitled to draw reasonable inferences (which need not be the only possible inferences) when presented with conflicting evidence, id. at 588; and that a suspect’s “innocent explanations . . . do not have any automatic probable-cause-vitiating effect[,]” id. at 592. The facts of Wesby are that police officers responded to neighbors’ complaints about loud music and illegal activity in a house that had been vacant for several months and found in the house a group of late-night partygoers. Id. at 583. The officers smelled marijuana and saw beer bottles and cups of liquor on the floor, and there was a “makeshift strip club” operating in the living room and “debauchery” happening on a bare mattress that was on the floor of an upstairs bedroom. Id. at 583. Each of the partygoers told police that someone had invited them to the house (for a bachelor’s party, some said), and, at the officers’ request, one of the partygoers made a phone call to “Peaches,” the putative host, who, the partygoer said, had just started renting the house. Id. Peaches told the officers that she was renting the house from the owner and that she had given the attendees permission to have a party there. Id. Upon contacting the owner, police learned that the putative host had not finalized a rental agreement for the home and 15 therefore lacked the right to use the house or authorize the party, and Peaches eventually admitted the same to the officers when they telephoned her again. Id. at 583–84. The officers arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry. Id. at 584. The charges eventually were dropped, and the partygoers sued for wrongful arrest under §1983 and District law. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the partygoers on the issue of liability, reasoning that “[a]ll of the information that the police had gathered by the time of the arrest made clear that [p]laintiffs had every reason to think that [the plaintiff partygoers] had entered the house with the express consent of someone they believed to be the lawful occupant.” Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (footnote omitted). The D.C. Circuit majority concluded that “there was no probable cause for the officers to believe that the [p]laintiffs entered the house knowing that they did so against the will of the owner or occupant.” Id. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that “the officers made ‘an entirely reasonable inference’ that the partygoers [knew their party was not authorized and] were knowingly taking advantage of a vacant house as a venue for their late-night party”; that “the officers could have reasonably inferred that [in stating otherwise, 16 the partygoers] were lying” and that Peaches was lying when she said she had invited them to the house; and that the officers could even have “inferred that [the putative host] “told the partygoers . . . that she was not actually renting the house[.]” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586–87, 588 (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable officer could draw these inferences even though the house had some “signs of inhabitance—working electricity and plumbing, blinds on the windows, toiletries in the bathroom, and food in the refrigerator[,]” id. at 586, and even though the condition of the house was arguably consistent with the putative host’s being a new tenant, id. at 588. The Court held that “[v]iewing the[] circumstances as a whole, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house.” Id. at 588. 6 To have probable cause, the Court cautioned, the officers did not have to “rule out [the partygoers’] innocent explanation” for their presence in the house.7 6 The Court recited a number of “suspicious facts”: partygoers scattered or hid when they saw the uniformed officers; the floor was dirty; the house had no furniture other than a few metal chairs and a bare mattress; there were no clothes in closets or boxes or other moving supplies; and Peaches had lied about renting the house and seemed evasive. Id. at 583, 586, 587, 588. 7 As the Supreme Court observed, the D.C. Circuit majority thought that the lap dances and drinking observed by the officers found when they entered the house were “‘consistent with’ the partygoers’ explanation that they were having a bachelor party” and “dismissed the condition of the house as ‘entirely consistent with’ Peaches being a new tenant.” 138 S. Ct. at 588 (quoting 765 F.3d at 23). But the Supreme Court was more impressed with the fact that none of the (continued…) 17 Id. And, notably, the Supreme Court did not simply conclude that the plaintiff partygoers’ wrongful arrest claim should go to a jury; rather, notwithstanding the record facts that weighed on both sides of the probable-cause issue and that split the D.C. Circuit panel, the Court concluded that the District of Columbia and its officers were entitled to summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs’ wrongful arrest claims. See 138 S. Ct. at 589. The Court stated that its analysis “would not change no matter which party is considered the moving party” (i.e., even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the partygoers). Id. at 584 n.1. In the instant case, the police responded to a radio run reporting that “a knife had been pulled” following a traffic dispute at the Wharf. The police thereafter spoke to the complainant and his nephew S.M., who both reported that Mr. Jenkins had angrily confronted the complainant while holding in his hand a pocketknife with the serrated blade visible. Mr. Jenkins acknowledged that he had confronted the complainant to complain about the latter’s taking of the parking space, thus partially corroborating the complainant’s and S.M.’s account. Mr. Jenkins denied that he had a knife, and no knife was found, but the officers knew that the (…continued) partygoers “could identify the bachelor[,]” a fact from which the officers could reasonably infer that the partygoers were lying. Id. at 587. 18 Jenkinses had walked away from the parking lot after the incident and thus would have had an opportunity to hide or dispose of the knife (if Mr. Jenkins had one) had they noticed the police presence (which, it appears, would have been “within [their] eyesight” [JA 147]) before or during their walk back to the parking lot. On the foregoing undisputed facts and the summary judgment record as a whole, and given the “not . . . high” bar that the probable-cause standard presents, we are satisfied that any reasonable juror would have to conclude that the police had evidence from which they could reasonably believe that there was a fair probability (even if not a preponderant likelihood) that Mr. Jenkins displayed a knife during the encounter with complainant, and that no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Jenkins for ADW. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586. In the wake of Wesby, we conclude that even if the facts here present “a very close call” as to what actually occurred during the encounter, probable cause is “too low a bar[,]” Hyung Seok Koh, 307 F. Supp. 3d at 848, for Mr. Jenkins to succeed on his wrongful arrest claim. “Probable cause to arrest exists if a police officer either had firsthand knowledge or received his information [about an offense having been committed] from some person — normally the putative victim or an eyewitness — who it 19 seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth.” Davis v. United States, 759 A.2d 665, 670 (D.C. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the summary judgment record contains no deposition testimony about S.M.’s demeanor or manner of dealing with the officers from which a jury could conclude that the officers could not reasonably believe that his account (which, according to the police report, “remained consistent”) was truthful. 8 And, as a matter of law, 8 Cf. Smith, 304 A.2d at 306–7 (explaining, in malicious prosecution action, that in the absence of evidence raising an issue about the honesty of the complainant’s belief that plaintiff was the intruder she saw leaving her tavern, “there was no fact issue respecting probable cause for the jury to resolve.”). The instant case, which involved a prompt report to police and the absence of any video evidence, is quite different from Sherrod v. McHugh, 334 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2018), in which the court summarized the facts that “[f]rom the very beginning” should have caused the police detective to “view[] skeptically” the claim that plaintiff Mrs. Sherrod had threatened the complainant with a gun after a traffic incident, and that enabled the plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim to survive summary judgment: the complainant “waited several hours before reporting the alleged incident” to police; Mrs. Sherrod was an elderly woman (“pushing 80 years old”) who “did not fit the profile of the typical perpetrator of an assault with a deadly weapon”; before arresting Mrs. Sherrod, the detective did not interview a witness who was shown on a security video that the parties agreed captured the altercation; and the security video was so pixelated that a jury was “the proper mechanism by which th[e] question [of whether it showed Mrs. Sherrod pointing a gun] should be resolved. Id. at 232, 233, 238, 240, 241. Mr. Jenkins makes much of the fact that during his deposition (and in response to leading questions), S.M. agreed to a description of the knife different from the one he gave police officers on the scene. Specifically, during his deposition, S.M. agreed with appellants’ counsel that the knife he allegedly saw was “purple” “with designs,” while one of the detectives on the scene testified that she had been told that S.M. described the knife as “black.” However, that apparent (continued…) 20 although Mr. Jenkins appears to imply that S.M. was not credible simply because of his youth, the fact that S.M. was only ten years old did not foreclose a reasonable belief that he was telling the truth about seeing Mr. Jenkins with a knife.9 We note further that Mr. Jenkins stated in his deposition that he did not overhear any of the conversation between the officers and S.M., and the record does not call into question the testimony by Officer Ronny Arce, who “assisted with talking with” S.M. in Spanish, that he “satisfied [him]self that, wherever [SM.] was [at the time of the incident], he was able to see [the knife].” 10 (…continued) inconsistency was not known to the police officers at the time of Mr. Jenkins’s arrest. 9 See, e.g., Gerald M. v. Conneely, 858 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting claim that police lacked probable cause to detain two juveniles whom a ten-year-old had accused of stealing his bicycle; reasoning that the complainant’s young age and the animosity between the children’s families, without more, did not allow a reasonable inference that the ten-year-old’s story was not worthy of belief); People v. Hetrick, 604 N.E.2d 732 (N.Y. 1992) (probable cause for a search of defendant’s apartment was properly based on affidavit of nine-year-old child who claimed to have witnessed drug activity there); see also Scott v. United States, 953 A.2d 1082, 1093 (D.C. 2008) (upholding trial court’s finding that sixyear-old was competent to testify in criminal proceeding). 10 And, of course, the possibility that Mr. Jenkins might be able to elicit testimony at trial that could cause a jury to question the reasonableness of the officers’ reliance on the statements from the complainant and S.M. was not enough to stave off summary judgment. “[S]peculation and surmise, even when coupled with effervescent optimism that something definite will materialize further down the line, are impuissant in the face of a properly documented summary judgment motion.” Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. (continued…) 21 As with S.M., the summary judgment record contains no deposition testimony from the officer who initially interviewed the complainant about the complainant’s demeanor or other factors that would enable a jury to conclude that it was unreasonable for police to believe that the complainant was truthful in his later statement (made with the assistance of a translator) about Mr. Jenkins’s display of a knife. The complainant’s claim that Mr. Jenkins held a knife during the altercation was corroborated by S.M.’s statement and partially corroborated by Mr. Jenkins’s acknowledgment of the angry encounter. Police could reasonably infer that the complainant’s initial statement that he saw Mr. Jenkins with keys and not a knife was attributable to the complainant’s limited English proficiency, and, in assessing the complainant’s credibility, could reasonably take into account the fact, mentioned in the police report, that the complainant “doesn’t speak fluent English[]” (and wasn’t sure what Mr. Jenkins was saying to him during the encounter).11 [JA 147] Further, the fact that the complainant changed his account (…continued) 1996). “The function of summary judgment is to . . . assay the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Cf. Balasubramanrim v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 143 F.3d 157, 163–64 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting Board of Immigration Appeals’s (continued…) 22 did not preclude a reasonable belief that the complainant was telling the truth during his later interview (that was conducted with the aid of a translator). 12 Finally, the officers could reasonably infer that Mr. Jenkins disposed of the knife after he noticed the police presence in the Wharf parking lot. 13 To be sure, (…continued) adverse credibility determination regarding asylum seeker’s claim that he was detained and tortured in his country because Board unreasonably failed to take into account that inconsistencies in his account, including his statement that he had never been arrested in his country, likely stemmed from his limited English proficiency; noting the asylum seeker’s explanation that “[w]hatever [airport interview questions] I didn’t understand, I said no.”). 12 See, e.g., Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that police lacked probable cause to arrest the assault victim’s husband, reasoning that even if police sergeant heard victim’s initial claim that a different man had attacked her, it was reasonable for the sergeant “to assess [the victim’s] demeanor, find her story credible, and rely on her subsequent identification of her husband as the attacker.”); Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1991) (concluding that detective acted reasonably in relying on victim’s identification of the Torchinskys as his assailants even though the victim had previously “offered differing statements about the cause of his injuries”). 13 This case is readily distinguishable from Payne v. Maher, No. 11 C 6623, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19617 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2014). There, complainants Denton and Henderson called 911 to report that after Payne brandished a pocket knife, they disarmed him and threw him to the ground. Id. at -3. All three men were still at the scene when police arrived, and Payne was lying on the ground, semi-conscious. Id. at , 7. The district court, ruling in the suit for false arrest brought by Payne (who claimed that Denton and Henderson had accosted him), reasoned that with Payne injured, semi-conscious, on the ground and calling for an ambulance when police arrived, “the knife, if there actually was one, should have been there too.” Id. at . But no knife was found, “a state of affairs that [the (continued…) 23 Mr. Jenkins consistently denied that he displayed or had a knife, but the officers were not required to believe him. 14 Mr. Jenkins emphasizes the undisputed fact that the officers never found a knife in the “immediate area” they searched, but that fact also did not negate probable cause. Per Wesby, we may not look at the absence of a knife in isolation, but must consider the totality of the circumstances (…continued) court reasoned] refuted [Denton’s and Henderson’s] claim that [Payne] had brandished a knife, [such that] a reasonable officer could not have reasonably believed, without more, that there was probable cause to arrest or charge Payne.” Id. at . In the instant case, by contrast, police arrived after Mr. Jenkins had walked away from the parking lot where witnesses claimed he had displayed a knife and, unlike Denton and Henderson, Mr. Jenkins had not only an opportunity but also an incentive to dispose of any knife before police officers interviewed him. 14 See, e.g., Nichols v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 322 A.2d 283, 286 (1974) (holding that an officer was not “obliged to believe the explanation of a suspected shoplifter.”); Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 524 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[An officer] need not rely on an explanation given by the suspect.”); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 32, n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A reasonable police officer is not required to credit a suspect’s story.”); Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he arresting officer does not have to prove plaintiff’s version wrong before arresting him[]” “is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest[,]” and “need not also believe with certainty that the arrestee will be successfully prosecuted.”); Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507, n.6 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[Officers a]re not required to forego arresting [a suspect] based on initially discovered facts showing probable cause simply because [the suspect] offered a different explanation.”); Criss v. Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988) (“A policeman . . . is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect’s story . . . .”). 24 of which the police officers were aware at the time Officer Davis arrested Mr. Jenkins. See 138 S. Ct. at 588. Mr. Jenkins argues that there was no probable cause to arrest him for ADW because there was “no allegation . . . that [he] threatened [the] complainant with the knife or that the complainant felt threatened by the knife or that Jenkins acted in any way in a threatening manner with the knife.” He also contends that a pocket knife was not a “dangerous weapon” as that term is used in the ADW statute because it was not a per se “prohibited weapon” as defined in D.C. Code § 22-4514(b) (2012 Repl.), which proscribes the possession of a “knife with a blade longer than 3 inches, or other dangerous weapon” “with intent to use [the weapon] unlawfully against another.” D.C. Code § 22-4514(b) (2012 Repl.). However, ADW occurs when a person commits simple assault with a dangerous weapon, see Perry v. United States, 36 A.3d 799, 811 (D.C. 2011), and one species of simple assault is intent-to-frighten-assault, see Contreras v. United States, 121 A.3d 1271, 1274 (D.C. 2015). Intent-to-frighten-assault “requires proof that the defendant intended either to cause injury or to create apprehension in the victim by engaging in some threatening conduct . . . .” Parks v. United States, 627 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1993). “[F]actual proof that the victim actually experience[d] apprehension or fear” is not “one of the essential elements” of the offense; rather, “the crucial 25 inquiry is whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.” Id. at 5–6 (brackets omitted). Further, simply holding a weapon before another person in a threatening manner can constitute intent-to-frighten assault; it is not necessary for the defendant to “brandish” the weapon or ostentatiously threaten the victim with it. See, e.g., Parks, 627 A.2d at 6–7 (holding that Parks’s “act of starting his car, reaching for his pistol, and bringing it up [to his knee] . . . with his gaze fixed on” a police officer who had pulled him over constituted intent-to-frighten assault); Mihas v. United States, 618 A.2d 197, 199–200 (D.C. 1992) (upholding a conviction for intent-to-frighten assault where the evidence showed that Mihas, who claimed to have been using a paring knife to clean his nails immediately before the assault, came within four or five feet of the victim holding the paring knife with the blade pointing towards the ground at a forty-five-degree angle while speaking “words of commanding tone”). Here, Mr. Jenkins was alleged to have “pulled” a folding pocketknife on the complainant while arguing with him “angrily” in the parking lot and to have held the knife in his hand, blade out, during the confrontation, such that the knife was visible. We have little trouble concluding that a person of reasonable sensibility witnessing that alleged conduct would perceive an immediate threat of danger. 26 Moreover, it is immaterial that the length of the blade of the (putative) knife may have been under three inches. A “dangerous weapon is one which is likely to produce death or great bodily injury by the use made of it.” In re M.L., 24 A.3d 63, 68 (D.C. 2011). Even a pocketknife with a short blade can be a dangerous weapon under some circumstances. See M.L., 24 A.3d at 66, 68, 70–71 (upholding a conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon where the blade of the defendant’s folding pocketknife “measured two and fifteen-sixteenths inches long” and the defendant was “carrying an open folding knife,” which the court remarked was “indicative of an intent to use it as a dangerous weapon”); Mihas, 618 A.2d at 199, 201 n.1 (upholding convictions for intent-to-frighten assault and possession of a prohibited weapon in a case in which, during a confrontation, the defendant possessed a paring knife with a two-and-three-quarters-inch-long blade). Because we conclude that Mr. Jenkins’s arrest was supported by probable cause, we need not determine whether Officer Davis is protected by qualified immunity from Mr. Jenkins’s constitutional claim. See Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1990) (“If probable cause was indeed present, it is not necessary to consider an immunity defense.”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“[J]udges . . . should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 27 immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”). In addition, our resolution of the probable-cause issue also resolves Mr. Jenkins’s common-law false arrest claim and assault and battery claims. See Scales v. District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722, 729 (D.C. 2009) (stating that “if a police officer has so-called constitutional probable cause to arrest, determined by reference to the objective standard used to determine probable cause in a criminal proceeding . . . the arrest will be lawful and the officer accordingly will have a complete defense to a false arrest claim . . . . ”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We turn finally to Mr. Jenkins’s negligent supervision claim. A party alleging negligent supervision must “show that an employer knew or should have known its employee behaved in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and that the employer, armed with that actual or constructive knowledge, failed to adequately supervise the employee.” Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 760 (D.C. 2001). As already noted, the Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the District on this claim without explaining its reasoning. The court may have assumed that a cause of action for negligent supervision could not lie because Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest Mr. Jenkins, and thus, his conduct was not tortious. See Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 925 A.2d 564, 28