Opinion ID: 163420
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence: Ball, Burks, and Greene

Text: 33 The narrow issue before us, then, is this: whether Oklahoma's act of prosecuting petitioner for the lesser included offense of second degree burglary, following reversal of petitioner's first degree burglary conviction based solely and expressly upon a finding of insufficient evidence as to the element distinguishing first and second degree burglary, was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5 We conclude that it did not. 34 We note, at the outset, that our inquiry is not satisfied by the definitive-sounding pronouncement in Brown, in which the Court stated: Whatever the sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense. 432 U.S. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221. Prior to making this pronouncement, the Court explicitly noted [w]e are not concerned here with the double jeopardy questions that may arise when a defendant is retried on the same charge ... after a conviction is reversed on appeal. Id. at 165 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2221. Thus, the Court in Brown removed from the table precisely the issue before us, and its broad statement does not control the result in this case. 35 In United States v. Ball, the Supreme Court declared the general rule, still applicable today, that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a criminal defendant who successfully appeals his sentence. 163 U.S. 662, 672, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). As the Court itself has acknowledged, however, its double jeopardy cases in the century following Ball can hardly be characterized as models of consistency and clarity. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). 36 In Burks, the Court reaffirmed the general rule set forth in Ball, but overruled many of its prior cases to clarify the distinction between the double jeopardy effects of appellate reversal for insufficient evidence and appellate reversal for trial error. 6 Carving out a narrow exception to the general rule established in Ball, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient. Burks, 437 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141. The Court has subsequently reemphasized the limited scope of the Burks exception. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) ([ Burks ] ... carved a narrow exception from the understanding that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction is subject to retrial.) (emphasis added). 37 Finally, in Greene v. Massey, a companion case decided the same day as Burks, the Court applied the Burks exception to a state criminal court proceeding. 437 U.S. 19, 24, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). Significantly, however, the Court expressly declined to reach the question of whether the Burks exception barred a subsequent prosecution for a lesser included offense: 38 Given our decision to remand this case for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, we need not reach the question of whether the State could, consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause, try [a defendant] for a lesser included offense in the event that his [conviction for the greater offense] is voided [based on insufficiency of the evidence]. 39 Greene, 437 U.S. at 25 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 2151. 40 We proceed to consider petitioner's argument in light of these precedents. 41