Opinion ID: 2978871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Principals Committed the Pippins Murder

Text: Based on this evidence, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Stewart of second-degree murder as an aider and abetter. It is undisputed that there was sufficient evidence to establish the first two elements necessary to sustain a conviction under an aiding and abetting theory. First, there was sufficient evidence that the crime charged, the murder of Robert Pippins, was committed by Whitley, Tate, and Hadley. The evidence showed that Pippins was shot five times in a manner consistent with a homicide. Testimony was offered that Pippins was a drug-dealer and kept quantities of illegal narcotics in his home. Narcotics stored in individual ziplock bags along with money and Pippins’ own firearm were recovered from a vehicle that sped from the vicinity of the crime scene. Officer Archambeau identified Hadley as the driver of that vehicle, and Stewart himself implicated Hadley and the two other principals in the murder of Robert Pippins in his sworn statement to the police. There was unrefuted testimony that Pippins was shot at least one time by the same firearm recovered from the vehicle driven by Hadley. There was, therefore, sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could find that the principals Whitley, Tate, and Hadley were guilty of the murder of Robert Pippins. No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 12 2. Stewart Assisted the Commission of the Pippins Murder The second element to convict Stewart as an aider and abetter is also not in dispute. Stewart performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, namely, the murder of Robert Pippins. There was sufficient evidence that the Pippins murder was carried out by the men to whom Stewart had given a .38 handgun. It is also undisputed that Stewart provided the weapon with the knowledge that the men intended to use it in the commission of a robbery. Stewart himself informed the police that the same men later told him that they discarded the weapon after committing a murder, thereby admitting that it was his .38 which was used to murder Pippins. The men also asked Stewart to lie in order to help them establish an alibi, which Stewart refused to do. The autopsy confirmed that Pippins was shot at least three times by a large caliber weapon such as a .38. Police found three bullet casings consistent with a .38 at the scene of the crime as well. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart provided a weapon to the murderer and so performed acts that assisted the murder of Robert Pippins. 3. Stewart’s Malice The primary issue in this appeal is whether Stewart held the requisite intent to be convicted of second-degree murder or had knowledge that the principals held such intent at the time that Stewart gave them aid and encouragement. Because malice is the requisite mens rea for second-degree murder under Michigan law, Goecke, 579 N.W.2d at 878, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart acted with malice or knew that the principals acted with malice at the time Stewart provided them with his firearm. In the alternative, Stewart may also be found guilty as an aider and abetter under Michigan law if second-degree murder was a natural and probable consequence of the crime Stewart did aid and abet. The Robinson court construed the language of Michigan’s aiding and abetting statute to provide that an aider and abetter may be convicted of two types of offenses: the offense the aider intended to commit and any No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 13 offense which was the natural and probable consequence of the intended offense. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d at 49 (“we hold that when the Legislature abolished the distinction between principals and accessories, it intended for all offenders to be convicted of the intended offense, in this case aggravated assault, as well as the natural and probable consequences of that offense, in this case death.”). Stewart does not dispute that he was guilty of aiding and abetting the crime of armed robbery. Therefore, even if there was insufficient evidence to show that Stewart acted with the requisite malice or that Stewart knew that the principals possessed the requisite malice for seconddegree murder, a rational trier of fact could still convict Stewart of second-degree murder if that crime is a natural and probable consequence of armed robbery. Because we hold that there was sufficient evidence to infer Stewart’s malice under the circumstances, we need not reach this alternative theory of Stewart’s guilt. Under Michigan law, “malice” is defined as “the intent to kill, the intent to inflict great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” Goecke, 579 N.W.2d at 878-79. An aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the crime. People v. Turner, 540 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), overruled in part on other grounds. Factors that may be considered include a close association between the defendant and the principal, the defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the crime, and evidence of flight after the crime. Id. Also “malice is a permissible inference from the use of a deadly weapon.” People v. Martin, 221 N.W.2d 336, 340-41 (Mich. 1974); overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Woods, 331 N.W. 2d 707 (Mich. 1982); Brown v. Jackson, 2009 WL 3125603, at -12 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2009); McGuire v. Ludwick, 2009 WL 2476452, at  (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2009); Daniels v. McKee, 2009 WL 2351767, at  (W.D. Mich. July 29, 2009). See also People v. Feldmann, 449 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Turner, 540 N.W.2d at 733; People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 136 (Mich. 1999); People v. Mass, 628 N.W.2d 540, 548 (2001). No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 14 In light of these principles of Michigan law, we hold that there was sufficient evidence presented in this case from which a rational trier of fact could infer the requisite malice to find Stewart guilty of second-degree murder. Initially, we emphasize that Michigan’s definition of malice does not require that a defendant act with the intent to commit murder. Rather the standard is much broader and includes the intent to commit serious bodily injury or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. More specifically, “[t]he offense of second-degree murder ‘does not require an actual intent to harm or kill, but only the intent to do an act that is in obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences.’” People v. Aldrich, 631 N.W.2d 67, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, it was not necessary to show that Stewart intended for Pippins or anyone else to be killed or that Stewart knew that Whitley intended to kill the victim of the robbery. Stewart contends that the prosecution had to prove that murder was “the natural and probable consequence” of committing an armed robbery. According to Stewart, the state had to show that the men to whom Stewart gave the weapon had murdered or harmed their robbery victims during prior robberies in order to prove that murder was “the natural and probable consequence” of the armed robbery in this case. Because murder was not “the likely, probable, or intended outcome of this robbery,” Stewart contends that he could not have acted with malice by lending his weapon to Whitley. Stewart cites national crime statistics for the proposition that very few armed robberies end in murder, and so it could not be said that murder is “the natural and probable” result of that type of crime. We reject Stewart’s argument in light of the broad definition of malice adopted under Michigan law. Malice includes more than the intent to commit murder. For the same reasons, the statistics on the number of murders resulting from armed robberies cited by Stewart are largely irrelevant. One can possess malice as defined by Michigan law simply by acting with disregard for the “life-endangering consequences” of one’s actions. Aldrich, 631 N.W.2d at 80. No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 15 Having established the applicable definition of malice, several of the relevant factors from which malice can be inferred are present in this case. First, by Stewart’s own admission, he had a close association with at least one of the principals by virtue of the fact that Tate was his cousin. Stewart further told the police that he was acquainted with Whitley and Hadley and even knew that these men “rode around and robbed people.” Clearly Stewart knew Whitley well enough to entrust his .38 to him. It could not be said then that the principals were strangers to Stewart. Second, although it is true that Stewart did not participate in the planning or execution of the crime, Stewart clearly knew that the men had carried out robberies in the past and intended to use his weapon in the commission of an armed robbery that very day. Despite his awareness of their past activities and present intentions, Stewart freely gave them aid. Indeed, Stewart armed them for the robbery. Third, Stewart’s flight after the crime is not in dispute. Stewart was a suspect in the Pippins murder investigation, but before police could question him, Stewart fled to Alabama. Perhaps most importantly, Stewart’s act in providing a weapon to be used in an armed robbery was done with an “obvious disregard of the life-endangering consequences.” It is undisputed that Stewart knew the weapon was going to be used to commit an armed robbery, a circumstance that would evidence “an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” See Goecke, 579 N.W.2d at 878-79. Taken together these factors support an inference that Stewart acted with malice when he provided his .38 to the principals. What is more, it was enough to infer Stewart’s malice if the evidence showed that Stewart gave aid to the principals with the knowledge that they intended to do an act with “obvious disregard to its life-endangering consequences.” The Michigan Supreme Court has held that in order to be convicted as an aider and abettor, the prosecution may prove either that “the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the defendant] gave aid and encouragement.” Robinson, 715 N.W.2d at 47-48. Consistent with this general principle No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 16 of aiding and abetting, Michigan law provides that “malice can be inferred from the aider and abettor’s knowledge that his cohort possesses a weapon.” Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 720 (6th Cir. 2003). This court and other federal courts applying Michigan law in habeas cases have recognized this inference concerning the aider and abetter’s knowledge that the principal is armed. See, e.g., Hill, 337 F.3d at 720 (defendant aided and abetted second-degree murder by acting as lookout; case remanded on issue of aider’s knowledge that principal was armed where trial court erred in admitting statement of co-defendant); Brown, 2009 WL 3125603, at -12 (defendant aided and abetted second-degree murder by planning robbery, coordinating movements with accomplice) (“the jury could infer from this careful planning that [the accomplice’s] use of a gun was not an unforeseen circumstance”); McGuire, 2009 WL 2476452, at  (defendant aided and abetted felony murder, which also requires malice, by driving brother to a neighborhood and waiting in the car with knowledge that his brother had a weapon); Daniels, 2009 WL 2351767, at  (defendant aided and abetted felony murder by participating in robbery of drug house during which the principal threatened victims with firearm and then held victims at gunpoint). See also People v. Turner, 540 N.W.2d 728, 733 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), overruled in part on other grounds (“Turner’s knowledge that [his accomplice] was armed during the commission of the armed robbery is enough for a rational trier of fact to find that Turner, as an aider and abetter, participated in the crime. . . . [B]ecause Turner knew of [his accomplice’s] intent to cause great bodily harm, a rational trier of fact could find that Turner was acting with ‘wanton and willful disregard’ sufficient to support a finding of malice.”); People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 137 (Mich. 1999) (“Defendant participated in a robbery involving the use of a knife, acting in wanton and willful disregard of the possibility that death or great bodily harm would result.”). In this case, the fact that Stewart aided the principals with the knowledge that they would be armed during the robbery offers another independent basis to infer Stewart’s malice at the time he provided the firearm. The proof showed that Whitley and Tate came to Stewart and asked to use his firearm for the express purpose of committing an armed robbery. Whitley’s stated intention to use Stewart’s weapon to No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 17 commit an armed robbery evidenced “an obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences.” In other words, Whitley, the principal to whom Stewart gave the weapon, possessed the requisite malice for second-degree murder at the time that Stewart gave him the weapon. For his part, Stewart knew that Whitley and the other principals intended to commit armed robbery and to use his firearm to accomplish the crime. Thus, Stewart was aware or should have been aware that Whitley was proceeding with “an obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences” of his actions. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could draw an inference that Stewart acted with malice by aiding and abetting Whitley. The lower court in this case concluded that the malice inference did not apply because Stewart himself did not use the gun and there was no evidence that Stewart was even present at the scene of the robbery. Likewise, Stewart argues on appeal that the malice inference concerning knowledge of a cohort possessing a weapon cannot apply in his case, primarily because Stewart was not present at the scene of the crime. We find this distinction unconvincing. First, the Michigan case law is clear that the aider and abetter need not possess the weapon himself. Second, the Michigan Supreme Court has cited with approval an earlier version of Michigan’s aiding and abetting statute which read, “all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offence, or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, may hereafter be indicted, tried and punished, as principals, as in the case of a misdemeanor” (emphasis added)). Robinson, 715 N.W.2d at 49 (citing Michigan’s aiding and abetting statute, 1855 Public Acts 77, § 19). There is no indication that presence is required in order to be convicted as an aider and abettor. Moreover, courts applying Michigan law have held that an inference of malice was appropriate under a variety of circumstances even when the aider and abetter is not in the principal’s presence at the time the principal committed the murder. See, e.g., Hill, 337 F.3d at 720 (aider and abettor convicted of second degree murder for acting as lookout outside victim’s home; remanded for error in admitting statement of codefendant); McGuire, 2009 WL 2476452, at  (aider and abettor of felony murder No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 18 convicted for simply driving brother to a neighborhood and waiting in the car at a stop sign); Daniels, 2009 WL 2351767, at  (aider and abettor of felony murder present in house but not in room when accomplice shot and killed robbery victim). These results are consistent with the broad applications of the inference approved by the Michigan courts. Turner, 540 N.W.2d at 733 (“Turner’s knowledge that [his accomplice] was armed during the commission of the armed robbery is enough for a rational trier of fact to find that Turner, as an aider and abetter, participated in the crime with knowledge of [his accomplice’s] intent to cause great bodily harm.”); Carines, 597 N.W.2d at 137 (“Defendant participated in a robbery involving the use of a knife, acting in wanton and willful disregard of the possibility that death or great bodily harm would result.”). We recognize that the Michigan cases applying the malice inference all involve some degree of presence at the scene of the crime on the part of the aider and abetter. In this case, there was no evidence that Stewart was present at the scene of the crime or had any prior knowledge about whom the principals intended to rob. These facts should weigh against an inference of malice. However, they do not preclude the inference. Taken together with all of the evidence discussed above, we find that multiple factors give rise to an inference of Stewart’s malice in this case. Stewart’s association with the principals, Stewart’s role in providing the weapon for the armed robbery, and Stewart’s flight to Alabama immediately after the Pippins murder all support the inference of malice. Stewart’s act of providing the weapon for an armed robbery evidences his own “obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences” of his actions, which is to say Stewart’s malice. Furthermore, malice could be inferred in this case because of Stewart’s knowledge that the principals would be armed during the robbery. Stewart gave aid with the knowledge of Whitely’s “obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences.” The fact that Stewart was not present and had no detailed knowledge of the robbery plot weakens the inference to be drawn from the fact that the principals were armed during the robbery. However, in light of the multiple bases for drawing the inference of malice, we hold that there was sufficient evidence presented from which a rational juror could infer Stewart’s malice. Therefore, Stewart is not entitled to the relief sought in his habeas petition. No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 19 E. Fundamental Fairness Concerns In Hill v. Hofbauer, this court noted that courts applying Michigan’s malice inference to aiders and abettors have also opined that “[i]t is fundamentally unfair and in violation of basic principles of individual criminal culpability to hold one felon liable for an unforeseen death that did not result from actions agreed upon by the participants.” Hill, 337 F.3d at 720 (citing Turner, 540 N.W.2d at 733). In fact, the district court in this case cited this language in its decision without further comment or analysis. We recognize that on its face this oft-cited proposition appears to undermine the rationale for our holding in this case. More specifically, we affirm Stewart’s murder conviction despite the fact that the murder of Robert Pippins was “an unforeseen death” that arguably “did not result from actions agreed upon by the participants.” Therefore, we take this opportunity to clarify the application of the principle generally as well as its application to the facts of this case. In order to provide greater context, we observe that the “fundamentally unfair” statement comes from an opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court, People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 327 (Mich. 1980). The significance of the Aaron decision lay in the fact that the Michigan high court held for the first time that a defendant could not be convicted of felony murder based solely on the intent to commit the underlying felony. Id. at 326. Rather, the prosecution had to prove malice in addition to the mental state required for the felony in order to convict the defendant of felony murder. Id. Aaron was notable then because it marked Michigan’s abrogation of the common law felonymurder doctrine. Id. at 327. See also Paul Moreno, People v. Aaron: Exorcising the Ghost of Felony Murder, 88:3 Mich. Bar J., Mar. 2009. In an effort to explain the reach of its holding, the Aaron court considered the effect of the abrogation of the felony-murder rule on the vicarious liability of co-felons where the underlying felony results in murder. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 327. In what is arguably dicta, the Michigan Supreme Court stated: In the past, the felony-murder rule has been employed where unforeseen or accidental deaths occur and where the state seeks to prove vicarious No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 20 liability of co-felons. In situations involving the vicarious liability of cofelons, the individual liability of each felon must be shown. It is fundamentally unfair and in violation of basic principles of individual criminal culpability to hold one felon liable for the unforeseen and unagreed-to results of another felon. In cases where the felons are acting intentionally or recklessly in pursuit of a common plan, the felonymurder rule is unnecessary because liability may be established on agency principles. Id. The Aaron court’s reasoning logically flowed from the abrogation of the common law felony-murder rule in Michigan. Just as the Aaron court held that the trier of fact could not infer intent to commit murder simply from the intent to commit the underlying felony, so too the trier of fact could not impute one co-felon’s malicious intent to the other co-felon vicariously. Thus, “[i]n situations involving the vicarious liability of co-felons, the individual liability of each felon must be shown.” Id. Courts applying Michigan law have subsequently cited Aaron many times for these propositions. Upon examination of many of those decisions, we find that the Aaron court’s “fundamentally unfair” concern has consistently been construed to mean that “[w]hen the state seeks to convict an aider and abettor of a substantive offense, the prosecution must establish that the aider and abettor himself possess[ed] the required intent or participate[d] while knowing that the principal possessed the required intent.” See West v. Jones, 2006 WL 508652, at  (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2006) (quoting Turner, 540 N.W.2d at 548) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown, 2009 WL 3125603, at ; Woods v. Booker, 2008 WL 4808724, at  (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2008); Stribling v. Smith, 2000 WL 796181, at  (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2000); Carines, 597 N.W.2d at 136-37; People v. Dumas, 563 N.W.2d 31, 42 (Mich. 1997) (J. Boyle dissenting). In fact, in a later opinion citing the “fundamentally unfair” language from Aaron, the Michigan Supreme Court stated, “This [fairness] concern is not implicated by an aiding and abetting standard which requires a finding that the co-felon acted with malice.” People v. Kelly, 378 N.W.2d 365, 373 (Mich. 1985). Based on this background, we hold that fairness concerns are not implicated in Stewart’s case. Our decision is consistent with the approach followed by the Michigan No. 08-2154 Stewart v. Wolfenbarger Page 21 courts, which require proof of the aider and abetter’s malice, or knowledge that the principal possessed the required intent, over and above the intent required to prove the underlying felony. As set forth above, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that Stewart acted with malice when he gave his gun to Whitley for the purpose of committing an armed robbery. Therefore, fundamental fairness and “basic principles of individual criminal culpability” are satisfied in this case. F. AEDPA Standards Even if we had concluded, after reviewing the record and drawing all conclusions in favor of the prosecution, that Stewart’s convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, the question would have remained whether it was unreasonable for the Michigan Court of Appeals to conclude that the evidence was sufficient. “A federal habeas court may not [grant habeas relief] simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied a Supreme Court case incorrectly.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641, 123 S.Ct. 1848 (2003). On the contrary, “it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied [that case] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002). Stewart has failed to carry this burden. We find no basis to call the state court’s decision an unreasonable application of Jackson. Under the circumstances, we cannot affirm the grant of Stewart’s habeas petition because Stewart has failed to show that the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals was objectively unreasonable. For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case with instructions to deny Stewart’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.