Opinion ID: 2805601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Circuit Court's Holding

Text: In this case, Walker did not request an order of arbitration in either her complaint or amended complaint. Instead, she sought money damages and an injunction reinstating her to her former position. Though this alone would ordinarily be enough to put in question the circuit court's arbitration order, 10 ARHA limits its appellate challenge of the arbitration order to the circuit court's 10 'Pleadings are as essential as proof, and no relief should be granted that does not substantially accord with the case as made in the pleading.' Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & Constr. Corp., 221 Va. 1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 229-30 (1981) (quoting Bank of Giles Cnty. v. Mason, 199 Va. 176, 180, 98 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1957)). Therefore, '[n]o court can base its decree upon facts not alleged, nor render its judgment upon a right, however meritorious, which has not been pleaded and claimed.' Id. at 1141, 277 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 207, 181 S.E. 521, 525 (1935)). 12 failure to apply the thirty-day appeal deadline imposed by Code § 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b). Both parties agree that, in March 2011, ARHA declared Walker to be noncompliant with the grievance procedure and deemed her request for arbitration to be withdrawn. See, e.g., Appellee's Br. at 6; Oral Argument Audio at 2:35 to 3:00. Walker specifically alleged that ARHA, through its counsel, made the compliance determination. 11 Walker, however, waited nearly a year to file her first complaint seeking judicial review - far beyond the thirty-day deadline imposed by Code § 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b). The circuit court decided not to apply the thirty-day deadline on the ground that this case involved a mere miscommunication between the parties as opposed to a compliance issue. We do not understand the distinction. Walker claimed that she was confused about the arbitrator selection process and that her confusion resulted in her alleged noncompliance. She did not assert, nor could she, given her pleading, that ARHA did not declare her noncompliant and deem her arbitration request to be withdrawn. It was just 11 At oral argument on appeal, Walker's counsel conceded that ARHA's counsel acted as the designee of ARHA's chief executive officer for purposes of making this determination. See Oral Argument Audio at 20:25 to 20:57. 13 this determination that Walker attacked in her amended complaint. The circuit court's reasoning conflated the cause of Walker's noncompliance (an alleged miscommunication) with its effect (a determination triggering the thirty-day window to petition the circuit court for review). The two are conceptually separate. The statutory deadline could not be set aside on the ground that the circuit court believed that Walker had a valid excuse for being noncompliant. If that were enough, the deadline would be pointless - for it would only impose a procedural bar on challenges destined to fail on the merits anyway. See generally Winslow v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 539, 546, 749 S.E.2d 563, 567 (2013) (It is never enough for the defendant to merely assert a winning argument on the merits - for if that were enough procedural default 'would never apply, except when it does not matter.' (citation omitted)). 12 12 Finally, we note that Walker did not file in the circuit court an application seeking to enforce a contractual arbitration right under the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, specifically, Code § 8.01-581.02(A). Nor did the circuit court issue an interlocutory order compelling arbitration under that statute or stay the proceeding under Code § 8.01-581.02(D) for purposes of retaining jurisdiction under Code §§ 8.01-581.010 and 8.01-581.011. Instead, the circuit court issued a FINAL ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, stating that the proceedings in this matter are otherwise terminated and this order is Final. Neither Walker nor ARHA questions our 14