Opinion ID: 889691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restoration Damages.

Text: ¶ 21 Section 929 and Sunburst govern the application of restoration damages in Montana. The law of torts works to ensure that an award of damages restores an injured party as near as possible to the party's pre-tort positionno better, no worse. Sunburst, ¶ 31 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 901 cmt. a (1979)). The difference between the value of property before and after an injury, or the diminution in market value, may constitute an appropriate measure of damages in property damage cases. Sunburst, ¶ 30; Burk Ranches, 242 Mont. at 305, 790 P.2d at 445. We recognized in Sunburst, however, that diminution in market value will not always correspond with a plaintiff's damages resulting from injury to real property. Sunburst, ¶ 37. Certain cases warrant an award of restoration damages in excess of the property's diminution in market value. Sunburst, ¶ 29. ¶ 22 We adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 and comment b in Sunburst for the calculation of damages to real property. Sunburst, ¶ 36. Section 929 provides in pertinent part: (1) If one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction of value, the damages include compensation for (a) the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value after the harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred[.] ¶ 23 Under § 929 the plaintiff may elect in an appropriate case to seek either the diminution in market value or the cost of reasonable restoration as the plaintiff's measure of damages. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929(1)(a). An appropriate case for restoration damages involves temporary damage and reasons personal to the plaintiff to restore property to its former condition. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 cmt. b. ¶ 24 The cost of restoring property to its pre-injury condition generally constitutes the appropriate measure of damages for temporary injuries. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 cmt. b; Felton Oil Co. v. Gee, 357 Ark. 421, 182 S.W.3d 72, 78 (2004). Section 929 imposes a limitation upon this right. The plaintiff must establish reasons personal to restore the property if the cost of replacing the land to its original condition exceeds the diminution in value. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 cmt. b; Sunburst, ¶ 35. ¶ 25 Speed points out that Lampi's injuryburned vegetationdiffers from the injuries in Sunburst toxic contamination. Speed suggests that this distinction allowed the District Court to reject Lampi's motions to establish restoration damages as the appropriate measure of damages in this case. Speed urged the District Court to follow this Court's rule for damages to vegetation established in Kebschull v. Nott, 220 Mont. 64, 714 P.2d 993 (1986), instead of Sunburst and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929. ¶ 26 We concluded in Kebschull that the diminution in market value constituted the appropriate measure of damages for destroyed vegetation from a negligently started fire. Kebschull, 220 Mont. at 67, 714 P.2d at 994-95. Speed argued in his summary judgment briefs that Lampi's injuryburned vegetationdid not qualify as the type of injury that the Court contemplated in Sunburst. We disagree. ¶ 27 Kebschull relied on the presumption that diminution in market value constituted the appropriate measure of damages in all property cases. Kebschull, 220 Mont. at 65, 714 P.2d at 994. Property experts testified that no diminution in market value had occurred and that the plaintiff had not suffered damages as a result. The Court had not yet adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929. This Court in Kebschull did not consider whether the case involved a temporary injury or whether reasons personal existed to support restoration damages. Kebschull does not limit a court's ability to award restoration damages to replace Lampi's burned vegetation in light of our decision in Sunburst and our adoption of § 929. ¶ 28 Lampi asks the Court to expand the restoration damages rule in Montana. The majority of courts that have applied § 929, including this Court, have considered whether a jury may award restoration damages in excess of the diminution in market value. Sunburst, ¶¶ 28-49. We have concluded that diminution in market value cannot serve as a cap on restoration damages. Id. at ¶ 46. Lampi now asks the Court to rule that restoration damages represent the only appropriate measure of damages in certain circumstances. ¶ 29 Lampi argues that he had presented the court with sufficient evidence before trial to establish that his claim represented an appropriate case only for restoration damages. The restoration damages rule requires plaintiffs to prove two separate elements, rather than the four elements Lampi set forth. Lampi must establish (1) temporary injury and (2) reasons personal in order to establish restoration damages as the appropriate measure of damages in his case. Sunburst, ¶¶ 31-39. ¶ 30 The Court in Sunburst also addressed in a separate section whether Sunburst residents would receive a windfall if restoration damages exceeded the diminution in market value. Texaco had complained that nothing required Sunburst residents to use an award of restoration damages actually to restore the property. The Court concluded that Sunburst residents had demonstrated through testimony at trial that they genuinely intended to restore the property. Id. at ¶¶ 40-44. Lampi thus reasoned that the restoration damages rule requires him additionally to prove a genuine intent to restore his property as a separate element of the restoration damages rule. Lampi correctly identifies that he must genuinely intend to restore his property in order to satisfy the reasons personal rule. ¶ 31 Sunburst did not create a genuine intent to restore property as a separate element of proof. Neither § 929 of the Restatement, nor the courts that have adopted its reasoning, recognize a genuine intent to restore the property as a separate element of proof. The Restatement and the courts that have addressed this issue instead have analyzed it as part of the reasons personal element. Osborne v. Hurst, 947 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Alaska 1997); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929. The reasons personal rule requires plaintiff to establish that the award actually will be used for restoration, and, therefore, subsumes this analysis. We examine in turn whether Lampi presented sufficient evidence of each element to satisfy his claim for restoration damages.