Opinion ID: 1842589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE (Sec. 31-01-03, N.D.C.C.)

Text: Over repeated objections that the dead man's statute precluded such testimony, the plaintiff was allowed to cross-examine Mrs. Luithle as to transactions between  her husband and herself. This cross-examination was proper, since the prohibition of the statute, where it applies, extends only to testimony by a party as to transactions with the deceased person unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party. The plaintiff objects further to the ruling of the trial court prohibiting him from testifying directly as to his own conversation with the decedent. The statute prohibits testimony by a party as to transactions with a decedent if the action or proceeding is by or against executors, administrators, heirs at law, or next of kin in which judgment may be rendered or ordered entered for or against them,. . . The plaintiff asserts that he was not suing Mrs. Luithle as an executor, administrator, heir at law, or next of kin but was suing her as an alleged partner of the deceased. In resolving this question, we note first of all that the plaintiff was given a very broad leeway in testifying as to transactions with the decedent, with the only real limitation being a prohibition against his own direct testimony as to one conversation in the presence of Mrs. Luithle, which she testified she did not hear. Secondly, we note that we have consistently confined the application of the dead man's statute to the letter of the statute and have declined to extend it by interpretation. McDonald v. Miller, 73 N.D. 474, 16 N.W.2d 270 (1944); Knoepfle v. Suko, 108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1961). And we have, on occasion, criticized the statute in rather strong language. In St. John v. Lofland, 5 N.D. 140, 64 N.W. 930 (1895), we said: Statutes which exclude testimony on this ground are of doubtful expediency. There are more honest claims defeated by them by destroying the evidence to prove such claim than there would be fictitious claims established if all such enactments were swept away, and all persons rendered competent witnesses. To assume that in that event many false claims would be established by perjury is to place an extremely low estimate on human nature, and a very high estimate on human ingenuity and adroitness. He who possesses no evidence to prove his case save that which such a statute declares incompetent is remediless. But those against whom a dishonest demand is made are not left utterly unprotected because death has sealed the lips of the only person who can contradict the survivor, who supports his claim with his oath. In the legal armory, there is a weapon whose repeated thrusts he will find it difficult, and in many cases impossible, to parry if his testimony is a tissue of falsehoods,the sword of cross-examination. 64 N.W. 930, at 931. Adhering to the policy of strict construction of the dead man's statute, we hold that the trial court erred in enforcing the statute in this case, but, as will appear later, we find the error harmless. In Mowry v. Gold Stabeck Co., 48 N.D. 764, 186 N.W. 865 (1922), we said: The statute, precluding testimony concerning transactions had with deceased persons, is specific in its character, and relates only to actions wherein the personal representative, heirs, or next of kin are parties. [Citation omitted.] The plaintiff did not appear in that capacity; he claims title through a deed made by his [deceased] father during his lifetime. The statute cannot be extended by judicial construction beyond its plain application. [Citations omitted.] 186 N.W. 865, at 866. In Barlow Grain & Stock Exchange v. Nilson, 57 N.D. 624, 223 N.W. 700 (1929), a creditor claimed it was the third-party beneficiary of a contract made between the defendant wife and her deceased husband under which the wife agreed to clear the  debts of her husband in consideration of his transfer of property to her. We said: The attempt here is to hold the defendant personally liable upon a contract made with her husband. She is not sued in the capacity of an executor, administrator, heir at law, or next of kin, and [her husband's] estate would not be affected, except beneficially, by the plaintiff establishing the contract alleged. 223 N.W. 700, at 701. In Miller v. First National Bank of Linton, 62 N.D. 122, 242 N.W. 124 (1932), we held that the claim, if the statute is to apply, . . . must be either a demand against the estate upon which judgment may be rendered or ordered entered for or against the estate or a demand by the estate in which judgment might be ordered for or against the estate,. . . 242 N.W. 124, at 127. By way of contrast, in International Shoe Co. v. Hawkinson, 73 N.D. 677, 18 N.W.2d 761 (1945), we held the dead man's statute applicable in a case where one of the defendants, a partner and administratrix of the other partner being sued, was representing the estate in the action in a matter in which the estate had an interest. In the present case, the plaintiff's claim against the decedent's estate has been accepted and allowed and there is no argument over the extent of the estate's liability. We therefore hold that the conversation between the plaintiff and Mr. Luithle was not barred by the dead man's statute because Mrs. Luithle was not sued in the capacity of executor, administrator, heir at law, or next of kin, and because no judgment could be ordered for or against the estate in the action or any subsequent action. However, we find the error harmless. The court found that there was no partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Luithle. We agree. In the absence of a partnership or some other theory upon which the wife could be held liable for the individual debt of her husband (and we have found no such appropriate theory here), a mere conversation between her husband and her husband's creditor would be hearsay in the absence of any proof that she participated in or heard the conversation. There is no such proof here. In any case, the plaintiff made no offer of proof as to the content of the conversation. In the absence of an offer of proof as to the contents of the conversation, we could not hold that any prejudicial error was committed. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hansen, 71 N.D. 383, 2 N.W.2d 163 (1941). In his reply brief on appeal, we find the plaintiff's assertions as to what the testimony would have been if he had been allowed to testify as to his conversation with the decedent. He asserts that the testimony would have been to the effect that certain cattle were released by the plaintiff to the decedent on the day of the conversation in exchange for new checks issued by the decedent only after the decedent in the presence of the defendant stated that if anything should happen to him he and the defendant were in business together and she would take care of the bills, and that the defendant did not deny the representation of the decedent, and the plaintiff relied upon that fact. If the testimony had been admitted, in our opinion the result of the case would not have been changed. The testimony would not have established a partnership, either actual or ostensible [Oelkers v. Pendergrast, 73 N.D. 63, 11 N.W.2d 116 (1943)], nor would it have established an obligation on the part of Mrs. Luithle to pay her husband's debts out of her separate property. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and TEIGEN, KNUDSON and PAULSON, JJ., concur.