Opinion ID: 772281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State Trial Court Decision

Text: 33 The state trial court rejected Weaver's Batson challenge, explaining that no prima facie showing of discrimination in the jury selection has been made. We regularly defer to the fact-findings of trial courts because those courts are uniquely positioned to observe the manner and presentation of evidence. Our deference to trial court fact-finding is doubly great in the present circumstance because of the unique awareness of the totality of the circumstances surrounding voir dire, Moore, 895 F.2d at 486, and because of the statutory restraints on the scope of federal habeas review. 34 First, a trial court's determination of the Batson prima facie step is highly fact-intensive. The determination is based largely upon information that will not be evident from a reading of the record, such as the ability to evaluate general demeanor; to observe attention span, alertness, and interest; and to assess reactions indicating hostility or sympathy towards or fear of the parties. Id. at 485-86. Second, on habeas review, we accord state trial courts broad latitude in determining questions of fact by virtue of the statutory presumption in favor of state court fact-findings, see 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1). 35 Weaver's showing falls short of rebutting the presumptive correctness of the state trial court's determination that Batson wasn't violated. Weaver points to the fact that the state trial court's express findings were limited to comments about the racial composition of the jury -- a numbers analysis. He directs us to our earlier precedent that a numbers analysis cannot, on its own, negate a prima facie case. See United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1989). But Weaver advances no additional support for his claim that the state trial court determined the facts unreasonably in light of the totality of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. 2254 (d)(2). 36 Contrary to Weaver's assertions, we believe that the district court's numbers analysis entails precisely the opposite conclusion. Our early Batson cases (decided during roughly the same time period as the instant state court decision) suggest that a numbers analysis is relevant in determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie case. E.g., Moore, 895 F.2d at 486 n.5; United States v. Fuller, 887 F.2d 144, 146 (8th Cir. 1989). Of course, the trial court's decision does not stand or fall on a numbers analysis alone. The state trial judge personally observed the venirepersons' demeanor during voir dire, and doubtless developed a sense for those their acumen. Likewise, the state trial judge personally observed the prosecutor during the exercise of peremptory strikes, and later when he explained his conduct. 37 In addition, we agree with the State of Missouri's contention that Weaver failed to provide additional evidence at the Batson hearing to establish a prima facie case. Weaver argued only against the weight of the race-neutral reasons proffered by the prosecutor, without demonstrating that the prosecutor's reasons were pretextual. 38 In sum, the trial court's use of numbers analysis (a relevant factor), coupled with the court's unique opportunity to observe the entirety of voir dire, coupled with Weaver's failure to provide additional evidence at the Batson hearing, supports the state trial court's decision to deny Weaver's Batson claim. See Luckett v. Kemna, 203 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). Weaver has failed to overcome the statutory presumption of correctness afforded the state court's fact-finding. Because he cannot denigrate the state trial court's factual determinations, we cannot conclude that the state trial court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). 2