Opinion ID: 4533289
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pscc

Text: ¶21 Pursuant to Colorado’s PSCC statute, section 18-1.3-405, “A person who is confined for an offense prior to the imposition of sentence for said offense is 9 entitled to credit against the term of his or her sentence for the entire period of such confinement.” We clarify today that courts should apply this statute consistent with three principles. ¶22 The first principle flows from the statutory mandate that a defendant receive credit for each day or “the entire period” of presentence confinement served. What this means is that a defendant is entitled to PSCC if “the presentence confinement [was] actually caused by the charge or conduct for which the defendant is to be sentenced.” Massey, 736 P.2d at 22. From our earliest interpretation of the PSCC statute, we have been clear that “causation in this context does not mean that the charge or conduct for which the sentence is to be imposed must be the exclusive cause of the offender’s confinement.” Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 795 (Colo. 1985); see also People v. Johnson, 797 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Colo. 1990); Massey, 736 P.2d at 22; Freeman, 735 P.2d at 881; Torand v. People, 698 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo. 1985). And we explained in Massey that “where two or more charges form multiple bases for the defendant’s presentence confinement, the defendant is entitled to credit against each sentence imposed on those charges, as long as the credit would not be duplicative.” 736 P.2d at 23. Yet, in Torrez, we departed from these earlier holdings, concluding that but-for causation was required for an award of PSCC. ¶¶ 3, 24, 403 P.3d at 190, 194; see also People v. Torrez, 2017 CO 91, ¶ 32, 403 P.3d 189, 196 (Márquez, J., dissenting); People v. Torrez, 2017 CO 91, 10 ¶¶ 60–63, 403 P.3d 189, 201–02 (Hood, J., dissenting). Instead of asking, as we had in previous cases, whether the defendant would have remained confined in the absence of any other charge, Torrez flipped the test and asked whether “the defendant would have been released from the confinement had that offense not existed.” ¶ 3, 403 P.3d at 190. ¶23 The Torrez but-for causation test is inconsistent with the language of the PSCC statute. The statute does not limit a defendant’s entitlement to PSCC to those situations in which the sentencing offense is the exclusive basis for confinement. Moreover, under the test set forth in Torrez, a defendant sentenced on multiple charges would be entitled to no PSCC because none of the charges would alone be the but-for cause of his confinement. This is inconsistent with the intent of the PSCC statute, which makes PSCC mandatory. ¶24 As noted, Torrez also cannot be reconciled with our earlier precedent, which made it clear that the causation required under the PSCC statute was not but-for causation. Therefore, there are sound reasons to overrule Torrez’s but-for causation test and return to a substantial nexus test that ensures a defendant will receive the PSCC to which he is statutorily entitled. Under that test, a substantial nexus exists where the defendant would have remained confined on the charge or conduct for which credit is sought in the absence of any other charge. Put another way, the court should ask “what would happen if only the sentencing charge 11 existed; in such a scenario, would the defendant have remained confined?” Torrez, ¶ 51, 403 P.3d at 200 (Márquez, J., dissenting). If the answer to this question is yes, a substantial nexus exists, and the defendant is entitled to PSCC so long as the credit would not be duplicative. ¶25 We agree, however, with the court’s observation in Torrez that “[t]he substantial nexus test is about causation, not geography.” ¶ 25, 403 P.3d at 195. And this leads us to the second principle that courts should apply in awarding PSCC: When determining whether a substantial nexus exists, causation, not geography, is the defining question. The PSCC statute supports this principle, saying nothing about geographic limitations on credit for confinement. See § 18-1.3-405. Furthermore, when a defendant is confined on charges from two different jurisdictions, he will necessarily have to be physically confined in only one of the two jurisdictions at any given time. His confinement, however, may be caused by the charges in both jurisdictions, and he is still entitled to nonduplicative credit as mandated by the PSCC statute. Consequently, to the extent that our prior caselaw imported a geographic component into the PSCC analysis, we conclude here that there is no basis in the statutory language for doing so, and we clarify that geography does not play a role in the calculation of PSCC. ¶26 Third, and finally, a defendant is not entitled to duplicative PSCC. The PSCC statute addresses directly one of the most likely risks of duplication. When 12 a defendant commits a new crime while already serving a sentence or on parole, the period of confinement prior to sentencing on the new offense will be credited only against the original sentence. Id. In circumstances not covered explicitly by the statute, courts should take care when sentencing to give the defendant a day of credit, and only a day of credit, for each day he was confined prior to sentencing. ¶27 These three principles clarify inconsistencies in our precedent interpreting the PSCC statute and should allow courts to award PSCC in a manner consistent with the language of the statute. A defendant is entitled to PSCC when he would have remained confined on the charge or conduct for which credit is sought in the absence of any other charge, whether that charge is in the same or a different jurisdiction, so long as the PSCC is not duplicative. B. Russell Is Entitled to Additional PSCC Against His Douglas County Sentence ¶28 Russell argues that he is entitled to PSCC against his Douglas County sentence for the period that he was confined after his termination from community corrections until his Douglas County resentencing. Because there is a substantial nexus between Russell’s confinement and his Douglas County offense, and because this additional PSCC would not be duplicative, we agree. ¶29 Russell would have remained confined on the Douglas County offense pursuant to section 17-27-104(6), C.R.S. (2019), and the Douglas County no-bond arrest warrant. When a defendant is terminated from a community corrections 13 program, he must be confined without bond until the court determines whether to remove him from the program. § 17-27-104(6). Accordingly, after Russell was terminated from community corrections, the probation department filed a notice of rejection requesting transfer of sentence, and the Douglas County District Court issued a no-bond arrest warrant for Russell. In the absence of the Jefferson County charge, pursuant to both section 17-27-104(6) and the related Douglas County arrest warrant, Russell would have remained confined without bond on the Douglas County charge until the court transferred the balance of Russell’s six-year sentence to the Department of Corrections. In other words, if only the Douglas County theft charge had existed, Russell would have remained confined after his termination from community corrections until his Douglas County resentencing. Thus, there is a substantial nexus between his confinement and the Douglas County theft offense that he was ultimately resentenced on. ¶30 Also, because Russell was sentenced to concurrent sentences, awarding him PSCC against his Douglas County sentence would not be duplicative. In fact, if PSCC is not applied against Russell’s Douglas County sentence, as a practical matter, he would receive no credit for the months that he was confined while awaiting resentencing. This is because Russell’s six-year Douglas County sentence was the longer of his two concurrent sentences; thus, applying the credit against his three-year Jefferson County sentence would have no impact on the actual 14 length of his term of incarceration. Here, only by giving Russell PSCC against his Douglas County sentence will he be guaranteed to receive credit for the full period of his presentence confinement against his total term of imprisonment.