Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion for a Bill of ParticularsPenalty Phase

Text: Juniper assigns error to the trial court's denial of his Motion for a Bill of Particulars to require the Commonwealth to describe the theory it intended to rely upon to prove the vileness factor at sentencing under Code § 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C). But we have repeatedly held that the Commonwealth need only allege the elements of capital murder set forth in Code § 18.2-31 without providing the accused with notice of additional allegations or a bill of particulars regarding aggravating factors. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 493-94, 619 S.E.2d 16, 40 (2005) ([I]n Virginia, if the indictment gives a defendant sufficient notice of the nature and character of the offense charged so he can make his defense, no bill of particulars is required .... [A]ggravating factors are not constitutionally required to be recited in a capital murder indictment. (citations omitted)); see also Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 480-81, 506 S.E.2d 763, 768 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812, 120 S.Ct. 46, 145 L.Ed.2d 41 (1999). The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Juniper's motion for a bill of particulars. See Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 402 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834, 112 S.Ct. 113, 116 L.Ed.2d 82 (1991).