Opinion ID: 722594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: When did the clock begin to run?

Text: 30 On May 6, 1994, the U.S. Marshal in San Francisco received a copy of Collins' demand for a speedy trial. The Marshal filed a copy of the demand with the district court clerk on May 10, 1994. The precise question we address is whether the IADA clock began to run: (1) when the Marshal received the demand; or (2) the day Marshal filed the demand with the district court. This issue raises a question of law which we review de novo. United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1992). 31 Article III(a) of the IADA provides that a prisoner: 32 shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint. 33 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. III(a). In Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993), the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that the 180-day clock does not start until the defendant's demand has actually been delivered to the district court and prosecuting officer that lodged the detainer against him. Id. at 52, 113 S.Ct. at 1091. 34 Here, Collins and the government agree that delivery to the U.S. Marshal fulfilled the requirement of delivery to the prosecuting officer. Collins goes further and argues that delivery to the Marshal also constituted delivery to the district court. 35 An argument similar to the one Collins raises here was rejected by the Supreme Court in Fex. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner could not start the clock by giving his demand to the prison authorities. Instead, the clock would start when the court and prosecuting officer received the notice. Id. at 46-51, 113 S.Ct. at 1088-90. The Court stated that this result would occur even if the warden maliciously delayed forwarding the prisoner's request or didn't send the demand at all. Id. at 49-50, 113 S.Ct. at 1089-90. 36 In other words, Fex instructs us that the IADA means what it says. And when it says that the prisoner must have his demand delivered to the ... appropriate court, that is what it means. See 18 U.S.C. App. II, art. III(a). Delivery to the Marshal on May 6, 1994 did not constitute delivery to the court because the Marshals are not agents for the court for purposes of accepting every request they find thrust upon them. Delivery to the court did not occur until May 10, 1994 when Collins' demand was filed. Therefore, we hold that the IADA's 180-day clock began to run on May 10, 1994. 37