Opinion ID: 2799489
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davis’ Motions for Mistrial

Text: Davis’ first motion for mistrial occurred during Branch’s testimony. During her testimony, Branch made a reference to Davis’ having previously been in prison. While on direct examination from the State, the following exchange occurred: “Q. Now, you had stated earlier that you had met . . . Davis when you were teenagers? A. Correct. Q. And you had been pen pals? A. Correct. He was writing me. When he got sentenced to prison, he was . . . .” Davis promptly objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The district court then admonished the jury, instructing the jury to disregard Branch’s last answer “in its entirety.” Branch never explained why Davis was in prison or how long Davis was incarcerated. Davis then moved for a mistrial. Davis did not argue that the State was trying to intentionally elicit the information about Davis’ previous incarceration from Branch, but that it was impossible for “the bell [to] be unrung” now that the information had been revealed to the jury. Counsel for the State explained that he had previously admonished Branch not to provide any extraneous information in her answers, but did not tell Branch specifically not to mention Davis’ previous Nebraska Advance Sheets 832 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS incarceration. The district court determined that the admonishment to the jury was sufficient to cure any prejudice and denied the motion for mistrial. Davis moved for a mistrial a second time during Clairday’s testimony. Portions of Clairday’s trial testimony were apparently inconsistent with her deposition testimony, as reflected by Davis’ questions on cross-examination. Clairday’s deposition testimony was never entered as an offer of proof, and the deposition testimony is not included in the appellate record. On cross-examination, Davis did, however, question Clairday about several of her prior inconsistent statements. During her deposition testimony, Clairday stated that Davis told Clairday that “some people were hurt, something happened that shouldn’t have happened,” but Clairday denied that Davis had made any other statements about the attempted robbery or the murders. On cross-examination, Clairday admitted that her testimony at trial was different from her testimony in her deposition. Clairday explained that she was not trying to be deceptive in her deposition testimony, but that at the time of the deposition, she simply did not remember some of the details recited at trial. Clairday testified that she had been a user of methamphetamine, that she had been under the influence of methamphetamine at the time she spoke with Davis about the incidents, and that she has memory problems, especially when she is nervous. After it became clear that Clairday’s testimony differed from her previous deposition testimony, Davis moved for a mistrial. Davis argued that there had been a discovery violation, alleging that in Clairday’s deposition testimony, “there’s only one occasion where [Clairday] attributes a statement similar to that to [Davis] under oath.” Therefore, according to Davis, Clairday must have communicated with the State at some point after her deposition and the State failed to “advise us of incriminating statements of [Davis] when they [knew] them to be available.” The State strongly denied having any meetings with Clairday after the deposition and stated that it “did not have any other information aside from everything that’s been provided by this witness in her previous statements, nothing different from meetings.” The district court overruled Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. DAVIS 833 Cite as 290 Neb. 826 the motion, because Davis was “effectively cross-examining” Clairday on the inconsistencies between her deposition and trial testimony.