Opinion ID: 1967178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does article 64 violate the contract clause of either the united states constitution or the rhode island constitution?

Text: The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, as well as the Rhode Island Constitution, limits the power of this state to modify its own contracts and to regulate private contracts. [7] United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). Although the language of the clause, which boldly declares that no state shall pass laws impairing contractual relations, would, on its face, appear to present an absolute bar to impairment, the United States Supreme Court has refused to read the language with literal exactness. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428, 54 S.Ct. 231, 236, 78 L.Ed. 413, 423 (1934) (the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula). A legislative enactment will pass constitutional muster under contract clause analysis so long as it is reasonable and necessary to carry out a legitimate public purpose. United States Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 25-26, 97 S.Ct. at 1519, 52 L.Ed.2d at 112. As a prerequisite to embarking upon an application of contract clause analysis, it is necessary for us to determine whether § 30-21-3 created a valid contractual relationship between the parties. The Supreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the principle that absent a clear indication by the Legislature that it intended to bind itself contractually by passing an enactment, the presumption pervades that [the] law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise. Dodge v. Board of Education of Chicago, 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 100, 82 L.Ed. 57, 62 (1937). The party asserting the creation of a statutory contract bears the weighty burden of overcoming this presumption, id., and the court for its part will be cautious in identifying a contract within the language of the statute and in defining the parameters of any contractual obligation it might detect. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1452, 84 L.Ed.2d 432, 446 (1985). The court looks first to the statutory language in determining whether a particular statute gives rise to a contractual obligation. Dodge, 302 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. at 100, 82 L.Ed. at 61. If the language of the statute provides for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the state then clearly a binding obligation is created; however, absent an adequate expression of actual intent to bind the state, the court will not be so quick to construe a statute as a private contract to which the state is bound as a party. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 466-67, 105 S.Ct. at 1452, 84 L.Ed.2d at 446. Section 30-21-3, in our opinion, represents merely a legislative policy declaration. Therefore, since § 30-21-3 does not adequately express an actual intent to contractually bind the state or its political subdivisions, we find no violation of either the Federal or State Constitution's Contract Clause.