Opinion ID: 541766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stay and Voluntary Dismissal

Text: 24 Hartford next contends that the district court erred in failing to stay the federal court proceedings in light of the Maher's subsequent state court action. According to Hartford, the Maher's state court action is virtually identical to the removed action, and a single proceeding would promote judicial economy. Alternatively, Hartford summarily claims error in the district court's failure to grant Hartford's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. 25 Before a court considers the propriety of a stay pending disposition of a state court action, the federal and state cases should be parallel--involving the same parties and the same issues. RepublicBank, Dallas, Nat'l Assoc. v. McIntosh, 828 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir.1987) (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 682 (5th Cir.1973)); see also Mendiola v. Hart, 561 F.2d 1207, 1208 (5th Cir.1977). As Hartford's federal case is not parallel with the Maher's state court proceeding, we need not reach the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to stay these proceedings. Hartford's claim in federal court is a Burnside cause of action. As discussed supra, that action is based on the third party's independent wrong to the employer. Peters, 764 F.2d at 320. In contrast, the Mahers' action in state court is a separate claim based on a wrong to the worker. Thus, although both cases involve the same underlying episode and entail significant overlapping proof, they concern independent wrongs. Moreover, the parties in the actions are disparate. The action in federal court concerns Hartford as plaintiff, whereas the action in state court involves the Mahers as the complaining party with Hartford holding only a subrogation interest in any recovery received. Thus, because the state and federal cases address distinct interests and concern different litigants, the district court appropriately refrained from staying this action. 7 26 Nor do we find that the district court erred in failing to grant Hartford's motion for voluntary dismissal. The district court's decision to deny a motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 1231, 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979). If a defendant will suffer some cognizable prejudice greater than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit, voluntary dismissal without prejudice should be denied. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2364 (1971 & Supp.1990). Important in assessing prejudice is the stage at which the motion to dismiss is made. Where the plaintiff does not seek dismissal until a late stage and the defendants have exerted significant time and effort, the district court may, in its discretion, refuse to grant a voluntary dismissal. Kramer v. Butler, 845 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (5th Cir.) (no abuse of discretion for district court to deny plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal where habeas corpus petition litigated for one year and full evidentiary hearing conducted at significant expense to the state and federal governments), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 168, 102 L.Ed.2d 138 (1988); Pace v. Southern Express Co., 409 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir.1969) (no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss where case was pending one and one-half years prior to submission of motion, considerable discovery was undertaken, and defendant had briefed motion for summary judgment); Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 627 F.2d 158, 159-60 (8th Cir.1980) (district court abused discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal where action pending 18 months, extensive litigation conducted, and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was rendered but the plaintiff apparently feared trial court would grant the defendant's motion for JNOV). 27 Hartford moved to dismiss this action without prejudice nearly ten months after the action was removed to federal court. Before that motion was filed, hearings were conducted on various issues, significant discovery was had, Costa had already been granted summary judgment, and a jury trial had been set for the remaining defendants. Clearly, the defendants expended significant time and effort litigating this action and Hartford was far less than prompt in seeking voluntary dismissal. Thus, we cannot say, based upon the record before us, that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the prejudice the defendants would suffer if dismissal were granted warranted denial of Hartford's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.