Opinion ID: 768200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Variance/Multiple Conspiracies

Text: 115 Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer next argue that their RICO conspiracy convictions should be reversed because the government proved the existence of multiple separate conspiracies in which they played no role and that the jury may well have convicted them based on the prejudicial spillover effect of the evidence of other conspiracies. Thus, they argue that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the multiple conspiracy doctrine. We disagree. 116 Appellants identify three categories of evidence that, in their view, created a prejudicial variance from the indictment: (i) proof that A&G paid bribes to the TPBA Officers, for which appellants had no responsibility; (ii) evidence of sixteen or more bribery schemes unrelated to appellants in which Zichettello and Montoro participated; and (iii) evidence of forty or more instances of campaign fraud perpetrated on the NYCCFB but unrelated to appellants. 117 With regard to the A&G bribes, the indictment included racketeering acts and substantive counts against Reale based upon his receipt of kickbacks between 1992 and 1994 from A&G. However, Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer were not charged in any of the racketeering acts or substantive counts involving A&G. Before trial, Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer moved to sever Reale from their trial, arguing that the jury's consideration of their guilt would be tainted by proof of Reale's involvement with A&G. See Reale, 1997 WL 580778, at . The district court denied the motion. See id. Over the government's objection, however, the district court granted the application to sever those racketeering acts and counts related to Reale's receipt of bribes from A&G. See id. at . The government thereafter moved in limine to admit evidence of these acts for certain limited purposes. The district court granted the motion on the ground that the evidence was probative. 118 We see no error in that ruling. The evidence was admitted only to show that A&G had already done some of the work for which LL&K received $750,000 and that, when A&G in turn replaced LL&K in 1992, A&G did so because it, like LL&K, was paying bribes. The evidence was, therefore, relevant to the conspiracy charges against Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer. Moreover, Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer themselves introduced much of the evidence concerning A&G's bribes to further their defense that only A&G needed to pay bribes. 119 As to the evidence of other kickbacks involving Zichettello and Montoro, it is true that both testified to taking kickbacks from vendors and professionals other than Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer. However, this evidence was relevant to their credibility as government witnesses, and neither Zichettello nor Montoro implicated appellants in any of these additional crimes, a fact of which the jury was well aware. Finally, unlike Hartman, Lysaght and Kramer were not charged with participating in the campaign finance scheme, and the proof relating to Hartman's participation in the scheme was limited to his own conduct, namely, the effort to obtain matching funds and to solicit officers of other organizations to contribute. 120 Although appellants advance this argument as involving the multiple conspiracy doctrine, it is really a garden-variety claim of unfair prejudice outweighing relevance under Fed. R. Evid. 403. A multiple conspiracy challenge to a conspiracy conviction must be predicated upon a contention that the defendant was found guilty of membership in a conspiracy other than the one charged. United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 562 (2d Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1520 (2d Cir. 1992). The essence of such a claim is that evidence showing that the defendant played a role in a conspiracy different as a matter of law from the one charged in the indictment wrongly convinced the jury to convict the defendant of the charged conspiracy. See United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1189-91 & n.6 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). 121 This is not, however, a case in which the jury could plausibly have convicted appellants of a conspiracy other than the one with which they were charged. In the case of the evidence involving the other bribes and campaign fraud described above, the non-involvement of Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer -- save for Hartman's role in the campaign finance scheme -- was clear, as were the independent probative purposes of that evidence. Finally, appellants do not challenge the admission of any of this evidence at issue on appeal, and our independent review of the district court's admission of this evidence shows no abuse of discretion. 122