Opinion ID: 2536526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ambiguity in Plain Language

Text: The amendments to the statute of limitations for sexual assault on a child were introduced as House Bill 02-1396, which was later enacted as § 18-3-411, C.R.S. (2002). In determining how to apply H.B. 02-1396, we begin with the plain language of the statute. Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 810 (Colo.2004). If the language is unambiguous, we look no further and apply the words as written. Slack v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 5 P.3d 280, 284 (Colo.2000). If, however, there is ambiguity on the face of the statute, our task is to discern the legislative intent behind the law. Frazier, 90 P.3d at 810. In construing statutory language, we read the statute as a whole, with a goal of giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). For purposes of determining the statute of limitations that applies to Summers' alleged crimes, two sentences contained in section 18-3-411 are relevant. The first is contained in subsection (2)(b) and reads, The ten-year statute of limitations shall apply to all felony offenses specified in subsection (1) of this section which are alleged to have occurred on or after July 1, 1992. § 18-3-411(2)(b), C.R.S. (2002). The second appears in section 18-3-411(5) as published in the Colorado Session Laws and reads, Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, this act shall take effect upon passage, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after said date. Ch. 288, sec. 5, § 18-3-411, 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1127, 1130. These two sentences are in direct conflict with one another. The first mandates that the new eighteen-plus-ten statute of limitations be retroactively applied to all crimes for which the ten-year statute of limitations had not yet run when the new law was enacted, including the crimes at issue in this case. If that language is applied, the charges against Summers are not time barred, and he can be tried on the charges. However, the second sentence mandates that the new statute of limitations applies only to crimes committed on or after its effective date of June 3, 2002, implying that the previously existing flat ten-year statute of limitations be applied to all crimes committed before that date. If this language is applied, the flat ten-year statute of limitations applies in this case, and the charges against Summers are time barred. Reading the statute as a whole, it is impossible to give meaning to both of these provisions. We must therefore determine which one controls by inquiring into the legislative intent behind the language used.