Opinion ID: 4234250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: S. waived her right to counsel.

Text: {¶ 12} Like the lead opinion, I begin with the fundamental principle that the right to raise a child is a basic and essential civil right. In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), citing In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990). Proceedings to terminate parental rights must afford parents “ ‘every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’ ” Hayes at 48, quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45 (6th Dist.1991). In Ohio, those protections include the right to assistance of counsel and the right to appointed counsel if a parent is indigent. See R.C. 2151.352; Juv.R. 4(A). {¶ 13} A parent’s right to counsel in permanent-custody proceedings is not absolute, however. In re B.M., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 09AP-60, 09AP-61, 09AP62, 09AP-63, and 09AP-64, 2009-Ohio-4846, ¶ 26. A parent may waive the right to counsel, but the parent must do so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In re Bowens, 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 92-A-1711 and 92-A-1717, 1995 WL 803811,  (Nov. 9, 1995). In certain circumstances, Ohio courts have inferred that parents facing termination of their parental rights have waived the right to counsel when the circumstances indicate a waiver. See In re W.W.E., 2016-Ohio4552, 67 N.E.3d 159, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.) (collecting cases). {¶ 14} Here, by proceeding with the permanent-custody hearing in A.S.’s absence after allowing her attorney to withdraw, the trial court implicitly found that A.S. waived her right to counsel. Citing In re Sadie R., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L- 04-1057, 2005-Ohio-325, ¶ 36, the lead opinion states that a juvenile court must make two inquiries before allowing a parent’s attorney to withdraw: first, whether counsel’s attempts to communicate with, and get the cooperation of, the client were reasonable; and second, whether the client’s failure to communicate left counsel 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO unable to ascertain the client’s wishes. Id. at ¶ 6. Those two inquires do not, however, fully address whether a parent has waived his or her right to counsel. {¶ 15} The issue that A.S. raises in her proposition of law is not the standard for allowing an attorney to withdraw from representation at a permanent-custody hearing but is the standard for finding that a parent has waived the right to counsel. While those standards overlap, they are not identical. A.S.’s proposition of law states that a parent cannot be deprived of the right to assistance of counsel unless the parent has knowingly waived that right and that a parent’s unexplained absence at the permanent-custody hearing, standing alone, is insufficient to infer the knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. The lead opinion adopts A.S.’s proposition of law as the syllabus of the court, and I agree with that statement of law as far as it goes and therefore concur in the syllabus. But given the stakes in a permanent-custody hearing, I think we can, and should, offer additional guidance to lower courts and practitioners on the issues raised here. {¶ 16} I would adopt—with some modification—the approach commonly used by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in cases of this type. The Tenth District has held that “where a parent ‘fails to maintain contact with counsel, fails to appear for scheduled hearings despite receiving notice of such, and fails to cooperate with counsel and the court, the court may infer that the parent has waived his or her right to counsel and may grant counsel’s request to withdraw.’ ” In re Garcia, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 03AP-874, 03AP-876, and 03AP-877, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 1069, -7 (Mar. 16, 2004), quoting In re Rachal G., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1306, 2003-Ohio-1041, ¶ 14. But rather than requiring specific inquiries for determining whether a court may infer that a parent has waived his or her right to counsel, the Tenth District has held that a court must take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the parent’s background, experience, and conduct. Garcia at , citing Rachal G. at ¶ 14. I would add that the trial court should engage in an on-the-record discussion of the factors indicating that a parent has waived the 8 January Term, 2018 right to counsel. A finding, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the parent waived the right to counsel is a necessary predicate for continuing with a permanent-custody hearing after allowing the parent’s counsel to withdraw. {¶ 17} Here, the trial court’s inquiry fell far short of these parameters. The trial court did not consider A.S.’s background, experience or conduct throughout this case. In fact, the trial court did not address the question of waiver at all; it did not make a finding that A.S. explicitly waived her right to counsel, and it did not expressly consider whether there were sufficient facts to warrant the inference that A.S. had waived that right. {¶ 18} The only discussion on the record was counsel’s statements that he had informed A.S. of the permanent-custody hearing by a letter dated June 29, 2016, and that he had informed her that the court was likely to proceed in her absence if she did not appear for the hearing and that he would ask to withdraw should that happen. Counsel acknowledged that A.S. responded to his letter on July 5, 2016, but he did not proffer the substance of her response. He did not say whether he knew A.S.’s wishes with respect to the motion for permanent custody, and he made no assertion as to whether he could competently represent her in her absence. Counsel’s statement that A.S. responded to his June 29, 2016 letter “[f]or the first time” on July 5, 2016—within a week of his sending the letter and a week prior to the permanent-custody hearing—does not demonstrate a lack of cooperation. With the exception of a single review hearing in December 2014 when she was incarcerated, the record reveals A.S.’s consistent appearances at hearings with counsel. It also includes some reports of A.S.’s progress toward completing her case plan and working toward reunification, despite stumbles with respect to her addictions. {¶ 19} Both the trial court and the Tenth District based their decisions solely on A.S.’s absence from the permanent-custody hearing. The only reason for allowing counsel to withdraw stated in the trial court’s judgment entry is that 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO “mother failed to appear at hearing.” And the Tenth District majority found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because A.S. knew about the hearing date but did not attend or advise her counsel or caseworker that she would not attend the hearing. 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-575, ¶ 17 (Feb. 21, 2017). But as the syllabus here holds, a parent’s mere absence from a custody hearing is not enough to warrant a finding that the parent has waived his or her right to counsel. Looking to the totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s implicit finding that A.S. waived her right to counsel. {¶ 20} In the end, I agree with the lead opinion that the trial court erred in allowing A.S.’s appointed attorney to withdraw from representation and in then proceeding with the permanent-custody hearing without A.S. being present. I therefore concur in reversing the judgment of the Tenth District. KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. _________________ O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. {¶ 21} Respectfully, I dissent. {¶ 22} The circumstances of this case suggest A.S. has waived her right to counsel because she had received notice from her attorney advising of the date and time of the permanent custody hearing, and a directive that she needed to be present at the hearing and that if she failed to attend, the juvenile court would likely proceed in her absence and counsel intended to ask the court for permission to withdraw. {¶ 23} The law with respect to a parent waiving the right to counsel in permanent custody proceedings and entitling counsel to seek to withdraw from representation is well documented in Ohio. {¶ 24} In In re C.H., 162 Ohio App.3d 602, 2005-Ohio-4183, 834 N.E.2d 401 (3d Dist.), the Third District Court of Appeals articulated that a court may infer that a parent has waived the right to counsel in a permanent custody proceeding and grant counsel’s request to withdraw based on “ ‘the total circumstances of the 10 January Term, 2018 individual case, including the background, experience and conduct of the parent.’ ” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting In re Rachal G., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1306, 2003-Ohio1041, ¶ 14; see also In re A.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 94098 and 94104, 2010Ohio-1441, ¶ 28; In re B.M., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 09AP-60, 09AP-61, 09AP62, 09AP-63, and 09AP-64, 2009-Ohio-4846, ¶ 26. {¶ 25} Here, the majority suggests that the juvenile court determined that A.S. had waived her right to counsel based solely on her failure to appear for the permanent custody hearing. As the appellate court recognized, however, counsel “indicated to the [juvenile] court that he had had prior difficulties communicating with his client.” 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-575, ¶ 16 (Feb. 21, 2017). The record further reflects that A.S. had attended earlier court proceedings involving this matter and knew of the permanent custody hearing date. In addition, counsel for A.S. sent her a letter informing her of the time and nature of the proceedings, that she needed to attend, and that if she failed to appear the trial court would likely go forward without her and that he would request to withdraw. Despite receiving that communication, A.S. failed to appear at the hearing and there is no evidence in the record that she attempted to contact counsel or the court to explain why she was unable to attend. {¶ 26} For these reasons, I would conclude that R.K. waived her right to counsel and affirm the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. _________________ Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and John W. Keeling, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Robert J. McClaren, for appellee. _________________ 11