Opinion ID: 43670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As Applied Constitutional Challenge

Text: Although the district court had jurisdiction to address Greenberg’s facial constitutional challenges to Fla. Stat. ch. § 61.08 et seq., the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to address Greenberg’s “as applied” constitutional challenge.3 In contrast to the facial constitutional challenge, Greenberg’s as applied challenge is inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings and is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “‘a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in [the United States Supreme Court].’” Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466 (11th Cir. 1996) (alteration in 2 Greenberg also argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the district court failed to accept the facts in his complaint as true; however, he fails to state any specific examples of facts that the district court did not accept as true. 3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on the following two cases: District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923). 7 original) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S. Ct. at 1315). “The doctrine applies not only to claims actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state court but are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.” Powell, 80 F.3d at 466. The Florida state trial court awarded alimony to Mrs. Greenberg, pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. § 61.08. Mr. Greenberg’s claim that the alimony provisions are unconstitutional as applied to him is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s decision to award alimony to Mrs. Greenberg. If we were now to hold that the Florida trial court unconstitutionally applied the Florida alimony provisions as to Greenberg, we would “effectively nullify” the state court’s judgment that Mrs. Greenberg receive alimony. See Powell, 80 F.3d at 467 (holding that RookerFeldman barred “as applied” challenge to state court decision to distribute a portion of husband’s naval retirement pay to wife upon divorce).4 4 This Court does have jurisdiction to hear Greenberg’s facial challenge to the alimony provisions. This facial challenge is not “inextricably intertwined” because this claim does not succeed only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-83 & 486, 103 S. Ct. at 1315-16 & 1317 (stating that federal courts “have subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state [statutes] . . . which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a particular case”); see also Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626-27 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that district courts have jurisdiction over facial constitutional challenges); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland v. Weiner, 868 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Thus, although federal district courts have jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges, Rooker and Feldman prohibit such courts from exercising jurisdiction to decide federal issues that are inextricably intertwined with a state court’s judgment.”). 8 Thus, the district court properly dismissed Greenberg’s as applied challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.