Opinion ID: 3010548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 647, 650-51 (N.J. 1987).

Text: In Lizak, the Farias had applied for a zoning variance. 476 A.2d at 1191-93. After opposition from nearby residents, the Woodbridge Township Board of Adjustment denied the variance. Id. at 1191. However, the board failed to record its determination in writing. As a result the Farias, under New Jersey law, were entitled to an automatic grant of the variance. Id. at 1192. A day after the Woodbridge Municipal Clerk certified the grant of the variance, the Farias obtained a building permit, and ten days later they began construction. Within a month, the exterior of the building was completed at an estimated expense of $60,000, almost one-half of the estimated cost of the project. When a nearby resident realized what was happening, she filed an appeal to the Township Council seeking revocation of the variance and the permit and an order directing the removal of the construction. The Farias responded that they had relied on the issuance of a valid building permit in proceeding with the construction and that the municipality was 42 equitably estopped from ordering the removal of the existing structure. Id. at 1193. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Farias' argument. Id. at 1198-99. After noting that good faith reliance is a prerequisite of equitable estoppel, the court explained: The Farias' conduct . . . does not so much bespeak good faith reliance as it reveals a hasty effort to attempt to acquire an unassailable position to which [they] equitably should not be entitled. They knew that their neighbors objected to the proposal and that the Board had orally disapproved their application. Consequently, they reasonably could have expected further opposition to the construction. They chose to rely on the advice of counsel that the Board's failure to reduce its decision to writing converted its oral denial into a statutory grant. Although that advice was correct as far as it went, the Farias' failure to publish a notice of approval left the variance subject to appeal for a reasonable time. In relying on their attorney's opinion while the underlying variance was still appealable, they took their chances. They should not now be heard to complain. Id. at 1198 (citation omitted). Phillips and Vitale, in this appeal, urge that there is a world of difference between their circumstances and those of the Farias. However, we reject appellants' effort to limit Lizak to its admittedly egregious facts. The driving force in that case was that parties who proceed with construction while their permits are still appealable [take] their chances. Id. As the trial court in Lizak explained, their reliance can not convert the permit into something not subject to administrative and judicial review. They could not reasonably 43 have relied upon the inviolability of municipal actions that were still subject to appeal. The . . . construction official's action assured [the Farias] that a permit was issuable, but not that [it] was not appealable. Lizak v. Faria, 434 A.2d 659, 664 (N.J. Super. 1981). To sustain appellants' position here would eviscerate the appellate process in land use applications. It would encourage recipients of zoning permits to launch into large-scale construction or renovation so as to present municipal authorities with a fait accompli before other affected parties have exhausted their opportunities to challenge the permit. We believe these considerations support the clear mandate of the highest court in New Jersey in Lizak.