Opinion ID: 709226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ability to Extend the Conspiracy

Text: 38 Maloney's last argument with respect to the obstruction of justice count is that the obstruction of justice charges could not have extended the RICO conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes. He raises a number of points in support of this position. 39 (a) Maloney contends that the obstruction acts were post-conspiracy attempts at concealment which could not have extended the conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes under Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402, 77 S.Ct. 963, 972-73, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). In Grunewald, three individuals had fraudulently succeeded in obtaining no prosecution rulings from the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1948 and 1949 for their tax evasion cases. Subsequent activities of the conspirators were directed at preventing detection of the irregularities in the manner in which they had secured the favorable rulings. Id. at 395, 77 S.Ct. at 969. The Court held that these subsequent activities could not be used to extend the original conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes because the main objective of the conspiracy had long been accomplished. Id. at 398, 77 S.Ct. at 970-71. The Court emphasized, however, that a vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been obtained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime. Id. at 405, 77 S.Ct. at 974; see Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 679 n. 10, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 1319 n. 10, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1959). Maloney suggests that Grunewald controls this case. 40 Unlike Grunewald, however, the conspiracy's main criminal objective was never finally attained in this case. United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, 1082 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 397, 116 L.Ed.2d 347 (1991), and cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1061, 112 S.Ct. 943, 117 L.Ed.2d 113 (1992). A conspiracy ends when its main criminal objective has been accomplished or abandoned, McKinney, 954 F.2d at 475, i.e., when the design to commit substantive misconduct ends. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir.1992). A conspiracy to murder, for example, ends when the murder is committed. McKinney, 954 F.2d at 475. Unlike many of the Court's concealment cases where the object of the conspiracy was a discrete criminal act, here we deal with a crime that had no specific terminating event. United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 383 (7th Cir.1978). Where a conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and a continued performance of acts, it is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that it has terminated.... United States v. Elwell, 984 F.2d 1289, 1293 (1st Cir.) (only event occurring between the last drug transaction and the indictment a year and a half later was an endeavor to obstruct justice), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2429, 124 L.Ed.2d 650 (1993); United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1125 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008, 95 S.Ct. 2629, 45 L.Ed.2d 670 (1975)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973, 104 S.Ct. 2349, 80 L.Ed.2d 822 (1984); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1268 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 1117, 103 S.Ct. 753, 754, 74 L.Ed.2d 971 (1983); cf. United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir.1993) (although only an endeavor to obstruct justice occurred in the period before indictment for bribery and fraud, court found that such activity was likely to continue for as long as Grubb remained in authority in Logan County.). 10 In the instant case, the main criminal objective, to fix cases whenever feasible, was neither accomplished nor abandoned as long as Judge Maloney remained on the bench, Swano continued to practice before him, and McGee continued his friendship with him. 11 Concealment, therefore, was an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy's main objectives. See United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 269 n. 8 (2d Cir.1992) (acts or statements designed to conceal an ongoing conspiracy are in furtherance of that conspiracy), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 998, 113 S.Ct. 1619, 123 L.Ed.2d 178 (1993). Maloney's statements to Swano helped to preserve his position on the bench--the essential ingredient in the conspiracy's ability to fix cases. See United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 982 (7th Cir.1986) (the acts of concealment further[ed] the objects of the conspiracy--obtaining money--and result[ed] in lengthening its duration); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 986 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Howard, 770 F.2d 57, 60-61 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 1213, 89 L.Ed.2d 325 (1986). Thus, Grunewald does not exclude the obstruction of justice acts from the RICO conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes. 41 (b) Maloney argues that his obstruction did not conduct the RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity under Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184-86, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1173, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993). According to the defense, in Maloney's endeavor to obstruct, unlike his taking of bribes, he was attempting to conduct his own affairs rather than the affairs of the enterprise, i.e., the Circuit Court. Id. Citing this court's holdings in United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1213 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 998, 113 S.Ct. 1617, 123 L.Ed.2d 176 (1993) and Overnite Transp. Co. v. Local No. 705, 904 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir.1990), the defense argues that Maloney's endeavor to obstruct was not a function of his position on the court and had no effect upon it. 12 42 The facts of this case belie Maloney's contentions. During both conversations with Swano, Maloney was an active judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County who at least co-operated or co-managed the enterprise with the other judges. See Grubb, 11 F.3d at 438-39 (citing Reves, 507 U.S. at 182-84, 113 S.Ct. at 1172). The first conversation followed a case conference in Judge Maloney's chambers which Maloney had arranged, and, under the authority of the Circuit Court, Swano was bound to attend. There was some testimony that Judge Maloney may have had most such case conferences in open court during this time, suggesting that he used his position in the court to secure a more private meeting. The second conversation also took place at the courthouse, which the Circuit Court required Swano to frequent as part of his representation of clients. Instead of calling Swano or arranging a meeting elsewhere, Judge Maloney chose to confront Swano at the courthouse where it would attract less suspicion for them to be seen together. In addition, Maloney's actions certainly had an effect on the enterprise, in that they helped preserve his position on the bench and prolong the possibility of fixing cases. Thus, in both instances, Maloney conducted the affairs of the enterprise when he attempted to obstruct justice. 43 (c) Maloney's last argument with respect to the obstruction count is that the conversations with Swano were not part of the RICO pattern. Under the continuity plus relationship test, a pattern is established by proving that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2895-96, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). Maloney suggests neither element was present. 44 Maloney first argues that the obstruction acts were not sufficiently related, because they were not committed somewhat closely in time to [the other predicate acts], involve the same victim, or involve the same type of misconduct. See Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1994), (quoting Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir.1986)). Time alone does not defeat the pattern. [A] three-year gap between the commission of predicate acts does not in and of itself amount to a failure to prove a pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 699 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 881, 113 S.Ct. 233, 121 L.Ed.2d 169 (1992). In fact, the gap is consistent with the time between the Jones and Hawkins bribes, reflecting the ongoing relationship of the conspirators. Furthermore, criminal acts are related if they have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. at 2901. Under this relatively broad standard, the bribes are clearly related to their concealment. The endeavor to obstruct was an attempt to maintain Judge Maloney's position to fix future cases. It had the same underlying purpose as the other predicate acts and involved the same participants and the same ultimate victim--the integrity of the criminal justice system. Cf. Grubb, 11 F.3d at 440 (witness tampering in an attempt to conceal bribe was sufficiently related to the bribe itself for RICO pattern requirement). 45 Maloney also contends that the witness tampering occurred too long after the conspiracy to establish continuity. This, however, assumes that the conspiracy had ended at the last bribe. As we explained previously, there was ample evidence that the conspiracy was still on as long as Judge Maloney remained on the bench. Id. Thus, because the conspiracy was a long-term activity without a natural end point, it certainly satisfies the continuity requirement. Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir.1992). Moreover, both the bribes and the concealment were a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. In addition to the bribes, Judge Maloney changed his bagman from Robinson to McGee, warned Robinson not to speak with Swano because he might be wearing a wire, spoke in code, and engaged in money laundering. Swano also told Cooley about Paul Baker, a possible government informant against them, and spoke to Hawkins concerning the possibility he might testify against him before the grand jury. Thus, there was sufficient evidence of a RICO pattern. 13