Opinion ID: 461631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: larry liefer

Text: 5 Defendant Larry Liefer argues that the district court erred by admitting testimony about another crime under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), by failing to declare a mistrial, by refusing to give an instruction on a lesser included offense, and by denying Liefer's motions for acquittal and for severance.
6 Defendant Liefer contends that the trial court erred in allowing John Shipley to testify about a time, apart from the charged conspiracy, when Shipley went to Liefer's farm to pick up a large quantity of marijuana. Liefer contends that this testimony was not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), because it was evidence of another crime not part of the charged conspiracy. Liefer objected to the testimony during a sidebar conference prior to Shipley taking the stand, but the trial court admitted the evidence over Liefer's objection. 7 Shipley testified that on a prior occasion, during the time period of, but not as part of, the charged conspiracy, Jack Birtwell sent him to Liefer's farm to pick up a load of marijuana that Liefer had been unable to distribute because of the marijuana's low quality. Liefer devoted much of his defense to refuting Shipley's testimony. Liefer argued that either Birtwell or Shipley had stored the marijuana on Liefer's property without his knowledge or consent. Liefer maintained that Shipley came to pick up the marijuana because Liefer had found the marijuana and ordered Shipley to get the marijuana off his (Liefer's) property. Liefer contends that he should not have been forced to defend against these inadmissible allegations of past misconduct. 8 The government asserts that the evidence was admissible because proof of a conspiracy to distribute narcotics requires a showing of specific intent. Liefer argues, on the other hand, that his defense relied only on a denial that he had ever received the distribution of marijuana involved in the indictment and thus intent was not controverted. The issue, therefore, is whether the government may present other-acts evidence, regardless of whether the defendant disputes intent, knowledge, or the other bases for Rule 404(b) exceptions, as long as specific intent is a required element of the crime. 9 Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) 1 does not permit the government to introduce evidence of other acts by a defendant in order to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the crime for which the defendant is charged. United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir.1984). Rule 404(b) does not bar such evidence, however, if the government offers the evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Because of the potentially prejudicial nature of such evidence, see United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir.1968), and the danger of jury misuse, the trial court must carefully assess all evidence offered by the government under Rule 404(b) to ensure that the evidence (1) falls within a Rule 404(b) exception and (2) has probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Fed.R.Evid. 403. 10 In a case such as this one, the government may want to introduce evidence of other bad acts by a defendant that are similar to the acts charged in the indictment. In Shackleford, supra, we reaffirmed the principle that Rule 404(b) does not give the government an unfettered right to introduce bad acts evidence. We laid down guidelines to ensure that the evidence presented by the government actually goes to prove matters at issue rather than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. See 738 F.2d at 779. 11 We note initially that Liefer contends that the holding of Shackleford controls the outcome of this case. In Shackleford, we reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial court had allowed the government to introduce evidence of a prior act of extortion by the defendant. We concluded that the evidence was only probative of the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. 738 F.2d at 779-84. We reached such a conclusion only after carefully analyzing the government's evidence in light of the particular facts of that case, the elements of the crime charged, and Rule 404(b). Therefore, Shackleford provides us not with an answer, but rather with a method of analyzing Liefer's claim. 12 In Shackleford, we used a four-part test to analyze whether the trial court should have admitted evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct under Rules 404(b) and 403: 13 [a]dmission of evidence of prior or subsequent acts will be approved if (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue (i.e. such that 'the consequential fact may be inferred from the proffered evidence,' 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 404 at 404-49 (1982)), (3) the evidence is clear and convincing, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 14 738 F.2d at 779. See also United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d 823, 832-33 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 804 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Boroni, 758 F.2d 222, 224 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906, 912 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Kane, 726 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir.1984). 15 The government contends that Shipley's testimony was relevant to issues other than Liefer's propensity to commit the crime charged since it showed Liefer's intent and knowledge about marijuana distribution and his plan to carry on the business by receiving and storing large quantities at his farm. Liefer argues that intent to distribute marijuana was merely a formal issue at trial, because if he conspired with a group possessing over one thousand pounds of marijuana, his intent to help distribute it was clear. Liefer contends that because his defense was based upon a denial that he ever possessed the marijuana, Shackleford must control. See 738 F.2d at 781 (intent must be more than a formal issue). 16 In Shackleford, however, the government did not need to produce evidence of the defendant's intent unless the defendant raised lack of intent as a defense, because specific intent was not an essential element of the offense of attempting to collect a debt by use of extortionate means in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 894(a) (1976). In Liefer's case, the government had to prove that the defendants conspired together, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, to distribute, with intent to distribute, marijuana in a quantity in excess of 1,000 pounds, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) (emphasis added). 2 17 As we noted in Shackleford, this circuit has 18 distinguished between situations in which intent is in issue because the government must show specific intent as an essential element of the crime and when intent is only a formal issue that can be inferred from the act. When the crime charged requires proof of specific intent, we have held that, because it is a material element to be proved by the government, it is necessarily in issue and the government may submit evidence of other acts in an attempt to establish the matter in its case-in-chief, assuming the other requirements of Rules 404(b) and 403 are satisfied. 19 738 F.2d at 781. The decision in Shackleford, therefore, applies only to crimes that do not include an element of specific intent. Intent is never merely a formal issue when the defendant is charged with a specific intent crime. 20 In United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 87, 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978), the government had to establish the defendant's specific intent to defraud in order to prove mail fraud. We held that the government was entitled to introduce evidence of prior similar bad acts even though the defendant had not disputed intent. 572 F.2d at 1202. In United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1985), we rejected an argument similar to the one Liefer raises here. In Chaimson we held that a defendant charged with a specific intent crime could not prevent the government from introducing other-acts evidence to prove intent by denying that he committed the act itself and conceding the intent issue. Id. at 805-808 (rejecting Second Circuit cases that allowed the defendant to concede intent and thereby exclude other-acts evidence); cf., id. at 813 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (government should not be allowed to flood the courtroom with other-crimes evidence simply because the crime was one of specific intent). See also Arnold, 833 (reaffirming this rule). In Liefer's case, specific intent to distribute was an essential element of the crime, and therefore intent was not merely a formal issue as it was in Shackleford. Because the government charged Liefer with a specific intent crime, it had the right to present other-acts evidence regardless of Liefer's attempt to concede the issue. There was no courtroom other-crimes flood. 3 21 Having decided that Shipley's testimony was directed towards establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, we also conclude that the testimony satisfies the second Shackleford requirement. The other-crime evidence was sufficiently similar to the crime charged in that Shipley testified that Liefer had stored the marijuana on his farm while waiting to distribute it, a modus operandi similar to that charged in the indictment. The other act was undoubtedly close enough in time, for it occurred within the time period of the conspiracy. 22 Liefer contends that the evidence fails the clear and convincing requirement because Shipley's testimony pertained to a return of the marijuana to Birtwell, not a distribution. We do not find this argument convincing. Shipley clearly testified that Liefer returned the marijuana because Liefer could not distribute it (because of low quality). The purpose of the clear and convincing standard is to ensure that the government's evidence directly establishes that the defendant participated in a prior crime (or misconduct), and to protect the defendant from evidence based upon highly circumstantial inferences. Chaimson, 760 F.2d at 807, quoting United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 2894, 61 L.Ed.2d 318 (1979); see also Hyman, 741 F.2d at 193 (direct, unimpeached testimony is clear and convincing). But cf. Boroni, 758 F.2d at 225 (uncorroborated and vague allegations of immunized witness fall short of clear and convincing). Shipley's testimony was admissible, therefore, because it was directly probative of Liefer's intent to distribute. 23 Finally, Liefer contends that any probative value of Shipley's testimony was far outweighed by its prejudicial impact particularly in view of the fact that the Trial Court gave no limiting instruction with regard to Shipley's testimony. First of all, none of the defendants tendered a limiting instruction or requested one at the time of Shipley's testimony, despite the fact that a lengthy sidebar shortly before Shipley testified made it clear that all the parties were aware of what Shipley would say. We will only reverse the trial court for failing to give an unrequested instruction if the failure is plain error, United States v. Oxford, 735 F.2d 276, 280 (7th Cir.1984), and Liefer does not argue that the trial court's failure amounted to plain error. 4 24 Moreover, we reject the argument that the prejudicial impact of Shipley's testimony far outweighed its probative value. We have repeatedly said that, with respect to Fed.R.Evid. 403, [t]he trial judge's assessment of relative probative value and unfair prejudice is generally accorded great deference because of his firsthand exposure to the evidence and his familiarity with the course of the trial proceeding. United States v. Levy, 741 F.2d 915, 924 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 440, 83 L.Ed.2d 366 (1984). See also Arnold, at 832; Hyman, 741 F.2d at 913 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 854 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 211, 83 L.Ed.2d 141 (1984). Based upon the probative value of Shipley's testimony noted above, 5 we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the evidence. See Chaimson, 760 F.2d at 808 (reviewing court may reverse only upon a showing of abuse of discretion). 25 We therefore conclude that the trial judge acted within his discretion in allowing Shipley to testify about picking up the marijuana at Liefer's farm. The testimony was probative of Liefer's specific intent to distribute, which was an essential element of the crime for which Liefer was charged. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that the probative value of the testimony was not outweighed by its potential for prejudice.
26 Defendant Liefer argues that the district court should have declared a mistrial because the Assistant United States Attorney twice attempted to elicit testimony that the government attorney knew was inadmissible. Liefer argues that such prosecutorial misconduct demands reversal. See United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285, 290 (10th Cir.1978), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc). 27 The first instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the testimony of Richard Schair. The government called Schair to testify on two occasions. On the first occasion, the trial judge ruled that Schair could not testify about statements by co-conspirators because the government's evidence had not yet established the conspiracy, as required by United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir.1978). The government recalled Schair as its final witness in its case-in-chief, and the trial judge then required the government to make an offer of proof as to what Schair would testify. The offer of proof contained no reference to any statement by Darrell Hall. Nonetheless, the government sought to elicit from Schair that Hall had once approached Schair to buy marijuana for Liefer. Liefer's attorney objected to this line of testimony, first on foundation grounds and later on what appear to be relevance or hearsay grounds, and the government withdrew the question to which the defendant raised the second objection. 28 Liefer argues that, since Hall was not alleged to be a co-conspirator, any testimony that Hall said Liefer sent him to buy drugs was clearly inadmissible hearsay. See United States v. Koopmans, 757 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir.1985). Furthermore, Liefer asserts, the evidence prejudiced him because no other witness testified that Liefer had contacted him about marijuana. Liefer contends that the government's introduction of these statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct, and that the district court therefore erred when it denied Liefer's motion for a mistrial. See Westbo, 576 F.2d at 289-92. 29 Since the government never offered proof nor alleged that Hall participated in the conspiracy, testimony about what Hall said to Schair about Liefer was hearsay, and not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446, 465 (7th Cir.) (Santiago requires district court to determine that declarant was member of conspiracy), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934, 102 S.Ct. 1989, 72 L.Ed.2d 454 (1982). The Assistant United States Attorney either knew or should have known that this evidence was clearly inadmissible. Unlike Westbo, however, here the trial court had not ruled on the admissibility of the testimony, and the government attorney therefore did not violate the clear intent of an evidentiary ruling. See Westbo, 576 F.2d at 292. The trial judge was in the best position to determine whether the incident was so serious as to merit a mistrial, see United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir.1980), and we will reverse his decision only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jordan, 722 F.2d 353, 357 (7th Cir.1983); Westbo, 576 F.2d at 292. Liefer was not so clearly prejudiced by this incident that the district court abused its discretion by denying Liefer's motion for a mistrial. See Jordan, 722 F.2d at 357 (trial court has broad discretion in determining appropriate remedy for the presentation of prior bad acts evidence). 30 Defendant Liefer also alleges prosecutorial misconduct during the redirect examination of Jack Birtwell's girl friend Lisa Tite. The government called Tite as a rebuttal witness over Liefer's objection that her testimony would not be proper rebuttal and would merely emphasize testimony about alleged marijuana transactions that were not part of the conspiracy charged. The court allowed the testimony on the issue of Liefer's credibility, to rebut Liefer's testimony that he had not had any large cash transactions with Jack Birtwell. 6 31 Once on the stand, however, Tite's testimony did not meet the government's expectations. When Tite failed to testify as anticipated, the Assistant United States Attorney changed his approach and attempted to elicit testimony from Tite that Birtwell had been involved in the distribution of controlled substances. The court sustained Liefer's objection that this line of questioning was outside the scope of the issues. 32 Following cross-examination, the Assistant United States Attorney again attempted on redirect to elicit testimony from Tite concerning Birtwell's drug involvement. When Tite once again failed to cooperate, the Assistant United States Attorney provided the elusive testimony himself by posing a leading question that informed the jury that Birtwell had received a ten-year sentence for the distribution of controlled substances. 7 Liefer immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement, but denied the motion for mistrial. 33 The line of questioning on redirect, in particular the leading question, was clearly improper in light of the court's prior ruling. Unlike the questions asked of Schair, the government on this occasion violated the clear intent of the court's [prior] ruling. Westbo, 576 F.2d at 292. However, the trial court ordinarily is in the best position to determine whether the incident of impropriety merited a mistrial, see Gardner, 611 F.2d at 777, and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Jordan, 722 F.2d at 357; Westbo, 576 F.2d at 292. 34 It is clear that the government disregarded the trial court's ruling in order to present inadmissible evidence to the jury. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that an instruction to the jury to disregard the statement obviated the need for a mistrial. Unlike the court in Westbo, 576 F.2d at 291-92, we are not faced with a case where the inadmissible evidence of the prior misconduct concerned the defendant himself. Furthermore, the evidence that Birtwell had a drug conviction might have supported Liefer's testimony that Shipley and/or Birtwell stashed marijuana on Liefer's farm without Liefer's knowledge or consent. We recognize that Liefer had testified that he and Birtwell were friends, and thus evidence of Birtwell's conviction might have had some impact upon Liefer's case. The trial court determined that any potential prejudice could be cured by the instruction without the necessity of a new trial. We find no abuse of discretion.
35 Defendant Liefer contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to the possibility of finding Liefer guilty of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to distribute less than 1,000 pounds of marijuana. Liefer maintains that, based on Jeffrey Cox's testimony, the jury could have found a conspiracy among Liefer, Patterson, and Cox involving only the two shipments of marijuana, each approximately 200 to 300 pounds, that were allegedly purchased by Patterson and stored at Liefer's farm. The government argues that the case involved only one factual dispute: whether the defendants were members of the Schair/Bayles conspiracy for which the grand jury indicted them. 36 We affirm the trial court's decision to refuse the lesser offense instruction. Recently we reviewed the standard for determining when a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense in United States v. Medina, 755 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 & n. 2 (7th Cir.1985). In Medina, we noted that [a]s a general rule, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense 'if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.'  755 F.2d at 1273, citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965); Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134, 76 S.Ct. 685, 688, 100 L.Ed. 1013 (1956); Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 323, 16 S.Ct. 839, 892, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). 37 A defendant generally satisfies this requirement by presenting sharply conflicting testimony on the element distinguishing the greater offense from the lesser. Medina, 755 F.2d at 1273. Absent conflicting testimony, a defendant may prevail if the jury might fairly infer the lesser offense from the evidence presented, including a reconstruction of events gained by accepting the testimony of one or more witnesses only in part. Id., citing United States v. Sinclair, 444 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C.Cir.1971). 38 In this case, there was no dispute that the Schair/Bayles conspiracy intended to distribute significantly more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana. The only factual issue in dispute was whether defendant Liefer was a member of that conspiracy. Where the defendant, like Liefer, presents solely an exculpatory defense, and does not defend upon the ground that he has committed only a lesser crime, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. 8 See Sinclair, 444 F.2d at 890. 39 In this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury as to multiple versus single conspiracies. If the jury had found that the government had not proven that Liefer was part of the Schair/Bayles conspiracy, the jury would have been obligated to find Liefer not guilty.

40 Defendant Liefer contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for acquittal. Liefer correctly points out that the only prosecution witness to connect him to the conspiracy was Jeffrey Cox, whose credibility Liefer challenged at trial. Even if we were to accept Liefer's argument that the case against him was weak, his challenge is essentially a credibility challenge, and thus within the province of the jury. 9 If the jury believed Cox's testimony linking Liefer to the Schair/Bayles conspiracy, then that evidence suffices to support a conviction. We thus uphold the trial court's denial of Liefer's motion for acquittal. 41 An appellate court reviewing a motion for acquittal applies the same standard as the trial court, United States v. Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir.1982), i.e., whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government could support a conviction, United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 319 (7th Cir.1983). We do not substitute our own determination of the credibility of witnesses, of the weight of the evidence, or of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, for those of the jury. United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir.1984). The jury evidently chose to accept the testimony of Cox concerning Liefer's involvement in the conspiracy, and Cox's testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, supports the trial court's decision to deny the motion for acquittal.
42 Defendant Liefer also challenges the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for severance. Liefer contends that he was prejudiced in that the jury heard massive amounts of evidence about the illegal activities of other participants in the conspiracy, most of which did not directly concern Liefer. 10 We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Liefer's motion for severance. 43 The decision whether to grant a severance involves a balance between important interests. On one hand, we have recognized a strong public interest in having persons jointly indicted for conspiracy tried together. United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1220 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 610 (7th Cir.1985). On the other hand, a joint trial may prejudice one or more of the defendants by confusing the jury as to what evidence is offered against each defendant. United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260, 267 (7th Cir.1983). The district court ordinarily is in the best position to balance this public policy preference for joint trials against the possibility that a joint trial may prejudice one of the defendants. Gironda, 758 F.2d at 1220. See also Percival, 756 F.2d at 610; Shively, 715 F.2d at 267. 44 Therefore, the decision whether to grant a motion for severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Gironda, 758 F.2d at 1220; Percival, 756 F.2d at 610. The judge correctly instructed the jury to give separate consideration as to what the evidence showed with respect to each defendant, not to consider against any defendant evidence admitted solely against some other defendant or defendants, and to decide each defendant's case on the evidence and law applicable to that particular defendant. We affirm the conviction of defendant Liefer.