Opinion ID: 3188458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant’s Claims for Damages

Text: a) Breach of implied covenant of good faith Appellant contends that there were two disputed facts that prevented 10 We also doubt that appellant could prove that there was a breach. As noted, A.B.S. received a choral stipend of forty-three percent of tuition for the 2008-09 school year. The following school year he received a choral stipend of $8,907 plus $6000 in financial aid, which taken together, amounted to forty-five percent of the $32,990 tuition for 2009-10. As we discuss infra at B.3.b., there is no evidence to support appellant‟s claim that the stipend would not be considered as part of a package of tuition assistance. 27 summary judgment for appellees on his claim that St. Albans School breached the covenant of good faith implied in the 2009-10 re-enrollment contract: (1) St. Albans School‟s reason for denying A.B.S.‟s re-enrollment for 2010-11, and (2) whether the discretionary language of the 2009-10 re-enrollment contract is unconscionable. The first point is factually contested, appellant argues, because St. Albans School provided conflicting testimony regarding the school‟s basis for denying A.B.S. re-enrollment for the 2010-11 school year. Appellant contends that Parker first stated in his April 27, 2010 affidavit that A.B.S. was not permitted to return because of appellant‟s actions, which “made a positive and constructive relationship impossible and that such a step would be in the school‟s best interests.” Appellant then points to the June 10, 2010 deposition of headmaster Wilson, in which he stated that the only reason that A.B.S. was not permitted to reenroll was because appellant failed to pay his tuition. Appellant argues that Wilson then “changed his reason,” explaining in a supplemental affidavit, dated August 31, 2010, that A.B.S. was not permitted to return both because of the unpaid tuition and because of appellant‟s actions. We disagree that the statements appellant identifies suffice to call into question that St. Albans School could lawfully deny re-enrollment to A.B.S. We 28 note that as Wilson explained in his August 31 affidavit, the two reasons were interrelated. Even if the statements reveal some ambiguity about the precise or primary reason or reasons for the decision not to permit A.B.S.‟s re-enrollment, that fact is not material to appellant‟s claim that the action was taken in bad faith and therefore is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The 2009-10 reenrollment contract required appellant to pay A.B.S.‟s tuition in full; failure to do so constituted grounds for expulsion and denial of re-enrollment for the next school year. St. Albans School also had the discretionary authority afforded to Wilson under a separate provision of the contract to decline A.B.S.‟s re-enrollment under certain circumstances. Whether St. Albans School had one or more grounds for the denial of A.B.S.‟s re-enrollment is not material to appellant‟s claim for breach of contract based on the implied covenant of good faith as both reasons cited were grounded in the contract that appellant signed. The implied duty of good faith imposes an obligation on a contracting party not to “evade[] the spirit of the contract, willfully render[] imperfect performance, or interfere[] with performance by the other party,” Allworth v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 201 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310 (D.C. 2000)), but it does not require a party to waive or rewrite the terms of the contract. Here, in fact, St. Albans School accommodated appellant by not exercising the option of expelling A.B.S. mid-year, accepting only a $2,000 29 payment to allow him to complete the school year, even though approximately half of his tuition remained unpaid. Moreover, on at least three occasions, at appellant‟s request St. Albans School extended the due date of the outstanding tuition balance before finally deciding not to allow A.B.S. to re-enroll for the following school year when the extended deadlines were not met. Appellant‟s argument is essentially that St. Albans School should have continued to forbear, especially once he provided evidence that he had reached a proposed settlement with his father‟s estate that would cover A.B.S.‟s tuition. But the letter from the estate‟s counsel he provided to the School pointed out that there were still a number of further signatures required and steps to be taken before the settlement received court approval. Although the situation looked promising, it was not a sure thing. Appellant‟s argument that his inability to pay should have been foreseen because he had advised the school that his personal financial situation was precarious,11 ignores that appellant was obviously aware of his own straitened financial circumstances when he signed the contract agreeing to pay his son‟s tuition. On this record, no reasonable jury could find that the school acted in bad faith, arbitrarily or unreasonably. Id. at 202. Appellant also contends that the “unbridled” discretion to expel or deny re11 In the financial aid application filed in 2009, appellant indicated he had no income and that his wife had a significant decrease in her income. 30 enrollment to A.B.S. granted to the St. Albans School headmaster under the contract is unconscionable because the object of the contract was a child, and it allowed appellees to “economic[ally] exploit[]” A.B.S.‟s service to the National Cathedral choir and harm his “mental, spiritual, moral and social development by denying him the right to complete his promised pilgrimage,” i.e., his three-year participation as a chorister in the National Cathedral. Appellant also argues that St. Albans School used the discretionary clause to prevent appellant from exercising his First Amendment right to petition for judicial relief. Whether the re-enrollment contract contains unconscionable provisions is not a material question of fact in dispute. As a threshold matter, we reiterate that St. Albans School had grounds to deny A.B.S.‟s re-enrollment for non-payment of tuition as the contract provides for expulsion or non-enrollment of students “whose tuition and fees are not paid as scheduled,” independent of the further discretion provided for in the contract. Moreover, the contract does not vest “unbridled discretion” in the headmaster: a student cannot be expelled or refused reenrollment for any reason; rather, the contract permits such action “if the Headmaster concludes, in his sole and absolute discretion, that the actions of the student‟s parent (or guardian) make . . . a positive and constructive relationship impossible or otherwise interfered with the school‟s accomplishment of its mission” or if “such action would be in the best interest of the student or the 31 school.” In this case, the school has cited specific examples to support the denial of A.B.S.‟s re-enrollment based on appellant‟s conduct: that appellant “falsely led the school to believe that payment of the tuition for the 2009-10 school year was imminent”; that appellant responded to the school‟s final deadline for resolving the unpaid tuition “with angry words and by threatening the school with litigation”; and that appellant “threatened that, unless the school acceded to his demands, he would challenge whether the Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation was properly chartered and he would embarrass the school with adverse publicity.” The cited reasons were specific and not fanciful; they are supported by the record in this case, as appellant in fact followed through: he sued and, among other things, challenged PECF‟s corporate status, a challenge that, as we have discussed, is totally without merit. Appellant‟s First Amendment argument concerning his right to seek judicial redress is also without merit, as the Constitution imposes limits on the state or state agents, not private parties such as appellees. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). Moreover, appellant‟s actions in the trial court and in this court belie his claim that his desire to petition for judicial relief has been stymied by appellees. b) Misrepresentation 32 In his complaint for damages, appellant claims that appellees made several misrepresentations that induced him, in 2008, to sign a multi-year commitment that A.B.S. would fulfill his duties as a Boy Chorister at the National Cathedral through the eighth grade, which required that he also be enrolled as a student at St. Albans School. Specifically, appellant claims that the following representations were made to him and were false: (1) that each chorister would receive a stipend worth forty-five percent of tuition at St. Albans in recognition of his time commitment to the National Cathedral choir; (2) that this stipend would not be considered by St. Albans School in arriving at awards for financial aid; (3) that a family‟s financial situation would not prevent a student who has been admitted from attending St. Albans School; and (4) that financial aid awards are calculated using a computerized system that treats each family the same in assessing their demonstrated need. In granting summary judgment for appellees on the claim of misrepresentation, the trial court concluded that even assuming that the false statements appellant alleged were made, they would not support an actionable claim for misrepresentation. The trial court reasoned that appellant was already aware of the amounts that A.B.S. would receive in the form of a choir stipend and financial aid for the 2009-10 school year and, therefore, could not have reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations when he signed the enrollment contract for 33 that year, in which he agreed to pay the tuition balance. On appeal, appellant argues, and we agree, that the trial court‟s temporal focus was too narrow. If all that were at issue in the litigation with respect to the misrepresentation claims were a defense to appellees‟ counterclaim for the 2009-10 tuition, we would agree with the trial court‟s reasoning. But as appellant points out, his complaint took a broader view and was grounded on his reliance on those misrepresentations when he made the multi-year commitment in 2008, before the initial enrollment of A.B.S. at St. Albans School for the fifth grade, which required that A.B.S. remain enrolled at St. Albans School through the eighth grade as a condition of A.B.S.‟s participation in the National Cathedral choir.12 Appellant thus claims economic 12 The Eighth Claim of appellant‟s complaint, seeking damages for misrepresentation, alleged as follows: 46. Defendants made false representations to Plaintiff, to wit, that (i) in recognition of the time commitment required of Boy Choristers, a choral stipend in the amount of 45% of the Defendant St. Albans School tuition would be given to each Boy Chorister, (ii) that the Chorister Stipend is not consider[ed] by Defendant St. Albans School in making the Financial Aid determination, (iii) a family‟s financial situation would not prevent a student from attending St. Albans School and (iv) St. Albans School‟s Financial Aid Committee awarded financial aid based upon the review of a computerized systematic analysis of the family‟s financial situation and treated each family the same. (continued . . .) 34 and personal injury to him and his son as a result not only of the tuition dispute for 2009-10, but also the subsequent disruption of A.B.S.‟s choral and school experience when he was not permitted to return to St. Albans School for the 201011 and subsequent school years, which rendered him ineligible to complete the choir commitment. Nonetheless, even with that broader understanding of the scope of appellant‟s misrepresentation claim, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to appellees. See Young, 11 A.3d at 249 (noting that on appeal of summary judgment, review is de novo, taking into account whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (quoting Bruno v. Western Union Fin. Servs., Inc., 973 A.2d 713, 717 (D.C. 2011)); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56 (c). We come to this conclusion based on application of the substantive legal elements _________________________ (. . . continued) 47. The aforementioned representations were material facts upon which Plaintiff relied in enrolling his son in the multi-year Chorister Program and St. Albans School. 48. Defendant St. Albans School, with knowledge of falsity of the aforementioned representations and with the intent to deceive Plaintiff, made the aforementioned representations. 35 of fraudulent misrepresentation and heightened evidentiary standard that apply to such a claim. It is well established that to succeed on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the claimant must prove six elements: (1) that a false representation was made, (2) in reference to a material fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with intent to deceive, and (5) action taken in detrimental reliance upon the representation. See Virginia Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Grp. Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 878 A.2d 1226, 1233 (D.C. 2005) (citing Bennett v. Kiggins, 377 A.2d 57, 59 (D.C. 1977)). Moreover, to be actionable, reliance on the misrepresentation must (6) have been justifiable. See Sundberg v. TTR Realty, LLC., 109 A.3d 1123, 1131 (D.C. 2015) (“A misrepresentation is „material‟ if it would be „likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so.‟” (quoting Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64 A.3d 428, 438-39 (D.C. 2013))). To prevail at trial on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the claimant has the burden to prove the elements by a heightened evidentiary standard, clear and convincing evidence. Bennett, 377 A.2d at 59.13 13 Special pleading requirements apply to claims of fraudulent misrepresentation. Because fraud is never presumed, it must be pled with particularity. See Virginia Acad. of Clinical Psychologists, 878 A.2d at 1233; (continued . . .) 36 At the summary judgment stage, the trial court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, which are functions reserved for the trier of fact. But to survive a motion for summary judgment, there must be “at least enough evidence to make out a prima facie case in support of” the nonmovant‟s position if credibility determinations and inferences were drawn in the claimant‟s favor. Id. (quoting Joeckel v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 793 A.2d 1279, 1281-82 (D.C. 2002)). “And of particular relevance here, „[i]f the claim must be demonstrated by heightened proof to succeed, the nonmovant claimant must produce more substantial evidence to successfully oppose summary judgment.‟” Id. (quoting 11 MOORE‟S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.03[4] (3d ed. 2005)); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (noting that “inquiry _________________________ (. . . continued) Super. Ct. Civ. R. 9 (b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”). To comply with the more rigorous pleading requirement of Rule 9 (b), a complaint must allege “such facts as will reveal the existence of all the requisite elements of fraud. Allegations in the form of conclusions on the part of the pleader as to the existence of fraud are insufficient.” Bennett, 377 A.2d at 59-60. Rule 9 (b)‟s “particularity” standard requires that the complaint include the time, place and content of the false representations, the fact misrepresented, and what the defendant gained (or the plaintiff lost) as a result of the fraud. United States ex rel, Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Where the complaint names a number of defendants, Rule 9 (b) requires that the identity and role of individual defendants alleged to have made false representations be specified in the complaint. See Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1986). 37 involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits”). If there is a genuine dispute on a material fact, summary judgment cannot be granted. However, for there to be a “genuine” dispute, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. Pro. R. 56(c)) (cited in Lowry v. Glassman, 908 A.2d 30, 36 (D.C. 2006)). Appellant argues that several items of evidence created genuine disputes of material fact requiring resolution by the fact-finder such that his claim of misrepresentation should have survived summary judgment. These include his August 13, 2011, affidavit in support of his opposition to appellees‟ motion for summary judgment14; the St. Albans School website; and statements made by 14 Appellant‟s August 13, 2011, affidavit states, at ¶ 17: The St. Albans School web page upon which I relied in enrolling my son states: “St. Albans wants to ensure that every boy admitted to the school knows that he will have the opportunity to attend, regardless of his family‟s financial situation.” It was affirmative[ly] represented to me by Mike McCarthy, Defendant‟s Musical Director[,] that in recognition of the time commitment required of Boy Choristers, a choral stipend at least in the amount of 45% of the Defendant St. Albans School tuition would be given to each Boy Chorister and that the rate was likely to rise. Additionally, the (continued . . .) 38 Music Director McCarthy in his February 28, 2008, letter and in his July 13, 2010 deposition. Having considered this evidence with respect to each of the specific claims of misrepresentation that appellant has made, and assuming that the jury would credit appellant‟s statement and draw reasonable inferences in appellant‟s favor, we conclude that the evidence falls short. In other words, there is no “genuine” dispute of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The 45% Choral Stipend Appellant argues that his affidavit and McCarthy‟s February 28, 2008, letter concerning the amount of the choral stipend suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact that defeats summary judgment on his claims of misrepresentation regarding the amount of future choral stipends. Consistent with our earlier analysis of appellant‟s claim of breach of promise, we conclude that McCarthy‟s statement _________________________ (. . . continued) Defendants represented that the Chorister Stipend was not consider[ed] by St. Albans School in making the Financial Aid determination. Finally, Defendants represented that St. Albans School‟s Financial Aid Committee awarded financial aid based upon the review of a computerized systematic analysis of the family‟s financial situation and treated each family the same. Each of these representations upon which I relied turned out to be false and were known to be false when made by the Defendants. 39 regarding the choral stipend for the 2008-09 school year did not constitute a promise that A.B.S. would receive a stipend worth at least forty-five percent of tuition every subsequent year he remained a chorister. Even read in the light most favorable to appellant, McCarthy‟s statement in the letter is qualified as a hope and appellant‟s affidavit makes clear that the alleged statement (to the extent McCarthy made a statement beyond what was in the letter) related to a future occurrence that McCarthy thought was “likely.” Given those important qualifications, on the evidence of record, no reasonable jury could find for appellant on this claim of misrepresentation. See Carleton v. Winter, 901 A.2d 174, 178 (D.C. 2006) (“[A] prophecy or prediction of something which it is merely hoped or expected will occur in the future is not actionable upon its nonoccurrence.” (quoting Bennett, 377 A.2d at 61)). The Chorister Stipend and Financial Aid The complaint also claims that appellees told him that the chorister stipend would not be considered in making financial aid determinations and that this was false because in making a financial aid award to A.B.S. for the 2009-10 school 40 year, St. Albans School in fact took into account the $9000 stipend, plus a $6000 financial aid to reach the approximately $15,000 of demonstrated financial need.15 To defeat summary judgment, appellant relied on the statement in his affidavit that appellees “represented that the Chorister Stipend was not consider[ed] by St. Albans School in making the Financial Aid determination.” See n.14 supra.16 Viewing the affidavit as a proffer of what appellant‟s testimony would be at trial and assuming further, as we must, that a jury would credit appellant‟s statement that such a statement was made to him, we conclude that appellant‟s testimony would not suffice to permit a reasonable jury to find that appellant proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that he reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentation. The reasonableness of a person‟s reliance on an asserted false statement is a fact-intensive inquiry that is evaluated “on a case-by15 Appellees do not dispute that the chorister stipend is taken into account. To the contrary, in his July 13, 2010 deposition, Parker stated that it was the policy of St. Albans School “to consider the chorister stipend, when making financial awards.” 16 Relatedly, appellant argues that McCarthy‟s statement that in appreciation for their efforts, boy choristers are given scholarships would be a misstatement if the stipends are taken into account in considering financial aid awards. Appellant also argues that the chorister stipends are “earned” by the Boy Choristers who must devote many hours of rehearsal and performance for the National Cathedral choir, which derives revenue from their performances. These arguments constitute reasons why the stipend should not be taken into account in the financial aid calculation, but they are not evidence that appellees misrepresented to appellant that it would not be taken into account. 41 case basis based on all the surrounding circumstances.” AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoted in Burman v. Phoenix Worldwide Indus., 384 F. Supp. 2d 316, 329 (D.D.C. 2005)); see Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 613 A.2d 916, 933 (D.C. 1992) (reliance on representation must be “objectively reasonable”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977) (reliance must be “justifiable”); id. at § 538 (whether reliance is justified is a question of materiality which employs a reasonable person standard). Whether there has been reasonable reliance is therefore usually a question for the jury, unless reliance on the misrepresentation is precluded as a matter of law.17 But even when there is no legal impediment to reliance, there must be some evidentiary basis upon which the jury may determine whether the claimant‟s reliance was justified. Moreover, the evidence must be sufficiently probative to permit a jury to make the necessary finding by clear and convincing evidence. See Bennett, 377 A.2d at 59. 17 See, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, 902 A.2d 91, 96 (D.C. 2006) (affirming grant of summary judgment where proof of reasonable reliance was legally impossible); Hercules & Co., 613 A.2d at 927-29 (holding that complete integration clause in contract made reliance on statement made outside of contract legally irrelevant and could not be considered in support of claim of fraud in the inducement). 42 In this case, the only evidence of record is appellant‟s affidavit concerning a “misrepresentation” made by “defendants” that the choral stipend would not be considered in making financial aid determinations. There is no specification at all about the manner in which the alleged misrepresentation was made (e.g., was it orally or in writing?), or about when it was made or the circumstances under which it was made. Nor is there any specification as to whether one, two or all of the defendants made the misrepresentation even though three separate operating entities are named in the complaint as defendants (PECF, National Cathedral, and St. Albans School). The individual who presumably made the false statement is not identified, leaving no clue as to the person‟s authority to make the alleged representation on behalf of any of the defendants. These factual details would be critical to a jury‟s evaluation of the reasonableness of appellant‟s reliance on the alleged statement as a credible representation binding any one of the defendants with respect to the consideration of the chorister stipend in financial aid determinations. Without such facts, the jury could only speculate. There is no reason to expect (and appellant does not contend) that sufficient evidence would have been presented if the case had been allowed to proceed to trial. Indeed, the record supports the opposite inference. Appellees filed the motion for summary judgment on the misrepresentation claim on August 4, 2011. In opposing the motion, appellant referred only to his affidavit of August 13, 2011, 43 which contained the bare assertion that the misrepresentation had been made. Appellant had already deposed National Cathedral music director McCarthy and St. Albans School finance director Parker the previous year, on July 13, 2010. Appellant‟s opposition did not rely on (or even refer to) their affidavits, which clearly did not support appellant‟s claim that the representations appellant alleged was made to him.18 Instead, appellant argued that the court should not decide the summary judgment motion at that time because he needed to complete discovery, 18 The following exchange took place during the July 13, 2010, deposition of McCarthy: Q. [Appellant] Did you tell me or my ex-wife, that the chorister stipend will be applied in some fashion, against any financial aid[] request made at St. Albans School? A. [McCarthy] I may or I may not have done that. I do not know. But usually, the awards are made through St. Albans School. So, as I understand it, if there is a financial aid[] request which has been granted by the school, then the chorister stipend is put to off-set that. At most, this exchange established that appellant was not informed by McCarthy that the stipend would be taken into account in the financial aid calculus. But it does not support the opposite proposition that is the premise of appellant‟s misrepresentation claim that he was affirmatively and falsely told that the chorister stipend would not be taken into account. In his July 13, 2010 deposition, Parker stated that although he did not know whether the policy to consider chorister stipends in making financial aid determinations was “communicated to the chorister parents,” he did know “that it is communicated that the choir stipend is for the payment of tuition at St. Albans School, and as such, the choir stipend is paid to the school, for the payment of tuition.” 44 including the re-deposition of McCarthy “regarding tuition scholarships,” of Parker regarding “the factual basis for denying all but $6000 to [A.B.S.] as financial aid for the 2009-2010 school year,” and of Headmaster Wilson and others with whom he consulted regarding the decision not to permit A.B.S. to re-enroll for the 200910 school year. Appellant re-deposed Wilson and others concerning the reenrollment question but there is no indication in the record that he re-deposed McCarthy or Parker, the persons he identified as relevant to the misrepresentation claim, nor does appellant argue on appeal that he tried but was prevented from deposing them anew. Thus, at the time the trial court granted summary judgment on the misrepresentation claim on February 6, 2013, discovery had been completed and the record was essentially the same as it was when appellees filed their motion two years earlier, with a vague and general assertion in appellant‟s affidavit about an alleged misrepresentation made by an undisclosed person on behalf of an unidentified defendant and without further elaboration about time, place or context. This does not begin to create a “genuine” issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 56 (c). We conclude that appellant has not met his burden to counter the motion for summary judgment with “significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint so that a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Lowery, 908 A.2d at 36. 45 St. Albans School Website In opposing summary judgment on his claim of misrepresentation, appellant‟s affidavit stated that he relied on the statement on the school website that “St. Albans wants to ensure that every boy admitted to the School knows he will have the opportunity to attend, regardless of his family‟s financial situation.” Appellant appears to interpret this statement to mean that A.B.S. should have received (in addition to the chorister stipend) financial aid in whatever amount was required to cover any tuition that his family was unable to pay. Even if we assume that a jury were to credit appellant‟s statement that he took notice of this statement on the website and that he understood and relied on the statement as a blanket guarantee when he made the multi-year commitment in 2008, the question remains whether a jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that such reliance was justified. Appellant‟s complaint and affidavit quote the same single sentence which is plucked from the St. Albans School website. A copy of the webpage itself, however, is also of record. We must view the sentence appellant claims misled him in the full context of the webpage to determine whether a jury could find that appellant reasonably relied on the one sentence to mean that his son would be able to continue to attend the school regardless of his family‟s changing financial 46 situation during the course of his enrollment at St. Albans School. The sentence appellant quotes appears in a section of the website describing a fundraising campaign: In September 2006, St. Albans School began the four-year public phase of the Centennial Campaign. Our “case for support” outlines our goals and opportunities as we move into our second century. St. Albans wants to ensure that every boy admitted to the School knows he will have the opportunity to attend, regardless of his family‟s financial situation. For this reason, we remain committed to a policy of meeting the full demonstrated financial need of all students offered admission to our School. Currently, approximately one out of four boys receives scholarship assistance. In the last five years, the average award has grown more than 58 percent. Looking ahead, we must provide more students—including the traditional middle class—with larger awards to continue to attract and retain an academically superior and wellrounded student body. The campaign goal for new financial aid endowment is $4 million. Viewed in context, we think it is clear that the sentence appellant identifies as a misrepresentation is not, as appellant contends, a guarantee of 100% financial support to any particular student throughout the course of his years at St. Albans School, but rather an aspirational statement of the goal and purpose animating a fundraising effort to ensure that St. Albans School will be able to attract and accommodate students from a broader financial spectrum by meeting their “full demonstrated financial need.” Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on 47 the claim of misrepresentation based on the website statement because (1) there is no evidence that the mission statement for St. Albans School‟s fundraising campaign is false and (2) no reasonable jury could find that a person in appellant‟s position who reads this statement of a campaign goal on a website would have reasonably taken it as a guarantee that personal financial circumstances would have no impact on A.B.S.‟s ability to continue to attend St. Albans School. Use of Computerized Systematic Analysis that Treats Each Family the Same in Making Financial Aid Determinations This particular claim of misrepresentation is barely sketched out in the complaint, and does not meet the requirement that each element of fraud be pled, much less with particularity. No facts are alleged to support that the alleged representation was false and, as in the case of the alleged misrepresentation about the chorister stipend and financial aid determinations, there is no specification of who made the alleged representation and under what circumstances. This deficiency is compounded at the summary judgment stage as there is no evidence, other than appellant‟s affidavit which merely repeats the allegation made in the complaint. On this bare record, no reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that appellees made a representation about the manner in which they conducted financial aid reviews (i.e., with the aid of a computerized 48 systematic analysis of a family‟s financial situation and treated all families “the same‟); that the statement, if made, was false; that it was made with the intent to deceive; and that appellant reasonably relied on the statement to his detriment. We conclude that because the evidentiary record does not permit a jury verdict in favor of appellant on any of the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations, appellees were entitled to summary judgment on these claims. See Lowry, 908 A.2d at 36.