Opinion ID: 195981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The ICC's Historic Preservation and Environmental Reviews

Text: 19 Berkshire next argues that the ICC failed to conduct necessary historic preservation and environmental reviews. On review, we think the record provides a rational basis for the ICC's disposition. 20 Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act requires that a federal licensing agency shall, prior to the issuance of a license, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470f. Applicable regulations, appearing at 36 C.F.R. Sec. 800.9, set forth various adverse effect criteria to be considered by the federal entity. 8 Berkshire argues that Housatonic's acquisition is inconsistent with two such criteria: (1) [i]solation of the property from or alteration of the character of the property's setting when that character contributes to the property's qualification for the National Register; and (2) [n]eglect of a property resulting in its deterioration or destruction. 36 C.F.R. Sec. 800.9(b)(2) & Sec. 800.9(b)(4). Berkshire reasons that, because it may no longer operate the scenic railway, the Lenox station is both functionally isolated (Berkshire's phrase) from its setting as well as deprived of revenues for the station's renovation, thus leading to its deterioration. Accordingly, Berkshire argues, the petition should be remanded for a full review under Section 106. Berkshire also argues that any exemption should be conditioned on Housatonic's agreement to allow Berkshire to use the line. 21 Even in a charitable light, Berkshire's arguments strain credulity. As to Berkshire's first contention, there is no basis for a claim of isolation, functional or otherwise. At least three factors support this conclusion. First, as noted above, largely because of an apparent breakdown in the B & M-Berkshire relationship, the scenic railway had not operated for more than a year prior to the Housatonic acquisition. At most, therefore, the effect of the Housatonic transaction on the then-non-functioning scenic railway was to perpetuate the status quo. In other words, we find no basis to conclude that the Housatonic exemption led to the isolation Berkshire claims has resulted. Second, as the ICC notes, the SHPO issued a no-effect letter, in which neither Lenox station nor the scenic railway were discussed. Third, we think that Berkshire's claim of isolation ... from the property's setting is facially implausible in view of the fact that the historic property in question--a railway station--abuts and, indeed, actually encroaches upon an active railroad right-of-way. 22 Berkshire's deterioration argument is similarly unavailing. Whatever deterioration might have flowed from the cessation of the scenic railway was not an effect caused by Housatonic's exemption. As noted above, the scenic railway had ceased operating well before the Housatonic acquisition. Moreover, as the ICC notes, a substantial question exists as to whether it has jurisdiction to grant the relief Berkshire seeks--that is, conditioning any exemption on Berkshire's right to use the track. Because we find that the exemption gives rise to no adverse effects, we need not reach the jurisdictional issue. 23 Finally, Berkshire argues that the ICC should have required an environmental assessment of the effects of the acquisition. Again, we do not agree. Under then-existing regulations, the ICC did not require environmental assessments when there was only a change in ownership or similar changes; such an issuance of securities or reorganization, but not involving a change in carrier operations. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 1105.6(c)(2) (1990). The ICC reasoned that because no operational changes were involved in the Housatonic transaction, an assessment was not required. Berkshire, however, points to another then-existing regulation under which an assessment would normally have been required when the proposed transaction involved an abandonment, acquisition, or operation of a line of railroad. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 1105.6(b)(1) (1990). Berkshire argues that, by its terms, the former Sec. 1105.6(c)(2) does not apply to an acquisition and operation of a line by a different entity and, in any event, the former Sec. 1105.6(b)(1) directly applies. In its denial of Berkshire's petition, the ICC indicated that the former regulation applied. Before this court, the ICC concedes that either regulation could apply to the transaction. Inasmuch as the transaction did not involve a significant change in operations on the track, we conclude the ICC did have a rational basis for not requiring an environmental assessment.