Opinion ID: 2357857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Order Refusing to Vacate or Modify the Second Arbitration Award

Text: The second arbitration proceedings were commenced at the instance of Mrs. Whitt. Instead of resisting an action to evict her she responded affirmatively to the Housing Authority's termination notice by once again pursuing a grievance before an arbitrator. In her grievance proceeding, Mrs. Whitt asserted the earlier arbitration award and the court's confirmation order and argued that she had been excused from paying rent. The Housing Authority asserted, however, that the condition of the housing unit had been improved and that Mrs. Whitt had nevertheless failed to pay rent. The arbitrator found that some, but not all, repairs remained uncorrected and because of the changed circumstances entered an award which (1) directed the Housing Authority to make and complete certain enumerated repairs within thirty days; (2) directed Whitt to pay rent due from and after March 1, 1978, less an abatement of $7.00 per month; and (3) suspended the cancelation notice until arrangements were made by Mrs. Whitt to pay back rent due under the award. Mrs. Whitt then filed the petition to vacate or modify the award which was heard by Judge Gelfand. The arbitration proceedings were held under the Arbitration Act of 1927, 5 P.S.  161 et seq. [4] Appellant argues, as she did in the trial court, that the arbitrator exceeded his powers [5] and entered an award against the law [6] because he did not adopt in toto the prior award and confirmation order of the Court. There is no merit in this argument. It was Mrs. Whitt who requested the second arbitration and not the Housing Authority. Having requested the arbitrator to suspend the termination notice which was served upon her, she cannot complain that the relief she requested was granted upon condition that she pay rent. By resubmitting to arbitration her dispute with the Housing Authority, she opened the door to a full and complete determination of the respective rights and duties of the parties. The award of the second arbitrator was not barred by principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel. A landlord and tenant relationship is not static but on-going. Circumstances change. Judgment for a single breach of an installment contract is not a bar to an action for a subsequent breach. Exner v. Exner, 268 Pa.Super. 253, 407 A.2d 1342 (1979); Byren & Weil v. French & Keeley, Inc., 103 Pa.Super. 573, 157 A. 367 (1931); 50 C.J.S., Judgments  670. Similarly, where rent is paid on a monthly basis, a judgment for unpaid rent is not ordinarily a bar to an action to recover rent coming due and remaining unpaid thereafter. Kapp v. Shields, 17 Pa.Super. 524 (1901); 22 P.L.E., Landlord and Tenant  353. In the instant case, almost two years had intervened between the first and second arbitration hearings, and almost one year had elapsed following court confirmation of the first award. The issues to be arbitrated in the second proceeding were not the same as those arbitrated in the first proceeding. The second arbitrator heard evidence regarding repairs that had been made and of the circumstances existing when, because of an alleged nonpayment of rent, termination notice was sent by the Housing Authority to the tenant. The arbitrator found that the conditions of the housing unit had changed and that effective March 1, 1978 the Housing Authority was entitled to be paid rent less an abatement of $7.00 per month. In this manner the arbitrator achieved a complete determination of the rights of the parties. It should be recalled that the second arbitration award was entered on November 7, 1978. At this time there had been no judicial determination that the Housing Authority had failed to make repairs as required by the original arbitrator's award. Mrs. Whitt's contempt proceedings were not commenced until March 29, 1979, and the order of Judge Wilson was not entered until June 7, 1979. The court's subsequent determination of Whitt's contempt petition had no effect on the ability of the second arbitrator to make his own determination of the facts from the evidence presented and to fashion consistently therewith a complete resolution of the controversy. Section 11 of the Arbitration Act of 1927, 5 P.S.  171, authorizes a court to modify or correct an award `[w]here the award is against the law, and is such that had it been a verdict of the jury the court would have entered different or other judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' This section `places an award on the same footing as the verdict of a jury [and] mistakes of law may be rectified on appeal.' City of Lebanon v. District Council 89, 36 Pa.Cmwlth. 442, 446, 388 A.2d 1116, 1118 (1978), quoting Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Smith, 350 Pa. 355, 359, 39 A.2d 139, 141 (1944). Resolutions of factual disputes, however, are within the province of the arbitrator. A reviewing court may not second-guess a fact-finder, where, as here, there is no transcript of the testimony and the reviewing court thus has no means by which to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence or to change the factual findings made therefrom. Pein v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 241 Pa.Super. 283, 286, 361 A.2d 348, 349 (1976). The arbitrator's findings of fact, under such circumstances, are unassailable. Id., 241 Pa.Superior Ct. at 287, 361 A.2d at 350. It follows that Judge Gelfand could not properly modify the second arbitrator's award, and he correctly refrained from doing so. The order entered to No. 1734 August Term, 1977 and holding the Philadelphia Housing Authority in contempt is reversed. The order entered to No. 54 February Term, 1979 and dismissing Lucy Whitt's motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award entered on November 7, 1978 is affirmed. POPOVICH, J., concurs in the result.