Opinion ID: 386112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The agents' creation of exigent circumstances

Text: 10 In United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978), we approved the warrantless use of a controlled delivery procedure almost identical to that used here. Thus, the procedure is not per se objectionable. 2 11 Hackett contends, however, that the agents had several days' notice that Hackett would be picking up the crate at the airport and had probable cause to arrest him there, and that they also knew at least 20 to 30 minutes before his arrival that Hackett was in all probability destined for his residence. Thus, an in-house arrest was foreseeable, argues Hackett, and any exigency existing at that time was created by the agents' own failure to procure a warrant in advance, or at least to arrange for the procurement of a telephonic warrant. 12 In support of this argument, Hackett cites United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 34 (9th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064, 97 S.Ct. 792, 50 L.Ed.2d 781 (1977). 13 In Curran, officers received a reliable tip that a large quantity of marijuana was at a certain house and would be shipped out in small quantities. They staked out the house and stopped three cars that left, finding three kilograms of marijuana in one. Without a warrant, officers approached the house; when the door was opened, they smelled marijuana. They entered and discovered marijuana. 14 The Government's exigency theory was that the officers approached the house simply to ask questions (for which no warrant is required); when the door was opened and the officers simultaneously smelled the marijuana and revealed their presence, it became necessary to enter immediately to prevent destruction of evidence. 15 We found it clear, however, that the officers did not intend merely to ask questions but also to search for marijuana. 16 Knowing that marijuana was present and knowing that they would make their presence known to the occupants, the officers consciously established the condition which the government now points to as an exigent circumstance. If exigency arises because of unreasonable and deliberate delay by officers, it is not an exigent circumstance capable of dispensing with the requirement of a warrant. 17 498 F.2d at 34. 18 We went on, nonetheless, to justify the entire raid, including the approach to the door, on an exigency theory. There was every reason to believe that the marijuana was in the very process of being distributed. We held that even though it might have been possible to attempt to stop all cars leaving the house until a warrant to search the house was obtained, this would have been unreasonable and burdensome under the circumstances. Moreover, word of such a siege soon would have reached the house, and the evidence would then have been destroyed. Id. at 35. 19 In Calhoun, DEA agents and local police officers had been investigating for many months members of a suspected drug importation ring. When they learned that a major drug transaction had taken place, they obtained and executed a search warrant for Calhoun's apartment. A shoot-out ensued in which the ring leader was killed and Calhoun wounded. A large quantity of heroin was discovered. About an hour later, other officers went to Sheppard's apartment to arrest him without a warrant. Sheppard was gone but evidence incriminating him was found in his apartment. 542 F.2d at 1102. 20 The Government argued exigency to enter Sheppard's apartment, saying that Sheppard might have learned of the raid on Calhoun's apartment and attempted to flee. We held that though this was possible, nothing in the record indicates it was more likely here than in any other case where there are two or more suspects and all are not arrested at once. Id. And the ability of the officers to maintain surveillance while a warrant was sought suggests that exigent circumstances did not exist. Id. 21 Here, on the other hand, it was necessary to effect the arrest as quickly as possible in order to catch the suspects in the act of opening the false bottom thereby establishing their guilty knowledge of the drug compartment and its contents. Moreover, as the agents testified the situation of Hackett's house and garage on the heavily-wooded bayside bluff made it difficult if not impossible to surround and secure the residence, as we felt could have been done with Sheppard's apartment. This was demonstrated by the fact that Hackett and Turner did manage to elude the agents closing in on the garage. Turner made it all the way out onto the street, apparently having gone down a bluff trail to the bay and circling around. Thus, the exigency we doubted in Calhoun was clearly present here. 22 We also had great difficulty in Calhoun with the fact that an arrest warrant for Sheppard had not been sought when the agents obtained the search warrant for Calhoun's apartment even though Sheppard's arrest was then intended. 23 Finally, we note that the alleged exigency in this case was a foreseeable result of the search of Calhoun's apartment. Having decided not to seek additional warrants at the time they requested the warrant for Calhoun's apartment, they cannot rely on the foreseeable consequences of that decision as a justification for a warrantless entry of a residence in the nighttime to effect an arrest. 24 Id. at 1102-03. 25 The officers in Calhoun intended at the outset to arrest Sheppard at his residence. Here, the agents did not specifically intend either to arrest Hackett or to make an arrest at a residence. They were interested in arresting only whoever knew the cocaine was in the crate, i. e., whoever was present when the secret compartment was opened. Although the agents knew beforehand that Hackett would be picking up the crate, and that he was the owner of I.K.I., Inc., the addressee of the crate, Hackett may have been a mere dupe or mule for the true smugglers. And because the crate was addressed to I.K.I., Inc., and Hackett picked up the crate during business hours, it was natural to assume that Hackett would proceed to I.K.I., Inc. Agent Cox testified that it was not until after Hackett crossed the Golden Gate Bridge that he began to suspect Hackett was heading for his residence. From that point it took only 15 to 20 minutes to reach Hackett's residence; approximately 5 to 10 minutes later, the crate was opened. Thus, only 20 to 30 minutes elapsed between the agents' first suspicions that Hackett was going to his residence and the opening of the crate. 26 Hackett contends that this was long enough to procure a telephonic warrant. We disagree. Such a warrant cannot be procured merely by calling up a magistrate and asking for authorization. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2) requires the following procedures: 27 (B) Application. The person who is requesting the warrant shall prepare a document to be known as a duplicate original warrant and shall read such duplicate original warrant, verbatim, to the Federal magistrate. The Federal magistrate shall enter, verbatim, what is so read to such magistrate on a document to be known as the original warrant. The Federal magistrate may direct that the warrant be modified. 28 (C) Issuance. If the Federal magistrate is satisfied that the circumstances are such as to make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit and that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, the Federal magistrate shall order the issuance of a warrant by directing the person requesting the warrant to sign the Federal magistrate's name on the duplicate original warrant. The Federal magistrate shall immediately sign the original warrant and enter on the face of the original warrant the exact time when the warrant was ordered to be issued. The finding of probable cause for a warrant upon oral testimony may be based on the same kind of evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon affidavit. 29 Even assuming the agents could have patched through to a telephone line from their car radio and contacted a magistrate, we doubt that the procedures mandated by Rule 41 could have been complied with in 20 minutes from a moving car. Moreover, it would not be reasonable to require agents even to attempt to do so while in pursuit of a moving suspect upon mere suspicion that the suspect is headed for his residence. Not until Hackett actually arrived and unloaded the crate into his garage did it become clear an arrest would take place there. 30 Hackett counters that Rule 41 could have been satisfied by pre-arranging for the telephonic availability of a magistrate and preparing a duplicate original warrant with only a few blanks left to be filled in as the information became available. This of course would have had to be done before Hackett arrived at the airport to pick up the crate. At that point there was absolutely nothing to suggest that an arrest at Hackett's residence might take place. To require here the procedure Hackett argues for would be to require it in every case where the merest possibility exists that a suspect might eventually end up at his residence. We are unwilling to impose such an unreasonable burden on the police. 31 The agents here did not create the exigent circumstances by unreasonable and deliberate delay in seeking a warrant.