Opinion ID: 202549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Privacy Interest

Text: The privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is not a cramped or limited notion of personal privacy. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762-63, 109 S.Ct. 1468. Instead, Exemption 7(C) protects a broad notion of personal privacy, including an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Id. at 762, 109 S.Ct. 1468. This notion of privacy encompass[es] the individual's control of information concerning his or her person, and when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. Id. at 789, 764, 109 S.Ct. 1468 n. 16. The individual, and not the agency in possession of the records, controls the privacy interest. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763-65, 109 S.Ct. 1468; Sherman v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 244 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir.2001) (providing that the individual controls the privacy interest at stake in FOIA exemptions). Furthermore, where the provider of the information or records is a private individual, the privacy interest ... is at its apex. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468; Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004). In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court pointed to the provisions of the FOIA allowing the redaction of an individual's identifying information and the segregation of exempt portions of the record in concluding that the disclosure of records regarding private citizens, identifiable by name, is not what the framers of the FOIA had in mind. 8 489 U.S. at 765-66, 109 S.Ct. 1468. The central purpose of the FOIA is to reveal government action, not to expose the actions of private third parties and their participation in law enforcement to the public. See id. at 774, 109 S.Ct. 1468 ([T]he FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.). With this general understanding of the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C), we turn to the facts at hand. Carpenter brought this FOIA action to compel disclosure of information or records provided by or concerning Koresko in connection with the Government's investigation and prosecution of Carpenter's business activities. We agree with the district court that a person need not be the subject of the investigation to have a substantial privacy interest in maintaining the secrecy of his involvement with the investigation. See Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566; Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C.Cir.1990). Rather, precedents suggest that individuals maintain a privacy interest under the FOIA in their identity as government informants and in not being positively associated with a criminal matter. See, e.g., Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566; Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767. Although Koresko is not, strictly speaking, a government informant, his privacy interest is analogous to that of an informant. This Court has long protected the identities of witnesses and informants in law enforcement records. Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566 (stating that FBI agents, support personnel, confidential sources, and investigatory targets all have significant privacy interests in not having their names revealed); New England Apple Council v. Donovan, 725 F.2d 139, 142 (1st Cir.1984); see also Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 ([P]ersons involved in FBI investigations—even if they are not the subject of the investigation—`have a substantial interest in seeing that their participation remains secret.'). While Koresko's identity is known and Carpenter alleges that he assisted the Government in its prosecution, it is a further invasion of Koresko's protected privacy interest to positively identify him with a given criminal matter and reveal the records or information that he provided. See Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 ([E]xemption 7(C) takes particular note of the 'strong interest' of individuals, whether they be suspects, witnesses, or investigators, 'in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity.'). Koresko, as a private individual, maintains control over information concerning his person and his involvement with the criminal justice system, and he alone controls when, how, and to what extent [that] information will be revealed. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 764 n. 16, 109 S.Ct. 1468. 1 Carpenter, however, asserts that Koresko has waived any privacy interest via his alleged involvement in the Government's prosecution. Plaintiff bases this contention on a letter from a Congressman attached to Koresko's motion to quash a subpoena in an unrelated administrative proceeding. The letter stated: I understand that Mr. Koresko has been of assistance to your office, the Boston office of the DOL/EBSA and Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Pineault in the Boston office of the United States Attorney. 9 (Appellant App. 60.) This, at best, tenuous connection to the Carpenter investigation is insufficient to waive Koresko's privacy interest. 10 The assertion that Koresko's identity as an informant in the Carpenter investigation arguably can be determined from another source does not terminate his privacy interest. See L & C Marine Transp., Ltd. v. United States, 740 F.2d 919, 922 (11th Cir.1984). That information has been released to the public domain, especially where the release is limited, has little bearing on the privacy interest. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763-64, 109 S.Ct. 1468. Indeed, in modern society there is little information that has not been released to another. Id. at 763, 109 S.Ct. 1468. 2 Thus, an intention by Koresko to waive his privacy interest cannot be distilled from an affidavit of a Congressman attached to his motion to quash a subpoena in an unrelated case. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has found that FBI agents did not waive the protections provided by Exemption 7(C) by testifying at the FOIA requester's habeas proceeding. Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 247 (6th Cir.1994) (The fact that an agent decided or was required to testify or otherwise come forward in other settings does not give plaintiff a right under FOIA to documents....). Exemption 7(C) leaves the decision about whether and how to reveal personal information to the individual. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763, 109 S.Ct. 1468. Because there is a valid privacy interest, the requested documents will only be revealed where the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake. Favish, 541 U.S. at 172, 124 S.Ct. 1570.