Opinion ID: 2586091
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural due process concerns

Text: Having concluded that AS 47.30.915(7)(B) is constitutional if construed to require a level of incapacity so substantial that the respondent is not capable of surviving safely in freedom, [45] we now address Wetherhorn's procedural due process challenges to the petition for thirty-day commitment. Involuntary commitment implicates Alaska's constitutional guarantees of individual liberty [46] and privacy [47] and therefore entitles the respondent to due process protections. [48] But in this case, these procedural issues were not raised below and are therefore waived unless they constitute plain error. [49] We will find plain error when there is a high likelihood that injustice has resulted. [50] Alaska Statute 47.30.730(a)(6) requires a petition for involuntary commitment to list the prospective witnesses who will testify in support of commitment or involuntary treatment. The petition in this case did not list any witnesses. API concedes that the petition failed to satisfy the statutory requirements. Although Wetherhorn did not object to this error during the hearing, she now argues that the failure to list witnesses amounts to plain error. But it is unclear what prejudice resulted from the failure to list witnesses in this case. Here, the petition for thirty-day commitment was signed by two API physicians and the only witness testifying before the hearing was another API physician. As API puts it, [t]hat a psychiatrist from API would testify in support of a petition initiated by API could surprise no one. We therefore conclude that the failure to list witnesses in this case does not constitute plain error. Wetherhorn also claims that the requirements of AS 47.30.730(a)(7) were not fulfilled. Alaska Statute 47.30.730(a)(7) requires a petition for thirty-day commitment to list the facts and specific behavior that support the petition for involuntary commitment. The commitment petition in this case states: Manic state[,] homeless and no insight and non med compliant x 3 months. Wetherhorn argues both that this statement was inadequate to support the petition and that it constituted a due process violation because the sentence did not afford her meaningful notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond. Again, because Wetherhorn did not raise this objection below, we review her complaints under the plain error standard. In her challenge to the sufficiency of the language on the petition, Wetherhorn argues that the list of facts and specific behaviors on the petition must: (1) be sufficient, without supplementation, to entitle the petitioner to the granting of the petition as a matter of law, and (2) to at least summarize all of the evidence the state intends to put on in its case in chief. But Wetherhorn's proposed requirements go far beyond what Alaska statutes require. Alaska Statute 47.30.730(a)(7) merely requires that the petition allege facts and specific behavior supporting the conclusion that the respondent meets the standards for commitment and does not articulate the standard by which the sufficiency of the facts and behavior listed is to be judged. And because whether a person is actually committed depends on the hearing, not on the petition standing alone, [51] there is no reason to require that the petition summarize all the evidence or be sufficient in itself to entitle the petitioner to a grant of the petition as a matter of law. Wetherhorn's second argument is that the factual allegations listed on the petition were insufficient to afford notice as required by due process. As a general principle, due process requires that the notice of a hearing must be appropriate to the occasion and reasonably calculated to inform the person to whom it is directed of the nature of the proceedings. [52] Due process also requires that a respondent be notified in such a manner that respondent has a reasonable opportunity to prepare. [53] Here, the petition and notice of hearing were reasonably calculated to inform Wetherhorn of the nature and purpose of the commitment hearing. The petition listed the facts and specific behavior to be raised at the hearing: Wetherhorn's (1) current manic state; (2) state of homelessness; (3) lack of insight; and (4) failure to take her prescribed medication for the last three months. We conclude that no prejudice resulted because this information was sufficient to inform Wetherhorn of the purpose of the hearing, the statutory scheme and evidentiary standard to be applied, and the kind of facts to be adduced at the hearing. It was sufficiently detailed to allow her to prepare for the hearing.