Opinion ID: 1164389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the schneider parcel

Text: The Edwardses' claim sought damages not only for the injury caused to their parcel by the cutting, but also for injury caused to the Schneider parcel. Wrangell argues that because the Edwardses had no interest, or possession of, the trees on the Schneider side of the section line, the Edwardses could not bring an action for trespass since possession is the basis of such an action. The Edwardses contend that they received a valid assignment of the cause of action from the owners of the Schneider parcel. Mrs. Schneider testified that after the trees were cut, the Schneiders orally gave Mr. Edwards the rights to the trees. She also agreed that she intended to let Mr. Edwards have any rights that [she] might have with respect to damages to that property adjoining his. The oral assignment was later confirmed by a letter from the Schneiders stating we give you [Mr. Edwards] legal consent to take our portion [of the trees]. Thereafter, the owners of the Schneider parcel conveyed by quitclaim any interest of any kind which they may have in the damages which have been claimed in a Complaint filed by James H. Edwards and Maxine B. Edwards. It is settled that an assignment may be made of a cause or right of action for trespass on, or injury to, land. [17] Specifically, a cause of action for the unlawful cutting and removal of timber may be assigned. [18] Moreover, a claim for damages to real property may be assigned without assigning or transferring the title or possession of the property. [19] We see no reason to deviate from these rules. It has been stated that a cause of action can be assigned if it survives. [20] AS 09.55.570 provides in part: All causes of action by one person against another, whether arising on contract or otherwise, except those involving defamation of character, survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal representatives of the latter. Therefore, we hold that the cause of action for unlawful cutting of timber may be assigned even though the owners of the Schneider parcel did not transfer any interest or possession in the land to the Edwardses. The general rule regarding the creation of an assignment has been stated as follows: The creation and existence of an assignment is to be determined according to the intention of the parties, and that intention is a question of fact to be derived not only from the instruments executed by them, but from the surrounding circumstances as well. Rivan Die Mold Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 26 Ill. App.3d 637, 325 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ill. App. 1975). [21] Moreover, an assignment may be oral or written and no special form is necessary provided that the transfer is clearly intended as a present assignment of the interest held by assignor. Matter of Estate of Vaughn, 38 Or. App. 29, 588 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Or. App. 1979). [22] We believe that sufficient evidence was presented to create a jury question regarding the formation of an assignment. Mrs. Schneider's testimony regarding an oral assignment and the written documents submitted certainly indicate that there was a present intent to assign the cause of action. Thus, the trial court correctly denied Wrangell's motion for a directed verdict regarding the cause of action for injury to the Schneider parcel because it cannot be said that fair-minded jurors in the exercise of reasonable judgment could reach but one conclusion on the issue in controversy. Beaumaster v. Crandall, 576 P.2d 988, 994 (Alaska 1978).