Opinion ID: 1057886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Public Policy and Legislative Deference

Text: We have a long tradition of deference to the legislature concerning the adoption of any new theory of liability, especially when conflicting public policy issues abound. Bell v. Hudgins, 232 Va. 491, 495, 352 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1987). Our recognition of an existing common law tort is consistent with this tradition of deference. Indeed, in accordance with legislative authority, the Court is obligated to continue to enforce this tort as the law of the Commonwealth. The General Assembly expressly directed in Code § 1-200 that [t]he common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly. As explained in Part II.B., supra, the common law recognized an English writ providing a tort claim based on wrongful interference with the parent-child relationship prior to 1607. This claim has never been altered by the General Assembly and is repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of the Commonwealth only insofar as it, historically, was applied in such a manner that protected the interests of fathers over mothers and valued male children over female children. Given that this gender bias existed throughout 17th century common law, the proper remedy is not to overlook the writ but rather to recognize the claim in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the Commonwealth, providing equal rights to both genders and allowing the common law claim to continue in full force within [the Commonwealth], by operation of the plain language of Code § 1-200. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Mehra, 281 Va. 37, 44, 704 S.E.2d 577, 581 (2011) (concluding that [a]brogation of the common law ... occurs only when the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested, as there is a presumption that no change was intended, and explaining that [w]hen an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it abrogates the common[] law rule only to the extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule. (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The General Assembly possesses the authority to enact legislation addressing the appropriate avenues for civil recovery in cases of interference with parental rights and offering guidance to this Court. To date, it has declined to do so. The General Assembly's prerogative to legislate does not negate our own judicial mandate to provide redress for injuries to recognized common law rights that occur to residents of the Commonwealth. When such injuries occur, it is appropriate that we offer a means of redress, and doing so does not usurp legislative authority. We are not persuaded by the argument that we should interpret the General Assembly's statutory abolition of the cause of action for alienation of affection, found in Code § 8.01-220, as somehow precluding a recognition of a cause of action for tortious interference with parental rights. These are distinct causes of action with separate elements: Tortious interference with parental or custodial relationship intimates that the complaining parent has been deprived of his/her parental or custodial rights; in other words, but for the tortious interference, the complaining parent would be able to exercise some measure of control over his/ her child's care, rearing, safety, well-being, etc. By contrast, alienation of affections connotes only that the parent is not able to enjoy the company of his/her child; this cause of action does not suggest that the offending party has removed parental or custodial authority from the complaining parent. Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 761 n. 44. The Florida Supreme Court, citing Kessel with approval, likewise recognized the common law tort of tortious interference despite a prior statutory abolition of an action for alienation of affection. Stone, 734 So.2d at 1045. The Restatement (Second) of Torts also considers these causes of action to be two separate torts, and rejects alienation of affection claims while approving of the cause of action for tortious interference. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 699 (One who, without more, alienates from its parent the affections of a child, whether a minor or of full age, is not liable to the child's parent.). The added element of physical separation from the parent in tortious interference renders the torts distinct. In sum, it is clearly the case that this ancient writtoday labeled tortious interference with parental rightsdid exist in English common law in 1607, that it can be construed in a manner not repugnant to the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and that no affirmative steps have been taken by the legislature to renounce the tort. We therefore answer the first certified question of law in the affirmative.