Opinion ID: 795411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Program Is Constitutional

Text: 34 We address in turn each of plaintiffs' arguments as delineated in the introduction. 35 A. The special needs doctrine does not require that the subject of the search possess a diminished privacy interest 36 Plaintiffs first raise the purely legal contention that, as a threshold matter, the special needs doctrine applies only where the subject of the search possesses a reduced privacy interest. While it is true that in most special needs cases the relevant privacy interest is somewhat limited, see Earls, 536 U.S. at 832, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (considering the privacy interest of public schoolchildren), the Supreme Court never has implied—much less actually held—that a reduced privacy expectation is a sine qua non of special needs analysis. For example, in Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) the Court struck down a warrantless, suspicionless search regime in which a hospital subjected prenatal care patients to drug tests and then disclosed the test results to the police for law enforcement purposes. The Court expressly noted that the patients had a full privacy expectation in their medical test results but that the existence of such a privacy expectation was not critical[.] Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78, 121 S.Ct. 1281. Instead, the critical difference upon which the decision turned was that the policy failed to serve a special need divorced from the State's generalized interest in law enforcement. Id. at 79, 121 S.Ct. 1281. 37 That approach comports with our long-standing view that the nature of the relevant privacy interest must not be treated in isolation or accorded dispositive weight, but rather must be balanced against other fact-specific considerations. In United States v. Albarado, we dismissed the notion that a full expectation of privacy, by itself, rendered unconstitutional warrantless, suspicionless magnetometer searches: 38 It has been suggested that those who seek to travel on a common carrier have a lower expectation of privacy regarding their person and the bags they carry.... Such a suggestion has little analytical significance; if it were announced that all telephone lines would be tapped, it could be claimed that the public had no expectation of privacy on the telephone. What is clear is that the public does have the expectation, or at least under our Constitution has the right to expect, that no matter the threat, the search to counter it will be as limited as possible, consistent with meeting the threat. 39 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir.1974). 40 Neither United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir.2004), nor Nicholas, upon which plaintiffs rely, contradicts that principle. Although in those cases we noted that the nature of the privacy expectation is an important factor in the special needs analysis, we did not impose a threshold requirement that the relevant privacy interest be diminished. Indeed, since each of those cases concerned individuals with reduced privacy interests, we had no occasion to consider whether the special needs exception might sometimes apply even to those with a full expectation of privacy. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669 (prison inmates); Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 190 (probationer). 41 Further, in Nicholas we expressly rejected the contention that application of the special needs doctrine turns on the type of privacy interest at stake. 3 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 666 (The problem with this argument is that neither Ferguson nor Edmond rested upon plaintiffs' undiminished expectation of privacy.). Instead, we identified the existence of a special need and then treated the privacy interest as a factor to be weighed in the balance. Id. at 669; Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 189-93; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (noting that a student's limited privacy interest was a hefty weight on the side of the school's balance); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests....). 42 Accordingly, to the extent that the principle needs clarification, we expressly hold that the special needs doctrine does not require, as a threshold matter, that the subject of the search possess a reduced privacy interest. Instead, once the government establishes a special need, the nature of the privacy interest is a factor to be weighed in the balance. 43 B. The container inspection program serves a special need 44 Plaintiffs next maintain that the District Court erred in concluding that the Program serves the special need of preventing a terrorist attack on the subway. Plaintiffs contend that the Program's immediate objective is merely to gather evidence for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law. 45 As a factual matter, we agree with the District Court's conclusion that the Program aims to prevent a terrorist attack on the subway. Defendants implemented the Program in response to a string of bombings on commuter trains and subway systems abroad, which indicates that its purpose is to prevent similar occurrences in New York City. In its particulars, the Program seeks out explosives only: officers are trained to recognize different explosives, they search only those containers capable of carrying explosive devices, and they may not intentionally search for other contraband, read written or printed material, or request personal information. Additionally, the Program's voluntary nature illuminates its purpose: that an individual may refuse the search provided he leaves the subway establishes that the Program seeks to prevent a terrorist, laden with concealed explosives, from boarding a subway train in the first place. 46 As a legal matter, courts traditionally have considered special the government's need to prevent and discover . . . latent or hidden hazards, Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384, in order to ensure the safety of mass transportation mediums, such as trains, airplanes, and highways. See Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (highway sobriety checkpoint); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (drug testing of railroad employees); Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (airplane baggage search). We have no doubt that concealed explosives are a hidden hazard, that the Program's purpose is prophylactic, and that the nation's busiest subway system implicates the public's safety. Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from bombing the subways constitutes a special need that is distinct from ordinary post hoc criminal investigation. See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir.2006) (Alito, J.) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to airport checkpoints and recognizing the need to prevent[] terrorist attacks on airplanes); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that airport searches are conducted for the parallel purposes of prevent[ing] passengers from carrying weapons or explosives onto the aircraft and deter[ring] passengers from even attempting to do so); Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500-01; Albarado, 495 F.2d at 804 (One of the prime purposes of the search, moreover, is deterrence, the knowledge that such searches are conducted acting to deter potential hijackers from even attempting to bring weapons on a plane.); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) (noting the validity of ... searches at places like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute). Further, the fact that an officer incidentally may discover a different kind of contraband and arrest its possessor does not alter the Program's intended purpose. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500. 47 Relying on dicta in Edmond, in which the Supreme Court struck down a drug interdiction checkpoint, plaintiffs urge the extraordinarily broad legal principle that a terrorist checkpoint serves a special need only in the face of an imminent attack. The Edmond Court merely remarked that under such dire circumstances, [f]or example, a checkpoint regime would almost certainly be constitutional. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 121 S.Ct. 447. That passing observation is neither controversial nor constraining. Indeed, the Edmond Court pointed out that although it struck down the drug interdiction checkpoint for lack of a special need, its holding did nothing to alter the constitutional status of the sobriety and border checkpoints that we approved previously, and that the constitutionality of such checkpoint programs still depends on a balancing of the competing interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program. Id. at 47, 121 S.Ct. 447; Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (Yet we would not suppose that, if the validity of these searches be conceded, the Government would be precluded from conducting them absent a demonstration of danger as to any particular airport or airline.). Where, as here, a search program is designed and implemented to seek out concealed explosives in order to safeguard a means of mass transportation from terrorist attack, it serves a special need. 48 C. On balance, the Program is constitutional 49 Having concluded that the Program serves a special need, we next balance the factors set forth above to determine whether the search is reasonable and thus constitutional. 50 (i) The government interest is immediate and substantial 51 Given the enormous dangers to life and property from terrorists bombing the subway, we need not labor the point with respect to need.... United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir.1974). As they must, plaintiffs concede that the interest in preventing such an attack is paramount but contend that the lack of any specific threat to the subway system weakens that interest by depriving it of immediacy. Plaintiffs again overstate the relevance of a specific, extant threat. 52 The Supreme Court, citing Edwards as a leading case, noted that no express threat or special imminence is required before we may accord great weight to the government's interest in staving off considerable harm. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (noting that a demonstration of danger as to any particular airport or airline is not required since [i]t is sufficient that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading). All that is required is that the risk to public safety [be] substantial and real instead of merely symbolic. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997) ([W]here the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as `reasonable'—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official buildings.); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 835-36, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (noting that the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use provides the necessary immediacy and that the school district need not await a particularized or pervasive drug problem before . . . conduct[ing] suspicionless drug testing). 53 Pursuant to this standard, the threat in this case is sufficiently immediate. In light of the thwarted plots to bomb New York City's subway system, its continued desirability as a target, and the recent bombings of public transportation systems in Madrid, Moscow, and London, the risk to public safety is substantial and real. Cf. Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 179 ([T]here can be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on airplanes is of paramount importance.); Marquez, 410 F.3d at 618 (It is hard to overestimate the need to search air travelers for weapons and explosives before they are allowed to board the aircraft. As illustrated over the last three decades, the potential damage and destruction from air terrorism is horrifically enormous.). The District Court did not err in according this factor substantial weight in support of constitutionality. 54 (ii) A subway rider has a full expectation of privacy in his containers 55 Although not a dispositive, threshold consideration, the nature of the privacy interest compromised by the search remains an important balancing factor. Whether an expectation of privacy exists for Fourth Amendment purposes depends upon two questions. First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy . . . . Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000). Second, we inquire whether the individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 56 As to the first question, a person carrying items in a closed, opaque bag has manifested his subjective expectation of privacy by keeping his belongings from plain view and indicating that, for whatever reason, [he] prefer[s] to keep [them] close at hand. Id. Further, the Supreme Court has recognized as objectively reasonable a bus rider's expectation that his bag will not be felt in an exploratory manner from the outside, id. at 338-39, 120 S.Ct. 1462, let alone opened and its contents visually inspected or physically manipulated. See generally New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) ([T]he Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, a subway rider who keeps his bags on his person possesses an undiminished expectation of privacy therein. We therefore weigh this factor in favor of plaintiffs. 57 (iii) The search is minimally intrusive 58 Although a subway rider enjoys a full privacy expectation in the contents of his baggage, the kind of search at issue here minimally intrudes upon that interest. Several uncontested facts establish that the Program is narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose: (1) passengers receive notice of the searches and may decline to be searched so long as they leave the subway, see Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180-81; Marquez, 410 F.3d at 617-18; Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500; (2) police search only those containers capable of concealing explosives, inspect eligible containers only to determine whether they contain explosives, inspect the containers visually unless it is necessary to manipulate their contents, and do not read printed or written material or request personal information, see Marquez, 410 F.3d at 617; (3) a typical search lasts only for a matter of seconds, see Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004); (4) uniformed personnel conduct the searches out in the open, which reduces the fear and stigma that removal to a hidden area can cause, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180; and (5) police exercise no discretion in selecting whom to search, but rather employ a formula that ensures they do not arbitrarily exercise their authority, see Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667; 109 S.Ct. 1384; United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir.2002). Although defendants need not employ the least intrusive means, Earls, 536 U.S. at 837, 122 S.Ct. 2559, to serve the state interest, it appears they have approximated that model. Given the narrow tailoring that the Program achieves, this factor weighs strongly in favor of defendants, as the District Court properly concluded. 59 (iv) The Program is reasonably effective 60 In considering the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, we must remember not to wrest from politically accountable officials ... the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). That decision is best left to those with a unique understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. Id. 22 at 454, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Accordingly, we ought not conduct a searching examination of effectiveness. Id. at 454, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 179-80 n. 9 (recognizing the court's limited role in gauging efficacy). Instead, we need only determine whether the Program is a reasonably effective means of addressing the government interest in deterring and detecting a terrorist attack on the subway system. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837, 122 S.Ct. 2559; Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664, 667 (2d Cir.1996). 61 The District Court credited the expert testimony of Sheehan, Cohen, and Clarke concerning the Program's deterrent effect. Plaintiffs neither contest their expertise nor directly attack the substance of their testimony. Instead, plaintiffs claim that the Program can have no meaningful deterrent effect because the NYPD employs too few checkpoints. In support of that claim, plaintiffs rely upon various statistical manipulations of the sealed checkpoint data. 62 We will not peruse, parse, or extrapolate four months' worth of data in an attempt to divine how many checkpoints the City ought to deploy in the exercise of its day-to-day police power. Counter-terrorism experts and politically accountable officials have undertaken the delicate and esoteric task of deciding how best to marshal their available resources in light of the conditions prevailing on any given day. We will not—and may not —second-guess the minutiae of their considered decisions. 4 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453, 110 S.Ct. 2481. 63 Instead, we must consider the Program at the level of its design. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (While no procedure can identify all impaired employees ... the FRA regulations supply an effective means of deterring employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alcohol in the first place.); Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427, 124 S.Ct. 885; Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38, 122 S.Ct. 2559; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n. 3 & 676, 109 S.Ct. 1384. From that vantage, the expert testimony established that terrorists seek predictable and vulnerable targets, and the Program generates uncertainty that frustrates that goal, which, in turn, deters an attack. See Marquez, 410 F.3d at 617([T]he randomness [of the searches] arguably increases the deterrent effects of airport screening procedures . . . .); Green, 293 F.3d at 862 (noting deterrent effect of stopping every sixth car traveling near a military installation). 64 Plaintiffs next contend that because defendants' experts could not quantify the Program's deterrent effect, their testimony fails as a matter of law to establish efficacy. The concept of deterrence need not be reduced to a quotient before a court may recognize a search program as effective. 5 Indeed, expressing the phenomena in numeric terms often is impossible because deterrence by definition results in an absence of data. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (Nor would we think, in view of the obvious deterrent purpose of these searches, that the validity of the Government's airport screening program necessarily turns on whether significant numbers of putative air pirates are actually discovered by the searches conducted under the program.). For that same reason, the absence of a formal study of the Program's deterrent effect does not concern us. 65 Plaintiffs further claim that the Program is ineffective because police notify passengers of the searches, and passengers are free to walk away and attempt to reenter the subway at another point or time. Yet we always have viewed notice and the opportunity to decline as beneficial aspects of a suspicionless search regime because those features minimize intrusiveness. Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500 (upholding suspicionless airport searches as reasonable so long as ... the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air). Striking a search program as ineffective on account of its narrow tailoring would create a most perverse result: those programs more pervasive and more invasive of privacy more likely would satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676-77 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (internal quotation marks omitted). 66 Importantly, if a would-be bomber declines a search, he must leave the subway or be arrested—an outcome that, for the purpose of preventing subway bombings, we consider reasonably effective, especially since the record establishes that terrorists prize predictability. See id. at 676, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (noting that such avoidance techniques can be fraught with uncertainty because a random search program cannot be predicted and its machinations are not likely to be known or available). An unexpected change of plans might well stymie the attack, disrupt the synchronicity of multiple bombings, or at least reduce casualties by forcing the terrorist to detonate in a less populated location. 67 Finally, plaintiffs claim that since no other city yet has employed a similar search program, New York's must be ineffective. In the first place, plaintiffs' inference is flawed: other cities must design programs according to their own resources and needs, which, quite apart from the question of efficacy, may not warrant or make possible such an initiative. Further, the upshot of plaintiffs' argument—that a program must be duplicated before it may be constitutional—strikes us as unsustainable. All things considered, the District Court properly concluded that the Program is reasonably effective.