Opinion ID: 542853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: boundaries of due process

Text: 33 We now arrive at the crux of the matter: determining, consistent with the rigors of Rule 56 and the limiting principle of qualified immunity, whether defendants reasonably should have known that the processes afforded Amsden were constitutionally infirm. Appellant claims that the Fourteenth Amendment was abridged both procedurally and substantively, so we must explore two trails. But, because the geography of due process is hilly, and its taxonomy freighted with ambiguity, we first elucidate some differences which distinguish procedural due process from substantive due process. We then survey Amsden's claims. 34
35 The essentials of procedural due process comprise notice of the charges and a reasonable chance to meet them. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348, 96 S.Ct. 893, 909, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Collins, 894 F.2d at 480. The basic purport of the constitutional requirement is that, before a significant deprivation of liberty or property takes place at the state's hands, the affected individual must be forewarned and afforded an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). As the rubric itself implies, procedural due process is simply a guarantee of fair procedure. Zinermon v. Burch, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). 36 There is no mechanical formula by which the adequacy of state procedures can be determined. To the contrary, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Courts thus conduct their tamisage according to a sliding scale, balancing a number of factors, including the nature of the private and public interests involved; the risk of erroneous deprivation accruing under the procedures used by the state; and the probable benefit of demanding additional procedural safeguards. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. at 2600; see also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-18, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1564-1565, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). When a procedural due process claim is advanced, the proper focus must be on the manner in which the state has acted: how and when the alleged deprivation was effected. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2650, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979); see also Zinermon, 110 S.Ct. at 983. Whether the deprivation (e.g., license revocation) was itself erroneous is beside the procedural due process point. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). 37 In contrast, a substantive due process claim implicates the essence of state action rather than its modalities; such a claim rests not on perceived procedural deficiencies but on the idea that the government's conduct, regardless of procedural swaddling, was in itself impermissible. Stating the proposition does not cabin it very well. It has been said, for instance, that substantive due process protects individuals against state actions which are arbitrary and capricious, Newman, 884 F.2d at 25, 5 or those which run counter to the concept of ordered liberty, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), or those which, in context, appear shocking or violative of universal standards of decency, Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 95 (1st Cir.1979) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, 100 S.Ct. 710, 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980). See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (in substantive terms, Due Process Clause condemns conduct too close to the rack and the screw); cf. Tenoco Oil Co. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1020-24 (1st Cir.1989) (discussing disfavored status of substantive due process claims). 38 We decline the invitation to sort out so wide a variety of labels. Wordplay aside, we agree with Judge Friendly that, in the circumscribed precincts patrolled by substantive due process, it is only when some basic and fundamental principle has been transgressed that the constitutional line has been crossed. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). As distinguished from its procedural cousin, then, a substantive due process inquiry focuses on what the government has done, as opposed to how and when the government did it. And although the yardstick against which substantive due process violations are measured has been characterized in various ways, we are satisfied that, before a constitutional infringement occurs, state action must in and of itself be egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking. 39
40 With this brief prelude, we turn to appellant's procedural due process claim. The interests involved are not much in doubt. Plaintiff's licensure directly affects his ability to earn a livelihood and is therefore a matter of considerable concern. By the same token, the public interest in ensuring standards, accountability, and professional competence cannot seriously be questioned. Given the balance of interests, our inquiry perforce centers around the fairness of the protocol which was employed and the risks of a lasting (erroneous) deprivation. 41 Appellant devotes the bulk of his argument to an unremitting attack on the procedural obstacles which the BLS supposedly placed in his path, contending that these obstacles reduced the hearings to a meaningless formality. He complains, for example, that the BLS prevented him from mounting a defense by not telling him that his relationship with Hunter was the focal point of the BLS's concern. He takes similar umbrage at the findings of fraud and inadequate supervision, asserting that, because of their tenuous bearing on the accusations contained in the notification letter, he had no fair chance to address the issues. He likewise complains that the BLS, after disclaiming jurisdiction over the reasonableness of fees, sandbagged him by considering the subject. Last but not least, he rails mightily against the glimpse of the Whipple property which was taken in his absence. 42 We must start somewhere in our effort to leaf through this gallimaufry of charges. The gravamen of plaintiff's argument appears to hinge upon whether he was deprived of proper notice. In plaintiff's view, the BLS revoked his license not to sanction his misconduct but to force him to jettison Hunter, thereby putting the latter out of the surveying business. Because the BLS acted surreptitiously, masking its true concern, plaintiff argues that he could not effectively defend himself. 43 We believe that Amsden relies on too isthmian an idea of how procedural due process regimens are to be evaluated. When a complainant alleges violations of procedural due process and asserts that those violations are cognizable under section 1983, the existence of state remedies becomes highly relevant. Zinermon, 110 S.Ct. at 983. A reviewing court must therefore examine the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure ... effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law. Id. The availability of judicial review is an especially salient consideration in situations where permits and licenses have been denied or revoked by state or local authorities in alleged derogation of procedural due process. See, e.g., Cloutier, 714 F.2d at 1192; Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1523 (1st Cir.1983). 44 We briefly describe the available process. New Hampshire afforded direct judicial review of the BLS's determination. See N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 310-A:71 (1984); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 541:6 (1974). For his part, however, Amsden found it unnecessary even to enter upon, let alone travel the entire length of, that road. Through his attorney, Amsden was given timely access to the BLS for the avowed purpose of administrative reconsideration. Although the negotiations which followed the rehearing request appear to have been undertaken informally, they were unquestionably part of the process afforded. See Chongris, 811 F.2d at 40-41. Moreover, the proof of the pudding is in the tasting: the process proved effective. The BLS utilized its reconsideration procedure, promptly granted rehearing, withdrew the license revocation, and restored Amsden's license unconditionally. This outcome, unadorned, strongly indicates that the available review mechanisms were constitutionally adequate. See Chongris, 811 F.2d at 43. More importantly, perhaps, the outcome belies any claim that defendants should have known their actions violated Amsden's procedural rights under the Constitution. 45 Neither the post-deprivation timing of the negotiations and rehearing nor the informality of the process is of such controlling concern that defendants should have known their actions might fall outside the realm of the Constitution. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 192-93, 104 S.Ct. at 3018-19; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. at 909; Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 43-44 (1st Cir.1988). Where the integrity of state-licensed professions is concerned, suspensions are permissible without extensive pre-termination process, provided that prompt review is available to resolve contested issues. See Barry, 443 U.S. at 64, 99 S.Ct. at 2649. Similarly, we have earlier upheld the sufficiency of post-deprivation notice and hearings concerning a developer's sewer-connection permit (without which the developer's plans were worthless), ruling that prompt, informal proceedings ... coupled with the judicial review provided by the state courts satisfied the requirements of the due process clause. Cloutier, 714 F.2d at 1192. So here: we see nothing in the procedural framework deployed by the BLS that would have indicated to a reasonable official in defendants' position that Amsden was being denied procedural due process. 46 As a matter of notice or opportunity to defend, then, it is irrelevant to the procedural due process point whether termination of the Amsden-Hunter relationship was demanded by the BLS or offered by Amsden. The material fact is that Amsden was apprised of the BLS's concerns in time to consider his options under the available review procedures and to act effectively thereon. Having properly pursued the route to redress which [the state] provided ... and having through that avenue secured the restoration of the very property of which [he] had been erroneously deprived, [plaintiff] cannot plausibly claim that [he was] denied the process which was due [him] under the Constitution. Chongris, 811 F.2d at 43. 6 47 Defendants' claim to qualified immunity would not be in jeopardy even if we believed that the additional complaints against Hunter were not properly before the BLS, or that, while acting in respect to plaintiff's license, the BLS took into consideration information dehors the record. In arguing to the contrary, appellant seemingly confuses garden variety error with constitutional breach. Cf., e.g., Newman, 884 F.2d at 26 (Even if it ultimately can be shown that the decision ... was arbitrary ... defendants are entitled to immunity from damages so long as they had no reason to know that the evidence on which they relied was faulty.); Brennan, 888 F.2d at 192 (similar). Chongris illustrates the point. There, board members had considered and relied on the views of an association which under state law lacked standing to participate in the dispute. 811 F.2d at 42. Although the board was wrong as a matter of state law to consider that evidence, we were nevertheless unable to ascribe any constitutional deprivation to the Board's decision. Id. 48 The BLS's unilateral visit to the Whipple property requires no different result. Whether or not good practice, we do not think that this excursion can be said to sink to the level of a constitutional abridgement. In Chongris, for example, we found no due process violation where a zoning board viewed premises out of the permit-seeker's presence. Id. at 38, 42. Given this circuit precedent, it would be surpassingly difficult to opine that defendants' visit to the Whipple property, without some associated showing (say, that evidence was amassed there which plaintiff was afforded no chance to meet), violated plaintiff's rights. Moreover, it is self-evident from the foregoing that, in our judgment, no reasonable board member would have thought taking a view in appellant's absence transgressed clearly established constitutional principles. Cf., e.g., Cloutier, 714 F.2d at 1191 (Full judicial-type hearings are not required when local boards engage in ... granting or revoking ... permits.); Sullivan v. Carignan, 733 F.2d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir.1984) (per curiam) (similar; state board of accountancy). 49 At the expense of carting coals to Newcastle, we mention for the sake of completeness that Amsden took yet a further route to redress, hawking his grievances to the BOC. That tribunal heard his diatribe against the procedural deficiencies which he thought infected the BLS hearings. The BOC addressed those issues. To be sure, damages were denied. But, the mere fact that Amsden did not garner an award does not improve his stance before us. To be constitutionally sufficient, state remedies need neither be coterminous with potential federal remedies nor prove successful in the end. As the Court has instructed: Although the state remedies may not provide ... all the relief which may have been available ... under Sec. 1983, that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1917, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (federal-state remedial comparison is not determinative of the [constitutional] adequacy of the state remedies); Chongris, 811 F.2d at 44-45. What counts is that New Hampshire held out to Amsden, in addition to the BLS's internalized reconsideration mechanism and the availability of direct judicial review, a collateral review process reasonably calculated to address and assuage his grievances. 50 To sum up, the risk of any lasting erroneous deprivation was miniscule. The panoply of state remedies available to Amsden--and utilized by him--guaranteed the fairness of the state's procedures to a point well above the constitutional minimum. In our view, those procedures were both reasonably effective and reasonably consistent with the imperatives of plaintiff's clearly established constitutional right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. No more was constitutionally exigible. See Zinermon, 110 S.Ct. at 983 (a procedural due process violation actionable under Sec. 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process). It is, therefore, frosting on the cake that, objectively speaking, the defendants were also entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claims. 51
52 Plaintiff attempts to paint the landscape a shade darker by coloring essentially the same factual predicate with the hues of substantive due process. He asserts that reinstatement of his license was contingent on abandoning Hunter, a quid pro quo beyond the reach of the BLS's authority. As such, Amsden urges us to find that the defendants' conduct amounted to such a misuse of administrative process that they should have realized Amsden's right to be free from arbitrary government action was imperilled. We are unconvinced. 53 There is nothing in this record which indicates to us--or which would have indicated to an objectively reasonable official--that defendants' performance crossed the constitutional threshold. Our cases make clear that a regulatory board does not transgress constitutional due process requirements merely by making decisions for erroneous reasons or by making demands which arguably exceed its authority under the relevant state statutes. Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 n. 9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989, 103 S.Ct. 345, 74 L.Ed.2d 385 (1982); accord Chongris, 811 F.2d at 42; Sucesion Suarez v. Gelabert, 701 F.2d 231, 233 (1st Cir.1983). Even bad-faith violations of state law are not necessarily tantamount to unconstitutional deprivations of due process. See Chongris, 811 F.2d at 43; Chiplin Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524, 1528 (1st Cir.1983); Roy, 712 F.2d at 1523; cf. Collins, 894 F.2d at 478 n. 6 (on qualified immunity inquiry, consideration of a government actor's subjective state of mind irrelevant); Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1036 (2d Cir.1989) (similar). By the same token, [o]fficials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision. Davis, 468 U.S. at 194, 104 S.Ct. at 3019; accord Goyco de Maldonado v. Rivera, 849 F.2d 683, 687-88 (1st Cir.1988). 54 To be blunt, we see no point in rehashing plaintiff's animadversions. Charges that substantive due process was denied cannot rest on conclusory allegations or rhetoric alone (even impassioned rhetoric). Were defendants' conduct presented as a matter to be decided on the merits, plaintiff's burden would be to show a due process deprivation of constitutional dimension. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 194, 104 S.Ct. at 3019. We feel confident that the BLS's treatment of Amsden, as factually described, was not so shocking or violative of universal standards of decency, Furtado, 604 F.2d at 95, as to transgress Amsden's federal constitutional rights. Of course, we need not go that far; defendants may ensure safe passage on this appeal merely by showing that, given the state of the law in 1983, reasonable officials would not have known that the actions in question amounted to a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. On this record, our precedents indisputably support the grant of qualified immunity. 55 Creative Environments, 680 F.2d 822, is precise enough. In that case, the complaint was cast in terms of substantive due process. Plaintiff, a developer, alleged that its proposal had been improperly rejected by the local planning board through an arbitrary misapplication of state law. Id. at 831. Nonetheless, we held that the complaint did not allege a constitutional deprivation even if the defendants had in fact misapplied state law. Id. at 831-33. In Chiplin, we likewise rejected substantive due process claims premised on arbitrary and malicious official action. 712 F.2d at 1528 n. 6. There, plaintiff alleged it had met all legal requirements for a building permit but that the town maliciously den[ied] it a building permit for invalid and illegal reasons and in bad faith. Id. at 1526. We affirmed a summary disposition, ruling that a mere bad faith refusal to follow state law in such local administrative matters simply does not amount to a deprivation of due process where the state courts are available to correct the error. Id. at 1528. See also Cloutier, 714 F.2d at 1189, 1191 n. 5; Roy, 712 F.2d at 1523. 56 Whether the revocation of Amsden's land surveying license was improperly motivated or insufficiently grounded as a matter of the BLS's jurisdiction is strictly a matter of New Hampshire law. The other issues raised by Amsden anent the BLS's findings, to the extent cognizable at all, are similarly resolvable in state-law terms. We have already limned the state's array of available avenues for review. Given this mise-en-scene, defendants' conduct simply did not possess the depth of imbrutage which might have led responsible public officials to believe their actions crossed the constitutional line. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.