Opinion ID: 2336502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grandfathered Use

Text: [¶ 18] The court concluded that Seymour violated three provisions of the Town of Levant Land Use Ordinance: section 1220(C), (D)(6) and (D)(10). Specifically, it found that during 2002, Seymour excavated earthen materials from the land north of the Tay Road (1) of over 1000 cubic yards without prior approval of the Planning Board; (2) within 150 feet of the property lines of two of her neighbors; and (3) below the level of the Tay Road and within 150 feet of its right of way. Seymour does not dispute these findings. [¶ 19] Seymour's principal defense was that excavation of gravel and loam from her land north of the Tay Road is an existing nonconforming grandfathered use, and for this reason, Planning Board approval was not required. It was Seymour's burden to prove the status of the new gravel pit as an existing nonconforming use. [4] Town of Orono v. LaPointe, 1997 ME 185, ¶ 13, 698 A.2d 1059, 1062. [¶ 20] The Levant ordinance has several provisions relevant to Seymour's defense. It defines a legally existing (grandfathered) non-conforming lot, structure, sign, or use as one that lawfully existed immediately prior to the enactment of this Ordinance... and which, as a result of the enactment[,] ... fails to comply with any of the requirements of this Ordinance. Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 910 (June 26, 2000). With respect to gravel pits in particular, it states: All existing gravel pits at the time of the adoption of the ordinance do not need Planning Board [a]pproval to continue operation. Levant, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 1220(A) (June 22, 1996). Section 1220(A) also states: Existing gravel pits may continue to operate as long as the extraction does not make the pit more non conforming. [¶ 21] The court concluded that Seymour had two gravel pits, one south of the Tay Road and one on the north side, and the gravel pit on the north side did not exist at the time of enactment of the land use ordinance. The court also found that there was a clear delineation between the two gravel pits and that the one on the north was not part of the one on the south nor was the north gravel pit an enlargement of the south pit. Therefore, the gravel pit north of the Tay Road was not an existing grandfathered nonconforming use. We review a trial court's factual findings for clear error, but we review its interpretation of the ordinance de novo. [¶ 22] We have said that a use is not grandfathered unless the owner or user demonstrates that the use existed prior to the enactment of the ordinance that restricts or prohibits the use and that the use was actual and substantial. Seven Islands Land Co. v. Me. Land Use Reg. Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475, 481 (Me.1982) (holding that preparation for a nonconforming use is not actual and substantial use). The uncontroverted evidence here was that the historic use of the land north of the Tay Road was corn cultivation and that no gravel pit existed on the north side prior to 1996 when the ordinance was enacted. [¶ 23] However, Seymour contends that she has only one gravel pit, which is located on both sides of the Tay Road. In other words, according to Seymour, the pit on the north side is merely an extension or enlargement of the gravel pit on the south. She argues that this position is supported by the doctrine of diminishing assets. She urges that we recognize the doctrine and apply it to her situation. [¶ 24] The doctrine of diminishing assets is based on the acknowledgment that gravel mining uses the land as a diminishing asset. Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278, 434 N.Y.S.2d 150, 414 N.E.2d 651, 654-55 (1980). It is because of the unique realities of gravel mining that ... courts have been nearly unanimous in holding that quarrying, as a nonconforming use, cannot be limited to the land actually excavated at the time of enactment of the restrictive ordinance because to do so would, in effect, deprive the landowner of his use of the property as a quarry. Id. at 655. The Washington Supreme Court has described the doctrine as extending the boundaries of the nonconforming mining use to the entire parcel intended to be mined at the time the zoning ordinance was promulgated. City of Univ. Place v. McGuire, 144 Wash.2d 640, 30 P.3d 453, 455 (2001). [¶ 25] The doctrine of diminishing assets is usually limited to the boundaries of the land where the use was initiated before the enactment of the land use ordinance. See Stephan & Sons v. Municipality of Anchorage Zoning Bd. of Exam'rs & Appeals, 685 P.2d 98, 102 (Alaska 1984). The excavator must show by objective evidence that the land where the excavator wants to extend excavation was clearly intended to be excavated before the ordinance became effective. See Town of Wolfeboro v. Smith, 131 N.H. 449, 556 A.2d 755, 759 (1989). Further, where more than one lot is owned by the excavator prior to the ordinance, expansion is not allowed to a lot that had not previously been a part of the excavation operation. Hansen Bros. Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Nev. County, 12 Cal.4th 533, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324, 1340 (1996). [¶ 26] Even if we were to adopt the doctrine of diminishing assets, it would not benefit Seymour. Pursuant to that doctrine she would have had to prove, by objective evidence, that before the ordinance became effective, the land north of the Tay Road was intended to be excavated and had previously been a part of the excavation operation. The evidence was that Seymour became the owner of the land on both sides of the Tay Road in 2000 and in that same year she received permission from the Planning Board to subdivide the north side into five house lots and one reserved portion. The portion of the north side that she began excavating in 2001 had been a cornfield since before Seymour's father died in 1994. Seymour testified that her father had always intended to dig gravel north of the Tay Road and that in the 1980s he had an excavator make test borings on the north and south sides to determine where the gravel was. Seymour's statement that her father always intended to dig gravel on the north side is not objective evidence. Evidence of test borings done in the 1980s is not a sufficient indication that the north side was part of the excavation operation in light of the fact that no excavation activity took place there until 2001. Therefore, we need not decide whether to adopt the doctrine of diminishing assets because Seymour has not shown that the doctrine is applicable to her situation. [¶ 27] Because Seymour's gravel pit north of the Tay Road was not an existing nonconforming use in 1996, she was required to seek Planning Board approval for her gravel pit, which she did not do. Therefore, the court did not err in finding that she violated section 1220(C) of the land use ordinance. [¶ 28] The court further concluded that even if the new gravel pit on the north side was an existing gravel pit, Seymour's excavation activities within 150 feet of the neighbors' property lines, as well as the excavation within 150 feet of the Tay Road and below its level, were all extractions that rendered the pit more nonconforming and, therefore, in violation of section 1220(D)(6) and (D)(10) of the ordinance. The evidence was sufficient for this finding.