Opinion ID: 835779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress Statements to Police Following Arrest

Text: Before the start of his penalty trial, defendant moved to suppress inculpatory statements that he had made in response to police questioning on the day of his arrest. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and defendant assigns error to that ruling. The following undisputed facts relating to defendant's assignment of error are taken from the trial court's findings of fact and from the record. See State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 135, 806 P.2d 92 (1991) (this court is bound by trial court's findings of historical fact if constitutionally sufficient evidence in record supports them). As noted previously, 338 Or. at 308, 108 P.3d at 1143, defendant was arrested in Stockton, California, at approximately 4:15 a.m. on December 13, 1995. After his arrest, defendant was transported to a station house of the Stockton Police Department, where he was placed alone in an interview room and was fed breakfast. At approximately 7:30 a.m. that same morning, Medford Police Detectives Newell and Skinner met with defendant. Defendant was not handcuffed. At the outset of the interview, the detectives identified themselves and informed defendant that their interview with him was being recorded. The detectives also read defendant standard Miranda warnings [13] and confirmed that defendant understood the rights that those warnings described. After initially speaking with the detectives for a short time, defendant stated, I think that I do need a lawyer. I do. The detectives responded to that statement by informing defendant that the interview would end if defendant wished to see a lawyer. The detectives then continued to speak with defendant for approximately 13 more minutes. During that time, the detectives stated that they were disappointed that defendant had elected to terminate the interview, that they were interested in hearing defendant's side of the story, and that they were curious about defendant's motive for the murders. They also discussed the extradition process with defendant and informed him that he would have the opportunity to see a judge that same day. In response to those statements, defendant asked the detectives about their theory of the motive for the crimes, as well as asked whether any arrest warrants had issued for him in California. Finally, before leaving the interview room, Newell stated: We're going to be here a few days. Uhm, we're doing search warrants and we're conducting interviews so, and I'm telling you this just for information. Uhm, if you change your mind and would like to talk to us, you can do so. All you need to do is contact the jail staff and say get a hold of Stockton detectives immediately. I want to talk to Medford detectives and these guys here will know how to get in touch with us. We spent last night in Visalia. Uhm, we will probably spend the night here I'm guessing.      Yeah, we're out of here. Wish you luck, bud. I think we'll be seeing you again, all right. Shortly after the detectives exited the interview room, another police officer entered the room, handcuffed defendant, and then left him alone again. Approximately one hour later, defendant knocked on the door to the interview room and requested to speak with the Medford detectives. In response to defendant's request, two different detectives, Medford Police Detectives George and Doney, met with defendant. At the outset of that interview, those detectives identified themselves and removed defendant's handcuffs. Those detectives also reminded defendant that the interview with him was being recorded and again read him standard Miranda warnings. Defendant subsequently made inculpatory statements relating to both the Ellis and Abdill murders and to the George murder. As noted above, before the start of the penalty trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements that he had made during the interview with George and Doney on the day of his arrest, as well as any evidence that had derived from those statements. He argued that suppression was required under both the state and federal constitutions because the police had failed to cease all questioning after he requested a lawyer and because his statements to George and Doney had been involuntary. Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion, stating: I am of the view that [defendant] did invoke his right to counsel. The law directs when that is done that all questioning cease. That did not occur precisely in this case. There was some conversation that took place after that[,] that is an irregularity. They could have done more as far as affording him an opportunity to contact an attorney. That also is an irregularity. I further find that [defendant] did on his own, quite apart from any law enforcement officers, reinitiate contact and ask to talk with the police officers. There [were] two different officers that [ sic ] than the two that he originally talked with. The two original ones were Newell and Skinner, and the other two were Officer Doney and Officer Tim George. The question posed to the Court, as I see it, is whether or not the irregularities enumerated were so egregious that the law should not recognize [defendant's] reinitiation of contact, and I am going to find that there were irregularities, but they were not so egregious that the law should not allow recontact, so the recontact was appropriate and was done voluntarily on the part of [defendant], and there were two other considerations. I did closely scrutinize what was said, and what [defendant] said to the police officers during the time after he asked for a lawyer was not any incriminating statement. In other words, he didn't let any cat out of the bag. He was not psychologically overcome. I don't think that he was in a position where he could as a reasonable person say `Well, I've already told them[,] so what's the use of not talking?' So there was no psychological overburden, and he didn't make any disclosures that were so serious that he felt he had already told them what they wanted to know. That is a pivotal consideration, in the Court's view, and it is for those reasons that I'll deny the Motion to Suppress in its entirety. Before this court, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements. Defendant contends that the admission of those statements during his penalty trial was contrary to ORS 163.150(1)(a) [14] and violated his right against compelled self-incrimination and the derivative right to counsel under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, [15] and his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. [16] For the reasons explained below, we reject defendant's arguments. [17]
We first consider whether defendant made a valid waiver of his right to counsel under Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment at the time when he made the challenged statements to George and Doney. To be valid under both the state and federal constitutions, a waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Joslin, 332 Or. 373, 386, 29 P.3d 1112 (2001) (Article I, section 12); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (Fifth Amendment). Although we are bound by its findings of historical fact, we review a trial court's conclusions regarding a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel for legal error. State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 571-73, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990). Consistently with our usual practice, we begin by considering defendant's arguments under the Oregon Constitution. See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983) (court considers all questions of state law before reaching federal constitutional claims). This court previously has held that, when a suspect in custody unequivocally asserts his or her right to counsel, then the police must cease further questioning and grant the suspect's request for a lawyer. State v. Kell, 303 Or. 89, 95-100, 734 P.2d 334 (1987). As explained in Montez, this court adopted that rule to protect a suspect in custody from being `badgered' by the police. 309 Or. at 572, 789 P.2d 1352 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983)). After a suspect in custody asserts the right to counsel, however, the suspect remains free to waive that right by initiating further contact with the police. Kell, 303 Or. at 95-100, 734 P.2d 334. The trial court in this case concluded that defendant made an unequivocal request for counsel when he told Newell and Skinner, I think that I do need a lawyer. I do. The trial court also concluded that, despite defendant's unequivocal request, those detectives failed to cease the interrogation. We agree with both of those legal conclusions. See State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38, 55, 913 P.2d 308 (1996) (court examines whether defendant's request for lawyer unequivocal as matter of law); Montez, 309 Or. at 572-73, 789 P.2d 1352 (examining whether officer's questions constituted continued interrogation as matter of law). Defendant's statement, when viewed in its entirety, expressed unambiguously that he wished to speak with a lawyer before talking to the detectives. Although Newell and Skinner appeared to recognize defendant's intent in making that statement, they nevertheless continued to probe defendant by repeatedly expressing curiosity about his motive for the crimes and by informing defendant that they were interested in hearing defendant's side of the story. As the trial court observed, defendant did not respond to that probing by making any further inculpatory statements to Newell and Skinner. Defendant nevertheless argues, however, that the failure of Newell and Skinner to cease the interrogation and provide him with a lawyer rendered his subsequent statements to George and Doney inadmissible. Although he acknowledges that he initiated that subsequent police contact, defendant contends that he did so only because Newell and Skinner's failure to provide him with a lawyer had caused him to think that his attempt to gain counsel was futile, and that he might as well talk to the police. We are unpersuaded by defendant's argument. Although Newell and Skinner unlawfully continued the first interview after defendant had invoked his right to counsel, that unlawful conduct did not induce defendant's subsequent statements to George and Doney. Instead, the police left defendant alone after terminating that first interview, and defendant himself reinitiated contact with the Medford detectives after having no further police contact for the period of one hour. When George and Doney responded to defendant's request to speak with the detectives, they again ensured that defendant understood that he had the right to remain silent and to have counsel present for any police interrogation. Defendant confirmed that he understood those rights and then asked the detectives what they wished to know about the crimes. Although it is true that George and Doney met with defendant before any effort had been made to secure a lawyer for him, nothing in the record suggests that defendant reinitiated contact with the police because he believed that the police would not fulfill that request. Indeed, as noted above, George and Doney began the interview by confirming that defendant understood that he had the right to counsel, and Newell and Skinner also had informed defendant that he would have a hearing before a judge that same day. We further reject defendant's suggestion that the passage of an hour's time gave rise to a reasonable inference that the police had planned to deny defendant's request for counsel. In view of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel under Article I, section 12, before making the challenged statements to George and Doney. We reach that same conclusion when we consider defendant's arguments under the Fifth Amendment. Similarly to this court, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment requires the police to cease all questioning after a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel, unless the suspect initiates further contact on his or her own. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. As described above, defendant here initiated the interview with George and Doney without any police prompting. In addition, as the trial court stressed, defendant did not make any inculpatory statements in response to Newell and Skinner's probing after he had invoked his right to counsel. Cf. Missouri v. Seibert, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (recitation of Miranda warnings insufficient to render confession admissible under Fifth Amendment when warnings came during same interrogation in which defendant already had made essentially same confession before receiving any warnings). In sum, the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's argument that his statements were inadmissible because they had been obtained in violation of his right to counsel under Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment.
We next consider whether defendant's statements to George and Doney were voluntary for purposes of Article I, section 12, the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The test for voluntariness under both the state and federal constitutions is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, it is apparent that the defendant's will was not overborne and his capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired. State v. Vu, 307 Or. 419, 425, 770 P.2d 577 (1989); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (applying same test for purposes of Fifth Amendment and Due Process Clause). In reviewing the voluntariness of a defendant's statements, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact, but must assess independently the ultimate legal determination of voluntariness. Stevens, 311 Or. at 135, 806 P.2d 92. In this case, defendant contends that his statements during his interview with George and Doney were involuntary because he had been held isolated and sometimes handcuffed in an interrogation room for several hours before making those statements. As further support for his argument, he points out again that Newell and Skinner failed to terminate the first interview immediately after his request for a lawyer and then failed to take any steps to obtain a lawyer for him. We agree with the trial court that those facts are insufficient to provide the basis for the conclusion that defendant's statements were involuntary. As discussed above, defendant made no additional inculpatory statements to Newell and Skinner after his request for counsel during the first interview. The conditions of defendant's custody also certainly were not so oppressive as to undermine defendant's ability to exercise his free will. Finally, none of the detectives made any promise of leniency or otherwise employed subterfuge to obtain defendant's statements. The trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress those statements.