Opinion ID: 2123921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: common law water rights

Text: Appellees AMAX and B & LS successfully argued to the trial court that I-SMCRA expressly preserves the common law water rights system that existed when I-SMCRA became effective. That right is stated in Wiggins v. Brazil Coal and Clay Corp. (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 958. In Wiggins, a surface coal mining company was pumping water out of its mining pits. This draining of the mining pits caused a lowering of the water level of a lake located over several adjacent properties. The lake was formed when percolating ground water and surface waters filled an abandoned strip pit. The adjacent landowners sued the strip mining company for damages and injunctive relief for causing the loss of water from their lake. In affirming the coal company's right to pump water from its strip mining pit, this Court held: Water which percolates away underground through porous earth from beneath one lot to surrounding lands, no longer belongs to the owner of the lot. Such water is regarded as lost water and is considered at any given time to be part of the land with which it mingles... . Ground water is part of the land in which it is present and belongs to the owner of that land. It may be put to use to the fullest extent to further enjoyment of the land, however this right does not extend to causing injury gratuitously or maliciously to nearby lands and their owners. Id. at 963-64. Appellees contend that Wiggins is the applicable law to be followed in the resolution of the present petition to transfer. Appellees cite to a provision in I-SMCRA that appellees believe expressly preserves the Wiggins common law water rights system. The I-SMCRA provision that appellees cite reads: Nothing in this article shall be construed as affecting in any way the right of any person to enforce or protect under applicable law the person's interest in water resources affected by a surface coal mining operation. I.C. § 13-4.1-8-1(25) (West supp. 1993). As previously noted, the Indiana legislature added this I-SMCRA language in 1986. The corresponding F-SMCRA provision, § 717(a), is virtually identical to the I-SMCRA provision, and is located at 30 U.S.C.A. § 1307(a). The trial court interpreted this I-SMCRA provision as absolutely prohibiting the DNR from setting forth any regulation of ground water use that contradicts state common law rights. This SMCRA section has previously been the source of much litigation. The AMAX trial court cites two federal cases that the trial court believes to preserve the status quo of common law water rights. In those cases, the federal courts interpret 30 U.S.C.A. § 1307(a), the F-SMCRA provision that I.C. § 13-4.1-8-1(25) is based upon. In Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation II, Round III, 620 F. Supp. 1519 (D.D.C. 1985), certain coal companies argued that they possessed protected water rights under state law that would not require them to replace all water sources under 30 U.S.C. § 1307(b). During this litigation, the Secretary of the Interior reinterpreted the federal regulation regarding 30 U.S.C. § 1307(a) as being deferential to state law: The Secretary agrees that § 717(a) [30 U.S.C. § 1307(a)] requires deference to State water law on questions of water use, and thus interprets § 717(b) [30 U.S.C. § 1307(b)] and the rule at issue as not requiring the replacement of water supplies to the extent a surface coal mine operator consumes or legitimately uses the water supply under a senior water right determined under applicable State law. Perm. Surface Mining Reg. Litig. II, Rd. III, 620 F. Supp. 1519. The federal district court upheld this interpretation. In National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir.1988), the National Wildlife Federation argued that the Secretary's reinterpretation of the federal regulation regarding private water rights was contrary to the federal statute. The Federation contended that Congress intended to deny all property rights in ground water to coal operators, and intended to provide additional remedies to owners adversely affected by surface coal mine operations that abused water rights, beyond those remedies previously available under state common law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argument and upheld the Secretary's reinterpretation, noting that the federal statute does not deprive anyone, including mine operators, of whatever rights to the use of water they had previously... . Hodel, 839 F.2d at 757 (affirming Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation II, Round III, 620 F. Supp. 1519 (D.D.C. 1985)). Moreover, throughout SMCRA, Congress expressed a concern for preserving existing property rights, and for not interfering with state determination of those rights. Id. Appellees believe that the DNR does not have the right to interfere with the right to use the ground water located beneath their land, as defined by state common law, because the federal courts' interpretations of § 717(a) of F-SMCRA require deference to state law. The trial court agreed in AMAX, holding that no provision within I-SMCRA was to affect in any way water rights. Appellees argue that SMCRA preserves the surface coal mine operator's rights in ground water, as defined in Wiggins. The appellees' argument is based upon the mistaken assumption that I.C. § 13-4.1-8-1(25), the I-SMCRA provision in question, determines what the proper law to follow is. The I-SMCRA provision does not state what the applicable law is  what law the court should apply when deciding a water rights case. Rather, the I-SMCRA provision preserves any person's right to enforce an interest in water resources, without defining what the limits of that interest are. The federal cases defer the determination of the applicable law in all states. As Hodel notes, It is not relevant to this analysis which [water rights] system a particular state follows; § 717(a) merely preserves for each party whatever rights state law allows. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 756, footnote 98. The conclusion that both I-SMCRA and F-SMCRA expressly preserve whatever water rights that state common law affords surface coal mine operators is a fallacy. Rather, the cited SMCRA provision expressly preserves a person's right to enforce or protect an interest in water resources that exists under applicable law. In order to determine what rights and interests exist, this Court now looks to what the applicable law is. When this Court decided Wiggins, the I-SMCRA regulations specifically did not apply. The cause of action in Wiggins arose in 1977, but Indiana did not attain control over strip coal mining regulation until July 29, 1982. Consequently, in Wiggins, we did not consider whether the DNR possessed the statutory authority to issue regulations governing the use of ground water as part of strip mining operations. In Wiggins, we recognized that I-SMCRA was presented as persuasive matter ... intended to persuade [the Court] that the public policy of the State is moving in the direction of recognizing that property in water should not be absolute in the owner of land where it is found. Wiggins, 452 N.E.2d at 962. We based our Wiggins decision solely on the application of Indiana's traditional ground water law, not I.C. § 13-4.1. We disagree with appellees' contention that Wiggins is the applicable law that denies the DNR authority to regulate their use of ground water. Appellees AMAX and B & LS argue that despite the clear language used by the legislature in providing statutory authority for the DNR to regulate their use of ground water, we should read the 1986 legislative amendment to I.C. § 13-4.1-8-1(25) as a complete nullification of these statutory provisions presented above. We disagree. Such a conclusion contradicts other portions of I-SMCRA, which explicitly reserves such powers for the DNR. The legislative intent as ascertained from an act as a whole will prevail over the strict literal meaning of any word or term used therein. When called upon to construe a single section of a statute, we construe that section with due regard for all other sections of the act and with due regard for the intent of the legislature in order that the spirit and purpose of the statute be carried out. Park 100 Dev. v. Indiana Dep't of State Rev. (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 220. Had the legislature intended such a result, it simply could have repealed any of the previously cited authority for the DNR's regulation of ground water. Our decision today does not eliminate the Indiana property rights to ground water. Rather, we recognize another restriction, one the legislature added, on the doctrine of absolute use of ground water. The State can regulate the use of property without destroying rights in that property. Our decision finds its roots in the seminal Supreme Court decision Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926): Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day... . And in this there is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall. The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare. The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. at 387, 47 S.Ct. at 118, 71 L.Ed. at 310. The right itself still exists, but the manner in which the State protects the right has changed.