Opinion ID: 2609242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Boundary Issue.

Text: The real property covered by the contract in relation to which the highway right of way exists is referred to in brief form as follows: The portion of U. S. Lot 5 in Section 4, Township 49 North, Range 2 W.B.M., lying north of U. S. Highway Project No. I-IN-5041(5) Highway Survey on file in the office of the Department of Highways, State of Idaho; Also that part of Section 5, said Township and Range, lying north of U. S. Highway Project bordered on the east by Wolf Lodge Creek (the description contained in the contract sets forth detailed distances and directions along Wolf Lodge Creek and is shown to be in Section 5); (and other property not involved in the boundary issue); all such property being situate in Kootenai County, Idaho. A right of way map of the Department of Highways of the State of Idaho admitted in evidence shows that the portion of right of way involved in this action borders the referred to real property at the south, immediately north of former U. S. Highway 10, and now north of Interstate Highway Project No. I-IN-5041(5). Such portion of the right of way is 50 feet wide at its easterly boundary and extends westerly, in uniform width, about 350 feet, and then continues westerly about 300 feet additionally, widening at its westerly boundary to some 115 feet or thereabout. An old fence, or farmers fence, borders the north boundary of the former U. S. Highway 10. This fence, plaintiffs assert, is the southern boundary of the property they contracted to purchase, and it is located approximately at the southern boundary of the portion of the right of way involved herein. A photostatic copy of a warranty deed is in evidence showing that respondents conveyed to the State of Idaho the property included in such portion of the right of way, and additional property for right of way purposes; the deed is dated August 22, 1958, and was duly recorded September 10, 1958, in the office of the Kootenai County recorder. Mr. Sacht, an engineer for the Department of Highways, testified that the description of the real property covered by the contract included the portion of the right of way involved herein. The issue thus presented to the trial court was whether respondents represented to appellants that the contract was intended to include or exclude such portion of the right of way; and if it was intended that the contract exclude it, whether appellants so understood such intendment, and through error the real property description contained in the contract included such portion of the right of way. Mr. Kelley, the realtor, testified that before the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase was entered into by the parties he conversed with respondents, the owners, concerning the description of the property, as to where the boundaries were: then he checked the property stating, the boundaries at that time were quite well staked out by the highway department.    we were going by the fence line, the existing fence line and existing state survey stakes which were very evident at that time; that he and respondent, Mr. Marks, walked about the entire boundary, and that on the south side of the property at that time the fence and the survey stakes differed. Mr. Kelley identified the old fence which he designated a farmers fence, as paralleling the former U. S. Highway 10 near its north boundary. He then testified: Q.    on the south side of the property you said Marks pointed out to you where that boundary was and said it consisted of some stakes and a fence? A. I stated at that point on the south side of the property the stakes  the survey stakes and the fence differed. He was testifying in relation to the right of way map of the Department of Highways. Mr. Kelley was then asked to use a blackboard on which he made certain lines and drawings at the request of appellants' counsel; the blackboard is not in evidence. His testimony appears to have related to the fence line running parallel to the former U. S. Highway 10, and to the line of stakes placed by the Department of Highways to the north of the fence line, in conformity with the north line of the right of way line. He also testified concerning a steel fence, the steel posts of which had been installed and which differed from the old fence. Mr. Kelley then stated that each time he took Mrs. Thomson to the property he pointed out the south boundary of the property which was the steel fence installed by the State, which differed from the farmers fence. He further testified, on direct examination by appellants: Q. Do you recall how high from the level of the ground those stakes were?       A. Probably about a foot. Q. What were they? A. Regular survey stakes. Q. Now when you showed the property to either or both the Thomsons, do you recall specifically pointing out those stakes? A. I pointed out the fence. I pointed out how it was aimed along those stakes. On cross examination he testified: Q. Now, you mentioned this farm fence alongside of U. S. Highway Number 10. Was that ever represented to you by the Marks as being their present boundary line ? A. No. Q. Did you ever represent it to the Thomsons as being the boundary line? A. No. Because the other fence was already aimed down through there.    Mr. Sacht, the engineer for the Department of Highways, called by appellants identified the portion of the right of way involved herein as acquired by the State, although included in the description contained in the contract. On cross examination he testified concerning the construction by the Highway Department of the right of way boundary line fence. He stated that the Department commenced construction of the fence during April 1959, but had not finished its construction. Appellant Mr. Thomson stated that his talk with Mr. Kelley at the property about the boundaries was rather general. He knew of the stakes on the east end of the pasture, which would be the end of the highway fence. He said that there was a permanent marker. He admitted the discussion with Mr. Kelley about the south boundary line of the property, and that it ran somewhere along the fence of [at] the front. While Mr. Thomson's testimony indicates that he was apprised of the approximate location of the north boundary of the highway right of way, he then asserted that he would not have contracted to purchase the property if he had been advised that the 50-foot right of way strip was not included in the property covered by the contract. Respondent Mrs. Thomson maintained that the old fence was on the southern boundary of the property; she didn't know that a portion of the property had been sold to the state for highway purposes, and she did not notice the stakes in front of the property; although she didn't walk over to the highway fence at the south boundary. She left the boundary matter to her husband. After appellants had visited and examined the property at least three times with Mr. Kelley, they then entered into the initial Receipt and Agreement to Purchase on December 9, 1959. Mr. Kelley therein set forth the description of the property involved in the right of way dispute, as follows: That part of lot 5 N. of hiway less right of way in Sec 4 Twp 49 R2WBM; Tax #3567 less right of way in Sec 5 Twp 49 R2WBM; On direct examination he was asked: Q. For clarification of the record, Mr. Kelley, the property description shown here [in the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase] was enlarged before the contract was entered into? He answered: I understand it was, yes. We get the legal description from the Treasurer and the Treasurer's legal description usually gives a tax number to define a certain piece of property,    whereas the legal description on their records would be too lengthy to keep in their books; therefore you get the rest from the Assessor, the metes and bounds description, that is. The Receipt and Agreement to Purchase bears out Mr. Kelley's version of the transaction relating to the disputed portion of the right of way. That initial agreement shows beyond dispute that the particular property intended by respondents to be sold and conveyed to appellants did not include the portion of the State's right of way involved herein, situate north of the Interstate Highway. Moreover, appellants by their execution of such instrument after their discussions had with Mr. Kelley, relating to the boundaries of the property, are shown to have had knowledge of the exclusion of such right of way from the land for which they contracted. Further, respondents, by their execution of such initial agreement, have shown that they intended exclusion of the right of way from the property which they intended to sell and convey to appellants. The error which occurred was a mutual mistake. The record shows what both parties intended, i. e., that the land to be covered by the contract excluded such portion of the State's right of way, whereas the formal contract, when drafted, included in the description contained therein the right of way property, which neither party intended. The misconception in the description was shared by both parties. The evidence additionally bears upon appellant Mr. Thomson's knowledge of the existence of the State's right of way. On the property covered by the contract he built a fence running generally in a north-south direction; but he stopped its construction at a point about 50 to 60 feet north of the old fence or farmers fence, bordering the former U. S. Highway 10. He then admitted he knew that the Highway Department had surfaced with blacktop 50 feet beyond the old fence and acknowledged the existence of the new fence built up to the new right of way line. He also admitted that respondent Mr. Marks had explained that the State had indicated that it was all right to use that property [right of way] as long as the State did not need it including a corner of a pasture affected by the right of way. This case is to be distinguished from Lanning v. Sprague, 71 Idaho 138, 227 P. 2d 347. In that case the vendor Sprague offered to sell a certain block of land, the north boundary being represented to extend 15 feet north of a certain fence line and which property the plaintiffs Lannings contracted to purchase, relying upon defendant Sprague's said representations; whereas in fact the north boundary extended 70 feet south of the fence. Actually the representations concerning the north 85 feet of the property were false; but Lannings were unaware of such falsity. In the case at bar respondents truly represented that the State's right of way bordered the Interstate Highway north of the old fence, or the farmers fence; also the State's right of way fence was shown to appellants; and the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase excluded the right of way from the property covered by the contract. Respondents truly represented the south boundary of the property and appellants knew its location. The unfortunate error occurred in the formal agreement of December 28, 1959, concerning which appellants had no knowledge until about the time they commenced this action. They had no knowledge thereof in February 1961 when they gave the notice of rescission, and nowhere does the record indicate their reliance upon such error in the description. After considering the evidence which is somewhat conflicting the trial court resolved the boundary dispute in favor of respondents. The court found that respondents did not, nor did any one acting in their behalf, represent to appellants that the property to be sold was to include all of the property north from the existing old fence running parallel to the former U. S. Highway No. 10, which is not the frontage for Interstate Highway 90; particularly, the court pointed to the testimony indicating that the boundary line of the highway right of way was clearly defined by highway stakes at the time the property was shown, which stakes were north of the old fence line; and that appellants admitted that the realtor pointed out the south boundary line in a general manner to them. The trial court properly concluded that appellants failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that any fraud was perpetrated upon them by respondents or anyone acting in their behalf.