Opinion ID: 2339576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: NLRA Preemption

Text: Unlike ERISA, the NLRA does not contain an explicit preemption provision. As a result, the NLRA's preemptive effect must be discerned by implication from the policies of the act. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Halifax and amici argue that because the Maine severance pay statute mandates the substantive terms of its collective bargaining agreement, this state statute is preempted by the NLRA. The NLRA was enacted in 1935 for the purpose of addressing industrial strife by encouraging collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 151. Aimed at redressing the inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate association, the NLRA's goal was to restore equality of bargaining power in the hope that depressed wage rates would thereby be resolved. 29 U.S.C. § 151. The act protects employees' rights to organize and to engage in concerted action in Section 7 and defines unfair labor practices by employers and labor organization in Section 8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159. As the Supreme Court noted in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2396, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985), The NLRA is concerned primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and conditions of employment, and not with particular substantive terms of the bargain that is struck when the parties are negotiating from relatively equal positions. (Emphasis added.) Grounding its decisions in the policies of the NLRA, the Supreme Court has discerned two different principles of preemption that flow from the act. The first is based on implied congressional intent to leave certain conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited by either Section 7 or 8 of the act unrestricted from most forms of regulation by either the NLRB or the states. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 12 L.Ed.2d 280 (1964); Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976). Cases dealing with this type of preemption ... rely on the understanding that in providing in the NLRA a framework for self-organization and collective bargaining, Congress determined both how much the conduct of unions and employers should be regulated and how much should be left ... to the free play of economic forces. Metropolitan Life, 105 S.Ct. at 2395. Despite the seeming broad range of this branch of NLRA preemption, state laws of general application that impose minimal substantive requirements on contract terms are not preempted. [10] As the Supreme Court noted in Metropolitan Life: Most significantly, there is no suggestion in the legislative history of the Act that Congress intended to disturb the myriad of state laws then in existence that set minimum labor standards, but were unrelated in any way to the processes of bargaining or self-organization. To the contrary, we believe that Congress developed the framework for self-organization and collective bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law promoting public health and safety. The states traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as `to the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons.' Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62 [21 L.Ed. 394] (1873) quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1855). States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State. Child labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety ... are only a few examples. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 [96 S.Ct. 933, 936, 47 L.Ed.2d 43] (1976). State laws requiring that employers contribute to unemployment and workmen's compensation funds, laws prescribing mandatory state holidays and those dictating payment to employees for time spent at the polls or on jury duty all have withstood scrutiny. See e.g., DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 72 S.Ct. 405, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952). Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2398. Maine's severance pay law is a statute of general application that affects union and nonunion employees equally. Designed to protect Maine citizens from the economic dislocation that accompanies closing of large establishments, the severance pay statute is a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co., Inc. v. Lewiston Auburn S.P.A., 320 A.2d 247, 254 (Me.1974); State v. Union Oil Co of Maine, 151 Me. 438, 120 A.2d 708 (1956). The statute, in fact, has a very limited impact on the collective bargaining process inasmuch as it does not ever apply when the parties have reached an agreement on the subject of severance pay via an express contract. Although Section 625-B does affect the collective bargaining relationship by encouraging employers to either agree to some form of severance pay contract or face liability under the act, it does not limit the rights of self-organization or forms of collective bargaining protected by the NLRA and is not preempted by the act. The second line of preemption that can be discerned from Supreme Court cases interpreting the NLRA protects the primary jurisdiction of the NLRAB to determine what kind of conduct is either prohibited or protected by the NLRA and was most thoroughly explored in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Under the Garmon rule, preemption of a state law must occur when it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a state purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8,.... Id. at 244, 79 S.Ct. at 779. Garmon preemption accomplishes Congress's purpose of creating an administrative agency in charge of creating detailed rules to implement the act, rather than having the act enforced and interpreted by the state or federal courts. As a result, state statutes that have been held to be preempted under Garmon involve state action that attempts to directly regulate conduct protected under Section 7 or prohibited under Section 8. Thus, in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971) the Supreme Court held that a state court did not have jurisdiction of a claim filed against a union by an employee who was fired for failure to pay union dues because the union's conduct was covered by either Section 7 or 8 and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Conversely, other Supreme Court cases denying preemption often recognize the importance of the state interest involved and uphold the state activity. In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977), the Court held that the NLRA did not preempt the state tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising in connection with a claim of employment discrimination by the union because the state had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the outrageous conduct alleged. Halifax and amici contend that the Maine severance pay law regulates conduct protected by the NLRA by (1) imposing a different resolution to a bargaining impasse than is required by Section 8(d) [11] and (2) interfering with the employer's right under section 7 to implement its last best offer unilaterally. Despite Halifax's attempt to characterize the severance pay statute as interfering with these employer rights and thus with the jurisdiction of the NLRB, its arguments on this score simply amount to a restatement of the position that Maine may not employ its police power to enact a law of general application that has an effect on the collective bargaining process. As such, Halifax's contentions do not even implicate Garmon -type preemption. Moreover, even if we were to decide that Section 625-B does interfere with the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the statute would be saved from preemption under the reasoning of Farmer set out above because it reflects the state's substantial interest in protecting Maine citizens from the economic dislocation that accompanies large-scale plant closings.