Opinion ID: 534080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusiveness of Title VII Remedy.

Text: 11 In both her initial and amended Complaints, Ishman alleged that the Service had violated several federal statutes in its dealings with her. By an Order dated 12 August 1985, however, the district court ruled that only Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) afforded Ishman any potential remedy. This ruling was correct. Section 2000e-16 is an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 828-29 (1976). As a federal employee alleging job-related discrimination, Ishman's sole recourse is to § 2000e-16. See White v. General Services Administration, 652 F.2d 913, 916-917 (9th Cir.1981). 1 12 An important implication of reliance upon § 2000e-16--and one that was noted by the district court, see Order at 2--is that Ishman must satisfy the requirements of that section in asserting claims. Thus, she may only assert claims that have been brought before the administrative tribunal of first resort within this statutory scheme. Serpe v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc., 718 F.2d 935, 936 (9th Cir.1983) (district court's subject matter jurisdiction in Title VII cases extends only to claims previously lodged with the EEOC). The record below discloses that the only claim in her Amended Complaint that was made before the EEOC was wrongful imposition of a 90-day probationary period following her reinstatement as a postal employee in May 1983. See Supplemental Excerpts of Record, 85, 90, 94. Thus, to the extent that the district court's dismissal covered any asserted claims other than imposition of the probationary period, the dismissal is affirmed. 13 To the extent that the dismissal included the claim for wrongful imposition of the probationary period, however, the dismissal is reversed. This claim could not have been dismissed for failure to satisfy Title VII's administrative requirements. Indeed, the Service has not argued that it should have been. Instead, the Service has argued, both here and below, that the claim is moot because Ishman completed the probationary period without suffering any injury, and thus the court could grant no relief even if Ishman were to prevail on the merits. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee, pp. 14-16; Brief of Defendant in Support of Motion To Dismiss, pp. 5-7. 14 The Service moved under Rule 12(b) to dismiss Ishman's claim of wrongful imposition of the probationary period. Motion To Dismiss. In support of its motion, the Service appended the sworn affidavit of Bette Leavitt, an administrator with the Service, who has personal knowledge of Ishman's employment history. Id. The district court did not exclude the affidavit, and indeed must have relied upon it in deciding whether, for example, Ishman had suffered any uncompensated injury as a result of having held probationary status during her first three months back at work. 15 The Leavitt affidavit constitutes a matter[ ] outside the pleadings, and, by considering it, the district court converted the defendant's motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). 2 The Rules dictate that when such a conversion occurs, all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to a ... motion under Rule 56. Id. We have noted previously the general agreement that in these circumstances the non-moving party must be sufficiently informed or aware that the motion has become one for summary judgment. Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir.1984). 16 Garaux further makes clear that, because Ishman was appearing pro se, it was incumbent upon the court to adhere strictly to the notice requirements of Rule 56(c) when it converted the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment. 739 F.2d at 439-40; see also McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.1987) (grant of summary judgment reversed because pro se plaintiff was not given notice that motion to dismiss had been converted into summary judgment motion). Yet, there is no evidence that Ishman received such notice. Ishman should have been informed that she was now confronting a motion for summary judgment, so that she could have prepared appropriate opposition papers. We therefore remand the case to the district court so that Ishman may be given an opportunity to oppose the Service's summary judgment motion and to show, if she can, that the probation had collateral and continuing consequences. (Apparently, Ishman wishes to dispute, for example, the information in the Leavitt affidavit. See Brief of Appellant at 4.) 17