Opinion ID: 2759857
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proffered Reason Pretextual

Text: Since LHC offered a legitimate reason for terminating Sones, the burden of production shifts back to the EEOC. It must offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant’s reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic (mixed-motive[s] alternative). Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Evans v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 2d 626, 640 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (applying same analysis to cases under ADA), aff’d, 273 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). At summary 18 Case: 13-60703 Document: 00512866071 Page: 19 Date Filed: 12/11/2014 No. 13-60703 judgment, “[e]vidence demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is false or unworthy of credence, taken together with the plaintiff’s prima facie case, is likely to support an inference of discrimination even without further evidence of defendant’s true motive.” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court correctly concluded that the EEOC did not satisfy the pretext alternative. Rather than disputing LHC’s claims regarding Sones’ alleged performance deficiencies, the EEOC argues that pretext can be inferred from the fact that LHC failed to document Sones’ deficiencies until after her seizure. However, as the district court observed, the record reflects that Sones exhibited performance issues both before and after her seizure. Indeed, Sones herself admitted that prior to her seizure she was having trouble with the computer-related aspects of the Team Leader position. This evidence was corroborated by the testimony of Sones’ supervisors as well as a colleague assigned to train her, all of whom testified that Sones was exhibiting performance issues prior to her seizure. Given this record, the EEOC failed to rebut LHC’s evidence regarding Sones’ unsatisfactory performance and therefore failed to demonstrate pretext. However, the EEOC’s failure to demonstrate pretext does not end the inquiry. Under the ADA, “discrimination need not be the sole reason for the adverse employment decision . . . [so long as it] actually play[s] a role in the employer’s decision making process and ha[s] a determinative influence on the outcome” See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For this reason, an employee who fails to demonstrate pretext can still survive summary judgment by showing that an employment decision was “based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives . . . [and that] the illegitimate motive was a motivating factor in the 19 Case: 13-60703 Document: 00512866071 Page: 20 Date Filed: 12/11/2014 No. 13-60703 decision.” Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Several portions of the record support the inference that discrimination was a motivating factor in Sones’s termination. First, as noted, Sones reported that Taggard said, “We’re going [to] have to let you go because you’re a liability to our company.” The district court concluded that “[t]his statement is consistent with LHC’s reasons for terminating Sones and is not evidence of pretext”—i.e., Sones’s mistake in patient care exposed LHC to potential liability. But as the EEOC rightly argues, the statement is also reasonably consistent with LHC fearing that Sones would have another seizure on the job. Because the district court was required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the EEOC, Turner, 476 F.3d at 343, the court erred in disregarding the statement as evidence of pretext. Further, the statements from Sones’s EEOC charge discussed above— “Taggard told me that if my disability manifested again while I was on the job, [LHC] would be in trouble,” and “[Brown] told me that I was terminated because I have become a liability to [LHC] because of my disability”—cast doubt on the validity of LHC’s purported reason for Sones’s termination. Taken together, the EEOC’s prima facie case and Brown’s and Taggard’s statements raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Sones’s disability was a motivating factor in her termination. See Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578. Summary judgment on the EEOC’s discriminatory-discharge claim was therefore improper.