Opinion ID: 36002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Forcible sex offenses”

Text: Although the district court enhanced the defendant’s sentence under paragraph (I) of § 2L1.2’s “crime of violence” definition, the government urges that we can also affirm the enhancement on the alternative basis that the defendant’s prior conviction--whether or not it satisfies paragraph (I)’s general U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). See 273 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2001). In reaching that conclusion, the court observed that, in addition to the risk of collateral injuries, the compelled sex act could itself be considered a type of “physical injury.” Id. at 750-51. 12 definition--is an offense specifically enumerated in paragraph (II), namely a “forcible sex offense.” Neither side has been able to provide us with definitive guidance on the meaning of “forcible sex offense” as that term is used in § 2L1.2. The Sentencing Guidelines and their commentary do not define the term. The parties agree that certain crimes, such as forcible rape in the traditional sense, clearly count as “forcible sex offenses,” and they also agree that certain other crimes involving wholly consensual sex (such as adultery) are not “forcible sex offenses.” The particular crime at issue here, MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.040, falls somewhere in the middle of those two agreed extremes. At certain points, the parties treat the question whether the offense is a “forcible sex offense” as a corollary to the question addressed earlier, i.e. whether the prior offense has as an element the use of force for purposes of paragraph (I): If the sexual assault offense does not involve the use of force, then it is not a “forcible sex offense”; if it does require the use of force, then it is a “forcible sex offense.” They also, however, marshal a few arguments that would independently arrive at a definition for the phrase. The government’s primary argument regarding the meaning of “forcible sex offense” as that term is used in § 2L1.2 is that the same phrase is used in a different section of the Guidelines in a context in which (says the government) it is apparent that forcible compulsion is not required. In particular, the 13 government points out that the commentary to the Guidelines section applicable to certain “sexual abuse crimes”--crimes that do not necessarily require threats or forcible compulsion in the brute sense--states that those crimes “are crimes of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 cmt. bkgrd. (2003).10 At the time that this particular Guideline was promulgated, over fifteen years ago, there was only one definition of “crime of violence” in the Guidelines, namely the definition provided in § 4B1.2. The 1987 commentary to § 4B1.2, in turn, states that its definition of “crime of violence” encompasses, among many other things, “forcible sex offenses.” Therefore, according to the government, this series of cross-references tells us that a crime does not require forcible compulsion for it to be a “forcible sex offense.” The government’s argument on this score is logically faulty. From the propositions (1) that certain “sexual abuse crimes” are “crimes of violence,” and (2) that “forcible sex offenses” are 10 One of the crimes covered by this Guidelines section is 18 U.S.C. § 2242, which can be violated, inter alia, by: engag[ing] in a sexual act with another person if that other person is-- (A) incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or (B) physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) (2000). 14 also “crimes of violence,” it does not follow that the specified “sexual abuse crimes” are “forcible sex offenses.” It is also notable that the definition of “crime of violence” in the 1987 version of § 4B1.2 relied on 18 U.S.C. § 16, which in turn defines “crime of violence” as either a crime that has as an element the use of force or a crime that by its nature poses a substantial risk that force may be used. Therefore, the “sexual abuse crimes” discussed in § 2A3.1 could qualify as “crimes of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 as long as they involved a substantial risk that force would be used.11 This web of related provisions therefore does not support the logical inference the government suggests. Relatively few appellate cases have discussed the meaning of “forcible sex offenses” for Guidelines purposes. Almost all of those that do discuss it, do so in connection with another 11 Indeed, a number of cases have held that various sex offenses satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 16’s definition precisely because they involve a substantial risk that force will be used, even if they do not necessary require the use of force as an element. See, e.g., Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d at 420-22. Section 4B1.2 has been amended since 1987, but not in any way that helps the government’s argument. The section now defines “crime of violence” to mean an offense that has the use of force as an element or an offense that poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2003). Courts frequently hold that certain sex offenses are “crimes of violence” under this Guidelines section because the crimes present a risk of injury, even though they do not involve the use of force. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 394 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that sexual contact with a child did not involve the use of force but did carry a serious potential risk of physical injury). 15 enumerated crime of violence, “sexual abuse of a minor.” The reason for the connection is that the 2001 version of § 2L1.2’s “crime of violence” definition links these two offenses, stating that “crime[s] of violence . . . include[] . . . forcible sex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor).” Statutes involving child sexual abuse typically do not require violence or threats, merely improper contact. One could therefore argue that “forcible sex offenses,” which “include” such crimes, likewise do not require violent force. Equally, one could also reconcile the two offenses by contending that “sexual abuse of a minor” qualifies as a crime of violence only when it is “forcible.” This court, like others, has rejected the latter argument, reasoning that “[s]exual abuse of a minor--forcible or not-- constitutes a crime of violence.” Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d at 316; see also United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that sexual abuse of a minor is a crime of violence regardless of “whether it includes--or even explicitly excludes--‘force’ as an element”). That is, courts take the view that sexual abuse of a minor is essentially sui generis and does not need to be otherwise “forcible.” And indeed, in the 2003 version of § 2L1.2’s “crime of violence” definition, the Sentencing Commission has de-coupled the two offenses, listing each separately. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2003). This change was intended to “make[] clear” that offenses like sexual abuse of a minor qualify as crimes of 16 violence regardless of whether they involve the use of force. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 658, at 401-02 (2003). None of this tells us what a “forcible sex offense” is, however, except perhaps that “sexual abuse of a minor” might not otherwise qualify as one. In the absence of an authoritative definition of “forcible sex offense,” we believe that the most natural reading of the phrase suggests a type of crime that is narrower than the range of conduct prohibited under § 566.040. In particular, it seems that the adjective “forcible” centrally denotes a species of force that either approximates the concept of forcible compulsion or, at least, does not embrace some of the assented-to-but-notconsented-to conduct at issue here. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “forcible” as “[e]ffected by force or threat of force against opposition or resistance”). We recognize that in the last few decades, a number of jurisdictions have modernized and liberalized their rape laws (or the judicial constructions of them), in a few cases even eliminating the force requirement. E.g., State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276-77 (N.J. 1992). A significant number of states, like Missouri, have supplemented statutes requiring force, threats, or compulsion with separate sexual assault statutes that criminalize certain unconsented-to (or legally unconsented-to) intercourse that does not involve extrinsic force. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(5) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 17 (McKinney 2004); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 2003). To our minds, these facts underscore that when one specifically designates a sex offense as a “forcible” sex offense, one probably does so in order to distinguish the subject sex offense as one that does require force or threatened force extrinsic to penetration.12 Thus, the phrase “forcible sex offense” used in paragraph (II) of § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(ii) may well be a term of art that encompasses a narrower range of conduct than does paragraph (I)’s general definition referring to crimes that “ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” See supra note 8. In any event, regardless of the precise boundaries of the phrase, we do not think that all of the conduct criminalized by § 566.040 can be considered a “forcible sex 12 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 501 n.8 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to “forcible rape . . . and nonforcible, but nonetheless coerced, sexual intercourse” (emphasis added)); Soto v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 539, 543-44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a sexual assault is a “forcible sexual assault” when the victim, in addition to not consenting, is coerced by the use or threatened use of force); In re Jessie C., 565 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (App. Div. 1991) (stating that a sexual misconduct statute criminalizing sex without valid consent “proscribes both forcible and nonforcible sexual intercourse”); State v. Philbrick, 402 A.2d 59, 63 (Me. 1979) (holding that a crime qualifies as a “forcible sex offense” when it involves “force in fact”). These authorities are relevant--just like dictionaries and other interpretive aids-- because they provide evidence of how speakers typically use the term we are interpreting. We do not claim that “forcible sex offense” is always used in this way, but we believe that the usage reflected in the above citations illustrates the central meaning of the term. 18 offense.” Therefore, we cannot affirm the defendant’s sentence on this alternative basis. On remand, the government is free to pursue the eight-level “aggravated felony” sentence enhancement. We express no opinion regarding whether that enhancement would be proper.13