Opinion ID: 766203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Obligation under Title II

Text: 12 In order to evaluate whether a fee constitutes a surcharge that violates Title II of the ADA, we conduct a two-part inquiry. First, as a threshold matter, we consider whether the measure for which California levies the fee is required to provide that individual or group nondiscriminatory treatment as mandated by the ADA. 28 C.F.R. S 35.130(f). If California charges for a measure not required under the ADA, the inquiry ends; 28 C.F.R. S 35.130(f) only forbids surcharges for required measures. 13 Second, we evaluate whether the fee for the measure is a surcharge; in other words, we consider whether it constitutes a charge that nondisabled people would not incur. If nondisabled people pay the same fee for an equivalent service, the charge to disabled people would not constitute a surcharge on a required measure. Thus, for example, a state can charge a fee for disabled license plates so long as it charges the same fee for nondisabled license plates. 14 Because surcharges against disabled people constitute facial discrimination, the meaningful access test formulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), does not apply. Under this test, a court considers whether the allegedly discriminatory measure prevents meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. Id. at 301. The Ninth Circuit has applied this test in the ADA context to evaluating whether facially neutral laws violate S 12132. See Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d 1041, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1998); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1996). 15 Using this standard in the context of facially discriminatory laws, however, would ignore the clear language of Title II. Cf. Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 733-35 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the reasonable modifications test does not apply to facially discriminatory laws because they present per seS 12132 violations). S 12132 covers not only exclusion from participation in or [denial of] benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, but also being subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. S 12132. By reviewing all S 12132 claims under a meaningful access test, this Circuit would focus only on exclusions and denials, and ignore completely the discrimination clause, not to mention the explicitlanguage of the ADA regulation at issue here. Other courts evaluating fees similar to the one at issue here have read the statute and ADA regulation together rather than applying a meaningful access test. See Thompson v. Colorado, 29 F. Supp.2d 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1998); Thrope v. State of Ohio, 19 F. Supp.2d 816, 824 (S.D. Ohio 1998); McGarry v. Director, Dept. of Revenue, 7 F. Supp.2d 1022, 1028 (W.D. Mo. 1998). We thus follow their approach and do the same; we hold that when states apply charges to required measures, we consider whether these fees constitute a surcharge forbidden under the ADA.