Opinion ID: 670488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Liability of Jakabovitz

Text: 14 Jakabovitz was held directly liable under Title VIII and sections 1981 and 1982 for refusing to show an available apartment to plaintiff-tester Jeannette Ramsey. Jakabovitz challenges the imposition of direct liability against him on the grounds that (1) the Court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof, and (2) Ramsey failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain her burden of proving discrimination.
15 Jakabovitz contends that the District Court erred in instructing the jury regarding (1) the parties' respective burdens in connection with proving discrimination and (2) the possibility of mixed motives on the part of the defendant. Much of the difficulty in this case arises from the fact that language used by appellate courts to formulate burdens of proof and production in the context of bench trials has been imported uncritically into jury charges. Though the burdens of proof and production do not vary from bench to jury trials, the standards that must guide a judge during a bench trial are not necessarily helpful or even appropriate for inclusion in jury charges. The bench trial judge acts both as a determiner of whether a case meets the legal requirements for decision by a fact-finder and as a fact-finder. A jury performs only the latter function. It therefore need not be told about concepts that guide the judge in determining whether the case merits jury consideration. At the same time, it must be told what legal principles to apply depending on the different ways it might view the evidence. Though we have previously pointed out that the jury trial context creates problems that do not arise in bench trials, see Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 186 (2d Cir.1992), lawyers are still prone to include in requested jury charges language that was written by appellate courts in the context of bench trials--language that is at best irrelevant, and at worst misleading to a jury. 4 Their penchant for doing so has regrettably been abetted by the inclusion of such language in some model instructions. 5 16 This case well illustrates the problems that can arise when such language is incorporated in a jury charge. For example, the jury charge included references to a prima facie case, to the defendants' burden of producing evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for their actions, and to the fact that when a defendant has produced evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, then it is the plaintiffs' burden to persuade you by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs because of the plaintiffs' race. Though these statements faithfully endeavored to track the three-step formulation of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), they created a distinct risk of confusing the jury. Prima facie case is not a term readily understood by jurors, and it has at least two meanings for judges. See id. at 254 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 7. Moreover, the distinction between burden of persuasion and burden of production is not familiar to jurors, and they may easily be misled by hearing the word burden (though referring to a burden of production) used with reference to a defendant in an explanation of that part of the charge that concerns a plaintiff's burden of persuasion. Finally, telling the jury that the burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff after the defendant has satisfied its burden of production runs the risk of creating extra confusion. 17 Basically, none of these phrases needs to be included in a jury charge in a typical case involving a claim of adverse action based on improper motivation, regardless of the state of the evidence. If the facts of the prima facie case are undisputed and the defendant has produced no evidence to rebut the prima facie case, no jury charge is needed because the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). 6 If the facts of the prima facie case are disputed and the defendant has produced no rebuttal evidence, then the jury needs to be told that if it finds the following facts, the plaintiffs are entitled to prevail: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class protected by the statute, (2) the plaintiff sought and was qualified for an apartment (or a job, in an employment discrimination case), (3) the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to rent the apartment (or obtain the job), and (4) the apartment (or job) remained available thereafter. See id. 7 However, there is no need to label these four facts as constituting a prima facie case, and it will normally not aid the jury to use that phrase. 18 If the defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that, if taken as true, would rebut the prima facie case, a threshold matter to be decided by the judge, the jury need not be told anything about a defendant's burden of production. In that event, whether or not the facts of the plaintiff's prima facie case are disputed, the jury needs to be told two things: (1) it is the plaintiff's burden to persuade the jurors by a preponderance of the evidence that the apartment (or job) was denied because of race (or, in other cases, because of some other legally invalid reason), see id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, 8 and (2) the jury is entitled to infer, but need not infer, that this burden has been met if they find that the four facts previously set forth have been established and they disbelieve the defendant's explanation, see id. 9 There is no need to inform the jury that the defendant had a burden of production because it is no longer relevant. Id. 10 There is also no need to refer to a burden shifting back to the plaintiff because, if the case requires submission to the jury, 11 all the jury needs to be told about the plaintiff's burden of proof is that the burden of persuasion as to discrimination is on the plaintiff; the presumption that triggered the defendant's burden of production has drop[ped] out of the picture. Id. 19 What has been said to this point concerns the typical case where the parties dispute whether the adverse action taken by the defendant was motivated by an impermissible factor (such as race or ethnicity) or a permissible factor (such as inability to pay rent or unfitness for employment). In some cases the evidence permits the trier to find that more than one factor motivated the adverse action. In that event, it will be appropriate at the defendant's request, and sometimes at the plaintiff's request, see Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 181, to instruct the jury concerning the defendant's affirmative defense of dual motivation, i.e., that the defendant would have taken the adverse action on the basis of a permissible reason even if the impermissible reason had not existed. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1787-88, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992). In such cases, the jury should be told that the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff to prove that the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by an impermissible reason, and that, if the jury finds that the plaintiff has sustained this burden, then the defendant can prevail if it sustains its burden of proving its affirmative defense that it would have taken the adverse action on the basis of the permissible reason alone. Of course, if the jury does not find that the plaintiff has sustained its burden, the jury should not go on to consider whether the defendant has sustained its burden concerning the affirmative defense. It might be useful to explain to the jury that the fact-finding as to whether the plaintiff has sustained its burden concerns what actually happened, whereas the fact-finding as to whether the defendant has sustained its burden on the affirmative defense concerns a hypothetical situation. 20 With these considerations in mind and recognizing that the framework of burdens fashioned in Title VII cases is fully applicable to Title VIII housing discrimination cases, see Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036-39 (2d Cir.1979), we turn to the instructions given in this case. Jakabovitz's first objection is that the Court erred in instructing the jury that he bore the burden of establishing that race played no role in his decision not to show an apartment to the African-American or Latino tester. In informing the jury as to the defenses available to a defendant if the plaintiffs established a discriminatory motive, the Court included the following instruction: 21 [A] defendant must establish that his decision not to offer an available apartment to plaintiff was based completely on considerations other than race or national origin, that is[,] the defendant must show that race played no role whatsoever in his decision not to afford the plaintiff access to an available apartment. 22 Jakabovitz timely objected to this instruction, saying, I respectfully except to the portion of your Honor's charge where it said the defendant has to prove that race played no role. His objection was overruled. 23 Under McDonnell Douglas, the defendant does not bear the burden of establishing that race was not a factor in his or her decision. Instead, the plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proving discrimination. While we agree with Jakabovitz that the portion of the charge excerpted above was erroneous, we think that the charge as a whole properly apprised the jury that the plaintiff bore the burden of establishing discrimination. The jury charge repeatedly made clear the plaintiff's burden of proof in the following passages: 24 To establish a case under Section 1981, the plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants were motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, that is, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants intentionally and purposefully discriminated against them because of race. 25 . . . . . 26 You should also understand that the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants actually were motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. 27 . . . . . 28 [Plaintiffs] must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of race. You should consider the plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence along with all of the evidence in the case and determine whether it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. 29 . . . . . 30 By producing evidence which puts the plaintiffs' claim in question, a defendant has fulfilled his or her burden to offer a non-discriminatory reason for not showing the black plaintiffs an apartment in a white area and then it is the plaintiffs' burden to persuade you by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs because of the plaintiffs' race.... 31 By meeting this intermediary burden, by offering a non-discriminatory reason or reasons, a defendant has shifted the burden of persuasion back to the plaintiffs. 32 . . . . . 33 If you find that the plaintiffs have sustained their burden by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant purposefully or intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff on the basis of her race, you must then consider the issue of damages.... 34 In order to prove a violation of Section 1982, the plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the discrimination of which they claim was purposeful and intentional. 35 Because of the Court's extensive and repeated instructions that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving discrimination, we believe that the jury could not have been led astray by the Court's brief comment to the contrary. When the jury instructions are considered as a whole--just as the jury heard them--the placement of the burden of proof onto the shoulders of the plaintiffs becomes clear. See Ressler v. White, 968 F.2d 1478, 1479 (2d Cir.1992). 36 Jakabovitz also objects to two other jury instructions dealing with proof of discrimination. First, he objects to the Court's instruction that he bore the burden of proving that he had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not showing the apartment to the minority tester. Jakabovitz, of course, bore only the burden of producing evidence in support of his claim of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his refusal to show the apartment to a minority person. Jakabovitz points to the following language in the instructions: 37 It is the defendants' burden to persuade you on this point, that means a defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a non-discriminatory reason for not offering the apartments to the plaintiff testers. 38 If this instruction had related to the portion of the jury's consideration that precedes consideration of the defendant's affirmative defense, it would have been erroneous. The sentence is worded in terms of actual intent, rather than the hypothetical state of mind contemplated by Price Waterhouse. However, the passage followed immediately after a passage that unmistakably referred to the affirmative defense, as to which the burden quite properly was assigned to the defendants. We do not need to decide whether this passage was erroneous because no objection was made to it, and it could easily have been related solely to the affirmative defense if the Court had been alerted to the possible ambiguity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. The purpose of the Rule is to require the parties to give the trial court an adequate opportunity to cure any error in the instructions before the jury deliberates. Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 177 (citation omitted); see also Lavoie v. Pacific Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir.1992); Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 365 (2d Cir.1992). 39 Second, Jakabovitz protests the Court's inclusion of any instructions concerning the affirmative defense. Again, the point is waived in the absence of objection, and, in any event, a dual motivation instruction would not have been improper on the facts of this case. See Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 181.
40 Jakabovitz's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by plaintiff Ramsey proceeds from the premise, which we accept, that Jakabovitz discharged his burden of producing evidence to rebut her prima facie case. He produced evidence that rebutted Ramsey's showing that the apartment in question was available when she applied to rent an apartment. He asserts that the apartment that he had offered to White tester Spiro was not available an hour later when African-American tester Ramsey arrived because it had been rented to someone else in the meantime. Jakabovitz presented evidence that someone named Andrew Lubrano had come in during that hour to add $200 to a $50 deposit he had made on the apartment two days earlier. Jakabovitz argues that his presentation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his failure to show the apartment placed the burden on plaintiff Ramsey to produce more evidence of discrimination. Her failure to present more evidence at that point, Jakabovitz continues, required judgment as a matter of law in his favor. 41 Jakabovitz offered this argument in a Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) motion three weeks after the jury found him directly liable for racial discrimination. The Court denied the motion because it said that Jakabovitz had failed to make the necessary Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence. On appeal, Jakabovitz contends that the Court ignored a motion that he filed on April 28, 1992, a motion filed, he points out, before the case went to the jury. Jakabovitz fails to note that that motion was made not just before the case went to the jury, but before trial began. Rather than deciding whether the trial court should have treated that motion as a timely Rule 50(a) pleading, we prefer to dispose of Jakabovitz's insufficiency claim on the merits. 42 Jakabovitz misreads the Supreme Court's statement in Hicks that once a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her action, the plaintiff must then establish that the defendant's actions were intentionally discriminatory. Jakabovitz takes this statement as requiring the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence after the defendant's production--evidence beyond that presented in the plaintiff's prima facie case. Justice Scalia took pains to preclude such an interpretation of the Court's decision when he observed that, upon rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons for its action, no additional proof of discrimination is required. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (emphasis, internal quotation marks & citation omitted). Thus, Ramsey did not fail to offer sufficient evidence of discrimination by not presenting more evidence after Jakabovitz endeavored to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for his actions. 43 The jury's verdict holding Jakabovitz liable for discriminating against Ramsey demonstrates that the jury believed that Jakabovitz's explanation was pretextual. The jury may have felt that Jakabovitz's claim that the apartment was no longer available when Ramsey arrived was unbelievable in light of the fact that Lubrano--the person to whom the apartment had supposedly been rented--was never allowed to move in.