Opinion ID: 1060705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRE-1989 VERSION OF (i)(5)

Text: The first issue designated for oral argument is constitutional. Middlebrooks argues that the aggravating circumstance set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982)that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mindis unconstitutionally vague and that its application to this case violates Article I, Section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [6] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court instructed the jury that no death penalty shall be imposed unless you unanimously find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind. It further instructed, however, that the jury was to follow these definitions: Heinous means grossly wicked or reprehensible, abominable, odious, vile. Atrocious means extremely evil or cruel, monstrous, exceptionally bad, abominable. Cruel means disposed to inflict pain or suffering, causing suffering, painful. Torture means the infliction of severe physical or mental pain upon the victim while he remains alive and conscious. Depravity means moral corruption, wicked or perverse act. We begin with the principle that any aggravating circumstance must furnish a principled guidance for the jury to choose between death and a lesser sentence. E.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). In applying this principle, we have consistently upheld the constitutionality of Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982) and have rejected the contention that it is vague or overbroad. State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 280 (Tenn.1998); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 181 (Tenn.1991); State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 670 (Tenn.1988). Moreover, in State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn.1985), we carefully reviewed this aggravating circumstance and clarified its application by specifically defining each term and qualifier contained in (i)(5). These Williams `definitions were included in the trial court's charge to the jury in this case. We therefore reject Middlebrooks' claim that the aggravating circumstance was vague or overbroad. Notwithstanding this Court's precedent, Middlebrooks relies on several United States Supreme Court decisions. See Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); Godfrey, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398. In State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 252 (Tenn.1989), we distinguished the language of the aggravating circumstance in (i)(5) from the language condemned as unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey and Maynard by pointing out that the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel language in Tennessee's statute does not stand alone but is modified and limited by the phrase in that it involved torture or depravity of mind. Id. at 252; see also State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 479 (Tenn.1993) (heinous, atrocious, or cruel defined and limited by torture or depravity of mind). This requirement satisfies the constitutional mandate of narrowing and both limits and guides the sentencer in choosing whether to impose a sentence of death. [7] Furthermore, the proof in this case as previously summarized is sufficient to establish both torture and depravity of mind as defined by prior decisions of this Court.