Opinion ID: 3027755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Character of the Evidence

Text: When evaluating the character of the proffered evidence, courts should consider the practical problems (e.g., disruptiveness to the trial) that may result in granting a motion to reopen, as well as what effect it would have on the entire case. See, e.g., Walker, 772 F.2d at 1178–79. Here, both considerations weighed in favor of Hugh’s motion to reopen. First, the practical implications of reopening the record in this case were virtually nil. Exhibit D-1-A had already been authenticated and could have been moved in 11 The majority would presumably fault Hugh as well for not raising redaction as a possible solution. The simple response, as explained earlier, is that the District Court did not base its ruling on D-1-A’s supposed hearsay character, but rather that the jury would give it “undue weight.” Redaction, of course, would not cure that supposed infirmity, and Hugh should not be faulted for failing to mention it. Moreover, district courts should not need the assistance of counsel to suggest that a document be redacted to exclude inadmissible hearsay—an easy and obvious remedy in situations like this. 20 evidence in a matter of seconds—and certainly in a shorter amount of time than the District Court spent concluding that an admissible document would not be admitted by reopening the record. The situation here (involving a single additional document) is similar in character to that presented in Smith, see 1994 WL 680999, at  (allowing gift certificates to be admitted after the close of evidence), or Dibella, see 403 F.3d at 119 (reopening the record to introduce a time-sheet). Moreover, admitting exhibit D-1-A would have been less disruptive than reopening the record for additional testimony, which other courts have allowed. See, e.g., Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 738, 741 (admitting the testimony of three additional witnesses); Green, 757 F.2d at 119 (one additional witness); Oleson, 213 F. at 331 (same); Keating, 116 F. at 565 (same); Fulton, 93 F. at 623 (multiple expert witnesses). Second, the importance of Hasan’s description of the second robber as having “nice hair” and a “Muslim-type beard” to Hugh’s defense is undeniable. In a trial at which the major point of contention was the proper identification of the suspect, exhibit D-1-A certainly had the potential to cast significant doubt on the validity of the only formal identification of Hugh that Hasan ever made.12 Specifically, Hugh’s counsel argued in his closing statement that, given Hasan’s description, the photographic line-up from which she selected Hugh as one of the robbers was unduly suggestive: 12 Tellingly, the Government never asked Hasan to make an in-court identification of Hugh as the second robber. 21 Well, you’ll look at her report, ladies and gentlemen, I’ve marked it as Exhibit [D-1-A], and in that report, ladies and gentlemen, you read it. She says he had a Muslim-type beard. It’s got a little chart for you here. Because she also said he had nice hair. Of the eight people, we have to find the Muslim guy with nice hair. Well, ladies and gentlemen, let’s get rid of the non-Muslim beards, shall we? Guy number one definitely has a Muslim-type beard. Guy number two, my client, definitely has a Muslim-type beard. Guy number three, oh, that ain’t a Muslim-beard, ladies and gentlemen. Guy number four, he has a Muslim-type beard. Guy number five, ah you could say that was Muslim. . . . ... . . . Guy number six, that is not a Muslim-type beard. Guy number seven, possibly. And guy number eight, that is definitely not a Muslim-type beard. I will let you make these opinions when you go in there. So now we’ve gone from eight to . . . five. Well, still, those odds aren’t bad. 20 percent chance, okay? Well let’s look at the guy. She said he had nice hair. She remembers the nice hair, remember that? Who’s got nice hair here? He doesn’t have hair, so he’s not going to be getting Mr. Nice Hair award. He’s got very well groomed hair. This guy, we’ve already taken, yeah, we’ll give him [nice] hair. He doesn’t even have hair on that picture, ladies and gentlemen. Okay. This guy, his hair is so short, how could you say he has nice hair? Ladies and gentlemen, I have conducted what? The process of elimination. ... I would ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to look at the page in my hand right now, it says, “Has[a]n.” And I wrote process of elimination, because that is what she testified to. She went through a process of elimination. Just like I did. We didn’t even have to see the man to do that. And I’ve gone from eight to two. And guess what she also said? He was very nicely groomed. He had beautiful hair. Of those two people, ladies and gentlemen, who gets the nice groom award? I’ll let you be the judge to that. Our Court has often had to examine the problems created by suggestive line-ups. See, e.g., United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006); Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2005). More generally, we have also noted that special care must be 22 taken in contexts like ours: “[T]he evidence was identification evidence. The dangers inherent in such testimony have many times been commented upon. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Courts must scrutinize this type of evidence especially carefully; juries must to the same.” United States v. Rabb, 453 F.2d 1012, 1014 (3d Cir. 1971) (second emphasis added). Rather than acknowledge the significance that exhibit D-1-A might properly play in the jury’s decision, the District Court instead ruled that sending Hasan’s statement to the jury would give it “undue weight.” This conclusion misses the mark.13 The situation here is analogous to a jury request to have portions of testimony read back, which we have previously addressed. In Rabb we noted the possibility that “a reading of only one portion of the testimony may cause the jury to give that portion undue emphasis,” but nevertheless concluded that [r]eading the transcript of the testimony of two . . . witnesses would not necessarily emphasize it or preclude consideration by the jury of the other testimony. In these circumstances, it must be assumed that the jury asked for a reading of this testimony because it was in doubt or in disagreement upon its proper evaluation. Id. at 1013–14 (emphasis added). More generally, we went on to note with approval the position advanced by the American Bar Association in its Standards Relating to Trial by 13 The majority avoids addressing the issue by erroneously concluding that the District Court did not base its decision on this ground. See Maj. Op. at 11. 23 Jury, ABA P ROJECT ON M INIMUM S TANDARDS OF C RIMINAL J USTICE § 5.2 & cmt. at 134–38, which suggests that courts accede to the reasonable requests of jurors to review specific evidence. Rabb, 453 F.2d at 1014–15 & n.1. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has observed, [w]hen a jury retires to consider their verdict, their discussion may produce disagreement or doubt or failure of definite recollection as to what a particular witness said in the course of his testimony. If they request enlightenment on the subject through a reading of his testimony, in the absence of some unusual circumstance, the request should be granted. The true administration of justice calls for such action. Where there is a doubt in the minds of jurors as to what a witness said, it cannot be prejudicial to anyone to have that doubt removed by a rehearing of his testimony. There is no need to be chary for fear of giving undue prominence to the testimony of the witness. If under our system of trials a jury is to be considered intelligent enough to be entrusted with powers of decision, it must be assumed they have sense enough to ask to have their memories stimulated or refreshed only as to those portions of the testimony about which they are in doubt or disagreement. State v. Wolf, 207 A.2d 670, 675–76 (N.J. 1965); see also United States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that a jury’s request to see certain exhibits indicates their importance); cf. United States v. McCarthy, 961 F.2d 972, 978 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming trial judge’s decision not to send an exhibit back to the jury, but noting that “[t]he jury did not request it”). The jury’s request here similarly demonstrates the importance of exhibit D-1-A in the context of this case, and it should have weighed heavily in favor of granting Hugh’s motion to reopen. For trial-by-jury to work properly, juries must be allowed the 24 tools with which to do their job.14