Opinion ID: 2588509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: The Multiple-Murder Special Circumstance

Text: The jury thus validly convicted defendant of first degree murder regarding the murders of both Daniel McDermott and Peter Baeza. Accordingly, the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding was valid.

Defendant contends the penalty phase verdict is invalid because one of the special circumstances found by the jury, the murder of a transportation worker, does not support a sentence of death, only life imprisonment without parole. (§ 190.25.) He contends this error violated the heightened reliability requirement imposed in capital prosecutions by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. To render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, the jury must find true at least one of the special circumstances listed in section 190.2. Once it does so, the jury must then decide in a penalty phase whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The jury weighs the factors listed in section 190.3 in making this determination. The jury below found three special circumstances: (1) defendant committed multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)); (2) the murder was committed during a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)); and (3) the victim was a transportation worker (§ 190.25). Although the transportation-worker special circumstance is not a special circumstance that supports a death sentence thereby leading to a penalty phase, the two section 190.2 special circumstances properly rendered the defendant death-eligible, subject to the penalty phase, where the jury would apply the section 190.3 factors. ( People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 364, fn. 7, 247 Cal. Rptr. 31, 753 P.2d 1109.) Defendant claims, however, It does not make any difference whether the other special circumstances were proved because we have no way of telling for sure whether it was special circumstance [No.] 1, or 2, or 3, or some combination ... which caused the jury to return the death verdict. But once the jury has found a section 190.2 special circumstance, the determination of whether to sentence the defendant to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole depends on the section 190.3 factors. Among these factors is factor (a): The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the instant proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1. Accordingly, there was nothing improper about the prosecutor's emphasizing that defendant murdered McDermott while he was doing his job as a taxicab driver, as this was a circumstance of the charged crime. Section 190.25, subdivision (c) specifically provides, Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the charging of any [other] special circumstance. While the statute does not authorize the death penalty, it does not prohibit that penalty if other special circumstances are proved. (3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Punishment, § 459, p. 612.) If we were to accept defendant's argument, it would turn the circumstance of killing a taxi driver on duty, a fact the Legislature has deemed worthy of special sanction (albeit less than some other special circumstances), into a shield from liability. If the Legislature had never enacted section 190.25, the prosecutor still would have been free to argue that the circumstances of the killing, which included the killing of a taxi driver doing his job, supported a death verdict. (§ 190.3, factor (a).) There would be no basis for reversal, as both the multiple-murder and robbery-murder special-circumstance findings were valid. By contrast, according to defendant, because the Legislature decided the killing of a taxi driver supported a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, we must now reverse. We decline to infer such an exculpatory effect from the Legislature's decision to increase the penalty for murdering transportation workers in cases where there are no other special circumstances.
Defendant asserts a violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the California Constitution, because the trial court instructed the jury that evidence had been introduced to show defendant had four prior convictions (which the jury had previously determined), including battery on a police officer. (§ 243, subd. (c).) The jury was further instructed that before it could consider any alleged crime as an aggravating circumstance, it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in fact convicted of the prior crime. Defendant now claims this instruction was error, because there was insufficient evidence the police officer suffered injury within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (c). A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction, but must overcome a strong presumption of constitutional validity. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1013, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Defendant has never established the invalidity of his prior conviction, and therefore the instruction was proper.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing Thomas Carter to testify about the impact of Peter Baeza's death. We conclude the trial court properly admitted the testimony. Carter testified that because he suffered from a seizure disorder, nobody would give him a jobexcept Baeza, who treated him like a son. Baeza helped Carter in getting financial assistance for his disability. Baeza treated Carter like a human being, whereas others did not. Prior to Baeza's death, Carter's seizures had improved and were almost gone. Since Baeza's death, Carter lost his job and was unable to find any other work. His physical condition deteriorated, and his fiancee left him. Baeza extended credit to many elderly people. Defendant contends the evidence should have been excluded because Carter was not a relative of Baeza's. The United States Supreme Court has not restricted the admissibility of victim impact evidence to relatives, however. The court has recognized the People are entitled to show the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720.) Furthermore, the separate opinions in Payne recognized the broad scope of victim impact evidence. The jury may know the full extent of the harm caused by the crime, including its impact on the victim's family and community.  ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 830, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (cone. opn. of O'Connor, J.), italics added.) Murderers know their victims probably ha[ve] close associates, `survivors,' who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death.... [T]hey know that their victims are not human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or friends or dependents. ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 838, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (cone. opn. of Souter, J.), italics added.) We therefore have drawn from Payne that it is proper to refer to the status of the victim and the effect of his loss on friends, loved ones, and the community as a whole. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 236, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) Defendant's argument thus must rest on a purported distinction between the admissibility of evidence describing the murder's impact on nonrelatives, which we have permitted, and testimony by nonrelatives, to which defendant now objects. This distinction is unsound, however, and would prove unworkable in cases where the only available witnesses were not formally related to the victim. We therefore hold the trial court properly admitted the testimony of Thomas Carter.
During the penalty phase deliberations, the jury passed a note to the court stating, We, the jury in the above entitled cause request the following: `If a juror(s) comes to the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances far outweigh the mitigating circumstances must the juror(s) then automatically choose the death penalty?'  The court answered by reading an excerpt from CALJIC No. 8.88. [8] Defendant asserts this reading violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and sections 7, 15, and 17 of article I of the California Constitution. Defendant contends the trial court failed to correctly answer the jury and should have instead given a shorter answer: No. The instruction is a correct statement of law, however, and if defendant favored further clarification, he needed to request it. His failure to do so waives this claim. ( Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1192, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.)
Defendant finally raises numerous challenges to the constitutionality of California's capital procedures. We have rejected these claims and do so again. Accordingly, we reiterate the following holdings: California's death penalty law sufficiently narrows the class of death-eligible defendants. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 676, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) The law does not impose overly broad death-eligibility for felony murder. ( Lewis, at p. 676, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; Anderson, at p. 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) The discretion exercised by California prosecutors is proper. ( Lewis, at p. 676, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; Anderson, at p. 601, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 462, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) A trial court need not instruct the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (1) the existence of aggravating circumstances except other crimes evidence; (2) that aggravation outweighs mitigation; and (3) that death is the appropriate penalty ( Anderson, at p. 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347). The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29), and we perform intracase proportionality review to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to defendant's personal culpability. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1269, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Section 190.3, factor (a) is not impermissibly vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-980, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; Anderson, at p. 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) It also does not require written findings of aggravating factors ( Tuilaepa, at pp. 975-980, 114 S.Ct. 2630; Anderson, at p. 601, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347), bar the consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity ( Tuilaepa, at pp. 976-977, 114 S.Ct. 2630; Anderson, at p. 601, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 69, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224), or require instruction as to which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating ( Anderson, at p. 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130). The passing of time between conviction and execution does not violate the federal Constitution ( Ochoa, at pp. 462-464, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78), and lethal injection is a constitutional means of execution ( Ochoa, at p. 464, 110 Cal. Rptr .2d 324, 28 P.3d 78).