Opinion ID: 2218955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did certain statements by Estate's counsel during closing argument constitute grounds for a mistrial?

Text: Jensen argues that trial counsel for the Estate (Mines) improperly requested a certain dollar amount for a damage award. Jensen further argues that a one million dollar damage award by the jury was not justified or supported by evidence produced at trial. Estate's counsel during closing argument twice requested a certain dollar value to be awarded from the jury in damages. He expressed: Cars cost a lot. Education costs a lot. It costs a lot to raise children, take care of them. I'm going to try to put a figure on it and, you know, whatever you decide, I'm sure the family's going to feel was very fair. And when you do this, we're not asking for sympathy. We're asking for justice, and I'm going to ask you to give the children for the loss of their mother for the pecuniary loss 50,000 a year for 20 years until they reach the age of maturity. (Emphasis added.) It appears that by multiplication that this comes to the exact amount awarded by the jury, a million dollars. However, Estate offered no testimony by expert witness to opine on the monetary value for the pecuniary loss of the decedent's services. These statements on the future pecuniary value of the loss of decedent's services were obviously based on Estate's own calculations. We held in Binegar v. Day, 80 S.D. 141, 151, 120 N.W.2d 521, 527 (1963) that an attorney cannot make his closing argument ... an avenue for the presentation of unsworn testimony. On one occasion, in a limited holding, this Court permitted unsworn testimony by an attorney during closing argument concerning damages. In Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 825 (S.D.1991), we held Given the nature of the services provided and the absence of a well-established market to determine the cost of such services, we cannot say it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion ... to permit Stormo's attorney to illustrate how such damages might be calculated. This all pertained to past services. The service in question was home health care. Furthermore, the Stormo jury actually heard evidence as to the amount of past services rendered by three lay witnesses and was asked to determine an award for those services. Here, however, He Crow provided only conjecture for unascertained future services. Posed before this Court is this specific damage issue: In closing argument, may counsel request the jury to award a specific amount, without benefit of having presented specific evidence or testimony regarding the pecuniary value of decedent's services? In wrongful death actions, plaintiff has the burden of proving the pecuniary loss resulting from the death of the decedent. Flagtwet v. Smith, 393 N.W.2d 452, 455 (S.D.1986) (citing Gilbert v. Root, 294 N.W.2d 431 (S.D.1980)). The amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact. This Court reviews the issue on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard. Pope v. Brown, 357 N.W.2d 510 (S.D.1984). Damages must be established by facts, not by legal argument alone. In the present case, the Estate, while listing the decedent's services, made no attempt during trial to put any monetary figure on their value. Estate presented no evidence showing actual economic loss. Thus, a jury had no basis upon which to reasonably assess the speculative value of the loss of a pecuniary value of decedent's services. See generally, Flagtwet v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 188, 191-93 (S.D.1985) (trial court did not commit clear error in adopting expert witness testimony on computation of economic loss of decedent); Jennings v. Hodges, 80 S.D. 582, 129 N.W.2d 59 (1964). We hold that it was clear error for the trial court to allow Estate's counsel to request a certain damage award amount in closing argument, under the state of the evidence. We reverse and remand on the issue of damages for a determination of a damage award, if any, in a new trial.