Opinion ID: 66378
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Littleton

Text: Finally, Appellants claim that Littleton’s conduct as special judge is not entitled to judicial immunity, because his appointment was found to be improper, depriving him of subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude that Littleton had sufficient subject matter jurisdiction for immunity purposes. A special judge or similar delegate is entitled to judicial immunity when his actions are “taken in good faith and within the scope of authority granted[.]” Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, Littleton was appointed by a general standing order to “possess all powers and perform all the duties of . . . Youth Court Judge in all matters” in which Osborne was unable to serve due to illness or absences, under section 43-21-113. He was also specifically appointed in this case by Judge Osborne. Littleton exercised this authority by presiding over Kemp’s assault case until the Mississippi Supreme Court found that his appointment was made in error. Although Littleton’s appointment and detention order were later vacated by the Mississippi Supreme Court, it does not follow that he lacked all jurisdiction. See Holloway, 765 F.2d at 523. 2 Indeed, the Court there noted that summary punishment for constructive contempt is unconstitutional. Id. at 299. 7 No. 08-60883 Indeed, Mississippi courts have long held that the acts of a de facto judge are valid, whether or not she was properly appointed or qualified for the office. See, e.g., Nelson v. Mississippi, 626 So. 2d 121, 125 (Miss. 1993); Upchurch v. City of Oxford, 17 So. 2d 204, 205 (Miss. 1944); Bird v. Mississippi, 122 So. 539, 540 (Miss. 1929)). In Nelson v. Mississippi, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered whether a conviction could be collaterally attacked because the special judge who presided over the case was improperly appointed under the applicable state statute. Nelson, 626 So. 2d at 124. The appellant there claimed that the improperly-appointed special judge had no power to act and, accordingly, the plea and sentence should be vacated. Id. Refusing to vacate the conviction and sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court reaffirmed that: one who acts pursuant to color of authority, though without legal authority, nevertheless performs valid acts. Any challenge regarding the validity of [the] actor’s appointment must be brought against the actor in proceedings contesting the right to office. Id. at 125. We also find instructive the Mississippi Court of Appeals’s analysis in McDonald v. McDonald, 850 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). There, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Chief Justice appointed a special judge under a statute that the appellant claimed was unconstitutional. Id. at 1186.3 The appellant argued that the special judge was therefore improperly appointed, voiding his subsequent custody order. Id. The appellate court deemed the constitutional argument waived, but opined that: [E]ven were we to find that there were flaws in the procedure, the appointment was pursuant to law and made Griffin at least a de facto judge, whose orders are valid until the issue of authority is properly raised and determined[.] 3 The appellant urged that the Mississippi constitution gives the governor sole authority to appoint a special judge after a recusal. Id. 8 No. 08-60883 Id. at 1187. The court further explained that a de facto officer in Mississippi is: one who exercises the powers and discharges the functions of an office, being then in possession of the same under color of authority, but without actual right thereto . . . . It is well settled in this state that acts of a de facto judge are valid, regardless of whether he was properly appointed or qualified or not. Id. (quoting Crocker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 346 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Miss. 1977)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Since Littleton was empowered generally to act as a youth court judge whenever Osborne declared himself unable to serve under Mississippi Code § 4321-113 and was specifically ordered to preside over Kemp’s case, and because Mississippi law deems the actions of an improperly-appointed special judge valid until the issue of his authority is determined, we conclude that Littleton here did not act with a clear absence of jurisdiction. Despite the fact that his actions were later voided by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Littleton had sufficient subject matter jurisdiction to support judicial immunity.