Opinion ID: 1970305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prejudice to Opposing Party Trial Attorney as Trial Witness

Text: The duty of a witness to state the objective truth when testifying is fundamentally different from the duty of a trial advocate to represent his or her client zealously within the bounds of the law. The personal credibility of a witness is always at issue and often subjected to vigorous cross-examination for purposes of impeachment. A trial advocate may not vouch for the credibility of a witness or state a personal belief in the merit of his or her client's position. Del.R.Prof.C. 3.4(e). See Jardel Co. v. Hughes, Del.Supr., 523 A.2d 518 (1987); Saunders v. State, Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 623 (1984); Joseph v. Monroe, Del. Supr., 419 A.2d 927 (1980); and Hooks v. State, Del.Supr., 416 A.2d 189 (1980). In fact, one of the rationales for prohibiting the dual lawyer-witness situation in a contested proceeding is to prevent confusion by the trier of fact with regard to the separate roles of an advocate and a witness. That rationale is explained as follows: Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's right in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. Delaware and Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7 (commentary). The interest of the opposing party protected by Rule 3.7 is parallel to that protected by Rule 3.4(e), which forbids an advocate from voicing personal opinions about the merits of a cause. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 680 (2d ed. 1993). Rule 3.7 and Rule 3.4(e) both prohibit the mixing of advocacy and testimony. Id. There are multiple threats to the integrity of the judicial proceedings if a trial advocate also testifies as a trial witness regarding a contested issue, e.g., (i) the attorney may either be accused of distorting the truth for the client's benefit or testifying truthfully to the client's detriment; (ii) the attorney may, perhaps even inadvertently, interject unsworn testimony into the cross-examination of other witnesses; (iii) the attorney may be called upon by other evidence to argue his or her own credibility to the trier of fact; (iv) the attorney may, in effect, give unsworn testimony during arguments to the trial judge and/or jury. Under the facts of this case, the centrality of Murphy's testimony to the contested issues of undue influence and testamentary capacity mandated his withdrawal as trial attorney. [4] Del.R.Prof.C. 1.16(a)(1); 3.4(e); and 3.7. Unlike other members of the Delaware Bar confronted by the same ethical obligation in the past, Murphy failed to recognize his duty as a lawyer/witness to withdraw, even after opposing counsel called it to his attention. Martin v. State, Del. Supr., 433 A.2d 1025, 1035 (1981). See also, e.g., State v. Bailey, Del.Super., 519 A.2d 132, 133 (1986). That is why trial judges have the power to disqualify trial counsel, when necessary, to preserve the integrity of the adversary process in the actions before them. Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221-22.