Opinion ID: 3185948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Big Horn’s FDIC Certificate

Text: Although this circuit has not yet considered a hearsay challenge to the admission into evidence of the content of an FDIC insurance certificate, several of our sister circuits have. Each has rejected the hearsay objection, albeit for differing reasons. The First Circuit affirmed the admission of an FDIC certificate to prove insurance coverage under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), the business-records exception. See United States v. Albert, 773 F.2d 386, 388–89 (1st Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit has likewise held that an FDIC certificate qualifies as a business record, see United States v. Riley, 435 F.2d 725, 726 (6th Cir. 1970), but it also has held one admissible as a public record under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), see United States v. Arthur, 822 F.2d 60 at  (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished). And the Ninth Circuit has held that the certificate is not hearsay because it is a “verbal act.” See United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d 157, 160–61 (9th Cir. 1993). The parties have not cited nor have we found any case holding that FDIC certificates are inadmissible hearsay. For the following reasons, we reject Defendant’s contention that they are. The Ninth Circuit may well be correct that the assertion of insurance coverage in an FDIC certificate is not hearsay. The rule against hearsay does not apply to “verbal acts . . . in which the statement itself affects the legal rights of the parties or is a R. Evid. 1004(a). Would the dissent nevertheless bar the testimony as hearsay? (The dissent agrees that Defendant has forfeited the best-evidence argument.) 7 circumstance bearing on conduct affecting their rights.” Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules, subdivision (c) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. (“If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”). The issue is whether evidence that the statement was made is in itself relevant to a material issue in the case. For example, the statement may be the predicate for a defamation claim; if so, the statement is not being offered for its truth (it is actionable because it is false) and is not hearsay. Or a promise to do something may be offered into evidence to prove the existence of a contract even if the promisor was insincere in making the promise. The promise is not offered into evidence to prove the “truth” of the promisor’s statement. The promise itself has independent legal significance, so there is no hearsay issue. Cf. Creaghe v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 323 F.2d 981, 984 (10th Cir. 1963) (“The hearsay rule does not exclude relevant testimony as to what the contracting parties said with respect to the making or the terms of an oral agreement. The presence or absence of such words and statements of themselves are part of the issues in the case.”). In both circumstances, the evidence of the statement is not being used to prove the truth of some assertion but “merely to show that it was actually made.” 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 801.11[3] (Mark S. Brodin ed., 2d ed. 2015). Apparently on that basis the Ninth Circuit wrote, “Like a written contract that memorializes the fact of a legal agreement, the [FDIC] certificate memorializes the fact of the legal relationship of insurer and insured.” 8 Bellucci, 995 F.2d at 161. If the certificate has independent legal significance—say, a bank’s deposits are insured if and only if the certificate is issued (regardless of whether the premium was paid or the coverage was approved by the proper official)—then we could comfortably conclude that the statement of coverage on the certificate is not hearsay. The statement would not be evidence of coverage; it would be what effectuates coverage. But we need not resolve the legal effect of the certificate itself and whether its content has independent legal significance. Even if the FDIC certificate is merely evidence of—that is, an assertion of—coverage, it easily qualifies as a public record under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), because it officially reports that the FDIC has initiated coverage. See Arthur, 822 F.2d 60 at . Under the Rule 803(8) exception to the hearsay rule, “[a] record or statement of a public office,” is admissible if “it sets out . . . the office’s activities . . . and . . . the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” There is no question that the certificate is a record or statement of the FDIC or that the FDIC is a public office. And the certificate clearly sets out the FDIC’s action—providing insurance to depositors of the institution named in the certificate. The certificate therefore satisfies Rule 803(8). See Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 542 (4th Cir. 2007) (county tax assessment, offered to prove home value, was properly admitted under Rule 803(8)); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (certificate of correction issued by United States Patent & 9 Trademark Office admissible under Rule 803(8)); United States v. Kuzmenko, No. 2:13cr-00062 JAM, 2014 WL 1334003, at  (E.D. Cal. April 3, 2014) (driver’s license). Foundation testimony is usually unnecessary for admissibility under Rule 803(8). See 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 803.10[2] (Mark S. Brodin ed., 2d ed. 2015) (“Since the assurances of accuracy are generally greater for public records than for regular business records, the proponent is usually not required to establish their admissibility through foundation testimony.”).