Opinion ID: 409582
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CHAOS-type surveillance

Text: 85 The district court rejected appellants' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief directed at Operation CHAOS and similar intelligence gathering activities on the ground that they were based upon merely hypothetical or speculative harm which is insufficient to support the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief. 93 Appellants argue that this ruling, which resulted in a grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees as to the CHAOS claims, was erroneous because (1) under current executive policy (the Executive Order governing foreign intelligence activities) there continues to be a threat of unlawful CIA surveillance of domestic political activities, in which some appellants are still engaged; and (2) even if there is no basis for a permanent injunction against the CIA, a declaration that past surveillance under Operation CHAOS was unconstitutional does not depend upon any showing of present or threatened future harm and so should have been granted. 86 Unlike their contentions based upon watchlisting or the general terms of Executive Orders 12036 and 12333, appellants' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief from Operation CHAOS or similar programs directed at discovering foreign influence upon domestic dissident activity are based upon demonstrated injury in fact. The CIA has conceded that various identified and unidentified plaintiffs here were subjected to surveillance under Operation CHAOS. 94 Therefore, it is evident that at least some of the appellants-the nine identified as subjects of CHAOS surveillance 95 -have standing in the constitutional sense to challenge the constitutionality of that surveillance and to seek appropriate relief upon proof of a violation of their rights. 96 87 The factual basis of appellants' claims concerning the gathering and compilation of nonpublic information consists of a number of redacted CHAOS documents 97 which fairly indicate that the nine identified appellants were the subjects of CHAOS information collection in varying degrees of intensity. These documents were segregated by appellants and filed under seal with the district court pursuant to an order of April 8, 1980 requiring plaintiffs to submit documents supporting their statement of material facts as to which there exists no genuine dispute. 98 Although the bulk of the redacted documents by themselves provide no substantial basis for concluding that the information contained therein was not public information, 99 a number of them do provide a basis for arguing that the surveillance which produced their contents triggered fourth amendment protections. 100 88 Despite the sparse nature of these submissions, we cannot say that given these documented instances of CHAOS surveillance, plus whatever evidence appellants could adduce relating to the circumstances surrounding the subject activities, appellants are incapable as a matter of law of demonstrating at least a prima facie case of fourth amendment violations. 101 The question therefore reduces to one of the availability of the remedies to which appellants claim entitlement. The district court held that plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are not based on a cognizable danger of recurrent violation, only on the speculative possibility thereof, 102 and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on those claims. We turn to the question of whether that judgment was an abuse of the district court's discretion. 89
90 In our view the district court's decision to deny injunctive relief against the defendants was clearly in accord with established principles. Even assuming that appellants could make out a showing of liability on their fourth amendment or statutory claims, it would have been an abuse of discretion to enter an injunction restraining future foreign intelligence gathering operations conducted at the behest of the President. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2326, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). There is nothing in the record that indicates appellants' ability to fulfill the traditional burden of proving the threat of imminent, specific and irreparable harm. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88, 94 S.Ct. 937, 951, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). 91 Appellants concede that Operation CHAOS was terminated nearly a decade ago. It cannot escape judicial notice that the United States has in the intervening years experienced no domestic political strife approaching the magnitude of that which prompted two Presidents to seek the information which Operation CHAOS was designed to provide. Congressional response to the revelation of CHAOS and similar intelligence gathering activities has also altered the context in which appellants' arguments are made-a principal example being the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 103 92 Although past surveillance gives the nine identified appellants standing to complain of injury, past injury alone is not sufficient to merit the award of relief against future conduct. A great deal more is required, particularly when the relief sought would broadly enjoin the conduct of vital governmental functions which require the exercise of discretion in a myriad of unpredictable circumstances. 104 (J)udicial intervention to prevent potential injury from prospective government misconduct is only justified when such misconduct is imminent, not merely hypothetical. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 589 n. 14 (D.C.Cir.1978) (citing cases), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943, 99 S.Ct. 2160, 60 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1979). To be entitled to invoke the injunctive remedy, a plaintiff must show not only that he personally faces an imminent threat of harm but also that the threatened harm is irreparable. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 593 F.2d 1030, 1067 (D.C.Cir.1978) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1075 (Robinson, J., concurring). See generally id. at 1067-70. In short, (t)he mere possibility of future misconduct is simply not enough. Id. at 1069. 93 Appellants' allegation to the effect that six of their number are still engaged in active opposition to prevailing United States foreign policy, and are therefore more likely (than, presumably, citizens in general) to be subject to unlawful government surveillance aimed at domestic dissidents 105 adds nothing to their case. The fact that an individual is more likely than a member of the population at large to suffer a hypothesized injury, while perhaps lending support to his standing to complain, makes the injury no less hypothetical. 94 Appellants' principal argument against the district court's denial of injunctive relief appears to assume that the district court premised its judgment on the view that their claim was moot. 106 They consequently direct their attack against that premise. We think appellants' focus is misleading in this regard, as it seeks to confuse the doctrine of mootness in the context of injunction proceedings, which goes to the justiciability of the underlying claim, with the substantive principles governing the grant of equitable relief. 95 Appellants place primary emphasis on the rule of United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953), which held that the burden is upon the defendant to show that a claim for injunctive relief has become moot in the Article III sense. But that opinion belies the conclusion that mootness was its sole concern; the Court was concerned with the requirements of equity as well as with those of the Constitution. It drew the distinction explicitly: 96 Along with its power to hear the case, the court's power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct.... But the moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. 97 Id. at 633, 73 S.Ct. at 897 (emphasis added). Thus, while the burden is (as appellants contend) upon the defendant to show that a claim for injunctive relief has become moot, it lies with the plaintiff to show entitlement to the remedy. 98 Even were we to agree that the termination of Operation CHAOS did not render the case moot in the Article III sense of that term, then, that would not dispose of the issue of whether coercive relief was mandated here. 107 For the reasons set forth by Judge Wilkey in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra, we affirm the district judge's exercise of her equitable discretion here. 99
100 Our conclusions with respect to appellants' claims for injunctive relief-that while they are justiciable, they were correctly denied as a matter of equitable discretion-do not dispose of these issues as they are presented by appellants' claims for a declaration of the unlawfulness of CHAOS-type programs. The district court had the obligation to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254, 88 S.Ct. 391, 398, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). 108 101 The essence of the declaratory remedy 109 is affording a form of relief, on the basis of acts either completed or threatened, which will operate to adjust the rights of the parties in cases where the award of a prospective coercive judgment would, for any of a number of reasons, be inappropriate. 110 Thus it is the case, in contrast to the injunctive remedy, that a declaratory judgment may be appropriate even in a case where, due to a change of circumstances in the interval between the complained-of injury (or threat of injury) and the prayer for relief, there is no showing of a likelihood of imminent future harm or of the irreparable nature of the threatened injury. 111 Particularly where the parties are involved in an ongoing relationship that may present the opportunity for future disagreement-contracts of insurance being perhaps the classic example 112 -an adjudication may be appropriate. 113 102 The foregoing considerations are, however, always subject to the minimum requirement of Article III. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 506, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961). As a result, notwithstanding the independent stature and comparatively broad discretionary availability 114 of declaratory relief in the jurisprudence of federal remedies, nor the ability of appellants to demonstrate injury in fact here, the constitutional as well as statutory confinement of the federal judicial power in actions for declaratory relief to cases of actual controversy requires that attention be paid to the relationship of the parties as it subsists at the time it comes before us. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1216, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969). 115 103 Appellants contend that although both Operation CHAOS and the domestic unrest associated with the Vietnam era have ceased, the fact that the executive branch has not renounced all claims of power under the Constitution to conduct CHAOS-type programs in the future compels the conclusion that a live controversy still exists. This argument confuses the injury-in-fact requirement necessary to standing with the liveness showing necessary to avoid a dismissal for mootness. Both are constitutional conditions on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. Thus, appellants' assertion that here the necessary case or controversy exists because defendants' actions have affected plaintiffs adversely 116 demonstrates only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for maintaining their action. 104 The controlling authority on the question of mootness in cases where declaratory relief is sought is Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). 117 There an employer whose employees had gone out on strike after the expiration of a collective bargaining contract brought suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of state welfare laws which made the striking employees eligible for public assistance payments. The state programs were alleged to violate federal labor policy and the policies of the Social Security Act. When the strike ended before the district court could consider the claims for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, the court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 105 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the prayer for an injunction was mooted by the employees' return to work, id. at 121-22, 94 S.Ct. at 1697-1698, the request for declaratory relief remained viable. The parties, the Court held, may still retain sufficient interests and injury as to justify the award of declaratory relief. Id. at 122, 94 S.Ct. at 1698. 106 Although the result in Super Tire was in favor of federal jurisdiction, critical to the Court's determination that the case for declaratory relief was not moot was the finding that the challenged public assistance programs constituted a government policy which was fixed and definite, id. at 124, 94 S.Ct. at 1699, and so not likely to be frequently altered by the executive depending on changing economic circumstances. Justice Brennan, in writing for the Court, distinguished cases in which the injury asserted took effect only upon the exercise of the responsible government official's discretion. Discussing two prior decisions in which the Court had ruled actions by employers moot, 118 he stated: 107 The governmental action challenged (in those cases) was the authority to seize the public utility, and it was clear that a seizure would not recur except in circumstances where (a) there was another strike or stoppage, and (b) in the judgment of the Governor, the public interest required it. The question was thus posed in a situation where the threat of governmental action was two steps removed from reality. This made the recurrence of a seizure so remote and speculative that there was no tangible prejudice to the existing interests of the parties and, therefore, there was a want of a subject matter on which any judgment of this Court could operate. Oil Workers, 361 U.S., at 371 (80 S.Ct., at 396). 108 Id. 416 U.S. at 123, 94 S.Ct. at 1698. Turning to the facts of Super Tire, it was observed that 109 The present case has a decidedly different posture. As in Harris and Oil Workers, the strike here was settled before the litigation reached this Court. But, unlike those cases, the challenged governmental action has not ceased. The New Jersey governmental action does not rest on the distant contingencies of another strike and the discretionary act of an official. Rather, New Jersey has declared positively that able-bodied striking workers who are engaged, individually and collectively, in an economic dispute with their employer are eligible for economic benefits. This policy is fixed and definite. It is not contingent upon executive discretion. 110 Id. at 123-24, 94 S.Ct. at 1698-1699. 111 The Court's resolution of the mootness question in Super Tire rested, therefore, on its finding that the governmental policy challenged in the original complaint was one essentially carved in stone and self-executing in nature-in short, one not contingent upon executive discretion. 119 It was crucial to the result that the source of complaint was a fixed policy directive of the government. 120 By contrast, even if the current status of executive thinking on foreign intelligence gathering, as manifest in Executive Order 12333, constituted a continuing and brooding presence, cast(ing) what may well be a substantial adverse effect on appellants' protected activities, 121 the absence of any reason to believe that such a policy is being unlawfully pursued, coupled with the virtual tautology that no foreign intelligence policy could be one not contingent upon executive (i.e., Presidential) discretion, places appellants' claims for declaratory relief in the category of moot controversies. 122