Opinion ID: 1738770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: does the law authorize the dismissal of spiller and prohibit a judgment being entered against her?

Text: ¶ 27. It is undisputed that at the time of Stewart's injury, Doris Spiller was acting in her capacity as an employee of the City of Jackson. However, Stewart claims that the MTCA does not preclude actions against employees in their representative capacity, rather it expressly provides for their joinder and for judgments against them, citing Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2) (Supp.2001): An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee's duties. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2)(Supp.2001). Stewart claims that even though Spiller cannot be held personally liable, the statute permits joinder of Spiller in her representative capacity, and that she is a proper party and may have a judgment entered against her. Stewart further contends that the only protection the MTCA provides Spiller is that her capacity in the litigation is only as a representative, and that the City of Jackson, Mississippi must pay any judgment against her. The pertinent part of the MTCA reads as follows: [F]rom and after October 1, 1993, as to political subdivisions, ... every governmental entity shall be responsible for providing a defense to its employees and for the payment of any judgment in any civil action or the settlement of any claim against an employee for money damages arising out of any act or omission within the course and scope of his employment.... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(3)(Supp.2001). ¶ 28. The City of Jackson responds by arguing that the Stewart sued Spiller in her individual capacity, and since no employee can be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee's duties, summary judgment was properly granted. The complaint simply names Spiller as a citizen of Jackson and states that she may be served with process at her place of employment, the City of Jackson. ¶ 29. The parties cite no other authority for their argument. Instead, they each rely upon their own interpretation of the statute. Although this question has not been directly considered by this Court, we look to our decisions in which the case against the individual employee was dismissed after the employer/sovereign was dismissed. ¶ 30. In Duncan ex rel. Duncan v. Chamblee, 757 So.2d 946 (Miss.1999), we dealt with the situation where the plaintiff (Duncan) voluntarily dismissed the school district from the suit, leaving the teacher (Chamblee) who allegedly administered excessive corporal punishment as the sole defendant. Id. at 947. We held: Duncan had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because she alleges that Chamblee was acting within the course and scope of her employment. This is fatal to Duncan's claim because Chamblee cannot then be individually liable. Chamblee would then fall within the protection of the MTCA along with her employer/sovereign who was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by Duncan. Id. at 951. ¶ 31. Two years later we dealt with this same issue, citing with approval our decision in Duncan: This Court has dealt with the issue and affirmed the dismissal of a suit against an individual employee acting within the scope of her employment, after the dismissal of the employing subdivision ... This Court has been consistent in rejecting the viability of claims against public employees where their political subdivision employer has been eliminated as a defendant. Cotton v. Paschall, 782 So.2d 1215, 1218 (Miss.2001). In Cotton, the school district was dismissed from the lawsuit, and the plaintiff did not appeal that decision. Id. at 1217. The plaintiff stipulated that an employee acting within the course and scope of her employment is immune from personal liability, but argue[d] that a judgment may be taken against an employee and that judgment must be satisfied by the employing governmental entity. Id. We rejected that argument. However, in the case sub judice, the governmental entity has not been dismissed, so Spiller does not come under the protection of Duncan and Cotton. Under the plain language of the MTCA, even though Spiller may not be personally liable for her acts and omissions occurring within the course and scope of her duties as an employee, she still may be joined in the action against her employer, the City of Jackson, if her acts or omissions are ones for which the City of Jackson may be liable. Thus, we also reverse and remand the summary judgment granted in favor of Doris Spiller.