Opinion ID: 2318562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carter's Elaborated Remonstrance

Text: Carter takes umbrage with Arthur's misapplication of Maryland law, as well as its deleterious effect on thousands of Maryland consumers harmed by title insurance overcharges. In his estimation, the exclusive/primary/concurrent jurisdiction paradigm is inapplicable because the Legislature gave the MIA no jurisdiction whatsoever over a claim such as his, however characterized. Carter argues that the Insurance Article authorizes the Commissioner, but not an aggrieved consumer, to file such a complaint against a title insurer. See Brief of Appellant at 22 (stating that Huntington presum[es], but never explain[s] how a person who believes an insurer has charged an excessive title insurance premium can file a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner); see Brief of Appellant at 22 n. 7 (stating that the Commissioner may hold a hearing only where the complainant has been aggrieved by an action of the Commissioner, not where, like here, the complainant has been aggrieved by an action of [a title insurer]). Arguing presumably in the alternative, Carter suggests that even if the Legislature granted the MIA administrative jurisdiction, it specified clearly in the statute that such jurisdiction is concurrent. To support his contention, Carter points to § 27-103(e) [8] and our interpretations of that section. Brief of Appellant at 14 (The [Insurance Article] is quite specific in granting consumers, like Mr. Carter, the right to judicially pursue the recovery of excessive premium charges.); See Brief of Appellant at 13 (quoting Mardirossian v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 376 Md. 640, 645, 831 A.2d 60, 64 (2003), for the proposition that the administrative remedy under §§ 27-103 through 27-105 is neither exclusive nor primary). Thus, Carter considers an analysis of the Zappone factors unnecessary. See Zappone, 349 Md. at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068 ([S]ometimes the Legislature will set forth its intent as to whether an administrative remedy is to be exclusive, or primary, or simply a fully concurrent option....). Then, presupposing that the Legislature was less than clear in the statute with regard to its jurisdictional assignment, Carter concludes that analysis of the Zappone factors bends in his favor and the presumption of primary jurisdiction is rebutted. Carter posits that, generally, the MIA is capable of providing only limited, as opposed to comprehensive, relief. [9] In this particular case, the remedies available to the MIA are especially meagerCarter is not alleging some isolated instance of a mere overpayment, but a practice of intentional and widespread deception ... for which [a] mere[ ] ... refund ... is clearly not an adequate remedy for the consumer harms alleged. (Emphasis added.) Carter emphasizes also that the MIA, on at least one other occasion, viewed its jurisdiction as concurrent in analogous circumstances. In its amicus brief filed in Zappone, the MIA argued that [w]here the conduct of a licensee is both prohibited by the Insurance [Article] and ... [the] common law ..., the Insurance Commissioner and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear the claim. Brief for Maryland Insurance Administration, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998) (No. 133), at 10. Carter presupposes, without more, that the factual differences between Zappone and this case present no obstacle to the continuing persuasiveness of the MIA's amicus brief. [10] Carters avers additionally that his causes of action stand separate and apart from the Insurance Article, even [though his] claim seeks to recover money paid in violation of a statute. Brief of Appellant at 17 (quoting Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 632 n. 11 805 A.2d 1061, 1077 n. 11 (2002) for the proposition that an action to recover excess interest, even when the applicable legal interest rate is set by statute, is a common law action). Lastly, Carter argues that [t]he enforcement of established rates requires no expertise of the Commissioner. The rate is the rate. It has already been reviewed and approved by the Commissioner. Mr. Carter has no grievance with the Commissioner or with the rate itself, a fact which constitutes a necessary predicate to even request [an administrative] ... hearing. But most assuredly, there is no expertise required of the Commissioner to confirm that Mr. Carter was charged a premium in excess of the approved rate any more than there would be for the Motor Vehicle Administration to confirm that a motorist exceeded the posted speed limit. B. The Negligent Misrepresentation Claim For reasons to be explained infra, we need not dwell on the parties' arguments concerning the negligent misrepresentation claim. Suffice it to say that Huntington insists Carter failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he did not plead the knowing falsity of the relevant statements on the HUD-1 form. In Carter's eyes, it was enough that Huntington knew or should have known that he qualified for the reduced rate, but charged the higher rate nevertheless.