Opinion ID: 1748866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gaming Associations

Text: Two gaming associations have attempted to enroll in this litigation: the Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association (iMEGA) and the Interactive Gaming Council (IGC). iMEGA and IGC both claim to represent registrants of some of the seized domains. They claim to have standing on behalf of their members under the doctrine of associational standing. iMEGA refuses to reveal which registrants it represents, or even how many. It simply claims to have members who registered some, but not all, of the seized domains. IGC, on behalf of its members, stakes claim to 61 seized domain names. [2] IGC is not all that clear, perhaps intentionally, about whether it represents registrants or the actual domain names. For example, on page 13 of its brief, it claims to be [r]epresenting the registrants for 61 of the 141 Domain Names. (Emphasis added.) Yet the following sentence of the brief reads, IGC identified all 61 domain names it represents.... (Emphasis added.) For purposes of this appeal, we will interpret IGC as purporting to represent registrants. The problem, however, is that IGC fails to disclose who these registrants are. Associational standing inherently depends on the membership of the association. The U.S. Supreme Court has set out three requirements for an association to have standing in federal court: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of the individual members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). In Hunt, the Court found that the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission had standing to challenge a North Carolina statute which prevented its members, Washington apple dealers, from displaying Washington apple grades. See id. at 337-45. While this Court has not held that the precise requirements of federal associational standing apply in Kentucky courts, at least the first requirement must apply. An association can have standing only if its members could have sued in their own right. Otherwise the primary requirement for standing, that the party has a real interest in the litigation, would be thwarted. In City of Ashland v. Ashland F.O.P. No. 3, 888 S.W.2d 667 (Ky.1994), this Court granted the Fraternal Order of Police standing to challenge a city ordinance that limited public employment to people living within city limits. The F.O.P. had standing because its membersthe policehad a real and substantial interest in striking the ordinance. Id. at 668. Although the ordinance only applied to new employees, other police officers depended on the quality of the new police for their own safety. Id. Such an interest conferred standing on the police association because, according to stipulation, it represented the majority of city police. Id. Unlike the F.O.P., the gaming associations in this case have failed to disclose whom they represent. While IGC claims to represent 61 of the seized domains and iMEGA purports to represent some more, this Court cannot simply take their words for it. The associations bear the burden to demonstrate that they satisfy the requirements of standing, and to do so requires proving that their members would have standing themselves. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (party invoking jurisdiction bears burden of proving standing); Am. Chemistry Council v. DOT, 468 F.3d 810, 820 (D.C.Cir.2006) (association bears burden to prove members have standing). Without even revealing any of the registrants they purport to represent, the associations cannot hope to achieve associational standing. At the very least, the identity of the party suffering an injury in fact must be firmly established. Am. Chemistry Council, 468 F.3d at 820; see also United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir.1992) (no associational standing where injured members were unidentified); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 103, 107-08 (2nd Cir.1984) (same); Revell v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., 321 Fed. App'x. 113, 117 n. 2 (3rd Cir.2009) (failure to identify affected members causes standing to evaporate quickly). But see Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 882 (11th Cir.1999) (taking contrary position). The cyber-age status of their members does not let iMEGA and IGC escape traditional standing requirements. In another suit brought on by an association of internet domain registrants, the Coalition for ICANN Transparency (CFIT) initially merely alleged vague categories of members that might suffer harm. Coalition for ICANN Transparency Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 464 F.Supp.2d 948, 956 (N.D.Cal.2006), rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.2009). Thus, associational standing had not been alleged because CFIT failed to name even one member. Id. CFIT was able to solve this problem, however, by identifying one of its members, Pool.com, Inc., which allegedly suffered injury-in-fact. Id. Here as well, the associations had every opportunity to cure their standing defects by identifying their seized members; in fact, they were ordered to do so by the Franklin Circuit Court. Refusing to follow this straightforward requirement, iMEGA and IGC do not have standing. Admittedly, in some cases the surrounding particulars may not demand that an association identify specific members. For example, in Ashland F.O.P., this Court did not discuss whether the fraternal order had identified affected members. Indeed, the Ashland F.O.P. may not have provided a membership list. But in that case it was stipulated that the F.O.P. represented the majority of the police force. 888 S.W.2d at 668. Since all members of the police could claim injury from the ordinance (albeit indirectly), it necessarily followed that the F.O.P.'s members would have had standing in their own right. Unlike in Ashland F.O.P ., there is no stipulation as to iMEGA or IGC's memberships. In fact, nothing is known about their members, other than their attorneys' vague assertions they represented some of the registrants. Moreover, notably distinct from Ashland F.O.P ., not all internet gaming registrants are affected by the seizure; only the registrants of the 141 seized domains. In cases where the harm is specific, the proof of standing must be equally specific. See Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.Supp.2d 269, 288 (D.N.J.2003). For example, in cases where only people in a certain geographical area may be harmed, a showing that members are located in that area is critical to associational standing. See id. (distinguishing AVX Corp., 962 F.2d at 117, stating, Geographic location was critical to establishing members' injury-in-fact in the environmental context....). Similarly, where, as here, the injury is limited to those whose property was actually seized, associational standing requires some assurance that members actually have an interest in the property. Thus, the associations must specifically identify some of the affected registrants they represent. This is not to say that showing associational standing requires heavy proof. On the contrary, it must simply be proven to the same extent as any other indispensable part of the plaintiffs case. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. [E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. Id. At the pleading stage, less specificity is required. At that point, an association may speak generally of the injuries to some of its members, for the presum[ption] [is] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. Id.; accord Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Buffalo v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 145 (2nd Cir.2006). By the summary judgment stage, however, more particulars regarding the association's membership must be introduced or referenced. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Buffalo, 448 F.3d at 144-45; Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 102 (2nd Cir.1984) (affirming dismissal where association indicated that it did not intend to identify any of its members who might have been harmed). Finally, before a favorable judgment can be attained, the association's general allegations of injury must clarify into concrete proof that one or more of its members has been injured. See Sierra Club, 747 F.2d at 107. By refusing] to come forward with any such showing, any claim to associational standing, and the potential for success on the merits is forfeited. See id. While the normal sequence of litigation is muddled in a writ petition, since only pleadings are filed and no discovery is allowed, the basic requisites for a judgment remain. This includes proof of standing. When associational standing is the chosen route, the writ petitioner must prove it represents at least one member with an injury in order to obtain relief. This may be done by reference to the facts in the underlying litigation or a verified assertion, such as in an affidavit, attached to the petition. Through their unwillingness to identify any of their members, iMEGA and IGC failed to meet this burden. As such, iMEGA and IGC lack standing and, therefore, their writ petition should have been denied. Writs are to be granted only as an extraordinary remedy, and certainly only when parties who have demonstrated a concrete interest are before the court. This is not to say, however, that the failure to establish standing in this writ action completely forecloses relief by way of a writ in the future. If a party that can properly establish standing comes forward, the writ petition giving rise to these proceedings could be re-filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals could then properly proceed to the merits of the issues raised, or upon a proper motion, this Court could accept transfer of the case, as the merits of the argument have already been briefed and argued before this Court. Until then, however, consideration of the merits of this matter is improper for lack of standing.