Opinion ID: 1212813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clearly Established Right to Impartial Jury Drawn from a Fair Cross-Section of the Community

Text: Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury includes the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. Id. at 530, 95 S.Ct. 692. The Court, however, impose[d] no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Id. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692. Instead, the Court held that defendants are entitled to a jury selection process that does not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof. Id. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Court clarified the rule announced in Taylor. There, the Court held that in order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must make a prima facie showing (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Id. at 364, 120 S.Ct. 1495. To meet this burden, a party need not show that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group came as a result of intentional discrimination. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n. 26, 99 S.Ct. 664. Rather, as other circuits have observed, [u]nlike the equal protection challenge, the fair cross section claim does not require a showing that the selection procedure is susceptible [to] abuse or not race-neutral; the defendant must only show that the exclusion of his or her group is `systematic.' United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246 (2d Cir.1995). Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the government to show that a significant state interest [is] manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process... that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68, 99 S.Ct. 664. Moreover, to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner need not prove that the outcome of his or her particular trial would have been substantively different had the petit jury been drawn from a representative pool. Rather, the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement is centrally concerned with insuring that the procedures employed by the state do not undermine the traditional role that juries play in our democracy and in our criminal justice system. The representativeness of the jury, drawn from all strata of our diverse society, is what inspires confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. 692; cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair.). Thus, the interference with the criminal defendant's ability or opportunity to draw a jury from a representative pool is the principal injury with which the Constitution is concerned. The holdings of Taylor and Duren, however, were not meant to usurp the traditional role of the states in determining juror qualifications. Instead, [t]he fair cross-section principle must have much leeway in application. The States must remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the community. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692.