Opinion ID: 185941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process and Sufficiency of Evidence

Text: 19 Petitioner raises several arguments. First, it contends that its redesignation as a terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution because the statute permitted the Secretary to rely upon secret evidence-the classified information that respondents refused to disclose and against which PMOI could therefore not effectively defend. We reject this contention. As noted above, that statute authorizes designation of a foreign terrorist organization when the Secretary finds three elements. As to the first, that is that the organization is a foreign organization, there is not and cannot be any dispute. The People's Mojahedin is so assuredly a foreign organization that until the Secretary's designation of the NCOR as its alias, it could not even establish a presence in the United States. See PMOI, 182 F.3d at 22-23. Nothing has changed in that regard since our prior decisions on the subject. 20 As to the second element, the PMOI advances a colorable argument: that the Secretary was able under § 1189(a)(3)(B) to consider classified information in making [this designation] and that the classified information was not subject to disclosure except to the court ex parte and in camera for purposes of this judicial review. Petitioner contends that this violates the due process standard set forth in Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C.Cir.1986), that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions. While colorable, this argument will not carry the day. 21 First, we have already set forth in NCOR the due process standards that the Secretary must meet in making designations under the statute. We held that the Constitution requires the Secretary in designating foreign terrorist organizations to provide to the potential designees, notice that the designation is impending. NCOR, 251 F.3d at 208. We further required that the Secretary must afford the potential designee an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 209 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. at 901-02). The record reflects that the Secretary complied with our instructions. 22 Granted, petitioners argue that their opportunity to be heard was not meaningful, given that the Secretary relied on secret information to which they were not afforded access. The response to this is twofold. We already decided in NCOR that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record. 251 F.3d at 207-09. We made that determination informed by the historically recognized proposition that under the separation of powers created by the United States Constitution, the Executive Branch has control and responsibility over access to classified information and has `compelling interest' in withholding national security information from unauthorized persons in the course of executive business. Dep't. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 824, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 763, 765 n. 3, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980)). In the context of another statutory scheme involving classified information, we noted the courts are often ill-suited to determine the sensitivity of classified information. United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Things that did not make sense to [a judge] would make all too much sense to a foreign counter intelligence specialist....). The Due Process Clause requires only that process which is due under the circumstances of the case. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.). We have already established in NCOR the process which is due under the circumstances of this sensitive matter of classified intelligence in the effort to combat foreign terrorism. The Secretary has complied with the standard we set forth therein, and nothing further is due. 23 However, even if we err in describing the process due, even had the Petitioner been entitled to have its counsel or itself view the classified information, the breach of that entitlement has caused it no harm. This brings us to Petitioner's statutory objection. Petitioner argues that there is not adequate record support for the Secretary's determination that it is a foreign terrorist organization under the statute. However, on this element, even the unclassified record taken alone is quite adequate to support the Secretary's determination. Indeed, as to this element — that is, that the organization engages in terrorist activities — the People's Mojahedin has effectively admitted not only the adequacy of the unclassified record, but the truth of the allegation. By statutory definition, terrorist activity is 24 any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if ... committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following: 25 (I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). 26 (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. 27 (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person. 28 (IV) An assassination. 29 (V) The use of any — 30 (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 31 (b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal monetary gain), 32 with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. 33 (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 34 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000 & Supp. 2003). By its own admission, the PMOI has 35 (1) attacked with mortars the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office; (2) assassinated a former Iranian prosecutor and killed his security guards; (3) killed the Deputy Chief of the Iranian Joint Staff Command, who was the personal military adviser to Supreme Leader Khamenei; (4) attacked with mortars the Iranian Central Command Headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Defense Industries Organization in Tehran; (5) attacked and targeted with mortars the offices of the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei, and of the head of the State Exigencies Council; (6) attacked with mortars the central headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards; (7) attacked with mortars two Revolutionary Guards Corps headquarters; and (8) attacked the headquarters of the Iranian State Security Forces in Tehran. 1 Were there no classified information in the file, we could hardly find that the Secretary's determination that the Petitioner engaged in terrorist activities is lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole, even without repairing to the classified information submitted to the court. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3)(D). 36 To summarize, the Secretary did not deprive Petitioner of any process to which it was constitutionally entitled. Even if the record supported a finding of violation of due process, such a violation would be harmless as the unaffected portion of the record is ample to support the determination made. 37 The remaining element under § 1189(a)(1) is that the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(C). The thrust of Petitioner's argument is that its allegedly terrorist acts were not acts of terrorism under the statute, because they do not meet the requirement of subsection (C). Petitioner argues that the attempt to overthrow the despotic government of Iran, which itself remains on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, is not terrorist activity, or if it is, that it does not threaten the security of the United States or its nationals. We cannot review that claim. In PMOI we expressly held that that finding is nonjusticiable. 182 F.3d at 23. As we stated in that decision, it is beyond the judicial function for a court to review foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch. Id. (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)). Even if we differed with the analysis of the prior panel of this court, which we do not, we are bound by its decision. LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C.Cir.1996) (one panel of the court does not have the authority to overrule another). In short, we find neither statutory nor due process errors in the Secretary's designation of petitioner as a foreign terrorist organization.