Opinion ID: 3026437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury’s Verdict is Supported by the Evidence

Text: The jury’s verdict on the objective reasonableness of Trooper Klem’s actions is well supported by the record. There are many facts that the jury was entitled to rely on that were not in dispute, including Bailey’s behavior prior to and during the high speed car chase that led to the George Washington Bridge. Bailey had shot and killed a police officer, had shot at another officer, had stolen a police car, had then carjacked the Camry from a rest stop on the New Jersey Turnpike, had launched a high speed chase on the Turnpike and, during that chase, had fired shots at Klem and other officers, wounding an officer and hitting Klem’s windshield. Furthermore, whether or not Klem knew exactly what had occurred, no one disputes that he came on the scene in the immediate aftermath of Bailey’s creating additional havoc by crashing into the Pathfinder. In short, no one 18 The fact that the District Court relied on Question Three as answering the qualified immunity question and entered a verdict based on Trooper Klem deserving qualified immunity is not reversible error. Because Trooper Klem was entitled to a verdict in his favor either if there was no constitutional violation or if he was entitled to qualified immunity, the error in the District Court’s analysis was harmless. Hill v. Laisz, 435 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that error is harmless where it is “highly probable” that the error did not affect the outcome of the case). 36 disputes that Bailey was actively evading arrest after committing several severe crimes, that he posed a serious danger to both the police and public, and that Klem could properly approach the scene prepared to use deadly force. In fact, Curley himself did so. He testified that, when he began to approach the Camry, his gun was drawn. The very real danger that both Curley and Klem perceived at the toll plaza was intensified by the presence of numerous innocent bystanders. Curley’s solicitude for the safety of the driver of the Pathfinder is not just commendable; it reflects the well-founded fear that people who got out of their cars were in danger of being shot. Added to all of this is the jury’s finding that, when Klem approached the wrecked Camry, he saw a toll booth attendant signaling him to look to the middle of the toll plaza. That is where Curley was standing with a gun in his hands. In Curley’s view, none of those facts is of any moment, since Klem’s failure to look into the Camry is dispositive. According to Curley, had Klem looked, he would have seen Bailey’s dead body and there would have been no confrontation.19 However, as we have stated several times, 19 This, of course, is the dissent’s view as well, post at 1112, and we do not suggest that this is illogical, only that it is not the exclusively logical view. We stated in Curley I that Klem knew there was only one suspect and, “had Klem known of Bailey’s suicide, it would have been clearly unreasonable for him later to confuse Curley with the suspect.” 298 F.3d at 281. Hence, the question of whether 37 the reasonableness of Klem’s conduct must be examined based on the totality of the circumstances, and the inquiry cannot be collapsed into a single instant, particularly not when, at that instant, Klem’s vision was being drawn by the toll booth attendant toward Curley, standing in the plaza with a gun.20 Thus, when we examine all of the facts and circumstances, the jury’s verdict that Klem acted reasonably is supported by the evidence. Klem looked in the Camry is highly relevant. But it is not outcome determinative. We did not equate looking in the Camry with knowledge of Bailey’s death, since it was conceivable that a factfinder could have decided that an objectively reasonable officer could look in the Camry and still not see Bailey, no matter how obvious the body might have been to others not in that officer’s unique position. It was also conceivable that a factfinder could conclude, as the jury apparently did, that despite Klem’s overlooking information that could have enlightened him about the suicide, his actions in totality and under the pressure of the moment were such that his failure to look in the car did not make the shooting objectively unreasonable. 20 The jury’s conclusion that Klem’s failure to look into the Camry was unreasonable is not beyond dispute. Given all else that had occurred and was occurring, it can be argued that looking at the gesticulating toll booth attendant, rather than into the car, may not have been the most reasonable action but was still within the bounds of reason. However, since we are upholding the verdict on other grounds, we do not address that issue. 38 The mistake Klem made has undoubtedly been terrible in its long-term consequences for Officer Curley and his family, and we do not for a moment discount the pain, sorrow, expense, and frustration that it has visited on them in their innocence. But a mistake, though it may be terrible in its effects, is not always the equivalent of a constitutional violation. In Curley I, we acknowledged “the great pressure and intensity inherent in a police officer’s hot pursuit of a suspect known to be armed and highly dangerous ... .” 298 F.3d at 280. That would amount to little more than lip service, were we to reverse the jury’s verdict and the District Court’s thoughtful decision on the post-trial motions. “[P]olice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Those were the circumstances facing both Trooper Klem and Officer Curley at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza. Viewed from that perspective, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, the seizure effected by the mistaken shooting was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It therefore was not a constitutional violation.