Opinion ID: 836210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: my statement to the parties

Text: My response, also communicated to the parties, challenging Justice Weaver's disclosure to the parties concerning her stock ownership is restated here as follows: [5] In light of her repeated public statements regarding standards for recusal, I regret that Justice Weaver has placed the parties in the awkward position of having to decide whether she will take part in the decision of this case notwithstanding her acknowledged financial interest as an investor in the defendant corporation. I ask that the following public information regarding Justice Weaver's stated positions on recusal be taken into consideration in making a decision on her request for remittal. While I have publicly supported the Court's more than a century old recusal policy,2 Justice Weaver has been equally publicly critical of that longstanding policy in suggesting that she subscribes to a higher standard.3 Nevertheless, Justice Weaver claims that her ownership of approximately $1,200 in defendant Dow's stock is not a `more than de minimis interest.' She has made this determination herself, which is contrary to her repeated public statements on the question of judicial recusal.4 For example, in this Court's March 18, 2009 order on ADM 2009-04 (Proposed Disqualification Rules for Justices), Justice Weaver reiterated her 2006 statement on disqualification and explained that [i]t is a most basic truth that the person who may be the least capable of recognizing a justice's actual bias and prejudice, or appearance of bias and prejudice, is the justice h[er]self.5 Presumably consistent with that sentiment, she recused herself in Kyser v. Kasson Twp ., because she has a past and current business relationship with Kasson Township Supervisor Fred Lanham and his family.6 Moreover, Justice Weaver has advocated a disqualification standard that requires judges to recuse themselves if there is merely an appearance of impropriety. She has cited with approval Canon 2 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that [a] judge shall avoid . . . the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities and Model Canon 3(E)(1), which states that a judge shall disqualify . . . herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.7 The disqualification standard that she has publicly championed is an objective standard, not a subjective standard to be determined by her say-so. Justice Weaver's appearance of impropriety standard is made without regard to whether an individual judge harbors an actual bias toward any party in the case being heard: [W]hen a judge recuses . . . herself to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the result is that the judge avoids risking actual bias. Second, when a judge recuses . . . herself, the judge eliminates the appearance of impropriety and thereby engenders public confidence in the judiciary.8 Accordingly, if her support of the appearance of impropriety standard is genuine  and I assume that she would not have advocated it otherwise  her personal belief that she has no personal bias or prejudice for or against either party and that the total value of her stock is not more than a de minimis interest is irrelevant to whether she must recuse herself. Moreover, Justice Weaver has advocated in her various published statements on disqualification standards that the disqualification decision cannot be solely vested in the judge who is the subject of disqualification but must be reviewed by other members of the Court.9 Here, Justice Weaver has made her own determination that her Dow stock ownership is de minimis within the meaning of MCR 2.003(B)(5). But there is no basis upon which an objective observer can assess the validity of her claim and decision. Context is essential in considering what level of ownership in a party litigant is de minimis, and no one but Justice Weaver is privy to her financial status  something she has chosen not to share. My point here is that Justice Weaver's request for remission is entirely inconsistent with her published views on what standards ought apply in recusal situations. Her ownership of stock in a party defendant does pose an appearance of impropriety from the standpoint of the public.10 Can anyone imagine the public at large believing that it is perfectly appropriate for a judge to decide a case in which she owns stock in one of the parties?11 Moreover, her communication  which states her conflict, announces that her conflict does not matter, and asks the parties to agree with her  is inherently intimidating and coercive to both parties involved in this litigation.12 Rejection of her stated premise  that, notwithstanding her stated conflict, she should participate in the case  obviously puts the parties in the position of offending a sitting Justice. By her own stated positions on recusal, she should not be putting the parties in the position of having to bless an appearance of impropriety. Finally, the nature of Justice Weaver's private communication with the parties does not comport with her conclusion that the Michigan Constitution, art. 6, § 6, requires that a justice's self-initiated decision and reasons not to participate, or a challenged justice's decision and reasons to participate or not participate, should be in writing and accessible to the public. 13 It would seem to me that, under her proposed regime, Justice Weaver's discussion of her stock ownership should be published for public review. Again, I wish to state that I believe that our historic disqualification policy is constitutionally sound and should be embraced by all members of this Court. Since it has not been, and since Justice Weaver has articulated her own, purportedly higher recusal standards, I am left to wonder why Justice Weaver advocates a public position contrary to the position she practices and why she believes it appropriate that the parties should be asked to bless her conflict. 2 In short, a justice confronted with a disqualification motion has typically consulted with members of the Court and made a determination whether participation in a particular matter was appropriate. Other than providing counsel, other members of the Court have not participated in the decision. Order of the Michigan Supreme Court, March 18, 2009, p. 33 (March 18, 2009 order) ADM 2009-04 (statement of Young, J.). See also Adair v. State of Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027, 1052, 709 N.W.2d 567 (statement of Young, J.). 3 See, e.g., March 18, 2009 order, supra at 9 n. 1 (statement of Weaver, J). 4 So far as I am aware, Justice Weaver did not consult with any member of this Court before announcing her position. 5 March 18, 2009 order, supra at 14. 6 Kyser v. Kasson Twp. [483 Mich. 903 (2009) (order denying leave)] and [483 Mich. at 983 (2009) (order vacating denial order and granting leave)]. Justice Weaver did not disclose the nature of her business relationship that warranted her recusal. 7 See Adair v. State of Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027, 1047, 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006) (statement of Weaver, J.). Justice Weaver does not subscribe to my view that, because Justices cannot be replaced on a case by case basis, a different rule of disqualification must apply to Justices. See id. at 1044-45, 709 N.W.2d 567. On the contrary, she advocates that a disqualified Justice can be replaced in such a case. 8 Id. (Emphases added.) Justice Weaver claims that she has no personal bias or prejudice for or against either party. . . . Nevertheless, her lack of actual bias in this case is irrelevant under her disqualification standard to the question whether the participation of a judge who has an ownership interest in a litigant creates an appearance of impropriety. 9 March 18, 2009 order, supra at 13-14. This, of course, is one of the issues pending in Caperton v. Massey, United States Supreme Court Docket No. 08-22, where it is claimed that due process requires that a recusal issue must be decided by someone other than the judge who is the subject of potential disqualification. 10 Indeed, Congress has made this very policy judgment. 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(4) disqualifies a federal judge from sitting in a case if he or she has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy. The statute defines financial interest as ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small. 28 U.S.C. 455(d)(4). While this federal statute is not controlling here as our disqualification rule for Michigan judges permits a de minimis financial interest, it does provide support for the proposition that even a small financial stake in a party litigant creates an appearance of impropriety. 11 As stated, Justice Weaver provides the parties with no basis upon which to evaluate her request for remission. 12 I am aware that this procedure is specifically contemplated by MCR 2.003(D). Nevertheless, if Justice Weaver's standard for recusal is the appearance of impropriety, then submitting this question to the parties becomes moot and is inherently aimed at coercing the parties to accept her participation notwithstanding the appearance of impropriety. 13 Adair, 474 Mich. at 1050, 709 N.W.2d 567 (statement of Weaver, J.) (emphasis added).