Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutor's peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror T.B.

Text: Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748] ( Wheeler ) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712] ( Batson ), which asserted that the prosecutor impermissibly exercised a peremptory challenge against an African-American female prospective juror based on group bias. (7) The governing principles are well settled. Under Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, `[a] prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group biasthat is, bias against members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar groundsviolates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the state Constitution. [Citations.]' [Citation.] `Such a practice also violates the defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations.]' ( People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 77-78 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 205 P.3d 245].)  Batson states the procedure and standard trial courts should use when handling motions challenging peremptory strikes. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1008 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775].) First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' [Citation.] ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410], fn. omitted ( Johnson ).) After the trial court here concluded its voir dire of the prospective jurors, the parties proceeded to exercise their peremptory challenges. The prosecution exercised its fourth peremptory strike against Prospective Juror T.B., a young African-American woman. Defense counsel immediately asked to approach the bench, but the trial court denied the request. The peremptory challenges continued until the trial court called a recess. After the prospective jurors left the courtroom, defense counsel presented his objection to the prosecutor's strike against T.B., claiming that the prosecutor had excused the prospective juror in violation of the state and federal constitutional principles espoused in Wheeler and Batson. Counsel acknowledged that one other African-American woman then was in the jury box, but asserted, [W]e are deficient, and argued that the only reason the prosecutor excused T.B. was because of her race. The trial court asked the prosecutor what she ha[d] to say about that. The prosecutor inquired, Is the court asking me to give reasons? The trial court replied: Tell you something, I know they have to make a showing. However, in this type of a case, I think it is important that the records be complete. In response to the trial court's request for some type of a basis for excusing T.B., the prosecutor first explained: She is 23 years old, which I have a rating as to youth and life experience, so it is a standard form I use for all the jurors. When I use the form, that's a negative being that age. I have an 18 to 29 range which is a negative, 23 years old, single, no children, basically no life experience . . . . The prosecutor then explained that her main reason for excusing T.B. is that [T.B.] said she was undecided on death. The prosecutor indicated she also felt T.B. had not been forthright about a crime for which her brother had been arrested in 1989. The trial court disagreed with that assessment, interjecting that T.B. disclosed on the juror questionnaire that her brother had been arrested for manslaughter and discussed the issue in chambers, saying she felt her brother had been treated fairly. The prosecutor added, finally, that T.B. did not vote. The trial court then asked defense counsel whether he had anything further to say. Counsel responded, Submit it. The trial court then denied the Wheeler motion without comment. Initially, we reject defendant's argument that, because the trial court asked the prosecutor to state her race-neutral reasons for excusing T.B., we should proceed immediately to the third step of the Batson analysisdetermining whether the record supports the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations without first determining whether defendant established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Defendant relies on the high court's statement in Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352 [114 L.Ed.2d 395, 111 S.Ct. 1859], that [o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. ( Id. at p. 359.) However, a trial court's request that the prosecutor provide reasons for his or her exercise of a peremptory challenge is not an implicit finding the defendant has established a prima facie case, and does not moot the issue, in every instance. In determining whether to infer a trial court's finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court's remarks in context. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605, fn. 2 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].) For example, in People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 746 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754], where the trial court had stated it did not believe the defendant had made a prima facie case under Wheeler, we declined to infer a contrary finding from the trial court's request that the prosecutor justify the peremptory challenges at issue for purposes of completing the record on appeal. (See also People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1091-1092 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) By contrast, in People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, we determined that by asking the prosecutor for an explanation, the trial court had impliedly found a prima facie case because `nothing in the record suggest[ed]' the trial court found otherwise. ( Id. at p. 471, quoting People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn. 2.) Viewing the record as a whole and examining the trial court's remarks in context ( People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn. 2), we conclude that unlike in Lewis, the trial court in this case made no implicit finding that defendant established a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination. To the contrary, the trial court's exchange with the prosecutor strongly suggests it found that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under Wheeler, but wanted to complet[e] the record on appeal. ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 746; see also People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1018 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 175 P.3d 13] [trial court's comments implied prima facie case had not been made].) The record shows the trial court responded to the prosecutor's apparent surprise at being asked to comment on defendant's motion by explaining: I know they have to make a showing. However, in this type of a case, I think it is important that the records be complete. Fairly read, the trial court's statement presupposes that the defense had not made a prima facie showing. Furthermore, although the trial court interrupted the prosecutor to contradict her assertion that T.B. had not been forthright about her brother's criminal history, it did not make factual findings regarding the credibility of any of the prosecutor's other race-neutral reasons. Instead, after the prosecutor finished stating her reasons, the trial court simply denied the Wheeler/Batson motion without comment. ( People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 78 [a finding of a prima facie showing would not be implied where the trial court announced it had found no prima facie case but asked the prosecutor to `protect the record' by stating reasons, then repeated its ruling without further explanation].) Indeed, in his opening brief, defendant himself observes that the judge did nothing but listen to the reasons given by the prosecutor and then immediately deny the [ Wheeler ] Batson motion. Defendant makes that point to argue that the trial court's denial of his Wheeler/Batson motion is not entitled to deference because the trial court failed to engage in any meaningful evaluation of the prosecutor's justifications. But his observation equally supports the conclusion, which our review of the record as a whole bears out, that because the trial court found no prima facie case of discrimination, it never intended to undertake a third-stage analysis. [9] (8) Having determined that the trial court impliedly found defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under Wheeler/Batson, we apply the standard the high court articulated in Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. 162, and undertake an independent review of the record to decide the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race. ( People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 79, italics omitted [reviewing court uses independent review to assess a finding of no prima facie case when it is unclear from the record whether the trial court used the strong-likelihood standard Johnson disapproved].) Under Johnson, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson 's first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. ( Johnson, supra, at p. 170; see also People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 341 [defendant must show an inference of discrimination arising from the totality of the relevant facts].) The defendant should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.) Here, defendant's showing was meager. In arguing the Wheeler motion, defense counsel merely pointed out that T.B. was an African-American woman and submitted the question on that basis alone, without referring to the juror's questionnaire or voir dire answers, responding to the prosecutor's stated reasons for the excusal, or pointing to any other evidence that would permit an inference of discrimination. That the prosecutor excused a single African-American prospective juror, without more, does not support the inference the excusal was based on race, especially given defendant's acknowledgment during the hearing that another African-American woman then was seated on the jury. ( People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 69-70 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622]; see also People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 899 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 200 P.3d 898] [motion based only on excusal of a single African-American prospective juror failed to establish a prima facie case].) As we have observed,  `the small absolute size of this sample makes drawing an inference of discrimination from this fact alone impossible.'  ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343; see also People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1018, fn. 10.) Nor does our independent review of the record disclose any other basis for inferring the prosecutor excused T.B. because of her race. We have previously described the type of evidence that may be particularly useful regarding this inquiry. For instance, it is relevant whether the record shows that the prosecutor `struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group.' ( People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 779 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548].) Also significant is whether the prosecutor failed to engage the prospective jurors `in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all.' ( Ibid. ) Although the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to claim discriminatory excusals under Wheeler, it is relevant `if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong.' ( Kelly, at pp. 779-780.) Both defendant and T.B. are African-American. And although neither the questionnaire nor the voir dire examination discloses the race or ethnicity of the seated jurors, we will assume for argument's sake that a majority of the jurors were White, like the victim. However, the record is otherwise devoid of any evidence supporting an inference of discrimination. First, although the record here does not disclose the racial or ethnic makeup of the juror pool, nothing suggests the prosecutor `struck most or all' ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 779) of the African-Americans from the venire. As noted above, defense counsel began his argument on the Wheeler/Batson motion by acknowledging that an African-American woman was then seated in the jury box, and there is nothing from which to infer that the prosecutor exercised a strike against her. We note that the prosecutor asked T.B. no questions. Ordinarily, this circumstance is relevant to our inquiry. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 779.) But, as previously noted in part II.B.2., at the time of defendant's trial in 1996, the trial court, not the parties, had primary responsibility for conducting voir dire. (§ 223, added by Prop. 115, § 7, eff. June 6, 1990.) Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel asked questions of any prospective juror during voir dire in open court. Thus, the prosecutor's failure to ask T.B. any questions is not significant here. ( People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1328 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270].) Notably, before excusing T.B., the prosecutor had reviewed T.B.'s answers on a questionnaire containing 98 questions. ( People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598-599, fn. 5 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292] [noting the trial court's remark that when every juror has answered an extensive questionnaire, `it can never be a perfunctory examination'].) Moreover, the prosecutor observed the trial court's voir dire of T.B., which covered her friendship with a deputy marshal, her brother's experience in the criminal justice system, her ability to follow the law as instructed by the trial court, and her attitudes regarding the death penalty. Indeed, defendant complains that the trial court questioned T.B. more closely than it did a seated juror who likewise indicated on her questionnaire she was undecided about the death penalty. Finally, the record discloses obvious race-neutral reasons for excusing T.B.: she was single and very young, and had not registered to vote. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 139 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980] [the prospective juror's youthful age, marital status, and failure to register to vote were proper concerns for the prosecutor because they suggested the juror was uninvolved in society]; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 429-430 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992] [the prosecutor stated proper race-neutral reasons for excusing the prospective juror on the ground the juror's youthfulness and lack of maturity affected her ability to accept responsibility in a death penalty case].) Based on our consideration of the relevant factors as well as the entire record of voir dire, we conclude the record fails to support an inference that the prosecutor excused T.B. on the basis of her race. (9) We reject defendant's assertion, based on our decision in People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 385 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769], that the trial court's failure to make `a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate' the prosecution's explanation and clearly to express its findings requires reversal. Silva does not guide our inquiry here. We have found it proper for trial courts to request and consider a prosecutor's stated reasons for excusing a prospective juror even when they find no prima facie case of discrimination; indeed, we have encouraged this practice. ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 723-724 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485].) However, the trial court is not required to do this at the first stage of a Wheeler/Batson analysis, and the trial court's invitation here to the prosecutor to state her reasons for excusing T.B. did not convert [this] first-stage Wheeler/Batson case into a third-stage case. ( People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1020; cf. People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988] [where the reviewing court upholds a trial court's finding of no prima facie case of discrimination, it need not then review the trial court's evaluation of the prosecutor's proffered reasons for the strikes at issue].) (10) Finally, because the trial court's request did not convert [this] first-stage Wheeler/Batson case into a third-stage case ( People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1020), we also decline defendant's invitation to engage in comparative juror analysis ( id. at p. 1019). As we have explained, [w]hatever use comparative juror analysis might have in a third-stage case for determining whether a prosecutor's proffered justifications for his [or her] strikes are pretextual, it has little or no use where the analysis does not hinge on the prosecution's actual proffered rationales . . . . ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 350.)