Opinion ID: 1058350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assault and Battery as a Lesser Included Offense

Text: Rowe first contends that assault and battery of a law enforcement officer under Code § 18.2-57(C) is not a lesser included offense of attempted capital murder of a law enforcement officer under Code § 18.2-31(6), and that because he was never indicted for the assault and battery charge, his conviction must be reversed. The Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of this argument, holding instead that Rowe had waived it by failing to comply with the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals. It is not necessary to specifically address the question of Rowe's compliance with Rules 5A:20(c) and 5A:18 because Rowe invited the very error of which he now complains. His approbation and reprobation is necessarily fatal to his lesser-included-offense argument. We have previously made clear that [a] party may not approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory. Nor may a party invite error and then attempt to take advantage of the situation created by his own wrong. Cangiano v. LSH Bldg. Co., 271 Va. 171, 181, 623 S.E.2d 889, 895 (2006). Cangiano had conceded at trial that language in a purchase agreement was contractual in nature, but then argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it held that he was contractually bound by it. 271 Va. at 180-81, 623 S.E.2d at 895. And in Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 590 S.E.2d 537 (2004), we held that a defendant could not complain on appeal of the trial court's decision not to disqualify jurors due to bias, when the potential bias complained of arose from questions asked by the defendant's attorney during voir dire. Id. at 144, 590 S.E.2d at 560. Here, the error asserted by Rowe is even more obviously the result of his own strategy and actions at trial. At trial, Rowe advanced the assault charge  the charge of which he was never indicted but eventually convicted  as a more lenient alternative to the attempted murder charge he was then facing and maintained that it was a lesser included offense. On numerous occasions during trial, counsel for Rowe sought to rebut the attempted-capital-murder charge, asserting that Rowe lacked the requisite specific intent for that crime. Counsel for Rowe described for the trial court the possible consequences if it agreed with these arguments, asserting that the Court clearly has options for imposing reduced penalties based on lesser included offenses. In support of his argument, Rowe cited and repeatedly referenced a Court of Appeals opinion, Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 362 S.E.2d 193 (1987), which he claimed supported his position that assault and battery of a law enforcement officer is a lesser included offense of attempted capital murder of a law enforcement officer. The clearest example of this occurred on the final day of the original trial, when counsel for Rowe, in response to a specific request from the trial court, stated his belief that felony assault and battery of a law enforcement officer ... would be the lesser-included offense for attempted capital murder. The record of the proceedings demonstrates that Rowe acquiesced without objection when the trial court accepted his theory. Rowe cannot now complain of the trial court's adoption of the legal theory he introduced and repeatedly urged the trial court to adopt. Because we hold that Rowe may not approbate and reprobate by inviting error and then seeking reversal of his conviction based upon it, it is not necessary to address Rowe's claim that the Court of Appeals erred in its application of Rules 5A:18 and 5A:20(c). Nonetheless, Rowe argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the ends of justice exception of Rule 5A:18 to reach the argument. We have held that [a]pplication of the ends of justice exception is appropriate when the judgment of the trial court was error and application of the exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice or the denial of essential rights. Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 17, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 (2005). Because Rowe invited the error of which he complained before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals' refusal to consider this argument under the ends of justice exception did not sanction a a grave injustice or the denial of essential rights, and was therefore correct.