Opinion ID: 304354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionality of Title III

Text: 17 Having determined that the application for this wiretap order was properly authorized by the Attorney General and that the conduct of the eavesdropping did not, in the circumstances, reflect a failure to minimize the interceptions, we now direct our attention to appellants' last argument that this wiretapping search was invalid, to wit: their contention that the wiretapping enabling act is facially unconstitutional. We note at the outset that this case involves neither evidence of a crime other than that for which the wiretap order was procured, nor an emergency wiretap consummated prior to judicial authorization. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to those sections of the Act. See 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2517(5); 2518(7). We are here concerned only with the basic thrust of the Act's wiretap provisions. We note also that every court having decided the question has affirmed the Act's constitutionality. 12 Indeed the one circuit court case on the question involved the very wiretap here in question, and the appellant in that case is also an appellant in this case. See United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 1783, 32 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972). 13 18 Appellants' first broad contention asserts that wiretapping and eavesdropping are inherently unconstitutional as violative of First Amendment freedom of speech, Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches, Fifth Amendment protection from self-incrimination, the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process, Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the penumbral right of privacy. The short answer to this blunderbuss assertion is that the Supreme Court has expressly held that some forms of eavesdropping are constitutional when accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966). Cf., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The only question left for this court to answer, then, is whether the Act here in question, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2515-18, contains the safeguards which the Supreme Court has said are essential. 19 While the Supreme Court has never specifically enumerated certain criteria which, if met, would enable an eavesdropping statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the flaws which the five-man majority saw in the New York wiretap statute can, viewed against Osborn and Katz, be seen as such as list. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). Those opinions would require: (1) that the applicant procure [from] a neutral and detached authority, which Katz says must be a judicial officer, an order permitting the wiretap; (2) that to procure the order, or renewal thereof, the applicant must show probable cause that an offense has been or is being committed and must state with particularity (3) the offense being investigated, (4) the place being searched (i. e., the telephone being tapped or place being bugged), and (5) the things (conversations) to be seized; (6) that the order must be executed with dispatch; (7) that it must not continue beyond the procurement of the conversation sought and thereby become a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause; (8) that it overcome the lack of notice by requiring a showing of exigent circumstances as a precondition to the order; and (9) that it require a return on the warrant. 14 20 Congress in passing the Act considered carefully the[se] decisions of the Supreme Court . . . and made an intensive effort to comply with the standards which had been enunciated in these cases. United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 683 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 1783, 32 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972). See Senate Report No. 1097, 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, p. 2112 et seq. We think reference to those sections of the Act listed in the margin with each criterion will show that Congress was successful in this effort. 21 The only facet of the Act which can be seriously questioned as failing the rigors of Berger is the provision allowing surveillance orders to last thirty days. The doubt as to that section stems primarily from the fact the only eavesdropping the Supreme Court has approved have been interceptions of single conversations. 15 Indeed, the Court in Berger reserved its strongest criticism of the New York law for the section allowing a dragnet-like surveillance for periods of sixty days and longer, saying it was, like the odius general warrants of colonial times, 16 the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause. 17 22 We do not, however, read Osborn, Katz and Berger as holding that only rifle shot eavesdrops are constitutionally permissible. The dragnet nature of the New York law resulted not only from the duration of the warrant, but also from the failure to confine the investigator's latitude with the various safeguards which the court noted that law did not contain. 18 Having required each of the procedural safeguards mentioned in Berger, we do not think Title III is rendered unconstitutional solely because it authorizes wiretaps which may last several days and encompass multiple conversations. The wiretap in the present case illustrates the reasonableness of such electronic searches. Here, the application made a probable cause showing of a narcotics distribution network with Richardson as its focal point. It demonstrated the exigency of gathering evidence as to all the tentacles of that enterprise by monitoring its communications center, and the tap was administered with each safeguard listed in Berger. Accordingly, this wiretap was not simply a blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop 19 upon Richardson pursuant to one showing of probable cause as to him. It was a continuing search of several persons' conversations pursuant to a multiple showing of probable cause reaching several people using that telephone. Furthermore, as shown above, the District Judge took the additional precaution of maintaining close supervision of the search by requiring frequent reports. Under such circumstances no fishing expedition can occur. 23 Obviously an electronic search extending over a period of time will encompass overhearing irrelevant conversations, but the search of a building will likewise involve seeing and hearing irrelevant objects and conversations. 20 We therefore reject the assertion that only single-conversation interceptions are constitutionally permissible, and we agree with the Tenth Circuit that Berger, Katz and Osborn do not indicate the contrary. 21 We read those opinions as saying that adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures 22 such as are required by this Act provide the reasonableness which the Fourth Amendment requires. We therefore hold that 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2515-18 are constitutional.