Opinion ID: 2264301
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appealing to the Jury's fears and prejudices.

Text: Petitioner points to the prosecutor's appeal to the juror's prejudices and fears when she made the following remarks: What does a monster look like? Looks like different things to different people. What does a sexual molester look like? He looks like someone you know. He looks like your uncle, your brother, your sister, your cousin. It's possible. But there is no certain way that someone who molests children looks. But they do ingratiate themselves. They make themselves indispensable. They are friendly, always there to watch. Not everyone is like that, but please don't misunderstand me because the important point here is that a child molester looks like anybody else. That's why they are able to do what they do, because they look like all of us, and we trust. Petitioner declares that such statements are designed to inflame the jurors' prejudices against a hated class of individuals and are therefore improper. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed stating that [t]he State never directly characterized appellant as a `monster' or `sexual molester.' Lawson, 160 Md.App. at 630, 865 A.2d at 634. The intermediate court found that the comments were isolated and that they did not affect the petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial. In the context of this case, we disagree. Prosecutors should not appeal to the prejudices of the jury. Contee, 223 Md. at 584, 165 A.2d at 894; Hill, 355 Md. at 211, 734 A.2d at 202. In Hill, the prosecution's improper remarks extended throughout the duration of the trial. The prosecutor, during opening arguments, told the jury that they were  chosen to send a message to protect [the] community  and to keep[ the] community safe. Hill, 355 Md. at 211, 734 A.2d at 202. The defense's prompt objection to that remark was sustained. Id. Later, during closing arguments the prosecution again asked the jury to send a message to the community and to the defendant's cronies. The objection to that statement was overruled. After the jury commenced deliberations, a motion for a new trial based on the improper remarks was denied. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court's decision based primarily upon the fact that the defense attorney failed to raise the objection before the jury was sent out for deliberations. Id. at 215, 734 A.2d at 204. This Court reversed stating that the objection was not overruled due to its untimeliness but on the merits. As a result, the motion did preserve the issue for review even though it was raised after the jury retired for deliberation. The Court also found that the prosecutors statements were wholly improper and presumptively prejudicial. . . . Id. at 216, 734 A.2d at 205. We recognized that the defense's motion for a new trial asked for more than just another curative instruction. . . . The point made was that the jury had been contaminated [] by the prosecutor's improper [remarks, including] . . . references to the need for the jurors to convict petitioner in order to preserve the quality of their own communities. Id. at 219-20, 734 A.2d at 206. As a result, the prosecutor's statements prejudiced the defendant. The Court of Special Appeals in Walker v. State, 121 Md.App. 364, 709 A.2d 177 (1998), addressed the impropriety of a prosecutor's closing argument calling the defendant an animal and a pervert. The court, in addressing these statements stated: Indeed, the nature of the evidence presented certainly gives rise to the conclusion that the actions of appellant  assuming them to be true as we must  were perverse, to say the least. When viewed, however, in the context of the totality of the prosecutor's closing argument, given such odious offenses, it is ironic that resort to excessive appeals to passion are needed to secure a conviction when the nature of the charges and the evidence adduced, without embellishment, is inherently inflammatory, albeit properly so. The right to a fair trial and the search for the truth, however, should not be hampered or obfuscated by extreme appeals to passion calculated to inflame the jury. When the reference to the silent screams and `pervert' are considered in conjunction with the characterization of appellant as `an animal,' we believe the prosecutor, in her zeal, exceeded the bounds of proper comment. Not only is it inappropriate to refer to a defendant in a criminal case as `an animal,' it may be argued that such strategy, in some instances, could be counterproductive should the jury view the State as engaging in a personal contest with the defendant. It is incumbent upon the People's representative to maintain an air of dignity and stay above the frey. Id. at 380-81, 709 A.2d at 185 (emphasis added). In the present case, although the prosecutor did not say this defendant is a monster and a child molester, it is clear that she intended to imply to the jury that he was that monster and child molester. Under circumstances such as those present here, it is not necessary for the prosecutor to specifically name the defendant, in order for the jury to understand that a defendant is the person the prosecutor is describing. Such statements are therefore inappropriate.