Opinion ID: 2626983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: {9} The State filed its appeal pursuant to N.M. Const. Art. VI § 2; NMSA 1978 § 32A-1-17(A) (1999); and NMSA 1978 § 39-3-3(B)(2) (1972), if this case was characterized as a criminal case; and under NMSA 1978 § 39-3-7 (1966) if the case was characterized as a special proceeding in district court. Section 39-3-7 governs appeals from special statutory proceedings in district court, including interlocutory appeals of orders or decisions that practically dispose of the merits of the action. Child argues that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal challenging the suppression of Child's statements and fingerprints. Child asserts that the State, in its original interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression orders, failed to show that the evidence sought to be admitted was critical or material to its case, or that the challenged suppression orders practically disposed of the merits of the case. {10} The State contends that it properly invoked, and met the requirements for jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The State also argues that this Court's writ of certiorari gives us jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals considered the jurisdiction issue pursuant to Section 39-3-3(B)(2), governing appeals from orders of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence. The Court concluded that its jurisdiction was proper under that statute. Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. {11} Previously our Court of Appeals has held that interlocutory appeals from children's court delinquency proceedings are governed by Section 39-3-4, the statutory provision pertaining to interlocutory appeals from civil cases and special statutory proceedings not practically disposing of the merits of the action, but involving controlling questions of law. See In re Larry K., 1999-NMCA-078, ¶ 13, 127 N.M. 461, 982 P.2d 1060 (We have held . . . that the statute governing interlocutory appeals from civil cases and special statutory proceedings, Section 39-3-4, applies to children's court delinquency proceedings. (citing In re Doe, 85 N.M. 691, 692, 516 P.2d 201, 202 (Ct.App. 1973), which characterized children's court proceedings as special statutory proceedings)). We note, however, that under the facts of In re Larry K and In re Doe, the parties would not have been authorized to rely on Section 39-3-3(B)(2), as neither case involved an appeal from a suppression order. The Court in those cases did not consider the applicability of Section 39-3-3(B)(2) to appeals from delinquency proceedings. Thus, there is no precedent to prevent a party to a delinquency proceeding from filing an interlocutory appeal under Section 39-3-3(B)(2). {12} The State has the same need for an automatic interlocutory appeal of the suppression of evidence in delinquency proceedings as it does in criminal proceedings because, in many cases, whether or not evidence is suppressed will determine if the State can go forward with its case. Because juvenile delinquency proceedings are sufficiently similar to criminal proceedings, we hold that Section 39-3-3(B)(2) governs in the circumstances of interlocutory appeals of suppression orders from a children's court. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (discussing how child will be found to be delinquent and subjected to loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to felony prosecution); In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex.1998) (Juvenile cases, while classified as civil proceedings, are quasi-criminal in nature.). {13} In this case, the State met the requirements for filing an appeal under Section 39-3-3(B)(2). Section 39-3-3(B)(2) authorizes the State to appeal a district court's decision or order suppressing or excluding evidence in a criminal case within ten days of that decision or order if the district attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. § 39-3-3(B)(2); see also State v. Alvarez, 113 N.M. 82, 84, 823 P.2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1991). The State in this case did timely file certification under Section 39-3-3(B)(2). Thus, we hold that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal pursuant to Section 39-3-3(B)(2). {14} The determination that Section 39-3-3(B)(2) controls interlocutory appeals of suppression orders in delinquency proceedings does not mean that a children's court proceeding cannot or should not be considered a special statutory proceeding under other circumstances. Our application of Section 39-3-3(B)(2) to appeals of suppression orders in delinquency proceedings does not preclude application of Section 39-3-4 to other appeals from children's court delinquency proceedings. Suppression of Child's Statements {15} We must determine whether the statements Child, age twelve, made to friends, neighbors, and family members are admissible in Child's delinquency proceeding under Section 32A-2-14(F). Because this case involves the interpretation of Section 32A-2-14(F), this Court's review of the decision to suppress Child's statements is de novo. See State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995). When interpreting Section 32A-2-14(F), we seek to give effect to the Legislature's intent. See id. To ascertain legislative intent, we look to the language used and consider the statute's history and background. Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, 121 N.M. 764, 769, 918 P.2d 350, 355 (1996). We read the entire statute as a whole, considering provisions in relation to one another. Cobb v. State Canvassing Bd. of N.M., 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 140 N.M. 77, 140 P.3d 498. {16} Section 32A-2-14(F) was enacted by the Legislature in 1993. The previous version of the statute, located at Section 32-1-27(F), was a single sentence: Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, no confessions, statements or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of fifteen years prior to an adjudication on the allegations of the petition. NMSA 1978, § 32-1-27(F) (1981). The current version of this provision distinguishes between children under thirteen and children who have reached their thirteenth birthday, affording greater protection to children twelve and under: Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, no confessions, statements or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of thirteen years on the allegations of the petition. There is a rebuttable presumption that any confessions, statements or admissions made by a child thirteen or fourteen years old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible. § 32A-2-14 (F). The fact that the Legislature drew a distinction between children under thirteen and children aged thirteen and fourteen demonstrates its clear intent to treat the two groups differently, and the plain language of this statute explains the nature of that difference. First, the second sentence of Section 32A-2-14(F) describes that statements made by a child thirteen or fourteen may be admissible if the State overcomes a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility. No such exception is provided to allow for the admission of statements made by children under thirteen. Second, the phrase made to a person in a position of authority qualifies confessions, statements or admissions in the second sentence. Likewise, the Legislature did not include this qualification in the first sentence of the amended statute. We must presume these omissions were intentional. City of Santa Rosa v. Jaramillo, 85 N.M. 747, 750, 517 P.2d 69, 72 (1973) (`We are not permitted to read into a statute language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.' (quoting State ex rel. Barela v. N.M. State Bd. of Educ., 80 N.M. 220, 222, 453 P.2d 583, 585 (1969))). Thus, the statute provides complete protection to children under thirteen, leaving no avenue for the State to introduce the confessions, statements, or admissions of individuals under thirteen regardless of the context in which, or to whom, they were made. {17} We further conclude that the phrase [n]otwithstanding any other provision to the contrary operates to eliminate any doubt regarding the totality of the ban on admission of confessions, statements, or admissions of children under thirteen. We disagree with the State's assertion that this phrase should be understood to mean simply that the Rules of Evidence do not control the admissibility of children's confessions, statements, and admissions. The phrase  any other provision (emphasis added) is broad enough to include other provisions of the Children's Code, such that even the Delinquency Act's stated purpose of hold(ing) children committing delinquent acts accountable for their actions does not provide a means by which the State can get around this prohibition. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-2(A) (2003). Rather, we share the Court of Appeals' presumption that the Legislature weighed these considerations with the protective purposes of the Children's Code, and we share its conclusion that no basis exists to question what the Legislature so comprehensively and unequivocally addressed in this statutory provision. See Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019, ¶¶ 18-19, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. Because the Legislature did not include any exception to this clear exclusionary provision, this Court is not permitted to create such an exception. See City of Santa Rosa, 85 N.M. at 750, 517 P.2d at 72 (The legislature did not see fit to include it in the statute, therefore it is excluded.). {18} In its briefing to this Court, the State argues that the term statements in Section 32A-2-14(F) should be ascribed a technical meaning. The State asserts that the term statements refers to formal narratives of facts, and under this interpretation of Section 32A-2-14(F), the comments Child made in social contexts to relatives and friends would be admissible. We are unpersuaded by the State's argument that statements should be interpreted as formal narratives of facts. This interpretation of statements is inconsistent with the second sentence of Section 32A-2-14(F) that describes statements or admissions made by a child . . . to a person in a position of authority. As we discussed, this qualification on the term statements is not present in the first sentence of Section 32A-2-14(F) and we have determined that it was intentionally omitted. In light of this intentional omission, we believe that we cannot ascribe a technical meaning to the term statement in the first sentence as we cannot conceive of a situation in which a child under thirteen gives a formal narrative of facts to an individual who is not in a position of authority. Therefore, in interpreting Section 32A-2-14 (F), we will not depart from established statutory interpretation which requires that, [i]n construing a statute, statutory words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and usual sense. Weiland v. Vigil, 90 N.M. 148, 151, 560 P.2d 939, 942 (Ct.App.1977) (citing Bettini v. City of Las Cruces, 82 N.M. 633, 485 P.2d 967 (1971)). {19} Ascribing the term `statement' its ordinary meaning is consistent with the purpose of Section 32A-2-14(F), as stated in State v. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484 (1966). Excluding all statements of children under thirteen is compatible with the legislative purpose of providing extra protection for the very young. Id. ¶ 15. Additionally, this reading of the statute furthers the recognized goal of encouraging free communication between children and adults. State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 791, 791 P.2d 64, 66 (1990) (Section 32-1-27(F) encourages children to freely converse with adults without fear that their statements will be used against them at a later date.). {20} In light of the purposes of 32A-2-14(F) and the unambiguous language within the statute, there is no basis on which [this Court] can determine that the Legislature did not mean what it stated. Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019 ¶ 18, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. We hold that all of Child's statements are inadmissible in her delinquency proceeding and we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to suppress Child's statements. Suppression of Fingerprints {21} The Children's Court suppressed Child's fingerprints based on its interpretation of Section 32A-2-14(I), which states [a] child under the age of thirteen alleged or adjudicated to be a delinquent child shall not be fingerprinted or photographed for identification purposes without obtaining a court order. The court reasoned that prints taken pursuant to a search warrant were inadmissible because a search warrant is not a court order. We must interpret Section 32A-2-14(I) in order to determine what procedure is required for the fingerprints of a child under the age of thirteen to be admissible in a delinquency proceeding, and, thus, our review of this section of the Children's Code is de novo. State v. Wilson, 2006-NMSC-037, ¶ 6, 140 N.M. 218, 141 P.3d 1272. {22} At trial and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the parties' arguments in favor of and against suppression of Child's fingerprints focused on whether or not a search warrant constitutes a court order. The Court of Appeals, however, did not see this question as determinative in this case. Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019, ¶ 23, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. Instead, it indicated that in order to determine if Section 32A-2-14(I) applied to the facts of the case at bar, the meaning of the phrase alleged . . . to be a delinquent child must be discerned. Id. ¶ 24. If Child was not alleged . . . to be a delinquent child at the time that she was fingerprinted, then the protections of 32A-2-14(I) would not apply and her fingerprints would be admissible. As noted above, the Court of Appeals did not resolve this question, but remanded the case to the Children's Court to answer this and other related questions. See id. ¶ 40. {23} In its Petition, the State asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the issue of the meaning of alleged . . . to be a delinquent child, since neither party raised that issue. Rather, the State contends that the Court of Appeals should have adhered to tradition by refraining from expressing an opinion on issues not raised by the parties. However, the State also argues that, having raised this issue sua sponte, the Court of Appeals obligated itself to resolve the question rather than remanding it to the Children's Court for resolution. {24} We acknowledge that as a general rule, propositions of law not raised in the trial court cannot be considered sua sponte by the appellate court. N.M. Dep't. Of Human Servs. v. Tapia, 97 N.M. 632, 634, 642 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1982) (quoting Sais v. City Elec. Co., 26 N.M. 66, 68, 188 P. 1110, 1111 (1920)); see also In re Doe, 98 N.M. 540, 541, 650 P.2d 824, 825 (1982); State v. Ferguson, 111 N.M. 191, 196, 803 P.2d 676, 681 (Ct.App.1990). However, this Court has held that three exceptions to that rule exist: (1) That jurisdictional questions may be raised for the first time here. . . . (2) That questions of a general public nature affecting the interest of the state at large may be determined by the court without having been raised in the trial court. . . . And (3) that the court will determine propositions not raised in the trial court where it is necessary to do so in order to protect the fundamental rights of the party. N.M. Dep't. Of Human Services v. Tapia, 97 N.M. at 634, 642 P.2d at 1093 (quoting Sais, 26 N.M. at 69, 188 P. at 1111). The Court of Appeals did not set forth the grounds on which it based its decision to depart from the general rule against raising an issue sua sponte. We find, however, that the interpretation of Section 32A-2-14(I) presents an issue of first impression in New Mexico with the potential to substantially impact investigatory procedure in juvenile cases. Therefore, it was permissible for the Court of Appeals to take up this issue as a question of a general public nature affecting the interest of the state at large under the second exception, above. Cf. State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 572, 573-74, 566 P.2d 121, 122-23 (Ct.App.1977) (holding that issue of whether the Children's Court erred in committing mentally ill, delinquent children to the state boys' school and in ordering that psychiatric care be provided them affects the interests of the state at large and is properly before the Court of Appeals despite not having been raised in the Children's Court). {25} We conclude, however, that the Court of Appeals' decision to remand rather than resolve the issue of the admissibility of Child's fingerprints, with instructions for the Children's Court to engage in statutory interpretation and examine legislative intent, was in error. See Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019, ¶¶ 34-47, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. Remanding to allow the Children's Court to conduct a statutory analysis seems both unnecessary and inconsistent with the traditional role of the appellate court. See generally State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 144-46, 870 P.2d 103, 106-08 (1994) (discussing the respective functions of trial courts and appellate courts). Additionally, as we discuss below, the Court of Appeals did not raise any questions of fact that would require the Children's Court to make additional factual findings in order to facilitate the interpretation of Section 32A-2-14(I). Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to remand this issue to the trial level and proceed to address this issue here. Meaning of alleged . . . to be a delinquent child {26} Section 32A-2-14(I) of the Children's Code prohibits the fingerprinting of children under the age of thirteen for identification purposes, alleged or adjudicated to be a delinquent, without a court order. Like the Court of Appeals, we find it necessary to discern the meaning of the phrase alleged . . . to be a delinquent child in order to determine whether the protection provided in Section 32A-2-14(I) applies to Child. {27} The Court of Appeals presented several possible meanings of the phrase alleged . . . to be a delinquent child. It suggested the words may mean allegations of fact in a law enforcement officer's affidavit for a search or arrest warrant, allegations of fact and delinquency in a complaint, allegations of fact and delinquency in a petition, or perhaps even some other allegations of delinquency. Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019, ¶ 27, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. In its Answer Brief before this Court, the State asserts that guiding principles of statutory construction would lead inevitably to the conclusion that subsection (I) does not apply to young children who are merely suspected of being delinquent. Rather, subsection (I) applies only to those who have been formally alleged to be delinquent. {28} We have previously stated that alleged when used in the context of Subsection 32A-2-14(C) of the same statute is a specific legal term which pertains to the time period after which a formal petition alleging delinquency has been filed in the Children's Court. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 29, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1 (emphasis added). Moreover, in the same Opinion we drew a clear distinction between the meaning of the terms alleged and suspected in the context of the Delinquency Act, finding that the plain meaning of `suspected' refers to a period prior to the filing of a petition when a child is believed to have committed a crime or offense but has not yet been formally charged. Id. (emphasis added.) Although our Opinion in Javier M. examined the meaning of alleged and suspected as used in Section 32A-2-14(C) of the Delinquency Act, we apply that interpretation to Section 32A-2-14(F) as it is considered a normal rule of statutory construction to interpret identical words used in different parts of the same act [as having] the same meaning. Dep't. of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342, 114 S.Ct. 843, 127 L.Ed.2d 165 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, when the Legislature includes a particular word in one portion of a statute and omits it from another portion of that statute, such omission is presumed to be intentional. City of Santa Rosa, 85 N.M. at 750, 517 P.2d at 72. Therefore, we hold that Section 32A-2-14(F) is not triggered at the stage when a child is merely suspected of being delinquent and only applies after a formal petition alleging delinquency has been filed. {29} We now apply the definition of alleged developed in Javier M., the time period after which a formal petition alleging delinquency has been filed in the Children's Court, 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 29, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1 (emphasis added), to the facts of this case. Child's fingerprints, were obtained pursuant to a search warrant that was executed on the same day the homicide occurred (June 14, 1999). However, the formal petition alleging Child's delinquency was not filed until August 9, 1999. Because a formal petition had not yet been filed when Child's fingerprints were taken, we hold that the protections of 32A-2-14(I) did not apply and that provision cannot be used as a basis to exclude her fingerprints from evidence. Because we conclude that Section 32A-1-14(I) does not apply to the facts of this case, we are not required to analyze whether a search warrant constitutes a court order as defined by Section 32A-2-14(I). Thus, we do not address this issue.