Opinion ID: 2607357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the state's breach of the agreement to recommend an indeterminate life sentence

Text: The district court found that when Lankford was first sentenced there was a binding sentencing agreement whereby the prosecution agreed to recommend an indeterminate life sentence in exchange for his cooperation in the prosecution of his brother, Mark Lankford. The district court held that the original agreement was still binding at the resentencing. It is necessary to review the district court's finding that an agreement originally existed, because the state now maintains that such an agreement was never entered into. [2] During the trial of Mark Lankford, Bryan Lankford was questioned about the existence of an agreement for a favorable sentence recommendation in exchange for his testimony and cooperation. Bryan Lankford's answers, although somewhat ambiguous and equivocal, made clear his belief that such a recommendation was forthcoming. At that point Bryan Lankford's trial counsel and the prosecutor both testified that no such agreement existed. The judge presiding at Mark Lankford's trial initially stated his belief that no such agreement existed and that Bryan Lankford was simply mistaken. However, the judge made no findings of fact to that effect and, despite Lankford's testimony that he believed such an agreement was in effect, the state proceeded to allow Lankford to testify without first making a record establishing that Lankford correctly understood the state of affairs. When the judge did make findings of fact in Mark Lankford's post-conviction proceeding, the judge's understanding had also apparently changed, because he found that in fact Bryan Lankford's testimony at Mark Lankford's trial was induced by a life-sentence recommendation at sentencing. In 1993 Bryan Lankford's trial counsel filed an affidavit in the present case stating that Bryan Lankford's decision to cooperate was motivated by the prosecutor's promise not to seek the death penalty. On the basis of this record, and in conjunction with the fact that in 1984 the state did actually make an affirmative recommendation that Lankford receive an indeterminate life sentence, the district court in this case found that an agreement had been entered into whereby the state agreed to recommend an indeterminate life sentence in exchange for Lankford's cooperation in the state's case against Mark Lankford. The state points to no basis in the record for reversing the district court's conclusion about the existence of the agreement. The state proceeded with the testimony of Bryan Lankford during Mark Lankford's trial knowing that Bryan Lankford believed it was pursuant to an agreement for a recommendation of an indeterminate life sentence. Moreover, the state apparently made no effort to challenge the finding of the trial court in Mark Lankford's post-conviction proceeding that such an agreement existed. Also unrebutted by the state is the 1993 affidavit filed in this case by Bryan Lankford's trial counsel. In summary, two different district courts have concluded that an agreement existed whereby Lankford was entitled to a recommendation for an indeterminate life sentence. The state has submitted no basis upon which to conclude otherwise.
The district court in this case recognized that even if Bryan Lankford forfeited no rights by testifying at his brother's trial, because of this Court's earlier holding that he waived his privilege against self-incrimination by testifying at his own trial, he had nonetheless provided the prosecution with cooperation. The district court concluded that the sentencing agreement was binding and was subject to specific enforcement at the resentencing, because it could not be retracted. The state maintains that this conclusion of the district court was erroneous, even if a sentencing agreement existed, because the agreement pertained only to the original sentencing. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), is the leading case recognizing the constitutional dimensions of enforcement of plea bargaining agreements, but the authorities applying the principles of Santobello to enforce sentence agreements after the original sentencing has already taken place are limited. As the district court noted, some courts have held that the government does not breach a plea agreement where it fulfills its recommendation obligations at the defendant's sentencing but thereafter opposes the defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. See, e.g., United States v. White, 724 F.2d 714, 717 (8th Cir.1984) (government's agreement not to recommend a particular type of sentence was not breached by its opposition to defendant's Rule 35 motion because by arguing to maintain a sentence already imposed the government did not recommend any particular type of sentence); Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir.1983) (government agreement not to oppose defendant's request for leniency at sentencing did not include a free shot by defendant in Rule 35 proceeding); United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (9th Cir.1979) (government agreement not to make a recommendation does not bar the government from opposing motion to reduce because there was no evidence that such a restriction was contemplated by the parties); Bergman v. Lefkowitz, 569 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.1977) (where court disregards prosecutor's sentence recommendation made as part of plea agreement, prosecutor is free to later oppose defendant's motion to reduce). Other courts have held that the government's agreement to take a certain position at sentencing forecloses its ability to later take an inconsistent position at a post-sentencing proceeding. See United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir.1973) (where plea agreement included an agreement by the government to recommend probation at sentencing, the government is also obligated to recommend a probationary sentence at I.C.R. 35 hearing because that is part of the sentencing process which the defendant was reasonably entitled to expect was included within the agreement); State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 765 P.2d 1114, 1120 (1988) (where plea agreement involving favorable sentencing recommendation by state was silent on state's obligations at hearing to modify sentence, ambiguity must be resolved in favor of defendant such that state is bound by earlier recommendation). Although the two groups of cases disagree about the scope of proceedings encompassed within an agreement that on its face only addresses the initial sentencing, the unifying theme in all of the decisions is the holding that under Santobello a defendant is entitled to receive whatever benefit the state actually agreed to provide at the initial sentencing. The two lines of cases only disagree about whether in the individual case the post-sentencing proceedings were contemplated in the negotiations of the parties. To accept the state's position in this case would necessitate acceptance of the assumption that Lankford and the state entered into an agreement that contemplated the unusual procedural developments in the case. The state would need to show that Lankford agreed to give testimony against his brother in exchange for a one time recommendation by the state for an indeterminate life sentence, but the recommendation would no longer be forthcoming should he successfully appeal and obtain resentencing. In the absence of any evidence in the record suggesting that Lankford entered into such a shortsighted deal the district court correctly resolved the ambiguity in favor of Lankford. Given the prosecution's initial failure to recommend an indeterminate life sentence at Lankford's resentencing, the next question is whether the district court crafted a sufficient remedy by striking the state's request for the death penalty and holding the state to a recommendation for an indeterminate life sentence. Lankford argues that he is either entitled to sentencing before a judge who is untainted by the state's initial request for the death penalty or, alternatively, that this Court should go a step further and order that the state's recommended sentence actually be imposed. In support of this latter request, Lankford relies on United States v. O'Brien, 853 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.1988). The court in O'Brien did not hold that the government had breached its obligations under the plea agreement, but the court nevertheless stated in dicta that a governmental breach could be remedied by ordering the imposition of a specific sentence if neither specific performance nor allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea would be an adequate remedy. Id. at 525-26. [3] There is no reason why true specific performance would be an inadequate remedy in this case. Lankford argues that it would be more expeditious for this Court simply to modify the sentence on appeal, but economy of time is an insufficient justification for transforming the government's non-binding recommendation into a stipulated sentence by ordering that it be imposed. Lankford's next claim is that the remedy crafted by the sentencing judge did not constitute true specific performance, because the sentencing judge had been exposed to the prosecution's impermissible request for a death sentence. In Santobello the Supreme Court suggested that specific performance of a lenient sentence recommendation entitles the defendant to sentencing before a judge not exposed to the prosecution's more harsh recommendation made in breach of the agreement. The Santobello Court acknowledged that the sentencing judge had stated that he was not influenced by the prosecution's recommendation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions that the state court decide whether to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea or instead order specific performance. Notably, the Supreme Court described specific performance as including resentencing by a different judge. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 499. Picking up the Supreme Court's instruction in Santobello, lower courts have ordered that specific performance of sentencing agreements be carried out with a second sentencing before a different judge when faced with a prosecutor's initial breach of an agreement for a sentencing recommendation. For example, the Supreme Court of Montana upheld an order for resentencing before an untainted judge in which the prosecution was directed to stick with plea agreement. State v. Persak, 256 Mont. 404, 847 P.2d 280, 282 (1993) (quotations omitted). Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that, where a prosecutor made a sentence recommendation other than that promised, it was necessary to vacate the sentencing and remand for a second sentencing by a different circuit judge following a recommendation by the prosecutor which is consistent with the plea agreement. Stone v. Cupp, 39 Or.App. 473, 592 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1979). The court in Stone felt this was necessary even though the trial court was not influenced by the recommendation because that factor is immaterial under Santobello. Id. 592 P.2d at 1045 n. 1. This case is different from Santobello, Stone and Persak in that the breach of the plea agreement in this case was discovered before sentencing took place. Santobello discussed specific performance as including resentencing by a different judge, but in Santobello the original judge had already imposed a sentence, having heard only the impermissible recommendation. This was also the case in Stone and Persak, two cases where no court had held that the prosecution was in violation of the plea agreements until after the sentences had already been imposed. These cases did not address the question of the appropriate remedy when the breach of a sentencing agreement is discovered before sentencing, when the sentencing judge has an opportunity to take adequate remedial action. Santobello explicitly left to the state courts selection of the appropriate remedy for breach of a plea agreement. Resentencing should not be necessary if the breach is discovered before sentencing and an appropriate cure is adopted by the judge. Along this line, the fact that the sentencing judge is exposed to a sentencing recommendation that breaches a plea agreement should not in and of itself require transfer of the case to another judge if the breach is recognized and appropriate remedial action taken. The question presented in this case is whether adequate remedial action was taken to allow the sentence to stand.