Opinion ID: 3013533
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commissioner Miller’s Testimony

Text: 3 In reviewing whether the District Court erred in its evidentiary ruling to allow Commissioner M iller to testify about the duties of the proposed Deputy Press Secretary position, we use an abuse of discretion standard. Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d. Cir. 1995). Wilhelm argues that Commissioner Miller lacked the personal knowledge to testify about Wilhelm’s capability to hold the proposed position. We disagree. Federal Rule of Evidence 602 provides in pertinent part, “[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may . . . consist of the witness’ own testimony.” Fed. R. Ev. 602. The court alerted Miller that more was needed than simply stating that he had reviewed the job description. Miller stated he was familiar with the position because he works with a press secretary in the PSP and he had worked with press secretaries for years in the Governor’s office. He opined that W ilhelm possessed the skills to excel in the press secretary post. The District Court has discretion to decide whether this burden of personal knowledge has been met. See U.S. v. Lake, 150 F.3d. 269, 273 (3d. Cir. 1998). An abuse of discretion occurs “when no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.” Hanover Potato Prod., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). A reasonable person would conclude that Miller’s experience qualified him to testify about the position. Accordingly, we will affirm the allowance of Miller’s 4 testimony.2