Opinion ID: 1533871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Cross-examination at the Suppression Hearing

Text: Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law during the suppression hearing when the Commonwealth questioned his former attorney on cross-examination regarding whether the attorney was in good standing and whether the past contact of the attorney with police created a bias against them. At the hearing, Appellant called Peter Blust (Mr. Blust), his former attorney, to testify. [21] Appellant's first few questions for Mr. Blust involved whether he was an attorney in good standing in the Commonwealth. N.T. 9/8/93 at 127-128. Mr. Blust testified that he was. Id. at 128. He advised the court that he was an acquaintance of Appellant and had served as attorney for Appellant with regard to some legal problems. Id. at 128-129. Mr. Blust also testified that Appellant called him from jail and told him that he had been arrested, that police kept telling him that he killed a little girl, that he had a mental block about the entire matter, that police were threatening to put him in the general prison population if he did not cooperate, and that police had not allowed Appellant to contact Mr. Blust despite his repeated requests. Id. at 130-132. The Commonwealth claims that it was entitled to cross-examine Mr. Blust with regard to the following: (1) subjects counsel for Appellant raised on direct-examinationso as to refute his claim that he was in good standing; and (2) his prior contact with policeto establish that Mr. Blust was biased against police and may have fabricated the claim that police wrongfully induced Appellant to confess. Brief of Appellant at 28. The Commonwealth cross-examined Mr. Blust with regard to his contention that he was a member of the bar in good standing based on their knowledge that Mr. Blust had not paid his annual fee. N.T. 9/8/93 at 134. The Commonwealth also sought to show that Mr. Blust was biased and may have had motive to fabricate his testimony. Id. at 148. The prosecutor asked him you don't like cops much. Do you? Id. To that end, the Commonwealth asked questions regarding whether Mr. Blust bore enmity towards police officers due to the manner in which they treated him when: (1) they arrested him for being intoxicated and being abusive to a police officer (Id. at 148); and (2) another arrest that led to his conviction for DUI. Id. at 149. After reviewing the transcript, we hold that the trial court did not err by allowing cross-examination during the suppression hearing with respect to issues raised on direct examination and the issue of bias. Regarding issues raised on direct examination, cross-examination is permissible within the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Begley, 566 Pa. 239, 780 A.2d 605 (2001) (finding it permissible to address the claim of Begley that he was a member of the Marine Corps). On cross-examination, an attorney is entitled to question the witness about subjects raised during direct examination as well as any facts tending to refute inferences arising from matters raised during direct testimony. Similarly, an attorney may discredit a witness by cross-examining the witness about omissions or acts that are inconsistent with his testimony. However, the scope and limits of cross-examination is [sic] vested in the trial court's discretion and that discretion will not be reversed unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion or made an error of law. Id. at 627 (citations omitted). The cross-examination of Mr. Blust with regard to his claim that he was an attorney in good standing was clearly within the scope of the direct examination. Accordingly, there is no basis for a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court also correctly allowed the Commonwealth to inquire into the prior experience of Mr. Blust with police to show that he did not like police and that his bias may have caused him to improperly assert police misconduct. Commonwealth v. Butler, 529 Pa. 7, 601 A.2d 268, 271 (1991). In Butler, we explained, the credibility of a witness may be impeached by evidence which tends to show that the witness had an interest in the outcome of the trial, or that the witness' testimony may be untruthful, or that the witness may possess a bias which colors his testimony. Id. (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 570 A.2d 75 (1990) we explained that: a party against whom a witness is called always has the right to show by cross-examination that a witness is biased or has an interest in the result of the trial. In the instant case, the introduction of... [the witness'] unsentenced convictions was relevant to show ... [the witness'] potential bias against Draper because of the activities of his police officer father. Since ... [the witness] denied any knowledge that Draper's father was involved in his investigation, it was within the province of the jury to decide whether [the witness'] testimony was tainted. Id. at 80 (citations omitted). See also, Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846 (1989) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 215, 112 L.Ed.2d 175 (1990) (evidence as to whether witness had advocated killing of police officers was admissible to show that the witness was biased against the officers). In this case, the questioning by the Commonwealth actually succeeded in getting Mr. Blust to admit that he did not like at least two individual police officers. N.T. 9/8/93 at 148, 154. There was potential bias and the Commonwealth acted properly by asking questions to show that bias. Additionally, the probative value of the testimony regarding bias clearly outweighed any prejudice to Appellant who was not the witness and who was not discredited by the prior contact Mr. Blust had with police. This was also not the guilt or penalty phase of the trial. The testimony on cross-examination came in during the suppression hearing, out of the presence of the jury. Consequently, the trial court properly allowed the Commonwealth to inquire into the prior experience of Mr. Blust with police to show that he did not like police and that his bias may have caused him to fabricate his testimony regarding police misconduct. Because we find the underlying claim not meritorious, we reject Appellant's claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness to the extent that he failed to object to the cross-examination of Mr. Blust.