Opinion ID: 2575291
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Data concerning past employment

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying him access to data concerning his past employment, and in prohibiting him from introducing evidence on that subject, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the error mandates reversal of the penalty imposed. [30]
Because defendant had access to classified information during his employment in the Navy and at ESL, the federal government expressed concern before and during trial that defendant would disclose confidential information at trial. At a hearing held before defendant testified at the guilt phase of the trial, Robin Ball, an attorney from the United States Department of Justice, sought to assert a privilege on behalf of the federal government, proposing that, at defendant's trial, he be permitted either to rise and object, or signal the court or the prosecutor that he wished to assert a claim of privilege. The trial court rejected the view that the federal government had standing to intervene in these proceedings, and could not conceive of any scenario in which Ball would be permitted to raise an objection before a capital case jury, but the court was not opposed to an arrangement between the prosecutor and Ball by which Ball might communicate concerns to the prosecutor. The following day, although the prosecutor also questioned the assertion that the federal government had standing to object, he informed the court and defense counsel that [t]here will however be some mechanism where . . . Mr. Ball can communicate with me at appropriate times. I will make any objections that the prosecution feels necessary. He subsequently added, I'm not nor do I intend to be an agent for the U.S. Government. My interests are prosecuting murder. During defendant's guilt phase testimony, the trial court sustained several objections by the prosecution on the ground of relevancy. Defendant claims error with respect to four questions he was asked but was not allowed to answer. First, defendant testified that following his return from Australia, he found a position working for a subset of a piece of equipment that we had deployed over in Australia. Defense counsel asked him to explain what he meant by a subset of the equipment that had been deployed. The prosecutor objected on relevancy grounds, which the trial court sustained. At a sidebar conference, defense counsel asked whether the objection had been made in response to a signal from the representative of the federal government, and the prosecutor stated he had no idea, and had objected because the question was irrelevant. Defense counsel stated he was attempting to elicit testimony (1) to counter prosecution testimony regarding the ESL location where defendant was assigned, as opposed to the location where he in fact was seen working (and by implication, stalking Black), and (2) to elucidate defendant's industry jargon so that the jury understood what it is he was working on. The trial court suggested counsel simply ask defendant where that piece of equipment was located. Second, when defendant testified that he was assigned to a different project, defense counsel asked him to identify the new project. The prosecutor's objection on the ground of relevancy was sustained. At sidebar, defense counsel again inquired whether the prosecutor's objection was prompted by a signal from Ball. After colloquy between counsel and the court, the prosecutor said, When I make a relevancy objection, I mean that the matter is irrelevant. Pure and simple. After further argument, the court again stated that [t]he relevancy is where he was working. Third, defendant testified that he did not believe the actions he took to gather information about Black were wrong, because his Navy career and his work at ESL fostered an attitude that gathering information surreptitiously was not wrong and that information was power. Defense counsel asked, What are you referring to in terms of what you did in the military and ESL that fostered these attitudes? The prosecutor objected that the information was irrelevant. At a sidebar conference, defense counsel suggested Ball had signaled the prosecutor. The prosecutor stated, I received no signal. I made a relevance objection. After further discussion between the court and counsel, the court asked defendant for an offer of proof regarding what defendant is going to testify to. After consultation with defendant, defense counsel stated defendant would testify that his work involved the use of electronic methods to monitor electronic signals generated by foreign powers, and he intend[ed] to ask [defendant] about that information, about where it was coming from, and why this work contributed to his attitudes, what it was about that that contributed to his attitudes . . . . After further argument by counsel, the court sustained the objection, noting that defendant already had testified that his military and work environment, in which he possessed security clearances that allowed him to obtain information, had led to his feeling of power from getting information. The trial court explained that it fail[ed] to see what he did specifically in the Navy or at ESL insofar as particular projects that he worked on, or particular discussion about monitoring electronic signals of foreign powers or as well as any agencies that he worked for, how that has anything at all to do with this. The court added that even if it had some marginal relevance under 352, this is a complete waste of time, confusion of the issues, and the probative value of this information is negligible. Fourth, after defendant testified further about the attitudes fostered by being involved in spying, and about his elite feeling from having access to classified information, defense counsel asked about the type of information gathered in the Australian facility where defendant worked. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's relevancy objection, and added that the testimony had no probative value and was time consuming. The court stated: I think you have beat to death the issue of spying equals power equals information equals power, that this Defendant has established those attitudes from his work in the military and at ESL, and that he has already described his attitudes about that and that the fact that normal people don't have this information, that he's elitist because he had all this information because of his super secret clearance. Enough is enough. Before the defense completed its direct examination of defendant, it was afforded a hearing regarding Ball's signals to the prosecutor. Ball testified that he would wave to Lieutenant Dow if a question or answer raised privileged matters. With respect to two questions, Ball stated he had waved to Dow, but the prosecutor already had stood up to object in each instance. With respect to another question, Ball said he waved to Dow and Dow touched the prosecutor's arm. Lieutenant Dow testified that the prosecutor stated that he was already aware and was about to object. Thus, the prosecutor did not in fact make any objections at the prompting of the federal representative. The confidential nature of defendant's work in the Navy and at ESL also resulted in limitations upon the testimony of Kent Wells, the Navy personnel security specialist, during the penalty phase. The trial court ruled in limine that it could not order Wells to disclose classified information, because doing so could subject him to criminal prosecution. It also concluded the confidential information defendant sought from Wells was not necessary, because the defense was making [its] point before the [j]ury with other evidence. Defendant requested that Wells testify outside the presence of the jury, be ordered to answer questions involving confidential information, and thereby be forced to invoke a privilege. The trial court agreed. As relevant here, Wells refused to disclose what information was gathered by the national security function with which defendant was involved, but agreed that defendant, as a member of the team, helped gather information which was essential to national security, search and rescue and navigational assistance. The trial court found [t]he gathering function itself . . . to be irrelevant. Wells also testified that knowing the location of ships, planes, and other kinds of objects is important in defending the United States against its enemies, and that defendant thereby contributed to the country's national security, but he refused to explain [w]hat type of enemy movements, activities, were being monitored that was of assistance to the United States in its defense. The trial court concluded that the type of enemy movements was irrelevant. Finally, Wells testified that in the course of repairing and maintaining the equipment, defendant may have been exposed to information stored in computers, but declined to disclose whether the equipment contained specific information about submarine activities of enemy fleets. The trial court found this information to be irrelevant, and also found that the inquiry would result in an undue consumption of time and would confuse the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Defendant contends the trial court's rulings give rise to several related questions: (1) In a capital case, does the defendant have a constitutional right to obtain and present mitigating evidence even if it is protected by a national security privilege? (2) If the defendant is denied the right to present such mitigating evidence, can the state nonetheless seek the death penalty on the theory that it is not the state, but the federal government, that is withholding the evidence? (3) In a capital case, can the court exclude details of a defendant's employment as irrelevant? Defendant does not argue there was error either in the trial court's rulings concerning the discovery of classified information or his motion to bar the death penalty, or in the federal court's grant of summary judgment with respect to defendant's Freedom of Information Act complaint. His argument focuses instead upon the trial court's rulings concerning relevance and the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 during defendant's and Wells's testimony, and the signaling system between the prosecutor and Ball, representing the United States Government. Moreover, as defendant acknowledges, during the presentation of evidence there were no objections or rulings on the basis of national security. Therefore, the first two issues identified by defendant are not presented. (26) We turn to the third issuewhether a court, in a capital case, may exclude details of a defendant's employment as irrelevant. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer in a capital case not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence, that is, evidence regarding `any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1015.) Nonetheless, the trial court still `determines relevancy in the first instance and retains discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.' ( People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 320 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 268, 148 P.3d 47]; see Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 12 [129 L.Ed.2d 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004] [The Eighth Amendment does not establish a federal code of evidence to supersede state evidentiary rules in capital sentencing proceedings.]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, fn. 12 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954] [Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.].) The meaning of relevance is no different in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding from what it is in any other context. ( McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 440 [108 L.Ed.2d 369, 110 S.Ct. 1227].) Thus, `[r]elevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.' ( Ibid. ; see Evid. Code, § 210.) Defendant contends that the trial court's repeated relevancy rulings favoring the prosecution were nothing more than a subterfuge, and that the court's implicit goal was to avoid having to rule on an assertion of a national security privilege. He also contends Evidence Code section 352, upon which the court relied in several of its rulings, was inapplicable because the information sought was not prejudicial, and would have taken little time to present. We first consider the rulings made during defendant's testimony. Defendant testified only at the guilt phase. Thus the challenged trial court rulings regarding his testimony are examined not in the context of his attempt to adduce penalty phase mitigating evidence, as defendant contends, but rather as evidence proffered in defense of the charged offenses. Defendant's testimony regarding his work assignments was relevant to counter the implication that he left his assigned work area in order to stalk Black. Therefore, evidence establishing that he was assigned to work in areas where Black was assigned was relevant, but the precise project upon which defendant was working, or a more detailed description of the equipment used, was not. Similarly, evidence indicating that defendant felt entitled to invade the privacy of others because of his military and ESL experience arguably was relevant to his state of mind, but the content of the classified information that he helped gather was not. The court's rulings concerning relevance and the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 were well within the court's broad discretion and do not demonstrate, contrary to defendant's assertion, that the trial court was acting in concert with the prosecution and the United States Attorney's office . . . to ensure that the basis for the exclusion was not national security. With respect to the signaling system set up between the prosecutor and Ball, defendant contends that the state actively collaborat[ed] with the federal government to withhold mitigating evidence from the jury. He claims the signaling system deprived him of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, because it masked the true basis for the objections, that is, national security, and thereby denied him the opportunity to seek meaningful appellate review of the real basis for the exclusion of this critical evidence. Once again, these events occurred during the guilt phase, at a time when defendant was not proffering mitigating evidence. In addition, the record indicates the signals did not lead to any objections; rather, the prosecutor was objecting or preparing to object when the signals were received. Nor did the trial court's challenged rulings regarding Wells's testimony, during the penalty phase, improperly limit the admission of mitigating evidence. The evidence presented fully informed the jury that defendant received a top-security clearance requiring that he be trustworthy, reliable, of unquestioned character, and loyal to the United States; he worked on a high frequency direction-finding network that assisted in search and rescue missions for aircraft or ships in distress; enemy location was one aspect of the information defendant would gather; the Secretary of Defense characterized all of the projects that defendant worked on as vital to the national defense; and much of his work remained classified at the time of trial. The precise information gathered, the type of enemy movements monitored, and whether the equipment contained information about the submarine activities of enemy fleets, was tangential and had no bearing upon defendant's character or record, or the circumstances of his crimes.