Opinion ID: 2681345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Batson-Wheeler motion

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly exercised a peremptory challenge to a prospective juror based on race and that the trial court later erred in overruling defendant‘s objection under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). Defendant‘s claim lacks merit. During jury selection, defendant, who is African-American, objected to the prosecution‘s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse the venire‘s only remaining African-American prospective juror, P.M., a college-educated schoolteacher who supported the death penalty. Defendant observed that, of all the prospective jurors in the venire, only two were African-American — P.M. and a prospective juror whom the trial court had excused for hardship. Defendant noted that P.M. was a strong supporter of the death penalty and he had assured the court that he could be fair. Defendant argued that P.M.‘s support for the death penalty showed that the prosecutor‘s peremptory challenge was race based. The prosecutor argued that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of race discrimination, and the trial court agreed. The court characterized P.M‘s thinking on the death penalty as ―equivocal,‖ justifying the prosecutor‘s use of a peremptory challenge to remove him. The court concluded that defendant had failed to show a ―strong likelihood‖ that the prosecutor‘s challenge was based on race, saying: ―I d[o]n‘t feel that a prima facie showing was made out‖; ―I 21 conclude that you have not made the prima facie showing‖; and ―I make the finding that you have not made out [a] prima facie showing . . . .‖ The trial court then asked the prosecutor whether he wanted to put his reasons for challenging P.M. on the record. The prosecutor responded: ―I don‘t want to waive the Court‘s finding.‖ The court then assured the prosecutor that, by stating his reasons on the record, he would not be conceding the question of a prima facie case. Specifically, the court said: ―I have already made the finding . . . , so you are not waiving the Court‘s finding. [¶] The question I have is notwithstanding the Court’s finding, do you wish to respond [to the claim of race discrimination] in any event?‖ (Italics added.) In short, the court made clear that it had made its ruling and that it was only giving the prosecutor a chance to make a contemporaneous record in the event that ruling was challenged on appeal. The prosecutor then gave his reasons, explaining: ―[P.M.‘s] answers don‘t make sense. He is a loose cannon. . . . [H]e doesn‘t understand the questions, he gives nonresponsive answers. [¶] . . . This is a man who supposedly has a college degree and is teaching high school . . . . But he doesn‘t understand simple English and doesn‘t respond appropriately. [¶] . . . [H]e would not understand the complexity of the case, . . . just based on his lack of understanding of certain common English words.‖4 4 When P.M. was asked in the juror questionnaire if he had health problems that might affect his ability to serve as a juror, he circled the word ―sight‖ but gave the explanation that he ―cannot hear from left.‖ He denied belonging to any group that advocates support for or abolition of the death penalty, but he apparently confused the word abolition with the word abortion, writing: ―Before the the [sic] starts to be born, I believe in abolition.‖ When he was later asked to elaborate, he said: ―[M]y mind went back to they are talking about if somebody is pregnant and they are talking about abortions, about killing — a lot of people give (footnote continued on next page) 22 After the prosecutor stated his reasons, the court said: ―Very well. I have heard Counsels‘ views, I have considered the record, I have made the finding. The Wheeler motion is denied.‖ (Italics added.) In other words, the court made clear that it was merely reiterating a finding it had already made. The three-stage procedure that applies to Batson/Wheeler motions is familiar. ―First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‗by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory (footnote continued from previous page) me the opinion that if somebody is pregnant, that the baby will be killed before that time and I told them I somewhere was against abortion. That‘s what I was trying to put in that statement, that I don‘t believe in abortion during this time.‖ When asked if he had given much thought to the death penalty before being called for jury duty, he answered: ―Not really, because, see, I had to catch up with so much of my schoolwork because I am a teacher and I am so busy with the children I try to clear that first. I don‘t think too much about it.‖ When asked if he could look defendant in the eye and say out loud that he voted to put him to death for his crimes, he answered: ―I think in some way, because even whoever the person is, I will have to set up my mind first at the beginning with a mind witness open first — until I get all the information.‖ When asked if he thought California was uncivilized because it has the death penalty, he answered: ―That is a big question sometimes. Because sometimes I think it should be done, and if it‘s proven — in the United States. If somebody has actually done a lot of things and I think there is some point it should be done sometimes if something does cross my mind, and then sometimes I believe that some persons should spend the rest of their time in jail. I have never actually sit around and listened to any facts about any person that somebody — you know, media information because I am not able to make a decision before that. [] There are things that cross my mind, things you see on television and those things you listen to. And that‘s where my decision came from.‖ When asked if he had knowledge of the law regarding aiding and abetting, he answered: ―Um, I was — I went to a library once and they had some things printed, but I was just reading a little about it, but I need — I didn‘t get all of the details about it.‖ 23 purpose.‘ [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‗burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion‘ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, ‗[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.‘ ‖ (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted.) This case involves only the first of these three stages. The concurring opinion argues that when the prosecutor volunteered his reasons for challenging P.M., the issue of whether defendant established a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose became moot, and we therefore should proceed to the third stage of the Batson analysis. That rule, however, applies only when the trial court explicitly or implicitly evaluates the prosecutor’s stated reasons. (See People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 786-787; People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 560-561; People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 174-175; People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 613, fn. 8.) Here, the trial court did not evaluate the prosecutor‘s stated reasons, either explicitly or implicitly. Rather, the court made its finding before the prosecution‘s recitation of reasons. The court stated that its invitation to the prosecutor to give his reasons was ―notwithstanding the court‘s finding,‖ and the court‘s final words on the matter were not an express or implied comment on the prosecutor‘s reasons, but a reiteration, without additional analysis, that the court had already made its finding. Those facts make this case indistinguishable from People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 78-80, in which this court unanimously rejected a Batson/Wheeler claim on first-stage grounds even though, as here, the prosecutor stated her reasons for her peremptory challenges on the record. In Hawthorne, as here, the trial court did not evaluate the prosecutor‘s stated reasons, a point that this court later found to be significant (see People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 24 p. 174, fn. 3). (See also People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 746 [―But when, as here, the trial court states that it does not believe a prima facie case has been made, and then invites the prosecution to justify its challenges for purposes of completing the record on appeal, the question whether a prima facie case has been made is not mooted, nor is a finding of a prima facie showing implied.‖].) We conclude, therefore, that this case involves only the first of the three Batson stages: whether defendant made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 5 Nevertheless, in finding that defendant had failed to show a ―strong likelihood‖ of discrimination, the trial court applied an inappropriately rigorous standard. (See Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168 [rejecting the ―more likely than not‖ standard for the prima facie showing of discrimination].) Accordingly, we review the record independently and apply the correct standard: ― ‗ ―whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror‖ on a prohibited discriminatory basis.‘ ‖ (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 342, italics added.) Certain types of evidence are relevant in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of race-based discrimination by the prosecution in its juror challenges. Included in the inquiry is whether the prosecution (1) struck most or all of the members of an identifiable group from the venire, (2) used a disproportionate number of its peremptory challenges against that group, or 5 Significantly, we are not here presented with, nor have we ever been presented with, a situation in which, after the trial court found that no prima facie case had been shown, the prosecutor volunteered reasons for the peremptory challenge that were facially invalid, suggesting impermissible group bias. Nothing we say here should be understood as indicating how we would address such a situation. 25 (3) engaged in little more than desultory voir dire. (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597.) Defendant here argues that, at trial, he made a prima facie showing of discrimination based on the circumstance that P.M., who supported the death penalty, was the only African-American prospective juror in the venire after hardship excusals. But P.M.‘s racial identity, standing alone, is not dispositive. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1101.) Moreover, the prosecutor here engaged Prospective Juror P.M. in an in-depth voir dire, covering more than five pages of transcript, in which P.M. displayed confused, rambling, and incoherent thinking. (See p. 22, fn. 4, ante.) A prosecutor would reasonably want to avoid having such a juror in a complex case such as a death penalty trial. When, as here, a prospective juror exhibits obvious signs of being unsuitable for the jury, the inference that the prosecutor excused the juror on an improper basis becomes less tenable and a correspondingly greater showing is required to support that inference. In light of the voir dire, the circumstance that P.M. was the only African-American on the venire does not support an inference of racial bias on the part of the prosecutor.