Opinion ID: 1329980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: expenses for private investigator

Text: On November 12, 1979, appellant filed a Motion to Produce an itemization by date, hour and individual, of all time expended by agents and employees of the State in the investigation of this case, asserting that it was necessary to determine the likely cost of retaining an independent investigator to aid in the preparation of his defense. Appellant also filed a Motion for Advance Expenses seeking advance authorization to incur expenses for an investigator, in a sum which would permit an investigation comparable to that conducted by the State, or in the alternative $5,000. [10] On December 4, 1979, both motions were denied by the court. The appellant contends that the denial of these motions severely hindered him in the presentation of his defense, and violated his rights to due process. In support of these contentions, appellant cites W.Va.Code, 51-11-8 [1977] [11] and State ex rel. Foster v. Luff, W.Va., 264 S.E.2d 477 (1980), decided four months after the trial court's ruling. In syllabus point 1 of Foster, supra, we held: Upon request for additional expert fees under W.Va.Code, 51-11-8: (1) the request should be made in writing; (2) the request should detail why the expert is needed; (3) defense counsel should be permitted an opportunity to elaborate on the motion; and (4) in denying the motion, the trial judge should place in the record the specific reasons for his ruling. We recognized in Foster that where good cause has been shown for retaining the services of an expert, but the trial court has arbitrarily refused, reversible error may result. 264 S.E.2d at 481. Although Foster dealt with additional expert witness fees, its analysis is applicable to fees for investigative services, which are covered by the same statute. The appellant claims that the trial court's denial of his Motion to Produce prevented him from fully justifying his request for investigative expenses. Further, he contends that the court did not permit him to develop evidence demonstrating his need for advance expenses in excess of the statutory maximum. We disagree. The record shows that defense counsel had made no attempt to ascertain the possible costs of hiring an investigator prior to the hearing on the motions, but planned to consult one as soon as he learned how many hours the State had spent on its investigation. Defense counsel presented argument in support of his motion, but did not request an evidentiary hearing. In the absence of some estimate of contemplated costs, it would have been impossible for the court to determine if appellant's expenses would have exceeded $500. In syllabus point 6 of State v. Less, W.Va., 294 S.E.2d 62 (1982), we said: It is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge whether investigative services are necessary under W.Va. Code, 51-11-8, and the exercise of such discretion will not constitute reversible error unless the trial judge abuses such discretion. While it is true that the judge did not place his specific reasons for denial on the record, we are of the opinion that good cause for appellant's request was not shown, and the court's refusal to approve additional expenses was not an abuse of discretion.