Opinion ID: 835498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bar Investigation

Text: On April 29, 2002, Anderson complained to the Bar about the accused's performance in handling her dissolution matter. In that complaint, Anderson stated that, after she had compared her own records of her communications with the accused to the itemized billing statement that he had sent her, she believed that many of the dates corresponding to the billing entries had been fabricated. Among other things, Anderson also complained specifically about the accused's failure to notify her of the scheduled trial date and generally of his failure to attend to several aspects of her case. As a result of her experience with the accused, Anderson stated that she was forced to find another lawyer to represent her in the dissolution matter and that she was frightened to do so because she was afraid that all attorneys acted in such manner with their clients. In response to Anderson's complaint, on April 30, 2002, the Bar's disciplinary counsel wrote to the accused informing him of its investigation and requesting that he provide his account of the matter along with a copy of his billing statements, time records, and correspondence concerning his representation of Anderson. On June 10, 2002, the accused responded that, because he had moved his office and home in February and March of that year, he was unable to locate Anderson's file and suggested that the Bar obtain copies of as much of the file as possible from Anderson to help expedite his further response. The accused also disputed any contention that his fee was excessive and stated that, because Anderson still owed him $1,335, he was holding a disputed amount of $75 in trust. Subsequently, the Bar sent another letter to the accused on July 12, 2002, requesting responses to a number of additional inquiries, including whether he had billed Anderson monthly for his time, what records he had used to prepare the itemized billing statement dated September 25, 2001, and why that billing statement did not account for the funds that Anderson had advanced to cover the filing fees in her case. Additionally, the Bar requested that the accused provide a copy of his lawyer trust account statements from November 2000 to the present. The accused responded to those requests in a letter dated August 8, 2002. The accused stated that he had not billed Anderson monthly for his services because the fee agreement had required that he do so only after his services had exceeded ten hours [5] and because he did not have time to do the billing for fees. With respect to the preparation of Anderson's billing statement, the accused stated that his assistant had prepared the billing based on his notes, which indicated the dates, the work performed, and the amount of time spent to perform that work. The accused admitted that he had not provided an accounting of Anderson's $300 filing-fee advance in the billing statement and that his failure to do so was an error. Finally, in response to the Bar's request for copies of his lawyer trust account statements, the accused provided the following explanation for why he could not comply with that request: The main reason is based on my clients['] rights to privacy. I assert my clients['] attorney/client privilege. I previously provided records relating to [Anderson.] Your request is outside the scope of this investigation and the breadth of the request spills over into my other clients['] rights to privacy. Trust accounting for my clients is not an issue in this matter. Whatever my clients have held in my trust account is a client secret and not subject to disclosure.    I am sorry, but I cannot give you what you request[.]    All bar proceedings are public record. My clients have a constitutional right to privacy. On September 3, 2002, the Bar renewed its request for a copy of the accused's lawyer trust account statements. The Bar informed the accused that its investigation included his handling of Anderson's funds and that his lawyer trust account should have maintained a $75 balance of funds belonging to Anderson from November 2000 to the present. The accused provided copies of some of his monthly statements in response to that request on October 10, 2002. The accused reported that the statements for several months were missing and that he had requested copies of those statements from the bank and would forward them to the Bar immediately upon receipt. One of the missing monthly statements was that for November 2001. As noted previously, that statement would have shown that the accused wrote checks to himself in November 2001 for a total of $750, drawing the balance in the account down to $46.15. At that time, the account should have held at least the extra $75 that Anderson had paid in excess of the actual filing fee for the dissolution proceeding. In a letter to the accused dated May 6, 2003, the Bar stated that it had not received copies of those missing statements and again requested that the accused submit them no later than May 16, 2003. On May 19, 2003, disciplinary counsel had a telephone conversation with the accused's lawyer, who reported that the accused was no longer located in Oregon and that he had closed his practice and moved to New Zealand on or about May 5, 2003. In a follow-up letter to that conversation, the Bar requested that the accused provide current contact information and again requested that he provide the missing bank statements. The Bar suggested that the accused make immediate arrangements with the bank to have the records forwarded to the Bar. On June 5, 2003, the accused responded with a letter indicating that the requested bank statements were enclosed. The Bar immediately wrote back, stating that several bank statements still had not been forwarded, including the November 2001 statement. Finally, on June 19, 2003  more than 11 months after the Bar's initial request  the accused provided the remaining bank statements to the Bar. The Bar filed a formal complaint against the accused on September 10, 2003. In response, the accused filed a motion to require the complaint to comply with BR 4.1(c), [6] arguing that it fail[ed] to connect alleged facts with alleged violations in a manner that clearly state[d] which pleaded allegations violate[d] which Disciplinary Rules. Subsequent to filing its complaint, the Bar made several requests that the accused provide dates for his deposition. Due to the accused's failure to cooperate with those requests, the Bar filed a Motion to Compel Deposition on December 1, 2003. In an order dated December 9, 2003, the trial panel addressed those issues and a number of others presented by both parties. First, the trial panel granted the accused's motion to require the complaint to comply with BR 4.1(c) and ordered the Bar to file an amended complaint. [7] Additionally, the trial panel granted the Bar's motion to compel the accused's deposition and ordered the accused to make himself available for a telephone deposition between February 1 and March 30, 2004. Finally, the trial panel sustained the accused's objection to the Bar's request for discovery of all client files other than Anderson's. On March 26, 2004, the Bar deposed the accused by telephone. During that deposition, the accused repeatedly objected and refused to answer questions posed by the Bar on various grounds, including lawyer-client privilege, client secrets, work product, and harassment. The following illustrates the types of questions asked and objections made: Q. After Ms. Anderson terminated the attorney-client relationship in September 2001 until the Bar asked you about Ms. Anderson's cost advance, did you review your trust account records? A. I'm going to object to that question on the basis it asks for information about other clients, and that information is privileged, that information is secret. And it goes way beyond the scope of this proceeding as limited by the trial panel chairperson. Q. When do you contend that you determined or discovered that you had not maintained Ms. Anderson's funds in your lawyer trust account? A. I'm going to object to that question on the basis of work product. Q. Are you going to answer the question? A. No, I'm not going to answer it. Q. What caused you to review the issue? A. Which issue? Q. Whether or not you had Ms. Anderson's funds maintained in your lawyer trust account, the issue that we've been questioning? A. I'm going to object to that question again on the basis of privilege and work product. Q. When did you make the review? A. The review of what? Q. The records. A. Which records? Q. Did you review any records to determine whether or not Ms. Anderson's funds had been disbursed from your trust account? A. Again I'm going to object to that particular question on the basis of work product. I won't answer it. Q. Any other objections? A. Work product. Privileged. You're asking some pretty general questions, but it appears to be specific with regards to Ms. Anderson. I'll just simplify it and state that there's probably some correspondence with you which reflects  from me which reflects a point at which that matter was answered and responded to. And  just leave it at that. Q.    [W]ould you please answer the question? A. It also goes beyond the scope of these proceedings as well. But it is work product and it is privileged whatever I might have discovered and when I discovered it with regard to these proceedings. Q. So you're refusing to answer the question? A. Yes, I am. Again you're just perpetuating the questions. This is unnecessary information, you don't need to know it. You're just using it to harass and prolong the proceedings. Q. When you determined that Ms. Anderson's funds had not been maintained in your lawyer trust account, what did you do? A. That assumes a fact not in evidence. And you're asking me two questions. Q. When you determined that Ms. Anderson's funds had not been maintained in your lawyer trust account, what did you do? A. That[] assumes a fact that is not in evidence. As the result of several similar exchanges between the accused and disciplinary counsel throughout the deposition, the Bar filed a Motion to Compel Accused's Response to Deposition Questions on April 30, 2004. In that motion, the Bar argued that the accused's objections at his deposition were unjustified, were not supported by law, and served only to obstruct and delay the Bar's discovery. As a result, the Bar contended, the accused unnecessarily had increased the time and expense associated with the proceeding. Also in April 2004, the Bar served the accused with a Request for Production of Documents related to the accused's treatment of the funds that Anderson had delivered to him. Additionally, the Bar requested documents related to the accused's maintenance of his lawyer trust account, including whether he specifically identified the account by use of the phrase Lawyer Trust Account, whether the account was an interest-bearing account, and whether any interest earnings had been paid to the OLF. Finally, the Bar requested documents related to the accused's representation of Anderson, including time records and Anderson's client file. The accused refused to comply with those requests. As a result, the Bar filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents on May 6, 2004, in which it requested that the trial panel compel the accused to produce the documents. In that motion, the Bar argued that the accused's failure to comply with its requests violated BR 4.5(b), [8] ORCP 36 (providing general provisions governing discovery), and ORCP 43 (governing production of documents). On June 9, 2004, the trial panel ruled on the Bar's motions. After reviewing the accused's deposition, the trial panel concluded that the Bar's questions properly had related to Anderson's case in particular or to the accused's maintenance of his lawyer trust account in general. The trial panel further concluded that the Bar's questions were reasonable under DR 1-103(C) (requiring lawyer subject to disciplinary proceeding to respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from investigating tribunal) and had not violated the trial panel's order of December 9, 2003. Additionally, the trial panel concluded that the documents that the Bar had requested were not protected by any privilege and did not qualify as work product. Consequently, the trial panel ordered the accused to submit to another deposition, to fully and truthfully respond to all reasonable inquiries, and to provide those documents to which he has access, including Anderson's client file and those records reflecting his receipt, deposit, and withdrawal of Anderson's funds. Because the accused did not comply with the trial panel's order to produce the latter documents, the Bar issued a subpoena to U.S. Bank in October 2004 to obtain the bank's documents related to his lawyer trust account. [9] The Bar deposed the accused again on November 11, 2004. At that deposition, the accused admitted that, at some point prior to his first deposition in March 2004, he had made a conscious decision to not send to the Bar a deposit slip reflecting a return of Anderson's $75 to his lawyer trust account  a document that the Bar had requested and the trial panel had ordered him to produce. The accused did not provide that deposit slip to the Bar until November 29, 2004, the first day of the hearing in this proceeding.