Opinion ID: 779950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Peters Was Disabled Under the Rehabilitation Act

Text: 22 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects a qualified individual with a disability from discrimination solely because of the person's disability by any program receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002). The Rehab Act defines an individual with a disability as one who: 1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; 2) has a record of such an impairment; or 3) is regarded as having such an impairment by the person's employer. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2002). This Court looks to the standards applied under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., to determine whether a violation of the Rehab Act occurs in the employment context. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir.1995). Under the ADA, a qualified individual with a disability is one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2002). 23 In order to determine whether Peters falls within the statutory meaning of disabled, we begin by noting that Peters concedes that he did not suffer from an actual physical or mental impairment that substantially limited a major life activity and that he did not have a record of such a disability. So, the issue before this Court is whether the City regarded him as disabled under § 705(20)(B)(iii). 24 Under the regarded as prong, a plaintiff may prove he is disabled by showing that either: 1) the employer mistakenly believes the employee has a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; or 2) the employer mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). In other words, the employer must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999); see also Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir.2000). 25 Though Peters initially argued that the City regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activities of lifting and working, he abandoned the lifting argument at oral argument before this Court. Thus, he now argues only that the City regarded him as disabled in the major life activity of working. To be sure, working constitutes a major life activity under the ADA and the Rehab Act. Amadio, 238 F.3d at 925; Moore, 221 F.3d at 953. Thus, the question is whether Peters demonstrated that the City believed his shoulder injury substantially limited his ability to work in general. 26 To be substantially limited in general, a person must be either unable to perform a major life function, or [be] significantly restricted in the duration, manner, or condition under which the [person] can perform a particular major life activity, as compared to the average person in the general population. Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir.2001). With respect to working, the person must be significantly restricted in the ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs. The determination of whether or not one is substantially limited in working is an individualized one, and we will consider the number and type of jobs from which a person is disqualified, the geographical area to which the person has reasonable access, and the individual's job expectations and training. Moore, 221 F.3d at 953. 27 It is clear, however, that an employer does not regard a person as disabled simply by finding that the person cannot perform a particular job. Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Of West Allis-West Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir.1992). Likewise, we previously declined to hold that a perception of disability arises solely from the employer's termination of the plaintiff because an impairment prohibits the employee from performing the job according to the employer's standards. Moore, 221 F.3d at 954. A terminated employee must present some evidence `of general employment demographics and/or of recognized occupational classifications that indicate the approximate number of jobs ... from which an individual would be excluded because of an impairment.' EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir.2001). 28 Though this Court declined in EEOC v. Rockwell International Corp. to adopt a per se rule that a plaintiff cannot prevail without qualitative evidence of the local job market, we still require that at least some such evidence be presented. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.1998) (This is not an onerous requirement, but it does require at least some evidence from which one might infer that [the plaintiff] faced `significant restrictions' in [his] ability to meet the requirements of other jobs); see also Rockwell Int'l, 243 F.3d at 1018. 29 We have already held that a person is not disabled where the plaintiff's evidence that he was substantially limited in working consisted of a physician-imposed forty-five pound lifting restriction and a prohibition against strenuous work or driving a forklift for more than four hours a day. Contreras, 237 F.3d at 763. The Contreras Court noted that such evidence did not even [hint] at the notion that [the plaintiff] is precluded from a broad class of jobs. Id. 30 In the case at bar, Peters in no way presented evidence that he was substantially limited in his ability to work or that the City regarded him as such. In fact, Peters fully demonstrated that he was still able to work. First, Peters continually told City officials that he did not feel limited by his shoulder. He informed his supervisor, Patrick Giesendorfer, that he painted three rooms and varnished the floors in his house, cleaned out his garage, and built deer stands during his time off from June 1994 through March 1995. 31 Second, Peters only presented evidence of his physician-imposed restrictions, which are hardly distinguishable from those in Contreras. To begin, Peters' physician imposed a fifty pound lifting prohibition, and Contreras' doctor imposed a forty-five pound prohibition. Dr. Hoeft categorized Peters' ability to lift various weights throughout the day, whereas Contreras' physician prohibited him from engaging in strenuous work. Based on Peters' permanent restrictions, it is apparent that for most of the working day Peters could not engage in strenuous lifting. At most, he could shovel or carry between twenty-one and fifty pounds for only thirty percent of the day, and he could carry between eleven and twenty pounds for a maximum of seventy percent of the day. Furthermore, Peters' permanent restrictions limited the use of his left arm and shoulder to a total of six hours in an eight-hour work day. 32 Peters argues that Dr. Hoeft's report, upon which the City relied, classified him in a medium demand job category and that this classification is evidence that he was precluded from all heavy demand labor jobs. Peters, however, provides no evidence to distinguish between so-called medium and heavy demand labor jobs. He simply asserts that the Operator's position is a heavy demand job and, therefore, that Dr. Hoeft's evaluation precluded him from it and similar jobs. Peters, however, did not indicate what those similar jobs might be. Without supporting evidence, we do not find Peters' argument persuasive. 33 The City also demonstrated that it never considered whether Peters was able to complete another job within the City because there were none vacant at the time it terminated him. Likewise, the City's Common Council never considered whether Peters could perform another job outside of the City. The City relied upon Peters' own physician-imposed, permanent restrictions in evaluating whether he could safely perform the job of an Operator and concluded that he could not. While Dr. Hoeft ultimately lifted those restrictions, at the time the City considered Peters' ability to do the job those lifting restrictions were classified as permanent. We cannot say that the City regarded Peters as substantially limited in his ability to work when it knew of his work during June 1994 through March 1995 and never considered his fitness for a job other than that of Operator. 34 Finally, Peters demonstrated to this Court that he was clearly capable of working after being terminated by the City. In fact, Peters found various jobs in construction and as a truck driver following his termination. This work required heavy lifting and carrying, all of which he was able to complete without limitation. 35 While the district court assumed for summary judgment purposes that the City may have regarded Peters as disabled, we hold that Peters does not fall within the meaning of disabled under the Rehab Act because he was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working despite his shoulder injury. The City did not regard Peters as disabled, and the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the City. 36