Opinion ID: 2996363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instructions on Count 3

Text: In a related argument, Stevenson claims that the district court gave a flawed jury instruction on Count 3 and that this error warrants reversal of his conviction on the count. In relevant part, the trial judge instructed the jury that in order to find a defendant guilty on Count 3, it 8 In Smith we focused especially on the words “induce” and “entice” as conveying the idea of intention, stating “it seems to us impossible to . . . ‘induce’ or ‘entice’ a person to take those actions, without the necessary scienter. The ideas of purpose, knowledge, and intent are inherent in those words.” Smith, 223 F.3d at 572. 24 Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 had to find that “the defendant knowingly employed or used a person or persons to assist in avoiding detection and apprehension for the narcotics conspiracy.” (Tr. 321819). As the government concedes, this instruction erroneously omitted the word “intentionally.” This error, at least facially, gave the jury a lower mens rea requirement than that required by § 861, which provides that defendants must have acted “knowingly and intentionally.” 21 U.S.C. 861(a) (2003). Obviously, the omission of part of the mens rea requirement of a statute is a serious flaw; however, because no defendant objected to the jury instruction at the trial level, we review the issue only for plain error. Again, under the plain-error standard, we will reverse the district court’s error only if it is clear or obvious and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). We note that Stevenson’s argument on the jury-instruction issue was not addressed in the Smith decision discussed above. In Smith, we specifically noted that “[p]erhaps one might ‘employ,’ ‘hire,’ or ‘use’ a person to . . . assist in avoiding detection without criminal intent . . . [but] it seems impossible to take the next step, which is to ‘induce’ or ‘entice’ a person to take those actions, without necessary scienter.” Smith, 223 F.3d at 572. In the jury instruction here, neither “induce” nor “entice” were used; rather the jury was told that Stevenson only had to “employ[ ]” or “use[ ]” minors to violate the statute. Also unlike the jury instruction in Smith, however, the court here did include the word “knowingly.” Thus, we are presented with the issue of whether the terms “employ” or “use” along with the mens rea term “knowingly” are sufficient to convey the requisite criminal intent of the statute—a question that we did not have to address in Smith. Id. at 572. Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 25 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 We find that the instruction given to the jury sufficiently encapsulated the idea of purpose and intent to avoid reversal under the plain error standard.9 Our reading of the instruction leads us to the conclusion that if Stevenson “knowingly” used kids in connection with the drug offenses that this use almost had to have been intentional. He knew these kids were minors and he knew that he was using and employing them to avoid detection of drug offenses. Put another way, it is difficult to see how he could knowingly but unintentionally “use” and “employ” a minor in these drug offenses. Consequently, we find that where a jury instruction includes the mens rea term “knowingly” but errantly omits the word “intentionally,” that jury instruction is not so flawed as to work substantial injustice, at least where the instruction also uses the words “employ” and “use.”10