Opinion ID: 1351576
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Error as to Aggravating Circumstances and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: (25) It is settled that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from imposing a penalty that is disproportionate to a criminal defendant's personal culpability. (See, e.g., People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 938.) It also bars use of procedures that create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of such disproportionality. (See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 502-509 [96 L.Ed.2d at pp. 448-452].) (26) Similarly, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from attach[ing] the `aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, ... or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty.... ( Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 885 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 255, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) Evidently, it also bars use of decision-making processes that may be understood to incorporate such mislabeling and thereby threaten arbitrary and capricious results. (27) Defendant contends that the court erred by instructing the jury as it did on aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances. His attack is directed against the court's failure to identify which circumstances were aggravating and which mitigating, and its failure to state that the absence of mitigation did not amount to the presence of aggravation. [10] He claims that in this regard the charge was inconsistent with the federal constitutional principles stated above. What is crucial for present purposes is the meaning that the instructions communicated to the jury. If that meaning was not objectionable, the instructions cannot be deemed erroneous. (See People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 487.) It now appears that we are to determine the meaning of the instructions not under the strict reasonable juror test  i.e., could a reasonable juror have understood the charge as the defendant asserts ( Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 375-376 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 394-395, 108 S.Ct. 1860])  but rather under the more tolerant reasonable likelihood test  i.e., is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury so understood the charge ( Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 329, 110 S.Ct. at p. 1198]). This is certainly true for purposes of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. ( Ibid. ) It appears to be true as well for purposes of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We must reject defendant's claim of error. Even under the strict reasonable juror test, the meaning that the instructions communicated was not objectionable. To begin with, a reasonable juror would have understood the instructions as prohibiting him from imposing a penalty that was disproportionate to defendant's personal culpability. This conclusion is virtually compelled by the plain language used in the definitions of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and in the description of the weighing process. Contrary to defendant's assertion, such a juror could not have interpreted the charge other than as barring disproportionality. Further, a reasonable juror could not have attached the `aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, ... or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty.... ( Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 885 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 255].) Defendant's claim to the contrary notwithstanding, a reasonable juror would readily have identified which circumstances were aggravating and which mitigating. Again, this conclusion is virtually compelled by the plain language used in the definitions of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and in the description of the weighing process. Certainly, such a juror could not have inferred  contrary to governing law (see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-289 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861] (plur. opn.))  that extreme mental or emotional disturbance and diminished capacity were circumstances in aggravation. Defendant argues in substance that a reasonable juror might have understood these circumstances as indicia of future dangerousness and hence as grounds for the ultimate sanction. We are not persuaded. It is pellucid in the very words of the instructions that both circumstances looked to the past, not the future, and supported life, not death. Again notwithstanding defendant's claim, a reasonable juror could not have believed  contrary to governing law (see People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 288-289 (plur. opn.))  that the absence of mitigation amounted to the presence of aggravation. The instructions made plain that aggravation required the existence of circumstances attending the commission of the offenses in question which increase their guilt or enormity or adds [ sic ] to their injurious consequences, but which are above and beyond the essential elements of the offenses themselves  and not merely the nonexistence of circumstances ... which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. [11]