Opinion ID: 623834
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Major Fox’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: White challenges the magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Major Fox. He argues that Major Fox labeled him a “snitch” or informant when he was a prisoner at the Michael Unit. White further asserts that the informant designation was made known to prisoners at the Darrington Unit, and as a result, he was assaulted after TDCJ - ID transferred him there. White relies upon Barnes’ statements and Frazier’s affidavit to support his 42 U.S.C. § 19832 claim.
The law imposes a statutory duty to protect prisoners from violence from other prisoners. 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(3) (2011) (“The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General shall . . . provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses 2 In its entirety, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 8 Case: 10-40843 Document: 00511770597 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/28/2012 against the United States.”). The United States Supreme Court, in a seminal case, definitively held “that a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Even prior to Farmer, the Court proclaimed that there is a right to safety in prison. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 352 (1986) (“In particular, it includes a prisoner's right to safe conditions and to security from attack by other inmates.”). Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote: [W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety -- it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (emphasis in original); see also Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Judge Richard A. Posner observed: “[i]f the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active [role] as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.”); Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1979) (“prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners”); Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 675 (8th Cir. 1992) (“This Court has clearly held that prisoners have a constitutional right to be free from . . . attacks by other inmates.”); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991); Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991); Vosburg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1988). 9 Case: 10-40843 Document: 00511770597 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/28/2012
To establish a failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner must show that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection.” Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff need not produce direct evidence of the official’s knowledge but rather may rely on circumstantial evidence. Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003). To survive summary judgment on a failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner is required to produce sufficient evidence of: 1) substantial risk of serious harm, 2) a prison official’s deliberate indifference to that risk, and 3) causation. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Radick v. Hardiman, 588 F. Supp. 932 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (deliberate indifference to violent prisoner attacks against other prisoners gives rise to liability for violation of Eighth Amendment rights); West v. Rowe, 448 F. Supp. 58 (1978) (when a prisoner’s repeated requests for help place appropriate officials on notice of a life-endangering situation, a constitutional duty of care arises binding such officials to take reasonable measures to ensure that prisoner’s safety). This court recognized that “an individual who divulges secret information about his gang might be a target of violence by fellow gang members,” and therefore may have a failure-to-protect claim. Adames, 331 F.3d at 514-515 (“[A] prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he helps create a risk to an inmate’s health or safety.”). To raise a fact issue, this court required the plaintiff to show that the defendant “was aware of facts that could lead him to infer that . . . gang members had learned about the conversation between” the defendant and the plaintiff-informant. Id. 10 Case: 10-40843 Document: 00511770597 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/28/2012 Here, White asserts that: 1) Major Fox told Barnes that White had provided incriminating information against Barnes; 2) prisoners at the Darrington Unit learned that White was a snitch from prisoners at the Michael Unit; and 3) White was assaulted at the Darrington Unit shortly thereafter. White supported his assertions with affidavits sworn to under the penalty of perjury by two prisoners, Barnes and Frazier. On March 17, 2003, Barnes first attested that: On March 5th I was called to the front office on Michael Unit by Major Fox, on this day he tells me that inmate Dexter White and another inmate Valentine had wrote statements against me concerning security keys. I told the major at this time I did not know either inmate. This is a very serious matter, especially being behind bars. (“Barnes’ First Statement”). In addition to Barnes’ First Statement, Barnes wrote a letter to White dated March 27, 2003 – 10 days later – which was “Received April 1, 2003 and stated (as transcribed by the magistrate judge): Well, I’m going to rewrite my legal work for you again. I was taken to the major’s office and was told I was getting a case for writing to you or as the major said, I had lied to him about you. I told him the truth, I didn’t know you before he put me on 11 Building, right beside you for two weeks, plus you are only doing my legal work for me. The major said you are the one who put me in here, starting four months ago. I don’t even know why I tried to argue with him. How can he talk about someone lying. You know, and I know, we didn’t know each other before 11 Building just a few weeks ago. He had the letter I had wrote to you about my Step One on my case, with the grievances I signed. Said you are getting a transfer for the help you have provided. Well looks like you got what you wanted if that’s the case, but Dexter I know better, you didn’t know me four months ago and I didn’t know you, so I need this legal work, I don’t know how to do it. I’m going to explain once again what all took place plus sign the grievances. The major can’t take any more from me, when the craft shop stuff is gone they don’t need to ever be coming around. Ho! I should have a lawyer from Palestine by next week. Also tell Rick the major said that 11 Case: 10-40843 Document: 00511770597 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/28/2012 Dwight Rawlinson was a friend of his and he wasn’t going to help me. I know that is a lie too, that man can only see out of one eye and has 10% only in it because of those people, he hate TDC for what they did. Plus I’m not going to stop until the truth comes out, either they can get it or I’m going to get help for them to get it right. I’m not going to allow no one to set me up and I don’t do nothing about it. White, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20433, at -18 (“Barnes’ Second Statement”). In support of Major Fox’s summary judgment motion, he stated, in relevant part, in his affidavit that: I was a Major employed at the Michael Unit in Tennessee Colony, Texas. As Major I was the ranking officer in charge of all general population offenders assigned to the Michael Unit. Offender White alleges I was deliberately indifferent to his safety when I falsely labeled him a snitch and had him transferred to another unit where he was subjected to violent assaults. However, at no time did I label White a ‘snitch.’ Snitch is a negative slang term offenders use to describe an informant, TDCJ uses the term confidential informant. Contrary to White’s allegations I never used him as a confidential informant or labeled him as one. I prefer not to use confidential informants and can only recall two instances where I ever used one in all my years with TDCJ. Neither informant was Offender White. Further, I have never told anyone I was using Offender White as a confidential informant. White also claims that being a ‘snitch’ was the reason he was assaulted at the Darrington Unit. However, I have not contact with any of the officers or offenders housed at the Darrington unit which is in Rosharon, Texas about two-hundred miles from the Michael Unit. At no time did I inform anyone at the Darrington Unit that Offender White was a snitch. I do not why or even if, he was assaulted at the Darrington Unit. (Emphasis added.) The magistrate judge granted summary judgment because she found that Barnes’ statements were unpersuasive and relied on inadmissible hearsay. To the contrary, Barnes’ First and Second Statements indicate that, 12 Case: 10-40843 Document: 00511770597 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/28/2012 as White alleged, Major Fox said to Barnes that White had provided incriminating information to Major Fox against Barnes. In addition, White testified at the evidentiary hearing that Major Fox placed White’s life in danger by telling Barnes that White was an informant. Therefore, at a minimum, Barnes’ statements and White’s testimony and allegations contradict the affidavit submitted by Major Fox, thus creating a genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Furthermore, the magistrate was in err when it disregarded as hearsay Barnes’ statement that Fox told Barnes that White was a snitch. First, by definition, Fox’s statement was non-hearsay as it constitutes a party-opponent admission. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Second, Fox’s statement was not necessarily offered for the truth of the matter asserted–it was not offered to prove White was a snitch. Instead, it was offered to show the effect on the listener–it was offered to prove that whoever heard White was a snitch believed that he was a snitch, and, therefore, wanted to harm him. See Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1434 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, it did not matter whether White was a snitch. It only mattered that Fox made a statement that caused others to believe White was a snitch. Accordingly, the magistrate erred when it disregarded Barnes’ statement as hearsay. Likewise, the magistrate judge disregarded Frazier’s affidavit, which expresses that Frazier overheard a prisoner at the Darrington Unit state that he learned from prisoners at the Michael Unit that White was an informant: On or about August 29, 2004, I was in the chow line at the Darrington Unit, and I overheard offender Laven tell two of his homeboys that, “I got a letter from the homies on Michael, and there is a snitch named Dexter White over here now-I’m going to smash his snitching-bitch-ass good.” I advised Dexter [White] of this fact, and he tried to get some assistance from the Unit administration - to no avail. 13 Case: 10-40843 Document: 00511770597 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/28/2012 The magistrate judge considered Frazier’s affidavit “nothing beyond sheer speculation.” At a minimum however, Frazier’s affidavit provides a link between Major Fox’s alleged statement to Barnes and the location of White’s alleged attack. The magistrate judge also discounted Frazier’s affidavit because the affidavit was executed in 2010, approximately six years after Frazier heard the prisoner’s statement, and ultimately determined that Frazier’s affidavit was “too remote and speculative to stand as viable opposition” to Major Fox’s summary judgment motion. However, that is basically a credibility determination, which should not factor into summary judgment. Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The presiding judge is not to weigh the evidence nor engage in credibility determinations.”) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49). Indeed, the length of time between the incident and the affidavit is not a legal basis to completely disregard it on summary judgment. The magistrate judge also found that Frazier’s affidavit was not based on Frazier’s personal knowledge. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”) (emphasis added). However, the affidavit does contain Frazier’s assertion that he heard another Darrington Unit prisoner state that Michael Unit prisoners considered White to be an informant and that he intended to assault White. Construing “all facts and inferences in the light most favorable” to White, see Dillon, 596 F.3d at 266, he produced evidence (Barnes’ First and Second Statements) that contradicted Major Fox’s statement that he did not tell anyone that White was a snitch. White also produced evidence (Frazier’s affidavit), which connects the snitch label from the Michael Unit and the subsequent assault at the Darrington Unit. If Major Fox informed another prisoner that 14 Case: 10-40843 Document: 00511770597 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/28/2012 White acted as an informant, then whether Major Fox acted with deliberate indifference to White’s safety by creating a risk of assault is a question for the fact-finder. See Adames, 331 F.3d at 510-15 (analyzing a claim that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference by informing prisoners that another prisoner provided incriminating information). When reviewing the evidence most favorably toward White, it is clear that he has produced sufficient evidence of: 1) substantial risk of serious harm, 2) Major Fox’s deliberate indifference to that risk, and 3) causation. Those alleged events occurred in rapid succession. White was allegedly assaulted on September 20, 2004. Thus, the alleged assault occurred shortly after August 2004, when Frazier’s affidavit indicates that he heard another prisoner state that he had learned from prisoners at the Michael Unit that White was an informant and that the prisoner planned to assault White. White received treatment for his injuries, which included facial trauma, on September 22 and October 29, 2004. See Estelle v. Gambelle, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-199 (“[B]ecause the prisoner is unable by reason of the deprivation of his liberty to care for himself, it is only just that the State be required to care for him.”) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04). Given Barnes’ statements and Frazier’s affidavit, which contradict Major Fox’s affidavit, there is a genuine dispute of material fact.