Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation of Duane Moody

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of evidence the police obtained as the result of statements made by Duane Moody  statements the trial court determined were involuntary. Defendant contends that the murder weapon, evidence relating to the automobile thought to have been used in the shooting of Detective Williams, and the testimony of Ali and Cathy Woodson should have been excluded as the fruit of Moody's involuntary statements. Accordingly, defendant contends the trial court violated his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. He also contends this evidence should have been excluded as the fruit of a violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In pretrial proceedings, before their cases were severed, defendant joined in codefendant Moody's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. Defendant contended he had standing to claim that Moody's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, because the warrantless arrest of Moody constituted outrageous government conduct in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process. He maintained that Moody's statement to the police and all evidence obtained as the fruit of the statement should be suppressed. Defendant also joined in codefendant Moody's motion to suppress the statements on the ground that they were involuntary because they were obtained as the result of offers of leniency and other physical and psychological coercion preceding and during interrogation. Defendant asserted that he had standing to raise the claim that Moody's statements were involuntary under Fifth Amendment principles, also asserting an independent due process right under the state and federal Constitutions not to have his conviction based upon the involuntary confession or statement of another. He moved to suppress Moody's statements and all tangible and intangible evidence obtained by the exploitation of the involuntary statements and their fruits. Evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress indicated that in a November 4, 1985, interrogation, Moody informed the police where he had secreted the murder weapon. The weapon was discovered at the location indicated  the Woodsons' house. In a November 6, 1985, statement, Moody said the vehicle that had been used in the shooting of Detective Williams was a sky-blue Oldsmobile with a white top, and he described its location. The vehicle was found at that location. The trial court heard numerous witnesses, and concluded that: Moody's arrest was supported by probable cause; Moody's claim that the police physically mistreated him was not supported by the record; statements Moody made to the police prior to November 4, 1985, were voluntary, but that Moody's statements to the police on November 4, 1985, were involuntary and inadmissible, apparently on the ground that they were the product of offers of leniency. In addition, the court found Moody's statement to the police on November 6, 1985, inadmissible as a fruit of the earlier coerced statement. Nonetheless, the court held that the murder weapon, the vehicle connected with the murder, and the testimony of Ali and Cathy Woodson were admissible because inevitably they would have been discovered during the course of a lawfully conducted investigation. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the murder weapon, evidence concerning the vehicle from which the fatal shots appeared to have been fired, and certain shell casings discovered in the vehicle. Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of the Woodsons regarding codefendant Moody's action in storing the murder weapon at their home on the night of the murder. He maintains that this evidence was the fruit of Moody's involuntary statements, and that the trial court erred in determining that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation even without Moody's statements. In his reply brief, defendant also contends that he has standing to raise this claim because violation of Moody's privilege against self-incrimination constituted a violation of his own due process rights. The coercion applied to Moody, he contends, caused Moody to disclose the whereabouts of the weapon and the vehicle, and to disclose the identity of the Woodsons. Without a rule requiring suppression of the challenged evidence, he alleges, police misconduct would be encouraged rather than deterred. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in determining that Moody's statements were involuntary, that defendant lacks standing to complain of any violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment rights, and that the trial court correctly determined that the challenged evidence inevitably would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation. Respondent claims, finally, that the introduction of the evidence, even if obtained as a result of an involuntary statement, did not violate defendant's due process right to a fair trial. As we shall explain, we need not and do not determine whether the statements were voluntary or whether the evidence inevitably would have been discovered, because we agree with respondent's final contention that, in any event, the introduction of this evidence did not violate defendant's due process rights. As an initial matter, we agree with respondent that defendant lacks standing to raise the claim that in conducting their interrogation, police officers violated Moody's privilege against self-incrimination. A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640, disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment rights. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 344, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 501, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) As we have recognized, the `admission at trial of improperly obtained statements [of a third party] which results in a fundamentally unfair trial violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.' ( People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 499, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) The violation of a third party's privilege against self-incrimination may deprive a defendant of his or her due process rights if such action adversely affects the reliability of testimony offered against the defendant at trial. As we have said: [W]hen the evidence produced at trial is subject to coercion ... defendant's due process rights [are] implicated and the exclusionary rule ... [is] applied. When a defendant seeks to exclude evidence on this ground, the defendant must allege that the trial testimony is coerced [citation], and that its admission will deprive him of a fair trial [citation]. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 344, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, italics in original.) Defendant does not contend that testimony presented at trial was the result of coercion. Moody did not testify at defendant's trial. Rather, defendant contends that the fruits of Moody's involuntary statements were inadmissible under the exclusionary rule applicable in cases of violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He maintains that police misconduct must be deterred, and that if the fruit of police coercion of a third party could be admitted against a defendant, the police ... would have little incentive ... to refrain from taking extreme and illegal measures to obtain evidence from one codefendant to use against another. Our opinion in People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, however, establishes that a defendant may not prevail simply by alleging that the challenged evidence was the fruit of an assertedly involuntary statement of a third person. In that case, we determined specifically that a defendant may not secure the exclusion of the trial testimony of a third party simply on the ground that it was the fruit of the third party's involuntary statement. ( Id. at pp. 346, 348-350, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) We explained that when the defendant's claim is based upon the involuntariness of a third party's statement, the exclusionary rule applicable to a claimed violation of the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. ( Id. at p. 346, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) Rather, the defendant may prevail only by demonstrating fundamental unfairness at trial, normally by establishing that evidence to be produced at trial was made unreliable by coercion. ( Id. at pp. 347-348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) As we observed in the Badgett case, the primary purpose of excluding coerced testimony of third parties is to assure the reliability of the trial proceedings .... ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 347, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) In addition, [t]he purpose of exclusion of evidence pursuant to a due process claim ... is adequately served by focusing on the evidence to be presented at trial, and asking whether that evidence is made unreliable by ongoing coercion.... ( Id. at pp. 347-348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, italics in original.) Defendant's assertion that the challenged evidence should have been excluded in order to deter police misconduct is inconsistent with the primary justification for recognizing the accused's limited standing to complain of the violation of another individual's privilege against self-incrimination  a concern to provide fundamental fairness at trial by ensuring the reliability of the evidence presented at that proceeding. Defendant's assertion that the goal of deterring police misconduct in all criminal investigations requires the exclusion of the ensuing evidence would result in the adoption of a Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule in such cases, affording defendants unlimited standing to complain of the violation of a third person's privilege against self-incrimination, without the necessity of demonstrating any fundamental unfairness in the trial itself. The law provides, however, that it is only the defendant's own right to fundamental fairness that is at stake in such circumstances, and that the exclusionary rule applicable to violations of the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. When in the past we have considered due process claims such as defendant's, the trial evidence sought to be excluded was the testimony of the third party who assertedly had been subject to coercion. (See People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 342, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 498-499, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) In the present case, defendant did not seek to exclude statements of the third party. Moody did not testify, nor was evidence of his involuntary statements to the police presented in evidence. Rather, at trial defendant sought to exclude demonstrative evidence he claims was discovered as a product of the coercion of Moody  the murder weapon and evidence relating to the vehicle from which it was asserted the fatal shots were fired  as well as the testimony of the Woodsons, in whose home Moody stored the murder weapon. We see no reason, however, to conclude that demonstrative evidence should be subject to a broader exclusionary rule under these circumstances than is applicable to testimonial evidence  quite the reverse, since coercion of a statement is far less likely to render physical evidence unreliable than it is likely to affect the reliability of trial testimony. We detect no connection between the asserted coercion of Moody  apparently arising out of offers of leniency in return for his cooperation with the investigating officers  and the reliability of the Woodsons' testimony at trial, or of the murder weapon or the vehicle, as evidence of defendant's guilt. Indeed, defendant has not contended that there is such a connection. Assuming, without deciding, that in some circumstances physical evidence might be excluded as unreliable as a consequence of the coercion of a third party, we observe that defendant makes no claim that the physical evidence he sought to exclude was unreliable, or that its reliability was in some way affected by any police coercion of Moody. We reject defendant's contention because he fails to carry the burden of demonstrating any fundamental unfairness at trial. (See People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) We have acknowledged that in some instances, courts analyzing claims of third party coercion have expressed some concern to assure the integrity of the judicial system by vindicating a due process right of the defendant in this context. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 347, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, citing United States v. Chiavola (7th Cir.1984) 744 F.2d 1271, 1273; United States v. Fredericks (5th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 470, 481, & fn. 14; LaFrance v. Bohlinger (1st Cir.1974) 499 F.2d 29, 32-34.) A recent decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, recognizes that the unreliability of a coerced confession of a third person is not the sole reason for its exclusion from evidence: `It is unthinkable that a statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state should be admitted at the government's behest in order to bolster its case.... Yet methods offensive when used against an accused do not magically become any less so when exerted against a witness.' ( Clanton v. Cooper (10th Cir.1997) 129 F.3d 1147, 1158.) In the present case, no `statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state' ( Clanton v. Cooper, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 1158) was admitted at trial. The trial court determined that the police did not coerce Moody physically, and the assertedly coerced statement was not admitted at all. Accordingly, we are not called upon to decide whether evidence produced by outrageous police misconduct, but not otherwise shown to be unreliable or subject to the ongoing effects of coercion, should be excluded in order to vindicate the integrity of the judicial system. [9] Defendant fails to demonstrate that his right to a fair trial was undermined by the introduction of physical evidence whose reliability is not questioned, or by the introduction of the testimony of witnesses who were not shown to be subject to any police coercion before or during trial. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence, and we reject defendant's due process claim.