Opinion ID: 2623207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Appointment of alternate commissioners

Text: Judge Mosley challenges the composition of the Commission in his case because the Nevada State Bar Board of Governors (the State Bar) improperly delegated the appointment of two alternate delegates to the executive director of the Commission. We agree that the appointments were improperly delegated. On February 10, 2000, upon learning of the Commission's investigation of Judge Mosley, James Beasley, a permanent member of the Commission, voluntarily recused himself from the subject disciplinary proceedings because he had at one time acted as Ms. Figliuzzi's attorney. Later, after the Commission formally determined that reasonable probability existed in this case to warrant prosecution of the charges against Judge Mosley, Donald Campbell, another permanent commissioner, recalled a prior but brief contact with Ms. Figliuzzi regarding the Mosley-Figliuzzi domestic-relations lawsuit and also voluntarily disqualified himself from further proceedings. Commissioners Beasley and Campbell are attorney members of the Commission, appointed by the State Bar pursuant to article 6, section 21(2)(b) of the Nevada Constitution. There is no constitutional procedure that governs the temporary replacement of disqualified board members. In such situations, the entities authorized to appoint commissioners (namely, this court, the State Bar, and the governor) customarily name alternates to replace the recused commissioners. In this case, the State Bar did not specifically name replacements for Beasley and Campbell. Instead, the Board of Governors, through the president of the State Bar, delegated to the Commission's executive director the authority to select alternates from a list or slate of twelve candidates nominated by the State Bar in 1995. [35] Acting on this delegated authority, Gang accordingly replaced Commissioners Beasley and Campbell with Larry Hicks, Esq., and B. Mahlon Brown, Esq., who were both listed on the State Bar's slate of approved attorney alternates. This court has not yet considered whether the State Bar or any other appointing authority may delegate its appointing power to Commission staff. We now conclude that the Nevada Constitution's text, structure, and purpose provide no basis for the State Bar's delegation of its appointment authority. The power of appointment to the Commission is created by article 6, section 21 of the Nevada Constitution. Subparagraph 2(b) (the appointment clause) provides: The commission is composed of ... [inter alia, t]wo members of the State Bar of Nevada, a public corporation created by statute, appointed by its board of governors.  (Emphasis added.) The appointment clause goes on to provide limitations on the appointment power: If a vacancy occurs, the appointing authority shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term. An appointing authority shall not appoint more than one resident of any county ... [and][n]o member may be a member of a commission on judicial selection. [36] As noted, the Nevada Constitution is silent with respect to the appointment or selection of Commission alternates. Nevada statutes relating to these matters likewise make no provision for the appointment of alternates. [37] We conclude, however, that the power to appoint alternates is an inherent power of the appointing authorities. Accordingly, we construe the text of the appointment clause as applying to the appointment of alternates. By its plain language, [38] the clause empowers the State Bar to appoint[] Commission members. Appoint means to assign, designate, or set apart. [39] These words connote a particularized selection and indicate that the power to appoint is specific rather than general. The appointment clause, by its terms, demonstrates that the appointment of alternates in this case was accomplished in violation of the state constitution. First, paragraph two vests the power of appointment in three, independently elected and distinct authorities: the governor, this court and the State Bar. The power to appoint commissioners is given to no one other than these entities. Second, the constitution establishes a scheme under which the appointing authorities designate commissioners for a specific term, and thereafter have no authority to remove the commissioners or otherwise replace them. This serves the purpose of ensuring that commissioners remain impartial by minimizing the likelihood of strategic appointments. Although there is absolutely no evidence that alternates Hicks and Brown are biased in any way, or that Gang had an ulterior motive in selecting them, we conclude that delegated appointment authority in general has the potential for undermining this carefully and thoughtfully crafted construct for neutral selection. Accordingly, we conclude that the text of the appointment clause unambiguously precludes the State Bar from delegating its appointment power in the manner described by these parties. Therefore, the appointment of the alternates by the executive director of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, pursuant to the instructions from the Nevada State Bar, violated the state constitution.