Opinion ID: 852787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of the Aggravating Circumstances

Text: Mask argues that his sentences were improperly enhanced because the aggravating circumstances were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as mandated by Blakely v. Washington . We agree with Mask in part. In Smylie v. State, we held that Blakely was applicable to Indiana's sentencing scheme, and thus required that the sort of facts envisioned by Blakely as necessitating a jury finding must be found by a jury under Indiana's existing sentencing laws. 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind.2005). Contrary to Mask's argument, Blakely does not require that a jury find all the facts used to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Blakely and the later case United States v. Booker indicate that there are at least four ways that meet the procedural requirements of the Sixth Amendment in which such facts can be found and used by a court in enhancing a sentence. As we noted recently in Trusley v. State , an aggravating circumstance is proper for Blakely purposes when it is: 1) a fact of prior conviction; 2) found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; 3) admitted to by a defendant; or 4) stipulated to by the defendant, or found by a judge after the defendant consents to judicial fact-finding, during the course of a guilty plea in which the defendant has waived his Apprendi rights. Trusley v. State, 829 N.E.2d 923, 925, 2005 WL 1415414, at  (Ind. June 17, 2005); See also Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 2541, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). At the sentencing hearing in this case, the judge enhanced Mask's sentences because there are aggravating circumstances by reason of the fact that there have been multiple instances of battery and over a long period of time and the fact that this did occur in fact when children were present.... (Tr. at 174.) As we have previously noted, the precise language of an aggravator need not be submitted to a jury nor admitted to by a defendant in order to pass the Sixth Amendment requirements established in Blakely. Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 17-18, 2005 WL 1403925, at -5 (Ind. 2005). In some instances, an aggravator may be permissible if it reflects an attempt to articulate or summarize the weight or importance of facts otherwise permissibly found. Id. The first of the aggravators here, that Mask had battered his wife on several occasions over a period of time, certainly complies with Blakely's requirements. Mask had pled guilty in 2001 to the battery of his wife, clearly a fact of prior conviction. Moreover, the jury found Mask guilty of the two instances of battery in 2002 that were separated by a month and that are the subject of the instant appeal. This indicates that the judge's statement concerning the number of batteries and the protracted period of time over which they occurred was based on facts found by permissible methods. It summarizes the weight of the prior convictions and was appropriately used by the trial court. The other aggravating circumstance, that the battery had occurred in front of a child, was not found by one of the permissible methods. The question of whether or not a child was present at the time of the December 20th battery was never submitted to a jury, nor included in the charging information. Mask never admitted that a child was present and, in fact, stated at trial that the child was lying about having witnessed any battery. (Tr. at 111.) Consequently, this aggravator was impermissible for purposes of enhancing the sentence of any of the counts. As we said in Smylie, though, such a fact does not need to be found by one of the permissible methods if it is used to run sentences consecutively. Smylie, 823 N.E.2d at 686. Thus, this fact could be used to run the December and November sentences consecutively.