Opinion ID: 6325142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V)

Text: ¶44 Alternate defense counsel contends that the allegedly ineffective counsel cannot provide the prosecution access to confidential attorney-client information until, pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V), the court decides to hold a hearing because it is only then that the scope of the subsection (1) waiver can be delineated. And, continues alternate defense counsel, subsection (2) is silent as to when the disclosures required by current counsel must be made, so that part of the statute, too, has to be read in conjunction with Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). Interpreting section 18-1-417 through the Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) prism, avers alternate defense counsel, reveals that the allegedly ineffective counsel and current counsel “need not and, in fact, cannot determine which documents, if any,” relate to the ineffective assistance claim filed until the court, acting pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V), sets a hearing. We disagree. 21 ¶45 Crim. P. 35, “Postconviction Remedies,” permits a defendant “aggrieved and claiming either a right to be released or to have a judgment of conviction set aside . . . [to] file a motion . . . to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence, or to make such order as necessary to correct a violation of his constitutional rights.” Crim. P. 35(c)(3). Paragraph (c)(3) outlines the procedures that “apply to the filing and hearing of such motions.” Id. As relevant here: • The court “shall promptly review all motions that substantially comply with Form 4, Petition for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c).” Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV). • If the motion, the file, and the record of the case show “that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the court shall enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying the motion.” Id. • In the event the court doesn’t deny the relief requested based on the motion, the file, and the record of the case, it must: (1) serve the motion on the prosecution if the prosecution hasn’t yet been served the motion; and (2) serve the motion on the Office of the Public Defender if the defendant has requested counsel be appointed. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). • If the court serves the motion on the Office of the Public Defender, then, within forty-nine days of service, that office must: indicate whether it intends to enter on behalf of the defendant, identify whether it has any conflicts of interest in representing the defendant, state whether it needs additional time to investigate the defendant’s claims, and add any claims it believes have arguable merit. Id. • Upon receipt of the response from the Office of the Public Defender, or immediately if the defendant did not request counsel or if the defendant already has counsel, the court must order the prosecution, within thirty-five days, to either respond to the defendant’s claims or request additional time to respond. Id. The court must also instruct 22 the defendant to reply to the prosecution’s response within twenty-one days. Id. • Thereafter, the court must “grant a prompt hearing on the motion unless, based on the pleadings, the court finds that it is appropriate to enter a ruling containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. • If a hearing is held, the court must take whatever evidence is necessary. Id. Further, the court must enter written or oral findings granting or denying the relief requested within sixty-three days of the conclusion of the hearing or provide the parties notice of the date by which the ruling will be issued. Id. ¶46 Nowhere does Crim. P. 35(c)(3) discuss or even mention section 18-1-417. Nor does that part of the rule reference attorney-client confidentialities. Simply put, while Crim. P. 35(c)(3) establishes the procedures counsel and the court must follow vis-à-vis an ineffective assistance claim, it says nothing about the automatic waiver in subsection (1) or the required disclosures in subsection (2). To make the automatic waiver and required disclosures contingent on the court’s decision to set a hearing under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) would require us to add words to the statute. And “we do not add words to . . . a statute.” People ex rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 22, 465 P.3d 554, 560. ¶47 In any event, alternate defense counsel stands on shaky ground in maintaining that subsection (2) is silent on the timing of the required disclosures by current counsel. It isn’t. Subsection (2) expressly states that current counsel 23 must make the required disclosures “upon request of the prosecution.” § 18-1-417(2). ¶48 Given the clear language of section 18-1-417, to consult Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) in construing the statute would be to look for answers to questions that don’t exist. Where, as here, the statutory language is unambiguous, we “give effect to its plain meaning and look no further.” Cowen, ¶ 12, 431 P.3d at 218. ¶49 We recognize that, despite the waiver in subsection (1) being automatic and the required disclosures in subsection (2) being due upon request, prosecutors will generally wait to seek confidential attorney-client information until, pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V), the court has requested a response from them or subsequently set a hearing. In our view, this is the preferred practice. Given the importance of the protection afforded confidential attorney-client information, prosecutors would do well to avoid requesting access to such information until they have a need for it. After all, the court may end up denying the claim without requesting a response from the prosecution or, if the prosecution files a response, without holding a hearing. ¶50 The question still remains whether the prosecution may seek an order or use an SDT to attempt to obtain access to the confidential information covered by section 18-1-417. The prosecution and the district court both argue that the prosecution may do either or both. We disagree. 24