Opinion ID: 1349673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of a compensable disability under subsection 301(4)

Text: In order to become eligible to receive worker's compensation benefits under chapter 3 of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L.  418.301; M.S.A.  17.237(301), the employee must prove that he has suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. See M.C.L.  418.301(1); M.S.A.  17.237(301)(1). [1] In order to meet this test, the employee must prove that his personal injury was a disability under subsection 301(4): As used in this chapter, disability means a limitation of an employee's wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a personal injury or work related disease. The establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss. [M.C.L.  418.301(4); M.S.A.  17.237(301)(4).] Like the majority, see op. at 902, I believe that subsection 301(4) is composed of two proofs: the employee must (1) prove that he has suffered a disability and (2) prove that this disability has resulted in a subsequent wage loss. In other words, the employee must first prove disability and then must prove that it is compensable. See Rea v. Regency Olds/Mazda/Volvo, 450 Mich. 1201, 1202, 536 N.W.2d 542 (1995) (Riley, J., dissenting) (To be a compensable disability under the act, it is necessary to show both the work-related injury and wage loss) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the Legislature has provided that the calculation of wage loss is measured by an impairment [in] earning capacity in the employments in which the employee was working when the injury occurred. M.C.L.  418.371(1); M.S.A.  17.237(371)(1). [2] This Court has reiterated the point on several occasions that loss of wage-earning capacity is the basic criterion for determining entitlement to compensation benefits. See, e.g., Leizerman v. First Flight Freight Service, 424 Mich. 463, 473, 381 N.W.2d 386 (1985). [3] Thus, I agree with the majority that the first sentence of subsection 301(4) must define a disability as an inability to perform at least a single job within an employee's qualifications and training. See op. at 898-899. [4] After establishing the proper two-part framework, however, the majority sets it aside in favor of a three-part test that it derived from its analysis of the lead opinion in Sobotka, supra . The majority concludes as follows: In application [of the two-part test], these basic principles operate to require that an employee must establish (1) a work-related injury, (2) subsequent loss in actual wages, and (3) a causal link between the two. Proof of the three elements will establish that an employee can no longer perform at least a single job within his qualifications and training, thus satisfying the first sentence of subsection 301(4), and that he has suffered a loss in wages, satisfying the second sentence of subsection 301(4). [Op. at 898-899. (emphasis in original).] There is no basis in the statute for allowing this standard to replace the legislatively established one, i.e., that the employee must prove (1) a disability and then (2) a reduction of his earning capacity. As I understand the proper system, a disability would be  a limitation in an employee's wage-earning capacity under the first step, because an employee could no longer perform a single job within his qualifications and training, but this fact would not necessarily establish a loss in that employee's earning capacity when considering all the jobs within his qualifications and training under the second step. [5] However, the majority refuses to accept the logic of its own test by rejecting this point: Absent postinjury employment establishing a new wage-earning capacity [,] benefit levels are not to be reduced by the proportionate impairment of residual wage-earning capacity. [Op. at 899, n. 2.] In other words, in proving a reduction in earning capacity, the employee apparently has no duty to prove that he is unable to earn the same wage for all the jobs within his qualifications and training. See also op. at 907, n. 24, and 910-911. [6] I disagree. In reaching its conclusion, the majority relies on the analysis of the lead opinion in Sobotka, supra at 27, 523 N.W.2d 454, reasoning as follows: [W]e rejected [in Sobotka ] the defendant's claim that a partially disabled worker who is not receiving wages must prove that the absence of wages is due to absence of residual wage-earning capacity. This conclusion appears nowhere in the text of the lead opinion in Sobotka. Instead, the lead opinion only concluded that an employee need not refute that he has a theoretical earning capacity: We reject the contention ... that plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence of jobs he could not perform if theoretically available and that defendant's offer of evidence of plaintiff's ability in the abstract to perform some employment rebuts the inference of causation that arises from a showing of unemployment and injury. [ Id. ] This is a different point from the one the majority makes in the instant case. I agree that an employee need not prove that he has no theoretical earning capacity and that he should not bear the burden of demonstrating that he cannot perform jobs that are not actually available to him. However, he must prove that he cannot earn wages in all the jobs within his qualifications and training that are available. In fact, there is support for this very point in the lead opinion of Sobotka, as the majority notes, where Sobotka quoted from Jones v. Cutler Oil Co., 356 Mich. 487, 490, 97 N.W.2d 74 (1959): `[The] real inquiry [for determining loss of wages] relates to the monetary worth of the injured workman's services in the open labor market under normal employment conditions.' [ Sobotka, supra at 24-25, 523 N.W.2d 454 (Boyle, J., lead opinion).] The employee must prove that the injury affects his ability to earn in each of the jobs within his qualifications and training that are available to that employee. Where the employee has multiple positions that he may perform within his qualifications and training, he will have to carry his burden with respect to each position. Of course, the lead opinion recognized in Sobotka, and I agree, that the employee does not bear the burden of a poor economy. Thus, if the only other positions that the employee is still able physically to perform are not available to him because of the economy, the lead opinion makes clear that he may still fully recover. See id. at 27-28, 523 N.W.2d 454. I do not dispute this point. This is now the rule of law in Michigan. See McKissack v. Comprehensive Health Services of Detroit, 447 Mich. 57, 70, 523 N.W.2d 444 (1994). Nevertheless, in every case in which an employee is partially disabled and unemployed, I would expect that, in order to prove a reduction in earning capacity, an employee would give testimony that either he is physically unable to perform all the jobs that he could previously perform within his qualifications and training available to him or that he has sought work for the jobs he is able to physically perform but did not receive an offer of work. The lead opinion in Sobotka apparently expected as much. See id. at 26, 523 N.W.2d 454 (Boyle, J., lead opinion). [7] There is also the possibility that the only positions that an employee would physically be able to perform after his injury (within his qualifications and training) would be ones that do not pay the same wage as his previous job. As I understand the employee's burden of proving a reduction in earning capacity, the injured employee would be bound to seek work in these positions and, if he was able to obtain one, he would receive the difference between his previous wage and his new lesser wage in worker's compensation. [8] The meaning of the standard that the majority uses to determine whether there is a reduction of earning capacity, i.e., whether the employee has proven that his injury caused the subsequent wage loss, see op. at 910, is not clearly defined. From the majority's analysis, I do not know in what circumstances an employee will have carried this burden. I also do not know under what circumstances the magistrate has a basis on which to infer the link between the injury and actual loss of wages. I believe that the magistrate should only infer an employee's loss of earning capacity in cases in which the facts are sufficient to warrant such an inference. Furthermore, the majority misstates the burden of proof for worker's compensation cases. In interpreting this Court's decision in Sobotka, the majority concluded that we determined as follows: Could benefits ever be denied where plaintiff was injured and unemployed? We answered: Yes, where the defendant carries the burden of showing the plaintiff's employability. Fellows v. Fuller Brush Co, 1996 Mich. ACO 151, 161. [Op. at____.] Thus, the majority states that the employer, as the defendant, carries the burden of proving the employee's employability. The lead opinion in Sobotka, however, only recognized that a finder of fact may infer an impairment of wage-earning capacity from a partial disability where that employee shows a work-related disability and subsequent wage loss. See Sobotka, supra at 15, 25, 523 N.W.2d 454 (Boyle, J., lead opinion). It did not indicate that an employer carries the burden of proving the employee's employability. Rather, the lead opinion only authorizes the magistrate to infer that an employee has suffered a reduction in earning capacity from the nature of the proofs establishing that he is disabled and suffered a loss in wages. For these reasons, I cannot agree with the three-part test the majority has established, displacing the framework created by the Legislature. These disagreements have implications for the instant cases before this Court.