Opinion ID: 411281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the alleged violations of substantive constitutional rights.

Text: 16 White contends that the board's decision to demote him by offering him a one-year contract as well as the decision to terminate him were improperly motivated by racial bias and by his exercise of his first amendment rights. 5 He claims that his criticism of the athletic program at the school, specifically his request for new basketballs and warm-up suits and his disagreement with an unsatisfactory evaluation, were substantial motivating factors in his termination. See Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). 17 The Commission's recommendation adopted by the district court 6 made no specific finding as to whether the board's decisions were motivated by White's exercise of protected activity. 7 It concluded only that 18 1. [The board] in the exercise of its discretion may determine that threatening to kill another person is reprehensible conduct, and a violation of the policies of the ... school district. 19 2. [The board] did not abuse its discretion in terminating the contract of petitioner. 20 3. The constitutional rights of petitioner have not been violated. 21 Record at 83. The hearing officer's review of the evidence, however, contains a lengthy discussion of the various allegations. The officer specifically found (1) that White had had a confrontation with his assistant during a basketball game, (2) that White threatened to kill the athletic director on two occasions, and (3) that the threats were serious enough that those around him believed him dangerous. Record at 82-83. 22 The hearing officer's conclusion that the board did not abuse its discretion in discharging White, following as it does directly after the conclusion that threatening to kill someone was a violation of the school policies, can only be interpreted as an implied finding that the board's decision was motivated by the death threats rather than by White's exercise of protected activity. 8 Indeed, the examiner did not make any finding that White's complaints about the athletic equipment and evaluation were at all factors in the board's decision. Therefore, it would seem that White did not even satisfy his burden of proving that his exercise of protected activity was a substantial factor in the board's decision to terminate him. 23 Our review of the record indicates that the Commission's conclusion that there was no violation of White's first amendment rights is not in error. See Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 665 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982) (holding that appellate review in a first amendment case of a lower court's finding concerning the motivation behind a decision to terminate a faculty member is governed by the clearly erroneous standard). White offered no evidence that he had criticized the athletic director, John Adams, before his contract dispute in the spring of 1977. The dispute with the athletic director over equipment occurred months later, in November, 1977. He had contested the unsatisfactory evaluation, however, and alleged that he was told by superintendent Taylor that the superintendent did not like people who keep things going regarding evaluations. Plaintiff's exhibit 22. Taylor did not remember making such a statement, Transcript III at 82, and explained that a number of coaches had been given one-year contracts instead of two-year contracts. Transcript III at 84. Further, the 1976-77 evaluation was not the first evaluation somewhat critical of White's performance. His failure to control his temper, rather than his critique of the evaluation, could well have been the reason for the board's decision to offer him a shortened contract. 9 Therefore, White has not demonstrated that his exercise of protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in his demotion. 24 The Commission's conclusion, adopted by the district court, that White's termination did not violate his constitutional rights is also supported by the record. Under Mt. Healthy, even if we assume that the exercise of protected first amendment activity played a substantial part in the decision to terminate an employee, the termination is not unconstitutional if the employee would have been terminated anyway. The Constitution requires only that an employee be placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. 429 U.S. at 285-87, 97 S.Ct. at 575-76. 25 The board claims that its decision to terminate White was based on (1) the incident involving the assistant coach at a basketball game, and (2) White's repeated threats to kill the athletic director. A number of school administrators testified that White had made the threats and that he was serious about carrying them out. There were also allegations of a violent incident involving a female student. We must agree with the district court's implied conclusion that this evidence demonstrated that White would have been dismissed regardless of his complaints. 26 Finally, White has not presented any evidence to support his allegation that his termination was racially motivated. In order to prevail on a racial claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that non-minority members were treated differently than minority members. See Baldwin v. Birmingham Board of Education, 648 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir.1981). White would have had to demonstrate that white persons threatened to kill fellow teachers and were treated differently than he was. No such showing has been made. Similarly, the superintendent testified that a number of coaches were given one-year contracts rather than two, Transcript IV at 149, and White made no showing that these decisions depended on the race of the coaches. Further, White's replacement as head basketball coach was black. Accordingly, the district court's conclusion that there was no violation of White's constitutional rights is affirmed. 27