Opinion ID: 1162628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Relating to the Instruction Pursuant to Penal Code Section 190.3

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in several particulars when it instructed the jurors, in accordance with Penal Code section 190.3 (hereafter section 190.3), on the factors they should consider in determining penalty. Defendant first claims the court erred by refusing to delete mitigating factors unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial. Under People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pages 104 and 105, however, the court's refusal was not error. Defendant next claims that the court erred by instructing the jury as it did in accordance with factor (a) (the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding), factor (b) (the presence or absence of criminal activity involving the use, attempted use, or threat, of force or violence) and factor (c) (the presence or absence of prior felony convictions). (13) He first argues that the court's instruction as to statutory sentencing factor (b) was error. In support he maintains that section 190.3 must be construed to limit the scope of that factor to crimes other than those of which the defendant was convicted in the capital proceeding. On this point we agree. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 105-106.) He then maintains that the court's instruction did not so limit the scope of that factor and thereby permitted the double-counting of the same evidence by the jury. On this point, however, we disagree (see id. at p. 106) and hence reject the claim of error. (14) Defendant next argues that the court erred in giving factors (b) and (c) without qualification. Specifically, he maintains that in order to prevent the risk of double-counting, the statutory scheme established by section 190.3 must be understood to allow the trier of fact to consider evidence of a single instance of violent criminal conduct resulting in a felony conviction under either factor (b) or factor (c) but not both. We cannot agree. The trier of fact may properly consider such evidence under both factors for two independent purposes: i.e., to determine the defendant's propensity for criminal violence and his lack of response to deterrence. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 764-765.) On request, the court should perhaps amplify on factors (b) and (c) and explain their interrelationship. But when as here no such request was made, the court is not under a duty to give an amplification or explanation sua sponte. ( People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal. Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366].) (15) Defendant also claims that the language of factor (k), combined with the prosecutor's argument, may have misled the jurors to his prejudice about the evidence they might consider in determining penalty. We agree. Pursuant to section 190.3, the court instructed the jurors that in determining penalty they should consider several specified circumstances and also (k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. In People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], we concluded that the language of factor (k) might mislead jurors about the evidence they might consider, in violation of the federal Constitution as construed in Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954], and Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 869], in which the United States Supreme Court held that the trier of fact may ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( Eddings, supra, at p. 110 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 8], quoting Lockett, supra, at p. 604 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 990] (plur. opn. by Burger, C.J.).) In People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], reversed on other grounds sub nomine California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], we stated that with respect to cases  such as the present  in which the jury had been instructed in the statutory language, we would examine each such appeal on its merits to determine whether the jury may have been misled. (40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17.) In conducting such an examination, we look to `the totality of the penalty instructions given and the arguments made to the jury'.... ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 786 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) If at the conclusion of our examination we are of the opinion that the jury may have been misled, we must hold that error of federal constitutional dimension has occurred. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 546 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 943, 107 S.Ct. at p. 842] (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.); see, e.g., People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 651 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 777 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) We apply this test to the case at bar. As stated above, the court instructed the jury pursuant to the potentially misleading language of factor (k). In turn, the prosecutor's argument  as will appear  did nothing to cure, but actually exacerbated, the instruction's potential to mislead: he told the jury in essence that defendant's mitigating evidence was simply irrelevant. After discussing the other penalty factors, the prosecutor addressed factor (k): Number eleven, any other circumstances [ sic ] which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. Is there any justification or excuse offered on behalf of the defendant for why this crime occurred? Obviously there is not. The evidence presented by the defendant this morning goes not to any of these eleven guidelines. What you heard this morning was evidence from people who knew the defendant well twelve years ago. None of these people knew the defendant or were with the defendant at or about the time these crimes were occurring. (Italics added.) The prosecutor continued: In listening to those guidelines the Court has read to you, there are no circumstances in mitigation. What was presented to you this morning does not apply to any of the guidelines the Court is going to read to you. ... [T]hat's all you're going to be basing your decision on. That's what makes your decision easy in this case is that there are no circumstances in mitigation. (Italics added.) The prosecutor then stated, [If] defense counsel['s] ... arguments ... don't fit into any of those guidelines, then they are not a basis for consideration in making your decision in this case. Immediately thereafter the prosecutor said his final words to the jury and reiterated, There are no circumstances in mitigation. In a word, as the Attorney General himself conceded at oral argument, The prosecutor did argue that there was no mitigating evidence. Thus, far from dispelling the notion that the jury's sentencing discretion and responsibility were confined by the potentially misleading language of factor (k), the prosecutor capitalized on that language and exacerbated its potential for misleading the jury in this crucial respect. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the jurors may have been misled about the evidence they might consider in fixing penalty, and hence conclude that error of federal constitutional dimension occurred. The Attorney General argues that the court cured the harm threatened by factor (k) by giving a definition of the term mitigating. During deliberations, the jury asked the court to reread the penalty instructions three times. The third time, they added the following request: Please read all of the instructions again explaining mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Can you give us additional definitions of these words in layman's terms? In response, the court gave the following definitions from Black's Law Dictionary: Aggravation. Any circumstance attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences, but which is above and beyond the essential constituents of the crime itself. [¶] I will next define `mitigating.' [¶] Circumstances such as do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. The court then cautioned the jury:  Now, you should understand that those two definitions were not intended to in any way alter the original instructions that I gave you, they were simply in response to your question to further clarify what is meant by those words that were used in my instructions. (Italics added.) We are not persuaded that the court's brief answer to the jury's query cured the harm threatened. Factor (k) was presented to the jury time and again: it was quoted and emphasized extensively by the prosecutor in his argument, delivered by the court in the penalty instructions, and reread three times during deliberations. The court's definition of mitigating, by contrast, was given but once. More important, the jury could not reasonably have taken the court's answer to expand the scope of factor (k): the court expressly warned the jurors that its supplemental definitions were not intended to in any way alter the original instructions that I gave you.... The Attorney General argues that the error was harmless. At the threshold we must determine the proper standard of review for prejudice. As we have explained, the error here is of federal constitutional dimension. As such, it is subject to review under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065], if it falls within the scope of the general rule, or is reversible per se, if it falls within an exception. ( Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, ___-___ [100 L.Ed.2d 284, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1797-1798].) In Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [95 L.Ed.2d 347, 107 S.Ct. 1821], the United States Supreme Court suggested that the kind of error under consideration here is subject to review under the Chapman test. (See id. at pp. 398-399 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 353, 107 S.Ct. at p. 1824] [the judge instructed an advisory sentencing jury not to consider, and himself refused to consider, certain mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant].) Accordingly, we shall apply that test until the court directs us to do otherwise. Even under Chapman, we are compelled to agree with the Attorney General's claim that the error was nonprejudicial. As our summary of the proceedings at the guilt and penalty phases of the trial reveals, the evidence in aggravation was overwhelming and the evidence in mitigation was minimal. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.