Opinion ID: 3051516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: California Conviction

Text: [7] In 1990, Crawford pled guilty to violating California Health and Safety Code § 11352(a), which provides: “[E]very person who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers, or give[s] away . . . any controlled substance 3210 UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD specified in [the statute] . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years.” To document the conviction, the government provided the felony complaint charging the § 11352(a) violation, the information, the plea form, the abstract of judgment, and the state court’s minute orders entering a judgment of conviction. On the plea form, Crawford provided a hand-written factual basis for his plea, which stated: “On 6/21/90 in Orange County I sold a useable quantity of cocaine, knowing it was cocaine. On 7/ 13/90 in Orange County, I transported cocaine knowing it was cocaine. The quantity on 6/21/90 was 14.45 gms. The quantity on 7/13/90 was 180 grams.” He signed and dated the form. [8] In analyzing whether a prior conviction qualifies as a prior predicate controlled substance offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the sentencing court must first use the categorical approach. United States v. Kovac, 367 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)). Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statute of conviction. Id. If the statute is facially over-inclusive, the court employs the modified categorical approach. Id. The government concedes that the California statute is too broad to qualify under the categorical approach because the Health and Safety Code covers such a wide range of possible behavior. See id. at 1119-20 (applying modified categorical approach to question of whether Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11352 violation qualifies as a career-offender predicate offense). Under the modified categorical approach, the prior offense may qualify as a career offender predicate offense if “ ‘documentation or judicially noticeable facts . . . clearly establish that the conviction is a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes.’ ” United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in United States v. Vidal, 426 F.3d 1011, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2005). “The UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD 3211 government has the burden to establish clearly and unequivocally that the conviction was based on all of the elements of a qualifying predicate offense.” Kovac, 367 F.3d at 1119. Where the prior conviction was based on a guilty plea, the sentencing court’s review is limited “to those documents ‘made or used in adjudicating guilt’ such as ‘the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or [the] transcript of [the] colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.’ ” United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 468 F.3d 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20, 26, (2005)); see also United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court concluded that the 1990 California conviction meets the requirements for the career offender enhancement under the modified categorical approach. Crawford argues that the documentation was insufficient to establish the elements of the California offense because certain parts of the plea documents were illegible, because the government relied on the abstract of judgment, and because the plea agreement itself was not signed by a judge. The district court considered and rejected each of these arguments. None of the arguments is persuasive on appeal. [9] The 1990 California conviction meets the requirements for the modified categorical approach. In his plea, Crawford clearly admitted that he knowingly sold and transported cocaine. Selling cocaine falls within the definition of a controlled substance offense, even though the statutory definition of the California offense is broader. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Crawford does not contest either the accuracy of the plea form or his statement contained on the form. The district court found that the plea form was signed by Crawford, his attorney, and the prosecuting attorney, and that nothing more was required. The district court therefore relied in part on the facts 3212 UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD admitted to in the plea in finding that the underlying elements of the § 11352 offense were established. Although Crawford disputes whether the abstract of judgment and the minute order are acceptable documentation, we need not comment on that argument. The plea, in conjunction with the charging documents, is sufficient to show that the California conviction was for a qualifying predicate drug offense and that the elements of the offense were satisfied. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1211.