Opinion ID: 2996434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether a “material change” occurred due to

Text: total disability In order to consider Ray’s duplicate claim (because his original claim had been denied in 1981), the ALJ was required to determine first whether a material change had occurred in Ray’s condition. A material change may be shown two ways. First, the miner can show that he did not have pneumoconiosis at the time of his original claim but has since contracted and become totally disabled by the disease. Second, and the method by which the ALJ determined Ray demonstrated a material change, the miner can show that the disease’s progress has resulted in total disability although it was not totally disabling at the time of the original application. McNew, 946 F.2d at 556. Ray’s original claim was denied because he could not prove his pneumoconiosis was totally disabling in 1980. Because the ALJ found that a material change had occurred in Ray’s condition by concluding that he had since become totally disabled by the disease, our review necessarily considers whether that determination is in line with the McNew standard and supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ relied primarily upon the opinion of Dr. Myers, who is board-certified in internal medicine, to find total disability—a conclusion which the Board affirmed prior 8 No. 02-1758 to its final remand. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Myers’ opinion was documented, well-reasoned, and accounted for numerous test results, some of which might have led to a negative pneumoconiosis diagnosis. Dr. Myers’ ultimate conclusion, however, was that Ray demonstrated pneumoconiosis to the point of total disability based on a complete pulmonary examination and Ray’s employment history as a coal miner. In remanding the case for the third and final time, the Board merely asked the ALJ to demonstrate further how she weighed all of the medical opinions to find a material change in Ray’s condition. To that end, the ALJ rationally concluded that the opinions of Drs. Sanjabi and Rao also showed a worsening of Ray’s pneumoco- niosis symptoms since 1980 and that the disease’s progress affected his ability to perform the arduous tasks required of a roof bolter at the time he filed his duplicate claim, thereby supporting Dr. Myers’ finding of total disability. Further, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Thompson’s and Dr. Rao’s reports did not provide evidence contrary to Dr. Myers’ specific finding of total disability because those physicians did not address Ray’s functional ability to perform his job. The ALJ also concluded that Dr. Houser’s report was ambiguous on the issue of total disability because his report did not specifically conclude that Ray could return to his coal mine job. Rather, Dr. Houser merely stated that he found “no functional disability.” The ALJ discredited this particular statement by Dr. Houser because Dr. Houser did not explain the exact meaning of “no functional disability,” nor did he explain whether that statement referred to Ray’s ability to perform his particular job. We do not find the ALJ’s conclusion irrational in this instance; she compared Dr. Houser’s report to those of Drs. Tuteur and Getty, who also found no total disability and specifically stated that Ray could perform the parNo. 02-1758 9 ticular tasks associated with his coal mine job. Dr. Houser’s lone, unexplained reference to functional ability is not sufficient to overturn the ALJ’s finding of total disability. This finding is further supported by Dr. Houser’s admissions that Ray’s pulmonary condition was not entirely normal and could be affected by heavy, exertional work. Finally, the ALJ reaffirmed her decision to discredit the report and opinion of Dr. Tuteur because she found his findings to be speculative, conclusory, and unsupported—another determination the Board did not disturb upon its final remand. Dr. Tuteur opined that Ray did not have pneumoconiosis and that his pulmonary problems were related to his smoking but failed to explain why Ray’s breathing problems continued after Ray ceased smoking approximately three to four years prior to filing his duplicate claim. The ALJ also did not find Dr. Tuteur’s opinion persuasive in light of Dr. Houser’s opinion that some of the effects of smoking can resolve or improve following the cessation of smoking. Dr. Tuteur also opined that Ray’s breathing prob- lems were not related to the inhalation of coal dust, though Ray’s exposure to coal dust continued well after he ceased smoking. Dr. Tuteur did conclude, however, that Ray’s breathing problems were not attributable to obesity, his knee injuries, or any other musculoskeletal problems. We do not find the ALJ’s determination to discredit Dr. Tuteur’s opinion irrational or unsupported by the evidence, noting that “[w]hether a medical opinion is reasoned . . . is a decision that rests ultimately with the ALJ, not with us.” Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Summers, 272 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we find that the ALJ’s determination that Ray’s pneumoconiosis had progressed to the point of total disability (whereas it had not when he filed his original claim in 1980) was rational, supported by substantial 10 No. 02-1758 evidence, and in line with the McNew standard. Ray therefore demonstrated a material change in his condition making consideration of his duplicate claim proper.