Opinion ID: 726329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Truth Defense

Text: 9 A motion to dismiss may be treated as one for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 if matters outside the pleadings are submitted. We may affirm a district court's dismissal as a valid entry of summary judgment where there are no issues of material fact and parties are given adequate opportunity to brief the issues involved. Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1494-96 (9th Cir.1995); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard that guides the district court. Id. at 1496. We may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Weiser v. United States, 959 F.2d 146, 147 (9th Cir.1992). 10 California law defines libel as a false and unprivileged publication ... which exposes a person to contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, and which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F.Supp. 924, 925 (C.D.Cal.1982). Plaintiff's admission of truth bars his defamation cause of action. Hejmadi v. Amfac, Inc., 249 Cal.Rptr. 5, 21 (1988). Under California law, Defendant can defeat a libel action by proving that the allegedly libelous publication, although not literally true in every detail, is substantially true in its implication, that the gist of the article, when read as a whole, is true. Wynberg, 564 F.Supp. at 927. See also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991) (recognizing substantial truth defense to defamation under California law). 11 The district court determined that Roberts was entitled to the substantial truth defense to defamation under California law because the collateral estoppel effect of the previous judgment rendered the facts undisputed as a matter of law: 12 Judge Marshall's findings as to what Kelly Galatz told the police demonstrate on their face that Galatz was not truthful when asked by the police how her son was injured. At a minimum, Galatz gave a false impression to police as to her knowledge of how her son was injured. 13 While we reject the court's holding regarding collateral estoppel, we hold that the court was entitled to rely on Judge Marshall's factual findings in assessing the substantial truth of Roberts' remark. 14 As reflected in Judge Marshall's findings, Galatz's testimony at trial support an inference that she gave inconsistent stories to the police. She first stated she did not know how her child was injured, and later admitted that her husband had thrown an onion chopper which had accidentally struck the child. We hold that the district court did not err in finding that these facts support a substantial truth defense barring Galatz's claim. 1 15 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the action. 16 AFFIRMED.