Opinion ID: 2192908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the threshold provision and jural rights

Text: The plaintiffs allege that they suffer from category 1 pneumoconiosis, but have a respiratory impairment of less than twenty percent. Thus, plaintiffs have not met the threshold for receiving a RIB award under KRS 342.732 as amended in 1996. Plaintiffs argue that because they have no remedy under the Workers' Compensation Act, the trial court below should have subject matter jurisdiction. The constitutionality of a similar threshold provision was upheld by this Court in Mullins, supra . In Mullins , the appellant was a heavy equipment operator in and around Virginia coal mines from 1977 to 1990. In 1990, the appellant took a position with a Kentucky company, where he worked for one year. In response to his claim for workers' compensation benefits, this Court held that the threshold provision of KRS 342.316(3)(b), requiring that a worker be exposed in Kentucky for two continuous years before qualifying for a RIB award, was constitutional. An employee's right to occupational disease benefits is purely statutory in nature and does not fall under the ambit of § 14 of the Kentucky Constitution. The General Assembly clearly is free to limit the application of workers' compensation benefits.... Id. at 263. See also, A. Larson & L. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §§ 12-23 to 12-26, 12-78 to 12-79 (1996) (pointing out that threshold provisions which effectively preclude a remedy for certain types of work-related injuries are generally held to pass constitutional muster). Also, this Court has held that [t]he fact that the act does not provide for pain and suffering is also no basis upon which a cause of action may lie. Zurich, 712 S.W.2d at 342. Shamrock's exclusive liability to plaintiffs is clearly governed by KRS 342.690(1): [T]he liability of such employer under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee.... There is no other remedy available. There was no common law cause of action for non-disabling category one pneumoconiosis in existence at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution; therefore, the jural rights doctrine is inapplicable. Regardless, the fact that a remedy for a work-related injury is unavailable under the Workers' Compensation Act does not authorize bringing a civil action for damages in circuit court. Davis, 276 S.W.2d at 676. Therefore, as the Workers' Compensation Act confers exclusive liability to participating employers for all matters falling within its purview, no trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over such a matter. The proper venue for a matter falling within the purview of the Workers' Compensation Act lies solely with the Workers' Compensation Board.