Opinion ID: 2324489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: VIABILITY OF STATE v. MAIK

Text: State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203 (1972), dwelt on by the majority here, and by the majority and the dissenter in the Appellate Division, undertook to define the phrase restored to reason as a standard for release of persons adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity under N.J.S.A. 2A:163-3. As interpreted by that case the standard for release is a most stringent one; not only must the psychotic episode which produced the criminal act have subsided, but the underlying illness must have been removed or effectively neutralized if it can be. Clearly adherence to this standard, likewise applicable under the companion statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:163-2, will lead in many cases to lifetime confinements, as recognized by the majority here. I question both the wisdom of that standard and its constitutionality. [5] The majority seems also to question its wisdom but seeks to lessen its impact by providing for conditional release in appropriate cases. Parenthetically I should observe that I find absolutely no warrant for the majority opinion's statement that the Maik Court indicated that something less than a `cure' is acceptable for compliance with the `restored to reason' standard of conditional release established by N.J.S.A. 2A:163-2 and 2A:163-3. I would point out that Jackson, which was decided since Maik, raises doubts about the constitutionality of Maik's holding, both as a matter of due process and of equal protection. Jackson held that due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858, 32 L.Ed. 2d at 451. If an underlying illness cannot be cured, no rehabilitative purpose can be served by continued confinement; if that illness is in remission, such that the patient is no longer dangerous, societal safety is not served either by that confinement. Additionally, because this is a more strict standard than that applied to the other involuntary civilly committed patients, it runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. IV