Opinion ID: 1837261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fatal Variance Between the Indictment and the Proof

Text: Robey next argues that a fatal variance exists between the facts alleged in the indictment charging him with murder and the proof offered at trial. The murder indictment states: William Keith Robey ... did recklessly engage in conduct which manifested extreme indifference to human life and created a grave risk of death to a person other than the said William Keith Robey, and did thereby cause the death of Tasha Kathleen Reese while operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and crossing the center line of the road and colliding with another motor vehicle thereby killing the said Tasha Kathleen Reese .... (Emphasis added.) The two-count indictment charging assault states: [1st:] WILLIAM KEITH ROBEY... did, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly engage in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another person and did thereby cause serious physical injury to JESSIE JAMES McNABB, JR., by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.... 2nd: WILLIAM KEITH ROBEY... while driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance or any combination thereof ... did cause serious bodily injury to the person of ... JESSIE JAMES McNABB, JR., with a motor vehicle .... (Capitalization in original.) Robey argues that the proof at trial consisted of evidence that he was intoxicated due not only to alcohol but also to drugs. Specifically, Robey stated in his application for rehearing of the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's denial of his second Rule 32 petition, a verbatim copy of which appears in his petition for the writ of certiorari, that [d]uring trial the State's proof was for murder/assault by [driving under the influence] of alcohol and a combination of a controlled substance, which is a violation of 32-5A-191(a)(4). (Robey's petition at 9.) The State has not challenged this assertion. Robey contends that, because the murder indictment recited only that Robey was driving under the influence of alcohol, the proof offered at trial indicating that he was driving under the influence of a controlled substance (or a combination of alcohol and a controlled substance) resulted in his being convicted of a crime for which he was not indicted (murder based on his causing the death of Reese while he was driving under the influence of a controlled substance or a combination of alcohol and a controlled substance). The Rule 32 petition that is the subject of this appeal is the second Rule 32 petition filed by Robey. Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides: A successive petition on different grounds [than those alleged in a previous Rule 32 petition] shall be denied unless (1) the petitioner is entitled to relief on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment or to impose sentence or (2) the petitioner shows both that good cause exists why the new ground or grounds were not known or could not have been ascertained through reasonable diligence when the first petition was heard, and that failure to entertain the petition will result in a miscarriage of justice. Unless Robey can show sufficient justification for his failure to argue this issue in his first Rule 32 petition, as well as a miscarriage of justice resulting from the trial court's failure to entertain the second Rule 32 petition, or unless the alleged variance between the indictment and the proof deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter judgment on the jury's verdict, the trial court correctly dismissed the successive petition. In Ash v. State, 843 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Ala.2002), we stated: A valid indictment is the source of the subject matter jurisdiction to try a contested criminal case. Batey v. State, 755 So.2d 593, 595 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). Absent a valid indictment, a trial court would lack subject matter jurisdiction to try, to convict, or to sentence a defendant in a contested criminal case. Batey, supra, and Hall v. State, 655 So.2d 51, 52 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). See also Crews v. State, 40 Ala.App. 306, 308, 112 So.2d 805, 807 (1959). Therefore, an amendment [to an indictment] which changes the offense or charges a new offense not contemplated by the original indictment would deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the different or new offense. (Emphasis added; some citations omitted.) In the instant case, there was no formal or constructive amendment to the indictment. With respect to the murder count, the trial court read the indictment to the jury and charged the jury as follows: To convict, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following three elements: First, that Tasha Reese is dead; second, the State would have to prove that the defendant in this case caused the death of Miss Reese by engaging in reckless conduct, that is, the operation of the motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, crossing the center line of the road, that's the manner in which it's set forth in the indictment. And, third, that in committing the acts which caused the death of Miss Reese the defendant acted with extreme indifference to human life. (Emphasis added.) The jury found Robey guilty of murder by driving under the influence of alcohol, as charged in the indictment. This is not a case in which the defendant was convicted of a crime for which he had not been indicted. The trial court therefore did not lack jurisdiction to enter a judgment on the verdict finding Robey guilty of murder. We need not decide whether evidence of Robey's drug use undermines the murder conviction. Robey has not shown facts sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the evidence of his intoxication solely by alcohol was insufficient to support the murder conviction. Moreover, such a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence would not be jurisdictional and would therefore be precluded in this successive Rule 32 petition. Robey cites Ex parte Lewis, 811 So.2d 485 (Ala.2001), in support of his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment because of what he says is a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial. In Lewis, we held that an indictment that failed to set forth an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was found guilty did not give the trial court jurisdiction to enter a judgment on the verdict returned on the indictment. What occurred in Lewis in essence was that a judgment was entered on a guilty verdict for an offense that had not been charged in the indictment. The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter such a judgment. In the instant case, however, all of the essential elements of reckless murder as set out in § 13A-6-2(a)(2), i.e., reckless murder based on Robey's driving under the influence of alcohol alone, were set out in the murder indictment. The trial court read the indictment to the jury and charged it on the elements as included in the indictment. Unlike the defendant in Lewis, Robey was not convicted of an offense for which he had not been indicted. Robey also cites Ex parte Hightower, 443 So.2d 1272 (Ala.1983), in support of his lack-of-jurisdiction argument. In Hightower, the defendant was indicted for engaging in sexual intercourse with a female without her consent. At trial, `the State wholly failed to prove that the sexual act was committed without [the victim's] consent....' 443 So.2d at 1274 (citing Hightower v. State, 443 So.2d 1270, 1271 (Ala.Crim.App.1982)). Rather, the proof showed that the defendant obtained the victim's consent by artifice. This Court held that the variance between the indictment and the proof at trial was fatal. However, there was no discussion in Hightower of the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter a judgment on the guilty verdict, and that case involved an appeal from a conviction, not an appeal from the denial of a Rule 32 petition.