Opinion ID: 2276329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Modification of Property Distribution

Text: The respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it required him to pay the petitioner one-half the value of the survivor benefit to which she was entitled under the divorce decree. He contends that by so doing, the trial court modified the parties' property settlement absent the requisite finding of fraud, undue influence, deceit, misrepresentation or mutual mistake. Sommers v. Sommers, 143 N.H. 686, 689, 742 A.2d 94 (1999). The petitioner agrees that the trial court modified the parties' property settlement, but contends that it did so based upon an implied finding of mutual mistake. Because the parties do not argue otherwise, we assume, without deciding, that the trial court modified the property distribution. We review the trial court's decision to modify a property division under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See Bonneville v. Bonneville, 142 N.H. 435, 437-38, 702 A.2d 823 (1997); cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296, 787 A.2d 175 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard). We will uphold the trial court's decision unless the record does not support it or it is tainted by error of law. See Bonneville, 142 N.H. at 437, 702 A.2d 823; cf. Lambert, 147 N.H. at 296, 787 A.2d 175. We find no error in the trial court's failure to make an explicit finding of mutual mistake. We must assume that the trial court made subsidiary findings necessary to support its general ruling. In the Matter of Kosek & Kosek, 151 N.H. 722, 725, 871 A.2d 1 (2005). The respondent implies that even if the trial court found mutual mistake, it was insufficient to justify modifying the parties' decree. He does not, however, explain why the mistake at issue was insufficient and we decline to speculate how it might be insufficient. We conclude that the respondent has not developed this argument sufficiently to warrant our review. See In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 709, 958 A.2d 948 (2008). Alternatively, the respondent asserts that obligating him to pay one-half the value of the survivor benefit was inequitable. We cannot conclude that requiring each party to be responsible for one-half of the value of the petitioner's survivor benefit was inequitable as a matter of law. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's decision to require the respondent to pay one-half the value of the survivor benefit to which the divorce decree entitled the petitioner.