Opinion ID: 599272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: angela's sentencing

Text: 52 Angela contends that the district erred in refusing to reduce her offense level for her role in the offense and in increasing her offense level for obstruction of justice.A. Role in the Offense 53 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 provides a range of adjustments for a defendant whose role in the offense of conviction makes her substantially less culpable than the average participant. Under the version of the guidelines applicable in 1991 and 1992, a four-level reduction in offense level is given to a minimal participant, a two-level reduction for a minor participant, and a three-level reduction for those falling in between. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Any determination under § 3B1.2 is heavily dependent upon the facts of the case. United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966, 975 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1077, 112 L.Ed.2d 1182 (1991). 54 The downward adjustment for a minimal participant should be given infrequently. United States v. Scroggins, 939 F.2d 416, 423-424 (7th Cir.1991). A defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and activities of others is indicative of a role of minimal participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, Application Note 1; United States v. Scroggins, 939 F.2d at 424. To merit a reduction as a minor participant, Angela had to show that she was substantially less culpable than the average defendant. United States v. Navarez, 954 F.2d 1375, 1382 (7th Cir.1992). The adjustment for either a minimal or minor participant requires the court to focus on the defendant's role in the offense, rather than unspecified conduct not part of the offense. United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 687 (7th Cir.1990). 55 Angela maintains that her role was either minimal or minor because she was substantially less culpable than the average defendant. She notes the absence of evidence that she participated in any of the planning, or talked on the phone to anyone, or was present at the live discussions for any reason other than her residence in the house. 56 We review the district court's findings under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Gutierrez, et al., 978 F.2d 1463, 1471 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Scroggins, 939 F.2d at 416. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the entire evidence, the court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); United States v. Herrera, 878 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th Cir.1989). If there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511; United States v. Brick, 905 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir.1990). 57 The record before the sentencing court was not limited to the evidence presented at trial. Sam had provided the government with an immunized pretrial proffer that was submitted at Angela's sentencing. In the proffer, Sam said that he told Angela on the day of the transaction that he was going to assist the Eichens in buying cocaine, and that Angela had agreed to join him. He also said that Angela was fully aware that he placed a weapon in her purse before they left their residence. 58 The district court found that Angela had lied to the magistrate during Sam's detention hearing when she testified that she did not know where she and Sam were going in her car and that she knew nothing about the drug deal. The district court also found that Angela was more than a minimal or minor participant because the jury found that she was guilty of the conspiracy, and because Sam's proffer indicated that she knew about the drug transaction, accompanied Sam for surveillance, and carried a gun and loaded magazine clip in her purse. As Angela acknowledges, the extent of her knowledge and participation comes down to a swearing contest between Angela and Sam. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511; United States v. Brick, 905 F.2d at 1095. 59 The district court determined that Angela had knowledge of the cocaine purchase; that she was present during discussions about the drug transaction; and that she knowingly went to the drug transaction with a .45 semi-automatic pistol and ammunition in her purse. It is true that unlike Sam, Angela did not plan the transaction, and unlike the Eichens, she did not take possession of the cocaine. Nonetheless, she brought a firearm to the scene and, like the defendant denied a reduction for his role in the offense in United States v. Johnson, 965 F.2d 460, 468-469 (7th Cir.1992), attended in full knowledge of the conspirators' plans. Under these circumstances, the district court's finding that she was not less culpable than the other participants was not clearly erroneous. B. Obstruction of Justice 60 Under the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect in 1991 and 1992, § 3C1.1 provided for a two-level enhancement of the offense level if the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the offense of conviction. The district court concluded that Angela had provided materially false information to the magistrate judge when she testified at Sam's detention hearing. At that hearing, Angela swore that she did not know that a drug deal was occurring, and that she had not been told where she and Sam were going in her car on the evening of the offense. Based on Sam's pretrial proffer to the prosecution, the district court concluded that Angela had lied. 61 Angela argues that her statements under oath at Sam's detention hearing, even if false, did not impede the investigation, were not material, and were merely a denial of guilt. A district court's determination that an obstruction of justice enhancement was warranted will only be disturbed if clear error is shown. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 849 (7th Cir.1991). Based upon Sam's proffer and the jury's verdict, no clear error is present. 62 Angela claims that the statements, if false, were not material because they did not tend to influence or affect the issue of whether Sam should be detained. She claims that her testimony went only to her role in the crime, and had nothing to do with whether Sam should be detained. 63 Material is defined as evidence, fact, statement or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 5. Many factors are taken into account in a detention hearing, including the nature of the circumstances of the offense charged, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1), and the weight of the evidence against the accused. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2). Angela's false testimony could have affected or influenced the magistrate judge's decision. For example, Angela did not testify to the real purpose of the Gunnings' presence at the scene, that being surveillance or counter-surveillance. Instead, she testified that they went to the gas station to buy cigarettes, and were parked in back of the gas station for some unknown reason. This false statement could have influenced the magistrate judge's determination with respect to Sam's detention. The district court's determination that Angela's false statements were material was not clearly erroneous. 64 Angela also maintains that she did not obstruct justice, but merely denied her guilt. To support her position, she cites United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 289-90 (7th Cir.1991), in which the defendant's denial of guilt was in response to questioning by a police officer. 929 F.2d at 286, 290. Angela, however, falsely testified under oath at a detention hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 939 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir.1991) (defendant who provides false testimony at a suppression hearing can receive obstruction of justice enhancement). Angela's argument offers no basis for distinction between sworn testimony at a detention hearing and a false denial of guilt at one's own trial, which constitutes grounds for enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. See, e.g., United States v. Easley, 977 F.2d 283, 286-287 (7th Cir.1992). 65 The district court did not err in enhancing Angela's offense level for obstruction of justice.V. CONCLUSION 66 The indictment properly set forth the offenses with which the defendants were charged; the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of guilt; and the district court committed no sentencing errors. Accordingly, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.