Opinion ID: 2558572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acceptance of Employment

Text: The Board accepts the Hearing Committee's finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent accepted employment in connection with the G. Thomas matter during the period late 2003 [through] early 2004. Id. at ¶ E. Acceptance of employment does not require a formal retention, nor does it require that the attorney be paid for the work. [6] Rather, the term contemplates only that the attorney has agreed to provide services. See In re Lieber, 442 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1982). Respondent's acceptance of employment is demonstrated by the undisputed evidence that she provided legal services for the benefit of G. Thomas. See In re Sofaer, 728 A.2d 625, 629 (D.C.1999) (provision of services evidences acceptance of employment). She consulted with Ms. Cooper and reviewed draft papers prepared by Ms. Cooper to be filed in G. Thomas' federal court case. She provided substantive and grammatical comments on the drafts and appraised the analysis. She was copied on communications from opposing counsel, BX 1 at 10, and attended a deposition. Respondent could not provide any reasonable explanation to the [Hearing] Committee about why she was editing legal papers or attending a deposition in the G. Thomas suit if she was not in fact acting as a lawyer for G. Thomas. HC Rpt. ¶ 12; Tr. 4/27/06 at 1321-23. Respondent demonstrated again and again her contemporaneous understanding that she was acting as counsel to G. Thomas. She expressed concern about participating in the Ferguson deposition because she was not a member of the bar of the federal district court in which the lawsuit was pending. She sought guidance from the D.C. Bar about the effect of the ethics rules on her work on the G. Thomas matter, something that would have been unnecessary if she were not acting as counsel. She advised Ms. Cooper prior to the deposition of M. Thomas that she would review the Bar's ethical rules to determine what my role should be with respect to questioning Michelle Thomas especially since my name [is] in the Letter of Determination. BX 4 (note dated December 19, 2003). These concerns suggest that Respondent herself thought that she was acting as a lawyer assisting in the representation of G. Thomas. Her response to the motion to disqualify also demonstrates that Respondent believed herself to be acting as counsel. That motion placed squarely in issue the propriety of Respondent's presence and role at the Ferguson deposition. Respondent and Ms. Cooper each filed a detailed affidavit in opposition to the proposed disqualification, but nowhere did either state that Respondent was not representing G. Thomas. BX 8. But if Respondent were not serving as G. Thomas' lawyer, one would expect that the federal court would have been told that there was no basis to disqualify Respondent since she was not acting as counsel. In short, Respondent's protestations that she was an observer or even that she was acting in furtherance of her own lawsuit against the District, are simply belied by the evidence of employment. Tr. 3/27/06 at 847-48. The Hearing Committee correctly discounted the testimony of G. Thomas that she never hired Respondent, never paid her and did not regard Respondent as her lawyer. HC Rpt. ¶¶ 12, F. It was not necessary for Respondent to have contracted directly with G. Thomas in order for Respondent to render services in connection with Ms. Thomas' lawsuit. Ms. Cooper, as G. Thomas' lawyer, enlisted Respondent's assistance. Moreover, as the Hearing Committee noted, the evidence shows that G. Thomas was aware of Respondent's involvement on her behalf and later sought Respondent's assistance in preparing the motion for reconsideration of Judge Lamberth's order disqualifying counsel. HC Rpt. ¶ F.