Opinion ID: 419808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant of Review

Text: 12 The company argues that the Board deviated from the rules set forth in 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.67(c) governing review of decisions of the Regional Director in representation cases. That regulation provides: 13 The Board will grant a request for review only where compelling reasons exist therefor. Accordingly, a request for review may be granted only upon one or more of the following grounds: 14 (1) That a substantial question of law or policy is raised because of (i) the absence of, or (ii) a departure from officially reported Board precedent. 15 (2) That the Regional Director's decision on a substantial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the record and such error prejudicially affects the rights of a party. 16 (3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error. 17 (4) That there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or policy. 18 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.67(c) (1982). 19 The company claims these standards are highly restrictive of the Board's right to review and the Board may not grant review absent compelling reasons premised on one of the grounds specified in the regulation. According to the company, the Board failed to disclose the ground upon which review was granted and adequate grounds for review were nonexistent. It asserts for these reasons that the Board abused its discretion by failing to comply with its own rules. The company does not, however, challenge the merits of the Board's conclusion. 20 Sav-On relies primarily on Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 409 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904, 90 S.Ct. 219, 24 L.Ed.2d 181 (1969) as support for its position that the standards for the Board's grant of review of decisions of the Regional Director in representation cases are highly restrictive. In that case the union petitioned for certification as the representative of the company's distributors. The company sought denial of certification on the ground that the distributors were independent contractors. The Regional Director found that the distributors were employees and ordered an election. The employer petitioned the Board for review. The Board denied review on the ground that the issues raised by the company were not sufficiently compelling to warrant review under 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.67(c). The union won the election. The employer refused to bargain and was charged with an unfair labor practice. The General Counsel moved the Board for summary judgment in the ULP proceeding. The Board ruled that under 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.67(f) denial of a request for review of a Regional Director's decision constitutes an affirmance and parties are precluded from relitigating any issues related to the Regional Director's decision in a related subsequent ULP proceeding. The Board granted the General Counsel's motion. The Second Circuit observed that subsection (c) was highly restrictive of the Board's right to review decisions of the Regional Director (id. at 678) and subsection (f) operated to preclude the Board from considering, in ULP proceedings, questions related to the underlying representation case. Id. at 679. Thus, most representation questions escaped Board review with a consequent shift of responsibility from the Board to the Regional Director. Id. The court noted that such deference to the Regional Director was not intended by Congress and that the Board's experience is particularly relevant in deciding complex bargaining unit questions before sanctions arising from the finding of a ULP are invoked. Id. at 680. The court remanded the case to the Board so that the Board could at least review the record to determine whether the Regional Director's decision was correct. Id. at 681-82. 21 It is readily apparent that Pepsi-Cola does not stand as a compelling authority for Sav-On's position. Although the court made reference to the highly restrictive standard of subsection (c), it determined that the Board could not abdicate its responsibility by granting such wide deference to the Regional Director as provided by the combined operative effect of subsections (c) and (f). In the instant case, contrary to Pepsi-Cola, the Board decided to review the Regional Director's decision. The Board's action is not in any way inconsistent with the language or spirit of the Pepsi-Cola case. 22 Notwithstanding Sav-On's misplaced reliance on Pepsi-Cola, its point that section 102.67(c) limits the Board's power of review is obviously correct. See N.L.R.B. v. Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 704 F.2d 1147, 1148; N.L.R.B. v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 389 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828, 89 S.Ct. 91, 21 L.Ed.2d 98 (1968). The company maintains that the Board did not disclose its ground for granting review and it assumes that the Board granted review under subsection (c)(2) because it found the Regional Director's decision to be clearly erroneous. It argues that the Regional Director's decision was not clearly erroneous and therefore the grant of review was improper. 23 Again, however, the company misses the mark. First, it cites no authority for the position that the Board must articulate the specific ground relied upon for granting review. Second, even assuming such articulation is required, the Board did state that the Regional Director erred in concluding that a union dominated by supervisors is not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act and that the conclusion is inconsistent with established Board precedent. This is sufficient to constitute an articulation that review was justified because the Regional Director departed from officially reported Board precedent. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.67(c)(1)(ii). Third, because the Board's review was premised on the Regional Director's deviation from Board precedent, we need not address the company's argument concerning the lack of clear error in the Regional Director's factual determination. 24 The Regional Director's conclusion that a union which is dominated by supervisors is not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act is inconsistent with NLRB precedent. In Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 631 (1979) the Board held: 25 The mere presence of supervisors in a labor organization is virtually irrelevant to determining status under Section 2(5) of the Act. Indeed, we have, with court approval, uniformly construed Section 2(5) to reach all associations which exist for the purpose, in whole or part, of collective bargaining and which admit employees to membership, despite the fact that supervisors, in addition to employees and even in substantial numbers, may likewise be admitted. 26 Id.; see also Int'l Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, 144 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1963), aff'd, 351 F.2d 771 (D.C.Cir.1965). In Sierra Vista the Board also noted that the question of statutory labor organization status is distinct from the question of the labor organization's qualification to act as a bargaining representative. Id. (emphasis added). The Board set forth criteria in Sierra Vista for determining the question of whether the presence of supervisors in an association operates to disqualify it from bargaining. 27 In this case, the Regional Director failed to analyze the facts in terms of the question of qualification to represent because of his mistaken legal conclusion that supervisor domination extinguishes an association's legal status as a labor organization. Because the Regional Director applied the wrong standard and departed from Board precedent, the Board was justified in reviewing the decision under 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.67(c)(1)(ii).