Opinion ID: 616359
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Counseling

Text: Tepperwien argues that the counseling he received with respect to the missing gas mask was a material adverse action. We agree with the district court that it was not as a matter of law. First, the counseling was rescinded after Tepperwien contacted the ECP. See Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that change in employee's reporting structure was not adverse employment action where it was rescinded with an apology day after employee complained); Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 756 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that jury could reasonably find that negative performance evaluation did not constitute material adverse action, where it was rescinded and destroyed two weeks after it was issued); cf. Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1120-21 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that no adverse action occurred where plaintiff never served suspension). While we do not hold that rescinded discipline can never constitute materially adverse action, we do hold that in the circumstances here, the rescinded counseling letter was not a material adverse employment action. Second, as Tepperwien acknowledged, the counseling did not place him in an active disciplinary process. The form itself is titled Employee Discussion Guide, and it confirmed that Tepperwien was not in an active stepwise disciplinary process. It noted only that the discussion was intended to be a counseling rather than a suspension, verbal warning, letter of reprimand, or other discipline. Hence, the form itself makes clear that a counseling is below even a warning or reprimand. The counseling was merely a discussion of a legitimate safety concerna missing piece of safety equipment and Tepperwien's actions in connection therewith. Third, even assuming the counseling rose to the level of some form of criticism, we have held, in the context of the issuance of a counseling memo, that criticism of an employee (which is part of training and necessary to allow employees to develop, improve and avoid discipline) is not an adverse employment action. Weeks v. N.Y. State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir.2001), abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). [9] Finally, the lack of material adversity is also demonstrated by the fact that Tepperwien was not the only officer to be counseled for this issue. Another security officer was counseled for the same failure to check the equipment, and the shop steward testified that this was an issue that had come up before, not just with Mr. Tepperwien, and the problem was a system error, not a behavior issue. The focus here clearly was not on Tepperwien, and it was not likely that counseling of this nature, which was given to other employees as well, would deter a reasonable employee from complaining of discrimination. In light of all the circumstances, we agree with the district court that no reasonable factfinder could have concluded that the withdrawn counseling was the sort of action that would have dissuaded a reasonable employee in [Tepperwien's] position from complaining of unlawful discrimination. [10]