Opinion ID: 1450094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficient evidence for murder convictions

Text: Grissom was charged with killing Butler with premeditation and deliberation or, in the alternative, during the perpetration of the felony of aggravated burglary. Grissom was charged with killing Rusch and Brown with premeditation and deliberation or, in the alternative, during the perpetration of the felony of aggravated burglary or aggravated kidnapping. He argues that because there is no evidence the killings occurred during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the aggravated burglaries and because the jury returned a general verdict, it is impossible to tell whether the jury relied upon legally sufficient grounds to convict him of murder. In support of his argument, the defendant cites State v. Garcia, 243 Kan. 662, Syl. ¶ 6, 763 P.2d 585 (1988), in which this court held that [a] general verdict of guilty must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient. Garcia had been charged with killing the victim while burglarizing either a house or a pickup, two separate and distinct burglaries. This court concluded the evidence did not support a burglary of the pickup and reversed Garcia's convictions for burglary and for felony murder based upon that burglary. The Garcia court relied upon Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931), in which the jury returned a general verdict, convicting Stromberg of violating a California penal statute that condemned the display of a red flag for any of three purposes. Stromberg challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The California appellate court upheld the conviction even though it questioned the constitutionality of one of the three purposes. The California court concluded that even if one of the purposes was unconstitutional, that provision of the statute could be severed, saving the rest of the statute and the conviction. The United States Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning: As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury were instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause.... It follows that instead of its being permissible to hold, with the state court, that the verdict could be sustained if any one of the clauses of the statute were found to be valid, the necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case was sent to the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld. 283 U.S. at 368. We distinguished Garcia in State v. Davis, 247 Kan. 566, 571-72, 802 P.2d 541 (1990), stating: There is a distinction between Garcia 's rationale that there must be sufficient evidence to convict for both of the separate crimes alleged in the complaint as the underlying crime for proof of felony murder and whether a defendant committed the underlying crime of aggravated robbery by one of several distinct statutory methods, i.e., by force or threat, that constitute the crime of aggravated robbery. Based upon State v. Pioletti, 246 Kan. 49, 785 P.2d 963 (1990), the instant case has more in common with Davis than Garcia. The Pioletti court stated: `When an accused is charged in one count of an information with both premeditated murder and felony murder it matters not whether some members of the jury arrive at a verdict of guilt based on proof of premeditation while others arrive at a verdict of guilt by reason of the killer's malignant purpose.' We have further held that the State is not required to elect between premeditated and felony murder, as K.S.A. 21-3401 established the single offense of murder in the first degree, and only provides alternative methods of proving the crime.  246 Kan. at 64. (Emphasis added.) Here, the question does not involve whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Grissom of separate felonies that would support a conviction for felony murder. The question is whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Grissom of three counts of the single offense of first-degree murder. Proof that Grissom committed first-degree murder can be shown by either one of two distinct statutory methods  premeditation or felony murder. The State is not required to prove a defendant committed both premeditated and felony murder. Furthermore, we are no longer bound by our earlier interpretation of Stromberg. The United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. ___, 116 L.Ed.2d 371, 112 S.Ct. 466 (1991), recently clarified the Stromberg holding. In Griffin, the issue was whether a general guilty verdict on a multiple-object conspiracy charge must be set aside if the evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects. 116 L.Ed.2d at 375. In reviewing the case law pertaining to general verdicts, the United States Supreme Court determined that the above-quoted language from Stromberg and the case's holding do not necessarily stand for anything more than the principle that, where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict that may have rested on that ground. 116 L.Ed.2d at 379. The Griffin court noted that the petitioner was seeking to expand the principles developed in Stromberg and subsequent cases. Petitioner cites no case, and we are aware of none, in which we have set aside a general verdict because one of the possible bases of conviction was neither unconstitutional as in Stromberg, nor even illegal as in Yates [ v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356, 77 S.Ct. 1064 (1957)], but merely unsupported by sufficient evidence. 116 L.Ed.2d at 380. The United States Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's claim, reasoning: Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law  whether, for example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence [citation omitted].... [I]f the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury's consideration. The refusal to do so, however, does not provide an independent basis for reversing an otherwise valid conviction. 116 L.Ed.2d at 382-83. Any language in Garcia contrary to the language quoted above from Griffin is disapproved. Here, Grissom's challenge to the three first-degree murder convictions is factual. Because he was charged in the alternative, if there is sufficient evidence to convict him of either premeditated or felony murder, the general verdict should be upheld. As illustrated by the evidence discussed in Issue I, there is sufficient evidence to convict Grissom of the premeditated murders of Butler, Rusch, and Brown, and that is sufficient to uphold the jury's general verdict. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Grissom of the felony murders of the three women.