Opinion ID: 170350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cline and the interpretation of the Cession Act

Text: In State v. Cline, 322 P.2d 208 (Okla. Crim.App.1958), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal appeals considered state jurisdiction over crimes in a federal game reserve and in that regard addressed the meaning of the Cession Act. [2] The broadest holding in Cline, that the State of Oklahoma did not cede exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, id. at 216, is not a point of dispute here. What is contested is the nature of the non-exclusive jurisdiction ceded by the State and whether it encompasses enforcement of federal criminal law, particularly the murder offense specified in § 1111. In that regard, Fields makes much of Cline's statement that Oklahoma could continue to exercise jurisdiction not in conflict with the authority vested in the Secretary of Agriculture to punish violations of the wildlife regulations prescribed by him, 322 P.2d at 216. He contends this statement implies that the only jurisdiction ceded to the United States was for enforcement of federal regulations relating to proprietary interests inherent in the purposes for which state land was acquired  in Cline for the protection of wildlife, and here for the protection of forest land. We disagree. First, regardless whether a state has fully ceded or withheld territorial jurisdiction over land acquired by the United States, a state cannot enforce laws that are inconsistent with the federal uses for which the land was acquired. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141-42, 147, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930); United States v. Lewisburg Area Sch. Dist., 539 F.2d 301, 307 (3d Cir.1976). Hence, the quote from Cline does not necessarily involve a judgment one way or the other as to the nature of the territorial jurisdiction ceded to the United States; rather, it merely observes the overriding priority accorded federal property use. See also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976). Second, the context of the quote suggests that, far from denying any authority beyond the proprietary, Cline was acknowledging the presence of an unexercised reservoir of such authority. Before referring to the wildlife regulations, Cline noted that the United States does not now assert by statute anything more than proprietary control through [regulations issued by] the Secretary of Agriculture. 322 P.2d at 215 (emphasis added). Thus, the court's subsequent reference to the wildlife regulations reflected a recognition of the limited authority Congress had thus far chosen to exercise, implying that the potential authority ceded to it by the Cession Act reached beyond such proprietary interests. There is another statement in Cline that at first blush may appear to support Fields' position but which, on closer examination, supports federal jurisdiction. Cline expressed concern that if the State did not exercise jurisdiction and enforce its criminal law in the reserve, there was nothing to fill the gap: The area is without protection as to breaches of the peace . . ., unless Oklahoma is permitted to exercise the residuum of jurisdiction it retains over the area[.] Id. at 216. This statement appears to imply that federal territorial jurisdiction is indeed absent, as otherwise there would be no gapthe Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, would have transformed all state crimes into federal crimes enforceable in federal courts, see id. § 13(a). But that implication is undercut by the very next passage in Cline, which points out that [i]n James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, [309 U.S. 94, 60 S.Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596 (1940)], reference is made to certain Congressional acts adopting state statutes as a means of promoting uniformity in law enforcement affecting such areas as the refuge herein, but these acts were repealed [in 1948]. Cline, 322 P.2d at 216. The cited case discussed an earlier version of the ACA repealed in 1948 (though replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 13(a), evidently unnoticed by the Cline court). Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 100-01, 60 S.Ct. 431. In short, Cline was concerned about a gap in criminal-law protections created by the repeal of the ACA, not by the absence of jurisdiction sufficient to impose and enforce criminal law through such federal legislation. This whole discussion suggests that the exercise of federal authority reflected in the ACA (based explicitly on territorial jurisdiction) had previously filled the criminal-law gap that the Cline court was concerned state law now had to fill. Once again, Cline indicates that federal criminal authority was absent in the game reserve because it had not been exercised, not because the federal government lacked jurisdiction to do so. In sum, Cline is fully consistent with, indeed lends substantial support to, our conclusion that the Cession Act cedes concurrent territorial jurisdiction to the United States. As discussed below, even if that jurisdiction is qualified by the Act's reference to the administration, control, and protection of forest lands, that qualification involves a matter committed solely to Congress's judgment and does not afford Fields any basis on which to challenge the jurisdictional validity of the murder statute under which he was prosecuted.