Opinion ID: 1211333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Purpose of the PLCAA

Text: Congress enacted the PLCAA in response to [l]awsuits ... commenced against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which seek money damages and other relief for the harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third parties, including criminals. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3). Congress found that manufacturers and sellers of firearms are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or ammunition products that function as designed and intended. Id. § 7901(a)(5). Congress found egregious [t]he possibility of imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others. Id. § 7901(a)(6). Congress reasoned that [t]he liability actions ... are based on theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of the United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion of the common law. Id. § 7901(a)(7). The PLCAA's stated primary purpose is: To prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as designed and intended. Id. § 7901(b)(1). In view of those congressional findings and that statement of purpose, Congress clearly intended to preempt common-law claims, such as general tort theories of liability. [6] Plaintiffs' claimsclassic negligence and nuisance, Ileto I, 349 F.3d at 1202are general tort theories of liability that traditionally have been embodied in the common law. With this background in mind, which strongly suggests that Congress intended to preempt Plaintiffs' claims, we turn to the predicate exception at issue here. The predicate exception covers causes of action that allege knowing violations of a state or federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms. Plaintiffs argue that this exception covers all state statutes that could be applied to the sale or marketing of firearms. Because California long ago codified its common law into the California Civil Code, Plaintiffs argue that its general tort claims fall within this exception. We disagree for three reasons. First, although the California legislature codified its common law, it was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code, as well as other sections of that code declarative of the common law, to insulate the matters therein expressed from further judicial development; rather it was the intention of the Legislature to announce and formulate existing common law principles and definitions for purposes of orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view toward continuing judicial evolution. Li. v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 1233 (1975). In other words, although California has codified its common law, the evolution of those statutes is nevertheless subject to the same judicial evolution as ordinary common-law claims in jurisdictions that have not codified common law. That judicial evolution was precisely the target of the PLCAA: The liability actions ... are based on theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of the United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion of the common law. The possible sustaining of these actions by a maverick judicial officer or petit jury would expand civil liability in a manner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several States. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7). Second, congressional findings speak to the scope of the predicate exception. Against the backdrop of Congress' findings on the unjustified expansion of the common law, id., Congress also found that [t]he manufacture, importation, possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local laws, id. § 7901(a)(4). We find it more likely that Congress had in mind only these types of statutesstatutes that regulate manufacturing, importing, selling, marketing, and using firearms or that regulate the firearms industryrather than general tort theories that happened to have been codified by a given jurisdiction. Third, Plaintiffs' argument leads to a result that is difficult to square with Congress' intention to create national uniformity. If Plaintiffs' view is correct, then general tort theories of liability are not preempted by the PLCAA in those states, like California, that have codified its common law. But, at the same time, those same theories of liability are preempted by the PLCAA in the states that have not codified their common law. In conclusion, an examination of the text and purpose of the PLCAA shows that Congress intended to preempt general tort theories of liability even in jurisdictions, like California, that have codified such causes of action.