Opinion ID: 524995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kilgore's Prior Restraint--Invalid in All Applications

Text: 130 In this case, several steps are involved in the constitutional inquiry. First, is Kilgore's Rule a prior restraint? I believe Kilgore's Rule is a prior restraint, and the majority incorrectly characterizes the Rule as an after-the-fact sanction in this case. Second, I will examine why this plaintiff should be able to challenge the Rule on its face. Finally, and most importantly, I will explain why this court is constitutionally compelled to consider this facial challenge: the Rule is invalid in all its applications. Thus, we should consider Moore's facial challenge, and we should find the Rule unconstitutional on its face. 131
132 Aware of--perhaps steeped in--the values guiding our First Amendment inquiry, and the framework of parallel threads that are all too often hopelessly tangled, one may properly analyze the facial difficulties of Kilgore's Rule. The first step, in deciding whether Moore can attack facially the Rule and prevail, is to decide how the Rule operates. Is the Rule a prior restraint? Is the Rule an after-the-fact sanction as the phrase is understood constitutionally? 133 It is usually best at first to examine closely the content of the Rule in controversy. The Rule states: 134 Refrain from furnishing information relative to department policy, practices, or business affairs except as authorized by the Chief of the Department. 135 On its face, this Rule primarily operates as a prior restraint. The word refrain directs a Kilgore firefighter not to speak. The content of the speech prohibition reaches to all information relative to department policy, practices, or business affairs--an extremely broad sweep concerning the type of speech involved. Consequently, a firefighter cannot speak about anything which touches upon the fire department's affairs. If a firefigher wants to speak to anyone--about, for example, a particular method of staffing a firehouse--the firefighter must go to the Chief with the proposed speech and receive the Chief's blessing--authorization--before the firefighter may utter a single syllable. The Rule gives the Chief the right not to authorize the proposed speech. Thus, the Chief can gag the firefighter before the words are spoken. No guidelines of any sort, except the scope of the content of the speech itself (information relative to department policy, practices, or business affairs), put a brake on the discretion of the supervisory official. Room for absolute discretionary censorship is inherent in the structure of the Rule. 136 The majority opinion does not think this Rule is a prior restraint. The majority asserts that the department does not pretend to have authority to gag its employees before they speak. It claims the right to fire, demote, or suspend them after they speak. That is not a prior restraint; it is an after-the-fact sanction. 137 I fundamentally disagree with the majority's asserted distinction for two reasons. First, the majority's assertion is not supported by the factual record. The City does believe that it may sanction its firefighters for failing to receive clearance for any proposed speech. The December 31, 1985, memorandum from the City Manager, Ron Cox, to Moore states that [b]oth Chief Duckworth and I directed you to say as little as possible and not discuss the events surrounding the fire.... You had stated you would say no more than what we had discussed and agreed upon.... You have been supplied with a copy of the Fire Department Rules and Regulations and are expected to know what those rules and regulations are ... you were directed verbally to refrain from any discussion of the events surrounding the fire. This flagrant insubordination cannot and will not be tolerated. As a result, disciplinary action must be taken.... Mr. Moore, I remind you again that you are an employee of this City. There will be no more public announcments, (sic) by you regarding your opinion of any policies or directives issued by this City. (emphasis added). 138 The City Manager's understanding of the Rule is that he has the authority to order an employee not to speak in the future. The City Manager also believes that the Rule operates to keep employees from speaking unless they obtain permission. 139 My second disagreement concerning the majority's characterization of the Rule is that the majority treats the existence of a sanction on these facts as inherently distinct from the evil of a gag. The majority believes that if a person is sanctioned, one is necessarily left with the conclusion that the regulation operates as an after-the-fact sanction. However, as I have discussed in Part C(2) supra, the majority fails to distinguish between two different types of sanctions and erroneously treats both as encompassing the constitutional idea of an after-the-fact sanction. Under the Kilgore rule, a firefighter who speaks without the Chief's blessing can be sanctioned for two distinct reasons: the failure to receive prior clearance; and the failure to speak acceptable words. The majority's conflation of these two different ideas leads to the mistaken legal conclusion if an offending employee is penalized after-the-fact that necessarily means that the rule is not a prior restraint. The sanction that flows from a failure to receive prior clearance is a sanction which attempts to enforce a prior restraint. But such a prior restraint-sanction is not, in the constitutional sense, an after-the-fact sanction. The majority errs in its characterization of the Kilgore Rule because it fails to identify the source of the sanction--a prior restraint. All of the majority's resulting errors flow from this one threshold error: the conflation of an after-the-fact sanction with a prior restraint sanction. A government's discretionary ability to apply a prior restraint is no less undesirable because the speaker has, at his or her own peril, ignored the government's dictates. 140 The crucial examination which leads to my result that Kilgore's Rule is a prior restraint focuses on what the speaker must do or cannot do as viewed from the speaker's viewpoint. Standing in the shoes of the potential speaker, (the internal viewpoint), one sees that the Kilgore Rule directs Moore, or any other Fire Department employee, to seek the Chief's approval before speaking. There are no guidelines for the Chief to apply to decide what to authorize and what not to authorize. In this situation, the Chief has the opportunity to act as a censor of the viewpoints of the fire department's employees. If the speaker must seek permission or review before speaking, then the system is a prior restraint. Of course, the fact that a rule is a prior restraint does not mean that the rule is per se unconstitutional. 141 If viewed from the speaker's viewpoint, a court decides that a speaker does not have to receive prior permission, only then should the court adopt the external viewpoint and ask the second question of whether speech is, in fact, gagged. If speech is gagged, the gag is also a prior restraint. But in analytical terms, this type of prior restraint is distinct from the clearance-type of prior restraint which looks at the rule from the speaker's viewpoint. See discussion in Part C-2. 142 Again, the majority errs in believing that the second type of prior restraint--the gagged speech--is the only type of prior restraint. Kilgore' Rule, on its face, is a screening-type of prior restraint. 143
144 As I have stated, the City of Kilgore enforced its prior restraint. Moore was, in part, punished for disobeying the mandate of the restraint. He was also punished for the content of his speech. He has been vindicated in Part I of this opinion for the application of the rule to the content of his speech. Moore also seeks vindication for his being subject to a screening device which has the potential to suppress undesirable speech. 145 Thus, because the Rule on its face operates as a prior restraint, and because the sanctioning of Moore manifests the evil contained in the Rule's prior restraint character, we are left with one question: whether Moore, who has prevailed upon his contention that the Rule was unconstitutionally applied to him, can attack the Rule on its face as an unconstitutional prior restraint. See generally Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 244 (1988). The majority finds that Moore has received all the relief due him, and therefore he can only challenge the Kilgore Rule on the ground of overbreadth as applied to him and not to any third parties. I disagree. 146 If this court does not entertain Moore's facial challenge, Kilgore's Rule will continue in force. We should, therefore, inquire into what happens if this court permits this prior restraint to stand. To accomplish this inquiry, it is necessary to see how this prior restraint affects the First Amendment's underlying values. 147 The existence of Kilgore's Rule threatens at least three of the values that undergird the First Amendment: truth, knowledge, and tolerance. One must create two categories of cases to see the effect of a prior restraint on the three stated values. The first category of prior restraints, which the majority believes is the only category, encompasses a situation in which the prior restraint is successful--the speech is gagged. This situation exists here not from the face of the Rule, but from the City's directive to Moore implementing the Rule. Moore has been directed not to speak about any public matters from the time of the directive into eternity. When speech is gagged, as the directive now has the effect of achieving, the words do not go forth. The public does not receive information, so the public is denied the opportunity to judge the truth of the speech, and is deprived of useful knowledge necessary to be able to make informed decisions. In addition, the effect of such a prior restraint is to introduce the probability of censorship by the supervisory official. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). Especially with a prior restraint such as Kilgore's, which has no guidelines, the restraining discretion serves as a device for the suppression of the communication of ideas and permits the official to act as a censor. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557, 85 S.Ct. 453, 465, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). Censorship distorts the dissemination of truth and knowledge to conform with the official's vision of truth and knowledge. 148 A successful restraint also indulges the worst tendencies of intolerance found in all of us including the governmental official. Moore's speech presents the archetypical example. His speech was critical of the fire department's handling of a fire. This criticism upset the department. The supervisory official, the City Manager, punished Moore both for his speech and directed him not to speak anymore. Tolerance was hardly the watchword for the City of Kilgore's actions. 149 Since Moore bypassed the prior restraint established on the face of the Rule and went ahead and spoke out about the handling of the December 26 fire (although the City has succeeded in placing a blanket prohibition for all future speech to which Moore feels bound), does the Rule still have deleterious effects on the First Amendment? The restraint's chilling effects and problems of proof supply the answer. To bypass a prior restraint requires tremendous verve from the speaker; foolhardiness is another way of stating the same thing, for the speaker must risk receiving a sanction not for the speech expressed but for ignoring the screening procedure. Verve is not, however, a constitutional requirement. Courts and scholars usually express this idea as the chilling effect of a prior restraint. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). In constitutional terms, the speech of the timorous is as important as the words of the bold. The First Amendment must therefore protect equally the fearless and the shy. In regard to free speech values, chilled speech also results, like suppressed speech, in a loss of truth, knowledge and tolerance. We should treat similarly the two categories of prior restraints. 150 Because of the tremendously harmful effects a prior restraint can have on our system of free speech,  '[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to [the court] bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.' Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1578, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (Pentagon Papers) (per curiam). 151 3. Constitutional Imperative to Consider Facial Challenge When Rule is Invalid in All its Applications. 152 Because of a prior restraint's effects on First Amendment values and the heavy presumption of invalidity a prior restraint bears, the constitution commands us to grant this plaintiff standing to hear his facial challenge in this situation because the restraint is invalid in all its applications. 153 The majority errs when it analyzes the Kilgore Rule only in terms of the substantial overbreadth doctrine. This error flows from the majority's mischaracterization of the Rule as an after-the-fact sanction. If the majority were to recognize that this Rule is a prior restraint, then the majority would be constitutionally compelled to examine the Rule, not under the substantial overbreadth doctrine, but under the Lakewood-Munson-Vincent line of cases. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2143-45, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 962, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2849, 2851-52 n. 13, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984); Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-97, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124-25, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). See discussion in Part C(2) supra. 154 Is Kilgore's prior restraint invalid in all applications? The district court believed that this prior restraint was permissible  '[f]or a variety of reasons, including safety and security, this is an area of legitimate government interest to control, or at least monitor, statements made by employees on possibly confidential or sensitive matters to prevent indiscrete disclosures. The majority takes a narrower view of what constitutionally could be restrained--[e]mployers will have to act as spokespeople. Speech that would be damaging to the department if made without supervisory approval may be essential to the department if made with approval. 155 The majority raises an interesting question about a governmental employer managing its own speech. There are certainly times a governmental body must utilize a spokesperson to communicate an official message to either the public or the members of the institution. Such speech often involves prior approval by supervisors to be sure the correct message is being communicated. The majority is correct that some sort of prior restraint could, hypothetically, be a legitimate restriction. Hypothetical interests are not, however, constitutionally sufficient. The test for a constitutional speech restriction is whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a proven compelling governmental interest. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2849, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637, 100 S.Ct. 826, 836, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (governmental interest must be proved in the record). 156 Kilgore, as a matter of evidence, has not presented proof of a compelling governmental interest--except possibly one interest: the release of information relating to an arson investigation. The interest in controlling spokespersons is not supported in the record. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Therefore we cannot consider it. 157 Premature release of an arson suspect's name, and crucial and unique details concerning an arson fire would likely constitute compelling governmental interests. These governmental interests are supported in the record. However, a compelling government interest is only half of the inquiry. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2849, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637, 100 S.Ct. 826, 836, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980). Narrowness and specificity, which provide notice to potential speakers, are the touchstones of a constitutional prior restriction. See Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-84, 89 S.Ct. 347, 352-53, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). Narrowness which is carefully tailored to the compelling interest must be present. Otherwise, the Rule is unconstitutional in every application. Nothing about the Kilgore Rule is narrow. The Rule covers release of any information relevant to department policy, practices, or business affairs. Most anything is relevant if it even approaches the subject matter. See generally Fed.R.Evid. 401. 158 Kilgore's Rule does not limit prior clearance to details of an arson investigation. The Rule does not place durational limits on the clearance feature; presumably, fifteen years after the closure of an arson investigation and conviction, a firefighter would still need prior clearance to comply with the Rule. The record is completely devoid of evidence that Kilgore has narrowing guidelines which relate directly to the proven compelling government interest. Without narrow guidelines, the discretion of the City is unconstitutionally boundless. Because the Rule is without guidelines, it could never be applied constitutionally, even if the speech involved details of an arson fire. The inherent censorship quality of this Rule dooms its every application to unconstitutional death. Kilgore's vision of narrowness is akin to a venture to catch one salmon in the ocean by using 1000 yards of netting at the mouth of a river in salmon season. Such a knotted webbing nets not only the one needed, sought-after salmon, but an entire school suffers from the sweeping endeavor. 159 The fatal flaw in Kilgore's Rule is the lack of standards limiting the discretion of a supervising official. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2144-45, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). Without guidelines, a reviewing court cannot adequately and easily determine whether the censor suppressed the speech for legitimate or illegitimate reasons. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2144. Standards provide the guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the licensing officials and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression. City of Lakewood 108 S.Ct. at 2144; see also Freedman v. State of Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 739-40, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). 160 It is the lack of narrow standards, expressing proven, compelling governmental interests, that makes this prior restraint unconstitutional in all conceivable applications. It is when statutes threaten [the risks of unbridled censorship schemes--self-censorship by speakers in order to avoid being denied a license to speak, and the difficulty of effectively detecting, reviewing, and correcting content-based censorship 'as applied' without standards by which to measure the censor's action--] to a significant degree that courts must entertain an immediate facial attack on the law. City of Lakewood 108 S.Ct. at 2145 (emphasis added). As the Kilgore Rule is written, there is no valid application. Therefore the majority is correct that the substantial overbreadth doctrine offers no avenue of relief for Moore. The generic notion, however, of a statute's ambit sweeping too far--descriptive overbreadth--should offer relief to Moore because the Rule constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint.