Opinion ID: 1160851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ease of Administration

Text: The question remains whether, after Custis, supra, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517, and Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th 953, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 928 P.2d 572, our decision in Sumstine recognizing a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure permitting the motion to strike procedure for Boykin-Tahl grounds is still sound. Both Custis and Garcia identify the ease of administration of the motion to strike procedure as a key factor in deciding whether to permit a defendant to mount, in his current trial, a collateral attack on a prior felony conviction. ( Custis, supra, at p. 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732; Garcia, supra, at p. 964, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 928 P.2d 572.) Thus, referring to a Gideon claim, the high court explained that determining whether counsel had been appointed in the prior proceeding was a simple matter of checking the judgment roll or the appropriate minute order. ( Custis, supra, at p. 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732.) The ease with which the validity of a Gideon claim could be determined strongly supported the Custis court's conclusion that the federal Constitution authorized the motion to strike procedure for denial of counsel claims, but no others. Garcia is a good example of the same legal analysis yielding different results when applied to a different factual situation. In that case, the defendant sought to strike an alleged prior felony conviction, claiming he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in the prior proceeding. We explained that [s]uch a claim often will necessitate a factual investigation with regard to counsel's actions, omissions, and strategic decisions, requiring the parties and the court to reconstruct events possibly remote in time, and to scour potentially voluminous records, substantially delaying the proceedings related to the current offense. Conducting evidentiary hearings on these types of claims also would protract substantially the proceedings on the current offense.  ( Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 965, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 928 P.2d 572, italics added.) Accordingly, the difficulty in proving such a claim, and the concomitant delay that would result in the current trial, convinced us that a criminal defendant should not be permitted to use the motion to strike procedure to litigate, in his current trial, ineffective assistance of counsel claims going to prior convictions. ( Id. at pp. 965-966, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 928 P.2d 572) Neither the discussion on the ease of administering the motion to strike procedure in Custis nor that in Garcia undermines our basic reasoning in Sumstine. Although a hearing on whether a defendant was given adequate Boykin-Tahl admonitions and waivers and whether the defendant was actually aware of his rights when he pleaded may, in some cases, involve a full-blown trial of contested facts, we reasoned in Sumstine that such wide-ranging inquiries should largely be avoided by the rule that Boykin-Tahl waivers be placed on the record to facilitate future review. ( Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 919, fn. 6, 206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904.) We reiterated that rule in Howard itself, noting the essential wisdom of explicit waivers remains beyond question and emphasizing that explicit admonitions and waivers are still required in this state. ( Howard supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1179, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) That the primary evidence of a Boykin-Tahl violation will usually appear on the face of the record distinguishes challenges on Boykin-Tahl grounds from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, at issue in Garcia. Evidence of the latter type of claim will most often be outside the trial record, as the trial court would be required to determine such issues as the reasons for prior trial counsel's tactics or omissions, what counsel should have done to secure a more favorable result, whether such additional actions would actually have had the desired result, and whether counsel acted unreasonably or as a less than diligent advocate for his or her client. In short, litigation of such claims will, in most cases, entail a degree of delay we found unacceptable in Garcia. (See Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 965, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 928 P.2d 572; see also People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134 [ineffective assistance of counsel claims more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding].) In Sumstine we reasoned the same would not be true for Boykin-Tahl claims, and respondent points to no evidence showing this prediction has proven unfounded. We assume this is because the determination of whether a defendant understood the constitutional rights he or she was waiving by pleading guilty is a much simpler task than determining whether prior counsel provided ineffective legal representation. After Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449, we have followed a rule in this state requiring a pleading defendant be told on the record that he is waiving the rights to a jury, to confront the witnesses against him and the freedom from compelled self-incrimination. For post- Tahl guilty pleas, then, the record of the hearing in which the trial court accepted the defendant's plea should clearly demonstrate the defendant was told of his rights and that he affirmatively waived them. Thus, permitting defendants to raise a Boykin-Tahl claim in a motion to strike at trial would entail little disruption; a quick review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing may be all that is necessary. For those cases in which the record fails to show the defendant was told of his rights or that he affirmatively waived them, before the trial court accepted the plea, a concern arises the plea may be constitutionally invalid. In those unusual cases, Sumstine holds that defendants need not wait to raise the claim in a separate habeas corpus proceeding, but may immediately move to strike the prior conviction. The validity of a criminal defendant's claim he or she was denied counsel in a prior proceeding admittedly is easier to determine from the face of the trial record than the validity of a Boykin-Tahl claim. Nevertheless, we understand the high court's decision in Custis, supra, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517, to set the floor for federal constitutional purposes, not to prohibit states from establishing rules of procedure to facilitate the smooth and efficient operation of their trial courts. Indeed, Custis itself identified instances in which Congress has, by statute, specifically permitted a defendant to challenge the constitutionality of a predicate felony in his current trial. ( Custis, supra, at p. 493, 114 S.Ct. 1732, citing 18 U.S.C. former § 3575(e), note following ch. 227 [dangerous special offender law]; 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2) [recidivist under Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970].) This court itself has authorized the motion to strike procedure in cases not involving claims of denial of counsel. ( Curl, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1292, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292; People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1135, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) Clearly, Custis did not intend to limit to Gideon claims all collateral challenges in the trial court.