Opinion ID: 530524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Foreign Assistance Act

Text: 10 We consider first plaintiffs' claim that the Mexico City Policy and the implementing clauses run afoul of the FAA. Their argument is two-pronged. First, they contend the challenged funding eligibility policy contravenes the statutory purposes of the Act and, thereby, exceeds executive authority. Second, they contend that the Executive, by adopting abortion-related restrictions more stringent than those set out in the Act, contravenes the limits Congress established and that the executive restrictions are, therefore, invalid. Brief for Appellant at 27. The District Court correctly ruled that both these arguments are without merit. 11 As to the first, that is, that the present executive practice is inconsistent with the general legislative policy, plaintiffs rely principally on statements of policy in 22 U.S.C. Secs. 2151b(a), 2151-1(b), 2151u(a). The first of these, section 2151b(a), sets forth Congress's general finding that: 12 effective family planning depends upon economic and social change as well as the delivery of services and is often a matter of political and religious sensitivity. While every country has the right to determine its own policies with respect to population growth, voluntary planning programs can make a substantial contribution to economic development, higher living standards, and improved health and nutrition. 13 Section 2151-1(b)(1) adds certain principles governing assistance. Among these principles are: [m]aximum effort ... to stimulate the involvement of the people ... through the encouragement of democratic participation; the administration of assistance in a collaborative style to support the developmental goals chosen by each country receiving assistance, id. Sec. 2151-1(b)(2); and that United States cooperation in development should be carried out to the maximum extent possible through the private sector, id. Sec. 2151-1(b)(8). Additionally, plaintiffs contend that the policy is inconsistent with section 2151u(a), in which Congress finds that activities planned and carried out by private and voluntary organizations and cooperatives, are favored. Specifically, plaintiffs point to the phrase from that section: it is in the interest of the United States that such organizations and cooperatives expand their overseas development efforts without compromising their private and independent nature. Id. Sec. 2151u(a). Plaintiffs contend that imposing the abortion-related limitations contravenes this stated objective. 14 To plaintiffs' rather general assertion that the present practice is invalid because it contravenes these goals of the statute, the short answer is that it does not. As to the general policy statement in section 2151b(a), neither the Mexico City Policy nor the implementing grant clauses evinces any interference with the congressionally desired right of every country to determine its own policies with respect to population growth. Id. Sec. 2151b(a). In fact, the Mexico City Policy specifically permits recipient foreign governments to continue to receive FAA funds in segregated accounts while conducting abortion-related activity with their own money. 15 As to the principles set out in section 2151-1(b), none of the cited subsections nor any other part of this or any other act expresses or implies a congressional intent that the President shall grant all requested funds to all entities seeking democratic participation whether from the private sector or elsewhere. As to the expression of congressional intent in section 2151u(a), as the Second Circuit noted in rejecting this same challenge to these same limitations, that section requires only that the Government consider the private and independent nature of private organizations which it utilizes, Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649, 654 (2d Cir.1988), not that they be immunized from any conditions on their grants. Nothing in the Mexico City Policy or the grant clauses in any fashion contravenes any of the cited findings or declarations of principle by Congress. Indeed, Congress in section 2151b(c)(1) expressly directed that the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2151b(c)(1) (emphasis added). The only congressional limitation placed on this discretion is set forth in section 2151b(f). That section provides: 16 (1) None of the funds made available to carry out this subchapter may be used to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions. 17 (2) None of the funds made available to carry out this subchapter may be used to pay for the performance of involuntary sterilizations as a method of family planning or to coerce or provide any financial incentive to any person to undergo sterilizations. 18 (3) None of the funds made available to carry out this subchapter may be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates, in whole or in part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of family planning. 19 Id. Sec. 2151b(f). See Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 838 F.2d at 654. Obviously, the funding limitations under attack not only do not run afoul of the 2151b(f) limitations, but if anything, go further in the same direction. 20 This brings us to the second of plaintiffs' arguments: that the clause limitations are violative of the FAA. In this argument they contend that the present eligibility policy contravenes specific provisions of the Act by going further than the quoted statutory limitations. In support of this proposition, they further offer the legislative history of the 1973 amendment which added the original abortion-related restrictions to the FAA. In the course of that enactment, Senator Helms, principal sponsor of the amendment, observed, [w]e could, in fact, go far beyond the present amendment and require all abortion activities, from whatever funds, to be stopped before our assistance could be received. But the present amendment does not do that. 119 Cong.Rec. 32,29 3 (1973). Plaintiffs then argue that Senator Helms's language indicates that Congress considered, but rejected, the policy now followed by the executive branch, and that executive policy is therefore in contravention of the act of Congress. This is simply not the case. 21 As the Second Circuit has observed, Senator Helms's statement 22 does not indicate that Congress has spoken on the issue of whether limitations may be imposed on the use of non-federal funds. At most, Senator Helms' statement indicates that Congress was aware that it could consider an amendment containing such limitations on non-federal funds, not that Congress considered, but chose not to adopt, such limitations. 23 Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 838 F.2d at 655 (emphasis in original). 24 Nothing in the statute as enacted or any reasonable interpretation of the words of the statute indicates an intent to limit the President's discretion to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, in the fashion argued by plaintiffs. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2151b(c)(1). We therefore conclude that the District Court correctly decided that subsection (f) only restricts the President's authority to furnish assistance in the enumerated circumstances. It does not, however, imply that the President cannot impose any other restrictions as to abortion. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd., 691 F.Supp. at 403. Or, as another district court has concluded, absent a specific limitation on the Executive's authority to condition disbursal of United States funds to foreign NGOs, it must be assumed that the Congress has left intact presidential authority to place conditions or to refuse funding to these organizations. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 670 F.Supp. 538, 544 (S.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd in relevant part, Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.1988).