Opinion ID: 848702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: statutory construction and analysis

Text: The issue before us is whether plaintiff's notices satisfied the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4). Our duty is to determine what the Legislature intended. Omelenchuk at 576 n. 19, 609 N.W.2d 177. We begin with the language of the statute, and if the intent of the Legislature is clearly expressed, no further construction is warranted. Helder v. Sruba, 462 Mich. 92, 99, 611 N.W.2d 309 (2000). The statute by its terms requires that the notice contain a statement of at least six items: (1) the factual basis for the claim, (2) the alleged applicable standard of practice or care, (3) the alleged manner in which the applicable standard of practice or care was breached, (4) the alleged action that should have been taken to comply with the applicable standard of practice or care, (5) the manner in which the breach of the standard of care proximately caused the injury, and (6) the names of all health professionals and health facilities that the claimant is notifying under the statute. MCL 600.2912b(4). To ascertain what the Legislature intended by this statute, we first examine the meaning of the word statement. The statute does not define statement, and a resort to a lay dictionary to ascertain the meaning intended is of limited usefulness. One dictionary provides: Statement, n 1. something stated. 2. a communication or declaration in speech or writing, setting forth facts, particulars, etc. 3. a single sentence or assertion: I disagree with your last statement. [ Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1995).] A statement can be merely a general assertion or it can be a detailed description. Plaintiff argues that the statute requires the former, and defendants argue that it requires the latter. The word as it appears in the sentence is susceptible to both meanings. Thus, to determine what the statute intends, we examine its structure as a whole, and particularly, the text surrounding the word statement. G.C. Timmis & Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co., 468 Mich. 416, 420, 662 N.W.2d 710 (2003). In discerning the intended meaning, we consider also the Legislature's apparent purpose in enacting the provision. In re Wirsing, 456 Mich. 467, 474, 573 N.W.2d 51 (1998). We may even consider legislative history. Adrian School Dist. v. Michigan Pub. School Employees Retirement Sys., 458 Mich. 326, 335, 582 N.W.2d 767 (1998). The statute in question requires that claimants alleging medical malpractice send a notice of intent to sue to potential defendants at least 182 days before filing a complaint. MCL 600.2912b(1). Each potential party is then required to make available to the others medical records in his possession relating to the claim. MCL 600.2912b(5). Within 154 days after receiving the notice of intent, the defendants are required to respond to it stating (1) the factual basis for their defense to the claim, (2) the standard of practice or care that they allege is applicable, (3) the manner in which they claim to have complied with the standard of care, and (4) the reasons why they contend that they were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injury. MCL 600.2912b(7). The statute anticipates that the defendants will often challenge the alleged applicable standard of practice or care and the manner in which it was breached. Id. The statutory period of limitations is tolled during the waiting period after the notice of intent is sent. MCL 600.5856(d). The 182-day waiting period before the filing of a complaint is immediately lifted if the defendants communicate in writing that they do not intend to settle the claim. MCL 600.2912b(9). The overall structure and the operation of the notice provision suggest that the Legislature intended the act to encourage settlement discussions. [19] The 182-day waiting period enables the parties to engage in settlement discussions before initiating a lawsuit, possibly avoiding litigation entirely. During this period, information is exchanged without regard to the formal rules of discovery. Moreover, the plaintiff is effectively immobilized while awaiting a response from the defendants. The waiting period is waived only if the defendants file written notice that they do not intend to settle the claim. At this stage in the dispute, it is unlikely that all anticipated experts and witnesses will have been identified and deposed. Theories of liability and defenses may not have been developed with precision. A higher level of specificity about a claim emerges from the information exchanged by the parties after the notice is sent. The statute works no unfairness on defendants. The potential defendants who receive the notice assuredly possess a high level of medical expertise. They do not require information of great specificity in order to begin investigating an impending lawsuit. Also, most of the records pertinent to a medical malpractice claim are likely to be under the control of the defendants. A general assertion of the basis for the claim and of the items required by the statute is sufficient to inform them about the claim and to encourage settlement discussions. Moreover, the provision does not require a unique standard, specific information, or a particularized statement as the majority asserts. Ante at 718 n. 8, 720. Had the Legislature intended extensive detail in the notice, it would have required it. Numerous other statutes specify detailed, complete, or full statements, or statements made with specificity. In the State Employees' Retirement Act, for example, each member is required to file a detailed statement of his prior service as an employee. MCL 38.14. MCL 500.424(2) in the Insurance Code provides: In addition to subsection (1), an alien insurer shall make and execute under oath a report of its financial standing and of its deposit together with a full statement of its business in the United States for the year preceding the statement pursuant to section 438. [Emphasis added.] MCL 462.2(2) in the railroad commission act requires the governor to provide a complete statement of the charges against a railroad commissioner after removing the commissioner for neglect of duty or malfeasance. MCL 333.22231(4) states: (4) Before a final decision on an application is made, the bureau of the department designated by the director as responsible for the certificate of need program shall issue a proposed decision with specific findings of fact in support of the proposed decision with regard to each of the criteria listed in section 22225. The proposed decision also shall state with specificity the reasons and authority of the department for the proposed decision. The department shall transmit a copy of the proposed decision to the applicant. [Emphasis added.] These provisions demonstrate that the Legislature knows what phrasing to use when it intends to require extensive detail. Because it did not explicitly mandate such specificity in this statute, we should refrain from adding it ourselves. In the past, the Court has avoided making a requirement that notices be detailed if they serve the object of the statute and do not prejudice the defendant. Hummel v. Grand Rapids, 319 Mich. 616, 625, 30 N.W.2d 372 (1948). The decision in Omelenchuk recognized that tolling provisions should not be traps for the unwary and that, without proper notice, there can be no tolling. Given that medical malpractice actions are complex and fact-intensive, the Court is ill-advised to require a detailed blueprint for notices of intent where the Legislature did not. [20] Omelenchuk at 576, n. 19, 609 N.W.2d 177.