Opinion ID: 146453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Vagueness Challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment

Text: To successfully make an as-applied vagueness challenge, the plaintiffs must show that section 14-107 either failed to provide them with notice that possession of their badges was prohibited or failed to limit sufficiently the discretion of the officers who arrested them under the statute. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294. The plaintiffs make neither showing.
[A]ll vagueness challenges, including those made as applied, require us to answer . . . whether the statute gives adequate notice. Farrell, 449 F.3d at 485. A plaintiff making an as-applied challenge must show that the statute in question provided insufficient notice that his or her behavior at issue was prohibited. See id. at 490. The standard is an objective one. See id. at 483. Courts ask whether the law presents an ordinary person with sufficient notice of or the opportunity to understand what conduct is prohibited or proscribed, Thibodeau, 486 F.3d at 67, not whether a particular plaintiff actually received a warning that alerted him or her to the danger of being held to account for the behavior in question. We understand the plaintiffs to argue, interestingly, that even if the literal words of New York City Administrative Code § 14-107 clearly apply to their conduct, the fact that the literal meaning of the words would also criminalize conduct that cannot conceivably actually be criminal would give an ordinary person a reason to believe that the conduct at issue in this case was not criminal either. Section 14-107, taken literally, unambiguously prohibits possession of the badges that the plaintiffs possessed. The statute criminalizes possession of any uniform, shield, buttons, wreaths, numbers or other insignia or emblem in any way resembling that worn by members of the police force. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 14-107 (emphasis added). A literal reading of these words clearly criminalizes possession of any badge that is like, but not identical to, a police badge. This, rather than settling the matter, complicates it. True, under the literal meaning of the statute, the plaintiffs knew that they were violating it. But it is difficult to conclude that a reasonable person would think that the statute means what it says. A literal reading of its prohibition of the possession of items in any way resembling a police uniform, shield, or insignia would criminalize possession of items that are widely held and openly displayed. How many children dressing up as police officers while trick-or-treating, or playingironicallycops in a game of cops and robbers, would be subject to arrest and prosecution under the statute's literal proscription of possession of a badge resembling a police shield? It is worth noting that the NYPD is itself involved in selling such items. It licenses for sale, for example, a sticker that contains a decal of the NYPD Shield, and a variety of T-shirts, hats, and other clothing that, applying the terms of the statute literally, would seem in some way to resembl[e] the uniform worn by NYPD officers. See NYPD Store, available at http://www.nypd.com/ (last visited 5/3/10). That the sale of such articles is facilitated by the NYPD lends credence to the proposition that an ordinary person might think that possession of some articles that are covered by the literal words of the statute is not in fact prohibited. In Morales, Justice Stevens was persuaded by a similar argument. Joined by two other Justices, he would have held that an anti-loitering statute that prohibited standing in public with a gang member provided insufficient notice to a reasonable person of what was forbidden despite the fact that the literal meaning of the statute was clear; such a literal meaning would mandate an application far beyond what was plausibly intended. Morales, 527 U.S. at 57, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (Since the city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in public with a gang member, the vagueness that dooms this ordinance is not the product of uncertainty about the normal meaning of `loitering,' but rather about what loitering is covered by the ordinance and what is not.). Were the plaintiffs in a position to raise a facial challenge, they might for this reason succeed. But, as we have explained, they are not. In their as-applied challenge, they must show not that section 14-107 provides insufficient notice to some people as to items that are prohibited, but that it provided insufficient notice to the plaintiffs as to the specific items that they were arrested for possessing. And neither the widespread availability of hats and T-shirts bearing the NYPD logo, nor the prevalence of toy badges, would be likely to confuse a reasonable person as to the illegality of an adult carrying a facsimile of a police shield in his belongings while entering a government building. Even if there is ambiguity as to the margins of what conduct is prohibited under the statute, we are of the view that an ordinary person would understand the statute to prohibit the possession of items that could be used by an adult to impersonate a police officer. We therefore conclude that despite the unfortunate breadth of the statute, it gives reasonable notice that possession of a badge that resembles a police shield in circumstances where it might be used in order to mislead is prohibited. Nor are we persuaded by the argument that the plaintiffs' badges were so different from authentic police badges that notice regarding a prohibition of possession of badges resembling police badges would not apply to those badges possessed by the plaintiffs. Plaintiff Davison was carrying an authentic, but unauthorized, New York City Transit Authority badge that he had failed to return upon ceasing employment for the New York City Transit Authority. Plaintiffs Dickerson and Hogans were each in possession of badges resembling official police badges in all respects other than the text on the face of the badges. There is evidence in the record that each could have been mistaken for a real police badge. See July 16, 2007 Reply Decl. of Thomas Mahoney in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at ¶ 2, Dickerson et al. v. Chertoff et al., No. 06 cv 7615 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007) (Dkt. No. 30) (Mahoney Reply Decl.). [16] We conclude that an ordinary person with sufficient notice of or the opportunity to understand what conduct is prohibited or proscribed would understand that an unauthorized New York City Transit Authority badge or a badge that had been altered to state New Jersey Firearms Academy Chief or Security Agent, but was in all other respects very much like an NYPD badge, would impermissibly resemble an NYPD badge. See Thibodeau, 486 F.3d at 67.