Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Glendale Bill lacked potential future applicability and created an illusory class.

Text: The Canister court then observed that [o]ur special legislation precedent illustrates that, even when the legislature had a specific entity in mind when drafting the legislation, the class created by the legislation is not illusory if it could include other members in the future. Canister, 110 P.3d at 384. The court further noted that [b]y contrast, a class that is drawn so that it will never have any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the legislation creating such a class is unconstitutional special legislation. Id. Such a class was considered in In re Senate Bill No. 95 of the Forty-Third General Assembly, 146 Colo. 233, 361 P.2d 350 (1961). In that case, the Colorado legislature passed an annexation bill that the Colorado Supreme Court determined could only apply to the annexation of the town of Glendale by the city of Denver. Id. at 353. The challenged bill, widely referred to as The Glendale Bill, provided in relevant part: Whenever any town existing under the general laws of this state contains less than six hundred and forty acres in area and shall have been surrounded for a period of not less than five years by a city or city and county, the territory included within such surrounded town shall become a part of the surrounding city or city and county and such surrounded town may be annexed to and become a part of the surrounding city or city and county by appropriate ordinance passed by the city council of the annexing city or city and county without complying with any of the other provisions of this article. Annexation shall be complete on the effective date of the annexation ordinance for all purposes except that of general taxation in which respect annexation shall not become effective until on and after the first day of January, next ensuing. Id. at 351-52 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Senate Bill No. 95). The bill also included a repealing clause, which provided that [t]he provisions of this act are hereby specifically repealed on and after July 1, 1962. Id. at 352. At the request of the governor, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the bill to determine if it was a special law in violation of the Colorado Constitution. Id. at 353. The court's review concluded that the bill was conclusively shown to be a special law based on two facts: (1) the bill applied only to 640-acre surrounded towns and not 640-acre surrounded cities, and (2) the repealing clause made it absolutely certain that the bill can apply only to a town now in existence and meeting the very special requirements of being less than 640 acres in extent and being completely surrounded by a special charter town or city. Id. at 353-54. The court further determined that the bill could not operate prospectively because it was impossible that before July 1, 1962, any circumstance [could] occur to allow another town to be surrounded for five years by a special charter town or city. Id. at 354. The court concluded that Senate Bill No. 95 was unquestionably conceived, cut, tailored and amended to accomplish a particular purpose with reference to a particular area, to-wit, Glendale. Once having accomplished that particular purpose the act would die before it could possibly accomplish a like purpose in any other place. Id. Based on this precedent, the Canister court determined that this description applied equally to the capital sentencing statute challenged in that case. Canister, 110 P.3d at 384. The court explained: [a]s of July 12, 2002, the date the statutory class created by section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) closed, as well as the date the statute became effective, Canister and Hagos were the only two people in Colorado for whom the prosecution had announced it was seeking the death sentence, who had been convicted at trial of a class 1 felony, and for whom a sentencing hearing had not yet been held. . . . Because of the time limitation built into the section, Canister and Hagos are the only two people to whom it will ever apply. Like the legislation in Senate Bill No. 95, section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) cannot operate prospectively, and will have no future effect after accomplishing its purpose of making the death penalty available as punishment for Canister and Hagos. Id. at 385. The Canister court concluded that the challenged provision was a violation of Colorado's constitutional prohibition against special legislation, stating that [b]ecause those two people are the only individuals to whom the statute will ever apply, the classification adopted by the legislature is logically and factually limited to a `class of one,' and thus is illusory. Id. at 385.