Opinion ID: 2756581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Background on Predial Servitudes

Text: Predial servitudes (or real servitudes) were defined in the RCC as “those which the owner of an estate enjoys on a neighboring estate for the benefit of his own estate. They are called predial . . . servitudes, because, being established for the benefit of an estate, they are rather due to the estate than to the owner personally.” 35 “A real or predial servitude is a charge laid on an estate for the use and utility of another estate belonging to another owner.” 36 The RCC also established that it was necessary for there to be two estates and for each to have a different owner, 37 then stated: It is necessary, in the third place, that the servitude have for its object the use or benefit of the estate in favor of which it is established. 34 Franks, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 35 RCC art. 646 (emphasis in original). LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 provides: “A predial servitude is a charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate. The two estates must belong to different owners.” 36 RCC art. 647. 37 RCC arts. 648 and 649; LA. CIV. CODE art. 646. 10 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 But it is not necessary that this benefit exist at the time of the contract; a mere possible convenience or remote advantage is sufficient to support a servitude. In order to render a servitude null, it is not enough that it should appear to be useless, it must be shown that at no time, and under no circumstances, can it possibly become useful to the person in whose favor it is enacted. 38 One significant consequence of a predial servitude, as opposed to a merely personal obligation, is that a predial servitude “is binding on subsequent owners who acquire the servient estate without further mention of the restriction in the act conveying the servient estate.” 39 Furthermore, “[o]ne of the characteristics of a servitude is, that it does not oblige the owner of the estate subject to it to do anything, but to abstain from doing a particular thing, or to permit a certain thing to be done on his estate.” 40 In 1923, unlike now, the RCC classified servitudes as either urban servitudes (those established for the use of houses) or rural servitudes (those established for the use of land), 41 and one of the principle rural servitudes was 38 RCC art. 650. LA. CIV. CODE art. 647 provides: “There must be a benefit to the dominant estate. The benefit need not exist at the time the servitude is created; a possible convenience or a future advantage suffices to support a servitude. There is no predial servitude if the charge imposed cannot be reasonably expected to benefit the dominant estate.” 39 RCC Properties, L.L.C. v. Wenstar Properties, L.P., 40,996 p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/5/06), 930 So. 2d 1233, 1237. 40 RCC art. 655. LA. CIV. CODE art. 651 provides: “The owner of the servient estate is not required to do anything. His obligation is to abstain from doing something on his estate or to permit something to be done on it. . . .” 41 RCC art. 710. 11 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 the servitude of passage. 42 This is a distinction without a difference because the servitude is defined essentially the same now as it was under the RCC: The right of passage, or of way, is a servitude imposed by law or by convention, and by virtue of which one has a right to pass on foot, on horseback, or in a vehicle, to drive beasts of burden or carts through the estate of another. When this servitude results from the law, the exercise of it is confined to the wants of the person who has it. When it is the result of a contract, its extent and the mode of using it is regulated by the contract. 43 Under the RCC, as now, landowners could establish predial servitudes by convention, i.e., by contract. 44 The RCC recognized that certain contractual obligations could be real or personal, depending on the parties’ intent, and recognized that explicit language is preferable to implication: Servitudes being established on estates in favor of other estates, and not in favor of persons, if the grant of the right declare it to be for the benefit of another 42 RCC art. 721. 43 RCC art. 722. LA. CIV. CODE art. 705 provides: “The servitude of passage is the right for the benefit of the dominant estate whereby persons, animals, utilities, or vehicles are permitted to pass through the servient estate. Unless the title provides otherwise, the extent of the right and the mode of its exercise shall be suitable for the kind of traffic or utility necessary for the reasonable use of the dominant estate.” 44 RCC art. 709 (“Owners have a right to establish on their estates, or in favor of their estates, such servitudes as they deem proper . . . .”). LA. CIV. CODE art. 654 provides: “Predial servitudes may be natural, legal, and voluntary or conventional. Natural servitudes arise from the natural situation of estates; legal servitudes are imposed by law; and voluntary or conventional servitudes are established by juridical act, prescription, or destination of the owner.” 12 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 estate, there can be no doubt as to the nature of this right, even though it should not he called a servitude. 45 On the other hand, if the act does not declare that the grant of a right is for the benefit of an estate but merely for the benefit of a person, the RCC provided that it might still be a predial servitude if it conveyed “a real advantage to the estate” as opposed to “personal convenience to the owner.” 46 Furthermore: If the right granted be of a nature to assure a real advantage to an estate, it is to be presumed that such right is a real servitude, although it may not be so styled. Thus, for example, if the owner of a house contiguous to lands bordering on the high road, should stipulate for the right of passing through lands, without it being expressed that the passage is for the use of his house, it would be not the less a real servitude, for it is evident that the passage is of real utility to the house. 47 However: If, on the other hand, the concession from its nature is a matter of mere personal convenience, it is considered personal, and can not [sic] be made real but by express declaration of the parties. 45 RCC art. 754 (emphasis added). LA. CIV. CODE art. 731 provides: “A charge established on an estate expressly for the benefit of another estate is a predial servitude although it is not so designated.” 46 RCC art. 755. 47 RCC art. 756. LA. CIV. CODE art. 733 provides: “When the right granted be of a nature to confer an advantage on an estate, it is presumed to be a predial servitude.” 13 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 Thus for example, if the owner of a house near a garden or park, should stipulate for the right of walking and gathering fruits and flowers therein, this right would be considered personal to the individual, and not a servitude in favor of the house or its owner. But the right becomes real and is a predial servitude, if the person stipulating for the servitude, acquires it as owner of the house, and for himself, his heirs and assigns. 48 As a backstop, the RCC provided: “Servitudes which tend to affect the free use of property, in case of doubt as to their extent or the manner of using them, are always interpreted in favor of the owner of the property to be affected.” 49 Louisiana courts have also long recognized that parties to a contract may choose to create neither a predial servitude nor personal servitude but rather a personal obligation, i.e, an agreement that focuses on the duty of an obligor rather than a benefit either to an estate (predial servitude) or to a person (personal servitude), and which does not bind the obligor’s successors-ininterest. In 1911, the Louisiana Supreme Court quoted with approval French civil law commentary to that effect: In case of doubt as to the nature of the service that has been stipulated, it is for the courts to decide, finally, whether the parties have intended to establish a real servitude or a personal servitude, or a simple right of 48 RCC art. 757. LA. CIV. CODE art. 734 provides: “When the right granted is merely for the convenience of a person, it is not considered to be a predial servitude, unless it is acquired by a person as owner of an estate for himself, his heirs and assigns.” 49 RCC art. 753. LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 provides: “Doubt as to the existence, extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in favor of the servient estate.” 14 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 15 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 obligation. The terms of the act of agreement should furnish the principal element of the decision. 50 The Louisiana Third Circuit later noted that the characterization of a clause as either a predial servitude, personal servitude, or personal obligation is a question of law determined by the ordinary principles of contract interpretation set out above: When contracting parties do not specify the kind of right they intended to create, the question may arise whether they intended to create a predial servitude, a personal servitude, or merely a personal obligation. This question is resolved in Louisiana by applying Civil Code articles 754-58, the rules of interpretation used to ascertain the kinds of rights created by juridical acts lacking express designation. 51 In short, under the RCC, parties to a contract may remove all doubt by expressly declaring a predial servitude, and if they do not, the interpretation depends on the nature of the right granted or obligation required under the language of the contract. As the statutes set out above illustrate, the language of the contract must control the interpretation, and the parties would do well to make explicit their intention to create or not create a predial servitude. Case law bears out this focus on the language of the contract, both under the RCC and the current Civil Code. See, e.g., Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 591 (1932) 50 Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 305, 59 So. 403, 408 (1911) (on original hearing) (quoting Baudry-Lacontinerie, Traité de Droit Civil-Des Biens (2d ed. 1899), p. 539). The court also quoted a passage from the Commentary of M. Huc which explained why personal obligations, i.e., those not running with the land, are permitted. Id. 51 McLure v. Alexandria Golf & Country Club, Inc., 344 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (La. Ct. App. 1977). The McLure case, like the Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., came before the 1978 Code revisions and therefore unquestionably applies to the 1923 instrument at issue in this case. 15 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 (noting that language in a deed granting use of a driveway to “the purchaser, its successors and assigns” would have created a predial servitude); Buckhorn Ranch, L.L.C. v. Holt, 2008-1509 p. 2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/6/09), 10 So. 3d 367, 369, writ denied, 2009-1263 (La. 9/18/09), 17 So. 3d 977 (creating a predial servitude with the phrase “these servitudes shall be predial servitudes”). Nevertheless, both the RCC and the current Civil Code create a presumption in favor of predial servitudes when the right confers an advantage to an estate. 52 Louisiana courts have applied the presumption to infer the creation of predial servitudes in a number of instances. In Burgas v. Stoutz, for example, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that a provision granting the use of a driveway on lot B to the owners of lot A was “of real utility” to lot A because it gave lot A “more free space either for building or for flowers, or for a garden, and making the property more desirable and valuable,” and therefore created a predial servitude. 53 Even in some cases where language in an act of sale specifically names one of the parties to the act as the beneficiary of the servitude, Louisiana courts have found a predial servitude rather than a personal servitude. In McLure, 54 the Court of Appeal held that an act of sale that stated “the vendee herein agrees to allow the vendor an outlet to Highway No. 165 and over and across the property herein purchased” created a predial servitude despite the use of the term “vendor,” which could potentially have been interpreted to confer a right only to the seller. In Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Poydras Ctr. 52 RCC art. 756; LA. CIV. CODE art. 733. 53 174 La. at 592. 54 344 So.2d at 1089. 16 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 17 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 Associates, 55 the court found that the language “[s]aid Metropolitan Bank to have the right to use the aforesaid common alley” did not thwart the creation of a predial servitude because it “matters not that the language of the Act was couched in personal terms, for the right created was a real advantage to the dominant estate and the reservation of the right to build was likewise a real advantage to the servient estate.” 56 Thus, there is no question that although it is better for contracting parties to be explicit regarding their intention to create a predial or personal servitude, courts will not hesitate to apply the predial servitude presumption in appropriate circumstances.