Opinion ID: 6342251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “After” Theory

Text: Although it is conceded that Kollaritsch governs the so-called “after” claims, the majority summarily excises the “same-victim requirement” for student-on-student harassment occurring between high school students. (Maj. Op. 10-11.) Nothing in Kollaritsch even faintly suggests that harassment of third parties could satisfy the requirement of further post-actual-notice harassment in cases involving non-university students. Indeed, in explicating that requirement, Kollaritsch specifically relied on a case involving a middle school student harassed by a high school student. See Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 621-22. That is, Kollaritsch said: “Because the further harassment must be inflicted against the same victim, the plaintiff ‘cannot . . . premise the [further harassment] element of her Title IX claim on conduct [by the perpetrator] directed at third parties.’” Id. (quoting Pahssen v. Merrill Comm. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2012)). The district court recognized as much, concluding that “Kollaritsch was unambiguous that a claim cannot be premised on a school’s failure to address a risk of sexual harassment based on past incidents of harassment against students other than the plaintiff.” (PageID 446 (citing Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 621-22).) Kollaritsch can be read no other way. Nor does this court’s decision in Foster support a contrary result. To be sure, Foster recognized that “the deliberate-indifference inquiry operates differently [for adults enrolled in an off-site graduate school program] than it does for elementary-age ‘schoolchildren’ over whom Nos. 20-6225/6228 Doe, et al. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. Page 20 grade schools possess a unique degree of ‘supervision and control.’” Foster, 982 F.3d at 970 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 646). Significantly, however, both Foster and Davis involved further harassment of the same victim. In fact, Foster’s focus on the degree of control pertained only to the reasonableness of the university’s response to the reports of further harassment. See id. at 965-70; see also id. at 981-82 (Moore, J., dissenting). The continuum of control is represented by Foster on one end (mid-career executive graduate program held off-site at a hotel) and Davis on the other (“a fifth-grade boy [who] waged a months-long campaign” of sexual harassment of a classmate mostly in the classroom under the direct supervision of a teacher). A high school’s control over a harasser and the context—particularly given greater autonomy of students than elementary school, difficulty controlling all contexts where students interact, and the ubiquity of social media in and outside of school—falls somewhere between those extremes. While Davis instructs that the degree of control is relevant to judging the reasonableness of a school district’s responses, it does not speak to the same-victim requirement. The district court did not err in finding that Jane Doe could not establish her Title IX “after” claim under Kollaritsch. Finally, with respect to the “after” claim asserted by Sally Doe, the district court found no basis to reconsider its prior decision granting MNPS’s motion for summary judgment in light of Kollaritsch. (PageID 444.) The majority opinion reverses on the grounds that a reasonable jury could find that “MNPS opted to avoid the problem” of harassment that followed the circulation of the video “resulting in Sally Doe having no choice but homeschooling or enduring further misconduct” (Maj. Op. 10.) That conclusion, however, rests on a selective misreading of the testimony from Sally’s mother. It is true that Sally’s mother said she asked Assistant Principal Newman to do something about the perpetrator and Newman responded that it was a criminal matter that was “out of her hands.” (RE 83-3, pp. 67, 69.) But, even by Sally’s mother’s account, that was not the end of the meeting with Newman. In fact, Sally was called to the office and questioned about what happened and the SRO who was present at the meeting initiated a formal complaint to get the video taken down. (RE 83-3, pp. 72-74, 76.) Sally’s mother met with a police detective less than two weeks later, who confirmed that the video had been taken down. (RE 83-3, pp. 82-84.) Nos. 20-6225/6228 Doe, et al. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. Page 21 Also, when Sally’s mother reported in emails on April 11 and 12 that Sally was experiencing harassment about the video from other students, Newman’s response was to ask to meet to “figure out a plan to get [Sally] through the rest of the year.” (RE 83-7.) The district court specifically found the “assertion that the school did nothing . . . is simply factually untrue” and concluded that Newman’s response “cannot be treated as a total abdication of responsibility such that an inference of deliberate indifference would arise.” (No. 17-cv-1098, RE 101, p. 52.) The district court reiterated on remand that Newman treated the incident—including, in particular, the videotaping aspect—as serious and maintained ongoing communication with Sally Doe’s parents. The initial perpetrator in the Sally Doe incident, moreover, faced significant consequences for his actions, including criminal prosecution. . . . [And,] although MNPS made some errors in its handling of Sally Doe’s case, the facts were not sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the school was deliberately indifferent. (PageID 438.) We recognized in Foster that, “[i]n an appropriate case, there is no reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not identify a response as not [deliberately indifferent] as a matter of law.” Foster, 982 F.3d at 971 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 649). The district court did not err finding that was the case with respect to Sally Doe’s “after” claim. I respectfully dissent.