Opinion ID: 2177003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Jury Coercion

Text: Finally, appellant Nero contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a supplemental instruction to avoid the coercive effect of the revelation during a jury poll that the seventh juror did not agree with the verdict returned prematurely. He argues that the instruction as given by the court failed to inform the jury that each juror was free to adhere to a position in spite of the views of the majority and left the impression that the jury would be required to continue deliberations until unanimity was reached. We have recognized that there is some coercive element inherent in every jury poll. Crowder v. United States, 383 A.2d 336, 342 (D.C.1978). The trial court has a measure of discretion in assessing the impact of the revelation of a dissenter during polling and in developing remedial measures to avoid undue coercion. Id. at 341; Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697, 701 (D.C.1993). The trial court's decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion, and we find none here. Where jury coercion is claimed in this context, in assessing the argument we examine (1) the inherent coercive potential of the situation before the court, and (2) actions of the trial court in exacerbating, alleviating or neutralizing any coercive potential. Harris, supra, 622 A.2d at 701. We then view these facts together in order to assess the possibility of actual coercion on any juror or jurors. Id. at 701-702. The potential for coercion resulting from the poll in this case was minimal. This is so because it was the seventh juror who expressed disagreement with the verdict, and the positions of the remaining jurors were never revealed. [15] Thus, the seventh juror did not stand in isolation before the court. See Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 464, 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986) (coercive potential minimal where juror not isolated as sole dissenter and jury split not revealed); see also Crowder, supra, 383 A.2d at 343 (coercive potential greater where twelfth juror revealed as lone dissenter). Here, the court excused the jury immediately, instructing them first not to deliberate until the court instructed them further. After consulting with counsel, the court gave standard criminal jury instruction no. 2.93 before allowing the jury to continue deliberating. [16] The instruction informed them that any juror could change his or her vote until they were discharged. [17] Moreover, the instruction was neutral. It was neither necessary nor prudent for the court to intrude further with the requested instruction where the jury made no inquiry after the court gave the standard instruction. [18] The trial court acted well within its discretion in denying the requested instruction and in carefully alleviating any potential coercive effect inherent in the situation. See Harris, supra, 697 A.2d at 706-707. We are satisfied that the jury fairly and freely reached a unanimous verdict.