Opinion ID: 2081521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the mother's appeal

Text: Appellant B.P. argues that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Gilliard's testimony about the results of her mental examination. Specifically, she contends that the government did not set forth sufficient facts and allegations in its petition to support a finding of neglect under D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(C), and that, as a consequence, it was impermissible under D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4) (2001) to allow Dr. Gilliard to give testimony about B.P.'s mental capacity based on his examination of her. This argument has merit. D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(1) provides that the trial court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, for good cause shown, order the mental or physical examination of the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child whose ability to care for the child is at issue. However, D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4) states: The results of the mental or physical examination shall not be admissible evidence in the factfinding hearing unless the allegations contained in the petition set forth facts which support a petition pursuant to D.C.Code, section 16-2301(9)(C). [Emphasis added.] The petitions in this case did not meet this statutory standard. Dr. Gilliard testified about B.P.'s mental condition at the hearing, but the government's neglect petitions contained very little in the way of actual facts to support a subsection (9)(C) claim of neglect. The relevant portion of each child's neglect petition stated only that said child's parent/guardian/custodian is unable to discharge his/her responsibilities to and for the child because of physical or mental incapacity (to wit, substance abuse and mental illness). The petition contained no other factual allegations of mental illness or other incapacity with respect to the mother. On its face, therefore, the petition falls short of the requirements of section 16-2315(e)(4). The guardian ad litem (GAL) argues that the examination results were not privileged and that they were therefore properly admitted. He cites D.C.Code § 16-2359(e), which states in part that neither the husband/wife privilege nor the physician/client or mental health professional/client privilege shall be a ground for excluding evidence in any proceeding brought under this subchapter. This provision, however, refers only to proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship (title 16, chapter 23, subchapter III), and not to neglect proceedings  such as the one in this case  which are brought under subchapter I. We will assume that the GAL meant to cite former D.C.Code § 2-1355 (recodified in the 2001 edition as D.C.Code § 4-1321.05), which states the rule applicable to neglect proceedings: Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 14-306 and 14-307, neither the husband-wife privilege nor the physician-patient privilege shall be grounds for excluding evidence in any proceeding in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia concerning the welfare of a neglected child; provided, that a judge of the Family Division ... determines such privilege should be waived in the interest of justice. This statute is not dispositive here, however, because the mother did not assert the physician-patient privilege as a basis for exclusion of Dr. Gilliard's testimony; indeed, she admits that she expressly waived that privilege. Both the mother and the GAL cite In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230 (D.C.1990), but that case is not helpful. The issue in In re O.L. was whether the trial court erred in overruling the mother's claim of physician-patient privilege with respect to the results of a court-ordered mental examination in a neglect hearing when the petition alleged neglect as defined in subsections (9)(B) and (9)(C). We concluded that the former D.C.Code § 2-1355 did not automatically waive the mother's privilege; rather, it gave the trial court the power to determine when a waiver would be in the interest of justice, id. at 1233, and only after a specific finding that the privilege should be waived . . . . Id. at 1234. As we have observed, however, the mother here does not seek the protection of the physician-patient privilege. Instead, she invokes D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4), which specifies that court-ordered examination results may be admitted at a fact-finding hearing only when the petition contains factual allegations that would, if proved, support a subsection (C) finding. [18] This was not an issue in In re O.L., because the petition in that case did contain detailed allegations about the mother's mental illness and drug usage. See id. at 1231 (quoting from the neglect petition). Because the neglect petitions did not allege sufficient facts to meet the requirements of D.C.Code § 16-2315(e)(4), we hold that Dr. Gilliard's testimony about the results of the mother's mental evaluation was improperly admitted.
The mother next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of neglect under subsection (9)(B) because there was no evidence of record that [she] willfully failed to do what was required of her. This court has held, however, that under D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(B), the court only needs to find that the children are without the statutory requirements. In re B.C., 582 A.2d 1196, 1198 (D.C.1990) (emphasis in original). In other words, willfulness is not an element that needs to be proved in order to establish neglect. Neglect does not require a finding of parental fault, only the inability or unwillingness to provide proper care for the child. Therefore, such inability based on the parent's mental capacity may support an adjudication of dependency based on neglect. In re E.H., 718 A.2d at 169 (citation omitted). Thus no affirmative act of wrongdoing is necessary to support a finding of neglect under this subsection. On the contrary, the best interests of the children are of paramount importance in neglect proceedings, and the court must consider the entire mosaic in making its determination. In re O.L., 584 A.2d at 1233 (citation omitted). In particular, the court may take into account any history of, but also the reasons for, neglect  i.e., chronic indifference, carelessness, dereliction, inability to perform, etc. In re T.G., 684 A.2d 786, 788 (D.C.1996). N.P. testified that she, not her mother, took the initiative to protect herself, her mother, and her sister from her father's violent behavior. According to Dr. Hill, N.P. was forced to take on the role of parental child, meaning that she was often the caretaker in the family. Her role as surrogate parent clearly took a toll on her; Dr. Hill diagnosed her as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder of a chronic nature. Moreover, Dr. Washington testified that I.P., the younger daughter, had a dysfunctional and inappropriate relationship with her father, which her mother passively accepted. In addition, N.P.'s testimony established that I.P. witnessed domestic violence between her parents on numerous occasions. I.P. was also diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as depression and suicidal ideation. Nevertheless, the mother maintains that the government succeeded in showing only that she is an ill-educated mother, who is in an abusive marriage and who cannot prevent her husband from going on drunken tirades at least once a month. Beyond that, she claims, there was no evidence that she failed to do what was required of her as a parent. While it is perhaps true that none of the circumstances we have outlined were the result of the mother's willful failure to perform any sort of parental function, the government did not have to prove any such willful failure. It merely had show that the children were neglected, i.e., without proper parental care or control. D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(B). The facts we have summarized here were clearly sufficient to support such a finding.
The mother also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of neglect under subsection (9)(C) because, as a matter of law, evidence showing battered women's syndrome, low intelligence, and lack of Americanization was inadequate to support a finding of mental incapacity. The trial court based its (9)(C) finding on Dr. Gilliard's diagnosis of the mother as suffering from battered women's syndrome and severe dependency needs. The mother maintains, however, that mental incapacity should encompass only mental illness or retardation. She further asserts that the evidence cannot support a subsection (9)(C) finding because the mother's issues with the father have no bearing on her fitness as a parent or her capacity as a parent. We have found no case law to support the proposition that mental incapacity should be construed as referring only to a diagnosable mental illness. We have said, however, that the government is `required to demonstrate the existence of a nexus' between a parent's ... mental incapacity and an inability to provide proper parental care. In re T.T.C., 855 A.2d 1117, 1119 (D.C.2004) (quoting In re E.H., 718 A.2d at 169). In this case the government presented, as evidence of the mother's inability to provide proper parental care, Dr. Gilliard's testimony about her battered women's syndrome, her low level of intellectual functioning, and her dependency on her husband and children. According to Dr. Gilliard, B.P.'s dependent personality disorder rendered her unable to make decisions on her own. In addition, the battered women's syndrome prevented her from seeing herself in a positive parenting light. Consequently, Dr. Gilliard concluded that because of her mental condition, she was unable to carry out her role as a parent. The only other evidence of her mental capacity (or incapacity) was the father's assertion that his wife functioned at the level of a second-grader. Beyond that, there was no testimony linking the mother's various diagnoses with any deficient parenting decisions. We have already held, earlier in this opinion, that Dr. Gilliard's testimony was improperly admitted. For that reason, we conclude that there was no valid evidence upon which the trial court could find that the mother was mentally incapacitated to such an extent that she was unable to care for her children. In this situation, we would ordinarily remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, thereby enabling the government either to amend the neglect petition or to retry the case with additional evidence (if it has any). In this case, however, there is no need to do that, since we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the court's finding of neglect by the mother under subsection (9)(B). We therefore vacate the trial court's finding of neglect under subsection (9)(C), but leave the (9)(B) finding  and the judgment based upon it  undisturbed.
Finally, the mother maintains that the trial court's (B) and (C) findings were mutually exclusive and contradictory. This is because, as she understands it, the court found that she willfully failed to provide parental care to her children (under (9)(B)), [19] but also that she was incapable of providing such parental care because of her mental incapacity (under (9)(C)). Thus, she argues, the two findings contradict each other. This argument is without merit. We have, on many occasions, upheld (B) and (C) findings as to the same parent. See, e.g., In re E.H., 718 A.2d at 170-171. Contrary to what B.P. suggests, the two sections are independent of one another; indeed, the trial court's findings in this case serve as an example of their independence. The court's finding of neglect under subsection (9)(B) was based on the condition of the children, not on the mother's acts or omissions. This was entirely unrelated to the (9)(C) finding that the mother was unable to discharge ... her responsibilities to and for the child[ren] because of ... mental incapacity, which focused not on the children's condition but on the mother's fitness as a parent and her ability to provide care. It was altogether proper for the court to make concurrent findings of neglect under these two different subsections, and the trial court committed no error in doing so.