Opinion ID: 4208683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Base Offense Level Enhancement

Text: Hayes’ first argument on appeal is that the district court erred in finding that the AK‐47ʹs serial number had been “altered or obliterated” pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) of the Guidelines. “We review de novo the district court’s legal interpretation of sentencing guidelines and review factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Harris, 718 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). As an initial matter, Hayes contends that the court improp‐ erly accepted as true, without requesting additional evidence, the fact that the gun’s serial number was covered by paint. 4 No. 16‐3752 There is simply no merit to this argument because, although challenging the applicability of the enhancement, Hayes had conceded the underlying factual basis multiple times. He signed the plea agreement, in which he admitted the AK‐47ʹs “serial number had been covered by a paint‐like substance that prevented the serial number from being visible.” The PSR also contained the same sentence, and at the sentencing hearing, Hayes expressly told the court that he had no disputes with the PSR’s factual findings. Finally, his own sentencing memoran‐ dum stated that he “concedes [the AK‐47] appeared to be covered in a paint‐like substance, which covered the serial number.” The district court did not err in accepting this undisputed fact as set forth in the plea agreement, the PSR, and Hayes’ own memorandum. We turn, then, to the issue of whether § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)’s use of “altered or obliterated” contemplates a serial number that has been covered by a substance that prevents it from being visible. Neither the Guidelines nor their Application Notes provide definitions of “altered or obliterated” or any other helpful guidance. We have, however, previously addressed the parameters of this language, albeit in an unpublished opinion. In United States v. Salinas, we held that “a firearm’s serial number is ‘altered or obliterated’ for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) if it has been ‘materially changed in a way that makes accurate information less accessible.’” 462 F. App’x 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Perez, 585 F.3d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 2009)). The serial number at issue in that case had been filed off, but ultimately was recovered by the Milwaukee Crime Lab. Id. However, because the filing made it “unread‐ able by the naked eye,” we found that it was “altered or No. 16‐3752 5 obliterated” under the Guidelines. The result in that case was supported by similar holdings from three of our sister circuits, each of which emphasized that the relevant inquiry is whether there has been a material change to a serial number “that makes accurate information less accessible.” See United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2005); Perez, 585 F.3d at 884; United States v. Jones, 643 F.3d 257, 258–59 (8th Cir. 2011). On the record before us, the extent of what we know about the serial number is that it was not visible because it was covered with a “paint‐like substance,” and that forensic specialists had to use a “chemical solvent” to uncover it. Based on that limited factual detail, we conclude that the AK‐47ʹs serial number was materially changed in a way that made the accurate information less accessible. Therefore, the § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement should apply. In reaching that conclusion, we reject Hayes’ interpretation of the “altered or obliterated” language, which would limit its application to cases where the serial number has been com‐ pletely destroyed or where one digit has been changed to another. Instead, we agree with the Ninth Circuit’s assessment that “[i]rrespective of how ‘obliterated’ is construed, ‘altered’ surely requires a lesser degree of defacement.” Carter, 421 F.3d at 912. Hayes argues that a stricter construction is demanded by reading “altered or obliterated” as a single phrase, which, according to Hayes, indicates the Sentencing Commission’s intent to limit the enhancement’s application to the situations he proposes. That analysis, however, ignores the presence of the word “or,” which demonstrates that either term, individu‐ ally, can serve as a basis for application of the enhancement. Id. at 911 (noting that the language is “presented in the disjunc‐ 6 No. 16‐3752 tive” and holding that “even if we were to construe ‘obliter‐ ated’ as Carter urges … the sentence enhancement properly applies so long as the serial number is merely ‘altered’”). Hayes’ proposed construction also belies the underlying purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). In Carter, the Ninth Circuit explained that the legislative purpose of the enhancement was to discourage the use of untraceable weaponry. 421 F.3d at 914 (citing United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 2001)). It clarified, however, that “[t]his purpose is advanced not only by punishing those who possess untraceable firearms, but also by punishing those who possess firearms that are more difficult, though not impossible, to trace … .” Id. Accordingly, any material change that makes the serial number less accessi‐ ble, thereby making the firearm harder to trace, fits § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)’s intended definition of “altered or obliter‐ ated.” Id. at 915–16. Covering a firearm’s serial number with a “paint‐like substance,” the removal of which requires a chemical solvent, surely makes that firearm more difficult to trace. The AK‐47ʹs serial number, therefore, was “altered or obliterated” for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B).