Opinion ID: 1791040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: grave desecration against elmwood.

Text: As a preliminary matter, we consider the assignment of error that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment. It was clearly shown that Elmwood had no notice and ARCP 55 makes it within the discretion of the trial court to set aside an entry of default. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's action. In Hogan v. Woodward Iron Co., 263 Ala. 513, 83 So.2d 248, this court held that the cause of action for damage to a grave accrues to the surviving spouse and if there is no surviving spouse then to the next of kin in the order of their relation to the deceased; and that all parties occupying the same degree of kin should join in any such suit. The reason is that it would subject the defendant to numerous suits by different parties for the same cause of action which should be settled in one suit. Appellant, while testifying, admitted that the deceased, Lora B. Gleason, whose grave was alleged to have been desecrated, had a living sister, and that at the time of the filing of this suit, twelve other living persons were the same degree of kin to the deceased, Lora B. Gleason, and yet appellant was the only plaintiff. There was no error in the trial court's ruling on this question. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment which was filed on March 3 and entered on March 7, 1975, because the ten-day notice provided for in ARCP 56(c) was not given. Counsel for appellant was present in court at the hearing on March 7 and did not object or call attention, by way of oral or written objection, to the ten-day limitation. The failure to raise the question constitutes a waiver. Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197 (CA 7th); Feng Yeat Chow v. Shaughnessy, 151 F.Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y.). See Committee Comments ARCP 1, concerning our adoption of the construction of other courts to these rules.