Opinion ID: 2853523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Custody Modification Motions

Text: In June 2012 Flynn resigned from his job after nine years as a journeyman telecommunications technician with the Matanuska Telephone Association (MTA). He worked for Chugach Power in Anchorage until December 2012, then in April 2013 he entered an apprenticeship program to become an inside wireman electrician. The program takes about five years to complete. It began with two months of classroom work; then, from June through October 2013, Flynn was employed on the North Slope. This temporary job required that he be out of town for four or five weeks at a time. Because the custody order granted Hope a right of first refusal, which she exercised, her custody time increased while Flynn was away working. In August 2013 Hope moved for a permanent modification of physical custody and requested an evidentiary hearing. She asserted that the 50/50 custody schedule provided by the 2010 order was no longer realistic given Flynn’s apprenticeship and his job on the North Slope, that this was a substantial change in circumstances, and 1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the privacy of the family. -2- 7047 that the custody order should be modified to “accurately reflect the parties’ current arrangement.”2 In September 2013 Flynn filed his own motion to modify physical custody, though he requested only a temporary change. He alleged that he was having financial and logistical difficulties transporting the children to two different schools with different start and end times. He proposed that Hope have physical custody of the children during the school week, that he have three weekends of visitation per month, and that this schedule be in place only during the 2013/14 school year, reverting to the alternatingweek schedule in June 2014. Hope agreed with Flynn’s proposal that she have custody during the school year, but she opposed his request that the modification be only temporary, and she disagreed with the way he defined the weekends.3 The superior court ruled on the parties’ modification motions in October 2013. It denied Hope’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that neither “the change in [Flynn’s] work schedule” nor “the fact that [Flynn] ha[d] changed jobs itself” was a substantial change in circumstances. But the court granted Flynn’s motion for a temporary modification, finding that “the difficulties of driving the children to school . . . is a change in circumstances.” The essential elements of the temporary order were that Hope would have physical custody of the children during the school week and Flynn would have custody three weekends out of every four. The court 2 See AS 25.20.110(a) (stating that custody award “may be modified if the court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child”). 3 Flynn proposed that he have three weekends of visitation a month; Hope proposed that he have two and a half (the half weekend ending at noon on Saturday). Flynn proposed that his weekend custody last until Monday morning; Hope proposed that it end Sunday evening. -3- 7047 ordered that this temporary arrangement last until June 1, 2014, and that a hearing would be set in the late spring or early summer “if necessary” to consider whether it would be appropriate to return to the week-on week-off schedule at that time. At a status hearing in April 2014, Flynn said that he would accept a conversion of the temporary order into a permanent one if it would mean that he could “avoid further custody litigation.” At that hearing and again at one in July, Hope agreed that the temporary order could be made permanent. The final child custody modification order, entered in August 2014, thus provides that Hope will have custody during the week and Flynn will have custody “three out of every four weekends, from Friday after school until Monday morning.” B. Modification Of Child Support Order And Imputed Income The October 2013 temporary custody order required that Flynn file a proposed child support order. Flynn’s proposed order and supporting affidavit gave his total 2013 income as approximately $44,000. This was a drop in income from that on which the preexisting child support order was based; that 2011 order showed that he earned $59,660 annually while working for MTA. Hope asked the court to impute income to Flynn based on his potential earnings.4 She contended that Flynn had become voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed when he changed careers. Her proposal, for $58,000 in imputed income, was based on Flynn’s earnings averaged over his last five years with MTA. She also contended that the order modifying child support should accurately reflect the superior court’s October 2013 order that she have “primary physical custody.”5 4 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(4). 5 Civil Rule 90.3 provides different calculations for child support obligations depending on whether one parent has “primary physical custody” or the parents have (continued...) -4- 7047 Flynn responded that his change in employment did not constitute voluntary underemployment. He also disputed Hope’s assertion that the superior court had granted her “primary physical custody” in the October 2013 temporary custody order, because her custody time and his were 68% and 32% respectively, which by definition under Civil Rule 90.3 is “shared physical custody.”6 The superior court referred the child support issues to a master, who held an evidentiary hearing in February 2014. Both parties testified. Following the hearing the master issued a written report and order in which he concluded that Flynn was “voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed” and that he should be imputed an annual income “at his previous total income of $59,660.” The master reasoned that Flynn had “no compelling reason” to leave MTA, that it was uncertain whether he could ever obtain employment that paid as well or better than his job at MTA had, and that it was speculative whether his career move would ever benefit the children. The master observed that the apprenticeship program caused Flynn to spend less time with the children in the short term and reduced his ability to pay child support. But the master also agreed with Flynn’s characterization of the parties’ 68/32 custody arrangement as “shared custody” for purposes of the child support calculation. Both parties filed objections to the master’s report. Flynn challenged the master’s conclusion that his career change was unreasonable. Hope again objected to basing a child support calculation on shared custody, insisting that she had primary 5 (...continued) “shared, divided, [or] hybrid physical custody.” See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)-(b). 6 The rule defines “shared physical custody” as “children resid[ing] with that parent for a period specified in writing in the custody order of at least 30, but no more than 70, percent of the year, regardless of the status of legal custody.” Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(f)(1). -5- 7047 physical custody because of the wording of the October 2013 temporary order. She contended that if the superior court “in fact modified the parties[’] custody arrangement from 50/50 shared to 68/32[] shared, it did so despite [her] opposition . . . , and absent an evidentiary hearing.” Having reviewed the pleadings and listened to the audio record of the evidentiary hearing before the master, the superior court issued its order in July 2014. Disagreeing with the master, it concluded that Flynn’s decision to change jobs, though voluntary, was “not unreasonable under the totality of circumstances.” Further, in response to Hope’s argument that she had been awarded primary physical custody, the superior court clarified that it had “in fact ordered 68/32 custody . . . and that it inaccurately used the word ‘primary’ in identifying that custody in its October 30, 2013 order.”7 It determined that the master correctly characterized the physical custody arrangement as “shared custody” for purposes of child support. Finally, in response to Hope’s contention that the superior court should have held an evidentiary hearing before modifying custody, the superior court observed that not only was the initial modification temporary, but it was consistent with the parties’ agreement, differing only on the specifics of Flynn’s weekend visitation. It explained that Hope waived an evidentiary hearing both because she did not ask for one on visitation, the only contested issue, and because she agreed on the record that the temporary order be made permanent without further proceedings. The superior court accordingly calculated child support on a 68/32 shared custody basis, using incomes of approximately $44,000 and $27,000 for Flynn and Hope respectively. 7 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(f)(2) (“A parent has primary physical custody . . . if the children reside with the other parent for a period specified in the custody order of less than 30 percent of the year.”). -6- 7047 On appeal Hope argues that the superior court erred by (1) denying her motion for modification of physical custody without an evidentiary hearing; (2) granting Flynn’s motion for temporary modification of physical custody, then converting it to a final order without an evidentiary hearing; and (3) refusing to impute income to Flynn for purposes of calculating child support. Flynn did not participate in this appeal.