Opinion ID: 1403389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of a Hearing

Text: Acknowledging this court's decision on this issue in Burchette v. Sex Offender Screening & Risk Assessment Committee, 374 Ark. 467, 288 S.W.3d 614 (2008), Parkman argues that he was unconstitutionally denied a hearing before the Committee. Parkman urges this court to overrule Burchette and to remand the matter to the Committee for a hearing. The Committee responds that because this court has previously held that a sex offender is not entitled to any additional face-to-face hearing before the Committee during the administrative-review process, and because Parkman offers no new arguments on the issue, the Burchette decision controls this issue. In considering any constitutional challenge to a statute, this court begins with the axiom that every act carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. See Arkansas Dep't of Correction v. Bailey, 368 Ark. 518, 247 S.W.3d 851 (2007). This presumption places the burden of proof on the party challenging the legislation to prove its unconstitutionality, and any doubts about the statute will be resolved in favor of the statute's constitutionality, if it is possible to do so. See id. Because statutes are presumed to be framed in accordance with the Constitution, they should not be held invalid for repugnance thereto unless such conflict is clear and unmistakable. See id. As an initial matter, Parkman urges this court to overrule our recent decision in Burchette, supra . In the absence of a compelling reason to do so, we decline to do so. We have held that: [i]t is necessary, as a matter of public policy, to uphold prior decisions unless great injury or injustice would result. The policy behind stare decisis is to lend predictability and stability to the law. In matters of practice, adherence by a court to its own decisions is necessary and proper for the regularity and uniformity of practice, and that litigants may know with certainty the rules by which they must be governed in the conducting of their cases. Precedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable. Cochran v. Bentley, 369 Ark. 159, 174, 251 S.W.3d 253, 265 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Here, Parkman maintains that he could have established the following, had a hearing during the Committee's administrative review been held: In addition to explaining to the Committee, under oath, that he has learned from his mistakes and has not committed any sexual transgression in many years, he would have established through his testimony and other evidencethat he has suffered a disabling stroke and will have extremely limited mobility and physical ability. [3] In Burchette, supra , Burchette similarly argued, based on due-process considerations, that he was entitled to a hearing before the Committee before it could affirm its initial assessment of him. Making many of the same arguments and relying on some of the same case law as Parkman, Burchette appeared to want to give his unsworn version of events, relating to the accusations for which he did not plead and was not charged, in person to [the Committee] so that [the Committee could] assess his credibility face-to-face. 374 Ark. at 473, 288 S.W.3d at 619. This court rejected Burchette's arguments, observing that Burchette had an in-person opportunity to give his version of the events during his assessment interview and that he had a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the matter in his interview. We held that Burchette had a meaningful opportunity to be heard under the facts of the case because of the procedure, which included a face-to-face risk-assessment interview and the Committee review, and, therefore, his procedural due-process rights were not violated by denying him a second face-to-face interview before the Committee. As in Burchette , a review of the instant record reveals that Parkman, too, was interviewed during the assessment process on January 11, 2006, and was given the opportunity to provide his version of the offenses of which he was accused. Indeed, the record further reflects that Parkman was given a supplemental interview on October 3, 2006. Accordingly, because Parkman was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard during the assessment, he was not unconstitutionally denied a hearing before the Committee. While Parkman avers that had a hearing been held he would have been able to present evidence regarding his stroke that occurred on January 15, 2007, that argument is of no moment. Arkansas Code Annotated § 12-12-922(b)(3) (Sp. Supp. 2006), provides: (3)(A) The basis of the request for administrative review shall be clearly stated and any documentary evidence attached. (B) The basis for administrative review is: (i) The rules and procedures were not properly followed in reaching a decision on the risk level of the sex offender; (ii) Documents or information not available at the time of assessment have a bearing on the risk that the sex offender poses to the community; or (iii) The assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. While the information regarding Parkman's stroke might arguably fall within subsection (3)(B)(ii), a review of the record reveals that it was not included in either Parkman's initial request for administrative review, dated November 21, 2006, nor his supplemental request, dated January 8, 2007. Obviously, information regarding the stroke of January 15, 2007, could not have been included where Parkman's stroke occurred after the requests for administrative review were made. Nonetheless, the Committee could not review information that was not placed before it. Because Parkman failed to raise this argument to the Committee in either his request for administrative review or his amended request for administrative review, we are precluded from considering it on appeal. [4] See Franklin v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 319 Ark. 468, 892 S.W.2d 262 (1995).