Opinion ID: 2507905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Rejection of Five Proposed Instructions.

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to give five of the 10 penalty phase instructions requested by defendant constitutes reversible error and deprived him of due process of law, equal protection, and a reliable determination of penalty in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. We address each of the instructions in turn.
The trial court refused to give defendant's proposed instruction No. 10, which stated: In determining circumstances in aggravation, you should not double count any circumstances of the crime which are also special circumstances. Instead, the court gave CALJIC No. 8.85 to the jury, stating that in determining penalty, the jury should consider, (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any circumstances found to be true. Defendant contends rejection of the proposed instruction was erroneous. We already have determined that CALJIC No. 8.85 does not imply that the jury may double count evidence. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 805, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Even assuming that the judge should have given defendant's proposed instruction, his failure to do so was harmless. (See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768-769, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Not only did the prosecutor argue this issue in a non-misleading manner, [15] but as a matter of common sense, [the jury] was unlikely to believe it should `weigh' each special circumstance twice on the penalty `scale.' ( Id. at p. 769, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Thus, the judge did not commit reversible error by failing to give the defendant's proposed instruction.
Defendant's proposed instruction No. 8, which the judge rejected, stated: In determining whether life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death, is the appropriate penalty, you may not consider the deterrent or non-deterrent effect of the death penalty. Defendant argues that because only statutory aggravating factors may be considered by the jury during their penalty phase deliberation, and deterrence is not a statutory aggravating factor, then the absence of an instruction informing the jury that they may not consider deterrence constitutes reversible error. We disagree. The trial court characterized this instruction as unnecessary. Deterrence was not an issue at trial, and the jury was presented neither with evidence nor argument by either side on the issue of the deterrent or nondeterrent value of the death penalty. The trial court properly refused the instruction ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 765, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1066, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388), and its absence was non-prejudicial. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559, judg. vacated and cause remanded (1992) 506 U.S. 802, 113 S.Ct. 32, 121 L.Ed.2d 5, reaffd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.)
Defendant's proposed instruction No. 2, which the trial court rejected, stated: The factors listed in Sections A, B and C, which are: the circumstances of the crime, the presence or absence of prior criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or violence, and the presence or absence of any felony conviction are the only factors that you may consider to be aggravating factors. You are not allowed to take into account any other facts or circumstances as weighing in favor of imposing the penalty of death on the defendant. Defendant's argument fails. The trial court is not constitutionally required to include an instruction identifying which factors are to be considered in aggravation. ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 898, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1266, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) We characterized a very similar argument as display[ing] a fundamental misunderstanding of the differing constitutional requirements for the narrowing and sentence-selection aspects of a state's capital sentencing law. ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 898, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15, citing People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1266, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) Thus, the trial judge properly declined defendant's instruction.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give proposed instruction No. 1. This instruction enumerated various factors to be included in mitigation, including childhood abuse suffered by defendant and defendant's lack of emotional maturity. [16] Defendant argues that under federal law, he is entitled at the penalty phase to clear instructions which not only do not preclude consideration of mitigating factors, [citation], but which also `guid[e] and focu[s] the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender ...' [citation]. ( Spivey v. Zant (5th Cir.1981) 661 F.2d 464, 471, quoting Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262, 274, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929.) He is incorrect. Such a pinpoint instruction, which asks the jury to draw inferences favorable to defendant regarding particular items of evidence, properly belongs not in instructions, but in the arguments of counsel to the jury. ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049.) Defendant also argues the trial court erred in refusing to give proposed instruction No. 5, which would have instructed the jury in part that [m]itigating factors are potentially unlimited. [17] The trial court correctly rejected this instruction as duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85(k). [18] (See People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805 n. 12, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 889-890, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940.) This court has interpreted section 190.3 factor (k), which CALJIC No. 8.85(k) incorporates, as `allow[ing] the jury to consider a virtually unlimited range of mitigating circumstances.' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1007, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171, quoting McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1192, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The jury was thus not reasonably likely to have [been] misled ... into believing that its consideration of mitigating circumstances somehow was limited. ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.)