Opinion ID: 2632884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Error in Admitting Results of Electrophoretic Testing

Text: At the preliminary hearing, and again at trial, the defense moved to exclude the testimony of crime laboratory (lab) criminalist John Johnson, who testified regarding his extensive qualifications and expertise in the electrophoretic method of blood testing. Here, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the results of the electrophoretic testing of the stains on the tennis shoes found in his garage. Specifically, he claims the prosecutor failed to satisfy the three prongs of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 ( Kelly) , for the admissibility of scientific evidence, namely, (1) the relevant scientific community's general acceptance of the technique or testing procedure, (2) an expert properly qualified to testify regarding such reliability, and (3) use of correct scientific procedures in the case before us. Defendant contends the erroneous admission of the results of the electrophoretic testing violated state evidentiary provisions (Evid.Code, §§ 350, 352), as well as his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and to a fair and reliable capital trial. (U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const, art I, §§ 7,15, & 17.) In July 1992, Johnson analyzed the stains on the tennis shoes. The left shoe bore a single bloodstain, while the right shoe had blood spattered on top and on its lace. Johnson's tests led him to conclude that all these stains could have been Pearl's blood, but not Hubert's or defendant's. At trial, Johnson testified that about 1.7 percent of the general population of San Bernardino County (including Pearl) would have an enzyme pattern consistent with that found on the right shoe, and that 9.8 percent of the population (and Pearl) would have a pattern consistent with the stain on the left shoe. Johnson explained that, in order to test the stains on the right shoe, he combined some of the scattered stains on it. He did so because each stain was an extremely limited sample and because the stains were close together, which indicated that they came from a single source. His testing disclosed that the combined stains did come from a single source, and he noted that his testing would have revealed the existence of separate sources had that been the case. Johnson left enough stains on the right shoe to allow further analysis if needed. Johnson also explained that, after testing the right shoe stains and combinations of stains, he compiled the results into a single blood profile, treating them as coming from the same single source. We discuss the three prongs of Kelly below. 1. General acceptanceKelly's first prong requires proof that the scientific technique is a generally accepted procedure in the relevant scientific community. Although defendant acknowledges that electrophoretic testing of dried bloodstains is generally accepted (see, e.g., People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 215, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302), he argues that the particular methodology used here with regard to the right shoe, namely, treating the scattered right shoe stains as coming from a single source, and combining the results of several different tests of those stains into a single blood profile, was a novel procedure unsupported by proof of general scientific acceptance. Johnson's assumption, that the blood spatters on the right shoe came from a single source, seems little more than application of common sense. (See People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1017-1018, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [blood spatter testimony not subject to Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240, rule because analytical methods used produce no aura of scientific infallibility].) But, in any event, as the trial court ruled, electrophoresis is generally accepted in the scientific community and, once a scientific procedure such as electrophoretic testing of bloodstains has become generally accepted, mere variations in technique or procedure go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. (See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 812-813, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865 ( Cooper) ). Although the foregoing rule would not have prevented defendant from showing at trial that Johnson's variations amounted to a material scientific distinction or material failure to use correct, scientifically accepted procedures (see People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 54, 80, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525), defendant made no such showing, and Johnson testified at length, justifying his procedures. Indeed, Johnson testified, and the trial court found, that if the stains on the right shoe had come from two different sources, Johnson's testing would have revealed that fact. Moreover, as the Attorney General observes, in addition to Johnson's availability for defense cross-examination, the prosecution did a split on the blood remaining on the right shoe after the compilation stain had been consumed and the defense was given splits of that blood evidence to perform independent testing. Yet the defense offered no tests of its own to rebut Johnson's conclusions. Similarly, defendant's observations that Johnson did not document all his work, took some inaccurate notes, did not conduct blind testing, deviated from the lab protocol in some respects, and failed to respond to a coworker's doubts about the accuracy of a test of blood on a carpet are all matters going to weight, not admissibility. ( People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 913, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940 ( Farmer) ; Cooper, supra, 53.Cal.3d at pp. 812-813, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) As Farmer explained, Kelly tests the fundamental validity of a new scientific methodology, not the degree of professionalism with which it is applied. ( Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 913, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940.) Defendant has failed to convince us that the particular technique Johnson employed constitutes a material scientific distinction from the general electrophoretic methodology discussed in our prior published decisions. ( People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 54, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525.) For all the reasons stated, we conclude that defendant's reliance on Kelly's first prong (demonstrating general acceptance in the scientific community) to contend the test results on the tennis shoes were inadmissible is misplaced. 2. Johnson's qualificationsKelly's second prong requires that the testifying expert be properly qualified to testify regarding the reliability of the scientific technique used. Defendant first complains that Johnson was linked to law enforcement, and that he lacked the scientific background and impartiality to be qualified to establish the reliability of his compilation technique, whereby he treated all the right shoe stains as coming from a single source. But, as we have seen, the scientific community already had generally accepted the electrophoretic testing of dried bloodstains, and Johnson's variations in technique went to weight, not admissibility. ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 812-813, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Johnson was fully qualified to perform electrophoretic testing and to relate the results. He had been a criminalist with the San Bernardino Sheriffs crime lab for 10 years by the time he testified, had taken several courses on serological testing and blood spatters, had written his master's thesis on the subject of electrophoresis, and read journals and attended study groups to keep current on new developments. By the time of trial, he had qualified as an electrophoretic testing expert in approximately seven cases. We find defendant's attack on Johnson's qualifications meritless. 3. Johnson's testing methods Defendant next argues that, under Kelly's third prong, Johnson's testing methods were not shown to be correct scientific procedures. (See People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 81-83, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525; People v. Pizarro (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 530, 622-633, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 21.) Much of this argument mirrors defendant's previously discussed criticisms regarding the supposed lack of general acceptance of Johnson's methodology. Defendant repeats his meritless assertion that the prosecution failed to prove Johnson's compilation technique was one that other scientists would have accepted. Defendant also contends that the prosecution failed to show that the scientific community drafted or approved the protocol the crime lab recommended and the slightly modified one Johnson actually used. In addition, defendant criticizes Johnson's failures (1) to have another lab criminalist provide a second, confirming reading of all his test results, (2) to perform blind tests to eliminate possible tester bias, and (3) to document more accurately his testing procedures. As indicated above, these matters were appropriately presented to the trier of fact to consider in weighing the accuracy of Johnson's conclusions, but none of them affected the admissibility of the test results themselves. ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 812-813, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865; Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 913, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940.) Defendant next focuses on Johnson's procedures in calculating the test results' statistical significance. As noted, Johnson testified that about 1.7 percent of San Bernardino County's general population (including Pearl Hails) would have an enzyme pattern consistent with that found on the right shoe; 9.8 percent of the population (and Pearl) would have an enzyme pattern consistent with the stain on the left shoe. Without exploring the matter further, defendant questions whether the prosecution carried its burden of proving that Johnson's choice of databases and method of calculating population frequency were scientifically correct. Defendant acknowledges that the trial court directed Johnson to calculate the statistical frequency using Riverside County and San Bernardino County statistics. Ultimately only San Bernardino County statistics were presented, presumably because the crime was committed in that county. Defendant, who objected to the statistical evidence only under Evidence Code section 352 (evidence more prejudicial than probative), now complains that the record fails to show why San Bernardino County was the proper database, and also whether Johnson's calculations were statistically correct. Significantly, at trial defendant did not, and does ,not now, point to evidence contradicting Johnson's conclusions. Defendant simply questions the sufficiency of Johnson's explanation regarding his methodology, which he more appropriately should have done at trial. The Attorney General observes that our cases allow this kind of statistical bloodgroup evidence. (See People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 241, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 215, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) Here, the trial court ruled that questions regarding the proper database went to weight, not admissibility. After a hearing in which Johnson explained how he calculated the general population frequency results, the court found his procedures were correct. Defendant gives us no reason to disagree, Accordingly, we remain convinced that the procedures utilized in the case at hand complied with the electrophoretic methodology that already has passed muster under the central first prong of the Kelly test. ( People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 81, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525.) We conclude that the court did not err in admitting the evidence of electrophoretic testing of the bloodstains on either of the tennis shoes found in defendant's garage. Accordingly, we need not reach the question whether any error in admitting this evidence prejudiced the defense. We note that defendant claims [t]he purported bloodstains and Johnson's interpretation thereof was the only physical evidence linking appellant to the killings of the Hailses. We simply observe that, assuming arguendo the test results from the compilation of stains from the right tennis shoe were erroneously admitted into evidence under Kelly, other evidence convincingly demonstrated defendant's guilt, including blood consistent with Pearl's found on the left tennis shoe, the blood on defendant's patio that was consistent with Hubert's blood but not that of the defendant, defendant's being seen with the Hailses a few days before their bodies were discovered, the missing employee notebook coupled with defendant's fingerprint on the crumpled and seemingly discarded ledger sheet containing defendant's work record and starting time for July 9, 1992, defendant's unexplained act of driving Hubert's truck, which contained a jewelry box similar to that missing from the Hailses' home, and defendant's sale of the Hailses' missing stereo speakers.