Opinion ID: 836026
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Act

Text: A charge under DR 1-102(A)(2) first requires this court to determine what `criminal act' the accused committed. In re Allen, 326 Or. 107, 120-21, 949 P.2d 710 (1997). The Bar suggests that the accused's false statements constituted the crimes of perjury under ORS 162.065 and false swearing under ORS 162.075, and the crimes of making a false oath or statement in a bankruptcy proceeding under 18 USC section 152, perjury under 18 USC section 1621, and making a false declaration ancillary to a court proceeding under 18 USC section 1623. Although the Oregon statutes referred to above do not limit their application expressly to any certain proceeding, the United States Supreme Court has held that giving false testimony in a proceeding authorized by federal law is a crime against the United States and that state courts therefore cannot assume jurisdiction. Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 215, 14 S.Ct. 513, 38 L.Ed. 415 (1894). Because the accused made his misrepresentations in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, we will not decide whether his conduct constituted a crime under Oregon law. [14] Turning to the federal statutes that the Bar cites, all essentially require proof of a false, material statement in a covered proceeding. 18 USC §§ 1621, 152, 1623. The primary difference among the statutes, for our purposes here, is the requisite criminal intent. Perjury under 18 USC section 1621 requires proof of a willfully made false, material statement. See Smith v. United States, 392 F.2d 169, 170 (5th Cir.1968) (willfulness is essential element of perjury under 18 USC section 1621). Similarly, the crime of making a false oath or statement in a bankruptcy proceeding under 18 USC section 152 requires proof of a specific fraudulent intent. See United States v. Mathies, 350 F.2d 963, 967 (3rd Cir.1965) (essential element of 18 USC section 152 is that false oath be made with fraudulent intent). By contrast, the crime of making a false declaration under 18 USC section 1623 requires proof of only a knowingly made, false, material statement. See United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198, 1207 (7th Cir.1980) (so stating). After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the Bar has met the quantum of proof required under 18 USC sections 1621 or 152. We turn to an examination of the remaining criminal statute, 18 USC section 1623. As noted, under 18 USC section 1623, it is a crime for any person, under oath, in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court of the United States, knowingly to make a false, material declaration. [15] The parties agree that the accused was under oath at the time of the conduct in question and that the examination qualifies as an ancillary proceeding. Cf. U.S. v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1993) (sworn civil deposition is ancillary proceeding for purposes of 18 USC section 1623). We already have concluded, in the context of DR 1-102(A)(3), that the accused knowingly made several false statements during the course of the examination. The remaining question is whether the accused's false statements were material, for purposes of 18 USC section 1623. Materiality has been interpreted rather broadly under 18 USC section 1623. A statement is material if it is related to any proper matter of inquiry. United States v. Ostertag, 671 F.2d 262, 264 (8th Cir.1982). However, a statement cannot be considered material unless it is capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it. United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1134-35 (5th Cir.1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of a deposition or similar examination, the Ninth Circuit generally has concluded that a false declaration is material under 18 USC section 1623 if a truthful answer is relevant to any subsidiary issue under consideration and the false declaration had a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision-making body to which it was addressed. See U.S. v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting out that standard under 18 USC section 1621, for purposes of civil deposition), overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Keys, 95 F.3d 874 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Rahman, Nos. 91-10364, 91-10365, 91-10376, 91-10416, 1992 WL 36372 at  (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1992) (applying Clark to deposition for purposes of 18 USC section 1623). Here, the trial panel concluded that the accused's statements were not material to the examination. We disagree. As the Bar notes, the scope of an FRBP 2004 examination is broad and may relate to any matter which may affect the administration of the debtor's estate. FRBP 2004(b). The accused's false statements responded to questions that were directed at determining: (1) whether Westview's proof of claim, which the accused had filed only two months before, was subject to challenge upon grounds of illegality; and (2) whether Westview had filed a duplicative proof of claim. Those matters were within the scope of the examination and were capable of influencing the decision-making process, because they had the potential of preventing the trustee's lawyers from ascertaining the validity of Westview's claim against the plaintiff-debtors' bankruptcy estates. Consequently, we conclude that the accused's knowing false statements were material to the examination. The accused argues that, even if he is found knowingly to have made false, material declarations, he is protected by the recantation defense set out in 18 USC section 1623(d), which provides, in part: Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section   . According to the accused, under that provision, he did not commit a criminal act, because he corrected his testimony within the time allowed by law. The accused's argument fails, however, because 18 USC section 1623(d) expressly requires that the accused have admit[ted] such declaration[s] to be false at the time when he corrected his testimony. See also U.S. v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir.1988) (recantation requires unequivocal repudiation of prior testimony). Here, the accused consistently has maintained that he did not knowingly make false statements. That is not a recantation. [16] We therefore conclude that the accused engaged in a criminal act as defined by 18 USC section 1623.