Opinion ID: 1451220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: incidents in the presence of the jury

Text: To support its result, the majority alleges that most of the vituperous exchanges were not made in the jury's presence. The record, however, does not support that conclusion. In fact, the animosity was brought to the attention of the jury early on the first day of trial. During voir dire the judge sustained an objection to a defense question regarding where a prospective juror parked when shopping at the mall where the alleged crime was committed. The judge called a sidebar to discuss the objection and told counsel that he would allow time later to place the discussion on the record. Defense counsel then completed his questioning of that juror. After the next venireperson had been examined by the prosecutor, the defense attorney requested an opportunity to recess and make his record regarding the earlier ruling. The judge declined. Defense counsel then indicated that he had no questions. He also declined to question the remaining three venirepersons, stating that he had an objection which he wished to put on the record. The judge then decided to include the jury and the following remarks were made: THE COURT: Well I think the jury ought to know what is going on. There was an objection and I ruled against Mr. Smith on a point and he seems to think I was wrong so we have a disagreement. MR. SMITH: No, I want it on the record. THE COURT: You will get in on the record. Mr. Smith, you will get it on the record when the jurors are dismissed. You don't need it before then because it isn't going to affect the situation at all. All right? Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 1, 1991), at 103. On the morning of the second day defense counsel resumed his opening statement with a remark which blatantly violated the judge's ruling regarding the victim's criminal history. This followed a particularly unpleasant exchange in chambers which ended by cross accusations of judge and attorney bashing. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 2, 1991), at 36. MR. SMITH: The court has directed me not to go into this man's  MR. LONG: Objection. THE COURT: You don't even have to talk about it[;] finish your opening statement. MR. SMITH: But I think the testimony is going to show the man is not really lily white as the prosecutor would have you believe. Let's go back to the scene at the mall. The testimony from the mall security and from anybody  MR. LONG: Objection; personal opinions are improper. THE COURT: They are improper. This is merely an opening statement and that is all. MR. SMITH: Do you want to make it for me? I have a witness, Mel Mocabee, who is going to testify the lot is lit up with 1,000 watt bulbs. Do you not want to hear that either? THE COURT: You are mischaracterizing what I said. You can outline what the evidence will show, but no personal opinions. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 2, 1991), at 38. Later, following defense counsel's cross examination of the victim, the prosecutor moved to reopen his direct examination and the following remarks were made: THE COURT: Do you want to argue about that? MR. SMITH: At this point, no, only as to pants. I'm not going to have him up here talking to the guy about what he just went over his testimony about. MR. LONG: I object. THE COURT: What he will be permitted to ask is what I rule he has a right to ask. I'm going to permit him to re-open. He can bring in anything that is relevant to the issues in this case and if you wish to attack that evidence, it is your prerogative and duty to do so. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 2, 1991), at 122. At a point later in the victim's testimony the prosecutor was permitted to refresh the victim's memory with the report prepared by police regarding the incident. Defense counsel objected and the following discussion ensued: THE COURT: Is the police report consistent with what this young man testified? MR. SMITH: I don't like that, whether or not it is consistent. THE COURT: I don't care whether you like it or not. Is it consistent? Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 2, 1991), at 127. The impact of the conflict between counsel and judge on the jury was recognized implicitly by both the defense attorney and the judge. In his closing argument, defense counsel made a speech about the adversarial nature of the legal system. He then added, Because of the nature of that, you may see at times that I get short with the judge or say things like that which I can see smiles on your faces or he is short with me or the prosecutor or whatever. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 4, 1991), at 91. In commenting on defense counsel's closing remarks after the jury was excused, the judge said, I think Mr. Smith, your effort to ingratiate yourself, in a [ sic ] the sense of the word, I guess, with the jury, in view of what I gather, you perceived the jurors or what you thought the jurors perceived in view of your conduct, didn't sell very well. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 4, 1991), at 119. The prejudice resulting from these exchanges in the jury's presence requires reversal under the reasoning of both State v. Levy, 8 Wn.2d 630, 113 P.2d 306 (1941) and United States v. Altamirano, 633 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.1980).