Opinion ID: 2185144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Administrative Action

Text: In general, a special use is a type of property use that is expressly permitted within a zoning district by the controlling zoning ordinance so long as the use meets certain criteria or conditions. The purpose of special uses is to provide for those uses that are either necessary or generally appropriate for a community but may require special regulation because of unique or unusual impacts associated with them. S. Connor, Zoning, in Municipal Law & Practice § 13.17 (Ill. Inst, for Cont. Legal Educ. 2000). A church may be an appropriate special use because, depending upon its size and location, it may create traffic or parking problems within the neighborhood in which it is located. For example, the number of parking spaces needed by a church may vary considerably depending upon the availability of parking spaces in the neighborhood at the time the church holds services. Thus, although a church might be considered a desirable and appropriate use within a zoning district, the municipality may classify it as a special use and may require, for example, that parking problems be resolved before granting a special use permit to a property owner that would allow the owner to use the property as a church. See generally 3 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's Law of Zoning & Planning, ch. 41 (4th ed. 1992); 3 K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, ch. 21 (4th ed. 1996). In Illinois, municipal special uses are authorized by section 11-13-1.1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1 (West 1994)). Special uses must be clearly distinguished from use variances. [A] variance is `authority extended to a property owner to use his property in a manner forbidden by the zoning enactment,' generally upon a showing of hardship. 3 K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 20.03, at 416 (4th ed. 1996), quoting Mitchell Land Co. v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 140 Conn. 527, 532, 102 A.2d 316, 319 (1953). A special use, on the other hand, `allows [a property owner] to put his property to a use the enactment expressly permits.' 3 K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 20.03, at 416 (4th ed. 1996), quoting Mitchell Land Co. v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 140 Conn. 527, 532-33, 102 A.2d 316, 319 (1953). In sharp contrast to a variance, the inclusion of a special use within a zoning ordinance `is tantamount to a legislative finding that the permitted use is in harmony with the general zoning plan and will not adversely affect the neighborhood.' 3 K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 21.13, at 126 (4th ed. 1999 Supp.), quoting Twin County Recycling Corp. v. Yevoli, 90 N.Y.2d 1000, 1001, 665 N.Y.S.2d 627, 688 N.E.2d 501, 502 (1997). A special exception use is a `permitted use' when allowed under a special permit. Thus, there has been a local legislative determination that the use, as such, is neither inconsistent with the public's health, safety, morals or general welfare, nor out of harmony with the town's general zoning plan. 3 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's Law of Zoning & Planning § 41.08, at 41-34 (4th ed. 1992); see also 83 Am.Jur.2d Zoning & Planning § 974, at 814 (1992) (Where a zoning ordinance authorizes a business as a special use, such authorization is tantamont [ sic ] to a legislative conclusion that the use is appropriate in the district). Thus, in the instant case, the City zoning ordinance's authorization of churches as a special use along West Lincoln Highway constitutes a legislative finding that churches, as such, are compatible with the surrounding property uses in that area. In the case at bar, the city council's reason for denying Living Word's application for a special use permit is not in dispute. Stated simply, the city council denied Living Word's application because it believed that all noncommercial uses were incompatible uses along West Lincoln Highway. The council based this belief on the City's then recently adopted comprehensive development plan. [2] This plan, adopted by the City approximately one month before Living Word submitted its application for a special use permit, addresses many areas of concern for the City, including demographic and economic trends occurring within the City. One portion of the plan is devoted to land use and highlights the West Lincoln Highway corridor as an area that should be improved as an auto commercial area oriented to a regional clientele. Relying on this stated goal, the city council concluded that to grant a special use permit for any noncommercial use, including churches, along West Lincoln Highway would frustrate the plan to develop that area as a strong commercial corridor. For this reason, the council denied Living Word's application. It must be emphasized that the city council's objection to Living Word's application for a special use permit did not center on any attribute of Living Word that is unique to this particular church or its facilities. The council did not conclude, for example, that the church will impede the orderly development of surrounding properties or lower their value because the church building is unusually large, or because the church's congregation generates traffic problems along West Lincoln Highway. Instead, Living Word's application was denied because the council believed that any noncommercial use of property located in the West Lincoln Highway corridor would have a negative effect on the commercial development of that corridor and, therefore, that all noncommercial uses should be completely excluded. It is clear that the city council's rationale for denying Living Word's special use permit application is at odds with the legislative intent expressed in the City's zoning ordinance. According to the zoning ordinance, and in contrast to the council's explanation for denying Living Word's application, churches are not a per se incompatible use along Lincoln Highway. Quite the contrary, the City zoning ordinance's inclusion of churches as a special use in the West Lincoln Highway corridor is equivalent to a legislative finding that [such a] use is one that is in harmony with the other uses permitted in the district. 3 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's Law of Zoning & Planning § 41.05, at 41-21 through 41-22 (4th ed. 1992). In light of the above, the question arises as to whether the city council, in denying Living Word's application for a special use permit, could legitimately set the legislative intent expressed in the zoning ordinance to one side and, instead, rely upon the developmental goals expressed in the comprehensive plan as the basis for its decision. For the following reasons, we believe the answer to this question is no. In the instant case, if the decision of the city council to deny Living Word's application for a special use permit is viewed as an administrative act, then that decision cannot be upheld on the basis proffered by the city council, i.e., that all noncommercial uses are incompatible in the West Lincoln Highway corridor. The City's zoning ordinance states that churches, as such, are a compatible use in the West Lincoln Highway corridor. As noted previously, acting administratively, the city council must adhere to the regulations and intent of the City's zoning ordinance. See K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 21.10, at 720 (4th ed. 1996) (As the legislature is acting in an administrative capacity, it must follow the zoning regulations). Thus, if we were to uphold the council's decision, we would be inappropriately permitting the council to suspend the expressed intent of the ordinance. E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's Law of Zoning & Planning § 41.08, at 41-35 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa v. Grosberg, 30 A.D.2d 887, 291 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1968)). The principle that administrative zoning agencies must adhere to the intent of the zoning ordinance was noted in Columbus Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 25 Ill.2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722 (1962). In Columbus Park, the Chicago board of zoning appeals denied an application for a special use permit to a church that had purchased two store buildings located in a commercial block. The board based its decision, in part, on the conclusion that the church would break    the continuity of the line of small businesses located on the block. Columbus Park, 25 Ill.2d at 73, 182 N.E.2d 722. On appeal, the principal claim at issue was whether the zoning board of appeals' denial of the application violated the church's constitutional rights, and the case was decided primarily on the free exercise clause of the first amendment. [3] However, the opinion also noted that the reasoning offered by the board for denying the permit application, i.e., that the church would disrupt business continuity, was not consistent with the intent of the ordinance. Columbus Park, 25 Ill.2d at 73, 182 N.E.2d 722. Any church located in a district zoned for business use would break the business continuity of surrounding commercial properties. By including churches as special uses, the Chicago zoning ordinance clearly intended to allow some churches in the relevant business districts. Because the rationale offered by the board, if upheld, would result in the exclusion of all churches from those districts, that rationale was inconsistent with the intent of the ordinance. Because special uses, as such, are considered compatible with other uses in the zoning district in which they are included, it is generally held that an application for a special use permit may not be denied on the ground that the use is not in harmony with the surrounding neighborhood. 3 K. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 21.13, at 743 (4th ed. 1996). Instead, a special use permit `must be denied when it is determined from the facts and circumstances that the grant of the requested special exception use would result in an adverse effect upon adjoining and surrounding properties unique and different from the adverse effect that would otherwise result from the development of such a special exception use located anywhere within the zone. Thus,    the appropriate standard to be used in determining whether a requested special exception use would have an adverse effect and, therefore, should be denied is whether there are facts and circumstances that show that the particular use proposed at the particular location proposed would have any adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such a special exception use irrespective of its location within the zone.' (Emphasis in original.) 3 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's Law of Zoning & Planning § 41.08, at 41-36 (4th ed. 1992), quoting People's Counsel v. Mangione, 85 Md.App. 738, 749-50, 584 A.2d 1318, 1323 (1991). There is nothing of record in this case which would indicate that Living Word's use of its property as a church would have any adverse effects on surrounding properties above and beyond those that would inherently be associated with any church located in the West Lincoln Highway corridor. Accordingly, in the case at bar, if the city council's denial of the permit application is considered an administrative decision, it cannot be upheld. The existence of the comprehensive plan, and the council's reliance upon that plan, does not alter this conclusion. The special use criteria in the City's zoning ordinance do not include conformance with the comprehensive plan as a requirement that must be met before a special use permit may be granted. See E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's Law of Zoning & Planning § 41.08, at 41-37 (4th ed. 1992) (Zoning ordinances may expressly provide as a standard for issuance of a special permit that the proposed use at the particular location be compatible with or not negatively impact the local comprehensive zoning plan). Moreover, the City's zoning ordinance is law; the comprehensive plan is not. As our Municipal Code explains, [an official comprehensive] plan shall be advisory and in and of itself shall not be construed to regulate or control the use of private property in any way, except as to such part thereof as has been implemented by ordinances duly enacted by the corporate authorities. 65 ILCS 5/11-12-6 (West 1994); see also Chase v. City of Minneapolis, 401 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. App.1987) (incompatibility with comprehensive plan insufficient basis for denying conditional use permit); Amoco Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 395 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn.App.1986) (same). Acting administratively, the city council is bound by the City's zoning ordinance, not the comprehensive plan. Thus, the city council's reliance on the comprehensive plan could not justify the decision to deny Living Word's application for a special use permit.