Opinion ID: 1275843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: city council's action

Text: On the other hand, it is necessary to discuss the validity of the appellee's appointment by city council upon recommendation of the mayor, as a full-time officer at hourly wages of three dollars. [12] As discussed above, the exclusive procedure for appointment required by W.Va. Code, 8-14-15 [1969], was not followed in this case. Consistent with the statutory and case law principle of strict compliance, it follows that the appellee's purported appointment as a full-time patrolman by city council was void ab initio. Furthermore, being void ab initio, the purported appointment could properly be resisted later by the city's officials making the void appointment, in addition to being subject to a sound challenge by third parties, such as other candidates for the position. The commission and the circuit court applied the concept of estoppel against the city. It is clear, however, that a municipality acting in a governmental, rather than a proprietary, capacity is not subject to the law of equitable estoppel and that, therefore, estoppel cannot be based on unauthorized acts of municipal authorities acting in a governmental capacity. These principles are set forth, for example, in the leading case of Cawley v. Board of Trustees, 138 W.Va. 571, 76 S.E.2d 683 (1953). In Cawley, a mandamus proceeding was brought by Mr. Cawley, a fireman, to require the payment of pension benefits for a certain permanent disability which he incurred while he allegedly was a member of the fire department of the City of Beckley, West Virginia. He was 41 years old when he applied for appointment as a member of such fire department, a fact known by city officials. At that time the statute [13] provided that the maximum age for an applicant to take the qualifying examination for appointment as a member of a paid fire department was 35 years of age. This Court affirmed the lower court's sustaining of the respondents' demurrer. We held that [a] person being older than the maximum age permitted by a civil service law is not eligible for appointment to a municipal fire department. [citation omitted] In making appointments to municipal fire departments, there must be compliance with valid Civil Service provisions. [citation omitted] 138 W.Va. at 579, 76 S.E.2d at 688. We also rejected the notion of a de facto appointment: Though the relator ... performed the duties of fireman [for over five years], he was not, as a matter of law, a member of the fire department of the City. Id. This Court therefore held that the alleged appointment by the then mayor and the subsequent confirmation by council were ineffective to constitute the relator a member of the fire department of the City. The action of the Mayor and the [City] Council were beyond their powers and therefore ineffective, as being contrary to the plain and clear mandate of the statute granting such power. 138 W.Va. at 579-80, 76 S.E.2d at 688. We noted that the statute in that case, as in the instant case, prohibited appointments `in any manner or by any means other than those prescribed in this article.' 138 W.Va. at 579, 76 S.E.2d at 687. Finally, this Court rejected the relator's contentions that the city officials had waived their right to object to his over-age status by appointing him and that by their appointing and confirming him and accepting his payments into the pension fund the city officials were estopped to deny his legal appointment and to deny his pension benefits. Estoppel cannot be based on an unauthorized act of municipal authorities. 138 W.Va. at 581, 76 S.E.2d at 688. A municipality acting in a governmental capacity is not subject to the law of equitable estoppel. [citation omitted] ... [I]n organizing, maintaining and paying a municipal fire department, the municipality is acting in a governmental capacity. [citations omitted] 138 W.Va. at 583-84, 76 S.E.2d at 690. This Court summarized the reasons for refusing to apply equitable estoppel to municipal governmental functions: To permit such estoppel on the basis of mistake or ill advised action by a former municipal authority would hinder and hamper governmental functions; and may be contrary to the public interest in many cases. 138 W.Va. at 584, 76 S.E.2d at 690. Another particularly relevant precedent decided by this Court is State ex rel. Wells v. City of Charleston, 92 W.Va. 611, 115 S.E. 576 (1922), syl. pt. 2 to which reads as follows: [M]unicipal authorities are not estopped by the passage of such an ordinance [one which is void to the extent of its conflict with the statute] from contesting its validity when brought in question in a suit or proceeding by one claiming the benefit thereof and seeking to enforce his supposed right thereunder. Similarly, the council and mayor of the city in the case now before us acted in a manner inconsistent with the Police Civil Service Act, the paramount law, and are not estopped from asserting the invalidity of the appellee's void appointment. In the very recent case of W.Va. Public Employees Insurance Board v. Blue Cross Hospital Service Inc., ___ W.Va. ___, 328 S.E.2d 356 (1985), we held in syllabus point 1: A state or one of its political subdivisions is not bound by the legally unauthorized acts of its officers and all persons must take note of the legal limitations upon their power and authority. Cunningham v. County Court of Wood County, 148 W.Va. 303, 310, 134 S.E.2d 725, 729 (1964). The Supreme Court of the United States has also recently addressed the issue of equitable estoppel against the government. For example, in Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984), the court stated: When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant. [footnote omitted] ... .... [T]hose who deal with the government are expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of government agents contrary to the law. [footnote omitted] 467 U.S. at ___, ___, 104 S.Ct. at 2224, 2226, 81 L.Ed.2d at 52, 54. In fairness, we note that the majority in Heckler v. Community Health Services, in dicta, refused to adopt a broad rule that the government may never be estopped. The two concurring justices would apply estoppel against the government only in a rather narrow range of circumstances and criticized the majority for leaving the impression of hospitality toward claims of estoppel against the government which the court's opinions do not warrant. A final authority on this point is County of York v. King's Villa, Inc., 226 Va. 447, 309 S.E.2d 332 (1983), wherein the Supreme Court of Virginia held: [W]here a contract executed by an agent of the government is ultra vires it is void ab initio and of no legal effect; thus no performance by either party thereto can give the unlawful contract validity or serve as the basis of any right of action upon it and the doctrine of estoppel has no application. 226 Va. at 452, 309 S.E.2d at 335.