Opinion ID: 2377073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: In a Case for Slander of Title, Attorney Fees May Form the Basis of a Damages Award if the Fees Are Reasonably Necessary to Remedy the Slander of Title

Text: ¶ 79 In slander of title cases, attorney fees may be recovered as special damages if the fees are reasonably necessary to remedy the disparagement of the plaintiff's title. [58] A claim for slander of title requires proof of four elements: (1) publication of a slanderous statement, (2) the statement must be false, (3) the statement must be made with malice, and (4) the statement must cause special damages to the plaintiff. [59] Given the jury's conclusion that Marvin slandered Branson's title, our attempt to reconcile the jury verdict begins by accepting that the first three of these elements were satisfied. [60] But we cannot simply accept that the jury found the fourth element, because its award of $0 in damages renders its answer to this question potentially inconsistent. Thus, in our attempt to reconcile this potential inconsistency we must determine whether the jury's award of $0 damages can reasonably be harmonized with its implicit finding that Marvin's published statements about Branson's title caused special damages to Branson. ¶ 80 Our cases establish that special damages in the context of a slander of title claim can take at least two forms. For instance, if a slanderous statement forces a party to sell land at a reduced price, the reduction in value is a realized loss that can form the basis of a damages award. [61] Alternatively, a landowner may take legal action to remedy the effects of the slanderous statement. [62] To the extent that this legal action is reasonably necessary to remove clouds from the party's title, the party may recover those attorney fees. [63] ¶ 81 We acknowledge that in some cases we have suggested that certain restrictions might limit the ability of plaintiffs to recover in various circumstances surrounding the alleged slander of title. For instance, where a party's claim for harm to the value of his property has been based on appraisal value instead of sale of the land at a reduced price, we have denied recovery because the damages had not yet been realized. [64] Similarly, in a case where plaintiffs took no action to clear the clouds from their title, we reversed an award of attorney fees on the basis that the fees were gratuitous in the absence of proof of any other damages. [65] ¶ 82 But these restrictions are not relevant to the case at hand. Here, Branson does not seek to recover merely for the decrease in the market value of his land. Nor does he seek an attorney fees award based on actions wholly disconnected from remedying the disparagement of his title. Rather, Branson seeks attorney fees in an amount that corresponds to the cost of bringing a legal action that led to the defects in his title being cured. We have upheld an award of attorney fees as special damages under these circumstances in the past, [66] and neither party has attempted to persuade us that our prior consideration of this issue was in error. As we have done in the past, we pause here to note that this approach aligns with the Restatement approach to this issue, which permits compensation in a slander of title action for the expense of measures reasonably necessary to counteract the [clouds on the title], including litigation to remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value by disparagement. [67] ¶ 83 Returning to our standard of review, we note that we are presented with essentially two viable interpretations. On one hand, the jury may have found that Branson successfully proved that his title was harmlessly slandered. Then, having concluded that Branson had successfully vindicated his rights, the jury may have intended to award Branson attorney fees as a reward. Such a verdict would be impermissible, and were this the only reasonable construction of the verdict, we would be bound to uphold the trial court's grant of JNOV. ¶ 84 The other viable interpretation is that the jury found that Branson successfully proved all elements of his slander of title claim, and that the slander was harmless except for the attorney fees Branson incurred in removing the clouds from his title. Therefore, although the jury found $0 in damages other than attorney fees, it awarded Branson his fees using the space on the special verdict form apparently reserved for that issue. ¶ 85 Given the choice of two competing reasonable alternatives, we are bound to adopt the construction of the verdict that does not nullify the jury's answers. Therefore, we conclude that the verdict should be construed as awarding Branson his attorney fees as damages in his claim for slander of title. We also find important the fact that the jury instructions explicitly stated that attorney fees could be awarded as damages in slander of title actions and that, at least with regard to some claims, attorney fees would be calculated postverdict by the court. This suggests that the jury believed it was supposed to decide whether attorney fees had been incurred without attempting to affirmatively establish the amount of attorney fees. ¶ 86 Because attorney fees may be awarded in some circumstances as special damages in cases of slander of title, the jury verdict in this case can be reconciled. It is reasonable to construe the judgment as indicating that Branson proved slander of title and that the only damages the jury found he incurred were the damages necessary to clear the clouds from his title. This construction renders the jury's answers on the special verdict form consistent. Because the verdict can be read harmoniously, the trial court erred when it concluded that the jury failed to follow the instructions on the special verdict form. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's grant of JNOV with regard to Branson's slander of title claim. We remand so that the trial court may determine the amount of attorney fees that Branson reasonably incurred in remedying the slander of his title. [68]