Opinion ID: 1441366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Official Records

Text: Johnson also contends that the trial judge erred in excluding notices from the Consumer Product Safety Commission which were published in the Federal Register. The notices invited public comment with respect to a petition whose purpose was to decrease injuries from scalding by reducing the maximum permissible temperatures of water provided by water heaters, and to alter as well the cautionary labeling. Johnson wanted to admit the notices for two reasons: (1) to prove the appellees' knowledge that hot water above 130 degrees Fahrenheit can easily scald small children; and (2) to establish a standard of care that hot water heaters should not be set above 130 degrees Fahrenheit. It is settled that an official public record can be admitted where properly authenticated. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 44(a); In re D.M.C., 503 A.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C.1986). See also FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Such evidence is admissible where relevant, and subject to a balancing of the probative value of the evidence against any unfair prejudicial effect on the factfinder. ( William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1100 (D.C.1996). In this instance the petition to change existing regulations was denied: The Commission has decided to deny this petition, in part, because of the voluntary efforts to lower factor pre-set temperatures on water heaters and to provide cautionary labeling addressing the scald hazard. In addition, the Commission believes that the maximum setting needed to reduce most scald injuries (125-130 deg.F; as indicated above, the time for a second degree burn to occur at a faucet temperature of 130 deg.F is 12 seconds); might not provide an adequate hot water supply to some households. 44 Fed.Reg. 11, 573 (emphasis added). Although appellant would have preferred a regulation akin to the temperature controls espoused in the petition before the CPSC, she cannot persuasively argue that the notices of proposed change established a standard of care. Quite simply, this is because no such regulation was enacted. Indeed the existing District regulations are consistent with federal standards. [2] In order for these notices to have been used to show a violation of a standard of care in a negligence action, the trial judge must determine that the publication actually stated the existing standard of care. See McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 581 (D.C.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 63, 139 L.Ed.2d 26 (1997) (citing Lewis v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 463 A.2d 666, 674 (D.C.1983)); Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir.1994). Clearly the proffered notices failed in this respect. In balancing the probative value of the notices against the possible prejudicial effect of misuse of such evidence by a jury, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. Appellees stipulated, for jury consideration, that it was aware that prolonged exposure to tap water above 125 degrees can cause scalding injuries. Further, an answer to an interrogatory, wherein Robertshaw admitted knowing that the young and the elderly were particularly vulnerable to hot tap water scalds, was read into evidence. We perceive no error stemming from this challenge.