Opinion ID: 2315948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Overall Voir Dire

Text: The purpose of voir dire is the creation of an impartial jury. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 409-10, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988) ( Williams II); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 29, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987). The test for determining if one may serve as a juror in capital cases is whether the prospective juror's opinions, be they for or against the death penalty, would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 151, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980)); see also State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 255, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (quoting same). `The quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.' State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 293, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 851, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841, 851 (1985)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed. 2d 803 (1989). The examination of each juror's views on capital punishment, however, must be sufficiently probing to assure compliance with the governing legal standards and to expose potential bias. State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 155, 590 A. 2d 624 (1991); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 354, 558 A. 2d 1259 (1989). Determining whether a voir dire is adequate requires an examination of the entire record. It is a fact-sensitive task. As this Court has previously recognized, the voir dire process frequently takes on a rhythm of its own. State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 244, 593 A. 2d 266, 276 (1991); State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 447, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991). Each judge conducts voir dire in his or her own way. The creation of an impartial jury, through the process of voir dire, follows no particular tests and is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula. United States v. Woods, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46, 57 S.Ct. 177, 185, 81 L.Ed. 78, 88 (1936); see also Mu'Min v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1917, 114 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that [t]here is no single way to voir dire a juror and that he would not limit the trial judge's wide discretion to determine the appropriate form and content of voir dire questioning). Because an assessment of an individual juror's impartiality rests on a close personal examination, this Court has accorded trial courts great deference in conducting voir dire. State v. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 275, 548 A. 2d 939; see also State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160, 203 A. 2d 1 (1964) (The trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in determining the qualifications of jurors.    [I]ts exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1965). In State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 402 A. 2d 203 (1979), we set forth the rationale underlying that rule of deference: Decisions concerning the potential bias of prospective jurors are primarily subjective in nature. They require at bottom a judgment concerning the juror's credibility as he responds to questions designed to detect whether he is able to sit as a fair and impartial trier of fact. Consequently, such evaluations are necessarily dependent upon an observation of the juror's demeanor during the course of voir dire  observations which an appellate court is precluded from making.         Although a juror's professions of impartiality will not always insulate him from excusal for cause, see, e.g., State v. Jackson, supra ; State v. Deatore, [70 N.J. 100, 358 A. 2d 163 (1976)], they will be accorded a great deal of weight, see, e.g., State v. Grillo, [16 N.J. 103, 106 A. 2d 294 (1954)]; State v. Jefferson, 131 N.J.L. 70, 72 [34 A. 2d 881] (E & A 1943). Inasmuch as the trial judge observed the venireman's demeanor, he was in a position to accurately assess the sincerity and credibility of such statements, and we should therefore pay due deference to his evaluation. [ Id. 80 N.J. at 63, 64, 402 A. 2d 203.] In State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 35-37, 524 A. 2d 130, and State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256-57, 524 A. 2d 188, this Court reaffirmed its special deference to the trial court in reviewing voir dire. A sensitive weighing and appraisal of a juror's entire response must be made by the trial court in its duty to resolve the question of whether the juror has shown bias or prejudgment. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 257, 524 A. 2d 188. Except in the rarest of circumstances, appellate judges should follow the prudent course of deferring to the court that was in the position to make such a close, personal inspection. State v. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 411, 550 A. 2d 1172; see also Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 852-53 (noting that deference should be given to trial court decisions because there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression regarding a prospective juror despite a lack of clarity in the printed record); State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 357, 558 A. 2d 1259 (noting sound measure of discretion given to trial judges). We measure the adequacy of the trial court's inspection of prospective jurors by its character and tone, not by any one question of the court or one response of a venireperson. State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 397, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988); State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256-57, 524 A. 2d 188. Unlike the majority, after reading this unanimated record, I find that the voir dire as a whole was sufficiently probing to weed out any prospective jurors whose ability to decide defendant's correct sentence was impaired. The voir dire spanned three days. The trial court took numerous precautions in conducting the voir dire. All prospective jurors completed a questionnaire. The questionnaire contained general questions concerning the juror's age, marital status, age and sex of children, occupation, physical condition, familiarity with defendant, the prospective witnesses, and the lawyers in the case, whether the juror or a member of his or her family or a close friend was employed in law enforcement, had ever been charged with a criminal violation or had ever been the victim of a crime. Each potential juror also was asked whether he or she had heard of a murder case involving defendant from any source and whether they had discussed defendant with anyone. Finally, each juror was requested to disclose any personal bias or prejudice that they believed would disqualify them from serving as a juror. As each prospective juror was questioned individually, the court reviewed his or her questionnaire and inquired about any answer that raised a concern. For example, if the prospective juror was a young woman or had young women family members, the court would ask whether that fact would create a bias against a defendant convicted of murdering a young woman. Invariably the court also asked each venireperson if he or she had any preconceived bias or prejudice against psychiatric testimony. The trial court's general instruction to the potential jurors set the tenor of the voir dire early in the proceeding. The point [is] that you have to evaluate yourselves, the judge will explain the case to you, introduce the various people connected with it and you have to listen and say would I then able to be fair and impartial and objective on that case? Could I be open minded? Could I listen to all the witnesses and listen to the judge and then call it fairly? And if you think yes, fine, sit there, but if someplace along the line you get the idea that gee, maybe I oughtn't be a juror on this case for whatever reason,    [w]ell, that's okay. Everybody is entitled to their opinion ... [but] the juror should not just forget about the law when they are sitting deciding the case. The jurors take an oath to observe the law, to follow the law. But if you ever got yourself in a situation like that where you are a prospective juror and you have strong feelings, okay. You are entitled to the feelings, but you should not sit as a juror on that particular case. That's all we try to do in the jury selection.         I want to assure you that there are no things such as the right answers or the wrong answers to the questions that we put, either the written questions or the oral questions. All we want are honest answers. You know we're not trying to measure you to somebody's standards. Try to give us an honest evaluation of yourself and that's all we ask. By the same token, if for some reason you should kind of fudge an answer on the questionnaire or fail to answer a question you really ought to answer, that would not be the right thing, we need that openness, frank response, because otherwise if you conceal something, it could result in a terrible miscarriage of justice which nobody wants. [Emphasis added.] That instruction went beyond dispelling the notion that there were any right answers. See State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 246, 593 A. 2d at 277. It impressed on jurors that they should report anything possibly compromising their duty or oath directly to the judge, regardless of when it occurred. On the morning of closing arguments, the following occurred: (The following was recorded in chambers.) THE COURT: You have asked to talk with me, we will just make a record of it so we know what's going on? A JUROR: Right. This weekend, I found out something I didn't know. THE COURT: Yes? THE JUROR: My husband's brother who I have never met, never seen, who I don't consider family, he's in Trenton State Prison, which I wasn't aware of. THE COURT: Would that affect you as a juror? THE JUROR: Well, no, I was thinking, I don't want to cause a mistrial. THE COURT: Well, don't worry about that. But you didn't know this man at all, your husband's brother, you never met him? THE JUROR: No. THE COURT: So all you have learned over the weekend is information he's in Trenton State Prison? THE JUROR: Right, he called Friday night. THE COURT: When he called, did he have a specific message for your husband? THE JUROR: No. THE COURT: And your husband didn't say anything to you more than that? THE JUROR: More than how are you doing? THE COURT: What did your husband say to you about his telephone conversation with his brother? THE JUROR: Nothing, he told me Tommy had called. THE COURT: But how did you discover somebody was his brother then? THE JUROR: He told me, I knew his brother was in jail, I didn't know where or why or anything, and  THE COURT: Okay. Don't get nervous, I understand where you are, that's all. You knew your husband had a brother who was kind of a ne-er-do-well, criminal of some sort in jail someplace? THE JUROR: Yes. THE COURT: Up until the weekend you didn't know where. You tell me the only additional bit of information you got was  where was it, Trenton State Prison? THE JUROR: Right. THE COURT: Now, I'm asking you, bottom line, is that going to affect you somehow, that knowledge now, affect you somehow in deciding this case? THE JUROR: No, I don't see why it would. THE COURT: You are the only one who can tell me? THE JUROR: No, doesn't make any difference to me. THE COURT: Okay. Do me a favor, go back to the jury room. Don't mention anything to the jurors about what we have talked about here. Sit tight, I'll be talking to the lawyers. If they have a problem I'll let you know. But thank you very much for letting me know. (The juror leaves the chambers) THE COURT: On the record, with the counsel in chambers here. Mrs. Robinson indicated to the Court officers this morning that she wanted to speak with me and I brought her in here with the reporter and I asked her what she wanted [to] talk about and she said this: That she didn't know up until Friday night that her husband's brother was an inmate in the State prison. She did know before Friday that her husband had a brother who was kind of a ne'er-do-well and was in jail someplace. She has never met the brother, never talked to the brother, but Friday night the brother called her and said, Hi, how are you? And the husband indicated to her and all he indicated to her was That's my brother calling from the State prison. I asked her on the record, Do you think that would somehow affect your judgment here as a juror? And she said, No, I don't know why it would. I said, Okay. Go back in the jury room, I'll talk to the lawyers and if they have a problem we'll be in touch with you further. That's where we are. MR. DIAMOND: I have no problems with that. MR. FAGEN: Well, I sure would have liked to ask her more questions. THE COURT: I'll bring her in if you want more questions. MR. FAGEN: Well I may give it some thought? THE COURT: Okay, I'm not rushing. THE COURT: I have asked Mr. Fagen whether he would like to question the juror further and he said  MR. FAGEN: No. THE COURT: And I understand it's satisfactory to both sides to allow her to continue? MR. DIAMOND: Yes. Alternate Juror Robinson's concerns and behavior exhibit a juror educated to the solemnity of her task and recognizing the on-going need to assure not only fairness and impartiality but the appearance of fairness and impartiality. Only by reading the entire voir dire can an appellate court ascertain whether the trial court's voir dire is adequate. The questioning of venirepersons Zetkulic, Sacchi, and Chang impresses me as indicative of the character of the overall voir dire. The persistence of the court in unearthing potential prejudice and in allowing, indeed forcing, jurors to air their views on the death penalty in their own words, State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 354, 558 A. 2d 1259, demonstrates the adequacy of that court's inquiries. Q Mr. Zetkulic, the answers you gave us on this questionnaire are the truth I take it? A Yes, sir. Q You have lived in Monmouth County a long time now, you indicate that you have served as a juror during that long time that you have lived here? A Yes I do. Q How long ago was that? A A round three years ago, your Honor. Q Here at the Courthouse? A Yes. Q Do you recall what kind of cases you may have sat on as a juror? A The one I sat on? Q What kind of case was it? A It was criminal charge of rape. Q Did you go all the way through to a verdict? A Yes. Q Anything about that experience sitting as a juror on that case, any impressions you may have formed which you feel might affect you in one way or another sitting as a juror on this case? A No, I don't think so, sir. Q There is a difference, obviously, with a rape case, sometimes you may have strong feeling about the process or something of that nature as the result of your service, you don't have those very strong feelings? A No, sir. Q You did check off the fact that you have heard of Mr. Biegenwald, and that you read of a case involving him? A I read it at the time of the case, I read the newspaper about it, but as I indicated, I didn't discuss it or anything, I really forgot. Q What do you remember about reading, that's the next question? A Hardly anything, sir. Q Well, what do you remember reading? A That it was quite a  what shall I say  sensational, you know, just  Q Aside from the fact it may have made headlines, what content do you recall, what facts? A I recall something about, maybe I mixed it with something else, something like it was in the parking lot or something like that, if this is the one, I don't know, but that's all. Q You recall something about a parking lot? A Yes, sir, I couldn't say I did not hear of it. Q Okay, that's fair. What we're trying to figure out is what might be still in the back of your head? A Hardly anything, your Honor, because I don't recall fully what it was all about. Q All right. Are you saying that if you should sit as a juror on this case in that jury box, that you would decide the question of what the proper penalty is based solely upon what you hear in this Courtroom? A I believe so, yes. Q And whatever it is, that faint memory you have, you will put that aside, is that what you are saying? A Yes, I think I would. Q We're asking  we wouldn't want a faint memory to blossom out to be big and affect your decision in this case? A I understand. Q You don't think that would? A No, I don't think so. Q One of the possibilities, and there are only two, is the death penalty. What are your views concerning the death penalty? A I have no firm conviction either way, I think that I'm not against it and I'm not totally for it. I would be for it in certain circumstances. Q Okay. So depending upon the circumstances? A Yes, sir. Q Well, that's another way of saying depending upon the good things and the bad things that are revealed to you in the courtroom? A I would say so. Q I don't want to put words in your mouth, that's what you are saying? A I would think I would have to find in my own mind whether it's justified. Q But it's depending upon how things come out, you could go either for the death penalty if you think it's right or for life imprisonment with no parole for 30 years? A I think I could, yes, sir. Q Some of the testimony as I indicated this morning will be psychiatric testimony which will be given to us by Dr. Eshkenazi. Do you think there's anything about psychiatric testimony just as such that would make you feel you might not listen to it or sort of poo-poo it or put it aside? A No, I have no feeling about it at all. Q One way or the other? A Yes, sir. Q Are you saying you would listen to it? A I would listen to it and judge it on its merits, sir.         THE COURT: Mr. Zetkulic, thank you, take a seat in the jury room there and don't engage in any discussion with the jurors who are ahead of you in this case, if you want to talk about the weather or sports, it's all right. A Thank you, sir. [Emphasis added.] The trial court, influenced perhaps by the tone of the responses or the demeanor of the responder, asked follow-up questions regarding the possible effect of prior jury service, knowledge of the Biegenwald case, the death penalty, and psychiatric testimony. Those questions were neither close-ended nor suggestive. Furthermore, even if they could have been misunderstood to be so, the court dissipated the effect of that misunderstanding by stating that it did not want to put words in [the venireperson's] mouth. The voir dire of venireperson Sacchi also demonstrates the patient probing that characterized much of the voir dire. Q You did say that either you personally or some member of your family was the victim of a crime? A Yes. Q What was that about? A It was an assault. Q Who? A My mother. Q How long ago was that? A Approximately two years ago, she answered the door to her house and she was accosted at gun point.         Q Did they find the person who did it? A They did, and I believe he was convicted, yes. Q Is there anything about your mother's experience which certainly was a terrifying one, that has affected you to the point where it may influence your judgment some how or other here? A It has in a way because it was an emotional experience. I was upstairs at the time and I wasn't aware of what was going on downstairs. So I felt I could have done something, quite a duress for my mother. Q But you understand that was a separate incident? A Yes. Q You think the memory of it would linger onto the point where when you came to decide what the appropriate penalty is in this case, it might affect you in coming to that decision? A I can't be sure of that because  Q Well, nobody can be sure. We're trying to probe you? A Yes, I understand. Q You understand how this case will work? A Basically. Q Okay. Because what will happen, so you are clear, is that there will be information presented to you, evidence as to what they call aggravating factors and mitigating factors, and in shorthand form the aggravating factors are the minuses if you will, mitigating factors are the pluses insofar as the death penalty is concerned. And then at the end of that presentation I'll explain the law that applies to the jurors when they come to do the weighing of those pluses and minuses. Do you think that you would be able to listen to the law as I explain it, accept that, then make your own independent evaluation of the evidence that's given to you and then come to a conscientious decision as to which penalty is the right one without being influenced by your mother's experience? A I would hope that I would be  I think I can do that, yes. Q You have served as a juror before yourself? A Yes. Q When was that? A Must have been about four years ago in Bergen County, Hackensack. Q Remember what kind of case it was? A Vandalism. Q Anything about that experience as a juror or anything about what you heard during that case which again you feel would affect your judgments as a juror if you are sitting here? A I don't think so in that case, no.         Q One of the witnesses who will testify as I indicated to the jurors is a Dr. Eshkenazi. Dr. Eshkenazi is a psychiatrist. Do you have any pre-conceived notions about the value of psychiatric testimony? A My own personal feelings about psychiatry can be  I feel it can be misleading in some respects, I don't think so  it can be misleading in my own opinion. Q Well, maybe it can be in the hands of some psychiatrists. The question is here, you'll see Dr. Eshkenazi, you will listen to him, do you think that you'll be able to decide whether his testimony is valuable testimony to you in deciding what the appropriate penalty should be or will you just say okay, here comes another psychiatrist and forget about paying any attention to him? A Well, I'm a law man, I don't know, it would probably lay with the rest of the evidence, I don't know where it is. Q You can talk about any kind of medical man or professional man and there are good and bad in any profession. A Yes. Q You wouldn't take it  you tell me if I'm wrong  you wouldn't just simply backhand psychiatric testimony and say forget about it? A No I certainly wouldn't. Q And as to the death penalty, what is your view of that? A That it could be appropriate or not appropriate. I'm  my feeling is yes, I do believe. Q Yes what? A I'm for that. Q For it all the time? A I feel that  well, it's hard to answer because  how can I say it, I don't know if you can rephrase that. I mean  Q I'm not trying to prompt you but we're trying to  A I'm trying to give you the right answer. Q There's no right answer. Give me the answer from the heart? A Could you tell me  Q What do you think about the death penalty? A I think it's right. Q In all cases, that was my follow up question, all the time? A Oh, I'm sorry, no I guess there's  Q In other words, Mr. Biegenwald is sitting there as a murderer. Are you going to say you get the death penalty without going any further? A No, it wouldn't be fair. Q Of course it wouldn't be. Might you be doing that? A No, not consciously I wouldn't do that. I would tend to be fair about it judgment wise in my own, if that answers your question. Q Well, see, there is no answer that you have to please me with, we just want to know  A I didn't know how to phrase it really, it's a little  Q Well, pluses and minuses, good and bad, weighing of good and bad always indicates the possibility you could go one way or another. I'm not so sure that possibility exists for you. A I had some very strong feelings about the death penalty, being more sort of proper in that respect. That's my honest opinion. THE COURT: Any other questions? MR. DIAMOND: Could we have a brief side bar? THE COURT: Sure. (The following was recorded at sidebar.) THE COURT: I'm inclined to excuse him for cause. The Court excused Sacchi for cause. The voir dire of Sacchi captures the trial court's approach and attitude for voir dire. We're trying to probe you, you tell me if I'm wrong, I'm not trying to prompt you, there's no right answer, [g]ive the answer from your heart, and there is no answer that you have to please me with illustrate the court's willingness to delve deeply when it believed a venireperson was less than forthcoming. See State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 246, 593 A. 2d at 277. The court's directness is refreshing because plain speaking is the best way to get at such predisposition. State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 445-46, 585 A. 2d 864. Typical also of the openness of the trial court's questioning regarding a juror's views on the death penalty is the following exchange between the court and potential juror Chang: Q Since the death penalty is a possible choice we would like to know what are your views on the death penalty? A Well, I really don't know what to make of it, really, yet, because I never have to go through that myself. And as far as I see about the death penalty, it has some good points and some bad points, a good point is that for one thing, the taxpayers won't have to spend the money to support the criminal. And the bad thing is that you can always encounter the fact a person could be innocent and in killing that person. So by doing that you yourself are a criminal. Q I didn't hear that, by doing what? A By doing that incorrectly you yourself are the criminal. Q Aha. Well, okay, how would that affect you, you are entitled to those views, how would that affect you if you were selected as a juror? A I would feel bad if I didn't do the best I could, I do the best I can based on what the evidence shows me, if I did bad, I didn't make a good choice, then I would feel bad. Q Well, I'm sure anybody would. But with all those feelings that you have now, how would that react on your ability to sit as a juror? A Whatever I do, I do according to what's presented to me and if I made that choice, I made it because that was what was presented to me. Q Are you saying that you want to be sure? A Yes, I want to be sure I make the right choice, if I made that choice because I did it when I thought about it, not because I just did it hastily. Q You understand this not flipping a coin. A Yes, you are putting a person in line. Q In line with those views you have expressed, do you believe if you sat there now, imagine you are sitting there, there will be evidence presented to you on what are called these aggravating factors and there will be evidence presented to you on mitigating factors. Do you think you'd be able to listen to both of them and sift through them and evaluate them and come to a decision based upon the law as I'll explain it to you? A Yes, I could do it.         Before ending Ms. Chang's voir dire the court asked, as it almost invariably did, [a]ny additional questions? The following dialogue then took place. MR. DIAMOND: Yes, your Honor. I believe Miss Chang stated one of the problems she had with the death penalty was the alternative of the State having to take care of the person, the cost factor. THE COURT: Yes. MR. DIAMOND: The two alternates, one is death or the State taking care of this person for the rest of his life, would that affect your decision, the cost factor. THE COURT: As a taxpayer, would you think to yourself that I'm a taxpayer paying for this and therefore I will vote for the death penalty and not  MR. DIAMOND: In other words would you rather kill him than feed him? THE COURT: Let her answer my question first? A. Well, I don't see the money anyway, I wouldn't even know exactly if that person has been supported by my taxes. THE COURT: Is that going to be in your mind when you are deciding as to whether to impose the death penalty or not? A No, what would be in my mind is, should that person deserve death or life, that's all, and whatever is presented to me, I really don't even know if it's going to make any difference in paying him because it's not going to matter, maybe a couple of cents. Q You are not going to be thinking dollars and cents? A No, of course not. I wouldn't be, it's just whether the person is going to live or going to die, simple as that, but I'm not going to think of anything else, money doesn't really make a whole lot of difference if a person  THE COURT: Bottom line value is human life? A. Right. Ms. Chang's voir dire was then concluded. Each of the foregoing examples ( voir dire of Zetkulic, Sacchi, and Chang as well as the general instruction) combines with the admittedly-proper voir dire of venireperson Russo to demonstrate the overall sufficiency of the voir dire. The majority points to the voir dire of juror Mitchell to provide a sense of the court's approach to death qualification. Ante at 36-37, 594 A. 2d at 190. However, the majority ignores Mitchell's actual responses and does not consider the effect of the non- or extra-verbal modes of communication and observation that give trial courts an overwhelming advantage over appellate courts in assessing the character of a venireperson's responses. We can profit from an occasional reminder of the limitations that our isolation from the courtroom imposes on a full appreciation of the trial dynamics.    A bloodless record conceals subtle nuances; although we cannot always sniff them out, they do not often escape detection by our trial judges. [ State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 547, 511 A. 2d 1150 (1986) (Clifford, J., dissenting) ( quoted in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 260, 524 A. 2d 188).] Instead the majority focuses on an ensuing colloquy between counsel and the court, during which the court said of venireperson Mitchell's response, You may not like that answer but it's absolutely the correct answer. I agree with the majority's abstract point that the suggestion in the colloquy that there is a `correct' answer to the open-ended question `what are your views on the death penalty?' is most troubling. Ante at 39, 594 A. 2d at 192. If the record indicated any attempt by the trial court to condition, coerce, or predetermine a venireperson's response or to qualify an unqualified juror, I would agree with the majority. However, the majority's hyper-technical sensitivity confuses a shorthand, imprecise description used among learned participants, out of earshot of the jury panel, with an improper attempt to suggest or elicit an untruthful, less-than-honest qualifying response. Cf. Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 433-34, 105 S.Ct. at 856-57, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 857 ([r]elevant voir dire questions    need not be framed exclusively in the language of the controlling appellate division opinion; the opinion is, after all, an opinion and not an intricate devise in a will). An imprecise description (that of calling a qualifying answer a correct one) exchanged between officers of the court belies the repeated attempts here to elicit the actual, rather than the acceptable, beliefs of jurors. This trial court conducted a voir dire that did, indeed, draw out the potential juror's views, biases, and inclinations and [that] provide[d] both counsel and the court the opportunity to assess the venireperson's demeanor. Ante at 39, 594 A. 2d at 192. The trial court certainly never exhibited an intent to elicit a correct answer. See State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 246, 593 A. 2d at 277 ( voir dire questions did not attempt to force the jurors into any mode). In fact, the court specifically warned against any such notion. More importantly, by focusing only on the dialogue between the trial court and defense counsel after Mitchell's voir dire rather than on Mitchell's voir dire itself, the majority erroneously concludes that the voir dire of juror Mitchell is inadequate. I agree with the Court's observation that Mitchell's voir dire could have been more probing  indeed, I suspect the same could be said of any voir dire. Cf. Mu'Min v. Virginia, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1904, 114 L.Ed. 2d at 504 ([t]o be constitutionally compelled, it is not enough that such questions might be helpful). However, his voir dire certainly was adequate. Ibid.; see also id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1909 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (that the trial judge could have done more does not automatically mean that a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred). RANDALL MITCHELL, sworn. EXAMINATION BY THE COURT: Q Take a seat there, please. You tell us that you and your family have lived in Oceanport for two years, where did you live before Oceanport? A Toms River before that and Bradley Beach before that. Q Okay. You indicate that during some period of time you had heard of Richard Biegenwald. How did that occur? A Just through the papers back at that time. Q Back some years ago? A Oh, yeah. Q Do you recall what it was through the papers that you read back then? A No, I have just read the name, having seen it in the papers. Q In what context? A In relation to some type of a trial or, you know, you have stories that you don't really know the contents about but you remember certain individuals that were involved, that's about it. Q All right. When you say that's about it, is there any precise fact that you remember from that time or from whatever you read? A Actually, no, it was just a name, familiarity only because I have lived in the county for a number of years. Q None of your family members or you have ever been connected with police work or Prosecutor's office or anything of that nature I take it from your answers? A Correct. Q These answers are all true answers? A Yes, sir. Q You have never sat as a juror before? A No, sir, I have not. Q You work for Bridgewater Wholesalers and you are the manager of a wholesale  what is that? A Well, it's basically building materials, wholesale. Q Building materials wholesale? A Right, up in Somerset County. Q All right. And your wife is a dental office manager? A Right. Q You have some small children, you have a girl who is age 12 I see. The victim in this case, Anna Olesiewicz was a young female, there's anything about having a young daughter and a young female victim that you think is going to affect your decision if you should sit as a juror? A No, I don't think so, primarily one of the reasons is my daughter doesn't live with me, she lives with the mother. Q Well, all right, wherever she lives, the question is still the same? A No, that doesn't seem to create a problem for me. Q All right. The obligation of the jurors here in this trial is a limited one as I explained, has to do with which penalty is appropriate to this situation based upon aggravating factors that are presented and mitigating factors that are presented. Unless those words throw you, I don't think they should, but aggravating factors would be those things which would tend to lean you towards the death penalty, mitigating factors would tend to lean you away from the death penalty and toward life imprisonment with no parole for 30 years, those are the two options? A Yes. Q Since death is a possible option, what do you think generally about the death penalty? A It applies in certain cases and sometimes it doesn't, it's not something that I have taken a position on definitely, that it goes or doesn't go in cases. Q There are some people conscientiously think the death penalty should never be imposed and they are entitled to that view. That's not your view? A No. Q There are also some folks who are more, if you will, hard-nosed and they would say if there is a murder involved whoever is convicted of that murder should get the same penalties, death penalty. Are you of that persuasion? A No, I think you have to weigh each case by its merits. Q Okay. Part of the evidence that will be presented to you is that of Dr. Eshkenazi, I mentioned his name yesterday, he's a psychiatrist. Anything about psychiatric testimony which you think is less worthy of acceptance than maybe other kind of medical testimony? A No, sometimes, in some cases it's very valid. Q At the end of the case after you have heard all the evidence on the aggravating and mitigating factors, I'll be explaining to all the jurors who sit how they should handle those and what principals of law apply to the decision. I tell you that your obligation under your oath is to accept the law as I explain it and not to substitute for it your own views as to what you think the law is or what it ought to be, you think you can do that? A Yes, sir, I do. Q Sitting there now and knowing it's important to all of us, you think that if you are selected as a juror on this case you would be able to sit, listen in that open minded way that I have described before, make your evaluation and then decide what is the appropriate penalty and do that fairly objectively and conscientiously? A I believe so. THE COURT: Any additional questions of the prospective juror? All right. Then thank you, Mr. Mitchell, will you take a seat in the jury room please, there are others there, don't discuss this case. Oh, one question I didn't ask. Yesterday I was very emphatic about not listening to anything, reading anything that has to do with this case. Now I understand there may have been something on T.V. last night, I understand there may have been something in the paper. Did you do any reading or listening? A I chuckled only because I fell asleep last night. Q All right. That's good, before you fell asleep did you see anything on T.V. and this morning did anybody have a newspaper you happened to see? A No I brought some of my own paperwork. THE COURT: Okay, bring your own paperwork, don't look at any newspapers. MR. DIAMOND: Your Honor there is one question I had, on number 19, ever heard of a murder case involving  I believe the juror said he recalled the headline but not the facts, but here there is a specific mention he said yes to having heard of a murder case, his recollection then is of a murder and I would like to inquire of that. THE COURT: Of the recollection that you said you had about Richard Biegenwald, was that in connection with the murder? A Not really, no. THE COURT: Well, that's what you checked here? A It was  I tried to get that  I checked it only because I wanted to have an opportunity to explain it to you. THE COURT: Okay, explain it? A It was a situation, name association with a case that hit the papers, if you live in the area for a long enough period of time the name, oh yes, I remember that, but you'll not remember anything about it and that's basically what I was trying to say there, yes, I heard of it but nothing about it. THE COURT: Of Richard Biegenwald in connection with murder? A Of Richard Biegenwald but not with relation to any specific crime. Q Generic crime of murder? A What was the question, I'm sorry. Q The question is, before coming here today had you ever heard of a murder case involving Richard Biegenwald from any source whatsoever, either today or at any time previously, Richard Biegenwald of a murder case involving Richard Biegenwald and you checked yes? A Yes, I was under the impression the question was Mr. Biegenwald with reference to whatever the situation happened to be and you people more or less have identified what the crime had been. Q Oh, because I said this is a murder case and you had heard Biegenwald and that's the association that made you check yes? A Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, same spot. A Okay. The voir dire of Mitchell, which the majority holds out as illustrative of some inadequacy, actually demonstrates the persistence and open-mindedness of this trial court. The court initially asked an open-ended question about the death penalty, five questions concerning previous knowledge of defendant, two questions related to the potential impact of the victim's status, and a question about the use and appraisal of psychiatric testimony. The trial court also responded positively to counsel's request for further inquiry and asked at least six more questions regarding Mitchell's prior knowledge of Biegenwald or his crimes. The voir dire of Mitchell exemplifies how this trial court, unlike the court in Williams, repeatedly asked the follow-up questions requested by counsel in order to explain previous answers. 113 N.J. at 420, 550 A. 2d 1172. Finally, the trial court's failure to pry into the terse responses of venireperson Black does not change my opinion that the general character of that voir dire was constitutionally-adequate. A host of reasons, not apparent from the written record, may have contributed to the court's acceptance of them without further inquiry. Defense counsel also declined to ask any further questions of this venireperson, apparently believing he had received enough information about her from her responses and demeanor during questioning. Such conduct by counsel strengthens my impression of the adequacy of this voir dire. See State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 396-97, 548 A. 2d 1022. This voir dire met every standard we have previously formulated and fulfilled the historic purpose of voir dire. Courts have long stated that voir dire is not a process of selection but one of rejection. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71, 7 S.Ct. 350, 351, 30 L.Ed. 578, 580 (1886); State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 454, 585 A. 2d 864; State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 280-81, 255 A. 2d 193 (1969). In State v. Manley , we defined the purpose and scope of voir dire, noting that counsel [had begun] to subvert the function which was to assist in the impaneling of an impartial jury by using it to educate the jury panel on the facts of a particular case, to prejudice the jury for or against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate the jury, to induce the jurors by use of the hypothetical questions or otherwise to commit themselves to vote in a particular way, or to instruct them in matters of law. [54 N.J. at 276, 255 A. 2d 193.] We went on to observe that the impression is inescapable that the aim of counsel is no longer exclusion of unfit or partial or biased jurors. It has become the selection of a jury as favorable to the party's point of view as indoctrination through the medium of questions or assumed facts and rules of law can accomplish. Id. at 281, 255 A. 2d 193. To remedy the situation this Court adopted Rule 1:8-3(a), the basic intent of which was to have the voir dire conducted exclusively by or through the trial judges to the extent reasonably possible.    Of course supplementary questioning by counsel personally is not foreclosed entirely, but control over its scope and content is left to the experienced judgment and discretion of the trial judge to be exercised with the history and purpose of the rule in mind. [ Id. at 282, 255 A. 2d 193.] The court's exercise of discretion in dealing with such requests is subject to reversal only on a showing of prejudice resulting from an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 27, 524 A. 2d 130. The majority's view that shopping, with its connotation of selection and post-comparison purchase, is a permissible or appropriate, indeed necessary, metaphor for the voir dire process, see ante at 32-33, 594 A. 2d at 188, ignores the abuses, concerns, and solutions that have shaped the evolution of voir dire. Courts, along with counsel, are not consumers in the voir dire market, picking and choosing jurors who meet their personal tastes; they are only inspectors in that market, examining and testing venirepersons to ensure the creation of an impartial jury from those that remain. The entire voir dire was more than sufficient to fulfill that goal. There was nothing perfunctory about the death-qualification process. See State v. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 408, 550 A. 2d 1172. Moreover, for reasons stated more fully below, I believe that the trial court's failure (1) to define the crime of murder or (2) to ask venirepersons about the possible effect that evidence of Biegenwald's prior murder convictions would have on their decision-making process did not render this voir dire constitutionally deficient.