Opinion ID: 2709058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judgment at Trial

Text: We apply the same standards of review as the district court in reviewing the bankruptcy court’s decision. In re Smith, 582 F.3d 767, 777 (7th Cir. 2009). We apply de novo re‐ view for the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and clear error review for its findings of fact. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7052; see Freeland v. Enodis Corp., 540 F.3d 721, 729 (7th Cir. 2008). The question whether an actor behaved willfully and ma‐ liciously is one of fact. Thirtyacre, 36 F.3d at 700. “When there No. 13‐1026 13 are two permissible views of the evidence, the [court]’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612, 628 (7th Cir. 2010). We must be especially deferential toward a trial court’s assess‐ ment of witness credibility. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). At trial, Horsfall and Call each testified. The bankruptcy court found that Horsfall “credibly testified that he has nev‐ er had any ill‐will or animosity towards First Weber … [and that he] believed his duties and obligations to First Weber under both the agent agreement and under Call’s listing con‐ tracts were terminated when the contracts themselves were cancelled or expired.” In contrast, the bankruptcy court “doubt[ed] the veracity” of Call’s testimony that Horsfall “induced him [Call] to expire his listings [sic] with First We‐ ber and list his properties to Picket Fence.” The court found Call’s “claimed ignorance of the one‐year exclusion period and the nature of protected buyers incredible in light of Call’s business and real estate experience.” The facts that the court credited support its conclusions that Horsfall did not intend to injure First Weber and that injury to First Weber was not substantially certain to occur. Horsfall could not have intended to injure First Weber if Horsfall did not even realize that the prior agreements re‐ mained in force. Furthermore, even if he had known the agreements remained in force, Horsfall’s collection of a commission from Call did nothing formally to change Call’s liability to First Weber. Whether he knew it or not, Call re‐ mained liable to First Weber on the Exclusive Right to Sell contract. That is undoubtedly why First Weber originally sued both Horsfall and Call in state court. As it happened, 14 No. 13‐1026 Call’s debt to First Weber was discharged in Call’s own bank‐ ruptcy, but that is not Horsfall’s fault. First Weber acknowl‐ edges as much in its brief before this court. Because Horsfall’s actions did not have the effect of ex‐ tinguishing Call’s debt to First Weber, injury flowing from those actions was not substantially certain to occur. Hors‐ fall’s unethical collection of an additional commission, while not to be commended, did not affect First Weber’s legal rights against Call. If First Weber had collected from Call, then perhaps Call would have had a claim for willful and malicious injury against Horsfall. But Call did not assert any claims in Horsfall’s bankruptcy, and First Weber’s injury was not derivative of any loss to Call. Moreover, the bankruptcy court found that Call knew he remained liable to First We‐ ber. First Weber could have collected from Call despite Hors‐ fall’s actions, and so its injury was not certain. We find no clear error in the bankruptcy court’s findings. First Weber has pointed to no evidence that would justify our setting aside the court’s credibility determinations. Alt‐ hough First Weber spends a great deal of time arguing that the court erred in finding that Horsfall was entitled to a commission on the Call sale, that Horsfall listed the Call property after leaving First Weber, and that Horsfall could have acted as a dual agent for both Call and the Acostas, none of these points is relevant to the question whether Horsfall intentionally injured First Weber or whether First Weber’s injury was substantially certain to occur. Ultimately, First Weber, supported by the Wisconsin Realtors Association as amicus curiae, contends that the bro‐ kerage was certain to suffer injury simply because Horsfall breached numerous legal and ethical obligations under Wis‐ No. 13‐1026 15 consin real estate law and ignored First Weber’s exclusive right to collect a commission from sale of the Call property to the Acostas. The hole in that argument is that Call re‐ mained fully liable for all commission debts owing to First Weber. Although First Weber was entitled to schedule its contractual claims against Horsfall in the bankruptcy court, it failed to show that those claims should be excepted from the normal power of the court to discharge debts.