Opinion ID: 5116742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alternative Basis for Liability

Text: [¶20] In her opposition to the motion for summary judgment and now on appeal, Boles cites Patten v. Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 A. 375 (1914), to argue that a landlord may be liable if he “rents a premises containing an unreasonably dangerous condition therein,” and “fail[s] to remedy the danger before accepting tenants.” The Superior Court did not address this argument, and although Patten remains good law, we find that it has no application to the facts of this case and is easily distinguished. [¶21] In Patten, the plaintiff’s horse was killed after it fell into an unmarked pit, which was concealed by ice and snow and which the defendant landlord had promised to repair before the tenant took occupancy. 111 Me. at 410-14, 89 A. 375. Here, unlike in Patten, the Whites did not promise to repair the step, nor is the step the type of concealed “nuisance” that was contemplated Although Boles characterizes Karen White’s deposition testimony about the Whites’ interest in 4 conditions identified in their house inspection as evidence that the Whites had agreed to maintain the premises in good repair upon renting it to the Lytles, the Whites’ prior repairs and intentions to improve the house do not establish the existence of an agreement with the Lytles. 13 in Patten. See id. at 415, 89 A. 375. This latter distinction is consistent with the legal principle that a landlord is liable for injuries caused by a latent defect when that defect is “hidden from knowledge as well as from sight and one which could not be discovered by ordinary and reasonable care.” Cole v. Lord, 160 Me. 223, 228, 202 A.2d 560 (1964) (quotation marks omitted); see also Nichols, 483 A.2d at 343.5 [¶22] Moreover, “no duty is owed to tenants to make the structural design or plan any more safe than it was at the time of letting.” Thompson v. Frankus, 151 Me. 54, 56, 115 A.2d 718 (1955) (citing Rosenberg v. Chapman Nat’l Bank, 126 Me. 403, 405, 139 A. 82 (1927)); see also Miller v. Hooper, 119 Me. 527, 529, 112 A. 256 (1921) (“An owner may build a tenement house with stairways which because of steepness or for other obvious structural reasons are inconvenient or even unsafe. The tenant cannot exact any change. If such stairways need to be repaired or rebuilt, the owner is not required to make them safer or more convenient.”). 5 The first Nichols exception imposes liability upon a landlord when the landlord “fails to disclose the existence of a latent defect which he knows or should have known existed but which is not known to the tenant nor discoverable by him in the exercise of reasonable care.” Nichols v. Marsden, 483 A.2d 341, 343 (Me. 1984). Although Boles’s argument alleges liability under Patten, the concealed nature of the defect in Patten mirrors the latent defect exception, which, in addition to requiring that the latent defect be one that the landlord should have known of, also requires that the defect be one that is undiscoverable by the tenant. Id. We also note that the parties’ statements of material facts do not contain an assertion that the Whites failed to warn the Lytles of any alleged defect. 14 The entry is: Judgment affirmed. Christian J. Lewis, Esq., and Sean V. Walton, Esq. (Orally), Hardy Wolf & Downing, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant Cecelia Boles John B. Schulte, Esq. (Orally), and L. John Topchik, Esq., Law Offices of John B. Schulte, Portland, for Karen M. White and Ronald C. White Jr. Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2019-238 FOR CLERKS REFERENCE ONLY