Opinion ID: 610561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trademark Liability

Text: 37 The District Court concluded that notwithstanding PIL's disclaimer, a substantial number of reasonably prudent purchasers, on seeing the name Twin Peaks as part of the title of the Book would be led to believe that plaintiff was the source of the goods. Accordingly, the District Court found that PIL had violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), and had engaged in unfair competition in violation of New York common law. PIL contends that reversal is required because the District Court failed to find that the TWIN PEAKS mark had a secondary meaning or to apply any of the Polaroid factors, see Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S.Ct. 36, 7 L.Ed.2d 25 (1961). PIL also contends that independent analysis of these factors supports the conclusion that it did not infringe TPP's trademarks. The parties agree that the resolution of the common law unfair competition claim parallels resolution of the trademark claim. While PIL's point concerning the failure to apply the Polaroid factors has validity, we are also concerned that the District Court failed to recognize the special concerns implicated by Lanham Act claims against titles of works of artistic expression.
38 The District Court made no explicit determination that TWIN PEAKS had acquired secondary meaning. We need not determine whether such a showing is required for suggestive literary titles, 4 since the stipulated facts would have required the District Court to find secondary meaning. TPP submitted extensive evidence of the publicity received by the televised episodes, and even PIL concedes that the series was a media phenomenon. Much of this publicity focused on David Lynch and Mark Frost. Thus the title is sufficiently well known that consumers associate it with a particular author's work. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir.1989). 39
40 Because of an author's significant First Amendment interest in choosing an appropriate title for his or her work, we have held that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 999 (footnote omitted). Although Rogers arose in the context of a title using a celebrity's name, we have applied it to the literary title Cliffs Notes, a literary title apparently not containing the name of a real person, and certainly not of a celebrity. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1989) ([T]he Rogers balancing approach is generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression....). 41 In this case, there would seem little question that the title is of some artistic relevance to the Book. The question then is whether the title is misleading in the sense that it induces members of the public to believe the Book was prepared or otherwise authorized by TPP. 5 This determination must be made, in the first instance, by application of the venerable Polaroid factors. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 n. 3. However, the finding of likelihood of confusion must be particularly compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interest recognized in Rogers. 42 Unfortunately, the District Court did not apply the Polaroid factors individually or determine whether the likelihood of confusion was so great as to overcome the presumption of Rogers. While we have occasionally endeavored to apply at least some of the Polaroid factors at the appellate level, see Orient Express Trading Co. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650, 654-55 (2d Cir.1988); Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 832 F.2d 1317, 1320-23 (2d Cir.1987), we believe the better course in this case is a remand to allow the District Court the opportunity to fully examine the factors relevant to likelihood of confusion. 43 The need for careful application of the Polaroid factors, assessed in light of Rogers, is underscored by two complicating considerations. The first is PIL's placement of a disclaimer on both the front and rear covers of the Book. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (2d Cir.1987); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1983) (injunction not available where there is any possibility that an explanation or disclaimer will suffice), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823, 105 S.Ct. 100, 83 L.Ed.2d 45 (1984). Though the disclaimer partially blunts TPP's attack by alerting readers that the Book has not been licensed by a group of pertinent entities including Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. Television Network Group, it would have been far more effective had it simply stated that the publication has not been prepared, approved, or licensed by any entity that created or produced the well-known TV program Twin Peaks. Judge Martin expressed the view, without elaboration, that the disclaimer was not effective. 44 The second special consideration bearing on the Book's title concerns the wording and appearance of the title. The title not only uses the name Twin Peaks but precedes the name with the phrase Welcome to. The title thus copies a legend that appears on a roadside sign in the introduction sequence of each televised episode. Moreover, the book title is presented against a background that appears to be a wooden slab, apparently an attempt to evoke the wooden roadside sign. It is a fair question whether a title that might otherwise be permissible under Rogers violates the Lanham Act when displayed in a manner that conjures up a visual image prominently associated with the work bearing the mark that was copied. 45 These circumstances make a remand especially appropriate. 6 Since TPP concedes that the resolution of the state law unfair competition claim follows trademark infringement liability, we vacate the District Court's determination that PIL engaged in unfair competition as well.