Opinion ID: 1182224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the kidnapping sentence

Text: As noted in Part 19, footnote 27, the majority ends its analysis of the classification of defendant's kidnapping conviction without deciding whether defendant or the state has the burden of proving that defendant released Mary without physical injury in a safe place prior to defendant's arrest. In support of defendant's argument that the state carries this burden, he cites State v. McMillen, 154 Ariz. 322, 324, 742 P.2d 823, 825 (App. 1987) (burden of proving that defendant did not release the victim without physical injury in a safe place prior to arrest is on the state), and State v. Sterling, 148 Ariz. 134, 136, 713 P.2d 335, 337 (App. 1985) (same). Because I believe both McMillen and Sterling were wrongly decided, and because defendant put their continued validity in issue, I would take this opportunity to overrule them. Subsection A of A.R.S. § 13-1304 sets forth the definition of the offense of kidnapping as follows: § 13-1304. Kidnapping; classification; consecutive sentence A. A person commits kidnapping by knowingly restraining another person with the intent to: 1. Hold the victim for ransom, as a shield or hostage; or 2. Hold the victim for involuntary servitude; or 3. Inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on the victim, or to otherwise aid in the commission of a felony; or 4. Place the victim or a third person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury to the victim or such third person. 5. Interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function. 6. Seize or exercise control over any airplane, train, bus, ship or other vehicle. Pursuant to this statutory definition, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction: The crime of kidnapping requires proof of the following three things. 1. The defendant knowingly restrained another person's movements, and 2. The restraint was accomplished: A. By physical force, intimidation or deception, and B. In a manner which interfered substantially with the person's movements, and 3. The restraint was with the intent to inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on a person. This instruction, which mirrors A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3), is appropriate; the state needed to prove no elements other than those set forth in § 13-1304(A)(3) to establish that defendant committed the offense of kidnapping. In its verdict, the jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping. Once found guilty, the trial court was required to sentence defendant. In Arizona, sentences are determined by the classification of an offense. Subsection B of A.R.S. § 13-1304 classifies kidnapping as follows: B. Kidnapping is a class 2 felony unless the victim is released voluntarily by the defendant without physical injury in a safe place prior to arrest and prior to accomplishing any of the further enumerated offenses in subsection A of this section in which case it is a class 4 felony. Defendant argues that because the state neither contended nor proved that he did not release the victim without physical injury in a safe place prior to arrest, he should have been sentenced for kidnapping classified as a class 4 felony. This argument presupposes that the state carries the burden of proving that defendant did not release the victim without physical injury in a safe place prior to defendant's arrest. This argument finds support in both McMillen and Sterling. The Sterling court, on which the McMillen court relied, mistakenly believed that Arizona's kidnapping statute created different offenses or degrees of kidnapping. Based on this mistaken belief, the Sterling court held that the voluntary release by the defendant without physical injury of the victim in a safe place prior to arrest is an element of the offense of second-degree kidnapping.  Sterling, 148 Ariz. at 136, 713 P.2d at 337 (emphasis added). Nowhere in A.R.S. § 13-1304(A), which sets forth the elements of kidnapping, however, is there a safe release requirement. Further, as distinguished from § 13-1304(A), § 13-1304(B) merely sets forth the classification scheme for the offense of kidnapping; it has nothing to do with the elements the state must prove to convict a defendant of kidnapping, nor does it create different offenses or degrees of kidnapping. See State v. Brady, 299 N.C. 547, 563, 264 S.E.2d 66, 75 (1980) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court stated, [Subsection (A)] defines the offense of kidnapping. Proof of the elements set forth therein is all that the statute requires for a conviction of kidnapping.... [Subsection (B)] merely prescribes the punishment for one convicted of kidnapping. It does not affect the elements of the offense of kidnapping or create a separate offense.) (emphasis in original); State v. Leslie, 14 Ohio App.3d 343, 345, 471 N.E.2d 503, 506 (1984) (to convict a defendant of kidnapping, the state need not allege or establish that the defendant failed to release the victim in a safe place unharmed); State v. Cornute, 64 Ohio App.2d 199, 200-01, 412 N.E.2d 416, 417-18 (1979) (same). The effect of § 13-1304(B) is to reduce the penalty imposable upon a defendant if the defendant safely returns his or her victim. Such safe return is thus a type of mitigating circumstance. See State v. Schneckloth, 210 Neb. 144, 149, 313 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1981) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court, in a thorough analysis, stated, The factors listed in subsection ([B]) are not elements of the offense of kidnapping, but are simply mitigating factors which may reduce the sentence of those charged [with kidnapping].). Accordingly, I would hold that, similar to the mitigating circumstances in § 13-703(G), the safe return of a victim by a kidnapper prior to the kidnapper's arrest is a mitigating circumstance that must be proved by the kidnapper by a preponderance of the evidence. See Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court stated, The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant's conduct subsequent to the kidnapping.... Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980). Placing the burden on the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances is not a violation of due process. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, ___-___, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3055-56, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (placing burden of proof on defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence is constitutionally permissible), aff'g State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017 (1989). In addition, because the safe return of a victim is not an element of the statutory offense of kidnapping, I would hold that the trial judge may make the determination whether a defendant has met this burden. See State v. Stewart, 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d 1138, 1146 (1977) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court stated, The release or nonrelease of a kidnapper's victim is [a fact which determines only the severity of punishment], and it is within the power of the state to allow the trial court, rather than the jury, to make this factual determination.); Brady, 299 N.C. at 563, 264 S.E.2d at 75 (Since the factors set forth in subsection ([B]) relate to sentencing, it is for the trial judge to determine their existence or nonexistence from the evidence presented....); State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 669, 249 S.E.2d 709, 719 (1978) (Normally a jury need only determine whether a defendant has committed the substantive offense of kidnapping.... The factors set forth in subsection ([B]) relate only to sentencing; therefore, their existence or nonexistence should properly be determined by the trial judge.). To the extent that McMillen and Sterling are inconsistent with this analysis, I would overrule them.