Opinion ID: 172520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy and Marijuana Charges

Text: Mr. Cesareo-Ayala challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial on the conspiracy and marijuana charges against him. Because he has not also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdicts on those charges, we could for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphsummarily conclude that, given the uncontested sufficiency of the evidence, the district court could not have abused its discretion in denying a new trial. Nevertheless, we will discuss the evidence supporting these two convictions. To establish a conspiracy, the government must prove: (1) the defendant's agreement with another person to violate the law; (2) his knowledge of the essential objective of the conspiracy; (3) his knowing and voluntary involvement; and (4) interdependence among the alleged coconspirators. United States v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). [T]he absence of any direct evidence of a conspiracy is immaterial so long as there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Cesareo-Ayala trains his fire on the knowing-and-voluntary-involvement element of the offense. He argues that Klepac whose credibility he assailswas the sole source of evidence on this point and that other witnesses could only testify that [Mr. Cesareo-Ayala] was present during several drug transactions, not that he took an active role. Aplt. Br. at 23. The credible evidence against him, he says, paints him as a mere observer of the cocaine deals. Id. at 24. We are not persuaded. We see no reason why a fact-finder could not rationally credit Klepac's testimony. Although he could not be precise about some details, his account was internally consistent. Moreover, his account was corroborated by Hogan's observations and by Mr. Cesareo-Ayala's own confession to the police. The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the contention that the evidence preponderate[d] heavily against the verdict. Evans, 42 F.3d at 593. As for the marijuana count, Mr. Cesareo-Ayala argues only that the evidence was insufficient to tie him to the marijuana found in the red sack. [1] But Officer Wright testified that when Mr. Cesareo-Ayala exited his vehicle at the bar, he was holding a red sack. Mr. Cesareo-Ayala then was observed going to the rear of the building and returning without the sack, which was later found behind the building. The sack contained a substantial quantity of marijuana. Moreover, after his arrest Mr. Cesareo-Ayala told Officer Nunez that he had come to the bar to receive money from Mendez and deliver marijuana to him. Mr. Cesareo-Ayala is correct that there could have been more evidence of guiltfor example, no fingerprints were found on the sack and no one had checked the rear of the building to see if the presence of the bag preceded Mr. Cesareo-Ayala's arrival. But such evidence was not essential. The new-trial motion was properly denied.