Opinion ID: 2345444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Unadjudicated Misconduct Evidence

Text: Johnson's next argument is that, in the penalty phase, the trial judge committed plain error when she admitted evidence suggesting that Johnson had some involvement in a prior shooting of his step-father without first weighing the reliability of the evidence and its probative value versus its unfairly prejudicial value. The record reflects that neither of those requests were made by defense counsel at trial. Truitt was recalled during the penalty phase and testified as follows: Q. Do you remember an incident around the end of August of 2003 with regard to the defendant's stepfather? A. Yes. Q. What do you know about that incident from your own knowledge? A. Shannon's little sister called my cell phone saying that the stepfather and mom got into a fight and she wanted Shannon. Q. Did you call him? A. Yes. Q. And then what did you do? A. I went over to see that she's okay because she was crying, she was upset, pretty much she got kicked out of the house, so we was in her neighbor's house. Q. When you are at the neighbor's house do you see the defendant arrive? A. Yes. Q. What happens after he gets there? A. He, I think he ran into the house, I seen him running out. Q. You saw him running out of the house? A. Yes, and people were saying that the stepfather was shot, that he shot the stepfather. [Defense Attorney]: Your Honor, can we approach? The Court: Sure. (Sidebar) [Defense Attorney]: Your Honor, the objection is that it's hearsay, number one, and it deprives Mr. Johnson of the right to confront his accuser if they are going to, the fact that they are going to say he shot somebody. I was about to argue this yesterday with the Barrow Barnett case. In that particular case, Your Honor, the reason I think it's pertinent is that the intentional murder was reversed because of a violation of the confrontation clause. Mr. Barrow was convicted of felony murder, so statutory aggravated was already in place, yet the Supreme Court ordered a new penalty hearing because of the confrontation clause violation. The clear implication, even though it doesn't actually say that, is that hearsay is not admissible in either phase of the death penalty proceeding. The Court: Okay, your objection is hearsay? [Defense Attorney]: Yes. The Court: Have you had a chance to read that case, any of you? [Prosecutrix]: Your Honor, I read several cases. I can't remember if I read that particular case, but I did read several. This is conduct that he was not convicted of. What I'm getting to is the defendant wrote her a letter admitting that conduct. The Court: Well, let's get there. [Prosecutrix]: I did ask her to say only what she personally observed and I tried to keep it away from it. The Court: I understand you asked her to talk from her own personal experience but if she goes astray, and there's an objection, simply lead her if you need to. I'm sure the defense won't object to leading her to keep her away from hearsay and to guide the witness to what she can testify to that is not hearsay, okay. (Sidebar concluded) The Court: The objection is sustained. [By Prosecutrix]: Q. Lakeisha, I need you to testify about things you actually saw or heard or the defendant told you, okay, things that other people said you can't testify about, okay? A. All right. Q. Now, you are there that day and you see him run out? A. Yes. Q. Later on did the defendant ever write you any letters about that incident? A. Yes. Q. And what did he say about it in the letter, do you remember? A. He was saying for me not to come to court to testify on him and for me to like hide at his mom's or leave the State because if I wouldn't show, the charges would be dropped against him just like the charges was dropped against him with his stepfather's incident. Johnson's letter to Truitt was admitted into evidence without objection. Thus, the State's proof of unadjudicated misconduct consisted of evidence of Truitt seeing Johnson run into and out of his stepfather's house, and a reference to charges against Johnson being dropped in a letter written to Truitt by Johnson himself. Johnson contends that the Superior Court reversibly erred in admitting evidence of unadjudicated misconduct offered by the State in its effort to demonstrate that Johnson attempted to improperly influence and dissuade a witness (Truitt) in this proceeding as he had done with witnesses in a prior prosecution against him. Johnson made no objection at his penalty hearing to this unadjudicated misconduct evidence. Consequently, this contention may now be reviewed on appeal only for plain error. [89] During the penalty phase, the State recalled Truitt to describe how Johnson attempted to prevent her from testifying against him and that Johnson had also done this to a witness in a previous criminal matter. There was no defense objection to Truitt explaining Johnson's witness tampering behavior, only to her relaying possible hearsay statements in her description of Johnson's involvement in a prior shooting of his stepfather. The State also offered, without objection, the complete April 25th letter in which Johnson both attempted to prevent Truitt from testifying and admitted he had successfully done so previously in connection with charges stemming from an unrelated shooting involving his stepfather. The record reflects that Johnson's only objection to Truitt's penalty phase testimony was the admission of certain hearsay statements, and that objection was sustained. Johnson now argues on appeal, however, that Truitt's testimony and the admission of his letter at the penalty hearing included improper evidence of unadjudicated misconduct about Johnson's involvement in his stepfather's shooting. In addition, on appeal, Johnson contends that the trial judge erred by not sua sponte making a judicial determination that the misconduct Johnson committed was established to a plain, clear and convincing degree. On appeal, Johnson asks this Court to conclude that the trial judge erred by not making a determination that the State's unadjudicated misconduct evidence was plain, clear and convincing, even though that was not the objection made at trial. The State argues that a trial judge should not be faulted for not making a specific evidentiary ruling when the subject was never fairly brought to the trial judge's attention. We agree. This Court has emphasized that counsel must explain the basis for admission or exclusion of evidence in order to preserve the issue for appeal. [90] Eyewitness testimony is normally deemed sufficient to satisfy the plain, clear and convincing standard utilized for admission of other crimes evidence under Rule 404(b). [91] Truitt's testimony as to what Johnson stated to her personally and what she observed satisfies this evidentiary standard. [92] Johnson's own written words describing the unadjudicated misconduct also qualify as plain, clear and convincing evidence. Even if the trial judge should have made a prior determination that the unadjudicated misconduct evidence was plain, clear and convincing before Truitt testified and Johnson's letter was admitted, such an omission was not plain error. The record reflects that the State's evidence of unadjudicated misconduct satisfied the plain, clear, and convincing standard. [93] Therefore, Johnson has not demonstrated plain error.