Opinion ID: 1058445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fingerprinting in the jury’s presence

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair trial by allowing the prosecution to fingerprint him in the jury’s presence. Citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) and State v. Braden, 874 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tenn. Crim. -8- App. 1993), the defendant asserts that “[c]ourts must be alert to practices which undermine the presumption of innocence of the accused and such practices must be subjected to ‘close judicial scrutiny.’” The defendant contends that, by taking his thumb print in the jury’s presence, the prosecution treated him “like a criminal[,] subjecting him to a humiliating and embarrassing procedure.” We disagree. Even though the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out this important fact, the defendant apparently still fails or refuses to recognize that he was in fact a convicted criminal when the trial court allowed the prosecution to obtain his fingerprint in the presence of the jury. The jury had already convicted the defendant of first degree premeditated murder. This fact is significant because it distinguishes this case from the cases upon which the defendant relies. For example, the defendant in Estelle was forced to stand trial in prison garb. 425 U.S. at 502-03. In Braden, the trial court informed the trial jury that the defendant was in custody. 874 S.W.2d at 625-26. By contrast, in this case the jury already had convicted the defendant of first degree murder; thus, he was no longer entitled to the presumption of innocence when he was required to submit to fingerprinting. Therefore, the defendant’s reliance upon Estelle and Braden is misplaced. The defendant also contends that, despite his refusal to stipulate to the prior convictions, fingerprinting was unnecessary because he did not contest his identity as the person convicted of the four prior felonies. We disagree. The prosecution had the burden of proving the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden includes the burden of proving the defendant’s identity as the person convicted in 1997 of robbery, kidnapping, attempted rape, and reckless endangerment. State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 472-73 (Tenn. 2002). Although a certified copy of a judgment of conviction creates a permissive inference of identity, the prosecution cannot be faulted for introducing additional evidence to establish identification. See id. at 472. Moreover, as this Court recently recognized, the prosecution's right to prove its case may not be foreclosed by a defendant's characterization of the proof as undisputed or by a defendant's offer to stipulate or concede certain factual issues. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 491 (Tenn. 2004). Thus, a defendant’s failure to contest an issue or a defendant’s offer to enter into a stipulation does not preclude the prosecution from introducing relevant, admissible evidence to prove its case. Furthermore, requiring the defendant to submit to fingerprinting in the presence of the jury did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused “from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. . . .” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). The privilege against self-incrimination offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling “communications” or “testimony,” but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of “real or physical evidence” does not violate it. -9- Id. at 764 (emphasis added); see also State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 87 (Tenn. 2001) (“[T]he Fifth amendment applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence.”). The presence of the jury does not enlarge the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination so that a defendant may not be required to provide fingerprints. Indeed, courts have concluded that requiring a defendant to provide fingerprints in the presence of the jury does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. See Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Propriety of Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Exhibit Self, or Perform Physical Act, or Participate in Demonstration, During Trial and in Presence of Jury, 3 A.L.R.4th 374, § 13 (1981) (citing cases). Also without merit is the defendant’s assertion that fingerprinting in the presence of the jury violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Some courts have concluded that a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial may be infringed if the defendant is required in the jury’s presence to participate in performances or demonstrations that damage the defendant’s image or unjustly humiliate or degrade the defendant. See United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252, 253-54 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam). However, we are unaware of any authority supporting the proposition that fingerprinting is an humiliating, degrading, or damaging demonstration that gives rise to a Fourteenth Amendment violation. As the Court of Criminal Appeals succinctly explained in this case: Fingerprinting, unlike being handcuffed or wearing an inmate’s uniform, does not portray the defendant as a dangerous criminal. As noted by this court over twenty years ago, fingerprinting is a commonplace practice which “signifies neither criminality nor saintly living.” State v. Tyson, 603 S.W.2d 748, 753-54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). Like the Court of Criminal Appeals, we are not persuaded that requiring the defendant to be fingerprinted in the presence of the jury deprived the defendant of a fair trial. This issue is without merit.