Opinion ID: 2585525
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: limiting collateral attacks upon judgments

Text: A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such judgment or decree. The word collateral, in this connection, is always used as the antithesis of direct, and it is therefore wide enough to embrace any independent proceeding. To constitute a direct attack upon a judgment, it is said, it is necessary that a proceeding be instituted for that very purpose. If an appeal is taken from a judgment, or a writ of error, or if a motion is made to vacate or set it aside on account of some alleged irregularity, the attack is obviously direct, the sole object of the proceeding being to deny and disprove the apparent validity of the judgment. But if that action or proceeding has an independent purpose and contemplates some other relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important or even necessary to its success, then the attack upon the judgment is collateral and falls within the rule. Kapiolani Estate, Ltd. v. Atcherly, 14 Haw. 651, 661 (1902) (citations and some quotation marks omitted) (italics in original) (underscored added). As previously stated, the Matsuuras' present action includes claims of fraud, racketeering, abuse of process, infliction of emotional distress, interference with prospective economic advantage, spoliation of evidence, and punitive damages. Thus, the present action has a purpose independent of overturning the judgment of the third circuit court and contemplates relief other than that sought in the original action. Therefore, the present action is a collateral attack upon the stipulated dismissal granted on November 23, 1994. This court has stated that, as a general rule, a collateral attack may not be made upon a judgment or order rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. If it is only a question of error or irregularity and not of jurisdiction, it cannot be raised on collateral attack. First Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks, 70 Haw. 392, 398 772 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1989) (brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Grindling, 96 Hawai`i 402, 31 P.3d 915 (2001); In re Genesys, 95 Hawai`i at 37 n. 4, 18 P.3d at 899 n. 4; Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 81 Hawai`i 270, 916 P.2d 680 (1996); Cooper v. Smith, 70 Haw. 449, 776 P.2d 1178 (1989). However, HRCP Rule 60(b) specifically allows for collateral proceedings when there is an allegation of fraud upon the court, stating, This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. (Emphasis added.) Thus, like the policy favoring the finality of judgments, the policy against collateral attacks on judgments is not absolute and does not favor limiting liability in a collateral proceeding when there is an allegation that fraud was committed in the prior proceeding.