Opinion ID: 4545148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sham Affidavit

Text: Button argues that the district court improperly considered two sham affidavits by Marthe and Perkins. Button acknowledges that “this case involves an atypical application of the sham-affidavit rule.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. Typically, sham affidavits appear as a plaintiff’s stratagem to defeat summary judgment. “It is well-settled that parties to a motion for summary judgment cannot create sham issues of fact in an effort to defeat summary judgment.” Bass v. City of Sioux Falls, 232 F.3d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). In contrast, Button argues that the district court improperly considered sham affidavits from the defense in deciding to grant summary judgment. The Marthe and Perkins affidavits are not shams. An affidavit is a sham affidavit if it contradicts prior testimony or is a “sudden and unexplained revision of testimony [that] creates an issue of fact where none existed before.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). However, if the affidavit merely explains portions of a prior deposition that may have been unclear, it is not a sham affidavit. City of St. Joseph v. Sw. Bell Tel., 439 F.3d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 2006). -6- Button bases her sham-affidavit averment on two contentions. First, she asserts that Marthe’s affidavit added two factors to the RIF discussions that she never mentioned in her deposition: (1) training on communication systems and (2) knowledge of new territories. However, Marthe’s deposition described how the RIF team’s discussions addressed each Operations Supervisor’s qualifications to dispatch the different desks alone. Those qualifications included knowledge of the different communication systems and territories. Thus, Marthe’s affidavit merely expands on the discussion of Operations Supervisor qualifications. It does not contradict her deposition testimony. See Bass, 232 F.3d at 618 (explaining that an affidavit that expands on information not specifically asked about in a deposition is not a sham affidavit). We conclude Marthe’s affidavit is not a sham. Button also characterizes Perkins’s affidavit as a sham. In her affidavit, Perkins recounted that the purpose of the RIF meeting was to gather feedback on the Operations Supervisors. Button correctly notes that Perkins’s affidavit said the RIF team believed that Button could not handle the new work. She points out, however, that Perkins had previously stated in her deposition that she did not remember specifics of the RIF meeting. Button thus argues that Perkins’s later, more detailed memory in the affidavit contradicts the deposition and is thus a sham. But, even if Perkins’s statement could be construed as contradictory to her deposition, the district court was not obligated to disregard it. Excluding the affidavit “is limited to situations where the conflicts between the deposition and affidavit raise only sham issues.” Baker, 581 F.3d at 690 (internal quotation omitted). Here, Perkins’s testimony simply mirrored Marthe’s testimony and the information listed on the spreadsheet. Perkins’s affidavit raised no sham issues. Therefore, the district court did not err in relying on Marthe’s and Perkins’s affidavits in its grant of summary judgment. -7-