Opinion ID: 1991184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alternative arguments for reversal and new trial

Text: Through a protective cross-appeal, the Gordons raise additional grounds for reversal of the circuit court. First, the Gordons argue they were entitled to a peremptory instruction on whether Dr. Kemper violated the standard of care. Second, they argue the circuit court erred in excluding key evidence. The Court of Appeals, having reversed on the lost or diminished chance doctrine, found the Gordons' remaining arguments to be without merit. While we agree the Gordons' argument concerning a peremptory instruction is without merit, we disagree with the Court of Appeals as to the exclusion of certain evidence, and thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the circuit court in this regard and conclude the Gordons are entitled to a new trial.
The Gordons argue they were entitled to a peremptory instruction on Dr. Kemper's breach of the standard of care. To support their argument, the Gordons point out that Dr. Kemper believed he had ruled out all possible physical causes for Lori's symptoms once the ultrasound of her gallbladder and the CAT scan of her abdomen came back within normal limits. Further, the Gordons point to the testimony of one of Dr. Kemper's own experts, Dr. Ehrie, which they claim acknowledged that the failure to conduct further tests was a breach of the standard of care, and that all physical causes for Lori's symptoms could not be ruled out based only on the two tests Dr. Kemper ordered. Relying on this evidence, the Gordons claim they were entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of breach of the standard of care. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this Court has stated: [a]ll evidence which favors the prevailing party must be taken as true and the reviewing court is not at liberty to determine credibility or the weight which should be given to the evidence, these being functions reserved to the trier of fact. The prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. (Citations omitted.) USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kramer, 987 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.1999). Further, [w]here there is conflicting evidence, it is the responsibility of the jury to determine and resolve such conflicts[.] Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Ky.1998). Generally, a trial judge cannot enter a directed verdict unless there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact exist upon which reasonable minds could differ. Id. at 18-19. While the Gordons have pointed to evidence which would support their position, this does not resolve the issue. Dr. Kemper has pointed out that Dr. Ehrie testified the standard of care would not have required an upper gastrointestinal (GI) workup at the time Lori appeared in Dr. Kemper's office on April 15th. Further, Dr. Ehrie testified that ordering no further tests and allowing time to see if the medication addressed Lori's symptoms was not a deviation from the standard of care. Although it appears as if Dr. Ehrie gave conflicting testimony, this is not sufficient to warrant a directed verdict. The jury, responsible for resolving such conflicts, ruled in favor of Dr. Kemper. Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not err in denying the Gordons' motion for a directed verdict on breach of the standard of care, nor were the Gordons entitled to a peremptory instruction on this issue.
The Gordons argue the circuit court committed reversible error in excluding certain testimony offered by Drs. Ehrie and Rubin. They point out that Dr. Ehrie would have testified Lori was in the early stages of her disease when she saw Dr. Kemper. Further, Dr. Ehrie was of the opinion that had Lori returned to Dr. Kemper's office and been properly diagnosed, she would have survived. The circuit court concluded that since Dr. Ehrie was not a board certified oncologist, he did not qualify as an expert for the purpose of giving an opinion as to the likelihood of Lori's survival. Citing to Owensboro Mercy Health Sys. v. Payne, 24 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Ky.App.2000), the Gordons argue any lack of specialized training goes to weight, not admissibility. Further, they argue it is actual experience, skill, and knowledge which should be considered for admissibility, not the designation of a particular specialty. See Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Ky.1997). Thus, since Dr. Ehrie, as an internist, diagnoses and treats cancer patients in his practice, the Gordons claim it was reversible error to exclude his testimony. The Gordons seem to have over simplified the purpose of Dr. Ehrie's testimony. While he may have been qualified to determine if Lori's cancer should have been diagnosed sooner, and whether she would have been a candidate for treatment, this does not mean he was qualified to testify whether Lori would have survived. The decision to qualify a witness as an expert rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. See Payne, 24 S.W.3d at 677. Further, it is not qualification in the abstract, but whether the witness's qualifications provide the necessary foundation to respond to the specific question asked. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir.1994). Given Dr. Ehrie's education and experience, and the specific question asked, we cannot say the Gordons have demonstrated a clear abuse of discretion in excluding this evidence. Likewise, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's decision to exclude a portion of the testimony of one of the Gordons' experts, Dr. Rubin. Dr. Rubin would have testified Lori's cancer could have been treated through January of 1997. Dr. Rubin based her opinion on radiological studies which showed no abnormalities in the abdomen prior to that time. Based on these studies, Dr. Rubin concluded the tumor had not broken through the stomach wall and, thus, could have been treated. Dr. Kemper objected, claiming the Gordons failed to disclose this opinion as required under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 26.02. Unable to cite the court to specific disclosure, the Gordons argued they substantially complied by disclosing Dr. Rubin's general opinion that Lori's disease could have been treated. The circuit court concluded generalities were not sufficient and sustained the objection. This decision is in accord with the disclosure requirements set out in CR 26.02 and CR 26.05. As the Gordons failed to supplement prior expert disclosure, the circuit court acted within its discretion in excluding the evidence. See Welsh v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 41, 48-9 (Ky.App.2001).