Opinion ID: 1783903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Was the lower court in error by failing to grant attorney's fees to Janice in the May 21, 1990 judgment?

Text: On cross-appeal, Janice alleges that the chancellor was in error in failing to award her attorney fees in its judgment of May 21, 1990. Since the chancellor found Martin to be in willful contempt, attorney fees should have been assessed. Martin totally ignored the orders and judgments of the chancery court, thus, requiring Janice to initiate further proceedings. In Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328, 331 (Miss. 1986), we stated: Under § 93-5-23, Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1979), chancellors are extended broad discretionary authority to make all orders touching the maintenance and alimony of a wife in a divorce proceeding. The scope of this statute is broad and includes granting chancellors the authority to award attorneys fees in divorce proceedings. This Court has held on numerous occasions that a question concerning attorneys fees is largely a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Kergosien v. Kergosien, 471 So.2d 1206, 1212 (Miss. 1985). Unless the chancellor abuses his discretion in such matters, his decision as to whether or not to award attorneys fees will generally be upheld. Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So.2d 1366, 1375 (Miss. 1983). Dillon, 498 So.2d at 331. In O'Neill v. O'Neill, 501 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss. 1987), we upheld an award of attorney fees to the appellee where evidence existed that the extensive litigation involved was initiated by the appellant although the appellant was unwilling to settle the matters. O'Neill, 501 So.2d at 1119. It is apparent from the record that Martin has inflicted substantial injury, both monetary and otherwise, on his ex-wife and children by evading and ignoring the many prior judgments ordering him to provide support and our judicial system as well by consuming the court's valuable time and resources. Accordingly, we find that the chancellor abused his discretion in not awarding Janice attorney fees. The lower court's judgments are affirmed on direct appeal, but reversed and remanded for a determination of attorney fees. AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEALS; REVERSED AND REMANDED ON CROSS-APPEAL. HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs except to the cross-appeal on attorney fees.