Opinion ID: 1152888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Defendant Was Properly Convicted of Child Abuse (Count Four).

Text: A person is guilty of child abuse under A.R.S. § 13-3623(B) if, while having care or custody of [a] child, the person causes or permits the health of a child to be injured or causes or permits the child to be placed in a situation where its person or health is endangered. [1] Defendant's challenge to his conviction for child abuse revolves around the statutory words care or custody and particularly the word care. He claims that he did not have care of Rachel within the meaning of section 13-3623(B) and, therefore, could not be convicted of child abuse. See A.R.S. § 13-3623(B). On these grounds, defendant urged a Rule 20 motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Four, which the trial court denied. A. The legal standard of care or custody in section 13-3623 Neither care nor custody is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3623. When a term is not defined in a statute, the court looks first to the statute's language to determine the legislative intent, as the language is the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning. State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993) (quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991)). A statute is to be construed according to the fair meaning of [its] terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law. A.R.S. § 13-104. If the language of the statute is plain, the court looks no further. Williams, 175 Ariz. at 100, 854 P.2d at 133. We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated. State v. Johnson, 171 Ariz. 39, 41, 827 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1992). A dictionary may define a word's natural and obvious meaning. State v. Bews, 177 Ariz. 334, 336, 868 P.2d 347, 349 (App. 1993). Care is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as charge, supervision, management: responsibility for or attention to safety and well-being. The example given is under a doctor's care. Care is also defined as custody or temporary charge. Charge is defined as care, custody and management, supervision. Custody is defined as protection, care, maintenance, and tuition. Webster's New Int'l. Dict. (3d ed. 1976). Therefore, both custody and care, as they relate to A.R.S. § 13-3623, imply accepting responsibility for a child in some manner. Defendant urges us to adopt a definition of care that he asserts was adopted by the court of appeals in State v. Swanson, 184 Ariz. 194, 908 P.2d 8 (App. 1995). Although we agree with the result in Swanson, we do not agree with all of its reasoning. In Swanson, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 195, 908 P.2d at 9. Because he had two children as passengers, he was also convicted of two counts of negligent child abuse. Id.; A.R.S. § 13-3623(C). On appeal, the defendant argued that he should have been acquitted of the child abuse charges. The Swanson court agreed, finding that the defendant did not have care of the children within the meaning of the child abuse statute. Id. In doing so, the court of appeals first referred to a statutory definition of custody found in A.R.S. § 8-101(5): Custody means a status embodying all of the following rights and responsibilities: (a) The right to have the physical possession of the child. (b) The right and the duty to protect, train and discipline the child. (c) The responsibility to provide the child with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical care, and the authority to consent to surgery or other extraordinary medical care in an emergency. A.R.S. § 8-101(5); see Swanson, 184 Ariz. at 195-96, 908 P.2d at 9-10. This definition of custody is taken from the article of the code relating to adoptions, and its application is expressly limited to that article. A.R.S. § 8-101. Nothing indicates that the legislature intended this definition to relate to the child abuse statute, and we can think of no reason why the legislature would intend any such connection. See A.R.S. § 8-101(5). Having referred to the adoption code's definition of custody, the court of appeals then went on in Swanson to hold that the defendant did not have care of his two passengers necessary to bring him within the child abuse statute. Swanson, 184 Ariz. at 196, 908 P.2d at 10. The court stated that the word care implies more than the general duty of care owed to anyone who may be injured by one's negligence. Id. We agree with this finding in Swanson. The general duty of care in negligence cases, properly rejected by the Swanson court, has no application in a criminal case. Under A.R.S. § 13-3623, a defendant must, at the very least, be criminally negligent before he can be convicted, although one might incur civil liability under a lesser standard. Under the facts of Swanson, we have no quarrel with the result because no evidence proved that defendant took responsibility for either child in any manner; he only allowed the children to ride in his car. That may have been sufficient to impose tort liability, but was not sufficient to prove criminal liability under the child abuse statute. The court of appeals recently referred to Swanson in upholding a defendant's conviction for child abuse. State v. Billy Don Smith, 188 Ariz. 263, 935 P.2d 841 (App. 1996). We find Smith quite instructive. In Smith, the victim, Sedona, and her mother, Beth, had been living with the defendant in his van for about a month and a half before the victim died. Id. at 263-264, 935 P.2d at 841-42. During that time, the defendant treated Sedona like his daughter. Id. Beth stated, He became very insistent that he bathe her and feed her and hold her and do everything regarding the parenthood of Sedona. Id. at 263, 935 P.2d at 841. Sedona showed signs of illness about two days before she died. When Sedona stopped breathing, Beth told the defendant that they had to get her to a hospital. The defendant initially refused, claiming that he would be arrested for child abuse. Id. at 264, 935 P.2d at 842. However, he agreed after Beth threatened to scream out the window for help. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant drove around for quite awhile, making up excuses, before he actually arrived at the hospital, where he dropped them off and drove away. Id. at 264, 935 P.2d at 842. The defendant was convicted of felony murder and child abuse for failing to seek medical treatment. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that he should not have been convicted of child abuse because he did not have care or custody of Sedona. Id. at 265, 935 P.2d at 843. The court, however, found that he had care of Sedona because he voluntarily assumed responsibility for providing for the victim. Id. The court stated that whether the defendant had care of the child is a jury question. Id. The court found that the jury had sufficient evidence to find that the defendant had care of the child, stating, The issue of whether appellant had assumed responsibility for Sedona's care was simply a question of fact the jury found against appellant, and the record supports that finding. Id. Accordingly, because care and custody are common terms, this court will apply their usual meanings within the context of A.R.S. § 13-3623. Care and custody, in this context, require that the defendant accept responsibility for the child in some manner. Only when no substantial evidence exists to find that the defendant had care or custody of the child will a directed verdict of not guilty or a reversal of a conviction be appropriate. B. Factual Basis for a Finding of Care in This Case When a defendant claims that evidence is insufficient to support a verdict, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989). Rather, it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and thereby ascertain whether substantial evidence exists to sustain the verdict. State v. Zmich, 160 Ariz. 108, 109, 770 P.2d 776, 777 (1989); State v. Barger, 167 Ariz. 563, 568, 810 P.2d 191, 196 (App. 1990). A judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 is appropriate only when no substantial evidence [exists] to warrant a conviction. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 20(a). Substantial evidence is evidence that would convince an unprejudiced thinking mind about the truth of the fact for which the evidence is presented. State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 597, 832 P.2d 593, 614 (1992). If reasonable [persons] may fairly differ as to whether certain evidence establishes a fact in issue, then such evidence must be considered as substantial. State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 553, 633 P.2d 355, 362 (1981) (citations omitted). In this case, substantial evidence exists for a jury to find that defendant had care or custody of Rachel. He accepted responsibility for Rachel by his actions. Angela Gray and all three of her children moved into defendant's trailer about three months before Rachel died. Defendant provided food and shelter for the family. He acted as a caregiver to all of Gray's children and was, in essence, their stepfather, although not married to their mother. Rebecca, Gray's eleven-year-old daughter, testified that she had to ask permission of her mother or defendant before she could go outside and play. On the day that Rachel's injuries occurred, Rebecca had asked defendant's permission twice to go outside: once to go to a friend's house and once to ride her bike. Rebecca testified to the manner in which defendant disciplined  by sending the child to his or her room. Additionally, defendant told the children that they were not allowed to play in his van because he had tools and other things in it that might hurt them. Defendant clearly accepted responsibility for Rachel by taking her out alone with him on three separate occasions on the fateful day. He continued to assert responsibility over her by telling people who were concerned about her condition that he had taken her to the paramedics and they had pronounced her all right. Having assumed responsibility for Rachel, it would be anomalous in the extreme to find that defendant's responsibility for her ended when he deliberately inflicted the fatal injuries upon her. The jury received substantial evidence to find that defendant had care or custody of Rachel within the meaning of A.R.S. § 13-3623.