Opinion ID: 761068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Step One--Permissibility of Departure Factors

Text: 20 Our starting point, in any discussion of departure from the sentencing guidelines, must be the statutory pronouncements of Congress and the related pronouncements of the United States Sentencing Commission. Congress has instructed courts not to depart from the applicable sentencing guidelines unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0 (1998). We have held that upward departures under § 4A1.3, such as the one employed by the district court in this case, are a subset of departures under § 5K2.0. See United States v. Maldonado-Campos, 920 F.2d 714, 719 n. 2 (10th Cir.1990). Section 4A1.3 permits an upward departure when reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes (emphasis added). The district court, in imposing the upward departure in this case, seemed to rely largely on the first prong, 1 stating that I think this is an atypical case. Factual basis for departure is that ... the defendant was assessed only five criminal history points as a result of five convictions. R.Vol. 7, at 25. 21 We must first determine whether the district court's stated ground for departure is a permissible ground. Underrepresentation of a defendant's criminal history is clearly a permissible ground for an upward departure. Because section 4A1.3 provides an encouraged basis for departure not already taken into account by the Commission, over-representation of a defendant's criminal history or likelihood for recidivism always will be an approved ground for departure. Collins, 122 F.3d at 1304. 22 But this does not end the inquiry. We must next determine whether the factual bases set forth by the district court in support of its finding of underrepresentation are themselves permissible grounds for departure. See id. (stating that [t]hese supporting facts themselves must constitute permissible grounds for departure). Upon examination, we think the factual bases relied upon by the district court constitute permissible grounds for departure. 23 Under the sentencing guidelines, [p]rior sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for the purposes of tabulating criminal history points. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(2) (1998). [P]rior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. Id. § 4A1.2, Application Note 3. In this case, the district court found that the three theft convictions and the one harassment conviction were related under this section. As a result, Carreon-Ortega was assigned only two criminal history points for these convictions. 24 The Sentencing Commission explicitly recognized that this rule regarding related offenses could result in several convictions going uncounted. The Commission stated that court[s] should be aware that there may be instances in which this definition is overly broad and will result in a criminal history score that underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and the danger that he presents to the public. Id. This court has sanctioned similar upward departures in prior cases, where the district court determined that the defendant's criminal history was underrepresented due to uncounted related offenses. See United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 280 (10th Cir.1990) (upholding a district court's decision to depart upward because of uncounted related offenses, and stating that [w]e have little difficulty in concluding that ... the district court's justifications for departure were not already adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines, ... since the Sentencing Commission explicitly stated in Application Note 3 that uncounted offenses could give rise to underrepresentation); see also United States v. Rivas, 922 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (10th Cir.1991) (making a similar holding). Other circuits have also sanctioned upward departures under similar circumstances, citing Application Note 3. See, e.g., United States v. Connelly, 156 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Gammon, 961 F.2d 103, 106 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 334 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Metcalf, 898 F.2d 43, 46 n. 6 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Jackson, 883 F.2d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, it is beyond question that a district court may depart upward from the sentencing guidelines' heartland when it determines that the defendant's criminal history is underrepresented due to uncounted related offenses. 25 Finally, we must determine whether the specific factual circumstances described by the district court in this case, in support of its finding of underrepresentation, are permissible departure factors. Collins, 122 F.3d at 1305. In this case, the district court cited three uncounted misdemeanor offenses; Carreon-Ortega was given only two criminal history points for four separate convictions of misdemeanor theft and harassment. The question before us is whether an upward departure is permissible on these facts, and, specifically, whether an upward departure is permissible on the basis of uncounted misdemeanor offenses. 26 At least one circuit has, at least most of the time, imposed a seriousness requirement for upward departures based on uncounted criminal conduct, stating that uncounted criminal conduct must in all cases cross a threshold of 'seriousness' to support a departure. Connelly, 156 F.3d at 984 (although citing some Ninth Circuit cases which did not require an explicit showing of seriousness). The Ninth Circuit implies such a requirement from the language of § 4A1.3 and from the examples of departure-worthy conduct listed in § 4A1.3. Id.; see also United States v. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir.1993). This circuit has never explicitly adopted this seriousness requirement in cases construing Application Note 3. 2 Other circuits either have not addressed the issue, or have been willing to impose upward departures on the basis of uncounted misdemeanor offenses. See Gammon, 961 F.2d at 106 (approving a district court decision to upward depart based on an uncounted conviction for a lesser included offense of theft); cf. United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 744 (5th Cir.1992) (approving a district court decision to depart upward on the basis of a juvenile adjudication for burglary and a misdemeanor conviction for theft where both were outside the limitations period; this latter conviction involved a violent purse snatching). There are also a number of cases within the Ninth Circuit which have increased sentences based on uncounted misdemeanor convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 858, 862-63 (9th Cir.1991) (making no mention of a seriousness requirement, and sanctioning an upward departure based on prior misdemeanors). 27 Even under the Ninth Circuit line of cases applying the seriousness requirement in Application Note 3 cases, the application of the rule has been less than uniform. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has termed immigration violations, marijuana trafficking, and prison fights and public transportation fare evasion as serious conduct, while declaring that auto burglary and tribal convictions for assault and battery fall outside the serious category. See Connelly, 156 F.3d at 984 (citing cases). It appears to us that even under the Ninth Circuit's rule, some misdemeanors would qualify as serious conduct while others would not. Application of the Ninth Circuit's rule would not necessarily aid Carreon-Ortega. 28 However, we do not think we need to decide, in this case, whether we would apply a similar rule in Application Note 3 cases. Even assuming, arguendo, that such a rule applied in this case, we think Carreon-Ortega's conduct is sufficiently serious to form a permissible basis for an upward departure, even under the Ninth Circuit's seriousness requirement. The uncounted offenses included a December 1988 incident in which Carreon-Ortega and two accomplices confronted the female victim on the street, stole her purse, and drove off; a December 1988 incident in which Carreon-Ortega threw a hard object through a window of the same woman's trailer, while yelling I'm going to get you; and a March 1989 incident in which Carreon-Ortega and one accomplice again accosted the same victim on the street and again stole her purse. R.Supp.Vol. 1, at 8-9. These incidents are different from, and more serious than, marijuana possession or tribal convictions for misdemeanor assault and battery, and at least as serious as other offenses deemed serious by the Ninth Circuit, such as immigration violations, and prison fights and transportation fare evasion. See Connelly, 156 F.3d at 984. These incidents are also much more serious than the conduct at issue in United States v. Wyne, 41 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir.1994), an Application Note 8 case in which the defendant's uncounted offense was assault on a female, but where the relevant state statute defined the offense broadly, to include even instances of yelling at a female, and where there was no evidence in the record setting forth the nature of the defendant's specific criminal conduct. Id. at 1408-09. We are persuaded that a pattern of uncounted criminal conduct which includes two separate instances of purse snatching and one incident where the defendant threw a hard object into an occupied residence is sufficiently serious to permit a district court to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines' heartland. 3 29 Therefore, we hold that the factors relied upon by the district court in making its decision to depart upward are permissible departure factors. Regardless of whether we apply the Ninth Circuit's seriousness requirement, it is permissible for the district court to depart upward on the basis of two uncounted convictions for misdemeanor theft, and one uncounted conviction for misdemeanor harassment. 30