Opinion ID: 545173
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The UAW as a Virtual Representative

Text: 35 In certain limited circumstances, this court has held that a person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 210, 46 L.Ed.2d 137 (1975). Arguably, if this close alignment of interests existed between Meza and the UAW, there might be sufficient identity of the parties under the doctrine of virtual representation to satisfy the privity requirement of res judicata despite the fact that the UAW acted without Meza's consent. 36 The question of virtual representation is to be kept within strict confines. Benson and Ford, Inc. v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 833 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir.1982)). Among the strict confines is a requirement that there be an express or implied legal relationship in which parties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties who file a subsequent suit raising identical issues. Benson and Ford, supra, 833 F.2d at 1175; Hardy, supra, 681 F.2d at 340; Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir.1978). 37 In the instant case, there is no express or implied legal relationship between Meza and the UAW. Meza was not a member of the UAW when the Union brought its suit. Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that Meza consented to the Union's representation, or that the Union had a contractual duty to provide such representation. Nor did the UAW have a statutory obligation to represent Meza. See Central States Pension Fund v. Central Transp., 472 U.S. 559, 105 S.Ct. 2833, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (union's duty is confined to current employees employed in the bargaining unit in which it has representational rights); UMWA Health & Ret. Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 574-75, 102 S.Ct. 1226, 1233-34, 71 L.Ed.2d 419 (1982) (former members ... may suffer from discrimination in collective-bargaining agreements because the union need not 'affirmatively ... represent [them]) (quoting Allied Chemical, supra, 404 U.S. at 181 n. 20, 92 S.Ct. at 398 n. 20). Moreover, even if the UAW volunteered to represent Meza, it is doubtful whether the Union owed him a duty of fair representation. 11 In light of the foregoing, we cannot see how the UAW could be accountable to Meza in any way. Therefore, we conclude that the doctrine of virtual representation has no application in this case. 38