Opinion ID: 857985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Staylog-Engaging Zone”

Text: The district court construed “staylog-engaging zone” as “[t]he portion of the flitch that includes holes of varying depths, as distinct from the veneer-producing zone.” J.A. 18. This term appears in the asserted claims from of the ’995 and ’828 patents. Capital argues that the term should not be limited to being “distinct from the veneerproducing zone” or to “holes of varying depths.” We hold that the district court correctly concluded that the “staylog-engaging zone” must be “distinct from the veneer-producing zone.” The plain language of the claims shows that the two zones are distinct. Both claim 1 Disclaimer during the prosecution of one patent applies to other patents in the same family when the patents are directly related, such as through a parentchild relationship. If the patents at issue are familial, but are not directly related, the question whether disclaimer applies will depend on the facts of the case. Based on the common use of the term “flitch” in the specifications of the patents-in-suit and their familial relationship to each other, we conclude that disclaimer applies equally to each asserted claim. CAPITAL MACHINE COMPANY, INC. v. MILLER VENEERS, INC. 9 16 of the ’995 patent and claim 15 of the ’828 patent, for example, recite cutting a “hole that extends through the staylog-engaging zone to the veneer-producing zone.” This is consistent with the patents’ specifications, which state that holes used to secure the flitch to the staylog “extend from a flitch mounting surface to the veneerproducing zone so as to define a boundary between the veneer-producing zone and the staylog-engaging zone.” ’995 patent at [57]; ’828 patent at [57]. We conclude, however, that the court erred by limiting the term to “holes of varying depths.” Nothing in the term “staylog-engaging zone” requires varying depth holes, and both the ’995 and the ’828 patents disclose that cutting varying depth holes is just one possible way to orient a tapered flitch so that its outside surface is parallel to the slicing knife. These patents also disclose an embodiment in which the tapered flitch is mounted flat on the staylog, which is then rotated to orient the flitch parallel to the knife. ’995 patent col.9 ll.60–64; ’828 patent col.9 l.66–col.10 l.3. This embodiment does not require holes of varying depths. C. “Predetermined Pattern/Predetermined Position” The district court similarly construed the terms “predetermined pattern” and “predetermined position” to require that the holes cut in the flitch to mount it to the staylog have varying depths. J.A. 18–19, 24. The term “predetermined pattern” appears in the asserted claims of the ’995 patent and the term “predetermined position” appears in the asserted claims of ’938 patent. The plain and ordinary meaning of these terms does not require holes of varying depths. Furthermore, as discussed above, the ’995 patent discloses an embodiment in which a tapered flitch is oriented parallel to the slicing knife by rotating the staylog. ’995 patent col.9 ll.60–64. Varying depth holes would be unnecessary in that embodiment. Moreover, with respect to the term “predeter- 10 CAPITAL MACHINE COMPANY, INC. v. MILLER VENEERS, INC. mined position,” the ’938 patent discloses an embodiment with holes of equal depth. ’938 patent col.8 ll.31–42. The district court erred by construing these terms to require varying depth holes. D. “Veneer-Producing Zone” The district court construed “veneer-producing zone” as “[t]he portion of the flitch parallel to the veneer-slicing knife and from which veneer is cut, as distinct from the staylog-engaging zone.” J.A. 16. Capital argues that this term should not be limited to being parallel to the veneerslicing knife because the ’828 patent is directed to preparing a flitch rather than slicing it, and thus the claims do not require a “veneer-slicing knife.” Capital also contends that the “veneer-producing zone” need not be “distinct from the staylog-engaging zone.” We hold that the district court correctly construed this term. The ’828 patent states that normally, when tapered flitches are mounted to a staylog, the veneer-producing zone is not parallel to the slicing knife. ’828 patent col.7 ll.19–23. As a result, the patent states that “a need exists . . . to allow the flitch to be mounted on a staylog so as to orient the semi-cylindrical veneer-producing zone of the flitch parallel to the veneer slicing knife while the flitch mounting surface may be oriented at an angle to the staylog mounting surface.” Id. col.2 ll.28–35. In the claimed invention, “the veneer-producing zone . . . is arranged with its axis of rotation parallel to the slicing knife.” Id. col.7 ll.23–27. The patent thus defines the “veneer-producing zone” as being parallel to the slicing knife. With regard to Capital’s second argument, we con- clude that the district court correctly construed “veneerproducing zone” as being distinct from the “staylogengaging zone” for the reasons discussed above. We thus hold that the court correctly construed the term “veneerproducing zone.” CAPITAL MACHINE COMPANY, INC. v. MILLER VENEERS, INC. 11 E. “Dogs” The district court construed the term “dogs” as “[d]evices without movable parts that apply force to grip or retain a flitch on the veneer slicer.” J.A. 14–15 (emphasis added). This term appears in the asserted claims of the ’137, ’938, and ’843 patents. Capital argues that the patents do not restrict “dogs” to having no movable parts, and points out that the patents disclose “movable dogs.” Miller counters that the specifications disclose only dogs without movable parts. Miller contends that “movable dogs” are simply dogs mounted on a pivotable arm, and thus may move them- selves but have no movable parts. The plain and ordinary meaning of “dogs” does not restrict the term to having no movable parts, and Miller points to nothing in the patents’ specifications showing that Capital limited dogs in this way. Although Miller is correct that having movable dogs does not mean that the dog itself has movable parts, this does not justify limiting the term in a way that is inconsistent with its plain meaning and is not supported by the intrinsic record. We thus hold that the district court erred by restricting “dogs” to devices “without movable parts.”