Opinion ID: 151935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Scott Is Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction.

Text: Scott has persuaded us that he is entitled to preliminary relief. For the reasons we have stated, Scott is exceedingly likely to prevail on the merits of his claim that the excess spending subsidy violates the First Amendment. Davis compels this conclusion. Moreover, as we have explained, preliminary relief would not be adverse to the public interest. On this record, because Scott is highly likely to prevail after a full trial on the merits, we must enjoin the operation of the excess spending subsidy. Courts have often treated the likelihood of success on the merits as dispositive where, as here, difficult to quantify and apparently similar harms are at issue. 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.3 (2d ed.1995). [T]he less certain the district court is of the likelihood of success on the merits, the more plaintiffs must convince the district court that the public interest and balance of hardships tip in their favor. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 918. We have even treated the merits as influencing our view of the relative severity of the harms. Most relevant here, when assessing the severity of burdens on speech, we have held that even a temporary infringement of First Amendment rights constitutes a serious and substantial injury. KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272. Similarly, we have held that the public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law. See id. ([T]he city has no legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance.); Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter., 648 F.2d at 959 (Given appellants' substantial likelihood of success on the merits, however, the harm to the city from delaying enforcement is slight.). So we are in complete agreement with the view of the district court that Scott is entitled to relief if his claim is likely to succeed. Although we appreciate the careful consideration the district court accorded these difficult issues, we disagree with the final step of its reasoning. One final point about severance, because the district court raised the issue. The district court suggested that, in the light of its view of the manner in which the excess spending subsidy encouraged participation in the public financing system, invalidating the subsidy might also require invalidating the $500 contribution limit. It is not clear whether the district court thought that it might have to strike the contribution limit as it applied to all candidates or only participating candidates. No party, however, suggests that we cannot preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the excess spending subsidy without also preliminarily enjoining enforcement of other provisions of the Act, and Scott argues that consideration of the severance issue is premature anyway. Consideration of the issue of severance might be premature because we will not invalidateonly preliminarily enjointhe excess subsidy provision, but we have no problem concluding that the excess spending subsidy is severable. Florida clearly favors (where possible) severance of the invalid portions of a law from the valid ones. Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1269 n. 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Florida employs a well-established four-part test to determine whether severance is appropriate: (1) the unconstitutional provision can be separated from the remaining valid provisions; (2) the legislative purpose of the act can be achieved without the invalid provision; (3) the valid and invalid features are not so inseparable that the legislature could only have wanted them to exist together; and (4) a complete act remains after severance. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 948-49 (11th Cir.2003). Here, as is in almost any case, we can easily separate the excess spending subsidy from the remainder of the Act and the Act remains complete even after severance. Id. at 949. We disagree with the district court that, because the legislature adopted a $500 limit on private contributions when it created the excess spending subsidy, the two provisions are tied so that we could not enjoin the operation of only the subsidy. The $500 limit on private contributions is generally applicable so that it burdens all candidates even when none accept public funds. Moreover, we have little trouble concluding that the Florida Legislature would want to sever the subsidy because the Act contains a severability provision that applies to any provision of [the] act, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-107 § 36. See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1090 (Fla.1987). For the reasons that we concluded that the subsidy was not narrowly tailored to the goal of encouraging participation in the public financing system, we also conclude that the legislative purpose of the Act can be served without the subsidy.