Opinion ID: 221079
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direction of mandatory and specific action

Text: Myers argues that there are two sources of mandatory and specific action in this case: The Manual provision requiring the Navy to review HASPs and the FFA provision requiring the project QAO to ensure that all work is performed in accordance with approved work plans, sampling plans, and QAPPS. The Navy argues that neither source imposed sufficiently specific requirements to divest the Navy of its discretion. i. Manual provisions. On appeal, Myers asserts that the Manual required that the HASP be reviewed by the Navy's CIH or similar competent person, not just by an employee of the contractor. The Navy argues that the provision of the Manual on which Myers relies does not specify how any review of the HASP was to be conducted and was not specific enough to remove discretion. The Navy also contends that the HASP was reviewed by the contractor's CIH. The district court made no findings on this issue. The relevant provision in the Manual, ¶ 0407.c, uses the unambiguously mandatory shall in stating the requirement for review of HASPs by a competent person. A competent person is defined as a CIH or equivalent by training and/or experience. The preceding provision in the Manual specifies that [e]ach NAVFACENGCOM activity shall ensure that plans are reviewed and accepted prior to issuing the Notice to Proceed. Manual, ¶ 0407.b. Because the NAVFACENGCOM is the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and this provision is also cast in the unambiguously mandatory terms shall ensure, this provision imposed upon the Navy itself a mandatory and specific duty to ensure that plans were reviewed and accepted. See Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129. In short, read in conjunction, paragraphs 0407.b and 0407.c of the Manual required review of HASPs by the Navy's competent person. No meaningful review  and certainly no meaningful review by the Navy  would be accomplished by having a contractor's CIH review the contractor's own HASP, particularly if the contractor's CIH is also the author of the contractor's HASP, as is the case here. This federal ... policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow, review by the Navy of a contractor's HASP by a competent person, such that the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. Thus, the Manual specifically prescribes a course of conduct, leaving nothing to the Navy's discretion. See Kelly v. United States, 241 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir.2001). The provision is not so uncertain in its definition of the requisite training of the person conducting the review that it is discretionary. Rather, the provision expressly requires review by a certified industrial hygienist [(CIH)] or equivalent by training and/or experience. Manual, ¶ 0407.c. (emphasis added). This specification of equivalence to a CIH by training and/or experience is sufficiently specific to define the requisite training of the person conducting the review. Although some professional judgment might be involved in deciding whether or not a particular person actually is the equivalent of a CIH by training and/or experience, that professional judgment is not the same as discretion. Moreover, in Bolt v. United States, 509 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2007), this court found that a comparable policy provision was sufficiently mandatory and specific to make the discretionary function exception inapplicable. In Bolt, this court held that the Army's Snow Removal Policy was sufficiently specific and mandatory to avoid application of the discretionary function exception, where it required that snow be removed from family housing parking areas once per year in late February or March. Bolt, 509 F.3d at 1032-33. This court found that this provision expressly impose[d] a specific and mandatory duty to clear Family Housing Parking Areas of snow and ice once a year, before the end of March, so that the Army had failed its burden under the first prong of the discretionary function analysis. Id. at 1033. This was so, even though the policy did not specify how the snow was to be removed or the training or qualifications of the person to perform the snow removal. See also Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944 (9th Cir.2000). Even supposing that the Navy had some discretion in the fulfillment of its duty to review HASPs, it had no discretion under the policy expressed in the Manual about whether or not to review the HASP at all and no discretion for such a review to be performed by anyone other than a Navy CIH or other competent person. Therefore, upon de novo review, we hold that the district court erred in determining that the Navy had met its burden on the first prong of the discretionary function analysis, because the Manual did impose mandatory and specific, requirements for review by the Navy of the contractor's HASP. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129. [4] Because the Manual directed mandatory and specific action, the inquiry comes to an end because there can be no element of discretion when an employee `has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive,' and the discretionary function exception is inapplicable. Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954). [5] ii. FFA provisions. Myers also argues that the FFA included mandatory and specific provisions regarding the Navy's obligation to ensure that safety procedures were followed. Specifically, she relies on the provision of the FFA requiring the Navy to designate a QAO to oversee field work and to ensure compliance with work plans and sampling plans. FFA, ¶ 20.1. The Navy contends that this provision did not specifically describe how the QAO was to ensure compliance with work or safety plans, nor did it remove discretion to delegate certain functions to the contractor. The district court did address this dispute, at least in its 2004 ruling on the Navy's motion to dismiss: The district court held that the FFA did not create any mandatory duty, because it did not specify how the Navy would carry out its duty to supervise. In its ruling on the first phase of the bench trial, the district court did not specifically address the FFA provisions at issue. The district court did conclude, however, that the evidence showed that Defendant made policy-based decisions regarding discretionary questions of whether to do the remediation work at all, and whether to do the work itself  or select a contractor. The FFA provision at issue, like the Manual provision discussed above, uses mandatory language: The QAO  will ensure that all work is performed in accordance with approved work plans, sampling plans and QAPPS and  shall maintain for inspection a log of quality assurance field activities and provide a copy to the Parties upon request. FFA, ¶ 20.1 (emphasis added). Again, these provisions specifically prescribe[] a course of action for an employee [the QAO] to follow, such that the employee [the QAO] has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. Unlike the provisions of the Manual discussed above, however, the first provision, at least, does not indicate what the [Navy] must do to comply with the QAO's duty to ensure that all work is performed in accordance with work and sampling plans. Thus, it does leave that aspect to the government's discretion. The second provision, which undisputably requires that the QAO maintain a log, also is not sufficiently specific as to what must be logged as a quality assurance field activity. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the cited provisions of the FFA are discretionary. Thus, at least as to the FFA provisions upon which Myers relies, the court must proceed to the second prong of the discretionary function inquiry. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129.