Opinion ID: 787685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Imbrieco's Plea Allocution and Michael Fortunato's Grand Jury Testimony

Text: 34 We turn first to whether the District Court's admission of two hearsay statements — Imbrieco's plea allocution and Michael's grand jury testimony — violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). 6 There, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the state trial court admitted a statement made by the defendant's wife to the police, notwithstanding the wife's unavailability to testify at trial due to the invocation of the marital privilege. Specifically, the Court held that [t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [are to be] admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 1369. In reaching this conclusion, the Court identified earlier lower federal court cases where testimonial statements had been admitted in contravention of its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, including cases where a plea allocution show[ed] [the] existence of a conspiracy, id. at 1372 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d 98, 104-05 (2d Cir.2001)), and cases involving the admission of grand jury testimony, see id. (citing, inter alia, United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118-20 (8th Cir.2000)). 35 In a letter brief submitted pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 28(j), the Government does not dispute the applicability of Crawford to the admission of Imbrieco's plea allocution and Michael's grand jury testimony; there is no question that both hearsay statements were testimonial statements made by declarants (a) who were unavailable to testify at the time that their hearsay statements were admitted into evidence, and (b) whose hearsay statements were not subject to cross examination by the defendants at the time the statements were made. Instead, the Government argues that our review is limited to plain error because (i) no Confrontation Clause objection was raised to the admission of Imbrieco's plea allocution, and (ii) the only Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of Michael's grand jury testimony was made in a footnote contained in a letter brief to the District Court. See United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 60 (2d Cir.2002) (We adhere to the principle that, as a general matter, a hearsay objection by itself does not automatically preserve a Confrontation Clause claim.). For the reasons set forth below, we find that the admission of these hearsay statements was plain error, and we exercise our discretion to vacate the convictions with respect to the false-statement conspiracy charged in Count IV. 36 [B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Here, it cannot be gainsaid that the District Court plainly erred in admitting into evidence testimonial hearsay statements that the Crawford Court expressly stated are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause. We hasten to observe that the able District Court made its rulings before the Supreme Court issued Crawford, and that only a soothsayer could have known with any certainty that the Court would change the legal landscape. That these statements were clearly admissible under our interpretation of the Confrontation Clause at the time they were admitted is of no moment, however, given that [a]n error is `plain' if it is `clear' or `obvious' at the time of appellate consideration.  United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir.2001) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467-68, 117 S.Ct. 1544). 37 Next, we conclude that this error affected the substantial rights of Polito and Fortunato. The Supreme Court has identified two kinds of errors that substantially affect a defendant's rights. The first class of errors are structural errors, that is, a defect affecting the framework within which [a] trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). These structural errors are so serious that they defy harmless-error analysis, and thus have been found by the Supreme Court in only ... a very limited class of cases. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69, 117 S.Ct. 1544. 7 To date, the Supreme Court has not held that the Confrontation Clause error raised here is one of those cases. 38 With regard to all other errors, such an error affects a defendant's substantial rights if it is prejudicial and it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Thomas, 274 F.3d at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted). Though prejudice is also required to show that an error is not harmless, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), the important difference of plain error prejudice [in most cases] is that it is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). 8 Because we find that the admission of these hearsay statements fails to satisfy the more exacting test applicable to non-structural errors, we need not — and do not — decide whether the District Court's error in admitting these statements was a structural error that would not require a finding of prejudicial effect. 39 The erroneous admission of evidence is not harmless unless [we] can conclude with fair assurance that [this] evidence did not substantially influence the jury. United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir.1999); see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). An error in the admission of evidence may be deemed harmless only if it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, we consider principally whether the [G]overnment's case against the defendant[s] was strong; whether the evidence in question bears on an issue that is plainly critical to the jury's decision ...; whether the evidence was emphasized in the [G]overnment's presentation of its case and in its arguments to the jury; and whether the case was close. Id. at 108-09 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 40 We cannot conclude with fair assurance that the admission of Imbrieco's plea allocution and Michael's grand jury testimony did not substantially influence the jury's guilty verdict. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 2004 WL 1682768, at  (2d Cir. July 28, 2004) (finding that the erroneous admission of the co-conspirators' testimonial plea allocutions was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt). Indeed, Michael's grand jury testimony was the only evidence offered to support the charge that Fortunato had corruptly endeavored to influence Michael's grand jury testimony, and, thus, this testimony formed the entire basis for the obstruction-of-justice violation alleged in Count VIII and for Racketeering Act Four in Count II. Plainly, then, the admission of this testimony contributed to the jury's conclusion that Fortunato committed these offenses. In any event, even were we to deem Michael's grand jury testimony admissible, for the reasons discussed below, the evidence was insufficient to support the defendants' convictions under Counts II and VIII ( see discussion infra Parts II.B and II.C.1, respectively), which, therefore, are reversed instead of vacated. 41 Imbrieco's plea allocution was also offered to establish the false-statement and obstruction-of-justice conspiracies charged in Count IV. One of the elements of a conspiracy to obstruct justice or to defraud the government is, of course, an agreement to do so. See United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 832 (2d Cir.1996); see also United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 105-06 (2d Cir.2002). Here, the only evidence that an illegal agreement existed, either to make false statements or to obstruct justice, was (i) Imbrieco's plea allocution, and (ii) Cerasulo's testimony that, shortly after the shootings, the defendants agreed to stick together and not tell nobody who did nothing. As discussed below, however, see discussion infra Part II.C., Cerasulo's testimony alone is insufficient to establish an agreement either to make false statements to the FBI or to obstruct justice by corruptly endeavoring to influence the grand jury testimony of Giuseppe and/or Michael. Thus, it is clear that the admission of Imbrieco's plea allocution contributed to the jury's conclusion that Polito and Fortunato conspired to obstruct justice and to make false statements to the FBI. 42 Because there was plain error and because that error affected the substantial rights of Polito and Fortunato, we turn to the fourth prong of the plain-error test — whether we should exercise our discretion to notice the plain error. We are permitted to exercise our discretion to notice a plain error only when the error `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Thomas, 274 F.3d at 671 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). We find that the fairness and integrity of the proceedings in this case were seriously affected by the unconstitutional admission of these hearsay statements. 43 Here, as we discuss in more detail below, the evidence supporting the defendants' convictions was, with respect to most of the counts charged in the indictment, legally insufficient. Indeed, some of the convictions are supported by quanta of evidence that are deemed legally sufficient only because, in assessing a legal-sufficiency challenge, we must consider improperly admitted hearsay testimony. 9 And the only count that is supported by properly admitted, legally sufficient evidence (Count VI) relates to the cover-up of acts for which we find Polito and Fortunato were not criminally liable as charged. It is also notable that, but for the inclusion of the obstruction-of-justice predicate act, the substantive RICO charges, at least, would be time-barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations. 10 Allowing these cover-up convictions to stand based solely on unconstitutionally inadmissible hearsay testimony would indeed lead to a result that would seriously call into question the fairness and integrity of these proceedings. For all of these reasons, we exercise our discretion to notice the plain error of the District Court in admitting the hearsay testimony of Michael and Imbrieco, and we vacate the convictions for false-statement conspiracy under Count IV of the indictment. 11