Opinion ID: 620466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Law .1) The Right To Be Present

Text: A defendant in a criminal case has the right to be present at every trial stage. Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(2); see United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 360 (2d Cir.1997) (right to be present rooted in Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and Fifth Amendment Due Process clause). The right to be present has been extended to require that messages from a jury should be disclosed to counsel and that counsel should be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responds. United States v. Mejia, 356 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (when jury note relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the communication to counsel for all parties) (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 38-40, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975)); United States v. Schor, 418 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir.1969). We have explained that the proper practice for handling jury inquiries is as follows: (1) the jury inquiry should be in writing; (2) the note should be marked as the court's exhibit and read into the record with counsel and defendant present; (3) counsel should have an opportunity to suggest a response, and the judge should inform counsel of the response to be given; and (4) on the recall of the jury, the trial judge should read the note into the record, allowing an opportunity to the jury to correct the inquiry or to elaborate upon it. Mejia, 356 F.3d at 475; accord United States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d 931, 934 (2d Cir.1981). Allowing counsel to be heard reduces the risk that the trial court will respond in a way that prejudices one side. See Ronder, 639 F.2d at 934. In general, the trial court should not respond to a jury note in an ex parte manner. Ex parte communications are pregnant with possibilities for error. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 460, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). Specifically, ex parte communication between the judge and a member of the jury may unintentionally drift into a supplemental instruction, id. at 462, 98 S.Ct. 2864, for which the defendant has a well-established right to be present, Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 588-89, 47 S.Ct. 478, 71 L.Ed. 787 (1927) (supplementary instructions ... ought to be given either in the presence of counsel or after notice and an opportunity to be present); accord Rogers, 422 U.S. at 38-39, 95 S.Ct. 2091. Furthermore, [u]nexpected questions or comments can generate unintended and misleading impressions of the judge's subjective personal views. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 460, 98 S.Ct. 2864. Gypsum provides one example of an ex parte exchange between judge and juror that inadvertently resulted in a constitutional violation. In Gypsum, the foreman requested a meeting with the trial judge to discuss the condition of the jury. Id. at 431, 98 S.Ct. 2864. Counsel reluctantly consented to the meeting. Id. at 432, 98 S.Ct. 2864. At the end of the meeting, the foreman said to the judge, You are after a verdict one way or the other. Id. The judge responded, Which way it goes doesn't make any difference to me. Id. The Supreme Court held that this exchange amounted to a supplemental instruction regarding the jury's obligation to return a verdict. Id. at 462, 98 S.Ct. 2864. The Court found the conversation particularly troubling in light of the fact that counsel was denied the opportunity to correct any prejudice that might have resulted from the exchange. Id.