Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: The Special Circumstances Findings

Text: Referring to his argument, discussed above, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Inez Blanco was an accomplice as a matter of law and that her testimony required corroboration and should be viewed with distrust, defendant argues that this omission also requires reversal of the jury's findings, as special circumstances, that the murder was committed during the commission of an attempted robbery and a burglary. As explained above, any such error is harmless, because Inez Blanco's testimony was sufficiently corroborated. ( Ante, at pp. 981-982.) (32a) Relying on the rule stated in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], that a finding of special circumstances is improper if the robbery [or burglary] is merely incidental to the murder, defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the special circumstances findings. We disagree. In Green, the sole object of the robbery was to facilitate or conceal the primary crime of murder. ( Ibid. ) The defendant took the victim's purse, clothes, and rings in order to conceal her identity. The facts in the present case are dissimilar. There is no indication defendant committed the burglary or attempted robbery in order to facilitate or conceal the murder. Instead, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that defendant intended to rob and then kill his victim. Inez Blanco testified that defendant needed money, and that the victim kept both cash and valuable jewelry in her home. In addition, Ruby Gonzales's 13-year-old daughter Marci testified she heard her mother pleading with her attacker, I will give you the money and the jewelry. Defendant argues this statement proves that defendant's sole purpose was to kill the victim, because he refused her offer of money and valuables, killed her, and left with nothing. The jury reasonably could have concluded otherwise. An equally plausible interpretation of the victim's statement is that the victim was responding to defendant's demand for money and jewelry. A likely reason defendant fled without completing the robbery was that he knew Marci Gonzales had telephoned the police. Defendant relies upon the holding in People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]. In that case, the defendant entered the residence of a couple who were engaged to be married and demanded money at gunpoint but did not take the cash and jewelry produced by the victims, later stating he did not want these things. After demanding and receiving the key to the victims' automobile, the defendant said to the woman, `You know why I'm here and you know who sent me,' and shot both victims, killing the man. ( Id. at p. 311.) The surviving victim testified that her former husband had threatened to kill her fiance and harm her. We held the evidence was insufficient to sustain special circumstances findings that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery and burglary, reasoning that the defendant's refusal to accept valuables that were given to him was inconsistent with an intent to steal and that the statement made by the defendant just prior to shooting the victims revealed that his true purpose was to shoot the victims. We concluded that the defendant's demand for and acceptance of the key to the victim's automobile, viewed in context, indicated a desire for a means of escape rather than an intent to steal. The present case is different from Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303. Gonzales offered to give defendant money and jewelry, but such valuables were not actually produced and refused, as was the case in Thompson. The record supports the inference in the present case that defendant intended first to kill Gonzales and then steal her money and jewelry, but abandoned this plan when the victim's daughter summoned the police. Also, unlike the defendant in Thompson, defendant in the present case did not state that his intention was not to steal. Defendant contends that his extrajudicial statements (made shortly before the murder), requesting money from his sister, cannot be used to establish the corpus delicti of the alleged special circumstances. Although it is true that the corpus delicti of felony-based special circumstances must be established independently of an accused's extrajudicial statements ( People v. Mattson (1984) 37 Cal.3d 85, 94 [207 Cal. Rptr. 278, 688 P.2d 887], fn. omitted), no such error occurred in the present case. [7] (33) `The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements, the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.' [Citation.] Such proof, however, may be circumstantial and need only be a slight or prima facie showing `permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed.' [Citation.] ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 364.) [T]he quantum of evidence the People must produce in order to satisfy the corpus delicti rule is quite modest.... ( Id. at p. 368.) (32b) The jury in the present case was instructed correctly regarding the corpus delicti rule, and there was some evidence of each element of the special circumstances independent of defendant's statements. Specifically, the testimony of Marci Gonzales that her mother offered defendant the money and the jewelry is evidence tending to establish the occurrence of an attempted robbery, a reasonable inference being that the victim's offer was made in response to a demand from her assailant for money and jewelry. This is sufficient to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 367.)