Opinion ID: 2062064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of appellants' motions for judgment of acquittal.

Text: White maintains that the basement area was a separate dwelling unit, with a separate entrance, inhabited by a tenant who paid rent to White's mother, who owned the house. [5] Thus, White says, he had no access to the drugs found in the basement apartment. He argues that without something to connect him with the drugs and thereby establish his constructive possession, the evidence was such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of an essential element of the crime. Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987) (emphasis in original). Earle also argues that the government's evidence was insufficient for the jury to convict him on any of the three charges; like White, he contends that the government failed to prove that he constructively possessed the drugs seized. In reviewing appellants' claims, we must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give deference to the right of the jury to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw all justifiable inferences of fact, making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. See id. at 263; In re L.A.V., 578 A.2d 708, 710 (D.C.1990); McAdoo v. United States, 515 A.2d 412, 427 (D.C.1986). When a defendant testifies on his or her own behalf, this court considers the entire record, not merely the government's evidence, in determining the sufficiency of the proof. See Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 780 (D.C. 1991). The testifying defendant runs the risk that his case will incidentally fill in the gaps left in the government's case. Dumas v. United States, 483 A.2d 301, 304 (D.C.1984); accord United States v. Foster, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 270, 783 F.2d 1082, 1085 (1986). To establish constructive possession, the government must prove that the accused (1) knew the location of the drugs, (2) had the ability to exercise dominion and control over them, and (3) intended to exercise such dominion and control. See Burnette v. United States, 600 A.2d 1082, 1083 (D.C.1991); Speight v. United States, 599 A.2d 794, 796 (D.C.1991); In re T.M., 577 A.2d 1149, 1151 n. 5 (D.C.1990); see also Brown v. United States, 546 A.2d 390, 394 n. 2 (D.C.1988) (quoting standard jury instruction). Constructive possession may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence, e.g., Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1195 (D.C.1990), and may be sole or joint possession. Id. (quoting Brown, 546 A.2d at 394 n. 2). If the accused is found near the drugs, this may establish a prima facie case of constructive possession if there also is evidence linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of which the possession is a part. See Speight, 599 A.2d at 797; In re T.M., 577 A.2d at 1153; Curry, 520 A.2d at 263 (citing United States v. Hubbard, 429 A.2d 1334, 1338 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857, 102 S.Ct. 308, 70 L.Ed.2d 153 (1981)); Wells v. United States, 515 A.2d 1108, 1113 (D.C.1986).
The government's evidence showed that there was nothing separating the basement where the drugs were found from the rest of White's residence except a stairway and two doors, both of which were open at the time of the incident. [6] White was smoking a marijuana cigar when the police arrived; the only other marijuana and rolling papers in the house were found downstairs in Room 1, on the table with other illegal drugs and paraphernalia. White, moreover, in denying anyone else was in the house, lied twice: once at the front door when the police arrived and again after the police discovered the young woman in the living room. This evidence was enough to support inferences that White knew about the drugs in his basement and had the ability, as well as the intent, to exercise dominion and control over them. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support White's conviction for constructive possession of the drugs downstairs.
Earle presents a closer case. The police discovered Earle in basement Room 2 lying face down on a bed with his arms outstretched, fully dressed, wearing shoes and socks, with the lights on, only a few feet away from Room 1, where in plain view there was a huge quantity of crack cocaine and marijuana with a street value in the thousands of dollars, along with paraphernalia associated with the illicit drug trade. Earle claimed to have fallen asleep while visiting his friend Tony, who, he said, lived in White's basement apartment. The question, then, is whether the jury could reasonably infer that Earle had knowledge of the drugs, coupled with intent and ability to exercise dominion and control over them, such as would warrant a finding of constructive possession. Recently, in Speight, we reversed a conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine for lack of a reasonable inference of constructive possession, even though the appellant was in the same room where the illicit drugs and related paraphernalia were found. We said that the jury reasonably could have found that the appellant knew about the drugs on the couch only six feet away and that, because they were so close to him, he had the ability to exercise dominion and control over them. See Speight, 599 A.2d at 796. We concluded, however, that the government's proof fell short of establishing an intention to exercise such dominion and control. We noted that no evidence linked Speight to the drugs other than his proximity to them. Of the five individuals in the apartment, others were closer to the drugs than Speight. Moreover, there was no evidence that Speight lived in the apartment. No belongings of his were found there, and there was no testimony about how long he had been there. We added that the fully furnished apartment appeared to be the tenant's residence; nothing suggested it was used primarily for illicit drug activity. We concluded that the clear import of the evidence presented was that appellant was nothing more than a visitor in someone else's home. Id. We stressed that although Speight gave a false name to the police, a factor which carries some weight in evaluating whether one was involved in criminal activity, see Wheeler v. United States, 494 A.2d 170, 173 (D.C.1985), that falsehood was not enough, coupled with Speight's proximity to the drugs, to warrant a finding of constructive possession. See Speight, 599 A.2d at 798. Similarly, in T.M., we declined to find constructive possession of a gun when: the appellants were two of six persons roughly equidistant from the gun in a sordid crack house, 577 A.2d at 1154; the appellants were acquitted of drug charges, and there was no evidence that either of them had any personal role in the handling or distribution of cocaine; and there was no evidence that either appellant had any prior association with the other persons in the apartment. Id. at 1153. In the present case, Earle was found not in a room with the drugs but in another room several steps away; thus, though closer to the drugs than White at the time, Earle was farther away than the appellants had been in Speight or T.M. The facts the jury heard here, however, create a different impression from the mere visitor image presented in Speight and in T.M. We begin by returning to the evidence of the police officers' awakening Earle in Room 2. White had engaged in a noisy struggle with police upstairs after a delayed response to their knock at his door. Then, before Officer Soulsby descended the stairs, i.e., during the period when he was executing a protective sweep of White's homeSoulsby heard the sound of footsteps in the basement, indicating that one or more persons were moving around there. Moreover, only seconds before encountering Earle, Officer Soulsby, while standing outside the door of Room 2, had called loudly upstairs to Officer Williams for assistance. [7] Officers Soulsby and Williams both testified that Earle did not appear to be startled or disoriented when they awakened him in Room 2. Under these circumstances, we believe the jury could reasonably have inferred that Earle had been feigning sleep, after hearing activity upstairs that suggested the police had arrived [8] and then rushing to position himself away from drugs and paraphernalia in plain view. Furthermore, the jury heard not only Earle's testimony but also McKenzie's and White's. Because this was a joint trial, and no severance issue is presented, we must view the evidence as the jury did with whatever inferences of guilt can reasonably and fairly be drawn from all the testimony taken together. The jury heard each of these defendants give testimony that not only was inconsistent with the testimony of police witnesses but also contradicted or otherwise tended to undermine the testimony of one another. It is a first principle that the jury, as finder of fact, has the function of determining the credibility of witnesses. Morrison v. United States, 417 A.2d 409, 413 (D.C.1980). And, as always in a trial by jury, conflicts in evidence are reserved for jury resolution. Streater v. United States, 478 A.2d 1055, 1058 n. 4 (D.C.1984). Earle testified that he knew White, who lived upstairs. Earle and McKenzie both testified that they knew Tonytheir alleged host in White's basement apartmentbecause they played soccer with him at Malcolm X Park, but Earle and McKenzie did not know one another. Nor, according to their testimony, had they ever seen one another before the night they were arrested in Tony's apartment, even though each played soccer with Tony. Earle and White had known each other for six years because they played soccer together, but White testified he knew neither McKenzie nor Tony, who, according to Earle and McKenzie, lived in White's own basement. [9] Neither Earle nor McKenzie ever saw the other in Tony's apartment in White's basement that night, according to their testimony, even though they were apparently there at the same timeand even though Tony got each of them a beer, Tony talked with McKenzie in the hallway, and Tony talked with Earle in the bedroom. According to both Earle and McKenzie, Tony left the house saying that he would be back in a short while, explaining to McKenzie that he was going to the store for more beer. Tony himself did not testify. [10] McKenzie also testified that he had gone to the bathroom just two minutes after Tony had left. McKenzie said he then heard a knock at the bathroom door and was confronted by the police only a minute and a half or so after he had entered the bathroom, having heard no activity in Room 1or upstairsin the meantime. According to the government's evidence, however, Officer Soulsby shouted to Officer Williams from the same hallway where McKenzie was supposedly standing at the same time. The two officers then encountered Earle in Room 2. Williams testified that he and Soulsby spent between 5 and 12 minutes there with Earle [11] before the officers took him across the hall to Room 1 and another officer brought White and his female companion downstairs to Room 1. According to the officers' testimony, only after everyone else was gathered in Room 1 did the officers discover McKenzie in the bathroom there. This court has recognized that a defendant's falsehood or fabrication of evidence in the presentation of the defense case is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause. Mills, 599 A.2d at 783-84 (quoting II J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 278, at 133 (Chadbourne ed. 1979)) (emphasis in Mills ); see Fox v. United States, 421 A.2d 9, 13 (D.C. 1980). In Mills, we emphasized that, [i]n some cases, the ultimate inference that is drawn from a person's self-serving lies is that he or she `did it.' Mills, 599 A.2d at 783. The jurors, faced with the morass of contradictory testimony by Earle, White, McKenzie, and the police officers, were free to believe Officers Soulsby and Williams and to disbelieve Earle and his codefendants in finding the facts. See Brenke v. United States, 78 A.2d 677, 678 (D.C.1951) (where there is a direct conflict between the testimony of a defendant and that of a witness for the government, the trier of the facts has a right to accept the version of the government's witness). More specifically, the jury reasonably could have inferred from the defendants' own testimony that the conflicting stories about Tony and the respective comings and goings in a relatively small areareminiscent of scenes from the Keystone Copswere inherently contradictory and far-fetched, especially when contrasted with the police witnesses' testimony. This reasonable rejection of the defense storiesincluding disbelief of Earle under these circumstancescould supply a powerful, reasonable inference that Earle was involved in a concerted illegal drug operation in the basement near where he was apparently feigning sleep. See Mills, 599 A.2d at 783. See also United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.1985) (defendant's incredible story was another circumstance the jury was entitled to consider in reaching its verdict); United States v. Cotton, 770 F.2d 940, 945 (11th Cir.1985) (jury free to disbelieve defendants' story that although they had been apprehended unloading duffle bags full of cocaine, they had been hired to unloadand believed that they were unloadingGuatemalian relief supplies); United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1346 (9th Cir.1981) (trier of fact, hearing testimony from government witnesses and multiple defendants, may conclude from its disbelief of defendant that the opposite of defendant's testimony is the truth); Seeman v. United States, 96 F.2d 732, 733 (5th Cir.) (jury may infer consciousness of guilt from false statements of accused attempting to explain proven facts), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620, 59 S.Ct. 80, 83 L.Ed. 396 (1938). Nothing like the bundle of questionable and conflicting stories the jury heard here was presented in Speight or in T.M. There are other differences from Speight and T.M. Earle and White testified that they knew each other. In contrast, there was no evidence in Speight or in T.M. showing that the appellants had any prior association with the other individuals present. See Speight, 599 A.2d at 797; In re T.M., 577 A.2d at 1153. Earle also admitted that he had given a false name to the police. [12] As we have noted, a false response to police can support an inference of consciousness of guilt, see Speight, 599 A.2d at 797; Wheeler, 494 A.2d at 173; Van Ness v. United States, 568 A.2d 1079, 1083 (D.C.1990), which may indicate an effort to conceal a concert of illegal action. Curry, 520 A.2d at 264. According to Speight, that false response in itself would not be a factor conclusive of guilt, but it does carry some weight when combined with other evidence tending to show guilt. Speight, moreover, had made no effort to separate himself from the contraband, whereas the jury here was entitled to infer that Earle feigned sleep to avoid any implication that he was associated with the huge drug distribution enterprise in the next room. Also, the jury reasonably could have inferred that White was attempting to conceal Earle's (and McKenzie's) presence when White twice told the police that no one was with him in the house. The jury reasonably could have inferred that White's delay in answering the door was an effort to give Earle and McKenzie more time to secrete themselves. Finally, the jury reasonably could have inferred that, since the police could hear movement downstairs, the persons downstairs could as easily hear the scuffle between White and the officers, followed by the police movements in conducting the protective sweep of the upstairs. Earle's apparent attempt to separate himself from the drugs, when he heard the noise upstairs that was identifiable as police activity, see supra note 8, was unlike that of the juvenile defendants in In re T.M., who openly attempt[ed] to scurry under clothes and blankets when unknown persons had just noisily broken down the door with a battering ram. In re T.M., 577 A.2d at 1153 (emphasis added). We believe Earle's apparent maneuver separating himself from the contraband by feigning sleep in a nearby room once he knew the police were searching upstairs is better compared with the situation in Thompson v. United States, 567 A.2d 907 (D.C.1989), where the defendant's surreptitious conduct in secreting himself behind the partition ... [was] evidence tending to show criminal activity on his part. Id. at 909. [13] The drugs and paraphernalia seized were packaged in a manner consistent with distribution. Much of the cocaine was packaged in ziplock bags, in amounts regularly sold and purchased on the street. The marijuana, found in combination with crack cocaine and paraphernalia, was ready for distribution. The items of paraphernalia were those associated with preparation and sale of illegal drugs. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer the intent to distribute. [14] In this case, the evidence [was] such that a reasonable mind might or might not have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Curry, 520 A.2d at 263. In such circumstances, we have explicitly held that a motion for judgment of acquittal should not be granted. Id. (citing Crawford v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 158, 375 F.2d 332, 334 (1967)). The trial court did not err in allowing this case to proceed to the jury. And, the evidence was such that a reasonable jury could find that Earle, as well as White, constructively possessed the illegal drugs and paraphernalia (through knowledge of the drugs and intent and ability to exercise control over them) and that they had the intent to distribute the drugs.