Opinion ID: 1917594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction S-3-A

Text: ¶ 18. On appeal, Hawthorne argues that jury instruction S-3-A as given by the trial court amounted to reversible error. Jury instruction S-3-A reads as follows: Deliberate design means intent to kill, without authority of law and not being legally justifiable, legally excusable or under circumstances that would reduce the act to a lesser crime. ¶ 19. Hawthorne contends that by omitting any language regarding the time for forming deliberate design ... was confusing and misleading to the jury. The record does not reflect that Hawthorne ever raised this objection to the deliberate design instruction at trial. However, the following exchange regarding the jury instruction is reflected in the record: The Court: S3, where do you get that? Mr. Simpson [State]: Judge, out of a case thatwe've submitted this almost in every murder case, maybe in every murder case. I will need to try to find the case that it's out of. It's a quote out of a case. The Court: Well, I think both sentences leave a big confusion as to what makes a homicide a murder. Simple design to kill, as it's addressed in the first sentence, doesn't necessarily work because it could exist in self-defense or manslaughter. The second sentence Mr. Simpson: Those are affirmative defenses, Judge. The Court: The second sentence, deliberate design, is really what makes murder. I think that we ought to delete the first sentence and just do deliberate design means, et cetera. Mr. Simpson: That's fine, Your Honor. We'll amend it and submit it. The Court: Mr. Crosby? Mr. Crosby [Defense]: If we were trying this as asay that he had lawful authority to shoot, or if we were saying it was legally justifiable to shoot, of if it was legally excusable for a lesser crime, then that would be appropriate. But we have not articulated that and submitted that defense. Now, this might be appropriate if my client decides he wants manslaughter culpable negligence instruction because then that would be a distinguishing The Court: Well, I think underand I don't know what the State's position is on manslaughter, although they've submitted one, but I think that, based upon the case law, either side can request it. I don't think it's at the opinion of the defendant. It's ultimately up to the [c]ourt. Mr. Crosby: Oh, yeah. But what I was saying is I don't think that would be appropriate unless we were asking for one. And actually, even in a manslaughter case, you can have the deliberate design to shoot and it still can be manslaughter, so even if we do request, either side requests a manslaughter instruction, this S3 is still not appropriate because it does not fit this case. If they believe he intended to shoot, then The Court: Well, but S1A is going to be with the deliberate design to kill, not shoot to kill. So that will take care of that. Prepare an S3A, Mr. Simpson. Mr. Simpson: Yes, sir. The Court: And just put that second sentence in there. Mr. Simpson: Yes, sir. The Court: Are you withdrawing it or do you want me to refuse it? Either one. Mr. Simpson: Excuse me? The Court: Are you withdrawing S3 or do you want me to refuse it? Mr. Simpson: I withdraw it and submit an S3A. Mr. Crosby: Although, Judge, unless we ask for a lesser crime, then this instruction is confusing and misleading. The Court: I don't think so. I think this is assisting the jury on what deliberate design means, and that's an element of the crime of murder with the deliberate design to kill. Mr. Crosby: All right. The Court: So I don't think that hurts, unless you know of a case that says otherwise. ¶ 20. In Jones v. State, 776 So.2d 643, 653 (Miss.2000), Jones asserted that the trial court committed reversible error in granting the State's jury instruction. Id. However, Jones had failed to object to the jury instruction offered by the State at trial. Id. This Court determined that Jones had waived any objection by not objecting to the jury instruction at trial. This Court stated: This Court has held on numerous occasions that an offered party's failure to object to jury instructions at trial procedurally bars the issue on appeal. Walker v. State, 729 So.2d 197, 202 (Miss. 1998); See also Green v. State, 631 So.2d 167, 173 (Miss.1994) (Green failed to object to the manslaughter instruction given at trial; therefore, it is not necessary for us to review this assignment.). 776 So.2d at 653. Accordingly, since Hawthorne did not make this objection at trial, this issue is now procedurally barred. Even if this issue is not procedurally barred, this Court has previously addressed the exact language given in jury instruction S-3-A. This Court in Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514, 516 (Miss.1996), considered the language of a similar deliberate design instruction. In Tran, the first paragraph of jury instruction S-1 provided that: Deliberate design means intent to kill without authority of law and not being legally justifiable, legally excusable or under circumstances that would reduce the act to a lesser crime. Id. ¶ 21. Tran's objection to this definition of deliberate design was determined by the Court to be without merit. Id. at 517. This Court determined: [I]t has long been the case law of this state that malice aforethought, premeditated design, and deliberate design all mean the same thing. Windham v. State, 602 So.2d 798, 801 (Miss.1992) (quoting Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Miss.1985)) (citing Dye v. State, 127 Miss. 492, 90 So. 180 (1922); Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778 (1881); McDaniel v. State, 16 Miss. (8 S. & M.) 401 (Miss.1847)). Definitionally [sic], we regard `malice aforethought' and `deliberate design' as synonymous. Blanks v. State, 542 So.2d 222, 227 (Miss.1989) (citing Fairman v. State, 513 So.2d 910, 913 (Miss.1987)); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Miss.1985); Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363, 367 (Miss.1985). Thus, Tran's arguments against the first paragraph of Instruction S-1 are meritless. ¶ 22. This holding in Tran was subsequently relied upon by the Court in Jones v. State, 710 So.2d 870 (Miss.1998). The Court in Jones stated: In Tran v. State , this Court found appropriate an instruction that read, Deliberate design means intent to kill, without authority of law and not being legally justifiable, legally excusable or under circumstances that would reduce the act to a lesser crime. Tran, 681 So.2d at 516. The Court stated that [t]here is no flaw in the instruction given as it does not state that deliberate design can be formed at the very moment of the fatal act, ... Id. This Court has also acknowledged that deliberate design to take the life of another connotes intent to kill. Peterson v. State, 242 So.2d 420, 427 (Miss.1970). Jones, 710 So.2d at 877-78. ¶ 23. We find that this issue is both procedurally barred from being raised on appeal, as well as, without merit.