Opinion ID: 147782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Existence of Procedural Due Process Rights

Text: The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs because it found as a matter of law that plaintiffs had a property interest under state law, which was cognizable under the due process clause, and that defendants deprived plaintiffs of that right without due process of law. Id. at 155. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and will affirm if there is no genuine issue as to any issue of material fact and. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Agusty-Reyes v. Dep't of Educ., 601 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir.2010). There are no contested material facts. The only questions before us are legal ones, specifically (1) whether, based on contractual, policy, or other sources derived from Puerto Rican law, plaintiffs had a property interest in continued employment with the Municipality; (2) whether that interest is a constitutionally protected right under the due process clause of the federal Constitution; and (3) whether the Municipality deprived plaintiffs of that right without providing constitutionally adequate process. See Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir.2008). Plaintiffs satisfied all these conditions, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in their favor.
We first address whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of continued employment, based on their contracts, surrounding Puerto Rican law, and the facts of the case. We hold that they did. The undisputed facts [1] established that when the Municipality hired plaintiffs, the contracts committed the Municipality to employing plaintiffs for almost a year, through June 30, 2001, though the Municipality knew that the Law 52 grant expired on December 31, 2000, approximately six months into that period. The Municipality also had the power to commit to employing plaintiffs for their full contractual terms, despite the limited duration of the Law 52 funds. Law 52 does not, by its terms, prohibit municipalities from supplementing Law 52 monies with municipal funds, see P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 29, § 711c, and the Commonwealth's Law 52 agreement with the Municipality here specifically provided that [i]f the Municipality offers to the employees other benefits which are not part of this agreement, the Municipality assumes responsibility therefore and pays them with its funds. Acevedo-Feliciano IV, 447 F.3d at 123. Nor was the Municipality prohibited by law from making this commitment. Indeed, the Autonomous Municipalities Act authorizes the mayor to propose readjustments to the Municipality's general expenses budget when there are anticipated surpluses. See P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 21, § 4309. Further, it is undisputed that the Municipality acted in ways to confirm plaintiffs' contractual expectations. After the Law 52 funds expired, the Municipality paid plaintiffs for some weeks out of municipal funds, confirming plaintiffs' expectation that their employment would continue under their contracts even after the Law 52 funds expired. This is sufficient to show that plaintiffs had a property interest in continued employment under state law.
Plaintiffs' property interest in continued employment under their approximately one-year contracts is a recognized procedural due process right. This circuit's law holds that a one-year term of employment with Puerto Rican government bodies is generally considered a protected property interest for procedural due process purposes. See Acevedo-Feliciano IV, 447 F.3d at 121; Caro v. Aponte-Roque, 878 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1989).
Finally, we consider, and reject, defendants' argument that plaintiffs were not deprived of protected property interests without due process of law because the process Puerto Rico provided was adequate. The plaintiffs' basic claim is that the Municipality deprived them of their property interest in continued employment pursuant to an official policy: the mayor, the Municipality's official policymaker, made the final decision to terminate plaintiffs, and the parties stipulated before the district court that no pre-termination hearing was provided. Defendants advance two arguments as to why state processes provided plaintiffs with all the process they were due. First, defendants say that, in practice, the Municipality provided plaintiffs with all the process they were due because plaintiffs were given notice and a collective opportunity to comment on their termination in the meeting where they were handed their termination notices. That argument is foreclosed by our earlier conclusion, based on the parties' previous submissions before this court, that none of the plaintiffs were granted a pre-termination hearing. Acevedo-Feliciano IV, 447 F.3d at 118-19. Second, defendants say that under Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), and its progeny, plaintiffs cannot make out a § 1983 claim without showing the inadequacy of existing state remedies, and that plaintiffs have failed to carry that burden. Defendants rely on cases involving random and unauthorized state deprivations of property interests, in which a pre-termination hearing is, by definition, infeasible and the question becomes whether the state's post-deprivation processes are enough to protect plaintiffs' rights. See, e.g., Chmielinski v. Massachusetts, 513 F.3d 309, 315 (1st Cir.2008). That is plainly not the kind of violation alleged here. [2]