Opinion ID: 2034964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mullins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, pointing to allegedly conflicting testimony of certain State's witnesses. There was some conflict about whether the dealer and Mullins entered the building together and whether the informant was in the building when Mullins gave the dealer the cocaine. The testimony of the State's witnesses was also contradicted by the testimony of the defendant, who denied his involvement in any drug transactions with the dealer. Additionally, Mullins points out that both the informant and the dealer had agreed to cooperate with the DEA. Both had been separately charged in the United States District Court with multiple drug-related counts, and both had pled guilty to single counts. The DEA made no recommendation in either case, but the witnesses' cooperation was made known to the sentencing judge. Each received a short period of incarceration and a period of probation. This information was fully revealed to the jury hearing Mullins' case. Mullins acknowledges that this Court will not reweigh the credibility of witnesses and will consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict along with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to determine whether a reasonable juror could determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, a conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. Lawhorn v. State (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 915. In this case, the dealer identified Mullins as the individual who supplied the cocaine sold to the informant. Mullins' presence at the transaction was confirmed by DEA Agents, and his participation was corroborated by reasonable inferences drawn from the informant's testimony. The arrangement between the DEA and the witnesses was fully revealed to the jury. The credibility of these witnesses and the weight of their testimony was within the province of the jury. The jury chose to believe and rely upon the evidence given by the dealer and the informant. It was reasonable to do so.