Opinion ID: 1265656
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Moki Mac

Text: The tax court ruled in favor of the Department based on Moki Mac, in which the court of appeals construed the statute at issue. In that case, the court held that the statute applied to river trips because river trips were an amusement, and the cost of the trip was an admission fee. Moki Mac, 160 Ariz. at 373, 773 P.2d at 478. The focus of Moki Mac was a constitutional challenge by Moki Mac to the amusement tax under the commerce and due process clauses. The court concluded that Moki Mac was engaging in business in Arizona, and therefore the tax applied to Moki Mac. Before deciding the constitutional issues, the court resolved whether Moki Mac's activities fell within the purview of the statute. Moki Mac, 160 Ariz. at 372-74, 773 P.2d at 477-79. The court of appeals' analysis of the constitutional issues in Moki Mac is detailed and thoughtful, whereas the discussion regarding the applicability of the statute to river trips cites no authority and offers no analysis. At the court of appeals, Moki Mac did not present the arguments presented in this case based on the principles of strict construction and ejusdem generis. The Department argues that stare decisis applies and that this court should follow Moki Mac. However, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply here because we, as the court of last resort on this issue, are not bound by a court of appeals opinion. See, e.g., Scappaticci v. Southwest Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 135 Ariz. 456, 461, 662 P.2d 131, 136 (1983) (noting that, [a]bsent a decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, a decision by one division of the court of appeals was persuasive with the other division). The court of appeals' holding in Moki Mac that river rafting trips were an amusement that charged an admission fee was clearly erroneous, and therefore this court will not follow it. Wilderness World argues that art. 9, § 3 of the Arizona Constitution, which was not cited to the court in Moki Mac, supports its argument that the tax statute should not be applied to it because the statute does not list river rafting as an object of the tax. Art. 9, § 3 states, in part: No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the tax, to which object only it shall be applied. However, the word object in art. 9, § 3 does not refer to the item being taxed, but instead refers to the objective or purpose of the tax. For example, Tillotson v. Frohmiller found a law unconstitutional because it did not state nor select the object to be promoted or carried out.... [I]t is for the legislature to state what it [the objective or purpose of the tax] shall be, and provide the funds to carry it out. This is necessary, under [art. 9, § 3], in order that the `object' for which taxes are levied may be known to the taxpayer. 34 Ariz. 394, 404-405, 271 P. 867, 871 (1928). [T]he failure of the act to specify the purpose for which the tax is levied is fatal. Id. at 405, 271 P. at 871, quoting Meyer v. Lynde-Bowman-Darby Co., 35 Okla. 480, 130 P. 548, 549 (1913) [2] ; see also Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. v. Peoria Sch. Dist., 55 Ariz. 151, 158, 99 P.2d 482, 484 (1940) (citing art. 9, § 3, and stating that legislature could not divert funds if object for which the money was collected still existed); Tax Comm'n v. Shattuck, 44 Ariz. 379, 385-88, 38 P.2d 631, 634-35 (1934) (citing Tillotson ); Bone v. Bowen, 20 Ariz. 592, 598, 186 P. 133, 136 (1919) (citing art. 9, § 3 as authority for statement that [p]ublic money can only be raised and used for specific purposes, and those purposes must be pointed out by law). Art. 9, § 3 does not apply to this case and neither supports nor detracts from Wilderness World's arguments based on strict construction and ejusdem generis.