Opinion ID: 2584893
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Assertedly Improper Instruction Concerning Motive

Text: Without objection by defendant, the trial court instructed the jury with the standard instruction concerning motive evidence, CALJIC No. 2.51. [31] On appeal, defendant contends this constituted reversible error, violating his rights to due process and a fair trial in three ways: it allowed the jury to convict him based solely on proof of motive; it shifted the burden of proof to the defense to prove innocence; and it lessened the prosecution's burden of proof on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation. We have rejected similar claims in prior decisions. Although defendant alleges in summary fashion that the present case is distinguishable on its facts because the prosecution's theory of the case here relied on motive, we discern no distinction of significance and conclude that our prior decisions are controlling. (15) CALJIC No. 2.51 does not impermissibly allow the jury to find guilt based upon evidence of motive alone, despite the absence of an explicit statement to that effect. ( People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 124-125 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400]; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 98 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749] ( Snow ) [the instruction tells the jury that motive is not an element of the crime charged (murder) and need not be shown, which leaves little conceptual room for the idea that motive could establish all the elements of murder].) Nor does it improperly shift the burden to the defense to prove innocence. ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 254 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123] [no reasonable juror would misconstrue CALJIC No. 2.51 as `a standard of proof instruction apart from the reasonable doubt standard set forth clearly in CALJIC No. 2.90'].) Finally, the instruction, which states that motive is not an element of the crime charged, does not conflict with the special circumstance instruction in such a manner that there is any reasonable likelihood that the jury would have been confused, and would have improperly decided the truth of the special circumstance allegation. ( People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 852 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820]; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 637 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160] [rejecting similar claim concerning financial gain special circumstance on the commonsense ground that . . . the `crime charged was murder and any reasonable juror would have understood the instruction as referring to this substantive offense only and not to any special circumstance allegation'].)