Opinion ID: 2368220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: testimony of shimelman

Text: Dr. Myer M. Shimelman, director of the inpatient psychiatric unit at St. Raphael's Hospital, when called as an expert witness by the plaintiff, stated without objection on direct examination that he had testified on behalf of the plaintiff in the Bensen v. Norwalk Hospital case; Bensen v. Norwalk Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Stamford, Docket No. 022284; which involved psychiatric care at the Norwalk Hospital. On cross-examination he acknowledged that he had been paid for his time in the Bensen case. He was then asked whether since the Bensen case he had testified in court on behalf of any plaintiff in any other alleged malpractice cases. He responded in the negative. On redirect examination the court permitted Shimelman, over the defendant's objection, to state that the Bensen case involved a psychotic woman who was allowed to wander off from the psychiatric unit and out a window. The plaintiff claims that this evidence was admissible to dispel the implication raised by the cross-examination that the doctor's testimony was motivated primarily by financial considerations rather than by sincere professional medical opinion. We need not address this issue further because the information disclosed by the doctor had been testified to earlier by another witness without objection and therefore was merely cumulative. Sitnik v. National Propane Corporation, 151 Conn. 62, 66, 193 A.2d 503 (1963). Objection is also pressed regarding the court's failure to strike Shimelman's testimony on redirect examination describing how he would have treated the patient. On direct examination Shimelman testified that in his opinion the plaintiff's injuries resulted from the defendant's failure to meet the applicable standard of care. On cross-examination he was examined about various treatment methods he used at St. Raphael's and at Veterans Administration Hospitals, particularly the use of seclusion and constant observation. The defendant inquired as to the doctor's rationale for using constant observation rather than seclusion. Because the defendant's questions focused on the doctor's method of treating a psychotic patient, it was allowable for the doctor on redirect examination to explain how he would have handled the plaintiff were he the treating physician. Kucza v. Stone, 155 Conn. 194, 198, 230 A.2d 559 (1967). We deal briefly with two other rulings involving the testimony of Shimelman. Inquiry was made of the doctor concerning the treatment of psychiatric patients at the Veterans Administration Hospital in West Haven. An objection by the defendant that this was not a general hospital was initially sustained by the court. Later, after hearing argument about the nature of this Veterans Administration facility, the court overruled the objection. This ruling was entirely proper. The plaintiff produced testimony indicating that the West Haven Veterans Administration Hospital was a general hospital with a psychiatric unit. This uncontradicted evidence provided a sufficient basis for Shimelman to testify as to the standard of care for operating a seclusion room. Finally, the defendant objects to the court's permitting Shimelman to testify that having the plaintiff in a steel bed in a seclusion room when she was not under constant observation was not a question of judgment but rather a sheer matter of responsibility. The basis of the objection was that the admission of this testimony was a clear invasion of the province of the jury. We find no merit to this objection. The doctor, having been repeatedly asked on cross-examination whether the decision to have the plaintiff on constant observation or in a seclusion room was a matter of judgment, certainly could respond to questions on redirect which explored this matter further with specific reference to the facts of the case. Where expert testimony is required to determine the issue of professional negligence often that testimony must include an opinion differentiating between professional judgment and professional responsibility even though such opinion may encompass the ultimate issue to be determined by the trier. State v. Johnson, 140 Conn. 560, 563, 102 A.2d 359 (1954); Lentine v. McAvoy, 105 Conn. 528, 533, 136 A. 76 (1927).