Opinion ID: 1405957
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether One Must Acquit of the Greater Offense Before Considering Lesser Included Offenses

Text: The contention that Stone authorizes the trial judge to instruct a jury not even to consider lesser included offenses before deciding to acquit of the greater, a position apparently embraced by the Court of Appeal in the present case, rests on slender California authority. Indeed it rests primarily on a single word in Stone where, as quoted above, we stated the jury should be told to decide whether defendant was guilty of the greater offense before considering the lesser included offense. ( Stone, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.) This language was repeated in a footnote in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 378, footnote 25 [208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011], but in that opinion it was clearly dictum. The point in McDonald was that given a jury's decision to acquit defendant of robbery, the defendant could not thereafter be convicted, on retrial, of attempted robbery. Mention of Stone 's considering language was incidental. A strict acquittal-first position also seems to have been espoused without a great deal of analysis in People v. Gonzalez (1983) 141 Cal. App.3d 786 [190 Cal. Rptr. 554]. Only CALJIC Nos. 17.10 and 17.11 were at issue in that case, instructions not evoking the order-of-deliberations issue as clearly as CALJIC No. 8.75. Gonzales concluded: We see no practical difference between an instruction which commands the jury to apply the concept of reasonable doubt `serially,' considering each charge in turn, and one which requires them to inspect the offenses `together.' ( Id. at pp. 793-794.) [7] When the word considering in Stone is read in context, however, it becomes clear that the term was not intended to have such a broad-ranging effect. While Stone 's use of the concepts of considering the lesser, deciding or finding defendant's guilt on each offense, and returning a verdict on a lesser offense has led to some confusion, the overall import of Stone is simply that the jury must acquit of the greater offense before returning a verdict on the lesser included offense, and no further control of the sequence of jury deliberations was intended. Indeed, this interpretation is the only reading of the opinion consistent with the fact that Stone presented the alternative of not giving the jury any explicit guidance unless a deadlock appeared to have developed. Jurors given no explicit guidance in the matter could, of course, commence deliberations in any order they wished, whether considering the lesser offenses first or beginning with the greater. It would be anomalous if one jury was forced into a strict pattern of considering offenses and another was not, based on no particular reason other than the judge's decision whether or not to anticipate a possible deadlock. Interpreting Stone, supra, 31 Cal.3d 503, to require acquittal of the greater offense before returning a verdict on a lesser included offense is consistent with the language of CALJIC No. 8.75 which, in its paragraphs most pertinent to the order-of-deliberations issue, states: You will note from this instruction that you must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder before you may find defendant guilty or not guilty of second degree murder ... and again: You must unanimously agree that defendant is not guilty of second degree murder before you find him guilty or not guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. ( Ante fn. 3, pars. 4, 5.) The official comment to CALJIC No. 8.75 also correctly perceived Stone as setting an order for the return of verdicts without precluding the jury from deliberating on the charged and lesser included offenses in whatever order they wish. Finally, we note that an interpretation of Stone as requiring acquittal first of the greater offense before returning a verdict on the lesser included offense, without further control of the sequence of jury deliberations, has been adopted by several Courts of Appeal in this state. (See People v. Gibson (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 841, 848 [241 Cal. Rptr. 126]; People v. Campbell (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 1653, 1673 [239 Cal. Rptr. 214]; People v. Zwiers (1987) 191 Cal. App.3d 1498, 1503-1506 [237 Cal. Rptr. 123]; see also People v. Reeves (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 65, 70 [176 Cal. Rptr. 182], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 919, fn. 6 [206 Cal. Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904].) [8]