Opinion ID: 2978289
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Bonyo’s Opinion

Text: Additionally, the ALJ found Dr. Bonyo’s conclusions to be “so extreme as to be implausible,” because Dr. Bonyo “completed a form stating that the claimant is totally unable to sit, stand, walk, work, lift, push/pull, bend, squat, climb, stoop or crouch in an 8 hour day.” Moreover, the ALJ found it “inconceivable that this claimant who has had pain due to pelvic adhesions with otherwise normal examinations would be completely unable to move or do anything at all.” The ALJ also found that “even taking the claimant’s pain into consideration, Dr. Bonyo’s notes fail to show findings that would preclude the claimant from performing at least light work activity.” The magistrate judge found this latter statement to constitute a medical judgment the ALJ was not qualified to make. The district court, however, disagreed, holding that “substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Bonyo’s opinion is inconsistent with the record as a whole.” No. 08-3651 Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 24 Medical opinions are defined as “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [her] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [she] can still do despite impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2) and 416.972(a)(2); Bass, 499 F.3d at 510. “The ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any medical expert, but may weigh the evidence and draw his own inferences.” McCain v. Dir., OWCP, 58 F. App’x 184, 193 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Underwood v. Elkay Mining, 105 F.3d 946, 951 (4th Cir. 1997)). In weighing medical expert opinions, the ALJ is required to consider their quality and, thus, “should consider the qualifications of the experts, the opinions’ reasoning, their reliance on objectively determinable symptoms and established science, their detail of analysis, and their freedom from irrelevant distractions and prejudices.” Underwood, 105 F.3d at 951. Nonetheless, an ALJ “may not substitute his own medical judgment for that of the treating physician where the opinion of the treating physician is supported by the medical evidence.” Meece v. Barnhart, 192 F. App’x 456, 465 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating “ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings”). In the instant case, the ALJ’s statements as to the implausibility of Dr. Bonyo’s findings constitute a medical judgment the ALJ was not qualified to make. The ALJ based the implausibility of Dr. Bonyo’s medical opinion on the ALJ’s independent determination that “[i]t is inconceivable that this claimant who has had pain due to pelvic adhesions with otherwise normal examinations would be completely unable to move or do anything at all.” Ultimately, the ALJ substituted Dr. No. 08-3651 Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 25 Bonyo’s medical opinion with his own in determining the degree of pain resulting from the condition from which Simpson suffers, and did not merely rely upon her testimony as to her daily activities or another doctor’s testimony as to her condition. Therefore, the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Bonyo’s opinion did not rest upon substantial evidence.