Opinion ID: 2502147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver by Failure to Appear

Text: The contention that China implicitly waived execution immunity by failing to appear in this turnover proceeding is equally unavailing. To be sure, the FSIA provides that immunity is lost if the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or by implication.  28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (emphasis added). But such a waiver, whether explicit or implicit, requires the  intentional relinquishment of a known right. Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 159 n. 3 (2d Cir.2008) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). Nothing in the text of the FSIA signals that Congress intended any lesser standard for the waiver of sovereign immunity. To the contrary, the legislative history of § 1610(a)(1) indicates that Congress contemplated that waiver of execution immunity would be accomplished by some affirmative act of the foreign sovereign: A foreign state may have waived its immunity from execution, inter alia, by the provisions of a treaty, a contract, an official statement, or certain steps taken by the foreign state in the proceedings leading to judgment or to execution. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 28, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6632. A mere failure to appear is not a sufficiently affirmative act to indicate intentional relinquishment of immunity, particularly not in this case where China has consistently maintained its jurisdictional and execution immunity in diplomatic communications. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d at 800 n. 17 (noting in execution immunity context that Seventh Circuit had rejected the notion that a foreign state's failure to make an appearance before the court could itself constitute an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity). Comparison with decisions in the jurisdictional immunity context confirms this view. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 28 (stating that waivers of execution immunity under § 1610(a)(1) are governed by the same principles that apply to waivers of immunity from jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(1)). In that area, our precedent instructs that the implied waiver provision of Section 1605(a)(1) must be construed narrowly. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we have been reluctant to identify a waiver of jurisdictional immunity in the absence of an affirmative indication of a conscious decision by the foreign sovereign. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1017 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that legislative history of § 1605(a)(1) provides examples of waiver involving circumstances in which the waiver was unmistakable, and that courts have been reluctant to find an implied waiver where the circumstances were not similarly unambiguous (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 18, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6623)); see also Rodriguez v. Transnave Inc., 8 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir.1993); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d at 378. Indeed, we have declined to find waiver of jurisdictional immunity in much closer cases than the present one. See, e.g., Cabiri v. Gov't of Republic of Ghana, 165 F.3d 193, 201-03 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that foreign state's initiation of eviction action in United States did not impliedly waive jurisdictional immunity with respect to unrelated counterclaims); Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 727 F.2d 274, 277-78 (2d Cir.1984) (finding no waiver of sovereign immunity where foreign state engaged in motion practice but had not yet filed responsive pleading). Accordingly, we also reject this prong of petitioners' waiver argument, and conclude that there is no merit to petitioners' claim that China waived execution immunity so as to require reversal of the challenged dismissal.