Opinion ID: 3063617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excessive Force Argument

Text: We review the district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo and view all evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 1994). The district court must enter an order of summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We stress that when considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not “weigh conflicting evidence or . . . make credibility determinations.” Id. We have held that “[w]here a non-movant presents direct evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact, 4 On appeal, Secondo also resurrects his state law negligence claims against Folsom and Mueller. 8 the only issue is one of credibility; thus, there is no legal issue for the court to decide.” Id. That said, we also recognize that although “all inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, . . . [a] court need not permit a case to go to a jury . . . when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-movant relies, are implausible.” Id. at 742-43 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “[w]e may affirm the district court’s [grant of summary judgment] on any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court actually relied.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We analyze a § 1983 excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. See Davis, 451 F.3d at 767. Our precedent in this area has set out several guideposts which establish the boundaries of our inquiry. First, we have held that “[i]n order to determine whether the amount of force used by a police officer was proper, a court must ask whether a reasonable officer would believe that this level of force is necessary in the situation at hand.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We note that our inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one. See id. at 1198 n.7. The relevant factors in our determination of reasonableness include: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 9 threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 1198 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, we also consider “the need for the application of force,” “the relationship between the need and the amount of force used,” and “the extent of the injury inflicted.” Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Third, we note that “the application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim of excessive force.” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) . Fourth, we have held that the extent of injury is not determinative, because “reasonable force does not become excessive force when the force aggravates (however severely) a pre-existing condition the extent of which was unknown to the officer at the time.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1200 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, we have noted that force is more likely to be unlawful if it occurs “after the arrest [has] been fully effected, the arrestee completely secured, and all danger vitiated,” as opposed to force employed by an officer while in the process of securing a suspect. Id. at 1199-1200.