Opinion ID: 1910611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: impeachment with testimony from the first trial

Text: Appellant also claims that the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment rights by permitting her impeachment with references to her testimony at the first trial which was declared a mistrial for lack of effective assistance of counsel.
After the government had completed its case-in-chief at the first trial, appellant was to take the stand in her own defense immediately after the lunch hour. Judge Mencher, who eventually declared the mistrial, found that appellant was to give the most critical testimony in the trial. He further found: During the noon recess, a time when defendant's state of mind was of critical importance, her lawyers presented her with a contingent fee agreement for $70,000 payable out of her husband's life insurance policies. Defendant became hysterical.. . . Suffice it to say, the attorney/client relationship was completely ruptured and torn asunder at this critical juncture. Later, after a day of haggling, a contract was signed for $40,000.. . . The overnight recess of September 23, 1976 was a critical time for the defense. The defendant, who had lost her composure during the day, needed to be reassured so that her crucial testimony would be as effective as possible the next day. . . . In this case, the defendant's lawyers, although aware of the critical nature of fully utilizing this time, squandered it to the detriment of the defendant's interests. In fact, the next morning [counsel] acknowledged that the prior evening should have been spent preparing defendant for her testimony. Under these circumstances, the judge also questioned defense counsel's objection to an instruction for voluntary manslaughter and the failure to follow up the possibility of a plea  alternative dispositions which would have precluded counsel from receiving the $40,000 fee. Judge Mencher accordingly found that the record leads to `an informed speculation that [the defendant's] rights were prejudicially affected' and that the government has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not so prejudiced. See Lollar v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 204, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (1967). He then held that appellant had been denied her Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, warranting a new trial.
On the authority of Harrison v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 387 F.2d 203 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), appellant claims that none of her prior testimony, elicited under unconstitutional circumstances, should have been used for impeachment at the second trial. Harrison, supra, was an appeal from a third trial for felony murder. In the first trial, a layman had represented appellants, pretending to be a member of the District of Columbia bar. At the third trial, the prosecution impeached one of the appellants with portions of his testimony from the first trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed as to that appellant on Sixth Amendment grounds, holding that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel barred use of appellant's testimony from the earlier trial. Failure to heed the constitutional admonition that the accused enjoy the right to assistance of counsel negates completely the court's jurisdiction to proceed.[] The proceeding is void, the occurrences therein are vitiated; transpirations otherwise legal go for naught. . . . It cannot be doubted that the Government's introduction into evidence of the statements [appellant] White made during a period when he was without counsel impinges rights the Constitution renders inviolate. [ Id. 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 254, 255, 387 F.2d at 212, 213.] The government questions the continued validity of Harrison, supra, in light of the Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). These two later cases stand for the proposition that even though the government cannot introduce a defendant's post-arrest statements in its own case when Miranda rights have been violated, [30] it may use those statements to impeach the defendant in the event that he or she testifies differently at trial. [31] Although Harris and Hass analyzed the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the government argues that the same reasoning should apply when Sixth Amendment rights are at issue. The government is not necessarily correct. In Harris and Hass, the Court focused on the question whether impeachment with unlawfully obtained statements would erode, unconstitutionally, the Miranda deterrent to official misconduct. The Court answered no, stressing that the privilege against self-incrimination does not include the right to commit perjury, Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 645 even though the possibility of uncovering impeachment material may increase the likelihood of unlawful police interrogation. Hass, supra, 420 U.S. at 723, 95 S.Ct. 1215. [32] A premise of both decisions, however, was the reliability of the impeaching statements. The Court assumed that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards, Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 224, 91 S.Ct. at 645; it meets the traditional standards of evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness. Hass, supra, 420 U.S. at 723, 95 S.Ct. at 1221. Appellant's Sixth Amendment case is different. The conflict of interest which arose between appellant and her attorney at the first trial in no sense was the product of misconduct by government officials. Thus, in this particular type of Sixth Amendment case, the government's use of appellant's prior trial testimony for impeachment would not undermine any constitutional protection against official misconduct. [33] On the other hand, we have an issue of reliability which was not present in Harris and Hass. The absence of effective counsel bears directly on the completeness, clarity, and thus reliability of a defendant's trial testimony. As a defendant is testifying, for example, the lawyer can ask additional questions to help resolve ambiguous responses or to correct answers based on misunderstanding of the question. Without uncompromising legal assistance, a defendant risks misstating the truth, or making material omissions, unaware of the lapse. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel secured in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)  which was deemed so vital that the Court gave it retroactive application  goes to the very integrity of the fact-finding process in criminal trials, and that a conviction obtained after a trial in which the defendant was denied the assistance of a lawyer lacked reliability. [ Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 484, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 1019, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 & n. 20, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965))].[ [34] ] We therefore have to consider whether the reliability of appellant's testimony at the first trial is sufficiently suspect that its use for impeachment at the second trial would violate the Sixth Amendment. [35] This question is part of a larger one, however, for as the government points out  and as the Supreme Court emphasized in Harris and Hass  the reliability of appellant's testimony at the second trial is also at issue. We therefore must weigh two related factors here: (1) the potential unreliability of the prior testimony and (2) the potential unreliability of the second trial testimony, based on appellant's opportunity to recast it without risk of impeachment.
The Sixth Amendment question is narrowed by the fact that there are other constitutional considerations, as well as common law rules of evidence, which  for the sake of reliability  impose limitations on such impeachment. It is appropriate, therefore, to discuss these other limitations first. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that a defendant's statement on a subject introduced for the first time on cross-examination cannot constitutionally be impeached with illegally obtained evidence. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925) (evidence from illegal search and seizure could not be used to impeach defendant's statement on cross-examination that he had never seen cocaine); compare Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (evidence of illegal search and seizure could be used to impeach defendant's denial, on direct examination, that he had never possessed narcotics). [36] Agnello and Walder considered a Fifth Amendment bar to impeachment, based on seizures unlawful under the Fourth Amendment; thus, they do not automatically shape Sixth Amendment analysis any more than Harris and Hass do. But given the Supreme Court's special concern for Sixth Amendment rights, see note 34 supra, Agnello casts a dark constitutional cloud on impeachment of a defendant's statement on cross-examination (on a subject raised for the first time) with testimony from an earlier mistrial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. There is another important variable. The circuit court in Harrison, supra, barred impeachment with prior testimony having a direct bearing on the events of the crime charged. In so ruling, however, the court distinguished with approval its line of cases, apropos of Walder, supra, upholding the constitutionality of impeachment with prior, inadmissible statements on collateral matters, i. e., matters unrelated to the crime charged. Id. 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 256, 387 F.2d at 214. [37] The common law rules of evidence project still another, somewhat different pattern. They generally permit impeachment with prior incriminating statements (or other evidence), whether the impeached testimony occurred on direct or cross-examination. E. g., Dane v. MacGregor, 94 N.H. 294, 52 A.2d 290 (1947); 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1023 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). If the testimony pertains to a collateral matter, however, the questioner must accept the answer; no extrinsic, contrary proof ( e. g., prior trial testimony) is admissible. Kelly v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 73 A.2d 232, 234 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 194 F.2d 150 (1952); Lee v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 128-29, 368 F.2d 834, 836-37 (1966); Ewing v. United States, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 21, 135 F.2d 633, 640 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776, 63 S.Ct. 829, 87 L.Ed. 1145 (1943). See 3A Wigmore, supra at §§ 1001, 1002, 1019. When we put these constitutional and evidentiary rules together, and consider impeachment at a second trial with a defendant's testimony from a previous trial where he or she lacked effective assistance of counsel, we conclude that: (1) if the subject of the statement to be impeached is elicited for the first time on cross-examination and is not a collateral issue, such impeachment is constitutionally suspect; (2) when statements on direct or cross-examination pertain to collateral issues, they can only be impeached through questioning, never with extrinsic evidence (such as the transcript from the prior trial); (3) there is a significant open question: whether, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, a prosecutor can use a defendant's testimony at a prior trial conducted without effective assistance of counsel to impeach that defendant's statement at a second trial, made on direct examination, that bears directly on the issue of guilt  Harrison analysis versus Harris and Hass.
We turn now to the facts of appellant's second trial. The prosecutor attempted to impeach appellant with testimony from the first trial at least ten times. We count four occasions when he attempted to impeach statements elicited on cross-examination. [38] Two of these matters were clearly collateral, see note 38 supra  and thus were not constitutionally improper. See Walder, supra ; note 37 supra. The common law rules of evidence were also satisfied, for in neither instance did the prosecutor resort to extrinsic evidence, namely the previous trial transcript. See Kelly, supra ; Lee, supra ; Ewing, supra . The other two matters covered on cross-examination, however, did bear directly on the shooting incident itself, see note 38 supra ; thus, the impeachment was constitutionally in error under Agnello, supra . Six instances of impeachment related to appellant's testimony on direct examination. [39] They also had a direct relation to the shooting incident, including appellant's self-defense claim. [40] On five of these occasions, moreover, the prosecutor used the transcript of the first trial to demonstrate appellant's self-contradiction, including, in one instance, the playing of the court reporter's tape recording of the testimony. Thus, as to all these instances, we squarely face the question whether Harris and Hass undercut Harrison. For purposes of decision we assume that appellant, as in Harrison, was without legal counsel at the first trial. We find no mitigation in the fact that appellant was assisted by a member of the bar, for counsel was compromising client interests at a critical juncture in the trial. Thus, we begin with the view, often expressed by the Supreme Court, that there is an inherent adverse impact on the reliability  the trustworthiness  of a defendant's statements at trial whenever he or she has been without counsel. But there are countervailing considerations. Appellant elected to testify at the first trial; there was no element of coercion. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979). Furthermore, prejudice is reduced by the constitutional and common law rules limiting impeachment of appellant's statements on cross-examination, and barring use of extrinsic evidence to impeach on collateral issues. Finally, still other protections at the second trial counteracted imperfections in the earlier testimony. The trial court, for example, conditioned impeachment with prior testimony on appellant's right to inform the jury as to how ineffective assistance of counsel led to the mistrial. In a pretrial Memorandum Opinion, the court provided: 4. The prior testimony of the defendant may be utilized by the government for purposes of impeachment but the defendant will be entitled to furnish a full explanation of the circumstances under which the prior testimony was given, including her dispute with her lawyers and the subsequent action of the original trial court. Appellant, accordingly, was able to inform the jury fully about the circumstances that arguably detracted from the value of such impeachment to the government. In addition, her trial counsel was in a position to rehabilitate her testimony upon redirect examination if the impeachment appeared serious. [41] We believe, under these circumstances, that the prior trial testimony on direct examination had sufficient reliability (subject to clarification at the second trial) to meet the constitutional standard of trustworthiness and voluntariness inherent in Harris and Hass and, more to the point, to withstand attack under the Sixth Amendment. We conclude, moreover, that the reliability interest inherent in the government's right to cross-examination  the protection against overly retailored testimony  cuts in favor of allowing impeachment at the second trial with prior testimony on the basis of Harris and Hass. We do not believe that the Constitution requires us to say with respect to the first trial, as the circuit court did in Harrison, supra, that the occurrences therein are vitiated. Id. 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 254, 387 F.2d at 212. They are not vitiated for all purposes. We add, finally, a note of perspective. Although the Court assumed that the impeaching statements in Harris, supra, and Hass, supra, assumed an acceptable level of trustworthiness and voluntariness, it would be misleading  despite language in cases such as Tehan, supra ; see note 34 supra  to presume that appellant's testimony at the first trial is inherently less reliable than uncoerced (but uncounseled) statements obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See note 35 supra. Obviously, reliability of improperly obtained statements turns on the circumstances, not on the constitutional amendment under which it is scrutinized. Thus, although the traditional Supreme Court protection of Sixth Amendment rights has required here an evaluation of reliability not undertaken in Harris and Hass, we anticipate that the Supreme Court would hold two cases controlling in the present context. We believe the Supreme Court has given a green light to the government's use of unlawfully obtained prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes, as long as the other constitutional standards and common law rules of evidence are met. We hold, on the facts here, that when a defendant elects to take the stand and a mistrial is declared thereafter because of ineffective assistance of counsel, the government is entitled to use testimony from the aborted trial to: (1) impeach statements made by a defendant on direct examination at the second trial, or (2) impeach statements made by a defendant on cross-examination if, but only if, the subject has been raised on direct examination. In either instance, however, no extrinsic evidence (such as the prior trial transcript) may be used to impeach on collateral issues, and the jury must be informed about the circumstances of the mistrial. Finally, we have considered whether the two instances of impeachment on cross-examination, resulting in constitutional error under Agnello, supra, warrant reversal. See text and cases at notes 36 and 38 supra. We conclude that they do not. They were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).