Opinion ID: 2531907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The LIA Claim

Text: CSX next argues that it was entitled to a JML on Miller's LIA claim. The FELA provides in part: Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories,... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce,... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its ... machinery ... or other equipment. .... In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 & 53. Pursuant to the FELA, a railroad owes its employees a duty to provide a safe workplace. Glass v. Birmingham Southern R.R., 905 So.2d 789 (Ala.2004). This duty is more expansive than the general duty to use reasonable care. Ex parte Williams, 554 So.2d 440 (Ala.1989) (Jones, J., dissenting). In order to recover under a FELA claim alleging negligence, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damage. Glass, supra ; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). A relaxed standard of causation has been applied under the FELA. `Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.' Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396 (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)). This Court has stated: The FELA was enacted in 1908 in order to provide railroad employees a remedy for injuries and death resulting from accidents on interstate railroads. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). Congress enacted the FELA because of its frustration with rail companies' evading liability to their employees for such injuries and death; consequently, the FELA strips such an employer of many of its common-law defenses. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 507-08, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). While the FELA is to be construed liberally, it is not a workers' compensation statute, Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427, nor does the FELA render an employer an insurer of the safety of its employees. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Dixon, 189 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir.1951). Despite the liberal manner in which the FELA is to be construed, `[t] he basis of the employer's liability is its negligence, not the mere fact that the injury occurred.' Dixon, 189 F.2d at 527; see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Green, 255 Ala. 642, 644, 53 So.2d 358, 359 (1951). `Employer negligence remains a prerequisite to liability.' Soto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 644 F.2d 1147, 1148 (5th Cir.1981). Glass, 905 So.2d at 793. The LIA provides that [a] railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances ... are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. 49 U.S.C. § 20701(1). As mentioned in note 1 above, the LIA does not provide a cause of action to injured railroad employees, rather [i]t merely makes violation of its prohibitions `unlawful.' Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949). The LIA supplements the FELA by imposing on interstate railroads `an absolute and continuing duty' to provide safe equipment. Urie, 337 U.S. at 188, 69 S.Ct. 1018. The LIA imposes a broad duty to keep all parts and appurtenances of its locomotives in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary peril to life or limb.... McGinn v. Burlington Northern R.R., 102 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 317 U.S. 481, 63 S.Ct. 347, 87 L.Ed. 411 (1943)). The LIA dispense[s] ... with the necessity of proving ... negligence... in certain classes of [FELA] suits. Urie, 337 U.S. at 189-90, 69 S.Ct. 1018. See also Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry., 395 U.S. 164, 166, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). Thus, railroad employers are strictly liable for injuries resulting from violations of the LIA. Lilly, supra ; McGinn, supra . A plaintiff may establish a violation of the LIA by demonstrating: (1) that the railroad employer breached its broad duty to keep all parts and appurtenances of its locomotives in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary peril to life or limb, or (2) that the railroad employer has failed to comply with regulations issued by the FRA. McGinn, 102 F.3d at 299 (citing Mosco v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 817 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir.1987)). The FELA causation standard is applicable in an action alleging a violation of the LIA. Green v. River Terminal Ry., 763 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.1985). Thus, a plaintiff need establish only that the defendant's violation of the LIA `played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.' Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396 (quoting Rogus, 35 U.S. at 506). Finally, contributory negligence is not a defense to a LIA claim. Garcia v. Burlington Northern R.R., 818 F.2d 713, 715 (10th Cir.1987). Miller alleged that CSX violated the LIA by using locomotives on its lines the parts and appurtenances of which were not in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury because, he alleged, CSX failed to ensure that the locomotive cab seats were securely mounted and braced. We note that a cab seat, which is prescribed by federal regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(a), is a locomotive part and appurtenance. See Oglesby v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603 (9th Cir.1993). Further, 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(a) requires that cab seats be securely mounted and braced. CSX initially argues that Miller failed to establish that it violated § 229.119(a) by proving that it failed to provide securely mounted and braced cab seats in its locomotives. CSX relies upon the decision in Sandstrom v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 907 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.1990), in which the court affirmed a JML on a LIA claim alleging a violation of § 229.119(a), concluding that the cab seats were not required to be fixed in place or immovable. In Sandstrom, the plaintiff was seated in the rear seat of two side-mounted seats of the cab of a locomotive that was pushing a snowplow when the snowplow derailed and jumped the tracks, carrying the locomotive with it. The plaintiff attempted to brace himself by grabbing the seat in front of him but the seat moved forward, causing the plaintiff to suffer serious injuries. Sandstrom, supra . The plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the claim to the jury because, he said, the forward movement of the seat upon the derailment itself was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found a violation of § 229.119(a). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed, stating: The mere fact that the seat moved forward upon the derailment would not itself show that the seat was not `securely mounted and braced.' The latter requirement does not mean `fixed in place' or `immovable,' but only that the seat be securely attached and supported. Indeed, the record indicates that the seats were designed to be movable forward and backward because such seat movement was necessary to enable the occupant to position himself to look through the windows of the cab. [The plaintiff] introduced no evidence that the seat in front of him was not `securely mounted and braced.' Because of the lack of such evidence, the district court justifiably refused to submit that issue to the jury. 907 F.2d at 840-41. Sandstrom is distinguishable from the present case. There, the plaintiff's alleged violation of § 229.1199(a) was based on the fact that the seat moved forward during a derailment. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that the seats were designed to move forward and backward and that the requirement that the seats be securely mounted and braced did not require the seats to be fixed in place or immovable. The court concluded that the plaintiff offered no evidence indicating that the seat by which he was injured was not securely mounted and braced beyond the fact that the seat moved forward during the derailment. Although the seats in the present case are side-mounted wall seats designed to move forward and backward like the seats in Sandstrom, Miller's LIA claim is not based on the forward-and-backward-movement design of the seat. Rather, Miller contends and has presented evidence to the effect that the seats were not securely mounted and braced because the track-mounting systems for the seats had eroded, which caused the seats to be loose and to wobble, shake, and sag. It would be difficult to comprehend that cab seats that were loose, causing them to wobble, shake, and sag, could be said to have been securely mounted and braced as required by § 229.119(a). Accordingly, we conclude that Miller has established a violation of § 229.119(a). We next must determine whether a jury question existed as to whether CSX's violation of § 229.119(a) `played any part, even the slightest, in producing' Miller's neck injury. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396. Miller presented evidence indicating that he was regularly exposed to side-mounted seats that were loose, unstable, and not secure because of wear to the track-mounting system, which in turn caused the seats to wobble and shake. The record also indicates that the track-mounting system for the Jagger seats, which were installed in the locomotives in the early 1990s, would also wear, causing those seats to become unstable and to shake. Miller presented expert testimony from Dr. Kress, a biomechanical engineer, and from Dr. Kelley, an occupationalmedicine specialist. Dr. Kress testified that the seats used by CSX were inappropriate for the shock-filled conditions aboard the locomotives and that those conditions were further exacerbated by cab seats that were not securely mounted and braced. Dr. Kelley testified that there is a widely recognized relationship between shock forces and cervical degeneration. He stated that railroad personnel who work aboard trains and who are exposed to vibrating forces are more likely to suffer neck disorders than people not exposed to such forces aboard trains. Dr. Kelley opined that loose locomotive seats increase movement for the employee, which tends to amplify the shock forces aboard the locomotives. Finally, Dr. Kelley concluded that Miller's work history with CSX and his working conditions aboard the locomotives were significant factors in causing his degenerative disk disease. Miller began experiencing neck pain in 2001. Initially, Miller's neck pain would subside at the end of a run when he got off the locomotive and rested. However, the pain would return on his next run when he was again exposed to the seats and to the traumatic forces on the locomotive. The neck pain eventually became constant and pain began radiating down his right arm. An MRI revealed that Miller suffered from degenerative disk disease. Miller initially had a good response to surgery performed by Dr. Raymon to decompress a nerve root and to fuse the cervical vertebrae; however, once Miller returned to work and was exposed to the seats and the traumatic forces aboard the locomotives he again began experiencing symptoms. As stated above, Miller eventually decided to retire from CSX because he could no longer tolerate the neck pain he experienced while aboard the locomotives. Dr. Raymon testified that repetitive trauma contributes to degenerative disk disease. Dr. Raymon testified that Miller's working conditions contributed to the degenerative disk disease, stating specifically that Miller's working conditions aboard the freight trains aggravated or precipitated his symptoms and contributed to his clinical presentation and symptoms. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in a light most favorable to Miller, and drawing such inferences as the jury would have been free to draw, Waddell & Reed, supra , we conclude that a jury question existed as to whether CSX's violation of § 229.119(a) played `any part, even the slightest' in producing Miller's neck injury. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying CSX's motion for a preverdict JML.