Opinion ID: 172956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “But For” Theory of Causation

Text: Before Minter delivered his opening statement, counsel for Prime objected to Minter’s theory of the case—but for the removal of the solid bar, the accident would not have occurred: [Minter’s counsel] continues—and I anticipate over my objections in this trial—will continue to argue that but for the removal of the solid bar, this accident would not have . . . occurred. That is improper, it’s irrelevant, and that type of an analysis could only go to a negligence claim where the active negligence was the removal of the safety bar. The products liability claim is whether or not that lift was defective as sold with two chains in 1991. (Appellant’s App. Vol. I at 7.) The court overruled Prime’s objection. [Id. at 36] In his opening statement, Minter’s counsel argued: “[I]f the defendant, Prime Equipment Company, had not altered this lift, it is undisputed that Terry Minter would be able to be at work today instead of sitting trapped in this wheelchair for the rest of his life.” (Id. at 54-55.) Again, Prime objected and the court overruled. [See id. at 55] Prime moved for a mistrial on the basis of Minter’s opening statement: “[Minter’s counsel] . . . over my objection, spent the entirety of his opening statement arguing a negligence claim that he has dismissed. I can’t even count how many times he made the argument that if the bar hadn’t been removed, we wouldn’t be here today.” (Id. at 64.) Minter’s counsel responded: “This whole lawsuit is about the fact that this machine came - 10 - to this dealer with a solid bar, they took it off, and sold it that way. I don’t know how many times I have to say that. That’s the whole point of our case.” (Id.) The court overruled Prime’s motion for a mistrial. [Id. at 65] Before Minter called Lyle Grider, Prime moved to prohibit Grider from testifying “that but for the removal of the solid bar, the accident wouldn’t have occurred” because such an argument would only be relevant in a negligence case, not a products liability case. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 334-45.) The court agreed: [T]he issue in this case is whether or not the chain-entry system as designed was defective or unreasonably dangerous. It is not whether or not it would have been safer with a solid bar. So I agree with defendants that Mr. Grider should not be allowed to testify as to the ‘but for removal of the solid bar the accident would not have occurred’ because that gets into a weighing of which is safer and that’s not the issue. The issue is, was it unreasonably dangerous with the chain-entry system . . . . [S]o he will not be allowed to testify and weigh the relative safety of each type of those machines. (Id. at 337-38.) The court later clarified: [Grider] will be able to testify as to the safety of the machine as it existed at the time of the accident without a relative weighing of the safety of a machine with the solid guardrail. So he will not be allowed to testify that but for removal of the solid guardrail, the machine became unsafe. His testimony will be restricted to . . . the relative safety of the machine as it existed at the time of the accident and as it was put into the stream of commerce with . . . the chain-rail system on it. (Id. at 365-66.) Before closing arguments, the court reiterated its earlier ruling: [T]he question is whether the product as Prime Manufacturing was using it and introduced it into the stream of commerce . . . was defective. I do not believe that the law allows for a weighing of, would it have been a better product if it had a solid guardrail versus the system that it had. The question is whether that in and of itself is defective. - 11 - (Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 549-50.) Minter contends the court erred in excluding his “but for” theory of the case because “[p]roving products liability with but for causation is endorsed by many courts, including the Oklahoma Supreme Court.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 18.) Prime contends the court correctly excluded Minter’s “but for” theory because it is not a proper theory of strict liability. Prime argues: “A central flaw in Mr. Minter’s repeated ‘but for’ arguments to the jury was that it focused the jury on the wrong predicate. The proper ‘but for’ causation inquiry is ‘but for’ an alleged defect in the product, not an alleged act by Prime.” (Appellee’s Br. at 18.) “‘[B]ut for’ causation is a non sequitur. What matters is causation by the defect.” (Id. at 19.) We agree with Prime. As previously discussed, in order to succeed on his claim, Minter had to prove the lift was defective, the defect rendered the lift unreasonably dangerous, and his injuries were caused by the defective lift. Minter’s “but for” theory was not relevant to any of these elements and improperly focused the jury on Prime’s conduct rather than the lift’s alleged defect. In Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., we explained: “As to strict liability, the question is whether the [product] was sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. The negligence question is whether [the defendant] exercised reasonable care.” 544 F.2d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Oklahoma law) (quotations omitted). Even if the jury concluded Minter would not have been injured but for Prime’s removal of the guardrail, the strict liability question would remain. In other words, whether Prime’s actions were the “but for” cause of Minter’s injury bears on the - 12 - question of whether Prime was negligent, not on the question of whether the lift was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Under Oklahoma law: [T]he fact that a product could be made safer by adding a safety device is not, without more, enough to establish that the product is defective as a manufacturer does not have a legal duty to produce a product incorporating only features representing the ultimate in safety. Wicker ex rel. Estate of Wicker v. Ford Motor Co., 393 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1236 (W.D. Okla. 2005) (quotations omitted). “Only when a defect in the product renders it less safe than expected by the ordinary consumer will the manufacturer be held responsible.” Lamke v. Futorian Corp., 709 P.2d 684, 686 (Okla. 1985); see also Gaines-Tabb, 160 F.3d at 624-25 (same); Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770, 775 (Okla. 1988) (“In this case the evidence that the tank could have been made ‘safer’ does not establish that it was less safe than would be expected by the ordinary consumer.”). Even though the lift might have been safer with the solid guardrail, as Prime acknowledges, that does not mean the lift was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Minter’s “but for” theory, even if allowed by the court and adopted by the jury, would not have proven his case. The court did not err in excluding it.12