Opinion ID: 4564055
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Booker sentencing

Text: The First Step Act does not provide for plenary resentencing, only for a reduction of sentence under specific circumstances. See Foreman, 958 F.3d at 510; United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2019) (order) (per curiam) (“The First Step Act’s limited, discretionary authorization to impose a reduced sentence is inconsistent with a plenary resentencing.”). 9 No. 19-3471, United States v. Wilson Furthermore, “[w]e have held [in Alexander] that a sentence reduction under the First Step Act is a § 3582(c) modification” of a sentence. United States v. Lakento Smith, 958 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2020). “[B]ased on the text and structure of the Fair Sentencing Act, the district court does not need to conduct a full resentencing.” Id. at 499. But, “when determining whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under § 404” of the First Step Act, “courts may consider all relevant factors.” United States v. Allen, 956 F.3d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 2020). “The First Step Act does not prohibit courts from considering the factors outlined in § 3553(a), which include the applicable sentencing guidelines range and other relevant information about the defendant’s history and conduct.” Ibid. When explaining its decision to deny a reduction of sentence of imprisonment in the context of the First Step Act, which included justifying the sentence by factors set forth in the plea agreement and discussed at the sentencing hearing, the district court in our case did not consider that the discretion of the original sentencing court had been constrained by the lower end of the Guidelines. The sentencing court addressed the minimum sentence set by the Guidelines and fixed Wilson’s sentence at the low end of the Guidelines at 262 months. The sentencing court stated, Normally the [c]ourt would say that because there aren’t any obvious mitigating factors, that some sentence in the mid[-]range of the guidelines would be most appropriate. However, these career offender provisions do and are intended to place the defendant at a very high custody range. And what the [c]ourt needs to do is determine whether the range contemplated—or whether the range contemplated is a sentence which is sufficient to address the offense conduct and to protect society from further similar activity. In this case it appears that even the low end of the guidelines range is sufficient to do that. Regarding Wilson’s supervised release, the sentencing court said: “Upon release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of 10 years, which is the [statutory] mandatory minimum term applicable for these offenses.” 10 No. 19-3471, United States v. Wilson Without the mandatory aspect of the Guidelines, the sentencing court might have set a lower sentence to begin with. At the sentencing hearing, the court questioned whether Wilson was actually subject to the twenty-year statutory mandatory minimum based on developing caselaw in this circuit. However, the sentencing court decided that it did not need to address this question, because the bottom of the then-mandatory Guidelines range was higher than the statutory minimum at the time. This court “recently held [in Foreman, 958 F.3d at 512–15] that § 3742(a)(1)—which permits review of a sentence ‘imposed in violation of law’—allows us to review for reasonableness a new sentence that the district court imposes after it grants a reduction under the First Step Act.” Smithers, 960 F.3d at 343. That is because “a district court ‘impose[s] a new sentence’ even when it engages in a limited modification or reduction of an existing sentence . . . .” Foreman, 958 F.3d at 511 (quoting Bowers, 615 F.3d at 719). Here, the district court partly denied Wilson’s motion to reduce sentence under the First Step Act, but it granted relief by reducing the term of supervised relief to eight years. It therefore “engage[d] in a limited modification or reduction of an existing sentence,” exposing its ruling to appellate review as an “imposition” of a sentence. See Foreman, 958 F.3d at 511; Smithers, 960 F.3d at 343. “Under normal circumstances, a district court judge who treats the Guidelines as mandatory in imposing a sentence in this post-Booker world necessarily commits plain error.” United States v. Magouirk, 468 F.3d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 2006). See also Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 537 (2013) (“Failure to calculate the correct Guidelines range constitutes procedural error, as does treating the Guidelines as mandatory.”). The error need not be obvious at the time of sentencing to be considered plain. United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir. 2005) 11 No. 19-3471, United States v. Wilson Our authority to remedy a “plain error” is discretionary. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993). Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” Review for plain error “requires [a defendant] to show (1) error (2) that ‘was obvious or clear,’ (3) that ‘affected defendant’s substantial rights’ and (4) that ‘affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)). “Only in exceptional circumstances will we find such error—only, we have said, where the error is so plain that the trial judge was derelict in countenancing it.” Ibid. (cleaned up). Here, the sentencing court admitted being bound by the mandatory Guidelines and imposed a sentence at the low end of the mandatory range. By implication, if not bound by the Guideline’s minimums of sentencing and supervised release, the sentencing court could have imposed a sentence below the Guidelines range. See United States v. Flowers, 963 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If, when a court originally imposed a sentence, it specifically relied on a mandatory minimum that was later amended by the Fair Sentencing Act, that fact would be a strong reason to grant resentencing under the First Step Act, since it in turn suggests that the sentencing court might have imposed a lower sentence were it not for that mandatory minimum.”) The district court considering Wilson’s motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act did not address the fact that Wilson was sentenced under mandatory Guidelines. It simply concluded that a reduction of his sentence was not warranted. But by not addressing the issue of pre-Booker sentencing, the district court effectively re-imposed a sentence under the mandatory Guidelines. However, this court has unequivocally held that “a district court judge who treats the 12 No. 19-3471, United States v. Wilson Guidelines as mandatory in imposing a sentence in this post-Booker world necessarily commits plain error.” Magouirk, 468 F.3d at 947. We therefore hold that the district court committed plain error in re-sentencing Wilson under the First Step Act to the same term of imprisonment and by not addressing the mandatory aspect of his original sentence under the Guidelines. We remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.