Opinion ID: 544733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fourth Amendment Challenge

Text: 10 Petitioners' primary contention is that the drug tests required by the FAA are unreasonable searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Our disposition of this issue is guided by the Supreme Court's decisions in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In Von Raab, the Court upheld a United States Customs Service requirement that employees seeking transfers or promotions to certain positions undergo urinalysis. In Skinner, the Court upheld a Federal Railroad Administration program requiring railroads to administer blood and urine tests to train workers involved in major railroad accidents, and permitting railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules. 11 Von Raab and Skinner settle some of the threshold questions in this case. First, drug testing performed by private employers under compulsion of government regulations constitutes governmental action subject to constitutional restrictions. See Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1411-12. Second, because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, urinalysis must be deemed [a] search [ ] under the Fourth Amendment. Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1413; accord Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1390. Third, the usual Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and probable cause do not necessarily apply in the drug testing context. Rather, when a search serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context. Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1390. 12 In the present case it is clear that the FAA drug testing requirements serve special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement within the meaning of Von Raab. As in Von Raab, the FAA rules specify that [t]est results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's consent. Id. Moreover, just as the Customs Service testing program in Von Raab was designed to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions ... and to prevent the promotion of drug users to those positions, id., so is the FAA's program designed to deter drug use among employees in safety-sensitive positions and to prevent the performance of safety-sensitive functions by employees under the influence of narcotics. We must therefore determine the constitutionality of the FAA program by balancing the government's interests against the employees' privacy interests. 13 In striking this balance, we take our primary guidance from Von Raab, because we think that the random testing at issue in this case is more closely analogous to the facts of Von Raab than to those of Skinner. In Von Raab, as in this case, the testing program did not require any level of individualized suspicion or the occurrence of any suspicion-triggering event; in Skinner, on the other hand, testing was limited to those employees involved in a train accident or safety rule violation. Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether this case can be distinguished from Von Raab in a way that would tip the balance against the constitutionality of the FAA's drug testing program. 14 In Von Raab, the Customs Service initiated a program of testing employees for drugs as a condition of employment in positions that met any one of three criteria: (1) direct involvement in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws; (2) a requirement that the incumbent carry a firearm; or (3) a requirement that the incumbent handle classified material. See id. at 1388. The drug tests followed procedures quite similar to the FAA procedures at issue in this case. See id. at 1388-89, 1394 n. 2. A union of federal employees challenged the program as violative of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court upheld the testing program as applied to the first two categories of employees listed above, and remanded as to the third category (employees handling classified information). 15 After concluding that the testing program invaded reasonable expectations of privacy and that the tests were motivated by special needs other than law enforcement, the Court balanced the private and governmental interests at stake, and decided that the balance justified the testing program. The Court reasoned that 16 [t]he Government's compelling interests in preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of the Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy interests of those who seek promotion to these positions, who enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special, and obvious, physical and ethical demands of those positions. Id. at 1397-98. 5 17 In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the petitioners' contention that there was insufficient evidence of a drug problem in the Customs Service to justify suspicionless testing. The Court noted that drug abuse is a pervasive social problem, and stressed that the testing program was aimed as much at deterrence as at detection. In light of the extraordinary safety and national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to positions that require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances, the Court wrote, the Service's policy of deterring drug users from seeking such promotions cannot be deemed unreasonable. Id. at 1395. 18 The government interest in preventing drug use by persons holding safety-sensitive positions in the aviation industry is at least as compelling as the interest in preventing drug use by Customs officers. Indeed, petitioners concede that the government has a strong interest in assuring aviation safety and that the drug-related job-impairment of any safety-sensitive aviation employee is a basis for the most serious concern. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 15-16. Nonetheless, petitioners argue that the FAA has failed to demonstrate a sufficiently high level of drug use in the industry to justify its testing program. 19 In our view, the evidence relied upon by the FAA is stronger than the evidence relied upon by the Customs Service in Von Raab. In Von Raab, the Service's testing scheme was not implemented in response to any perceived drug problem among Service employees, and there was evidence that only 5 employees of 3,600 tested positive for drugs. Id. at 1394. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that this evidence was insufficient to establish a substantial governmental need, because of the deterrent purposes of the program and the potential for serious harm. Id. at 1395. 20 In the present case, the FAA administrative record included evidence that a number of pilots and other airline crew members had received treatment for cocaine overdoses or addiction; that tests by companies in the industry had turned up instances of drug use by pilots and mechanics; and that drugs were present in the bodies of pilots in two airplane crashes. 6 Moreover, the harm that can be caused by an airplane crash is surely no less than the harm that might be caused by drug impairment in the course of Customs Service employment. When viewed in this light, the need for the FAA's testing program equals, if not exceeds, that for the Customs Service program approved in Von Raab. 21 Petitioners also argue that the FAA testing program intrudes more deeply on privacy interests than the program approved in Von Raab. 7 They point to the fact that the FAA provides for unannounced (i.e., immediate) testing, while the Customs Service program requires at least five days' notice; and that the FAA program is random, while the Customs Service program is only activated by certain events (i.e., applying for certain positions). 22 Although these factors add some weight to the invasion of privacy side of the Fourth Amendment balance, they are insufficient to tip the scales against the FAA drug testing program at issue here. The reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C.Cir.1989), is instructive. In Harmon, the court upheld (as to some employees) a Justice Department testing plan that provided for random testing and notice on the same day, preferably within two hours, of the scheduled testing. 878 F.2d at 486 (interior quotation omitted). The court noted: 23 Certainly the random nature of the OBD testing plan is a relevant consideration; and, in a particularly close case, it is possible that this factor would tip the scales. We do not believe, however, that this aspect of the program requires us to undertake a fundamentally different analysis from that pursued by the Supreme Court in Von Raab. 24 Id. at 489. This is particularly true in light of the FAA's reasonable conclusion that random testing without advance notice will prove to be a greater deterrent than testing with advance notice. 8 25 Finally, petitioners argue that the FAA plan grants employers too much discretion. This argument is unpersuasive. First, the strict randomness requirements ensure that no employer will have discretion in deciding which employees should be searched. Second, employers' discretion as to how to structure their testing programs will be limited by collective bargaining and the requirement that the FAA approve the plans of individual employers. 9 26 In sum, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment issue in this case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the Fourth Amendment issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Von Raab. We therefore reject petitioners' constitutional challenge to the FAA drug testing program.