Opinion ID: 2639004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mother's Arguments

Text: [¶ 14] Mother's appeal is based on three arguments. She contends that the district court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by W.R.C.P. 52, that the district court's decision was contrary to the evidence, and that the decision was not in the child's best interests. [¶ 15] Prior to the introduction of any evidence, Mother requested, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52, [1] that the district court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court's final order, entitled Order for Custody and Visitation with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, clearly complies with the requirements of W.R.C.P. 52. In this order, the district court adequately outlines its findings and separately states its conclusions. We find Mother's argument on this issue to be without merit. [¶ 16] Mother next argues that the district court's decision was contrary to the evidence. Mother's appellate brief lists each of the district court's findings and conclusions individually, and then states whether she accepts or disputes them. With every disputed finding, she presents an argument why the finding is inaccurate, generally focusing only on evidence that supports her position and ignoring any contrary evidence. To argue successfully that the decision was contrary to the evidence, Mother must demonstrate that a material factor deserving significant weight was ignored or that a finding was contrary to the evidence or against the great weight of the evidence. In re MS, 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo.2000) ( quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo.1998)). This can be a difficult task, considering we `afford to the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.' In re MS, 9 P.3d at 986 ( quoting Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431). We have stated that [t]he trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh their testimony, and, thus, this Court accords considerable deference to the trial judge's findings. Clark v. Clark, 980 P.2d 821, 823 (Wyo.1999). While the district court's final order may not have characterized every fact as Mother would have liked, or articulated every one of Mother's strengths and Father's weaknesses, the record indicates that both Mother and Father are capable of providing KRA adequate care and support, and that the shared custody arrangement is working well and allows both parents adequate parenting time to develop a relationship with KRA. We find nothing in the record demonstrating that the district court's decision was contrary to the evidence. [¶ 17] Finally, Mother argues that the district court's decision was not in KRA's best interests. Mother contends that the weekly alternating shared custody arrangement, where the parents are living seventy miles apart, and which results in KRA being with her step-sister only every other week, is not in KRA's best interests. [¶ 18] Fashioning a custody arrangement that will best serve the child's best interests is within the discretion of the trier of fact. Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶ 9, 35 P.3d at 1242-43 ( quoting Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431). We have stated: The best interests of the children is the primary consideration when parental custody matters are being determined. Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 352 (Wyo. 1986). [T]he `goal to be achieved is a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each of the parents, with paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the children.' Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo.1965)). Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993). The district court must order a custody arrangement that will most adequately serve the child's best interests. While there are instances where shared custody may be appropriate, we have consistently held that we do not favor such an arrangement. Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶ 15, 35 P.3d at 1244; Reavis, 955 P.2d at 432; Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321, 322 (Wyo.1990). There are several reasons for our reluctance to embrace the concept, but first and foremost is the recognition that stability in a child's environment is of utmost importance to the child's well-being, and divided custody places the stability of a child's environment at risk. Whether termed divided, shared, or joint physical custody, a measure of instability is inherent in the arrangement. Gurney [v. Gurney ], 899 P.2d [52] at 55 [(Wyo.1995)]. We do not dispute that there may be cases where joint or shared physical custody may approximate the former family relationships more closely than other custodial arrangements, or for other good reason may be in the best interests of the children. However, divided physical custody may not be indiscriminately substituted for an award of sole custody to one parent in order to appease one party. Reavis, 955 P.2d at 432. In Reavis, the district court ordered shared custody stating that this arrangement would promote `an ongoing, strong and healthy parent to child relationship between both mother and father.' Id. at 432. We reversed, finding nothing in the record to support that notion. Id. [¶ 19] Here, unlike Reavis, the record demonstrates good reason that shared custody is in KRA's best interests, and that shared custody most closely approximates the former family relationship. At trial, Father presented evidence that if Mother was given primary custody, she would attempt to alienate KRA from him. Q (By [Father's attorney]) [Father], when you were cohabitating with [Mother] and [her other daughter], did you observe [Mother] and [her other daughter] discussing [her other daughter's] father? A I know [Mother] has not, really, ever talked directly to [her other daughter] about her father, but she would talk to me, call him names and things like that, and [her other daughter] would be right there. I know that she has taught [her other daughter] to call her dad spic, and has taught her to call her dad fucker. I know [her other daughter] has told her dad that he is not her dad. Q [Father], do you have any concerns about what might happen with your daughter if she is left in that environment? A That is a lot of my concern. I feel that [KRA] if she is with [Mother] will be told certain things that aren'tthat are not [true], be told lies, that she will grow up confused and emotionally and mentally unstable through a lot of them, reactions, and/or, things that [Mother] may tell her. I feel that just the whole emotional and mental stability of everyone on, it seems like, on her side of the family, doing a lot of one week be best friends, next week be worst enemies. I feel that that's unstable for [KRA]. She'sI am just, I guess worried that she will be taught things, and told things that are not the truth and that it could truly hurt her emotionally later on. The district court found that [Mother] has actively encouraged her other daughter ... to disparage and otherwise denigrate and be estranged from her father, and that [Mother's] attempt to unnecessarily criticize [Father]... indicates her inability to understand the importance of [KRA's] relationship with her father.... The district court concluded that [Mother] is able to provide personal care for [KRA], and [KRA] would live with her sister in [Mother's] custody. However, [Mother] may deprive her daughter of a complete, emotionally secure relationship with her father. We must afford considerable deference to the district court's findings as [t]he trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh their testimony, Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶ 22, 35 P.3d at 1246. [¶ 20] We also note that at the time of the hearing, the parties had been exercising shared custody for over nine months and the district court found that [t]he current shared custody arrangement has not caused difficulties for [KRA]. At the time of the writing of this opinion, KRA will have been in the shared custody arrangement for two years. We have recognized that stability in a child's environment is of utmost importance to the child's well-being. Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo.1995). To change the custody arrangement that KRA has known for two years would jeopardize that stability and be contrary to her best interests. We will affirm the district court's order of shared custody.