Opinion ID: 2792368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Investigating Officers

Text: This court has held that an investigating officer (10) could not undermine the prosecution's plea bargain. Sanchez, 146 Wn.2d at 370 (Madsen, J., dissenting), id. at 358-59 (Chambers, J., concurring/dissenting). Though neither party challenges this rule, the Court of Appeals has frequently misidentified this holding. See State v. Lindahl, 114 Wn. App 1, 11-12, 56 P.3d 589 (2002) (In Sanchez, the court found no breach of a plea agreement in cases where ... an investigating officer argued at sentencing for a longer sentence than that agreed to in the plea agreement); Carreno-Maldonado, 135 Wn. App. at 84 (incorrectly citing Sanchez to support the proposition that the State does not breach the plea bargain when ... an investigating officer[] argue[s] for an exceptional sentence). Therefore, we expressly affirm the rule in Sanchez in order to provide clarity. We rely on Sanchez for the proper analysis to use when considering whether a particular state officer can advocate against a plea bargain reached between the 6 State v. MacDonald (Ronald Wayne) No. 89912-6 prosecution and the defendant. 146 Wn.2d 339. Sanchez was a consolidated case involving two appeals: the first appeal (petitioner Mark Harris) involved an alleged plea breach by a community corrections officer (CCO), and the second (petitioner Librado Sanchez) alleged a plea breach by an 10. /d. at 343. Harris alleged that his plea bargain was breached when the ceo prepared a presentence report recommending an exceptional sentence contrary to the prosecutor's standard range recommendation and when the ceo spoke in support of that report at Harris' hearing. /d. at 344. Harris was charged with third degree rape of a child. /d. He entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of communicating with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of RCW 9.68A.090. /d. The standard range sentence for the offense was 22-29 months, and the prosecutor agreed to recommend 29 months. /d. The ceo assigned to Harris' case prepared a presentence report pursuant to former RCW 9.94A.110 (2000) (recodified as RCW 9.94A.500). /d. The presentence report recommended an exceptional sentence of 60 months. /d. The court found the aggravating factors suggested by the CCO's presentence report and imposed a sentence of 60 months. !d. Sanchez pleaded guilty to three counts of second degree child molestation. /d. at 342-43. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecutor would not make a sentencing recommendation. /d. at 343. Prior to the sentencing, Dr. Jerry Miller evaluated Sanchez and recommended a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), which would impose a partially suspended 75-month sentence. /d. This recommendation was contained in the CCO's presentence report. /d. However, the victim, the victim's parents, and the 10 made statements at the sentencing hearing. 7 State v. MacDonald (Ronald Wayne) No. 89912-6 The 10 argued against the SSOSA, arguing that Sanchez violated a position of trust, that Sanchez lied to Dr. Miller in order to receive the SSOSA, and that Sanchez's acts were 'as bad as if somebody drug someone in the bushes and violently raped them.' /d. The court imposed a standard range sentence of 70 months' imprisonment, and Sanchez appealed on the grounds that the IO's testimony undercut the prosecutor's plea agreement. /d. at 343-46. The Sanchez plurality opinion viewed the plea agreement as having been made between the prosecutor and the defendant, not between the State and the defendant. /d. at 348 ('[T]he prosecutor and the defendant are the only parties to a plea agreement.' (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Wakefield, 130 Wn.2d 464, 474, 925 P.2d 183 (1996))). From this premise, the plurality opinion rejected an agency analysis and held that whether a government employee other than the prosecutor is bound by the agreement depends not on the employee's role vis-a-vis the prosecutor, but on the employee's role vis-a-vis the sentencing court. /d. at 348-49. The plurality's analysis considered the statutory role that a ceo and an 10 have at sentencing under former RCW 9.94A.110. Sanchez, 146 Wn.2d at 349, 351 ('The court shall ... allow arguments from ... an investigative law enforcement officer as to the sentence to be imposed (first alteration in original) (quoting former RCW 9.94A.11 0(1 )). The plurality opinion concluded that this statutory authority specifically authorized argument from an 10 about a sentence. /d. at 352. Further, the plurality opinion concluded that there was no appearance of unfairness because the 10 in 8 State v: MacDonald (Ronald Wayne) No. 89912-6 Sanchez's case was neither a party to the plea agreement2 nor an employee of the prosecutor's office. /d. The plurality opinion concluded that Sanchez's 10 did not have a duty to abide by the prosecutor's plea agreement. /d. The plurality opinion also held that a CCO acts on behalf of the court rather than as an arm of the prosecutor and that the ceo in Harris' case was not bound by the terms of the plea agreement. /d. at 354.