Opinion ID: 2625
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable In Context

Text: The City relies on the dictionary definition of applicable, which is, simply, capable of being applied. On the other hand, the Firearms Suppliers contend that the phrase statute applicable to the sale or marketing of [a firearm] in the context of the language in the entire statute limits the predicate exception to statutes specifically and expressly regulating the manner in which a firearm is sold or marketed  statutes specifying when, where, how, and to whom a firearm may be sold or marketed. We agree that the examples of state and federal statutory violations in the predicate exception itself refer to state and federal laws that specifically and expressly govern firearms. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I)-(II). We also agree with the District Court's rejection of the Firearms Suppliers' argument that the predicate exception is necessarily limited to statutes that expressly regulate the firearms industry. However, for the reasons set forth below, we disagree with the District Court's adoption of the out-of-context plain meaning of the term applicable and its conclusion that the dictionary definition of the term applicable accurately reflects the intent of Congress. The meaning of the term applicable must be determined here by reading that term in the context of the surrounding language and of the statute as a whole. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.); see also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (We consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.); King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991) (holding that a statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context (citation omitted)). Adhering to this principle, we have held that fundamental to any task of interpretation is the principle that text must yield to context. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir.2007). [4] Viewed in this light, the term applicable must be examined in context. The PLCAA provides that predicate statutes are those that are applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms]. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). The universe of predicate statutes is further defined as including the examples set forth in subsections (I) and (II). As stated, we agree with the Firearms Suppliers that these examples refer to statutes that specifically regulate the firearms industry. Yet, as also stated, we do not agree that the PLCAA requires that a predicate statute expressly refer to the firearms industry. Thus the contours of the universe of predicate statutes  i.e., those statutes that are applicable to sale or marketing of firearms  are undefined and we can only conclude that the term applicable requires a contextual definition. Moreover, because both the City and the Firearms Suppliers rely on a reasonable meaning of the term applicable, we must look to the canons of statutory interpretation to help resolve the ambiguity. United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 262 (2d Cir.2000); see also Daniel v. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 423 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that where ambiguity is found in the meaning of a statute, we resort first to canons of statutory construction and . . . [then] to legislative history).