Opinion ID: 770933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Jurisdiction for Reinstatement of a Vacated Conviction

Text: 16 Rutledge argues that no statute provides a district court with the power to reinstate a vacated conviction. Rutledge claims that the district court erred by rejecting this challenge in both his sec. 2255 and Rule 60(b) motions. We review de novo the district court's legal determination that it had jurisdiction to reinstate a vacated conviction. See United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 1999). 17 While Rutledge raises an interesting challenge to the district court's action, we conclude that a district court does have statutory authority to reinstate a vacated conviction. 3 We begin with the relevant language of sec. 2255 18 If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. 19 (emphasis added). Admittedly, nothing in this language directly and explicitly states that a vacated conviction can be reinstated, but such a statement is unnecessary. The terms resentence and correct the sentence as may appear appropriate are both grants of broad and flexible power to the district court. 4 See United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170, 1171-72 (4th Cir. 1997). These terms encompass reinstating a vacated conviction as part of the process of correcting the sentence, if such an act would be proper. Reinstating Rutledge's conspiracy conviction would be appropriate here because that conviction does not suffer from any procedural or substantive defect, but was vacated only because it was an included offense of the CCE conviction. In these circumstances, sec. 2255's language granting the power to resentence or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate provides district courts with a jurisdictional basis to reinstate the vacated conviction for the included offense. 20 Our prior cases permitting district courts to increase sentences for particular convictions after a successful sec. 2255 motion support this holding, though these decisions are not exactly analogous since vacated convictions were not involved. The word sentence in sec. 2255 refers to the entire package of terms that the defendant receives for his convictions. See United States v. Walker, 118 F.3d 559, 561 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 1996). A defendant cannot have a legitimate expectation in the finality of his or her sentence when he or she uses a sec. 2255 motion to challenge his or her convictions. See Woodhouse v. United States, 109 F.3d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1997). If a defendant successfully challenges some of his or her convictions on a sec. 2255 motion, the district court may adjust the remainder of the package by resentencing the defendant on the remaining convictions, which includes increasing the sentences on those counts. 5 See United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith, 103 F.3d at 534. At least in circumstances where a conviction was vacated only because it is an included offense of another conviction, this vacated conviction should be considered part of the sentencing package which the defendant has challenged, and so subject to reinstatement if the conviction in which it is included also is vacated. 21 The Supreme Court's opinion reversing our judgment in Rutledge's case is instructive on whether a district court can reimpose a vacated conviction. The government argued that both the CCE and conspiracy convictions should stand because this would prevent a defendant who successfully challenges one of these from escaping punishment. 517 U.S. at 305. In rejecting this argument, the Court explained that the lower courts had already developed methods to resolve such problems. Id. at 305-06. In particular, the Court favorably cited the opinion in United States v. Silvers, 888 F. Supp. 1289, 1306-09 (D. Md. 1995), aff'd in relevant part, 90 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 1996), where the district court reinstated a previously vacated conspiracy conviction after vacating and granting a new trial on the defendant's CCE conviction. The Court's passage might be considered dictum, but it represents the Court's considered view on an issue related to its holding and should be followed unless it conflicts with a holding of the Court. See United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Supreme Court has validated the precise action of the district court in the instant case. Rutledge correctly points out that neither the Court's opinion in Rutledge nor the lower court opinion in Silvers discuss the statutory basis for such action by the district court. However, given the broad language of sec. 2255, we will not say that the district court lacked jurisdiction for an act explicitly approved by the Supreme Court. 22 Besides this language in the higher court's Rutledge opinion, our decision also has substantial support in precedents that have addressed the question of whether a district court can reinstate a vacated conviction. The majority of courts to consider this issue have found that districts courts do have such power. See Silvers, 90 F.3d at 101; United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1233 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 531 (5th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. West, 201 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (vacating defendant's CCE conviction and remanding to district court with instruction to reinstate previously vacated conspiracy conviction); United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1386 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that a vacated conviction can be reinstated without specifying which court can do so); United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (same). Again, while these cases do not explicitly address the question of statutory jurisdiction, we are unwilling to conclude that all of these opinions are wrong given that the reinstatement of a previously vacated conviction fits within the language of sec. 2255. We have carefully and thoughtfully considered the statement that district courts cannot reinstate convictions made in United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1991), but find it unpersuasive in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Rutledge and our own analysis. 23 One last concern remains regarding the reinstatement of Rutledge's conspiracy conviction. Rutledge asks that we remand his case to the district court so that he may challenge his conspiracy conviction, which he had not done previously because the conviction had been vacated. A court should notify the defendant that it is contemplating reinstating a vacated conviction before it renders its decision in order to give the defendant the opportunity to challenge any reinstated convictions. However, in the facts of this case Rutledge was given just such an opportunity. The district court raised the question of reinstating Rutledge's conspiracy conviction in a December 4, 1997 telephone conference. From this point forward, Rutledge was on notice that the reinstatement of his Count II conviction was a distinct possibility. Rutledge had almost ten months between this conference and the lower court's decision, during which Rutledge's counsel filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the sec. 2255 petition, to challenge the propriety of his conspiracy conviction. Furthermore, after the court's decision actually reinstating the Count II conviction, Rutledge filed a Rule 60(b) motion, but again did not question the substance of this conviction. Thus, Rutledge has forfeited any objection to his reinstated conspiracy conviction.