Opinion ID: 579192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Government's Objectives

Text: Before deciding whether reasoned analysis supports Congress's judgment that the gender preference is substantially related to its objectives, we must be clear about which objectives, precisely, Congress endorsed. Implicit in the government's judgment, my colleagues suggest, is the assumption that women are more likely than white men to broadcast women's programming or other targeted programming. Ante at 395. In fact, Congress did not emphasize the idea of women's or minority or any other targeted programming when it endorsed the FCC's gender preference. Congress's repeated statements on the subject show that it thought increased female ownership would promote the broader (and less controversial) goal of increasing programming diversity in general. My colleagues acknowledge the broader goal sporadically in their opinion, but in applying the intermediate scrutiny test, they focus only on the narrower goal of increasing women's or minority programming. And they strike down the preference based on a single study that never considered programming for general audiences. As early as 1982, Congress recognized that women are significantly underrepresented in the ownership of telecommunications facilities and that the American public will benefit by having access to a wider diversity of information sources if the role of underrepresented groups in broadcasting, such as women, is increased. H.R. No. 97-765 (Conf.Rep.), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News 2288-89; cf. Random Selection/Lottery Systems--Third Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 95 F.C.C.2d 432, 438 (1983) (noting that women own a majority of only 2.8% of all televisions stations). The Metro Court itself cited the report accompanying Congress's 1987 directive that the FCC preference policies stay in place. The report of the Appropriations Committee explained: The Congress has expressed its support for such policies in the past and has found that promoting diversity of ownership of broadcast properties satisfies important public policy goals. Diversity of ownership results in diversity of programming and improved service to minority and women audiences. S.Rep. No. 1982, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987) (quoted in Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3016) (emphasis added). The Committee recognized the continuity of congressional action in approving the minority and the gender preferences, noting that [i]n approving a lottery system for the selection of certain broadcast licensees, Congress explicitly approved the use of preferences to promote minority and women ownership. Id. at 76-77 (also quoted in Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3016) (emphasis added). Two years later, Senator Hollings, chair of the authorizing committee and the appropriations subcommittee for the FCC, described the repeated inclusion of the appropriations rider in subsequent appropriations bills as an indication of Congress' continuing support for these policies. Minority Ownership of Broadcast Stations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1989). At the same time, the Senate heard testimony that a specific definition for the term 'female programming'  was not necessary because [t]he purpose of the female preference is to increase female ownership in order to promote viewpoint diversity. Id. at 78 (emphasis added). In the 1987 appropriations rider itself, Congress endorsed the rationale of the FCC's gender preference. See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub.L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-31 (1987) (specifically approving preference policies as developed by the Commission). And the FCC had  'recognized female involvement as contributing to potential diversity of programming and awarded merit in a comparative proceeding on that basis.'  Horne Industries, Inc., 94 F.C.C.2d 815, 823 n. 32 (1983) (quoting Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 69 F.C.C.2d 1591, 1593 n. 9 (1978)) (emphasis added); see also Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 95 F.C.C.2d at 435-36; Mid-Florida Television Corp., 69 F.C.C.2d at 652. All this is to say that the governmental objective in this case, as in Metro Broadcasting, is not merely to increase programming specifically targeted at women or minorities, but to increase programming diversity in general. Congress and the FCC have selected the minority ownership policies primarily to promote programming diversity, the Court said in Metro, and the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an important governmental objective. 110 S.Ct. at 3010 (emphasis added). Although Congress did not provide a precise definition of programming diversity, the Metro Court offered the following definition: the expectation that varying perspectives will be more fairly represented on the airwaves. 110 S.Ct. at 3018. Programming diversity includes, the Court made clear, the selection of topics for news coverage and the presentation of editorial viewpoint, as well as avoiding stereotypes on general programming. Id. at 3017; see also Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1208-09 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Wald, J., dissenting).D. The Nexus 1 Reasoned Analysis In addition to obscuring the government's objectives, my colleagues ignore the Metro Court's central conclusion that the minority preferences were substantially related to the objectives because the reasoning employed by the Commission and Congress is permissible, 110 S.Ct. at 3018. The reasoning upheld in Metro is hard to distinguish from the reasoning underlying the gender preference. Noting that the nexus between ownership and programming 'has been repeatedly recognized by both the Commission and the courts,'  110 S.Ct. at 3015 (quoting H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-765, p. 40 (1982)), the Metro Court went on to endorse Congress's logic by comparing it to the logic of the jury selection cases: We have recognized, for example, that the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment forbids the exclusion of groups on the basis of such characteristics as race and gender from a jury venire because [w]ithout that requirement, the State could draw up jury lists in such manner as to produce a pool of prospective jurors disproportionately ill disposed towards one or all classes of defendants, and thus more likely to yield petit juries with similar disposition. 110 S.Ct. at 3018 (quoting Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990)). It is a small step from this logic, the Metro Court said, to the conclusion that including minorities in the electromagnetic spectrum will be more likely to produce a 'fair cross section' of diverse content. Id. It is an even smaller step from this logic to the conclusion that including women in the broadcast spectrum will be more likely to produce a fair cross section of diverse content. The first jury venire cases, after all, concerned women, not minorities. As early as 1946, the Supreme Court suggested that female participation in the jury system is necessary if that process is to reflect a cross section of the community. Ballard v. United States 329 U.S. 187, 191, 67 S.Ct. 261, 263, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946). The Court stressed that while neither men nor women think or act as a class, [t]he truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. Id. at 193-94, 67 S.Ct. at 264. My colleagues have no patience for subtle interplay or distinct quality, insisting on numbers instead. The jury cases, combined with Metro, make it clear that Congress's assumptions about ownership by women and diversity of programming are permissible rather than impermissible. It is clearly a legitimate inference for Congress and the Commission to draw that as more [women] gain ownership and policymaking roles in the media, varying perspectives will be more fairly represented on the airwaves. Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3018. (citation omitted). As a matter of logic, in fact, the mild gender preference that my colleagues say is unconstitutional seem much more directly related to the goal of programming diversity than the minority distress sale policy upheld in Metro. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her Metro dissent, the distress sale policy provides preferences to minority owners who neither intend nor desire to manage the station in any respect. 110 S.Ct. at 3041-42. The FCC awards a gender credit, by contrast, only where the prospective female owners will devote substantial amounts of time on a daily basis to the management of the station. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395 (1965). In fact, under FCC rules, credit is awarded only to the extent that female owners will hold a policy-making position and the credit is proportionate to the extent of her involvement. New Continental Broadcasting Co., 96 F.C.C.2d 544, 546-47 (Rev.Bd.1983). In practice, this means that well-qualified women have been rejected for licenses because the FCC thinks they will not be sufficiently involved in daily programming decisions. See, e.g., Alexander S. Klein, Jr., 69 F.C.C.2d 2134, 2146-47 (Rev.Bd.1978). Given the fact that female owners who benefit from the gender preference are more likely than minority distress sale owners actually to influence programming, I do not understand how my colleagues can conclude that minority ownership is logically related to the goal of programming diversity, but female ownership is not. The Court in Metro also emphasized the fact that the distress sale policy placed only a slight burden on non-minorities. 110 S.Ct. at 3026-27. In practice, the Court pointed out, distress sales have represented a tiny fraction--less than four tenths of one percent--of all broadcast sales since 1979. Id. at 3027. In the case of gender preference, the burden on men is equally slight: out of 8,720 stations responding to an FCC survey, only 81 stations said they had benefited from the minority or women's preference program, less than 1%. Congressional Research Service, Minority Broadcast Station Ownership and Broadcast Programming: Is There a Nexus? 41 (June 29, 1988) [hereinafter CRS Report ]. And since the gender preference does not exclude men while the distress sales the Supreme Court approved do exclude non-minorities, the logic of Metro suggests that the burden is even slighter. 2 Archaic Stereotypes In light of Metro and the gender cases, unless statistics disproved the link, I think that my colleagues could strike down the preference policy only if they held that Congress's assumptions about female ownership and programming diversity are based on archaic stereotypes. They never suggest this, unsurprisingly, because Congress has not relied on stereotypes of any kind. It has not assumed that women share some cohesive, collective viewpoint, Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3018, or that female journalists will approach stories about the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, or foreign relations any differently than male journalists would. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3255, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). Nor has Congress endorsed the similarly controversial proposition that men and women think differently about most questions. (If it had, the constitutional issue might be closer: the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Ms. Betty Friedan's The Second Stage ). It has merely assumed that some female programmers will choose to emphasize different subjects--breast cancer, say, or glass ceilings in the workplace--than male programmers will. The assumption strikes me as innocuous to the point of being obvious. The familiar response is that the editorial perspectives of the Washington Post and the New York Times are hard to distinguish even though the Post was, until recently, published by a woman, and the Times is published by a man. See, e.g., Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1199 (D.C.Cir.1985). But if constitutional decisions must turn on anecdotes, there are plenty to the contrary. For example, when Jennifer Lawson was appointed to be the Public Broadcasting Service's first executive vice president for national programming, she announced that her main goal was to make PBS programming a better reflection of the cultural, political, and sexual diversity of the U.S. David Klinghoffer, All-Powerful Programming Czar Promises the Era of the Multicultural, Washington Times, March 6, 1991, at E1. And the Supreme Court in Metro stressed that Congressional policy does not assume that in every case minority-ownership and management will lead to more minority-oriented programming or to the expression of a discrete 'minority viewpoint' on the airwaves ... Rather both Congress and the FCC maintain simply that expanded minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate result in greater broadcast diversity. 110 S.Ct. at 3016 (emphasis added). It would be hard, in any case, for my colleagues to maintain that gender preference will promote archaic stereotypes, since the FCC and Congress have concluded that gender preference will reduce archaic stereotypes. In the late 1970s, the Civil Rights Commission published two reports concluding that the broadcast media often portrayed women and minorities in stereotypical ways, and that the problem could be addressed by increasing the number of women and minority decisionmakers in radio and television. See Window Dressing on the Set: Women and Minorities in Television, A Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights (1977) (cited by the Commission in its Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership,68 F.C.C.2d at 980 n. 9); see also Window Dressing on the Set: an Update, A Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights (1979). A 1990 report finds that the stereotypes persist, and also concludes that female programmers would reduce them. National Commission on Working Women, What's Wrong With This Picture? The Status of Women on Screen and Behind the Camera in Entertainment TV (1990). Just as the Metro Court concluded that minority owned stations tend to avoid racial and ethnic stereotypes in portraying minorities, 110 S.Ct. at 3017, it was both reasonable and permissible for Congress and the Commission to conclude that female owned stations would avoid gender stereotypes. In their briefs and at oral argument, lawyers for the FCC tried to summarize the logic that supports Congress's conclusions, but my colleagues have belittled their efforts at every turn. The Commission's brief cites nothing, the majority asserts, that might support its predictive judgment that women owners will broadcast women's or minority programming at any different rate than will men. Ante at 395. But the Commission's brief cites precisely the kind of reasoned analysis that satisfied the Supreme Court in Metro. See Appellant's Brief at 34-36 (citing, among other things, jury venire analogy and Window Dressing on the Set Report). My colleagues reproduce a long exchange at oral argument in which, they say, the Commission's lawyer confirmed that the record in this case lacks evidence of a substantial relationship. But, as the transcript makes clear, the questioning judge repeatedly cut off the lawyer's attempt to explain the government's reasoning, demanding he produce evidence or a basis in fact for the conclusion. To my mind, the excerpt helps to show how starkly my colleagues have misunderstood the nature of the inquiry into substantial relationship, and in their hunger for statistical evidence, have overlooked reasoned analysis. E. The Statistics I am reluctant to accept my colleagues' invitation to scrutinize the statistics strictly, since Metro tells us that Congress's empirical conclusions deserve great weight. 110 S.Ct. at 3011. But my colleagues' treatment of the data is so unconvincing that their conclusions cannot be defended, even on their own terms. And even though the Metro Court found empirical support for Congress's conclusions outside of the administrative record, my colleagues make no attempt to consider the host of other studies that provide more of the statistics they demand. 1 The CRS Report My colleagues have decided to reject Congress's findings after parsing a single report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, which merited a single footnote in Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3017 n. 31, and which received no more attention in the opinion than any other study. Their odd treatment of the report is obvious from the beginning of their analysis. The title of the report asks Is There a Nexus? and, according to my colleagues, the report, answer[s] its own question, at least with respect to women. The answer it gives is 'no.'  Ante at 396. But the answer it gives is plainly yes. Based on th[e report's] findings, the cover page of the CRS study concludes, there is a strong indication that minority and women station ownership result in a greater degree of minority programming. CRS Report at cover page (emphasis added); see also id. at 44 (While stations with women owners lag slightly behind those with minority owners in programming for minorities generally,, a substantial percentage [of women-owned stations] programs for blacks and Hispanic audiences.) (emphasis added). The Metro Court took the study's conclusions at face value. Yet my colleagues ignore the central conclusion printed on the face of the study. I concede that if reliable data conclusively disproved Congress's judgments, it might suggest that Congress's analysis was not reasoned. But the CRS study not only fails to disprove Congress's judgments, it clearly supports them. The report concludes, for example, that 35% of stations owned primarily by women are likely to broadcast women's programming, while just 28% of stations owned by non-women are likely to do so. CRS Report at 18 (Fig. 9A). That means that the female owned stations are 20% more likely to broadcast women's programming than stations owned by men. The data also reveal a statistical correlation between female ownership and minority programming. Twenty-six percent of stations with female owners broadcast programming targeted to Blacks, while 20% of stations owned by non-Blacks do. CRS Report at 14 (Fig. 5A). In other words, stations owned in part by women are 30% more likely to broadcast Black programming than stations owned by people who are not Black. The statistical correlation between women owners and programming directed at other minority groups is about the same. See CRS Report at 15-17 To put the percentages in perspective: In the 1952 election, a landslide, Dwight Eisenhower won 55% of the popular vote, to Adlai Stevenson's 44% (about 33.5 million votes to about 27 million). The difference between the votes received by the two candidates? Only 25%. A correlation of that size does not satisfy my colleagues. But they do not tell us why that link does not satisfy the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment does not identify the mystical point at which an empirical correlation becomes--to use my colleague's word--meaningful; and judges have no basis, except their own policy preferences, for telling Congress it could not conclude that a 20% or 30% increase in women's or minority programming was enough to justify the gender preference. Besides downplaying the significance of the statistical correlation in the CRS report, my colleagues make three other observations about the data. But the data do not prove what my colleagues say.  My colleagues stress that stations in which women own less than 50% of equity are as likely to broadcast women's programming as stations in which women own more than 50%. Ante at 397. But that is the wrong comparison. Because the preference policy goes only to women who will also manage (and who will therefore be in a position to influence programming), the more relevant comparison is between women owners who are managers and women owners who are not. And the report makes clear that there is no correlation between owning more than 50% equity and holding a management position. Of the stations reporting that at least one of their owners was also a manager, 55.8% percent said those owners held less than 50% interest in the station, while just 44.2% reported those owners held more than a 50% interest in the station. CRS Report at 39 The right question is whether a correlation exists, on the whole, between female owner-managers and diverse programming. The report demonstrates that correlation and likely understates it, because, according to the statistics, only 18% of the female owners in the survey were also managers. CRS Report at 40. The report also understates the correlation because it asked only about programming specifically targeted at women, minorities, children and senior citizens, and not at general audiences. CRS Report at 54.  My colleagues focus on data from five large cities--a subsection of the report--which they claim call into question the link between female owners and women's programming. Ante at 397. But they fail to mention that data from the same cities suggests a significant link between female ownership and minority programming. About 30% of stations with female owners target Black audiences, compared to only about 23% of stations without minority owners--a difference of 30%. CRS Report at 25. About 27% of stations with female owners target Hispanic audiences, compared to only about 20% of stations without minority owners--a difference of 35%. Id. The differences are similar for programming directed at Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American and Alaskan audiences. Id  My colleagues rely on the report's finding that radio stations with at least one women owner use broadcasting formats in nearly the same order as stations owned by non-minorities (which includes men and women). Ante at 397. That means that stations with female owners are about as likely to use an All News or Talk or Golden Oldies format as stations without any minority ownership. But my colleagues' focus on formats strikes me as irrelevant at best, and unsettling at worst. They cannot possibly expect stations owned by women to program soft, feminine, music, or to replace a Country Western format with Adult Contemporary. The point is that more female owner-managers will likely enhance the diversity of programming within the existing formats, and the study certainly does not disprove it 2 Other Studies Finally, if my colleagues want more statistics, there are plenty to support Congress's position. When the Supreme Court in Metro noted that Congress's conclusion about the nexus between programming and diversity is corroborated by a host of empirical evidence, 110 S.Ct. at 3017, it did not limit itself to studies that Congress had consulted, or that appeared in the administrative record or FCC brief. Apart from the CRS report, in fact, every study the Supreme Court cited (including unpublished doctoral dissertations and presentations at obscure symposia) came directly from amicus briefs supplied by organizations like the NAACP and the Congressional Black Caucus. This Court, too, could have called for amicus briefs on the statistical question (or accepted the brief that was offered) and our failure to do so looks less than sporting, since our decision seems to turn on the absence of them. Nevertheless, statistical support for the gender preference is not hard to find. Despite the fact that Metro, for example, concerned race rather than gender, the Court received one amicus brief showing a clear statistical correlation between women programmers and women's programming. An organization called American Women in Radio and Television surveyed the radio programs that had received National Commendation Awards in 1986 for presenting issues of particular interest to women or for presenting women in a positive and realistic light. Women represented 58.5% of the producers, 84.2% of the writers, and 92.9% of the reporter/hosts. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Women in Radio and Television, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 20-21, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1991). Women, by contrast, accounted for only 29.8% of broadcast managers or professionals in general. See FCC, Cable and Broadcast Industry Equal Employment Opportunity Trend Report (1986). The statistics for producers are relevant, rather than irrelevant, ante at 396 n. 7, because the gender preference goes only to owners/managers who are also involved in programming decisions. The majority persistently ignores this fact, except to suggest that female owner/managers can influence programming only by hiring female producers and writers. Id. In fact, however, FCC cases make clear that the female owner/managers who receive preferences are themselves involved in programming decisions. In Coastal Broadcasting Partners, 6 FCC Rcd. (No. 14) 4242 (1991), for example, the Commission gave a preference to a female owner/manager who proposed to work full-time as Director of Programming and Public Affairs, a role in which she would focus on program development, program acquisitions, ascertainment of needs and public affairs programs and announcements. Id. at 4244-45. She would also serve on a programming committee responsible for set[ting] programming policy, and would see to it that those policies are followed and [would] carry them out. Id. at 4245. If this case is appealed to the Supreme Court, I have no doubt that a host of amici will submit a host of empirical evidence to corroborate Congress's judgment. In the meantime, a quick skim of the best-seller lists, the computer banks, and the rejected amicus brief, suggests the range of the studies they will have at their disposal. Susan Faludi's Backlash, for example, devotes an entire chapter to the proposition that female programmers in the 1980s who tried to portray single or working women as independent professionals rather than as miserable careerists or as sex symbols, were challenged by male programmers at every turn. She gives a host of examples, and cites several studies to prove her point. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH, 140-168 (1991) (citing National Commission on Working Women, Women Out of View: An Analysis of Female Characters on 1987-88 TV Programs, (1987); Davis, Portrayals of Women in Prime-Time Network Television: Some Demographic Characteristics, 23 SEX ROLES 325-30 (1990)). Other sources include: two symposia co-sponsored by the FCC and American Women in Radio and Television, Inc., Women in the Telecommunications Marketplace and The Woman Entrepreneur; National Commission on Working Women, What's Wrong With This Picture? The Status of Women on Screen and Behind the Camera in Entertainment TV (1990); Herbert, Study Charges Sexism in Women's Sports Coverage, L.A. Times, Aug 30, 1990, Part F, p. 2, col. 3 (describing a study prepared by professors at the University of Wisconsin and the University of Southern California); P. Koza, Kiddie TV Study: One Smurfette Amid a Host of Smurfs , United Press International, July 14, 1982 (describing a study by Boston University professors finding that programs targeted at children presented outdated stereotypes of gender roles). Again, I hardly think these kinds of studies are necessary to decide the constitutional question, but since my colleagues do, there are plenty to go around. 78 I must also dissent, finally, from my colleagues' paraphrased descriptions of my positions. I do not suggest, as they claim, that the Supreme Court already has decided that the Commission's sex-based policy passes constitutional muster, ante at 386 n. 1. I do not suggest that deference means not just limited factual review, but none at all, ante at 392 n. 2. I do not suggest that a sex based classification might survive intermediate scrutiny even if it rests upon unsupported generalizations about men or women as a group, ante at 393 n. 3. And I do not suggest that a relevant generalization is presumed true (even if unsupported) unless proved otherwise, id. I welcome, of course, a vigorous debate. But I think we should debate the more modest propositions actually contained in this dissent. 79    80 The blind use of statistics, Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted, cannot be permitted to undermine the policies of Congress or erode our decisions on substantive law. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Fisher, 449 U.S. 1115, 1118, 101 S.Ct. 929, 930, 66 L.Ed.2d 845 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). As a matter of policy, the decision to give a mild preference to women in the assignment of broadcast licenses is open to debate. But as a matter of law, the constitutionality of this affirmative action program is clear--at least until the Supreme Court overturns Metro and a long line of gender cases. One of the most unsettling trends in appellate jurisprudence is the tendency of judges who are devoted to the original intention of the framers of the Constitution to ignore the original intentions of elected representatives in Congress. Today my colleagues thwart not only the intentions of Congress and the Executive, but also the intentions of the Supreme Court. I think that the third branch has no business telling the first branch how to make national policy, or what policy to make, and I dissent.  Justice Thomas was a member of this court when the case was briefed and argued and is designated today a Circuit Justice of this circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 42, 43(b) 1 Our dissenting colleague suggests throughout that the Supreme Court already has decided that the Commission's sex-based policy passes constitutional muster. [A]s a matter of law, he writes, the constitutionality of this affirmative action program is clear--at least until the Supreme Court overturns Metro. Post, at 415. In striking down the preference policy, he writes, my colleagues have done precisely what the Supreme Court forbids them to do. Post, at 404. And it strikes me as impossible, our colleague writes, to reconcile the Supreme Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting with [this court's] decision today. Post, at 404. With all due respect, we think it impossible to reconcile our dissenting colleague's suggestion with the unambiguous reservation of Metro Broadcasting itself: [T]he Commission's gender preference policy is not before us today. 110 S.Ct., at 3005 n. 7 The Commission's gender-preference policy is, however, before us today, and though its subject may challenge certain articles of faith, this case deserves the fair, careful, and dispassionate treatment that we try to accord all of the cases we decide. Our dissenting colleague nonetheless accuses us of telling the first branch how to make national policy, post, at 415, and of pay[ing] lip service to Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting while apply[ing] in practice ... Justice O'Connor's dissent, post, at 404 thereby showing disrespect not only to a coordinate branch of government, see post, at 415 ([J]udges who are devoted to the original intention of the framers of the Constitution ... ignore the original intentions of selected representatives in Congress.); post, at 406 (There is not even a pretense of deference to Congress anywhere in their opinion.), but also to our own branch of government, see post, at 415 (Today my colleagues thwart not only the intentions of Congress and the executive, but also the intentions of the Supreme Court.); post, at 404 ([A]s appellate judges, our duty is to follow Supreme Court precedents, not to anticipate them.), and, for good measure, to the lawyers for one of the parties, in their efforts before and at oral argument, see post, at 412 ([M]y colleagues have belittled their efforts at every turn.... [T]he questioning judge repeatedly cut off the lawyer's attempt to explain the government's reasoning.). We welcome vigorous debate, of course, but with all due respect, we think our colleague's overheated approach discouraging: not so much an invitation to invigorating debate as a bid to provoke a shouting match. One hopeful note, however: if taking seriously the responsibility of judicial review is a vice, it is a vice that fortunately is shared, at least at times, across the jurisprudential spectrum. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509-10 (D.C.Cir.1991) ([J]ust as the FCC may not ignore the dictates of the legislative branch, neither may the judiciary ignore its independent duty to check the constitutional excesses of Congress.). 2 Our dissenting colleague reads Metro Broadcasting for the rule that although courts should not defer to Congress on constitutional questions, we should defer ... to Congress on empirical questions. Post, at 406. Of course, the point about which we disagree with our colleague and with Congress--whether sex-based preferences will advance substantially the goal of increased programming diversity for intermediate scrutiny purposes--is a mixed question of law and fact, neither purely constitutional nor purely empirical. We nonetheless agree with our colleague insofar as he suggests that we must review Congress's judgment deferentially, without reweighing the evidence de novo. At times, however, our colleague hints at the far different hypothesis that deference means not just limited factual review, but none at all. See, e.g., post, at 406. We know of no support--and our colleague cites none--for the proposition that if the constitutionality of a statute depends in part on the existence of certain facts, a court may not review a legislature's judgment that the facts exist. If a legislature could make a statute constitutional simply by finding that black is white or freedom, slavery, judicial review would be an elaborate farce. At least since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), that has not been the law 3 Our dissenting colleague asserts that a sex-based classification might survive intermediate scrutiny even if it rests upon unsupported generalizations about men or women as a group. See post, at 406-408. He notes correctly that the purpose of intermediate scrutiny is to ensure that sex-based classifications are based on reasoned analysis rather than archaic stereotypes, post, at 408, possibilities that he appears rightly to regard as mutually exclusive. But an analysis that rests upon unsupported factual premises cannot possibly be reasoned, and an untrue and widely-held generalization about men or women is by definition a stereotype. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Rights Comm'n, Characters in Textbooks 5 (1980) (explaining that a member of a group is stereotyped when she is portrayed in a stylized manner that conforms to widely accepted, but often untrue, ideas of what members of the group are like). More to the point, unless a generalization about men or women asserted in defense of a sex-based classification is grounded in some degree of fact, the classification cannot possibly advance any legitimate state interest, much less an important one. Our dissenting colleague, however, insists that a relevant generalization is presumed true (even if unsupported) unless proved otherwise. See post, at 408, 414. On this point, our colleague is mistaken--for it is a firmly established principle[ ] that the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification'  falls on the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S., at 723-24, 102 S.Ct. at 3335-36 (citation omitted); see also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744-45, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 1398, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984) (imposing the same burden with respect to federal statutes) In our view, Craig v. Boren establishes beyond doubt that a sex-based classification cannot survive unless the sex-centered generalization asserted in the law's defense actually comport[s] with fact. 429 U.S., at 199, 97 S.Ct. at 458. Craig struck down a sex-based differential in Oklahoma's drinking age precisely because of the ultimate unpersuasiveness of th[e] evidentiary record compiled by the State in order to prove that young men were likelier to drive drunk than were young women. Id., at 201, 97 S.Ct. at 459; see also id., at 204, 97 S.Ct. at 460 ([T]he showing offered by [the State] does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving.). Because so few men in the aggregate drive drunk, as the statistics themselves indicated, the Court concluded that the relationship between gender and traffic safety was far too tenuous to meet the intermediate scrutiny test. See id., at 204, 97 S.Ct. at 460. Our dissenting colleague contends that the Court struck down the law only after pointing out that the different drinking ages were based on 'social stereotypes.'  Post, at 408 (quoting 429 U.S., at 202 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 459 n. 14). But the point of the Court's observation was that the stereotypes (themselves unsupported generalizations) were likely to distort the accuracy of the [ ] comparative statistics asserted to justify them, because  'reckless' young men who drink and drive are transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home. 429 U.S., at 202 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 459 n. 14. This and other methodological problems with the statistics further supported the Court's judgment that the necessary link was far too tenuous empirically. See id., at 202-04, 97 S.Ct. at 459-60. Thus, the Court's observation that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, id., at 204, 97 S.Ct. at 460, underscores only that some statistically-observed correlations are insufficient to validate a sex-based classification--and not, as our dissenting colleague suggests, see post, at 408, that a correlation between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purport[s] to represent, 429 U.S., at 199, 97 S.Ct. at 458, is unnecessary. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld is to the same effect as Craig v. Boren. The Court struck down the statute at issue because it rested on an  'archaic and overbroad' generalization--that is, on assumptions that in view of the large percentage of married women working (41.5% in 1971) and other current statistics bore little relationship to present reality. 420 U.S., at 642 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. at 1231 & n. 11; see also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S., at 88-89, 99 S.Ct. at 2663 (concluding that because no  'statistical evidence'  supported Congress's sex-based distinction, the classification must rest on some  'baggage of sexual stereotypes'  and therefore is not substantially related to the attainment of any important and valid statutory goals). Our dissenting colleague cites no case in which a sex-based classification was upheld despite the absence of a demonstrable and relevant difference between men and women. Neither Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981) (plurality opinion), nor Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981), see post, at 407-408, establishes this possibility. Michael M. upheld a statute punishing only men for having sexual relations with minors. The statute was designed to prevent teenage pregnancy, and it reflected the obvious biological fact that only women can become pregnant. Addressing the question whether that relevant difference was sufficient to justify the classification, a plurality rested on the ground that a sex-neutral statute might be less effective because a female is surely less likely to report violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to criminal prosecution. 450 U.S., at 473-74, 101 S.Ct. at 1207 (plurality opinion). The plurality's subsequent characterization of that proposition as merely a plausible one of differing speculations, see id., at 474 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 1207 n. 10, might have suggested that sex-based classifications are presumed supported until proven otherwise, but the Court's later pronouncements squarely reject this reading. See, e.g., Mathews, 465 U.S., at 744, 104 S.Ct. at 1398 ( '[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing ... that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of [important governmental] objectives. '  (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S., at 724, 102 S.Ct. at 3336 (internal quotations omitted))). Rostker upheld a statute requiring only men to register for the draft. Another statute, unchallenged in Rostker, prohibited women from combat. Considering whether that relevant difference was sufficient to justify another sex-based classification with respect to draft registration, the Court rested upon Congress's factual finding that any future draft ... would be characterized by a need for combat troops. 453 U.S., at 76, 101 S.Ct. at 2657. After itself reviewing the evidence supporting that finding, the Court criticized the district court for not conducting an appropriately deferential examination of the evidence, id., at 83, 101 S.Ct. at 2661--a limited review (as is always the case when courts review legislative factfinding), but a review nonetheless. In short, neither Michael M. nor Rostker insulates Congress's empirical judgments from scrutiny, and neither even remotely supports the proposition for which they are cited--that the constitutionality of a sex-based distinction does not depend upon the degree of correlation between sex and the attribute for which sex is used as a proxy. 4 Our dissenting colleague tells us that we identify women's or minority programming as programming specifically targeted at women or minorities, post, at 409. We do not. Neither women's viewpoint nor women's programming necessarily means viewpoints or programming targeted to women or of special interest to women or concerning subjects that some may suppose women are likely to put on the airwaves, and the same is true for minority viewpoint or minority programming. Rather than presume to give content to these terms, cf. post, at 411 (calling innocuous to the point of being obvious the assumption that some female programmers will choose to emphasize different subjects--breast cancer, say, or glass ceilings in the workplace); infra note 8, we remain agnostic. We do assume, however, as did Congress, that these terms necessarily have some meaning--but whatever women's programming and minority programming are, there is no evidence showing that women owner/managers are substantially likelier to program them than are men 5 This exchange was typical: Judge Thomas: ... I am asking you, in the aggregate, what difference does it make, other than [that] you have a male owner or a female owner? Mr. Pash: I think that what difference it makes, ... is that there is a reasonable expectation-- Judge Thomas: Based on what? Mr. Pash: --a reasonable expectation based on the fact that women are a significant group, the fact that they are significant in size, they are a significant group in the society. Judge Thomas: I understand that. I understand that women are a significant group, and I understand that they are significant in size. But what difference does it make, if a woman owns a station or if women owned all the stations, other than that they owned all the stations? Does it make a difference in programming, does it make a difference in content of the points of view, does it make a difference in the editorials? What does it make a difference? Mr. Pash: It makes a difference ... it makes a difference in viewpoint and perspective presented on the station, and the expectation is that-- Judge Thomas: Okay. Now, what is that based on? Mr. Pash: That is based on the expectation that, because women and other groups--but in this case we are talking about women--have been historically subject to societal prejudices and particular societal attitudes that they-- Judge Thomas: So, does that mean they will have a different point of view as a result of prejudice, or they don't own stations as a result of prejudice? Mr. Pash: No, that means that there is an expectation that, in the aggregate, they will have a different perspective on questions, not on every question, not in every case, but-- Judge Thomas: Based on what, though? I mean how can you conclude that [women] will have a different perspective? Mr. Pash: Well, I guess this is going to sound circular, but you can conclude they will have a different perspective, because, historically, they have been subject to prejudice and different societal attitudes, and this has led to their playing a different role in society, they are being treated differently, subject to stereotypes and so forth.... Judge Thomas: But how is this expectation any different from a stereotype, if it doesn't have any basis in fact? Mr. Pash: Well, I am not saying it does. I am saying it doesn't have any basis in fact. I am saying that this record doesn't provide factual evidence for it.... .... Judge Thomas: Okay. Fine. But is there any evidence that there is a difference between the stations owned by women and owned by men? Mr. Pash: No, there is no evidence in the record.