Opinion ID: 848916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the majority's misapplication of masters and nabozny

Text: The majority erroneously states that the difference between the present case and Masters and Nabozny is that here, while the act was intended, the result was not. Op. at 27. There is no such difference among these three cases. Rather, in both Masters and Nabozny, the insureds made precisely the same claim as presented herethat they did not intend the result of their deliberate acts. Robert intended to pull the trigger of his shotgun, but he testified that he did not intend to cause any physical injury to his friend. The question for the purpose of coverage is whether the shooting can be considered an accident because Robert should not have reasonably expected the consequences when he intentionally aimed his shotgun at the head of his friend, cocked the hammer, and pulled the trigger. The purported difference between this case and Masters and Nabozny has been created by the majority, which has imposed a different construction of the phrase intentional act. As stated in Masters, this Court unanimously adopted an objective test of intentionality: an intentional act causing injury is not an accident if the insured actually intended the harm or if the harm should reasonably have been expected. [5] Here, the majority fails to apply the objective Masters test of intentionality, instead substituting a subjective one. [6] The majority states that [w]e agree with plaintiff that Robert intended to point the gun at Kevin and pull the trigger.[ [7] ] However, Robert believed that the gun was not loaded. Robert had no intention of firing a loaded weapon. No bodily injury would have been caused by Robert's intended act of pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun. Op. at 27 (emphasis added). What the majority must justify, but cannot, is why we must consider his act of pointing a shotgun at another person and pulling the trigger from Robert's subjective perspective. [8] Under the Masters test, the question is whether the insured reasonably should have expected the consequence because of the direct risk of harm he intentionally created. However, the majority tautologically concludes as a matter of law that Robert should not have reasonably expected the consequences that ensued from his act because his intended act was merely to pull the trigger of an unloaded gun. [9] Op. at 27 (emphasis added). However, what Robert's reasonable expectations should have been, not what his actual subjective beliefs may or may not have been, are the focus of the Masters standard. The majority erroneously maintains that the test we articulated in Masters and Nabozny is a subjective one. However, the majority fails to explain our objective application of the test in both cases. In addition, the term reasonably has consistently been construed as indicating an objective rather than a subjective standard. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 432 Mich. 656, 443 N.W.2d 734 (1989), six justices, including the author of the current majority opinion, agreed that `reasonably be expected' is unambiguous and requires application of an objective standard of expectation. 432 Mich. at 688, 443 N.W.2d 734. In Fire Ins. Exchange v. Diehl, 450 Mich. 678, 685, 545 N.W.2d 602 (1996), the Court held that injury `neither expected nor intended by the insured' required a subjective standard of expectation where the policy language did  not employ the term ` reasonably .' (Emphasis added.) The majority simply refuses to acknowledge that the test adopted in Masters and Nabozny utilizes the same language that has been construed by this Court as requiring an objective standard of inquiry. Without offering any rationale for doing so, the majority makes the insured's subjective belief regarding the status of the gun definitive, as though no contrary conclusion were possible. The issue is whether, in intentionally creating a direct risk of harmpulling the trigger of a shotgun without ascertaining if it was loadedthe insured should have reasonably expected the consequences. Given that the applicable standard is objective, the insured's subjective belief is not controlling. Inexplicably, under the standard adopted by the majority, neither the holding nor the outcome in Masters or Nabozny could be sustained today.