Opinion ID: 1735417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Walker's Statements and the Items Discovered.

Text: ś 86. The State argues that Walker failed to object to the this issue. Failure to raise an issue at trial bars consideration on an appellate level. See Smith, 729 So.2d at 1201 (A trial judge will not be found in error on a matter not presented to him for decision.); Williams, 684 So.2d at 1203 (contemporaneous objection rule is applicable in death penalty cases); Foster, 639 So.2d at 1270 (If no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. This rule's applicability is not diminished in a capital case.); Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 369 (Miss.1987) (Counsel may not sit idly by making no protest as objectionable evidence is admitted, and then raise the issue for the first time on appeal.); M.R.E. 103(1)(a) (requiring timely, on-the-record objection before error can be predicated on the admission of evidence). The rule that failure to object constitutes waiver applies to Fourth Amendment claims as well. Stevens v. State, 458 So.2d 726, 730 (Miss.1984). ś 87. During a suppression hearing, the trial judge sits as a fact finder. Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996). On appeal, the trial judge's findings can only be reversed for manifest error or if they are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. ś 88. Walker claims that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his statements and the items found in Richardson's car after he was stopped and arrested for driving with a suspended license. Walker alleges that there was no evidence to support the initial stop because he was never issued a speeding ticket. Walker claims that because there was no ticket in any form or fashion, the reason for the stop could easily have been pretextual; thus, the fruit of the search incident to stop violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (holding that a search and seizure which is illegal at its inception is not rendered legal by what brings it to light). However, Walker produced no proof to even suggest that the stop was pretextual. ś 89. A review of the record reveals that the trial court conducted a thorough hearing on Walker's motion to suppress his statements and the items found in Richardson's car. Both the statements and pictures of the items found were introduced as evidence at trial. At no time at trial did Walker claim that the stop itself was pretextual, thereby rendering inadmissible the statements and items discovered. Therefore, this assignment of error is procedurally barred from review by this Court. ś 90. In regard to the evidence seized from the Richardson car, alternatively, Walker is procedurally barred as well, in light of the fact that he has no standing to make a Fourth Amendment claim. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-44, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). That amendment states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). Richardson, not Walker, was the owner of the car. Only persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated can benefit from the protections of the exclusionary rule. Therefore, we hold that Walker has no standing to allege a Fourth Amendment claim. ś 91. Assuming arguendo that Walker is not procedurally barred, his argument is without merit. The proponent seeking to overturn a denial of a motion to suppress has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the confession or evidence in question were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Baldwin v. State, 757 So.2d 227, 231 (Miss.2000). In United States v. Escalante, 239 F.3d 678, 680-81 (5th Cir.2001), the court stated: The traffic stop may have been pretextual. But under Whren v. United States, [517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)], a traffic stop, even if pretextual, does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer making the stop has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. This is an objective test based on the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop, not on the motivations of the officer in making the stop. On the other hand, if it is clear that what the police observed did not constitute a violation of the cited traffic law, there is no objective basis for the stop, and the stop is illegal. (Footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). ś 92. Officer Kennedy testified that Walker was speeding as he was exiting the construction zone. Walker never contested, and does not now contest, Kennedy's testimony that he was speeding. Because Walker failed to contradict Kennedy's testimony that he was speeding, the testimony of Kennedy shall be taken as true. See Hearin-Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Currie, 248 So.2d 451, 454 (Miss.1971). Therefore, it cannot be said that Kennedy's stop was pretextual. ś 93. Walker further claims that pretext is shown from the fact that he never was issued a speeding citation. Although this Court has never addressed the present issue, the Court of Appeals has stated: There is no requirement that an officer issue a citation for the predicate traffic violation to have a valid stop or search. McCollins v. State, 798 So.2d 624, 628 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). See also Allenbrand v. State, 217 Ga.App. 609, 610, 458 S.E.2d 382, 383-84 (1995) (citing Hines v. State, 214 Ga.App. 476, 477-78, 448 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1994)) (Whether a citation is issued is `of no consequence' in determining the officer's probable cause to stop the vehicle.). Walker's claim is without merit. ś 94. We hold that Walker has no standing to allege a Fourth Amendment violation because he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a car he stole and did not own. Further, Walker never disputed that he was in fact speedingâ a valid reason for the stopâ immediately preceding him being pulled over by Kennedy. Walker has presented no evidence that Kennedy was without probable cause to stop him and no evidence to suggest that any failure to issue a ticket was the result of an alleged pretextual stop. The evidence before us shows that the stop was objectively valid and, thus, notwithstanding the procedural bars, this issue is devoid of merit.