Opinion ID: 2997748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Relating to the Termination

Text: The district court granted summary judgment in favor of City Colleges on Waite’s claims that she was terminated from her job because of national origin discrimination, age discrimination, or in retaliation for filing a discrimination claim with the EEOC. We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. See McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). We will consider evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is properly granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A dispute over material facts is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The district court determined that Waite was terminated because she was insubordinate; she declined Armster’s request to help with an “in-kind” report, and she failed to conduct food reviews to train her subordinates in spite of being asked to do so by Armster. It is questionable whether Waite was able to prove her prima facie case as to her terNos. 04-2403 & 04-2278 11 mination claims, but even assuming that she has established a prima facie case of discrimination, we agree with the district court’s determination that she failed to prove that a genuine factual issue exists on the question of pretext. City Colleges argues that it fired Waite because she was unresponsive and insubordinate to her supervisor, and because she failed to perform her job in a responsible manner. It supports the claim with descriptions of two particular situations: the preparation of the in-kind report and the scheduling of the food reviews. Armster asked Waite to supervise and assist clerical staff members who had been assigned to complete an in-kind report which was necessary for a grant application. The night before it was due, Armster requested that Waite make corrections to the report. Waite responded that she would be unable to work on the project that evening. The report was submitted late, and City Colleges was placed in violation of the grant agreement. Waite claimed that she was not responsible for the report and tried to pass blame to her subordinates and the accounting department. This explanation does not excuse her refusal to follow the directives of her supervisor, and it is not sufficient evidence which could convince a reasonable jury that Waite’s insubordination was not a true basis for her termination. The other incident leading to termination had to do with food reviews. Armster asked Waite to schedule food reviews within 10 days and to bring along two of her subordinates when she carried out the reviews. These reviews were to help train the staff members to conduct the reviews themselves in the future. Waite failed to schedule these reviews within the 10-day window proposed by Armster. She then argued that food reviews were not her responsibility, and that Armster must have asked her to schedule them in order to fabricate a reason to fire her. This unsubstantiated claim is not enough to create a material issue of fact. See State 12 Nos. 04-2403 & 04-2278 Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1145 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that the claim was “pure speculation and therefore raises no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment”). Again, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Waite “simply provides no basis upon which a reasonable judge could doubt the ver- acity of City Colleges’ account of the food review incident or its assessment that Waite was unresponsive and insubordinate to her supervisor.” Because Waite could not prove that City Colleges’ proffered reasons for terminating her were pretextual, summary judgment was properly granted with respect to the claims arising from her termination.