Opinion ID: 1751000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: had the defendant's right to a speedy trial secured by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the united states and article 3, section 14, 24 and 26 of the mississippi constitution of 1890 been abridged?

Text: The right to a speedy trial is secured by Article III, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 and by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The following chronological chart illustrates the sequence of events that took place. Arrested and Incarcerated ................ October 27, 1990 Indictment ............................... August 16, 1991 Arraigned and Appointed Counsel .......... September 16, 1991 Continuance by agreement (totaling 49 days) .................................. September 16, 1991 Defense motion for psychiatric examination granted ................................ November 4, 1991 Court was furnished with psychiatric report ................................. February 12, 1992 Trial .................................... April 13, 1992 Total days ............................... 532 days Total days from arrest to trial minus continuances ........................... 383 days In considering Giles' constitutional claim, the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments attaches at the time of arrest. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss. 1990); Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989). Once the constitutional right to a speedy trial has attached, we must consider and apply the federal test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and adopted by this Court in determining whether the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1376 (Miss. 1988); Wells v. State, 288 So.2d 860 (Miss. 1974). The Supreme Court in Barker opined that four factors must be considered: (1) Length of delay; (2) Reason for the delay; (3) Defendant's assertion of right; and (4) Prejudice resulting to defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. The Court forewarned that all factors must be considered together with no one individual factor completely disposing of the issue. Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. With this in mind, we turn to the Barker factors.
Giles was arrested on October 27, 1990, and his trial began on April 13, 1992. The total number of days from arrest to trial was five hundred and thirty-two (532) days, approximately eighteen months. Giles, however, cannot complain of any delays attributable to him. Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 876 (Miss. 1987). Therefore, the time period from September 16, 1991, to February 12, 1992, shall not be considered when calculating the length of delay since the first continuance was by agreement of both parties and the second continuance was on defendant's motion. As a result, the total number of applicable days from arrest to trial is three hundred eighty-three (383) days. What comprises an impermissible delay is problematical. We have on occasion reversed cases wherein the delay was less than 383 days, but have also denied reversal on this ground where the delay was more than 383 days. Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Miss. 1985) (290 days); Lightsey v. State, 493 So.2d 375, 378 (Miss. 1986) (458 days). This Court has pronounced that a postponement of eight months or more is presumptively prejudicial. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989). As such, we must proceed with the remaining factors to determine if there are factors that overcome the presumed prejudice. Stated previously however, this one factor, alone, is insufficient to cause reversal but triggers an examination of the other three factors. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 676 (Miss. 1990).
The first delay is the approximate ten-month period that followed from the time Giles was arrested until he was indicted. The record does not indicate or reveal any reason for this delay. The State attributes the delay to the negligence of the prosecutor who was in office at the time this case arose because once the present prosecutor came into office, the case was tried, excluding the time remaining on the continuance for the psychiatric evaluation, in sixty (60) days. The State's argument is substantiated by several articles included in the appellant's brief from the local Laurel newspaper regarding cases in Jones County that were dismissed due to lack of prosecution. One article notes that the district attorney who tried the case sub judice inherited a backlog of five hundred seventy (570) cases. According to the articles, this enormous backlog was created by the fact that the court docket was not called during the last two terms under the former District Attorney Wyatt Collins. Where the defendant has not caused the delay and the State does not show good cause for that delay, this Court weighs this factor against the prosecution. Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1137, 1139 (Miss. 1992). However, the Supreme Court in Barker stated that a deliberate attempt by the State to delay a trial should be weighed more heavily than other neutral reasons, and a more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily ... Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. See Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1137, 1138-39 (Miss. 1992) ([A]ny delay unintentionally caused by the State will not be weighed as heavily against the prosecution as where the delay was intended to hurt the defendant's case.); Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814, 817 (Miss. 1986) (congested docket was sufficient to establish good cause for delay); Diddlemeyer v. State, 398 So.2d 1343, 1345 (overcrowded docket constituted good cause for continuance). It is noted that the cases in which this Court has reversed judgments based on the speedy trial issue, the State invariably failed to show good cause for the delay. See Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1137, 1140 (Miss. 1992); Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989); Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1377 (Miss. 1988); Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 790 (Miss. 1986); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982). The State's reason for the delay from arrest until indictment is sufficient to withstand scrutiny. This is evidenced by the fact that once the newly elected district attorney took office, excluding the continuance charged to Giles, the case was tried in sixty (60) days. The State showed good cause for the delay, and this factor is not weighed against the State. Nevertheless, this Court admonishes former District Attorney Wyatt Collins. There is no excuse for what the district attorney did or rather failed to do. It is unconscionable for a district attorney not to bring any cases to docket for two court terms and only goes against what a district attorney's responsibilities truly are.
This Court has repeatedly held that [a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial. Beavers, 498 So.2d at 791. See Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760, 761 (Miss. 1985); Turner v. State, 383 So.2d 489, 491 (Miss. 1980). However, when a defendant asserts his right to a speedy trial late in the process, the late filing will not be fatal, but will weigh against the defendant. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989). This factor, like all other factors, is only one factor to consider in the Barker balancing test. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Giles argues that because he was not appointed counsel for eleven months, this time should not weigh against him. After being appointed as counsel at the arraignment, Public Defender Ronald Parrish remained of counsel for four months. He then resigned, and the position was filled by the public defenders who tried the case. It was then, some one hundred thirty-six (136) days after Giles had been appointed counsel, that he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of a denial of a speedy trial. This was seventy-four (74) days prior to trial. The State argues that the assertion of the right to a speedy trial does not totally depend on the appointment of counsel since there exist many cases replete with pro se motions for speedy trial requests. Nevertheless, this factor does not weigh against Giles since he did assert his right to a speedy trial once counsel was appointed.
The Supreme Court in Barker expressly held that there are three interests that the right to a speedy trial protects: (1) deterring oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) decreasing anxiety and concern; and (3) limiting the likelihood the defense will be prejudiced. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. See Vickery, 535 So.2d at 1377. In the case at hand, Giles had twice confessed to murdering his wife, and therefore, it would seem he should have little if any hope of being released from prison. Secondly, there would, of course, exist anxiety and concern when one faces a capital murder charge. Giles, however, did not demonstrate much concern since he never requested counsel be appointed. [I]t is clear that an affirmative showing of prejudice is not necessary in order to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314 (Miss. 1990). See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2692, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 530 (1992) ([C]onsideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable ... particularized prejudice). In Doggett, the Supreme Court held that the delay between defendant Doggett's indictment and arrest violated his right to a speedy trial. Doggett, at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2192, 120 L.Ed.2d at 532. In February of 1980, Doggett was indicted for conspiring to distribute cocaine. Doggett subsequently left the country unbeknownst to officials. In September of 1981, Doggett was arrested in Panama on drug charges. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2688, 120 L.Ed.2d at 526. Although Panamanian officials promised to extradite Doggett back to the United States, they freed him and allowed him to go to Columbia. Id. In 1982, Doggett slipped through American Customs in New York City and began a new life in Virginia. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2688, 120 L.Ed.2d at 527. It was not until 1988 when a simple credit check was being run on people subject to outstanding arrests that Doggett was found. Id. Doggett was arrested some eight and a half years after his indictment. Id. As reasoning behind its reversal, the Court stated that, [f]or six years, the Government's investigators made no serious effort to test their progressively more questionable assumption that Doggett was living abroad, and, had they done so, they could have found him within minutes. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2691, 120 L.Ed.2d at 529. The Court further stated that had the United States officials pursued the defendant with reasonable diligence, his claim would have failed. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 531. The case at hand can be distinguished from Doggett in that the government officials egregiously failed to pursue its case and arrest Doggett for over eight years. The government, through its negligence, allowed Doggett to return to the United States, become married, receive a college degree, become steadily employed and live openly under his true name. In the case at hand, the police officials were not negligent in arresting Giles. Although the Doggett Court held that it is not necessary for a defendant to demonstrate particularized prejudice, this Court has stated that it will not allow speculative harm to tip the scales in [a defendant's] favor. Noe v. State, 616 So.2d 298, 302 (Miss. 1993). Giles suffered no prejudice that compares to the prejudice suffered by the criminal defendants in cases where this Court has reversed based on the speedy trial issue. In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989), this Court held that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and, accordingly, reversed. In Smith, the defendant was arrested on May 20, 1986, for simple assault and carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 407. On September 19, 1986, defendant Smith was also indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of making a false statement in the acquisition of a firearm, and on one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Id. Smith was convicted in federal court of the false statement count on February 23, 1987, and the other charge was dismissed. Id. Smith was later re-indicted by a state grand jury and was charged as an habitual offender. Id. The basis for the habitual offender status was a prior 1979 conviction and the 1987 federal conviction. Id. Smith was convicted in state court and was sentenced to the maximum imprisonment for each felony. Id. This Court held that Smith was definitely prejudiced by the delay in trial because: [h]ad Smith been tried prior to February 23, 1987 .. . he could not have been sentenced as an habitual offender. Quite possibly, he would not have received the maximum sentence on the two charges. Because he was sentenced as an habitual offender, he lost the opportunity for probation and parole. Id. at 409. In Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1377 (Miss. 1988), this Court held that the criminal defendant suffered oppressive pretrial incarceration where it was shown that defendant was severely beaten by another inmate causing defendant to be hospitalized. Vickery was, in addition, hospitalized a second time as a result of a nervous breakdown. Id. Lastly, defendant endured two rape attempts while in the prison hospital. Id. See Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1063 (Miss. 1985) ([T]he prejudice to Bailey was threefold; he was ineligible for parole and disqualified from participating in rehabilitation programs[, and] ... [h]e was also unable to properly locate witnesses that would have substantiated his defense ...); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982) (Perry was prejudiced in serving a lengthy period of time at Parchman without the opportunity to participate in various rehabilitation programs due to the pendency of the Harrison County charges.).
Although the defendant did assert his right to a speedy trial, it is but one factor to consider, and a complete analysis of the factors enunciated in Barker favors the State. The State provided legitimate and justifiable reasons for the delay evidenced by the fact that this case was tried within sixty (60) days, excluding time subtracted for defendant's continuance, from when the new district attorney took office. In addition, Giles suffered no undue prejudice in the delay.
Giles contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a requested lesser-included offense instruction. The trial court refused an instruction which, according to Giles, would have informed the jury that it should convict the defendant of simple murder should the State fail to prove all the elements of capital murder. The proposed instruction which Giles argues is a lesser-included offense instruction, however, is simple form-of-verdict instruction. In the very recent case of Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239 (Miss. 1993), this Court was faced with both the same refused form-of-verdict instruction and the same argument Giles presents. In Conner, this Court held that the trial court's refusal to grant a lesser included offense instruction was not reversible error for two reasons. First, the defendant never sought a lesser-included offense instruction and failed to complain of the court's refusal to give one. Secondly, the record in Conner had no evidentiary foundation for which upon the instruction could stand. Conner, 632 So.2d at 1254. This Court held that the proposed form-of-verdict instruction in Conner did not constitute a lesser-included offense instruction since the defense tendered no instruction defining simple murder, nor did it ask the trial court to explain to the jury that it could convict the defendant of a lesser crime than capital murder. Id. Like Conner, in the case sub judice, Giles offered no instruction defining simple murder and, in addition, did not request that the trial court convict Giles of a lesser crime than capital murder. Giles' argument that the trial court should have reformed this instruction so that it properly informed the jury of its authority to find the defendant guilty of some lesser offense is of no merit. In Conner, this Court held that its case law does not impose upon a trial court a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte, nor is a court required to suggest instructions in addition to those which the parties tender. Id. However, on remand if Giles presents a lesser-included offense instruction, the trial court judge should be mindful of this Court's evidentiary standard found in Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1021 (Miss. 1985): [A] lesser included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge  and ultimately this Court  can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense (and conversely not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge). See McGowan v. State, 541 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Miss. 1989). In Welch v. State, 566 So.2d 680, 684 (Miss. 1990), this Court further supported the granting of lesser-included offense instructions stating: Defendants are entitled to have instructions on their theory of the case presented to the jury for which there is foundation in evidence, even though the evidence might be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.
Giles makes numerous arguments contending that the trial court erred in granting Instruction S-1, a comprehensive instruction which guided the jury in its decision at the penalty phase of the trial. Among the assignments of error was the fact that the trial court failed to inform the jury of its life option. Sentencing Instruction S-1 in the case at hand provided a space for the foreman of the jury's signature after the death penalty option. The instruction, however, did not provide a space for a signature after the option of life imprisonment or the option of being unable to agree on punishment. Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171 (Miss. 1992) provides clear guidance on this issue since the instruction questioned in Jenkins is essentially the same as the one in the case at hand. This Court held: [W]e simply note that Instruction C-1-S-A, as given by the lower court, was erroneous. ... Page three contained the first option, the form of the verdict for the death penalty, and concluded with a line designated for the foreman's signature. Page four contained Option Two, the form of the verdict for life imprisonment, and Three, the verdict if a unanimous four contained Option Two, the form of the verdict for life imprisonment, and Three, the verdict if a unanimous decision could not be reached, but provided no spaces for the foreman's signature. We concerned that the instruction as written and printed could cause the jury to neglect Options Two and Three. Upon retrial, we suggest that the trial court revise this instruction to more clearly instruct the jury. Jenkins, 607 So.2d at 1180. This assignment of error lacks merit since the only objection interposed by defense counsel to Instruction S-1 concerned the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel language of the instruction. Defense counsel affirmatively stated that it was otherwise satisfied with the instruction. In Moawad v. State, 531 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1988), the defendant on appeal assigned as error the granting of several sentencing instructions. This Court, however, held: The record reflects that no objection was made to any of the three instructions set forth above. Therefore, the points are procedurally barred and are not properly before the Court for consideration. Moawad, 531 So.2d at 635. See Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 680 (Miss. 1991); Settles v. State, 584 So.2d 1260, 1262 (Miss. 1991); Walker v. Graham, 582 So.2d 431, 432 (Miss. 1991). Since the only objection that Giles interposed to Instruction S-1 was the included aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, all other grounds were waived when defense counsel affirmatively stated that it was otherwise satisfied with the instruction. See Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S.Ct. 330, 102 L.Ed.2d 348 (1988). Although this issue is procedurally barred, the trial court should not allow an instruction such as this on remand.