Opinion ID: 852961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Function of Section 14

Text: Because the language of Section 14 does not clearly resolve the question before us, it is appropriate to look to the purpose of the provision to illuminate its meaning. This proposition applies to constitutional provisions as well as statutes. Ind. Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind.1994); Eakin v. State ex rel. Capital Improvement Bd. of Managers of Marion County, 474 N.E.2d 62, 64-65 (Ind.1985); Tarlton v. Peggs, 18 Ind. 24, 25 (1862) (construing Art. V, § 14); State ex rel. Mass Transp. Auth. of Greater Indianapolis v. Ind. Revenue Bd., 144 Ind.App. 63, 71, 242 N.E.2d 642, 647 (1968) (same), trans. denied. Both sides argue that the purposes of Section 14 are furthered by the construction they urge. All agree that one principal goal of the 1972 amendment was to provide a date certain by which the governor must act or a bill became law without his signature. The pocket veto was thus to become a relic of the past. And it seems equally clear that the Section was intended to require the governor to act on a timetable that permitted the legislature to respond to a veto during adjournment at the first opportunity, i.e., on the first day of the next session. But Plaintiffs identify no good reason why the constitution or its framers would wish to prohibit a physical delivery of a veto before it is due. The use of returned on simply reflects the then-current understanding that that date was not only the desired deadline, but also the first opportunity to complete a return of a bill to a branch of government that floated into and out of existence from time to time. So viewed, the returned status is accomplished only when the entity to whom return is required is present to receive it. This construction does no violence to the framers' objectives, is consistent with the text, gives due respect to views of the other branches, and is eminently practical.