Opinion ID: 1996441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Webb contends that the court erred in its factual findings. Webb relies on Joy's presence in Montana at the time of her death and that she had registered a vehicle there. In particular, Webb emphasizes that Joy obtained a Montana driver's license and received mail from the Social Security Administration at her Montana address. Webb also disagrees with the court's determinations about the credibility of the witnesses. Thomas, however, counters that the evidence was contradictory about Joy's intention to move and argues that the court correctly considered the credibility of the witnesses. Although there are various statutory procedures relating to the determination of domicile, the probate statutes do not provide a definition of domicile. See, e.g., Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2411 (Reissue 1995). We have said that `[t]he term domicile is difficult of accurate definition, and it has been stated that the concept cannot be successfully defined so as to embrace all its phases. Its meaning, in each instance, depends upon the connection in which it is used.' In re Estate of Meyers, 137 Neb. 60, 64, 288 N.W. 35, 37 (1939). It is universally held, however, that to acquire a domicile by choice, there must be both (1) residence through bodily presence in the new locality and (2) an intention to remain there. See, Huffman v. Huffman, 232 Neb. 742, 441 N.W.2d 899 (1989); In re Estate of Meyers, supra . Consequently, domicile is obtained only through a person's physical presence accompanied by the present intention to remain indefinitely at a location or by the present intention to make a location the person's permanent or fixed home. Huffman v. Huffman, supra . We have stated that to change domicile, there must be an intention to abandon the old domicile. In re Estate of Meyers, supra . In addition, because the intent of a person is not readily susceptible of analysis, all of the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the person must be taken into consideration to determine his or her domicile. Id. In In re Estate of Meyers, the decedent owned a ranch in Arthur County, but had been living in Omaha, Douglas County. He was listed in the Omaha city directory and maintained a bank account in Omaha. There was evidence that he changed his residence to Omaha to benefit his health and obtain education for his daughter. But he also continued to maintain his business in Arthur County and was registered to vote there. The trial court determined that the decedent was domiciled in Arthur County. On appeal, we stressed that the decedent was registered to vote in Arthur County and noted that all of the circumstances must be considered. We further stated that `[a] change of residence for the purpose of benefiting one's health does not usually effect a change of domicile. Such a change is looked upon as temporary merely, even though the actual time spent in the new residence may be long.' 137 Neb. at 67, 288 N.W. at 38. Here, the court recognized evidence indicating that Joy may have intended to change her domicile to Montana. But the court also considered conflicting evidence. Although Joy obtained a Montana driver's license and registered a vehicle in Montana, she also listed her move as temporary on a form she filled out with the postal service. The record also contains photographs showing that Joy left a substantial amount of her belongings at her home in Nebraska. Although Webb testified that Joy intended to permanently relocate to Montana, others testified that Joy would have told them if that were the case. The record also allows the court to infer that Joy went to Montana to receive medical care. Thus, there was conflicting evidence about Joy's intent to change her domicile. In particular, there was evidence that she did not abandon her Nebraska domicile. The court could reasonably infer that Joy traveled to Montana to receive long-term medical care but did not intend to permanently change her domicile. Webb argues, however, that the court's determinations about the credibility of the evidence and the witnesses were in error. But the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are for the trier of fact. In re Application of Jantzen, 245 Neb. 81, 511 N.W.2d 504 (1994). The county court's decision is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED.