Opinion ID: 1854001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The instruction pertaining to use of a firearm.

Text: Trial court instructed the jurors that, should they find defendant guilty of robbery in the first degree, they must then determine whether he employed a firearm during the commission of the offense. A special interrogatory was also given to the jury on this issue. These measures were predicated upon section 902.7, The Code 1979, which provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment in forcible felonies where the use of a firearm is involved. The jury answered the special interrogatory in the affirmative, finding that defendant had utilized a firearm when committing the robbery. As a result, trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence. Defendant asserts trial court erred in giving this instruction and special interrogatory because the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the loaded revolver used in the commission of the robbery was actually capable of firing the live ammunition it held. Defendant contends this element must be established before the jury could conclude that he had utilized a firearm. The term firearm, as employed in section 902.7, is nowhere defined in the criminal code. Defendant bases his contention upon State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747 (Iowa 1978), in which this court concluded that a starter's pistol did not fall within the term firearm as used in section 695.1, The Code 1977. Id. at 750. Rather, as contemplated by that statutory provision, a weapon had to be able to propel a projectile ... by explosive force in order to be a firearm. Id. Defendant contends that definition of firearm is equally applicable here, and that the State was therefore required to demonstrate that the revolver involved possessed those qualities. We believe Lawr is distinguishable from the instant case. In Lawr, the instrument in question was constructed so that it was incapable of firing a projectile. Id. at 749. The revolver with which we are confronted, however, was clearly designed to be capable of propelling a projectile by explosive force. Thus, we do not find Lawr controlling. See State v. Pinckney, 306 N.W.2d 726, 728-29 (Iowa 1981). We also believe that adoption of the position advanced by defendant would frustrate the legislative intent underlying section 902.7. For that section to come into play, the trier of fact must in part find that the person represented that he or she was in the immediate possession and control of a firearm, displayed a firearm in a threatening manner, or was armed with a firearm while participating in the forcible felony. § 902.7, The Code (emphasis added). Thus, the statutory provision is applicable even where the perpetrator of a forcible felony only represents that he or she possessed or controlled a firearm during the commission of the crime. To require that the State demonstrate that the firearm involved was capable of firing would, in light of this language of section 902.7, lead to an absurd result. Consequently, we reject defendant's argument. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979). Defendant also contends trial court erred in failing to define the term firearm in its instructions to the jury. This issue was first raised in defendant's motion for new trial. Although he interposed two objections to trial court's proposed instructions, no objection was raised with respect to the absence of an instruction defining the term firearm. Thus, no error was preserved. State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911, 914-15 (Iowa 1980); Iowa R.Civ.P. 196.