Opinion ID: 395225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the civil rights allegations

Text: 32 Counts IV and V allege that Kush, Maskill, Miller, and Horton have engaged in acts under the color of state law that amounted to a deprivation of appellant's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(2). Because Counts IV and V incorporate all the allegations of the preceding counts, one must survey the entire complaint to determine precisely the actions that the appellant contends constitute such deprivations. 33 This turns out to be more simple than one might have anticipated. Count Two is directed at Maskill, and whether it states a claim turns entirely on whether Count One states a claim against Kush. Therefore, the analysis of Count One is equally applicable to Count Two. Count Three, on the other hand, fails to state a claim against the Arizona Board of Regents and Arizona State University because of the Eleventh Amendment. No further discussion of that portion of Count Three is necessary. Insofar as Count Three under our discussion in Part II of this opinion may state a claim against Miller not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the validity of that claim initially turns on whether Count One states a claim against Kush. The failure of Count One to state a claim against Kush would completely exonerate Miller. 34 Because of these relationships between Counts One, Two, and Three, our discussion of the first of the two civil rights counts, Count Four, which alleges a claim embraced within 42 U.S.C. § 1983, can be focused entirely on the complaint's Count One.
35 A careful analysis of Count One reveals that the following actions of Kush are alleged to amount to deprivations actionable in federal court by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 36
37
38
39 4. Deprivation without a hearing of appellant's scholarship and his business and educational relationship with Arizona State University. 40 We shall consider each of these allegations. All concede that all relevant actions by the appellees were under color of state law. 41 1. Assault and Battery. 42 This court has held that an allegation of an unprovoked assault and battery by a guard upon a prisoner known by the guard to be suffering from an attack of emphysema, by striking him in the solar plexus hard enough that the 'attack rendered the patient plaintiff totally handicapped'  states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Meredith v. State of Arizona, 523 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1975); see Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). We left open the question whether less reprehensible conduct would suffice to state a claim. 523 F.2d at 484. 43 We need not pursue this issue, however, because we believe the teaching of Parratt v. Taylor, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), provides the guidance we must accept. Under that decision we may assume, without deciding, that the alleged assault and battery deprived the appellant of liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and focus our attention on whether this was done without due process of law. Id. at 1914. Obviously the assumed deprivation was not, nor could it have been, accompanied by a predeprivation hearing. That being so, the issue is whether the postdeprivation hearing available to the appellant under the law of the State of Arizona satisfies the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 We hold that it does. The Supreme Court in Parratt v. Taylor indicated that when no practical way to provide a predeprivation hearing exists, a postdeprivation hearing provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner will suffice. Id. at 1915. The issue becomes merely whether the remedies available under Arizona law and in the Arizona courts constitute the postdeprivation hearing required by the Fourteenth Amendment. As already mentioned, counsel have informed us that certain proceedings growing out of the incidents related by the complaint before us already have taken place. This indicates not only the existence of postdeprivation remedies under Arizona law, but also that appellant has pursued those remedies. Thus, our task is made less difficult than that of the Parratt Court, which relied on the mere existence of state tort procedures to find that due process concerns had been met, despite the plaintiff's failure to take advantage of those procedures. In the instant case, since appellant has sought redress in the Arizona state courts, and in the absence of suggestion that the postdeprivation procedures under state law are deficient, we must conclude that the alleged deprivation was not without due process of law. That the effect of our holding is to relegate appellant to his tort law remedy under Arizona law for Kush's alleged assault and battery should surprise no one. That is the consequence of Parratt v. Taylor as applied to this action of Kush. 45 2. Demotion of Appellant. 46 As already indicated, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is necessary that there be a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws. Appellant enjoyed no right under the Constitution nor under the laws of Arizona to maintain his position as either a first or second string defensive back or as the first string punter. In demoting him, Kush, acting we will assume under color of state law, deprived him of neither liberty nor property. See Walsh v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 939, 67 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981); Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Athletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 1977) (participation in intercollegiate athletics not a fundamental right for equal protection analysis). Appellant had no legal guarantee of uninterrupted enjoyment of the status he occupied during the 1977 season. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-12, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160-1166, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Neither was the demotion a grievous loss within the meaning of that phrase when employed for purposes of fixing the substantive content of actions cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 588, 95 S.Ct. 729, 743, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (Justice Powell, dissenting). 47 3. Harassment, Embarrassment and Defamation. 48 Appellant's allegations of harassment, embarrassment, and defamation by Kush also fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This result is compelled by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 701-10, 96 S.Ct. at 1160-1164. Even if, as appellant impliedly alleges, Kush went beyond the usual verbal lashings common to football practice fields his transgressions constitute nothing more than a tort which the state may protect against ... by virtue of its tort law. Id. at 712, 96 S.Ct. at 1165. 49
50 Appellant's complaint makes abundantly clear that, while Kush wanted appellant to get off the team and surrender his scholarship, appellant desired either to red shirt or to transfer to another school without suffering the suspension of his eligibility for financial aid for one year as required by the NCAA rules. Kush refused to accede to either request. This refusal does not amount to a deprivation of an interest in liberty or property under the authorities previously cited. Appellant had no right guaranteed by state law to enjoy either alternative. 51 Appellant did enjoy a right against cancellation or gradation of his scholarship during the period of its award for athletic reasons and against revocation except for good cause, and only after a proper hearing, if so requested. See p. 5594, supra. We will assume, without deciding, that these NCAA rules created an interest in property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Our difficulty is that the appellant has failed to allege a deprivation of these rights. His allegations do not even reveal the period of the scholarship award or that he requested a hearing pursuant to NCAA rules. Nor does appellant explain how his scholarship or NCAA rules created a right to be red-shirted or to transfer without loss of eligibility under these circumstances. Furthermore, the issue of Kush's consent to a restriction-free transfer arose, indeed only could arise, when appellant sought to surrender his scholarship and continue his football career without interruption and with immediately available scholarship aid at a school other than Arizona State University. Kush's failure to assist him in this endeavor could in no way have infringed the appellant's continued enjoyment of scholarship rights at Arizona State University. Kush's refusal deprived appellant of no interest in property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The interest in property we have assumed arguendo that appellant possessed was not that of which appellant asserts he was deprived. 52 We, therefore, conclude that Count Four has failed to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
53 The final count of appellant's complaint, which we set out fully in the margin, 1 purports to allege claims under both sections 1983 and 1985(2). The gist of the complaint is that Kush, Miller, and Horton have conspired to intimidate witnesses to prevent such witnesses from freely, fully and truthfully testifying as to matters raised in the within complaint. 54 The district court held this count failed because appellant did not allege that the conspiracy was in any way related to his membership in a class and because the count was too conclusory to state a valid claim. We hold that the district court erred in holding by implication that the first portion of section 1985(2), which is set forth in the margin, 2 is applicable only when the intimidation is related to invidious discrimination against a class. We also hold that appellant has sufficiently alleged a claim under the first portion of section 1985(2). 55 We recognize that the first of these holdings places us alongside the District of Columbia Circuit and the Third Circuit and in opposition to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. 3 Like the District of Columbia and Third Circuits, we are guided by the plain language of the first part of section 1985(2) and the legislative history which indicates clearly that the constitutional concerns that led to restricting the second part of section 1985(2) to deprivations of equal protection of the laws were not applicable to that section's first part. That part was designed to protect the federal government's interest in its own courts. No constitutional doubt with respect to the power of the federal government to protect that interest existed in 1871 nor does any exist today. To require that a class-based discriminatory intent be shown to establish a cause of action under the first part of section 1985(2) would attribute to Congress in 1871 a constitutional concern that did not exist. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 616 (D.C.Cir.1980). 56 The teaching of Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), is not to the contrary. There the Court sought to interpret section 1985(3) in a manner that was responsive to the desire of Congress to avoid the inescapable constitutional issue that would have attended enactment of a general federal tort law. This was accomplished by limiting the scope of that subsection to those private conspiracies behind which lie some racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. Id. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798. Part one of section 1985(2) requires no such limitation because it is limited by its terms to private conspiracies designed to obstruct certain processes of any court of the United States. This provision has within it no seeds from which could spring a general federal tort law. 57 The same cannot be said with confidence about the second part of section 1985(2) which is concerned with private conspiracies to defeat the course of justice in state courts with the intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws. To require a racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind the private conspiracy involving this part of section 1985(2) is entirely proper. This court has so held. See Phillips v. Bridge Workers Local 118, 556 F.2d 939, 940-41 (9th Cir. 1977). No case in this circuit has been brought to our attention, nor have we been able to discover any, that imposed a similar requirement with respect to the first part. 58 Whether appellant has adequately alleged a claim under the first part of section 1985(2) is a close question. Certainly he has failed to allege a proper claim under its second part because, although the allegations of Count Five set forth a private conspiracy designed to obstruct the due course of justice at the state level, there exists no sufficient allegation of racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. However, we conclude that appellant's Count Five sufficiently alleges a claim under part one of section 1985(2) to escape a motion to dismiss. We are influenced in reaching this decision by the fact that the proper scope of part one of section 1985(2) previously has been uncertain and that the relationship between the parts of section 1985(2) has been obscure to some extent. On remand the district court may wish to require the appellant to amend Count Five to make more particular his allegations under part one of section 1985(2) and to eliminate those allegations pertaining to the second part of that section. Nothing in this opinion should be construed to prevent this course of action. 59 In view of these holdings it is not necessary to address Count Five's allegation that Kush, Miller, and Horton violated section 1983 as well.