Opinion ID: 2632147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony of Guilty Plea Solicited by the Prosecution

Text: During voir dire, examination of witnesses and closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the witnesses as accomplices and emphasized the witnesses' convictions. Mazurek contends that under our holding in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo.1979), the prosecution's solicitation of Scheschi's testimony that he entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy and burglary, and Morran's testimony that he entered a plea of guilty to burglary, was plain error requiring reversal of his conviction. In Kwallek, we held that the admission of the testimony of a co-conspirator, that he had entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy, over the objection of counsel, was reversible error. [T]he rationale of the rule holding the admission of such evidence to be prejudicial error is said to be that it is irrelevant and incompetent because it suggests that since the confederate is guilty, the defendant must also be guilty, and this inference violates the defendant's right to have his trial on its own merits. Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1375-76 (citing State v. McCarthy, 567 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.App.1978)). At the outset, we note that Mazurek raised no objection to these activities. Therefore, we consider these claims under a plain error standard of review. Plain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo.1999) (quoting Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo.1994)); see also Mora v. State, 984 P.2d 477, 480 (Wyo.1999). We need spend little time on the first two prongs of our plain error analysis. It is clearly shown in the record that at the end of his direct examination, the prosecutor asked Scheschi and Morran if they had entered guilty pleas to charges arising from the burglary of the victim's garage, to which each gave an affirmative response. It is also clearly improper for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony. See Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1375-76, and the cases and annotation cited therein; Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1996). We presumed Kwallek made it clear, to prosecutors and defense counsel alike, that prosecutors are not permitted to elicit this type of testimony on direct examination. Such testimony is inadmissible evidence because it is irrelevant and incompetent evidence which the jury may use improperly. See id. In Ross, we opined: The State's opening statement promised the jury evidence that Ross' wife had previously admitted guilt to a misdemeanor charge of failing to protect her son from his father. When that promise was fulfilled, the absence of a timely objection by Ross' trial counsel would not appear sufficient to save the State's case from reversal, predicated on the rule of Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo.1979). Kwallek, as reaffirmed by Urrutia, [v. State, 924 P.2d 965 (Wyo.1996)] contemplates situations in which two individuals are prosecuted for different offenses arising out of the same circumstance, rendering the fact that one has pleaded guilty    inadmissible against the other. Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1375. Ross, 930 P.2d at 968. Whether the third prong of our plain error test is satisfied requires more in depth analysis, however. In order to show that the error was prejudicial, Mazurek must demonstrate that he was not allowed a trial on its own merits. In Kwallek, we did not find the defendant was prejudiced merely because testimony of a guilty plea was presented. Rather, our holding rested on the fact that the circumstances in that case encouraged the jury to believe the admissions were valid circumstantial evidence that the accused was also guilty. Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1376. In Kwallek, the defense filed a motion in limine before trial and objected to the testimony during trial. Id. at 1375-76. The prosecutor asked Kwallek's confederate if he was charged in the same incident, if his case was completed, and what happened in his case. Id. at 1375. The witness told the jury he pleaded guilty, and questioning by the prosecutor ceased. Id. Under those circumstances, we held: Since the court twice refused to prevent the disclosure, it is improbable that the Judge would have either directed the jury to disregard the testimony or have given a curative instruction had they been requested. The probability is, therefore, that the jury was left with the impression that, since the total evidence connected the defendant with [the witness] in the altercation with [the victim], the court must have wanted the jury to understand that, since [the witness] had pleaded guilty, it must be that the defendant is also guilty. Id. at 1376. We found the error was prejudicial and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. On appeal, Mazurek complains that the prosecutor improperly encouraged the jury to use the guilty pleas as substantive evidence of his guilt. Mazurek did not object at trial, and we will only grant a new trial if the prosecutor's actions amounted to plain error. Because plain error analysis requires us to examine the record as a whole, in ruling on the appellant's contentions we necessarily consider the effect of these alleged errors on the trial collectively. United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir.1993). Therefore, the pertinent portions of the closing arguments of both the defense and the prosecution follow. In its closing the defense argued: What did they bring you? Did they bring you his fingerprints from the shop? Did they bring you hair? Did they bring you anything showing he was ever in the shop? It's their burden to bring you the evidence to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. 1998, you got nothing or any type of forensic scientific DNA, any type of evidence. What they brought you was James Scheschi and Aaron Morran, two burglars facing 10, 20 years and awaiting to be sentenced, to see what they get. You have to ask yourself, do you trust them? You saw them, you heard them. Do you trust them? If they offered you some great deal on some land they had, would you buy it? If you're not going to make a property decision based on what they tell you, can you make a decision beyond a reasonable doubt on something that is as serious as this based on what they tell you? The defense then noted the inconsistencies in the stories from the two witnesses, and argued that when people are lying, they miss the details. He gave specific examples of lies and inconsistencies in their stories, which included: did they go to Country General and take pallets once or twice that night and who kicked in the door to the garage? He then asked the jury to consider why neither one could remember who kicked in the door: Maybe the one that kicked in the door is the one who is going to get the harder sentence. In their criminal minds they're playing some games. Do I give a little bit of truth, do I give lies, throw in a little bit of this? They play the games. Why do they do it? The whole reason they're here in the first place, they don'tthey only care about one thing, and that's their sentence. That's why they're here. That's why they're willing to lie. That's why they're refusing to admit who kicked in the door. They're only here for one purpose, not to tell the truth, not to clear up any crime. They're only here because they're waiting to be sentenced. You can't trust that. If they were breaking into your property, and we know that they'll steal your things, they'll drive around town drunk, they will lie to you in a second. Instruction 6-A tells you that if you believe a witness has testified falsely about a material fact, has lied to you about something important in this case, you can disregard everything they say. Why do we have that instruction? Because we don't convict people on the word of liars. That's what the law tells you to do. Will was there, was certainly there many parts of all of this. He wasn't there when they broke in and stole these items. He certainly was there at different parts. That's what he said. He said he was there. He didn't say I broke into the shop. The defense also reminded the jurors of the two witnesses who testified for the defense: the paperboy, who saw two men by the garage that night; and the victim's daughter, who saw two men at Ms. Wade's home the next day. Their testimony conflicted with the testimony from the prosecution's witnesses and confirmed Mazurek's defense. Mazurek argued that the only explanation for what his witnesses saw was that Mazurek wasn't there during the burglary, and the victim's daughter saw two men because Mazurek was at Wade's house and not with Morran and Scheschi. Therefore, Morran, not Mazurek, hitched a ride into town to get Wade's vehicle. Finally, the defense asked the jury to remember: During the jury selection, you were all seated there, there was only one question that [the prosecutor] asked each of you individually. He asked general questions but asked each of you, said your name, asked each of you individually only one question during jury selection, and that was what do you think about accomplices. That was because he understood that you were going to have to believe these accomplices for him to have a case. That is the case. That's why that's the only question he asked individually to you. What he didn't tell you was that not only was he saying they were accomplices, but what they've shown you is that they're liars, they are drunks. They make stories up that contradict each other, that contradict other more credible witnesses, and that they are waiting to be sentenced, hoping for probation. You can't trust them, because they're not trustworthy. You would not in your daily life trust them. You cannot trust them here. There was no conspiracy. There was no understanding. There was no mutual understanding, no agreement. There was no burglary involving Will. There was a burglary involving two men, Aaron Morran and James Scheschi. On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded by telling the jury that asking for evidence like DNA and fingerprints is trying the police department and a waste of time and money. He argued this is especially so because, You've got two people that came off it and said they did it, and they incriminated a third. The prosecutor told the jury, The hard evidence in the case is what [Scheschi] and what [Morran] told you. That is uncontradicted in this case coupled with this defendant showing up in the pawn shop down in Loveland. He continued: We know there's three guys in the hock shop. This defendant is one of them. That's one of those sides [sic] issues. When you don't have anything else to do you, you've got the insanity defense. That doesn't work most of the time. You've got self-defense. You've got some other dude did it. That's what this one is about. Two did it. Then they say the third did it, or we try the victim, or we try the police department, we try the DA. Let's divert the real case outside into immaterial areas and say well, if the guy lied about the ID card, then he's lying about everything. The instruction says that you can disregard testimony if you think he lied by necessity or not on material facts, which is an important fact, not the collateral facts. So don't get the smoke and mirrors job going in front of your face. Get right down to the hard evidence, the hard, uncontradicted evidence. The prosecutor then asked the jury to consider the fact that Mazurek fled from Detective Way after he was handcuffed, and to [c]ouple that with the testimony by the accomplices. They are accomplices, no question about it. Accomplices are kind of like dealing withdealing with informants in drug cases, guys working off beefs, you know. They're great fun on cross-examination, usually former addicts or something like that. You can have a ball with those people. Same thing with accomplices. These guys are fair game, sitting duck target up there. They got up there under oath, told you what happened, told you truthfully. The deals were this, that they would testify truthfully; and that's what they did, exactly what they did. Accomplices and informants, great fun. I think one of the jurors made comments about he didn't like finks or narcs or something like that. Well, that's fine. Everyone's entitled to their opinion. You've got to weigh the testimony, look at the surrounding facts. This man lost a lot of stuff out of his garage. Three guys involved, three guys down in Denver (sic) trying to hock the stuff. Jamie and Aaron, they've came in, paid their dues, took their medicine; and now they're waiting to see what the Court is going to do with them. They're going to have the snitch jacket the rest of their life. They're going to wear that, whether they like it or not. A threat is made right here outside in the hallway by this defendant upon Jamie. Is that evidence of a man who is innocent? Of course not. It's an attempt toat retribution. It's a threat by what Jamie said. He makes that threat to Jamie, a fellow that he's known since back in fifth or sixth grade. These guys hope they're going to get probation. That's up to the Court, not a sure thing.