Opinion ID: 2586200
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Causal Connection Theory

Text: ¶ 21 We first consider the Colosimos' claim that their lack of knowledge regarding the causal connection between the abuse and their injuries constitutes an exceptional circumstance. Although Utah courts have not directly addressed this question, they have analyzed cases involving repression of sexual abuse, and it is with these cases that we begin our analysis. ¶ 22 Utah courts have consistently held that the statute of limitations in child sexual abuse cases can be tolled only in narrow circumstances. For example, in Olsen v. Hooley, we held that a plaintiff who has repressed all memory of sexual abuse cannot be deemed to have reasonable knowledge of the abuse. [22] Under such circumstances, the limitations period is subject to tolling. Tolling is appropriate in such cases because [r]epressing the memory of operative facts is, in effect, not knowing or being aware of those facts. [23] But we limited our holding by emphasiz[ing] that [the] case involve[d] a plaintiff who allege[d] that she totally repressed her memory; it [did] not involve a plaintiff who remembered the abuse but did not realize until later that the abuse caused the psychological harm suffered. [24] In other words, even though we implicitly recognized that victims of child sexual abuse may often be unable to causally connect their abuse to their injuries, we were unwilling to suggest that such an inability would toll the statute. ¶ 23 Similarly, in O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, we refused to toll the statute in a case involving a plaintiff who had been sexually abused as a teenager and was aware of the abuse, but who had psychologically been unable to reveal the abuse until many years later. [25] We reasoned that [u]nder our discovery rule cases, his knowledge of the facts underlying the cause of action precludes his reliance on that rule because his inability to reveal the abuse [was] not the same as his not knowing of the abuse. [26] We accordingly held that he had failed to diligently pursue his claim. [27] ¶ 24 In Burkholz v. Joyce , we examined whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations when, during the limitations period, the plaintiff's knowledge of the operative facts underlying his cause of action is interrupted by a period of psychological repression during which [the] plaintiff is unaware of such facts. [28] As in O'Neal, we refused to toll the statute of limitations, concluding that such a plaintiff cannot make the initial showing that he did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within [the limitations] period. [29] ¶ 25 Courts from other jurisdictions have even more explicitly refused to toll statutes of limitation in cases where plaintiffs have been unable to causally connect their knowledge of being sexually abused with their injuries. For example, in Parks v. Kownacki, a plaintiff was abused by a priest when she was a minor, and although she was aware of the abuse from the time it occurred, she was not aware of the connection between the abuse and her injuries. [30] The Illinois Supreme Court held that because she had a reasonable knowledge of the abuse, her failure to understand the connection between the abuse and other injuries [did] not toll the statute of limitations. [31] ¶ 26 Similarly, in Kraft v. St. John Lutheran Church, the Eighth Circuit, applying Nebraska law, refused to toll the statute of limitations for a plaintiff who allegedly had been abused by a teacher at a religious school. [32] That court reasoned that the plaintiffs' mental injuries did not render him incapable of understanding his legal rights and acting to protect them, and [t]he fact that [the plaintiff] may not have actually drawn the connection at that point or may not have understood the extent of his damages did not prevent the statute of limitations from running. [33] ¶ 27 These courts were unwilling to adopt a causal connection rule because their precedent clearly foreclosed application of the discovery rule where a victim was sufficiently aware of the underlying facts to know that a tort had been committed. [34] Because the abuse victims in these cases had not completely repressed knowledge of the abuse, even though they were unable to fully connect the abuse to their injuries, they were deemed to have knowledge of their claims, thus preventing application of the discovery rule. [35] Utah precedent evidences a similar reluctance to apply the discovery rule absent complete repression of all memory of the abuse. [36] We therefore conclude that the exceptional circumstances version of the discovery rule does not operate to toll the limitations period on a claim when a victim was aware of the abuse, even though he was unable to causally connect the abuse to his injuries. ¶ 28 The Colosimos attempt to avoid this conclusion by relying on the case of Foil v. Ballinger, where we stated that [w]e see no basis for making a legal distinction between having no knowledge of an injury . . . and no knowledge that a known injury was caused by unknown negligence. [37] But the Colosimos' reliance on Foil is misplaced [38] because Foil involved a claim for medical malpractice under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which contains a provision explicitly tolling the limitations period until a plaintiff is aware of his injury. [39] ¶ 29 There is no similar statutory basis for tolling the limitations period in this case. Although the legislature passed a statute in 1992 that tolls the running of the limitations period in child sexual abuse cases until the victim knows or reasonably should know that his injury was caused by the abuse, [40] that statute does not apply retroactively and so is not applicable here. [41] ¶ 30 In fact, many of the cases the Colosimos cite in support of their causal connection theory [42] are from jurisdictions that have based their tolling of the limitations periods on applicable statutes. [43] For example, a Washington state statute indicates that the limitations period in child sexual abuse cases should be brought `[w]ithin three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act.' [44] Thus, in these cases, the courts were not creating new tolling rules; they were merely applying statutory tolling provisions. Lacking a statutory basis, we decline to hold that a victim's inability to tie the abuse to his injury constitutes an exceptional circumstance under the discovery rule. ¶ 31 Because the Colosimos do not allege that they repressed all knowledge of their abuse, they had knowledge of the operative facts giving rise to their claims. Their inability to connect the abuse with their injuries does not render them eligible for application of the exceptional circumstances version of the discovery rule.