Opinion ID: 1824316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the lower court incorrectly applied the laws of mississippi to both realty (immovables) and personal property (movables) when the laws of florida should have been applied to personal property, thereby allowing tomsche to receive all personal property.

Text: As always, we must first consider our standard of review. Typically this Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong and not supported by substantial, credible evidence. Smith By Young v. Estate of King, 579 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Miss. 1991); Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-597 (Miss. 1990). This rule does not apply to questions of law. When presented with a question of law, the manifest error/substantial evidence rule has no application and we conduct a de novo review. Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 239 (Miss. 1991); Holliman v. Charles L. Cherry & Associates, 569 So.2d 1139, 1147 (Miss. 1990); Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So.2d 1024, 1028 (Miss. 1990). Notwithstanding our respect for and deference to the trial judge, on matters of law it is our job to get it right. That the trial judge may have come close is not good enough. Cooper, 587 So.2d at 239, quoting UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hospital, Inc., 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987). Tomsche conceded in his brief that distribution of the real property located in Mississippi is properly governed by Mississippi law, but contended that distribution of the personal property of Mason's estate which was situated in the State of Mississippi should be controlled by the laws of Florida, entitling him to one hundred percent (100%) of the personalty contained in Mason's estate. The chancellor applied Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-1 (1972) because Tomsche's status as a pretermitted spouse created a partial intestacy. Tomsche's status as a pretermitted spouse indeed created a partial intestacy as the property located in Mississippi could not be disposed of pursuant to probate in Florida. Section 91-1-1 (1972) applies in cases of partial intestacy to subject property of a decedent to Mississippi law. Wilson v. Cox, 49 Miss. 538, 543-44 (1873). See also Estate of Wilson v. Nat'l Bk. of Commerce, 364 So.2d 1117, 1122-23 (Miss. 1978). Mason's will made no provision for Tomsche, therefore Tomsche has the right to share in Mason's estate as though she had made an unsatisfactory provision in her will as regards him. Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-27 (1972). Formal renunciation of the will is not necessary, although the will shall be treated as though it had been renounced. Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-27 (1972). A pretermitted spouse is entitled to fifty percent (50%) of his deceased spouse's estate when there are no children or descendents of children. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 91-5-27 (1972) and 91-5-25 (Supp. 1992). A pretermitted spouse has this right although the domicile of his deceased spouse was in a foreign state. Bolton v. Barnett, 131 Miss. 802, 827, 95 So. 721, 725-26 (1923). Caveat: if the pretermitted spouse has a separate estate at the time of the death of his spouse, equal or greater in value to what his lawful portion of decedent's estate would be, he does not take. If his separate estate is valued at less than the portion of decedent's estate which he would receive, he is entitled to the portion of decedent's estate which, when added to his separate estate, is equal in value to one-half (1/2) of decedent's net estate. Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-29 (1972); Banks v. Junk, 264 So.2d 387, 393-94 (Miss. 1972); Myers v. Laird, 230 Miss. 675, 683, 93 So.2d 828, 831 (1957). If the pretermitted spouse's separate estate is less than one-fifth (1/5) the value of his lawful portion of decedent's estate, he shall receive one-half (1/2) of decedent's net estate. Banks, 264 So.2d at 394. Notwithstanding the fact that Mason was domiciled in Florida, Tomsche, as a pretermitted spouse, is entitled to the portion of Mason's estate which, when added to his separate estate, is equal in value to one-half (1/2) of Mason's net estate unless his separate estate at the time of Mason's death was equal or greater in value to the portion he would lawfully take or his separate estate at the time of Mason's death was less than one-fifth (1/5) the value of the portion he would lawfully take. The chancellor found that Tomsche's separate estate was valued at three thousand dollars ($3,000.00). The record does not reveal the value of Mason's estate and the chancellor merely concluded that Tomsche should receive one-half (1/2) of Mason's estate less the three thousand dollar ($3,000.00) value of his separate estate. This conclusion of the chancellor is correct provided Tomsche's separate estate does not meet or exceed the value of one-half of Mason's estate or is not less than one-fifth (1/5) the value of one-half of Mason's estate. Limited as we are by the insufficient record, we must remand for determination of the proper amount to which Tomsche is entitled pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-29 (1972).