Opinion ID: 2996771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retention of a Fingerprint Expert

Text: King first challenges the district court’s decision to deny his request to hire an expert to conduct a fingerprint test on the drugs. King argues that it was Montgomery who sold the drugs, and a fingerprint test of the drugs would corroborate this theory of defense if his prints were not on the drug packages. The government responds that King’s request was frivolous because, given the overwhelming audio and eyewitness evidence, a fingerprint analyst would not have contributed to a plausible defense. Title 18 of the United States Code, section 3006A(e)(1) governs the funding by the government of expert services for indigent criminal defendants. Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate 6 No. 03-2180 inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court, or the United States magistrate judge if the services are required in connection with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). The government does not challenge King’s assertion that he is indigent and thus unable to afford expert services. This court reviews a decision to grant or deny a request for expert services for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cravens, 275 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2001). The test for whether expert services should be provided is “whether a reasonable attorney would engage such services for a client having the independent financial means to pay for them.” United States v. Alden, 767 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1984). This court has recognized, however, that this standard, if applied too literally, could result in the government being forced to finance a “fishing expedition.” Id. As a result, this court has held that “it is appropriate for the district court to satisfy itself that a defendant may have a plausible defense before granting the defendant’s section 3006A(e) motion.” Id., quoted in Cravens, 275 F.3d at 639. Other circuits have also adopted this “plausible defense” requirement. See United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 1997). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying King’s request for a fingerprint analysis. King did not have a plausible defense that would have made a fingerprint analysis necessary. The evidence that King sold Espinoza methamphetamine is overwhelming. Espinoza personally purchased the drugs from King. King’s approach to Dominguez’s car and his return to his car after the sale were No. 03-2180 7 observed by a police surveillance team that also overheard the details of the sale through a listening device. King was arrested immediately after the sale with the proceeds (prerecorded money) of the sale on his person and at his feet. Neither King’s brief nor the record calls into question Espinoza or the surveillance team’s version of events. Furthermore, audio tapes of King arranging the drug sale were also made. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to require the government to finance a fingerprint expert, particularly after the government had already financed two separate expert analyses of the audio tapes to bolster an earlier theory that King had sold the drugs but had been entrapped. Also, King’s attorney rejected the court’s initial suggestion that the police conduct a fingerprint analysis for free. We agree that the test would not have contributed to a plausible defense. King’s request appears to have been the classic fishing expedition and the government need not have financed it.