Opinion ID: 2616073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The trial court's denial of Holly's demand for a jury trial

Text: Holly's complaint was filed with the superior court on November 29, 1979. It was not accompanied by a demand for a jury trial. Lease's answer and counterclaim were served on January 14, 1980, apparently beyond the twenty day limit imposed by Civil Rule 12(a). [5] Holly's reply to the counterclaim was mailed to Lease on February 21, 1980, again beyond the twenty day limit. Holly also mailed a demand for jury trial on February 21, 1980. It appears that neither party objected to the other's late service of pleadings. After a telephonic conference, a Trial Setting Conference Order was entered which stated that a jury trial was requested. The order was subsequently vacated due to discovery problems. On November 13, 1983, after three years of inaction, Holly again filed a memorandum to set the case for trial, which stated that a jury trial was not demanded. Another telephonic pretrial conference was held; Holly admits that the attorneys briefly discussed the question of a jury trial in this conference. The pretrial order, filed on December 6, 1983, stated that the trial would be without a jury. An amended pretrial order also specified a non-jury trial. Trial was set for July 16, 1984. On July 13, 1984, one business day before the start of the trial, Holly requested a jury trial via telephonic conference. Judge Cranston denied Holly's request. On cross-appeal Holly claims that he filed a timely demand for a jury trial and asks us to remand the case for a new trial to a jury. We find that by his conduct Holly waived his right to a jury trial. Civil Rule 38(d) provides: (d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. A party's consent to withdraw the jury trial demand may be implied by a failure to appear at trial. Discussing the identical federal provision, Professors Wright and Miller have stated that it is clear that the test of waiver that is applied to other constitutional rights, that there must have been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, is not applicable to the right to trial by jury. ..... Waiver by failure to make a timely demand is complete even though it was inadvertent and unintended and regardless of the explanation or excuse... . The right to jury trial may also be waived by conduct or agreement of the parties. 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2321 at 101-02 (1971) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Wright and Miller). Here, while Holly's initial demand for a jury trial may have been timely even though it accompanied an untimely responsive pleading, [6] Holly's post-demand conduct constituted a waiver of his right to a jury trial. Holly's second memorandum to set the case for trial stated that a jury trial was not requested. Holly's attorney admits that at the subsequent pretrial conference the parties questioned whether the case was jury or non-jury. The pretrial order specified a non-jury trial. The pretrial order was amended to correct a clerical error and the amended order also specified a non-jury trial. Finally, and most importantly, Holly acquiesced to the order for seven months, up to the eve of the trial. Given Holly's indication that a jury trial was not requested, the subsequent open question as to whether there would be a jury trial, the pretrial order specifying a nonjury trial, and the acquiescence to the order, Holly waived his right to a jury trial. Cf. 9 Wright and Miller § 2321 n. 57 (Supp. 1985). The pretrial order control[led] the subsequent course of the action unless modified by the judge to prevent manifest injustice. Alaska R.Civ.P. 16(e). A further question is whether Judge Cranston abused his discretion in not modifying the order to allow a jury trial. With regard to the federal analog to Civil Rule 16(e), Professors Wright and Miller have stated: The court may permit the pretrial order to be amended when the danger of surprise or prejudice to the opposing party is small and a failure to amend might result in an injustice to the moving party. On the other hand, if the evidence or issue was within the knowledge of the party seeking modification at the time of the conference or if modification would place a great burden on the opposing party, then it may not be allowed. 6 Wright and Miller § 1527 at 611-12 (footnotes omitted). Holly was aware at the time of the pretrial conference that there was a question as to whether there would be a jury trial. Moreover, Judge Cranston found that it would be prejudicial to [Lease] to now, at this late date [Friday], to require preparation for a jury trial to commence on Monday. Judge Cranston did not abuse his discretion in not allowing a jury trial.