Opinion ID: 109531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: William Baird, a citizen of New York.

Text: 2. Parents Aid Society, Inc., a Massachusetts not-for-profit corporation. Baird is president of the corporation and is director and chief counselor of the center it operates in Boston for the purpose of providing, inter alia, abortion and counseling services. Baird and Parents Aid claim to represent all abortion centers and their administrators in Massachusetts who, on a regular and recurring basis, deal with pregnant minors. App. 13, 43. 3. Mary Moes I, II, III, and IV, four minors under the age of 18, pregnant at the time of the filing of the suit, and residing in Massachusetts. Each alleged that she wished to terminate her pregnancy and did not wish to inform either of her parents. [7] Id., at 16-18, 19-22. The Moes claimed to represent all pregnant minors capable of, and willing to give, informed consent to an abortion, but who decline to seek the consent of both parents, as required by § 12P. App. 13, 43. 4. Gerald Zupnick, M. D., a physician licensed to practice in Massachusetts. He is the medical director of the center operated by Parents Aid. He claims to represent all physicians in Massachusetts who, without parental consent, see minor patients seeking abortions. Ibid. The defendants in the action, who are the appellants in No. 75-73 (and who are hereinafter referred to as the appellants), are the Attorney General of Massachusetts, and the District Attorneys of all the counties in the Commonwealth. Appellant in No. 75-109 (hereinafter referred to as the intervenor-appellant) is Jane Hunerwadel, a resident and citizen of Massachusetts, and parent of an unmarried minor female of childbearing age. Hunerwadel was permitted by the District Court to intervene as a defendant on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. [8] App. 24. On November 13, appellants filed a Motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court should abstain from deciding any issue in this case. Id., at 23. In their memorandum to the court in support of that motion, appellants, in addition to other arguments, urged that § 12P, particularly in view of its judicial-review provision, was susceptible of a construction by state courts that would avoid or modify any alleged federal constitutional question. Record Doc. 5, p. 12. They cited Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), and Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498, 510-511 (1972), for the proposition that where an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a constitutional construction, a federal court should abstain from deciding a constitutional challenge to the statute until a definitive state construction has been obtained. The District Court held hearings on the motion for a preliminary injunction; these were later merged into the trial on the merits. It received testimony from various experts and from parties to the case, including Mary Moe I. On April 28, 1975, the three-judge District Court, by a divided vote, handed down a decision holding § 12P unconstitutional and void. 393 F. Supp. 847. An order was entered declaring § 12P and such other portions of the chapter [112] insofar as they make specific reference thereto void, and enjoining the defendants from enforcing them. App. 45-46; Jurisdictional Statement in No. 75-73, pp. A-33, A-34. The majority held, inter alia, that appellees Mary Moe I, Doctor Zupnick, and Parents Aid had standing to challenge the operation of the statute, individually and as representatives of their proposed classes, 393 F. Supp., at 850-852, [9] and that the intervenor-appellant had standing to represent the interests of parents of unmarried minor women of childbearing age, id., at 849-850. It found that a substantial number of females under the age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent, and viewed the overall question as whether the state can be permitted to restrain the free exercise of that consent, to the extent that it has endeavored to do so. Id., at 855. In regard to the meaning of § 12P, the majority made the following comments: 1. The statute does not purport to require simply that parents be notified and given an opportunity to communicate with the minor, her chosen physician, or others. We mention this obvious fact because of the persistence of defendants and intervenor in arguing that the legislature could properly enact such a statute. Whether it could is not before us, and there is no reason for our considering it. 2. The statute does not exclude those capable of forming an intelligent consent, but applies to all minors. The statute's provision calling for the minor's own consent recognizes that at least some minors can consent, but the minor's consent must be supplemented in every case, either by the consent of both parents, or by a court order. ..... 4. The statute does not purport simply to provide a check on the validity of the minor's consent and the wisdom of her decision from the standpoint of her interests alone. Rather, it recognizes and provides rights in both parents, independent of, and hence potentially at variance with, her own personal interests. 393 F. Supp., at 855. The dissent is seemingly of the opinion that a reviewing Superior Court Judge would consider only the interests of the minor. We find no room in the statute for so limited an interpretation. Id., at 855 n. 10. The parents not only must be consulted, they are given a veto. Id., at 856. The majority observed that  `neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,' In re Gault, 1967, 387 U. S. 1, 13, ibid., and, accordingly, held that the State cannot control a minor's abortion in the first trimester any more than it can control that of an adult. Re-emphasizing that the statute is cast not in terms of protecting the minor . . . but in recognizing independent rights of parents, the majority concluded that [t]he question comes, accordingly, do parents possess, apart from right to counsel and guide, competing rights of their own? Ibid. The majority found that in the instant situation, unlike others, the parents' interests often are adverse to those of the minor and, specifically rejecting the contrary result in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (ED Mo. 1975), see ante, p. 52, concluded: But even if it should be found that parents may have rights of a Constitutional dimension vis-a-vis their child that are separate from the child's, we would find that in the present area the individual rights of the minor outweigh the rights of the parents, and must be protected. 393 F. Supp., at 857. The dissent argued that the parents of Mary Moe I, by not being informed of the action or joined as parties, have been deprived of their legal rights without due process of law, ibid., that the majority erred in refusing to appoint a guardian ad litem for Moe I, and that it erred in finding that she had the capacity to give a valid and informed consent to an abortion. The dissent further argued that parents possess constitutionally cognizable rights in guiding the upbringing of their children, and that the statute is a proper exercise of state power in protection of those parental rights. Id., at 857-865. Most important, however, the dissent's view of the statute differed markedly from the interpretation adopted by the majority. The dissent stated: I find, therefore, no conceivable constitutional objection to legislation providing in the case of a pregnant minor an additional condition designed to make certain that she receive parental or judicial guidance and counselling before having the abortion. The requirement of consent of both parents[[]] ensures that both parents will provide counselling and guidance, each according to his or her best judgment. The statute expressly provides that the parents' refusal to consent is not final. The statute expressly gives the state courts the right to make a final determination. If the state courts find that the minor is mature enough to give an informed consent to the abortion and that she has been adequately informed about the nature of an abortion and its probable consequences to her, then we must assume that the courts will enter the necessary order permitting her to exercise her constitutional right to the abortion. Id., at 864. The indicated footnote reads: The majority speculate concerning possible interpretations of the `for good cause shown' language. There is also some doubt whether the statute requires consent of one or both parents. The construction of the statute is a matter of state law. If the majority believe the only constitutional infirmities arise from their interpretation of the statute, the majority should certify questions of state law to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pursuant to Rule 3:21 of that court in order to receive a definitive interpretation of the statute. Id., at 864 n. 15. Both appellants and intervenor-appellant appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction of each appeal and set the cases for oral argument with Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, ante, p. 52, and its companion cross-appeal. 423 U. S. 982 (1975).