Opinion ID: 2180185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the protective orders

Text: As we have previously noted, the trial court issued protective orders precluding Weakley from taking the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of Burnham and Foster Wheeler. [12] The court (Zeldon, J.) did not provide reasons for her decision, nor did she specify what information Weakley would have to provide in order to be permitted to depose the designees of these defendants. In asbestos cases, however, it appears to be the practice in the Superior Court to require the plaintiff, prior to conducting any discovery, to identify, in answers to interrogatories, which of a defendant's products are alleged to have harmed the plaintiff, and at which jobsites. See Anderson v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 93-10602 (Super.Ct.D.C.1995) (Levie and Graae, JJ.). The court opined in Anderson: Discovery should follow the filing of [a] well-pleaded complaint. It is not a device to enable a plaintiff to make a case when his complaint has failed to state a claim. [13] Put differently, discovery is not the opportunity for a plaintiff to discover if he [or] she has [a] claim against a particular defendant. In this case, the trial judge may have relied upon the authority of Anderson. We review discovery orders for abuse of discretion. Kay v. Pick, 711 A.2d 1251, 1256 (D.C.1998). Exercise of discretion must, however, be founded on correct legal principles. In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C.1991). The moving defendants have cited no appellate authority, and we are aware of none, precluding discovery where, as here, a party has stated under oath that he has frequently come into contact with a defendant's product, and has regularly been exposed to that defendant's asbestos-containing boilers, but (several decades later) does not recall precisely where or when. Indeed, the ambit of discovery afforded by Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(b)(1) is broad: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to an issue involved in the pending action, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. We discern merit in Weakley's complaint that he was thus caught in the `Catch-22' created by the trial court. Mr. Weakley could not obtain the discovery without plenary knowledge and could not achieve plenary knowledge without discovery. To the extent that Anderson would preclude Weakley from conducting discovery of Burnham and Foster Wheeler, if he remembers that he frequently encountered these defendants' products but no longer recalls the exact time and place (when the information about time and place is likely to be readily available to the defendant), we cannot agree with the Superior Court's reasoning. As Weakley asks rhetorically in his reply brief, [a]fter all, how hard is it for Foster Wheeler to open a file drawer and search for the presence of its boilers in Fairfax County Public Schools? [14] However that may be, we think that in the present case a reasonable solution, not unduly objectionable to any party, may be at hand. In their briefs, all three parties involved in this issue have cited without disapproval Judge Joyce Hens Green's decision in Covington, from which we have quoted at the outset of this opinion. Weakley asserts that he has provided the defendants with the information that Covington would require. Moreover, Foster Wheeler has advised us in its brief on appeal that Weakley offered to question the Foster Wheeler designee only [regarding] the location of each boiler it manufactured, sold or distributed and which were installed in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia from 1964-1974 (i.e., topics 1-3 of his Notice of Deposition). JA at 160-61. Weakley proffered that he would seek to depose the witness on topics 4-16 of his Notice [o]f Deposition only if the first phase of inquiry revealed specific sites where a Foster Wheeler boiler was used where Weakley worked. JA at 161. In light of the foregoing, we are satisfied that the dispute over the protective orders can be readily resolved in a manner that will minimize the burden upon the defendants while still providing Weakley with relevant information. We therefore direct the trial court to apply to this record the ruling in Covington and to limit Weakley's inquiry along the lines described in the passage we have quoted from in Foster Wheeler's brief.