Opinion ID: 1404608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Order and Judgment of the Trial Court

Text: Rule 67.01 provides that a dismissal without prejudicethe order granted by the trial court when the Kestermans moved for voluntarily dismissal of the portion of their action based on the phantom driverallows the dismissing party to bring another civil action for the same cause, unless the civil action is otherwise barred. Notwithstanding a dismissal without prejudice, the common law doctrine of claim preclusion may present an instance where the civil action is otherwise barred. The question in this case is whether the common law doctrine of claim preclusion admits an exception that preserves the Kestermans'phantom driver theory. While the doctrine of claim preclusion generally prohibits splitting' of a single claim, there are limited situations where this general rule does not apply. One such exception exists when the court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiffs right to maintain the second action. Restatement 2d of Judgments sec. 26(1)(b) (2007). In this situation, a determination by the court that its judgment is without prejudice to a second action on the omitted part of the claim, expressed in the judgment itself . . . should ordinarily be given effect in the second action. Id. at Comment (b). Missouri cases discussing claim preclusion generally follow the Restatement of Judgments. Chesterfield Village, Inc . at 318. In its judgment and order dismissing the Kestersons'phantom vehicle claim without prejudice, the trial court stated, [t]he Court finds, pursuant to the motion filed by Plaintiffs and by oral argument that the dismissal of this cause of action without prejudice would lead to judicial economy by avoiding at least one trial and potentially avoiding two trials. While it is difficult to understand, from the perspective of an appellate court, why the dismissal without prejudice would further judicial economy, the correctness of the trial court's prediction about judicial economy is not the issue. To decide the applicability of claim preclusion, the issue is whether the trial court expressly reserved the Kestersons' right to file the phantom vehicle claim at a later time, and it is unmistakably clear that the court did so. [5] The doctrine of claim preclusion, therefore, would not apply, though the doctrine would normally bar the Kestersons from bringing the phantom vehicle claim in a subsequent suit. Because the trial court expressly authorized the splitting of the phantom vehicle theory from the theory of negligence against Wallut the driver in its dismissal without prejudice, the Kestersons may bring this phantom driver claim in a second suit.