Opinion ID: 2507215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the WRA provide a remedy for wages untimely paid in violation of former WAC 296-128-035?

Text: ¶ 17 Champagne claims that the County's practice of paying additional pay at the end of the month subsequent to when it was earned violates the WRA. The WRA states, [a]ny employer . . . who . . . [w]ilfully and with intent to deprive the employee of any part of his wages, shall pay any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract . . . [s]hall be guilty of a misdemeanor. RCW 49.52.050(2). A WAC provision may also provide the basis for a WRA action since agency regulations carry the force of law. White v. Salvation Army, 118 Wash.App. 272, 287-88, 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (citing Wingert, 146 Wash.2d at 848, 50 P.3d 256). [9] Pursuant to the WRA, an employer's violation of an agency rule must be willful and with the intent to deprive its employee of wages. ¶ 18 A willful withholding under RCW 49.52.050(2) is a basis for exemplary damages in a civil action of twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld . . . together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney's fees. RCW 49.52.070. [10] This court defines a willful withholding as `the result of knowing and intentional action and not the result of a bona fide dispute as to the obligation of payment.' Wingert, 146 Wash.2d at 849, 50 P.3d 256 (quoting Chelan County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. County of Chelan, 109 Wash.2d 282, 300, 745 P.2d 1 (1987)). A bona fide dispute is a `fairly debatable' dispute over whether an employment relationship exists, or whether all or a portion of the wages must be paid. Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wash.2d 152, 161-62, 961 P.2d 371 (1998) (citing Cannon v. City of Moses Lake, 35 Wash.App. 120, 125, 663 P.2d 865 (1983); Moran v. Stowell, 45 Wash.App. 70, 81, 724 P.2d 396 (1986); Chelan County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 109 Wash.2d at 301, 745 P.2d 1). ¶ 19 Determining willfulness is a question of fact reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Pope v. Univ. of Wash., 121 Wash.2d 479, 490, 852 P.2d 1055, 871 P.2d 590 (1993) (citing Lillig v. Becton-Dickinson, 105 Wash.2d 653, 660, 717 P.2d 1371 (1986)). However, where no dispute exists as to the material facts, the court may dispose of such questions on review of summary judgment. Schilling, 136 Wash.2d at 160, 961 P.2d 371; CR 56(c). [11] ¶ 20 In the present case, neither party disputes the material facts. The County's regular practice is to pay its employees additional pay at the end of the month subsequent to the month in which it is earned. The lag time violated former WAC 296-128-035, which required an employer to pay its employee at no longer than monthly intervals. However, this system complies with the provisions in the governing collective bargaining agreement with respect to overtime wages and compensatory time. Further, Champagne does not allege that bad faith or animus motivated the creation or administration of the additional pay system. Accordingly, the record lacks the requisite substantial evidence that gives rise to a finding of willful withholding on the part of the County. This is more likely a bona fide dispute over whether the wages were due by a certain time. ¶ 21 We now turn to the disposition of the claim by the Court of Appeals and the County's argument. The Court of Appeals held, and the County argues, that Champagne may not assert claims under the WRA since the wages due were eventually paid. The Court of Appeals determined that Champagne lacked a viable action under the WRA based upon this court's language in SPEEA. In SPEEA, we described the differing functions of the WRA, MWA, and WPA. We then proceeded to discuss the implications of the MWA. The import of this statutory scheme is that in circumstances where an employer paid no compensation whatsoever to an employee, the employee, if not otherwise exempt under the [MWA], could recover wages representing the difference between the statutory minimum wage and what was actually paid. SPEEA, 139 Wash.2d at 831, 991 P.2d 1126 (citing RCW 49.46.090(1)). The Court of Appeals seized upon this language in dismissing Champagne's wage claim. ¶ 22 The Court of Appeals erred in two respects. First, it took the language from SPEEA out of context. The SPEEA court recognized that a plaintiff could recover WRA damages in addition to the unpaid wages recoverable under the MWA. [12] 139 Wash.2d at 831, 991 P.2d 1126. However, the court addressed only the extent of recovery available under the MWA, not the WRA, because the plaintiffs had not pursued remedies under the WRA. Id. Conversely, since Champagne has pursued remedies under the WRA, the Court of Appeals should have limited its application of SPEEA to Champagne's MWA claim and not his WRA claim. ¶ 23 Second, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that a violation of former WAC 296-128-035 triggers the remedies available in the MWA (chapter 49.46 RCW) but not the WRA (chapter 49.52 RCW) or WRA (chapter 49.48 RCW). Champagne, 134 Wash.App. at 520 n. 5, 141 P.3d 72 (former WAC 296-128-035 applies only to violations of minimum wage laws under chapter 49.46 RCW, not chapters 49.48 and 49.52 RCW). This conclusion is inconsistent with the plain language of the WRA, which penalizes an employer who willfully withholds wages due under any statute, ordinance, or contract, RCW 49.52.050(2), including substantive agency regulations. White, 118 Wash.App. at 287-88, 75 P.3d 990. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals misapplied the reasoning in SPEEA to dismiss Champagne's WRA claim. ¶ 24 Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals on different grounds. [13] We hold that former WAC 296-128-035 provides a basis for liability if the undisputed material facts support a finding that the violation was willful. Here, we find that the County did not act willfully since the disagreement over payment of wages is a bona fide dispute.