Opinion ID: 1674461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: PAULSON-LOCKWOOD AND MILLER TESTS v THE APPEAL BOARD'S BURKE TEST

Text: Before weighing the validity of the Appeal Board's Burke test assuming plaintiff's left leg was not disabled [it actually was], would the right leg be industrially useless?, in the light of Paulson, Lockwood and Miller, let us examine the context in which this test is presented. The pertinent part of the Appeal Board's opinion follows: Plaintiff's decedent did suffer an extension of disability because his industrially useless left leg caused extra strain over the years on his right knee, but it must be determined that this extension of disability amounted to the industrial loss of use of the right knee as a separate member. The right knee in conjunction with the left leg was continuing the progression of injury and disability until plaintiff's decedent's death. The poignant question is, is the right leg, in and of itself industrially useless, or assuming plaintiff's left leg was not disabled, would the right leg be industrially useless? Applying the medical testimony to the questions, it is clear that the answers are `No.' The plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof to show plaintiff's decedent had lost the industrial use of both legs. (Emphasis added.) It is quite clear that the real issue in Burke is whether there actually was an industrial loss of use of both legs caused by the injury he suffered ( Paulson issue) rather than whether the industrial loss suffered arose out of an employment-related or non-employment-related injury ( Miller issue). It is evident from the dispositive portion of the Appeal Board opinion, quoted above, that the issue it was dealing with was not whether Burke's injury was employment-related but whether his injury caused the industrial loss of use of both legs. It demonstrates this because it recognizes that the left leg was industrially useless and asks assuming plaintiff's left leg was not disabled, would the right leg be industrially useless? In other words, the Burke issue is not a Miller issue  was the cause of the industrial loss an employment-related injury? Likewise, the Appeal Board's test in Burke which goes to the connection between the injury suffered and the industrial loss, is not related to Miller nor Miller to it. So nothing further need be said about Miller's connection with this case beyond saying that it may be inferred that the Appeal Board opinion does not dispute that if there was an industrial loss of use of both legs it arose from an employment-related injury, as Miller prescribes. We come, then, to considering the Appeal Board's test in Burke in light of Paulson and Lockwood. It is clear from the excerpt from the Appeal Board opinion quoted above that the Board's test requires both injury and industrial loss in each leg, hypothetically separated from every other member of the body. This requirement is specified in three places in the above quotation. 1.     it must be determined that this extension of disability amounted to the industrial loss of use of the right knee as a separate member 2.     is the right leg, in and of itself industrially useless     3.     assuming plaintiff's left leg was not disabled, would the right leg be industrially useless     From this it is clear that the Appeal Board's test is out of tune with the Paulson and Lockwood tests. It is out of tune with the first test  [i]t is not necessary that both legs or either leg be injured at all  because it requires each leg be considered in hypothetical isolation from the other members of the body and to have its own injury. In both Paulson and Lockwood neither leg was industrially injured. Under the test applied in Burke there could not have been recovery in either case. It is out of tune with the second test  [t]he industrial loss of use of both legs may result from leg-connected disabling pain    so severe as to make use of the legs in industry practically impossible even though that pain is generated from an injury elsewhere in the body (Paulson) or it may result when a non-leg malady is triggered by use of the legs and it is that condition which prevents use of legs in industry (Lockwood) . It is out of tune with the second test because it requires each member of the body to be found industrially useless from an injury in that very member in hypothetical separation from the other members of the body. In Paulson and Lockwood the leg-connected pain was generated from the interplay of use of the legs and an injury in another part of the body. We find nothing in the reasoning of the Appeal Board to cause us to overrule Paulson or Lockwood. We are satisfied that these cases correctly interpret the Workmen's Compensation Act and provide a reasonable and logical policy. We re-affirm Paulson and approve Lockwood. As for the application of Paulson and Lockwood to the facts in Burke, it makes little sense to hold that there is permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs where a malady in the head or in the area of the groin may interact with movement of the legs to cause a condition in the legs that makes their use in industry practically impossible and yet turn around and say that just because the malady is in one leg, rather than in the head or groin there is no industrial loss of use of both legs, although physically there is such loss. We reject such a rule as wholly unnatural, unreasonable and illogical. We therefore amplify and consolidate the tests in Paulson and Lockwood, as follows: There is permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs where, inter alia, 1. An employment-related injury in one or both legs causes pain or other condition that prevents use of both legs in industry. 2. The use of one or both legs, whether or not injured, triggers an employment-related injury or malady in any part of the body, including one or both legs, that causes pain or other condition that prevents use of both legs in industry. In conclusion, as we consider the hypothetical test the Appeal Board applied in Burke contrary to the approved tests of Paulson and Lockwood, we reverse and remand this case to the Appeal Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.