Opinion ID: 1927823
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Waiver

Text: The defendants first contend that all of the notes and guaranties signed by the guarantors constitute a single integrated agreement with Oxford, and that there is express language in the guaranties waiving any right of contribution among and between them. Generally, the right to contribution can be destroyed only by an agreement between the obligated parties. United States v. Immordino, 534 F.2d 1378, 1382 (10th Cir.1976) (citing 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution §§ 6, 32 (1965)). Therefore, even if the relevant guaranty language contains an express waiver of the guarantors' rights to contribution, the waiver is enforceable by one guarantor against another only if the separate guaranties can be read together as a single contract. The general rule is that in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention, instruments executed at the same time, by the same contracting parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction will be considered and construed together, since they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract or instrument. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 388 (1991). See also Rosenthal v. Means, 388 A.2d 113, 115 (Me.1978) (all writings that form part of or pertain to the same transaction should be read together); Alden v. Camden Anchor-Rockland Mach. Co., 107 Me. 508, 510, 78 A. 977 (1911) ([d]ifferent instruments are to be construed together as parts of the same contract where necessary to carry into effect the agreement and intention of the parties). There is ample evidence in the record to support the position that all of the guaranties should be read together as part of the same transaction. Oxford's decision to lend money was premised on all of the shareholders and their spouses signing guaranties. In her affidavit Kandlis acknowledges that all of the Keiser shareholders signed identical guaranties, for the same purpose, and that they all knew what they were signing. All of the guaranties were signed by the respective guarantors within a two week period. Finally, the use of the phrase jointly and severally suggests the parties intended that the guaranties be considered as one agreement. See George C. Hall & Sons, Inc. v. Taylor, 628 A.2d 1037, 1039 (Me.1993) (joint and several liability can result when two or more parties are liable pursuant to a single contract); see also Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294, 297 (Me.1979) (citing Don L. Tullis & Assoc., Inc. v. Gover, 577 S.W.2d 891, 900 (Mo.App.1979), for the proposition that where two or more persons undertake the performance of an obligation the presumption is that the undertaking is joint, words of express joinder not being necessary, but words of severance being required to produce several responsibility). Thus we are satisfied that if the guaranties contain an express waiver of contribution it is enforceable among and between the guarantors. Although it did not directly rule on the defendants' express waiver argument, the trial court did find that the relevant language of the Guaranty documents at issue is not ambiguous as a matter of law. A guaranty is a contract and is governed by the same rules of construction as other contracts. Rosenthal, 388 A.2d at 114; see also Gillighan v. Boardman, 29 Me. 79, 81 (1848) (a contract of guaranty must receive such a construction as will carry into effect the intentions of the parties). Whether the language of a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. Tondreau v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 638 A.2d 728, 730 (Me.1994). If the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain its interpretation is a question of fact to be determined by a factfinder. Id. Contract language is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Fitzgerald v. Gamester, 658 A.2d 1065, 1069 (Me.1995). We find that the contract language is ambiguous and therefore its meaning should not have been determined by the trial court on a motion for a summary judgment. The relevant guaranty language states: The Undersigned hereby waives any right to exoneration by the Borrower, or to contribution from any co-surety or security for any of the Obligations, defers any right of subrogation until all Obligations of the Borrower to the Bank, whether or not guaranteed by the Undersigned hereunder, are paid in full, and defers and fully subordinates to the Obligations any right to reimbursement from the Borrower, until all Obligations of the Borrower are paid in full. The above-quoted language is a single sentence, set-off only by commas. The contribution waiver language is in the first of three clauses within the sentence. That first clause speaks only in general and presumably absolute terms. It could be interpreted to be, as the defendants argue, an express waiver of the co-guarantors' contribution rights. The sentence, however, ends by referring to a time when Oxford is finally paid in full, suggesting that the contribution waiver was meant to be only temporary, until such time as the Keiser debt is satisfied. Because the language is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations a summary judgment is not appropriate on the basis that Kandlis expressly waived her right to contribution.