Opinion ID: 413379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Amendment Violations

Text: 24 In Weatherford v. Bursey, 21 the Supreme Court held that a threat of significant harm to the defendant was a necessary component of a nondeliberate violation of the Sixth Amendment. 22 Mere attendance by an undercover agent at a meeting with the criminal defendant and his attorney does not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation as long as the agent communicates nothing of what he learns to his superiors and does not testify as to the content of the conversation. 23 In the instant case, appellee relies on the fact that appellants were all acquitted, and contends that therefore no violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred. 24 25 The threat of significant harm required by Weatherford does not, however, have to amount to prejudice in the sense of altering the actual outcome of the trial. 25 Although the Sixth Amendment is concerned primarily with fairness at trial, it is not limited to that function. 26 The right to counsel protects the whole range of the accused's interests implicated by a criminal prosecution. These interests may extend beyond the wish for exoneration to include, for example, the possibilities of a lesser charge, a lighter sentence, or the alleviation of the practical burdens of a trial. 27 26 In Weatherford, the intrusion imposed no additional effort or burden on the defense, as the informant did not turn over any evidence to the prosecution. In the instant case, the evidence gathered by Poe could have been used against the appellants if they had not challenged it. Moreover, the appellants need not prove that the prosecution actually used the information obtained. The prosecution makes a host of discretionary and judgmental decisions in preparing its case. It would be virtually impossible for an appellant or a court to sort out how any particular piece of information in the possession of the prosecution was consciously or subconsciously factored into each of those decisions. Mere possession by the prosecution of otherwise confidential knowledge about the defense's strategy or position is sufficient in itself to establish detriment to the criminal defendant. Such information is inherently detrimental, ... unfairly advantage[s] the prosecution, and threaten[s] to subvert the adversary system of criminal justice. 28 Further, once the investigatory arm of the government has obtained information, that information may reasonably be assumed to have been passed on to other governmental organs responsible for prosecution. Such a presumption merely reflects the normal high level of formal and informal cooperation which exists between the two arms of the executive. 29 27 Appellants contend that Poe's continued status after their indictment as both a secret FBI informant and as their confidant obstructed their counsel's efforts to gain expeditious and economical dismissal of the criminal charges they faced. FBI documents show that Poe informed the FBI of the appellants' efforts to contact a potential witness; the financial difficulties of the defense team, particularly regarding the adverse financial impact of a particular venue motion; and the existence of a jury selection survey. 30 Moreover, there is evidence that the FBI routinely passed information received from Poe to the Department of Justice and attorneys involved in this case. 31 Such information would undoubtedly have been of interest to a prosecuting team planning its strategy. Thus, the record suggests a realistic possibility that appellants suffered injury as a result of governmental intrusions in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 28