Opinion ID: 337643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: alvarado and williams.

Text: 82 Alvarado and Williams contend on appeal that: (1) the United States does not have jurisdiction to try Indians on a charge of fourth degree burglary under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and the South Dakota Criminal Code; (2) the government failed to prove that these appellants are Indians within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1153; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to convict them. 83 On March 20, 1973, Morris Holyrock went to his father's home on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. On arrival, he observed that the home had been broken into. He also observed three men standing outside the house, a fourth man coming out of the house and a fifth man in the home. Holyrock asked one of the men, later identified as Williams, Where's the old man? Williams responded, He went to Rapid City and told us we could use his house. Alvarado was standing approximately four feet away from Williams and ten feet away from Holyrock when this exchange took place, but did not respond to either the question or the answer. Holyrock then left and returned two hours later with four tribal policemen. The officers found Williams, Alvarado and codefendant Newman Crowels, Jr., in the home. 19 Food left in the home had been eaten, and two guns were missing. 84 Williams and Alvarado were convicted of knowingly breaking and entering into the home of Frank Holyrock, an Indian, without his permission with intent to commit larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and S.D.C.L. §§ 22-32-11 and 22-32-13. Section 1153 states in part: 85 Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely    burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 86 As used in this section, the offenses of burglary, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and incest shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed. 87 South Dakota Compiled Laws § 22-32-11 states: 88 Every person who breaks and enters the dwelling house of another at any time in such manner as not to constitute burglary as otherwise specified in this chapter with intent to commit a crime is guilty of burglary in the fourth degree. 89 The appellants contend that the definition of fourth degree burglary found in § 22-32-11 describes a crime that is significantly less serious than common law burglary. They argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1153 creates federal criminal jurisdiction only over major crimes and that jurisdiction of this  relatively minor offense (fourth degree burglary) should be left to the Indian tribal courts. They cite United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411, 77 S.Ct. 397, 399, 1 L.Ed.2d 430, 433 (1957), and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886), in support of their position. 90 We rejected the appellant's argument in Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389, 393-394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830, 79 S.Ct. 52, 3 L.Ed.2d 69 (1958), and reject it here. 20 In Costello, the defendant contended that he could not be convicted of the offense of transporting firearms after having previously been convicted of a violent crime because his prior state conviction of burglary was based upon a statute which did not include all of the elements of common law burglary. We noted that at the time Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act, laws against burglary existed in practically all the states that included not only strict common law burglary but other lesser related offenses termed as forms of burglary. We concluded that Congress did not intend the word burglary to be given a strict common law definition and found no error in Costello's conviction of the Firearms Act. 21 91 Here, § 1153 clearly states that burglary is to be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed. Further, there is no legislative history that suggests an intent not to include what is classified in South Dakota as fourth degree burglary as outside the jurisdiction basis of § 1153. It follows that the District Court had jurisdiction. Accord, United States v. Gilbert, 378 F.Supp. 82, 89-94 (W.D.S.D.1974). 22 92 The appellants also assert error in the finding by the trial court that they are Indians within the meaning of § 1153. They assert there was insufficient evidence to prove they were Indians, they are not Indians as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in ruling on this issue and not allowing this issue to go to the jury. 93 The evidence clearly indicates that Alvarado is one-fourth Yurok Indian by blood and that he filed an application to be recognized as a member of the Yurok Tribe on the California State Judgment Rolls on September 19, 1969. He stated on that application that he had been previously entered on a judgment roll in 1950, and that he knew that roll number. The Superintendent of the Pawnee Agency testified that appellant Williams was listed on the Pawnee tribal roll, and that an applicant must have at least one-fourth Pawnee blood to be so enrolled. 94 The definition of exactly who is and who is not an Indian is very imprecise. F. Cohen, Federal Indian Law (1958), at 4-12. Courts have generally followed the test first discussed in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1845): in order to be considered an Indian, an individual must have some degree of Indian blood and must be recognized as an Indian. See State v. Attebery, 110 Ariz. 354, 519 P.2d 53 (1974). In determining whether a person is recognized as an Indian, courts have looked to both recognition by a tribe or society of Indians or by the federal government. Federal Indian Law, supra, at 776. 95 The Supreme Court has held that a child of a white father and an Indian mother could inherit the mother's share of tribal property. Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 51 S.Ct. 615, 75 L.Ed. 1389 (1931). Other federal cases have held that one-fourth to three-eighths blood, Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir. 1917), or one-eighth to one-fourth blood, Sully v. United States, 195 F. 113 (8th Cir. 1912), is sufficient to be enrolled as a member of a tribe and to be entitled to benefits as such. 96 In the more recent case of Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash.2d 677, 440 P.2d 442 (1968), the court found a woman of one-fourth Makah blood, who held herself out as a member of that tribe, to be an Indian. Accord, State v. Attebery, supra. 97 We find that both Williams and Alvarado are of Indian blood and have held themselves out to be Indians. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court in determining that they are Indians within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1153. We find no error in the trial judge determining this jurisdictional issue. 98 We also find no merit to the appellants' claim that there was insufficient evidence to prove that they intended to commit burglary. The appellants had not, as they alleged, been given permission to use the home. They were initially found standing outside the home and subsequently found to have occupied it. The padlock on the door was broken, food stored in the home had been eaten and weapons kept there had been removed. 99 We likewise find no merit to their claim that there was insufficient evidence to find that the building was a dwelling house under S.D.C.L. § 22-32-14. The building was clearly used from time to time as a dwelling by the senior Holyrock. No further occupancy is required to bring it under the protection of S.D.C.L. § 22-32-14. 100 We affirm the convictions of Williams and Alvarado. 101