Opinion ID: 884313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Mason's motion to dismiss Count II and Count III of the information for lack of probable cause? Mason argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss Counts II and III of the information. He contends that the information did not contain allegations specific enough to meet the probable cause requirement of § 46-11-201(2), MCA. Leave to file an information will be granted if it appears from the application that probable cause exists to indicate that the offenses have been committed by the defendant. State v. Ramstead (1990), 243 Mont. 162, 165-66, 793 P.2d 802, 804. In the supporting affidavit, the State need only recite facts sufficient to indicate a probability that the named defendant committed the charged offenses; the State need not demonstrate a prima facie case. Ramstead, 793 P.2d at 804. See also State v. Little (1993), 260 Mont. 460, 861 P.2d 154. In reviewing an affidavit for probable cause, the district court may use common sense and draw permissible inferences. On appeal, this Court will not reverse a district court's determination regarding probable cause absent an abuse of discretion. Little, 861 P.2d at 160; Ramstead, 793 P.2d at 804. In this case, the affidavit underlying the information contained a long excerpt from R.K.'s journal, detailing the abuse she suffered as a child. This excerpt vividly recounted the progression of the abuse as well as the details of the particular incident which gave rise to the charges. However, as Mason notes, R.K. in the journal sometimes employed euphemisms, such as recounting the initial events of one incident and then stating that Mason proceeded to do his thing. Mason contends that such phrases are vague and insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to charge him with the challenged crimes. The affidavit, however, is not limited to the excerpt from R.K.'s journal. It also contains the testimony of the county attorney, who attested that the victim had told him that sexual contact took place during the incident giving rise to the charge of sexual assault, and that penetration took place during the incident giving rise to the charge of sexual intercourse without consent. The affidavit in this case was both lengthy and detailed, and the representations of the victim, together with the statements of the county attorney, constituted more than sufficient probable cause to support the information. As noted above, the prosecution need not prove its case before charging a defendant; it need only recite facts indicating that it is probable that the defendant committed the offenses. Ramstead, 793 P.2d at 804. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding sufficient probable cause to charge Mason with the crimes alleged.