Opinion ID: 2259105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Assault with Intent to Maim Conviction

Text: The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167, 512 A.2d 1056, 1057 (1986) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); see also State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994); Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 281, 619 A.2d 111, 114 (1993); McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 289, 600 A.2d 430, 439 (1992); Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 535, 573 A.2d 831, 833 (1990). Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder. See Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580, 583 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1991). Thus, our concern is not whether the verdict below was in accord with the weight of the evidence, but rather, whether there was sufficient evidence at trial that either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant's guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d at 337. Respondent was charged with assault with intent to maim. Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 386 (Repealed). At the time of the offense in this case, the statute provided in pertinent part: If any person shall unlawfully shoot at any person, or shall in any manner unlawfully and maliciously attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, or shall unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut or wound any person, or shall assault or beat any person, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable such person ..., such offender shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction are subject to imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Maiming was not defined within section 386. Rather, the definition appeared in section 385 of Article 27: Every person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, who shall be convicted of the crime of cutting out or disabling the tongue, putting out an eye, slitting the nose, cutting or biting off the nose, ear or lip, or cutting or biting off or disabling any limb or member of any person, of malice aforethought, with intention in so doing to mark or disfigure such person, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction are subject to imprisonment for not more than 15 years. Assault with intent to maim is a specific intent crime. In that regard, a conviction cannot lie unless the perpetrator had the specific intent to inflict one or more of the injuries described in [section] 385. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 212, 507 A.2d 1098, 1118 (1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987); see also Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 230, 623 A.2d 630, 633 (1993). Additionally, the injury must be permanent in nature. Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 702, 625 A.2d 984, 993 (1993); Hammond v. State, 322 Md. 451, 457-59, 588 A.2d 345, 347-48 (1991). Respondent's second question in his cross-petition argues that the prosecution was required to prove that respondent had the specific intent to bit[e] off the ... ear of Ms. Jones. Our analysis, however, does not begin or end with the biting issue. Count One of the Criminal Information filed in the circuit court alleged that respondent did unlawfully and maliciously cut ... Tammy Tirrell Jones, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable.... (Emphasis added.) The trial judge stated when addressing respondent's motion for acquittal at the close of the State's case: Well, there was evidence that the victim... stated that the defendant bit her and had a knife, and she had wounds that are evidenced by the hospital records, stab wounds to the chest, an ear edema. [The evidence] indicates that she was ... knifed. I certainly think there is legally sufficient evidence.... The defense presented no case at trial. It then renewed its argument that the evidence on the assault with intent to maim charge was not sufficient. The trial judge responded: I don't have any doubt that there was a knife involved. The Court believes beyond a reasonable doubt that [a knife] was used and that was an intent to maim. The Court of Special Appeals held below that there was sufficient evidence presented from which the trial court could have found respondent guilty of assault with intent to maim. Respondent argues the intermediate appellate court erred in this regard because the mere fact that Ms. Jones was bitten on the ear is not sufficient to establish an intent to maim, which, under the statute, essentially means intent to bite her ear off. Respondent, however, was convicted based upon the knifing. We believe there was sufficient evidence to convict respondent for assault with intent to maim for his attack on Ms. Jones with the knife, which resulted in three two-centimeter stab wounds to her chest. [10] As we have stated, the prosecution was required to prove that respondent assaulted Ms. Jones with the specific intent to maim, disfigure, or disable her. This Court and the Court of Special Appeals have said on many occasions that this intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Ford, 330 Md. at 702-03, 625 A.2d at 994. [11] More specific to this case, the intent necessary for a conviction under [section] 386 may be inferred from evidence of an attack with a deadly weapon. Id. at 703, 625 A.2d at 994 (citing Marks v. State, 230 Md. 108, 112-13, 185 A.2d 909, 912 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 918, 83 S.Ct. 1308, 10 L.Ed.2d 417 (1963)). What is more, a fact finder is permitted to infer from the act of stabbing that the stabber intended permanently to maim, disfigure, or disable his victim. Williams v. State, 100 Md.App. 468, 472, 641 A.2d 990, 992 (1994). See also Jenkins v. State, 59 Md.App. 612, 617, 477 A.2d 791, 793 (1984) ([A]n intent to maim, disfigure, or disable under [section] 386 may be established by showing an intent to do grievous bodily harm such as pointing and shooting a gun at another), rev'd in part on other grounds, 307 Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465 (1986); Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61, 74, 368 A.2d 1080, 1088 (1977) (upholding assault with intent to maim conviction because the pointing of a gun toward another human and discharging it in random fashion is sufficient to support inferences of intent to do grievous bodily harm.); cf. Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102 A.2d 816, 819-20 (1954) (noting as to assault with intent to murder that [t]he deliberate selection and use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body is a circumstance which indicates a design to kill, since in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his act.). Returning to the case at hand, when the defense moved for judgment of acquittal, the judge stated in discussing this issue: I don't have any doubt that there was a knife involved. The Court believes beyond a reasonable doubt that one was used and that was an intent to maim, and that the defendant is guilty of all the charges based on the statement at the time of the victim and the evidence submitted by the hospital records as to the statements as to the cause of the injuries and the injuries that were actually found, and the Court will enter verdicts of guilt. The judge found that respondent, in assaulting Ms. Jones with a knife, was guilty of the charges against him, i.e., that he intended to maim, disfigure, or disable her permanently. The evidence of the several puncture wounds from the knife in her chest and the use of a knife in general were sufficient to sustain that conviction. The victim's injuries correlate directly to an intent to maim on respondent's part because first, an intent to maim Ms. Jones can by inferred from respondent's use of the knife, a dangerous weapon. Second, by stabbing the victim in her chest, the general area of the heart and lungs, respondent obviously intended to cause serious physical injury: disablement or disfigurement. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that petitioner had the intent to maim, disable or disfigure Ms. Jones permanently. Accordingly, we shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals as to the sufficiency of the evidence issue.