Opinion ID: 2162451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Police Officer's Offer of Consideration To A Witness.

Text: The defense attempted to elicit testimony from George Mouzis, one of its two witnesses, that a Detective Thompson of the West Allis police department had offered him some sort of deal or bargain or walking papers if he would turn state's evidence against Dennis Woodhull and say that he confessed to the crime in question. Mouzis was an inmate with the defendant, Smith and Wild in the Milwaukee county jail at the time of the defendant's alleged confession. The trial court sustained the state's objection to any such testimony on the basis that it was hearsay and that the defendant could have subpoenaed Detective Thompson to bring out such testimony. Thompson was out of the state at the time of the trial. The state now concedes that the testimony of Mouzis would not be hearsay because it would not be offered to prove the truth of the fact asserted, but only offered so that the finder of fact might consider the statement's effect on the hearer. Auseth v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 627, 630, 99 N. W. 2d 700. The question before this court then becomes whether the refusal to admit this testimony into evidence was prejudicial to the cause of the defendant. The only possible probative value of the admission of this testimony would be to infer that because the police were alleged to have made these statements to Mouzis, they might also have done so to Wild and Smith. There is nothing in the record which would tend to indicate such a probability. The defense counsel extensively, and to no avail, crossexamined both Wild and Smith concerning any type of arrangement they might have made with the police officers to secure their testimony in this case. Furthermore, Wendell Weidelmann, witness for the defendant, testified that the police also had discussed the case with him and had offered no inducement whatsoever for his testimony. While this particular testimony of Mouzis could properly have been admitted into evidence, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to do so does not reach such constitutional proportions as to constitute prejudicial error. Errors, if any, committed during the course of the trial should not serve to overturn a judgment `unless it appears pretty clearly that had they not occurred, the result might probably have been more favorable to the party complaining.' Dascenzo v. State (1965), 26 Wis. 2d 225, 236, 132 N. W. 2d 231.