Opinion ID: 2312412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alcantara

Text: Alcantara, who pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement with the government, raises a number of sentencing issues on appeal.
Alcantara argues that the District Court erred in calculating his base offense level when it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he should be held responsible for at least 150 kilograms of cocaine. When a district court makes a finding of fact with respect to the amount of drugs attributable to a defendant, we review that finding for clear error. United States v. Ramirez, 609 F.3d 495, 503 (2d Cir.2010). Such a finding may rest on a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 175 (2d Cir.2008). Where, as here, there has been no seizure of narcotics (or the amount of narcotics seized does not properly reflect the magnitude of the criminal conspiracy), a sentencing judge is authorized to approximate the relevant drug quantity. See id. We need not resolve whether the District Court erred in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Alcantara was responsible for at least 150 kilograms of cocaine. As the District Court explained, evidence that Alcantara knew that Hiciano's ring dealt in crack cocaine as well as powder cocaine, and knew of the quantity of crack that could be made from the quantity of powder he sold to Hiciano, supports the District Court's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Alcantara could and should be held responsible for at least 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. The District Court did not clearly err in reaching this conclusion.
Alcantara challenges the enhancement of his offense level by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which provides that a defendant's offense level should be enhanced if he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Id. While the criminal activity must be found to have involved five or more participants, the defendant need not have been the leader of more than one other participant for this adjustment to apply. United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir.2008). We will overturn [t]he sentencing court's findings as to the defendant's role in the offense ... only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Farah, 991 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir.1993); see United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 107 (2d Cir. 2000).
As an initial matter, Alcantara argues that the District Court erred in enhancing his offense level by four levelsthe designated enhancement for leaders or organizersrather than three levelsthe designated enhancement for managers or supervisorsbecause the Court classified him at sentencing as a supervisor, rather than as a leader or organizer. See United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 348 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) provides for a three-level enhancement if `the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants' (quoting § 3B1.1(b))). Both the Court's use of the word supervisor and its citation to § 3B1.1(c) [17] (rather than § 3B1.1(b) or (a)) appear to have been simple misstatements, and did not reflect the Court's factual findings. The Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) and the government had both argued for a four-level leadership role enhancement. [18] The District Court also expressly found that the evidence showed a hierarchy; that Hiciano represented the whole organization; and that on the top [we] have Alcantara, who certainly exercise[d] a certain amount of control over Hiciano. The Court then stated that it was in agreement with the Government and also with probation's assessment that the defendant is entitled to the aggravating four-point enhancement. The sentencing record reveals no discussion of other types of role enhancements. We have no reason to believe the Court intended to impose anything other than the four-level leader or organizer enhancement. [19]
Alcantara argues that he did not exercise control over Hiciano, and that the District Court's conclusion that he was a leader or organizer of Hiciano's conspiracy was therefore unsupported by the record. The Court's application of a four-level leader or organizer role enhancement was not clearly erroneous. Alcantara was, as the Court observed, a significant supplier of drugs to Hiciano's organization. The Court repeatedly emphasized the influence this position gave Alcantara over Hiciano's management decisions, noting that even though Alcantara did not direct the activities of the distribution ring by issuing orders to its lower-ranked members, his control over Hiciano affected the operation of the distribution ring as a whole. [20] The Court explained that Alcantara's position as Hiciano's creditor enabled him to require Hiciano to increase the distribution ring's sales efforts (or otherwise alter its activities) in order to pay the ring's debts, and that therefore the enhancement was appropriate. Indeed, the Court noted at least one instance in which Alcantara set fire to a vehicle he believed to belong to Hiciano, in order to intimidate Hiciano into paying the more than $90,000 he owed to Alcantara. Cf. United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 806 (8th Cir.2000) (enhancement appropriate where defendant threatened to kill two individuals if they could not show that they had not stolen drugs belonging to him, suggesting defendant had influenced the[ir] conduct). Accordingly, the District Court did not clearly err in determining that Alcantara's influence over Hiciano was sufficient to support a four-level enhancement for a leader or organizer role in the offense. [21]
In any event, even if the District Court could be said to have committed legal error by calling Alcantara a supervisor rather than a leader or organizer, or by imposing any role enhancement at all, any such error was harmless. Moreover, where, as here, the record indicates clearly that the district court would have imposed the same sentence in any event, the error may be deemed harmless. United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 68 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 197 (2d Cir.2008) ( en banc ). We hold, for two independent and sufficient reasons, that the record clearly indicates that the role enhancement had no effect on Alcantara's sentence. First, we note that the District Court sentenced Alcantara principally to 120 months' imprisonment. That term of imprisonment constituted the statutory minimum term applicable to his offense of conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). No further departure, short of a safety-valve reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (to which Alcantara does not argue he was entitled), could have reduced his sentence below the statutory minimum. Because Alcantara was sentenced to the statutory minimum term of imprisonment, any error in adding the role enhancement was harmless as a matter of law. Second, and in the alternative, the District Court clearly intended to grant Alcantara a substantial departure from his Guidelines-recommended sentence. The Court calculated that, with a four-level enhancement and other adjustments, Alcantara's final Guidelines level would be 43, which the Court described as high. The Court then went on to observe that, even if Alcantara's objections to the PSRincluding his objection to the four-level enhancementhad been successful, the guidelines would still be high. [22] The Court ultimately imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of 120 months, equivalent to at least a twelve-level departure, in large part to recognize Alcantara's very substantial cooperation. Moreover, the Court clearly indicated its reluctance to sentence Alcantara to an extended term of imprisonment, in part because of his youth. We hold that the Court's statements on the record at sentencing are sufficient for us to conclude that the role enhancement did not affect Alcantara's sentence. We therefore hold that, even if the District Court had not applied the four-level role enhancement, Alcantara's sentence would have been the same, and that any error in arriving at his sentence was harmless.
We have considered the remainder of Alcantara's arguments on appeal, and find that they are meritless. We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court as to Alcantara.