Opinion ID: 781039
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to the Cross Examination of Henry's Expert Testimony

Text: 77 Henry testified to traits commonly manifested in victims of child sexual abuse to aid the jury in assessing the credibility of the children's testimony and, in particular, in understanding why their stories may have changed over time. She also stated, without objection, her opinion that, of the fifty-to-one hundred alleged victims of child abuse she has assessed and treated, in only one instance did the child lie. Notably, however, Henry did not offer any opinion as to the credibility of Nnedi or Chendo, and did not testify to her prior contact with them. 9 78 Eze makes two claims of ineffective assistance in connection with Henry's testimony. First, Eze contends that his counsel should have objected to Henry's testimony that she had encountered only one incident of a child falsely alleging sexual abuse in the course of the fifty-to-one hundred cases on which she has worked. Eze argues that this testimony was designed merely to prejudicially indicate that the complainants' allegations were true and to bolster their credibility, thereby intruding upon the jury's province to assess their credibility. The District Court acknowledged that this testimony indirectly related to [the] witness' honesty, but concluded that it was tempered by Henry's statements explaining why it is sometimes difficult to discern the accuracy of children's statements. 79 Henry's expert testimony on the behavioral patterns of sexually abused children was admissible under New York law. Experts may testify to matters that would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror. People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1990) (citation omitted). Because the dynamics of sexual abusive relationships are not familiar to the average juror, New York courts permit experts to explain the reactions of young victims of sexual abuse. Id. at 135-36; People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 551 N.E.2d 561, 572 (1990). New York courts have explained that child sexual abuse syndrome is a recognized diagnosis based upon comparisons between the characteristics of individuals and relationships in incestuous families, as described by mental health experts, and the characteristics of the individuals and relationships of the family in question. In Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 524 N.Y.S.2d 19, 518 N.E.2d 914, 917 (1987); accord Taylor, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d at 135. Evidence of such rape trauma syndrome, however, is not admissible when it inescapably bears solely on proving that rape occurred, as opposed to explaining behavior that may appear unusual to the average juror. Taylor, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d at 139. 80 Henry did not testify to whether Nnedi and Chendo exhibited behavior indicative of sexual abuse, but rather related victims' behavioral characteristics not generally known by the average juror. So far, Henry's testimony was entirely admissible under New York law and, therefore, counsel did not err in failing to object to the testimony. Yet, the defense may have had a valid objection that Henry's statement that only one child out of nearly fifty-to-one hundred lied implied that Chendo and Nnedi were telling the truth. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 737-39 (11th Cir.) (granting a habeas petition in part because expert testified that 99.5% of children tell the truth regarding sexual abuse allegations), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963, 119 S.Ct. 405, 142 L.Ed.2d 329 (1998). It also is possible, however, that there was a strategic explanation for not objecting. The defense may have decided not to draw attention to this matter during direct examination, but instead attack the testimony on cross examination, where Henry acknowledged that there had been no judicial determination of the truth of the allegations in those cases. 81 Eze's second argument regarding Henry's testimony is a different matter. Eze contends, as he did regarding Dr. Lazoritz's expert testimony, that his counsel erred by ineffectively cross-examining Henry's expert testimony and by failing to call an expert to challenge her testimony. Despite the fact that it was largely limited to an unbiased explanation of child sexual abuse syndrome, and although counsel was able to elicit favorable admissions in cross examination, Henry's testimony was extremely damaging to Eze's defense. Henry testified that child sexual abuse syndrome can explain why an abused child makes inconsistent statements or with holds information regarding the occurrence or extent of the abuse. In response to a question about why a child might seem to allow abuse to take place or continue without protest, Henry stated children often have a sense of hopelessness and feel powerless to stop the abuse. Henry also remarked that inconsistencies in a child's allegations and statements are to be expected, and that the issue of consistency is very important to evaluate because you don't want a child's statement to be too consistent because, in fact, if it's too consistent, it can have the quality of being memorized or rote or programmed. 82 The reasoning of Lindstadt and Pavel applies with equal force here as well. Henry's testimony was arguably devastating to Eze's defense because it explained why the girls may have withheld disclosure for so long and why their testimony was inconsistent at trial. Eze's counsel thus had a heightened responsibility to educate herself on the topic of child sexual abuse syndrome and, if necessary, consult an expert in preparation for trial to ensure her client's interests were properly represented. 83 We begin with the defense's cross examination of Henry's expert testimony. Defense counsel questioned Henry on other studies critical of the behavioral patterns she discussed and suggested other factors that could have accounted for the girls' behavior beside sexual abuse. In light of the significant deference we accord a trial counsel's decision how to conduct cross examination and our refusal to use perfect hindsight to criticize unsuccessful trial strategies, we decline to find deficient the cross examination of Henry. See Dunham v. Travis, 313 F.3d 724, 732 (2d Cir.2002) (Decisions about `whether to engage in cross-examination, and if so to what extent and in what manner, are ... strategic in nature' and generally will not support an ineffective assistance claim.) (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir.1987)); United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 265 (2d Cir.1992) (same), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1029, 113 S.Ct. 1840, 123 L.Ed.2d 467 (1993). 84 Even granting our conclusion about the cross examination of Henry, we nonetheless are troubled by the defense's failure to call an expert witness to refute Henry's testimony. By not offering a rebuttal expert, the jury was almost certain to give significant weight to Henry's explanation of the behavior of sexually abused children. A defense expert in this field could have undercut the testimony, as well as arguments made in the prosecution's summation which drew heavily from Henry's testimony. As we discussed earlier, see supra II.B.1.b., counsel's decision not to call a particular witness usually constitutes trial strategy that we hesitate to second-guess so long as the strategy advanced the client's interests. Pavel, 261 F.3d at 218-19; Luciano, 158 F.3d at 660. From the record before us, however, we cannot tell if the defense's failure to call an expert to refute Henry's testimony reflected a sound trial strategy or perhaps some unjustifiable reason, such as a desire to avoid work. See Pavel, 261 F.3d at 218. 85