Opinion ID: 1179895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the express disavowal of repeal or limitation in const. art. 32

Text: The final clause of Const. art. 32 reveals both its narrow scope and the fact that its limitations were meant to apply only to bonds issued pursuant to its implementing statute, RCW 39.84: This section is supplemental to and shall not be construed as a repeal of or limitation on any other authority lawfully exercisable under the Constitution and laws of this state, including, among others, any existing authority to issue revenue bonds. Const. art. 32, § 1(e). The bonds in this case are being issued pursuant to other authority. They are being issued pursuant to RCW 43.163. Because they are nonrecourse bonds ( i.e., the State is not financially obligated on the bonds) they need not rely on Const. art. 32 for their constitutional validity. Therefore, these bonds, issued pursuant to other authority should not be subject to the restrictions in Const. art. 32. Treasurer Grimm and the dissent fail in their attempt to explain away this language. They focus unduly on the word existing. As a result, they argue the entire clause only disavows conflict with law existing at the time of ratification. Therefore, they conclude that the restrictions in Const. art. 32 apply to all nonrecourse bonds, because we had not yet recognized their constitutional validity in Higher Educ. Facilities Auth. or State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wn.2d 491, 671 P.2d 247 (1983). [5] This narrow interpretation of the final clause of Const. art. 32 is irreconcilable with its plain language. We will not construe or interpret a constitutional provision that is plain or unambiguous. Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wn.2d 189, 191, 543 P.2d 229 (1975). The plain language of the amendment disavows a repeal of or limitation on any other authority ... including, among others, any existing authority to issue revenue bonds. (Italics ours.) Const. art. 32. The language of the amendment indicates that existing authority is only a subset of other authority. [O]ther authority must be read as authority that existed in the past, present or future. Therefore, by its own language the strictures of Const. art. 32 were not meant to apply to bonds issued under authority other than itself, regardless of when that authority came into being. [4] Treasurer Grimm also emphasizes that the final clause of Const. art. 32 only disavows interference with any other authority lawfully exercisable. (Italics ours.) His argument appears to be that the disavowal of repeal or limitation does not apply to these bonds because the constitutionality of certain types of nonrecourse financing was unsettled at the time Const. art. 32 was adopted. This position, however, ignores the fact that cases approving bond issuances subsequent to the adoption of Const. art. 32 did not create new authority. The authority already existed. We simply recognized that properly structured issuances would not violate the lending of credit prohibition in our state constitution. We did not create any new authority. Treasurer Grimm dismisses the interpretation we advance, claiming that the article does not contain a self-destruct mechanism. Brief of Respondent, at 33. Our interpretation does not make the effect of Const. art. 32 disappear. The limitations contained in Const. art. 32 still apply to industrial development bonds issued pursuant to its implementing statute, RCW 39.84. They do not, however, apply to other types of bonds issued pursuant to other authority, as is the case here. [5]