Opinion ID: 2048925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First entertained is defendant's claim to the effect plaintiff's acceptance of the aforesaid conditional check constituted a binding accord and satisfaction.

Text: At the outset it is understood the partnership was terminated November 1, 1966, by Gibson's voluntary withdrawal. See Owen v. Wilden Hospital, Inc., 245 Iowa 382, 389, 62 N.W.2d 186 (1954). The crucial problem to be initially resolved is whether, under existing circumstances, the well established principle of accord and satisfaction is applicable. To constitute an accord and satisfaction, where there is a bona fide dispute, it is necessary the money should be offered in satisfaction of the claim, and the offer accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to the condition that, if the money is accepted, it is accepted in satisfaction, and such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that, if he takes it, he does so subject to such conditions. A party to whom an offer is thus made has no alternative but to refuse or accept it upon such conditions, and if he takes it his claim is canceled. In other words, if the offer is accepted by the offeree his claim is canceled and no protest, declaration or denial on his part, so long as the condition is insisted on, can vary the result. See Mayrath Company v. Helgeson, 258 Iowa 543, 547, 139 N.W.2d 303 (1966); Olson v. Wilson & Co., 244 Iowa 895, 899-904, 58 N.W.2d 381 (1953), and citations. See generally 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §§ 1-27; 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction §§ 1-8, 32-34.