Opinion ID: 1762918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Challenge to the Jury Instructions.

Text: Defendant also assigns as error that portion of the jury instructions in which the trial court explained the element of kidnapping known as confinement or removal. The statutory definition of kidnapping provides in pertinent part: A person commits kidnapping when he or she either confines a person or removes a person from one place to another, knowing that he or she has neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so; provided, that to constitute kidnapping the act must be accompanied by one or more of the following: .... (3) The intent to ... subject the person to a sexual abuse. Iowa Code § 710.1 (1983). In State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1981), this court held that the phrase confines a person or removes a person requires more than the confinement or removal that is an inherent incident of sexual abuse; we said: Such confinement or removal may exist because it substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim, significantly lessens the risk of detection, or significantly facilitates escape following the consummation of the offense. Id. at 745. Accord State v. Ristau, 340 N.W.2d 273, 275-76 (Iowa 1983); State v. Newman, 326 N.W.2d 796, 801-02 (Iowa 1982); State v. Knupp, 310 N.W.2d 179, 182-83 (Iowa 1981). Using that and other language in Rich as a guide, the trial court instructed the jury: One of the essential elements which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in either kidnapping in the first degree or kidnapping in the third degree or false imprisonment is that [the victim] was confined or removed. In that regard, you are instructed that this requires more than confinement or removal that is inherent within the commission of the offense of sexual abuse. A person is confined when that person's freedom to move about is substantially restricted by force, threat, or deception. The person may be confined either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which the person has been removed. Although no minimal period of confinement or distance of removal is required, such must exceed that which is normally incidental or dependent upon the commission of a sexual abuse and must be more than slight, inconsequential, or as an incident inherent in the offense of sexual abuse so that the confinement or removal has a significance separate and apart from a sexual abuse. Such confinement or removal may exist because it substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim or significantly lessens the risk of detection. Defendant acknowledges that the trial court's instruction correctly reflects our prior interpretations of the kidnapping statute. He proposes, however, that we now adopt a narrower interpretation, eliminating as a factor that type of confinement or removal which merely significantly lessens the risk of detection. If we were to approve defendant's proposed instruction, the prosecution would be unable to prove the confinement or removal element of kidnapping without showing that it had substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim. See Note, Kidnapping in Iowa: Movements Incidental to Sexual Abuse, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 773, 800-801 (1982) (advocating adoption of this narrower interpretation and the language of defendant's proposed jury instruction). Before deciding Rich this court carefully studied the decisions of other courts which have wrestled with the problem of drawing a line between the statutory offenses of kidnapping and sexual abuse. Rich discussed those cases in considerable detail, then drew a careful line between what was not sufficient for kidnappingconfinement or removal which is merely incidental to sexual abuse, and what is sufficientconfinement or removal which (1) substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim, (2) significantly lessens the risk of detection, or (3) significantly facilitates escape following the consummation of the offense. 305 N.W.2d at 745. We have reconsidered our analysis of the kidnapping statute in Rich and conclude that we there correctly interpreted the intent of the legislature and arrived at a sound and workable distinction between kidnapping and sexual abuse. We reaffirm the holding and language of Rich. There was adequate record support for the kidnapping instructions which were given to the jury. From the evidence introduced at trial the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant assaulted the victim in her car, then dragged her out of the car and forced her into his residence where his actions would be less detectable and where he might batter her at will. In the house the risk of detection would be less likely, the risk of harm to the victim more likely. We find no merit in the defendant's assigned errors. AFFIRMED.