Opinion ID: 201225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Sayyah's Habeas Corpus Petition Falls Within the Scope of Section 1252(d)(1)

Text: 32 According to section 1252(d)(1), we may review Sayyah's final order of removal— and therefore the due process claim in his habeas corpus petition which requests review of that order 7 —only if Sayyah has exhausted all administrative remedies available to him as of right. Sayyah argues that he has exhausted his administrative remedies because, at the time he filed his habeas corpus petition, he had waived his right to appeal to the BIA. He contends that this waiver foreclosed his ability to pursue any remedy as of right. We disagree. 33 Sayyah's waiver of his right to appeal to the BIA does not constitute exhaustion of the administrative remedies available to him as of right under section 1252(d). See, e.g., Theodoropoulos, 358 F.3d at 174 (holding alien's waiver of right to appeal to BIA was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies for jurisdictional purposes). Sayyah argues that his waiver here was the product of Judge Ragno's oppressive and improper behavior. But after the hearing at which the behavior criticized was exhibited, Sayyah was later granted an additional opportunity to appeal to the BIA. Sayyah's purported fear that an appeal would force him to appear once more before Judge Ragno was an insufficient excuse not to comply with the exhaustion requirement. His appeal would have been to the BIA, not to Judge Ragno. The BIA had the authority to deal with Sayyah's objections to the events in Judge Ragno's courtroom and provide relief, which might or might not have included further hearings before Judge Ragno. See Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 763 (1st Cir.1992) (listing judicial conduct among irregularities that BIA could have corrected if brought to its attention); cf. Podio v. INS, 153 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1998) (remanding to BIA case concerning alleged immigration judge misconduct and stating, [w]hile the choice of a presiding judge is left to the discretion of the BIA, we believe that all of the parties concerned, including the original immigration judge himself, would prefer that the new hearing be held before a different judge). 34 Sayyah further contends that since his case was reopened only after petition by the INS, any remedy available to him was discretionary and not as of right. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). We disagree. Upon reopening of his case, Sayyah was given the opportunity to directly appeal to the BIA as of right. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3; Hernandez, 238 F.3d at 54 (stating that timely appeal to the BIA is a remedy as of right). Moreover, the distinction Sayyah seeks to make on these facts between discretionary remedies and remedies as of right is somewhat illusory. In Hernandez, we discussed the fact that an untimely motion to reopen is a discretionary motion but that, to the extent the BIA grants such currently available remedies as a matter of grace, courts may require exhaustion of them. See 238 F.3d at 54-55. We conclude that Sayyah did not exhaust the administrative remedies available to him as of right under section 1252(d)(1). 35