Opinion ID: 507338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Alleged Errors at Trial

Text: 24 Appellant correctly points out three errors committed by the trial court, in addition to the Jencks error. 10 Because we have determined that a remand is appropriate on the Jencks issue, we decline to engage in an issue-by-issue harmless error analysis on the incomplete record before us. See United States v. McLister, 608 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.1979). Even if each of these errors, by itself, is arguably harmless, their cumulative effect may well be prejudicial. Id. At this time, we identify the trial court's errors and remand for a determination of prejudice.
25 Before testifying on her own behalf, Wallace unsuccessfully moved to prohibit the government from impeaching her with evidence of a 1970 heroin trafficking conviction. 11 Wallace contends that the district court improperly denied her motion because: (1) the heroin conviction was time-barred under Rule 609(b), and (2) the district court incorrectly balanced the factors involved in determining the probative value versus prejudicial effect of the prior conviction. We review the district court's denial of an in limine motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 487 (9th Cir.1985). 26 Although Wallace's 1970 heroin conviction was more than ten years old, her conviction in 1977 for perjury resulted in a revocation of her parole for the 1970 heroin conviction and her reconfinement in 1977, less than ten years before trial. The district court admitted the heroin conviction, apparently relying on our decision in United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.1984), to conclude that appellant's reconfinement in 1977 upon revocation of her parole was confinement imposed for [the original] conviction which tolled the ten-year limit of Fed.R.Evid. 609(b). In McClintock, the court affirmed the admission for impeachment purposes of a mail fraud conviction that was more than ten years old, because the defendant's subsequent confinement on probation revocation constituted confinement for the original conviction under Rule 609(b). The court relied on the fact that defendant's probation was revoked for violation of a substantive condition--his failure to refrain from engaging professionally in charitable fund raising--that directly paralleled his original crime--engaging professionally in fraudulent charitable fund raising. 748 F.2d at 1288. The McClintock court conspicuously declined to endorse a broad rule that probation or parole revocations always constitute confinement for the original conviction for Rule 609(b) purposes, and we decline to extend McClintock here. Because Wallace's perjury conviction was not substantively related or parallel to the original heroin conviction, we conclude that the revocation of Wallace's parole based on the perjury charge does not constitute confinement for the original heroin conviction tolling the ten-year limit of Rule 609(b). 27 Additionally, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the heroin conviction under the criteria of Rule 609(a). In balancing the probative value against the prejudicial effect of a prior conviction, this Circuit has stated five factors that the district court should consider. 12 United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 579 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1985). Though we do not require the trial judge to state his or her analysis of each of the five factors with special precision the record should reveal, at a minimum, that the trial judge was aware of the requirements of Rule 609(a)(1). Id. at 579-80. In this case the district court considered expressly only two of the five factors. As to one of the factors it considered, the district court incorrectly assumed that the similarity of the prior conviction and the present charges weighed in favor of admissibility. 13 In Bagley, we stated: 28 To allow evidence of a prior conviction of the very crime for which a defendant is on trial may be devastating in its potential impact on a jury ... [W]here ... the prior conviction is sufficiently similar to the crime charged, there is a substantial risk that all exculpatory evidence will be overwhelmed by a jury's fixation on the human tendency to draw a conclusion which is impermissible in law: because he did it before, he must have done it again. 29 772 F.2d at 488. That risk was clearly present in this case, especially where appellant Wallace's prior perjury conviction was already available for impeachment purposes. 14 The district court abused its discretion in denying Wallace's motion to exclude her prior heroin conviction.
30 Appellants contend that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of Doris Sterling, the chief government witness, on three separate occasions. Prosecutorial vouching may occur when the prosecutor either (1) place[s] the prestige of the government behind the witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity, or (2) suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir.1980). Because Wallace and Penn failed to object to the prosecutor's alleged vouching, we review appellants' contentions for plain error. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1337, 94 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987). Under the plain error doctrine, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), we recognize only those errors that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,'  United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (citation omitted), and we will reverse  'solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.'  Id. We review the alleged error in the context of the entire record to determine whether it rises to the level of plain error. Id. 470 U.S. at 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1047. 31 The first instance of alleged prosecutorial vouching occurred during the direct testimony of Doris Sterling when she testified that she had entered into a plea agreement with the government, part of which required her to testify truthfully. 15 References to truthfulness requirements in plea agreements do not constitute vouching when made in response to attacks on the witness's credibility because of the plea agreement. United States v. Shaw, 829 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir.1987). Sterling's references to her plea agreement, however, occurred during her direct testimony, before any attack on her credibility. Though Sterling's references to her plea agreement do not portray [the government] as a guarantor of truthfulness, Roberts, 618 F.2d at 537, as directly as statements by the prosecutor himself, they suggest that Sterling, who might otherwise seem unreliable, has been compelled by the prosecutor's threats and the government's promises to reveal the bare truth. The implication, moreover, remains that the prosecutor can verify the witness's testimony and thereby enforce the truthfulness condition of its plea agreement. 32 Appellants contend that two other instances of prosecutorial vouching occurred during the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. 16 The prosecutor's single reference in his closing argument occurred in the context of outlining the evidence corroborating Sterling's testimony. The prosecutor's more pointed remarks during rebuttal argument would clearly be improper vouching, if they were not invited responses. We must consider the prosecutor's comments in the context of defense counsel's arguments, which repeatedly asserted that the government's key witness was lying. 17 Arguably, the prosecutor's remarks in that context did no more than respond substantially in order to 'right the scale.'  Young, 470 U.S. at 12-13, 105 S.Ct. at 1044-45. The appropriate response by either prosecutor or defense counsel is to make a timely objection to improper comments or behavior and to request a curative instruction. See id. Defense counsel made no objection here. The district court instructed the jury that Doris Sterling's testimony should be examined with greater caution as the testimony of an immunized witness as well as of an accomplice. However, the court took no other steps to cure the effect of the prosecutor's remarks, which should not have been made. We do not decide whether the improper vouching rises to the level of plain error, because we cannot review the entire record before the Jencks material has been produced.C. Admission of Post-Arrest Statement 33 During the October 26 search of the Seattle residence, Wallace was arrested and given a Miranda warning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). While Wallace was being transported to the Marshall's office, DEA agent Brehm explained to Wallace the potential benefits of her opportunity to cooperate with the government. Wallace, for a time, said nothing, but eventually, she responded: I didn't sell no heroin to Doris. TT at 7, 38. The government introduced the statement into evidence at trial. 18 34 Wallace contends the district court erred in finding that she had waived her Miranda rights after arrest and that her post-arrest statements were admissible. We review the district court's finding that appellant Wallace waived her Miranda rights under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir.1986). To establish a valid waiver, the government must show that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1756-57, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Where the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right is at issue, the burden is a heavy one because this court must afford the defendant every reasonable presumption against waiver. United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir.1984) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 35 There is no evidence of an express waiver of Miranda rights in this case. 19 In the face of repeated questioning by Agent Brehm, Wallace maintained her silence for several minutes and, perhaps, as many as ten minutes. See Heldt, 745 F.2d at 1277 (refusal to sign waiver form suggests defendant, who subsequently talked to police officers for three hours, did not intend to waive Miranda rights). The Supreme Court in Miranda warned that a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Moreover, Agent Brehm's questioning, after Wallace's initial refusal to respond, violated an express directive of Miranda: If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. 20 We conclude that Wallace did not waive her rights, and that the district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise. The statements should have been suppressed. D. Cumulative Error 36 Although each of the above errors, looked at separately, may not rise to the level of reversible error, their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial to the appellants that reversal is warranted. See United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 200-01 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. McLister, 608 F.2d at 788. Our court is particularly sensitive to allegations of prejudice where, as here, the convictions are based on the largely uncorroborated testimony of a single accomplice or co-conspirator. See United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir.1972). Given the centrality of the credibility contest between the defendants and the co-conspirator witness, we are particularly troubled by the possible cumulative effect of those errors which go to the credibility of the witnesses: the Jencks violation, the improper admission of the heroin conviction, and the prosecutorial vouching. In this context, we do not find that a balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review would be very enlightening in determining whether the appellants were prejudiced by the errors. 21