Opinion ID: 2821480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Conviction Issues

Text: Hodges contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior convictions under Rule 404(b) as his defense strategy did not put intent or lack of accident at issue, and the Government used his prior convictions to show propensity. He next asserts the district court abused its discretion in refusing to bifurcate his trial because introducing evidence of his past crimes to support a conviction for possession of firearms by a convicted felon created a high risk of unfair prejudice. Finally, Hodges asserts the district court 3 Case: 14-11994 Date Filed: 07/29/2015 Page: 4 of 13 abused its discretion by excluding evidence of third parties’ prior convictions because those convictions were relevant to Hodges’ defense theory that someone else was responsible for the drugs and guns police found in and outside the house.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Hodges’ prior conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. See United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating we review evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion). By pleading not guilty to the instant charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and failing to stipulate as to intent, Hodges made intent an issue in the case even though his defense was focused on whether he possessed the marijuana found outside the house. See United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 238 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2682 (2014) (stating a defendant who enters a not guilty plea and does not take affirmative steps to remove intent as an issue makes intent a material issue the government must prove). Hodges’ prior conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was relevant to the issue of intent because both the extrinsic offense and the charged offense involved the same mental state—intent to distribute marijuana—which the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (explaining when the state of mind required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is identical, the evidence is relevant to an 4 Case: 14-11994 Date Filed: 07/29/2015 Page: 5 of 13 enumerated issue rather than solely to the defendant’s character). Because the extrinsic and charged offenses were identical in nature and separated by less than two years, the similarity between the offenses weighs in favor of admissibility. See United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating when the extrinsic offenses were similar in time and nature to the crimes charged, those factors weigh in favor of admissibility). The district court also did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Hodges’ prior conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. To sustain a conviction for possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, the Government had to prove that Hodges knowingly possessed firearms. See United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). By focusing his defense of this charge on whether he had any connection to the guns found in the backpack, Hodges put both his knowledge of the guns and whether he actually or constructively possessed the guns at issue. Although his prior conviction did not require the same mental state required in this case, the fact Hodges previously possessed a gun in connection with a felony makes it more likely he knew about the guns found on property he was renting and in close proximity to marijuana distribution implements. The prior conviction also makes it more likely Hodges intended to exercise control over those guns. Finally, the extrinsic offense was similar in both time and nature to the charged offense. 5 Case: 14-11994 Date Filed: 07/29/2015 Page: 6 of 13
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to bifurcate Hodges’ trial. See United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 385 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating we review denials of motions to sever for abuse of discretion). First, trying the offenses together did not create compelling prejudice. As discussed above, evidence of his prior convictions would have been admissible in both stages of the trial had it been bifurcated. See United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating when evidence admissible to prove each charge is also admissible to prove the other charge, joining the offenses does not create compelling prejudice). Second, the district court gave limiting instructions that cured any potential prejudice created by trying the charges together. See Walser, 3 F.3d at 386-87 (explaining severance is not required when a limiting instruction may cure any potential prejudice).
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of the prior convictions of Deundre Carter and Ronnie Moore, two persons who also had access to the house Hodges rented but who were neither defendants nor witnesses at Hodges’ trial. While Moore’s and Carter’s prior convictions were arguably relevant, Hodges presented ample evidence to ply his theory the drugs and guns belonged to someone else (such as evidence other people 6 Case: 14-11994 Date Filed: 07/29/2015 Page: 7 of 13 stayed at the house and marijuana was found there well after Hodges was arrested). Admitting the prior convictions might have created a risk of confusing the issues because doing so would inject into the trial the issue of the potential guilt of third parties not standing trial when the only relevant issue was whether Hodges was guilty, regardless of whether others may have been complicit. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.