Opinion ID: 1723376
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michigan's Long-Arm Statute

Text: Michigan's long-arm statute, M.C.L. § 600.705; M.S.A. § 27A.705, allows this state's courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in certain situations. The existence of any of the following relationships between an individual or his agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable a court of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the individual and to enable the court to render personal judgments against the individual or his representative arising out of an act which creates any of the following relationships: (1) The transaction of any business within the state. (2) The doing or causing an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort. (3) The ownership, use, or possession of real or tangible personal property situated within the state. (4) Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. (5) Entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant. (6) Acting as a director, manager, trustee, or other officer of a corporation incorporated under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within this state. (7) Maintaining a domicile in this state while subject to a marital or family relationship which is the basis of the claim for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, property settlement, child support or child custody. [4] Plaintiffs contend that Wilson falls within the scope of subsection 2: The doing or causing an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort. In interpreting this provision, it is helpful to consider the history of long-arm statutes in the United States. After the United States Supreme Court expanded the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in Int'l Shoe, [5] virtually every state enacted statutes to facilitate the use of long-arm jurisdiction. Illinois was the first state to pass a long-arm statute, and this statute attempted to identify every situation in which a state could appropriately exercise jurisdiction. [6] Soon after the Illinois statute was passed, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute permitted the state to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause. [7] Several other states followed Illinois' lead and passed laundry-list style long-arm statutes, [8] and many courts of states with these statutes held that the scope of the statute was coextensive with the Due Process Clause. [9] Thus, in these states, the courts have essentially merged the constitutional and statutory questions. In 1970, California explicitly merged the two-steps of jurisdictional analysis by passing a statute that simply says that the state may assert jurisdiction in any situation allowed by the Due Process Clause. [10] The Legislature passed Michigan's long-arm statute in 1961. This statute resembles Illinois' laundry-list-style long-arm statute. Not long after Michigan's long-arm statute was passed, this Court indicated that it would follow the lead of other states and construe the long-arm statute to confer jurisdiction to the broadest extent constitutionally permissible. In Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 198, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971), a majority of this Court stated: We are called upon in this case to construe a Michigan statute which represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents. Unless we are prepared to say that Michigan is forbidden by the Federal Constitution to exercise jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute we should not construe the statute so restrictively. Likewise, the lead opinion in Schneider v. Linkfield, 389 Mich. 608, 616, 209 N.W.2d 225 (1973), repeated this proposition from Sifers: The courts of those states having `long-arm' statutes similar to that of Michigan which confer, specifically, limited personal jurisdiction over defendants based on `the transaction of any business within the state,' have generally construed their statutes as extending the state's jurisdiction to the farthest limits permitted by due process.[ [11] ] Since this Court's pronouncements in Sifers and Schneider, the proposition that Michigan's long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause has been continually repeated by the Michigan Court of Appeals [12] and federal courts sitting in diversity. [13] Despite the almost-universal assumption that Michigan's long-arm statute was intended to grant the broadest jurisdictional powers constitutionally possible, some members of the Court have suggested that the long-arm statute may not be as broad as widely believed. In Hapner v. Rolf Brauchli Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 168, n. 2, 273 N.W.2d 822 (1978), Justice Levin, joined by Justice Fitzgerald, stated in a footnote: I also note my disagreement with the statement that [i]n previous decisions, this Court has viewed the statute as an attempt by the Legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents. ... The Michigan statutes, in contrast with statutes or rules of other states (Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 410.10; N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:4-4[d]), does not contain a provision subjecting non-residents to jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible under the Federal Constitution. Likewise, in Witbeck, supra at 428 Mich. at 666, n. 3, 411 N.W.2d 439 this Court in dicta equivocated on the scope of the long-arm statute. In construing Michigan's statute, some courts have concluded that its reach is coextensive with due process tests laid down by the United States Supreme Court.... This conclusion is based upon a statement made in Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 198, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971), that the long-arm statute represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents. However, the Sifers Court also declared that its holding rested upon the exercise [of] jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute.[ [14] ] In order to resolve the present case, the precise contours of the long-arm statute need not be determined. I do note, however, that statutes that extend jurisdiction of courts are generally construed broadly. 3A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 67.03, pp 67-69. Instead of determining if the long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause, I would hold that Wilson's actions are within the scope of the plain language of subsection 2 of the long-arm statute. This subsection allows this state's courts to exercise long-arm jurisdiction for [t]he doing or causing an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort. Wilson allegedly came to Michigan, became intoxicated in Michigan, and chose to drive while intoxicated in Michigan. He argues that these acts did not result in the current action for tort, and that the only act that resulted in an action for tort was the act of crossing the center line in the Detroit-Windsor tunnel and striking plaintiff's car. As I noted above, however, whether a causal link between Wilson's alleged activities in Michigan and the accident exists is a question of fact. Because the trial court granted summary disposition in this case, I must accept the plaintiffs' claim that the accident was caused by Wilson's alleged intoxication. As also noted above, the causal link alleged by the plaintiffs are not so attenuated that I would find a lack of causation as a matter of law. Moreover, the fact that the accident occurred outside Michigan does not remove defendant Wilson from the scope of subsection 2. Subsection 2 does not require that the entire tort occur in Michigan. Rather, it provides that either the act or the consequences of the act must occur in Michigan. In this case, Wilson began this tort when he breached his duty of care by choosing to drive while intoxicated. [15] The consequences of this negligent conduct occurred in Canada when the plaintiffs suffered their damages. [16] Because subsection 2 will reach a defendant if either the act or the consequences of the act occur in Michigan, Wilson is within the scope of subsection 2. [17] Therefore, because Wilson allegedly became intoxicated in Michigan and chose to drive while intoxicated in Michigan, he committed acts in this state that result[ed] in an action for tort. Jurisdiction is thus proper under the long-arm statute. Because both the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met, this state may exercise limited personal jurisdiction over Wilson.