Opinion ID: 1157479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutionality of 18-6-401

Text: We first consider the defendant's claim that section 18-6-401, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), violates equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 25, because it proscribes identical conduct encompassed by reckless manslaughter, section 18-3-104(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), but authorizes the imposition of a greater penalty than reckless manslaughter. On the date of the offenses, April 27, 1979, the crime of child abuse as charged in the indictment was defined in section 18-6-401 as knowingly, intentionally, or negligently, and without justifiable excuse, causing or permitting a child (a person under the age of sixteen) to be [p]laced in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health or to be tortured or cruelly punished. Under section 18-6-401(7), child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury was classified as a class three felony which carried a penalty of five to forty years. Section 18-1-105, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). In contrast, a person commits the crime of reckless manslaughter if [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person. Section 18-3-104(1)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists. Section 18-1-501(8), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Reckless manslaughter was a class four felony punishable by an indeterminate term of imprisonment from one day to ten years. Section 18-1-105, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). In People v. Taggart, Colo., 621 P.2d 1375 (1981), we dealt with a challenge similar to that raised here. Recognizing that section 18-6-401 is directed specifically to conduct abusive to children, as distinguished from criminal negligence resulting in death to anyone, adult or child, we held that there was no constitutional infirmity in the statutory scheme which imposed greater penalties for child abuse than for criminally negligent homicide: We conclude that the legislature was well within its discretion in determining that the conduct encompassed by the statutory definition of child abuse in section 18-6-401 is deserving of a classification distinct from the general statutory prohibition against criminally negligent homicide. Children are much less able than adults to protect themselves from the risks of injury or death associated with the acts proscribed by section 18-6-401, and those acts are most likely to be committed by someone in a parental or custodial relationship to a child of tender years. People v. Taggart, supra . Colo., 621 P.2d at 1382. For purposes of equal protection, there are significant differences between the legislative proscription of specifically defined acts of child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, as outlined in section 18-6-401, and the general proscription of reckless conduct resulting in death to any person, adult or child, as proscribed in section 18-3-104. We conclude that the legislative classification of child abuse as a crime warranting a more serious penalty than reckless manslaughter does not violate equal protection of the laws.