Opinion ID: 207795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Record in a Cancellation Proceeding

Text: The evidence of record before the Board in a cancellation proceeding is governed by 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b). Specifically, section 2.122(b) provides that the record in a cancellation automatically includes the file of the registration at issue: (b) Application files. (1) The file ... of each registration against which a petition or counterclaim for cancellation is filed forms part of the record of the proceeding without any action by the parties and reference may be made to the file for any relevant and competent purpose. We find this regulation to be clear and unambiguous. The entire registration fileincluding any evidence submitted by the applicant during prosecutionis part of the record in a cancellation without any action by the parties. Therefore, a party seeking to cancel a Section 2(f) registration must rebut the applicant's evidence of distinctiveness made of record during prosecution to satisfy its ultimate burden of proof. Cf. Yamaha, 840 F.2d at 1576. The Board relied on its decision in British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Corp., 28 USPQ2d 1197, 1993 WL 409141 (TTAB 1990), to exclude the evidence submitted during prosecution. [4] In British Seagull, which related to an opposition proceeding, the Board stated that although the application file was automatically part of the record pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), documents and other things filed in connection with the application were not. 28 USPQ2d at 1200. This statement conflicts with the plain language of the regulation. Indeed, the Board in British Seagull did not discuss the language of 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b) at all; it cited instead to two other Board cases, neither of which discussed the regulatory language and neither of which was factually on point. [5] Because British Seagull is contrary to the plain language of 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), we expressly overrule that decision to the extent it is inconsistent with our decision today. In the case at hand, the Board acknowledged that the applicant had submitted evidence of acquired distinctiveness during prosecution. However, the Board decided that it could not consider this evidence because the Cold War Museum did not resubmit the evidence in the cancellation. This was error. The unambiguous language of 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b) provides that the entire file of the registration at issue is automatically part of the record, without any action necessary by the parties. Therefore, the evidence of the mark's acquired distinctiveness submitted during prosecution was automatically part of the record before the Board, and the Board was required to consider this evidence in determining whether Air Museum had met its burden of proving a lack of acquired distinctiveness by a preponderance of the evidence.